

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
AFTER 15 JULY 2016

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Danzouma Alima Anda , certify that

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ABSTRACT

Turkish Foreign Policy Strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa after 15 July 2016.

The failed coup of 15 July 2016, marked the definitive split in the political relationship that linked the ruling AKP and the Gülen Movement (GM), both in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, the GM through its transnational networks of schools and businesses had long played a role in Turkish diplomacy, in its non-traditional areas, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Therefore, the events of 15 July 2016 induced a necessary transformation of Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, where the Turkish state should take over control of its foreign policy in that region, where it is now competing with one of its former transnational actors. To this effect, this research tries to address the issue of the change that affects the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, following the events of 15 July 2016. It also intends to tackle issues such as the relationship between the Turkish state and its civil society in foreign policy, as well as the theoretical issue of the success of a strategy of soft power with the state as the main agent. In this regard, Turkey's relationship with two SSA countries since 15 July 2016 onwards are analyzed as a case study of the reaction of SSA countries to the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA after the failed coup of July 2016, namely: Turkey-Senegal relationship and Turkey-Nigeria relationship. In doing this, this study relies on IR theories such as neo-classical realism, neo-realism, and soft power. It also uses the qualitative approach, with content analysis as a data analysis strategy.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Soft Power, Turkish foreign policy in SSA, AKP-GM political alliance, GM networks in Africa, GM schools in Africa.

ÖZET

15 Temmuz 2016 Sonrası Sahra Altı Afrika'da Türk Dış Politikası Stratejisi.

15 Temmuz 2016'daki başarısız darbe, hem Türk iç hem de dış politikasında iktidardaki AKP ile Gülen Hareketi'ni (GM) birbirine bağlayan siyasi ilişkide kesin bir kopuşa işaret etti. Gerçekten de GM, ulusötesi okul ve iş ağları aracılığıyla Türk diplomasisinde, geleneksel olmayan alanlarında, özellikle Sahra Altı Afrika'da (SAA) uzun süredir rol oynamıştı. Bu nedenle, 15 Temmuz 2016 olayları, Türk devletinin şu anda eski ulusötesi aktörlerinden biriyle rekabet halinde olduğu bu bölgede dış politikasının kontrolünü devralması gereken SAA'daki Türk dış politika stratejisinde gerekli bir dönüşümü tetikledi. Bu amaçla, bu araştırma, 15 Temmuz 2016 olaylarının ardından Türk dış politika stratejisini etkileyen değişim konusunu ele almaya çalışmaktadır. Ayrıca, dış politikada Türk devleti ile sivil toplumu arasındaki ilişki gibi konuların yanı sıra, devletin ana ajan olduğu bir yumuşak güç stratejisinin başarısına ilişkin teorik meseleyi ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin 15 Temmuz 2016'dan bu yana iki SAA ülkesiyle ilişkisi, Temmuz 2016'daki başarısız darbe girişiminin ardından SAA'daki Türk dış politika stratejisine SAA ülkelerinin tepkisinin bir vaka çalışması olarak analiz edilmektedir: Türkiye-Senegal ilişkisi ve Türkiye-Nijerya ilişkileri. Bunu yaparken, bu çalışma neo-klasik gerçekçilik, yeni gerçekçilik ve yumuşak güç gibi uluslararası ilişkiler teorilerine dayanmaktadır. Ayrıca, veri analizi stratejisi olarak içerik analizi ile nitel yaklaşımı kullanır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türk dış politikası, Yumuşak Güç, SSA'da Türk dış politikası, AKP-GM siyasi ittifakı, Afrika'daki GM ağları, Afrika'daki GM okulları.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADB	Africa Development Bank
AFAD	Afet ve Acil Durum Yonetimi Baskanligi
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi
AKSIAD	Association for Cultural, Social, and Economic Cooperation between Turkey and African Countries
AOF	French West Africa
AQIM	Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAR	Central Africa Republic
CEMAC	Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community
COEDAT-NATO	Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEIK	Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DTM	Under secretariat of Foreign Trade
EAC	East Africa Community
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central Africa States
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West Africa States
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FETO	Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü
GM	Gülen Movement

GNP	Gross National Product
IBF	International Business Forum
ICC	Islamic Chamber of Commerce
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IDEF	International Defense Industry Fair
IHH	Insan Haklari ve Hizmet
IR	International Relations
ISIS	Islamic State in Syria
KDK	Turkish Public Diplomacy Office
KYM	Kim Se Yok Mu
LDC	Least Developed Countries
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MÜSIAD	Mustakil Sanayici ve Isadamlari Dernegi
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa Development
NDU	National Defense University
NPD	New Public Diplomacy
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OIC	Organization of Islamic Cooperation (formerly Organization of the Islamic Conference)
PD	Public Diplomacy
PKK	Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers' Party)
PSE	Emerging Senegal Plan
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
SSB	Savunma Sanayi Baskanligi

SME	Small and Medium Size Enterprise
TFP	Turkish Foreign Policy
TIKA	Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı
TİM	Turkish Exporters Assembly
TMF	Turkish Maarif Foundation
TOKİ	Toplu Konut İdarsi Başkanlığı
TUBİTAK	Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey
TÜSİAD	Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği
TUSKON	Türkiye İşadamları ve Sanayiciler Konfederasyonu
UAV	Unnamed Aerial Vehicles
UDEF	Federation of International Students of Turkey
UN	United Nations
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
WFP	World Food Program
YTB	Turks Abroad and Related Communities
ZLECAF	Africa Continental Free Trade Area

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

“For us, the ultimate importance of July 15 is that it has become the symbol of the first and glorious resistance of our nation against the coups it has been subject to throughout its history. (...) Such events take their place as harbingers of change and progress in the history of nations. From now on the history of Türkiye will be analyzed in two periods, before and after July 15, proving the strength of our democracy and demonstrating the power of our nation”.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (15 July 2022)¹

On the night of 15 July 2016, a group of Turkish soldiers engaged in a bloody and failed coup attempt to overthrow President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and his party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP or in Turkish AKP) that had ruled the country since 2002. The plotters were revealed to be part of FETÖ (Fethullahcı Terorist Örgütü - Fethullahcı Terrorist Organization), a terrorist organization as recognized by the Turkish state, affiliated with the Gülen movement (GM),² an organization created by the Turkish cleric Fethullah Gülen. The failed putsch came after a series of confrontations between the AKP government and the GM that were already visible since 2013. However, 15 July 2016, became a major turning point in Turkish politics, leading to a wide-scale crackdown on individuals and organizations associated with the GM and by extension FETÖ.

¹ “Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016”, *TRT World*, (July 15, 2022). Online, retrieved from: <http://trt.world/subscribe>.

² For more information about the Gülen Movement, see Joshua Hendrick, *Gülen: The Ambiguous Politics of Market Islam in Turkey and the World* (New York: NYU Press, 2014); also Hakan Yavuz, “A Framework for Understanding the Intra-Islamist Conflict between the AK Party and the Gülen Movement”, in *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, 19 (1, 2018), p. 11-32.

The coup attempt and the disagreement that started a few years before it, represented a dramatic change compared to the previous role the GM had seemed to occupy in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy networks, during the earlier part of the twenty-first century. In fact, the AKP government and the GM had formed a close symbiotic relationship, especially between 2007- 2013, an association for which President Erdoğan, himself, later publicly expressed regret.³ The partnership between the Turkish government and the GM was particularly efficient in the field of Turkish foreign policy (TFP), as both players found a conjunction of interests in their ambitions regarding particular regions of the world. The said ambitions were notably reflected in the AKP government's "strategic depth" doctrine, which aimed to increase Turkey's influence in the countries of the Global South as well as in Turkey's neighboring countries, by the pooling of the actions of the Turkish public and private actors in TFP, to expand the country's soft power. Businesses and civil society organizations associated with the GM played a role in this expansion. Though being an Islamist movement, the GM took on the motto of "build schools rather than mosques", and hence encouraged its members to open schools in Turkey and more than 120 countries, particularly in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Angey, 2015). Owing in part to the activities of the GM network abroad, notably in the areas of education and humanities, Turkey was able to increase its international influence during the 2000s. Therefore, the split between the Turkish government and the GM and its affiliated network, which culminated in the events of 15 July 2016, has potentially essential

³ Erdoğan's discourse explicitly connects this relationship to an interest in the GM's activities abroad: "Late [prime ministers] Demirel, Özal, Ecevit, and even we supported this structure [i.e. GM] alike. Even I helped them even though they had many qualities that I did not approve of. We tolerated them for the sake of the education activities they carried on abroad ... May God and our people forgive us." *NTV*, "Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Rabbim de milletim de bizi affetsin," August 3, 2016, <https://www.ntv.com.tr/turkiye/rabbim-de-milletim-de-bizi-affetsin,a-10dDB6SEucoS9ZT8sSmQ>.

fallouts in TFP, given that the Turkish government started to crack down on the affiliates of the GM / FETÖ not only domestically but also abroad.

This thesis studies how this break in the political alliance between the GM and the AKP affected the TFP strategy in SSA. It argues that after July 15, 2016, there has been a structural change in terms of the participant actors, and a change towards the greater use of hard power instruments compared with the relatively more soft power-oriented policy of the period before the coup attempt. The thesis also demonstrates, through a comparative examination of the cases of Senegal and Nigeria that these changes were received and absorbed in different ways across SSA countries, resulting in easier compliance with or resistance to the new TFP orientation, depending on the linkages the Turkish state had with the receiving state and the society. Thus, the study reveals two different reactions of SSA countries to the post-July 2016' TFP strategy in SSA focused on the fight against the GM network, according to the economic power of the countries. Indeed, there is, on the one hand, a rather negative reaction to the TFP post-July 2016, in the SSA's economic powers, in particular countries like Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya, which have a diplomatic and economic power similar to that of Turkey, and therefore are likely to resist to the Turkish demands regarding the fight against the GM on their territories. On the other hand, there is a positive reaction of economically less advanced countries of SSA, like Chad, Mali, Cameroon, and Senegal to the TFP post-July 2016 in general, and more specifically to the fight against the GM network in Africa initiated by the Turkish Government, given that Ankara exercises a stronger influence in these countries, due to its dominance in the balance of power, namely economically. The study of the selected SSA countries' reactions to the TFP after the July 2016 events, also exhibits a disagreement between these SSA states and their societies regarding the issue of the Turkish government's fight against

the GM on their territories. This reveals the strength of the implantation of GM in SSA societies, notably through its network of schools, and is embodied by the opposition of the SSA societies to the transfer of the Turkish government's fight against GM to their countries. Finally, this study highlights the importance of national interest as the driver of the foreign policy of states, as illustrated by the compliance of the selected SSA to the TFP post-July 2016, despite the opposition of their societies. Hence, the analyzes carried out within the framework of Nigeria and Senegal, showed that even if the request of the Turkish authorities to put an end to the activities of the GM in these countries ran up against the disapproval of the civil society of these countries, Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, which for several years has efficiently combined soft power with hard power, in particular through the enhancement of the security component in the said foreign policy strategy, has enabled Turkey to reverse the trend in the decline of its image in SSA, prompted by the withdrawal of the GM as the major player in the Turkish strategy in SSA. The study thus contributes to the study of Turkish foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa and the wider theoretical literature on soft power in the field of International Relations.

1.1 Background of the study: the Gülen movement and the Turkish foreign policy strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa

Until falling out with each other, The AKP government and the GM had a partnership of convenience, which enabled them to achieve their ambitions both in Turkish domestic and foreign policy. The relationship was grounded on the sharing of a common ideology, as both organizations were rooted in the Islamist movement. The AKP and the GM also had the same social base, namely the Anatolian middle classes, morally conservative but economically liberal and favorable to globalization (Balci,

2013). Besides, they both had the same political rivals, namely the Turkish army and the bureaucratic elite run by the secular Kemalist intelligentsia (Balci, 2013). Hence, the two Islamist movements joined forces in the 2000s to gain power in Turkey. This political alliance based on convergent mutual interests enabled them to reinforce their complementarity and face their common political rivals. This complementarity consisted for the GM in the political support of the AKP in its activities both in Turkey and abroad, and for the AKP in the support of the GM's social roots, which was made up of a powerful network with significant international ramifications. This network brought together millions of supporters and was present in all sectors of Turkish society, the economy, education, and media but also in the Turkish administration. It included in particular a television channel (Samanyolu TV), a press organ (*Zaman*), an intellectual foundation (Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi –Journalists and Writers Foundation), an employers' union (TUSKON), a humanitarian association (Kimse Yok Mu), all articulated around a network of high-level schools both in Turkey and abroad (Angey, 2015). Indeed, one of the main mottos of this movement, “build schools rather than mosques”, it has encouraged its members to open schools in Turkey and more than 120 countries, particularly in Central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Angey, 2015). Thanks in part to the activities of the GM network abroad, notably in the areas of education and humanities, Turkey was able to increase its international influence and raise the status of global power on the international stage during the 2000s.

Henceforth, this political alliance between the AKP and the GM, was particularly efficient in the field of Turkish foreign policy (TFP), as both players found a conjunction of interests in their ambitions regarding particular regions of the world in the 2000s. Indeed, almost dormant until the early 2000s, diplomatic relations between Turkey and countries of the Global South, namely Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

and Latin America countries, have largely benefited from Gülenist networks to develop. Especially as far as TFP in SSA, which is the focus of this study, is concerned, it is possible to observe a conjunction of actions in the agendas of the Turkish government and the GM in this area of the African continent in the early 2000s (Angey, 2015). Actually, since 1998, the Turkish government had launched an “Opening up to Africa” program, aimed at increasing not only cultural and social exchanges, but also economic and political relations with SSA countries. This program of opening up to the SSA region was part of a policy to revitalize Turkish foreign policy, intending to establish Turkey as a global power, in particular by strengthening its presence in the Global South, namely the countries of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it is only with the rise to power of the AKP in 2002, that this ambitious program will be implemented by the Turkish government, notably in line with the "strategic depth" doctrine, as theorized by the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu. The said doctrine was based in particular on the strategy of soft power, to increase Turkey's influence in the countries of the Global South as well as in Turkey's neighboring countries, through the pooling of the actions of the Turkish public and private actors in Turkey's foreign policy. Thus, SSA now seemed to be a fundamental ally in helping Turkey to assert itself on the international scene (Angey, 2015). Consequently, the Turkish government will multiply the initiatives aimed at opening up the SSA region to Turkey, in particular in 2005, declared “Year of Africa” in Turkey, and 2008, with the organization of the first Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit in Istanbul, during which PM Erdoğan invited Turkish businessmen to invest massively in SSA (Angey, 2015). It should be noted that acting as the civilian part of this SSA expansion policy, Turkish businessmen from the new Anatolian bourgeoisie, well integrated into globalization, in particular those of TUSKON, close to the GM,

were key players in the accession of Turkish trade to the market of SSA countries (Angey, 2015). Indeed, TUSKON has contributed to initiating and intensifying the economic and trade relations between Turkey and the SSA region, in particular through the organization of the “Turkey-Africa Trade Bridge”, which was an economic forum organized annually by the TUSKON from 2006 to 2011, and which enabled the meeting of bureaucrats and businessmen of both Turkey and Africa.⁴ Besides, it is worth emphasizing that taking advantage of the economic, political, and social liberalism in sub-Saharan African countries during the 90s, the GM also developed its network of private schools, in several SSA countries by the end of the 90s- early 2000s, namely few years before the implementation of the Africa Action Plan by the Turkish government. Hence, this network of schools was for several years the main Turkish actors in a space where the Turkish state was not represented. These schools, subsequently extended their activities in SSA, to the field of the humanities, particularly in favor of fellow Muslim populations in SSA countries, through Turkish humanitarian NGOs such as KYM, per the religious vocation of the GM. These activities of Turkish civil society actors in SSA, in the fields of education, trade, and humanities, enabled Turkey to increase its influence and prestige in SSA countries during the 2000s. In return, the AKP has given its political and above all symbolic support to the GM educational, commercial, and humanitarian actions in SSA countries. Hence, this synergy of the efforts, of both the Turkish state and Turkish private actors members of the GM, have enabled Turkey to rapidly develop its ties with the countries of SSA, during the decade ranging from 2005 to 2013, and to become one of the major emerging powers in SSA, in competition with other emerging countries such as China, Russia, India or Brazil. Thus, as stated by Özkan and Akgün

⁴ For more information about this forum as well as the significant role of TUSKON in the development of trade relation between Turkey and SSA, see: Özkan and Akgün (2010).

(2010, p. 351): “Turkey- Africa policy is based on consensus and civil society backed institutions, which is critical for Turkey's long-term involvement in the continent”. In a nutshell, for nearly a decade, the alliance between the AKP and the GM, worked well, allowing them at the level of domestic policy to neutralize their common political rivals the Kemalist army and the Turkish secular elite, and internationally to garner various foreign policy success.

However, from 2010 onwards, the political alliance between the two Islamist allies began to crack, divergences between both allies having emerged in both domestic and foreign policy. First, at the level of Turkish foreign policy, the first disagreement between the AKP and the GM took place in the framework of a diplomatic crisis between Turkey and Israel in May 2010. The crisis erupted between the two countries after a humanitarian convoy of the Turkish NGO IHH, close to the AKP, tried to defy the blockade of the Gaza Strip by the Israeli authorities. Fethullah Gülen publicly disapproved of the Turkish NGO's initiative for its non-compliance with legal provisions and its recklessness, criticized the government for supporting it, and distanced himself from Prime Minister Erdoğan's anti-Israel rhetoric. As far as domestic politics was concerned, a divergence of view between the AKP and the GM appeared within the framework of the Gezipark demonstrations of May 2013 in Turkey. In a public statement, Gülen notably denounced the police repression and the authoritarian drift of PM Erdoğan in the management of the said crisis.

The now antagonistic relationship between the AKP and the GM, experienced its first peak in December 2013, when prosecutors close to the GM launched a vast investigation for corruption against PM Erdoğan and his closest allies, both AKP members and businessmen (Zarcone, 2016). For their part, PM Erdoğan and the AKP have accused the Gülen movement of trying to launch a judicial coup against the

government. However, these events of December 2013 served to highlight the depth of the GM's infiltration into the Turkish state apparatus, as well as the extent of the spying and eavesdropping operations it had undertaken in all departments of state and government, and against thousands of politicians, academics and businessmen. Thus, it was shown later on, in 2016 that the GM had fraudulently infiltrated the Turkish judiciary, by cheating in the recruitment exams for judicial officials, the police, and the army from 2009 to 2013 (Zarcone, 2016). President Erdoğan reacted by accusing the GM of being behind a “parallel state”, whose aim was to seize power and began a campaign of repression against the GM both internally and internationally. The Turkish government banned the schools of the Gülen community and its exams preparation courses, before suspending, dismissing, or imprisoning the civil servants linked to the GM, who were present in large numbers in several ministries (Justice, Interior, Education, Foreign Affairs, etc.) (Zarcone, 2016). The Turkish armed forces, however, were not being purged (Zarcone, 2016). The repression continued unabated during the years 2014 and 2015. Finally, the antagonism between the AKP and the GM culminated with the coup attempt on the night of 15 July 2016, plotted by the “uprising of a minority within the army”,⁵ which marked the definitive split in the alliance between the AKP and the GM.

Indeed, the triggering event of the coup would have been the announcement of an upcoming purge of Gülenist elements within the Turkish army, during the high military council which was to be held in August 2016 (Zarcone, 2016). Officers linked to the GM would then have decided to bring down the regime (Zarcone, 2016). This coup attempt failed, however, due in particular to the small number and poor organization of the putschists, who failed to rally the entire Turkish army and Turkish

⁵ These words are retrieved from President Erdoğan speech on the night of the coup.

population to their cause. Thus, once public and constitutional order were restored, President Erdoğan declared a state of emergency, and intensified the massive purge against members of the GM in all sectors of Turkish society (Zarcone, 2016). 7,400 soldiers were arrested, including a third of the generals and admirals of the Turkish army (Zarcone, 2016). The Turkish army underwent a complete reorganization, and 149 generals out of 358 were dismissed (Zarcone, 2016). The main bureaucratic apparatuses of the State were also the subject of purges on an exceptional scale, incommensurate with those of the previous months. By the end of August 2016, 40,000 people were arrested and 150,000 civil servants were suspended or dismissed (Zarcone, 2016). The arrests also extended to members of large financial groups, the media, universities, as well as diplomatic personnel, posted abroad close to the GM. The reason invoked was generally the same: “complicity with an armed terrorist organization” (Zarcone, 2016). Indeed, the GM is now considered by the Turkish authorities as a terrorist organization, and the acronym FETÖ (Fethullahcı Terrorist Örgütü - Fethullahcı Terrorist Organization) is henceforth used to qualify the GM.

However, the new stand of the Turkish government towards the GM, now perceived as a security threat to the Turkish state, will have profound repercussions on the relations between Turkey and several of its foreign partners, more particularly SSA countries, given the strong implantation of the GM in SSA. Hence the Turkish government intensified in SSA the repression campaign against the GM it started several years before the coup, notably against GM civil society organizations such as the TUSKON and KYM, and most especially against the school of the GM perceived as the main financial asset of the organization, all accused of “joining a terrorist organization and financing terrorist acts”. Therefore, during an official visit to SSA in 2017, following the coup attempt, President Erdoğan stated:

We are making strenuous efforts to clear FETÖ from friendly and brotherly geographies in Africa (...) this herd of murderers, this organization, which was caught red-handed on the night of July 15, is no longer capable of hiding under the disguise of dialogue, service, education, or trade.⁶

Hence, it appears from this development that, the split in the political alliance between the two Turkish public and private actors following the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, has considerably impacted the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, given the strong partnership between both former political allies in this field. With this in mind, this thesis studies how this split in the political alliance between the AKP and the GM, affected the TFP strategy in SSA. It argues that there has been a structural change in terms of the participant actors with a greater presence of the Turkish state, and a reshaping of the partnership between the Turkish state and Turkish Civil Society Organizations (CSO) in the field of the TFP in SSA, as compared to the era before the coup attempt. This study further claims that there is a conceptual change in the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, towards the greater use of hard power instruments such as Turkish military might as a tool of Turkish influence in SSA, compared with the relatively more soft power-oriented policy of the period before 15 July 2016 events. Finally, this thesis also demonstrates, through a comparative examination of the cases of Turkey's relations with two Sub-Saharan African countries, namely Senegal and Nigeria, selected analytically, according to criteria such as the extent of their diplomatic and economic relations with the Turkish state, as well as the importance of the GM network within these countries, that these changes were received and absorbed in different ways across SSA countries, resulting in easier compliance with or

⁶ Official web page of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, https://www.tcbb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70781/afrikali_dostlarimizin-fetoye-karsi-hassasiyeti-artmaktadir, cited by Turhan (2021, p. 2).

resistance to the new TFP orientation in SSA after 15 July 2016 events, depending on the linkages the Turkish state and Turkish private actors had with the receiving state and its society before 15 July 2016 events. The study thus contributes to the study of Turkish foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa and the wider theoretical literature on the analytical concept of soft power in the field of IR.

1.2 Literature review

The literature dedicated to Turkish Foreign Policy (TFP) is huge and diverse, with each scholar focusing on a particular area of TFP. Hence, the first wave of literature on Turkish foreign policy, with scholars such as Çelik (1999); Hale (2002); Larrabee and Lesser (2003) focuses on the determinants of Turkish foreign policy. Most of these works focus on the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy, namely Turkey's geographic position, its human and natural resources, and its economic development. Concerning Turkey's geographic position, it is underlined that Turkey's central position at the crossroad of three continents makes this country a major player on the international scene, namely by its natural involvement in many international issues. The role played by Turkey as a strategic country in the confrontation between the then two powers during the Cold War is stressed by these scholars. After the Cold War, Turkey remained a key regional player in Eurasia, especially for NATO because of its neighborhood with Russia and Muslim countries such as Syria, Iran, and Iraq which are essential for the U.S. in its war against terror.

As far as Turkey's economic development is concerned, the above-cited scholars, emphasized that the economic rise of Turkey since the Özal era, thanks to the effect of globalization on Turkey's economy, led to a change in the institutional framework of TFP, especially with the insertion of actors from the Turkish society

(businessmen association and civil society organizations) into Turkish foreign policy decision-making. Hence, actors from Turkish civil society became important players in the area of Turkish foreign policy, as stated by theoretical studies on the domestic influence of foreign policy.

Thus, concerning the literature on the interaction between domestic policy and foreign policy, Gourevitch (1978), reviews the various factors of domestic policy that affect foreign policy, as studied by IR scholars, namely:

The presence and character of bureaucracy (Kissinger, Allison, Halperin); the pressure of the masses on policymaking or the lack of such pressure (Kissinger, Wilson, Lenin); the strength and autonomy of the state (Gilpin, Krasner, Katzenstein); the drives of the advanced capitalist economy (Lenin, Magdoff, Baran, and Sweezy); the perceptual set of leaders (Jervis, Steinbrunner, Brecher); national style (Hoffmann); the logic of industrial development (Kurth); the character of domestic coalitions (Gourevitch, Katzenstein); the relative weight of transnational actors in a given polity (Nye and Keohane); the level of modernization (Morse) (Gourevitch, 1978, p. 901).

Within the literature on the interaction between domestic policy and foreign policy, the theory on the influence of the strength and autonomy of the state on foreign policy, developed by scholars such as Krasner (1977) and Katzenstein (1977) is of particular interest to the current study, since it deals with the relation between the state and civil society in the framing of foreign policy. Indeed, the said theory relies on assumptions that are in opposition with the neo-realists' claims, to explain foreign policy. Thus, the theorists of the impact of the strength of the state on foreign policy, claim that the power relationship within States themselves is a determining factor in foreign policy decision-making, more important than the relative power of various states on the international scene as stated by neo-realist scholars. The main indicators used by the proponents of the influence of the strength of the state on foreign policy decision-

making, to assess the internal power of states, are state centralization and social mobilization.

Political centralization refers to the capacity of power of the one who holds the executive power, whereas social mobilization depends on two factors, namely: the degree of cohesion and the degree of social organization. Hence, the more cohesive and organized society is, the more it can exert pressure on the executive. By combining state centralization and social mobilization, it is possible to assess the internal power of a state, and explain and predict its foreign policy. Thus, according to the theory on the impact of the strength of the state on foreign policy, strong states, given their ascendancy in the balance of power with the civil society, would be able to impose their foreign policy preference more effectively. Conversely, weak states would be dependent upon social forces and public opinion in foreign policy decision-making. Scholars of this theory, namely Krasner (1977) and Katzenstein (1977), consequently situate France and the U.S. at the antipodes, distinguishing between elite democracies, governed from the top and pluralistic democracies governed from the bottom⁷.

Other proponents of this approach, like Risse (1991), study the impact of public opinion on states' foreign policy. Risse (1991, p. 485) establishes that although the strong versus weak state is a valid theory, it is nevertheless “too simplistic to account for the variation between domestic structures”. Risse (1991) suggests that the missing link in the analysis of the relationship between the state and public opinion or society, in the foreign policy decision-making process, is the study of the coalition-building

⁷France is the most illustrative example of a strong state, where political power, particularly in matters of foreign policy, is centralized in the hands of the executive power. Conversely, the U.S represents the archetype of the weak state with strong involvement of civil society and the legislative power (represented here by the Congress) in foreign policy decisions making. In weak states, the executive has little room for maneuver on foreign policy issues, on which different interest groups voice their opinions (Katzenstein, 1977). Thus, Krasner (1977) consider this institutional organization as a weakness in foreign policy, because it increases the state's vulnerability to external pressures due to the various adjustment the state should make to satisfy the different component of the society.

process. This is the way political networks are built, namely the various channels of communication and exchange between the executive and social actors. Or, how societal actors express their interests to policymakers. Risse (1991) is therefore in favor of a mixed approach that combines structural-institutional approaches and the coalition-building process.

Other scholars like Gourevitch (1978) and Putnam (1988) also point out the limits of the strong versus weak state approach. Regarding first the critics of Gourevitch (1978), he draws attention to the importance of the identity of political leaders, that is to say, the importance of personal or cognitive factors in foreign policy decision-making. Thus, for Gourevitch (1978), limiting oneself to the institutional structure of a country to explain its foreign policy behavior, is an apolitical approach, because some foreign policy decisions come from the personal preferences of policymakers. Finally, Gourevitch (1978, p. 911) underlines that the importance of the institutional structure of the state (strong or weak) does not rest on its capacity, but rather on how a given structural organization can in certain circumstances allow one of the actors, the state, or society, to take the lead over the other.

Contrary to the argument of the strong versus weak state approach, according to which internal constraints prevent the state from converting its domestic resources into power on the international level, due to the pressure of societal actors on the foreign policy of states, Putnam (1988), on his part, notes that those internal constraints can be assets for states on the international scene under certain circumstances. Thus, for Putnam (1988), domestic constraints can turn into resources for states at the international level, insofar as states can use those constraints to justify and defend their position in international negotiations, and impose their preferences on their foreign counterparts. That is to say that, in an interactive dynamic (internal-external), a

negotiator can even raise his domestic constraints to increase his balance of power at the international level.

This research aims at contributing to this theoretical debate on the impact of the institutional structure of the state on foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, the analysis of the overall TFP, and TFP in SSA in particular, as studied by various scholars, shows that TFP is a favorable field for an assessment of the strong versus weak state theory.

Going back to the literature on TFP, which is the focus of this thesis, a second wave of the literature on Turkish foreign politics specializes in Turkish foreign policy after the Cold War era, and more specifically on TFP under the AKP rule. The scholars of this wave, for the most part, analyze Turkey-EU relations, namely the issue of Turkey's access to the EU (Batalla, 2012; Kennedy & Dickenson, 2012; Öniş, 2011). This wave of literature on TFP, also stresses the importance of Turkey's public opinion in TFP. To this effect, the scholars state that the slowdown of the Turkey-EU access process resulted in Turkish foreign politics stepping backward from the West because of the ensuing disappointment it causes in Turkish society (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). Therefore, this literature focuses on the shift of the axis of Turkish foreign politics from the West to the East, namely countries of the BRICS, as well as the opening up of Turkey's foreign policy to new areas of the global south, such as Latin America and Africa (Donelli & Levaggi, 2016; Donelli, 2018; Hurrell, 2000). Here, special emphasis should be given to the literature dedicated to the former Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (Aras, 2009; Davutoğlu, 2008; Davutoğlu, 2013; Özkan & Akgün, 2010).

Indeed, Davutoğlu is considered by many scholars of Turkish Foreign politics as “the main architect” of the AKP's foreign policy (Aras, 2014; Murinson, 2006). The

principles of Turkish foreign policy, he stated in an academic paper entitled *Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring*, such as: Rhythmic diplomacy, multi-dimensional foreign policy, zero problems with neighbors, order institutional actor, international cooperation, proactive foreign policy, are the landmarks of the Turkish foreign policy under the AKP (Davutoğlu, 2012). Indeed, Davutoğlu's ambition was to make Turkey a global and autonomous actor, which no more holds its foreign policy stand neither to the West nor to the East, but an actor that has an autonomous foreign policy guided, by its national interest (Davutoğlu, 2008). This vision of TFP qualified as "Neo-Ottomanism" aimed at making Turkey a leader in the Muslim world, as well as a central player in Eurasia, namely thanks to the rich Turkish historical and cultural heritage (Balci, 2003(a), 2003 (b)). According to Davutoğlu's vision, the new TFP should rely more on soft instruments of foreign policy, as well as on a partnership between the state and civil society, so that Turkey could become a global actor (Davutoğlu, 2008, 2013). Thus, the rise of the AKP in Turkish politics goes along with the emergence of non-state actors from the Turkish society in TFP, namely businessmen associations (TUSKON, MÜSIAD), as well as faith-based civil society organizations like the Gülen Movement (Alkan & Mercan, 2013; Yankaya, 2014). This emergence of Turkish civil society as a player in TFP is considered by several scholars of Turkish foreign policy as a fundamental change in Turkish foreign policy enabled by the rise of the AKP to the top of the Turkish state (Batalla, 2012; Kennedy & Dickenson, 2012; Öniş & Yilmaz, 2009).

In line with this, a considerable part of the literature on TFP during the AKP era focuses on the role played by Turkey's civil society actors in TFP. In the same vein, the importance of other domestic factors in the making of TFP is also stressed by scholars (Larrabee & Lesser, 2003). Thus, Domestic factors such as the influence of

Islam, nationalism, and Turk identity, are identified by Larrabee and Lesser (2003), as a determinant in the making of TFP. Indeed, Larrabee and Lesser (2003) state that domestic political issues, namely: antagonism such as Islamism versus secularism; the military versus civilians; state versus society, will be key factors in the future for TFP.

This study is in line with most of the analysis of the second wave of the literature on TFP, especially the significance of Turkey's domestic institutional framework for TFP. However, most of the studies in this second wave of the literature on TFP, focus on Turkey's relations with its traditional partners such as the EU, NATO, and the U.S., or the regional foreign policy of Turkey with central Asian, Middle Eastern, and Mediterranean countries. Very few references are made on the relationship between Turkey and countries of the global south, especially Sub-Saharan Africa in these works, though Turkey's civil society is very committed in countries of the Global South, notably in SSA.

Therefore, to fill this gap in the study of TFP, a third wave of literature on TFP, made up of scholars such as Donelli (2019), Angey (2014), Özkan and Akgün (2010), stress the role of actors of the Turkish society in the establishment of Turkey's relations with Sub-Saharan Africa. These scholars underline that in SSA, contrary to Turkey's relations with its traditional partners from the west, the establishment of diplomatic relations is most of the time the result of informal initiatives led by Turkish non-state actors from the civil society or the business world. Thus, as stated by scholars like Bacchi (2015), Turkey's interest in Africa was first materialized by the adoption in 1998, by the Turkish government of an "Africa Action Plan", which was intended to be the road map of the TFP strategy in SSA. The said document states the framework of the public-private partnership between Turkish private actors and the Turkish

government to mutualize their effort to increase Turkish presence in SSA. Thus, Turkey's interest in SSA as studied by scholars is two-fold: commercial and political.

Firstly, as far as the economic or commercial level is concerned, Africa is considered by the Turkish political class, and by Turkish businessmen, as a conducive field for the expansion of Turkish trade in order to diversify the markets, given the stagnation of relations between Turkey and its traditional European partners since the 2000s (Dal & Dipama, 2019). Finally, at the political level, Africa is perceived by Turkish foreign policymakers as a reservoir of votes in international organizations, in particular at the United Nations (Mbabia, 2011). Accordingly, thanks to the support of African countries, Turkey was able to obtain in 2009 a seat as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (Mbabia, 2011). On a practical level, the good political relations between Turkey and the African continent as a whole, has also resulted in the obtaining by Turkey of the status of observer member in the African Union in 2008, as well as in the increase of the number of Turkish diplomatic representation in Africa (Özkan & Akgün, 2010).

In the same vein, scholars such as Dal and Mehmetcik (2018), Donelli (2018), Gökhan and Afacan (2013), Gök and Dal (2016), İpek and Biltekin (2013), Kalin (2011), Mbabia (2011), Öner (2013), Özkan and Akgün (2010), Özkan (2018), Urcan (2018), Wheeler (2011), Angey and Molho (2015), Athie (2014), Ayhan (2018) highlight the importance of the public-private partnership in the TFP strategy in SSA and analyze TFP strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa under the conceptual frameworks of Soft power, Public Diplomacy, and civilian diplomacy (Gök & Dal, 2016). Turkey's implication in the peace process in SSA' countries like Somalia or Darfur is generally taken as an illustration by the aforementioned scholars (Gök & Dal, 2016; Siradağ, 2013).

Furthermore, it is worth noticing that, in the literature dedicated to Turkey's non-state actors' role in TFP in SSA, GM enjoys a particular place. Indeed, scholars such as Angey (2014, 2015(a), 2015 (b)), Balci (2013, 2014 (a), 2014 (b), 2010), Hendrick (2014), Michel (2003), stress the central place of the GM in the first decades of AKP's foreign policy strategy in Africa. Thus, the GM through its network of schools and its active diaspora abroad, played the role of representatives of the Turkish state in many regions of the world, where Ankara diplomacy was not present, thus serving as a channel of communication between formal authorities of these countries and the Turkish government (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). The GM was therefore presented by scholars as the main asset of the AKP in TFP, with whom it shared its vision of political Islam, in its neo-ottoman ambition of TFP, especially in regions such as central Asia and SSA (Balci, 2014). However, with the escalation of the domestic political conflict between the two former Islamic political allies, as analyzed by scholars like Yavuz (2018), Taş (2017), and Usluer (2016), the ruling AKP government in Turkey, transferred its domestic fight against the GM and its affiliated networks at the international level (Angey, 2018).

Indeed, given the importance of the AKP-GM political alliance in TFP, the domestic conflict between the AKP and the GM has serious ramifications in TFP, as stated by scholars like Angey (2018), Balci (2014), Donelli (2019), Watmough and Öztürk (2018), and Usluer (2016). Hence, Turkey-SSA's relations are analyzed by the up-cited scholars, as an important field of the continuation of the domestic conflict between the AKP and the GM at the international level. Besides, going further in the analysis of the impact of the split in the political alliance between the AKP and the GM, scholars like Çzerep (2019), and Özkan (2018), examine the conflict between the GM and AKP as a serious blow to Turkey's soft power strategy in SSA.

However, the up-cited studies analyze the impact of 15 July 2016 events, mainly under the framework of the GM-AKP political conflict, namely the shutting down of the GM institutions (mainly schools) in the world, by the Turkish government. None of these scholars analyzed the overall impact of 15 July 2016, on the TFP strategy in SSA, and on the ensuing perception of TFP by SSA countries, where the GM was an important player in the TFP strategy. I should nevertheless underline that, scholars such as Usluer (2016), Aras (2017), and Augé (2018), attempt to analyze TFP after 15 July 2016 events.

Usluer (2016) is concerned, with the theoretical analysis of TFP after 15 July 2016 failed military coup. Indeed, the author analyzes the impact of 15 July 2016, through the lenses of IR theories, namely neo-realism and neo-liberal institutionalism. She, therefore, states that 15 July 2016 political events in Turkey, will have a major impact on the TFP strategy, namely a shift from a neo-liberal foreign policy to a more rational and neo-realist foreign policy, characterized by an emphasis on security issues (the fight against terrorism). She also highlights that the shift in the TFP strategy is likely to appear at the bilateral level. Thus, at the multi-lateral level, Turkey will keep its neo-liberal stand on foreign policy, led by humanitarian ideals and the promotion of peace in the world.

Aras (2017) on its part, analyzes 15 July 2016 as an event that helped to bring to the surface, former existing issues that undermine the TFP even before 15 July 2016 events. These issues are among others, the TFP systemic crisis, Turkey's domestic political crisis, the security crisis, and the identity crisis. He points out the relationship between domestic politics and international politics, namely the dependence of TFP on Turkey's domestic politics, as one of the problems that led to the systemic crisis of TFP. Therefore, Aras (2017) analyses TFP more in terms of perspective to get TFP out

of the crisis in which it is stuck even before 15 July 2016 events, and does not tackle the impact of 15 July 2016 political events on TFP.

Finally, Augé (2018), is a better insight into the analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA after the July 2016 failed military coup in Turkey, since it is more concrete than the two aforementioned works in its approach. Indeed, Augé (2018) analyses the failed military coup of 2016 in Turkey as an event that has serious ramifications for the TFP strategy, especially the TFP strategy in SSA. The author states that since 15 July 2016, TFP in SSA is in a process of reformation. This reorganization of TFP strategy in SSA is materialized mainly by a more active role of the Turkish state in the area of TFP strategy in SSA, and especially by the replacement of traditional players of TFP in SSA, namely the GM and its affiliated organizations, by new Turkish state-affiliated players. Hence, Augé (2018) focuses mainly on the issue of the substitution of the GM-affiliated employer networks in Africa (TUSKON) by those affiliated with the Turkish state apparatus. This study also lays a great emphasis, on the issue of the shutting down of GM schools in Africa and their replacement by the Turkish state's MAARIF schools. Hence, Augé (2018) analyses the impact of the domestic conflict between the AKP and the GM on TFP in SSA, more within the framework of the players of TFP strategy in SSA. Though this important issue is tackled in this thesis, my thesis, however, goes beyond the analysis of the new players of TFP strategy in SSA, and investigates TFP strategy in SSA, in its whole, namely its conceptual and structural aspects, and beyond, since it also assesses the reception of TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016, by SSA countries.

In conclusion, the main focus of this thesis is on the impact of 15 July 2016 political events on the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA. In other words, the subject of this study is the TFP strategy in SSA from the 15 July 2016 events in Turkey

onwards, with the main objective to analyze if there is any rupture or continuity in the TFP strategy towards SSA countries following 15 July 2016, as well as determine the impact of the possible change in the TFP strategy in SSA, on the trend of the relations between Turkey and its SSA partners. In its approach, this thesis is innovative, as it goes beyond the analysis of the effect of the 15 July 2016 events on TFP under the angle of the AKP-GM conflict, to grasp the broad impact of the 15 July 2016 failed coup on Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, both in terms of its players and content.

1.3 Theoretical framework

This study is guided by two different conceptualizations of realism, namely neorealism and neo-classical realism. These are two different conceptualizations of realism, considered by authors like Brooks (1997) as “dueling realism.”⁸ These two types of realisms mainly diverge, concerning the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy.

Hence, in the neorealist framework, foreign policy is the outcome of the international system's pressure on individual states while domestic politics is denied any effect on the foreign policy of states. Whereas in the framework of neo-classical realism, domestic politics is not devoid of an impact on the foreign policy of States and is even considered by neo-classical realism proponents, as a valid variable, besides the systemic constraints to account for the foreign policy of states (Brooks, 1997). Thus, neo-classical realists stress that the strength of a state as well as its relation with

⁸ Although both theories agree on the fact that military security is the State's prime responsibility (Brooks, 1997, p. 446), they nevertheless diverge on the State's prioritization of its preferences. Hence, while neo-realism, namely with scholars like Waltz (1979) and Mearsheimer (1994) prioritizes military capabilities over economic power, for Neo-classical realists like Gilpin (1983) and Brooks (1997), power and not security is the ultimate objective of States. Specifically, Neo-classical realism emphasis on State's response to threats, while neorealism has a more pessimistic view of international relations and stresses on states seek for security (Rose, 1998, p. 152). Therefore, these two theories are also referred to as defensive realism and offensive realism (Brooks, 1997; Rose, 1998).

its society, are important intervening variables between systemic constraints and the strategy adopted by the state to face its international challenges.

Since the current study aims to analyze the impact of a major event in Turkish domestic politics, precisely the failed military coup of 15 July 2016 on the TFP in Africa, neo-classical realism is a convenient theoretical base. Its use of both systemic and domestic level analysis, to account for the foreign policy of States is helpful to analyze how the changes in Turkish domestic politics stemming from the political events of 15 July 2016, affects the general framework of TFP in SSA. Besides, Turkish foreign policy in SSA is also driven by the systemic concern to preserve Turkey's position as an emerging power in SSA, competed by one of its subnational actors. Hence, neo-classical realism has the advantage of merging systemic arguments and "Innenpolitik" arguments of theories such as republican liberalism, to account for the foreign policy of states. In this light, the republican liberalism argument in the explanation of foreign policy, which states the importance of domestic politics coalitions in the foreign policy orientation or preferences of states, as described by Moravcsik (1998), is a useful theoretical framework to account for the impact of the end of the political coalition between the ruling AKP government in Turkey, and the Gülen movement on the TFP strategy in SSA.

Neo-realism on its part, is called upon to analyze my statement about the changing of the paradigm of TFP strategy in SSA, from a society-centered to a state-centered foreign policy, following the 15 July 2016 failed military coup in Turkey. Indeed, as stated by Usluer (2016) I also hypothesize that since 15 July 2016, and in the political context of the domestic conflict between the AKP and the GM, TFP in SSA is in a process of transformation. Thus, as the fight against the GM and its affiliated networks both at the domestic and external levels, became the top priority

for the survival of the Turkish state's institutions, Turkey adopted a more realist stand in its foreign policy, especially in SSA, which is an important rear base for the GM. This realpolitik stand of TFP is characterized by the prioritization of Turkish national interest, in particular Turkey's security, in its bilateral relations with SSA countries, and also by the changing of Turkey's foreign policy instruments, from the use of soft instruments, with a greater implication of societal actors, to a harder foreign policy stand, with a greater presence of the state and government institutions. Therefore, TFP in SSA, is a good illustration of the neo-realists assumption of the centrality of the state, as the main actor of international politics, even in the globalization context which led to the involvement of actors from the society in the field of foreign policy. Thus, as stated by Waltz (2000, p. 17): "The withering away of the power of the state whether internally or externally is more of a wish and an illusion than a reality in most of the world".

Furthermore, in addition to realism, the concept of soft power as developed by Nye (1990, 2008) as well as its subsequent critics, are used in this study, to analyze and assess TFP strategy in SSA before and after 15 July 2016. Although Nye (2010) himself, emphasizes that soft power is not a theory but an analytical concept that fits with the various IR mainstream theories, namely: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. In line with this, the criticism of the concept of soft power by scholars like Patalakh (2016), who points out the shortcomings of Nye's (1990, 2008) conceptualization of soft power, is also regarded in this study. Indeed, Patalakh (2016) proposes a realistic or rational approach to soft power as he states that a soft power strategy is always implemented with a realpolitik aim. For Patalakh (2016) a realistic approach to the concept of soft power, studies the soft power of a state in a context of competition with one or more other states, to obtain an expected result from another

state. Accordingly, Patalakh (2016) criticizes Nye (1990) that he finds too anchored to the idealist current, for taking into account only absolute gains as opposed to the realistic approach which takes into account relative gains in a policy of soft power. The current study is in line with Patalakh (2016) as, I argue that Turkey grounded its foreign policy in SSA, on the use of its soft power assets, with an objective of *realpolitik* and in a context of competition with other emerging powers such as: India and China.

Furthermore, Patalakh (2016) proposes to study soft power in a strategic approach that is a soft power strategy led by the state itself, in which the state and no longer non-state actors, would be the main agent. Such an approach to soft power is in opposition to the conceptualization of Nye (1990, 2008), who considers that a strategy of soft power led by the state as the main agent, is doomed to failure, and carries the risk to be assimilated by the recipients as propaganda. In this regard, Nye (2013) criticizes the soft power strategy of countries such as China and Russia, in which the government is the main agent of soft power.

Given these different approaches to soft power, we wonder about the efficiency of a strategy of soft power in which the state is the main agent. To this effect, this study has the ambition to be the framework for the assessment of a soft power strategy with the state as the main agent. Indeed, I postulate that in the aftermath of the events of July 2016, the Turkish state has taken over its soft power strategy in SSA. Thus, a study of this new trend in the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA will enable us to assess the effectiveness of the soft power strategy led by the state as the main agent, and to make our contribution to this theoretical debate.

1.4 Research question (RQ)

This thesis is centered on one main question: what has been the impact of the July 2016 coup attempt on the strategy and reception of the TFP in SSA? In other words, is there been a rupture or a continuity in the Turkish foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis SSA countries, since the failed coup of 15 July 2016, in Turkey?

A thorough analysis of this central question pushed us to investigate two secondary questions, namely:

- RQ 2: If there is a change in the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA after the coup attempt of 15 July 2016 in Turkey, what is the nature of the change? More precisely, is it a change in the conceptual approach (the content and objectives of the TFP strategy in SSA)? Or it is a change in the structural approach (that is to say the players of TFP strategy in SSA)?
- RQ 3: Besides, what is the possible effect of these changes on the trend of Turkey's relations with SSA countries?

1.5 Hypothesis (H)

As an attempt answer to the central question, this thesis supports the hypothesis that 15 July 2016, political events in Turkish domestic politics, induced noticeable changes in the TFP strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly in the structural framework (players) of the TFP strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa, with a greater presence of the Turkish state as the chief actor of the foreign policy, as well as the insertion of a security component in Turkey's SSA' strategy, to fight against the transnational threat represented by the FETÖ for the security of the Turkish state. This study, therefore, claims that there is a shift in the TFP strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa following the events of the failed coup of 15 July 2016, in Turkey, namely from a foreign policy

strategy grounded on soft power instruments to a harder foreign policy strategy stand, grounded on more hard power or coercive instruments of foreign policy. Besides, these changes in the TFP strategy in SSA produced different receptions on the part of the SSA countries (H1).

This hypothesis has three main variables, namely a dependent variable (Y), and two independent variables (X1 and X2), as well as a population. The political events of 15 July 2016, which is the cause of the change as the independent variable (X1); the linkages the Turkish state and Turkish private actors have with the state and society in various sub-Saharan African countries are the other independent variable (X2), which is interacting with the changes induced by the coup attempt to produce an effect on the strategy and reception of the TFP in SSA (the population where the effects of the change are measured), and finally the Turkish foreign policy, where the effects of the change are observed, as the dependent variable (Y).

This can be illustrated in the form:

15. 07. 2016 political events in Turkish domestic politics (X1) \oplus linkages the Turkish state and Turkish private actors have with the state and society in sub-Saharan African countries (X2) \Rightarrow Change in Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA (Y).

Thus, the following secondary hypothesis is derived:

- H 2: The changes in the TFP strategy in SSA induced by the failed coup attempt of July 2016 in Turkey, with the Turkish government fight against the FETÖ as the main objective, prompted dissimilar reactions not only across SSA States, but also within SSA's countries at the state and society levels, notably, depending on the strength of the implantation of the FETÖ,

as well as of the intensity of the ties with the Turkish government, in the given SSA countries, both at the states and societies levels.

1.6 Delimitation of the Study

This section aims to justify the time and spatial framework of this study.

1.6.1 Spatial framework

As far as the spatial framework is concerned, the part of Africa concerned with this study, is Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exclusion of North Africa, which was a former area of influence of Turkey during the Ottoman Era, and is considered by Turkish policymakers as part of the Middle East region.⁹ SSA region is a relevant field to analyze the TFP strategy after the political events of 15 July 2016, in Turkey. Turkey's presence in sub-Saharan Africa is relatively new and formally originated from the Turkish government's "New Africa Policy" initiated in 1998. As several researchers have observed (Angey, 2018; Augé, 2018; Balci, 2014), SSA is a convenient field for investigating the impact of the events of July 2016, on the Turkish foreign policy strategy because it is the place of many stakes both for the AKP government and the GM, in the aftermath of the failed coup d'état of July 2016. Indeed, SSA is a practical rear base for the Gülen movement, in transnational exile, in the wake of the failed coup of July 2016 (Watmough & Öztürk, 2018). This transnational organization, enjoys a good reputation in SSA, because of its activities in the fields of education and trade, as well as its charity deeds. Therefore, the GM has many supports in both the societal and political spheres of SSA states. Hence, it is important for the AKP government to

⁹ North Africa countries in the geographical sub-division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, belongs to the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). Source: https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-relations-with-the-arab-countries.en.mfa.

strengthen its presence in SSA, to put an end to this organization, considered a threat to the Turkish state.

Furthermore, Turkey-SSA relations present a unique feature since the first contacts between the Republic of Turkey and most SSA countries, most of which were not established by the states, through the traditional state-to-state diplomacy, but rather by non-state actors (NGOs, businessmen), mainly those affiliated with the GM. As a result, the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA is a good illustration of the strategy of soft power in foreign policy. Hence, Turkey- SSA relations are interesting to assess the impact of July 2016 on the TFP strategy, and also the concept of soft power in a practical way. In this prospect, Turkey's relations with two Sub-Saharan African countries from 2016 onwards, namely: Nigeria and Senegal, are used as analytically selected cases, to assess the reception by SSA countries, of the Turkish strategy vis-à-vis SSA countries, since the coup attempt of July 2016.

Indeed, the said countries were selected according to their strategic importance for Turkey in its SSA outreach, as well as the strength of their relations with Turkey at the political, economic, and social levels. Hence, both Senegal and Nigeria are regional powers in the West African region and belong to the first circle of countries with whom Turkey have strong and ancient relations in the SSA region. Nigeria and Senegal are also models of democracy in the SSA region, given the alternation at the head of their executives observed since their accession to independence in the 1960s, as well as the strength of their civil societies.

As far as Turkey-Nigeria relation is concerned, Nigeria is the first economic power of the African continent and the first economic partner of Turkey in SSA, with a volume of exchange that amounted to 754 million dollars in 2020.¹⁰ This country

¹⁰“Expectations as Erdoğan visits Nigeria”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 17 October, 2021, <https://dailytrust.com/expectations-as-turkish-president-Erdoğan-visits-nigeria>, accessed, 04.01.2022.

also has a strong Turkish diaspora living on its territory. Indeed, the strong economic potential of Nigeria, the first economic power of the African continent, attracted Turkish businessmen, especially those affiliated with the Gülen community since the beginning of the policy of openness toward SSA initiated by Turkey. Hence, the latter has invested heavily in Nigeria, namely: the construction of schools, followed by commercial and humanitarian activities. The GM, therefore, has an important network in Nigeria, consisting in particular of a University, the University of the Nile, which is one of the best universities in Nigeria; the Nizamiye Hospital, which is a referral hospital in the Nigerian capital Abuja, and also a network of 17 primary and secondary schools across Nigeria,¹¹ ranked among the best in the country. Must be added to these social infrastructures, about 40 Turkish companies in Nigeria, which employ nearly 2500 Nigerians.¹² Given these significant investments, more than 1000 Turks affiliated with the GM were registered in the Nigerian territory in 2016.¹³ Moreover, on the diplomatic level, this economic giant of SSA is an important partner for Ankara because of its large market and its strong energy potential.¹⁴ Nigeria and Turkey are two regional giants, Turkey in Central Asia and Nigeria in SSA. Both countries are members of the same international clubs such as the Developing 8 (D8) and the G20 of developing countries.¹⁵ Therefore, the analysis of Nigeria's reaction to the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016, is of interest to this study, because it will enable a proper assessment of the new orientation of TFP in SSA, in a context where Turkey is not likely to exert a real balance of power on its African partner.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ "Nigerian Government Reacts to Planned Deportation of 1000 Turks", *Daily Post* (Nigeria), 15 June, 2016, <https://dailypost.ng/2017/10/24/nigerian-govt-reacts-planned-deportation-1000-turks/>

¹⁴ Nigeria is the most populous country on the African continent with a population of over 219 million in 2021, and the 6th oil exporting country in the world. Source: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigeria#>, accessed, 04.01.2022.

¹⁵ "Expectations as Erdoğan visits Nigeria", Op. Cit.

