

INCONSISTENCY AND MULTIPLICITY IN THE SELF

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INCONSISTENCY AND MULTIPLICITY IN THE SELF

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

Inconsistency and Multiplicity in the Self

This thesis consists of an empirical study and a philosophical discussion. The empirical part is based on the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework whose fundamental principle argues that the self-concept is not unitary and it is composed of multiple self-aspects which reflect important components of one's personal life such as roles, social identities, relationships etc. Self-aspects are associated with attributes and when a self-aspect becomes activated via contextual inputs, its associated attributes become more accessible. The aim of the empirical study of this thesis was to investigate how one's perception change when two different self-aspects that are associated with opposing attributes become activated at the same time. Results showed that (1) simultaneous self-aspect activation rendered both opposing attributes and both self-aspects more accessible than baseline levels; (2) yet one opposing attribute still received more accessibility boost than the other, similarly one self-aspect became more accessible than the other. Philosophical implications of this empirical study along with the whole body of work derived from the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework are discussed subsequently: (1) in terms of how these philosophical implications relate to philosophical discussions of unity - multiplicity in the self, especially to Korsgaard's Constitution Model; (2) one of the crucial findings of the broad work related to the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework is that in general, people lack global traits. The implication of this finding is discussed in conjunction with the Situationism - Virtue Ethics debate.

ÖZET

Benlikte Görülen Tutarsızlık ve Çoğulluk

Bu tez, bir deneysel çalışmadan ve bu deneysel çalışmanın bulgularının felsefi tartışmalarla ilişkilendirildiği bir bölümden oluşmaktadır. Deneysel çalışma Çoklu Benlik Halleri Teorisine dayanmaktadır; teoriye göre benlik kavramı tek ve bütünleşik değildir, aksine insanların hayatlarının rolleri, sosyal kimlikleri, ilişkileri gibi önemli parçalarını yansıtan birçok farklı benlik hali benlik kavramını oluşturur. Benlik halleri farklı kişisel özelliklerle bağlantılıdır ve bir benlik hali bağlamsal girdilerle aktif hale geldiğinde onunla bağlantılı olan kişisel özellikler de daha erişilebilir hale gelir. Bu tezde yapılan deneyin amacı iki farklı benlik halinde birbirine zıt kişisel özellikler barındıran kişilerin, bu iki benlik hali aynı anda aktif hale geldiğinde algılarında ne yönde bir değişiklik yaşanacağını gözlemlemektir. Deneyin sonuçları gösterdi ki: (1) bu iki benlik halinin aynı anda aktif hale gelmesi birbirlerine zıt olan her iki kişisel özelliği ve bağlantılı oldukları benlik hallerini normalden daha erişilebilir hale getirdi; (2) zıt kişilik özelliklerinden birisi yine de diğerinden daha fazla erişilebilir hale geldi, aynı şekilde bir benlik hali diğerine kıyasla daha erişilebilir hale geldi. Deneysel çalışmayı takiben, bu deneyin bulguları ve Çoklu Benlik Halleri Teorisi kapsamında yapılan önemli çalışmaların bulguları bir arada değerlendirilerek felsefi açıdan etki edebileceği iki konu incelendi: (1) Benlik konusunu teklik - çoğulluk boyutunda ele alan Korsgaard'ın Anayasa Modeli ile bu bulguların etkileşimi tartışıldı. (2) Çoklu Benlik Halleri Teorisi'nin önemli bulgularından birisi global kişisel özelliklerin genelde insanlarda olmadığıdır. Bu bulgunun Durumculuk - Erdem Etiği tartışmasına nasıl etki ettiği ele alındı.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The self” as a topic of research has been one of the most central issues in psychology and philosophy alike. The seminal work of the American psychologist William James, the *Principles of Psychology* (1890), laid the groundwork for future research with regards to the self. Since then, throughout the modern history of psychology, the self has been conceptualized in various ways and it has been studied on many different levels of analysis. A relatively recent study (Robins, Tracy, & Sherman, 2009) shows that 43% of personality psychologists indicate that they study the self-concept. According to Robins, Norem, and Cheek (2008), a search on PsycINFO (one of the main databases covering the psychological literature) with the keyword “self” yields 265,161 articles. Furthermore, even within a single journal, *the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 33% of all articles published in that journal from 1970-2007 had “self” as one of the keywords. These figures show how widespread the study of the self has been within the academia for the past 50 years. Naturally, this extensive work covering this topic resulted in numerous self theories that aim to explain this phenomenon from various angles. It is helpful to review some of these constructs and conceptualizations that have been instrumental in the development of the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework which serves as the basis of this thesis.

1.1 Self-schemata

It is difficult to trace back the term “schemata” to its first usage in psychology literature but it would be fair to say that it became an important concept thanks to

Hazel Markus. In her widely cited paper, Hazel Markus (1977) defines self-schemata as “cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of the self-related information contained in an individual's social experience” (Markus, 1977, p.64). As such, self-schemata are to be taken as cognitive structures. These structures are formed through past experience, and they influence both the perception of the information related to the self and the individual’s behavior. After a self-schema is established in memory, it operates as a sort of selective mechanism that governs whether an input or information is attended to, how it is perceived and processed. Thus, self-schemata are far from being passive memory storages, rather they serve as foundation for “future judgments, decisions, inferences, or predictions about the self.” (Markus, 1977, p.64). As an organization of knowledge about the self, a self-schema is formed on a specific dimension of behavior, such as being independent or being dependent or in terms of a domain, such as athletics. In order to show the empirical validity of the self-schema construct, Markus designed an experiment in which participants were measured for their self-judgments on dependence-independence dimension. In the experiment, participants were given a number of trait adjectives that are associated with being independent and being dependent. Participants were asked to make self-judgments about these trait adjectives, meaning that they judged whether these words are self-descriptive or not. The results obtained from this study showed that participants with an already formed self-schema in this dimension either as independent or dependent made significantly faster self-judgments than those who don’t have an established self-schema in this dimension. Those with self-schemata were also able to provide consistent responses and were comfortable about predicting their future behavior leaning heavily towards the side of this dimension that is characteristic of

themselves. On the other hand, aschematics, those who don't have a particular self-schema developed in a given dimension, did not differ in their responses to self-judgments about this dimension; they did not differ in their response latency for dependent and independent adjectives. They also did not show a preference between dependent and independent behaviors in their predictions about the future.

The self-schemata research offers a couple of key insights into the structure of the self-concept: information about the self is organized and classified in memory and this organized knowledge (i.e., self-schemata) influence how information is processed in related behavioral dimensions; self-schemata show consistency and serve as a basis for future behavior. The establishment of self-schemata as valid cognitive structures has been crucial for understanding the structure of the self-concept and it has significantly influenced the subsequent research done in this area. It would be fair to regard this line of research as a precursor to many self theories, including the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework.

1.2 Unity and multiplicity in the self

Most self theories, including that of Markus, took the self as a single, unitary entity up until recently. Within the psychology literature, this was almost taken to be granted considering that there are distinct interest areas within this topic such as self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-affirmation, self-verification, self-evaluation, and so on. Kurzban and Aktipis (2007) bring this issue up and point out that if there was no unified self to begin with then many, if not all, theories on the self would need a considerable revision, to say the least. McConnell (2009) makes the same point by arguing that the inherent presupposition that there is an encompassing self in need of

affirmation, verification, enhancement etc. can be seen in most work done in this domain.

Despite the dominant trend of assuming a single, unitary self within the literature, starting from 1980s, there have been a couple of exceptions to this trend that remained somewhat isolated. One of them is Higgins' distinction between actual, ought and ideal selves. In his self-discrepancy theory, Higgins (1987) distinguishes these three selves as the basic domains of self: “ (a) the actual self, which is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or another) believes you actually possess; (b) the ideal self, which is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or another) would like you, ideally, to possess (i.e., a representation of someone's hopes, aspirations, or wishes for you); and (c) the ought self, which is your representation of the attributes that someone (yourself or another) believes you should or ought to possess (i.e., a representation of someone's sense of your duty, obligations, or responsibilities).” (Higgins, 1987, p.320-321). Although, Higgins' line of research was mainly focused on the link between self-discrepancy and emotional vulnerability, his distinction between these domains of the self suggested the need to view the self through the lens of multiplicity and was therefore important in its own right.

Another important multiplicity concept, possible selves, was introduced by Markus and Nurius (1986). The possible selves is a much broader concept than Higgins' actual, ought and ideal selves distinction. It actually encompasses these and many other kinds of selves. The possible selves are defined as the selves that one can become: the creative self, the sportsman self, the fat self, the depressed self, the drug addict self, and so on. Thus, in short it may include any type of self that one sees himself/herself becoming.

Baumeister and Tice (1986) introduced a different kind of multiplicity with regards to the self. They posited the existence of the private self, the public self, and the collective self. The private self is defined as one's understandings of the attributes, traits and behaviors of oneself (e.g., "I am shy"); the public self is one's understandings of how others perceive oneself (e.g., "In general, I am regarded as a funny person"); the collective self is one's understandings of how a particular group regards oneself (e.g., "My friends believe that I am a responsible person"). Triandis (1989), who utilized these concepts in his line of work focused on how the self and social behaviors vary between different cultural contexts, explains their differences in a very concise way: "The private self is an assessment of the self by the self. The public self corresponds to an assessment of the self by the generalized other. The collective self corresponds to an assessment of the self by a specific reference group." (Triandis, 1989, p. 2).

Apart from these attempts that aimed to show that the structure of the self-concept contains multiplicity, there have been some other concepts that need to be mentioned as well. Katzko (2003) lists all of these concepts along with concepts discussed earlier, all of which were put forth by various self researchers: "subselves (Martindale, 1980; Rosenberg, 1997); subpersonalities (Rowan, 1990); potential selves (Schlenker, 1980); possible selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986); a false versus authentic self (Harter, 1997); private, public, and collective selves (Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; Triandis, 1989); actual, ought, and ideal selves (Higgins, 1987); imagoes (McAdams, 1993); and dialogical selves (Hermans, 1996; Hermans & Kempen, 1993)." (Katzko, 2003, p.84).

Although all of these aforementioned concepts of multiplicity were crucial in developing a multi-faceted view with regards to the self, the work on *self-complexity* has been critical for the emergence and the development of the Multiple-Self Aspects Framework.

