INTERNAL DYNAMICS AND FACILITATING FACTORS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF INTERNAL MIGRATION WITHIN TURKEY, 1950-1980

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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the Thesis of Zachary Terris Barnett-Howell, for the degree of Master of Arts from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History to be taken September 2009.

Title: Internal Dynamics and Facilitating Factors: A Critical Appraisal of Internal Migration Within Turkey, 1950-1980

Internal migration between the years 1950 to 1980 was crucial in shaping the political, economic, and social landscape of Turkey as it exists today. Much of the research done on migration in Turkey utilizes a specific push-pull theoretical framework, pioneered by Lee and Todaro. Both the Todaro model and Lee's push-pull framework are of a descriptive nature, and have certain intrinsic flaws. Both theories offer little critical analysis of migration flows, rely heavily on aggregate data such as employment numbers, and generally fail to explain continued high rates of migration into overcrowded urban centers. More recent migration theory has focused on the internal dynamics and network effects of international and domestic migrations to great effect. This paper provides an overall critique of the Todaro model and Lee's push-pull theory as they have been applied to Turkey. It further discusses the more recent developments in migration theory and how they can be used to critically examine the Turkish case from 1950 to 1980. Finally, there is the matter of separating out the facilitating factors or transportation and communication infrastructure as exogenous to the highly circular relationship between migration and its surrounding economic and political context.

(TURKÇE ÖZET)

Atatürk İlkerli ve İnkılap Tarıhı Enstitüsü'nde yüksek lisans derecesi için Zachary Terris Barnett-Howell tarafından Eylül 2009'de teslim edilen tezin özeti.

Başlık: Türkiye'deki İç Göçe (1950-1980) Eleştirel Bir Yaklaşım : İç Dinamikler ve Kolaylaştırıcı Etkenler

1950 ile 1980 yılları arasındaki iç göç, Türkiye'nin bugünkü siyasi, ekonomik ve toplumsal manzarasını şekillendirme açısından büyük önem taşır. Türkiye'de göç üzerine yapılan araştırmaların çoğu, Lee ve Todaro öncülüğünde geliştirilmiş belli bir kuramsal çerçeveyi kullanır, göç olgusunu itici ve çekici faktörlerle açıklarlar. Ancak hem Todaro'nun modeli, hem de Lee'nin itici ve çekici faktörler çerçevesi, analizden çok tasvire yöneliktir ve her ikisinin de kendi içinde bir takım kusurları vardır. Her iki kuram da göç dalgalarını açıklamada eleştirel bir analize pek az başvurur, ağırlıklı olarak, istihdam sayıları gibi toplu verileri kullanır ve halihazırda çok kalabalık olan şehir merkezlerine göçün büyük ölçüde devam etmesinin sebeplerini açıklamada genellikle yetersiz kalırlar. Daha güncel göç kuramları ise daha çok uluslararası ve iç göçün iç dinamikleri ve bağlantı ağları oluşturma etkilerine odaklanır. Bu çalışma Todaro'nun modelinin ve Lee'nin itici çekici faktörler kuramının Türkiye'ye uygulanmasının eleştirisini yapmayı amaçlar. Bunun yanısıra göç kuramındaki yeni gelişmeleri ve bunların 1950 1980 arasında Türkiye'deki göçün eleştirel bir değerlendirmesini yapmakta nasıl kullanılabileceğini tartışır. Son olarak, ulaşım ya da iletişim altyapısı gibi kolaylaştırıcı etkenleri göç ve göçü çevreleyen ekonomik ve siyasal bağlam arasındaki dairesel ilişkinin dışında tutma meselesini ele alır.

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CONTENTS

Tables

Figures

PREFACE

Internal migration has been a force in Turkish history over the past sixty years. The rapid transfer of population from rural to urban areas has served to shape and reshape the country in a myriad ways. The period starting approximately in 1950 and continuing until 1980 is the first time that the Turkish populace became mobile and increasingly urban. This thirty-year period is one of rapid change for Turkey as it industrialized, mechanized, and urbanized; changed its economic structure to an import-substitution-industrialization system; and allied with the U.S. and NATO. It's easy to get lost in the flurry of activity in post-WWII Turkey, and internal migrations have particularly been subsumed by other issues. Yet these migrations have left behind perhaps the most durable institutions of this period, the triad of metropolitan cities comprising Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir; cities that dominate a large part of political, economic, and cultural life in Turkey.

The subject of internal migrations is an inherently complex one. Past studies have regarded Turkish internal migrations as a product of agricultural mechanization, highway construction, political activism, a social awakening, populism, and even political Islamism. In some other cases these migrations have been portrayed as a demographic and vitality shift, which was merely the result of Turkish modernization.

The bulk of studies done on internal Turkish migration were completed before 1980. They utilized the best and most prominent theories at the time, but since then the study of internal migrations in Turkey has fallen to the wayside. The current area of focus is on international migration to Germany, or else more

dramatic migrations earlier in Turkey's past[1]. In reviewing and re-appraising these works there are several things to be gained. Foremost, there is the potential to apply post-1980 theories of migration to the currently assembled data. Much of the theoretical framework used in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s has been substantially modified, some concepts have even been discredited. Furthermore, what would have appeared as more open ended questions to researchers at the time, whether migration would continue, and in which direction, have since been settled with certainty.

Finally, by re-appraising Turkish migrations we are able to better understand one of the principal forces that have shaped the country. Like much of the work on migration in general, studies on Turkish migration are highly fragmented, occasionally redundant, and often contradictory. This thesis tries to offer a single resource, which correlates and corroborates past data, as well as offers a point from which further research can progress. Migration in Turkey is too important a subject to ignore, and by looking over past work with a contemporary theoretical viewpoint we can better understand the history of the country.

To achieve a better accounting of Turkish migration from 1950 to 1980 requires a significant amount of explanation , both about Turkey and about migration. This has the benefit of providing a more holistic context in which to

[1] Zürcher gives an account of the population exchange between the nascent Greece and Turkey that occurred during the peace treat of Lausanne. "The remainder of the Greek Orthodox population of Anatolia (but not that of Istanbul), about 900,000 people, was exchanged against the Muslims from Greece (except the community in Western Thrace) who numbered about 400,000." This event has its own literature revolving around it, and remains a significant historical and cultural moment in Greek and Turkish relations. Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 164.

understand the extremely specific issues relating to Turkish migration. Yet there is also the risk of entangling the subject in too many tangential issues. A central claim of this thesis is that migration has too often been regarded as a *component* of other studies and therefore has not had the empirical or theoretical treatment that it deserves. This balance will be kept in mind

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Why Focus on Migration

Migration has defined Turkey in ways that no other singular event can lay claim to. Turkey began its post-World War Two existence as a peripheral agrarian country. It was included into the Marshall Plan as a last-minute consideration, and then was sought as a means of bolstering European agricultural markets. The country was overwhelmingly rural in character, a fact that had remained constant since its first census taken in 1927 when 83.6 percent of the country lived in rural areas.[2] This had changed little by 1950, which saw only the smallest decrease in rural population, which fell to 81.5 percent.

However, in the following years the population would begin to trickle, and eventually flood into the cities and the metropoles. In 1960 the percent of population living in rural areas had fallen to 74.1 percent, and by 1970 this fell even further to 66.8 percent. Finally in 1980 the rural-urban split of Turkey's population nearly broke even with only 54.6 percent of the population still living in rural areas.

Over this thirty-year period from 1950 to 1980 the population of Istanbul mushroomed from almost one million people to 4.4 million in 1980. Ankara grew by the largest factor of any city in Turkey, starting with a population below 300,000 in 1950 and ending up at nearly two million in 1980, about 650 percent larger over a mere three decades. The rapid expansion of Turkey's three major cities was not

[2] Rural areas are defined as anything that is not specifically urban. This includes areas that are not administratively urban, nor areas that are not considered urban by size. For the actual definition of urban used in this thesis see section 4.a.

finished in 1980. Istanbul has continued to grow and currently has a population well over twelve million.

That these cities in Turkey are the political, economic, and social hubs of the entire country goes without saying. Although in recent years there is growing evidence that smaller cities[3] have begun to play a stronger role in Turkey, these three metropoles remain the commanding heights of the country. While Istanbul has a legacy of being the seat of empires, both Byzantine and Ottoman, Ankara is a city that has come to prominence as a byproduct of the mass influx of population and its status as capital of the Turkish Republic.

Beyond the growth of the largest cities in Turkey, remains the fact that migration has played a tremendous role in the development of Turkey. "Internal migration and the consequent population distribution," writes Gedik, "have many significant consequences which are related to the national economy, environment, energy resources, and to many social issues." Migration has transformed the political and economic context of Turkey more than anything else has.[4]

What this thesis attempts is to fuse a critical appraisal of past studies on Turkish migration with new theory. The aim is to be able to provide a structure by which current theoretical work can be fit to the Turkish case. The benefit is mutual, first in better explaining Turkish migrations, but also in providing a useful empirical

[3] This includes smaller regional and district centers. Konya, Kayseri, Bursa are examples of cities that are smaller than the metropoles by an entire factor of magnitude, yet have become relatively prosperous centers.

[4] Ayşe Gedik, "Comparative Study of Migration between Turkey and Japan based on the Model Reference Adaptive Theory," *International Journal of Environmental Creation* 1, no. 1 (1998), p. 1.

illustration of modern theories of cumulative causation,[5] network theory,[6] and other transitional theories[7] which have not been widely applied to Turkey.

A Brief History of Cities

The history of migration is inextricably connected with that of cities. The role of cities is not simply the aggregation of people within a small area, but their growth has had far-reaching political, economic, and social consequences. Beyond the crude number of people living in a megacity, the development of large urban centers has enormous cultural and political effects on the society of a country. These cities are called metropolises, urban giants, primate cities, megacities, megapolis,[8] supercities, supergiants—and for the purposes of this study, metropoles.

The concept of a "primate city," is used for a country that has "one city that is exceptionally large, economically dominant, and culturally expressive of national identity." Common to many developing countries, this situation where one city outstrips all others in terms of growth and importance creates an unbalanced urban system where the needs of that capital far outstrip all other national priorities.

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[5] Elizabeth Fussell and Douglas S. Massey, "The Limits to Cumulative Causation: International Migration from Mexican Urban Areas," *Demography* 41, no. 1 (2004).
[6] Douglas S. Massey, "Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causes of Migration," *Population Index* 56, no. 1 (1990).
[7] Hein de Haas, "Migration and Development A Theoretical Perspective," *International Migration Institute Working Papers*, 2008, p. 12.
[8] There is no objective definition of what changes between a city and its larger variant that is so central to our study here. For a historical-geographical analysis and definition see Ayşe Sema Kubat, "Istanbul: A Configurational Model for a Metropolis," in *3rd International Space Syntax Symposium* (Atlanta, 2001), p. 62.7.

There is also the possibility of "dual primacy," where two cities serve as focal points for the entire country.[9]

An older article by Linsky is still quite useful in providing a basic typology for primate cities, as well as assessing the degree of primacy they have in their own country. The salient points are his negative correlation between average income to the primacy of any one urban center. He also highlights the importance of an export-oriented economic system to establishing a city as nationally and internationally potent.[10]

The metropoles however have been linked to a variety of pathological urban problems. Excessive size leads inexorably to a shortage of necessary urban services, a condition that exacerbates the problems of slums and crime. Regardless of the economic potential of metropoles, it seems impossible for them to continue to provide services and opportunities when their populations are doubling in a ten-year time frame.[11]

Yet these metropoles also are considered exceedingly important for the development of a country in the current world system. Keyder makes this same argument, which is that metropoles occupy a uniquely important position in a global market where capital is highly mobile. Keyder writes that the "logic of capital" is now working on a global level, irrespective of national boundaries and preferences.

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[9] Jack F. Williams, Donald J. Zeigler Stanley D. Brunn, eds. *Cities of the World: World Regional Urban Development*, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 18.
[10] Arnold S. Linsky, "Some Generalizations Concerning Primate Cities," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 55, no. 3 (1965), p. 507.
[11] Jack F. Williams, Donald J. Zeigler Stanley D. Brunn, eds. pp. 37-38.

The result is "a new era in which cities…autonomously play in the global economic field."[12]

Keyder goes on to show how the primacy of these metropoles over national interests is in fact historically derived, where port cities such as "Alexandria, Izmir, Bombay, Calcutta, [and] Canton," took the initiative ahead of their respective states and empires in integrating themselves in the world economy.[13] Keyder then divides the current world into a three-tier system, with "top tier global cities such as New York, London, Tokyo [and] Los Angeles," as the centers of political and economic decision making. These in turn are supported by a second-tier of cities such as "Frankfurt, San Fransisco, or Hong Kong," and then a final tier below this consisting of all the rest.[14]

A publication by the corporation Pricewaterhouse Coopers corroborates Keyder's argument about the importance of cities in respect to their national economies, and even the international system. According to their calculations, the top thirty global cities accounted for a full 16% of the entire world's GDP in 2005.[15] The report further estimates that by the year 2020 Istanbul will move from thirty-fourth place in its current ranking among world cities to be the twenty-sixth largest city in the world in terms of GDP.[16]

Keyder too sees a future role for Istanbul as "the nodal point of access and control at the intersection of emergent cross-regional networks." Or more simply

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[12] Çağlar Keyder and Ayşe Öncü, *Istanbul and the Concept of World Cities* (Istanbul: FES, 1993), p. 9.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[15] Pricewaterhouse Coopers, "UK Economic Outlook," (2007), p. 4.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

put, that Istanbul should be able to become a powerful and prominent city, not just nationally but internationally.[17] Keyder views this role as consistent with Istanbul's history as a major port city for hundreds of years, as well as the "seat of imperial power" for two major empires.[18] The role of the metropolitan center is not simply confined to its borders, but rather "the influence…extends beyond its boundaries...where the metropolitan center is able to organize the economic and social activities to a considerable extent."[19]

Istanbul's role as the most important point in Turkey has its problems as well. Given the rate at which urban growth, and metropolitan growth in particular, has outstripped development throughout the country it has created a "major problem…in national development plans" in all developing countries.[20] In Turkey as well, although problems of metropolitan development have not been as striking as those in other parts of the world, such as Mumbai or Beijing, there have been significant problems in creating harmonious development in such an unbalanced system.

What is Migration

Migration itself requires very little definition, which is a problem. Migration "is intuitively obvious," writes Skeldon, but has "proved notoriously difficult to

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[17] Keyder and Öncü, p. 8.
[18] *Ibid*., p. 10.
[19] Roy C. Treadway, "Gradients of Metropolitan Dominance in Turkey: Alternative Models," *Demography* 9, no. 1 (1972), p. 13.
[20] Richard E Bilsborrow, Thomas M McDevitt, Sherrie Kossoudji and Richard Fuller, "The Impact of Origin Community Characteristics on Rural-Urban Out-Migration in a Developing Country," *Demography* 24, no. 2 (1987), p. 193.

define and to measure accurately." Skeldon's definition includes short-term circular movements and permanent migration as "population mobility."[21] A similar definition will be used throughout this paper, given that the intrinsic nature of migration is the simple relocation of people from an origin to a destination. There are several types of migration, but the principle in all of them remains the same. Being the only force besides natural population growth rates to change the demographics of an area, it is intrinsically complex in how it functions given that it interfaces with many other aspects of public life. The definition to be used in this paper is simply the quasi-permanent[22] relocation of people from one area to another.[23]

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[21] Skeldon, "Migration and Poverty," in *African Migration and Urbanization in Comparative Perspective* (Johannesburg, 2003), pp. 1.

[22] Time is another problematic factor in measuring migrations. People migrate over years rather than instantaneously. The result of time-lagged migration, as migrants move from city to city over a series of years, is difficult to accurately capture. There is no definite solution to this problem, and as a result this thesis will not attempt to impose a definition for the proper amount of time that constitutes a migration. Further problems in defining migrants include errors due to "memory lapses" of those responding to the census questionnaire. And available migration data "may not distinguish immigrants and return migrants from foreign tourists, children of emigrants who were born abroad and who happen to be visiting Turkey on the census day, etc." See: Ayfur Barisik, Ayda Eraydin and Ayşe Gedik, "Turkey," in *Handbook on International Migration* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pp. 305-306.

[23] In the literature on migration there are four primary types of migration. Rural to urban, rural to rural, urban to urban, and urban to rural. The way these flows behave further changes on the precise definitions of rural and urban used in a country at any given time. Disentangling how migrations occur between these two areas requires a significant amount of statistical work to properly understand. This thesis is primarily concerned with rural to urban migration, considering urban to urban migration to often capture the movements of migrants moving along a series of steps to a final destination. Data supports a focus on rural to urban migration in Turkey. In 1965 the largest migration flow was from rural-to-urban areas (23.5% of all migrants), although this was followed by rates of migration moving between urban areas (21.2% moving in and 24.8% moving out). This trend would reverse after 1980, when "migration between urban centres became the dominant movement." Ayşe Gedik, "Migration and Urban Growth in Turkey 1965-1985," in *Innovation and Urban Population Dynamics* (London: Avebury, 1992), pp. 106-107. For the best work that discusses the precise migration types see Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination

The issue of migration studies remains hugely problematic, both as a discipline in and of itself, and given its role in Turkish studies. While Zelinsky writes that "the volume on migration is considerable," he also notes that "it is greatly overshadowed by analyses of fertility and other such popular topics." The same is true in Turkish studies, where migration has become a byword for popular areas of study such as urban anthropology or historical economic development.

The reason for migration being so often conflated—and subsumed—by other topics is simply that migration is so difficult to effectively analyze. "The essential reasons," for this overshadowing of migration by other studies, write Zelinsky, "are to be found in the intrinsic nature of the phenomenon, in definitional problems, and in the difficulties of data procurement and analysis." While demographic change can be counted with a census, "exactly who is a migrant, and what do we mean by migration?"[24]

Zelinsky continues with a series of questions that continue to problematize migration theory. "How far (or how rapidly) need one travel and for how long to be classed as a migrant? What are the purposes of the trip? How different are origin and destination?" And most important to our study, "how do we handle repetitive trips?" While these questions are of a more theoretical nature than Turkey, the

Choice of Village-to-Province-Center Migrants in Turkey, 1965-70" (Ph.D. diss, University of Washington, 1977). Ayşe Gedik, *Rural-to-Urban Migration in Turkey During the Past Thirty-Five Years: 1965-2000*, MiReKoç (Istanbul: Koç University, 2009).

[24] Wilbur Zelinsky, "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition," *Geographical Review* 61, no. 2 (1971), p. 223.

problems that these questions present can be found throughout the literature on Turkey.[25]

Typology

Concurrent with the development of an international asylum regime with the United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, came an article in 1958 by William Petersen. His "A General Typology of Migration" laid down the dichotomization of migration studies that is still used in today's literature. He differentiated between the two most basic types of migration, "forced migration" and "free migration."[26]

Forced migration was split into a further two categories, "forced," and "impelled" migration .The latter being where individuals are coerced and otherwise encouraged to migrate, but ultimately given a choice. The example Petersen gives to explain this difference is of the Nazi regime "encouraging Jewish emigration by various anti-Semetic acts," from 1933 to 1938, and then from 1938 to 1945 forcing Jews into cattle trains.[27]

The secondary types of migration that Petersen outlines are indiviudally free and mass migration. The key here is the "will of the migrants" in choosing where, when, and how to move. Mass migration was part of migration, but involved larger

[25] Wilbur Zelinsky, pp. 223-224.
[26] William A. Petersen, "A General Typology of Migration," *American Sociology Review* 23 (1958).
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 261.

social factors that served to override individual's motivations. This paper is solely concerned with migration that was free.[28]

The category of free migration requires further specification to fully clarify the pressures and types of migration that can occur. Using Sell's typology, we have imposed mobility and preference-dominated mobility. Both imposed and preference-dominated are considered to be volitional, but the way in which the migration decision is reached differs.[29]

Imposed mobility describes a situation when "important aspects of the [migration] decision were largely determined by decision units or social processes external." Sell includes job-related moves, as well as military redeployments. In both cases the migrant had some say in the matter, but external forces largely shaped the move. [30]

Preference dominated mobility is simply when an individual or a household unit decides to move based largely on the interests of the individuals making the move. The degree of separation between a migrant undergoing an imposed move to keep his or her job, or one moving to due to a preference for a better job is not well established. Yet this typology provides a useful frame of reference for categorizing Turkish migrations. First of all we are ignoring migrations that forced or impelled, mass migrations in Turkey throughout this period were taken on an almost entirely volitional basis.[31]

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[28] Petersen, p. 263.
[29] Ralph R. Sell, "Analyzing Migration Decisions: The First Step-Whose Decisions?" *Demography* 20, no. 3 (1983), p. 303.
[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 303-304.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 304.

The second question then, is the degree to which Turkish migrations consisted of preference-dominated mobility or imposed mobility. Both are essentially volitional, but this paper is more focused on—and will argue—that migration in Turkey from 1950 to 1980 was not impelled by any external factors, but rather was the expression of broad preferences at the time.

The vast majority of migrations in Turkey throughout the 1950s to 1980s can be considered almost entirely preference driven. People chose to move without any overriding state, societal, or economic pressure. This is not to say that there weren't incentives to encourage migration, but there was nothing compelling people to move. The imposed mobility that existed was in the form of military conscription, mandatory for all male citizens. Previous studies have already accounted for in the data fluctuations brought about by conscription and the attendant redeployment of soldiers to various parts of the country. Therefore, all the work here addresses migration as a purely volitional process, the primary interest being movements from rural to urban areas.

Views on Migration

There are two main schools of thought that have been used to analyze migration. The first set of assumptions attempt to chart migration as a universal act that takes place under relatively weak constraints and in an intermediate context. This means that migrants' decisions and choices are the best possible as conceived by individual actors. "This individual decision model has often been used to specify statistical models estimated on aggregate areal data." The fact that so many actors

make the same choice points to the universality of the decision making process; as well as the clear contextual imperative to move.[32]

The second method of analyzing migration requires an emphasis on the specific historical characteristics of origin and destination. Interlevel dependencies "among individual household, community, and national-level factors," are necessary to parse migration theoretically. Furthermore, "inter-temporal" dependencies between factors such as early migration leading to late migration, or the chain of causality by which migration creates jobs, which creates more migration must be accounted for. [33]

The aim of this study is similar in spirit to what Massey suggests in his own paper in which he states a need for "a consideration of macroeconomic and historical-structural perspectives," the use of "cumulative causation," as well as drawing on "the literature of anthropology, demography, economics, sociology, history, geography, and regional science."[34] The goals of this paper are far more modes than developing a full "dynamic multilevel theoretical model." Rather it aims is to analyze migration with such considerations in mind.[35]

Migrations in Turkey require a model of the complexity that Massey proposes and not simple solutions. Much of the research that was undertaken on the migrations from 1950 to 1980 was concurrent with the actual migrations themselves. With the benefit of hindsight, the primacy of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir is now difficult to dispute—something that was not so definite during the

[32] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 6.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The goal of analyzing migrations is to then explain how these cities became the way they are today, and to critically analyze past work that seek to explain their development.

Problems with Migration Research on Turkey

Stated in the chapter above, migration research in Turkey is difficult to analyze for a variety of reasons. First there is the problem that is it subsumed into so many different literatures. A prime example is the groundbreaking book on squatter settlements by Karpat in 1976[36]. This book has spawned an entire subsection of literature analyzing Turkey's urban social and political structures. Yet "the Gecekondu study was undertaken primarily to gain insight into the migration phenomenon," claims Karpat in a more recent article, "and only secondarily to provide information for the public or a blueprint for government policy."[37]

The biggest problem is the disconnect between fields of study on Turkish migration. The work done on the subject during the period of migrations, 1950-1980, falls squarely into two camps: qualitative work on Turkish history (see: Karpat), and statistical studies (see: Gedik). As a result any comparison between the two subfields, despite having identical topics, is of uncertain value. The difference in

[36] Kemal Karpat, *The Gecekondu, Rural Migration and Urbanization in Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976).
[37] Kemal Karpat, "The Genesis of the Gecekondu: Rural Migration and Urbanization," *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, no. Thematic Issue 1 (2004), §30.

methodologies used by researchers at the time prevents significant comparison or correlation.[38]

Older studies from the 1970s and 1980s used the best migration theory at the time, a fact that is no longer true. Current works on Turkey often include a section on migration, but draw their empirical and theoretical data from research that is now thirty years old. One problem with this dependency on past books and articles is that they ignore more recent theory. While the data available on Turkish migrations has remained static, migration theory has changed significantly in the past ten years. Despite this current studies on Turkey are using the same theoretical constructs applied in the 1970s.

