

THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SATELLITE INDUSTRIAL
TOWN AT THE EDGE OF THE ISTANBUL METROPOLITAN AREA:
ÇERKEZKÖY

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ABSTRACT

An abstract of the dissertation of Muzaffer Kaya, for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University to be taken May 2013

Title: The Emergence and Development of a Satellite Industrial Town at the Edge of the Istanbul Metropolitan Area: Çerkezköy

This study examines the transformation process of Çerkezköy, a small town in Tekirdağ province, into an industrial city from the 1970s to the present day as a result of the decentralization of the manufacturing industry in İstanbul. In the study, why İstanbul industry chose Çerkezköy for settlement and how the industrial zone and urban space developed is explained by examining the spatial strategies of the state institutions, the industrialists, and the local actors. The theoretical framework of the study was formed by using two different literatures: First, that of industrial decentralization and second, that of local entrepreneurialism. The main body of the data used in the study is comprised of news and articles from local newspaper archives, documents from The Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association archive, and information obtained from in-depth interviews.

As the result of the study, it was found that local initiatives developed by different actors in different periods have played a determining role in Çerkezköy's becoming one of the biggest industrial zones in Turkey. These local initiatives, backing the support of the central state authorities, have led to rapid industrialization and urban growth in the district. Within this period, while the industrial corporations, the headquarters of which are generally located in İstanbul, were making profits, the peasants who were dispossessed by those industrialists, the workers, most of whom left their hometowns and settled down in Çerkezköy, and also all the living things that were exposed to the intense environmental pollution have paid the heavy cost for the industrial and urban growth.

ÖZET

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü'nde

Doktora derecesi için Muzaffer Kaya tarafından

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Başlık: İstanbul Metropolünün Çeperinde Bir Uydu Sanayi Kasabasının Doğuşu ve Gelişimi: Çerkezköy

Bu tezde Tekirdağ ilinin küçük bir kasabası olan Çerkezköy'ün İstanbul sanayisinin desantralizasyonu sonucunda, 1970'li yıllardan günümüze, bir sanayi kentine dönüşme süreci incelenmektedir. Tezde İstanbul sanayisinin neden Çerkezköy'de yer seçtiği ve ardından sanayi bölgesinin ve kentsel alanın nasıl geliştiği, devlet kurumlarının, sanayicilerin ve yerel aktörlerin mekânsal stratejilerinin incelenmesi yoluyla açıklanmıştır. Araştırmanın teorik çerçevesi iki ayrı literatürden yararlanılarak oluşturulmuştur. Bunlardan birincisi, sanayi desantralizasyonu; ikincisi ise yerel girişimcilik literatürleridir. Araştırmada kullanılan verilerin ana gövdesini yerel gazete arşivlerinden derlenen haber ve yazılar, Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği'nin arşivinden edinilen belgeler ve yapılan görüşmelerden elde edilen bilgiler oluşturmaktadır.

Araştırmanın sonucunda, Çerkezköy'ün bugün Türkiye'nin en büyük sanayi bölgelerinden birisi haline gelmesinde, farklı dönemlerde farklı aktörler tarafından geliştirilen yerel girişimciliğin belirleyici bir rol oynadığı gösterilmektedir. Merkezi devlet kurumlarının da desteğini alan bu yerel girişimler, ilçede hızlı bir sanayileşmeye ve kentsel büyümeye yol açmıştır. Bu süreçte, genellikle merkezleri İstanbul'da olan sanayi kuruluşları önemli karlar elde ederken, büyümenin ağır bedellerini topraklarını kaybeden köylüler, çoğu memleketlerini terk ederek ilçeye yerleşmiş olan işçiler ve yoğun bir çevre kirliliğine maruz kalan Çerkezköy'deki tüm canlılar ödemiştir.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ÇCCI: Çerkezköy Chamber of Commerce and Industry (*Çerkezköy Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası*)

ÇIA: Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association (*Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği*)

ÇOIZ: Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone (*Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi*)

ÇOIZEEC: Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone Entrepreneur Establishing Committee (*Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Müteşebbis Teşekkül Heyeti*)

CPTU: Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (*Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)

CTTU: Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (*Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*)

EEC: Entrepreneur Establishing Committee (*müteşebbis teşekkül heyeti*)

GNAT: Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*)

HDAT: Housing Development Administration of Turkey (*Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı*)

JP: Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*)

JDP: Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*)

MP: Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*)

NMP: Nationalist Movement Party (*Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*)

OIZ: Organized Industrial Zone (*Organize Sanayi Bölgesi*)

PAD: Priority Areas for Development (*Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yörelere*)

PDP: Peace and Democracy Party (*Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*)

RPP: Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*)

SII: Social Insurance Institution (*Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu*)

SPO: State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*)

UCCET: Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği*)

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In this dissertation, I recount the story of the transformation of Çerkezköy, a small town in Tekirdağ province situated 110 km west of İstanbul. This town evolved into an industrial city from the 1970s to the present day as a result of the decentralization of İstanbul industry. As an investigation into economic geography, this study intends to show how decisions taken by local and central state agencies, industrialists and local actors shaped the historical course of Çerkezköy's industrial geography. This successful transformation cannot be explained through abstract and rational models of industrial location theory; rather, it was the cumulative effects of concrete historical events within this process. In studies on location theory there is a tendency to apply abstract models and mathematical calculations to observed developments. What I try to show in this study is that industrial geography unfolds in a contingent way under the impact of at times consistent and at other times conflicting decisions of the actors in various positions of effectiveness, and with the impact of developments in different scales a specific path emerges in which many different factors have played a role.

The answers to the following questions are sought in this study. First, why did industrialists in İstanbul choose to locate, at the beginning of the 1970s, in Çerkezköy where there was scarcely any infrastructure and labor supply was far from guaranteed? Second, how was it possible that Çerkezköy industrial zone emerged in

the 1970s, continued its development in the following decades, and became one of the biggest and best-equipped industrial zones of Turkey? Third, what transformation did the urban space undergo after İstanbul industry chose to locate in Çerkezköy and, in this process, what kind of relations did the locals of Çerkezköy and various migrating groups establish with the rapidly changing urban space?

Two separate literatures were used while seeking the answers to these questions. The first one was the literature that analyzes the shifting of manufacturing industry from urban centers to suburbs and satellite towns. The second was the literature on local entrepreneurialism, especially “growth machine” theory. Among many villages and towns, those that the industry will prefer while decentralizing from urban centers to rural areas are to some extent determined by the efforts of local entrepreneurs in these settlements. In this respect, these two literatures were employed to complement each other in the case of Çerkezköy.

It is impossible to consider the development of Çerkezköy apart from the developments in the İstanbul metropolitan area. The import substitution industrialization that started since 1950s intensified in İstanbul, the largest city of the country, such that in 1971 the 54 percent of the industrial employment in private sector was within the provincial borders of İstanbul. The İstanbul industry, which was cramped for space in the city center, started to decentralize first within the provincial borders and then towards the nearby cities since 1960s. The first provinces that the İstanbul industry decentralized are Gebze district of Kocaeli, which is in the east, and Bursa, in the south, in which the first organized industrial zone (OIZ, *organize sanayi bölgesi*) of Turkey was established in 1962.

The decentralization towards west happened to be shorter in distance, reaching the region (nearly 30 km.) between the Büyük and Küçük Çekmece lakes.

However, in 1972 the movement of İstanbul industry towards west spread out of the province for the first time by choosing to locate in the Çerkezköy area of Tekirdağ. The distinguishing characteristic of Çerkezköy from the other regions is when the İstanbul industry decentralized, there had been no industrial entity in the region before. So as to say, Çerkezköy was started from scratch in 1972. Whereas, Kocaeli, where the eastward decentralization headed towards, is a province that large state industrial investments created. Bursa had a longstanding local industrial tradition, the weaving sector being in the first place, besides its organized industrial zone. Çerkezköy not only had no industrial past, but it also had almost no labor supply or infrastructural feasibility. All these means and facilities were provided after the location of industry in Çerkezköy.

Although the first decentralization towards Trace started in 1972, the major intense industrial flow began in the second half of the 1980s. The attempts to move the large industrial establishments out of İstanbul, which had a rapid population growth and was taking over new economic missions as Turkey was getting integrated in the globalization process in the 1980s, increased. The severe shortage of water in these years was also a factor in moving the water consuming sectors, such as leather, textile, and chemistry out of the province.

In these years, the industrialists who had to leave İstanbul as a result of the decisions taken by the İstanbul Municipality and the central governments preferred to locate in Trace rather than Gebze. This preference had basically two reasons: first, due to the increase in the occupancy rate, the land prices were high and industrial parcels were smaller in Gebze; and second, there were constraints on state incentives in Kocaeli as well as İstanbul.

Especially in the end of the 1980s and in the beginning of the 1990s, an intense industrial migration from İstanbul to Thrace occurred. This intense industrial flow was primarily to the two districts of Tekirdağ, Çorlu and Çerkezköy, which were in the provincial borders of İstanbul. However, there emerged two quite different industrial settlement patterns in these two areas. The firms headed towards Çorlu, which is on the D-100 highway, located randomly along the highway by purchasing land from villagers and realtors, without adhering to any plan. In this process, which local municipalities and central state authorities overlooked, there emerged an irregular industrial settlements on these lands most of which were subject to the village law and were highly arable. In this way, there emerged an industrial corridor along the D-100 highway towards Edirne.

On the other hand, in Çerkezköy there emerged a planned industrial settlement due to the intervention of the state institutions in the emergence of the industrial space from the beginning. That the Land Office confiscated 450 hectares of land for industrial settlement in 1972 and then an organized industrial zone having been built with the government resources on this land, led to the emergence of a planned industrial district in Çerkezköy. The firms heading towards Çerkezköy in these years located within the organized industrial zone.

Below is a map of the industrial zones in Trace that are in the provincial borders of İstanbul. The purple spots on the map represent the industrial areas in Çorlu and Çerkezköy districts of Tekirdağ province and the industrial areas in their immediate periphery. This geographic area, which is adjacent to İstanbul province, covered by the map, is the zone where industrialization is most intensive in Thrace region. A great majority of these industrial enterprises are the production units of

firms whose headquarters are in İstanbul. In this respect, the map presents the picture of İstanbul industry scattered in Thrace.




Fig. 1. Industrial settlements in Tekirdağ province.¹

It is observed that İstanbul industry, which is scattered throughout Thrace, is randomly aligned on the sides of main roads, the major axis being D-100 (also known as the E-5) highway. These industrial areas, which were constituted without sticking to any plan, were declared “municipal industrial areas” later on by the local governments by making local zone plans (*mevzi imar planı*).² However, since no infrastructure work was done, these factories have caused great environmental

¹ Ministry of Environment and Forestry et al., *Trakya Alt Bölgesi Ergene Havzası Revizyon Çevre Düzeni Planı: Plan Analitik Raporu* (Thrace subregion Ergene basin environmental plan revision: analytical report on the plan) (Ministry of Environment and Forestry, 2009), p. 345.

² Local zone plans are zoning plans made with the aim of including the unplanned settlements later on eclectically within the scope of a plan.

damage. Uncontrolled use of underground waters has decreased the clean water reserves in the region considerably and the discharge of waste water to wells dug without constraint and to streams has destroyed the animal and plant life in the Ergene River and Çorlu Stream. Overconsumption of water and pollution have created the risk of running out of potable water in the following few decades. Fertile agricultural areas in the region have become industrial; and due to the lack of water, agricultural production has decreased dramatically. Environmental pollution, increasing day by day, has reached a level that threatens the health of the people living in the region. At the present time, the Turkish government and Tekirdağ governorate have been working to improve these unorganized industrial areas.³

In the upper right corner of the map, a purple spot as a large group, which is not aligned on the main transportation axes, attracts attention. This is Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone (ÇOIZ, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi*), the first area where İstanbul industry located in Thrace and the only example of regular industrialization in the region until 2000s. New organized industrial zones have been constructed since the end of 1990s in Edirne, Çorlu, Kırklareli, Malkara and Hayrabolu, yet they incorporate very few industrial facilities. ÇOIZ, which was started to be constructed in the 1970s, with its area of 1234 hectares, is one of the largest industrial zones in Turkey. ÇOIZ, having the biggest central treatment plant in Turkey, produces all the electricity it uses from natural gas. Besides, project work of the dam to be built by ÇOIZ in order to meet the increasing water demand of the

³ Devrim, 06 October 2011, “İslah OSB’lere Büyük Destek,” available online at <<http://www.devrimgazetesi.com.tr/haberdetay.asp?ID=10605>> [21 November 2011]; *Trakya Gündemi*, 31 May 2012, “Trakya’da 5 İslah OSB’nin Kuruluş Protokolü Hazırlandı,” available at <<http://www.trakyagundemi.com/tekirdag/14608809/tekirdag-da-5-islak-osb-nin-kurulus-protokolu-hazirlandi.html>> [31 May 2012]

region is ongoing. In ÇOIZ, where almost two hundreds firms are active in the year 2012, about 55,000 workers are employed.⁴

Industrialization in Çerkezköy has not been limited to ÇOIZ, in the second half of the 1990s and the 2000s new industrial settlements have emerged in the district. In the industrial zone of 450 hectares, opened in Veliköy town of Çerkezköy in 1994, today eighty-five industrial enterprises operate.⁵ As for the industrial zone opened in the 2000s in Karaağaç town, there are thirty-five enterprises.⁶ When all these enterprises are taken into account, the number of factories in the district exceeds three hundreds today.

In Çerkezköy, which can be described as an industrial basin at the present time, a fast urbanization has also been experienced in parallel to industrialization. Çerkezköy (means Circassian Village), which was a small town with a population of almost four thousand in 1972, has rapidly grown with its villages since this date as a result of migrations brought about by the industry and the total population of the district reached 177,442 in 2011. In this approximately forty-year period, while the population of the district center has reached eighty thousand, the population of Kapaklı, which was a village of Çerkezköy with a population of a thousand in 1972, has today exceeded sixty thousand.⁷ While Çerkezköy and Kapaklı have become medium-sized industrial cities, the villages of Kızılpınar, Veliköy, and Karaağaç, which are around the organized industrial zone, have become industrial towns with

⁴ Directorate of Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone, “ÇOSB Hakkında” (About ÇOIZ) available at <http://www.cosb.org.tr/?module=modul_tek&modul=130&cat=46> [24 May 2012]

⁵ Veliköy Municipality, “Beldemizde Bulunan Fabrikalar” (Plants in our town), available online at <http://www.velikoy.bel.tr/v/velikoy_3.asp> [16 June 2012]

⁶ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 June 2012, available online at <http://www.cerkezkoy.com.tr/haber/karaagac-islak-osbnin-onayi-cikti-h13227.html>

⁷ Turkish Statistical Institute, “Address Based Population Registration System,” available online at <<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul>> [19 May 2012]

populations ranging between six and fifteen thousand. Nowadays, these locations are about to actually merge though not legally.

In this rapid growth process, Çerkezköy has received migration from all of the cities of Turkey, including İstanbul, and from abroad, particularly Bulgaria. Between 1995 and 2000, Çerkezköy receiving the second highest amount of migration compared to its population among the 924 districts of Turkey.⁸ As a result of this profound level of migration, in 2000, the annual population growth rate of the district has been calculated to have been sixty-nine per thousand. According to this rate, Çerkezköy has the fifth highest level of population growth in Turkey.⁹ It has been estimated that the population of Çerkezköy district will reach to 400,000 in 2023.¹⁰

Çerkezköy is a district that also attracts attention in terms of the rate of employees in manufacturing industry to total employment. In 2000, the rate of employees in manufacturing industry to total employment was 49.85 percent in the district center and 42.12 in the whole of the district.¹¹ With these rates, it is one of the districts with the highest rate of employees in manufacturing industry in Turkey.

In Çerkezköy, industrialization, population growth, and urbanization continue at the present day without slowing down. The rapid social and spatial transformations which it has experienced in the last forty years and still experiences had cause me to

⁸ Mustafa Yakar, “Türkiye’de İç Göçlerin İlçelere Göre Mekansal Analizi: 1995-2000 Dönemi,” (Spatial analysis of domestic migration in Turkey by districts: 1995-2000 period) *Uluslararası İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi* 9, no. 1 (2012), p. 753.

⁹ Bülent Dinçer and Metin Özaslan, *İlçelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması*, (Research on the socio-economic development ranking of districts) (Ankara: DPT, 2004), p. 204.

¹⁰ Gökhan İnce, *Çerkezköy 2023 Kent Vizyonu Çalışması* (Çerkezköy 2023 study on the vision of the city) (Tekirdağ: Çerkezköy Belediyesi, 2009), pp. 127-129.

¹¹ Dinçer and Özaslan, p. 238; Rüya Bayar, M. Murat Yücesahin and E. Murat Özgür, “Türkiye’nin İmalat İşlevinde Uzmanlaşmış Şehirselleşim Yerleşimleri,” (Urban settlements of Turkey which have professionalized in manufacturing function), *Coğrafi Bilimler Dergisi* 1, no. 2 (2003), p. 10.

regard Çerkezköy as an interesting subject for analysis. In this research, I have endeavored to present the historical course of spatial change in Çerkezköy, which has had a different industrialization experience than the other parts of Thrace.

During my research, I realized no comprehensive study on the radical changes that have been experienced since the 1970s in Çerkezköy had been done. However, İlhan Tekeli drew attention to Çerkezköy in a significant study on the İstanbul metropolitan area as such: “During this period [1965-1984] the most interesting development occurred in Çerkezköy within Tekirdağ province and influenced industrial dynamics in the metropolitan area.”¹² In this 1992 dated study, Tekeli properly linked the developments in Çerkezköy with the developments in the İstanbul metropolitan area. However, in the same study, in an article by Murat Güvenç’s that analyses the industrial geography in İstanbul comprehensively, although the Gebze district of Kocaeli was considered in the metropolitan area, Çorlu and Çerkezköy were excluded.¹³ Since then, there has been no comprehensive study on the expanding of the İstanbul metropolitan area towards Trace region, apart from a few master theses that focus on some detailed topics in the whole issue and the articles derived from these thesis. In this dissertation, the development process of Çerkezköy, which is specialized in manufacturing industry in the metropolitan area and has a different industrialization experience compared to the other industrial centers surrounding İstanbul, is comprehensively researched and analyzed from the beginning to the present day.

¹² İlhan Tekeli, “Development of Urban Administration and Planning in the Formation of İstanbul Metropolitan Area,” in *Development of İstanbul Metropolitan Area and Low Cost Housing*, İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992, p. 88.

¹³ Murat Güvenç, "General Industrial Geography of Greater İstanbul Metropolitan Area: An Exploratory Study," in *Development of İstanbul Metropolitan Area and Low Cost Housing*, İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992, pp. 112-160.

Since Çerkezköy's transformation into an industrial town occurred as a result of the decentralization of İstanbul industry, in Chapter Two where I present the theoretical framework, at first, I discuss the literature developed on the decentralization of industry. I have divided the approaches in this literature, mainly developed in the US, into two main groups, those that regard technical-economic factors as the determining causes of the decentralization of industry, and those that regard political-institutional factors as the determining causes. Following that, I have adopted the comprehensive approach presented by Lewis and Walker as my method. In this approach, the decentralization of industry is a dynamic process determined by the simultaneous effects of economic-technical factors, political-institutional factors, and developments in the real estate market. In the decentralization process of industry in metropolitan areas, while class struggle and the planning processes of municipalities constitute the political-institutional factors; relocation decisions made by firms as a result of technological-organizational developments in transportation and production systems and cost calculations make up the economic-technical factors; and the effort of big real estate agents to attract industrialists to lands which they have developed around the city make up the real estate factor.

While applying this three-pillar approach to Çerkezköy case, it is emphasized that the role played by big real estate agents in the US in the process of developing industrial lands is enacted by local governments and partially by central state agencies in Turkey. In Turkey, there are no real estate agents powerful enough to impact the decentralization of industry. In addition, whereas urban planning process is completely under the control of local governments in the US, in Turkey it has been under the control of the central state until 1980s. Although the powers of local governments have increased since the 1980s, they have never reached the same level

as it is in the US. For this reason, the differences between political and economic systems of Turkey and the US are considered while employing Lewis and Walker's approach.

In this section, additionally, the impact of the big transformation process in the international capitalist system, known as globalization, on industrial geography is also emphasized. The beginning of 1970s, which marked the beginning of globalization, corresponds to the beginning of the industrialization in Çerkezköy. However, departing from this correspondence, it would not be accurate to establish a direct relation between the industrialization in Çerkezköy and globalization. The direct effect of globalization on the industrialization in Çerkezköy was seen in the 1980s when the Turkish economy started to incorporate into the globalization process. In those years, the effort to make İstanbul "a world city" accelerated the removal of industry from İstanbul. Thus, a rapid influx of industry to Çerkezköy (and to other provinces and districts on the periphery of İstanbul) has occurred since the end of the 1980s. In addition, direct foreign capital investments to Çerkezköy began in the same period.

In this section, finally, brief information about the classification of industrial districts and the features of satellite industrial towns are given since Çerkezköy is a satellite industrial district.

Departing from the determination that local entrepreneurialism has played an important role in the locating of industry in Çerkezköy for the first time and in the industrial and urban growth process in subsequent years, the second part of theoretical framework is composed of local entrepreneurialism title. The concept of local entrepreneurialism, which was again mainly developed in the US, is employed to cover all the concepts, such as local (or civic) boosterism, urban entrepreneurship

and urban entrepreneurialism, used in various studies conducted in this field. In this section, first, Molotch's growth machine theory, which claims that growth coalitions constituted by local actors shape the future of cities, criticisms of this theory, and the answers given to those criticisms are summarized.

After that, the concept of urban entrepreneurialism, which has become prominent in urban studies since the 1990s with the impact of David Harvey's works, is elaborated. Although Harvey employs the concept of "urban entrepreneurialism" in a narrower sense to mean new mode of governance of cities in the globalization process, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, the effort of localities (villages, neighborhoods, towns or cities) to grow, in competition with each other, via entrepreneurial politics has at least been a phenomenon that has been observed since the nineteenth century in the US and England. Thus, in Molotch's Growth Machine theory, entrepreneurial policies are not associated with neo-liberal regulations. According to Molotch, that the land is commodified at a certain level and that the local governments have powers at a certain level provide the required objective condition for the formation of urban growth coalitions. These conditions, which are present at the highest level in the US, have been exist in other capitalist countries – including Turkey – to varying degrees since the nineteenth century. Although they are stimulating in understanding the changes in local politics in the last decades, concepts of "urban entrepreneurialism" or "entrepreneurial city", employed with the aim of defining a new phenomenon that emerged in globalization process, are not appropriate for this study, in which Çerkezköy is the subject. Because, the concept of urban entrepreneurialism, in the sense defined by Harvey, theorizes about the fact that city governments, which have de-industrialized and are deprived of public resources more and more due to neoliberal economic policies, turn to entrepreneurial

politics through establishing partnerships with the private sector. This conceptualization will not provide the appropriate framework to understand the local development of Çerkezköy which has grown by industrializing as of the 1970s.

In this dissertation, the concept of local entrepreneurialism is employed in its broad sense, as in Growth Machine theory, and it is understood as the effort of local actors to attract public or private resources for the aim of economic growth, in competition with other localities. However, in Molotch's theory, while the leaders of local entrepreneurialism are the actors of the real estate market (land speculators, property investors, developers, financiers, and so on), whom he defines as "place entrepreneurs," in this study it is demonstrated that other actors in the locality also can play the leading role in the formation of local growth coalitions. In terms of this study, instead of the ownership of real estate, local dependency in a broader sense provides the basis for local actors to be engaged in growth politics. For example, the owners of factories, the headquarters of which were in İstanbul, in Çerkezköy were dependent on the locality due to their big fixed investments and they formed a growth coalition in accordance with their own interests.

In addition, it cannot be said that local actors turn to entrepreneurial politics always only to gain personal material benefits, like Molotch assumes. As will be seen in the example of Çerkezköy Mayor Hikmet Uğraş, individuals whose sense of belonging to a locality is very strong have pioneered entrepreneurial politics though they have not obtained significant financial gain. At this point, the sense of identification with the town has a role beyond the simple financial benefit.

In the Chapter Three, government policies on the spatial regulation of industrial areas in Turkey, the spatial movement of İstanbul industry, and the initiatives of Çerkezköy municipality to attract industry are described; and based

upon these data, the question of why İstanbul industry turned to Çerkezköy in 1972 is answered.

Industry's turning to rural areas by leaving the metropolises is a phenomenon seen in the advanced capitalist countries since the end of the nineteenth century. As for Third World countries, huge industrial cities that emerged during the import substitution industrialization period started to prominently decentralize towards their immediate periphery as of the 1970s. İstanbul, which embodied half of the private manufacturing sector in the 1960s in Turkey, also started to decentralize towards neighboring provinces in the same period.

The decentralization of İstanbul industry took place along the D-100 Highway, which was the main transportation axis and which linked İstanbul to Anatolia eastward and to Thrace (and thus Europe) westward. The leading factors that caused İstanbul industry to leave urban center from the second half of the 1960s were that there was not an opportunity to expand since there was a lack of space and the land prices were expensive in the urban center and that industrialists were trying to avoid municipal controls. This decentralization headed towards Çerkezköy due to the fact that the State Planning Organization (SPO, *Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*) provided special incentives by declaring the district a priority area for development and that Çerkezköy Municipality would provide cheap land to industrialists. Çerkezköy became an industrial center due to the industrial decentralization policy of the state and local entrepreneurialism which made use of the opportunity created by this policy.

Both the interventions of various state authorities and local entrepreneurialism have played significant roles in the development of Çerkezköy. At the beginning, the stimulating factor that attracted the industrialists to the district

was the SPO's policy of regional incentives. However, the vigorous efforts of the Çerkezköy Municipality to provide large and cheap parcels for the industrialists also have a facilitating effect. Later on, the confiscation of land by the Land Office set the grounds for a regular industrialization, but the transformation of this land into an OIZ was realized with the efforts of the Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association (ÇIA, *Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği*), which was established by the first entrepreneurs invested in the district. Also, the adding of 800 hectares of land to the OIZ in 1990 is a result of the efforts of the ÇIA.

During the initial settlement of industry in Çerkezköy, the local dynamics played a subsidiary role whereas the principle role was played by the regulatory policy of the central state. However, Çerkezköy's future was predestinated by the initiatives emerges in the locality since the time the first industrialists started to buy land in the area in 1972. The local growth coalition, which was set up by the industrialists who made investments in the district together with the local politicians, enabled the establishment of a large industrial zone in Çerkezköy with the state resources. The decisions taken about Çerkezköy by the governments and the state bureaucracy were influenced by the lobbying activities of the local actors. As a result of these influential lobbying activities, Çerkezköy became far more successful in attracting state resources compared to the other localities in Trace.

In the Chapter Four, the historical development of Çerkezköy industrial zone is examined in two periods, 1972-1983 and 1984-1996. What kind of solutions the industrialists proposed for the basic infrastructure and labor problems during these periods are examined. Particularly, the activities of ÇIA, the main actor in the development of the industrial zone, are discussed in detail.

In this chapter, first, how land ownership was transferred into other hands in Çerkezköy is recounted. As a result of the dispossession of peasants by industrialists, the state via Land Office, and by land speculators, small agricultural lands were turned into big industrial parcels. After the location of industry, with the establishment of ÇIA to solve the basic infrastructure problems of the industrial district, a quite effective growth coalition was formed. This coalition, which received the support of central state agencies and the Çerkezköy municipality enabled Çerkezköy has become one of the biggest organized industrial zones in Turkey.

In this process, that the agricultural activity in the region almost disappeared due to the overuse of water and the environment was excessively polluted were overlooked by central and local state authorities. The infrastructure of the region such as transportation, communication, electricity, etc. was constructed by state resources. The deficit in the labor supply was compensated by migrations, on the one hand, and gathering workers with shuttles from surrounding districts and villages, on the other hand. Thus, in Çerkezköy, processes of both proletarianization by the separation from land and proletarianization without being separated from land were experienced simultaneously.

In the Chapter Five, the urban development of Çerkezköy is assessed respectively in its geographical, constructional, demographic, economic and social dimensions. The transformation of Çerkezköy from a railway town to an industrial city since the 1970s is shown using satellite photographs and maps. How the state, municipality, developers, land owners and migrating groups shaped the urban space in this process is presented. Additionally, how the villages surrounding the industrial zone grew while competing with Çerkezköy district center is demonstrated.

In the Chapter Five, furthermore, the growth of local economy with the impact of industry and thus the establishment of the Çerkezköy Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ÇCCI, *Çerkezköy Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası*) is recounted. The ÇCCI, which turned to urban entrepreneurial policies in the early 2000s, has become an institution that conducts lobbying activities on behalf of Çerkezköy before governments. In this chapter, last, relations and tensions among the various social groups, and their sense of belonging to Çerkezköy are discussed within the context of urban space.

As can be seen from this brief summary, in the dissertation, the story of Çerkezköy is mainly recounted in the Third, Fourth and Fifth chapters. These chapters, due to their contents, cover different historical periods. Since in the Third Chapter it has been intended to explain why industry chose to locate in 1972 in Çerkezköy, this chapter discusses the relation between industry and space in Turkey until the beginning of the 1970s. For the formation process of industrial space, in other words the establishment process of ÇOIZ, is examined in the Chapter Four, the period from 1972 to the mid-1990s is covered. Industrial settlement in Veliköy and Karaağaç, which emerged within the borders of Çerkezköy district after the 1990s and which showed a development pattern similar to that of the industrial clusters in Çorlu, is not included in the thesis subject. Since ÇOIZ has taken its ultimate form by the mid-1990s, the course of development of the industrial space is studied until this period. As for the Chapter Five, after briefly mentioning the preindustrial history of Çerkezköy, the urban development of Çerkezköy from 1972 to the present day is presented. The reason why this chapter is extended to the present time is that the urban space is still being shaped at the district center. While ÇOIZ had taken its

ultimate shape by the mid-1990s, urban development actually started in the 1990s and has accelerated in the 2000s.

Although the research is spatially limited to the district center of Çerkezköy, data on the whole of the district are presented to the extent necessary. Especially the urbanization process of the district center is discussed in relation to the rapidly growing villages around the industrial zone.

Before this study, four master theses have been written on Çerkezköy. In this study, I especially benefitted from two of these, Ayda Eraydın's master thesis, where she examined the assumptions of location theory, written in 1976; and Fatma Eker's master thesis, where she studied the effects of incentive measures, written in 1982. Both studies concentrated on the location choice of the industry.

Apart from these theses I utilized, all of the data presented on Çerkezköy was obtained from primary sources. In order to follow the local developments that have taken place in Çerkezköy since the 1970s, I first, scanned the local newspaper archives. *Çerkezköy Postası*, the first local newspaper in the district, was published in 1972 when industry chose to locate in the town; however, this newspaper, which was published weekly, was closed down after only four issues. I found the archives of this newspaper, published by prosecutor Mehmet Feyyat and his wife, at the National Library. Although it was published only four times, since it was published during the period when industrialists were coming in Çerkezköy, it was a very valuable resource. Afterwards, I also interviewed Mehmet Feyyat.

Unfortunately, I was unable to access the archives of *Yeni Çerkezköy* newspaper, which was published from 1977 to 1980. I could see only one issue of this newspaper published in 1980 in the ÇIA archives. Then, I decided to follow the developments in Çerkezköy in the 1970s from local newspapers published in Çorlu,

which is a neighboring town. I scanned all the issues of *Devrim* newspaper from 1971 to 1977, *Çorlu* newspaper from 1972 to 1974 and *Çorlu Ekspres* newspaper from 1972 to 1973, all of which were published in Çorlu, at the National Library. All these three newspapers were published daily.

Çerkezköy Gazetesi, published since the 1980s and the only local newspaper of Çerkezköy until the early 2000s, was the local newspaper from which I most benefited. I scanned all the issues published between January 1980 and December 1996 of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*. The newspaper was published twice a week from 1983 to 1985, and published weekly at other times. The archives of the newspaper in the office in Çerkezköy are resources so rich as to provide data for all research to be conducted on Çerkezköy. I am grateful to the owner of the newspaper, Zafer Avcılar, who allowed me to utilize the archive, and for his supportive attitude.

In addition to these, by scanning the 1972 archives of the national *Ekonomi* newspaper and the 1974 archives of the national *Ekonomi Politika* newspaper available at the İstanbul Atatürk Library, I noted down the news published on Çerkezköy. Moreover, I scanned the online archives of the national *Milliyet* newspaper and *Official Gazette* in detail. In these archives, I examined all the news and documents about Çerkezköy since the 1970s that I regarded as important. Besides, by also reading the minutes of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey, which were transferred to the Internet in 2011, in detail, I reviewed all of the speeches that mentioned Çerkezköy.

A significant part of the written primary sources is comprised of the archive documents of ÇIA and the Directorate of ÇOIZ. I would like to thank the director of ÇOIZ, Mehmet Özdoğru, and Chairman of ÇIA, Yıldırım Ulkat, who allowed me to utilize these archives, very much. First of all, I had to classify the ÇIA archives,

which were composed of tens of unclassified folders and files tucked in boxes and shelves in the basement of the association's office. With the assistance of Hüseyin Çolak, employee of the association, by skimming the whole archives, I separated the folders that I thought would be useful to my research, and afterwards I simultaneously classified and scanned these folders. In the ÇOIZ archives, which were neatly organized, I scanned all of the documents from the 1970s to 1998. I recorded more than a thousand pages from these two archives that complement each other via photocopy and photography. The documents I accessed in the archives are annual activity reports of the board of directors of the ÇIA presented at the general assemblies of the association, correspondences with various institutions and persons, most of which are with the Ministry of Industry, correspondences with members of the association, some reports, and newspaper clippings about the Çerkezköy industrial zone.

In addition to the written sources, I conducted interviews, most of which lasted more than an hour, with 37 people. Except for the three interviews that were carried on via the telephone, all of them were conducted face to face and recorded. Three people were interviewed twice. The interviewees are as follows: former Minister of Industry, Ayhan Çilingiroğlu; former head of the SPO Economic Planning Department, Hikmet Çetin; former Director of the SPO Priority Areas for Development Research Department, Teoman Yayın; former vice president of the Department of Priority Areas for Development, Atilla Candır; former Çerkezköy Prosecutor, Mehmet Feyyat; owner of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi* and former president of the council of the ÇCCI, Zafer Avcılar; former general director of the Dinarsu factory and former Chairman of Board of Directors of the ÇCCI, Ömer Kılınç; Chairman of Board of Directors of the ÇOIZ, Ömer Sarıoğlu; Chairman of the Board

of Directors of the ÇIA, Yıldırım Ulkat; Chairman of the Board of Directors of the ÇCCI, Dursun Ali Tever; Director of the ÇOIZ, Mehmet Özdoğru; Ahmet Gayretli, who has worked as a manager for long years at Profilo factory and at the ÇIA; former Çerkezköy mayors Abdülkadir Karan, Remzi Garip, and Mehmet Uz; Çerkezköy deputy mayor Gökhan İnce; former director of development at Çerkezköy Municipality, Şadi Çorbacı; former director of technical works İbrahim Erkan; former mayor, who played a significant role in the industrialization of Çerkezköy, Hikmet Uğraş's sons, Mustafa Uğraş and Bülent Uğraş; former employee of the municipality and collector of provincial special administration, Ali Meydanlı; former employee of district governorate and founder of Çerkezköy Motor Carriers' Cooperative (*Çerkezköy Motorlu Taşıyıcılar Kooperatifi*), Alaattin Gökalp and his daughter Emine Gökalp; President of Çerkezköy Chamber of Tradesmen and Artisans (*Çerkezköy Esnaf ve Sanatçılar Odası*), Ali Bozdağ; Zeki Baydar, who has been the lawyer of the ÇOIZ for more than 20 years; President of the Çerkezköy Association of Real Estate Agents (*Çerkezköy Emlakçılar Derneği*), Serkan Karagöz; former president of the branch of TEKSİF Union under the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (CTTU, *Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*), Hayri Maytalman; former representative of LASTİK-İŞ union under the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (CPTU, *Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*), İhsan Çamyar; the Mukhtar of Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi (Quarter), Ali Pektaş and his assistant Fevzi Pektaş; the Mukhtar of Fatih Mahallesi, Özcan Cengiz; the Mukhtar of Cumhuriyet Mahallesi, Hikmet İşcan; the Mukhtar of İstasyon Mahallesi, İsmail Sencar; *Çerkezköy Manşet* newspaper editor-in-chief Gökhan Babayiğit; researcher and writer from Tekirdağ, Mehmet Serez; Hasan Erkan, who was born in 1924 in Çerkezköy and who has knowledge and a clear memory to the extent to be

considered an expert witness in land cases; and Hasan Bayraktar, who has been a shopkeeper in Çerkezköy for 60 years. I would like to thank these people, who supported this research by showing the courtesy of accepting my interview request, very much.

In total, I spent more than three months in certain intervals in Çerkezköy in order to scan all these archives and to conduct the interviews. In the meantime, apart from the recorded interviews, I also had the opportunity to converse with various people and to make observations. These conversations and observations were useful especially in terms of the section where analysis on local social life in Çerkezköy is presented in the Chapter Five.

Finally, this dissertation, which contains a significant amount of data on the recent economic and social history of Çerkezköy, has the characteristic of a study of local social history on Çerkezköy. It also presents data, based on primary sources, beyond the locality of Çerkezköy on the relations of businessmen to state bureaucracy and politicians in Turkey.

CHAPTER II

THE DECENTRALIZATION OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AND LOCAL ENTREPRENEURIALISM

The Decentralization of the Manufacturing Industry from the Metropolitan Core

Throughout the nineteenth century, industrial settlements in advanced capitalist countries mainly were concentrated in the city centers. The labor requirements of the factories resulted in a massive rural-urban migration and thus engendered the emergence of major industrial cities in Europe and North America.¹⁴ Since the close of the century, however, industry has started to withdraw from the city centers and move towards suburbs and satellite industrial towns. The decentralization of industry occurred throughout the twentieth century.

After the Second World War, while industry in advanced capitalist countries was moving from metropolitan cores to periphery, it, particularly the labor-intensive sectors, also started to move towards Third World countries. Together with globalization, the relocation of the industry gained acceleration. From the 1970s onwards, labor-intensive sectors with relatively outdated technology concentrated in Third World countries whereas industrial sectors with advanced technology started to locate in rural areas outside the traditional industrial zones of advanced countries. Within the same period, industry which concentrated in the primate cities of the

¹⁴ Lewis Mumford, *Tarih Boyunca Kent: Kökenleri Geçirdiği Dönüşümler ve Geleceği* (The city in history, its origins, its transformations and its prospects) (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 2007), pp. 558-564.

Third World began to overflow from those cities and spread to villages and towns in the immediate periphery.

The changes experienced in the geography of industry over a hundred years have taken place as a result of many economic, technical, social and political factors. Theories developed about the decentralization of industry from city centers will be discussed below; afterwards, the impact of globalization on geography of industry will be emphasized. Finally, characteristics of industrial zones will be examined briefly.

Theories about the Decentralization of Manufacturing Industry

The move of manufacturing industry from city centers towards suburbs and satellite towns has been a topic of interest for researchers since the beginning of the twentieth century.¹⁵ Studies about this subject have concentrated in advanced capitalist countries, in particular the US. Before moving on to these approaches deriving from various theoretical assumptions, it will be useful to mention classical industrial location theory briefly.

Industrial Location Theory

The first systematic studies on the location of industry were conducted in Germany. Von Alfred Weber's studies form the basis of Classical Industrial Location Theory. The discipline, developed within the paradigm of classical economics, had both a positive and a normative character. Besides explaining why firms choose certain

¹⁵ Robert Lewis, "Industry and the Suburbs," in *Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Home on the Metropolitan Fringe*, ed. Robert Lewis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), pp. 1-5.

locations, this theory aimed to assist firms in their choice of locations. It endeavored to find the optimum location in order to increase the profitability of a firm. The emergence of the theory was closely related to Germany's effort to organize its rapid industrialization process in the most efficient way.¹⁶

Weber, in a book published in 1909, focused mainly on the reduction of costs (especially transportation costs) to the minimum in explaining the location of firms. According to Weber, firms choose their location so that the cost of access to the sources of raw materials and labor market is minimized. Furthermore, the clustering of firms in a specific location has a total positive influence on all of them. The sum of positive influences such as sharing infrastructure costs, reducing the transaction costs among firms and information sharing is called "economics of agglomeration."

While Weber developed a supply-oriented approach, August Lösch developed a demand-oriented approach that centers upon the market. Instead of minimizing the input costs, Lösch focused on maximizing the profit. For this reason, he claimed that the effort to minimize the cost of access to the market was decisive in the location of firms.¹⁷

Thereafter, approaches that took other factors into consideration were put forward. McDonald and McMillan specify these factors as such: Wages, access to skilled labor, energy costs, land prices, infrastructure feasibility, taxes, and access to production technology, information and production services.¹⁸

¹⁶ Erol Tümertekin and Nazmiye Özgüç, *Ekonomik Coğrafya: Küreselleşme ve Kalkınma*, 8. ed. (Çantay Kitabevi: İstanbul, 2005), pp. 441-451; İlhan Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu İçin Sanayi Yazıları, Toplu Eserler 11* (Industrial writings for industrial society: complete works 11) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2009), p.13.

¹⁷ Tümertekin and Özgüç, p. 441-451; Doreen B. Massey, "Towards a Critique of Industrial Location Theory," *Antipode* 5, no. 3 (December 1973), pp. 35-36.

¹⁸ John F. McDonald and Daniel P. McMillan, *Urban Economics and Real Estate: Theory and Policy* (Malden, MA: Oxford, Blackwell, 2007), pp. 29-36.

Pellenbarg defines this approach, which assumes that firms make decisions about locations as being perfectly informed, rationally and with either cost-minimizing or profit-maximizing motivation, as the Neo-classical Approach. As for the Behavioral Approach, criticizing the Neo-classical Approach, which is based on the assumption of homo-economicus in classical economics, it purports that firm owners will not have the perfect information of economic conditions and that they will not always be able to interpret the information they have accessed rationally. Moreover, the Behavioral Approach maintains that the motivation of firm owners is not optimum profit, but rather satisfying profit. In this case, the appropriate place for a firm to settle is not a certain point to make optimum profit, but rather a space including many points that will make a satisfying profit. In addition to these, while the Neo-classical Approach focuses on pull factors, the Behavioral Approach considers pull factors and push factors together. Push factors could be internal (growth, need to expand) or external (congestion, government restrictions).¹⁹

However, the Behavioral Approach also has significant limitations. Both the Neo-classical Approach and the Behavioral Approach consider the firm as the unit of analysis. In both approaches, the structure and functioning of economic system that includes the firm are excluded from analysis. The firm is examined disjointedly from the totality of the economic structure and the firms' choices of location are explained with abstract reasoning instead of historical analysis. In addition, in these approaches, conditions for perfect competition are assumed to be present, and thus the monopolistic operation in the market is ignored.²⁰

¹⁹ Piet H. Pellenbarg, Leo J. G. Van Wissen and Jouke van Dijk, "Firm Migration," in *Industrial Location Economics*, ed. Philip McCann (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002), pp. 110-118.

²⁰ Massey, pp. 33-37.

Pellenbarg remarks that in addition to these two approaches, there is a third, which he designates Institutional Approach. In the Institutional Approach, while explaining industrial location, not only are decisions made within the scope of the firm, but also the social and cultural structure in which the firm is situated, government regulations, and the influences of real estate market are taken into consideration.²¹

Technical Explanations for the Decentralization of Manufacturing Industry

It was unimaginable to expect that the assumptions of the Industrial Location Theory's different variations would not influence the ideas produced in order to account for the decentralization of manufacturing industry. In the preliminary studies conducted in this field, it was agreed that the decentralization of manufacturing industry would be explicated by the reverse interpretation of the classical approach, which focused on transportation costs. If the concentration of industry in cities could be elucidated by minimizing the cost of access to market and labor market, the decentralization of industry could be explained with the reduction of transportation costs as a result of technological advances. In accordance with this notion, the fact that trucks and automobiles became widespread and highways were built in addition to railways decreased transportation costs and thus enabled the decentralization of industry from city centers. With respect to this classical approach, developments in transportation technology are the main decisive factor in the decentralization of industry.²²

²¹ Pellenbarg et al. "Firm Migration," pp. 110-118.

²² Robert Lewis and Richard Walker, "Beyond the Crabgrass Frontier: Industry and the Spread of North American Cities, 1850–1950," in *Manufacturing Suburbs: Building*

In the following years, more complicated approaches that centered upon technological advances were developed. Before proceeding with these approaches, Scott's neat summary of all the possible factors mentioned about the decentralization of industry should be presented. Scott lists the possible push factors that compel the industry to decentralize from city centers as such: Growth of firms and lack of space for expansion at inner city sites, obsolete central plant and equipment, traffic congestion, high central wages, central labor shortages, labor conflict and high levels of unionization in the inner city, planning restrictions on industry and urban renewal in central areas, high central land prices, cost-benefit calculations which induce centrally located firms to vacate their present locations in order to capitalize site values, and high central tax rates on industry. Possible pull factors in the periphery for industry are described as such: Development of means of transportation, invention of efficient horizontal plant layouts combined with cheap land in the suburbs, previous decentralization of the working population, favorable social climate of peripheral areas, proximity of suburban locations to major airports, and the accessibility of the periphery to the residences of managers and administrative staff.²³

Scott asserts that though all the factors mentioned above have an effect upon the shift of the industry from city centers to periphery, what is determinant is the internal dynamics of the firm. In order to understand spatial regulations of firms, organizational and technological changes should be analyzed primarily.

Scott states that the theory closest to his approach is the Product Cycle Model. With respect to this model, thanks to their characteristics, city centers serve

Work and Home on the Metropolitan Fringe, ed. Robert Lewis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), p.19.

²³ Allen J. Scott, "Locational Patterns and Dynamics of Industrial Activity in the Modern Metropolis," *Urban Studies* 19, no. 2 (May 1982), pp. 111 -142.

for “incubation” in the production of new goods. Cities, in addition to being markets, are centers where capital, skilled labor and knowledge accumulate. For this reason, new inventions appear in cities.

New goods are produced in small amounts in the first stage and they require skilled labor. However, the production of the good is standardized in time. Along with the development of machinery begins standardized mass production, the size of the company grows and the labor employed turns into unskilled labor. In this case, dependence of the firm on the city center decreases. In other words, while a city center serves for incubation in manufacturing a product, along with “maturation” of the product, decentralization becomes more advantageous. A growing firm whose manufacturing is standardized requires larger areas and it gravitates towards cheaper, unskilled labor. Thus, the decentralization of industry is explained with the developmental dynamic of the product’s manufacturing process. Together with factories becoming enormous, integrated plants, the economics of agglomeration described by Weber becomes superfluous. The total utility gained by the clustering of firms becomes meaningless for enormous, integrated plants; thus, industry is decentralized.

Scott describes the Product Cycle Model as follows:

In the early phases of the cycle, when a new article has just appeared on the market, firms engaged in the manufacture of the article tend to be small, to depend on skilled labor inputs, and to seek out positive agglomeration economies at inner city locations. As the market for the article expands, the production process becomes more standardized, and firms grow larger; thus firms now become increasingly independent of the central city with its stock of positive agglomeration effects and they start to move out to the suburbs. Finally, as the production process evolves into full maturity, firms begin to establish capital intensive branch plants (using semi-skilled or unskilled labor) in medium-sized and small towns far away from the major urban centers.²⁴

²⁴ Scott, “Locational Patterns,” pp. 124-125.

Scott remarks that, although the Product Cycle Model is relatively the best realistic explanation, it fails to explain the essential decisive dynamic of the decentralization of industry. He carefully scrutinizes technological changes in the production process and regulations in the organization of labor. According to him, while labor intensive companies tend to cluster in the city center, capital intensive companies tend to locate in larger areas outside the city. The more the component of capital increases against the component of labor in the firm, the more the firm tends to decentralize. Labor intensive, small, vertically disintegrated firms, among which exist extensive transactions, are inclined to cluster in urban centers; whereas vertically integrated, capital intensive firms which have standardized mass production tend to be further in the periphery and scattered.

As the firms grow, they start to maintain their labor intensive units, such as management in urban center, and send their capital intensive units to periphery. In terms of capital intensive units that require the use of broader spaces, remote areas are more profitable, since both land prices and labor becomes cheaper as we move away from the city center. However, functions necessitating skilled labor are retained in the city center. As Scott suggests, “In recent decades, in large metropolitan regions, core areas have tended to have a comparative advantage for labor intensive industrial activities, while peripheral areas have tended to have a comparative advantage for capital intensive industrial activities.” Large companies, by separating production unit from management unit, take the advantages of periphery without giving up of the advantages of the city center.²⁵

²⁵ Scott, “Locational Patterns,” pp. 125-130; Allen J. Scott, “Industrial Organization and the Logic of Intra-Metropolitan Location: I. Theoretical,” *Economic Geography* 59, no. 3 (July 1983), pp. 233-250.

Scott clarifies the subject in a more subtle way in one of his articles published later on. According to Scott, organizational and technical change reveals itself as social division of labor and fragmentation of production process. The emergence of big, standardized, integrated and mechanized production has decreased firms' requirement of industrial clusters and skilled labor. What is more, these clusters have lost their desirability as a result of high land prices, high taxes, high wages and disobedient labor. Especially, the presence of an organized and experienced working class constitutes a major problem. On the other hand, with the development of multi-establishment firms, branch-plants which have standardized production and do not require skilled labor have been moved to the periphery. Multinational companies have moved these units to Third World countries whereas labor intensive, white color functions have remained in the metropolises of advanced countries. Furthermore, the development of transportation and communication opportunities has also supported this decentralization.

Scott claims that another propensity caused by technological advances is the emergence of new industrial complexes based on high technology. These new industrial complexes have emerged outside the US's and Europe's traditional industrial zones since the 1970s. This situation means the disappearance of gains secured in favor of labor in the work life. In these areas where the tradition of class struggle does not exist, new industrial districts which make use of high technology based on flexible production have emerged.²⁶

Barkley and Hirschberger also vindicate an approach similar to Scott's. As maintained by them as well, the main factor affecting the firms' choice of location is the change in the production technology and the structure of organization. Since

²⁶ Allen J. Scott, "Industrialization and Urbanization: A Geographical Agenda," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 76, no. 1 (March 1986), pp. 25-37.

integrated plants making large scale, standardized mass production require relatively unskilled labor and vast spaces, they prefer areas outside the metropolis. On the other hand, small companies making flexible production with high technology for specialized markets tend to cluster in metropolises.²⁷

Pellenbarg also suggests that the firms' internal structures and dynamics are decisive in decentralization of industry from metropolitan cores. Firms requiring larger areas as a result of their growth move out of city centers and locate in rural areas.²⁸

Keeble states that there are three approaches to clarify the decentralization of industry from metropolises towards towns and rural areas in England from the 1960s onwards. First, and the best explanation according to Keeble, is "constrained location theory" argued by Fothergill and Gudgin. This approach proposes that the main reason for factories to decentralize from metropolises to rural areas is the lack of space in cities. Businesses requiring larger areas as a result of mechanization migrate to rural areas since there is no space to expand in the cities. This migration can take the form of relocating only the branch plants as well as relocating the whole firm.

The second approach explicates the decentralization of industry from urban areas to rural areas with the effort to reduce the production costs (particularly wages and rents). However, Keeble remarks that with regards to England, whether the cost difference between the urban and the rural is big and permanent enough to migrate, is debatable.

In the third approach, a radical and Marxist one, mentioned by Keeble, it is been claimed that due to accumulation of capital, multi-plant companies have turned

²⁷ David L. Barkley and Sylvain Hinschberger, "Industrial Restructuring: Implications for the Decentralization of Manufacturing to Nonmetropolitan Areas," *Economic Development Quarterly* 6, no.1 (February 1992), pp. 64-79.

²⁸ Pellenbarg et al., "Firm Migration," pp. 128-129, 140.

towards less organized and cheap labor. Keeble is of the opinion that the difference among these variables between urban and rural areas in England is not big enough to necessitate decentralization.

In conclusion, basing his conclusion on upon a vast number of empirical studies, Keeble asserts that among these three approaches the “constrained location theory”, which determines the decisive factor as that firms cannot find any space to expand in urban areas, is the most explicative approach.²⁹

As regards Lewis and Walker, in explaining the decentralization of industry from metropolises, both the approach focusing on transportation technology and the approach focalizing on technological-organizational developments in the production process are inadequate. The developments in transportation system is certainly important in the decentralization of industry; however, it is does not directly determine decentralization. First of all, railway transport and sea transport had developed considerably before industry was decentralized. Secondly, the development of transportation system does not have to precede industry. Most of the time, industry has gone to a district first and then transportation system is built. Thirdly, the decentralization of industry began before the proliferation of trucks and it continued afterwards.

Lewis and Walker regard Weberian Theory’s assumption, which suggests that firms focus only on minimizing the costs to increase profitability, as an insufficient approach. In fact, firms do not only try to reduce the costs, but also try to increase productivity by means such as developing technology, standardizing and rationalizing production, to increase profitability.³⁰

²⁹ David Keeble, “The Urban-Rural Manufacturing Shift,” *Geography* 69, no. 2 (April 1984), pp. 163-166.

³⁰ Lewis and Walker, “Beyond the Crabgrass Frontier,” p. 20.

Lewis and Walker propound that approaches focalizing on developments in the production process are also unrealistic. Principally, the proposition that in parallel with the development of a product, the size of a firm always evolves from small to large is not accurate. Besides, it cannot be claimed that small companies always remain in the city center and that big integrated firms always get out of clusters in the city center. Industrial development and location are not monotonic, uniform processes. Technological-organizational development in each industrial branch will have various locational outcomes. What is more, big integrated firms, just like the small firms, are involved in numerous external transactions. In the integration of different production processes, these transactions among the firms are most of the time mediated by national or local professional associations.³¹

The Class Struggle Approach

Giving voice to one of the strongest objections to technological determinist and “spatial determinist”³² approaches to the decentralization of industry, David Gordon emphasizes the decisiveness of class struggle. Studying the historical development of American cities, he alleges that the decentralization of industry from cities cannot be explained with technological variables but rather with class struggle. According to Gordon, the pursuit of cheap land, the firms’ requirement of large areas or the proliferation of trucks are insufficient to explain decentralization. The major decisive

³¹ Scott, in his later studies, observing that small sized and large companies exist together in new industrial zones, revised his initial approach. Ibid., pp. 21-23.

³² Gordon, defines regarding current urban form as the inevitable result of an evolutionary process as “spatial determinism” and likens this approach to technological determinism. David M. Gordon, “Capitalist Development and the History of American Cities” in *Marxism and the Metropolis*, ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 25-63.

factor is the process of capital accumulation, and therefore the conflict between labor and capital.

The principle problem in passing from the regime of commercial capital accumulation to the regime of industrial capital accumulation for Gordon was to make labor submissive, and thus to bring it under control. Capitalists tried to achieve this aim by isolating the working class from the other social classes. The ideal spaces for this aim were either isolated workers' neighborhoods or new industrial cities created from scratch. However, the isolation of the working class was a policy containing conflicts in it because, on the one hand, it severs the working class from the public life of the city; on the other hand, it smooths the organization of working class by making closer relations within itself. As the time went by, isolated workers' resistances started to be politicized and shift from workplaces to city centers.

Naturally, the struggle of the working class was not the sole problem of industrial capital accumulation. The lack of labor supply, increase in land prices, traffic congestion and taxes imposed on employers by politicians were also among the problems of industrial capital accumulation. However, industry did not have to leave the cities to resolve these problems. The lack of labor supply was solved with rural-urban migration, trams eased transportation system, the boom in real estate and construction sectors in the 1890s put an end to the increase in land prices. Despite these solutions, as from end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, factories started to constitute industrial suburbs or satellite cities by leaving city centers. The decisive dynamic in this process was the labor movement. Nonetheless, since relocating factories outside the city would bring a heavy financial burden, it was impossible for small companies to relocate their factories. For this reason, from 1898 to 1903, many businesses merged. Thanks to the centralization of

capital, production units could be transferred to the periphery. The corporate executive offices remained in urban centers. Thus, the transition to the corporate city from the industrial city was realized.³³

Patrick Ashton, on the one hand, indicates that both social and technical factors play a role in the decentralization of industry from city centers. As social factors he enumerates the increase of tax incidence in the city centers, the rise of the working class's power over urban policy, and workers' movements. As technical factors, he cites developments in the forces of production such as the proliferation of electricity, the firms' requirement of broader areas for assembly line production, and the proliferation of trucks. According to Ashton, developments in the forces of production provide the material basis for industry to move to the suburbs while social developments trigger it.

Ashton explains the establishment of autonomous governments in the suburbs which surround American cities with the influence of industry that moved to suburbs. Industrialist who moved to the suburbs prevented the annexation of these areas by the expanding city center because employers could more easily establish dominance over small and politically independent local governments. The political independence of suburbs in America functioned as a mechanism that favored capital. Suburbs, competing with each other in order to attract industry, endeavored to increase their attractiveness by providing free infrastructure services or reducing taxes. Thus, public resources used for capital accumulation. As to their class interests in the city center; the industrialists, who dominated governments in the suburbs,

³³ Gordon, "Capitalist Development," pp. 25-63.

sought to protect them by the intervention of the national government when necessary.³⁴

A contemporary study supporting the class struggle approach has been conducted by Erik Olsen. Olsen, by example of the meat packing industry, claims that in the US from the 1940s to the early 2000s, the major decisive factor in industry's choice of location and change in the organizational structure was class struggle. Olsen, proposing that industry in general, on the one hand, started to move from the metropolises to the periphery from the 1940s onwards and, on the other hand, it at the same time started to move from the traditional industrial zone in the northeast of the US towards western and southern zones, asserts that this shift occurred as a result of fast unionization in the traditional industrial zone in the 1940s.

In the northeast of the US, the traditional industrial zone, the rate of unionization was below the average of the country until 1939. However, from this date onwards, thanks to legal modifications, the rate of unionization increased dramatically and rose a great deal above the average of the country. The reaction of the firms in the meat packing industry to the high level of unionization and the increasing power of the unions was to reduce the scale of production on the one hand and, on the other hand, to move their factories to rural areas and southern states where workers' rights were limited. As a result of this strategy, the number of firms in the meat packing industry in the northeast was decreased and large scale businesses were replaced by small-sized businesses. In 1963, while the meat packing industry in metropolitan areas incorporated 79 percent of all the workers in the

³⁴ Patrick J. Ashton, "The Political Economy of Suburban Development," in *Marxism and the Metropolis*, ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 64-89; Ann R. Markusen "Class and Urban Social Expenditure A Marxist Theory and Metropolitan Government," in *Marxism and the Metropolis*, ed. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 90-115.

sector, this rate decreased to 48.3 percent in 1992. The rate of unionization, which was 46.1 percent in 1980, also decreased to 20.9 percent at the end of the decade.

An interesting point underlined by Olsen is that firms applied this strategy at the expense of decreasing their productivity. By relinquishing economy of scale and the advantages of being close to metropole, they ran the risk of decrease in productivity. Only after the power of the unions was broken, did the firms started to reincrease their scale of production.³⁵

Richard Peet also states that during the 1930s and 1940s in America, especially in the industrial zone in the northeast, the rate of unionization increased rapidly. From the end of the 1940s onwards, industrialists started to decentralize industry to southern states or abroad against the rising strikes and wages. For instance, General Electric reacted to the strikes of 1946 in Massachusetts by decentralizing production into northern New England and the south, and eventually to Singapore. Thereby, capitalists who relocated to areas of low class struggle gained advantages over those who remained in areas of high class struggle. Ultimately, the search for cheap and submissive labor resulted in the fact that more production units decentralized to southern states or abroad.³⁶

Harvey, on a more theoretical level, indicates that the spatial movement of industry resulted from both conflict between capitalists and working class and rivalry among capitalists themselves. According to Harvey, capitalists relocate in order to

³⁵ Eric K. Olsen, "Class Conflict and Industrial Location," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 42, no.3 (2010), pp. 344-352.

³⁶ Richard Peet, "Relations of Production and the Relocation of United States Manufacturing Industry since 1960," *Economic Geography*, 59, no. 2 (April 1983), pp. 112-143.

both make extensive profit by getting ahead of the game against each other and to discipline labor.³⁷

Adopting the perspective of class struggle, Andrew Herod remarks that in the studies conducted on the geographic movements of industry, the influence of labor on this movement has not been sufficiently estimated. He suggests that in classical location theory, labor is regarded as an item in the cost calculations of employers, as a passive variable rather than an active and effective power. According to Herod, this approach, which considers labor as an abstract variable rather than an active subject, looks at the configuration process of industrial geography completely from the point of view of capital.

However, according to Herod, not only in classical location theory but also even in Marxist economic geography studies, labor is acknowledged as secondary to capital. In fact, the working class plays a decisive role, at least as much as capital, in the configuration of the economic geography. Herod, departing from Harvey's concept of "spatial fix," claims that like the capital creates "spatial fixes" in order to sustain accumulation process; labor also creates "spatial fixes" in order to reproduce its existence. The idea that capital has created a world in its own image is not true. Various sections of the working class strive to realize their social and biological reproduction by at times compromising or conflicting with capital and by compromising or competing with other sections of the working class. Throughout this process they play a central role in the configuration of the economic geography.

³⁷ David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 388-393; David Harvey, *Postmodernliğin Durumu*, 2. ed. (İstanbul: Metis, 1999), pp. 264-265.

Eventually, it is necessary to explain the configuration of economic geography not from the point of view of capital, but from the perspective of labor.³⁸

Towards a More Comprehensive Approach

Lewis and Walker, who analyze the suburbanization of manufacturing industry from 1850 to 1950 in North America, bring a comprehensive approach to the subject.

Lewis and Walker, analyzing the formation of industrial suburbs and satellite towns as a part of the metropolitan development process, specify that three main dynamics are effective in the process: The economic logic of geographical industrialization, land development (investment in real estate), and metropolitan politics and planning.

Lewis and Walker acknowledge the effect of technological factors on the condition that these are not isolated from the other factors. They state that the growth of a firm's scale is especially an important factor. Since large firms require broad spaces as a result of assembly line production, they are not only more obliged to decentralize from the city center, but also they have the necessary financial means for decentralization compared to small firms. For this reason, the primal firms leading suburbanization are large scale firms followed by small and medium sized firms. Needless to say, the development of the means of transportation facilitates this process. New industrial zones generally form around the main transportation lines.

In making the lands in the periphery of the city fit for industry, in other words, in the process of producing industrial lands, the role of real estate entrepreneurs should not be neglected. Real estate entrepreneurs and speculators make constant effort to expand the city. The transformation of the land in the city's

³⁸ Andrew Herod, "From a Geography of Labor to a Labor Geography: Labor's Spatial Fix and the Geography of Capitalism," *Antipode* 29, no.1 (1997), pp. 1-31.

periphery into an industrial zone is a process mediated by them. Speculators encourage firms and people to move to the suburbs in order to make their investment in the land profitable. What is more, not only real estate agents but also large firms contribute to this process by purchasing more than necessary land in the peripheries of cities for themselves with the aim of speculation.

Indicating political struggles and planning in metropolis as the third factor, Lewis and Walker express this opinion as follows:

In addition to the economic logic of industrialization and property development, political intervention and conscious planning have also played a significant part in the intentional process of shaping and reshaping North American cities. Despite the apparent chaos of urban building, a prevailing vision of urban expansion and suburbanization has guided the plans of industrialists, developers, and governments. The construction of cities is more than an exercise in economics; it is irreducibly about the search for geographic control, or the politics of space.³⁹

According to Lewis and Walker, the rise of the labor movements and loss of political control in the metropolis are significant factors in the decentralization of industry. Small local units enable capitalists to establish political control over labor more easily. The planning processes of local and national governments play an important part in the formation of new industrial zones. City plans shaped by the influence of industrialists, real estate entrepreneurs, financiers, politicians and planners have a direct impact on industrial settlement.

In the opening of new areas to industrial settlement, local and national governmental institutions play critical roles by undertaking the responsibility of providing infrastructure services. Naturally, none of this happens by itself. In cities “growth coalitions” supporting these processes are constituted. These coalitions, including industrialist, real estate agencies and politicians, compete with other local

³⁹ Lewis and Walker, “Beyond the Crabgrass Frontier,” p. 28.

institutions in order to attract government resources and private capital to recently formed industrial zones.⁴⁰ This subject will be discussed below.

Logan and Molotch also point out to the critical role played by the institutions in the decentralization process of industry. As emphasized by them, regulations such things as road construction, the allocation of lands to industry, tax exemption, providing infrastructure services, and the making of labor law can be realized only by local and central governmental agencies.⁴¹

The decentralization of industry to the periphery is not a progressive process that takes place gradually. It happens by leaps and bounds. Periods when industry heads towards urban periphery, generally correspond with growth periods of industry and the real estate sector.⁴² The growing sector expands to new areas and settlements of working class are formed around the zone where the industry is decentralized. In the recession period followed by this growth, the gap between the new zone where the industry is located and the metropolis start to be filled gradually. These areas, some of which were initially suburbs, are included in the city center in time. Thus, the relocation of industry determines the shape of metropolitan settlement.⁴³

Finally, it should be underlined that while studying the relocation of industry, macro changes in the economic system should definitely be considered. Lewis puts forward the idea that in understanding the decentralization of industry, it is not adequate simply to reckon developments on the metropolitan scale, and that regional,

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 28-31.

⁴¹ John R. Logan and Harvey L. Molotch, *Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place*, 20th anniversary ed. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), p. 186.

⁴² Soja also states that in general urban transformations, and in particular the decentralization of industry to the periphery, follow a parallel path with the growth periods of capitalist economy. Edward W. Soja, *Postmetropolis Critical Studies of Cities and Regions* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2000), p.109-116.

⁴³ Robert Lewis, "Running Rings around the City: North American Industrial Suburbs, 1850-1950," in *Changing Suburbs*, ed. R. Harris and P. Larkham (London: Spon Press, 1999), pp. 146-167.

national and global developments also should be taken into consideration. The development of new technologies, developments about markets, changes in the sources of raw materials in the world will have an impact on the geographic distribution of industry.⁴⁴

At this juncture, the effects of globalization, the most fundamental socioeconomic transformation over the past decades, on the decentralization of industry can be studied.

The Effects of Globalization on the Decentralization of Industry

The restructuring process of the economy, which started after the global economic crisis experienced in the 1970s, resulted in radical changes in the geography of industry. In the face of decreasing profitability and increasing competition around the world, multinational companies started to restructure the production process on a global scale with the support of advances in the communication and transportation sectors. In this restructuring, while units such as management, finance, and research and development were maintained in big metropolises denominated as world cities, labor intensive production units were carried to Third World countries or underdeveloped areas of advanced countries where labor is cheaper and disorganized, the taxes are low, and auditing is loose. The development of Post-Fordist, flexible manufacturing types accompanied this process. In the new industrial zones, where strong traditions of unionization not exist, conditions of flexible accumulation were implemented more easily.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Lewis, "Industry and the Suburbs," p. 10.

⁴⁵ Yeong-Hung Kim and John Rennie Short, *Cities and Economies* (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 39-46; Joe R. Feagin and Michael Peter Smith, "Cities and the New Division of Labor: An Overview," in *The Capitalist City: Global Restructuring and*

Metropolises abandoned by industry began to concentrate on the service, finance, and tourism sectors. Within the service sector enclosing an extensive range, especially business services (advertisement, finance, legal services) became prominent. The service sector, while employing professionals with high salaries also employed low-wage unskilled workers. This did not mean that the city centers would completely be deindustrialized. Industrial enterprises using high technology and “sweatshops” where immigrants and women were employed under severe conditions proved to be industries situated in the metropolitan area.⁴⁶

In this process, while capital gained more mobility, the cities entered into fierce competition with each other to attract capital. Despite the fact that some cities could compensate for the loss in industry through new sectors, most cities could not and thus unemployment and social exclusion increased.⁴⁷

The effect of globalization on cities was not unilateral. Certain large cities became prominent as spaces where the global economy is run. While globalization weakened nation states’ economic control mechanisms, it enabled certain advanced countries’ metropolises to become prominent. Metropolises such as New York, London, and Tokyo reached the condition of agencies shaping the globalization process due to the services they provided. Globalization offered the large cities the opportunity to play a significant part in regulating the world market beyond the national borders. While these cities, called world cities, became prominent as

Community Politics, ed. Michael Peter Smith and Joe R. Feagin (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 9-11; Susan S. Fainstein and Scott Campbell, “Introduction: Theories of Urban Development and Their Implications for Policy and Planning” in *Reading in Urban Theory*, ed. Susan S. Fainstein and Scott Campbell (Oxford, Malden: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 5-8, Melih Ersoy, “Sanayisizleşme Süreci ve Kentler,” *Praksis*, no. 2 (Bahar 2001), pp. 32-36, Harvey, *Postmodernliğin Durumu*, pp. 168-171.

⁴⁶ Kim and Short, *Cities and Economies*, pp. 50-56, Feagin and Smith, “Cities and the New Division of Labor,” pp. 13-16.

⁴⁷ Susan S. Fainstein, “The Changing World Economy and Urban Restructuring”, *Reading in Urban Theory*, ed. Susan S. Fainstein and Scott Campbell (Oxford, Malden: Blackwell, 1996), p.170-186

headquarters of the global economy their populations also became more cosmopolitan.⁴⁸

Feagin states that the restructuring of cities in the globalization process cannot simply be explained with economic developments and that government policies also step into the process. The heavy expenses of restructuring have usually been met by central and local governments. Organizations based on public-private partnership also have been influential on urban reorganization.⁴⁹

Noyelle et al. explicate the effect of globalization on the relocation of the industry in the US as such: Large factories built during the Keynesian-Fordist period resorted to reducing the costs against the international that rivalry intensified in the 1970s. While the executive units of large companies remained in the metropole, production units were decentralized to the southern states and rural areas where wages and unionization were low. The necessity to expand for certain factories making use of new machinery and development of means of transportation also played a part in this process.⁵⁰

It has also been claimed in the recent years that the development of technology at dizzying speeds has decreased the importance of traditional factors on location of the industry. Fu-Chen Lo and Yue-Man observe that as a result of globalization and the great progress made in information technology, traditional location factors have lost their significance and that from now on industry will prefer places which will enable easy access to information and capital.⁵¹ Fainstein suggests that technological developments have expedited and accelerated relocation of the

⁴⁸ Kim and Short, *Cities and Economies*, p. 65-74.

⁴⁹ Feagin and Smith, "Cities and the New Division of Labor," pp. 17-23.

⁵⁰ Thierry J. Noyelle and Thomas M. Stanback, *The Economic Transformation of American Cities* (Ottawa: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), pp. 93-114.

⁵¹ Fu-Chen Lo and Yue-Man Yeung, "Introduction," in *Globalization and the World of Large Cities*, ed. Fu-Chen Lo and Yue-Man Yeung (New York: UN University Press, 1998), p. 4.

industry, and thus it is important to be close neither to the market nor to the source of raw material, but rather to transportation facilities.⁵² Peter Hall claims that developments in transportation and communication technologies are principle factors in the decentralization of industry.⁵³

The decentralization of industry from city centers to periphery is not a process undergone only in advanced countries. Developing Third World countries have undergone similar developments. Within the period when Fordist industrial policies were applied in advanced countries, certain Third World countries started to industrialize via import-substitution policies.

In the Third World, urbanization generally took place as the growth of a city in such a way that it predominates over the national economy. These primate cities, which are mostly ports, became the focus of industrialization during the period of import-substitution industrialization. Concentration of the industry in these cities resulted in overpopulation, traffic congestion, rapid increase of land prices, air pollution, and lack of infrastructure. Costs of factories requiring broader areas day by day began to increase. Due to the increasing costs, factories tended to leave city centers. Governments also supported the decentralization of factories to periphery; they established industrial estates around the metropolis and brought infrastructure services. Together with the development of means of transportation, industry started to move towards the periphery.⁵⁴

⁵² Susan S. Fainstein, "The Changing World Economy," pp. 172-178.

⁵³ Peter Hall, "Globalization and the World Cities," in *Globalization and the World of Large Cities*, ed. Fu-Chen Lo and Yue-Man Yeung (New York: UN University Press, 1998), pp. 27-28.

⁵⁴ Alan Gilbert, "Urban Agglomeration and Regional Disparities," in *Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the Third World*, ed. Alan Gilbert and Josef Gugler (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 46-61; Alan Gilbert, "Third World Cities: The Changing National Settlement System," *Urban Studies* 30, no. 4-5 (1993) pp. 727-728.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, the growth rates of primate cities such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City and Seoul started to decrease; however, the growth rates of other cities in the immediate periphery began to increase. This resulted from the fact that industry decentralized from the primate city to areas in its immediate periphery. For example during the 1970s, ten cities 150 km. away from Sao Paulo, the largest city in Brazil, experienced a faster industrialization and population growth than Sao Paulo. However, the benefits of industrialization in the immediate periphery continued to flow to the metropolis. Headquarters remained in the metropolis, whereas production units were decentralized to the surrounding cities.

Governments in the Third World countries made use of both incentives and restrictions in order to distribute the industrial agglomeration in metropolises to other regions of the country. Generally, incentives were applied more than restrictions. However, capital preferred to choose a location in the immediate periphery of the metropolis instead of going to distant areas. The effort to distribute industry throughout the country for the most part proved fruitless.

Together with globalization, international companies started to shift certain production units to Third World countries in order to exploit cheap labor. This process was supported also by the Third World government suffering from their debts to advanced countries. The problems of working conditions and environment were ignored. In this period, free trade zones were created in certain Asian countries.

Transition from import-substitution industrialization to export-oriented industrialization also resulted in the decentralization of industry from large cities to surrounding areas with means of transportation in some countries. Now that the

target is not selling goods to the local market, being located in the city center started to lose its importance for these companies.⁵⁵

Studying the decentralization of industry in Mexico, Aguilar, remarks that despite the decrease in the growth rate of Mexico City during the 1990s, cities in the immediate periphery experienced rapid growth. In this period, industry decentralized around the highways connecting Mexico City to the surrounding cities by creating industrial corridors. Since industry decentralized to close cities, the Central Region, which comprises Mexico City, continued to be the region where most investments accumulated in the country. In this process, inequality between the Central Region and other regions of Mexico further increased.⁵⁶

In another study conducted on Mexico, it is suggested that industry partly migrated to regions close to the US border following the liberalization of trade in the 1980s. Some of the firms manufacturing for the US market, in this period, chose locations in northern Mexico.⁵⁷

A Typology of Industrial Districts

In economic geography studies, in addition to the location and relocation of industry, the characteristics of industrial districts are a subject accentuated upon by researchers. Lewis divides industrial districts established around the cities into quarters. The first one is the industrial districts formed informally around the

⁵⁵ Alan Gilbert, "Urban Agglomeration" pp. 46-61; Alan Gilbert, "Urban and Regional Systems: A Suitable Case for Treatment?" in *Cities, Poverty and Development: Urbanization in the Third World*, ed. Alan Gilbert and Josef Gugler (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992) pp. 251-253; Gilbert, "Third World Cities," pp. 727-730.

⁵⁶ Adrian Guillermo Aguilar, "Megaurbanization and Industrial Relocation in Mexico's Central Region," *Urban Geography* 23, no. 7 (2002), pp. 649-673.

⁵⁷ Gordon H. Hanson, "Regional Adjustment to Trade Liberalization," *Regional Science and Urban Economics* 28, no. 4 (1998), pp. 419-444.

metropolitan settlement; the second is satellite industrial towns; the third is a suburb or a town dominated by one business; and fourth one is officially established industrial districts.⁵⁸ Richard Harris explicates the difference between a satellite town and an industrial suburb as such: Workers in an industrial suburb can go to work from the city center; however, with regards to a satellite town, this is not possible since a satellite town is relatively distant. For this reason, those who promote the establishment of satellite towns have to provide solutions to the housing problem of workers. Building lodgings especially for skilled laborers is a frequent practice.⁵⁹

It is also propounded that the Post-Fordist mode of production, implemented since the 1970s, created new industrial districts. With respect to this standpoint, the effort to minimize the transaction costs between parent companies and contractors, and the transaction costs among small companies is one of the key dynamics of the Post-Fordist industrial agglomeration. As the production process in Post-Fordist flexible manufacturing was vertically fragmented, small-sized companies proliferated instead of large-scale factories. Among these companies specializing in different stages of the production process and using skilled labor and high technology, an extensive transaction was carried out by necessity. This caused the spatial agglomeration of companies and thus new industrial districts were formed. As examples of such industrial districts, Third Italy in Italy, Silicon Valley in the US and Silicon Glen in England are given.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Lewis, "Running Rings around the City," pp. 160-162.

⁵⁹ Richard Harris, "Suburbanization and the Employment Linkage," in *Manufacturing Suburbs: Building Work and Home on the Metropolitan Fringe*, ed. Robert Lewis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), pp. 226-227.

⁶⁰ Soja, *Postmetropolis*, pp. 156-180; Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson, "City Economies," *A Companion to the City*, ed. Gary Bridge and Sophie Watson (Oxford, Malden: Blackwell, 2003), p. 106; Ayda Eraydın, *Post-Fordizm ve Değişen Mekânsal Öncelikler* (Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 1992), pp. 35-42.

Ann Markusen specifies that industrial districts can be divided into four types and they can possess the features of one or several of these types. The first one includes the Marshallian and Italianate Industrial Districts. In this type, business structure is dominated by small, locally owned firms. There is substantial interdistrict trade among buyers and suppliers. The labor market is contained in the district and there is a unique local cultural identity. Secondly, Hub-and-Spoke Industrial Districts, in which the business structure is dominated by one or several large, vertically integrated firms surrounded by suppliers. Core firms are embedded nonlocally, with substantial links to suppliers and competitors outside the district. There is a low degree of cooperation among large competitive firms. Thirdly, satellite industrial platforms, in which the business structure is dominated by large, externally owned and headquartered firms. There is minimal interdistrict trade among buyers and suppliers. However, there is a high degree of cooperation and linkages with external firms, especially with the parent company. There is also a little evolution of unique local cultural identity. And fourthly, state-anchored industrial districts, in which the business structure is dominated by one or several large, government institutions such as military bases and large public universities surrounded by suppliers and customers.⁶¹

Sam Ock Park makes a more detailed analysis of satellite industrial district, which mostly corresponds to the Çerkezköy model, is the subject of this study. Park indicates that satellite districts, where generally large branch-plants are situated, are established and developed as a result of national government enterprises rather than local government enterprises. The relation of these industrial districts to the locality

⁶¹ Ann Markusen, "Sticky Places in Slippery Space: A Typology of Industrial Districts," *Economic Geography* 72, no. 3 (July 1996), pp. 293-313.

and their contribution to local development are limited; their nonlocal relations are stronger.

However, Park remarks that in advanced forms of satellite industrial districts, small companies will be joined with large branch-plants and thus relations between large and small companies will intensify since presently large companies subcontract more and more. What is more, governments apply special procedures in order to support SMEs. As a result of these developments, relations to the locality increase in advanced satellite industrial districts as distinct from classical satellite districts. In the passage of time, local governments start to play a more important part in the development of these types of industrial districts.

Finally, Park states that industrial districts have a dynamic structure, that they can display the features of more than one type and that they can transform from one type to another.⁶²

Local Entrepreneurialism

Thus far I have dwelled upon why and how industry decentralized from the metropolis. I have discussed the fact that decentralization is a multivariate process in which various dynamics related to technology, economy, politics, institutions and real estate market played a part. In order to explain why decentralized industry chooses one or a few villages or towns among many and does not head towards others, an in-depth analysis of the internal dynamics of the districts to which industry relocates in decentralization is required. In the process of transforming small settlements to new industrial districts the political enterprises of local agencies play

⁶² Sam Ock Park, "Networks and Embeddedness in the Dynamic Types of New Industrial Districts," *Progress in Human Geography* 20, no. 4 (1996), pp. 476-493.

an important role. If local agencies form stable coalitions and promote regional and national (sometimes trans-national) relations, they can play a vital role in the growth of their own districts. At this point, the “growth machine” approach developed by Harvey Molotch and studies conducted which are based on the concept of urban entrepreneurialism (or entrepreneurship) will provide a convenient framework.