1.3 Self-complexity

The definition of self-complexity varies across different models of self-complexity (see Rafaeli-Mor & Steinberg, 2002). Ultimately, Linville's (1985) self-complexity model was the one that received the most attention in the field. Linville's definition of self-complexity relies on the idea that the self is "cognitively represented as a complex structure" (Linville, 1985, p.95). Even though she does not provide a detailed account of the precise form of this structure, she states that this structure reflects the organization of relevant self-knowledge from various domains in one's personal life and it is triggered when information about the self is processed (Linville, 1985). The essential construct of her model is termed "self-aspect". She asserts that people view themselves in terms of multiple self-aspects. A self-aspect can be thought of as "a self-relevant cognitive category, concept, or schema." (Linville, 1985, p. 97). Self-aspects usually include social roles (father, basketball player, policeman) and types of interpersonal relationships (employer, helper). Accordingly, self-complexity "is a function of two things: the number of aspects that one uses to cognitively organize knowledge about the self, and the degree of relatedness of these aspects." (Linville, 1985, p. 97). Her model measures complexity in terms of (1) idiosyncratic attributes that one has in his/her self-aspects which reflect different domains of one's personal life, and (2) the number of connections or

degree of overlap between these self-aspects. Greater number and less connectedness of self-aspects reflect greater self-complexity.

Since Linville's model is at the foundation of McConnell's Multiple Self-Aspects Framework and since the latter will be presented in great detail in the following chapter, there is no need to go into the details of her conceptual framework at this point. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that Linville's model and the subsequent work done in this field mainly focuses on the relation between self-complexity and well-being. Some of the important findings in this line of research were that (1) people with less self-complexity "experience more extreme affect and self-appraisal" (Linville, 1985, p.102), meaning that after success they experience stronger positive feelings and after failure they experience stronger negative feelings (Linville, 1985); (2) people with greater self-complexity deal with stress and recover from negative mood better than those with less self-complexity (Linville, 1987).

1.4 The multiple self-aspects framework

As I mentioned in the beginning, this thesis is based on the conceptual framework of the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework and it relies on the findings obtained through using the research paradigm associated with this framework. McConnell's framework heavily draws on Linville's model. Although some of the fundamental assumptions of the framework are essentially the same as Linville's model, there are a number of differences and developments, especially in terms of how the self is structured in memory and how it functions.

In the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework, the self is taken to be a knowledge structure that is represented in memory. Self-related knowledge is represented as "a network of distributed nodes" (McConnell, 2009, p. 5). The accessibility of these

nodes differs based on the associations that they have with each other. The activation of an area that is connected through associations affects perception as well as behavior in a way that is context-dependent. Since the fundamental principle of this framework is that “the self is a collection of multiple, context-dependent self-aspects.” (McConnell, 2009, p.5), context-modulated influence on perception and behavior occupies a central role. In this framework, an overarching consciousness and self-awareness is granted to an individual. Even so, his/her behavior is taken to be mainly operated by context-dependent self-aspects that become activated via contextual inputs. Self-aspects are defined as the self-representations that reflect the consequential parts of one’s life and experience. They include unique “organizing contexts” (McConnell, 2009, p. 5) such as roles (e.g., being a student, being a father), social identities (e.g., Fenerbahçe fan), affective states (e.g., feeling depressed), social relationships (e.g., being Ceren’s boyfriend), personal goals (e.g., wanting to be a computer engineer), and so on. Theoretically they can include all sorts of meaningful contextualized aspects of one’s life. Self-aspects can be thought of as “broad organizing concepts” (McConnell, 2009, p. 5) that may contain all aforementioned contextualized concepts as well as other constructs mentioned earlier (i.e., possible selves, the authentic self, the private self, the actual self, the ideal self, etc.).

As mentioned above, the activation of a self-aspect happens via contextual inputs such as “environmental settings, social interactions, mental simulation” (McConnell, 2009, p. 5) and it is the result of “the dynamic inputs and constraints of one’s goals, actions, and cognitions as the self moves through the environment” (McConnell, 2009, p. 5). Thus, when one moves into an environmental setting that one has a previously established self-aspect for, his/her relevant self-aspect becomes

automatically activated and it guides his/her actions, perception, goals and behavior. For instance, when a student goes to university to attend class, his/her “student self-aspect” becomes activated and he/she acts in accordance with it.

But what does a self-aspect consist of more concretely? The second fundamental principle of the framework provides an answer: “Self-aspects are associated with personal attributes, which become more accessible when the self-aspect is activated and vice versa.” (McConnell, 2009, p. 5). Thus, the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework contends that a self-aspect is associated with attributes; these attributes may be traits (e.g., talkative), social categories (e.g., male), behaviors (e.g., altruistic), physical characteristics (e.g., being tall) and many others. These attributes can be obtained through various ways: they can be passed onto to an individual through cultural means, they can be generated as a result of social interactions, they can be formed via one’s own “inferences drawn from one’s own behavior” (McConnell, 2009, p. 6), and so on. In any event, these attributes are thought to be formed thanks to personal experiences of events. For example, an individual may have developed the trait “shy” over the years because he/she couldn’t read a poem in front of her/his classmates in primary school (specific exemplar-1), she/he couldn’t raise her/his hand in the class for a question which she/he knows the answer to (specific exemplar-2), and she/he couldn’t confess her/his love to his/her crush in high school (specific exemplar-3). Exemplars such as these are thought to bring about “global and more abstract self-representations”, as is the case in the example given above. (Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994, as cited in McConnell, 2009, p. 6).

Self-aspects mirror organizing contexts that are categorized as “extrapersonal (e.g., where I am, when I am)” (McConnell, 2009, p. 6) dimensions of life. On the other hand, the attributes that are associated with self-aspects mirror “intrapersonal

(e.g., what I am, how I am)” (McConnell, 2009, p. 6) elements that describe how one behaves in these contexts. An attribute may be solely associated with one self-aspect in some cases, whereas in others, an attribute may be associated with a couple of self-aspects. In other words, there may be overlaps between self-aspects in terms of attributes that they are associated with. For example, an individual may have the attribute “extravert” associated both with his/her “student” self-aspect and with his/her “close friend” self-aspect whereas she/he may have the attribute “joyful” only associated with his/her “family” self-aspect. Hence, attributes form a complex and widely associated network within the self-concept depending on their connections with self-aspects.

Since attributes may vary substantially from one self-aspect to another, an individual may display very different behavior in different contexts. For instance, an individual can be quiet, respectful, hard-working in university since his “student” self-aspect consists of these attributes but he/she can act in an obnoxious, lazy manner on a basketball court as his/her “basketball player” self-aspect is associated with these attributes. Thus, a great deal of variety can be shown by an individual in terms of self-representation and the behavior she/he displays across contexts. Different contexts evoke activation for relevant self-aspects, consecutively this causes the attributes that they are associated with to become activated via spread of activation and this activation ultimately spreads to “traits, emotions, goals, actions, and perceptions” (McConnell, 2009, p. 6).

Before moving on to present the empirical data that support these two fundamental principles of the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework, it should be stated that there are three more principles that are somewhat peripheral to the framework as well as to this thesis, which are nonetheless given below:

“3. Overall affect reflects the evaluation of one’s self-aspects weighted by their accessibility, and thus feedback about a self-aspect will affect general affective states to the extent that the information has implications for one’s evaluation of that self-aspect.

4. Feedback about a self-aspect influences evaluations of other self-aspects that share greater attribute associations.

5. The impact of information pertaining to a specific attribute on overall affect increases as the number of self-aspects associated with the attribute increases.”
(McConnell, 2009, p. 5)

The empirical support for the two fundamental principles comes from McConnell and his colleagues’ work (McConnell, 2009). In a study with the aim to test the hypothesis that people have multiple context-dependent self-aspects, 339 participants were asked to provide their self-aspects in an open-ended manner and then to associate attributes with each one of them from a list of 40 traits to indicate how they construe those self-aspects. Participants were free to use any attributes from the list as many times as they wanted for as many self-aspect as they saw fit. They provided 4.43 self-aspects and employed 22.59 of 40 traits on average. 42% of attributes were used for more than one self-aspect, whereas 58% of them were uniquely associated with only one self-aspect (McConnell, 2009). This indicates a sort of connectedness between self-aspects but at the same time the results make it evident that participants believe themselves to have multiple self-aspects that have idiosyncratic attributes instead of overlapping ones.

In another study conducted by McConnell, Rydell, and Brown (2009) the second principle, which asserts that the activation of a self-aspect renders its associated attributes more accessible, was tested. To this end, participants first

performed the formerly outlined task of reporting their self-aspects and associating them with attributes. Three weeks later, participants were back in the lab to complete a study consisting of three parts. This study seemed to be independent from the initial task they completed. The first task of this three-part study was a lexical decision task in which participants decided whether strings of letters were words or non-words. The list of the words used in this task was the list of attributes that they had been previously given in the self-aspect reporting task. In the second task, a writing exercise was administered. Participants expressed themselves about one of their self-aspects that they provided earlier. The aim of this task was to activate the targeted self-aspect. Finally in the third part, participants carried out the exact lexical decision task once again. The results showed that participants provided faster responses when they judged attributes that are associated with their activated self-aspect than other self-descriptive attributes that are associated with other (non-activated) self-aspects. This result supports the second principle by showing that when a self-aspect becomes activated, its associated attributes become more accessible in memory.

Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2004) conducted a similar study. Participants of this study were undergraduate students with ties to campus sororities of Greek System. The participants were randomly assigned to a control or priming condition. In the lab, those in the priming condition were asked to contemplate on their sorority identities while the control group was not primed in any way. Afterwards, both groups completed a lexical decision task in which they judged non-words and words related to Greek life. The participants in the priming condition provided faster responses than those in the control condition. This result supports the second principle by indicating that self-aspect related set of knowledge has greater accessibility in memory when that self-aspect becomes activated.

On a final note, the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework in general acknowledges that cultural variances influence the self-concept but it challenges the argument of Markus & Kitayama (1991) research line that the self-concept is rather unified and it is constructed as independently from social contexts in individual-centric cultures such as Western Europe and North America. Aforementioned empirical results show that even in these cultures, the self-concept is composed by contextualized mental components called self-aspects.

1.5 The present study

The present study relies on the conceptual scheme of the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework and the empirical findings that its line of research generated. McConnell and his colleagues showed that people have multiple self-aspects whose attributes may differ substantially; this also implies that people can have opposing attributes in their different self-aspects. As a matter of fact, everyone can conceive of a person who is a kind, thoughtful, and honest father but is a ruthless, dishonest, and deceiving salesman. The point of the example is that people can and do have opposing attributes in their different self-aspects. Although contexts that trigger the activation of related self-aspects are sometimes separated naturally, there are times when two different self-aspects become activated at the same time (e.g., when a student visits his/her university with his/her family where his/her student self-aspect and son/daughter self-aspect would be simultaneously activated; when a basketball player plays basketball with his/her friends where both his/her basketball player and friend self-aspects become activated). In such cases, one could expect a sort of conflict between opposing attributes and even between their associated self-aspects altogether due to spread of activation. Recall that McConnell and other researchers

found that the activation of a self-aspect makes self-aspect-related knowledge easier to access in memory, hence relevant cues are perceived faster but if a conflict does indeed occur between opposing attributes within two different self-aspects would this still hold true for both self-aspects and these opposing attributes? In other words, would knowledge related to both self-aspects become more accessible because of their simultaneous activation or would we observe a situation where knowledge related to one self-aspect become less accessible due to the conflict of opposing attributes? In short, there are a couple of possibilities for this situation. Accordingly, this study's aim was to investigate changes in activation of opposing self-aspect-relevant attributes when two different self-aspects that are associated with these opposing attributes become activated at the same time.

