Germany's Commitment to and Impact on

European Integration: Continuity or Change?

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For Seçkin, Defne and Kaan

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ABSTRACT

Germany's Commitment to and Impact on

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This study examines whether, and to what extent, united Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration has changed. A comparative analysis over time is undertaken by contrasting West Germany's European policy with that of united Germany. Special importance is attributed to political parties and public opinion. Both influence the shaping of European policy, that occupies a position in-between foreign policy and domestic policy, because the European Union is not only an arrangement between nation-states, but affects individual citizens directly. The process of German unification, Germany's new foreign policy and Germany's impact on European integration are studied for indications of Germany's alleged new "assertiveness". Our main finding is that the commitment of German political parties to European integration has not decreased, but even increased. However, Germany's foreign policy has shifted towards "benign" realism, and its European policy has become more pragmatic due to new challenges in the international environment. United Germany's influence in the European Union has increased, and is, at the same time, decreasing as Germany is pushing for more supranational decision-making. The "permissive

consensus" of the German public is eroding due to the changed nature of the European Union that has started to confer more rights and duties on individual citizens since the Maastricht Treaty. Notwithstanding certain changes, Germany's basic consensus on European integration continues to exist. As a trading state, the country can best ensure its interests in a peaceful and cooperative environment and considers European integration as the best tool to prevent history from repeating itself.

Keywords

ÖZET

Almanya'nın Avrupa Entegrasyonuna Taahhüdü ve Entegrasyon üzerindeki Etkileri : Devamlılık mı yoksa Değişim mi ?

Bianca Kaiser-Pehlivanoğlu

Bu çalışma birleşik Almanya'nın Avrupa entegrasyonuna taahhüdü ve entegrasyon üzerindeki etkisinin değişip değişmediğini ve değişiklik varsa boyutunu irdelemektedir. Batı Almanya'nın Avrupa politikası ile birleşik Almanya'nın Avrupa politikası farklı zaman dilimleri göz önüne alınarak karşılaştırmalı analize tabi tutulmuştur. Bu konuda siyasi partiler ve kamuoyuna özel bir önem verilmiştir. Hem siyasi partiler hemde kamuoyu, dış politika ile iç politika arasında yer alan Avrupa politikasının şekillenmesini etkilemektedir, çünkü Avrupa birliği yanlızca ulusdevletler arası bir düzenleme olmakla kalmayıp, aynı zamanda vatandaşları birey olarak doğrudan ilgilendirmektedir. Almanyanın birleşme süreci, Almanya'nın yeni dış politikası ve Avrupa entegrasyonu üzerindeki etkileri Almanya'ya atfedilen yeni "iddialı yaklaşımının" belirtileri açısından değerlendirilmiştir. Ana bulgumuz Alman siyasi partilerinin Avrupa entegrasyonuna taahhüdünün azalmadığı, hatta arttığı yönündedir. Bununla birlikte, Almanya'nın dış politikası "selim" bir realizme doğru kaymış ve Avrupa politikası uluslararası alandaki yeni tehditler nedeniyle daha pragmatik bir hale gelmiştir. Birleşik Almanya'nın Avrupa Birliği üzerindeki etkisi artmıştır, ve aynı zamanda, bu etki Almanya daha fazla devletlerüstü karar alınması konusunda gayret

gösterdikçe azalmaktadır. Alman halkının Avrupa birliği konusundaki başlangıçta siyasilere devrettiği karar verme yetkisi ("permissive consensus") Maastricht Anlaşmasından beri vatandaşlara daha fazla hak ve görev vermeye başlayan Avrupa Birliği'nin değişen yapısı nedeniyle erozyona uğramaktadır. Belirli değişikliklere karşın Almanya'nın Avrupa entegrasyonu konusundaki temel fikir birliği devam etmektedir. Ticaret yapan bir ülke olarak, Almanya çıkarlarını en iyi şekilde barış ve işbirliği ortamı içerisinde koruyabilir ve Avrupa birliğini tarihin tekerrürünü engellemek için en uygun araç olarak görebilir.

Anahtar sözcükler

Almanya - Avrupa Entegrasyonu - Almanya'nın Birleşmesi - Siyasi Partiler - Kamuoyu.

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I. INTRODUCTION

When the Berlin Wall opened in the night of November 9 in 1989, the Cold War came to an end virtually over night. Although the winds of change had been blowing from Moscow for quite some time, the German leadership, like the rest of the world, was caught completely off guard by the historic events of that fall. West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl had repeatedly expressed his conviction that German "reunification" would not take place in his lifetime. All of a sudden, though, national "unification"[1] - a priority national policy-goal cherished since Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany - was looming on the horizon and became an accomplished reality only a year later.

What had already been two powerful countries in the heart of Europe, suddenly joined and became one. Everybody agrees that no other country in Europe is likely to play such a "pivotal role"[2] as Germany in shaping the future course of the new Europe. For Western Europe, Germany's active participation in the historic drive toward greater economic and political integration is regarded as indispensable. On the other hand, Central and Eastern European countries, as well as the successor states of the former Soviet Union, see Germany as a vital source of financial aid and investment, as well as the most important trading partner, while trying to overcome the difficult challenges of economic reconstruction.

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[1] The political distinction between "reunification" and "unification" will be explained later on. In this study, the term "unification" will be used.
[2] Paul B. Stares, "Introduction" in: Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe*, Washington (D.C.) 1992, p. 1.

After the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany, integrating the country into the Western European context had become one of the main pillars of West German foreign policy. It was well understood by Konrad Adenauer, and by all of his successors, if German unification was ever to happen, it could only take place under the umbrella of the European Community, and with the full consent of its neighbors. When German unity was finally achieved in 1990, many of Germany's allies wondered whether Germany would now, after having achieved this goal, be less cooperative in European matters. Despite West Germany's, and later unified Germany's, extreme efforts to assure the world that it had learned its lesson from history, and that it is whole-heartedly dedicated to European integration, ambiguity about Germany's real motivations has never been completely erased.

The so-called *German Question*, which is often alluded to, has had different notions and dimensions over time.[3] One notion focused on the German people and their ability to establish "a stable liberal democratic polity in Germany"[4]. The old Federal Republic of Germany was considered a highly successful example of democratic values and institutions. With the inclusion of the former German Democratic Republic into the Federal Republic, the *German Question* seemed to be settled in this regard. Yet, another view focused on Germany's relationship with its European neighbors. Hassner has circumscribed this by asking: "What kind of Germany would fit into what kind of Europe, so as to be neither too strong nor too weak for its European environment?"[5] This question has been posed since the beginnings of the European

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[3] Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte* ("German Unification: International Aspects"), publications for the Research Institute of the German Society for International Politics, Bonn/Bergisch-Gladbach 1991, pp. 101-104.
[4] William E. Paterson, "Germany and Europe" in: Jonathan Story, ed., *The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy since 1945*, Cambridge (MA) 1993, p. 165.
[5] Pierre Hassner, "The Shifting Foundations" in *Foreign Policy*, vol. 48, no. 3, 1982, p. 3.

Community, and continues to be asked today. After unification, many Europeans, and Germans alike, have thus been asking themselves whether the *German Question* has now been settled conclusively, or whether a new and stronger Germany will strife to dominate its European partners in the European Union. Or worse, whether Germany might embark again on some dangerous – possibly military – adventure.

The aim of this study is, therefore, to examine what indications there are of Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration, and in which way these have been affected by the event of unification. We will examine the attitude of Germans, politicians and public alike, towards European integration, as well as the motivation behind them. At first, focus will be on these attitudes, as they manifested themselves in West Germany from the inception of the Federal Republic until 1989, before the fall of the Berlin Wall. This is necessary in order to contrast them with attitudes after unification. The process of unification will be examined, analyzing whether this process itself has given rise to paradigmatic changes in German foreign policy in general, and in European policy in particular, and in which way unification was achieved. Then, we will look at post-unification attitudes towards European integration, and at the impact Germany has had so far on shaping the new Europe.

Whereas before 1989, European integration is understood to include only the European Community, in the subsequent period we will also look at Germany's engagement in the former Eastern Bloc. When discussing theoretical schools of thought, we will see that integration theory has so far not come up with a generally accepted definition of integration, or even indicators measuring the extent of integration. In our analysis, by "integration" we understand the ever-increasing

pooling of national sovereignty under one common body, namely the European Union. It lies in the nature of the European Union that, here, a definition of "integration" is difficult. In particular the events in Europe after the end of the Cold War have made it increasingly difficult to guess at the final shape that the European Union will take. To describe it as "a federation in the making" is probably the most accurate term available.

When analyzing to which extent German commitment to and impact on European integration has been altered, the following consideration must be taken into account: The end of the Cold War has not only upset the European continent, but has had global dimensions. While the bi-polar world has certainly come to an end, the debate in international relations goes on over whether multiple new poles have emerged, or whether there is only one global power left, that is the United States, and which configuration is the more stable one. This situation has affected several countries as to their identity and purpose. The European Union, for one, aims at becoming a new "superpower", which is demonstrated by the Union's efforts to set up a common foreign and defense policy in order to assert its political weight, and possibly military might, in the international arena. Yet, the prospect of admitting new members does not make this aim easy. On the one hand, the structures of the European Union urgently need an overhaul to handle the new "extended" family. On the other hand, an increasing number of voices within the Union will make it even harder for it to speak with one voice.

Germany, it seems, is "in the eye of the storm". Almost everyone acknowledges that so much depends on the new Germany. However, the country has come under heavy

pressure through varying expectations. Germany is expected to take a lead in furthering European integration. Yet, its global role is disputed. While some expect Germany to assume global political and military responsibilities, it meets at the same time with criticism if it attempts to do exactly that. This situation is not helped by the fact that the Germans themselves continue to have ambivalent feelings about their new role in the world.

The literature, that has been surveyed, has not produced any satisfying in-depth factual analysis on Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration. Many authors write about German foreign policy in general terms, and the issue of European integration figures only as one among others.[6] Others have focused mainly on security and/or the German-American relationship.[7] Many writings deal with Germany's role in European integration in a rather superficial way. Often, conclusions are drawn without sufficient factual evidence, and the evaluation of Germany's role appears thus not well sustained and rather fragmented. The theoretical approach used in various studies written after German unification, even lacking completely sometimes, has not been satisfying either. It is mostly reduced to an exchange in arguments over the question of whether the new Germany has suddenly become more "assertive", or whether the country has simply developed into a "normal" state. The underlying assumption in most of these works is that state behavior is influenced by

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[6] See for instance Christian Hacke, *Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* ("Reluctant Global Power: The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany"), Stuttgart 1988. Hacke, from a conservative point of view, focuses on the foreign policy of successive governments and finds that "classical attributes of power (political pressure, strife for territorial gains and military aggression) have been abandoned", and that instead a "will for peace and readiness for conciliation" has emerged (p. 467). See also the second edition of Hacke's book under the same title, published in Frankfurt a.M. in 1993.

[7] See for instance Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika* ("Germany, Europe, America"), Paderborn 1991; Helga Haftendorn, Lothar Wilker and Claudia Wörmann, eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* ("The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany"), Berlin 1982.

the relative possession of power, although the dimensions of "power" are not clearly established.

Therefore, we face the task of making a contribution to constructing a more comprehensive picture of Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration. We will, particularly, use primary sources to a much greater extent than has been done so far. Apart from such a content analysis, we regard it as innovative to directly contrast pre-1989 and post-1989 attitudes and policies in this context. Furthermore, the analysis of the position of German political parties on European integration is particularly conducted on the basis of primary sources, that is to say political speeches and statements. Moreover, by including the impact of Germany public attitudes and political parties into our analysis of German European policy, we acknowledge the growing awareness in international relations that domestic politics and foreign policy cannot be separated. Moreover, European policy is not to be included into traditional foreign policy. It is rather a special case due to the fact that the European Union is increasingly affecting individual citizens directly. Yet, in all this, we realize that this problem area is characterized by extreme complexities, which a short study, such as the present one, can hardly hope to untangle completely. In order to outline the theoretical background for our analysis and establish the methodology procedure, we will now turn to the study's research design.

2. RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to set up the research design of our study, we will first of all look at theoretical schools of thought that are believed to be relevant for theoretical assumptions underlying our analysis. In the second place, a literature survey will be undertaken to see what the current state of knowledge regarding our research question is, and which contribution our study can make in this regard. Finally, we will outline the methodological procedure that will be applied to this study.

2.1. Schools of Thought

International relations as a discipline is preoccupied with the study of the relationships between states. To this end, states are considered to be primary actors. However, it is difficult to choose a focal point when engaging in the analysis of a particular problem. Due to the fact that international relations is a comprehensive field characterized by complex relationships, this problem is not solved easily. In order to distinguish between various approaches, the researcher must be aware that, practically, there exist six levels of analysis[1]: individuals, subnational groups (parties, the media, interest groups)[2], nation-states, transnational groups and organizations not made up of states (political, religious or economic entities), international groups and organizations with states or their representatives as members (European Union, United Nations), and the

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[1] See J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" reprinted in: James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, New York 1969, pp. 20-29.

[2] This is the particular focus of national and comparative foreign policy studies postulating a significant linkage between domestic and international politics.

international or global system. Naturally, the field of international relations is divided by scholars favoring one or the other approach, or rather favoring "micro" or "macro" perspectives.

International relations theory, consisting of numerous individual theories, makes statements which identify and explain relationships between variables. These relationships can be either of a causal or correlational nature, the latter being the weaker one of the two. International relations theory attempts particularly to establish causal relationships. Its functions are, in the first place, to explain relationships between different variables, and to organize the factual material in such a way as to determine what the different variables causing foreign policy are. Theory further serves to predict the consequences of alternate courses of action, and constitutes an important guide to foreign policy.

In the following, we will examine different theoretical approaches in order to see in which way they have contributed to explaining the phenomonenon of European integration. In addition, the motivation of states to cede national sovereignty to a supranational body will be looked into. Theories of integration have been especially constructed to explain the experience of the European Community in the 1960s and subsequent decades, and only to a lesser extent integration experiences in other regions of the world. We will examine the two main schools of this approach, namely functionalism and neo-functionalism. With all schools of thought we will particularly determine how far they have been able to explain a country's motivation, here Germany's, to join an integrational regional scheme. Furthermore, we will look at

factors influencing the shaping of European policy as a mixture of domestic politics and foreign policy.

2.1.1. Theories of Integration

2.1.1.1. Functionalism

David Mitrany is widely regarded as the "father" of functionalism. His writings, produced during the period between the two world wars as well as after the Second World War, have influenced other integration theorists to a great extent. At the heart of Mitrany's theory is his doctrine of "ramification". It explains how the development of collaboration in one technical field leads to similar behavior in other technical fields. Central to Mitrany's approach are, therefore, issues in which technicians play a vital role. Mitrany believed that, in the end, the political sector would be absorbed. Taylor and Groom state that such cooperation is "peace-oriented"[3], linking it with idealist ideas. By placing emphasis on cooperation, functionalism is, thus, opposed to realist theory, which is preoccupied with conflict and competition as the foremost characteristics of international politics.

Haas, in the early stage of his work a functionalist, later a neo-functionalist, based his theory upon Mitrany's. Yet, he developed his own definition of integration, regarding it basically as a phenomenon by which "political actors in several distinct national

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[3] A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, "Functionalism and International Relations" in: A.J.R. Groom and Paul Taylor, eds., *Theory and Practice in International Relations: Functionalism*, New York 1957, p. 2.

settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction of the preexisting national states."[4] Whereas Haas concentrated mainly on the Western European experience, as indeed most scholars of integration theory do, Lindberg viewed regional integration as part of an evolution towards international integration, as "(...) evolution over time to a collective decision-making system among nations."[5] By this, Lindberg implicitly embraces the idealist concept that human beings are able to alter their behavior by learning from past experiences.

Writers on integration are generally concerned with the process by which loyalty is shifted from one center to another, in our case study here that would be shifting loyalty from the German nation-state to the supranational structure of the European Union. All scholars conceive of an integrative system as one in which "actors find it possible consistently to harmonize their interests, compromise their differences, and reap mutual rewards from their interactions."[6] Expectations of these rewards are, at first, evaluated by the political and economic elites of a country. Progress in integration is determined by the ability of elites to "internalize" the integrative process, and work towards its realization. The idea that integration is a "multidimensional" phenomenon has initially been put forward by Lindberg[7], that is to say it includes

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[4] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, Stanford 1958, p. 16.
[5] Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement" in: Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, eds., "Regional Integration: Theory and Research", special issue of *International Organization*, vol. 24, no. 4, 1970, p. 650.
[6] Donald J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 10, no. 3, March 1972, p. 277.
[7] See Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement".

political as well as economic and legal dimensions. This has, however, later been embraced by other theorists as well.

2.1.1.2. Neo-Functionalism

Neo-functionalism is a continuation of functionalism. Some theorists, most notably Haas and Lindberg, have even modified and further developed their own, earlier, functionalist theories. The modification of definitions of integration and the testing of hypotheses about it, are the principal contributions to neo-functionalism. Most writers have been preoccupied with analyzing the Western European situation, but also increasingly with integrative experiences in the third world.

Haas modified Mitrany's doctrine of "ramification" into the concept of "spill-over". He suggested that if actors, on the basis of their interest-inspired perceptions, "desire to adapt integrative lessons learned in one context to a new situation, the lesson will be generalized."[8] In his work on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Haas assumed that political elites, which he saw as relevant for the initiation and progress of integration, do not support integration for "altruistic reasons"[9] but rather for pragmatic motives, that is to say they are weighing expected benefits and penalties. The innovative element that Haas introduced in his theory is the way he defined these expected benefits. Since few nations are observed to pursue power as such, power is closely linked to "the realization of welfare aims".[10] Furthermore, Haas drew attention

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[8] Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, Stanford 1964, p. 48.
[9] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, p. 13.
[10] Ibid.

to the possibility that political elites may redefine their perception of self-interest and welfare by undergoing a learning-process through previous integrative steps. The actors' purposes, that were at first considered to be technical, may be gradually politicized, and actors may thus "agree to consider the spectrum of means considered appropriate to attain them."[11] In addition, nations may also "upgrade" their national interests in a larger integrative setting.

Haas was especially concerned with the degree to which a regional integrative system can superimpose a national system, and therefore transform the international system. In this context, he pointed to two options nation-states have, when considering collective decisions taken by the integrative system[12]: Nation-states may a) consider the system's structures as too weak to achieve purposes and decide to withdraw from the integrative system, or b) they may enhance their original purposes and promote integration.

Haas, however, also recognized constraints of his own theory. On the one hand, he pointed to the fragility of his concept concerning expectations of economic gain, because they are not "reinforced with deep ideological or philosophical commitment."[13] An integrative process that is "built and projected from pragmatic reasons, therefore, is bound to be a frail process, susceptible to reversal."[14] On the other hand, although national political elites are confronted with an ever-growing

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[11] Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economics and Differential Patterns of Political Integration: Projections about Unity in Latin America" in *International Organization*, vol. 18, fall 1964, p. 707.
[12] Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, p. 81.
[13] Ernst B. Haas, "The 'Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 5, June 1967, pp. 323-45.
[14] Ibid.

range of issues, Haas does not see that governments are seeking supranational solutions to the same extent. Thus, he put forward a concept of "fragmented issue linkage" which will occur "when older objectives are questioned, when new objectives clamor for satisfaction, and when the rationality accepted as adequate in the past ceases to be a legitimate guide to future action."[15]

It has been mentioned already that several scholars viewed integration as a "multidimensional" phenomenon. Nye developed a neo-functionalist model that is based upon seven "process mechanisms" and four conditions for the "integrative potential". He also set forth three perceptual conditions that are affected by the integrative process, and four conditions that are likely to characterize the integration process over time.[16] Nye's contribution to integration theory lies in the fact that he has provided a framework for comparing different integrative processes, and for evaluating the scope of potential that regional organizations have to further integrate or develop into a federation. This is essential for policy-makers in order to create a strategy for integration, and for theorists to make predictions on the future of regional integrative systems.

Whereas Nye, in his analysis, drew more upon systems theory, Lindberg concentrated on both systems theory and decision theory. Lindberg regarded integration as an "interactive multidimensional process" that must be identified, measured, and compared. He concentrated his analysis on the "multiple properties of collective

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[15] Ernst B. Haas, "Turbulent Fields and the Theory of Regional Integration" in *International Organization*, vol. 30, no. 2, 1976, p. 184.
[16] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization*, Boston 1971, especially pp. 56-93.

decision-making systems".[17] In his paradigm of integration, Lindberg set forth "variable properties" that supposedly characterize the extent to which a group of nation-states engages in collective decision-making. Lindberg and Scheingold applied certain aspects of Lindberg's paradigm in an analytical study of the European Community.[18] Their main finding was the existence of an increase in issue areas dealt with collectively, as well as a "permissive consensus" among the public and political elites regarding the Community's legitimacy. In another empirical study, Russett used factor analysis to delineate regional groupings.[19] By factor-analyzing 54 social and cultural variables on 82 countries, Russett established four main groupings holding a certain integrative potential: the "Western Community", "Latin America", "semideveloped Latins", and "Eastern Europe".

2.1.1.3. General Critique of Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism

The main criticism of both functionalist and neo-functionalist theory is still the same that Nye put forward in 1968. That is to say, there is no generally accepted definition of integration or common agreement on indicators relevant for integration.[20] Similarly, Puchala noted that "more than fifteen years of defining, redefining, modeling, and theorizing have failed to generate satisfactory conceptualizations of

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[17] Leon N. Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement", p. 651-52.
[18] Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs (NJ) 1970.
[19] Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology*, Chicago 1967.
[20] See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement" in *International Organization*, vol. 22, fall 1968, p. 857. For a collection of writings on integration at the international level see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *International Regionalism: Readings*, Boston 1968.

exactly what it is we are talking about when we refer to 'international integration' and exactly what it is we are trying to learn when we study this phenomenon."[21] Several authors placed special emphasis on communications, or the flow of transactions within an integrated community. In this way, Deutsch, for instance, arrived at the conclusion that "European integration has slowed since the mid-1950s and it has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957-1958."[22] In contrast, others, like Lindberg, by using different indicators, or even sometimes the same ones, concluded that European integration had experienced considerable progress.[23]

Inglehart was the first analyst to pay special attention to public attitudes vis-à-vis European integration, which had been neglected so far. In a 1967 study, he examined the attitudes of school children in Britain, the Netherlands, Germany and France. He found that this young generation strongly supported European integration.[24] That generation, obtaining its political orientation after World War II, had a much more positive outlook than their parents, he found. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have expected that generation to make its "impact on the further evolution of the European Community in the 1990s."[25]

Another point of critique has been the lack of international systemic factors in the analytical frameworks attempting to explain integration. Hoffmann pointed to the fact that two important factors have been overlooked when analyzing European

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[21] Donald J. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants and International Integration", p. 267.

[22] Karl W. Deutsch, *France, Germany and the Western Allicane*, New York 1967, p. 218.

[23] Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford 1963, especially pp. 286-88.

[24] Ronald Inglehart, "An End to European Integration?" in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, March 1967, p. 92.

[25] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, New York 1990, third edition, p. 456.

integration. He argued that the bi-polar system that existed after World War II, and the diversity of national units, have considerably inhibited further spill-over in Europe.[26] In this context, one can think of additional examples of variables from the international environment that may influence the scope of integration in the European Union today, or the decision to join this Union. One example is increased international economic competition, particularly by South-East Asian countries, or even perceived threats posed by the former Soviet republics to Eastern and Middle European countries. These countries also have a psychologic feeling of belonging with Western European countries, rooted in a common cultural heritage.

Further, it has been criticized that functionalism is foremost concerned with technical, that is to say in the context of the European Community with economic, considerations. It is, however, difficult to separate economic, social and political tasks. Pentland, for instance, has concluded that, in a shrinking world, there is few evidence to sustain the hypothesis that economic growth and technologyby themselves are going to generate integration merely through functional cooperation.[27]

In addition, functionalism does not explain why national governments are generally reluctant to cede political authority to a supranational body. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff have stressed that "the road to political integration lies through political 'acts of will', rather than functional integration in economic and social sectors."[28] When comparing different integrative experiences, functionalism does neither account for the fact that

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[26] See Stanley Hoffmann, "The fate of the nation-state" in *Daedalus*, VC, summer 1966, p. 865.
[27] See Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, London 1973, especially pp. 97-98.
[28] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, p. 459.

expectations of economic gains from increased trade have led Western European countries to proceed with integration, while in a number of Third Wrld countries such expectations are often not present due to the fact that trade has been traditionally limited to agricultural products and raw materials that are exported to developed countries.

Summing up, it can be said that functionalist and neo-functionalist models of integration are not wrong but insufficient. Apart from the lack of a commonly accepted definition of integration, thus inhibiting research, no comprehensive analytical framework has been set up. Such a framework would need to take into account multidimensional aspects, that is to say economic, political and legal components, and enable the researcher to measure the extent of integration. However, research of such a complex phenomenon as integration should not solely concentrate on quantitative aspects. Other factors, such as the role of coercion, political will and leadership, and the impact of international issues upon integration may not be measurable. This fact calls for researchers to place equal emphasis on qualitative analysis. As integration is proceeding and, as in the case of the European Union today, is affecting citizens directly, public opinion and the response of political parties to increasing integration must be taken into account as well.

It is striking that all significant integrative models date back to the time before the 1980s. Since many theorists have focused primarily on the European Community, that fact might be due to the little progress integration has experienced there in the 1980s. The general feeling of pessimism at that time - "Eurosclerosis" - had a parallel in the work of theoreticians. Even though there was much speculation about the Single

European Market to be completed by the end of 1992, theorists have not shown much effort to develop new integrative frameworks. The same is true for the first half of the 1990s. Most scholars have probably been very busy dealing with international events that unfolded after 1989, including German unification.