The Growth Machine Thesis

Proposing the “growth machine” thesis for the first time in an article⁶³ in 1976, Molotch explained his thoughts in detail in *Urban Fortunes*, a book co-published by Logan and Molotch in 1987. Despite drawing upon Neo-Marxist urban studies as well as the classical ecologic approach, Logan and Molotch criticized both approaches. They criticized the classical ecological approach for it endeavoring to account for everything by employing the invisible hand of “free” market and disregarded the socially constructedness of the market; they criticized Neo-Marxist approach, focusing on the capital accumulation process, because of its determinism which does not consider the role of urban agencies.⁶⁴

Logan and Molotch, deriving their theses from the studies they conducted on US cities, underline two characteristics of these cities. The first one is that the land has been completely commodified (the dominance of private sector on ownership and use of land), and the second is that local governments have relatively great political powers (especially in collecting taxes and urban planning). The presence of

⁶³ Harvey Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 82, no. 2 (September 1976), pp. 309-332.

⁶⁴ Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes*, pp. 4-12.

these two characteristic at a certain level is the necessary condition for the mechanism, which they name as “growth machine,” to work.⁶⁵

With reference to Marx’s labor theory of value, Logan and Molotch denote that land and buildings have two different values, like other commodities, “use value” and “exchange value.” When we use a place to maintain our lives or to work, use value is in question. When we have it as an investment, change value gains importance. It is rent income that determines the change value of the place. A certain part of urban space matters to some people in terms of its use value whereas some other people are only interested in it in terms of exchange value. According to Logan and Molotch, on the basis of all the discussions related to the use of space in capitalist city underlies the conflict between those who regard space in terms of exchange value and those who regard it in terms of use value.

Rent income, determining the change value of place, has an inconsistent characteristic. For example, if an airport is constructed, the land and buildings around it will gain value. If a garbage disposal facility is built, they will decrease in value. Speculators, receiving information of possible investment decisions beforehand, make great profits by purchasing real estates they think will gain value in the future. There is a group of people designated by Logan and Molotch as “structural speculators” who manipulate the developments as they want instead of forecasting them. By way of their political relations, they increase their rent incomes by orienting government investments towards the lands they own.⁶⁶

Urban growth is of vital importance for those who earn money from land and the construction of buildings. By and large, all urban elites support urban growth; however, those who earn money from place (place entrepreneurs) regard growing the

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁶⁶ Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes*, pp. 13-31.

city as their major occupation. “Place entrepreneurs” pioneer the establishment of urban “growth coalitions.” The more real estate prices and rents increase, in other words, the extent to which profitability in this sector is high, the more the efforts of place entrepreneurs to grow the city increase. Some people who have professions give up their major occupations and head towards the real estate sector which makes sweet profit.

In addition to place entrepreneurs, local businessmen, local politicians, local media, private companies providing for public utilities such as water, electricity and transportation, and financial institutions act as major actors in the growth coalition. Despite the fact that the growth direction of the city and who will have how much share from the growth cause conflicts among the actors in the coalition, the main subject on which they all agree is the necessity of growth. The local elites want the city to grow in such a way that their assets increase in value the most. The effort of each actor to increase his rent causes cracks in the coalition. However, there are certain elites for whom the growth direction of the city is not important, growth of the city in total is sufficient. For instance, with regards to local newspaper owners, the growth direction of the city is not important at all. What matters to them is the increase in the total population, thereby the increase in potential audience. A similar situation is also valid for private companies providing public utilities. These actors, keeping a “neutral” position in terms of growth, generally play a unifying role and try to be spokesperson in the coalition.

Local governments are always pro-growth; their principal activity is to have a bigger share from the general growth in the country. Those who are most interested in local politics are those who make the most profit out of growth. Molotch states that, “the people who participate with their energies, and particularly their fortunes,

in local affairs are the sort of persons who - at least in vast disproportion to their representation in the population - the most to gain or lose in land-use decisions.”⁶⁷

The components of the growth coalition are not limited to the actors mentioned above. Universities, unions, tradesmen and professionals, sports clubs and art circles, designated as “auxiliary players” by Logan and Molotch also can participate in these coalitions. The routine activities of these coalitions to grow the cities turn these cities into “growth machines”. Growth coalitions can be established on the scales of neighborhood, city or region.

The executives of local branches of multi-locational companies are relatively less interested in growth policy. If these executives are locals, it is more probable that they play an active role in the coalition. However, if they have come from outside, since their relation to the locality is limited and they will not be in the expecting real estate income, they will not play an active part in the coalition. However, this does not mean that they are powerless in local politics; on the contrary, local governments abstain from making decision that will disturb these executives.

In order to reach their targets, growth coalitions enter into relations with political mechanisms on various scales. They take a close interest in local politics and they donate excessively to presidential candidates. They get involved in the urban planning process and manipulate local government resources in accordance with their own interests. In the meantime, they try to transfer national resources reserved for growth to their districts such as a highway passing through their cities or the construction of an industrial park in their cities. These kinds of major investments

⁶⁷ Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine,” p. 314.

change the fortunes of cities. Land gains value in the district to which the investments are directed and thus the growth rate of the city increases.

There are towns that have grown rapidly and become large cities thanks to the efforts of local entrepreneurs in America. For example, Chicago, while it was a village with a population of four thousand, became an enormous city as a result of the efforts of the local elite led by a speculator. Firstly, the passing of the railway through the district was secured and then the bringing of industry to the area was enabled. After the growth elites of Los Angeles secured the construction of a major port from the budget of the federal government, the city started to grow rapidly.

Growth coalitions try to attract not only government resources but private capital as well. They spend local resources for the creation of a good business climate in order to attract private capital. They endeavor to attract the capital by ways such as developing the infrastructure, overlooking environmental pollution, reducing taxes and imposing restrictions on unions.

It cannot be argued that the efforts of growth coalitions are always successful. Sometimes they fail to obtain results from these enterprises. When growth is achieved, only a small minority derives a profit from it. However, growth elites propagandize that growth is good and necessary for everyone. Localities are encouraged to support growth projects. Campaigns, cultural events and ceremonies are organized so that the ideology of growth is embraced by all of the inhabitants.

Either private or public, the allocation of resources to a locality means that it cannot be allocated to another locality. Namely, the growth success of a locality will have a negative impact on the development of other localities. This growth race, a zero sum game, reproduces inequalities.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes*, pp. 50-85.

In places where growth is achieved, it has different effects on different groups. It cannot be claimed that growth increases the life quality of most of the people. Poor people and workers generally do not make profit from growth and on top of that it is a high probability that they will suffer. Logan and Molotch summarize the potential negative results of growth as such: First of all, local public resources spent in order to attract capital can be larger than the total income generated by growth and in such a case local governments fall into financial crisis. Secondly, growth in a specific local place redistributes the existing jobs on a national scale instead of creating new employment opportunities. In other words; the number of jobs in total does not increase; only the places of jobs change. Thus, people have to pursue their jobs and migrate. Thirdly, urban renewals made for growth sometimes threaten poor neighborhoods, many people are displaced. Fourthly, growth usually increases inequality and discrimination. And fifthly, it is the poor who are most affected by the environmental pollution caused by growth.⁶⁹

Twenty years after the growth machine thesis was put forward for the first time, in a study revising it, the success and inadequacies of the thesis were depicted. Jonas and Wilson state that the superiority of growth machine thesis to urban studies prior to itself is that it gives a central role to human agents. In the Growth Machine approach, coalitions, strategies, plans, institutions and actors play active parts in determining the fortune of cities contrary to previously conducted studies. Jonas and Wilson, giving a warning, remark that when the thesis is applied to contexts outside the US, national scale and nation state regulations become more prominent because

⁶⁹ Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes*, p. 85-96.

the autonomy of local governments in any countries is not as extensive as that of those in the US.⁷⁰

Mark Boyle emphasizes that civic boosterism functions as an ideology justifying the self-interests of urban elites who constitute growth coalitions. This ideology is accepted by city-dwellers, because, campaigns for civic boosterism provide them with identity, a sense of belonging and the opportunity to socialize. According to Boyle, civic boosterism not only ensures the creation of a collective identity, but also establishes and reproduces the belief that cities or communities will have a future in this system as long as they meet the requirements of growth and create favorable conditions for the capital to come to their cities.⁷¹

Based on their research and many studies conducted on American cities, Logan et al. indicate that it is highly controversial how much growth is achieved in reality as a result of efforts made to grow. They underline that the only certain point in Molotch's thesis is also the effort to grow. They write, "It may be surprising to note that Molotch (1976) did not argue that growth machines *actually* affect growth, but only that they *attempt* to do so."⁷²

Evaluating the growth machine thesis within the context of Israel, Kirby and Abu-Rass observe that the thesis does not take the effect of nation state into consideration sufficiently and that it does not accentuate adequately the political

⁷⁰ Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson, "The City is a Growth Machine: Critical Reflections Two Decades Later," in *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later*, ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 3-18.

⁷¹ Mark Boyle, "Growth Machines and Propaganda Projects: A Review of Readings of the Role of Civic Boosterism in the Politics of Local Economic Development," in *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later* ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 64-70.

⁷² John R. Logan, Rachel Bridges Whaley, Kyle Crowder, "The Character and Consequences of Growth Regimes: An Assessment of Twenty Years of Research," in *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later* ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 92.

context of growth. For example, the development of Arab towns in Israel is totally subject to the state's logic of political control. Kirby and Abu-Rass claim that the dominant role of the nation state in organizing the space is actually valid for America as well. They maintain that the state policy, in invading the lands of Native Americans and the expansion of settlements towards the west, was not much different from the example of Israel.⁷³

Jessop et al. criticize the growth machine thesis on the grounds that it bends the bar towards the actor in the actor-structure dichotomy. According to them, while the thesis can well account for the internal dynamics of urban coalitions, it cannot sufficiently relate local to economic and political forces and processes on a larger scale. The growth machine thesis, focusing on local actors, does not pay enough attention to structures in which local actors are included. However, coalitions established in locality are restricted by large scale structures.

Jessop et al. define their approach as follows:

In opposing this agency-centered localism, however, we are not advocating some form of global structuralism. Instead, we explore the dialectic among different spatial scales of economic and political organization and emphasize the mutual constitution of structure and agency across different levels.⁷⁴

Moreover, they manifest that the role of the state is not laid bare adequately in the thesis. They emphasize that the increasing participation of business circles in local politics is a result of the state's restructuring process.⁷⁵

⁷³ Andrew Kirby and Thabit Abu-Rass, "Employing the Growth Machine Heuristic in a Different Political and Economic Context: The Case of Israel," in *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later* ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 213-225.

⁷⁴ Bob Jessop, Jamie Peck, Adam Tickell "Retooling the Machine: Economic Crisis, State Restructuring and Urban Politics," in *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later* ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 141-142.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.141-159.

In his response to these criticisms, Molotch rejects the criticism that he has not considered national factors in the construction of the local. Proposing that the mutual relation between local dynamics and supra-local dynamics appear in the growth machine thesis, he says that starting from macro processes in order to explain the local is not a must. He states that “The process of local building and the national systems of politics, culture and economy should make sense in terms of one another and explanations of the two spheres should make analytic contact. We can get at it, from both directions.”⁷⁶ He adds that he prefers to start from the local details. Growth elites establish the connection between the local and supra-local scales. Growth elites function as mediators relating local politics and daily life to macro political economic structures. In short, they are in relation both to the daily life of the local and to the supra-local structures.

Molotch specifies that the validity of the thesis outside US depends on the accrual level for two conditions related to countries’ land-use patterns. Firstly, the emergence of urban growth machines depends on “the degree that land and buildings are allowed to operate as commodities.” He continues as follows:

A high level of commodification justifies placing life bets in real estate and striving to manipulate land-use laws, politicians, and others’ locational decisions. These are the basis of “structural speculation” – investing not in property per se but in the capacity to influence the feature social-spatial structures that determine the value of property. Prevalence of this sort of speculation is mark of a fully evolved growth machine apparatus.⁷⁷

The greater the income gained by rent than other ways of earning income, the greater the increase in the possibility of establishing growth coalitions. If the income gained

⁷⁶ Harvey Molotch, “Growth Machine Links: Up, Down and Across,” in *The Urban Growth Machine: Critical Perspectives, Two Decades Later*, ed. Andrew E. G. Jonas and David Wilson (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 255.

⁷⁷ Molotch, “Growth Machine Links,” p. 251.

by the purchase and sale of property is not high, enterprises in this sector becomes meaningless.

The second condition is that the political authority has weak control over land ownership and land-use. In places where political authority has strong control over land ownership and land-use, the room for real estate entrepreneurs to maneuver becomes narrow, and the establishment of growth coalitions or their operating effectively becomes difficult.⁷⁸

A decade after this article, Molotch, in the preface of *Urban Fortunes*, which he prepared for the 2007 edition of the book, states that the more widespread the market economy, the more other countries' land-use types resemble the US model. And this means that the possibility of building "growth machines" in all the countries in the world has increased.⁷⁹

Urban Entrepreneurialism

Urban entrepreneurialism can be defined as the mobilization of local governments and local elites, while competing against other localities, in order to enable the economic development of the city. The concept, previously expressed as "urban entrepreneurship" in urban studies, has proliferated by taking on new meanings after David Harvey's article published in 1989.⁸⁰ Local enterprises undertaken to attract economic sources have been observed since the nineteenth century in the US and called "local (urban or civic) boosterism." However, Harvey remarks that despite the fact that there are similarities between the concepts of "local boosterism" formed in

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 250-254.

⁷⁹ Logan and Molotch, *Urban Fortunes*, pp. vii-xxv.

⁸⁰ David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism," *Geografiska Annaler, Series B, Human Geography* 71, no. 1 (1989), pp. 3-17.

the nineteenth century and “urban entrepreneurialism,” the latter indicates a recent phenomenon that appeared in the 1970s in capitalist countries.

Harvey maintains that the globalization process triggered by the crisis in the 1970s and passing from Fordism to Post-Fordism in the production system changed government of cities fundamentally. Whereas during the Fordist-Keynesian period local governments were focused on the distribution of resources and providing social services, that is to say, the management of existing welfare, in the competition environment provoked by globalization, local governments focus on developing projects in order to attract or maintain the capital that become increasingly mobile. Harvey describes this change as the passage from managerialism to entrepreneurialism.

According to Harvey, a significant difference of new urban entrepreneurialism from local boosterism observed in US cities since the nineteenth century is that it is based on public-private partnership. In this partnership which develops speculative projects in order to maintain economic growth. While the public undertakes the risks, the private sector makes profit. New urban entrepreneurialism, instead of focusing on improving the life conditions of city-dwellers, centers on projects believed to achieve economic growth and providing a good business climate. As Harvey states,

The new urban entrepreneurialism typically rests, then, on a public-private partnership focusing on investment and economic development with the speculative construction of place rather than amelioration of conditions within a particular territory as its immediate (though by no means exclusive) political and economic goal.⁸¹

⁸¹ Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” p. 8.

And he continues as such: “Urban governance has thus become much more oriented to the provision of a ‘good business climate’ and to the construction of all sorts of lures to bring capital into town.”⁸²

Harvey asserts that urban entrepreneurialism can be oriented towards four main targets: First, bringing direct investments that will develop the industry or service sector to the city; second, developing projects (sports stadiums, shopping and entertainment centers, art galleries, cultural activities) in order to bring more consumers and tourists to the city; third, attempts to attract command and control functions of economy like finance, knowledge-producing, media, law services, and last, enterprises undertaken to direct government investments to the locality. As one or more strategies among these four can be applied, securing one of them can pave the way for the others in time.⁸³

Urban entrepreneurialism also means competition among cities. The fact that capital became more mobilized together with globalization provoked competition among the locals trying to attract the capital to them. Thus, this resulted in entrepreneurial policies’ becoming more prominent. Local governments started to confine themselves to the economic logic of neo-liberal capitalism more and more. Harvey writes, “Indeed, to the degree that inter-urban competition becomes more potent, it will almost certainly operate as an ‘external coercive power’ over individual cities to bring them closer into line with the discipline and logic of capitalist development.”⁸⁴

Especially in the cities of advanced countries, which have been abandoned by industry, entrepreneurial policies have been applied zealously. While social policy was retracted, bringing capital to cities became the main goal. Assuming that growth

⁸² Ibid., p. 11.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 8-10.

⁸⁴ Harvey, “From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism,” p.10.

will bring welfare per se, local governments tried to bring capital with policies such as reducing taxes, providing cheap infrastructure, land and education services, reducing regulations and attracting attention with cultural and sports activities.⁸⁵

Also Bob Jessop relates the turning of local governments towards entrepreneurial policies to the effect of globalization. Together with globalization, which started as a result of crisis experienced by the Fordist growth in the 1970s, a more competitive economic climate was created. During this period when the cities of advanced countries were going through a financial crisis, the concepts of “entrepreneurial city” and “governance” came to the foreground. Together with the concept of the entrepreneurial city, local governments started to be perceived as institutions competing with each other to achieve economic growth rather than as institutions providing social services. By means of the concept of governance, instead of strict bureaucratic or merely marketing practices, public-private partnerships, a combination of both, were promoted. The border between the state and private became vague. Supra-national and sub-national scales began to be brought to agenda more often. Jessop explicates two principal characteristics of entrepreneurial city as such:

- (a) the city is being re-imagined – re-imaged – as an economic, political and cultural entity which must seek to undertake entrepreneurial activities to enhance its competitiveness; and that (b) this re-imag(in)ing is closely linked to the re-design of governance mechanism involving the city – especially through new forms of public-private partnership and networks.⁸⁶

An important component of entrepreneurial policy is the creation of images for cities. Images created for cities, in addition to being an outward-looking

⁸⁵ Kim and Short, *Cities and Economies*, pp. 82-89.

⁸⁶ Bob Jessop, “The Entrepreneurial City: Re-Imaging Localities, Redesigning Economic Governance, or Restructuring Capital,” in *Transforming Cities Contested Governance and New Spatial Divisions*, ed. Nick Jewson and Susanne MacGregor (Oxon: Routledge, 1997), pp. 28-41.

advertisement, function as a medium for the local elites to dominate the local people. Images created serve for the provision of solidarity and belonging, and thus serve for social control, to the extent they are embraced by the inhabitants. Thereby, projects enabling a small group of city-dwellers to make a profit are justified. However, as Hal and Hubbard remark, the consumption of these images is not a process free of conflict. The lower classes consume these images in their daily lives not in the way wished by the elites, but rather through their own experiences.⁸⁷

There have been various objections to Harvey's thesis that entrepreneurialism is a new phenomenon in urban politics. Hall and Hubart state that entrepreneurialism did not start in the 1970s and that it has always been a characteristic of urban governances.⁸⁸ Peter Shapely observes that urban entrepreneurialism has a long history not only in US, but also in England and that since then nineteenth century, local governments, besides providing social services, have undertaken various enterprises such as developing infrastructure services, in order to bring investments to city. Shapely further claims that the history of public-private partnership is as old as the history of capitalism and that it could not be proposed as a new characteristic of urban governances. However, these claims do not imply that nothing has changed with globalism. According to Shapely, the major effect of globalization on urban entrepreneurialism is that the growth enterprises of local governments became more and more market-oriented.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard, "The Entrepreneurial City: New Urban Politics, New Urban Geographies?" *Progress Human Geography* 20, no. 2 (1996), pp. 156-167; Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism," p. 13-14; Kim and Short, *Cities and Economies*, pp. 89-90.

⁸⁸ Hall and Hubbard, "The Entrepreneurial City," p. 155.

⁸⁹ Peter Shapely, 23 November 2010, "The Entrepreneurial City: The Role of Local Government and City-Centre Redevelopment in Post-War Industrial English Cities," available at <<http://tcbh.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2010/11/22/tcbh.hwq049>> pp. 1-6, 20-23 [25 Jan. 2011].

A vast number of studies conducted on urban entrepreneurialism and growth coalitions in North American cities served to reveal different dimensions of the subject. These studies, on the one hand, demonstrate how much urban entrepreneurialism is effective in determining the fortune of cities and, on the other hand, they have increased our knowledge on the formation, function, and strategies of growth coalitions.

William D. Angel remarks that urban entrepreneurialism had a significant impact on passing from an agricultural economics to industry in Texas in the first half of the twentieth century. Especially during the 1930s and 1940s, local businessmen, by means of the nongovernmental organizations they established, carried out lobbying activities in order to bring industrial enterprises in Northern districts and state's military investments to Texas. On the other hand, in order to transform Texas into a suitable area for industry, they mobilized the sources of the city for infrastructure expenditures. Thus, Texan businessmen, by means of nongovernmental organizations, mobilized the local government also and enabled private and public investments to come to their city. According to Angel, although these enterprises cannot single-handedly account for industry's moving from north to southern states in the US, they explain why industry agglomerated in some southern states and not in some others.⁹⁰

In the research Michael Adamson conducted on the town of Ventura in California, the relation between large companies making investments in the locality and the local elites is emphasized. At the close of the nineteenth century, as a result of a local entrepreneur's efforts, oil reservoirs were discovered near the town; large petroleum companies that built facilities in the area after the discovery also took a

⁹⁰ William D. Angel, "Zenith Revisited: Urban Entrepreneurship and the Sunbelt Frontier," *Social Science Quarterly* 61, no. 3-4 (December 1980), pp. 434-445.

close interest in local politics due to their long term, stable investments in the district. Petroleum companies, by means of the funding and various services they provided, became influential on local government. An influential person within Ventura's local growth coalition served as a medium between the petroleum companies and the local elites. Adamson indicates that the growth project of the local elites and growth projects of the petroleum companies coming from outside sometimes coincided and sometimes conflicted. For example, while local boosters in Ventura wanted to use the coastal area for touristic purposes, the petroleum companies wanted to build a port for their needs. Ultimately, since the prosperity of the area depended on petroleum production, the petroleum companies got their way.

Another discussion took place about including the district where petroleum facilities are situated within the borders of the municipality. Petroleum companies demanded that the district where their facilities were situated be kept outside the borders of the municipality so that they could avoid taxes and legal restrictions. In conclusion, as a result of large donations they made to the local government, their demand was accepted.

The example of Ventura demonstrates that outside firms, which are generally assumed not to be interested in local growth, will take an interest in local growth more in order to protect their benefits as their fixed capital investments in the local increase. However, their growth projects can be quite different from those of the local elites.⁹¹

Kevin Fox Gotham, in a study conducted on Kansas City, analyzes the effect of local governmental structures, institutional arrangements, and the political struggles between city officials and business elites on urban growth policies. Stating

⁹¹ Michael R. Adamson, "Oil Booms and Boosterism: Local Elites, Outside Companies, and the Growth of Ventura, California," *Journal of Urban History* 35, no.1 (November 2008), pp. 150-177.

that growth coalitions formed in localities have various components, strategies and opportunities, Gotham focuses on the tension between business circles and political authorities. He also emphasized that in order to comprehend the formation and strategies of growth coalitions, the course of historical development should be studied in addition to macro structural transformations. He “uses the narrative concepts of *path dependency* and *policy feedback* to illustrate how past events and actions, important decisions, and political conflicts can delimit future growth strategies and policy options.”⁹²

Gotham indicates that in Kansas City, which he analyzed from this perspective, the growth coalition formed by businessmen during redevelopment of city center in the 1940s was really influential by means of institutions established by public-private partnership; however, as a result of economic recession in the city center and the rise of a grassroots movement in the 1960s this coalition was dissolved. In the 1980s, a new generation of businessmen established a loose coalition and tried to create a “good business climate” in the city center by means of tax reductions and incentives.⁹³

Analyzing the change of Orillia village near Toronto into an industrial town, Noble shows how the strategic enterprises of local businessmen who have totally dominated the local government change the fortune of the village. The businessmen, who first of all ensured the passing of a railway, which would probably have followed another route, through their village, took the first strategic step towards the growth of the village. Secondly, they enabled the production of cheap energy for

⁹² Kevin Fox Gotham, “Growth Machine Up-Links: Urban Renewal and the Rise and Fall of a Pro-Growth Coalition in a U.S. City,” *Critical Sociology* 26, no. 3 (2000), p. 268.

⁹³ Gotham, “Growth Machine Up-Links,” pp. 268-300.

industry by having the municipality build a hydroelectric plant. These two strategic paved the way for Orillia village to become an industrial town.⁹⁴

Studying growth coalitions established from 1950 to 2000 in a mid-sized Canadian city, Marquis demonstrates that the components and strategies of these coalitions established by local politicians and businessmen were variable; they included cracks within them and growth efforts were not always successful.⁹⁵

A different study on growth coalitions has been conducted by David Elkins. Elkins asked the directors of chambers of commerce of 238 cities with a population of more than fifty thousand who were the most active members of growth coalitions. The vast majority stated that businessmen in the real estate sector (developers, construction firms, and financial institutions) and mayors were the most active members of growth coalitions. According to this study, while local politicians become prominent in the growth coalitions established in residential suburbs, businessmen in the real estate sector are more decisive in city centers.⁹⁶

All the studies mentioned above prove that urban entrepreneurialism is an important factor that changes the fortune of towns.

Conclusion

The process of industrial decentralization has been shaped by a wide range of factors in different historical periods and different places. It is possible to make a

⁹⁴ E. J. Noble, "Entrepreneurship and Nineteenth Century Urban Growth: A Case Study of Orillia, Ontario, 1867-1898," *Urban History Review* 9, no.1 (June 1980), pp.64-89.

⁹⁵ Greg Marquis, "Regime or Coalition? Power Relations and the Urban Agenda in Saint John, 1950-2000," *Journal of Enterprising Communities: People and Places in the Global Economy* 3, no. 4 (2009), pp. 355-368.

⁹⁶ David R. Elkins, "The Structure and Context of the Urban Growth Coalition: The View From the Chamber of Commerce," *Policy Studies Journal* 23, no.4 (Winter 1995), pp. 583-599.

long list of the determining factors provided in different studies. However, we can understand which factors on this list are effective in any example of decentralization only within the context of historical-spatial development of the aforementioned example.

For the decentralization of industry, it is impossible to define an abstract universal reason valid for all geographies and historical periods. However, this does not mean that some generalizations cannot be made. Analyzing the spatial mobility of manufacturing industry from the emergence of industrial capitalism to the present day allows some methodological deductions about the process. Above, studies that focused on the economic-technical and political-institutional factors in explaining decentralization of industry were discussed. In this study, the inclusive theory put forward by Lewis and Walker will be adopted. According to this approach, the decentralization of industry is a dynamic process in which economic-technological factors, political-institutional factors and real estate market which creates industrial land in the periphery of the metropolis simultaneously play a part. This three-part model obtained from the studies conducted on North America cities can be claimed to be valid for all capitalist countries as long as local specificities are considered. In the Turkey model, the regulatory role of the nation state gains more importance in terms of methodology.

In terms of this study, where the story of Çerkezköy, which was transformed into an industrial city while it was a small and poor town, is narrated, a question as important as why and how industry left the metropolis is which place the industry chose as its new location. In this process of choosing a location, the place chosen should not be regarded as completely passive. On the contrary, it is observed that growth coalitions established in small villages and towns sometimes can be

extremely influential in attracting industry and other economic resources to their localities. To what extent and what sort of role the local initiative played in the choice of Çerkezköy as an industrial location and on the development of Çerkezköy in the following years will be analyzed by utilizing Logan and Molotch's growth coalition approach and the literature on urban entrepreneurialism outlined above.

Literatures on the decentralization of industry and urban entrepreneurialism are evaluated as two complementary theories in terms of this study. In fact, these theories analyze different dimensions of the same process. While the industry, which had to leave metropolises, is looking for new locations with favorable conditions to sustain or increase profitability, some villages and towns try to attract industry to their localities. In this dissertation, in order to thoroughly understand this process, which is affected also by nation states and global economic developments to various degrees, both literatures are utilized.

CHAPTER III

WHY INDUSTRY CAME TO ÇERKEZKÖY IN 1972?

Industrialization and Space in Turkey (Until the Beginning of 1970s)

Turkish Republic, taking over quite limited industrial assets from Ottoman Empire, maintained open agrarian economy until the Great Depression of 1929. During this period, there was not a significant increase in the number of industrial businesses which were mostly situated in İstanbul and İzmir. The 1929 World Economic Crisis forced the young Republic to form a new economic policy based on its own resources. First of all, protectionist policies were implemented, and then statist industrialization thrust was started. During the period of First Industrial Plan, implemented from 1934 to 1938, big government business enterprises were established predominantly in food and textile sectors, and partially in land and metal industries. In the favorable climate provided by the protectionist policies, there was also a significant increase in the small scale private manufacturing companies.

Recently established government business enterprises did not concentrate at port cities of İstanbul and İzmir as they did during the Ottoman Empire. These government business enterprises, which had to be based on their own resources as a result of the Great Depression, were established in provinces and districts close to sources of raw materials and railway network in terms of transportation. Spreading industry around the country instead of concentrating at a few centers was in accord

with young Republic's endeavor to create a national market.⁹⁷ Besides, workers' movements and the social unrest that might have emerged due to the concentration of industry in big city centers were subjects the Republican People's Party (RPP, *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*) government, which had established a strict one-party regime, were concerned about.⁹⁸

This industrialization thrust in the 1930s lasted until the beginning of the Second World War. The severe economic conditions of wartime suspended the industrial thrust. After the War, the economy of Turkey experienced rapid growth, mainly in the agricultural sector with the aid of the US. By means of tractors obtained as part of the Marshall Plan, the amount of cultivated agricultural areas increased by fifty percent between 1948 and 1956.⁹⁹

From 1953 onwards, the foreign trade regime based on the exportation of agricultural products began to have excessive deficits that could not be narrowed. When the Democratic Party, in power at that time, could not find foreign aid and external loans, it had to impose import restrictions on industrial products and take a series of protective measures. The import restrictions on industrial products provided a favorable basis for import-substitution industrialization in the domestic market. Credit facilities provided by the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey's (*Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası*), which is founded with the assistance of World Bank, also accelerated the establishment of new domestic industrial enterprises. In those years, while the government enterprises aimed at producing intermediate goods, the private sector aimed at labor-intensive sectors such as food, textiles, metal and plastic

⁹⁷ Faruk Ataay, "Türkiye Kapitalizminin Mekânsal Dönüşümü" (Spatial transformation of Turkish capitalism), *Praksis*, no. 2 (Spring 2001), p. 58.

⁹⁸ Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem* (There is a village far away: peasant discourse in the early republic period) (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), pp. 79-80, 132-138.

⁹⁹ Eric Zürher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* (Turkey: a modern history) 7. ed. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), p. 326.

industries. Import-substitution industrialization, which started as a result of pressing conditions, was in accord with the advanced capitalist countries' policy of moving the industry in these branches to underdeveloped countries. The primary characteristic that differentiated import-substitution industrialization in this period from that of the 1930s was that it was not realized in a closed economy, but rather in collaboration with foreign capital under the conditions of an open economy.¹⁰⁰

Import-substitution industrialization became the official economic policy in the period of planned development which started after the military coup of 1960. The military government, seeking to prevent the problems caused by the unplanned growth during the Democratic Party period, founded the State Planning Organization (SPO) four months after the coup. The SPO, preparing five-year development plans including provisions "mandatory for public sector and guiding for private sector" from 1963 onwards, became one of the primary actors that shaped the industrialization process in Turkey. While the public sector aimed at long-term strategic investments which could not be made by the private sector, the latter aimed mostly at producing consumer goods.

During the 1960s and 1970s, industrialization, which was regarded as synonymous with development, was adopted as a "national ideal." It became a hegemonic discourse for both right wing and left wing parties. In this period, in the process of capital accumulation, industrial capital was dominant over the other sectors of capital. Public resources were substantially put at the disposal of industrial capital. The state supported import-substitution industrialization basically in three ways. First of all, by imposing import prohibitions on consumer goods, local

¹⁰⁰ Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi* (Economic history of Turkey) (Ankara: İmge, 2006), pp. 107-116; Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* (State and class in Turkey) (İstanbul: İletişim, 1989), pp. 191-194. Haldun Gülalp, *Kapitalizm, Sınıflar ve Devlet* (Capitalism, class and state) (İstanbul: Belge, 1993), pp. 34-41.

industrialists were protected. Due to this protectionist policy, monopoly price structure was formed in the domestic market. Secondly, incentives such as low-priced input from government enterprises, low-cost loans, and tax and tariff reductions were provided. Thirdly, by keeping the value of the Turkish Lira (TL) high via exchange rate adjustments, industrialists importing machinery, intermediate goods, and raw materials were protected.¹⁰¹

The industrial sector grew by an annual average of 9.6 percent between 1960 and 1970.¹⁰² The crisis of 1970 was temporarily resolved by means of a loan provided by the IMF after the devaluation and the remittances sent by immigrant Turkish workers in Germany. The main reason that led import-substitution industrialization into crisis is that the industry, which was technologically dependent on advanced capitalist countries, constantly required imports in great quantities. Foreign exchange obtained from the exportation of agricultural products was insufficient for the importation of investment goods. Domestic market oriented industry spent foreign exchange, but since there was no exportation it did not bring foreign exchange.

The IMF, providing a loan to Turkey to resolve the crisis of 1970, proposed a transition to export-oriented industry as a solution. What is more, Turkey's goal to become a member of the European Economic Community made it compulsory that the industry of Turkey be in accordance with the conditions of international competition. Industry's becoming internationally competitive could only be possible

¹⁰¹ Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Küreselleşme, İktisat Politikaları ve Büyüme: Seçme Eserleri II* (From the Ottoman era to the republic, globalization, economic policies and growth: collected works II) (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası, 2009), pp. 239-249; Keyder, pp. 227-236.

¹⁰² Atilla Sönmez, "Türkiye'de Sermaye Birikimi Süreci ve Sanayileşmeye Etkisi" (Process of capital accumulation in Turkey and its effect on industrialization), in *İlhan Tekeli İçin Armağan Yazılar*, ed. Selim İlkin, Orhan Silier, Murat Güvenç (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2004), p. 345.

with the increase of production efficiency. For this reason, the government promoted large-scale, export-oriented industrialization with relatively high technology.¹⁰³ As a result of these efforts, there was a partial increase in the exportation of industrial goods during the 1970s.

After resolving the crisis of 1970, the boom throughout the industrial sector continued. Annual growth rates were 8.9 percent in 1971, 10.6 percent in 1972 and 12 percent in 1973.¹⁰⁴ This rapid growth was accompanied by the monopolization of capital. The monopolization trend, which started at the end of the 1960s, increased during the military regime which started with the Memorandum of March 12, 1971 and continued until the end of 1973. The section that had the biggest opportunity to benefit from state incentives in these years was the big industrial capital, which was in close relations with the governments and the high bureaucracy. During the military regime, resources were transferred to big capital by lowering workers' wages and reducing the prices of agricultural goods in addition to enhancing the incentive system.¹⁰⁵

Investment Incentives Policy of the State

In the period of import-substitution industrialization, an investment incentives policy started to be effectively implemented during the years when the Justice Party (JP, *Adalet Partisi*), under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, representing center right,

¹⁰³ İlhan Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, p. 248.

¹⁰⁴ Yavuz Bayülken and Cahit Kütükoğlu, *Türkiye Sanayinde Öncelikli Sektörler ve Bölgesel Kalkınma Yaklaşımı: TMMOB Sanayi Kongresi 2009* (Priority sectors in Turkish industry and the regional development approach: TMMOB Industry Congress of 2009) 2. Ed. (Ankara: TMMOB Yayınları, 2010), p. 21.

¹⁰⁵ Ahmet Aker, *12 Mart Döneminde Dışa Bağımlı Tekelleşme* (Foreign-dependent monopolization during the period of March 12) (İstanbul: Sander, 1975); Keyder, p. 204; Gülalp, p.38.

was in power. In accordance with Law no. 933, enacted in 1967 on the proposal of Turgut Özal,¹⁰⁶ SPO undersecretary of the period, the SPO incorporated all of the investment incentives that had been implemented by different state institutions before.¹⁰⁷ Until 1971, the year when Turgut Özal was removed from office, the SPO played a key role in the distribution of investment incentives. The Incentives and Implementation Department, established during this period within the body of the SPO, became an institution frequently visited by industrialists in search of access to incentives and loan facilities.¹⁰⁸

Among the incentives items provided by the state to industrialists, the two most important were customs exemption and investment allowance. Since import-substitution industrialization relied on the importation of machinery and intermediate goods, the customs exemption was significant. With regards to one account, the sum of custom duties of a machine brought from abroad amounted approximately to seventy percent of the price of the machine in 1974. That is to say, an employer who benefited from customs exemption had a forty percent reduction by paying a hundred Liras instead of a hundred and seventy Liras for the goods imported for industry. The second important incentive was the investment allowance. The investment allowance was calculated by the amount of shareholders' equity used for the investment. A certain rate of this amount was deducted from the income tax. For example, a fifty

¹⁰⁶When Turgut Özal, who had to resign from his office after the 1971 military coup, was the undersecretary of the prime ministry in 1980 during the Demirel Government, he was to become famous as the architect of passage to export-oriented economy. Özal, who became the symbol of passage to the liberal economy in Turkey, took office in the government formed after the 1980 military coup as the minister in charge of economy and became the Prime Minister by winning the elections in 1983.

¹⁰⁷ State Planning Organization, *VI. Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu: Yatırımları Teşvik Politikaları* (Sixth Five-Year Development Plan Specialization Commission Report: policies of investment incentives) (Ankara: DPT, 1989), p. 14.

¹⁰⁸ Kansu states that the SPO, the main mission of which was planning, became an institution that distributes rent. Günel Kansu, *Planlı Yıllar: Anılarla DPT'nin Öyküsü* (Planned years: story of SPO with memories) (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2004), pp. 280-290.

percent investment allowance meant that half of the shareholders' equity spent on that investment would be deducted from the income tax paid. The rate of investment allowance could change according to sectors and regions.¹⁰⁹

There were other benefits in obtaining an incentive certificate for a business apart from these two significant advantages. Having an incentive certificate made it easy to get loans from banks. Although an incentive certificate did not legally provide guarantee for loans, banks regarded it as a de facto guarantee.¹¹⁰

Due to the advantages mentioned above, obtaining an incentive certificate from the SPO (later on from Ministry of Industry) became extremely important for industrialist. In 1972, the year when industry came to Çerkezköy, an increase in incentives was the leading subject brought on to the agenda by the employers' organizations.

The Distinctness of 1972

In the previous chapter, with references to Lewis and Soja, we had mentioned that manufacturing industry spread to urban periphery generally during periods of economic growth. 1972, the year when the first industrialist from İstanbul came to Çerkezköy, is also included in the rapid growth period of the Turkish economy between 1964 and 1977. Furthermore, 1972 was the year in which the highest increase in the period was experienced with growth rates of 10.53 percent in total industrial employment and 12.60 percent in private industrial employment.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Nural Denker, "Teşvik Tedbirleri Ve Yatırımlar Üzerindeki Etkileri" (Incentive measures and their effects on investments) (MA Thesis, Bogazici University, 1974).

¹¹⁰ Ömer Kılınç, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 22 March 2011.

¹¹¹ *İstatistik Göstergeler 1923-2009* (Statistical indicators 1923-2009) (Ankara: TÜİK, 2010), p. 251.

Since there were no government enterprises among the firms that migrated to Çerkezköy, it will be more meaningful for us to follow the trends in the private industrial sector. The boom in the private industrial sector in 1972 can be observed in the diagram below. When the annual change in real production is examined in the diagram, it is seen that, 1972 is at the top. The growth in real production in 1972 reached 25 percent, which is an astronomical number.




Fig. 2. Rate of change in employment and real production in the private manufacturing industry (1963-1995)¹¹²

This boom in production and employment in 1972 was related to the sudden increase in state incentives.

¹¹² Özlem Onaran, "Türkiye'de İhracat Yönelimli Büyüme Politikalarının İstihdam Üzerindeki Etkileri" (Effects of export-oriented growth policies in Turkey on employment) in *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar II: İktisadi Kalkınma Kriz ve İstikrar*, Ed. A. Köse, F. Şenses and E. Yeldan, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), p. 583.

Table 1. Progress of Investment Incentive Certificates ¹¹³

Years	Number	Amount of investment (based on prices in 1997) billion TL.	Rate of incentives in GNP
1968	62	70,958	0
1969	93	183,66	2
1970	73	138,455	2
1971	69	104,568	1
1972	311	921,243	9
1973	511	1,223,897	11
1974	434	842,129	7
1975	630	788,193	7
1976	941	992,817	8

As can be observed from the table, in 1972 there was a boom in both the number of businesses which obtained incentive certificates and the total investment amount of incentives provided. The incentives provided for capital investments in 1972 and 1973 made up 9 percent and 11 percent of the GNP, respectively. It also should be mentioned that these incentives were provided largely for the manufacturing sector. From 1968 to 1977, as the number of projects, 80 percent of incentive certificates and as amount of investment, 87 percent of incentive certificates, were provided for the manufacturing sector.¹¹⁴ With regards to another account, between 1968 and 1997, 80.4 percent of incentive certificates as amount of investment were provided for the manufacturing sector.¹¹⁵

The increase in state incentives in 1972 is explained in a book published by the Ministry of Industry and Technology as follows:

¹¹³ Mustafa Sungur Duran, *Türkiye’de Uygulanan Yatırım Teşvik Politikaları: 1968-1998* (Investment incentive policies implemented in Turkey: 1968-1998) (Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı, 1998), p. 210.

¹¹⁴ Fatma Eker, “Türk Sanayinde Teşvik Tedbirleri ve Çerkezköy Örneği” (Incentive measures in Turkish industry and Çerkezköy model) (MA Thesis, İstanbul Technical University, 1984), p. 21.

¹¹⁵ Duran, p. 151.

There was a discontinuation in the implementation of incentive measures from the beginning of 1971 until the end of the year and this situation affected investments negatively.

At the beginning of the year 1972, a significant part of Incentives and Implementation Department was attached to the Ministry of Industry and Technology. Together with the various decrees and declarations implemented by the Ministry of Industry and Technology, incentive measures were dynamized in 1972 and consequently the ambition to invest increased at an ever-mounting speed. In summary, the year 1972 can be regarded as a boom year in terms of investments.¹¹⁶

The pause in incentives in 1971 was in fact a result of political developments. The military coup, staged in March 1971 with the aim of suppressing youth and workers' movements which had started at the end of the 1960s and had become increasingly radicalized day by day, overthrew the Demirel government, which had been quite generous in providing incentives for capital. Afterwards, a "government of technocrats," formed with the consent of the military and which lasted until December 1971, under the leadership of Nihat Erim, removed the Incentives and Implementation Department from the body of SPO and attached it to the Ministry of Industry, and implemented a more strict incentives policy. The bounteous incentive policy of Demirel-Özal duo, which had caused rumors of corruption, partially regressed during this period.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ Ministry of Industry and Technology, *50 Yılda Türk Sanayi* (Turkish industry in 50 years) (Ankara: Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı, 1973), p. 447.

¹¹⁷ Some employers' organizations also directed criticisms at the corruption in the distribution of incentives. Ertuğrul Soysal, who became the Secretary General of TÜSİAD following the Chairmanship of the Board of Directors of the İstanbul Chamber of Industry, criticized the corruption in the distribution of the incentives harshly: "Incentives were implemented in an unplanned, complicated, arbitrary and uncontrolled way. They have been exploited by some shrewd. (...) Machinery imported customs-free and with private credits on behalf of incentive regions were transported to other regions or sold." (*Teşvikler plansız, karmaşık, keyfi ve denetimsiz bir şekilde uygulanmıştır. Kimi açık gözler tarafından istismar edilmiştir. (...) Gümrüksüz ve özel kredilerle teşvik bölgesi adına ithal edilen makineler buradan başka bölgelere taşınmış ya da satılmıştır.*) Ertuğrul Soysal, *Sanayileşme ve Bölgesel Denge* (Industrialization and regional balance) (İstanbul: TÜSİAD, 1975), pp. 24-25.

The power of the JP steadily increased in the governments formed after the subversion of government of technocrats. In each of the terms of three governments formed until the elections held at the end of 1973, the incentive policy in favor of big capital was continued effectively. The fact that the foreign exchange reserves increased during those years, by the IMF loan and remittances send by Turkish workers in Germany, rendered this policy possible.

The lack of investment incentives and the necessity to increase them was one of the subjects expressed frequently by employers' organizations in business newspapers in 1972. Stating that "1972 will be a year of testing for Turkish private sector," Ertuğrul Soysal, chairman of the Board, İstanbul Chamber of Industry, remarked that 1971 passed suppressing anarchical events, and that stability had been assured, yet it was time to increase investments.¹¹⁸ Soysal, in a press statement he released later on, said:

As it will be recalled, the directors of our Chamber, by issuing a call to all the entrepreneurs and industrialist in the new year, reminded that 1972 would be a testing year for the private sector and invited them to invest. Today, our industrialists are looking for an office to apply for and incentive system for their ready projects.

Industrial investments are promoted via various measures all around the world. Incentive is not giving a present, tip or *ulufe* [payment made to the Janissaries in Ottoman Empire] to the entrepreneur. And implementing incentives is not an ex gratia or a gift under the initiative of the government; it is a duty. If incentives are not implemented, no one participates in industry, which is the most backbreaking one among the economic efforts. (...)

Consequently, industrialists maintaining their positive and constructive attitudes for 1972 expect that measures which will accelerate the investments and exportation and which will bring vitality to the economy will be taken immediately.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁸ "İstanbul Sanayi Odası Başkanı E. Soysal'ın Yeni Yıl Mesajı" (New year message of the E. Soysal, the Chairman of the Board, İstanbul Chamber of Industry) *Ekonomi Gazetesi*, 3 January 1972.

¹¹⁹ "Teşvik Tedbiri Arttırılmalı" (Incentive measures should be increased) *Ekonomi Gazetesi*, 21 February 1972.

The importance of the year 1972 is discussed in a study published in a business newspaper as follows:

The social events that took place in 1971 and the cancellation of incentive measures that had a strong effect on the development of especially private sector investments, brought about a slowing down and recession in investment enterprises in this sector throughout an important part of the year 1971. (...)

The fact that dollar reserves have shown a significant increase since 1970 and that they have reached a quite high level will remarkably strengthen the possibility of importation in the year 1972. (...)

We are of the opinion that for the private sector, which slowed down in the investments and paused in some matters in 1971, to develop its investments and reach them to the level anticipated in objectives of the plan in 1972, the most effective measure will be the reconsideration of implementation of incentive measures.¹²⁰

In 1972, in addition to the increase in state incentives, industrialists were provided with the opportunities of medium-term credits. İlhan Tekeli wrote that starting to provide medium-term loans to industry after 1972 resulted in the development of large scale industry in the private sector.¹²¹ In addition, the credit facilities of certain sectors were supported via specific government decrees. “In the years of 1971, 1972 and 1973, the textile industry benefited from external loan by means of specific government decrees.”¹²²

Consequently, in 1972, in the private manufacturing sector in Turkey, an investment boom, stimulated by the regulations made in the incentives and credit system by the state, was experienced. This investment boom was realized in new spaces, determined by a historical process in which the spatial policies of state

¹²⁰ Muhtar Baruter, “İmalat Sektöründe Yatırım Hedefleri ve Gerçekleşme,” (Investment goals in manufacturing industry and realization) *Ekonomi Gazetesi*, 10 June 1972.

¹²¹ İlhan Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, p. 153.

¹²² İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında Sanayi Yerleşim Planlaması* (Industrial location planning in İstanbul metropolitan area) (İstanbul: İSO Yayını, 1981), p. 117.

agencies, the location decisions of industrialists and the efforts of the local dynamics to draw the industry were effective to a certain extent.

State's Policy of Spreading Industry

Above, how statist industrialization during the 1930s spread throughout the country was discussed. Import-substitution industrialization, which started during the 1950s, concentrated at particularly in İstanbul, and in the provinces of İzmir, Ankara, and Adana. While the government enterprises generally spread throughout the country, the private sector mostly concentrated along the İstanbul-İzmit axis.

İstanbul, due to its rapidly increasing population, was the most important market for the industrial goods. In addition, industry's dependence on imported inputs made İstanbul, İzmir, and İzmit, all of which were port cities, favorable for industrial location.¹²³ Apart from these, the monopolistic structure of the capital also caused the industry to concentrate in a limited number of centers. İstanbul, where the headquarters of most of the conglomerates were situated, became a big industrial city during this period.¹²⁴

A rapid migration to the big cities, İstanbul being in the first place, where industry was concentrated, started. The population that flowed to the cities was greater than industry required for employment. Inevitably, problems such as traffic congestion, lack of infrastructure, and environmental pollution appeared.

In parallel to these developments, income inequality among different regions of the country increased more. The development gap between the poor provinces,

¹²³ Ataay, p. 61.

¹²⁴ Keyder, p. 278-279.

most of which were in the eastern part of the country, and the advanced provinces, most of which are in the western part of the country, began to increase gradually.

Istanbul's becoming a huge industrial city by increasing the gap between it and the other cities and rapid increase of the regional inequality forced the state from 1960s onwards to make policies in order to spread the private sector investments to every part of the country as far as possible. For this purpose, the state imposed various restrictions on industrial investments in metropolises and provided special incentives for investments in underdeveloped areas. As is the case with other Third World countries, also in Turkey incentives were implemented more effectively than the restrictions.¹²⁵

First of the two basic pillars of regional incentive policy in Turkey was providing special advantages via bringing tax reductions and various exemptions to investments in underdeveloped regions. The second was constructing organized industrial zones which provided ready infrastructure to firms in the periphery of the metropolises and in the underdeveloped regions of the country. We will respectively examine how these two tools were implemented.

Priority Areas for Development (PADs)

During the 1960s, when planned economy management started, correcting regional inequality and spreading of development to every part of the country was one of the main subjects of debate on the agenda of the state and the public. From the point of view of the military, which became a party to political power as a result of the National Security Council brought by the Turkish Constitution of 1961 issued after

¹²⁵ Alan Gilbert's designation on the implementation of incentives and restrictions in Third World countries was conveyed in the second chapter of this thesis.

the military coup of 1960, regional inequality was a security problem that could trigger secessionism. In the eastern provinces where the Kurdish population made up the majority, regional development plans should have been made in order to prevent secessionist quests from getting a foothold.¹²⁶

Although the military's interest in regional development is limited to solving "the Eastern problem," experts in the SPO dealt with the subject in a wider context. The aims of the regional development policy were expressed under three titles in the First Five-Year Development Plan. First was to determine the potential development centers throughout the country; second was to accelerate development in underdeveloped areas; and third was to enable a more balanced distribution of economic activities and population by creating new growth centers in the periphery of big cities, the problems of which increased day by day.¹²⁷

For the realization of these interconnected aims, various means were employed. Among these means, the primary was providing incentives such as tax reductions to underdeveloped regions.¹²⁸ From 1968 onwards, in the annual programs prepared within the framework of the five-year development plans, the names of underdeveloped provinces taken into the scope of incentives started to be published. While twenty-two provinces in the eastern region of the country were on

¹²⁶ İlhan Tekeli, *Türkiye'de Bölgesel Eşitsizlik ve Bölge Planlama Yazıları* (Writings of regional inequality in Turkey and regional planning) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2008), p. 259.

¹²⁷ The idea of creating new development centers around big cities was expressed in the First Plan as such: "Metropolitan areas: Studies on metropolitan areas where many social, economic and physical problems arise as a result of extreme concentration of the population and economic activities make up another dimension of regional policy. By creating new attraction and growth centers, and industry in the surroundings of these areas, means which will enable a more balanced distribution of population and economic activities should be inquired." Republic of Turkey, *Kalkınma Planı (Birinci Beş Yıl) 1963-1967* (First Five-Year Development Plan 1963-1967) (Ankara: DPT, 1963), pp. 473-474.

¹²⁸ "Tax concessions will be provided for underdeveloped regions with the aim of increasing the role of private sector in developing the underdeveloped regions and supporting activities of private sector in these regions." (*Geri kalmış bölgelerin kalkınmasında, özel kesimin rolünü artırmak ve bu bölgelerde özel kesimin faaliyetini desteklemek gayesi ile geri kalmış bölgelere vergi kolaylıkları sağlanacaktır.*) Ibid., p. 476.

the list of underdeveloped provinces in the 1968 Annual Program, the province of Edirne in Thrace region was added to the 1969 Annual Program.¹²⁹ The list did not change in the programs of 1970 and 1971. Incentives such as tax reductions and customs exemption were implemented in these provinces.

Despite the incentives, the private industry sector did not go to these provinces, which were far from İstanbul and other major cities and whose infrastructure facilities were extremely limited. In 1972, it was ascertained that the implementation of incentives to underdeveloped regions had not reached the targeted results:

The implementation of investment incentives in underdeveloped areas without arranging preconditions remained ineffective since it did not provide advantages that will balance external savings which emerge at certain points where present infrastructure and services concentrate. In the spatial distribution of requests for investment allowance, 482 out of a total of 742 land requests and 8.5 billion TL out of a total investment worth 13 billion TL (61.5 percent) between September 1967 and October 1970 came from the Marmara Region.¹³⁰

The fact that the private sector continued to concentrate along the İstanbul-İzmit axis and a few major cities propelled the SPO to reorganize incentive regions. In the 1972 Annual Program, in which the expression Priority Areas for Development (PADs, *Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yöreler*)¹³¹ started to be employed for underdeveloped regions, the number of provinces included within the scope of incentives was raised to thirty-

¹²⁹ State Planning Organization, “Yıllar İtibariyle Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yöreler” (Priority areas for development by years) available online at <<http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/PortalDesign/PortalControls/WebIcerikGosterim.aspx?Enc=83D5A6FF03C7B4FC0B6C445B8568FF66>> [29 May 2011]

¹³⁰ Republic of Turkey, “1972 Yılı Programı’nın Uygulanması, Kordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine Dair Karar” (Decree on the implementation, coordination and monitoring of 1972 Annual Program) *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 14058, 30 December 1971, p. 119.

¹³¹ 1972 Annual Program was prepared under the chairmanship of Memduh Aytür who was brought to the office of SPO undersecretariat by the “government of technocrats” formed after the military coup of 1971. Aytür, who was one of the most influential names of high bureaucracy during that period, did not allow the use of the concept of “region” with the thought that it would support secessionism, so instead of it the concept of “area” [*yöre*] was utilized. For this reason, in the program of 1972 and programs of later years expression of “priority areas for development” started to be employed instead of “underdeveloped regions.” Tekeli, *Türkiye’de Bölgesel Eşitsizlik*, p. 260-261.

three. In accordance with the socio-economic development index prepared by the SPO, on this new list there were also other provinces from central and western Anatolia. In addition to the thirty-three provinces, for the first time an evaluation on the basis of districts was carried out and sixty-seven underdeveloped districts of twenty-five provinces were also announced as PAD.¹³² Districts were determined in accordance with the research on the development level among districts conducted by the SPO in 1965.¹³³

In choosing some of these districts, the aim of decentralizing the industry which had concentrated in a few cities, İstanbul in particular, was pursued. The Kiraz district of İzmir; the Delice and Şereflikoçhisar districts of Ankara; and the Bahçe, Feke, Tufanbeyli, and Saimbeyli districts of Adana were among these districts. The Çerkezköy district of Tekirdağ, the Kofçaz district of Kırklareli, and the Pazaryeri district of Bilecik were placed on the list in order to decentralize İstanbul industry.¹³⁴

Hikmet Çetin, who was the head of the SPO Economic Planning Department when the Program of 1972 was prepared, indicated that providing incentives to remote regions was not effective in the decentralization of İstanbul industry and for

¹³² The whole list of provinces and districts included in the 1972 Annual Program is given in the appendix section of the thesis. Determining PADs on the basis of districts was brought to an end in 1979. From that date onwards, PADs were determined on the basis of provinces, as had been the case before 1972.

¹³³ State Planning Organization, *Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yörelerin Tesbiti ve Bu Yörelerdeki Teşvik Tedbirleri* (Determining priority areas for development and incentive measures in these areas) (Ankara: DPT, 1973) p. 7.

¹³⁴ Hikmet Çetin, interview by the author, telephone interview, 3 May 2011; Teoman Yayın, interview by the author, telephone interview, 7 May 2011; Atilla Candır, interview by the author, telephone interview, 7 May 2011. Risks that would be caused by the concentration of industry at cities were also underlined in the Third Plan prepared in 1972: “Industrial units which were not constructed in a certain order in the immediate periphery of cities cause irrational use of land and speculative movements and thus result in loss of resources. Concentration of industry at certain centers will cause bigger problems in the future and it will strongly make the necessity of spreading industry throughout the country evident. This development may cost the society a lot more than realizing these in the present day in a planned way.” Republic of Turkey, *Üçüncü Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı: 1973-1977* (Third Five-Year Development Plan: 1973-1977) (Ankara: DPT, 1973), p. 113.

this reason with a more realistic approach close regions were included among the scope of incentives.¹³⁵

Teoman Yayın, chairperson of the research branch established within the body of the SPO in order to determine the PADs, relates the process of determining provinces and districts on the 1972 Annual Program as follows:

The military had only “the east” on its mind; however, we thought that it was necessary to create growth centers in various places of Anatolia and Thrace. (...) On the proposal of the military, we went to the east, carried out research on the basis of provinces and then we asked “why do we not work on the basis of districts?” Our aim was to create growth centers. We had thought that the same need was also necessary for other regions of Turkey. The industry which had concentrated at certain centers had to be decentralized. For this reason, we determined many growth centers. Among these, Bozüyük and Çerkezköy were successful. Çerkezköy was not only the poorest area of Tekirdağ but also was favorable for being developed as a growth center; its infrastructure could be prepared easily. Some provinces of Bilecik, Çanakkale, and Konya were added to the list in order to create growth centers.¹³⁶

Atila Candır, another expert who conducted studies on PADs in the SPO while the program of 1972 was being prepared, stated that in 1972, as distinct from the previous years, including some districts to the scope of incentives in addition to provinces was for the decentralization of the industry.

Districts were added to the list for certain purposes. For example, adding Çerkezköy and some districts of Bilecik and Adana to the list aimed to decentralize the industry. (...) Adding Çerkezköy to the list

¹³⁵ Çetin, interview by the author.

¹³⁶ Yayın, interview by the author. The goal of creating growth centers was expressed in the Second Plan as follows: “By focusing the investments, which will increase the economic activities of underdeveloped regions, on strategic urbanization centers with growth potential in these regions, development points which gain the power to develop by themselves and influence their surroundings will be obtained.” (*Az gelişmiş bölgelerin iktisadi faaliyetlerini artıracak yatırımlar bu bölgelerde büyüme potansiyeli yüksek stratejik şehirleşme merkezlerinde yoğunlaştırılarak kendi kendine gelişme gücü kazanan ve çevresini etkileyen gelişme noktaları elde edilecektir.*) Republic of Turkey, *İkinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 1968-1972* (Second Five-Year Development Plan 1968-1972) (Ankara: DPT, 1968), p. 263.

was to decentralize İstanbul industry. Since Kocaeli side had become concentrated, the European side was considered.¹³⁷

Consequently, although providing incentives for underdeveloped regions was in the beginning brought on to agenda by the military with the purpose of preventing Kurdish secessionism in the eastern provinces, the SPO employed this medium in order to accelerate development in underdeveloped regions throughout the country, to create new growth centers, and to decentralize industry in the metropolises.

However, these goals were realized only to a limited extent. The implementation of regional incentives was not successful in decreasing the inequality among regions and investments continued to concentrate in advanced regions.¹³⁸ According to one account, 49 percent of investments made by obtaining incentive certificates between the years 1968 and 1977 were in the Marmara region.¹³⁹ Industrialist found it risky to go to remote regions without infrastructure simply for incentives.

On the other hand, it cannot be claimed that the regional incentives policy failed completely. Regional incentives were effective when they were provided to regions close to metropolises. For example, the decentralization of İstanbul industry to the provinces of Tekirdağ and Bilecik was made possible by the regional incentives policy.¹⁴⁰ In addition, regional incentives policy had an important effect in

¹³⁷ “İlçeler belirli amaçlar için konuldu. Örneğin Çerkezköy, Bilecik ve Adana’nın bazı ilçelerinin konulması sanayiye dağıtmayı hedefliyordu. (...) Çerkezköy’ün konulması İstanbul sanayisini desantralize etmek içindi. Kocaeli tarafı yoğunlaştığı için Avrupa tarafı düşünülüyordu.” Candır, interview by the author.

¹³⁸ Tekeli, “Türkiye’de Bölgesel Eşitsizlik, pp. 68-87.

¹³⁹ Eker, p. 25.

¹⁴⁰ Ertan Yülek, former Director General of Incentive and Implementation Department, deputy of Adana, in a congress of 1998 explicates this situation as such: “Incentive implementation system in Turkey did really important things. See what it achieved: İstanbul was an advanced region, Turkey carried out a very good implementation. With that implementation, for example by accepting Çerkezköy as a PAD, name of the then “underdeveloped area”, carried the burden of İstanbul to Çerkezköy.

the emergence of new growth centers in Anatolia. All the new industrial centers such as Denizli, Konya, Kayseri, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, and Malatya which came to prominence in the 1980s were in the scope of incentives in the program of 1972.

While Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Malatya were included within the scope of the incentives as provinces, six districts of Kayseri, seven districts of Denizli, and eight districts of Konya were also included within the scope of the incentives.

Organized Industrial Zones

Another medium employed to spread the industry throughout the country was the construction of Organized Industrial Zones (OIZ).¹⁴¹ The construction of the first OIZ was started in 1962 in Bursa. Subsequent to that, during the period of Second Five-Year Plan (1968-1972) construction of OIZs began in the provinces of Manisa, Konya and Gaziantep.¹⁴²

Another incidence: Let us discuss Bozüyük. Bozüyük also attracted industrialization in other places to itself due to the fact that it was considered as a PAD. By this means, the basis of a more balanced regional development in Turkey was established and it was succeeded.

(...) in the past we had an implementation and that was incentives on the basis of districts. By this means, instead of collecting incentives at certain places they were distributed to provinces such as Bozüyük, which I had just mentioned as an example, and Çerkezköy. And thus, in Bahçe district of Adana, which is my region, as a result of its being a PAD, today there is a chemistry factory which exports to the entire world.” Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi* (GNAT Minutes Journal), term 44, session 4, vol. 43, 20 January 1998.

¹⁴¹ For detailed information on OIZs see: Mahmut Özdemir, *Türkiye’de Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri* (Organized Industrial Zones in Turkey) (Ankara, TOBB, 1990); Asuman Çezik and Ayda Eraydın, *Türkiye’de Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri: 1961-1981* (Organized Industrial Zones in Turkey: 1961-1981) (Ankara: DPT, 1982).

¹⁴² The decision about OIZs in the Second Plan was as follows: “In order to enable the development of industrial facilities, industrial zones with full infrastructure outside the cities will be organized, and measures that will promote and enable the transference of facilities with limited opportunity to develop in cities to these zones will be taken.” (*Sınai tesislerin gelişmelerini sağlayabilmek için şehir dışında her türlü altyapı imkanları olan sanayi sahaları düzenlenecek ve şehir içinde gelişmesi sınırlı tesislerin bu sahalarla naklini teşvik edici ve kolaylaştırıcı tedbirler alınacaktır.*) Republic of Turkey, *İkinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı*, p. 374.

It was expected that the OIZs would serve both to agglomerate the industry in the city to certain regions and to spread the industry throughout the country. For this reason, during the 1970s the foundations of new OIZs were laid in many cities. However, due to inadequate loans, construction of these OIZs lasted for years. In addition, since the locations of some OIZs were determined by political interests instead of economic rationality, even if their construction was completed they could not become centers of attraction for industrialists.

Juristically, OIZs could be established according to the Organized Industrial Zones Establishment Fund Regulations (*Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Kurma Fonu Yönetmeliği*) of the Ministry of Industry and Technology, dated 1967. There was not a specific law that regulated the establishment and operation of OIZs. According to the Regulations, as the first step of establishing an OIZ in provinces, with the partnership of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, provincial special administration (governorate), and municipality, an entrepreneur establishment committee (EEC, *müteşebbis teşekkül heyeti*) had to be formed. The state provided credit to the EECs of OIZs whose constructions were confirmed by decree of the council of ministers. The EEC was in charge of completing the construction of the OIZ and selling the land by making use of this credit. Ninety-nine percent of OIZ construction expenses were covered by funding from the Ministry of Industry whereas one percent of it was covered by the EEC. With the money gained from the sale of parcels in OIZ, the EEC repaid the loan used for the construction of the OIZ to the Ministry of Industry at low interest and for a period ranging from 10 to 25 years. Local businessmen played a significant role in the construction and management of OIZs.

When the OIZs were constructed in regions where industry had a tendency to develop and when they offered land at a price regarded as normal by industrialists, they were generally successful. However, they failed in relocating the industry to underdeveloped places where industry did not have a tendency to develop and thus they turned into idle infrastructure investments.

Neither OIZs nor regional incentives were useful in affecting interregional industrial relocation. Industrialists generally looked for ways to benefit from these incentives without moving further away from the big cities.¹⁴³

This section discussed the policies implemented by the nation state in the formation of industrial geography. The location tendencies of industrialists will be examined in the following section in which decentralization of industry in İstanbul is discussed.

The Decentralization of the Manufacturing Industry from İstanbul

The industrialization of Çerkezköy was a direct result of the decentralization of industry from İstanbul. For this reason, in order to explain the industrialization of Çerkezköy, the process of the decentralization of industry from İstanbul should be analyzed in more detail. In this section, since the reasons for the first industrial migration, which took place in 1972, to Çerkezköy will be discussed, the story of the decentralization of industry from İstanbul will be followed until the early 1970s. The decentralization of industry from İstanbul in the later decades will be addressed while discussing the second wave of industrialization in Çerkezköy, which took place at the second half of the 1980s.

¹⁴³ Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, p. 58.

From the beginning of import-substitution industrialization until the beginning of the 1970s, almost for 20 years, İstanbul experienced industrial growth above the average of Turkey. İstanbul in 1950 was equivalent to one-third of Turkey in terms of the number of industrial workers and total production value.¹⁴⁴ This rate continually increased until the beginning of the 1970s; however, from this date onwards, it started to decrease gradually. While the rate of İstanbul in industrial assets of Turkey started to decrease in the 1970s, the rates of other cities around İstanbul proceeded to increase. This was a result of the shift of industry from İstanbul to surrounding provinces. This process, which gained acceleration from the 1980s onwards, bears a resemblance to the process of spreading industry from Third World primate cities such as Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City and Seoul to cities and towns in the immediate peripheries during the 1970s, a process described by Alan Gilbert above.

The progress of rate of İstanbul in total and private manufacturing industry employment of Turkey by year is given in the table below:¹⁴⁵

Table 2. Rate of İstanbul in Manufacturing Industry by Years (Employment)

Years	Rate in the total manufacturing industry	Rate in the private manufacturing industry
1965	33.99	49.18
1968	36.61	53.56
1971	38.03	53.62
1972	37.74	52.29
1975	35.94	49.51
1978	34.03	47.44
1981	31.53	41.99

¹⁴⁴ Mustafa Sönmez, *İstanbul'un İki Yüzü: 1980'den 2000'e Değişim* (Two Facets of İstanbul: Change from 1980 to 2000) (Ankara: Arkadaş, 1996), p. 21.

¹⁴⁵ İstanbul Municipality, *İstanbul Külliyyatı: Cumhuriyet Dönemi İstanbul İstatistikleri* (Corpus of İstanbul: Statistics of İstanbul during the Republican Era) (İstanbul: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Kültür İşleri Daire Başkanlığı, 1997), pp. 668-669.

As can be observed from Table 2, the rate of İstanbul continually increased until 1972; however, from this year onwards a decrease, even if a slight one, started. In the second half of the 1960s and during the 1970s, industry in İstanbul on the one hand kept growing and on the other hand spread to the surrounding provinces. Industry in İstanbul first spread to İzmit, situated to the east of İstanbul, and then to Bursa, situated to the south of İstanbul. From 1972 onwards, it spread to Tekirdağ, situated to the west. In industry's departing for Bursa, the construction of an OIZ and in its departing for Tekirdağ, Çerkezköy's inclusion in the scope of PAD were influential.

The rates of provinces around İstanbul in the manufacturing industry value added of Turkey can be seen from the table below:¹⁴⁶

Table 3. Manufacturing Industry Rates of Provinces around İstanbul (Value Added)

	1964	1972	1979
Kocaeli	4.90	11.55	12.10
Bursa	2.50	3.56	4.00
Tekirdağ	0.20	0.22	1.00

In the previous section, the distinctness of the year 1972 in terms of development of Turkish industry was emphasized. The table above demonstrates that one more fact can be added to the distinctness of that year. It is the beginning of the relative decrease in the growth rate of industry in İstanbul. In other words, 1972 is the year when the decentralization of industry from İstanbul to the surrounding provinces started to increase.

After presenting this general picture, presently the dynamics which created this reality that is reflected by these figures will be discussed.

¹⁴⁶ Sönmez, *İstanbul'un İki Yüzü*, p. 37.

The first area in İstanbul where manufacturing industry concentrated was the Haliç coast line, between the neighborhoods of Sirkeci and Eyüp, in the city center. At the end of the nineteenth century, Sirkeci was the fundamental point of transportation in İstanbul thanks to its port and railway station. In addition, due to being in the city center, it was advantageous in terms of having access to the market and labor power. In the first city plan made by Prost in the Republican era in 1937, industrial location around Haliç was confirmed. It was specified that the new industrial facilities to be built could locate in the area beginning at a distance of 500 meters from the historical walls. Afterwards, with the Ordinance of İstanbul Industrial Zones (*İstanbul Sanayi Bölgeleri Talimatnamesi*) issued in 1947, areas between Eyüp and Silahtarağa, Eyüp and Edirnekapı, and Yedikule and Bakırköy were designated for heavy industry. For medium scale industry both shores of Haliç were deemed suitable.¹⁴⁷

The rapid increase in the number of factories in the 1950s turned the planning of manufacturing industry sites in the city into an urgent problem. The first serious plan made for the spatial regulation of industry in İstanbul was the Beyoğlu Master Plan, made in 1954. In this plan Bomonti, Levent and the Beyoğlu shores of Haliç including Kağıthane valley were announced as industrial areas. Together with the local industrial plans made from 1955 to 1960, Topkapı, Haznedar, and İstinye were defined as industrial areas.¹⁴⁸

Until the mid-1960s, industry concentrated at Rami, Topkapı, Bayrampaşa, and Zeytinburnu, which were areas either on the shores of Haliç or in its immediate

¹⁴⁷ Celal Kızıldeli, “İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında Sanayi Yer Seçimlerinin İrdelenmesi (Örnekler: İkitelli O.K.S.B., Dudullu O.S.B., Çerkezköy O.S.B.)” (The Examination of Industrial Site Selection in İstanbul Metropolitan Area (Examples: İkitelli O.K.S.B., Dudullu O.S.B., Çerkezköy O.S.B.)) (Ph. D. diss., Mimar Sinan University, 2000), p. 104; İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında*, p. 19.

¹⁴⁸ İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında*, p. 20.

periphery, and in Mecidiyeköy, Levent and İstinye areas in the north. From the second half of the 1960s onwards, industry started to spread to a broader periphery, to Sefaköy-Yenibosna areas in westward and then to Avcılar and Firuzköy. Factories started to be built along the D-100 highway between Küçük Çekmece Lake and Büyük Çekmece Lake. On the Asian side, industrial settlement began along the D-100 highway from Maltepe-Kartal area to Gebze.¹⁴⁹ There was a boom especially in the textile industry from 1960 to 1970 and thus large scale textile companies started to locate outside the city center.¹⁵⁰ In this period, small scale industry concentrated in Eminönü, Mahmutpaşa, and Bomonti.

At the beginning of the 1960s, many factories were also built in areas which had not been indicated as industrial areas in İstanbul and *gecekondu*¹⁵¹ settlements quickly emerged around these factories. In this period, when the SPO was established and regional development plans were on the agenda, Turkey's first regional plan prepared by the Ministry of Development and Housing (*İmar ve İskan Bakanlığı*) was the East Marmara Plan, which aimed to decentralize industry from İstanbul. In this plan incorporating İstanbul, İzmit, Sakarya, and Bursa, it was estimated that the development of İstanbul should be eastward and that a large industrial basin between İzmit and Sakarya should be formed.¹⁵² It was thought that the Organized Industrial Zone constructed in Bursa would reduce the burden on İstanbul.

¹⁴⁹ Erol Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekân* (İstanbul, Human and Space) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları), 1997, pp. 50-54; Fülün Bölen, *Türkiye'de Sanayi Yer Seçiminin Yerleşme Sistemine Etkileri* (Effects of Choice of Industrial Locations on Settlement System in Turkey) Postdoc. Thesis, İstanbul Technical University, 1982, p. 45.

¹⁵⁰ Bahriye Ak, *Deindustrialization under the Impact of Globalization: The Case of İstanbul*, (MA Thesis, METU, 2008), p. 50.

¹⁵¹ Gecekondu literary means "built-overnight." It refers to houses constructed on state or privately owned lands without planning and/or construction permission through the efforts of migrants from the rural to urban areas.

¹⁵² Ruşen Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası* (Urbanization Policy) 11. ed. (Ankara: İmge, 2010), p. 329-331.

The National Security Council, perceiving rapid and uncontrolled urbanization as a security problem, decided in 1965 that Master Plan Bureaus should be formed for İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir provinces in the body of the Ministry of Development and Housing.¹⁵³ In the Industrial Plan of 1966, prepared by the İstanbul Master Plan Bureau, which was established by the decision of the National Security Council, it was proposed that polluting industry should be removed from dense settlement areas and the historical peninsula, and industrial development areas were designated in the İstanbul metropolitan area.¹⁵⁴ These were Rami, Topkapı, Bomonti, Levent, Halkalı, Kurtköy, Küçükköy, and Ümraniye. Haliç and İstinye were not included in the Plan of 1966 and it was stated that these areas should be deindustrialized.¹⁵⁵ However, despite the fact that industrial areas along the shores of Haliç were cancelled, since constructions of additional facilities and warehouses were allowed, the concentration of industry in this area continued.¹⁵⁶

Although industrial areas were determined in the plans prepared, instead of moving to these determined areas, industrialists predominantly preferred to locate in villages and towns outside the municipal adjacent areas in İstanbul.¹⁵⁷ It appears that

¹⁵³ İlhan Tekeli, “1839-1980 Arasında İstanbul’un Planlanma Deneyimleri: İcabında Plan”, (Experiences of planning İstanbul between 1839 and 1980: Plan if necessary) *İstanbul*, no.4, 1994, p. 35.

¹⁵⁴ The preparation process of the plan was described in the daily press as such: “All of the industrial facilities that will be built in İstanbul from 1970 onwards will be located outside the city. Çatalca and its surroundings along the Kırklareli asphalt in Rumelia side, and in Anatolian side Kurtköy along the Ankara asphalt are reserved as industrial areas.

Research going on for a year on providing new areas for the temporary period which will last till 1970, has ended. Documents obtained at the end of the research conducted by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Tourism, National Security Council, the Ministry of Development and Housing, and representatives of the Municipality, have been submitted to the Ministry of Development and Housing for the planning. After the plan prepared is confirmed by National Security Council, it will be accepted and start to be executed by the city council.” “Fabrikalar Şehir Dışına Çıkarılacak” (Factories will be moved out of the city), *Milliyet*, 14 October 1965.

¹⁵⁵ İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında*, pp. 20-21.

¹⁵⁶ Kızıldeli, p.105.

¹⁵⁷ “The industrial area determined according to the present plan for İstanbul was not been filled. According to the attested plan, out of 600 hectares of industrial land 158 hectares

in 1970, almost eighty percent of industrial establishments were outside the areas designated as industrial areas by the municipality.¹⁵⁸ İlhan Tekeli remarks that the most important reason why the industry did not go to areas designated as industrial zones in city plans was the sudden rise in the land prices in these zones.¹⁵⁹

This problem was predicted in the Second Five-Year Development Plan and in order to prevent the extreme increase in the land prices, it was proposed that the General Directorate of Land Office, as an institution which would regulate the land market and confiscate necessary lands for investments in housing, industry and tourism sectors and for public services, should be established within the body of the Ministry of Development and the Housing. Land Office was established in 1969; however, due to the fact that its financial opportunities were limited and that there were deficiencies in its legislation; it could fulfill its mission only to a very limited extent.¹⁶⁰ In 1972 Annual Program, it was decided that the financial opportunities of the Office should be increased and lands should be stocked in the development areas of big cities so that it could work more effectively.¹⁶¹ However, until 1975, the Office could confiscate only 600 hectares of land in İzmir, 200 hectares of land in

have been used for industrial location. However, industry which has randomly located in areas which are not recognized as industrial land comprises 797 hectares of land.” (*İstanbul’da mevcut plana göre ayrılmış sanayi alanı doymamış durumdadır. Tasdikli plana göre 600 hektarlık sanayi alanının 158 hektarına sanayi kurulmuştur. Buna karşılık İstanbul’da sanayi alanı olarak kabul edilmeyen gelişigüzel yerleşen sanayi 797 hektarlık bir arazi kaplamaktadır.*) “Fabrikalar Şehir Dışına Çıkarılacak,” *Milliyet*, 14 October 1965.

¹⁵⁸ Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekân*, p. 56.

¹⁵⁹ Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, pp. 54-55.

¹⁶⁰ Keleş, pp. 538-541.

¹⁶¹ “Financial opportunities of General Directorate of Land Office will be increased so as to be able to directly prevent land speculation which has increased as a result of urbanization rate. Land stock will be realized especially in the development areas of big cities.” (*Arsa Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü’nün şehirleşme hızı dolayısıyla artan arsa spekülasyonunu doğrudan önleyebilecek biçimde malî olanakları artırılacaktır. Arsa stoku özellikle büyük şehirlerin gelişme alanlarında yapılacaktır.*) Republic of Turkey, “1972 Yılı Programı’nın Uygulanması,” p. 120.

Gebze, 600 hectares of land in Çerkezköy, and 60 hectares of land in Ümraniye with the aim of being used as industrial zones.¹⁶²

The state's effort to regulate industrial settlement in İstanbul failed to a large extent since cheap land from the areas announced as industrial areas could not be provided for industrialists by way of confiscation. In an atmosphere where plans had a limited influence on the regulation of industrial settlement, the decentralization of industry in İstanbul was shaped largely by the location choices of industrialists. Industrialists played a significant role in the shaping of industrial settlement and therefore in the creation of urban form in İstanbul metropolitan area with their location choices which they made by considering the fluctuations in the land market and opportunities provided by the legal loopholes.

Industrialists and Space

The departure of factories areas from where industry concentrated and which became a part of city center in time (surrounding of Haliç, Topkapı, Zeytinburnu-Bakırköy, and Bomonti) accelerated after 1965, was discussed above. Tümertekin indicates that the most important reason for this was the need for large and cheap land.¹⁶³ Land prices in the areas where industry concentrated had risen and also it was difficult to find enough land.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Republic of Turkey, "1975 Yılı Programı'nın Uygulanması, Kordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine Dair Karar" (Decree on the implementation, coordination and monitoring of 1975 Annual Program) *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 15135, 31 January 1975, p. 91.

¹⁶³ Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekân*, pp. 50-54, 179-180.

¹⁶⁴ To give a few examples about this subject: Ahmet Gayretli, who worked as a manager in 1973 in Profilo factory situated in Mecidiyeköy, a neighborhood in the city center: "Because of lack of space the factory had 4-5 floors underground. It was like a labyrinth, I had hardly memorized the place of refectory in a month." (*Yer darlığı yüzünden fabrika 4-5 kat yeraltına iniyordu. İçi labirent gibiydi, yemekhanenin yerini bir ayda zor ezberlemiştim.*)

The second half of the 1960s was a period in which the concentration of capital and hence the scale of factories increased in Turkey.¹⁶⁵ Especially the textile factories came in need of horizontal expansion.¹⁶⁶ This was necessary both for the machinery to be placed efficiently and these factories required large storage yards because of the problems in raw material procurement. For these reasons, factories that had reached a certain size started to locate in the lands of villages and independent municipalities along D-100 highway, which was the main transportation axis of İstanbul.

Until the legal modification in 1984, the adjacent area of İstanbul municipality was restricted to the urban center. Villages and towns which were close, even neighboring to the urban center, were outside the control of the city municipality though they were within the İstanbul metropolitan area. They were either subject to village law or they had the status of independent municipalities. This legal situation gave the village administrations and independent municipalities the chance to allocate land to industry as they wished. Industry's moving to these places, by causing the lands of these villages and towns to increase rapidly, provided profits

Ahmet Gayretli, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 13 May 2011.

The owner of this factory, Jak Kamhi, in an interview he gave to a business magazine explains the reason for moving to Çerkezköy as the necessity to increase the production volume. Jak Kamhi, "Yabancı Sermaye Yüzde Yüzü İster," *Global Sanayici Dergisi*, no. 2, (Mayıs 2010), p. 35.

