THE KURDISH MIGRANTS IN YENIBOSNA: “SOCIAL EXCLUSION”, CLASS AND POLITICS

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THE KURDISH MIGRANTS IN YENIBOSNA: “SOCIAL EXCLUSION”, CLASS AND POLITICS

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Title: The Kurdish Migrants in Yenibosna: “Social Exclusion”, Class and Politics

This study is based upon a group of forced Kurdish migrants whose “social exclusion” is generally suggested to have arrived at an extent in which the forced migrants are both out of the labor market and grassroots politics. This thesis basically suggests the opposite: the forced migrants fill the ranks of the informal labor market to a significant extent and, at the same time, they constitute the main actors of grassroots politics within the urban slum. The “new urban poverty” approach, on the other hand, suggests that social exclusion has arrived to an extent that absolute disconnection from economic, social and political life is at hand and that the risk of “underclass” is imminent. Building upon a mainly qualilative research conducted in the district of Yenibosna, located in the borough of Bahçelievler in Istanbul, this thesis criticizes this approach along mainly (but not exclusively) two lines. While acknowledging the basic premises of the “new urban poverty” regime and the inevitability of “social exclusion”, this thesis shows that the Kurdish migrants are not really excluded from the labor market at all: more or less regularly employed within the textile sector over long periods of time, the Kurdish migrants form a forcibly dispossessed or proletarianized population which occupies the lower ranks of the urban informal labor market. In other words, exclusion results not from “absolute disconnection” per se but from their “integration” as cheap labor into the labor market. Furthermore, their community has not disappeared; a total atomization has not taken place. Their relationship with the state is, on the other hand, not to be understood in a basic dichotomy of presence or lack; rather, it turns out to be more ambiguous. Lastly, the Kurdish migrants, politically mobilized to a large extent, turn out to be inside grassroots politics. Given these assumptions, could we speak of a “class formation” rather than a “class deformation”, this thesis basically asks in the last instance. The answer is affirmative. What is at hand is a class in formation, a significant portion of which is formed by the Kurdish forced migrants whose exclusion should not suggest that they are out of the market and politics at all. The actors of grassroots politics have, after all, shifted towards the Kurdish migrants. Thus, if one is to speak of politics and class in the urban slum or of informality or policies against exclusion, this cannot overlook or underestimate the existence and politics of the forced migrants, this thesis basically suggests.

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Başlık: Yenibosna'nın Kürt Göçmenleri: "Sosyal Dışlanma", Sınıf ve Siyaset

Bu çalışma, "sosyal dışlanma"nın emek piyasasının ve siyasetin tamamen dışına itmiş olduğu varsayılan, zorunlu Kürt göçü ile İstanbul'a yerleşmiş göçmenler üzerine kurulu. Bu tez bu varsayımın aksini öneriyor: Kürt göçmenler, kayıtdışı iş gücünün önemli bir kısmını oluştururken varoşlardaki yerel siyasetin en temel özneleri. Öte yandan, "yeni kent yoksulluğu" yaklaşımı sosyal dışlanmanın ekonomik, sosyal ve siyasi hayattan keskin bir kopukluğa evrildiğini ve bir "alt sınıf" oluşumunun ihtimal dâhilinde olduğunu öneriyor. İstanbul'da bulunan Bahçelievler ilçesinin Yenibosna semtinde yapılan (daha çok niceliksel) bir araştırmadan yola çıkan bu çalışma, bu yaklaşımı iki temel argümanla (fakat bu iki argümanla sınırlı da olmadan) sınıyor. Bu çalışma, yeni yoksulluk rejiminin varlığını ve temel ilkelerinin geçerliliğini teslim edip Kürt göçmenlerinin emek piyasasının dışında olmadığını öneriyor: az çok düzenli bir biçimde ve uzun süreler boyunca – daha çok- tekstil sektöründe çalışan Kürt göçmenler kayıtdışı piyasasının en alt kademelerini dolduran, zorla mülksüzleştirilmiş ya da proleterleşmiş bir kitleyi oluşturuyorlar. "Dışlanma" ekonomik yapı ile ilişkisizlikten türemekten ziyade o ilişkiden türüyor. Göçmenlerin sosyal ağları tamamen parçalanmamış olmakla beraber, devlet ile ilişkileri bir 'var / yok' ikiliği içinde algılanacak kadar da basit değil. Son olarak, siyasi olarak oldukça hareketli olan bu Kürt göçmenler, yerel siyasetin aktif özneleri. Bu önerilerin ışığında, sınıfların çökmesinden veya kaybolmasından ziyade bir "sınıf oluşumu" sürecinden bahsedebilir miyiz? Bu tez, belkemiğini oluşturan bu soruya göçmenlerin genel bir profilini sunarak olumlu bir yanıt veriyor. Varoşlardaki siyasetin ekseni bu sınıfın önemli bir kısmını oluşturan zorla göç ettirilmiş Kürtlere kaymış durumda. Eğer şehrin varoşlarında sınıftan, siyasetten, kayıtdışılıktan veya genel olarak "dışlanma karşıtı politikalar"dan bahsedilecekse, bu Kürt göçmenlerin varlığını ve siyasetini yok sayarak veya küçümseyerek gerçekleşemez.

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CONTENTS

FIGURES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is based on a group of forced Kurdish migrants, whose "social exclusion" is generally claimed to have arrived at a point in which they are completely out of the labor market and politics. After all, a permanently pauperized "underclass", of which the forced Kurdish migrants will be a significant component, is seriously at hand, this logic claims. This thesis falsifies this depiction of "absolute social exclusion" by treating class and politics as relevant analytical tools to understand the case of forced migrants. Rather, this thesis will portray the (relative) "ordinariness" of the urban poverty of the slum, Yenibosna, which forms the context of this study, through a group supposedly the most deprived and, thus, the primary bearers of the new urban poverty regime: displaced Kurdish migrants. These migrants do not, indeed, turn out to be totally "integrated". Economically they are, to a large extent, integrated into the informal economy, more or less regularly bounded by the local textile workshops; in other words, despite being vulnerable to the dynamics of the market, they are not really "excluded" from it. Wage-labor remains as the primary form of subsistence. Their exclusion is, in fact, related to their "integration" as cheap labor. These migrants, furthermore, constitute an organized and active population, engaged in grassroots politics. Their relations with the state are, indeed, scant – however not only because of the state's preferred exclusion, but seemingly because of the migrants' preference. Socially, they do not seem to have formed a local and an incoherent enclave; they have not really been forsaken in terms of social relations.

This thesis, thus, positions itself against the assumption that social exclusion, under the rubric of "new urban poverty", has arrived at a level that the forced migrants are "totally disconnected" from the rest of the society; against the assumption that the working poor, given their economic conditions, i.e. their irregular informality, do not really constitute a "class" but, rather, a permanently unemployed or casually employed underclass; against the assumption that the urban poor are isolated from the local economy and politics.

The moral of the thesis is twofold: both "class" and "politics" persist as analytical tools for understanding the displaced Kurdish migrants. After all, the Kurdish migrants have been forcibly dispossessed to congregate in the lower ranks of the informal economy. One, thus, cannot speak of class, informality and politics without taking the existence of the Kurds into consideration. More significantly, these migrants, as members of an informal class, constitute the most politically mobile group within the urban slum.

Thus, what is at hand is not a "class deformation" as such, i.e. the disappearance of wage-labor and of grassroots politics but the opposite: "class formation". This is, of course, not to say that a "class" only composed of the Kurdish migrants is at hand.

This environment in which these migrants reside, Yenibosna, is, thus, not to be analyzed within a simple dichotomy of "slum of hope" / "slum of despair". Not confining itself within this dichotomy, it presents itself as a laboratory for examining the intricate interplay between class, migration and politics. It is not really deindustrialized; it is not a hyper-ghetto, its marginality is not "advanced". Its poverty does not totally belong to the "new poverty regime". Nevertheless, its marginality is not a myth at all. This slum is a result of the ongoing process of

informalization. It does not have a chronic, common unemployment pattern yet (in the case of the Kurdish migrants) and it bears the mark of an endemic informalization, mainly in the textile sector. In other words, it is a bearer of informal small-scale industrialization and proletarianization against the powerful currents of pervasive deindustrialization and "class deformation", a remarkable feature of "advanced marginality".

It has, indeed, been a common suggestion that "neoliberal structuring" has gone hand in hand with "deindustrialization", the rise of "service society" and a "new poverty regime". While this thesis does not really deal with this suggestion, what this neoliberal restructuring rhetoric ignores is, however, that a counter-dynamic is, also, at hand: proletarianization. This assumption is echoed throughout this thesis via the case of the Kurdish migrants of Yenibosna, a group, one supposes, that should be totally excluded in all aspects. In other words, "wage-labor", though transformed into a novel form, remains the primary subsistence activity of this recent group of Kurdish migrants. Total disconnection from the labor market is not in question. Dispossession and subjugation to wage-labor have gone hand in hand. This group of recent migrants, furthermore, does not exclusively fit into the category of "new urban poor" or of the permanently unemployed "underclass". As suggested below, the latter term is a fallacy in the first place. Rather, with their abrupt integration into the local informal economy, they constitute a major portion of the "informal proletariat". Social exclusion, after all, turns out to be a matter of inclusion. The ordinariness of Yenibosna, thus, becomes visible in this double movement, in the existence of the rise of a new, informal labor-force with the degradation of the old (formal) work patterns. Thus, this thesis suggests that doing justice to the Kurdish migrants' class position, rather than focusing merely on their

poverty, remains a major duty. After all, a significant component of this “invisible” class is (and will be) formed by the Kurdish migrants. This significance, furthermore, will not be merely a matter of quantity but of political mobilization.

This thesis does not position itself merely within the realm of economic transformation or economic restructuring. It will suggest that this economic transformation, indeed, has electively affined with the process of “forced migration”, the Kurdish expulsion during the 1990s, resulting in the dispossession and de-ruralization of migrants. These migrants, however, are not really excluded from the informal market, after all; they lack the formal qualifications and rewards, but they turn out to be workers who are more or less regularly employed and who do not find it hard to be occupied. In other words, they are integrated as “cheap labor”. Furthermore, the fact that they are “informal” does not conceal the fact that they are, indeed, “connected” with the labor market and that they are members of a class in formation.

In short, this thesis, situated in a peripheral neighborhood in Istanbul, Yenibosna, builds upon the literature on “new urban poverty”, testing its premises via the case of the displaced Kurds, particularly of the youth. The basic question is as follows: has “social exclusion” or “new urban poverty” arrived at a point in which the forced Kurdish migrants are totally isolated from the labor market and politics? While acknowledging the existence of the multiple facets of the Kurds’ exclusion, the answer will be a clear-cut “no”.

This population has been materially dispossessed to occupy the ranks of the informal sector but, at the same time, they have become the main actors of urban politics. Thus, both with their position within the labor market and their political mobilization, they suggest the emergence of a new class which is as informal as it is

"mobile". This "class", of which the Kurdish migrants form a significant portion, resides, works and protests within the urban slum.

This slum, furthermore, is a bearer of the results of different migratory patterns, which might suffice to explain various class positions. It has its better-off Turkish and Kurdish inhabitants and it also has its badly-off Turkish and Kurdish inhabitants. The "badly-off" Kurdish inhabitants, as the members of a forced migratory wave, are the main objects of this study, as suggested above. After all, the materially dispossessed Kurdish migrants should be the primary bearers of social exclusion, common-sense and academic works suggest. This thesis will not, however, embark upon a mission of "taboo-breaking". Acknowledging most of the assumptions regarding the urban poverty of Turkey, it aims at leveling the "exclusion" of the Kurds by building upon two axes. The former one is based upon the Kurdish component of the informal labor force: what is the relationship between (informal) labor and the Kurdish migrants? Are the migrants outside the labor market? The latter one is based upon the politicization of the Kurds: are they isolated from politics at all?

The conclusion of the story will be, thus, as follows: one could speak of a "class formation" rather than a class deformation or the emergence of permanent economic exclusion in the case of the Kurdish migrants. After all, they are "inside" the market and, given a high political mobilization, these migrants fulfill the requirements for the degree of "an informal working class".

This fulfillment is particularly significant. After all, the words "Kurds" and "class" have been generally used within separate domains. The Kurds' economic position has been confined generally within the realm of extreme poverty or joblessness. On the other hand, class analyses, seeing the Kurds merely as an ethnic

or an identity group, have not done justice to the weight of the Kurds within the informal working class. After all, their demands do not pertain to the economic realm and, being uneducated, traditional, informal and irregular workers, they form a "lumpenproletariat" or a loose group of casual workers, this logic ensues. This thesis, in the last instance, is an attempt at criticizing the presumed discrepancy between "class" and "the Kurdish issue" by moving upon the literature on "social exclusion". If one is to speak of "class" or of "informality", one cannot bypass the existence of the forced Kurdish migrants.

Methodology, Limitations and a Caution

This thesis is erected upon interviews with ten Kurdish migrants, conducted in the neighborhood of Zafer, located in Yenibosna, Bahçelievler. Zafer Mahallesi, as suggested below, seems representative of the district of Yenibosna. The writer of this thesis has been frequenting this district since 2007, due to his involvement with an independent solidarity cooperative which gives voluntary lessons for the university and high school entrance exams to disadvantaged students.

Almost no specific data on Yenibosna or on Zafer Mahallesi exists according to the municipality. Thus, some of the quantitative data such as voting patterns had to be compiled manually. Furthermore, the limited data acquired from the municipality had to be generalized.

The qualitative research mainly (but not exclusively) worked through the snowball sampling method; an informant led to another. Only two of the interviewees were previously personally known by the author of this thesis; despite the risk of a biased sample, these migrants' stories were deemed representative. As

suggested above and below, the interviewees were generally employed; however, being Kurdish and having migrated from specific places during specific periods, rather than merely being employed, were deployed as criteria.

Questions regarding employment, unemployment, social aid, political involvement, social networks were asked to scrutinize the "exclusion" of the migrants and their households. The qualilative research aimed at depicting a general profile of the forced migrants and their households. Besides the qualitative research, a modest quantitative research on the households of Zafer Mahallesi was randomly conducted. Demographic information, employment or unemployment patterns and access to social aid were asked to 28 members of different households, which helped to gain information about 99 individuals in total.

This thesis's representativeness is, however, limited. It does not give a general profile of the displaced or the Kurds in general. It cannot extrapolate on the future of the relationship between informal economy and the Kurds while it can surely suggest that the Kurds possess a significant weight in the local informal economy. The fact that most of the interviewees are not actually totally destitute might suggest that this thesis does not really deal with the poorest of the poor[1] but, rather, deals with a group of working poor, characterized by quasi-regular informal employment in the textile sector. This is due to the locality of Yenibosna. Thus, a second limitation appears: the peripheral poverty of Yenibosna is significantly different from the inner-city poverty of other areas. Yenibosna does not possess the popular stigmatization of, say, Tarlabaşı. "Work", furthermore, has not really disappeared in Yenibosna. It has never been a totally "industrialized" area in the first

[1] For the the employment patterns and subsistence strategies of the poorest of the urban poor in Turkey, see Ayşe Buğra Kavala and Çağlar Keyder. February 2008. "Kent Nüfusunun En Yoksul Kesiminin İstihdam Yapısı ve Geçinme Yöntemleri." Sosyal Politika Forumu, [online]: http://www.spf.boun.edu.tr/docs/kent_yoksullugu_rapor.pdf [01 June 2010].

place, such as Paşabahçe.[2] Thus, one has to keep in mind that the area in question resembles a peripheral working space, rather than a forsaken hell of jobless urban poverty. It is, indeed, not an environment in which marginality is "advanced" per se but an environment in which social exclusion expresses manifestations of poverty, which are not really new but which are, more or less, "ordinary". Thus, being contextualized in a peripheral environment in which informal industrialization is on-going, its results might differ from similar studies on "inner-city poverty". In other words, the peripheral slum in which this thesis is contextualized, Yenibosna, might breed different manifestations (and degrees) of poverty and exclusion, for instance, from Okmeydanı, a slum to be "gentrified", or from Diyarbakır's inner-city poverty, which is generally referred to as the culmination of urban poverty and exclusion.[3] Furthermore, with regard to forced migration, this thesis deals with a (relatively) "fortunate" population of migrants, who had the chance to have arrived in Istanbul during the 1990s and early 2000s. Thus, it cannot speak upon "forced migration" in general.

This thesis, furthermore, will not deal with the degree of the Kurdification of the informal labor force in numerical terms or will not really suggest that a "split labor market" is at hand in Turkey or that solely the Kurds occupy the lower ranks of the social hierarchy. It cannot do so methodologically although it suggests that the Kurds occupy a significant weight within the informal economy.

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[2] For the multiple manifestations of exclusion in Tarlabaşı, see Bediz Yılmaz, "Far Away, So Close: Social Exclusion and Spatial Relegation in an Inner-City Slum of İstanbul," in *Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Slum Areas of Large Cities in Turkey*, eds. Fikret Adaman and Çağlar Keyder (European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG: 2006), pp. 26-41. For the deindustrializion and dislocation of Paşabahçe, see Ayşe Alnıaçık, "After Deindustrialization, In the Midst of Urban Transformation: The Case of Paşabahçe" (MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2008).

[3] For a study on poverty and forced migration in Diyarbakır, see "Zorunlu Göç ve Etkileri: Diyarbakır" (Ankara: UNDP Kalkınma Merkezi – Eğitim, Araştırma, Uygulama, Danışmanlık, Üretim ve İşletme Kooperatifi, 2006).

Most importantly, a caution needs to be taken: this thesis will not claim that "exclusion" is a myth after all. It is, indeed, aware of the inevitability of the exclusion of the employed or unemployed poor in a capitalist economy.[4] Furthermore, the term "underclass", with the heavy connotations it brings, is an academic (and a political) "fallacy" in itself. After all, as Byrne notes, "[t]he permanent underclass in postindustrial flexible capitalism is generally speaking a myth. What matters is the combination of low wages, insecure employment, and dependence on means-tested benefit supplements to low incomes. Poor work is the big story in any flexible labour market."[5] Thus, this thesis uses and criticizes the term underclass to go against the tendency to divorce the Kurdish issue from a class-based approach, i.e., to trap the issue within "extreme poverty" or absolute social exclusion. After all, despite being an empirical and a theoretical fallacy, the term "underclass" has been used to understand the exclusion of the Kurdish migrants.[6]

This thesis will not, furthermore, suggest that the poor turn out to be petty entrepreneurs who make well use of their resources, that their poverty is a highly overrated phenomenon, and that they should be left to the mechanisms of the "spontaneous order". Indeed, the group which is the subject of this study is poor and socially excluded in all aspects; rather, this study will suggest that this group's poverty should not make one overlook the fact that this group's "social exclusion" might not be so absolute at all and that this group, after all, might constitute a "class". Underrating the absoluteness of Kurds' exclusion should not mean that they

[4] For the "functionality of the poor" (whether as an industrial reserve army or as a surplus population), see David Byrne, *Social Exclusion* (Berkshire: Open University Press, 2005), pp. 42-44.

[5] Byrne, *Social Exclusion*, p. 73.

[6] The term underclass, furthermore, overlooks the assumption that "class" is not an entity to be relegated solely to the domain of "economics". The depiction of the politics of the migrants below will illuminate this argument.

should be left alone from any (positive) intervention and that they are actually doing well by using “the resources of poverty” in the first place. On the other hand, a dynamic generally dismissed as unimportant or contingent exists in the case of the Kurds: politics. Thus, this thesis aims at assessing the degree of “social exclusion” of a migrant group supposedly to be the most socially excluded by utilizing mainly two concepts: class and politics.

This group, it is generally suggested, is akin to an “underclass“, almost absolutely excluded in all aspects. What this thesis basically goes against is this assumption: it does so via focusing on two interrelated realms – “class” and “politics”. While “class deformation”, i.e. the disappearance of wage-labor and the reign of deproletarianization, is generally accepted without reserve, this thesis offers the possibility that a “class formation” might be, rather, at hand – this class, a major component of which will be formed by these migrants, will not be marked by its poverty or pauperization but mainly with its abrupt integration into the economy and political mobilization.

The Distinction of the Kurdish Migrants

The wave of forced migration in the 1990s has supplied the informal sector with cheap, insecure labor, resulting in the informalization or proletarianization of the recent Kurdish migrants. In other words, this process of “informalization” went hand in hand with the (mainly forced) material dispossession of the Kurds; however, the Kurds have not been the single bearer of these material processes at all. They do not carry the weight of the world all alone, either. As Yükseker suggests, the recent migratory waves were caused not only by the armed conflict: “high levels of net

migration took place not only out of … [the conflict-induced region], but also from the Black Sea and Central Anatolia regions during the second half of the 2000s."[7] Furthermore, the "existing neoliberal policies impact all rural regions of the country and not just the east and the southeast."[8] After all, "dispossession from land has affected a higher degree of proletarianization of IDP [internally displaced persons] households and recent rural to urban migrants compared to previous waves of rural migrants, necessitating a fuller degree of dependence on markets" whether migration was a result of neoliberal de-agrarianization or forced migration or both.[9] In other words, while the degree of exclusion is, indeed, variable, this research will not suggest that the economic exclusion of the Kurdish migrants is absolute or quite distinct, after all. These migrants are, after all, "desired" and integrated as cheap labor. The matter at hand is not a matter of "extreme joblessness" or "the permanent underclass" but of poor work and informality.

Though this thesis cannot deal with numbers by relating ethnicity with the labor force through a numerical map, the Kurdish labor force seems representative with regard to the composition of the local informal economy and, in this respect, seems not quite distinct with their economic position. A significant portion of the informal economy is, indeed, "Kurdified". However, the migrants' distinctiveness does not really lie in their weight in the economy as a different ethnonational group but in their unprecedented political mobilization (regardless of its content) which is not characteristic of either previous migrants or other components of the informal

[7] Deniz Yükseker, "Neoliberal Restructuring and Social Exclusion in Turkey," in *Turkish Economy in the Post-Crisis Era: the New Phase of Neo-Liberal Restructuring and Integration to the Global Economy*, eds. Ziya Öniş and Fikret Şenses (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), p. 268.

[8] Ibid., p. 268.

[9] Ibid., pp. 266-267.

workforce and which one does not expect to see from such an "excluded" group. This mobilization, in fact, might be a significant factor in fighting various forms of exclusion. In other words, the Kurdish migrants do not turn out to be passive victims of exclusion.

Despite the structural rigidity[10], these migrants are not detached from "politics". Rather, they are the main actors of urban politics. Although one cannot speak of "urban politics" in its common usage, i.e. of actions motivated by economic hardships, this does not make the migrants' political action insignificant. This study, however, will not deal with the expression or formation of a "Kurdish identity"[11]; rather, it defines political mobilization in general, engagement in grassroots politics being a constituent part of it. This conceptualization helps us to understand the political "exclusion" of the Kurdish migrants. These Kurdish migrants' isolation from the state, furthermore, is ambiguous.

Possible Contributions and the Organization of the Thesis

What could this study's contribution be? While scrutinizing the "exclusion" and "integration" of Kurdish migrants, it gives a different glimpse of the internally displaced: this group is not merely a congregation of the poor or the unemployed.

[10] After all, "social exclusion" is mainly a structural process, i.e. related to the state's policies and economic adjustments, as suggested below. The mobilization of the Kurdish migrants, thus, pertains to an "agency".

[11] This thesis will not claim that forced migration automatically makes one "political", while the opposite might be true in the first place. One could speculate that the Kurdish migrants have transferred their politicization to the urban slums. The investigation of the relationship between politicization and migration, however, extends the scope of this research. As Çelik claims: "ethnicity can be the extension of historically determined past relations or can be constructed by contemporary group interactions … This is not to argue that Kurdish migrants were devoid of ethnic consciousness in their villages or that it revitalized once in the city. Rather, the claim is that one should look at this as a process, which has a beginning in the place of origin and continues in the place of destination" (p. 150). See Ayşe Betül Çelik, "Migrating onto Identity: Kurdish Mobilization Through Associations in Istanbul" (Ph.D Dissertation, SUNY Binghamton University, 2002).