As far as Turkey-Senegal relation is concerned, the Turkish state has developed diplomatic relations with the Republic of Senegal since 1963, namely some three years after Senegal accessed independence. Senegal, therefore, constitutes a major element of the penetration strategy of Ankara in SSA, as it is the first French-speaking country of SSA to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey. The said Turkish Embassy in Dakar used to cover all of the West African regions. Turkey's interest in Senegal can be explained by several factors. Senegal occupies a strategic position in SSA, as it is located in the Gulf of Guinea, which is an important entry point for trade routes, especially port areas in SSA. Because of this strategic positioning, Senegal was the capital of French West Africa (AOF) during the French colonial period.¹⁶ In addition to this, both Turkey and Senegal have a strong community of Sufi Muslims and are members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Given this religious affinity between both countries, Senegal was the first SSA country, where the GM opened up a school in 1997 in Dakar (Shinn, 2015). This is Yavuz Selim boarding school, which was since then a referral academic institution in Senegal. Besides, in recent years, Senegal has become a favorable market for Turkish Small and Medium Size enterprises (SMEs), especially those dealing with the field of infrastructure. Hence, recently, Ankara obtained the management of the new Blaise Diagne airport in Dakar.¹⁷ The infrastructure was entrusted to a Turkish consortium made up of the companies Summa and Limak, which in 2017 were granted a 25 years concession (Yazıcıoğlu & Saa Ngouana, 2020). For Turkey, Senegal is a land conducive to

¹⁶ "French West Africa (AOF) was a general government bringing together within a single federation eight French colonies in West Africa between 1895 and 1958. Constituted in several stages, it eventually united Mauritania, Senegal, French Sudan (now Mali), Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Togo, and Dahomey (now Benin). Its area reached 4.689.000 square kilometers, about seven times that of France. Its capital was Saint-Louis (Senegal) until 1902, then Dakar (Senegal)". Source, retrieved from: Wikipedia online: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrique-Occidentale_fran%C3%A7aise, accessed, 04.01.2022.

¹⁷ Interview with the Director in charge of the Asian region at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Op. Cit.

investment. Turkey has therefore become a strategic partner for the Senegalese President, Macky Sall, and one of the main investors of the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE), which aims to make Senegal an emerging power by 2035. The visible results of Turkish investments in Senegal are among others: The management of the Blaise Diagne international airport, the construction of the Abdou Diouf International Conference Center, the Dakar Arena stadium, the International Market of Dakar, the Abdoulaye Wade football stadium, and finally the Diamniadio jumbo jets station.

Given this preeminent position of Turkey as a strategic partner for the economic development of Senegal, unlike in the Nigerian case, the Turkish government is likely to exert a real sway on the Senegalese authorities' reaction to the changes in the TFP in SSA after July 2016. Besides, in addition to the ruling elite or governments' reaction to the TFP after July 2016, the civil society reaction to the TFP in SSA after July 2016, should also be taken into consideration in the analysis, for both countries Senegal and Nigeria, given the strong implantation of the GM in the societal milieu of both countries. Therefore, the analytical cases of Nigeria and Senegal, present different combinations in which Turkey's hard and soft power in SSA works or fails to work together, through state and society, as illustrated in table 1.

Furthermore, in addition to Nigeria and Senegal, the reaction to the TFP in SSA after July 2016 in another Country, Cameroon, though not in-depth analyzed, is also referred to in the analyses of this study. Indeed, Cameroon belongs to the group of SSA countries, whose Turkey's interest is relatively new, as it dates back to Turkey's opening-up policy to SSA in 2005. Cameroon occupies a strategic position in Central Africa, due to its openness to the sea, its position at the crossroads between most of

the countries of Central Africa,¹⁸ as well as its neighborhood with Nigeria, the leading Economic power of the African continent. Cameroon can therefore be described as a gateway to Central Africa. Although diplomatic relations between Cameroon and Turkey have existed since the 1960s, when Cameroon accessed independence, it was not until 2010 that Turkey opened its embassy in Cameroon, following the visit of President Abdullah Gül to Cameroon the same year.¹⁹ This was followed in September 2018 by the formal opening of the Cameroon Embassy in Ankara. Thus, since 2010, the two countries have organized several economic and political meetings aimed at strengthening their relations.²⁰ It is important to note that the relationship between the two countries at the economic level is very dynamic. Cameroon exports to Turkey, in particular, timber, crude oil, aluminum, and imports cement, irons and metals, yeast, tires, and fertilizers.²¹ This fruitful economic cooperation between the two countries was made concrete by significant Turkish investments in Cameroon, the most notable of which to date, is the Japoma sports complex in the city of Douala, for an amount of approximately 160 billion CFA Francs, 85% of which was supported by Turkey.²² To these investments, we must add the activities of TIKA, which has opened up a regional office in Cameroon since 2014.²³ Finally, it is important to stress that since 2018, both countries have also intensified their cooperation in the field of defense and security.²⁴ Furthermore, besides state-level relations, the GM also established its network of schools in Cameroon, in 2004. This is the Amity International schools, located in three

¹⁸ Cameroon indeed shares borders with almost all the state of the Central Africa Economic and Monetary community (CEMAC), namely, Chad, CAR, Congo Brazzaville, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea.

¹⁹ Interview with the Director in Charge of cooperation with Turkey at the Cameroon Ministry of External Relations, held on 06.10.2021

²⁰ Idem.

²¹ Idem.

²² Idem.

²³ Idem.

²⁴ Idem.

(3) cities in Cameroon through three schools: Amity International College and Istikamet International Schools.²⁵ These institutions in Cameroon, as everywhere else in SSA, enjoyed a good reputation for academic excellence.

With regard more specifically to Cameroon’s reaction to the TFP in SSA after July 2016, the political context of this country in terms of the level of democracy and strength of the civil society, which are pretty low, added to the relative newness of its relations with both the Turkish state and Turkish transnational actors, unlike Nigeria and Senegal, all resulted in a rather passive reaction to the change in the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016, both at the state and society levels. Therefore, the case of Cameroon’s reaction to the changes in the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016 in this study, is merely used as an illustration to support the main argument of this study.

Table 1. Summary of the Selected Countries' Reaction to the TFP Strategy in SSA after July 2016

Countries	Nigeria	Senegal	Cameroon
Civil society	Resistance	Partial resistance	compliance
State	Partial resistance	compliance	compliance

1.6.2 Time framework

This study covers two (02) main eras: the era before, and the era after 15 July 2016 failed coup. The first era involves Turkey-SSA relations before 2016. This era concerns chapters 3 and 4 of the study, where the relations between Turkey and SSA countries before 2016 are analyzed. The said timeframe relates to the first years of the

²⁵ The three cities were Yaoundé (politics capital of the country) Douala (Economic center of the country) and Ngaoundéré (a city in the northern part of the country, with a majority of Muslim population).

establishment of relations between the Republic of Turkey and SSA countries, and beyond since this study also examines SSA relations with the Ottoman Empire.

The second era mainly covers Turkey-SSA relations from the 15 July 2016 failed coup attempt in Turkey till the year 2022. Although the political split between the GM and the ruling AKP started before 2016, particularly in 2013 domestically, 15 July 2016 nevertheless marked an accentuation of the Turkish government's actions to fight against the GM. Moreover, this timeframe corresponds to an upheaval in Turkish politics, with the institutional shift from a parliamentary to a presidential system, and the establishment of a state of emergency right after the failed coup attempt, which led to the jailing of more than 43,000 people including people from the civil society²⁶. In addition to this judicial offensive, the ruling AKP stepped up initiatives on the diplomatic front, calling for the closure of GM schools and assets abroad, particularly in the Balkans, Central Asia, and SSA.

To this end, given those political upheavals, we can consider that this period was a decisive moment, not only for Turkish domestic policy but also for its foreign policy, particularly in SSA, where the performance of the GM schools and affiliated businessmen from the Turkish Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists (TUSKON), more than in any other continent, served the AKP market-oriented foreign policy, since it contributed to the spreading of a favorable image of Turkey in SSA, and to open up the African market to Turkey (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 543). Therefore, the end of the political coalition between the GM and the Turkish government following the events of 15 July 2016, called for a reformation of the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA.

²⁶ Source: <https://Ovipot.hypotheses.org/category/politique-interieure>, accessed, 10.01.2022

1.7 Methodological considerations and research design

As far as the method of data collection and analysis of the study is concerned, this thesis is based on the socio-historical method, as it analyzes Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA according to its development across time. The socio-historical method aims to understand, in light of the historical past, how things work in the present.²⁷ According to Norbert Elias (1970) “The socio-historian wants to highlight the historicity of the world in which we live, to better understand how the past weighs on the present”. Hence, this method fits with the purpose of this research, which is to analyze the elements of change and continuity in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, after the failed coup of July 2016. Following this socio-historical method, the analysis of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, in this study is divided into two (02) time frames.

The first-time frame corresponds to the analysis of the Turkey-SSA relations before the events of the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. This part aims to highlight the foundations and structural determinants of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, from the period of the Ottoman Empire to the era before 15 July 2016. The second time frame, for its part, analyzes Turkey's foreign policy strategy after the failed coup of July 2016. The analysis in this part aims in particular at bringing out the changes made in the TFP strategy in SSA, after 15 July 2016. Therefore, the analyses, in this thesis, follow the principles of synchrony and diachrony, in which the former is interested in the implementation of the subject of the study at a given moment in time, while, the latter is interested in its evolution over time.²⁸

Concerning the data collection method, this research uses the qualitative approach and data from primary and secondary sources. Indeed, the data for this study

²⁷ Source: <https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socio-histoire#>, consulted 05/09/2022.

²⁸ Source: https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Synchronie_et_diachronie, consulted on 05/09/2022.

were collected through the literature review of relevant academic books and articles on Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, as well as through interviews, and press articles, particularly those of Nigeria and Senegal, which served as case studies in this study. It should be emphasized that the qualitative approach has both advantages and disadvantages for the researcher. In terms of advantages, it makes it easy to collect a large amount of relevant information on the subject of the study, and thus, limits the time and space constraints for the researcher. As for its drawbacks, the data available in too large amounts can be difficult for the researcher to analyze, particularly regarding their reliability and their relevance. Data collection and analysis for this research took place in three phases.

In the first phase of data collection, I first carried out the literature review of relevant books and scholarly articles on Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, which enabled me to identify the gap in studies relating to the analysis of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA and to elaborate my problem and my hypotheses. The literature review, also helped me in drafting Chapter 2 of this thesis, which deals with the concept of foreign policy strategy, as well as Chapters 3 and 4, which concern Turkey's foreign policy strategy before the events of July 2016. Thus, the review of the relevant academic literature enabled me to identify and analyze the structural determinants as well as the foundations of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, in chapters 3 and 4 of this study.

In chapter 4 in particular, the analysis of the academic literature on TFP in SSA made it possible to highlight the institutions, as well as the main areas or tracks on which Turkey has built its foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis the SSA region, namely: ODA, humanitarian aid, education, trade, and religion. It is these two variables (institutions and tracks) that have subsequently, in chapter 5, served as the basis for

analyzing the change and continuity in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA following the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey.

Hence, the data collected through the literature review of the specialized academic literature were also used for the analysis of Turkey's foreign policy strategy post-July 2016. These include data on Turkey's education policy in SSA after the July 2016 coup attempt, namely scholarly articles on the Turkish Maarif Foundation and its role in Turkey's foreign policy after July 2016. There is also data relating to Turkey's ODA in SSA after July 2016, as well as data about the relationship between the Turkish government and Turkish businessmen in Turkey's economic and trade diplomacy in SSA since 2016. It was during the analysis of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, after July 2016, that I started the second phase of data collection and analysis.

This second phase focused on fieldwork through interviews. In this regard, I made a study trip to Dakar, Senegal, to conduct interviews. This study trip to Senegal, which took place in December 2021, lasted 10 days.

As far as the interviews themselves are concerned, I was able to carry out a total of 4 elite interviews, namely:

- An interview with the Director in charge of cooperation with Turkey at the Ministry of foreign affairs of Senegal;
- An interview with the Head of the Academic Inspectorate of Dakar, which is a department of the Senegalese Ministry of Education, in charge of the management of public and private schools for the Dakar region;
- An interview with the collaborator of the Academic Inspector, who deals particularly with the schools of the Turkish Maarif Foundation;
- An interview with the Director in charge of the management of private schools at the Ministry of National Education of Senegal.

I should emphasize that I used purposive sampling, that is to say, I selected some people to interview, based on their involvement in the management of Turkey-Senegal relations. Furthermore, the choice to use purposive sampling was also dictated to me, by the fact that Senegal is a country that was unknown to me before I went there for this research, which constituted a difficulty to access informants. So, I had to rely on my connections in that country, to get appointments with relevant informants. The choice of purposive sampling is also justified by time constraints, given the brevity of my stay in Senegal. Thus, purposive sampling enabled me to have access to some key respondents, in a short time.

Concerning the actual conduct of the interviews, the interviews took place in the respective offices of the various respondents, following an interview protocol (see appendix B), which I had to submit beforehand to the respondents. The said interview protocol, consisted of open-ended questions, about various aspects of the relations between Turkey and Senegal, such as:

- The framework of Turkey-Senegal cooperation;
- Strengths and weaknesses of Turkey-Senegal cooperation;
- Perception of Turkey-Senegal cooperation since 15 July 2016;
- The challenges for the future of Turkey-Senegal cooperation.

As noted by Aberback and Rockman (2002), open-ended questions are more suitable for elite's interviews, since they enable the respondents to freely express themselves about the topic. I should, however, emphasize that though these Senegalese officials agreed to answer my questions, their answers, for the most part, seemed to me biased, and irrelevant, for most of the interviewees, except for the Academic Inspector of the

Dakar region and her collaborator. This can be explained by the sensitivity of the topic, in particular, because Turkey is currently a strategic economic partner of Senegal, and also by the fact that the issue of the transfer of the GM schools, Yavuz Selim, to the Maarif Foundation is still pending in law court. Moreover, the fact that I had to reveal to my informants that this research was taking place under the academic supervision of a Turkish university institution, undoubtedly raised suspicions as to the use of the data collected during the interviews. Thus, as noted by Lee (1993), in his book about research on sensitive topics: “There is a risk of mistrust, concealment, and dissimulation on the part of the participants of the research” (Aberback & Rockman, 2002, p. 673). Therefore, due to the lack of trust and concealment of key information by some respondents, some interviews turned out to be irrelevant for use in this thesis. However, interviews such as the interview with the Academic Inspector of the Dakar region, as well as the one with her collaborator, proved to be sources of relevant information, in particular for the analysis of the TMF as a new player in the Turkish strategy in SSA, and also for the assessment of the perception of the Turkish strategy in SSA after July 2016, by the Senegalese.

Phase three of data collection and analysis, on its part, focused on the content analysis of media coverage by the press of SSA countries, of the relations between Turkey and the countries of SSA, since the failed coup of July 2016. Indeed, this content analysis was intended to assess Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, but also to bring out the perception of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, both by the political elite and civil society of SSA countries. With this in mind, two SSA countries were selected as case studies: Nigeria and Senegal. I should emphasize that both countries were chosen because of their different reactions to Turkey's foreign

policy strategy in SSA post-July 2016. This is to assess the success or failure of the Turkish strategy in SSA more broadly.

It should also be noted that given material constraints, namely financial, I was unable to travel to Nigeria to carry out fieldwork, including interviews. The lack of fieldwork in Nigeria can also be explained by the fact that the choice of Nigeria as a case study, took place in a late phase of my research process, in particular, following the remarks and observations of my thesis committee, on the need to conduct a comparison of the reaction of SSA countries to the TFP in SSA post-July 2016, through a contrasting analysis of the reaction of SSA' countries. Thus, since the literature review on the TFP in SSA post-July 2016, highlighted the case of Nigeria, my choice naturally focused on this country, as a case study for a comparison of the reaction of SSA countries to the TFP in SSA post-July 2016.

Concerning the content analysis of the media coverage of Turkey-SSA relations post-July 2016 itself, I carried out the analysis on a case-by-case basis. Thus, I first analyzed the case of Turkey-Nigeria relations post-July 2016. Here, I selected four Nigerian newspapers, more precisely, I used their web page, to get articles concerning my research. I selected four news sources, both for Nigeria and Senegalese cases, to ensure the reliability of the data. The four Nigerian newspapers used in this study are *the Dailypost*, *the Dailytrust*, *the Guardian*, and *the Punch*. The four Senegalese newspapers I used are *Le Quotidien*, *Dakractu*, *L'Enquete*, and *Seneweb*. It should be noted that the choice of media outlets to analyze was made randomly, due to my lack of knowledge on both the Nigerian and Senegalese media landscape. I, however, checked on the internet, the ranking of the most-read online newspapers in Nigeria and Senegal, to enable me make my choice. Subsequently, I used the major features of the Turkey-SSA relations post-July 2016, highlighted by the literature

review, as keywords to generate results on each of the websites of the selected Nigerian media outlets. These keywords include:

- Turkish schools in Nigeria;
- Turkish Maarif foundation;
- Turkey-Nigeria relations;
- President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria.

These keywords generated results (press articles), which I then, classified according to the recurrence of the topics covered, and the method of content analysis, based on categories. These recurring themes in the press articles obtained, thus constituted the different sub-categories of my content analysis. Indeed, Wanlin (2007, p. 249), defines content analysis as “a set of methodological tools that apply to extremely diverse "discourses" and are based on deduction as well as inference”. It consists of gathering or collecting a corpus of information concerning the object of study, sorting it according to whether it belongs to it or not, searching its content according to its thematic similarities, gathering these elements into conceptual classes, and finally studying the relationships between these elements and giving a comprehensive description of the subject of study. Hence, the sub-categories found in the Nigerian press articles, express the key events of Turkey-Nigeria relationship after July 2016, as well as the perception of Turkey's foreign policy by Nigerians. The content analysis of the Senegalese press was carried out using the same process.

It should be noted that the content analysis of the media coverage by the press, enabled me to have access to a certain amount of data, though these are secondary sources of data, such as press interviews with the political elite of the countries studied, about the relationship between Turkey and their countries, but also, interviews with

the public, relating to their perception of Turkey. Thanks to these various data, I was able to assess the perception of the TFP strategy in SSA post-July 2016, both by the political elite and the societal class of SSA countries. Furthermore, the content analysis of the media coverage of the relationship between Turkey and the selected SSA countries also enabled me, to analyze the relations between Turkey and the selected SSA countries according to their development across time, because I was able to obtain updated information on the relations between Turkey and the selected SSA countries, which I could not have obtained through mere interviews or literature review, because of their topicality. Thus, the content analysis of the press enabled me, to be up to date about Turkish foreign policy in SSA, which is a topic in perpetual evolution, in particular concerning current issues such as the setting up of Maarif schools in some SSA countries, as well as Turkey's security policy in SSA.

1.8 Limitations of the research design

It is worth noticing that, I faced several difficulties during this research process. These difficulties have generated a certain number of limitations, likely to hamper the relevance of the results obtained within the framework of this study. Among these limitations, the lack of fieldwork in Nigeria, which is one of my case studies, for interviews, can raise doubts about the relevance of the hypotheses I reached out to as a result of this research, particularly concerning the perception of Turkey's foreign policy post-July 2016 in SSA. In the same vein, the impossibility to conduct interviews with civil society, both in Senegal, where I carried out the field research and in Nigeria, can also raise the same doubts about the results of this research. Besides, the lack of interviews with officials of the Turkish Maarif Foundation in one of the SSA countries, whether in Cameroon, Senegal, or Nigeria, can also alleviate the richness of this study

in terms of the quality of the data collected. Finally, the lack of interest in some of the elite interviews I conducted in Senegal, may also affect the relevance of the results of this study.

However, it is worth emphasizing that I was able to overcome the problems linked to the poverty of my fieldwork, in particular, thanks to the content analysis of the media coverage of the Turkey-SSA relationship by the press. Indeed, as noted above, this content analysis enabled me, to have access to elite interviews, in particular those of the rulers of the various countries (Turkey, Senegal, Nigeria), but also of certain political elites of these countries, as well as members of the civil society of the selected SSA countries. In addition, thanks to the content analysis of the press, I also had access to various press interviews with the president of the TMF, about the activities of this Turkish institution in SSA. In short, the content analysis of the media coverage of Turkey-SSA relations by the press enabled me to compensate for the poor quality of the fieldwork (interviews) noticeable in this study, which itself stems from the sensitive character of the topic under scrutiny.

1.9 Structure of the thesis

As far as its structure is concerned, this thesis is made up of 07 chapters, which analyze the TFP strategy in SSA since 2016, on a theoretical and empirical level.

Chapter 1 is the introduction of the thesis. It presents the review of literature, the problem of the thesis, and the research methodology used in this study.

Chapter 2 analyzes the conceptual framework of this study, precisely the concept of foreign policy strategy, defined in this chapter, as the means that states use to achieve their foreign policy objectives. This chapter also analyzes the concept of foreign policy strategy through three (03) IR concepts, which define the means used

by states to achieve their foreign policy objectives. These are the concepts of Soft power, Hard power, and Smart power. Emphasis is placed on the analysis of the concept of soft power as a state foreign policy strategy in this chapter, due to the highlighting of this concept by the literature review on TFP in SSA. Hence, the purpose of this conceptual chapter is to analyze the different means of foreign policy strategy of states, through their instruments and actors. It is this analysis of the concept of foreign policy strategy, which serves as a basis for the rest of the thesis for the analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA.

Chapter 3 analyzes the TFP in SSA from a historical perspective, which examines Turkey-SSA relations, from the era of the Ottoman Empire, through the creation of the Republic of Turkey, and finally the rise to power of the AKP in Turkey since 2002. This chapter aims in particular, to shed light on the structural determinants of TFP in SSA. It also analyzes the implementation of TFP in SSA on the bilateral and multilateral levels. Thus, this aims to present the framework of Turkey-SSA relations, through the historical foundations of the said relationship. It also aims to investigate the reasons behind Turkey's interest in the SSA region, since the AKP's rise to power in 2002.

Chapter 4, focuses on the TFP strategy in SSA during the first decade of Turkey's opening up policy to Africa initiated by the AKP, from 2005 to 2016. The Turkish strategy in SSA during this decade is analyzed through the concept of soft power, more specifically the concept of multi-track public diplomacy, as analyzed in chapter 2. Indeed, this chapter highlights the specific relationship between the Turkish state and non-state actors in the implementation of the TFP strategy in SSA. Moreover, this strategy of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, during its first decade, is broken down into different areas that fit with those of the concept of multi-track diplomacy. With

this in mind, the second part of this chapter focuses more particularly on the various areas of Turkey's multi-track public diplomacy in SSA, during the first decade of the AKP's SSA policy. This strategy of Turkey's multitrack public diplomacy in SSA is analyzed through its various areas, as well as its institutional players.

Chapter 5 analyzes the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016. Indeed, the failed coup of July 2016, perpetrated by the GM in Turkey, is analyzed, as a conjectural determinant, which prompted significant changes in the TFP strategy in SSA from 2016 onwards. These changes in the TFP strategy in SSA, are noticeable in particular, at the level of the institutional players of the TFP in SSA. Particular emphasis is also placed, on the analysis of Turkey's security diplomacy in SSA, as the new key area of the TFP strategy in SSA since 2016.

Chapter 6 finalizes the analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA since 2016, through its empirical and theoretical assessment. Empirically, the assessment of the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016, is based on an analysis of the contrasting reaction of two SSA countries to the TFP post-July 2016, namely: Nigeria and Senegal. Finally, on a theoretical level, this chapter relates the findings achieved through the analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016 in this study, with the assumptions of the concept of soft power, as developed in chapter 2 of this thesis.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes this thesis through an overall assessment of the study as well as its various findings. This chapter also assesses the contribution of this study to the research in the field of IR, as well as its limitations.

CHAPTER 2

FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGIES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Cornish et al. (2011), define strategy as: “a collection of ideas, preferences, and methods which explains activities and give it purposes by connecting it to the desired effect or stated goal”. According to scholars such as Clausewitz, the concept of strategy deals mainly with military purposes. Hence, this concept is mostly used for national security issues (Irrerio Seminatore, n.d.). However, scholars like Cornish et al. (2011), more and more analyze the political aspect of the concept of strategy. Hence, for Irrerio Seminatore (n.d.), strategy is not merely the art to use war for political ends. It is also “the whole range of defense means (material, psychological and political), used by states to protect their territories and population from foreign aggression”. In the same vein, Cornish et al. (2011) further define strategy as “the interface which provide governmental politics with its ways and means (or its capabilities), and which gives activity (military or other) its ends (or its purposes)”. From this definition of the concept of strategy, two variables that appear central are “ends” and “means”. Thus, Yükselen (2020) conceptualizes strategy as “the match of ends and means”. The ends represent what a given state is seeking to achieve; while the means are “the resources a given state can devote to achieving the ends” (Cornish et al., 2011). However, Yükselen (2020, p. 21), highlights the focus on means in most conceptualizations of strategy.

In the same vein, the concept of strategy will be mostly employed in the course of this study regarding the means of foreign policy. Therefore, the means of strategy in this thesis will be defined as foreign policy instruments that states use to reach their

foreign policy objectives. These strategies or instruments are generally classified in the foreign policy analysis literature, into the two main behavioral categories of coercive and non-coercive instruments, or as stated by Nye (1990), “hard power” and “soft power”. Between these two extremes, several types of instruments can be grouped into three categories: socialization; coercion, and intervention (Morin, 2013, p. 33). To each of these categories belong different instruments or tools of foreign policy.




Figure 1. The range of foreign policy instruments

Source: Jean-Frederic Morin, *La Politique Etrangère*, p. 33.

In a nutshell, this chapter aims to analyze foreign policy strategies through the lenses of foreign policy instruments or means. Thus, we will start with an analysis of coercive or hard instruments of foreign policy, then a greater emphasis will be put on non-coercive instruments which are mostly referred to in the scholarly literature as the soft instruments of foreign policy. This stress on soft instruments of foreign policy is explained by the main hypothesis of the thesis which is the shift from a society-centered to a state-centered TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016. This study assumes that Turkey had mostly a society-centered foreign policy strategy or soft strategy since the beginning of its implantation in the SSA region. Therefore, the

framework of soft foreign policy instruments will be the main guiding line of our analysis of TFP in Africa after 15 July 2016. Hence, the emphasis on the examination of foreign policy strategy' instruments of the category of soft power. Finally, we will conclude this theoretical chapter by a consideration of the relationship between the two categories of hard and soft instruments of foreign policy.

2.1 The coercive instruments of foreign policy

The first category of foreign policy strategy that we will analyze, is coercive instruments. Romeo (2015) define coercion as: “a type of strategy which aims to reach its goals through a series of threats of violence and negotiated outcomes”. Hence, coercive instruments are generally referred to in the scholarly literature as “hard instruments of foreign policy”. Scholars such as Smith-Windsor (2000), distinguish two forms of coercive or hard instruments namely: “physical force and behavioral hard power” (Abdullah Ali, 2016, p. 21). Physical force is “the tangible manifestation of hard power”, for example: military operation, whereas behavioral hard power relies on coercive instruments or means such as coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions (Abdullah Ali, 2016, p. 21).

Hence, the strategy of coercion lies in between the extremes of socialization and intervention strategies. Morin (2013), defines coercive measures, as those which aim to influence the behavior of a target by modifying the calculation of its interests, without intervening directly in foreign territory.

Besides, it is worth noticing that coercion relies on the assumption of the rationality of the actors, meaning their ability to frame their interests according to the cost and benefits of their actions. Schelling (1966, p. 69) clearly explains the distinction between coercion and brute force. He states that coercion depends not only

on persuasion and intimidation but also on the cooperation of the party receiving the threat. In this regard, coercion as a strategy takes into consideration the interest of both the coercer and the coerced. Hence the outcome of the issue rest in the hands of the adversary. For that reason, coercive actions mostly start with economic sanctions. Consequently, the instruments of coercion rest on the credibility of threats (George, 1971, p. 10). On the contrary, in the use of brute force, there is no concern for the other side's interest and cooperation. Brute force deals mostly with the military might of the parties involved, Schelling (1966) thus refers to it as “forcible actions”.

The instruments of coercion are classified invariantly in foreign policy analysis literature. Thus, according to Morin (2013, p. 36), coercion can be conceptualized in five dimensions which are:

- i. The use of positive sanctions versus negative sanctions;
- ii. The threat of sanctions versus the effective use of sanctions;
- iii. The objectives of the coercive strategy (deterrence versus compellence);
- iv. The scope of the coercive instruments (immediate versus general);
- v. The target population of the coercive strategy (elite versus mass).

Alexander George (1971) on its part, distinguished three main instruments of coercion, namely: coercive diplomacy, deterrence, and compellence; while other scholars consider coercive diplomacy as the main instrument of coercion that encompasses altogether deterrence and compellence (Romeo, 2015). Finally other scholars like Schelling (1966), distinguished two main strategies of coercion, being compellence and deterrence.

Following this classification of coercive instruments concerning the literature, it seems necessary to analyze the three concepts of coercive diplomacy, compellence, and deterrence to have a broad picture of coercion as a strategy of foreign policy.

2.1.1 Coercive diplomacy and compellence

Coercive diplomacy as a strategy of foreign policy has been best conceptualized by Alexander George (1971), who defined it as “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action”. Following this definition, Levy (2008, p. 539) in his analysis of Alexander George's work, defined coercive diplomacy as:

A political-diplomatic strategy that aims to influence an adversary' will or incentives structure. It is a strategy that combines threats and force and if necessary the limited selective use of force in discrete and controlled increments in a bargaining strategy that includes positive inducements (Levy, 2008, p. 539).

According to George (1971), coercive diplomacy is different from the brute use of force in the sense that it deals more with the psychological dimension of force which is psychological pressure. Therefore, for Levy (2008, p. 539), the aim of coercive diplomacy is the compliance of the adversary to one's demand, while avoiding military actions. Hence, according to Alexander George (1971, p. 9), coercive diplomacy in crisis or conflict management is mainly a defensive strategy whose objectives are:

- i. “Merely stopping the opponent's action”;
- ii. “The reversal of what has been already accomplished”;
- iii. “Cessation of the opponent's hostile behavior” (George, 1971, p. 9).

Besides, a coercive diplomacy strategy may associate threat to positive incentives as a token of reassurance, “to secure the adversary acceptance of the

demand”. Following these features of coercive diplomacy strategy, George (1971, p. 9) established various types or tactics of coercive diplomacy. The main are:

- i. “The stick and carrots strategy, in which the carrots can be “any of a variety of things the adversary values”. It can be a concession, or a side payment; while the stick includes economic sanctions as well as military force”;
- ii. “The full-fledged ultimatum”, that consist in a demand and a threat in case of non-compliance (George, 1971, p. 9);
- iii. “The “Try and see” approach”, that consist in gradual threats to the adversary until its final compliance (George, 1971, p. 9).

It is necessary to emphasize that contrary to George (1971), compellence and coercive diplomacy are regarded as the same concept by scholars like Biddle (2020), and Fryar (2012). Indeed, George (1971) in his definition of coercive diplomacy, stresses the fact that the strategy of coercion can be used both for a defensive and offensive aim. As a consequence of these similarities between the two concepts, compellence is mostly considered another term for coercive diplomacy (Romeo, 2015, p. 6). Hence, according to Schelling (1966), the strategy of compellence varies in its use either in peacetime or in wartime; the use of compellence in peacetime is referred to as coercive diplomacy (Biddle, 2020, p. 98). In the same vein, Romeo (2015, p. 6) analyses compellence as the broader concept that encompasses both coercive diplomacy and blackmailing, given that it is made up of elements of both concepts, namely the use of threats and force.

2.1.2 Deterrence

Levy (2008, p. 539) defines deterrence as: “the use of threats to dissuade an adversary from initiating an undesired action”. Mueller (2018) distinguished two types of deterrence:

- Deterrence by the threat of denial, in which parties decide to not act by fear the other side can defeat the attack;
- Deterrence by the threat of punishment, where parties do not act for fear that the opponent can inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation.

The most notable example of the use of deterrence as a strategy is the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) doctrine during the Cold War (Biddle, 2020, p. 101). It is worth mentioning that, even if deterrence and compellence are both coercion strategies, they nevertheless differ in various ways. Thus, Schelling (1966) stated that the difference between the two types of coercive strategies lies in four main features, namely: the type of action, the aim of the threat, the timing, and the framing of the punishment.

Thus, following the feature of action, deterrence is different from compellence in the sense that it involves no action on the part of the adversaries, while compellence intends to make an adversary do something or change the course of action (Biddle, 2020, p. 103). In the same vein, the use of threats in deterrence strategy aims at refraining an adversary from doing something, while in compellence the use of threats aims to propel an adversary to take an action. As far as the timing is concerned, Schelling (1966), stressed that deterrence generally implies infinite timing, while compellence must have a definite timeframe. Finally, concerning the framing of the punishment, the strategy of deterrence entails no punishment as long as the adversary

does not act, while punishment is a full part of the strategy of compellence (Biddle, 2020, p. 103).

2.1.3 Intervention as a coercive instrument of foreign policy

Military intervention is the third category of coercive instruments. Morin (2013, p. 38) defines interventions as “interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign state to modify its structures”. Morin (2013) distinguishes two types of interventions: political interventions and military interventions. It is worth noticing that intervention or war as a foreign policy strategy is an extreme policy that, compared to other foreign policy instruments, remains relatively rare in contemporary foreign policy, because of its heavier cost (Morin, 2013, p. 38).

2.2 Socialization as an instrument of foreign policy

Morin (2013, p. 34) defines socialization as: “the transfer of beliefs, values, and ideas from one actor to another.” Socialization is a strategy that uses non-coercive or material instruments such as threats or promises, to shape the preferences of others (Johnston, 2008, p. 21). In IR literature, the socialization process mostly refers to the transfer of norms in the international system. Therefore, it is defined as “a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted by one party to another” (Johnston, 2008, p. 21).

Socialization relies on the idea that social interactions can change the world views and ideologies of international actors. Hence, socialization can be the result of various micro-process which lead to the changing of behaviors of actors in a pro-social way. These micro-processes inducing socialization are among others: identification, social influence, mimicking, and persuasion (Johnston, 2008, p. 21). Thus, for

Johnston (2008, p. 25) persuasion consists in “changing minds, opinions, and attitudes about causality and affect, without the use of coercive means”. Indeed, it can happen, within the framework of a process of rational communication, that one actor is sincerely convinced of the correctness of the arguments of another and that he comes to modify his ideas. Persuasion bridges the actors' meaning, since it leads to common knowledge and interests. In a nutshell, as Johnston (2008, p. 26) states, socialization as a foreign policy strategy aims at influencing other’s behavior by cajoling, persuading or shaming them.

However, in IR literature, a particular emphasis is put on persuasion as the main process of socialization. This is in line with the concept of “soft power”, as theorized by Nye (1990).

Indeed, the concept of Soft Power (SP), was first coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. He later elaborated more on it in a seminal article, entitled “Soft Power” (1990). In this work, Nye (1990), stated that following the end of the Cold War (CW), the nature of power in world politics changed, as the international system shifted from bipolarity to multipolarity. In this new international system characterized by the multiplicity of actors, a state can no more rely only on material power based on economics and military assets. Thus, in the new multipolar world characterized by the rise of information and communications technologies, the nature of power is shifting from traditional tangible resources to non-tangible resources such as cultural attraction, ideology, or international institutions. Besides, Nye (1990) also demonstrated that in this changing world politics, coercive instruments of power have lost much of their influential effect and are becoming more costly in their use. Therefore, according to Nye (1990, p. 100), for a state to lead long in world politics, it should rather rely on

the power of attraction, which is “the ability to set the political agenda and other’s preferences” (Nye, 2008, p.100). Nye (2008, p.100) also underlines that:

Attractiveness may be based on both or either rational or affective components of culture, values, and/or policies. For example, values such as democracy, freedom, the alleviation of poverty, and human rights may attract others because they address individual and collective desires and needs (Nye, 2008, p. 100).

Hence, Nye (2008, p. 95) defines Soft power as a State’s “ability to co-opt others rather than coercing them”. In order, to be an efficient strategy of foreign policy, soft power relies on two main instruments, namely: strategic narratives of communication and Public Diplomacy.

2.2.1 Strategic narratives as a tool of soft power

Miskimmon et al. (2017, p. 1), define Strategic narratives as:

A communication tool through which political actors attempt to build a shared meaning of the past, present, and future of international politics, to shape the behavior of domestic and international actors (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 1).

Hence, strategic narratives as a foreign policy instrument enable states to construct and maintain their influence in world politics through the connection of interests, values, and goals it establishes among the various actors involved in the narrative (Miskimmon et al., 2017, p. 3). Therefore, Miskimmon et al. (2014, p. 5) conceptualized strategic narratives as “the use of language to rhetorically trap others”.

To this effect, strategic narratives are labeled by scholars as “the 21st-century diplomatic tool” (Miskimmon et al., 2018, p. 1). Indeed, the efficiency of strategic

narratives as a tool of foreign policy derives from the ability of language to transform soft power assets such as culture or values into effective coercive power, that is the ability to transform the non-tangible soft power resources into actual force that can constraint the behavior of states (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 72). As an illustration of it, Miskimmon et al. (2014) have demonstrated how states' commitment to values such as Human rights protection, shapes their behavior on particular issues and constrains them to act in a given way which can sometimes be in opposition to their particular interests because they have to act under their official discourse to keep their credibility in world politics (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 72). Besides, as a foreign policy tool, strategic narratives also enable states to reach their desired outcomes or preferred behavior from other states, through the ability to build a common meaning and interest between parties (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 72). For example, scholars such as Efeğil (2009), Goodarzi and Maboodinejad (2016), Balci and Liles (2018) have analyzed how Turkey uses its historical and cultural bonds with Central Asian countries to become a regional power in that area. Moreover, states can also build on strategic narratives to implement and justify their foreign policy actions as is the case with the US narrative of the “War on terror” following the 09/11 events (Morin, 2013, p. 35).

Thus, strategic narratives transform soft power into an effective force. To this effect, Miskimmon et al. (2014) state that “strategic narrative enact soft power.” It is worth mentioning that, strategic narratives do not come from the void. To be efficient as a persuasive tool and gain acceptance by a target audience, a strategic narrative should be backed by actual real facts or history (Miskimmon et al., 2014, p. 4). Hence, as stated by Klyueva (2017), “narratives emphasize that history (context) matters.” There are three main types of strategic narratives identified by scholars, namely:

international or systemic narratives; national or identity narratives; issue narratives (Van Noor, 2017).

As far as the elaboration of a strategic narrative is concerned, the construction of a strategic narrative goes through three main phases, with the involvement of specific actors at the various stages. Those phases are namely: the narrative formation; the narrative projection; and the narrative reception (Klyueva, 2017, p. 88).

2.2.2 Public diplomacy as an instrument of soft power

The term public diplomacy (PD) was coined during the 1960s by an American scholar Gullion, against the backdrop of the US policy to attract the support of the foreign public during the Cold War (Melissen, 2005). As stressed by Gregory (2008, p. 281):

For practitioners of public diplomacy, his thinking is relevant to priorities given to comprehension of cultures and attitudes, cross-cultural dialogue, people-to-people exchanges, and finding common ground in strategic communication (Gregory, 2008, p. 281).

As a foreign policy strategy, public diplomacy is experiencing a revival of interest since the terror attacks of September 11, 2001 (Hocking, 2005, p. 28). Indeed, this new development in world politics has highlighted the central place now occupies by the image and the media in state's foreign policy in the 21st century (Hocking, 2005).

As a concept in IR, public diplomacy is traditionally, mostly defined concerning governments' actions toward a foreign audience (Gilboa, 2008). However, this state-centric view of PD is more and more the object of controversy given the practice of PD on the ground (Melissen, 2005). Indeed, the end of the CW came up with dramatic changes in world politics that affected the practice of PD. These changes

are namely: the democratization of world politics with the rise of non-state actors in the political arena; the transnationalization of social interactions thanks to the development of transportation facilities; the rise of the new technologies of information and communication (NTIC), which fostered the implication of the general public in the political debate, and its subsequent impact which are the growing importance of media as well as image in world politics (Snow, 2020).

Indeed, the globalization of world politics came along with the transnationalization of issues that now have a global impact, and are resolved on a global scale. As a result, the state as the sole actor in world politics is more and more lacking the capacity to face transnational issues, which affect directly the lives of the population at the grassroots (Castells, 2008). Thus, the growing importance of societal actors in international politics, who have direct access to people on the ground, even sometimes challenging the competence of the State (Castells, 2008). Therefore, in this context of rising global issues, states have recourse to societal actors to reach their foreign policy objectives (Castells, 2008). PD as a strategy of foreign policy is also affected by these developments (emergence of societal actors), this is why scholars such as Melissen (2005) coined the term “New Public Diplomacy” (NPD) that fits best the practice of PD in the framework of globalization. Hence, Signitzer and Coombs (1992), define PD as:

How both governments and private individuals and groups influence directly and indirectly those public attitudes and opinions, which bear directly on another government's foreign policy decisions (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 137).

Though PD is described by scholars as a key instrument of SP, which transforms SP assets of value, culture, and politics into action, it is not a soft instrument

per se (Melissen, 2005). Indeed, it pursues various functions. In this regard, Melissen (2005, p. 9) states that “Nations in transition and global south countries' new interest in PD bears strong economic motives”. Cull (2008) classifies the functions of PD into 05 elements: listening; advocacy; cultural diplomacy; exchange diplomacy; and international broadcasting. Leonard (2002) and Nye (2008), group these 05 elements into 03 dimensions of PD, namely: news management, strategic communication, and relationship building. Besides, Leonard (2002) establishes 05 instruments of PD which perform these functions, namely: “NGO diplomacy; diaspora diplomacy, political party diplomacy; brand diplomacy; and business diplomacy” (Leonard, 2002). Gilboa (2008, p. 71) adds 03 more instruments namely: advocacy; international broadcasting, and cyber public diplomacy. He also classifies PD instruments according to criteria such as their range, time, purpose, and their relation to media and governments. The following table illustrates the types of PD instruments.

Table 2. Public Diplomacy Instruments

	Type of PD	Time frame	Flow of Information	Typical Infrastructure
I	Listening	Short & long-term	Inward to analysts and policy process	Monitoring technology & language trained staff
II	Advocacy	Short term	Outward	Embassy press office, foreign ministry strategy office
III	Cultural diplomacy	Long-term	Outward	Cultural Center and/or library
IV	Exchange diplomacy	Very long term	Inward & outward	Exchange administrator, Educational office
V	International broadcasting	Medium-term	Outward but from a news bureaucracy	News bureaus, production studios, editorial offices, and transmitter facilities

Source: Cull (2009, p. 25).

Taking into account the various instruments of PD, scholars like Melissen (2005), Hocking (2005) and Snow (2020), differentiate 02 main types of PD: the traditional/hierarchical/strategic PD and the networked/ multitrack PD.

2.2.2.1 The traditional/hierarchical/strategic public diplomacy

In the traditional PD, the state is considered the main actor of PD (Hocking, 2005). Though the role of other actors both societal and organizational is recognized, in the implementation of the PD strategy on the ground, the relation between the state and these other actors is nevertheless a hierarchical one. Thus, in the traditional PD, the preeminence is on state-to-state type relations or state-to-public relations (Hocking, 2005). Besides, traditional PD also emphasizes advocacy since its main purpose is to defend a government interest or view. Here, “public matters to governments as tools of foreign policy” (Snow, 2020, p. 9). Hence, this type of PD mainly aims at reaching foreign policy objectives. Because of its state-centric nature, hierarchical PD tends to be assimilated into propaganda (Snow, 2020, p. 9).

The various similarities between propaganda and PD, namely their use of instruments of international broadcasting, blur the line between the two strategies (Berridge, 2010). Hence, Berridge (2010, p. 179) defines propaganda as:

The manipulation of public opinion through the mass media for political ends. It might be more or less honest, more or less subtle, and sometimes directed more at achieving long-term, rather than short-term, changes in opinion. Its target might be foreign public opinion, domestic public opinion, or both. (...) 'Public diplomacy' is the modern name for white propaganda directed chiefly at foreign publics (Berridge, 2010, p. 179).

Propaganda as a tool of foreign policy was mainly used during the CW by the protagonists, to raise support for the opposite side's public opinion, and to counter the information broadcasted by the opponent. The US propaganda policy during that period is well illustrated by the US information agency (USIA), created by the US government during that period to counter the propaganda of the USSR, and which was dissolved by the end of the CW (Gilboa, 2008, p. 59). The US public diplomacy activism following the 09/11 terror attacks as a strategy to raise the support of Muslim countries' public opinion, following the US military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, is also perceived by scholars like Melissen (2005) and Snow (2020) as propaganda. Indeed, scholars such as Nye (2008) and Melissen (2005) underline that the US' PD towards Muslim public opinion, was deemed counterproductive because it was mainly an advocacy campaign that was perceived by the target audience as propaganda. Hence, Melissen (2005), highlights that the main difference between PD and propaganda rests in the listening function of PD. While propaganda is mainly a one-way communication, PD is interactive communication between the advocacy state and its target audience. In the same vein, Nye (2008) stresses the importance of NSA in the PD process to ensure the credibility of the state's PD initiatives. According to Nye (2008), state-centric PD is more and more ineffective in the globalization era, because of the lack of trust of the public both domestic and foreign towards state authorities. Therefore, the strategic PD is assimilated into propaganda by the public (Nye, 2008). Hence, the need for a less state-centered approach to PD that takes into account the role of societal actors.

2.2.2.2 The networked model of pd/ multitrack PD

The networked PD is also referred to as “the diplomacy of sovereignty-free actors” (Hocking, 2005, p. 40). It comes from the observation that societal actors have more ability to solve issues of global scales, because of their proximity with people on the ground, as well as their ability to transcend state boundaries in comparison to state actors. Hence, the networked model of PD highlights “the private dimension of PD” (Hocking, 2005, p. 37). Hocking (2005, p. 36) defines a network as:

A set of relatively stable relations which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors who share common interests concerning a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way to achieve common goals (Hocking, 2005, p. 36).

Therefore, in the networked model of PD, there are no hierarchical relations between state and non-state actors (Hocking, 2005, p. 35). The networked model of PD recognizes the contribution of each actor in its respective way and on an equal base. In this context where the competencies of the state are challenged by various societal actors, on the ground, image and reputation become prime assets in world politics, which confer credibility to the various actors (Nye, 2008). In this quest for image and credibility, NGOs enjoy a particular advantage over other actors. Indeed, the goal of public diplomacy is to establish long-term relationships with the target audience, and thus to create the conditions favorable to the implementation of the political objectives of the advocating country (Nye, 2008). In this sense, network communication has a considerable advantage, namely the possibility of communicating directly with the target audience on the ground (Nye, 2008). This direct communication with the public makes it possible to transcend the cultural barriers between the public and those

involved in public diplomacy (Nye, 2008). However, this flexibility available to NGOs is not accessible to state actors because of their centralized structure (Nye, 2008). This greater flexibility of NGOs to get access to the public is at the origin of the concept of NPD or networked public diplomacy (Hocking, 2005, p. 37).

Indeed, the NPD, or networked public diplomacy, is no longer limited to advocacy and direct communication between the state and the target audience. It aims more at the establishment of long-term relationships with civil society actors in the target country and to facilitate communication between domestic and foreign non-governmental actors (Nye, 2008). In networked public diplomacy, the role of the State as an actor of public diplomacy is no longer to monitor interactions between domestic and foreign non-governmental actors, but the role of the State is also to promote and participate in the establishment of these transnational networks (Nye, 2008). Excessive state control or even the preponderance of the state presence in these transnational relations is likely to tarnish the credibility of state policies and the relationships of trust that these networks are supposed to facilitate (Nye, 2008).

According to Ogg (2002, p. 63), the involvement of citizens in the sphere of diplomacy is also referred to as “citizen diplomacy”; or “non-state diplomacy”, and was first conceptualized by Montville (1981) through its concept of “Track two (2) diplomacy”. This concept designates “a broad range of unofficial contacts and interactions aimed at resolving conflicts both internationally and within states” (Ogg, 2002, p. 15). As this definition show, the concept of Track Two diplomacy was first developed in the area of peace and security issues, as a means of conflict resolution (Ogg, 2002). More precisely, this concept stems from the idea that conflicts have both a material and a psychological dimension (Ogg, 2002, p. 63). It also originates from the observation that in the field of conflict resolution, actors from the sphere of civil

society such as religious organizations, journalists, scholars, indigenous NGOs, citizens groups, and private individuals, have a significant role to play in conflict mediation alongside government officials, though in an informal way, because of their proximity with populations on the battlefields (Diamond & McDonald, 1996, p. 2). It is worth noticing that track two diplomacy is not a replacement to official diplomacy, on the contrary, it is a good complement that sets the ground for official negotiations and that should be used in combination with official diplomacy efforts. As stressed by Lewer (1999), nonofficial interveners play a complementary role by “Bridging the gap” between official diplomacy and the public. The said gap consists mainly of psychological and cultural barriers which hindered the communication between the parties involved in the conflict (Ogg, 2002). Thus, Track 2 diplomacy is necessary at the grassroots to alleviate these barriers and set the ground for official negotiations (Ogg, 2002).

Concerning the growing contribution of track 2 diplomacy in the area of conflict resolution, as well as the diversity of non-state actors involved in track 2 diplomacy, Diamond and McDonald (1996), suggested that the concept of Track 2 diplomacy, could no longer suit the development in the field of non-state actors’ diplomacy. Therefore, they coined the concept of “Multi-track diplomacy”, which better fits the complex web of initiatives in conflict resolution. Thus, Diamond and McDonald (1996), subdivide track 2 diplomacy into 08 new categories or tracks which describe the initiatives of respective non-state actors, and added to Track one or official diplomacy forms the network of multitrack diplomacy. The network of PD, is made up of: government or official Diplomacy (T1); Professional or conflict resolution Diplomacy (T2); Business Diplomacy (T3); Private citizen Diplomacy (T4); research,

training and education Diplomacy (T5); Peace activism Diplomacy (T6); Religious Diplomacy (T7); Funding Diplomacy (T8).

As the concept of multitrack diplomacy is conceptualized, there are no hierarchical relationships between the various tracks or actors, rather they are interdependent and each track depends on the others to be efficient. Besides, the various tracks representing civil society actors should work in harmony to exert enough influence on track 1 or government policies (Diamond & McDonald, 1996).




Figure 2. Diamond and McDonald's multitrack diplomacy model (Diamond & McDonald, 1996)

Source: The Institute of multi-track diplomacy

Finally, it is worth noticing that though the concept of multi-track diplomacy was first developed in the area of conflict resolution, it also applies to other areas of international relations such as foreign policy. Hence, scholars such as Putri and

Raharyo (2019), Donelli (2018, 2021), analyze the foreign policy strategy of emerging countries like Indonesia and Turkey in the background of multi-track diplomacy. Indeed, as a foreign policy strategy, multi-track diplomacy can be an effective strategy for a state to reach its foreign policy objectives, thanks to the involvement of societal actors “to support the achievement of the state national interest (Putri & Raharyo, 2019, p. 179).

2.3 Smart power or the interplay between soft power and hard power

As we have introduced them so far, the strategies of foreign policy have been polarized into hard instruments and soft instruments. However, critics of the concept of soft power, like Keck (2013) and Wagner (2014), underlined that such a polarization of foreign policy instruments does not fit the reality, since the border blurs between the foreign policy instruments in their effective implementation in politics. Rather, scholars such as Keck (2013), and Wagner (2014) highlight that there is a continuum among foreign policy instruments of the categories of hard and soft power. Thus, a soft power instrument can be efficient to achieve hard power objectives, and on the other way round coercive instruments can serve soft power purposes. Hence, Keck (2013) states that the concept of soft power is widely misunderstood as the opposite of coercion. Keck (2013) stresses that economics and military capabilities can be effective soft power assets. In the same vein, the use of soft power instruments as media broadcasting was an efficient soft power instrument targeting hard power goals, especially during the Cold War.

To cope with the conceptual limitation of Soft power as the opposite of hard power, Nye and Armitage (2007) coined the concept of smart power. Indeed, Wilson (2008) defines Smart power as: “the capacity to combine elements of hard power and

soft power in ways that actors' goals are advanced effectively and efficiently". Nye and Armitage (2007) highlight that the two types of foreign policy strategies are deeply intertwined since both, aim at reaching a foreign policy outcome by affecting the behavior of others. Thus, the two strategies are not opposite but complementary powers. In the same vein, Korb and Boorstin (2005) developed the concept of integrated power, to describe the complementarity between soft and hard power instruments. Hence, smart power is the combination of the different instruments of power, be it economic, diplomatic, military, or cultural. However, Wilson (2008) highlights that to have an efficient smart power strategy, the advocating country should pay attention to some aspects in the elaboration of the smart power strategy. Those important aspects are:

- The characteristics of the target country and its population;
- Good knowledge of its own country's assets and limitations;
- Good knowledge of the regional politics where the smart power strategy will be deployed;
- Finally, a good command of the appropriate instrument of smart power to employ.

According to scholars, such as Raimzhanova (2015), the EU can be considered the world's top practitioner of Smart power, because of its capacity to set the agenda in world politics. While, Keck (2013) emphasizes the smart power practice of other powers such as the US and China, especially in their foreign policy in Africa.

2.4 Conclusion

This chapter aimed to present the range of foreign policy strategies into a coherent framework, to set the theoretical basis which will support our analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA. Hence, it appears that to reach their desired outcomes in foreign policy, states have a wide range of instruments that are classified by scholars into the two main categories of hard instruments and soft instruments. Since power is defined as the ability of one actor to get its desired outcomes in world politics, those instruments have been classified by Nye (1990) in the behavioral categories of coercive instruments and attractive instruments. Furthermore, as stated by Wagner (2014), the hard or coercive instruments of foreign policy, are more and more neglected for the benefit of soft instruments, that suit better contemporary world politics in the context of globalization and the information age. Among these soft instruments, PD has a privileged place as the foreign policy instrument of the 21st century, notably in the foreign policy strategy of emerging powers such as Turkey (Hurrell, 2000; Öner, 2013). Hence, remaining chapters of this thesis will be dedicated to the analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA both in the structural and historical framework, and the conjectural context of the post- 15 July 2016 political events in Turkey, which had ramifications on the TFP strategy in SSA.

CHAPTER 3

THE TIMELINE OF TURKEY’S PRESENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

“We have a legacy from the Ottoman Empire. They call us the New Ottoman. Yes, we are the New Ottoman. We have to deal with the countries in our region. In fact, we are opening up to Africa. Great states are following with surprise. Especially France is investigating why we are opening to Africa. I also gave instructions. No matter which African country Sarkozy goes to, he will see the Turkish embassy building and the flag wherever he goes”.

Ahmet Davutoğlu, 2009.²⁹

To determine if there is continuity or change in the Turkish foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2016, it is first of all necessary to unveil the foundations of Turkey's relation with Sub-Saharan African countries, which can be traced back to the time of the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, this necessary leap into the past could provide insight that will help unravel some features of Turkey's relationship with countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in the present day. As Carr (1961) said: “History is a dialogue between the present and the past”. Therefore, the historiography of Turkey’s relations with Sub-Saharan Africa will unveil “the deep forces”³⁰ that underlie Turkey-Sub-Saharan Africa relations. As Renouvin and Duroselle (1964) argued, the study of foreign policy can no longer be done alone. Historiography must take into account the

²⁹ «Sarkozy gittiği her yerde bizi görecek », *Yeni Safak*, 30 May. 2009, online retrieved from: <https://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/sarkozy-gittigi-her-yerde-bizi-gorecek-225129>. Consulted 02.01.2022.