Owner of Gümüşsuyu Halı factory and the President of Machine Made Carpet Manufacturers Association Bedrettin Öztemir: "Since it was impossible to realize the expansion required by our increasing production volume in Topkapı, we purchased 100,000 square meters of land in Çerkezköy and built 25,000 square meters of indoor area. We moved in 1976." (*Artan imalat hacmimizin gerektirdiği genişlemeyi Topkapı'da yapmak imkansız olduğundan Çerkezköy'de 100 bin metrekaare arazi alıp 25 bin metrekaare kapalı alan yaptık. 1976'da taşındık.*) *Milliyet*, 6 November 1983.

¹⁶⁵ İsmet Kılınçaslan, *İstanbul: Kentleşme Sürecinde Ekonomik ve Mekânsal Yapı İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: Economic and Spatial Structure Relations in Urbanization Process) (İstanbul: İTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi, 1981), p. 245.

¹⁶⁶ According to a study conducted by İstanbul Chamber of Industry in 1981, 33 percent of textile companies required a space bigger than 50 decares. İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında*, p. 43.

to land owners and local administrators. In addition, after the industry was located, labor power started to migrate to these areas and gecekondu settlements were formed around the factories. The rapid increase of population enabled these villages to gain the status of independent municipalities in a short time.¹⁶⁷ *Mukhtar* (village headmen) and land owners promoted the coming of industry in order to benefit from the profit provided by this process.¹⁶⁸

Locating on village lands provided two important advantages to industrialists. Firstly, they could purchase large amounts of land at cheap prices. Secondly, they could avoid the restrictions and control of the city municipality. They could build their factories quickly without sticking to a plan on the lands they bought from the villagers or real estate agents.¹⁶⁹

İlhan Tekeli additionally underlines a factor belonging to the period that forced the industrialists to avoid the control of municipality. During the 1960s in Turkey, industrialists generally could find short term loans at high interest rates. Consequently, they had to build their factories at once and start production. However, obtaining the necessary permissions in order to build a factory in zoned areas could take 6 months, which was a loss of time that could not be endured.

¹⁶⁷ “There are 32 municipalities established in this way in İstanbul in 1975. Zoning plans of these municipalities always fall behind the developments. In fact, they are nothing but the legalization of fait accomplis.” (*İstanbul’da 1975 yılında bu şekilde kurulan 32 belediye vardır. Bu belediyelerin imar planları ise hep gelişmelerin arkasında kalmaktadır. Aslında olup bittilerin yasallaştırılmasından ibarettir.*) Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, p. 55.

¹⁶⁸ Tümertekin compiles the names of some of these villages which are in the urban center at the present time: Alibeyköy, Kağıthane, Küçükköy, Sağmalcılar, Güngören, Küçük Çekmece, Koca Sinan, Avcılar, Büyük Çekmece, Küçükyalı, Maltepe, Kartal, Pendik, Tuzla, Yakacık, Ümraniye. Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekân*, p. 57.

¹⁶⁹ Studying the history of industrialization of the Dilova region, situated between İstanbul and İzmit, contained by İzmit, Dinçer remarks that one of the reasons why the industrialists regarded the region as favorable was the facilities provided by first the status of village and then the facilities provided by the local municipality after the village became a municipality. Mehmet Evren Dinçer, *The Transformation of an Industrial Location: Dilovası from 1990s to Present* (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2007), p. 56.

According to Tekeli, this was one of the factors that led industrialists to build factories in areas without zoning plans.

Tekeli also emphasizes that industrialists in Turkey behaved in accordance with the motivation to have a share in the urban speculation in the process of purchasing land. During the 1960s and 1970s, the fact that land speculation was common in İstanbul and that the banks provided loans based on the value of real assets caused the industrialists to acquire speculative tendencies. Big industrialists who could relocate outside the city generally bought more lands than they required. An industrialist who could get a loan according to the value of his land had a share also in the land speculation by raising his loan ceiling to the extent of the land he owned. What is interesting here is that an industrialist could have a share in the urban speculation without selling his land. Thus, the industrialist could make more money than the land speculator who benefited from the speculation by selling his land.¹⁷⁰

Thus far industry's moving from the city center to villages within the borders of İstanbul province has been discussed. While this process was going on, in the meantime industry was moving out of the borders of İstanbul province. Especially after 1965, conglomerates mostly started to build their factories outside İstanbul. Fulin Bölen's research, conducted in 1981, comprising 70 industrial enterprises located outside İstanbul whose headquarters were in İstanbul, demonstrates that the main reason to build factories outside İstanbul was to benefit from the incentives.

¹⁷⁰ Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, pp. 47-48; An example about this subject: "Also during the process of industrialization in Zincirlikuyu-Levent-Maslak line, factories were built by exploiting the fact that these areas were village administrations in the beginning. Big capital enterprises purchase large lands across the factories with the idea that these lands will gain value in the future." (*Zincirlikuyu-Levent-Maslak hattında sanayileşme sürecinde de, başlangıçta muhtarlık olmasından faydalanılarak fabrikalar kuruluyor. Büyük sermaye kuruluşları fabrikaların karşısında ilerde değer kazanacağı düşüncesiyle geniş arsalar alıyor.*) Binnur Öktem, "Küresel Kent Söyleminin Kentsel Mekanı Dönüştürmedeki Rolü: Büyükdere-Maslak Aksı" (The role of global city discourse in transforming urban space: Büyükdere-Maslak axis), in *İstanbul'da Kentsel Ayrışma: Mekansal Dönüşümde Farklı Boyutlar*, ed. Hatice Kurtuluş, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 2005), p. 42.

Thirty-nine out of 70 companies within the scope of the study stated that regional incentive was the primary reason to locate outside İstanbul. The two most important criteria following incentives were closeness to raw material sources and closeness to market. The findings of the research additionally indicate that companies preferred to benefit from incentives without moving further away from İstanbul (that is to say from the market and headquarters).¹⁷¹

One of the underlying reasons why industrialists did not want to move further away from İstanbul where headquarters were situated was the ownership structure of the companies. The owners of conglomerates, which had the characteristics of family companies, preferred to built their production units at a distance which allowed them to monitor these units from where they lived.¹⁷² The Former Director General of Dinarsu, Ömer Kılıç explains this situation as such: “Industry in İstanbul is a family company. The owner wants to go to his factory every morning. For this reason the industry does not move far away. The owner wants a place where he can go and come back daily.”¹⁷³ The Former Minister of Industry, Ayhan Çilingiroğlu’s observations also supports this view: “Industry did not want to move away from İstanbul because an industrialist does not want to move far away from the market. Besides, under the conditions of those days if the facility was out of sight, its control would be too difficult. Transportation was difficult, airlines did not function well.”¹⁷⁴

Consequently, from the second half of the 1960s onwards, industry in İstanbul spread towards the east and west in the shape of expanding rings along the D-100 highway, the main transportation axis, beginning from outside the municipal adjacent areas as a result of the increase in land prices and the difficulty in obtaining

¹⁷¹ Bölen, pp. 44-53.

¹⁷² Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, p.76.

¹⁷³ Kılınc, interview by the author, 22 March 2011.

¹⁷⁴ Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, interview by the author, tape recording, İstanbul, Türkiye, 28 April 2011.

land in the city center. Industrialists were in search of an optimum point between the effort to find cheap and large parcels of land subject to village law and the effort not to move away from the city center as much as possible. Mukhtars, local municipalities and real estate agents also played active roles in producing land for industry. Factories' moving outside of the borders of İstanbul, if the factor of raw material is omitted, were mostly possible by providing state incentives to the regions to which they moved.¹⁷⁵

The Effect of Class Struggle

What has been discussed so far demonstrates that the economic-technical difficulties of the companies, land development for industry in villages close to urban center and regulations of state agencies played roles in the decentralization of industry from İstanbul. As a significant political factor in this process, what kind of role the working class struggle played is also a subject that should be examined because the 1960s and 1970s saw unionization and labor radicalism reach their peak.

Throughout the 1960s, there was a significant increase in unionization and the number of workers going on strike and during this period labor wages constantly rose.

¹⁷⁵ The result of survey conducted in 1981 by İstanbul Chamber of Industry by interviewing 1515 industrial businesses demonstrate that only 2 percent of the industrialists who want to change their places want to move outside İstanbul. İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında*, p. 41.

Table 4. Strikes from 1963 to 1973¹⁷⁶

Years	Number of strikes	Number of workers going on strike
1963	8	1,514
1964	83	6,640
1965	46	6.593
1966	42	11,414
1967	100	9,463
1968	54	5,179
1969	66	20,162
1970	72	21,156
1971	78	10,916
1973	22	12,284

As can be observed from the table, there was a significant rise in the number of strikes and workers going on strikes after 1964. This increase resulted from the enactment of the law that recognized the right to strike in 1963. Considering that industry in İstanbul started to move to districts away from the urban center and out of the province borders from 1965 onwards, one can claim that there is a parallelism between the increase in workers' strikes and decentralization of industry from İstanbul to relatively distant regions. However, in order to make a causal connection between these two processes, at least in terms of this study, there is not satisfactory data.

In Bölen's research, as discussed above, conducted in 1981, out of 70 industrial enterprises, only one stated that its primary reason to go outside İstanbul province was to avoid the workers' movement. Other than that, two industrial enterprises cited avoiding the workers' movement as their second priority reason and two industrial enterprises stated avoiding it as their third priority reason. In Bölen's

¹⁷⁶ Mehmet Şehmus Güzel, "Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sinde İşçi Hareketleri" (Workers' movement in Republican Turkey), in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1983), pp. 1860, 1872.

research, the rate of the effect of the workers' movement on the decentralization of industry from İstanbul was calculated as only 2.3 percent.¹⁷⁷

Applying the class struggle approach, David Gordon asserts that at the close of the nineteenth century not only the workers' movement but also problems such as the expensiveness of land, traffic congestion, and scarcity of labor supply hindered capital accumulation and that, however, other problems except for the workers' movement were resolved by staying in the urban center. Since other problems were resolved in the urban center, Gordon remarked that the main decisive factor in the relocation of industry was the workers' movement. In İstanbul during the 1960s, problems such as space congestion, expensiveness of land, and traffic were not resolved within the urban center. That is to say, other problems of the capital accumulation were experienced as intertwined with problems caused by the workers' movement. Besides, the workers' movement was taken under control, even if temporarily, by the military intervention in 1971.

In terms of labor radicalism, there was a significant increase in the number of workers going on strike especially in 1969 and 1970. In June 1970, there were huge demonstrations attended by more than 100,000 workers, which lasted for two days and were suppressed by the proclamation of martial law after the police forces proved incapable.¹⁷⁸ However, this period did not last long and following the military intervention in 12 March 1971, the workers' movement was suppressed. From April 1971, when martial law was proclaimed until the end of 1973, strikes and workers' demonstrations were banned.¹⁷⁹ In this period, increases in workers' wages were also

¹⁷⁷ Bölen, p. 52.

¹⁷⁸ Sırrı Öztürk, *İşçi Sınıfı, Sendikalar ve 15-16 Haziran* (Working class, unions and 15-16 June), 2. ed. (İstanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 2001).

¹⁷⁹ Güzel, p. 1872.

stopped. The central government suspended the process before the possible effects of class struggle on the industrial geography appeared.

The increase in workers' wages in Turkey, however, cannot be said to have hindered capital accumulation in the 1960s. Although wages increased in the industry during the 1960s, the rate of wages in total value added decreased instead of increased. Despite the increase in wages, profit rates did not decrease; on the contrary, they increased.¹⁸⁰ On the other hand, businesses which went outside the borders of İstanbul province during the 1960s and 1970s were generally large factories where unions were organized. Since collective bargaining was made on the basis of the line of business, the effect of the location of factories on wages was restricted.¹⁸¹

Another difference from the American cities at the end of the nineteenth century analyzed by Gordon is that the central state directly shaped industrial relocation by providing incentives to specific regions around İstanbul. That is to say, before the possible spatial effects that the class struggle could occur, the central state intervened in the process.

In consequence, in 1972, when industry headed towards Çerkezköy from İstanbul, strikes and workers' demonstrations were banned, the increase in workers' wages was suspended, and all the radical left organizations were crushed. No one could have guessed at that moment that the workers' movement would rise more powerfully between 1974 and 1980.¹⁸² In the light of these data, it can be stated that

¹⁸⁰ Boratav, p.138-139.

¹⁸¹ Tekeli, *Sanayi Toplumu*, p. 51.

¹⁸² From the examples given below it is understood that the workers' movement, which became more common and radicalized between 1974 and 1980, forced the industrialists to apply certain spatial strategies. These stories experienced in the second half of the 1970s were probably not exceptions.

Businessman Şaban Çavuşluoğlu: "In 1970s we built another factory because of the strike. We declared lockout and closed down the factory in Alibeyköy for a year and eight

the workers' movement was not a decisive factor in the decentralization of industry from İstanbul at the beginning of the 1970s.

Local Enterprises Undertaken to Bring Industry to Çerkezköy

Thus far it has been discussed that the regional policy of the central state directed the decentralization of İstanbul industry towards Çerkezköy. However, if the local enterprises that embarked upon attracting the industry are not added, the picture would be incomplete. Particularly the enterprises undertaken by Hikmet Uğraş, who was the mayor from 1963 to 1973 and from 1989 to 1994, adding to a total of 15 years, played a significant role in the industrialization of Çerkezköy.

Hikmet Uğraş, the Republican People's Party (RPP), who was elected as the mayor in 1963, was the grandson of Molla Mehmet, the first mayor of Çerkezköy. After his grandfather, his father Mustafa Uğraş also served as a mayor for eight years. When he was elected mayor, he had a small shop in İstasyon quarter of the town. He was a primary school graduate. Everyone who knows him tells stories of the initiative and the extensive effort he put in the development of the town.¹⁸³

days. We opened a factory in Sefaköy. We brought the machinery in the customs to Sefaköy. We built a temporary factory and had to manufacture there." (1970'lerde biz grev yüzünden ikinci bir fabrika daha kurduk. Lokavt ilan ettik Alibeyköy'ü bir yıl sekiz gün kapattık. Sefaköy'de bir fabrika açtık. Gümrükteki makineleri buraya çektik. Geçici bir fabrika kurduk ve üretimi orada yapaya mecbur kaldık.) İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Sanayi Odası'nın Elli Beşinci Yılında Türk Sanayi*, (Turkish industry in the fifty-fifth year of İstanbul Chamber of Industry) (İstanbul: İSO Yayını, 2008), p. 141.

"There was a strike in Profilo's factory in İstanbul in 1979, the union had occupied the factory. Arçelik did not function either. We transported the machinery to Çerkezköy and continued to work there." (1979'da Profilo'nun İstanbul'daki fabrikasında grev vardı, sendika fabrikayı işgal etmişti. Arçelik de çalışmıyordu. Biz makineleri Çerkezköy'e taşıdık ve burada çalışmaya devam ettik.) Gayretli, interview by the author.

¹⁸³ Despite the fact that he was the mayor of a small municipality, his attending the Fifth European Conference on Municipalities as the representative of Thrace region, which was attended by 33 mayors in total from Turkey, can be regarded as the manifestation of how driven he was in municipalism. *Devrim*, 16 September 1972.

Çerkezköy was the poorest district of Tekirdağ. The productivity of the soil except for the areas near Çorlu River was low. The importance of the railway, which had once invigorated the economy of the district, had decreased after the 1950s. The only way to develop Çerkezköy, which had limited ability to develop by means of agricultural production, was to bring state investments or private industry to the area. Hikmet Uğraş worked hard on both issues. In order to solve the infrastructure problems, like many other mayors, he frequently visited Ankara and spoke to representatives of İller Bankası¹⁸⁴ and the SPO. Since he could not be influential as the mayor of a small town, he resorted his political and personal contacts. The people from whom support was most received in this respect were the Tekirdağ deputies and senators. As a matter of fact, a significant part of the activities of deputies consisted of bringing state resources to their own regions. They strengthened their vote base in their regions to the extent they could realize this goal.

The people from whom Uğraş received support were RPP Tekirdağ deputy Yılmaz Alpaslan, Orhan Öztrak, who was still a friend of Uğraş although who transferred to Republican Reliance Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi*) from RPP, and Senator Hayri Mumcuoğlu. Apart from these, Mustafa Uğraş, the eldest son of Hikmet Uğraş, says that they had an acquaintance on the Board of Directors of İller Bankası and through the medium of this acquaintance his father was able to convey their wishes by directly addressing Esat Kırathıoğlu, General Director of İller Bankası.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ A government institution providing resources for local governments.

¹⁸⁵ Mustafa Uğraş, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Turkey, 15 March 2011.

Uğraş would often go to the government institutions he needed help from and would make friends with the administrators and thus got his job done.¹⁸⁶ His initiative and effort attracted the attention of Turgut Özal, who was the SPO undersecretary from 1967 to 1971. Baydar said,

Özal came here during the 1980s, for an opening in Hema. Then Hikmet Uğraş was not the mayor. Özal said, “Well, there was a mayor here when I was in the Planning Department [SPO], he tried hard, he came to the department a lot. He would turn up like a bad penny. Why did not you invite him to the opening? Ask him to the opening, Mehmet Hattat.”¹⁸⁷

Uğraş recounts the enterprises he undertook in Ankara to solve the infrastructure problems of Çerkezköy in an interview he gave to the local newspaper, *Devrim*, published in Çorlu as follows:

In 1969 with the support of the General Directorate of İller Bankası, we managed to obtain 30 liters of water per second via a deep well drilling.

However, bringing of this water was included in the program of 1971 by both my personal efforts and the requests of Deputy Yılmaz Alpaslan, member of RPP MYK, and Senator Hayri Mumcuoğlu to the State Planning Organization. This project, which

¹⁸⁶ One of these people was Atalay Coşkunoglu, General Director of Highways. Hikmet Uğraş’ son Bülent Uğraş recounts how this friendship benefited the district as such: “In 1989 there was not any infrastructure. My father made the main roads hot asphalt. These roads were made in return for a Dinarsu carpet and a bucket of Veliköy yogurt. He did not pay a red cent. It was thanks to my father’s friendship with Coşkun Bey [Atalay Coşkunoglu].” (1989’da hiçbir alt yapı yoktu. Babam ana caddeleri sıcak asfalt yaptı. Bir Dinarsu halısı ile bir kova Veliköy yoğurduna yapıldı bu yollar, beş kuruş vermeden. Babam’ın Coşkun Beyle olan muhabbeti sayesinde.) Bülent Uğraş, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Turkey, 21 March 2011.

Another testimony is as such: “Hikmet Uğraş got the Çerkezköy TEM [E-80] connection done. He spoke to Coşkun Atalay [General Director of Highways, Atalay Coşkunoglu is referred] from the bureau of public roads. They were acquaintances. The name of the street where I live is Coşkun. Between his comings and goings, Hikmet met him and also named a street after him.” (Çerkezköy TEM bağlantısını Hikmet Uğraş yaptırdı. Karayollarından Coşkun Atalay [Karayolları Müdürü Atalay Coşkunoglu kastediliyor] ile görüştü. Onunla tanışıklığı vardı. Benim oturduğum sokağın adı Coşkun’dur. Hikmet abi gide gele tanışmış, bir sokağa da adını vermiş.) Zeki Baydar, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Turkey, 21 March 2011.

¹⁸⁷ “Özal buraya 1980’li yıllarda geldi, Hema’da bir açılış için. O zaman Hikmet Uğraş başkan değil. Özal dedi ki, ‘Ya burada bir başkan vardı, ben Planlama’da [DPT] iken çok gayret etti, çok geldi gitti. Adamı kapıdan kovardık pencereden girerdi. Hikmet beyi neden çağırmadınız açılışa. Onu da çağır Mehmet Hattat’ dedi.” Baydar, interview by the author.

requires 1,700,000 Liras, will start in 1971 and will be completed in 1973. (...) Selahattin Babüroğlu, Minister of Development and Housing, has said that to do the project included in the plan as a priority, the subvention of it will be provided as soon as possible.¹⁸⁸

Uğraş, on the one hand, worked to solve the infrastructure problems of the town via Ankara and, on the other hand used all the opportunities of the municipality in order to attract industrialists to the town. He told how, as the municipality, they supported the building of flour and vegetable plants in Çerkezköy as follows:

For the construction of a flour plant with a capacity of 25 tons in our town in 1968, everything was made easier for our entrepreneur friends and an area not included in the zoning plan was incorporated in the plan as an industrial area and efforts were made for the construction of this facility.

In principle, instructions were given to lend assistance for the construction of all kinds of industry and workplaces by the private sector and also to show concern for this issue by our first-degree officers.

In the beginning of April 1971, we learned that one of our *hemşehri*¹⁸⁹ Saim Çetintaş, from Yanıkağıl village of our district, who had gone to Germany as a worker and went into business, came to Turkey with the aim of building a vegetable plant; we made the offer that if he built this facility in Çerkezköy we would provide cheap land from the industrial area belonging to our municipality and thus, we enabled the construction of this facility in Çerkezköy. (...)

An area of 20,000 square meters was provided for the canning factory and as a symbolic price, one square meter of it was sold for one Lira.¹⁹⁰

In addition, he demanded that the senator and deputies of the province assisted in bringing industry to the town.¹⁹¹ Uğraş also states that he went to the SPO personally and demanded that Çerkezköy be included in the scope of incentives as Edirne:

In the middle of 1971, I learned that the SPO had declared some towns in Thrace as underdeveloped areas, by the way also Edirne, and that industrial enterprises with an incentive certificate had been allocated

¹⁸⁸ *Devrim*, 11 August 1971.

¹⁸⁹ “Hemşehri” refers to people of the same hometown. Mostly *hemşehri* is used in daily life among migrants to denote people from the same province.

¹⁹⁰ Hikmet Uğraş, *Devrim*, 11 August 1971.

¹⁹¹ Hasan Erkan narrates that at a meeting at a coffee shop attended by senator Hayri Mumcuoğlu, Hikmet Uğraş said “The DDY warehouse has been closed down, our youth is unemployed, we want you to bring industry to here” to the senator. Hasan Erkan, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 24 March 2011.

to these places. I told about the situation of our district to the SPO, with which I had made a contact through a relative of mine in Ankara. I demanded that its geographical structure be assessed in addition to its economic structure. And the happy news about Çerkezköy, the decree of the Council of Ministers, was published in the *Official Gazette* on 30 December 1971. And Çerkezköy was shown as a target to Turkish industrialists.¹⁹²

This point is very important because Uğraş claims that he had a share in the taking of the SPO decision which changed the fortune of Çerkezköy. Below how this decision was taken will be discussed.

The role of Hikmet Uğraş in development of Çerkezköy described also by a businessman as follows:

Çerkezköy was really a village. While the government provided incentives and licence, the Industrial Development Bank gave credit. For this reason, I went there to look for land. While I was having lunch in Silivri, a commandant general serving in the Thrace Region and mayor of Çerkezköy approached saying, “Haydar Bey, we invite you to build a factory in Çerkezköy. We have artesian water and the land is free...” We all went there and looked round. There were no factories in Çerkezköy. “There is no such thing as free land; we must pay a symbolic price,” we said and purchased the land. After us, Nurullah Narin came to the region. They built a factory exactly opposite of ours. Today Çerkezköy is an enormous industrial zone. This was done by the then mayor. If he had not said, “The people here are hungry, workers will be employed and shopkeepers will sell bread, fruit, meat and milk to them,” this affluence would not have come into existence.

By this means we expanded our factory. We bought new machinery. We built AKİP factory in Çerkezköy and Edip factory in İkitelli. We started with weaving and increased the number of weaving looms, we got a loan. We did all of these in the 1970s. Gradually, we started to export. Foreign exchange started to come. Industry started to come.¹⁹³

¹⁹² Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 14 February 1989.

¹⁹³ Haydar Akın, “Teşvik ve Kredi,” in *İstanbul Sanayi Odası’nın 55. Yılında Türk Sanayi* (İstanbul: İSO Yayını, 2008), p. 259.

Industry's Move to Çerkezköy

From what has been recounted until now, it can be stated that there were three main actors that played roles in the move of industry to Çerkezköy. The first one was the nation state, which aimed at rapid industrialization departing from the view that development could only be realized via industrialization, and which endeavored to spread industry throughout the country in order to avoid the drawbacks that might have resulted from regional inequalities. The second one was the industrialists in İstanbul, who were looking for vast spaces adequate for the scale of expanding factories and thus who sought to benefit from state resources as much as possible. The third one was Çerkezköy municipality, primarily Hikmet Uğraş the mayor, in the effort to develop their poor, small town.

First, the industrialists in İstanbul will be discussed. Above, the dynamics which led to the decentralization of industry from İstanbul to the surrounding villages, towns and cities from the second half of the 1960s onwards were explained. “The spontaneous propensity” of industrialists in this process was to locate in villages and towns, where cheap and large lands could be found, situated around the main arterial road the D-100 highway, and outside the municipal adjacent areas yet not far from the urban center. At the beginning of 1972, the furthest point that the factories, which went outside the city in this way, reached westwards was the Firuzköy-Ambarlı area, which was 30 km away from the urban center. Çerkezköy, 110 km away from İstanbul and connected to the D-100 highway with a macadamized road of 28 km, was by no means a region that attracted the attention of the industrialists in İstanbul.

Secondly, when the efforts of Çerkezköy municipality to attract the industry are analyzed, it can be said that these efforts did not bring any significant results till 1972. Until this date, the municipality only managed to facilitate the building of a flour plant and a canning factory by providing cheap land.

Çerkezköy's becoming a center of attraction for industrialists in İstanbul in 1972 can only be explained by taking the regulative institutions of the nation state as an actor into consideration. The factor directing industry in İstanbul towards Çerkezköy in that year was that the SPO, one of the most powerful government institutions of the period, included Çerkezköy among the PADs in 1972 Annual Program. A few months after this decree was published in the *Official Gazette* on 30 December 1971, an extensive flow of industrialists to the region started.

Two studies conducted on Çerkezköy clearly demonstrate that the main reason for the factories to move to Çerkezköy was to benefit from the incentives provided for the PADs.¹⁹⁴ In these studies, based on interviews with the owners of factories and factory managers, all of the businesses stated that they had come to Çerkezköy because it had been included in the scope of incentives. In addition to this, the opportunity to find cheap land and proximity to İstanbul were mentioned as secondary and tertiary factors.¹⁹⁵ In the first issue of *Çerkezköy Postası*, which was published only as four issues in the autumn of 1972, it was also emphasized that the reason why industrialists had flowed to Çerkezköy was the providing of incentives

¹⁹⁴ Fifty percent investment allowance, customs exemption from the imported investment goods and exemption from building construction tax were provided to the businesses established in the PADs. State Planning Organization, *Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yörelerin Tesbiti*, p. 85.

¹⁹⁵ Ayda Eraydın, "Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location: Determination and Test at a Case Study" (MA Thesis, METU, 1977), pp. 90-93; Eker, p. 124.

and the difficulty of locating in İstanbul. Proximity to İstanbul was mentioned as an additional advantage.¹⁹⁶

Çerkezköy was the closest PAD to İstanbul, the heart of industry. However, when the transportation opportunities of the period are considered, it should be underlined that this closeness was a relative one. It took almost two and a half hours to go to Çerkezköy from İstanbul by automobile. When the limitations of transportation and communication of those years are taken into account, in fact Çerkezköy was a relatively “distant” place for the industrialists in İstanbul. Sakıp Sabancı, one of the greatest businessmen in Turkey, and one of the owners of YÜNSA, one of the initial factories built in Çerkezköy, describes the distance from his memories as follows:

Turhan Sümbül prepared a project, obtained an incentive certificate, and even purchased the land for construction in Çerkezköy.

In those years Turgut Özal was the general coordinator of our conglomerate. First, we went to Çerkezköy and saw the land. It was a distant place; however Turhan Sümbül was determined to establish the factory there. (...) We decided to realize the project in cooperation with Turhan Sümbül.¹⁹⁷

In addition to Çerkezköy, the province Edirne and Kofçaz, a district of Kırklareli, were also announced as PADs in Thrace. No industrial enterprise went to Kofçaz, on the border of Bulgaria, due to its distance from İstanbul and from main roads. In Edirne, which had been included in the scope of incentives since 1969 and 230 km away from İstanbul, a limited number (six) of industrial enterprises were

¹⁹⁶ *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

¹⁹⁷ “Turhan Sümbül bir proje hazırlamış, teşvik belgesi almış, hatta teşvik bölgesinde, Çerkezköy’de kuruluş yerini bile satın almış.

O yıllarda Turgut Özal holdingimizin genel koordinatörü idi. Önce Çerkezköy’e gelip araziye gördük. Uzak bir yer ama, Turhan Sümbül burada yapmaya kararlı. (...) Turhan Sümbül ile işbirliği halinde projeyi gerçekleştirmeye karar verdik.” Sakıp Sabancı, *İşte Hayatım* (Here’s my life) (İstanbul: Aksoy Matbaacılık, 1985), p. 140. Turhan Sümbül, general director of a factory in Aydın belonging to Sümerbank, a textile enterprises belonging to the state, had quitted his job in order to establish his own textile business in İstanbul. By becoming partners with Sabancı, he established YÜNSA in Çerkezköy.

established.¹⁹⁸ A textile businessman recounts why he had given up on establishing a factory in Edirne although he had obtained an incentive certificate with this aim in 1970 as follows:

Since we obtained our licence [incentive certificate] we thought that we should go to Edirne and see the city. However, there was neither electricity nor water nor a road in Edirne. That is to say, in order to construct these we should have had the power of a state. Hereupon, Nuri Akın went and talked to Turgut Özal [SPO undersecretary of the period]. He said, “We tried to do this for Edirne, but this is not an event within our power. If you provide this to us in İstanbul, we can do it.” Thereupon Turgut Özal said, “If you build a factory comprising 50,000 spindles in İstanbul and your father supports you, I will provide you the licence.” When Nuri Akın said, “We will establish the factory and my father will support me,” this project was realized. Thus, we obtained the licence of Edirne İplik to be established in İstanbul.¹⁹⁹




Fig. 3. Administrative map of Thrace Region.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey, “Trakya Bölgesinin Öncelikleri”, *V. Türkiye Ticaret ve Sanayi Şurası* (TOBB: Ankara, 19 November 2008), p. 365.

¹⁹⁹ Rüştü Akın, *Ben de Tekstilciyim* (I am a textile businessman as well) (İstanbul, 1995), p. 150.

²⁰⁰ Taken from Ergun Taneri, *Bölge Planlama* (Regional Planning) (İstanbul: Devlet Mühendislik ve Mimarlık Akademisi Yayınları, 1978), p. 172.

When Çerkezköy was announced as an incentive region in 1972, like Edirne there was no infrastructure; however, its proximity to İstanbul when compared to Edirne and the expectation that infrastructure could be completed in a short time attracted industrialists. When the active role of the local municipality was added to this, in 1972 more than 30 industrialists purchased land in Çerkezköy and in five years 15 factories were established in the district.

In consequence, Çerkezköy became an industrial zone as a result of the SPO's announcing the district as a PAD in the program of 1972. However, how this decision was taken is a subject that should be examined separately because it has been claimed that local politicians were influential in the making of this decision.

How Çerkezköy was Included in the Scope of PAD

In the passage above, Hikmet Uğraş, the mayor of Çerkezköy in that period, implies that by meeting with SPO officers in person he led them to take this decision. In this interview given during an election campaign, he emphasized his own efforts in Çerkezköy's being included in the scope of incentives. However, researcher Mehmet Serez and former Çerkezköy prosecutor Mehmet Feyyat, both of whom were interviewed for this study, claim that Tekirdağ deputy Orhan Öztrak was influential in the making of this decision.²⁰¹ Serez asserts that Uğraş had very good relations with Öztrak, that he asked for Öztrak's support constantly in order to develop the

²⁰¹ Mehmet Feyyat, interview by the author, tape recording, İstanbul, Turkey, 26 May 2010; Mehmet Serez, interview by the author, tape recording, Tekirdağ, Turkey, 19 May 2011.

district, and that Öztrak ensured Çerkezköy's being included in the scope of incentives by using his political clout in Ankara.²⁰²

Another person who implied that the SPO's decision about Çerkezköy was taken under the pressure of politicians and businessmen is Ertuğrul Soysal, the secretary general of TÜSİAD in that period:

Incentives which were at first channeled to provinces in east and south east were spread to 33 provinces afterwards as a result of political pressure and the insistence of investors. In the meantime, Edirne and especially Çerkezköy were for some reason announced as underdeveloped areas, after allowing for a few industrial enterprises and investments to be made, Edirne was relinquished; however, hundreds of thousands square meters of land was scrambled for in Çerkezköy though there was no infrastructure.

(...)

There was no settlement project in Çerkezköy, electricity was limited, water, settlement areas, opportunities of replenishment and distribution, and communication methods were primitive. In a nutshell, a new anarchic industrial city, which was already a burden on the İstanbul metropolitan area, was created.²⁰³

Özcan Ertuna, who worked at the SPO for some time, criticized Çerkezköy's being included among the PADs in a conference speech as follows:

The personnel of the PADs Department sorted out a list by using taxonomy method. The first list consisted of thirty-six provinces. Then, four provinces were added by a top-down proposal or an instruction, and to make the matters worse, some districts in developed provinces were arbitrarily added to the PADs. Well, Kiraz in İzmir and Çerkezköy are examples of these areas.

²⁰² Orhan Öztrak, whose predecessors were also politicians, is the son of Faik Öztrak, who was Tekirdağ deputy from 1923 to 1950 and who was the home secretary from 1939 to 1942. He was Tekirdağ deputy for long years as well and worked as the home secretary from 1963 to 1965 during the RPP government. In the splitting of the RPP in 1967, he cooperated with Turhan Feyzioğlu and resigned from the RPP and was involved in the establishing of the Reliance Party (*Güven Partisi*). Orhan Öztrak, was the secretary general of this party when the industrial migration to Çerkezköy started in 1972.

After analyzing conflicting data from different resources, I concluded that Öztrak played a role in Çerkezköy's becoming an industrial zone; however, this was not related to the making of the SPO decision but rather to the establishment of OIZ in Çerkezköy. In the oral sources, the fact that the SPO included the district in the scope of incentives in 1972 and that the decision to establish an OIZ in Çerkezköy was taken by the Ministry of Industry in 1973 are generally confused with each other during narration. The establishment of OIZ will be dealt with in the next chapter.

²⁰³ Soysal, p. 25.

The destinies of many mid-level and top-level managers, who lived in Çerkezköy or Bilecik but whose families lived in İstanbul, and their families were thus shaped. That is to say, regional planning was undermined to a large extent before it started.²⁰⁴

Although not directly related to Çerkezköy's being included in the scope of incentives, in many resources it is generally indicated that in determining the PADs, "objective criteria" were not complied with and that politicians put pressure on the governments in order to have their own regions included in the scope of the incentives.²⁰⁵

All these described above turn how the decision about Çerkezköy was taken into an object of curiosity. First of all, it should be remarked that the data quoted from authorities in the SPO above conflict with the claims given above because the specialists and administrators who made the decision of including Çerkezköy in the scope of the PAD had stated that Çerkezköy and other districts included in the scope of regional incentives likewise were chosen by depending upon the development

²⁰⁴ Özcan Ertuna, *Türkiye'de Bölgesel Politika* (Regional policy in Turkey) (Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etütler Konferans Heyeti: İstanbul, 1989), pp. 199-200. Ertuna is referring to the Annual Program of 1973 in which the number of provinces in the scope of incentives were raised from 36 to 40. However, 67 districts, among which Çerkezköy and Kiraz were also included, were added to the list in the 1972 Annual Program.

²⁰⁵ To give a few examples of this: "Except for GAP, regional policies are fruitless in terms of resolving the regional differences in the country and distributing the wealth throughout the country. The concept of PAD has deviated from the original purpose as a result of politicians' putting their own regions forward or their efforts to 'distribute to everyone' with populist tendencies." (*Bölgesel politikalar, ülke içinde bölgesel farklılıkları giderme ve refahı ülke geneline yayma açısından GAP dışında başarısızdır. KÖY kavramı politikacıların kendi bölgelerini öne çıkarma ya da populist eğilimlerle "herkese dağıtma" çabaları ile asıl amacından sapmıştır.*) Fatma Doğruel, "Türkiye'de Bölgesel Politikalar," in *Değişen Mekan: Mekansal Süreçlere İlişkin Tartışma ve Araştırmalara Toplu Bakış: 1923-2003*, Ed. Ayda Eraydın, (Ankara: Dost, 2006), p. 177.

In a research conducted by the National Security Council, it is claimed that "It was witnessed that even some developed areas were occasionally added to this list [priority areas for development] as a result of powerful politicians' having their own electoral districts added to the list." (*Güçlü politikacıların, kendi seçim bölgelerini bu listeye [kalkınmada öncelikli yöreler] sokturarak, kimi gelişmiş yörelerin bile bu listelere zaman zaman sokulduğuna tanık olunmuştur.*) National Security Council, *Türkiye'de Bölge Planlamasının Evreleri* (Ankara: Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Genel Sekreterliği Yayınları, 1993), p. 95.

Günal Kansu, who did a comprehensive and original study on the SPO, remarks that in the 1970s deputies put pressure on the governments to have their own regions included in the scope of incentives. Kansu, p. 404.

research among districts conducted in 1965 in order to spread the concentration of industry in metropolitan areas and create new attraction centers throughout the country.

Hikmet Çetin and other experts in the SPO, with whom I interviewed in order to shed light on the subject, put emphasis on the fact that the decision was taken completely for “technical” reasons and that they had not been under any political pressure. As a matter of fact, the 1972 Annual Program, in which Çerkezköy was included in the scope of PAD, was prepared during a period in which the effect of politicians was quite reduced.

The 1972 Annual Program was prepared during the First Nihat Erim government, which was formed after the March 12 coup, approved by the council of ministers on 29 November 1971 and after being published in the *Official Gazette* on 30 December 1971, it came into force. The First Erim government was a government of technocrats in which 15 out of 26 ministers were chosen from outside the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT, *Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*). During the period of this government, which dissolved upon the resignation of technocrats after almost eight months, the bureaucrats had more power than the politicians. In this government, Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, who was among the founders of the SPO, became the vice prime minister whereas Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, who was also among the founders of the SPO, took charge as the minister of industry. Karaosmanoğlu discharged Turgut Özal, who had been assigned by Demirel, removed from power by the military coup, and also who had close relations with business circles, and appointed Memduh Aytür, an extremely powerful bureaucrat from whom politicians and businessmen hesitated to demand anything, to the position of SPO

undersecretary .²⁰⁶ As for Hikmet Çetin, head of the Economic Planning Department, the most important branch of the SPO, he was in the position of second man at the institution. He recounts that during those days of the military regime, politicians did not have the power that to influence the SPO; and he explains why Çerkezköy was included in the scope of incentives as follows:

Çerkezköy's inclusion in the scope of incentives was a decision taken by the SPO with the aim of decentralizing industry in İstanbul. The influence of the politicians was not in question. Providing incentives to distant regions was ineffective in decentralizing industry from İstanbul. For this reason, we announced the provinces in the periphery of developed provinces as PAD. And we succeeded in this. We also proposed the construction of organized industrial zones. We did the same thing not only for İstanbul, but also for Ankara, İzmir, and Adana. This was a technical decision rather than a political one. After all, during the period of March 12, politicians were preoccupied with their own troubles, they could not be influential in anyway. Above all, Memduh Aytür was in charge. He was one of those bureaucrats to whom the politicians hesitated to say anything. It was a time when the SPO was very influential.

If we had not done this the coasts of İstanbul would have been filled up with industry. Çerkezköy was chosen because it was the least developed district of Tekirdağ. Besides, we considered the proximity of Çerkezköy to the market, that is to say, İstanbul. Determining incentive regions imaginarily does not enable industry's going there.²⁰⁷

Atila Candır, vice-president of the Department of PADs until 1973, said that politicians did not have any effect on the decisions: "Politicians may have been more influential after us."²⁰⁸ Teoman Yayın, in charge of the research in the same department, remarked, "There may have been demands from politicians and businessmen. However this [PADs] was decided by the SPO's own initiative."²⁰⁹ Ayhan Çilingiroğlu, the minister of industry of the period, also firmly specified that the list of PADs included in the 1972 Annual Program had been prepared by the

²⁰⁶ Kansu, pp. 312-321.

²⁰⁷ Çetin, interview by the author.

²⁰⁸ Candır, interview by the author.

²⁰⁹ Yayın, interview by the author.

SPO's initiative and that there was no intervention to its content in the council of ministers.²¹⁰

When the districts included in the scope of incentives along with Çerkezköy in the 1972 Annual Program are examined, it can be seen that the priorities mentioned by experts of the SPO are reflected in the list. In order to decentralize the industry concentrated at metropolises, ten districts from Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Bilecik, Ankara, Adana and İzmir were added to the list.

The regional incentives list of the 1972 Annual Program was once discussed in the Parliament. Kırşehir deputy Mustafa Aksoy asked the government why

²¹⁰ When I asked Çilingiroğlu about the possibility of Tekirdağ deputies and senators having any influence on the SPO for Çerkezköy to be included in the scope of incentives, he laughed as he answered the question: “zero percent, zero percent.”

Çilingiroğlu said: “We can sincerely say that the determination of priority areas for development was the result of the SPO's work. I cannot know whether the deputies, mayors or governors of those regions had any influence while the SPO was doing its work. Unsurprisingly, there was no discussion in the government as to choose certain places because principally we did not intervene in the work of technicians. The SPO was our former organization. Neither I nor Atilla [Karaosmanoğlu], as people who had participated in the establishment of the SPO and established the rules of it, intervened in the works of the SPO. Thus, choosing of those places was the internal work of the SPO.

Since the day the SPO was established, both local politicians and certain businessmen tried to affect the plan. For example, while the plan was being prepared, some people would come to the SPO and exert themselves, saying “oh, please attach great importance to railways.” That person was most probably the representative of a firm selling railway equipment. Or else, a business would or would not be done in city A, people from that region came and tried to influence the SPO. In fact, normal naive people also came to the SPO. For example, when PETKİM was to be built in Çayırova, a poor peasant came and said, “Oh please do not built this here. This is agricultural land where excellent cherries grow.” Maybe the man was right. Consequently, people came to the SPO and tried to influence somehow due to love of country and nation, personal interest or their own political futures. Their efforts were never influential during when we were in charge in the SPO. We listened to the people, thanked them and sent them away. As a matter of fact, one of the magnates went to the house of a colleague of ours and our colleague threw him out of his house.

(...)

The SPO worked in both ways in decentralizing the industry from İstanbul. The first one was to build facilities in Anatolia and the second was to provide certain conveniences under the name of “priority areas for development.” In this respect, the selection of Çerkezköy should be regarded as the decision of technicians.

(...)

Spreading industry not only to Çerkezköy but to Anatolia in general, such as to Bozüyük, Konya and even Ankara, was encouraged. The immediate surroundings of Ankara was a rural economy.” Çilingiroğlu, interview by the author.

Kırşehir, two districts of which had been included in the scope of incentives, had not been included in the scope of incentives as a province. The minister of state of the period Orhan Kitaplı answered the question as follows:

I listened to our friend, Kırşehir deputy Mr. Mustafa Aksoy's reasonable complaints about his electoral district. As you would appreciate, Turkey entered a planned period in order to resolve the complaints and prevent this imbalance. As a matter of fact, as a result of these studies, in 1963, twenty-two provinces were acknowledged as undeveloped or underdeveloped and they were identified in order to provide incentives to these areas via reduction. In 1970, socio-economic development index by provinces was implemented and according to the results of this index the twenty-two provinces rose to thirty-two. These comprise almost all the provinces in the southeast and east and also include underdeveloped provinces according to these indexes both in west and central Anatolia.

(...)

In addition to these, many districts, which are underdeveloped according to these indexes whereas the provinces comprising them do not comply with these indexes, -including two districts of Mr. Aksoy's province-, were added to this list with the aim of providing incentives.²¹¹

As a consequence, in the light of all the data presented, it can be said that Çerkezköy was included in the scope of incentives as a result of the SPO's spatial policies rather than the pressure of politicians or businessmen. While determining the PADs, the SPO aimed not only to remove regional inequalities, but also to decentralize the industry concentrated in metropolises and to create new development centers in the country. Including Çerkezköy and the other 66 districts in the scope of incentives in the 1972 Annual Program should be regarded as the implementation of this policy.

Certainly this designation is related only to the 1972 Annual Program and in particular to Çerkezköy's being announced as a priority area for development. Thus, which political factors played a role in the determination of the PADs in later years is a subject that should be studied separately.

²¹¹ Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 25, session 1, vol. 20, 7 January 1972.

The Beginning of Industrialization in Çerkezköy

Considering all the factors together, industry's movement to Çerkezköy can be explained as follows.

The SPO experts who prepared the 1972 Annual Program observed that providing incentives to underdeveloped provinces, all of which were in the eastern part of Anatolia (except for Edirne), did not prevent industry's rapid concentration in İstanbul and a few big cities. For this reason, they decided to implement the regional incentive, which had been provided since 1968, only to provinces defined as underdeveloped, in a more detailed and multi-purposeful manner. Shifting from the basis of provinces to the basis of districts, they determined 67 districts, which were least developed and had the potential for economic development. As one of these districts, Çerkezköy was selected both because it was the most underdeveloped district of Tekirdağ and because it had the potential to attract the industry of İstanbul since it was on the border of İstanbul and had appropriate topographic features for industrial settlement.

In the meantime, Hikmet Uğraş, the mayor, in a vigorous effort to bring industry to Çerkezköy, demanded from both the deputies of the region and the officers of the SPO that the province be included in the scope of incentives. It is certain that he made such an effort; however, it does not seem possible to state that he was influential in the Çerkezköy's inclusion in the scope of incentives. As remarked by also Çilingiroğlu, such demands were received continuously by the SPO; however, the planners made their decisions independently from those demands in that period. What is more, the possibility of a small town mayor having an effect on the decision of the SPO is small.

The efforts of Hikmet Uğraş became important after the decision of the SPO because the industry did not immediately flow to Çerkezköy upon its inclusion in the scope of incentives. As recounted above, much the industry was unwilling to leave İstanbul. Halit Narin, the first industrialist who located in Çerkezköy, tells that Vehbi Koç had gone to see the district before he did and left saying “nothing will happen here.”²¹²

After the 1972 Annual Program was published in the *Official Gazette*, Uğraş intensified his efforts to bring industrialists to Çerkezköy. He had an important chance to reach industrialists. Sadık Sever, who was the director of development in the İstanbul municipality in 1958, was from Çerkezköy and was acquainted with many industrialists in İstanbul due to his office.²¹³ It is said that Sever was also friends with Halit Narin.²¹⁴ Uğraş emphasized the role of Sadık Sever in an interview as follows:

Mr. Sadık Sever, who was from Çerkezköy and was the Director of Development in the İstanbul Municipality during the period of Democratic Party, had his own firm at the time. He assisted us with a very large circle of industrialists. He had a hand with locating the factories, which we always appreciated. We are grateful to him. He made a great contribution to the zoning plan work.²¹⁵

²¹² Halit Narin, *Türkiye'sine Sevdalı Adam* (Man in love with Turkey) (Ankara: Tekstil Sanayi İşverenleri Sendikası, 2009), p. 50.

²¹³ After retiring from his office in the Municipality, he had his own firm in İstanbul. During the 1960s he was a city councilor of İstanbul from the JP. He returned to Çerkezköy after the coming of industry.

²¹⁴ Hasan Erkan, interview by the author; Abdülkadir Karan, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Turkey, 23 Mart 2011.

Also Halit Narin mentions Sadık Sever in his memoirs: “There was a person who was the director of development in İstanbul during the period of the deceased Menderes. He was from Çerkezköy. Afterwards they [Halit Narin and his father] came with him and they decided to purchase a land from the village.” Narin, p. 50.

²¹⁵ “Çerkezköylü olup Demokrat Parti döneminde İstanbul Belediyesi İmar Müdürü olan sayın Sadık Sever bu tarihlerde İstanbul’da serbest mimarlık yapıyordu. Çok geniş bir sanayici muhiti ile bize yardımcı oldu. Fabrikaların yerleştirilmesinde her zaman takdirle karşıladığımız yardımları oldu. Müteşekkirimiz. İmar planı çalışmalarında büyük katkısı olmuştur.” *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 14 February 1989.

The first news about the industrialists after the decree that states that Çerkezköy had been included in the scope of PAD, published in the *Official Gazette* on 30 December 1971, is dated 5 January 1972. According to the news published in *Devrim* newspaper, four industrialists from the steel, aluminum, furniture and button sectors resorted to Uğraş and asked for land.²¹⁶ However, we observe that no news on this subject was published later and that these factories were not built. Presumably, this enterprise remained inconclusive.

In a second article dated 5 February 1972, the efforts of Uğraş to bring investors to Çerkezköy are reported:

Every passing day we closely witness that Çerkezköy, neglected for various reasons for years, is becoming a model town as a result of Mayor Hikmet Uğraş' extraordinary work.

A town with limited opportunities, Çerkezköy has always made a move forwards thanks to Hikmet Uğraş' efforts.

The water problem of the town has been, though partially, resolved. The economic and commercial situation of Çerkezköy has been evaluated, contacts with entrepreneurs have been established, and necessary conveniences have been provided to them in order to have them build factories in Çerkezköy. Taking the economic condition of the people of Çerkezköy into consideration, a great reduction has been made in the electricity price contrary to other municipalities. As to the decision taken by the Municipality today, the price for 1 kilowatt of electricity has been reduced to 65 Kuruş from 85 Kuruş.²¹⁷

Although the great reduction in electricity price was explained by the poverty of the people, it was most probably to attract industrialists. The actual attractive offer the municipality made to the industrialists was to provide lands as vast as they desired at one Lira per square meter. Both the lands of the municipality and the farms of villagers were presented to industrialists at one Lira per square meter.²¹⁸ The fact that

²¹⁶ *Devrim*, 5 January 1972.

²¹⁷ *Devrim*, 5 February 1972.

²¹⁸ Hikmet Uğraş: "Our municipality regards providing lands to our industrialists as the main goal. For this reason, as the municipality we provide lands at 1 Lira per square meter." (*Belediyemiz, sanayicilerimize arsa temin etmeyi ana gaye olarak kabul etmektedir. Bu sebeple belediye olarak metrekaresi 1 liradan arsa temin ediyoruz.*) *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 26

the municipality played an active role in providing lands eased and quickened the industrialists' coming to Çerkezköy. In incentive regions where land provision was not as easy as this one, investments could sometimes be delayed for several years.²¹⁹

Thanks to all these advantages, Çerkezköy started to attract the attention of the industrialists in İstanbul. Halit Narin, who built the first industrial facility in Çerkezköy, describes his going to Çerkezköy as follows:

When Halit Narin entered into business life and started to embark upon enterprises, first with his father and in his management and then by himself and his close colleagues, he saw that in terms of the subject of location and jobs in Turkey, there were many virgin, untouched but promising places and topics. Çerkezköy enterprise was the first example to this.

In 1969 [the true date is 1972 a. n.] an incentive was provided for making investments in Çerkezköy and its surroundings. (...) Halit Narin and his father went to Çerkezköy to see its situation and to make an evaluation at first hand. It was a village next to the railway, surrounded by mountains and hills and there were only a few shops in it. It was a village in the strict sense. (...) Before Narin family, the deceased Vehbi Koç went, observed the village and its surroundings,

April 1972. In terms of demonstrating the cheapness of land prices we should note that at this date the daily local newspaper Çorlu Gazetesi costs 50 Kuruş and the national newspaper Milliyet Gazetesi costs 75 Kuruş. Besides, one square meter of land in Bakırköy, where textile factories concentrated in 1973 in İstanbul costed 1000 TL. Eraydın, "Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location," p. 92.

²¹⁹ "It has been observed that many projects, approved by the SPO and received incentive from the Ministry of Industry since their investments are in the borders of certain provinces, could not obtain the land in the province to be invested in even when their machinery arrived at the customs." (*D.P.T. ce onaylanan, Sanayi Bakanlığından yatırımı belli bir ilin içinde kaldığı için teşvik alan birçok proje, makinaları gümrüğe geldiği anda, halen o il içinde yatırımın yapılacağı arsayı temin edemediği görülmüştür.*) İstanbul Chamber of Industry, *İstanbul Metropolitan Alanında*, p. 4.

An owner of a big chemistry factory, who had bought industrial land in Dilovası, between İstanbul and İzmit, in 1970, states that it took almost four years for him to combine small parcels belonging to different people and to start the construction of the factory. Dinçer, *The Transformation of an Industrial Location*, p. 57.

Çilingiroğlu related the problem of land as such: "People in small villages and towns would make things difficult for the incoming industrialists. Suppose that you want to build a facility in a village, the land prices all of a sudden quintuple. Secondly, you did not yet start digging but you start receiving business cards from politicians and bureaucrats stating whom to employ. You cannot buy land with your money. Local conditions are not encouraging." (*Küçük köy ve kasabalardaki insanlar gelen sanayicinin işini zorlaştırırlardı. Diyelim ki gidip bir köyde tesis kurmak istersiniz birden arazi fiyatları beş katına çıkar. İkincisi, daha kazmayı vurmamışsınızdır siyasetçi ve bürokratlardan kartvizitler gelmeye başlar, bunları işe alın diye. Paranızla arsa alamazsınız. Yerel koşullar teşvik edici değildir.*) Çilingiroğlu, interview by author.

walked round it and left saying “nothing will happen here.” Halit Narin and his father did not think so. There was a person who was the director of development in İstanbul during the period of the Menderes. He was from Çerkezköy. Afterwards, they came with him and decided to purchase land from the village. Hikmet Bey was the mayor. They had dinner together. Hikmet Bey wanted the region to develop. He wanted his region to be invested in. One square meter of land would be 50 Kuruş [the true price is 1 Lira]. However, the people even consented to give their land for free so that the investment was made.²²⁰

The day Halit Narin and his father went to Çerkezköy and chose a location with

Sadık Sever is recounted in *Devrim* newspaper, dated 3 April 1972, as follows:

Çerkezköy, which became one of the heavy maintenance pilot areas in Thrace, is nominee to become an industrial city. Çerkezköy has vast lands; however, since its soil is poor the people are poor though it is an agricultural region.

In this regard, in order to help the citizens, the administrators of Çerkezköy had succeed in turning the area into a center of heavy maintenance by putting the maximum effort and also have accomplished industrializing their town by means of making contacts with businessmen in metropolises and selling the lands of the municipality to them.

Businessmen who came a few days ago from İstanbul walked round and identified the places where textile factories could be built.²²¹

As is understood from this news, in the beginning of April 1972 Narin Holding chose a location in Çerkezköy and began to purchase land from the municipality and the villagers. This can be taken as the starting date of industrialization in Çerkezköy. The construction of the Narin factory started and two more industrialists bought land within the same month.²²² Subsequently, many industrialists (some of whom had the aim of speculation) started to purchase lands.

How the industrialists in İstanbul turned towards Çerkezköy is summarized in a column in which an interview with Mecdi Arca, President of Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association, is presented:

²²⁰ Narin, p. 50.

²²¹ *Devrim*, 3 April 1972.

²²² *Devrim*, 14 April 1972; *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 26 April 1972.

‘Our facilities were in Eyüp... Our company was expanding gradually. It had become a must for us to expand our facilities as well. However, there was no empty land in Eyüp. We were stuck in...’

Here at this very time Çerkezköy came to the help of industrialists in İstanbul.

When Çerkezköy was also included in the framework of ‘PAD’, industrialists in İstanbul started to compete for this ‘underdeveloped area’ which is 120 km away from İstanbul.

Mecdi Arca continued his speech saying, ‘The primary attractive factor in Çerkezköy for us was that the land prices were very cheap. It was the year 1972 and one square meter of land in Çerkezköy was at 125 Kuruş... As to the villagers who heard that we industrialists had started to compete with each other in order to buy lands from Çerkezköy, they started another competition among themselves. They made queues at our doors in order to sell their lands. We bought 300,000 square meters of land. We bought some of it at 125 Kuruş per square meter and the rest of it 150 Kuruş per square meter.’

The General Director of a big carpet and blanket manufacturing company, Mecdi Arca, also assumed the responsibility of being the President of the Çerkezköy Industrialists’ Association.

I asked the president what the price of lands in Çerkezköy at present in Kuruş.

‘The price of lands in Çerkezköy is no longer Kuruş,’ said he and added laughingly:

‘In Çerkezköy, today the average price of a land is about 400 Liras.’

Mecdi Arca remarked that the only reason why especially industrialists in İstanbul had started competing for Çerkezköy was not the cheapness of land prices.

‘Since Çerkezköy was included in the scope of PAD, it had become attractive for us for other reasons as well. In places included in the scope of PAD, an investment allowance was provided to industrialists. There was a tax subsidy. Conveniences such as customs exemption, installment of customs duty were provided. In addition to all these, even though our capital was small, since we were making investments in this region we could find big credit facilities.’

Apart from cheapness of land prices and its closeness to İstanbul, providing such conveniences turned Çerkezköy instantly into a ‘gold mine’ in the eyes of the industrialists.²²³

²²³ Mete Akyol, “Çerkezköy’de ‘Çok Özel’ Sektör,” *Milliyet*, 18 April 1981.

Conclusion

This chapter explained the fact that in 1972 industrialists in İstanbul chose to locate factories in Çerkezköy, which is 110 kilometers away from the urban center, within the context of the spatial movement of industry in İstanbul, the regulations of central state and the efforts of local government. This industrial migration, which is experienced as a result of these three dynamics, complies with Lewis and Walker's tripodal approach which was discussed in the Chapter Two. Lewis and Walker state that industry's movement from urban center to suburbs and satellite towns can be explained by economic-technical necessities and developments, political influences, and developments in the real estate market (land development for industry). In the case of Çerkezköy, the spatial movement of industry in İstanbul corresponds to economic-technical reasons. At the end of the 1960s, the concentration of capital in manufacturing industry accelerated and big companies organized as conglomerates started to require larger production units. However, due to the lack of space and expensiveness of land in the urban center, the possibility of horizontal expansion was out of question. Therefore, conglomerates began to move their production units outside the urban center. The main dynamic that forced the companies to leave the city center at the end of the 1960s was the need to expand horizontally.

The political factor that played a role in industry's movement to Çerkezköy was the intervention of central government agencies. It was stated that the role of the workers' movement was not decisively important as a political factor in industry's leaving İstanbul in 1972. The role of İstanbul municipality, the powers of which were limited to a great extent until the second half of the 1980s, was likewise limited. Two central government agencies which played a role in shaping the industrial geography

of İstanbul were the Ministry of Development and Housing, and the SPO. The İstanbul Master Plan Bureau, which was responsible for city planning, was under the Ministry of Development and Housing. In the Industrial Plan of 1966 prepared by this Bureau, industrial areas were determined and industrial location to certain areas was prohibited. Although the plan was implemented on a limited scale, it effected the shaping of industrial geography in İstanbul to a certain extent. As for the SPO, it pointed out the new settlement areas to industry by including certain provinces and districts in the periphery of İstanbul in the scope of PAD.

As the third factor, Lewis and Walker draw attention to the development process of industrial lands and within this context, to the importance of developers. The role played by real estate entrepreneurs in the decentralization process of industry in North American cities was in Çerkezköy, at least in the starting phase, played by the municipality. As will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, the municipality played a critical role in industrialists' procuring as much land as they desired at cheap prices. In addition, the extensive effort made by the Çerkezköy municipality to bring state resources and industrial businesses to town can be interpreted as an example of the local boosterism observed in North American towns. At this juncture, mayor Hikmet Uğraş' entrepreneurship occupies a special place in Çerkezköy's becoming an industrial town.

Consequently, among the areas pointed out by the SPO to industrialists by providing special incentives, Çerkezköy was the one which was the most quickly and intensely industrialized. This was both the result of Çerkezköy's being the closest incentive region to İstanbul and of its municipality providing the industrialists with cheap land. Incentive, relative closeness to İstanbul, and the supply of appropriate lands turned Çerkezköy into a 'gold mine' for İstanbul's manufacturing industry,

which was growing rapidly and experiencing a lack of space. The success of Çerkezköy in attracting industrialists was the result of the simultaneous presence of these three qualifications. The absence of one of these three qualifications would have made the other two meaningless, decrease the attractiveness of Çerkezköy to a great extent and even annihilate it. Therefore, these factors should be considered not one by one but all together and seen as completing each other.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY IN ÇERKEZKÖY

The Establishment of the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone

Process of Purchasing Land

Following the publication of the decree of the Council of Ministers that included Çerkezköy among the PADs in the *Official Gazette* on 30 December 1971, the Çerkezköy municipal council declared 1400 hectares of nonarable land, situated in the north and northwest of the district center, as an industrial area with the approval of the Ministry of Development and Housing.²²⁴ In the period that lasted until April, when land sale first began, while industrialists in Istanbul examined the area, Mayor Uğraş was trying to bring industrialists to the area with the assistance of Sadık Sever, the former Director of Development in İstanbul, who was also from Çerkezköy.

At the end of the previous chapter it was discussed how the municipality sold land for one TL per square meter in order to attract industry and that in the same period in Bakırköy neighborhood of İstanbul, where some of the factories to be relocated in Çerkezköy afterwards were situated, land prices were almost one thousand TL per square meter. The land prices in Çerkezköy, being one thousand times cheaper than those in Bakırköy, considerably decreased the cost of the

²²⁴ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii ile İlgili Fizibilite Raporu* (Feasibility report on the expansion of Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone) (Tekirdağ, 1990), p. 31.

industrialists' infrastructure investments.²²⁵ Moreover,, thanks to the municipality, industrialists had the opportunity to find as much land as they wished at such a cheap price.

Certainly the state incentive provided for the area was an important factor in the coming of industrialists to the area. However, the incentive would have been meaningless if the industrialists had been unable to obtain the large amount of land which they desperately needed. A deadline was determined in the incentive certificates for establishing factories and those who failed to set up their factories on time lost their rights to benefit from the incentives. That is to say, the industrialists had to obtain the large industrial parcels which they needed at a low price and as soon as possible. The municipality played a critical role at this point. Not only did it sell the land belonging to the municipality to the industrialists from the 1400 hectares of land determined as an industrial area, which was consisted of a great number of small parcels, but also acted as a mediator between the land owners and the industrialists. In other words, it de facto assumed the role of a real estate agent.²²⁶ In return for this service, it received a commission.²²⁷

²²⁵ The former mayor, Abdülkadir Karan, recounts Nurullah Narin's telling him that he could not afford to buy five decares of land in Bakırköy. Karan, interview by the author.

²²⁶ "Entrepreneurs and investors;

- In order to maintain their facilities, which are in İstanbul, in Çerkezköy

- And to make new investments and facilities

have bought the lands seen in Appendix I-VI [1400 hectares of land] under the organization and assistance of the Mayor's office by mutual agreement of the land owners and the industrialists, and they established their facilities in a short time."

(*Müteşebbis ve Yatırımcılar*;

- *İstanbul'daki tesislerini Çerkezköy'de devam ettirmek*

- *Yeni yatırımlar ve tesisler yapmak üzere*

Ek I-VI'da görülen sahaları [1400 hektarlık alan], Belediye Başkanlığı'nın organizasyon ve yardımı altında sahipleri ile karşılıklı anlaşarak almışlar ve kısa sürede tesislerini kurmuşlardır.) Çerkezköy Municipality, Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii, p. 2.

²²⁷ The industrialist who bought lands for one TL per square meter through the agency of Municipality agreed to pay fifty kuruş donation per square meter. It has been said that the municipality earned an income of 3 million liras from these grants. In addition, Narin Holding, which was the first to buy land as well the most (almost 1000 decares), promised to

Çerkezköy was an area where small scale land ownership was predominant. There were hundreds of small plots of land in the area were allocated to industry. In this case, a critical and a difficult task, consolidating the lands and turning these into large industrial parcels, had to be performed. In the beginning, the municipality undertook this task, and with time, some local people who had money started to produce lands for industrialists by trying to become real estate agents. Thus, Çerkezköy land, which was divided into hundreds of small parcels, turned into large industrial parcels.

At the beginning of April 1972, Narin Holding became the first to purchase land. With the advantage of being the first, it bought the largest and most convenient land. Having examined the area, Narin family, father and son chose 1000 decares from the area closest to the city center. On one side was the road and on the other side was a brook into which the waste water of the factory could be dumped. Şadi Çorbacı, the Director of Development in Çerkezköy Municipality of the period, who witnessed Narin family's site selection, recounts that day as follows:

Sadık Sever was friends with Halit Narin. They came together. I showed the Kuşbahçe neighborhood [the valley on the border of İstanbul] to Narin, he did not like it. He found the area too small, with no space for expansion. We showed him the threshing field. He liked it and assigned Sadık Bey to collect lands on his behalf.²²⁸

The Narin family purchased 379 decares of 1000 decares of land from the municipality and the rest from 153 villagers.²²⁹ Those who witnessed the purchasing

build an arts school which would cost 2.5 million liras. *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

²²⁸ Şadi Çorbacı, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 23 December 2011.

²²⁹ Şevket Genç, "Değişmekte Olan Yerleşme: Çerkezköy," (A changing settlement: Çerkezköy), (Graduation thesis, İstanbul University, 1975), p. 9; *Çerkezköy Postası*, 11 October 1972.

process said that the villagers who were willing to sell their land queued up before the municipality building and that the sale process lasted until late into the night.²³⁰

It was reported that Narin encouraged his brother-in-law Tevfik Ercan, the owner of Ercan Holding, to buy the land next to his own.²³¹ The AKİP factory, in which Ercan was a partner, purchased 473 decares of land from the area on the other side of the road. 142 decares of the land in question belonged to the municipality.²³² The remaining part was purchased from 33 villagers.²³³

All those who bought land following these two firms bought it from private individuals. In April, a third firm purchases land for a milk factory through the agency of the municipality.²³⁴ In May and June, the purchase of land accelerated. Trakya İplik, in which Ertekin Ashapoğlu was a principal partner; Dinarsu and Aksu from the Dinçkök Group; Jakarteks, owned by Naim Akbay; Yünsa in which Sabancı Holding was partner; and Gümüşsuyu owned by Öztemirler purchased land in amounts ranging from 79 decares to 381 decares in size. All of these firms are big textile companies which had been unable to expand horizontally in İstanbul.

In addition to these, from the metal sector, the PEG and PEMKO firms of Profilo Holding and the Hema firm of Hattat Group purchased 152 decares, 96 decares and 200 decares of land, respectively.²³⁵ Among these firms, Aksu purchased its 300 decares of land from 88 people while Profilo Holding purchased 248 decares

²³⁰ Ali Meydanlı, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 16 March 2011.

²³¹ Bülent Uğraş, interview by the author.

²³² Genç, p. 9.

²³³ *Çerkezköy Postası*, 3 November 1972.

²³⁴ *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 26 April 1972. This factory will not be established though the land has been purchased.

²³⁵ *Yurt Encyclopedia*, V. 10 (İstanbul: Anadolu Yayıncılık, 1984), p. 7014.

of land occupied by its two factories from 64 people.²³⁶ In time, some firms further expanded the lands that they had bought at the beginning.

People who acted as intermediaries during these purchases and the sales provided the industrialists with parcels of land as large as they desired. Gayretli, who was a director of Profilo, states that with the coming of industry “a great many real estate agents sprang up” in Çerkezköy and that the land was bought through the agency of them.²³⁷ Hasan Erkan, one of the old inhabitants of Çerkezköy described this as follows:

There were people who bought and sold land, I did it, too. Those who had some money on hand started to buy and sell land. (...) Industrialists used to come and say, ‘I will set up a factory, can you find me a place?’ ‘Of course’ someone would say. Then he would show the land. If the industrialist liked it, the intermediary would go and buy the land first and then sell it to the industrialist.²³⁸

The former mayor, Mehmet Uz, said:

There were intermediaries who provided land for industrialists since the beginning. This intermediary was sometimes the person who owned the largest land in the area desired to be bought; he would also persuade the others to sell their land. For example, Profilo wanted land especially close to railways. In addition to the commission, they paid a salary for many years to the person who had intermediated for these lands though he did not work.²³⁹

Another important problem in purchasing land besides the parcels’ being divided into small units was that most of them were without registration.²⁴⁰ Since the area did not

²³⁶ Çerkezköy Postası, 3 November 1972.

²³⁷ Gayretli, interview by the author.

²³⁸ “Arsa alım satım yapanlar oldu, ben de aldım sattım. Elinde biraz parası olanlar arsa alım satımı yapmaya başladı. (...) Geliyor sanayici ‘ben fabrika kuracağım’ diyor ‘bana yer bulabilir misin?’ ‘Hay hay’ diyor. Gidiyor tarlaları gösteriyor. Sanayici beğenirse gidip o arsaları alıyor, sonra da sanayiciye satıyor.” Hasan Erkan, interview by the author.

²³⁹ “Sanayicilere arsa sağlayan aracılar başından beri vardı. Bu aracı, bazen alınmak istenen yerde en büyük arsası olan kişiydi; diğerlerini de ikna ediyordu satmaya. Mesela Profilo özellikle demiryolu kenarında istemişti. Bu arsalara aracılık eden kişiye, aracılık komisyonunun dışında, uzunca yıllar maaş verdiler, çalışmadığı halde.” Mehmet Uz, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 25 March 2011.

²⁴⁰ Until then only migrants who came in 1935 had land titles. The state had given them 10 decares of land per capita, 10 decares of land per house as land of passport and 2

have cadastre, the real owners of the lands could be determined by the tax rolls of the provincial special administration. Most land was sold by notes given by mukhtars and some of these notes were missing. For this reason, much of the land was bought from people who were using the land at that moment but had no official documents. Since the lands were not registered, sales were made by presenting a land registration case in Çerkezköy court.²⁴¹

Ali Meydanlı, who worked as a collector in the office of provincial special administration in that period, narrates how the owners of lands were determined as follows:

The land did not have cadaster. For this reason industrialists bought the land according to the tax rolls of the provincial special administration. For example, someone sold the land via a note. Some did not even have a note. He either had not obtained a note or had lost it. Therefore, I said, ‘take the user as the basis.’ We accepted the one using the field as its owner. So, the one using the field sold it even if there were no documents.²⁴²

This implementation, which is reminiscent of the Ottoman land regime before the Tanzimat period, caused serious problems until a cadastre was completed. Even if the person using the land at that moment sold the land, the heirs to this land who had moved to İstanbul would come and stake out a claim and demand money from the industrialists or from those who had sold the land. Therefore, there were cases in which the industrialists bought the same land a few times. Ömer Kılınç, the general director of Dinarsu factory in that period, describes the situation as follows:

We had to buy the land three or four times. The father was dead, his children were scattered, and some of them had gone to İstanbul. Since the land was not registered we had to buy it via a note. The heirs who

decares of land as vineyard. Except for these, none of the fields had land titles. Meydanlı, interview by the author.

²⁴¹ Çerkezköy Postası, 9 September 1972.

²⁴² “Kadaastro yoktu, o yüzden sanayiciler özel idare vergi kayıtlarına göre yerleri aldılar. Mesela senetle satmışsın. Kimisinde senet bile yok. Senet almamış ya da kaybetmiş. O yüzden ben ‘kullanani esas alın’ dedim. Tarlanın içinde olanı mal sahibi kabul ettik. İçinde olan, kağıt olmasa da sattı.” Meydanlı, interview by the author.

heard that the lands had gained value would come and say that they had not sold their land. Then you paid them again. Likewise, the land was not registered, it did not have cadastre. Until the cadastre was completed, all kinds of questions of law lasted a long time. Cadastre is one of the works that saved the industrialists. It took 10-15 years.²⁴³

Ultimately, all these difficulties were overcome and most of the industrialists bought their land –to be registered later on– in 1972. It has been remarked that 22 industrialists bought lands before September 1972.²⁴⁴ The question that comes to mind is how such large amounts of land could have been purchased in such a short amount of time. While in other places consolidation of lands could take years and thus many investments were delayed, how could the industrialists obtain land in such large parcels as they desired in five to six months, in such a short period of time, in Çerkezköy?

The answer of this question resides in the ambiguity of the land titles. First of all, the area allocated to industry in Çerkezköy was nonarable, barren land. Before the coming of industry, 1 square meter of land cost 20-25 kuruş. Therefore, selling the land to industrialists for 1TL per square meter meant that the value of the land increased four to five times instantly. This was an unexpected big win, like winning the lottery, for the poor villagers of Çerkezköy. However, thinking that the villagers

²⁴³ “*Arsayı 3-4 defa alırdık. Baba ölmüş, çocuklar dağılmış, kimi İstanbul’a gitmiş. Arsayı tapu olmadığı için senetle alırdık. Yerlerin değer kazandığını duyan varisler de gelip ben satmıyorum diyor. Ona da bir daha para veriyorsunuz. Tapu olmadığı gibi kadastro da yok. Kadastro bitene kadar her türlü hukuki sorun uzun sürmüştür. Sanayiciyi kurtaran işlerden birisi kadastro. Kadastro 10-15 sene sürdü.*” Kılınç, interview by the author, 22 March 2011.

²⁴⁴ “The coming firms are as follows: Narin Mensucat, Akip, Aksu, AEG Profilo, Man Motor Sanayi, Trakya İplik, Simaş İplik, Akınal İplik, Gümüşsuyu, Yaprak Triko, Tekistüre Kumaş Sanayi, Jakarteks, İnan Tekstil, Sanacak Tül, ÇBS Boya Sanayi, Puro Plastik Deri Sanayi, Arca Kumaş, Boyner Kumaş, Neyir Triko, Kemal Yağcıoğlu Fırça Sanayi, Boğaziçi Güney Sanayi, Dünder Baştımara Konfeksiyon...” *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

The number of industrialists who purchased land in Çerkezköy is given as 29 in 1975. These are: Narin, Akip, Trakya İplik, Plaser, Yünsa, Asma İplik, Jakarteks, Dinarsu, Emin Hattat, Tatlıcılar, Profilo, Durulaks, Gümüşsuyu, Sancaktül, Emin Cankurtaran, Ünal Tüzün, Kazım Türegün, Seb Kur, Zetina, İnan Tekstil, Şehsuvar Kilit, Mustafa Yavaş, Konbaş Sanayi, Faik Babacan, Mustafa Üzer, Man, Akınal, Jüt Çuval, Batı Mensucat. Genç, pp. 10-11.

would fall for this and would want to sell their property at once would be a superficial viewpoint concerning the issue.

The villagers quickly sold their lands not only with “carrot”, but also with “stick.” Though they had been cultivating these fields for years and paying taxes on them, they did not have land titles and the rumor that the government would confiscate the whole area was circulating. Besides, even if the government did not confiscate the lands, the previous owners from whom they had bought these lands at a low price with a note or without any document could again stake out a claim and thus the villagers could have lost their land in this way too. In other words, the villagers had doubts and fears about both the government and each other. Under these circumstances, considering the possibility of losing everything in return for nothing, they chose to sell their land at once.

Hasan Bayraktar emigrated in 1935. He worked as a grocer in the region for 60 years and described the selling of the land as follows:

People were afraid since they did not have land titles, therefore they wanted to sell their land immediately, and they made a queue. In any case, the villagers had bought the lands they use with a note given by the mukhtar. They wanted to sell their land immediately in case the person from whom they bought the land returned. The fear that perhaps I may lose this property tomorrow because there is not a land title... Some of them said, I will return to my land, give your money back. That is to say, the previous owner demanded the land back. Some of them did not even have a note given by the mukhtar. They were afraid of both confiscation and of each other.

We were told that this region would become an industrial area and we should sell the land or else we would have to go to Ankara to claim our rights. Rumors were circulating.²⁴⁵

Those were the reasons why the villagers queued before the municipality building when Narin Holding was purchasing land. However, despite all of this, there were villagers who did not want to sell their lands which were in the industrial parcels.

²⁴⁵ Hasan Bayraktar, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdag, Türkiye, 14 March 2011.

Even if they were in small numbers, the resistance of these villagers made it impossible to use the parcel as a whole. The lands in this situation were confiscated by the municipality and given to the industrialists.²⁴⁶

Nonetheless, the resistance of the villagers who did not want to sell their lands cannot be said to remain inconclusive. Ali Meydanlı tells that Narin wanted to expand his land until the brook but failed:

Narin also wanted to buy the lower part of Pınarça Road. His intention was to go down until the brook. In this region there were vineyards of two decares given to immigrants. Ziya Sever, brother of Sadık Sever and mukhtar Salih İşcan came to village coffeehouse together. Mukhtar told me, ‘Ali you also have two decares of land there. Sell the land or they will be confiscated.’ Forgive me, it will sound rude, but I said, ‘Mukhtar, there is only one place you haven’t fucked and that is behind our ear, but you are trying to fuck that, too.’ People here have only two decares of land to hang up their hat and you are trying to take it away from them.’ Then people were awakened and did not sell their land, thus he could not go down as far as the brook.

Those who had land in the area which Narin purchased were given new lands from this part [presently the neighborhood of Çelebi Boys’ Dormitory]. Things were framed up but we do not know what happened behind the scenes.²⁴⁷

While all this was taking place, the famous prosecutor of Çerkezköy, Mehmet Feyyat,²⁴⁸ purports that with the other public officers he visited the villagers and warned them not to sell their land cheaply to the capitalists.

²⁴⁶ “There were two people who did not sell their land in the area purchased by AKİP and they confiscated those lands.” (*AKİP’in aldığı bölge içinde tarlasını satmayan iki kişi vardı, onları da istimlak ettiler.*) Meydanlı, interview by the author.

²⁴⁷ The vineyards that Narin could not buy are private-registered lands that had been distributed to 1935 immigrants. Since the land had titles the villagers were unwilling to sell it. The behavior of these villagers supports our explanation given above. Ibid.; Ziya Sever, whose name was mentioned in the passage, was the district head of the Workers’ Party of Turkey, which was closed in 1971 and also the brother of architect Sadık Sever. An article in *Çerkezköy Postası*, it said about him that “by providing full coordination among private sector industrialists, he also puts effort in the establishing of factories on the lands sold by the villagers.” (*özel sektör sanayicileri arasında tam bir koordine temin etmekle köylüler tarafından satılan arazilere fabrikaların kurulması için keza gayret göstermektedir.*) *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

²⁴⁸ Mehmet Feyyat, who worked as a prosecutor in Çerkezköy from 1966 to 1973, had become famous for a lawsuit which he brought to the Constitutional Court against the Ministry of Justice and won, and for his risings which became public, such as applying to the Grand National Assembly of Turkey for forwarding the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to

We officers, district governor, high ranking military officers, and provincial health director went to villages and warned the villagers. The first ones bought the lands at very low prices. We told the villagers to overcharge by demanding four, five, six, seven liras per square meter. We increased the rent of the villagers. By telling and telling again, we raised the prices.²⁴⁹

Although we cannot know how much public officers intervention contributed to the increase in prices, it was impossible for the prices not to increase in a place where such an intensive demand for land was present. Thus, in the industrial zone the prices of lands which had been sold for one lira per square meter until the beginning of June, increased up to five liras per square meter by the beginning of September.²⁵⁰ Kılınç indicates that towards the end of this intense process of purchase and sale of lands, the prices rose up to 10-15 liras per square meter.²⁵¹

Following the rapid increase in land prices, industrialists and speculators thinking that the lands of Çerkezköy would speedily gain value, started to buy lands from villages near Çerkezköy. From the beginning, land prices in the villages were lower compared to land prices in the district center. Before the coming of industry, while the price of a land was 20 kuruş per square meter in Çerkezköy, it was 10 kuruş per square meter in Kapaklı village.²⁵² Just like the 1960s in İstanbul, the industrialists headed towards the village lands which were both cheaper and outside

the Supreme Court. Feyyat, who had become a popular figure in the public with the title of “Çerkezköy prosecutor” during these years and who was accused of being a communist by the members of the JP, was elected as the İstanbul senator from the RPP list during the 1970s.

²⁴⁹ “Biz memurlar, kaymakam, üst rütbeli subaylar, sağlık müdürü köyleri gezip köylüyü uyardık. İlk alanlar çok ucuza almıştır. Köylüye dört, beş, altı, yedi lira diyerek daha yüksek fiyata vermesini söyledik. Köylünün rantını arttırdık. Söyleye söyleye fiyatları arttırdık.” Feyyat, interview by the author.

²⁵⁰ Çerkezköy Postası, 9 September 1972.

²⁵¹ Kılınç, interview by the author, 22 March 2011.