Gaddis has rightly criticized international relations theory for not having been able to forecast the future, that is to say the end of the Cold War.[29] In particular, he criticizes the behaviorial approach for not being in touch with reality. This "bottom-up" approach[30], in his opinion, first measures and compares all observable evidence. Only then is a theory constructed to verify the resulting findings. The structural school is criticized for being too static. The "top-down" approach[31], on the other hand, treating unmeasurable structures in measurable ways, does, in Gaddis' view, not explain changes within states which, on their part, determine the characteristics of systems. Finally, the "evolutionary approach" is said to combine elements of the structural and the behavioral approaches, and extend them along the axis of time. However, Gaddis contends, it blurs "the distinction between behavior and structure."[32] This approach assumes that a learning process accounts for modifications in the behavior of states, and that such accumulated experience can indeed over time modify systemic structures.[33]

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[29] John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War" in *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1992/93, pp. 5-58.
[30] Ibid., p. 13.
[31] Ibid., p. 15.
[32] Ibid., p. 17.
[33] See also Francis Fukuyama's much noticed article, "The End of History?" in *The National Interest*, no. 16, summer 1989, pp. 3-18.

It is on the grounds of this criticism that Gaddis deplores the absence of an all-encompassing, or grand theory for international relations. This evaluation can also specifically be applied to integrative theory. Gaddis suggests to bring the scientific approach up to date by utilizing all tools disposable to predict the future, that is to say not only "theory, observation, and rigorous calculation, but also narrative, analogy, paradox, irony, intuition, imagination, and - not least in importance - style."[34] In short, he opts for making the "soft" sciences (social sciences), that became "harder" just as the "hard" sciences (natural sciences) were becoming "softer", again a little "softer".[35]

2.1.2. Other Theoretical Schools

Since integration theory has been found not to be sufficient for explaining the phenomenon of integration and the motivation of nation-states to join or stay within an integrative framework, we will now look at other theoretical schools searching for further explanatory factors. This will also be helpful in evaluating and understanding existing literature on Germany, relevant for our analysis of determining Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration.

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[34] John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", p. 58.
[35] Ibid., p. 54.

2.1.2.1. Idealism/Utopianism

The basic assumption of idealism, which was referred to as "utopianism" especially in the United States during the interval between the two world wars, is that human conduct is shaped by its environment. If these environmental factors are altered, then human conduct itself can be transformed. Humankind is, therefore, considered to be able to learn from historic lessons and capable of improvement. By setting up norms of conduct, as international law strives to do, it is believed that political behavior of nation-states can be changed.

The interest in international relations as a scholarly discipline rose after the First World War out of the desire to prevent such destructiveness to happen again. Yet, the failure of the League of Nations presented a major setback to idealist thoughts, or "Wilsonian idealism", at the time. The assumption of idealists that national self-determination would always produce representative government was proven wrong by the rise of Nazism in Germany. Consequently, another assumption, namely that of harmony of interest in peace at the level of individuals, which would then be brought to the level of representative political leaders, failed equally.

Especially Carr analyzed the philosophical differences between utopianists and realists.[36] He regarded most utopians as intellectual descendants of eighteenth-century Enlightenment optimism, nineteenth-century liberalism, and twentieth-century Wilsonian idealism. Criticizing both utopianists and realists, Carr held the view that

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[36] See Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, London 1939.

whereas utopians are inclined to ignore the lessons of history, realists often read history in a much too pessimistic way. While idealists tend to exaggerate freedom of choice - peace or war - realists overemphasize fixed causality and slip into determinism. Whereas the idealist is tempted to confuse national self-interest with universal moral principles, the realist often denies that human beings are capable of modifying their action through the process of thinking. Carr, a pragmatist himself, concluded that valuable political theories must contain both elements of realism and idealism, of moral values as well as of power.[37]

In 1972, Duchene invented the term "civilian power" in connection with the European Community.[38] Whereas Hill has provided a good overview of the various approaches in idealism,[39] Maull has listed the characteristics of a civilian power which, in his opinion, Germany and Japan come closest to possess.[40] In the context of the European Community, Germany as the epitome of a trading state that emphasizes economic might over military might, coupled with a foreign minister - Hans-Dietrich Genscher - who emphasized a "policy of responsibility" in his foreign policy, has long been regarded as an important factor in influencing the Community's development towards a civilian power.

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[37] Ibid., especially pp. 92-94.
[38] Francois Duchene, "Europe's Role in World Peace" in: R. Mayne, ed., *Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead*, London 1972.
[39] Christopher Hill, "European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian Model - or Flop?" in: R. Rummel, ed., *The Evolution of an International Actor: Western Europe's New Assertiveness*, Boulder (Col.) 1990.
[40] Hanns W. Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik" ("The Federal Republic of Germany as a Civilian Power - Fourteen Theses for a New German Foreign Policy") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 47, no. 10, 1992, pp. 269-278.

2.1.2.2. Realism

Realist theory has dominated international relations theory especially in the United States from the 1940s to the 1960s. It is partially a critique of idealism or utopianism, whose normative assumption is that the anarchic international system can be transformed through international law and organization. Realist theory is equally normative in its approach, but its proponents supposedly base their analysis on a theoretical framework that was drawn from history, especially the era of Europe's classical balance of power. In reality, realism is not as much theoretical as it is policy-oriented.

Realism has particularly set out to search for causes of conflict and war among nations. The two main causes for war are thought to be conflicting national interests pursued by states, and their struggle for power. The basic assumption of realism thus arises from the perceived nature of man. Man is a competitive being, and political behavior is rooted in the tendency on part of one actor, or state, to control or dominate others. Consequently, the main critique of realism is that although it explains competition, war and violence, it does not explain cooperation and peace.

Other fundamental assumptions of realist theory are the same as found in the so-called "traditional" paradigm of international relations: (1) nation-states are the key actors in a 'state-centric' system; (2) domestic policy and foreign policy are clearly separable domains; (3) international politics is a struggle for power in an anarchic environment; (4) due to differences in capabilities, the international system is composed of greater and lesser states. In realist understanding, "power" consists of different capabilities, or

qualitative and quantitative factors. That includes not just military might, but also natural resources, general economic potential, geographic location, population, levels of technology, political leadership, strategy, and ideology. However, it is foremost rather constant factors, such as geography and human behavior, that shape international conduct.

Realist scholars do not believe that the international system can be stabilized by altering or perfecting human behavior, as the utopian framework assumes. Hence, they focus on regulatory mechanisms, such as the balance of power, to prevent global hegemony of one nation-state. Although not being able to explain peace and cooperation, especially Hans Morgenthau, the "father" of realism, was preoccupied with searching for conditions to ensure international peace. He set up the following three conditions[41]: (a) absence of modern nationalism, that is to say the pursuit of national interests shall not go beyond what is necessary for national survival; (b) international consensus about a balance of power; (c) "traditional" diplomacy behind closed doors as opposed to diplomacy as conducted in the 20th century.

In looking for conditions to ensure peace, realists seek to reconcile national interests with supranational ideals. Yet, in realist theory, national interests are clearly set above supranational ideals. In that sense, regional integration is viewed again as a way to achieve national interests. Nation-states are, thus, actors looking for a tool conducive to maximizing their economic, and subsequently, political power position. Realism, however, does not explain, why nation-states are ready to cede national sovereignty to

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[41] See Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, brief edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson, New York 1993, especially parts eight, nine and ten.

a supranational body. Yet, although such a move may increase the economic power position of nation-states - as witnessed in the European Union - political power will necessarily decrease in the long-run if it is given out of national hands and transferred to a supranational institution.

2.1.2.3. Neo-Realism

Since the 1970s there has been not only a revival of interest in realist theory, but a broadly based neo-realist approach has emerged. Neo-realist theory set out to define key concepts more clearly than realism, and develop a series of propositions that can be subjected to investigation and empirical testing. In this school of thought especially one name stands out, that of Kenneth Waltz, who developed structural realism, or structuralism.

For neo-realists, power remains a key variable, but equal importance is given to the structure that links various actors, i.e. states. According to Waltz, the term "structure" implies the way in which the parts are interrelated and arranged. Like realists before him, Waltz conceived of states as "unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination."[42] In this approach, the international system is characterized by anarchy, thus contributing to the insecurity of states. Waltz proposed that only structural transformation could alter the anarchical nature of the international system.

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[42] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading (Mass.) 1979, p. 101.

In Waltz' theory, the main capabilities of nation-states are of military, economic or technological nature. Patterns of the system - like the balance of power - are derived from, and influenced by, the characteristics of states. Although this theory explains why there is insecurity, and why there is a balance of power, it does again not explain why states have realized that it is in their own best interest to cooperate. Furthermore, one type of state is not distinguished from another. In this way, internal conditions of states are disregarded and all concrete details about state behavior are dismissed. Waltz, who in contrast to Morgenthau is a theoretician, is basically seeking to build a general theory of international relations explaining the fundamental tendencies of states setting up a general framework that explains the behavior of states over a long period of time. To this end, no differentiated characteristics of states are needed.

The main similarities between realist and neo-realist theory are that both focus on the state as the basic unit of analysis and, thus, treat states as unitary actors, that is to say as the sum of interests of bureaucracy, political classes etc. Furthermore, both regard a balance of power as the fundamental pattern of behavior in the anarchic international system. However, whereas Morgenthau explained the behavior of states by human nature, Waltz has explained it in terms of the system's structure. Neo-realism is also criticized for being too static. By solely focusing on the state as actor, it ignores, as Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff correctly state, the "social basis and social limits of power. Power cannot be reduced to capabilities; instead, power consists also of psychological factors such as public morale and political leadership, as well as situational factors and

the extent to which power is exercised within a consensual, contrasted with a conflictual, framework."[43]

2.1.2.4. Systems Theories

Systems theory is a series of statements about relationships among independent and dependent variables. Changes in one or more variables are accompanied, or followed, by changes in other variables or combinations of variables. Polarity is one of the main concepts of systems theory. Waltz, for example, believes a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one[44], although many political scientists regard the latter as more stable.

A variation of systems theory, although closely related, is the concept of interdependence that is used to characterize relationships in the global international system. The main proponents of this school are Keohane and Nye[45], but their approach is not a neo-realist one like that of Waltz. Interdependence theorists hold that country A is dependent upon, as well as influenced by, the behavior of country B. The main assumption is that, in the modern world, nation-states cannot act as independently any more as they used to do. Military power is not considered as critical any more, whereas economic competition or conflict has become at least as important as political conflict. Interdependence theory modifies systems theory in so

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[43] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, p. 126.
[44] See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics" in *International Security*, vol. 18, no. 2, 1993, pp. 44-79.
[45] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition*, Boston 1977.

far as it stresses the importance of economic cooperation and international regimes, that is to say a set of rules agreed upon by a number of states to deal with a certain problem, for instance the European Union or OPEC.

In this context, Keohane and Nye find that increased international dependence has given rise to four political forms of interaction: communication, transport of goods, transport of people, and international financing. They call this state of affairs "world politics".[46] Furthermore, Nye points to the changed nature of power. He claims rightly that "power is becoming less fungible, less coercive, and less tangible.[47] Equally, Gutjahr maintains that "soft power", the ability to influence the action of other actors through negotiations, bargaining and compromises, has become a much more important tool in shaping the international agenda.[48]

Another important contribution to systems theory has been made by James Rosenau through his concept of "cascading interdependence".[49] At the heart of this concept are phenomena such as "resource scarcities, subgroupism, the effectiveness of governments, transnational issues, and the aptitudes of publics"[50], which are characterized by rapidly changing patterns of interaction among each other. The meaning of cascading interdependence is that individuals and groups occupy various roles in differing systems, that means in systems in which they may have participated

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[46] See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics*, Cambridge (MA) 1981.

[47] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York 1990, p. 188.

[48] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defense Policy after Unification*, London/New York 1994, p. 8.

[49] James M. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revsited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence" in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 28, no. 3, 1984, pp. 255-281.

[50] Ibid., p. 255.

previously or are participating currently. This leads to role conflicts and the "crisis of authority"[51]; therefore, it is wrong to refer to a "state system". The result of cascading interdependence is that power is distributed in erratic fashion among state entities and different subsystems at various levels.[52] Thus, the dynamic phenomenon of cascading interdependence may lead either to cooperation or to conflict, the latter resulting from a systemic breakdown.

Systems theory and integration theory have been closely associated in the literature of international relations theory. This is due to the fact that a great amount of integration theory has focused on the regional level. Therefore, integration studies and the regional subsystem have also been linked, especially since the early 1960s, when many writers set out to study the phenomenon of the European Community.

2.1.2.5. Decision-Making Theories

Basically, with the possible exception of Rosenau, systems theory assumes that states are unitary actors. Decision-making theory, however, rejects this. It focuses rather on political elites and public behavior. The process of decision-making itself can be defined as the act of choosing among available alternatives about which uncertainty exists. Since people usually do not have total information about the issues they are going to decide about, most decision-making theorists assign a central place to perception, or the subjective way a certain situation in the real world is viewed.

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[51] Ibid., p. 264.
[52] Ibid.

Therefore, decision-making theory, in contrast to traditional analysis, strives to examine the behavior of specific human beings as the shapers of governmental policy.

A great extent of decision-making theorists have focused on foreign-policy decisions in a crisis situation. One of the classic examples here is the study of Holsti, Brody and North of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.[53] Easton viewed the essence of political decision-making in a traditional way, when he defined politics as "the authoritative allocation of values for a society"[54]. However, decision-making theorists do not generally agree that the process of public and private decision-making is the same. The classic model of decision-making has viewed policy-makers as "rational" beings who, in order to arrive at a maximum utility, make their calculation in two basic dimensions, namely utility and probability. Decision-making theory, on the other hand, has come to view particularly the process of foreign-policy making rather as an "incremental process containing partial choices and compromises among competing organizational interests and bureaucratic pressures."[55]

In Allison's view, the "rational actor model", or "classical model", is not sufficient to account for reality. This is so because, in contrast to reality, policy choices are regarded as decisions taken by unified governments based on logical ways of achieving certain objectives. Allison, therefore, suggests that "although the Rational Actor Model has proved useful for many purposes, there is powerful evidence that it must be supplemented, if not supplanted, by frames of reference that focus on the

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[53] See Ole R. Hosti, Richard A. Brody and Robert C. North, "Measuring Effect and Action in the International Reaction Models: Empirical Materials from the 1952 Cuban Crisis" in *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 1, 1964, pp. 165-183.
[54] David Easton, *The Political System*, New York 1953, p. 129.
[55] James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, p. 469.

governmental machine."[56] To this end, Allison proposes to supplement the "rational actor model" with the "organizational process model" and the "bureaucratic politics model".[57] The "organizational process model" views governmental behavior not so much as a matter of free choice, but rather as independent outputs of different large organizations that are only partly coordinated and controlled by government. The "bureaucratic politics model" assumes that foreign-policy decisions are more or less the result of bargaining between competing bureaucratic agencies.

In conclusion, the decision-making process, as understood by general decision-making theory, is a function of many different factors relating to the behavior of individuals and of large organizations. Since decision-making is shaped by both the system and the individual's perception of it, together with personal traits of foreign-policy leaders, decision-making varies largely from one political context to another. Thus, decision-making theory is especially suitable to provide valuable insights to comparative foreign policies, although being distinct from it.

2.1.2.6. Theories of Coercion

Theories of coercion in international relations attempt to explain the phenomenon of war and establish the necessary conditions for its occurrence. Waltz analyzes three

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[56] Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston 1971, p. 5.
[57] See Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications" in *World Politics*, vol. 24, spring supplement 1972, pp. 40-79.

"images" that can explain international conflict:[58] human behavior (first image), internal structure of states (second image), and international anarchy (third image).

Microcosmic theories of coercion deal with the first image. There are basically three approaches in this category: (1) biological instinct theories of aggression, (2) psychological theories postulating a frustration-aggression drive, and (3) social learning theories. It is questionable, however, that any of these approaches constitutes a valid explanation, or sufficient condition, of intersocietal warfare. Equally, they can not, although this has not been the issue of analysis, explain cooperation among nations. For that, it is necessary to turn to the macrolevel of coercion theories.

Macrocosmic theories of coercion concentrate on the level of societies, nation-states, and other large organizations, in order to analyze the phenomenon of international conflict. Such theories, and assumed causes and explanations of war, are abundant. Of special interest, however, to our analysis is the school of peace research that is preoccupied with determining factors for the control of war. Among the most notable factors are diplomatic negotiation, international law, and international organization. Especially the subject of international law has attracted wide scholarly attention. Largely being a product of the Western world, it has, however, been often rejected by communist states and many, formerly colonized, Third World countries.

The terms "conflict resolution"[59] and "peace research"[60] have developed over time and include today studies in functional integration, international economic

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[58] Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York 1959.
[59] See for instance Lewis Lipsitz and Herbert M. Kritzer, "Unconventional Approaches to Conflict Resolution" in *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 19, December 1975, pp. 713-733; Morton Deutsch, *The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes*, New Haven 1973.

development, theories of arms races, the psychological study of political leaders, the behavior of decision-makers under conditions of crisis etc. In general, conflict has been regarded to serve positive social purposes. Even war is sometimes viewed as a means to resolve the integrative function of violent conflict. Analysts who perceive of conflict as a functional force regard it not only as an integrating force. They maintain that conflict helps to build up a group or collective identity, clarifies group boundaries ("in-group" versus "out-group"), and contributes to group cohesion. Consequently, many modern scholars perceive of conflict as "the central explanatory category for the analysis of social change or progress".[61]

2.1.3. Conclusions

The above-discussed theoretical schools have supplied valuable insights for our analysis of Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration. Having pointed out the changed nature of European policy in the wake of the Maastricht Treaty - which has assigned more rights to individual citizens and is, at the same time, involving them more directly in European Union affairs - it is evident that a clear distinction between domestic politics and foreign policy, as realism suggests, is not possible any more. International relations, in an integrative setting such as the European Union, and the conduct of foreign policy cannot be explained exclusively at the level of states.

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[60] See for instance Kenneth E. Boulding, "Accomplishments and Prospects of the Peace Research Movement" in *Arms Control and Disarmament, 1986*, vol. 1, London 1986, pp. 43-58.
[61] Lewis A. Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe (Ill.) 1964, p. 8.

Idealism, in the same way as realism and neo-realism, neglects the importance of political leaders and public opinion for the foreign-policy decision-making process. The "permissive consensus" that existed concerning the European Community's legitimacy, as neo-functionalists stated, does not exist any longer, as the public debate surrounding the Maastricht process has shown. This fact, together with the impact that German unification has had on the German public, justifies the examination of public attitudes for the formulation of Germany's European policy. Furthermore, the nature of the German party system - a system characterized by large catch-all parties that have formed shifting government coalitions with each other - warrants a closer look at the different streams within political parties in order to make predictions on future government coalitions.

The focus of decision-making theories on political elites and public behavior has explicitly rejected the assumption of states as unitary actors. Since the conditions for foreign-policy making differ from one political context to another, this process has to be especially examined within the German system. The Federal Chancellor's authority to determine policy guidelines of his ministries (*Richtlinienkompetenz*), including the Foreign Ministry, presents a special peculiarity of the German political system. Furthermore, the fact that foreign policy issues, which were usually not included in public political debates, but have increasingly begun to be included after national unification, sustains criticism against realism and neo-realism that the social basis and social limits of power cannot be ignored. In this regard, equally important is the quality of leadership, that is to say personal traits and motivation of political leaders to conduct European policy the way they do.

This last point encroaches upon the question of how the nature of the European Union has changed, or is changing. It remains to be seen whether the importance of high politics - that is to say the influence of political leaders to promote European integration through acts of will rather than economic or political necessity (spill-over effect) - is undergoing change and is making room for politics (public opinion, interest groups and party politics). Rosenau's concept of cascading interdependence has shown that, especially in a supranational construction such as the European Union, boundaries between state systems as well as subsystems are not fixed anymore. This is also of importance for shifting loyalties of the public and political leaders.

Theories of coercion have revealed that conflict can be regarded as the central explanation for the analysis of social change or progress. This becomes evident in the attitudes of many European political leaders who, after the devastating experience of the Second World War, conceive of the European Union in the first place as an instrument to preserve peace. In this respect, then, idealism is right in maintaining that individuals and their representative leaders are capable of learning from historic lessons. On a systemic level, the concept of interdependence has focused on increasing globalization and the change in the nature of power. Soft power has become a much more important tool in influencing international politics than traditional hard power. This appears to have given especially Germany a stronger influence in world politics due to the fact that this trading state reveals many of the characteristics of a "soft-power nation".

2.2. Literature Review

The literature on Germany, that was surveyed, has been chosen according to the relevance it bears for our research questions. That is to say, we have been looking specifically for publications dealing with German unification and explaining to which extent this event has affected Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration.

The literature on German unification that has appeared since 1989 has been very extensive. In the tumultuous times following immediately the historic events of 1989, writings tended to be quite emotional. Then, in the years 1991 and 1992, they became more factual, analyzing the process of unification. In subsequent years, most writers have come to terms with unification, basically being appeased by political realities, that is to say by the fact that Germany has demonstrated its willingness to remain firmly embedded in the Western Alliance of NATO and EU. However, the search for an answer to the question of whether Germany is trying to, and will, attain status of a "superpower" - both in political and in economic terms - has been continuing. As we will see, this is due to old fears harbored by Germany's neighbors because of the country's history. The 'burden of history' is apparently lifting very slowly, for both Germans and other Europeans. Therefore, German foreign-policy decisions - sometimes not carefully thought out by political leaders at home, sometimes overrated abroad - continue to be under special scrutiny.

Authors, who have written on Germany, can broadly be put into two categories: idealists and realists. Both, it appears, have been using the event of German

unification to underline their respective ways of looking at the post-cold war world. Idealists have, from the first moments of change in East Germany, with typical optimism, heralded the impending change in Germany as a historic chance to further European integration, and have their views seen confirmed by the Maastricht Treaty. Realists, with typical pessimism, have been cautious from the beginning, and warned of consequences caused by a revival of German nationalism[62], including the acquisition of nuclear weapons[63]. Economic difficulties that have been encountered by Germany and other EU member-states since the mid-1990s, have been taken as proof that it would be wiser to pursue economic convergence before embarking on the final section of the road to economic and monetary union.

Kaiser has produced a valuable analysis of the unification process' international issues on the basis of primary sources. He has dedicated, however, only two short chapters to Germany's relationship with the European Community.[64] Kaiser finds that German unity has helped deepening European integration. Germany must "set a good example" to help overcome the other member-states' reluctance to pooling sovereignty. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the fact that Germany's economic power cannot be equated with political power, because a multitude of economic actors operating in Germany are foreign.[65] In this context, Dohnanyi has also emphasized that a more "powerful" united Germany inherits at the same time the

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[62] For an immediate reaction to the possible unification of the FRG and GDR, see Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Beware, the Reich is Reviving" in *Times*, October 31, 1989.

[63] See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", pp. 44-79.

[64] Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte* ("German Unification: International Aspects"), publications for the research institute of the German Society for International Politics, Bonn/Bergisch-Gladbach 1991, pp. 95-129.

[65] Ibid., p. 124.

burden of a completely ruined East German economy. Modernizing that economy will

require massive investment for several years to come.[66]

Lippert et al. have examined the technical impact of German unification on the

European Community in selected economic sectors for a short-term and long-term

prognosis.[67] In terms of economic might, Lippert et al. find that, in the medium-term,

Germany has become "more of an equal, weaker, partner than a dominant member of

the Community".[68] The main reasons for this are the collapse of East-West trade in

1990-92, systemic change in East Germany, and a growing budget deficit. In the long-

term, much will depend on whether and how completely the eastern German

economy can be turned around.

A book by Stares entitled *The New Europe,* includes a relevant chapter on "Germany

and Europe" by Paterson[69]. Both the book and Paterson's chapter provide good

overviews over the situation in Europe after the Cold War and over Germany's

relationship with the European Community respectively. Paterson, while mainly

focusing on security issues, has found that the arguments against German dominance

outweigh those for dominance, and has observed a complete "lack of nationalist

euphoria"[70] in Germany over unification.

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[66] See Klaus von Dohnanyi, *Das deutsche Wagnis* ("The German Venture"), München 1990; Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Perspektiven der deutschen Einheit* ("Economic and Social Perspectives of German Unity"), expert opinion by the Institue of the German Economy, Cologne, September 1990.
[67] Barbara Lippert et al., *German Unification and EC Integration: German and British Perspectives.* London 1993.
[68] Ibid., p. 131.
[69] William E. Paterson, "Germany and Europe" in Jonathan Story , ed., *The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy since 1945*, Cambridge (MA) 1993, pp. 165-184.
[70] Ibid., p. 167.

Gutjahr bases his apt analysis of the position of German political parties on defense and foreign policy on speeches, articles and other publications by leading politicians.[71] He has found that there exists a cross-party consensus on these issues, and has taken this finding as an indication of basic trends in German politics. Gutjahr concludes that Germany will naturally become more assertive and calls this "benign realism"[72].

Pond concurs with Gutjahr that Germany will become more assertive and also calls this "good"[73], especially for the United States. She finds the German in the street to be "resolutely nonnationalistic"[74]. In a later article, she briefly suggests that German European policy is not motivated by "altruism, but self-interest"[75]. This is an argument that is, of course, not new, but which shall be explored more in depth in our analysis. In the same relaxed manner as Pond and Gutjahr have classified Germany's new assertiveness as good, Gordon and Schmidt have accepted Germany's "normalization" in foreign policy matters.[76]

It appears, that several American writers have been influenced by the realist assumption that nation-states are almost exclusively struggling for power. Thus, they have been unable to imagine that the possibility of war, at least among Western European nations, has been reduced to the almost impossible. Neo-realists, like

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[71] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defense Policy after Unification*.
[72] Ibid., p. 182.
[73] Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, spring 1992, p. 114.
[74] Ibid., p. 130.
[75] Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power" in *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1, winter 1996, p. 30.
[76] See Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy" in *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 2, 1994, pp. 225-243; Manfred G. Schmidt, "Political Consequences of German Unification" in *West European Politics*, vol. 15, October 1992, pp. 1-15.