When it comes to modern migration theory, the same problem is true that little of it directly pertains to Turkey. Much of the advances made in modern migration theory have been tested in the United States[39], S.E. Asia[40], Bangladesh[41], and Morocco[42] to name a few. Their results have rarely been applied to Turkey, and therefore while it is probable that certain social and mobility functions remain

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[38]A list of the principal works done on Turkish migration, published between 1950 to 1980. It is by no means an exhaustive list, but should give the reader some idea about the research that was done at the time. Works that fall within the quantitative studies on Turkey include Erol Tümertekin, *Internal Migrations in Turkey* (Istanbul: Taş Matbaası, 1968); Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice;" Belgin Tekçe, "Urbanization and Migration in Turkey 1955-1965" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1974). Studies that took a more qualitative approach would include Ibrahim Şanlı, Yücel Ünal and Ismet Kılınçaşlan, *Internal Migration and Metropolitan Development in Turkey* (Istanbul: Reyo Koll. Şti., 1976); Karpat, *The Gecekondu*; Tansı Şenyapılı, "Economic Change and the Gecekondu Family," in *Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

[39] See: Massey, "Social Structure."

[40] See: Skeldon, "Migration and Poverty."

[41] See: Mariapia Mendola, "Migration and Technological Change in Rural Households: Complements or Substitutes?," *Journal of Development Economics* 85 (2008).

[42] Hein de Haas, *The Impact of International Migration on Social and Economic Development in Moroccan Sending Regions: A Review of the Empirical Literature*, (IMI, 2007).

constant, there is little empirical evidence. Therefore, in order to avoid meaningless comparisons, the sections of this thesis remain necessarily separate.

In Chapter 2 the focus is on explaining several concepts of contemporary migration literature. Chapter 3 provides a historical review of migration theory. Chapter 4 gives the history and data of migrations in Turkey. Chapter 5 offers a critical account of how historical theories were used to analyze Turkish migrations. And Chapter 6 provides some insights into how contemporary theory can be used to better understand and analyze migrations in Turkey from 1950 to 1980.

CHAPTER 2: MIGRATION THEORY

Migration studies are a disparate and scattered group of studies. They include over a hundred years of theoretical work, interspersed with occasional case studies that have often been beholden to the dominant economic and political theories of the time. Massey describes the discipline of migration as intensely fragmented along four specific dimensions. The first dimension is the role of time in studying migrations, the second is where the impetus of migration is generated from, the third is in regard to the appropriate level of analysis, and the fourth being whether the emphasis of migration studies should be on the causes or effects of migration.[43]

These four cleavages have all played a role in shaping the debate over Turkish migration. Yet the debate itself is rarely, if ever, mentioned in any of the literature specific to Turkey. Therefore it is necessary to clarify the various positions, as they will later be seen in regards to the development of literature on Turkey, as well as how new *theoretical* literature can be applied to the Turkish case.

The first debate that Massey outlined was the one over whether migration was historically derived or whether it was largely generalizable. The bulk of migration theory, which has steadily drifted under the auspices of economic theory, argues that general models can account for migration anywhere. Researchers such Ravenstein (1885, 1889), Lee (1966), and Todaro (1969) "have sought to develop general models that are broadly applicable under weak assumptions."[44]

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[43] Massey, "Social Structure," pp. 3-4.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

This strain of thinking has produced a set of preconditions and macroeconomic indicators that can capture all the necessary data in regards to migration. Factors such as age, sex, distance, and the material endowments of any origin or destination can account for migration anywhere at any point in time. The other side of the debate, championed by the likes Wallerstein (1974), Petras (1981), and Morawska (1990) argues that migrations are inherently path dependent and historically derived. More will be explained about the pertinent theories, but the key is which theories exerted the greatest influence on the development of the literature on Turkish Migrations.[45]

The second cleavage in migration literature lies in who is the relevant actor in terms of the migration decision. Again, the broad set of economic theories has historically championed individual choice models, which has been reflected in the literature on Turkey. A newer subset of migration theory has risen against this, arguing that migration decisions are often nonsensical on an individual level, and instead must be analyzed using larger social institutions, namely the family.[46]

There is some merit to situating migration decisions in a broader social structure, rather than the individual level. Migration can be a survival strategy used by a family to diversify risk or increase overall profitability, even if it ends in a net loss for the individual. Regardless, this particular debate is the least useful in terms of Turkish migrations, being far more useful in analyzing international migrations that encounter hard barriers to migrations rather than the softer type barriers that internal migrants encounter.

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[45] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 3.
[46] *Ibid*, pp. 3-4.

The third point of contention in the literature rests on the proper level of analysis. Again, macroeconomic theories zoom all the way down to the individual level of analysis. This is combined however with aggregate level data on "labor force participation, job creation, migration, income, and unemployment." Their models attempt to show how these macro-level variables, such as the overall rate of unemployment, serve to inhibit or encourage individuals to migrate. On the other side of the debate is the use of household and community variables and other social data. This methods takes an intermediate range on viewing migration, eschewing big picture statistics for neighborhood and community centric data. It also zooms out from individual preference models, and instead looks at the characteristics of entire communities or households and how they interact with the abovementioned variables.[47]

Finally Massey arrives at a particular fault line in migration theory that is the most salient to research on Turkey. The problem of causality that has perennially plagued migration studies is the degree of endogeneity that migration has on itself. The earliest studies assumed that migration was the product of social and economic circumstances, namely regional inequalities, and, as such, was a natural movement towards equilibrium. Massey cites Gunnar Myrdal's theory of "circular and cumulative causation," as key to unraveling the endogeneity problem. Cumulative causation regards the social and economic changes in a country as independent variables placed against migration. Migration serves to affect these variables, as these variables in turn affect migration. Which element has a greater degree of

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Massey, "Social Structure," p. 4.

responsibility for the causation of the other is not significant; it is the circular relationship that matters.[48]

De Haas corroborates Massey's criticism of long-standing migration theories on several points. He writes, "Another weakness of migration and development research has been the tendency to study *causes* and *impacts* of migration separately."[49] The result has been the fragmentation of migration as a discipline, leading to what Massey describes as "a multiplicity of self-contained migration literatures that reinforce and perpetuate basic cleavages in the discipline." Therefore it is a synthesis of current theories that will offer the best variety of tools and concepts that can be applied to the Turkish case. It would not be useful to reexamine old studies using the same theories as were used thirty years ago, nor would it be relevant to use completely different theories that have no bearing on the previous work done.[50]

The argument however has been best put by Massey et. al. is that studies on migration remain "mired in nineteenth-century concepts models and assumptions."[51] They argue against the dogmatic use of a singular academic lens, and call for a dynamic theory that can explain the multifaceted nature of all migrations. Certainly such a theory has not arrived. Yet the goal is clear: any appraisal of historical works and theories on migration requires more than a simple argument. Rather they require a holistic accounting of that migration on a variety of

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[48] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 4.
[49] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 2.
[50] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 4.
[51] Douglas S. Massey, J. Arango, G. Hugo, A Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino and JE. Taylor, "Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal," *Population and Development Review* 19 (1993), p. 432.

theoretical and empirical levels. De Haas notes, "the lack of theoretical rootedness and largely *descriptive nature* of much empirical work," is a key problem in looking at past studies of migration,[52] and by proxy, Turkish migration in particular.

Key Terms

Now that the current state of migration studies and its conflicts have been explained, it will be helpful to highlight a few concepts that will be crucial to our critical appraisal of the literature specific to Turkish migrations. There are five specific points that require greater attention, four of them present in contemporary literature, one of them that is this paper's contribution to the current theoretical literature. These concepts have not been widely applied to the Turkish case. These include the role of (A) factors internal to migration: (*i*) feedback loops/network effect and (*ii*) critical mass; as well as (B) factors external to migrations: (*i*) cumulative causation (*ii*) human versus social capital. The inclusion of the (C) role of facilitating factors should be regarded as novel in this thesis.

Feedback Loops/Network Effects

The second concept that will be useful in the Turkish case is the role of network effects and feedback loops. The feedback loop, whereby migration and jobs interact leading to a mutual increase, is merely one example of a feedback loop that is present in all Turkish migrations. Massey writes, "However an immigration stream begins, it displays a strong tendency to continue because of the growth and

[52] Hein de Hass, "Migration and Development A Theoretical Perspective," *International Migration Institute Working Papers*, 2008, p. 2.

elaboration of migrant networks." Network effects allow the separation of a migration flow from its surrounding context, so that the migration responds to its own internal dynamics and demands than the environment around it.[53]

Network effects are generally used by researchers to explain how "rural-to-urban labor migration is perfectly rational even if urban expected income in lower than rural income."[54] Under normal circumstances making a move that probably would result in a utility loss would be irrational. Network effects prove such moves as rational, using a that rests on three separate propositions:[55] (1) migrants are risk loving, (2) risk diminishes over time, and (3) that there is a more complex engine at work regarding how people decide to move.[56]

The latter two propositions are the most important to our argument. It seems self-evident that migration flows, which consist mostly of young men, take more risks than a classic rational choice everyman.[57] Risk diminishing over time presents the greatest thrust in perpetuating migrations and channelizing them. The risk for a single migrant to move to any location in a given country carriers a set cost and risk to doing so. "Since only those who anticipate positive net benefits of

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[53] Douglas S. Massey, "International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State," *Population and Development Review* 25, no. 2 (1999), p. 306.
[54] Eliakim Katz and Oded Stark, "Labor Migration and Risk Aversion in Less Developed Countries," *Journal of Labor Economics* 4, no. 1 (1986), p. 135.
[55] Another suggested answer to this problem is the use of bounded rationality. It is not within the expertise of this paper to discuss it, but for further reading please see: Herbert A. Simon, *Reason in Human Affairs* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983).
[56] Katz and Stark, p. 136.
[57] One study observed "villagers who leave the villages are usually men of capacity and initiative, and also the most active members of the rural communities where they are needed badly. In contrast to those who leave the village, those who stay at the village are mostly older and more conservative people." Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, pp. 83-84. Quoted from Cevat Geray, "Urbanization in Turkey," *Journal of the Faculty of Political Sciences* 24, no. 4 (1970), p. 168.

migrating will move, initial migration should select against those who underestimate the net return of migration and attract those who overestimate them." As a result initial migrations will only have a small population and will move towards areas where the greatest advantage can be seen.[58]

Over time these migrants act as a "bridgehead," and set up the requisite mechanisms that diminish the cost of making the move. The result is that the more people in a particular migration stream over time, the more institutions and mechanisms will exist to reduce cost and barriers to later migrations. This can occur in many ways, either in terms of sending more information back to points of origin, being able to arrange journeys for less money, or being better equipped to provide shelter and employment to subsequent migrants.[59] The risks that early adopter migrants faced are well documented.[60] Nevertheless, their sacrifices served to create a network increases in size and capacity with each migrant added to it.

Risk versus Rewards

Central to the study of microeconomics is rational choice theory, of which the underlying assumption is the unerring rationality of individuals. Furthermore, "that

[58] Julie DaVanzo, "Repeat Migration in the United States: Who Moves Back and Who Moves On?," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 65, no. 4 (1983), p. 1. Cited from Allen Jeremiah, "Information and Subsequent Migration: Further Analysis and Additional Evidence," *Southern Economic Journal* 45 (1979).

[59] A significant component of the use of previous migrants to expedite future migrations is done for Turks migrating internationally. Given the relatively more solid barriers to migration having a relative already settled in a foreign country can almost be a prerequisite for migrating there. However, as many articles show, the relationship between past and expectant migrants is not as simple as believed. In fact many migrant wish to discourage others from joining them as much as they enable their movements. For further reading see: Anita Böcker, "Chain Migration Over Legally Closed Borders: Settled Immigrants as Bridgeheads and Gatekeepers," *Netherlands' Journal of Social Science* 30 (1994), p. 97

[60]

poor people in less developed countries undertake migration, and in particular, rural-to-urban migration as an act of rational choice has long been a major theme in development economics." Migrants move in order to better themselves and their situations. In addition, given high level of risk attendant in migration, a high payoff is expected.[61]

A migration however is often undertaken with imperfect knowledge, and therefore the migrant incurs an "actuarially unfair risk with income earning in the urban sector often not being guaranteed prior to the migrants' arrival there."[62] Should the migration be successful—landing with a job, a house, and other such amenities—a migrant can gain significantly more than they might have by staying in his or her original location. A failed migration however would mean that a migrant would either be unable to overcome the barriers to migration, or else experience no gain in welfare upon arrival. High levels of unskilled urban unemployment, crime, poverty, and squalor make this a very real danger.

A migration then is made in terms of weighing the potential gains of moving to a new destination over the possible risks, including the already well-known utility of staying in the original destination. To make this example concrete, a Turkish peasant living in a village and considering a move to Istanbul would have to weigh the cost of transport to the city, finding a home and a job, and the possibility that the latter two would be no better than his current situation. Furthermore, the farmer knows what his life would be like if he stays in the village, and has to compare his known utility with the possibility of greater or lesser rewards in the metropole.

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[61] Katz and Stark, p. 134.
[62] *Ibid*.

The problem that neoclassical microeconomic migration theory has encountered is the fact that the risks and barriers to migration are often so high that rational people should almost always stay where they are. This troublesome conclusion has been reached given the data on the poor standards of living of recent migrants, as well as continued migration in the face of rising unemployment rates and even higher degrees of marginal underemployment. A particular theoretical fix, called the Todaro Model (to be discussed in greater detail herein) views migration as a form of gamble of expected returns in the distant future outweighing present costs

Critical Mass

The network effect of any migration stream is dependent on the amount of the population that is willing to take part, either in supporting it, or in actually migrating. This form of migration occurs either before or after a dividing line described most succinctly as the "critical mass" of a migration. In 1971 Zelinsky authored one of the initial works on migration that illustrates the concept of critical mass . In his paper he proposed that increased mobility and subsequent migration was not the result of a set of "laws of migration" that induced movement, but rather was the result of a societal change that was "an essential component of the modernization process."[63]

The process of modernization creates the preconditions and justifications for emigration and internal migration. Castles explains, "at the beginning of a

[63] Zelinsky, p. 222.

process of modernization and industrialization, there is frequently an increase in emigration [migration too], due to population growth, a decline in rural employment, and low wage levels."[64] The result was that migration was following a naturally prescribed course, the same as any inverted U-shaped Kuznets curve. Migration would rapidly increase, plateau, and then decline at set points in the development of a society.[65]

Like most theories using Kuznets' Curves, there is considerable debate about which point greater mobility is supposed to shift downwards or end. Micro-level theories are more promising in terms of specific case application, which put forth the binary notion of critical mass. The concept of critical mass works for either a specific migration stream, or else migration throughout a society. By capitalizing on the reduced costs of migration via networks effects, migration passes a threshold where it becomes economically and culturally embedded within a society.

[64] Stephen Castles, "Development and Migration - Migration and Development: What Comes First?" IMI (2008), p. 5.
[65] Hein de Haas, "Turning the Tide? Why Development Will Not Stop Migration," *Development and Change* 38, no. 5 (2007), p. 21

Figure 1, A list of Zelinsky's diagrams showing proposed mobility transitions.

The important graph is the Rural-Urban one (C), showing the proposed rise and fall of mobility, and correspondingly urbanward migration.

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

Zelinsky, p. 233.

Massey describes this process as "once the number of network connections in an origin area reaches a *critical level*, migration becomes self-perpetuating because migration itself creates the social structure to sustain it (emphasis added)." Once the threshold is crossed, then the initial push and pull factors that caused migration are no long relevant. Instead migration branches out with every act of migration reducing "the cost of subsequent migration for a set of friends and relatives." Before this point of critical mass, migration is induced by a variety of conditions. However, past this point migration acquires an internal dynamism that propels it forward.[66]

The concept of critical mass is picked up by de Haas, who explains differences in migration patterns through a parabolic curve. At the upswing of the curve there is a mark delineating the point at which "a certain critical number of migrants" at the given destination provide the critical mass for the "positive effects of spatial clustering and economies of scale start to give migration processes their own momentum."[67]

Network effects are the theoretical explanation of what has been termed "chain migration" in the literature on Turkish migration. There is a significant difference in terms of migration occurring before a migrant population achieves critical mass in any one destination, and the way in which migration functions after this critical mass has been achieved. Network effects are not constantly in effect,

[66] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 8.
[67] Hein de Haas, "The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes," in *IMSCOE Conference on Theories of Migration and Social Change* (University of Oxford, 2008), p. 31.

but require migration and connections on a large scale before they function to effectively reduce the costs and risks of migration.[68]

Cumulative Causation

Cumulative causation is an attempt to solve the causality problem plaguing migration studies. One brief history of Turkish migration argues that "employment and higher income opportunities," among other factors, were key to inducing a higher level of rural to urban migration throughout the country. [69] The problem however with this argument, and the push-pull dichotomy it employs, is that jobs don't cause migration. Muth demonstrates as early as 1971, "migration and employment growth each affect and are affected by each other," and "due to their interaction upon each other, exogenous increases in either migration or employment growth lead to multiple increases in both."[70]

Muth's argument was further corroborated by Steinnes' research. Published seven years later, Steinnes provided more statistical backing to Muth's argument that "the rationale for the dependence of migration upon employment growth has little support."[71] Steinnes tackles the causality problem in trying to answer whether people are following jobs or jobs are following people. The precise directionality between the two does not need to be established, but a more ordered understanding of their interconnectedness and causality is helpful. Although past studies saw

[68] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 19.
[69] Halil I. Taş and Dale R. Lightfoot, "Gecekondu Settlements in Turkey: Rural-Urban Migration in the Developing European Periphery," *The Journal of Geography* 104, no. 6 (2005), p. 66.
[70] Richard F. Muth, "Migration: Chicken or Egg?," *Southern Economic Journal* 37, no. 3 (1971), p. 295.
[71] *Ibid*., p. 298.

employment growth as exogenously determined, and, as such, "induces migration," we need to reorient ourselves to see that migrants were not chasing jobs in actuality *creating* them.[72]

Steinnes' conclusion buttresses Muth's original argument with even more statistical data. It further shows that migration induces job creation, although both are mutually interconnected.[73] There is an additional temporal element, which is the timelag between migration and the subsequent job creation, and the complementary increase in migration induced by the previously created jobs. Looking at other factors beyond available jobs and unemployment rates (see Tekçe in the later chapters) is crucial to understanding how migration in Turkey was the fulcrum on which the country managed to industrialize and *not the result of a labor market correction*.[74]

Human Capital versus Social Capital

A different way of looking at migration has been to view it as a form of investment. If migrants are rationally choosing between staying or going, a critical question is the degree to which migration will be beneficial in the long-term. "Human capital theory assumes that personal assets such as skills, education, and physical abilities are fundamental 'capitals' that boost economic production." Migration can represent a double gain for migrants: first by giving them the opportunity to develop a new set of skills that will be more valuable either at the

[72] D. N. Steinnes, "Causality and Migration: A Statistical Resolution of the "Chicken or Egg Fowl-Up," *Southern Economic Journal* 45, no. 1 (1978), p. 219.
[73] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[74] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 9.

origin or destination point. Secondly, it allows the migrant to capitalize on skills that were not highly valued at the point of origin, but are more sought after at the destination.[75]

Fields argues that migration is a "form of human investment whereby individuals are thought to incur present costs (both monetary and psychic) in the hope of receiving higher future earnings and other benefits." The result is where a peasant would move from rural Turkey to a major city. In the countryside labor is cheap, and therefore has a low rate of return, while a city with major industry has a demand for labor and therefore offers a greater return on the same skillset.[76]

An extension of human capital theory changes the locus of the decision making process from the individual to the family. "Having a migrant member working elsewhere is a family strategy to manage uncertainty, diversify the income portfolio, and alleviate liquidity constraints through remittances." By sending one person to the city the family as a whole can better weather economic problems "by maintaining cooperation…through remittances sent by migrants, for example, or inheritance left by people at origin."[77]

While migration might carry marginal benefits and significant risks, by expanding their portfolio of human investments, a family might be able to escape hardship and economic downturn in their region. While an individual's net gain

[75] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 6.
[76] Gary S. Fields, "Labor Force Migration, Unemployment and Job Turnover," *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 58, no. 4 (1976), p. 407.
[77] Mendola, p. 152.

may be small, the security that a family may potentially reap can be large. [78] This plays a significant role in international migration, but using migration as a source of extra income has long been a strategy of survival for many rural inhabitants in Turkey.[79]

Once the social dimension of the family was introduced, then the logical next step was to view migration as not simply an investment in human capital, but in social capital as well. Human capital represents the individual characteristics that migration and experience contribute to, and in turn bring about profit. Social capital is a different beast altogether, representing the social structures and institutions that a community constructs.

According to Fussel and Massey "migration related social capital is a set of resources that are embodied in social networks that acquire instrumental value for people who wish to emigrate."[80] The connections and relationships in a social web serve to benefit its members by providing aid, information, and other goods such as food and shelter. Social capital is a key factor in "enabling and inspiring people to migrate."[81] The result is a network that lowers the cost and enhances the benefit of

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[78] The authors Katz and Stark end up working out two possible circumstances in which migration taken at a likely loss can still be attractive. The first cause is due to the effects of relative versus absolute deprivation. An area experiencing economic growth requires greater efforts by its members to distinguish themselves or to keep up with their neighbors. Secondly, in periods of high economic growth the reward is sufficiently lucrative that even poor odds make migration a worthwhile gamble. The chance to strike it rich serves to overcome the likelihood of only marginal gains. For more information see Katz and Stark, p. 140.

[79] Pamuk describes remittances as important in their ability to bring foreign currency into Turkey, and thereby speed development. Şevket Pamuk, *The Cambridge History of Turkey: Volume 4 Turkey in the Modern World*, ed. Reşat Kasaba (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 284

[80] Fussel and Massey, p. 152.

[81] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 19.

migration for every act of migration that occurs.[82] These networks are not weak however, and exist independently of other state and financial institutions. The salient point is that after significant investment, these networks carry enough social capital to become self-perpetuating.[83]

One possible explanation for the projected decline in mobility for rural-to-urban migration within Zelinsky's mobility hypothesis is the degree to which cities prevent the formation of social capital. An urban setting reduces the chances of forming the close-knit bonds that are more common in rural settings. A dense urban population leads to greater anonymity and selectivity of contacts and friends. Furthermore, migrants are less likely to use their earnings to contribute towards communal projects than their own consumption and well-being. This creates a situation in which the social ties that helped propel migration into the city cannot further develop to bring migrants to another destination. This increases the

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[82] Human capital undergoes a relatively direct conversion to financial capital. Sought after skills and qualities are well compensated in the job market. Social capital however undergoes a different conversion process into financial capital, but is still highly fungible. For more information see P. Bourdieu, "The Forms of Capital," in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* , eds. J.G. Richardson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986). And J.S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* 94 (1988).

[83] Two interesting papers were written on the strength of weak connections between people. The argument was that while the literature argues that direct blood ties are the only significant ones in aiding and determining migration, that in fact very weak and limited relationships can be significant in determining migration. This tends to hold true in Turkey as well where people from the same village or region form organizations to help each other out, despite having had little to no prior contact. In this manner weak social ties have a large impact on the country and its people, despite being invisible to most studies. For more information see: Mark S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," *American Journal of Sociology* 78, no. 6 (1973). And Mark. S. Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited," *Sociological Theory* 1 (1983).

function cities have as population traps, where the larger a city is the lower out-migration tends to be.[84]

The Role of Facilitating Factors

This study seeks to accomplish three separate goals. First, this thesis seeks to provide a comprehensive and updated account of Turkish migrations for the period of 1950-1980. Secondly, the goal is to give a critical appraisal of past works on the subject, particularly in terms of the theoretical concepts that they used and to explain how those theories have since advanced. Finally, there is a small contribution to existing theory that can be made through the concept of facilitating factors.

Older studies of Turkish migration focused heavily on the context in which migrations were taking place. The political and economic climate was considered to have a tremendous impact on migrations. Later studies focused on the internal dynamics of migration and on how migrations operated as a social institution independent of their surrounding context. A valuable addition to these two layers is a meso-layer field of analysis that accounts for non-contextual and non-internal variables.

External variables often include factors such as employment rates, or housing supply. Yet recent theory has discovered these variables, although exogenous to migration, share a discursive relationship. The result is the classic

[84] Fussel and Massey, pp. 153-154.

chicken-and-egg problem alluded to in several papers,[85] where migration and employment can only be understood through the lens of cumulative causation.

Cumulative causation may be the most accurate method of studying migration how migration interacts with its environment, although it has not been widely tested on Turkey. Internal dynamics steps in to answer how migration perpetuates itself, but only beyond a point of critical mass. This leaves us with two theoretical systems, the historical one[86] in which economic incentives and other preferences serve to pull migrants to cities, until migration reaches a certain point and the other where it takes off on the strength of its own networks.[87]

The point that is proposed here is that facilitating factors play a central role in allowing migration to perpetuate, both before and after that critical point of takeoff. These factors fall into two primary areas of infrastructure: transportation and communication. There are several unique properties to both: they require a relatively high degree of state investment to create and maintain, they are not elastic to demand or use, and they do not constitute an incentive to migration in of themselves.