1.6 Research questions

There are two research questions of this study.

1- Do people who have at least two opposing traits in their two different self-aspects perceive knowledge related to these attributes faster when both of these self-aspects are activated at the same time or would we observe a situation where one of these traits suppresses the other, therefore leading to faster perception for only one of the two traits?

2- Based on the spread of activation principle of the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework, the exact relation type between specific opposing traits might be expected with regards to other traits that are associated with these two targeted self-aspects containing opposing traits. Thus, the same question is extended to all traits that are associated with two targeted self-aspects: Do people who have at least two opposing traits in their two different self-aspects perceive knowledge related to all

traits of these two self-aspects faster when both of these self-aspects are activated at the same time or would we observe a situation where one of the activated self-aspect suppresses the other, therefore leading to faster perception for only of the two self-aspects?

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

2.1 Participants

All participants of this study were first and second year undergraduate students in Boğaziçi University. They were enrolled in an introductory psychology course. The first session of the study was conducted online and 370 participants completed this session. 138 of them were male, 229 of them were female, 5 of them did not identify as female or male. Participants' age ranged from 18 to 38 with a mean of 20.8 ($SD = 2.03$). Although 203 of these participants were eligible to participate in the second session of the study, only 81 of them elected to do so. 27 of these 81 participants were male and 53 of them were female, 1 of them did not identify as either. Age range for the participants who took part in the second session were 18-27 with a mean of 20.5 ($SD = 1.5$).

Participants received appropriate amount of extra course credits in return for participation. The study was conducted in compliance with the ethical requirements of Boğaziçi University Social Sciences Institute Ethics Coordinating Committee. All participants read and signed consent forms for each of the two sessions of the study that they participated in. Since all participants were native Turkish speakers, all materials used in the two sessions were provided in Turkish.

2.2 Materials

2.2.1 Self-aspect description task

The first session of the study was self-aspect description task and it was conducted online (see Appendix A). Participants were first briefly informed about the meaning of the term self-aspect and were provided a short summary of the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework's fundamental principle. Two examples of hypothetical individuals were given in the following pages, with a number of self-aspects and their associated traits for each hypothetical person. Following this, participants were asked to provide their own self-aspects and choose trait adjectives that best describe these self-aspects. The trait adjective list contained 24 trait adjectives which were 12 pairs of antonyms. Participants were free to indicate as many self-aspects as they wanted up to 10 and they were also free to choose as many trait adjective as they wanted for each self-aspect. Furthermore, they were informed that they can choose a trait adjective for more than one self-aspect, meaning that they were allowed to choose overlapping traits for self-aspects. It was also indicated in the form that they did not have to use all of the traits given.

This task was based on self-aspect description tasks that Linville (1985) and McConnell et al. (2009) used in their respective studies. Self-description task was validated in self-complexity literature in Linville's studies (Linville, 1985; 1987). Although, the basic structure of the task was the same, since the focus of this study was on people who have opposing traits in their self-aspects, the trait adjectives used for this task was modified accordingly. Linville's self-aspect description task contained 40 trait adjectives of which 20 were positive and 20 were negative. In this modified task, there were 24 trait adjectives (12 pairs of antonyms). There were a number of criteria for the selected traits adjectives: (1) The adjectives used for this

task were not overtly negative to avoid social desirability effects. (2) Certain trait adjectives that have multiple meanings and can be used in place of another adjective with a completely different meaning in Turkish were avoided. (3) Certain traits adjectives in English can convey their meaning in one word but in Turkish often the same meaning is conveyed either by using a relative clause or by using an adjective clause both of which require using more than one word and since this study used a lexical decision task, certain traits that fall in this category had to be avoided altogether. (4) The selected trait adjectives were based on and selected from the Big Five trait taxonomy (John & Srivastava, 1999).

2.2.2 The lexical decision task

A lexical decision task was implemented in the second session of the study to measure contextual activation of traits, the main outcome of interest in the present study. The task contained 120 words and 120 non-words, all in Turkish (see Appendix B). These non-words were created for this task and they were all pronounceable but meaningless in Turkish. In addition to the 24 trait adjectives from the self-aspect description task, there were 4 synonymous words (or words with very close meanings to the original trait adjective) for each of these traits adjectives, making it a total 120 words. The task was similar to the one used in McConnell et al.'s (2009) study where trait adjectives from the self-aspect description tasks were used to measure self-aspect related knowledge accessibility in memory. The lexical decision task was programmed and run on DirectRT version 2012. Words and non-words appeared on the computer screen one by one and participants decided whether the specific string of letters on the screen was a meaningful word or a meaningless non-word as fast as possible.

2.3 Procedure

For the first session of the study, participants were informed and called for the study via their registered university e-mail addresses. Each participant completed the online self-aspect description task by filling out the form. After this, the data obtained from participants was screened to determine whether they had at least two opposing traits in their self-aspects. Only those who had at least two opposing traits in two different self-aspects (e.g., extravert in student self-aspect but introvert in family self-aspect) were invited for the second session of the study. The second session was conducted 4-6 weeks later than the first part. During the second session, when a participant arrived at the lab, first he/she signed a consent form and then was escorted to a cubicle by the experimenter. In the cubicle, there was only a computer for the lexical decision task, a chair and a pen and paper. The second part of the study was composed of 3 parts: the lexical decision task, a writing exercise for self-aspect activation, the identical lexical decision task again. Once they were in the cubicle, participants were informed about the lexical decision task by verbal instructions. They were told that a word or a non-word was going to appear on the screen and they were going to decide whether it was a legitimate Turkish word or a non-word as fast as possible using the keyboard. They were informed that the “L” key was for words and the “S” key was for non-words. They were instructed to place and keep their index fingers on these keys and begin when they are ready. They were specifically told to provide their answers as fast as possible but to also be careful not to make mistakes. The order of appearance for non-words and words were completely randomized for each participant and each administration of the lexical decision task.

The second section of the second part of the study was a writing exercise that aimed to activate targeted self-aspects. Once participants finished the first lexical decision task, they were instructed to think and write about two specific self-aspects that they provided in the first session of the study. They were told to write 6 sentences to describe each of these self-aspects (e.g. “describe how you are as a friend”, “describe how you are as a dancer”). In order to avoid order (i.e., primacy and recency) effect, they alternated between self-aspects. That is, they wrote one sentence for one self-aspect then one sentence for the other and so on until they were done writing a total of 12 sentences. Each participant was individually instructed to write about two specific self-aspects drawn from their responses in the first session of the study. These two specific self-aspects were targeted because they were associated with opposing traits. Participants were unaware of this fact. This writing process took about 7-8 minutes for most participants. Although it happened very rarely, the experimenter intervened with participants who took much longer than 8 minutes by indicating that they have done enough writing for this task. Since the purpose of this task was not to obtain 12 sentences from participants but to activate their targeted self-aspects through mental simulation, this time restriction was considered appropriate and necessary for preventing fatigue during the second session. This section of study designed for self-aspect activation was based on a similar self-aspect activation related writing exercise that McConnell et al. used (2009).

After completing the writing exercise, participants engaged with the same lexical decision task again. They were given the same instructions that were provided for the first lexical decision task trial. Each lexical decision task trial took about 12 minutes and the whole second session of the study took about 30 minutes on average.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

The first session of the study where participants reported their self-aspects and associated traits of these self-aspects revealed that 203 participants out of total 370 participants had at least two opposing traits in their two different self-aspects. Pairs of self-aspects associated with opposing traits were mostly these self-aspects: student-family self-aspects pair (54), student-friend self-aspects pair (26), student-boyfriend/girlfriend self-aspects pair (22), family-friend self-aspects pair (10) and the rest of self-aspect pairs associated with opposing traits were within a wide range of self-aspects including sportsman/sportswoman self-aspect, gamer self-aspect, dancer self-aspect, and so on.

Among 81 Participants who participated in the second session, student self-aspect (47), family self-aspect (30), friend self-aspect (30), boyfriend/girlfriend self-aspect (25) and “when alone” self-aspect (9) were the most commonly seen self-aspects.

Before the analyses of reaction time (RT) data from the lexical decision task, incorrect responses and responses faster than 300 milliseconds (ms) and slower than 2000 ms were eliminated, as is standard in RT-based lexical decision tasks (Ratcliff, 1993).

3.1 Accessibility of traits

To investigate how the activation of two different self-aspects that are associated with opposing traits affects the perception of words related to these traits, RTs for the targeted trait adjective and its 4 synonymous words were averaged, resulting in two

variables (“trait 1” and “trait 2”), which represent the opposing traits. Although most of the participants had only one opposing pair of traits in two of their self-aspects, some participants had more than one opposing pair of traits. For these participants, their RTs for these other opposing traits were added to the appropriate average in the same manner.

A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare pre-manipulation RTs with post-manipulation RTs for each of the opposing traits. As shown in figure 1 and 2, words related to trait 1 and trait 2 were both perceived faster post-manipulation. There was a significant difference between pre-manipulation condition for trait 1 ($M = 665.58, SD = 101.51$) and post-manipulation condition trait 1 ($M = 623.78, SD = 99.23$), $t(71) = 4.47, p = .000$. Accordingly, participants gave faster responses on average after (vs. before) the activation of self-aspects. Similarly, there was a significant difference between pre-manipulation condition for trait 2 ($M = 664.38, SD = 109.53$) and post-manipulation condition for trait 2 ($M = 634.56, SD = 113$), $t(71) = 2.84, p = .006$.¹ Once again, post-manipulation responses were faster than pre-manipulation responses. These results suggest that simultaneous self-aspect activations of two self-aspects increase accessibility for both of the opposing traits that they are associated with.

¹ 9 outliers were detected and removed from these analyses. Values more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the calculated interquartile range were taken to be outliers. Results were very similar in analyses without eliminating these outliers: pre and post-manipulation trait 1, $t(80) = 4.18, p = .001$ and pre and post manipulation trait 2, $t(80) = 2.14, p = .036$.




Figure 1. Trait 1 pre-manipulation (left) and post-manipulation (right)

Note: AV-bs-1-tr represents pre-manipulation targeted trait 1, AV-A-1-tr represents post-manipulation targeted trait 1. AV-bs-2-tr represents pre-manipulation targeted trait 2, AV-A-2-tr represents post-manipulation targeted trait 2.