²⁵² Mehmet Aslan, “Bir Kasabanın (Kapaklı’nın) Sosyolojik İncelemesi,” (MA Thesis, Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi, 1988), p. 47.

the control of the municipality.²⁵³ According to an article published in a local newspaper in Çorlu, “Land in Çerkezköy and in its neighboring provinces and districts were being purchased and investments were made for the future.”²⁵⁴ In an another piece of news, it was stated that in nine villages of Çerkezköy, that is to say in the whole district, industrialists had bought ten thousand decares of land and that the mayor and district governor had tried to prevent the increase in land speculation in the district.²⁵⁵

At this juncture, the municipality made a critical decision and prevented the spread of industrial settlement in Çerkezköy to villages. According to the 47th Article of Zoning Plan Law no 6785, all the villages within the borders of the district were included in the municipal adjacent area.²⁵⁶ Thus, the unrestrained spread of factories to the villages was prevented. In order to prevent land speculation, the municipality applied to the Land Office in the Ministry of Development and Housing and demanded that the Land Office confiscate lands to provide for the industrialists.²⁵⁷

²⁵³ Doğu Mensucat purchased 63 decares of land from Kızılpınar village, which is next to Çerkezköy and spent 31,500 liras to bring electricity to the village. Sanacak Tül, on the other hand, bought lands in Veliköy. *Devrim*, 30 September 1972.

²⁵⁴ *Çorlu Ekspres*, 7 October 1972.

²⁵⁵ *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

²⁵⁶ Republic of Turkey, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 18252, 15 December 1983.

²⁵⁷ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 33.

The Land Office's Purchasing of Land and Taking the Decision to Establish

OIZ

The Minister of Development and Housing of the period, Turgut Toker,²⁵⁸ who had been the deputy mayor of İstanbul Municipality before, regarded Çerkezköy as the primary center to where İstanbul industry would be shifted. The fact that a great number of big industrialists chose Çerkezköy seems to have been effective in the making of this decision.

Our metropolitan plans of Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmir will take their final shape in the following days. Meanwhile, industrial location centers of İstanbul and Ankara have been determined. Preparations for choosing sites in Çerkezköy, to where the center of İstanbul industry will be moved, have started. In addition to the new facilities to be built there, a subject that threatens human health in İstanbul will be eliminated and the leather industry facilities in Zeytinburnu and Kazlıçeşme will be removed to Çerkezköy.²⁵⁹ This settlement also has been embraced by the private sector.²⁶⁰

Toker's emphasizing that Çerkezköy "also has been embraced by the private sector" in his speech creates the impression that he also conferred with the private sector and got their opinion while making this decision. Or else, while making this decision, he at least considered the influx of industrialists to Çerkezköy. In any case, Çerkezköy, which did not have any place on the agenda of layout planning of İstanbul industry, was immediately declared as the new settlement area of İstanbul industry after the

²⁵⁸ Ankara deputy of JP, Toker, had worked as deputy mayor in İstanbul and Ankara municipalities before he became a deputy. After the Second Nihat Erim government, which was formed during the March 12 interim regime, was dissolved, he ranked as the Minister of Development and Housing in Ferit Melen government which was formed on 22.05.1972. He remained in this office until 07.04.1973 when Melen Government resigned.

²⁵⁹ Removing the leather factories from İstanbul became possible only at the end of the 1980s. These enterprises were removed not to Çerkezköy but to the Tuzla Organized Leather Industrial Zone and to Çorlu.

²⁶⁰ *Çorlu Ekspres*, 5 December 1972; The preparations for choosing sites in Çerkezköy, mentioned by the Minister, was reported as news in *Çerkezköy Postası* published on September 9, where it was stated that the Land Office and technocrats of the Ministry of Industry were "working under a great pressure" on Çerkezköy. *Çerkezköy Postası* 9 September 1972.

coming of the industrialists. However, the coalition government, in which the Minister who made this announcement worked, would resign a couple of months later. Toker, even if he failed to remove the leather facilities from İstanbul during his period of ministry that lasted almost a year, provided that the Land Office under his ministry confiscated lands from Çerkezköy and İstanbul Dudullu in order to offer them to industrialists.

The Land Office confiscated almost 600 hectares of land close to the region from where industrialists had bought lands in Çerkezköy. While 450 hectares of this land was spared for the settlement of industrial enterprises, 150 hectares was planned as an industrial residential area.²⁶¹

In order to prevent incorrect settlements that might occur during the implementation of the Big İstanbul Master Plan, a Land Office organization has been established in İstanbul and it has already purchased lands that cost 25 million liras.

Confiscations, which especially are aimed to prevent the speculation in rural areas and to relieve the city center by pushing the industrial enterprises outside the city, have been realized at Çerkezköy and Dudullu. This organization, which is under the General Directorate of Land Office, conducts the business of designing the confiscated area for the present. The organization, which has a team of seven people under the leadership of İstanbul Provincial Development Director Beşiz Düvenli, will start building infrastructure facilities after the land it purchased has been designed and then it will evaluate the land demands of the necessary cooperatives and industrial enterprises.²⁶²

Another significant step taken during the same government period was the Council of Ministers' decision to build OIZ in Çerkezköy –along with some other cities. Dated 29 March 1973 by a decree of the Council of Ministers No. 7/6177, it was decided that in some cities, including Çerkezköy, OIZs were to be built.²⁶³

It is interesting that this decision, taken a week before the Melen government's resignation on 7 April 1973, was not published in the *Official Gazette*.

²⁶¹ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 33.

²⁶² *Milliyet*, 5 April 1973.

²⁶³ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 35.

Normally, all the decrees of the council of ministers enter into force only after they have been published in the *Official Gazette*. However, this decision taken on building OIZs in Kayseri, Kütahya, Zonguldak, Adana and Çerkezköy was not published. I could not determine whether this situation resulted simply from a mistake or a conscious decision.

From the area of 600 hectares confiscated by the Land Office, land was not allocated to industrialists. This area was to remain idle until it was purchased by The Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone Entrepreneur Establishment Committee (ÇOIZEEC, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Müteşebbis Teşekkül Heyeti*) with the aim of building OIZ in 1976.

The subject that would cause debate later on was that confiscation on such a scale had been realized and that the decision to build an OIZ in Çerkezköy, which had a water shortage, had been taken. Mehmet Serez, a researcher from Tekirdağ and a former member of the JP whom I interviewed on this subject, states that Tekirdağ deputy of the period Orhan Öztrak was influential in the making of the OIZ decision. Serez indicates that Öztrak with his political clout suppressed the director of Mineral Research and Exploration Institute (*Maden Tetkik Arama Enstitüsü, MTA*), who had been unable to find water in the region during the land survey, and had ensured the finding of groundwater at a depth of 65 meters by deepening the drilling more.

Orhan Öztrak asked, ‘Do you know the story of this place?’ (...) ‘I’, said he, ‘got the Organized Industrial Zone of this place from the State Planning Organization.’ I got it, which is not to say I asked for it, I got it. (...) ‘Hikmet [Uğraş],’ said he, ‘visited me many times’ (...) ‘Look’, he said. ‘I went to’, he said, the ‘Mineral Research and Exploration Institute and talked to the general director’, he said. ‘I told the general director, you will find water for me in that region, you will.’ Because, each textile factory requires 100 tons of water per day, 100 tons! There is no water, they manage with well water, and there is no water. Back then Maoists were dominant in the MTA. They went down to the depth of 45 meters and did not find any water. Orhan Öztrak told him ‘look here general director’, he said, ‘I will’, he said, ‘remove you

from the general directorate, you either find the water or you will be wasted from general directorate, watch your step.’ (...) Orhan Öztrak was such a good man that no one had ever seen him speak like this in a threatening manner. And then he said, ‘I threatened him.’ They ran across an arm of the Danube River at a depth of 65 meters.²⁶⁴

Mehmet Feyyat, Çerkezköy prosecutor of the period, also remarks that Öztrak was influential in taking the OIZ decision.²⁶⁵ Although we do not have exact information on this subject, it should be mentioned that the period when the National Reliance Party (*Milli Güven Partisi*) vice president Ferit Melen was the prime minister was a period in which Öztrak, the general secretary of the same party could have had effective political clout.^{266 267}

Another group that was able to use political clout to bring state investments to Çerkezköy was the industrialists themselves. Halit Narin, who purchased the largest amount of land in Çerkezköy was the vice-president of the Turkey Employers’ Union during those years. He was an influential businessman and representative of employers’ organizations. He was known for his closeness to and support of JP chairman Süleyman Demirel.²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ Serez, interview by the author.

²⁶⁵ Feyyat, interview by the author.

²⁶⁶ The Melen government, which was formed during the 12 March interim regime, became a coalition of the National Reliance Party and the JP after the ministers from the RPP inside the government, resigned on 4 November 1972. This coalition of right parties on the one hand followed a strict anti-communist policy, and on the other hand, carried out their pro-big capital economic policies.

²⁶⁷ The OIZs took an important place in the competition of politicians in the 1970s to bring state resources to their own regions. In many cities, decisions to establish OIZ were taken without serious feasibility studies, and then the construction of these OIZs lasted for years (15-20 years). There is data makes one think that the same situation is valid for at least some of the cities where OIZs were announced to be built with decree no 7/6177. Deputies of Kütahya and Kayseri, two cities about which the decision to establish OIZ was made, held the offices of Minister of Industry and Minister of Finance in the Melen government which made this decision. Among these, the construction of Kütahya Organized Industrial Zone started in 1979 and was completed in 1998. The time elapsed from the making of the decision to the completion of construction was exactly 25 years.

²⁶⁸ Halit Narin, who was the president of the Turkey Employers’ Union from 1974 to 1989, held the office of president of Turkish Textile Employers’ Union continually from 1974. Narin, who became a popular figure in public with the title of “boss of bosses” in the 1970s, was one of the leading representatives of big capital.

The Establishment of Factories and Problems Awaiting Solutions

In 1972, a great majority of the land on which factories were to be established had been purchased and in the meantime constructions had begun. Sadık Sever, former İstanbul development director and architect who intermediated in certain industrialists' investing in Çerkezköy, was preparing the layout plans of factories.²⁶⁹ Large horizontal factory buildings were being constructed on the large parcels of lands bought by the industrialists. Thirteen firms, which occupied an area of almost 413 hectares had begun construction.²⁷⁰



Fig. 4. A picture of Aksu and Dinarsu factories at the beginning of the 1980s.²⁷¹

In articles published in local newspapers, it was emphasized that the factories would make use of high technology and that the production would be export-oriented. It was said that Narin had made an investment of 361 million liras while Akip and

²⁶⁹ Devrim, 2 October 1972.

²⁷⁰ Eraydın, "Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location," p. 49.

²⁷¹ The picture was taken from the archives of ÇOIZ General Directorate.

Hema had made investments of 200 million liras each.²⁷² Attending the groundbreaking ceremony of the Hema hydraulic factory, Prime Minister Naim Talu, declared in the speech that Turkish industry had to prepare for international competition and the common market which was expected to be realized with the European Community and that it had to orient towards export. He also observed that the textile industry had a great potential of export to Europe. For this reason, he drew attention to the need to increase the number of high-tech and large scale firms.²⁷³

While 1973 passed with groundbreaking ceremonies attended by businessmen and politicians, it was said that at the beginning of the year 1974 an industrial investment of almost 2.5 billion liras was made in Çerkezköy.²⁷⁴ In this period when quite optimistic expectations appeared in the press, it was said that the industrial zone would be filled in a short time and that Çerkezköy would become the “Manchester of Turkey.”²⁷⁵ In a study conducted in 1975, which stated that “there is the conviction that the filling of the whole area can be realized in 10 years,” in the event that the conviction is realized, it was estimated that the population of Çerkezköy would reach 250,000.²⁷⁶

However, for the realization of these optimistic expectations, both the Turkish economy had to continue to grow and the fundamental problems, infrastructure among them in Çerkezköy had to be solved. From the end of 1972, attention started to be drawn to these problems. A news report dated 11 October 1972, complained that there was no communication among the industrialists who were building

²⁷² *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 2 March 1973; *Çerkezköy Postası* 11 October 1972.

²⁷³ *Milliyet*, 28 July 1973.

²⁷⁴ *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 5 April 1974.

²⁷⁵ *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

²⁷⁶ Taneri, pp. 174-176.

factories in Çerkezköy and that they were not interested in the infrastructure and housing problems of the district.²⁷⁷

One of the figures who first discussed the problems in Çerkezköy with the public was Şevket Yılmaz, Adana deputy from the JP and former president of the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions. Yılmaz, who was at the same time the president of Parliamentary Working Committee, by speaking outside the agenda in the session of the parliament held on 4 January 1973, pointed out the urgent problems awaiting solutions in Çerkezköy. Asserting that the state should make investment in the district since it was impossible for the infrastructure of Çerkezköy to meet the needs of the incoming industry, Yılmaz specified what needed to be done in six articles as follows:

1. Immediate action should be taken for the sewer, water and road problems of Çerkezköy district. To solve these problems there is a necessity that Ministry of Public Works, the General Directorate of Highways, the Ministry of Development and Housing, and the Ministry of Village Affairs cooperate.

2. That cadastral work has not been done in and around the district will cause great obstacles and disagreements in the future. I request that the Ministry of State, to which the General Directorate of Land Registry and Cadastre is attached, starts cadastral work in Çerkezköy at once by giving this issue priority.

3. It is a must that the General Directorate of the Social Insurance Institution make the necessary preparations for a dispensary in the first plan. Considering that in the following years at least 50,000 people will need to benefit from insured health services, there is a necessity that the required health facilities be constructed.

4. A fast tendency of land speculation in Çerkezköy has already started. A land of 10,000 decares purchased by the Land Office in this place is inadequate. It will be appropriate to expand the area belonging to the Land Office. Thus, both land speculation will be prevented and the required land for social housing, the construction of which is a necessity, will be allocated. Otherwise, if the sensitivity expected is not displayed, in a very short time this district of ours also will be filled with gecekondu. (...)

5. This district of ours requires a new zoning plan prepared by considering the industrial facilities which are being built. Çerkezköy can be an exemplary industrial city if, besides the need for housing in

²⁷⁷ *Çerkezköy Postası*, 11 October 1972.

which the employees will dwell with their families, other new facilities necessitated by the social and cultural requirements of the increasing population and by the daily life are planned.

6. An issue we regard with utmost importance is the issue of the housing of our employees. The construction of social housing should be started at once.²⁷⁸

This speech presented the fundamental problems and demands of industrialists. In two meetings repeated in the press at the beginning of 1974, industrialists summarized the problems of the region as electricity, road, water, communication, housing, industrial zone planning, cadastre, sewer, customs clearance and health services.²⁷⁹

To solve all these problems, a great number of state institutions had to be mobilized, which was not easy to achieve. Thus, RPP Tekirdağ deputy Yılmaz Alpaslan's remarks, delivered exactly three years after the Şevket Yılmaz's speech, show that Çerkezköy was far from being "an exemplary industrial city."

Our Çerkezköy does not have enough water for the population brought about by this industrialization. It is completely bereft of a sewer. Even the cesspools are inadequate. Nowadays, the sewage flows into our city. Electric energy is insufficient. Above all, a city zoning plan has not been prepared, yet. The city is being devastated by random projects. On the other hand, no organization addresses the issue of constructing social housing for the workers. The highway problem of the city also remains the same. (...) Presently, Çerkezköy does not even have a clinic hospital.²⁸⁰

All these problems, in addition to making the living conditions of the workers difficult, also posed a great obstacle to the factories' working efficiently. In order to solve these infrastructure problems, which could interrupt the profitability of big investments made in Çerkezköy, in cooperation, and to bring state resources to the region, the industrialists chose the way of organizing in an association.

²⁷⁸ Şevket Yılmaz, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 33, session 1, vol. 31, 4 January 1973.

²⁷⁹ *Ekonomi Politika*, 5 April 1974. *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 25 May 1974.

²⁸⁰ "Çerkezköy Plansız Şekilde Sanayileşiyor" (Çerkezköy is industrializing without a plan) *Devrim*, 3 December 1975.

The Foundation of the ÇIA and Its Activities

The Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association (ÇIA) was founded on 24 November 1973. Since all the headquarters of firms were in İstanbul, a branch of it was opened in İstanbul. The founding members of the association were Halit Narin (Narin Tekstil), Jak Kamhi (Profilo), Naim Akbay (Jakarteks), Necmettin Öztemir (Gümüşsuyu Halı), Mecdi Arca (Dinarsu Halı), Cüneyt Besen (Plaser), Turan Sümbül (Yünsa), Nuri Cerit (Akip İplik), Vedat Durusel (Durusel Halıcılık), Ertekin Ashaboğlu (Trakya İplik) and Kaymaz Akkalay. Although Halit Narin officially took on the task of the presidency of the association from its founding date to the Extraordinary General Assembly organized on 1 October 1974, this task was de facto fulfilled by vice president Naim Akbay. Akbay, who was elected president in that Assembly, remained in this office until 1980.²⁸¹

The main activity of the association was to mobilize state institutions and politicians in order to solve the infrastructure problems in Çerkezköy and to defend the common interests of industrialists.²⁸² In order to achieve this goal, negotiations were made with many state agencies, the urgency of the problems was expressed and efforts were made to bring government resources to the region. Providing a list of the institutions with which the board of directors of the ÇIA entered into negotiations to solve infrastructure and other problems portraty the intensity of the effort: the

²⁸¹ “Halit Narin did not actively engage in the work of the association in Çerkezköy. Naim Akbay was the one to take care of this locality. Naim Akbay was the first one to get down to work. He liked to deal with such works, and since he had a good Jewish partner, he had free time.” (*Halit Narin aktif bir şekilde uğraşmazdı Çerkezköy'deki dernek işleriyle. Bu yerelle ilgilenen Naim Akbay. İlk koşturan Naim Akbay. Bu işlere koşturmayı severdi, iyi Yahudi bir ortağı olduğu için vakti de vardı.*) Kılınç, interview by author, 22 March 2011.

²⁸² Besides, the association also carried out a wide range of “social assistance” activities in Çerkezköy, all of which are impossible to be mentioned here. Organizing circumcision ceremonies; contributing to having Atatürk's sculpture done; donating to associations for a mosque, local sports clubs, educational institutions in the region, police department and gendarmerie, certain political parties were among these activities.

Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Development and Housing, and the Directorate of Land Office, which was under the same ministry, the Ministry of Village Affairs, the Turkish Electricity Administration Regional Office, the State Hydraulic Works Regional Office, the Highways Regional Office, the Regional Office of General Directorate of State Posts, the Social Insurance Institution, the Provincial Directorate of Health, the Land Registry and Cadastre Office, the Ministry of Customs and Monopolies, the Governorship of Tekirdağ, Regional Police Directorate, and the Gendarmerie Regional Command. Sometimes, since a problem was in the area of responsibility of a few of these institutions at the same time, it was necessary to conduct meetings which brought their representatives together.

The remarks of one of the executives of Profilo and president of supervisory board of ÇIA Erdoğan Yalkın in a letter to the association give an idea of the activities of the association in the 1970s.

For the formation of infrastructure, each month a factory organized big dinner parties, comprising 70-80 people, attended by officials from Tekirdağ, Edirne and even Ankara, and thus the infrastructure of Çerkezköy was formed. (...)

All the expenses for the formation of the infrastructure, especially visits to Ankara, which were quite frequent, and even the donations to parties were met by the companies.

To make contact, by organizing gatherings with music and dinner in İstanbul each factory insured the acceleration of works.²⁸³

Political instability in the 1970s lead the obstacles which made it difficult for the ÇIA to obtain results while consistently continuing these activities. In seven years that passed from the founding of the association on 24 November 1973 to 12 the

²⁸³ Dated 1993, this letter, presented in the Appendix section, was written with the aim of providing information while a report on the expenses made by the founding firms of ÇIA for the region since the beginning. ÇIA Archive.

September 1980 military coup, eight governments held office.²⁸⁴ During first General Assembly of the ÇIA, this problem was pointed out.

(...) we should primarily and sincerely state that without exception, all the problems [highways, water, electricity, communication, housing, industrial zone planning, problems of health and social services] mentioned above by our temporary board of directors have been dealt with one by one, conveyed to all the relevant public and private institutions in detail, and it has been ensured that they address these problems still more each day. However, alternatives in domestic and foreign politics, reasonable and indispensable reasons, and leastwise turning of the bureaucracy wheel slowly have decelerated solving some of our problems while they have kept the solving of some other problems in their normal course.²⁸⁵

Among the state institutions with which ÇIA conducted lobbying activities, the one that it had to make contact most was naturally the Ministry of Industry.

Undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry Mehmet Gölhan listened to the problems of industrialists by attending the meeting organized by the ÇIA in Çerkezköy on 23 August 1974. During the meeting industrialists complained that the infrastructure problems in Çerkezköy, in which they had made investments with “great expectations,” had somehow not been solved, and they demanded that the ministry

²⁸⁴ Although the industrialists in Çerkezköy preferred JP government in the 1970s, they did not refrain from adopting a style suitable to the RPP discourse in periods when RPP formed a government. Since they constantly had business with state agencies they tried to get on well with each government. What was said in the press conference, held by ÇIA on 5 April 1974 during RPP-MSP coalition government, can be shown as an example of this.

“Authorities [board of the ÇIA], by expressing that with regards to the visits they paid to the relevant official authorities they were not received as the representatives of monopoly capital, remarked ‘we, industrialists in Çerkezköy, believe that we will work with the latest means of technology in cooperation with the state sector, public sector and cooperatives, and we wish that all the smart industrialists would believe in this.’ ” (*Yetkililer [ÇERSAD yönetimi] ilgili makamlarla yaptıkları temaslarda tekeli sermayenin temsilcileri olarak karşılanmadıklarını, ifade ederek ‘biz Çerkezköy sanayicileri tekniğin en son imkanları ile devlet sektörü, halk sektörü ve kooperatiflerle elele çalışacağımıza inanıyor, akıllı sanayicilerimizin tümünün buna inanmasını diliyoruz’ şeklinde konuşmuşlardır.*) “Çerkezköy Sanayi Derneği: Hükümet Sanayicinin Yanında,” (Çerkezköy Industrial Association: The government is on the side of industrialists), *Ekonomi Politika*, 5 April 1974.

²⁸⁵ ÇIA Extraordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1 October 1974, ÇIA Archive, p. 1.

urgently supported the solving of problems by “exerting its authority where necessary.”

The industrialists stated that in Çerkezköy, where nothing was complete, the situation was desperate, as a result of problems with electricity, water, communication, transportation and loans, facilities that cost millions of liras were inactive, (...) and that none of the guarantees given during the building of facilities were valid presently. (...) the industrialists, remarking that they had difficulties in terms of loans stated that the guarantee of an 80 percent loan and 20 percent capital, which had been promised them while the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone was being established, was not implemented and that they had great difficulties at banks (...) They asserted, ‘Promises given to us by the ministry have not been kept.’ The Industrialists, in the meantime, remarked that incentive certificates had been given to industrialists who had applied to invest in Çerkezköy before it had been analyzed as a region, and that was why they were in such a condition.²⁸⁶

In response to the industrialists, undersecretary Mehmet Gölhan said that “the problems of Çerkezköy, which will lead the moving of Turkish industry outside the metropolitan areas, will be solved as soon as possible”. He stated that “assistance will be provided to them from the funding allocated for the establishment of the Organized Industrial Zone.”²⁸⁷

As is understood from this news, before they made investments in Çerkezköy, industrialists received some promises from politicians on providing especially infrastructure and loans. In addition, they criticized how the incentive certificates had been used without conducting a land survey in Çerkezköy (in other words they criticize the Ministry of Industry during Melen government).

During these meetings, the undersecretary Mehmet Gölhan, told the industrialists that they could solve all these problems only by establishing an Organized Industrial Zone and advised them that they should embark upon such an

²⁸⁶ “Çerkezköy Sanayi Bölgesinin Hiçbir Sorunu Henüz Halledilmiş Değil” (None of the problems of Çerkezköy Industrial Zone has yet been solved), *Ekonomi Politika*, 24 August 1974.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

enterprise²⁸⁸ because almost all the infrastructure and superstructure expenses of OIZs were met by the Ministry of Industry. In this case, the establishment of OIZ was adopted by industrialists as the most effective way of directing state resources to Çerkezköy.

For our problems to be solved by the relevant public institutions in time and completely, before anything else it is necessary that the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone be transformed into Organized Industrial Zone.

At the meetings held at the Ministry of Industry and Technology, the importance of such an organization was emphasized and it was recommended.²⁸⁹

The Establishment of the Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone (ÇOIZ)

Although the establishment of the Organized Industrial Zones in Turkey had begun in early 1960s, there was no law that regulated their establishment and operation. Until the Organized Industrial Zones Law was enacted in 2000, OIZs could be established according to the Organized Industrial Zones Establishment Fund Regulations, dated 1967, of the Ministry of Industry. According to the Regulations, in order to establish an OIZ in a place, a chamber of industry and commerce had to be present there; however, these were not present in Çerkezköy. For this reason, by changing the regulations, it was provided that employers' associations also could form an OIZ EEC in cooperation with municipality and provincial special administration.

²⁸⁸ Kılınç, interview by the author, 22 March 2011.

²⁸⁹ “Problemlerimizin ilgili kamu kuruluşları tarafından zamanında tüm olarak ve noksansız halli için her şeyden evvel Çerkezköy Sanayi Bölgesi’nin Organize Sanayi Bölgesi haline dönüştürülmesi gerekmektedir.

Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı’nda yapılan toplantılarda böyle bir organizasyonun önemi üzerinde bilhassa durulmuş ve tavsiye edilmiştir.” ÇIA 1st Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1975, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

However, as an association, in accordance with the regulations, we were deprived of the opportunity to embark on such an organization and to constitute and benefit from the necessary fund by establishing an organized industrial zone entrepreneur establishment. As a result of our efforts and close support of the Ministry of Industry, with the change made in the 7th article of the Organized Industrial Zone Establishment Fund Regulations, which was published in the *Official Gazette* on 21 October 1974, the decision that associations could establish Organized Industrial Zone entrepreneur establishment in cooperation with provincial special administration and municipality was officially issued.²⁹⁰

We had very important problems which were beyond the limits of our material and spiritual powers and were awaiting solutions. The only way out was the formula to establish an Organized Industrial Zone in Çerkezköy in a way in which we should do with what we had and to provide the present industry in certain ways with benefits and services brought by it. Departing from this main idea, contacts with the Ministry of Industry and Technology started.

In several meetings held with the officials of the ministry, first of all an agreement on the importance of an organization in principle was reached. However, as an association, our participation in such an organization (Organized Industrial Zone Entrepreneur Establishment) as a constitutive element was impossible due to the regulations in force. As a result of our pressing efforts and close support of the Ministry of Industry, with the change made into the 7th article of Organized Industrial Zone Establishment Fund Regulations, which was published in the *Official Gazette* on 21 October 1974, it was provided that the associations formed among industrialists could be included in the entrepreneur entity which was formed by Chambers of Industry and Commerce in tandem with Provincial Special Administration and Municipalities before.²⁹¹

When the Çerkezköy municipality and Tekirdağ Provincial Special Administration also found this enterprise favourable, the ÇIA established Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone Entrepreneur Establishment Committee (ÇOIZEEC) together with these institutions. ÇOIZEEC was composed of nine people, including five ÇIA representatives, two municipal representatives, and two representatives of the provincial special administration. The committee took great responsibility and powers, such as with the loan it received from the ministry of industry planning,

²⁹⁰ ÇIA 1st Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1975, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

²⁹¹ ÇIA 2nd Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

constructing, parceling OIZ and selling lands, operating the zone and ensuring that the loans were repaid. The Ministry of Industry only had a supervisory role.²⁹²

The lobbying activity of the ÇIA in the establishment of the OIZ was limited to this. The ten percent share which was to be paid by the EEC was, instead of cash in advance, transformed into payment by bank letter of guarantee for the first time in Turkey.

In accordance with (g) clause of the 4th article of the Organized Industrial Zone Establishment Fund Regulations, it was required that 10 percent of the sum of the exploration project (9,260,200) be paid by the entrepreneur committee [EEC] cash in advance for the expenses of the establishment of the organized industrial zone (92,6002,000 TL). As the committee, it was declared that this was impossible, and that since industrialists in Çerkezköy had used all their means to make their investments the 10 percent payment was out of the question. It was proposed that alternatives be sought. At the meeting held among the representatives of our association, the deputy undersecretary, and president of the department of industry under the chairmanship of the Minister of Industry and Technology of the period, Mehmet Gölhan, whose close interest and support we had had since the beginning, a formula to be implemented in Turkey for the first time was found:

The 10 percent share of the Entrepreneur Committee was to be given as bank letter of guarantee.²⁹³

In the future, the payment of ten percent share by bank letter of guarantee was to be regarded as too much by the industrialists in Çerkezköy and it was ensured that the Ministry of Industry decreased the share of the EEC to one percent.²⁹⁴

The establishment of the ÇOIZ officially started with the protocol made by ÇOIZEEC, which was composed of the ÇIA, the Çerkezköy Municipality, and the Tekirdağ Provincial Special Administration, with the Ministry of Industry on 25 December 1975. According to the protocol, the payments to be made from the fund

²⁹² Çezik and Eraydın, p. 63.

²⁹³ ÇIA 2nd Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

²⁹⁴ Naim Akbay, No. 14-78 document, 31 August 1978, ÇIA Archive.

of the Ministry of Industry were to be repaid in 25 years at an interest rate of 3.5 percent by means of selling parcels of land in the ÇOIZ.²⁹⁵

As for the place where the OIZ would be established, in the beginning the area where the present factories were situated and some of the lands confiscated by the Land Office next to it were considered. the OIZ board reasoned that “If we can purchase some lands of the Land Office at prime cost and enlarge the limits of the industrial zone in a way to include the present industrial facilities and organize infrastructure and other issues together with the entrepreneur committee, we will have found a way out.”²⁹⁶ However, this idea was later on given up and it was decided to establish the OIZ only in the area confiscated by Land Office. “Presently, we are in the stage of purchasing 4,800,000 m2 of land from the State Land Office in the cheapest way in accordance with the law and the legislation and having it paid from the fund.”²⁹⁷ Probably, the industrialists worried that their own property would be a part of the OIZ, the legal status of which was not clear and which would be administrated in tandem with the local administration and governorate. Instead of this, they preferred to benefit from the OIZ’s infrastructure by staying out of it.

At the ÇIA’s General Assembly in 1976, the benefits that would be brought by the OIZ, the establishment of which begun, in the future to industrialists who were in the present industrial region of the municipality were compiled as follows:

²⁹⁵ ÇIA 2nd Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, ÇIA Archive, p. 5-6.

²⁹⁶ “*Arsa ofisinin bir kısım arazisini maliyet fiyatından almak ve sanayi sahasının hudutlarını mevcut sanayi tesislerini de içinde alacak şekilde genişletip alt yapı ve diğer hususları bu teşebbüs heyeti ile organize edersek çıkar yol bulunmuş olur.*” Minutes of ÇIA 1st Ordinary General Assembly, 30 January 1975, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

²⁹⁷ “*Şimdi Devlet Arsa Ofisinden alınacak 4.800.000 m2 arsanın en ucuz şekilde kanun ve mevzuatlara uygun olarak alınması ve fondan ödenmesi safhasına gelmiş bulunuyoruz.*” ÇIA 2nd Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, ÇIA Archive, p. 5.

1- We will have the opportunity to benefit from the infrastructure services which will be built in the Organized Industrial Zone, at low cost.

2- Our problems, such as a fire station, water, sewer, disposal of sewage water, and environmental pollution will be solved.

3- We will have the opportunity to benefit from the social facilities.

4- From now on, the industrial problems of Çerkezköy will be considered as the problems of an expanded industrial zone and we will have the constant support of the state.²⁹⁸

The first step in the establishment of OIZ, which was started with the above mentioned aims, was to purchase 450 hectares of land for six liras per square meter from the Land Office.²⁹⁹ By June 1977, the implementation of the zoning plan of the zone and projects of infrastructure and superstructure were completed, and from this date onwards construction work began. The zone was divided into 107 industrial parcels with dimensions ranging from 4,000 square meters to 240,000 square meters.³⁰⁰

Except for the treatment plant, the work on the infrastructure continued until 1988, and the treatment plant would only be put into service in 1995.

Lobbying Activities of the ÇIA until the Beginning of the 1980s

Below what kind of solutions industrialists in Çerkezköy and the ÇIA brought to the infrastructure and labor problems, will be discussed, two main issues for the operation of firms, from the beginning of the 1970s to the mid-1990s. For this reason, here we will mention the lobbying activities apart from these two main issues.

²⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 6.

²⁹⁹ ÇIA 3rd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1977, ÇIA Archive.

³⁰⁰ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 December 1981.

It has been mentioned above that the motivating factor for the industrialists to choose Çerkezköy was the region having been declared a PAD, that is to say, special incentives were provided to the investors. However, it was impossible for an area, where 16 industrial enterprises were built and some of which started manufacturing, to have the same status according the criteria of the SPO. As much as is understood from the minutes of the ÇIA's general assemblies, the SPO, in its 1975 Annual Program, wanted to remove Çerkezköy from the PADs; however, this was prevented by the intervention of the Ministry of Industry. On the other hand, due to the water problem in the area, giving new incentive certificates was suspended. The president of the ÇIA, Naim Akbay, described this situation in the minutes of the General Assembly as such:

“Incentive certificates have been suspended by the ministry since the water problem has not been currently solved. However, the issue of Çerkezköy is being removed from PADs by SPO has resulted in our favour thanks to the efforts of dear Minister of Industry Mehmet Gölhan.”³⁰¹

Çerkezköy was on the list of PADs in the program of 1975. However, in the 42nd Article of the program, after indicating that İstanbul and İzmit had been excluded from the scope of incentives, it said “For the demands of incentives concerning Çerkezköy, the approval of SPO is required.”³⁰² Thus, the giving of special incentives for new investments to be made in Çerkezköy was stopped; nonetheless, it was ensured that the investments made should continue to benefit from special incentives.

However, in the program of 1976, Çerkezköy was moved to the same status as İstanbul and İzmit in terms of new investments; in other words, it was also

³⁰¹ “Şu anda su problemi halledilmediği için teşvik belgeleri bakanlıkça askıya alınmıştır. Ancak Çerkezköy’ün DPT tarafından gerice yörelikten çıkartılması hususu da sayın Sanayi Bakanı Mehmet Gölhan’ın gayretleriyle lehimize sonuçlanmıştır.”ÇIA 1st Ordinary General Assembly Proceeding, 30 January 1975, ÇIA Archive.

³⁰² Republic of Turkey, “1975 Yılı Programı’nın Uygulanması,” p. 4, 11.

declared that new investors could not benefit from the incentives on the general incentives table. On the other hand, by maintaining Çerkezköy's status as a PAD, it was ensured that the present industrialists would benefit from the special incentives one more year.³⁰³

Nonetheless, in the program of 1977, a compromise was reached, Çerkezköy was excluded from the PADs; however, it was declared that the firms to be established could benefit from the general incentives. In other words, the area was removed from having the same status as İstanbul and İzmit. Instead, it was reckoned with other cities where industrial concentration had reached a certain level.

For the incentives of new investments and expansion investments above the economic scale, that will be made within the territorial boundaries of the provinces of Bursa, Sakarya, İzmir, Antalya, İçel, Adana, Hatay and the district of Çerkezköy, and within the boundaries of Ankara Municipality, it is essential that the location is approved by the Ministry of Industry and Technology in terms of planning urbanization, preventing environmental pollution, and protecting agricultural lands.³⁰⁴

However, in the program of 1978, Çerkezköy was again moved to the same status as İstanbul and İzmit and an end was put to the firms' benefiting from the general incentives.³⁰⁵ In August of the same year, the situation was further reiterated by the issuance of a declaration in which it was stated that "new investments and expansion investments above the economic capacity" to be made in İstanbul, İzmit, and

³⁰³ "New investments to be made in the borders of İstanbul Province, Kocaeli Province and Çerkezköy district, expansion investment above the economic scale (except for investments of ship, shipyard, tourism, mass merchandizing, modern storage facilities equipped with ventilation, bulk and mixed cement and ready-mixed mortar, frigorific truck and trailer, dairy cattle, milk processing facilities and agriculture) have been moved excluded from the scope of incentive implementations.

Incentives of expansion, modernization, renovation, quality improvement, and debottlenecking investments related to present facilities, which are in large scales not to be ignored in these areas, will be proceeded according to the provisions of this program decision." Republic of Turkey, "1976 Yılı Programı'nın Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine Dair Karar" in *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 15456, 2 January 1976, p. 4, 12.

³⁰⁴ Republic of Turkey, "1977 Yılı Programı'nın Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine Dair Karar" in *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 15780, 1 December 1976, p. 13.

³⁰⁵ Republic of Turkey, "1978 Yılı Programı'nın Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine Dair Karar" in *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 16214, 28 February 1978, p. 39.

Çerkezköy “cannot benefit from any of the incentive measures whether they are on the incentive lists or not.”³⁰⁶

After this date, the ÇIA made attempts at the Ministry of Industry to have Çerkezköy reclassified to the status of a “normal” region (in other words, so as to abolish the restriction on general incentives). Naim Akbay, in a letter sent to the Ministry of Industry, stated that entrepreneurs who had applied to purchase lands in ÇOIIZ had given up their applications after the area had been excluded from the scope of incentives.³⁰⁷ In addition, it is said that a company named Kimkat, which had bought land in Çerkezköy had moved the investment to the Vize district of Kırklareli when the incentives for Çerkezköy were removed.³⁰⁸

It has been observed that the ÇIA’s attempts to remove the incentive restrictions accomplished a result at the beginning of 1980.

Our association, (...) has made the necessary attempts about this issue at the relevant Ministry and undersecretary of State Planning; as a result of the meetings held, a positive result has been obtained from the relevant authorities on the issue of Çerkezköy’s reinclusion in the scope of incentives at least on a project basis. We have received the confirmation from the General Directorate of Incentives and Implementation Department of the Ministry of Industry and Technology, and the undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry that nowadays a change in the decree will be made.³⁰⁹

As it had been anticipated by the Board of Directors of the ÇIA, in the Declaration on Promoting and Directing the Investments of the Ministry of Industry, published on 14 May 1980 in the *Official Gazette*, only the names of İstanbul and İzmit were mentioned as areas where incentives were restricted. Çerkezköy was not mentioned

³⁰⁶ Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 16376, 13 August 1978.

³⁰⁷ Naim Akbay, No. 46-78 document, 9 October 1978, ÇIA Archive. (The document is present in the Appendix section.)

³⁰⁸ ÇIA 6th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1980, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

³⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 5.

in this scope.³¹⁰ As for the Program of 1982, which was published in November 1981, although the area of incentive restriction was expanded to include the municipal borders of Ankara, Bursa, and İzmir in addition to İstanbul and İzmit, Çerkezköy was not included in this list.³¹¹ In other words, as was expressed at the 1980 General Assembly of the ÇIA, Çerkezköy “at least” had achieved the status of a normal area.

The next step of the association following this one was to have Çerkezköy switched to the status of PAD again! The Ulusu government, formed after the 12 September 1980 military coup, with a decree it issued on 12 July 1982 had provided that the investments which had incentive certificates in provinces that had been PAD before and the attribute of which had been removed in 1981 could benefit from the incentives given to PADs until 1985.³¹² The new president of the ÇIA, Mecdi Arca,³¹³ directly applied to the prime minister Ulusu (who visited the district in the beginning of July 1982) so that this decree was also implemented for Çerkezköy, which was removed from the scope of PAD in 1977.

As it is the case with other underdeveloped areas, we had presented to your high opinion that in our Region as well many conditions of underdeveloped areas still continued.

For this reason, our dear government, with an apt decision, implemented decree no. 8/4913 and thus stopped the unjust treatment of many investments.

However, we are of the opinion that our region’s not being included in the scope of the aforementioned decree although all the conditions of underdeveloped areas prevail is the result of a mistake.³¹⁴

³¹⁰ Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 17017, 14 June 1980.

³¹¹ Republic of Turkey, “1982 Yılı Programı’nın Uygulanması, Koordinasyonu ve İzlenmesine Dair Karar” in *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 17530, 30 November 1981, p. 13.

³¹² Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 17752, 12 July 1982.

³¹³ Arca, the general director of Dinarsu firm within the body of Dinçkök Holding, was the president of ÇIA and ÇOIZEEC from 1980 to 1989.

³¹⁴ Mecdi Arca, letter dated 11 August 1982, ÇIA Archive. (The document is present in the Appendix section.)

This daring effort to have a district, in which almost 10,000 industrial workers were employed, declared as an underdeveloped area remained fruitless. However, the board of the ÇIA was to take its chance once more in order to realize this excessive demand. In the briefing given to the president of the republic, Kenan Evren, who visited Çerkezköy on 10 July 1984, in addition to the other demands, the request that the district be declared a PAD again was expressed as a primary demand.³¹⁵ Despite all these efforts, Çerkezköy was denied the status of PAD.

The fact that the status of Çerkezköy constantly changed in the regional incentive implementation during the 1970s resulted from the differences of attitudes both between the SPO and the Ministry of Industry, and among the governments which came into power. Though the SPO recommended in 1975 that Çerkezköy be removed from the scope of PAD, the time was extended for two more years with the intervention of the Ministry of Industry. The fact that some of the firms which had started investing in the area after receiving incentive certificate had not yet finished construction seems to have played a role in this extension. Among the investors who had received incentive certificate, Gümüşsuyu was the last to finish construction in 1976. Çerkezköy's status as a PAD was terminated at the end of this year.

The program of 1978, which brought a strict incentive restriction to Çerkezköy, and the declaration issued within that year occurred during the 3rd Ecevit government; however, the removal of these restrictions took place during the 6th Demirel government. In fact, the difference of attitude between the Ministry of Industry and the SPO was also closely related to the difference between the parties. Mehmet Gölhan,³¹⁶ the undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry from 1972 to

³¹⁵ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 12 July 1984.

³¹⁶ Gölhan, who was also the Minister of Industry outside GNAT during the Irmak government which was in power from 17 November 1974 to 31 March 1975, was the undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry from 1972 to 1976 and 1979 to 1982.

1976, was one of the bureaucrats that are closest to Demirel, the leader of the JP. On the other hand, in the 1970s generally, people who shared close views with the RPP worked in the SPO. During these years, while the right wing represented by the JP was in full compliance with the demands of the capital circles, the RPP had a populist attitude more detached from the capital. For this reason, the lobbying activities of the ÇIA was able to obtain more results during the coalition governments leaded by the JP and in the state institutions where members of the JP were effective.³¹⁷

Another lobbying activity of the ÇIA in this period was related to the establishment of a customs office in Çerkezköy. The industrialists in Çerkezköy, who exported some of their goods, decided in the General Assembly of 1975 that they should attempt to establish a customs office.³¹⁸ In the same year an application was made to Orhan Öztrak, the Minister of Customs and Monopolies of the period, and it was ensured that the works for the establishment of Çerkezköy Customs Office started.³¹⁹ The Çerkezköy Customs Office was established in 1976.³²⁰

The ÇIA, which became an effective employers' organization, was interested not only in local problems. In a letter sent by Naim Akbay in 1979 to Halil Başol, Minister of Commerce from the JP, adopting a national commerce policy that

³¹⁷ It is possible to observe the sympathy of industrialists for the AP and their antipathy for the RPP in the beginning of the letter sent by Naim Akbay to Tekirdağ deputy Halil Başol, who became the Minister of Commerce, four days after the 3rd Ecevit government's commission expired and 6th Demirel government was formed: "The fact that a power and mentality we pined for came into force and your assignment once again especially to a Ministry closely concerned with our problems has been the greatest happiness for us as industrialists." (*Sanayiciler olarak özlemine duyduğumuz bir iktidar ve zihniyetin göreve başlamış olması ve bilhassa sorunlarımızla en yakından ilgili bir Bakanlığa yeniden atanmanız bizler için mutlulukların en yücesi olmuştur.*) Naim Akbay, letter no. 44-79, 15 November 1979, ÇIA Archive.

³¹⁸ ÇIA 1st General Assembly Minutes, 30 January 1975, ÇIA Archive, p. 5.

³¹⁹ ÇIA 2nd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

³²⁰ ÇIA 3rd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1977, ÇIA Archive, p. 5.

favoured the weaving and garment sectors was recommended.³²¹ Still, in a letter sent to the relevant authorities on behalf of ÇOIZEEC, that most of the resources of the OIZ and Small Industrial Sites Fund under the Ministry of Industry were spent on small industrial sites which decreased the resources of the OIZs, resulting in the prolongation of the constructions; therefore, the committee recommended that “small industrial sites should definitely be removed from the resources of organized industrial zone establishment funds.”³²²

Although it cannot be claimed that all the attempts of the ÇIA obtained results, these intensive lobbying activities played a significant role in solving the problems of the industrialists in Çerkezköy and increasing their profits.

The Çerkezköy Industrial Zone at the Beginning of the 1980s

Completing the construction works of all the factories in Çerkezköy Industrial Zone lasted until 1976. In fact, a total of 34 firms had received incentive certificates to build industrial facilities in Çerkezköy. However, among these firms, those which could not (or did not) fulfill the requirements of incentives until September 1975 lost their rights to benefit from them. In other words, almost half of the entrepreneurs who purchased land in the area built industrial facilities there. After the incentives were removed industrial migration to the area stopped.

³²¹ The three-stage commerce policy of Akbay, who was also a manufacturer of garments was as follows: Firstly, the practice of providing cotton to manufacturers of yarn at export prices should be more strictly followed and cotton exports should be restricted; secondly, yarn should be provided to the weaving sector at export prices; and thirdly, textiles should be provided to the garment sector at export prices. (In those years, the export prices of textile raw materials and products were cheaper than the domestic prices.) Thus, Turkey should become a country that mainly exports. Naim Akbay, letter no. 44-79, 15 November 1979, ÇIA Archive.

³²² Presidency of Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone Entrepreneur Establishment Committee, “Çerkezköy Industrial Zone,” 10 July 1981, ÇIA Archive, p. 9.

In the table below the list of the industrial enterprises in the area according to the data of 1982 is given. Except for these 15 firms that present a stable existence in the area, 4-5 small firms also operated between 1976 and 1983 for a short time and closed down.³²³

Table 5. Factories at Çerkezköy at the beginning of 1980s³²⁴

Firm	Product	Open area (decares)	Closed area (decares)	Employees
1. AKİP Tekstil Sanayi A.Ş. (Ercan Holding)	Cotton yarn	473	23	489
2. AKSU İplik Dokuma Boya A.Ş. (Dinçkök Holding)	Textile fabric	300	41	352
3. ASMA Sentetik İplik, Çuval San. A.Ş.	Synthetic yarn, sack		4	70
4. BOMAŞ Bobin Masura Sanayi A.Ş. (Ercan Holding)	Coil, bobbin	15	3	58
5. DİNARSU İmalat ve Ticaret A.Ş. (Dinçkök Holding)	Carpet, blanket	320	45	869
6. GÜMÜŞSUYU Halı Sanayi A.Ş.	Carpet	79	32	726
7. HEMA Hidrolik Makine Sanayi A.Ş. (Hattat Holding)	Hydraulic pump	200	23	490
8. JAKARTEKS Mensucat Sanayi A.Ş.	Upholstery and drapery fabric	200	30	320
9. NARİN Mensucat Fabrikaları A.Ş.	Cotton yarn, corduroy	1000	109	945
10. PLASER Plastik Sanayi A.Ş.	Plastic greenhouse films	46	3	20
11. PEG Profilo Elektrikli Gereçler Sanayi A.Ş.	Refrigerator	152	84	1966
12. PEMKO Profilo Elektrik Motorları Kompresör A.Ş.	Electric motor, compressor	96	26	1401
13. POLİJÜT Ambalaj Eşya San. A.Ş.	Polypropylene sack	106	7	170
14. TRAKYA İplik Sanayi A.Ş.	Cotton yarn	381	22	350
15. YÜNŞA Yünlü Sanayi A.Ş. (Sabancı Holding)	Yarn, fabric, carpet	300	34	690
	TOTAL	3668	486	8916

11 of the 15 firms on the list were large-scale enterprises that employed more than 300 workers. Four of them were small and medium-sized companies. If they are analyzed on the basis of sector, out of 15 firms, nine were in the textile sector, three were in the metal sector, two were in the plastic sector, and one was in the paper sector. Sixty percent of the firms and 54 percent of the employees were in the textile

³²³ Eraydın, "Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location," p. 20.

³²⁴ Eker, p. 117; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 7 July 1982; *Yurt Encyclopedia*, p. 7014.

sector. The metal sector, making up the second most intensive sector, includes 43 percent of the employees.

In Table 5, it is observed that especially the firms which first came to Çerkezköy bought more lands than they required. The rate of construction on the lands of Narin, Akip and Trakya İplik, three firms which first purchased lands in Çerkezköy, was 10 percent, 5 percent and 6 percent, respectively. The construction rate of the area, a total of 3668 decares, was 13 percent. Purchasing such large lands can be, partly, explained by the idea that investments might expand more in the future, and the fact that industrialists had “got their fingers burnt” in İstanbul. However, these reasons cannot fully explain the situation for all the industrialists. Purchasing such large amounts of land seems to have resulted also from the motive to earn profit from the speculations on land prices in the future. In 1972 and 1973, the expectations about the future of Çerkezköy were much greater than the reality.³²⁵ The Minister of Development and Housing’s declaration that İstanbul industry would be moved to Çerkezköy must have increased the expectations considerably. It is understood that due to these expectations, industrialists aimed to have a share in the land speculation.³²⁶

³²⁵ Expectations for the future of Çerkezköy the population of which was about 4000 at the beginning of 1972 were as follows: Çerkezköy will have a population of 20-25,000 thousand by 1975 at the latest. *Devrim*, 2 October 1972; According to the official estimates, it is said that 10 years later Çerkezköy would have a population of 80,000. *Çerkezköy Postası*, 9 September 1972.

³²⁶ In the third chapter, it was mentioned that in Turkey in the 1970s not only estate agents, but also industrialists turned to land speculation.




Fig. 5. Çerkezköy industrial zone layout plan (1984).³²⁷ Since the names of firms were illegible in the original drawing, these names have been added with red letters.

As stated above, the headquarters of all of the enterprises in Çerkezköy were in İstanbul. For this reason, Çerkezköy had the characteristic of a typical satellite industrial zone. Seven of these firms had factories also in İstanbul. Out of these seven firms, only two of them had input-output relationship between the factories in Çerkezköy and İstanbul. However, two enterprises in the area moved their factories from İstanbul to Çerkezköy.³²⁸

In the Çerkezköy industrial zone, input-output relations between firms did not exist except for one case. Bomaş, creating the exception, sold bobbin and thread

³²⁷ Taken from ÇIA Archive.

³²⁸ Eker, p. 127.

spool to the textile firms. As a matter of fact, the reason for its coming to the area, in addition to the incentive, was to be close to textile firms.³²⁹

The enterprises in the area did not have any raw materials relationship with Thrace. They brought their raw materials from various regions of Turkey and abroad. Their markets were, until the beginning of the 1980s, mostly domestic. In 1976, İstanbul created 84 percent of the domestic market.³³⁰ From the 1980s onwards, the share of exports increased. Most of the products were exported to Europe while some of them were exported to the Middle East.³³¹ In 1983, among the firms in Çerkezköy, Trakya İplik and Narin stated that they exported 80 percent of their production, while Akip exported 85 percent of its production, and Polijüt exported all of its production.³³²

The president of the ÇIA Mecdi Arca, described their turning to exports to journalist Mete Akyol as follows:

‘We were producing a lot, we were making a lot of money’ he said, ‘We did not know what it was to stock... The goods we produced were sold and consumed in the domestic market instantly.’

When I heard the expression ‘domestic market,’ it occurred to me and I asked about the foreign market:

‘Were not you exporting at the same time?’ I said.

Mecdi Arca answered my question with sincerity:

‘I should admit that we did not need to get tired of exporting’ he said, ‘While we could sell the goods we produced without having any troubles in Karaköy, none of us took the trouble to go abroad and look for foreign markets for nothing...’

‘What about now?’

‘Now the conditions have completely changed, of course’ said Mecdi Arca, ‘When our sales stopped in the domestic market, in order to survive, by necessity, we started to look for foreign markets and to

³²⁹ Eraydın, “Factors in the Choice of Industrial Location,” p. 108.

³³⁰ Ibid. p. 31.

³³¹ Eker p. 122; The owner of Gümüşsuyu and the president of Machine Carpet Manufacturers’ Association Bedrettin Öztemir stated that they went into a crisis when the domestic market shrank after the 24 January 1980 decisions which liberalized the economy, and that they were able to overcome it by increasing their exports. Öztemir, remarking that they also benefitted from export incentives, stated that their goal was to increase the rate of exports to fifty percent of their total sales. *Milliyet*, 6 November 1983.

³³² “Çerkezköy Özel Eki,” *Dünya Gazetesi*, 28 March 1983.

push the opportunities to sell our goods abroad. And I can proudly say that we have achieved great successes in our activities. Now we make more sales in the foreign market than the domestic market.’³³³

Almost all the transportation of raw materials and products of industrialists in Çerkezköy are carried out via highways. The railway is used only by a plastics firm when it purchases raw material from Europe. The traffic of raw materials and products with remote countries is made via highways until İstanbul port, and then via shipping. The railway is not used because it is too slow compared to the highways.³³⁴

In the ten years that passed from the coming of industry to the beginning of the 1980s, although the infrastructure of Çerkezköy had been partly improved, none of the serious problems had yet been solved. In Çerkezköy in a special insert of *Dünya Gazetesi*, published March 1983, the industrialists, with whom interviews had been made, pointed out the ongoing infrastructure problems. The inadequacy of the D-100 highway which was the only alternative for transportation, and the primitiveness of the roads that connected Çerkezköy to other districts and villages to the extent that they were impassable when it snowed, were regarded as the leading inconveniences. The industrialists primarily mentioned the problem of transportation because it also caused problems in terms of labor supply. Since the labor supply in the Çerkezköy district center was inadequate, a great majority of the workers were brought in from neighboring areas in shuttles. The roughness of the village roads and their being blocked in winter occasionally could result in labor losses.

In addition to the road problem, the difficulty in finding qualified workers, the absence of a hospital in the region, and the inadequacy of communication infrastructure were also cited as important problems.³³⁵ The water problem, however,

³³³ Mete Akyol, “Çerkezköy’de ‘Çok Özel’ Sektör,” *Milliyet*, 18 April 1981.

³³⁴ Eraydın, “Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location,” pp. 53-54; Eker, pp. 121-122.

³³⁵ “Çerkezköy Özel Eki,” *Dünya Gazetesi*, 28 March 1983.

which had been regarded as the biggest problem in the beginning, had been temporarily solved by the deep wells each firm dug on its own land.

The ongoing OIZ construction was not proceeding at the desired pace. Due to difficulties in providing water and energy, the costs of the OIZ had increased and the construction time had been extended.³³⁶ The SPO's decision that Çerkezköy had its fill of industry and the temporary discontinuation of the credit by the Ministry of Industry and Technology also caused the infrastructure work to be hindered.³³⁷ By 1982, the sewer and electricity infrastructure of the OIZ were completed, and for the water requirement, permission to drill 12 deep wells had been received from the State Hydraulic Works.³³⁸ Thus far, none of the industrial parcels at the OIZ had been sold.

In the meantime, the Ulusu government, formed after the 12 September 1980 military coup, increased the interest rate on the credits given by the Ministry of Industry for OIZs from 3.5 percent to 15 percent as of 1 March 1981. As for the payback period, it was reduced to 15 years from 25 years. In addition, with a decree published on 31 January 1982, the contribution of the OIZ EEC, which had been reduced to 1 percent as a result of the ÇIA's lobbying activities, was again increased to 10 percent.³³⁹ Thus, certain gains that had been made via lobbying activities during civil governments were revoked by the military regime. Above, the success of ÇIA's lobbying activities within the context of the JP and the RPP governments was

³³⁶ Çezik and Eraydın, p. 64.

³³⁷ Eker, pp. 132-133.

³³⁸ Ibid., p. 131.

³³⁹ Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone Entrepreneur Establishment Committee, "Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Faaliyetleri Hakkında Görüş ve Önerilerimiz," (Our Views and Suggestions on the Activities of Organized Industrial Zones), ÇIA Archive; Republic of Turkey, "Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı Fonlar Yönetmeliği," (Ministry of Industry and Technology Funds Regulations), in *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 17591, 31 January 1982.

discussed. In the period from 1980 to 1983, during which the military regime prevailed, lobbying activities, at least on some issues, remained ineffective.

The Second Wave of Industrial Development

Between 1972 and 1974, there was a rapid influx of industry to Çerkezköy. In this period, 15 factories were either built or their construction began. The removal of the regional incentives for new investments in Çerkezköy from 1975 onwards and the removal of the district from the status of PAD as from 1977 resulted in the discontinuation of investments. When the economic crisis that arose in 1978 in Turkish economy and recession were added to these, a period of stagnation which lasted until 1984 was experienced. From 1980 to 1983, the number of workers employed in the factories decreased, one of the big firms, Jakarteks, was closed down in 1983 as a result of going bankrupt, and Yünsa was reopened again after being closed down for a while.

The infrastructure of the OSB, the construction of which continued, was completed to a great extent in 1984 and the policy of promoting investments started by the Özal government initiated the second wave of industrial migration to Çerkezköy. From 1984 to 1987 a slow rate of industrialization and from 1988 to 1994 a fast rate of industrialization were experienced. In the beginning of the second wave of industrialization, as had been the case in the beginning of the first wave of industrialization, state incentives were the determining factor. However, this time spatial incentive was provided for a smaller area, only to the ÇOIZ. The ÇOIZ, presenting a ready infrastructure and special incentives, became an attractive option for the firms forced to leave İstanbul during the 1980s.

The second wave, like the first one, was also the result of the decentralization of İstanbul industry. During the 1980s, the efforts to remove industry (especially the textiles, leather and chemical industries which consumed too much water) from İstanbul increased. At the end of the 1980s, when a water shortage appeared in the city, the pressure of the İstanbul Municipality on the industrialists intensified.

Below, the second industrial wave to Çerkezköy, triggered by all these factors, will be discussed in detail after summarizing the overall picture.

The Decentralization of İstanbul Industry during the 1980s

The Turkish manufacturing industry, started to grow again in an export-oriented, open economic model in the 1980s, begun to spread spatially to a larger area.

Eraydın summarized the spatial movement of the industry in her analysis based on the data of 1970-1984 as follows:

The numerical data demonstrate that while the increase in the number of people working in industry in İstanbul province was limited, in Thrace, which was the western extension of this industrial development, and in Kocaeli and Sakarya provinces in the east and in Bursa, which was the functional extension of İstanbul, there was a rapid development. Similarly, in response to the slow development in İzmir, it is observed that Manisa developed in terms of industry. It has been observed that the investments in the central Anatolia region were realized in, instead of Ankara, cities in the periphery, especially the ones sponsored by the state; in brief, while industry's spreading from developed areas to underdeveloped areas did not gain importance, the spread of industry within the region was accomplished to a certain extent. This kind of narrow-scoped spreading indicates that the negative conditions resulting from the agglomeration at the main industrial centers gained importance, however, the economic significance of industries' being close to the main centers continued.³⁴⁰

³⁴⁰ Ayda Eraydın, "Sanayi Yapısındaki Yeni Oluşumlar ve Yer Seçimi" (New Formations in the Structure of Industry and Choice of Location) in *1987 Sanayi Kongresi ve Sergisi*, Makine Mühendisleri Odası, 9-15 November 1987 Ankara, p. 101.

From the second half of the 1980s onwards, cities described as the new industrial centers³⁴¹ were added to this table. In this period, the spread of industry took two forms: First was the decentralization from İstanbul, İzmir, Adana and Ankara provinces, where industry had concentrated, towards surrounding districts and provinces; and the second was the emergence of new industrial nodes in Anatolia, such as Denizli, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş and Kayseri. From the 1980s onwards, while the manufacturing industry either regressed or made no progress in the big urban centers, there was a rapid development in the finance, services, and construction sectors.³⁴²

In this period, the efforts to clear İstanbul –so it could be turned into a city of finance, culture and tourism- of industry, accelerated.³⁴³ In any case, the water problem, which started to increase towards the end of the 1980s, turned the city into a place which could not receive more industrial burden. At the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the clearing Haliç and Kazlıçeşme of industry, which had not been implemented although expressed during the 1970s, occurred. In the meantime, İstanbul Municipality, which became the Metropolitan Municipality with Law no. 3030 enacted in 1984, included some of the previously independent neighboring municipalities. This meant the expansion of İstanbul Municipality's space of control. The İstanbul Water and Sewerage Administration (İSKİ), which manages the water works of İstanbul Municipality, started to closely monitor the

³⁴¹ State Planning Organization, *Bölgesel Gelişme Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu* (Regional Development Specialization Committee Report) (Ankara: DPT, 2000), pp. 178-230.

³⁴² Doğruel, pp. 187-188; Ali Ekber Doğan "Türkiye Kentlerinde 20 Yılın Bilançosu" (Balance of 20 Years in Turkish Cities), *Praksis*, no. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 107-109.

³⁴³ To give an example: "At the 1st International Leather and Garment Symposium organized by Türkiye Gazetesi, mayor of İstanbul Metropolitan Municipality Bedrettin Dalan said, 'İstanbul should not be an industrial city.' (...) Bedrettin Dalan remarked, 'As a municipality, we have allocated space between the two Çekmece lakes for the textile businessmen working in the field of fabric, yarn and garments. We have been negotiating for their removal.' " *Milliyet*, 18 January 1988.

firms in the textile finishing sector which consumed too much water and to fine them for causing environmental pollution from the end of the 1980s.³⁴⁴

The move of the big firms outside the city resulted from more than pushing factors. The lands and buildings of factories in the urban center could be turned into investments which would bring greater rent due to the increasing land prices. Thus, certain holding companies turned their old factory lands in the urban center into shopping and finance centers.³⁴⁵

Big industrial facilities in various parts of the city started to move towards Gebze in the east and in the west to the region between two Çekmece lakes and Thrace. İstanbul industry, which rapidly decentralized, especially preferred west rather than the east in 1990s. A fast industrial shift to Thrace, to the Tekirdağ area being in the first place, was experienced. This development can be seen in the tables below.

³⁴⁴ “İstanbul’da İSKİ’den kaçan birçok tekstil terbiyecisi Trakya yöresine kaydı,” (Many textile finishers running away from *İSKİ* in İstanbul moved to Thrace region). Sadık Oğuz, “Sanayici Trakya’ya Kayıyor,” (Industrialists are moving to Thrace), *İstanbul Sanayi Odası Dergisi*, n. 383, 1998, p. 61; Ömer Sarıoğlu, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 24 April 2010.

³⁴⁵ Mustafa Sönmez, *Bölgesel Eşitsizlik: Türkiye’de Doğu Batı Uçurumu* (Regional inequality: East West gap in Turkey) (İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 75.

Table 6. Share of Provinces by Years in Total Manufacturing Industry Value-added (%)³⁴⁶

Rank	Province	1980	1985	1992	1996	1997
1	İstanbul	27.60	29.62	28.03	25.46	24.84
2	Kocaeli	14.44	15.48	14.70	12.67	15.27
3	İzmir	10.94	11.29	12.16	13.91	12.07
4	Bursa	3.50	5.66	7.03	6.39	6.40
5	Ankara	3.78	4.51	3.45	3.74	4.07
6	Tekirdağ	1.42	1.32	2.39	3.17	3.32
7	İçel	6.51	4.83	3.30	3.85	3.26
8	Adana	5.39	4.38	4.00	2.77	2.93
9	Zonguldak	4.28	2.91	1.62	1.55	2.38
10	Kırıkkale	0	0	1.63	2.47	2.31
	Other Provinces	22.15	20.00	21.69	24.00	23.20
	Türkiye	100	100	100	100	100

As can be seen in Table 6, Tekirdağ, by leaving Adana, İçel and Zonguldak behind, rose to the sixth rank among provinces in terms of its share in industrial value-added in 1997. The province which experienced the highest increase with the rate of two percent between 1985 and 1997 was Tekirdağ.

³⁴⁶ State Planning Organization, *Sanayi Politikaları Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu* (Industrial policies specialization committee report) (Ankara: DPT, 2000) p. 35.

Table 7. Shares of İstanbul and the Surrounding Provinces in the Employment in Turkish Manufacturing Industry³⁴⁷

Province	1980	1985	1990	1995	1997
İstanbul	30.82	30.42	30.61	28.84	28.44
Kocaeli	5.64	5.68	5.42	4.63	5.07
Sakarya	1.28	1.15	1.02	1.16	1.17
Bilecik	0.30	0.57	1.10	1.11	1.01
Bursa	4.15	5.74	6.92	8.05	8.53
Tekirdağ	1.24	1.44	2.20	2.98	4.00
Kırklareli	0.39	0.60	0.74	0.95	1.16
Marmara Region	45.79	47.91	50.20	50.46	51.95

As can be seen in Table 7, in terms of employment in the manufacturing industry, İstanbul made no progress during the 1980s, and it started to regress a little from 1990 onwards. In the share of Kocaeli and Sakarya between 1980 and 1997, a regression, even if a small one, was observed. Bilecik, after rising until 1995, regressed a little. Three provinces that constantly rose throughout the period were Bursa, Tekirdağ, and Kırklareli. The rise in Bursa resulted partly from its own local dynamic and partly from the decentralization of İstanbul. However, the rise in Tekirdağ and Kırklareli was completely the result of the decentralization of İstanbul industry. The employment share of the Marmara region as a whole also continually increased during this 17 years period.

The table, in summary, demonstrates these two developments clearly. The first is that İstanbul industry –like it did during the 1970s– decentralized to the Marmara region in the 1980s and 1990s as well. The second is that İstanbul industry,

³⁴⁷ State Planning Organization, *Sanayi Politikaları*, p. 36; State Planning Organization, *Bölgesel Gelişme*, p. 184; Ministry of Environment and Forestry et al., *Trakya Alt Bölgesi*, p. 339.

after 1980, turned its direction of spread mainly from east to west, in other words from Kocaeli to Thrace.

There were two main factors behind turning towards the west rather than the east. The first was that in Thrace land prices were cheaper than in Gebze, which had reached a certain amount of industrial concentration and in Thrace there was the opportunity to find larger industrial parcels.³⁴⁸ The second was that incentive restrictions continued within the borders of İstanbul and Kocaeli provinces except for the OIZs. In a period when generally incentives were increased³⁴⁹ and when incentives were the main source of motivation in industrial investments, investing in Kocaeli, where the incentive restriction continued, had become more disadvantageous.

Despite these two factors making Thrace more attractive than Kocaeli, lack of labor supply must have been an important problem for the industrialists going to Thrace region. However, the settlement of thousands of immigrants in the region as a result of forced migration from Bulgaria in 1989 solved this problem easily. What is more, the Bulgarian immigrants were more disciplined and better trained compared to the average local workers in Turkey. They also did not have the prejudices against women's working which were common in Turkey. Especially, in terms of textile

³⁴⁸ Yıldırım Ulkat, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 10 May 2011; Mehmet Özdoğru, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 20 May 2011.

³⁴⁹ Motherland Party (MP, *Anavatan Partisi*), as the government of the period, carrying the banner for economic liberalism and export-led growth, had alleviated the conditions required while giving incentive certificate to the investments and it had increased the rates of tax reductions. In accordance with the general style of MP's doing politics, incentive implementation was made more flexible in which executive authorities had a broad authority. Öztin Akgüç, "Sanayide Teşvik Tedbirlerinin Etkileri" (Effects of incentive measures on industry), 1987 *Sanayi Kongresi ve Sergisi*, Makine Mühendisleri Odası, 9-15 November 1987 Ankara, pp. 80-81.

industry, which required the employment of women, this increase in the supply of women's labor became one of the factors making the region attractive.³⁵⁰

Another factor making the region attractive for textile sector was the presence of abundant underground water resources in Thrace. The textile factories that had to leave İstanbul because of the water problem had the opportunity to use underground water in the region boundlessly since the controls were made superficially. Lastly, the E-80 highway, the construction of which was completed between 1989 and 1994, and which was put into service, became a factor that accelerated the moving of industry to the region.³⁵¹

With the effect of all these factors mentioned, an intensive industrialization was experienced in Thrace in the 1990s. Industrialists coming to Thrace took advantage of the state incentives to the maximum. Thus, in the period from 1990 to 1996, Tekirdağ, by receiving 9.1 percent of the investments supported by incentives in Turkey, ranked third after İstanbul and Bursa.³⁵²

Tekirdağ, mainly Çerkezköy and Çorlu districts, bordering İstanbul, underwent a rapid industrialization. In the gross income of Tekirdağ province in

³⁵⁰ Gülşen Pelin Öcal. *Trakya Bölgesinin Sanayileşme Dinamikleri ve Çorlu Sanayi Kümelleri*, (Industrialization dynamics of Thrace region and Çorlu industrial clusters) (MA thesis, İstanbul Technical University, 2006), p. 130; Sönmez, *Bölgesel Eşitsizlik*, p. 97; Özdoğru, interview by the author.

³⁵¹ "In the 1990s, with the transportation opportunities enabled by the Fatih Sultan Mehmet Bridge and beltways, by also passing the borders of the province, İstanbul industry filled the Gebze Industrial Zone in the east, the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone, which was not filled for years despite all the incentives, in the west, and it started to decentralize towards Çorlu, Babaeski region." (1990'larda ise Fatih Sultan Mehmet Köprüsü ve çevre yollarının sunduğu ulaşım olanaklarıyla, il sınırlarını da aşarak, doğuda Gebze Sanayi Bölgesi; batıda, yıllarca bütün teşviklere karşın dolmayan Çerkezköy Sanayi Bölgesi doyuma ulaşmış; Çorlu, Babaeski bölgesine desantralize olmaya başlamıştır.) Semra Kalkan, Sinan Çetiz, Zekai Akay, "İstanbul Metropolitan Alanı ve Bu Alanda Yaşanan Yapısal Değişim" (İstanbul metropolitan area and structural change experienced in this area), *Dünya Şehircilik Günü 28. Kolokyumu: Değişen-Dönüşen Kent ve Bölge*, Middle East Technical University, 8-9-10 November 2004.

³⁵² Sönmez, *Bölgesel Eşitsizlik*, p. 61.

1995, the urban center had 22 percent, Çorlu had 21 percent and Çerkezköy had 27 percent shares. The total share of other six districts was 30 percent.³⁵³

Some of the industrialists heading for Thrace chose Çerkezköy in order to benefit from the special incentives provided for the OIZs. And a larger number of industrialists started to form an industrial corridor on Çorlu-Lüleburgaz line along the D-100. It was observed that textile factories were concentrated especially in places where underground water was close to the surface.³⁵⁴ Following that, while the construction of the E-80 Highway, which passed between Çerkezköy and Çorlu, was going on (from 1992 onwards), a second corridor of factories started to be formed around the road that connects Çorlu to Çerkezköy.³⁵⁵ Although these factories, most of which are said to be unlicensed, could not benefit from the special incentive provided for the OIZ, they benefitted from cheap lands, the illegal use of groundwater, ease of transportation, and general export incentives.³⁵⁶

Although the program of 1988 said that,

In provinces where there are Organized Industrial Zones, municipalities; in places where there are not any municipalities, governorates will primarily give permission and licence to industrialists who will locate in OIZs. If there is available land in OIZ area, requests of separate choice of location will not be assessed.³⁵⁷

³⁵³ Sönmez, *Bölgesel Eşitsizlik*, p. 97.

³⁵⁴ Erel, T. Levent. “Çorlu ve Çerkezköy’de Sanayileşme” (Industrialization in Çorlu and Çerkezköy), *İstanbul Üniversitesi Deniz Bilimleri ve Coğrafya Enstitüsü Bülteni*, no. 8, 1992, p. 101.

³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

³⁵⁶ In a study conducted on industrial clusters in Çorlu, it was stated that the main reason why firms chose locations in Çorlu was proximity to İstanbul and ease of transportation. Following that, the opportunity of cheap and large lands, conveniences in labor supply and water supply were also enumerated. Şazuman Sazak, “İstanbul Sanayinin Desantralizasyonu ve Bunun Trakya Bölgesine Etkisi’nin Çorlu-Büyükkarıştıran Sanayi Alanında Değerlendirilmesi” (Decentralization of İstanbul industry and the analysis of its effect on Thrace region in Çorlu-Büyükkarıştıran industrial area) in *Trakya’da Sanayileşme ve Çevre Sempozyumu III, 11-13 Kasım 1999: Bildiriler Kitabı* (Edirne: Makine Mühendisleri Odası, 2000), p. 51.

³⁵⁷ “Organize Sanayi Bölgesi bulunan illerde, şehirlerde belediyeler, belediyesi bulunmayan yerlerde Valilikler öncelikle O.S.B. içinde yerleşecek sanayilere izin ve ruhsat vereceklerdir. O.S.B. alanında boş yer olduğu takdirde münferit yer seçimi talepleri

The local authorities, though there was available land in the ÇOIZ, overlooked the firms' choosing locations randomly in Çorlu, and even promoted it.³⁵⁸ Thus, as distinct from Çerkezköy, an unplanned industrial settlement emerged in Çorlu.

The passage below summarizes this reality of unplanned industrialization quite well:

Especially the industrial concentration in the Çorlu, Çerkezköy, and Muratlı triangle has gradually started to draw the reaction of the industrialists too. The method employed here is providing energy from the closest energy line via a step-down converter, obtaining running water from underground water by digging a well, and discharging waste, generally without any purification, to the closest brook, without getting permission or licence from any authorities, or by getting permission and licence by purchasing lands along E-5 [D-100] or other main arteries via local zone plan that has been made. And most of these enterprises are enterprises with incentive certificates. After the number of industrial enterprises increased in this region, the region was declared an industrial zone and thus industrial zones, the problems of which we hope to solve, have emerged.³⁵⁹

By 1997, in the triangle of Çerkezköy, Çorlu, Lüleburgaz (according to some, the “devil’s triangle”³⁶⁰) a total of 687 factories, most of the headquarters of which were

değerlendirilmeyecektir.” Republic of Turkey, “1988 Yılı Programı,” in *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19739, 28 February 1988, p. 399.

³⁵⁸ “Although the Organized Industrial Zone has been completed and there are available parcels in these zones, as a result of the Governorates and Municipalities not adopting the subject or illegal location, industrial settlement outside the Organized Industrial Zones has been observed in the areas mentioned.” (*Organize Sanayi Bölgesi tamamlanmış ve bu bölgelerde boş parsel olduğu halde Valiliklerin ve Belediyelerin konuya sahip çıkmaması nedeniyle veya kaçak olarak söz konusu yörelerde Organize Sanayi Bölgelerinin dışında sanayi yapılaşması gözlenmektedir.*) Erdoğan Özbay, “Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri ve Trakya” (Organized Industrial Zones and Thrace) in *Trakya’da Sanayileşme ve Çevre Sempozyumu II: Bildiriler Kitabı* (Edirne: Makine Mühendisleri Odası, 1997), p. 204.

³⁵⁹ “Sonuç Bildirgesi,” in *Trakya’da Sanayileşme ve Çevre Sempozyumu II: 6-8 November 1997*, available online at <http://www.mmo.org.tr/etkinlikler/trakyada/index.php?etkinlikkod=77> [10 October 2011]

³⁶⁰ Emre Aysu, “Açılış Konferansı,” in *Trakya’da Kentleşme ve Yerel Yönetimler Sempozyumu 12-13 Ekim 2001: Bildiriler Kitabı* (Urbanization in Thrace and Local Authorities Symposium 12-13 October 2001: Book of Proceedings), (Edirne, Makine Mühendisleri Odası, 2001), p. XXVIII.

in İstanbul, were in production. In these facilities in these three districts almost 100,000 people were working.³⁶¹

The Second Industrial Influx to Çerkezköy

The First industrial influx to Çerkezköy was triggered by the declaration of the region as a PAD. As for the second industrial influx, it mainly occurred thanks to the OIZ constructed in the region. Firms that wanted to benefit from the ready infrastructure and incentives provided to the OIZs, headed for Çerkezköy from the end of the 1980s onwards. In this sense, Çerkezköy became a region where two important spatial adjustment tools of the state in Turkey operated together. Thanks to the incentives for PADs, Çerkezköy obtained its first industrial accumulation; following that, it experienced the second industrialization wave thanks to OIZ, as discussed above.

The second wave of industrialization in Çerkezköy can be seen in the tables below.

³⁶¹ Perihan Çakıroğlu, “Sanayi Trakya'ya Taşınıyor” (Industry is moving to Thrace), *Milliyet*, 9 November 1997.

Table 8. Numbers of New Firms Starting Production in Çerkezköy by Year³⁶²

Year	Number of firms
1985	4
1986	3
1987	2
1988	6
1989	9
1990	12
1991	14
1992	11
1993-1994	35
1995	6
1996	5

Table 9. Numbers of Industrial Parcels Sold at OIZ by Year³⁶³

Year	Number of parcels
1981	1
1982	2
1983	1
1984	10
1985	39
1986	35
1987	6
1988	13
1989	22
1990	0
1991	1
Total	130

³⁶² Data in Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 were compiled from documents of ÇIA General Assemblies, archive of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, and the studies of Şevki Genç and Fatma Eker.

³⁶³ The total number of parcels at ÇOIZ was 134.

If we look at only the firms which started production (Table 8), we can say that the second wave of industrialization in Çerkezköy started from 1988 onwards and continued until 1994. However, the firms' starting production was not realized immediately. Purchasing land and the construction of factories sometimes took 5-6 years. For this reason, it will be more appropriate to look at industrialists' purchase of lands in order to determine the beginning date of their heading to Çerkezköy. Table 9 demonstrates that the selling of industrial parcels at ÇOIZ began in 1984, and that in 1985 and 1986 it experienced the peak time. The sales, after undergoing a temporary recession in 1987, accelerated again in 1988 and 1989. By the end of 1989, 130 out of 134 industrial parcels at ÇOIZ had been sold.

Departing from the land sales in OIZ, 1984 can be determined as the year when the first stirrings of the second wave of industrialization in Çerkezköy began. From that year until 1989, almost all the stock of land in OIZ was sold; however, the completion of the construction of factories progressed more slowly. The number of factories that began production started to increase consistently after 1988; in 1993 and 1994 an industrial boom in the strict sense was experienced. When firms whose constructions were ongoing and firms that began production are considered together, it is seen that the period when industrial influx to Çerkezköy was at peak was from 1988 to 1994.

This period, at the same time, as explained above, saw an intensive industrial influx into Thrace in general. Above, it was discussed how the industrial influx basically headed for two areas; one of them was Çorlu district along the D-100 highway and the other was the ÇOIZ. The ÇOIZ, for the first time in the 1980s, was brought onto the agenda as one of the areas shown as targets for the industry which

was to leave Haliç.³⁶⁴ The preparations made about this subject were completed in October 1984 and the decree of the Council of Ministers announcing that 99 percent credit for infrastructure costs and 90 percent credit for superstructure costs would be provided for the industrialists in Haliç in case of their moving to Çerkezköy, Gebze, or Bilecik OIZ was published in the *Official Gazette* on 25 October 1984. A credit budget of a total of 77 billion TL was allocated for these removals.³⁶⁵ In the last months of the same year, the ÇOIZEEC accelerated its efforts to attract industrialists in İstanbul to the ÇOIZ by preparing a brochure. In the brochure prepared, the advantages that the ÇOIZ provided for the industrialists were enumerated as follows:

1. The opportunity to benefit from the provisions of decree no. 84/8592 dated 25.10.1984 (Related only to the industrialist that will be removed from Haliç area)
2. Highways and railway transportation opportunities
3. Passing of Europe highway (E-80), the construction of which is in progress, close to Çerkezköy and its connection to Çerkezköy
4. Closeness to Port and Trade Centers
5. The opportunity of carrying out all kinds of customs transactions in the district
6. Technology and services brought by the present industry to Çerkezköy
7. Sirkeci-Çerkezköy electric suburban train's being put into service
8. The local community's becoming conscious to the extent of providing service to industry
9. The lands being not sloped, rough, stony or rocky
10. Industrial parcels' being in various sizes instead of a standard size, and the opportunity to give their land titles immediately
11. Its being chosen as the pilot Organized Industrial Zone where the central treatment plant is to be built
12. The opportunity to benefit from social facilities including their furnishings
13. Benefitting from adequate and quality electric energy
14. The opportunities to benefit from natural gas obtained in Thrace (the subject is in the research stage)

³⁶⁴ "Large and small 800 factories along Haliç will be removed to Gebze and Çerkezköy." *Milliyet*, 5 June 1983; "The work carried out by İstanbul Governorate to remove the factories in Haliç to Çerkezköy and Bilecik is about to be completed." *Milliyet*, 25 April 1984.

³⁶⁵ *Milliyet*, 4 October 1984; Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 18556, 25 October 1984.