Rather, they form a significant section of the informal proletariat; thus, it is possible to situate them within the context of a "class" rather than of jobless poverty or casual labor. This might raise questions regarding the relationship between forced migration and class formation. Politically, this group is not really "excluded"; in a period in which mass movements are on the decline or in a deadlock, this group forms a politically mobile population, whose mobility is, despite its political visibility, mainly ignored or underestimated. Their relations with the state, with regard to social aids, furthermore, are not really the results of "structural ignorance" but, to an extent, might be the results of a self-calculation. Socially, the community of the Kurdish migrants has not disappeared in the first place. A total atomization has not taken place. The avoidance of a total atomization might be related to the patterns of migration and, even, to politicization. Thus, this thesis might help to shift the focus towards the Kurds' politicization not as a "contemporarily exotic fact", but as a dynamic mechanism which appears as an empowering strategy. This factor is much more than mere "slum radicalism". The studies on the exclusion of the Kurdish migrants interestingly have been silent on the existence and potentiality of the politicization of the Kurds in general.

With regard to the Kurdish issue, this thesis modestly aims at reconciling "ethnicity" and "class" – by releasing the issue in question from the matrix of identity or of poverty. This recent group of migrants is not really doomed to jobless poverty but in a way, has integrated into the informal economy. In other words, they are not merely pauperized but, filling the local textile workshops, they have constituted a portion of the informal proletariat. Thus, neither is the informal economy devoid of "ethnicity" nor are the recent migrant Kurds merely within the confines of extreme jobless poverty. After all, the literature on "informality" and

"class" abstains both from differentiating the Kurds' position in the informal economy and from treating their "politics" as a significant dynamic.

This informal proletariat, as repeatedly suggested above, is not mainly composed of "poor" workers whose labor turnover is high but it is composed of workers, who do not really find it hard to be employed within the informal textile sector. In other words, a different conception of class is also at hand; this class, though informal, is marked not by its poverty or high rates of unemployment or of labor turnover, but by a more or less "integrated" economic position and the political relations in which it mobilizes and engages. They are, indeed, economically excluded from stable, formal and good-quality work; however, their exclusion is related to their "integration" into the local economy whether as regular or irregular laborers. The issue at hand is, indeed, an issue of "poor work".

This class' political demands are not, furthermore, as one would expect from a "militant" (formal) class or "lumpenproletariat"; their demands are not mainly related to the "macrophases linked to neoliberal economic reforms [such as] the retrenchment of the semi-welfare state, the explosion of unemployment and underemployment, and the decentralization of state services."[12] The actors of politics within the urban slums have not only shifted towards the informal Kurdish migrants but the content of urban grassroots politics has also been modified.

What is this thesis composed of? This study will being by clarifying its concepts and context, all of which were stated above: social exclusion and (new) urban poverty, Yenibosna and, to a lesser extent, proletarianization and the informal economy, forced migration and political action. After a thorough summary of the

[12] Javier Auyero, "Protest in Contemporary Argentina: A Contentious Repertoire in the Making," in *Out of the Shadows: Political Action and Informal Economy in Latin America*, eds. Patricia Fernandez-Kelly and Jon Shefner (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2006), p. 166.

general debate on new urban poverty or the new manifestations of social exclusion, this thesis will focus on case studies of exclusion in Turkey before moving onto defining its secondary concepts and methodology. Chapter 2 will be composed as such.

After Chapter 3, it will move on to assess the degree of the "social exclusion" of Yenibosna by utilizing external data and quantitative research. The introduction of the context will constitute Chapter 3. The words "slum", "social exclusion" and "urban poverty" will haunt this chapter with the utilization of relevant literature.

After portraying the exclusion of Yenibosna, this thesis will move on to treat the recent Kurdish migrants as its object of analysis (from which qualitative data were collected), since this group should be the primary bearers of social exclusion after all. The different manifestations of the "social exclusion" of the migrants will follow. The questions, crudely put, are as follows: what is the relationship between these migrants and the labor market? Are they politically apathetic or isolated? Are they devoid of any social ties? What is their position vis-à-vis state services? The concepts "forced migration", "proletarianization", "politicization" and "networks" will mainly echo throughout this chapter, which will help to question the social exclusion literature.

While concluding Chapter 4, a question, which forms the hidden agenda of this study, will be asked: does this depiction of the Kurdish migrants pertain to a "class formation"?

Lastly, the context, the concepts and the results of this study will be summarized in the conclusion. This thesis raises suspicions towards the concept of (absolute) "social exclusion" with regard to the Kurdish migrants, it will be claimed.

What is at hand is not exclusively “social exclusion” but also “class formation”. “Exclusion” turns out to be a matter of inclusion into the labor market. Could one perceive this inclusion (coupled with the political mobilization of the migrants) as a “class formation”?

What follows now is a brief clarification of the contexts and concepts uttered above, namely, “social exclusion” and the related concepts, marginality and underclass. These concepts and the relevant literature, will not be, however, exhausted in this theoretical section; they are concepts which will be echoed throughout this thesis. Then, before moving onto Chapter 3, a short delineation of secondary concepts, i.e. proletarianization and the informal economy, forced migration and political action, will follow.

CHAPTER 2

ASSESSING URBAN POVERTY: INTRODUCTION OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

The concepts to be used throughout this study are delineated below. This thesis aims at pulling Yenibosna's poverty and exclusion to shreds; it will do so by focusing on a population whose poverty, rather than their class position and political mobilization, has been widely scrutinized. This study, however, does not position itself mainly in the literature on forced migration or informal economy or collective action but within the literature on urban poverty and social exclusion. The former set of concepts, i.e. informalization or political mobilization, will complement the main argument. What follows below, before the evaluation of Yenibosna, is a summary of the relevant literature on social exclusion and urban poverty within which this research situates itself.

The population which constitutes the object of this study, as mentioned above, is the forced Kurdish migrants. Does this group form a group at the margin, i.e. are they, indeed, economically, politically and socially excluded to the point that they are totally out of the labor market and of politics? After all, Turkey's poverty has arrived at a new degree, "characterized by high levels of long term unemployment … (which are) generally insensitive to changes in economic conjuncture", as Güvenç suggests.[13] The main bearers of this weight should be the Kurds, who have been forcibly dispossessed from their land and stripped of social

[13] Murat Güvenç, "Kent Yoksulluğu" in *Yoksulluk, Bölgesel Gelişme ve Kırsal Yoksulluk, Kent Yoksulluğu*, eds. A. Halis Akder and Murat Güvenç (İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2000), p. 95.

ties (notwithstanding the structural political exclusion to which they are subject), one might suggest.

As suggested above, this thesis will be contextualized in a slum[14] of Istanbul, located in the district of Bahçelievler, named Yenibosna. It, however, does not fit primarily to the category of "slum of hope", which offers the possibility that many of the migrants will be gradually assimilated or acculturated in the employed (formal) population.[15] It does not really look like a "slum of despair" either, which suggests the existence of the impossibility of social mobility and which dooms the slum-dwellers to the constantly reproduced (extreme) jobless urban poverty.[16] This dichotomy, as suggested below, is irrelevant. It is, indeed, "marginal"; nevertheless, it does not really suggest a "myth of marginality" as Janice A. Perlman would claim. Its marginality is not "advanced" in Loic J. D. Wacquant's sense either.

What does one mean by "new urban poverty", "social exclusion" or "marginality" in the first place? What does "the myth of marginality" entail? This thesis will now trace the evolution of "marginality" into "social exclusion", while utilizing the latter concept rather than the former for the sake of theoretical clarity.

Definitional Clarifications: Marginality, Underclass and Social Exclusion

The concepts of "social exclusion", "marginality" and "underclass", albeit used vaguely above and in general, pertain to different realities and different geographies. In an ideal-typical fashion, the former is mainly applied to the European concept,

[14] The word "slum", in this context, pertains not to a congregation of favela-type residences but to "legalized" low quality apartment buildings.

[15] Charles Stokes, "A Theory of Slums," *Land Economics*, 38, no. 3 (1962), p. 190.

[16] Ibid., p. 190.

while the second is characteristic of the Latin American context and the latter is often used with regard to the United States.[17] However, given "that they point towards a series of changes in economic systems and social structures throughout the world", as Wacquant suggests[18] and that "social exclusion" has gained an upper hand, these terms are, contemporarily, connected with the non-integration and the seeming permanency they suggest.

Given the vagueness and the loose usage of these terms, defining these terms still remains a duty. This thesis will make use of the three terms and the related debates as delineated below while using (social) "exclusion" as an encompassing term. After all, the terms, albeit applied in different geographies, refer to same processes and same results, i.e. changes in the labor market's structure and the emergence of a (loose) congregation of pauperized and chronically unemployed or precariously working individuals, who are stripped of social ties and devoid of political rights and participation.

What follows below is an attempt to define these terms and, at last, to present the relevance of "social exclusion".

The first term, marginality or marginalization, is to be attributed to the Latin American context (though not exclusively), as suggested above. The "classic marginality of the 1960s" in its Latin American sense, Ward claims, was built upon two axes: the economic and the cultural. The debate surrounding the concept was

[17] Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, *New Poverty and The Changing Welfare Regime of Turkey*, (Ankara: UNDP, 2003), p. 20; A.S. Bhalla and Frederic Lapeyre, *Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World* (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 153.

[18] Buğra and Keyder, *New Poverty and The Changing Welfare*…, p. 21.

between two strands of thought: modernization and dependency theory.[19] Economically, "a growing separation between a blue-collar elite on the one hand and the marginal masses on the other" was at hand; thus, these masses "threatened social and political stability."[20] However, it soon appeared that poverty was not a matter of exclusion but of "integration" as the proponents of the dependency theory suggested.[21] After all, the formal and the informal were linked in multiple forms.[22]

Culturally, with the weight of traditionality and rurality, these migrants were marginal to the city life, bringing the risk of "ruralization of the city."[23] Therein, their "culture of poverty" appeared: Oscar Lewis' "culture of poverty" (coined circa 1963) suggested that "the people in the culture of poverty have a strong feeling of marginality, of helplessness, of dependency, of not belonging" and that "they are like aliens in their own country", feeling inferior and unworthy.[24] The bearers of the culture of poverty, as Ward suggests, "were outside the cultural mainstream, and their poverty was so deeply embedded that it became trans-generational, and those trapped in the culture carried a whole range of marginal traits at the individual, familial and community levels."[25] Furthermore, "not only material but moral

[19] Peter M. Ward, "Introduction and Overview: Marginality Then and Now," in "From the Marginality of the 1960s to the 'New Poverty' of Today: A LARR Research Forum," *Latin American Research Review*, 39, no. 1 (2004), p. 184.

[20] Ibid, p. 184.

[21] Janice A. Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro* (Cambridge: University of California Press, 1976), p. 245.

[22] Ward, "Introduction…", pp. 184-185.

[23] Ibid, p 185.

[24] Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty," *Society*, 35, no. 7 (1998), p. 8.

[25] Ward, "Introduction…", p. 185.

destitution as well [was] an essential part of slum life", the debate ensued.[26] Was an anomic and a dysfunctional urbanization at hand? Was not "the urban sickness of the 'squatter phenomenon' which is afflicting so many of the towns and cities of the developing world today … as virulent, as insidious, as malignant as the plague?"[27]

The critiques, on the other hand, suggested that social networks and local organizations helped the poor to survive; they were integrated into networks "that they could mobilize to reasonable effect."[28] Irregular settlements, after all, possessed a rationale. Furthermore, irrationality was not to be attributed as a psychological trait; rather, the poor acted in a "rational-utilitarian" fashion, within the structural limits they were trapped.[29] Marginality was, after all, a myth to a large extent, as Perlman suggested.

Perlman, working upon her research in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro in the late 1960s, claimed to attack the "ill" assumptions regarding migrants – the marginality inscribed on the migrants is crudely as follows, she suggested: "the city has been invaded by hordes of rural peasants", "these migrants are … arriving lonely and rootless from the countryside, unprepared and unable to adapt full to urban life and perpetually anxious to return to their villages," and "in defense, they isolate themselves in parochial ruralistic enclaves rather than take advantage of the wider city context."[30]

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[26] Alejandro Portes, "Rationality in the Slum: An Essay on Interpretative Sociology," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 14, no. 13 (1972), p. 269.

[27] Morris Juppenplatz. *Cities in Transformation: The Urban Squatter Problem of the Developing World*, (St. Lucia: University of Queensland Pres, 1970), p. 1

[28] Janice A. Perlman, "The Metamorphosis of Marginality in Rio de Janeiro," in "From the Marginality of the 1960s to the "New Poverty" of Today: A LARR Research Forum," *Latin American Research Review*, 39, no. 1 (2004), p. 185.

[29] Portes, "Rationality in the Slum…", pp. 285-286.

[30] Perlman, *The Myth of Marginality*…, p. 1.

"Marginality", Perlman suggests, is a loose definition used to include a variety of groups, such as "the *poor* in general, the *jobless*, *migrants*, and members of other *subcultures*, racial and ethnic *minorities*, and *deviants* of any sort."[31] Five common traits persist, according to the common usage of the term, Perlman claims. First of all, spatiality and spatial organization overlap with poverty and "physical traits"; "the ghetto or shantytown as a physically delineated space" is, thus, a "space within which everyone is marginal, and outside of which everyone is somehow 'integrated.'"[32] Secondly, the marginal forms an "underclass in the economic-occupational structure"; it consists of "those who are precariously part of the labor market."[33] "The determining characteristic" is, thus, "an economic-occupational one dealing with lack of work or with unstable, low-paying jobs which are not part of the mainstream economy and do not contribute to it."[34] Thirdly, the marginal is a migrant, a newcomer, one of a different subculture.[35] It is situated in a transitional level, i.e. between rural and urban. Fourthly, "the possibility of a gradual formation of a sub-society composed precisely of racial or ethnic marginal men"[36] arises according to the common usage of the term. The road to "mainstream", thus, goes through the denunciation of one's ethnicity. Lastly, the marginal is a "deviant" with its "lack of participation in the occupational, religious or political mainstream."[37]

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[31] Ibid., p. 93.

[32] Ibid., p. 94.

[33] Ibid., p. 94.

[34] Ibid., p. 94.

[35] Ibid., p. 94.

[36] Ibid., p. 95.

[37] Ibid., p. 96.

Perlman suggests that the five categories of marginality described above pertain to reality – albeit to an extent. However, the crucial point is that "because of the living conditions of this sector of the population in favelas or in suburbios, they have been automatically assumed to have a series of associated economic, social, cultural and political characteristics."[38] Perlman countered this line of thought by claiming that "the favelados and suburbanos do *not* have the attitudes of behavior supposedly associated with marginal groups."[39] "Socially, they are well organized and … make wide use of the urban milieu", she claimed, while adding that "economically, they work hard" and that "politically, they are neither apathetic nor radical."[40] Furthermore, rather than marginality, they suggest a sense of "integration", especially in the economic domain: "exploited groups … are not marginal but very much integrated into the system, functioning as a vital part of it."[41] Thus, she claimed, "the defining characteristic of the marginalized sector is its role in the accumulation process characteristic of dependent nations."[42] Building upon dependency theory, she affirmed the suggestion that "'marginalization' is the consequence of a new model of development (or underdevelopment) that has a basic characteristic - the exclusion of vast sectors of the population from its main productive apparatus."[43] It is not, thus, an "individualistic" process. Growth, after all, does not lead directly to employment; thus, "the outcome of this process … [was] a

[38] Ibid., p. 97.

[39] Ibid., p. 242.

[40] Ibid., pp. 242-243.

[41] Ibid., p. 245.

[42] Ibid., p. 258.

[43] Ibid., p. 251.

disproportionate number of under-employed people who are not wage-earners, have no particular credentials, no job stability, no social security, no protection of labor legislation and who live in a state of constant uncertainty."[44] This form of "marginality", which Perlman transmits from Quijano, resulted in "two types of marginal workers," the first one being "the 'marginalized bourgeoisie', which consists of self-employed craftsmen, small independent businessmen, and shopowners ..." and the second one being "the 'marginal proletariat', which consists mainly of migrants expelled from agriculture and – if working at all – employees in low-echelon jobs, such as domestic servants or messenger boys."[45] The first group is marginalized via a process in which their economic functions lose their significance. The second group consists of "landless peasants, expelled from the agricultural sector and unable to find work within the dynamic sector of production in the city"; for this reason, "they are forced to accept temporary work in the marginalized sector of the economy or settle for careers restricted to the very lowest ranges of the modern industrial sector."[46]

Marginality is not, however, limited to the Latin American context. As Bhalla and Lapeyre suggest, "the debate on exclusion in Western Europe has led some scholars to speak about the Latin Americanization of Europe, thereby suggesting a similarity between exclusion and marginalization."[47] The similarity results from "the informalization of the labor market and the growth of casual

[44] Ibid., p. 252.

[45] Ibid., p. 255.

[46] Ibid., pp. 255-256.

[47] Bhalla and Lapeyre, *Poverty and Exclusion*…, p. 153.

employment" in both contexts.[48] However, differences remain. The Latin American poor might not have been previously "included" in the capitalist system in the first place while the European poor's exclusion results from their consequent "expulsion" from the capitalist system.[49]

However, thirty years after coining the term "myth of marginality", Perlman claims that "what seems to be emerging is the transformation over thirty-five years from 'the myth of marginality' to 'the reality of marginality.'"[50] Ward, too, claims that the classic marginality theory is being revitalized upon a more concrete ground, as it is being replaced by the term "social exclusion."[51] Similarly, Roberts claims, in line with the assumptions regarding the end of "integrating poverty" in Turkey (delineated below), that while "the informal economy grows … (and) incomes drop within it," "severe constraints upon the upward mobility of the poor" surface.[52] This is at odds with the situation of "the urban poor of the 1960s and 1970s … [who] had real opportunities for their rising expectations to be met, albeit through their own efforts in constructing their homes and creating work opportunities."[53] Furthermore, what is at hand is not marginality per se, but "social exclusion" which is "based on a differentiated inclusion in a social system."[54] While the former concept, marginality,

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[48] Ibid., p. 153.

[49] Ibid., p. 153.

[50] Janice A. Perlman, "The Metamorphosis of Marginality: Four Generations in the Favelas of Rio de Janeiro," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 606, no. 156 (2006), p. 175.

[51] Ward, "Introduction…", pp. 185-186.

[52] Bryan R. Roberts, "From Marginality to Social Exclusion: From Laissez Faire to Pervasive Engagement," in "From the Marginality of the 1960s to the "New Poverty" of Today: A LARR Research Forum," *Latin American Research Review*, 39, no. 1 (2004), p. 196.

[53] Ibid., p. 196.

suggests that “people were outside the formal institutions that promoted the skills and values of modernity”, Roberts claims, the latter, social exclusion derives from a “differentiation produced by the institutions of the state.”[55] Thus, he repeats the critique of the classic marginality theory, by superimposing it upon “social exclusion”; exclusion is, after all, a matter of inclusion.

De la Rocha, similarly, affirms the novelty of poverty as discussed above: “as economic uncertainty continues, seemingly indefinitely, a social and cultural context of radical exclusion is emerging in urban Mexico.”[56] The “resources of poverty”, which manifested itself “through social mechanisms that included the participation of more than one household member and the combination of diverse income sources and a multiplicity of remunerated occupations”[57], are being exhausted, able to be seen via the “erosion of social systems of support and self-help.”[58] This is due to “increasing deterioration of labor markets”[59], in other words, due to economic restructuring, which manifests itself through the debt crisis and capital flight.[60] The rise of informal employment, the decline of wages, the deterioration of local manufactures, job scarcity and unemployment are the immediate results.[61] Thus, the exclusion of poor is at hand; the poor are, now, not

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[54] Ibid., p. 196.

[55] Ibid., p. 196.

[56] Mercedes De La Rocha, “From the Resources of Poverty to the Poverty of Resources? The Erosion of a Survival Model,” *Latin American Perspectives*, 28, no. 4 (2003), p. 73.

[57] Ibid., p. 77.

[58] Ibid., p. 86.

[59] Ibid., p. 86.

[60] Ibid., p. 81.

[61] Ibid., p. 82.

"integrated" into the economic system as the working poor. This process involves "increasing unemployment (particularly of youth), decreasing male participation in the employment structure, and the increasing precariousness of the available jobs in which most women participate" and the feminization of work.[62] The household has, thus, lost its capacity of survival. What is at hand is the poverty of resources – not the resources of poverty anymore.

Back to Perlman: How does the transformation of "myth" into "reality" manifest itself? Thirty years later, despite the rise of collective consumption of urban services and individual consumption of household goods, "the gap between rich and poor has increased even more."[63] Racial discrimination has become more widespread [64]; "health services, security, exclusion, and the economic situation have gotten worse" while Rio's manufacturing has been on the decline.[65] Was "advanced (urban) marginality", in Wacquant's sense, at hand? In two aspects, Perlman claims. "Social inequality in the context of overall prosperity [has resurged] and the elimination of jobs for unskilled workers" has gained more ground.[66] Furthermore, "an absolute surplus population that will never work again, as well as a form of poverty that is becoming more persistent for those who do have jobs, as a result of low rates of pay and the exploitation of temporary workers" have become more prevalent.[67] These

[62] Ibid., pp. 87-88.

[63] Janice A. Perlman, "Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of Rio De Janeiro 1969-2002," in *Urban Informality: Transnational Perspectives from the Middle East, Latin America and South Asia*, eds. Ananya Roy and Nezar AlSayyad, (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), p. 27.

[64] Ibid., p. 30.

[65] Ibid., p. 34

[66] Ibid., p. 21.

[67] Ibid., p. 21.

two dynamics, however, are not new in the first place; they were part of the old marginality, albeit amplified three decades later.[68] Thus, marginality appears under the fabric of "advanced marginality".

The term "advanced marginality" is to be attributed to Wacquant. Wacquant's depiction of advanced marginality does not really suggest a homogeneity; thus, he suggests that "a paired comparison between neighborhoods of relegation in Chicago's 'Black Belt' and the Parisian 'Red Belt''shows that the declining French metropolitan periphery and the Afro-American ghetto remain two sharply distinct socio-spatial constellations."[69] Whereas the former "operates first and foremost on grounds of 'race' bolstered by state structure and policies and aggravated by class divisions", the latter, the French Red Belt "is driven chiefly by class factors, partly exacerbated by colonial-immigrant status and partly alleviated by the (central and municipal) state."[70] Thus, "the United States ghetto is a racially and culturally monotonous universe characterized by low organizational density and state penetration (and therefore high physical and social insecurity), whereas its French counterpart is typically heterogeneous in both ethnonational and class recruitment with a comparatively strong presence of public institutions and far-reaching state penetration."[71] However, "advanced marginality" might be the possible result of the convergence between the two configurations, he claims.

The term characterizes the general contours of the new form of "social exclusion": Wacquant's delineation of advanced marginality, which the First World

[68] Ibid., p. 21.

[69] Loic J. D. Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality: Notes on Its Nature and Implications," *Acta Sociologica*, 39, no. 2 (1996), p. 122.

[70] Ibid., p. 122.

[71] Ibid., p. 122.

cities are to confront,[72] implies the existence of "fragmented work", disconnection from macro-economic trends, territorial stigmatization, the dissolution of "place", the loss of "hinterland" and class decomposition.[73] The desocialization of wage labor, Wacquant suggests, pertains to "the growth of part-time, 'flexible', variable-schedule positions with fewer benefits, negotiable extension and benefit clauses, revised wage scales, and the various avenues pursued to evade the standard, homogenizing effects of state regulation of wage work" and to "the resurgence of sweatshops, piecework and homeworking, the development of teleworking and two-tier wage scales, the outsourcing of employees … [and] the institutionalization of 'permanently temporary' work."[74] Similarly, labor market security, income and employment security have been under attack. "Disconnection from macro-economic trends," on the other hand, is marked by the asymmetry between "national and even regional aggregate unemployment and labor markets trends on the one hand, neighborhood conditions on the other" and by the simultaneous existence of "productivity increases and emerging forms of 'jobless growth.'"[75] Durable joblessness coupled with the disappearance of the means of social sustenance suggests the incapacity of the "workers temporarily rejected from the labor market … [to] fall back upon the social economy of their community of provenance, be it a functioning working-class borough, the communal ghetto, or a rural village in the backcountry."[76] Thus, "self-provisioning" and "shadow work" come into play, "which do little to alleviate

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[72] Ibid., p. 123.