Figure 2. Trait 2 pre-manipulation (left) and post-manipulation (right)

3.2 Accessibility of self-aspects

To investigate how the activation of two different self-aspects that are associated with opposing traits affects the perception of words related to all associated traits of these self-aspects, a paired-samples t-test was conducted. The exact same procedure of previous analyses was executed; pre-manipulation RTs were compared with post manipulation RTs for each self-aspect. As shown in figure 3 and 4, words related to self-aspect 1 and self-aspect 2 were both perceived faster post-manipulation. For self-aspect 1, there was a significant difference between the average RTs in the pre-manipulation ($M = 657.38$, $SD = 95.98$) and post-manipulation ($M = 621.90$, $SD = 84.15$) trials, $t(71) = 4.92$, $p = .000$. Similarly, for self-aspect 2, there was a significant difference between average RTs in the pre-manipulation ($M = 661.35$, $SD = 93.19$) and post-manipulation ($M = 633.58$, $SD = 91.44$) trials, $t(71) = 4.30$, $p = .000$.² These results suggest that simultaneous self-aspect activation of two self-aspects increases accessibility of both of these self-aspects despite the fact that they are associated with opposing traits.

² 9 outliers were detected and removed from these analyses. Values more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the calculated interquartile range were taken to be outliers. Results were very similar in analyses without eliminating these outliers: pre and post manipulation self-aspect 1, $t(80) = 4.74$, $p = .001$ and pre and post manipulation self-aspect 2, $t(80) = 4.91$, $p = .001$.




Figure 3. Self-aspect 1 pre-manipulation (left) and post-manipulation (right)

Note: AV-bs-1-asp represents pre-manipulation targeted self-aspect 1, AV-A-1-asp represents post-manipulation targeted self-aspect 1. AV-bs-2-asp represents pre-manipulation targeted self-aspect 2, AV-A-2-tr represents post-manipulation targeted self-aspect 2.




Figure 4. Self-aspect 2 pre-manipulation (left) and post-manipulation (right)

3.3 Comparing accessibility boosts between traits

In order to examine how opposing traits differed from each other in terms of the effect that simultaneous self-aspect activations have on them a one-sample t-test was conducted³. The absolute difference ($M = 72.81, SD = 55.61$) between trait 1 and trait 2 was tested against zero to investigate whether they differed. Despite the fact that self-aspect activation resulted in both sets of opposing traits becoming more accessible (see above), the results of this one-sample t-test showed that knowledge related to one trait was still perceived significantly faster than the other, $t(71) = 11.11, p < .000$ ⁴. In other words, one trait dominated the other in terms of accessibility boost it received via self-aspect activation.




Figure 5. The absolute difference between trait 1 and trait 2

³ This analysis had to be conducted with a one sample t-test instead of a repeated measures ANOVA as trait 1 and trait 2 are not fixed, coherent concepts/categories; what trait 1 and trait 2 corresponds to vary for each subject, therefore trait 1 and trait 2 are in arbitrary positions. Since trait 1 and trait 2 are not fixed, coherent concepts/categories, they cannot be defined as factors in a repeated-measures ANOVA. Thus, the only way to assess the difference between trait 1 and trait 2 was to first obtain differences of pre- and post-manipulation values of each trait in itself and then determine the absolute difference between these two values to test against zero.

⁴ 9 outliers were detected and removed from this analysis. Values more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the calculated interquartile range were taken to be outliers. Results were very similar in analysis without eliminating these outliers: $t(80) = 10.53, p = .001$

3.4 Comparing accessibility boosts between self-aspects

Similarly, in order to examine how the targeted two self-aspects differed from each other in terms of the effect of simultaneous self-aspect activations have on them a one sample t-test was conducted⁵. The absolute difference ($M = 45.72$, $SD = 37.04$) between self-aspect 1 and self-aspect 2 was tested against zero to investigate whether they differed. Despite the fact that knowledge related to these self-aspects were perceived faster for both self-aspects after activation, results of this one-sample t-test showed that knowledge related to one self-aspect was still perceived significantly faster than the other, $t(71) = 10.47$, $p = .000$ ⁶. In other words, one self-aspect dominated the other in terms of accessibility boost it received when both self-aspects were activated at the same time.




Figure 6. The absolute difference between self-aspect 1 and self-aspect 2

⁵ Because of the same reasons as in the case of the analysis of traits (see footnote 3), this analysis had to be conducted with a one-sample t-test instead of a repeated-measures ANOVA.

⁶ 9 outliers were detected and removed from this analysis. Values more than 1.5 interquartile ranges away from the calculated interquartile range were taken to be outliers. Results were very similar in analysis without eliminating these outliers: $t(80) = 11.40$, $p = .001$

3.5 Discussion

Results obtained from this study suggest a number of important things: (1) In line with the earlier findings (McConnell, 2009), self-aspect activation causes its related self-knowledge to be perceived faster. (2) When two different self-aspects become activated at the same time, self-knowledge related to both of these self-aspects become more accessible despite the fact that they are associated with opposing traits. (3) When two different self-aspects that are associated with opposing traits became simultaneously activated, self-knowledge related to these opposing traits was perceived faster for both opposing traits. (4) While there was no clear indication that the activation of one opposing trait caused the other opposing trait to be inhibited (e.g., causing self-knowledge related to the inhibited trait to be perceived slower than baseline level), one opposing trait still dominated the other in terms of the accessibility boost that these opposing traits receive from self-aspect activations. In other words, even though both opposing traits are perceived faster (compared to baseline) when their respective self-aspects become simultaneously activated, self-knowledge related to one opposing trait is perceived even faster than the other. (5) The exact same relation is observed with regards to self-aspects that are associated with opposing traits; self-knowledge related to one self-aspect is perceived even faster than the other in spite of the fact that both of these self-aspects become more accessible compared to their baseline levels.

Although, it wasn't possible to assess whether the dominating trait was associated with the dominating self-aspect in this study, such a result seems highly probable. In line with the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework's fundamental principles, accessibility of a self-aspect and its associated traits should go hand in hand. Spread of activation principle predicts that an activation of a self-aspect will

render its associated traits more accessible as well, meaning that accessibility of a trait should parallel accessibility of a self-aspect, hence it is reasonable to argue that in our study the dominating trait was probably associated with the dominating self-aspect.

3.6 Limitations and future directions

One limitation of the study was due to the fact that trait 1 and trait 2, and their associated self-aspects were not fixed concepts/categories. That is to say, each opposing trait and each of its associated self-aspect varied for every subject. Because of this, it was not possible to analyze whether the dominating trait was indeed associated with the dominating self-aspect. Future studies can establish this link by choosing participants with fixed opposing traits and self-aspects. For example, subjects for this future study may only include participants who have the trait “extravert” in their “student” self-aspect and the trait “introvert” in their “friend” self-aspect. This way, it can be possible to reliably analyze this question. A study with fixed opposing traits and self-aspects could also allow for better explanation of variance with regards to specific traits.

Another important future direction following this study can be to investigate the underlying reason for difference of accessibility boost observed in opposing traits and their associated self-aspects. Even when self-knowledge related to both opposing traits and self-aspects become more accessible than baseline levels why do one opposing trait and one self-aspect still receive a significantly higher accessibility boost than the other? Two possible reasons come to mind: first, frequent use of a specific self-aspect could render it more dominating than the other; McConnell mentions frequent use as a possible reason for increase in accessibility of a self-

aspect in general (McConnell, 2009). Thus, it may simply be the case that one of the self-aspects was usually more frequently used than the other, leading to the pattern of results we observed in the one-sample t-tests. Second, how much importance an individual attaches to these two specific self-aspects can play a crucial role in this regard. Again, it may simply be that one of the self-aspects was usually more important or central to identity. A future study with the goal of examining this issue may discover the source of this difference.

CHAPTER 4

PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION

4.1 Philosophical clarification and implications of the multiple self-aspects framework

The Multiple Self-Aspects Framework is an empirical framework focusing on the self with a cognitive and psychological lens. Naturally, it does not have any philosophical aspirations nor does it attempt to relate to kinds of philosophical discussions that have been going on for centuries. Nonetheless, it has certain philosophical implications and the empirical data that this thesis and other body of work that sprang out from this framework provide valuable new insights for some philosophical debates with regards to the self. Before moving on to debates, however, we need to clarify usages of certain key concepts of the framework and point out the level of analysis that this framework engages with.

As evident from his quotes, throughout the presentation of the framework McConnell uses the terms self and self-concept interchangeably. What is meant with the term self and how it is defined varies substantially in philosophical texts and psychology literature as well, thus a certain amount of confusion may seem inevitable in this specific topic. Nevertheless, what the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework engages with is actually quite clear and such confusions can be avoided altogether if we stick to the term self-concept alone. As mentioned above, McConnell defines the self as a “collection of multiple, context-dependent self-aspects.” (McConnell, 2009, p.5), it has well-defined boundaries; it deals with self-representations and how the self is represented in the memory. That is why, sticking to the term self-concept seems very appropriate instead of using the term self which

might incur a lot of vague meanings. On the other hand, it should be clearly stated that these representations are not just some depository that are static and serve no important role. On the contrary, the self-concept, as we have seen so far, is very dynamic and serves extremely crucial purposes in terms of an individual's actions, goals, purposes, emotions etc. The upshot of this distinction between the self and the self-concept is twofold: first, the term self has been used in many different ways with a wide variety of meanings and since it is hard to define, its meaning can be vague and the picture McConnell draws in his framework clearly focuses on the self-concept; it deals with how self-knowledge is represented in the memory, how it functions, what sort of mechanisms facilitates these functions, what sort of effects these representations have on perception etc. Thus, it is distinguishable from the term self. Depending on the definition, self-concept may be categorized as a part of the self for some philosophers. Again, since there is no universally agreed upon meaning or definition of the self, this debate is best left alone. Second and most importantly, this distinction allows us to see clearly on what level of analysis the discussion is held. The Multiple Self-Aspect Framework and the empirical data related to it does not make ontological claims, rather its focus is solely on the cognitive-psychological level of the self phenomenon. Thus, historically important ontological discussions about whether the self exists as a substance, how its metaphysical nature really is etc. are essentially unrelated to this framework. The empirical findings and the theoretical framework can be compatible with any type of ontological view on the self from Cartesian dualism claiming that the self is an immaterial substance (Descartes, 1641) to the Buddhist view that the self does not exist (Rahula, 1959). Since this framework categorically does not make any ontological claims, it does not have any ontological commitments as well and it would be a mistake to read

McConnell's usage of the term self as referring to some kind of metaphysical entity. Similarly, multiplicity present in the framework refers to a multiplicity seen on a cognitive level. Obviously, there are not numerically distinct multiple entities occupying a body-mind complex, rather the empirically supported fundamental claim is that on the cognitive level an individual does not have a unitary self-concept. Thus, when an individual acts in the world depending on the environmental contexts, his/her mental and affective states there is a mental shift that happens via self-aspect activation bringing a certain part of self-concept forward to guide one's actions, perception and behavior in general. Perhaps instead of asserting that an individual has multiple selves, as it can be misleading, it is best to describe the fundamental claim of the framework as one having multiple parts of associated and clustered self-knowledge forming a self-concept in memory that is not unitary. Although, the empirical work that the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework generated sheds some light on the structure of the self-concept, it is not fully fleshed-out yet, so an important question remains with regards to how much disunity or disconnection exists within the self-concept itself. As stated before, self-aspects themselves are associated with attributes and these attributes in turn can be associated with other self-aspects; thus a sort of associative network is already in place within the self-concept among its self-aspects. These associations seem far from complete, meaning that self-concept does not seem to be fully connected but the degree to which self-aspects that make up the self-concept are connected with each other seems crucial in terms of determining the kind of multiplicity that is prevalent in the self-concept. In any event, these are empirical issues and hopefully will be answered through experimental means in the future. What needs to be emphasized is that the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework does not have ontological commitments; hence it does not have relevance to debates

about the self that are metaphysical in nature. On the other hand, this thesis and its framework do have relevance to some other philosophical issues that are about the self, namely inconsistency and disunity seen in the self and the debate between situationism and virtue ethics.