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[85] Specifically see: Muth. Also see: Steinnes.

[86] Either push-pull theory or the Todaro model.

[87] In their case study of Mexico Mckenzie and Rapoport find that "initial network formation raises migration incentives and propensities." Although their work is obviously not directed towards Turkey, the methodology and reasoning they use is largely sound and a similar model could be directly applied to Turkish data. For more information see David Mckenzie and Hillel Rapoport, "Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico," *Journal of Development Economics* 84 (2007), p. 6.

These factors have been discussed in detail in histories of Turkish migration,[88] but emphasizing their importance is novel to contemporary migration theory. Transportation and communication infrastructure is necessary but not sufficient for mass migrations to take place, to cross the "critical mass" threshold. This infrastructure should be taken as an endogenous variable when analyzing migration flows, since it does not share a discursive relationship with contextual or internal factors. Furthermore, better transport and communication helps activate certain elements of migration networks that make great use of advances in the speed of travel and communication.

Descriptive Nature of Past Studies

A difficulty with many past works on Turkish migration is their strict emphasis on performing descriptive rather than analytical work. This tendency is derived from older theories of migration that were not overly theoretical. Zelinsky himself admits that his hypothesis of a mobility transition, which has proved an enduring contribution to migration theory, is done "almost entirely at the descriptive level; no serious effort is made to plumb the processual depths."[89] De Haas too criticizes the lack of "theoretical rootedness" of the bulk of migration studies that fail to take into account what previous studies on migration have already proven.[90]

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[88] To name only a few see: Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, and Çağlar Keyder, *State and Class in Turkey a Study in Capitalist Development* (New York: Verso, 1987).
[89] Zelinsky, p. 221.
[90] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 2.

This "amnesia," de Haas argues stems from the "sheer heterogeneity" of migrations and their impacts. The result is a canon that is either hugely disconnected in using a common theory or arrives at purely functionally specific conclusions. As Zelinsky has mentioned above, the problems in definition of migration led to a large number of studies seeking merely to measure it, define it, and redefine it; all without any substantial contribution to the question as to why or how this process was occurring.

Works on Turkey suffer from the same problem. Many of the studies published on Turkish migration or deal with migration show a strong dependency on the earliest works (to be discussed herein). This tendency is so great that even theoretical structures that have since been repudiated in the literature on Turkey continue to crop up in contemporary articles. One such example was a 2005 article in The Journal of Geography, which describes urbanward migration as due to:

> The social and physical attraction of the cities, industrialization of the urban areas and occupational opportunities for migrants and their children. Improvements in transportation and communication have played a significant role in increasing the mobility of people in Turkey…greater educational opportunities in the cities started to change the traditional way of thinking, weakened traditional tribal ties, and weakened resistance to change…people have departed rural areas because of economic hardship, poverty in the village, and sometimes the poor condition of arable land. Seasonal unemployment, low income, and lack of cultural and educational facilities contribute to the desire to leave rural areas…[91]

A critical appraisal of the works on Turkish migrations will come in following chapters, this example is merely to provide an immediate illustration of several of the theoretical failings. Certainly, the sources that Taş and Lightfoot used from the

[91] Taş and Lightfoot, p. 266.

1970s had presented migration under this particular push-pull framework. There are two immediate problems with their excerpted quote: first it relies on a push-pull theoretical framework from the 1960s. Secondly, a problem that is tied to the use of push-pull, is the lack of analysis as to the causes and methods of migration. Instead of attempting to at least highlight the most significant causes of migration, the authors are content to enumerate a tremendous list of possible causes and contextual factors that contributed to migration.

Reliance on Reported Data: Quantitative and Qualitative

Further problems with studying migration stem from the methods they employ. Demographic studies can be content with measuring biological events, births and deaths are clearly discernable, but migration theories are not so closely tied to the lived experience of migration. This leads to theoretical constructs that rely on faulty data.

A central question to this study, and all studies of migration, is "why do people move?" To answer this question researchers have either asked migrants themselves as to why they moved, or else come up with their own explanation for such a journey. The problem with qualitative interviews is the nature of people to offer post-facto rationalizations for their decisions. Migration may have been caused for wholly different reasons than people are willing to admit to, or may have been aware of. The question as to whether migrants are even aware of why they moved is especially problematic in light of family-based decisions to move and not

individual ones. This may create a situation where a migrant did not actually make the choice to move, but was instead chosen by his family.[92]

Other contextual theories that use population growth or economic deprivation fail to capture the reasons for people moving at all. "After all, people do not migrate 'because of' population growth." Rural population growth may have created the preconditions necessary to make migration an attractive alternative to life in the village. Yet macro-demographic factors do not constitute a reason for migration in and of themselves, though they can certainly provide incentive.[93]

The existence of transportation and communication infrastructure does not constitute an incentive in itself. Nevertheless, it does two things: first it independently lowers the cost and risk of migration by providing a freer flow of people and information. This exists independently of any social network that migrants end up relying upon to help in their journey. Still, without the infrastructure, social capital networks cannot grow. While social and human capital both are fungible in terms of financial capital, neither serve to provide the capital necessary to build the highway systems or telephone lines that facilitate secure and rapid migration.

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[92] Beyond theory, there's a considerable body of evidence that supports greater attention being paid to household level decision making mechanisms. Tunalı states, "…furthermore, for households that have more than one breadwinner, the migration decision has implications for the economic activities undertaken by the entre household. These two observations suggest that household income, as opposed to individual earnings, is the appropriate concept for studying migration." As suggested in theory, migration can be a method of a household diversifying its investments or gaining access to new forms of income, something that is demonstrably true for Turkey. İnsan Tunalı, "Rationality of Migration," *International Economic Review* 41, no. 4 (2000), p. 901.

[93] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 14.

Certainly in terms of modern migrations the role of transportation and communication structures is considered a revolutionary factor.

> [Migration's] character has, however, fundamentally changed due to revolutionary technological and infrastructural developments…the major advances in transport and communication technology…have further facilitated, accelerate and transformed…this process…As we will see, in particular the recent transportation and telecommunication revolutions have dramatically expanded the opportunities for migrants and their families to maintain transnational livelihoods and to construct transnational identities.[94]

Transportation and communication infrastructure deserve separate consideration because they are completely independent from migration and state policy towards migration. The development of means of travel and communication neither encourage nor discourage migration, but serve as the framework on which specific migration channels can be built. Current studies on international migration put a tremendous emphasis on these technological revolutions. A similar mindset ought to be used when looking at similarly revolutionary developments in a historical perspective.

Determining Migration Flows and Numbers

Demographic Data

To determine the rate and direction of migrations it becomes necessary to consult general demographic statistics. Migration impacts the demographic makeup of an area by either increasing or lowering its population beyond the natural population change. Natural population change in Turkey is the difference between

[94] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 14.

crude birth rates and death rates. If the population of a specific area grows faster than the natural population growth in that area, then migration is the explanatory factor.[95]

In any location four actions are occurring simultaneously: people are being born, others are dying, migrants are settling in the area, and migrants are exiting the area. All together these four actions make up population change in a given area in Turkey. And by subtracting the natural population growth from the overall population growth, we can arrive at an estimate of net migration in the region.

There is the problem of varied population growth rates across Turkey. For example, rural areas in the Southeast of Turkey had fertility rates up to three times as high as those in Turkey's metropolitan areas,[96] leading to high rates of growth in those rural areas despite a lack of in-migration.[97] Migration inflows can be registered by population growth that exceeds natural births and deaths. Controlling for those natural demographic factors is important because, as Turkey modernized , average life expectancy rose.[98]

It is also known is that Turkey as a country overall had an extremely high fertility rate in the 1950s, but this rate had fallen sharply by the 1960s and

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[95] Frederic C. Shorter and Belgin Tekçe, "Demographic Determinants of Urbanization in Turkey," in *Turkey Geographic and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 282.
[96] Even here we find further variation, as Ankara boasted significantly higher fertility rates to Istanbul and Izmir. Frederic C. Shorter, "Information on Fertility, Mortality, and Population Growth in Turkey," *Population Index* 34, no. 1 (1968), p. 14
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 17
[98] Differentials in fertility rate remain significant throughout the country. In a recent report Gedik finds that fertility rates in the Southeast of Turkey have remained significantly higher than the rest of Turkey, approximately 2-4 times as much. The result is that the Southeast has become and will continue to be a major exporter of migrants due to the sheer demographic surplus relative to other regions in the country. For more information see Gedik, *Rural-to-Urban Migration in Turkey*, p. 75.

continued trending downwards. In regards to the overall decline in fertility rates, researchers have concluded that "geography matters," in showing that there are vast differences in fertility rates in different areas of the country. The Western areas of Turkey maintained a low fertility rate, but the Southeast has historically had a significantly higher fertility rate. An interesting correlation was further drawn, that "in settlements where the migration variable is negative (i.e. settlements with a high level of out-migration), the level of fertility tends to be lower." The low fertility rate in places that experience high out-migration is thought to be the result of the departure of the younger generations, usually the first to migrate out.[99]

The last conclusion, where high levels of outmigration tend to negatively impact fertility, rings especially true for the period between 1950 to 1980. The Western regions of Turkey experienced a concurrent decline in fertility just as their levels of migration, especially out-migration, were growing. The Southeast of Turkey however was isolated from the internal migrations of this period and its fertility rates remained high.

Urbanization

Urbanization is also well defined by Shorter and Tekçe as "the process of concentration of people and activities in urban communities. The extent of urbanization at any specific time is measured by the proportion of the total population residing in urban communities." Therefore the change in the level of urbanization is measured by the increase in the proportion of people living in urban

[99] Oğuz Işik and Melih Pinarcioğlu, "Geographies of a Silent Transition: A Geographically Weighted Regression Approach to Regional Fertility Differences in Turkey," *European Journal of Population* 22, no. 4 (2006), p. 415

areas over time. The more people living in urban areas over any period of time represent a move towards urbanization.[100]

Many dimensions, including a complex division of labor, are used to define the concept of an urban area. As a result urban areas generally fall along a continuum, some possessing more urban characteristics, some less. In terms of population size, administrative areas of 10,000 and 20,000 inhabitants have been considered to be urban in Turkey..[101]

Pseudo-Urbanization

In terms of general use, urbanization is nothing more than the movement of people from areas that are considered rural to those that are considered urban. In practice this term carries significantly greater meaning. As the complex web of migration patterns in Turkey illustrates, just because a country is urbanizing does not mean that all urban areas are growing equally or developing in a qualitatively similar manner.

Pseudo-urbanization is mentioned by Karpat[102] in the same way that Kiray uses *false urbanization* to account for the growth of cities that do not resemble the traditional city.[103] Akçura continues by explaining that "demographic urbanization has been more rapid than functional urbanization," which brings about the question

[100] Shorter and Tekçe, p 283.
[101] The population at which a settlement is considered urban in Turkey was changed from 10,000 to 20,000 in 1975. As a result there is some confusion as studies authored before 1975 use urban to describe areas containing at least 10,000 people, which studies authored after 1975 use urban to describe areas of at least 20,000 people. This is discussed in greater detail in section 4.a. *Ibid.*, pp. 283-284.
[102] Karpat, *The Gecekondu,* p. 20.
[103] Mübeccel Kiray, *Örgütlesemeyen Kent: Izmir, Ankara* (1972), p. 551. Quoted in Miranda Iossifidis, *A Study of the Gecekondu in Istanbul, Turkey.* Available: [online]: exchange.drawloop.com/published/download/11576 [24 September 2009]. p. 22.

"whether or not the process can truly be termed urbanization and also provides a basis for maintaining that the process is a type of **artificial, pseudo-urbanization** [emphasis added]."[104]

This term pseudo-urbanization is significant in two different ways. First, migration works as a modernizing force by allowing people from traditional backgrounds to experience the modernizing influence of the city. However, in the Turkish case this was not the result. Urban peasants populated these cities and failed to adopt what were considered the norms and values of city life. [105]

Of greater importance is the second use of these terms that can be used to connote the growth of urban areas that possess none of the attractions of urban life. If newly arrived migrants were, as Şenyapılı argues, attempting to integrate into an urban space, then they sought certain goals. Chief among these was the adoption of an urban lifestyle and upper class consumption habits. Given the unevenness of Turkey's development however, many so-called urban areas lacked the functions that migrants would have sought.[106]

Economically, smaller cities had very little to offer migrants. Even medium and large cities had only limited functions as economic and administrative hubs. The result was that the economic activities available to migrants in urban areas of approximately 10,000 to 20,000 inhabitants were often equivalent to agricultural

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[104] Tuğrul Akçura, "Urbanization in Turkey and Some Examples," in *Turkey Geographic and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp. 297.
[105] Karpat, *The Gecekondu,* p. 20.
[106] Tansı Şenyapılı, "Charting the 'Voyage' of Squatter Housing in Urban Spatial 'Quadruped'," *European Journal of Turkish Studies* Thematic Issue 1 (2004), § 16.

work. This certainly is one reason why many smaller cities failed to *permanently* capture a larger portion of migrants.[107]

The result of pseudo-urbanization was a misleading dataset. At one point in time it appeared that all urban areas were growing, this growth obviously the result of certain attractive factor endowments not present in rural areas. Taken over a series of points in time it becomes clear that many of these areas were sending out almost as many migrants as they took in. Researchers initially thought new urban areas would develop as an alternative to the metropoles, effectively damming the flow of migrants. However, the result was the opposite however, with small urban areas adding to, not subtracting from migration to the metropoles.

Barriers to Migration

The role that barriers to migration play in hindering movement is often understated. A barrier consists of anything that inhibits or constrains movement from one area to another. There are two types of barriers, physical barriers to migration and socio-psychological barriers. A physical barrier is anything that increases the cost of movement in terms of time, money, or safety. Treadway is very clear that travel between cities in Turkey cannot be computed along straight lines and kilometers, but requires accounting for the real time and cost that these journeys took.[108]

Physical barriers in Turkey have manifested themselves in terms of limited and expensive transport options as well as road connections that are frequently

[107] Akçura, pp. 299-300.
[108] Treadway, p. 31.

disrupted. These have not prevented migration across the country outright, but have served to limit the ability of migrants to access all parts of the country equally. Large cities naturally were the easiest to reach. Even other cities that were spatially closer might be more difficult to visit.

Uncertainty about transportation or the inability to return to one's starting location further amplifies the effects of physical barriers. Although cities and towns may be shown as linked on a map, the reality is that these links can be tenuous. As a result it is necessary to see migration barriers as existing along a gradient. Even once roads and rails connect areas of the country; it does not mean that they are fully integrated. The eventual elimination of these barriers with the development of a national highway system in the 1950s is one of the more important developments in Turkey.

However, there is an inherent blindness when it comes to accounting for transportation as a barrier to migration. Once migration barriers are overcome, for example through the development of road infrastructure, these barriers become invisible. The time period in which the effect of transportation barriers can be observed is relatively small, and afterwards movement became relatively cheap and efficient. As a result researchers tend to discount the problems that migrants had at the time.

Socio-psychological barriers represent the range at which migrants are willing to move, regardless of their ability to do so. While this is not a barrier in the traditional sense, it does appear in the data as the limited distances at which

migrants move from their origin. Although movement may be feasible, a lack of familiarity with certain areas may rule them out as possible destinations.

High levels of communication infrastructure, such as radios or telephones help reduce the effect of socio-psychological distance. The greatest facilitating factor in which socio-psychological barriers are overcome is the presence of friends or family at a given destination. Again, this barrier is extremely difficult to view in retrospect, and is only visible in the recorded data.

CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

Ravenstein: The First Statistical Study of Migration

Arriving at a conclusion as to why Turkish migration began in the first place is beyond the scope of this thesis. Either a result of or in spite of its fragmentation, migration theory shows a high level of dependency on past works. Therefore, while the first modern study of migration was authored over 100 years ago, the assumptions and ideas that were presented there remain visible in contemporary works. We see this continuity in Zelinsky's seminal paper,[109] as well as by Massey[110] and de Haas.[111] Massey goes as far as to claim that current migration theory "remains mired in nineteenth-century concepts, models, and assumptions." Therefore, it is necessary to highlight the concepts that have become received wisdom, despite having been hugely problematic.[112]

Initially emerging as a subset of human geography, with all the weight that Thomas Malthus brought to the topic, came Earnest George Ravenstein. Ravenstein was one of the first academics to seriously tackle the questions surrounding why and how large numbers of people were moving about England.

In his "The Laws of Migration" published in 1885, Ravenstein proposed that certain factors, such as age, sex, distance, and economic incentives, could account for migration across Britain and Europe. This was the first time that migration had

[109] Zelinsky, pp. 219-220.
[110] Massey, "Social Structure," p. 3.
[111] de Hass, "Migration and Development," p. 4.
[112] Massey et. al., p. 432.

been studied statistically as a social phenomenon. This type of study was similarly applied to the internal migrations in Turkey.[113]

Although the two factors that Ravenstein popularized as important to defining migratory patterns, size of the destination and distance between locations, are central to any modern discussion, his work was also flawed in its inability to ascribe definite rules or patterns to migration mechanics. Rather than being able to propose a functional theory, Ravenstein ended up with a large collection of factors that while appeared necessary for migration, lacked a chain of causality or a hierarchy in the efficacy of factors. In fact, Ravenstein's failure to come up with a general theory of migration remains a problem for the entire discipline. Several theorists are doubtful as to whether a general theory of migration can even exist.[114]

Lee and the Laws of Migration

The next significant development in migration theory arrives concurrent with the beginnings of migration studies in Turkey. In 1966 Everett Lee published "A Theory of Migration"[115] which was seminal in its attempt to create a succinct three-part model to explain how migration works. In all fairness, the article itself is a masterpiece of simplicity, for both better and worse.

Lee's theory, which can be best described as a push-pull model, places migrants themselves in the background, and focuses on the specific factor

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[113] Emir Işaşir. "Prevention of Illegal Migration" (MA thesis, Bilkent University, 2006), p. 12.
[114] As with any social science, the amount of proof and certainity that can be reached is relatively far below that of the material sciences. Nevertheless, the possibility of a theory that could be broadly applied to many migration flows appears elusive, if not impossible. For more information see: J. Salt, "Contemporary Trends in International Migration Study," *International Migration* 25 (1987).
[115] Everett S. Lee. "A Theory of Migration." *Demography* 3, No 1 (1966).

endowments of the area that is sending migrants and the area that is receiving migrants. Cognizant that migration really is a two-way street, Lee proposes that quality of life and opportunities available are what decides when and where people go.

According to Lee, migration involves only three things: "an origin, a destination, and an intervening set of obstacles." Rather than attempt to define migrations each as corresponding to a unique set of factors, Lee sets up a schematic for a circuit. The origin and destination each constitute a separate pole and a resistor sits between them at some intermediary strength, either mitigating or preventing migration entirely. Factors that are considered positive at one pole, such as good weather, are enough to induce migration, at least if the climate is sufficiently inclement at the other pole.[116]

Within this polar model, Lee identifies three key elements to migration, all of which continue be of use today. The first is the diversity of conditions across a country. Given a disparate level of development and quality of life within a country, much less the world, individuals would have the incentive to move. Secondly, individuals and their knowledge of the costs and benefits of living elsewhere were the only factor in migration. While a state or a state of affairs can incentivize a population to stay or go, ultimately migration is a matter of individual choice.

Finally, what remains the most underdeveloped area of migration studies is the effect that migration streams have on migration. A migration stream is a particular route from point A to B that is favored over equally auspicious options.

[116] Lee, p. 49.

Lee gives the example of Italian migrants from Sicily migrating chiefly to the United States, and even then only to a few cities in the north of the U.S. This stream was wholly independent of another stream where Italians from Lombardy and Tuscany were highly channeled towards South America, and then Buenos Aires.[117]

Given that migrants have an overwhelming propensity to "proceed along well defined routes toward highly specific destinations," it should be expected that migration patterns would acquire a permanent characteristic, regardless of the impermanent factors that led to its creation. This streaming of migration creates a pocket set of circumstances that significantly alter the decision of later migrants. While these streams are visible in data sets once collected, they are difficult to identify through normal practices of human geography involving a simple calculus of distance, city size, and so forth.[118]

Lee did not attempt to fit his theory to a particular history or case. Unfortunately, the theory was nonetheless adopted wholesale by researchers attempting to fit it directly to their own case, as the proverbial square peg to the round hole. The weakness of the theory was that it considered the mass appeal of certain macro-elements—climate, location, job opportunities—but failed to promote any of these over the other.

Despite its swift adoption by researchers in the field (see Tümertekin, 1968), Lee's theory ended up as muddled as The Laws of Migration. De Haas questions "whether the push-pull framework is of much analytical use, and whether it can be called a theory at all. It is rather a descriptive model in which the different factors

[117] Lee, p. 55.
[118] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

playing a role in migration decisions are enumerated in a relatively arbitrary manner." Lee's thesis sets up a clear-cut framework by which a migration decision can be diagrammed. But it does not offer any insight into how that decision is made.[119]

Furthermore, de Haas continues to attack push-pull theory

> The tendency of push-pull models to confuse different scales of analysis…and do not allow for assigning relative weights to the role and importance of factors that have been included and excluded. Analyses concluding that low wages, high population pressure or environmental degradation as opposed to better conditions at the destination 'cause' migration tend to be so general as to be more or less stating the obvious.[120]

The problem as de Haas explains, is that any given push or pull factor assumes the "mirror" image is present at the other end. Low wages at the origin inherently implies high wages at the destination. This assumption is either obvious or it is untrue, but neither result contributes to a better understanding of the migration process. Indeed, push-pull factors such as wage differentials entirely ignore the complex relationship between wage, labor availability, and migration. The result is the acceptance of the inherent "limitations of equilibrium approaches such as the push-pull framework."[121]

The Answer to Migration Paradoxes, Todaro

Following the general adoption of Lee's sociological laws of migration was the growing prominence of economic interpretations of migration. Using the

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[119] de Hass, "Migration and Development," p. 9.
[120] *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

concepts of rational choice theory, economists argued that migration could be distilled down to a simple search for better living conditions: basically money. Migrants certainly had many competing considerations in their choice whether and where to migrate, but the greatest determinant was money.

The next set of ideas that tried to create an order out of this overtly chaotic system was a paper by Michael Todaro. He described the paradox of this urbanizing period as one in where "the existence of positive marginal products in agriculture and significant levels of urban unemployment, rural-urban labor migration not only continues to exist…but appears to be accelerating." General economic theory viewed labor wages as affected by the laws of supply and demand. Migration was simply a product of workers moving towards jobs with higher pay, and they would continue to migrate until demand for further labor and wages dropped, and the system would return to equilibrium. But rather than migration flows reaching any form of equilibrium in the metropoles of Turkey, migration continued to paradoxically tip the scales towards an urban exaggeration.[122]

The continuance of what was assumed to be labor migration moving into provinces with low wages and high unemployment was the economic equivalent of water running uphill. The continuance of this impossible circumstance was the reason for the popularity of the Todaro model as it explained why, if not how urban directed migration would occur:

> "The paradox is due to the assumptions that in choosing between labour markets, risk-neutral agents consider expected wages; that the probability of

[122] John R. Harris and Michael P. Todaro, "Migration, Unemployment and Development: A Two-Sector Analysis," *The American Economic Review* 60, no. 1 (1970), p. 126.

> obtaining urban employment is approximated by the ratio of urban jobs to the urban labor force; and that the urban wage rate is considerably and consistently higher than the rural wage rate. Under these assumptions, inter-labour market (rural-urban) equilibrium mandates urban unemployment. This unemployment ensures that the expected urban wage is equal to the rural wage (which is assumed constant throughout). **The repercussion of this simple set of assumptions is that contrary to received wisdom, once the migration response is factored in, several policies aimed at reducing urban unemployment will raise urban unemployment rather than reduce it**."[123] (emphasis added)

Contemporary Theory

From the end of the 1970s a new type of theory was being developed to tackle the problems of migration that were still considered intractable to academics at the time. Former mainstays of migration analyses, such as the rate of employment and unemployment, had proved useless. "One of the most perplexing problems confronting migration scholars is the lack of significance of local unemployment rates in explaining migration," wrote Greenwood in 1975.[124]

The failure of theory throughout the late 1970s was, as de Haas write, the its inability to "see migration as a social *process*."[125] Zelinsky's theory of a mobility transition gave rise to a new section of migration theory that viewed migration as a dynamic institution that functioned across several levels. This new theory has been christened the new economics of labor migration (NELM) although still does not stand as a coherent general theory.