Mearsheimer, have argued – in a much noticed article of the latter[77] – that the situation in Europe, including Western Europe, after the Cold War will set free old animosities and will make people long for the way things were before the Soviet Union collapsed. The analysis of Germany's new potential as presented by Asmus[78], follows the same line, while specifically concentrating on the new Germany.

Both views, idealists and realists, basically argue over the question of whether Germany can be contained by and within the framework of the European Union, or whether the event of unification has played into German hands regarding revived nationalism. This is particularly reflected by the struggle over the choice and applicability of such words as "power", "superpower", "assertiveness", "normalization", and "national interest". Rittberger has expressly rejected the term "power" *per se* for Germany. He calls the idea to "raise the Federal Republic as an individual state to the rank of a 'power' – of whatever size – (...) an anachronism, an example of 'outdated thinking.'"[79] On the other hand, a 1990 Newsweek cover declared: "A Unified Germany: The New Superpower"[80]. Thus, it summarized the opinion of numerous publications appearing at that time. Kaiser also concurs with Schwarz that "Germany is now indeed 'Europe's central power.'"[81]

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[77] John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War" in *International Security*, vol. 15, no. 1, summer 1990, pp. 5-56.

[78] See Ronald D. Asmus' following publications for the RAND-Corporation: *German Unification and Its Ramifications*, Santa Monica (CA) 1991, *Germany in Transition: National Self-Confidence and Interntional Reticence*, Santa Monica (CA) 1992, and *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation*, Santa Monica (CA), 1993.

[79] Volker Rittberger, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - eine Weltmacht?" ("The Federal Republic of Germany - A Global Power?") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, January 19, 1990, p. 17.

[80] Cover title of *Newsweek International* of February 2, 1990.

[81] Quotation of Hans-Peter Schwarz' book entitled: *Die Zentralmacht Europas: Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne* ("Europe's Central Power: Germany's Return to the World Stage"), Berlin 1994, by Karl Kaiser, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Aera des Globalismus: Zwischen Interdependenz und Anarchie" ("German Foreign Policy in the Era of Globalism: Between Interdependence and Anarchy") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 1, 1995, p. 35.

There have been several attempts to contradict realist and neo-realist views. Katzenstein, for example, details the taming effects on foreign policy that exist in a pluralist democracy[82]. In Germany, a new "idealist" school of thought[83] has emerged explaining Germany's peaceful intentions and political will to create a European peace zone[84]. Kohler-Koch finds that the case of Germany gives reason for hope that such a systemic transformation may indeed be achieved. This is so because on the one hand, Germany has a vested interest in European integration which enables it to achieve increased welfare, as well as a certain position of "power", especially in the economic sphere. Furthermore, Germany's readiness to commit itself to integration and transfer its sovereignty to a supranational body is enshrined in the *Basic Law*. Kohler-Koch concludes that Germany's "liberal-cooperative internationalism" - the foundation of which has been laid by *Genscherismus* - represents a good basis for European federalism and the interweaving of national and European politics. Yet, she does not consider the strategy of deepening and widening the European Union a good basis for this end. In her view, deregulation of the market may bring about economic growth. Yet, it creates, at the same time, social problems which may generate into political unrest due to the lack of opportunities for political participation.

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[82] See Peter Katzenstein, "Taming of Power: German Unification, 1989-1990" in: Meredith Woo-Cumings and Micheal Loraux, eds., *The Past as Prelude: History in the Making of a New World Order*, Boulder (Colo.) 1993, pp. 59-81.

[83] See for instance Beate Kohler-Koch, "Deutsche Einigung im Spannungsfeld internationaler Umbrüche" ("German Unification in the Electric Field of International Change") in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1991, p. 607.

[84] On this concept, see also Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Die neue europaeische Friedensordnung" ("The New European Peace Order") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 45, 1990, pp. 473-478; and by the same author "Kooperative Sicherheitsstrukturen in Europa: Der Beitrag Deutschlands und Ungarns" ("Cooperative Security Structures in Europe: Germany's and Hungary's Contributions") in *Integration*, vol. 14, 1991, pp. 99-105.

Maull, also representing an idealist view, sees the necessity, like Kohler-Koch, to move beyond the constraints of the nation-state and form a new international order governed by the rule of law. He focuses on the need to "civilize" both society and international politics. That is to say, all action must be submitted to the rule of law, and the use of force shall be banned. Yet, for a transitional period, military might will still be needed in order to channel conflict into non-military forms of conflict.[85] Maull attributes great importance to Germany as an almost "civilized" power in transforming the international system.

The view concerning Germany's role in the European Union, and indeed in the world, held by German President Roman Herzog, can be evaluated as an attempt to reconcile idealism and realism. Herzog, in a speech before the German Society for Foreign Policy, has broken publicly with the self-imposed taboo of German politicians to speak aloud about "Germany's interests". Herzog claims that Germany's main interests are security and preserving welfare, and that there is no use hiding them behind the image of "international altruism".[86] At the same time, however, in order to succeed with these interests, it is vital for Germany to bring the task of European integration to a successful end. "German interests and German co-responsibility for the world are more or less one", says Herzog. The distinction between a "policy of interest", pursued by realists, and a "policy of responsibility", pursued by idealists, does therefore no longer exist under the conditions of the present-day international system.[87]

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[85] Hanns W. Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik", p. 278.

[86] Roman Herzog, "Die Grundkoordination deutscher Aussenpolitk" ("The Basic Coordination of German Foreign Policy"), keynote speech by the German President at the 40th anniversay of the German Society for Foreign Policy, reprinted in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 4, 1995, p. 8.

[87] Ibid.

Summing up, it can be stated that the surveyed literature on Germany, German unification and European integration has in general not been explicitly based on theoretical frameworks. Levels of analysis have often been blurred without theoretical justification. It is therefore correct of Herzog to speak about the existing dichotomy between realism and idealism. However, in view of the many theories that exist in international relations, this is hardly a satisfying reality. In order to examine Germany's engagement in the European integration process, a more encompassing approach – going beyond the mere distinction between idealist and realist motifs for Germany's European policy – is needed.

2.3. Methodology

2.3.1. The Research Problem and Its Analytical Framework

As the above literature review has shown, publications dealing with the event of German unification have been numerous. However, very few studies have linked this event specifically to Germany's role in the European integration process. Rather, Germany's general search for a new identity after unification has given rise to various speculations. Those studies that have dealt with external effects of German unification, have done so mostly in terms of security questions, or in very general terms. Furthermore, the lack of theory in many studies has been observed. It is often left to the reader to work out the author's underlying assumptions from a vast amount of

opinion and information. Yet, many authors neglect to provide comprehensive factual evidence for their arguments. Hence, despite some attempts, no comprehensive and well-sustained picture of Germany's role in European integration has so far emerged.

This study is mainly concerned with analyzing how Germany's commitment to European integration, of both its political leaders and the German public, has developed over time, and how this commitment has been affected by the event of German unification. Furthermore, we intend to examine to which extent Germany has so far influenced the European Union, and will influence it in the foreseeable future. To this end, a number of subordinated questions have been set up that are believed to play into the analysis of our main research problem.

(1) Have the special circumstances, under which the Federal Republic of Germany was founded, played a special role in Germany's European policy?

(2) Which place does European policy take on Germany's list of national goals and priorities?

(3) Which contributions have individual political leaders made in shaping Germany's European policy and to the progress of European integration?

(4) Where do German political parties stand on the issue of European policy and integration, and how have they been affected by the event of national unification?

(5) What are public attitudes on the issue of European policy and integration, and how have they changed after unification?

(6) Has the event and conduct of the unification process brought about paradigmatic changes in Germany's foreign policy?

(7) How have changes in the international system affected Germany?

(8) What has been Germany's impact on European integration so far, and what is its potential to influence future developments?

The absence of a general theoretical framework equipped to explain and analyze the international behavior of nation-states as well as domestic politics has been noted. It must be particularly stressed here that, in the case of Germany's European policy, a distinction, as is usually drawn between domestic politics and foreign policy, is not adequate because both areas are closely interlinked. There have been, indeed, some studies that highlight the linkage between domestic factors and foreign policy. While some underline the importance of political elites and leaders[88], others stress different domestic factors like the nature of the decision-structure and personal characteristics of political leaders[89], domestic economic issues[90], or a combination of these factors[91].

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[88] See for instance Valerie Bunce, *Do Leaders Make a Difference? Executive Succession and Pulic Policy under Capitalism and Socialism*, Princeton 1981, and the subsequent critique by Thomas A. Baylis, "Review of 'Do New Leaders Make a Difference? by Valerie Bunce" in *American Political Science Review*, vol. 77, 1983, pp. 230-31; Gregory G. Brunk and Thomas G. Minehart, "How Important Is Elite Turnover to Policy Change?" in *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 28, no. 3, 1984, pp. 559-69.
[89] See the collection of articles by Maurice East, Stephen A. Salmore and Charles Hermann, eds., *Why Nations Act*, Beverly Hills 1978; Karen A. Rasler, William R. Thompson and Kathleen M. Chester, "Foreign Policy Makers, Personality Attributes, and Interviews" in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 24, March 1980, pp. 47-66.

In the case of Great Britain, France, and West Germany, Hanrieder and Auton have tied foreign-policy goals to three major domestic issues: political and economic recovery, security and national self-definition.[92]

This vast array of factors thought to influence foreign policy, corresponds to the highly complex relationships any researcher will encounter when studying social and political phenomena. Therefore, the issues to be studied in this work must be chosen on a selective basis. It has also to be emphasized that we regard the analysis of Germany's role in the European integration process as a case study, that is to say, we are aware of the uniqueness of this case. It will be beyond the scope of this study to draw general conclusions for foreign-policy making. Regarding the main research question, our theoretical assumptions and propositions, based upon the theoretical schools of thought we have discussed, are the following:

(1) The realist assumption that states are primarily inclined to pursue national interests in order to achieve national power is incomplete. It must be broadened by insights like those developed by Haas, who has maintained that political elites may redefine their perception of self-interest and welfare by undergoing a learning process through previous integrative steps. Thus, nations may "upgrade" and "politicize" their interests in a larger integrative setting.

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[90] See Michael S. Lewis-Beck, *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*, Ann Arbor (MA) 1990.
[91] See for instance Thomas J. Volgy and John E. Schwarz, "Does Politics Stop at the Water's Edge? Domestic Political Factors and Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Cases of Great Britain, France, and West Germany" in *Journal of Politics*, vol. 53, no. 3, 1991, pp. 615-643.
[92] Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme P. Auton, *The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Great Britain*, Englewood Cliffs (NJ) 1980.

(2) The element of time, that is to say short-term versus long-term considerations, has not been paid due attention to in the analysis of national interests and goals. It is, however, particularly important in the case of Germany. Long-term considerations, especially the attainment of economic goals, i.e. the accumulation of welfare, have mostly had prevalence over short-term goals, both economic and political.

(3) We assume that progress in economic and political integration within the European Union has always had its origin rather in political "acts of will" than in "spill-over". In the sphere of economics, though, there has been undoubtedly a large amount of spill-over from one technical (economic) field to another. Yet, important economic programs with political elements, like the European Monetary System, the Single Act and European Economic and Monetary Union, have always been initiated on the basis of political considerations.

(4) In order to evaluate Germany's commitment to European integration, focusing on the attitudes of political leaders, political parties and public opinion have been found to be the most relevant indicators. This task shall be carried out by analyzing a wide variety of primary sources.

(5) We believe that an evaluation of Germany's current role in European integration should not be carried out in an isolated context. Therefore, we favor comparative analysis across time, that is to say going back until the beginnings of West Germany's European policy and contrasting it with united Germany's European policy.

(6) In the same way as the effects of the Cold War, that is to say the division of Europe and Germany, have shaped Germany's European policy, changes in the international environment after 1989 have equally made an impact on Germany's foreign and European policy.

(7) It is assumed that the Second World War acted as a catalyst for European integration. Although economic considerations played an important role, it was the devastating experience of war that made states, or rather statesmen, realize that a peaceful and prosperous future could only lie in cooperation. Similarly, the end of the Cold War and German unification have contributed to the awareness that Europe's and Germany's future lies in further integration.

2.3.2. Outline of Research Procedure

The fact that we intend to sustain our analysis and arguments with numerous primary sources has already been mentioned. This is especially valid for the analysis of Germany's commitment to European integration. We will, therefore, particularly study speeches and statements of political leaders, politicians as representatives of their respective political parties and those parties' programs, as well as numerous opinion polls. As for Germany's impact on European integration, we will try to trace the development of the European Union and uncover indications of Germany's particular contribution to it. As for the temporal sequence of analysis, we have divided our study into three major parts in order to deal in a comparative way with the above-

stated main research question: the period before unification, the unification process itself, and the time after unification.

Chapter Three starts at the inception of the Federal Republic and analyzes the particular circumstances leading to its formation, and then works up to the time just before national unification took place. This chapter seeks particularly to work out the relationship between domestic factors, that is to say circumstances and constraints that West Germany faced in its peculiar situation after the Second World War, and West Germany's European policy. While exploring basic principles of West German foreign policy and the country's main interests and policies, emphasis is on successive political leaders and their impact on the FRG's position within the European Community and the development of the integrative process.

Chapter Four analyzes how political parties and public opinion viewed European integration before 1989. In recognition of the fact that the West German political system was characterized by producing varying government coalitions between the main political parties, we will determine what official party positions on European integration were, as well as which positions diverting streams within the various parties held. Furthermore, acknowledging that public opinion can also play an important role concerning the formulation of foreign policy in a pluralist, democratic system, public attitudes towards European integration are examined. This is done by considering historic factors contributing to the formulation of public opinion, as well as by looking at public attitudes as they manifested themselves in opinion polls.

Chapter Five maintains that the process of German unification has been a critical event for Germany's role in European integration. Special focus is upon the way the unification process itself was conducted during the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations. Then, the reaction of Germany's neighbors to the prospect of facing once more an enlarged Germany after two world wars is evaluated, as well as the way the German political leadership has responded to concerns about the future conduct of Germany. The role of the European Community in the unification process has been of special importance since everybody agreed that German unification could only happen within the framework of the Community. Furthermore, emphasis is on domestic aspects of the unification process by analyzing in which way political and economic challenges of unification are constraining the new Germany's international performance.

Chapter Six, in a similar way as Chapter Four, explores political parties and public attitudes. It traces the changes that have occurred after unification in this regard. Domestic attitudes and responses to the new situation in Germany are thought to be important for evaluating whether actions by political leaders, that have been called "assertive", have a basis for conducting an alleged *realpolitik* in the various strata of parties represented in the *Bundestag* and in public opinion.

Chapter Seven explores, after having analyzed global challenges faced by the new Germany, whether united Germany's foreign policy has undergone any fundamental change. Although Germany's European policy has been found to constitute a special case of foreign policy, or rather something in-between foreign and domestic policy, selected foreign-policy decisions taken by Germany's leaders after unification, are

examined in order to determine in which atmosphere foreign policy is now conducted and shaped.

Chapter Eight evaluates the impact united Germany has had on European integration with respect to economic, political and security issues. Special emphasis is on Germany's role in the preparation for the completion of the third stage of European economic and monetary union, i.e. the substitution of national currencies for a European currency, the ECU. Furthermore, we will analyze in which way Germany has contributed to overcoming the "democratic deficit" in the European Union, and has helped shape a European common foreign and defense policy. Our analysis will then look beyond the borders of the European Union, into the direction of Central-East European countries. Germany's supposed "bridging role" in establishing close ties with those countries, and the prospect of incorporating them into the European Union, will be examined.

Chapter Nine draws conclusions from the overall analysis with respect to the initially formulated research questions and their assumptions. It seeks particularly to answer the question of whether there is continuity or change in Germany's approach to European integration. In the process we hope to reveal whether Germany is, or has become, the European "superpower" on the basis of its new-found "assertiveness". Furthermore, our conclusions will show whether realist or idealist components prevail in German foreign-policy making, and in which way Germany is influencing European integration, that is to say particularly whether it is influencing the European Union towards becoming a "civilian power" or a "superpower" with military capabilities. The intricate relationship between Germany and the European integrative

process may reveal in which directions both Germany and the European Union are heading.

3. WEST GERMANY'S EUROPEAN POLICY: 1949-1989

In order to conduct our comparative analysis over time regarding Germany's European policy before and after unification, we will study in this chapter the pre-unification period. By analyzing the particular situation in which Germany found itself after the Second World War and the constraints imposed upon the country, we will study West Germany's main foreign-policy principles, national interests, strategies and policies. Regarding West Germany's European policy, focus will be on the contribution of individual political leaders, from Konrad Adenauer to Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

3.1. Formation of the Federal Republic of Germany and Its Political and Historical Environment

After the German Army had declared unconditional surrender on May 8/9, 1945, the last Government of the German *Reich* stayed in office for 23 more days. Its members were subsequently arrested together with other high-ranking officials and brought to trial for crimes against peace and humanity at the Nuremberg Trials. The highest jurisdiction of the *Reich* was taken up by the victorious powers - the United States of America, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and France - on June 5, 1945. According to the London Protocol of September 1944, the core target of the Allied Forces was to gain complete control over Germany. Thus, the country was divided into three zones,

with the capital Berlin being divided into three as well,[1] and a joint council made up of the respective commander-in-chiefs.

By dividing Germany into several sectors, the Allied Forces attempted to prevent the Germans from ever trying again to become a hegemonial power through the use of military force. German aspirations for conquest, and Prussia as the cradle of militarism, were to be eliminated forever. Criminal Germans were to be punished for genocide and war crimes, and the whole of Germany re-educated in a democratic spirit. The Yalta Conference intended to avoid the end of Germany as a state. The Soviet leader Stalin, in particular, was interested in maintaining Germany as an economic entity. He demanded huge amounts of reparations to be made for the heavy loss and damages that the Soviet Union had suffered from the German attack. The United States were equally interested in a vital German core state. This was not because of reparations, but because President Roosevelt strove for a global system of equilibrium and desired a stable central Europe.

Soon after the German capitulation on May 12, 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill told President Truman by telegraph that the Soviet troops were now hidden behind an "iron curtain", and that nobody knew exactly what was going on behind it. The outcome of the Potsdam Conference in the summer of 1945, was rather fixing tensions than solving them. There was consensus as far as de-nazification, de-militarization, economic de-centralization, as well as the conversion of the Germans to democracy were concerned. The Allied Forces gave their consequential consent to the

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[1] It was only at the Yalta Conference of February 1945 that France was granted the status of a fourth controlling power and received its own occupation zone and a share in Berlin.

expulsion of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. As for the four occupied zones, it was concluded that each Allied Power should get reparations from its own zone for the beginning. The zones were further to be maintained as economic and political units. This, in turn, led to the fact that the occupied zones were closely linked to different political and economic system. Thus, West Germany, as the prinicipal border state of the Iron Curtain, became the country in which the Cold War revealed itself like in no other country in the world.

In 1947, as far as economic life was concerned, the United States and Great Britain united their zones and established the *Bizone*. Soon afterwards, French resistance was overcome and the French zone united with the *Bizone*. This unified western economic territory (*Trizone*) was to become later on the Federal Republic of Germany. The monetary reform in the West on June 20, 1948, introducing the D-mark as national currency, triggered Stalin's blockade of West Berlin. In the night of June 23, 1948, all connections by land between the western zones and West Berlin were closed. For almost one year, until May 12, 1949, West Berlin was provided for through an allied air-lift. The help granted to the Germans in this seemingly desperate situation greatly contributed to the fact that the Allied Forces were not seen any more as "occupying forces" but as "friends".

The division of Germany into a western and a Soviet-controlled eastern part was formalized in the summer of 1949 with the erection of two German states: the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in June and in September 1949 respectively. Hanrieder is right when he says:

> The *German Question* was as much cause as realization of the Cold War. And the foundation of the two German states in 1949 appears in retrospective as a logical, even if not unavoidable consequence of the competition between East and West to establish a European post-war order.[2]

In the western part of Germany, the development of political life was evolving from bottom to top. That is to say, after the formation of the federal states on a state level (*Bundeslaender*), political parties were initially permitted only on a local level, and only much later on a zone-wide level. Administrative organs were only just beginning to emerge. Since coordination and cooperation on a state-transcending level were required, the occupied zones were unified as stated above, leading to more efficient administration of "Marshall-Plan" aid. That aid was an American financial contribution to the reconstruction of Europe. It amounted to 1.4 billion dollars paid to Germany from 1948 to 1952.[3] Whereas in the eastern zone socialization of industry progressed, the western part of Germany adopted a modified free market model, namely the "social market economy" model[4].

Concerning the scope of action for West Germany's foreign policy, it can be said that it was non-existent during the immediate period following the foundation of the Federal Republic. The *Petersberg Agreement*[5] - an agreement concluded between the

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[2] See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika* ("Germany, Europe, America"), Paderborn 1991, pp. 2-3.

[3] See Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Tatsachen über Deutschland* ("Facts on Germany"), Frankfurt a.M. 1992 , p. 93.

[4] The term was coined by Alfred Müller-Armack in 1947. Contrary to liberal economics, this concept acknowledges that free market forces need regulatory state action in order to offset unwanted effects such as unfair competition. It also professes solidarity with individuals disadvantaged by free market forces, and entitles them to compensation on part of the state. It may also be dubbed "capitalism with a social conscience", characterized by close cooperation between labor, capital and financial institutions.

[5] For a reprinted version of the Petersberg Agreement see: Helga Haftendorn, Lothar Wilker and Claudia Wörmann, eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* ("The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany"), Berlin 1982, p. 94.

Allied High Commissioners and German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on November 22, 1949 – declared as its foremost goal "to integrate the Federal Republic as a peace-loving member into the European community." In order to promote a feeling of security for western European states, the FRG was encouraged to participate again actively in international relations. Thus, it was granted the right to exchange trade as well as diplomatic representatives with other countries.[6] Such were the very first steps towards West Germany's sovereignty in foreign-policy matters.

The Allied Powers were determined to bind the FRG as closely as possible into the Western European context. The *Petersberg Agreement* further encouraged West Germany to join relevant international bodies, particulary some European organizations: the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, later the OECD) and the Council of Europe. The first building blocs for West Germany's participation in reconstructing a European order were thus laid. It is, therefore, evident that the idea of integrating the FRG into the West did not solely originate in the mind of a single individual, namely Konrad Adenauer, as has been sometimes implied. Although Adenauer's contribution was considerable, it is rather a historic fact that only because West Germany's western orientation had already been decided upon by the Allied Powers, the Federal Republic of Germany was allowed to come into life.[7]

On a sociological level, it has been observed that the West German population was naturally rather oriented towards the West. The new state consisted mainly of groups

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[6] Ibid., p. 94.
[7] See also Gilbert Ziebura, "Europaidee und Supranationalitaet in der Westdeutschen Aussenpolitik" ("The Idea of Europe and Supranationality in West Germany's Foreign Policy") reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 136.

of population from regions - Westphalia, Württemberg, Bavaria, and Rhineland - which have traditionally been opposed to the Prussian idea of a monopolistic state, ruled by civil servants with its corresponding social and economic basis.[8] The successful monetary reform of June 18, 1948, reinstated the conservative middle class as the main economic and political player, and provided them with an opportunity to regain a new self-consciousness. In foreign-policy terms a logical correlation was the urge to identify with the West through integration.[9]

In July 1951, Great Britain, France and the United States declared that the state of war with West Germany had been terminated. The Soviet Union followed much later, on January 1955. Indeed, it was not until the so-called Treaty on Germany (*Deutschlandvertrag*) of December 10, 1954, that Germany's sovereignty was explicitly reinstated:[10]

> It is declared herewith, in a clear and completely unmistakable way, that through the termination of the occupation status the Federal Republic will become a sovereign state with unlimited powers over its internal and foreign affairs.

When the Federal Republic, in accordance with allied wishes, joined NATO on May 5, 1955, it was a sovereign state, acting within a framework set up by the three Allied Forces. Unification with the "other" Germany had been a priority since the inception of the Federal Republic. To underline its preliminary character, the constitution of the Federal Republic was called *Basic Law* (*Grundgesetz*). A final constitution was not to be passed until German unity would have been once more established. The most

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[8] Ibid., p. 137.

[9] See Fritz René Allemann, *Bonn ist nicht Weimar* ("Bonn is not Weimar"), Cologne/Berlin 1956, p. 62.

[10] This was a modified version of the agreement on the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Western Allied Powers. Reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 111.

striking characteristics of the *Basic Law* were the prohibition to abolish the existing

democratic, social and federal order (Article 20.4), the provision to tie all state power

to human rights (Article 1), and the prohibition of all changes to the latter provision

(Article 79). The preamble further laid down the explicit goal of furthering European

unification to the greatest possible extent.

3.2. Main Principles of West German Foreign Policy

West German foreign policy has differed greatly from the foreign policies pursued by

other large European states, due to those exceptional circumstances under which the

FRG had been founded after World War II. No German politician could speak openly

of a "German national interest" - for fear that West Germany's neighbors would

immediately see the ghosts of its Nazi-past come to life again. And yet, such interests

did, of course, nevertheless exist. Those national goals, however, were not pursued

through the traditional tools of military force and high politics, but rather through

much subtler means such as commerce and international finance.