15. Housing opportunities in the confiscated mass housing area immediately adjacent to the zone
16. Many specific conveniences endowed by the region³⁶⁶

Despite the credit opportunity provided by the government, there were no significant move of factories from Haliç to Çerkezköy except for a few firms. However, probably due to the effect of this decree also and as a result of the increasing advertising activities of the ÇOIZEEC, the purchase of land quickly from the ÇOIZ, from which there were no demands of land until 1984, started. As can be observed in Table 9, between the years 1984 and 1986 a total of 84 parcels were sold. At the end of 1986, two-thirds of the parcels had been sold. However, the beginning of the construction of factories and their rapid increase occurred after special incentives had been provided for the OIZs in 1988.

In the 1980s, regions in Turkey were separated into four categories in terms of incentives. Developed regions (the provincial borders of İstanbul and İzmit, and the municipal borders of Ankara, İzmir, Bursa and Adana), normal regions (Tekirdağ province, in which Çerkezköy is situated, was in this category), second-degree PADs and first-degree PADs. Investment incentives were given gradually by depending on this classification. The rate of investment allowances was thirty percent in developed regions, forty percent in normal regions, sixty percent in second-degree PADs and a hundred percent in first-degree PADs.³⁶⁷ With a declaration issued in 1988, it was announced that for OIZs, the rate of investment allowances of one category below

³⁶⁶ Presidency of ÇOIZ Entrepreneur Establishment Committee, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi*, (Tekirdağ, 1984)

³⁶⁷ Republic of Turkey, “Yatırımların Yönlendirilmesi ve Teşviki ile İlgili Tebliğ 85/1,” (Declaration on directing and promoting investments 85/1) in *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 18553, 22 October 1984; Republic of Turkey, “Yatırımların Yönlendirilmesi ve Teşviki ile İlgili Tebliğ 87/1,” (Declaration on directing and promoting investments 87/1) in *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19298, 1 December 1986.

than the one they were in, was to be valid.³⁶⁸ For example, while the rate of investment allowances in “normal areas,” where Çerkezköy is also situated, was forty percent, the rate of investment allowances in OIZs in normal areas was sixty percent, which was equal to the rate of investment allowances outside OIZs in second-degree PADs. Apart from this difference of twenty percent in investment allowances, in OIZs, there were exemptions for building construction fees, occupancy permit fees, property tax (five years as from the completion of construction), corporation tax and value-added tax from land sales.³⁶⁹ In addition, with another declaration issued in 1988, advantages were brought to the firms in the OIZs in terms of access to the funds distributed by the state with the goal of promoting investments.³⁷⁰

Special incentives provided to OIZs made ÇOIZ an attractive option for industrialists looking to locate in Thrace. In an article series published in 1992-1993 in *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, it was indicated that nineteen out of twenty-three firms, which came to the region after 1985 had stated that one of their reasons for choosing Çerkezköy had been the incentives provided for the OIZ and infrastructure opportunities. As the second reason, ten firms had stated its being close to İstanbul. Apart from these, four firms had stated a connection with one of the big firms in Çerkezköy, three firms had stated the presence of customs, two firms had stated cheap labor and two firms had stated the opportunity of large lands as one of their

³⁶⁸ “Yatırımların Teşviki ve Yönlendirilmesi ile ilgili Tebliğ 88/3” (Declaration on directing and promoting investments 88/3) in Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19776, 5 April 1988.

³⁶⁹ Özbay, p. 203.

³⁷⁰ While the premium rate to be taken from Resource Utilization Support Fund was fifteen percent of equity in normal regions, it was designated as forty percent for OIZs in these regions. “Kaynak Kullanımını Destekleme Fonu Hakkında Tebliğ,” (Declaration on resource utilization support fund) in Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19835, 7 June 1988; Republic of Turkey, *T. C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19986, 11 November 1988.

reasons to come to Çerkezköy.³⁷¹ From these answers obtained by interviewing the owners and managers of firms, it is understood that in choosing Çerkezköy, the presence of the OIZ was the main reason. All the other reasons make sense with the presence of the OIZ.

The owner of Tever Ağaç Sanayi, one of the first firms established in Çerkezköy, Dursun Ali Tever, also remarked in my interview with him that he had chosen Çerkezköy because of the incentives. “We received incentives. We did not pay customs duty. At that time the customs duty was very high. We were exempt from property taxes for five years. There was also an investment allowance. We were exempt from taxes and fees.”³⁷² Ahmet Gayretli, who had been an administrator at the ÇIA for long years and Director of ÇOIZ Mehmet Özdoğru also said that the OIZ incentives were the main factor for the industrialists’ choosing Çerkezköy.³⁷³

Along with the special incentives, the ÇOIZ was an attractive option for the textile sector because it provided cheap and abundant water, and a treatment plant was being constructed. Especially for textile dyeing plants, which use a great deal of water and generate very dirty waste in huge amounts, the OIZ infrastructure represented an important convenience. Ömer Sarioğlu, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the ÇOIZ, who at the same time had a dyeing plant, remarked that he had come to the ÇOIZ in 1993 from the Güneşli neighborhood in İstanbul as a result of pressure from İSKİ.³⁷⁴ The Chairman of the Board of Directors of the ÇIA, Ulkat, also drew attention to this:

³⁷¹ In this article series prepared by Naime Sert and lasted almost for a year, there is detailed information about a total of 37 firms. Naime Sert, “Çerkezköy Sanayisi,” (Çerkezköy Industry), *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 28 July 1992 - 17 August 1993.

³⁷² Dursun Ali Tever, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 11 May 2011.

³⁷³ Gayretli, interview by the author; Özdoğru, interview by the author.

³⁷⁴ Sarioğlu, interview by the author.

In the period of Dalan, they wanted to remove the factories; this area was mainly filled with textile factories. Dye plants use too much water; there is abundant water in the region. At the end of the 1980s, dyeing plants came to Çerkezköy mostly. Textile businessmen moved in here. The labor intensive sector turned towards here.³⁷⁵

Most of the enterprises that came during the second wave were medium-sized enterprises. However, among them there were big firms such as Volkswagen, Profilo Telra, Dünya Halı, Deva Holding, Bozkurt Mensucat, Altın İplik, and YKK. After the coming of Volkswagen in 1991, the Japanese zipper firm YKK was opened in 1994.³⁷⁶ YKK, which opened a branch in Turkey for the rapidly developing textile sector, chose Çerkezköy due to the presence of the OIZ and the concentration of the textile factories. The coming of another big foreign firm to the region occurred by way of the sale of a firm. Profilo Holding sold the big facilities it had first built in Çerkezköy to the German BSH firm. The directors of this giant enterprise included in the global chain of BSH stated that they chose Çerkezköy since it was close to south European market.³⁷⁷

The story of Profilo Telra's coming to the ÇOIZ from İstanbul Mecidiyeköy was told by the owner of the firm, Jak Kamhi, in an interview with a magazine. Kamhi said that he had become friends with Bedrettin Dalan, who was the general director of the factory of the Gümüşsuyu firm at Çerkezköy in the 1970s. Dalan, after he became the Mayor of İstanbul Municipality in 1984, told him that Mecidiyeköy would become an area of skyscrapers and would gain value, and for this reason, he should move his television factory there to Çerkezköy. Kamhi moved his factory in

³⁷⁵ “Dalan zamanı fabrikaları çıkarmak istediler, burası tekstil ağırlıklı gitti. Boyahaneler çok su kullanır, bölgede su çok. 80 sonu en çok da boyahaneler geliyor. Tekstilciler buraya akın etti. Emek yoğun sektör buraya yöneldi.” Ulkat, interview by the author.

³⁷⁶ Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 7 January 1992; Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 17 May 1994; Milliyet, 14 May 1994.

³⁷⁷ Milliyet, 10 October 1997.

Mecidiyeköy to the ÇOIZ upon this advice.³⁷⁸ In those years, when values in İstanbul were rapidly rising, Narin Holding and Dinçkök Holding also moved their production units to Çerkezköy, closing down their factories in Bakırköy and Eyüp.³⁷⁹ Apart from these, the Gümüşsuyu firm, by purchasing a larger parcel of land at the OIZ, established a second facility called Dünya Halı.

In the process of the second wave industrialization, the number of firms coming to the region as the subsidiary industry of big factories established in 1970s was quite limited. In the research in *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, mentioned above, out of 23 firms that migrated to the region only four stated that they had chosen Çerkezköy for this reason.

After giving the general picture of the second wave industrialization, now we will look more closely at the developments at the OIZ, which was the main dynamic of this process.

The Developments at the OIZ

The construction of the OIZ was completed in 1988 except for the treatment plant. By the end of that year, 107 parcels at the OIZ, in other words, 80 percent of the total parcel stock had been sold. However, industrial facilities had been built on only 15 percent of these parcels.³⁸⁰ In a field research conducted by Hacettepe University students in October 1988, it was claimed that this situation resulted from purchasing lands from the OIZ with the aim of speculation.³⁸¹ The claim that lands had been purchased from the OIZs with the aim of speculation is one that has also been stated

³⁷⁸ Kamhi, p. 35.

³⁷⁹ Narin, p. 52.

³⁸⁰ Table 8 and Table 9.

³⁸¹ Mustafa Aytem et al. “Bölgesel Sanayileşme Üzerine Araştırmalar” (Researches on regional industrialization), *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 13 June 1989.

in various sources.³⁸² My interviewees at Çerkezköy did not object to this either, they remarked that there were people who bought lands from the ÇOIZ and held them for long years.³⁸³

Legal and actual circumstances made it possible to purchase lands from the ÇOIZ and hold them so that they gained value over time. According to the OIZ Regulations of Ministry of Industry, construction was to be started on parcels bought from the OIZ in a year and completed in 18 months at the latest. Parcels also could not be used for commercial purposes. However, since these rules were not regulated by a law, there were no sanctions when people did not follow them.³⁸⁴ The state and the OIZ managements did not follow the rules strictly.³⁸⁵ Besides, even if the law permitted and ÇOIZ management wanted to implement it, at that time they did not

³⁸² “However, due to Entrepreneur Establishments’ [EECs] acting with a speculative thought or industrialists’, for whom parcel was provided, not beginning the investment in the time stated in internal ordinance, although there are available parcels at certain Organized Industrial Zones in developed areas where the demand is intensive, real investors cannot find industrial parcels and their investments can be delayed.” (*Ancak talebin yoğun olduğu gelişmiş yörelerdeki bazı Organize Sanayi Bölgelerinde boş parsel olduğu halde Müteşebbis Teşekküllerin spekülâtif düşünce ile hareket etmesi veya kendisine parsel tahsis edilen sanayicinin iç talimatnamede belirtilen sürede yatırıma başlamaması nedeniyle gerçek yatırımcılar sanayi parseli bulamamakta ve yatırımları gecikebilmektedir.*) Erdoğan Özbay, p. 205. Besides see Fehmi Yavuz, *Kentsel Topraklar* (Urban Lands) (Ankara: S.B.F. Basın ve Yayın Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1980), p. 60; Selim Özgen, “The “Ballast” of İstanbul: A Critique of the Spatial Reorganization of Industrial Production in Gebze,” (MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2008), p. 87-90.

³⁸³ Özdoğru, interview by the author; Tever, interview by the author; Baydar, interview by the author.

³⁸⁴ Çezik and Eraydın, p. 24.

³⁸⁵ Ömer Kılınç indicates that even since the law was enacted in 2000, it has always been possible to hold the lands at OIZ for selling. He describes one of the ways of doing this as follows: “In this case, you establish an anonymous firm with the person, to whom you will sell the land, with a partnership of 1 percent, or you sell your shares later on. In other words, you sell the land you have indirectly. Thus, the law to prevent holding lands will be circumvented. In any case, the state also implements this law very flexibly. What is important for me is the establishment of industry there, be the establisher Ahmet or Mehmet, it does not matter.” (*Bu durumda satacağın kişiyle anonim şirket kuruyorsun, yüzde 1 ortaklıkla, ya da sonradan hisselerini satarsın. Yani elindeki yeri dolaylı olarak satarsın. Elde tutmayı engelleme yasası böylece aşılmış olur. Zaten devlet de bu konuda gayet esnek uyguluyor yasayı. Benim için önemli olan orda sanayinin kurulmasıdır, ama Ahmet, ama Mehmet.*) Ömer Kılınç, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 25 March 2011.

have an adequate budget for confiscation either.³⁸⁶ As a result, it was possible to purchase land from the ÇOIZ and keep it without doing anything for years.

In addition, in the research of the Hacettepe students, it is asserted that the founding firms of the ÇIA, which also comprise ÇOIZEEC, parceled out the lands according to their own needs, that the parcels close to the electric transformer and treatment plant were kept too large and that these parcels were purchased by the members of the association.³⁸⁷ Examination of the OIZ settlement plan of 1995 (Figure 6) shows that there is legitimacy in this claim.

³⁸⁶ Özdoğru, interview by the author; Tever, interview by the author.

³⁸⁷ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 18 July 1989.




Fig. 6. ÇOIZ plot plan (1995).³⁸⁸ The parcels bought by Profilo, Gümüşsuyu and Hattat Holding are marked with red.

In fact, while the OIZ was being established, the first wave industrialists were not thinking of purchasing lands there. They had already bought more land than they needed. This situation is also mentioned in Eker's thesis which states that, "since all the enterprises have adequate lands for expansion, they do not have any land demands from the newly opened OIZ."³⁸⁹ While the situation was as such in the beginning of 1980s, in the second half of the 1980s, Profilo, Gümüşsuyu and Hema (Hattat Holding) established facilities by purchasing lands from the OIZ. Their

³⁸⁸ ÇIA Archive.

³⁸⁹ Eker, p. 130.

buying lands from the OIZ instead of expanding on the land they already owned probably have resulted from the idea of benefitting from the OIZ opportunities. Especially Gümüşsuyu and Profilo purchased large parcels in the OIZ. As can also be seen in Figure 5, three parcels more than 200,000 square meters (200 decares) were purchased by Profilo (241,000), Dünya (Gümüşsuyu) Halı (230,000) and Altın İplik (264,000). These three large parcels, as was stated in the research of Hacettepe students, were next to the electric transformer and treatment collector.

It was out of the question for all the first wave industrialists to buy lands from OIZ in order to benefit from the special incentives. They had already constructed gigantic factories on their own large lands. However, they had to find a way to benefit from the incentives of the OIZ, which had been established by themselves adjacent to their land and still managed by them; and they did. They decided to include the area in which they were situated, called “Unorganized Industrial Zone”, an area of 800 hectares (henceforward, this zone will be referred to as Municipal Industrial Zone) in the OIZ.³⁹⁰ The ÇIA began the first correspondences with the competent authorities about this issue in 1989. First of all, the consent of the special provincial administration and Çerkezköy municipality, and the other components of ÇOIZEEC, were taken, and then the application was made to the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry of Industry accepted this request on the condition that in transforming the region to the OIZ no kind of credit support from the ministry would be demanded and that all the costs would be covered by the ÇOIZEEC. Upon the

³⁹⁰ “Another significant activity of ours which was addressed from October 1989 onwards was to enable industrialists in Unorganized Industrial Zone to benefit from Organized Industrial Zone incentives, to increase employment, to turn the unused lands between the industrial parcels into production areas by putting them to use and to do away with the Organized-Unorganized distinction.

Our enterprises responded positively by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce and works such as feasibility report, zoning plan, ownership status determination have been started in cooperation with the Municipality and our Association.” ÇIA 16th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 25 January 1990, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

SPO's giving consent on 15 October 1990, the Municipal Industrial Zone, where the first generation industrialists were situated was declared a ÇOIZ "Expansion Area" (*Tevzii Alanı*).³⁹¹ From that date onwards, firms in the ÇOIZ Expansion Area also started to benefit from OIZ incentives.³⁹²

Before the OIZ expansion decision was taken, the Municipality had started Municipal Industrial Zone's zoning plan work in 1989.³⁹³ After the declaration of the ÇOIZ Expansion Area, a 40 decares of land next to the municipal industrial region was added to the region of 800 hectares by a decision of city council.³⁹⁴ The plan, prepared by İller Bankası, was approved by the Municipality in 1992.³⁹⁵ In the same year, zoning plan implementation was started.³⁹⁶

Thus, ÇOIZEEC³⁹⁷ both continued to manage the present OIZ and took the responsibility for bringing the necessary infrastructure to the area of 800 hectares, which was declared an expansion area. Since credit from the ministry for the ÇOIZ Expansion Area was out of the question, this area had to be constructed with the income that would be obtained from land sales. The lack of a ready budget caused the continuous postponement of the necessary work.

The Ministry of Industry, seeing that no kind of work was being done in the Expansion Area for the construction of the OIZ, suggested in 1995 that a separate OIZ be established in the area of 800 hectares and for that, a separate EEC should be

³⁹¹ ÇIA 17th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 31 January 1991, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

³⁹² Özdoğru, interview by the author; Tever, interview by the author.

³⁹³ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 40.

³⁹⁴ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 2 March 1992. Addition of the 40 decares of land to OIZ took place with the decision of city council despite the objection of Hikmet Uğraş, the mayor at that time. It is claimed that in the taking of this decision, the land mafia was included and that certain members of the city council gained unearned income.

³⁹⁵ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 14 April 1992.

³⁹⁶ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 1 September 1992.

³⁹⁷ In the meantime, with a regulatory change made in 1989, the task of the presidency of EECs was given to the provincial governors instead of industrialists. From that date onwards, president of ÇOIZEEC is Tekirdağ governor, not the president of ÇIA.

established as well.³⁹⁸ The ÇOIZEEC, by objecting to this suggestion, demanded that the same committee continue the work of transforming the Expansion Area to an OIZ.³⁹⁹ The present committee prepared the plans requested for the “Expansion Area”, now called as the 2nd OIZ by the Ministry of Industry, and these plans were approved by the Çerkezköy Municipality and the Ministry of Industry in 1996.⁴⁰⁰ However, the status of the expansion area and its unification with ÇOIZ remained the subject of debate between the Ministry of Industry and the ÇOIZEEC.

While these developments were taking place with regards to the Expansion Area, in the ÇOIZ many firms started production, and conflicts between these firms and the EEC (de facto first generation industrialists) managing ÇOIZ arose. Incoming firm owners thought that the ÇOIZEEC did not deal with the problems of the industrialists coming to the zone and that it should transfer its management to the industrialists at ÇOIZ. They were also uncomfortable with the Municipal Industrial Zone’s being added to the present OIZ. They wanted that this region, whose infrastructure problems had not been solved, to be established as a separate OIZ.⁴⁰¹

While these debates were going on, in 1994 and 1995, many firms became members of the ÇIA and the association became an organization which also represented the second generation industrialists. The number of firms that were members of the ÇIA increased from twenty to thirty-six in 1994, and by the end of 1995 it had increased to fifty-one.⁴⁰² In 1996, the industrialists at the ÇOIZ partly obtained their right to self-government. On 15 October 1996, a Board of Directors of

³⁹⁸ Ministry of Industry and Commerce, document dated 12 October 1995, ÇIA Archive.

³⁹⁹ ÇOIZEEC, document dated 18 October 1995, ÇIA Archive.

⁴⁰⁰ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 9 January 1996, *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 20 August 1996.

⁴⁰¹ Document dated 17 May 1993 sent by Sadık Oğuz to industrialists on behalf of the ÇIA, ÇIA Archive; Özdoğru, interview by the author; Tever, interview by the author.

⁴⁰² ÇIA 21st General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 31 December 1994, ÇIA Archive; ÇIA 22nd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1996, ÇIA Archive.

the ÇOIZ that would work under the EEC was established. On this board of directors, which consisted of seven persons, there were five firms' representatives chosen among the firms at the ÇOIZ, the director of the ÇOIZ, and the Çerkezköy district governor on behalf of the EEC.⁴⁰³ Thus, the ÇOIZ, named the 1st Zone, attained a board of directors. However, the Expansion Area, named the 2nd Zone, did not have a board of directors. The status of this zone would remain indefinite for a long time and only in 2002, thanks to the initiatives of the ÇCCI, would be unified with the ÇOIZ.

The Çerkezköy Industrial Zone in the Mid-1990s

By the mid-1990s, two thirds of the ÇOIZ had become full, and in the Expansion Area 18 new firms had been established since 1990. Although its legal status was not yet certain, with the addition of the Expansion Area in 1990, the Çerkezköy OIZ area had reached almost 1250 hectares. Thus, the Çerkezköy OIZ, with both its sections, had become the second largest OIZ in Turkey following the Adana OIZ. The ÇOIZ, in addition, was one of the few OIZs that constructed central treatment plants in Turkey.⁴⁰⁴

We can follow the development of industry in Çerkezköy from its beginning to 1996 from the table below.

⁴⁰³ Inspectorate of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Inspection Report No. 1998/7, 30 November 1998, ÇOIZ Archive, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁴ At the end of 1996, among 36 OIZs completed in Turkey, only 5 had treatment plants. Özbay, p. 202.

Table 10. The Change of Number of Firms at Çerkezköy Industrial Zone and Employment by Year

Year	Number of firms in production			Employment		
	MIZ*	OIZ	Total	MIZ	OIZ	Total
The beginning of 1975	4		4	1209		1209
The end of 1975	11		11	4140		4140
1976	13		13	5376		5376
1978	16		16	8500		8500
1981	16		16	10679		10679
1982	16		16	8941		8941
1984	17		17	9817		9817
1989	12	15	27	10088	2023	12111
1990	12	24	36			
1991	16	43	59	10461	2406	12867
1993	16	57	73	10523	5564	16087
1994	27	75	102			16500
1995	27	81	108			
1996	30	84	114			17586

* MIZ (Municipal Industrial Zone) will be ÇOIZ Expansion Area from October 1990 onwards.

As can be seen from Table 10, the numbers of firms in Çerkezköy continuously increased until 1978. After that, due to the restrictions on incentives and economic crisis, a period of stagnation that lasted until 1984 was experienced. From 1984 onwards, acceleration started again and especially between 1989 and 1994 continued at a great pace. However, after 1994, its rate of increase slowed down. In the period between 1972 and 1983 saw the first wave of Çerkezköy's industrialization, 1984 and 1994 its second wave.

While in 1981 in sixteen firms 10,679 workers were employed, in 1996 in 114 firms almost 17,500 people were employed. Whereas in 1981 there were 667 workers per firm on average, in 1996 there were 154 workers per firm. The decrease in the number of workers per firm resulted from the fact that most of the enterprises which came to the zone after 1984 were medium-sized and that the first generation big firms increasingly employed fewer workers due to technological developments.⁴⁰⁵ The first enterprises that came to Çerkezköy were big and integrated facilities which could venture to go outside the city, as stated by Lewis and Walker. However, after the ÇOIZ was established, the presence of ready infrastructure enabled also medium-sized companies to go outside İstanbul.

The employment information of 37 firms that appear in the article series prepared by Naime Sert in 1992 and 1993 demonstrates that one-third of the workers were women.⁴⁰⁶ Women's employment was utilized intensively, especially in the textile sector. According to the 1997 OIZ promotional catalogue, 52 percent of the firms in the OIZ and Expansion Area were in the textile sector. Following textiles, the largest share belonged to the dye-chemical sector, with a rate of 12 percent.

In this classification, textile dyeing plants have been regarded as part of the textile sector. When we take textile dyeing plants also into account, we can see that the dyeing sector was big. The construction of a central treatment plant played a role in these firms, which produce a great amount of waste, preference of the ÇOIZ. Apart from these, in the total firms of both sections, 7 percent were in the plastics sector, 6 percent were in the metal sector, 4 percent were in the health sector, 4

⁴⁰⁵ Halit Narin: "Between 1970 and 1980, we worked with 1200 people; we improved our machinery, now we work with 800 people. We produce four times more than we did in 1980s." *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 25 August 1992.

⁴⁰⁶ Naime Sert, "Çerkezköy Sanayisi," *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 17 August 1993.

percent were in the automotive sector, 3 percent were in the food sector and 12 percent were in other sectors.⁴⁰⁷

Among the firms in Çerkezköy, most of which had headquarters in İstanbul, the input-output relation was limited.⁴⁰⁸ In this regard, the ÇOIZ continued its characteristic of being a typical satellite industrial area in the 1990s as well. In 1997, the number of foreign firms in the region was 8.⁴⁰⁹ According to the data of 1996, almost half of the production in the region was exported.⁴¹⁰ Since the headquarters of the firms were in İstanbul, they paid their taxes to tax offices in İstanbul.

Çerkezköy's transportation problem was solved to a great extent with the construction of the E-80 highway connection in 1996. As for the water problem of the region, it was solved by gradually digging deeper wells. The underground water supply had proved to be more than expected; however, it was thought that it would cause problems in the future. For this reason, it was said that the Yoncalı dam, which was mentioned in the 1970s, should be built.⁴¹¹ Electricity, natural gas and communication infrastructure were considerably worked out.⁴¹²

Consequently, in the mid-1990s, Çerkezköy, at the end of a period of almost twenty-five years, became one of the biggest industrial zones in Turkey with its 114 industrial enterprises and almost 18,000 employees. What roles were played by the state institutions, governments, industrialists and local government in that process were discussed. In the following, how the industrialists solved their basic production problems will be examined in detail. The infrastructure problem, water and the

⁴⁰⁷ Directorate of Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Firma Tanıtım Katalogu 1996-1997* (Tekirdağ: [ÇOIZ], [1997]).

⁴⁰⁸ Kızıldeli, p. 157.

⁴⁰⁹ *Milliyet*, 9 November 1997.

⁴¹⁰ H. Şerefür Eser, "Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Yapısal Analizi ve Ekonomik Etkinliği" (MA thesis, Trakya University, 1997), p. 98.

⁴¹¹ Inspectorate of Ministry of Industry and Commerce, p. 5.

⁴¹² Kızıldeli, pp. 166-167.

highway being in the first place, the environmental pollution problem and labor problem will be the three main topics to be discussed.

How Did the Industrialists Solve the Basic Problems?

Infrastructure Problems

Electricity and Communication

Together with the establishment of first factories, providing the necessary infrastructure was an urgent problem. Since no preparations had been made beforehand, both the local government and the industrialists tried to solve the infrastructure problems of the region by mobilizing all the political and bureaucratic channels. Among these, while electricity and communication problems were relatively easily and rapidly solved, solving the problems of water and highway took a long time. The ÇIA, established to solve all of these problems, negotiated with many state institutions and political party officials on the local, regional, and national levels. Sometimes to ensure that the work was done rapidly, it made financial contributions to state agencies.

In 1972 and 1973 when the first factories were established and while the ÇIA had not yet been founded, the efforts of Çerkezköy mayor Hikmet Uğraş and Tekirdağ Senator Hayri Mumcuoğlu to solve the electricity problem appeared in the pages of newspapers. In a piece of news dated January 1973, it is said that Uğraş had found credit from the Turkish Electricity Administration and İller Bankası to solve

the electricity problem of Çerkezköy.⁴¹³ Following that, it is stated that with Mumcuoğlu's "pursuing the matter in Ankara" the electricity project had been approved by the relevant authorities.⁴¹⁴ In consequence of these initiatives, the Turkish Electricity Administration started the construction of a high-voltage transmission line from Çorlu to Çerkezköy in 1973.

However, when the workers of the subcontractor constructing the high-voltage transmission line went on strike, the subcontractor terminated the contract with the Turkish Electricity Administration and the construction of the electric line was left half finished. Thereupon, the ÇIA, which was founded in the meantime, made a move and by negotiating with the relevant authorities it ensured the completion of the line in 1975.⁴¹⁵ In the General Assembly of the ÇIA in 1977, it was said that the electricity problem had been solved to a great extent.⁴¹⁶ Although there were complaints about power cuts in the General Assembly in January 1978, the fact that the subject of electricity was not on the agenda in the following general assemblies demonstrates that it was no longer as issue.

Communication problem, like the electricity problem, has been solved rapidly. As a result of "the contacts made with General Directorate of PTT, Regional Directorate of Edirne Region Telephone and provincial authority for ensuring the making of Çerkezköy-İstanbul, Çerkezköy-Tekirdağ, Çerkezköy-Foreign Countries

⁴¹³ Devrim, 31 January 1973.

⁴¹⁴ Çorlu Gazetesi, 10 April 1973.

⁴¹⁵ "About this subject, which became very urgent, very often and intensive negotiations with the Turkish Electricity Administration and the relevant ministries were held by our association." (*Çok aktüel bir hale gelen bu mevzuda Derneğimiz tarafından TEK ve ilgili Bakanlıklar nezdinde çok sık ve yoğun görüşmeler yapılmıştır.*) ÇIA Extraordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1 October 1974, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

⁴¹⁶ ÇIA 3rd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1977, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

communication directly and most rapidly,⁴¹⁷ the number of subscribers in Çerkezköy, which is 75, increased to 400 and a carrier current device with 12 channels was allocated into the district for international phone calls.⁴¹⁸ The communication problem, like the electricity problem, did not appear among the problems brought up in the general assemblies after that of 1978.

Water

Solving the water problem was more difficult than that of electricity and communication. The factories were meeting their water requirements from the wells they dug. However, the amount of water in the present wells was not adequate and in the beginning, the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works did not give permission to dig deeper wells with the idea that it would harm agricultural irrigation. In the pre-industrial period, the majority of water resources in the region had been allocated to rice cooperatives.

With the aim of finding a solution to the water problem, the ÇIA entered into negotiations with the Ministry of Industry, the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, the Ministry of Development, İller Bankası, and the Tekirdağ governorate for the allocation of some of the water used for agriculture in Thrace to industry or else for permission to drill deeper wells.⁴¹⁹ However, a positive result was not obtained from all these efforts. “(...) [our demand] to increase our opportunities to benefit from the

⁴¹⁷ ÇIA Extraordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1 October 1974, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

⁴¹⁸ This device allocated to Çerkezköy in 1974 by the General Directorate of State Posts was given to military authorities due to the Cyprus Peace Operation which took place at this date, in 1975, a new device was provided for Çerkezköy.

⁴¹⁹ ÇIA Extraordinary General Assembly Minutes, 1 October 1974, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

present underground water resources was not been positively responded to by the authorities due to both technical terms and agricultural policy.”⁴²⁰

Solving the water problem in the region once and for all would only be possible with the constraction of a dam.⁴²¹ The Directorate of State Hydraulic Works had planned to build a dam in Yoncalı, neighboring Çerkezköy, but had kept waiting due to its high cost.⁴²² A second project was to pipe water to Çerkezköy from Balkaya. It was decided that this project, which necessitated 100 million TL in terms of the prices of the year 1974, would be carried out with the cooperation of the Ministry of Village Affairs, İller Bankası (on behalf of Çerkezköy Municipality) and the Ministry of Industry (on behalf of ÇOIZ).

That this enterprise overstepping the limits of Çerkezköy industrialists could only be realized by state opportunities was imposed on and accepted by the relevant ministries and institutions at various meetings and thus İller Bankası was engaged. At the beginning of 1975, the Balkaya Project and pipe line project, with an average of 300 liter/sec, which has actually started today, was recognized by making the necessary agreement between the Çerkezköy municipality and the bank.⁴²³

However, when the Ministry of Village Affairs withdrew from the project due to the cost, work came to a standstill. In the meantime, the industrialists continued to dig wells to meet their urgent water requirements and DSI officials were sealing the illegal wells they detected. In the debates reflected in the press, Çerkezköy was

⁴²⁰ ÇIA 1st General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1975, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

⁴²¹ State Planning Organization, *Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Özel İhtisas Komisyonu Raporu* (Organized Industrial Zones Specialization Commission Report), (Ankara: DPT, 1976).

⁴²² Eraydın, “Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location,” pp. 53-54.

⁴²³ “Çerkezköy sanayicilerinin imkan hudutlarını aşan bu teşebbüsün ancak Devletin imkanlarıyla gerçekleştirileceği yapılan muhtelif toplantılarda ilgili bakanlık ve kuruluşlara empoze ve kabul ettirilerek İller Bankası devreye sokuldu. 1975 başlarında Çerkezköy Belediyesi ile banka arasında lüzumlu anlaşma yapılarak bugün fiilen başlanmış olan ortalama 300 lt/sn lik Balkaya projesi ve isale hattı projesinin tahakkuku sağlandı.” ÇIA 2nd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, pp. 2-3.

presented as “an example of poor feasibility with insufficient data in the organization of the investment.”⁴²⁴

As a result of negotiations made by the ÇIA, supported by the Ministry of Industry, with the Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, the permissions needed to dig new deep wells was obtained in 1976 and 1977⁴²⁵ and the needs of factories were met.

At the beginning of the 1980s, the same problem occurred for the ÇOIZ, the construction of which was ongoing. During a visit in 1982, prime minister Bülent Ulusu demanded that the ÇOIZ be completed before 1983. However, in order to do this, first of all, the water problem had to be solved. Either the dam project prepared by the State Hydraulic Works and then postponed, had to be put into practice or permission to dig new deep wells had to be given. At the end of the negotiation made by ÇOIZEEC with the Ministry of Industry, it was decided to dig wells since the dam would be costly.⁴²⁶ The necessary permissions were obtained from the State Hydraulic Works and in 1982 and 1983, 12 deep wells were drilled at the ÇOIZ.⁴²⁷

By 1994, the number of deep wells at ÇOIZ had raised to 17. As the level of water continually decreased due to overconsumption, the depth of wells had reached 250 meters.⁴²⁸ However, in 1986, water available at a depth of 80 meters at the ÇOIZ.⁴²⁹ This rapid decrease in the level of water made the industrialists anxious and caused the subject of building the dam to be brought onto the agenda again. It was

⁴²⁴ Devrim, 15 July 1976.

⁴²⁵ ÇIA 3rd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1977, ÇIA Archive, p. 3; ÇIA 4th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1978, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

⁴²⁶ “Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi,” the report presented to Ministry of Industry, 1982, ÇIA Archive.

⁴²⁷ Eker, p. 131.

⁴²⁸ “Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi,” report dated 5 December 1994, ÇIA Archive.

⁴²⁹ Tever, interview by author.

said to be necessary “not to rely upon the deep drilling wells the flow of which decrease every passing day, and to work and cooperate on starting the project of the K  m  rk  y-Yoncalı dams immediately.”⁴³⁰

Despite all the efforts, due to its high cost, the dam could not be built and   OIZ continued to use the underground water. In 1993, as a precaution, the   IA decided not to provide any more land at   OIZ to enterprises that required excessive amount of water.⁴³¹

Transportation

In 1973,   erkezk  y was connected to the D-100 highway with a macadamized road of 28 km. The   IA’s first project was to have this road surfaced with asphalt. For the rapid construction of the road, 1,250,000 TL were donated by   IA to the Regional Directorate of Highways in 1974. Due to various land confiscation problems, surfacing the whole road with asphalt took until 1977.⁴³² Next was the renovation of the village roads, on which the workers were brought to the factories in shuttles. No results could be obtained from this attempt. They were only able to obtain support from the relevant state agencies to open the roads more quickly when they were blocked by snow.⁴³³ Complaints about the village roads continued in 1997: “The

⁴³⁰   IA 22nd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1996,   IA Archive.

⁴³¹   IA 20th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 31 January 1994,   IA Archive, p. 1.

⁴³²   IA 1st General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1975,   IA Archive, p. 1;   IA 4th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1978,   IA Archive, p. 2.

⁴³³   IA 5th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 23 January 1979,   IA Archive, p. 3.

biggest complaints of the industrialists were the power cuts that started and the roads of the district which could never be renovated.”⁴³⁴

The ÇIA’s more serious and long-term attempt in terms of transportation was to influence the routing of the motorway that would connect Edirne to İstanbul. Although the construction of this road, which would be named E-80 later on, started in 1989, work on the project had begun in the 1970s.⁴³⁵ In 1975, the ÇIA made negotiations with the relevant authorities so that the motorway would either pass through Çerkezköy or pass close to Çerkezköy. The president of the association, Naim Akbay, expressed this demand in a letter written to the Minister of Customs and Monopolies (at the same time Tekirdağ senator) Orhan Öztrak as follows:

The realization of the facts below, about which Çerkezköy industrialists expect the guidance of your excellency, are among our most important problems. Namely;

1. The passing of Thrace highway, which is still in the phase of project and the construction of which will begin in the near future, through Çerkezköy, which has become an industrial center by growing more and more every passing day, (...) ⁴³⁶

Work on this subject was reported in the 2nd General Assembly as follows:

Our association has also officially applied to the Ministry of Public Works General Directorate of Highways for the passing of the Thrace motorway, which is still in the phase of project, as close as possible to Çerkezköy and its being connected to Çerkezköy via a transmission line, additionally, assistance of various Ministries about this subject has been demanded.⁴³⁷

⁴³⁴ *Milliyet*, 9 November 1997.

⁴³⁵ The Minister of Development and Housing Mukadder Öztekin stated that confiscation operation for Edirne-İstanbul Motorway would begin in 1973 and that the motorway would be constructed at a place outside the routing of E-5 [D-100]. *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 17 August 1972.

⁴³⁶ “Çerkezköy sanayicilerinin zat-ı âlilerinden delaletlerini bekledikleri aşağıdaki hususların gerçekleşmesi de en önemli sorunlarımız arasındadır. Şöyle ki;

1. Halen proje safhasında olup yakın bir gelecekte yapımına başlanacak Trakya otoyolunun, her geçen gün daha da büyüyerek bir endüstri merkezi haline gelen Çerkezköy’den geçmesi, (...)” Naim Akbay, letter dated 19 December 1975, ÇIA Archive.

⁴³⁷ “Derneğimiz ayrıca halen plan proje safhasında bulunan Trakya otoyolunun mümkün olduğu kadar Çerkezköy’e yakın geçmesi ve bir iltisak hattı ile Çerkezköy’e bağlanması hususunda Bayındırlık Bakanlığı Karayolları Genel müdürlüğüne resmen müracaat etmiş, ayrıca muhtelif Bakanlıkların bu konuda müzaharetleri istenmiştir.” ÇIA 2nd

A piece of news published in 1976 said that the confiscation of land for the Thrace Motorway had started, and that the road, after passing through north of the Çekmece lakes and south of Çerkezköy, would merge with the D-100 highway in Çorlu neighborhood.⁴³⁸ What is significant here is how close to Çerkezköy the road would pass. What is said in the 1983 General Assembly report is as follows:

The routing of the motorway, planned to be constructed by the state, which passed from 23 km southwest of Çerkezköy before, according to the information recently received, by approaching to Çerkezköy by 11 km, will pass from a distance of 12 km to Çerkezköy and its connection to Çerkezköy will be ensured.⁴³⁹

The motorway, the construction of which started in 1989, really did pass from a distance of 12 km to Çerkezköy. The distance stated as 23 km in the report corresponds to the Tekirdağ junction on the motorway. The map in Figure 7 shows that the motorway, by turning towards north from this conjunction, arches towards Çerkezköy. If the news of *Milliyet* newspaper in 1976 is correct, the motorway, in the beginning, was supposed to turn toward Çorlu, in other words to the D-100 highway, without turning towards Çerkezköy. With this change of plan, it has been provided that the road passed closer to Çerkezköy. Although it is not possible to determine how much effect the efforts of the ÇIA in 1975 had on the formation of this curve towards Çerkezköy, we can claim that the presence of industry in the region ensured the road's passing in close proximity.

General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

⁴³⁸ *Milliyet*, 22 June 1976.

⁴³⁹ “Devletçe yapılması programlanan ve daha evvel Çerkezköy’ün 23 km. Güney batısından geçen otoban güzergahı, son alınan bilgilere göre Çerkezköy’e 11 km. daha yaklaşılarak 12 km. mesafeden geçecek ve Çerkezköy’e iltisaki sağlanacaktır.” ÇIA 9th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 26 January 1983, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.



Fig. 7. E-80 Motorway passing from the south of Çerkezköy.

The ÇIA also worked to have the electric train service between Sirkeci and Halkalı extended to Çerkezköy. Above it was mentioned that railway was used to a limited extent in shipping raw materials and products. The industrialists thought that the electric train would be useful in terms of labor supply. The association made its first attempt in 1975. The matter was also pursued in subsequent years and in 1984, train service from İstanbul to Çerkezköy started.⁴⁴⁰

After the E-80 highway was built, both the ÇIA and Çerkezköy municipality made extensive efforts for the construction of a Çerkezköy linking road. Mayor Uğraş, remarks that Tekirdağ governor Lütfi Tuncel and RPP deputy Enis Tütüncü supported the municipality in that matter.⁴⁴¹ As a result of the attempts made, the

⁴⁴⁰ ÇIA 2nd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1976, p.2; ÇIA 9th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 26 January 1983, ÇIA Archive, p.2; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 July 1984.

⁴⁴¹ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 15 January 1991.

foundation of the linking road was laid in March 1994 by Onur Kumbaracıbaşı, the Minister of Development and Housing.⁴⁴² Thus, the former Çerkezköy road was connected to the E-80 highway; however, the construction of the new linking road, which had been planned to, never started. Serkan Karagöz, president of the Çerkezköy Association of Realtors and former district head of the Motherland Party recounts how the building of the new linking road was ensured in 1996 as follows:

[In the 1994 elections] Remzi Garip won the office of mayor independently. At that time, there were 15 municipal council members before Remzi Garip. He had to get along with them so as to be able to work. Out of these 15 municipal council members 8 were in Motherland Party; that is to say with me. (...) At that time, Mesut Yılmaz had come to Çerkezköy. During Mesut Yılmaz's visit, when we told him that an independent candidate had won the mayoralty, he had said, 'District head, I want this man in this party no matter what.' And when I told him [Remzi Garip], he said 'OK Serkan, I will pass to Motherland Party, but there should be compensation for this. Let me not pass for anything.' (...) Our present for his passing to Motherland Party was building this linking road from the toll booths to here, Çerkezköy. (...) Even Mesut Yılmaz came here for the opening of this road.⁴⁴³

With the construction of the new linking road, Çerkezköy's transportation problem was solved.

The Problems of Wastewater and Environmental Pollution

The factories established in Çerkezköy were discharging their wastewater into the Çorlu brook without any treatment. The industrialists, seeking to avoid the cost of establishing a treatment plant, thought that they could solve this problem, like the other big infrastructure problems, via the establishment of the OIZ.

Taking fundamental precautions, especially required by the aquaculture law, against our industrial sewage and waste's polluting

⁴⁴² *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 8 March 1994.

⁴⁴³ Serkan Karagöz, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 21 March 2011.

the environment will financially constrain us considerably. We have acted with the conscious that this can be solved with the formula of establishing an Organized Industrial Zone, and an Organized Industrial Zone has been established.⁴⁴⁴

When the treatment plant of the OIZ was built, the factories in the present industrial area would send their wastewater to this facility via a common sewerage system they would build. However, the building of the treatment plant of the OIZ took much longer than expected. Although the project work was started in 1978,⁴⁴⁵ the construction of the facility was constantly postponed by the Ministry of Industry due to financial problems.⁴⁴⁶

Çorlu brook became extremely polluted in a short time. The villagers, who used the water for agriculture and stockbreeding, sued the factories in 1979. The court found in favor of the villagers in 1984, and 11 factories were sentenced to stop production until they had built their treatment plants and heavy fines were imposed.

With the Çerkezköy Penal Court of First Instance, activities of 11 factories were stopped on the grounds that they violated the provisions of Aquaculture Law. The case, opened by the inhabitants of Kızılpınar, Veliköy, Karaağaç and Yulaflı Village who take water from Çorlu Brook for irrigation and animal watering, concluded yesterday. The court decided to stop the work of factories until they establish a wastewater treatment plant.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ “Bilhassa su ürünleri kanunu gereğince, sanayi pis su ve atıklarımızın çevre kirletmesine karşın, köklü tedbirler almamız gücümüzü oldukça zorlayacaktır. Bunun ancak Organize Sanayi Bölgesi kurulması formülü ile halledilebileceği bilinciyle hareket edilmiş ve Organize Sanayi Bölgesi kurulmuştur.” ÇIA 5th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 23 January 1979, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

⁴⁴⁵ First project work on the treatment of wastewater was done in 1978 and 1979 by a team under the leadership of Kriton Curi from Boğaziçi University.

⁴⁴⁶ ÇIA 7th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1981, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

⁴⁴⁷ “Çerkezköy Asliye Ceza Mahkemesi’nce, Su Ürünleri Yasası hükümlerine aykırı hareket ettikleri gerekçesiyle 11 fabrikanın faaliyeti durduruldu. Çorlu Deresi’nden bahçe ve hayvan sulama için su alan Kızılpınar, Veliköy, Karaağaç ve Yulaflı Köyü sakinlerince açılan dava dün sonuçlandı. Mahkeme fabrikaların atık su arıtma tesislerini yaptırıncaya kadar faaliyetten men edilmesine karar verdi.” Milliyet, 16 February 1984.

As a result of the tests which the court had İstanbul Technical University do, it was revealed that the water of Çorlu Brook could not be used in any kind of agricultural activity.⁴⁴⁸ However, the lawyers of the factories immediately appealed to a higher court. This appeal was accepted by the higher court and the decision to stop the production issued for the factories was stopped.⁴⁴⁹ Thus, production continuation without a hitch at 11 factories that employed almost 9,000 workers was ensured.

The decision given by the Çerkezköy Penal Court of First Instance failed to stop the productions of firms which polluted environment. However, from this date onwards, the factories started to build preliminary treatment facilities within their own structures and the ÇIA accelerated its efforts to construct a central treatment plant in the OIZ. That the court's decision went to the Supreme Court saved time for the industrialist. In the meantime, the factories built preliminary treatment facilities.⁴⁵⁰ Wastewater coming out of the preliminary treatment plant was to be transferred to the central treatment plant in the OIZ. However, work at the OIZ did not proceed at the desired pace. Though the problem of waste water was the main topic of the ÇIA's general assemblies in 1985 and 1986, since subsidies could not be provided from the Ministry of Industry, the construction of the central treatment facility was not started.⁴⁵¹

In the meantime, the decision of the Çerkezköy Penal Court of First Instance was approved by the Supreme Court.⁴⁵² However, it is understood that the owners of the firms have somehow impeded implementation of the decision despite this approval. While the activities related to wastewater in 1985 were assessed in the 12th

⁴⁴⁸ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 February 1984.

⁴⁴⁹ *Milliyet*, 18 February 1984.

⁴⁵⁰ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 23 July 1984. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 August 1984.

⁴⁵¹ ÇIA 12th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1986, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

⁴⁵² "Yargıtay Atık Su Kararını Onayladı" (The Supreme Court approved the wastewater decision), *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 18 April 1985.

General Assembly, it was said that “solution in terms of time was sought for the judicial situation that appeared.”⁴⁵³ Though what kind of a solution “in terms of time” was found for the decision of the Supreme Court remains unclear with regards to this study, it can be said that the duration was almost a year. In May 1986, the Motherland Party government of the period put an end to this uneasy situation by enacting an amnesty under the name of Amendment to the Law of Aquaculture.⁴⁵⁴

The law amendment draft of the government was regarded as an amnesty of industry by the opposition deputies in the session of Parliament. It was claimed that the draft had been prepared due to the pressure of the industrial circles because, with the two provisional articles in the amendment draft all the penalties that were given by the courts until the law amendment became valid were cancelled and a period of two years was given to the industrialists for the construction of treatment facilities. In the debates, names frequently mentioned were those of Çerkezköy industrialists about whom there had been a Supreme Court decision and businessman and President of Fenerbahçe Sports Club Ali Şen, whose factory at Kocaeli had been closed down with a court decision.⁴⁵⁵

There are many factories at Çerkezköy. These factories pour poison into Ergene Rivulet, and from there to Çorlu Brook and to Ergene River, this poison goes till Gulf of Saros.

⁴⁵³ CIA 12th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1986, p. 2.

⁴⁵⁴ Cases opened due to environmental pollution were not problems of only Çerkezköy industrialists. In November 1984, Kocaeli Bar sued four factories on behalf of 3 975 people, as a result of this case which was widely covered in the media leather factory of famous businessman Ali Şen was closed for 53 days. And in February 1985, General Directorate of Mersin Aquaculture sued İskenderun Demir Çelik İşletmesi, which is a public institution, for polluting the sea. The years of 1984 and 1985 were a period when the awareness on environmental pollution was raised in public opinion in Turkey. *Milliyet*, 23 November 1984, *Milliyet* 10 February 1985, *Milliyet* 04 May 1986.

⁴⁵⁵ The phone call made by Motherland Party deputy Orhan Ergüder to the Kocaeli governor in which he asked for permission for Ali Şen’s factory, the activity of which had been stopped, continue its work until he finished the state tender he bid was reported in the media and in the parliament session where the Aquaculture Law was discussed this event was brought to the agenda. Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 106, session 1, vol. 29, 15 May 1986.

I have to explain to you why this amendment in the law is being made: There – I will not tell the names of the establishments since it becomes advertising otherwise; they do that advertising on TV exceedingly, I do not want to advertise – factories of some influential people have been shut down by the brave and gallant prosecutor, judge and district governor of the region. By means of pressing, they have had their factories reopened and have suppressed the minister in order to pour poisoned water for two more years.⁴⁵⁶

Mr. President, distinguished members of parliament, when the document about the amendment to be made in Aquaculture Law No. 1380 was brought to the commission as a government bill, that there was a detail, an interest, a dispute behind it was apparent in the provisional 1st and 2nd articles. Its content was, although its name was Amendment Aquaculture Law, certainly an amnesty of industry. This, no matter how much camouflaged, was brought before you as the presence, blow and power balance of rich and influential people.⁴⁵⁷

To the industrial enterprises and work places, the production of which were formerly stopped, the right ‘to continue their productions from the date when this law became valid’ was bestowed; in other words, the decision of the court was stuck down and the convict was privileged with amnesty. On this subject this question appears in mind perforce: Is the ministry in favour of poor fishermen and farmers or the industrialists and businessmen?⁴⁵⁸

The draft was accepted on 15 May 1986. In consequence of the debates in the Parliament, the time allowed to industrialists for building treatment facilities was decreased from two years to one year, but the government was given the powers to extend this time six months more.⁴⁵⁹ Thanks to an amendment in the law, the court decision about the Çerkezköy industrialists was dropped.

The lobbying activities of the ÇIA on the wastewater problem continued intensively in 1986 as well. However, no solution was found that year for the central treatment plan that was to be built in the OIZ. In 1987, when the term of the amnesty

⁴⁵⁶ Ertuğrul Gökğün (Aydın deputy), Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 105, session 1, vol. 29, 14 May 1986.

⁴⁵⁷ Yılmaz Demir (Bilecik deputy), Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 105, session 1, vol. 29, 14 May 1986.

⁴⁵⁸ Mehmet Kemal Gökçora (Bursa deputy) Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 105, session 1, vol. 29, 14 May 1986.

⁴⁵⁹ Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, term 106, session 1, vol. 29, 15 May 1986; Republic of Turkey, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19120, 28 May 1986.

of industry presented by the Motherland Party government had expired, the advice of the ÇIA to its members was to match the criteria stated in the Aquaculture Regulations dated 1973 that each factory build a treatment plant for its wastewater in their own facilities.⁴⁶⁰

The industrialists, who were for the first time trying to implement the Regulations from 1973,⁴⁶¹ decided that they were too heavy and should be relaxed. That the central treatment plant which they had expected for years had not been built and that it would be difficult for the treatment plants in their own facilities to meet the criteria stated in the Aquaculture Regulations dated 1973 (or the effort to avoid the costs of meeting these criteria), led the Çerkezköy industrialists to set a new goal: to change the criteria of wastewater pollution!

With the aim of relaxing the very heavy and strict numbers and rules which are determined by the aquaculture as the criteria of discharging wastewater, works and initiatives that take a long time have been made within the body of Ministries, the draft law prepared by the Prime Ministry Directorate General for Environment on this matter was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly and although it was returned to the parliament for formal adjustments designated by the presidential authority, due to the fact that the date of the elections was brought forward and the assembly was adjourned, it was not possible to make the adjustments to the mentioned articles. We regard it highly beneficial to continue our attempts as an association to revitalize of this law in 1988, which will bring a great relief to Turkish industry.”⁴⁶²

Within the scope of this research, it is not possible to determine the results of this attempt. Hence in 1988, the second Motherland Party government made two legal adjustments with regards to the subject. The first was that in March 1988, some

⁴⁶⁰ ÇIA 13th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1987, ÇIA Archive, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁶¹ Republic of Turkey, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 14607, 22 July 1973.

⁴⁶² ÇIA 14th Extraordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 29 January 1988, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

articles of the Environment Law were changed.⁴⁶³ It was declared that the Provisional First Article, which allowed for one more year for factories to build their treatment facilities with the law amendment in March 1986, would be invalid when the new Regulations were enacted. Thus, with the new Water Pollution Regulations considered to have been enacted, the preparation of “starting with a clean slate” was formed. Secondly, in September 1988, the Water Pollution Regulations became valid with their publication in the *Official Gazette*.⁴⁶⁴ In the Provisional Second Article of this Regulations, more extra times ranging from one year to two and a half years was allowed to the industrialists to construct their treatment facilities.⁴⁶⁵ Thus, the “great relief,” sought by Çerkezköy industrialists, was provided to Turkish industry.

The ÇOIZ central treatment plant, the construction of which was not started for long years, was built between 1988 and 1994. The project of the facility was made with international support, at an amount of 498,000 Sterling donated to the ÇOIZ by the English government. In this way, the project work was completed in 1988 and the construction of the facility started in 1992. The facility, which cost 15 million dollars and the construction of which was completed in 1994, entered into service as of 1995.⁴⁶⁶

The treatment facility was planned according to the requirements of the ÇOIZ First Region. However, as it had been planned years earlier, the factories in the ÇOIZ Expansion Area also directed their waste water to the treatment facility of the ÇOIZ. When it was understood in 1997 that the capacity of the facility fell short of meeting

⁴⁶³ “2872 Sayılı Çevre Kanunu’nun Bazı Maddelerinin Değiştirilmesi Hakkında Kanun” (Law on the Amendment of Some Articles of the Environment Law No. 2872) in Republic of Turkey, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19751, 11 March 1988.

⁴⁶⁴ Republic of Turkey, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, no. 19919, 4 September 1988.

⁴⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁶ Directorate of Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Firma Tanıtım Kataloğu*, ÇIA 15th Ordinary General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 27 January 1989, ÇIA Archive, p. 3.

the demand, the connection of the factories in the Expansion Area with the treatment facility was cut. These factories went on with their own treatment facilities which they had built earlier.⁴⁶⁷

To avoid costs, there was a method applied by the industrialists who had to build treatment plants in Çerkezköy as well as in other parts of Turkey: Establishing but not operating the facilities. Abdülkadir Karan, who was the mayor of Çerkezköy from 1973 to 1980, and from 1984 to 1989, states that even though the factories had treatment facilities, they did not use these facilities at night.⁴⁶⁸ The factories not running the treatment plants due to their cost was a complaint expressed in many other resources.⁴⁶⁹

In the more than twenty years that had passed since the beginning of industrialization in Çerkezköy, factories have solved their waste problems with the methods described above; however, the cost of these “solutions” to the Thrace region has been heavy. The organic life in Çorlu brook and Ergene river has ended due to industrial wastes and these streams have turned into dirty watercourses that reek at a distance of 2-3 km. As a natural consequence of this, irrigated agriculture has come to an end in Çerkezköy and Çorlu.⁴⁷⁰ In 1996, the Mediterranean S.O.S. Association

⁴⁶⁷ Servinaz Kuru, “Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi’nde Endüstriyel Arıtma Uygulamaları” (Industrial Treatment Implementations in Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone) in H. Ziya Özek and Ali Maralcan, *Çerkezköy Değerleri Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı* (Çerkezköy’s Values Symposium Proceedings) (Tekirdağ: Namık Kemal University, 2010), pp. 84-85.

⁴⁶⁸ Karan, interview by the author.

⁴⁶⁹ “Kızılıpınar Mayor: Profilo discharges wastewater into the brook at night.” *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 27 December 1994. Factories that have treatment facilities do not operate them since their operation costs are high. Çakıroğlu, *Milliyet*, 9 November 1997. “Even though they have treatment plants, most of these enterprises do not operate their treatment facilities.” Ahmet Kubaş et al., *Trakya Bölgesinde Sanayileşmenin Tarımsal Üretime Etkileri ve Sonuçlarının Sürdürülebilir Tarım Politikası Açısından Değerlendirilmesi*, (Effects of industrialization on agricultural production in the Thrace region and analysis of its effects in terms of sustainable agricultural policy) (Tekirdağ, n. p., 2002) p. 58.

⁴⁷⁰ Ahmet Kubaş et al., pp. 55-58, 92.

listed Çerkezköy among the ten regions in Turkey, where environmental pollution had most intensified.⁴⁷¹

The Labor Problem

The Labor Supply

When the first factories started to be built, the population of Çerkezköy was around 4000 and most of the young people in the district had gone to İstanbul to work. After the coming of industry, however, Çerkezköy started to get immigration instead of being a place of emigration. However, the population growth experienced due to immigration was not enough to meet the labor requirement of the rapid industrialization. For this reason, the industrialists had to find the labor power they required from the neighboring villages and districts. Therefore, first of all, the villagers had to be persuaded to work in factories.

From 1973 onwards, an intensive campaign to find workers in Çerkezköy and the surrounding areas started. In addition to the factory managers, mukhtars and unionists played active roles in this campaign. The personnel managers of the factories went to the villages through a familiar person. Sometimes these visits were announced to the villagers by the playing of drums and people to work in the factories were sought in the village square or the village coffee shop. Especially the mukhtars of the villages acted as intermediaries in finding workers.⁴⁷² Hayri Maytalman, who has been in the region since the establishment of the industry and

⁴⁷¹ *Milliyet*, 6 June 1996.

⁴⁷² Gayretli, interview by the author; Bülent Uğraş, interview by the author.

who has been a union manager for many years, describes the role of the union in supplying workers as follows:

As a union we went and recruited workers. We tried to teach the workers to be workers. We told them that they would retire one day, we reminded them that they need to work. You receive a salary, we told them about retirement, insurance. (...) As the employer and the union we recruited workers hand in hand for 2-3 years. Both the employer and we recruited workers. 3-4 years later the situation was reversed, people started to form queues before the doors of the factories. The villagers looked at each other and saw that the girls who were working bought washing machines for their houses and had money, then a rush for the work started. Then the employers started to be picky.⁴⁷³

Maytalman states that at first, the villagers who started working found the factory environment odd, and that they made remarks such as “how can one stay in here, it is too noisy,” and that in the first few years the turnover rate was very high. Ömer Kılınç, who was a manager at Dinarsu factory in that period, recounts that when they asked in the following day, a worker who did not come to work why he did not come to work, he could quite comfortably give reasons such as “there was a henna night”, and that he regarded it as natural. Kılınç states that it took three-four years for the workers to get used to the work discipline.

Another problem encountered in the first attempts of supplying labor was the anxiety felt by the parents about sending their daughters to work. To relieve this anxiety such a method was developed: It was made sure that the girls worked under the supervision of an older woman from the village. She would go to the factory with the girls, and at the factory, while they worked, she waited either do nothing or do

⁴⁷³ Basri Maytalman, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 22 March 2011.

Ahmet Gayretli explains the effort of unionists to find workers as such: “Unions find people because if the person is their man then they can use him later on, so that he will support them in the union, when they say ‘I got you a job’, they can make him do anything they want later on.” (*Sendikalar adam bulur, çünkü kendi adamı olsun ki yarın onu kullanabilsin, sendika içinde kendisini desteklesin, ‘Ben seni işe koydum’ desin, yarın ne istiyorsa yaptırsın ona.*) Gayretli, interview by the author.

some work such as washing dishes. In the evening she would go back to the village with the girls. This woman received a normal worker's wage.⁴⁷⁴

The subject of having the girls sent to work was addressed in a study conducted by Mehmet Aslan on Kapaklı village, which is one of the villages around the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone. Aslan states that the first heads of the families that give permission to their daughters to work were the heads of families who were relatively poor and had many daughters. Although a limited number of families sent their daughters to work at first, in a short time girls' working became common, and even the heads of families themselves started to put effort in getting their daughters employed.⁴⁷⁵

The labor thus supplied from the villages was transported to the factories via a shuttle network provided by the firms. From the towns and villages, which were in an area with a diameter of 120 km, between Büyükçekmece district of İstanbul and Pınarhisar district of Kırklareli –both of which were from a bird's-eye sixty km away from Çerkezköy–, workers were carried by shuttle buses in three shifts a day.⁴⁷⁶ In the beginning of 1978, it was said that ninety percent of the workers at the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone were brought in from outside Çerkezköy.⁴⁷⁷

By 1982, the closest of which was five km and the farthest of which was sixty six km, 8000 workers were carried with 141 shuttle buses to Çerkezköy from tens of villages and towns. Workers' coming from Pınarhisar, the farthest point, to Çerkezköy took 2,5 hours due to the poor village roads, which meant that five hours

⁴⁷⁴ Kılınç, interview by the author, 25 March 2011; Maytalman, interview by the author.

⁴⁷⁵ Aslan, p. 101.

⁴⁷⁶ A newspaper advertisement searching for a shuttle bus that will work between Silivri, Çorlu, Büyük Çekmece and Çerkezköy. *Milliyet*, 16 April 1976.

⁴⁷⁷ ÇIA 4th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1978, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

a day was spent on the way for coming to and going from work.⁴⁷⁸ According to a study made by Zafer Avcılar from *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, workers from neighboring districts spent 3-4 hours commuting on average. According to the same study, 32.5 percent of the workers at the factories resided in the Çerkezköy district center. Almost half of the total workers were provided within the borders of Çerkezköy district, and the remaining half came from outside the borders of Çerkezköy district.⁴⁷⁹

The buses and minibuses used for carrying workers were generally very old and they carried passengers beyond their capacity. And when the roughness of village roads was added to that, accidents and loss of lives were experienced occasionally.⁴⁸⁰ When a service bus carrying workers to Narin factory collided with a train on 1 March 1976, ten workers lost their lives and forty-nine were injured. At the time of the accident, in this vehicle, which had a capacity of thirty-two people, there were sixty-seven workers.⁴⁸¹

⁴⁷⁸ Eker, p. 128.

⁴⁷⁹ Zafer Avcılar, “Çerkezköy’de Sanayi ve Getirdikleri,” (Industry at Çerkezköy and what it brought about), *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 5 January 1983 - 6 April 1983.

⁴⁸⁰ “İşçi taşıyan otobüs buzlu yolda devrildi bir işçi öldü” (The bus carrying workers overturned on the icy road, a worker died) *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 February 1984; “Çerkezköy’e işçi taşıyan servis, öğrenci servisine çarptı. 8 kişi öldü” (The service bus carrying workers to Çerkezköy hit a students’ bus, 8 people died.) *Milliyet*, 6 November 1985.

⁴⁸¹ Devrim 4 March 1976, *Milliyet*, 2 March 1976.

1982, for the administrative and technical personnel of eleven enterprises at Çerkezköy, there were company lodgings for a total of 350 apartments for families and single people.⁴⁸⁷ “We brought the workers at İstanbul here as foremen.” Gayretli says, “Their precedence rose here. We gave them fully furnished duplex housing, with a swimming pool. We transported highly qualified workers from İstanbul daily. Finding workers and training them was the most important problem.”⁴⁸⁸

However, the conditions were very different for the unskilled labor, who received minimum wages. The wages were a little higher in the metal sector but generally, the wage given to unskilled labor was either the minimum wage or a little higher. However, in the 1970s, it was not possible to employ workers at the minimum wage at the factories in İstanbul. In this sense, the industrialists who built factories in Çerkezköy had the advantage of employing workers at the minimum wage in the beginning.⁴⁸⁹ Since rapid unionization was experienced in Çerkezköy, a great majority of the workers entered into the collective bargaining system and were subject to agreements made on a national scale. Even so, the employers saved costs since they started the wages from the minimum wage at Çerkezköy.

The element increases the cost of unskilled labor for industrialists was the transportation expenses. According to Eker, service cost at certain routings could rise up to 7500 TL monthly per worker in 1982.⁴⁹⁰ Considering that the minimum gross wage was 10000 TL⁴⁹¹ in that year, we can say that 7500 TL was relatively high.

⁴⁸⁷ Eker, p. 129.

⁴⁸⁸ “İstanbul’daki işçileri buraya usta olarak getirdik. Burada kıdemleri yükseldi. Dayalı döşeli dubleks lojman verdik, havuzlu. Çok kalifiye işçileri İstanbul’dan getirip götürdük. İşçi bulma ve eğitme en önemli sorundu.” Gayretli, interview by the author.

⁴⁸⁹ Kılınç, interview by the author, 25 March 2011; Maytalman, interview by the author.

⁴⁹⁰ Eker, p. 129.

⁴⁹¹ Available online at <http://www.muhasabenet.net/asgari_ucretler.htm> [22 September 2011]

Employers, in order to be relieved from the costs of shuttles and the other inconveniences they caused, made attempts as of 1974 for the construction of mass housing (*toplu konut*).

After 1972, from the moment we started investing in Çerkezköy, it was known by all that one of our biggest problems was employment. Since then, the necessary man power to operate our facilities has been brought to the workplace, with great sacrifices and concessions, from the neighboring villages and towns by carrying them with buses. This method could never been and will not be a radical solution, because of the often increasing, abnormal wage claims of carriers, failure in transportation or not being able to transport people at all in winter conditions, bottlenecks in fuel oil supply, etc. Ensuring that our workers work at peace by owning a house in the locality and making the personnel, who are trying to make a living by coming to work even under bad weather conditions from long distances with various difficulties, peaceful and robust, enabling them to benefit from a number of social opportunities could only be solved with the formula of establishing a residential center at Çerkezköy.⁴⁹²

For that purpose and with the ÇIA's guidance, employees of nine factories established housing cooperatives.⁴⁹³ The construction of the cooperative buildings took a long time due to various bureaucratic and financial problems. First of all, 65,100 m² of land, next to the OIZ, was bought from the area that had been

⁴⁹² ÇIA 6th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 10 January 1980, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

⁴⁹³ While most of the industrialists regarded construction of mass housing for workers as a key to the housing problem, two industrialists claimed that it would have been more appropriate to build houses in villages rather than constructing mass housing. In the meeting held with the industrialists during the Prime Minister Uluşu's visit to Çerkezköy in 1982, Halit Narin demanded that, instead of mass housing, workers should be given housing credit and thus it should be ensured that they build houses in their own villages. Of course this should be carried out along with developing the transportation opportunities. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 7 July 1982.

The same idea was also supported by the owner of Gümüşsuyu firm, Necmettin Öztemir:

"In our opinion, there is a more useful arrangement than mass houses for the workers, who will be directed towards industry. This can be achieved as such, without rupturing the relation of workers with land, by providing them with financial support for the houses they will build on fields or yards within the settlement areas they are in, it can be ensured that they own houses. In this respect, by immediately developing a system to procedure of agricultural credit operated by Ziraat Bankası, the way to make our workers of village origin own houses will be cleared." "Çerkezköy Özel Eki", *Dünya Gazetesi*, 28 March 1983.

However, the ÇIA board of directors thought that the most realistic solution was mass housing.

confiscated in 1972 to be turned into a residential area by the Land Office, at a cheap price.⁴⁹⁴ In 1983, construction began.⁴⁹⁵ By 1990, 600 houses had been built for the workers in this area.⁴⁹⁶ However, these 600 houses were far from solving the housing problem of 12,000 workers.

The second project the industrialists embarked on –with the Municipality– to solve the housing problem was Emlak Bankası Houses. During the visit of president Turgut Özal to Tekirdağ, the governor of the province had demanded that Emlak Bankası build houses in Çerkezköy and Çorlu, and Emlak Bankası had responded positively to this demand. Thereupon, mayor Hikmet Uğraş and members of the board of directors of the ÇIA negotiated with the general director of Emlak Bankası, and made an agreement for the construction of 3000 houses.⁴⁹⁷ By 1994, 720 of the houses, which represented the first stage of the project, had been completed.⁴⁹⁸ However, since the prices of the houses were quite high, they were purchased not by the workers, but by the firm managers and the wealthy people of Çerkezköy.⁴⁹⁹ Consequently, in the 1990s, the workers continued to be transported to the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone with shuttle buses.⁵⁰⁰

The efficiency of the labor provided from villages was low. For the purpose of qualifying the workers, especially in the metal sector, training sessions were given

⁴⁹⁴ “With the interference of Distinguished Minister of Development and Housing, with whom we had the opportunity to meet thanks to the close attention and efforts of our Tekirdağ Governor, the prices of lands have been decreased by 45 percent more and they cost in accordance with their conditions 50-60-70 TL/m².” (*Tekirdağ Valimizin yakın ilgi ve gayretleriyle görüşme imkanı bulduğumuz Sayın İmar ve İskan Bakanımızın müdahalesi ile arsa fiyatları yüzde 45 daha indirilerek durumlarına göre 50-60-70 TL/m² olmuştur.*) ÇIA 7th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1981, ÇIA Archive, p. 4.

⁴⁹⁵ ÇIA 10th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1984, ÇIA Archive, p. 2.

⁴⁹⁶ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 46.

⁴⁹⁷ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 26 February 1991.

⁴⁹⁸ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 August 1994.

⁴⁹⁹ Eser, p. 97.

⁵⁰⁰ Not only most of the workers but also most of the managers dwelled outside Çerkezköy. According to the research of Naime Sert, 70 percent of the factory managers did not reside in Çerkezköy. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 17 August 1993.

by factory.⁵⁰¹ Except for the untrained labor hired from the villages, there was also a reservoir of trained and disciplined labor in the region. These were immigrants from Bulgaria known for their industriousness and discipline. In an article series prepared by *Cumhuriyet* newspaper about the Thrace region, it was said that the factories preferred to employ immigrant women and children.⁵⁰²

During Çerkezköy's industrialization process, two waves of immigration from Bulgaria, first being in 1978 and the second in 1989, occurred. During the first wave, due to the opportunity to work in the factories, many of the immigrants headed towards Çerkezköy and settled in the area called the Muhacir Mahallesi (immigrant neighborhood).⁵⁰³

Another important characteristic of the labor market at Çerkezköy was the rate of women employed. According to a study conducted by Avcılar for *Çerkezköy Gazetesi* in 1983, women workers comprised 27 percent of the total employees.⁵⁰⁴ A study conducted by Naime Sert in 1992 found the rate of women employees to be 32 percent.⁵⁰⁵ In an article series by Çakıroğlu in *Milliyet*, women workers were described as follows:

Akin (*soydaş*) women coming from Bulgaria are an indispensable resource. Their work discipline and professionalism are the first choices of the bosses.

The salaries they receive are on the level of minimum wage and range between the net salary of 15 and 20 million TL. Village girls, who used to stay at home and make lace, knit, and milk the cows, work at the machinery of the textile factories 7-8 hours a day.

⁵⁰¹ Kamhi, p. 35. "Hema'da Çıraklık Okulu Açılıyor" (An apprenticeship school is opened at Hema), *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 7 January 1992.

⁵⁰² Mehmet Kemal and İsmail Gülgeç "Çerkezköy Sanayiciliğine Can Kurban," (How wonderful is Çerkezköy industrialism), *Cumhuriyet*, 4 November 1981.

⁵⁰³ Since no deductions were made from the salaries of 1978 and 1989 immigrants for five years due to the decision given by the governments, they received their salaries during this time of gross wage.

⁵⁰⁴ Zafer Avcılar, "Çerkezköy'de Sanayi ve Getirdikleri," *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 5 January 1983 - 6 April 1983.

⁵⁰⁵ Naime Sert, "Çerkezköy Sanayisi," *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 28 July 1992 - 17 August 1993.

The women workers with whom we talked did not complain about their situations perhaps because their chiefs were next to them. However, as a working woman, I could not help but notice the exhaustion and resentment in their faces (...)

The bosses, while they mention that they are very content with women workers, also emphasize that women workers are more careful and obedient. Although women receive a low wage, their economic independence provides a certain guarantee.⁵⁰⁶

During the 1980s and 1990s, Çerkezköy and its villages grew rapidly with receiving immigrant from not only Bulgaria, but from cities all over Turkey as well. The labor requirement of the developing industry was met by this way. In 1996, in the ÇOIZ and the in region announced as the Expansion Area 17,586 people were employed. 9625 workers, which correspond to 55 percent of them, had come from Çerkezköy district center and the towns and villages of Çerkezköy. In the 1990s, rapidly growing town of Kapaklı alone had a rate of 12 percent (2106 workers). Of the remaining workers, 4421 workers (25 percent) from the Saray district, 2843 workers (16 percent) from Çorlu, and 679 workers (4 percent) from Silivri weretransported to Çerkezköy on shuttle buses. When compared to the beginning of the 1980s, it is observed that the basin from where workers were recruited had become smaller; it was limited by neighboring districts. But still, the rate of workers carried from outside Çerkezköy district was more or less the same as the rate at the beginning of the 1980s. Almost half of the workers were from outside the district.⁵⁰⁷

Labor Control

During the 1970s, when the industrialization at Çerkezköy started, unionization spread throughout Turkey and was radicalized. There was cutthroat competition

⁵⁰⁶ Perihan Çakıroğlu, “Tekstil Kadının Omzuna Basarak Yükseliyor” (Textile is rising by stepping on the shoulders of women), *Milliyet*, 17 November 1997.

⁵⁰⁷ *Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği Bülteni* (Bulletin of Çerkezköy Industrialists’ Association), 1996, ÇIA Archive.

between two big confederations in the manufacturing sector, which constituted the main body of unionization. On one side there was the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (CPTU), in whose administration the RPP and the illegal Communist Party of Turkey were influential, embodying different tendencies of the left. On the other side was the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (CTTU), which advocated a right-wing and reconciliatory line. This cutthroat competition and polarization between the unions was intertwined with the right-left polarization of the period, and it acquired ideological and political dimensions beyond the competition between unions. These developments on the national scale had an impact on Çerkezköy; however, the political tension in the region never reached the level in İstanbul.

The labor movement in Çerkezköy was never as strong as it was in İstanbul. That the workers here had agricultural land at the same time, and that they had means to subsist even if they became unemployed, reduced the conflict. The factory was also regarded by girls and boys of the village as an escape from the oppression of their fathers.⁵⁰⁸

Together with the beginning of the construction of factories, unions started to open representative agencies in Çerkezköy. TEKSİF, a textile union under CTTU, had a five-storey commercial complex built in 1973⁵⁰⁹ and realized its first branch congress in April 1974.⁵¹⁰ The Textile Workers' Union, which was to join CPTU in 1975, also started to unionize in the same period.⁵¹¹ The first conflict of authority occurred over Narin and Akip, the two factories which had been established first in the region.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁸ “Çerkezköy’de işçi hareketleri hiçbir zaman İstanbul’daki gibi sert olmadı. Buradaki işçilerin aynı zamanda ekecek toprağa sahip olması, işsiz kaldığında bile geçinebilecek araçlara sahip olması çatışmayı yumuşattı. Ayrıca köyün genç kızları ve erkekleri için fabrika baba baskısından da bir kurtuluş olarak görüldü.” Kılınç, interview by the author, 25 March 2011.

⁵⁰⁹ *Çorlu Gazetesi*, 18 June 1973. *Milliyet*, 7 October 1973.

⁵¹⁰ *Milliyet*, 22 April 1974.

⁵¹¹ *Devrim*, 5 February 1974.

⁵¹² *Devrim*, 25 November 1974. Most of the time, the disputes about which union really deserves to have the authority at a workplace were brought to trials and during those one or two years the trial lasted, the workers could not benefit from their union rights. Maytalman, interview by the author.

The TEKSİF Union won this struggle to have authority.⁵¹³ However, the Textile Workers' Union under CPTU won the union election made in 1975 at Dinarsu factory.⁵¹⁴

In 1980, the CPTU Textile Workers' Union was unionized in the factories of Jakarteks, Dinarsu, Gümüşsuyu and Asma. As for the Mine Union (*Maden İş*) under the CPTU, it was unionized at the two factories of Profilo. These factories participated in the great strikes organized by the CPTU on national scale. In February 1980, 2000 workers in Çerkezköy participated in strikes started by the CPTU Textile Workers' Union.⁵¹⁵ In that year, the struggle between the unions became severe. From time to time fighting between rival unions members broke out.⁵¹⁶

The attitude of the employers toward unionization was primarily to prevent it. If that was not possible, they chose the union which they regarded as more reconciliatory.⁵¹⁷ Since in the 1970s the prevention of unionization was not generally possible; employers, instead of the CPTU, which advocated a radical line, preferred unions under the CTTU.

The employers most feared the loosening of work discipline and the slow down of production. For this reason, they tried to establish strict control over the workers. As was the case with all of the other problems, in this problem also the ÇIA intervened. The ÇIA, tried to ensure that the state sent more security forces to the region, and developed a widespread and systematic intelligence network about the workers.

A document sent by the president of ÇIA Naim Akbay in 1978 to General Directorate of Security, reads as follows:

⁵¹³ *Milliyet*, 6 February 1976.

⁵¹⁴ *Milliyet*, 12 June 1975.

⁵¹⁵ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 3 March 1980.

⁵¹⁶ Maytalman, interview by the author.

⁵¹⁷ Gayretli, interview by the author.

It is of crucial importance to take the necessary precautions for public peace, security and traffic, and against workers' movement in Çerkezköy, which has become a modern industrial city. Up to the present, Çerkezköy security chief office with its present staff has assisted us beyond its power. However, in the face of the developing industry and increasing of the problems brought about it every passing day, we are of the opinion that it would be proper to reinforce the present staff of the security chief office with one police chief, two traffic policemen, eight police officers and a traffic police car.⁵¹⁸

This request of the ÇIA was met in 1979.

As a result of our work in 1979, with the understanding and support of administrative authorities, within the present conditions, staffs of police and gendarmerie were quite reinforced both in terms of personnel and equipment compared to their situations before 1979.⁵¹⁹

In addition the ÇIA also continued to provide the building and vehicle requirements of security forces as one of its prominent "social activities." Among these, the ones appeared in archive documents are as such: In 1981, 150,000 TL donation to the Çerkezköy district gendarmerie command;⁵²⁰ in the same year, purchase of a typewriter for the Çerkezköy police station and one for the Tekirdağ Directorate of Security; in 1983, 100,000 TL donation to the Tekirdağ Security Chief Office; in 1986, construction of a part of the building of gendarmerie station; in 1987, equipping gendarmerie station with wireless operator;⁵²¹ construction of industrial police station service building and a housing with twelve apartments by ÇOIZEEC on the land provided by it.⁵²²

⁵¹⁸ Naim Akbay, document no. 8-78, 3 April 1978, ÇIA Archive.

⁵¹⁹ "1979 yılı çalışmalarımız sonucu idari makamların anlayış ve yardımlarıyla mevcut imkanlar ölçüsünde emniyet ve jandarma kadrosu gerek personel gerekse araç ve gereç bakımından 1979 öncesine göre oldukça takviye edilmiştir." ÇIA 6th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1980, ÇIA Archive, p. 6.

⁵²⁰ ÇIA 7th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 1981, ÇIA Archive, p. 6.

⁵²¹ ÇIA 19th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 8 April 1993, ÇIA Archive.

⁵²² Çerkezköy District Governorate, "Briefing Report", 24 October 1994, ÇIA Archive. [The report presented by district governor İsa Küçük to the Minister of State Ali Şevket Erek during his visit to Çerkezköy].

Developing direct and close relations with the local civilian authorities and security forces⁵²³ and working to reinforce the security forces in the region comprised one part of the precautions the ÇIA took against the workers' movement. The other part involved the intelligence gathering activities organized by the firms. The reason for this activity was explained in this way:

However, in a period in which our country lives in the days of the heaviest crisis in the history of Republic, when anarchy, terrorism, separatism and destructiveness increase their severity and look for new areas to spread, and when hotbeds of mischief and factions want to destroy our country from within; also in Çerkezköy, which has become a strategic region by transforming into an industrial center, as firms, although we have reinforced our plans to ensure our security and peace, to fight against sabotages and fires, and to prevent infiltrations, we think it useful to indicate that there is a great necessity in our conjointly taking the passive precautions by providing the necessary co-ordinations with provincial and district authorities, and determining and fully implementing the methods of getting people work, and following a rational policy.⁵²⁴

This passage is an excerpt from the annual report of the Board of Directors of the ÇIA but reads more like an internal correspondence of a military unit. This style resulted partly from the atmosphere of the period and partly from the fact that Şükrü Eğin, the secretary general of the association, was a retired military officer.⁵²⁵

The intelligence gathering system developed by the association was this: Factory managers would send a list indicating the names of workers who had quit the jobs and their reasons for quitting every month (as of 1979 biweekly) to the

⁵²³ "Based on our certain intelligence, we recommend that factories should learn the personal backgrounds of workers, especially those who are recruited from the province and districts, by cooperating with the security forces and that they should be more careful in employing workers." (*Fabrikaların bilhassa il ve ilçelerden alınan işçilerin emniyetle işbirliği yapılarak özgeçmişlerinin öğrenilmesini ve işe almada daha titiz davranılmasını bazı istihbaratımıza dayanarak tavsiye etmekteyiz.*) Document No. 3-78 sent by ÇOIZ director Şükrü Eğin to factory managers, 8 February 1978, ÇIA Archive.