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[123] Ben Jelili Riadh. 1998. *Rural-Urban Migration: On the Harris-Todaro Model*. Available [online]: http://www.arab-api.org/cv/riyadh-cv/pdf/Riadh3.pdf. [Accessed Sep 24, 2009]
[124] Michael J. Greenwood, "Research on Internal Migrations in the United States: A Survey," *Journal of Economic Literature* 13 (1975), p. 411.
[125] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 10.

Castles defined NELM as remaining "within the neo-classical paradigm of income maximation…yet questions neo-classical theory's methodological individualism, by emphasizing the role of families." Certain developments to come out of this approach have been the idea of a "migration hump," or what is termed the "critical mass" of a migration. Once a migration crosses the hump, then individuals and groups face a different set of incentives than they did before the hump.[126]

Mendola views NELM differently, as the theory "explains migration as an inter-temporal household strategy entailing interrelationships between determinants and impacts for the migrant." She further draws on Stark's emphasis of family strategy towards risk minimization as crucial to understanding how migration decisions are made.[127]

Limiting NELM to simply adding the role of families into preexisting equations does not do it justice. Rather, NELM has been used with a variety of other techniques, including *transitional theories*. These are offshoots of Zelinsky's original mobility transition theory, and are used to link migration as a process that runs parallel to other transitions, political (e.g. democratic) and economic.[128]

Since 1990 migration studies have trended towards a more pluralist perspective. Rather than attempting to use a singular theory to account for migration, there is a more cohesive blend of politics, economics, and human geography.[129] These theories, including NELM, take into account that "migrants rarely move simply from A to B but their movement is a complex system between

[126] Castles, p. 5.
[127] Mendola, p. 152.
[128] Castles, p. 5.
[129] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 31.

two, or among several, destinations."[130] Furthermore, theorists no longer attempt to isolate the individual decision, but place migrants within the context of "family, household and community networks." This allows for individual behavior to be interpreted within a "communal risk minimizing strategy."[131]

The most important change in migration theory is the emphasis now placed on migration as a process into and of itself. "Migration is not an independent variable explaining change," de Haas argues, "but is an endogenous variable, an integral part of change itself in the same degree as it may enable further change." Focusing in on the sheer level of endogeneity that migration displays offers the opportunity to reexamine the role of past migrations in history. Rather than measure migrations as static events, such as weather conditions, migration is now properly placed into a new context: its own. [132]

[130] Skeldon, "Migration and Poverty," pp 8-9.
[131] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[132] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 43.

CHAPTER 4: HISTORY OF INTERNAL MIGRATIONS

Terms

Without getting bogged down in the details, there remain a few terms that require explanation. The difficulty arises from the inherent bifurcated nature of migration studies. When focused on a country such as Turkey, migration becomes as much about urbanization—especially metropolitan urbanization—and requires two entirely different sets of data.

The first type of data in regards to urbanization relies far more on aggregated demographic statistics, such as population size, birth and death rates, as well as a handful of terms to describe specific administrative areas. In Turkey the largest administrative unit is the province, which boasts a single province center. The province is then subdivided into districts, each with their own district center.

For example, Diyarbakir is both the name of a province and the provincial capital and a city too that is dealt with independent of its other functions. Even the term urban is not constant. For the first fifty years of the Turkish republic an urban area was statistically defined as a town of 10,000 or more inhabits. Of course with rapid urbanization this figure was increased in 1975 to a minimum of 20,000 inhabitants in order to be more discriminating. To put it more simply, urban is dually defined by administrative criteria irrespective of population, and as a city or settlement with a population size of 10,000, later 20,000.[133] A final descriptive term

[133] Ayşe Gedik. "Urban Growth in Turkey: Effects of Different Migration Flows to/from Urban Centers during 1965-70 and 1975-80." *Scientific Papers of The Institute of History of Architecture, Arts and Technology of the Technical University of Wroclaw,* (Wroclaw Polytechnic, 1989), p 156.

is metropolis or metropole, and will be used exclusively for the cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir.

Figure 2, Differential Urbanization in Turkey, 1955-97



For use in this thesis, the Pre-Concentration period will stretch from 1950 to 1960, covering the initial migrations across Turkey. The Urbanization period remains from 1960 to 1980, including the transition from small migration flows to mass migration. The period that Gedik describes as Polarization Reversal, from 1980 to 1997 is beyond the purview of this thesis, but represents the growth of smaller regional centers and a growing level of entropy for migration and settlement across Turkey.

Ayşe Gedik, "Differential Urbanization in Turkey: 1955-2000," in 43rd Congress of the European Regional Science Association (Jyvaskyla, 2003), p. 17.

Internal Migration's Triptych

The history of internal migration in Turkey can be broken into three separate periods. The first segment detailed by Gedik[134], lasting from 1950 to 1960 is titled "pre-concentration." Following this, then from 1960 to 1980 is the most intense period of rapid "urbanization." This period is the defining moment for everything that comes after, as the changes wrought during this explosion in size and composition of cities sets the stage for how Turkey developed and continues to develop. The final period of migration, and therefore urbanization, is the reverse polarization period, which lasts from 1980 up to 2000.

The period of reverse polarization will not be detailed in this thesis for several reasons. First, the impact of those migrations is still being measured and understood. An attempt to perform any sort of historical analysis on recent migrations would be premature at best. Secondly, the migrations from 1980 onwards are of a markedly different character. The periods from 1950 to 1960, and 1960 to 1980 primarily featured migration in the central and western portions of the country. You can draw a direct line down the center of Turkey, from the Black Sea cities to Hatay; everything to the west of this line is directly involved in the internal migrations, while everything to the right of this line was relatively disconnected.

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[134] Ayşe Gedik. "Differential Urbanization in Turkey: 1955-2000." *43rd Congress of the European Regional Science Association (ESRA*), (Jyvaskyla, Finland, August 27-30, 2003), p. 17.

The salient point is that in the initial two periods, pre-concentration (1950-1960) and urbanization (1960-1980), the ultimate result of these migrations was still unknown at the time. How demographics would shape the country was difficult to foresee, as Taeuber states, "Here there are no valid bases for projection other than research on the growth and changing status of the population of Turkey itself."[135] Even past 1980 Turkey still enjoyed a "relatively even urban population distribution." This distribution depended on a situation where "alternative destinations are provided and urban population distribution is rather balanced."[136]

Certainly, the growth that Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir would undergo was not foreseen at the time, although the potential was. By the late 1980s earlier optimism proved overly optimistic; migrants no longer faced the plethora of choices that earlier generations had. Migration began pouring in from the grossly underdeveloped Southeast. But there was no longer tremendous choice in where to migrate; the viability of small cities such as Muş, Bitlis having long ago vanished.[137]

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[135] The dependency of predictions on past census and migration data made estimations of Turkish demographics based on hindsight rather than future probabilities. The growth of migration at geometric rates, which is what occurs in any migration stream that passes the critical mass threshold, is difficult to see using data that is up to five years old. Irene B. Taeuber, "Population and Modernization in Turkey," *Population Index* 24, no. 2 (Apr 1958), pp. 119.

[136] Ayşe Gedik, "Rural to Urban Versus Urban to Urban Migration in Population Growth of Urban Places in Developing Countries: Case Study of Turkey, 1965-1970," in *Families in the Face of Urbanisation* (New Delhi, 1985), pp. 13.

[137] The current patterns of migration show a high level (above the 80th percentile) of intra-provincial migration in the Southeast, where province centers serve to attract a large number of migrants. Gaziantep for example has had continually had high levels of intra-provincial migration throughout. Again, this presents the question as to whether these centers are undergoing a process of pseudo-urbanization that mirrors the experience of Western Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s. Or it is entirely possible that urban growth and development will remain a permanent feature of the Southeast. From the history enumerated in this thesis however, it would appear that the migratory patterns are developing along the same lines as they did in the past. The result is should then be similar,

Pre-Concentration Period 1950-1960

Of course all internal migration did not start in 1950, but had been a permanent aspect of life in Turkey throughout the Republican and Ottoman periods. Indeed, the single-party era had focused significantly on the construction of railroads in an effort to unify the country. As a result, although not necessarily geared to the needs of a mobile populace, the country was theoretically traversable without tremendous difficulty.

In 1935 Turkey's population stood at 16,158,000, but only 16.6% of that was urbanized. The vast majority of the country lived in disconnected rural areas. Certain regions such as the Black Sea coast maintained ties to Istanbul over sea routes, but the majority of the country was sedentary and dispersed over a relatively large landmass. In the eastern quarters of the country, within the provinces of Van and Hakkari there was only one rural settlement to every seventy-seven square kilometers. This density increased to a maximum of a rural settlement every nine square kilometers along the Black Sea in the province of Trabzon.[138]

Ten years later, in 1945 the population of Turkey had grown to 18,790,000, but only a small percentage of this growth was realized in urban areas, bringing the total percentage of Turkey's urbanized population up to 18.3%. By the start of what we have termed the *pre-concentration* period (1950) the population of Turkey had

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with ever larger transfers of population from the Southeast to the metropoles over the next few years. For more information see Gedik, *Rural-to-Urban Migration in Turkey,* p. 33.

[138] These numbers are based on a study conducted on 1945 population numbers. See Necdet Tunçdilek, "Settlement Geography of Turkey", *1st University Coğrafya Enstitüsü Pub*, No. 49/1283 (1967).

reached 20,947,000—but the rural-urban division had hardly changed. Still only a small proportion of the population, 18.5%, lived in urban districts.[139]

The population of Turkey had been growing steadily since the establishment of the Republic, but it had maintained a relatively even population distribution and rate of growth. The country was most densely populated in the center and western provinces. Economically and culturally the country was bisected, dividing a more interconnected Western half of the country from the socio-economically backwards Eastern area.

Note in the table below that while most of Turkey grew at a steady pace, the populations of the three regions, Marmara (Istanbul), Aegean (Izmir), and Central Anatolia (Ankara), greatly increased after 1950. The only other region with equivalent growth was South East Anatolia, but that is due to high fertility rates rather than massive in-migration.

During this pre-concentration period of 1950-1960 the decrease in the number of international immigration is striking. In the years between 1951 and 1955 there were 138,889 total migrants and refugees admitted into Turkey, the bulk of these—approximately 100,000—Turkish or Muslim expatriates arriving from Bulgaria. However, in the next four year period, 1956 to 1960, this number drops by a factor of ten, with only 10,955 migrants and refugees admitted into Turkey.[140] This tremendous drop in immigration demonstrates that in terms of sheer number of migrants, external and international demographics played an insignificant role in the growth of cities.

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[139] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 43.
[140] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

Table 1

Population of the Regions of Turkey, 1935 to 1955[141]						
Regions	*Population (in '000)*			*Annual percent change*		
	1935	*1945*	*1955*	*1935 to 1940*	*1950 to 1955*	*1935 to 1955*
Turkey	16,158	18,790	24,122	1.7	2.8	1.9
Marmara	2,214	2,565	3,438	2.8	3.9	2.2
Aegean	2,733	3,219	3,840	1.5	2.6	1.7
Mediterranean	1,342	1,783	2,438	1.3	3.4	2.3
Black Sea	2,440	2,756	3,325	1.3	2.0	1.6
Central Anatolia	5,268	5,949	7,696	1.4	2.6	1.9
North	2,309	2,687	3,497	1.3	3.0	2.1
South	1,426	1,665	2,076	1.7	2.3	1.9
East	1,533	1,597	2,123	1.2	2.3	1.6
Eastern Anatolia	2,160	2,518	3,385	2.3	3.1	2.2
Northeast	1,024	1,242	1,600	2.5	2.7	2.2
Southeast	1,136	1,276	1,785	2.1	3.5	2.3
Source: Irene B. Taeuber, "Population and Modernization in Turkey," *Population Index* 24, no. 2 (Apr 1958), p. 102.						

Migration started in earnest as "Turkish peasants began, for the first time, to leave the land permanently in significant numbers."[142] Migrants traveled to a variety of urban destinations now that the country was more accessible.[143] During the pre-concentration period (1950-1960) growth was highest in small cities: district and province centers which proved the most direct destination for migrants attempting to head out of the village through intra-provincial migration. "From 1950 to 1955 the existence of a nationwide movement to urban areas was

[141] Taeuber, p. 102.
[142] Malcom D. Rivkin, *Area Development for National Growth: The Turkish Precedent* (New York: Frederikc A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), p. 99.
[143] Urban growth was present in "every region during the 1935-1965 period." This growth was not uniform however, reaching a high of ".82 percentage points [per annum] for the North Central Anatolia," and a low of ".17 percentage points per annum for the Eastern Black Sea region." In the Marmara, Eastern Mediterranean, and Aegean regions the percent of urban population was high as well, but growth was realized in all quarters of Turkey. For more information see: Tekçe, pp. 80-81.

unmistakable. The total population increased 15 per cent in this five-year period. Increases amounted to 27.5 per cent for the city areas, i.e. centers of provinces and districts, 11.0 per cent for the remainder of Turkey.[144]

The Rise of Ankara

Ankara and Istanbul are the undisputed primate cities of Turkey. Between the two cities however, it is in Ankara's development where migration has played the largest role in shaping the city. Back in 1927 Ankara was chosen as the site for a new capital. During that initial Republican period Istanbul had dominated the rest of the country in terms of its political, economic, and social capital. Desiring a break with what they saw as the "decadent Ottoman period," the new revolutionary state made their already de-facto capital of Ankara the capital of Turkey.[145]

The move was explained to the press for two reasons: first to create a capital city that was immune to direct foreign threats of invasion. Secondly, to establish an administrative center that offered a more efficient and equitable location for providing services and facilities throughout the country. Istanbul's position at the western edge of the country had made contact and control of its southern and eastern provinces difficult. This was also a chance for the social engineers in the new state to take their hand at constructing a new type of city for the new Turk.[146]

This choice was problematic however, given that there was little that made Ankara suitable for a capital city. Rivkin describes the Anakara of 1920 as a "mud-

[144] Taeuber, p. 104
[145] Keyder and Öncü, p. 15.
[146] Dilek Inci Caner, "Ankara as the Capital of Turkey: Its Planning and Development in Early Republican Period." (MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1996), p. 33.

brick, disease ridden town of 25,000 people, subsisting on a declining mohair trade and its role as a military installation."[147] There were not enough buildings in the city to house the state machinery, much less the foreign embassies that a capital required. Despite its inauspicious beginnings Ankara received the greatest attention from the new government, and continued to grow in size and influence.[148]

The planning of Ankara is worth some attention, at least in how it was designed to remedy the chaos and overgrowth of Istanbul. Ironically, decades of mass migration would create more irregular housing than any other building structure. Yet for this period the intention was to create a perfectly ordered and harmonious urban space.

Ankara's planning went through several stages, beginning with a German named C. Lörcher and continuing with several other German architects until Hermann Jansen won a 1927 international contest to design Ankara.[149] Jansen won the competition that had stipulated his plan woul be able to accommodate a population of 250,000 to 300,000 over the next fifty years.[150]

According to Jansen, should the population rise above that level then city life would become untenable. "Major restrictions should be applied to prevent such a negative development," wrote Jansen. Accordingly excessive growth would jeopardize Ankara's planned virtues in every aspect. Ankara's metropolitan

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[147] Rivkin, p. 48.
[148] Caner, p. 39.
[149] Initially the new regime had a reported "dislike of foreign capital and expertise." This apparent dislike however did not seem to influence the development of Ankara's city plan, which was largely controlled by German architects and social engineers. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
[150] *Ibid*.

population increased to 750,000 by the "mid-1960s and to about 3.6 million by 1990."[151]

Early Metropolitan Focus

Migrations beginning in the 1950s to the 1960s often consisted of great hardships. A migrant would head towards his destination with little more than the address of a coffee shop where he might find others who had migrated from his village.

> He was so unsure of his future that he even carried his mattress bundled up on his back along with a bag of food. Under these insecure conditions, migration was first undertaken by the household head and the rest of the family stayed to keep up the fight for subsistence until the household head could raise sufficient income to summon them.[152]

Early migration was termed *gurbetçilik* (seasonal migration, or literally "away in strange lands.") that increasingly acquired a more permanent character. While a *gurbetçi* (seasonal migrant) would initially stay only for a short period, a greater number of migrants chose to settle in the metropoles. Over time they would facilitate the migration of other family members and friends. Factors such as friends and family who had already moved, as well as higher wages in the city served as the motivation for early migrants.[153]

An example of internal migration before the 1950s was from the Black Sea region, an area that had maintained seaborne routes to Istanbul. The entire Black

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[151] Kyle T. Evered. "Symbolizing a Modern Anatolia: Ankara as Capital in Turkey's Early Republican Landscape." Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 28, No 2, 2008, pp 338, 339.
[152] Şenyapılı, "Economic Change," p. 238.
[153] Karpat, *The Gecekondu,* p. 54.

Sea region had regularly sent out migrants to live in Istanbul, given the ease of sailing there from any of the major Black Sea cities. Provinces near to Ankara and Izmir had also long sent out seasonal migrants to these major cities in order to help support families back in the village. The prevalence of *gurbetçilik* indicates that the migration decision was not primarily one of individual choice, but rather can be viewed as a family attempting to diversify their risk portfolio with extra income from remittances and urban connections.[154]

When migration began in earnest there was little done to prepare for the flood of migrants. In lieu of any formal or informal organizations designed to assist migrants, new arrivals were left almost entirely to their own devices. As a result new migrants were greeted with a level of fear by urbanites, and initial studies of migration focused primarily on reassuring urban dwellers that migration to the metropoles could not increase to the level that it inevitably would, and that peasants were capable of become urbanites.[155]

The hostility felt towards urbanward migrants is not specific to Turkey, but can be seen in migrations elsewhere in the world from 1950 to 1980, and also contemporary migrations. "Since the mid—1970s, opposition to immigration has been on the rise," and "has come to perceived as a burden and even an outright threat to economic growth and the welfare state."[156] The interest in finding a way to "drastically reduce" migration is often due to the fear of a lack of housing or jobs.

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[154] Çağlar Keyder, "Paths of Rural Transformation in Turkey," *ESA Working Paper*, no. 11 (1980), p 6.
[155] Karpat, "The Genesis of the Gecekondu," § 29.
[156] Furthermore, "in the post-9/11 era, latent feelings that non-Western immigrants also form an internal threat to social cohesion, cultural coherence, and security of Western societies have increased." de Haas, "Turning the Tide?," p. 2.

Although according to current theory, the chain of causality is that migration begets jobs and not the other way around.[157]

What distinguishes the metropoles of Turkey from other urban settlements is their unique capacity to absorb migration. While all urban areas in Turkey began experiencing high rates of in-migration after 1950, smaller urban areas would also experience a similarly high level of out-migration. As a result a regional center would grow from the influx of peasants from rural areas within the province, but then would shrink, as many of the new arrivals would continue to other cities. Out-migration was lowest in the largest cities and highest in the smallest cities, setting the stage for an unbalanced urban system.[158] A possible explanation for this is the difficulty in creating social capital networks inside large cities. Although there is evidence that people from the same region, *hemşehri* (from the same region) maintain social ties, they may not be able to convert these ties into financial capital that would allow a move elsewhere.[159]

As a result of this fast paced movement, the network of now interconnected Turkish cities served to exacerbate the scale of migration. Only the largest cities,

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[157] Castles, p. 1.

[158] Ayşe Gedik, "The Effects of In- and Out-Migration on Urban Growth in Turkey (1965-85) And a Comparison with the Developed Countries," *Papers in Regional Science: The Journal of the RSAI* 71, no. 4 (1992), p. 413.

[159] A study on "new" poverty in Istanbul found that migrants arriving after 1990 have been faced with a more difficult time integrating into urban life than their predecessors. The difficulty is due to a growing formalization of city life and an end to the informal networks that characterized and aided earlier migrants. Especially migrants from the Southeast of Turkey for which "returning to where they have come from can only be a dream," given that their former homes may have been destroyed by war. Essentially, integration into urban society has become increasingly problematic for new arrivals, a problem that specifically leads to poverty. For more information see Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, *New Poverty and the Changing Welfare Regime of Turkey*, (United National Development Programme, 2003), p. 23.

and the metropoles at that, were capable of holding a significant proportion of migrants. For example, between 1955 and 1960 the province of Ankara received 876 percent more migrants than it sent out.[160] Likewise, in 1965 Ankara received over 500,000 new migrants, and only given off 59,000. Istanbul received almost 1,000,000 new migrants over the same time frame, only sending out 108,000; Izmir received 231,000 migrants and only sent off 58,000.[161]

Ankara grew to act as a bulwark for Istanbul, working as a stopgap measure to prevent the full weight of all the migrants from falling directly on it. "Why do most of the scholars and policy makers perceive the problem of uneven population distribution to be how to affect the 'destination' choice of rural outmigrants," asks Gedik. Instead she argues "the problem is how to 'hold-absorb' the rural inmigrants once they migrate to an urban area." In-migration was high in all urban across the country, but with nearly equal outflow. The "three metropolises," however, "had the minimum urban-to-urban outmigration rates." [162]

The Marshall Plan

The U.S. included Turkey in its final draft of the Marshall Plan in 1948. The Plan was a multifaceted aid program designed to rebuild Western Europe, create a

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[160] Tümertekin, p. 108.
[161] This data was obtained from the 1965 census accounting for "people who lived in regions other than those in which they were born." The data doesn't have the same degree of reliability as the 1970 census that provided an account for where migrants had been five years ago, and where they were now. Still, there is no other statistical source from which to draw data. For more information see: Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, pp. 44-45.
[162] Ayşe Gedik, "Rural to Urban Versus Urban to Urban Migration in Population Growth of Urban Places in Developing Countries: Case Study of Turkey, 1965-1970," in *Families in the Face of Urbanisation* (New Delhi, 1985), p. 12.

functional capitalist market, and to suppress communist ideology.[163] The plan officially was operational from 1948 to 1952, although aid continued through 1962.[164] The Marshall Plan is historically tied to two major developments in the Turkish economy. The first, being the mechanization of agriculture, is often overstated in its importance. The second underappreciated development, the construction of a national highway system had a tremendous impact on migration.[165]

The Marshall Plan began by sending Turkey 28 million dollars in 1948, expanding to 59 million dollars by 1950, and ending in 50 million dollars in 1951 when the Plan drew to a close. Considering that Turkey's GDP in 1950 and 1951 was 10.4 million and 12.3 million Turkish lira respectively, approximately 21 million dollars, this investment represented a significant influx of aid, especially of much needed foreign currency reserves.[166]

"Agriculture was one of the most crucial areas for the implementation of the Marshall Plan in Turkey." In 1948 and 1949 over 23 million dollars were allocated to the agricultural sector, with approximately 70% of this money spent on tractor purchases.[167] This money allowed Turkey to import 8,980[168] new tractors. Given

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[163] Burcu Birinci, "The Marshall Plan in Turkey: A Critical Evalutation of United States' Interests in the Plan and Its Effects on the Republic" (MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007), pp. 46-48.
[164] *Ibid.*, p. 53.
[165] Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 224-225.
[166] Shorter et al. pp. 134-135.
[167] Birinci, p. 72.
[168] The table below gives a more complete picture of the speed and extent of Turkish mechanization. The true impact of this mechanization is debatable, with some sources claiming that it was one of the driving forces in creating a large number of landless, jobless potential migrants. While other sources claim that the effects of mechanization were limited, as it was generally used within the existing social and economic order. This thesis

that most agricultural production was still being done with an iron plow, this level of mechanization would create a surplus labor force as well as allow intensive farming and the accumulation of a greater surplus.[169]

Indeed, data published by the Turkish Directorate General of Statistics showed only a steady growth in agricultural production. These basic statistics show neither a sudden collapse in farm production that might precipitate a rush to the cities, or a boom resulting from mechanization that would leave millions unemployed. Owen and Pamuk support this assertion, arguing "the domestic terms of trade remained favorable to agricultural because of the government price support policies, allowing the rural producers to hold on to their gains until 1957."[170] Furthermore, "strong increases in agricultural incomes," combined with an

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comes down on the side of the argument that agriculture mechanization and intensification undoubtedly destroyed many livelihoods, but it did not do so to such a degree that would explain the volume of Turkey's internal migrations. The table was originally from an Agricultural Statistics Summary (S.I.S. 1967: 7 and 1970: 24, 25); quoted in Adnan Güriz, "Land Ownership in Rural Settlements," in *Turkey Geographic and Social Perspectives*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 88. See next page footnote for the table.