Numerous analysts agree, thus, on describing West Germany as a "trading state", a

formulation first used by Rosecrance[11]. Maull argues that Germany should not be

called a "civilian power" without reserve.[12] Yet, German foreign policy is said to play

a key role in civilizing international relations in the future, especially in developing

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[11] See Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York (NY) 1986.
[12] See Hanns W. Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik" ("The Federal Republic of Germany: A Civilian Power - Fourteen Theses for a New German Foreign Policy") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 47, no. 10, 1992, pp. 269-278.

effective structures of European collective security. Schwarz, on the other hand, traces political culture in Germany, from its historical leaders, who were obsessed with power, to the present.[13] There, he finds the Germans to have almost forgotten everything about military and political power, and just relying on economic success and might. However, West Germany did indeed have national interests, even if they were not pronounced as such. Most of the time, they were pursued in ways different from other Western countries. Gordon summarized the main distinguishing characteristics of West German foreign policy, quite appropriately, under the headings of "policy of responsibility", "civilian policy", "parochial policy", and "multilateral approach".[14]

1. Policy of Responsibility

Based on the FRG's unique historic responsibility, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the Federal Republic's former Foreign Minister for almost twenty years, has always put the "European peace task"[15] of both German states into the foreign political foreground. The fears of neighbors concerning the Germany's past were to be respected and handled in the most sensitive way. Nationalistic "power politics" were to give way to a more humane and universal understanding of international politics. At the same time, a liberal asylum policy compensated in part for former atrocities

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[13] See Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Die gezaehmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Macht-vergessenheit* ("Tamed Germans: From Power-Obsession to Power-Oblivion"), Stuttgart 1985.
[14] See Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy" in *Orbis*, vol. 38, vo. 2, 1994, pp. 226-228.
[15] See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Die Friedensverantwortung der Deutschen" ("Germany's Responsibility for Peace") in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit* ("On the Road to Unification: Speeches and Documents from Turbulent Times"), Berlin 1991, p. 135.

committed, financial aid was paid to victims of the Holocaust and their survivors –
including the state of Israel. A constitutional ban on wars of aggression was
introduced, the country's full integration into friendly alliances was ensured, as well as
a ban on weapons exports to areas of tension.[16] The impression that West Germany
had not drawn a valuable lesson from its past was to be avoided under all
circumstances.

2. Civilian Policy

The emphasis on economic, instead of military, might in the FRG has already been
mentioned. Although West Germany had the largest West European army after 1955
and played a critical role as a deterrent on NATO's central front, it was nevertheless
subjected to more restrictions than any other army within NATO. The *Basic Law*, for
instance, has limited the tasks of the Federal armed forces to "defense purposes".
Before unification, there was broad consensus among political parties to interpret this
formulation as a prohibition of any deployment of German troops outside NATO-
territory. Furthermore, West Germany was among the countries keenest to pledge
never to use or produce chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.

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[16] See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Wir wollen ein europaeisches Deutschland* ("We Want a European
Germany"), Berlin 1991, pp. 27-30.

3. Parochial Policy

Despite the world-wide engagement and presence of West German firms, the scope of action of West Germany's foreign policy was rather limited. The FRG was highly active only within Europe. It tried to break through the Iron Curtain and establish contacts with the GDR and other East European states (*Ostpolitik*), it has influenced the development and expansion of the European Community to a great extent, and it has ensured its special defense interests within NATO. Other than that, the FRG has practically been absent from the world political stage. It had no colonies nor foreign military bases, it has had hardly any impact on developments in the Middle East or other areas of military and political conflict. Kielinger has written that "Germany (has been) guided (...) by the notion that the world wanted nothing more from it than a low profile in crisis situations and the continued profession of a lasting readiness for peace."[17]

4. Multilateral Approach

In contrast to its neighbors, the FRG has always tried to avoid the impression that it was pursuing national interests. It rather preferred to act in a multilateral context by stressing the shared nature of those interests and by seeking the full support of its partners before acting. With this tactic the Federal Republic was able to meet its particular needs. Among these were NATO's military strategy of "forward defense",

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[17] See Thomas Kielinger, "Der Golf-Krieg und die Folgen aus deutscher Sicht" ("The Gulf War and Its Consequences from a German Point of View") in *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 42, no. 3, 1991, p. 246.

the 1954 treaties committing the Western Allied Powers to German unification, an agreement allowing trade with East Germany to be considered as intra-EC trade, *Ostpolitik* and, in the early 1980s, the deployment of American "Euromissiles" not only to Germany but also to other European countries.[18] Discussing the West German position regarding the European Monetary System at the end of the 1970s, Hanrieder has come to the following conclusion:[19]

> As usual the Germans preferred a European institutional framework to implement their national interests and sought to avoid - in a clumsy manner - the impression they were seeking national scope of action, or trying to enlarge their political influence.

3.3. *West Germany's National Interests, Strategies and Policies*

At the end of World War II, West Germany's immediate national interests consisted mainly in finding solutions to the following three problem areas:

(a) in terms of economics, to do away with restrictions imposed on national economic production, most notably in the steel and coal sectors; to reconstruct the economic infrastructure destroyed in the war, and to find renewed access to the markets of western industrialized countries;

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[18] See Philip H. Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy", p. 228.
[19] See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika*, p. 358.

(b) in terms of politics, to cope adequately with the challenge posed by the country's division into two states, and to deal with the shadows which were thrown on West Germany by its Nazi-past;

(c) in terms of security, to deal with the security threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies.

These three problem areas were the starting point for the shaping of West German post-war foreign policy. Strategically, the solution to these problems was mainly sought through Western integration - European unification, close ties with the United States, and joining NATO in particular. Overall national goals of economic, political and military might were closely intertwined. As will be seen, economic policy was often carried out in order to attain certain political ends, thus becoming occasionally a substitute for military means, the use of which the FRG denied itself categorically.

Summing up, it can be said that West Germany's different political leaders have been quite successful in conducting a foreign policy that reconciled the differences in pursuing various national interests and, at the same time, demonstrate an appropriate national sensitivity regarding the country's Nazi-past in such a way that it was acceptable to its neighbors.

3.3.1. Western Integration

The Federal Republic's decision to integrate into the West was historically based on the common cultural heritage it shared with the West. Specific reasons for doing so in the aftermath of World War II will be outlined in the analysis of Adenauer's *Westpolitik*. The actual process of Western integration was carried out at three different levels: at the level of actively being involved and supporting European integration, by maintaining close ties with the United States, and by joining NATO.

3.3.1.1. European Integration

West Germany's economic problems after World War II were intended to be solved to a great extent through European integration. Thus, the first step taken was to reconcile with old war enemy France. Jean Monnet, the General Commissioner for modernizing the French economy, drew up a plan for pooling the production of coal and steel of the participating countries under a new High Authority. Although the plan became to be known as the "Schumann Plan"[20], Monnet is generally acknowledged as the "Father of Europe"[21]. He also became the first President of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). That organization came into being when its six founding members[22] signed the *Paris-Treaty* in the spring of 1952.

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[20] French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann presented the plan drawn up by Jean Monnet to German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on May 9, 1950, whose approval followed immediately.
[21] It must be noted, however, that the plan worked out by Monnet took up the idea formulated by Winston Churchill in his famous Zurich speech of September 19, 1946. In that speech Churchill had called for the creation of a United States of Europe, emphasizing Franco-German cooperation as the essential prerequisite, while attributing a merely promoting (e.g. passive) role to Great Britain instead of being an active member.
[22] France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

The ECSC was complemented by the *Rome Treaties* of March 25, 1957, signed by the same six founding members. It established both the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The foremost goal of these three communities, as expressed in their respective preambles, was to make war among its member-states impossible. The superiority of this goal had arisen from the devastating experience of World War II. The underlying motivation for forming them was the realization, especially by France, that the only way of containing the Germans and to forego any go-it-alone on their part was to bind them irrevocably into a European framework. The cornerstone was to be cooperation and reconciliation between France and Germany.

In terms of economics, the practical impact of having joined the three organizations for West Germany were that former restrictions imposed onto the Federal Republic was lifted. Higher living standards, full employment and economic expansion were the main aims envisaged by the economic integration of Europe. They apply to all sectors of the economy covered by the three treaties, ranging from agriculture to transport to banking and services.[23] Being a member of these organizations further meant for West Germany that no trade barriers would be imposed on the country's exports to its former war enemies. Solely the common economic well-being of member-states counted, and that could only be achieved through a common, borderless market.

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[23] See Commission of the European Communities, "European Unification: The Origins and Growth of the European Community", Periodical 1/1990, pp. 21-24.

Extensive support for rapid European integration was given right from the beginning, owing to the realization of West German post-war political leaders, most notably by Konrad Adenauer, that the country would stand the best chance of being economically successful in a borderless entity with its neighboring countries. Such an approach benefited the Germans in a two-fold way: On the one hand, it rehabilitated them in a moral sense after the war, and gave them back a certain degree of national pride as democratic, tireless promoters of the vision of a unified Europe. On the other hand, it gave them the tool, i.e. a huge consumer market, needed for economic expansion. Although the factors contributing to the post-war German economic miracle (*Wirtschaftswunder*) were without doubt manifold[24], it was eventually the possibility to export that triggered its economic success.

Although for decades the Federal Republic has been among the leading exporters worldwide[25], its first major experiences as an exporter were collected on intra-European markets, and the bulk of its exports continue to go today to the member-states of the European Union. Thus, by fully embracing and supporting the concept of European integration, the FRG was enabled to reap the fruits of a common market and become the economically strongest state within the European Community.

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[24] American financial assistance, German ingenuity and efficiency, absence of major clashes between labor and capital, a well-functioning banking sector, relatively huge amounts of natural resources - steel and coal - necessary for industrial production to name but the most important.

[25] Two in three jobs on the German labor market depended directly or indirectly - and continue to do so - on export goods.

3.3.1.2. Partnership with the United States and NATO-Membership

The Federal Republic's decision to establish close ties with the United States is to be seen in the light of realities as they existed at the end of World War II. The "Order of Yalta"[26] revealed three basic features: 1. the Atlantic community as the Western Bloc, 2. the emergence of the United States and Soviet Union as superpowers and, 3. the globalisation of the bloc confrontation.

The FRG's economic problems, as has been shown above, were basically taken care of through European integration. As for security, neutrality was never regarded a serious option by the Federal Government at the time. Adenauer, especially for pragmatic reasons, thought it best to join the Western club of industrializing countries. He reasoned that national division could be overcome only in the long-run by attaining a far superior economic position than the East.[27]

The "big brother" across the Atlantic, as the United States were often referred to in West Germany, soon came to value the FRG as the most reliable continental ally against the Communist threat, not just in geopolitical terms but in ideology as well. Henceforth, the two countries called each other "partners". The security partnership between the Federal Republic and the United States found its first culmination when the former joined NATO in 1955, after having once more regained independence in foreign-policy matters.

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[26] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, London/New York 1994, pp. 5-8.
[27] As will be seen later on, this was in contrast to views held at the time by the opposition party SPD. They were greatly opposed to integrating the FRG into the Western Bloc for fear that the division of the country would thus be finalized, and that the two parts would never become one again.

Despite a sometimes rocky relationship, NATO-membership has never been seriously questioned by any post-war Federal Government. In fact, NATO-membership was essential to ensure European neighbors that there would be no military threat from the Federal Republic. The Alliance's first Secretary General, Lord Ismay, brought NATO's function precisely to the point in his famous quotation of "keeping the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down."

Thus, the American presence in Europe pursued two goals: political containment and military deterrence. At the same time, both fulfilled a double function[28]: Containment meant not only containing the Soviet Union, but also close supervision and containment of old enemy/new friend Federal Republic of Germany. This approach was generally welcomed in the FRG. Not only did Europeans and Americans not trust the Germans, but the Germans did not trust themselves and thought they needed some protection from themselves. On the other hand, American military presence in Europe had the effect of deterring the Soviet Union and its allies. However, through the principle of "active or extended deterrence", America reassured its West European friends that, in the event of a Soviet attack, they would not only defend American territory but defend Western Europe as well.

Through close ties with the FRG and their security arrangement with Western Europe, the United States were certain they would always be consulted and kept informed about major developments within the European Community. The failure to

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[28] See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika*, pp. 34-41.

establish a genuine European security union meant that West Europeans would continue to rely on the United States and NATO for military protection.

However, NATO's strategy of "forward defense" led to increased protests in West Germany, where doubts persisted that the country would be "sacrificed" in the event of a nuclear or conventional confrontation between the superpowers in Europe. Throughout the 1970s massive demonstrations revealed the feeling of large parts of the population to be living on the "top of a volcano". At the same time, many West Germans could not help the impression that the United States tried to narrow the FRG's scope of action in foreign-policy matters through this security partnership. When, with the arrival of Michail Gorbachev in the Kreml, West German fears of the Soviet Union decreased considerably, the basis for an American presence in the Federal Republic - both as a political mentor and military defender - crumbled. This coincided with growing resistance in the United States - both in public as well as in Congress - against the costly deployment of American troops in the FRG. As for West Germany's membership in NATO, it has been observed that it was more complete than that of other larger European members. Unlike Britain and France, all of its forces were committed to NATO. It had no general staff and no independent strategic planning function.

3.3.2. National Unification

The terms "unification" and "reunification" have often been used interchangeably. The difference is a political one. Conservative circles have mostly tended to use

"reunification", particularly during the unification process of 1989/90. That was meant to imply claims to territory included within the borders of the German *Reich* as of 1939. This included the territory of the German Democratic Republic, as well as Polish territory beyond the Oder-Neisse border. Leftist circles, on the other hand, tended to favor the expression "unification", excluding explicitly the claim to Polish territory from their definition of the term. Liberal circles mainly adopted the latter definition, yet also suggested a new term: "new unification" (*Neuvereinigung*). This study uses the term "unification". We believe that the definition implied by this term reflects most accurately the actual state of affairs that has been achieved after the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic were united in 1990.

Although national unification was a top foreign-policy priority of all political parties[29] at the time when the Federal Republic was founded, approaches to and evaluations of new post-war realities differed widely. Konrad Adenauer, on the one hand, opted for unification of the two German states via integration into the West. He based his course on the realization that despite the fact that many allies of his country had vowed to support unification efforts, they nevertheless were very much at ease with the present situation and feared the consequences any changes could evoke. Indeed, before whenever a power equilibrium in Europe was threatened by one of its states it had been the flanking powers Russia and Great Britain that intervened. In the twentieth century then, this constellation changed and the United States took over Britain's stabilizing role in Europe. After World War I, America had failed to ensure

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[29] This corresponded to the constitutional order derived from the preamble of the *Basic Law*. See also Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 234.

that Germany could not reach for European hegemony again, and thus had to intervene once more during World War II.

After having shared the victory over Nazi-Germany, ideological differences had become dominant to an extent which made it impossible for the Allies to act together any longer. The division of Germany was sustained on a military level by a growing conventional and nuclear weapons arsenal of the two superpowers. In the process, however, not only Germany had been divided but Europe as well. The Soviet Union had acquired allies basically on the grounds of military "persuasion", the United States on the grounds of ideological arguments.

The superpowers' scope of action was not only confined to Europe. The Soviet Union broadened its sphere of influence to Asia, then Africa and South America. This was countered by an American global containment strategy. But Germany had become the geostrategic center of the Cold War; the confrontation potential at its inner border had become the measure for world-wide tension between the superpowers and their respective allies.

Therefore, Adenauer conceived of the *German Question* not as a national problem but rather a European one, or even a world-wide one. He realized that national unification could not be achieved in the short-run. His strategy was to enter the difficult path of slowly regaining the confidence of Western states by proving that his country was a reliable - perhaps the most reliable - partner when it came to confronting the Communist threat. This strategy paid off when the Federal Republic regained sovereignty in foreign-policy affairs in 1955. But since then, "sovereignty" in

the FRG's foreign policy has almost always meant to take decisions in agreement with its European and American partners.

Adenauer's unification policy contained economic recovery for the FRG after World War II. Together with the Western world, it had to be proven to the Communist Bloc that the capitalist system was the stronger and more desirable one. In the long-run, this would eventually lead to unification of the two German states and Europe as well. Adenauer was quite aware that once the Iron Curtain had been set up, none of the superpowers was particularly interested in changing the status quo. The stakes involved were too high to call for any radical change. It was, therefore, at Adenauer's insistence that the so-called *Bonn Convention*[30] included a special commitment by the Western powers to support German unification. The first two paragraphs of Article 7 read as follows:

> The Signatory States are agreed that an essential aim of their common policy is a peaceful settlement treaty for the whole of Germany, freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation for a lasting peace. They further agree that the final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement. Until a peaceful settlement treaty has been concluded, the Signatory States will cooperate to achieve, by peaceful means, their common aim of a reunified Germany enjoying a liberal democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic, integrated into the European Community.

The concept of the oppositional Social Democrats, on the other hand, aimed at solving the *German Question* through unifying the two German states first, then to determine Germany's position in a unified Europe, which still needed to be created. The Social Democrats' leader Kurt Schumacher valued western democracies to the

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[30] Treaty on the Relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers of October 23, 1954 ("Bonn Convention"), in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1955, pp. 306-09.

same extent as Adenauer and favored a close relationship with them. However, before entering into negotiations with the Western powers, he demanded of them to recognize the FRG as an equal partner.[31]

Since the Social Democrats' approach to solve the *German Question* seemed to be the more direct and shorter one, they often accused Adenauer of not being sincere with regard to national unification. In fact, Adenauer favored his country's European orientation over a peace treaty for Germany. When the Soviet Union sent a note to the governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States[32], promising to "consider the question of a peace treaty with Germany at once", Adenauer rejected this on the grounds that the Soviet Union only sought to prevent the FRG from joining the European Community. In 1955, when the FRG was about to join NATO and the WEU, the Soviet Union again tried to "bait" the Federal Republic by suggesting that West Germany should negotiate about unification with the Soviet side.[33] This was again rejected by Adenauer who considered it as a mere tactic to delay negotiations on the Treaty on Germany and the European Defense Community.[34]

Adenauer has often been said to be distrustful of his fellow Germans concerning their dedication to democracy. Therefore, he considered it much safer to bind them into an

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[31] See "Westintegration - Einleitung" ("Integration into the West - Introduction") in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 91.
[32] Note by the Soviet Government to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States of March 10, 1952, reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 242-245.
[33] Ibid., p. 244.
[34] See Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauers Wiedervereinigungspolitik: Zwischen nationalem Wollen und realpolitischem Zwang" ("Adenauer's Reunification Policy: Between National Ambition and Constraints Imposed by Realpolitik") reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 283.

European framework first before tackling the issue of unification. Adenauer had also

realized, of course, that the Western powers would have never permitted immediate

unification because fears of a renewed German menace were still much too great in

the aftermath of World War II. These fears are known to have persisted for a long

time to come, and have still not been completely eroded. Thus, it appears that, from

the point of view of the FRG's neighbors, unification of the two Germanies and

Western integration were two mutually exclusive goals. The question of how

subsequent Federal governments have managed this "walk on the edge" will be

addressed later on.

Although West Germany had entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,

the Federal Government declared in December 1955 that this constituted a special

case. It would not recognize the GDR as a sovereign state, and it would not take up

diplomatic relations with those states recognizing the GDR internationally. The so-

called *"Hallstein-Doctrine" of sanctioning any country that recognized the GDR* put

the Federal Republic into a state of diplomatic non-recognition of Communist states in

Eastern Europe. When relations with Yugoslavia and Cuba were severed, the Soviet

reaction led to the blockade of Berlin and the erection of the Berlin Wall.

In 1963, Egon Bahr, then director of the press and information office at the Berlin

Senate, first talked about changing the relationship between the two German states.

His formula of "change through rapprochement" aimed at establishing contacts with

the GDR's Government - although not legally recognizing it - and thus facilitating

conditions for the population. In 1967, Chancellor Kiesinger had already offered the

GDR concrete negotiations in the area of traffic and economy.

In 1969, then, the social-democrat/liberal coalition undertook a complete change in the country's *Deutschlandpolitik*[35]. Chancellor Willy Brandt talked in his 1969 Government Declaration for the first time of "the existence of two states in Germany"[36], although denying the GDR the status of a state recognized by international law. The *Four-Power-Agreement on Berlin* of 1971[37] paved the way for the first German-German agreements on a governmental level, such as the agreement on transit traffic through the territory of the GDR to West Berlin. These, then, led eventually to the Basic Contract (*Grundlagenvertrag*) between the two German states on Dec. 21, 1972[38]. Article 6 recognized the legal existence of two German states, which were declared to be independent concerning their domestic and foreign affairs. Article 8 envisaged the exchange of permanent representatives between the two countries. After these had taken up their work in 1974, further agreements were made concerning traffic, post and telecommunications, medical care, as well as determining borders. Questions concerning German nationality or recognizing the GDR as a foreign country, however, continued to exist.

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[35] Despite *de facto* recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state by the Brandt Administration, policies concerning the two German states continued to be called - as they had been since the division of the country - *Deutschlandpolitik* ("Policy concerning Germany"). By not running this policy under the label of "normal" foreign policy, the use of language reveals the efforts on the parts of politicians not to allow the division of the country to become internalized by the population. This is true for all subsequent governments until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

[36] In *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 132, 1969, p. 1122.

[37] Reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 264-75.

[38] Treaty on the Basics of the Relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic ("Basic Contract") of December 21, 1972, in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Dokumentation zur Entspannungspolitik der Bundesregierung* ("Documentation on the Federal Government's Policy of *Détente*"), Bonn 1979, seventh edition, p. 190.

3.3.3. Economic, Political and Military Capabilities

When given the chance of rebuilding their country after World War II, West Germans had lost their national sovereignty as well as pride. However well-meaning the Allied Forces might have appeared to the German population, they were *de facto* occupying German territory and putting restrictions on the Federal Republic's scope of political action. The psychological impact on the population was considerable. Their country was literally in ashes, defeat in war and the growing awareness of atrocities committed during the war had buried most feelings of self-esteem.

Now, favorable domestic as well as external conditions promised the chance of a new beginning and rehabilitation. West Germans jumped at this chance and devoted themselves wholeheartedly to the economic reconstruction of their country. Economic success became the substitute for lost political and military influence. The German *Wirtschaftswunder brought increasing prosperity and* welfare starting from the late 1950s. It was unique in so far as it was based on an array of factors - economic, political and security - which contributed to its success.

Externally, economic recovery was made possible by generous financial aid, most notably the Marshall-Plan, the political support of the free world to allow the FRG to assume once more a role on international markets, and the protective attitude that the United States played in ensuring the country's security. The Federal Republic has often been called a "free-rider"[39] on security, a fact which has been closely associated

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[39] See Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton (NJ) 1987, pp.74-74 and 224-25 on the problem of free-riding for international trade.

with its economic success. Most important, however, for the FRG was its ability to participate in international trade.

The West German economy has duly been called an "export economy". Gradually, the export sector grew to such an extent until two in three jobs were producing export goods, the main markets of which were in Western Europe. Those who suspected a strategy behind the FRG's economic success found this confirmed in the words of Ludwig Erhard, then Minister of Economic Affairs, who declared as early as 1953 that "foreign trade is not a special science of those involved in it, but rather essence and basic requirement of our economic and social order as such."[40] But these words should rather be interpreted as the early realization of the chances the FRG was offered than a long-term strategy. As has already been discussed, internal factors were equally importanty.

The Federal Republic has often used its financial and economic policies to attain certain foreign-policy goals. Accordingly, there has been a tendency abroad to evaluate German economic activities in a political light. Since the FRG was deprived of the use of military means to achieve political goals, Hanrieder considers the use of economic means as a compensation for it, or else: "the exercise of economic might as the continuation of politics with different means."[41] This becomes especially evident by looking at the way in which Eastern Bloc countries, particularly the GDR, were treated.[42] Financial "aid" was often used to achieve better relations and consolidate

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[40] Ludwig Erhard, "Die geistigen Grundlagen gesunden Aussenhandels" ("Intellectual Basis for Healthy Foreign Trade") reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 403-404.
[41] Wolfram F. Hanrieder, *Deutschland, Europa, Amerika*, pp. 262-263.
[42] See also: Hans-Hermann Höhmann and Christian Meier. "Deutsch-russische Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Bilanz und Perspektiven" ("German-Russian Economic Relations: Review

them, especially in the field of German-German relations where the FRG was interested in facilitating human contacts across the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, financial aid for developing countries was made dependent upon non-recognition of the GDR on part of the receiving countries, i.e. applying the so-called *Hallstein-Doctrine*.

The *Hallstein-Doctrine*[43] underlined the sole power of representation by the Federal Republic of Germany which Bonn claimed over East Berlin. Yet, the accreditation of two German states in Moscow undermined such a claim. Consequently, a legal and diplomatic formula was invented in December 1955 according to which the FRG would deny or withdraw diplomatic recognition from states recognizing the GDR-regime. Exempted, however, was the Soviet Union.

The Hallstein-Doctrine was never officially announced. However, a declaration by the head of the Foreign Ministry's political department, Wilhelm Grewe, in December 1955, was treated as an official interpretation[44]:

> First of all, one has to state that in general it cannot be determined
> completely at which moment recognition occurs according to
> international law. (...) It is clear, however - and we have made this
> sufficiently clear - that we regard intensified relations with
> Pankow/East Berlin as an unfriendly action. One can respond to
> unfriendly actions committed on the part of other states with
> measures at different levels: One can either call one's ambassador
> back home for reporting, or one can also pursue further
> retrenchment of such a mission. In short, there are still a couple of

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and Perspectives") in *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 46, no. 1, 1995, pp. 51-59; and Robert Mark Jr. Spaulding, "German trade policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage" in *International Organization*, vol. 45, no. 3, 1991, pp. 343-368.
[43] Named after Professor Walther Hallstein, a close confident of Adenauer and, at the same time, President of the EC-Commission.
[44] Interview with the Head of the Foreign Ministry's Political Department, Professor Dr. Grewe, December 11, 1955, in: Auswaertiges Amt, *40 Jahre Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Eine Dokumentation* ("40 years of Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany"), Stuttgart 1989, pp. 15-16.

measures before cutting off diplomatic relations. And it is clear that such a grave step as cutting off diplomatic relations will only be taken after very serious consideration and under very serious circumstances. But it is clear that this question is a very serious question for us. When being faced with the problem of Germany's double representation in third states we will probably not be able to draw anything else but very serious consequences from it.