[73] Ibid., pp. 124-128.

[74] Ibid., p. 124.

[75] Ibid., p. 125.

[76] Ibid., p. 127.

precariousness" after all.[77] Class structures, are, furthermore, being "deproletarianized", by becoming devoid of a "language, a repertoire of shared representations and signs" and of its organizational counterparts, i.e. trade unions and similar organizations which are drawing to a close.[78] Thus, the question arises: is there still a working class?

On the axis of "symbolic violence", these territories of advanced marginality are concentrated and isolated areas of "social purgatories"[79], possessing the stigma of poverty and/or race/colonial-immigrant origin. Thus, the loss of social dignity and, consequently, the loss of a "place" in which the inhabitants feel secure and with which they identify.[80] In short, marginality has advanced to an extent in which an advanced form of "social exclusion", in its multiple forms, is present.

On the other hand, Perlman's favelas falsify Wacquant's assumptions in three further aspects: the favelas are not marked by the spatial concentration of poverty: "in terms of spatial and racial concentration, there are other disconnects between social reality in Rio's favelas and the new marginality. Specifically, not all of Rio's poor live in favelas, and not all favelados are poor… Furthermore, Rio's favelas are neither racially, socially, culturally, nor economically homogeneous."[81] Furthermore, since Brazil never developed a welfare state in the first place, one cannot talk of the retrenchment of the state either.[82] However, "state retirement

[77] Ibid., p. 127.

[78] Ibid., p. 128.

[79] Ibid., p. 125.

[80] Ibid., p. 126.

[81] Perlman, "Marginality: From Myth to Reality in the Favelas of…", p. 24.

[82] Ibid., p. 24.

payments are a major source of income for the majority of households."[83] Lastly, the poor of Rio are not doomed to "bounded territories of urban relegation"[84] since marginality is not as "advanced" as expected and since mobility is a (diminishing) possibility. Thus, the advanced marginality thesis is partly validated, Perlman suggests.

Enter a third concept whose relevance[85] is, thus, made questionable with advanced marginality or social exclusion as such taking ground: "underclass". As suggested above via Wacquant, Chicago's Black Belt, "a racially and culturally monotonous universe characterized by low organizational density and state penetration (and therefore high physical and social insecurity),"[86] houses this "underclass". Coined by Mydral but mainly attributed to Wilson's depiction of the Black American ghetto, "underclass" compasses a population "almost exclusively [formed] by the most disadvantaged segments of the black urban community, … heterogeneous grouping of families and individuals who are outside the mainstream of the American occupational system"; this population, furthermore, includes "individuals who lack training and skills and either experience long-term unemployment or are not members of the labor force, individuals who are engaged in street crime and other forms of aberrant behavior, and families that experience long-

[83] Perlman, "The Metamorphosis of Marginality…", p. 191.

[84] Ibid., p. 192.

[85] As suggested above, the term "underclass" is problematic in itself. It does not explain the relationship between the exclusion of the employed or unemployed poor and their casual or regular "integration" into the labor market. In other words, these poor individuals are desired (and integrated) as cheap labor even when they are excluded from the labor market. Furthermore, the term in question has been erroneously used to understand the case of the Kurdish migrants in the first place.

[86] Loic J. D. Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality…", p. 122.

term spells of poverty and/or welfare dependency."[87] This resulted from a displacement, a "social dislocation". This process advanced as follows: "First, the middle-class whites fled to the suburbs. Then the middle-class blacks left for safer neighborhoods. (And) [t]hen businesses moved, some to the suburbs, others to the South."[88] Thus, manufacturing was almost destroyed, leading to a higher level of unemployment.[89] The new urban poverty is, thus, marked by "poor, segregated neighborhoods in which a majority of individual adults are either unemployed or have dropped out or never been a part of the labor force."[90] Furthermore, joblessness breeds problems of social organization: "High rates of joblessness trigger other problems in the neighborhood that adversely affect social organization, ranging from crime, gang violence, and drug trafficking to family breakups and problems in the organization of family life."[91] Thus, a "rational planning" of life, as it is "the necessary condition of adaptation to an industrial economy", seems impossible.[92] Furthermore, the state has disappeared; "it is the collapse of public institutions resulting from state policies of urban abandonment and punitive containment of the black (sub-)proletariat that emerges as the most potent and most distinctive cause of entrenched marginality in the American metropolis," as Wacquant claims.[93]

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[87] William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass and Public Policy*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 8.

[88] Alex Kotlowitz, *There are No Children Here: The Story of Two Boys Growing Up in the Other America*, (New York: Doubleday, 1991), pp. 10-11.

[89] Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*…, p. 45.

[90] William Julius Wilson, "The New Urban Poverty and the Problem of Race", *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, Lecture Delivered at the University of Michigan (1993), p. 6.

[91] Ibid., p. 9.

[92] Ibid., p. 9

[93] Wacquant, Loic J. D. 2007. *Ghetto, Banlieue, Favela, Et Caetera: Tools for Rethinking Urban Marginality*. Available [online]:

The structural - not the "panicky" conservative definition of "underclass" - is closer to the definition of social exclusion, Bhalla and Lapeyre suggest.[94] The structural definition, to be attributed to by Myrdal, "conveys the present marginalization or exclusion of workers from production through the development of precarious forms of work and unemployment."[95] Thus, the concepts of underclass and social exclusion converge on "how the interrelationships between changes in productive structure and social institutions affect those within the emerging global economy who are becoming permanently superfluous or irrelevant to its functioning."[96]

The perplexity over such terms, i.e. marginality, underclass and exclusion, in this study, will be set off by utilizing the concept "new urban poverty" via focusing on the multidimensional character of exclusion or poverty (while narrowing the term to the economic, social and political realm). In other words, the term exclusion, given ambiguity over its meaning,[97] will be loosely utilized, compassing but not being limited to "urban poverty".

How does this research define social exclusion in the first place? This research will comply with and, at times, betray these definitions of social exclusion:

> "Social exclusion is a process whereby certain individuals are pushed to the edge of society and prevented from participating fully by virtue of their poverty, or lack of basic competencies and lifelong learning opportunities, or as a result of discrimination. This distances them from jobs, income and

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http://cas.uchicago.edu/workshops/urban/WacquantUrbanMarginality.pdf [20 May 2010], p. 3.

[94] Bhalla and Lapeyre, *Poverty and Exclusion in a Global …*, p. 109.

[95] Ibid., p. 109

[96] Ibid., p. 110. As suggested above, this presumed "permanent irrelevance" of the poor is irrelevant.

[97] Hilary Silver, "Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms," *International Labour Review*, 133, no. 5-6 (1994), p. 536.

> education and training opportunities as well as social and community networks and activities. They have little access to power and decision-making bodies and thus often feel powerless and unable to take control over decisions that affect their day to day life."[98]

And in Madanipoor, Cars and Allen's words: "social exclusion is defined as a multi-dimensional process, in which various forms of exclusion are combined: participation in decision making and political processes, access to employment and material resources, and integration into common cultural processes. When combined, they create acute forms of exclusion that and a spatial manifestation in particular neighborhoods."[99] Thus, social exclusion is not to be reduced to poverty, since social exclusion might result from or, even, transcend non-economic processes or manifestations of exclusion in the first place.[100] Moreover, in its academic propagation, "social exclusion … is best understood in terms of its causes, especially economic restructuring and state retrenchment".[101] While this research distances itself from "income and consumption-based approaches" or the approach which "combines in its different variants a measure of per capita income with various health and education indicators as a measure of human development,"[102] given its design, it cannot compass all of the multiple faces of social exclusion; rather, the term is to be limited to the economic, political and social facet.

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[98] Fikret Adaman and Çağlar Keyder. "Poverty and Social Exclusion: A Theoretical Outline" in *Poverty and Social Exclusion in the Slum Areas of Large Cities in Turkey*, eds. Fikret Adaman and Çağlar Keyder, (European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities DG: 2006), p. 6.

[99] Byrne, *Social Exclusion*, p. 2.

[100] G. J. Room, "Social Exclusion, Solidarity and the Challenge of Globalization," *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 8 (1999), p. 169.

[101] Mary Daly and Hilary Silver, "Social Exclusion and Social Capital: A Comparison and Critique," *Theory and Society*, 37 (2008), p. 559.

[102] Fikret Şenses, *Küreselleşmenin Öteki Yüzü: Yoksulluk*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 66.

Due to the welfare crisis, economic decline and the codification of new problems as "social risks"[103], the term "social exclusion", theoretically and practically, has gained ground primarily in the European context. The superiority of the term is generally attributed to its multidimensional and dynamic character, which the poverty approach lacks.[104] After all, "the controversy regarding the notion of the new poor is a reflection of changed thinking and a growing belief in the structural nature of the emerging socioeconomic situation."[105] Thus, the problems turned out to be not merely economic but are also related "to various phenomena characterized by a declining access to the labor market, a weakening of family ties, a growth of informal networks, the growing violation of human rights and a decline in social participation."[106]

Now certain case studies of exclusion in Europe and in Latin America follow. Kapphan and Haussermann, through the case of Berlin, trace the effects the transition from the industrial city to the service city has on urban poverty. After all, "the overall number of jobs decreased" while "the share of the unemployed and of welfare recipients is increasing."[107] Furthermore, "[t]he social composition of the city's population and its neighborhoods, as well as household structures, changes" while "a concentration of unemployment and welfare dependents" is at hand.[108]

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[103] S.P. Mangen, *Social Exclusion and Inner City Europe: Regulating Urban Regeneration*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 7.

[104] Bhalla and Lapeyre, *Poverty and Exclusion in a Global*…, p. 16.

[105] Ibid., p. 96.

[106] Ibid., p. 97.

[107] Andreas Kapphan and Hartmut Haussermann, "Berlin: Opportunities, Constraints and Strategies of the Urban Poor," in *Neighbourhoods of Poverty: Urban Social Exclusion and Integration in Europe*, eds. Sako Musterd, Alan Murie and Christian Kesteloot, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), pp. 18-19.

[108] Ibid., p. 19.

Thus, "what previously had been a working-class neighborhood became a neighborhood of unemployment, because the dramatic losses of jobs in manufacturing degrade former workers' neighborhoods."[109] This is, however, not limited to Berlin at all.

M. Smith, through the case of London, suggests that "the growth of socially excluded groups … carries spatial implications in the UK and it is on the peripheral and inner-city social housing estates where processes of social and spatial segregation largely culminate and where some of the greatest deprivation is to be found."[110] Building upon the example of St. Helier, he suggests that "social exclusion is not expressed primarily as a lack of labor" but as the inability to achieve a constancy in work and as the sense of incompetency.[111] After all, for those in the informal labor market, "employment is experienced as a further source of insecurity and fragmentation rather than the means to security, an improved standard of living and entry into occupations that provide a source of collective identity."[112] Thus, social exclusion is not about the jobless or the underclass at all; rather, "the nature of contemporary work, and exclusion from secure paid employment, is central to understanding the contemporary experience of social exclusion."[113]

The case of two neighborhoods of Antwerp, Dam and Silvertop, pertain to a similar (but nonetheless slightly different) reality: jobs have declined as the result of

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[109] Ibid., p. 19-20.

[110] David M. Smith, *On the Margins of Inclusion: Changing Labour Markets and Social Exclusion in Londo*n, (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2005), p. 28.

[111] Ibid., p. 194.

[112] Ibid., p. 195.

[113] Ibid., p. 196.

"the withdrawal of the port, the de-industrialization of the area's economy, and the emigration of retail shops."[114] Once working class neighborhoods, these urban spaces have turned into "deprived neighborhoods". Urban social exclusion, however, turns out to be not homogeneous after all, both in terms of spatiality and of individuals. For instance, in London, "the non-British-born ethnic minority households who are unemployed or in low paid employment had less robust family and kinship networks but made substantial use of voluntary organizations and the faith community" while "those in employment were more likely to have been long-term residents with more support and were more familiar with the environment."[115] In short, whether in London, Milan or Brussels, social exclusion is "the product of micro and local factors including those generated by the history of residence and residents,"[116] while "post industrialism" is a recurrent theme in the narratives of European social exclusion. The application of the term to the European context also encompasses the existence or the non-existence of "the welfare state, inequalities in income and wealth and national and metropolitan influences."[117] Furthermore, location within the sub-regional economy, accessibility, infrastructure also matter. Thus, the European context seems to differ from the American one, which "emphasize[s] the importance of the market and race as the organizing determinants of residence"; the European context "is less about a concentration effect" but is a path-dependent one, extended

[114] Inge van Nieuwenhuyze and Jan Vranken, "Antrewerp: Confronting the Social and Spatial", in *Neighbourhoods of Poverty: Urban Social Exclusion and Integration in Europe*, eds. Sako Musterd, Alan Murie and Christian Kesteloot, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 39.

[115] Smith, *On the Margins…*, p. 168.

[116] Christian Kesteloot, Alan Murie and Sako Musterd, "European Cities: Neighbourhood Matters," in *Neighbourhoods of Poverty: Urban Social Exclusion and Integration in Europe*, eds. Sako Musterd, Alan Murie and Christian Kesteloot, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 235.

[117] Ibid., p. 235.

over a long period of time.[118] The difference, furthermore, pertains to the fact that the European context has not embarked upon a homogenization of social exclusion yet, as in the American case.

Gacitua Mario, on the other hand, working on the example of Brazil, suggest as follows: despite the fact that Brazil's poverty has decreased, poverty reduction has not been homogeneous; "structural factors such as race-based discrimination are at the root of labor market exclusion and … informal arrangements are more prevalent among groups with less social mobility."[119] "Marginal youth face severe vulnerability and exclusion in Brazil" since their "access to education, the job market, and social services is weak, and politico-institutional participation is low"[120]; and "the existence … of gender- and race-based inequality and discrimination by state officials and Brazilian society at large" is very common. Appropriate channels of representation do not exist either.[121]

The Latin American case studies of (new) urban poverty, according to Fay, generally suggest that "the urban poor are much more integrated into the market economy", thus being vulnerable to fluctuations in the market economy; that poverty is distributed heterogeneously "socioeconomically and with respect to economic activities and processes"[122]; that, despite heterogeneity, a segregation exists; that "social networks are less stable in urban areas, with relationships based more on the quality of reciprocal links between individuals and friends than on familial

[118] Ibid., p. 236.

[119] Estanislao Gacitua Mario, "Conclusions and Recommendations," in *Social Exclusion and Mobility in Brazil*, eds. Estanislao Gacitua Mario and Michael J. V. Woolcock, (Washington: World Bank, 2008), p. 99.

[120] Ibid., p. 103.

[121] Ibid., p. 105.

[122] Marianne Fay, "Overview," in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. Marianne Fay, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), p. 2.

obligations"; that urban living is exposed to organized crime and violence; and, finally, that, rather than services being absent, the matter at hand is the quality of services.[123] The Latin American examples suggest that finding a job is easier than finding a good job.[124] Furthermore, the limited mobility of the poor results in the "peripheralization" of the poor, high unemployment and low income, as in Sao Paulo.[125] Racial, gender and "spatial" discrimination also persist.

How do the Latin American poor shelter? First of all, homeownership is relatively high while renting, lending and sharing shelter remain as other options for the poor.[126] The houses are, furthermore, generally "informal", the norm being "self-construction, typically help from neighbors or family."[127] Access to services is quite common; however, the quality of the services remains suspicious.[128]

What about the economic and social capital of the poor? During the Latin America of the 1990s, "female participation rose; open unemployment increased; the sectoral composition of jobs changed, with a decrease of manufacturing and public sector employment; and the informal sector grew."[129] Labor is both scant and low-quality. Furthermore, "the high (if not total) integration of the urban poor into the

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[123] Ibid., p. 3.

[124] Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi, "Working One's Way up: The Urban Poor and the Labor Market," in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. Marianne Fay, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), p. 51.

[125] Ibid., p. 53.

[126] Marianne Fay and Anna Wellenstein, "Keeping a Roof over One's Head: Improving Access to Safe and Decent Shelter," in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. Marianne Fay, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), pp. 92-94.

[127] Ibid., p. 96.

[128] Ibid., p. 98.

[129] Laderchi, "Working One's…", p. 64.

market economy is likely to result in accumulation patterns in which financial assets are a priority," Fay and Laderchi claim.[130] Thus, market vulnerability is prone. Assets, indeed, exist but the urban poor is "constrained in their choices – because of lack of resources, their risk aversion, and the lack of savings and insurance instruments adapted to their needs."[131] Furthermore, "networks in urban regions tend to be less stable than those in rural communities,"[132] while familial obligations are also prone to crises.

However, a collectively efficient system still remains in the cities. After all, "the sheer scale of violence in the *barrios* (slums) of Latin American cities means that violence has become 'routinized' or 'normalized' into the functional reality of daily life."[133] Furthermore, types of violence vary by country; it might be caused by political conflict; it might be "institutional", meaning that it is used by the state and other informal institutions; it might be caused merely by economic reasons and it might be social, such as domestic abuse, street violence and child abuse.[134] Wacquant's social dystopia seems to be affirmed by the recent rise of violence in the Latin American context.

What about the general critiques of social exclusion? The theoretical and academic critiques of the concept "social exclusion" seem to be converging on the fact that exclusion is not a malfunction after all. Ruth Levitas, stressing the

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[130] Marianne Fay and Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi, "Relying on Oneself: Assets of the Poor," in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. Marianne Fay, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), p. 197.

[131] Ibid., p. 214.

[132] Michael Woolcock, "Relying on Friends and Relatives: Social Capital", in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. Marianne Fay, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), p. 224.

[133] Caroline Moser, Ailsa Winton and Annalise Moser, "Violence, Fear and Insecurity among the Urban Poor in Latin America," in *The Urban Poor in Latin America*, ed. Marianne Fay, (Washington: World Bank, 2005), pp. 125-126.

[134] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

Durkheimian aspect of the concept, claims that the term is built upon a "discourse unable to address the question of unpaid work in society (work principally done by women), or of low-paid work, and [that the term] completely erases from view the inequality between those owning the bulk of productive property and the working population, as well as observing inequality among workers."[135] Integration into society is, furthermore, understood as integration into work.[136] Thus, other forms of exclusion are ignored in its primal and legal European usage; furthermore, exclusion might be a form of inclusion, after all. In the case of women, "the exclusion … from paid work is their integration as unpaid workers" and "the exclusion of migrant workers from benefit rights" actually means "their integration as a flexible pool of low-paid workers."[137]

Du Toit, working upon the South African example, similarly stresses the limits of social exclusion. Via the case of Ceres, "poverty results not from people's *exclusion* from that market but from the ways they are *included*," he claims[138]; after all, "the insertion of poor individuals and households into the commercial food system, privatization, and cost recovery for basic services are all part of this story."[139] Thus, he suggests the usage of the term "adverse incorporation", which "tends to see poverty and inequality not as contingent remainders (the result to limitations or failure of growth) but rather as a regular and unexceptional by-product

[135] Ruth Levitas, "The Concept of Social Exclusion and the New Durkheimian Hegemony," *Critical Social Policy*, 16, no. 5 (1996), p. 7.

[136] Ibid., p. 11.

[137] Ibid., p. 18-19.

[138] Andreas Du Toit, "Social Exclusion Discourse and Chronic Poverty: A South African Case Study," *Development and Change*, 35, no. 5 (2004), p. 1002.

[139] Ibid., p. 1003.

of processes of accumulation and social differentiation that accompany growth."[140]

Daly and Silver, summarizing the debate around the concept, suggest that "[s]cholars of inequality are wary of the terminologies of both social exclusion and social capital on the grounds that they deflect attention from ever-increasing income inequality and class conflict"[141]; given the vagueness around the term, "the question of whether "separate" or "poor" is necessarily 'excluded'" and the definition of an inclusive society still remain a theoretical duty. [142]

Bowring, like Levitas, embarks upon an "anti-systemic" critique of the social exclusion tradition: "the tendency among social thinkers working in this tradition to equate, implicitly at least, exclusion with normative deviation, and inclusion with conformity to social convention, weakens the challenge of the redistribution perspective to the dominant culture and norms of capitalist society."[143] Exclusion is "abnormal", accordingly to this tradition's stress on "capitalist consumerism"[144] since it is built upon a discourse which categorizes and creates "needs" and, thus, defines social exclusion therein.[145] Thus, in an epoch in which the effect of "direct labor" is declining and its measurement becoming more difficult,[146] fighting exclusion is not a matter of redistribution, i.e. not of social policy but of

[140] Ibid., p. 1006.

[141] Daly and Silver, "Social Exclusion and Social Capital…", p. 554.

[142] Ibid., p. 557.

[143] Finn Bowring, "Social Exclusion: Limitations of the Debate," *Critical Social Policy*, 20, no. 3 (2000), p. 309.

[144] Ibid., p. 316.

[145] Ibid., p. 318.

[146] Ibid., p. 324-325.

shifts of "value". In other words, "a political discourse capable of recognizing and mobilizing the autonomy of those characterized as dispossessed" is needed. [147]

This thesis will not, however, embark upon a total critique of social exclusion. Its critique will take a different route. It will claim that the forced Kurdish migrants' marginality do not really fit into a total framework of structural or symbolic exclusion, i.e. into "advanced marginality". However, the prevalence of "exclusion" should not lead one to ignore that exclusion is also a matter of integration, as suggested above. Another significant dynamic, "class formation", is, thus, deemed relevant.

Yenibosna's local economy is, indeed, mainly formed by informal, fragmented labor; social security is not widespread either. However, being one of the centers of (informal) garment production[148] and being the receiver of a population to be proletarianized, its economic marginality is not advanced as Wacquant or other depictions of acute "social exclusion" would claim. Dependence on wage-labor persists.

In short, economically, the relation (or the disenchantment) with the labor market, in the case of the internally displaced Kurds, will be investigated in the thesis; politically, their "political participation" and relations with the state will be scrutinized; socially, their community (still existent but not quite powerful) will be briefly depicted.

Thus, this study will use the concept social exclusion, as understood in the European context and as conceptualized just above, since the Turkish case studies seem to employ the word in question. It will, furthermore, use it interchangeable with

[147] Ibid., p. 320.

[148] Saniye Dedeoğlu, *Women Workers in Turkey: Global Industrial Production in Istanbul*, (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2008), p. 62.

the term “new urban poverty”. Since a definitional clarification regarding the marginal, the underclass and the excluded is far from being completed, to overcome this perplexity, this study will use social exclusion as an umbrella term or, despite nuances, as a meta-term. After all “within the rhetoric of the EU institutions … the concept of social exclusion … became the key concept,”[149] tinged with “post industrialism”. Tekeli, similarly, employs the word “exclusion”, manifested in three levels (i.e. social, economic and political), with regard to the “globalizing and technologically restructuring” world economy; whereas the industrial society needs the poor, the information society excludes them, he claims. Thus, the excluded is the chronic poor, the underclass.[150] Buğra and Keyder’s “new urban poverty” points to the possibility of the severeness of social exclusion.[151] Within this light, the Turkish case studies of marginality and exclusion now follow.

The Case Studies of Exclusion in Turkey

How has the inclusive poverty of Turkey transformed into an “exclusive” one? This is the basic question that the case studies of exclusion in Turkey seem to be occupied with.

The former regime of poverty, realized during the developmentalist period, experienced successful integration of Anatolian migrants, “as seen in the ability of the migrants to find jobs and to acquire the ownership of a gecekondu, and also at a

[149] Ibid., pp. 128-129.