⁵²⁴ ÇIA 6th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 30 January 1980, p. 6.

⁵²⁵ Şükrü Eğin, who was the general secretary of the association since its establishment to 1996, was a retired military officer. Even an interviewee has stated that Eğin worked in the army as an intelligence officer. By the way, it is said that the employment of retired police officers and soldiers as personnel managers by the firms is a widespread practice.

association. The association, after combining the lists from all the factories, copied and delivered them to all the factories again. Thus, each firm manager learned who had quit and on what grounds or who had been laid off in the factories in the region, and was able to consider the information on the lists while hiring. This, in fact, was nothing but a perfect example of the practice called “black list” among the workers. Probably, also with the contribution of the military experience of the general secretary of the association, it was practiced quite systematically.

It is understood that the practice of black listing, some examples are given in the appendix section, started in 1976.⁵²⁶ Probably it continued in this way until the 1980 military coup.⁵²⁷

After the 12 September 1980 military coup, the labor process was controlled by the army.⁵²⁸ The CPTU, which had become the representative of the workers’ movement radicalized during the 1970s, was closed. The CTTU, the only union that was not closed, continued its activities. The impact of this on Çerkezköy was the passing of the workplaces where CPTU had been unionized, to the CTTU.⁵²⁹ After

⁵²⁶ “The issue of labor turnover is regularly reported to our members under the organization of our association by sending them the information received.” (*İşçi giriş ve çıkışları hususu derneğimiz organizesinde muntazaman üyelerimize alınan bilgilerin tevhit edilmesiyle zamanında duyurulmaktadır.*) CIA 3rd General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 28 January 1977, p. 7.

“The labor turnover, which is reported to the association biweekly by our firms and which we, as an association have announced to our firms by combining them, have turned into a tradition, will be reported to the association as of 1 February 1979 (...)” (*Bir gelenek haline getirdiğimiz, firmalarımızın 15 günde bir derneğe yazılı olarak bildirdikleri ve dernekçe de bunların birleştirilerek firmalarımıza duyurduğumuz işçi giriş ve çıkışlarını 1 Şubat 1979 tarihinden itibaren tüm firmalarca derneğe duyurulmasını (...)*) CIA 5th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 23 January 1979, CIA Archive, p. 6.

⁵²⁷ The oldest list I could find in the archive is dated to May 1979.

⁵²⁸ Boratav, pp. 149-151.

⁵²⁹ Six hundred Gümüşsuyu workers and 331 Dinarsu workers whose union was closed passed from CPTU Textile Workers’ Union to TEKSİF. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 18 May 1983. “Out of 1050 workers working at Dinarsu factory 822 became members of TEKSİF Union. Gathering of employees, working in the other textile factories, also under the roof of TEKSİF Union is going on.” (*Dinarsu fabrikasında çalışan 1050 işçiden 822’si Teksif sendikasına üye oldu. Tekstil dalında üretim yapan diğer fabrikalardaki çalışanların da*

the CPTU was closed, the workers' movement in Çerkezköy completely entered under the guidance of TEKSİF and the Turkish Metal unions, both of which were affiliated with the CTTU. In 1984, TEKSİF was unionized in twelve factories in Çerkezköy and out of 7000 textile workers in the region, 6000 became member of this union.⁵³⁰ The number of members of the Turkish Metal Union, which was unionized in all the big metal factories, was 4830 in 1994.⁵³¹ Although the CPTU restarted its activities in 1992,⁵³² it never reached its former power in the region. Its level of unionization remained limited.

Consequently, the Çerkezköy industrialists produced solutions to their labor problem (including labor control in the 1970s and the labor supply), one of the biggest problems they encountered, within the specific conditions of the region. The areas around the factories that chose locations in villages close to the İstanbul urban center were filled with gecekondu and thus, the labor supply stopped being a problem. Due to the specific conditions at Çerkezköy, the details of which will be discussed below, the population growth in the district center fell behind the labor supply required by the industrialization. For a small town to make progress, to be able to accommodate 10,000 workers in several years, it was necessary for either the state or the industrialists to make investments in housing and urban infrastructure. When this was not done, a broad network of transporting workers in an area with a diameter of 120 km was formed, which was unprecedented in Turkey.

In the second chapter of the dissertation, the comparison of Richard Harris between industrial suburbs and satellite industrial towns was discussed. According to Harris, the main difference between the two is that in the second, employers have to

Teksif sendikası çatısı altında toplanmaları devam etmektedir.) Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 13 February 1984.

⁵³⁰ Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 13 September 1984.

⁵³¹ Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 13 December 1994.

⁵³² Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 17 November 1992.

produce a solution for the housing problem. He states that in North America, building lodgings especially for skilled labor is a common practice. In Çerkezköy, company lodgings were built also only for managers and skilled labor. As for the housing cooperatives established by the workers with the support of the ÇIA, they were built in insufficient numbers, which made transporting workers inevitable.

The fact that more than half of the workers were transported every day to the factories from the villages, at the same time meant a proletarianization process that was different from the one in the metropolitan area. Proletarianization experienced without being separated from the agricultural land made it possible to keep the wages low and also contributed to a lower level of radicalism in the workers movement. Although industrialists did not leave İstanbul because of high wages or workers' radicalism, after they located in Çerkezköy, they benefitted from low wages by starting to employ unskilled labor at minimum wage, and from the relative docility of the workers who were still attached to their land.

Conclusion

Chapter Three discussed how the industrialists of İstanbul turned towards Çerkezköy due to the SPO's incentives and supportive and facilitating attitude of the locality. Çerkezköy's becoming one of the biggest organized industrial zones of Turkey by continuing its development in the subsequent years, occurred again as a result of a process in which industrialists, central state institutions, politicians and local authority took part. Although all of the agents cited contributed to this process, it should be indicated that the fundamental agent of development was the industrialists

who first invested in the region. If it had not been for their efforts to bring the public resources to Çerkezköy, it would not become such a larger industrial zone.

The industrialist who first invested in the region were forced to by the inadequacy of the infrastructure in Çerkezköy. The necessary infrastructure for the operation of huge facilities they were building was absent. These negative conditions compelled the industrialists to unite under the umbrella of the ÇIA in 1973. Thus, an association with the main activity of providing the transference of public resources to Çerkezköy emerged. The establishment of the ÇIA meant the building of a growth coalition in Çerkezköy. Later on, in 1975, when the ÇOIZEEC was formed with the municipality and governorate, these institutions were also added to the coalition.

The most important step taken by the ÇIA for the development of the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone was its starting the initiative of the establishment of the OIZ in 1975. The necessary conditions for this initiative to be successful were prepared by the Melen government in 1972 and 1973. An area of a total of 600 hectares confiscated by the Land Office under the Ministry of Development and Housing at the end of 1972 in order to prevent land speculation in the region and to present lands to industrialists at appropriate prices, remained idle until 1975. In addition, a decree of the Council of Ministers for the establishment of an OIZ in Çerkezköy was issue in 1973 though no steps were taken for implementation. The decision to establish an OIZ and the presence of land belonging to the state facilitated the ÇIA's establishment of the OIZ. Ömer Kılınç describes the importance of the Land Office's having bought land in Çerkezköy as follows:

The reason why this region is successful is that the OIZ was established in care of Land Office. Çorlu cannot be organized in any way because all the industrial lands are private property. The Land Office, after purchasing lands at a cheap price and spending money on the infrastructure, sold the lands to industrialists at a price a little above cost. But when all the land belongs to private people and when

their value has increased, from whom and how are you to buy land?
The Land Office bought 450 hectares in Çerkezköy. Can you buy this
from a private individual? Nobody wants to sell land that has gained
value.⁵³³

While in Çorlu a random and scattered industrial settlement occurred, in the making of an organized industrialization at Çerkezköy, land confiscation by the Land Office and then the ÇIA's having built an OIZ on this land with the funds of the Ministry of Industry is very important. Another important step that provided an organized industrial settlement was Çerkezköy Municipality's preventing random industrial settlement by taking the whole district, which had been included in the status of PAD, under the scope of the municipal adjacent area in 1972. These decisions, taken by the local and central state agencies, shaped the development process of the Çerkezköy OIZ, and ensured that a relatively organized industrialization ensued.

The ÇIA, forming the core of Çerkezköy growth coalition, on the one hand, has started to construct the ÇOIZ with the EEC it had established, and on the other hand, ensured the solving of the infrastructure problems of the municipal industrial area, where the factories were situated, with public resources.

The ÇOIZEEC was a public-private partnership where industrialists came together with the local government, and governorate, which represents central state. The function of this partnership, to which the industrialists contributed only one percent, first, was to establish an OIZ with the funds received from the Ministry of Industry and then to attract İstanbul industrialists to the OIZ. This constant contact among industrialists, local authorities and central state authorities provided that the lobbying activities carried out to develop Çerkezköy Industrial Zone were realized more effectively.

⁵³³ Kılınç, interview by the author, 22 March 2011.

Although Molotch, who put forward the Growth Machine thesis, assumes that the interest of local branches of multilocal corporations in local growth coalitions would be low, in Çerkezköy, on the contrary, the primary components of the growth coalition were the owners and local managers of these firms. The example of Ventura town, cited from Michael Adamson above, demonstrated that when the investments are stable, big and long term, local branches of multilocal firms are more interested in the local growth policies. Since the investments made in Çerkezköy between the years of 1972 and 1975 were also quite big and permanent with regards to the firms making them, they had to be concerned about local development, especially in terms of infrastructure, for their material interests. What is more, by purchasing large lands from the region, in fact they had at the same time made real estate investments. The group that would most benefit from Çerkezköy's growth in terms of industrial infrastructure was the industrialists.

At this point, emphasize should be given to the difference between mayor Hikmet Uğraş's local entrepreneurialism and that led by industrialists. Uğraş promoted industrial location in order to provide economic and urban development for his poor town. On the other hand, the aim of the industrialists was to remove the obstacles before the accumulation of capital and to increase the value of their fixed investments. For this reason, the urban development of Çerkezköy concerned industrialists as far as it served the accumulation of capital. For example, asphaltting the roads of the district concerned them in terms of facilitating the transportation of their workers and goods. Hikmet Uğraş's entrepreneurialism, instead, aimed to transform Çerkezköy into "an example industrial city." To what extent this aim was achieved will be discussed below.

The price of growth created by the local entrepreneurialism led by industrialists by receiving the support of the local government and central state agencies has been intense environmental pollution and an end to agricultural production. Clean water resources in Çerkezköy and in the Ergene basin in general, ecologic life, agricultural production and human health have been sacrificed by the state for the aim of industrialization. Since those who derived the most profit in this process, in other words industrialists, live outside Çerkezköy, they do not receive their share in this price while those who live in the region continue to pay heavily.

Another upheaval caused by industrial concentration in Çerkezköy was the population boom and the experience of a rapid urban growth. How the urban space has been changed by different actors and how the changing space has affected social relations reciprocally in Çerkezköy, the population of which has become heterogeneous in terms of culture and class as a result of migrations it received and the development of local economy will be discussed below.

CHAPTER V

URBAN DEVELOPMENT OF ÇERKEZKÖY

In the previous chapters of the dissertation, why industry chose to locate in Çerkezköy and the development of industrialization in Çerkezköy from its beginning to the mid-1990s were discussed. In this chapter, the urbanization process that appeared as a result of industrial settlement will be examined. Although the industrial area in Çerkezköy district center took its ultimate shape in the 1990s, the urban area continues its rapid growth horizontally and vertically in the present day. The period of most rapid urban growth was the second half of the first decade of the 2000s. For this reason, the analysis in this chapter comprises the period from the beginning of the 1970s to 2012, the year when this research was finished. The course of extraordinary urban growth experienced in this forty year period in Çerkezköy will be analyzed.

The location of industry in Çerkezköy triggered a rapid urbanization process not only in the district center but also in the villages, and new urban areas emerged. In this chapter, although the focus will be on the developments in the district center, as was done in the previous chapters, the developments in the villages will be discussed to the extent they are deemed necessary. Particularly, the section of migration and population will consider not only the urban center, but the totality of the district.

The urban development of Çerkezköy, which emerged as a new industrial city, will be discussed in five sections. In the first section, firstly, pre-industrial history of Çerkezköy and the property debates during the process of selling lands to industrialists in the 1970s will be recounted, and then the development of urban area will be demonstrated by making use of zoning plans and satellite images. In the second subtitle, housing production and the building of urban infrastructure will be discussed. Then, the demographic development will be examined, and followed by local economic developments. Finally, some aspects of local social relations and contradictions within the context of urban space will be explored.

The Emergence and Development of Urban Form

Pre-industrial Çerkezköy: A Brief History

The establishment date of Çerkezköy is specified as 1863. In that year, a group of Circassians who took refuge in the territories of the Ottoman Empire were settled in east Thrace region. By settling almost forty families a village was established and named Çerkezköy.

Çerkezköy started to gain value in military and commercial terms as a result of the passing of the Rumeli Railway, which was built in those years, through Çerkezköy and the opening of the train station in 1873. Upon the occupation of eastern Thrace by Russian troops during the Ottoman-Russian War in 1877 and

1878, the Circassians left the village. Muslim refugees from the Balkans settled in the empty village.⁵³⁴

The population increased due to continuous waves of refugees from the Balkans. A municipal organization was formed in 1911.⁵³⁵ Immigration continued in waves during the Republican period in 1928, 1935 and 1938. The state gave land to the immigrants in the Republican period. In 1958 Çerkezköy became a district.

Before the coming of industry, Çerkezköy was a poor town with an economy based on agriculture and animal husbandry. Except for the lands alongside Çorlu brook, the productivity of the soil was low. While a few families had relatively large amounts of land, mainly small land ownership was prevalent.⁵³⁶

Apart from agriculture, an important means of livelihood was railway labor after the largest maintenance depot of the State Railways in Thrace was established in Çerkezköy. Many people worked there. The second important benefit of the railway to local economy was that the station became a commercial center. Since Çerkezköy was the northernmost station in Thrace, firewood, various agricultural products, and animals for slaughter to be sent to İstanbul from Kırklareli and Saray neighborhood were first brought to Çerkezköy with ox carts, and from there were shipped to İstanbul via train. The work of shipping goods to İstanbul was carried out by

⁵³⁴ In addition to Muslims, Jewish families who migrated from Thessaloniki also settled in Çerkezköy. Those families who were engaged in trade had to leave Çerkezköy during the 1934 Thrace Events. Hasan Erkan, interview by the author.

⁵³⁵ Selman Akı, *Çerkezlerden Çerkezköy'e* (From Circassians to Çerkezköy) (İstanbul: Logos Yayınları, 2007), pp. 247-250.

⁵³⁶ Even though the inheritance case opened by the heirs of Şevket Paşa about a land of 29,000 decares, comprising also a part of Çerkezköy, that then claimed had belonged to Şevket Paşa in the 19th century, has lasted for long years, it has remained inconclusive. This land case called as the "Pasha Case" by the inhabitants of Çerkezköy. Baydar, interview by the author; Hasan Erkan, interview by the author.

Former Çerkezköy prosecutor Mehmet Feyyat stated that, in order to prevent the passing of this land, on which there were also a military unit and the buildings of various public institutions, to Paşa's heirs, he complicated the case by writing petitions to these public institutions and ensured that they took notice of this case of which they were unaware. According to Feyyat by this means, "The land reform in Çerkezköy was procured spontaneously." *Çerkezköy Postası*, 7 September 1972; Feyyat, interview by the author.

merchants from Çerkezköy. These merchants had storehouses both in Çerkezköy and around the Yenikapı train station in İstanbul. Many people from Çerkezköy worked in these storehouses.⁵³⁷

As the end of the 1950s, as a result of the building of highways and the increasing number of trucks, the train station lost its former importance. Goods were started to be carried by truck from Thrace directly to İstanbul. The firewood, grain and animal storehouses disappeared; the town's economy lost its former vitality. When the railway maintenance depot was also closed in the subsequent years, the town's economic life completely stagnated.⁵³⁸

The only development that positively affected the town's economy in the second half of the 1950s was the establishment of a military unit in Çerkezköy. Though the soldiers made important economic contribution to the town in the beginning, after the military built public housing and canteen for its personnel, this contribution decreased.⁵³⁹

At the beginning of the 1970s, Çerkezköy was the poorest district in Tekirdağ.⁵⁴⁰ Until the coming of İstanbul industry, there were only three small industrial enterprises in the town. A sunflower oil factory was built in 1949, a flour factory in 1968, and a pickles and canned food factory in 1971.⁵⁴¹ Though referred to as factories, these were small workshops employing fewer than twenty people.

More than half of the goods produced in agriculture and stockbreeding were consumed locally, the remaining was sold in İstanbul.⁵⁴² The agricultural products which were traded were wheat, sugar beet, rice and sunflower. Two-thirds of the

⁵³⁷ Hasan Erkan, interview by the author; Meydanlı, interview by the author.

⁵³⁸ Ibid.

⁵³⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁰ Genç, p. 9.

⁵⁴¹ Oya Yolaç, "Çerkezköy Kazası Monoğrafyası," (Monography of Çerkezköy District) (Graduation thesis, İstanbul University, 1965), p. 48; *Devrim*, 11 August 1971.

⁵⁴² Yolaç, p. 50.

total milk production in Çerkezköy was sold to dairies.⁵⁴³ The center with which the town had the closest economic relations following İstanbul was Çorlu, which was twenty four km away.

Due to these economic conditions, many people from Çerkezköy immigrated to İstanbul. Disregarding the increase in the population of the military unit in the district, the population of Çerkezköy tended to decrease in the 1960s.

Table 11. Population of Çerkezköy District Center by Year⁵⁴⁴

Year	Total	Women	Men	difference between men and women
1960	5465	2081	3384	1303
1965	5355	1989	3366	1377
1970	6682	2108	4574	2466

The higher male population in Table 11 results from the presence of soldiers in the district.⁵⁴⁵ When we include the wives and children of the military officers, it can be estimated that the military population was somewhat greater. In Yolaç's research in 1965, the military unit is stated to have been almost 2000 people.⁵⁴⁶ In 1968, the military unit was expanded and transformed into an armored brigade. Male population growth in 1970 data demonstrates the increase in the number of soldiers.⁵⁴⁷ When we add the families of military officers and sergeants to the extra

⁵⁴³ Genç, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁴⁴ Yolaç, p. 15; Turkish Statistical Institute, available online at <<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul>> [12 October 2011];

⁵⁴⁵ Normally, in a district of migration, male population should have been a little less than the female population. Thus, according to the data of 1970, the female population in the villages of Çerkezköy was 3947, while the male population was 3660. Turkish Statistical Institute, available online at <<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul>> [12 October 2011].

⁵⁴⁶ Yolaç, p. 13.

⁵⁴⁷ In an interview made with him, Mayor Hikmet Uğraş mentions the increase in the number of military units. "...with the increase of military units in the recent years, a difference in housings is visually observed." *Devrim*, 11 August 1971.

male population, which was 2466 in 1970, we can estimate that the population of the military unit was around 3000. Departing from these data, we can say that the population of Çerkezköy in 1970 was around 3500-4000 when the military unit was not taken into account.⁵⁴⁸

Despite this small population, Çerkezköy, with its single storey houses, was spread over a relatively large area. With the zoning plan made in 1953, an area of a total of 180 hectares was taken in the scope of zoned area.⁵⁴⁹ Below Figure 9 shows a map drawn in the 1950s of the settlement of Çerkezköy district center.



Fig. 9. Çerkezköy map (estimated 1950s)⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁸ In the briefing given to Prime Minister Uluşu during his visit to Çerkezköy in 1982, the population of Çerkezköy in 1972 was indicated to be 3010. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 7 July 1982.

⁵⁴⁹ Yolaç, p. 22.

⁵⁵⁰ I took this copy of the map from the Real Estate Agent Reşat Bahar, the colored original drawing in the archive of Çerkezköy Municipality is present in the appendix section of the thesis.

As can be seen from the map, Çerkezköy town was composed of two sections, the main village settlement on the left and the settlement around the train station. Three big buildings seen at the upper right belonged to the military unit. Although most of the population was settled in the village area, the trade center of the town was the area formed around the train station and named as İstasyon Mahallesi (İstasyon Quarter). Shopkeepers in the town and most of the public institutions were situated in İstasyon Mahallesi. Interviews revealed that there were disagreement between the people living around the station and those who live in the main village settlement about issues such as where the marketplace would be established or where the new government building would be constructed.⁵⁵¹

The main village settlement was composed of three quarters named Gazi Osman Paşa (GOP) Mahallesi, Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa (GMKP) Mahallesi and Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi. In 1970 in these four quarters (including İstasyon Mahallesi), there were 1141 buildings in total.⁵⁵² Among these, 1061 of them were single-storey, seventy-one of them were two-storey, four of them were three-storey and five of them were five-storey. The few buildings with three or more stories were the public housing buildings of the military officers or they were buildings belonging to various public institutions. Among these buildings, 1095 were used as housing.⁵⁵³

⁵⁵¹ Feyyat, interview by the author; Karan, interview by the author.

⁵⁵² These four quarters were administrated by two mukhtars due to lack of population. As of 1984, one mukhtar will be chosen for each quarter. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 6 February 1984.

⁵⁵³ State Institute of Statics, "Tekirdağ," *1970 Binalar Sayımı*, (1970 Count of Buildings) (Ankara: DİE, 1972), p. 12.



Fig. 10. Aerial view of main village settlement.⁵⁵⁴

In the aerial photograph, showing the village settlement in Figure 10, the section circled with white is the village square. There was a two-storey municipal building and a primary school. At the beginning of Atatürk Street, passing through the middle of the village, on the left, public housings of military officers are seen. Along this street which is six meters wide and cobblestone-paved, there were a few single-storey shops such as repair-shop, hairdresser, grocer, and stove dealer.⁵⁵⁵ The road, which is the continuation of Atatürk Street, connects Çerkezköy to Kapaklı village and to Saray district.

In the Picture below, afore İstasyon Mahallesi and behind village settlement are seen.

⁵⁵⁴ Pictures in Fig 9 and Fig 10 are taken from Çerkezköy Municipality. (I have added the writing and signs in Fig 9).

⁵⁵⁵ Fevzi Pektaş, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 19 December 2011; İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 20 December 2011.



Fig. 11. Aerial view of İstasyon Mahallesi

Consequently, at the beginning of the 1970s, except for a train station whose importance had decreased in time and the small downtown around it, Çerkezköy had the appearance of a village with spread out, single-storey houses.

Lands Sales to Industrialists, Land Disputes, and Speculation

Chapter Four discussed how land was provided to the industrialists who built factories in Çerkezköy and what kind of problems they encountered during land purchase. This chapter will examine the impact of this process on the inhabitants of Çerkezköy.

The fact that land that had sold at twenty or twenty-five kuruş per square meter, gained value at once with the coming of industry, attracted the land owners, who had migrated to İstanbul, back to Çerkezköy. As of 1972, on the one hand, land was sold to industrialists in the area declared industrial zone, and on the other hand,

in other places outside the industrial zone, land was bought with the idea that it would gain value in the future. How the profit that emerged in this process of the increased value of the land would be shared among the heirs became an important problem. Disputes among the heirs were generally brought to court and the land sold by filing suits of partition (*izale-i şuyu*).⁵⁵⁶

Çerkezköy Gazetesi (which started publishing in 1980) in the 1980s has great number of advertisements for the sale of real estate by court decisions. Zafer Avcılar, owner of the newspaper, indicates that this resulted from two reasons. First, due to inheritance disputes, many of suits of partition were filed and some of the advertisements were the sale advertisements of these lawsuits. He remarks that, after the coming of industry, due to the inheritance disputes about lands, close relatives fell out with each other.⁵⁵⁷ Other advertisements had to do with land sales made due to foreclosure suits. According to Avcılar, many people (generally real estate agents) obtained credit from banks by mortgaging the land they had purchased, and when this credit was not repaid, the banks, in order to collect the debt, put the land up for sale by the court.⁵⁵⁸ Hikmet Uğraş also talked about this in an interview. “Though the incentives continued when the town was opened to the country as an OIZ, industrial lands, bought by some speculative efforts were sold by the local real estate agents to

⁵⁵⁶ Suits of partition are the lawsuits filed for the selling of the land by the court decision and distribution of its price among the partners in cases of sharing disputes among partners (or heirs).

⁵⁵⁷ Like Avcılar, most of the interviewees from Çerkezköy mentioned this subject: “People came from İstanbul to seek inheritance. Those who left Çerkezköy came back.” (*İstanbul’dan miras kovalamaya geldi insanlar. Çerkezköy’ü terk edenler geri geldi.*) Karan, interview by the author; “Siblings fell out with each other. The sibling in İstanbul comes and sees that the land is gone. They fall out with each other.” (*Kardeşler birbirine girdi. İstanbul’daki kardeş geliyor, bakıyor arsa gitmiş. Birbirlerine giriyorlar.*) Hasan Erkan, interview by the author; “When industry came, everybody came back from İstanbul, when the lands gained value.” (*Sanayi gelince herkes İstanbul’dan geri geldi, toprak değer kazanınca.*) Emine Gökarp, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 21 March 2011.

⁵⁵⁸ Zafer Avcılar, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 14 May 2011.

people who were not industrialists. This land, because of these opportunists, was seized by the banks.”⁵⁵⁹

In Çerkezköy, both in the industrial zone and throughout the district, many people bought land with the idea that it would gain value in time. This was not limited to the real estate agents and speculators, everyone who had money bought land as far as their budgets allowed. Factory managers, civilian and military officers in the region, people who had professions, local shopkeepers, railway workers and retirees were among these.⁵⁶⁰

Mehmet Uz, one of the former mayors, remarked that after the zoning authority was given to the municipalities with a law enacted in 1985,⁵⁶¹ the members of the municipal council informally turned to the real estate sector. However, different from any real estate agents, these individuals had the power to determine the areas to be zoned for housing and to change the zoning plans. Uz states that obtaining unearned income by purchasing land from the area to be zoned for housing and changing the zoning plans on the basis of parcel were the most commonly encountered malpractices in municipal management. He says that the members of the municipal council were in different political parties, but this did not constitute any obstacle to their full collaboration with regard to obtaining unearned income.⁵⁶²

⁵⁵⁹ “*Belde OSB olarak ülkeye açılırken teşvik uygulaması halen devam etmesine rağmen bir takım spekülâtif gayretlerle kapatılmış bulunan sanayi arsaları mahalli emlakçılar vasıtası ile sanayici olmayan kesimlere aktarılmıştır. Bu arsalar bu fırsatçılar yüzünden bankalara hacizlidir.*” *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 14 February 1989.

⁵⁶⁰ Alaadin Gökalp, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 21 March 2011; Feyyat, interview by the author.

⁵⁶¹ With the new Zoning Law No. 3194 approved on 9 November 1985, the authority to certify the plan was passed to municipal councils from The Ministry of Development and Housing, besides, the authority to give building license to private offices was given. Orhan Göçer, *Metropolitan Planlama* (İstanbul: Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi Yayını, 1990), pp. 97-109.

⁵⁶² Mehmet Uz, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 21 December 2011.

The losers of the land market in Çerkezköy were the villagers who sold all of their lands to factory owners in 1972. A great number of stories, some of which are fantastic, are told about how those villagers, who received a relatively good amount of money, wasted their money.⁵⁶³ The villagers, who saw that the land prices increased a few months after they sold their lands for one TL per square meter to industrialists, started to think that they had been deceived and these debates caused Hikmet Uğraş to lose his position as mayor in the elections of 1973. In a comment made in *Çerkezköy Postası* a year before the local elections held in December 1973, the local political consequences that would be caused by the land sale process at Çerkezköy were estimated accurately.

The fact that Hikmet Uğraş, who has successfully fulfilled the duties of mayor for two terms, mingled with the industrialists and the conflicts and infighting between the excessive demands of the industrialists, and the local requirements and the demands of the public, has caused him to wear out inevitably.

I wonder whether the industrialists, who were effective in the indifference of Hikmet Uğraş, the mayor who defeated the candidates of the former Democratic Party and the new JP with his ability and success, to center-left, formation with public and the trade union movement, will be able to save him on this course?⁵⁶⁴

Some villagers, who sold their lands at one TL per square meter, went to court on the grounds that the industrialists had obtained unlawful profit. These lawsuits, which did not reach any conclusion, lasted for years.⁵⁶⁵

⁵⁶³ “People like it when they sell lands that cost 25 kuruş per square meter at 1 TL per square meter. Most of them spent that money freely, they were spoilt, they bought cars and spent the money licentiously. Then they begged those factories to have their children employed at those factories.” (25 Kuruş yapan yeri 1 liradan satınca insanların hoşuna gidiyor. Çoğunluk bu paraları yedi; şımarı, otomobil alıp parayı hovardaca harcadılar. Sonra o fabrikalara çocuklarını işçi olarak sokmak için yalvardılar.) Karagöz, interview by the author. “Most of those who sold their lands spent the money at Sulukule or so. There is a story: He rents two cars, in one of them he travels and in the other his hat. They spend money that generously, that is to say.” (Tarlaları satanların çoğu parayı Sulukule’de falan yerlerdi. Şöyle bir hikaye var: İki araba tutuyor, birinde kendisi diğerinde şapkası gidiyor. O kadar bonkör para harcıyorlar yani.) Bülent Uğraş, interview by the author.

⁵⁶⁴ *Çerkezköy Postası*, 3 November 1972.

⁵⁶⁵ Fevzi Pektaş, interview by the author.

Development of the Urban Form of Çerkezköy

It was expected that after the big industrial enterprises settled in Çerkezköy, the district center would grow rapidly. It was estimated that in two or three years the population would rise to 20,000 or 25,000 and in ten years it would rise to 80,000.⁵⁶⁶ Çerkezköy Municipality, in order to control this expected rapid development and to prevent unorganized settlement, first of all, as it was discussed in Chapter Four, with the approval of the Ministry of Development and Housing, included the villages into the municipal adjacent area.⁵⁶⁷ Besides, with the thought that the former plan would be inadequate, preparations for a new zoning plan were started as of 1974. The architect Kemal Ahmet Arû, who also was the professor of Sadık Sever started to Çerkezköy's new zoning plan according to Article No. 42. In other words, the former plan was put aside and a new plan was prepared so that it would also include the newly emerged industrial zone.⁵⁶⁸

The draft plan, prepared to 1/5000 scale, was sent for the approval of the Ministry of Development and Housing in the same year. The draft, the process of

⁵⁶⁶ “En geç 1975 yılında Çerkezköy 20-25 bin nüfusa sahip olacak.” (Çerkezköy will have a population of twenty-thousand to twenty-five thousand at the latest by the year 1975.) Devrim, 2 October 1972; “Yapılan resmi tahminlere göre 10 yıl sonra Çerkezköy’ün nüfusu 80 bin olacak.” (According to the official estimates, ten years later population of Çerkezköy will be eighty thousand.) Çerkezköy Postası, 9 September 1972.

⁵⁶⁷ “For the purpose of preventing the building of gecekondu, the borders of the district are included in the municipal adjacent area according to Law no. 6185 and construction of residence outside the city zoning plan which is recently being made is not allowed.” (Gecekondu kurulmasını önlemek amacıyla ilçe hudutları 6185 sayılı kanuna göre mücavir alana alınmış olup yeni yapılmakta olan şehir imar planının dışında mesken yapımına izin verilmemektedir.) Genç, p. 22.

⁵⁶⁸ The plans made for Turkish cities are generally plans called “local zone plan,” and are based on the present settlement. However, Article no. 42 is (Article no. 18 after the law enacted in 1984) an implementation in which the present settlement is assimilated to the new plan by “remoulding”, in other words by making the necessary demolitions and arrangements. In Turkey, Article no. 42 was rarely implemented. Şadi Çorbacı, who was the director of development in Çerkezköy municipality from 1960s to 1994, states that Çerkezköy was the first district to implement its zoning plan according to Article no. 42. Çorbacı, interview by the author.

making and approval of which was also supported by the ÇIA, was approved in 1975.⁵⁶⁹ Accordingly, the preparation of the implementation plans at a 1/1000 scale were started, but this preparation, because it was delayed due to various reasons, turned into an “endless story,” to use the expression of the board of directors of the ÇIA.⁵⁷⁰ The implementation plan was not finished until 1980. Reasons for this delay included government reshuffles, which occasionally occurred in Ankara in the 1970s, bureaucratic procedures, inadequacy of cadastral work in the district, continuation of factory and company lodgings constructions until 1977, and the disagreement of the members of the municipal council of the period on the details of the plan.⁵⁷¹ It is stated that the plan was delayed because the members of the city council from the JP, who were dominant in the municipality in the period from 1974 to 1980, objected to the passing of certain roads through their own properties.⁵⁷² Architect İbrahim Erkan, who worked as the director of technical works in the municipality between 1984 and 1987, states that Fevzi Paşa Street, along which the houses of the JP’s notables were situated, was made curvy so that it would go around their land.⁵⁷³

The plan, which was at last completed in 1980, was approved by the Çerkezköy Municipal Council and the Ministry of Development and Housing in the same year.⁵⁷⁴ However, at this time, the implementation of the plan was delayed by the municipality. What ensured the implementation of the approved zoning plan was the 12 September 1980 military coup,⁵⁷⁵ after which the municipal management

⁵⁶⁹ Minutes of ÇIA 1st General Assembly, 30 January 1975, p. 5.

⁵⁷⁰ ÇIA 5th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 23 January 1979, p. 3.

⁵⁷¹ Eraydın, “Factors at the Choice of Industrial Location,” p. 13.; Çorbacı, interview by the author; Remzi Garip, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 21 December 2011.

⁵⁷² Uz, interview by the author, 21 December 2011.

⁵⁷³ İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author.

⁵⁷⁴ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi’nin Tevsii*, p. 5.

⁵⁷⁵ Uz, interview by the author, 21 December 2011.

offices were abolished and the district governors acted as mayors at the same time. District governor Yaşar Uğurlu, who also took on the position of mayor, in a statement he made to *Dünya* newspaper, stated that the zoning plan had been delayed by the previous municipality on purpose and that illegal housing had been constructed. “The work to prepare the Çerkezköy Municipality Zoning plan, which started in 1972, was not made until 28 July 1980 due to political disputes and the constant intervention of interest groups.”⁵⁷⁶

During the time that Yaşar Uğurlu was mayor, a team under the leadership of Associate Professor Ahmet Açlar from Yıldız Technical University first prepared the Zoning Plan Regulation. This regulation was approved and published on 24 November 1982 in the *Official Gazette*.⁵⁷⁷ After that, the implementation of the zoning plan was started according to Article no. 42. Due to technical and financial inadequacies, in the period of 1980-1984, when the military regime continued only a part of the plan could be implemented. As a result of the First Stage implementation of the plan, in March 1983, owners of 1300 real properties received their land titles during a ceremony.⁵⁷⁸ The second half of the plan implementation was started in May 1983, when the widening of Atatürk and Öztrak boulevards began.⁵⁷⁹ The civil government that took office after the elections in 1984 continued the implementation of the zoning plan. Work to widen the main roads continued until 1986.⁵⁸⁰ While the implementation of the plan continued, cadastral work in the district were also carried on and completed in 1985.⁵⁸¹

⁵⁷⁶ “1972 tarihinde başlayan Çerkezköy Belediyesi İmar Planı hazırlama çalışmaları siyasi çekişmeler ve menfaat gruplarının devamlı müdahaleleri dolayısıyla 28.07.1980 tarihine kadar çıkarılamamıştır.” “Çerkezköy Özel Eki” *Dünya Gazetesi*, 28 March 1983.

⁵⁷⁷ Republic of Turkey, T.C. Resmi Gazete, no. 17878, 24 November 1982.

⁵⁷⁸ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 9 March 1983.

⁵⁷⁹ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 6 April 1983; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 11 May 1983.

⁵⁸⁰ İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author.

⁵⁸¹ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 6.

Implementing the zoning plan according to Article no. 42 included great difficulties. Since the plan was not made by basing on the previous settlement, it was necessary to demolish and confiscate property in some places and since there were no budgets, it was necessary to give land from another parcel to those whose land had been confiscated. It is said that injustices were done and great debates took place during the implementation of the zoning plan in Çerkezköy.⁵⁸²




Fig. 12. Çerkezköy Master Plan (1980)⁵⁸³

⁵⁸² Baydar, interview by the author; Karagöz, interview by the author; Garip, interview by the author. Sabri Avcılar, the owner of Çerkezköy newspaper, claims that while the zoning plan was implemented, properties of some people were confiscated and in spite of that, some other people obtained property inequitably. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 4 October 1994.

⁵⁸³ Taken from the study of Fatma Eker (I added the red signs and titles).

The master plan in Figure 12 is a drawing of the plan, approved in 1980, at a scale of 1/10000. The region circled in red is the former village square, determined as the city center in the new plan. Atatürk Boulevard, which passes through the middle of the square, was widened from six meters to twenty-five meters and it was planned as the commercial center of the city.⁵⁸⁴ The other main streets were also widened to twenty or thirty-five meters during the implementation of the zoning plan.

After Atatürk Boulevard was opened in 1984, three and four-storey buildings were started to be built on this street and the shops in İstasyon Mahallesi moved into them. At the beginning of the 1990s, Atatürk Boulevard, as had been projected in the plan, became the commercial center of the city. As for İstasyon Mahallesi, it languished from that date onwards.

In the plan in Figure 12, the industrial settlement in the northwest of the urban settlement is also shown. Next to most of these factories, which seem to have been built in the Municipal Industrial Region haphazardly, there were also company lodgings for workers. That these company lodgings were separate from the urban settlement is a factor that has affected urbanization negatively.

⁵⁸⁴ İbrahim Erkan, who directed the 1984-1987 development implementations as the director of technical works, states that he wanted to widen Atatürk Boulevard to 35 meters and to make the urban center larger, but he could not do these since the property owners and the city council prevented him. İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author.




Fig. 13. Çerkezköy Environmental Plan 1/25000⁵⁸⁵ (approximately 1985).

In Figure 13, the settlement areas of the villages on the periphery of Çerkezköy district center and the industrial zone are shown. The ordered small white circles show the borders of the plan. The red areas mark the settlement areas in the mid-1980s. The white areas around the present settlement areas marked with red in the district center were determined as housing development areas. The areas in gray represent public service areas and green spaces. In the upper part of the plan, the yellow rectangle marked the mass housing area, which is the property of the Land Office, shows the area on which workers' housing cooperatives were built in the 1980s. After the construction of cooperative houses, this area was named İsmet Paşa Mahallesi. This area, had been within the borders of Kapaklı village before it was confiscated by the Land Office, passed again to Kapaklı town in 2002 as a result of Kapaklı municipality's winning the case it had brought to court. In the environmental

⁵⁸⁵ Çerkezköy Municipality archive (I added the yellow indicators).

plan, settlements of factories in the Municipal Industrial Area (*Anorganize Sanayi*) and Organized Industrial Zone are also seen.

As is seen in the Environmental Plan, the Çerkezköy urban settlement was limited to the industrial zone in the west and north, and with the military region (the area with horizontal lines on the right) in the east. In the north-east, the area of the plan reached the borders of Pınarça village. In the plan, İstasyon Mahallesi is widened towards the south until the road to İstanbul. In the two areas outside the plan, which are indicated with yellow ellipses, gecekondu were built in the 1980s. In 1991, an area of two hundred decares covered by these gecekondu was included in the scope of master plan through the making of their local zone plans by the municipal council.⁵⁸⁶ These two areas are shown with the same signs in Figure 14 also.

Along with the opening of housing development areas (white areas within the borders of the environmental plan) to settlement in the 1990s, Çerkezköy's urban form at present emerged.

⁵⁸⁶ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 12 February 1991; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 8 October 1991.




Fig. 14. Çerkezköy satellite image (2009)

The only direction in which Çerkezköy urban settlement, squeezed between the military region, industrial zone, and the borders of a neighboring village in the north, could expand was the Kartaltepe area to the south of İstasyon Mahallesi. Emlak Bankası Housings, the construction of which started in 1991, was built in this area. With the revisions made to the plan in 1998, the Kartaltepe area was determined as a mass housing area (the area marked with red in Fig. 15). In the revision of the plan in 1998, in addition, the zoned area in İstasyon Mahallesi was expanded towards the east and a part of the Ambardere area, which is to the south of the military region, was zoned for low density housing (see. Fig. 15). In the Ambardere area, which is not suitable for intensive construction, middle-class villa-style houses with gardens

were built.⁵⁸⁷ After that, with a new revision to the plan in 2008, the Ambardere area was fully zoned for housing and the total of Kartaltepe region was determined as a mass housing area.⁵⁸⁸ In this region, where at first the Emlak Bankası housing was constructed, the building of luxury housing estates that mostly appeal to the middle class continues.




Fig. 15. Çerkezköy satellite image (2011)

An important change that took place in Çerkezköy's settlement area as a result of the zoning plan revision in 2008 was that almost half of the land belonging to Narin factory, which was closed down in 2000, was excluded from the OIZ and added to the urban settlement. The owner of the enterprise, Halit Narin, received the necessary approval for excluding an area of 450 decares of the factory land from the OIZ in 2008 from the Ministry of Industry; and Çerkezköy municipality, by making a plan

⁵⁸⁷ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Son 5 Yılda Çerkezköy Belediyesi Faaliyetleri* (Activities of Çerkezköy Municipality in the last five years) (Tekirdağ: Pruva Yayıncılık, 1999), p. 89.

⁵⁸⁸ Gökhan İnce, *Çerkezköy Bölgesel Gelişim Projesi: Proje Raporu* (Çerkezköy regional development project: project report) (Tekirdağ: Sima Ajans, 2011), pp. 25-27.

revision, zoned this area for housing.⁵⁸⁹ In this area, named Narin Park, Martı Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş., which also belongs to the Narin family, constructed an estate of 548 houses. Some of these houses were produced by renewing the old company lodgings of the Narin factory. In addition to Narin Park, a big shopping center was opened. It is said that in this area, a great part of which is still empty, a total of 7000 houses will be built.⁵⁹⁰ The area marked with a red line in Fig. 16 shows the land of the Narin factory that was added to the urban settlement. As can be seen from the image, Narin Park is as big as a quarter of Çerkezköy. Thus, an area as big as a quarter, belonging to one person, was added to Çerkezköy urban area.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁹ The Nationalist Movement Party (NMP, *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*) Çerkezköy District Head Mustafa Ordu claims that the municipal council's including the land belonging to the Narin factory in the zoning plan one and a half month before the Ministry of Industry approved the land's exclusion from the OIZ and that giving permission for twelve-storey buildings for Narin Park housings while building permission was given for maximum six-storey buildings in Çerkezköy urban center are clearly cases of corruptions. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 07 September 2010.

⁵⁹⁰ Available online at <<http://www.narinparkeveleri.com/narinpark.html>> [11 November 2011].

⁵⁹¹ The fact that Halit Narin could exclude this land of 450 decares, which was added to the ÇOIZ in 1990 for the purpose of benefiting from the incentives, from the OIZ after he turned to the construction sector from industrialism and that he could have the land included in municipal adjacent area under the conditions of zoning he desired should be seen as an example of how easily and rapidly the state apparatus (central and local) in Turkey responded to the demands of big capital. Narin has described this situation in the ceremony he conducted to celebrate his twentieth year at Çerkezköy as follows: "When the infrastructure problems of Çerkezköy was mentioned, Mr. Narin said, 'There is nothing that I cannot get done in Turkey except for my own business. I will enable the realization of all the projects prepared for the development of Çerkezköy and are waiting for approval at the level of ministries in Ankara. For this, those concerned should come and demand it from me.'" (*Çerkezköy'ün alt yapı sorunları konu edilince sayın Narin, 'Benim kendi işim dışında Türkiye'de yaptıramayacağım hiçbir şey yoktur. Çerkezköy'ün imarı için hazırlanmış Ankara'da bakanlıklar düzeyinde olur bekleyen tüm projelerin yaşama geçirilmesini sağlarım. Bunun için ilgililer benden talepte bulunsunlar.'* dedi.) *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 25 August 1992.



Fig. 16. Narin factory's land added to Çerkezköy zoning plan⁵⁹²

Due to the increase both in the population and density of buildings, in 2007 the number of quarters was increased from four to eight. Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi was divided into two and one part of it became Yıldırım Beyazıt Mahallesi. The area, that was in the north-east of GMKP Mahallesi and which was opened to settlement in the 1990s, named Bağlık by the inhabitants of Çerkezköy has become Bağlık Mahallesi. And the area to the east of GMKP Mahallesi was combined with Ambardere under the name of Fatih Mahallesi. The Kartaltepe area, where new luxury houses were built, was separated from İstasyon Mahallesi and became Cumhuriyet Mahallesi. Cumhuriyet Mahallesi, zoned for mass housing settlement, was designated as Çerkezköy's new development area (see Fig. 17).

⁵⁹² Available online at <<http://www.narinparkevleri.com/narinpark.html>> [11 November 2011].




Fig. 17. Quarters of Çerkezköy (2011) (red lines show the borders of quarters).

Emergence of New Urban Areas in Çerkezköy District

The Development of urban areas in Çerkezköy district was not limited to the district center. As of second half of the 1980s, Kapaklı, Kızılpınar, Veliköy and Karaağaç villages, which were around the industrial zone, underwent a rapid urbanization process. As can be seen in Figure 13, the Organized Industrial Zone and Municipal Industrial Zone, which would be united as one organized industrial zone later, were situated between Kapaklı, Karaağaç and Kızılpınar villages. These three villages and Veliköy along the Çorlu road emerged as Çerkezköy's new urban areas as of 1990s due to rapid population growth. In Figure 18, the views of these urban areas in 2011 are shown. The merger of these urban areas, each of which is a separate municipality today, into one municipality, is being discussed. While Çerkezköy Municipality

advocated for unification, Kapaklı and Kızılpınar towns aimed to remain separate districts.

It is seen that among the villages, especially Kapaklı village creates an urban area as big as Çerkezköy district center. When the preparation of Çerkezköy's zoning plan was delayed and thus the housing production was inadequate, since the village lands could be sold more freely and without being controlled, first a rapid land trade and speculation started in Kapaklı, followed by a rapid housing production.⁵⁹³




Fig. 18. Urban areas emerged around the ÇOIZ (2011).

The reason why a significant part of the migration directed to Çerkezköy preferred the villages instead of the district center was that first of all the lands were cheaper in

⁵⁹³ Aslan, p. 64.

the villages. Second, the control of constructing buildings was lighter in villages than it was in the district center. Although the villages were included in the borders of Çerkezköy municipal adjacent area as of 1972, they gained their independence after their municipal organizations were established.

In Turkey, villages that have populations of more than 2000 people according to the general census gain the right to establish a municipal organization. In this way, municipal organizations were established in Kapaklı in 1986, in Kızılpınar in 1990, in Veliköy in 1992, and in Karaağaç in 1999. Villages that establish a municipal organization have changed zoning plans in a way to promote rapid construction.⁵⁹⁴

Parcels have been kept small so that everybody can build houses, in order to increase the profit of the property developers and land owners the number of storeys allowed was kept high compared to Çerkezköy district center, and the share of the municipality for roads and green spaces were kept small. As a result of all of these, a more irregular urbanization occurred in the villages compared to the district center. In former Çerkezköy Mayor Remzi Garip's words, villages have become Çerkezköy's "zoned gecekondu."

The rapid and uncontrolled housing production in villages, Kapaklı being in the first place, has caused an irregular urbanization.⁵⁹⁵ The only organized urban area in these villages is İsmet Paşa Mahallesi, which passed Kapaklı Municipality with a court decision in 2002, although it was at first within the borders of Çerkezköy Municipality. This quarter was built on land next to the OIZ, of 150 decares confiscated by the Land Office in 1972 for the buildings of workers' housing. On a

⁵⁹⁴ Preparation of the zoning plans of villages started in the 1980s. In February 1984 the maps of three villages around the OIZ were completed and in the same year making of the zoning plan was started. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 9 February 1984; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 24 May 1984. Zoning plans of Kızılpınar and Pınarca villages were approved in February 1988. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 February 1988.

⁵⁹⁵ Eser, p. 74. Garip, interview by the author.

small part of this area, at the beginning of the 1980s workers' cooperative housing was built. Later on, in the 1990s and early 2000s, many housing estates were built in this area.

However, Veliköy village along the Çorlu road developed another growth strategy along with housing production. In 1994, 190 hectares of the village's land was declared as industrial zone by the municipality.⁵⁹⁶ The land prices in the Veliköy Industrial Zone, which was in a convenient location in terms of transportation due to its proximity to the E-80 highway that had recently been built, were one-third of the prices in the ÇOIZ.⁵⁹⁷ For this reason, industrialists and land speculators (or those who were both) started to buy land from the zone. Thanks to the money received for the intensive land sales and for the transactions (licence, taxes, etc.) of the firms established, Veliköy Municipality experienced a boom in revenues in 1995. While the municipal budget was 5.5 billion TL⁵⁹⁸ in 1994, it raised to 828 billion TL in 1996.⁵⁹⁹ The budget of Çerkezköy Municipality was only 205 billion TL in 1996.⁶⁰⁰ Today, in Veliköy Industrial Zone, around eighty industrial enterprises operate.

In Karaağaç village as well, an area of 186 hectares was opened to industrial settlement with the approval of the municipality in the early 2000s. The number of factories constructed without planning in this area reached thirty-five in 2012. At the present time, transforming the unorganized industrial settlement in Veliköy and Karaağaç into OIZ has been decided by the government and work has begun on this issue.⁶⁰¹

⁵⁹⁶ The size of Veliköy Industrial Zone has reached 450 hectares in later years. İnce, *Çerkezköy Bölgesel Gelişim Projesi*, p. 35.

⁵⁹⁷ Tever, interview by the author.

⁵⁹⁸ Çerkezköy District Governorate, "Brifing Raporu" (Briefing Report), 24 October 1994, CIA Archive.

⁵⁹⁹ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 2 January 1996.

⁶⁰⁰ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 22 October 1996.

⁶⁰¹ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 June 2012.

Construction of the City

Housing Production

The housing problem was one of the main problems of Çerkezköy until the construction boom experienced in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s. In an article published in 1982, this situation was described as follows:

In the recent years, the housing problem in our district and the highness of house rents has been a visible reality. This reality forces the families that work in their workplaces at Çerkezköy to live in old, broken buildings, in small rooms and even in neighboring districts and villages.⁶⁰²

In an observation made in 1997 a similar picture is drawn:

House rents start from 15 million TL. This is the rent of a bad gecekondu. The rents rise up to 45 million TL. Those who earn money and build gecekondus construct unplastered buildings and by adding a storey each year like the slums of İstanbul. While executives generally live in houses built by Emlakbank, workers live in the places that they can find.⁶⁰³

Company Lodgings and Housing Cooperatives

After the factories began production, the housing of those who came to Çerkezköy to work started to constitute an important problem. As an urgent solution, factory owners began to build lodgings for managers and skilled labor. In 1982, a total of

⁶⁰² “Son yıllarda ilçemizde konut sıkıntısı ve konut kiralalarının yüksekliği gözle görülür bir gerçek. Bu gerçek Çerkezköy’deki işyerlerinde çalışan aileleri eski, dökük binalarda, daracık odalarda, hatta çevre ilçe ve köylerde ikamet etmeye mecbur ediyor.” Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 1 December 1982.

⁶⁰³ “Ev kiralari, 15 milyon liradan başlıyor. Kötü bir gecekondunun kirası bu. 45 milyona kadar çıkıyor kiralari. Para kazanıp kondu yaptıranlar İstanbul’un varoşlarındaki gibi sıvasız ve her yıl birer kat çıkarak dikeyyorlar binalari. Üst düzey yöneticiler, genellikle Emlakbank’ın yaptırdığı ve evlerde otururken, işçiler bulabildikleri yerlerde yaşıyorlar.” Çakıroğlu, “Sanayi Trakya’ya Taşınıyor,” Milliyet, 9 November 1997.

350 lodgings were present at all the factories.⁶⁰⁴ Since the zoning plan had not been implemented, it was not possible to build houses in the city center. Lodgings were built on the factory lands by getting the necessary permissions from the municipality. Those people living in these housing developments, which were a few kilometers away from the town center and which were integrated with the factory life, had scarcely any relations with the town. The presence of sports and social facilities in addition to the housings made it unnecessary for those who lived there to have any relations with the town.⁶⁰⁵

In the Chapter Four, how the other housing production enterprise initiated by the industrialists was to promote workers' cooperatives was discussed. In these cooperative houses built on the land confiscated by the Land Office, by benefitting from the laws enacted in the beginning of the 1980s for the purpose of promoting mass housing construction, seven hundred worker families resided in 1990.⁶⁰⁶ This area, almost four km away from city center, was added to Çerkezköy urban settlement under the name of İsmet Paşa Mahallesi with the decision of the municipal council. The connection of these housings to Çerkezköy was provided with a minibus line.⁶⁰⁷

Except for the houses in İsmet Paşa Mahallesi, very few houses could be built at Çerkezköy via cooperatives. Most of the initiatives failed since most of the contributors could not pay the installments. Among the limited number of cooperatives that were completed, the first was the Feyzullah Toprak housing, which had seventy-two flats, situated in the Tepe region of İstasyon Mahallesi. After that, again in the same quarter, Dinarsu and Koroğlu cooperative houses, with fifty and

⁶⁰⁴ Eker, p. 129.

⁶⁰⁵ Garip, interview by the author.

⁶⁰⁶ Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 46.

⁶⁰⁷ As it is mentioned above, İsmet Paşa Mahallesi was incorporated into Kapaklı town as of 2002.

thirty-two houses, respectively, were built. Apart from these, no remarkable housing projects via cooperatives have occurred in Çerkezköy.⁶⁰⁸

Gecekondus and Family Apartments

The unskilled workers who migrated to Çerkezköy at first began to live in bachelor quarters that had been of barns or woodsheds, or in jerry-built shacks they built on land they bought. Until the mid-1980s, when the zoning plan was implemented, almost all of the new houses constructed in the town were single-storey houses. Some of these were built in accordance with the old zoning plan which was in effect, and some of these were built illegally in the unplanned area. According to Çerkezköy District Governor Yaşar Uğurlu's statement, the number of housings in the town, which was 1100 in 1970, rose to 1600 in 1980. Out of 500 newly built housing, 290 were licensed and 210 were illegal buildings and gecekondu.⁶⁰⁹

In the sense of single-storey houses built in unplanned areas, gecekondu were concentrated in two areas in Çerkezköy until 1980. These were Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi and Bağlık area, called the Çingene Mahallesi (Gypsy Neighborhood), where Roma lived. Although Roma were some of the oldest inhabitants of Çerkezköy, they lived around the cemetery situated to the east of Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Mahallesi, in jerry-built huts on public land in Bağlık. With the coming of industry, the building of gecekondu in this area increased. Thus, Bağlık stopped being an area where only Roma lived. On the other hand, in Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi, gecekondu were built on the peoples' own lands but without permission. Since in the beginning many people from Ordu province settled en masse in the west part of

⁶⁰⁸ İsmail Sencar, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 20 December 2011.

⁶⁰⁹ "Çerkezköy Özel Eki", *Dünya Gazetesi*, 28 March 1983.

this quarter, which is Yıldırım Beyazıt Mahallesi at the present time, it was called Ordu Mahallesi among the people. People from Erzurum and Kars were also settled in this area.⁶¹⁰

Abdülkadir Karan, the mayor of the period from the JP, states that the municipality overlooked the gecekondu built on registered lands due to housing problem:

On registered lands, single-storey houses were built. We overlooked even they were not planned because there were no houses. How were the people going to build houses with the minimum wage? Those who bought lands built small shacks. The lands belonged to them but without license (...) ⁶¹¹

In the process of building gecekondu in Çerkezköy, the land mafia did not play a role. In this process, principally the municipal organization and JP district organization were influential. Ali Pektaş, who was the mukhtar of Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi for many years, explains the role of JP organization in building gecekondu as, “there was feudalism (*derebeylik*) back then.” He says that the person who was the district head of the JP and member of the municipal council had a hardware store and that he allowed the gecekondu on the condition that the people bought their construction materials from him. Another goal in overlooking the illegal housing was to win the votes of the inhabitants of the gecekondu. Pektaş states that Ordu Mahallesi was established in this way and that in return for this, the people from Ordu voted for the JP.

Furthermore, Pektaş indicates that the JP district head, who dominated the municipal organization, bought the lands of some people at low prices by threatening to confiscate their lands.

⁶¹⁰ Ali Pektaş, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 19 December 2011.

⁶¹¹ “*Tapulu arazilerde tek katlı evler yapıldı. İmar olmasa da göz yumduk. Çünkü ev yoktu. Asgari ücretle adam nerde ev yapacak. Arsa alanlar küçük barakalar yaptılar. Arazi kendisinin ama ruhsatsız (...)*” Karan, interview by the author.

Saim Turlin [JP district head] bought my neighbour's land which was thirteen decares. He frightened people. If you don't give it to me, I will make it a green space, said he. So he cheaply bought lands. Then he sold these to someone with a huge difference in the price. Members of municipal council did this.⁶¹²

This narrative, also corroborated by other interviewees, shows that in Çerkezköy, the JP organization played a role similar to that of a land mafia. Informal relations within the formal structure blurred the boundaries between the legal party and the mafia.

Amnesty Law No. 2905 enacted in 1983 for the gecekondus throughout Turkey also legalized the gecekondus in Çerkezköy.⁶¹³ Those who had built gecekondus on their own lands were given deeds to their houses and to those who had built gecekondus on public land were given land title allocation document (*tapu tahsis belgesi*). Accordingly, with the implementation of the zoning plan, the areas where the gecekondus were situated were included in the planned area.

However, the building of gecekondus continued in the 1980s as well. In two areas in İstasyon Mahallesi, which are shown above in Figure 13 and Figure 14 with yellow ellipses, gecekondus were built outside the plan. Among these, the one on the left is today's Alper Street and the settlement around it, the name of which was Mimar Sinan. The gecekondus in this part were mostly built by people from Tokat province. They bought large amounts of land and sold it to their own relatives and hemşehris in shares. The yellow ellipse on the right shows Çaylak Street and the settlement around it. Some people from Ordu who made money by trading in Çerkezköy, bought large amounts of land from this hillside, which is in fact a landslide site, and by selling it to their relatives in shares, they settled there collectively. Since the lands were sold in shares, except for the relatives and trusted

⁶¹² "Saim Turlin [AP ilçe başkanı] komşumun 13 dönümlük yerini aldı. İnsanları korkuttu. Vermezseniz yeşil saha yaparım dedi. Öyle ucuza yerler aldı. Sonra bunları başkasına büyük farkla satıyor. Belediye meclisi üyeleri yaptı bunu." Ali Pektaş, interview by the author.

⁶¹³ Çerkezköy Gazetesi, 20 April 1983.

hemşehris, nobody was included in the shares. Thus Alper Street and around it was populated by people from Tokat, and Çaylak Street by people from Ordu.⁶¹⁴ The gecekondu in these two areas were included in the plan by making their local zone plan in 1991.⁶¹⁵

As for Bulgarian refugees of 1978, they built gecekondu on lands which they bought from their relatives in Gazi Osman Paşa Mahallesi, who had come to Çerkezköy before them, and settled in this area called Muhacir Mahallesi. The refugees from Bulgaria also settled in other quarters of Çerkezköy at a substantial rate. Former Mayor Remzi Garip, one of them, states that solidarity in daily work among the refugees is strong, and that they constructed their buildings via cooperation and without employing any workers. The municipality overlooked the gecekondu built by the refugees before the implementation of the zoning plan, just as was the case in the other examples.

When the borders of the boulevards and streets became clear after the implementation of the zoning plan, reinforced concrete buildings started to rise in Çerkezköy. Previously, permanent big buildings had not been constructed because of the possibility they might be demolished if a road was to pass through. At first, on Atatürk Street, which was recently zoned for housing, four-storey reinforced concrete constructions were built as of 1984. The plan gave the right to build four-storey on the lands along the main roads and to build two or three-storey in the rest of the town.

The extensive demand for housing led the landowners to construct buildings. The shopkeepers who had money, people with professions who bought land, those

⁶¹⁴ İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author. Sencar interview by the author. İhsan Çamyar, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 22 December 2011.

⁶¹⁵ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 12 February 1991; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 8 October 1991.

who had made money by selling lands to industrialists or those who had made money by selling a part of their land, and close relatives who had united their savings began to construct two or three-storey family apartments. Thus, single-storey houses began to be replaced by reinforced concrete buildings.⁶¹⁶

In the 1990s, a strict policy was adopted against the building of gecekondu and the building new gecekondu was not allowed. Thirty-two gecekondu built in the unplanned area were demolished in August 1992 and in November 1992 a few gecekondu built in Pınarça village, which is in municipal adjacent area, were demolished. On 24 November 1992, Çerkezköy Municipality published a notice in the only local newspaper of the district, *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, stating that the building of houses without licence definitely would not be permitted.⁶¹⁷

Today in Çerkezköy there are four areas where old gecekondu remain. Among those, since Çaylak Street and Alper Street, which are in İstasyon Mahallesi, are now in the planned area as mentioned above, the single-storey buildings are not considered as gecekondu. The single-storey houses on the public land in Bağlık area and around the municipal water channel in Fevzi Paşa are still considered as gecekondu. In these two regions there are a total of 292 gecekondu.⁶¹⁸ 141 of them are inhabited by Roma. Çerkezköy municipality continues to work on urban renewal project in order to demolish these gecekondu and settle their inhabitants in new housing units built by Housing Development Administration of Turkey (HDAT, *Toplu Konut İdaresi Başkanlığı*).⁶¹⁹ The Roma with whom I talked about the matter

⁶¹⁶ Fevzi Pektaş, interview by the author. İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author. Garip, interview by the author.

⁶¹⁷ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 4 August 1992; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 24 November 1992.

⁶¹⁸ Gökhan İnce, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 23 December 2011.

⁶¹⁹ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 6 January 2011.

object to this project by saying that apartment life does not suit them since they generally collect solid waste and scrap metal for their livelihood.

In the satellite image given in Figure 19, the areas where there are gecekondu still in Çerkezköy are marked with blue lines. In the gecekondu on the border of Bağlık and Fatih Quarters mostly Roma live. Since 1990s, Kurds have also started to settle in this area. In the gecekondu in Yıldırım Beyazıt Mahallesi, Roma and families from Black Sea region live. The gecekondu in these two areas are illegal buildings on public land. The gecekondu in İstasyon Mahallesi are now on planned land; in other words, they have gained legal status. A rapid building of apartments is observed on Alper Street, seen on the left. On Çaylak Street, which is situated partly on a landslide site, the old gecekondu settlement has reached the present without changing much.



Fig. 19. Çerkezköy's present gecekondu areas (2011).

State's Housing Production

The state's direct contribution to housing production in Çerkezköy happened in the 1990s. As a result of the efforts of the Tekirdağ Governorate, the Çerkezköy Municipality and the ÇIA, Emlak Bankası built a housing estate of 1000 houses in the Tepe region. The first stage of the construction started in 1991 and was completed in 1994.⁶²⁰ In the second half of the 1990s, Emlak Bankası constructed two mass housing units in two more areas, one in Kumlu Geçit area in Fevzi Paşa Mahallesi and the other next to OIZ. When all three areas are considered, Emlak Bankası has constructed almost 3000 houses in Çerkezköy. The red circles in Figure 20 show Emlak Bankası housings built in three areas in Çerkezköy.

The Emlak Bankası housing projects, when they were first built, appealed to those who were financially well off in Çerkezköy. Generally, factory managers, professionals and big tradesmen bought flats. Some big factories bought up to fifty flats to use them as lodgings. However, as more luxurious houses were built in Çerkezköy, the Emlak Bankası houses started to appeal to lower income groups. Hikmet İşcan, the mukhtar of Cumhuriyet Mahallesi states that now ordinary workers can also live in Emlak Bankası houses.⁶²¹

After the mass housing area next to the OIZ was included in the borders of Kapaklı Municipality in 2002, an estate of 1160 housings called Yıldız Kent was built in this area by HDAT.⁶²² In this area, presently, HDAT is building a luxurious estate called Dream City.

⁶²⁰ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 3 December 1991; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 August 1994.

⁶²¹ Hikmet İşcan, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 22 December 2011.

⁶²² In 2004, General Directorate of Land Office was abolished and all its assets were transferred to HDAT. Thus, the housing area of 150 decares next to the ÇOIZ also passed to



Fig. 20. Emlak Bankası Housings

Property Developer's Housing Production

The acceleration of housing production in Çerkezköy took place with the entrance of property developers to the housing market. Although projects by property developers started at the end of the 1980s, the number of buildings constructed in this way was quite few until the end of the 1990s. It is said that this was because the number of storeys allowed in the buildings in the zoning plan was low. In the plan approved in 1980, permission was given for four-storey buildings on the parcels on the main roads and three storeys on the other parcels. The construction rate on the basis of

HDAT. HDAT is a state institution that played a leading role in the boom experienced in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s in the construction sector in Turkey.

parcel was stated as thirty percent.⁶²³ Since parcels were generally about four hundred square meters, which meant a housing area of 120 square meters. The plan envisaged that Çerkezköy would be formed with three or four-storey buildings, each storey including one flat, with gardens. In its present state, the plan proposed a healthy urbanization that will keep a high life standard for the public.⁶²⁴ However, with regards to the landowners, who want to increase profits, and to the construction market, the plan was a handicap. Zafer Avcılar expresses this situation as follows:

If the number of storey was not increased, property developers would not have come in here. The Villages made the decisions faster; however, the right to build more storeys was granted very late here. Those who made the first plan kept the number of storeys low. For this reason, urbanization happened late. The plan made by the university was like that of the Etiler district in İstanbul.

The turning point in housing was the building of the Emlak Houses. The Emlak Houses opened up our horizons. Then they understood that the property developers would not come if the buildings were less than five-storey, that they should listen to the demands of the market. The capital, even if it were the wisest man of the world, will not make investment if it does not have an interest. In Kızılpınar, mayor Adnan gave permission for fifteen storeys while we were discussing five storeys.⁶²⁵

The land owners, instead of sharing half of a three-storey apartment with one flat in each storey with property developers, preferred to construct these buildings on their own in longer terms. (The rate of agreement between the property developers and landowners was generally fifty percent.) With regards to property developers, the low numbers of flats decreased the profitability.

In order to accelerate housing production, the municipal council made revisions in the zoning plan in various periods. First of all, in 1986 it increased the number of storeys in Atatürk, Öztrak, Barbaros, Güveniş, Namık Kemal, Fevzi Paşa,

⁶²³ Thirty percent construction license means that in only thirty percent of a certain parcel a building can be constructed and the remaining seventy percent should be left as a garden.

⁶²⁴ Uz, interview by the author, 21 December 2011.

⁶²⁵ Zafer Avcılar, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 21 May 2011.

Hükümet, Batur and Santral streets from four to five.⁶²⁶ After that, in 1992, the rate of construction in a parcel was raised from thirty percent to forty percent.⁶²⁷ Since the sizes of parcels at Çerkezköy were generally around four hundred square meters, increasing the rate from thirty percent (120 square meters) to forty percent (160 square meters) meant to be able to construct the buildings with two flats on one storey.⁶²⁸ In the revision made in 1998, the number of storeys of the buildings on the main roads was raised to six.⁶²⁹

It is said that property developing accelerated in Çerkezköy after the revision in the zoning plan in 1998. A landowner, who previously was allowed four flats at maximum on a piece of land, could now have half of the twelve flats that could be built on the same land after the revisions made. This situation seemed profitable for both the landowners and the property developers in Çerkezköy, which had a great housing shortage. The expectation of high profit started to stimulate the construction sector. However, this stimulation was short lived. As of 1999, the construction of buildings again stagnated and this stagnation lasted until 2004.

The stagnation experienced in the period from 1999 to 2004 in Çerkezköy in the constructing buildings had a few reasons. After the big Marmara earthquake of 1999, Çerkezköy Municipality decreased the number of storeys of the buildings on the main roads to five again. Thinking that they should stick to the original plan and that the revisions were wrong, the mayor of the period, Mehmet Uz, from the Democratic Left Party, remarks that he persuaded the municipal council to decrease the number of storey of buildings thanks to the anxiety created by the earthquake.⁶³⁰ The reaction of the landowners and property developers was to keep the construction

⁶²⁶ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 17 June 1986.

⁶²⁷ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 16 June 1992.

⁶²⁸ İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author.

⁶²⁹ Garip, interview by the author.

⁶³⁰ Uz, interview by the author, 25 March 2011.

waiting with the expectancy that the numbers of storey would rise again in the future. The economic crisis of 2001 experienced after the Marmara earthquake caused the construction sector to stop completely. Although most of my interviewees say that the stagnation in the construction sector resulted from Mehmet Uz's "strict municipalism,"⁶³¹ underlining the negative impact of the 1999 earthquake and the national economic crisis experienced in 2001 on construction sector is a more objective view.

After the municipal elections were won by the Justice and Development Party (JDP, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) in 2004, a boom was experienced in the construction sector. This boom was related to both the rapid growth in the construction sector in Turkey motivated by the JDP government and the local developments at Çerkezköy.⁶³² The stagnation experienced in the period from 1999 to 2004 had increased the housing demand in Çerkezköy to the highest level. The municipality, dominated by members of the JDP, first of all increased the number of storeys to six again, and not only on the main roads but also in all of the quarters of Çerkezköy, increased the number of storey by one at least. Increasing the number of storey of buildings mobilized the property developers and the land owners. That the banks started to give long-term housing credits with low interest rates in this period increased the demand for housing. This excessive demand for housing accelerated the construction of buildings. In all quarters of Çerkezköy, a rush of construction began.

⁶³¹ Against these claims, Mehmet Uz just says that he implemented the law to everyone equally. Ibid.

⁶³² After Çerkezköy municipality was won by the JDP in the local elections of 2004, the impact of businessmen in real estate and construction sectors on local politics became more apparent. Ali Ertem, who has been the mayor since 2004, is also a businessman in the construction sector.

Since the new law and regulations for the construction of buildings after the big earthquake increased the costs of construction, it became difficult for people to build apartment buildings on their own. For this reason, a great majority of the buildings was constructed by property developers in the first decade of the 2000s.

Table 12. Building Areas Given License in Çerkezköy District Center (m²)⁶³³

Year	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
The area given license	35,845	99,869	195,345	391,562	401,538	298,879	346,188	374,474

As seen in Table 12, a rapid increase in the construction of buildings started in 2004 and continued until 2007. The crisis of 2008 caused the sector to regress. In 2009, the rise started again. In the years between 2004 and 2007, almost 11,000 housings are said to have been built.⁶³⁴

With the boom in the construction sector, empty parcels in the urban settlement were filled, the old two or three-storey family apartment buildings were demolished and new six-storey buildings, the sizes of which range between 400 square meters and 1000 square meters, with a modern appearance were built. The city, which had a limited ability to expand horizontally, so to speak, expanded vertically.

The housing market boom in Çerkezköy has caused the construction firms in İstanbul and those who bought real estate for investment to be interested in the district. In addition to the Narin Park residential project, the constructions of luxurious housing estates named Forest City and Koza Park in the Kartaltepe area, İstanbul City in Kızılpınar town, Çiçek Park and Dream City in Kapaklı town,

⁶³³ İnce, *Çerkezköy Bölgesel Gelişim Projesi*, p. 29.

⁶³⁴ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 18 February 2008.

continue. In addition to these multi-storey (more than ten-storey) luxury estates that appeal to the middle classes, the building of villa-type houses in the Ambardere area are in progress. These housings are purchased by professionals such as doctors and lawyers, property developers, factory managers, wealthy tradesmen, and investors from İstanbul.⁶³⁵

Lastly, it should be noted that the rate of house ownership in Çerkezköy district center is 58 percent, while it is 65 percent in the total province and district centers of Turkey, according to the Turkish Statistical Institute's data of 2000.⁶³⁶ In Çerkezköy Municipality's report dated 2011, the rate of house ownership is indicated as approximately 60 percent.⁶³⁷

Urban Infrastructure and Basic Public Services

While housing development in Çerkezköy fell behind industrialization, urban infrastructure and public services fell behind the housing development. In 1988, when the infrastructure of the OIZ was completed except for its treatment plant, the district center of Çerkezköy had no sewer infrastructure, the water supply network was partly present and water cuts occurred occasionally, the roads were not asphalted and the street lamps were rarely hit. There was no hospital in the district where almost 12,000 workers worked. There were only a few primary health care centers and a Social Insurance Institution (SII, *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu*) dispensary.⁶³⁸

⁶³⁵ Emre Narin, vice president of the board of directors of Martı Gayrimenkul Yatırım Ortaklığı A.Ş., states that 70 percent of the housings in Narin Park were bought by investors from İstanbul. *Hürriyet*, 26 January 2010.

⁶³⁶ Turkish Statistical Institute, available online at <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul> [12 October 2011].

⁶³⁷ İnce, *Çerkezköy Bölgesel Gelişim Projesi*, p. 43.

⁶³⁸ Garip, interview by the author.

However, in the local media in 1972, it was heralded that “Çerkezköy, pilot industrial zone of Thrace, will be the golden city of the future.”⁶³⁹ From 1972 to 1990s, thanks to the transference of public resources, the industrial zone really showed a great improvement and gained a reputation as being the only organized industrial zone in Thrace. On the other hand, since urban development was maintained by local resources, the same improvement could not be attained in this field. Like the state, the industrialists also did not make a direct contribution to the development of the urban infrastructure.⁶⁴⁰ In lawyer Zeki Baydar’s words:

[Industrial zone] was like a dukedom, its roads were asphalted, its water was given, and its electricity was given. They were very comfortable. (...) Their line was different. The municipality would do these for the city only by its own means. Even our street lamp did not work. The industrialists made no contribution to urbanization.⁶⁴¹

Çerkezköy indirectly benefited from public resources thanks to some infrastructure investments made for industry. This was valid especially for transportation and communications, the asphaltting of the linking road between Çerkezköy and D-100 highway, the passing of the E-80 motorway close to Çerkezköy and the electric train’s starting to work between İstanbul and Çerkezköy as of 1984 are leading examples of this. Although the electric train connection to Sirkeci was made by the industrialists with the expectation that it would be useful for bringing labor from İstanbul, this did not happen as the trip lasted more than three hours. Train service functioned as a means of transportation for people from Çerkezköy to travel to İstanbul cheaply. In addition, due to the presence of industry, an automatic telephone

⁶³⁹ Devrim, 16 September 1972.

⁶⁴⁰ Karan, interview by the author.

⁶⁴¹ “[Sanayi bölgesi] dükalık gibiydi, asfaltı yapılmış, suyu verilmiş, elektriği verilmiş. Çok rahattı onlar. (...) Onların hattı ayrıydı. Şehre ancak belediye kendi imkânlarıyla yaparsa yapardı. Sokak lambamız bile yanmıyordu. Sanayicilerin kentleşmeye hiçbir katkıları yok.” Baydar, interview by the author.

switchboard was installed in the Çerkezköy Post Office in 1984 and all the town people benefitted from this.⁶⁴²

Since in Turkey municipalities can benefit from national public resources mainly via political connections, the initiatives of the mayors at Ankara were of capital importance. Hikmet Uğraş, elected as mayor again in the 1989 local elections, showed his active attitude in attracting the industry to the region in 1972, this time in providing infrastructure to the area. With the initiatives he undertook via the deputies of the region in Ankara, he ensured that the water and sewer infrastructures were constructed by İller Bankası.⁶⁴³ In addition, as a result of the negotiations made with the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement, and General Directorate of Highways, the E-80 Highway was connected to the former Çerkezköy road in the Beyciler area, which is twelve km to Çerkezköy.⁶⁴⁴ In addition to these, a new big municipal building, most of the cost of which were covered by the donations collected was constructed. One of the most important improvements during the period from 1989 to 1994 when Uğraş was the mayor, was that the zoning plan of the region that declared the ÇOIZ Expansion Area was implemented. Thanks to this implementation, the municipality gained revenue-generating areas.⁶⁴⁵ While the zoning plan of the area of 800 hectares, which was declared the ÇOIZ Expansion Area, was made, a share of 35

⁶⁴² *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 9 August 1984.

⁶⁴³ Hikmet Uğraş states that Tekirdağ deputy Tütüncü's "closely pursuing the matter" had a significant impact on the fact that the sewer project of the district was included in the Program of 1990. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 10 October 1989. *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 9 January 1990.

⁶⁴⁴ Hikmet Uğraş: "By means of the attention of the General Director of Highways, Mr. Coşkunoglu, E-6 [E-80] connection of the district will be provided. In this matter, our Governor Mr. Tuncel and our deputy Mr. Tütüncü also had great services." *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 15 January 1991.

Remzi Garip, elected mayor after Hikmet Uğraş, states that Çorlu Municipality and Çorlu Chamber of Commerce and Industry tried to prevent the E-80 connection, which links Çerkezköy to İstanbul directly, and that they strived for the use of Çorlu E-80 linkage road while going to Çerkezköy. Garip, interview by the author.

⁶⁴⁵ Baydar, interview by the author; Garip, interview by the author.

percent fell to the Municipality.⁶⁴⁶ In 1996, as a result of the sale of parcels, obtained from this area, the budget of the municipality was multiplied approximately by four. The municipal budget that was 205 billion TL in 1996 rose to 811 billion TL in 1997.⁶⁴⁷

Thanks to this revenue obtained, the roads in the city were asphalted in the period from 1994 to 1999, when Remzi Garip was the mayor. In return for the independent mayor Garip's passing to the Motherland Party a new E-80 linkage road was constructed in 1998.⁶⁴⁸ Thus, in the 1990s, significant improvements were made in the infrastructure of Çerkezköy.

The development of public services in Çerkezköy took place in the 1990s like the urban infrastructure. Though thousands of workers worked in the district, there was not a SII hospital or hospital belonging to the Ministry of Health until 1995. To solve this problem which had been an issue discussed by both the industrialists and the unionists⁶⁴⁹ since the 1970s, the first step was taken in 1986. When the news that a SII hospital was to be built in Çorlu instead of Çerkezköy was heard in 1985, the president of the CTTU, Şevket Yılmaz, made negotiations with the authorities to have the hospital built in Çerkezköy.⁶⁵⁰ With the effect of the negotiations made by the union, the construction of the Çerkezköy SII hospital was started in 1986, and completed in 1991. However, the capacity of the hospital was well below Çerkezköy's needs. In this 70-bed hospital, only seven medical doctors worked in

⁶⁴⁶ According to the law, the municipalities received a share of thirty five percent from the areas they zoned, for infrastructure such as green spaces, roads, etc., and social services.

⁶⁴⁷ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 22 October 1996.

⁶⁴⁸ We had recounted the story of having the linkage road built in the Fourth Chapter.

⁶⁴⁹ TEKSİF, protested the inadequacy of SII dispensary with a workers' march in 1977 in which a thousand workers participated in Çerkezköy. *Milliyet*, 8 July 1977.

⁶⁵⁰ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 11 April 1985; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 20 July 1993.

1994.⁶⁵¹ In 1995, the number of the hospital staff was increased and by restructuring, it was made a 100-bed hospital.⁶⁵²

The second state hospital in Çerkezköy was built in the second half of the 1990s in the OIZ on the initiative of the municipality. Garip, who was the mayor in that period, states that he ensured the allocation of an area of 25,000 decares in the OIZ for the construction of a hospital as a result of his persistent efforts in the the ÇOIZEEC. The second state hospital in Çerkezköy was built in this area that was assigned to the Ministry of Health. Since this part of the OIZ was included in the borders of Kapaklı town as a result of the court case which resulted in 2002, the hospital also passed to Kapaklı town.⁶⁵³

Investments in education were also made with delay. Although the lack of trained workers was one of the problems from which the industrialists in Çerkezköy suffered, except for having a few primary schools built, the industrialists did not make any significant contribution to education until recent years.⁶⁵⁴ The Industrial Vocational High School, the construction of which started in 1982 regarding the needs of the industry, began classes only partially in 1989.⁶⁵⁵ In 1994, there was a high school, a vocational high school, and an Anatolian High School in Çerkezköy. In addition, a Vocational School of Higher Education affiliated to Trakya University started teaching in the period of 1994-1995.⁶⁵⁶ The opening of a vocational school of higher education in Çerkezköy was realized as a result of the negotiations made by

⁶⁵¹ Çerkezköy District Governorate, "Brifing Raporu," 24 October 1994, ÇIA Archive.

⁶⁵² *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 2 January 1996.

⁶⁵³ Garip, interview by the author.

⁶⁵⁴ Industrialists, instead of investing in secondary and high education, were interested in designing the program of state school in the district in accordance with the needs of the industry. One of the topics of activity program of ÇIA in 1991 was to provide that the departments, which were needed by the industrial enterprises, would be opened in the vocational high school which recently started teaching. ÇIA 17th General Assembly Annual Report of the Board of Directors, 31 January 1991, ÇIA Archive.