³⁰ “To understand diplomatic action, one must seek to perceive the influences that have guided its course. Geographical conditions, demographic movements, economic and financial interests, features of the collective mentality, the great sentimental currents, are the deep forces that have formed the framework of relations between human groups and, to a large extent, determined their character. The statesman, in his decisions or his projects, cannot neglect them; he is influenced by them, and he is obliged to see what limits they place on his action. Yet when he possesses either the intellectual gifts, or firmness of character, or temperament which pushes him to cross these limits, he can try to modify the play of these forces and use them for his ends”. Retrieved from: Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, *Introduction à l’Histoire des Relations Internationales*, (Paris, Librairie Armand Colin, 1964), p. 520.

underlying movements and non-political factors to explain the foreign policy of states. In this regard, this chapter intends to determine the foundations of Turkish foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa through a socio-historical approach. This chapter will be subdivided into two parts which will trace back the history of Turkey's presence in SSA, namely from the Ottoman era to the current period with the rise to power of the AKP on top of the Turkish state. Hence, this socio-historical approach will enable us to uncover the structural determinants or variables of Turkish foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. The said structural variables, which according to various scholars of foreign policy analysis, are the main variables behind the foreign policy of a state.

3.1 From Ottoman turkey to the “opening-up to Africa” policy

This first part of the chapter aims to unveil important features of Turkey's presence in SSA during the Ottoman period. Indeed, some of these features are the source of Turkey's current foreign policy in SSA. In addition to its Ottoman-era heritage, the recent history of the Turkish Republic, in particular its foreign policy vision after the Cold war era, is also the trigger of Turkey's recent interest in the SSA region.

3.1.1 Ottoman Turkey in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

Turkey's presence in SSA countries is not a matter of today, though Turkey is sometimes referred to in the literature as a newcomer to SSA (Bacik & Afacan, 2013). Indeed, Turkey's presence on the African continent dates back to the Ottoman era, during which, part of what is today considered to be North Africa was an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, especially with countries like Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria. Also, the Ottomans established a distinction between North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, where North Africa because of its geographic and cultural proximity

with the empire, was considered the hub of Ottoman activities in the continent, and a point from which to expand to other areas of the African continent (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014, p. 221). Thus, according to researchers such as; Enwere and Yilmaz (2014), the first contact between Ottoman Turkey and SSA was established by the Bedouin and caravan routes between North Africa and SSA. During this period, relations between the Ottoman Empire and SSA kingdoms such as Kanem Bornu and Wadai were mainly in the realm of trade (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014, p. 217). In the same vein, the Kanem Bornu kingdom, agreed on a defense pact with the Ottoman Empire in 1575 (Minawi, 2016, p. 20). In addition, the relationship of the Ottoman Empire with the feudal kingdoms of SSA was also favored by the presence of Muslim populations in these kingdoms. Thus, as stated by Minawi (2016, p. 20), the moral duty to “lead fellow Muslims in the Sahara and the SSA who had not yet benefited from modern progress towards a better future”, was also a motivation behind the relations of Ottoman Turkey with the feudal kingdoms of SSA. In this regard, according to Enwere and Yilmaz (2014, p. 561): “the opening of the first mosque in Lagos (Nigeria), in 1894, prompted the Ottomans to send emissaries to this city of SSA”.

However, domestic issues within the Ottoman Empire, like the war with Russia of 1877-1878, and the beginning of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (which was then called “the sick man of Europe”), and the arrival of colonial powers on the African continent (France, Great Britain, Germany) all together contributed to the dissolution of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the SSA (Minawi, 2016, p. 8). Since this period coincided with the Berlin Congress of 1884-1885, which initiated the scramble for Africa by the European powers, the Ottoman Empire was denied a colonial history with the SSA. Indeed, as Minawi (2016, p. 2) stated:

Because of the internal and external troubles the Ottoman Empire faced during the era of the scramble of Africa, the Ottoman Empire is generally excluded from the study of imperialism". Therefore, the Ottoman Empire is erroneously labeled (mainly in Western literature) as "non-imperial", "border imperialism" or "informal colonial" (Minawi, 2016, p. 2).

However, Minawi (2016) clearly indicated that the Ottoman Empire participated in the Berlin Congress of 1884-1885, during which the spheres of influence were determined by the European colonial powers. Therefore, Minawi (2016) established a colonial history for the Ottoman Empire in SSA. Thus, the Ottoman Empire alongside other imperial powers such as France and Great Britain or Italy indicated its areas of interest (sphere of influence) on the African continent during the Berlin congress. The said area stretched from the Eastern Sahara to the Lake Chad basin, meaning part of the current territories of countries such as Libya, Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, and Cameroon (Minawi, 2016, p. 3).

Indeed, Minawi (2016) demonstrates that the Ottoman Empire during Sultan Abdul Hamid II's reign in the 19th century, particularly from 1880 to 1902, was undeniably a colonial power in this region of Africa. Hence, the Ottoman Empire was mainly settled in Libya (then called Tripolitania), through which the empire extended its influence and presence in the SSA, using Islam as a tool. This was done primarily with the help of the Sanusi Order, a powerful and influential Muslim community-based in Libya, which had a political alliance with the Ottomans for the indirect rule of the Libyan Ottoman provinces (Minawi, 2016, p. 25).

Thus, Minawi (2016) asserts that contrary to what is said in western literature, the Ottoman Empire effectively took part in the Berlin Congress of 1884-1885, not as a silent observer, but as an active actor which sought to protect its interests in Africa. The Berlin Act of 1885, came up with two main doctrines: the hinterland, and the

effective occupation of the land, whose aim was to prevent land disputes between colonial powers over their spheres of influence to end up in armed conflict. The hinterland doctrine meant that each colonial power had the right to claim the interior of its coastal territory as its own. The effective occupation of the land, for its part, is a rule which conditions the ownership of a colony or a territory to a colonial power by its material presence (military or economic) on the said territory. Based on this rule, the Ottoman Empire claimed the territories of the northern Mediterranean coast of Libya with the Lake Chad basin as its hinterland.

However, right after the Berlin Congress, disputes arose among the European powers about the Ottoman territories of the Lake Chad Basin. Indeed, this area was the corner point of the spheres of influence of two European imperial powers, namely: France and Great Britain. Thus, the Ottoman Empire's claim over the Lake Chad Basin as the hinterland of its Libyan provinces clashed with the French and British spheres of influences (Minawi, 2016, p. 38). As a result, the disputed area was the object of a British-French Agreement in 1890, namely over the territories of Wadai, Bornou, Kanem, and Bagirmi (Minawi, 2016, p. 64). After claims by the Ottoman Empire, over the violation of their rights in the Lake Chad Basin area, the French and British sides justified their occupation of the disputed area by the fact that it was not effectively ruled by the Ottomans as stated by the rule of the effective occupation of the land of the Berlin Agreement. Indeed, the Ottomans relied on their political alliance with the Sanusi Order to claim their right to the disputed territories. However, the French and British sides supported their occupation of the disputed territories over the fact that they "were outside direct Ottoman rule" (Minawi, 2016, p. 60).

Thus, by the end of the year 1890, the British and French sides considered their occupation of the Lake Chad Basin territories as "a *Fait accompli*," and to be no more

subject to any negotiation with the Ottoman Empire (Minawi, 2016, p. 78). It is worth mentioning that, the Ottoman's loss of its territories in the Lake Chad Basin area, was mainly the result of the diplomatic weakness of the empire by the end of the 19th century. Ottoman's loss of its SSA territories might be considered the result of an imbalance of powers between the various protagonists of the Berlin congress. The Ottomans resorted to international law to justify their claim over the Lake Chad Basin area, but the International law seemed not to appeal to the Ottoman case in SSA (Minawi, 2016, p. 78). Finally, by the year 1894, the Ottoman Empire gave up on its claim over the Lake Chad Basin territories in SSA, to focus on the protection of its Libyan provinces, which also became the target of European colonial powers (namely Italy) (Minawi, 2016, p. 78). By the year 1918, the Ottoman Empire definitively lost its Libyan territories, which marked the beginning of a long split between the African continent as a whole and Turkey; namely with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the Turkish Republic in 1923.

3.1.2 Turkey- SSA relations from the rise of the Turkish republic to the cold war era

The second era in Turkey-SSA relations can be located in the time frame spanning from the creation of the Turkish Republic to the Cold War period, from 1923 to the end of the 80s (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014). This is the period that is generally referred to in the literature dedicated to TFP in SSA, as the period of neglect in Turkey-SSA relations (Genç & Tekin, 2014; İpek & Biltekin, 2013). Indeed, during this time frame, Turkey-SSA relations were almost non-existing. It was not until 1926, three years after the rise of the Turkish Republic that Turkey established its first contact with an SSA country, namely Ethiopia (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 123). The lack of interest of the

Turkish Republic in SSA during this period can be explained by various factors, among which:

- Turkey's domestic issues after the rise of the Turkish Republic;
- The guiding lines of Turkish Foreign Policy under Kemalism;
- The Cyprus issue;
- The systemic issue of the Cold War's impact on TFP.

As far as the Turkish Republic's domestic issues were concerned, it was mainly the transformation of Turkey's economy, from a feudal economy during the Ottoman era, to a more capitalist economy with the rise of the Turkish Republic (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014). Due to its economic stakes, the Turkish Republic was dependent on the West, thus Western countries became the focus of TFP (Genç & Tekin, 2014; İpek & Biltekin, 2013). On the other hand, SSA was also subject to European colonialism, Ethiopia being the only SSA country that was independent during the 20'S. All those elements did not enable the establishment of relations between Turkey and SSA during the early years of the Turkish Republic.

With the creation of the Turkish Republic, Kemalism which was the dominant ideology of Turkey carried some foreign policy principles such as westernization; non-interventionism, and protection of its national sovereignty, which hindered the development of Turkey-SSA relations after the Second World War (Genç & Tekin, 2014, p. 92). This was exacerbated by the international context of the Cold War, during which Turkey, clearly adopted a western stand that affected its position on issues related to Africa. For example, Turkey opposed the independence of Algeria in 1956 (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 126). Nevertheless, the Turkish Republic recognized most of the new African states after the decolonization of the continent during the 60'S.

Thus, Turkey established diplomatic relations with some SSA countries such as Nigeria and Ghana during this period (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 126).

Following the decolonization of Africa, Turkey and the new states of SSA took part in the non-aligned movement. However, during the non-aligned countries conference of 1955 in Bandung, Turkey displayed its pro-western stand and advocated against neutrality in the face of Soviet expansionism, which caused tensions between Turkey and other members of the non-aligned movement, most of whom were African countries (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 125).

Later on, the Cyprus issue became critical in the development of Turkey-SSA relations during the 1970s. Indeed, Turkey's intervention in Cyprus faced the opposition of most western countries, especially the US, with the 1975 arms embargo on Turkey (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 127). To cope with this issue and to get out of its isolationism in the western camp, Turkey needed international support and resorted to African countries (Genç & Tekin, 2014). Therefore, Turkey initiated its first Africa action plan during the 1970s, and modified the administrative structure of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to reflect the new multi-dimensional stand of its foreign policy (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 127). Thus, this period witnessed the creation of regional desks in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), among which one was assigned to SSA (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 127).

Subsequently, a phase of relative progress in Turkey-SSA Africa relations followed, marked among other things by events such as: "the signing of the economic and technical cooperation agreement between Turkey and Sierra-Leone in 1979; the opening of the Turkish embassy in Kinshasa in 1976; and the medical assistance package sent to Zimbabwe in 1978" (İpek & Biltekin, 2013, p. 127). Yet, this first initiative was unsuccessful, and Turkey failed to mobilize the international support it

needed in its Cyprus case. Thus, the non-aligned movement not only recognized and supported the legitimacy of the Cypriot Greek Republic in 1974, but also officially sided with the Cypriot Greek Republic at the Movement's summits of 1976 and 1979 (Genç & Tekin, 2014, p. 93). Consequently, the Cyprus issue has turned out to be a long-lasting obstacle to the development of Turkey-SSA relations (Genç & Tekin, 2014, p. 93).

In addition to the aforementioned motives, it is worth mentioning that SSA did not appeal to Turkish public opinion during the 1980s. In particular, due to the negative image of conflicts, diseases, and poverty in SSA, broadcast in the international media during this period; added to the general lack of knowledge of this region of the world by the Turkish public (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014). This further widened the gap between Turkey and SSA, which would not be bridged until the end of the 1990s, which was the era of the revival of relations between Turkey and the SSA countries.

3.1.3 Turkey's opening-up to Africa policy of 1998

The end of the 90s, more precisely the year 1998, is the third era in the history of Turkey's rapprochement with the SSA (Enwere & Yilmaz, 2014; Özkan, 2010). This period is the result of various factors which enabled the development of Turkey-SSA relations. In fact, during this period, Turkey started to enjoy the benefits of its westernization in the economic aspects. To sustain the positive economic results emanating from its westernization, successive Turkish governments of the late 1980s, as well as those of the 1990s, adopted an economy-based foreign policy approach, which resulted in the opening of the TFP to new regions of the world (Aydin, 2000, p. 17). This diversification of TFP began first with its close neighbors in Central Asia and the Caucasus and then spread to Latin America and SSA (Genç & Tekin, 2014, p.

93). It is worth noticing that this economic vision of the TFP was initiated for the first time in 1983 under the government of the Turkish Prime Minister Turgüt Özal (Aydin, 2000, p. 18).

Indeed, Özal with his neoliberal doctrine was decisive in the economic-based approach of the TFP. Turkey's economic exports-led growth required the expansion of TFP to search for new markets, which triggered Turkey to come out of its isolationism of the early years of the Republic, to adopt a much more offensive foreign policy on the economic level (Aydin, 2000, p. 18). This is how SSA was identified as an important market by the Turkish authorities. However, this approach couldn't be materialized during Prime Minister Özal's term due to internal political instability in Turkey (Aydin, 2000, p. 17). By the end of the 1990s, the government of Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz, with Foreign Minister İsmail Cem, adopted this approach to foreign policy (Aydin, 2000, p. 17).

Actually, Cem emphasized the cultural richness of Turkey, a country at the crossroads between several cultural areas (Africa, Asia, and Europe), to promote a multidimensional approach to Turkish foreign policy (Aydin, 2000, p. 17). It aimed to make Turkey a regional power in Central Asia, as well as a bridge between the continents of Africa, Asia, and Europe. Thanks to this new multidimensional approach to Turkish foreign policy, Africa was set back on the Turkish political agenda in the late 1990s.

The Yılmaz government aimed to carve out a place for Turkey in the African market, by using its assets such as its vast population, its advanced industry, and the historical depth of its ties with the African continent, to develop economic, commercial, and cultural relations between Turkey and Africa (Genç & Tekin, 2014, p. 94). In this regard, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem, carried out

several consultations with African countries during June 1998, which led to the adoption by the Turkish government of the Turkish expansion strategy in Africa document, entitled “Opening-up to Africa Policy”, in October 1998 (Paolo, n.d.).

However, it is worth noticing that the decision of the Yilmaz government to open up Turkey's foreign policy to Africa was facilitated by various factors both domestically and internationally. Internally, this new approach to Turkish foreign policy enabled the Turkish government to divert the attention of its public opinion from domestic issues like the Kurdish problem and the polarization between secularists and Islamists (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 532). Finally, on the international level, the opening of Turkey to regions of the world other than the West, allowed Ankara to increase its partners and diversify its markets, especially following the rejection of the Turkish candidacy by the European Union at the EU summit in Luxembourg in 1997 (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 532).

Thus, with the adoption of this document, SSA became a focus area for Turkish diplomacy. Hence, this document is considered by scholars of Turkey's foreign policy in Africa as the roadmap of Turkey's foreign policy in Africa till the present day (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 532). Indeed, the action plan of 1998 prescribed various measures, both legal and practical, aiming at developing relations between Turkey and the African continent. These measures range, among other things, from increasing the number of Turkish diplomatic missions in Africa to signing economic agreements between Turkey and various SSA countries, to Turkey joining African international organizations (Mbabia, 2011, p. 110).

Table 3. Main Measures of the 1998 Action Plan

Diplomatic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Opening of three embassies in Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Zimbabwe - Regular sending of Turkish emissaries to SSA countries to develop perceived privileges there - Appointment of honorary consuls among the most important local businessmen - Improvement of the infrastructure of Turkish embassies in Africa
Politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of high-level African visits - Establishment of political consultation mechanisms - Intensification of contacts with African countries within international organizations - Increase in visits by Turkish delegations to Africa - Contribution to United Nations assistance programs and humanitarian assistance - Simplification of inter-parliamentary exchanges
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ratification of commercial, technical, economic, and scientific cooperation agreements - Action to avoid double taxation, promotion, and mutual protection of investments - Invitation of the Ministers of Trade, Industry, Health, Agriculture, and Education to identify areas of cooperation; invitation to African trade ministers at the Izmir International Fair - Creation of a technical assistance fund reserved for Africa - Obtaining member status of the African Development Bank as a non-regional donor - Preparation of Turkey's acquisition of shares in African Exports & Imports Bank - Promotion of exchanges between businessmen - Creation of joint chambers of commerce - Promotion of communications, air relations, and maritime transport - Encouragement to set up in Africa for Turkish companies - Cooperation in the defense industry sector
Cultural	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ratification of cultural cooperation agreements - Promotion of contacts between universities and proposals for study grants

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Invitation of African academics to seminars, conferences, and festivals - Creation of an Institute of African Studies to enlighten Turkish opinion on African realities
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Source: Mbabia (2011, p.110).

In short, the Turkish strategy of opening up to Africa aimed at developing relations between Turkey and the African continent in all aspects, diplomatic, economic, commercial, scientific, technical, and cultural. However, this ambitious Turkish Foreign Policy program faced several obstacles which hampered its execution in the early 2000s (Rudincova, 2014, p. 202). Indeed, Turkey's domestic issues, such as the instability of the coalition government, as well as the lack of administrative staff for the implementation of this program within the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and finally the economic crisis in Turkey of the year 2000-2001, did not enable the materialization in the facts of this action plan, by successive Turkish governments of the late 1990s-early 2000s (Rudincova, 2014, p. 202). Therefore, it was only with the rise to power of the AKP which came along with “a parliament majority, a restructured economy and a solid foreign policy framework” that Turkey-SSA relations have taken off since the year 2002 (Paolo, n.d.).

3.2 The AKP and Turkey’s fresh turn of foreign policy in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2002: “the strategic depth”

Turkey has opened a bright page of its relationship with the Sub-Saharan part of the African continent since the rise to power of the AKP in Turkey in 2002. Ideologically, the driver of this new foreign policy strategy towards SSA is to find in the doctrine developed by one of the main thinkers of the AKP named Ahmet Davutoğlu, also

called “The strategic Depth”. This doctrine will be implemented in TFP towards SSA both at the multilateral and bilateral levels.

3.2.1 “The strategic depth” doctrine of Turkish foreign policy

Before elaborating on the place of SSA in the strategic depth doctrine of the TFP during the AKP era, it is first of all necessary to analyze the driving motivations behind the newly appointed AKP interest in the SSA countries.

3.2.1.1 Sources of the AKP’s interests in SSA

Turkey’s interest in the region of the Global South in general and more precisely in Latin America (LA) and the SSA, is driven by both domestic and international pressure (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). Regarding international pressure, it is Turkey's growing isolation in the international arena, which results from various problems it faces in its home region (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016, p. 266). Hence, first of all, in the Western bloc, there are difficulties with the EU regarding its candidacy for EU membership, as well as its disputes with the US within NATO (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016, p. 266). Meanwhile, Turkey also faces rivalry with Russia in the Eurasia region, as well as rivalry with Iran over the Kurdish issue (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016, p. 266). These various international constraints will push Turkey to adopt a more autonomous and assertive foreign policy (Batalla, 2012).

As far as domestic pressure are concerned, it is mainly the effects of the economic crisis of the early 2000s, which promoted the AKP's rise to power (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). Indeed, this economic crisis which hit Turkey in particular during 2001, will facilitate the AKP's access to power insofar as it contributed to delegitimizing and discrediting its secular adversaries (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016).

Moreover, in the same year 2001, the government of Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, with Minister of Economy Kemal Derviş, had drawn up an ambitious economic program aimed at getting the country out of the crisis. The said program, entitled "Strengthening the Turkish Economy Program", recommended, in particular, an expansion of the Turkish economy based on an approach focused on globalization and internationalization. Thus, it is the AKP government, which will be in charge of implementing this ambitious program as soon as it comes to power in 2002 (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). Moreover, still, along the lines of the domestic causes of the AKP's policy of opening up to the SSA, there is also the emergence of a new Islamist economic elite, which accompanied the emergence of the AKP party, called the Anatolian Tigers (Batalla, 2012; Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). This new elite made up mainly of businessmen organized in confederations, the most notable of which is the TUSKON, will exert pressure on the AKP power, to push it to seek new markets and thus to open up TFP to non-traditional regions such as SSA and Latin America (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). To the action of this new economic elite, we must also add the activism of the Turkish civil society in the early 2000s, in particular that of Islamist humanitarian NGOs, which are now operating at the international level (Davutoğlu, 2008).

These various domestic and external factors will promote what is called in the literature dedicated to TFP, "the shift of the axis of Turkish foreign policy" (Aras, 2009; Coşkun, 2016; Gökhan & Afacan, 2013). This new direction in TFP, was initiated by Ahmet Davutoğlu, then Special Advisor at PM Erdoğan office. Thus, this new Turkish foreign policy under the AKP era is driven by the strategic vision of Ahmet Davutoğlu, which he developed in his academic work entitled "Strategic Depth". Therefore, to better understand TFP under the AKP era, it is necessary to

identify the outline of this grand strategy, which dictates the main axes of Turkish foreign policy in general and in SSA in particular since 2002.

3.2.1.2 The place of SSA in the Turkish “strategic depth”

Brooks et al. (2012) define a grand strategy as: “a set of ideas aimed at deploying a nation's resources to achieve its long-term interests”. Thus, Brooks et al. (2012) subdivide the concept of grand strategy into three main variables: interests, goals, and choices. In the same vein as Gonzalez and Zengin (2016) who adopted this conceptualization of the grand strategy of Brooks et al. (2012), the foreign policy strategy of Turkey developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu also called “Strategic Depth”, will be analyzed in this study according to the variables: interests, objectives, and choices.

Regarding the origins of the concept of "strategic depth", it should first be noted that this concept is drawn from the academic research of Ahmet Davutoğlu, in particular from his work,³¹ published in 2001, on TFP. This work notably underlines the importance of Turkey's geopolitical position in its foreign policy strategy. Thus, according to Ahmet Davutoğlu's (2001) thesis, Turkey's position at the crossroads between Europe, Asia, and North Africa, as well as its historical heritage from the Ottoman Empire, are geopolitical assets available to Turkey to become a major power in international politics (Davutoğlu, 2008) . This approach is based on three principles which will be the guiding principle of Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP era. These three principles are a) a multidimensional foreign policy; b) activism; c) order building.³²

³¹ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik, and Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu*, (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).

³²Actually, Davutoğlu (2001, 2008) stated 05 principles, namely: “a balance between security and democracy in a country”; a “zero problem policy toward Turkey’s neighbors”; “to develop relations with the neighboring regions and beyond”; “adherence to a multidimensional foreign policy”; “rhythmic diplomacy”, but I grouped them into 3 broad principles.

Thus, as regards the multidimensional approach of TFP, it aims at the diversification of Turkey's allies, which, according to Davutoğlu, must no longer rely solely on its alliance with the Western bloc, but must seek to increase its presence in the regions of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Muslim world, but also to open up to regions not traditional for TFP such as Latin America and SSA (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016, p. 267). Paradoxically, this approach also aims to strengthen ties between Turkey and the West. Indeed, Davutoğlu argues that the more Turkey develops its relations with other regions of the world, the more valuable it will be to the Western bloc (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016, p. 267).

The principle of activism of Turkish foreign policy, meanwhile, aims to make Turkey a regional power, not only in its geographic region which is Central Asia but also in the Muslim world and for developing countries of SSA and Latin America in general (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 79). To achieve this goal, Turkey should, according to Davutoğlu's vision, have more active diplomacy, especially in the field of humanitarian aid where it has a comparative advantage over other traditional and emerging powers (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). This vision aims to make the TFP a "humanitarian niche" (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). Besides, the activism of Turkish diplomacy according to Davutoğlu's vision, also involve the multiplication of actors and fields of intervention of TFP. Turkish foreign policy must therefore seize the opportunity offered by the democratization of the country, with the accession to power of the democratically elected AKP (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 79). This democratization is reflected at the level of foreign policy by the involvement of private actors as well as civil society in the development and implementation of this foreign policy, which was traditionally the prerogative of the military and bureaucratic elite (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). Concerning the multiplication of the fields of activity of the TFP, this will no

longer be limited to traditional (state-state) diplomacy but will become a multitrack diplomacy that covers several areas, such as trade, education, religion, humanitarian aid, media, culture, (as it will be developed in the next chapter).³³

Finally, the principle of “order building”, follows that of pro-active diplomacy. It aims to ensure a place for Turkey, at the rank of global powers, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Turkey is thus establishing itself as a defender of developing countries within major international bodies, such as the United Nations, where it advocates reform of the United Nations Security Council and a more equitable international order (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 84). This strategic depth doctrine, which will become the guiding line of TFP under the AKP regime, aims to ensure Turkey's security and economic interest.

As far as Turkey's security interest is concerned, “the strategic depth” is based on the premise that Turkey must become an autonomous actor, which holds its position on the international scene neither from the West nor from the East (Batalla, 2012). Thus, this vision defends the idea that Turkey should counterbalance its dependence on the countries of the West, by multiplication of alliances in its other areas of geopolitical affiliation such as Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the former Ottoman territories, to maintain the balance of power in his region (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 79).

Regarding the economic interest, this new strategic orientation of TFP also aims at the economic prosperity of Turkey and thus aroused a strong interest on the part of the new Turkish Islamist economic elite as well as among the actors of the civil society (Arslan, 2019).

As for the objectives, this doctrine is carried by three main objectives, which are: the quest for new markets, the expansion of Turkish cultural identity also called

³³ Davutoğlu, actually referred to this as “Rhythmic diplomacy”.

"neo-ottomans", and finally the quest for a higher status on the international stage (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016). These objectives are the drivers of Turkey opening up to the countries of the Global South, namely Latin America and more particularly Sub-Saharan Africa under the AKP era (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016).

As regards the quest for a new market, it constitutes the primary reason for Turkey's opening-up policy to sub-Saharan Africa under the AKP. It corresponds to new Turkey's export-led economy. To this desire for Turkey's greater integration into the global economy, we must add the pressure exerted by the new Turkish Islamist economic elite formed by "the Anatolian tigers" on the AKP government to seek for new markets to sell manufactured products made in Turkey. Thus, the activities of Turkish businessmen belonging to the TUSKON and the MÜSIAD, have often accompanied or even preceded the establishment of formal relations between Turkey and the countries of SSA (Arslan, 2019).

This vision of the Turkish economy is the continuity of the liberal economic policy developed during the 1980s under the Özal government as well as the policy of opening up to Africa initiated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, İsmail Cem at the end of the 90s (Kiraz, 2021). Under these different impulses, Turkey has thus, gradually transformed into a "trading state", with an export-oriented economy (Arslan, 2019). Hence, the beneficial effects of foreign trade on the country's economic growth, in particular on employment, income, and investment, have aroused the interest of Turkish policymakers in the development of this sector (Arslan, 2019). From this perspective, SSA Africa, which has a population of over 1 billion,³⁴ was a promising market for Turkish products. As a result, thanks to an aggressive economic policy

³⁴ Source www.mfa.gov.tr

towards SSA, trade between Turkey and SSA increased from \$ 742 million in 2000 to a value of \$ 5.7 billion in 2008.³⁵

The expansion of Turkish culture in the former Ottoman territories, and more generally in countries with a large Muslim population, constitute another important aspect of the development of relations with the SSA in the doctrine of "Strategic Depth" (Murinson, 2006). Indeed, according to Ahmet Davutoğlu's vision, Turkey would be the natural leader of the Muslim world, for it is the heir to the Ottoman Empire, which in its time unified all Muslim nations (Denizeau, 2019). This vision, which is also qualified by certain authors as "Pan-Islamism" (Murinson, 2006), is the result of a wider ambition of Ahmet Davutoğlu, which aims, in particular, to revive the cultural and traditional Ottoman heritage first at the domestic level and finally to use this cultural heritage to reconnect Turkey with the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, and more generally the Muslim peoples, especially in SSA (Murinson, 2006). Islam has thus served Turkey as an instrument to bring about its rapprochement with the SSA, in particular through the activities of faith-based NGOs of an Islamic background such as "Kimse Yok Mu?" the Humanitarian Relief Foundation (IHH), the Turkish Red Crescent (Kizilay) and activities of the Gülen Movement's affiliated organizations (Murinson, 2006).

Indeed, scholars like Denizeau (2019); Murinson (2006) ; Cagaptay (2020), establish that, as in its foreign policy in the Middle East, Islam shapes TFP in SSA, as illustrated in particular by Turkey's pro-Islamist rhetoric in SSA, as well as Turkish humanitarian aid in SSA which is much more oriented towards countries with high Muslim populations like Somalia.³⁶ In 2009 at an AKP meeting, Ahmet Davutoğlu

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Gonzalez and Zengin (2016) have, for example, demonstrated that religion is of greater importance in Turkey's rapprochement towards SSA as compared to its rapprochement with Latin America.

stressed the importance of the Ottoman heritage in Turkey's policy of opening up to SSA: “We have inherited these relations from the Ottomans. They call us neo-Ottomans. Yes, we are neo-Ottomans”.³⁷ Thus, this emphasis on religion in its rapprochement with the SSA allowed Turkey to forge the image of “a soft power” in the public opinion of the SSA states (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016).

Finally, the quest for a higher status in the international arena is also one of the objectives which frame the Doctrine of “strategic depth” (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 82). Thus, Ahmet Davutoğlu aims to elevate Turkey to the rank of global power. To achieve this goal, Turkey must become a model for developing countries of SSA and Latin America (Davutoğlu, 2008, p. 82). This quest for global power status is also one of the keys to Turkey's rapprochement with SSA, insofar as Turkey needs the support of SSA countries, for its candidacies within the major international bodies such as the UN Security Council (Gonzalez & Zengin, 2016).

In a nutshell, the doctrine of TFP or "Strategic Depth", developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu in 2001, is the Roadmap of Ankara's strategy for its relations with SSA countries. This strategy as presented has a multilateral component and a bilateral component of the rapprochement between Turkey and the SSA countries.

3.2.2 The levels of Turkey's rapprochement strategy toward SSA

Turkey's foreign policy strategy toward SSA since the rise of power of the AKP has been implemented both at multilateral and bilateral levels of cooperation with SSA countries.

³⁷ «Sarkozy gittiği her yerde bizi görecek ».

3.2.2.1 The multilateral level

Turkey has used its presence in main regional international organizations as well as the organization of international summits, as tools to implement its strategy in SSA.

3.2.2.1.1 Turkey- SSA cooperation within the framework of international organizations

Turkey's presence in some strategic global and regional organizations is the first element of Turkey's rapprochement with SSA (Pannetier, 2012). Indeed, Turkey is present in several United Nations bodies. As a result, Turkey has positioned itself as a major player in the field of humanitarian aid in SSA.³⁸ Thus, in addition to having increased its contribution to the financing of development programs supported by the United Nations, Turkey was positioned in 2017, in the first place of the countries providing aid at the international level, in particular thanks to its initiatives in the Horn of Africa region.³⁹ The importance of the humanitarian approach in Turkey's diplomatic strategy in SSA was illustrated by the holding of the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016.⁴⁰ Turkey is also active in United Nations peacekeeping operations in SSA. In this context, she participated in various peacekeeping operations in SSA (Pannetier, 2012, p. 12). It is also important to stress, once again, that Turkey is a voice for developing countries in general and SSA countries in particular, in its advocacy for the reform of the United Nations, namely regarding the issue of the reform of the UN Security Council (Pannetier, 2012, p. 12).

In addition, Turkey hosted the 2011 summit for the Least Developed Countries, bringing together 33 African countries "which had to be particularly taken care of"

³⁸ <http://mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

³⁹ <http://mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁴⁰ Ibid.

(Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). Turkey is a member of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which coordinates projects in 32 countries in SSA. In 2007, Turkey established a bilateral partnership with FAO, allowing her to participate more closely in certain projects. Turkey is therefore supporting 24 FAO projects (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). Besides, since 1969, Turkey has been a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) which is its main partner for exports (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). Among the members of the said organization, are countries of SSA, such as Senegal, Nigeria and Cameroon.

As far as African regional international organizations are concerned, in 2003, Turkey became an observer member of the African Union (AU) (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). This marked an important step in Turkey's rapprochement with Africa, even before the proclamation of the year of Africa in Turkey in 2005 (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). Subsequently, this status was confirmed in 2008, when Turkey was granted the status of “strategic partner” for Africa by the AU.⁴¹ Turkey's strategic importance to the AU quickly became evident as the then AU President Jean Ping attended the 2008 Turkey-Africa Summit and in 2011 the Turkey-Africa Ministerial Conference (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). Moreover, thanks to its status as a strategic partner of the African Union, Turkey also occupies a privileged place in the implementation of the African Union's Agenda 2063 which relates to the economic development of the continent.⁴² Besides, Turkey is an observer member in most of the African regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), and the Economic Community of Central Africa States (ECCAS).⁴³

⁴¹ <http://mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁴² <http://mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁴³ Ibid.

In May 2008, Turkey became a non-regional member of the African Development Bank (ADB) (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). This was another big step toward Africa, taken a few months before the 2008 Turkey-Africa summit, which aimed to strengthen bilateral economic exchanges and establish a real plan of cooperation (Pannetier, 2012, p. 13). Further, as a sign of its willingness to strengthen its engagement with Africa, the Turkish parliament passed a law on 19 March 2020, to increase Turkey's contribution to the ADB.⁴⁴ This increase should allow Turkey to compensate for the shares of other countries that voted against the ADB's decision to increase its capital by 125% and enable Turkey to keep its right to vote in the institution.⁴⁵

In short, at first glance, the multi-lateral level of Turkey's strategy toward SSA may seem derisory, insofar as these regionals and global organizations do not mainly deal with Turkish-SSA relations. However, the formal and informal exchanges that some heads of state or representatives may have during these international meetings are mentioned on the website of the Turkish Foreign Ministry and counted as diplomatic visits.⁴⁶ Finally, let us note that Turkey joined most of these organizations from the beginning of its new policy of opening up to Africa. Consequently, this multilateral framework is an integral part of Turkey's strategy of rapprochement with Africa as a whole, and with SSA in particular.

⁴⁴ from around \$ 800 million to \$ 4 billion, source: <http://mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ <http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-afrika.en.mfa>

3.2.2.1.2 The Turkey-Africa summits

To intensify and follow up its presence on the African continent in general and in SSA in particular, since 2008 Turkey has already organized three grand Turkey-Africa Summits, namely in 2008, 2014, and more recently in December 2021.

3.2.2.1.2.1 The 2008 Turkey-Africa Summit

In August 2008, the President of the Republic of Turkey, Abdullah Gül, organized in Istanbul the 1st Turkey-Africa Summit bringing together 50 African countries. This summit aimed to formalize relations between Turkey and the African continent, by creating "a platform for bilateral dialogue" (Mbabia, 2011). It was also a sign of the sustainability of relations between the two parties (Pannetier, 2012, p. 15). This summit was held as an international summit, as indicated by the high level of representation of the various delegations (Pannetier, 2012, p. 15). Besides, various international organizations were also present such as the UN and more notably African regional organizations (Pannetier, 2012, p. 15). This was a major signal of the success of the multidimensional strategy adopted by Turkey in its approach toward Africa in general and SSA in particular.

This summit was an opportunity to strengthen the relations established since the strategic plan of 2003, and the year of Africa of 2005, to take stock of relations, but also to define objectives. It was during this summit that the Turkish government announced the opening of 10 new embassies in SSA (Pannetier, 2012, p. 15).⁴⁷ This announcement was proof that the important decisions concerning the Turkish-SSA rapprochement were made at the multilateral level, and not bilaterally, as was the case for the opening of new embassies (Pannetier, 2012, p. 15). These openings were

⁴⁷ Notably in: Angola, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, and Chad.

usually followed by the opening of the airways company “Turkish Airlines” routes in the respective countries (Pannetier, 2012, p. 15).

This international summit was therefore a catalyst for future bilateral relations. They were announced in the final declarations adopted by all the countries, which were also the plans for future relations and collaborations in all areas. This 2008 summit was closed with the adoption of two main acts: “The Istanbul Declaration on the Africa-Turkey Partnership”, and “The Cooperation Framework for the Africa-Turkey Partnership”.⁴⁸ Besides, the handling of the issue of the critical condition of most SSA countries’ economies during the discussions, was another sign that Turkey intends to place herself as a SSA advocate at the international level.⁴⁹ The election to the United Nations (UN) Security Council was closed, and Turkey therefore, informally gave the assurance to her African partners that she will defend the interests of Africa if it sits there (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17). Hence, finally this same year 2008 Turkey obtained a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN security council for the period 2009-2010, mainly thanks to the massive support of African countries.⁵⁰ The second act regarding the “Cooperation Framework for the Africa-Turkey Partnership” provided several things. First, within the framework of intergovernmental cooperation, the opening of the first Turkish Agency for International Cooperation and Development (TIKA) offices in SSA was planned in Addis Ababa, Khartoum, and Dakar. The stress was, therefore, put on development aid (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17). As far as the commercial level was concerned, it was decided to create a “legal and economic framework conducive to economic cooperation” (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17). Finally, overall partnerships were planned in all areas. At the economic and commercial level, for

⁴⁸ <http://mfa.gov.tr/turkey-africa-relations.en.mfa>

⁴⁹ <http://africa.mfa.gov.tr/istanbul-declaration-adopted-on-19-august-2008-at-the-turkey-africa-cooperation-summit-in-istanbul.en.mfa>

⁵⁰ 50 over 53 African countries voted for Turkey.

example, the Turkey-Africa Chamber of Commerce was created (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17).

The summit did not take stock of all areas of cooperation because most of the future bilateral relations established in the political, economic, cultural, and touristic areas, were initiated during the summit (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17). Following the Summit, Ankara organized the United Nations International Conference on Somalia, which took place in Istanbul (Mbabia, 2011). In December 2011, a 2008 Turkey-Africa Summit monitoring meeting was held in Istanbul, entitled: the “Turkey-Africa Cooperation Senior Official's Meeting” (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17). Hence, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu welcomed representatives of the African Union, those of the “New Partnership for Africa's Development” (NEPAD), African representatives, as well as those of regional economic communities, and international organizations (Pannetier, 2012, p. 17).

The holding of this meeting proved once again the strong interest that Turkey has in Africa. The fact of convening the meeting just three years after the 2008 summit, a conference with ministers from African countries, was a sign that Turkey was keen to follow the course of operations very closely (Pannetier, 2012, p. 18). In addition, new objectives were defined there. The latter were gathered in the “Turkey-Africa Partnership Joint Action Plan 2010-2014”, adopted at the 2008 summit, and updated in 2011 during this meeting (Pannetier, 2012, p. 18). This plan still aimed to consolidate ties between Turkey and Africa. Indeed, with this new plan, Ankara committed to contributing to the peace and stability of the African continent, as well as its economic and social development, through the channel of global cooperation between actors of public institutions, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations (Pannetier, 2012, p. 18).

3.2.2.1.2.2 The 2014 Turkey-Africa summit

The second Turkish-African Cooperation Summit was held in November 2014 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea. A high-level Turkish delegation headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan participated in the summit as well as 200 Turkish businessmen from different fields.⁵¹ Several African Heads of State⁵² took part in the work of the said Summit, organized under the theme “a new model of partnership for the strengthening of sustainable development and the integration of Africa.”⁵³ During the meeting, Africa and Turkey mapped out a framework for cooperation through a new partnership policy and established a joint plan, the implementation of which spanned the period 2015-2019. The summit workshop meeting was used to adopt the framework of the Africa-Turkey partnership, engaged in a process of “stable and lasting” cooperation embodied in a declaration of principles known as the “Malabo Declaration” and an action plan for the years 2015-2019.⁵⁴

Thus, in terms of economic cooperation, Africans and Turks have embarked on a process of establishing “economic and trade exchanges giving a decisive impetus to investment”. At the political level, on the other hand, the Turkish side committed to adopting harmonized positions with the continent and to contributing to the peaceful settlement of conflicts.⁵⁵ As far as peace and security were concerned, the fight against terrorism became a new aspect of cooperation between the two parties. The Heads of State and Government have thus agreed, according to this Final Declaration, to

⁵¹Source:<https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/turquie/le-2%C3%A8me-sommet-turquie-afrique-d%C3%A9marre-mercredi-%C3%A0-malabo/100469>

⁵²Representing all the countries of the African continent, Mauritania, Ethiopia, Algeria, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Libya, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Egypt took part in the Summit.

⁵³https://www.alwihdainfo.com/2eme-sommet-Afrique-Turquie-un-nouveau-modele-de-partenariat-trace-a-Malabo_a13710.html

⁵⁴ africa.mfa.gov.tr/21-november-2014-summit-declaration.en.mfa

⁵⁵ africa.mfa.gov.tr/21-november-2014-summit-declaration.en.mfa

consider the crimes perpetrated by terrorist groups as "serious violations of human rights".⁵⁶ As stated in the Final Declaration, both parties agreed to:

Denounce terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and regard the crimes committed by terrorist groups as serious violations of fundamental human rights, as well as an incessant threat to the human rights, safety, security, and stability of countries.⁵⁷

This, was a turning point in Turkish-SSA relations, as this declaration marked the beginning of the internationalization of the domestic conflict between the AKP and the Gülen movement, which ignited in 2013 in Turkey. So, in his address during this summit, speaking of the Gülen Movement, President Erdoğan said:

We see that some dangerous structures are trying to influence Turkey and some African countries under the guise of non-governmental organizations or voluntary workers in education. We are watching this carefully. We expect our friends in Africa to be aware of this threat, and I want to emphasize that we are ready to exchange information to fight against these organizations (President Erdoğan, 2013).⁵⁸

Finally, this summit made it possible to take stock of the Turkey-Africa cooperation, since the 2008 summit in Istanbul. Thus, since the Istanbul Conference of 2008, major advances have been observed in a large number of areas ranging from the volume of commercial exchange which has developed based on the principles of "equitable partnership and common benefit", to the establishment of a mechanism for political dialogue, as well as economic investments.⁵⁹ Thus, according to data from the Turkish Ministry of Economy, Turkey's export rate with Africa in 2014 reached 9.3%,

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Idem.

⁵⁸ Source: www.alterinfo.net of November 27, 2014, accessed 02.01.2022.

⁵⁹ africa.mfa.gov.tr/21-november-2014-summit-declaration.en.mfa

that of imports at 3.7%, that of investments in Africa abroad at 3.6%,⁶⁰ and finally that of construction services abroad at 18.1%.⁶¹ Additionally, in 2013 Turkey increased its number of embassies and trade adviser offices in Africa to 30 from just 07 embassies and one trade adviser office in 2003.⁶² But, as noted during the closing ceremony, the host of the summit, the President of the Republic of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang, “much remains to be done, given the objectives set, during the first Turkey-Africa Cooperation summit, held in Istanbul in 2008”. The Equatorial Guinean President also stressed that “Turkey has the technical means to ensure Africa's emergence”.⁶³

This summit thus, made it possible to reaffirm the determination of African states to strengthen cooperation with Turkey within “the framework of the African Union's agenda 2063”.⁶⁴ In the same vein, Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, then Mauritanian President and President of the African Union, reiterated the African continent's commitment to strengthen its partnership with Turkey. He thus underlined that “Afro-Turkish trade will play a decisive role in the integration of Africa”,⁶⁵ before hoping that Turkey and the African continent work together to build an exemplary partnership, given the common values they share. Finally, the two parties agreed that the third Turkey-Africa cooperation summit would be held in 2019 in Turkey.

⁶⁰ Source: <https://www.trt.net.tr/francais/afrique-asie/2014/11/12/sommet-de-partenariat-turquie-afrique-188051>

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Source: <https://www.trt.net.tr/francais/afrique-asie/2014/11/12/sommet-de-partenariat-turquie-afrique-188051>.

⁶³https://www.alwihdainfo.com/2eme-sommet-Afrique-Turquie-un-nouveau-modele-de-partenariat-trace-a-Malabo_a13710.html

⁶⁴ africa.mfa.gov.tr/21-november-2014-summit-declaration.en.mfa

⁶⁵https://www.alwihdainfo.com/2eme-sommet-Afrique-Turquie-un-nouveau-modele-de-partenariat-trace-a-Malabo_a13710.html

3.2.2.1.2.3 The 2021 Turkey-Africa summit

The third Turkey-Africa summit which took place on 16 December 2021, under the theme “Strengthened partnership for mutual development and prosperity”, was chaired by the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in the presence of some forty African countries, represented by around twenty Heads of State and government and foreign ministers, as well as a delegation from the African Union.⁶⁶ It should be noted that this Summit, which was initially scheduled in 2019, has been the subject of multiple postponements, particularly, because of the occurrence of the Covid-19 pandemic. The purpose of this summit was to give a fresh impetus to the strategic partnership between Turkey and the countries of the African continent, as well as to take stock of the two previous summits.⁶⁷ As far as the Turkish side was concerned, the main objective of this summit, as already stated by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the “Turkey-Africa business summit” which took place in October 2021 in Istanbul, as a prelude to this summit, was to double the volume of trade with Africa, to reach at least \$ 50 billion.⁶⁸ In this perspective, the Turkish president launched a real offensive on SSA, in particular through a diplomatic tour, which he carried out in early October 2021 in three SSA countries.⁶⁹ As a result of this tour, President Erdoğan notably became the non-African leader having visited the largest number of African countries, with a total of 38 trips to Africa in 28 countries.⁷⁰

The main objective of this summit was therefore to validate the 2022-2026 roadmap or cooperation plan for the next five years between Turkey and the African

⁶⁶Source: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211218-fin-du-sommet-afrique-turquie-avec-la-signature-d-un-plan-de-coop%C3%A9ration-sur-5-ans>

⁶⁷Source: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211218-fin-du-sommet-afrique-turquie-avec-la-signature-d-un-plan-de-coop%C3%A9ration-sur-5-ans>

⁶⁸Source : <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211217-un-3e-sommet-afrique-turquie-pour-s-implanter-plus-profond%C3%A9ment-sur-le-continent>

⁶⁹ Namely, Togo, Nigeria, and Angola.

⁷⁰Source:<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211217-un-3e-sommet-afrique-turquie-pour-s-implanter-plus-profond%C3%A9ment-sur-le-continent>

Continental Free Trade Area (ZLECAF).⁷¹ The said roadmap is a ten-page declaration that was signed by the various parties at the end of the summit.⁷² The main areas of cooperation between Turkey and Africa for the next five years are detailed there, namely peace, security, infrastructure, trade, industry, and education among others.⁷³ Defense and security are also key areas of cooperation between Turkey and Africa identified during this summit.⁷⁴ The issue of the fight against terrorism, which preoccupies many African states, has thus been widely discussed, in particular concerning the sale of Turkish arms and vehicles to the continent.⁷⁵ It is with this in mind that Moussa Fakir, the chairman of the AU commission, insisted: “We have pleaded with the Security Council for almost ten years already but we have not been able to obtain sustainable funding for United Nations resources.”⁷⁶ The President of the DRC Félix Tshisekedi, acting as president of the AU, on his part, insisted on the need for investment, expertise, and support needed by the countries of Africa.⁷⁷

In response to these demands from the African side, Turkey pledged to improve cooperation in the sectors of education, health, agriculture, and human development through knowledge exchange. Finally, a project monitoring mechanism has been put in place.⁷⁸ A mid-term evaluation of the resolutions adopted during this summit is also scheduled in two years, and the next major Turkey-Africa summit is set for 2026 on the African continent.⁷⁹ The Turkish president concluded the summit with an invitation

⁷¹ “The African Continental Free Trade Area (ZLECAF) is a free trade area project created across the entire African continent. The objective of the project is to eventually integrate all the 55 states of the African Union within the free trade area”. Source, retrieved from https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zone_de_libre-%C3%A9change_continentale_africaine

⁷²Source:<https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211217-un-3e-sommet-afrique-turquie-pour-s-implanter-plus-profond%C3%A9ment-sur-le-continent>

⁷³Source : <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211218-fin-du-sommet-afrique-turquie-avec-la-signature-d-un-plan-de-coop%C3%A9ration-sur-5-ans>

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Idem.

⁷⁶ Idem.

⁷⁷ Idem.

⁷⁸ Idem.

⁷⁹ Idem.

to the countries of the continent for the 2nd edition of the Diplomacy Forum scheduled in Antalya-Turkey in March 2022. In addition, Turkey also pledged to send 15 million doses of anti-Covid vaccines to Africa, which she considers marginalized in the global distribution of vaccines.⁸⁰

3.2.2.2 The bilateral level

Turkey's bilateral relations with the SSA countries can be classified into four broad groups.⁸¹ This classification takes into account criteria such as the length of relations between Turkey and these countries, and finally the importance of political and economic exchanges between Turkey and these countries. Thus, these criteria make it possible to distinguish the SSA countries which have relations with Turkey into 4 major groups, namely: the regional powers; the new strategic alliances; the new partnerships; a recent Turkish presence.

3.2.2.2.1 The regional powers

The first group includes South Africa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sudan. This first group is made up of countries with which Turkey maintains strong diplomatic and economic relations (Pannetier, 2012, p. 19). These official relations were generally established from the independence of countries as was the case for Kenya, or Senegal, which saw Turkish embassies open, respectively in 1968 and 1963.

The relations that Turkey maintains with these countries are indeed not the fruit of its openness to Africa, but they have existed for several decades, sometimes even since the Ottoman Empire (Pannetier, 2012, p. 19). The countries in this group all have

⁸⁰Source: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211218-fin-du-sommet-afrique-turquie-avec-la-signature-d-un-plan-de-coop%C3%A9ration-sur-5-ans>.

⁸¹ This classification is inspired by Pannetier (2012).

an embassy in Ankara, and Turkey also has embassies in these countries. Economic relations are stable and important. South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana are Turkey's top three economic partners in sub-Saharan Africa (Pannetier, 2012, p. 19). These countries also consider Turkey as one of their strategic partners and use the relations established with Ankara to ensure their regional power, or to raise their status on the international scene (Pannetier, 2012, p. 19). With the opening-up policy towards SSA that Turkey initiated in the early 2000s, it has strengthened the ties established with these countries, both politically and economically.

On her part, Turkey has used its relations with these regional powers, as an entry point to the other countries of the SSA region. Indeed, Nigeria is the gateway for West Africa, South Africa for the southern region of Africa, and Ethiopia for East Africa. To these countries, we must add Somalia which is not an important economic partner of Turkey but has maintained relations with Turkey since the Ottoman era (Pannetier, 2012, p. 20). In addition, Somalia is also a showcase for Turkish diplomacy in SSA, insofar as the strong humanitarian support received from Turkey, and the speech made around this mobilization broadcast a positive image of Turkey in SSA (Pannetier, 2012, p. 20).

Then, Sudan, Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya could be considered as the sub-group of regional powers (Pannetier, 2012, p. 20). Relations are also strong with these countries, but these relations are nevertheless more recent. Trade between Turkey and these countries is good, and structured around several economic and political agreements. In this presentation on the relations between Turkey and these regional powers in SSA, a special emphasis should be put on Senegal, which is one of our case studies.

Indeed, according to the Director in charge of the Asian region at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

The motivations behind Turkey's cooperation with Senegal are multiple and varied. Turkey opened its first Embassy in Senegal in 1963. This Embassy covered the entire West African sub-region. Since that time, Senegal has always served as Turkey's rear base to cover all of West Africa and beyond. Besides, Turkey and Senegal are members of the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and both have a strong community of Sufi Muslims. (...) Turkey is seeking significant diplomatic support from Senegal in Africa and a favorable market.⁸²

Hence, trade between Senegal and Turkey is quite dynamic. Recently, Ankara obtained the management of the new Blaise Diagne airport in Dakar.⁸³ The infrastructure was entrusted to a Turkish consortium made up of the companies Summa and Limak, which in 2017 were granted a 25-year concession (Yazıcıoğlu & Saa Ngouana, 2020). For Turkey, Senegal is a land conducive to investment. According to the Director in Charge of the Asian region at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “Turkey has become a first-rate partner for Senegal. It has indeed carried out nearly 40% of the projects of the Emerging Senegal Plan”.⁸⁴ Turkey has therefore become a strategic partner for the Senegalese President, Macky Sall, and one of the main investors of the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE) which aims to make Senegal an emerging power by 2035.

⁸² Interview with the Director in charge of the Asian region at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held on 12.20.2021.

⁸³ Interview with the Director in charge of the Asian region at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ibid.

⁸⁴ Interview with the Director in charge of the Asian region at the Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ibid.

3.2.2.2.2 The new strategic alliances

The second group includes Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Mali, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania, and Zambia (Pannetier, 2012, p. 21). These countries have strong relations with Turkey, which has developed strong diplomatic and economic ties with them since the beginning of its opening-up to Africa policy. Indeed, the main characteristic of this group is that they are new allies of Turkey (Pannetier, 2012, p. 21). Unlike the first group, the relationships are rather recent. But what characterizes them, is the speed and the force with which these relations have been established. The Turkish embassies in these countries were indeed established between November 2009 and February 2012, namely 10 in a time frame of 13 months (Pannetier, 2012, p. 22). It is therefore a powerful policy, which also requires significant funds and proof that Turkey relies heavily on its relations with these countries (Pannetier, 2012, p. 21). These countries were the first targets of Turkey's opening-up policy to SSA, through the development of diplomatic relations, and the signature of economic, political, and trade agreements (Pannetier, 2012, p. 22). The economic situations of these countries are quite stable, and good, and they are therefore attractive to Turkey (Pannetier, 2012, p. 22). Indeed, these countries have a very important economic weight in their region: this is the case of Cameroon, whose volume of trade with Turkey amounted to \$ 57 million in mid-2008, and Cote d'Ivoire with a trading volume of \$ 157 million during the same period (Pannetier, 2012, p. 22).

Thus, this second group is characterized by a strong will of Turkey to develop and strengthen relations, as illustrated by the speed of the opening of Turkish embassies in these countries, as well as the increasing trade rate, and finally the

development of political and sectoral cooperation between Turkey and these countries since 2002.

3.2.2.2.3 The new partnerships

The third group is a little pivotal group that does not have too much identity (Pannetier, 2012, p. 24). It is made up of countries that have recently established relationships with Turkey, unlike the first group in which we find countries with which the relations are rather ancient, but the relations Turkey maintains with countries of this third group, are not yet as strong as with those of countries of group 2 (Pannetier, 2012, p. 24). It is made up of Benin, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Liberia, Mozambique, Niger, Sierra Leone, and Togo (Pannetier, 2012, p. 24).

