

THE IMPORTATION OF OTTOMAN TONBAKU FROM IRAN AND ITS  
SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS: 1891-1914

MEHMET KILIÇ

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

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Mehmet Kılıç

Boğaziçi University

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes Ottoman tonbaku imports from Iran and its socio-cultural implications. This study examines the possibility of success of public economic policies that did not take society and social groups into consideration in the economic decision process within the context of the tonbaku trade. This work takes smuggling as a case to study this argument.

The Ottoman state imported tonbaku from Iran owing to its own low domestic production. Thus, this circumstance led to the domination of Iranian merchants and the Shiite Ulama, who collected religious taxes from this trade, on the tonbaku market in the Ottoman Empire. The state also monopolized the tonbaku trade with Iran to maximize its revenue, giving a concession to *Société du Tombac*, known as the Tonbaku Monopoly, in 1891. The Ottoman government and the Monopoly did not take the merchants and the Ulama groups into consideration in the decision process and preferred to continue a high price policy. However, the establishment of the Monopoly and the price policy contributed to a severe smuggling and consumption of smuggled tonbaku. Thus, the income of the state from the trade decreased. Additionally, the Monopoly was abolished in 1914.

## ÖZET

Bu tezin konusu Osmanlının İnan'dan tonbaku ithalatını ve sosyo-kültürel uzantılarını analiz etmektir. Bu çalışma ekonomik karar sürecinde toplumu ve toplumsal grupları dikkate almayan kamu iktisadi politikalarının uygulanabilme şansını tonbaku ticareti bağlamında inceler. Bu çalışma argümanını araştırmak için kaçakçılığı “olay/sorunsal” olarak alır.

Osmanlı devleti yerli üretimi sınırlı olduğu için İnan'dan tonbaku ithal etmekteydi. Bu durum ise İnanlı tüccarların ve bu ticaretten dini vergiler alan Şii Ulema'nın, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda tonbaku pazarı üzerinde dominant olmalarına neden oldu. Osmanlı devleti ise gelirini arttırmak için İnan'la olan tonbaku ticaretini tekelleştirip bu hakkı Tonbaku Rejisi olarak tanınacak *Société du Tombac* şirketine 1891'de vermiştir. Osmanlı hükümeti ve Reji ekonomik karar alma sürecinde tüccar ve Ulema gruplarını dikkate almamışlar ve aynı zamanda yüksek fiyat politikası sürdürmeyi tercih etmişlerdir. Fakat, tekelin kuruluşu ve fiyat politikası keskin bir kaçakçılığa ve kaçak tonbaku tüketimine neden olmuştur. Böylece, devletin tonbaku ticaretinden gelirleri düşmüş ve Reji de iflas ederek 1914'te lağvedilmiştir.

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## CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER TWO: WATER PIPE CULTURE AND TONBAKU CONSUMPTION.....	4
The Entrance of Tobacco into the Ottoman Empire.....	4
A Temporary Stagnation in Tobacco Consumption.....	6
The Smoking Culture during the Eighteen Century.....	8
Tonbaku Consumption and Water Pipe Culture in the Nineteen Century.....	10
The Bey'eye of Tonbaku a Consumption Tax.....	20
Conclusion.....	22
CHAPTER THREE: DOMESTIC TONBAKU PRODUCTION AND TONBAKU IMPORT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.....	25
Domestic Tonbaku Production in the Ottoman Empire.....	25
Ottoman Tonbaku Import from Iran.....	33
Domination of Iranian Suppliers on the Ottoman Tonbaku Market.....	40
Conclusion.....	46
CHAPTER FOUR: TONBAKU SMUGGLING AND CONSUMPTION OF SMUGGLED TONBAKU.....	49
Izzet Bey's Report Predicting Resistance.....	49
Establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly in the Ottoman Empire.....	52
Samples of the Social Groups' Resistances.....	53
Tonbaku Smuggling.....	59
The Deterministic Effects of Smuggling on Policies of the Tonbaku Monopoly and the Ottoman Government.....	64
The Impact of Smuggling on the Relationship between the Ottoman Government and the Tonbaku Monopoly.....	66
The Consumption of Smuggled Tonbaku.....	69
The Effects of Smuggling on the Bankruptcy of the Tonbaku Monopoly.....	77
The Effects of Smuggling on the Abolition of the Tonbaku Monopoly.....	79
Conclusion.....	81
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION.....	85
APPENDICES.....	91
REFERENCES.....	117

## ABREVIATIONS

- A DVN Sadaret, Divan-I Hümayun Kalemi
- A MKT NZD Sadaret, Mektubi Kalemi, Nezaret ve Devair
- A MKT MHM Sadaret, Mektubi Kalemi, Mühimme
- A MKT DV Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi, Deavi
- A MKT UM Sadaret, Mektubi Kalemi, Umum Vilayat
- A M Sadaret, Müteferrik Belgeler
- A MKT MVL Sadaret, Mektubi Kalemi, Meclis-I Vala
- BBA Başbakanlık Arşivi, Archives of the Prime Ministry, Istanbul
- C BLD Cevdet, Belediye
- C EV Cevdet, Evkaf
- C ZB Cevdet, Zaptiye
- DH İD Dahiliye Nezareti, İdare Kısmı
- DH MKT Dahiliye Nezareti, Mektubi Kalemi
- DH MUİ Muhaberat-I Umumiye İdaresi Belgeleri
- HAT Hatt-I Hümayun
- HR HMŞ İŞO Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Belgeleri
- İ E İrade, Evkaf
- İ EV İrade, Evkaf
- İ HR İrade, Hariciye
- İ HUS İrade, Hususi
- İML İrade, Meclis-I Vala
- İ MVL İrade Meclis-I Vala

İMMS İrade Meclis-I Mahsus  
MAD Maliyeden Müdevver Deterler  
MV Meclis-I Vükela Mazbataları  
Y A HUS Yıldız Tasnifi, Sadaret Hususi Maruzat Evrakı  
Y A RES Yıldız Tasnifi, Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı  
Y MTV Yıldız, Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı  
Y PRK ASK Yıldız Perakende, Askeri Maruzat  
Y PRK AZJ Yıldız Perakende, Arzuhal ve Journaller  
Y PRK BŞK Yıldız Perakende, Mabeyn Başkitabeti  
Y PRK HR Yıldız Perakende, Hariciye Nezareti Maruzatı  
Y PRK UM Yıldız Perakende, Umum Vilayetler Tahriratı  
Y PRK TKM Yıldız Perakende, Tahrirat-I Ecnebiyye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği  
Y PRK ZB Yıldız Perakende, Zaptiye Nezareti Maruzatı  
ZB Zaptiye Nezareti Evrakı

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The Ottoman economy in the nineteenth century is often presented within the theoretical context of globalization. During this age, the Ottoman economy experienced a growth in the value and volume of foreign trade as it integrated into the Western economy. In other words, this circumstance meant the expansion of Western economy into Ottoman territories. International markets and their actors dislocated local ones and their players with this penetration. Thus, this extension led to remarkable shifts in the region's socio-economic and cultural structure.<sup>1</sup>

During the globalization period, the economic integration into the Western economy corresponded with economic restructuring in the Ottoman Empire. The old economic system was restructured in accordance with the Western model. Thus, the central authority improved its power, rationality, and capability of imposing its wants on the society. This was a common goal shared both by the bureaucrats and by the Western economic powers.<sup>2</sup>

Within this framework, the dislocating effects of the globalization on the local markets and their actors, the economically centralizing government, and integration into the Western economic system are given prominence. From

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<sup>1</sup> Donald Quataert, *Social Disintegration and Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire 1881-1908* (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), p. 147. Zafer Toprak, "From Liberalism to Solidarism: The Ottoman Economic Mind in the Age of the Nation State (1820-1920)," in *Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic Life* (Studien zu Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Osmanischen Reich), ed. Raoul Motika, Christoph Herzog, Michael Ursinus (Heidelberg: Heidelberg Orientverlag, 1999), p. 177.

<sup>2</sup> Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) vol:2, p. 762

this point of view, the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade from the late Ottoman Empire period has not been a studied realm of commerce. This is because tonbaku, a variety of tobacco used in water pipe, had a small place in the Ottoman-Iranian relations in terms of both value and volume. That is to say, we are in the dark on the story of tonbaku, which may be defined as the economic, socio-cultural, and even political aspects of this particular trade sector.

In this study, I will examine the applicable possibility of public economic policies that did not take society and social groups into consideration in the economic decision process. I will take smuggling as a case within the framework of the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade from 1891 to 1914 to reveal the reactions of social groups because this is when the Ottoman government monopolized this trade, giving a concession to *Société du Tombac*, a French consortium. Additionally, I will focus on the effects the consumption of smuggled tonbaku had on the smuggling to identify the reactions of consumers to the central economic policies. This work will not be based on the theoretical context of anti-capitalism. It tries to discuss the public policies as the responsibility of the central policy makers.

In this work, archival documents were used to identify the socio-economic aspects of the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade, generally. The documents are in the Prime Ministry Archive in Istanbul. Travel books and memoirs were also used to describe and analyze the cultural features of tonbaku consumption.

This work is divided into three chapters. Chapter 1 descriptively discusses tonbaku consumption as a socio-cultural activity based on the places

where consumption was realized. It also tries hermeneutically to discover ties between consumers and the water pipe within the environment. Last, the chapter takes the state as an actor being included in the consumption process with its socio-economic policies.

Chapter 2 first attempts touch on the reasons why Ottoman domestic tonbaku production remained low to explain the compulsive factors for the dependency of Ottoman market on the import of Iranian tonbaku. From this perspective, the chapter discusses the emergence of dominant social groups in the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade.

The Chapter 3 examines smuggling and the consumption of smuggled tonbaku within the monopolization of the import and sale of Iranian tonbaku in Ottoman territories. This chapter also focuses on the reactions of tonbaku suppliers and consumers against the central economic policies within the economic decision process. Here, it tries to show interactive connections between the suppliers and consumers, taking the price sensitive aspect of the market within the central policies.

In conclusion, this thesis evaluates the obtained results within the framework of the tonbaku market's interactive structure related to consumers, merchants, the Shiite Ulama, the state and culture.

## CHAPTER TWO

### WATER PIPE CULTURE AND TONBAKU CONSUMPTION

This chapter examines water pipe culture and tonbaku consumption. It first tries to specify the entrance process of tobacco into Ottoman territories and analyzes the first opposition to its consumption in the sixteenth century. It then describes the spread of smoking culture as a daily practice in the eighteenth century. Further, it argues that water pipe culture was based on smoking culture. Finally, it scrutinizes the interactive relationships between the meaning of water pipe, consumption activity and the space. Here, it ascribes a special role to women in the spatial spread of consumption. It also takes the consumers and the state as active role players having significant effect on interactive relationships. That is, the state will be taken as a character determining socio-economic policies.

#### The Entrance of Tobacco into the Ottoman Empire

Different dates can be given for distinctive parts of Ottoman territory for when the Ottomans came into contact with tobacco. It was brought over the Indian trade routes into Ottoman Yemen in 1590 and then was carried over to Syrian and Egyptian territories at the end of the 1590s.<sup>3</sup> According to Peçevi, an Ottoman historian, Englishmen first imported it to Istanbul to be used as a

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<sup>3</sup> Relli Shechter, *Smoking, Culture, and Economy in the Middle East* (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2006), p. 16.

remedy for illnesses stemming from humidity in 1600.<sup>4</sup> In brief, the date Ottomans met with tobacco varied from one region to another.

Istanbul can be taken an example of how speedily tobacco consumption spread right after its entry into a certain territory. This was due to the existence of coffeehouses, a wide and large public sphere, which functioned as a marketing channel providing the opportunity for the public consumption of tobacco. Peçevi argues that there were no coffee or coffeehouses in Istanbul until 1554, when Hakem, a tradesman, who was from Aleppo, and Şems, who was from Damascus, opened stores to sell coffee in Tahtakale, and from then on the number of coffeehouses significantly increased, insomuch as some state officials and the ulama also opened coffeehouses.<sup>5</sup> Beyond their function as profit sources, they were centers for chatting, reading books, and poems, playing backgammon and chess.<sup>6</sup> This context not only eased the internalization of tobacco by Ottoman society, but also its internalization provided feedback for the externalization of these practices.

Tobacco consumption demonstrated a very rapid pace of horizontal and vertical spread so that the set of smokers contained a large number of people from all segments of society including ordinary people, state officials, and some of the Ulama.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> İbrahim Peçevi, *Peçevi Tarihi*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1283), p. 365.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 363-364.

<sup>6</sup> Kudret Emiroğlu, *Gündelik Hayatımızın Tarihi* (Ankara: Dost Yayınevi, 2002) p. 450-451. Peçevi, vol. 1, p. 364.

<sup>7</sup> Gelibolulu Mustafa Ali, *Görgü ve Toplum Kuralları Üzerinde Ziyafet Sofraları* (Mevaidü'n-Nefais fi Kavaidi'l-Mecalis), trans. Orhan Şaik Gökyay (Istanbul: 1978), p. 180-181. Peçevi, Vol. 1, p. 365.

## A Temporary Stagnation in Tobacco Consumption

The spread of tobacco consumption encountered some resistances in the seventeenth century. This resistance came from Ulama and central governments. The attitude of the Ulama was divided in two. A group of the Ulama used to smoke tobacco, as already mentioned, and others objected to its consumption. Additionally, the Ottoman governments occasionally prohibited smoking. Such situations caused a stagnation in consumption in the seventeenth century.

In the beginning, the Ulama felt very enthusiastic to argue about and oppose tobacco consumption. Most of them gave sermons and deliver fatwas against it. However, Katib Çelebi supports the idea that they could not develop a common attitude towards whether people should use it or not.<sup>8</sup> For instance, Ibrahim Effendi, one of the ulama, held numerous discussions and gave *fatwas* to prevent its consumption but he was unsuccessful. People persisted in smoking in spite of the Ulama's opposition.<sup>9</sup> When a number of the Ulama attempted to stop people from smoking, some of them claimed it harmless to the health and commenced smoking.<sup>10</sup> In short, they could not create a common reaction.

The state also took some deterrent measures to prevent people from the consumption of tobacco. In 1633, the real reason for the first severe

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<sup>8</sup> Katib Çelebi, *Mizanü'l-Hakk fi İhtiyari'i-Ehakk*, trans. Orhan Şaik Gökyay (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1972), p. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Orhan Şaik Gökyay, *Katib Çelebi: Hayatı, Kişiliği ve Eserlerinden Seçmeler* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), p. 260.

<sup>10</sup> See for discussions and examples: Ahmed Cevdet Paşa, *Tarih-i Cevdet*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat, 1976), pp. 76, 77, and 78.

tobacco prohibition was the Cibali fire in Istanbul. The fire destroyed a vast number of buildings, including baths, houses, and shops. Naima, an Ottoman historian, implies that Sultan Murad IV ordered the closure of all coffeehouses in the Ottoman Empire to remove the possibility of social unrest because the frequenters of the coffeehouses publicly discussed the destructive impacts of the fire on the community despite the central government's concerns.<sup>11</sup> The new Sultan prefers to close the coffeehouses and prohibited tobacco consumption to prevent the possibility of disobedience by the community and to provide authority over society.

The prohibition would be a breakingpoint in tobacco consumption, for the Sultan ordered the execution of a number of smokers and coffee drinkers.<sup>12</sup> The Sultan disguised himself to apply the prohibition in Istanbul, and hunted smokers in the streets and busted the places that sold tobacco at night.<sup>13</sup> That is, fear of the Sultan compelled people not to smoke. Katip Çelebi stated that Murad IV increased the violence of the prohibition so that even some of his soldiers could not secure their lives.<sup>14</sup> Mehmed Halife, an Ottoman historian, claimed that smoking brought about the death of many people and no one knew how many.<sup>15</sup> Finally, consumption moved into a recessive phase, even if it did not totally halt until the beginning of the eighteenth century.

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<sup>11</sup> Mustafa Naima, *Tarih-i Naima: Ravzate'l-Hüseyn fi Hulasat Ahbare'l-Hafikeyn*, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1280), p. 158-161.

<sup>12</sup> Bernard Lewis, *the Middle East* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1995), p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> Jean Thévenot, *1655-1656'da Türkiye*, trans. Nuray Yıldız (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi, 1978), pp 152,153.

<sup>14</sup> Katip Çelebi, p. 32.

<sup>15</sup> Mehmed Halife, *Tarih-i Gilmani*, trans. Ömer Karayumak, (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi), p. 30.

## The Smoking Culture during the Eighteenth Century

In the eighteenth century, the slowdown in tobacco consumption was reversed. Smoking became a common activity in the habitual practices of the Ottoman community in the daily life, beginning immediately after morning coffee and lasting until late night. That is to say, smoking took the form of a sedentary habit by spreading throughout the social base.

D'Ohsson states that long tobacco pipe known as *çubuk* was the most common tool of smoking in this century. He continues stating that the Ottomans produced the pipes' handles generally from the wood of trees such as jasmine and rose, and adorned them with gold and silver. Furthermore, tobacco consumption was not constrained to male consumers. It included female consumers also. Wealthy women used pipes adorned with precious stones, whereas ordinary women were contented with simple ones.<sup>16</sup> Here, we can feel that women constituted a remarkable subgroup of tobacco consumers. Tobacco consumption with long pipes seems to have reflected the gender, social strata, and pleasures of consumers.

D'Ohsson also indicates that the pipes were the ultimate and undisputed tools of smoking in homes, e.g., offering pipes to visitors was a tradition in Ottoman society.<sup>17</sup> After the meal, hosts first offered coffee and then pipes to all visitors. Probably home was the most convenient places for smoking in wintertime.<sup>18</sup> In brief, smoking became part among the routine activities of daily life.

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<sup>16</sup> M. de M. D'Ohsson, *XVIII Türkiyeşinde Örf ve Adetler*, trans. Zerhan Yüksel (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi), p. 62.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid*, p. 63.

Smokers did not leave home without their pipe and tobacco, for they smoked not only at home but also in streets, coffeehouses, and excursion spots. Especially, going to coffeehouse to smoke was a common activity among men. There, everybody started smoking his pipe joyously in the early morning.<sup>19</sup> D’Ohsson says that a Muslim who lit his pipe after having a cup of coffee sitting in meadow under a tree was the happiest man in the world.<sup>20</sup> In brief, when people internalized smoking to relax and for pleasure, tobacco externalized them to consume it in different parts of the public places.