4.2 Inconsistency and disunity in the self

One of the important findings of this study is that more than half of the participants, 203 out of 370 reported to have at least one opposing attribute pair in their two different self-aspects. This result coupled with the other findings of the body of work related to the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework indicates a kind of inconsistency and disunity prevalent in self-concept. The kind of inconsistency this framework brings forward can be considered new and certainly different than that of traditionally discussed in philosophy literature. The idea of disunity in the self dates back to the time of Ancient Greece but the way McConnell's framework partitions the self is certainly a new way of looking at things in terms of disunity and multiplicity.

The study on the self needs an interdisciplinary approach if it is to be fully fleshed-out. Empirical findings and theoretical structures based on them need to be integrated with philosophical approaches with regard to the self. Unity-multiplicity dimension of the self has been explored by philosophers and Christine M. Korsgaard's book (2009) offers a model on the self that is built on the earlier work of Plato and Kant who in their own ways partitioned self as well. She improves on their work in her book, *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*. I believe the work related to the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework could also be integrated into her model, and help improve some parts of her model. The theoretical structure of McConnell's framework brings some explanatory power to Constitution Model laid

out by Korsgaard and it furthers her model in certain aspects by providing it an empirical basis.

4.2.1 Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity

Korsgaard's book mainly deals with the interplay of action, agency and identity by analyzing their interaction on the moral dimension. It heavily draws from the earlier work of Immanuel Kant, Aristotle and Plato, especially with regard to their moral philosophy. In order to make sense of her Constitution Model for our purposes, we need to begin by introducing certain crucial concepts and their relations to one another. It is important to fully explain them early on as they serve as the foundational theoretic components that establish her detailed Constitution Model of the self.

Starting with the concept of action: action is a sort of "necessity for human beings" (Korsgaard, 2009, p.1). That is to say, it is inevitable for human beings to act, even choosing not to act is a form action as it has already been chosen by the agent in question and it makes it a form of action: standing still, lying down on the couch without moving etc. are all actions that human beings do. All actions are subjected to a kind of normativity which has a "psychological force" in us that governs our actions. Along with normativity, there comes the problem of being virtuous or acting morally. Unlike other theories that take being good or virtuous as effortless states stemming from pre-existing internal conditions, Korsgaard's theory views our inner condition largely different. In her point of view, humans have to work in themselves to bring about and maintain moral/rational actions (Korsgaard, 2009, p.7). It is a kind of inner conflict between various parts of the soul/self. Through this struggle that requires effort and work, human beings as agents strive for

a kind of unity in themselves, which in turn is what produces the good action. And this process of integration and unity of the self itself is what she calls self-constitution.

Drawing from the works of Aristotle, Korsgaard argues that a good action is the one that follows from the right principle. She says: “A good action is one that embodies the *orthos logos* or right principle—it is done at the right time, in the right way, to the right object, and—importantly for my purposes—with the right aim.” (Korsgaard, 2009, p.10). What is important with this formulation of right action is that it includes “the aim” as a part of the action itself. The very same type of formulation is seen in Kant’s own moral philosophy with regard to defining the moral action. Both of these philosophers conceive the aim of action as an indispensable part of itself, which gives it the form of “to-do-this-act-for-the-sake-of-this-end”, Korsgaard claims. Another important similarity between Kant’s and Aristotle’s conception of action is that both of them think that what makes an action good is the form of its principle it relies on. That is to say, an action is good only if its parts like its aim, time, place etc., are all “related to one another in the right way” (Korsgaard, 2009, p.17). If they are so, that means that an action can have the internal property of rightness or lawfulness which is found in the principle or the maxim of the action itself. Since such conceptions necessarily lead to view actions as “bearers of moral value” (Korsgaard, 2009, p.18), both of these philosophers ends up asserting that actions are chosen for their own sake, which of course Korsgaard endorses.

Now we can move on to see how Korsgaard relates this conception of action to agency and identity. She believes that for an action to be attributable to an agent, the agent needs to be unified, a whole, a single entity. In her view, if a seeming

action emerging from an agent is not chosen by the whole of agent then it can not be considered an action at all. For example, an involuntary movement like a twitch in the eye can not be properly categorized as an action. Similarly, any sort of movement that is the result of an effect in the agent or on the agent alone cannot be taken to constitute an action. She puts it this way: “For a movement to be my action, for it to be expressive of myself in the way that an action must be, it must result from my entire nature working as an integrated whole (Korsgaard, 2009, p.19). The sort of unification she has in mind is not something that is formed a priori, rather through choices that to lead to specific actions in the world agents constitute themselves. And it is this act of choosing that leads to the unity of identity through self-constitution. To understand how such a formulation is possible, we need to understand how Korsgaard utilizes Aristotle’s idea that “what makes an object the kind of object it is, is its function” (Korsgaard, 2009, p.28). Accordingly, what makes a hammer what it is, is its capacity to smash, for example. The function of living beings, such as humans, is to “maintain and reproduce themselves” (Korsgaard, 2009, p.35). Living beings aim to sustain their form to carry on being until they simply can not. All parts of an organism and their relation to one another and to the whole are arranged in a way to make it possible. Thus, living beings are thought to exist in a continuum in time where they can be properly categorized as activities or processes that do the sorts of actions that sustain their form throughout their life-time, such as consuming food, sleeping, reproducing and so on. For animals, it is much simpler as they are solely governed by their instincts but for us, the act of maintaining ourselves to exist requires us to make choices. Along with our natural rational capabilities, the primary reason for this is our inherent capacity of self-consciousness. Self-consciousness provides us an inner “space” where we can deliberate, reason and decide our actions.

Now, when we add these ideas together, we can clearly see how Korsgaard claims that human beings, as agents constitute themselves through choices they make and actions they cause in the world, all done in an attempt to unify themselves and integrate their identities.

Now that we have seen how our choices constitute ourselves, we can move onto another instrumental component of Korsgaard's theory, practical identities. Practical identities are what humans create for themselves when they are faced with the inevitable reality that they have to choose in order to decide what kind of an agent they will be in the world. Practical identities serve as the basis for our choices. Korsgaard provides the definition of practical identity in this way: "a description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking." (Korsgaard, 2009, p.20). Thus, it can be anything that the agent takes to be valuable or worthwhile; social roles such as being a father, a student; professions such as being a craftsman; ethnic, national identities, political identities such as being Turkish and so on. All of these roles and similar ones fall under the concept of practical identities in her conception. Some of these identities may be not chosen by the agent, like belonging to an ethnic group, but in the end it is up to the agent to decide whether he values them to conduct certain actions for the sake of ends conceived in description of the practical identity in question. Once owned, these identities become the sources of reason for our actions. Korsgaard likens the impact of these practical identities on our choices to incentives and principles in Kant's formulation for moral motivation as the source of an action (Korsgaard, 2009, p.22). According to Kant, every action stems from an incentive, the thing that pops up in the mind designating an action as worth doing; every action relies on a principle that dictates whether it should be selected or not. The same type of structure is seen with

regard to practical identities. They serve as sources of incentives and they also consist of the principles in their structure. For example, assuming an agent regards being a student as a one of her practical identities, she acts in accordance with this identity; she finishes her school projects on time as it is a vital part of being a good student and refuses to conduct actions that wouldn't fall under proper description of being a student, like submitting a school project of another student as her own.

Before presenting the Constitution Model, we need to unfold one last key idea which is tightly tied to it: psychic unity. As I mentioned briefly before, Korsgaard asserts that self-consciousness allows an agent to have inner space where he can deliberate and choose between his incentives. Following Plato and Kant, she says that the soul/self has parts and incentives are only just one part of it. There are also principles to choose, principles of reason or maxims in the Kantian terminology. This way, self-consciousness creates a sort of "psychic complexity" that the agent experiences (Korsgaard, 2009, p.125). As such, for humans, psychic unity becomes a sort of task that they have to engage in order to become unified. Thus, the act of deliberating to decide an incentive to act on based on a principle of reason not only leads to an action in the world but it also unifies the agent. This idea of unification is crucial; since in any given moment in any given situation we can only commit a single action when we find ourselves in a situation where multiple competing incentives may pop up in our mind or when we have a sort of conflict arising from our practical identities, we need to deliberate and choose one incentive based on a principle we determine to perform an action as a unified agent. Recall the earlier claim of Korsgaard that for an action to be attributable to an agent it needs to emerge from the whole of him; accordingly we can say that thanks to self-consciousness and

capacity to reason, a human agent reunifies himself before committing an action in the world and thereby his action becomes attributable to him.

4.2.2 The constitution model

According to Plato's conception, the soul/self has three parts named appetite, reason and spirit. Appetite can be thought of as the same thing as incentive, the Kantian term that we have used so far. And reason is reason. As for spirit, it is distinct from both reason and appetite but most of the time act as an ally to reason. In Korsgaard's words how it differs from them is explained as such: "That it is distinct from appetite shows up in the fact that anger and indignation, which are manifestations of spirit, are often directed against the appetites themselves." (Korsgaard, 2009, p.139). In short it is defined as "the sense of honor, protective of the dignity and value of the self." (Korsgaard, 2009, p.140).