⁶⁵⁵ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 10 October 1989.

⁶⁵⁶ Çerkezköy District Governorate, "Brifing Raporu," 24 October 1994, ÇIA Archive.

the owner of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, Sabri Avcılar, who was also a member of the provincial council of Tekirdağ, with the president of the university.⁶⁵⁷

In addition the Çerkezköy Adult Education Center, which has been active since 1974, organized various technical courses. The number of secondary schools rose to six in the district with the building of three multi-program high schools in the first decade of the 2000s. Furthermore, for the purpose of training skilled staff for the textile sector, the Çerkezköy Vocational and Technical Education Center was established by the Turkish Textile Foundation in 2007.⁶⁵⁸

Immigration and Population Growth

In the zoning plan approved in 1980, it was anticipated that the population of Çerkezköy district center would be 100,000 in 2000.⁶⁵⁹ However, the population of the district center was only 41,638 in 2000. Even though the population growth rate of the district center, the population of which was 6682 in 1970, was well above Turkey's average, it was lower than expected. On the other hand, an unexpected population growth was experienced in the villages of Çerkezköy. Almost half of the influx that was anticipated to turn to Çerkezköy district center after the industry's choosing the location, headed for the villages around the industrial zone rather than the district center. When these villages, which underwent a rapid urbanization, are also considered, the urban population rose to approximately 80,000 in 2000. A population of 80,000 was a number close to the projection in the plan. If workers were not transported from the neighboring districts with shuttle buses, probably, Çerkezköy's population in 2000 would have been more than 100,000 as well. As

⁶⁵⁷ Avcılar, interview by the author, 14 May 2011.

⁶⁵⁸ İnce, *Çerkezköy 2023*, pp. 18-19.

⁶⁵⁹ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 2 March 1983.

discussed above, the number of workers residing in Çerkezköy district center and villages had fallen behind the demand of the industry, and this had resulted in the factories' recruiting workers from the neighboring areas with a broad shuttle network. The emergence of the shuttle network; however, by having a reverse effect, slowed down the inflow that would have take place from the close regions to Çerkezköy.

As discussed above, the delay in the implementation of the zoning plan in Çerkezköy district center, the villages' offering cheaper lands to the immigrants and loosening the control of construction caused almost half of those who migrated to Çerkezköy to settle outside the district center. For this reason, the population growth of Çerkezköy should be assessed on the basis of the district considering also the villages. In the table and figure below the increase in populations and geographical positions of the settlement units in Çerkezköy district are shown.

Table 13. Population Development of Çerkezköy District

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
District center	6682	12,908	23,102	41,638	73,918
Kapaklı	1182	2680	6142	19,160	55,431
Kızılpınar	1379	2005	3718	7716	14,177
Karaağaç	495	880	1742	6202	10,109
Veliköy	800	1385	2183	3387	5728
Pınarça	648	822	1048	1177	1622
Yanıkağıl	923	1075	1212	1333	1589
Bahçeagıl	698	671	713	783	622
Karlı	739	717	674	629	512
Uzunhacı	743	785	749	660	512
Total	14,289	23,928	41,283	82,685	164,220



Fig. 21. Çerkezköy district map. (The numbers on the roads represent distance in kilometers.)

As seen in Table 13, from the 1970s to 2010, rapid population growth was experienced in the district center and the four villages (Kapaklı, Kızılpınar, Karaağaç, and Veliköy) around the industrial zone. As there was no significant population growth in the five villages that were relatively distant from the industrial zone, population declined in the three villages (Bahçeagıl, Karlı, and Uzunhacı) which were the farthest. While the total population of Turkey was almost doubled from 1970 to 2010, the population of Çerkezköy district was multiplied by 11.5. The population of the district center almost doubled every ten years, and Kapaklı village, during these 40 years, experienced a more rapid population growth than the district center and the other villages. Kızılpınar and Karaağaç villages received intensive migration as of the 1990s, and Veliköy, which was farther away from the ÇOIZ, experienced a slower population growth compared to the other three villages.

The transfer of İsmet Paşa Mahallesi, where the workers' cooperatives and Emlak Bankası housings were situated, from Çerkezköy to Kapaklı, and the building of Yıldız Kent residential project in this area by HDAT have a share in the extraordinary population growth of Kapaklı during the first decade of the 2000s. Kapaklı was one of the biggest sub-districts of Turkey with a population of 60,877 in 2011. The regions from which Kapaklı most received migration were Thrace, Bulgaria and the Black Sea region, Samsun being in first place. The towns of Kızılpınar and Karaağaç, on the other hand, received migration as of 1990 mostly from eastern provinces such as Kars, Van, Erzurum, Muş, and also Tokat, which is in the mid-Black Sea region. The demographic structure of the villages completely changed as a result, turning the local population into a minority.

Çerkezköy received migration from almost every region of Turkey. After the industry chose the location and the construction of the factories began, first of all,

people from Çerkezköy, who had migrated to İstanbul, returned to their towns. The first settlers from outside the town were people who worked in the construction of the factories. Most of these construction workers started to work in the factories when they began to operate. And some of them took places in the local construction sector that started to develop in the town. Since there was not a construction sector at Çerkezköy before, these first groups coming from outside were able to monopolize the construction sector for long years. It is said that among those who came with the first migration wave, mostly people from Erzurum, Gümüşhane, Tokat and Samsun worked in construction.⁶⁶⁰

Another part of the first migration wave was the workers the firms transferred from their factories in İstanbul to Çerkezköy. For example, it is said that many workers from Ordu who had worked at the Dinarsu factory in İstanbul came to the factory in Çerkezköy. A significant part of the immigrants coming from İstanbul was foremen and technical staff.

To this first wave of migration coming from Anatolia and İstanbul, people coming from various regions of Thrace were also present. In 1978, in compliance with the agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria, some of Bulgarian Turks who had come to Turkey were settled in Çerkezköy and neighboring districts and villages for the purpose of working in the factories. The second wave of immigrants from Bulgaria took place in 1989. A significant part of these who came to Turkey by forced migration settled in Çorlu and Çerkezköy in order to work in the factories.

The factories in the second half of the 1980s started to prefer workers who lived near the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone to decrease the cost of transportation. This accelerated the migration to Çerkezköy and Kapaklı. In this period, an intensive

⁶⁶⁰ İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author.

migration also from the forest villages of Kırklareli, where the income obtained from forestry had decreased, to Çerkezköy was experienced.⁶⁶¹

According to a study conducted by Çerkezköy Municipality in the district center in 1988, 35 percent of the population had been born in Çerkezköy. In the same study, the rate of people born in Tekirdağ was 4 percent, the rate of people born abroad was 11 percent and the rate of people born in the other provinces of Turkey was 55 percent. When analyzed on the basis of family, the rate of families who were natives of Çerkezköy was 28.8 percent. 13.3 percent of the families came from a foreign country (mostly Bulgaria), 9 percent of them came from İstanbul, and 4 percent of them from the other districts of Tekirdağ, and 44.9 percent of them came from other provinces.⁶⁶²

Statistics that show the birth places of the population on the basis of districts in the Population Census of 2000 demonstrate the distribution of migration turned to Çerkezköy. Although all the provinces from which people migrated were mentioned in the statistics, here the most crowded ten provinces in addition to Tekirdağ and foreign country are included.

⁶⁶¹ Aslan, p. 65.

⁶⁶² Çerkezköy Municipality, *Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin Tevsii*, p. 21.

Table 14. Çerkezköy District Population by Birth Place (2000)

Birth Place	Number	Rate
Tekirdağ	26,878	32.5
İstanbul	5870	7.1
Foreign Country	5814	7.0
Kırklareli	5032	6.0
Edirne	4462	5.4
Samsun	2891	3.5
Ordu	2721	3.3
Erzurum	2575	3.1
Kars	2192	2.7
Tokat	2075	2.5
Van	1597	1.9
Sivas	998	1.2

It should not be forgotten that in Table 14, among those who were born in Tekirdağ, there were also the children of people who came from other provinces and abroad, born in Çerkezköy. For this reason, the number those people who were really from Tekirdağ should be less than the people who were born in Tekirdağ. Due to the same reason, the number of immigrants coming from all of the provinces, except Tekirdağ, and foreign country should be a little more than given in the table. It also should be indicated that most of those who were born in İstanbul were the children of people who had migrated to İstanbul from other provinces. Provided that these margins are left, the composition of the population of Çerkezköy can be seen from the Table 14.

According to Table 14, in 2000, those who were born in Çerkezköy and other districts of Tekirdağ constituted one-third of the population of the district. Those who were born in İstanbul and those who were born in a foreign country were the two biggest groups after those born in Tekirdağ. They were followed by two provinces of Thrace, Kırklareli and Edirne. As for the immigration from Anatolia, Samsun, Ordu

and Tokat provinces of the Black Sea region, constituted an important part. The second biggest group from Anatolia was from eastern provinces, Erzurum, Kars, with Van in first place.

After 2000, in Turkey a Population Population was not taken, and instead, as of 2007 Turkey moved to an address-based population registration system. In the address-based population registration system administered every year, instead of the birth places of the population of the district, the provinces to which they are registered are given. In Table 15, in which provinces the population within the borders of Çerkezköy district was registered in 2010 are shown. The basic difference between the data in this table from that in Table 14 is that, it takes the province of registration rather than the birth place as its basis. Since most people who were born in a foreign country are registered in Çerkezköy, they are included in the population of Tekirdağ.

Table 15. Çerkezköy Population According to the Province of Registration (2010)

Province	Number	Rate
Tekirdağ	32,015	19.5
Samsun	12,435	7.6
Kırklareli	11,110	6.8
Edirne	10,514	6.4
Tokat	8464	5.2
Ordu	8301	5.0
Erzurum	8111	5.0
Kars	6447	3.9
İstanbul	5740	3.5
Van	5147	3.1
Sivas	3090	1.9

According to Table 15, in 2010, in the whole Çerkezköy district, those who were registered in Tekirdağ, including Bulgarian immigrants, were fewer than twenty percent. It is observed that immigration from Kırklareli and Edirne continued in the early 2000s as well, the rate of these two provinces to the total population increased by 1.8 percent. It is seen that immigration from Samsun continue to increase in the early 2000s and that this province rose to the second rank following Tekirdağ. In this period, the number of people from Tokat increased and left the people from Ordu and Erzurum behind. Since the province of registration was taken as the basis rather than the birth place in the data of 2010, the rate of İstanbul decreased. From the eastern provinces, the significance of Erzurum, Kars and Van continue. The data of 2010 indicate that in Çerkezköy district, the rate of Thracians, including immigrants from Bulgaria, decreased to one-third and that two-thirds of the population came from various provinces of Anatolia.

When we look both tables at the same time, it is understood that the provinces from which people most migrate from Anatolia to Çerkezköy have been the same provinces since the beginning. The large hemşehri groups that came from İstanbul upon the establishment of the first factories have enabled the continuation of migration from their provinces by bringing their own relatives. Tokat, Ordu and Samsun provinces in Black Sea region and Kars, Erzurum and Van provinces in eastern Anatolia have been the provinces from which people have immigrated to Çerkezköy from 1970s to the present time most.

Industrialization in Çerkezköy also has affected the population growth in the neighboring areas. In the villages of neighboring areas from where the workers were transported with shuttle buses, the decrease in population stopped and even

population growth began. This impact can be seen clearly in the period from 1975 to 1980 when there was no industrialization in Thrace except for Çerkezköy.

Table 16. Village Populations of Districts Neighboring Çerkezköy by Year⁶⁶³

	1965	1970	1975	1980
Çorlu	28,458	27,328	26,319	30,835
Saray	17,068	16,378	16,072	17,105
Vize	25,535	24,892	24,246	25,468
Lüleburgaz	37,931	36,570	35,969	38,440

The Local Economy

Employment

While being an industrial worker became the main source of income with the establishment of factories in Çerkezköy, the local economy also started to revive. 49.9 percent of the employment in the district center in 2000 was in the manufacturing sector. 28.4 percent of those working in the manufacturing sector were women. The rate of people working in industry in the entire district was 42.12 percent. Çerkezköy had the third highest rate of workers working in industry in Turkey after the Hacılar district (48.13 percent) of Kayseri and the Babadağ district (46.91 percent) of Denizli.⁶⁶⁴

⁶⁶³ In the period from 1975 to 1980, the total village populations of Çatalca and Silivri districts, which are within the borders of İstanbul province, neighbouring Çerkezköy increased significantly. Nevertheless, since the impact of Çerkezköy on the population growth in these villages, which were at the same time under the impact of other socio-economic processes based in İstanbul, could not be determined, they were not included in the table. Turkish Statistical Institute, available online at

<<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/nufusmenuapp/menu.zul>> [12 October 2011].

⁶⁶⁴ Dinçer and Özaslan, p. 238.

Since the industry provided permanent job opportunities, the labor force participation rate in Çerkezköy is above the average in Turkey, whereas the unemployment rate is below the average. According to data of the Turkish Statistical Institute, in 2000 in Çerkezköy district center, 57.2 percent of the population who were twelve years and over participated in the labor force. This rate is 40.6 percent in the total of centers of provinces and districts in Turkey. While the unemployment rate in the centers of the provinces and districts of Turkey in 2000 were calculated as 17.2, this rate was 11 percent in Çerkezköy district center. While the unemployment rate in the total population of Turkey is 8.9 percent, the rate of unemployment in entire Çerkezköy district is 5.21 percent. The rate of unemployment on the basis of districts for the year 2010 is not available. However, in the interviews I conducted with five quarter mukhtars in Çerkezköy, all the mukhtars stated that the rate of unemployment was very low in their quarters.

With the impact of industrialization in the 1970s, new business areas started to develop. One of the sectors that first developed was the transport sector. The urgent need for carriers for the transport of both the raw materials and products, and the workers caused many people from Çerkezköy to buy transport vehicles. Truckers from Çerkezköy organized as a cooperative in order to prevent anyone from entering into the transport market from outside. The truck drivers carrying loads to factories established the Çerkezköy Motor Carriers' Cooperative (*Çerkezköy Motorlu Taşıyıcılar Kooperatifi*) in 1977. The number of members of the cooperative, which had 44 members in 1985, rose to 81 in 1992 and to 136 in 2011.⁶⁶⁵ The owners of buses carrying workers established the Çerkezköy Bus Operators' Cooperative in

⁶⁶⁵ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 28 January 1985; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 24 March 1992; <<http://cerkezkoytaskoop.com>> [15 January 2012].

1980 with approximately 70 members.⁶⁶⁶ The cooperatives, by not allowing anyone except for those who reside in Çerkezköy and its villages to make transport goods in the district, have become a de facto monopoly in the local transport sector.⁶⁶⁷

Another sector developed in Çerkezköy in direct connection to industry is sub-industries such as spare parts, forging and turnery. In the small industrial site built by the municipality in 1984⁶⁶⁸ for the settlement of sub-industry, today there are twenty small enterprises. At the present time, the municipality is working to move the small industrial site to a larger area. It is said that the sub-industry in Çerkezköy has not developed as much as desired, and that the firms in ÇOIZ continue to fulfill their sub-industry requirements from Çorlu and İstanbul.⁶⁶⁹

Among the sectors that developed in parallel to the population growth, the leading one is the construction sector. Property development, which developed as of the end of the 1980s, boomed in the early 2000s, and in this period many property developers appeared in Çerkezköy. Especially people from Gümüşhane and Erzurum provinces are said to have an important place in property development. In the recent years, people from Van and Kars also have turned to this sector.⁶⁷⁰ The construction sector, constituting 5.35 percent of the employment at Çerkezköy in 2000, is a sector in which close relatives work together and temporary employment is commonly

⁶⁶⁶ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 30 January 1984. This cooperative was dissolved at the end of 1980s.

⁶⁶⁷ Alaadin Gökalp, interview by the author; Nejat Çinisli, factory manager of Narin Tekstil was complaining from this situation as follows: “There is a shuttle bus fight among the factories. Buses cannot be found. You cannot bring buses from outside because people from Çerkezköy do not want it. Even if you bring buses, they sabotage them by doing small things such as adding water to the petroleum of buses.” (*Fabrikalar arasında servis kavgası var. Otobüs bulunamıyor. Dışardan otobüs getiremiyorsunuz. Çünkü Çerkezköylüler istemiyor. Getirseniz bile gelen otobüslerin benzinlerine su karıştırmak gibi küçük sabotajlarda bulunuyorlar.*) “Özel Çerkezköy Eki,” *Dünya Gazetesi*, 28 March 1983.

⁶⁶⁸ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 13 December 1984.

⁶⁶⁹ Ali Bozdağ, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 23 December 2011. Uz, interview by the author, 21 December 2011.

⁶⁷⁰ İbrahim Erkan, interview by the author; Bozdağ, interview by the author.

used. It is indicated that people coming from the provinces of eastern Anatolia such as Van and Ağrı as temporary workers do the most difficult jobs in the sector.⁶⁷¹

Lastly, it should be mentioned that small retailers trading consumer goods have an important place in the district's economy and in employment. In 2000, 9.1 percent of the total labor force in the district center worked at enterprises involved in wholesale and retail sale trade, hotels and restaurants. In the sum of Çerkezköy district, the number of tradesmen registered with the Chamber of Tradesmen and Artisans was 2088 in 2009.⁶⁷² The president of Chamber of Tradesmen and Artisans, Ali Bozdağ, indicates that among the tradesmen in the district, Thracians are predominant.⁶⁷³

The Establishment of the ÇCCI and Its Impact

Local economic development triggered by the industry formed the basis for the establishment of the Çerkezköy Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ÇCCI). The idea of establishing a Chamber was first discussed among the tradesmen from Çerkezköy.⁶⁷⁴ In order to establish a chamber, which was affiliated to Çorlu Chamber of Commerce and Industry with Saray district, 201 signatures had to be collected from the tradesmen and industrialists. After the unsuccessful attempts in the beginning of the 1990s, Sabri Avcılar, owner of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, appealed to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce by collecting the sufficient number of

⁶⁷¹ Çamyar, interview by the author.

⁶⁷² İnce, *Çerkezköy 2023*, p. 21.

⁶⁷³ Bozdağ, interview by the author.

⁶⁷⁴ Avcılar, interview by the author, 14 May 2011; In the general assemblies of ÇIA held in 1992 and 1993, the idea that a chamber of commerce and industry should be established in Çerkezköy was expressed; nevertheless, a concrete step was not taken about this matter. ÇIA 18th General Assembly Annual Report of Board of Directors, 30 January 1992; Minutes of ÇIA 19th General Assembly, 13 February 1993, ÇIA Archive.

signatures from Çerkezköy and Saray.⁶⁷⁵ As a result of this appeal, on 3 November 1994, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce approved the establishment of ÇCCI.⁶⁷⁶ The Chamber entered into service in 1995.

Zafer Avcılar, who supported his father in the establishment of the chamber and who would be the president of the council of the ÇCCI for ten years as of 1999, states that the Çorlu Chamber of Commerce and Industry tried to prevent the establishment of the ÇCCI. The establishment of the ÇCCI meant that the dues collected and other incomes received from tradesmen and industrialists at Saray and Çerkezköy would be cut. Avcılar criticizes the Çorlu Chamber of Commerce and Industry for not making any contributions to Çerkezköy although it has collected dues from Çerkezköy industry for years. “In fact, Çorlu has bled us dry; there is nothing that Çorlu has given here. (...) There is not even a pin’s head sent by the Çorlu Chamber of Commerce and Industry to Çerkezköy in return for the dues it collected from us during the existence of industry.”⁶⁷⁷

The direct benefit of the establishment of the ÇCCI to industrialists and tradesmen in Çerkezköy was that at first it enabled the opportunity to have the bureaucratic procedures, which they had to get done in Çorlu or İstanbul Chambers of Commerce and Industry before, done in Çerkezköy faster and more cheaply.⁶⁷⁸ Certainly, the function of the chamber was more than taking care of bureaucratic

⁶⁷⁵ Avcılar, interview by the author, 14 May 2011; *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 18 May 1993.

⁶⁷⁶ *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 20 December 1994.

⁶⁷⁷ “Çorlu bizim kanımızı emdi aslında, Çorlu’nun buraya verdiği hiçbir şey yok. (...) Sanayinin varoluş tarihinde bizden aldığı aidatlar karşılığında Çorlu Ticaret Sanayi Odası’nın Çerkezköy’e toplu iğne başı gönderdiği yoktur.” Zafer Avcılar, interview by the author, 14 May 2011.

⁶⁷⁸ Dursun Ali Tever complains that in addition to the prolongation of the procedures and their being relatively expensive at Çorlu and İstanbul, donations are constantly demanded from the industrialists: “While receiving a document in Çorlu, for example a capacity certificate, they demanded fifty particle boards. They constantly tried to pilfer from us.” (*Çorlu’da belge alırken, mesela kapasite belgesi verecek, 50 tane sunta istiyor. Sürekli bir şeyler koparmaya çalışıyorlardı.*) Tever, interview by the author.

procedures. The chamber, especially in the 2000s, played a significant role in the protection of the economic interests of businessmen and in the local development of Çerkezköy.

According to Avcılar, the establishment of the the ÇCCI, above all, enabled “the meeting of the merchants with the industrialists, and the local initiative with the industrial initiative.”

Çerkezköy tradesmen, merchants, and locals have held the industrialists in high esteem. But then, they want the industrialists to be more blended in with them. Industrialists are great, just like the state. This requirement was not fulfilled sufficiently. However, it has started to be fulfilled since the ÇCCI has been established.⁶⁷⁹

The ÇCCI, as indicated by Avcılar, became a place where the factory representatives and local tradesmen and businessmen came together. The first president of the Council of the ÇCCI was Mustafa Gürsoy, one of the leading tradesmen of Çerkezköy. The first Chairman of the Board of Directors was the general director of Dinarsu factory, Ömer Kılınç, who would hold this office for ten years. In the beginning, those who took active roles in the chamber on the side of the industrialists were the local managers of the factories rather than the owners of firms. This situation changed in time. In 2005, Ali Tuncel Çetin, one of the owners of Çetin Tekstil San. A.Ş. was chosen the Chairman of the Board of Directors of ÇCCI. After him, the owner of Tever Ağaç Sanayi A.Ş., Dursun Ali Tever, undertook this task in 2009. Tever still continues to be the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the ÇCCI. The President of the Council of the ÇCCI at the present time is İsmail Akın, who is the owner of a construction firm (a property developer). When the managing bodies of the ÇCCI are analyzed from 1999 to the present day, it is observed that the

⁶⁷⁹ “Çerkezköy esnafı, tüccarı, halkı sanayiciyi baş tacı yapmıştır. Ama sanayicinin de daha fazla içinde olmasını ister. Sanayici büyüktür, aynı devlet baba gibi. Bu ihtiyaç yeterince karşılanmamıştı. Ama ÇTSO kurulduğundan itibaren bu ihtiyaç da karşılanmaya başlıyor.” Zafer Avcılar, interview by the author, 21 May 2011.

presidency has been assumed by local tradesmen and businessmen while the chairmanship of the Board of Directors has been assumed by industrialists. It is seen that among the local businessmen, especially those who are in the construction sector are more effective in the bodies of the ÇCCI in the recent years. This situation can be regarded as the result of the boom experienced in the construction sector in Çerkezköy after 2004.

Although the ÇCCI is a recently established chamber, with the advantage of representing a large industrial zone it became an active local business organization in the 2000s. The number of the members of the ÇCCI, which showed a rapid increase, reached 2400 in 2011.⁶⁸⁰ The chamber, on the one hand, functions as an intermediary in forwarding the problems and demands of industrialists to the government via the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (UCCET, *Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği*), and as an agent assisting industrialists' making new commercial links. On the other hand, it plays a significant role in terms of Çerkezköy's local development. Dursun Ali Tever, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chamber gives an example with regards to the first of the double functions of the Chamber:

Lastly, there were the incentives given during this government [JDP government]. They wrote fourteen items, we said 'no, these should be added and those should also be added' and increased the items to twenty nine. We immediately made a list, I collected signatures from the presidents of other chambers as well; I gave it to the President of TOBB [UCCET], Mr. Rıfat.⁶⁸¹

The chamber, additionally, prepared a catalogue that introduced the industrial firms at Çerkezköy in five languages and had them distributed at industrial fairs abroad.

⁶⁸⁰ İnce, *Çerkezköy Bölgesel Gelişim Projesi*, p. 31.

⁶⁸¹ "En son bu hükümet [AKP hükümeti] zamanında verilen teşvikler vardı. 14 tane yazmışlar, biz dedik 'olmaz şunlar da olsun, bunlar da olsun' 29'a çıkardık. Hemen bir liste yaptık, diğer oda başkanlarından da imza topladım; onu TOBB Başkanı Rıfat beye verdim." Tever, interview by the author.

In addition, one of the important activities of the chamber in terms of Çerkezköy's local development was ensuring the addition of the area declared ÇOIZ Expansion Area in 1990 to the body of the ÇOIZ. Former President of ÇCCI, Avcılar states that the unification of the municipal industrial zone which had been declared the ÇOIZ Expansion Area with the ÇOIZ was realized due to the lobbying activities of the ÇCCI. Avcılar, saying that they had invited NMP deputy Hasan Kaya, who was the Parliamentary Commissioner for Industry and Commerce of the period, through the agency of the Board of Directors of ÇCCI member Mustafa Ordu, from the NMP (he would later on become NMP head of district) to Çerkezköy, says that in the meeting held with Kaya they obtained a promise from him on the subject of unifying the two industrial zones, a project that was delayed for years. The Board of Directors of the Chamber also negotiated with NMP leader Devlet Bahçeli in addition to Kaya, and as a result of all these lobbying activities, thanks to the fact that the Ministry of Industry was in the power of the NMP, which was the government partner, it ensured that the unification of the ÇOIZ and the Expansion Area as a single OIZ was approved. Thus, in 2002, the OIZ and Expansion Area were unified under a single management.⁶⁸²

As of 2006, the ÇCCI turned towards creating regional policies by organizing meetings attended by all the chambers of commerce and industry in Thrace. During these meetings, regional problems in terms of industry were discussed. In addition, the ÇOIZ was introduced to other chambers as an exemplary OIZ. Avcılar remarks that thanks to these meetings Çerkezköy “has become the leader despite Çorlu” in Thrace.

⁶⁸² Zafer Avcılar, interview by the author, 14 May 2011.

During those years in the ÇCCI, projects such as turning North Thrace into a tourism region, establishing a university at Çerkezköy also were brought onto the agenda; however, these projects remain inconclusive. In addition, the Ministry of Justice made an attempt to build an F-type prison in the district in 2000. This was prevented by the objections of the ÇCCI.⁶⁸³ The president of the council of the ÇCCI of the period, Avcılar, who said “We thought that such entities should not come to the heart of industry,” states that he met with the Minister of Justice of the period, Hikmet Sami Türk in person in order to prevent the building of these prisons. The project of building a prison, which was supported by some members of the council of the ÇCCI on the grounds that it would provide employment, was rejected with the thought that it would harm the “exemplary industrial town” image of the district.⁶⁸⁴

The result of the ÇCCI’s efforts at promoting Çerkezköy is expressed by Avcılar as follows.

Çerkezköy’s brand value has increased. When we look from the industrialist’s point of view, his facility’s value has also increased. Now, is the value of an empty factory at Kırklareli equal to the value of an empty factory at Çerkezköy? As Çerkezköy’s brand value has increased, likewise, the share those living in Çerkezköy, those who have properties received from the gross national product and their attitudes towards life have changed both economically and socially.⁶⁸⁵

⁶⁸³ The F-type prisons were highly debated and named “cell-type” in public due to their architectural structures which isolate the prisoners.

⁶⁸⁴ Zafer Avcılar, interview by the author, 21 May 2011. The mentioned prison has been built in another region of Tekirdağ province.

⁶⁸⁵ “Çerkezköy’ün marka değeri arttı. Ya sanayici açısından baktığımızda, tesisinin de kıymeti arttı. Şimdi Kırklareli’deki boş bi fabrikayla Çerkezköy’deki boş bi fabrikanın değeri bir midir? Çerkezköy’ün marka değerinin artmasıyla, aynı şekilde Çerkezköy’de yaşayanların, mülk sahibi olanların da bu gayri safi milli hasıladan aldığı pay, hayata karşı duruşları sosyal olarak da iktisadi olarak da farklı oldu.” Ibid.

Socio-Spatial Relations in Çerkezköy

Spatial Segregation

Some of the hemşehri groups, though not all of them, that immigrated to Çerkezköy district center have clustered in certain areas. Especially in the process of building gecekondu on the lands outside the zoning plan, some hemşehri groups have clustered in these areas. In Yıldırım Beyazıt Mahallesi and in Çaylak Street in İstasyon Mahallesi people from Ordu, and in Alper Street in İstasyon Mahallesi people from Tokat have settled in the lands outside the zoning plan collectively. In addition, immigrants from Bulgaria have settled in Gazi Osman Paşa Mahallesi. People from Gümüşhane have concentrated in Gazi Mustafa Kemal Paşa Mahallesi. The destiny of the Roma, who lived in the Çingene Mahallesi in the pre-industrial period as well, has not changed so much since the coming of industry; mostly they have continued to live isolated in the gecekondu in Bağlık Mahallesi. Some of the Kurds who came to the region in the 1990s from Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Batman and Siirt have settled in the region where Roma lived.

As a result of the beginning of property developing in the 1990s and the construction boom experienced in the second half of the first decade of the 2000s, the gecekondu and small family apartments began to be replaced by big buildings with flats 20 to 50. Since the flats in the buildings produced by property developers were purchased by families from different backgrounds, the hemşehri clusters became dispersed to a great extent. In areas where gecekondu and family apartment buildings are relatively more common, relative predominance of certain hemşehri groups continues. However, at the present time, these areas constitute a small part of

the urban area in Çerkezköy district center. In the majority of the urban area, different hemşehri groups have been settled randomly.

In some streets where the buildings are collectively made by extended families, the same hemşehri groups have clustered in an apartman building. It is said that Alevi families from Varto have started buying lands and building apartments collectively in Çerkezköy. These buildings, constructed with a method called “cooperatives based on trust” by the people from Varto, are present in various quarters of Çerkezköy. A woman from Varto, with whom I conversed, said that they were inclined to build a shared apartment since they were worried that they would be excluded by Sunni majority due to their beliefs.

At the present time, a great majority of the buildings in Çerkezköy have been constructed by property developers and there is a heterogeneous settlement in these buildings. Özcan Cengiz, mukhtar of Fatih Mahallesi, remarks that in the apartment building, in which he resides, there are 26 flats and families from 16 provinces. This situation is valid in general for all the buildings constructed by the property developers.⁶⁸⁶ However, in Bağlık Mahallesi, where the number of storeys is limited to four, family apartments are more common than the buildings constructed by the property developers. Although in this quarter, which was zoned for housing in the 1990s, people from different provinces have settled, the people that know the quarter say that the Kurdish population predominates.

While the spatial distribution of different ethnic groups and hemşehri groups in recent years has become heterogeneous, spatial segregation based on class distinctions has become more apparent. The middle class has started to remove itself from the living spaces of the working class and the poor. Sections that earn high

⁶⁸⁶ Özcan Cengiz, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 20 December 2011.

incomes such as factory managers, property developers, big business owners, senior public officials and those professionally employed have started to reside in the luxury homes built in the regions recently zoned for housing. The first houses that appealed to the middle class were the Emlak Bankası Houses built in the Kartaltepe area.⁶⁸⁷ Subsequent to that, villa-type houses with gardens started to be constructed in the Ambardere area. In recent years, luxury housing estates, including villa-type detached houses and multi-storey buildings, have been built in the Kartaltepe area (Cumhuriyet Mahallesi), and more are being built. Çerkezköy Municipality describes this area as “the new face of Çerkezköy.”⁶⁸⁸

In the urban center, the rents are relatively high in the square, where the Municipality building is situated, and its immediate surroundings. However, this area is not separated from the neighborhoods where the workers, who constitute the majority of the population, live. The areas where the rents are lowest are the areas where the gecekondus are situated, and in these places the poorest people of Çerkezköy, the Roma, poor Kurds, and poor people from Black Sea region live.

Economic Differentiation between Immigrant Generations

Although the first generation of immigrants had some advantages compared to those who immigrated later, there were not large income disparities, as there were in İstanbul, between the generations of immigrants in Çerkezköy. The economic inequality occurred between the generations of immigrants in İstanbul has resulted from the largeness and dynamism of informal economy and informal housing.

⁶⁸⁷ As it has been mentioned in the previous chapters of this dissertation, Emlak housings, which appealed to the wealthy people in the beginning, have started to appeal to the lower classes as new luxurious housing estates have been built.

⁶⁸⁸ İnce, *Çerkezköy Bölgesel Gelişim Projesi*, p. 26.

However, in Çerkezköy, the labor market has been predominantly formal, except for the construction sector, and the informal housing market has remained quite restricted.

Nevertheless, these do not necessarily mean that there are no differences between the generations of immigrants. The most important advantage of the first comers is that they bought lands cheaply. The rapid increase in land prices made it difficult for those, who came later, to buy land in the district center. The last comers mostly have bought flats, instead of land, from property developers with bank credit.

Since a great majority of those who immigrated to Çerkezköy has worked as industrial workers, a large income gap between the generations has not occurred in terms of working life. The business area, in which significant income differentiation has emerged, is the construction sector. Some of the workers in this sector in time have started property development and have accumulated capital by employing their own relatives and hemşehris. Especially since 2004, a great number of property developers have appeared in the district and they have made great profits thanks to the dynamism of the housing market.

Consequently, among the first generation of immigrants, those who bought large amounts of land and those who turned to property developing in the construction sector have prospered. In terms of industrial workers, who constitute the great majority of the population, a large difference has not occurred between the generations.

Ethnic Tension

Although a great number of different cultural and ethnic groups live together in Çerkezköy, this has not been a source of conflict. I did not encounter any news on this subject when I scanned the archives of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*.⁶⁸⁹ Gökhan Babayiğit, who has been a journalist for eight years in Çerkezköy and also the editor in chief of *Manşet Gazetesi*, said that a clash among the different hemşehri groups has never occurred in the district center.⁶⁹⁰

However, that there is not an open clash does not mean that there are no prejudices, exclusionist discourses or practices among the groups. It is said that, when the immigration to Çerkezköy began, the local inhabitants, who became a minority, felt reaction against those who have come from outside. However, since immigrants soon outnumbered them and gained economic strength, this reaction has not been expressed. Remzi Garip, who is also an immigrant from Bulgaria, describes this situation as follows: “Natives of Çerkezköy have an air that is specific to them, showing that they are the natives, but they cannot say it out loud because they are economically exhausted. The outsiders have economically captured the market.”⁶⁹¹

Gökhan Babayiğit from *Manşet Gazetesi* states that the natives have tried to keep hold of certain symbolic areas against the outsiders. For example, they did not want the outsiders to be effective in Çerkezköy Sports Club and tried to manage the

⁶⁸⁹ Available online at <www.cerkezkoy.com.tr>.

⁶⁹⁰ Gökhan Babayiğit, interview by the author, tape recording, Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ, Türkiye, 12 January 2012.

⁶⁹¹ “Çerkezköy yerlisinin hala böyle bir havası vardır kendine göre, ben buranın yerlisiyim diye, ama artık yüksek sesle söyleyemiyorlar, çünkü ekonomik olarak bittiler, ekonomik olarak dışardan gelenler işe el koydu.” Garip, interview by the author.

club on their own, and that they endeavored not to lose being the aga [*ağa*] of oil wrestling, which is a tradition of Çerkezköy.⁶⁹²

Although the difference between the natives and the outsiders is not readily apparent due to the vast majority of the outsiders, it is seen that the difference of being a Thracian and an Anatolian is a more manifest discourse. It is said that the Thracians, including the immigrants from Bulgaria, regard those who have come from across the İstanbul Strait as “strangers,” and that those who have come from Anatolia consider Thracians, immigrants from Bulgaria being in the first place, “weak in terms of religious belief and morality.”⁶⁹³ These exclusionist discourses are not on a level that causes a separation of the living spaces in Çerkezköy district center. In Çerkezköy almost every part of society lives intermingled in the buildings constructed by the property developers. The fact that the living spaces of the groups are not separated prevents the exclusionist discourses produced in the daily life from becoming strict exclusionist practices.⁶⁹⁴

However, it should be indicated that the Roma are an exception in this respect. Exclusionist discourses, which have deep historical roots against them, continue together with strict exclusionist practices. Hikmet İşcan, mukhtar of Cumhuriyet Mahallesi remarks that in order to throw two Romany families out of an apartment building in Emlak Bankası Housings, from which they have bought flats, the neighbours had collected signatures and that these two families had had to return to the Çingene Mahallesi.⁶⁹⁵ İhsan Çamyar recounts that when he rented one of the

⁶⁹² Babayiğit, interview by the author.

⁶⁹³ Çamyar, interview by the author.

⁶⁹⁴ It is commonly mentioned that in Velimeşe village, on the border of Çerkezköy, of Çorlu and in Saray district of Tekirdağ, land was not sold to anyone except to Thracians and thus, immigration from outside was prevented. It is said that also in the villages of Çerkezköy which are relatively distant to the industrial zone; villagers did not take kindly to the arrival of outsiders.

⁶⁹⁵ İşcan, interview by the author.

flats in his apartment building in Yıldırım Beyazıt Mahallesi to a Roma tenant, the other tenant from the Black Sea region living in the other flat left the building in reaction to that.⁶⁹⁶ The Roma youth with whom I had the opportunity to talk in Çerkezköy stated that they had also been subject to discrimination while looking for jobs, and that some factories had not employed them since they are Roma. Although some of the Roma have more integrated into the social fabric at Çerkezköy by working at the factories as workers, a large part of them live isolated by the majority.

The situation of Kurds is different. Although some of the Kurds share similar life conditions with the Roma by settling in the gecekondus in Bağlık area, the majority of the Kurdish population is dispersed in each quarter of Çerkezköy. A significant number of Kurds work both in the factories and in the construction sector. They have reached a position in the local economy and social life and cannot be excluded easily.⁶⁹⁷ The strict exclusionist attitudes and lynching attempts against Kurds who immigrated to cities and towns in the West by the local populations in the early 2000s have not been observed in Çerkezköy. However, it is said that despite this, the nationalist and exclusionist discourse which has raised in the recent years in Turkey targeting Kurdish political movement and from place to place all the Kurds, has started to be felt in Çerkezköy, too.

I learned from the local administrators of Peace and Democracy Party (PDP, *Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi*) that a few small-scale attacks targeting the PDP's district organization, though not generally against the Kurdish population, have been made. The most recent one among these has been a group of twenty people's throwing stones at the windows of the PDP building and then running away, after the

⁶⁹⁶ Çamyar, interview by the author.

⁶⁹⁷ In spite of this, the Kurdish workers with whom I conversed in the Peace and Democracy Party district building, said that in some factories the personnel managers are retired soldiers and that these people do not want to employ Kurds.

funeral of a soldier, who has lost his life in the armed conflicts in the southeast region, in Çerkezköy.⁶⁹⁸

However, despite the deep-rooted prejudices and some exclusionist attitudes, a common reaction against Kurds reaching to the degree of violence, as has been the case in other cities and towns that have received Kurdish immigrants in Turkey, has not been an issue in Çerkezköy. Among the other groups there is no tension on this level as well.

This relatively “peaceful” atmosphere in Çerkezköy can be said to have a few reasons. First of all, since a great majority of the population earns their livings working in the industry, there is no fight for sharing resources which can intensify ethnic tensions. The unemployment rate, as discussed above, is below the national average. The labor force participation rate is also very much above the national average. In Çerkezköy, where the population participates in the working life at a rate much higher than the average in Turkey, the rate of people who have green cards,⁶⁹⁹ a symbol of poorness, to the population is also low. The total number of people who had green cards in December 2011 within the borders of Çerkezköy was 8284.⁷⁰⁰ This figure corresponds to 4.7 percent of the total population. The rate of people who have green cards in Turkey is 12.2 percent.⁷⁰¹ Although the working conditions have worsened due to the neoliberal adjustments in the early 2000s and salaries dropped to

⁶⁹⁸ *Çerkezköy Bakış*, 28 September 2012. Available online at <<http://www.cerkezkoybakis.com.tr/cerkezkoy/bdp-binasina-saldiri-h2808.html>>.

⁶⁹⁹ Green Card is given by the ministry of health in order to provide free health service to the citizens who have no social security and whose monthly income is less than one third of the minimum wage.

⁷⁰⁰ Çerkezköy District Governorate Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation (*Çerkezköy Kaymakamlığı Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Vakfı*)

⁷⁰¹ By December 2011 the population of Turkey was 74.72 million, and the number of people who had Green Cards was 9.14 million. *Dünya*, 24 December 2011; *Milliyet*, 1 January 2012; <<http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul>>.

the level of minimum wage except for certain sectors, being able to participate in working life has a relieving effect on social tensions.

My Kurdish interviewees, who are advocates of the PDP, while acknowledging that the job opportunities relieve the tensions, state that the main factor preventing the ethnic clash is the presence of a balance of power among the groups. They claim that the Kurds, the people from Black Sea region, the immigrants from Bulgaria and Thracians are in numbers that balance each other, and for this reason each group behaves toward others more cautiously.

Consequently, the opportunity of finding a job always even if at a low salary, that there is not a sharp spatial segregation except for Roma, and the power balance among the immigrant groups have prevented ethnic conflicts.

Being from Çerkezköy

In various publications about Çerkezköy, it is expressed that the population settled in Çerkezköy since the arrival of industry has not developed a sufficient consciousness of being from Çerkezköy. In the book *Çerkezköy 2023: Kent Vizyonu Çalışması* (Çerkezköy 2023: study on the vision of the city) prepared by Çerkezköy deputy mayor Gökhan İnce, it is said that

Among our citizens, who have migrated to our district from different regions of our country, the sensitivity of hemşehrilik is high. This sensitivity should be transformed into a form of being more adapted to Çerkezköy. Works should be started on a local scale so that non-governmental organizations support the issue of consciousness of being from Çerkezköy.⁷⁰²

⁷⁰² “Ülkemizin değişik yörelerinden ilçemize göç eden vatandaşlarımızın hemşehrilik hassasiyetleri yüksektir. Bu hassasiyetlerinin Çerkezköy’ü daha çok benimsemeye yönelik bir hale dönüştürülmesi gereklidir. Sivil toplum örgütlerinin Çerkezköylülük Bilinci konusunu desteklemesi için yerel ölçekte çalışmalar başlatılmalıdır.” İnce, *Çerkezköy 2023*, p. 129.

At the Values of Çerkezköy Symposium (*Çerkezköy Değerleri Sempozyumu*)

organized by Namık Kemal University, the same problem is expressed as follows:

Even though Çerkezköy district has an industrial zone which has become a brand on a national and international scale, it has turned out that its urban identity has not sufficiently developed since it received intensive immigration and that work in this field should be conducted immediately. Developing the social fabric, cultural exchange atmosphere and its level, has become a must. Spreading the consciousness of being from Çerkezköy among the young population will also contribute to the development of urban identity.⁷⁰³

Taha Aslanlı, a journalist from *Çerkezköy Haber* newspaper, in a presentation he made during the same symposium, questioned why the consciousness of being from Çerkezköy had not developed and claimed that especially the activities of fellow hemşehri associations pose an obstacle in that matter. Stating that those in the position of workers and tenants have developed less of an identity of being from Çerkezköy compared to tradesmen and property owners. He additionally stressed that the industrialists also “could not be from Çerkezköy,” except for Halit Narin.⁷⁰⁴

In addition to the resources above, most of my interviewees also mentioned that those who have immigrated have continued to identify themselves by the places they have come from. In this sense, it cannot be said that those immigrated to Çerkezköy after the coming of industry have constituted a common local identity.

When Çerkezköy started to intensively receive immigration, it was a village settlement that had no physical or social infrastructure. There was not a good life

⁷⁰³ “Çerkezköy ilçesi, ulusal ve uluslararası ölçekte marka olmuş bir sanayi bölgesine sahip olmakla birlikte, yoğun göç alması nedeniyle kent kimliğinin yeterince gelişmemiş olduğu ve bu alanda ivedilikle çalışmaların yapılması gerekli olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Sosyal dokuyu ve kültürel alışveriş ortamını ve düzeyini geliştirmek bir zorunluluk olmuştur. Genç nüfus arasında Çerkezköylülük bilincinin yaygınlaştırılması da kent kimliğinin gelişmesine katkı sağlayacaktır.” “Sempozyum Sonuç Bildirgesi” (Final declaration of the symposium), in H. Ziya Özek and Ali Maralcan, *Çerkezköy Değerleri Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı* (Tekirdağ: Namık Kemal University, 2010), pp. 217-218.

⁷⁰⁴ Taha Aslanlı, “Neden Çerkezköylü Olamıyoruz?” (Why we cannot be from Çerkezköy?), in H. Ziya Özek and Ali Maralcan, *Çerkezköy Değerleri Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı* (Tekirdağ: Namık Kemal University, 2010), pp. 168-170.

standard or a developed urban culture that would enable the newcomers to identify themselves with Çerkezköy. There was no reason for the immigrants, who settled in Çerkezköy via a hemşehri network, who lived in bad gecekondu, and most of whom worked for the minimum wage and in shifts, to develop a sense of belonging to a town where there were scarcely any social activities or entertainment culture, where the standard of the urban infrastructure and public services were low and where environmental pollution was felt more and more.

It is observed that this situation did not change much also in the first decade of the 2000s when the urban infrastructure and public services at Çerkezköy were developed and the face of Çerkezköy changed with the new buildings. Unionist İhsan Çamyar summarizes the relation of immigrants, who settled in the area after the coming of industry, to Çerkezköy as such: “Nobody is adapted to Çerkezköy, but also they cannot do without Çerkezköy.”⁷⁰⁵

I think that the main reason why those who have settled via migration do not feel that they belong to Çerkezköy is the lack of areas of social life which would create the sense of locality and the lack of time necessary for social life. The fact that the spaces for social life in Çerkezköy are scarce is an issue on which almost everyone agreed. The only movie house in the district is in a shopping center constructed a few years ago, there is not a cultural center, and there are scarcely any public entertainment venues. The wealthy parts of Çerkezköy fulfill their social and cultural needs in İstanbul, Silivri, or Çorlu. As for the workers and small retailers, they do not have any time for social life. As a result of the neoliberal regulations made in the working life in the early 2000s, in most factories working twelve hours a day has become almost a rule. Since it is not possible to subsist on the minimum

⁷⁰⁵ Çamyar, interview by the author.

wage, most of the time the workers themselves want to work overtime in order to increase their monthly income. Besides, since almost all the enterprises work in two or three shifts, friends, close relatives, and even spouses spending time together becomes difficult.

In most workplaces, leave days are allowed on any day in a week, unlike only on Saturday and Sunday which was the case in the past. Under these conditions, workers' participating in any social activity and identifying with the place where they live does not seem possible in any case. A worker with I interviewed described the situation as such: "Most workers work twelve hours a day, there is no social life, no social circle (...) The shift system is wearing since it leaves one sleepless at night, people wander like souls, you salute a man but he does not salute you in return." The only social spaces for men that have time are coffee shops mostly opened as a club of a hemşehri association. There is no social space where women can spend time together. Cafes that appeal to students have started to be opened in the recent years.

Although the municipal management frequently voices the discourse of "developing the consciousness of being from Çerkezköy", in reality, the political process itself reproduces and reinforces the present hemşehri identities. Hemşehri associations most of which were opened in the first decade of the 2000s are regarded by the political parties as places to canvass during local elections. Association managers generally bargain to be elected to the municipal council in return for directing the votes of their hemşehris as a block to a party. As long as local politics mostly continue via hemşehri associations, the discourse of the Municipality to develop a consciousness of being from Çerkezköy will amount to nothing, and even, it will fail just because of those that express this discourse.

Conclusion

In the forty-year period that has passed from 1972 to the present time, Çerkezköy has been transformed from a small railway town into an industrial city. Its district center and the four villages around the industrial zone have experienced rapid population growth in this process and new urban areas have emerged other than the district center. As a result of the population growth, municipal organizations have been established in Kapaklı, Kızılpınar, Veliköy, and Karaağaç villages. These villages, which have become independent municipalities, have gained the powers to approve zoning plans and they have developed growth strategies in their own ways. While Kapaklı and Kızılpınar have grown with rapid, unplanned housing production, in Veliköy and Karaağaç new industrial areas have emerged. In this process, the main actors of the urban growth in the recently emerging towns have been mayors and municipal councils in which there are the leading tradesmen, real estate agents and property developers. Today, debates on rearranging these urban areas, where approximately 170,000 people live, in terms of administration continue. While Çerkezköy municipality claims that all the urban areas should be gathered under the roof of one municipality, the towns aim to become districts.

Industrialization and the population growth it brought about have accelerated the development of the local economy. This development gained an institutional quality with the establishment of the ÇCCI. It is also observed that in this process, Çerkezköy has started competing against Çorlu, which is 24 km away and which contains a bigger local economic potential. The initiative led by the local union branch in 1985 to have a SII hospital built in Çerkezköy instead of Çorlu, and Çorlu's efforts to prevent the building of the E-80 linkage road to Çerkezköy and the

establishment of the ÇCCI can be given as examples of this rivalry. Even at the beginning of 1980, the owner of *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, Sabri Avcılar, was writing that Çerkezköy, which had become an industrial town, had to put an end to being dependent on Çorlu by accelerating its urban development.⁷⁰⁶

The fact that Sabri Avcılar, owner of the only local newspaper in that period, led the establishment of the ÇCCI, which brought together the representatives of the local economy developing in Çerkezköy and the industrialists, affirms one determination of Molotch about growth coalitions. Molotch states that local newspaper owners generally function as unifiers in growth coalitions and that they play the role of spokespeople. While the local property owners debate the growth direction of the city, this debate is irrelevant to the local newspaper owners and firms that provide public services; what is important to them is the total growth of the city. In Çerkezköy as well, the local newspaper owner led the establishment of the ÇCCI, which was an important step in the economic development of the district, and then his son Zafer Avcılar, taking over the newspaper, has been the president of the council of the ÇCCI for ten years.

Although industrialization started in Çerkezköy in 1972 and since then intensive population growth has been experienced in the district, infrastructure services such as sewer, asphaltting the roads, water supply, and social services such as a hospital and a school in the district center only started to be developed in the 1990s. Urban development has lagged behind the industrial development. The primary reason for this is that though state resources have been used extensively for the establishment of the industrial infrastructure, urbanization to a great extent has been left to the market and to the local resources. As with most Third World

⁷⁰⁶ Sabri Avcılar “Çorlunun Kenar Mahallesi Olmaktan Çıkmalıyız” (We should stop being the slum of Çorlu), *Çerkezköy Gazetesi*, 14 January 1980.

countries, in Turkey as well, public resources have been allocated to industrialization, which is regarded as the main engine of development, while the regulation of urban growth triggered by industrialization has been ignored. While at the present time the ÇOIZ is exemplified to the other OIZs in Turkey as one of the OIZs with the strongest infrastructure, Çerkezköy, from the 1970s until now has continued to make an effort to realize its dream of becoming an “exemplary industrial city.”

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Çerkezköy, a small town in Tekirdağ province which neighbours İstanbul on the west side, became an industrial city in the 1970s by growing rapidly as a result of socio-economic processes at the global, national, regional and local levels and the spatial strategies of different actors in these processes. The global context of Çerkezköy's industrialization is the process of the shift of low-tech, labour-intensive and environmentally hazardous manufacturing sectors from advanced capitalist countries to Third World countries, including Turkey, after the Second World War. This process accelerated in the 1970s when the international capitalist economy was restructured.

The manufacturing investments made in the Third World countries that industrialized in this period were concentrated in cities which were the biggest commercial centers of these countries. These cities grew rapidly in the 1970s as a result of the investments and confronted big problems caused by the excessive concentration of industry and population, and started to decentralize manufacturing industry to the surrounding districts and provinces. Thus, in the immediate periphery of the huge industrial cities of the Third World, new industrial towns and cities emerged.

In Turkey as well, import-substitution industrialization, which started in the 1950s, was concentrated in İstanbul, the biggest commercial center of the country. Industry, which was located in the urban center at first, from the second half of the

1960s onwards, started to decentralize towards the east and west (and partly towards the north) along the D-100 highway, which was the main transport axis of İstanbul. Congestion and increasing land prices in the urban center made it difficult for the factories to expand, and industrialists tried to avoid the regulations of İstanbul Municipality by moving their operations to villages close to the D-100, in the form of expanding rings. While this movement started by the industrialists out of technical and economic necessities was ongoing, state agencies were also taking steps to decentralize İstanbul industry in order to prevent the economic and social problems caused by excessive concentration. Since municipalities had limited powers in that period, new industrial areas were determined by the central government, with decisions made by the SPO, the Ministry of Industry, and the Ministry of Development and Housing. In the shaping of İstanbul's industrial geography, the location choices made by industrialists according to their own economic logic generally were more effective than the plans made by ministries. In most cases the locations where the industry de facto went, were later on included in plans as industrial areas.

Çerkezköy, 110 km away from İstanbul and 28 km away from D-100 highway, drew the attention of industrialists in İstanbul once it was included in the scope of the Priority Areas for Development. In the Government Program of 1972 prepared by the SPO, a few provinces and districts close to İstanbul were included in the status of PAD for the purpose of decentralization of industry. The most important advantages provided by the status of PAD were a 50 percent investment allowance and customs exemption. If it is considered that all machine goods were bought from abroad, the importance of the customs exemption can be better appreciated. In

addition, incentives certificates, obtained for the investments in PADs, made it easier to obtain credit from banks, which was an important advantage for industrialists.

When Çerkezköy was shown as a target to industrialists with the incentives of PAD in 1972, it was a time when the conditions for new investments were quite favourable in Turkey. The financial crisis of 1970 had been overcome with IMF support and remittances sent by the Turkish workers in Germany; the youth and workers' movements that had radicalized in the late 1960s had been suppressed with the martial law proclaimed in 1971 and workers' wages had stopped increasing. The second Nihat Erim government, formed after the dissolution of the government of technocrats at the end of 1971, increased the distribution of incentives; and obtaining medium-term and long-term credit from national and international financial institutions became easier.

As a result of all these factors, a boom was experienced in manufacturing sector investments in 1972. Most of these investments received incentives from the state and borrowed heavily from banks. They were large-scale investments because the governments of the period were thinking that the agreement which required the removal of customs wall between the EEC and Turkey by degrees would come into force in 1973; therefore, they were hoping to create industrial establishments that would reach a scale and level of efficiency that would withstand international competition. The investment boom in 1972 increased the need for large areas where production units could be established. Just at such a time, Çerkezköy, which was included in the scope of PAD and which was the closest PAD to İstanbul, drew the attention of industrialists in İstanbul.

Çerkezköy became a center of attraction for industry as a result of the decisions, unintentionally supporting each other, of two opposing political tendencies

in the state. The SPO, representing the bureaucratic tendency in the state, in the Government Program of 1972 which it prepared in 1971, pointed to Çerkezköy as a target location for İstanbul industry via regional incentives. After the government of technocrats, in which the bureaucrats who approved the Program of 1972 were the majority, was dissolved in December 1971, coalition governments formed in 1972 and 1973 (the Second Erim, Melen and Talu governments) followed a much more liberal policy in distributing incentives. A boom was experienced in the number of investments to which incentives were given in these years when deputies from the JP held the office of Ministry of Industry. The generosity in the distribution of incentives prompted businessmen to turn to new industrial investments and to urgently search for space for these mostly large-scale industrial investments. In their search for space, Çerkezköy, designated as a target location for the decentralization of industry by the statist bureaucracy, became an option. Thus, decisions made by two different political tendencies in accordance with their own priorities complemented each other and formed the objective ground for industrialists' choosing to locate in Çerkezköy.

However, the formation of this objective ground (the presence of an incentive area neighbouring İstanbul and the industrialists' search for space which became urgent) did not mean that the industrialists would automatically choose to locate in Çerkezköy. Thus, in the first three months after the district was included in the scope of PAD, no investment was directed to Çerkezköy. Probably in this process some industrialists checked Çerkezköy and, due to the inadequacy of infrastructure such as roads, electricity, and water, did not embark on any enterprises.

In triggering the industrial rush to Çerkezköy, developments on the local scale and personal networks played a role. Halit Narin, who first invested in the

district, purchased land from Çerkezköy via architect Sadık Sever, whom Narin knew from İstanbul and who was the former director of development and a member of the İstanbul municipal council from the JP. Sever, on behalf of the Narin Group, bought a plot of land approximately 100 hectares from the Çerkezköy municipality and villagers. In this process, the sale of land belonging to the municipality for one lira per square meter and the municipality's mediation between the villagers and the industrialists smoothed and accelerated the transaction. It is understood that the efforts of Mayor Hikmet Uğraş to persuade industrialists in İstanbul to invest in the district by negotiating with them were also effective in overcoming industrialists' reservations about Çerkezköy. In addition, the ambiguity of land titles in Çerkezköy made it possible for industrialists to obtain large amounts of lands in a short time and very cheaply. The villagers who did not have titles to the lands they had possessed and cultivated for decades wanted to sell their lands at once since they were worried that these lands would be confiscated or else the previous owners or relatives would stake a claim on their lands. These supportive local conditions, together with the objective conditions mentioned above, caused a land rush of industrialists to Çerkezköy in the spring and summer of 1972.

In 1972, more than 400 hectares were purchased in order to establish industrial facilities and in a couple of years thirteen industrial enterprises were operating in Çerkezköy. Although all the boundaries of Çerkezköy district were in the status of PAD, Çerkezköy municipality prevented dispersed industrial settlement by including all the villages within the borders of the municipal adjacent area in 1972. Thus industrialists had to buy lands from an area of approximately 1400 hectares determined by the municipality. In the same year, in order to prevent the increase in land prices and speculation, the Land Office, affiliated with the Ministry

of Development and Housing, confiscated 600 hectares to offer to industrialists for the construction of mass housing. The Minister of Development and Housing of the period, Turgut Toker from the JP, had determined Çerkezköy as the new center where İstanbul industry was being relocated, and had decided on this confiscation. Çerkezköy was one of the few areas where the Land Office carried out such confiscations for the sake of industrial development in the 1970s.

The compact settlement of industry and the Land Office's buying lands were two critical steps that would shape the development of Çerkezköy in the future years. In 1973, one more step was added to these and a decision to establish an OIZ in Çerkezköy was taken, just a week before the dissolution of the Melen government. However, according to the OIZ Regulations of the Ministry of Industry, in order to establish an OIZ in a region, a local chamber of commerce and industry and local entrepreneurs searching for a space for their investments had to be present. As there did not exist a chamber of commerce and industry and as all the industrialists that wanted to invest in the region had already bought large amounts of land in Çerkezköy, the conditions to establish an OIZ were not present. Hence, after the change of government, no steps were taken for the establishment of OIZ.

While the construction of factories continued, Çerkezköy Municipality and Tekirdağ deputies made attempts in Ankara to solve the basic infrastructure problems of the district such as electricity, water and transportation. However, these attempts did not yield much result. Especially the insufficiency of water resources had led to the view that Çerkezköy was not a suitable place for industrial investments to be expressed in the media. Owners of enterprises, who did not have any coordination among them at first, came together and established the Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association in October 1973 due to these urgent problems. The ÇIA started to

negotiate with politicians and state institutions at various levels for the urgent establishment of the infrastructure by the government, which would enable the huge industrial facilities that were being constructed to operate efficiently.

As a result of these negotiations, the industrialists decided in 1974 that the big infrastructure problems at Çerkezköy could only be solved by establishing an OIZ. With the idea that they also would benefit from the infrastructure that the Ministry of Industry would build for the OIZ, they launched their initiative. In order to do this, by making the necessary changes in the OIZ Regulations, it was provided that industrialists' associations could take active part in the establishment of OIZ. Accordingly, the ÇIA formed the ÇOIZEEC together with Çerkezköy Municipality and Tekirdağ governorate as mentioned in the Regulations. The ÇOIZEEC purchased 450 hectares of land that had been confiscated in 1972 by the Land Office for industrial settlement with credit it received from the Ministry of Industry, and the project was launched.

This enterprise, embarked upon by the industrialists with the aim of solving their infrastructure problems with public resources, was a vital step for Çerkezköy's future development. If they had not embarked upon this enterprise due to compelling conditions, Çerkezköy would have remained an industrial area limited to the first factories built because after the status of PAD was removed, Çerkezköy's attractiveness decreased to a great extent. Çorlu, which was on D-100 highway and where the ground waters were closer to the surface, was a more favourable area for industrialists.

The ÇIA, besides starting the enterprise of establishing an OIZ, provided the establishment of a customs office in Çerkezköy. It also obtained the necessary permissions from the relevant state agencies to dig deep wells to access ground

water, the development of communications and electricity infrastructures, and also making the connection with İstanbul via electric train. It also worked to get the E-80 Motorway, which was yet in project phase, to pass close to Çerkezköy.

While the infrastructure problems were thus solved, the labour problem was solved by carrying workers from villages by shuttle buses. In order to be able to keep the managers and technical staff at Çerkezköy, lodgings were built next to the factories and these people were given higher salaries compared to İstanbul. However, unskilled labour, constituting the great majority of the employment, was generally paid the minimum wage and was made to work for lower compensation than in İstanbul. Besides, industrialists in Çerkezköy were able to establish a control mechanism over workers that would be envied by the industrialists in İstanbul thanks to both the cooperation of local security forces and the strong employers' organization. Additionally, the fact that most of the workers were not separated from their agricultural land had the effect of decreasing labor radicalism.

From 1984, when the infrastructure of the OIZ was completed to a great extent, the ÇIA, on behalf of the ÇOIZEEC, started to concentrate on promotional activities in order to attract industrialists in İstanbul to Çerkezköy. Moreover, in the same year the government, by suggesting to the industrialists removed from Haliç relocate in the ÇOIZ along with the OIZs in Gebze and Bilecik, announced that easy credit would be offered to the enterprises that went to these OIZs. As a result of these developments, in 1985 and 1986 intensive land sales took place and the first industrial enterprises started to be built in the ÇOIZ. When the MP government in 1988 provided special incentives to those industrialists who chose to locate in the OIZs, the construction of factories in the ÇOIZ greatly accelerated. Especially firms in textile finishing sector, which were forbidden to operate in İstanbul, turned to the

ÇOIZ, where a treatment plant was being built. In the 1990s, the ÇOIZ also started to draw the attention of foreign firms that wanted to invest in Turkey and by 1997 eight foreign firms were located there.

While the first influx of industry to Çerkezköy took place during the import-substitution industrialization period, the second influx of industry started in the 1980s when the Turkish economy entered into a restructuring compatible with the globalization process. The determining factor that attracted İstanbul industry to Çerkezköy in 1972 was the incentives of PAD given to Çerkezköy. As for the second wave of industry that started in the 1980s, the incentives provided for the OIZs and the presence of a ready infrastructure was effective.

While the first settlement had been realized by large-scale enterprises, in the 1980s when the necessary infrastructure had already been built, small and medium-sized firms also started to locate in Çerkezköy. If we look at this from the perspective of factors that pushed industry from İstanbul, there was no opportunity to expand in the urban center in the beginning of the 1970s, and by the 1980s the regulations of İstanbul municipality, the powers of which increased further, were determining factors. Especially the industries that consumed too much water or posed pollution risks were removed outside the city at the end of the 1980s.

When special incentives were provided in 1988 to enterprises that chose to move to the OIZs, the first wave of industrialists who established the ÇOIZ, in order to benefit from these incentives, decided to have the municipal industrial area of almost 800 hectares, where they were situated, also included in the scope of the OIZ. As a result of the attempts of the ÇIA, the land where the first wave industrialists had built was declared “The ÇOIZ Expansion Area” by the Ministry of Industry in 1990. Thus, the first wave industrialists also started to benefit from the incentives granted

to the OIZ. With the addition of this area, which would be integrated with the existing OIZ in the future, the surface area of the ÇOIZ reached 1234 hectares.

Thanks to all these advantages the ÇIA secured, with the support of the municipality and the governorate, Çerkezköy became one of the largest industrial zones in Turkey. Çerkezköy, which had been a small town, engaged in agriculture and stock breeding in 1972, became an industrial zone where more than a hundred enterprises operated and almost 18,000 workers were employed in the mid-1990s.

While the industrial space in Çerkezköy thus emerged and developed, the formation of the living space of the population, which rapidly increased due to the immigration brought about by the industry, took place in a more uneasy and longer process. When Çerkezköy Municipality, whose mayor was Hikmet Uğraş, declared the entire Çerkezköy district a “municipal adjacent area” in 1972, it had aimed to prevent not only the dispersed industrial settlement but also irregular urbanization. However, it was not as successful in the latter as it was in the former. A new zoning plan, the preparations of which had started in 1974 anticipating a population of a 100,000, was only completed in 1980; and the implementation of the plan, which started in 1982, continued until 1986. In this process, the housing needs of the people who immigrated to Çerkezköy in order to work in the factories and in the developing local economy became a big problem. Some of them, coming mostly from Thrace including Bulgaria, the mid-Black Sea Region, eastern Anatolia and İstanbul, settled as tenants in jerry-built shacks, which had been used as stable or hayloft by the people of Çerkezköy, or in family apartment buildings built from the 1970s. The other part, on the other hand, by purchasing land from planned or unplanned areas or occupying public land, which was a small amount in Çerkezköy, built gecekondus with the assistance of their relatives. Members of the JP, who dominated the

municipality of the district center from 1973 to 1989 except for the four-year interruption during the military regime, generally overlooked illegal housing construction for the purpose of gaining economic or political benefits. After 1989, when Hikmet Uğraş from the RPP was elected mayor again, a strict attitude was adopted in this respect. Upon the inclusion of the existing gecekondu in the unplanned area in the zoning plan, illegal housing construction was brought to an end.

Nevertheless, legal housing production was far behind the amount needed. The most important development in housing production in the 1990s was Emlak Bankası building a total of 3000 apartments as mass housing in three areas in Çerkezköy as a result of the joint attempt of municipality, governorate, and the ÇIA. However, these apartments, because of their high prices and monthly dues, were purchased by factory managers or wealthy people of Çerkezköy rather than the workers.

That a solution was not generated for the housing problem in Çerkezköy center led some of the population flowing into the district to settle in the villages around the industrial zone. Land prices in the villages were lower than they were in the district center and the municipality's control over the construction of buildings was less strict. The villages, which gained the status of independent municipalities as a result of the population growth, obtained the authority to make and change their own zoning plans as they wished. While Çerkezköy district center, despite some revisions, generally stuck to the zoning plan, in the villages that became independent municipalities, legal (zoned) but irregular and unhealthy housing projects were common.

Çerkezköy Municipality, upon the emergence of the new independent municipalities that competed with it, made adjustments in the zoning plan at various times in order to boost the construction market in the district center. Land owners and property developers were encouraged to produce housing by allowing the construction of taller buildings. The boost experienced in housing production through these revisions has continued until the present time except for a temporary stagnation between the years of 1999 and 2004. Especially since 2004, a great boom in construction also has been experienced simultaneously with the boom in the construction sector throughout Turkey. In this period, five and six-storey apartment buildings and housing estates appealing mostly to the middle classes were constructed.

The development of the urban infrastructure and public services at Çerkezköy also was provided with delay. The basic needs of urban life such as the construction of the water and sewer system that included the whole district center, asphaltting the main roads and streets, and improving the education and health services were only realized in the 1990s. Spaces designated as service areas required for the development of cultural and social life remain limited even today.

The main reason why urban development fell behind industrialization was that state resources, generously transferred for providing the necessary infrastructure and services for industry, were not offered with the same generosity when it came to improving the life quality of those living in Çerkezköy. While urban infrastructure and social services were provided with delay, housing production was completely left to the market. In Çerkezköy, where the local economy was weak and the resources of the local government were extremely limited, providing housing for thousands of workers could only be undertaken by the industrialists' or the state's

public housing agency. However, the industrialists were satisfied with building lodgings for skilled labour and the state produced housing in Çerkezköy as a market actor through Emlak Bankası.

Transferring public resources to industry, regarded as the primary way of development, and abandoning urbanization to the market has been the state's policy in Turkey, is the case in most Third World countries. In this respect, Çerkezköy is not exceptional. However, what portion of the state resources allocated to industry would be given to which town is related to local developments. Çerkezköy mayor Hikmet Uğraş's effort to attract public resources and the private sector to Çerkezköy is an example of local boosterism mentioned in local entrepreneurialism literature. The initiative of the municipality, especially after the district was given the status of PAD in 1972, was effective in private industry's turning to Çerkezköy, especially due to the provision of cheap and large tracts of land to industrialists.

After industry was located in Çerkezköy, the main actor of local entrepreneurialism was the industrialists' organization, the ÇIA. The Çerkezköy industrialists, who were well organized as a result of compelling conditions and with the advantage of being clustered in the same zone, have been more successful than their cohorts in other regions in attracting public resources to their locality through the ÇIA. Although the regulating and supportive policy of the central state institutions and the local government played an important role in the success of Çerkezköy in industrialization, the main agent that provided the continuity of development is the ÇIA. State institutions sometimes exhibited conflicting attitudes about the district, the efforts of the local government varied according to the municipal administration elected but the industrialists, as the main agents of the

process, consistently tried hard to attract more public resources to the Çerkezköy Industrial Zone.

As discussed in Chapter Two, even though Molotch's Growth Machine theory assumes that local units of multi-locational firms whose headquarters are outside will not be interested in local development, the example of Ventura town analyzed by Michael Adamson showed that the firms investing in the region from outside would be interested closely in the local development in the case of their investments' being large and long term. This situation is also valid for Çerkezköy. That the first investments made in Çerkezköy were very large and permanent, and that these firms were buying large amounts of lands at the same time, made these firms act as "locals." This could only be possible with the solving of the infrastructure problems of Çerkezköy so that the factories could operate efficiently and that the large lands they bought could gain value. If the first investments had been small-scale and short term, probably a growth coalition like the ÇIA would not have emerged.

As a result of the association's forming the ÇOIZEEC with the Tekirdağ Governorate and Çerkezköy Municipality so as to be able to establish an OIZ later on, the central and local government representatives institutionally took part in this growth coalition. This coalition, constituted by the private sector and public institutions, ensured that the growth policies were sustained effectively. For example, in the building of the Emlak Bankası project involving 3000 flats, first the governor stepped in, and then board of directors of the ÇIA and the mayor together enabled the building of housings by negotiating with the director of Emlak Bankası.

Although it did not take part in this coalition institutionally, another agent in growth policies was TEKSİF union, affiliated with the CTTU. Chapter Four

discussed how Şevket Yılmaz, the former president of TEKSİF and deputy of the JP in 1973, made a speech in the Parliament that suggested that the state resources should be mobilized for the district to become an exemplary industrial city. The fact that especially after the 1980 military coup TEKSİF, which became the only union in the region due the closing down of the CPTU, reached 6000 members caused it to focus more on the local issues, like lobbying for establishment of a SII hospital at Çerkezköy instead of Çorlu.

While the function and importance of the ÇIA decreased after the second half of the 1990s, when the infrastructure of the ÇOIZ was completed, the ÇCCI, which had been recently established and which brought the industrialists and the local tradesmen together within its body, started to become the new center of local entrepreneurialism. The establishment of the ÇCCI can be evaluated as the first step of Çerkezköy's moving beyond being a classical satellite zone. Although the headquarters of most of the firms in the region are still in İstanbul, the establishment of the chamber prepared the conditions for the industrial zone to develop closer relations with the local economy.

The example of Çerkezköy demonstrates how the success of local growth coalitions in Turkey depends on the connections they make with the government in Ankara and the central state bureaucracy. Since the powers and the resources of local governments are relatively limited, the competition among localities takes place to a great extent via Ankara. The connections made with the officials of the ruling party, and a systematic lobbying activity to influence the bureaucracy, seem to be the principle ways to attract public resources.

Lastly, it should be remarked that the gains obtained and the price paid as a result of local growth are distributed very unevenly. The heavy price of the rapid

industrial and urban growth in Çerkezköy has been the depletion of the ground water resources and intensive environmental pollution. While this price is paid by those living in Çerkezköy, the firm owners and executives who make the real profit from the growth reside outside Çerkezköy. What kind of an effect this environmental pollution, overlooked by state agencies so that industrial manufacturing is not interrupted, has on the health of inhabitants of Çerkezköy is an issue that has not yet been studied.

More extensive research on Çerkezköy, where nature, urban space and social life is rapidly transforming, is required. In this dissertation, I focused on the development of industrial and urban space and the agents of this process. Among these agents, I concentrated mainly on industrialists, central state institutions, and the local authorities. How the workers experienced the same process and their relations with the space remains an area to be studied further. This study can serve as a basis for future research that may focus on the experiences of workers.

APPENDIXES

Appendix A Original Texts

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1971 yılı başlarından yıl sonuna kadar teşvik tedbirleri uygulamasında bir duraklama olmuş ve bu durum, yatırımları da olumsuz yönde etkilemiştir.

1972 yılı başında Teşvik ve Uygulama Dairesi'nin önemli bir kısmı Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığına bağlanmıştır. Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığınca uygulamaya konulan çeşitli kararname ve bildirimlerle 1972 yılında teşvik tedbirlerine dinamizm getirilmiş ve bunun sonucunda yatırım yapma hevesi gittikçe artan bir tempoda gelişmiştir. Özet bir deyimle yatırımlar bakımından 1972 yılı bir sıçrama yılı olarak nitelenebilir.

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Hatırlanacağı gibi, odamızın yöneticileri yeni yılda tüm müteşebbis ve sanayicilere çağrıda bulunarak 1972'nin özel sektörün sınav yılı olduğunu hatırlatmış ve sanayicileri yatırıma davet etmiştir. Bugün sanayicilerimiz projeleri ellerinde başvuracak makam ve teşvik düzeni aramaktadır.

Endüstri yatırımları bütün dünyada çeşitli tedbirlerle teşvik edilir. Teşvik müteşebbise hediye, bahşiş, ulufe vermek değildir. Ve teşvikleri uygulamak hükümetin inisiyatifine kalmış bir lütuf ve ihsan da değildir, görevdir. Bu yapılmazsa kimse ekonomik çabaların en yıpratıcısı olan endüstriye girmez. (...)

Sonuç olarak, 1972 yılı için olumlu ve yapıcı tutumlarını sürdüren sanayiciler, yatırımları ve ihracatı hızlandıracak, ekonomiye canlılık getirecek tedbirlerin derhal alınmasını beklemektedir.

118

1971 yılında oluşan toplum olayları ve özellikle özel sektör yatırımlarının gelişmesine kuvvetli etkisi olan teşvik tedbirlerinin durdurulması 1971 yılının önemli bir kısmında bu sektördeki yatırım teşebbüslerinde de bir yavaşlama ve duraklama meydana getirmiştir. (...)

Dolar rezervlerinin 1970'ten itibaren önemli bir yükselme göstermesi ve oldukça yüksek bir düzeye ulaşması 1972 yılında ithalat olanağını önemli biçimde kuvvetlendirebilecektir. (...)

1971 yılında yatırımlarda yavaşlama ve belirli konularda duraklama gösteren özel sektörün 1972 yılı içersinde yatırımlarını geliştirmesi ve plan hedeflerinde öngörülen düzeye çıkarabilmesinde ise en etkili tedbirin 'teşvik tedbirleri' uygulamasının yeniden ele alınması olacağı kanısındayız.

125

Büyük şehir bölgeleri (Metropolitan bölge): Nüfusun ve iktisadi çalışmaların aşırı derecede toplandığı ve bunun sonucu olarak bir çok sosyal, iktisadi ve fizikî meseleleri olan büyük şehir bölgelerimizle ilgili çalışmalar, bölge politikasının bir başka yönüdür. Bu bölgelerin dolaylarında yeni çekim ve büyüme merkezleri, sanayi yaratarak nüfusun ve iktisadi çalışmaların daha dengeli bir şekilde dağıtımını sağlayacak araçlar araştırılmalıdır.

128

Ön koşulları hazırlamadan başlatılan az gelişmiş yörelerdeki yatırımları özendirme uygulaması, var olan alt yapının ve hizmetlerin yoğunlaştığı belli noktalarda ortaya çıkan dışsal tasarrufları tartacak ölçüde avantajlar sağlayamadığı için etkisiz kalmıştır. Yatırım indirimi isteklerinin yersel dağılımında, Eylül 1967 - Ekim 1970 arasındaki toplam 742 toprak isteminin 482 sinin ve toplam 13 milyar TL. lık yatırımın 8,5 milyar TL . lık kısmının (Yüzde 61,5) Marmara Bölgesinden geldiği görülmektedir.

132

Şehirlerin yakın çevrelerinde belirli bir düzen içinde kurulamayan sanayi birimleri, rasyonel olmayan arazi kullanımına ve spekülatif hareketlere yol açmakta, böylece kaynak kaybına neden olmaktadır. Sanayinin belirli merkezlerde yoğunlaşması, ilerideki dönemlerde daha büyük sorunlara yol açacak; sanayinin yurt düzeyinde dağıtılması gereğini şiddetle hissettirebilecektir. Bu gelişime topluma, bugün bunları planlı biçimde gerçekleştirmekten çok daha pahalıya mal olabilecektir.

134

Askerler sadece Doğu'yu düşünüyorlardı, ama biz Anadolu ve Trakya'nın çeşitli yerlerinde cazibe merkezleri yaratmak gerektiğini düşündük. ... Askerlerin önerisi ile Doğu'ya gittik, önce il bazında araştırmalar yaptık, sonra "neden ilçe bazına inmiyoruz" dedik. Amacımız cazibe merkezleri (growth centers) yaratmaktı. Aynı ihtiyacın Türkiye'nin diğer bölgelerinde de gerekli olduğunu düşünüyorduk. Belli merkezlerde biriken sanayiye desantralize etmek gerekiyordu. Bu amaçla birçok cazibe merkezi belirledik. Bunlardan içinden Bozüyük ve Çerkezköy başarılı oldu. Çerkezköy hem Tekirdağ'ın en fakir bölgesiydi hem de cazibe merkezi olarak geliştirilmeye uygundu, altyapısı kolayca sağlanabilirdi. Bilecik, Çanakkale, Konya'nın kimi ilçeleri cazibe merkezleri yaratmak için listeye konuldu.

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Türkiye'deki teşvik uygulama sistemi, hakikaten epeyce önemli işler yapmıştır. Neler yapmıştır, bakın: İstanbul gelişmiş bir bölge idi, Türkiye çok iyi bir uygulama yaptı. O uygulamayla, mesela Çerkezköy'ü, kalkınmada öncelikli, o zamanki ismiyle "gerice yöre" kabul etmek suretiyle İstanbul'un ağırlığını Çerkezköy tarafına çekti. Başka bir hadise: Mesela Bozüyük'ü alalım; Bozüyük de -başka yerdeki kalkınmada öncelikli yöre sayılması hesabıyla orası da- başka yerlerdeki sanayileşme cazibesini kendi üzerine çekti. Bu suretle ne oldu; Türkiye'de daha dengeli bölgesel bir kalkınmanın esası getirildi ve bunda da muvaffak olundu.

(...) geçmişte bizim bir uygulamamız vardı, o uygulama, ilçe bazında teşvikler idi. Bu suretle, teşvikleri belli yerlere toplama yerine, biraz evvel misalini vermiş olduğum Bozüyük gibi, Çerkezköy gibi veya kendi bölgem Adana'nın Bahçe İlçesinde, kalkınmada öncelikli yöre olması sebebiyle, bugün, bütün dünyaya ihracat yapan bir kimya fabrikası kurulmuştur.

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İstanbul'da 1970 yılından itibaren kurulacak sanayi tesisleri tamamen şehir dışına yerleşecektir. Sanayi alanı olarak Rumeli cihetinde Kırklareli asfaltı üzerinde Çatalca ve civarı, Anadolu yakasında da Ankara asfaltı üzerinde Kurtköy ayrılmıştır. 1970 yılına kadar olan geçici dönem için yeni alanlar açılması ile ilgili olarak 1 yıldan beri yapılan çalışmalar sona ermiştir. Ticaret ve Sanayi Odaları, Bayındırlık

Bakanlığı, Turizm ve Tanıtma bakanlığı, MGK, İmar iskan Bakanlığı ve Belediye temsilcilerinin katıldığı çalışmalar sonunda elde edilen dokümanlar planlaşmak üzere imar iskan bakanlığına verilmiştir. Hazırlanan plan MGK'nın onayından geçtikten sonra Belediye meclisince kabul edilerek uygulanmaya başlanacaktır.