Coffeehouses commenced became the undisputed place for smoking and for discussing political thoughts and gossip in the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>21</sup> They were places where workers, tradesmen, and travelers relaxed and chatted.<sup>22</sup> Mary Montague narrates interesting impressions about coffeehouses. She describes that a coffeehouse typically was composed of a big saloon where there were benches and its floor was covered with carpets. She reports that habitués drank coffee and smoked water pipes sitting on the benches.<sup>23</sup> Tonbaku, a variety of tobacco, also began to be used with water pipe.

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<sup>18</sup> François Baron De Tott, *Türkler ve Tatarlara Dair Hatıralar (Memoires sur les Turcs et les Tartares)*, trans. Mehmet Reşat Uzmen (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi), p. 57.

<sup>19</sup> Francisco Miranda, *Venezualla’lı General Miranda’nın Türkiye’ye Dair Hatıratı*, trans. Fuad Carım. (Berksoy Matbaası, 1965), p. 74.

<sup>20</sup> D’Ohsson, pp. 63-64.

<sup>21</sup> Fikret Sarıcaoğlu, *Kendi Kaleminden Bir Padişahın Portresi: Sultan I. Abdülhamid (1774-1789)*, (Istanbul: Tarih Ve Tabiat Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), pp. 248, 249, 250.

<sup>22</sup> BBA, C ZB 48/ 2351, C EV 408/20662.

<sup>23</sup> Mary Montague, *1717-1718’De Türkiye*, trans. Reşat Ekrem Koçu (Istanbul : Çığır Kitabevi, 1939), pp. 11, 15.

Tobacco mostly was used in coffeehouses and on the streets in the eighteenth century. In addition, women also began to use tobacco widely with the dissemination of smoking. Additionally, the second half of the eighteenth century was a transition period for smokers to shift from the usage of long pipes to water pipes.

### Tonbaku Consumption and Water Pipe Culture in the Nineteenth Century

#### Tonbaku

First, we should introduce tonbaku and specify its difference from ordinary tobacco, known as tütün. It had a stronger taste than tütün. It was used with a water pipe to cut its harmness in the water.

Tonbaku was brought from Iran into the Ottoman territories. It was produced in the southern Farsistan and Isfahan regions of Iran.<sup>24</sup> The best known kinds were Şiraz, Isfahan and Keşan tonbakus. Each kind had a specific taste and its own habitués in the Ottoman community.<sup>25</sup> It is clear that Ottomans labeled these kinds according to the places where they were cultivated.

In the nineteenth century, tonbaku was widely consumed in the Ottoman community by using water pipe.

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<sup>24</sup> M. L. Tomara, "Tobacco and Other Cash Crops 1890s," in *the Economic History of Iran*, ed. Charles Issawi, (Chicago and London: the University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 250.

<sup>25</sup> Sadri Sema, "Nargile," in *Ehlikeyfin Kitabı*, ed. Fatih Tıǧlı (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), p. 382.

## The Water Pipe and Its Connotations

The Persians invented a water pipe, known as *kalyan* in the Persian language and *nargile* in the Ottoman language, in the early seventeenth century. The second half of the eighteenth century was the specific period when the Ottomans commonly began to use water pipes. Then water pipes, which filtered and cooled *tonbaku* which has a stronger taste than other tobacco varieties, became the most popular tool for smoking in the nineteenth century. Both Arabs and Turks produced water pipes domestically, adorned them with flower and fruit motifs, and decorated them with gold and silver.<sup>26</sup>

The components that make up a water pipe are as follows: a head (*ser*), a bowl for *tonbaku* (*lüle*), an elastic tube (*marpuç*), a bottle (*şişe*), and a mouthpiece (*ağızlık*). The head assembled on the bottle is the long body of the water pipe. The bowl is filled with *tonbaku* and ash is located on it. The elastic tube, which takes smoke from the bottle and delivers it to user's mouth, is a hose. The bottle is filled with water to cool the *tonbaku*'s smoke. The mouthpiece is affixed to the elastic tube to allow inhaling the smoke. Balıkhane Nazırı Ali Rıza states that the habitué himself put together those parts in the coffeehouse, paying attention to the most important points to derive the highest pleasure from smoking the delicious *tonbaku*.<sup>27</sup>

We can interpret several features of some artistic water pipes, which Nargileci Musa Halil sold, to see the clues of their meaning for the water pipe

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<sup>26</sup> A. Esat Bozyiğit, "Nargile," in *Ehlikeyfın Kitabı*, ed. Fatih Tığlı, (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), p. 394.

<sup>27</sup> Balıkhane Nazırı Ali Rıza, *Bir Zamanlar İstanbul*, ed. Niyazi Ahmet Banoğlu (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi), p. 71.

habitué.<sup>28</sup> The first one was gilded and had a silhouette like an artichoke, a silver head, a pink bottle, and a silver mouthpiece. Its shape at first glance gave the impression of nature, which made the water pipe addicts free from anxieties about their personal and social lives. The second one is described as a simple tulip with a silver head and it was adorned with navy blue flowers drawn on its bottle. It is possible to observe that this one also implied tulips and pleasures of the Ottoman Tulip Age to relax the water pipe habitués, as if the joyful character of this age was embodied symbolically in it. The others had similar features, which tried to externalize the addicts so that they could internalize and feel the pleasures of the outer world.

We should try to interpret symbolic meanings of the water pipe. In addition, we can seek to understand the concept of pleasure (keyif). In his travel book, *Istanbul*, Edmondo de Amicis defines keyif as the biggest pleasure of the Ottomans' bodies and souls, which revealed their nature and philosophy. He made this definition according to an Ottoman taking of keyif while using water pipes.<sup>29</sup> We can reach an interpretation that the water pipe was a tool for seeking keyif for a habitué.

#### The Position of Coffeehouses in Tonbaku Consumption

Coffeehouses spread throughout every part of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century. Undoubtedly, they were the most important places for the use of water pipes in that century. There had to be water pipes in the

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<sup>28</sup> BBA, Cevdet İktisat, 1202.

<sup>29</sup> Edmondo de Amicis, *Istanbul*, trans. Beynun Akyavaş, (Ankara : Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1986), p. 424.

coffeehouses to offer someone who wanted to smoke tonbaku. In this respect, I will seek to examine the importance of coffeehouses in tonbaku consumption.

It is possible to give Istanbul as an example for specifying the significance of coffeehouses. The coffeehouse was a place through the dissemination of which water pipe culture was developed. However, during the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839), the central government closed some coffeehouses, especially those along the Bosphorus coast preferred by the Janissaries, because they became the center of opposition to new foundations after the abolition of the Janissary army.<sup>30</sup> We can predict that a contraction took place in the development of water-pipe culture and naturally in the consumption space of tonbaku with the closedown of coffeehouses in Istanbul.

Another important subject is that in the 1850s, both Muslim and non-Muslim opened new coffeehouses in cities, towns, and villages in different regions of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>31</sup> The number of such coffeehouses continued to increase especially from the 1880s to the 1890s.<sup>32</sup> By building them in the gardens, employers sought to attract water pipe habitués and provide them a natural place to feel the pleasure deeply. Communal differences also had a prominent effect on the preference for coffeehouses at the beginning of the 1900s because people of the same community would gather in same coffeehouses.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> François Georgeon, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Son Döneminde İstanbul Kahvehaneleri," in *Doğu'da Kahve ve Kahvehaneler* (Istanbul : Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), p. 45. BBA, C ZB 14/698. Salah Birsal, *Kahveler Kitabı* (Istanbul : Koza Yayınları, 1975), p. 19,

<sup>31</sup> BBA, A MKT DV 121/36, A MKT UM 500/88, A DVN 136/12.

<sup>32</sup> BBA, DH MKT 1349/87, 1499/96, 1585/25, 1577/3, 419/47, 2146/32.

<sup>33</sup> BBA, ZB 375/80, 634/16.

There happened an event exemplifying the social function of water pipes offered in the coffeehouses. An angry dispute between Ahmed, who was a coffeehouse operator, and Yusuf Andorya, who was a Christian merchant from Beirut, gives some clues about this function in Tarsus in 1861. Andorya wanted Ahmed to prepare a water pipe with tonbaku, but Ahmed said that he could not get it until he had paid his debt, and then quarrel was taken to court. There was a tobacconist, a water seller, a grocer, a common day laborer, and merchants, all of whom were from different parts of the Empire, among witnesses in the coffeehouse.<sup>34</sup> The use of tonbaku habitué gathered both Muslims and non-Muslims from different professions in the same place. Habitué could easily access water pipes whenever and wherever they wanted due to the wide coverage area it reached through coffeehouses in both the cities and smaller towns.

The governments' policies had important impacts on the position of coffeehouses in tonbaku consumption. Though Sultan Mahmud II had outlawed many of them, later governments encouraged the building coffeehouses. Even a number of them belonged to the state. The government gave them for rent at a public auction for a year in the 1860s.<sup>35</sup> The state encouraged the smoking culture to spread within the Empire in parallel with the consumption of tonbaku.

Gerard de Nerval's observations also contain interesting information about the life in coffeehouses in Istanbul. He went with Iranians to a coffeehouse which was at the back of Bayezit Mosque and which was

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<sup>34</sup> BBA, A MKT MVL 147/36.

<sup>35</sup> BBA, A M 26/26, A MKT DV 122/14, İ MVL 585/26326, A MKT UM 500/88.

especially preferred by foreign merchants. Nerval said that the owners of coffeehouses offered water pipes to customers as soon as they sat. Meddah, a kind of storyteller, told his stories, and habitués read their newspapers. Nerval's words imply that foreigners who visited Istanbul for trade or other reasons witnessed a well-defined water pipe culture.<sup>36</sup> Also foreigners in Istanbul preferred this coffeehouse where resigned habitués were lost deep in thoughts to seek keyif by looking at the smoke coming out of the bubbles of water pipes.

Furthermore, the socializing effects of the water pipe on foreigners can be observed. Its use became popular among foreigners who visited coffeehouses. As an example, Pretextat Lecomte says that some European habitués especially preferred Tophane and Petits-Champs coffeehouses to smoke water pipe each day in Istanbul at the end of the nineteenth century.<sup>37</sup> That is, the water pipe caused Europeans to integrate into Ottoman society.

The decoration of coffeehouses also had important effect on the preference of water pipe addicts because they paid attention to the comfort of coffeehouses in order to feel the keyif. Balıkhane Nazırı Ali Rıza states that some coffeehouse floors were covered with carpets. The others were furnished with cedar on which cushions and pillows were put.<sup>38</sup> Habitués gurgled in the water of water pipes until they became lost in sleep and until the time reached

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<sup>36</sup> Gerard De Nerval, *Doğuya Seyahat*, trans. Muharrem Taşcıoğlu (Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1984), p. 95.

<sup>37</sup> Pretextat Lecomte, *Türkiyede Sanatlar ve Zeneatlar: Ondokuzuncu Y.Y. Sonu*, trans. Ayda Düz (Istanbul : Tercüman Gazetesi), p. 187.

<sup>38</sup> Balıkhane Nazırı Ali Rıza, p. 69.

five in the morning in such places.<sup>39</sup> It may be said that habitués lived in an artificial world in coffeehouses, far from the problems of the real world.

It can be argued that tonbaku consumption also was effective on the formation and differentiation of social groups by means of coffeehouses in the Ottoman community because people who had the same profession or those who belonged to same social groups gathered in the same coffeehouses. Members of fire brigade and stokers, for instance, went to their own coffeehouses. There were such places in Aksaray, Divanyolu, Tophane, Şehzadebaşı, Direklerarası, Galata and along Bosphorus coasts in Istanbul.<sup>40</sup> Porters who worked in quays such as in Eyüp also preferred their coffeehouses to relax and to use water pipe.<sup>41</sup> Thus, they could become easily contactable for employers by having a stable position. We can advocate that coffeehouses fulfilled a market function gathering both producers and consumers in the same place for the labor market. In brief, the social stratum and professional differences were effective on habitués to prefer a coffeehouse.

To specify the locations of coffeehouses in cities may reveal some clues about the social groups who consumed tonbaku. There were coffeehouses near mosques, monasteries and those that belonged to vaqfs. Especially, religious people preferred such places where the water pipe offered them a mystical ambience.<sup>42</sup> Dervishes also were assiduous habitués of

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<sup>39</sup> BBA, ZB 12/110.

<sup>40</sup> Balikhane Nazırı Ali Rıza, p. 146. Nerval, p. 79.

<sup>41</sup> BBA, DH MKT 1257/65.

<sup>42</sup> BBA, İ DF 6/1315 Za-05, İ EV 24/1317 N-03, İ EV 53/1329 Za-03, DH TMİK S 35/90, DH MKT 2002/35, 2222/83, 2323/65, 2296112, 2356/79, 2366/33, İ AZN 27/1315 R-11, HR HMS İŞO 145/43, İrade Evkaf 1322. S. 17/9, 1326. B. 13/9.

coffeehouses in the neighborhood of their convents.<sup>43</sup> Müsahipzade Celal also confirms that there were numerous such coffeehouses in Istanbul.<sup>44</sup> Here, it seems that the use of water pipe disseminated among different religious groups by means of coffeehouses. It presented a variety of abstract tastes and flavors to people belonging to various social groups of spiritual and religious dispositions.

To provide social control, the central governments constantly observed coffeehouses before and after the proclamation of the Second Constitution in 1908. According to them, the surveillance was the result of moral necessities both during the reign of Abdulhamit II before 1908 and in the period of the Committee of Union and Progress after 1908.<sup>45</sup> Actually, their real goal was to avert opposition movements against their administrations. From here, the central governments were not pleased with coffeehouses, where political thoughts formed and developed at the beginning of twentieth century. In this respect, it is possible to support the idea that water pipe culture as one of the reasons for coffeehouses to exist had a supporting impact on the accumulation of thoughts shaping the Ottoman political organizations. However, we should emphasize that the Ottoman governors did not restrict the use of water pipe in both periods.

### The Position of Women in Tonbaku Consumption

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<sup>43</sup> BBA, ZB 355/66.

<sup>44</sup> Müsahipzade Celal, *Eski İstanbul Yaşayışı* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 129. BBA, ZB3 75/45.

<sup>45</sup> BBA, ZB 352/41, DH MKT 989/21, DH MUI 92-1/14.

Women used water pipes. Some instances are available about women who used them even if it was not possible to determine how wide the usage of water pipe spread among them. Amicis observed that women used water pipe with rosewater in their houses in Istanbul.<sup>46</sup> In his long biography in which he narrated the habits in Nablus, Muhammed Izzet Derveze said that women used water pipes in their homes with their husbands.<sup>47</sup> We can conclude based on narrations of Amicis and Derveze that women participating in water pipe habitués increased tonbaku consumption and enlarged places where tonbaku was consumed.

It is possible to find places where the most women used water pipes in the Ottoman provinces. The vicinity of Baghdad had a special place for water pipe in smoking culture because women constituted an important part of water-pipe users there. Ali Bey felt that the use of water pipe was more prevalent than tobacco in this region. He added that women generally smoked water pipes, and that they carried their water pipes with them when they visited each other and went to the bath or excursion spots. Ali Bey also said that he met women who earned money selling bowls of water pipes.<sup>48</sup> It seems that tonbaku consumption broadened in the Baghdad region owing to the fact that Baghdad had been a center for tonbaku and Iranian tonbaku merchants since 1750s, as it will be discussed in the third chapter. In addition to this, the center of Shiite Islam, Atabat, containing Necef, Kerbela and Kazimeyn

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 255.

<sup>47</sup> Muhammed Izzet b. Abdülhadi b. Derviş Derveze, *Müzekkîratu Muhammed Izzet Derveze*, Vol. 1, (Beyrut: Dârü'l-Garbi'l-İslâmi,1993), p. 108.

<sup>48</sup> Ali Bey, *Lehçetü'l-Hakayık*, trans. Şemsaddin Kutlu, (Istanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi), p. 254-255.

,where a large number of Shiite visitors came from Iran bringing with them their tonbaku, was in that region. At the same time, women widened consumption space for tonbaku by adding baths and excursion spots to it. They engaged in some economic activities by selling parts of water pipes.

Abdul-Aziz Bey told that there were water pipes in houses of wealthy people to offer them to visitors who preferred to smoke tonbaku. To prepare it was the duty of Tütüncübaşı Ağa.<sup>49</sup> It may be concluded that their existence in homes added to women's inclusion in habitués. As a result, it can be argued that smoking became a custom among daily home practices.

Women used water pipes in places other than baths, excursion spots and their homes. Even if it is not known whether there were coffeehouses for females only, it is possible to find some women who owned coffeehouses. It is interesting because owners of coffeehouses generally were men. To specify some exceptions instances are available such as Zeyneb Hatun, Nefise Hatun, Ayşe Hanım, and Ayşe Zekiye Hanım.<sup>50</sup> In other words, there were women who not only smoked tonbaku, but also owned coffeehouses. Furthermore, there also were non-Muslim women owning coffeehouses. Hence, we can claim that women took an active role in the economic aspect of smoking phenomenon. To sum up, tonbaku consumption became a socializing tool for women and, probably, an indirect reason orienting them toward working life.

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<sup>49</sup> Abdülaziz Bey, *Osmanlı Adet, Merasim ve Tabirleri*, ed. Kazım Arısan-Duygy Arısan Günay (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2002), p. 181. Dorina L. Neave, *Eski İstanbul'da Hayat*, trans. Osman Öndeş (İstanbul: Tercuman Gazetesi, 1978), p. 59.

<sup>50</sup> BBA, A MKT DV 217/12, 90/93, A MKT UM 2141/46, 251/89, DH MKT 2565/91, İ ŞE 15/1319. Ş. 02.

## The Bey'ıye of Tonbaku a Consumption Tax

Bey'ıye was a kind of consumption duty collected from tonbaku stores and peddlers in the Ottoman Empire. The collection of this duty for the first time came onto the agenda at the beginning of the 1860s in Baghdad. At that time, tobacco imported from Iran had reached huge amounts in that city. The officials of the Baghdad Customs Administration (Baghdad Rüşumat Emaneti) asked the central government to ban the import of Iranian tobacco, for the loss to the state budget in 1860 was about 50,000 kese per annum according to their calculations.<sup>51</sup> Upon the government's approval, bey'ıye was decided to be levied on Iranian tobacco rather than increasing custom tariffs. Since tonbaku was classified as a variety of tobacco, its prices were also affected by this new tax regulation.