3.4. West Germany's European Policy and 'Deutschlandpolitik'

3.4.1. Adenauer's 'Westpolitik'

Konrad Adenauer was the first West German Chancellor and, at the same time, Foreign Minister. He was in office for almost fourteen years from 1949 to 1963. During this long period, he set the standards and basic guidelines for West German foreign policy, which have continued to have a major impact on policymakers until the present day. Yet, his policies have been disputed for decades. Many of his critics seem to have come to rest only when East and West Germany were finally united in 1990.

The task that Adenauer faced when he took office, was to try and convert defeated and occupied West Germany into a functioning state, sovereign in its domestic and foreign affairs. As we have mentioned earlier, the FRG's western orientation had been decided upon by the Western Allied Forces even before the country was founded. Adenauer's personality was in line with this; he came from a population stratum which favored western orientation (Rhineland, middle class). He sought to ensure

security from Germany for the rest of Europe, and for Germany from the Communist threat. Indeed, concerning security from Germany, he was somewhat distrustful of his fellow Germans and their commitment to peace. He embedded West Germany into the network of the Western Alliance (i.e. European Community and NATO) to such an extent as to render German aggression impossible.

In 1951, in a speech in London[45], Adenauer talked about the danger of an exaggerated nationalism that had led the German nation into disaster. But Germans had learned from their mistakes, and Article 24 of the *Basic Law* allowed the FRG to transfer sovereign rights to a supranational body. The desire to become an equal part and partner of the West and the struggle for a united Germany were equally stressed in the Preamble. In the same speech, Adenauer considered the ECSC as a "decisive step towards solving the German-French problem" which had brought "inexpressible sorrow over Europe". After the GDR had been founded, Adenauer declared in the *Bundestag* on October 21, 1949[46]: "Until German unity will have been achieved, the Federal Republic of Germany is the only legitimate state organization of the German people." The protocol testified to "animated applause and clapping on the right, in the center and on the ranks of the SPD."

However, when Adenauer flatly refused to consider the previously-mentioned note sent by the Soviet Union to the governments of the other Allied Forces, suspicions concerning his sincere devotion to national unification became loud, especially in the

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[45] See Konrad Adenauer, "Auf dem Weg nach Europa" ("On the Road to Europe"), speech in London on December 6, 1951, reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 101-102.
[46] Quoted in Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauers Wiedervereinigungspolitik: Zwischen nationalem Wollen und realpolitischem Zwang", p. 140.

oppositional SPD. Evaluating existing parameters of the political system, Adenauer

drew the conclusion that in order to win the desired freedom in domestic and foreign-

policy matters, West Germany must set up the closest ties possible with Western

Europe and the United States. In his Government Statement of October 20, 1953, he

said:

> Nobody who had maintained that there was an irreconcilable
> contradiction between unification and European integration, had
> revealed the secret of how and by what means unification was to
> come about and be secured other than by the path of European
> integration. There is no other path to unification than that of
> European integration, unless we are prepared to give up our
> freedom and deliver all Germany into the hands of the Soviet
> Union.[47]

To criticism of his *Westpolitik*, Adenauer replied in an interview in 1956: "It would be

quite wrong to say we regard European unification as a substitute for German

unification."[48] His critics, however, continued to regard supranationality as pursued by

Adenauer, as "a primary substitute after the loss of the *Reich*"[49]. Yet, public opinion

was very enthusiastic about the European idea, but for different reasons: Some

regarded it as a transition to a Western European federal state, while others

considered it a milestone on the path to a classic nation-state.

The fact that Adenauer was at heart a political realist is understood when analyzing his

concept of European integration. If unification of the two German states was the

ultimate goal, European integration was merely the tool to achieve national interests.

After Adenauer's visit to Moscow in 1955, it must have been clear to him that the

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[47] Quoted in Klaus Gotto, "A Realist and Visionary: Konrad Adenauer's Reunification Policy" in
German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture, vol. 19, June 1990, p. 32.
[48] Quoted in ibid., p. 33.
[49] See Gilbert Ziebura, "Europaidee und Supranationalitat in der Westdeutschen Aussenpolitik" in:
Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 142.

German Question would require a longer timetable. The only option for the time being was to keep it open. But if European integration were to succeed and the right moment arose, then the FRG could "throw the weight of a united Europe as a new important momentum into the scales when negotiating about unification."[50]

Adenauer had learned directly from Khrushchev that the Soviet Union had to solve three basic problems at the same time: raise living standards, arm to the same level as the United States, and prepare for potential conflict with the People's Republic of China. Adenauer was aware that this meant an overstretch for Moscow. He hoped that one day the Soviet Union would have to reduce its overcommitment in East Germany and give internal stability preference over ideological and political extension. His famous "magnet theory" put forward the idea that, in the end, the West would be superior to the East due to its political freedom and high living standards achieved by the capitalist economic system. The inherent weakness of despotism, including the lack of success of its centrally planned economy, would undermine the legitimacy of its existence. German unity could then be achieved as part of a new peace order for Europe and a readjustment in the global balance of power. By the time, West Germany would be fully embedded in the European Community and attain a superior position in it. Adenauer was much earlier able to envisage this than most of his fellow countrymen. It was all just a question of time.

Adenauer was aided in convincing West Germans of the necessity to further European integration by an intensification of the Cold War and the fact that France warmed up

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[50] Konrad Adenauer, "Schreiben des Bundeskanzlers Dr. Konrad Adenauer an die Bundesminister vom 19. Januar 1956" ("Letter by Chancellor Dr. Konrad Adenauer of January 19, 1956 to the Federal Ministers"), reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 113.

to the idea of an integrated Western Europe, as expressed by Robert Schuman's proposal to establish the ECSC. Adenauer himself, however, never got over the failure to establish a European Defense Community. West Germany was compensated by being admitted to NATO, but European integration could not be regarded Adenauer's long-term primary foreign-policy goal any more.

At the beginning of the 1960s then, even Adenauer was more committed to a European confederation than a federation. Main reasons for this attitude were the following[51]: The fact that Great Britain had joined EFTA; West German public opinion showed negative reactions toward the EEC for which the West German Government had to enter into too many compromises; the concept of achieving unification through European integration increasingly lost credibility; beginnings of an *Ostpolitik* were showing.

Schwarz has challenged the image of the Chancellor as a politician who was a stranger to global political developments, and who defied all ideas of changing West Germany's position concerning legal recognition of East Germany. Schwarz quotes an interview with Adenauer on October 3, 1963[52], shortly before his resignation, in which he said he had asked Chruchchev "whether we should not make a truce for ten years, and then after ten years have a referendum. On the condition that during those ten years there would be greater freedom for the people in the Soviet zone than there is now." Although, at the time, nothing indicated that unification was imminent, and the Western powers were pressuring Adenauer into accepting realities and establishing

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[51] Gilbert Ziebura, "Europaidee und Supranationalitaet in der Westdeutschen Aussenpolitik", pp.145-151.
[52] Quoted by Hans-Peter Schwarz, "Adenauer's Wiedervereinigungspolitik. Zwischen nationalem Wollen und realpolitischem Zwang", p. 286.

a *modus vivendi* with East Germany, he was nevertheless not inclined to initiate any change. This might be due to the fact, as Schwarz suggests[53], that Adenauer felt his own time in office nearing its end and, therefore, did not want to start any new policies that he himself would not be able to bring to an end. But his motives to cling to his political stance will remain unclear.

After Adenauer resigned from office in 1963, the Conservatives under Ludwig Erhard, who was Federal Chancellor from 1963 to 1966, continued to be unable of adapting to changed parameters in international politics. Slow change started to surface only with Kurt Georg Kiesinger, who headed the Great Coalition with the SPD from 1966-1969, and with Willy Brandt who served as his Foreign Minister. Adenauer's legacy, however, is West Germany's integration into the European Community with far-reaching effects on the economic sector and on foreign-policy issues, as well as the country's membership in NATO. It is through these two international bodies that the FRG found a new identity after World War II and basic orientation for its future foreign-policy decisions.

3.4.2. Brandt's 'Ostpolitik'

The beginnings of *Ostpolitik* had been initiated by Adenauer when he agreed with the Soviet Union on the establishment of diplomatic relations in September 1955. In the general atmosphere of decreased tensions between the superpowers after the Cuban Crisis - de Gaulle had even recognized the Oder-Neisse-line as the border between

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[53] Ibid., p. 288.

Poland and East Germany - the Federal Republic set up trade missions in Poland, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria in the years 1963 and 1964. Alongside this "substitute diplomacy"[54], the *Hallstein-Doctrine continued* to be in force.

In June 1966, the SPD party congress demanded the lifting of the *Hallstein-Doctrine* and the establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern Bloc countries. However, Adenauer's kind of *Ostpolitik* was entwined into the context of his *Deutschlandpolitik*, i.e. sole power of representation by the Federal Republic and non-recognition of East Germany. When the Berlin Wall was built in August 1961, *Ostpolitik* had reached an impasse.

It was not until 1968, that Willy Brandt - the SPD-chairman and Foreign Minister of the Great Coalition from 1966 to 1969 - presented his ideas of a "European peace order" which would allow for a new era in foreign policy to begin. In an interview with the *Deutschlandfunk*[55], Brandt explained that by a "European peace order" he understood, in the first place, a "European security order". Such an order could operate from the continuing existence of the present alliances and bring them into a certain relationship to one another, or a new model could be created, gradually substituting NATO and Warsaw Pact. Both models should of course not entail any reduction in actual security. As first, and essential, steps towards any change Brandt named "equal troop reductions, abstention from force, but also inspection zones, exchange of maneuver observers and others."

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[54] See Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p. 316.
[55] Ibid., pp. 326-28.

"Continuity and innovation" was the slogan with which the new social-liberal government had set to work. Chancellor Brandt illustrated this when he said in his first Government Declaration of October 28, 1969, that international recognition of the GDR by the Federal Government would be out of the question. This statement stood for continuity, but already the next sentence brought revolutionary innovation: "Even if two states exist in Germany, they are not like foreign countries to each other." For the first time, the existence of two states on German soil had been acknowledged.

Brandt's secretary of state at the Chancellor's Office, Egon Bahr, conducted first direct negotiations with the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the end of 1969, and then met with him 13 more times over the next three months. The so-called *"Bahr-Paper"*[56] laid down ten guidelines for relations with the Soviet Union and contained the basic elements of the subsequent *Moscow-Treaty*. The most important items in the *Bahr-Paper* are No. 3, stating that borders in Europe as they exist at present, including the Oder-Neisse-line, shall be considered as inviolable thereafter, and No. 4, declaring that the relationship between the FRG and GDR are to be based on "full equality, non-discrimination and sovereignty". Both items broke with the political tradition of the CDU/CSU. The West German Government signed the Treaty with the Soviet Union on August 12, 1970[57]. On the same day, Foreign Minister Walter Scheel

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[56] In: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Die Vertraege der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken und mit der Volksrepublik Polen* ("Treaties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the People's Republic of Poland"), Bonn 1971, p. 17.
[57] Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (Moscow-Treaty) in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, vol. II, 1972, pp. 353-56.

presented the "Letter on German Unity"[58] to the Soviet Foreign Ministry. It stated that the Treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union "is not in contradiction with the Federal Republic's political goal of working towards a state of peace in Europe, in which the German people will regain unity in free self-determination."

In December 1970, West Germany signed a treaty with Poland[59] concerning the normalization of their mutual relationship. The two countries declared that the Oder-Neisse-line formed Poland's western border, and that the two countries have not, and will not have in the future, any territorial claims on each other. However, the consensus was not perfect because the German Government stuck to its position that only a peace treaty with an all-German administration could bring a legally binding renunciation of pre-war territory. Consequently, up until 1990, West German maps continued to show Prussia, Silesia etc. as occupied territories, despite repeated protests from Warsaw.[60]

Parallel to bilateral negotiations between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, Warsaw and East Berlin, negotiations were also under way among the Four Powers USA, Soviet Union, Great Britain and France about the Berlin Question. They were concluded on September 3, 1971 with the *Four-Power-Agreement on Berlin*[61], which presented as Görtemaker has remarked, "from a western point of view, the Soviet

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[58] Walter Scheel, *Brief zur deutschen Einheit* ("Letter on German Unity") in: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Die Vertraege der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken und mit der Volksrepublik Polen*, p. 12.
[59] Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the People's Republic of Poland on the Basics of Normalizing their Mutual Relationship in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, vol. II, 1972, pp. 361-63.
[60] See Peter Borowsky, *Deutschland 1970-1976* ("Germany 1970-1976"), Hannover 1980, p.132.
[61] The Four-Power-Agreement on Berlin of September 3, 1971, reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 264-275.

Union's actual compliance with western wishes due to the Eastern Treaties, as well as the West's consent to participate in CSCE."[62] It was, at the same time, the price for recognition of the GDR by the West. The Agreement secured the viability of West Berlin although it was stated explicitly that it continued not to be part of the Federal Republic and would not be governed by it. Following the *Four-Power-Agreement*, a series of treaties concerning human cross-border contacts and technical issues were concluded, most notably the *Transit-Agreement* regulating traffic to West Berlin through specially designed access roads.

Between December 1970 and December 1971, Egon Bahr and Michael Kohl, the secretary of state at the GDR's Council of Ministers, met over 70 times negotiating the Basic Contract. This contract was no partition treaty, yet resembled one closely. International recognition of the GDR on part of the FRG did not occur. This was illustrated in the fact that no ambassadors, but "permanent representatives" were exchanged. As in the case of the *Moscow-Treaty*, the Federal Government sent its *"Note on German Unity"* to the Foreign Ministry of the GDR. The *Hallstein-Doctrine* had become obsolete, since "none of the two states can act in the name of the other, or represent it at an international level."[63] The following year both states became members of the United Nations.

The new *Ostpolitik* led to sharp political confrontations between SPD/FDP on the one hand, and CDU/CSU on the other. Conflict escalated in a constructive vote of no confidence against the Brandt Government, and failed only barely. It revealed,

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[62] Manfred Görtemaker, "Entspannung und Neue *Ostpolitik* 1969-1975" ("*Détente* and New *Ostpolitik* from 1969 to 1975") in *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, vol. 4, no. 245, 1994, p. 37.
[63] Ibid.

however, that the opposition did not have a very convincing alternative policy either.

Early national elections in October 1972 resulted in a clear victory by the Brandt-led

coalition. At the time, the CDU/CSU were in fact the only democratic party in

Western Europe that did not approve of the new *Ostpolitik*, exemplified in the above-

mentioned four Eastern Treaties. However, when it came to voting in the *Bundestag*,

the majority of oppositional MPs abstained, thus making ratification of the treaties

possible.

The CDU/CSU opposition had also sought, but had not been able to reach,

nullification of the Treaty between the FRG and GDR through the Constitutional

Court. However, the Court clarified and stressed, in accordance with the Preamble of

the *Basic Law*, that no constitutional organ of the FRG had the right to give up

national unity as a political goal. The Court declared that the treaty continued to keep

up the notion of unity of the German nation and German nationality, and would not

contain international recognition of the German Democratic Republic on the part of

West Germany.[64]

Brandt's new *Ostpolitik* was a pragmatic policy because it addressed only issues

beneficial to West German national interests, whereas issues that could not be agreed

upon between the parties were left aside. Baring talks about a *modus vivendi*[65] when

describing what Brandt intended to achieve. Elements of this pragmatic approach

were essentially the following three[66]: 1. acceptance of post-war borders and non-

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[64] See Eckart Thurich, "Die Deutschlandpolitik der sozial-liberalen Koalition 1969-1982" ("The *Deutschlandpolitik* of the Social-Liberal Coalition from 1969 to 1982") in *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, vol. 4, no. 233, 1991, p. 19.
[65] See Arnulf Baring, *Machtwechsel: Die Aera Brandt-Scheel* ("Change of Power: The Era Brandt-Scheel"), Stuttgart 1982, p. 256.
[66] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 26.

aggression; 2. the avoidance of a final, legally binding settlement of the *German Question*; 3. no impairment of West Berlin's political status. All these elements can in fact be found in the Eastern Treaties.

Brandt had taken European cooperation into account at the very beginning of his new *Ostpolitik* by declaring an active Western policy as a prerequisite for *Ostpolitik* and *détente*.[67] However, Brandt realized that due to the Federal Republic's vested interests and particular political realities, negotiations with the East had to be conducted at a bilateral level. Western Europe, appeased by Bonn's declaration of being firmly embedded in the context of the European Community, was content to let the Federal Republic take the first steps of *détente* alone.

Only a couple of weeks after having taken office, Brandt made his famous speech at the Den Haag Summit of December 1, 1969[68]. It has widely been regarded as a driving force regarding enlargement of the Community, as well as promoting the integration process. Brandt particularly urged the French not to block accession of Great Britain, as well as other countries ready to join. He saw the European Community not as a new bloc but rather as an "exemplary order" serving as a "module in a balanced peace order comprising the whole of Europe." West Germany, without explicitly saying so, would be pioneering this task by "seeking dialogue with the East in cooperation and agreement with the West." Thus, the Federal Republic "guaranteed" that the West would not have to fear any uncertainties about Bonn's

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[67] See Christian Hacke, *Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* ("Reluctant Global Power: The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany"), Stuttgart; Klett-Cotta, 1988, p. 210.
[68] Speech by the German Chancellor at the Heads of States and Governments Conference of the European Communities' member-states in Den Haag on Dec. 1, 1969, in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1970, pp. 36-40.

intentions, and was believed in. As for further integration within the Community, Brandt stated that his government was willing to enter the path towards economic and monetary union by trying to overcome structural differences among the member-states. Concerning the EC's institutions, Brandt's suggestions were to "tighten up the Council's working method, to enlarge both the Commission's factual tasks and the Parliament's competence, especially its control over the budget." He went on to explicitly mention direct parliamentary elections in order to achieve principal parliamentary control over the Community's affairs. All of his suggestions were put into practice - more or less successful - in the 1970s and 80s. Further, on the occasion of signing the *Moscow-Treaty*, Brandt declared before the press that concerning the great economic potential for trade made availabe through this Treaty, West Germans were not going to exploit it alone but "will act here again as Europeans."[69]

In terms of security, Brandt was firmly determined to keep the Federal Republic within the Western Alliance, i.e. NATO. When giving a speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany he observed[70]:

> The stronger the ties of a common military risk are, the bigger our security will grow. When risk is concerned, everything possibly separating us from each other would be less security; in the first place for us, soon for all. I think the result is clear (...). The Alliance has become indispensable for Europe and for America, for all of us (...).

When Helmut Schmidt - Federal Chancellor from 1974 to 1982 - took over in office, the paradigmatic change in foreign policy had already been completed. Hence,

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[69] In: Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Die Vertraege der Bundesrepublik Deutschland mit der Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken und mit der Volksrepublik Polen*, Bonn 1971, p. 28.
[70] Willy Brandt, "Europa und die Vereinigten Staaten: die unentbehrliche Allianz" ("Europe and the United States: The Indispensable Alliance"), speech delivered before the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany, Düsseldorf 1978.

Schmidt's time was not highlighted by any more innovative characteristics. Instead, East-West relations developed in accordance with the parameters set up by the Brandt Government. Chancellor Schmidt, though, was the one who elevated negotiations with the East onto a multilateral level - as opposed to previous bilateral negotiations - when the Federal Republic started to participate in the Helsinki process. Yet, the conclusion about the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 made by an influential West German journalist reflects the Federal Republic's official position at the time quite well[71]:

> *Détente* and CSCE are not synonyms. The European Conference has been an important part of *détente*, yet it has not been its center-piece. It was a consequence of, not the cause of, normalization. The Conference has not produced anything that would not have been possible without it, nor has it prevented anything that would have otherwise happened.

3.4.3. 'Genscherismus'

Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the longest-serving foreign minister in post-war Germany, being in office from 1974-1992. As a young man he came to West Germany in 1952, leaving his hometown Halle in East Germany after having received part of his education at the University of Leibzig. In the West, he launched himself quite soon into politics. His main political goals have always been ending the division of his home-country through ending the division of the European continent, and taking on the responsibility that no war would ever again emanate from German soil. In 1966, as a member of the *Bundestag*, he elaborated on the national question by

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[71] Quoted in: Helga Haftendorn, *Sicherheit und Entspannung: Zur Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1955-1982* ("Security and *Détente*: On the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany 1955 to 1982"), Baden-Baden 1983, p. 143.

trying to embed the unity of the divided German nation into European developments.

Genscher was one of the first West German politicians to be in favor of the idea of a "security conference comprising the whole of Europe."[72] This conference, the CSCE, came indeed and paved the way for German unity.

Genscher called the *Hallstein-Doctrine* "narrow-minded"[73] and rejected the Federal Republic's claim to sole representation as a legal doctrine. The latter, understood in the right way, was "the political right of the Federal Republic to speak and act on behalf of all Germans as long as the Middle Germans[74] (were) not allowed to articulate their political will in a free manner."[75] Genscher's first big international success, although not widely known and mentioned, was his ability – at the insistence of his then State Secretary Günther van Well – to keep the *German Question* open in the Helsinki Act of 1975. Although the Document contained the clear commitment of all signatory states to recognize the inviolability of all European borders, it also stated that states "may alter their borders in a peaceful way and through mutual agreement in accordance with international law."[76]

On the occasion of a Government Declaration concerning the CSCE, Genscher spoke of "Germany's specific relationship with the conference, its goals and opportunities." He stated that "nobody other but us Germans can have a greater interest in the conference reaching its goal, that is to say to improve contacts between the states and

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[72] In a contribution for *liberal*, the Free Democratic party organ, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 27.
[73] Ibid., p. 30.
[74] Genscher always talked about "Middle Germans" instead of "East Germans".
[75] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 31.
[76] Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Bulletin: Konferenz über Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa, Schlussakte Helsinki* ("Bulletin: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act of Helsinki"), Bonn, Aug. 15, 1975, p. 925

people in the whole of Europe."[77] Genscher's emphasis in those years was clearly on multilateralism and cooperation when he demanded a "world without hegemony"[78], "an order of equality"[79] in which "the realization (of human rights) can be the only measure of progress."[80]

In the second half of the 1970s, the German Foreign Minister coined the idea of a "realistic" policy of *détente*. However, that period became for many supporters of *détente* at a time of disillusion as new Soviet atomic middle range missiles against Western Europe were employed, which culminated in the Western "arm-and-negotiate" decision. Yet, Genscher's understanding of the term had nothing to do with political "realism". In 1982, he explained his view in an article for *Foreign Affairs*:[81]

> Realistic means that the Alliance (NATO) will always be aware of the continuing difference between East and West with regard to moral values and goals. It (the Alliance) is aware that *détente* can only be built on the basis of a policy of equilibrium, but that - understood in such a way - *détente*, as one of the two pillars of peace-keeping, is a necessary complementation to a policy of equilibrium.

Throughout his speeches in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Genscher frequently referred to NATO's *Harmel-Report* of 1967[82], named after the former Belgian Foreign Minister. Apart from the fundamental conviction that any kind of *détente* in Europe presupposed a close partnership between North America and Western

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[77] Government Declaration before the German *Bundestag* on July 25, 1975 reprinted: in Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, pp. 35-36.
[78] Speech before the 32nd General Assembly at the United Nations on Sept. 29, 1977, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 44.
[79] Ibid., p. 43.
[80] Ibid., p. 50.
[81] Article for *Foreign Affairs* in the fall edition of 1982, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 98.
[82] In *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 149, 1967, p. 1257.

Europe, the report was based mainly on two principles: First, "that political and military security cannot be separated" and, secondly, "the principle that real *détente* has to be to the immediate benefit of the people and must be carried by them."[83] The fact that Genscher intended to put defense on a par with dialogue with the East contributed to tensions between Bonn and Washington that were being experienced since the late 1970s. In America, on the other hand, the prevalent opinion in government circles was to exclude dialogue and concentrate exclusively on defense capacity.

As a Liberal, Genscher's main emphasis was on economics, and he knew well how to use economic relations in order to obtain political goals. With reference to the relationship between East and West, he concluded that "cooperation is an indispensable part of a long-term peace policy. That is why economic relations also contribute in an important way to the continuity and stability of the political relationship between West and East."[84] For Genscher, military might was not important; it had, in fact, to be limited. What counted was economic might. This would, then, be translated into political might, which should be used – within a European context - to further integration. Genscher never tired of repeating that nobody needed to fear neither West Germany nor, later, a united Germany. There would be no go-it-alone, and whatever might Germany should gain would be used solely for peaceful purposes: "For the sake of our own national interests, we have to be the motor in the European integration process and a reliable partner. Only in such a

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[83] Government Declaration before the German *Bundestag* on July 25, 1975, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 38.
[84] Speech before the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki on Nov. 2, 1983, reprinted: in Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 112.

way can we be assured to have a say in the formation of world politics as far as it affects European interests."[85]

As early as 1980, Genscher's belief that German unification could only be achieved within a European context and that dialogue with the Soviet Union had to be extended, was based on the thought that modern technology and means of communication are putting nations into a world of global interdependence: "Today, states can only reach their goals of peace and economic prosperity in a state of global cooperation."[86] In order to achieve such a world, Genscher demanded a restructuring of the global order: "Forms and instruments for global conflict management and resolution are becoming ever more necessary. The most pressing challenge of our era (is): to create a world order which would make such cooperation possible and organize it in a reliable manner."[87]

It is due to these convictions that, at the beginnings of the 1980s, Genscher did not declare *détente* to have failed, despite a revival of the Cold War. "Realistic" *détente* had to be able to cope with such setbacks, reassess its strategy and start again. Equally, he was the one German politician not to be drawn into the tide of *Eurosclerosis*. Despite the fact that in the first election for the European Parliament in 1979, voting turnout was only 65.9% and media polls showed that public support for the European Community in West Germany had fallen below 50% for the first time,

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[85] Contribution in a *Bundestag* debate on the situation of the nation in a divided Germany, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 118.
[86] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik für die achtziger Jahre" ("German Foreign Policy in the 1980's"), speech before the German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn on May 5, 1980, reprinted in: Helga Haftendorn et al., eds., *Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, pp. 526-27.
[87] Ibid., p. 527.