This group is characterized by the fact that there is a real desire for rapprochement. However, there are not many concrete links yet (Pannetier, 2012, p. 24). These countries were not a priority for Ankara, that is to say, Turkey has mobilized significant funds to open embassies in all the countries of the second group, which could therefore be considered more important in its SSA strategy. But there are nevertheless some recent efforts of rapprochement initiated by Turkey, especially since President Erdoğan's Africa tour in October 2021, during which he visited Togo, and had a meeting with the Liberia Head of State.⁸⁵

This recent tour by President Erdoğan was an opportunity to deepen relations with these countries, especially with Togo, where Turkey's opened its 43rd Embassy on the continent during this visit.⁸⁶ The said opening was accompanied as usual by the

⁸⁵ President Erdoğan made a tour of Africa during which he visited three countries namely, Togo, Angola, and Nigeria. Besides he also met the heads of state of Liberia and Burkina-Faso during his visit to Togo.

⁸⁶Source: <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20211217-un-3e-sommet-afrique-turquie-pour-s-implanter-plus-profond%C3%A9ment-sur-le-continent>, accessed, 04.01.2022.

opening of an airline of the company Turkish Airways. This is a sign that although ties were not yet formally established between Ankara and these countries, there was nonetheless a political will, emanating from the top of the state, to bring the two parties closer together. Thus, at the economic level, relations have exploded, doubled, or even tripled with these countries and official economic cooperation agreements have been signed. This third group is, therefore, proof that businessmen are the precursors of relations between Turkey and most of the SSA countries. Therefore, for several years now, the Turkish state tries to catch up, tries to interfere in these relations, build on them, but also deepen them.

3.2.2.2.4 A recent Turkish presence

The last group is made up of Burundi, Botswana, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Djibouti, Eritrea, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Central African Republic (CAR), Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Swaziland, Chad, and Zimbabwe (Pannetier, 2012, p. 27). This group is characterized by the weakness of trade agreements. Though the Turkish trade exchange with these countries remains weak, it is nevertheless worth noticing that, Turkey has for several years now, increase its political relations with some of these unstable countries, namely CAR and Chad.⁸⁷ Besides, even if the trade is low, which is understandable because the majority of countries in this group are either very small or unstable countries, there is also an increase in trade since 2004 and the policy of opening up to SSA, as these states were represented at the 2008 summit.

⁸⁷ President Erdoğan met his Central African counterpart in the margin of the Istanbul summit in December 2021. Thus, according to the Central African Republic Presidency via its Facebook page, in addition to the decision of intensifying military cooperation between the two countries, both heads of state have put a particular emphasis on the development of trade cooperation which is still at a low level. Both parties have also decided to study the possibilities of the opening of an air route for Turkish airways between Bangui and Istanbul in a near future. Source: <https://ndjonisango.com/2021/12/20/rca-le-president-touadera-au-3eme-sommet-partenariat-afrique-turquie-a-istanbul/> accessed 01.06.2022.

3.3 Conclusion

In a nutshell, Turkey's strategy toward SSA was first of all global, meaning toward the continent as a whole. Turkey, later on, strengthened or initiated bilateral relations with all SSA states. In addition, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the countries of SSA, in particular trade, illustrate the close relationship between Turkish public and the private actors, especially the Turkish entrepreneurs, who very often accompanied the official state delegation when the relationship with an African country is set to be established. Therefore, the main purpose of the next chapter will be to analyze the relationship between the various actors as well as the areas of interest of Turkey's foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis SSA. This strategy, labeled by some scholars "Ankara consensus" (Donelli, 2018), involves several actors both from the public and private spheres, and covers several areas. It will therefore be analyzed through the prism of the multitrack foreign policy strategy, as introduced in the previous chapter.

CHAPTER 4

TURKEY AS A CIVILIAN POWER IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A MULTITRACK FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY

“Turkey’s success is not only the result of state policies, but also the activities of civil society, business organizations, and numerous other organizations, all operating under the guidance of the new vision. The state’s macro strategy is in conformity with the micro strategies of individual people, corporations, and civil society organizations” Ahmet Davutoğlu (2008, p.83).

Turkey has adopted the full range of soft power instruments as developed in Chapter 2 in its expansion in SSA, namely strategic narratives and public diplomacy. Thus, it is this soft power strategy used by Turkey to establish herself in SSA that this 4th chapter of our study will analyze. Therefore, this chapter is a necessary prerequisite to investigating whether there is a rupture or continuity in Turkish Foreign policy strategy toward SSA after 15 July 2016. Besides, this strategy of Turkish soft power in SSA was depicted as unique because of the prominent place given to Turkish civil society actors in Ankara's African policy (Donelli, 2018). This will bring about an ambiguous relationship between Turkish state (T1) and non-state (T2) diplomacy, in the SSA region. This specificity of Turkish diplomacy in SSA, which is in line with the principle of multi-dimensionality of Turkish diplomacy, developed by Ahmet Davutoğlu, requires a special emphasis in our analysis of Turkey's soft power strategy in SSA before July 2016. In particular, concerning the relationship between the actors of the state sphere and those of civil society in the framing and implementation of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA.

In addition, an analysis of the priority areas of Turkish diplomacy in SSA is also essential, insofar as Turkey in its strategy of multi-track diplomacy in SSA, has

focused on social issues, namely: humanitarian issues, trade, education, religion, and development assistance. As a result, in the first decade of its establishment in SSA, Turkey is referred to as a civilian power⁸⁸.

4.1 The public-private partnership in TFP in SSA

To establish herself in SSA, Turkey has developed a foreign policy strategy grounded on her networked public diplomacy. This public diplomacy strategy involves several actors from both the state and civil society spheres. However, Turkey stands out from other emerging powers in its application of public diplomacy vis-à-vis SSA, as her networked public diplomacy strategy is informal (Donelli, 2018, 2021; Çevik, 2018). Indeed, there is no formal institutional framework that governs relations between the Turkish state and civil society actors operating in SSA (Donelli, 2018, 2021; Çevik, 2018). As Donelli (2018) pointed out, if in theory the strategy of public diplomacy in networks is based on the horizontal relationship between the state and non-state actors, it nevertheless has elements of coordination between the different tracks. However, the case of Turkey's networked public diplomacy is unique, as there is no formal coordination between state actors' diplomacy (T1) and non-state actors' diplomacy (T2) (Donelli, 2018, 2021; Çevik, 2018).

Indeed, the link between the different tracks of Turkey's networked public diplomacy in SSA lies outside the institutional framework and is located within the ideological realm (Donelli & Levaggi, 2016). As we established in the previous chapter, Turkish foreign policy in SSA has as a domestic foundation the emergence of the Islamist elite in Turkish society with the rise to power of the AKP. This elite, which works both in the economic and humanitarian fields, is at the origin of the accentuation

⁸⁸ A civilian power is a country use of non-coercive means, especially military means, and its reliance on peaceful means such as trade, to achieve its foreign policy goals.

of the policy of openness towards SSA initiated by the previous Turkish governments at the end of the 1990s and stressed during the AKP era. Actually, on the ideological level, this elite shares with the AKP leaders the ideology of pan-Islamism, and the vision of the leading role that Turkey is called upon to play in the Muslim world (Donelli & Levaggi, 2016).

Moreover, in this pan-Islamist ideology, the idea that Muslim populations are often marginalized in the humanitarian actions of the international community pushed the proponents of this ideology to direct their humanitarian actions toward countries with a strong Muslim community (Çevik, 2018), in particular those of SSA such as Somalia, which faced a serious humanitarian crisis in the early 2000s (Çevik, 2018). This is how Somalia will become the gateway for Turkish official diplomacy (T1) and non-official (T2) in SSA, in particular through the action of its humanitarian NGOs in this country (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). What is interesting in Turkey's approach toward SSA is that Turkey will use this strategy of networked public diplomacy, both in conflicting countries like South Sudan and Somalia and in peaceful SSA countries such as Nigeria and Senegal (Donelli, 2018).

Thus, as stated by Özkan (2018) in the first decade of its implantation in SSA, Turkish Foreign policy was in the form of a “civil society-led, the state followed initiatives”. Indeed, as various other scholars highlighted, the expertise in the field of these non-state actors as well as their proximity to the local populations on the ground has often facilitated the arrival and establishment of Turkey’s T1 in SSA (Donelli, 2018, 2021; Çevik, 2018; Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Thus, as established by scholars of the literature on informal diplomacy regarding the benefits of unofficial diplomacy (T2),⁸⁹ Turkey makes use of the activities of its non-state actors in fields such as

⁸⁹ See chapter 2 of this dissertation.

education, health, trade, and religion, to build relationships of trust with the population of SSA at the grassroots and to eliminate the psychological and cultural barriers which can be an obstacle to the deployment of its activities in SSA (Donelli, 2018).

Regarding precisely the relations between T1 and T2 in the framing and implementation of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, it is interesting to untangle the mechanism of cooperation between them. Though, as Çevik (2018) points out, it is difficult to make sense of the complex web of relations between the Turkish state and non-state actors in Turkey's foreign policy in SSA (Çevik, 2018).

First of all, as far as the foreign policy decision-making process is concerned, this is an exclusive competence of state diplomacy (T1) (Donelli, 2018). Thus, in the first years of its policy of openness towards SSA, the framing of Turkish foreign policy in SSA essentially came under Turkey's official diplomacy (T1), in particular through its institutions, which are: the Prime Minister's Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, but also more recently the Turkish Public Diplomacy' Office (KDK) which is attached to the Turkish Prime Minister's Office (Donelli, 2018; Çevik, 2018).

Indeed, this latter institution, created in 2010, has the mission, among other things, to promote Turkish foreign policy and Turkey's image to both domestic and foreign audiences (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016).⁹⁰ Finally, the Turkish office of Public Diplomacy also has the mission of monitoring the relations between the various Turkish public and private institutions that deal with Turkish foreign policy in SSA, in particular: the TIKA, the TOKI, and the AFAD (Huijgh & Warlick, 2016, p. 20). With regard to the TIKA, to which we will return in more detail in the next section to analyze Turkey's official development assistance in SSA, it should be noted that the latter is

⁹⁰Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Circular: Office of Public Diplomacy, Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Office of Public Diplomacy, 30 Jan. 2010, Web, 15 Dec. 2014.

in charge of the coordination on the ground of the various actions of Turkish actors in the field of development (Çevik, 2018).

Finally, concerning economic relations between Turkey and SSA, they are ensured by other Turkish state institutions such as the Foreign Economic Relations Board of Turkey (DEİK) and the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TIM). Thus, as the nature of these institutions shows, Turkey works mainly in SSA in the fields of infrastructure, health, education, and the establishment of institutional buildings (Donelli, 2018, p. 72). Besides, another Turkish public institution that is significant in Turkish T1 in SSA is the Diyanet, which handles the religious aspect of Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA. Diyanet activities in SSA deserve careful analysis, given the importance of the religious dimension in Turkey's approach towards SSA. We will give more in-depth attention to some of the up-cited Turkish public institutions in the next section of this study, namely in the analysis of the tracks of Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA.

As far as Turkish T2 diplomacy in SSA is concerned, scholars such as Çevik (2018) and Donelli (2018) have established that although Turkish non-state actors do not participate in the framing of Turkish foreign policy in SSA, they are nevertheless an essential element of its implementation on the ground. The official recognition of the importance of Turkish NGOs in TFP materialized in 2004 with the adoption of a legal framework, the law No. 5253, entitled "the law on associations."⁹¹ Indeed, the latter grants Turkish NGO's the right to establish partnerships with their foreign counterparts, as well as the possibility of obtaining financial assistance from abroad, and finally, the right to receive donations from lucrative sources (Turhan, 2019). This administrative facility has considerably increased the effectiveness of Turkish NGOs

⁹¹ For the full text of this Law, see: <https://www.dernekler.gov.tr/tr/mevzuat/kanun/5253-derneklerkanunu.aspx>.

in the area of humanitarian aid (Turhan & Bahcecik, 2021, p. 145). The unofficial character they have, allows them to settle more easily into local communities, and even to develop close ties with them (Donelli, 2018, 2021; Çevik, 2018). Thus, thanks to this capacity for adaptation and infiltration, Turkish private actors have often served as a relay between Turkish T1 diplomacy and both the political leaders and the populations of SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Besides, Turkish civil society actors have also spread the image of a benevolent Turkey throughout the African continent, thanks to their humanitarian activities on the ground (Çevik, 2016). Hence, this positive image beneficiates the Turkish T1, which mostly played on its civil society humanitarian activities, especially those with an Islamic background, to build its narrative in SSA (Donelli, 2018). In this perspective, the activities of Turkish non-state actors are supported by the Turkish T1, particularly in the speeches of Turkish leaders during their state visits to SSA (Donelli, 2018). Hence, although there is no formal coordination framework governing the actions of the Turkish public and private actors in SSA, the link between Turkish T1 and T2 is nevertheless ensured by their shared ideological orientation (Donelli, 2018). Moreover, in a more practical aspect, The Turkish T1 also supports non-state actors' activities in SSA through administrative and legal help, namely in the obtaining of authorizations for their activities in SSA host countries (Donelli, 2018). Due to this implicit and verbal support of their activities by the Turkish state, the activities of Turkish T2 are all considered by the T1 as an integral part of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA and are logged by the Turkish Public Diplomacy Office in the same way as those of the T1 (Çevik, 2018).

However, it is worth noticing that the Turkish non-state actors in Africa have financial independence from the Turkish state, which enables them to develop their activities on the ground free from Turkish state control (Çevik, 2018, p. 180). Hence,

various scholars highlight that this freedom enjoyed by the Turkish non-state actors in SSA can be an impediment to Turkey's T1 in SSA in the long run, since it enables Turkey's non-state actors to develop their agenda in the SSA field (Donelli, 2018; Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Startlingly, other scholars such as Donelli (2018) and Çevik (2015), point out that this same financial aspect could be the missing link between Turkish T1 and T2 in SSA.

Indeed, as noted by these authors, the relationship of patronage, as well as ideological affinities, binds the various actors of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA, in particular the AKP leaders, the economic operators of MÜSIAD and TUSKON, and Turkish humanitarian NGOs (Çevik, 2018, p. 180). Indeed, as we underlined in the previous chapter, during their official visits to SSA, the Turkish leaders are always accompanied by large delegations of Turkish businessmen to negotiate important contracts for the benefit of the latter. In addition, the up-cited scholars have established links between the main Turkish companies that benefit from contracts in SSA countries and the AKP, like the firm Al Bayrak (Çevik, 2018, p. 181).

Besides, Turkish NGOs in SSA benefit from financial and material donations and support from Turkish businessmen (Çevik, 2018, p. 181). These are namely the employers' organizations MÜSIAD and TUSKON, which contributed to financing the activities of Turkish humanitarian NGOs (Çevik, 2018, p. 181). Hence, the financial channel is the missing link that binds the T1 and the T2 of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA, in a vertical relation, with the Turkish state namely the AKP ruling elite on top.



Figure 3. The link between the Turkish state and non-state actors in SSA

Source: The author⁹².

In a nutshell, the interesting relationship between Turkish T1 and T2 in the application of Turkey's networked public diplomacy in SSA, allows Turkey to stand out from other emerging and traditional powers in SSA. Moreover, this informal nature of the relationship between Turkish public and private actors is an important variable in our analysis of the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA after the events of 15 July 2016 in Turkey, and requires an in-depth analysis of the main areas or tracks of Turkey's informal diplomacy in SSA.

4.2 The tracks of TFP strategy in SSA

Although Turkish public diplomacy towards SSA involves all the tracks or areas of the public diplomacy strategy analyzed in the network of multitrack diplomacy as established by Diamond and McDonald (1996), this study will nevertheless focus on five (5) main areas that can be considered as Turkey's priority areas in its strategy

⁹² On the basis of the analysis of Çevik (2018); Donelli (2018), on the relationship between the Turkish state and non-state actors in the TFP in SSA.

towards the SSA region initiated under the AKP rule. These five areas include the fields of official development assistance, humanitarian aid, trade, religion, and education. It is to the analysis of these tracks of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA, and the main actors of their implementation on the ground that this section of the study is dedicated.

4.2.1 TIKA and Turkey's official development assistance in SSA

Official Development Assistance (ODA) represents the first track in the web of the multitrack diplomacy strategy. Indeed, as a component of a state's official diplomacy, it is an effective foreign policy instrument that allows a state to achieve various foreign policy objectives, particularly on the political and economic levels. Thus, although it is a major instrument of the soft power strategy, it can serve various purposes of both hard and soft politics (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019, p. 174). Hence, on the economic level, it allows, for example, a given state to enter the market of the state receiving aid, through free trade agreements or the promotion of foreign direct investment (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019, p. 174). Thus, on the economic level, ODA creates an environment favorable to trade for the donor country in the market of the recipient country, in particular by facilitating exports from the donor country within the recipient country and by securing its access to raw materials (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019, p. 174). Politically, ODA allows the donor country to influence the decisions and behavior of the recipient country. This has been demonstrated in the case study on the relationship between ODA and states' votes at the UN (Korkmaz & Zengin, 2020). This is why ODA is considered by Kočan and Arbeiter (2019) a powerful instrument in the foreign policy strategy of a state.

Thus, it is possible to understand the foreign policy of a state based on its allocation of ODA to another state or region (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019, p. 175). Indeed, an increase or decrease in ODA can make it possible to analyze the state of diplomatic relations between two states (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019, p. 175). Similarly, the orientation of a country's ODA can help determine its foreign policy objectives (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019, p. 175). This is how SSA has established itself as one of the main recipients of Turkish ODA since the rise to power of the AKP in Turkey.

Indeed, since the beginning of the new direction of Turkey's foreign policy initiated by the AKP, which aims to make Turkey a major power among Southern countries, Turkey is at the forefront of emerging countries' donors to humanitarian assistance (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019). In particular, in 2017, it was ranked as the top donor country of humanitarian assistance (Abdinor, 2019).




Figure 4. Leading 10 contributors of humanitarian assistance 2017

Source: *Global Humanitarian Assistance Report*, 2018, retrieved from Abdinor (2019). Online, retrieved from www.Researchgate.Net/Publication/329164707. Accessed 01.05.2021

This preeminent place granted to ODA in the strategy of expansion of Turkish power in its regions of interest, in particular, Central Asia, the Balkans, and more recently SSA, has materialized through the transformation of TIKA, the main institution responsible for Turkish ODA since the rise to power of AKP (Özkan & Demirtepe, 2012). Indeed, the *Türk İşbirliği ve koordinasyon Idarersi Başkanlığı* (TIKA), was created in 1992 with the mission of helping the economies of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans after the collapse of the USSR (Özkan & Demirtepe, 2012). The challenge for Turkey is mainly to "save" the social memory, the culture, and the common past that it shares with these states, in particular the Ottoman heritage. However, it should be noted that the first major operations of this institution in 1996 were already geared towards SSA, particularly with the strengthening of institutional capacities in Gambia; Guinea; Guinea Bissau; Mauritania; Somalia; and Sudan (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019). However, the year 2003 marked a turning point in the history of TIKA, because the latter was placed by decree N04668 of May 12, 2003, under the patronage of the Turkish Prime Minister's office, to increase its efficiency and expand its areas of activity, thereby transforming TIKA into the main agency in charge of Turkey's official ODA (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019).

Thus, this decree attributes mainly to TIKA, the mission to contribute to the economic, technical, social, cultural, and educational development of developing countries through its projects and programs (Özkan, 2018). Its main mission is to serve as a link between the countries in need of aid and the Turkish state institutions and agencies likely to provide this aid (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019). Hence, at the level of the strategy of TFP, development assistance carved out a place in Davutoğlu's vision of multi-dimensional and proactive Turkish foreign policy (Tüyoğlu, 2021, p. 13). On the cultural level, TIKA has as mission, to promote the image of Turkey, as well as

Turkish culture in the world through its programs and projects, particularly those relating to the restoration of the heritage from the Ottoman era in the ancient Ottoman territories. Thus, 50 to 70% of the total aid allocated by the TIKA relates to the restoration of Ottoman infrastructures, in particular the mosques in the former Ottoman territories (Özkan, 2018).

TIKA has 4 main areas of intervention, namely: technical assistance; restoration and preservation of the Ottoman heritage; technical studies; and humanitarian assistance (Özkan, 2018). A particularity of TIKA in SSA is that it carries out its projects in Africa with the support of local associations and NGOs which are generally the initiators of action plans on the ground (Özkan, 2018). Moreover, TIKA's approach in SSA is unprecedented insofar as it consists of asking countries what their needs are, and giving them what the latter deems necessary. This may be infrastructure, training, or schools.⁹³ This approach enables the effective participation of the recipient country in the Aid process (Tüyoğlu, 2021, p. 14). Therefore, TDA mainly consists of technical cooperation and capacity building rather than financial aid (Tüyoğlu, 2021, p. 14). In this regard, in 2016 TIKA invested \$4 billion of its budget, representing a percentage of 65.40% of its overall budget in the sector of social infrastructure and services, including areas such as education (31.8 %.); health (9.7%); water and sanitation (0.4%); government and civil society (10.3%) other social infrastructure and service (14.2%) (Turhan, 2019, p. 152). While, the remaining part of the budget (34.6%), was allotted to the economic infrastructure and service; multisector activities; and production sectors (Turhan, 2019, p. 152).

⁹³ Source: Interview granted by Serdar Çam, deputy Ministry of culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey and former head of TIKA from 2011-2019 to *Jeune Afrique* : « Turquie : « Un tiers de notre aide au développement est consacré à l'Afrique », *Jeune Afrique* , 3 december 2021. Online, retrieved from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1263044/economie/turquie-afun-tiers-de-notre-aide-au-developpement-est-consacre-a-afriqueaf/>, consulted 12/03/2022.




Figure 5. Turkish bilateral official development assistance by sectors

Source: *Turkish Development Assistance Report*, 2016. Retrieved from: Turhan (2019, p. 152).

Finally, according to Kočan and Arbeiter (2019), another peculiarity of TIKA development projects is that they must contribute to the interests of both the recipient countries and those of Turkey, which establishes Turkey's ODA as an instrument of Turkish foreign policy strategy (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019). In the same vein, the TIKA itself stipulates that the projects and programs it implements in the recipient countries must be in line with Turkey's foreign policy vision.⁹⁴ So, according to Korkmaz and Zengin (2020), one can observe a balance between the increase of the activities of the TIKA in a given country and the intensification of the economic relations between Turkey and the said country. Similarly, the distribution of TIKA offices in SSA reflects the strategic priorities of Turkey's foreign policy, given that this organization does not have clearly defined criteria that condition the allocation of Turkish ODA (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019). This is the place to emphasize that the other specificity of Turkish ODA in SSA is its discursive dimension. Indeed, Turkey stands out from other

⁹⁴TIKA, *Annual Report 2013*. Accessed February 27, 2021, [http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA ANNUAL REPORT 2013.pdf](http://www.tika.gov.tr/upload/publication/TIKA%20ANNUAL%20REPORT%202013.pdf).

traditional and emerging SSA partners in that the allocation of its ODA is not conditioned by compliance with political or social norms (Tüyoğlu, 2021), as is the case for example with the European ODA in SSA. Moreover, Turkey explains its humanitarian action in SSA through the historical and religious ties it shares with certain SSA countries, as introduced in the previous chapter. Accordingly, this discursive dimension allows Turkey to give its ODA to SSA a completely altruistic image, that is to say, devoid of any material interests (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019).

Hence, since 2003, TIKA has increased its activities in SSA. The first TIKA office in SSA was opened in 2005 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,⁹⁵ followed by other TIKA offices in other SSA countries as relations between Turkey and SSA developed (Özkan, 2018). TIKA currently has 22 regional offices in Africa.⁹⁶ Besides, at the Fourth UN Conference on Least Developed Countries, which took place in Istanbul in 2011, Turkey pledged to provide \$2 billion over ten years to these 48 states, 35 of which are Africans.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ Mehmet Ozkan, “The Turkish Way of Doing Development Aid? An Analysis from the Somali Laboratory”.

⁹⁶ Source: Interview granted by Serdar Çam, deputy Ministry of culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey and former head of TIKA from 2011-2019 to Jeune Afrique: « Turquie: « Un tiers de notre aide au développement est consacré à l’Afrique », 3 december 2021. Online, retrieved from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1263044/economie/turquie-afun-tiers-de-notre-aide-au-developpement-est-consacre-a-afriqueaf/>, consulted 12/03/2022.

⁹⁷ Ibid.




Figure 6. Top least developed countries recipients of Turkish aid

Source: *Turkish Development Assistance Report 2016*, retrieved from Abdinor (2019).




Figure 7. Turkish ODA's share of SSA in comparison to other LDC countries

Source: Karahan (2020). Online, retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-50442-7_10, consulted on 28.03.2022.

Thus, nowadays, a third (1/3) of TIKA's activities are devoted to Africa and SSA represents a quarter (1/4) of TIKA's annual budget.⁹⁸ This budget finances projects and programs mainly in the areas of technical assistance (including humanitarian assistance, agriculture; health; education; water and sanitation; Training; institutional capacity building); economic infrastructure and service; peacekeeping operations; and post-conflict reconstruction (TIKA, 2013). In line with this, TIKA set up in 2008 an agricultural development program labeled the "Africa Agricultural Development Program", which covers the majority of countries in West Africa and Southern Africa (Özkan, 2013). It is within this framework that Turkey was recognized by the World Food Program (WFP) as a development partner of SSA (Özkan, 2013, p. 143). TIKA also deploys in SSA through other major programs such as the "Africa Health Program" and the "Africa Vocational Training Program" (TIKA, 2016).

This increase in TIKA's activities in SSA countries is in line with the increase in trade relations between Turkey and the countries of this region (Korkmaz & Zengin, 2020). Thus, from 2003 to 2011 the trade balance between Turkey and SSA increased from 04 billion dollars to 17 billion dollars (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019); while the activities carried out by TIKA in Africa reached the amount of 8 billion 120 million US dollars in 2017, against 85 million US dollars in 2002 (Kočan & Arbeiter, 2019). In this regard, a scholar like Tüyoğlu (2021, p. 13), highlights that Turkish entrepreneurs' settlement in SSA is in line with TIKA's activities and expansion in this area of the continent. Hence, as established in the previous section, the various actors of TFP in SSA, are interdependent and contribute to each other success, especially those in the field of trade and the humanitarians.

⁹⁸ Source: Interview granted by Serdar Çam, deputy Ministry of culture and Tourism of the Republic of Turkey and former head of TIKA from 2011-2019 to *Jeune Afrique*.

To sum up, this section of our study dedicated to the analysis of Turkey's ODA in SSA through the action of TIKA has made it possible to demonstrate that this institution, and the Turkish ODA it embodies, is a major tool of Turkish foreign policy expansion strategy in SSA. Besides, the increase in TIKA's activities in the SSA region illustrates the importance that this region of the continent has acquired in Ankara's foreign policy since the rise to power of the AKP. Indeed, Ankara's official ODA in SSA is in line with Turkey's political, ideological, and above all economic interests in the SSA region. This humanitarian diplomacy of Turkey in SSA also develops through the activities of Turkish humanitarian NGOs in SSA countries, which even constitute its main players.

4.2.2 Turkish humanitarian NGOs as a tool of Turkish influence in Sub-Saharan Africa

Turkish humanitarian NGOs through their activities are an essential component of Turkish soft power in Africa. Indeed, they represent the civil part of Turkish public diplomacy by enabling the participation of actors from the societal sphere in the implementation on the ground of this foreign policy strategy (Çevik, 2015, p. 125). This is one of the essential criteria of the New Public Diplomacy (NPD) or Public Diplomacy in the era of globalization, as analyzed in the second chapter. Thus, the participation of actors from the societal sphere, makes it possible to legitimize but also gives credibility to the public diplomacy of a state (Melissen, 2005). The activities of humanitarian NGOs, which constitute the second track of multitrack diplomacy, are, therefore, nowadays, a major criterion for the success of a state's public diplomacy strategy (Melissen, 2005).

In the case of the strategy of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA, which is the focus of this study, the activities on the ground of Turkish humanitarian NGOs have played an essential role in Ankara's strategy of implantation in SSA (Çevik, 2018). It should be emphasized from the outset that these Turkish NGOs which deploy internationally and specifically in SSA, are NGOs that work in the field of humanitarian aid, and that have a strong Islamist affiliation (Çevik, 2015). Thus, historically, the advent of these "faith-based NGOs" in the Turkish political sphere dates back to the end of the 1980s, which was marked in Turkey by the neo-liberal policy initiated by the PM Özal, and which enabled the rehabilitation of Islamist parties on the Turkish political scene (Çevik, 2015, p. 123).

Indeed, the previous Turkish governments, in particular the military regime that guaranteed the secular heritage of Atatürk, have for long impeded the political deployment of actors from the Islamist sphere (Çevik, 2015, pp. 123-124). Thus, to exist politically during the military regime, these Islamist political actors developed a strong social base, particularly through NGOs (Çevik, 2015, p. 56). Thus, the emergence of faith-based NGOs during the neo-liberal era is in line with the emergence of the Islamist bourgeoisie of the Anatolian Tigers in the economic area during this same period (Çevik, 2015, p. 56). The emergence of these Islamist actors on the Turkish political scene also increased with the rise to power of the AKP in the early 2000s (Çevik, 2015, p. 56). Hence, in addition to the ideological root that these actors share with the AKP, the development of civil society in Turkey, inherent in the conditions of Turkey's accession to the EU, has favored the proliferation of NGOs in Turkey, as well as the expansion of their activities both nationally and internationally (Turhan, 2019, p. 160). Thus, the deployment of these three players in Turkish politics was carried out in concert, particularly in the field of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA,

where the three Islamist players linked by their common religious ideology helped each other (Turhan, 2019, p. 160).

Indeed, the major role played by NGOs in the networked public diplomacy strategy, particularly in terms of proximity diplomacy and collection of information about the society of the host countries, has been proven in the case of Turkish humanitarian NGOs in TFP in SSA (Çevik, 2015, p. 126). As Çevik (2015) points out, the increased presence of these Turkish humanitarian NGOs in SSA has favored the establishment of official relations between Turkey and the host states of SSA, following the Turkish expansion strategy in SSA initiated by the AKP government (Çevik, 2015, p. 126).

Thus, the religious character of these faith-based NGOs has enabled them to become major players in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, particularly among the Muslim communities of SSA, thanks to the Islamic values of charity and solidarity that they define as the driving force of their actions (Çevik, 2015, p. 127). These actions mainly consist of the donation of meals for the break of the fast during the holy month of Ramadan; the restoration of mosques; the distribution of Qurans (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). As an illustration, the IHH, which is a major Turkish humanitarian NGO in SSA, has already distributed more than 100.000 Qurans in SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). It has also built mosques in several SSA countries such as Senegal, Mali, Rwanda, and Somalia (Özkan & Akgün, 2010).

It should be noted that though they have a strong Islamist root, these Turkish faith-based humanitarian NGOs do not pour into religious proselytism in SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010), which also allows them to enjoy a positive image in non-Muslim communities of SSA, thanks to their charitable deeds (Çevik, 2015, p. 132). Moreover, this image of volunteers that they enjoy, as well as the Ottoman heritage that they

represent, is in opposition to the image of former colonial power which tarnishes the humanitarian action of traditional European powers in the eyes of the public of SSA (Çevik, 2015, p. 132).

Thanks to its faith-based Humanitarian NGOs, Turkey has built the image of a benevolent power in SSA (Çevik, 2015, p. 132). Moreover, through their speeches about solidarity and Islamic charity, these NGOs have made it possible to create a chain of solidarity between the Turkish populations and those of SSA, by sensitizing Turkish society on African humanitarian issues, such as famine, in their fundraising campaigns (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 539). One of these renowned campaigns was the one organized in 2011 by three leading Turkish faith-based humanitarian NGOs in SSA, namely: IHH, Deniz Feneri, and Cansuyu (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 539). This campaign enabled to raise of 365 million dollars in favor of humanitarian aid, in particular the crisis in Somalia (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 539).

On a practical level, the Turkish approach to the concept of humanitarian aid is innovative (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 7). Indeed, Turkey has a fairly broad conception of the concept of humanitarian aid, which tends to assimilate it into that of development aid (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 7). Thus, the two concepts, according to the Turkish conception, can be summed up as “all the actions that aim to save lives and alleviate the suffering of populations who are victims of crises and conflicts” (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 7). Therefore, the TIKA, which is the Turkish institution in charge of the coordination of the Turkish ODA, as analyzed in the previous section, classifies Turkish humanitarian aid according to 2 categories (Turhan, 2019, p. 166):

- a) Financial assistance and non-financial assistance to developing countries;

- b) Emergency aid consisting, in particular, of the distribution of meals, the construction of shelters, and the supply of health care.

Hence, both concepts are used interchangeably in Turkish practice, and the activities of Turkish humanitarian NGOs are listed in TIKA's reports as an integral part of Turkish ODA (Turhan, 2019, p. 163). According to Guo (2020), this ambiguity in the use of the two concepts allows the AKP government to make ODA expenditures acceptable to the Turkish public, in particular by passing ODA off as a form of religious charity.

Thus, the activities of Turkish humanitarian NGOs in SSA essentially focus on the social field. They consist mainly of the construction of wells, hospitals, and schools as well as the provision of health care (Çevik, 2016, p. 57). Turkish faith-based humanitarian NGOs also work in capacity building for the empowerment of vulnerable populations, especially women and children, in areas such as agriculture, livestock, and handicrafts (Çevik, 2016, p. 57). Their aim here is to reduce the dependence of SSA countries upon ODA, following the maxim "learning to fish, rather than giving fish" (Çevik, 2016, p. 127). Thus, according to the 2011 report of TIKA, Turkish humanitarian NGOs contributed to the Turkish ODA for an extraordinary record of \$199.52 million in 2011 (Turhan, 2019, p. 166). It can be seen from this report that the most active Turkish humanitarian NGOs are: the Cansuyu Dernegi, Kimse Yok Mu? (KYM), Deniz Feneri, Yeryuzu Doktorlari, and Insan Haklari ve Hizmet (IHH).




Figure 8. Distribution of humanitarian assistance by Turkish faith-based NGOs in 2011

Source: The data for this figure was provided by *TIKA Report* (2011), p.71⁹⁹

In 2012, SSA became the main recipient of humanitarian aid from Turkish faith-based NGOs, in particular countries such as Somalia, Niger, and Sudan, which are the main beneficiaries (Turhan, 2019, p. 167). The most active Turkish NGOs according to the 2012 TIKa report are Kimse Yok mu?, İHH, Dost Eli, Yunus Emre Foundation, Yardımeli Society (Helping Hand), Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation, Cansuyu, Yeryüzü Doktorları, and the Diyanet Foundation (Turhan, 2019, p. 167).

⁹⁹ Retrieved from Turhan (2019).

Table 4. Shares of Turkish Faith-based NGOs in Turkish Humanitarian Assistance for the Year 2012

Turkish Faith-Based NGOs	Shares In Humanitarian Assistance
Kimse Yokmu	\$45 million
Dost Eli	\$16.28 million
Yunus Emre Foundation	\$12.75 million
Yardımlı Society	\$8.28 million
Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Foundation	\$8.23 million
Cansuyu	\$7.40 million
Yeryüzü Doktorları	\$7.36
Diyanet Foundations	\$3.35
TOTAL	\$111.65 million

Source: The data for this table was provided by *TIKA Report* (2012), p.78¹⁰⁰

It can be observed from this table that KYM was one of the major Turkish faith-based humanitarian NGOs during the first years of the soft power strategy promoted by the AKP government. However, the latter's activities, are no longer listed in TIKAs annual reports on Turkey's ODA since 2013 (Turhan, 2019, p. 168), which is the year of the rise of political tensions between the AKP and its former Islamist ally, the GM.¹⁰¹ Indeed, this NGO which was officially created in 2002, is noteworthy, insofar as it is affiliated with the transnational movement of Imam Fethullah Gülen, which was particularly active in the field of education in SSA. KYM is thus, also one of the pioneering Turkish NGOs in the field of Turkish humanitarian aid in SSA.

¹⁰⁰Retrieved from Turhan (2019, p. 167).

¹⁰¹Following the exacerbation of the crisis between the GM and the Turkish government, this NGO has been finally closed down in Turkey in 2016.

KYM is at the origin of several development projects in SSA countries, particularly in the fields of health, water, and sanitation, the construction of religious infrastructures, post-conflict reconstruction, and humanitarian relief, which are also the areas of predilection for most of the Turkish “faith-based NGO's” in SSA.¹⁰² But, KYM stands out in SSA for its activities in the field of education.¹⁰³ Indeed, its activities in the field of education in SSA have enabled it to gain international recognition. This NGO has thus obtained the status of a consultant to the UN ECOSOC and is also a partner in several UN bodies (Binder & Erten, 2013, p. 7). In addition, KYM signed a MoU with the African Union (AU) Commission in 2015.¹⁰⁴ As Aisha Abdullahi, AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, highlighted in 2016, the AU relies on its partnership with KYM to promote the right to education in Africa, especially for refugee children and children in countries in crisis.¹⁰⁵ Thus, in addition to building schools, KYM has provided thousands of scholarships to children in SSA countries. In particular, it provided 3,177 scholarships during the period 2011-2016 for the children of SSA.¹⁰⁶

Among the Turkish faith-based NGOs involved in SSA, the IHH also requires a particular focus, given its activities in SSA. Indeed, established in 1995, IHH is one of the pioneering Turkish NGOs in the SSA region (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). The IHH has also greatly contributed to the discovery of SSA by the Turkish public, in particular through its fundraising campaigns during the periods of Ramadan and the Feast of Sacrifice in favor of the populations of SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). IHH carried out

¹⁰² KYM, *Reporting for Africa* (2016), online, retrieved from: <https://reliefweb.int>, consulted, 31.03.2022.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ KYM, *Reporting for Africa*.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

its first activities in SSA in 1996 in Somalia before expanding to other SSA countries (Özkan & Akgün, 2010).

The year 1999 constitutes a turning point in the activities of the IHH in SSA, because, during this year, it developed its first large-scale campaign in favor of SSA, particularly in Ethiopia, within the framework of the famine which hit this SSA country (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). It was also during this campaign that the IHH identified access to water as a major issue for the populations of SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Therefore, water and sanitation became a priority area for IHH in SSA. In this context, this organization drilled more than 1,000 wells in SSA in the early 2000s.¹⁰⁷

Furthermore, another field of action of the IHH in SSA is health, in particular, visual health and more specifically the fight against cataracts (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 562). This disease aroused the interest of the IHH because it permanently affects poor countries in SSA, in particular, because of the lack of appropriate infrastructure to perform eye surgeries (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 562). With this in mind, IHH has launched a major campaign for SSA, titled: “The Turkish people will open the eyes of 100,000 Africans and 100,000 Africans will see with Turkey” (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 562). This campaign, which began in 2007, has enabled the IHH to raise funds for 35,000 cataract surgeries (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 562). This campaign peaked in 2017 and enabled IHH to gain international recognition.¹⁰⁸ This campaign has thus enabled the IHH to establish itself as a role model for other Turkish humanitarian NGOs and even for Turkish official diplomacy in SSA (Özkan, 2010, p. 145). Indeed, following the resounding success of this campaign, TIKA has partnered with IHH to perform 12,000 additional cataract surgeries in Sudan (Özkan, 2013, p. 145).

¹⁰⁷ “The IHH has so far opened more than 1,000 water wells in various African countries such as 1,146 in Somalia, 27 in Cameroon, 24 in Kenya, 5 in Ethiopia. The foundation is also planning to open 475 more water wells in Africa”. Source: Siradag (2015, p. 12).

¹⁰⁸ The IHH was chosen to develop the code of conduct for Islamic humanitarian NGOs of the OIC.

Clearly, IHH's campaigns in favor of SSA have attracted many other Turkish NGOs as well as Turkish investors in this region of the African continent (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). These different projects, particularly in the fight against cataracts and water supply, of the IHH in SSA, have also served as models for other Turkish faith-based NGOs in SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). Thus, through its projects in favor of SSA, the IHH has become an essential tool of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA (Özkan & Akgün, 2010). It is in this regard that this organization has been included in the agenda of the Turkey-Africa summits (Özkan & Akgün, 2010, p. 542).

To sum up, thanks to the activities of official and non-official Turkish actors in the humanitarian field, Turkey was able to establish herself as an emerging power in SSA (Özkan, 2013, p. 140). Moreover, the positive capital garnered thanks to its image as a benevolent power in SSA also enables Turkey to expand its trade with SSA countries. These economic exchanges between Turkey and SSA are, therefore, also an essential part of Turkey's multi-track public diplomacy strategy in SSA.

4.2.3 Turkey as a trading state in Sub-Saharan Africa

With globalization and its ensuing interdependence between States, economics appears more and more as a structuring factor of interstate relations. Indeed, economic relations, and more specifically trade, have become an essential element of the foreign policy of states. The importance of trade in the foreign policy of states has therefore been underlined by various IR scholars (Kant, 1997; Oneal et al., 2003), particularly concerning the impact of trade as a pacifying element in interstate relations. Thus, trade appears as a privileged instrument of the soft power strategy of states, in particular, because of its advantages in terms of cost and utility, as compared to the coercive instruments of foreign policy. It is in this regard, that trade has been identified

as the third track of the multitrack public diplomacy strategy, because of its potential for conflict resolution, and the establishment of prosperous and sustainable relations between states (Mc Donald, 2012, p. 67).

Among the scholars who analyzed the impact of trade on foreign policy, Rosecrance (1986) is of interest, due to its conceptualization of the concept of the “trading state.” Indeed, Rosecrance (1986) defines the concept of the “trading state” in opposition to coercive military power, which limits the national interest of states to security issues. Thus, for Rosecrance (1986), with the globalization of economies, states increasingly tend to favor their trade and economic development over war and territorial conquest as sources of power on the international scene. Following Rosecrance (1986), Kirişci (2009), took on this concept, in particular through his concept of "trading Turkey", which designates the novel orientation of Turkey's foreign policy, which is increasingly focused on trade since the rise to power of the AKP in 2002.

Indeed, Kirişci (2009) was the first to analyze Turkey as a trading state with its concept of “trading Turkey”, which stems from the transformations observed in Turkish foreign policy since the late 1980s. These changes mainly concern the “desecuritization” of Turkey's foreign policy with the end of the military regime, and most specifically the end of Turkey's autarky policy and the opening of Turkey to the world with the adoption of a neo-liberal stand in economics, as developed in the previous chapter.

This policy of opening up the Turkish economy intensified under the AKP era with the principle of “zero problems with neighbors” initiated by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Thus, the Turkish strategy to become a regional power in its Central Asian region, according to Davutoğlu, passed through an intensification of trade ties with Turkey’s

neighboring Central Asian countries, following the theory of peace through trade developed by Kant.¹⁰⁹ Thus, the first decade of the 2000s was marked by an increase in Turkish presence in international trade, particularly in terms of exports. Trade has thus taken an increasingly important place in Turkey's economy since the end of the 1980s, hence the term "trading Turkey" assigned to Turkey. Accordingly, the share of trade in Turkish GNP rose from 9% in 1975 to respectively 23% in 1995, 39% in 2005, 42% in 2007, and 54% in 2017 (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 250). This opening of Turkey to world trade started in its immediate neighborhood in Central Asia, before expanding to the Middle East and North Africa, and finally to SSA under the AKP era.

Indeed, with regard specifically to the deployment of Turkey's trade strategy in SSA, it is worth noticing, once again, that it results from the impetus of the new Turkish Islamist entrepreneurs (The Anatolian Tigers), who impelled their Islamist allies of the AKP to explore new markets for their small and medium-sized enterprises in SSA. Besides, the will to expand the Turkish economy towards the SSA market is also dictated by Turkey's need to diversify its economic partners, so that it will not be under the diktat of any privileged partner, notably the countries of the EU and the US. Finally, the global financial crisis of 2008, which hit Turkey's traditional economic partners, namely the EU and the US, is also one of the factors which reinforced the will of the Turkish authorities to seek new markets outside the traditional areas of Turkey's foreign policy (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 250). It is in this context that SSA has been identified as a dynamic market, favorable for the flow of Turkish manufactured products of value and average quality, as well as a source of raw material supply for Turkey (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 247). It should be emphasized here that the commercial success of other emerging economies, particularly those of the BRICS

¹⁰⁹ Immanuel Kant, "The Conditions of Peace".

(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in the SSA region during this same decade, is also one of the elements that motivated Ankara's interest in the SSA region (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 250).

In this regard, a strategy aimed at developing trade and investment between Turkey and SSA was developed in 2003 by the Undersecretary for Foreign Trade of Turkey (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 251). This strategy envisioned in particular the instrumentalization of other soft power tools such as humanitarian and development aid to facilitate the establishment of Turkish business in SSA (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 254). Indeed, as highlighted in the previous sections, Turkish Islamist entrepreneurs in SSA contribute to financing the humanitarian activities of Turkish faith-based NGOs in SSA (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 254). It is in this sense that Cannon (2016, p. 103) analyzes Turkey's humanitarian operation in Somalia as a commercial strategy of Turkey, which aimed at opening the Somali market to Turkish companies, particularly in the construction sector.

In the same vein, it should be noted that conservative confederations of Turkish entrepreneurs like the TUSKON are key actors in the accession of Turkish trade to the market of SSA (Donelli, 2018, p. 10). Indeed, the latter has facilitated the establishment of links between Turkish entrepreneurs and their SSA counterparts, in particular through the organization of business trips for Turkish investors in SSA, as well as the organization of Turkish trade fairs in SSA countries, intending to introduce the SSA region to Turkish investors (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 255). Among such initiatives, there is the "Turkey-Africa Trade Bridge", which was an economic forum organized by the TUSKON in 2006, which enabled the meeting of bureaucrats and businessmen of both Turkey and Africa.¹¹⁰ The conservative Muslim businessmen,

¹¹⁰ For more information about this forum as well as the significant role of TUSKON in the development of trade relation between Turkey and SSA, see: Özkan and Akgün (2010); also Özkan (2013).

often used the rhetoric of Islamic solidarity, as a tool to build trust with their Sub-Saharan counterparts and to gain confidence over their competitors from other emerging and traditional powers, especially in Muslim communities of SSA (Donelli, 2018, p. 11). These Turkish employers' organizations have thus contributed to setting up long-term relationships between Turkey and SSA. In the same vein, the DEIK (foreign economic board of Turkey), which is a Turkish government institution, has set up business councils in various SSA countries, intending to increase Turkish exports in these SSA host countries (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 256). To capitalize on the positive trend in the commercial relation between Turkey and the SSA region, the Ministry of the economy of Turkey and the DEIK in cooperation with the African Union (AU) Commission, also set up the Turkey-Africa Business Forum in 2016, which is a “platform for the business circles of Turkey and African countries” (Donelli, 2018, p. 10).

With regard specifically to the strategy of expansion of Turkish trade to SSA initiated by the Turkish authorities in 2003, it should be noted that its objectives were, among others (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 251):

- to increase the volume of exchanges with SSA by 3% over 3 years;
- to open the SSA market to Turkish small and medium-sized enterprises;
- to increase Turkish FDI in SSA;
- to facilitate technology transfer from Turkey to SSA countries;
- to ensure the insertion of Turkish companies in the engineering and construction sectors in SSA.

This strategy enabled Turkey to triple the volume of its trade with SSA from 2013 to 2015 from 6 billion US dollars in 2013 to 17.5 billion US dollars in 2015. Moreover, Turkish companies have already benefited from over 1,500 projects in SSA worth

US\$55 billion. According to Donelli (2021), in “2015 there were 43 Turkish firms among the world’s 250 biggest contractors by investment in Africa”.¹¹¹ Turkish FDI in SSA, for their part, increased from 100 million dollars in 2003 to 46.2 billion dollars in 2016.




Figure 9. 2005-2016 imports and exports trade of Turkey with the SSA region (in billion USD)

Source: The data to draw this figure are retrieved from Dal and Dipama (2019).

However, it should be emphasized that although Turkey is increasingly a privileged partner of SSA on the economic level, the balance of trade between SSA and Turkey appears to be in deficit for the countries of the SSA, insofar as Turkey exports more to SSA than it imports from this region (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 264). As a result, despite significant progress in economic relations between Turkey and SSA, Turkey remains a second-tier trading partner for SSA countries, behind EU countries, and economic giants from Asia such as Japan and China. Thus, as Dal and

¹¹¹http://www.enr.com/toplists/2015_Top_250_International_Contractors1. Retrieved from: Donelli (2021, p. 11).

Dipama (2019) note, this trade imbalance between Turkish exports and imports in SSA could weaken in the long run Turkey's trade strategy in SSA, which aims, in particular, to increase the volume of Turkey's trade with SSA to \$50 billion by 2023 (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 265).

Table 5. Rankings of Export Partners of Sub-Saharan Africa

Partner Name	2005 (\$Billion)	Rank	2015 (\$Billion)	Rank
UK	11.276	1	5.370	9
USA	10.899	2	9.057	3
Japan	6.007	3	4.446	14
China	5.736	4	23.477	1
Netherlands	5.467	5	7.120	6
France	4.631	6	4.882	10
South Africa	4.613	7	7.845	4
Germany	4.362	8	6.063	7
Switzerland	3.180	9	7.461	5
Spain	3.063	10	4.504	13
India	1.953	14	10.344	2
Turkey	0.366	42	2.264	22

Source: WITS, Sub-Saharan all products export US\$ thousand <https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SSF/StartYear/2005/EndYear/2015/TradeFlow/Export/Indicator/XPRT-TRD-VL/Partner/BY-COUNTRY/Product/Total>. Retrieved from (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 265).

It should be noted that in addition to humanitarian assistance, Turkey also relied on political instruments such as the signing of Free Trade Agreements with SSA countries, to establish itself as a commercial power in SSA (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p.

252). Besides, Turkey has created a business consultant position in her various embassies in SSA, as another administrative measure aimed at ensuring the smooth running of its trade relations with SSA (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 256).

On a practical level, the key sectors of Turkish investments in SSA are construction, textiles,¹¹² manufactured goods, and agricultural machinery (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 258). Concerning the construction sector, Turkey carried out major projects in SSA countries, such as the Dakar Blaise Diagne International Airport in Senegal, the Japoma stadium in Cameroon, the new terminal at Ghana's Kotoka International Airport in Accra (Ghana), the Dakar Arena sports center in Senegal, and more recently the Abdoulaye Wade stadium also in the Senegalese capital Dakar.¹¹³ Turkish construction companies are preferred by SSA countries as compared to their Chinese rivals, because of the good quality of their work as well as the transfer of technology they enable, since they employ local handwork (Abdinor, 2021, p. 33). Consumer goods such as: "textiles, fertilizers, machinery, steel, rubber, furniture, mechanical and electrical devices and their spare parts, plastic products" constitute the majority of Turkish exports to SSA (42.86% in 2016) (Abdinor, 2021, p. 12), while Turkey mainly imports raw materials such as: "unfinished leather, Arabic gum, resin, volatile oils, cotton, tea, coffee, spices, cocoa, textile fibers, fish, raw materials for dye and paints" from SSA (44.21% in 2016) (Abdinor, 2021, p. 12).

Concerning the main SSA countries that are partners of Turkey on the commercial level, it should be noted that Turkey is established in the various regional economic poles of SSA, namely: West Africa, Central Africa, and East Africa. Thus,

¹¹² "For example, Turkish firms have so far invested about \$1.2 billion in the textile industry in Ethiopia alone, which is more than total Chinese investment in the same industry". Retrieved from: Frederico Donelli, "Turkey's involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa", p.10.

¹¹³ This new stadium was built in a year and a half by the Turkish company Summa for a cost of 238 million euros. It is the same Turkish company that built the Dakar Arena sports center inaugurated in 2018. Source: www.lemonde.fr

the geographical distribution of Turkey's main trading partners in SSA reveals that Turkey trades mainly with the economic powers in these regional poles of SSA. These include Nigeria, Senegal, Ivory Coast, and Ghana in West Africa; Cameroon in Central Africa; and finally South Africa, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Angola in East Africa (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 258).

Table 6. Trading Partners of Turkey in SSA, in 2018

Country	Ranking
South-Africa	1
Nigeria	2
Sudan	3
Senegal	4
Cote d'Ivoire	5
Ethiopia	6
Ghana	7
Tanzania	8
Angola	9
Cameroon	10

Source: (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 258).

Moreover, analyses show that Turkey invests mainly in African economic powers such as Nigeria, Ethiopia, and South Africa. Ethiopia notably benefited from US\$3.2 billion in FDI in 2016; while it invests more in ODA in countries with less advanced economies such as Cameroon and Senegal (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 257).

Clearly, concerning this analysis of economic and more specifically commercial relations between Turkey and SSA, Turkey's commercial ambitions in SSA appear to be the driving force behind the policy of opening up toward SSA initiated by Ankara since the rise to power of the AKP, and its ambition to raise Turkey to the status of power at the international level. Indeed, Turkey's commercial aims in SSA seem to be the element that unites the efforts of the main actors of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA since the AKP's rise to power, namely the AKP government, the civil society, and Islamist businessmen. Turkey, which has the ambition to become a power in the Global South, as stated in Davutoğlu's strategic depth doctrine, also relies on religion as the main tool of its soft power strategy, particularly in Muslim communities of SSA.

4.2.4 Religion as a tool of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA

Since the events of 11 September 2001 and the awakening of religious fundamentalisms in the world, religion is increasingly appearing as a structuring factor of international relations in the era of globalization, which is also marked by the resurgence of identities. It is in this sense that scholars like Huntington (1996) note that after the ideological conflicts that happened during the 20th century, the 21st century would be that of the Clash of civilizations, especially as far as religions are concerned (Yang & Li Li, 2021, p. 1).

Despite its conflict-prone aspects, highlighted by authors such as Huntington (1996), the religious factor also appears to be a unifying element in international relations, in particular by uniting actors around common norms, ideas, values, interests, and identities (Yang & Li Li, 2021). In line with it, religion has been identified as the seventh track in the Multitrack Diplomacy approach to conflict

resolution. Yang and Li Li (2021) establish that religion has three main social functions that allow it to exercise power over societies: the performative function (which refers to the construction of identities), the discursive function (which shapes collective interests), and the relational function (which influences the perceptions, knowledge, and ideas of the actors) (Yang & Li Li, 2021, p. 6). Therefore, given this ability to shape the culture, attitudes, and preferences of actors, religion is an element of power in international relations (Nye, 2004).

Indeed, as Özkan and Chatterjee (2019, p. 115) note, religious values “affect the foreign policy choices of states, by causing, facilitating or justifying the course of events”. In the same vein, Haynes (2016) following Nye (2004) analyzes religion as a soft power resource for states, particularly through the concept of religious soft power. Thus, through this concept, Haynes (2016) highlights the impact of transnational religious actors on the foreign policy of States. Following this analysis, which made it possible to highlight the importance of religion in the foreign policy of states, it is possible to account for the role of religion in Turkey's foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis the SSA region.