On 10 January 1862, the first bey'ıye was collected from store owners and peddlers who sold tobacco, snuff, and tonbaku while tonbaku consumption gradually was increasing in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>52</sup> The bey'ıye was 100 piatres for peddlers, 30 percent of the annual rents for stores the annual rent of which was greater than 333 piatres, and 100 piatres for stores annual rent of which was less than 333 piatres in Istanbul.<sup>53</sup> However, in other provinces, it was collected as 30 percent of annual rents from stores and, in equal parts, 50 piatres from peddlers and stores the annual rent of which was less than 50

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<sup>51</sup>BBA, MAD. d, 12846, no. 259, p. 1.

<sup>52</sup>BBA, A MKT MHM 242/66. İhsaiyat-ı Maliye (Maliye İstatistikleri): 1885-1909 (Ankara: T.C. Maliye Bakanlığı Araştırma, Planlama ve Koordinasyon Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2000), p. 208.

<sup>53</sup> This new regulation also necessitated storeowners to get a license for selling.

piatres.<sup>54</sup> So, the government had a new fiscal resource that would not be affected by fluctuations in the sales volume of tonbaku.

The Administration of Ottoman General Debts, which was founded with the Muharrem Decree in 1881, collected the tonbaku bey'iyeye until 1883.<sup>55</sup> The Debts Administration reordered the bey'iyeye for the stores selling tonbaku by classifying cities: 150 piatres from stores in first class cities, 100 piatres from those in second-class cities, and 50 piatres from those in third class ones.<sup>56</sup> The government sought to guarantee its income by adjusting the taxes to rents instead of taxing the commodity itself. At the same time, the Administration intended the taxes to be at low levels to encourage tonbaku consumption and increase number of tradesmen by classifying the cities. Thus, by supporting the tonbaku sellers, it planned to enlarge the market locally and to make it accessible to more consumers.

The Ottoman government allocated the tax revenue of tobacco to the Ottoman Debts Administration. On 27 May 1883, the Administration established Société de la Régie Cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman, the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly, to gain control over the tobacco market and increase its consumption.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the government divided the bey'iyeye tax into two parts: The Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly collected the first one from the native tonbaku while the central government collected the second part from

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<sup>54</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, vol. 1 (Dersaadet: Matbaa-i Osmaniye, 1911), pp. 640, 641.

<sup>55</sup> İhsaiyat-ı Maliye ve Mesarif-ı Umumiye 1325-1326 (Istanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1327) , p. 203. Donald C. Blaisdell, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Avrupa Mali Denetimi: Duyunuumumiye*, trans. Ali İhsan Dalgıç (Istanbul: Doğu-Batı Yayınları, 1979) p. 95.

<sup>56</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Düstur* 2<sup>nd</sup> Series, p. 642.

<sup>57</sup> Baisdell, p. 108.

foreign tonbaku mostly imported from Iran.<sup>58</sup> This arrangement implies that the Ottoman state wanted to reserve the income from Iranian tonbaku for its budget and to create a resource to match current expenses.

### Conclusion

The entrance and wide consumption of tobacco by large social groups in the Ottoman Empire started at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In the first half of the seventeenth century, tobacco consumption was exposed to fierce opposition by the state and the ulama. However, smokers' enthusiasm overcame the oppositions and smoking spread vertically and horizontally within social strata. Thus, the way to a traditional smoking culture was made.

In the eighteenth century, smoking emerged as a common activity as part of habitual practices of daily life. That is to say, smoking became a sedentary element of lifestyle gaining a social base. In this era, the long pipe (çubuk), an indicator of gender and social stratum, was the most relevant means for smoking. The second half of the eighteenth century was a transition period from çubuk to water pipe, namely, from tobacco to tonbaku.

Tonbaku consumption increased in the second half of the eighteenth century. This was a cultural shift grounded on the traditional smoking culture. The most important engine of this change was the water pipe. It was an instrument to discover and feel the pleasure (keyif). Additionally, its artistic shape and decoration served this purpose for habitués. That is, there was a

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

close relationship between the smoker and the water pipe because a part of the keyif that was felt with tonbaku consumption was embodied in it.

There were not only male but also female water pipe users. Women used the water pipe with rosewater and took it with them when they went visiting. They also attempted to figure out and to touch the keyif by means of it.

In the nineteenth century, there was a strong and close relationship between tonbaku and where it was consumed. Consumption space for tonbaku included homes, baths, excursion spots, and coffeehouses. Women had a special role in the enlargement of this space because they took their water pipes with them to places where they actualized their daily routines and used the water pipe with their husbands in their homes.

The most crucial part of the consumption space was the coffeehouse in the nineteenth century. There had to be water pipes to present for habitués. The Ottoman government in general encouraged these places with the exception of the reign of Mahmud II. There were not only private coffeehouses but also public ones opened by the vaqfs and monasteries in the first half of the nineteenth century. These places served people belonging to different social strata and communities. Their number increased after the 1880s. In the beginning of the 1890s, coffeehouses spread from cities to villages. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the government attempted to keep them under control to secure its authority over society. At this time, it was possible to see the effect of water pipes on the accumulation of thoughts and the shaping of political oppositions. In brief, consumption space like baths, homes, excursion spots, and coffeehouses was an important layer of the tonbaku

market. At the same time, in the nineteenth century, the above-described space provided a socio-cultural base for the tonbaku market.

There was a direct proportionality between the size of this space and the size of demand for tonbaku. That is, generally, when the consumption space enlarged, the demand increased and when it was decreased, the demand decreased. In addition, this space provided natural advertisement both for tonbaku consumption and for use of water pipe. For instance, the introduction of the bey'eye in 1862 by the state following the enlargement of consumption space after the 1850s reveals that consumption also increased in conjunction with the enlargement of space. The bey'eye used to be collected from the tonbaku stores. Thus, the burden of the duty was loaded on the sellers instead of on consumers in 1883. That is, the state planned to increase the demand.

## CHAPTER THREE

### DOMESTIC TONBAKU PRODUCTION AND TONBAKU IMPORT OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

This chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Ottoman domestic tonbaku production and the tonbaku import from Iran. I will first try to specify why the tonbaku production was low and link this to the dependence of the Ottoman market on the Iranian tonbaku. I shall offer an examination of the Ottoman tonbaku import in the historical process. The chapter also attempts to take this dependency as a reason leading to the emergence of two active groups, the Iranian merchants and the Shiite Ulama. Additionally, it tries to analyze these groups as effective and interactive actors of the tonbaku trade and the market.

#### Domestic Tonbaku Production in the Ottoman Empire

Ottomans consumed tonbaku from the second half of the eighteenth century. However, tonbaku agriculture remained very low. The factors that kept Ottoman domestic production from spreading will be discussed.

Table 1  
Regional Comparative Production For Tonbaku in kg 1908-1909

Districts	1908		1909		1908=100
	kilo	%	kilo	%	
Bagdad	238,656	54.2	434,479	64.6	182.1
Aleppo	191,429	43.5	0	0.0	0.0
Beirut	7,945	1.8	235,950	35.1	2,969.8
Aydin	1,351	0.3	1,182	0.2	87.5
Ankara	303	0.1	0	0.0	0.0
Midilli	153	0.0	51	0.0	33.3
Trabzon	100	0.0	70	0.0	70.0

Adana	84	0.0	343	0.1	408.3
Istanbul	80	0.0	66	0.0	82.5
Total	440,101	100.0	672,141	100.0	152.7

Sources: 1908: Maliye Nezareti İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1326 (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1329)

1909: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 3. Sene 1327, (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1330.), p. 68.

Looking at the above table, one can see that there was domestic production in some provinces. Tonbaku production was realized almost entirely in three provinces. Although nine provinces produced tonbaku in 1908, this number remained limited to just four in 1909. According to Table 1, the domestic production was realized in Baghdad, Beirut, Aleppo, and to some degree in Aydin.

Table 2  
Regional Production For Tonbaku As Acre (1908 and 1909)

	1908		1909		1908=100
	acre	%		%	
Aleppo	4782	64.7	0	0.0	0.0
Bagdad	2428	32.8	4332	45.4	178.4
Beirut	139	1.9	5148	54.0	3,703.6
Aydin (Izmir)	33	0.4	42	0.4	127.3
Ankara	7	0.1	0	0.0	0.0
Midilli	2	0.0	1	0.0	50.0
Trabzon	2	0.0	3	0.0	150.0
Adana	1	0.0	7	0.1	700.0
Istanbul	1	0.0	3	0.0	300.0
Total	7395	100.0	9536	100.0	129.0

Sources: 1908: Maliye Nezareti İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1326, (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1329)

1909: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 3. Sene 1327, (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1330.), p. 68

As can be seen in Table 2, approximately two-thirds of the cultivated lands were in the Aleppo region in 1908, with the rest in the Baghdad region.

Table 3  
Spatial Distribution for Domestic Tonbaku Production

	1908				1909			
	kilo	%	acre	%	kilo	%	acre	%
Adana	84	0.02	1	0.01	343	0.05	7	0.07
Ankara	303	0.07	7	0.09	0	0.00	0	0.00
Aydin	1,351	0.31	33	0.45	1,182	0.18	42	0.44
Bagdad	238,656	54.23	2,428	32.83	434,479	64.64	4,332	45.43
Beirut	7,945	1.81	139	1.88	235,950	35.10	5,148	53.98
Aleppo	191,429	43.50	4,782	64.67	0	0.00	0	0.00
Istanbul	80	0.02	1	0.01	66	0.01	3	0.03
Midilli	153	0.03	2	0.03	51	0.01	1	0.01
Trabzon	100	0.02	2	0.03	70	0.01	3	0.03
Total	440,101	100.00	7,395	100.00	672,141	100.00	9,536	100.00

The difference between the cultivated lands and the harvest provides clues about the variable structure of productivity in the tonbaku production.

Table 3 shows the productivity levels.

Table 4  
Regional Productivity For Tonbaku As Kilo per Acre

Districts	1908		1909		1908=100
	Kilo per acre	%	Kilo per acre	%	
Adana	84.0	141.1	49.0	69.5	58.3
Ankara	43.3	72.7		0.0	0.0
Aydin	40.9	68.8	28.1	39.9	68.7
Bagdad	98.3	165.2	100.3	142.3	102.0
Beirut	57.2	96.0	45.8	65.0	80.2
Aleppo	40.0	67.3		0.0	0.0
Istanbul	80.0	134.4	22.0	31.2	27.5
Midilli	76.5	128.5	51.0	72.4	66.7
Trabzon	50.0	84.0	23.3	33.1	46.7
Total	59.5	100.0	70.5	100.0	118.4

Source: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 3. Sene 1327, (Istanbul, Matbaa-I Amire, 1330), p. 68.

The levels of production indicate that the plantings were to meet individual demands.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, this circumstance partly changed and market-oriented production largely replaced it. A very limited domestic crop was sent from the port cities, particularly Latakia and Beirut, to foreign countries, although tonbaku production in Syria could not supply the demands of native consumers in the eve of the 1850s.<sup>59</sup> At the same time, the holding of a public auction every year for Lebanese tonbaku also supported market-oriented cultivation in Beirut. The Beirut administration, for instance, assigned domestic tonbaku to a contractor in payment for 500,000 piatres at a public auction in 1903.<sup>60</sup> Contractors conveyed the commodity of native producers to the merchants; that is to say, their existence indicates the connection between tonbaku producers and merchants.

#### Comparison between Tobacco and Tonbaku Production

We can relate the limitation of tonbaku in its totality to the position adopted by Ottoman governments. In the early times, the government made domestic tonbaku dependent on the tobacco (duhan) transactions owing to low-level production. With the establishment of the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly in 1883, the government transferred the control of domestic tonbaku to the monopoly.<sup>61</sup> The Debts Administration sought to specialize in

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<sup>59</sup> BBA, DH İD 215/8. Charles Issawi, *the Fertile Crescent* (New York-Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 298.

<sup>60</sup> BBA, DH MKT 634/22.

<sup>61</sup> BBA DH MKT 1828/66. Haydar Kazgan, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Şirketleşme* (Creative Yayıncılık, 1999), p. 111. Fatma Doğruel-Suut Doğruel, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Tekel* (Istanbul: Tekel, 2000), p. 66.

and to provide full control over the domestic tobacco through the monopoly.<sup>62</sup>

On the other hand, the Ottoman Treasury continued to receive income from the bey'ıye duty of the domestic tonbaku. Nevertheless, in 1888, the Ottoman

Debts Administration took the bey'ıye of native tonbaku under its control.<sup>63</sup>

This date marks the loss of the total control the Ottoman government had over the domestic tonbaku. From this, we can conclude that the central governments did not generally support tonbaku agriculture and production.




Figure 1: *Duhan* Tax (1859-1881).<sup>64</sup>

It was impossible for tonbaku to compete with tobacco in the domestic production. Tonbaku could never surpass the two per thousand of tobacco tithe. In addition to this, generally the tobacco tithe steadily increased although tonbaku tithe could not hold a periodic stability. Its increase remained undermined by the tobacco. At first glance, it can be guessed that this was

<sup>62</sup> Behzat Üsdiken, *Pera ve Beyoğlu'nda Bankalar, Bankerler, Sarraflar, Tefeciler, Kuyumcular* (Creative Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 176.

<sup>63</sup> BBA, MV 14/35. Mehmet Hakan Sağlam, *Osmanlı Borç Yönetimi: Düyun-ı Umumiye 1879-1891*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007), p. 127.

<sup>64</sup> See for quantities of the annual *Duhan* taxes: Tefik Güran, *Osmanlı Mali İstatistikleri Bütçeler 1841-1918* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 2003).

related with production. In reality, it is not wrong to say that it originated in the price instability.

We can exemplify the weightiness of the taxation on the general production with the tax increase in 1904. The Assembly of Representatives (Meclis-i Vükela) accepted the decision of the Monopoly to collect four piatres per kilo from domestic tonbaku production with the suggestion of the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly in 1904. The Monopoly also agreed to give 45 paras of four piatres to the Ottoman treasury.<sup>65</sup> Thus, the Tobacco Monopoly started to collect both this tax and the tonbaku tithe from native producers. At the same time, this application meant the equalization of the taxes collected both from the domestic product and from the foreign one. This decision meant a significant burden for the producers considering they paid only two piatres 30 para prior to the decision.<sup>66</sup>

On the other hand, the Meclis-i Vükela postponed its decision on the increase of the above-mentioned tax for Aydin. The cultivation of tonbaku in Aydin started in the early 1900s, and its production average reached 33 tons in 1905. The producers in Aydin resisted the newly increased tax amounting to four piatres per kilo, as they could not pay it, since they already produced it at the cost of 3-4 piatres and sold it for 6-7 piatres to merchants at most.<sup>67</sup> The downturn in the tonbaku production in Aydin can be explained by a possible smuggled production in this province.

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<sup>65</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 1<sup>st</sup> Series, vol. 8, p. 238-239. BBA, MV 108/65.

<sup>66</sup> BBA, DH MKT 1142/47.

<sup>67</sup> BBA, İ ML 1323 Ra/9.

Tracing the echoes of taxations imposed by the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly half a century before, one can easily detect the producers' discontent about it. When the Adana Monopoly administration tried to collect four piatres per kilo from domestic tonbaku beyond the tithe, the producers sent a common petition in 1895 to the central government against the monopoly, arguing that if the monopoly collected this amount, they would be reduced to extreme poverty.<sup>68</sup> We do not have sufficient documents about whether or not the monopoly realized its attempt. However, that this subject is mentioned in the 1904 agenda leads us to think that the monopoly was unable to convince the government. Consequently, this event implies a possibility that the weightiness of taxes began to feed the smuggled production in the domestic tonbaku. Additionally, we can argue that the Ottoman governments might have condoned the smuggled production, since the income of domestic tonbaku belonged to the Ottoman Debts Administration.

The Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly made the same offer to the central government about the domestic tonbaku produced in Baghdad. Yet the producers similarly opposed the decision, arguing that the production would decrease after this increase in the tonbaku price.<sup>69</sup>

We can guess that the increase of the tonbaku cost was reflected its market price. Table 5 presents a comparison between tobacco and tonbaku tithes between 1900 and 1909.

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<sup>68</sup> BBA, DH MKT 436/70.

<sup>69</sup> BBA, DH MKT 1232/70.

Table 5:

Comparison between Tobacco and Tonbaku Tithes				
Years	Tobacco Tithe		Tonbaku Tithe	
	Piatres	1900=100	Piatres	1900=100
1900	24,321,360	100.0	11,314	100.0
1901	21,686,770	89.2	22,563	199.4
1902	17,914,893	73.7	28,032	247.8
1903	15,354,000	63.1	22,897	202.4
1904	21,575,166	88.7	20,103	177.7
1905	24,754,424	101.8	31,460	278.1
1906	26,074,448	107.2	33,591	296.9
1907	29,540,200	121.5	34,708	306.8
1908	40,577,434	166.8	16,906	149.4
1909	56,265,853	231.3	71,139	628.8

Source: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 3. Sene 1327, (Istanbul, Matbaa-i Amire, 1330.), p. 70.

The most striking thing about Table 5 is the remarkable increase in the amount of tonbaku tithe between 1908 and 1909. The increase in the tonbaku production was approximately 53 percent. The tithe collected, on the other hand, increased about 337 percent. This last raise also indicates that prices increased

$$P_{1326,1327} = \frac{(628.8-149.4)/149.4}{(672.1-440.1)/440.1} \equiv 2.86 \quad [1]$$

manifold because the tithe duty was taken as piatres. This circumstance suggests that the market was open to speculation because the producers and merchants, whose number was limited, monopolized the tonbaku trade.

Consequently, a stable structure was not constituted in the domestic tonbaku production limited to a few provinces. Domestic tonbaku could not

take its place on the market. The producers in the few provinces only had connections with the merchants to market their commodities. Additionally, the Ottoman central governments remained unwilling to support the domestic tonbaku production controlled by the Tobacco Monopoly attached to the Ottoman Debts Administration after the 1880s. As a last word, the limited Ottoman tonbaku production was the main reason for the Ottoman consumer's dependence on Iranian tonbaku.

### Ottoman Tonbaku Import from Iran

We have already indicated that the Ottoman domestic production was insufficient to meet the needs of consumers. Naturally, the Ottoman tonbaku market depended on foreign tonbaku imported from Iran. Generally, Iranian merchant merchants began exporting tonbaku to the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the eighteenth century.<sup>70</sup>

Tonbaku transactions were handled as a part of tobacco (duhan) transactions in the Ottoman Empire, since it was seen a kind of tobacco in the 1750s. However, it was labeled as different from the tobacco and was levied on a first new customs tariff at the rates of 12, 15, and 24 akçes in accordance with tonbaku kinds in 1762. The differing rates of the tariffs were determined in accordance with the quality of the tonbaku. In contrast to this, the tariff collected from the tonbaku kinds imported into the Ottoman Empire was fixed at the rate of 24 akçes per a kıyye disregarding any difference in quality.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> Fehmi Yılmaz, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Tütün: Sosyal, Siyasi ve Ekonomik Tahlil 1600-1883", (Ph.D. diss., Marmara University, 2005), p. 248.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 248.