Genscher came up with the "Genscher-Colombo-Initiative"[88]. This counteract to *Eurosclerosis*, although unsuccessful in part due to the lack of support by Chancellor Schmidt, deserved credit since it was formulated years before Euro-scepticism should finally come to an end in the second half of the 1980s. The West German Foreign Minister saw political integration as a prerequisite for solving world-wide economic challenges together.[89]

When in 1982, after 13 years of social/liberal rule, the Federal Republic was ready for a political about-turn (*Wende*), Genscher was the key-actor by holding with his FDP the decisive percentage of votes to tip the balance, this time, in favor of the Christian-Democrats. Naturally, he stayed on as Foreign Minister and, thus, guaranteed continuity in West Germany's foreign policy. Despite Chancellor Kohl's interest in foreign-policy matters and his party's surfacing revisionist tendencies with respect to *Deutschlandpolitik*, the Foreign Ministry under Genscher was considered "one of the key factors in the fading of traditional Conservative aspirations."[90] Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was continued, the Oder-Neisse-line acknowledged as Poland's western border, renewed interest in the European Community still intensified, and *détente* remained a persistent feature of West German foreign policy. After the 1987 national election Genscher's course was even more consolidated due to an increase in the FDP's percentage of votes.[91]

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[88] This plan proposed a treaty on European union in order to reinforce the political goal of European unification. For further details see: Wilfried Loth, "Europa als nationales Interesse? - Tendenzen deutscher Europapolitik von Schmidt bis Kohl" ("Europe as National Interest? - Tendencies of German European Policy from Schmidt to Kohl") in *Integration*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1994, p. 151.

[89] See "Europas Rolle in der Weltpolitik" ("Europe's Role in World Politics"), speech before the European Management Forum on Jan. 29, 1982, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, Stuttgart, April 1985, p. 331.

[90] See Lothar Gutjahr's chapter "The FDP's Security Policy" in: Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 81.

[91] See Jochen Thies, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland nach den Wahlen vom 25. Januar 1987: Aussenpolitische Kontinuitaet und leichte Akzentverschiebungen" ("The Federal Republic of

Particularly the ongoing interest in *détente* was thought to have been the main feature of *Genscherismus*. Genscher's notion of a "policy of responsibility" was over and over repeated by himself in statements that never again should a war be started from German soil, that nobody in Europe would ever need to fear German aggressiveness, and that whatever actions the Federal Republic would undertake should solely be to the benefit of world peace and especially European integration. All this was coupled with Genscher's modest and low-key public appearances and official statements. He was always inclined to follow the mainstream in international discussions in order to avoid drawing attention to deviating positions on part of the FRG.

Then, in 1987, Genscher was to hold a speech in Davos which should change public perception of his person abroad as well as domestically. In his probably most daring speech during his time in office, he delivered a forceful pleading for Gorbatchev and the "new thinking" in and "new policies" of the Soviet Union[92]. Genscher had understood that "the increase in growth and technological progress is (...) the primary goal of Gorbatchev's policy. (...) Gorbatchev has realized: modernizing the economy will not work without modernizing and opening society as well, domestically and internationally."[93] That implied that Gorbatchev would "also need a new foreign policy."[94] It would be "a mistake of historic extent if the West would let this chance

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Germany after the Election of Jan. 25, 1987: Continuity in Foreign Policy and Small Shifts in Emphasis") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 42, no. 8, 1987, p. 219.
[92] See: Hans-Dietrich Genscher's speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos on Feb. 1, 1987, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 140.
[93] Ibid., p. 142.
[94] Ibid., p. 143.

pass by, merely because it cannot rid itself from a way of thinking that always, when looking at the Soviet Union, solely considers the worst scenario."[95]

These statements gained Genscher very negative reactions abroad, especially in Great Britain and America. The term *Genscherismus* again made the rounds, this time implying a supposed limp softness vis-à-vis the enemy. However, later on it should become - as Genscher himself was proud to say - "a world-wide movement with an ever-growing number of supporters."[96] Two years later, in January 1989, Genscher already seemed to expect change when he told the same audience in Davos: "The European Community is a part of a European peace order that has already been formed. But the Community is not the whole of Europe."[97]

Genscher repeatedly warned his audiences to realize and understand the complexities of modern life and the global interdependence of all sectors of life. It is this "dynamic interplay of different elements and processes" that had turned world politics into a "world domestic policy."[98] Consequently, speaking in a European context, the only logical conclusion for the German Foreign Minister was pushing integration ever more. He evaluated the European Community in the following way:[99]

> The European Community is, at present, the highest developed form of co-existence by sovereign states. By integrating twelve European democracies we have won a victory over national egoisms, over power-political thinking and over prejudices. It is the greatest and most beautiful victory in European history - it hasn't cost a single drop of blood, nor a single life, but it can win the future for us.

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[95] Ibid., p. 146.
[96] Quoted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 137.
[97] Speech before the World Economic Forum in Davos on Jan. 29, 1989, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 188.
[98] Ibid, pp. 191-92.
[99] Contribution in *Die Zeit* of October 21, 1988, reprinted in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Unterwegs zur Einheit: Reden und Dokumente aus bewegter Zeit*, p. 173.

In summary, Hans-Dietrich Genscher may be called a "visionary" politician, who employed "realistic" means to achieve political ends. When, in the second half of 1989, the winds of change blew across the European continent, Genscher's dream of his life - German unification - was starting to become a reality. However, his vision of building a truly unified Europe was still facing numerous obstacles.

3.5. Conclusions

As this chapter has revealed, the circumstances under which the Federal Republic of Germany had been founded played an important role for its European policy. The Western Allied Powers had decided that West Germany had to be firmly integrated into the West in order to prevent uncontrolled German aggression to happen again. The painful experience of the Second World War and its aftermath, namely foreign occupation and the division of Germany, led to the awareness in West Germany that its future - and ultimately united Germany's future, if it was ever to take place - could only lie in European and Western integration. Such an approach would, at the same time, solve West Germany's most pressing problems of economic reconstruction, political rehabilitation and withstanding the security threat from the East.

This chapter has also shown that the European Community was born out of political considerations, namely the historic reconciliation between West Germany and France. Despite the fact that economic cooperation has increasingly led to include further economic sectors (spill-over), the basic drive for integration was rooted in political

acts of will. In this, West German political leaders have played a leading role. Especially Konrad Adenauer, who was in charge both of the Federal Republic's Chancellorship as well as the Foreign Ministry, enforced his vision of an economically strong, and eventually politically strong, FRG in the European Community. Adenauer was led by realist motivations, naturally excluding military might that would not have been tolerated by the Allied Powers. It can be said that he envisaged European integration as a tool to rehabilitate his country both in an economic and political sense. Adenauer was determined to achieve as much influence for the FRG as was possible in the light of restrictions put upon the country by the Allies. Supranationality, in his concept, was not born out of idealist ideas, but out of political necessity. His foreign-policy decisions constituted an irrevocable basis for the FRG's future conduct of foreign policy.

Willy Brandt, with his new *Ostpolitik*, built upon the fundament laid by Adenauer, despite his party's (SPD) initial opting for a neutral state. Although Brandt has often, especially in retrospective, been heralded as an architect of a European peace order, his approach was founded primarily upon the search for a way in which to enforce his country's national interests, that is to say above all to alleviate human sufferings resulting from the country's division and, eventually, national unification. When Hans-Dietrich Genscher took over the Foreign Ministry under Brandt, new elements founded upon humanitarian considerations were introduced into West Germany's foreign policy. Especially Genscher - and, as we shall see later on, Helmut Kohl - was deeply influenced by his personal history. European integration, for Genscher, was not confined to Western Europe, but included Eastern Europe as well. While pursuing his

"vision" of a peaceful, united Europe, Genscher was realistic in his evaluation of international political setbacks, which he did not let discourage him.

Summing up, it can be stated that among leading West German politicians there was consensus on the commitment to European integration. The politician with most traits of an idealist has been found to be Hans-Dietrich Genscher, although he was realistic in his appreciation of world politics in general, and European politics in particular. Yet, Genscher introduced idealist components into West German foreign policy, embodied in his "policy of responsibility". Despite the fact that West German national interests always existed, and alternating politicians worked more or less directly to achieve them, political leaders have been found to have undergone a certain learning process since the inception of the Federal Republic. European integration and supranationality increasingly became ends in themselves rather than mere tools of achieving national interests. This is rooted in the fact that, despite numerous criticism, the European Community resulted in more net benefits for the Federal Republic of Germany than in net disadvantages. Rolling back integration within the Community was regarded by West German leading politicians as endangering the country's economic prosperity and peace that had been achieved after the war. Since Adenauer, long-term considerations, both of an economic and political nature, led to the Federal Republic's continued commitment to European integration.

In order to examine whether the consensus on West Germany's commitment to European integration was shared by the country's political parties and public to the same degree as by its leading politicians, we shall now turn to our next chapter.

4. EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AS VIEWED BY WEST GERMAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE UNIFICATION

It has already been noted that, in the context of Germany's foreign policy, European policy is seen to take a place in-between foreign policy and domestic policy. Thus, we conclude that domestic, that is to say German, political parties and public opinion must be also be taken into consideration for our analysis. In general, it has been established that political parties are political institutions that directly influence policies.[1] They are at the heart of input factors that affect outputs of politics, namely policies. This is related to the basic dynamics of party politics. Usually, political parties have their own policy choices when it comes to policy issues. Different parties take different positions regarding controversial issues. Often, that is related to their location on the ideological spectrum and/or can be related to the goal of maximizing votes. Parties are particularly influential when they are in government. Nonetheless, as opposition or government, they are generally considered significant for mobilizing public opinion on policy issues, for bringing issues on the policy agenda, as well as for constraining policy choices.

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[1] See for instance A. Blais, D. Blake and S. Dion, "Do Parties Make a Difference? Parties and the Size of Government in Liberal Democracies" in *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 37, no. 1, 1993, pp. 40-63; S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*, Cambridge (MA) 1992; Peter Katzenstein, *Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-Sovereign State*, 1987; Charles Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, New York 1977.

Regarding public opinion, there is a wide literature that focuses on its crucial impact on policy-making.[2] Although often there is no uniform understanding on, or model for, the processes and channels through which this impact can occur, it is clear that public opinion affects policy-making through numerous and diverse channels. First of all, public opinion is established as one of the crucial factors in the decision-maker's (psychological) world. In other words, public opinion is an influence when it is perceived and taken into account by those who make decisions. Furthermore, it enters the policy-making process through direct democratic political pressures and the mass media. Finally, due to its potential ability to ultimately affect electoral outcomes and its role in affirming legitimacy, public opinion cannot be ignored. We will now examine how political parties and public opinion have affected European policy in West Germany. In Chapter Six we will, then, see which impact German unification has had on them regarding their influence on the shaping of European policy.

4.1. West German Political Parties and European Integration

West Germany's main political parties were formed between 1945 and 1947: the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Social Union (CSU), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP). The SPD had already been founded at the end of the last century and is one of the oldest parties in Europe. It had been closed down during the Hitler-regime, but was reopened after World War

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[2] See for instance D. Balsam and J. Bayles, "Public Opinion and the Parties' Defense Policies" in *Political Quarterly*, vol. 57, no. 2, 1986, pp. 187-94; Russel J. Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion, Political Parties in Advanced Industrialized Democracies*, Chatham (NJ) 1996; Peter Schmidt, "Public Opinion and Security Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany" in *Orbis*, vol. 28, no. 4, 1985, pp. 719-42; Jerry L. Yeric and John R. Todd, *Public Opinion: The Visible Politics*, Itasca (IL) 1994.

II. The SPD used to be a blue-collar party, but turned into a catch-all party after the Bad Godesberg Conference of 1959.

The CDU and CSU were new political parties. In contrast to the old Catholic Center Party of the Weimar Republic, they addressed voters from both Christian confessions (Protestants and Catholics). However, both are not religious parties, despite the fact that they maintain ties with the churches. Both are catch-all parties as well. The CDU and its Bavarian "sister party" are autonomous parties, but form a single parliamentary group.

The FDP was also a new political party, continuing the tradition of German Liberalism. The FDP has never been a powerful party. Although it has in fact few committed supporters, it has sometimes attracted more than 10% of shifting votes from SPD and CDU. However, the FDP has played a crucial role as coalition-partner for the two larger parties SPD and CDU/CSU. It has been the junior coalition-partner in all West German governments, except during the Great Coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD from 1966 to 1969.

All three parties have gone through important programatic changes during the time since their formation. At the federal level they have all, at one time or another, entered into a coalition with one another, or have been together in the opposition. Since all three parties understand themselves as catch-all parties representing all social strata, they have very distinct right and left wings, which represent the numerous positions of a mass party. Ideologically, these parties make up a triangle, rather than representing positions on a left-right continuum.

The Green Party (*Die Grünen*) is a special case.[3] Born out of the peace and ecological movement of the 1970s, it was founded in January 1980 at the federal level. Between 1983 and 1990, the Greens were represented in the *Bundestag*. This party was formed by opponents to nuclear power stations and protest groups with pacifist tendencies. While the party was rather homogenous at the beginning, soon a rift could be observed. On various issues, "fundamentalists" (*Fundis*) and "realists" (*Realos*) have confronted each other, the latter having to do with considerations concerning "real life" as opposed to idealist or "theoretical" politics.

We will now examine to which degree consensus on the European integration issue has existed within parties, as well as across them, owing to various intra-party factions. This is important regarding the possibility of coalition among the different political parties. Up to now, coalitions have been formed between CDU/CSU and SPD, SPD and FDP, CDU/CSU and FDP. A coalition between the SPD and the Green Party has so far been formed only at the *Laender* level (federal state level), but is within the range of possibility after the next general election of September 27, 1998. In order to make a statement on united Germany's commitment to European integration, a study of the various political parties' position on European integration as has evolved over time will be made. Here, in Chapter Four, emphasis will be on the

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[3] Other political parties, like the much-feared and discussed *Republikaner* - a party based on a far right-wing ideology - shall not be discussed here, since they failed to enter the *Bundestag* due to the five percent margin of vote required of political parties. This hurdle had been first introduced in 1953, and requires a party to obtain at least five percent of the legal vote, or at least three direct mandates, before it may enter the *Bundestag*. The Constitutional Court has explicitly accepted this regulation. Thus, of the 36 political parties which competed during the first West German election of 1949, only four were left in parliament in 1990. The goal of this regulation has been to prevent a fragmentation of the political landscape - as had happened in the Weimar Republic - and provide for parliamentary majorities able to govern.

last few years before unification. In Chapter Six, we will then continue our analysis of

the political landscape as it has presented itself after unification, and see whether

significant changes have occured.

4.1.1. CDU/CSU

Despite the fact that the Foreign Ministry has been in the hands of the FDP since

1972[4], the Federal Chancellor's competence to set policy guidelines

(*Richtlinienkompetenz*) has guaranteed him, that is to say Helmut Kohl since 1982, a

great say in foreign-policy matters. Since the political "about-turn" (*Die Wende*) of

1982, the CDU/CSU has formed a coalition-government with the FDP. Naturally,

Kohl himself, as party-chairman of the CDU and Chancellor, has been the most visible

exponent of his party's views.

The much discussed "about-turn" had been founded on domestic arguments and did,

therefore, not bring about many changes in foreign policy. As has previously been

pointed out, a consensus had existed in all government-coalitions of the Federal

Republic on the importance of West Germany's membership in the European

Community. However, Kohl as the head of the "classic European party"[5], intended to

place new emphasis on the Community's political integration. At the beginning, Kohl

had few ambitions in foreign policy but has always been rather concentrated on

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[4] Hans-Dietrich Genscher was Foreign Minister between 1974 and 1992.
[5] Christian Hacke, *Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* ("Reluctant Global Power:The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany"), Stuttgart 1988, p. 254.

domestic politics. As "Adenauer's political grandson", however, as he has liked to call himself, he has set out to carry on Adenauer's legacy of creating a unified Europe.

In his 1983 Report on the State of the Nation, Kohl claimed that "we Germans, will never accept the division of our fatherland."[6] Yet, Kohl and many of his party colleagues realized that there was no way back for the CDU to policies pursued before Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. The only way to "reunification", for which no coherent strategy existed, could be within the framework of the European Community, "with our neighbors' consent".[7] Kohl has not hesitated to reveal himself as a European federalist by stating that "from the beginning, we have understood a free Europe, the building of a United States of Europe, as a politically and economically integrated whole."[8] The majority of his party seemed to share this commitment: "The CDU wants the United States of Europe."[9] Furthermore, for Kohl, like for Adenauer, "the core of European integration is the tight relationship and friendship between Germany and France."[10]

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[6] Helmut Kohl, "Bericht zur Lage der Nation" ("Report on the State of the Nation") in *Stenographischer Bericht des Deutschen Bundestages*, 35th sitting of the German *Bundestag* on June 23, Bonn 1983, p. 987.

[7] Helmut Kohl, "Bericht der Bundesregierung zur Lage der Nation im geteilten Deutschland" ("Report of the Federal Government on the State of the Nation in the Devided Germany"), 205th sitting of the German *Bundestag* on March 14, 1986, reprinted in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 27, 1986, p. 202.

[8] Helmut Kohl, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der internationalen Politik in der Perspektive des Jahres 2000" ("Role of the Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics in the Perspective of the Year 2000"), speech by the German Chancellor before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on October 23, 1986, in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, vol. 131, October 31, 1986, p. 1102.

[9] CDU, "Unsere Verantwortung in der Welt: Christlich-demokratische Perspektiven zur Aussen-, Sicherheits-, Europa- und Deutschlandpolitik" ("Our Responsibility in the World: Christian-Democratic Perspectives on Foreign, Security, and European Policy as well as *Deutschlandpolitik*"), resolution by the CDU's 36th Federal Party Congress, in *CDU-Dokumentation*, no. 19, 1988, p. 16.

[10] Helmut Kohl, "Die Rolle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der internationalen Politik in der Perspektive des Jahres 2000", p. 1102.

Kohl, personally traumatized by the Second World War through - he had lost a brother in the war, experienced near starvation, and witnessed the partition of his home-country - has devoted his political career to the rehabilitation of Germany, both in the economic as well as political sense. The globalisation of West Germany's economy - which was the leading global economic power during the 1980s - had turned the country into the "economic location Germany". Kohl understood that this translated into new responsibilities in international politics: "We have to arouse a new and stronger awareness in our people for the role and responsibility of the Federal Republic of Germany in international politics in the coming decades."[11] "(...) Expectations are rising for Germany to take on more international responsibilities"[12], Kohl stated before the CDU's Party Congress in 1988.

This indicates that there has been a shift within the CDU to a more global orientation already before national unification took place in 1990. In those times, the ground was being prepared for West Germany's world-wide interests, that could not be realized in effective terms any more from a solely national basis. But when evoking the realities of international interdependence, Kohl is careful not to antagonize his present and future partners: "We are prepared to cooperate economically. As one of the biggest industrial nations in the world,we have a lot to offer."[13] Apart from this, Kohl's

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[11] Ibid., pp. 1101-02.
[12] Helmut Kohl, *Unserm Land die Zukunft sichern* ("Securing the Future for Our Country"), speech before the CDU's 36th Federal Party Congress in Wiesbaden, June 13-16, 1988, brochure published by the Federal Office of the CDU, pp. 16-17.
[13] Helmut Kohl, "Im Dienste der Menschen: Unsere Politik gegenüber unseren östlichen und südöstlichen Nachbarn" ("In the Service of Human Beings: Our Policy towards Our Eastern and South-Eastern Neighbors"), speech before the Evangelic Academy in Tutzingen on January 20, 1988, in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 16, 1988, p. 132.

genuine European vocation is not questioned by most Europeans. In fact, a

Newsweek-cover in 1996 dubbed him: "The Last European"[14].

But not all within the CDU have shared Helmut Kohl's view on European integration.

A classification undertaken by Gutjahr distinguishes between five sub-groups within

the CDU regarding foreign and defense policy.[15] The first group, the "pragmatists",

have formed the most influential strand after 1987. The most prominent names they

include are Helmut Kohl and Alfred Dregger, the former leader of the CDU in the

Bundestag. Kohl's view on European integration has developed out of power-political

realities for which the European Community has formed the most convenient

platform: "We are confronted with the challenge of adapting our economy to

changing conditions of international competition and to opportunities of technological

innovation."[16] Gutjahr concludes rightly that "conservative pragmatists were aiming to

use Germany's power sources in a non-ideological way to increase the country's

global influence."[17]

The second group, the "euro-conservatives", have been a minority, albeit an

influential one, before 1989. Prominent names are Karl Lamers (former speaker for

disarmament issues), Hans-Gert Poettering (former speaker for the CDU on security

in the European Parliament), and Willy Wimmer (a former secretary of state). They

have basically been concerned with security issues in and for Europe[18], in the tradition

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[14] *Newsweek International*, April 1, 1996.
[15] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, London/New York, 1994.
[16] Helmut Kohl, Government Declaration during the fourth sitting of the German *Bundestag* on March 18, 1987 in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 27, 1987, p. 209.
[17] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 56.
[18] See Hans-Gert Poettering, *Die Emanzipation Europas in der Sicherheitspolitik: Europa als Auftrag* ("Europe's Emancipation in Security Policy: Europe as a Mandate"), series of publications

of political realism. In contrast to the "pragmatists", they have gone much further in their aspirations for a European political union. Western Europe was to act globally, and Germany could be a leading member in it.[19]

The "liberal-conservatives" - a third group identified by Gutjahr - have clustered around such prominent figures as former West German President Richard von Weizsacker, the President of the *Bundestag* Rita Süssmuth, and the former CDU's Secretary General Heiner Geissler, who has challenged Helmut Kohl for party-leadership. Even before 1989, their outlook could be called pan-European, because they emphasized that Europe goes beyond the European Community.[20] Their search for new structures, particularly the CSCE, became especially apparent after 1989. In general, they have often rejected the Conservative rhetoric of their party colleagues, and can be counted among those who did consider a coalition with their liberal partner FDP not a mere political necessity.

The last group identified by Gutjahr - the "national-conservatives" - has formed around Bernd Wilz (a former secretary of state), Rupert Scholz (a former defense minister), and Jürgen Todenhöfer, who later made negative headlines when it became public that he had held secret meetings with the politically outlawed *Republikaner*[21]. Their political rhetoric had strong nationalistic overtones. Not surprisingly, they were very critical of European integration and its implications for national independence.

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by the Parliamentary Group of the EVP (*Europaeische Volkspartei*) in the European Parliament and the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group in the German *Bundestag*, May 2, 1985, p. 6.

[19] See Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 62.

[20] See for instance Richard von Weizsaecker, speech before the *Überseeclub* ("Transatlantic Club") in Hamburg on May 7, 1986, reprinted in Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, ed., *Reden und Interviews (2)* ("Speeches and Interviews (2)") Bonn 1986, especially p. 271.

[21] See *Der Spiegel*, July 20, 1992, pp. 80-81.

At best, they can be counted among confederalists, who envisage a loose cooperation in the fields of economic and defense issues among member-states. In this context, a European defense community could present, in their view a pillar within NATO and take on "complementary functions".[22]

The CSU is a political party which acts at a federal level together with the CDU. At the *Laender* level, it has attained a position resembling that of a one-party state in Bavaria, collecting always more than 50% of the vote there. The CSU is close in ideology to the "national-conservatives" of the CDU, and openly professes to a very conservative and nationalistic outlook. In fact, Franz Schönhuber - the first chairman of the *Republikaner* - had been a member of the CSU for several years. With respect to European integration, the CSU has maintained a confederalist view. That is to say, it envisages lose cooperation in the field of economics. A political or even a defense union was considered by the CSU's late chairman Franz Josef Strauss as "dreams of the future"[23].

4.1.2. FDP

German Liberals have, traditionally, been preoccupied predominantly with economics, that is to say with free trade. It is due to this fact that they have been among the first in West Germany to realize that the global economic climate had begun to change

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[22] Rupert Scholz, "Grundsaetze der Sicherheitspolitik des Atlantischen Bündnisses" ("Basic Fundaments of the Atlantic Alliance's Security Policy"), speech before the *Atlantik-Brücke* in Bonn on June 8, 1988, in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 81, 1988, p. 771.
[23] Franz Josef Strauss, "Der Gipfel und die Folgen" ("The Summit and Its Consequences"), interview in *Die Bunte*, December 10, 1987, p. 68.

since the 1970s. The new international interdependence, they realized, required new policies. Nation-states could no longer act, and were indeed no longer acting, alone in the international system. With respect to technological innovation, West Germany would, on the one hand, have to hold its own against economic rivals. On the other hand, it had to cooperate in order to be able to innovate and secure export markets. Genscher, thus, stated in 1983: "Our country cannot pull through the competition with the United States and Japan alone. We have neither the research facilities nor the industrial capacity; for that we need Europe."[24]

As has been stated earlier, when discussing *Genscherismus*, Liberals were primarily concerned with economic power, not with military might. The latter should even be reduced because it was not considered to be relevant any more. This fact does not place the FDP in the ranks of realists or neo-realists like the CDU/CSU; it rather represents a modified, softer version of *realpolitik*, emphasizing particularly economic power. The Liberals' dedication to European integrationy is genuine. They have basically agreed with Conservatives on the Community's role. Although Genscher's *"policy of responsibility"* contained moral elements, it was at the same time oriented to achieving West Germany's national interests, namely economic might and national unification.