Indeed, religion occupies a prominent place in Turkey’s opening-up policy towards SSA, undertaken by Ankara under the AKP era. Actually, Davutoğlu, the ideological thinker of Turkey's foreign policy under the AKP era, assigned an important role to religion in his multidimensional doctrine of Turkey's foreign policy.¹¹⁴ For Davutoğlu (2008), Turkey should rely on its historical and religious ties with the former Ottoman territories, to raise the status of power on the international scene.¹¹⁵ Hence, according to Davutoğlu, Turkey has a natural leadership position in

¹¹⁴ For discussions on Ahmet Davutoğlu’s influence and doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy, see chapter 3 of this thesis.

¹¹⁵ Idem.

the Muslim world as the heir to the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, with the rise to power of the AKP in 2002, Turkey, though constitutionally a secular state, will break with secularism in foreign policy initiated under the Kemalist regime, and adopt a foreign policy stand increasingly geared towards the Muslim world (Özkan, 2014, p. 225). This new approach to Turkey's foreign policy, described as pan-Islamism, will develop first of all in its closed neighborhood of Central Asia as well as in the Balkans, where Ankara will work to restore the Ottoman heritage, to strengthen its position in these regions (Özkan, 2014, p. 225). Subsequently, Turkey will expand its strategy of pan-Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (Özkan, 2014).

At the multilateral level, Turkey's pan-Islamism is illustrated by the increasingly prominent place that Ankara occupies within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) since the AKP's rise to power (Özkan, 2014, p. 226). Thus, under the AKP, Turkey became an active member of the OIC (Özkan, 2014, p. 226). A major feature of the new status of Turkey within the OIC, is the appointment of the Turk Eklemidin Ihsanoğlu, as Secretary-General of the OIC in 2004. Besides, Turkey's position in the Muslim world was strengthened during the 2010s, with the Arab Spring, during which Turkey became a model for other Muslim states, thanks to its ability to combine Islam and modern values (Yilmaz, n.d., p. 11).

Still, in the wake of its new pan-Islamist and neo-Ottoman approach initiated during the AKP era, Ankara has radically changed its stand vis-à-vis regions such as SSA and Latin America (Özkan, 2014). Indeed, from now on, Turkey no longer considers the latter as troubled and distant regions, but rather as potential political and economic partners on the international scene (Özkan, 2014). With this in mind, Turkey will rely on religion to normalize its relations with these new partners (Özkan & Chatterjee, 2019, p. 119).

Precisely concerning Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, the religious factor is of major importance, especially because of the common history that binds SSA and Turkey since the Ottoman era. Therefore, as developed in the previous chapter, the religious factor allows Turkey to legitimize its presence in SSA. Thus, according to Gabrielle Angey (2014, p. 29):

The desire to use Islam as a symbolic resource in Turkish expansion to Africa can be found in the speech by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkish Prime Minister, who, on August 21, 2011, in Istanbul, in front of the executive committee of the OIC, appeals to 'the community of the Prophet' to justify the campaign of donations launched by Turkey to help Somalia. This desire is also portrayed during PM Erdoğan's visit to Senegal in January 2013, where he highlighted the religious proximity of the two countries. Hence, while Senegalese Prime Minister Abdoul Mbaye highlighted the similar profile of the two countries, both Muslim and democratic, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for his part, told the story of Senegalese skirmishers fighting for France against the Ottoman Empire in the Dardanelles in 1915, who, having heard the call to prayer, would have abandoned their arms to go and pray and refused to fight against 'their Ottoman brothers' (Angey, 2014, p. 29).

In the same vein, the religious dimension enables Turkey to stand out from other emerging and traditional powers in SSA, because the latter are active mainly in the economic and humanitarian fields, and do not share this identity bond with SSA (Özkan, 2014). Turkey's strategy in SSA is therefore unique, insofar as it goes beyond materialist interests and takes up an identity dimension (Özkan, 2014). On a practical level, Turkey's pan-Islamist foreign policy in SSA was implemented by two main actors: the Diyanet, which is the state institution of the Turkish government in charge of religious matters, and the Gülen movement (GM), a Turkish transnational religious community.

4.2.4.1 Diyanet as an actor in Turkish foreign policy in SSA

As regards first the role of the Diyanet (The Directorate of Religious Affairs) in Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, it should be emphasized that although it was created in 1924, the Diyanet has only intervened as an actor in Turkey's foreign policy since 1983 (Öztürk, 2018, p. 3). Indeed, during the Kemalist period, Diyanet's main mission was to strengthen the secularism of the Turkish state through state control over religious matters, to promote a moderate Islam (Turkish Islam), and to ensure the pre-eminence of the state over religion (Öztürk, 2018, p. 3). It was in 1983, under the Özal government that the Diyanet set up a foreign affairs office (Özkan, 2014, p. 117). The creation of this office aimed to maintain the link between Turkey and its Diaspora abroad, mainly in Europe, through the promotion of moderate Islam and Turkish culture within this diaspora (Yilmaz, n.d., p.1).

The role of Diyanet as an actor in Turkish public diplomacy was strengthened in 2002, with the rise to power of the AKP (Öztürk, 2018). Indeed, the Diyanet occupied a prominent place in Davutoğlu's multidimensional diplomacy strategy. The latter aimed to make the Diyanet an instrument in the service of the dissemination of Sunni-Hanafi Islam in the world (Öztürk, 2018, p. 4). The Diyanet will thus be placed under the supervision of the Turkish Prime Minister's office as soon as Davutoğlu took up this position in 2015 (Yilmaz, n.d., p. 4).

Thus, under the AKP, Diyanet will see its budget, its missions, and its personnel reinforced (Özkan, 2014, p. 227). It will therefore become one of the Turkish public institutions that receive the most funding with an operating budget almost comparable to that of the Turkish Ministry of Defense (Özkan, 2014, p. 227). The Diyanet will become under the AKP, the largest and best-administered state religious institution in the Islamic world comparable to the Vatican in the Catholic

religion (Özkan, 2014, p. 227). The AKP will accordingly make the Diyanet a real instrument at the service of its public diplomacy both with the Turkish audience and abroad (Öztürk, 2018, p. 4). Indeed, through its religious sermons, Diyanet supports AKP policies both nationally and internationally (Yilmaz, n.d.). Turkey's religious diplomacy through Diyanet also strengthens Turkey's relations with Muslim countries (Özkan, 2014, p. 227). Thus, the activities of Diyanet as an actor in Turkish public diplomacy consist mainly of humanitarian aid, the restoration of mosques, the offer of scholarships, the financing of the pilgrimage to Mecca for the poor populations in the countries where it is active, the distribution of Korans and manuals on the Islamic religion, the translation of the Koran into local languages (Yilmaz, n.d.). The first activities of the Diyanet as an actor in Turkey's foreign policy along these lines focused on the religious education of the Chinese, the organization of conferences on the Muslim religion for foreign Muftis, and the financing of the pilgrimage to Mecca for the benefit of Muslims in the Balkan countries (Yilmaz, n.d., p.7).

Under the AKP rule, the position of Diyanet as a global player in Turkish foreign policy will be strengthened, by extending its areas of competence from the traditional regions of Turkish foreign policy to new regions such as Latin America and SSA (Özkan, 2014, p. 227). With regard specifically to the activities of Diyanet in SSA, they result from Turkey's awareness that religion is the ideal complement to its strategy of penetration in SSA, due to the Ottoman heritage which binds it to the Muslim populations of SSA (Özkan, 2014, p. 230). It is in this sense that to revive this historical link with the SSA, the Diyanet organized in November 2006, the first Turkey-Africa Religious Leader Summit in Istanbul (Özkan, 2014, p. 229), exactly one year after the declaration of the year of Africa by the Turkish government. Twenty-one (21) African countries took part in this summit (Özkan, 2014, p. 229). During this

summit, African religious leaders praised the historical ties that bind Turkey to Africa and expressed their desire to revive them (Özkan, 2014, p. 229). It is in this perspective that the second Turkey-Africa religious leader summit was organized by the Diyanet in Ankara in November 2011 (Özkan, 2014, p. 229). During this summit, the African religious leaders mainly shared with the Turks, their desire to see Turkey strengthen its educational offer in Africa (Özkan, 2014, p. 230).

Indeed, the activities of the Diyanet in SSA, essentially focused on: humanitarian aid (in the same areas as that of other Turkish actors), the restoration and construction of mosques, and food donations, especially during the holy month of Ramadan and the feast of the Sacrifice, the granting of scholarships. Therefore, during this November 2011 summit, African religious leaders will call on Turkey through the Diyanet to play a more active role in the education sector in Africa, especially religious education, through the construction in Africa of schools inspired by the Turkish model of Imam Hatip schools (Özkan, 2014, p. 230).

This is the place to emphasize that the establishment of such schools in SSA is of particular importance for the Muslim populations of these countries. Indeed, Imam Hatip schools fill a gap in the educational offer in SSA, which stems from the fact that the majority of educational institutions in this region are either secular or Christian missionaries, which constitutes an obstacle to the education of young people of the Muslim faith in these countries (Güner, 2021). Thus, to acquire a religious education, young Muslims in these countries are forced to go to Madrasas, which do not provide modern education (Güner, 2021). Therefore, the dissemination of Imam Hatip schools in SSA appears to be a solution to the problem of the education of young Muslims in SSA, due to their ability to combine religious education and scientific knowledge (Özkan, 2014, p. 231). These schools are the only models of their kind in the Islamic

world (Özkan, 2014, p. 231). To this end, the Turkish schools of the Imam Hatip model have been set up as a model for other Muslim countries following the events of September 11, 2001 (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 280). These schools, thanks to their curriculum, are on the fringes of other religious schools in Muslim-majority countries because they are not limited to religious training, in particular learning the Koran like the traditional Madrasas, but they combine this religious learning with a secular curriculum, which allows their graduates to integrate more easily into society and to find a job at the end of their training (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 280). Moreover, these schools allow the dissemination of moderate Islam, thanks to the control of the Turkish state, through its Ministry of National Education, in the making of their curriculum (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 280).

It is in this sense that the model of Turkish Imam Hatip schools has gained recognition in Muslim countries, especially in countries plagued by Islamic fundamentalisms like Pakistan (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 280). Long before the events of September 11, 2001, the spread of Imam Hatip schools outside Turkey's borders was already following the evolution of Turkey's foreign policy. It should be noted that the Diyanet has played an important role in the dissemination of Turkish schools of the Imam Hatip model in the world (Güner, 2021, p. 11). In this regard, it has provided more than 1,359 scholarships enabling young people from foreign countries to study in international Imam Hatip schools in Turkey (Güner, 2021, p. 11). In addition, in 1990, the Diyanet undertook the construction of the first religious schools inspired by the Imam Hatip model, in the countries of Central Asia and the Balkans (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 280). However, it was after the attacks of September 11, 2001, that the international appeal of Turkish schools of the Imam Hatip model increased (Aşlamacı & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 288). Countries such as

Pakistan, China, and Russia have officially made requests to the Turkish authorities to establish Imam Hatip schools there (Aşlamacıa & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 288).

In SSA, countries such as Somalia, Niger and Chad have also made this request to Turkey (Aşlamacıa & Kaymakcanb, 2017, p. 280). This is the place to emphasize that Turkish civil society organizations like the Mahmud Huddayi Foundation are also very active in the dissemination of schools inspired by the Imam Hatip model in SSA, alongside Diyanet (Güner, 2021; Özkan, 2014). Indeed, Turkish international NGOs affiliated with this organization have contributed to the establishment of schools inspired by the Imam Hatip model in several SSA countries (Güner, 2021, p. 22; Özkan, 2014, p. 230), such as:

- The Girls' boarding school of Dakar- Senegal (Sefkat Yolu NGO)
- The Türkiye Imam-Hatip Secondary and High School in Dar Es-Salam, Tanzania. (Rehema Foundation)
- The Private International High School of Medina in Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso.
- The Medine (Erkek) Imam-Hatip Lisesi in Bamako-Mali (The Foundation for Solidarity and Aid to Malian People, FOSAPMA (Güner, 2021, p. 22).

Clearly, thanks to Diyanet, Turkey has become a major player in the field of Islamic education in the world in general and in SSA in particular. This position of Turkey as an educational hub, particularly concerning its relations with SSA countries, has also been favored by the activities of the Gülen movement in this part of the African continent.

4.2.4.2 The schools of the Gülen movement as actors of turkey's foreign policy in SSA

The Gülen movement (GM) is a Muslim neo-brotherhood group born in Turkey between the 70s and 80s (Bilici, 2006). Its members adhere to the ideology advocated by the Turkish Imam Fethullah Gülen. The latter is a disciple of Said Nursi, a Kurdish neo-Sufi who advocated an ideology based on education rather than the establishment of places of worship, to create a golden generation, whose aim would be to bring good on earth (Bilici, 2006, p. 6).

This is how the GM or Hizmet community, which means "service", advocates the social commitment of its members to the service of humanity (Angey-Sentuc, 2015a, p. 25). This community which is involved in various sectors such as education, trade; the media; the humanitarian, was the largest and most institutionalized Islamic group in Turkey (Angey-Sentuc, 2015a, p. 7). During the first decade of the AKP rule in Turkey, in particular, until 2013, this religious community played a major role in Turkey's foreign policy, in various regions of the world, particularly in SSA.

Because of the place of education in the ideology advocated by its leader Fethullah Gülen, schools constitute the basis of the expansion of GM in Turkey and the world (Angey, 2014, p. 26). Thus, after the success of the opening of schools and private tutoring centers (Dershane), preparing for the competitive entrance exam to university in Turkey, the GM's educational network has extended to the rest of the world (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 26). This expansion of the GM educational network took place first in Central Asia, following the end of the Cold War, then in the second half of the 1990s in the Balkans and Africa, and finally in the 2000s in Asia, Latin America, and Europe (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 26).

With the rise to power of the AKP in Turkey in 2002, the GM became a major player in Turkey's foreign policy, especially in regions such as Central Asia, and SSA,

due to its extensive network (Balci, 2003). Indeed, the two actors of Turkish politics will establish an informal alliance allowing them to achieve objectives, both in terms of domestic policy and foreign policy (Shinn, 2015). Thus, in terms of domestic politics, this alliance with the GM will allow the AKP to consolidate its power in Turkey, particularly vis-à-vis the army, which has exercised a great influence on Turkish politics since the rise of the Republic of Turkey (Shinn, 2015, p. 116). In return, the GM will benefit from the new approach of opening in foreign policy, initiated by the AKP, to extend its network around the world (Shinn, 2015, p. 116). This alliance will also be favored by the Islamic roots shared by the two actors. Besides, the strong economic potential of SSA aroused the interest of Turkish businessmen affiliated with the GM, in particular those of TUSKON, who have set up various initiatives aimed at boosting trade between Turkey and the SSA countries (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 26). These businessmen who encouraged the policy of opening up of the Turkish government towards SSA financed the establishment of the first Turkish schools in SSA (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 26). Indeed, as Angey (2014, p. 28) points out:

The decision to set up in a country results from the coordination between teacher-pioneers from Turkey, GM businessmen scouting in the field, and religious businessmen based in Turkey, anxious to sponsor a project of the setting up of a school that will create economic opportunities for them in the future (Angey, 2014, p. 28).

Thus, the motivation of these entrepreneurs is twofold: through their donations, they perform a religious activity while opening up the possibilities of commercial opportunities in SSA countries (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 28). Indeed, through schools, they established local contacts allowing them to win markets on the African continent

(Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 28). Moreover, concerning the religious dimension, SSA is perceived in the mind of GM members, as an economically and morally deprived region (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 29). The SSA region, therefore, appears to be the privileged place to put into practice the ideology of Imam Gülen, by “fighting against poverty, ignorance, and intolerance and by implementing a conception of development that passes through the education of an Elite” (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 27). Therefore, the GM had established schools in 120 countries around the world, including forty (40) in African countries.

Hence, the first GM school in the SSA region was created in 1997 in Dakar, Senegal (Shinn, 2015, p. 65). This is Yavuz Selim boarding school. It is important to note that although the GM was originally a community founded around a religious ideology, the GM schools in SSA, as in the rest of the world, were mostly secular institutions (Shinn, 2015, p. 45). Thus, these schools are aimed at both Christians and Muslims. These schools hence had a high proportion of Christian students in the SSA countries where they are located (Shinn, 2015, p. 45). However, these schools were broadly perceived in SSA as Muslim schools, because they were run by pious Turkish teachers belonging to the GM (Shinn, 2015, p.45).

Thus, concerning the teaching curriculum within these establishments, an important place was given to ethics and discipline, instead of religious teachings (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 31). In addition, these schools were characterized by the privileged place granted to the hard sciences (mathematics, physics-chemistry, computer science), which were generally taught by teachers coming from Turkey, compared to arts and letters, mostly taught by local teachers recruited on the ground in SSA (Angey-Sentuc, 2015b, p. 33). According to David Shinn (2015, p. 49): “some African Muslims, even complain that the Hizmet schools are not sufficiently Islamic”.

It should be noted that GM schools have greatly contributed to the Turkey-Africa rapprochement initiated by the AKP government in the early 2000s, thanks to the quality of education and training provided there (Shinn, 2015, p. 49). Thus, even though these schools did not display identity markers, in particular, their belonging to Turkey or the Muslim religion, they contributed to the dissemination of a positive image of Turkey within society and even governments of SSA countries, both in countries with a Christian majority and in countries with a Muslim majority. Hence, official Turkish diplomacy has often built on this positive image to establish itself in SSA countries (Shinn, 2015, p. 54). Thus, as David Shinn (2015) points out:

The government of Turkey has never provided funding for Hizmet schools in Africa. The relationship between the AKP and the schools has undergone a dramatic change over the past dozen years and is still evolving. There is a track record of senior Turkish officials visiting GM schools during visits to Africa and praising them. In 2008, then Foreign Minister Ali Babacan visited one of Yavuz Selim High schools in Dakar. President Gul during his 2009 visit to Kenya went to Light Academy in Nairobi, where he commented that the school will strengthen relations between the two countries. During a trip to DRC in 2010, President Gul visited Hizmet School where he congratulated the Turkish business persons for contributing to its construction. He continued to Cameroon, where he went to Amity International College and said the GM schools will make Cameroon's future bright. (Shinn, 2015, p. 54).

To sum up, during the first decade of the policy of opening up toward SSA initiated by the AKP government, GM schools, and “Turkish diplomacy has contributed to each other successes in SSA” (Shinn, 2015, p. 127) . GM schools even preceded Turkey's official diplomacy in some SSA countries and were considered in many SSA countries as representations of the Turkish state (Shinn, 2015, p. 115). Therefore, these schools were a good illustration of the public-private partnership in Turkey's foreign policy in SSA during its early years (Shinn, 2015, p. 115). The education sector is therefore an essential element of Turkish public diplomacy in SSA,

as also illustrated by the importance of the higher education scholarships provided by some Turkish government institutions to SSA students, in the soft power strategy of Turkey vis-à-vis this region of the world.

4.2.5 Turkish higher education scholarships as tools of Turkish influence in Sub-Saharan Africa

In the era of globalization, enabled by the development of means of transport and communication, culture plays an increasingly important role in the interactions between states. Indeed, as Nye (2008, p. 102) points out, cultural barriers can act as an obstacle to communication between states, by influencing how the recipient state of the public diplomacy perceives the public diplomacy initiatives of the issuing state. Hence, public diplomacy as a foreign policy strategy of states aims to build long-term relations between states by bringing their societies closer together, to put an end to these cultural barriers (Nye, 2008, p. 102). One of the means used by public diplomacy in this aim, is the international educational exchanges, in particular through scholarships, exchange programs, training, and seminars, which facilitate peer to peer communication, and thus enable the establishment of communication networks that transcend cultural barriers (Nye, 2008, p. 102). It is in this sense that education constitutes the 5th track in the multi-track public diplomacy' approach to conflict resolution. Thus, as Aras and Zulkarnain (2018, p. 15) point out:

The educational exchange plays a significant role in diffusing the state's cultural values and developing a pool of intellectuals who the state can to some extent rely on as it moves to build and strengthen relations with governments across the globe (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 15).

It is in this sense that Turkey uses higher education scholarships as a tool to increase its attractiveness and expand its network internationally and particularly in SSA (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 5). Thus, the Turkish government, through organizations such as the YTB, Diyanet, and TUBITAK, has been offering scholarships for several decades to international students, allowing them to study in public higher education institutions in Turkey. Hosting international students, especially those from SSA, enables Turkey to diffuse its soft power. Indeed, these international students from SSA serve as bridges between Turkey and SSA, because they develop proximity or even a cultural affinity with Turkey, which in the long run is reflected within their respective societies (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 5). This cultural affinity is used by Turkey to extend its reputation in various countries and on the long run, plays a positive role in the economic and political relations that Turkey maintains with the countries of origin of these international students (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 5). In addition to this political aspect, it should be noted that hosting international students on its soil is economically profitable for Turkey (Baydemir, 2020, p. 60). Given these various advantages of international educational exchanges, Turkey has competed since the rise to power of the AKP to become an international educational hub, like powers such as the USA, France, the UK, and China (Baydemir, 2020, p. 59).

Table 7. International Student Mobility in Turkey, the USA, and China

Countries	Data year	Overall International Students	Sub-Saharan African Students
Turkey	2018	125.000	11.378
USA	2017	1.078.000	37.735
China	2016	442.000	61.594 (including North Africa)

Source: Retrieved from Baydemir (2020, p. 59).

Henceforth, Turkey has integrated the granting of university scholarships to international students as an integral component of its strategy of opening up to the world in general and SSA in particular (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 7). It is with this in mind that President Erdoğan promised during his visit to Somalia in 2012, to grant 1,200 scholarships to Somali student (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 7). In addition to Somalia, Turkey has also set up special programs for students from countries in crisis such as Syria (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 7). Within the framework of this international educational policy initiated by the AKP government, the YTB (Turks Abroad and related communities) occupies an essential place thanks to its Türkiye Bursları Scholarships, which is an educational exchange program. Indeed, following the words of this organization, the Türkiye Bursları Scholarships program aims at: “Build a network of future leaders committed to strengthening Turkish studies, cooperation among countries, and mutual understanding among societies” (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 8).

It should also be noted that this organization follows the main lines of Turkish foreign policy by offering Türkiye Bursları scholarships mainly to nationals of countries in Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa (Aras & Zulkarnain, 2018, p. 8). The Türkiye Bursları Scholarships program hence enables Turkey to have an important network within these regions, which have been a priority for Turkey's foreign policy since the AKP's rise to power. Thus, according to the YTB, the number of international students in Turkey increased from 5.378 in 1983 to 16.000 in 2002 and 125.000 in 2018 (Baydemir, 2020, p. 58). This growing interest of SSA students in Turkey is explained by several factors, in particular: the economic progress of Turkey which is perceived as an emerging economy in SSA, the quality of education and technological progress in Turkey in comparison with the countries of SSA, the

possibility for these SSA students to obtain a job at the end of their studies, in particular within the numerous Turkish companies and institutions active in their countries of origin (Baydemir, 2020, p. 58). In addition to these factors, religion (Islam) is also one of the reasons that drive SSA students to choose Turkey as a place of study (Baydemir, 2020, p. 58). Thus, in the words of the President of the Federation of International Students of Turkey (UFED), reported by Baydemir (2020, p. 62): “One of the most important reasons for the increase of the number of international students in Turkey is Islamophobia. Consequently, the number of international students from SSA in Turkey increased from 4532 for the 2013-2014 academic year to 11378 for the 2017-2018 academic year (Baydemir, 2020, p. 59).

Table 8. International Student Mobility in Turkey by Academic Years

International Students in Turkey	Gender	2013/2014	2014/2015	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018
Overall	Male	33.420	49.533	60.037	71.775	81.706
International Students	Female	14.749	22.487	27.680	36.172	43.324
	Total	48.169	72.020	87.717	107.947	125.030
Students from SSA	Male	3.518	5.322	6.749	6.749	8.788
	Female	1.014	1.636	2.089	2.089	2.590
	Total	4.532	6.958	8.738	9.882	11.378

Source: Retrieved from Baydemir (2020, p. 59).

Although this number has increased for students from overall SSA countries during this period, it should be noted that this increase is more notable for certain SSA countries such as the DRC, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Benin, Djibouti, Ivory Coast, and Chad (Baydemir, 2020, p. 59). In addition, President Erdoğan said during his speech at the graduation ceremony for international students of the Türkiye Burslari

scholarships that, Turkey aims to be among the world's top 5 countries hosting international students (Baydemir, 2020, p. 59).

However, it should be noted that this ambition of Turkey is hampered by various factors, including the language of instruction, which is the Turkish language in most higher education institutions in Turkey, as well as the difficulties of integration of students from SSA in Turkish universities due to the differences between Turkey's and SSA's education systems (Baydemir, 2020, p. 63). Thus, concerning Nigeria, for example, even though it is one of Turkey's top economic partners in SSA, there has been a drop in foreign students from this country to Turkey since 2013, when no Nigerian student came to Turkey with a YTB scholarship (Baydemir, 2020, p. 62). Indeed, this year marked the beginning of the conflict between the AKP and the GM internationally, particularly in the field of SSA. It should be underlined that most of the Nigerian students studying in Turkey during the first years of Turkey's opening policy towards SSA, were students coming from GM schools, which were well-settled in this SSA country (Baydemir, 2020, p. 62). Thus, according to the words of the president of the UDEF reported by Baydemir (2020, p. 64):

Those who come to Turkey from Nigeria are mostly FETO. They come from their schools. After July, 15 coup attempt, some of the students who came through FETO schools were detained. The number of Nigerian students detained reached 56. One of these imprisoned for three months was the son of the speaker of the Nigerian parliament. FETO did not stand idly by and used it, causing a negative impression of Turkey in Nigeria. Families whose children were detained protested in front of the Turkish Embassy in Nigeria. (Baydemir, 2020, p. 64).

Thus, the political crisis between the GM and the AKP had repercussions on these Nigerian students in Turkey, in particular during the coup d'état of July 15, 2016, for which several Turkish media described the foreign students as supporters of FETO

(Baydemir, 2020, p. 64). This has had negative consequences on Turkey-Nigeria relations at the state level and also on the image of Turkey within Nigerian society (Baydemir, 2020, p. 64). However, the Turkish authorities have become aware of the fact that this situation could harm Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA. Therefore, to ease tensions with international students following the tragic events of July 2016, the YTB in collaboration with SETA organized in July 2017, a forum entitled: "15 July through the Perspective of International Students", during which foreign students were able to talk about their experience on this tragic day of 15 July 2016 (Baydemir, 2020).

In a nutshell, education is an essential component of Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA. Thus, both thanks to the Turkish religious schools of the Imam Hatip model, the GM schools, and finally the university scholarships granted by Turkish state institutions, Turkey has become an important player in the education sector in SSA for several years now, even competing with traditional powers such as France, the UK, and the USA, active for longer than Turkey in this sector in SSA. Hence, the education sector has greatly contributed to Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA, due to the image of excellence that the Turkish actors in this field have disseminated across SSA countries. This, explains the foreign policy measures taken by the Turkish government in the aftermath of the events of July 2016, particularly targeting this field in its foreign policy vis-à-vis SSA.

4.3 Conclusion

In a summary, this chapter of the thesis made it possible to highlight the major features of Turkey's foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis the SSA region since it was initiated by the AKP. Thus, as scholars like Binder and Erten (2013, p. 7) and Guo (2020) noted, the analysis of the main areas of Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA reveals that several

Turkish actors are committed to the same areas and perform the same activities in SSA (see figure 10). The humanitarian aid and education sectors of Turkey's Public Diplomacy in SSA, are particularly illustrative of this fact. This ambiguity in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA is the result, among other things, of the strong involvement of private actors from both civil society and the business world in Turkey's foreign policy in SSA during its first decade, especially those affiliated with the GM community like TUSKON, Kimse Yok Mu, and GM's schools' teachers. Furthermore, the analysis of the various tracks of Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA in this chapter also highlighted the importance of trade and education as the main sectors that underpin Turkey's opening-up policy towards the SSA region. Given these elements, it appears that the domestic political crisis between the AKP and the GM, one of the major players in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA during its first decade, is likely to induce changes in Ankara's strategy vis-à-vis the SSA following the political events of 15 July 2016. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the nature of these changes, as well as their impact on Turkey's public diplomacy in SSA. The next chapter of this study will focus on these issues.




Figure 10. Framework of Turkey's multitrack public diplomacy in SSA

Source: The author

CHAPTER 5

THE RECONFIGURATION OF TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AFTER 15 JULY 2016

“We are making strenuous efforts to clear FETO from friendly and brotherly geographies in Africa (...) This herd of murderers, this organization, which was caught red-handed on the night of July 15, is no longer capable of hiding under the disguise of dialogue, service, education, or trade (...) With the support of the Maarif Foundation, TIKA (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency), and Turkiye Scholarships, we will ensure that this organization no longer poses a threat to our nation and friends”. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (2017).¹¹⁶

Scholars such as Aydın (2000, 2019) and Rosenau (1971) establish that two main types of variables or determinants influence states' foreign policy: structural variables and conjectural variables. Thus, the structural variables or determinants of foreign policy are those static elements, which are not subject to change, that shape states' foreign policy over the long run (Aydın, 2000, p. 3). These variables explain the continuity in the foreign policy of states. Hence, in light of these structural variables, it is possible to predict the foreign policy of states. Among these structural determinants, there is the history, culture, and geographical location of the states (Aydın, 2000, p. 3). In line with this, the two previous chapters of this study made it possible to highlight the history, geographical location, and religion as the structural determinants of Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis the SSA region. Therefore, to determine whether there is a rupture or continuity in Turkey's foreign policy in SSA following the events of July 2016 in Turkey, the current chapter will analyze the political events of July 2016, in

¹¹⁶Official web page of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, https://www.tcbb.gov.tr/en/news/542/70781/afrikali_dostlarimizin-fetoye-karsi-hassasiyeti-artmaktadir, cited by Turhan (2021, p. 2).

particular the failed coup d'état, perpetrated by the GM, as a conjectural determinant of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA.

Indeed, Aydin (2019, p. 11) defines the conjectural determinants of foreign policy as dynamic variables, which are subject to change. These include developments in international politics or in the domestic politics of states, which have an impact on the state's foreign policy. These developments are for example changes in the international system like the end of the cold war, changes in the domestic politics of states, like a change of political regime or political alliance, or economic factors such as economic crises. These various conjectural variables are likely to influence the foreign policy of states, particularly regarding its implementation (2019, p. 11). It is worth noticing that Aydin (2019) already analyzed the September 12, 1980 coup in Turkey as a conjectural variable that induced significant changes in Turkey's foreign policy (2019, p. 23).

In the same vein, the current chapter of the study aims to highlight the transformation of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, induced by the political events of July 2016 in Turkey. Indeed, these events had considerable repercussions on Turkey's domestic politics, including the establishment of a state of emergency, its subsequent restriction of freedom in the aftermath of the failed coup, and the intensification of the fight against the Gülen community, now considered a security threat by Ankara. Besides, after July 2016, Turkey experienced a change in the governmental system with the transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system in 2018, which had significant effects on TFP such as the reinforcement of the presidential power in foreign policy decision-making (Michelsen Institute, 2019).

These various developments in Turkey's domestic policy from 2016, drive Turkey to revise its foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis SSA. These transformations in

Turkey's foreign policy towards SSA concern most of the areas of intervention of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, as developed in the previous chapter, in particular the sectors of education, trade, official development assistance, and humanitarian aid, as well as the actors involved in their implementation. Indeed, the events of 15 July 2016, considerably affected the relationship between Turkish public and private actors in TFP in SSA. Hence, following the domestic political development after the failed coup of July 2016, the relatively loose relationship between the Turkish state and Turkish private actors in the implementation of the TFP strategy in SSA was subject to adjustments. Significant among these adjustments is the creation of a new Turkish state institution in the arsenal of Turkey's public diplomacy and soft power toolkits, the Turkish Maarif Foundation (TMF). Furthermore, the events of the coup attempt of 15 July 2016, also prompted Ankara to revise the orientation of its foreign policy strategy in SSA, to meet the security challenge represented by the FETO's partisans abroad, hence putting into question the paradigm of the Turkish trading state in SSA. Finally, these changes in Turkey's foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis SSA have an impact on Turkish public diplomacy in SSA, in particular on its relations with SSA countries at the state and societal levels, which should also be analyzed, through the reaction of SSA to these changes in Turkey's foreign policy strategy.

5.1 The Maarif foundation, a new instrument of turkey's soft power for projecting Turkey as an international educational brand

The Maarif Foundation is a Turkish non-profit-public educational foundation created in June 2016, by Law N^o 6721 of June 17, 2016, of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, to be the driving force behind Turkey's education policy on the international level (Akgün & Özkan, 2020). This creation thus marks its entry into the club of

institutional actors of Turkish public diplomacy in the world alongside TIKA, the Yunus Emre foundation, or Diyanet. First of all, it should be noted that Maarif in the Turkish language is a word that means education, knowledge, and culture (Angey, 2018, p. 58). Thus, according to the law that created it, the Maarif Foundation (TMF) was established to carry out Turkey's strategy in the field of international education. According to its statutes, the mission of the TMF is to serve: “As a Gateway to the international education arena of Turkey that will contribute to enhancing cultural and civilizational interactions and pave the way for achieving the common well-being”.¹¹⁷

Therefore, the TMF has been assigned the mission since its creation, to play a role in Turkey's public diplomacy by promoting intercultural dialogue in the different countries where it is established.¹¹⁸ Thus, according to Professor Birol Akgün, who has led the TMF since its creation in 2016, the creation of the TMF is also justified by the awareness of the Turkish authorities of the need to build public diplomacy focused on people-to-people relations, since education is an essential component of public diplomacy.¹¹⁹

In the same vein, the creation of the TMF also aims to consolidate Turkey's position as an international educational hub, acquired through the activities of Turkish institutions such as TIKA, Diyanet, YTB, and other Turkish actors in this field, through the establishment of an institution in charge of coordinating Turkish educational activities abroad (Akgün & Özkan, 2020). With this in mind, the TMF works to promote Turkey's image as an international educational center to attract international students, through the advertising of Turkey and its educational

¹¹⁷<https://www.turkiyemaarif.org/page/53-fields-of-activity-10>

¹¹⁸ “Maarif Foundation head: We aim to offer an education that reflects Turkish vision, promote Turkish language”, *Daily Sabah* (Turkey), 13.feb.2017, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/02/13/maarif-foundation-head-we-aim-to-offer-an-education-that-reflects-turkish-vision-promote-turkish-language>.

¹¹⁹ Idem.

institutions, particularly Turkish universities on an international scale, including the organization of international educational fairs (Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 63). Turkey also justifies the creation of the Maarif Foundation, by its will to contribute to the achievement of the objectives of the United Nations 2030 agenda in the field of education.¹²⁰ With this in mind, the TMF carries out most of its activities in the least developed countries (LDCs) of Central Asia, the Middle East, and especially Africa.¹²¹ To this end, the main areas of activity of the TMF are the opening of educational establishments ranging from nursery schools to higher education establishments (schools, boarding schools); the training of the personnel who will teach there; carrying out scientific research and research and development activities; the development of methods of works following the legislation of the host countries; the financing of educational publications, the provision of scholarships (national and international).¹²² In addition to these various activities, the TMF plays an important role in promoting the Turkish language internationally alongside the Yunus Emre Foundation, in particular through the development of Turkish language instruction manuals, as well as the teaching of the Turkish language up to the B2 level in its various schools (Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 67). Clearly, through these different activities in the international education sector, the TMF aims to promote the Turkish model of international education. These missions of the TMF are reflected in the law that established the TMF, which also governs its mode of management. Indeed, the foundation is a governmental structure but managed autonomously by a Governing

¹²⁰ See Birol Akgun interview with *Jeune Afrique* (June 2018), “Turquie – Écoles Gülen en Afrique: « La fondation Maarif négocie avec tous les pays d’Afrique », *Jeune Afrique*, June, 15. 2018, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/582016/politique/turquie-ecoles-gulen-en-afrique-la-fondation-maarif-negocie-avec-tous-les-pays-dafrique/>

¹²¹ *Idem*.

¹²² See Art. 2.1 of the Turkish Maarif foundation law.

Assembly of 12 members (which is responsible for appointing the members of the Board of Directors), as well as an Inspection Board.

Seven (07) of the members of the Governing Assembly are appointed by the President of the Republic of Turkey, while the remaining five (05) members belong to the various administrations such as the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance, as well as a representative of the Commission for Higher Education (YOK).¹²³ Concerning the Board of Directors, each member of the Board of Directors is responsible for a technical and geographical area of intervention.¹²⁴ Hence, the TMF is divided into 07 areas of activity: America (South and North); Europe; Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Asia Pacific; North Africa and the Middle East; Anglophone Africa; and Francophone Africa.¹²⁵ Finally, the Board of Inspectors of the TMF is in charge of controlling the activities and the accounts of the foundation.¹²⁶ It is made up of 5 full members and 5 alternate members appointed by the Board of Directors for 5 years.¹²⁷ Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ministry of Finance are also members of this inspection board.¹²⁸ Financially, the TMF relies on public funds coming directly from the Turkish state budget, which are added to donations and income from its activities, and like most public foundations in Turkey, enjoys tax-free status.¹²⁹ Hence, with regard to its financing, the TMF is neither a pure state institution nor a civil society organization, but can rather be considered as belonging to the category of quasi-non-governmental organization, which is defined by Turhan (2021, p. 9) as:

¹²³ See Art. 3.1 of the Turkish Maarif foundation law.

¹²⁴ See Birol Akgün interview with *Jeune Afrique* (June 2018), Op. Cit.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ See Art. 3.1 of the Turkish Maarif foundation law.

¹²⁷ Idem.

¹²⁸ Idem.

¹²⁹ See Art. 5 of the Turkish Maarif foundation law.

Agencies, corporations, or organizations that are financed by the state but do not act within the confines of state control. They act independently and perform regulatory functions (Turhan, 2021, p. 9).

Besides, the law that created the TMF provides that, as the only entity authorized to provide educational services on behalf of the Republic of Turkey abroad, within the framework of the realization of its missions, the TMF can in the event of need, buy, take over or lease infrastructure belonging to Turkish private entities both in Turkey and abroad.¹³⁰

This last provision of the law that creates the TMF, refers to the political function of the TMF. Indeed, created just a month before the failed coup of 15 July 2016, the TMF started its activities in the field of Turkey's international education in the aftermath of these events. Its implementation is therefore in line with the strategy of repression against the FETO, initiated by the Turkish authorities following these dramatic events.

5.1.1 The TMF as a tool of repression of the FETO in SSA

It should be emphasized at the outset, as developed in the previous chapter that before the creation of the TMF in 2016, the promotion of Turkey as an educational brand abroad was mainly driven by GM schools. Thus, the latter has spread the Turkish educational model in several countries of the world, thereby embodying the figure of the Turkish educational model on an international scale. This international educational activity has been the engine of the GM both in terms of its funding and its domestic and international reputation, especially in poor regions of the world such as SSA

¹³⁰ See Art. 2.2 of the Turkish Maarif foundation law.

(Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 65).¹³¹ Indeed, as highlighted, the GM community took advantage of the policy of liberalization of the education sector in SSA initiated during the 90s, to enter this region of the world and exploit at the same time economic opportunities offered by the vast African market, for the benefit of the SMEs of the Turkish entrepreneurs of the TUSKON, affiliated to the GM. GM schools in SSA, constituting a total of 106 schools spread over 36 African countries,¹³² have thus enabled GM to integrate lastingly into SSA societies, in particular thanks to their good reputation of excellency and morality, which enabled them to be esteemed institutions within the said societies, but also, thanks to the networks that this movement has been able to set up in SSA, made up of the many students trained in their schools, who duly became an important support for the GM across SSA.¹³³

Given these various factors, the SSA region constitutes a convenient rear base for the GM in the framework of the intense policy of exfiltration off the Turkish territory of this movement, initiated by the Turkish government in the wake of the failed coup of July 2016.¹³⁴ It is this domestic and international context of Turkey's foreign policy, which presided over the creation of the TMF in 2016. As Cem Zorlu, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the TMF pointed out in 2017:¹³⁵

GM schools have spread enormously abroad. These schools were present in 116 countries, constituting a network of 800 schools, 1000 foundations, 200 media,

¹³¹ It should be emphasized here that, the fees of GM private schools in SSA, were quite expensive hence their attendance by the children of the elite. However, those schools also provided scholarship opportunities for less privileged pupils in accordance with their scholarly achievements.

¹³²“Turkey keeps FETO schools overseas under close watch”, *Anadolu Agency* February, 18, 2017, online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/4865>

¹³³ Interview granted by Cemalettin Kani Torun, AKP parliament member and member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish parliament, “Turquie – Écoles Gülen en Afrique: « On n’a pas encore réussi à les déraciner, mais nous avons bien progressé »”, *Jeune Afrique* January, 20, 2018, online, retrieved from: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/537900/politique/turquie-ecoles-gulen-en-afrique-on-na-pas-encore-reussi-a-les-deraciner-mais-nous-avons-bien-progresse/>

¹³⁴ *Idem.*

¹³⁵ Observatoire Pharos (2018).

and 500 companies. Part of this network has not yet ceased to function and it is the work of Turkish diplomacy and the TMF to help put an end to it.

Thus, to consolidate its fight against the GM, the Turkish government had to reorganize its foreign policy strategy in SSA, while preserving the assets that contributed to Turkey's reputation in this region of Africa, Turkey as an international educational brand, being one of those assets. Hence, as noted by the director of the TMF, Professor Birol Akgün, who is, by the way, a prominent analyst of the TFP in SSA: « In the past, the brand of Turkish schools abroad were mostly used, popularized and even hijacked by FETO. TMF is effectively reclaiming educational soft power for Turkey» (Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 65).




Figure 11. The state of TMF activities in the world at the beginning of its international activities in 2016

Source: Anadolu Agency (2017), "Turkey keeps FETO schools overseas under close watch", online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/4865>

To reclaim its strategy in SSA, in the field of international education, long embodied by the GM, the Turkish government has gathered all the diplomatic, economic, and legal means to strengthen the TMF as the new figurehead of the brand Turkey in the education sector in SSA (Angey, 2018, p. 57). Accordingly, the transfer of GM schools to the TMF as new administration or in extreme cases their permanent closure, or even their nationalization, or their transfer to reliable third parties, has become the major concern on the agenda of bilateral and multilateral Turkey-Africa meetings, since 2016 (Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 65). Turkish President Erdoğan also made a major African tour by the end of 2016, with which TMF officials were associated. President Erdoğan expressed in these words the ambitions that the Turkish authorities put in the TMF: “if they (the GM network) say that they are active in 170 countries, you (the TMF), must be active in the 193 countries of the United Nations.”¹³⁶

As Birol Akgün, director of the TMF, pointed out during an interview with the Turkish newspaper *Daily Sabah* in 2017, the establishment of the TMF in a country comes at the end of an intense process of diplomatic negotiation between Turkey and the said country.¹³⁷ “We usually step in as a solution partner after the Turkish diplomacy achieves a certain level of understanding with the country’s officials.”¹³⁸ During these diplomatic negotiations, the Turkish side make the African states understand the danger represented by the FETO. Thus, in an interview with *Hurriyet Daily News* in 2019,¹³⁹ Birol Akgün answered the question of how the Turkish

¹³⁶ Observatoire Pharos, « La Fondation Maarif, un Outil de Soft Power Effiace au Service d’Ankara ».

¹³⁷ “Maarif Foundation head: We aim to offer an education that reflects Turkish vision, promote Turkish language”, *Daily Sabah*, 13.Feb.2017, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2017/02/13/maarif-foundation-head-we-aim-to-offer-an-education-that-reflects-turkish-vision-promote-turkish-language>.

¹³⁸ Idem.

¹³⁹ “FETÖ schools abroad handed over to Turkey saw rise in student numbers: Foundation head”, *Hurriyet Daily News* February, 20. 2019, online, retrieved from: <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/amp/feto-schools-abroad-handed-over-to-turkey-saw-rise-in-student-numbers-foundation-head-140982>.

government justifies its fight against GM schools to SSA governments after supporting and promoting their expansion in SSA for years, in the following terms:

I am not the direct interlocutor of these questions. It is rather the Foreign Minister. But for the past 40 years, we have known them as educational institutions. We thought they were apolitical, free of ideology. They were seen as institutions open to modernity, but at the same time endorsing traditional and religious values. But indeed, they have created a perception abroad that these schools were opened by the Turkish state. But we are explaining to our interlocutors that it is a structure with a hidden agenda.¹⁴⁰

These negotiations between Turkey and SSA countries regarding the closure of GM schools raise various concerns about budgetary, legal (takeover of establishments, expropriation of sometimes private land), and technical (finding sufficient numbers of teachers) issues.¹⁴¹ Thus, concerning the establishment of the TMF in Cameroon and Senegal, these concerns complicated further the settlement of the TMF in these countries.

First of all, as far as Senegal is concerned, the Yavuz Selim schools were created and run by the GM community in Senegal in 1998. It was a network of 15 primary, nursery, and secondary schools, which had a total enrollment of approximately 3000 students.¹⁴² These schools were considered elite schools in Senegal, because of the quality of the education provided there, but especially because they were attended by children of Senegal's political and economic elite.¹⁴³

Thus, the question of the closure of these schools and especially their transfer to the TMF gave rise to social movements in Senegal, because of the good relations

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Interview granted by Cemalettin Kani Torun, AKP parliament member and member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish parliament, to *Jeune Afrique* (2018), Op. Cit.

¹⁴² « Sénégal : les forces de l'ordre bloquent les écoles Yavuz Selim, proches de la confrérie Gülen », *Jeune Afrique*, October. 2. 2017, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/479818/societe/senegal-les-forces-de-lordre-bloquent-les-ecoles-yavuz-selim-proches-de-la-confrerie-gulen/>

¹⁴³ Ibid.

between the members of the GM community, founders, and administrators of the Yavuz Selim schools, and some Senegalese political and administrative elites (Angey, 2018, p. 61). There was also the issue of the threat to the jobs of the Senegalese staff of these schools, which indeed employed many Senegalese teachers.¹⁴⁴

The negotiation process for the transfer of the Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF between the Turkish and Senegalese parties started in November 2016, when the Senegalese President Macky Sall, met with members of the TMF to discuss the modalities of taking over the Yavuz Selim schools by the TMF.¹⁴⁵ Following this meeting, in December 2016, the Senegalese government withdrew the authorization to practice from the Başkent Eğitim association, which was in charge of the management of the Yavuz Selim schools.¹⁴⁶ To face this issue, the parents' association of Yavuz Selim schools, whose president was an influential Senegalese politician, formed a collective to appeal the decision to close the Başkent Eğitim association, to the Supreme Court of Senegal, thereby offering a reprieve to the Yavuz Selim schools.¹⁴⁷ This parent association grounded its defense strategy against the transfer of Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF, on the respect for the sovereignty of Senegal (Angey, 2018, p. 65). Indeed, according to this association, the Yavuz Selim schools being subject to Senegalese law, a foreign public foundation (in this case Turkey) did not have the right to seize property under Senegalese private law.¹⁴⁸ To find a solution that satisfies both the request of the Turkish side, to withdraw the administration of the Yavuz Selim schools from the members of the GM, and the desire of the parents of pupils to keep these schools functional, the parents association pledged to withdraw the Başkent

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸ « Sénégal : les forces de l'ordre bloquent les écoles Yavuz Selim, proches de la confrérie Gülen », Op. Cit.

Eğitim association from Yavuz Selim schools and proposed to the Senegalese government to proceed with a capitalistic change, symbolized by the sale of Yavuz Selim schools to a company created for the occasion, Yavuz Selim SA.¹⁴⁹ With this in mind, the Turkish investors of the Yavuz Selim group, offloaded their stake in the schools, in favor of a French company, Horizon Education, which now held 61% of the capital, the rest belonging to Senegalese.¹⁵⁰ However, the Senegalese government rejected this proposal, and in September 2017 filed a petition with the Supreme Court of Senegal.¹⁵¹ Subsequently, the Senegalese Ministry of National Education published an order on 11 September 2017, relating to the withdrawal of authorization to open and close private educational establishments of the Yavuz Selim group, intending to ratify the transfer of Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF. This procedure having been contested by the collective of parents of pupils, the arbitration of the judges in October 2017 finally validated the decision of the Senegalese government to transfer the Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF.¹⁵² However, although these schools have effectively been operating under the administration of the TMF since the 2017 school year, it should be noted that the question of the legitimacy of the transfer of the Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF remains pending before the Senegalese courts. Thus, according to the Academic Inspector of the Dakar region, during the interview, granted to us as part of this research:

The legal process for transferring the Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF is quite slow, the President of the Republic, Macky Sall, is personally involved in the transfer of schools, but it is delayed because of legal issues.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Our interview with the Academic Inspector of Dakar Region.

As for Cameroon, it should be noted that the negotiations for the transfer of GM schools to the TMF took place under less tense social conditions than in the case of Senegal. This transfer nevertheless gave rise to some strains during the exchanges between Turkish and Cameroonian parties.¹⁵⁴ Thus, in Cameroon, GM schools were part of the Amity International group, present in three (3) cities in Cameroon through three schools: Amity International College and Istikamet International School.¹⁵⁵ These establishments, active in Cameroon since 2004, as everywhere else in SSA, were establishments of excellence, accessible to the country's elite. Following diplomatic negotiations with the Cameroonian government, during which the Turkish side made the Cameroonian authorities understand the danger represented by the GM schools as well as the administrative and educational staff responsible for these schools, the process of transferring the GM schools to the TMF was finalized with the signing on 25 April 2018, of the Memorandum of Understanding on the takeover by TMF of the activities of the schools' Amity International College and Istikamet Islamic international schools in Cameroon.¹⁵⁶ However, it should be noted that there have been attempts by officials of the Amity group to obstruct the process of transferring the GM schools to the TMF.¹⁵⁷ Thus, one of the subterfuges which the Turkish officials of the Amity schools used, was the programming of a solemn graduation ceremony on 26 May 2018, one month after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, intending to mislead Cameroonian public opinion and parents of pupils and to open registrations for the next school year.¹⁵⁸ However, the said ceremony was banned by

¹⁵⁴ Our interview with a staff of the Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon.

¹⁵⁵ The three cities were Yaoundé (politics capital of the country) Douala (Economic center of the country) and Ngaoundéré (a city in the northern part of the country, with a majority of Muslim population).

¹⁵⁶ Source: an interview with a staff of the Cameroon Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

the Cameroonian authorities.¹⁵⁹ At the end of this successful transfer process, the TMF took over the management of all the schools of the Amity group in Cameroon in July 2018, under the name Maarif Schools of Cameroon.¹⁶⁰ Hence, the former Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Cameroon His Excellency Mürat Ülkü declared to Anadolu Agency on the occasion of the conference of Turkish Ambassadors in Ankara, in August 2018: “We got rid of the terrorist organization FETO in Cameroon. The Maarif Foundation took over the management of all the schools in July and these schools begin to provide lessons towards the end of August”. In the same vein, His Excellency Ayşe Saraç, who succeeded His Excellency Mürat Ülkü as Ambassador of the Republic of Turkey to Cameroon in 2019, declared in her speech during the official inauguration ceremony of the Maarif Schools of Cameroon: “Cameroon has supported our country and has become our friend and ally in our fight against FETO”.¹⁶¹ While the Cameroonian Minister of National Education in her speech, for her part described the transfer of GM schools to the TMF as a “diplomatic victory”.¹⁶²

It should however be mentioned that in addition to the transfer of the schools to the TMF, the Turkish authorities have also requested from Cameroon the extradition to Turkey of the Turkish officials of the Amity schools who are under arrest warrants in Turkey.¹⁶³ Thus, if the question of the transfer to the TMF went smoothly, this last question remains problematic between Turkey and Cameroon.¹⁶⁴ Thus, according to our source at the Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon:

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Interview granted by Mürat Ülkü, then Turkish Republic Ambassador to Cameroon, to *Anadolu Agency* in August 2018. Online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/afrique/cameroun-la-fondation-maarif-prend-la-direction-des-écoles-de-feto/1233209#!>

¹⁶¹ “Ouverture officielle des Ecoles Maarif au Cameroun », *Türkiye Maarif Vakfı*, September 06, 2019. Online, retrieved from : <https://maarifschool.org/post/7-kamerun-maarif-okullari-resmi-acilisi-gerceklestirildi-615?lang=tr>

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Source, an interview with a staff of the Cameroon Ministry of External Relations.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

Turkey made it clear to the Cameroonian side that the non-resolution of this case is likely to cause trouble in bilateral relations between the two countries and slow down the realization of major projects.¹⁶⁵

This is the place to emphasize that the field survey in both Cameroon and Senegal revealed that the negotiations between the Turkish side and the authorities of these two countries for the transfer of GM schools to the TMF have often unfolded against a backdrop of diplomatic pressure from Turkey to have its demands accepted by these SSA countries. Thus, when asked how the Turkish authorities managed to have the closure of Yavuz Selim schools in Senegal accepted, our source in Senegal confirmed that Turkish investments in the Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE), in particular the case of the new Blaise Diagne International Airport in Dakar, “had weighed on the balance”.¹⁶⁶ This was also highlighted by Angey (2018, p. 61):

Why did the Senegalese authorities accept to hand over these establishments, which were among the top private schools in the country? In late August 2016, the representative for Senegal of Turkey’s foreign economic relations board, DEIK (Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Kurulu), and the Turkish ambassador in Dakar held meetings with the Senegalese minister of education to denounce the terrorist organization hiding behind the Yavuz Selim schools of this country, and to call for reinforced economic cooperation between the two ‘brother countries. At the same time, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı, TİKA) and the 100% state-owned Exim Bank signaled they were ready to sink new investment into the country. Economic factors thus played a part in negotiations to close the schools. The Senegalese authorities accepted to transfer the schools to the Maarif Foundation to secure long-term commercial cooperation involving new public actors (TIKA, Exim Bank, DEIK) and new private actors (MÜSIAD) (Angey, 2018, p. 61).

At the multilateral level, as part of its strategy to promote TMF in Africa, Turkey organized a Turkey-Africa Ministerial Conference on Education, in October 2017, prepared by the TMF, the Turkish Ministry of Education, and the Turkish Ministry of

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with the Dakar Academic Inspector, Op. Cit.

Foreign Affairs (Angey, 2018, p. 58). Thirty-eight (38) African countries took part in this conference, whose central point on the agenda was the takeover of GM schools by the TMF (Angey, 2018, p. 58).