Thus, tonbaku tariff took its place in the budget income of the Ottoman treasury.

The government's attempts to increase the budget share in the tonbaku tariff would continue from 1790s to the 1810s. Iranian merchants exported tonbaku to Baghdad possibly by paying 4 percent customs tariff according to the 'ahidname's, which were arranged in 1794. 'Ahidname's gave permission to foreign merchants to import tobacco with a low-level customs tariff. Other merchants brought it from Baghdad into Aleppo and Damascus by paying a domestic tariff complying with the Interior Customs System. The Ottoman central government rearranged this tariff three times before 1813, and the third arrangement was determined at the rate of 3 percent. The increase in the interior tariff between 1791 and 1813 was 100 percent, namely, 48 akçes per a kıyye.<sup>72</sup> In short, the Ottoman government encouraged the merchants to import the tonbaku by holding the tariffs given by the Iranian merchants at a low level, while it sought to raise the interior tariffs paid by the merchants carrying it from Baghdad to different parts of the Empire to escalate the state revenue.

The Ottomans pursued the stimulation policy for the Iranian merchants to import the tonbaku, for they excluded it from the other tobacco kinds though they escalated the tobacco tariffs at the rate of 100 percent to raise a new army after the abolition of the Janissaries in 1826.<sup>73</sup> They

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, pp. 249, 250.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p. 250. *Türkiye'de Tütün*, (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Bankası), p. 12. Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi 1500-1914* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p. 199.

protected the newly improving tonbaku trade from the adverse financial effects of the centralization policy.

Iranian merchants increased their control on the tonbaku trade in the 1820s. They captured the trade of the Tabriz-Erzurum route and, they wanted to pay customs tariff at the rate of 4 percent as they did in Baghdad. However, the Ottoman government determined it as 48 akçes for the tonbaku brought to Erzurum.<sup>74</sup> The revival of this route paralleled with the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. After occupying Egypt, Napoleon tried to capture the Syrian region. This circumstance led to a military alliance between the Ottoman Empire and England endeavoring to prevent threats by France to India.<sup>75</sup> The security of the southern tonbaku trade routes was severely impaired by the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars; thereby the northern trade ways gained importance.

With the 1838 commercial treaty, the tariff on the tonbaku was arranged as 5 percent, after the arrangement determining it as 4 percent in 1830. This tariff continued without change until 1850, when the Ottoman government decided to collect a 5 percent customs tariff from the foreign tobaccos after 20 percent decrease.<sup>76</sup> Although a 5 percent increase offered advantages to foreign merchants against native ones, it meant at least a 1 percent rise for the Iranian tonbaku merchants.<sup>77</sup> However, the application of

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<sup>74</sup> Fehmi, p. 249.

<sup>75</sup> Mister George Yanc, *Tarihu Mısr: min Ahdi'l-Memalik ila Nihayeti Hukmi İsmail*, trans. Ali Ahmed Şükri, (Kahire: Mektebetu Medbuli, 1996), pp. 42, 44, 45.

<sup>76</sup> Fehmi, p. 252.

<sup>77</sup> Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisi ve Dünya Kapitalizmi* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınevi, 1984), p. 20.

tonbaku tariffs, which changed from one region to the other, continued in spite of all the arrangements.

The tobacco supply on the market increased after the 1860s, especially because of the imported Iranian tobacco in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. For instance, in the Baghdad region, the tobacco supply reached such a level that the native cultivators could not sell their products owing to reduced prices in 1860.<sup>78</sup> The reason Iranian tobacco experienced decrease in tobacco cost was the low-rate tariffs collected from the current market price of tobacco. The ratio of tariff on Iranian tobacco and tonbaku, for instance, was 4 percent in the Baghdad region. The circumstance in the Baghdad province required measures to protect native cultivators.

A new tobacco regulation was proclaimed to protect native producers in 1862. The regulation prohibited the import of raw tobacco and gave permission to import manufactured tobacco by levying a 70 percent tariff. Additionally, it determined the customs tariff on the Iranian tonbaku at the rate of 75 percent.<sup>79</sup> The Ottoman government abstained from the ban of tonbaku to increase the income of the state budget because native cultivators could not meet the demands of the domestic market.<sup>80</sup> Increased tonbaku tariff was not applied in every part of the Ottoman territory, at least not until the 1870s.

On 19 December 1875, the central government totally prohibited the import of tobacco from Iran into Ottoman territories when it levied a new tariff at a rate of 75 percent on the net value of Iranian tonbaku brought both by land

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<sup>78</sup> BBA, MAD.d, 12846, No: 259, p. 1. Issawi, p. 180-181.

<sup>79</sup> BBA, A MKT UM 574/8, 574/67, 569/75. Doğruel, p. 46.

<sup>80</sup> BBA, A DVN 161/70, A MKT NZD 250/23, A MKT UM 463/27, A MKT MHM 213/15, 214/99.

and by sea. Iranian merchants had to weigh their tonbaku and to pay the customs tax in the Customs Administration at the borders or at the ports.<sup>81</sup> This decision was embodied in the trade agreement signed between the Iranian Embassy and the Ottoman Empire on 1 January 1876. We can conclude that the Ottoman government made such an arrangement not only to reinforce native cultivators by prohibiting tobacco import but also to provide cash to meet its current expense by the increasing tonbaku tariff.

The Iranian embassy objected to the application of the agreement, arguing that different customs taxes had to be determined in accordance with different prices of the tonbaku kinds, such as Isfahani, Kaşani and Şirazi; because they argued that the difference in quality of the different tonbaku kinds could lead to an escalation in the taxing of poor ones. But the Ottoman government simply rejected the Embassy's claim.<sup>82</sup>

The Ottoman government's real goal in such a discussion was to equalize the customs tariff levied on the Egyptian tonbaku at the same rate, 75 percent, as that of the Iranian one partly because of the fact that the Egyptian government decided to collect 20 piatres per kıyye from the Ottoman tobacco exported to its country.<sup>83</sup> Thus, the Egyptian tonbaku could not contribute to a decrease in the price of Iranian because if the prices reduced, the demand for Iranian tonbaku would decrease, resulting in a decline in state revenue.<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>81</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM 478/2. Republic of Turkey, *Düstur* 1<sup>st</sup> Series (Istanbul-Ankara: Başvekalet Neşriyat ve Müdevverat Dairesi Müdürlüğü, 1289-1322), pp. 326,327.

<sup>82</sup> BBA, İ HR 270/16235.

<sup>83</sup> BBA, Y A RES 38/11, A MKT MHM, 465/21.

<sup>84</sup> BBA, İ HR 270/16235, 1.

The other issue included the agenda was the Tabriz-Erzurum-Trabzon trade route significant for tonbaku trade in the 1870s. This way revived in the 1830s with the advent of steam navigation between Trabzon and Istanbul through to Izmir and low of transport costs.<sup>85</sup> However, the Trabzon route lost its importance after the revival of Poti route, a Trans-Caucasian trade route, in the 1860s because, according to the Ottoman Customs Administration, the Ottoman government applied a transit tax (müruriye) at the rate of 1 percent from the commodities passing from Trabzon to Iran, but Russia did not.<sup>86</sup> Discussions about the revival of the Trabzon route against the Poti way continued from the end of the 1870s until the early 1880s.

The Iranian business transactor (karperdaz) in Erzurum proposed that the Ottoman government should not tax Iranian commodities passing from Trabzon in transit. He also suggested that the 12 percent export tariff collected from Ottoman commodities exported to Iran should be decreased to a rate of 1 percent to resurrect the Tabriz-Erzurum-Trabzon route against the Poti route, as the income of exported goods into the Iran was just around 128,000 piatres in 1877. In the same direction, the customs tariff applied to Iranian goods passing through the Ottoman lands in transit would be decreased as the Iranian goods exported into the Ottoman Empire and those in transit paid a 6 percent tariff. Thus, the Ottoman government planned to attract the Iranian tonbaku merchants to the Trabzon route, since with the tonbaku imports increasing, a 75 percent tariff would already be collected even if the taxes to the Iranian

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<sup>85</sup> Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade Route 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 1, no. 1 (January 1970), p. 18.

<sup>86</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM 460/6.

commodities in transit were abolished.<sup>87</sup> The Consul of State decided to decrease the transit tariff and export duty from 12 percent to 1 percent in 1883.<sup>88</sup> This indicates that the Ottoman government tried to increase the tonbaku supply to compensate for its loss in decrease of transit and export tariffs by reviving the Tabriz-Trabzon route against the Russian Trans-Caucasian trade routes.

The volume of the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade began to grow after the 1880s. The Ottoman government attempted to make more profit from this growth by raising customs tariff. In 1880, the Iranian and Ottoman governments signed a new trade treaty, according to which customs tariff would be collected at the rate of two piatres per kilo. After a year, the volume of tonbaku import into the Ottoman Empire reached some 4,000 tons. This growth contributed to the renewal of the trade contract. Thus, the customs tariff was increased from two to three piatres per kilo. State revenue also became 30,000 liras from the tonbaku customs with the new tariff.<sup>89</sup> It appears that the Ottoman government, which had previously encouraged the tonbaku trade by holding tariff rates at a low level, then increased the customs tax to obtain more profit in parallel with the enlarging tonbaku trade during the 1880s.

In 1891, the Ottoman and the Iranian governments renewed the 1882 tariff without changing the tariff of three piatres per kilo. The resumed tariff

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<sup>87</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM 487/62.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> BBA, Y A RES 56/64-1,4. *The Levant Herald and Eastern Express*, vol. 9, No. 19, p. 220.

remained in force for nine years.<sup>90</sup> We can assert that the goal of the Ottoman government was to ensure stability in the volume of tonbaku import from Iran, as the volume of importation had remained around 4,000 tons since 1882. If the customs tariff were to be increased, this size could decrease due to smuggling.

### Domination of Iranian Suppliers on the Ottoman Tonbaku Market

#### Iranian Tonbaku Merchants

We first encountered Iranian tonbaku merchants in the first half of the eighteenth century. The Iranian merchants imported tonbaku over the trade routes passing from the Persian Gulf to the Baghdad region until the 1750s.<sup>91</sup> They started to become effective on the Iranian-Ottoman tonbaku trade in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. For instance, they captured control of the Tabriz-Erzurum tonbaku route in the 1820s.<sup>92</sup>

We encounter a number of Iranian merchants starting to settle down in different parts of the Empire, especially in cities and sub-districts, opening up tonbaku stores in the Ottoman Empire since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In Istanbul, the number of such merchants jumped from 100 in 1851 to

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<sup>90</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 1<sup>st</sup> series, vol. 6, pp. 955-956.

<sup>91</sup> Fehmi, p. 248.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid*, 249.

400 in 1892.<sup>93</sup> They used muleteers to carry the commodities to the cities in which they had settled in.<sup>94</sup>

Many Iranian tonbaku merchants both imported the tonbaku from Iran into the Ottoman provinces and sold it in their own stores. For instance, the officials of the Baghdad Customs Administration asked the central government to collect the bey' iye duty from them, for the loss of state budget was at the rate of 50,000 kese per year according to their calculations in 1860.<sup>95</sup> It can easily be concluded that Iranian merchants owned tonbaku stores in the Baghdad region as the stores paid the bey' iye tax. Additionally, they maintained their connection with the Iranian producers.

The era when the Iranian merchants were most effective on the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade was after 1870s as they also acted as negotiators in the trade agreements between the Iranian and Ottoman governments. When the Ottoman government increased the tonbaku customs tariff, fixing it as 75 percent in 1875, Hacı Muhammed Bakır Ağa, Hacı Resul Ağa and Kerbelalı Ağa Baba, as respected Iranian tonbaku merchants in the Ottoman Empire, entered into negotiations between two countries, asking the Ottoman government to determine different prices for different kinds of

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<sup>93</sup> BBA, A MKT UM 122/20. Han Melik Sasani, *Payitahtın Son Yıllarında Bir Sefir*, trans. Hakkı Uygur, (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2006), p. 212. Zekeriya Kurşun, "Üsküdar'da İranlılar ve İran Mezarlığı," in *Üsküdar Sempoiumu IV 3-5 Kasım 2006*, ed. Coşkun Yılmaz (Istanbul: 2007), p. 196.

<sup>94</sup> BBA, A M 5/31. Mohammad Reza Nasiri, *Nasirettin Şah Zamanında Osmanlı-İran Münasebetleri 1848-1896* (Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Culture of Asia and Africa, 1991), p. 95.

<sup>95</sup> BBA, MAD. d, 12846, no. 259, p. 1.

tonbaku 1876.<sup>96</sup> This illustrates that some notable tonbaku merchants recognized by both countries had emerged.

In another case of group reaction of merchants against the Ottoman government owing to the increased tariff in 1875, the Iranian merchants maintained that the government had to abolish this duty because it would contribute to an injustice with heavy and increased customs tariff.<sup>97</sup> However, the Ottoman government replied that the bey'iyeh was a different tax from the customs tariff and was only collected from stores and peddlers.<sup>98</sup> Following this, the Ministry of Finance closed the stores of Iranian merchants who resisted paying the tariff.<sup>99</sup> Two conclusions can be drawn of this event about the position of the merchants and that of the government: The tonbaku merchants not only imported commodities from Iran, but also sold it in their own stores in the Ottoman Empire, growing stronger and more effective in time. Second, the Ottoman state remained powerful and decisive against the merchants. Along with this attitude, it chose to put the burden on foreign merchants rather than increase the consumer prices.

#### Shiite Ulama

The Shiite Ulama had an important political and socio-economic role in the regions in which Shiite populations lived in the nineteenth century.

There was a cohesion between the ulama and the state in the time of the Safavid dynasty. However, the unity between the Shiite ulama and the state

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<sup>96</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM 478/2.

<sup>97</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM, 481/43.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

<sup>99</sup> Han Melik Sasani, p. 203.

broke down after the collapse of Safavids because the Qajars excluded the ulama from the economic and political decision mechanisms in the nineteenth century. The most important reason for this was the Western impact on Iran and England and Russia's position against the ulama. For instance, the Western powers were willing to gain political and economic control of the state at that time. They obtained considerable power through political and economic privileges during the reign of Nasreddin Shah.<sup>100</sup> The ulama objected to the concessions granted to the agents of the Western capitals because the European economic expansion weakened the ulama's economic and political abilities. The Reuter concession can be taken as an example of the ulama's position on Western capitalism. They led protests against the concessions of railway and natural sources taken by Baron du Reuter in lieu of £ 40,000 until the Shah annulled it.<sup>101</sup> In brief, the waves of capitalism and their exclusion from the state core to its sphere caused the ulama to regain the power they had held in the times of the previous dynasty.

The other orienting reason for the Shiite ulama to reclaim their economic and political efficiency was the centralization of the Iranian state. The centralizing policies corresponded with the European influence, resulting in repression of the people and pushed them to side with the ulama.<sup>102</sup> The attempts of reforms and innovations serving centralization contributed to the ulama's oppositions, by which they objected to state policies in favor of the

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<sup>100</sup> Muhammed Ahmed Penahi Simnani, *Nasreddin Şah: Feraz ve Furud-ı İstibdad-ı Sunneti der İran* (Tehran: İntişarat-ı Numune, 1377), p. 243.

<sup>101</sup> See for detailed information, Abbas İkbâl, *Tarihu İran ba'd el-İslam: min Bidayeti'd-Devleti't-Tahirîyye hatta Nihayeti'd-Devleti'l-Kacariyye*, trans. Muhammed Alauddin Mansur (el-Kahire: Darü's-Sikafeti ve en-Neşri ve et-Tevzi', 1989), pp. 826, 827, 828.

<sup>102</sup> Mazlum Uyar, *Şii Ulemanın Otoritesinin Temelleri* (İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları, 2004), p. 201

people. That is to say, they preferred to move together with the people against the central government's policies to provide a social basis for their oppositions.

The capability of the Shiite ulama to be effective on social events originated in the creation of a politically and economically centralized structure. The fields in which the Shiite mujtahids were involved were redefined by Şeyh Muhammed b. Bakır en-Necefi known as Necefi (1787-1849) and Murtaza b. Muhammed Emin el-Ensari et-Tusteri en-Necefi known as Murtaza Ensari (1799-1864). Especially these two mujtahids renewed the principles of Shiite Islam leading to centralization.<sup>103</sup> Necefi supported the idea that the mujtahids had to collect religious taxes such as humus in the name of the head of the ulama.<sup>104</sup> Thus, this event would lead to the effective use of the ulama's authority over the Shiite society. Additionally, this centralization meant the constitution of a hierarchical structure in the ulama. This circumstance characterized the role of the ulama in the social events such as the tobacco and tonbaku protests in 1891 and 1892.

The religiously controlled area by the Shiite ulama started in the Ottoman Empire and went beyond the Iranian borders. The center of this area was Atabat composed of Najaf, Samarra, Kazimiya, and Karbala in the Iraq region of the Ottoman lands. Atabat became a center for the Usuli School, which advocated a political role for the ulama during the nineteenth century.<sup>105</sup>

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p. 228.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, p. 229.

<sup>105</sup> Gökhan Çetinsaya, "The Caliph and Mujtahids: Ottoman Policy towards the Shiite Community of Iraq in the Late Nineteenth Century," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4, (July 2005), p. 561

In brief, the ulama represented a centralized autonomous group which was free from Iranian control.

One of the financial resources of the Shiite ulama was vaqf lands. These properties constituted a very important category of land in Iran. The incomes of vaqfs were devoted to religious and charitable purposes such as feeding the poor and supporting students in madrasahs.<sup>106</sup> The properties of the vaqfs were prevalent in provinces such as Isfahan and Shiraz, where tonbaku was cultivated and there was a close relation between the ulama, the merchants, and the producers. These provinces exported tonbaku into the Ottoman territory and would play an important role in the tonbaku protests.<sup>107</sup> These revenues flowed through to central administrative city region of the ulama, Atabat, to be used for the mentioned purposes.<sup>108</sup>

The religious taxes such as humus were other income sources for the ulama. The merchant and artisans gave an important part of this revenue to the ulama. That is, the ulama lived their gold age with the rise of the commercial activities in the nineteenth century, as there was a directly proportional relationship between the trade and the ulama's income. For instance, Murtaza Ensari, chief mujtahid, annually took 200,000 tuman, which was 1/15 of the Iranian budget in the 1850s.<sup>109</sup> Mirza-yı Şirazi (1815-1895), chief mujtahid, was also sent special appropriations of revenue per year from Iran at the

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<sup>106</sup> A. K. S. Lampton, *the Persian Land Reform 1962-1966* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 27.