Increase in Mechanization: 1936 to 1967		
Years	No. Tractors	No. of Harvesters
1936	961	104
1940	1,066	57
1948	1,750	994
1952	31,415	3,222
1957	44,144	6,523
1962	43,747	6,072
1967	74,982	7i840
1970	105,865	8,568

[169] Omer Celal Sarc, "Growth of the Turkish Rural Population," *Middle Eastern Affairs* 3, no. 3 (March 1952), p. 75.
[170] Şevket Pamuk and Roger Owen, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century* (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1998, p. 108.

expansion in cultivated land, especially among small peasant landholders, in no way suggests significant deprivation in rural areas that would create the need for migration.[171]

Table 2

Farm Production			
Product (in tons)	*1934-1938 (avg)*	*1950*	*1951*
Cereals	6,800,000	7,800,000	10,700,000
Cotton	55,000	118,000	155,000
Sugar beets	400,000	855,000	1,350,000
Potatoes	173,000	605,000	670,000

Source: "Facts and Figures," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol 3, no. 3 (March 1952), p. 93.

Although it is natural to expect that these tractors might have a large impact on agricultural production in Turkey, given that there were over 3 million agricultural holdings, it could not have had a transformative effect on the livelihoods of small peasant holdings.[172] Further studies on the effect of farm mechanization, one that was carried out in 1954 and survey 3,015 farms, found there was no "powerful labour displacement effects."[173]

As a result of increases in population and the growth of market forces, agricultural production continued to increase, but only incrementally due to advances in machinery and modern intensive cultivation techniques. The "annual value of agricultural production rose by 45 percent over the decade [1950-1960]; but this increase did not come from generally higher productivity, for the amount of land under cultivation had meanwhile increased by 56 percent." Through this we see the expansion but not intensification of agriculture. Although farm

[171] Pamuk and Owen, p. 108.
[172] Sarc, p. 75.
[173] Shorter et al., p. 66.

mechanization may have allowed some leeway in sending migrants off to the cities, it by no means constituted a driving force of migration.[174]

Road Building

Ultimately, it was road building not agricultural aid that proved the Marshall Plan's most lasting contribution to migration in Turkey during the post-War period. A secondary component of the Marshall Plan was the allocation of funds to highways construction and improvement projects. The United States Commissioner of Public Roads was involved in the drafting of a new highway plan for Turkey, an abrupt departure from the railway-centered policy of the state throughout the previous decades.[175]

Prior to 1950 there existed significant barriers to mobility due to an insufficient transportation system. The railways system that had been developed during the single party era was designed for "strategic and military purposes instead of economic ones."[176] The roads that existed were often impassable during the winter and rainy seasons so much so that out of the 44,186 kilometers of roads in Turkey, only "half the national road mileage was capable of being traversed safely by ordinary motor vehicles."[177]

The single party era was determined to link the entire country with a modern transportation system, but one that could be held under the central control of the

[174] Rivkin, pp 102-103.
[175] Herbert J. Cummings, "Highway Program," *Middle Eastern Affairs*, Vol 3, no. 3 (1952), p. 94.
[176] Birinci, p. 150.
[177] *Ibid.*, p. 152.

state. The obvious choice was the railroad, and railroad construction was intensively pursued during this era. Technically, the growth of railroads was successful in linking every part of the country. But it did not do so in a way that was easily accessible or affordable.

The growth of railways in the single party era was focused almost exclusively on furthering agricultural production. Throughout the 1930s a full eight to nine percent of government expenditures were solely devoted to railway construction.[178] The goal was to use railways to expand agricultural exports and to allow the military to penetrate throughout the country. Access to existing transportation infrastructure remained exceedingly difficult due to limited port facilities and a lack of feeder roads to railway heads.[179]

Turkey did not lack roads in general, but rather an integrated all-weather road system. What roads existed were often slight improvements on old caravan routes. They were loosely graded, unpaved, and frequently impassable. Even prior to 1948 no single major road running out of Ankara was passable for the entire year. Inclement weather, from floods to snow, could entirely sever road connections across the country.[180]

The year 1950 brought an end to RPP control of the country, and the rise of the DP removed any political or social barrier to migration. More significant was the Marshall aid funds and advisors creating a new highway system for Turkey. The difference between a railroad system devoted to freight and a highway system

[178] Sarc, p. 75.
[179] Tekçe, p.89.
[180] Cummings, p. 95.

devoted to passengers is night and day. It is not even a question why migration was so low during the one party period. "In 1948 a nation of some 20,00,000 people was being served by 28,390 kilometers of national and provincial highways, whereas an area of comparable size…in the United States with a population of only 6,000,000 had approximately 87,800 kilometers of federal and state highways."[181]

While in 1952 Turkey possessed 7,600 kilometers of railway, this was entirely owned and operated by the state. Passenger trains ran when, where, and if the state decided to operate them. Many villages and towns that were in the general of vicinity of a railway head still lacked the necessary feeder roads to guarantee access to and from the station. As a result, traveling between smaller cities, towns, and villages was irregular, expensive, and uncertain.[182]

As a result of the aggressive highway construction program, the cost and ease of movement became easier and cheaper. What originally had been longer and more arduous journeys, became more and more well-traveled routes. The mobility shift upwards, as Zelinsky argues, was the result of a developing and modernizing society. As mobility increased in Turkey, migration rates did likewise. [183]

Improving road conditions led to a longer lifespan for vehicles, and a reduction in the necessity of foreign exchange to replace spare parts. Cummings notes that the number of buses registered in Turkey jumped 90% in the three years between 1947 and 1950, and the number of passenger cars increased by 110%.

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[181] Cummings, p. 94.
[182] Sarc, p. 73.
[183] Zelinsky, pp. 222-223.

Table 3

Travel Times and Cost: 1949-51					
Road from Ankara to-	*Travel time (Hrs. by bus)*		*Passenger rate (Turkish lira)*		*Reduction*
	1949	*1951*	*1949*	*1951*	*%*
Istanbul	18	14	15	10	33%
Kayseri	11	9	8.5	6	30%
Zonguldak	14	9	15	9	40%
Samsun	20	16	16	11	31%
Konya	9	5	10	5	50%
Source: Cummings, p. 95.					

Table 4

Number of Motor Vehicles by Selected Provinces				
Province	*1947*		*1950*	
	Passenger Cars	*Buses*	*Passenger Cars*	*Busses*
Istanbul	2,052	195	4,495	346
Konya	47	48	86	81
Elazig	27	11	35	5
Adana	135	53	256	81
Izmir	387	142	950	318
Samsun	78	36	114	60
Trabzon	49	32	104	66
Source: Cummings, p. 96.				

Cummings claims "within the space of three short years more passengers…are being moved more miles for less money than at any time in the history of Turkey."[184] Tekçe agrees with this assessment, with her own data showing an extraordinary growth in the numbers of kilometers being traveled on the roads of Turkey.

[184] Cummings, p. 96.

Table 5

Passengers 1948-1960 (Millions of person kilometers)								
	Railroads		*Roads*		*Airlines*		*Maritime*	
Years	*Pas-kms*	*% total transit*	*Pas-kms*	*%*	*Pas-kms*	*%*	*Pas-kms*	*%*
1948	2546	67.8	1211	32.2	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
1950	2516	45.7	2597	47.2	n.a.	n.a.	389	7.0
1955	3917	25.8	10831	71.4	64	0.4	361	2.4
1960	4396	28.0	10880	69.3	115	0.7	304	1.9
Source: Tekçe, p. 92.								

By the end of the 1950s and the *pre-concentration period*, the number of passenger kilometers increased from 2.6 million in 1950 to nearly 11 billion in 1960. Within the span of a decade roads had entirely reversed the dominance of railways as the main conduit of transportation in Turkey. Areas that had previously only been accessible through difficult terrain were now connected year round to the major transit centers. These tables show the rapid development of bus and taxi services designed to allow people to quickly and cheaply migrate across the country. The sudden leap in available means of transportation, once the highway system was in place, is another example of cumulative causation. Transportation enables migration in ways that it could not previously exist. But this level of transportation would never have developed without the market demand already created by migration. Initially it would appear that migration caused a spike in available bus and taxi routes. However, after this initial point both migration and number of cars and buses led to subsequent increases in the other.

What is known is that with the highway program of the 1950s, the availability of transit increased 100%, and the number of passengers increased by a factor of ten. In her thesis Birinci specifically notes the *facilitating* factor that

transport played in mediating migrations. "What mainly promoted the mobility of the Turkish population, migration and cultural diffusion was the highway program." Although "the Marshall Plan cannot be claimed as the main initiator of the urbanization process…it is clear that the Marshall Plan and its policies had a *facilitating and accelerating* effect on it." [emphasis added] In this manner the development of highways proved to have a long-term effect on enabling and promoting migration networks.[185]

Urbanization 1960-1980

The *pre-concentration* period from 1950-1960 was of a markedly different character from the intensified urbanization process that last twenty years from 1960 to 1980. The year 1960 is especially significant, with a military coup overturning the Democrat Party government. The Democrats had specifically sought to develop urban areas within the interior as a way of lessening growing migration pressures and maintaining their promise of "a good life for all." Despite the best intentions of the development program, migrations become increasingly rapid and focused on the metropoles.[186]

This sudden spike in migration was a direct result of the planning under the Democrat party, which had emphasized the construction of highways and state-supported factories. As Rivkin notes, "the advantages of providing highways and unprofitable industries to declining regions with little growth potential can be seriously questioned." Investment did not manage to raise standards of living in the

[185] Birinci, p. 197.
[186] Rivkin, p. 142.

countryside, and only provided the means by which the rural population could make their journey to Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir that would continue to draw an even more disproportionate share of migration.[187]

By the advent of this period of urbanization in 1960, the quality of village life was decidedly mixed. Basic social and transportation services were met, as one survey in 1967 showed 83.2% of villages had a mosque, and 72.7% had a primary school. Even 74.2% of villages had direct access outside of their village via a motor vehicle, showing how quickly automotive transportation had penetrated Turkey. On the other hand, only 36% of villages had running water, and a mere 23.9% of villages had a telephone.[188]

While mobility had increased and allowed greater movement and migration, communication still remained a difficult problem. Although physical and practical migration barriers had been slowly torn down, psychological and social factors continued to have a limiting effect on internal migration. Although villagers could now move to the city more easily and for less money, their capacity to maintain communication with the village was limited.[189]

The Effects of Distance

A peasant in Turkey could travel and return from a journey of approximately 100 kilometers in one day. Within this distance migration volumes would be quite

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[187] Rivkin, pp. 142-143.
[188] Shorter et al., p. 20.
[189] For further discussion see Muzaffer Sherif, "Differential Contact with Modern Technology in Five Turkish Villages," *An Outline of Social Psychology*, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 692-701.

high given the general ease and security of travel. Examples include a 1965 migration stream of 3,042 people from Kirşehir to Yozgat (115 km), 851 people from Yozgat to Çorum (105 km), or 3,089 people from Giresun to Ordu over a mere forty-six kilometers. At distances greater than 100 kilometers however there is "a definite lack of significance in inter-subregional migration in Turkey."[190] An example of the lack of effect of distance would be there Samsun subregion, "where migration from nearby provinces to Istanbul is about 2 to 5 times in excess of that to Samsun, despite the fact that Istanbul in approximately 3 to 4 times farther away."[191] For migration from a village, town or city, to a destination that is *outside* of the province, the distance is simply not a factor.

The only way for distance not to be a factor is if either there is no cost related to distances beyond 100 kilometers, or if the cost of migration to all places beyond 100 kilometers is equal. By cost of migration this does not refer to the literal price of a ticket from Sivas to Istanbul or Izmir.[192] Rather the cost refers to the choice made by migrants, whether to make the journey or not at all. As discussed above in the theoretical section, costs include the opportunities lost versus the opportunities gained, as well as the very real risks faced by migrants upon entering an alien urban environment.

By costs beyond a day's journey of 100 kilometers, being equal, the risks of migrating would be equal regardless of destination. A migrant considering a move of either 200, 500, or even 1,000 kilometers would regard the distances as equally

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[190] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 50.
[191] *Ibid*.
[192] Approximately twenty to fifty liras at 1965 prices. See Şanlı et al. for more details.

risky and instead choose where to migrate based on specific factor endowments of the destination.

Gedik offers further proof as to the unimportance of distance as a deciding factor for out-migrants. Although the province of Hakkari is one of the most distant, boasting an average trip length of 651 kilometers for arriving migrants, Istanbul in turn has the second longest trip length for in-migrants, approximately 506 kilometers. Despite the similarities in distance between the two cities, only 700 migrants chose to go to Hakkari in 1965 while 100,000 in-migrants were reported in Istanbul. Izmir, the smallest of the three metropoles, has an average in-migration distance of 456 kilometers, and Ankara's average journey clocks in at 277 kilometers.[193]

What Gedik describes as most significant is the interaction between villages, the centers of the province in which they are located in, and then the interaction between various provinces and province centers. In a later paper Gedik notes that for the 1965-1970 period that

> A smooth functional relation with distance could not be maintained. Elasticity of migration with respect to distance disappears almost totally after a very short distance, that is the distance from the villages to their own province center. In other words, after an average of 40 km., migrants move in a leap-frog fashion towards one of the three metropolitan areas regardless of the distances involves. **Socio-psychological distances seem to be more meaningful than physical distances**.[194] (emphasis added)

The pattern that Gedik describes is one where only two locations exist: the metropoles, and the specific province center. Certainly, migrants have a definite

[193] Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," p. 118.
[194] Ayşe Gedik, "Internal Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985: Test of Some Conflicting Findings in the Literature," *Working Papers in Demography*, no. 66 (1996), p. 11.

propensity to migrate to the nearest urban province center. However, once that move has been completed or is undesirable, then the second choice is overwhelmingly a move to the metropoles.

Only in which metropole will migrants end up in does distance appear to have an effect. Gedik gives the example that "provinces in Eastern and especially in Northern Turkey have been sending migrants to Istanbul. On the other hand, beginning with the establishment of Ankara as capital of the nation, provinces in eastern-Central Turkey sent their migrants to Ankara, the metropolis nearest to their own province."[195]

Despite a small difference in figures, ultimately creating a definite radius of between forty to 100 kilometers of social and psychological comfort, it is clear that physical distance has little to do with the risks and choices involved with migration. By this period transit links had become so well established that the choice of where to migrate no longer had to correspond to one particular railway route, but rather could involve the entire map.

Istanbul as the Golden City

Table 6

Passengers 1960-1967 (Millions of person kilometers)								
	Railroads		*Roads*		*Airlines*		*Maritime*	
Years	*Pas-kms*	*% total transit*	*Pas-kms*	*%*	*Pas-kms*	*%*	*Pas-kms*	*%*
1960	4396	28.0	10880	69.3	115	0.7	304	1.9
1965	4075	12.9	27200	86.0	163	0.5	204	0.6
1967	4301	11.4	33000	87.6	216	0.6	170	0.4
Source: Tekçe, p. 92.								

[195] Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," p. 127.

The first limiting factor to migration was the range of social and psychological comfort. The general accessibility of information in Turkey played a secondary limiting factor. If migrants were to abandon their homes and villages, it would have to be due to knowledge of the opportunities that awaited them in the cities and metropoles. Certainly mobility had continued to increase from the stagnant situation before the 1950s, to a giant increase in the number of cars and buses shuttling people around the country.

As a result both the rate of migration, as well as the speed at which migrants were able to move into the metropoles increased significantly. What changed however was that it became far more channelized in terms of destination. Tümertekin noted in 1968 "the immigrants that go to settlements with a population of 10,000 or more, are more than sixty percent male. Yet, those who go to settlements with a population of less than 10,000 are just over half male. This situation probably occurs because, those who migrate to rural settlements mostly go with their families while, men go mainly alone to cities."[196]

The majority of early migrants were male. Young men were far more risk-taking and willing and capable to make the longer journeys to the metropoles, while families required a greater number of intermediary factors to complete their journey. A family that had decided to move would require more than just a bus ticket to Istanbul, but rather needed an entire support network to complete the move.

[196] Tümertekin, p. 152.

Chain migration is a particular aspect of internal migration. Rather than a series of short migrations set against a few long-range flows, channels began opening between smaller cities and the receiving metropoles and larger cities. As earlier as 1968 Tümertekin saw the possibility for migration to move "in stages, from village to town, from town to city, and from city to big cities." This combination of long-range migrations and short-range stops, all led to the metropoles.[197]

Step Migrations

Migrations can occur as either a singular movement from one place to another, or a set of migration steps progressing over time to a final destination. Multiple step migrations allow migrants "to gather information over several stages of their movement to their final urban destination." Smaller cities were not actually attracting migrants, but were being used as transit points on the way to the metropoles.[198]

Even if a small city had been the intended destination for a family, it was there that they were far more likely to hear news about Istanbul or Ankara. A key factor in accelerating urbanization was the belief that the standard of living in the major cities was greater than anywhere else. The result was that smaller cities

[197] Tümertekin, p. 144.
[198] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 54.

worked as intermediary points, "stepping stones" to the major cities that would prove the final destination for migrants.[199]

Table 7

Rates of Population Growth by Urban Area, 1955-1980[200]				
Period	*Large Metropolis*	*Smaller Metropolis*	*Medium Urban Center*	*Small Urban Center*
1955-1960	0.054	0.046	0.055	**0.064**
1960-1965	0.049	**0.057**	0.044	0.041
1965-1970	0.051	**0.057**	0.054	0.050
1970-1975	**0.054**	0.048	0.047	0.042
1975-1980	0.035	**0.051**	0.043	0.040
Source: Gedik, "Differential Urbanization in Turkey," p. 14.				

Seen in the figure above, previous high rates of growth during the *pre-concentration* period were replaced by growth in the metropolitan areas of Turkey for a period of two decades from 1960 to 1980. Small cities continued to grow, but would never surpass the rate at which Turkey's largest cities were increasing in size.

[199] Including cities such as Akçakoca, Diyarbakir, Ankara, Samsun, Ezurum, Edirne, Izmir, Adana, Bursa, Konya, Sivas, Zonguldak, Malatya, and Eskişehir. These cities offered more than just transit, which was quickly becoming a flat commodity anyways. They had better access to newspapers, television, and telephones. They also offered job opportunities for migrants saving money to make the final leap to the metropoles. There existed a very difficult balancing act at the time, between heightened expectations of the quality of life in Istanbul, and the reality of squatter housing throughout the major cities. See Şanlı et al. for more information.

[200] For the purposes of this table, a large metropolis has more than 1,000,000 inhabitants, a smaller metropolis has between 500,000 and 1,000,000 inhabitants, a medium urban center has between 250,000 and 500,000 inhabitants, and a small urban center has between 125,000 and 250,000 inhabitants. Gedik, "Differential Urbanization in Turkey," p. 14.

The fact that the largest cities were further increasing in size proved difficult for older theories to explain. Rather than reach a point of equilibrium the urban landscape in Turkey became increasingly unbalanced. A reliance on push-pull theory, a mainstay of early studies, was becoming increasingly difficult to justify in the face of continued migration to the metropoles. There are two reasons for this difficulty, namely in that a push-pull theory depends upon differential factors between areas. Migrants move from unattractive areas to more attractive ones, with the difference between the origin and destination accounting for the size and speed of the migration flow.

Urban areas could offer considerably more to migrants than life in the village, but it's difficult to use the push-pull model to explain the superiority of the metropoles over other urban centers.[201] The fact is that with continued migration, the standard of living fell in Istanbul. By the late 1960s only "2 percent of gecekondu [squatter] settlements had city water, 11 percent had electricity…and 24 percent had baths." Heating was limited to wood stoves and the roads in these settlements were unpaved, so they would become "impassable at the first gust of rain." It is difficult to imagine the deprivation, relative or otherwise, that would make these circumstances seem enticing.[202]

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[201] Gedik notes, "During 1965-70, 75-80, and 80-85 the three metropolises had the largest population as well as the largest number of rural in-migrants. The three metropolises comprised between 52-54 per cent of the total permanent resident population of the 67 urban centers; and attracted between 52-60 per cent of all rural-to-urban in-migrants. Gedik, "Migration and Urban Growth," p. 109.
[202] Karpat, *The Gecekondu,* p. 94.

Perception of Income in the Metropoles

Income has always been higher in urban areas, whether in the unorganized or organized sectors, when compared to agricultural (rural), unorganized jobs. Although agricultural incomes continued to grow throughout the 1960s, they were left far behind non-agricultural jobs. In the table below it is evident that agricultural jobs simply did not have anywhere near the earning potential of all other job types in Turkey.

Table 8

Per Capita Income by Sectors (in Turkish Liras)		
Years	Agriculture	Non-Agriculture
1950	507.32	1,148.84
1955	581.93	1,383.46
1960	760.35	2,842.01
1965	820.00	2,101.59
Source: Geray, p. 165.		

Past studies treated all migrants as job seekers and rational individuals who were incentivized by profit, rather than looking for an urban quality of life in terms of access to healthcare, education, and entertainment.[203] This profit seeking took the form of perusing the highest *expected wage* available in the country, rather than *actual* or *average* wage.

Looking at economic rather than social variables, Tekçe advances the Todaro migration model by using a destination employment approach. She argues:

[203] Various survey have returned answers as to why migrants moved to a city. These answers include a giving their children a better life, the cosmopolitan nature of a city, "refuge for a potential victim of a vendetta, to provide a respite for the unsuccessful, or even to harbor a person who is seen as a criminal." While all these answers may be true for various individuals, they still fail to provide any sort of rule of guide as to why and how migration occurs. For specific references see Şanlı et. al., p. 80.

> Migration…occurs to secure improvements in employment activities. Employment refers to being engaged in income-producing activities. Improvement means obtaining a job with higher productivity, higher wages, better conditions of work, and grater security. Thus employment is not viewed simply as an end in itself, but also in terms of improvements in content, conditions, and income from lifetime work activity.[204]

The theory states that migration responds primarily to the income disparity between regions in the country and sectors of the economy. Although it was the highest wages in the organized sector that attracted migrants, their chances of acquiring these jobs were low. By the mid-1960s crossing the country was both cheap and easy, but finding a high paying job was not. Migrants found a labor market split between an organized sector offering high pay and benefits, and the unorganized sector "The unorganized sector is an urban equivalent in productivity and work organization to peasant agriculture. Work sharing keeps earnings only a little higher or about the same as for laborers in nearby rural areas." Resultantly unorganized sector jobs were the most common, yet offered the small gain over agricultural labor.[205]

If employment in the unorganized sector was scarce encouragement for migrants, then it was the better-off organized sector that served to draw migrants to the major cities. Still, the existence of well-paying jobs in the organized sector by no means signified availability, or the ability of peasant migrants to fill these openings. Migrants had to carefully weigh their chances at acquiring improved employment at any number of possible destinations.

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[204] Tekçe, p. 148.
[205] *Ibid*., p. 155.

Upon arrival to a new destination a migrant would assume one of three roles: underemployment—an analogue to unemployment in the developed world—employment in the inferior unorganized sector, or employment within the organized sector. Of these three categories, the first two were by far the most likely. From the unorganized sector migrants entered into a competition with all other urban job seekers for a limited pool of desirable jobs. Although the actual chance of acquiring a good job might be low, the opportunity to do so was hugely attractive.[206]

The keystone of this argument is not the actual wage differentials between rural and urban employment, and even the real chances of acquiring a better job, but rather the migrants' perception as to their chances of getting a job. Much like the lottery, even if time and money would be better spent—at least in the short term—in improving one's situation in the village, the lure of striking it rich it the city should prove the deciding factor in migration.

Through statistical analysis, Tekçe finally concludes that there exists a tremendous degree of migratory sensitivity to wage differences among cities. From 1955 to 1965 the sensitivity of migration to expected earning potential doubled. Therefore "even slight improvements in expected urban earnings for any particular city relative to others will make a substantial reorientation of the urbanward migration to that city."[207] The degree to which marginally higher wages interacts with cumulative causation is interesting. As more migrants served to create more jobs at a higher wage, the sensitivity of later migrants would naturally lead them to

[206] Tekçe, p. 161.
[207] *Ibid.*, p. 167.

gravitate towards centers of migration. In this way migration and economic growth fed each other.[208]

The powerful effect of slight differences in earning potential can be seen in the growing channelization of migration flows towards the larger cities. As earning factors play a spoiler role in destination choice, the number of destinations narrow dramatically to the metropoles and few other major cities. Although other destinations might have offered an equivalent lifestyle, they were simply not considered when placed against Istanbul, Ankara, or Izmir.

During this era, a saying became famous that Istanbul was the land of opportunity *: Istanbul'un taşı toprağı altındır* (Even the stones and soil of Istanbul are golden). If economic considerations were to outweigh all others, and if Istanbul offered the greatest opportunities, then it would receive the greatest share of migrants. Of course this saying could, and would, be applied to Ankara and Izmir. All three cities suffered disproportionate amounts of migration relative to the marginal economic and social benefits that they could provide. [209]

During the urbanization period between 1960 and 1980, the number of people living in urban areas increased dramatically, as did a simultaneous growth in the population sizes of large cities. What the data clearly shows is that after 1960, growth became explosive in the urban areas or Turkey. From 1960 to 1970 the percent of the population living in urban areas jumped from 25.9 percent to 33.2 percent, a gain of more than seven percent. The percent of urbanization increased then another twelve percent, from 33.2 percent to 45.4 percent from 1970 to 1980.