Both aims could only be achieved within a peaceful and cooperative climate, for which the European Community was considered a conducive tool. Yet, by stressing the role of the CSCE, Liberals were closer to the Social-democrats' pan-European

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[24] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Die technologische Herausforderung" ("The Technological Challenge"), speech before the German Employers' Federal Association (BDA) on December 13, 1983, in Bonn aktuell, ed., *Hans-Dietrich Genscher: Deutsche Aussenpolitik*, Bonn 1985, p. 428.

outlook, who regarded the CSCE as a forum for structural change. Equally, the FDP approached the SPD more by viewing security not just as defense as the CDU/CSU does, but also by understanding it to include global issues such as ecological problems, indebtedness of the Third World, and hunger in the world.

Although the FDP is a relatively small party, different outlooks on European integration among its party ranks has been observed. Yet, the rift between its factions is not as great as, for instance, in the CDU/CSU. The fact that the FDP has been a coalition-partner of the CDU/CSU as well as the SPD, has made critics speak of this party as a "wryneck". More positive observers have interpreted this fact as a sign of the FDP's "pragmatic" approach to politics. This criticism has, of course, mostly concentrated on Genscher as the head and most dominant figure of his party, who served both under a Social-democratic chancellor (Schmidt) and under a Conservative one (Kohl). Another prominent figure who came under fire of criticism was Günther Verheugen, a long-standing member of the FDP, who switched parties and later became the SPD's spokesman on foreign-policy matters.

The FDP's program for the third direct European elections in June 1989, allows positive conclusions as to their dedication to European integration: "The European Community must develop into a European Union."[25] This "has to become a reality still in this millennium."[26] The FDP has favored European "symbols like a common flag, common passport, common driver's license, common stamps, and a common currency."[27] It has demanded further increased powers for the European Parliament[28],

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[25] FDP. Program for the European Elections of 1989, p. 6.
[26] Ibid., p. 3.
[27] Ibid., p. 4.
[28] Ibid., pp. 5-6.

a common foreign policy, as well as a policy of collective security has to be pursued further. The nation-state is regarded as "interfering too much in our daily life."[29] Although no explicit restrictions on the Community's scope of action are mentioned, it is noticeable that the program does not speak, as the CDU/CSU does, of a "United States of Europe". The FDP rather envisages a "confederation of states that shall deal with a series of common concerns in a federative manner."[30]

4.1.3. SPD

In its foreign and defense policies, the SPD has traditionally placed major emphasis on peace and the prevention of war. However, the party could broadly be split into two wings - idealists and pragmatists - who were basically trying to solve the same problem, that is how to preserve peace, in different ways. Idealists have focused on the evolution of civil societies[31] through reforming industrial societies, and have rejected military means.[32] The other strand, which represents a majority within the party, has pursued a more pragmatic approach regarding political realities. Willy Brandt and Egon Bahr initiated a pragmatic *Ostpolitik* in the 1960s and early 1970s. During the 1970s, Helmut Schmidt, despite his transatlantic approach, initiated at the same time a pragmatic European policy. It was aimed at combating a global economic

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[29] Ibid., p. 4.
[30] Ibid., p. 6.
[31] See for instance Hanns W. Maull, "Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik" ("The Federal Republic of German as a Civilian Power - Fourteen Theses for a New German Foreign Policy") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 47, no. 10, 1992, pp. 269-278.
[32] Lothar Gutjahr classifies SPD-politicians into six categories: atlanticists, national realists, western Europeanists, pan-European institutionalists, civil democrats, and anti-militarists, in: Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, pp. 135-146. The last two groups correspond to the idealist wing. Since Gutjahr's classification system has too many overlappings among the different groups, we will only distinguish between idealists and realists, or pragmatists.

crisis by rendering European economies more competitive through the European Monetary System.

In the early 1980s, the center of the SPD shifted its orientation from an Atlantic outlook to a more European one. This was caused mainly by the Reagan Administration and its new defense strategy - exemplified by its SDI-plans - that was regarded as too aggressive. In line with this new orientation, the SPD gradually replaced the old concept of deterrence with "common security"[33]. Already in 1981, Egon Bahr[34] pointed to common interests among Europeans that he saw arising out of increased globalisation. Bahr stated that a "global power struggle", primarily over scarce oil resources at that time, was being fought in a "classic manner": "Each, in accordance with his own capabilities, against the others."[35] In his view, Europe, squeezed between the two superpowers, had come to realize that it has everything to lose in the event of conflict. Eventual consequences of a military confrontation sharpened European eyes to notice "common interests concerning cooperation and détente."[36] Therefore, the European response to growing globalisation was "the solidarity arising from common fate and common security."[37]

Willy Brandt realized that in terms of achieving the strategic goal of unifying the two Germanies, "the best *Deutschlandpolitik* is one which is set up on a European approach. (...) The best policy for Berlin, for Germany, and for Europe is one with a

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[33] Egon Bahr and Dieter Lutz, eds., *Gemeinsame Sicherheit: Idee und Konzept* ("Common Security: Idea and Concept"), vol. I, Baden-Baden 1986, especially p. 11.
[34] Egon Bahr, "Europa in der Globalitaet" ("Europe in the Global System"), in *Merkur*, vol. 53, no. 8, 1981, pp. 765-771.
[35] Ibid., p. 765.
[36] Ibid., p. 768.
[37] Ibid., p. 771.

global outlook; not in the sense of confrontation, but cooperation."[38] As a confirmed

pragmatist, Brandt understood that Germany's division had become a constituent

element of European *détente*, that the *German Question* had become a part of the

equilibrium in Europe. He regarded German unification as a "historical prospect", but

not a possibility in practical politics. The continuing division of Germany would

probably be the price for European unification.[39]

In 1984, Horst Ehmke went one step further and acknowledged the need for

European economic integration. He found that problems of the world economy and

international economic, monetary, and fiscal policies could not be subordinated to

questions of security. "On the contrary: Western Europe's political weight in the

world depends to a high degree on its economic and technological might. The latter

also forms the basis for putting Western Europe onto its legs in security matters."[40]

In 1985, Hans-Jochen Vogel - then head of the SPD Parliamentary Group - put

special emphasis on Europe's potential concerning global economic competition:

"With regard to cooperation and competition, a united Europe can attain a position

vis-à-vis the United States and Japan that would be unattainable for each individual

member-state alone."[41] Vogel, therefore, explicitly supported the European Monetary

System, the European Single Market, European Political Cooperation, and the

principle of majority-voting in the Community's decision-making mechanisms.[42] He

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[38] Willy Brandt as cited in ibid., p. 771.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Horst Ehmke, "Überlegungen zur Selbstbehauptung Europas: Ein Diskussionspapier" ("Reflections on Europe's Self-Assertion"), in *Politik: Aktuelle Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, no. 1, 1984, p. 15.
[41] Hans-Jochen Vogel, "Europa am Scheideweg" ("Europe at the Cross-Roads"), in *Politik: Aktuelle Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, no. 4, May 1985, p. 4.
[42] Ibid., pp. 4-5.

even supported a union that would not include all members, "instead of a complete union which has missed its historic hour and which has reverted to definite frustration."[43] With respect to a forthcoming response by the *Bundestag* to the new EC-Commissions working program for 1985, the SPD Parliamentary Group introduced a motion containing Vogel's above-mentioned proposals.[44]

The SPD's pan-European outlook has been manifested and maintained in most SPD statements concerning the European Community. The SPD Parliamentary Group stated in a 1988 resolution: "Europe - that does not only stand for the European Community. Europe also includes EFTA-countries. And: Europe does not end at the Elbe-river."[45] In their 1989 Basic Program[46], the SPD asked for a "United States of Europe" to be established. This goal had already been formulated by the SPD in 1925 in its Heidelberg Program[47], a demand that was, at that time, based upon the SPD's peace policy in the light of the First World War.[48] The SPD repeated that all democratic European states should be admitted to the Community. The ultimate goal remained the establishment of a "peace order comprising the whole of Europe." In the same way as Germany hadd to make its contribution to the European Community to help establish a European peace order, the European Community itself was regarded

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[43] Ibid., p. 5.
[44] Motion by the SPD Parliamentary Group, reprinted in: *Politik: Aktuelle Informationen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands*, no. 4, May 1985, pp. 6-7.
[45] SPD, "Die Zukunft heisst Europa" ("The Future's Name is Europe"), resolution by the SPD Parliamentary Group, in *Die SPD im Deutschen Bundestag*, October 11, 1988, p. 3.
[46] SPD, *Basisprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands* ("Basic Program of the German Social Demcratic Party"), Bonn 1989.
[47] In: Dieter Dowe, ed., *Programmatische Dokumente der Deutschen Sozialdemokratie* ("Programatic Documents of the German Social Democracy"), third edition, Bonn 1990, pp. 211-220.
[48] See Oskar Lafontaine in a foreword to the brochure entitled "Thema Europa" ("The Issue: Europe"), published by the European Parliamentary Group of the European Social Democratic Party (SPE), Bonn, February 1998 p. 5.

as an important "element in a world community of regions" destined to help establish global peace.

4.1.4. Die Grünen

In contrast to the established political parties, the Green Party (*Die Grünen*) emphasized post-materialist values[49] and aimed at establishing a "post-industrialist' society"[50]. They introduced new topics onto the political agenda like the environment, unilateral disarmament, and hunger in the Third World. The keyword adjectives the Green Party used to describe itself were "ecological, social, grassroots-democratic and non-violent"[51].

Soon after the Green Party had been established, an intra-party conflict erupted between *Fundis* and *Realos*. In 1983, when the party entered the *Bundestag* for the first time with 5.6% of the federal vote[52], this struggle intensified. The *Realos* were always a minority, but they have been gaining slowly and steadily. The *Fundis* represented the idealist views on which the party had been founded. The realist wing, on the other hand, was more prepared to enter into compromise with the established parties for the sake of converting at least some of their ideas into politcal reality. This

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[49] See Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Thomas Poguntke, "Die Grünen" ("The Greens") in: Alf Mintzel and Heinrich Oberreuter, eds., *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* ("Political Parties in the Federal Republic of Germany"), publications by the Federal Center for Political Education, vol. 282, Bonn 1990, p. 304.
[50] Die Grünen, *Programm zur Bundestagswahl 1990* ("Program for the Federal Election of 1990"), drafted by the party's program commission, Bonn, January 1990, p. 5.
[51] Die Grünen, *Das Bundesprogramm* ("The Federal Program"), Bonn 1987, p. 4.
[52] See Die Grünen, *Global denken - vor Ort handeln!* ("Think Global - Act Local!"), declaration of the Green Party on the European Parliament elections of June 17, Bonn 1984, p. 43.

was the case in the first coalition between the Green Party and the SPD at the *Laender* level, namely in the Federal State of Hessen in 1987. On foreign and European policy issues, however, the party was rather unanimous in its opinion. This can be attributed to the fact that, during the first decade of its existence, the Green party was predominantly concerned with domestic politics.

The first of the two main pillars upon which Green politics has been based, is "the subordination of the economy to ecological aspects"[53] as the single most innovative element. The other pillar is the idea of "positive peace", understood as a condition that goes beyond the mere absence of physical violence. With respect to European integration, these two pillars manifest themselves in a distinctive way. Concerning the first pillar, the Green Party said "no to the Single Market."[54] This was on the grounds that they did not want to support the industrialization of agriculture in countries like Spain, Portugal and Greece. They rather envisaged agricultural production by small and middle-sized farms that oriented itself along the needs of domestic, regional demand. Furthermore, the Green Party demanded strict controls on economic enterprise mergers, as well as the embodiment of environment protection as a primary goal into the Treaties of the European Community.[55]

Regarding the second pillar, the approach of the Greens to peace is a global one. Environmental destruction and weapons of mass destruction pose, in their eyes, equal threats to the survival of humankind. With respect to European integration, the party

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[53] Ferdinand Müller-Rommel and Thomas Poguntke, "Die Grünen", p. 289.
[54] Die Grünen, *Plattform der Grünen zur Europawahl '89: Grüne Positionen zum EG-Binnenmarkt* ("Green Platform for the European Election of 1989: Green Positions on the Single Market"), Bonn 1989, p. 6.
[55] See Die Grünen, *Kurzprogramm der Grünen zur Europawahl '89* ("Short Program of the Green Party for the European Election of 1989"), Bonn 1989, p. 18.

has called the rise of a (Western) European superpower a "nightmare"[56], a "Common

European House" a "dream"[57]. Green European policy has stood for "a Europe of

dissolving blocs, self-restriction, cooperation among regions, and international

solidarity. But above all, the Greens stand for a Europe of common reconstruction."[58]

Already in 1984, the Green Party criticized sharply the non-transparent bureaucracy in

Brussels, cut off from any democratic control.[59] In fact, they questioned the whole

political decision-making structure of the European Community. It was considered as

"completely insufficient" to solve European and international problems in an

"ecological and grassroots-democratic sense".[60] The Green Party has conceived of

itself as part of a European-wide - and indeed global - movement concerned with

grassroots democracy. Its presence in the European Parliament, of whose function the

party did not approve at all, was seen simply as a means to voice public discontent

with the present system and a platform from where to work towards fundamental

change.[61]

The Green Party rejected a European Community that aimed at becoming a global

power because this would also imply the necessity to obtain military power. They

intended to create a "civilian" Community[62], or rather a civilized Europe of regions, in

which the CSCE would play a key-role. The ultimate aim of their envisaged "common

European peace order" was the "creation of a disarmed zone in Eastern and Western

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[56] Ibid., p. 3.
[57] Ibid., p. 6.
[58] Ibid., p. 7.
[59] Die Grünen, "Global denken - vor Ort handeln!", p. 6.
[60] Ibid., p. 9.
[61] Die Grünen, *Kurzprogramm der Grünen zur Europawahl '89*, p. 8.
[62] Ibid., p. 9.

Europe".[63] The Green Party vehemently rejected any kind of "eurocentrism". European integration was not considered to be a "purpose in itself".[64] The importance of regions over centralized institutions and power in Brussels was one major theme in the Greens' European policy. Their slogan was: "Unity through diversity!"[65] A retreat into the limitations of the nation-state was regarded as highly undesirable. European integration was indeed seen as a milestone to global regionalism. However, the Community should not force its own model onto other regional systems, but conduct instead a long-term, mutually beneficial exchange and cooperation with other regions[66]. Thus, the Community would help to establish global peace.

4.2. Public Attitudes and European Integration

4.2.1. The "Burden" of History

After a comparative study of nations that have experienced defeat in war and of nations that have successfully fought for independence and freedom, Rose has found that the latter experience pride for centuries to come.[67] On the contrary, nations that have been defeated are influenced by this experience for more than over a hundred years. In this sense, the humiliating defeat at the end of World War Two has had a great impact on the West German population since 1945. Eleven million German

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[63] Die Grünen, *Das Bundesprogramm*, p. 19.
[64] Die Grünen, *Kurzprogramm der Grünen zur Europawahl '89*, p. 10.
[65] Ibid., p. 11.
[66] Ibid., p. 20-21.
[67] For an exposition of Richard Rose's views see: Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Renate Köcher, *Die verletzte Nation: Über den Versuch der Deutschen, ihren Charakter zu aendern* ("The Hurt Nation: On the Germans' Attempt to Change Their Character"), Stuttgart 1987, pp. 25-26.

soldiers alone were held prisoners-of-war by the Soviet Army, the country had to pay reparations of war to countries invaded by Hitler's army for decades to come, and the Germans had to face complete foreign occupation of their national territory resulting in the partition of the country.

However, over the years, the shame over the unimaginable magnitude of atrocities committed by the Nazis in the name of Germany has become even more intense. In the course of de-nazification of the western sectors of Germany, later the Federal Republic, ordinary Germans who had been adults during the Third *Reich* had to come to terms with their conscience over whether they had any complicity (*Mitschuld*) in Nazi-crimes. For the younger generation, born after the war, the situation was not much easier. Perpetually, West Germans were confronted with their history: in school curricula, where the Nazi-past was treated extensively in history, literature and political science classes, during school excursions to former concentration camps, by an impressive number of state-sponsored institutions for contemporary history and political education, and through the broadcast of innumerable, mostly foreign, films showing the cruel realities of the Nazi-horror regime. West Germans were not allowed to forget about their past because, as the politically correct attitude went, "if we forget, history will repeat itself."

The political left has often maintained the idea that younger Germans, just by being Germans, continue to bear a special responsibility for the country's Nazi-past. Although not being directly implicated in war-crimes, they, too, should feel a sense of "guilt". The just punishment, as they perceived it, was the division of their home-country. Since Germans know what kind of atrocities human beings are able to carry

out in times of war better than anyone else – although leftist mostly hold the view that genocide "is not a German disease that couldn't happen anywhere else"[68] – they are under a special obligation, in their opinion, to work for peace. As has been pointed out earlier, initially large parts of leftists thought European integration to be in contradiction to German unity. During the 1980s, however, with their acceptance of West Germany's membership in NATO, this position also faded gradually.

The political right generally represented the position that German history has to be seen in terms of the particular, singular path (*Sonderweg*) that Germany has followed from the nineteenth century through World War One and then to the rise of Nazism and World War Two. This path caused Germany's ideological and political isolation, surrounding it with neighbors unfriendly towards it. Therefore, West Germany's integration in international frameworks, particularly the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community, guarantees that the country will never again embark on such a dangerous course.

As a consequence, nationalism was rejected by a vast majority of Germans and was considered to be, after the end of the Third *Reich*, a historical phenomenon. The German nation was conceived of as a cultural nation, one half of it continuing to exist on the other side of the Iron Curtain.[69] Although a majority of the West German public was theoretically in favor of unification, the realization of it was seen as a very distant possibility. Thus, by the end of the 1980's Germans had come to terms with the division of their country and had accepted it as a fact, although a regrettable one.

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[68] Peter Glotz, "No Patent on Hate" in *Newsweek International*, April 29, 1996, p. 25.
[69] See also Willy Brandt's memoirs as quoted in Angela Stent, "The One Germany" in *Foreign Policy*, vol. 81, winter 1990-91, p. 60.

It is in this light, as Emmerich Francis has pointed out, that the lack of a clear distinction between "people" and "nation" (*Volk* and *Nation*) - or as he calls it "ethnos" and "demos"[70] - in the German language can be explained. Due to the command for national unification as laid down in the *Basic Law*, "people" in the sense of ethnicity and culture became synonymous with "nation" in the sense of citizenship in a democratic and political sense.[71] That can also qualify as a reason why, up to the present date, Germans have difficulty in awarding citizenship to foreigners born in Germany, and rather prefer to adhere to the principle of blood relationship. It also explains why, after unification, Chancellor Kohl proclaimed: "We are again one people", when, in fact, he meant "nation". Germans on both sides of the border had never ceased to be one "people" due to their cultural heritage and language and the relatively short time of separation. This fact could not be eliminated even by the most rigorous communist regime.

Yet, despite the wish for national unification, West Germans reconciliated themselves with reality and lived quite comfortably within the confines of their provisional arrangement, that is to say the Federal Republic of Germany. Although the division of Germany has been called "a classic example of muddling through and improvisation"[72], it has allowed West Germans to set up an "orderly" and efficient economic system and, thus, regain national pride in the form of their economic model

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[70] See Emmerich Francis, *Ethnos und Demos* ("Ethnos and Demos"), Contributions to the Theory of Ethnicity, Berlin 1965.
[71] See also M. Rainer Lepsius, "Ethnos' and 'Demos": Zur Anwendung zweier Kategorien von Emerich Francis auf das nationale Selbstverstaendnis der Bundesrepublik und auf die Europaeische Einigung" ("Ethnos' and 'Demos': On the Application of Emmerich Francis' Two Concepts for the Way the Federal Republic Perceives of Itself as a Nation and for European Integration") in *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, vol. 38, 1986, p. 755.
[72] Angela Stent, "The One Germany", p. 54.

and prosperity. That has, of course, happened greatly due to the generous support of its former, victorious, war-time opponents, who "behaved less like victors and more like potential partners."[73] Above all, the Federal Republic was given the opportunity to integrate into the West by becoming one of the founding members of the European Community, the basic starting-point for its legendary success story.

4.2.2. Public Opinion and the European Community

Regarding other nations, West Germans have never, on a psychological level, so much differentiated between "friendly" and "unfriendly" countries, but have rather viewed the "others", that is to say the world community, as something they very dearly wanted to belong to. After having been excluded from this community, they were determined to do their best not to let it happen again. The way in which the Nazis have "abused" the term "nation" has had traumatic consequences for the national consciousness of West Germans.[74] They had become used to the idea that "their future does not lie in reviving the nation-state, but in overcoming it."[75]

That is why most West Germans saw national unification to happen in an unspecified distant future. It also explains why the majority of West Germans have been keen supporters of the big international organizations United Nations, NATO and the

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[73] Rainer Barzel, "The Future of Reunited Germany Will Be Decided by Europe: Germany Back Again?" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, p. 26.
[74] See Günther Rüther, "Politische Bildung und politische Kultur im vereinigten Deutschland" ("Political Education and Political Culture in the United Germany") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, August 8, 1993, p. 11.
[75] Karl Jaspers, *Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung: Über Aufgaben deutscher Politik* ("Freedom and Reunification: On the Tasks of German Politics"), München 1960, p. 53.

European Community. While membership in the United Nations has never been questioned, NATO-membership has been more controversial and often questioned by parts of the political left. Yet, over the last twenty years, NATO has experienced support by a solid two-thirds majority of the West German population.[76] Negative attitudes towards NATO were almost always coupled with anti-American sentiments. Over the decades, some 20 to 25% of West Germans have declared that they "did not have a favorable opinion of Americans."[77]

While it has been pointed out that the Federal Republic's commitment to the European Community has been fueled, in the first place, by ardent efforts of politicians - from Adenauer to Kohl - West German public opinion has always been supportive, even if it has grown somewhat weaker over the decades. Whereas during the 1960's general support was over 70%, during the 1980's the percentage of people seeing only advantages in EC-membership decreased to less than 30%. Roughly around 30% was the percentage of those seeing only disadvantages. The majority - around 45% - regarded the Community as bringing both advantages and disadvantages.[78] This is obviously due to the fact that West Germans, as the main net financial contributors to Community resources, have become wary of their role as "paymaster". Yet, despite this, withdrawal of West Germany's membership in the Community has never been an issue on the political agenda. Quite to the contrary, in

[76] See Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, spring 1992, p. 129; and Peter R. Weilemann, "German Loyalty to the West: Public Opinion on the Eve of Unification"." in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 19, June 1990, p. 28.
[77] See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Öffentliche Meinung und Aussenpolitik" ("Public Opinion and Foreign Policy") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 8, 1995, p. 5.
[78] Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht" ("Attitudes towards the European Union after Maastricht"), internal study no. 30/1992 for the Research Institute of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, January 22, 1992, table 4, p. 8.

the 1980's, Chancellor Kohl put all his political weight behind the move to complete

the Single Market that was, at the time, opposed only by the Greens in the *Bundestag*.

West German elections were always largely fought on economic issues. Foreign-

policy matters were hardly ever touched upon. Apart from the fact that European

integration was largely thought of as "semi" domestic policy, it was common wisdom

that the European Community was vital to West Germany's large export industry and,

therefore, for its economic well-being. Withdrawal from the Community was never

discussed among the public, at most some discontented voices could be heard at the

introduction of the European Monetary System. In this way, West Germany's leading

politicians could count upon a "permissive consensus"[79], and go ahead with European

integration as they deemed appropriate.

With regard to national pride, a continuous decrease in support for the statement "I

am proud to be a German" could be observed since 1975 until the late 1980s. While a

majority never identified with this statement - in 1975 only 43% identified - support

was further reduced by almost 10% at the end of the 1980s.[80] German philosopher

Jürgen Habermas has maintained that the D-mark has become the symbolic

manifestation of German national consciousness[81], while others have talked of a "D-

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[79] See Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs (NJ) 1970; and Mark Franklin et al., "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*. vol. 32, no. 4, December 1994, pp. 455-472.

[80] Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Öffentliche Meinung und Aussenpolitik", p. 4. This finding has partly been confirmed by Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht", figure 2, p. 4.

[81] See Jürgen Habermas, "Nochmals: Zur Identitaet der Deutschen: Ein einig Volk von aufgebrachten Wirtschaftsbürgern?" ("Once Again: On the Identity of the Germans: A United Nation of Angry Economic Citizens?") in: Jürgen Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution* ("The Revolution Making Good"), Frankfurt a.M. 1990, p. 210. For a similar argument see also Harold James, *A German Identity 1770-1990*, Routledge 1989.

mark nationalism". To the question "Would you be for or against abolishing the D-mark and if only one uniform European currency existed?", posed by the Allensbacher Public Opinion Research Institute, the percentage of those in favor decreased from a high 57% in 1974 to only 20% in 1988. In both years mentioned here, however, some 20% were neither for nor against it.[82] This issue has gained some importance in Germany after the time-table for the introduction of the ECU had been set by the Maastricht Treaty, and shall be pursued later on.

4.3. Conclusions

The result of our analysis regarding support for European integration among West German political parties and public is that, despite some exceptions, West Germans had generally a positive attitude towards the European Community. Among political parties, it has been found that, for different reasons, right-wing factions of the CDU/CSU and the Greens were not supportive of the European Community. The "national-conservative" strand within the CDU, as well as the CSU, for fear of eroding national sovereignty, envisaged the European Community member-states to be loosely connected and cooperate to some degree in the fields of economics and, possibly, defense. In short, for them, political union would be going too far.