<sup>107</sup> Heidi Walcher, "Isfahan," in *Encyclopedia Iranica* ed. Ehsan Yarshater (New York: Encyclopedia Iranica Foundation, 2006), pp. 660, 665,666. BBA, Y A RES 56-64.

<sup>108</sup> BBA, YPRK.AZJ. 31-8.

<sup>109</sup> Faleh A. Cabbar, *Irak'ta Şii Hareketi ve Direniş*, trans. Hikmet Halis (Istanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2003), p. 203-204.

beginning of the 1890s.<sup>110</sup> According to the governor of Baghdad, Hüseyin Refik, he spent the revenues especially to pay the wages of the Shiite students at Atabat.<sup>111</sup> The religious taxes and their importance provide us with accurate and appropriate diagnostic tools about the position of the Ulama in the tonbaku protests.

### Conclusion

The Ottoman domestic tonbaku production was low because a stable structure had not been constituted. This circumstance continued during the second half of the eighteenth century. With the establishment of the Ottoman Debts Administration in 1881, the Ottoman government remained unwilling to support the native tonbaku production and continued its encouragement for the import from Iran. The Debts Administration founded the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly to control the Ottoman tobacco and tonbaku production. Tonbaku agriculture was pursued in a few provinces but far from fulfilled the demand of the Ottoman consumers during the first decade of the 1900s. Naturally, the Ottoman tonbaku market depended on foreign tonbaku.

The Ottoman governments encouraged the import of tonbaku from Iran owing to its low domestic production in the second half of the eighteenth century. However, they increased the interior customs tariff a few times from 1791 to 1813. Stimulating policies repeated in 1826 when the Janissary army was abolished because no shift had occurred in the tariff though the tobacco tariff was increased at a rate of 100 percent to raise a new army. In the 1820s, the tariff showed a slight rise for the tonbaku passing over the Tabriz-Trabzon

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<sup>110</sup> BBA. Y.MTV. 73-71.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

route, revived after the Napoleonic wars. In 1838, the tonbaku tariff showed only a 1 percent increase. This tariff continued without any changing until the 1850s. We observe a shift in the Ottoman customs policy in 1862 because a 75 percent increase in the tariff started to be applied in several regions and was generalized in 1875. Thus, the Ottoman government preferred to raise its income from the tonbaku import from Iran. After 1880, it followed the same way and increased the tariff from two to three piatres as the volume of import grew. The government did not change this, to ensure stability in profits until 1891.

The dependence of the Ottoman market on the Iranian tonbaku led to the Shiite Ulama and the Iranian tonbaku merchants becoming significant actors in the Ottoman tonbaku market. The Iranian merchants had imported tonbaku from Iran to the Ottoman territory since 1750s. Their weightiness began to be felt in the 1820s when they gained control of the Trabzon-Tabriz route. They both imported tonbaku and opened stores in the Ottoman Empire after the 1850s. They also had an effective role on the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade as they were invited for the determination process of customs tariff in 1875. After this date, they also opposed the rising tariff by the Ottoman government. Their number was 400 just in Istanbul in 1892. They seized full control of the tonbaku trade by the end of the 1880s.

The Shiite ulama also were an important social group included in the tonbaku market. The ulama lost their efficiency in the period of the Qajar dynasty in Iran. They were taken from the center of the state to the periphery. They founded a hierarchical system and centralized by resettling in Atabat in Iraq. This structure became a proper means in establishing their ability to

foster common reactions through social events such as the tonbaku protest. It is possible to argue that they were active agents in production, as they owned extensive vaqf lands in Iran. The properties of the vaqfs were concentrated in provinces such as Isfahan and Shiraz, where tonbaku was produced and there was a close relation between the ulama and the merchants. These provinces exported tonbaku into Ottoman territory and would play an important role in the tonbaku protests. The volume of Isfahan's export into the Ottoman provinces was more than 50 percent of the Iranian total tonbaku export into the Ottoman Empire in 1891.<sup>112</sup> That is, Iraq was a religious center while Iran was an income source. Additionally, they had close interactive relationships with merchants because they collected religious taxes from the agricultural production. The ulama took the important part of their revenue from merchants. The value of such income was at the rate 1/15 of the Iranian budget in 1850. That is, the ulama lived their golden age with the rise of commercial activities in the nineteenth century because there was a directly proportional relationship between trade and the ulama's income. Naturally, they wanted the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade to be controlled by the Shiite merchants. At the same time, they wanted the merchants to become an active part of the Ottoman tonbaku market. In short, the religious taxes provide us with the proper diagnostic tools to understand the position of the Ulama in the tonbaku protests. The ulama and the merchants made a common profit from tonbaku trade.

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<sup>112</sup> BBA, Y A RES 56/64.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### TONBAKU SMUGGLING AND CONSUMPTION OF SMUGGLED TONBAKU

This chapter analyzes the possibility of success of the public economic policies that did not take society or social groups into consideration. The chapter attempts to take the smuggling and the consumption of smuggled tonbaku as a case within the framework of the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade in its historical process. First, it focuses on the background of the public economic policies and explores the policy makers' ability to predict the possible results of such policies. Additionally, this chapter pays special attention to the reactions of the society and social groups against public policies, and examines their diagnostic effects on them. Last, the chapter takes the Shiite ulama and the Iranian tonbaku merchants as social groups and consumers and society as well as the state as an actor in the tonbaku market.

#### Izzet Bey's Report Predicting Resistance

First, the process that led Izzet Bey, the minister of Ottoman Internal Customs, to prepare a report will be discussed. In March 1890, the Iranian government granted a right of monopoly to Major Gerald Talbot, a British capitalist, to sell, export, and control the Iranian tonbaku and tobacco in Iran. Thus, the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia was founded to carry out the mentioned works.<sup>113</sup> In April 1891, both the Iranian government and the Persian Monopoly offered a proposal to the Ottoman government to establish a

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<sup>113</sup> A. K. S. Lambton, "the Tobacco Régie: Prelude to Revolution I," *Studia Islamica* vol. 22 (1965), p. 120.

tonbaku monopoly which would enjoy the right of Iranian tonbaku import exclusively.<sup>114</sup> They also suggested that 30 paras per kilogram should be the price to be charged by the monopoly. The Iranian side was planning to dislocate active social groups who governed Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade in order to make more profit. They also aimed at preventing tonbaku smuggling from Iran into Ottoman lands. The Ottoman government estimated the amount of smuggled tonbaku to exceed 1,000 tons a year in 1891.<sup>115</sup> The Ottoman cooperation was a vital prerequisite for the realization of the Iranian side's purposes.

On hearing the Iranian side's suggestions, the Ottoman government started to discuss widely the possibility of establishing a tonbaku monopoly. On November 11, 1891, the Ottoman government assigned Izzet Bey to prepare a report concerning a concession to bring Iranian tonbaku into the country. He listed his suggestions in the report, foreseeing that to pursue public economic policies excluding society and social groups would lead to the emergence of resistance against the Tonbaku Monopoly, which would be established, and the government.

In his report, Izzet first discussed how consumers and merchants in the tonbaku market would react to such policies. He thought that the Ottoman government would have to fix the market price of tonbaku with the Tonbaku Monopoly, which would be established if the concession was given. He continued, adding that the Ottoman government should consider taking the purchasing power of consumers into consideration while determining the

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<sup>114</sup> BBA, Y A HUS 255/65.

<sup>115</sup> BBA Y A RES 56/64.

market price of tonbaku. Besides, he noted that the average sale price of tonbaku was around 3-4 piatres in the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire although it was 7-8 piatres among merchants before the subject of establishing a tonbaku monopoly arose. He pointed out that if the government fixed a selling price of more than 7-8 piatres, it would oppress consumers. He advises that the price be at most around 7-8 piatres.<sup>116</sup> Izzet predicts that if left to itself, the Monopoly would insist on an oppressive, high-price policy. Thus, Izzet felt that the government had to be involved in the price determination process.

Izzet also paid attention to the behavior of consumers, explaining how consumers would behave when they heard of the establishment of a Tonbaku Monopoly and how they were expected to react. Indeed, Ottoman consumers had stocked a large quantity of tonbaku to meet their two-year needs in fear of a monopoly being established after the foundation of the Persian Tobacco Monopoly. Naturally, tonbaku was in the black market now, so prices increased. For instance, the tonbaku price among merchants was around 18 piatres when its selling price was around 23 piatres per kilo.<sup>117</sup> However, these prices were artificial and temporary because they would drop to their previous level, according to Izzet. If current black market prices were taken as a basis to fix the price, consumers would incline towards smugglers after they consumed their stocked tonbaku because they preferred the cheap smuggled tonbaku over the expensive product sold by the Monopoly. In the end, the state treasury's income from tonbaku would decrease. In brief, Izzet argued that the Ottoman

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<sup>116</sup> Ibid.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

government should fix the selling price of tonbaku at between three and eight piatres in order not to lose the favor of consumers.

#### Establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly in the Ottoman Empire

Société du Tombac, a French consortium, applied for the concession to be known as the tonbaku monopoly. It appears that the Ottoman government evaluated this application to be in favor of the Empire because the state treasury would gain a new income source and make more profit from the tonbaku trade. Sadrazam Ahmed Cemal Paşa and Nazif Efendi, the Minister of Finance, in the name of the Ottoman State and Vicomte George de Zogheb in the name of Société du Tombac signed the contract on 1 December 1891.

According to the convention, the Ottoman government gave the right of import and sale of the foreign tonbaku to Société du Tombac, which thereafter was known as the Tonbaku Monopoly, for 25 years. The government agreed to take three piatres per kilo for the first nine years, four piatres per kilo for the second nine years and 4.5 piatres per kilo for the next seven years as tariffs.<sup>118</sup> The Tonbaku Monopoly agreed to pay 40 paras per kilo for amounts less than 4,000 tons and pay 50 paras per kilo for over 4,000 tons as monopoly taxes to government. In addition, the Monopoly was expected to pay at least 36,000 OLs. We can see that the Ottoman government made a comprehensive bargain to guarantee its profit. The Ottoman governments would help the Monopoly by preventing smuggling. In the Ottoman Empire, only people who were licensed by the Tonbaku Monopoly would be able to import and sell. The government and the Tonbaku Monopoly

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<sup>118</sup> BBA, Y A RES 56/64.

fixed selling prices in the contract.<sup>119</sup> The government planned to control the price policy to be followed by the Monopoly.

The Tonbaku Monopoly signed a similar convention with the Shah of Iran on 26 December 1892. The Monopoly obtained the right of tonbaku export into the Ottoman Empire for 25 years. According to the convention, the Iranian government would take a five percent duty from tonbaku exported to the Empire. The Iranian government was to receive £ 13,500 per annum for three years, £ 15,000 per annum for the next six years, and £ 20,000 per annum for the last sixteen years of the concession time.<sup>120</sup>

The Monopoly would import the tonbaku from Iran into the Ottoman Empire without any mediator. Thus, both the Iran and the Ottoman states gained a new income source. In addition to the tariffs, these treaties meant that both states would share or totally confiscate the income of local groups in the market.

#### Samples of the Social Groups' Resistances

Different social groups such as the Iranian tonbaku merchants and the Shiite ulama benefiting from the tonbaku trade tried to be included in the decision-making process before and after the establishment of the Monopoly because the rights taken by the Monopoly were strongly related to them, as discussed in Chapter Two. However, the decision makers took neither the merchants nor the ulama into consideration. Naturally, both of them preferred the way of resistance.

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<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

## The Protests of Tonbaku Merchants and Sellers

We should begin with protests of tonbaku merchants and sellers to exemplify the soft resistance of social groups, as they were the first to be affected by the adverse effects of the establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly.

The first reactions were the resistance from Iranian tonbaku merchants and sellers with the establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly. They believed that they would be the first group whose profit from tonbaku trade would be swept away by the monopoly. First, they presented a petition both to the Iranian Embassy in Istanbul and to the Ottoman government to prevent the establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly. Unfortunately, both sides rejected it.<sup>121</sup> It is possible to argue that the rejection was a turning point leading to the initiation of the resistance of tonbaku merchants and sellers.

Considering that their demands were rejected, it may be said that protest was a unique way for them to protect their rights against the decision makers in the Monopoly problem. Tradesmen began to protest with slogans both against the Tonbaku Monopoly, the Iranian Embassy and against the Ottoman government in the March of 1892. The protests lasted for days although the leaders of the protestors were put under arrest.<sup>122</sup> In this case, Iranian tradesmen accepted that not only the Iranian state but also the Ottoman government were responsible for their exclusion from the tonbaku trade.

It is possible to observe that tonbaku stores were also included in the protests. With the establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly, the sale and import of tonbaku became dependent on the approval of the Monopoly. For

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<sup>121</sup> BBA, DH ID 98983.

<sup>122</sup> BBA, Y PRK ZB 9/96.

this reason, Iranian tonbaku sellers closed their stores to protest against the Tonbaku Monopoly on 18 April 1892.<sup>123</sup> After a month, 400 Iranian tonbaku sellers in Istanbul, all of whom were Iranian, presented petitions to the Monopoly demanding that their losses be compensated.<sup>124</sup>

The protests of the Iranian merchants lasted for days in June 1892, continuously increasing. Ohannes Han, the Iranian Ambassador, was unable to bring an end to the protests of the merchants in Istanbul.<sup>125</sup> The protests reached such a point that the Iranian Embassy asked the Ottoman government to provide security. In the end, a security circle was established around the Embassy.<sup>126</sup> The merchants pioneering the protests were taken under close surveillance for months.<sup>127</sup>

In addition to the protests of the Iranian merchants in Istanbul, Yemeni merchants continued to sell the tonbaku they imported although the Tonbaku Monopoly had been established.<sup>128</sup> In 1893, Yemeni merchants also opposed the tonbaku concession. Eighteen merchants sent a petition to the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire to cancel the tonbaku concession. They explained their attitude against the monopolization of tonbaku in Yemeni region, arguing that they sustained their living with the tonbaku trade. Additionally, they maintained that the monopolization of tonbaku trade in Yemen would mean

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<sup>123</sup> BBA, Y MTV 61/65.

<sup>124</sup> Han Melik Sasani, p. 212.

<sup>125</sup> BBA, Y PRK ZB 9/96.

<sup>126</sup> BBA, Y A HUS 262/17.

<sup>127</sup> BBA, Y PRK HR 16/10, Y PRK ZB 12/30.

<sup>128</sup> BBA, DH MKT 2008/12.

the ruining of their lives. However, the Ottoman government did not accept their suggestion.<sup>129</sup>

We can cite the profit rates given to the tonbaku franchisers by the Tonbaku Monopoly to specify the reactions of the sellers. In the contract, signed between the Monopoly and the Ottoman government, the monopoly would give a maximum profit of 20 percent of tonbaku price to stores taking its franchise though the average price of tonbaku increased at a rate of 300-500 percent of the prices of the previous years.<sup>130</sup> Therefore, the stores that would not accept the profit level given by the Monopoly would be closed.<sup>131</sup>

Consequently, Iranian sellers and merchants, and Yemeni merchants could not participate in the policy making process to determine the future of the tonbaku trade with Iran and its market within the Ottoman borders. This circumstance would become a turning point for the merchants to start smuggling and for sellers to sell smuggled tonbaku. We should add to this the position of merchants and sellers that would make them effective in smuggling due to the connections they provided. Merchants provided connections between Iranian producers and sellers who also were of Iranian origin and who afforded merchants' connections with Ottoman consumers.

#### The Fatwa of Mirza Hassan Shirazi

Agriculture and trade had vital importance for the Shiite ulama because they collected religious taxes from producers and traders. For this reason, they opposed not only foreign control but also centralization economic policies. In

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<sup>129</sup> BBA, DH MKT 104/38.

<sup>130</sup> BBA, Y A RES 58/36.

<sup>131</sup> BBA, DH MKTV 1998/117.

this direction, they tried to use their religious authority to prevent the tonbaku concession in Ottoman lands as discussed below.

First, the Shiite ulama attempted to organize the Iranian tonbaku merchants against the Tonbaku Monopoly to protect their gains from the tonbaku trade. For instance, on 9 May 1892, Ahund Mirza Hacı Muhammed Ali, an Iranian preacher, gave sermons and advices to merchants against the Tonbaku Monopoly in Valide Hanı, Istanbul. There was a masjid in the building, where the protests of the merchants were organized.<sup>132</sup> Most Iranian merchants had stores and offices there.<sup>133</sup> This circumstance indicates the close relationship between the ulama and the merchants, and their common gain from the Ottoman-Iran tonbaku trade.

The Shiite ulama also preferred an indirect political way to shape their opposition against the Tonbaku Monopoly. For this purpose, they put further pressure on the Iranian government to convince the Ottoman side to cancel the Monopoly. For instance, Iranian Embassy informed the Ottoman government that the Tonbaku Monopoly had to be cancelled to impede the opposition of the ulama.<sup>134</sup> However, on 25 January 1892, the government refused the Iranians' suggestion, arguing that the Tonbaku Monopoly founded with the want of the Iranian government.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup> BBA, Y MTV 62/32.

<sup>133</sup> Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "the Iranian (Azeri) Merchant Community in the Ottoman Empire and the Constitutional Revolution," in *Les Iraniens D'Istanbul*, ed. Thierry Zarcone, trans. Shahr Zarinebaf (Paris : Institut Français de Recherche, 1993), p.210

<sup>134</sup> BBA, Y PRK TKM 24/2.

<sup>135</sup> BBA, Y A HUS 255/65.