[150] İlhan Tekeli, “Kent Yoksulluğu ve Modernite’nin Bu Soruya Yaklaşım Seçenekleri Üzerine,” in *Yoksulluk, Bölgesel Gelişme ve Kırsal Yoksulluk, Kent Yoksulluğu*, eds. A. Halis Akder and Murat Güvenç (İstanbul: Tesev Yayınları, 2000), p. 144.

[151] Buğra and Keyder, *New Poverty and The Changing*…, p. 49.

social and political level, as seen in the transformation of local associations of people from the same geographic region; and in the transition of political networks from patronage based links to more modern types."[152] Poverty is, however, not transitory anymore; familial mechanisms, "either because of their own situation (…) or because of the decreasing opportunity of stable employment", will not be sufficient.[153] After all, the possibility of exclusion was offset by a variety of mechanisms before:

> "[N]ew inhabitants of the city could generally have access to a network of family members or co-locals (…). These social networks helped them to find land and construct gecekondus, and with time they could enlarge these houses in a way to acquire some additional income from rent. In addition to the informal work opportunities within the area of informal settlement, setting up one's own business or finding jobs in the formal sector also depended on the support mechanisms provided by the same networks."[154]

The state, also, functioned as a patronage mechanism. These informal mechanisms, however, seem to have expired, thus, becoming insufficient to avoid social exclusion.[155]

Furthermore, while one can speak of economic growth in Turkey, this refers to export-oriented, mainly informal and flexible production.[156] Joblessness, informal employment, recurring unemployment have lost their temporary character while capitalism and globalization destroy "the use of family labor, self-employment and street vending."[157] Thus, "people in this situation are not going to complete the transformation process from being villagers, or from small production and informal

[152] Ibid., p. 6.

[153] Ibid., p. 9.

[154] Ibid., p. 18.

[155] Ibid., p. 19.

[156] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[157] Ibid., pp. 21-22.

employment, to being more integrated members of urban economies."[158] The migration from the Southeast adds an insult to injury, since "migrants from the Southeast are not arriving into already existing social networks and the opportunities they provide, but to the uncertainty of completely foreign surroundings"; "far from relatives" and with "chances of owning a gecekondu in the slum … slim", the male members of these households, above 35-40 years old, are not given jobs because of their age; "women bring work home or are employed in irregular cleaning jobs" and "children are sent to work either as street peddlers or in small work shops."[159] Furthermore, it is possible that with the degrading characteristic of informal labor, a feminization of employment might also be at hand.

In short, the new regime of urban poverty is characterized by the absence of inclusion or integration, which was present in the old regime. While the former, with its gecekondus, the social networks and the job opportunities that the networks provide and with its economic integration (into the formal mechanism) and social security, is characteristic of the developmentalist period, the latter is marked by the absence of irregular home ownership, deteriorating networks and the informal labor market.[160]

Işık and Pınarcıoğlu's analysis of Sultanbeyli is a vivid depiction of the transformation of the old poverty regime into the new poverty regime. The case of Sultanbeyli basically suggests that the area in question has reproduced social inequalities to an acceptable extent via the mechanism of "poverty-in-turns", which "builds itself on the capabilities of the urban poor, especially on their active

[158] Ibid., p. 24.

[159] Ibid., p. 28.

[160] Ibid., p. 49.

strategies vis-à-vis the formal market economy that has hardly given them a safe haven."[161] These informal capabilities pertain to capabilities of "the agents of networks … to create wealth and help operate an internal mechanism through which the obtained wealth may trickle down from top to bottom."[162] The networking relations are, however, not really egalitarian but hierarchical, as in the case of Sultanbeyli, since "it was over all a ruthless system where by some became relatively richer at the expense of others."[163] The date of entry into the network, or the date of moving into the area and occupying land, and "the hemşerilik ties" determined one's position.[164] However, with the crisis of land and the 2001 crisis, "networking relations based on active trust that had paved the way for the existence of poverty networks in the previous two decades in Sultanbeyli were all of a sudden dissolved; and the active trust between landlords and tenants irrevocably lost."[165] Thus, the bonanza years ended. "Poverty-in turns" is gradually being replaced with "chronic poverty", with the diminishing opportunities for mobility; "the former system in which poverty could be escaped through networking along with cultural and ethnic identities is a thing of the past now and the poverty trap as a vicious circle" looms.[166] The transition to the new poverty regime and, thus, the emergence of an "underclass" is imminent.

[161] Oğuz Işık and Melih Pınarcıoğlu, "Not Only Helpless but also Hopeless: Changing Dynamics of Urban Poverty in Turkey, the Case of Sultanbeyli, Istanbul," *European Planning Studies,* 16, no. 10 (2008), p. 1355.

[162] Ibid., p. 1355.

[163] Ibid., p. 1361.

[164] Ibid., p. 1363.

[165] Ibid., pp. 1365-1366.

[166] Ibid., p. 1367.

Erder's *Kentsel Gerilim* (*Urban Tension*), via the case of Pendik, also suggests the role of "informal networks" in the production and reproduction of social inequalities. The existence of "informal occupation of land" has institutionalized informal networks (demanding networks whose demands are generally unanswered), situated in low-quality urban spaces.[167] The former manifestation of "urban tension" arises in the existence of community as problem-solvers; the second pertains to the forced expulsion of the Kurds; the latter is merely generational.[168] The former manifestation, the existence of communities, has arisen with regard to the non-existence of state, Erder claims. Thus, communities have transcended beyond their religious function, resulting in a discrepancy between the Sunni and Alevi communities.[169] The urban problems related to the forced migration of the Kurds, furthermore, since it has not been officially recognized, have been relegated to the (weak) solidarity of the hemşehri networks.[170] The living conditions of these migrants, coupled with the fear of the PKK, Erder claims, have preoccupied the migrants with prejudices and police. This politicizes the Kurdish migration and this migration, thus, transcends the capabilities of the hemşehri network.[171] The latter form, the generational tension, is stuck within a double movement: while the state relegates the education and socialization of the youth to the family, the families perform the opposite. Thus, the youth are socialized within the context of the street,

[167] Sema Erder, *Kentsel Gerilim,* (İstanbul: Uğur Mumcu Araştırma Vakfı, 1997), p. 170.

[168] Ibid., p. 175.

[169] Ibid., p. 176.

[170] Ibid., p. 177.

[171] Ibid., p. 178.

the TV screen and the workplace.[172] Lastly, given the fact that these places of urban tension give the impression of "informal enclaves", whether they should be regarded as poor or rich has been a controversial issue, Erder claims.[173] However, despite the heterogeneity of the inhabitants of the area, despite the co-existence of the well-off and the badly-off, these areas could be regarded as poor, given their isolation from city services, Erder concludes.[174]

The case of Ümraniye, too, testifies to Erder's suggestion: indeed, migration pattern results in a differing degree of mobility opportunities, creating the area's "winners" and "losers". With the non-existence of institutional regulation, the existence of networks as assets creates new opportunities of mobility for some, while its non-existence institutionalizes the poverty of others.[175] She divides the inhabitants of the area into three: the rising households, the isolated households and the poor / the settled poor. The former includes those involved in urban rent, those with remittances and political networks and those who are the operators of family businesses.[176] The second, the isolated households, includes those without political networks and urban rent but with more or less guaranteed jobs and houses for use.[177] The latter, the poor and those in the process of being poor, are excluded from the labor and house market; their isolation is not chosen as in the second group. This group includes the widows, the old, those without male children and those who have

[172] Ibid., pp. 178-179.

[173] Ibid., p. 180.

[174] Ibid., p. 170.

[175] Sema Erder, *Ümraniye: İstanbul'a Bir Kent Kondu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), p. 291.

[176] Ibid., pp. 292-293.

[177] Ibid., pp. 293-294.

arrived at the city without talent or capital. This group also includes the forced Kurdish migrants, who are devoid of the opportunity of flexible and gradual adaptation.[178]

The displaced Kurds, also, occupy the lowest ranks in Işık and Pınarcıoğlu's three-tier pyramid of Sultanbeyli.[179] Those who are above the pyramid, composing the 13% of the population, are the winners; given their date of arrival, all of them possess land and apartments, while most of them benefit from "urban rent". Those who occupy the middle of the pyramid are those well-offs, most of whom own a house but not land. Those who occupy the bottom of the pyramid are the late-comers, who do not own either an apartment or land. The worse-off, in this case, compose mainly of internally displaced Kurds, who are, as wage-laborers, congregated mainly in the construction and textile sector.[180]

Yılmaz's portrayal of Tarlabaşı, on the other hand, suggests that "the different migrant groups are in different socio-economic (and spatial) positions and thus have not been equally affected by social exclusion."[181] While "the previous migrant groups have been better off in all aspects of urban life, the recent migrants have suffered mostly from an exclusionary procedure" – the recent migrants mainly being displaced Kurds.[182] Tarlabaşı, furthermore, is an inner-city slum not to "be characterized by a complete dislocation of economic activities."[183] The first

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[178] Ibid., p. 296.

[179] Oğuz Işık and Melih Pınarcıoğlu, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk. Gecekondulaşma ve Kent Yoksulları: Sultanbeyli Örneği*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 311-314.

[180] Ibid., pp. 174-175.

[181] Yılmaz, "Far Away, So Close: Social Exclusion…", p. 28.

[182] Ibid., p. 28.

[183] Ibid., p. 30.

dimension of the residents' exclusion is economic: "Tarlabaşı has a higher rate of unemployment (20 per cent), the access to the formal labor market is extremely limited and only access to precarious, irregular, temporary jobs in the informal sector without social security and with low wages is available", "the employers tend to accumulate either in self-owned commercial (…) or manufacturing (...) activities; while the employees are workers in the food-drink and entertainment sector or in the … workshops", street jobs are quite common and "every kind of aid was met with a rush of interest."[184] Furthermore, reliance on assistance results in the exclusion from the formal market. Socially, exclusion is visible via the uncommonness of social security, high level of school drop-outs, the prevalence of child labor, high criminality and the fragility of social / solidarity networks.[185] Access to public goods and services, the common use of child labor, and the lack of social participation, thus, point to the existence of "social exclusion". Politically, no mobilization, whether political and associational, exists; the displaced Kurds are not able to vote and, finally, a national threshold, that limits the representation of the Kurds, exists anyway.[186] Spatially, the area is a monument of great decay; it is overcrowded, and it is stuck within a vicious circle of concentrated / concentrating poverty.[187] Discursively, it is stigmatized with its criminality and delinquency; the existence of Romanis, Kurds and Africans also perpetuates an ethnic stigmatization.[188] Thus,

[184] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

[185] Ibid., pp. 32-25.

[186] Ibid., p. 35.

[187] Ibid., p. 36.

[188] Ibid., p. 37.

Yılmaz, after portraying the multidimensional character of exclusion in Tarlabaşı, concludes as follows:

> "the informal activities no longer suffice to integrate socially; … the society is becoming increasingly polarized across the fault lines based on class, religion and ethnicity; … the inner-city slums are no longer transitory places for the rural-to-urban migrants but perpetual spaces of relegation; … the conflict-induced migrant Kurds are the primary candidates to become Turkey's underclass because of the unprecedented conditions of their flight/displacement and settlement in the cities; … social exclusion in Turkey, today more than ever, takes its roots not only from poverty, but also from ethnic segregation and stigmatisation; and finally …, social exclusion is undeniably coupled with spatial segregation."[189]

Thus, an "underclass" in Wacquant and Wilson's sense, situated in an inner-city area with "a new socio-spatial patterning of class and racial domination, recognizable by the unprecedented concentration of the most socially excluded and economically marginal members of the dominated racial and economic group"[190] is imminent.

The integrating poverty is, thus, transformed into an exclusionary one, resembling Wacquant's advanced marginality. Tarlabaşı, as "a territory of urban relegation *par excellence,*"[191] portrays the non-transitory, thus, perpetual character of relegation.

Yükseker's "Neoliberal Restructuring and Social Exclusion in Turkey", though not a case study, is particularly significant. Dispossession caused by restructuring, some examples of which are "the decline in security of employment, informalization, the privatization of state-owned industries, the dictates of world commodity markets over the livelihood of small farmers and the commodification of urban housing," results in forms of social exclusion which are manifested both in the

[189] Ibid., p. 39.

[190] Bediz Yılmaz, "Entrapped in Multidimensional Exclusion: Perpetuation of Poverty among Conflict-Induced Migrants in an Istanbul Neighborhood", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 38 (Spring 2008), p. 209.

[191] Ibid., p. 208.

fields of "customary/traditional rights" and of "rights that were won in the course of capitalist development."[192] Within this framework, Yükseker employs the concept social exclusion, the sources of which are variable.

What are the manifestations of "social exclusion" in contemporary Turkey? First of all, poverty reigns. "About one-third of urban workers and three-quarters of rural workers are without social security"; thus, "informality is an important source of poverty."[193] Furthermore, the social security system, notwithstanding its contribution to inequalities between the formally and informally employed along with the unemployed, is available to "only about 40 percent of the working population."[194] Similarly, the gender gap still remains.

What are the sources of social exclusion? Two interrelated mechanisms, concerning both the rural and urban transformation, are at hand. The form of social exclusion resulting from the rural transformation involves (but is not limited to) the forced migration of the Kurds, in the forms of "dispossession of [Kurdish] people from agricultural means of production and rural lifestyles", of the congregation of the Kurdish migrants at the bottom of the urban labor market and of the use of child labor.[195] "[M]igrants who have settled in industrial districts of Istanbul have become sources of cheap labor in the manufacture of garments (…) while others who live in inner-city neighborhoods far from job opportunities are even unable to do that," Yükseker continues.[196] Regardless of the type of income-earning activity, whether it

[192] Yükseker, "Neoliberal Restructuring…", p. 263.

[193] Ibid., p. 264.

[194] Ibid., p. 264.

[195] Ibid., pp. 266-267.

[196] Ibid., p. 267.

is manufacturing, tourism or agriculture, the commonality is "that these forms of income earning are often low-wage, irregular and informal, hence outside the social security system."[197] The rural transformation, however, is not limited to forced migration. After all, "the deepening of neoliberal policies in agriculture has challenged the sustainability of small-scale agricultural units" and farming is displaced as the primary source of income.[198] "The decline in agricultural subsidies and the privatization of agricultural industries" all have their part to play.[199]

On the axis of social exclusion resulting from urban transformation, lies "the diminishing opportunities for shelter in cities", which results in the end of "integrating poverty".[200] Urban renewal schemes also pose a threat.

Regarding the Kurdish IDPs, two other dimensions of exclusion exist: language and discrimination. After all, the lack of linguistic capital has resulted in the lack of the IDP's access to state services, whether public services and social assistance. Furthermore, discrimination pertains to the overt or subtle manifestations of inter-ethnic tensions. These two dimensions are, however, not really separable, since "prejudice against Kurds also leads to discrimination in the housing and labor markets and in access to public services."[201]

Lastly, regarding social policy and the social exclusion of the Kurds, Yükseker notes that the "Kurds living in the eastern and southeastern regions as well as IDPs (although not to the same extent) have benefited from all forms of social

[197] Ibid., p. 267.

[198] Ibid., p. 267.

[199] Ibid., p. 267.

[200] Ibid., p. 268.

[201] Ibid., p. 270.

assistance,"[202] whether the green card or the conditional cash transfers or other forms of social assistance. This results not only from "the high incidence of rural and urban poverty in the region", but also from the "political preference of the current government."[203] These forms of social assistance, Yükseker concludes, operate only to mitigate the "social risks" and "assume dispossession to continue"; thus, they deal with the symptoms, but do not remedy the political and economic sources of social exclusion.[204]

The TESEV Working and Monitoring Group on Internal Displacement in Turkey, similarly, examines the case of IDP's "social exclusion", via a research conducted in Istanbul and Diyarbakır,[205] the results of which Yükseker uses to highlight the multidimensional facets of social exclusion. First of all, internal displacement is not merely on a horizontal level; it is also a vertical process, which, through the process of dispossession from the traditional means of livelihood, makes itself manifest in the vulnerability of the IDPs vis-à-vis the market.[206] The age group above 50 is the most negatively affected group with regard to the market opportunities. Second, "social citizenship" had been violated during the course of dispossession; no special social assistance was given and the aid for returning to village was too late, despite recent forms of special aid.[207] Third, the housing

[202] Ibid., p. 275.

[203] Ibid., p. 275.

[204] Ibid., p. 276.

[205] Deniz Yükseker, "Internal Displacement and Social Exclusion: Problems Encountered by Internally Displaced Persons in the Provinces of İstanbul and Diyarbakır," in *Coming to Terms with Forced Migration: Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey*, eds. Dilek Kurban, Deniz Yükseker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Turgay Ünalan and A. Tamer Aker, (İstanbul: TESEV, 2007), p. 257.

[206] Ibid., pp. 257-258.

[207] Ibid., pp. 261-262.

problem was "solved" via "ending up living in inadequate, unsanitary and unsafe housing."[208] Fourth, jobs that the IDPs ended up in (for those lucky to be occupied) were mainly informal and irregular.[209] "IDPs lack of skills necessary to compete in the labor market and their low level of education in general (the fact that most adult women do not even speak Turkish), it is easy to comprehend why families who were forced to migrate have joined the ranks of urban poor and why they have been unable to extract themselves from this situation,"[210] Yükseker suggests. Fifth, child labor was mobilized to solve the problems of exclusion.[211] Sixth, the right to education, especially in the case of girls and women, since most of the financial burden is put upon their shoulders, was not enjoyed to a larger extent.[212] Lastly, social discrimination is, especially for those residing in urban spaces where regional affiliations do not really exist, prevalent "in the areas of housing, employment and education," the IDPs claim.[213]

Şen's depiction of deteriorating solidarity mechanisms, in the case of the Kurdish migrants, is similarly significant. Most of the Kurdish "subaltern"s have been subject to forced migration; they have been almost totally dispossessed; the head of the household is devoid even of unqualified skills.[214] Total dispossession and

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[208] Ibid., p. 266.

[209] Ibid., p. 267.

[210] Ibid., p. 268.

[211] Ibid., p. 268.

[212] Ibid., p. 274.

[213] Ibid., p. 274.

[214] Mustafa Şen, "Kökene Dayalı Dayanışma-Yardımlaşma: 'Zor İş…'" in *Yoksulluk Halleri: Türkiye'de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri*, ed. Necmi Erdoğan, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 275.

the loss of productive capacities have rid solidarity mechanisms of their material resources. Those who might help the poor, i.e. relatives, are in the same position. Furthermore, the previous Kurdish migrants tend to distance themselves from the forced migrants.[215] Thus, (ethnic) solidarity plays no significant role in the "community", whether in a formal or an informal manner. Devoid of language skills and minimal social and cultural capital to integrate into the city, and dispossessed of traditional means of production (i.e. agriculture), the forced migrants are subject to discrimination and stigmatization.[216]

Keyder suggests that, through "de-industrialization, post-Fordism, globalization and … the transition from national developmentalism to neoliberal capitalism",[217] in other words, through "rapid integration into transnational networks and markets"[218], "important changes in all these dimensions which together define exclusion" have appeared.[219] These changes particularly "derived from the structural transformation of the market for labor, new pressures on and demands from the land market and property regime, and shifts in the patterns of migration and in the profile of the immigrants."[220] Thus, "Istanbul has lost its predominantly middle-class and relatively homogeneous character to one more commonly associated with extreme disparities of income, wealth and power."[221] During the phase of "modernization",

[215] Ibid., p. 275.

[216] Ibid., p. 282.

[217] Çağlar Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion in İstanbul," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 29, no. 1 (March 2005), p. 127

[218] Ibid., p. 124.

[219] Ibid., p. 128.

[220] Ibid., p. 128.

[221] Ibid., pp. 124-125.

integration and incorporation seemed to reign: "earlier migrants gained higher positions in the hierarchy (due to better locations both in the material terms of housing and within the established networks) as newer, and therefore less privileged, migrants arrived."[222] "[M]aterial accumulation and …. the building of networks necessary for access to the material world" was also possible.[223] From the mid-1980s, this "integration" seemed to disappear while globalization and polarization became more visible through "gated communities, five-star hotels, the city packaged as a consumption artifact for tourists, new office towers, expulsion of small business from the central districts, beginnings of gentrification of the old neighborhoods, and world images on billboards and shop windows."[224] With manufacturing giving way to services, a new economic logic gained the upper hand. Furthermore, the commodification of land and property went hand in hand with "the erosion of the non-formal dimensions of the welfare regime, while no attempt was made to substitute for them with institutionalized welfare."[225]

Adaman and Ardıç, via "a survey conducted in the slum areas of six metropolitan cities in Turkey," basically come to the conclusion that "a significant number of people living in these areas are distanced from jobs, income, education and training opportunities, with little access to power and decision-making bodies."[226] Thus, the poor is pushed towards the edge of society. Though exclusion is "a manifestation of the political economy of the production and distribution

[222] Ibid., p. 126.

[223] Ibid., p. 126.

[224] Ibid., p. 128.

[225] Ibid., p. 131.

[226] Fikret Adaman and Oya Ardıç, "Social Exclusion in the Slum Areas of Large Cities in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 38 (Spring 2008), p. 29.

processes," other dimensions of exclusion, i.e. cultural and political, exist as well.[227] Poverty still reigns as the "problem with which many of the households have to live"; it has become a "lifestyle."[228] "Nearly two-thirds of the households [had] no formal insurance against health or employment risks, or retirement options" and "there are barriers to accessing education" with illiteracy being common.[229]

Who fits into the definition of the "excluded", according to this research? The Kurds, women, recent migrants, locals in slum areas, the young, the disabled, ethnic and national minorities.[230] "Strong evidence emerged that those who moved to the city after internal displacement constitute one of the most troubled subgroups, with a more acute experience of exclusion." [231]

Necmi Erdoğan, seeing poverty not only as an economic category but also as a situation in which people make sense of their world,[232] similarly suggests that global processes related to "late capitalism" have created a new dimension of social exclusion and marginalization.[233] The political culture of Turkey, he claims, is devoid of urban local social movements such as consumption organizations, cooperatives etc.; however, it is also devoid of an endemic "hustling", characteristic

[227] Ibid., p. 31.

[228] Ibid., p. 57.

[229] Ibid., pp. 57-58.

[230] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[231] Ibid., p. 58.

[232] Necmi Erdoğan, "Yoksulları Dinlemek," in *Yoksulluk Halleri: Türkiye'de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri*, ed. Necmi Erdoğan, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 14.

[233] Necmi Erdoğan, "Garibanların Dünyası: Türkiye'de Yoksulların Kültürel Temsilleri Üzerine İlk Notlar," in *Yoksulluk Halleri: Türkiye'de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri*, ed. Necmi Erdoğan, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 30.

of the American ghetto.[234] The poor are, furthermore, not only poor but also "subaltern". However, their independent "subjectivity" is not suppressed – such a subjectivity does not exist in the first place.[235] Thus, they are not "counter-hegemonic" subjects but are trapped in the "purgatory"; they are neither in nor out.[236]

Lastly, Sönmez' analysis of concentrated urban poverty in Izmir follows. Testing the premises of the ecological, culturalist, structuralist approach towards urbanization and industrialization (not towards "urban poverty" as such), she focuses on the "peripheries of the traditional city centre" or the inner city, which bears the burden of urban poverty.[237] "[A] pattern of the concentrated urban poverty evolved in inner areas because certain jobs in the informal economy are located in the inner areas of metropolitan cities," she claims.[238] The reorganized informal economy, which co-opts the 67% of Izmir's population, resulting in "a labour force that held no rights and therefore no social security and a union" "has become the major source for creating employment opportunities in peripheral economies," as in the Latin American case.[239] Thus, "the inner areas of İzmir are … the primary location for work-places and housing of migrating groups", resembling Burgess' concentric zones model.[240]

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[234] Ibid., p. 39.

[235] Ibid., p. 95.

[236] Ibid., p. 96.

[237] İpek Özbek Sönmez, "Concentrated Urban Poverty: The Case of Izmir Inner Area, Turkey," *European Planning Studies*, 15, no. 3 (April 2007), p. 334.