[208] Muth, p. 296.
[209] Rivkin, p. 28.

In a span of thirty short years Turkey had been transformed from a largely rural country to one soon to be dominated by its urban cityscapes. [210]

Rise of the Metropoles

There is a qualitative difference in the type of migration that occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, and that of the 1970s and 1980s. While the pre-concentration period was largely concerned with overcoming barriers to migration and forging new beacheads in Istanbul and Ankara, the later decades involved capitalizing on the connections made by migrants that had gone before.

Communication played two integral roles, first in better facilitating contact between successful migrants and their relatives and friends in the villages and small cities. Secondly, the rise of mass communication would serve to inflate expectations about the advantages of life in a big city. The focus was never on the real advantages available to migrants, which in fact were limited, but rather the perceived advantage of living in the largest, most important cities.

Table 9

Urban and Rural Population: 1927-1980

Year	Total Population	Urban Population	Percent Urban	Rural Population	Percent Rural
1927	13,648,000	2,236,000	16.4	11,412,000	83.6
1940	17,821,000	3,234,000	18.1	14,586,000	81.9
1950	20,947,000	3,884,000	18.5	17,063,000	81.5
1960	27,755,000	7,189,000	25.9	20,566,000	74.1
1970	35,605,000	11,821,000	33.2	23,784,000	66.8
1980	44,737,000	20,330,000	45.4	24,406,000	54.6

Source: Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985), p. 28.

[210] Danielson and Keleş, p. 51.

Under our current theoretical model, the effect of this perceived advantage is immediately obvious. While urban population only captures the number of people living in areas with more than 10,000-20,000 inhabitants, it fails to show the growing unequal distribution of migrants. Rather than consider all destinations equally, the perceived value of the metropoles grew to outweigh all other choices. While in the pre-concentration period a large percentage of migrants moved to smaller cities, migration trends would irreversibly focus on large cities.

From the data below, the percent of urban population relative to the size of the urban area can be determined. Although in the 1950s and 1960s growth is highly concentrated in cities between 10,000-20,000 inhabitants, and 20,000-50,000, by the 1970s and 1980s the proportion of urban dwellers living in cities of 100,000 inhabitants or more had come to almost twice the number of all other urban inhabitants.

Table 10

Distribution of the Urban Population by City Size Groups: 1927-1980

	1927	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980
10,000-20,000	24.0	23.8	22.9	15.8	12.7	10.8
20,000-50,000	28.9	28.7	23.2	21.9	13.0	15.2
50,000-100,000	9.3	12.2	10.1	17.0	11.6	10.7
100,000+	37.8	35.3	43.8	45.3	56.7	63.3

Source: Danielson and Keleş, p. 51.

To further discuss this phenomenon of large city growth, it becomes clear that growth rates, and thereby migration, were not only highest in the large cities of Turkey, but even then primarily so in the largest cities. Istanbul would grow over four times its original size in the span of thirty years, and Ankara would grow over

six times over the same period. Even Izmir saw an increase in population proportionally identical to Istanbul, as did Adana and Bursa—although these began with considerably smaller population bases.

Table 11

The Growth of Turkey's Five Largest Cities: 1950-1980					
	1950 (000)	1960 (000)	1970 (000)	1980 (000)	Growth Index (1950=100)
Istanbul	983	1,467	2,132	4,433[211]	451
Ankara	289	650	1,236	1,878	650
Izmir	228	361	521	1,096	481
Adana	118	232	347	575	487
Bursa	104	154	276	445	428
Source: Danielson and Keleş, p. 50.					

Table 12

Relative Growth of Istanbul's Population					
Years	Turkey National Total	Turkey Urban Total	Istanbul	Istanbul's Share in National Total %	Istanbul's Share in National Urban %
1945	18,790,174	4,687,102	1,078,399	5.7	19.4
1950	20,947,188	5,244,337	1,166,477	5.6	19.1
1955	24,064,754	6,687,102	1,533,822	6.4	18.7
1960	27,754,820	8,859,731	1,802,092	6.8	17.0
1965	31,391,421	10,805,817	2,293,823	7.3	16.6
1970	35,605,176	13,691,101	3,019,032	8.5	16.1
1975	40,236,826	16,869,068	3,903,650	9.7	15.7
1980	44,736,826	21,993,318	4,741,890	10.7	21.6
Source: Keyder and Öncu, p.16					

By the end of this period of urbanization in 1980 a significant proportion of the country lived within the metropoles. At the start of internal migration the population of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir had only totaled 1.5 million, merely seven percent of the total population of the country. By the end of the pre-concentration

[211] Approximately 1.6 million people were added by the official incorporation of twenty-five suburbs into Istanbul city proper. Danielson and Keleş, p. 50.

period this number had increased by a multiple of five and the metropoles encompassed a tremendous amount of urban in-migration.

The key to the growth of the metropoles was not due to significantly higher rates of in-migration than elsewhere in the country. All urban areas were receiving large amount of in-migration, and for many years small and medium sized cities actually received a higher proportion of in-migrants than the largest cities. What the metropoles excelled at was in terms of absorbing migration.[212]

Even by 1980, migrations cannot be characterized as unidirectional. Most urban areas in Turkey were seeing a rise population due to migration. Counter to both push-pull theory and the Todaro paradox, in-migration was high all around. It is only in terms of out-migration that a significant difference can be observed. Gedik states:

> Prosperous urban centers with high net in-migration were characterized by low out-migration rather than by high in-migration rates, whereas depressed areas with high out-migration rates were characterized by high out-migration rather than by low in-migration rates. The urban centers with high net in-migration and those with high net out-migration do not differ from each other in terms of their in-migration rates as much as they differ in their out-migration rates.[213]

Mushrooming Houses: Gecekondu Growth

One ubiquitous result of this migration was the blossoming of irregular housing throughout Turkey. These houses, termed gecekondu (literally "landed overnight"), were illegally constructed, lacked almost all of the conveniences of modern living, and formed the bulk of housing for new arrivals. Studies authorized

[212] Gedik, "Migration and Urban Growth," p. 110.
[213] Gedik, "The Effects of In- and Out-Migration," p. 409.

by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement found that "in the first half of the 1960s 59% of the population in Ankara, 45% in Istanbul and 33% in Izmir lived in irregular settlements." By the 1980s the numbers had increased to 55%, 70%, and 50% respectively.[214]

The gecekondu settlements were the natural result of a massive influx of population to urban areas, and the absolute lack of plan for where they might live. Original plans for Ankara had called for an absolute limit of 300,000 inhabitants.[215] But by 1960 the population of Ankara had already exceeded this limitation twice over, and would grow to six times its intended size by 1980. Two things might have independently saved the metropoles from becoming rapidly composed of gecekondu settlements: either swift government intervention, or else a well-functioning land and construction market.

State policy changed significantly in regards to the value of migrants. During the 1950s Turkey had only a few industries, and consequently had a very low demand for unskilled migrants. As a result "the migrants were unwanted elements in the urban economy. There were no economic functions that could be performed by the quality of labor they provided; they were uneducated, unskilled, with no experience of urban economic and social life."[216]

Although urban peasants were initially seen as a nuisance by public authorities, industrialization produced a need for surplus urban manpower. As a result the Turkish state increasingly saw migrants as a needed asset. The self-

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[214] Ayşe Buğra, "The İmmoral Economy of Housing in Turkey," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* Vol 22, no. 2 (2002), p. 307.
[215] Caner, pp. 56-57.
[216] Şenyapılı, "Economic Change," pp. 238-239

reliance of new migrants appealed to the elite, given their resourcefulness constructing their own houses and businesses, with little demand for aid from the state or their employer.[217]

The development of gecekondu settlements is another area which appears problematic until cumulative causality is correctly applied. A central concern about migration had been the lack of regular housing for new arrivals. Certainly, it can be argued that gecekondu settlements were no more than a stopgap measure. But more often than not gecekondu settlements evolved into regular neighborhood districts. Migrants were quite capable of transforming their human and social capital into financial capital. "The average migrant continued to have claims to some land in his village," write Pamuk and Owen, and this concept of independent ownership drove gecekondu construction. "More often than not he [a migrant] came to the urban area with sufficient resources to build an instant squatter house."[218]

Interestingly it was as early as 1948 the state had recognized the problem of a housing shortage at the advent of urbanward migration flows. Despite this early warning, the state's efforts to provide housing were generally limited to state employees, and therefore results were limited at best. This was not problematic however, as housing was by no means the limiting reactant to migration. Construction and development grew out of migration, not the other way around. Then, once housing developments and construction had become regularized, they

[217] Şenyapılı, "Economic Change," pp. 240-241.
[218] Pamuk and Owen, p. 117.

could offer better standards of living to new migrants, again increasing the rate of housing construction and migration.[219]

In the face of state inaction, gecekondu construction continued unabated, and by 1966 a Gecekondu Law was passed, effectively legalizing all existing settlements. This law would continue to be renewed, even up to the present to legalize new settlements.[220] Although this law solved the housing shortage problem that had been worrying Turkish academics for years, it also consolidated the status of the gecekondu as a permanent characteristic of the Turkish urban landscape, with all the flaws inherent.[221] Abysmal standards of living, dangerous construction methods, and a host of other problems would become endemic to the metropoles.[222]

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[219] Buğra, p. 308.

[220] The difficulty facing the Turkish government is the need to protect private property rights on one hand, with the tremendous pressure to find suitable housing for the tremendous influx of migrants. The gecekondu law—no. 775—allows buildings to remain on property that they don't own so long as they are literally built at night and then remain inhabited. By article two of this law it states: "the term gecekondu refers to illicit constructions, that were built regardless the general regulations and directives determining construction work requirements, regardless the soils on which building is permitted or not, regardless the fact that land do [sic] not belong to the builder and that *gecekondu* are being built without the owner's authorization." The intention of the law is clear enough in allowing the spread of illegal construction without requiring the intervention of the state or other legal authorities. This is also cognizant of the fact that these settlements presented a myriad of problems in terms of providing utilities, unsafe construction, and other hazards. For more information see Iossifidis.

[221] The history and culture of gecekondu settlements has generated a tremendous amount of academic interest over the years. Studies ranged from initial surveys of population and density, to the various forms of music and film that emerged out of these areas. With attention of course comes a point of view that life in the gecekondu was actually quite good, or at least better than earlier academics have portrayed. A quote from Robert Neuwirth's *Shadow Cities* (2006) book tells about life in one area: "In those early years, Selvi and her neighbours had to take a wheelbarrow and some plastic drums to a Nestle plant a bit more than a kilometer away to get water. The neighbours strung their own wires, looped from house to house, and stole electricity from poles on a nearby street that led to other factories. And they dug a pit between Selvi and her neighbour, where they placed a large plastic tank that functioned as their sewerage system." (Quoted in Iossifidis, p. 14.) The true quality of gecekondu life is not at stake for this thesis, although it does stand to reason that life in

The gecekondu phenomenon may be one of the more interesting byproducts of migration, it should by now means be taken as a process independent of migration. A quote from Şenyapılı shows the strength of gecekondu studies in analyzing the end result of migrations, but at the same time confusing them as a process inherent to Turkey: "as underlined in several squatter housing studies, the primary aim of squatter population was to be able to integrate to urban life. The three important components of this integration process involved a) a well-paying, steady urban job, b) a proper shelter and c) the achievement of urban lifestyle."[223] Certainly the gecekondu and migrant populations overlapped almost entirely, but the gecekondu must be seen as merely an urban adaptation to migration pressures, rather than a case-specific urban development.

What Şenyapılı does correctly identify in the above quote are the interests of urban in-migrants, and gecekondu dwellers by extension. Another study by Saran in the gecekondu settlements in Istanbul found considerable uneven development. Per-capita incomes generally increased for all residents in the gecekondu settlements over time, although certain factors such as literacy and education remained low—especially among women.[224]

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these shantytowns was sufficiently unpleasant so as not to avidly attract new settlers, at least by most standards.

[222] Umut Duyar-Kienast, *The Formation of Gecekondu Settlements in Turkey: the case of Ankara* (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2005), p. 34.

[223] Şenyapılı, "Charting the 'Voyage'," § 16

[224] Saran specifically studied the districts of Zeytinburnu, as well as Gültepe and Çağlayan in 1962 and 1963. It's a very thorough study of the condition of life in gecekondu settlements. However, it does leave some unanswered questions about whether migration networks had overall positive externalities in terms of income and quality of life, or whether additional migrants were degrading public goods and services to a significant degree. Other research tends to argue that overall high levels of migration caused considerable strain on urban infrastructure and services. Whether increases in per capita income, as Saran notes, were

Studies on the gecekondu districts have a habit of conflating historical fact with Yeşilcam Cinema sentiment. While the patterns of living and types of culture that emerged from these ghettos are interesting, they remain the byproduct of mass migrations and not the intended result. The gecekondu are not deliberately contrived by the "executive committee of the bourgeoisie," a la Marxist theory. The state was powerless to condemn and ultimately forced to condone these settlements. Although the gecekondu may act as a village within a city, the cultural aspect pales beneath the material pressures of inexorable migration to the metropoles.[225]

Table 13

Framework of Transformation of Squatter Housing Problems			
	1950-60	1960-70	1970-1980
Government Model	Nation state, welfare state	Nation state	Nation state questioned, rise of the local.
Dominant Urban Land Supply Model	Illegal invasion	Shared ownership	Housing cooperatives
Public Approach to the Squatter Housing Problem	Squatting is an illegal and dilapidated housing problem, elementary measures to stop or re-direct migrant flow, the problem is temporary, public housing, multi-party system starts political patronage	Housing sector is unproductive, squatting is a housing problem, central government intervenes through Law 775, legalizing and classifying existing stock, prohibiting new stock, political patronage expands	Populist subsidies to rural area, credit flow and subsidy to prices of agricultural products slows down rate of migration flow, cooperative organization in housing sector, squatter problem more and more identified with poverty, starts to lose its 'housing' connotation.
Source: Şenyapılı, "Charting the 'Voyage'," § 44.			

enough to offset this drop, is uncertain. Nephan Saran, "Squatter Settlement (Gecekondu) Problems in Istanbul," in *Turkey Geographic and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974).

[225] Karpat, "The Genesis of the Gecekondu," § 30.

It is in regards to the poverty of the gecekondu where migrant expectations play the greatest role. Many gecekondu residents responded in surveys that they preferred city life and intended to stay there. Despite initial hardship migrants insisted that city life, and life in the metropoles in particular, offered them the greatest benefit. This answer may have reflected a preference for long term gains, especially the benefits that their children could accrue. What is clear though is that migrants were deriving some other benefits from life in the city, not measured by the expected variables of work in the organized sector or a significantly higher standard of living. [226]

What can be said is that unorganized and chaotic migrations into the metropoles did result into significant hardship for those living in the metropoles. The gecekondu districts, as stated above, served to house the majority of new migrants[227], but under suboptimal conditions. Even by the early 1940s gecekondu

[226] Overwhelmingly respondents in a 1962 survey did not want to return, often due to the fact that they did not have anything in their village, or Istanbul was now where they made their living, or simply "it is better here than it is in the village." See below table for further data. Nephan Saran, "Squatter Settlement (Gecekondu) Problems in Istanbul," in *Turkey Geographic and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), pp 358-359.

Answers Received From Men and Women to: "Would you Like to Go Back to Your Village?" (Zeytinburnu, 1962)

	N	No		Yes		Not Certain	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
Total	6325	5985	94.6%	325	5.2%	15	0.2%
Men	2956	2762	93.4%	188	6.4%	6	0.2%
Women	3369	3223	95.7%	137	4.1%	9	0.2%

[227] Saran chooses to separate international migrants from national migrants in Zeytinburnu, but in that study as well as all others the near-total majority of gecekondu inhabitants are in-migrants in the sense that they are not native to the city of their residence. For further info see Saran, pp. 340-341. Also see Karpat, *The Gecekondu*.

development had begun in Istanbul and Ankara, and by 1980 nearly five million urban dwellers across Turkey were living in some form of irregular housing.

Table 14

Squatter Housing: 1945-1980				
	Number of Units	Percent of housing stock	Number of individuals	Percent of Urban Population
1945	10,000	4.0	40,000	1.4
1950	100,000	4.8	500,000	12.8
1955	170,000	6.5	850,000	13.5
1960	240,000	16.7	1,200,000	16.4
1965	430,000	22.9	2,150,000	22.9
1970	600,000	21.4	3,000,000	23.6
1980	950,000	21.1	4,750,000	23.4
Source: Danielson and Keleş, p. 42.				

Table 15

Squatter Housing in Ankara: 1950-1980			
	Number of Squatter Houses	Number of People Living in Squatter Housing	Percent of Urban Population Living in Squatter Housing
1950	12,000	62,400	21.8
1960	70,000	364,000	56.0
1970	144,000	748,000	60.6
1980	275,000	1,450,000	72.4
Source: Danielson and Keleş, p. 166.			

In terms of standards of living, most gecekondu settlements lacked the basic amenities of established urban districts. In response the city municipalities of the metropoles tried to extend utility services to the newly constructed gecekondu settlements. Basic services such as sewage, electricity, and water expanded rapidly during this period, as did the amount of public transportation offered. Expanding at an equal pace was the cost of funding ever-larger municipal services, which never could keep pace with the demand for them. By 1981 the State Institute Planning Organization noted that "Since the limited financial resources allocated to these

costly capital investments are far from being sufficient enough, the infrastructure deficit tends to grow at increasing rates ever year."[228]

Development of Communication

The Todaro model uses the concept of expected earnings, rather than actual chances of employment, to explain the paradox of continued labor migration in the face of greater and greater unemployment. While it has been demonstrated that migrants may be engaging in a form of actuarially unfair gambling, the degree of unfairness a migrant can tolerate is uncertain. Further accurately gauging a migrant's risk can prove difficult as well. The difficulty in proving the precise degree of risk puts the burden of analysis of a migrant's expected utility rather than probable utility.[229]

There are two primary sources to look at in terms of shaping expectations. Media plays a significant role, as does the presence and communication between migrants in the city with their friends and family still in the village, or migrants returning to the village. While it is difficult to gauge the content of the news and media at the time, at least not without an exhaustive study of those materials, what

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[228] State Planning Organization. *Urban Public Finance Policies*, Country Report II, SPO Pub. no. 1760, Social Planning Department Pub. no. 333 (Ankara: 1977), pp. 36. As quoted in Danielson and Keleş, p. 136.

[229] Katz and Stark use a method developed by Friedman and Savage to explain how an individual that is almost always risk adverse will ultimately decide to take risks. They come up with a set of circumstances they feel are compelling, which allow migrants to "gamble." This is one method of stretching the Todaro model, although they do admit "Friedman and Savage's explanation has been recognized as an essentially ad hoc formulation of the utility function created specifically to accommodate a bothersome economic phenomenon, namely, simultaneous gambling and insurance." Katz and Stark, p. 137. Also see M. Friedman and L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," *Journal of Political Economy* 56 (1948).

can be more easily determined is the difficulty with which media was acquired by those living in rural Turkey.

Gedik hypothesizes news media had a weak effect on potential migrants [230]because many villagers did not have "access to a newspaper and/or radio, or they may not receive the radio wave or they may not understand or accurately decode the language used in the radio broadcasts or newspapers. "[231] A later survey of villagers found supporting evidence that many people in rural areas were not able to get, or to understand much of the media at the time.

Table 16

Survey Results Obtained in the Developed and Less Developed Villages		
Factor	Developed Villages (avg.)	Underdeveloped Villages (avg.)
Listen to the radio once a week or more	66%	56%
Literacy Rate	52%	41%
Leave the village once a week or more	35%	26%
Source: Ahmet Tugaç, "Indices of Modernization," in *Turkey Geographic and Social Perspectives* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1974), p. 166.		

Table 17

Mass Media Consumption, Survey of Villagers		
	1962	1968
Listening to the radio once a week or more frequently	43%	59%
Listening to the radio daily	19%	40%
Villages without a radio	12%	1%
Villages with more than 20 sets	16%	68%
Reading or listening to the newspaper being read	48%	59%
Villagers who have been to the cinema	43%	51%
Source: Tugaç, p. 159.		

[230] Specifically for the 1965-70 period, where migration is defined as a "change in permanent residency during a five year period.
[231] Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," p. 185.

This is not to suggest that villages in Turkey existed in a form of medieval disconnect, but simply that the spread of information by traditional media was limited at best. Literacy hovered below fifty percent in agricultural areas, and most villagers only received news by radio a few times a week. Regardless of what was written and published at the time, it could not be easily disseminated.

A weakness of the Todaro model has been the stark terms in which it accounts for employment prospects. The model includes the number of available jobs in the organized sector, the unorganized sector, and then their availability proportionate to the population and amount of in-migration. Earlier it was shown that looking at official employment and unemployment statistics in developing countries is not overly useful, given how underemployment is more pervasive than unemployment.

The result is that employment does not directly influence migration. Gedik found in her dissertation "the variables, 'chances of being employed in the organized sector' and 'intensity of employment in the unorganized sector', have the lowest values," in terms of their correlation to migration flows. The prospect of employment was not an important consideration for migrants at the time, at least in comparison to other concerns.[232]

Either potential migrants were perceiving an entirely different world, or else the way in which they viewed their job prospects differed wildly from the criteria that researchers had been using. Gedik suggest that "a village migrant may consider that the larger the population of a province center, the greater are his 'chances of

[232] Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," p. 257.

being employed in the organized sector', and the greater is the 'intensity of employment in the unorganized sector.'" It is a creative solution in that it melds the role of the sociological and economic aspects of the city together. Gedik's solution however is that migrants are unable to discern their chances of employment in cities, and merely make the assumption that bigger is better. As one Turkish proverb states "Boğulacaksan büyük denizde boğul." (If you will drown, you should do so in the biggest sea.) [233]

Throughout the history of Turkish migrations have consistently been directed to larger and larger urban areas. This description alone however, does not provide adequate explanation or analysis as to the process by which migrants chose the metropoles over other urban centers. A convincing answer, suggested by Tekçe as a suggestion for future research, was the role that family and friends already in the city play in helping newcomers acquire jobs. She suggests that more "stands to be learned about the influence of contacts at prospective destinations upon destination choice and efficiency of job search."[234]

This proposal hits closest to the mark, as Gedik further confirms that for migrants "the existence of the previous village migrants is the dominant factor in deciding about a destination." The effects of these previous migrants are important, both in helping maximize economic incentives, as well as lessen the limiting effects of socio-psychological distance.[235]

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[233] Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," p. 303.
[234] Tekçe, pp 237-238.
[235] Gedik presents a thorough analysis of how "previous village migrants" have the greatest impact on migration and the migration decision. For more information see Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," chapter VIII.D.2.

CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL ACCOUNT OF THEORY

Continued Problems in Theory

Despite many attempts, a comprehensive migration theory has never been fully developed. Historical migrations can be most accurately described as a mass quantity of independent--yet simultaneous--decisions to relocate. Past theoretical works have yet to achieve a comprehensive hierarchy of rules or factors that govern specific migrations that can be applied globally and historically. The same criticisms that were leveled against Ravenstein's Laws of Migration in the 1800s are just as applicable to the modern use of push-pull theory and the Todaro model when considering Turkish migration.

For example, in a commentary attached to Ravenstein's first paper, the Rev. I. Doxsey suggested that changes in the agricultural sector were responsible for long distance migration from towns to cities. His point was to counter one of Ravenstein's laws: that migration was more likely to occur over short rather than long distances. Again, this very same conclusion was found to be true in the case of Turkish migration. [236]

Ravenstein faced further criticism from Rowland Hamilton, who questioned the very nature of the so-called Laws of Migration. Hamilton's main frustration with Ravenstein is due to mutability of the Laws of migration.

> much confusion…by formulating a 'law', and then explaining away its action, as if what was a law in one sense was not a law in another…the conditions

[236] Ernest G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Statiscal Society of London* 48, no. 2 (1885), p. 232.

> laid before them were but a portion of a very large and intricate question, and would constantly be modified by other facts.

Furthermore, Hamilton claimed that "*vis inertia*" played a large role in developing the historical structure of migration, more so than Ravenstein's short-view paper could account for. This inertia is naturally what we have come to term "internal dynamics."[237]

Ravenstein actually agreed with these criticisms, responding that he had:[238]

> Hesitated before he made use of the term 'law' and merely did so because he could find no other term. All he meant to convey was that migration went on according to certain rules. They spoke of laws of population, notwithstanding that these laws might be interfered with at any moment, and…were really being interfered with in different countries.[239]

Yet it is not enough to merely split the difference, and end up with a series of laws that are not laws, or rather rules that are modified and mitigated by an endless series of factors. A critical framework is necessary to fill in the gaps between the

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[237] Ravenstein, 1885, p. 233.