186

1969 yılında İller Bankası Genel Müdürlüğü yardımlarıyla bir derin kuyu sondajı yapılarak saniyede 30 litre su almaya muvaffak olunmuştur. Yalnız bu suyun getirilmesi için Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı'na gerek şahsen, gerek milletvekilimiz CHP MYK üyesi Yılmaz Alpaslan ve senatörümüz Hayri Mumcuoğlu'nun da çabalarıyla 1971 yılı programına aldırılmıştır. 1 700 000 Lira yatırımı gerektiren bu iş 1971 yılında başlayacak 1973 yılında ikmal edilecektir. (...) İmar İskan bakanı Selahattin Babüroğlu plana alınan işin öncelikle yapılması için ödeneğinin en kısa zamanda gönderileceğini söylemiştir.

188

Kasabamızda 1968 yılında 25 ton kapasiteli bir un fabrikası yaptırılmasında müteşebbis arkadaşlarımıza bütün kolaylıklar gösterilmiş olup imar planına dâhil olmayan bir saha tamamen sanayi sahası olarak plana aldırılmış ve bu tesisin kurulması için gayret gösterilmiştir.

Özel sektör tarafından yapılmak istenen her türlü sanayi ve iş sahası için prensip olarak en fazla yardımcı olması birinci derecede memurlarımızın da yakınlık göstermeleri için gerekli talimat verilmiştir.

1971 yılı Nisan ayı başında, Almanya'ya işçi olarak gitmiş ve Berlin'de ticarete atılmış bulunan ilçemizin Yanıkağıl köyünden Saim Çetintaş adında bir hemşerimizin sebze fabrikası yaptırmak üzere Türkiye'ye geldiğini öğrenerek, bu tesisin Çerkezköy'de kurulması halinde belediyemize ait sanayi sahasında ucuz arsa vereceğimizi arz etmemiz sayesinde bu tesisin Çerkezköy'de kurulmasını sağladık. (...)

Konserve fabrikasına ise 20 bin metrekaare yer verilmiş, sembolik bedel olarak metrekaresi bir Lira'dan verilmiştir.

190

1971 yılı ortalarında DPT'de Trakya'mızda bir kısım beldelerde bu arada Edirne de gerice kalmış yöre ilan edilerek teşvik uygulamalı sanayi kuruluşlarını bu yerlere tahsisinin yapıldığını öğrendim. Ankara'da bir yakınım vasıtası ile ulaştığım DPT'ye ilçemizin durumunu anlattım. Ekonomik yapı yanında coğrafi yapısının da değerlendirilmesini talep ettim. Ve 30 Aralık 1971 tarihli Resmi Gazete Bakanlar Kurulu'nun Çerkezköy'le ilgili mutlu haberi yayınlandı. Ve Çerkezköy Türk sanayicisine hedef gösterildi.

191

Çerkezköy gerçekten bir köydü. Hükümet teşvik ve lisans verirken, Sınai Kalkınma Bankası da kredi veriyordu. Bundan dolayı arsa aramaya gittim. Silivri de yemek yerken, Trakya'nın askeri komutanı bir paşa ve Çerkezköy belediye başkanı geldi, "Haydar Bey, sizi Çerkezköy'de fabrika yapmaya davet ediyoruz," dediler. "Artezyenden su çıkar, arsa da bedava..." Hep beraber kalktık, gezdik. Çerkezköy'de hiç fabrika yoktu. "Bedava olmaz, sembolik bir ücret verelim," dedik ve arsayı aldık. Bizden sonra Nurullah Narin geldi. Tam bizim karşımıza bir fabrika yaptılar. Bugün ise Çerkezköy muazzam bir sanayi bölgesi. Bunu yaptıran da o zamanki belediye

reisi. “Buradaki insanlar aç, işçiler istihdam edilecek, esnaf da onlara ekmek, meyve, et süt satacak,” demese, bu zenginlik oluşmayacaktı.

Biz de o sayede fabrikamızı genişlettik. Yeni makineler aldık. Çerkezköy’de AKİP İkitelli de Edip fabrikasını yaptık. Dokumayla başladık, tezgahları çoğalttık, kredi aldık. Bunları 1970’lerde yaptık. Yavaş yavaş ihracata başladık. Döviz gelmeye başladı. Sanayi gelmeye başladı.

197

Lisansımızı [teşvik belgesi] aldığımız için, Edirne’ye gidip bir görelim dedik. Baktık ki Edirne’de ne elektrik, ne su, ne de yol var. Yani bunları bizim yapabilmemiz için bir devlet kudretine sahip olmamız gerekiyordu. Bunun üzerine Nuri Akın gitti, Turgut Özal’la [dönemin DPT müsteşarı] konuştu. Dedi ki “Biz Edirne için bunu yapmaya kalkıştık, ama bu bizim kudretimizin dışına çıkan bir olay oluyor. Siz bize bunu İstanbul’da verirsiniz yapabiliriz.” Turgut Özal’da bunun üzerine Eğer İstanbul’da 50 bin işlik bir fabrika kurarsanız ve baban da sana bu konuda yardımcı olacaksa size veririm” demiş. Nuri Akın da “Kurarsınız ve babam da yardımcı olacak” deyince bu iş gerçekleşmiş oldu. Böylece İstanbul’da yapmak üzere Edirne İplik’in lisansını aldık.

201

Önceleri Doğu ve Güneydoğu illerine yöneltilen teşvikler, politik baskılar ve yatırımcıların ısrarları ile sonradan 33 ile yayılmıştır. Bu arada Edirne ve özellikle Çerkezköy nedense gerici yöre ilan edilmiş, birkaç sanayi kuruluşuna izin verildikten ve yatırımlar yapıldıktan sonra Edirne’den cayılmış, fakat Çerkezköy’de hiçbir alt yapı olmamasına rağmen yüzbinlerce metrekaarelik arazi kapılmıştır. (...)

Çerkezköy’de yerleşme planı yoktur, elektrik sınırlıdır, su, yerleşme alanları, ikmal ve dağıtım olanakları, haberleşme çareleri ilkelidir. Özetle daha şimdiden İstanbul metropolüne yüklenen yeni bir anarşi sanayi kenti yaratılmıştır.

202

KÖY [Kalkınmada öncelikli Yörelere] dairesinin çalışanları taksonomi yöntemiyle bir sıralama yapıyorlar. İlk liste 36 ilden ibaretti. Sonra 4 il tepeden gelme bir öneriyle veya talimatla eklendi ve bu da yetmiyormuş gibi, gelişmiş illerdeki bir takım ilçeler de gelişigüzel, kalkınmada öncelikli yöreler listesine eklendi. Ne bileyim İzmir’de Kiraz, Çerkezköy bunlara örnek.

Şu anda aileleri İstanbul’da oturan ama kendileri Çerkezköy’de ya da Bilecik’de oturan pek çok orta ve üst düzey yöneticinin ve ailelerinin kaderi böylece çizildi. Yani bölgesel planlama olayı başlamadan büyük ölçüde baltalanmış oldu.

205

Çerkezköy’ün teşvik kapsamına alınması İstanbul sanayisini desantralize etmek amacıyla DPT’nin aldığı bir karardır. Siyasilerin etkisi söz konusu değildir. Uzak bölgelere teşvik vermek İstanbul sanayisini desantralize etmekte etkisiz oluyordu. Bu yüzden gelişmiş illerin çeperindeki ilçeleri kalkınmada öncelikli yöre ilan ettik. Ve bunda başarılı olduk. Organize Sanayi Bölgesi yapılmasını da öneriyorduk. Aynı şeyi sadece İstanbul için değil Ankara, İzmir ve Adana için de yaptık. Bu siyasi değil teknik bir karardır. Zaten 12 Mart döneminde siyasetçiler kendi dertlerine düşmüşlerdi, her hangi bir etkileri söz konusu olamazdı. Hele ki başımızda Memduh

Aytür vardı, siyasetçilerin bir şey söylemeye çekineceği bürokratlardandı. DPT'nin çok etkili olduğu bir zamandı.

Eğer bunu yapmasaydık İstanbul sahilleri sanayi ile dolacaktı. Çerkezköy, Tekirdağ'ın en az gelişmiş ilçesi olduğu için seçildi. Ayrıca pazara, İstanbul'a yakın olmasını gözettilik. Hayali bir şekilde teşvik bölgeleri belirlemek sanayinin oraya gitmesini sağlamıyor.

208

Kalkınmada öncelikli yörelerin belirlenmesi samimiyetle söyleyebiliriz ki DPT'nin çalışması ile oldu. DPT çalışmasını yaparken o bölgelerin milletvekilleri veya belediye başkanları, valileri etki yaptılar mı bilemem. Normal olarak hükümet içinde şuraları seçelim gibi bir tartışma olmadı. Çünkü, biz prensip itibariyle teknisyenlerin çalışmasına müdahale etmiyorduk. DPT bizim eski teşkilatımızdı. Gerek ben gerek Atilla [Karaosmanoğlu] DPT'nin kuruluşunda bulunmuş ve oranın kurallarını koymuş insanlar olarak, oranın çalışmasına herhangi bir müdahalemiz olmuyordu. Dolayısıyla bu yerlerin seçilmesi DPT'nin iç çalışmasıdır.

DPT kurulduğu günden beri gerek yerel siyasetçiler gerekse bazı iş adamları plana etki etmeye çalışmışlardır. Plan hazırlanırken, bir örnek diyelim mesela, “aman demir yollarına çok önem verin” diye birileri gelip DPT içersinde gayret sarf etmiştir. O, büyük ihtimalle demiryolu teçhizatı satan bir firmanın temsilcisidir. Veya A şehrinde bir iş yapılacak veya yapılmayacaktır; o yörenin insanları gelip etki yapmaya çalışmışlardır. Hatta DPT'ye çok safiyane normal vatandaşların da geldiği olmuştur. Diyelim ki PETKİM Çayırova'da kurulacağı sırada, bir gariban köylü vatandaş gelmişti; “Aman ne olur bunu buraya kurmayın, burası çok iyi kiraz yetiştirilen bir zirai bölgedir”. Belki de haklıydı adam. Dolayısıyla bazı insanlar vatan sevgisinden, bazı insanlar menfaat kaygısından, bazı insanlar kişisel olarak kendi politik gelecekleri ile ilgili olarak DPT'ye gelip şöyle veya böyle etki yapmaya çalışırlar. Bu çabalar bizim planlamada etkili olduğumuz dönem hiç etkili olmamıştır. Dinlerdik, teşekkür eder gönderirdik. Hatta çok menfaat sahibi adamlardan birisi bir arkadaşımızın evine kadar gitmiştir, arkadaşımız onu evinden kovmuştur.

(...)

İstanbul'u desantralize etmek konusunda DPT iki türlü çalışıyordu. Birincisi Anadolu'ya tesis yapmak, ikincisi “kalkınmada öncelikli yöreler” adı altında bazı kolaylıklar sağlamak. Bu bakımdan Çerkezköy'ün seçilmesini teknisyenlerin kararı olarak görmek gerekir.

(...)

Sanayiye Anadolu'ya yaymak; sadece Çerkezköy'e değil, Bozüyük öyledir, Konya'ya gitmesi teşvik edilmiştir, hatta Ankara'ya gitmesi teşvik edilmiştir. Ankara'nın yakın çevresi kırsal ekonomi idi.

209

Kırşehir Milletvekili Sayın Mustafa Aksoy arkadaşımızın, seçim bölgesi ile ilgili haklı şikâyetlerini dinledim. Takdir buyurulur ki, bu şikâyetleri gidermek, bu dengesizliği önlemek için Türkiye bir plânlı döneme girmiştir. Nitekim, bu çalışmalar içinde 1963 yılında 22 ilimiz gelişmemiş, az gelişmiş olarak kabul edilmiş ve buralara indirim yolu ile teşvik temin etmek için bir tesbit yapılmış idi. 1970 yılında, iller itibariyle, sosyo-ekonomik gelişmişlik endeksi uygulaması yapılmış ve bu endeksin neticelerine göre 22 il 32 adede çıkarılmıştır. Bunlar Güney - Doğu ve Doğu illerimizin aşağı-yukarı tamamını içine almakta ve bu endekslere göre gerek

Batıda olsun gerek Orta - Anadolu'da olsun, az gelişmişlik gösteren illerimizi de ihtiva etmektedir.

(...)

Bunların dışında, vilâyetlerin tümü itibariyle bu endekslere uymıyan fakat kazalar itibariyle bu endekslere göre az gelişmişlik gösteren - ki bunların içinde Sayın Aksoy'un saydığı kendi vilâyetinin iki kazası da vardır – birçok kaza bu iller dışında bu neticeyi vermiş ve teşvik getirmek bakımından bu listeye ithal edilmiştir.

215

Yıllardan beri çeşitli sebeplerle ihmale uğrayan Çerkezköy'ün, Belediye Başkanı Hikmet Uğraş'ın insan gücü üstünde çalışmalarıyla örnek bir kasaba haline geldiğini her geçen gün daha yakinen görmekteyiz.

İmkânları dar, kısıtlı bir belde olan Çerkezköy Hikmet Uğraş'ın uğraşmalarıyla daima ileri doğu hamle yapmaktadır.

Kasabanın su derdi, kısmen de olsa halledilmiştir. Çerkezköy'ün ekonomik ve ticari durumları incelenmiş, müteşebbis iş adamlarıyla temaslar sağlanmış, bunlara Çerkezköy'de fabrikalar kurdurmak için gerekli kolaylıklar sağlanmıştır. Çerkezköy halkının iktisadi durumu göz önüne alınarak, diğer belediyelerin aksine elektrik ücretinde büyük bir indirim yapılmıştır. Belediye'nin bugün almış olduğu bir kararla elektriğin kilovatı 85 kuruştan 65 kuruşa indirilmiştir.

218

Halit Narin, önce babasıyla ve onun yönetiminde, daha sonra da kendi başına ve yakın iş arkadaşlarıyla iş hayatına girip çeşitli girişimlerde bulunmaya başladığında kafasında Türkiye'deki yer ve iş konusu olarak pek çok bakir, el değmemiş fakat büyük gelecek vadeden yerler ve konular olduğunu gördü. Bunun ilk örneği Çerkezköy girişimidir.

1969 yılında [doğrusu 1972 olacak y.n.] Çerkezköy ve civarı ile ilgili olarak yatırım konularında bir teşvik çıkıyor. (...) Halit Narin babası ile durumunu görmek için ve birinci elden bir değerlendirme yapmak için Çerkezköy'e gidiyorlar. Her tarafı dağlık tepelik, içinde sadece iki-üç dükkan olan, demiryolunun kenarında bir köy. Tam anlamıyla bir köy. (...) Narinler'den önce merhum Vehbi Koç gitmiş, köye ve çevresine bakmış, oraları dolaşmış ve “buradan bir şey olmaz” deyip ayrılmış. Halit Narin ve babası öyle düşünmüyorlar. Rahmetli Menderes zamanında İstanbul'a imar müdürü olan bir zat vardı. Kendisi Çerkezköylü. Daha sonra onunla geliyorlar. Ve oradan bir arsa almaya karar veriyorlar. Merhum Hikmet Bey oranın belediye reisi. Birlikte yemek yiyorlar. Hikmet Bey bölgenin kalkınmasını istiyor. Bölgesine yatırım yapılmasını istiyor. Arsanın metrekaresi 50 kuruş [doğrusu 1 lira olacak]. Ama halk, yatırım yapılınsın diye arsaları bedava vermeye bile razı.

219

Trakya'nın ağır bakım pilot bölgeleri arasına giren Çerkezköy sanayi şehri olmaya namzettir. Geniş araziye sahip olan Çerkezköy, ziraat bölgesi olmasına rağmen toprağının zayıf olması nedeniyle halkı fakirdir.

Bu bakımdan Çerkezköy idarecileri de vatandaşlarına yardımcı olmak için azami gayret sarf ederek bölgeyi geniş bir ağır bakım merkezi haline getirmeyi ve bu bakımdan da büyük şehirlerimizdeki iş adamlarıyla temasa geçip çok ucuza belediye arsalarından satmak suretiyle beldelerini sanayileştirmeyi başarmaktadırlar.

Bir iki gün önce İstanbul'dan gelen iş adamları tekstil fabrikalarının kurulabileceği yerleri gezmişler ve tesbit etmişlerdir.

221

‘Tesislerimiz Eyüp’teydi... Firmamız giderek genişliyordu. Tesislerimizi de genişletmemiz artık bir zorunluluk olmuştu. Fakat Eyüp’te, boş arsa yoktu. Sıkışıp kalmıştık...’

İşte Çerkezköy, İstanbul’daki sanayicilerin imdadına tam da bu anda yetişmiş. ‘Kalkınmada öncelikli yöre’ çerçevesine Çerkezköy de alınınca, İstanbullu sanayiciler, İstanbul’a 120 km. yakınlıktaki bu ‘gerice yöreye’ ye doğru bir yarışa girişmişler.

‘Çerkezköy’de bize öncelikle çekici gelen nokta, arsa fiyatlarının çok ucuz olmasıydı’ diye, sürdürdüğü konuşmasını Mecdi Arca ‘Yıl 1972 idi ve Çerkezköy’de arsanın metrekaresi 125 kuruştı... Biz sanayicilerin orda arsa alma yarışına giriştiğimizi duyan köylüler ise, kendi aralarında başka bir yarış başlatmışlar, kendi tarlalarını satabilmek için kapımızda kuyruklar oluşturmuşlardı. Biz, 300 bin metrekaresine arsa aldık. Bunun bir bölümünü 125 Kuruştan, kalan bölümünü de 150 kuruştan aldık.’

Büyük bir halı ve battaniye yapımı şirketinin genel müdürü Mecdi Arca, aynı anda Çerkezköy sanayiciler Derneği başkanlığı görevini de üstlenmişti.

Başkan’a Çerkezköy’de arsa fiyatlarının bugün kaç kuruş olduğunu sordum.

‘Artık kuruşla konuşulmuyor Çerkezköy’de arsa fiyatları’ dedi ve gülererek ekledi:

‘Çerkezköy’de bugün bir arsanın ortalama fiyatı 400 lira dolayındadır.’

Özellikle İstanbullu sanayicilerin Çerkezköy’e doğru yarışa kalkışmalarının tek nedeninin, arsa fiyatlarının ucuzluğu olmadığını söyledi Mecdi Arca.

‘Çerkezköy, kalkınmada öncelikli yöre kapsamına alındığı için, bizim açımızdan daha başka nedenlerle de çekici bir duruma gelmişti’ dedi, ‘Kalkınmada öncelikli yöre kapsamına alınan yerlerde sanayicilere yatırım indirimi sağlanıyordu. Vergide sübvansiyon vardı. Gümrük bağımsızlığı, gümrük taksitlendirmesi gibi kolaylıklar getiriliyordu. Tüm bunların dışında, sermayemiz küçük de olsa, bu yörede yatırım yaptığımız için, büyük kredi olanakları bulabiliyorduk.’

Arsa fiyatlarının ucuzluğu, İstanbul’a yakınlığı dışında, bir de bu tür kolaylıkların sağlanması, sanayiciler gözünde Çerkezköy’ü bir anda ‘altın madeni’ yapmış.

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İnsanlar tapu olmadığı için de korktular, o yüzden de hemen satmak istediler, burada kuyruk oldu. Zaten köylüler de kullandıkları arsayı muhtarlık senedi ile almışlar, aldıkları kişi döner diye hemen elden çıkarmak istediler. Yarın bu mal elimden gider belki, çünkü tapusu yok korkusu... Kimisi ben yerime döneceğim dedi, al paranı. Eski sahibi yeri geri istiyor. Kimisinde muhtar senedi bile yok. Hem istimlaktan korktular, hem de birbirlerinden korktular.

Bize burası sanayi bölgesi oldu, verin yoksa istimlak edilecek, yoksa gidip hakkını ararsın Ankara’da dediler. Kulaktan kulağa laf dolaşıyordu.

245

Narin Pınarça yolunun alt tarafını da almak istedi, dereye kadar inmektir niyeti. Bu alanda göçmenlere verilen 2’şer dönümlük bağ yerleri vardı. Sadık Sever’in kardeşi Ziya Sever muhtar Salih İşcan’la beraber kahveye geldiler. Muhtar bana dedi ki ‘Ali senin de orada 2 dönümlük yerin var, yerleri verin’ dedi ‘yoksa istimlak edecekler’. Af buyurun, biraz kaba olacak: Muhtar dedim, bir kulağımızın arkası kaldı düzülmedik, onu da düzmeye çalışıyorsunuz. Dedim, milletin burada iki dönümlük

yeri var başını sokacak, onu da almaya çalışıyorsunuz.” Millet uyandı vermedi yerini, aşağıya, dereye kadar inemedi. Narin’in aldığı yerde arsası olanlara bu taraftan (şimdiki Çelebi Erkek Yurdu civarı) arsa verdiler. Öyle bi fırıldaklar döndü ama, artık bilemiyoruz işin iç yüzünü.

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Ankara, İstanbul ve İzmir’e ait metropoliten plan çalışmalarımız önümüzdeki günlerde kesin şeklini almış olacaktır. Bu arada İstanbul ve Ankara’ya ait sanayi yerleşme merkezlerinin yeri belli olmuştur. İstanbul sanayi merkezinin taşınacağı Çerkezköy’de yer seçimi hazırlıklarına başlanmıştır. Burada kurulacak yeni tesislere ilaveten, İstanbul’da insan sağlığını tehdit eden bir konu ortadan kalkacak ve Zeytinburnu ile Kazlıçeşme’deki deri sanayi tesisleri de Çerkezköy’e nakledilecektir. Bu yerleşim alanı özel sektörce de benimsenmiştir.

260

Büyük İstanbul Nazım Plan uygulaması sırasında doğacak yanlış yerleşmeleri önlemek amacıyla İstanbul’da bir Arsa Ofisi örgütü kurulmuş ve şimdiden 25 milyon liralık arazi satın almıştır.

Özellikle kırsal alandaki spekülasyonu önlemek ve sanayi kuruluşlarını şehir dışına iterek şehir merkezini rahatlatmak amacı güden kamulaştırmalar Çerkezköy ve Dudullu’da yapılmıştır. Arsa Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü’ne bağlı bir kuruluş olan örgüt, şimdilik kamulaştırılan sahanın projelendirilmesi işini yürütmektedir. İstanbul İl İmar Müdürü Beşiz Düvenli’nin başkanlığında yedi kişilik bir kadrosu olan örgüt satın aldığı arazinin projelendirilmesinden sonra alt yapı tesislerini yapma yoluna gidecek ve daha sonra gerekli kooperatif ve sanayi kuruluşlarının arsa taleplerini değerlendirecektir.

262

Orhan Öztrak, ‘biliyor musun’ dedi ‘buranın hikayesini’ (...) ‘Ben’ dedi ‘Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı’ndan buranın Organize Sanayi Bölgesi’ni çıkarttım’. Çıkarttım, yani çıkartmaya rica ettim falan filan yok, çıkarttım. (...) ‘Hikmet [Uğraş]’ dedi ‘bana geldi gitti, gitti geldi’ (...) ‘Bak’ dedi, ‘gittim’ dedi, ‘Maden Tetkik Arama Enstitüsü’ne, genel müdürle konuştum’ dedi. ‘Genel müdüre bana burada su bulacan dedim, su bulacan.’ Çünkü her tekstil fabrikasının günde 100 ton suya ihtiyacı var, 100 ton! Su yok, adamlar kuyu suyu ile geçiniyor, su yok. O zaman Maocular hakimdi MTA’ya. Bunlar gidiyorlar 45 metreye kadar iniyorlar ve hiç suya rastlamıyorlar. Orhan Öztrak demiş ki ona ‘bana bak genel müdür’ demiş ‘seni’ demiş ‘genel müdürlükten ederim, ya suyu bulursun ya da genel müdürlükten gidersin gümbürtüye, ona göre.’ (...) Orhan Öztrak o kadar iyi adamdı ki, hiç böyle tehditvari konuştuğunu kimse görmemiştir. Ondan sonra, ‘tehdit ettim’ dedi. 65 metrede Tuna’nın koluna rastlamışlar.

276

1. Çerkezköy ilçesinin kanalizasyon, su ve yol sorunu için derhal harekete geçilmelidir. Bunun için Bayındırlık Bakanlığı, Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü, İmar ve İskan Bakanlığı ve Köy İşleri Bakanlığı’nın işbirliği yapmasında zaruret vardır.
2. İlçe ve civarında kadastro çalışmalarının yapılmamış olması, ilerde çok büyük mahzurlar ve anlaşmazlıklar doğuracaktır. Tapu ve Kadastro Genel Müdürlüğü’nün bağlı olduğu Devlet Bakanlığının bu konuya öncelik vererek, Çerkezköy’de kadastro çalışmalarını bir an önce başlatmasını rica ediyorum.

3. Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu Genel Müdürlüğünün ilk planda bir dispensar için gerekli hazırlıkları yapması şarttır. Gelecek yıllarda asgari 50,000 kişinin sigortalı sağlık hizmetlerinden faydalanması gerekeceği düşünülürse, sağlık tesisleri için gerekli tesislerin yapılmasında zaruret vardır.
4. Çerkezköy’de daha şimdiden süratli bir arsa spekülasyonu eğilimi başlamıştır. Arsa Ofisi tarafından bu mahalde alınan 10,000 dönümlük yer yetersizdir. Arsa Ofisi’ne ait sahanın genişletilmesi uygun olacaktır. Bu suretle hem arsa spekülasyonu önlenecek, hem de burada inşası gereken sosyal meskenler için gerekli yer ayrılmış olacaktır. Aksi halde bu konuda beklenen hassasiyet gösterilmezse çok kısa bir zamanda bu ilçemiz de gecekonduyla dolacaktır. (...)
5. Bu ilçemizin kurulmakta olan sanayi tesisleri dikkate alınarak yeni bir imar planına ihtiyaç vardır. Çalışanların aileleri ile birlikte barınacakları mesken ihtiyacı dışında, artacak nüfusun sosyal ve kültürel ihtiyaçlarıyla, günlük yaşantının gerektireceği diğer yeni tesisler planlanırsa Çerkezköy örnek bir sanayi şehri olabilecektir.
6. Çok önemli gördüğümüz bir konu da işçilerimizin mesken meselesidir. Şimdiden burada sosyal meskenler inşaatına başlanmalıdır.

278

Çerkezköy’ümüzün bu sanayileşmenin getirdiği nüfusa yetiyecek suyu bulunmamaktadır. Kanalizasyondan tümüyle yoksundur. Fosseptik çukurlar bile yetersizdir. Pislikler şu günlerde şehrimizin içine akmaktadır. Elektrik enerjisi bu yükü kaldıramamaktadır. Tüm bunların ötesinde, Şehir İmar Planı şu ana kadar hazırlanamamıştır. Gelişi güzel inşaatlarla şehir perişan edilmektedir. Öte yandan işçilerin barınabilmeleri için, hiçbir örgüt sosyal konut yapımına eğilmemektedir. Şehrin yol sorunu da olduğu gibi durmaktadır. (...) Şu anda Çerkezköy’ün bir sağlık ocağı bile yoktur.

281

Alt yapı oluşumu için her ay bir fabrika, Tekirdağ, Edirne ve hatta Ankara yetkililerinin de iştirak ettiği 70-80 kişilik büyük yemekli toplantılar yapılarak Çerkezköy’ün alt yapısı oluşturulmuştur. (...)

Alt yapı oluşumu için yapılan tüm harcamalar, bilhassa sık sık yapılan Ankara seyahatleri masrafları hatta partilere yapılan bağışlar şirketlerce karşılanmıştır. İrtibatların sağlanması için her fabrika İstanbul’da müzikli, yemekli toplantılar yaparak işlerin çabuklaştırılmasını sağlamıştır.

283

(...) öncelikle ve samimiyetle şunu belirtelim ki, Derneğimizin geçici idare heyeti tarafından yukarda sıraladığımız sorunların [yol, su, elektrik, haberleşme, iskan, sanayi bölgesi planlaması, sağlık ve sosyal hizmet sorunları] istisnasız hepsi yegan, yegan ele alınmış ilgili bilumum kamu ve özel kuruluşlara detaylarıyla aktarılmış hergün bir kat daha fazla eğilmeleri sağlanmıştır. Ancak, iç ve dış politikada ki alternatifler, makul ve zaruri nedenler, birazda bürokrasi çarkının ağır işlemesi sorunlarımızın bazısının hallini kısmen ağırlaştırmış, bazısının normal seyrini muhafaza ettirmiştir.

284

Sanayiciler, hiçbir şeyi tamam olmayan Çerkezköy’de durumun çok vahim olduğunu, elektrik, su, haberleşme, ulaşım ve kredi sorunları nedeniyle milyonluk

tesislerin çalışamaz durumda bulunduklarını (...) tesisler kurulurken verilen hiçbir garantinin bugün işlemediğini söylemişlerdir. (...) kredi yönünden de zorlukla karşılaştıklarını belirten sanayiciler, Çerkezköy Sanayi Organizasyon bölgesi kurulurken kendilerine vaat edilen yüzde 80 kredi ile yüzde 20 sermaye garantisinin de uygulanmadığını, bankalarda büyük zorluklarla karşılaştıklarını belirtmişler (...) ‘Bakanlık tarafından bize verilen taahhütler yerine getirilmiyor’ demişlerdir. Sanayiciler, bu arada, Çerkezköy’ün bölge olarak incelenmeden buraya yatırım yapmak için müracaat eden sanayicilere teşvik belgelerinin verildiğini, bu yüzden de bu durumlara düşüldüğünü söylemişlerdir.

288

Ancak dernek olarak, mevzuat gereği; böyle bir organizasyona gitmek ve organize sanayi bölgesi müteşebbis teşekkülünü kurarak lüzumlu fonu teşkil ve bundan istifade etmek olanağından mahrumduk. Çabalarımız ve Sanayi Bakanlığının yakın müzaharetleriyle 21. Ekim.1974 tarihli resmi gazete’de yayınlanan “Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Kurma Fonu Yönetmeliğinin” 7 nci maddesinde yapılan değişiklikle derneklerin mahalli özel idare ve Belediye ile beraber organize Sanayi Bölgesi müteşebbis teşekkülünü teşkil edebilecekleri kararı resmen çıkartılmış oldu.

289

Maddi ve manevi kudretimizin hudutlarını aşan ve çözüm bekleyen çok önemli sorunlarımız vardı, bunun da yegane çıkar yolu istim arkadan gelecek şekilde Çerkezköy’de bir Organize Sanayi bölgesi kurarak onun getireceği nimet ve hizmetlerden bazı esprilerle mevcut sanayinin de istifadesini sağlamak formülü idi. Bu ana düşünce yönünden hareketle Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı ile temaslara başlandı.

Bakanlık yetkilileri ile yapılan müteaddit toplantılarda önce prensip olarak bir organizasyonun önemi üzerinde mutabakata varıldı. Ancak dernek olarak böyle bir organizasyona (Organize Sanayi Bölgesi Müteşebbis Teşekkülüne) kurucu bir unsur olarak iştirak etmemiz mer’i kararnameler gereğince mümkün değildi. Israrlı çabalarımız ve Sanayi Bakanlığının yakın müzaharetleriyle 21 Ekim 1974 tarihli resmi gazete ile yayınlanan “Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Kurma Fonu Yönetmeliği”nin 7 nci maddesinde yapılmış olan değişiklikle daha önce Sanayi ve Ticaret odalarının Özel idare ve Belediyelerle müştereken kurdukları müteşebbis teşekküle sanayicilerin kendi aralarında kurdukları derneklerin ithali sağlandı.

291

Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri Kurma Fonu Yönetmeliğinin 4 ncü madde (g) fıkrası gereğince organize sanayi bölgesi kuruluş masraflarına (92.6002.000 TL) proje keşif tutarının % 10 nunu (9.260.200) nakten ve peşinen müteşebbis teşekkül tarafından karşılanması öngörülüyordu. Heyet olarak bunun mümkün olamayacağını, Çerkezköy Sanayicilerinin yatırımlarını gerçekleştirebilmek için bütün imkanlarını kullandıklarını dolayısıyla % 10 karşılığı ödemenin söz konusu olamayacağı beyan edilerek başka alternatifler aranması teklif edildi. Bidayetten beri yakın alaka ve yardımını gördüğümüz zamanın Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanı Mehmet Gölhan’ın riyasetinde derneğimiz temsilcileri, Müsteşar V. ve Sanayi dairesi Reisi ile yapılan toplantıda, Türkiye’de tatbikatı ilk defa yapılacak bir formül bulundu. Şöyle ki: Müteşebbis Teşekkülün % 10 iştirak payı banka teminat mektubu olarak verilecekti.

296

- 1- Organize Sanayi Bölgesinde yapılacak alt yapı hizmetlerine çok cüz'i masraflarla bağlanma (faydalanma) imkanlarına sahip olmamız.
- 2- İtfaiye teşkilatı, su, kanalizasyon, pis suların tasfiyesi, çevre kirlenmesi sorunu gibi problemlerimizin çözüm bulması.
- 3- Yapılacak sosyal tesislerden istifade imkanımız.
- 4- Çerkezköy sanayi sorunlarının bundan böyle genişletilmiş sanayi bölgesi sorunu olarak mütalaa edilerek devletin daima müzaheret ve yardımını sağlamış olmak.

301

“İstanbul İli, Kocaeli İli ve Çerkezköy İlçesi sınırları içinde kurulacak yeni yatırımlar, ekonomik ölçeğin üstünde tevsii yatırımları (Gemi, tersane, turizm, büyük mağazacılık, havalandırma donatımlı modern depolama tesisleri, dökme ve karma çimento ve hazır harç, frigorifik çekici ve treyler yatırımları süt inekçiliği, süt işleme tesisleri ve tarımsal yatırımlar hariç) teşvik uygulamaları kapsamının dışına çıkarılmıştır.

Bu bölgelerdeki ihmal edilemeyecek büyüklükteki mevcut tesislerle ilgili tevsii, modernizasyon, yenileme, kalite düzeltme, dar boğaz giderici yatırımların teşvikine bu program kararı hükümlerine göre devam edilir.

302

Bursa, Sakarya, İzmir, Antalya, İçel, Adana, Hatay illeri ile Çerkezköy İlçesi mülki ve Ankara Belediyesi sınırları içinde yapılacak yeni ve ekonomik ölçeğin üstündeki genişletme yatırımlarının teşvikinde kuruluş yerinin, şehirleşmeyi düzenlemek, çevre kirlenmesini önlemek ve tarım alanlarının korunmasını sağlamak bakımından, Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığınca uygun görülmesi esastır.

307

Derneğimiz, (...) bu konuda ilgili Bakanlık ve Devlet Planlama müsteşarlığı kademesinde gereken girişimlerde bulunmuş, yapılan toplantılar sonucunda Çerkezköy'ün yeniden hiç olmazsa proje bazında teşvik kapsamına alınması hususunda ilgili mercilerden olumlu sonuç alınmıştır. Bugünlerde bu konuda bir kararname değişikliğinin çıkacağı teyidini Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı Teşvik Uygulama Genel Müdürlüğünden ve Sanayi Bakanlığı müsteşarlığından almış bulunmaktayız.

312

Diğer Gerice Yörelerde olduğu gibi, Bölgemiz de, çok sayıda Gerice Yöre şartlarının elan devam etmekte olduğunu yüksek görüşlerinize arz etmiştik.

Bu nedenle sayın Hükümetimiz, çok yerinde bir kararla, 8/4913 sayılı kararnameyi uygulamaya koymuş ve böylelikle bir çok yatırımın mağduriyetlerine son verilmiştir. Ancak tüm Gerice Yöre şartları devam ettiği halde, Bölgemizin mezkur kararname kapsamına alınmamış bulunmasının, bir yanlışlık eseri olduğu kanaatindeyiz.

338

Sayısal veriler, İstanbul ilinde sanayide çalışanların artışı kısıtlı olurken, bu sanayi gelişiminin batı uzantısı olan Trakya bölümünde ve doğudaki Kocaeli, Sakarya illeri ile İstanbul'un işlevsel uzantısı olan Bursa'da hızlı bir gelişimin gerçekleştiğini göstermektedir. Benzer şekilde, İzmir'deki yavaş gelişmeye karşılık, Manisa'nın sanayi açısından geliştiği görülmektedir. İç Anadolu bölgesinde yatırımların Ankara ili yerine çevrede yer alan, özellikle kamu ağırlıklı illerde gerçekleştirilmiş olduğu

izlenmektedir, özetle sanayinin gelişmiş bölgelerden az gelişmiş bölgelere doğru yayılması önem kazanmaz iken, bölge içi yayılma belirli bir ölçüde sağlanabilmiştir. Bu tür dar kapsamlı yayılma, ana sanayi merkezlerindeki yığılmadan kaynaklanan olumsuz koşulların önem kazandığını, ancak sanayilerin ana merkezlere yakın olmalarının ekonomik önemini sürdürdüğünü göstermektedir.

357

Özellikle Çorlu, Çerkezköy, Muratlı üçgenindeki sanayi yoğunlaşması giderek sanayicilerin de tepkisini çekmeye başlamıştır. Burada uygulanan yöntem; hiçbir merciden izin ve ruhsat almadan ya da yaptırılan mevzi imar planı ile E-5 kenarında ve diğer ana arterler üzerinde yerlerini satın alıp izin ve ruhsat alarak, enerjiyi en yakın hattan bir indirici vasıtasıyla temin etmek, kullanma suyunu kuyu açarak yeraltı sularından karşılamak, atıklarını ise genelde hiçbir arıtma yapmadan en yakın dereye deşarj etmektir. Ve bu kuruluşların büyük çoğunluğu teşvik belgeli kuruluşlardır. Bu bölgede sanayi kuruluşlarının sayısı arttıktan sonra bölge sanayi bölgesi ilan edilmekte ve böylece sorunları çözmeyi umut ettiğimiz sanayi bölgeleri doğmaktadır.

364

1- 25.10.1984 tarih ve 84/8592 sayılı kararname hükümlerinden yararlanma imkanı (Yalnız Haliç yöresinden nakledilecek sanayicilerle ilgili)

2- Kara ve demiryolu ulaşım kolaylıkları

3- İnşası devam eden Avrupa otobanın (E80) Çerkezköy yakınından geçmesi ve Çerkezköy'e irtibatlı olması

4- Liman ve Ticaret Merkezlerine yakınlığı

5- Her tür gümrük işlemlerinin mahallinde yapılabilmesi

6- Mevcut sanayinin Çerkezköy'e getirdiği teknoloji ve hizmetler

7- Sirkeci-Çerkezköy elektrikli banliyö treninin hizmete girmiş bulunması

8- Yöre halkının sanayiye hizmet verebilecek seviyede bilinçlenmesi

9- Arazinin meyilsiz, engebesiz taş ve kayalık olmaması

10- Sanayi parsellerinin standart olmayıp muhtelif büyüklüklerde ve tapularının hemen verilebilir durumda olması

11- Merkezi arıtma tesisinin yapılacağı pilot Organize Sanayi Bölgesi olarak seçilmesi

12- Mefruşatı [eşyası] dâhil sosyal tesislerden hemen yararlanabilme imkânı

13- Yeterli ve kaliteli elektrik enerjisinden yararlanma

14- Trakya'da çıkan doğal gazdan yararlanma imkânları (konu araştırma safhasındadır)

15- Bölgenin hemen bitişiğinde kamulaştırılmış toplu konut sahasında iskân imkanları

16- Yörenin bahşettiği kendine özgü birçok kolaylıklar

388

1989 senesinin Ekim ayından itibaren ele alınan diğer önemli bir faaliyetimiz de; Organize Sanayi Bölgeleri teşvik uygulamalarından Anorganize Sanayi Bölgemiz yatırımcılarını da yararlandırmak, istihdam gücünü arttırmak, aradaki boş arazileri değerlendirerek üretim alanlarına dönüştürmek ve Organize-Anorganize ayrımını ortadan kaldırmak amacına yönelik çalışmalarımızdır.

Yaptığımız teşebbüsler Sanayi ve Ticaret Bakanlığınca da olumlu karşılanmış olup Belediye ve Derneğimiz işbirliği ile fizibilite raporu, imar planı, mülkiyet durumlarının tesbiti çalışmalarına başlanmış bulunmaktadır.

441

[1994 seçimlerinde] Remzi Garip bağımsız olarak Belediye Başkanlığını kazandı. O zaman Remzi Garip'in karşısında 15 tane meclis üyesi var, çalışabilmesi için bunlarla iyi geçinmesi lazım. Bu 15 meclis üyesinin 8'i Anavatan Partisi'nde, bendeydi. (...) O zaman Mesut Yılmaz gelmişti Çerkezköy'e. Mesut Yılmaz geldiği zaman, belediye başkanlığını bağımsız kazandığını söylediğimizde kendisine, demişti ki 'Başkan bu adamı ne yapıp edip bu partiye istiyorum.' Ben de kendisine söylediğimde [Remzi Garip] demişti ki 'Tamam Serkan, geçerim ANAP'a, ama bunun bir karşılığı olması lazım, boşu boşuna geçmeyelim.' (...) Gişelerden bu tarafa, Çerkezköy'e bu yolun bağlantısının yapılmasıydı geçiş hediyemiz. (...) Hatta Mesut Yılmaz buraya bu yolun açılışı için geldi.

454

Çerkezköy'de bir yığın fabrika var. Bu fabrikalar, Ergene Çayına, oradan Çorlu Deresine ve Ergene Irmağına zehir akıtıyor, bu zehir Saroz Körfezine kadar gidiyor. Bu kanundaki değişiklik neden yapılıyor onu size izah etmek mecburiyetindeyim: Orada - tesislerin ismini söylemiyorum, reklam olur sonra; o reklamı televizyonda yeterince yapıyorlar, ben reklam yapmak istemiyorum - bazı etkili kişilerin fabrikaları, oranın cesur ve yiğit savcısı, hâkimi ve kaymakamı tarafından kapatılmıştır. Bunlar baskı yapmak suretiyle fabrikalarını tekrar açtırıp iki yıl daha zehirli su akıtmak üzere bakanı baskı altına almışlar.

455

Sayın Başkan, değerli milletvekili arkadaşlarım; 1380 sayılı Su Ürünleri Yasası'nda yapılacak değişiklik ile ilgili metin hükümet tasarısı olarak komisyona geldiği zaman ardında bir inceliğin, bir çıkarın, bir kavganın var olduğu, geçici 1 ve 2 nci maddelerinde belirliydi. İçeriği ise; adının Su Ürünleri Yasasında Değişiklik olmasına karşın, bal gibi bir sanayi affı idi. Bu, her ne kadar kamufle edilmişse de, zengin ve etkin kişilerin varlığı, esintisi ve kuvvet dengesi olarak yüksek huzurlarınıza getirilmiştir.

456

Vaktiyle faaliyetten men edilmiş bulunan sanayi kuruluşları ile işyerlerine; 'Bu kanunun yürürlüğe girdiği tarihten itibaren faaliyetlerine devam edebilme' hakkı bağışlanmakta; yani, mahkeme kararı yok edilmekte ve hükümlü affa mazhar olmaktadır. Bu konuda ister istemez şu soru hatıra gelmektedir: Bakanlık, dar gelirli balıkçı ve çiftçiden mi, yoksa sanayici ve işadamlarından mı yanadır?

460

Sanayi Atık Sularımız'la ilgili olarak su ürünleri konusunda deşarj kriterleri olarak belirlenmiş bulunan gerçekten çok ağır ve katı rakamları ve hükümleri yumuşatmak amacıyla da Bakanlıklar nezdinde çok uzun süren çalışma ve girişimler yapılmış bu konuda Başbakanlık Çevre Genel Müdürlüğünce hazırlanan kanun tasarısı Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nden geçmiş ancak Cumhurbaşkanlığı makamınca şekil yönünden tesbit edilen bazı düzeltmeler için meclise iade edilmişse de seçimlerin öne alınması ve meclisin dağılması nedeniyle belirtilen maddelerde yapılacak düzeltme

mümkün olamamıştır. Türk sanayine büyük ferahlık yaratacak bu kanunun 1988 yılında yeniden canlandırılması için dernek olarak girişimlerimizi devam ettirmemizde büyük fayda görmekteyiz.

471

Sendika olarak da gittik işçi topladık. İşçilere işçi olmayı öğretmeye çalıştık. Yarın emekliliğiniz var dedik, onlara çalışmaları gerektiğini anlattık. Maaş alıyorsun, emekliliği anlattık, sigortayı anlattık (...) İşveren ve sendika olarak elele 2-3 sene işçi topladık. İşveren bir taraftan, biz bir taraftan işçi topladık. 3-4 sene sonra durum tersine döndü, kapıların önü dolmaya başladı. Köylüler birbirine baktı, çalışan kızlar evine çamaşır makinesi alıyor, parası oluyor, bu sefer de hücum başladı işe. Bu sefer işverenler seçici olmaya başladı.

490

1972 senesinden sonra Çerkezköy’de yatırımlara başladığımız andan itibaren en büyük sorunlarımızdan birisinin de istihdam sorunu olduğu hepimizce bilinmekteydi. O günlerden bu yana tesislerimizi çalıştırabilmek için lüzumlu insan gücü, büyük fedakârlıklar ve tavizler karşılığında civar köy kasabalardan otobüslerle taşınarak işyerine getirilmektedir. Bu yöntem hiçbir zaman köklü bir çözüm olamazdı ve olmayacaktır, zira taşıyıcıların sık sık artan anormal ücret talepleri, kış şartlarında nakliyatın aksaması veya hiç yapılamaması, akaryakıt teminindeki darboğazlar vs. hususlarla; işçilerimizin mahallinde bir ev sahibi olarak huzur içinde çalışmalarını temin etmek ve kötü hava şartlarında dahi uzak mesafelerden türlü meşakkatlerle gelerek geçimini temine çalışan personeli huzurlu ve zinde kılmak, onları bir takım sosyal imkanlardan faydalandırmak ancak Çerkezköy’de bir konut yerleşim merkezinin kurulması formülü ile çözümlenebilecekti.

491

Bizim kanımıza göre, sanayiye yönlendirilecek işçilerin toplu konuta kavuşturulmasından daha faydalı bir düzenleme söz konusudur. Bu şöyle olabilir, işçilerin toprakla ilişkisini koparmadan bulundukları yerleşim sahralarındaki tarla veya bahçe içinde kuracakları evlere maddi yardım sağlanarak onları konut sahibi yapma yolu sağlanabilir. Bu konuda, Ziraat Bankası’nın çalıştırdığı, zirai kredi verme usulüne hemen bir sistem geliştirilerek köylü kökenli işçilerimizi ev sahibi yapmanın yolu açılmış olacaktır.

504

Bulgaristan’dan gelen soydaş kadınlar ise vazgeçilmez bir kaynak. Onların iş disiplini ve profesyonellikleri patronların ilk tercihlerini oluşturuyor. Aldıkları maaşlar ise asgari ücret düzeyinde olup, net 15-20 milyon lira arasında değişiyor. Daha önce evlerinde oturup oya dokuyan, yün ören, inek sağan köylü kızlarımız, tekstil fabrikalarındaki makine başlarında günde 7-8 saat mesai yapıyorlar. Konuştuğumuz kadın işçiler, belki de amirleri yanında olduğu için pek hallerinden şikâyet etmediler. Ama çalışan bir kadın olarak onların yüzlerindeki yorgunluğu ve burukluğu fark etmemem elde değildi (...) Patronlar kadın işçilerden çok memnun olduklarını belirtirken onların dikkatli ve itaatkâr olduklarını da vurguluyorlar. Kadınlar düşük ücret de alsalar ekonomik özgürlükleri belli bir güvence sağlıyor.

516

Modern bir sanayi kentine dönüşen Çerkezköy’de genel asayiş, emniyet ve trafik, işçi hareketlerine karşı gerekli önlem ve vecibelerin zamanında alınması büyük önem taşımaktadır. Bugüne kadar Çerkezköy emniyet amirliği mevcut kadrosuyla güçlerinin fevkinde gerekli hiçbir yardımı esirgememişlerdir. Ancak gelişen sanayinin ve onun beraberinde getirdiği sorunların her geçen gün artması karşısında mevcut emniyet Amirliği kadrosunun 1 komiser, 2 trafik memuru, 8 polis memuru ve bir trafik aracı ile takviye edilmesinin uygun olacağı kanaatindeyiz.

522

Ancak ülkemizin Cumhuriyet Tarihinin en ağır bunalımlı günlerini yaşadığı, anarşi, terör, bölücülük ve yıkıcılığın her geçen gün şiddetini arttırdığı, sıçramak için yeni yeni odaklar aradığı, fesat ve nifak yuvalarının ülkemizi içten çökertmek istediği bir ortamda; bir sanayi merkezi haline dönüşerek stratejik bir bölge haline gelen Çerkezköy’de de firmalar olarak kendi emniyet, asayiş, sabotaj ve yangınlara karşı koyma, sızmaları önleme planlarımızı pekleştirmekle birlikte, müştereken il ve ilçe yöneticileri ile gerekli koordinasyonu sağlayarak gereken pasif önlemleri alma ve çalıştırma yöntemlerini de tayin ve eksiksiz tatbik etmemizde ve akılcı bir politika izlememizde çok büyük bir zaruret olduğunu belirtmekte fayda görürüz.

531

Buranın başarılı olmasının nedeni Arsa Ofisi eliyle OSB kurulmasıdır. Çorlu bir türlü organize olamıyor, çünkü sanayi topraklarının tamamı özel mülkiyetin elinde. Arsa Ofisi düşük fiyattan arsa alıp, altyapı harcamalarını yaptıktan sonra maliyetinin biraz üstünde sanayiciye satar. Ama bütün topraklar özel ellerde olunca ve kıymeti de artmış olunca kimden nasıl alacaksınız? Çerkezköy’de arsa ofisi 450 hektar almış, özel şahıstan bunu alabilir misiniz? Değer kazanmış arsayı vermek istemez kimse.

562

İki devre için belediye başkanlığı görevini başarı ile ifa eden Hikmet Uğraş’ın sanayiciler ile haşır neşir olması ve sanayicilerin aşırı talepleri ile mahalli ihtiyaçlar ile halkın talepleri arasındaki çelişki ve sürtüşmeler ister istemez yıpranmasına vesile olmaktadır.

Eski Demokrat Parti ile yeni AP’nin adayını kabiliyet ve başarısı ile hezimete uğratan Belediye başkanı Hikmet Uğraş’ın ortanın solu ve halkla oluşma ve sendikal hareketlere karşı bigane kalmasına amil olan sanayiciler acaba bu yolda kendisini kurtarabilecek mi?

623

Eğer kat artırımını olmasa buraya müteahhitler girmeyecekti. Beldeler daha hızlı karar aldı, burada ise kat hakkı çok geç verildi. İlk planı yapanlar kat hakkını düşük tutmuş, bu yüzden şehirleşme geç oldu. Üniversitenin çizdiği plan, İstanbul’daki Etiler semti gibiydi.

Konutlaşmada dönüm noktası Emlak konutlarının yapılmasıydı. Emlak konutları ufukumuzu açtı. Sonra baktılar ki beş kat olmayınca müteahhitler girmiyor, piyasanın talebini dinlemek lazım. Sermaye, çıkarı yoksa allame-i cihan olsa yatırım yapmaz. Kızılpınar’da Adnan başkan 15 kat verdi, biz beş katı tartışıyorduk.

Appendix B
Provinces and Districts Included in PAD in 1972 Annual Program:

Provinces:

Adıyaman
Afyon
Ağrı
Artvin
Bingöl
Bitlis
Burdur
Edirne
Çankırı
Çorum
Diyarbakır
Erzincan
Erzurum
Elazığ
Gaziantep
Giresun
Gümüşhane
Hakkâri
Kars
Kastamonu
Malatya
Maraş
Mardin
Muş
Niğde
Ordu
Sivas
Siirt
Sinop
Tunceli
Urfa
Van
Yozgat

Districts:

Bahçe, Feke, Mağara (Tufanbeyli), Saimbeyli (Adana)
Taşova (Amasya)
Delice, Şereflikoçhisar (Ankara)
Akseki, Korkuteli, Gündoğmuş (Antalya)
Balya, Kepsut (Balıkesir)
Pazaryeri (Bilecik)
Yenice (Çanakkale)

Acıpayam, Çal, Çameli, Çardak, Çivril, Kale, Tavas (Denizli) 7
Altınözü, Yayladağ (Hatay)
Atabey, Yalvaç (Isparta)
Kiraz (İzmir)
Develi, Felahiye, Sarioğlan, Sarız, Tomarza, Yahyalı (Kayseri) 6
Kofçaz (Kırklareli)
Çiçekdağ, Kaman (Kırşehir)
Beyşehir, Bozkır, Doğanhisar, Ermenek, Hadım, Kulu, Seydişehir, Çumra (Konya) 8
Altıntaş, Gediz (Kütahya)
Yatağan (Muğla)
Derinkuyu, Gülşehir, Hacıbektaş (Nevşehir)
İkizdere, Kalkandere (Rize)
Terme, Vezirköprü (Samsun)
Çerkezköy (Tekirdağ)
Artova, Erbaa, Niksar, Reşadiye (Tokat)
Arsin, Çaykara, Sürmene, Tonya, Yomra (Trabzon)
Banaz, Sivaslı (Uşak)
Devrek, Kurucaşile (Zonguldak)

The Provinces Not Included in Both Lists:

İstanbul, İzmit, Bursa, Sakarya, Eskişehir, Bolu, Manisa, Aydın, Mersin.

Appendix C

First Issue of Çerkezköy Postası



Appendix D
Some Documents from Archive of Çerkezköy Industrialists' Association

A Letter Dated 1993

Sayın Ahmet Gayretli dikkatine

PEG A. Ş. 0.282.726 53 96

Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği tarafından
Çerkezköyün Sanayi Kenti oluşturma için
yapılan icraat hakkında özete bilgi


1. Çerkezköy'de 1973 yılında başlayan sanayi yatırımlarının üretim yapabilecek tesislere dönüştürülmesi, hiçbir alt yapısı olmayan bir bölge için, uzun ortak çaba ve maliyet gerektirmiştir.
2. Alt yapı oluşumu için her ay bir fabrika Tekirdağ, Edirne ve hatta Ankara yetkililerinde iştirak ettiği 70-80 kişilik büyük yemekli toplantılar yapılarak Çerkezköyün alt yapısı oluşturulmuştur:
 - Çorlu trafosundan Sanayiye ait bir yüksek gerilim hattı çektilerilerek bu hat enterkonnekte şebekeye bağlanmıştır.
 - Su temini için derinsu kuyuları için gerekli müsadeler alınarak o tarihlerdeki tesisler için kuyulara ve organize bölge bölge su ihtiyacını karşılayacak kuyuların yasal olarak yaptırılması sağlanmıştır.
 - İletişim için Çerkezköye 2 defa yeni santraller yaptırılarak telefon ihtiyacı sağlanmıştır.
 - Kınalıköprü Çerkezköy stabilize yolun ilk asfaltlandırılması maliyetin % 15'inin Sanayicilerin katkısıyla ancak mümkün olabilmektedir. Bedel Sanayicilerden dernek defterine konmaktan ayrıca toplanmıştır.
 - Asayiş, ulaşım, iç vollar, yeni kurulan muhaviye merkezi gibi tesislerde çalışan kimselere ait lojman, eşya ve ihtiyaçları oluşumuna kadar Sanayiciler tarafından sağlanmıştır.
3. Alt yapı oluşumu için yapılan tüm harcamalar, bilhassa sık sık yapılan Ankara seyahatleri masrafları hatta partilere yapılan başlıklar şükretilerle karşılanmıştır.
4. İhtiyaçların sağlanması için her fabrika İstanbulda müstakki, vemekli toplantılar yaparak işlerin çabuklaştırılmasını sağlamıştır.
5. Organizeenin ilk çalışmalarında gerek projelerin takibi ve hatta ilk 6 ay Bölge Müdürlüğü görevi fahriyen Sanayi temsilcileri tarafından karşılanmıştır.
6. Yukarıdaki katkılara ilaveten bu oluşum ve özellikle Organize sanayi bölgesine katkıyı sağlamak amacıyla Dernekte Sanayicilerden büyüklükleri oranında katkılar sağlanmıştır. Bu şekilde Organize Sanayi Bölgesinin kurulması ve sür'atle (emsallerine göre) bitirilmesi mümkün olabilmektedir.
7. Derneğin Çerkezköy için yaptığı ve Sanayicilerden sağlanan bütün paraları yurtdışı hizmetlerin haricinde kalan kısmı ilişik listede resmi defterlerden çıkarılmıştır. Bu meblağ 1974 - 1992 (dahil) arasında 8 1.286.612 ye baliğ olmaktadır.


SKLARI 1 Dernek kanalıyla yapılan harcamalar listesi
2 Dolar kurlarıyla ilgili liste

erdoğan yalın

03.10.2011

The Latter Written by Naim Akbay to Orhan Öztrak





ÇERKEZKÖY ORGANİZE SANAYİ BÖLGESİ
MÜTEŞEBBİS TEŞEKKÜLÜ
ÇERKEZKÖY
D : 254

Sayı :
Konu :

...../...../.....

ve 9.06/8600 sayılı cevabî yazısı ile Çerkezköy'de daha evvel kaldırılan teşvik tedbirlerinin 1979 programına tekrar alınacağı tarafımıza bildirilmişti.

Bu durumun devam etmesi ilerde gerek müteşebbis heyetimizi gerekse Bakanlığınızı telâfisi çok zor durumlara düşürecektir. Aynı şekilde teşvik göreceklerini umarak Çerkezköy Organize Sanayi Bölgesinde şimdiden gerekli arsa müracaatında bulunan birçok müteşebbislerde bu karar karşısında teşebbüslerinden vazgeçmek durumunda kalmışlardır.


Konunun ehemmiyetine binaen tarafınızdan acilen tetkiki ile Çerkezköy'ün 1979 yılından itibaren teşvik kapsamına alınmasını herşeyden evvel Organize Sanayi Bölgelerinin kurulmasını esprisi bakımından yüksek takdirlerinizle ünele arz eder, saygılar sunarız.

Naim A K P A Y
Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği ve
Organize Sanayi Böl. Müt. Hey. Bşk. 7

Gereği için: Sanayi Ve Tek. Bakanlığı
Bilgi için : Devlet Plânlama teş. Müsteşarlığı

20.05.2011

The Latter Written by Mecdi Arca to Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu



kazanarak ülke ekonomisindeki yerini almasına hız katar.
tır.

- 2 -

Dolayısıyla bu hususun düzeltilerek, bizler için de eşit bir uygulamaya geçileceği yolundaki inancımızı teyid etmek isteriz.

Yoğun mesaileriniz arasında, zat-ı alilerinizi, sorunlarımızla meşgul ettiğimizden dolayı affımızın kabulünü rica eder, Üstün Devlet hizmetlerinizin devamı dileklerimizizin lütfen kabul buyurulmasını arzederiz.

Derin Saygılarımızla.

Çerkezköy Sanayicileri Derneği
Başkanı

Mecdi Arca

17.05.2011 16:49

ÇERKEZKÖY SANAYİCİLER DERNEĞİ
24'ÜNCÜ OLAĞAN GENEL KURUL
YÖNETİM KURULU FAALİYET RAPORU
04 ŞUBAT 1998

Sayın Başkan, Çerkezköy Sanayiciler Derneği'nin değerli üyeleri,

Yönetim Kurulumuz adına hepinizi saygı ve sevgilerimizle selamlar, 24'üncü Olağan Genel Kurulumuza teşriflerinizden dolayı teşekkürlerimizi sunar, 1998 yılının Ülkemize ve Milletimize mutluluklar ve başarılar getirmesini dileriz.

Değerli Arkadaşlarımız;

1973 yılında 11 firmanın işverenlerinin müşterek arzuları ile kurulan Derneğimiz bugün 25. yılını idrak etmiştir.

Derneğimiz 24.11.1973 tarihinde tüzel kişilik hakkını kazanmıştır. Derneğimizin İlk Yönetim Kurulu Başkanı Sn.Halit NARİN ve Yönetim Kurulu Üyeleri :Sn.Mecdi ARCA, Sn.Necmettin ÖZTEMİR, Sn.Cüneyt BESEN, Sn.Nuri CERİT, Sn.Kaymaz AKKALAY

Dostlarımızdır.

Derneğimiz kurulduğu günden bugüne kadar Sanayicilerimize ve Çerkezköy'e pek çok olumlu hizmetler yapmıştır ve halen bu hizmetlerine devam etmektedir.

Derneğimizin bugüne kadar gerçekleştirdiği hizmetlerin kısa bir özetini vermek isteriz.

Kınalı Köprü/Çerkezköy arası devlet karayolunun asfaltlanması. Yıl 1974

Çerkezköy Elektrik Nakil Hatlarının sanayicinin ihtiyacını karşılayacak şekilde düzenlenmesi için Ankara nezdinde girişim Yıl 1974

Çerkezköy Telefon Santralının halli. Yıl 1974

03.10.2011 Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı ile birlikte: Yol - Su - Kredi - Elektrik - Muhaberat - Altyapı - Sağlık - Sosyal sorunların halledilmesi için çalışmalar. Yıl 1974

Organize Sanayi Bölgesi'nin kuruluşu ile ilgili çalışmalar. Yıl 1975

Trakya Otoyolunun Çerkezköy'e yakın geçmesi ve Çerkezköy'e bağlanması hususunda Bayındırlık Bakanlığı ile temaslar. Yıl 1975

Çerkezköy'e Gümrük Teşkilatının Kurulması için Gümrük ve Tekel Bakanlığı ile temaslara. Yıl 1975

Organize Sanayi Bölgesinin kuruluşu. Yıl 1976

Sanayide çalışanların konut probleminin halli için Devlet Arsa Ofisi ile görüşmeler. Yıl 1976

Çalışma Bakanlığı'nın işgüvenliği konusunda taleplerinin İMGA Mühendislik Bürosuna yaptırılması. Yıl 1976

Toplu Konut için Arsa Ofisi Genel Müdürlüğü'nün iskan sahası olarak ayırdığı 1.660.000 m² lik arazinin tamamının satın alınması. Yıl 1976

Güvenlik probleminin halli için Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü ve Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı nezdinde girişimlerde bulunulması. Yıl 1978

Arıtma Tesisleri ve ana kollektörü için SUTEM Ltd. ile ilk girişim Yıl 1978

Çerkezköy'ün tekrar teşvik kapsamına alınması için girişim Yıl 1979

Organize Sanayi Bölgesi inşaat ve diğer faaliyetler için Sanayi ve Teknoloji Bakanlığı'ndan Türkiye Halk Bankası aracılığı ile krediler alınması için iştirak paylarının teminat mektubu olarak karşılanması. Yıl 1981

Arıtma Tesisine ait tatbikat projesi için gereken ödemenin yapılması. Yıl 1982

Değerli Dostlarımız;

Derneğimiz Bölgemize o kadar çok hizmete öncülük etmiştir ki bunları saymak için bugün zamanımız yetmez. Ancak bu hizmetleri çevremize verirken bize yardımcı olan destek veren:

- İlimiz Tekirdağ'da görev yapan tüm Valilerimize,
- İlçemiz Çerkezköy Kaymakamları ve Belediye Başkanlarımıza,
- Maddi ve manevi destekleriyle yanımızda olan Sanayici arkadaşlarımıza bu vesile ile şükranlarımızı ifade ederiz.

Dostlarımız;

Yaklaşık iki yıldır görevde olan biz Yönetim Kurulu Üyeleri de bizden önceki Sanayici Dostlarımız gibi bizlere sağladığınız maddi ve manevi imkanlarla Bölgemiz Sanayicilerine ve Çerkezköy'e hizmete devam ettik.

Bizim dönemimizde: Derneğimiz bütçe olanakları ölçüsünde yöremizde çeşitli kuruluşların ihtiyaç duyduğu yardım taleplerinin önemli bir kısmını karşılamıştır. Bu yardımlarımız;

03.10.2011

- Çerkezköy Tapu Sicil Memurluğu'na bilgisayar alımı,
 - İsmetpaşa Mahallesi Cami Yaptırma Derneği'ne maddi yardımda bulunulması,
 - Endüstri Meslek Lisesi Bilgisayar Eğitimi Laboratuvarı yapımı için maddi yardımda bulunulması,
 - Fevzi Paşa İlköğretim Okulu'nun bahçe istinat duvarlarının yapımı için maddi yardımda bulunulması,
 - Emniyet Başmüfettişliği Çorlu Bölge Müdürlüğü'nün buzdolabı ihtiyacının karşılanması,
 - Kapaklı Sağlık Ocağı'nın bilgisayar ihtiyacının karşılanması,
 - Hacı Fahri Sümbül Anadolu Meslek Lisesi'ne maddi yardımda bulunulması,
 - Sanayiciler İlkokuluna bir adet fotokopi makinasının hibe edilmesi,
 - SSK Hastanesi Derneğine faaliyetlerine devam edebilmesi için maddi yardımda bulunulması,
 - Yoncalı Barajı için DSİ XI.Bölge Müdürlüğü ile temaslarda bulunulması,
 - Bölgemizde faaliyet gösteren Spor Kulüplerine maddi destekte bulunulması,
 - Sanayi Polis Karakolu'na 758 19 60 no.lu telefonun hibe edilmesi,
- gibi hizmetleri yerine getirdik.

Yönetim Kurulumuzun fahri olarak gerçekleştirdiği bu görevde sizlerin ilgi ve desteğine teşekkürü bir borç biliriz. Sizlerin katılımı, ilgi ve desteğinizle Derneğimiz maddi ve manevi olarak da güçlenerek gelecek günlerde daha da yoğunlaşacak sorunlara göğüs gerebilecektir.

Bütün sorunları aşmada her zamankinden fazla olarak, birlik ve beraberliği ihtiyacımız vardır.

Bölgemizin sorunlarına hakimiyeti ve dirayetli yönetimiyle bizlere her zaman destek olan Sayın Valimizin ve Yerel Yöneticilerimizin de yardımıyla, tüm sorunların aşılabacağı inancı içindeyiz.


Bu düşünceler içinde 1998'de verimli ve başarılı çalışmalar dileklerimizle saygılar sunarız.

YÖNETİM KURULU

[Signature]

03.10.2011

A Few Examples of Black Lists



P E M K O
KASIM AYI İŞÇİ ÇIKIŞLARI

<u>Sicil No.</u>	<u>Adı Soyadı</u>	<u>Çıkış nedeni</u>
1071	Vahip Akpınar	Devamsız
2015	Hamdi Adalı	Başarısız
915	Kamber Alyaz	Askerlik
2031	Saim Can	Başarısız
1084	Muzaffer Diri	İstifa
1968	Rahim Katı	İstifa
923	Erdoğan Kızıl	Askerlik
1242	Erdoğan Kara	17.Madde
2026	Arif Soytürk	Devamsız
2021	Eftal Taşçılar	İstifa
2002	Rıza Yıldız	İstifa
942	Melahat Yağcı	İstifa
2029	Zeynel Yıldız	Başarısız



AKIP TEKSTİL

SANAYİ ve TİCARET A.Ş.

ÇERKEZKÖY/7.2.1978
Refs:FM/CK/Dg.Y/78-82
Konu:İşten ayrılan personel Hk.

ÇERKEZKÖY SANAYİCİLER DERNEĞİ
BAŞKANLIĞI'na,

MECİDİYEKÖY/İSTANBUL


14.12.1977 tarihi ile 31.1.1978 tarihleri arasında işten ayrılan
personel listesi aşağıda çıkartılmıştır.

Bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Saygılarımızla,
AKIP TEKSTİL
SANAYİ ve TİCARET A.Ş.

E.İ/P.Y

ADI SOYADI	GÖREVİ	ÇIKIŞ TARİHİ	SEBEBİ
Fatma DÖNMEZ	İplik Yedek	14.12.1977	Devamsızlık
Hasan ÖREN	Harman Arkacı	15.12.1977	İhraç
Aynur GEZER	Triko	15.12.1977	"
Sadi SIRACA	Cer Fitil Ust.	21.12.1977	"
Recep BAYRAKTAR	Kard Ekip Ust.	21.12.1977	"
Hikmet KULAKSIZ	Cerci	24.12.1977	İstifa
Semra SEVİM	Velkmann Büküm	28.12.1977	"
And NAİBOĞLU	İplik Ustabası	4. 1.1978	"
Betül GİRGİN	Muhasebe Şef Muav.	9.1.1978	"
Neriman AKALIN	Merkezi Büro M.	9.1.1978	"
Enver USLU	Takimeci Yedek	13.1.1978	Deneme Senu
Fikret BAŞKAYA	Fitil Takimeci	24.1.1978	Devamsızlık
Sabri TOMGAÇ	İplik Bakimeci	25. 1.1978	İstifa
Gülseven KURŞUN	Triko	30. 1.1978	İhraç
Nilgün KURŞUN	"	30. 1.1978	"



**GÜMÜSSUYU HALI
SANAYİİ VE TİCARET A.Ş.**

inönü caddesi no. 96, taksim - istanbul
gümüşsuyu caddesi no. 56, topkapı - istanbul
karaağaç yolu, cerkezköy - tekirova

telefon : 43 33 06 (4 hat)
telefon : 76 20 45 (3 hat)
telefon : 82 - Cerkezköy

sicilli ticaret no. 47214 / 9005
telgraf: gümüşhalı - İSTANBUL

ÇERKEZKÖY SANAYİCİLER DERNEĞİ
Büyükdere Cad : Garaj Sok :
No : 40 / 2 Daire : 4
MECİDİYEKÖY / İSTANBUL

~~XERKEZKÖY~~ ÇERKEZKÖY 1.2.1979

işaretimiz, Y.E./E.E. Sayı : 15

tarihiniz,

işaretiniz,

Fabrikamızdan 1.1.1979 - 31.1.1979 tarihleri arası ayrılan işçi durumu
aşağıya çıkartılmıştır.

Bilgi edinilmesini rica ederiz.

Saygılarımızla

GÜMÜSSUYU HALI SANAYİİ VE TİCARET A.Ş.
Karaağaç Yolu ÇERKEZKÖY

<u>Fb.SİCİLNO</u>	<u>ADI VE SOYADI</u>	<u>GÖREVİ</u>	<u>ÇIKIŞ TARİHİ</u>	<u>ÇIKIŞ NEDENİ</u>
675	ALİ GÜLÜŞTÜR	G.idare	2.1.1979	Askerlik nedeniyle
381	ŞÜKRÜYE ER	İplik ştr.	25.1.1979	İstifa
117	MAHMUT TUNGER	G.idare	10.1.1979	13.maddeye istinaden
955	R.AYŞE KARAKAŞ	Y.B.Aktarma	8.1.1979	Devamsız
1062	NEVZAT YENİCİ	Dokuma	11.1.1979	17.maddeye istinaden
304	PEMBE HASIRCI	G.idare	17.1.1979	13.maddeye istinaden
356	MEDET ERDOĞAN	Dokuma	18.1.1979	17.maddeye istinaden
1179	NACİ ÖZÜK	Apri-ütü	19.1.1979	13.maddeye istinaden
1518	FERİDE BAHTİYAR	Konfeksiyon	30.1.1979	İstifa

Bankalar : İş Bankası Yenice 120958 - İş Bankası Ayazpaşa 474 - Akbank Bahçekapı 6913/8 - Yapı Kredi Beyoğlu 2812/40
Ziraat Bankası Bahçekapı 3349 - Türk Ticaret Bankası Tophane 78-6 - Öğretmenler Bankası Beyoğlu 841 -
Vakıflar Bankası Beyoğlu 00/111-5 - Halk Bankası Karaköy 30203 - Osmanlı Bankası Yenice 711150/3 -
Etibank Karaköy 4371 - Emlak Kredi Bankası Harbiye 97.

Appendix E

News about a Workers' Protest in Devrim Newspaper in 1976

Sevginin Gücü Hiç
Bir Şeyde Yoktur.
Bülent Ecevit

Devrim

4
MART
1976
PERŞEMBE

HAKİKATİ KONUŞMAKTAN KORKMAYINIZ

YIL: 10 SAYI: 2483 * FİYAT: 50 Krs. * GÜNLÜK SİYASİ AKŞAM GAZETESİ * Sarıtas Pasajı No. 8-10-12 * 10 99 - ÇORLU

Narin Mensucat işçileri işvereni protesto etti

"Bu bir kaza değil, işverenin kâr uğruna yarattığı bir cinayettir"

Yayınlanan bildiride, 32 kişilik servis otobüsü ile 97 kişinin taşındığı belirtildi

Tekirdağ Milletvekili Yılmaz Alpaslan'ın Gümrük ve Tekel Bakanlığı bütçesi üzerinde yaptığı konuşma

Benekay'ın hazine yağmasına olanak sağlayan bu genelge karşımda bakana ne gibi bir işlem yaptığını bilerek sordu. Hemen günün belirteyim ki, Sayın Bakan. Özetle bu konuda hiç bir işlem yapılmamıştır. Sımdı ben bu gerçek karşısında An kara C. Saymanı göreve çağırıyor, genelgeyle devlet gümrüğünü sorduran Benekay hakkında kovuşturma açılmasını diliyorum.

Benekay'ın marifeti bu kadarla da bitmiyor. İstanbul satış gümrüğü müdürlüğü Benekay mazaıyla yapılan bir oto tahsisinin 1894 sayılı yasaya aykırı olduğunu, yazı ile kendisine bildirmesine karşın, 1976/1975 günlü yazıyla Benekay, kanun da te elyurum, derestine, arabasını verilmemesi emre diye Çorlu'ya ki bu kurala Gümrük ve Tekel Bakanlığı gibi değil, Cephe mantığı ile, orta çığı deresteyikleri gibi yürütüldü.

23 Şubat günlü Milliyet Gazetesi bu marifeti müsteşar yardımcısının yeni bir kanunusuzluğunu ortaya koyuyor. Gümrüklerden sokulmak istenen bir makinanın mevzuata aykırı olduğunu bildiren görevliye emir verip makinanın ithaline olanak sağlıyor. Davranışını kendisine soran gazeteciye de "1000 ke te böyle emir veririz" diyerek başına "bayrak ve kanunusuzluğun müsteşar yardımcısı olduğunu, Cepheye yazışır görevli olduğunu ortaya koyuyor. Bunlara ne buyurur sayın bakan?

11 TIR KAMYONU KAYBOLDU:

20 Kasım 1976 günlü Cumhuriyet Gazetesinin 1. sayfasında şu haber verilmektedir:

"Kapaklı emir kapısından Türkiye'ye giren 11 TIR Kamyonu kayboldu" aynı konuda Milliyet Gazetesi de ise haber şu başlıkla veriliyordu:

"Kapaklıyı geçen şüpheli 8 TIR Kamyonu ne oldu."

Dünyada hiç bir ülke gümrük kapısında, böyle bir yarı kapatma kapatma rastlamak olanaksızdır. Ne yazık ki, gümrük kapılarımızda şu tür olaylar hergün sergilenmektedir. Kaybolan 11 TIR'ın aradan 6 ay geçmesine karşın izine rastlanamamıştır. Plaka değiştirildikleri ve işletildikleri sayıları ülkemizin kaçakçılık merkezlerine hoplukları nedeniyle yazılıp söylenmekte ise de, bakanlık bu konuda aciz ve perşanlıktan ibarettir. TIR saygınları koruyup bakanlık arada bir görevlilere yer değiştirip, rinden ayrılmadan atama işlemi iptal etmektedir.

(Devamı yarın)

13.1976 günü Velimeşe köyünde meydana gelen ve 10 vatandaşımızın feci şekilde ölümü, birçok vatandaşımızın yaralanması ile neticelenen feci trafik kazasının yankıları devam etmektedir. Olay üzerinde bildiriler yayınlayan emekçi çevreler ve bu devrimin kurucuları, olayı, kaza değil, işverenin herşeyden önce tuttuğu "KAR" uğruna yarattığı bir cinayet olarak nitelendirmektedir.

Kazayı protesto etmek amacıyla bir bildiri yayınlayan Çerkezköy Narin Mensucat Fabrikası işçileri, işvereni protesto ederek, tüm işçileri birlik ve beraberliğe çağırışlardır. Bildirinin bazı bölümlerinde şöyle denilmektedir:

"Narin Mensucat patronu biz işçileri fabrikasına taşımak için kazaya uğrayan araba ile sözleşme yapmıştır. Taşıma işlemi başladığında kiralanan arabanın taşıma kurallarına uygun olmadığı teminle bizim tarafından sendikamız fabrikaya gelen dört servis otobüsünde insan taşıma ya elverişli olmayacak kadar eski ve bakımsız olduklarını tespit ederek, Çerkezköy Emniyet Komiserliği'ne ve fabrikaya uyarı yazıları gönderilmiştir.

Diğer isteklerimizle birlikte servis sorununu halledilmesini hep birlikte istedik. Karşılık alamayınca verilmeyen hakların alınması için, yapması gerekeni yaptık. 3.7.1975 tarihinde demokratik haklarımız olan iki günlük direniş gerçekleştirdik. Direniş neticesi servisler değişti ise de o zaman 400 kişi olan işçi sayısı kazanan olduğu 13.1976 tarihinde 700 kişiye ulaştığı halde, bir trenin Narin Mensucat Çerkezköy fabrikası işçilerini götürmekte olan servis otobüsünde 97 kişi taşınmaya başlandı.

Kazanın olduğu anda arabada 67 kişi bulunmaktaydı. Yalnızca kendi çıkarttığı düşünün patron insanların hayatlarını hiçe sayarak, insan onuruna yakışmayan araçlarla onları taşımak ve kazadan sonra da olayın fabrikada duyulması üzerine çalışmak istemeyen

biz işçileri kendikamızın yeticilerinin kaza yerinde bulunmamasından yararlanarak zorla çalıştırmak istemesi bile patronların, kendilerine alın teri ile milyonlar kazandıranlara karşı hiçbir de geri göstermektedir. Hatta kazanın ertesi günü ölen arkadaşlarımızın cenazelerini kaldırmaya gitmek isteyenimizi bile önlemeye çalışan,

fabrikasının bir günlük zararını milyonlar olduğunu söyleyen işverenin insan hayatına verdiği değer ortadadır.

Açıklamalarımız göstermektedir ki, bu bir kaza değil, Tatlı-kârlarından vazgeçmeyen her şeyde (servis de bile) kendi çıkarlarını elde eden işverenlerin yarattığı bir cinayettir.

ÇORLU'ya Ticaret Lisesi yapılması için ön çalışmalar başladı

Çorlu Ticaret ve Sanayi Odasının öncülüğünde Çorlu'ya Ticaret Lisesinin kazandırılması için çalışmalar başlatılmıştır. Bunun için Çorlu Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası Meclisi bu alanda gerekli çalışmaları yapmak amacıyla anararında bir müteşebbis heyet seçmiştir. Eysel Eren başkanlığındaki heyete Eyüp Du

zenli, Şabbettin Turmen, Adem Özen seçilmişlerdir. Heyet önümüzdeki günlerde bu alandaki çalışmalara başlayacaktır.

Bu konuda bir görüşme yaptığımız heyet başkanı Eysel Eren, Çorlu'da bir ticaret lisesi açılman için bütün imkânları kullanarak çalışma başlatmış olduğunu belirtti. Devamı S. 6'd

Alpaslan Çorluda

TBMM Bütçe Karar Komisyonundaki çalışmalarını tamamlayan,

CHP Tekirdağ Milletvekili Yılmaz Alpaslan, bu sabah Çorlu'ya gelmiştir.

Askeri Hastanede tedavi edilen Yahya Örnek öldü

Velimeşe trafik kazasında ölenlerin sayısı 10'a yükseldi


Önceki gün Velimeşe köyünde meydana gelen trafik kazasında, bir trenin Narin Mensucat Çerkezköy fabrikası işçilerini götürmekte olan servis otobüsünde 97 kişi taşınmaya başlandı.

Yaralananlar tedavi edilmek üzere Çorlu Devlet ve Askeri hastanelerine kaldırıldı.

miştir. Seçim bölgesinde bir süre kalacağını açıklayan Tekirdağ Milletvekili, bu süre içinde Tekirdağ'a bağlı ilçelere ziyaretlerde bulunacağını açıklamış, Türkiye'nin son günlerdeki iktisadi ve siyasi durumu ve Bütçe çalışmaları hakkında vatandaşlara açıklamalarda bulunacağını belirtmiştir.

Yılmaz Alpaslan bu amaçla bugün Malgara ilçesinde bir ziyarette bulunmuştur.

Appendix F
A Newspaper Article about Çerkezköy in Cumhuriyet Newspaper in 1981



Appendix G
A Map of Pre-Industrial Çerkezköy



Appendix H
A Satellite Image of Çerkezköy Organized Industrial Zone (2009)



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