[238] Ibid., p. 326.

[239] Ibid., p. 329.

[240] Ibid., pp. 331-332.

Lastly, being devoid of social ties and of the opportunity to build squatters differentiates inner-city poverty from the poverty of the peripheral squatter settlements; however, Sönmez continues, given the rates of unemployment, poverty of the working population is overrated - the most destitute population does not consist of mainly informal workers but of young migrant families and, mostly, the lonely elderly.[241] Thus, she claims as follows: "despite the low wages and lack of any kind of employment security, the majority of residents in these inner areas work without any access to the social welfare programmes of the country. They try to earn their lives by working either in small scale manufacturing or at various marginal service jobs. Therefore, we do not observe a group of hopeless poor people that depend on the welfare state. It is rather a group of low-income working class."[242] This assumption, although it seems to be built upon a frail basis, appears applicable to the case of Yenibosna.

Back to Yenibosna: although this research is not competent to answer the question "whither Yenibosna?" it could confidently suggest that it does not totally present a novel form of jobless urban poverty. However, its marginality is not a myth; marginality, on the other hand, does not exclude the migrants' integration into the main productive apparatus. Independently of the different trajectories of South Africa and Turkey, Du Boit's suggestion complements this assumption: "poverty results not from people's exclusion from that market but from the ways they are included."[243] After all, "there is a close link between inequality and poverty on the

[241] Ibid., p. 334.

[242] Ibid., p. 334.

[243] Du Toit, "Social Exclusion Discourse…", p. 1003.

one hand, and, on the other, the historical processes of dispossession that have worked to render people dependent on the labour market in the first place."[244]

Yenibosna, indeed, seems to be beyond an epoch during which "thanks to … networking relations, the urban poor reaped the benefits of both informal market with burgeoning entrepreneurial activities mostly in labour intensive industries, and the illegal real estate market of squatter housing (gecekondus) in an overtly populist-clientelist climate."[245] Rather, it is in a process of "peripheral slummification" since the new comers, who arrived during 1980s and 1990s as a result of political and economic crises, are generally destitute without the opportunity to occupy and build on public land.[246] The "entrenchment of the market forces", furthermore, suggests the commodification of land and shelter, thus, giving way to the advance of the informalization of the economy rather than the usage of land as a profitable asset.

This thesis, indeed, does not reject the existence of "novelties" and it does not suggest that these developments are not related to small-scale industrialization in the first place. They are, indeed, interrelated. What it basically goes against is the depiction of the end-result; class deformation and the rise of a pauperized, welfare-dependent, apolitical "underclass" do not really apply to the realities of Yenibosna, particularly, to the forced Kurdish migrants. Rather, with the congregation of Kurdish migrants into the lower ranks of the local economy, the Kurdish migrants are still inside the labor market. Thus, "exclusion" is not exclusion per se but a result of abrupt integration into the capitalist economy. Coupled with the politicization of the migrants, what is at hand might be called "class formation" in the first place.

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[244] Ibid., p. 1004.

[245] Işık and Pınarcıoğlu. "Not Only Helpless but also Hopeless…", p. 1354.

[246] Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion…", p. 127.

These assumptions are to be supported by empirical evidence after a clarification of secondary concepts.

Secondary Definitional Clarifications

The main theoretical realm this thesis situates itself in has been described above. However, the concepts "proletarianization / informal economy", "forced migration", "political action" will be used so abundantly in this study that they ask for a definitional clarification. After all, these terms will be used as tools to understand the exclusion of the Kurds. Thus, now follows a short section on secondary definitional clarifications.

Proletarianization and the Informal Labor Market

One, inevitably, needs to go to the Marxian concept "primitive accumulation" to embark upon a theoretical clarification of "proletarianization". Primitive accumulation, in its primal definition, suggests "the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production" while turning the transformer into a "wage labourer."[247] The Marxian definition of "primitive accumulation" includes a wide range of processes, some of which are relevant to this study, such as "the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of property rights (common, collective, states etc.) into exclusive property rights; the suppression of rights to commons; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative …. forms of

[247] Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (Volume 1), (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1976), pp. 874-875.

production and consumption; … the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land … and, ultimately, the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation."[248] Furthermore, this process varies from context to context. Harvey claims that "a general reevaluation of the continuous role and persistence of the predatory practices of 'primitive' or 'original' accumulation' within the long historical geography of capital accumulation is … very much in order"[249] since what is at hand is an on-going process; thus, he coins the term "accumulation by dispossession". Harvey, furthermore, suggests that "primitive accumulation" might not be totally "revolutionary" after all, since it suggests the simultaneous existence of both coercion and co-optation: "kinship structures, familial and household arrangements, gender and authority relations … all have their part to play" in this process, which might lead to instances in which "the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed as inconsistent with labour under capitalism" or in which "they are just as likely to be co-opted in attempt to forge some consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class formation."[250] Thus, the process and its results are almost always heterogeneous. Its mechanisms might include speculative financialization, privatization, displacement of peasant populations, asset destruction through inflation, commodification of nature and cultural forms.[251]

Having explained the relevance of the concept "primitive accumulation", one might move on to sharpen the concept for the purposes of this study by molding it into another concept, "proletarianization". This study will use the word

[248] David Harvey, *The New Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2003), p. 145.

[249] Ibid., p. 144.

[250] Ibid., p. 146.

[251] Ibid., pp. 147-148.

proletarianization, rather than primitive accumulation, due its object of analysis; this study, thus, does not (and, given its scope, cannot) deal with "capitalist economic development" in general. It will define proletarianization as the subjection of workers under wage labor in whether form (i.e. via neoliberal restructuring or forced migration), and proletarian as "anyone who works for the wages at the command of someone else who owns the means of production."[252] The "two coordinate processes" of "the substitution of wage labor for other forms of return to labor" and of "the expropriation of the means of production from the producers themselves"[253] will suffice to understand the economic position of the Kurdish migrants.

A companion of this concept will be informalization. After all, "the process of proletarianization is deeply embedded in the structural and systemic aspects of informalization."[254] This study, however, will not deal with informalization as a structural or world-systemic process but rather the particular results of this process, i.e. a component of the informal working-class in a particular neighborhood in Istanbul. Despite the affinity, "proletarianization" is not directly correlated with "informalization". Nor informalization necessarily includes proletarianization; it is, furthermore, not a euphemism for poverty, as Portes and Castells argue.[255] It is, rather, "a process of income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is

[252] Charles Tilly and Chris Tilly, *Work Under Capitalism*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1998), p. 145.

[253] Charles Tilly, *As Sociology Meets History*, (London: Academic Press Inc., 1984), p. 195.

[254] Faruk Tabak, "Introduction: Informalization and the Long Term," in *Informalization: Process and Structure*, eds. Faruk Tabak and Michaeline A. Crichlow (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2000), p. 16.

[255] Alejandro Portes and Manuel Castells, "World Underneath: The Origins, Dynamics and Effects of the Informal Economy," in *The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries*, eds. Alejandro Portes, Manuel Castells and Lauren A. Benton (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1989), p. 12.

unregulated by the institutions of the society, in a legal and social environment in which similar activities are regulated."[256]

Portes and Hoffman, via their analysis of the Latin American class structure, differentiate the informal proletariat from the formal proletariat as follows: the latter "corresponds to workers in industry, services and agriculture who are protected by existing labor laws and covered by legally mandated systems of health care, disability and retirement"[257] while the former, blooming in the age of neoliberalism, "supply low-cost goods and services to consumers and cheap inputs to formal sector enterprises."[258] The former, the informal proletariat, consists of "account workers (minus professionals and technicians), unpaid family workers, domestic servants, and waged workers without social security and other legal protections in industry, services and agriculture."[259] Davis, by working upon Portes' and Hoffman's depiction, suggests that this informal proletariat denies the myth of the "heroic self-employed"[260]; its informality is marked by "the absence of formal contracts, rights, regulations and bargaining power",[261] by "extreme abuse of women and children", by the fragmentation of existing work and subdivision of incomes,[262] by their tendency to a "third economy" built upon hope (i.e., gambling),[263] by the erosion of solidarity

[256] Ibid., p. 12.

[257] Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman, "Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change During the Neoliberal Era," *Latin American Research Review*, 38, no. 1 (February 2003), p. 48.

[258] Ibid., p. 50.

[259] Ibid., p. 50

[260] Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums*, (London, New York: Verso, 2006), pp. 180-181.

[261] Ibid., p. 181.

[262] Ibid., p. 182.

[263] Ibid., p. 183.

mechanisms[264] and, lastly, by the promotion of conflict and the use of coercion in order to compete in the market.[265] Probably, most importantly, this informal proletariat lives, works and protests within the context of the urban slum.[266] The Kurds of Yenibosna will, to a large extent, fit into this definition rather than into a single category of the "permanently unemployed" or the "underclass"; thus, these definitions will echo throughout this thesis through the case of the Kurdish forced migrants.

Forced Migration

The Kurdish migrants, who are the subject of this study, are *forced* migrants or, rather, "internally displaced persons", which is defined as "persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border."[267] This definition, visibly, excludes "regular migrants", i.e., economic or voluntary migration. This is the threshold which differentiates the recent Kurdish migrants from the other social groups, as labeled in this study.

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[264] Ibid., p. 184.

[265] Ibid., p. 185.

[266] Portes and Hoffman, "Latin American Class Structures…", p. 76.

[267] United Nations, "Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement", 2004, p. 1.

Internal displacement, furthermore, might be disaster-induced, development-induced or conflict-induced.[268] The latter form of internal displacement fits to the case of recent Kurdish migrants and, is, thus, relevant to this study; it is embroiled in the mist of the Kurdish issue "within the context of the widespread breaches of the rule of law in the provinces under emergency rule."[269] This is the basic definitional category, which this study employs to codify a forced migrant.

What about the numbers? The Ministry of Interior of Turkey suggests that conflict-induced displacement has resulted in the migration of 357,000 people while civilian organizations suggest that the number should be between 1 and 3 million. The HÜNEE report, a "legally" ordered report on the issue of forced migration, suggests that the number is between 953,680 and 1,201,000.[270]

The city centers of Batman, Van, Diyarbakır, Urfa, Adana, Mersin, Antalya, Izmir, Istanbul, Bursa have received most of the migrants, it is generally claimed.[271] How does forced migration occur according to the relevant literature? "[T]he accounts given by IDPs almost invariably mention ultimatums by the gendarme to leave their villages within a short period of time (a few hours to several days)."[272] Displacement is, thus, sudden.

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[268] Turgay Ünalan, Ayşe Betül Çelik and Dilek Kurban, "Internal Displacement in Turkey: The Issue, Policies and Implementation," in *Coming to Terms with Forced Migration: Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey*, eds. Dilek Kurban, Deniz Yükseker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Turgay Ünalan and A. Tamer Aker, (İstanbul: TESEV, 2007), pp. 80-81.

[269] Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yükseker, "A Belated Awakening: National and International Responses to the Internal Displacement of Kurds in Turkey," *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 32 (2005), p. 19.

[270] Ayhan Kaya, ed. *Türkiye'de İç Göçler: Bütünleşme mi Geri Dönüş mü?*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), p. 69.

[271] Ibid., p. 70.

[272] Ayata and Yükseker, "A Belated Awakening…", p. 16.

Given the fact that "houses, sheep pens, stored grains, fields and trees were often burnt during or soon after the eviction of the residents, either by the gendarmes or by accompanying village guards, to make return to the villages impossible",[273] one could surely suggest that displacement went in hand with dispossession – of those who possessed land in the first place. Furthermore, the prospects for re-use of this land seems weak: "since the arable lands and houses have been left unattended for nearly two decades, return and re-settlement means re-building a life from scratch at financial costs that cannot easily be afforded by the displaced population."[274] What is at hand is an irreversible dispossession or separation from agriculture. Although research on what happened to the dispossesseds' land seems almost non-existent, the right to land seems has irrevocably lost, as in the suggested case of tobacco production in Batman: "Some IDPs who had to abandon the field they have cultivated have lost their right to sell tobacco, either because they were obliged to sell their permits out of poverty or because their permits have expired because they were unable to cultivate their fields."[275] Furthermore, the village guards seem to possess the right of production of tobacco in the first place. Although Yükseker claims that there is no definite evidence that village guard system is highly correlated with crimes such as "occupation of agricultural land, gathering of other people's produce, the cutting of trees, reaping of grass, grazing animals in other people's

[273] Ibid., p. 16.

[274] Abdülkerim Sönmez, "The Effects of Violence and Internal Displacement on Rural-Agrarian Change in Turkey," *Rural Sociology*, 73, no. 3 (2008), p. 403.

[275] Ayşe Betül Çelik, "Evaluation of Fieldwork Conducted in the Province of Batman: The Socio-Economic Consequences of Internal Displacement and Obstacles to Return," in *Coming to Terms with Forced Migration: Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey*, eds. Dilek Kurban, Deniz Yükseker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Turgay Ünalan and A. Tamer Aker, (İstanbul: TESEV, 2007), p. 223.

fields", [276] independently of the fate of the properties, forced material dispossession has occurred to a large extent - thus, a TMMOB report on the issue of forced Kurdish migration suggests as follows: "In reply to a question regarding property left behind, 74.5 percent of the forced migration group said they left their homes behind, 62 percent their fields, 58 percent their vineyards and orchards, and 41 percent their livestock. Only 15 percent said that they left nothing behind; 48 percent of the same group said that the property they left was burned, 23 percent that their property was left unattended, and 15 percent that they did not know what happened to their property."[277]

Political Action

The Kurdish migrants, interviewed within the pretext of this study, will be remarkable for their political action. This, however, will be at odds with the classic conception of "the formal working class". It is, furthermore, at odds with depictions of forced migrants as "politically excluded". First of all, this politically active migrant group does not mainly engage "in protest(s) against price rises, the removal of state subsidies, or the generalized deterioration of the public services";[278] their collective action is not really a result of "the retrenchment of the semi-welfare state, the explosion of unemployment and underemployment, and the decentralization of

[276] Deniz Yükseker, "Internal Displacement in the Province of Diyarbakır: Return, Urban Issues, and the Implementation of Compensation Law," in *Coming to Terms with Forced Migration: Post-Displacement Restitution of Citizenship Rights in Turkey*, eds. Dilek Kurban, Deniz Yükseker, Ayşe Betül Çelik, Turgay Ünalan and A. Tamer Aker, (İstanbul: TESEV, 2007), p. 184.

[277] Ibid., p. 151.

[278] Portes and Hoffman, "Latin American Class Structures…", p. 76.

state services."[279] Secondly, this mobilization defies the notion of the political exclusion of the Kurdish migrants; they are, indeed, excluded in multiple forms, i.e. economic, political and social – what makes them distinct, however, is their involvement in grassroots politics, which, besides its political intentions, might function as an empowering strategy.

Roberts and Portes claim that "though interests may be the underlying basis for collective action, the theoretical literature makes clear that actual instances of these events depend on the strength of social networks and the presence of mobilizing organizations, such as community organizations or nongovernmental organizations, both religious or secular."[280] With the fading away of the ISI period, the presence of labor unions and political parties have disappeared, they claim.[281] While it seems true that the presence of "militant" workers organized in labor unions is almost non-existent in the case of Turkey, political parties or associations still exist as highly effective mobilizing structures, able to be seen through the case of the Kurdish migrants. After all, the form of grassroots politics has not changed – the main actors of grassroots politics have, however, shifted from formal workers to informal workers, a significant portion of which are formed by the Kurdish migrants.

This population, the dispossessed Kurdish urban population, forms the main focus of this study. This population, furthermore, with the "non-integration" and "exclusion" their migratory pattern suggests, has been a significant component of the studies of new poverty in Turkey as delineated above. Now follows the depiction of the peripheral environment within which these migrants reside.

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[279] Auyero, "Protest in Contemporary Argentina…", p. 166.

[280] Bryan R. Roberts and Alejandro Portes, "Coping with the Free Market City: Collective Action in Six Latin American Cities at the End of the Twentieth Century," *Latin American Research Review*, 41, no. 2 (2006), p. 60.

[281] Ibid., p. 60.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONTEXT: YENIBOSNA

As suggested above, this thesis is situated in a slum of Istanbul, named Yenibosna. This thesis, as suggested above, doesn't really focus on Yenibosna but on the social exclusion of the forced migrants who live and work in Yenibosna. Located in the district of Bahçelievler, this slum has been almost totally exempt from academic interest. This chapter, through the quantitative research and external data, aims at giving an impression of Yenibosna, particularly of Zafer Mahallesi.

An entry on an Internet encyclopedia suggests as follows:

> "Yenibosna is a borough, located on the western part of the Istanbul district of Bahçelievler, bordering with the neighbor district Küçükçekmece. The earliest population record, whilst it was a village, was 350 and saw rapid migration after the founding of Republic of Turkey. The origin of the borough's name comes from the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo. The settlement was initially named Saraybosna, which is the Turkish equivalent of Sarajevo before it was renamed Yenibosna with the formation of the Republic of Turkey."[282]

The information on the website of the municipality of Bahçelievler, of which this entry is a translation, similarly claims that the area has once been a Byzantine garrison and that it had been used as a stone pit during the Ottoman era and that the first settlement of Bulgarian immigrants had occurred during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78. Furthermore, the number of immigrant households has rose from 6 to 40, due to a new immigrant wave after the declaration of the Republic. After 1936, the area was named Yenibosna, welcoming further migrants, mainly from the Balkans. Despite being a municipality in 1972, infrastructural problems have gained

[282] *Yenibosna*. 24 February 2010, Available [online]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yenibosna [01 May 2010].

the upper hand, the text continues: now situated in the municipality of Bahçelievler, which parted from Bakırköy in 1992, the borough houses 190,000 inhabitants, the text concludes.[283] Another text suggests that despite the "state policies", the gecekonduization rate of Yenibosna has been low.[284]

The particular neighborhood this study is interested in, Zafer Mahallesi, houses 63,700 inhabitants, again according to the municipality.[285] An updated statistics, dated 2009, however, claims the number to be 83,273. [286] Given the high possibility that the former number is compiled according to the data of 2000, the population has risen slightly more than 30% in 9 years - in numerical terms, approximately 20,000. Whether the actual number is, this neighborhood turns out to be the most populated one of Bahçelievler in general. Lastly, the municipality suggests that the neighborhood of Zafer has six mosques, five schools, two health organizations, three parks and no sporting facilities.

However, a distinct entity as "Zafer Mahallesi" does not really exist in the first place - except "legally". Rather, given the shared characteristics, Zafer Mahallesi and the surrounding neighborhoods are all together labeled as Yenibosna, as a municipal worker claims.[287]

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[283] Bahçelievler Belediyesi. Date Unknown. *Saraybosna'dan Viranbosna'ya Yenibosna*. Available [online]: http://www.bahcelievler.bel.tr/bpi.asp?caid=243&cid=167 [05 May 2010].

[284] Bahçelievler Belediyesi. Date Unknown. *Tarihi Konumu.* Available [online]: http://www.bahcelievler.bel.tr/bpi.asp?caid=243&cid=165 [09 May 2010]. What is meant by "the state policies" probably refers to the state's "redistributive" participation in or, at times, its ignorance of gecekonduization. See Işık and Pınarcıoğlu (2001), pp. 95-122.

[285] Bahçelievler Belediyesi. Date Unknown. *11 Mahallenin Tarihçeleri.* Available [online]: http://www.bahcelievler.bel.tr/bpi.asp?caid=243&cid=183 [05 May 2010].

[286] From an untitled statistical document on the population of the neighbourhoods of Bahçelievler. Acquired from the Planning Department of the Bahçelievler Municipality.

[287] Thus, this paper uses Yenibosna and Zafer Mahallesi interchangably. It seems feasible to generalize the results of this thesis with regard to the surrounding neighbourhoods, i.e. Fevzi Çakmak, Hürriyet, Kocasinan and Soğanlı.

North of the E-5 / D-100 where Şirinevler meets the Ataköy tramway station and of Bakırköy, Yenibosna is popularly known for its metro station, outlet centers and cemevi.[288] The particular neighborhood, in which this study is interested, is delineated in its general and specific contours respectively in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Figure 1: The General Contours of Zafer Mahallesi

Whether Zafer Mahallesi is peripheral or not depends upon the criteria one employs to define "peripherality"; it is, indeed, distant from the city centers, i.e. Beyoğlu or from Mecidiyeköy. However, it is not as peripheral as Esenyurt (which is left to the map) or as Bağcılar; as seen in Figure 1, it is close to the center of Bahçelievler (the circle of Şirinevler) and to Bakırköy. Sprawling in the form of a more or less vertical rectangle, the neighborhood in question is 10-15 minutes from the metro station and Şirinevler. Figure 2 gives a more specific glimpse of the extent of the neighborhood.

[288] Yenibosna Cemevi, right to the area in question, is the "headquarters" of Cem Vakfı. See: http://www.cemvakfi.org and "Akademi Cem", *Hürriyet*, 16.01.2001.



Figure 2: The Specific Contours of Zafer Mahallesi

Comparing these maps with Güvenç and Işık's "social geography" of Istanbul[289] would help. Building upon the status-tenure profiles of the inhabitants of Istanbul, Güvenç and Işık's social geography is as follows:

[289] Murat Güvenç and Oğuz Işık, "A Metropolis at the Crossroads: The Changing Social Geography of İstanbul under the Impact of Globalization," in *Of States and Cities: The Partitioning of Urban Space*, eds. Peter Marcuse and Ronald Van Kampen, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 207.



Figure 3: Güvenç and Işık's "Social Geography" of Istanbul

Juxtaposing the delineation of Zafer Mahallesi with Güvenç and Işık's social geography suggests that the area in question is "dominated by low-income wage earner groups", surrounded both with owner-occupier wage earner and other groups and with "no dominant group". The red dotted area in the map (more or less) corresponds to Zafer Mahallesi.

What designates the "low-income wage earner groups"? In Güvenç and Işık's words:

> "These areas are mostly concentrated on the European side of the metropolitan area where the central business district of Istanbul is located. This geographical unit of the metropolitan area is specialized in trades such as textiles, the garment industry, etc., where the bulk of production is realized within vertically disintegrated production complexes. In such trades flexible employment strategies are deployed. This leads to little or no job security and

> chronic fluctuations of household incomes, a fact which also accounts for the low levels of house ownership."[290]

Dedeoğlu similarly suggests that "the *gecekondu* neighbourhoods where migrant families live are the prime locations of small-scale garment ateliers because of easy access to the pool of abundant labour and cheap business premises."[291] She claims that "with more than 35 per cent of total firms, the constituency of Bakırköy, which hosts the highly populated neighbourhoods of Merter, Güngören, Şirinevler and Yenibosna, is the center of garment production." [292]

A single bus route exists to reach Zafer Mahallesi through Yıldırım Beyazıt Caddesi, via 31 (Yenibosna – Yenikapı), 31E (Yenibosna – Eminönü) or 98B (Yenibosna – Bakırköy). Furthermore, through Mahmutbey Caddesi, it is possible to reach Zafer Mahallesi (though indirectly) via 397B (Başakşehir 4. Etap – Zeytinburnu Metro), 97 (Güneşli – Beyazıt), 98A (Göztepe Mahallesi – Bakırköy) and 98M (İstoç – Bakırköy).[293] This is, of course, not to be treated as tourist guide information. Rather, this information helps one to get an impression of the transit character of the area in question; Zafer Mahallesi stands in the middle of a busy route, whether between the (more or less) central neighborhoods (i.e. Bakırköy or Eminönü) and the peripheral textile production centers such as Güneşli or Soğanlı.

Specific data on Yenibosna or Zafer Mahallesi is scant according to the municipality. However, it might be feasible to generalize the information of

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[290] Ibid., pp. 208-209.

[291] Dedeoğlu, *Women Workers in Turkey*…, p. 62.