Following Socrates and Plato, Korsgaard draws a parallel between the parts of the soul and the parts of the city, which is the basis of her model. She relays Plato's formulation of the ideal city in which there are three parts or classes. First, there are rulers who govern the city, then there are auxiliary forces formed by police and army who enforce the laws that the rulers enact and there are citizens who live their lives in the city and attend to their needs, conduct certain professions etc. Plato then finds the corresponding parts in the human soul/self: reason corresponds to the rulers in that they both govern the whole for the good of the whole, spirit functions like auxiliary forces carrying out laws that reason set and appetite is similar to the citizens living in the city whose purpose is to cater to the needs of the whole (Korsgaard, 2009, p.141). What unifies the three parts of the city and makes it a whole is its constitution. Constitution assigns the roles of each branch, lays out the

details of roles, defines their boundaries and so on. Among other things, it essentially determines the rules for taking a deliberative action. So long as rulers don't undertake an action based on the ruling mechanism that relies on the constitution, an action that represents the whole of the city cannot be considered to be taken. Thus, for example, if a citizen or a group of soldiers from the army of the city act on their own to commit a crime against another city their action wouldn't be attributable to the city itself as that action does not stem from the whole of city, from its constitutional mechanism (Korsgaard, 2009, p.141). Following the analogy, it is concluded that for human beings, constitution is also what governs the process of deliberative action. Here, the constitution determines the roles of reason, appetite and spirit. Thus the same process of deliberative action can be seen in the self as reason chooses between various appetites based on the laws or the maxims that have been established and it establishes new maxims when necessary.

4.2.3 What does the multiple self-aspect framework bring to the constitution model?

At first glance, the Constitution Model and the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework may not seem to have anything in common. Admittedly, these two models deal with very different issues, their focuses are extremely different as well even though both of them are about the self and tackle it on the unity-multiplicity dimension. The Constitution Model describes the multiplicity seen in the self on any given moment that an agent may find himself in with a disunified self that has at least three parts conceived as appetites, reason and spirit. As we have seen Korsgaard explaining it so far, the agent's inevitable role is to bring unity to this multiplicity through a sort of constitution so that he may be able to commit actions in the world. On the other hand, the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework deals with questions of unity and

multiplicity on the dimension of different contexts that the agent can find himself in. These contexts in turn shape the agent's mental representations with regard to himself through experience. Then these context dependent self-representations called self-aspects guide his behavior, emotions, perception and actions.

What provides a common ground for possible discussion of these two separate models is the extreme similarity of two crucial concepts used in them: self-aspects and practical identities. The concept of practical identities as conceived by Korsgaard is almost identical to the concept of self-aspects in the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework model. Social roles, professions, political identifications etc. are the things that constitute the practical identities and self-aspects. Although similarity of them in this regard is evident, what distinguishes the self-aspect concept from the practical identity concept is the role that it is assigned to in shaping the agent's perception, emotions and actions. Korsgaard's conception of practical identity is somewhat *static* in terms of its influence on the agent. Practical identities seem to serve as a sort of storage where we derive our sources of reasons. Recall that in her conception the function of practical identities is to serve as basis of our choices; they act as sources of reason for actions. On the other hand, in the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework model, self-aspects are mental structures that basically direct our behavior, modify our perceptions and emotions. They are much more dynamic and consequential. Furthermore, instead of serving as purely depository-like structures like practical identities, self-aspects are *embodied* in the sense that an agent essentially becomes his relevant self-aspect in a given context. Replacing practical identities with self-aspects would keep the spirit of Korsgaard's model and it would also give her model an empirical basis.

Although implementing self-aspects into the Constitution Model seems to bring advantages to it but wouldn't it also threaten Korsgaard's main aim of achieving psychic unity as self-aspects themselves are contextualized structures? As I mentioned earlier, self-aspect activation happens via environmental cues and inputs, this means that in any given moment more than one self-aspect can be activated. Furthermore, activation of one self-aspect makes its associated knowledge more accessible but it does not completely block the access to other self-aspects. If activation of a self-aspect did indeed block access to others then it could have posed a serious threat to the kind of unity that is necessary for Korsgaard's model. But as it stands, self-aspects as mental constructs actually works in favor of her unification idea. Self-aspect activation process may actually provide a more detailed explanation of the process of unification. Because conflicts may arise in the self as it has multiple self-aspects that have varying attributes (opposing attributes in some cases) and a sort of integration is required in these cases. This integration process lines up perfectly with Korsgaard's idea that achieving psychic unity is a task that one has to engage. Once we replace the concept of practical identities with the concept of self-aspects in the Constitution Model, the unification-integration process not only has to happen in a given moment where an agent finds himself with competing appetites and principles but it also has to be brought about by the agent for self-aspects that may bring disunity to the self. What I mean is that in a given moment agent has to reunify himself in order to act but he has to take time to contemplate to align himself (his self-aspects) across contexts as well. Although Korsgaard conceives of practical identities rather static, she also mentions something similar to what I suggest here: "We have many particular practical identities and so we also face the task of uniting them into a coherent whole." (Korsgaard, 2009, p.21).

In sum, introducing self-aspects into Korsgaard's model not only as sources of incentives but also as dynamic mental structures that agents embody when they act improves the model and provides it an empirical basis. An interdisciplinary and holistic approach on the self is necessary to explain this phenomenon; bringing different ways of partitioning the self and integrating them together is a crucial task for this purpose. On unity-multiplicity dimension of the self, such an integration attempt may serve well as a foundation block.

4.3 Situationism vs virtue ethics and the lack of global traits

One of the most important implications of the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework and also of this study is the lack of global traits (also referred to as *chronic* traits (McConnell, 2009)) seen in individuals. A global trait is thought to be a trait that is active across contexts and has effect on perception and actions of an individual all the time. For example, an individual who has the global trait "caring" is supposed to act in a caring manner in all contexts she/he is in since it is supposedly active all the time. Brown and McConnell (2009) tested the validity of global traits and showed that global traits are not always active, which naturally implies that there are no global traits. In their study, participants specified all their global traits in addition to providing traits that they often see in other individuals. This method was historically used as a reliable measure to determine global traits for an individual (Higgins, 1982 as cited in Brown & McConnell, 2009). Furthermore, participants completed a 5 minute self-aspect description task, similar to the one depicted earlier, to see which traits were associated with which self-aspects. One week later, participants returned to the laboratory to make judgments about traits being self-descriptive for themselves and to evaluate other individuals' ambiguous behavior to decide whether their

behavior were aligned with one of their earlier provided global traits (e.g., a participant was given the sentence “Jeff never says no when his friends ask for his help” (Brown & McConnell, 2009, p. 9) and was asked to determine whether Jeff’s behavior was “giving” or “submissive” and one of these traits was a global trait for the participant). Before engaging with these tasks, however, participants completed a writing exercise designed for self-aspect activation and they were separated into two groups. In the first group, self-aspect that was activated was associated with one of their global traits, and in the other group activated self-aspect was not associated with a global trait. Results showed that participants in the first group provided faster self-judgments (faster responses for indicating a trait is self-descriptive) and interpreted ambiguous behavior as being in parallel to their own global traits. These two effects are standardly taken to be influence of global traits in the literature (McConnell, 2009) but these effects were not seen in the participants in the second group. Thus, Brown & McConnell concluded that these effects were actually mediated by self-aspect activation that is associated with the trait in question. If a trait was indeed global then it would have had these two effects for participants in the second group as well. Since a global trait is supposed to be active all the time, naturally it is supposed to have an influence on perception regardless of self-aspect activation. In other words, there would be no need for a global trait to be activated to show its influence.

On the other hand, these results do not rule out the possibility of a trait being global. A trait can be relatively global to the extent that it is associated with multiple self-aspects. Technically, it is possible for a trait to be associated with all self-aspects of an individual. In that case, a trait can be global but in reality that is rarely the case. In his study with 339 participants that is presented in an earlier section, McConnell

reports that “average individuals had at least one attribute appear in 69% of their self-aspects.”(McConnell, 2009, p.11), meaning that a trait can be relatively global but it is not fully global for most individuals.

The empirical evidence suggesting the lack of global traits is especially relevant for the situationism and virtue ethics debate in philosophy. Situationism is the thesis that human behavior is not driven and brought about by personal traits, rather how a person acts is determined by specific features of situations that he/she finds himself/herself in (Upton, 2009). Situationism first emerged in the social psychology literature in 1970s but its introduction to philosophical circles happened after some decades with Harman’s influential paper called “Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error” (1999). Following this paper, John Doris released his book on the same topic called *Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior* (2002). Doris and Harman have been the two most prominent defenders of situationism in philosophy, their views converge with each other and they often employ very similar arguments and make use of the same psychology experiments. That is why, treating their positions together should provide an accurate and sufficient portrayal of the kind of situationism that argues against core principles of virtue ethics. Before doing that, however, we need to present the fundamental tenets of virtue ethics to have a better grasp about how situationist arguments are employed against it. Virtue ethics has its roots in Aristotle, the principal idea of his ethical theory is that good action is achieved through virtues (Kraut, 2018). Virtues are taken to be character traits, more precisely as global character traits (Hursthouse, 2018). To behave virtuously means to act in a way that is in accordance with the virtue in question in every situation that is relevant to that virtue (Upton, 2009). For example, a soldier who is courageous, as

a person who possesses “courage” as a virtue in his character, should behave courageously when he is fighting in the battlefield as well as in a social situation in civil life where he has to show the courage to stand up against an injustice he witnesses. Aristotelian virtue ethics has a lot of other important aspects to it, but there is no need to dive deep into its theoretical structure as situationism arguments are raised directly against its fundamental commitment to global traits.

Harman (1999) makes use of the results of two historically important psychology experiments to argue that human behavior cannot be attributed to global traits. First experiment is the famous Milgram experiment (1963, as cited in Harman, 1999). In this experiment, participants were instructed to ask questions to another person, dubbed as “the learner” and turn up a dial to shock him with electricity for each wrong answer. The electric shocks participants administered were increasing with each wrong answer that the learner gave. There was no real electric shock given to the learner, he was acting as though he was in pain with each electric shock that participants subjected onto him but participants were not aware of this. Participants were instructed and pressured by experimenters to keep on administering electric shocks for each wrong answer despite the level of shocks reaching to dangerous volt levels. Most of the 40 participants administered electric shocks of up to 450 volts which is a lethal level.

Second experiment that Harman uses is named The Good Samaritan Study (Darley & Batson 1973, as cited in Harman, 1999). In this experiment, participants were told that they were going to give a talk on a religious topic. On the way to the lecture hall, some participants were told that they needed to hurry as they were late for the seminar and others were told that they were on time. On their way, participants encountered a victim who was clearly in need of help. 63% of

participants who were unhurried helped the victim, while only 10% of participants who were in a hurry did so.

Doris (2002) brings up an experiment called The Phone Booth Study (Isen & Levin, 1972 as cited in Doris, 2002) to argue for Harman's position. In this experiment, participants were separated into two groups. They were assessed on the basis of their helping behavior. One group of participants found a dime in a phone booth while the other group didn't and after they left the phone booth a woman dropped her papers onto the ground. 88% of the participants who had found a dime prior this event helped her pick up the papers whereas only 4% of the participants in the other group helped her.