Figure 12. Balance sheet map of the TMF in SSA (2016-2021)

Source: *Anadolu Agency* (2021), "Turkish Maarif Foundation provides education in 25 countries in Africa", online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/info/infographic/25338>

Clearly, as these analyzes demonstrate, the takeover of GM schools appears to be the primary mission that justifies the creation of the TMF by the Turkish authorities. It is in this sense that Birol Akgün (2020, p. 60), in a scholarly paper on the TMF, recognizes that the TMF was created by the Turkish authorities, to reclaim its foreign policy strategy in the field of education. Thus, according to Birol Akgün, in addition to the need to strengthen Turkish Soft Power and compete with other emerging countries to become an international educational hub, the creation of the TMF was prompted by the events of July 2016:

Coupled with these two developments, was the attempted military coup of July 15, 2016, by the FETO, whose internationalization was mostly based on opening so-called Turkish schools all over the world. This event urged Turkey to reclaim its own domain mostly controlled by FETO, in international education and so in this context the TMF was established (Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 60).

Furthermore, for a proper analysis of the activities of the Maarif Foundation in the field, we carried out a content analysis of the media coverage of the activities of the TMF by the Turkish press,¹⁶⁷ in particular the online articles of the *Yeni Şafak*, *Hurriyet Daily News*, and *Daily Sabah*. As for the process of content analysis, two types of coding were used to analyze the data. Firstly, initial open coding was conducted on the databases of online news sources. That initial coding enabled us to identify, name, and categorize the data. Subsequently, in the databases of the selected online news sources, the keyword “Maarif Foundation” was used, which generated respectively: 23 results for the *Hurriyet Daily News*, 103 results for *Daily Sabah*, and 727 results for *Yeni Şafak*. After analysis, the titles of the generated online articles

¹⁶⁷ The said content analysis was carried out by the author in an unpublished work carried out in 2018 (Bogazici University, POLS 584 final paper), hence most of the details and data of this content analysis, as explained in this thesis are retrieved from the said unpublished work.

were organized under various codes such as: “FETO/Gülen/Terrorism/Education/Africa” for the *Hurriyet Daily news* database; “Transfer FETO schools/FETO threat/Terrorist/Gülen movement schools in Africa/Soft power/Cooperation/Africa/Shut down schools/Gülenist/Education” for *the Daily Sabah* database; and finally “Education vision/Quality education/FETO/Take over FETO Schools/Africa/International students/Build schools/State budgets” for the *Yeni Şafak* database. Finally, these various codes obtained from the analysis of the headings of the online articles for each of the newspaper databases were again organized under three main categories namely:

- i. Fight against FETO
- ii. Turkish influence
- iii. Turkey-Africa relations.

Hence, the counting of occurrences of the titles of the newspapers as organized in these three main categories, showed that the category “fight against FETO” was the most dominant in each of the online newspapers database, as reflected in figure 3. Therefore, this content analysis of Turkish newspapers, shows that during its first years of function, the TMF mainly worked as an instrument of the Turkish government to fight against the FETO in Africa.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ This content analysis was carried out by the author, in the framework of a school work (a final paper titled, Turkish Maarif Foundation as a tool of Turkish Foreign Policy: the case study of Turkey-Africa Relations), and has never been published.




Figure 13. Distribution of categories in the three online news sources

Source: Content analysis carried out by the author in an unpublished work carried out in 2018.

5.1.2 Review of the activities of the TMF as a new institutional player in Turkish public diplomacy in the world

Given the results of the TMF since its creation in 2016, this organization presents a rather positive balance sheet according to its initial objectives. Thus, in 2021, nearly five years after its creation, the TMF has schools in 47 countries around the world.¹⁶⁹ It has also already taken over 230 schools in the GM network in 19 countries and is recognized in 104 countries around the world.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the SSA in general appears to be the region of the world where the Turkish strategy of reclaiming the educational activities of the GM was most successful, with countries like Somalia being among the first countries in the world to close GM schools, right after the Failed Coup in Turkey.¹⁷¹ Indeed, “188 (45%) out of the 415 educational institutions of the TMF are

¹⁶⁹ « La Turquie fait partie des cinq premiers pays grâce au "réseau international d'écoles" de la Fondation Maarif », *Anadolu Agency*, September, 18, 2021, online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/fr/turquie/la-turquie-fait-partie-des-cinq-premiers-pays-grâce-au-réseau-international-décoles-de-la-fondation-maarif/2378458#!>

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Interview granted by Cemalettin Kani Torun, AKP parliament member and member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Turkish parliament, to *Jeune Afrique* (2018), Op. Cit.

in Africa”.¹⁷² Thus, as Birol Akgün stated in an interview with the Turkish newspaper *Daily Sabah* in 2018:

We are having positive reception from countries, especially in Africa, we have made some progress and transferred the control of a prominent number of schools to our administration.¹⁷³

Besides, as Birol Akgün points out in his interview with the *Daily Sabah* in 2017, GM schools have remained active in most Western countries, particularly in Western Europe and the US: “especially in the west they have a hard time understanding our reasons”.¹⁷⁴

It should be highlighted here that if the TMF is successful in its activities in most SSA countries, however, countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya, though among Ankara's main economic partners in SSA, remain reluctant to the request of the Turkish authorities to close GM schools or transfer them to TMF, given the importance of these schools in the educational landscape of the said countries (Ogunmodede, 2021).

Looking at the balance sheet of the TMF since its creation, it appears that the takeover of GM schools has been the main activity of this organization. According to Birol Akgün, this is justified by the fact that the strategic plan (2016-2019) for the first three years of the TMF was based on that priority objective (Akgün & Özkan, 2020, p. 65). However, since 2020, the TMF has focused on another of its missions, which is “to create schools from scratch” and strengthen educational excellence within all the

¹⁷²SETA, “Experts Respond: Turkey-Africa Relations: An Increasing Partnership”, (December 2021), online, retrieved from: <http://plus.google.com/share?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.setav.org%2Fen%2Fexperts-respond-turkey-africa-relations-an-increasing-partnership%2F>

¹⁷³ “Maarif foundation President Birol Akgün, Turkey now control 60 percent of non-western FETO schools”, *DailySabah*, July 31, 2018, <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2018/07/30/maarif-foundation-president-birol-akgun-turkey-now-control-60-percent-of-non-western-feto-schools>.

¹⁷⁴ “Maarif Foundation head: We aim to offer an education that reflects Turkish vision, promote Turkish language”, Op. Cit.

establishments it runs.¹⁷⁵ With this in mind, the TMF's strategic plan for the period 2021-2023 provides for: "the prioritization of strategies aimed at emphasizing the quality of education, human resources, and financial management and further deploying the value of the foundation's international brand".¹⁷⁶ In line with these strategic objectives, Turkey is now one of the top 5 countries in the world in terms of the network of international schools, competing with France, the UK, China, and Germany.¹⁷⁷ This was made possible thanks to the activities of the TMF, which in 2021 had a total of 377 schools in 44 countries across the world.¹⁷⁸




Figure 14. Summary of TMF achievements worldwide (2016-2021)

Source: *Anadolu Agency* (2021), "Turkey ranks among top 5 countries with its global school network: Maarif president", online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkey-ranks-among-top-5-countries-with-its-global-school-network-maarif-president/2379034>.

¹⁷⁵ *Turkiye Maarif Vakfi*, « Activités de la Foundation Maarif et succès de ces institutions Educatives », (2019), online, retrieved from: <https://turkiyemaarif.org/post/7-activities-of-the-turkish-maarif-foundation-and-achievements-of-educational-institutions>.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁷ "Turkey ranks among top 5 countries with its global school network: Maarif president", *Anadolu Agency* July, 23, 2021, online, retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/education/turkey-ranks-among-top-5-countries-with-its-global-school-network-maarif-president/2379034>.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

Following this analysis of the TMF as a new institution for the projection of Turkish Soft power in the world, it appears that the SSA region is central in Turkey's foreign policy strategy of repression of the Gülen movement after the failed coup of July 2016, considering the involvement of Turkish diplomacy for the closure of GM schools in SSA and to impose TMF schools as the new face of the brand Turkey in the field of international education in SSA. This, reveals new features of the Turkish foreign policy in SSA following the events of July 2016. First of all, with regard to the rather loose relationship between Turkish public and private actors, and even the pre-eminence of Turkish private actors in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA since 2005, the creation of the TMF in 2016 as well as the strong support given to this institution by the Turkish authorities for its deployment in SSA, is the sign of a new stronger state presence of the Turkish state in its foreign policy in SSA. This strong involvement of the Turkish state in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA raises doubts about the new orientation of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, which seems to no longer be based on the strategy of soft power aiming at winning the hearts and minds of the people of SSA, but rather on the strategy of coercive diplomacy of “carrot and stick”, concerning the means used by the Turkish diplomacy in its negotiations with the countries of SSA.

Finally, the creation of TMF and the support for its establishment in SSA by the Turkish state, reveals a form of path dependency of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA,¹⁷⁹ in its strategy to reclaim the image and actions of Turkey in SSA, undertaken by the Turkish authorities through the TMF, after July 2016. Indeed, with the creation of the TMF, the Turkish government follows the same *modus operandi* as the GM in the field of education, which made the economic and social success of the members of

¹⁷⁹ This idea was also developed in Gabrielle Angey (2018, p. 67).

this Turkish transnational religious community in SSA and by extension that of all the Turkish public and private actors in this region of the world during the first decade of the 2000s. Hence, even if the TMF is a new player in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, its primary mission, which is the promotion of the Turkish educational model in SSA, reflects continuity in Turkey's approach vis-à-vis SSA, aiming to project in SSA the image of benevolent power. Furthermore, the creation of the TMF in 2016, also reflects a change in the form (public actors instead of private actors) and the substance (objective pursued by the foreign policy strategy) of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA post-July 2016, related to the issue of the fight against the Gülen movement in SSA. However, it remains to analyze the impact of these changes in the Turkish foreign policy in SSA, in other significant areas of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA such as ODA and trade.

5.2 Turkey's ODA in SSA: from a soft power tool to a coercive diplomacy' tool of the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016

In this part of our analysis of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after the July 2016 events in Turkey, we will highlight the role played by ODA in the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016. Indeed, as developed in the previous chapter, ODA has been a major tool of Turkey's soft power in SSA, since the beginning of the policy of opening up to SSA, initiated by the AKP government in 2005. Hence, ODA has enabled Turkey to develop its relations with the SSA region on the commercial level, thanks to the positive image of a benevolent power that Turkey acquired among the populations and governments of this region, in particular through the activities of TIKA, which is the major player in the Turkish government's ODA, but also through the many financial, material and infrastructural aid that Turkey has provided to SSA

countries.¹⁸⁰ In this sense, scholars such as Turhan (2021) and Korkmaz and Zengin (2020) establish that Turkey's ODA to SSA has different aims from that granted by Turkey to its other regions of interest such as Central Asia or the Balkans. Indeed, these studies reveal that the ODA given by Turkey to these regions has a materialist purpose, which is to become a regional power in these regions since the end of the Cold War. Thus, with regard to relations between Turkey and SSA, Turhan (2021, p. 4) emphasizes that Turkish ODA in this region is guided mainly by a normative aim, which is humanitarian. As an illustration of this, in 2017 Turkey became the largest provider of humanitarian aid to the least developed countries (LDC), three of which were SSA countries, including Somalia, Niger, and Sudan.¹⁸¹ In the same vein, Turkey's ODA to SSA countries is mainly oriented toward countries in political or humanitarian crises (Turhan, 2021, p. 4).

It should be noted that the bulk of Turkish ODA to SSA reached its highest level in 2013, namely, one year before the holding of the second Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit (Turhan, 2021, p. 5). However, the bulk of Turkey's ODA to SSA countries experienced a historic decline in 2015, in particular, due to the context of Turkey's foreign policy in the Syrian crisis, and the Arab springs, concerning the role, played by Turkey in these crises which have affected its neighborhood of the Middle East (Turhan, 2021, p. 7). Hence, most of Turkey's ODA from 2015 was directed to these countries.

¹⁸⁰ See Chapter 2 of this thesis.

¹⁸¹ See *Turkish Development Assistance Report* (2016).

Table 9. Turkey's Bilateral Development Assistance to SSA Countries: net ODA Disbursement 2011- 2018 (USD million)

<i>Countries</i>	<i>2011</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2013</i>	<i>2014</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2016</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>
<i>Angola</i>	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	0.5
<i>Benin</i>	0.1	0.1	1.2	0.6	0.3	0.7	2.2	0.05
<i>Botswana</i>	0.1	0	0	0.1	0	0.1	0.1	-
<i>Burkina-Faso</i>	1.9	0.8	0.4	4.2	0.9	0.7	1.1	0.29
<i>Burundi</i>	0	0.1	0.5	0.7	0	0.4	1.3	-
<i>Cameroon</i>	0.4	0.5	2.5	2	0.3	1.9	2.6	0.35
<i>Central Africa Republic</i>	0.1	0.1	1	1.5	0.4	0.5	0.8	-
<i>Chad</i>	0.1	0	1.1	1.4	0.5	1.3	2.5	0.67
<i>Comoros</i>	0.3	4.1	0.4	0.4	1	0.3	1.1	0.40
<i>Congo</i>	0.4	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.16
<i>Côte d'Ivoire</i>	0.3	0.5	0.8	1.2	0.2	1	1.4	-
<i>Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>	0.1	0.1	1.5	1.4	0.2	1	2.5	0.02
<i>Djibouti</i>	0.1	0.2	1.4	3	3.9	1.8	3.5	14.68
<i>Eritrea</i>	4.4	1.9	2.2	0.1	-	0.2	0.5	0.08
<i>Ethiopia</i>	1.4	3.8	3	3.7	0.7	4	5.8	0.63

<i>Gabon</i>	0	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.1	0.2	0.3	-
<i>The Gambia</i>	0.3	0.4	1.1	1.8	12.7	1.2	2.1	3.16
<i>Ghana</i>	0.4	0.8	2.1	3	0.3	1.6	4.5	0.12
<i>Guinea</i>	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.9	0.5	4.3	1.5	3.0
<i>Guinea-Bissau</i>	0.1	0.6	1.2	1.2	0.2	0.4	1	0.38
<i>Kenya</i>	2.1	1.1	5.1	3.3	0.2	2	2	0.65
<i>Liberia</i>	0.1	0	0.2	0.8	1.3	0.2	0.6	-
<i>Madagascar</i>	0.7	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.1	0.4	1.2	0.05
<i>Malawi</i>	0	-	0.2	0.4	-	0.2	0.5	-
<i>Mali</i>	0.2	1	6.1	1.5	0.7	2.5	1.7	0.28
<i>Mauritania</i>	0.4	1.6	4.7	4.5	12.7	0.8	1.2	-
<i>Mozambique</i>	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.8	0	0.2	0.7	0.35
<i>Namibia</i>	0	0	0.1	0.2	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.44
<i>Niger</i>	2.6	3	9.6	4.1	8.9	11.9	9.6	5.54
<i>Nigeria</i>	0.5	0.7	1.3	1	0.1	0.7	1.1	0.01
<i>Rwanda</i>	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.6	-	0.4	1.3	0.03
<i>Senegal</i>	1.92	2.2	5.1	2.9	7.5	0.8	1.2	0.51
<i>Sierra-Leone</i>	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.06
<i>Somalia</i>	93.4	86.6	115.7	74.4	314.8	59.6	60.6	29.1
<i>South-Africa</i>	0.2	0.1	0.6	1.1	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.92
<i>South-Sudan</i>	0.1	0.4	1.1	1.5	0.7	0.4	1.3	0.47

<i>Sudan</i>	21.3	62.3	6.3	9.4	22	9.4	7	25.1
<i>Tanzania</i>	0.3	0.5	1.4	1.7	0.4	1.1	1.7	1.05
<i>Togo</i>	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.8	-
<i>Uganda</i>	0.7	1.6	1.7	2	0.3	1.1	2.5	0.29
<i>Zambia</i>	0	0	0.5	0.5	0.1	0.5	1.3	0.10
<i>Zimbabwe</i>	0	0	0.3	0.5	-	0.8	1.2	0.05

Source: Retrieved from Turhan (2021, p. 8).

However, the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey as a conjunctural element of TFP is also a factor likely to influence the volume of Turkey's ODA to SSA, due to the importance of ODA as a tool of Turkey's penetration strategy in this region (Turhan, 2021, p. 9). In this perspective, the strategy of the TFP in SSA following the failed coup of July 2016, will necessarily rely on the instrument of ODA to achieve its objectives in SSA, in particular, that of the destruction of the GM's assets, strongly established in this region of the world. Thus, an analysis of Turkey's ODA to SSA countries highlights fluctuations in the volume of ODA from Turkey to strategic SSA countries for the years 2016, and 2017 (Turhan, 2021, p. 9). These countries can be classified into three distinct groups, depending on their reactions to the demand of the Turkish authorities to transfer GM schools to the TMF or to close them, which is one of the priority objectives of the TFP in SSA after the failed coup in July 2016.¹⁸²

Thus, in the first group, we have the countries which have quickly agreed to Turkey's demands concerning GM schools from the year 2016. These are Chad, Somalia, Sudan, Gambia, and Guinea (Turhan, 2021, p. 11). The second group is made

¹⁸² This classification of Turkey's ODA share to SSA countries according to their reactions to Turkey's requests, is based on Turhan (2021) classification. However, the argument supported by the latter is different from the one supported in this thesis.

up of countries that agreed to the Turkish government's request regarding the GM schools on their territory, after a process of diplomatic negotiation, during the year 2017, such as Cameroon, Mali, Ethiopia, and Niger (Turhan, 2021, p. 12). Finally, the third group is made up of countries that to date have not yet agreed to the request of the Turkish authorities to close the GM schools or transfer them to the TMF. These are countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Benin, and Uganda (Turhan, 2021, p. 13).

It should be emphasized from the onset, that Turkey's ODA in the majority of the countries of these three groups and beyond for most SSA countries,¹⁸³ has increased in the years 2016 and 2017. This makes it possible to establish a correlation between the use of ODA as an instrument of Turkey's Foreign Policy strategy in these countries, and the objective targeted by the TFP strategy in these SSA countries from July 2016. Hence, from the analysis of Turkey's ODA to these countries of the three groups, following the figures for the said years in Table 9, we can observe that there is an increase in Turkey's ODA, either for the year 2016 or the year 2017. There is even a record increase in Turkey's ODA either for the year 2016 or in 2017 for most of these countries, such as Chad (2.5 million dollars in 2017); Benin (\$2.2 million in 2017); Cameroon (\$2.6 million in 2017); Ethiopia (\$5.8 million in 2017); Guinea (\$4.3 million in 2016); Niger (\$11.9 million in 2016); Uganda (\$2.5 million in 2017). It should be noted that 2017 corresponds to the year of intensification of the diplomatic campaign led by the Turkish government in Africa for the transfer of GM schools to the TMF or their closure. It was in particular during the year 2017 that President

¹⁸³ See the figures in table 9.

Erdoğan made his first African tour post-July 2016, as part of the Turkish diplomatic initiatives to fight against the GM network.¹⁸⁴




Figure 15. Flow of Turkish ODA to the selected SSA countries in USD millions (2013-2018)

Source: The author from the data retrieved from Turhan (2021, p.8).

Thus, this analysis of the flow of Turkey's ODA to SSA for the years 2016 and 2017, highlights a correlation between the volume of Turkey's ODA allotted to these SSA countries and the objectives of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA oriented towards the extermination of the GM network in SSA after the events of July 2016 in Turkey.

On a theoretical level, this use of Turkish ODA as an instrument of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016, is congruent with the strategy of

¹⁸⁴ Source : « Erdoğan en Afrique pour parler du prédicateur Gülen », *Jeune Afrique*, October 23, 2016, www.jeuneafrique.com

coercion, more precisely to the strategy of coercive diplomacy as defined by Levy (2008).

The strategy of coercive diplomacy, as introduced in the second chapter of this study, corresponds to the psychological dimension of the use of power in the framework of diplomatic negotiations, which consists for a player to exert psychological pressure on the adversary in order to compel him to his will. This pressure can be exerted either by using the promise of a future reward, in the event of acceptance of the will of the power exercising coercive diplomacy, this is what is referred to as the "carrot" strategy, or through the use of both the promise of a reward (carrot) and the threat of a sanction (stick) to the adversary in the event of refusal to agree to the will of the power exercising the coercive diplomacy (George, 1971). Accordingly, the increase of Turkey's ODA as an instrument of TFP strategy in SSA for the years 2016 and 2017 is congruent with the strategy of coercive diplomacy, where the increase in the volume of ODA for the years 2016 and 2017 in some of the SSA countries by Turkey seems to have been used as an incentive (carrot) to incite them to agree to the demands of the Turkish government concerning the fight against the GM network. It should be emphasized that on the theoretical level, the strategy of coercion in foreign policy is in opposition to the strategy of socialization, which consists for a player, relying on its factors of soft power, as elements of persuasion in world politics. Thus, Johnston (2008) defines the socialization strategy as: "a strategy that uses non-coercive or material instruments such as threats or promises to shape the preferences of others". More precisely, Nye (1990), defines soft power as the ability of a power "to get the other want the outcome that you want, to co-opt, rather than coercing them".

To sum up, the analysis of Turkey's ODA to SSA for the years 2016 and 2017 exhibits a change in the strategic orientation of Turkey's ODA, from a soft power instrument to a coercive diplomacy tool, in the context of the fight against GM' assets in SSA after the failed coup of July 2016. Concerning the focus of this thesis which is the analysis of change and continuity in Turkey's foreign policy in SSA after July 2016, this change in the strategic orientation of the ODA instrument in the TFP in SSA, confirms the hypothesis of the hardening of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, due to transnationalization of the fight against the GM network, considered a threat to the national security of Turkey by Ankara.

5.3 The reconfiguration of the relationships between the Turkish state and the employers' groups in turkey's economic diplomacy in SSA: the strengthening of MÜSIAD in Turkey's SSA strategy

From the 1980s, Turkey adopted an economic policy stand focused on exports, to which Turkey owes the label "trading Turkey".¹⁸⁵ The Turkish state was supported in this approach by Turkish employers' groups, in particular, those from the Islamist economic elite, which emerged in Turkish politics during this same decade, especially those affiliated with the MÜSIAD. Indeed, the MÜSIAD (Association of Independent Businessmen and Industrialists) is a confederation of Turkish businessmen and industrialists, which was created in Istanbul in 1990, by businessmen from Anatolia, mainly owners of SMEs (Yankaya, 2017). These businessmen, in addition to their Anatolian roots, were also linked by their belonging and attachment to the religion and Islamic values (Yankaya, 2017, p. 39). Beyond these cultural and religious affinities, the MÜSIAD was also created to challenge the hegemony of large economic and

¹⁸⁵ See the previous chapter of this thesis.

industrial groups in the Turkish economy, led mainly by the Westernized and secular elite, united within the TÜSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) (Yankaya, 2017, p. 40). On the political level, the creation of the MÜSIAD is also part of the backdrop of the emergence of political Islam in Turkey in the 1980s, a political movement that reached its peak in 1996 with the coming to power of Neçtim Erbakan's Refah Partisi (prosperity party), which is considered to be the ancestor of the current AKP party (Yankaya, 2014). This party was characterized by its strong Euro-skepticism and promoted the establishment of an Islamic union with the Ottoman model as a reference (Yankaya, 2014). Hence, most of the businessmen affiliated with the MÜSIAD were at the grassroots of the creation of the AKP, some of them were even among the founders of the AKP in 2002.¹⁸⁶

The MÜSIAD hence shares with the AKP, from its creation, a strong political and ideological affinity based on Islamic values. This ideological and political affinity based on religion also links the AKP with another employer's confederation of Islamist background, the TUSKON (Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey). The latter is centered on the development of GM's educational activities around the world (Yankaya, 2017). Thus, the TUSKON was not truly constituted as an employers' association until 2005 (Yankaya, 2017), which also corresponds to the official year of the beginning of the policy of opening up to the SSA initiated by the AKP. These three major Turkish employers' organizations, MÜSIAD, TÜSIAD, and TUSKON have been the driving force behind Turkey's economic diplomacy in various regions of the world, initiated by the AKP government since its rise to power in 2002 (Yankaya, 2017).

¹⁸⁶ “In the first AKP government of November 2002, there were 23 Müsiad members among the parliament members. After the second victory of the AKP in 2007, the number of parliament members from the Müsiad rose to thirty, and the 2011 elections counted twenty-three”. Source: Yankaya (2014).

5.3.1 The partnership between the AKP government and Turkish employer's organizations in the implementation of Turkey's economic diplomacy in the world

The analysis of the relations between the Turkish government AKP and the Turkish employers' organizations, in the foreign policy of Turkey, once again highlights the role of private actors in TFP. Indeed, with the advent of globalization, private actors involved in transnational dynamics can have activities complementary to those of state institutions in their field, or even compensate for their absence (Benhaïm, 2015). This is what an author like Benhaïm (2015) calls "the co-production of foreign policy"; or what Hibou (1999), describes as "discharge". Hence, private actors can participate in defining a diplomatic strategy with state actors (Benhaïm, 2015, p. 3). In the same vein, transnational private actors can contribute through their activities to the dissemination of a positive image of a country, even though they are in no way associated with decision-making in foreign policy (Benhaïm, 2015, p. 3). Finally, Benhaïm (2015) emphasizes that this phenomenon of co-production of foreign policy is a corollary of the domestic policy of the state.

In line with this, the employers' organization TÜSIAD, has been the ally of the AKP government in its foreign policy ambition for Turkey's accession to the EU, in particular through the support of powerful Turkish multinationals to the candidacy of Turkey, such as Koç or Doğan affiliated with the TÜSIAD (Yankaya, 2017). In return, TÜSIAD businessmen benefited from the privatization of Turkish companies initiated by the AKP government during the 2000s, particularly in the fields of energy, telecommunications, infrastructure, and cement, but also from the sale of land newly opened for construction in some major cities of Turkey, to promote their expansion (Yankaya, 2017). These include major economic groups such as Koc, Sabanci, Doğan, and Doğuş, members of TÜSIAD (Yankaya, 2017). By way of illustration, in 2005,

the Koç-Shell consortium won the second-largest privatization in the history of Turkey, that of the refining company Tupras for an amount of 4 billion 600 million dollars (Yankaya, 2017).

Concerning TUSKON, this employers' organization associated with the GM has greatly contributed to the opening-up policy of Turkish diplomacy towards regions such as Central Asia, Latin America, and especially SSA, initiated by the AKP in 2002. Indeed, the TUSKON deployed in SSA following the foreign trade strategy of the Turkish government (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). In this sense, this confederation received active support from Turkish state institutions in its various activities in SSA (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). Hence, the Turkish government through its institutions such as the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Under secretariat of Foreign Trade (DTM), the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), sponsored TUSKON events in SSA, especially the Turkey-Africa Foreign Trade Bridge programs, with the participation of senior officials and civil servants, and providing bureaucratic and technical support (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). Besides, the AKP government has also promoted TUSKON in SSA, by including representatives of this confederation in official delegations, during state visits to SSA countries carried out by senior Turkish officials (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). For example, TUSKON took part with a large delegation in President Abdullah Gül's official visit to Nigeria from July 7- 9, 2010 (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). Therefore, thanks to this alliance between the AKP government and TUSKON in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, Turkey was able to easily establish relations with African countries, with which it had no formal diplomatic relations beforehand.

This cooperation between TUSKON and Turkish state institutions in SSA was mainly shaped on a pragmatic basis (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). TUSKON, in addition to the support of the Turkish government, had the material and human capacities to deploy on the SSA market, in particular thanks to the GM's private Turkish schools financed by its businessmen, while in return Turkey's foreign policy in SSA benefited from the trust and above all from the connections established on the ground thanks to these schools and other humanitarian activities of the GM (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). It is in this vein that the President of TUSKON Rızanur Meral stated in 2009:

We are implementing strategies parallel to state policies. Since these policies are the result of research, they do not conflict with our work. In fact, the state paved the way. He created important strategies. But there was no actor to bring them to life. We have become those actors.¹⁸⁷

The organization of Turkey-Africa economic bridges by TUSKON from 2006 onward, is one of these major initiatives of TUSKON for Turkey's economic diplomacy in SSA (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 36). It was indeed a kind of summit on trade between Turkey and African countries, with an original format, associating both bilateral meetings between Turkish and African officials, and B2B meetings between businessmen from Turkey and Africa (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 36). Thus, these economic bridges which were held over 5 editions from 2007 to 2011, enabled the establishment of fruitful relations between Turkish businessmen and those of SSA, as well as the signing of several commercial agreements between Turkey and African countries (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 35). In addition, the TUSKON played an important role within the DEİK (Council for Foreign Economic Relations of Turkey),

¹⁸⁷Rızanur Meral, "2005 Yılında İhracatımız 2.5 Milyar Dolardı", *Kobi Sektör*, 19 Ekim, 2009 (<http://www.kobisektor.com/gundem/4133.html>), cited by: Alkan and Mercan (2013, p. 35).

which is the administration in charge of coordinating the foreign relations of the Turkish employers' confederations (Yankaya, 2017). As developed in the previous chapter, this institution set up and organized various Turkey-Africa economic forums. DEIK has also established offices within the various Turkish embassies in SSA, intending to ensure the smooth running of economic relations between Turkey and SSA.¹⁸⁸ Finally, TUSKON has supported the establishment of associations in African countries, in order to set up a lobby close to Turkey, such as the Association of Senegalese Businessmen who love Turkey; and the Association for Cultural, Social, and Economic Cooperation between Turkey and African Countries (AKSIAD), aimed at transforming the relations developed with Africa into a long-term cooperation network (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 38).

Hence, TUSKON has been a strong ally of the AKP government in its foreign policy strategy in SSA. In return, for its activities in favor of the Turkish foreign policy in SSA, TUSKON was granted by TOKI, most of the large public contracts in terms of housing construction and urban development (Yankaya, 2017, p. 43).

Finally, as regards the MÜSIAD, this Islamist employers' organization has always been a strong ally of the AKP in domestic politics, in particular, to denounce the repressions against Islamist-rooted political movements exercised by the Kemalist's politico-military elite, during the decades of 80-90 (Yankaya, 2017, p. 40). MÜSIAD has also been very active in the economic cooperation between Turkey and the Muslim world (Yankaya, 2017, p. 41). Indeed, MÜSIAD set up the International Business Forum (IBF) in 1995, in collaboration with the main Islamic intergovernmental organizations: the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), and the Islamic Chamber of Commerce (ICC)

¹⁸⁸ See the previous chapter of this thesis.

(Yankaya, 2017, p. 41). The MÜSIAD defined the IBF as a gathering of “countries with which Turkey shares historical and cultural ties to develop trade and industrial relations” (Yankaya, 2014, p. 10). The IBF ultimately aims to integrate all the economies of Muslim countries into a single economic bloc comparable to the EU model (Yankaya, 2014, p. 10). Clearly, the IBF is a platform for consultation within the framework of congresses, for businessmen from Muslim countries, but also for political leaders from Muslim countries that are members of the OIC, allowing them to discuss the economic issues they are facing (Yankaya, 2014, p. 10). It should be noted that the creation of the IBF is in line with Turkey's ambitions, under the AKP government, to become the leader of the Muslim world. Indeed, the objective of the IBF is to propose solutions to the problems "of the world of Islam" in order to act collectively to promote the interests of Muslims considered marginalized in Western economic domination (Yankaya, 2014, p. 10).

However, it should be emphasized that even if these different employers' organizations have each, in different capacities, been a political ally of the AKP, in domestic or foreign policy, they nevertheless evolved into a competitive dynamic (Yankaya, 2017, p. 43). Yet, this political alliance between the AKP and some of these business groups, in particular, the TÜSIAD and the TUSKON, will gradually crumble from 2007 onward, which marked the beginning of the strengthening of the power of the AKP in Turkish politics (Yankaya, 2017, p. 43).

5.3.2 The rift between the AKP and the TÜSIAD and the TUSKON, and the consolidation of the alliance between the AKP and the MÜSIAD

First of all, concerning the TÜSIAD, tensions with the AKP appeared from 2007 onward, when the latter began to criticize the AKP on its management of foreign

policy, in particular the delays in its accession process to the EU, as well as its handling of relations between Turkey and Western powers (Yankaya, 2017, p. 43). In terms of domestic politics, the TÜSIAD also criticized the AKP for its authoritarian turn during the Gezi Park events in 2013 and for the corruption scandal of December 2013, which affected several AKP leaders, including the then Prime Minister Erdoğan (Yankaya, 2017, p. 43).

As for the TUSKON, the split between this employers' organization and the AKP also started in December 2013, when the AKP government accused senior police and media officers, affiliated with the GM, of having voluntarily leaked corruption files to undermine its power (Yankaya, 2017, p. 44). Accordingly, within the framework of the fight between the AKP and the GM, the TUSKON was accused by the Turkish government of treason and of belonging to the “lobby of the Imam” (Yankaya, 2017, p. 44). In the same vein, the AKP Government will begin to exercise repression against TUSKON members and their businesses both in Turkey and abroad, particularly in SSA.

Hence, in 2015, Turkish businessmen in Africa, affiliated with TUSKON, reported to *Zaman*, a Turkish newspaper close to the GM, about administrative restrictions preventing them from exporting their goods to SSA countries.¹⁸⁹ Subsequently, tensions between the GM and the AKP escalated in July 2016, with the coup attempt, attributed to elements of the Turkish army close to the GM. Thus, following the events of July 2016, the leaders of TUSKON and 187 companies' members of the TUSKON, were accused of “joining a terrorist organization and financing terrorist acts, and were the subject of police investigations and judicial prosecutions” (Yankaya, 2017, p. 44). The president of TUSKON Rızanur Meral fled

¹⁸⁹ “Government oppression of confederation hurts Turkish exports to Africa”, *Today's Zaman*, 10 March 2015, cited by Shinn (2015, p. 11).

abroad, and at the end of July 2016, the Turkish government closed by decree, the 196 local and regional employers' associations forming the TUSKON (Yankaya, 2017, p. 44). Many businessmen affiliated with TUSKON have seen their assets confiscated by the state, their participation in tenders and their operating licenses canceled; and their businesses placed under state supervision (Yankaya, 2017, p. 44). By way of illustration, Bank Asya, which specialized in Islamic finance, close to the Gülen movement and partner of TUSKON, was placed under the supervision of the Turkish state and then closed in 2017 (Yankaya, 2017, p. 44). The said bank was carrying out in the meantime, in association with the Islamic Development Bank, an ambitious project in the field of Islamic Financing, in the West African region, namely in Senegal and its neighboring countries like Mauritania and Guinea. However, in the framework of the political conflict between the AKP and the GM, Bank Asya was impeded by economic and legal issues, and finally, in 2015, it sold its shares in the said project to the Islamic Development Bank (Shinn, 2015, p. 12). In Cameroon, the Turkish authorities have requested the extradition to Turkey of Turkish businessmen affiliated with TUSKON, business managers, and former directors of the Turkish schools of the Amity International group, namely for accusations of “belonging to an armed terrorist organization and violation of the provisions of Turkish Law N^o 6415”.¹⁹⁰

These tensions between the AKP and the TÜSIAD on the one hand, and the TUSKON on the other hand, will strengthen the position of the MÜSIAD as a strategic ally of the AKP, in particular following the political events of July 2016 (Yankaya, 2017, p. 45). Hence, the MÜSIAD will show its support for the AKP, right in the days following the failed coup. Indeed, every night between July 16 and August 9, 2016, the leaders of companies affiliated with the MÜSIAD participated in demonstrations

¹⁹⁰ Source: our interview with a staff of the Ministry of External Relations of Cameroon.

in support of the Turkish government organized in the central squares of several Turkish cities, which they titled “democracy guards” (Yankaya, 2017, p. 38). Thus, within the framework of these demonstrations in support of the AKP, the MÜSIAD “called on its 11,000 members to gather in the mosques for the evening prayer, then to go to the public squares during the night and to decorate the facades of their businesses with flags in support of the government” (Yankaya, 2017, p. 38).

As a token of gratitude for the support of MÜSIAD during the political crisis of July 2016, the Turkish government imposed MÜSIAD as the major employers' organization in Turkey (Yankaya, 2017, p. 45). Thus, MÜSIAD is present since 2016, in 86 Turkish cities and 65 foreign countries, through 60,000 companies, the majority of which are SMEs (Yankaya, 2017, p. 46).

5.3.3 The AKP- MÜSIAD alliance in Turkey's economic diplomacy in the SSA region since 2016

In the same vein, MÜSIAD has taken over the implementation of Turkey's economic diplomacy in regions of the world once attributed to TÜSIAD and TUSKON in the Turkish foreign policy strategy. Thus, in 2017, Nail Olpak, a former member of the High Advisory Board of the MÜSIAD was appointed head of DEIK.¹⁹¹ Moreover, from the end of 2016, the MÜSIAD began to deploy itself as the major player in Turkey's economic diplomacy in SSA, in the same way as the TMF in the field of education. Therefore, in August 2016, the head of MÜSIAD began to be part of the diplomatic campaign to fight against the GM, initiated by Turkish diplomacy through official visits to various SSA countries (Yankaya, 2017, p. 45). Besides, in 2016,

¹⁹¹ <https://www.deik.org.tr/deik-s-structure-from-the-president?sm=ozgecmis>

MÜSIAD officials made an official visit to South Africa,¹⁹² and in 2017 to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), to position themselves against TUSKON (Alkan & Mercan, 2013, p. 38). The objective of these visits is, in the words of the president of the MÜSIAD, Abdurrahman Kaan: “to reassure the external partners about the maintenance of democracy, economic stability, and the normality of daily life in Turkey despite the state of emergency” (Yankaya, 2017, p. 46). The latter also stressed the importance of the role of MÜSIAD in the fight against GM abroad, during an interview with Anadolu Agency in 2016: “In this fight with the terrorist organization FETO, whose end is not far, the international representation of the MÜSIAD has become all the more important as we work to improve the country's image” (Yankaya, 2017, p. 46).

In line with this, MÜSIAD opened offices in July 2016 in South Africa, Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, Ivory Coast, and Senegal (MÜSIAD, 2019). It further declared 2018 as “the Year of Africa”, as part of its strategy of strengthening its presence abroad (MÜSIAD, 2019, p. 11). In this perspective, new regional offices of MÜSIAD in SSA were opened in countries such as Chad, Kenya, Zambia, Tanzania, and Somalia (MÜSIAD, 2019, p. 11). In addition, MÜSIAD set up various initiatives for the promotion of Turkish products in SSA, but also of African products in Turkey. These include the creation in May 2016 of the Cultural Center and Market of African Crafts in Ankara (MÜSIAD, 2019, p. 33), for the sale of products imported from SSA countries such as Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, North Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Benin and Uganda; the creation in 2018 of a Turkish-African Commercial and Cultural

¹⁹²Source: <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/milli-egitim-bakani-yilmaz-amacimiz-afrika-ulkeleriyle-egitim-iliskimizi-gelistirmek-406157>.

Center in Sudan, for the exhibition and sale of products made in Turkey (MÜSIAD, 2019, p. 12).

In addition, Turkish businessmen affiliated with MÜSIAD, owners of SMEs specializing in the construction and ICT sectors, which are the favorite areas of Turkish companies in SSA, have recently taken an active part in the last two African tours of President Erdoğan in SSA, precisely in October 2021 and more recently in February 2022.¹⁹³ These include companies such as Summa, which has built numerous infrastructures in Africa (in Senegal, Rwanda, Niger, and Equatorial Guinea); Limak (present in 14 African countries); Toşyalı (active in the steel industry, which chairs the Turkey-Senegal Business Council); Çalık (Active in Africa in several sectors such as energy, banking, textiles, construction, mining, telecoms, etc.).¹⁹⁴

To sum up, this analysis of the alliances between the Turkish AKP government and employers' organizations, after the events of July 2016 in Turkey, sheds light on the state of relations between the Turkish government and non-governmental actors in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy after July 2016. Thus, the strengthening of the alliance between the ruling AKP and MÜSIAD, and the subsequent strengthening of MÜSIAD's position as the main employers' organization in Turkey's economic diplomacy, once again reflect the retrieval by the Turkish State of its foreign policy in SSA, since 2016. Clearly, the relationship between the Turkish state and non-governmental actors, in particular Turkish transnational economic actors, in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, which was once loose, now appears more structured. The close relationship between the Turkish presidency and Turkish

¹⁹³ President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made his first African tour of 2022, to three SSA countries: DR Congo (February 20), Senegal (February 21-22) and Guinea-Bissau (February 23). Source: « Turquie-Afrique: des hommes d'affaires dans le sillage d'Erdoğan à Kinshasa et à Dakar », *Jeune Afrique*, february 23, 2022. Online, retrieved from : <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1317869/politique/turquie-afrique-des-hommes-daffaires-dans-le-sillage-dErdoğan-a-kinshasa-et-a-dakar/>

¹⁹⁴ Idem.

conservative transnational businessmen has also expanded in the area of security and defense, in which Turkey's SMEs have become important players on the international scale, in recent years.

5.4 The emergence of Turkey as a security player in SSA after 15 July 2016

As developed in the previous chapter, from the 1980s onward, Turkey adopted a foreign policy stand centered on trade, hence the qualifier "trading Turkey". Thus, in the trading state concept, as developed by Rosecrance (1986), the trading state is distinguished by the pre-eminence given to economic issues over security issues. With this in mind, Turkey's foreign policy with the rise to power of the AKP in 2002, particularly within the framework of Ahmet Davutoğlu's doctrine of "zero problems with neighbors", moved away from a foreign policy strategy stand focused on security issues, of the previous military governments that ruled Turkey during the 80s and 90s (Ekşi & Erol, 2018). Indeed, this foreign policy focused on military issues and aimed to ensure the sustainability of the young Republic of Turkey in the face of domestic and international threats (Ekşi & Erol, 2018, p. 40). However, with the rise to power of the AKP, Turkey's international influence, particularly at the regional level, became the priority objective of Turkey's foreign policy, which led to "the demilitarization" of its foreign policy instruments, to the benefit of soft power instruments such as trade (Dal & Dipama, 2019, p. 242). The trading state strategy has thus enabled Turkey to achieve its ambition of becoming a regional power in its immediate vicinity of Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa (MENA) with the rise to power of the AKP. However, developments inherent in international politics as well as Turkey's domestic politics, from 2013 onward, will trigger the AKP government to revise its foreign policy strategy based on non-coercive instruments (Donelli, 2019; Usluer, 2016).

Indeed, the impact on Turkey of the crises and conflicts that will affect the countries of its neighborhood such as Syria, and more generally the countries of North Africa with the Arab springs in 2013, will lead Turkey “to remilitarize” its foreign policy from 2013 (Donelli, 2019; Usluer, 2016). The Syrian crisis, in particular, due to the involvement of the Kurdish populations living in the border region between Turkey and Syria, will push Ankara to get involved in this conflict, to stem the expansion of terrorism on its territory (Donelli, 2019, p. 12). Thus, Turkey will divest itself of its trading state stand, which favors non-interventionism in the conflicts of neighboring countries and carry out military operations in Syria, like Operation “Olive Branch”, to ensure the security of its territory and to stop the spread on its territory of the activities of terrorist groups such as ISIS and the PKK, favored by the civil war in Syria (Donelli, 2019; Usluer, 2016). Moreover, still, on the international level, the war in Libya resulting from the Arab Spring is another field of materialization of the new security stance adopted by Turkey in its foreign policy (Kardaş, 2020). Thus, Turkey intervened militarily in Libya in June 2020, to support the Libyan government of national accord in the face of rebel incursions led by General Aftar (Kardaş, 2020, p. 4). In particular, Turkey justifies its involvement in the Libyan crisis through the historical ties that have linked the two countries since the Ottoman era (Kardaş, 2020, p. 4).

At the domestic level, the increase in international terrorism from 2013, due to the emergence of terrorist groups such as ISIS in Syria, and neighboring Turkey, will also lead Turkey to give greater importance to security issues in its foreign policy. Indeed, Turkey suffered several terrorist attacks on its territory between 2013 and 2015 attributed to this terrorist group. Finally, the security turn of the TFP was accentuated in 2016, with the domestic political issue of the failed coup of 15 July 2016, perpetrated

by the GM or FETO, is now considered a threat to Turkey's domestic and international security by the Turkish government. To sum up, these various developments in Turkey's domestic and international policy from 2013, will lead Turkey to harden its foreign policy by adding hard power instruments, in order to deal with these various threats to its territorial integrity.

In this regard, scholars such as Usluer Usluer (2016, p. 35) and Donelli (2019, p. 13) consider that 2016 marks the beginning of a new phase in the Turkish foreign policy strategy under the AKP era, with the shift from an ideational and normative foreign policy strategy based on soft power instruments, to a pragmatic and rational foreign policy strategy, based on hard foreign policy instruments and aimed at ensuring Turkey's security interests. More specifically, Donelli (2019, p. 13) labels this new phase of Turkey's foreign policy, based on security issues, the “Erdoğan Doctrine”. Indeed, Donelli (2019, p. 13) defines the “Erdoğan Doctrine” as Turkey’s new foreign policy strategy based on security concerns and modeled after the pre-emptive national security strategy, adopted by the Bush government in the United States, following the events of September 11, 2001 (Donelli, 2019, p. 13). According to Donelli (2019), the main idea underlying this doctrine is that to face the main threats to its security, Turkey has adopted a preventive foreign policy (Donelli, 2019, p. 13). This new security orientation of Turkey's foreign policy is reflected in the militarization of its foreign policy instruments, in particular, the armed interventions in the conflicts affecting its neighborhood, in Syria and Libya, as developed above, but also in the development of its military industry (Bouvier, 2020).

Indeed, Turkey has become from 2015 onward, a major producer of arms on an international scale, particularly in terms of military technology, and more particularly the manufacture of military drones (Bouvier, 2020). It should be

emphasized that these unmanned aerial vehicles, constitute an important strategic asset in the military arsenal of states in the era of ICTs, particularly concerning military intelligence. Thus, this new military technology has enabled Turkey to achieve significant success in its fight against terrorism, particularly against the PKK in Iraq since 2016 (Bouvier, 2020). As Emile Bouvier (2020) points out, Turkey integrated TB2 drones for the first time into its military system against the PKK in northern Iraq, in 2016 (Bouvier, 2020). This led to the arrest of 2000 PKK militants, including 600 by drone attacks, or 30% of losses inflicted on the PKK, since the beginning of the use of drones by the Turkish army (Bouvier, 2020). Faced with this observation, drones have become an essential component of Turkey's security and military strategy. With this in mind, Turkey has decided to intensify the development of drones “made in Turkey”, within the framework of the 2023 objectives defined by the Turkish prime minister, aimed at making Turkey a power on the international scene, ahead of the celebration of the centenary of the Republic of Turkey, on October 29, 2023 (Bouvier, 2020).

Turkish drones, in particular, the Bayraktars TB2 produced by the Baykar Makina group, and the ANKAs, have enjoyed international success since 2020, on the front lines of various conflicts that have engulfed Turkey's vicinity, in particular: the Syrian conflict, the conflict in Libya, the Azeri-Armenian conflict in Nagorno Karabagh, and more recently since February 2022 the war in Ukraine (Donelli, 2022). These different conflicting theaters have made the effectiveness of Turkish drones known to the world (Donelli, 2022). The Azeri-Armenian conflict in September 2020 and the Syrian conflict in June 2020 were particularly illustrative of the effectiveness of Turkish drones (Donelli, 2022). Indeed, the Turkish Bayraktars TB2 drones used by the Azeri army, an ally of Turkey, in its conflict against the Armenian forces in Upper

Karabagh, were decisive, allowing many material losses in the opponent camp (Donelli, 2022). As a token of gratitude, the chairman of the Baykkar Makina group, Selcuk Bayraktar, will receive an honorary distinction from the President of Azerbaijan in April 2021 (Donelli, 2022). Previously, in June 2020, these same Turkish drones had already distinguished themselves in the theater of the Libyan conflict (Donelli, 2022). Indeed, the intervention of the Turkish forces, in Libya, in particular through the Bayraktars TB2 drones of the Turkish army, for the benefit of the Libyan government of the national accord of Fayed Al Sarraj, made it possible to repel the insurrection of the rebels led by General Haftar, at the gates of the capital Tripoli, after just a week of fighting (Donelli, 2022). Therefore, following these resounding successes, orders for drones made in Turkey are multiplying around the world, in particular, because of their good value for money (Donelli, 2022). Indeed, the Bayraktar TB2 would cost 5 million dollars per unit against 26 million dollars to acquire a U.S-made Protector drone (Donelli, 2022). Turkish drones, thus constitute since 2020, an essential instrument in Turkey's new foreign policy strategy, although part of the range of coercive instruments of hard power, they still participate in increasing Turkey's influence on the international scene (Donelli, 2022). This new international influence enjoyed by Turkey since 2020, thanks to its arms industry, has also earned Turkish diplomacy the qualifier of “drone diplomacy” (Donelli, 2022). Turkey's new foreign policy approach, focused on security concerns, and marked by “the militarization” and hardening of foreign policy instruments, will also manifest itself in Turkey-SSA relations from 2016. This new security component in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA is reflected in three main features:

- The strengthening of the military cooperation between Turkey and SSA countries;

- Turkey's “drone diplomacy” in SSA;
- And Turkey's involvement in the security crisis in the Sahel region.

5.4.1 The strengthening of military cooperation between Turkey and SSA countries

Turkey realized the importance of military cooperation with SSA countries since Abdullah Öcalan the leader of the PKK, fled to Kenya in 1999 (İnaç, 2022; Orakci, 2018). Subsequently, the latter's arrest was only possible thanks to the cooperation between Turkey’s intelligence services (MIT) and their Kenyan counterparts, in February 1999 (İnaç, 2022, p. 156). The strategic importance of SSA for Turkey, was subsequently, once again illustrated in 2016, within the framework of the failed coup, perpetrated by members of the FETO, for which the SSA countries constitute an important fallback base. In this regard, according to scholars like Kenfack (2020) and Donelli (2022, p. 4), Turkey has increased the number of its military Attachés in Africa, as a reflection of the strategic importance of Africa for Turkey. Hence, Kenfack (2020, p. 53), highlights that “out of 72 Turkish military mission attachés in the world, 18 are located in Africa, which represents the ¼ of the total”. This is a signal of increasing developments in Turkey-Africa cooperation in the fields of security and defense when one knows the role of these military Attachés in intelligence services. Accordingly, these military Attachés play an important role in the fight against FETO members, in transnational exile (Watmough & Öztürk, 2018) in some SSA countries, since the failed coup of 15 July 2016, and who still represents a threat to the security of Turkey. According to Orakçı (2018, p. 2), FETO members are still active, “undercover”, in countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and Uganda. Therefore, their extradition to Turkey is an essential issue in Turkey’s diplomatic relations with these countries. However, it should be emphasized that Turkey’s

security organs have already been successful in the capture of FETO members in SSA, since 2016. This includes the arrest in Sudan in 2017, of Memduh Çikmaz, “the safe box of FETO” (Orakçı, 2018, p. 2), by MIT; and in April 2018, the capture in Gabon of three high-rank FETO members by MIT (Orakçı, 2018, p. 2). Beyond the augmentation of Turkey’s military Attachés in SSA countries, Turkey also increased its formal cooperation with SSA countries, through the signature of defense and security agreements.

The defense agreements between Turkey and SSA countries cover areas relating to military training, training of gendarmerie and police forces, and cooperation in the field of the defense industry (Kenfack, 2020). Thus, concerning the training of police and gendarmerie forces, nearly 900 SSA officers belonging to these corps, have been trained in Turkey since 2007, in particular within the framework of the project: “International Police Training Cooperation Project” (Sıradağ, 2018). Regarding SSA countries that have signed defense agreements with Turkey, these are Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Guinee Bissau, Uganda, Benin, Chad, Congo- Brazzaville, the DRC (Sıradağ, 2018, p. 10).

Table 10. African Countries Linked to Turkey with at Least One Military or Security Agreement

Field of cooperation	Countries
Military Training, Science & Techniques	<i>Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan</i>
Gendarme Training	<i>Burkina Faso</i>
Police Training	<i>Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinee Bissau, Niger, Somalia, Uganda</i>

Defense Industry & Scientific Cooperation	<i>Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo-Brazzaville, Ethiopia, Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, DRC</i>
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Source: Retrieved from Kenfack (2020, p. 46).

The training of the defense forces of SSA countries is an important part of these military cooperation agreements between Turkey and SSA countries. With this in mind, Turkey has become in recent years a destination for training in the security and military field for SSA countries (Kenfack, 2020). In this regard, the Turkish National Defense University (NDU) has hosted militaries from SSA countries, for several years now. This is a Turkish higher education institution specializing in military training, created in July 2016 (Kenfack, 2020), following the failed coup perpetrated by factions of the Turkish army close to the GM. The creation of this institution, hence, follows the shutting-down of several Turkish military academies, as part of the fight against the GM (Kenfack, 2020). Therefore, the creation of the NDU by the Turkish government aims for the Turkish state to ensure the coordination of military training throughout the territory (Kenfack, 2020). Within the framework of military cooperation between Turkey and SSA countries, military personnel from several SSA countries have already been trained within this institution, which organizes refresher courses and seminars for them (Kenfack, 2020). Thus, in 2017, 176 SSA soldiers took part in training in Turkey (Kenfack, 2020, p. 48). The NDU has since its creation already trained more than 104 SSA officers from various countries such as Cameroon, Gambia, and Senegal (Kenfack, 2020). This university also received the visit of the delegations of the military schools of Nigeria and Tanzania in 2018 (Kenfack, 2020). One of the emblematic examples of this cooperation in military training between Turkey and the SSA countries is General Odawa Yusuf, current Chief of Staff of the

Somali army, who was among the first graduates from this university in 2016 (Kenfack, 2020).

In addition, still within the framework of cooperation in the field of military training between Turkey and SSA, Turkey also offers training for the armed forces of SSA countries at the Center of Excellence Defense Against Terrorism (COEDAT-NATO) (Kenfack, 2020). It is a military training institution created in 2003 in collaboration with NATO (Kenfack, 2020). This institution offers training mainly in the field of the fight against terrorism (Kenfack, 2020, p. 49). From this perspective, this institution is of particular interest to SSA countries that have been plagued by terrorism issues for several years (Kenfack, 2020). In addition to training the defense and security forces of SSA countries, Turkey has also become in recent years an important supplier of military equipment for SSA countries, thanks to recent developments made by Turkish industries in this field.

5.4.2 Turkey's "drone diplomacy" in SSA

For several years, Turkey has been using its advances in the field of military industry as an instrument of attraction in its relations with SSA countries (Donelli, 2022, p. 2). Indeed, the recent developments made by Turkish arms industries in this sector have enabled Turkey to deepen its presence in SSA, by expanding its areas of cooperation to the security and defense sectors, with this region of the continent. Thus, during the first decade of the opening-up policy to SSA initiated by the AKP, TFP in SSA was mainly focused on soft power instruments. Since 2020, the development of cooperation in the field of military industry with SSA has enabled Turkey to give a fresh impetus to its relations with SSA (Donelli, 2022, p. 1), and thus make Turkey a complete power in SSA. Indeed, the international success of the drones made in

Turkey, which have gained international recognition, following their resounding success in the military campaigns in Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, aroused the attraction of SSA countries, frequently confront with security issues such as civil wars, irredentism and increasingly terrorism. Besides, these security issues, African states must also face the conditionality and demands of Western powers, like the USA, France, and Great Britain, which are among the world's top suppliers of military equipment.¹⁹⁵ Indeed, these countries are very attentive to the issues of human rights and democracy for the sale of military equipment to SSA countries (Donelli, 2022, p. 4). It is also necessary to underline the high cost of military equipment from these Western countries for the budget of SSA states (Donelli, 2022, p. 4). In this context, the emergence of Turkey among the countries producing military equipment in recent years, offers an effective alternative to SSA countries in search of quality military equipment for their security, in particular, because of the good value for the price of military equipment made in Turkey, and the absence of conditionality linked to questions of democracy and human rights, for the purchase of this equipment to the Turkish partner (Donelli, 2022, p. 4). These factors enabled Turkey to become a major player in the field of security in SSA since 2020 (Donelli, 2022, p. 4).