The Iranian government presented a new suggestion to the Ottoman government to cancel the tonbaku concession on 2 March 1892. The suggestion was that the Iranian side would accept an increase in customs duty from three to five piatres if the Ottomans rescinded the concession. The Ottoman government did not accept this offer because the abolition of the Tonbaku Monopoly in this way would mean submitting the authority of Shiite ulama in Ottoman territory.<sup>136</sup>

The Shiite ulama started to feel the need to take a more concrete position against the Tonbaku Monopoly because they were not successful against the Monopoly by means of suggestions from the Iranian government and the merchants. It was clear that they should plan to create a common resistance against the Monopoly and the Ottoman government. On 22 October 1892, Mareşal Nusret from the Ottoman Sixth Army in Iraq informed the central government that Mirza Hassan Shirazi, the chief mujtahid, vehemently forbade all Shiite men and women in the Iraqi region to sell, to purchase, and to use the tonbaku sold or purchased by the Tonbaku Monopoly.<sup>137</sup> He also reported that all the Shiite people talked about this fatwa.<sup>138</sup> The fatwa can be interpreted as follows: If the Shiite population obeyed the orders of the fatwa, the merchants would prefer to import tonbaku from Iran into the Ottoman territory through smuggling, the sellers would prefer to sell smuggled tonbaku, and the consumers would prefer to consume smuggled tonbaku. In addition, the Iranian producers would not sell their crops to the Tonbaku Monopoly.

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<sup>136</sup> BBA, Y PRK AZJ 56/5.

<sup>137</sup> This fatwa was different from the fatwa given by Hassan Shirazi against the Persian Tobacco Monopoly in 1891. He gave it just against the Tonbaku Monopoly in 1892.

<sup>138</sup> BBA, Y PRK ASK 86/54.

That is, this fatwa planned to call the Shiite population living in the Ottoman Empire for a soft resistance. Thus, the Shiite population would eliminate the functions of the Monopoly and partially cut off the profits of the Monopoly and the Ottoman government from the tonbaku trade.

### Tonbaku Smuggling

In 1894, the Ottoman government proclaimed a new Tonbaku Regulation and sent thousands of copies of its text different provinces because hundreds of smuggling lawsuits had accumulated in the courts.<sup>139</sup> In other words, a strong smuggling activity was maintained against the Tonbaku Monopoly and the government. I will attempt to exemplify this circumstance with cases as indicators for the soft resistance of the social groups.

### The Case of Iraq

Iraq had an important location in the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade because it shared a long border with Iran. Moreover, it was a place where thousands of Shiite people from Iran came to visit sacred places such as Atabat, the spiritual center of Shiism, including Samarra, Kerbela, and Kazimiyye. These features granted the Iraqi region a special position in tonbaku smuggling.

When we look for the fundamentals of tonbaku smuggling to Iraq, we can identify two basic reasons for tonbaku to easily be smuggled from Iran: The Erzurum Treaty signed in 1823 and the Decree of 1875. These treaties

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<sup>139</sup> BBA, DH MKT 326/52.

gave the Iranian visitors the right to bring with them a certain amount of tonbaku without being subject to taxes and control of the Tonbaku Monopoly. However, Monopoly officials confiscated the tonbaku of Iranian visitors and pilgrims. Additionally, in Iraq, the officials raided Iranians' stores and homes to search for smuggled tonbaku at night and day on August 16, 1892.<sup>140</sup> From here, we can argue that above-mentioned treaties provided a camouflage for Iranian smugglers and especially offered Iraqi consumers an opportunity to consume smuggled tonbaku. Additionally, it is clear that a severe struggle between the Monopoly and the Iranian merchants continued in the Iraqi region.

The long Iranian-Ottoman border without the necessary number of checkpoints made smuggling easier. Additionally, smugglers transported tonbaku also over the Persian Gulf and Shatt al-Arab into Basra province.<sup>141</sup> It appears that smugglers either used the uncontrolled boundaries or appeared as visitors to avoid the surveillance of the Iranian and Ottoman states.

### The Case of Yemen

Yemen was one of the leading tonbaku consumers in the Ottoman Empire. With the establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly, smuggling dramatically increased in Yemen though the Monopoly and the Ottoman government took preventive measurements.

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<sup>140</sup> BBA, DH MKT 1988/100.

<sup>141</sup> BBA, DH MKT 441/18.

To examine the measurements, it can be concluded that at the beginning of the 1890s both the Monopoly and the government thought that smuggling originally was a problem of security. That is, they thought that smuggling could be prevented if security measurements were increased on the Yemeni coasts and in the Persian Gulf.<sup>142</sup> For example, they decided to buy steamers to follow smugglers and to establish police stations to arrest them. According to their idea, these measures were unique way to prevent smuggling. The Monopoly guards with increasing security measurements caught a large amount of smuggled tonbaku. However, the smugglers tried to increase their activities to compensate their losses.<sup>143</sup> There is no doubt that both the Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly attempted to gain total control over the tonbaku market with these measurements.

After 1895, measurements were increased to control tonbaku entrance into Yemen. Strict surveillance was initiated with the help of four steamers to put an end to smuggling on the Yemeni coasts through the Persian Gulf.<sup>144</sup> Smugglers had to search different ways to overcome this problem. As a result, they started to use foreign ships such as Italian and British ones. The influence of Western powers on Gulf trade made their jobs easier.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> BBA, DH MKT 441/18.

<sup>143</sup> BBA, DH MKT 114/43.

<sup>144</sup> BBA, DH MKT 210/76.

<sup>145</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM 674/10. See for Western Powers' effectiveness on the Gulf trade: Muhammed Hasan el-Ayderus, *Tarihu 'l- Halicü 'l-Arabi: el-Hadis ve 'l-Muasır* (Kuveyt, 1996), pp. 215-216.

At the same time, smugglers used small boats to escape from intense surveillance.<sup>146</sup> Especially at nights, these boats carried tonbaku and docked at uncontrolled places along the coastlines.<sup>147</sup> It seems that these small Arabian boats, which could not be compared with bigger Western ships, were used to transport tonbaku from big ships to uncontrolled places along the coasts.<sup>148</sup>

### The Case of Hejaz

Smuggling also showed a great increase in Hejaz. Smugglers took almost full control of the tonbaku market in this region.

The circumstances in the Hejaz region were partly similar to those in Iraq in terms of smuggling. The essence of smuggling there also was Iranian visitors and pilgrims, as was the case in Iraq, for they had a right granted by the Erzurum Treaty signed in 1823 and a Decree proclaimed in 1875 of bringing with them tonbaku for their own consumption.<sup>149</sup> In other words, smugglers brought tonbaku as pilgrims and visitors. The amount of tonbaku seized, which was much more than a reasonable amount for personal consumption, indicates this. For instance, smuggling reached such a level that confiscated tonbaku was about 2,400 bundles from 1891 to 1893.<sup>150</sup> It is obvious that tonbaku trade under the veil of visitors and pilgrims became the popular way for smuggling in the following years. This popularity would

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<sup>146</sup> BBA, DH MKT 472/34.

<sup>147</sup> BBA, Y PRK UM 46/72, DH MKT 114/43.

<sup>148</sup> Ayderus, p. 214.

<sup>149</sup> BBA, DH MKT 1988/100.

<sup>150</sup> BBA, MV 108/16.

continue until the 1910s. Smugglers this way brought large amounts of tonbaku into Hejaz.<sup>151</sup> In brief, the above-mentioned agreements provided a confident and advantageous way for smugglers against the surveillance personnel of the Tonbaku Monopoly.

Increasing smuggling led to competition between sellers who sold smuggled tonbaku and franchisers of the Tonbaku Monopoly in the market. The franchisers complained about their rivals to the administration of Hejaz province to prevent sales of smuggled tonbaku in the 1910s.<sup>152</sup> It is true to say that they could not compete with them because consumers naturally preferred the low-priced products offered by smugglers.

#### The Case of Syria

Syria also was one of the leading tonbaku consumers of the Empire besides Iraq, Yemen, and Hejaz. After the establishment of the Tonbaku Monopoly, smugglers started to compete severely with the Monopoly in the market.

The demand of consumers made smuggling maintainable in this region. Muhammed Izzet Derveze said that though Tonbaku Monopoly was established, people accessed and stocked Iranian tonbaku by means of smugglers.<sup>153</sup> From this, it may be concluded that the monopolization of

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<sup>151</sup> BBA, DH ID 82/12.

<sup>152</sup> BBA, DH ID 94-1/30.

<sup>153</sup> Derveze, Vol. 1, p. 108.

tonbaku triggered the consumption of smuggled tonbaku. In other words, the consumers' reaction to this new situation encouraged smuggling.

On the other hand, it may be said that the Ottoman authorities could not predict that there was a close relationship between smuggling and the behaviors of consumers. They thought that they could easily prevent smuggling with regulations by removing some smugglers. However, people started to see smuggling as a normal reaction to the Monopoly because it was a way providing them with a cheap commodity.<sup>154</sup>

Smugglers started to compete violently with the Monopoly in an organized manner, namely, in the form of gangs. In one case, Ottoman security forces fought against and caught a gang of smugglers on Beirut coast on the eve of the 1900s.<sup>155</sup> Documents of this period give important clues about the inner structure of these organizations. We know that smugglers hid their tonbaku in homes and had a distribution system to deliver to sellers in the cities.<sup>156</sup> It may be said that the smugglers distributed tonbaku upon order for purchase.

#### The Deterministic Effects of Smuggling on the Policies of the Tonbaku Monopoly and the Ottoman Government

Perceptions of the Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly about why smuggling emerged and increased after the establishment of the Monopoly were shaped around security insufficiency. Therefore, they tried to build a security wall around the monopolized regions especially around Iraqi,

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<sup>154</sup> BBA, DH MKT 888/59.

<sup>155</sup> BBA, Y A HUS 395/94, Y PRK UM 50/16.

<sup>156</sup> BBA, DH İD 124-1/21.

Yemeni, Hejaz, and Syria regions, all being leading consumers of Iranian tonbaku. I will take such attempts of the Monopoly and the government as an effect of the smuggling.

The Ottoman government and the Monopoly paid special attention to preventive measures against smuggling in the Yemeni region. The monopoly wanted the government to empower guards with guns against smugglers. Smuggling was very strong in Yemen and smugglers could fight against them if it was necessary.<sup>157</sup> The Ottoman central government and the Monopoly remained behind the smugglers because the position of the smugglers shaped the perceptive basis of their policies.

After assigning guards to places such as Iraqi, Yemeni, Hejaz, and Syria to prevent smuggling, the Monopoly agreed with the Ottoman government to acquire ships to stop smuggling along the coasts of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Expenses belonged to both sides.<sup>158</sup> It appears that with the monopolization of tonbaku, smuggling reached an undisputable level. That is, the level of smuggling determined the concrete means of central policies.

Smuggling spread through the Marmara Sea at the end of the 1890s. For this reason, the Ottoman government wanted a Monopoly ship to control this sea. The subject of getting a new ship also came onto the agenda. The Ministry of Finance argued that its budget was insufficient for buying a ship to control Marmara Sea.<sup>159</sup> The dissemination of smuggling through the Marmara Sea indicates that preventive measures could not become effective because of

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<sup>157</sup> BBA, Y A HUS 299/96, İ HUS 25/1311.Z.15, Y PRK ASK 100/87, DH MKT 2132/22.

<sup>158</sup> BBA, DH İD 98645, Y A RES 69/2.

<sup>159</sup> BBA, A MKT MHM 631/28, MV 90/52, Y A RES 84/78.

pressures stemming from these preventive measures aggravated smuggling. That is, the enlargement of smuggling was a determiner on the limits of central reactions. Here, it is beneficial to keep in mind that smugglers' cooperation with the Western maritime existence within Ottoman territory became an indicator of limits of control of Ottoman central government's dominancy on its seas.<sup>160</sup>

The Tonbaku Monopoly sought different solutions in order to find an ally against smugglers. In this respect, it attempted to work with local administrators beyond security measures. Especially from 1893, it started to make mayors as his its officials.<sup>161</sup> Such tactics show that measures expanded from the borders into the territory. Thus, eliminating smuggling was thought to be easier this way. That is, smuggling compelled the Monopoly to develop a local based policy.

#### The Impact of Smuggling on the Relationship between the Ottoman Government and the Tonbaku Monopoly

The relationship between the Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly changed significantly after 1895. I will try to evaluate this shift as the effect of smuggling and consumption of smuggled tonbaku.

The basic reason for disagreements between the Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly was the decrease of their income from tonbaku, as each held the other accountable for this. For example, the tonbaku imports of

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<sup>160</sup> BBA, DH MKT 2106/72.

<sup>161</sup> BBA, DH MKT 119/41.

Hejaz had been about 1,500,000 kıyyes before the establishment of the Monopoly. However, by 1897, this amount sharply dropped to 400,000 kıyyes. At the same time, tonbaku income declined to 20,000 liras though it had been 150,000 liras in the region. According to the Ottomans, the Monopoly was responsible for this decline because it had not succeeded at importing tonbaku.<sup>162</sup> However, in the process of the establishment the Monopoly, the Ottoman authorities had believed that the Monopoly would be able to overcome these difficulties by itself. It is possible to say that the smuggling and consumption of smuggled tonbaku led to the emergence of disagreements between the government and the Monopoly, creating deterministic effects on the income from the tonbaku trade.

From the Ottomans' viewpoint, the high price policy of the Monopoly led to the decrease in income. The Yemeni region could be given as an example supporting the Ottomans' argument. According to local administrators in Yemen, almost 1/3 of the tribes obtained their tonbaku through smuggling. They pointed out that this circumstance contributed to competition and even fighting among tribes. According to them, the monopoly sold the tonbaku at very high prices. In the end, they informed the central government that people had started to discuss the legitimization of the Ottomans in the Yemeni region.<sup>163</sup> It appears that smuggling stemmed mostly from the high price policy of the Ottoman government and the Monopoly because both sides had fixed the prices in the concession contract. Additionally, this policy led to the emergence of a legitimization problem of

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<sup>162</sup> BBA, Y PRK AZJ 43/69.

<sup>163</sup> BBA, DH MKT 966/67.

the Ottomans in Yemen. It is clear that Yemeni consumers believed that the Ottoman government was responsible for the high prices. Moreover, the prices began to affect the social order between the tribes. In brief, smuggling originating from the high price policy had significant effects on disagreements between the government and the Monopoly.

On the other hand, looking from the Monopoly's side, the Ottoman government was responsible for the decline in the tonbaku income. For instance, smugglers publicly sold smuggled tonbaku in Hejaz. Administrators of the monopoly argued that although the government undertook to help them against smuggling in the agreement signed in 1891, it had not taken any measures against smugglers.<sup>164</sup> It may be concluded that the Ottoman government might have avoided the expenses of fighting against smuggling.

According to the Monopoly, local administrators also were insensitive to the sale of smuggled tonbaku. Not only income of state budget but also that of the monopoly decreased because of this insensitivity. For instance, the Monopoly administration argued in its reports written to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that though smuggled tonbaku was sold in streets of Mecca, the local administrators did not attempt to stop this sale.<sup>165</sup> Consequently, we can say that the attempts of the Monopoly to ally with local administrators, as discussed above, could not be achieved.

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<sup>164</sup> BBA, DH İD 94-1/30.

<sup>165</sup> BBA, DH MUI 108-1/41, DH İD 94-1/30.

### The Consumption of Smuggled Tonbaku

The Ottoman Empire and the Tonbaku Monopoly followed a high price policy to make more profit from the tonbaku trade. However, against this policy, consumers rationally preferred the consumption of smuggled tonbaku.

Tonbaku consumption was more than 4,000 tons in the Ottoman Empire before the foundation of the Monopoly in 1891. However, after the Tonbaku Monopoly obtained the exclusive right of import and sale of tonbaku in Ottoman territories, this quantity sharply dropped to 1,800 tons a year in 1893.<sup>166</sup> There were three reasons for this circumstance.

The first was the high price policy. When the Ottoman government and the Monopoly fixed prices of tonbaku varieties at high levels, naturally the demand of consumers increased for the cheaper smuggled tonbaku. The average selling price had been about 3-4 piatres in the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire before the establishment of the Monopoly, but the prices in other provinces were slightly higher. In the establishment process of the Monopoly, a black market came into existence and its prices were taken as a basis in the convention of the tonbaku concession (see Table 6).<sup>167</sup> This meant a huge increase in prices. Naturally, the sales of the Monopoly sharply dropped from 4000 tons at the beginning of the 1890s to 1,800 tons at the end of 1893. That is to say, the demand shifted to the cheaper smuggled tonbaku.

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<sup>166</sup> *İkdam*, 12 Cemaziyel Evvel 1312, Vol. 1, No. 102, p. 2.

<sup>167</sup> BBA, Y A RES 56/64

Table 6

The List of Tonbaku Varieties and Their Fixed Prices in the Tonbaku Convention (per Kilo)		
variety	quality	prices
Isfahan	first	27
	second	25
Keşan	first	25
	second	23
Shiraz	first	37
	second	27
Hejaz	first	23
	second	21
	third	20

Source: BBA, Y A RES 56/64

On the other hand, the Ottoman government offered the Monopoly to decrease prices by lowering custom tariff to raise demand for the tonbaku imported by the Monopoly. At the end of the negotiations in 1893, the tariff was decreased from three piatres to one piatres in Yemen, Baghdad, and Basra provinces.<sup>168</sup> When reduction in the tariff had a positive effect on tonbaku imports, the Tonbaku Monopoly and the Ottoman government included Hejaz among the provinces where the tariff reduction was applied. Reduction was valid for five years.<sup>169</sup> It is clear that both the government and the monopoly attempted to decrease the market price of tonbaku in order to compete with smuggled tonbaku.

<sup>168</sup> BBA, İML 1321/C.8.

<sup>169</sup> Ibid.

Reduction in the tariff led to increases in the tonbaku imports of the Monopoly. The annual increase was more than 50 percent. As tonbaku import were about 2,100 tons from 1894 to 1897, this amount rose to around 3,200 tons from 1897 to 1901 in regions where the reduction was applied. Both the Ottoman government and the monopoly decided to continue the reduction. However, this reduction in reality did not cause the Monopoly's imports to increase, hence the consumption of smuggled tonbaku to decrease, but it caused the route of tonbaku transported to other regions to shift to the gates applying reduced tariffs.<sup>170</sup>

Decreasing sales were a vital subject for the Monopoly to continue its existence. For this reason, in 1895, administration of the Monopoly notified Ottoman Ministry of Finance that price of tonbaku should be increased by two piatres to meet its losses. However, the Ministry of Finance maintained that this raise would contribute to an increase in smuggling due to the fact that the market price of tonbaku sold by the Monopoly already was higher than that of smuggled tonbaku. The Ministry supported the idea that to prevent smuggling the current price should be maintained without any increase. In the same year, the Monopoly declared bankruptcy.<sup>171</sup> It can be concluded that demand of consumers for cheap smuggled tonbaku led to bankruptcy of the Monopoly as will be discussed below.

The second reason for the dropped sales of the Monopoly was the fatwa of Mirza Hassan Shirazi against the Tonbaku Monopoly. He called the Shiite people not to consume or sell tonbaku imported by the Monopoly. This

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<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> BBA, DH MKT 417/72.

call reduced the sales of the Monopoly. It is possible to argue that this fatwa became effective on the behavior of Shiite consumers.