With the help of the results of these social psychology experiments, Doris and Harman aim to establish one strong and one weaker theses: (1) Virtues are global character traits and results of these experiments show that most people lack virtues. If people had virtues, their behavior would be determined by their virtues; instead in the case of overwhelming majority of people, their behaviors are determined by situational factors. From this it follows that people don't have character traits; there is no empirical basis for character (Harman, 1999). (2) If the core principles of virtue ethics were true, then its claims would be supported on empirical grounds, meaning that virtues that are ascribed to people would explain the behavior of most of the population. The results of aforementioned studies show that people don't have virtues that consistently influence their behavior in a broad range of virtue-relevant situations. Since virtues are global character traits, these results at least establish that people don't have global character traits, rather they can only have local character traits that influence a restricted amount of situations. (Doris, 2002)

While Harman denies character traits altogether, Doris supports the weaker claim that there are no global character traits. According to Doris, global character traits as conceived by virtue ethicists have two crucial features:

“Consistency: Character traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behavior across a diversity of trait-relevant eliciting conditions that may vary widely in their conduciveness to the manifestation of the trait in question.

Stability: Character traits are reliably manifested in trait-relevant behaviors over iterated trials of similar trait-relevant eliciting conditions.” (Doris, 2002, p. 22)

Doris has no problem with the second feature but he calls the first feature into question, as empirical results show that people fail to show consistent virtuous behavior in different virtue-relevant situations. These claims raised by Harman and Doris created a lot of interest among philosophers. To be sure, there are a number of objections about the validity of their claims on philosophical grounds and their interpretation of experiments mentioned above (see Miller, 2003; Kamtekar, 2004; Athanassoulis, 2000; Sreenivasan, 2002). But instead of providing these criticisms, because of our scope I’d like to focus on how the empirical findings derived from the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework fits within this debate.

The Multiple Self-Aspects Framework seems to fall in between these two sides. As evident from the results of studies derived from this framework, people comfortably report to have multiple self-aspects that vary significantly with their associated attributes and traits. Nonetheless, this does not mean that people don’t have character. People behave reliably and consistently in accordance with their self-aspects. Even though great variance is observed among different self-aspects, internal consistency within a self-aspect is expected in the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework. Attributes, including character traits, are key components of self-aspects

since behavior is still explained via them. Situational factors are not seen as the primary determining factors for behavior as the emphasis of the framework is still on the mental structures that are self-aspects. The activation of these self-aspects is taken to be what guides an individual's actions, perception, emotion etc. Thus, McConnell's framework does not support Harman's strong thesis that there is no character that reliably predicts behavior and that behavior should be explained by situational factors alone.

As for Doris' weaker claim, the issue here is a bit tricky. First of all, Doris' conception of local traits is narrower than what is allowed in McConnell's framework: (1) Doris considers local traits as narrow behavioral dispositions that are situation specific and takes them to be "not integrated" (Kamtekar, 2004, p.460); (2) These traits are not thought to be applicable for a broad range of different situations but restricted to singular situations such as "drinking a cup of tea at the café" or "lying down on the couch at home". "Local traits" used in this sense does not match with the structure of self-aspects. In the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework, traits associated with self-aspects are formed through exemplars that can cover a wide range of situations. Furthermore, self-aspects themselves often cover a much wider scope of situations as well. Having a student self-aspect is not as restricted by relevance of situation, for instance. Therefore, self-aspect relevant contexts as conceived in McConnell's framework include far more situations. In this regard, situationist definition of local traits seems far too isolated and limited compared to that seen with self-aspects. Besides, attributes can be associated with multiple self-aspects, as is the case seen in one of McConnell's studies where 42% of the attributes that participants listed for their self-aspects were associated with more than one of their self-aspects (McConnell, 2009). This type of overlap observed among self-

aspects shows that the number of trait relevant situations, hence the number of times it will be active is a lot more than how Doris anticipates it.

Another important difference between situationist position and McConnell's framework is that there is still room for global character traits in the latter. As mentioned before, studies related to the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework show that it is rare for an attribute or trait to be associated with all of one's self-aspects, meaning that people in general lack global character traits. But this does not necessarily imply that people can not have global character traits and that traits can only be associated with self-aspects tied to specific contexts. It is still possible for an individual to possess an attribute that is prevalent in all of his/her self-aspects.

Despite these discrepancies between situationism and the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework, the latter is still committed to the claim that global traits are not widespread in people. Furthermore, it is shown on empirical grounds that there are no global traits that are active all the time. So where does this leave it with virtue ethics? If these empirical findings are indeed true, it leaves virtue ethicists with a couple of tenable positions. First and perhaps the most obvious option for a virtue ethicist would be to invoke the normative-descriptive distinction. This is the position Alfano (2013, as cited in Doris, Stich, Phillips & Walmsley, 2017) defends. He argues that claims of virtue ethics should only be taken as normative claims, meaning that this ethical theory only attempts to show how things should be, how an ideal person should be and behave. It does not attempt to describe how people actually are, therefore it cannot be disputed on empirical grounds. Of course this position can be defended somewhat more sophisticatedly but ultimately this sort of position strips virtue ethics from its advantages and in the end what good would an ethical theory serve if it does not have real world application or correspondence?

In my opinion there are two much better positions virtue ethicists could employ: first, in alignment with the empirical findings derived from the Multiple Self-Aspects Framework, people can be virtuous in specific contexts as long as they have virtue-traits in their related self-aspects. Thus, a contextualized virtue based account is possible and these contexts can include far more numerous situations and the scopes of these contexts are far wider than how situationists conceive them. Although not exactly the same, this kind of modification in virtue ethics seems to be anticipated by Kamtekar (2004). In that paper, she argues for a more specified taxonomy for virtues. For example, she argues that honesty refers to far too many behavioral dispositions, in that not cheating, not lying, not stealing can all be grouped up under the concept of honesty but in fact they all refer to distinct dispositions. Therefore, using one word to cover all these dispositions create a sort of confusion. This may be what underlies the lack of consistency seen in individuals in different situations that are honesty-relevant. Looking from this perspective, it seems possible to explain how one can be an honest father who does not lie to his family but be a dishonest salesman who swindles his customers. Even though, this solves a number of issues it still seems possible for someone to have exact opposing dispositions in two different self-aspects, as in one can be a son who never lies to family but as a friend lie to his friends. This type of very specific virtue relevant dispositions can be covered in this contextualized account. Not-lying as a sub-trait of honesty trait needs to be associated with this hypothetical person's "son self-aspect" as well as his "friend self-aspect". Although it is not given for any individual, this account offers a way for people to be virtuous in different situations in varying contexts. This would fit well with the idea of moral development seen in virtue ethics, which serves a key role. The task of being virtuous now can be conceived as a

contextualized task and consistency across situations has to be provided by the moral agent. Psychologically, this would correspond to having traits or more specific dispositions conceived as sub-traits associated with their context-relevant self-aspects.

Second option for virtue ethicists would be accept the rarity of virtues as to acquire full virtues is a very difficult task. This type of position is defended by Athanassoulis (2000). She argues that acquiring a full virtue is a challenging task, there is constant struggle for the moral agent in his/her mental life between his/her opposing desires. To have a full virtue means to effortlessly behave virtuously, as in if one is fully compassionate she/he will behave compassionately in all situations while having no internal struggle whatsoever. But until one has virtue, it is an uphill battle. Thus, it is possible for people to behave virtuously in some situations while not acting in line with the virtue in question in some other cases. Accordingly, many people may engage in unvirtuous behavior and it may be rare to find someone who has full virtue. Aristotle himself seems in agreement on the rarity of virtues:

“the many naturally obey fear, not shame; they avoid what is base because of the penalties, not because it is disgraceful. For since they live by their feelings, they pursue their proper pleasures and the sources of them, and avoid the opposed pains, and have not even a notion of what is fine and truly pleasant, since they have had no taste of it” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1179b, p.11–16 as cited in Miller, 2017).

Athanassoulis sees full virtues as ideals to be reached. In that regard, rarity does not seem to pose a serious problem against her position. Furthermore, it seems possible to integrate her view with the Multiple Self-Aspect Framework as well. Only this time, the way to reach this ideal would perhaps be better defined and somewhat more clarified. As I argued earlier for Kamtekar’s position, to acquire a

full virtue here would correspond to having a virtue-trait becoming associated with all of one's self-aspects (provided that all contexts related to these self-aspects require virtue-relevant behavior) so that she/he can display virtuous behavior across all contexts and situations.

4.4 Conclusion

The self is a vast topic of research. The fact that it occupies such a central role in our lives makes it a crucial target domain for expanding human understanding. This thesis tackles a small part of the issue. Even on unity-multiplicity dimension of the self, the work that needs to be done is huge. An interdisciplinary holistic approach seems necessary to properly investigate it and bring forth valuable insights. The empirical study and the subsequent philosophical discussion present in this thesis is a step in this direction.

APPENDIX A

ONLINE SELF-ASPECT DESCRIPTION TASK

Hypothetical Person 1

Student Self-Aspect:

Hardworking, Serious, Charitable, Introvert

Family Self-Aspect:

Compassionate, Docile, Anxious, Pessimist, Affectionate

Boyfriend Self-Aspect:

Impervious, Stern, Lackadaisical

Friend Self-Aspect: Affectionate, Entertaining, Joyful, Extravert, Charitable

“When Alone” Self-Aspect:

Anxious, Pessimist, Lazy

Gamer Self-Aspect:

Stern, Competitive, Extravert, Independent

Hypothetical Person 2

Student Self-Aspect:

Competitive, Extravert, Hardworking, Distant, Independent

Family Self-Aspect:

Distant, Impervious, Independent

Friend Self-Aspect:

Introvert, Distant, Anxious, Pessimist

Girlfriend Self-Aspect:

Anxious, Compassionate, Introvert, Docile, Affectionate, Sensitive

Musician Self-Aspect:

Independent, Extravert, Innovative, Serious

Sportswoman Self-Aspect:

Introvert, Sensitive, Conservative

Write your self-aspects and select traits that you think best describe how you are in those self-aspects similar to previous examples. As long as you see it meaningful you can write and describe as many self-aspects as you want to up to 10 but you don't have to complete all 10 slots. You can select as many traits as you want to describe a self-aspect and you don't have to use all the given traits. You can use a trait multiple times to describe multiple self-aspects. While describing your self-aspects, you can select traits in any way you like and you are free to choose opposing traits for different self-aspects as well. Please keep in mind that providing truthful answers are very important for our study.