This is materialized in practice, by the increasingly prominent place occupied by security and defense issues on Turkey's agenda in SSA. Initiatives such as the creation of the Turkey-Africa Forum on Defense, Security, and Space, by the Turkish military industries in 2018, attest to this fact (Besenyo, 2019, p. 82). In the same vein, President Erdoğan inaugurated, the 2021 edition of the International Defense Industry

¹⁹⁵ According to Kenfack (2020, p. 50): “the United States, Russia, France, Germany and China were the five largest arms exporters in 2014–2018”. While Turkey emerged as “the world 14th arms exporter in the world in 2019”. Source: Besenyo (2019).

Fair (IDEF) with the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Julius Maada Bio.¹⁹⁶ Thus, another materialization of the growing importance of security and defense issues in current Turkey-SSA relations is the place of these issues in the bilateral meetings between the leaders of Turkey and those of SSA since 2020. Thus, the defense industry was part of the debates at the Turkey-Africa summit in December 2021.¹⁹⁷ A summit session was specifically dedicated to discussions in this area¹⁹⁸. In addition, according to the media *Africanews*, several African Heads of State and government seized the opportunity of this summit to initiate negotiations relating to the purchase of military equipment made in Turkey.¹⁹⁹ Previously, the sale of arms and other military equipment had already been at the heart of exchanges during President Erdoğan's African tour in SSA, namely in Nigeria, Togo, and Angola in October 2021, as a prelude to the Turkey-Africa Summit in December 2021 (Donelli, 2022, p. 5). It should be underlined that the Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, is now part of President Erdoğan's official delegation in his visits to SSA, as well as the president of the SSB (Savunma Sanayi Baskanligi), the Turkish state agency in charge of the export of military equipment.²⁰⁰ This is a strong signal of the importance of security issues in general and the military industry in particular in this new phase of the AKP's foreign policy strategy in SSA following the events of 15 July 2016 (Donelli, 2022, p. 5). This is the place to underline that, following the failed coup of 15 July 2016, the Turkish

¹⁹⁶ Source: <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1317869/politique/turquie-afrique-des-hommes-daffaires-dans-le-sillage-dErdoğan-a-kinshasa-et-a-dakar/>.

¹⁹⁷ “Turkey-Africa Summit comes amid Ankara’s rising defense exports to continent”, *France 24*, December 17, 2021, online, retrieved from: <https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20211217-turkey-africa-summit-comesamid-ankara-s-rising-defence-exports-to-continent>.

¹⁹⁸ <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/turkey-africa-partnership-summit-adopts-joint-declaration/2451160>

¹⁹⁹“Turkey’s Africa Summit: a likely opportunity to sell more drones”, *Africanews*, December, 19, 2021, online, retrieved from: <https://www.africanews.com/2021/12/19/turkey-s-africa-sumit-a-likely-opportunity-to-sell-more-drones/>

²⁰⁰Source:<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1317869/politique/turquie-afrique-des-hommes-daffaires-dans-le-sillage-dErdoğan-a-kinshasa-et-a-dakar/>.

defense industry was placed under the direct control of the Turkish presidency. In addition to this, Turkey's arms businesses also received more funding from the Turkish state as well as important diplomatic support for their promotion abroad, since they are considered a contribution to Turkey's international prestige (Cannon, 2021).

Thus, as part of this African Tour of President Erdoğan in October 2021, beyond the opening of new Turkish embassies in Togo, and the establishment of a new Turkish Airlines route in Luanda (Angola), Turkish drones were the focus of President Erdoğan's African tour.²⁰¹ Indeed, most of the SSA heads of state met during this tour and expressed their interest in the acquisition of Turkish military drones.²⁰² During President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria in particular, the Nigerian President showed an interest in the purchase of Turkish military drones, which could be useful for his country in the fight against the terrorist group Boko Haram (Donelli, 2022). As such, negotiations would have been initiated between Turkey and Nigeria for the purchase by the latter of armed drones made in Turkey (Donelli, 2022).

However, beyond the interest shown and the prospects for purchase, Turkish drones have already distinguished themselves in the conflicting theater in SSA, in 2021, within the framework of the war in Ethiopia between the Ethiopian Federal government and the rebels of the Tigray (Donelli, 2022). These unnamed aerial vehicles, purchased in August 2021 during the visit to Ankara of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, were thus decisive in the fighting to push back the rebels who were already at the gates of the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa (Donelli, 2022). Finally, Niger, another SSA country heavily affected by terrorist attacks by groups such as Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel, also

²⁰¹ « Everywhere I go in Africa, everyone asks about UAV's ». Source: retrieved from: africanews.com.

²⁰² Ibid.

sealed an arms contract with Turkey in November 2021, including the purchase of Bayraktar TB2 military drones (Özkan & Kanté, 2022).

Beyond the attraction for Turkish military drones which constitute one of the most recent technological innovations in terms of military equipment, SSA states are also showing interest in other products of the Turkish defense industry (Donelli, 2022, p. 4). Thus, one of the military equipment made in Turkey, which is the most successful in SSA, is the armed vehicles produced by the Katmerciler Company (Donelli, 2022, p. 4). In 2021, this company sold 118 Hizir light armored vehicles to Kenya for \$91.4 million,²⁰³ as well as several of the same armored vehicles to Uganda for \$6.3 million.²⁰⁴ These Katmerciler armored vehicles have also been purchased by Senegal, Mali, Niger, and more recently in February 2022, during President Erdoğan's African Tour in Senegal and the DRC (Kenfack, 2020, p. 52). Other Turkish companies in the arms industry also won important business in SSA, such as Aselsan, which opened a branch in South Africa in 2011, Otokar, BMC, and Roketsan (Kenfack, 2020, p. 52). Thus, Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast have purchased Cobra vehicles from the Otokar Company.²⁰⁵ Burkina Faso has also ordered demining equipment from the Turkish firm Afsat.²⁰⁶

Overall, the developments made by Turkish industries in the field of military equipment and arms industries have enabled Turkey to establish itself as a major player in the security and defense sector in SSA, in particular, because of the need for SSA states plagued by security issues, for quality military equipment. Thus, thanks to its military technology offer, Turkey has been able to increase its influence in SSA, and

²⁰³Source:<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1317869/politique/turquie-afrique-des-hommes-daffaires-dans-le-sillage-dErdoğan-a-kinshasa-et-a-dakar/>.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵Source:<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1262938/economie/cote-divoire-burkina-rwanda-quand-la-turquie-accelere-en-afrique/>

²⁰⁶ Ibid.

can now extend its sphere of influence to strategic regions of SSA such as the Sahel, where it is increasingly imposing itself as a new player in the security crisis that has affected this strategic area of SSA for several years.

5.4.3 Turkey as a new player in the Sahel region

The “militarization” of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, since 2016, is also reflected in the search for strategic areas in SSA (Donelli, 2022, p. 6). To this end, Turkey has established itself as a power in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia and Sudan (Besenyo, 2019; Siradağ, 2018). Thus, Turkey opened in 2017 in Somalia, its largest military base abroad (Samalp & Crocy, 2021, p. 2; Siradağ, 2018, p. 9). This Turkish military base in Somalia is an essential strategic asset of Turkey, in its rivalry with the Gulf States, in particular, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for the control of the passageways of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean (İnaç, 2022, p. 157). Turkey also obtained during the year 2018, the management of Suakin Island in Sudan for 99 years, which is also an important passageway to the Red Sea (İnaç, 2022, p. 157). Thus, thanks to this agreement with the Sudanese authorities, Turkey has been able to increase its control over the Red Sea, which is the second most important maritime route in the world, and an “essential passage for trade between East Asia and Europe” (İnaç, 2022, p. 157). However, since 2018, Turkey has shown increasing interest in the Sahel region of West Africa (İnaç, 2022, p. 157).

Bordering North Africa, in particular countries like Libya, this region has for several years been strongly affected by the jihadist terrorism of groups such as AQIM and Boko Haram, which take advantage of the fragility of the States of this region to lead armed insurgencies within their territories. This situation has worsened with the civil war in Libya since 2012, which increased the proliferation of weapons in this

region. The Sahel is thus, a key geopolitical issue in the war against jihadist insurgents (International Crisis Group, 2022). To this end, this region is the subject of covetousness of several powers, in particular, France, Russia, and China, due, among other things, to the financial windfall represented by the arms markets, and the significant mineral wealth which abound in the states of the Sahel region. Thus, to fight against the rise of terrorism in this region, the states of the Sahel region set up during the year 2017, the G5 Sahel force, made up of the armies of the five SSA states that make up the Sahel region, namely: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. This joint force also relies on significant logistical and financial support from France.

Indeed, it should be noted that the Sahel region is mainly made up of former French colonies. The latter therefore considers this region as part of its sphere of influence in SSA and has been heavily involved in the politics of the states of this region since the 1960s. However, for some years now, the legitimacy of France within this region is called into question, in particular, because of its lack of success in the fight against terrorism in this region, whose states are also highly prone to coups. Thus, diplomatic tensions with Mali, a central state in the Sahel region, which have been exacerbated since 2020 with the military coup, that led to the overthrow of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita by the Malian army, will lead to the withdrawal of the French army in Mali, and more recently at the end of 2021, to France's decision to halve by 2023, the French troops in the G5 Sahel force (International Crisis Group, 2022). Turkey will seize this opportunity offered by the decline of France in the Sahel region to establish itself more and more as an alternative power in this region (International Crisis Group, 2022). In this perspective, the sharing of a common identity link, namely Islam, with the countries of this region composed of a majority of Muslim populations,

constitutes an asset for Turkey (International Crisis Group, 2022). Hence, the population of the Sahel countries perceives Turkey's security commitment in this region as legitimate (International Crisis Group, 2022). Indeed, faced with the exacerbation of “anti-French sentiment” among the population of this region, Turkey, a Muslim country, is perceived as a major international player, with which the countries of the region have more in common than the West, Russia, or China, and which can be beneficial to them (International Crisis Group, 2022).

Ankara will thus take advantage of this common religious identity to promote its economic and strategic interests in the Sahel (International Crisis Group, 2022). Subsequently, in 2020, Ankara began to develop its military cooperation with the countries of this region, in particular Niger and Mali. Thus, in July 2020, Niger and Turkey signed a Military Agreement (International Crisis Group, 2022). The latter, whose terms are secret, would provide for Turkish soldiers to come and train and support the Nigerien army in the fight against Boko Haram and for Turkey to help secure Niger's borders with Mali and Burkina Faso (International Crisis Group, 2022). Moreover, the recent military activism of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, in particular the opening of military bases in Somalia and Sudan, raises doubts as to the outcome of this agreement regarding the opening in the future, of a Turkish military base in Niger (Samalp & Crocy, 2021, p. 3).

As far as Turkey-Mali relations are concerned, Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavuşoğlu was the first senior foreign official to visit Mali, following the coup d'état perpetrated by the Malian army on August 18, 2020 (International Crisis Group, 2022). This, also raises doubts about Turkey's aims in the Sahel region, given the diplomatic tensions between France and the military in power in Mali.

It should be noted that this increasing Turkish involvement in the Sahel region has fueled tensions between France and Turkey.²⁰⁷ Hence, in November 2020, the French President, Emmanuel Macron, accused Turkey of weakening France's ties with West Africa by playing on “postcolonial resentment”.²⁰⁸ Turkey, for its part, justifies its security commitment in the Sahel by the need to protect Turkish economic investments in this region²⁰⁹. This point is shared by analysts such as Cannon (2021), according to whom Turkey has no strategic ambition in SSA (Cannon, 2021). Indeed, for Cannon (2021), Turkey’s new strategic interest in SSA is an opportunistic and ad-hoc policy, aiming mainly at increasing its arms sales in SSA countries. Cannon (2021), supports his point, by the fact that Turkey has no direct strategic interest in SSA, because this region is not part of its immediate vicinity, and therefore does not represent a direct threat to Turkey’s national security interest. Hence, for Cannon (2021), the recent opening of the Turkish military base in Somalia does not correspond to the will of Turkey to deploy its hard power in SSA, rather it is part of Turkey’s peacekeeping commitment in Somalia.

As a summary of this section of the thesis dedicated to the emergence of security and defense issues in TFP strategy in SSA, we can say that the increasing role of Turkey as a security player in SSA, following the events of the failed coup of 15 July 2016, results from the need for the Turkish state, to meet the security challenge represented by the FETO diaspora in SSA. Beyond that national security aspect, the emergence of Turkey as a security player in SSA, also responds to Turkey’s global strategy, to become an important arms supplier internationally ahead of the celebration of the 100 years of the Turkish Republic in 2023. In this regard, SSA with its various

²⁰⁷ <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1076943/politique/exclusif-emmanuel-macron-entre-la-france-et-lafrique-ce-doit-etre-une-histoire-damour/>

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

security and defense issues represent an important market for Turkey's arms industries, in their ambition to increase their exports to \$10.2 billion by 2023 (Cannon, 2021).

As far as our analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA after the failed coup of 15 July 2016 is concerned, the analysis of Turkey-SSA relations in the fields of security and defense, reveals once again the importance of the events of the failed coup of July 2016, as a conjectural determinant that prompted Turkey to increase the security component of its SSA foreign policy strategy. Furthermore, the analysis of Turkey's new arms sell diplomacy or "drone diplomacy" in SSA, once again highlights the strengthened role of the Turkish state, namely the Turkish head of state, in Turkey-SSA relations, as illustrated by the campaign led by President Erdoğan, to promote Turkey's arms industries in SSA. Finally, 2016 marks a new phase of Turkey-SSA relations, since, with the growth of the security components in its strategy in SSA, Turkey has become a complete power in SSA, using the full range of Foreign policy instruments, from soft instruments to hard instruments in its foreign policy strategy. This complete Foreign policy strategy enables Turkey to challenge traditional powers such as France in SSA.




Figure 16. Landscape of Turkey-Africa cooperation in the area of security and defense

Source: Retrieved from Besenyo (2019, p. 82)²¹⁰.

5.5 Conclusion

This chapter of the thesis aimed to analyze changes in the TFP strategy in SSA, after the event of the failed coup of 15 July 2016 in Turkey. Hence, the analysis highlighted some changes in the TFP strategy in SSA before and after, the said political events. These changes include a transformation in the relationship between the Turkish state and the Turkish private actors in the implementation of the TFP strategy in SSA. Thus, it appears that following the failed coup of 15 July 2016, the Turkish state actors took

²¹⁰ The information contained in this figure are not updated, namely with regard to a country like Cameroon, which signed a defense agreement with Turkey in 2021, or the DRC and Senegal which signed security and defense agreement with Turkey in February 2022.

the lead in its foreign policy toward SSA, which is in contrast to the first decade of the TFP in SSA, as developed in the previous chapter, where Turkey's SSA strategy relied on a strong state-civil society partnership. However, the study of Turkey's foreign policy strategy after the events of 15 July 2016, in the current chapter, also reveals a path-dependency on the part of the Turkish state, in its SSA strategy, since most of the transformations operated in the said strategy concern the actors and not the main content of the strategy. An illustration of this is the creation and new role attributed to the MAARIF Foundation by the Turkish government in TFP in SSA; as well as the new prerogatives and importance granted to the MÜSIAD in Turkey's economic diplomacy in SSA, by ruling Turkey's AKP, to replace the defunct GM affiliated TUSKON. Therefore, the Turkish ruling AKP seems to have kept the same *modus operandi* initiated by the Turkish CSOs in SSA, which made the success of Turkey in this area of the African continent during the opening-up phase of its policy in SSA. Another, important, new feature of the TFP strategy in SSA, to underline in the same regard, is the strengthened role of the Turkish Presidency, as an institutional actor of the TFP in SSA. Indeed, most of the Turkish institutions involved in the TFP, are now attached to the Turkish Presidency, like the Maarif Foundation, whose board members are designated by the Presidency, or the SSB, which has been attached to the Turkish Presidency following the events of the failed coup of 15 July 2016.

As far as the role and the involvement of the SSB in TFP strategy in SSA, after 2016, is concerned precisely, the analysis highlighted that Turkey has become a major player in the field of security and defense in SSA, hence adding coercive instruments in its overall foreign policy strategy in SSA. This, constitute one of the major innovation in the TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016, in comparison to the first

decade of the TFP in this region, when Turkey's strategy was based on soft power instruments.

Accordingly, with regards to all these variables, the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, in Turkey, can be considered a turning point in the TFP strategy in SSA, hence highlighting the internal-external dynamics of Turkish foreign policy, since this period marked the beginning of a new phase in Turkey-SSA relations. It remains to analyze how the underlined transformations operated by the Turkish state in its foreign policy strategy in SSA, impacted Turkey- SSA relations.

CHAPTER 6

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TFP STRATEGY IN SSA AFTER 15 JULY 2016

“Yavuz Selim's issue has been in the news for several years. Turkey has, for more than 3 years, asked for the closure of these schools for reasons that it had explained to us related somewhat to the stability of the country and the activities reproached to this movement (...) since then, Senegal had not agreed to kick out 3,000 students and we had demanded the share of our Turkish partners. Which was an exercise done. But then there was a coup in Turkey. (...) A total of 15 schools in Senegal provided this quality education. But, for a year, we had worked with the various stakeholders, informing them that the Turkish State had decided to interrupt the teaching activities of the Gülen movement in Senegal. This was done several months ago” (Macky Sall, President of the Republic of Senegal, October 2017).²¹¹

“You know, states don't have friends, they only have interests. What I ask to the Senegalese is to trust the head of state and their government, which is not going to take a decision that is contrary to the interests of the state” (Serigne Mbaye Thiam, Minister of National Education of the Republic of Senegal, February 2017).²¹²

“The Federal Government considers that Turkey's allegations and petitions are frivolous because they have no legal basis. (...) It would be morally and legally unjust to surrender at the request of the Turkish Government on mere allegations” (Malam Adamu Adamu, Nigeria Federal Minister of Education).²¹³

After an analysis of the elements of change and continuity in the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, following the July 2016 events in Turkey, in the previous chapter, the current chapter of the thesis, aims at making an empirical analysis of the reception of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA countries. In this regard, two case studies of the reaction of SSA countries to Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July

²¹¹Source:https://senego.com/macky-sall-oui-cest-le-president-turc-Erdoğan-qui-a-demande-la-fermeture-de-yavuz-selim_580118.html.

²¹²« Serigne Mbaye Thiam sur l’Affaire Yavuz Selim: les Etats n’ont pas d’Amis ils n’ont que des Intérêts », *Le quotidien* (Dakar), 17 February 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/serigne-mbaye-thiam-sur-laffaire-yavuz-selim-les-etats-nont-pas-damis-ils-nont-que-des-interets/>

²¹³“Turkey asks Nigeria to shut-down Turkish College”, *The Daily Trust* (Nigeria), July 29, 2016, <http://www.dailytrust.com.ng/news/general/turkey-asks-nig-to-shut-down-turkish-college/157199.html>.

2016, will be analyzed: the Turkey-Nigeria relation, and the Turkey-Senegal relation. The choice of these two countries responds to the concern to better account for the reception of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA countries which have a diplomatic and economic power similar to that of Turkey, and likely to cooperate with Turkey on an equal basis, as well as in SSA countries where Ankara exercises a stronger influence, due to its dominance in the balance of power. Furthermore, to better highlight the perception of Turkey's foreign policy in these SSA countries, this chapter uses the content analysis method, based on the media coverage by various press organs of the selected countries of the relationship between these countries and Turkey, from July 2016's events onwards.

Finally, in another part, this chapter will challenge the findings and results obtained on the analysis of the TFP strategy in SSA after the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey, within the framework of this study, against assumptions of the concept of soft power, as it was conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004, 2008). Indeed, this last section of the study will focus on the analysis of the relevance of various assumptions in the conceptualization of soft power by Nye (1990, 2004, 2008), in the light of the observations and results obtained following our analysis of the strategy of the TFP in SSA after the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey.

6.1. The Mixed Reaction of African States to Changes in Turkey's Foreign Policy Strategy in SSA: a Comparative Analysis of the Reaction of SSA's Major Economic Powers and SSA's Medium Economic Powers

An analysis of the reaction of SSA countries to Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, exhibits two different reactions of SSA countries to the post-July 2016' TFP focused on the fight against the GM network, according to the

economic power of the country. Indeed, there is, on the one hand, a rather negative reaction to the TFP post-July 2016, in the SSA's economic powers, in particular countries like Nigeria, South Africa, and Kenya. On the other hand, there is a positive reaction of economically less advanced countries of SSA, like Chad, Mali, Cameroon, and Senegal to the TFP post-July 2016 in general, and more specifically to the fight against the GM network in Africa initiated by the Turkish Government. Therefore, in order to better account for this contrasting reaction of SSA countries to the TFP post-July 2016, the analysis of the relationship between Turkey and two SSA countries belonging to these two categories will be carried out, namely the Turkey-Nigeria relation and the Turkey-Senegal relation.

6.1.1 The reaction of SSA economic big powers to the change in TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016: the case of Turkey-Nigeria relation

Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, post-July 2016, focusing on the fight against the GM network, experienced a mitigated success in some countries of the SSA region and more specifically with the economic powers of SSA. Thus, the Turkish authorities are encountering difficulties in developing the new TFP strategy, focused on the fight against GM, in some SSA countries.

Indeed, it should be noted that in some SSA countries, although poor, such as CAR and Mozambique, the special links maintained by the leaders of the GM schools with the political elite, as well as the involvement of this political elite in the management of the said schools, allowed the GM to outlive the offensive of the Turkish government (Augé, 2018; Czerep, 2019).²¹⁴ In other countries, considered the

²¹⁴ In the case of the CAR, the wife of the Prime Minister is one of the founders of the Turkish school, "Galaxy school". Moreover, this school is one of the best schools in this particularly poor and unstable country of SSA, which makes the question of its closure even more difficult for the authorities of this country. As far as Mozambique is concerned, the President of the Republic, Filipe Nyusi, as well as the

economic powers of SSA, like Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, and until 2021 Ethiopia,²¹⁵ the Turkish authorities have also come up against the refusal of these countries to put an end to the activities of the GM on their territories. This might be explained by the fact that these countries can resist the pressures of the Turkish authorities regarding the extermination of the GM network on their territories, as these states are enough economically developed to face the risk of lower subsidies or investments from Turkey, in addition to their importance for the economic diplomacy of Turkey in SSA. Hence, the governments of these countries have not responded favorably to Turkey's request to close the GM schools or transfer them to the TMF, in particular, because they consider the management of the GM schools to be an issue of national sovereignty, and also because of the importance of GM schools and companies within their societies. As a result, the issue of the fight against the GM network has considerably affected Turkey's image among the economic powers of SSA, since 2016. The relationship between Turkey and Nigeria, the largest economy on the African continent, is particularly illustrative of this.

Minister of Defense, Atanasio Salvatore Ntumute, maintain privileged relations with the GM Willow International School. Indeed, as regards the President of the Republic, the son of the latter is a graduate of this institution, while the Minister of Defense is one of the investors and even honorary president of this school. Thus, these various links of important elites of this country with the GM school of Mozambique, makes the fight of the Turkish government against GM in this country, particularly difficult.

²¹⁵ The takeover of the 06 GM Schools in Ethiopia by the TMF was particularly difficult. Indeed, until 2021, the Ethiopian authorities preferred the takeover of these schools by third parties to their takeover by the TMF. It was at the end of 2021 that the Ethiopian government finally agreed to hand over the management of these schools to the TMF, in particular following the contribution of security cooperation between Turkey and Ethiopia (sale of Turkish drones to Ethiopia) in the conflict of the Ethiopian government against the rebels of Tigray. Source: "Turkey's Maarif take over 2nd FETÖ-linked school in Ethiopia", *Hurriyet Daily news*, 7 September, 2021. <https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-maarif-takes-over-2nd-feto-linked-school-in-ethiopia-166340>.

6.1.1.1 Background of Turkey-Nigeria relations after 15 July 2016 failed coup in Turkey

Nigeria is a good case study of the reaction of economically advanced SSA countries to the African strategy of the TFP after July 2016, insofar as this country is the first economic partner of Turkey in SSA, with a volume of exchange that amounted to 754 million dollars in 2020,²¹⁶ but also because of the strong presence of the Turkish diaspora in this country, especially those affiliated with the Gülen community. Indeed, the “de-gülinification”²¹⁷ of its SSA policy, intensified by the Turkish authorities since the July 2016 failed coup in Turkey, has strongly impacted diplomatic relations between Turkey and Nigeria, because of the involvement of the GM in the development of ties between the two countries. Hence, in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup, Turkish diplomacy through its then Ambassador in Abuja, Hassan Çakıl, intensified the pressure on the Nigerian authorities to close schools, hospitals, and businesses of the Turkish nationals affiliated with the GM, and to transfer their various assets to the TMF, likely to build more social infrastructure within the framework of the cooperation between the two countries.²¹⁸ However, given the importance of these Turkish schools in Nigerian society, and also because of the pressure exerted by the Nigerian civil society on the Federal Government of Nigeria to keep these schools open, the political cost associated with the closure of the GM institutions pushed the Nigerian authorities to reject Turkey's request. Furthermore, it should be noted that these educational institutions of the GM were founded in partnership with Nigerian

²¹⁶“Expectations as Erdoğan visits Nigeria”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 17 October, 2021, <https://dailytrust.com/expectations-as-turkish-president-Erdoğan-visits-nigeria>.

²¹⁷This expression is retrieved from: Cagaptay (2020, p. 232).

²¹⁸ “Turkey Concludes Plans to Establish Maarif Foundation”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), February, 11, 2019, <https://dailytrust.com/turkey-concludes-plans-to-establish-maarif-foundation>.

businessmen, and some cases with Nigerian Muslim organizations.²¹⁹ In order to reject the demand of the Turkish government, the Nigerian authorities relied in particular on the fact that the Turkish side did not present any tangible proof of the GM's involvement in the July 2016 coup, as well as the membership of GM members in a terror organization.²²⁰ In line with this, the Nigerian Federal Minister of Education, Malam Adamu Adamu, told the Nigerian press in 2016:

The Federal Government consider that Turkish allegations and petitions are frivolous because they have no legal basis (...) it would be morally and legally unjust to surrender at the request of the Turkish government on mere allegations.²²¹

Thus, the Nigerian authorities have simply conceded to changing the name of the GM institutions, by removing the mention of Turkey from their labels, to appease the Turkish side. To this end, the Turkish Nizamiye Hospital simply became the Nizamiye Hospital and the Turkish Nile University was renamed the Nile University.²²²

Subsequently, the Turkish authorities proceeded to arrest about fifty (50) Nigerian students in Turkey, including the son of the speaker of the National Assembly of Nigeria, and to the exclusion of Nigerian students holding GM scholarships, on the grounds of their belonging to a terror group (Baydemir, 2020, p. 65). These arrests were relayed in the Turkish media, where these foreign students were presented as imported agents of the FETO.²²³ The YTB President Kudrat Bülbül had also announced to *Anadolu Agency*, the cancellation of scholarships and the extradition to

²¹⁹“Drone Diplomacy? Turkey’s growing presence in Africa”, *France 24*, October, 15, 2021, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RTz2YqR3050>.

²²⁰ “How FG Snubbed Turkey on Schools Closure”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), July, 26, 2016, <https://dailytrust.com/how-fg-snubbed-turkey-on-schools-closure>.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² “Drone Diplomacy? Turkey’s growing presence in Africa”, Op. Cit.

²²³ “İthal ajanlar sınır dışı”, *Daily Sabah* (Turkey), August, 3. 2016, <http://www.sabah.com.tr/egitim/2016/09/28/ithal-ajanlar-sinir-disi>.

their countries of foreign students in connection with FETO.²²⁴ This situation contributed to further exacerbating diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Nigeria, insofar as the arrest of the Nigerian students was perceived by the Nigerian authorities as a means of pressure used by Turkey to induce the Nigerian government to yield to the request from the Turkish authorities relating to the seizure and closure of schools, businesses, and hospitals of GM members in Nigeria.²²⁵ With this in mind, the Nigerian House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on Turkey to apologize to Nigeria for the illegal arrest of Nigerian students in Turkey, at the risk of Nigeria adopting retaliatory measures as a form of reciprocity (Baydemir, 2020, p. 65).

Subsequently, the Nigerian government refused the extradition to Turkey of the 1,000 Turkish nationals' members of the GM living on its territory, as requested by the Ankara authorities.²²⁶ The Nigerian government also granted them the status of refugees in Nigeria, the latter having been stripped of Turkish nationality and their passports canceled following the failed coup of July 2016.²²⁷ Hence, the spokesperson for the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria, declared in 2017, to the Nigerian press, that Nigeria would guarantee the rights of all the refugees living on its territory and reassured the Turkish refugees living in Nigeria of their full legal protection guaranteed by Nigerian law and international law, and that until they are found to have violated Nigerian law, Nigeria will continue to collaborate with members of the Hizmet movement.²²⁸

²²⁴“FETÖ bağlantısı tespit edilen öğrencilerin bursları kesilecek”, *Anadolu Agency*, August, 21, 2016, <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/turkiye/feto-baglantis-i-tespit-edilen-ogrencilerin-burslari-kesilecek/621359>.

²²⁵“Nigeria won't allow mistreatment of her students by Turkey”, *The Guardian* (Nigeria), February, 23, 2016, <https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria-wont-allow-mistreatment-of-her-students-by-turkey/>.

²²⁶«Nigerian govt reacts to planned deportation of 1000 Turks », Op.Cit.

²²⁷Ibid.

²²⁸ «Nigerian govt reacts to planned deportation of 1000 Turks », Op. Cit.

It should also be noted that Nigerian civil society, in particular the press, pupils' parents' associations, and NGOs, has been heavily involved in the issue of the closure of GM schools in Nigeria, given the importance of these schools in the country's education system. The issue of the closure and seizure of GM schools by the Turkish government, and later the arrest of Nigerian students in Turkey, thus significantly tarnished Turkey's image with the Nigerian public, from 2016 onward (Baydemir, 2020, p. 65). Thus, following the arrest of Nigerian students in Turkey, a march of protest was organized by the parents of students in front of the Turkish Embassy in Abuja (Baydemir, 2020, p. 65). Nigerian activists such as Chioma Osuji, president of the Civil Society Action Coalition for Education for All (CSACEFA), created in 2000, which brings together more than 600 civil society education organizations in Africa, also demonstrated their protest against the Turkish policy of closure of GM' schools in SSA.²²⁹ The latter thus urged African governments to resist any plot of the Turkish government and to highlight their sovereignty and respectability, by refusing the disguised order to hand over Turkish schools to the Maarif Foundation:

African governments should resist any plot by the Turkish government and highlight their sovereignty and respectability by refusing the disguised order to hand over the Turkish schools to the TMF. How is it possible? An NGO taking charge of private investments with the help of the government? It is not possible. They cannot just wake up one day and take charge of the schools. It would be terrible. It is Africa. We will not allow any country to treat us as a banana continent. I did not see any country in Africa that would accept that. Certainly not Nigeria. There would be strong opposition.²³⁰

In the same vein, the MURIC, a Muslim faith-based NGO in Nigeria, published a column in support of the GM in several Nigerian newspapers, in the framework of the

²²⁹« La Fondation Turquie Maarif Fossoyeur de l'Éducation en Afrique », *le quotidien* (Dakar), 11 June 2017, <http://www.lequotidien.sn/la-fondation-turque-maarif-fossoyeur-de-leducation-en-afrique/>

²³⁰ Ibid.

official visit to Nigeria, in October 2021, of President Erdoğan.²³¹ In this column, the president of the MURIC stated:

We heartily welcome the bilateral agreements signed by Nigeria and Turkey as they have the potential to boost economic and military advancement in both countries. (...) However, we take the Turkish president's allegation that there are terrorists in Nigeria with a pinch of salt. It is false, baseless, and of no consequences whatsoever, we are aware of the existence of Boko Haram and ISWAP terrorists in the country, but we reject the attempt to label innocent Turkish citizens as terrorists just because there is a political different between them and their president.²³²

To sum up, the background of Turkey- Nigeria relations, after the events of the July 2016 failed coup in Turkey, exhibits a fairly tense relationship between the two countries at the state level, as well as a deterioration of Turkey's image at the level of the Nigerian civil society. However, to better account for the perception of Turkey's foreign policy in Nigeria after 2016, it is worth carrying out a content analysis of the media coverage by the Nigerian press, of the relations between both countries since 2016. This content analysis aims to highlight the perception of the image of Turkey's foreign policy in Nigeria since 2016, as well as the subsequent developments recorded in the relations between the two countries since 2016.

6.1.1.2 Analysis of Nigeria's perception of TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016

According to Yaylaci and Karakuş (2015), newspapers are a rich source of data, to analyze how the public perceives political news. Indeed, as these scholars point out, the media influence public opinion, by acting both as a reflection and as a support for

²³¹“Islamic group warns Turkey President, Erdoğan as he arrives Nigeria today”, *Daily Post* (Nigeria), October, 18. 2021, <https://dailypost.ng/2021/10/18/islamic-group-warns-turkey-president-Erdoğan-as-he-arrives-nigeria-today>.

²³²Ibid.

the dominant public opinion (Yaylaci & Karakuş, 2015, p. 239). It is in the same vein, that the content analysis of the media coverage of the Turkey-Nigeria relationship by Nigerian newspapers in this study aims to highlight how Turkey's foreign policy vis-à-vis Nigeria since 2016, is perceived by the Nigerian side, but also to assess Turkey's image in Nigeria since the political events of July 2016 in Turkey, which had repercussions on the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

6.1.1.2.1 Data analysis method

In order to highlight the perception of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA after July 2016 by Nigerian society and authorities, a content analysis of the online press, as well as statements by Nigerian and Turkish authorities was conducted. In this regard, 4 Nigerian online newspapers, namely: *the Daily Trust*, *the Daily Post*, *the Guardian Nigeria*, and *the Punch* were selected. It should be emphasized that the choice of the news source to analyze was made randomly. Besides, the statements of the Nigerian and Turkish authorities to this Nigerian press were also used. The data was obtained from the online database of these different newspapers and analyzed through the method of content analysis based on categories. The online newspapers were analyzed for the period ranging from July 2016 to March 2022, based on themes and style.

Concerning the method of analysis itself, the online databases of the various newspapers were analyzed separately by the author. Subsequently, the data obtained were classified into main themes and sub-categories. The search for data was done manually, namely without the use of search software, by typing the keywords in the search tab of the various websites of the selected newspapers. Five (05) keywords or themes were used to obtain results in the websites of the selected newspapers, namely:

- Turkey-Nigeria relations

- Turkish schools in Nigeria
- Turkish Maarif Foundation
- Turkish refugees in Nigeria
- President Erdoğan visits Nigeria.

However, only the themes: of Turkish schools in Nigeria and President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria were retained, as they generated the most relevant results. It should be noted that these research themes were chosen based on the main highlights of the Turkey-Nigeria relationship after July 2016, as analyzed in the previous section. Subsequently, the articles obtained from the various websites of the four (04) selected newspapers were classified into three (03) sub-categories for the theme "Turkish Schools in Nigeria", namely:

- Diplomatic tension between Turkey and Nigeria
- Authoritarian drift of the Turkish government
- Nigerian students arrested in Turkey.

The theme of President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria, for its part, generated only one sub-category: security cooperation between Turkey and Nigeria.

6.1.1.2.2 Findings

The results are presented following the total number of press articles obtained from the websites of the various online newspapers, and their distribution according to the various sub-categories. In figure 17, the total number of articles obtained from the two selected themes, is presented. Thus, the two research themes "Turkish schools in

Nigeria" and "Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria", generated around 200 articles in the selected Nigerian press.




Figure 17. The number of news and column articles on the themes of “Turkish schools in Nigeria” and “President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria” in the four (04) selected Nigerian newspapers

Source: The Author

As figure 17 shows, *the Daily Trust* newspaper published the most articles on the theme “Turkish school in Nigeria”, while *The Punch* newspaper published the most articles on the theme “President Erdoğan's Visit to Nigeria”. It should also be noted that *the Daily Trust* newspaper has the fewest articles on the theme "President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria". Besides, most of the articles of this newspaper regarding the relations between Turkey and Nigeria, date from the period between 2016 -2019, which corresponds to the period of a diplomatic row between Turkey and Nigeria, following the failed coup d'état of July 2016 in Turkey, and the transfer of Gülen schools to the TMF and the extradition of Turkish refugees in Nigeria to Turkey, as

required by the Turkish government, as well as the arrest of Nigerian students in Turkey.

6.1.1.2.2.1 Findings on the theme “Turkish schools in Nigeria”

The analysis of the theme “Turkish schools in Nigeria within the selected Nigerian newspapers, reveals that the issue of the transfer of GM schools to the TMF or their closure, as required by the Turkish authorities, was analyzed in the Nigerian press under three sub-categories, namely:

- Diplomatic row between Turkey and Nigeria
- Authoritarian drift of the Turkish government
- Arrest of Nigerian students in Turkey.

The distribution of the number of articles for the various newspapers, for these three sub-categories, is presented in figure 18.




Figure 18. Distribution of news on the theme “Turkish schools in Nigeria” in the four selected Nigerian newspapers

Source: The author

As figure 18 shows, the issue of the closure of GM schools in Nigeria following the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey, was particularly covered by the *Daily Trust* newspaper, which notably published many articles on this topic in its opinion section between 2016 and 2019. As can be seen, most of these newspapers analyze the issue of the closure of Turkish schools from the angle of diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Nigeria. Then, the Turkish AKP government is perceived as authoritarian by the Nigerian press, in its fight against the GM, because, as Figure 2 shows, after the category "diplomatic tension between Turkey and Nigeria", it is the category "authoritarian drift in Turkey" which dominates. The Nigerian press after 2016, criticizes, in particular, the methods used by the AKP government, to fight against the GM, like the muzzling of the Turkish media, and the spying on the Turks (members of the GM) in foreign countries. In addition, the Nigerian press raises doubts about the membership of Turkish refugees in Nigeria, to a terror organization (the FETO), as presented by the Turkish authorities, given the social and humanitarian activities carried out by the latter in Nigeria. Thus, the allegations of the Turkish government on the terrorist character of the FETO, are perceived in the Nigerian press as "irrational"²³³ or even "madness."²³⁴ In an article in the *Daily Post*, entitled "Those Erdoğan Calls Terrorists Are Building Schools, Hospitals, Helping Nigerians,"²³⁵ in particular, the humanitarian works of GM members in Nigeria are highlighted. Finally, it should also be pointed out that the issue of the arrest of Nigerian students in Turkey in 2016, as part of the fight of the Turkish authorities against the GM network, has

²³³ "In Turkey, an Irrational Fear of Someone Else's Popularity", *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 11 August, 2016, <https://dailytrust.com/in-turkey-an-irrational-fear-of-someone-elses-popularity>.

²³⁴ "Madness in Turkey: High Time Civilized World Intervenes", *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 25 August, 2016, <https://dailytrust.com/madness-in-turkey-high-time-civilised-world-intervenes>.

²³⁵ "Those Erdoğan called terrorists are building schools, hospitals, helping Nigerians", *Daily Post* (Nigeria), 22 October, 2021, <https://dailypost.ng/2021/10/22/those-Erdoğan-called-terrorists-are-building-schools-hospitals-helping-nigerians-muric>.

been analyzed by the Nigerian press as a means of coercion by the Turkish government on the Nigerian authorities. This is illustrated in press articles, such as “Nigeria should resist Turkey's bullying,”²³⁶ or “Nigeria won't allow mistreatment of her students by Turkey.”²³⁷

Moreover, given the large number of articles devoted to diplomatic tensions between Turkey and Nigeria, this sub-category itself reveals 2 sub-categories, namely:

- GM as a Turkish problem, and
- Respect for the sovereignty of Nigeria.




Figure 19. Distribution of news for the sub-categories “Hizmet as Turkish issue” and “respect of the sovereignty of Nigeria” in the four selected Nigerian newspapers

Source: The Author

Thus, the analysis of press articles that fall under the category “diplomatic tension between Turkey and Nigeria,” shows that the fight against GM led by the

²³⁶ “Nigeria should resist Turkey’s bullying”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 20 August, 2016, <https://punchng.com/nigeria-resist-turkeys-bullying/>.

²³⁷ “Nigeria won’t allow mistreatment of her students by Turkey”, *The Guardian* (Nigeria), 15 September, 2016, <https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria-wont-allow-mistreatment-of-her-students-by-turkey/>.

Turkish authorities is perceived in Nigeria as a strictly Turkish domestic issue, which has nothing to do with Nigeria. In this regard, the request of the Turkish authorities to close the schools and businesses of the GM refugees in Nigeria is perceived as an attack on the sovereignty of Nigeria and interference in the domestic affairs of Nigeria, to which the Nigerian press appeals the government of Nigeria to resist. This is illustrated in *Daily Trust* articles such as “How federal government snubbed Turkey on schools closure;”²³⁸ “Count us out of Turkey’s coup”,²³⁹ “Turkish schools in Nigeria are not owned by the Turkish government”.²⁴⁰

6.1.1.2.2 Findings on the theme of president Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria

The content analysis of the Nigerian online press also reveals that the year 2021, was an important turning point in diplomatic relations between Turkey and Nigeria. Indeed, as figure 20 shows, several articles in the selected press focused in particular on President Erdoğan's state visit to Nigeria in October 2021, as well as on the participation of Nigerian President Mohamadou Buhari in the Turkey-Africa summit in Istanbul in December 2021. Among the four selected newspapers, these events were particularly covered by the Nigerian newspaper *the Punch*, which devoted 12 articles to the topic.

²³⁸ “How federal government snubbed Turkey on schools closure”, Op. Cit.

²³⁹ “Count us out of Turkey’s Coup”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 1 August, 2016, <https://dailytrust.com/count-us-out-of-turkey-s-coup>.

²⁴⁰ “Turkish Schools in Nigeria are not owned by the Turkish Government”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 20 September, 2016, <https://dailytrust.com/turkish-schools-in-nigeria-are-not-owned-by-government-of-turkey>.




Figure 20. Distribution of news on the theme “President Erdoğan's visit to Nigeria” in the four selected Nigerian newspapers

Source: The author

It should be noted that in these articles devoted to these two important events in the Turkey-Nigeria relationship, the relationship between the two countries is mainly analyzed from the angle of the security cooperation between the two states, in particular the fight against terrorism. Turkey is thus perceived from 2021 onward, by the Nigerian press, as a great military power on the international level which can help Nigeria in its fight against terrorism, in particular against the Boko Haram terror group, as illustrated by articles in the newspaper *The Punch*, such as: “Turkey to help Nigeria tackle insecurity;”²⁴¹ “Turkish teams discuss naval ships with Nigeria officials;”²⁴² “Turkey agrees to sell naval ships to Nigeria: Buhari pledges partnership;”²⁴³ “Nigeria-Turkey to strengthen security and defense ties;”²⁴⁴ “who will tell Buhari that Nigeria is at war.”²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ “Turkey to help Nigeria tackle insecurity”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 15 October, 2021, <https://dailypost.ng/2021/12/17/turkey-to-help-nigeria-tackle-insecurity/>

²⁴² “Turkish teams discuss naval ships with Nigeria officials”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 14 October, 2021, <https://punchng.com/turkish-teams-discuss-naval-ships-sale-others-with-nigerian-officials/>

²⁴³ “Turkey agrees to sell naval ships to Nigeria: Buhari pledges partnership”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 20 October, 2021, <https://punchng.com/turkey-agrees-to-sell-naval-ships-to-nigeria-buhari-pledges-partnership/>

²⁴⁴ “Nigeria-Turkey to strengthen security and defense ties”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 20 October, 2021, <https://punchng.com/nigeria-turkey-to-strengthen-security-defence-ties/>

²⁴⁵ “who will tell Buhari that Nigeria is at war”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 15 October 2021, <https://punchng.com/who-will-tell-buhari-that-nigeria-is-at-war/>

It should be highlighted that in general, the content analysis of the Nigerian press coverage of Turkey-Nigeria relations after the coup attempt perpetrated by the GM in July 2016, in Turkey, unveils two main periods in the relationship between the two countries. The first period which begins just after the coup of July 2016, was marked by the request of the Turkish authorities to the federal government of Nigeria to close the schools and other assets of the GM in Nigeria. This period corresponds to the diplomatic tensions between the two countries and relates to most of the press articles selected from 2016 to 2019. Finally, a second period which begins from October 2021 onwards, in particular the articles which relate to the visit of President Erdoğan to Nigeria, indicates a more peaceful relationship between the two countries, in particular, the end of the diplomatic row regarding the GM issue, thanks to Turkey's support in the fight against terrorism in Nigeria. This tightening of the security cooperation between the two states from 2021, relates not only to the fight against terrorism but also to the arms industry, as well as the construction of infrastructure. The TMF has thus, undertaken to build a five-star hotel, a conference center, an international standard hospital, and schools in Abuja.²⁴⁶ The new impetus in the security cooperation between Turkey and Nigeria has helped ease the tensions between both countries triggered by the issue of GM refugees in Nigeria. Thus, in his address to the Nigerian press on October 20, 2021, during his official visit to Nigeria, President Erdoğan²⁴⁷ stated that Turkey was ready to help Nigeria in its fight against terrorism:

²⁴⁶ Source: “Nigeria places Erdoğan’s enemies on surveillance in exchange for Turkey’s military assistance”, *The Africa Report*, 15 March, 2022, <https://www.theafricareport.com/159327/nigeria-places-Erdogans-enemies-on-surveillance-in-exchange-for-turkeys-military-assistance/amp/>, consulted on 16/07/2022.

²⁴⁷ « Terrorists who launched coup against me are in Nigeria-Turkish President », *Daily Post* (Nigeria), 20 October, 2021, <https://dailypost.ng/2021/10/20/terrorists-who-launched-coup-against-me-are-in-nigeria-turkish-president>.

Distinguished members of the press, as Turkey, we have closely monitoring developments unfolding in Nigeria, our brotherly and friendly nation. We are ready to share our ever-expanding capabilities with Nigeria, especially in the field of the defense industry and security which has been praised by the entire globe.²⁴⁸

President Erdoğan also hinted in this speech that Turkey expected reciprocity from Nigeria in its fight against terrorism, recalling that the GM was still active on Nigerian territory:

The perpetrator of the heinous failed coup of July the 15th, FETO, is still illegally active in Nigeria, and we are continuously sharing our intelligence with the Nigerian interlocutors and authorities (...). This sensitivity that we have showcased in fighting terrorism, I hope, will be reciprocated by our Nigerian brothers, sisters, and counterparts.²⁴⁹

Subsequently, in December 2021, Nigerian President Buhari, paid an official visit to Turkey, within the framework of the Turkey-Africa summit, which was described as "epic" by the Nigerian press, in particular the daily newspaper *the Guardian*.²⁵⁰ Thus, as part of this official visit, Turkey and Nigeria continued discussions on security cooperation. The Nigerian state of Zamfara, particularly affected by the abuses of the terror group Boko Haram, finalized discussions for the purchase of Turkish military drones during this visit (Donelli, 2022).

Clearly, since 2021, the Nigerian authorities have realized that Turkey could be a useful partner in the fight against insecurity in Nigeria, in particular for the supply of military equipment and armaments. As Prince Adetokunbo Kayode, former

²⁴⁸Ibid.

²⁴⁹ Ibid.

²⁵⁰“Takeaways from Buhari’s epic visit to Turkey”, *The Guardian* (Nigeria), 23 December 2021, <https://guardian.ng/news/takeaways-from-buharis-epic-visit-to-turkey-by-garba-shehu/>

Minister of Defense of Nigeria, told the *Daily Trust*, in December 2021 about the security cooperation between Turkey and Nigeria.²⁵¹

Turkey is a major defense items producer, a major shipbuilding country, and an all-around growing industrial power. The Nigerian Armed Forces require access to modern weapons systems, especially those relevant to the new war, asymmetric warfare, counter-insurgency campaigns, trans-border banditry, and tactical support for internal security forces. These can be purchased from Turkey for immediate and strategic supplies when needed to build a strategic relationship.²⁵²

Thus, following the Turkey-Africa summit of December 2021, the spokesperson for the Nigerian government, Garba Shehu, declared to the Nigerian press that Turkey is a key partner for the security of Nigeria and that in this aim, Nigeria will not let any entity undermine its relations with Turkey.²⁵³

The national security component equally has a Turkish angle to it and one that turned to be one of the gains, in the sense that both countries have a common view of what Turkey perceives as a security threat to their nation and its leaders present in Nigeria. This is about some Turkish investments, schools, and hospitals associated with an opposition figure linked to the abortive coup and attempted assassination of President Erdoğan.²⁵⁴

This statement by the Nigerian government constitutes a U-turn in Nigeria's stance vis-à-vis the Turkish government's policy of fighting against the GM network in Nigeria. Indeed, through this declaration, the Nigerian authorities now concede the GM's involvement in the failed July 2016 coup in Turkey. Hence, in March 2022, the Nigerian government took measures aimed at controlling the flow of financial assets

²⁵¹ “Expectations as Erdoğan visits Nigeria”, Op. Cit.

²⁵² Ibid

²⁵³ “Nigeria won’t allow any entity undermine ties with Turkey –Presidency”, *The Punch* (Nigeria), 26 December, 2021, <https://punchng.com/nigeria-wont-allow-any-entity-undermine-ties-with-turkey-presidency/>

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

of GM members in Nigeria, so that they could not use the money obtained through their business in Nigeria, to finance actions prejudicial to the Turkish State.²⁵⁵

The government of Nigeria will not allow any part of our territory to be used to undermine a friendly state such as Turkey. Under our strict Central Bank and Financial Intelligence Unit's governance structure and management, money from the investments in issue cannot be moved anywhere to finance subversive activities.²⁵⁶

Clearly, given this new favorable stand of the Nigerian government concerning the request of the Turkish government in the context of the fight against the GM network, the Turkish strategy of "drone diplomacy", can be considered a new instrument in the Turkish soft power toolkit in SSA, since Turkish armaments have enabled Ankara to turn the tide in its tense relations with Nigeria prompted by the issue of the closure of GM schools, and finally, to slowly obtain from the Nigerian authorities, the outcomes she wanted regarding the handling of GM' refugees in Nigeria. Therefore, the control of the financial transactions of the GM refugees living in Nigeria, could be the first step towards full acceptance, in the future, by the Nigerian government of the demands of the Turkish authorities regarding the GM in Nigeria. However, although the Nigerian federal government has conceded control of the GM's financial assets, it should be stressed that the Nigerian authorities have not yet, to date, officially changed their stance on the issue of the closure of the GM schools or their transfer to the TMF.

²⁵⁵Ibid.

²⁵⁶Ibid.

6.1.2 The Reaction of SSA middle economic powers to the change in TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016: the case of Turkey-Senegal relations

Just like Nigeria, is a good case study of the reaction of the economic powers of SSA to the Turkish foreign policy in SSA after July 2016, the Turkey-Senegal relationship, appears as a suitable example of the reaction of the medium powers of SSA, to the new orientation of TFP in SSA after 2016. Indeed, like Nigeria, Senegal is part of the first circle of SSA countries, with which economic and diplomatic relations with Turkey are the most advanced. Nigeria and Senegal are also models of democracy in the SSA region, given the alternation at the head of their executives observed since their accession to independence in the 1960s, as well as the strength of their civil societies. The background of the Turkey-Senegal relationship having been developed in chapters 1 and 3 (see 3.2.2.2.1) of this study, as well as the context of the fight against the GM in Senegal, developed in chapter 5 (see 5.1.1), the current section will focus mainly on the perception in Senegal of the Turkish foreign policy after July 2016.

6.1.2.1. Data analysis method

To account for the perception of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA after July 2016 in Senegal, a content analysis of the press online, as well as statements by the Senegalese and Turkish authorities were conducted. In this regard, three Senegalese online newspapers, namely: *Le Quotidien*, *Dakaractu*, and *Senego.com*, were selected. It should be emphasized that though the choice of the newspapers to analyze was made randomly, the selected newspapers are nevertheless among the top 10 of the most consulted online news sources in Senegal.²⁵⁷ As in the Nigerian case, the data was obtained from the online database of the selected newspapers and analyzed through

²⁵⁷ Source: <https://askan.co> › 2022 › 04 › top-10-journaux-senegalais-en-ligne.

the content analysis method based on categories. The online news sources were analyzed for the period ranging from July 2016 to March 2022 based on themes and style.

Concerning the method of analysis, the online databases of the selected newspapers were analyzed separately by the author. Three keywords or themes were used to generate results in the websites of the selected newspapers, namely:

- Yavuz Selim schools;
- Turkish Maarif Foundation
- Visit of President Erdoğan to Senegal.

It should be noted that these research themes, were chosen based on the main highlights of the Turkey-Senegal relationship after July 2016, as analyzed in the previous chapters of this study. Subsequently, the articles obtained from the various websites of the three selected Senegalese online sources were classified into sub-categories. These sub-categories were obtained based on the recurrence of the topics addressed in the various press articles. Thus, for the theme “Yavuz Selim Schools”, four (04) sub-categories have been retained, namely:

- National interest of Senegal;
- Turkish pressure;
- Clash between the State and civil society;
- Legal litigation.
- The theme "Turkish Maarif Foundation", for its part, highlighted three sub-categories, namely:
 - Turkish pressure;
 - Clash between the state and civil society;

- Legal litigation.

Finally, the theme "President Erdoğan's visit to Senegal", for its part generated only one sub-category, namely: "Turkey as a partner in the development of Senegal".