[292] Ibid., p. 62. Bakırköy as a constituency actually hosts none of the neighbourhoods listed in the quotation. It is a separate district on its own. Merter is a neighbourhood of both Bahçelievler and Güngören, which are separate districts. Şirinevler and Yenibosna are situated within the district of Bahçelievler. See: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2008, *İstanbul'un Yeni 'İlçe' Haritası Çizildi*, [available] online: http://www.ibb.gov.tr/tr-TR/Pages/Haber.aspx?NewsID=15773 [09 May 2010].

[293] Manually compiled from www.iett.gov.tr.

Bahçelievler to get an impression of Yenibosna, which, after all, forms a major portion of the district.

An untitled report on Bahçelievler[294] suggests that the settled population of Bahçelievler mainly is from the Black Sea region (33%), followed by Eastern Anatolia (22%), which is followed by Central Anatolia (19%). Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia, with a percentage of 34.2, occupies the first rank with regard to inner migration. It is followed by the Black Sea region, which holds a weight of 32 percent.

The economy of Bahçelievler is mainly concentrated in Yenibosna and Çobançeşme, which are composed of industrial units, specialized in the sectors of food and textiles, this report continues. 30 percent of the population residing in Bahçelievler is engaged in manufacturing while trades hold a weight of 29 percent. The unemployment rates are striking: the proportion of the unemployed to the employed is 54 percent.[295]

What about the "political tendencies" of the inhabitants of Zafer Mahallesi? The data from Yüksek Seçim Kurulu on the elections of 2007 and 2009 could be summarized under two figures as follows:[296]

[294] This untitled and unpublished report is acquired from the Planning Unit of the Municipality.

[295] How this report calculates the unemployment rate is a significant question. Thus, the rate is suspicious.

[296] The datas on the elections of 2007 and 2009 are manually compiled from www.ysk.gov.tr. The DTP under the fabric of Bin Umut Adayları, had shown the then-imprisoned Sebahat Tuncel as an independent candidate in the elections of 2007 for the third constituency (üçüncü seçim bölgesi) of Istanbul; a frail "coalition" with leftist political groups was also made. The latter data, on the election of 2009, is compiled accordingly to the votes on the candidates of the municipality of İstanbul ("Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanlığı"). Again a "coalition" between the DTP and a group of leftist political groups was made.



Figure 4: The Distribution of Votes in the General Election of 2007 in Zafer Mahallesi

Of the 42006 listed voters in Zafer Mahallesi during the election of 2007, 33713 have voted. The AKP gains the upper hand with 17379 votes, to be followed by the CHP (with 5783 votes). The number of votes for the independent DTP candidate and the MHP are close to each other – the numbers are respectively as follows: 2525 and 2405.



Figure 5: The Distribution of Votes in the Local Elections of 2009 in Zafer Mahallesi

During the local elections of 2009, of the 54304 listed voters in Zafer Mahallesi, 42483 have voted. The numbers for the AKP, CHP, DTP and MHP are respectively as follows: 22038, 10419, 3941 and 1588. In other words, while the AKP and MHP's position in the average have decreased, the CHP and DTP have increased their weight in total. The other political parties do not seem to be showing a significant role or fluctuation in the two elections. The significance of these two figures lies in the weight of the DTP, the "pro-Kurdish" party in which the forced Kurdish migrants mobilize.[297]

What about "social assistance"? According to the scant statistics of the municipality,[298] out of the 4039 recipients of who were deemed eligible to receive "food aid" last year, 921 turn out to be residing in Zafer Mahallesi. Figure 6 depicts the percentages.

[297] The adjective pro-Kurdish is consciously in a quotation mark; generally labelled as the party which defends only the rights of the Kurds, the DTP (contemporarily the BDP), as a leftist party, goes way beyond this definition. A glimpse at the legal work performed by the DTP / BDP deputies, which includes the problems of the Kurds as much as the problems of the workers, the women , the youth etc., might empower this suggestion. See the website of the Turkish National Assembly for the resolutions of the DTP / BDP deputies: www.tbmm.gov.tr . This suggestion, however, should not conceal the fact that a significant portion of the Turkish voters in Yenibosna is not tending towards the BDP in the first place.

[298] Acquired from the division of Public Relations.



Figure 6: The Distribution of Food Aid in Bahçelievler

Zafer Mahallesi and the surrounding neighborhoods add up to almost half of the total. Although no other specific data on other form of welfare aid exist according to the municipality,[299] Zafer Mahallesi ranks first, whether one takes *aşevi*, *sünnet* (circumcision feast) and *nikah* (espousal) registrations into consideration, it is suggested.[300]

How has Yenibosna been given coverage in mainstream media? The mainstream media seems to be keen on stressing the "criminality" of the area on an irregular basis. The coverage, however, seems scant. Besides a bunch of criminal events[301], the stress seems to be on the "illegally political" character of the

[299] This lack of information is suggested by a municipal worker in charge.

[300] Why does Zafer Mahallesi rank first? The same municipal worker suggests that this results from the fact that Zafer Mahallesi is full of those who come from "the East" in order to find jobs. However, they were not able to find jobs here either. Thus, they form a group that cannot hold on to anything.

[301] Though the news items are neither representative nor the results of a thorough and longitudinal examination, the headings might be used to give an impression. A bunch of 'criminal events' exist: "Öldürüp kaza süsü verdiler", *Hürriyet*, 04.02.2000; "Diyarbakır'da Aile Meclisi İstanbul'da İnfaz", *Hürriyet*, 24.03.2000; "Bahçelievler'de Fuhuş ve Çete Olaylarına Tepki", *Hürriyet*, 21.07.2006; "İstanbul Bahçelievler'de 20 kişilik silahlı saldırı: 3 yaralı", *Hürriyet*,

neighborhood. A "map of terror", claiming to be compiled from the Emniyet's records, suggests that Zafer Mahallesi is one of the neighborhoods in which the PKK is active in.[302] News items of terrorist activities are quite common in comparison to criminal events; Newrozes, other pirate activities, bombing events and violence seem to be prevalent activities in Yenibosna.[303] A few items involving the activities of the TKP-ML, the DHKP-C and other nameless organizations also exist.[304] These newspaper items, however, should not suggest that Yenibosna is a politically stigmatized neighborhood, such as Gazi Mahallesi or 1 Mayıs Mahallesi, but that it might be in the process of becoming so. These items' representativeness is, thus, suspicious. However, if a stigmatization is imminent, this has to do with the political mobility of the Kurdish forced migrants, which this thesis treats as its object of analysis.

The case of the Kurdish migrants will be scrutinized within this context, Yenibosna, which, as a peripheral destitute slum, witnesses a small-scale industrialization and the in-migration of the dispossessed. The focus will be,

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15.01.2007; "Bahçelievler'de Silahlı Kavga: 5 Yaralı", *Zaman*, 01.06.2008; Hakkari'de arazi kavgası: 1 ölü, 2 Yaralı, *Hürriyet*, 03.09.2008; "İstanbul'da Taksici Cinayeti", *Hürriyet*, 04.08.2008; "Kod Adı: Osman orada mı?", *Hürriyet*, 26.11.2008.. "İstanbul'un Göbeğinde Kafasına Sıktılar", *Zaman*, 17.05.2009. Items stressing the destitution and/or illegality of the area also exist; "Bir Avuç Cehennem", *Hürriyet*, 07.07.1999; "Gecekondu Yıkımı", *Hürriyet*, 27.06.2000 "İstanbulluların Yarısı Gecekonduda Oturuyor", *Hürriyet*, 05.11.2000. Again, the reader should be reminded of the fishy representativeness of the compiled news items.

[302] "İstanbul'un Terör Haritası", *Milliyet*, 08.01.2008.

[303] "Sağduyulu Nevruzlara Doğru", *Zaman*, 22.03.1996; "PKK'nın Karadeniz Sorumlusu Yakalandı", *Hürriyet*, 06.11.1998; "Hainler yine denedi", *Hürriyet*, 15.03.1999; "Polise kurşun", *Hürriyet*, 22.03.1999; "İstanbul'daki Eylemler", *Hürriyet*, 24.03.1999; "Korsanlı Pazar", *Hürriyet*, 21.03.2000; "Çocukların Eylem Oyunu Uymadı", *Hürriyet*, 01.11.2003; "Konserve Kutusunda Bomba", *Hürriyet*, 22.06.2006; "Yenibosna'da Terörist Avı", *Zaman*, 09.04.2007; "İstanbul'da Molotoflu Dehşet", *Hürriyet*, 19.08.2007; "Genç Parti Bürosuna Molotoflu Saldırı", *Hürriyet*, 31.10.2007; "Neron İstanbul'u Yakmaya Devam Ediyor", *Vatan*, 27.12.2007; "İstanbul'da Molotoflu Saldırılar Devam Ediyor", *Hürriyet*, 23.10.2008; "Tehlikeli Gerginlik", *Sabah*, 14.12.2009; "İstanbul'da 15 Kundakçı Yakalandı", *Hürriyet*, 31.12.2007.

[304] "İnfaz Timi Yakalandı", *Hürriyet*, 13.05.1998; "Polis Kan Vererek Teröristi Kurtardı", *Hürriyet*, 18.04.2007; "Yeni Bosna'da 17 Gösterici Gözaltına Alındı", *Zaman*, 07.10.2007. "Cinayetten Hüküm Giydi ama Maktul Hala Yaşıyor", *Hürriyet*, 27.11.2007.

however, not on the urban environment but on how the Kurdish migrants work, live and engage in politics in this environment.

CHAPTER 4

THE "EXCLUSION" OF THE KURDISH MIGRANTS

This chapter is based on the qualitative data collected from Kurdish migrants. Moving upon the univocality of the economic, social and political conditions of the migrants (as transmitted through them), this chapter will scrutinize the "exclusion" of the migrants. The chapter will be composed of three sub-sections: manifestations of economic, social and political exclusion. Before moving onto the data, a clarification of the concept exclusion needs to be given despite the risk of falling into repetition.

The multiple dimensions of "exclusion", in an ideal fashion, consist of the economic, political and social, which are interrelated in the first place. The former manifestation of exclusion, economic exclusion, "is concerned with the questions of income and production and access to goods and services … from which some people are excluded and others are not."[305] The social dimension, on the other hand, is built upon three axes:"(i) access to social services (for example, health and education, drinking water and sanitation facilities), (ii) access to the labour market (precariousness of employment as distinct from low pay), and (iii) extent of social participation reflected in the extent of weakening of the social fabric, as measured by greater crime, juvenile delinquency and homelessness, and so on."[306] The former manifestation of the social dimension of exclusion might be read via "access to public goods and services (access to education and health can be evaluated through life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rate, adult literacy rate or secondary school

[305] Bhalla and Lapeyre, *Poverty and Exclusion*.., p. 17.

[306] Ibid., p. 21.

enrollment", the second via "rate of unemployment and long-term unemployment, vulnerability or precariousness of employment measured by some yardstick of insecurity and risk, for example, rates of job turnover, proportion of second jobs, assessment of people working in the informal sector, household income trends and so on" and the latter via "rates of trade union membership and local associations engaged in activities designed to integrate marginalized groups into the mainstream of civil society … [and] crime and delinquency rates."[307] Lastly, the third form of social exclusion, the political, is based upon the "incompleteness" of citizenship, defined through participation, equality of opportunity and rule of law.[308] The excluded do not have a political influence and they are not represented. They do not engage in political participation.[309]

In the light of this theoretical outline, the questions this section will ask are as follows: are the Kurdish migrants "out" of the labor market after all? Are they isolated from social services, the labor market and the general social fabric? Are they "incomplete" apolitical citizens?

The answers to these questions will suggest the existence of a domain which the dichotomy between exclusion and integration overlooks: "class formation". After all, the Kurdish migrants are not isolated from the general and specific (i.e. social) manifestations of capitalist development; their "exclusion" is not total exclusion from the labor market but, rather, it results in their integration as cheap labor. Furthermore, they share a common language which, at times, is translated into collective action. Focusing upon the "absoluteness" of the exclusion of the Kurds overlooks this possibility of a class formation, this thesis basically suggests.

[307] Ibid., p. 50.

[308] Ibid., p. 21.

[309] Ibid., p. 22.

Elif's (25) family has migrated from Diyarbakır / Lice in 1992, as a result of village burnings. The father (with other relatives) was, at the time, engaged in market trade in Istanbul. The whole family, which was unable to sustain traditional means of production (i.e. agriculture) as a result of the on-going war, was finally transferred to Istanbul, when the villages were burnt down. The family, with some of the relatives, had directly settled in Yenibosna and has been living there since then. The other relatives have scattered all over Istanbul.

The father, due an operation he had last year, is currently out of work. The family depends upon the wage-labor of Elif and his two brothers, who are regularly working in the textiles. No outside assistance is in question; nor, especially if it is from the state, it is something desirable. One of the family members has left Istanbul to study university while the youngest member of the family is currently a primary school student. Although the two other brothers of Elif are high school graduates (one of whom both works and prepares for the university entrance exams), Elif has never gone to school and is currently an Açıköğretim high school student.

The family members are "eternal" supporters of the BDP (and previous Kurdish parties); Elif had once been a keen activist of the DTP. Due to the fact that she has to work and take care of her sister, she has given up politics although she is still an attender of political organizations and protest events - whenever she finds the time, she claims. The scarcity of time is a theme which Elif constantly returns to.

Box 1: Elif's "Social Exclusion"

Economic Exclusion: Employment, Unemployment, Wage-Labor

Given the flexible and precarious working conditions and the disappearance or the degradation of work, the risk of permanent or regular unemployment is either present or imminent, the dominant view basically suggested. Does the excluded form a group of urban poor permanently excluded from job opportunities or are they, rather, integrated into the capitalist economic system, albeit in a thwarted manner? The urban poor of Yenibosna are, indeed, "excluded"; however, the application of the deindustrialized and deproletarianized European "social exclusion" or Wacquant's (quasi-dystopic) "advanced marginality" to this context has its limits. This section builds upon this a critique of these assumptions.

Before beginning to transmit the accounts of the Kurdish migrants, one has to clarify the reader of the method. These accounts are to be used as representative of the other interviewees; they do not pertain to specific interesting instances. For the sake of clarity and to avoid to the risk of mundane repetition, this method was employed. Furthermore, a few of the interviews were not tape-recorded due to technical reasons. However, this thesis would suggest that there is a shared experience of (basic) conditions after all. Thus, it does not move upon pecularities but upon generalities. Unless it is indicated otherwise, the quotations are meant to suggest general tendencies and, thus, are representative of the other informants.

The Kurdish migrants are the permanent poor, because of their lack of networks since they arrived at the city without networks in the first place and since the settled, Kurdish inhabitants of the area tend to isolate themselves from this new

group of migrants, as suggested above. They are the main bearers of the new poverty, Erder claims for instance.[310]

The Kurdish migrants of Yenibosna are, of course, poor; they are outside the social security system[311]; they receive low wages; there are sometimes problems with receiving wages; they are not members of a trade union. However, a permanent unemployment is not really in question. As claimed continuously above, what marks the exclusion of the migrants is not their isolation from the market but, rather, their abrupt integration into it. One should be reminded of Du Toit's suggestion: "poverty results not from people's *exclusion* from that market but from the ways they are *included.*"[312]

Employment does not turn out to be an irregular "instance" in the case of the Kurdish migrants. While the youth should be naturally akin to a permanently unemployed underclass, as De la Rocha suggests via the case of urban Mexico[313] or as visible through the British "surplus youth underclass",[314] the case of (young) Kurdish migrants testifies to another reality.

Rather, almost all of the migrants, most of whom were young, claim to be occupied over relatively long periods of time, while unemployment is a recurring but not a permanent phenomenon. If exclusion is at hand, it has to do with age, one should note. While the younger members of the nuclear households are regularly

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[310] Erder, *Kentsel Gerilim*, p. 296.

[311] None of the informants and of their family members was actually "inside" the social security system.

[312] Du Toit, "Social Exclusion Discourse and Chronic Poverty…", p. 1002.

[313] De La Rocha, "From the Resources of Poverty to the Poverty of Resources…", pp. 87-88.

[314] Robert Macdonald, "Dangerous Youth and the Dangerous Class," in *Youth, the 'Underclass' and Social Exclusion*, ed. Robert Macdonald, (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 22.

employed in the textiles, the older members seem to have dropped out of work either because of illness or age.

Ali [315] (30, Male, Adıyaman/Gerger) depicts his history of unemployment as follows: "We do not really regularly change jobs in general… I had been unemployed due to the crisis last year; it lasted one month or so…" [316]

Baran (21, Male, Diyarbakır/Silvan) similarly claims that he had been indeed unemployed for some time but it lasted only ten days: "There are periods in which we are unemployed. Sometimes there are such periods. It lasts for ten days after I quit the job. It does not last long, I find [another job]."[317]

Cuma (19, Male, Batman/Sason), who claims to have migrated because of economic reasons and "some events", also suggests that it has been four months since he arrived (for the second time) in Istanbul and that for the first two months he had been unemployed.[318] His other four family members also are occupied in the textile sector. Dursun's (17, Male, Batman / Sason) younger family members have been working in the textile sector for seven years. Fatma (18, Female, Diyarbakır / Lice) has been working in the same workshop for three years while being in the sector for 7-8 years.

[315] These are, of course, pseudonyms. Note that Ali is not a forced migrant but his experiences are similar to the other informants' experiences.

[316] "Genelde, çok iş değiştirmiyoruz. Oluyor, bazen oluyor. Geçen sene krizde oldu, bir ay falan işsiz kaldım. Fakat iş lazım, para lazım, boş kalıyoruz." Being occupied in the same workplace for a year, he claims to be working for 14-15 years in the textile sector.

[317] "İşsiz kaldığımız dönemler oluyor. Bazen oluyor. İşten çıktığımdan 10 güne kadar… Çok uzun sürmüyor. Ben buluyorum yani."

[318] Cuma and his parents have returned back to Batman a year ago. It took 8 months for Cuma to come back. The original quotation is as follows: "Memleketten dört ay oldu geldim, toplam saysan iki aydır çalışıyorum. İşsiz kalmadım ama çalışıyorum, karın tokluğuna çalışıyorum."

These migrants, eight of the total interviewees, are mostly trapped in the textile sector. In other words, they do not find it hard to be more or less regularly[319] occupied with low-quality jobs. In other words, these Kurdish migrants do not seem to be at the brink of chronic or long-lasting unemployment; wage-labor persists as the primary source of income[320]. Furthermore, none of them reported receiving welfare aid or regular aid from their families or relatives. Work is not casual but regular. "One should not be unoccupied; when you are unoccupied for a month, it has a negative impact on you to a great extent"[321], Cuma claims.

Unemployment or job turnovers are not, of course, "exceptions" given the informality of the labor market. However, they are not really permanently recurring phenomena either. One does not become a seller at the market (*pazarcı*) and a textile worker next month and a seller again. Furthermore, almost all of them reported having most of their family members (regardless of gender) employed mainly in the textile sector, though other occupations are at times uttered.[322] An exception, indeed, exists: İhsan ([legally] 29, Male, Batman / Kozluk[323]) is a baker working in bake houses or restaurants for 8 years in total. He seems not to be acquainted with the textile sector after all, although his family members have been so.

[319] Note that regularity, in this context, is emphasized to suggest the "abrupt integration" of the migrants into the economic system. In other words, the migrants cannot be outside the labor market at all; independently of the regularity of work, they form a "reserve army of labor".

[321] "İnsanın hiç böyle boş kalmaması lazım, böyle bir ay boş kaldığın zaman sana çok yansıyor."

[322] To a lesser extent, one should note. Other occupations mainly include construction, 'pazarcılık' (market trade), 'kebapçılık' and shoe trade. However, both the food and construction sector occupy the first rank both according to the informants and the quantitative research.

[323] The dominancy of the interviewees from Batman should not overlook the fact that they are from separate families (or households) and that their migratory routes and periods are different.

Are these migrant workers representative after all? According to a quantitative research[324] conducted on the households of Zafer Mahallesi within the pretext of this research, out of 99 individuals, 50% of whom (48 individuals) are eligible for work[325] 30% of them (16 individuals) are working in the textile sector while 18% of them (9 individuals) work in the service sector. The other half is unemployed. As suggested above, a municipal report on Bahçelievler suggests that the area is mainly composed of industrial units, specialized in the sectors of food and textiles and that 30% of the population residing in Bahçelievler is engaged in manufacturing. This study deals with a portion of this percentage.

A significant portion of the textile workers, according to the quantitative research, turns out to be coming from the conflict-induced regions: out of the 16 textile workers in total, slightly more than a half of them are Kurdish. Having most of their family members engaged in textiles, they did not report being unemployed for a long time.

The younger members of nuclear households generally are employed within the textile sector as the older members of the nuclear households mostly turn out to be either unemployed because of age or illness.[326] Furthermore, unemployment due to accidents during work is at times mentioned; Hasan (Van, Male, 22) has dropped out of the textile sector to move upon the construction sector (which offered more money); he is now unemployed. Hasan's family has been dealing with a court case

[324] The selection was random as suggested above. The research aimed at getting a modest glimpse of the employment and social security patterns of the inhabitants of the area; it asked general questions about the members of the households.

[325] The rest of the population consists of the younger (15-) and the elderly (65+) individuals.

[326] Half of the intervieewees were residing within nuclear households, i.e. with their parents. The other half lived with their brothers and sisters while the parents have either returned to the hometown (or to the first destination of migration) or never come to Istanbul in the first place.

due to an accident involving his (now crippled) brother during construction work. Hasan claims to be irregularly working at the constructions.

Unemployment, however, does not turn out to be primarily a chosen strategy given the "quality" of work. This suggestion is, of course, applicable to youth. The Latin American case, as delineated above, is applicable; finding a job is easier than finding a good job. After all, in neighborhoods where a high number of Kurds has concentrated, looking for jobs in small workshops might not be a problem after all, as Yükseker claims.[327]

Most of the young interviewees, who actually form the majority of the interviewees in total, claimed that they had been working constantly since 11-12 years old. Dursun[328] has suggested that he works in the textile sector whenever he is free of the obligations of the school. Baran, who has been working since 10 years and who claims to have changed five to six workshops in these ten years, has entered the textiles when he was 11.

However, not all of the migrants are as "lucky" as Dursun, who has the chance to be exempt from work. Elif (25, Female, Diyarbakır / Lice), an Açıköğretim[329] Lise 1 student, tries both to work in the textiles and to pass the exams to get a high school diploma, in order to be eligible for the university entrance exams. The situation of Fatma, an Açıköğretim Lise 2 student, is similar. Having two siblings, one of whom has quit his job in the textiles to prepare for the university

[327] Deniz Yükseker, "Internal Displacement and Social Exclusion: Problems Encountered by Internally Displaced…", p. 275.

[328] In comparison to Cuma, who is at the same age and from the same hometown, Dursun's family has arrived at İstanbul due to state repression during the first years of 2000. Though this migration is not exactly forced migration as generally suggested, it is "forced" nonetheless. One has to note that Dursun does not have a familial tie with Cuma.

[329] Açıköğretim pertains to "distance school education".

entrance exams in a *dershane*,[330] Fatma has been working in the same workshop for three years with some of her relatives, while having been in the textile sector for seven to eight years. This affirms the TESEV Working Group's findings regarding child labor: "All of the eight youths from Batman, Van, Hakkari and Diyarbakır, interviewed in the Yenibosna neighbourhood in Istanbul said that they had been working since they were 10-12 years old."[331]

Furthermore, the migrants do not really have a "primordial" relationship with the owners of the workshop; the majority of them are not working in family businesses, but working under a previously unknown boss.[332] Ali, Baran and Cuma's boss is Kurdish; Newroz is a "public holiday" in the workshop. The workshop in which these workers are employed is generally a middle-scale workshop, generally employing between 10 and 30 workers.[333]

Dursun suggests that the coupling of being unable to cultivate tobacco in Batman and state repression led to their migration. Internal displacement is, at times, connected with "economic migration" after all.[334] Regardless of the reasons of migration, it seems feasible to suggest that most of the migrants have been dispossessed of traditional means of livelihood. Having almost no (economic) ties with their hometown, subjugation to wage-labor is present.