TRAITS

Hardworking - Lazy

Affectionate - Distant

Charitable - Independent

Extravert - Anxious

Compassionate- Stern

Serious - Entertaining

Competitive - Docile

Sensitive - Impervious

Anxious - Calm

Optimist - Pessimist

Innovative - Conservative

Joyful- Lackadaisical

APPENDIX B

ONLINE SELF-ASPECT DESCRIPTION TASK (TURKISH)

ÖRNEK KİŞİ 1

Öğrenci Benlik Hali:

Ciddi, Çalışkan, Yardımsever, İçe dönük

Evlat Benlik Hali:

Şefkatli, Uysal, Endişeli, Karamsar, Sıcakkanlı

Sevgili Benlik Hali:

Vurdumduymaz, Sert, Sıkılğan

Arkadaş Benlik Hali:

Sıcakkanlı, Neşeli, Dışa dönük, Eğlenceli ,Yardımsever

Yalnızken Benlik Hali:

Endişeli, Karamsar, Üşengeç

Bilgisayar Oyuncusu Benlik Hali:

Sert, Rekabetçi, Dışa dönük, Bağımsız

ÖRNEK KİŞİ 2

Öğrenci Benlik Hali:

Rekabetçi, Dışa dönük, Çalışkan, Mesafeli, Bağımsız

Evlat Benlik Hali:

Mesafeli, Vurdumduymaz, Sıkılğan, Bağımsız

Arkadaş Benlik Hali:

İçe dönük, Mesafeli, Endişeli, Karamsar

Sevgili Benlik Hali:

Endişeli, Şefkatli, İçe dönük, Uysal, Sıcakkanlı, Hassas

Müzisyen Benlik Hali:

Bağımsız, Dışa dönük, Yenilikçi, Ciddi

Sporcu Benlik Hali:

İçe dönük, Hassas, Muhafazakar

Çevre Aktivisti Benlik Hali:

Sıcakkanlı, Hassas, Dışa dönük, İyimser, Neşeli, Çalışkan

Önceki sayfalarda verilen örneklerde olduğu gibi sahip olduğunuzu düşündüğünüz benlik hallerini yazınız ve bu benlik hallerinde nasıl biri olduğunuzu en iyi tasvir eden kişilik özelliklerini her bir benlik hali için seçiniz. Sizin için anlamlı olduğu sürece 10 farklı benlik halinizi formlarda doldurabilirsiniz ama 10 formun tamamını doldurmak zorunda değilsiniz. Aynı şekilde, belirttiğiniz bir benlik halini tanımlamak için dilediğiniz kadar kişilik özelliği seçebilirsiniz ve verilen kişilik özelliklerinin tamamını kullanmak zorunda değilsiniz. Bir benlik halini tanımlamak için kullandığımız bir kişilik özelliğini diğer benlik halleri için de kullanabilirsiniz. Benlik hallerinizi tanımlarken verilen kişilik özelliklerini dilediğiniz gibi seçebilir ve bir benlik halinde bulunan bir kişilik özelliğinin zıttını bir başka benlik hali için seçebilirsiniz. Lütfen vereceğiniz bilgilerin gerçeği yansıtmasının çalışmamız için çok önemli olduğunu unutmayın.

KİŞİLİK ÖZELLİKLERİ:

Çalışkan

Sıcakkanlı

Yardımsıver

İçe dönük

Sakin

Şefkatli

Ciddi

Rekabetçi

Hassas

İyimser

Yenilikçi

Neşeli

Üşengeç

Mesafeli

Bağımsız

Dışa dönük

Endişeli

Sert

Eğlenceli

Uysal

Vurdumduymaz

Karamsar

Muhafazakar

Sıkılğan

APPENDIX C

LEXICAL DECISION TASK

Note: First trait in each row is the trait used in the self-aspect description task, following 4 traits are taken to be synonymous or with a very close meaning. Certain trait adjectives translated from Turkish may not totally match in meaning

MEANINGFUL WORDS

Hardworking- Diligent - Orderly -Disciplined - Conscientious

Lazy -Slothful - Sluggish- Idler - Lethargic

Affectionate - Friendly- Sympathetic- Amiable - - Warm

Distant - Detached -Wary - Standoffish- Dull

Charitable- Helpful -Selfless -Benefactor -Altruist

Independent - Free - Selfish - Ego centric - Self-directed

Introvert - Shy - Timid - Withdrawn - Quiet

Extravert - Enterprising -Talkative - Assertive - Sociable

Calm - Collected- Nonchalant - Still - Peaceful

Anxious - Apprehensive - Worried - Concerned - Distressed

Compassionate - Merciful - Humane - Warm hearted - Forgiving

Stern - Aggressive - Disagreeable - Quarrelsome - Harsh

Serious - Earnest- Mature - Solemn- Dignified

Entertaining - Amusing - - Funny - Prankster- Teaser

Competitive - Ambitious - Determined - Stubborn - Combative

Docile - Meek - Amenable - Malleable- Obedient

Sensitive- Tickly - Delicate- Tender - Susceptible

Impervious- Carefree - Insensitive - Reckless - Slapdash

Optimist - Upbeat - Hopeful - Sanguine- Roseate

Pessimist- Dejected - Downbeat - Suspicious - Skeptic

Innovative- Creative - Open-minded - Curious - Liberal

Conservative- - Uptight- Traditionalist- Hardliner - Protective

Joyful- Energetic- Enthusiastic- Happy- Jubilant

Lackadaisical- Sullen- Sulky - Bored - Grumpy

NON-WORDS:

Umlak, Gaziga, Kuruna, Şari, Merraki, Kulunga

Kelza, Vuzuna, Gellen, Hellifi, Batka, Fulaz

Fizker, Eyefün, Herza, Oraçan, Konfa, Ezazet

Feppon, Selülük, Merafül, Munreki, Argankılı, Natikon

Falayir, Erüşcen, Arınyulu, Kaldoçi, Çakağır, Selarin

Hünzari, Elifenli, Vuzutera, Nizifan, Gölüze, Nirigan

Eskunza, Silfansı, Kelop, Pülünç, Essari, Şindari

Hanpunda, Sisivi, Külenbe, Girimun, Bevahirna, Solfahu

Kartik, Merdongil, Paykır, Neroşul, Lofar, Tostan

Fonkar, Şertil, Poşifa, Kalot, Marzin, Ölgek

Pıkır, Elişet, Fazula, Satyelli, Vortuk, Bulka

Tertişkip, Sarri, Hunşa, Falmun, Tülü, Bırı

Azina, Lert, Fero, Seritp, Hüzfan, Nerci

Esfag, Nilitin, Yayıtun, Şurna, Bizgi, Elpon

Nifiş, Piru, Nünge, Sünvuş, Eşfial, Turron

Benmu, Candor, Gülyop, Terizan, Durtup, Şiljen

Kurutađ, Asındas, Purunaz, Uruđan, Fenzari, Ggn
Kalmuna, Fazahr, Diliye, Tırıman, Volot , Hınfır
Sıtyuđun, Bicinşer, Jepoller, Yuf, Gedansa, Atopyap
Osogan, pfn, Mezişat, Genzikçe, Bilkonsu, Tonbunya

APPENDIX D

LEXICAL DECISION TASK (TURKISH)

Not: Sol baştan ilk sıradakiler benlik halleri tasvir formunda kullanılan asıl kişilik sıfatlarıdır. Yanlarında yazan 4 sıfat, bu asıl sıfatlarla eş anlamlı ya da çok yakın anlamlı olarak kabul edilmiştir.

ANLAMLI KELİMELER

Çalışkan- Gayretli - Düzenli -Disiplinli - Özenli
Üşengeç -Tembel - Miskin- Aylak - Uyuşuk
Sıcakkanlı- Cana yakın- İçten - Dostane - Sevecen
Mesafeli - Soğuk - İlgisiz - Temkinli- Donuk
Yardımsever- Cömert -Kalender -Fedakar -Diğerkam
Bağımsız - Özgür - Bencil - Benmerkezci -Hür
İçe dönük - Utangaç - Ürkek - Çekingen - Sessiz
Dışa dönük -Girişken - Konuşkan - Baskın - Sosyal
Sakin - Serinkanlı - Soğukkanlı - Dingin - Huzurlu
Endişeli - Gergin - Kaygılı - Telaşlı - Tedirgin
Şefkatli - Merhametli - İnsancıl - İyi kalpli - Bağışlayıcı
Sert - Sinirli - Haşin - Agresif - Kavgacı
Ciddi - Ağırbaşlı- Olgun - Vakur- Oturaklı
Eğlenceli -Nüktedan-Komik-Şakacı- Muzip
Rekabetçi - Hırslı - Azimli - İnatçı - Mücadeleci
Uysal - Mülayim - Yumuşak başlı - İlimli- İtaatkar
Hassas- Alıngan - Kırılgan- Narin - Duyarlı

Vurdumduymaz - Gamsız - Duyarsız - Aldırışsız - Lakayıt

İyimser - Umutlu - Optimist - Ümitli- Hayra yoran

Karamsar- Kötümser - Pesimist - Kuşkucu - Şüpheci

Yenilikçi- Yaratıcı - Açık fikirli - Meraklı - Araştırmacı

Muhafazakar- Mutaassıp- Tutucu - Sabit fikirli - Koruyucu

Neşeli- Enerjik - Coşkulu - Canlı - Sevinçli

Sıkılğan- Somurtkan- Huysuz - Bezmiş - Bıkkın

ANLAMSIZ KELİMELELER:

Umlak, Gaziga, Kuruna, Şari, Merraki, Kulunga

Kelza, Vuzuna, Gellen, Hellifi, Batka, Fulaz

Fizker, Eyefün, Herza, Oraçan, Konfa, Ezazet

Feppon, Selülük, Merafül, Munreki, Argankılı, Natikon

Falayir, Erüşcen, Arınyulu, Kaldoçi, Çakağır, Selarin

Hünzari, Elifenli, Vuzutera, Nizifan, Gölüze, Nirigan

Eskunza, Silfansı, Kelop, Pülünç, Essari, Şindari

Hanpunda, Sisivi, Külenbe, Girimun, Bevahirna, Solfahu

Kartik, Merdongil, Paykır, Neroşul, Lofar, Tostan

Fonkar, Şertil, Poşifa, Kalot, Marzin, Ölgek

Pıkır, Elişet, Fazula, Satyelli, Vortuk, Bulka

Tertişkip, Sarri, Hunşa, Falmun, Tülü, Bırı

Azina, Lert, Fero, Seritp, Hüzfan, Nerci

Esfag, Nilitin, Yayıtun, Şurna, Bizgi, Elpon

Nifiş, Piru, Nünge, Sünvuş, Eşfial, Turron

Benmu, Candor, Gülyop, Terizan, Durtup, Şiljen

Kurutađ, Asındas, Purunaz, Uruđan, Fenzari, Ggn

Kalmuna, Fazahr, Diliye, Tırıman, Volot, Hınfır

Sıtyuđun, Bicinşer, Jepoller, Yuf, Gedansa, Atopyap

Osogan, pfn, Mezişat, Genzikçe, Bilkonsu, Tonbunya

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