6.1.2.2 Findings on the theme “Yavuz Selim’s schools”




Figure 21. Distribution of categories in the selected online news source for the theme “Yavuz Selim’s schools”

Source: The Author

As figure 21 shows, it is the category “clash between the state and the civil society” that dominates in the three online news sources for the theme “Yavuz Selim schools”. Indeed, most of the articles in the selected Senegalese online press, analyze the issue of the closure of the GM Yavuz Selim schools in Senegal, from the angle of the divergence of views between the Senegalese state and Senegalese civil society the closure of these schools. Thus, the analysis of the media coverage of the issue of the closure of GM schools in Senegal reveals that the GM Yavuz Selim schools were

closed under pressure from the Turkish government, although these academic institutions of excellence, were highly appreciated by the Senegalese people, hence the strong mobilization of the Senegalese civil society to oppose their closure. In this regard, the decision of the Senegalese government to close these schools, and to transfer their management to the Turkish Maarif Foundation, was perceived by the Senegalese press as a violation of Senegalese law²⁵⁸ and as a sign of weakness on the part of the Senegalese authorities who yielded to the demands of a foreign power at the sacrifice of the education of Senegalese youth.²⁵⁹

This theme of the closure of Yavuz Selim schools was extensively developed in *Le Quotidien* newspaper, in particular, because of the proximity of the owner of this press organ, Mandiambal Diagne, with the GM Yavuz Selim schools, whose he was the Chairman of the Board of Trustees.²⁶⁰ To this end, the articles regarding the Yavuz Selim schools, have particularly highlighted the societal mobilization for the maintenance of Yavuz Selim schools.

By way of illustration, there are articles such as: “Closure of Yavuz Selim schools: the big party denounces an irresponsible act”;²⁶¹ “Closing Yavuz Selim Schools: Students fools of Macky”;²⁶² “Yavuz Selim: inviting parents to enroll their children elsewhere are storming Yavuz Selim schools”;²⁶³ “Decision of the state to

²⁵⁸ « Affaire Yavuz Selim : Etat de non-droit », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 11 July, 2017 <https://lequotidien.sn/Affaire-Yavuz-Selim-Etat-de-non-droit/>

²⁵⁹ « Fermeture des écoles Yavuz Selim : les élèves têtes de Turc de Macky », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 15 September, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/fermeture-des-ecoles-yavuz-selim-les-eleves-tetes-de-turc-de-macky/>

²⁶⁰ Source : <https://www.enqueteplus.com/content/madiambal-diagne-president-du-conseil-d%E2%80%99administration-du-groupe-yavuz-selim-%E2%80%98avec-macky>

²⁶¹ « Fermeture des Ecoles Yavuz Selim le Grand Parti Denonce un Acte Irresponsable », *Le quotidien* (Senegal), 14 September, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/fermeture-des-ecoles-yavuz-selim-le-grand-parti-denonce-un-acte-irresponsable/>

²⁶² « Invités à inscrire leurs Enfants ailleurs les Parents d’élèves prennent d’assaut les Ecoles Yavuz Selim », *Le Quotidien*, 16 September, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/invites-a-inscrire-leurs-enfants-ailleurs-les-parents-deleves-prennent-dassaut-les-ecoles-yavuz-selim/>

²⁶³ « Decision de de l’Etat de Confier les Ecoles Yavuz Selim à Maarif y’en-a-marre se Joint à la Lutte », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 25 July, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/decision-de-letat-de-confier-les-ecoles-yavuz-selim-a-maarif-yen-a-marre-se-joint-a-la-lutte/>

entrust the Yavuz Selim schools to the TMF: Y'En A Marre joins the fight”;²⁶⁴
 “Opposed to the closure of its schools, education unionists support Yavuz Selim”;²⁶⁵
 “Closure of Turkish schools: Touba and Tivouan support Yavuz Selim”;²⁶⁶ "March of
 protest of the former staff of Yavuz Selim: Serigne Mbacke Thiam welcomed by signs
 in Thiès";²⁶⁷ "Mamadou Kebe, President of the parents of students: the state will
 administer schools without students";²⁶⁸ “Hands off my school...I Am Yavuz
 Selim”;²⁶⁹ "Against leadership change in Yavuz Selim: clerics support Baskent
 Egitim".²⁷⁰

These press articles, hence, reveal that the Senegalese government’s decision to close the GM Yavuz Selim schools has given rise to a strong mobilization of the Senegalese society on all sides. Thus, in addition to actors directly concerned such as the association of parents of students and teachers' unions, we can also note the mobilization of other actors of the civil society such as artists, in particular the collective of Senegalese rap singers “Y'en a Marre”, which organized a concert in support of Yavuz Selim schools in January 2017.²⁷¹ We also note the mobilization of

²⁶⁴« Opposés à la Fermeture de ses Ecoles des Syndicalistes de l’Enseignement soutiennent Yavuz Selim », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal) ,19 July, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/opposes-a-la-fermeture-de-ses-ecoles-des-syndicalistes-de-l-enseignement-soutiennent-yavuz-selim/>

²⁶⁵« Fermeture des Ecoles Turques Touba et Tivaouane au secours de yavuz Selim », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 10 July, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/fermeture-des-ecoles-turques-touba-et-tivaouane-au-secours-de-yavuz-selim/>

²⁶⁶« Manifestation de l’Ex Personnel de Yavuz Selim, Serigne Mbaye Thiam accueilli par des Pancartes à Thiès », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 20 September, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/manif-de-lex-personnel-de-yavuz-selim-serigne-mbaye-thiam-accueilli-par-des-pancartes-a-thies/>

²⁶⁷« Mamadou Kebe President des Parents d’eleves, l’Etat va administrer des Ecoles sans Eleves », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 25 September, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/mamadou-kebe-president-des-parents-deleves-letat-va-administrer-des-ecoles-sans-eleves/>

²⁶⁸« Touche pas à mon Ecole je suis Yavuz Selim », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 14 July, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/touche-pas-a-mon-ecole-je-suis-yavuz-selim/>

²⁶⁹« Contre le Changement de Direction à Yavuz Selim les Religieux soutiennent Baskent Egitim », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal) ,18 July, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/contre-le-changement-de-direction-a-yavuz-selim-les-religieux-soutiennent-Baskent-Egitim/>

²⁷⁰Ibid.

²⁷¹« Affaire Yavuz Selim, ‘y-en-marre’ porte le Combat », *L’Enquete* (Senegal) ,15 July, 2017, <https://www.enqueteplus.com/content/affaire-yavuz-selim-y-en-marre-porte-le-combat>

Senegalese religious leaders, like the Khalif General of the Murids²⁷² and the Archbishop of Dakar,²⁷³ who stood against the closure of the Yavuz Selim schools.

6.1.2.3 Findings on the theme “Turkish Maarif foundation”




Figure 22. Distribution of sub-categories for the theme “Turkish Maarif foundation”

Source: The author

As figure 22 shows, the content analysis of the theme “Turkish Maarif Foundation” of the Senegalese online press, reinforces the observation that the question of the closure of the GM schools Yavuz Selim by the Senegalese government, and their transfer to the TMF, is perceived by the Senegalese press, as the result of a diplomatic pressure exerted by the Turkish government on the Senegalese authorities. Indeed, as shown in

²⁷² « Affaire Yavuz Selim : l’Eglise invite l’Etat à ne pas sacrifier l’Education des Enfants », *Dakaractu* (Senegal), 26 July, 2017, https://www.dakaractu.com/AFFAIRE-YAWUZ-SELIM-L-E%CC%81glise-invite-l-Etat-a-%CC%80-ne-pas-sacrifier-les-ele%CC%80ves_a123900.html

²⁷³ « Le Khalif général des Mourides s’oppose à la Fermeture des Ecoles Yavuz Selim », *senego.com*, 23 July, 2017, https://senego.com/le-khalif-general-des-mourides-soppose-a-la-fermeture-des-ecoles-de-yavuz-selim_405985.html

figure 22, it is the "Turkish state pressure" subcategory that is the dominant subcategory for this theme, in particular with headlines of press articles such as: "Closure of Turkish schools, under pressure from Ankara Yavuz Selim drowned in the Bosphorus";²⁷⁴ "the Turkish government would have put on the table a large sum to appropriate the Yavuz Selim schools";²⁷⁵ "Erdoğan wants Senegal to close Yavuz Selim schools";²⁷⁶ "Macky Sall: yes it was President Erdoğan who asked for the closure of Yavuz Selim".²⁷⁷

These allegations of diplomatic pressure from the Turkish government on the Senegalese authorities stem from an article in the French newspaper *Le Monde*,²⁷⁸ dated October 06, 2017. According to the said article, Ankara would have paid 2.5 million dollars to Senegal, namely one-third of the 7.5 million initial endowments for the first three years of activity of the TMF, so that the takeover of the Yavuz Selim schools by the Maarif foundation is processed quickly.²⁷⁹

Furthermore, it should be highlighted that the content analysis of the media coverage of Turkey's foreign policy in Senegal after July 2016, does not reveal a particular perception of Turkey by the Senegalese press, as was the case for the Nigerian press. Indeed, the TFP in SSA after July 2016 was perceived by the Nigerian press as an attack on the sovereignty of SSA states, or even interference by Turkey in

²⁷⁴« Fermeture des Ecoles Turques, sous la Pression d'Ankara Yavuz Selim noyé dans le Bosphore », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 14 July, 2017, <https://lequotidien.sn/fermeture-des-ecoles-turques-sous-la-pression-dankara-yavuz-selim-noye-dans-le-bosphore/>

²⁷⁵« Le Gouvernement Turc aurait mis sur la Table une forte Somme pour s'approprier les Ecoles Yavuz Selim », *Senego.com*, June, 12, 2017, https://senego.com/le-gouvernement-turc-aurait-mis-sur-la-table-une-forte-somme-pour-sapproprier-les-ecoles-yavuz-selim_578753.html

²⁷⁶ « Erdoğan veut que le Senegal ferme les Ecoles de Yavuz Selim », *Senego.com*, 20 May, 2017, https://senego.com/Erdoğan-veut-que-le-senegal-ferme-les-ecoles-de-yavuz-selim_360176.html

²⁷⁷« Macky sall oui c'est le president Turc Erdoğan qui a demandé la fermeture de Yavuz Selim », *Senego.com*, 24 May, 2017, https://senego.com/macky-sall-oui-cest-le-president-turc-erdoğan-qui-a-demande-la-fermeture-de-yavuz-selim_580118.html

²⁷⁸ « Fermeture des écoles Gülen au Sénégal: comment Dakar a cédé aux pressions d'Erdoğan », *Le Monde*, 06 October, 2017, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/06/fermeture-des-ecoles-gulen-au-senegal-comment-dakar-a-cede-aux-pressions-d-erdoğan_5197352_3212.html

²⁷⁹ Ibid.

the domestic affairs of SSA states. In the case of Senegal, the perception that arises from the content analysis of the press relates much more to the decision of the Senegalese authorities to close the GM schools, which is perceived by the press as a sign of weakness of the Senegalese government, which goes against the law of the land as well as the general will of the people. This is illustrated in headlines such as: “Yavuz Selim: Macky Sall has disappointed the Senegalese,”²⁸⁰ and “For Erdoğan and against the Senegalese youth.”²⁸¹ This can be explained by the good settlement of GM Yavuz Selim schools within Senegalese society. Indeed, as noted by Angey (2018), these schools, the first GM schools created in SSA, had been present in Senegal for more than two decades and were academic institutions of excellence having trained many children from the Senegalese Elite. To this, must be added the charitable and religious activities of the members of the GM community in Senegal, which have contributed to bringing them closer to the Islamic brotherhoods, which are very influential in the Senegalese socio-political sphere (Angey, 2018). All of this has resulted in Senegalese society appropriating these Turkish private schools, which have become an essential element of the Senegalese education system (Angey, 2018). Thus, in Senegal, the closure of Yavuz Selim schools was not perceived fundamentally as a Turko-Turk issue, but as a national problem of Senegal, one of a crisis in the Senegalese education system, hence the strong mobilization of the society civil.

²⁸⁰ « Yavuz Selim, Macky Sall a decu les Sénégalais », *Senego. Com*, 14 September, 2017, https://senego.com/senego-tv-yavuz-selim-macky-sall-a-decu-les-senegalais-regardez_576088.html

²⁸¹ Source: <https://lequotidien.sn/author/aicha/>

6.1.2.4 Findings on the theme “President Erdoğan visit to Senegal”




Figure 23. Distribution of sub-categories for the theme “President Erdoğan's visit to Senegal”

Source: The author

As far as the theme “visit of President Erdoğan to Senegal” is concerned, the content analysis of the media coverage by the selected press, reveals that the Senegalese press did not analyze the various visits of President Erdoğan to Senegal in 2016, 2018, 2020 and 2022, from the perspective of the fight against the GM and more specifically the closure of Yavuz Selim schools in Senegal. Indeed, on all the articles dedicated to these visits in the selected press, including a total of 09 articles for *Le Quotidien*; 18 articles for *Dakaractu*; and 21 articles for *Senego.com*, the majority of the articles deal with Turkish investments in Senegal or the benefits of the partnership with Turkey for the development of Senegal. As figure 23 shows, few articles on this theme deal with the fight against the GM in Senegal. It can therefore be concluded that economic issues dominate the relationship between Turkey and Senegal and that Turkey still enjoys a positive image in Senegal, despite the changes made in the strategy of the TFP in Senegal, in particular the eradication of GM members. Thus, Turkey is perceived in the Senegalese press as a major partner in the development of Senegal, thanks in particular to its numerous investments in Senegal within the framework of the

Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE), as illustrated by press articles such as: “Binali Yildirim, President of the Turkish National Assembly: helping Senegal to develop”;²⁸² “Economy, Turkey promises an increase in its investments in Senegal”;²⁸³ “volume of trade with Senegal: the Turkish President announces a new objective of one billion dollars”;²⁸⁴ “Defense of Islam and weak Muslim countries: Erdoğan almost alone against all”;²⁸⁵ “Africa facing the obligation to pay a tribute to Turkey”.²⁸⁶ In line with this, President Erdoğan declared in his address to the press during his official visit to Senegal in 2018 that: cooperation between Turkey and Senegal is a fruitful partnership, “a symbol of a win-win”. Ankara thus carried out in 2018, nearly 29 projects for a total amount of 775 million dollars, in particular in the fields of factories, furniture, and the railway system.²⁸⁷

It is indeed the Turkish investments in this PSE, which have been decisive for the success of Turkey's fight against the GM in Senegal after July 2016, insofar as the President of the Republic of Senegal, Macky Sall, had focused his first term on the construction of infrastructure, and that the Turkish government has assisted the state of Senegal in many PSE projects, the most notable of which, but the list is not

²⁸²«Binali Yildirim President de l’Assemblée Nationale Turque, aider le Senegal à se developper », *Le Quotidien* (Senegal), 20 December, 2020, <https://lequotidien.sn/binali-yildirim-president-de-lassemblee-nationale-turque-aider-le-senegal-a-se-developper/>

²⁸³« Economie, la Turquie promet une augmentation de ses investissements au Senegal », *Dakaractu*, 13 November 2020, https://www.dakaractu.com/ECONOMIE-La-Turquie-promet-une-augmentation-de-ses-investissements-au-Senegal_a183107.html

²⁸⁴ « Volume des échanges commerciaux avec le Senegal, le president Turc annonce un nouvel objectif d’un milliard de dollars », *Dakaractu*, 13 December 2020, https://www.dakaractu.com/Volume-des-echanges-commerciaux-avec-le-Senegal-Le-president-turc-annonce-un-nouvel-objectif-d-un-milliard-de-dollars_a183104.h

²⁸⁵« Defense de l’islam et des pays faibles musulmans Erdoğan presque seul contre tous », *Senego.com*, December, 01. 2020, https://senego.com/defense-de-l-islam-et-des-pays-faibles-musulmans-Erdogan-presque-seul-contre-tous_

²⁸⁶« L’Afrique face à l’obligation de reconnaissance à l’endroit de la Turquie», *Senego.com*, 06 December, 2020, https://senego.com/lafrique-face-a-lobligation-de-reconnaissance-a-lendroit-de-la-turquie-cheikh-ibrahima-diallo_1154710.html

²⁸⁷« Cooperation Turquie, 29 projets réalisés au Senegal pour 775 millions de dollars », *Dakaractu*, December 13. 2021 https://www.dakaractu.com/Cooperation-turque-29-projets-realises-au-Senegal-pour-775-millions-de-dollars_a148067.html.

exhaustive, are the construction of the Blaise Diagne International Airport in Dakar (AIBD), the construction of the Abdou Diouf International Conference Center in Diamniadio (CICAD), the large carrier station in Diamniadio, the international market in Diamniadio and more recently the Abdoulaye Wade stadium in Dakar, whose inauguration President Erdoğan attended during his visit to Senegal in February 2022.²⁸⁸

The construction of the new city, Diamniadio, which is the flagship of the PSE, is thus the fruit of the cooperation between Turkey and Senegal, in particular, thanks to the financing of 152 billion FCFA granted to the Senegalese government by Eximbank Turk, for the construction of infrastructures in this new city.²⁸⁹ Besides, during President Erdoğan's official visit to Senegal in February 2022, a military framework agreement was signed between the two countries.²⁹⁰ The said Agreement relates in particular to cooperation in the fight against terrorism.²⁹¹ Hence, the national interest of the country, in particular economic development, took precedence over the societal desire to maintain the GM schools. However, it should be highlighted that the issue of the transfer of GM schools to the TMF in Senegal is not yet fully resolved, though the members of the GM have ceased all activities in the Senegalese territory since 2017, as the Senegalese justice has not yet ruled on the sale of buildings

²⁸⁸« Fermeture des Ecoles yavuz selim en Afrique la raison du plus fort économiquement », *L'Enquete* (Senegal), July, 12. 2017, <https://www.enqueteplus.com/content/fermeture-des-%C3%A9coles-yavuz-selim-en-afrique-la-raison-du-plus-fort%E2%80%A6-%C3%A9conomiquement> (accessed 01.08.2022).

²⁸⁹« Visite de chantiers Diamniadio fabriqué en Turquie », *L'Enquete* (Senegal), 23 June, 2020, https://www.enqueteplus.com/content/visite-de-chantiers-diamniadio_fabriqu%C3%A9-en-turquie (accessed 01.08.2022).

²⁹⁰« La Turquie et le Sénégal coopèrent dans le domaine militaire et ont signé un accord-cadre à cet effet », *Senego.com*, 10 February, 2022, https://senego.com/senegal-et-turquie-un-accord-cadre-militaire-signe-entre-les-deux-pays_1391245.html (accessed 21.08.2022).

²⁹¹« Diplomatie : Dakar et Ankara vers la finalisation d'un Accord sur le plan sécuritaire », *Dakaractu*, 03 February, 2022, https://www.dakaractu.com/Diplomatie-Dakar-et-Ankara-vers-la-finalisation-d-un-Accord-sur-le-plan-securitaire_a215195.html (accessed 21.08.2022).

belonging to the Yavuz Selim group to the TMF.²⁹² Besides, our interviews with officials from the Ministry of Education in Senegal revealed that there is still a feeling of nostalgia among the Senegalese people for the Yavuz Selim schools. Hence, during our investigation at the Academic Inspectorate of the Dakar region as part of this research, one of our interviewees, who wishes to remain anonymous, reveals that the quality of teaching has fallen sharply since the resumption of the Turkish schools by the TMF. The success rate of students in these schools, once among the highest in the country under the management of the Yavuz Selim group, had notably declined under the administration of the TMF.²⁹³ In addition, another of our respondents, who is in charge of the cooperation with the TMF, revealed that the working relations with the managers of the TMF had remained rather timid since their takeover of the management of Turkish schools, in comparison with the managers of the Yavuz Selim Group who, in their time, maintained warm relations with the officials of the Ministry of National Education and especially with the Senegalese population through their charitable deeds.²⁹⁴

At the end of this content analysis of the Senegalese and Nigerian press coverage of Turkey's foreign policy in these two countries, which aimed to highlight the Nigerian reaction and the Senegalese reaction to the TFP after July 2016, what can be observed is that the national interest of the states takes precedence in both cases. The difference between the Senegalese reaction and the Nigerian reaction to the TFP post-July 2016, is that although the two countries are models of democracy in SSA, in the case of Nigeria, its economic power enabled the Nigerian government to follow

²⁹² « Infrastructures scolaires plaidoyer pour le transfert des batiments de Yavuz Selim à la Fondation Maarif », *Le Soleil* (Senegal), 20 May, 2022, /<http://lesoleil.sn/iinfrastructures-scolaires-plaidoyer-pour-le-transfert-des-batiments-de-yavuz-selim-a-la-fondation-maarif/> (accessed 13.08.2022).

²⁹³ Interview with a senior staff of the Dakar Academic inspectorate, 15.12.2021.

²⁹⁴ Interview with a staff of the Dakar Academic inspectorate, 15.12.2021.

the will of its public opinion over the issue of the GM refugees in Nigeria. However, as an illustration of the primacy of the national interest in the foreign policy of states, as established by Morgenthau (1960), the security problems facing the Nigerian state, were a game changer in the recent decision of the Nigerian authorities to concede to some of the Turkish government's demands, after resisting diplomatic pressure from Ankara since 2016. In the case of Senegal, the attraction for significant economic investment from Turkey has pushed the Senegalese government to subordinate the will of the population to the national interest of the country defined in terms of Turkish economic investments.

To sum up, the strategy of the TFP in SSA post-July 2016, appears to be successful given the two case studies of Senegal and Nigeria, especially since the year 2021 and the emergence of Turkey as a security power in SSA, which raised Ankara to the rank of a major player in SSA. Thus, the “de-gulinification”²⁹⁵ of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, initiated by the AKP government following the failed coup of July 2016, did not call into question the gains of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, obtained thanks to its strategy of soft power and more precisely of public diplomacy, put in place by the AKP since 2005. It now remains to assess the success of the TFP strategy in SSA after July 2016 from the point of view of the concept of Soft Power, as conceptualized by Nye (2004). In other words, how do the findings on the reception of TFP in SSA after July 2016 by SSA countries, observed within the framework of this research, inform us about the concept of soft power, its shortcomings, and its ambiguities?

²⁹⁵This term is retrieved from: Cagaptay (2020, p. 232).

6.2 Assessment of TFP strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016 in the backdrop of the concept of soft power

The concept of soft power since its conceptualization by Nye (1990), has been the subject of keen interest from specialists in international relations as well as policymakers. As a result, this concept has aroused various criticisms concerning aspects such as its ambiguous definition, in particular: the difference that Nye (1990, 2004) establishes between Hard power and soft power (Leca, 2013); the confusion between resources and instruments of soft power as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004) (Bilgin & Eliş, 2008); the ethnocentrism in the conceptualization of soft power by Nye (1990, 2004) (Fan, 2008; Fliegel & Kříž, 2020; Çevik, 2019), and finally the lack of strategic orientation of this concept as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004) (Layne, 2009; Lock, 2009; Patalakh, 2016). Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, as the previous developments of this study showed, is grounded on the strategy of soft power, Turkey in its action in SSA is considered a civilian power (Dal & Mehmetcik, 2018), a humanitarian power (Çevik, 2016), and a trading state (Kirişci, 2009), by scholars. Moreover, the policymakers of the Turkish strategy in SSA themselves, underlined that this strategy is in line with the soft power strategy (Davutoğlu, 2012; Kalin, 2011). In line with these, Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, as analyzed in this research, appears as an appropriate case study to assess the concept of soft power.

In this perspective, the findings of this research challenge various assumptions of the concept of soft power as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004), highlighting previous limitations of this concept observed by other scholars, in particular: concerns about the lack of strategic orientation of soft power as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004) and the ethnocentrism in the conceptualization of soft power.

6.2.1 The lack of strategic orientation of the concept of soft power

The criticism about the lack of strategic orientation of the concept of soft power underlined by scholars such as Patalakh (2016); Fan (2008); Lock (2009); Layne (2009), stems from their analyses that soft power as conceptualized by Nye (2004), does not take into account the point of view of the recipient or target state of soft power. Hence, these authors highlight that in his conceptualization of soft power, Nye (2004), did not analyze soft power as a relational process involving two parties, namely: the sending state (applicant, wielder, agent) (Patalakh, 2016, p. 89) and the recipient state (subject, target, receiver) (Patalakh, 2016, p. 89). Nye (2009), in his response to criticisms of the concept of soft power, acknowledges that his conceptualization of soft power focuses on the sending state, since the concept of soft power when conceived by Nye (1990, 2004), was initially intended to help US policymakers in their making of US foreign policy (Nye, 2009, p. 215).

The focus on the agent in the soft power as conceptualized by Nye (2004), has for consequence that this concept does not sufficiently take into account the point of view of the recipient state, its context, and its peculiarities (Patalakh, 2016, p. 87). Among the peculiarities of the recipient state to be taken into account by the wielder state in the soft power strategy, there is, in particular, the relationship between the political elite and civil society (Layne, 2009; Patalakh, 2016) and the presence of soft power from other competing powers (Patalakh, 2016, p. 87). Besides, the weak consideration of the peculiarities of the receiving state, results in the inability of the concept of soft power, as conceptualized by Nye (2004), to account for the results of states' soft power policy in the practice, as well as to predict the effectiveness of soft power as a foreign policy strategy (Patalakh, 2016, p. 89). Thus, as far as the political elite and civil society of the recipient state are concerned, the concept of soft power as

conceptualized by Nye (2004), lay more emphasis on the civil society of the recipient state as a target of the soft power of the wielder state, than on the political elite. Indeed Nye (2008), assumes that in the information age, the public opinion of the recipient state, more than its political elite has become the main target of states' foreign policy (Nye, 2008). Hence for Nye (2008), the attraction exerted by the values of a country or a group of countries on the populations of other countries, is likely to induce their government to take into account in their interstate relations, the feelings of the public, alleged to be seduced by these values (Leca, 2013, p. 4).

The importance of civil society in the recipient state, as developed by Nye (2004) is questioned by Layne (2009) and by Patalakh (2016). Thus, Layne (2009) emphasizes that the political elite must be the priority target of the soft power strategy of states, since, it is the latter that is at the heart of the decision-making process (Layne, 2009, p. 57). For Layne (2009), although public opinion influences the choices of the ruling elite in the decision-making process, the political elite can nevertheless make decisions that go against the will of the public opinion, especially in democracies, namely when these decisions regard foreign policy or homeland security, which are areas of high politics and which involves the national interest of states (Layne, 2009, p. 57). Consequently, a soft power strategy that has a real strategic objective, that is to say, which aims to obtain a political decision expected by the wielding state from the recipient state, and not to attract economic investments or foreign students, must focus on the ruling elite, since it is the latter who ultimately decide (Patalakh, 2016, p. 93). Clearly, the weak attention on the ruling elite as a target of the soft power strategy undermines the ability of soft power as a foreign policy strategy that "achieves preferred outcomes through cooperative means of framing the 'agenda, and persuasion" (Nye, 2011, p. 19).

Turkey's foreign policy strategy vis-à-vis Senegal, as analyzed in the previous section, is particularly illustrative of the importance of the ruling elite of the recipient state as a target of the soft power strategy. Indeed, Turkey was able to obtain from the Senegalese government, its desired outcome regarding the GM schools, thanks to a soft power' strategy focused on the ruling elite, namely the increase of Turkish investments in Senegal, despite the protests and the strong opposition of the Senegalese civil society to the request of the Turkish authorities.

Furthermore, Layne (2009) also points out that "Nye's assumption about civil society as the main target of states 'soft power, rests on a simplistic analysis of the political decision-making process within the state, in which civil society wields a real influence on the political elite" (Layne, 2009, p. 55). Hence, this assumption does not reflect the reality of the decision-making process within the state, particularly in matters of foreign policy in which, for the most part, the state acts as a unitary actor (Layne, 2009, p. 55). Therefore, for Layne (2009), the importance of the political elite as a target of the soft power of the wielding state, reveals the theoretical relevance of the concept of soft power, because soft power as a foreign policy strategy, henceforth acts like traditional diplomacy between governments (T1) (Layne, 2009, p. 56).

6.2.2 The ethnocentrism in Nye's (1990, 2004) conceptualization of soft power

The critics regarding ethnocentrism in Nye's conceptualization of soft power refer here to two main features. On the one hand, there is the importance of civil society as a player in the soft power strategy of states, and on the other hand the importance of democratic values as resources of the soft power of states. Indeed, this criticism stems from the observation made by scholars (Fan, 2008; Fliegel & Kříž, 2020; Çevik, 2019) that the concept of soft power, as conceived by Nye (2004), focuses on Western

societies, and does not take into consideration the assets and singularities of non-Western societies, in particular the countries of Asia and Africa, which also have a potential of soft power. As Fliegel and Kříž (2020) point out, this gives the impression that soft power is a privilege of Western societies, although non-democratic countries such as China or Russia can also have a power of attraction (Fliegel & Kříž, 2020).

Thus, concerning the significance of civil society as a player in the soft power strategy of states, Nye (2008, p. 105) states that a soft power strategy must necessarily be supported by non-governmental actors, as a guarantee of its credibility with the target public, because a soft power strategy carried out by state actors alone, is likely to be perceived as propaganda (Nye, 2008, p. 105). However, the success of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, calls this assumption into question. Indeed, as demonstrated by the previous analyzes of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA since 2016, developed in this study, the Turkish government has reclaimed the implementation of its foreign policy strategy in SSA, through the establishment of public and semi-public institutions, aiming to take over the role formerly played by non-state actors in the Turkish strategy in SSA. However, as demonstrated by the analysis of the reception of Turkey's post-July 2016 foreign policy in SSA, this replacement of non-governmental actors by the quasi-monopoly of the Turkish state in its policy vis-à-vis SSA, has not undermined Turkey's influence in most SSA countries. Therefore, the case of Turkey's new soft power strategy in Africa, carried by governmental and semi-governmental actors, proves that the soft power strategy where the state is the main actor can be successful, even in a context where the state conflicts with its civil society, as is the case with the AKP government and the GM.

Regarding the criticism of the liberal values of democracy and good governance as a resource of soft power, Nye (2008, p. 96) considers these liberal

values essential elements for attracting foreign audiences in a soft power strategy. However, these liberal values do not have the same appeal in all societies, hence the need, as stated above, to take into account the particularities of the recipient state in the strategic use of the concept of soft power. Thus, the results obtained within the framework of this research, underline that, despite its decay in terms of individual freedom, in particular the relations between the Turkish state and its civil society, Turkey remains an attractive country for the countries of SSA, especially as a model of economic and military success. Therefore, though the democratic decline observed in Turkey since 2016 has in the first place negatively affected its image in SSA, particularly within the economic powers of SSA such as Nigeria, the economic and especially military assets of Turkey have enabled it to restore its image in SSA. Consequently, the case study of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, challenges ethnocentric assumptions in Nye's soft power conceptualization, which make liberal values an essential resource of soft power. In the same vein, scholars such as Çevik (2019), analyzed Turkey's soft power capacity, given the democratic backsliding in this country since 2013. Thus, Çevik (2019) establishes that though Turkey has lost its appeal to the public of Western societies due to its democratic decline, on the contrary, the influence and the attraction of Turkey in non-Western societies, in particular in SSA, have been on the rise in recent years (Çevik, 2019, p. 66).

For scholars like Bilgin and Eliş (2008), Nye's emphasis on liberal values as a major source of soft power stems from the strong anchoring of this concept in the liberal stream of international relations, which makes soft power a “too soft” foreign policy strategy, and difficult to apply in practice. In this sense, this later limitation of the concept of soft power, highlighted by our case studies, also raises the problem of

the relationship between the elements of soft power and the elements of hard power in Nye's (2004) conceptualization of the concept of soft power.

Thus, Nye (1990, 2004) defines the elements of soft power, consisting of intangible resources such as culture, and democratic values, as those which are the opposite of the elements of hard power, consisting of tangible or material resources such as states' military and economic might (Nye, 1990). This dichotomy in the definition of the elements of soft and hard power makes it difficult to apply soft power as a foreign policy strategy of states in practice, because, to be able to exercise a real power of influence, the elements of soft power must be used in conjunction with elements of hard power (Çevik, 2019). The establishment of the Maarif Foundation as an instrument of soft power for Turkey in SSA, supported by Turkey's economic investments in SSA, as analyzed in this study, is illustrative of this fact. "Turkey's drone diplomacy", applied by Ankara in SSA for a few years now, which has increased Turkey's pull in SSA, also illustrates the complementarity between the elements of hard and soft power. Therefore, given the dichotomy in the definitions of the elements of soft and hard power by Nye (1990) and the practice of the strategy of soft power by states in the field, the concept of soft power becomes blurred, because it is difficult to distinguish the strategy of soft power from that of hard power (Çevik, 2019, p. 53), as well as to categorize instruments such as official development assistance (ODA) in one or the other of the categories of soft power and hard power (Çevik, 2019, p. 54). Hence, as established by Çevik (2019), the complementary use of the two strategies of soft and hard power was decisive in the success of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA after 2016:

Turkey's relative economic progress has enabled it to invest in its foreign policy by emphasizing a softer approach to power, which was made possible as a

result of its hard power resources. Turkey's growing economy helped boost its diplomatic presence across Africa (Çevik, 2019, p. 56).

To sum up, concerning the assumptions of the concept of soft power, as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004), the success of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA since 2016 is puzzling. Indeed, the assumptions made by Nye (1990, 2004, 2008) prove ineffective in accounting for the success of the Turkish strategy in SSA, led by the AKP government since 2016. In particular, because this success calls into question Nye's assumptions, such as the significance of civil society both as a target and a major player in the soft power strategy of states, as well as the primacy of liberal values as resources of states' soft power. Therefore, the case study of the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, argues in favor of a better strategic orientation in the conceptualization of soft power, so that the latter becomes an effective conceptual tool for the analysis and design of states' foreign policy strategy.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

As a conclusion to this study on Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after July 2016, it is worth making an overall assessment of this study, its findings, and its limitations.

7.1 Summary of chapters

This thesis aimed to determine whether there has been a change or continuity in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA after the events of the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. In this regard, the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey has been analyzed in this study as a conjectural determinant of Turkey's foreign policy, defined according to Aydin (2019) as the elements which lead to a change at a given time in the foreign policy of states. Thus, regarding the problem of this research, it focused on a central question and two secondary questions. As for the central question, the matter was to determine, what is the impact of the events of the failed coup of July 2016, on Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA. The two secondary questions were: if the events of July 2016 in Turkey led to changes in the TFP strategy in SSA, what is the nature of these changes? Furthermore, what is the impact of these changes in Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA on the relations between Turkey and SSA countries?

In order to address this problem, this study relied on the socio-historical method, which aims to relate the past and the present in the analysis of the foreign policy of states. Thus, taking into account this socio-historical method, this thesis proceeded with the analysis, following two major time frameworks that analyze the

strategy of TFP in SSA before and after July 2016. This is reflected in the structural organization (chapters) of this study.

Accordingly, Chapter 1 was the introduction to the study. This chapter presented, in particular, the problem, as well as the research methodology used in this study. Chapter 2, on its part, focused on the analysis of the conceptual framework of this study, namely the concept of foreign policy strategy. Indeed, the concept of foreign policy strategy, which has served as a guideline throughout this study, has been defined as the means that states use to achieve their foreign policy objectives. These means of state foreign policy have been defined by scholars (Morin, 2013; Nye, 1990), through the concepts of soft power and hard power. Hence, these concepts identify the instruments used by states to achieve their foreign policy objectives. These instruments are categorized into soft instruments such as strategic narratives and public diplomacy; and hard instruments, namely: coercive diplomacy, deterrence, to the use of armed force. More specifically, this chapter analyzed these various foreign policy instruments theoretically. Special attention was paid in particular, to the analysis of the concept of soft power as a foreign policy strategy of states, due to the highlighting by the scholarly literature on TFP in SSA, of this concept as the main foreign policy strategy of Turkey since 2005. Overall, the analysis brought out the fact that the concept of soft power as a state foreign policy strategy is based on the interaction between the diplomacy of public actors and the diplomacy of private actors, in which civil society plays a preeminent role because of its various areas of intervention, such as education, trade, humanitarian aid, religion. This interdependence between state and private actors in state foreign policy as conceptualized in the concept of soft power, constituted a key feature of the analysis of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

Thus, Chapter 3 focused on the analysis of TFP in SSA through its historical foundations. This chapter aimed to highlight the structural determinants of TFP in SSA, in order to grasp the reasons underlying Turkey's interest in SSA since the AKP's rise to power in 2002. Among the structural determinants of Turkey's foreign policy in SSA, the relationship between the Ottoman Empire and the SSA region has been analyzed as a structural determinant that explains Turkey's current interest in the SSA region. Moreover, after decades of hiatuses, Turkey's interest in the SSA region reawakened with the rise to power of the AKP in Turkey in 2002, which constituted a strategic turning point in Turkish foreign policy. The said strategic turning point of the TFP with the rise to power of the AKP was the initiative of Ahmet Davutoğlu, then adviser and later on Minister of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister Erdoğan in the first governments of the AKP. Thus, the examination of the place of SSA in this new strategic orientation of the TFP from 2002, constituted an essential part of the analysis in this chapter. Finally, this chapter examined Turkey-SSA relations from 2005 on the bilateral and multilateral levels, in particular the various Turkey-Africa summits.

Chapter 4, on its part, analyzed more particularly the strategy of TFP in SSA during the first decade of TFP in SSA that is to say from 2005 to the beginning of 2016. The purpose of this chapter was to highlight the main features of the TFP strategy in SSA during this era, as well as the players in their implementation. Thus, based on the scholarly literature on TFP in SSA, in particular authors such as Donelli (2021) and Çevik (2018), the strategy of TFP in SSA during this first decade has been analyzed from the angle of soft power, more particularly of multi-track diplomacy as it was introduced in chapter 2. Given the importance of the relationship between public and private actors in the implementation of multitrack diplomacy public diplomacy, as conceptualized by scholars such as Nye (2008), the first part of the analysis in this

chapter, studied the relationship between Turkish public and private actors in the implementation of TFP in SSA. It occurred that during this first decade of the TFP in SSA, which ended with the events of the coup attempt of July 2016, Turkish private actors, in particular those affiliated with the GM, occupied a preeminent place in the implementation of the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA. Scholars such as Angey (2018) described the role of private actors in TFP in SSA as a phenomenon of discharge, which defines the process by which the state allocates part of its functions to private actors. This chapter has thus highlighted the role of Turkish private actors in the strategy of TFP in SSA during its first decade. Among these Turkish private actors involved in the TFP in SSA, there are in particular Turkish businessmen, mainly those affiliated with the GM, as well as Turkish faith-based humanitarian NGOs, which were active in the construction of Turkey's image and public diplomacy in SSA during this first decade. Finally, the second part of this chapter on the TFP strategy in SSA before July 2016, analyzed the main areas or tracks of the TFP strategy in SSA for the decade from 2005 to the beginning of 2016. Thus, following Donelli (2021), the analysis in this chapter showed that Turkey adopted a foreign policy strategy in SSA based on the model of multitrack diplomacy for peacekeeping. This strategy focused on sectors such as ODA, humanitarian aid, trade, education, and religion, has enabled Turkey to establish itself as an emerging power in SSA. Indeed, thanks to this efficient strategy, during this first decade Turkey strengthened its position as an emerging power in SSA. Specifically, Turkey reached important achievements in SSA, both in the area of trade and international politics, in particular markets for its SMEs in SSA countries. Overall, this chapter of the thesis has especially highlighted the role of Turkish private actors in Turkey's strategy in SSA before July 2016, in particular

their preeminent action in the various fields of the strategy of the TFP in SSA, be it trade, education, religion and above all humanitarian aid.

Chapter 5 analyzed the strategy of the TFP in SSA after the failed coup of July 2016. Indeed, July 2016 was analyzed in this chapter as a conjectural determinant, which prompted a transformation in Turkey's strategy in SSA. The changes induced by the July 2016 events in Turkey's strategy in SSA as analyzed in this chapter, mainly relate to the relationship between Turkish private and public actors in the TFP in SSA, because of the strong involvement of Turkish private actors affiliated with the GM in the implementation of TFP strategy in SSA during its first decade. Among these institutional changes, one of the major changes that followed the exclusion of the GM from the TFP strategy in SSA, is the establishment in 2016 of the TMF, by the Turkish government, to take over the activities of the GM in the field of education. As other institutional changes analyzed in this chapter, there is also the substitution of the TUSKON affiliated to the GM as a major player in Turkey's economic diplomacy in SSA, by the MÜSIAD, which is another important Turkish employers' organization, but close to the ruling AKP party in Turkey. These changes in the TFP strategy in SSA post-July 2016 were analyzed as the reflection of the strengthening of the presence of the Turkish State as the main player in the Turkish strategy in SSA. This can be explained in particular by the fact that the new institutions of the TFP strategy in SSA are difficult to classify be it in the category of public or private actors given their links with the ruling AKP government in Turkey.

In addition to these institutional changes induced by the failed coup of July 2016, this chapter also highlighted a conceptual change in the use of the ODA of Turkey in SSA, initially used as a non-coercive instrument in the service of Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy in SSA. Hence, the analysis within the framework of this

chapter showed that Turkey's ODA in SSA has been used since 2016, as a means of inducement or payment, to bring SSA countries to agree to the requests of the Turkish government concerning the closure of the GM economic and educational assets in SSA.

Finally, still, on the conceptual level of the changes brought about by July 2016 in the strategy of the TFP in SSA, the analyses in this chapter have revealed that the security and defense sector has become an essential component of the Turkish strategy in SSA, in particular, concerning cooperation between Turkey and SSA countries for the training of military personnel, and especially the sale of arms from Turkey to SSA countries, also called "drone diplomacy". Thus, the development of the security component in Turkey's strategy in SSA since July 2016 calls into question the image of civilian power and commercial state in SSA, shaped by Turkey during the first decade of the TFP in SSA. The emphasis on the security dimension in Turkey-SSA relations since 2016, in particular the sale of armaments, has enabled Turkey to strengthen its strategy in SSA and to become a major power in SSA.

Chapter 6, which constituted the last analytical chapter of this study, on its part, focused on the assessment of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA post-July 2016. To do this effect, this chapter carried out a contrasting analysis of the reaction of two major partners of Turkey in SSA to the TFP post-July 2016 in SSA, namely: Nigeria and Senegal. It occurred from the analysis that the strategy of the TFP in SSA, post-July 2016, although it led in the first phase, to diplomatic tensions between Turkey and these SSA countries, and caused serious damage to the image of Turkey within the society of these SSA countries, in particular, because of the importance of the educational and economic structures of the GM in these SSA countries, has finally, all the same, resulted in success, especially during recent years. This success stems from

the increase in Turkish economic investments within these countries of SSA, and especially “the drones diplomacy” of Turkey in these countries of SSA, which are facing various security issues. Finally, this chapter also proceeded to a theoretical assessment of the TFP strategy in SSA, post-July 2016, in particular by relating the findings obtained within the framework of the analysis of this study and the assumptions of the concept of Soft power, as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2008). This theoretical evaluation of the TFP strategy in SSA post-July 2016, highlighted some shortcomings of the concept of Soft power of Nye (1990, 2008), in particular the mismatch between the concept of soft power and its practice in the field by states. This chapter has also highlighted the ineffectiveness of this concept in accounting for the success of the soft power strategy, with the state as the main agent, as illustrated by Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, post-July 2016.

7.2 Summary of findings

Given the summary of the chapters of this thesis, this study highlighted various findings on the TFP strategy in SSA. First of all, concerning the implementation of Turkey's strategy in SSA, initiated by the AKP government in 2005, this study has highlighted the essential role of Turkish private actors, in particular, the GM in the initial phase of the Turkish foreign policy strategy in SSA, during its first decade from 2005- to early 2016. This study is therefore an illustration of the impact of the relationship between the state and its civil society in foreign policy decision-making, as studied by various IR scholars.²⁹⁶ Indeed, the analysis in this study, particularly in chapters 3 and 4, has highlighted the fact that TFP in SSA, during its first decade, was the result of the pooling of the efforts of the Turkish state and the Turkish civil society

²⁹⁶ See chapter 1.

actors in SSA. Thus, the analysis of the TFP in SSA during this first decade has demonstrated that the political coalition in Turkish domestic politics between the GM and the AKP in power since 2002, has been transferred to Turkey's foreign policy in SSA where the two former Turkish political allies helped each other until the definitive split of their political alliance marked by the July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey.

Moreover, as other major findings, this study also shed light on the internal-external dynamics in the foreign policy of the states, in particular through the analysis of the changes in the strategy of the TFP in SSA following the failed coup of July 2016 in Turkey, as studied in chapter 5. Thus, due to the end of its alliance with the GM, the Turkish state had to reorganize its foreign policy strategy in SSA, by setting up new institutions that could substitute for the GM.

The analyses in this chapter have however revealed that in doing so, the Turkish state has not carried out a complete conceptual reorientation of its strategy in SSA because the new institutions of the TFP set up after July 2016, fall on the same conceptual line, and are active in the same fields as the defunct GM institutions. This has been analyzed in this study as a form of path dependency of Turkey in the field of foreign policy, particularly in the fields of education and trade in SSA. Therefore, the analysis in this study demonstrated that the rupture or change in the TFP strategy in SSA post-July 2016 events, is merely at the structural level, while there is rather a continuity in the overall conceptual framework of the TFP strategy in SSA.

Furthermore, in the same vein, this study also shed light on the ambiguous relationship between Turkish public and private actors in the implementation of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA, in particular the ambiguous nature of some of the new institutional players of the TFP in SSA such as the TMF and the MÜSIAD,

which it is difficult to define whether they belong to the public or private sphere because of their links with the ruling AKP.

Finally, a last major finding of this study, is the increasingly preeminent role of the security component in the Turkish strategy in SSA, whose introduction into the Turkish strategy in SSA in recent years has enabled the success of the TFP in SSA post-July 2016, despite significant institutional changes in Turkey's soft power toolkit in SSA. Thus, thanks to this security and military component, Turkey was able to increase its influence in SSA and now competes with traditional powers such as France, China, and the USSR in the SSA region.

To sum up, given these findings, my early hypothesis on the shift of Turkey's foreign policy strategy after the failed coup of July 2016, from a soft power strategy to a hard power strategy, is not valid, insofar as Turkey has rather adopted a complete foreign policy strategy, which combines elements of hard and soft power, and above all that hard power in particular, the security component, in the Turkish strategy post-July 2016 in SSA, is at the service of the Turkish influence (soft power) in the SSA region. In the same vein, my secondary early hypothesis, on the negative impact of the changes in the Turkish strategy in SSA post-July 2016 on Turkey's image in SSA, is also not valid given the conclusions of this study because thanks to its new strategy in SSA, which efficiently combines hard and soft power since 2016, Turkey has been able to increase its influence in the SSA region. These various findings, which this study has brought to light, also call into question some of the assumptions of the concept of soft power, as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2008), hence constituting the contribution of this thesis to research in the field of IR.

7.3. Contribution to literature

This research bears practical and theoretical implications and can contribute to improving knowledge in the field of IR and the area of Turkish foreign policy in various ways. Indeed, as highlighted by Aras (2017), Turkish foreign policy is in a process of transformation following the dramatic political events of 15 July 2016. Hence, studying the transformation that operates in Turkish foreign policy is of interest since it can inform both foreign policy theory and practice.

As far as the theoretical aspect is concerned, this research assumes subsequent implications that challenge the concept of soft power as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2008). Indeed, this study relies on the hypothesis that following 15 July 2016 political events in Turkey, which led to a dramatic change in the overall Turkish politics, TFP in Africa shifted from a society-centered to a state-centered foreign policy. More precisely, this study assumes that to face its challenges at the international level, namely the security issue of the fight against the GM, Turkish foreign policymakers, adopted a more realistic stand in SSA, where the TFP strategy traditionally relied on Turkey's soft power assets. Therefore, this study analyzes the soft power strategy from the State's perspective, meaning the state is the main actor of the strategy, which is in opposition to the concept of Nye (2008) according to which a state-led soft power strategy is doomed to failure. Thus, this study is an empirical framework to assess the efficiency of a State-led soft power strategy, which can contribute to increasing the scope of the soft power theory and bringing it closer to practice.

Besides, studying soft power with the state as the main actor, also leads to questioning the very conceptualization of soft power by Nye (1990, 2008), as far as the relation between hard power and soft power is concerned. Indeed, as stated by Nye (1990, 2008), soft power by definition is opposed to the hard coercive force, military

most generally but also economically.²⁹⁷ Soft power is measured in carrots, not in sticks. However, in practice, the boundary between soft and hard power is very loose, and States sometimes resort to hard power means to achieve the soft power effect, and the other way round. Thus, the current research through the analysis of the Turkish Foreign policy strategy in SSA after 15 July 2016, investigates the interrelation between soft and hard power and therefore contributes to better informing the soft power theory on that aspect. Finally, another relevant theoretical contribution of this thesis is that it studied the soft power strategy of a state by taking into consideration the reception of the soft power strategy by the target country, which according to Patalakh (2016), is not sufficiently taken into account in the soft power as conceptualized by Nye (1990, 2004, 2008).

In terms of its practical implications, this study can help Turkish foreign policymakers to better formulate Turkish foreign policy in Africa. Indeed, the context in which Turkish foreign policy is stuck after July 2016 is complicated insofar as the domestic conflict between the government and the GM is transposed internationally, where the stakes are not perceived by the foreign partners. Thus, in regions such as SSA where GM networks enjoy a positive image, actions of Turkish diplomacy aiming at putting an end to GM activities may be difficult for Turkey's SSA partners to understand. Therefore, Turkish foreign policymakers need to grasp the expectations of the receiving countries, to make a foreign policy strategy that will allow Turkey to fully realize its objectives in SSA. With this aim, through the assessment of the perception of Turkish foreign policy after July 2016, by SSA recipients, this study can

²⁹⁷I should nevertheless underline that an attempt to bring together the concepts of soft and hard power was made by Nye, through the concept of smart power. Indeed Nye (2008) defines smart power as a combination of soft and hard power resources. However, as various critics have noted (Angey and Molho, 2015), the definition of smart power itself remains ambiguous and does not provide sufficient information on the relationship between soft and hard power.

contribute to better informing Turkish foreign policymakers about the expectations of SSA countries. This is important in a soft power strategy because as Patalakh (2016) underlines, an effective soft power strategy must necessarily take into account the expectations of the various targets in the target country.

Besides, at the academic level, SSA is an area of research that is not sufficiently studied by Turkish scholars, although relations between Turkey and the SSA region of the African continent, are increasingly important. This thesis, therefore, contributes to shedding light on the increasingly important position that SSA has acquired in Turkish foreign policy in recent years, and thus it might stimulate the interest of Turkish scholars in this field of study which remains not enough exploited.

7.4 Limitations of the study and suggestions for further research

Before putting an end to this thesis, it is worth noticing that this study did not examine the whole range of Turkey's soft power instruments in SSA. Hence this study was unable to provide a holistic analysis of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA. As analyzed in chapter 2, the range of soft power instruments is made-up of strategic narratives and Public diplomacy. However, this thesis chose to focus on the study of PD as an instrument of the TFP strategy in SSA in its analysis though strategic narratives are an important feature of the TFP strategy in SSA since 2005, namely Turkey's discourse on the lack of colonial history in SSA or Turkey's discourse on win-win cooperation with SSA countries. These strategic narratives represent the psychological dimension of Turkey's foreign policy strategy in SSA. Hence, the strategic narrative of Turkey in SSA, although it is intangible, and its effects on Turkey-SSA relations difficult to measure, nevertheless constitutes an essential feature of Ankara's SSA strategy.

Accordingly, the analysis of strategic narratives as an instrument of the TFP strategy in SSA would deserve better consideration, and could greatly contribute to the study of TFP in SSA, notably, given recent controversies opposing Turkey and France about Turkey's rhetoric over the colonial past of western powers in SSA. Therefore, the analysis of the role of strategic narratives in the Turkish strategy in SSA could be an interesting area for future research in the field of TFP in SSA.

APPENDIX A

HUMAN SUBJECTS ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 17.08.2021-25737

T.C.
BOĞAZIÇI ÜNİVERSİTESİ
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME
KOMİSYONU
TOPLANTI TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı : 21
Toplantı Tarihi : 16.08.2021
Toplantı Saati : 21:00
Toplantı Yeri : Zoom Sanal Toplantı
Bulunanlar : Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen, Prof. Dr. Ebru Kaya, Prof. Dr. Fatma Nevra Seggie
Bulunmayanlar :

Danzouima Alima
Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler

Sayın Araştırmacı,
"Turkish Foreign Policy In Sub-Saharan Africa after July.15.2016: The Case Study Of Cameroon And Senegal" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığımız SBB-EAK 2021/44 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 16 Ağustos 2021 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar tüm üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oybirliği ile alınmıştır. COVID-19 önlemleri kapsamında kurul üyelerinden ıslak imza alınmadığı için bu onay mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Ebru Kaya tarafından bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Prof. Dr. Ebru KAYA
ÜYE

e-imzalıdır
Prof. Dr.Ebru KAYA
Raportör

APPENDIX B

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1- Background of Turkey-Senegal cooperation

- What do you think are the main motives for Turkey to cooperate with Senegal?
- What are the main features or areas of Turkey- Senegal cooperation?
- What are the most efficient and active Turkish institutions in Senegal?
- Would you say the cooperation with Turkey is beneficial for Senegal?
- Do you think Turkey is a key partner for Senegal?
- What are the visible outcomes of that Senegal-Turkey cooperation?

2- Strengths and weaknesses of Turkey-Senegal cooperation

- What are the main assets of Turkey as a partner for Senegal?
- What do you think are the limitations of Turkey as a partner for Senegal?
- Is there any difference between Turkey's official rhetoric of noninterventionist policy in Africa and win-win partnership, and the reality on the ground?
- Do you think Turkey has a neocolonial hidden agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa?

3- Perception of Turkey-Senegal cooperation since 15, July 2016

- Due to the importance of the schools of the Gülen movement and other Turkish trade networks affiliated with the Gülen movement, Senegal has found itself involved in the struggle of the Turkish government against the Gülen movement. Do you think this is a strictly Turkish domestic policy issue?
- Have there been any particular requests from the Turkish government to put an end to the activities of the Gülen movement in Senegal?
- How did the Turkish side go about making these requests understood?
- Do you think that the request of the Turkish government to put an end to the activities of the Gülen movement in Senegal is justified?
- Do you perceive the danger of the Gülen networks as described by the Turkish authorities?
- Apart from the shutdown of Gülen schools and affiliated trade networks, how was Turkey-Senegal cooperation affected by the political events of the failed coup in Turkey of July 2016?
- Do you think there is a change in the Turkish approach or style in its cooperation with Senegal since those dramatic events?
- Is there a change in the Turkey-Senegal cooperation trend since the events of July 2016?
- If yes, how do you assess that change?
- What do you think Turkey has been doing right?
- What do you think Turkey has been doing wrong?

- Can you tell us more about the process and progress of the transfer of the management of Turkish schools to the Maarif foundation?
- What motivated the decision of the Senegalese government to accept the transfer of the management of Turkish schools to the Maarif foundation?
- How would you assess the activities of the Maarif Foundation in Senegal since 2016?
- Is there more advantage to cooperate with an official actor of the Turkish government rather than with private groups as was the case before the arrival of the Maarif foundation?

4- The challenges for the future of Turkey-Senegal cooperation

- What are the prospects for Turkey-Senegal Cooperation?
- Do you foresee any difficulties in the future of Turkey-Senegal cooperation?
- What in your opinion are the main assets and weaknesses of Turkey in comparison to Senegal's other traditional and emerging partners?
- What are Senegal's main expectations for the future in its cooperation with Turkey?

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