[238] The degree to which criticisms of Ravenstein's Laws of Migration mirror criticisms of modern studies of migration is remarkable. Despite acknowledging the weakness of his premise, namely that there were laws to migration, Ravenstein went on to publish a second paper with the same title, although broader in scope. Again, this paper attracted much of the same criticisms the first one had. Mr. T.H. Elliot said the paper had whetted his curiosity, but questioned whether any laws of migration could be supported with the limited data available. Mr. Stephen Bourne further argued that the laws of migration had not been "formulated in such a categorical order that they could be criticized," essentially they were truisms. And R. Hamilton, presumably the same one who had commented on Ravenstein's paper four years earlier, complimented Ravenstein on an "interesting contribution to that generalization of particulars which would enable them to make a law of migration hereafter. It was an exceedingly difficult thing to know where to draw the line in preliminary investigations of this nature." It was a very oblique way of saying that Ravenstein's work was impressive in scope, but had continued to fail in deriving any durable truths as to how migration worked. It is highly ironic that these same criticisms that were leveled against a paper written in 1889 are still applicable to equivalent works produced in the 1970s and 1980s. For more information see Ernest G. Ravenstein, "The Laws of Migration," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 52, no. 2 (1889), pp. 302-305.

[239] Ravenstein, 1885, p. 235.

descriptive nature of push-pull sociological theory, and the continued paradox of the Todaro model. What is more useful is understanding the specific facilitating factors developed that allowed and encouraged migration, as well as the emergence of internal dynamics that exerted a more powerful force on migrations than external factors.

Failure of Theory in Practice

Ultimately, researchers must accept that the forces at work in Turkish migrations cannot be easily explained by theories of push and pull, or economic reductionism. Push and pull offer many useful factors, but none that reliably analyze or explain Turkey's migratory history. Theorists look at the mass migrations in Turkey and attempt to extrapolate an overriding cause. For example, Erman claims "the Marshall Plan (for example, the introduction of tractors, fertilizers, irrigation systems and new agriculture products), resulted in a large number of peasants migrating from their village, in search of a new livelihood."[240] However, existing data plainly contradicts such facile explanations.

The argument central to these economic analyses--that urban standards of living were higher than those of rural areas--is further undone by the intensification of the gecekondu situation in the metropoles. Although Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir would eventually adopt measures to bring electricity, water, and sewers to the gecekondu areas, for the first few decades they offered a very low quality of life to

[240] Tahire Erman, "The Politics of Squatter (Gecekondu) Studies in Turkey: The Changing Representations of Rural Migrants in the Academic Discourse," *Urban Studies* 38, no. 7 (2001), p. 985

new migrants. Although many believed that standards of living would be higher in the metropoles, information about the lack of basic services, poor conditions, and low wages must have been available to expectant migrants.[241]

Therefore, an examination of available data suggests that migration is not simply a blind network of human movement, but instead that migration is also an actor that affects its own surrounding conditions to a significant extent. Conditions in the village or the city were never the sole reason behind migration, nor did the perception of Istanbul as a golden city "fool" migrants into abandoning their farms and villages. Instead, migrants continued to come through increasingly specialized migration networks that incentivized greater numbers of people to go to the metropoles.[242]

Problems with Past Research in Turkey

> "The future prosperity of every villager does not necessarily depend on his community's becoming an incipient town, being integrated within an urban complex, or undergoing rural transformation. Neither does it depend upon *the villager's detaching himself from rural life and migrating to one of the great cities* or to a job in Western Europe… A [development] strategy would give primary support to the rural-directed settlements…Another basis for the strategy would be to encourage the growth of urban-directed villages indirectly through town and city development programmes…Similarly, the

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[241] Danielson and Keleş, p. 42.

[242] Gezici and Keskin see migration as having several profound impacts on Turkish society. "Of these impacts, it is the economic impact whose reflection is seen most on the society. Among the studies on migration and economy in this context, the study by Ozmucur and Silber (2002) analyzed the effect of migration on spatial inequality for the years 1987 and 1994, and also researched the income composition of internal migration, the importance of the size of household and the effect of proximity to different regions. As a result of this study it was proven that internal migration from rural to urban areas increased the inequalities in per capita income." Ferhan Gezici and Berna Keskin, "Interaction between Regional Inequalities and Internal Migration in Turkey," in *ESRA Conference Papers* (2005), p. 3. Also see S. Özmucur and J. Silber, "Spatial Income Inequality in Turkey and the Impact of Internal Migration," 2002. Available [online]: http ://www.wider.unu.edu/conference.

> conversion of rural settlements into incipient towns through the opening of government offices, strategically chosen so as to maximize the total stimulus on surrounding rural areas, would be another promising possibility." [emphasis added][243]

Written in 1967 by John Kolars, the above statement was false by the time the book was published. It is difficult to know whether no one foresaw Turkey's future as defined by the explosive growth of its largest cities. Or instead, if academics at the time purposefully turned a blind eye to the rise of the metropoles, even as the peasants had already breached the gates.[244]

It is true that Turkey has never undergone an outwardly dramatic shift from rural to urban as in comparison to Russia, China, and India's experience. No catastrophic events occurred in Turkey during this time period that would have triggered such extreme migratory patterns. Due to the lack of a clear and present event, it was difficult to imagine at the time that Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir would multiply several times in size over the next half-century. [245]

The fact that small peasant holdings in Turkey had remained economically viable throughout the twentieth century made any dramatic urbanization process difficult to imagine. There were no contextual factors, beyond the presence of previous migrants, which favored a geometric growth in migration to the metropoles. Nevertheless, the shift of population from rural to urban areas accelerated, especially the extreme clustering around Istanbul, making it incredulous at any point to imagine a future for Turkey being other than urban.[246]

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[243] Shorter et al., p. 83.
[244] *Ibid*.
[245] Keyder and Öncü, p. 7.
[246] Pamuk and Owen, p. 108.

There remains the question as to why researchers between the 1960s and the 1980s, and especially now remain wedded to push-pull theories. Kolars' comment is striking in that it captures the general attitude of many researchers during his time. Push-pull theories and the Todaro model account for migration in retrospect, but are incapable of accounting for the dynamic processes that developed in Turkey. Since there was a definite lack of migration during the one-party period in Turkey, he argued that migration, and thereby urbanization, would play only a limited role in the future of Turkey.

Problems with Pseudo-Urbanization

Push-pull theory was adopted as soon as it was formulated because it easily allowed a limited set of factors to account for migration between areas. It described migration not as an actor or an institution, but rather a directionless stream of water. If the slope of the hill changed, so would the flow of water; migration was entirely reactive to the conditions around it. If migration was inherently responsive, then all push-pull theory had to do was identify the differences between areas that were sending and areas that were receiving. The difference in these factors would provide the answer.

Further in line with the metaphor of migration as a flow of water, Tümertekin wrote "Ankara has the role of a dam in its relation with Istanbul and Izmir." Tümertekin argues that if Ankara had not been able to absorb as much in-migration as it did, "to think of the condition of Istanbul would be in, would not at all end in positive results in the matters of urbanization and city-planning." In that

sense Tümertekin is entirely right, for without the draw of Ankara, it appears that an even greater amount of migrants would have been directed into Istanbul.[247]

Seeing Ankara as a dam prompted Tümertekin to further posit, "It is possible that a somewhat central province which has developed to be an attractive in-migration centre, can act as a harmonizing agent." His argument is that increasing the attractiveness of another province, it could divert migrants from the metropoles. If migrations were truly as blind and reactive as Lee's push-pull theory had described, then migration flows would automatically re-route to other destinations if they were equally attractive.[248]

Tümertekin's work was grounded in a general "developmentalist optimism" that saw "balanced growth" despite the fact that much of his own evidence showed a disproportionately high level of migration leading into the metropoles.[249] His optimistic interpretation led to an emphasis of the fact that migrations were directed to urban centers in general, which is both true and misleading. He points out that several urban centers existed that could be implanted with what are described as suitable conditions, such as education or healthcare facilities. In this manner urban settlements located in regions with a tradition of out-migration, could instead be developed so as to "act as a balance, as the harmonizing agent for population."[250]

Specifically Tümertekin mentions the three cities of "Samsun in the Black Sea Region, Bitlis and Muş in the Eastern Anatolian Region, and Diyarbakir in the South

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[247] Tümertekin, p. 111.
[248] *Ibid*.
[249] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 23
[250] Tümertekin, p. 112.

Eastern Anatolian Region," as having the potential to become centers of in-migration.[251] The logic is clear; if Ankara acts as a dam for Istanbul and Izmir, then smaller cities can act as a dam for Ankara, and so on and so forth. Although he acknowledges that Muş and Bitlis were "unimportant" at the time, he does argue that they were "gradually becoming in-migration centers."[252] Tekçe, who specifies notable in-migration rates in Muş as well, reinforces this claim.[253]

In addressing push and pull factors, Tümertekin is primarily concerned with what he describes as the "economic hardship" of living in villages. His argument is less of a substantive account of agricultural conditions at the time than an attempt to fit the Turkish case into the theoretical framework of push and pull theory.[254] As for the effects of urban pull, he acknowledges that economic opportunities form only a fraction of the causes of migration, and that migrants are further motivated by a desire for education and entertainment.[255]

Migrations and their External Context

Coming eight years after Tümertekin's principal work, the book Metropolitan Development in Turkey continued to view migration flows as a mute, mutable force. In a section titled "Programs Redirecting Migrants ' Movements to Urban Areas," the authors suggested "rural development will, in some way, begin to reverse the flow of migrants to the cities, or at least stabilize the movement of the rural inhabitants."

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[251] Tümertekin, pp. 111-112.
[252] *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 118.
[253] Tekçe, p. 113.
[254] Tümertekin, p. 137.
[255] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

Despite the intervening years since Tümertekin's book, and the rising tide of migration, the belief remained that with the proper incentives, migration could be diverted from Istanbul to "Elazığ, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Samsun, and Eskişeshir."[256]

The authors believe that incentives such as the opening of the Ziya Gökalp University in Diyarbakir in 1970, or the development of Central Villages in the Second and Third Five-Year Development Plans would be sufficient to "dissuade rural populations from migrating to urban areas," or work as "a dike, holding migrants in big villages." In keeping with the dam metaphor that Tümertekin first used, it is clear that the authors were aware of the rising tide of rapid migration in the metropoles. Indeed cities in the Southeast did develop significantly, but predictions that it would hold back migration from reaching the metropoles were overly optimistic.[257]

An important attraction to urban areas in general was the role of economic opportunities, as a new migrant would discover "wages most likely are higher than what he was previously earning on the farm and that his position in the urban work force is a more secure and stable one."[258] Beyond economic benefit it was also noted that "by almost every measure—income, skills, housing, education, healthcare, and access to all sorts of goods and services—residents of the metropolitan centers are better off than their country cousins."[259]

However, their first critical mistake was the belief that such attractions were general features of urban areas in Turkey, and that migrants were choosing their

[256] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, pp. 180-181.
[257] *Ibid*., p. 186.
[258] *Ibid*., p. 159.
[259] Danielson and Keleş, p. 68.

destination based on factor endowments alone. While some migrants did, in fact, choose their destination based on factor endowments of the area, most were swayed by a variable that the theory failed to measure: that each migrant would make a destination more attractive for subsequent migrants.

Tekçe finds that from 1955 all the way to 1965 "the metropolitan units of Istanbul and Izmir together with the capital of city of Ankara dominate the urban system…in terms of the quantity of migrants they attract annually." Just Istanbul and Izmir alone counted for a tremendous thirty sex percent of all urbanward migration.[260]

This evidence of fast urbanization in small cities across the country, coupled with a heavy focus on the metropoles, put researchers into a difficult situation. On one hand, as predicted, urban areas were generally becoming more populated. However, migration was increasingly concentrated around three urban areas. While regional centers were drawing in migrants from their villages and district centers at a fast pace, the metropoles were drawing in migrants from across the country. The accumulation of migration networks was proportional to the number of migrants gathered in the metropoles. The costs of migration therefore dropped even if the gains to migration remained static.

Cities like Diyarbakir, Muş, and Bitlis offered greater opportunities and quality of life than a village. However, given the rapid improvements in transportation across nearly all areas of Turkey, there was no need for migrants to settle in provincial cities when they could continue on to the metropoles. Therefore,

[260] Tekçe, p. 113.

despite efforts to attract migrants to smaller cities and their very real improvement to village life, Turkey's metropoles dominated the urban landscape.

Finally, the movement of migrants to the major cities can only be partially attributed to the attractiveness of certain factors therein. While increased wages and other opportunities may serve as a rationale for migration, they cannot account for its existence. Tekçe cautions "the chance for employment in the organized sector of urban economy is offered as one major dimension of the attractiveness of alternative urban destinations to prospective migrants and not as a factor which has a symmetrically powerful influence on the decision to become a migrant."[261]

Opportunities, or rather *perceived* opportunities do play an instrumental role in where migration goes, they cannot explain how migration operates. The sum of existing rural misery combined with the attractions of city life, even viewed through the lens of how a potential migrant perceives these attractions, fails to capture how migration and migration choice operates for two important reasons: facilitating factors and channelization.

Dynamism of Migration Flows

It was a conceptual mistake for researchers to view migration as a river. The belief that migration responds to external conditions fluidly and effortlessly has been reversed in contemporary theory. Many past studies have appreciated the role that transportation and communication played at the beginning of migration in the

[261] Tekçe, p. 192.

1950s, but do not continue to see it as a significant facilitating factor in the 1970s, 1980s, as well as the post-1980 migrations.[262]

Private transport, unlike state railways, emerges and is directed by local demand. Once the necessary infrastructure had been established, buses, taxis, and cars filled the roads at an amazing pace. Şanlı et al. observe "within recent years, there has been a 21 percent increase in highway construction and a ten-fold increase in the number of buses and trucks." The improved transportation grid eliminated the effects of distance on migrants, but only for certain destinations. Buses focused primarily on delivering passengers to the most popular destinations, reinforcing migratory routes to the metropoles and reducing traffic to smaller urban centers. [263]

A Notable Lack of Push Factors in Rural Areas

A further complication to push-pull analysis comes by the fact that Turkish migrations appear counterintuitive to traditional migration logic. For migration to occur conditions at the sending end must be worse—significantly worse—than at the receiving end, in order to generate the desire to migrate. The first problem is that this fails to account for the beginnings of migration in Turkey, much less for the increase in rate and volume.

Although many researchers have tried to use the 1950s as a time of agricultural upheaval and discontent throughout Turkey, available data simply does

[262] Tekçe, p. 88.
[263] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 160.

not bear this claim out. In a set of village case studies published in 1980, Keyder is clear that while conditions for peasants and small landowners in Turkey are from ideal, they are not radical enough to constitute an urgent desire to migrate.

Keyder lists the multiple factors in favor of small landowners, from additional roads into rural areas, tractors improving land reclamation, "the Korean War price boom which helped to change the terms of trade in favor of agriculture…political develops internal to Turkey where a peasantry-supported party came to power and through inflationary policies postponed the impact of the post-Korean recession on agriculture." His article is about capitalist development in villages, and provides a rather complete and rosy picture of the economic prospects for small landowners.[264]

The article concludes by arguing against what they term "irresponsible estimates concerning landless peasantry (up to one-fourth of the rural population) current among Turkish statisticians and social scientists." Rather than depict rural Turkey as a mass of landless peasants scratching out a living, the article instead argues that a mere five percent of the peasantry is "really" landless, and that the rest of the villages are engaged in largely productive, profitable capitalist labor.[265]

The findings above are a far cry from the intolerable state of Turkish villages that other researchers have described. Şanlı et al consider that the push factors for the countryside are far more important than the pull of the city, given the low agricultural yields in villages across Turkey, fragmented land ownership, and overall subsistence level conditions. Given that the small landowner has still not

[264] Keyder, "Paths of Rural Transformation," p.2.
[265] *Ibid*., p. 25.

disappeared, Keyder's description seems the more carefully researched and accurate one. This is not to suggest that urban life wasn't superior to rural conditions—only that the poor standard of village life should not be exaggerated.[266]

As a result it becomes evident that there is no crucial event between 1949 and 1950 that would account for the beginnings of migration. Nor is there a dramatic worsening of conditions in agricultural areas that would explain increased migration flow. If anything urban conditions deteriorated through this period, leading to what should be equilibrium under push-pull theory.

Finally, there is the matter of the Southeast. Historically the Southeast of Turkey has been the least developed in terms of practically every single measure of economic strength and standard of living. Birthrates are significantly higher than elsewhere in the country despite the difficult conditions. The Southeast has an agricultural yield of approximately half that of West Turkey, and ten to twenty percent the GDP per capita.[267]

However, throughout the three decades of study the majority of migration occurs in the western half of Turkey, coincidentally the most developed and with the highest standard of living. "If there were wide differences between push factors in rural areas, then it would be expected that there are wide differences in the respective rural-to-urban out-migration rates," argued Gedik.[268] Instead between 1965 and 1970 areas such as Ankara have outmigration rates of over ten-percent,

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[266] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, pp. 81-82, 137.
[267] Gedik, "Internal Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985," p. 4.
[268] *Ibid*.

while the eastern provinces of Hakkari, Mardin, Bitlis, Muş, Urfa, and Van have outmigration rates between 1.2% and 2.2%.[269]

The problem in focusing in on rural conditions is that while they contributed to out-migration rates, it is difficult to isolate a factor that is sufficiently convincing to this regard. The true impact of mechanization on the rural workforce has yet to be resolved. Underdevelopment cannot be an overriding push factor, or else higher levels of migration from the Southeast would have occurred, which was clearly not the case. Further suggestions include the desire to escape tribal vendettas, or highly specific strategies of survival that cannot be applied to the huge quantity of migrants.[270] Although rural areas gave birth to mass migrations, the reasons for these migrations cannot be found there.

Problems with Todaro

In his examination of the migration paradox, Todaro correctly focuses on the role of expected wages driving migration rather than real differences between urban and rural average wage levels. Migrants are therefore portrayed as investors, or even gamblers. Although real income over a lifetime may vary little between the choice of staying in the village or going to the city, those who migrate are "maximizing their expected utility."[271]

Information that affects the decision of whether and where to migrate includes *expected* difficulties in finding and obtaining a job, relative to levels of

[269] Gedik, "Internal Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985," p. 5, footnote 114.
[270] Karpat suggests that pressure from landlords or tribal chiefs, or a *kan davası* (vendetta) may have motivated migration.
[271] Harris and Todaro, p. 127.

unemployment which produces greater and greater competition for high wage jobs, as well as to barriers of migration. What the Todaro model ultimately does is sets a series of assumptions: first assuming that urban wage levels will always remain higher than rural wage levels, and second that the probability of gaining urban employment is a factor both empirically discernable to potential migrants, as well as researchers.

Primarily, the concept of unemployment is problematic, as Tekçe wrote on the difficulty in ascertaining many of the true problems of unemployment and underemployment in developing countries. Developed countries with large social safety nets are able to accommodate—as well as gauge—a large number of unemployed people without immediate danger, but poorer countries are not:

> [Unemployment] is a luxury that relatively poor people can afford for only very limited periods of time. The social system remains viable only so long as it continuously adapted to share existing work activity with all income seekers. Thus, measured rates of open unemployment are likely to be small and do not reflect adequately the variation in the extent of the employment problem in a situation characterized by underemployment and low incomes.[272]

As a result, a strict separation between the unemployed and employed is difficult to enforce. A survey run by the State Statistical Institute found unemployment in gecekondu areas at 7.2% in Ankara, 7.4% in Istanbul, and 7.9% in Izmir—but to what degree this reflects the actual economic situation of the inhabitants is uncertain.[273] In comparison the overall rate of unemployment in Turkey hovered from 3.4% to 6.8% during this period, but again these statistics are

[272] Tekçe, p. 151.
[273] Danielson and Keleş, p. 41.

not necessarily sound given the high rate of unorganized and marginal forms of employment.[274]

An individual migrant's chances of obtaining employment cannot be read as the number of job seekers divided by the number of jobs. Social and informal connections play a tremendous role, in first getting migrants to the metropoles, but then in assisting them in gaining desirable employment. According to Riadh:

> Potential migrants may not think of the possibility of employment in terms of a given probability of getting a job that is independent of time, but in terms of an uncertain period of waiting after which they can expect to obtain job offers…. Therefore, potential migrants receive from time to time information about specific job opportunities and it is to such specific information that the individuals respond. A person engaged in rural-based search usually acquires such specific information about jobs through communication channels (friends and contacts, previous migrants from the same rural location, etc.). This urban-to-rural information flow, for an individual, is influenced by several factors such as the number of contacts he has, the level of search effort he chooses, and the urban labor demand conditions.[275]

Another complication of the Todaro model is that a singular urban wage fixed above an agricultural wage is simply not realistic. Urban labor markets are "far better characterized by wage dispersion," as well as imperfect information about the labor market due to employer or worker ignorance. Even among homogenous workers at identical jobs, disparate wages are a common among urban conditions in less developed countries. This uneven distribution of urban wages plays "a

[274] Tuncer Bulutay, *Employment, Unemployment and Wages in Turkey* (Ankara: International Labour Office, 1995), pp. 259, 261.
[275] Riadh.

significant role in the formation of premigration expectations and thus on the migration decision."[276]

Finally there are complications that arose from the transformation of Turkey's large cities into megacities. As Danielson and Keleş wrote, "the magnitude of urban problems increases geometrically as the size of urban communities expand arithmetically." Adequate housing and utility quickly became a myth, as the metropoles struggled to provide sufficient and rudimentary services to their inhabitants. Access to healthcare and education became as elusive as it had in rural areas, prompting a mayor of Istanbul to claim, "Istanbul really is a sick city." Whatever attraction urban life may have initially had, by the 1960s and 1970s it was only a marginal improvement over life elsewhere.[277]

Seeing the rapid decline of urban and metropolitan standards of living, researchers claimed, "The importance of push factors in Turkey is a function of their relative weight in the push-pull dichotomy. The weight is apparent in the continuity of operation of these factors even if the pull factors fail to operate or expand at a rate that would bear a reasonable relationship to the rate and volume of migration to the cities." [278]This is the complement to other arguments on Turkish migration. On one hand we have theories that attempt to show how urban areas were extremely attractive. On the other hand this work tries to show how rural areas were extremely unattractive. This relative difference between conditions in rural and urban areas makes the question as whether it was push or pull that motivated

[276] Riadh.
[277] Danielson and Keleş, p 68.
[278] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 80.

migrants "arbitrary." De Haas criticizes how the push and pull factors are so inextricably linked that the dominance of either is impossible to establish.[279]

A problem with viewing migration as pitting a distant future expected utility against current liabilities is that it requires greater and greater modification to the expected utility that an individual migration would believe in to justify continued migration against the reality of deteriorating urban conditions. Migration remains hugely risky and as such the Todaro hypothesis does not hold up under empirical testing. Therefore "how is it that calculative behavior by rational people results in choice of an actuarially unfair risky prospect?"[280]

The most difficult aspect of migration research has always been the need to assemble a number of distinct variables that can account for migration patterns. Unfortunately, previous models failed not only due to their poor choice of variables, although this was a critical factor, but also because they failed to incorporate the interaction between the variables into their overarching structure As a result the Todaro model cannot reasonably describe migrations in Turkey, just as no combination of rural push and urban pull factors can sufficiently explain why or how migrants have moved across Turkey.

Previous researchers have used some combination of the Todaro model and push-pull model to some success, but an amalgamation is not the answer. It fails to address the structural deficits found in both models. Instead a new, more rigorous theoretical model is necessary to fully account for Turkish migration.

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[279] de Haas, "Migration and Development," pp. 9-10.
[280] Katz and Stark, p. 135.