The third reason was the Iranian sellers who closed their tonbaku stores. In 1893, there was a tremendous reduction in the bey'iyeye duty paid by the stores similar to the decrease in the volume of tonbaku sales (see Figure 2). There are three possible reasons for this decline. First is that the number of sellers remained stable while the raise of demand increase came to a halt. Second is that the demand was boosted when sellers enlarged their enterprises. Third is that the number of sellers who sold the smuggled tonbaku grew. The third possibility apparently describes the closest to what actually happened, because the Iranian merchants had closed their tonbaku stores in 1892. For instance, the number of Iranian merchants who closed their stores was around 400 just in Istanbul. Thus, there was a 50 percent drop in the bey'iyeye income.




Figure 2: Annual Tax Income of Tonbaku Bey'iyeye in the Ottoman Empire from 1886 to 1909, Index for 1886=100  
Source: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1327 (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1330), p. 121

There was a stable decrease in the bey'ıye income from 1893 to 1909. This indicates that the franchiser holders of the Monopoly could not compete with the smugglers and closed their stores. In other words, they could not sell their commodities owing to the increasing consumer demand for cheap smuggled tonbaku (see Table 7). It may be said that sellers who continued to run their stores had to sell the smuggled tonbaku to compete with smugglers as some of them had been involved in smuggling tonbaku since 1893.

Table 7

Inter-Regional Comparison for Tonbaku Bey'ıye from 1906 to 1909 ( piatres)					
	1909	1908	1907	1906	changing 1906-7, %
Istanbul	49,425	52,573	55,055	59,176	-16
Edirne	1,437	2,057	2,287	1,888	-24
Erzurum	1,812	1,183	2,119	2,644	-31
Adana	3,998	3,984	3,888	3,592	11
Ankara	2,712	3,874	4,624	5,158	-47
Aydın (İzmir)	8,600	10,291	9,795	8,967	-4
Bitlis	834	770	564	718	16
Bagdad	22,239	22,261	21,366	22,690	-2
Beirut	49,748	49,892	49,195	40,127	24
Midilli	2,438	2,459	3,437	3,004	-19
Aleppo	14,615	13,859	12,895	12,846	14
Bursa	5,676	7,318	8,141	7,266	-22
Sivas	2,167	2,154	2,167	2,343	-8
Trabzon	2,000	1,846	2,375	2,829	-29
Konya	2,025	2,640	2,370	4,044	-50
Mosul	999	1,319	1,647	1,774	-44
Yemen	9,915	10,883	11,546	12,120	-18

Source: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1327 (Istanbul, Matbaa-I Amire, 1330), p. 120.

We can estimate approximate number of stores and sellers from Table 3 if we think that each store paid the bey'ıye about 100 piatres, for this was the

amount approximately collected from an average tonbaku store. Results are shown in Table 8.

Table 8  
Inter-Regional Comparison for the Number of Tonbaku Sellers Estimated from the Bey'iyе "tax per seller=100 piatres"

	1909	1908	1907	1906
Istanbul	494	526	551	592
Edirne	14	21	23	19
Erzurum	18	12	21	26
Adana	40	40	39	36
Ankara	27	39	46	52
Aydın (İzmir)	86	103	98	90
Bitlis	8	8	6	7
Bagdad	222	223	214	227
Beirut	497	499	492	401
Midilli	24	25	34	30
Aleppo	146	139	129	128
Bursa	57	73	81	73
Sivas	22	22	22	23
Trabzon	20	18	24	28
Konya	20	26	24	40
Mosul	10	13	16	18
Yemen	99	109	115	121
total	1806	1894	1935	1912

Source: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1327 (Istanbul, Matbaa-I Amire, 1330), p. 120.

The demand for cheap tonbaku showed itself as a decrease in the number of sellers and stores. It may be argued that one reason for this circumstance was the uneven income distribution among provinces in the Ottoman Empire. That is to say, if the income of a region was high, prices were also high and if the income was low, prices were low. Additionally, low prices indicate the prevalence and abundance of smuggled tonbaku. At the same time, different income rates indicate that the consumed tonbaku varieties

and qualities varied from one region to another. For instance, smugglers totally controlled the market in Yemen in the 1910s. They delivered tonbaku to the addresses of consumers. Officials of the Ottoman administration said that the consumers consciously preferred the tonbaku delivered by smugglers instead of that sold by the Monopoly.<sup>172</sup> In brief, there was a high correlation between the consumption of smuggled tonbaku and the income distribution structure. Table 9 can give some hints.

Table 9  
Tonbaku Consumption in the Ottoman Provinces in 1909

Provinces	Kg	OLs	Price (Piatres per kg)
Syria	531,140	110,714	20.8
Yemen	96,786	9,206	9.5
Baghdad	256,620	6,270	2.4
Hejaz	86,312	8,669	10
Istanbul	164,462	30,654	18.6
Total	1135120	331,026	12.26

Source: Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 3. Sene 1327 (İstanbul, Matbaa-I Amire, 1330), p. 366.

There was a similar situation in the Hejaz region. For instance, the sellers of smuggled tonbaku were spread throughout the streets of Mecca. Franchisers of the Monopoly complained about the smugglers to the Administration of Hejaz province to prevent sales of smuggled tonbaku in the 1910s.<sup>173</sup> Both the Ottoman government and the Monopoly could not prevent this circumstance.<sup>174</sup> It is clear that consumer's demand for low-priced tonbaku

<sup>172</sup> BBA, DH MUI 36-2/19, 1-10/35.

<sup>173</sup> BBA, DH İD 94-1/30.

fed smuggling and made it maintainable during the Monopoly period in spite of attempts of the Monopoly and the government (see Figure 3).




Figure 3: Tonbaku Consumption in Hejaz from 1907 to 1912 (per kilo)

Source: BBA, DH ID 95-2/3

The Ministry of Finance sent a report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs about the great increase in smuggling in Hejaz, Syria and Beirut, regions that were among the main consumers of tonbaku. The report indicates that the sales of the Tonbaku Monopoly were quite low that obtained income could not meet the costs of the Monopoly due to the large sales of smuggled tonbaku in these regions. The most important indicator of this circumstance was the decreasing sale levels in the Hejaz region according to the report (see Figure 3).<sup>175</sup> It seems that smugglers gained control over the tonbaku market in competition with the Monopoly in this region.

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<sup>174</sup> BBA, DH MUI 108-1/41.

<sup>175</sup> BBA, DH ID 95-2/3.

### The Effects of Smuggling on the Bankruptcy of the Tonbaku Monopoly

Both the Ottoman government's and the Monopoly's income from tonbaku import sharply dropped owing to smuggling in 1894.<sup>176</sup> They attempted to prevent this reduction by taking some measures. However, the bankruptcy of the monopoly could not be averted in the following process.

The tonbaku sales of the Monopoly could not exceed 1,800 tons at the end of 1893. The administrators of the Monopoly decided to give the right of tonbaku sale to the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly, which had a more efficient operating system. Thus, they planned to decrease the cost of sales.<sup>177</sup> The Tonbaku and Tobacco Monopolies signed a convention on 5 December 1894. The convention would be valid for four years. The Tonbaku Monopoly would pay the costs of sales to the Tobacco Monopoly. In addition, the Tonbaku Monopoly transferred other costs such as distribution of the tonbaku to stores, premiums, and salaries of the warehouses and monopoly officials to the Tobacco Monopoly.<sup>178</sup> It is clear that the administrators of the Tonbaku Monopoly wanted to benefit from the Tobacco Monopoly to compete with smuggling. Thus, they predicted that the revenues would rise.

A new tonbaku regulation was proclaimed to cease smuggling on 5 December 1894 when the Tonbaku and the Tobacco Monopolies signed the convention. The smuggled foreign tonbaku would be confiscated on behalf of the Ottoman treasury. The Tonbaku Monopoly would license the imported tonbaku. The import of tonbaku would be depended on the control and

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<sup>176</sup> BBA, İML 1312/S. 27.

<sup>177</sup> *İkdam*, 12 Cemaziyel Evvel 1312, vol. 1, p. 1.

<sup>178</sup> BBA, DH MKT 326/52.

observation of the Customs House.<sup>179</sup> The tonbaku would be firstly brought into the Customs Administration after its import duty was paid. The tonbaku imported by sea and by river had to be brought to the ports where there were Customs Houses. The Tonbaku Monopoly would bring the tonbaku to its warehouses and, tonbaku sellers would take it there. People who denounced smugglers would be paid a reward.<sup>180</sup>

The Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly aimed to take strong preventive measures against smuggling and smugglers with this new regulation. The measures mostly focused on controlling the tonbaku trade. Coordination between government, the monopoly, and sellers were redefined. The Ottoman central government commanded local administrations to help Monopoly officials to realize these measures.<sup>181</sup> It can be concluded that government planned to integrate citizens into the surveillance process.

To this aim, a commission was founded in the body of Ministry of Finance to examine the question of the suppressing contraband along the littoral of the Yemeni province after the regulation was proclaimed. Additionally, the Monopoly sent inspectors to different provinces such as Yemen, Hejaz, and Baghdad where there were branches of the Monopoly.<sup>182</sup> However, the decline in imports could not be prevented.

The Monopoly declared bankruptcy in 1895 despite the strong measures taken in 1894. In other words, the Monopoly could not provide

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<sup>179</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Düstur*, 1<sup>st</sup> Series, vol. 6, p. 1535-1536.

<sup>180</sup> BBA, DH MKT 326/52.

<sup>181</sup> BBA, DH MKT 2086/43.

<sup>182</sup> BBA, DH MKT 829/75.

income and cost equilibrium. This circumstance led to a debt crisis and the Monopoly stopped almost all of its payments in 1895. In that time, the Ottoman Bank accepted to assume its debts about £ 240,000 as share. Thus, the Bank had 4/5 of all shares and raised the capital of the Monopoly to 12,500,000 francs for its revival.<sup>183</sup> In brief, the owners of the Monopoly left Société du Tombac to the Ottoman Bank against credit duties. The Bank also preferred to raise capital to meet the costs of the Monopoly and to apply the taken measures against smuggling.

#### The Effects of Smuggling on the Abolition of the Tonbaku Monopoly

In spite of the attempts of the Bank, the Monopoly could not meet its expenses. I will suggest smuggling as the main cause of its collapse.

It is possible to observe that the Iranian government was more successful than the Monopoly and the Ottoman government in prevention of smuggling. We can look at the profit of the Iranian side from tonbaku export to the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the Iranian government increased its revenue from the tonbaku exported into the Ottoman Empire by more than 50 percent from 1907 to 1911.<sup>184</sup> Also, the volume of exports indicates the same reality. Although Iranian exports were around 1,500 tons, the import of the Tonbaku Monopoly remained at 800 tons in 1912.<sup>185</sup> It seems that a large part

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<sup>183</sup> André Autheman, *Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete Osmanlı Bankası: Bank-I Osmani-I Şahane* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2002), p. 111.

<sup>184</sup> Seyyid Mohammed Ali Cemalzade, *Genc-i Şaygan ya Evza-yi İktisadi-yi Iran*, (Tehran, 1362) p. 34.

<sup>185</sup> Tomara, p. 249. BBA, İMMS 1333.L.7/3.

of tonbaku taxed in Iranian customs entered into the Ottoman Empire through smuggling.

The measures taken could not be applied efficiently after the bankruptcy of the Monopoly in 1895, the regulations remained insufficient. In this direction, the discussions about at what price the confiscated tonbaku would be sold in the Ottoman territory can be given to exemplify this circumstance. These debates continued even until 1909.<sup>186</sup> That is to say, regulations could not answer even such minor problems. Thus, smuggling assumed such a sophisticated structure that tonbaku could be smuggled by means of foreign post offices at the beginning of the 1900s.<sup>187</sup> Additionally, the Iranian government did not have an effective regulation about tonbaku exporting from 1892 to 1929.<sup>188</sup> This problem also made the entrance of smuggled tonbaku easier to the Ottoman Empire.

Both customs tariff and the Monopoly tax specified in the convention of the tonbaku concession had important impacts on the cancellation of the Monopoly. For instance, the Monopoly had to pay 4.5 piatres per kilo to the Ottoman government during the last seven years of concession period.<sup>189</sup> In addition, the Monopoly had to pay 40,000 Ottoman liras in three installments to the government as monopoly tax. From here, it is possible to calculate the average tax burden per kilo sold. The tax' cost of tonbaku is found to have been 9.5 piatres per kilo since 800 tons were imported from Iran in 1912. In other word, the above-mentioned situation contributed to an increase in the

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<sup>186</sup> BBA, MV 147/13.

<sup>187</sup> BBA, DH İD 110/5.

<sup>188</sup> Issawi, p. 249.

<sup>189</sup> BBA, Y A RES 56/64.

cost of tonbaku per kilo. In brief, the Monopoly had to decrease its costs to compete with the cheap smuggled tonbaku, but on the other hand, it had to make more profits to finance its expenditures. This dichotomy continued without a permanent solution until the collapse of the Monopoly in 1914.

The Monopoly's income obviously remained under its expenditures in the period after 1908. In 1908, its annual income was about 11,000 OLS, which was slightly over its expenses. After this date, the Monopoly could not make any profit again.<sup>190</sup> Its imports also indicate this circumstance. The volume of imported tonbaku dramatically dropped from 1,200 tons in 1908 to 800 tons in 1912.<sup>191</sup> The Monopoly could not pay the final installment of the monopoly tax in 1912. For this reason, the Ottoman government proclaimed the abolition of the Monopoly on 27 September 1914.<sup>192</sup>

### Conclusion

In 1891, both the Iranian government and the Persian Tobacco Monopoly suggested the Ottoman government establish an Ottoman tonbaku monopoly. This monopoly would import Iranian tonbaku into the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman side assigned Izzet Bey to prepare a report to identify whether giving a concession would be in favor of the state. Izzet Bey noted that to follow public economic policies excluding society and social groups that took part in the market structure could encounter a counteraction.

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<sup>190</sup> *Maliye Nezareti İstatistik Şubesi Senelik İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1327* (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1330.), p. 366.

<sup>191</sup> *Maliye Nezareti İhsaiyat-I Maliye 1326* (Istanbul: Matbaa-I Amire, 1329), p. 312.

<sup>192</sup> BBA, İ MMS 1333.L.7/3.

In December 1891, Société du Tombac, a French consortium, gained the exclusive right of import of Iranian tonbaku and its sale in the Ottoman territory. Thus, the suggested monopoly was officially announced and signed a similar convention with Iran, monopolizing the right of export to the Ottoman land in order to gain full control over Iranian-Ottoman tonbaku trade. Thus, both Iranian and Ottoman governments planned to obtain a new resource for their budgets by means of the Monopoly established by Western capitalists. On the other hand, these treaties would make the tonbaku market an exclusive space for the Monopoly. That is, the income of previous agents of the market would be partly shared or totally confiscated.

The Iranian sellers and merchants in the Ottoman territories were not able to participate in the decisive process to determine the future of the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade. In 1892, they started protests against the Tonbaku Monopoly and the Ottoman government in Istanbul; however, their reactions were not taken into consideration. Additionally, Yemeni merchants also attempted to prevent the monopolization of trade in the Yemen province, but they could not achieve it. The only remaining way for them to resist was to continue their business through smuggling

The Shiite ulama were among the groups benefiting from tonbaku trade. Their benefit lay in almost all stages of the tonbaku trade, as discussed in Chapter Two. The Ulama shared profit with merchants because they collected religious taxes from agricultural trade. They tried to organize merchants through sermons and put the Iranian government under pressure for asking Ottomans to cancel the tonbaku concession, but they were ignored. In 1892, Mirza Hassan Shirazi issued a fatwa as the chief mujtahid that

prohibited sales, purchases, and consumption of tonbaku imported by the Monopoly by the Shiite population living in Ottoman territories. This fatwa at the same time was a promotion for consumption, sales, and purchases of smuggled tonbaku.

In 1892, smuggling started to spread throughout different Ottoman provinces such as Iraq, Yemen, Hejaz, and Syria. Smugglers carried tonbaku as visitors in the Iraqi and Hejaz regions. In Yemen, smugglers preferred the uncontrolled coastlines. In Syria, smugglers worked as organized bodies.

The Ottoman government and the Monopoly attempted to follow a high price policy. However, consumers preferred to buy the cheaper smuggled tonbaku. In 1893, the sales of the Monopoly sharply dropped to 1,800 tons per annum, which in 1891 was expected to be at least 4,000 tons. In 1893, the tariff was reduced in order to compete with smugglers. However, the Monopoly could not compete with them because the smugglers continued their established network relations with Iranian producers, and offered cheap commodity to Ottoman consumers. For instance, In Syria and Yemen smugglers delivered tonbaku to the consumers' addresses after the beginning of the 1900s.

In 1894, the Monopoly went bankrupt due to its declining income and the fact that majority of its ownership had been transferred to the Ottoman Bank in lieu of its loans. However, the Monopoly's income could not match its expenses. Finally, it was abolished in 1914.

To sum up, the Monopoly and the government contributed to the shift of consumption to the smuggled tonbaku. They could not foresee that the price elasticity of tonbaku demand was very high. The government and the

Monopoly fixed the prices the lowest being 20 piatres per kilo though it was 3-4 piatres in the eastern provinces in 1891 prior to the establishment of the Monopoly. To illustrate the difficulty of the competition we should reveal that the lowest price offered by the rival dropped almost to the same level in 1909 when the Monopoly totally left behind the very short profitable period. In the end, the Ottoman government and the Tonbaku Monopoly admitted their failure at controlling smugglers and consumer preferences.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

We examined the possibility of success of public economic policies that do not take society and social groups into consideration in the economic decision-making process. We took the tonbaku smuggling and the consumption of smuggled tonbaku within the concept of the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade from 1891 to 1914.

The spread of tobacco consumption in large social groups took place in the first half of the seventeenth century in spite of opposition and prohibition by the Ulama and the governments. Thus, the consumption of tobacco vertically and horizontally was disseminated to society. In the eighteenth century, coffeehouses, homes, and excursion spots were special places to enjoy smoking in daily practices. In the first half of the eighteenth century, smoking showed itself as a sedentary daily practice. In this period, a long pipe (çubuk) was the popular tool to discover the pleasure in smoking. A conventional smoking culture took its place in social space in that period. The second half of the eighteenth century witnessed a transition from çubuk to water pipes as a means of smoking. In other words, tonbaku started to replace partly tütün in the consumption activity gradually. The water pipes themselves reflected the codes of pleasure with their artistic creation. Thus, smoking activity gained a sophisticated character.