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[330] *Dershane* is a private educational facility which prepares students for high school, university and other "central" exams. At the time of the writing of this thesis, Fatma's brother has returned to the workshop.

[331] Ibid., p. 271.

[332] The case of Kahraman below is an exception.

[333] For the working conditions and labor relations in the textile industry, see Erdem Yörük, "Social Relations of Production within the Workshop System in Istanbul's Apparel Industry" (MA thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2006).

[334] Deniz Yükseker, "Internal Displacement in the Province of Diyarbakır…", p. 181.

What does "subjugation to wage-labor" entail? This is related to another question: How does one categorize the composition of the households? Wallerstein's analysis of households might help. According to this categorization, income is described in five items, the first and most obvious being *wage-labor*, whether occasional or regular; then, follows *subsistence activity*; to be followed by *petty commodity production*. The last items are, respectively, *rent* and *transfer payments*.[335] Therein, the differentiation between semi-proletarian and proletarian households arise; the former pertains to households with wage-income accounting for less than 50 percent of the total income while the latter pertains to a household with more than or equal to 50 percent of the total income.[336]

The households of Yenibosna and the interviewed Kurdish migrants mainly fit into the former definition, not being akin to a welfare-dependent or semi-proletarian composition. In other words, wage-labor still reigns the area in question. Dependence on wage income has increased due to migration. The migrants have been not merely "pauperized" but also "proletarianized" and "informalized". Transfer and rent payments seem to be absent. While petty commodity production is in question at times[337], the households' female labor is not really contextualized within the house. Lastly, as suggested above, dispossession has rendered the possibility of subsistence activity almost null. In short, none of the intervieewees suggested any other form of income rather than wage-labor.

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[335] Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-System Analysis: An Introduction*, (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004), pp. 32-34.

[336] Ibid., p. 34.

[337] For instance, Elif, before being employed in the textile sector, used to knit accesory items while at the same taking care of her sister and preparing for the Açıköğretim exams. None of the other intervieewees, however, suggested the presence of similar income-earning activities.

The working conditions of the migrants are well-known[338]; the migrants are well aware of this fact. “What do I tell you, you know all the working conditions, no security, overwork etc.”[339], Ali claims. The general depiction, as transmitted by Baran, is as follows: “We work without security and the wages are not enough here [Someone intervenes by saying “we want justice” at this point]. We are, of course, not content with the working conditions. Though we generally work for eight hours, here [in this workshop] we work for ten hours while during Saturdays we work until 13 o’clock.”[340]

Wilson’s analysis of the black ghetto, a manifestation of urban marginality, does not really apply to the case of Yenibosna: “when there were unskilled jobs available in the manufacturing sector there was work; when the manufacturing sector disappears, young black males are left behind by the new service economy in which there is demand for the more educated, the more culturally endowed, and generally female workers.”[341] Unskilled jobs persist. Wright and Singelmann’s assumption might, rather, be more helpful: a shift to less proletarianized industries, i.e. to postindustrialism or the reign of service society, is generally at hand; however, this dynamic coincides with more proletarianization within the industrial sector.[342]

Resembling an industrial working class district, with a bulging level of informal labor, the slum in question houses inhabitants not isolated from the

[338] See: Yörük, “Social Relations of Production...”

[339] “Ne anlatayım ki, hepsini biliyorsunuz, sigorta yok, fazla mesai vs..”

[340] “İşte sigortasız çalışıyoruz, maaşlar da kurtarmıyor burada. [Adalet istiyoruz]… Çalışma koşullarından memnun değiliz tabii. Her yerde sekiz saat çalışıyoruz, burada on saat çalışıyoruz, …, bazen 11’e kadar da çalıştığımız da oluyor. Cumartesi 1’e kadar mecburi çalışıyoruz.”

[341] Keyder, “Globalization and Social Exclusion…”, p. 130.

[342] Erik Olin Wright and Joachim Singelmann, “Proletarianization in the Changing American Class Structure,” *The American Journal of Sociology*, 88 (1982), p. 179.

economic system. How could they be "left out" of the labor market in the first place? Exclusive wage-dependency, furthermore, is common in the case of Yenibosna while unemployment does not seem either endemic or chronic (yet). The economic marginality of the area in question, furthermore, does not pertain to a "marginal pole" (as Quijano suggests), which "primarily describes productive or commercial activities of workers without waged work or wage-income."[343] It does not have a widespread "alternative economy" either; it does not really possess a high number of "units [that] are not based entirely or partially on wages and the market"[344] and these units are not really built upon primordial relationships. Furthermore, the street is not the main site of economic activity. Yenibosna's economy is, indeed, informal; it is, however, not the informal economy of the street in the form of peddling, drug trafficking or similar "shadow activities" (as Wacquant would claim) but it is generally the informal economy of the workshop. Labor, in other words, is not irregular to a large extent; rather, it is, both surprisingly and mundanely, mainly concentrated in the informal textile workshops, which are frequented not with "urban poor" performing "casual work" but mainly with "working poor", who do not portray a significant labor turnover and who are more or less regularly employed. The difference, in order to assess the degree of the exclusion of the migrants, is crucial.

[343] Anibal Quijano, "The Growing Significance of Reciprocity from Below: Marginality and Informality under Debate," in *Informalization: Process and Structure*, eds. Faruk Tabak and Michaeline A. Crichlow (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 2000), p. 148.

[344] Ibid, p. 159.

İhsan's (29, Male, Batman / Kozluk) family has moved from Kozluk to Batman because of being forced to become a "village guard" and of the village evacuations. While certain members of the family have spread as far as Balıkesir and Manisa, İhsan's family's migration to Istanbul has been indirect. Having been a cotton and tobacco cultivator in Batman, the family has first moved to Batman, then to Kocasinan in Istanbul (a neighbourhood close to Yenibosna) during the 1990s. Only during the first years of 2000, did they settle in Yenibosna.

İhsan has been a baker for a long time, even when they were residing in Batman, while other family members have been regularly or irregularly e employed within the textile sector in Istanbul. The father and the step-mother died last year. The younger brother left the city to study at university. The older sister has married, moving to an Aegean city. In other words, the family has disintegrated while other family members and relatives still reside within the vicinity of Yenibosna. İhsan currently resides in the workplace.

Rather than this story of "disintegration", the "social exclusion" of İhsan is more significant. İhsan claims to have a wide circle of friends and acquaintances; he suggests that he is a regular (but seemingly unfaithful) attender of the BDP and other unrelated political parties and organizations whether in Yenibosna or Soğanlı. Being a member of the HADEP's youth during the late 1990s, he suggests that he will not vote for the BDP in the next elections. This regular attendance of organizations and the nature of his job have to do with his network, he claims.

Box 2: İhsan's "Social Exclusion"

Social Exclusion: Migration, Community, Residence, Welfare, Education

The Kurdish migrants, due to a total atomization of social relations, have been stripped of social ties, it has been generally suggested. Directly arriving in an unknown atmosphere, the migrants have been rid of the possibilities of forming communities or networks and of maintaining solidarity. Furthermore, the state has "left" them. Access to social services and education is quite low. Neighborhood networks were strained due to the forced Kurdish migration. "While the earlier migrants were attracted by employment opportunities, possibilities of house ownership through appropriation of public land and better access to education and health services, for the newcomers the decision to migrate is likely to be based more on necessity than on the prospect of a better life."[345] Most of the forced migrant Kurds have arrived at older shanty-town neighborhoods: "they thus occupy a distinctly lower status in the social hierarchy; they do not participate in the older communal functions, they have their own coffee-houses, and may be members of ethnic associations that are necessarily more political than the associations that are entirely oriented to consolidating locality-based networks of the older migrants."[346] Furthermore the male migrants, without families, i.e. bachelors, "end(ed) up living in 'inns', sharing a room, or in the most dilapidated sections of the inner city, long abandoned and still far from being gentrified, associated in the media mind with crime, deprivation and vulnerability."[347] These are generally self-employed as shoe-shiners or street vendors, waiting for informal work. Since construction work has disappeared to a large extent, there appears the "danger that these new immigrants

[345] Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion…", p. 131.

[346] Ibid., p. 132.

[347] Ibid., p. 132.

have now calcified into a permanent underclass, moving back and forth between unemployment, self-employment and casual, informal work, always in need of outside assistance for survival."[348] Not only materially but also socially these migrants are excluded; they do not reap the benefits of an existing network.

This section will scrutinize the last of these assumptions.

Most of the forced Kurdish migrants did not directly arrive in Yenibosna in the first place. Rather, arrival has been "indirect". For instance, Cuma's family settled in the city center of Batman, before migrating to Istanbul during the late 1990s. Dursun's family migrated to Yenibosna due to state violence; however, some of their family members, including his sisters, were already living and working in Yenibosna. Thus, they had actually arrived into existing relations. Elif's father has been working as a seller in the markets of Istanbul even before 1990s. Coupled with rising economic hardships and the burning of the villages in 1992, they had chosen to settle the whole family in Istanbul, she suggests. Fatma's family, similarly, settled in Istanbul during the same time; in other words, they had both transferred their social relations to Istanbul and "integrated" into an already existing network, which had been formed by members of the households who have previously migrated. In other words, no one seems to have chosen Yenibosna as a random destination.

Furthermore, as generally has been suggested, the migration route starts with the nearest city or town and then spreads towards the peripheral cities. The final destination is the "Western" city centers; the route is, in all of the case, drawn by the social and economic capital one possesses.[349] Thus, the internally displaced do not

[348] Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion…", p. 132.

[349] Kaya, ed. *Türkiye'de İç Göçler: Bütünleşme mi Geri Dönüş mü?*, p. 172.

suddenly enter into a metropolitan environment totally devoid of networks; however, the quality of networks seems questionable. [350]

Although the ties with the hometown have been deteriorated economically, the relationship of the migrants and their hometown has not totally disappeared. Cuma's parents returned back to the hometown two years ago while his sisters and brothers still reside within Yenibosna. He is likely to return in a few months. Baran, whose parents are still in Diyarbakır, is, too, hopeful of returning – if "peace" is established. İhsan's family has disintegrated while his sister and other family members have left Istanbul. Some of them have gone back to the center of Batman, the "new" hometown.

As suggested above, no transfer from the hometown in the form of "rent" or "subsistence activity" seems present. Thus, it seems feasible to speak of a thorough dispossession, of being totally vulnerable to the mechanisms of the market, in other words, of proletarianization. The traditional means of production deteriorated after or even before the migration to Istanbul. For instance, Dursun has suggested that they were not able to cultivate tobacco in the first place; state repression added an insult to injury. İhsan, similarly, complained of the quota system. Elif and Fatma suggested that their family was not able to produce due to the war, even before their villages were burnt down. Though no special data on dispossession exists, it is feasible to make a suggestion regarding the definition of displacement. In other words, conflict-induced displacement is not solely a matter of the evacuation and burning of villages

[350] One should be reminded of the limitation proposed in the introduction of this thesis. This thesis deals with a relatively "fortunate" population of Kurdish migrants, who have found the chance to arrive at Istanbul. Furthermore, the poverty in question is not really inner-city poverty but "peripheral poverty". These distinctions should be taken into account in order not to overestimate the role of networks.

or hamlets, as it has generally been confined to in the official discourse[351] ; it, surely, includes this form of forced displacement but actually results from a spectrum of reasons, such as being "forced or compelled to leave their homes because of feelings of insecurity, armed clashes, military-imposed food embargoes as well as threats by the security forces, the PKK and government-employed village guards."[352] In other words, the conflict in question breeds or exacerbates economic hardships; migration is not merely related to security but to the impossibility of sustaining the traditional means of production. [353]

Have the "communal ties" totally disappeared because of migration? As suggested above, migration actually builds upon existing relations and the existing networks were reinforced by the further transfer of acquainted population to the slums. Dursun claims that the vicinity of Yenibosna is full of relatives, *hemşehri*s or acquaintances. After all, the tendency has been towards settling in Yenibosna. Elif, claiming that she does not like dealing with visits to relatives, suggests that their relatives have been spread all over the city, though they are not alone at all in Yenibosna. Thus, Yenibosna does not turn out to house scattered or atomized groups of forced migrants but is a more or less tight concentration of them. Furthermore, while the collected data does not really refer to the existence or non-existence of new communities formed with regard to workplaces, it could be speculated that the migrants are not confined to a static network. Yenibosna, despite the fragmentation of labor, is a "large factory" after all.

[351] Ünalan, Çelik and Kurban, "Internal Displacement in Turkey…", p. 69.

[352] Ayata and Yükseker, "A Belated Awakening…", p. 15.

[353] As suggested above, this thesis conceptualizes "forced migrants" within this definition.

Of those who were interviewed, none was a bachelor residing in a bachelor house.[354] All of the interviewees had either their (generally married) brothers and sisters or their whole family living with them. In other words, the composition of households seems to overlap with the composition of families, either totally or to a large extent.[355]

The residence is generally a low-quality slum apartment. In other words, Yenibosna is not akin to Tarlabaşı whose "general appearance … is a decayed one" and in which "every year a few buildings collapse, sometimes resulting in casualties."[356] Yükseker, similarly, makes the distinction between neighborhoods such as Tarlabaşı and Balat and more "developed" neighborhoods such as Yenibosna, Güneşli, Soğanlı, Esenler and Bahçelievler: "Although the urban development in these areas is relatively better, it seems that the rents are high because of the high number of manufacturing workshops in the area. Therefore, although there are more work opportunities in Güneşli and Yenibosna compared to Tarlabaşı, the burden of rent is much higher."[357]

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[354] The bachelor houses had been subject to a thorough terrorization by the state last year. Thus, the non-existence of bachelors within the total interviewees, rather than a thwarted random selection, might be related to their disappearance. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to support this local information with external data since it has not been given coverage anywhere. Furthermore, the "mobility" of bachelors seems distinct from the more or less "settled" acccounts of most of the intervieewees. After all, only two of them were hopeful of returning.

[355] "Household" is differentiated from a "family", although the former does not exclude the latter; a household might be formed by kins, close kins but what connects the members of the household are the "long-term income-pooling arrangements". See: Joan Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein, "Households as an Instituion of the World Economy," in *Creating and Transforming Households: The Constraints of the World-Economy*, eds. Joan Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 13. In the case of Yenibosna, household mostly overlaps with family.

[356] Yılmaz, "Far Away, So Close: Social Exclusion…", p. 36.

[357] Yükseker, "Internal Displacement and Social Exclusion…", p. 265. The rent for a 2+1 apartment in Zafer Mahallesi is generally between 450 and 600 TL – a monthly wage of a textile worker is similary within this range.

How do the Kurdish migrants spend their "leisure time"?[358] A common suggestion would be that these migrants shut themselves up within their limited enclaves. This suggestion would not be based upon a frail ground. However, as suggested above, the migrants do not really reside within a totally alien environment. Given the extent of social relations (which is not to be overrated or underrated), Ali claims that whether because of a wedding or a funeral or something else, he has to leave the neighborhood on a regular basis. Baran suggests that he does not really have a private life; he spends the time wandering out with his friends. Elif claims that she likes to wander around in Istanbul but, given the heavy work and the obligations of schools she is subject to, how could she find time to wander freely? She suggests that she had been regularly wandering around Sultanahmet or Eminönü with his aunt and cousin but it has been a long time since she last visited Taksim. Besides leaving the neighborhood to attend protest events, family picnics remain regular activities, according to Elif. How could a worker, who works for 10-12 hours during workdays and for 5 hours during Saturdays, find time to wander freely? Cuma similarly speaks of the scarcity of time. It turns, after all, to be mainly a problem of "time" but not of "poor resources" or of an environment alien to the Kurds.

What kind of a relationship do the migrants have with the state? Has the state "left" them?

The common suggestion has been that, because of "technical deficiencies" such as the language problem, the migrants had not really been acquainted with the state services in the first place. After all, as Yükseker notes, "illiteracy and weakness of Turkish language skills among both women and men contributed to the difficulty

[358] The word leisure is consciously in a quotation mark; after all, given the fact that most of the workers spend 10-12 hours a day in the workshop, "leisure time" is a luxury that pertains to post-afternoon Saturdays and whole Sundays. Cuma, for instance, claims that he spends his time outside of work during weekdays, which makes 2-3 hours a day, by wandering around or using the Internet.

of both social and economic 'integration' of IDPs in cities," resulting in their lack of "access to public services (e.g. healthcare, the justice system, social assistance etc.)."[359] This assumption is built upon a realistic basis; however, it is incomplete.

As suggested above via Figure 6, the particular neighborhood within this thesis is contextualized, Zafer Mahallesi, has received the 20% of the total welfare aids from the municipality, thus occupying the first rank.[360] Were the Kurdish migrants receiving aid? Or were they eager to do so?

None of the interviewees actually reported receiving aid either from the municipality or from other state organizations. Most of them were not eager to do so. Gürsel (17, Male, Batman), who has been working for 1.5 years, claimed that they did not receive any aid from anywhere; nor did they want any from "such a state".[361] Dropped out of the 7th grade, he did not want to go to school in the first place. Elif similarly claims that his father labeled those receiving aid as "stooges" (*yardakçılar*); during the election period, he wanted to be sure that no one he knew in Diyarbakır accepted the aid of the government. He was such an "enemy of the state" (*devlet düşmanı*). Ali does not recieve any aid either; furthermore, he does not see it as necessary.[362] Kahraman similarly speaks of his "problematic" relationship with the state (delineated below).

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[359] Yükseker, "Neoliberal Restructuring and Social Exclusion…", p. 269.

[360] Is the high rate of municipal aid related to the strong presence of the Kurds? In other words, does aid function to "contain" the Kurdish mobilization? Or is this high rate merely related with a high level of poverty? These are significant questions that transcend the range of an M.A. thesis.

[361] "No… We don't want it in the first place. We never applied for [it], we don't want it in the first place. State.. To the hell with such a state." The original quotation is as follows: "Yok… İstemiyoruz zaten. Hiç başvurmadık da, istemiyoruz zaten. Devlet.. Öyle devlet olmaz olsun yani."

[362] "Devletten gelecek hayır Allah'tan gelsin", he claims while laughing. The original quoatation does not really possess a religious connotation but suggests the lack of hope from receiving aid from the state.

Most of the interviewees, though not as "radical" as these cases, did not apply for aid in the first place. Of the minority which has applied, the applications had been turned down. Hasan claims that "if they give, of course we would want it but they do not give [aid]."[363] Cuma similarly claims that they had seen those who could not receive it and, thus, they did not apply for it. Thus, rather than a "technical deficiency" as language, the main reason for not receiving aid might be explained by the "resentment towards the state"[364] or by indirect negative experience. Similarly, İhsan suggests that he knows a bunch of people who would not go to the mosques because of regular [anti-Kurdish] legal propaganda during the Friday sermons.[365]

The "retrenchment of the state", furthermore, does not really mean much in the case of the Kurdish migrants; these migrants have not reaped the benefits of the "welfare state" in Turkey in the first place. [366] The distance between the Kurdish migrants and the state is not really related to the non-existence of the state; given the fact that the vicinity Yenibosna is not really devoid of a presence of public institutions, municipal aid (and a regular militarization by the state), it might be related to how the state manifests itself vis-à-vis the Kurdish migrants. This is,

[363] "Maalasef [olmadı]. Yani biz istiyoruz da vermiyorlar. Verseydi alacam ben. Verse tabi biz isteriz." One should add that Hasan was reluctant to give the name of the party he supports; although he claims that he attends protest events for sure, he does not pronounce a political motive but, rather, says that he dances and engages in halay and so forth. These seemingly non-relevant details are given to suggest the "moderate" condition of Hasan as compared to the former examples.

[364] The "state", the "municipality" and the "government" are generally used interchangably.

[365] "Anti-Kurdish" propaganda pertains to "counter-guerilla" propaganda.

[366] Perlman's suggestion paraphrased above might explain why the word "welfare" is in an ironical apostrophe: since Brazil never developed a welfare state in the first place, one cannot talk of the retrenchment of the state.

however, a suggestion that should be more thoroughly investigated; thus, it is not really feasible to embark upon a thorough generalization.[367]

Lastly, some of the youths' education levels are not "dramatic" as it seems. Most of them, unsurprisingly, were school drop-outs. Three of the interviewees, however, are high school students, which pertain to a different reality. Two of these students are both regular workers and Açıköğretim high school students. One of them, Dursun, is currently a high school student. The younger sisters of these students are regularly attending primary school. Some of the younger members of Elif and Kahraman's family are even studying university. In other words, rather than being totally out of educational system, the "new" generation is in it to an extent.[368] Unsurprisingly, the "workplace" and "school" do not turn out to be mutually exclusive realms after all.

[367] Limiting the state services to aid is similarly problematic. Thus, this study falls short of explaining the Kurdish migrants' relationship with the various mechanisms of state, such as health services and courts. For instance, of those "inside" the education system, none spoke of a resentment. The pejorative connotation recieving aid possesses might not be reproduced in accounts of relationships with other state mechanisms after all.

[368] Elif suggests that his father sees education as a way of escape from subjugation to the exploitation and harassments of a boss. The younger members of the household (composed of 10 individuals), thus, are currently as follows: a university student, two preparing for the university entrance exams and a primary school student whose education is valued. The two other youths in the household are high school graduates.

The story of Dursun's migration pertains to a different form of "forced migration". Harassed by the gendermarie, Dursun's father tries to find a way out of Batman / Sason. He transfers the whole family to Yenibosna, in which his older girls were already living and working in.

This happens in 2003. Contrary to the general suggestion, forced migration does not only include the "evacuation of villages" but includes myriad forms of state repression. This occurs even in a period in which "hopes for peace" reign. In other words, state repression has not decreased much despite the fact that the armed conflict stopped during this period. Given the fact that war still looms, forced migration is not "history" but is an on-going process.

Having been tobacco cultivators in Sason, Dursun's family has directly moved to Yenibosna. They currently form a household of ten. Of those who are between the working age (15-65), almost all of the family members are employed in the textile sector for seven years. Dursun is currently a Lise 4 student, preparing for the university entrance exams. His two other siblings, respectively 12 and 10 years old, are currently attending primary school. None of the other members of the family has had secondary education. Two of the female members of the family have been working since they were, respectively, 12 and 14 years old. This household does not depend on either welfare or other forms of assistance; no other form of income exists in the family besides the wages of these four family members, who are employed in Yenibosna. His mother applied for aid during the last years to be turned down. Dursun, who also works during holidays, claims that the members of his household are regular attenders of Newrozes and other protest events organized by the BDP. Most of the relatives live within the vicinity of Yenibosna.

Box 3: The "Distinctiveness" of Dursun's Forced Migration

Political Exclusion: Engagement in Grassroots Politics

The common suggestion regarding the Kurdish migrants' political exclusion claims that, given the technical impossibilities such as the lack of a "certificate of residence" (*ikametgah belgesi*) and given the fact that no political bodies exist to empower the migrants, the Kurds have been left out of the politics. Thus, they are "incomplete citizens." For instance, the UNDP Report on the new poverty regime of Turkey suggests the isolation of the migrants from politics: the Kurdish bachelors live in a near total cultural exclusion and "as they are not registered residents of the area, they cannot participate in the political life, or vote in elections."[369] Yılmaz depicts the "political exclusion" of the inhabitants of Tarlabaşı, as follows:

> "[T]hree issues reveal some elements for such exclusion. The first one is the inexistence of political or associational mobilisation for the neighbourhood, which not only reveals the lack of a political know-how with the objective of improving the living conditions in Tarlabaşı, but also the lack of a sense of neighbourhood identity and attachment. The second regards the fact that some segments of Tarlabaşı's population cannot be said to fully enjoy their political rights: the displaced Kurds who lack identification papers and residential registration which are necessary to be able to vote…. The third issue is at the national level: concerning legislative elections, the existence of a 10 per cent national threshold prevents a real representation of the Kurds in parliament."[370]

These suggestions, indeed, pertain to reality. However, the forced migrants are not politically passive or apathetic in the first place. Rather, their political "activity" might be an empowering mechanism against the powerful currents of exclusion.