CHAPTER 6: THEORY EXTENDED

Both push-pull theory, and the Todaro model are insufficient in explaining the factors that led to mass migrations across Turkey. Contemporary theories that account for internal factors and cumulative causation can be more useful tools for analyzing Turkish migrations. The tradeoff, however, between the elegant simplicity of former models with the chaotic systems of modern theory is not an easy one . Many recent books and articles continue to use a push-pull model given its ability to easily accommodate various theoretical structures. The circularity and endogeneity problems that contemporary dynamic theories give rise to can be difficult to effectively solve. The goal must be to adapt contemporary theory, not just to historical work, but modify it in a way that it becomes more attractive to historians.[281]

The disconnect between theory and historical case study is significant. There is also a further gap between migration studies and the application of migration in other literatures. An example of this disconnect is Bulutay's 1995 book on labor markets in Turkey. Migration is a significant aspect of any study on employment in Turkey, but rather than address it in a substantive fashion, Bulutay uses Lee's exact 1969 theory of push, pull, and intermediate factors to explain migration. Certainly push and pull factors were critical in starting migration—migration requires a destination and a reason for moving. Yet it fails to account for the rise of migration in the 1960s when Turkish migrations crossed the critical mass threshold and became a mass movement. From that point forward it makes less and less sense to

[281] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 9.

look at the material contextual factors than to study the internal dynamics of the migration.[282]

Internal dynamics theory is not without its problems either. Beyond the difficulty is disentangling various causalities and endogenous factors, there are many logical problems and inconsistencies with contemporary theory. One of the principal problems involves the theoretically limitless expansion of internal dynamics and network effects in migration streams. Having past the critical mass threshold, migration grows in size and accessibility at an exponential rate. Given that the cost of migration falls for each member added, then over time the cost would move inexorably towards zero as the entire society began to move. This circular nature of migration would assume that migration should continue infinitely.[283]

Migrations do not continue infinitely, or to depletion levels at the origin. Built within the migration network are factors that serve to undermine and halt migration, as well as further it. One example is the "bridgehead/gatekeeper" dualism. As migrants first begin to flow into an area they serve as bridgeheads, allowing future migrants to use their knowledge and resources to enable their own migrations. After time however migrants already settled at their destination limit further migration, "being hesitant or unwilling to assist prospective migrants." This

[282] Bulutay, p. 119.
[283] de Haas, "The Internal Dynamics," p. 17.

transition into migrants as gatekeepers limits the capacity of networks to grow to their maximal size.[284]

Furthermore, de Haas attacks the exceptionalism of internal dynamics for failing to explain why only some migrations become self-perpetuating, while most never reach the critical mass threshold. If we accept Granovetter's proposal about the strength of weak social ties,[285] then it would imply that network effects would begin to take hold at even the smallest levels. If internal dynamics are truly "self-reinforcing," then they should be apparent in many migration streams, not just a few key centers.[286]

Recent research on Turkey has not shown significant clustering of migrants, but high levels of entropy instead. Comparing the population distribution across the country in 1970 and 2000, the level of migration entropy has increased significantly. The metropoles do continue to suck in a tremendous amount of migrants. However, there is now more migration to more destinations outside of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. This entropy that has been a continual aspect of Turkish migrations remain in a gray area that was not captured by past theory and continues to elude present theory. If fail to generate a social capital network, then the metropoles would

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[284] Migration is not dependent on these networks, but they do not always work in an idealized manner. Relatively impoverished migrants may find these networks essential, although it's uncertain whether Turkish migrants can be accurately described as impoverished. Furthermore, these social networks create and perpetuate their own hierarchies. The result can be a high monetary price or amount other goods in order to gain the benefit of such migrant social networks. The result therefore is "double-edged" network that can encourage or discourage overall migration. de Haas, "The Internal Dynamics," pp. 23, 29-30. For more information see: Böcker.

[285] Granovetter admits the need to more strongly examine the development of social capital systems over time. Once a social capital system is in place then its growth can be relatively easily explained. But he does not give a reason for why it would or would not form in the first place. See: Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," p. 229.

[286] de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 17.

capture an ever larger number of migrants—which is not the case as entropy values were high for 1970 and have only increased over the next three decades. If these small migrations were generating their own social capital networks, then they would grow in size and specificity; this has not manifested either.[287]

According to Gedik,

> The increase of the entropy values…indicates that there is relatively more even share of the village out-migrants among the provinces due to increased *accessibility*, [emphasis added] education and awareness about the opportunity, and capability to take risk in new environments, as well as the more even share in terms of previous migrants in the destination who are relatives or friends.[288]

The "heterogeneity" of these migrations in Turkey is difficult to explain using current theory. Despite the advantages over past theories, internal dynamics and push-pull theory both suggest a limitless increase in the specificity of migration flows to certain destinations and not a growing level of entropy resulting from the diffusion of migration across destinations. There is the possibility that Turkey's migrations have been unique to Turkey, and that they are impossible to theorize. This attitude, Skeldon warns, will "lead us down the sterile path of relativism and return us to an exceptionalism that was all too common in the geography of the past."[289]

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[287] "Both in 1970 and in 2000," writes Gedik, "the distribution of village out-migrants among the provinces exhibits very high degrees of homogeneity, i.e., the respective entropy values are very large." In 1970 the level of entropy was 3.87(0.08) and increased to 4.16.(0.05). Excluding Istanbul the entropy value rose from 3.63 (0.13) in 1970 to 3.98 (0.09) in 2000. Gedik, *Rural-to-Urban Migration in Turkey*, p. 17.

[288] *Ibid*, p. 18.

[289] Ronald Skeldon, *Migration and Development: A Global Perspective* (Essex: Longman), 1997, p. 13. Cited in Hein de Haas, "Migration and Agricultural Transformations in the Oases of Morocco and Tunisia," KNAG (Utrecht, 2001), p. 18.

Facilitating Factors

Facilitating factors are one small addition to current theory that may alleviate the inconsistencies of current migration theory and avoid Turkish exceptionalism. Separating facilitating factors as their own independent variable is a step that provides a contextual but independent basis for further evaluating how migrations begin and continue. These factors have been mentioned in theory, and are well known in the case studies of Turkish history. But they have not been addressed as a separate variable that is relatively immune from the infinite causality loops that plague internal dynamics theory.

In Gedik's 1977 dissertation she stated that "the fact that the push and the pull factors interact with each other, and that the decision to migrate and the decision where to migrate are related to each other simultaneously, and that the relationship between these two decisions is cyclical." This statement provides a perfect avenue to address Turkish migration, in that it accounts for the need of some intrinsic push and pull factors, but also allows for migration to be seen as an endogenous process. More importantly is the "simultaneous" nature of the decision.[290]

Migrants do not consider the decision to migrate and the decision of where to migrate separately. For push-pull theory to have any relevance, the destination is only attractive in relation to the origin. The migrant makes the choice, both to leave, and to where to go to, at the exact same moment. Still, there is one more decision being made at that point in time, which is the means by which a migrant will move.

[290] Gedik, "A Causal Analysis of the Destination Choice," p. 13.

The means by which a migrant moves includes both the literal transportation to the destination, as well as the use of the existing social capital to make such a move successful. The infrastructure that a migrant uses to make such a move is entirely independent of migration. There is a huge degree of correlation and causality between migrants and jobs, and migrants and construction. The discursive relationship between the two leads to continued increases in both. Yet there is no such relationship between migration and transportation and communication infrastructure.

Social capital networks lower the cost of migration, thereby making it relatively more attractive. Increased migration in an area creates relative deprivation which increases the desire to migrate. Push and pull factors remain making one area more attractive than another. But highway systems and phone networks have never been instigated by migrations, nor instigated migrations themselves. Instead they form the infrastructure, the foundation on which social capital develops. They are entirely independent of the migration process, yet play a significant role in enabling and guiding migration.

Figure 3 Framework for Analyzing Migration Interactions

Source: Hein de Haas, "Migration and Development," p. 44.



De Haas offers a useful model for looking at the endogenous loops that migration interacts with macro-level and micro-level context variables.
Adding facilitating factors to this model:



Transportation as a Facilitating Factor

Facilitating factors in Turkey include the development of a national highway system and the establishment of mass transit throughout the country. Enhanced railways, roads, buses, and taxis formed the means by which physical barriers to migration could be circumvented. Of course the development of transportation infrastructure did not occur symmetrically throughout the country. Rivkin notes that despite greater accessibility to the rural hinterlands, Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir enjoyed the greatest "comparative advantage" of the highway system by having the cheapest and most efficient transit systems running to and from the metropoles.[291] Şanlı et al. further agree, "the rural road building program of the Turkish government has also contributed to the increased mobility of the rural population."[292]

Despite widespread investment the condition of roads in rural areas and villages remained far from optimal. Tugaç's study found that even by 1968 "only 23% of the sample of 220 villages had roads good enough to insure travel by all kinds of vehicles in all seasons," and that "70% of the villages had difficulties in reaching the provincial capital in bad weather." According a village survey, the poor condition of roads was the second greatest problem.[293]

[291] Rivkin, p. 111.
[292] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 160.
[293] Tugaç, p. 158.

Tümertekin also acknowledged the link between the facilitating impact of transport and migration. He accurately predicted the growth of migration from the Southeast with the advent of sufficient facilitating factors:

> What must be expected in areas of out-migration is that the population in the East and Southeast region will provide an increasing important share of the movement to the western portions of the country, although previously unimportant and far from the centers of attraction. **Improved transportation facilities** which connect this part of the country in an efficient and inexpensive manner will soon have their impact felt and reinforced in patterns of internal migration.[294] (emphasis added)

Tümertekin accurately explains how transportation infrastructure would serve to first enable and then promote migration in the Southeast after 1980, just as it had done in the rest of Turkey after 1950. Again, it is important to note that facilitating factors primarily served primarily to reduce the cost and risk of migrating to the metropoles and other large cities, but not the entire country.

Communications as a Facilitating Factor

Despite the role of transportation infrastructure in overcoming the effect of previous physical barriers to migration, there remained socio-psychological barriers. Tied into the destinations that migrants would choose to move, the effects of this barrier were not so easily overcome. Although the issue of mass transportation was settled by the early 1950s, lack of telecommunication played a crucial role in channeling migrants towards the metropoles.

As illustrated in the previous chapters, the means of communication throughout 1950 to 1980 did not keep pace with the capacity for movement.

[294] Tümertekin, p. 159.

Literacy rates remained very low throughout, and a large proportion of migrants did not experience any form of mass communication, whether through a newspaper or a radio. The result of this weak communication system was twofold:

First, the decision to migrate rests on the amount and quality of available information. While a migrants might have the ability to move anywhere in Turkey, they would have "little chance of being individually informed about the conditions prevailing in the diverse regions of potential migration." The limited penetration of mass media would make it impossible for any one migrant to possess a complete picture of all available opportunities. What information they did possess by way of a radio or newspaper would favor Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir over other urban centers.[295]

Şanlı et al. note:

> The level of infrastructural development also plays a role in the process. For example, the level of development of the communications media is directly related to the rate of out-migration. The increased availability of transistor radios, to name only one communications innovation, has made a significant impact on the awareness of rural inhabitants about life in the outside world.[296]

Beyond mass communications however, the individual connections between friends and family members proved the most important in gaining information about the opportunities that existed in urban areas. "Migrating to Istanbul, building a house, and finding a job in the city revolved around *akrabalık* (blood relationship) and *hemşerilik* (common village-town origin. *Hemşeri(s)*: common village-town

[295] Christophe Z. Guilmoto and Frederic Sandron, "The Internal Dynamics of Migration Networks in Developing Countries," *Population: An English Selection* 13, no. 2 (2001), p. 139.
[296] Şanlı, Ünal and Kılınçaşlan, p. 160.

migrants)." These relationships were essential to transmitting information about urban prospects and shaping migrant perceptions.[297]

These relationships were not merely instrumental in communicating information about urban life, but also constituted an essential strategy of survival. Faced with no societal or state institutions designed to assist urban migrants, "blood and communal ties provide the only basis for mutual help and solidarity." As a result migrants in search of aid or assistance would be guided along the path of past migrants, as the lack of a communications infrastructure prevented a greater level of coordination in sending migrants to less well known or population destinations.[298]

As facilitating factors, both the specific development of transportation and communication infrastructure served to unevenly negate migration barriers. In areas well connected by roads and buses, push and pull factors could exert an influence. Just as a migrant might choose between well known and socially connected areas based on other factor endowments, such as the chance of a job or education. Without these facilitating factors however, which were not ubiquitous at any point from 1950 to 1980, the effect of push and pull, as well as expected earnings, was severely mitigated.

Internal Dynamics

Although facilitating factors remain significant in understanding migration, they represent only half the equation. The other half of the equation is the role that internal dynamics play in regulating and guiding migration. Traditional studies

[297] Karpat, *The Gecekondu,* p. 83.
[298] Karpat, *The Gecekondu,* p. 86.

have emphasized the sole effect of external factors on migration without accounting for the possibility of push and pull mechanisms existing within migration channels.

Facilitating factors interface with migration barriers in such a way that push and pull factors develop, but wholly within specific migration channels. An example would be the means by which communication infrastructure represents a facilitating factor, but specifies the development of a new type of pull factor. The presence of migrants in a given city makes that city more attractive—but only to migrants from that given village or family.

Internal migration has developed in a way that cannot be accurately defined by classical economics. Instead it demonstrates several network effects and externalities that create a different set of circumstances for migrants on the ground than collected data can account for. These networks externalities exist both in a more abstract economic measure, but also in the specific relationships between migrants who, in turn, encouraged the movement of greater migrations.

Network Effects and Externalities

Push-pull factors were built around the idea of migrants achieving maximal benefit by moving to areas with the greatest positives and fewest negatives. The Todaro model was essentially an extension on push-pull theory, which focused exclusively on the pulling effects of perceived higher urban wages. Yet Todaro remained centered on the concept of migrants maximizing their individual welfare.

The enumerated failures of both theories lies first in the way in which they weighed the value of various push and pull factors, and secondly in their inability to

account for internal dynamics. We have already explained how various push and pull factors can be mitigated or enhanced by facilitating factors. These are all external though. Whereas factors that are the most effective in influencing migration are the ones that exist internally.

Factors such as employment are viewed as valuable according to their scarcity. A migrant pursuing a job is most interested in the wage differential between the organized and unorganized sector, but is limited by the number of jobs available relative to the number of migrants. Regardless of the value a job might possess, its scarcity limits its attractiveness to migrants. Therein lies the Todaro paradox, where the "value" of migration drops according to the growing scarcity of jobs brought on by the onset of further migration.

More simply put, "each potential migrant decides whether or not to move to the city on the basis of an implicit 'expected' income maximization objective." The chances of realizing this maximal outcome are limited by the number of new migrants. Todaro theorized that migrants overestimated their chances and overvalued a high income, despite a continually declining real value of future migrations.[299]

Guilmoto and Sandron propose however that migrants are seeking to minimize their risks rather than maximize their gain. Migration can be a risky choice due to the distance and uncertainty involved, but it also can function to diversify risk. For example, the institution of gurbetçilik allowed migrants to double their chances at acquiring a steady income, either in the village or the city. Over

[299] Michael P. Todaro, "Income Expectations, Rural-Urban Migration and Employment in Africa," *International Labour Review* 104, no. 5 (1971), p. 391.

time however, migration would become institutionalized and evolve into an "apparently quasi-autonomous system."[300]

Migrants working within this quasi-autonomous system would be subject to network externalities rather than traditional rules applying to scarcity. Most goods in the world are subject to the effects of supply and demand. The value of diamonds, for example, is calculated inversely to their rarity. Another type of good, such as a telephone, is valued in a very different way. The intrinsic value of a single telephone is zero. With greater quantities however, the value of each telephone increases.[301]

The channelization, or institutionalization that internal migration underwent in Turkey benefited significantly from network effects. Although cannot be accurately termed risk adverse, they are pursuing of a strategy of satisficing over maximization. "Any receiving area that allows one to expect an income with a probability deemed to be acceptable constitutes a 'satisfactory' solution without necessarily being optimal."[302]

By forgoing an optimization process migrants are less responsive to the possibility of higher gain elsewhere. Once migrants are within a quasi-autonomous channel from a specific village or city leading to a metropole, then they benefit from a declining future costs. Family and hemşeri organizations that had migrated early bore the initial brunt of the costs of migration. As the network grew, so did its

[300] Guilmoto and Sandron, p. 144.
[301] Nicholas Economides, "The Economics of Networks," *International Journal of Industrial Organization* 14, no. 2 (1996), p. 6
[302] Guilmoto and Sandron, " p. 155.

ability to provide for future migrants in terms of housing, jobs, and other assistance.[303]

Chain Migration

The existence of these networks begins at an individual level, but gradually increases up to familial and then societal levels. Arıkan describes chain migration as "the situations in which an individual migrant sends for family, kin, or members of a community, thereby combining individual and family migration in long term." In this manner the movement of a single migrant, over time, can lead to exponentially greater movement.[304]

Karpat provides a more detailed description of this process where, over a series of years, a gurbetçi becomes a permanent migrant in the city, and then serves as a conduit for further migration. The first migrant will initially bring over a bachelor brother or oldest son. As the standard of living improved for the pioneers, further "able-bodied male relatives, usually another brother or first cousin, and so on," until migration had significantly expanded from the one initial migrant to a growing network. Eventually "the wife and the children arrived only after there was assurance of housing and continuous employment to sustain the entire family."[305]

By forming set channels between specific villages or smaller cities and the metropoles, the cost of migration decreased and the potential for gain increased. Specific migration chains exhibit institutional inertia, whereby the chain is set up to

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[303] Guilmoto and Sandron, p. 155.
[304] Beyhan Arıkan, *Descriptive Analysis of the Inter-Provincial Migration: GAP Region, 1975-80 and 1980-85.* (MA thesis: Middle East Technical University, 1994), p. 26.
[305] Karpat, *The Gecekondu*, p. 86.

most efficiently satisfy movement costs and needs from only specific points. This network "becomes the exclusive channel for migration in the eyes of the villagers," and "once in place, a channel is difficult to replace."[306]

The initial investment costs associated with developing a migration network to the metropoles preclude abandoning them in favor of other destinations that may offer theoretically satisfactory outcomes, but lack the support network that has grown up most commonly in Istanbul, Ankara, or Izmir. These support networks exert a very strong pull on migrants, as they can generally offer the greatest level of security and information about a given move, even if other destinations offer greater maximal benefit.[307]

Migration as a Cycle[308]

> In total, the endogenous evolution of the migration institution can be conceptualized in several phases. A preliminary, pioneer, phase takes place in the absence of a network…During the following phase, the multiplicative effects of the first successful migrations are numerous and the institution is quickly constituted around the migration channels that have succeeded. The cost of migration thus tends to decline and migration flows accelerate.[309]

In addition to facilitating factors, the growth of migration as a pseudo-autonomous institution best describes the behavior of migration throughout Turkey. The concept that Guilmoto and Sandron have espoused is that migration is self-reinforcing. The process of migration exerts both endogenous and exogenous

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[306] Guilmoto and Sandron, p. 156.
[307] *Ibid.*, pp 156-157.
[308] Many of the ideas in this section were developed from a paper presented by Hein de Haas. The copy used was a draft version with specific instructions not to quote it. Regardless it is important to acknowledge the debt this paper owes to this valuable source. For more information see: Hein de Hass, "The Internal Dynamics of Migration Processes," in *IMSCOE Conference on Theories of Migration and Social Change* (University of Oxford, 2008).
[309] Guilmoto and Sandron, p. 158.

effects. The effects serve to change external circumstances in the form of infrastructure or development, but also to create a self-perpetuating motion.

In that sense that facilitating factors are further triggered by demand from migration, we can observe a feedback loop wherein migration shapes the external conditions within which it operates, and where it arrives. The endogenous effects of migration however are more potent in terms of creating a self-sustaining endogenous loop.

In her work Gedik points out that the data shows "previous migrants seem to attract other migrants in a snow-ball fashion in subsequent years (chain migration).[310] In this manner family relationships and hemşeri relations form the means by which migration was able to achieve explosive levels of growth over a few decades.

"Akrabalık and hemşerilik played basic roles in the entire process of migration and the settlement in the city," and by extension formed the most powerful push and pull factors that directed migration. These simple connections, when applied simultaneously and broadly across the country were the linkages that allowed migration to gain its own momentum.[311]

Migrants went everywhere, but the metropoles, benefiting from a historical comparative advantage were able to attract many early pioneers. As a result these first migrants were followed "by their kin and by fellow- villager s who were encouraged to migrate to the city because they already had contacts there." Migrants that have reached the metropoles would then encourage and enable other

[310] Gedik, "Internal Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985," p. 11.
[311] Karpat, *The Gecekondu*, p. 86.

migrants to make the same move, and so on and so forth, until the size of these cities had reached the limits of geometric growth and the origins of migration were largely depleted on potential migrants.[312]

[312] Erman, p. 985.

CHAPTER 7: IN CONCLUSION

> For the rural-to-urban out-migration, a number of factors – education, skill, access of the migrants to information, availability of transportation and communication facilities, and especially the existence of previous migrants and the past migration history of the rural population – all have significant effects.[313]

There is a disconnect between the literature on Turkish migrations and contemporary migration theory. Much of what has been historically proven about Turkey is still new to migration theory. Much of the improvements and developments in migration theory are still relatively new to Turkish studies. There has been a certain intransigence in contemporary Turkish studies that remain wedded to the same theoretical constructs that were new in the 1960s and 1970s, but have since been proven unreliable.

This continued dependency on older theories is not a coincidence, as push-pull theory and Todaro offer a significant degree of flexibility in explaining historical events. If contemporary theory has not been widespread in Turkey's literature, it is because it initially appears confusing, and does not offer readily available solutions to certain problems. Modern theory reverses certain assumptions about the causality of migrations and contextual factors such as employment ad housing. Yet cumulative causation does not offer a clear-cut solution that fits past and present historical models.

This thesis has attempted to demonstrate the areas in which the application of push-pull theory and the Todaro model are historically inconsistent. Furthermore, it has shown areas where internal dynamics and network effects offer

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[313] Gedik, "Internal Migration in Turkey, 1965-1985," p. 16.

a better explanation for the actions of Turkish migrations. The novel contribution of this thesis has been introducing elements from Turkish history into migration theory—facilitating factors—and introducing contemporary migration theory to Turkish migration.

Migration studies have often been closely tied to questions of economic and social development, and the Turkish case is no exception. Researchers were concerned about whether Turkey's urban landscape would develop into a balanced system (according to the size-rank rule) or not. Migration and development studies between the years of 1950 to 1980 consisted of a period of great optimism and case studies attempted to chart urbanization and development as push and pull factors would dictate.

Our current ability to understand the development of such an unequal urban distribution in Turkey rests on our hindsight, and the improvement of theoretical models. The exponential growth of migration streams to the metropoles vis-à-vis the *relative* decline of migration (and thus urban growth) to smaller urban centers is clearly explained by network theory and internal dynamics. Looking back at history with these concepts in mind, Istanbul's meteoric growth is not a surprise, but rather the result of the specific nature of migrations at the time.

Furthermore, these concepts help restore the role of migrations to their rightful place in Turkish history. The boom in construction and industrialization that occurred after the 1950s was due in a large part to the efforts of the migrants themselves. As we have shown above, migration plays as large a part in economic development as economic development plays in migration.

Other misconceptions about Turkey's agricultural and urban conditions are better understood under contemporary theory. Rather than disastrous agricultural conditions forcing migration, we now see that a combination of risk taking young men, and risk-adverse families formed the first group of migrants. Later on these migrants established "bridgeheads," essentially social capital networks that were easily fungible into financial capital. The result is that we can see gecekondu areas not as the last resort of the urban poor, but rather individual and collective investment strategies.

Given a discursive relationship between migration and development, not a unilateral one as previously thought, then the construction of transportation and communication networks plays a crucial role in allowing migrations. This is certainly a known factor in all histories of Turkey, but it has not been properly emphasized for allowing and channeling migrations. It does add a crucial independent variable to contemporary theory. These facilitating factors help modulate migration streams, independently of the changing internal dynamics and external context. These factors lower the cost of movement and information, thereby amplifying pull factors, and create the basis for social capital networks to form.

Contemporary theory argues that migrants are the determining factor in economic and social growth, as well as political change. Rather than assuming these migrants are a static variable, it is important to reevaluate the economic and political development through the lens of migration. This thesis provides the theoretical framework and the manner in which it can be applied to Turkey.

Future work could focus most strongly on the various avenues through which migration is expressed. Political and economic changes in Turkey can be more closely correlated to developments in migration. While there is a significant body of work on the sociology of international Turkish migrants, equivalent attention has not been paid to the culture and networks of internal migrants in Turkey (with the exception of Gecekondu studies).

Finally, a future study that focused on analyzing the empirical data using these new theories would be quite valuable. This thesis provides the first step in doing so, and later research can capitalize on these suggestions with more empirical work. Ultimately, the problem is well described by İçduygu and Ünalan, that internal migration "has had a profound impact on a cause and effect basis on the formation of society in Turkey for the last 50 years," yet does "not have a comprehensive history which was written based on a reliable and valid database." "They emphasize the deficiency, especially for the last 10-15 years, of the studies that may demonstrate all the dimensions, causes and effects, and dynamics of internal migration movements in Turkey." This thesis constitutes an important step towards a holistic accounting of the history of internal migrations in Turkey.[314]

[314] A. İçduygu and T. Unalan, *Türkiyede İç Göç: Sorunsal Alanları ve Araştırma Yöntemleri*, (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998). Quoted in Gezici and Keskin, pp. 3-4.

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