In the nineteenth century, the water pipe obtained a special place in smoking culture. It was commonly used to consume Iranian tonbaku. Its popular use caused some changes in the daily practices of Ottomans. Coffeehouses, homes, and excursion spots functioned as consumption spaces

for tonbaku. The habitués sought pleasure in the harmony and cohesion between space and the water pipe. The position of Ottoman governments was also effective on the water pipe culture. They encouraged the dissemination of water pipe culture. They started to collect the bey' iye, a consumption tax, from stores and peddlers with common consumption of tonbaku since 1862. Thus, the state treasury obtained a new resource. The state always collected this duty from the storeowners in order not to cause a burden on consumers.

Ottoman domestic tonbaku production was low in spite of the cultural depth of the tonbaku consumption. This was the reason why a stable structure had not constituted in tonbaku agriculture in the nineteenth century. Thus, the Ottoman tonbaku consumption was dependent on Iranian tonbaku. They encouraged tonbaku import to increase the treasury income with low tariff applications during the first half of the nineteenth century. With the establishment of the Ottoman Debts Administration in 1881, the Ottoman government remained unwilling to support the native tonbaku production and continued its encouragement of import from Iran. This is because the Debts Administration founded the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly to control the Ottoman tobacco and tonbaku production.

The Iranian merchants brought tonbaku from Iran since the second half of the eighteenth century and started to gain total control over the Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade in the second half of the nineteenth century. They also opened tonbaku stores within Ottoman borders during this period. Thus, they tried to obtain full control over the Ottoman tonbaku market especially at the end of the 1880s. The Shiite ulama also played an important role in the domination of Iranian tonbaku merchants because they had a common profit

from this trade. That is, the ulama took religious taxes from traded agricultural commodities, and possessed large vaqfs' lands in Iran as well. Consequently, they were part of the tonbaku producers, and supporters of the continuity of Ottoman-Iranian tonbaku trade by means of Iranian merchants. These factors led to the domination of the Ottoman tonbaku market by these two social groups.

We should define the tonbaku market to summarize what we want to say. The tonbaku market was an interactive and complex structure. This structure constantly was subject to reshaping by interactions between consumers, Iranian merchants, Shiite Ulama, the water pipe culture, the Ottoman State, and the consumption space.

This interactive structure was exposed to effects of Western economic expansion through public economic policies. These effects appeared as an intervention of the Ottoman central government in order to take full control of the tonbaku trade with Iran together with the Western capitalists. That is, the Ottoman government and Western capitalists agreed to found a tonbaku monopoly in 1891 in order to fulfill this purpose. The government was planning to increase its budgetary income gained from the tonbaku trade. Consequently, the Tonbaku Monopoly, Société du Tombac, took the exclusive rights of importing and sale of Iranian tonbaku in the Ottoman Empire.

Additionally, the Monopoly gained the exclusive right of exporting tonbaku from Iran. Thus, the Persian Tobacco Monopoly was supposed to deliver the tonbaku it collected from the Iranian producers to the Tonbaku Monopoly at the Ottoman-Iranian borders. That is, the establishment of Tonbaku Monopoly meant the exclusion of two interest groups, namely, the

Iranian merchants and the Shiite Ulama, from tonbaku trade. These two groups had provided the links between producers and consumers. The merchants had been active in the tonbaku trade since the second half of the eighteenth century and started to dominate the market by the end of the 1880s. In the same period, they consolidated their dominance by opening stores. The ulama was the other important player of the market. They collected religious taxes from the agricultural productions. Additionally, they were part of production. The Monopoly was going to absorb their profit from the market. That is to say, the Monopoly attempted to dislocate the ulama and the merchants from their position as the linkage between the producers and the consumers.

On the other hand, both the ulama and the merchants preferred the way of resistance against the Tonbaku Monopoly and the Ottoman government to cancel the tonbaku concessions. The merchants started protests by closing their stores in Istanbul in 1892. However, the government rejected their demand that led to the emergence of tonbaku smuggling. That is, the merchants, some of whom had stores, provided the consumers with cheap commodity.

Additionally, the Ulama opposed tonbaku concessions by lending support to merchants due to the common interests they shared. In 1892, preachers gave sermons to organize the merchants against the Monopoly, in Istanbul especially. In the same year, Mirza Hassan Shirazi, the chief mujtahid, issued a fatwa against the Tonbaku Monopoly, prohibiting sales, purchases, and consumption of the tonbaku imported by the Monopoly for the Shiite people living in the Ottoman Empire. That is, the Ulama sought to mobilize the Shiites to create a public reaction against the Monopoly.

The Ottoman government and the Monopoly fixed the selling prices of tonbaku varieties on the contract. They decided on following a high price policy to maximize their profits. However, the market forces were very sensitive in price setting. Naturally, the consumers preferred to consume cheaper commodities offered by the smugglers. Thus, a severe competition began between the smugglers and the Monopoly. The smugglers continued their connections with the producers in Iran. So, their commodities were cheaper than those of the Monopoly. In 1893, sales of the Monopoly sharply dropped below 50 percent of the targeted import volume. At the same year, the bey'iyeh incomes also decreased because many merchants closed their stores. The tonbaku tariff was decreased in the provinces where it was mostly consumed in order to increase sales in 1893. However, the Monopoly was not able to compete with the smugglers and bankrupted in 1895. The ownership of the Monopoly soon was transferred to the Ottoman Bank since it could not pay its debts.

Afterwards, the Ottoman Bank resorted to capital raising for the company. Nevertheless, this was also ineffective to move it into a profitable stage. The decline in the sales of the Monopoly continued and the company hardly could cover its losses until 1908. Following this year, it could not, and the Monopoly's income consistently remained under its expenses. In the meantime, demand for smuggled tonbaku permanently followed an increasing pattern. In the Yemeni region, smugglers systematically delivered tonbaku to consumers' addresses. In Hejaz region, the sales of Monopoly's franchisers almost stopped. In 1912, the Ottoman government began to discuss abolition

of the Monopoly because it could not pay its debts. In 1914, the government cancelled it.

Consequently, the merchants and the Ulama responded to the exclusive policies produced by the Western capitalist and the Ottoman government with smuggling when consumers preferred consuming the smuggled tonbaku in the presence of high price policy. Thus, both the Monopoly and the government failed. Their attempts to maximize their profits by following a high price policy constitute the basis of their failure. Naturally, they could not compete with the smugglers because they did not take the price sensitivity of the consumers into consideration. However, the price elasticity of tonbaku was very high. Additionally, there was a competitor offering a cheaper commodity to the consumers. Thus, the tonbaku market continued its previous interactive structure during the Monopoly's period. This conclusion supports the argument that public economic policies cannot be successful if market mechanism, namely, supply and demand forces and their equilibrium, and relevant social dynamics are not taken into consideration. Briefly, based on the study we finally can state that in order for public economic policies to be successful, the society and social groups who are affected by it should not be disregarded while making economic decisions.



باعتبار اینکه این شرکت در حال حاضر در مرحله مقدماتی فعالیت خود را آغاز کرده و هنوز در حال تکمیل ساخت و تجهیز است. در صورتیکه این شرکت بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند، این شرکت در صورتیکه بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند، این شرکت در صورتیکه بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند...

این شرکت در حال حاضر در مرحله مقدماتی فعالیت خود را آغاز کرده و هنوز در حال تکمیل ساخت و تجهیز است. در صورتیکه این شرکت بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند، این شرکت در صورتیکه بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند...

این شرکت در حال حاضر در مرحله مقدماتی فعالیت خود را آغاز کرده و هنوز در حال تکمیل ساخت و تجهیز است. در صورتیکه این شرکت بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند، این شرکت در صورتیکه بتواند در آینده به صورت یک شرکت سهامی عام فعالیت کند...





1848

Il a été reconnu et arrêté

le jour de...

Le Gouvernement Impérial  
 a décidé de la création  
 d'un grand établissement  
 de commerce, au capital de  
 50 millions de francs, sous  
 le nom de Banque Impériale  
 de France, à Paris, le 15  
 Mars 1848.

Article 1<sup>er</sup>

Le Gouvernement Impérial  
 a décidé de la création  
 d'un grand établissement  
 de commerce, au capital de  
 50 millions de francs, sous  
 le nom de Banque Impériale  
 de France, à Paris, le 15  
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 de France, à Paris, le 15  
 Mars 1848.

Lesdits articles de la loi de 1806  
ont été abrogés par la loi de 1817

Lesdits articles de la loi de 1806  
ont été abrogés par la loi de 1817

Article 1  
à un tiers, moitié, deux

Lesdits articles de la loi de 1806  
ont été abrogés par la loi de 1817

Lesdits articles de la loi de 1806  
ont été abrogés par la loi de 1817

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ont été abrogés par la loi de 1817

Article 8

Lesdits articles de la loi de 1806  
ont été abrogés par la loi de 1817



CHIMIE DES ÉLÉMENTS

Si l'on considère une réaction chimique, elle peut être représentée par une équation chimique. Les réactifs se trouvent à gauche et les produits à droite. Les coefficients stœchiométriques sont placés devant les formules chimiques. Les équations doivent être équilibrées, c'est-à-dire que le nombre d'atomes de chaque élément doit être le même de part et d'autre de l'équation.

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Article 10  
 La chimie est une science qui étudie la composition et les propriétés des substances et les transformations qu'elles subissent. Elle est divisée en chimie organique et chimie inorganique.

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Article 11  
 La chimie est une science qui étudie la composition et les propriétés des substances et les transformations qu'elles subissent. Elle est divisée en chimie organique et chimie inorganique.

*[Faint handwritten notes in the left margin, partially illegible.]*

seront exemptés de tous droits  
de douane et de transport, et  
devront acquiescer, sans réserve,  
à l'impôt de transit accordé.

Article 6.

Les marchandises de toutes espèces  
acquiescées par les sociétés trans-  
sahariennes, devront être réexpédiées  
au départ de destination dans les  
vingt jours de la livraison.

Pendant la durée de la conven-  
tion, le double passera toujours  
régulièrement par les douanes  
indigènes des colonies, conformément  
aux règles en vigueur, et  
sera soumis à un régime spécial de  
passage par les douanes indigènes.

Article 7.

Les marchandises réexportées im-  
pédiées dans le territoire des  
colonies, sauront acquiescer, sans réserve,  
à l'impôt de transit accordé, au départ de  
destination, dans les vingt jours de la  
livraison, conformément aux règles  
en vigueur, et sera soumis à un régime  
spécial de passage par les douanes  
indigènes.

*[Faint handwritten notes in the left margin, partially illegible.]*

Le grand de ces...  
de la police...  
de la police...  
de la police...

Le grand de ces...  
de la police...  
de la police...  
de la police...

1870

Commissaire de la Police Nationale  
pourront être...  
la nuit au...  
surtout, de chaque...  
de la police...  
de chaque...  
restent au...  
par la...  
meilleure...  
tout, avec...  
à tel...  
du...  
en...  
répéter...  
pour...  
l'effort...  
attendant...  
des...  
contants...  
très...  
de...  
rien...

1871

Le grand de ces...  
de la police...  
de la police...  
de la police...

Le grand de ces...  
de la police...  
de la police...  
de la police...

1872  
Le 15 Mars 1872  
Monsieur le Ministre  
J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint  
un rapport sur les travaux effectués  
par le service de l'enseignement  
primaire pendant l'année scolaire  
1871-1872. Ce rapport est divisé  
en deux parties : la première  
contient les renseignements  
généraux sur l'état de l'enseignement  
primaire dans le département  
et la seconde les détails  
relatifs à l'enseignement  
primaire dans les communes  
de la circonscription.

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et la seconde les détails  
relatifs à l'enseignement  
primaire dans les communes  
de la circonscription.

1. *La République* est un régime  
 qui a été établi par la  
 constitution de 1870. Elle  
 est basée sur le principe  
 de la séparation des  
 pouvoirs. Le législatif  
 est composé de la  
 Chambre des députés et  
 du Sénat. L'exécutif  
 est confié au Président  
 de la République et au  
 Conseil d'État. Le  
 pouvoir judiciaire est  
 exercé par le Tribunal  
 de cassation et les  
 tribunaux inférieurs.

2. *Le régime* est basé  
 sur le principe de la  
 séparation des pouvoirs.  
 Le législatif est  
 composé de la Chambre  
 des députés et du  
 Sénat. L'exécutif est  
 confié au Président  
 de la République et  
 au Conseil d'État. Le  
 pouvoir judiciaire est  
 exercé par le Tribunal  
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 tribunaux inférieurs.

3. *Le régime* est basé  
 sur le principe de la  
 séparation des pouvoirs.  
 Le législatif est  
 composé de la Chambre  
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 tribunaux inférieurs.

Parti	Voix
Union républicaine	100
Radicaux	80
Libéraux	60
Conservateurs	40
Socialistes	20
Autres	10

Bibliothèque de la République

L'Assemblée a été présidée par M. le Ministre de l'Intérieur.  
 Elle a été ouverte à 9 heures.  
 Le Ministre de l'Intérieur a prononcé l'éloge de M. le Comte de Paris.  
 Il a ensuite exposé les motifs de la loi sur le régime des boissons.  
 Cette loi a pour objet de modifier le régime des boissons.  
 Elle a été adoptée à l'unanimité.  
 Le Ministre de l'Intérieur a ensuite exposé les motifs de la loi sur le régime des boissons.  
 Cette loi a pour objet de modifier le régime des boissons.  
 Elle a été adoptée à l'unanimité.  
 Le Ministre de l'Intérieur a ensuite exposé les motifs de la loi sur le régime des boissons.  
 Cette loi a pour objet de modifier le régime des boissons.  
 Elle a été adoptée à l'unanimité.

M. le Ministre de l'Intérieur

Le Gouvernement a l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint le projet de loi sur le régime des boissons.  
 Ce projet a pour objet de modifier le régime des boissons.  
 Il a été élaboré par le Comité consultatif des boissons.  
 Le Gouvernement a l'honneur de vous adresser ci-joint le projet de loi sur le régime des boissons.  
 Ce projet a pour objet de modifier le régime des boissons.  
 Il a été élaboré par le Comité consultatif des boissons.

L'Assemblée a été présidée par M. le Ministre de l'Intérieur.  
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 Cette loi a pour objet de modifier le régime des boissons.  
 Elle a été adoptée à l'unanimité.

de destruction. C'est en passant  
 monde. C'est l'ambiguïté  
 à la société en passant  
 l'un à l'autre, en se séparant.  
 C'est le cas de la guerre civile  
 pour la société, à la guerre  
 et qui sera combattue par la  
 guerre ou par une révolution.  
 L'autre - les parties, le système  
 sera soumis à la décision  
 d'un comité ou d'un peu d'hommes.  
 C'est le parti - système, d'un  
 de une révolution par la voie  
 commerciale, et de deux  
 autres par le profit d'un  
 de la guerre civile.  
 C'est donc un système  
 mission, son objet est  
 pour le deux parties.  
 et cette tâche est de  
 et d'organiser dans le détail  
 la question - modification de  
 avec le capitalisme du début  
 de la révolution comme  
 cette tâche, ainsi et  
 la réflexion approfondie et  
 l'Etat, et l'on s'agit  
 à l'égard de la révolution.  
 en souffrant, mais des  
 les parties en passant  
 la guerre à la guerre.  
 C'est le système  
 1. Préparation de la guerre

Le cas de la guerre civile  
 est le plus fréquent, la guerre  
 d'un ou d'un peu d'hommes  
 choisie par les deux parties  
 de la guerre - système, d'un  
 de une révolution par la voie  
 commerciale, et de deux  
 autres par le profit d'un  
 de la guerre civile.

en passant  
 les parties en passant  
 la guerre à la guerre.



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Appendix D: Tariff Decrease to Decline the Consumption of Smuggled

Tonbaku

Handwritten text in Arabic script, likely a historical document or manuscript. The text is dense and appears to be a formal report or decree. It contains several lines of text, some of which are indented. The script is in a traditional style, possibly from the Ottoman Empire or a similar region. The text is written on a rectangular piece of paper with a decorative border. There are some faint markings and a small stamp at the top right of the page.

Source: BBA IML 1321/C.8











Appendix F: The telegraph of Sixth Army about Effect of the Fatwa of Mirza Hassan Shirazi in Iraq



Source: BBA Y PRK ASK 86/54

Appendix G: The Convention Signed between the Tonbaku Monopoly and the Ottoman Tobacco Monopoly in 1894



Source: BBA DH MKT 326/52

توضیحات: شرحی که در این کتاب آمده است، در بعضی موارد با آنچه در کتب دیگر آمده است، تفاوت دارد.

کتاب: شرحی که در این کتاب آمده است، در بعضی موارد با آنچه در کتب دیگر آمده است، تفاوت دارد.

کتاب: شرحی که در این کتاب آمده است، در بعضی موارد با آنچه در کتب دیگر آمده است، تفاوت دارد.

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کتاب: شرحی که در این کتاب آمده است، در بعضی موارد با آنچه در کتب دیگر آمده است، تفاوت دارد.

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کتاب: شرحی که در این کتاب آمده است، در بعضی موارد با آنچه در کتب دیگر آمده است، تفاوت دارد.

کتاب

شاکر زکریا...  
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم...  
الحمد لله رب العالمين...  
والصلاة والسلام على سيدنا محمد...  
والآله الطيبين الطاهرين...  
أما بعد...  
فإننا نحن undersigned...  
بموجب ما ذكره...  
في تاريخ...  
من سنة...  
في شهر...  
بمدينة...

تذکرہ

بخدمت عالیجناب...  
موجود در محل...  
الذکر...  
تاریخ...  
مقام...  
بخدمت...  
بموجب...  
در تاریخ...  
بمقام...  
بخدمت...  
بموجب...  
در تاریخ...  
بمقام...

تذکرہ

بخدمت عالیجناب...  
موجود در محل...  
الذکر...  
تاریخ...  
مقام...  
بخدمت...  
بموجب...  
در تاریخ...  
بمقام...  
بخدمت...  
بموجب...  
در تاریخ...  
بمقام...

تذکرہ

بخدمت عالیجناب...  
موجود در محل...  
الذکر...  
تاریخ...  
مقام...  
بخدمت...  
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بخدمت...  
بموجب...  
در تاریخ...  
بمقام...

تذکرہ

بخدمت عالیجناب...  
موجود در محل...  
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Cevdet, Zaptiye

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