[369] Buğra and Keyder, *New Poverty and The Changing Welfare Regime*…, p. 23.

[370] Yılmaz, "Far Away, So Close: Social Exclusion…", p. 36.

Given the fragility of investigating political participation, the dominance of uttered political mobilization is surprising.[371] Most of the interviewees reported regular visits of the "İlçe"[372] and attending protest events. "The party that I adopt is the BDP and I hang out there at times," Baran claims. [373] Ali has voted for AKP, because of his wish for "the freedom of the headscarf" and, thus, he is ridiculed by his friends.[374] Elif was a regular activist of the former DTP / now BDP but, given the lack of time, she had to stop visiting the party. Her family, though fervent advocates of the BDP, does not attend protest events or similar events but sends her and her cousin as representatives, she claims. Dursun and his family regularly attend protest events and Newrozes, whether local or central, although they do not regularly visit the party. The members of these families are registered voters.

Cuma, although he is a fervent political speaker, does not report attending protest events regularly. After all, he has to "work, work, work, work and work".[375] Gürsel suggests that he regularly visits the İlçe and that he wants "justice" and a new state. The massacres have not been forgotten, he suggests: thus, whenever an event happens he attends it. After all, it is a matter of Kurdishness. Baran claims that,

[371] Note that the writer of this thesis has not encounted these interviewees with an outspoken political motive but as an university student trying to collect data. However, one should note that the rate of politicization among the intervieewees is unexpectedly high – especially with regard to the fact that a bunch of the Kurdish inhabitants of the area in question had been recently subject to a state harassment due to "the KCK operations". Still, this thesis cannot generalize upon the Kurds, with its bunch of intervieewees; however, a significant portion of these informal workers seems to be acquainted with the BDP.

[372] "İlçe" pertains to the BDP's headquarters in the district in question. Note that none of the interviewees were reached directly through the BDP headquarters. Thus, the randomness of the selection of sample is reliable with regard to the political mobilization of the migrants.

[373] "Benimsediğim parti BDP'dir, ara sıra oraya takılıyorum."

[374] "I only long for the freedom of the headscarf", he claims. However, he seems to be devoid of religious ties with any political or other organizations.

[375] The original quotation, difficult to be translated, is as follows: "Pek katıldığım olmuyor aslında. Çünkü kafam yani.. İnsanın şeyi ekmek derdine düşmüş. Böyle mitinglere falan gidecek falan şeyi yok yani, böyle hep ekmek derdi. Çalış, çalış, çalış, çalış, çalış…"

through these regular visits and through attending these events, they do what they have to do. When there is time left besides work, he attends the BDP and local or central protest events. He suggests that he has not been able to attend recent protest events because he has had to work. In other words, most of the interviewees are regularly inside "politics" and they express this politicization under the terms of the necessity of justice and of Kurdishness. The need to work, however, sometimes besets the participation in politics. "Political apathy" turns out to be a myth. However, at the same time, the worker has to sell his time.

Most of the politicized interviewees[376], who were regular visitors of the BDP, did not report attending other organizations. After all, Yenibosna lacks the presence of democratic organizations. Elif, whose representativeness should be in doubt, reported regularly attending a solidarity organization in order to get a high school diploma. Elif suggests that attending these kinds of organizations helps to "enlarge" one's network; after all, one meets new friends and forms new networks via these organizations.[377] Dursun and İhsan, similarly, suggest that they construct new social ties, through political parties and other organizations. However, it should be asserted that "politicization" is not about constructing networks at all. Thus, a speculation could be made: regularly attending organizations which raise "democratic challenges … to the monopoly of state control"[378], the migrants are

[376] A reminder: not all of the intervieewees were BDP sympathizers. Given the fact that the rate of political party or organizational membership is very low in the case of the Turkish migrants, the mobilization of Kurdish migrants is significant. Almost 80% of the respondents of the questionnaire were not members of an organization in any kind. When the word "dernek" (*organization*) or "parti" (*political party*) was uttered, the question was passed by the informant quickly, saying "yok, yok, yok" (no, no, no). The uttered mobilization of these informants, thus, gains a significance.

[377] This assumption, though contextualized not through a political party, seems applicable to the political parties as well. The other respondents have not, unfortunately, given meaningful information about the specific empowerment mechanisms of attending political organizations. As suggested above, politics was expressed under general headings.

[378] Çelik, "Migrating onto Identity: Kurdish Mobilization…", p. 10.

regularly engaged in "politics", whether as irregular attenders or as regular members. In other words, "empowerment" is not merely or (possibly) significantly about "networks", i.e. it is not related to finding jobs or making friends or hanging around. Rather, it has to do with a process in which the demands of the migrants are voiced: democratic participation whether through protest events, attending organizations and taking responsibilities.[379]

These political actors do not really engage in protests pertaining to the economic realm, i.e. they do not voice demands relating mainly to "neoliberal adjustment" in a Latin American fashion.[380] They do not "rebel against neoliberalism as they directly experience it in their everyday lives."[381] Indeed, their demands are not really related to their working conditions or low wages, although they are well aware of the generality of the working conditions. Their demands are generally situated within the realm of "Kurdishness". This, however, doesn't mean that political demands necessarily exclude economic demands.

Contextualized in an environment in which a working class movement does not exist, they do not behave as a class in its "formal" sense. Thus, this political informality tends to be ignored simply as mere "slum radicalism" or "identity politics". However, the coupling of the economic position with the politicization of the migrants might pertain to a different process after all: class formation. The deployment of "social exclusion" as a category for understanding the Kurdish migrants overlooks this process.

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[379] How politicization empowers one is a significant question that this thesis cannot answer since an ethnographic research was not conducted in political parties. Thus, this thesis views politicization as an outcome – not as a process. The migrants, it basically suggests, turn out to share both a common political language and a repertoire of collective action.

[380] Auyero, "Protest in Contemporary Argentina…", p. 155.

[381] Susan Eckstein, "Urban Resistance to Neoliberal Democracy in Latin America," *Colombia Internacional*, Vol. 63 (June 2006), p. 35.

Forced to migrate from Batman / Sason because of the violence imposed on them because of their refusal to become a village guard (*köy korucusu*), Kahraman's (57, Male) story is a perfect depiction of dispossession. Currently living in a household of 8, Kahraman owns a small workshop for 6 months and is currently in debt.

Kahraman and his family left Sason during 1993, first to arrive at Diyarbakır / Bismil. Having been tobacco cultivators both in Sason and Bismil, they had left Bismil 10 years ago to arrive at Yenibosna. Kahraman, his son, daughter-in-law and his two sisters are currently working in the small-scale workshop. Furthermore, he suggests that he is subject to constant harassment both by the police and the municipality because of the social security procedures. The two other members of the household are currently studying at university outside Istanbul.

Neither recieving aid nor being eager to do so, Kahraman has voted for the Kurdish political parties over a long time. He, as an active member of the BDP and a regular reader of *Günlük* (the "pro-Kurdish" newspaper), claims to be a regular attender of Newrozes, election rallies or other protest events. Though a primary school graduate, Kahraman is well aware of the contradictions and is keen on talking about who is responsible with regard to the war and the Kurdish issue. "Politicization", after all, is not a matter of "formal education".

Box 4: The Case of Kahraman

Class Formation?

The informality and the (overrated) irregularity of the labor of the Kurdish migrants have resulted in their depiction as an indefinite group of casual workers. Furthermore, their political demands, since they do not pertain to the realm of economy, are merely underestimated as "slum radicalism" or "identity politics". Socially, they were atomized to an extent that a community was not present any more. They did not belong either to a group or a class.

Wacquant, through the case of Chicago's Black Belt and the Parisian Red Belt, portrays the end-result of advanced marginality as follows:

> "[S]hould France's 'excluded' and America's 'underclass' … still be considered part of a 'working class' when that class itself is agonizing, indeed fast disappearing in the form in which we have known it for much of the past century? Do they stand at the fringe of the service (sub)proletariat in an entirely new class constellation? Or are residents of neighbourhoods of relegation located 'outside' the class structure altogether, having fallen into a zone of social liminality wherein a specific social tropism operates that effectively isolates them from others around?"[382]

The depiction of the Kurdish migrants in Turkey has generally complied with the questions that Wacquant proposes above. However, it turns out that the Kurdish migrants of Yenibosna as depicted above are not really outside the class structure or outside the process of small-scale industrialization / informalization altogether. Labelling them as a class or an underclass, furthermore, does not depend on a political tendency, despite the fact that the latter term, "underclass", is a fallacy in itself. Rather, the data presented above shows that the Kurdish migrants are more or

[382] Wacquant, "The Rise of Advanced Marginality…", p. 129.

less regularly[383] inside the labor market and that they, thus, form a significant portion of the informal working class. After all, they are not permanently excluded as such but "integrated" as cheap labor into the capitalist economy.

A crucial question should be raised herein: What is "class formation" as a process in the first place? Katznelson, building upon a historical analysis that seems contemporarily relevant, notes two "objective" and two "subjective" levels.[384] The first of the objective levels pertains to the level of capitalist economic development. Does wage-labor persist? Is proletarianization in its orthodox meaning still relevant? The second of the objective levels refer to work-place relations and the labor market: how does social existence (as a result of capitalist development) develop at work and outside work? The third level or the first subjective level suggests that "classes are formed groups, sharing dispositions", "[sharing] understandings of the system… [and] values of justice and goodness."[385] After all, these dispositions are configurations within which people act. The last level or the latter subjective level pertains to "disposition to behave collectively". This disposition might or might not be translated into "collective action", which occurs "when 'sets of people commit pooled resources', including their own efforts, to common ends."[386] Collective action, furthermore, does not merely pertain to demands for better wages and working conditions; its forms and contents are variable.

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[383] Note that being a member of a class is not a matter of the regularity or the irregularity of labor. This "regularity" is, in fact, emphasized in this thesis to suggest that the forced migrants are not outside the labor market at all.

[384] Ira Katznelson, "Working Class Formation: Constructing Cases and Comparisons," in *Working Class Formation: Nineteenth Century Patterns in Western Europe and the United States*, eds. Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 14-19.

[385] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[386] Ibid., p. 20.

The interaction between these four levels defines class formation. "In this formulation, class formation is not a specific outcome... Rather, the two sets of variation in disposition and collective action at the third and fourth levels of class constitute twin objects of analysis of variations in working-class formation," Katnelzson suggests.[387] The crucial questions to be asked are, thus, as follows:

> "Under what conditions will class-based understandings of social life experience at the second level of class develop? Will these be limited to workplace relationships and to the terms of the demands working people put to their employers, or will they encompass other arenas of social and political life? Under what conditions will working people assert their claims against their employers or their landlords or the state or against other targets within or outside legitimate systems of interest representation?"[388]

Does the case of the Kurdish migrants fit into this framework? Are these questions relevant to the case of the migrants? In other words, are the Kurdish migrants generally confined within the manifestations of the neoliberal capitalist development? Do they share similar working conditions? Do they form a "group" with shared values? Are they disposed to behave collectively?

The answer to the latter four questions above (which respectively overlap with the four levels of class formation Katznelson proposes) is affirmative. The portrayal of the social exclusion of the Kurdish migrants suggested that they are actually "in" the labor market, being congregated in the informal textile workshops; that their working conditions are similar and that they are aware of the generality of the working conditions; that they voice similar demands and notions of justice (i.e.

[387] Ira Katznelson, *Marxism and the City*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 210.

[388] Ibid., p. 210.

demands regarding Kurdishness); they are, indeed, disposed to behave collectively – after all, they perform a major portion of political mobilization in the urban slums.[389]

Furthermore, the Kurdish migrants address the word class not merely in its economic sense but also with its political connotations. Their "proletarianization" has, indeed, affined with (mainly forced) dispossession and informalization of the economy. The end-result is mainly homogeneous: concentration in the lower ranks of the informal labor market – in the case of Yenibosna, the textiles. The experiences are, in short, similar. However, class, in the framework presented just above, is not an economic entity after all. Rather, it also has a political dimension. A significant portion of this migrant group is not really politically apathetic. Rather, voicing similar demands of justice and using the same mobilizing structures (i.e. political parties), they share values of justice and injustice and a repertoire of collective action. The non-economic character of these demands, ie. the focus on Kurdishness, should not conceal the fact that the actors of slum politics have transformed from formal workers to informal workers, a significant portion of which are politically dynamic Kurdish migrants.

Rather than a "class deformation" and the disappearance of the wage-labor, the case of the forced Kurdish migrants actually pertains to the formation of one. The questions Katnelzson proposes above are, thus, relevant. Thus, if the metropolitan slums are "volcanoes" waiting to erupt as Mike Davis labels them, this has to do with the presence of the politically mobile Kurdish workers.

This is not to claim that the working class or the poor have been merely "Kurdified".[390] Rather, this suggests the increasing significance of the Kurds in the

[389] An important note: the utilization of this framework within this study helps not to define the boundaries of a social class but to highlight the distinction of the Kurdish migrants. In other words, "class formation" is not merely about the Kurds at all.

informal labor market – the rate of which this study does not deal with. The significance, thus, lies mainly not in ethnicity or the Kurdification of the labor market but in the increasing politicization which these migrants perform.[391] There is not much "novelty" in the poverty or the exclusion of the Kurdish migrants; the novelty lies in their political mobilization, which takes place within the urban slum and which, besides its contemporary political intentions, holds the possibility for fighting various forms of exclusion. Furthermore, this political mobilization overlaps with the (shared) economic conditions of the migrants. Deploying class and politics as analytical frameworks for understanding the Kurdish migrants is, thus, essential. The issue at hand is, indeed, related to "social exclusion" but actually transcends it.

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[390] See: Erdem Yörük, "Zorunlu Göç ve Türkiye'de Neoliberalizm', *Bianet*, 21.11.2009, [Available] online: http://www.bianet.org/biamag/insan-haklari/118421-zorunlu-goc-ve-turkiye-de-neoliberalizm. For an interview with the writer in question, see "Türkiye'de İşçi Sınıfı Kürtleşti", *ANF*, 01.12.2009, [Available] online: http://www.firatnews.org/index.php?rupel=nuce&nuceID=17765 .

[391] It seems that this fact has started to be seen as a 'security' concern. An interview with an analyst, Erhan Göksel, suggests that more than 50% of the working class is formed by the Kurds. This novel "discovery", the interviewee claims, points to a dangerous possibility: if the PKK and the BDP lay claim to the working class, it will be even worse than armed struggle. See: "Erhan Göksel Giderayak Hükümeti Bombaladı", *Ege'de Sonsöz*, 24.04.2010, [Available] online: http://www.egedesonsoz.com/default.asp?sayfa=haberdetay&part=politika&hID=72670&haber=erhan-goksel-giderayak-hukumeti-bombaladi .

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study has stressed the limits of the "new urban poverty" and (absolute) "social exclusion" in the case of the Kurdish migrants of Yenibosna. Through qualitative research on the Kurdish migrants' economic position, relations with the state, their community and political involvement, the exclusion of the Kurds was scrutinized.

Neoliberal restructuring and the degradation of work have arrived to an extent that a group of permanently unemployed is seriously at hand, the logic of advanced marginality or social exclusion suggested; the Kurdish migrants, because of their abrupt migration pattern, should be the primary bearers of the resulting social exclusion, this logic ensued. This thesis basically went against these assumptions. The Kurdish migrants, indeed, turned out to be occupying the lowest ranks: however, a depiction of their social exclusion as absolute ignores a significant process: class formation. They turned out to be inside the class structure and their "exclusion" resulted from this "integration". While concluding, this thesis will summarize these assumptions and counter-assumptions.

This thesis has started with a general summary of the concept in question and of how the concepts marginality and underclass have lost their dominance as a result of the reign of social exclusion. The global tendencies suggest the convergence of marginality, underclass and exclusion under the fabric of "social exclusion" or "advanced marginality". The distinct features of this advanced marginality were constant unemployment, the degradation / desocialization of labor, deproletarianization, the disappearance of social cohesion and total atomization. A

permanently unemployed underclass, which is isolated from the benefits of a community and from politics, is at hand, this logic suggested. Furthermore, when these pauperized individuals are employed, their employment is casual and irregular. Employment does not pertain to a vital realm in the lives of these individuals.

Then, case studies of exclusion in Turkey were summarized. A common suggestion of most of these case studies was that the forced migrant Kurds are forming a population which was on the brink of being economically, politically and socially excluded to such an extent that they form an "underclass". Economically, they are out of the market, either permanently unemployed or precariously and irregularly employed in the various sectors of the informal labor market; socially, their community has diminished to an extent that networks have disappeared and, worst of all, the state has "left" them; politically, they were isolated from grassroots politics. The forced Kurdish migrants have directly arrived at a place completely unknown to them; thus, they had found it hard to be integrated into the existing social relations. They are floating between unemployment, self-employment and casual, informal work, permanently in need of outside aid.

How did the presented data affirm or reject these assumptions? This thesis did not reject the existence of "social exclusion" in the first place. The Kurdish migrants did not turn out to be using the resources of poverty quite well. They did not integrate into the urban economy by making use of land and labor, i.e. via "poverty-in-turns". Nor did they reap the benefits of a well-established network, as previous migrants. Thus, this thesis did not suggest that exclusion is a myth after all. However, it aimed at "levelling" the social exclusion of the Kurdish migrants by constantly repeating two main counter-assumptions. The former one went as follows: the Kurdish migrants' economic exclusion has not arrived to an extent that they are

either totally or partially excluded from the market. They, after all, were bounded within the capitalist labor market – mainly, though not exclusively, within the textile sector. Their employment was not casual. Rather, they formed a group of regularly working low-income poor. The informal labor market owes its "existence" to the forced Kurdish migrants to a large extent, one could suggest. Exclusion resulted from their integration as cheap labor. The latter assumption suggested the role of politicization; given the high rate of participation of the Kurds in grassroots politics, the Kurds are already engaged in political mechanisms which will suffice to fight various forms of exclusion.

The Kurdish migrants are not really irregularly employed; rather, more or less regularly trapped within the textile sector, with low levels of wages and degrading jobs, they were "inside" the labor market. They turn out to be wage-dependent, not welfare-dependent. Wage-labor persists as the main source of income.

Given the abrupt dispossession from land and the lack of capital of any form, the Kurds are doomed to extreme, jobless poverty, the dominant view suggested. The presented data suggests the possibility of contextualizing the Kurdish migrants within the concept of "class" rather than merely extreme poverty or social exclusion. This distinction is particularly significant and will echo throughout this conclusion.

With the on-set of deindustrialization, neoliberal restructuring and the degradation of (formal) work, a deformation of class is present, it is generally suggested. Can we still speak of a working class as such? After all, the formal rights that were won during the course of class struggle are lost. The formality of labor is gradually replaced with flexible, informal and irregular labor. A "militant" working class, furthermore, seems far from existing.

The case of the forced Kurdish migrants, congregating in the textile sector, however, pertains to a distinct reality. After all, wage-labor still reigns as the primary source of income; labor has not desocialized. In other words, the Kurdish migrants turn out not to be "de-proletarianized". The reverse, "proletarianization", is valid. Thus, most surprisingly, rather than a class deformation, we might actually speak of a class formation. In a period in which no grassroots movements or democratic movements seem to reign, a significant portion of this formed class is marked by its political dynamism. A significant portion of these Kurdish migrants, thus, constitutes this "informal proletariat" which is in constant progress. This political mobility will mark the Kurdish component of this informal class. In other words, "exclusion" is not merely on an objective level, i.e. related to macro-scale developments such as "neoliberal restructuring" but takes place on a subjective level as well. The existence of Kurdish politics testifies to this reality: "political involvement" might not disappear with the fragmentation of labor. Its presence might actually owe to the existence of other agencies as well, i.e. mobilizing structures such as political parties.

Thus, one cannot speak of "informalization / proletarianization" and "political action" within the context of urban slums without reconciling the Kurds with "class". In other words, the Kurdish migrants constitute a "potentially suspicious" or threatening group both remarkable with its economic position and political mobilization. The main actors of politics in urban slums, after all, are these migrants who are generally employed within the manufacturing sector. The actors of grassroots politics have shifted from the "formal" workers to the informal workers, a major component of which is formed by the Kurdish migrants which this study treated as its object of analysis. These workers' politics is not, however, politics in its

classical sense, i.e. politics pertaining to the realm of economic rights. This should not, however, lead one to underestimate the political potential of the migrants in question. After all, "collective action" manifests itself in myriad forms and contents.

The Kurdish migrants are, thus, first and foremost, not politically excluded after all. This is not to say that structural impediments against the demands of the Kurdish migrants do not exist. Rather, this suggestion refers to the "agency" of the Kurdish migrants. Furthermore, their exclusion might be the result of a preferred self- distancing from the state in the first place. They are, indeed, quite organized and mobile although it is not "class consciousness" in its classic and formal sense. This organization and mobility refer to an arena which analyses of class, policies fighting exclusion and of forced migration seem to have ignored. In other words, the forced migration of the Kurds did not merely bring a population to be informalized or proletarianized; it also introduced (or intensified) a politically charged repertoire of collective action within the slums of Istanbul. In other words, despite the legal barriers, the Kurdish workers' mobilization voices demands for recognition. They do not turn out to be passive bearer of exclusion as such. Furthermore, the existence of democratic organizations, whether in the form of political parties or mass organizations, might be a precondition for fighting exclusion in the first place. These organizations or repertoires of collective action, after all, function as a safety net against the "atomizing" effects of the new urban poverty. They function as empowering mechanisms in its political and, to a less significant extent, social sense. Politically, they become the arena of voicing demands, of fighting various forms of exclusion. Socially, they might become the preset of sustaining communities. Hence, these dispositions, experiences and grievances turn out to be shared.

The migrants, however, turn out to be isolated from the state's social policies in the first place. Whether as the result of preferred self-distancing or of the state's own choice, the relationship between the Kurdish migrants and the "hostile" state seems problematic. The migrants reported receiving no aid; some of them did not want aid from "such a state" in the first place. Whether the state will release its "relief rolls" to contain such a "problematic" population remains as an unanswered question. However, social policy, in any form, might not help with regard to this group of politically mobile Kurdish migrants, if one does not take reconciliation with the migrants into consideration. The tension between recognition and redistribution manifests itself herein.

The Kurdish informal workers turn out to be the (legal and, possibly, illegal) actors of grassroots politics, whether through democratic participation in political organizations, attending protests or throwing stones. Without taking this novel form of grassroots politics into consideration, any "class analysis" or "social policy" is doomed to fail.

Furthermore, the forced Kurdish migrants constitute a major portion of the informal proletariat; their precarious economic conditions have not arrived at an extent that they are totally out of the labor market. Rather, being employed in the local textile sector, they function as "cheap labor". Thus, deploying "class" rather than underclass or extreme poverty as analytic tools for understanding the Kurdish migrants seems feasible. After all, a significant portion of this informal class is formed by these migrants; their politicization adds an extra dynamic to this informal class. Thus, the Kurdish issue is not merely an issue of either identity or poverty. It also deserves to be reconciled with the issue of class and politics. On the other hand, class analyses have tended to ignore the Kurdish dynamic in the first place. While a

single “Newroz” demonstration in Istanbul houses as many workers as a May 1 demonstration, the words “Kurds” and “class” are still being used as if having no relation in common. From this suggestion, we come to another: these informal workers, of whose “class position” is dismissed with a heavy focus on their ethnicity and with their demands relating to identity, reside, work and protest within the urban slum. These informal workers’ will not be either “irregularly employed” or “politically apathetic”. They will not be “out” of the labor market. In short, a new generation, which is inside the “system” as it is outside of it, seems to have appeared under the form of an informal class. And the context is the urban slum.

Thus, it seems that one cannot speak of “slum politics” without enunciating the word “the Kurds”. And one cannot speak of class and of informality without referring to the Kurdish migrants and their politics. The moral of this portrayal of “social exclusion” in Yenibosna is as such.

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