The Greens, on the other hand, rejected the European Community as it was, including the decision-making structure, because they feared that the Community could develop

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[82] For a graphic description of the Allensbacher results see Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht", figure 9, p. 18.

into a superpower with military capabilities. Specifically, they also rejected the prospect of the Single Market which would not, as they demanded, subordinate the economy to ecological aspects. Furthermore, they favored a pan-European integration effort, in order to overcome the bloc division on the European continent. For them, representation in the European Parliament only served the purpose of working towards radical change and global peace. In short, for them, political union would not go far enough. It must, however, be noted that Green European policy at that time was not elaborated well and constituted a rather general critique of existing realities.

Apart from minority nationalistic strands in the CDU, that party was very pro-European. In the tradition of Adenauer, the party liked to call itself *the* European party. Its party-leader's, that is to say Chancellor Kohl's, European vocation was unquestionable. During its time in government, the CDU was instrumental in furthering European integration, towards the end of the 1980s, particularly so regarding the envisaged introduction of the Single Market.

The Liberals were equally pro-European. Traditionally concerned with economics, they came to realize the huge economic potential of the European Community for the Federal Republic in the age of globalisation. As its party leader, Foreign Minister Genscher, was particularly stressing moral and humanitarian principles in West Germany's foreign policy, this was reflected in the party's pan-European outlook, similar to the Social-democrats. This was founded in the understanding of security not just as defense, but as the striving for a European peace order comprising the whole continent in which the CSCE would play a crucial role.

The SPD was found to have shifted from its Atlantic orientation under Chancellor Schmidt during the 1970s to a more European outlook since the early 1980s. Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* of the early 1970s was translated into a pan-European orientation during the 1980s. Yet, the European Community was regarded as the primary institution for coordinating economic policies of the member-states in the era of globalisation and for promoting economic, and ultimately, political stability.

Public opinion was found to have been positively inclined towards European integration. Rooted in the Federal Republic's recent history, the West German public had come to accept that the country's future, including the prospect of German unification, could only lie with the European Community. However, general approval rates of the Community were found to have considerably declined during the 1980s when compared to the 1960s. Nevertheless, a majority of West Germans continued to view the Community in a favorable way, despite an obvious wariness of being the largest net contributor to the Community's budget.

Regarding our comparative analysis in time of Germany's European policy, Chapter Three and Chapter Four have analyzed the pre-unification period. First of all, we will now, that is to say in Chapter Five, turn to the unification process itself and the way it was handled by German political leaders. Then, Chapters Six to Eight will examine the post-unification period.

5. THE PROCESS OF GERMAN UNIFICATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

German unification is without doubt one of the most surprising and significant events of this century. The division of Germany was the symbol of the Cold War, being both cause and realization of it. With the unification of Germany, the Cold War came to an end; the division of Germany as well as the division of the European continent were ended. A new future had begun for Germany and Europe.

However, this farewell to the old world order meant at the same time bidding farewell to the provisional arrangement of the two German states. Despite great euphoria at the sight of the tumbling Berlin Wall, Germans were soon facing suspicions from their neighbors concerning the real motivation behind their wish for unification. Although the Federal Republic had gone through thorough political re-education, and had in fact been able to build a model democratic system, nearly half a century after Nazism had been defeated the burden of proof was still placed on the Germans to demonstrate that they were not up to something sinister. In fact, many Germans themselves doubted that they should be entrusted with an enlarged Germany.

Suddenly, the *German Question*, which had appeared to have been solved for some time when the Wall came down, was back on the European agenda. Stürmer has noted that the *German Question* has actually the wrong name because it has never been the property of the Germans, least of all since 1945.[1] Further, the term implies

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[1] See Michael Stürmer, "Die Deutschen in Europa: Auf dem Weg zu einer zwischenstaatlichen Innenpolitik" ("The Germans in Europe: On the Road to an Internaional Domestic Policy") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 24,1989, p. 722.

that if there is a question, an answer is waiting somewhere. But the *German Question* is probably one of those that cannot be solved to the satisfaction of everybody. Thus, in 1989, the *German Question* had to be regarded as the starting point for new questions affecting Germans and Europeans alike. This is so because, as Weidenfeld has rightly pointed out, the organization of Germany as a state has always presented "the key to the European order - in a positive as well as a negative sense, as unification motif as well as explosive agent."[2]

These "new" questions concerning a united Germany that Europeans and Germans asked themselves, can be summarized as followed:[3] First, in which way has Germany's role been influenced by unification, and what will be its future nature? Second, how will the Germans define their new location? Will they be looking eastward or westward? Third, which degree of global responsibility are the Germans striving for and willing to overtake? Fourth, how will the Germans, from two different states, organize their cohabitation, and which new traces will this nation reveal? Five, will the new Germany use its economic potential and newly gained political influence

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[2] Werner Weidenfeld, "Der deutsche Weg" ("The German Path"), editorial, in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 4, 1995, p. 1.

[3] See for instance Christian Hacke, "Deutschland und die neue Weltordnung: Zwischen innenpolitischer Überforderung und aussenpolitischen Krisen" ("Germany and the New Global Order: Between Domestic Overstretch and External Crises") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, November 6, 1992, pp. 3-16; Christian Hacke, "Neue deutsche Fragen: Übernimmt die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in Europa und in der Welt von morgen mehr Verantwortung?" ("New German Questions: Will the Federal Republic of Germany Take over Greater Responsibility in Europe and in the World of Tomorrow?") in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 4, 1991, p. 8; Manfred Funke, "Turning Points in 20th-Century German History: The New Face of Germany" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, pp. 17-22; William Wallace, "Deutschland als europaeische Führungsmacht" ("Germany as Europe's Leading Power") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 5, 1995, pp. 23-28; Gerd Langguth, "Will Europe Become More German or Germany More European? - Germany's Role in Europe" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 31, October 1993, pp. 6-18.

to dominate its European neighbors, that is to say will it become a "European superpower"?

At a time when political earthquakes shook the European continent to an extent unknown in recent history, the anxiety underneath all these questions reflected the insecurity of Europeans concerning their future and their desire for predictability. The European Union, specifically, faces the task of dealing with and incorporating former Communist states. Adding to all these factors of insecurity, there is Germany's assumed uncertain attitude towards Europe, and the quick pace with which German unification has come about. We will examine the above-mentioned questions in the light of our basic research question, that is to say we will analyze whether any changes have occurred in Germany's attitude towards Europe, and if so what their magnitude is.

To this end, in this chapter, we will look at the way unification has been negotiated and completed in less than a year, and analyze external aspects as well as domestic issues of unification. In Chapter Six, a look at German political parties and political leaders, as well as the extent to which the event of unification has influenced public opinion will help round up the domestic picture. In Chapter Seven, the analysis of selected instances in German foreign policy after unification will help us answer the question to which extent Germany has grown beyond its former traditional parochial role and is engaging itself in global responsibilities.

5.1. The Process of German Unification

The most noticeable feature of German unification is probably the quick pace with which it took place. A brief chronology of events demonstrates this: On November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall opened; on November 28, 1989, Chancellor Helmut Kohl presented his "Ten-Point-Plan" for overcoming the division of Germany and Europe to the German *Bundestag*; in February 1990, economic and monetary union between West and East Germany was decided upon and came into effect on July 1, 1990; three "Two-plus-Four" conferences took place between May 5 and July 17, 1990, and resulted in the "Agreement on the Final Regulations concerning Germany" on September 12, 1990; on October 3, 1990, East and West Germany were formally united when East Germany joined the Federal Republic according to Article 23 of the *Basic Law*; political unification of the two German states was brought about by the first all-German general election of December 2, 1990.

The conditions, both external as well as internal, under which the huge political enterprise of uniting the two German states took place were quite favorable. In the first place, the constellation of international political leaders involved in the process was quite extraordinary, as was their ability to cooperate in a phase of multilateral and bilateral diplomacy that was to become one of the most intensive in European history. The main political figures included experienced politicians such as Helmut Kohl, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, George Bush, James Baker, Michail Gorbatchev, Eduard Shevardnadse, Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand and Jacques Delors. Kaiser has

called this constellation "a stroke of luck of statecraft"[4]. In foreign policy terms, timing could not have been better for the Federal Republic. On one side, it was enjoying very friendly relations with the United States and was firmly anchored in the Atlantic Alliance, on the other side, it was on very good terms with France and fully integrated into the European Community.[5]

Yet, domestic factors were equally important, such as the favorable conditions of high economic growth, democratic stability and social harmony.[6] Unification would have neither been possible without the efficient German bureaucracy that created the basis for constitutional, legal, economic, financial and institutional unification of two states that had developed quite different systems over the last four decades.

However, despite this successful side of unification, a great amount of criticism was launched against the way the unification process was conducted. Not surprisingly, given Germany's historical record, the harshest criticism came from abroad, although in relatively low numbers. The most intensive and detailed criticism arose on the home-front, particularly the political opposition of Social Democrats and the Greens. In the following, we will look in more detail at external and domestic aspects of the unification process, evaluate relevant criticisms and put them into context. The domestic as well as international debate regarding the way unification was handled will provide a more complete picture of the public mood in Germany, which is

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[4] See Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte* ("German Unification: The International Aspects"), publications for the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn/Bergisch-Gladbach 1991, p. 21.
[5] See also Horst Teltschik, "Neither 'Political Dwarf' Nor 'Superpower': Reflections on Germany's New Role in Europe", in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 21, January 1991, p. 19.
[6] See ibid., p. 19.

essential for understanding whether German positions on European integration have changed, or not.

5.2. External Aspects of the Unification Process

5.2.1. Analysis of the "Two-Plus-Four" Negotiations

At the end of 1989, it had become clear to German politicians and West Germany's neighbors that unification of the two German states was on the way of becoming a political reality. In the following, we will analyze different factors and conditions that contributed to the outcome of the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations, that is to say to the Treaty on the Final Regulation concerning Germany of September 12, 1990.[7]

As for formalities concerning the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations, the first meeting among the Four Allied Powers, i.e. their respective ambassadors of the Allied Control Council, took place in Berlin on December 11, 1989. In West Germany, however, this meeting had revived the impression of an "anti-Hitler coalition"[8]. It was at the insistence of the United States that the following meetings bore the name "Two-plus-Four" instead of "Four-plus-Two", thus elevating the status of the two German states from defeated power to equal partner. The two Germanies were supposed to find a common position on external aspects of unification, and then negotiate them with the Four Allied Forces. Such a procedure secured the Germans' right to self-

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[7] Agreement on the Final Regulation concerning Germany of September 12, 1990, in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1990, pp. 1317-29. The agreement entered into force on March 15, 1991.
[8] Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte*, p. 53.

determination and, at the same time, left room for expressions of partnership as they had developed among the Allied Powers.

It is noticeable, and has not gone down well with some states, that Germany's neighbors were excluded and that negotiations did not take place within the framework of a large international peace conference, despite the fact that the Potsdam Conference of 1945 had demanded a "peace settlement" involving all concerned parties. However, as soon as the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations had begun, all participating states agreed to invite Poland to the meeting of foreign ministers in Paris on July 17, 1990. This happened at the insistence of France, that had in the meantime become a "defender" of Polish interests. That meeting cleared the way for a final settlement of the border question (Oder-Neisse) between Germany and Poland, and resulted in a treaty between the two countries on the confirmation of that border on November 14, 1990.[9]

Concerning the formal arrangement of the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations, the whole unification process has been criticized, among others, as "a concerted bilateral policy with multilateral embedding".[10] The impression of traditional high politics conveyed by the "Two-plus-Four" talks was indeed justified. Whereas France and Great Britain seemed to play rather marginal roles during the negotiations, the talks were mainly conducted among the Bonn government and Washington and Moscow. East Germany's lack of diplomatic experience compared to West Germany, its

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[9] Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland on the Confirmation of the Border Existing between these Two Countries of November 14, 1990, in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 134, November 16, 1990, p. 1394.

[10] Beate Kohler-Koch, "Deutsche Einigung im Spannungsfeld internationaler Umbrüche" ("German Unification in the Electric Field of International Change") in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1991, p. 610.

preoccupation with domestic affairs, and the fact that the elections of March 1990 there had put parties into power that were basically an extension of the West German party system, made its government and bureaucracy quite willing to leave external negotiations in the hands of its "tutor" West Germany. Concerning cooperation between himself and the East German Foreign Minister, German Foreign Minister Genscher said the "new German algebra" now went like this: "One plus one equals one."[11]

The United States, a traditional close friend of West Germany, was geographically far enough away not to be bothered by alleged German aspirations to a new "superpower" status, and had historically never been immediately threatened by Germany. Furthermore, America realized that it were in its own best interest to side with a future unified Germany that would be bound to play a major role in European integration. Since a stable Western Europe had always been in the strategic interest of America, and it would be in need of united Germany as a reliable partner more than ever, it backed the Germans' wish for speedy unification almost from the beginning.

The one country that had to be especially courted was the Soviet Union. Out of all political leaders involved in the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations, Gorbatchev was the one who had to make the most concessions. These included granting the future Germany the right to freely choose which military alliance it would join, and withdrawing the Red Army from German soil. When negotiations concerning military alliance membership seemed to have arrived at a deadlock in February 1990,

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[11] Quoted in Eckart Thurich, "Der Weg zur Einheit" ("The Road to Unity") in *Informationen zur politischen Bildung*, vol. 4, no. 233, 1991, p. 39.

Genscher launched a "firework" of diplomatic talks with his Soviet colleague Shevardnardse, resulting in Gorbatchev's final consent to German wishes.

As for the contents of the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations and the final treaty concluded between the two German states and the Allied Powers, they reflected a compromise of what was acceptable to all parties and their respective strategies and circumstances with which they were faced. From West Germany's point of view, four major considerations had to be taken into account during the negotiations: In the first place, fears by its neighbors concerning united Germany's economic, political and military strength had to be dispersed. Secondly, the country had to find a way to ensure its continued integration in Western structures, especially in NATO, without jeopardizing its unification plans. Thirdly, united Germany's sovereignty should not be restricted in any way. Finally, West Germany would try to avoid an international peace conference with all of its former military enemies, designed to solve left-over questions from the Second World War.

In order to solve all of these problems and obstacles to German unification, West Germany produced the following results of the "Two-plus-Four" talks in cooperation with the Allied Powers: The above-mentioned goal of avoiding an international peace conference could only be achieved by negotiating simultaneously on a multilateral as well as bilateral basis. Multilateral talks took place in the form of the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations. Bilaterally, the Federal Republic of Germany concluded a number of agreements with other countries, primarily of a military nature or friendship treaties.[12]

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[12] To name but the most important agreements and treaties: Agreement between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Republic of France on the Treaty concerning the Deployment of Foreign Military Forces in the Federal Republic of Germany of September 25, 1990, in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1990, pp. 1391-92; Treaty between the Federal

Concerning united Germany's increased weight in economic, political and military matters, the Federal Republic designed the following strategy, that was also acceptable to its partners: In order to diffuse German power, most Germans agreed that the country should remain embedded in the European Union.[13] This was particularly stressed continuously by Chancellor Kohl:[14]

> A Germany that is in firm unison with democracies of the free world and increasingly politically and economically integrated in the European Community, is an indispensable factor of stability, something that Europe needs in its midst especially right now.

Kohl even made a special effort, in cooperation with France, to promote political union as well as economic and monetary union, resulting in the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty on the Final Regulation concerning Germany also mentions Europe at length. In its preliminary remarks, German unification within its final borders is evaluated as "an important contribution to peace and stability in Europe."

As has been explained before, united Germany's continued membership in NATO was a hard-won concession from the Soviet Union. Whereas NATO-membership was designed to appease concerns of its Western neighbors, who much preferred to see

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Republic of Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on the Conditions concerning the Limited Deployment and the Modalities concerning the Scheduled Retreat of Soviet Troops from the Territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of October 12, 1990, in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1990, pp. 256-290; Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics of November 9, 1990, in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 3, 1991, pp. 85-90; Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Poland concerning the Confirmation of their Common Border, of November 14, 1990, in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 134, November 16, 1990, p. 1394.

[13] See for instance Jochen Abr. Frowein, "Rechtliche Probleme der Einigung Deutschlands" ("Legal Problems concerning German Unification") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 7, 1990, p. 238.

[14] Helmut Kohl, Government Declaration by the German Chancellor before the German *Bundestag* on February 15, 1990, reprinted in: Jochen Thies and Wolfgang Wagner, eds., *Das Ende der Teilung: Der Wandel in Deutschland und Osteuropa* ("End of the Division: Change in Germany and Eastern Europe"), Bonn 1990, p. 329.

German military might contained by the Atlantic Alliance, this prospect produced

anxiety in Moscow. Since the Soviet Union had agreed to withdraw its military forces

from German soil[15], it had, in return, some demands on the Federal Republic and

NATO. These included basically large financial assistance on part of the Federal

Republic, amounting to almost 13 billion D-Mark for withdrawal costs of the Red

Army, including the building of new housing facilities for army personnel in the

Soviet Union, as well as educational opportunities to train for new jobs, plus an

interest-free credit of 3 billion D-Mark[16]. NATO, on its part, agreed to carry out

reform plans, with which it would emphasize more its political character and change

its conventional and nuclear strategy. Furthermore, the Federal Republic announced

its willingness to create new pan-European structures, which would especially be

strengthened within the framework of the CSCE. This would, at the same time,

ensure new legitimization for a continued role of the Soviet Union in Europe.

The third problem of united Germany's unlimited sovereignty touched especially upon

the country's right to determine freely its alliance membership. Initially, Moscow had

opted for a prolongation of the Four-Power Rights over Germany. However,

ultimately it gave up on it and the Four Powers declared on October 1, 1990, in New

York that with the beginning of Germany unity on October 3, 1990, their rights

would be terminated.[17]

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[15] See also the Treaty between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics on Some Transitory Measures of October 9, 1990, in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1990, pp. 1655-59.

[16] See ibid.

[17] See the Declaration on the Suspension of the Efficacy of the Four Powers' Right and Responsibilities, Signed by the Foreign Ministers of France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States in New York on October 1, 1990, in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1990, pp. 1331-32.

In summary, the Treaty on the Final Settlement concerning Germany is not a peace treaty but takes the place of one. The treaty marks the end of the post-war era and secures unification of the two German states on an international level. It has been evaluated by many as a "great diplomatic success"[18]. It has, in fact, been a huge diplomatic effort and achievement, especially considering the short period of time during which the interests of six states had to be brought to a common denominator.

It is actually doubtful whether a lengthy and complicated process involving all former war participants would have produced a similar result. The term "favorableness of the hour" (*Gunst der Stunde*) made the rounds concerning Kohl's courage to seize the historic opportunity for unification.[19] Despite initial resistance to speedy unification by his political opponents, Kohl has later been credited by many of the latter precisely for this courage.[20] The impression of the "favorableness of the hour" was shared by American politicians, who talked about a "window of opportunity" that had been opened by the developments of 1989 and 1990, but which could close any time soon. In view of the problems that the Soviet Union faced in 1991 - economic crisis, secessionist movements, Shevardnadse's resignation - it seems a likely probability that Gorbatchev, whose concessions were crucial to the "Two-plus-Four" talks as we have seen, would not have been able to act the way he did a year later. However, a different scenario from the one that actually took place will have to be left to

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[18] Gilbert Gornig, "Die vertragliche Regelung der mit der deutschen Vereinigung verbundenen auswaertigen Probleme" ("The Legal Regulation of External Problems Related to German Unification") in *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 42, no. 1, 1991, p. 12.

[19] See also Helmut Kohl in his historic speech in Dresden on December 19, 1990, reprinted in: Jochen Thies and Wolfgang Wagner, eds., *Das Ende der Teilung: Der Wandel in Deutschland und Osteuropa*, pp. 256-58.

[20] See for instance the wife of late SPD-politician Willy Brandt, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, "Nation im vereinigten Deutschland" ("Nation in the Unified Germany") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, October 21, 1994, p.5.

speculation. In the end, the fact that Germany's division, and finally the division of Europe, were overcome was a historic process, the outcome of which was characterized by historic circumstances and the response taken to them. The "Two-plus-Four" talks represented therefore the most pragmatic solution to a pressing historic question, although maybe not the most satisfying one. Helmut Kohl rightly characterized the Treaty on the Final Settlement concerning Germany as a huge diplomatic success, bringing about "the first unification of a country in modern history to take place without war, without suffering and without conflicts creating new bitterness."[21]

5.2.2. German Unification as Viewed by Germany's Partners and Neighbors

International opinion regarding the prospect of German unification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, ranged from extreme negativism like the remark of Israel's Shamir, who feared a "new holocaust"[22], to slight uneasiness, which was probably experienced by most foreign statesmen who felt a bit overwhelmed at the news of this unexpected event. In his historic speech in Dresden, Chancellor Kohl said that "we understand some of these fears", and pledged "to take them serious"[23]. The country that recovered the fastest from this shock were the United States. In the words of former

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[21] See the statement by Chancellor Kohl on the conclusion of the Treaty on the Final Settlement concerning Germany in: Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, ed., *Documents of German Unity*, Bonn 1990, p. 2.

[22] Quoted in Klaus von Beyme, "Transition to Democracy - or Anschluss? The Two Germanies and Europe", in *Government and Opposition*, vol. 25, no. 2, 1990, p. 185.

[23] Helmut Kohl's speech in Dresden on December 19, 1990, p. 257.

Ambassador to Germany, Vernon Walters, "The United States may with a certain amount of pride, lay claim to having been the first and most resolute foreign country supporting the reunification of Germany."[24]

In the following, we will briefly outline the strategies of some selected countries, that are considered to have been most relevant to the Federal Republic regarding their stance on German unification - that is to say the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Great Britain. As far as data are available, brief mention will be made of public opinion concerning German unification in these countries.

5.2.2.1. The United States

Although in October/November 1989, nobody outside of Germany believed in German unification as an imminent prospect, this changed after Chancellor Kohl's "Ten-Point-Plan" of November 28, 1989[25]. Despite the fact that this plan envisaged a confederation between the two German states and regarded unification as a future political goal, abroad it was only understood that the Germans could and wanted to unite again.

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[24] Vernon A. Walters, "Former US Ambassador on Efforts to Achieve Real Unification" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, p. 29.
[25] Helmut Kohl, "Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europas, vorgelegt von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl in der Haushaltsdebatte des Deutschen Bundestages am 28. November 1989" ("Ten-Point-Program for Overcoming the Division of Germany and Europe, Presented by Chancellor Helmut Kohl during the Budget Debate in the German *Bundestag* on November 28, 1989") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 24, 1989, pp. 728-34.

The United States, "a congenital believer in second starts"[26], was from the beginning very supportive of this idea. In the first place, the American Government was astonishingly fast to work out a concept regarding German unification. One day after Kohl had presented his plan, U.S. Foreign Minister James Baker formulated four principles on which German unification was to be based[27]: First, self-determination of the German people should be guaranteed without prescribing the final version German unity should take. Second, unification was to take place with Germany's continued obligations in NATO and the European Community. Third, for the sake of stability, unification was to be peaceful, gradual and part of a step-by-step process. Four, Germany's borders were to be final. George Bush, who presented the American strategy on December 4, 1989, during the NATO-summit in Brussels while reporting on his meeting with Gorbatchev on the two preceding days before Malta, repeated these four principles.

The obvious contradiction between principle one and two - that is to say if a united Germany possessed the full right to self-determination, it should of course be able to choose becoming a neutral state - was at the heart of the American strategy thereafter, namely to prevent that Germany would become neutral. In order to achieve this end, the United States undertook great efforts to accommodate the interests of the Soviet Union. These efforts included a promise to initiate an overhaul of NATO's strategy and structures, an agreement not to deploy NATO troops on eastern German soil for

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[26] Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power" in *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1, 1996, p. 28.

[27] See James A. Baker, "Press Conference by the American Foreign Minister James A. Baker on November 29, 1989, in Washington" in: United Stated Information Service (USIS) Bonn, ed., *U.S. Policy Information and Texts*, no. 148, December 1, 1989. Baker, later reaffirmed these principles during his visit to Berlin in a speech by the American Foreign Minister James A. Baker before the Berlin Press-Club in West Berlin on December 12, 1989, in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 4, 1990, pp. 77-84.

a limited time, to strengthen the CSCE-process, and to ensure that Germany would

reaffirm its renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons[28]. At the end of

May 1990, Bush invited Gorbatchev to a summit meeting in Washington, and one

month later the Soviet president finally gave his consent to a united Germany with full

sovereignty and the right to choose freely its alliance affiliation.

Despite America's official support for German unification, some, if rather isolated,

negative voices arose in the United States. Those voices came especially from

American Jewish and American Polish groups. Elie Wiesel, for instance, warned that

"whenever Germany became too powerful, it fell victim to dangerous temptations of

ultra-nationalism."[29] The Polish-American Congress, after Kohl's announcement of

his "Ten-Point-Plan", made it clear that "while we recognize the immediate right of all

nations to self-determination, including, in the case of Germany, the right to

unification, (...) its actual implementation must rest upon the recognition of territorial

integrity and other nations' security."[30]

Public opinion polls conducted only several weeks after the fall of the Berlin Wall,

showed an overwhelming support by the American public for German unification. For

instance, an opinion poll conducted by *Business Week* asked: "Would you be in favor

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[28] See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Rede des Bundesministers des Auswaertigen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, anlaesslich der Vierten Überprüfungskonferenz des Vertrages über die Nichtverbreitung von Kernwaffen am 22. August 1990 in Genf" ("Speech by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany Hans-Dietrich Genscher on the Occasion of the Fourth Conference Revising the Non-Proliferation Treaty in Geneva on August 22, 1990,") in *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 102, August 8, 1990, pp. 860-63, in which Genscher declared that united Germany will abide by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, furthermore, intends to lead efforts to prohibit chemical weapons worldwide.
[29] See Elie Wiesel in *New York Times*, November 17, 1989, quoted in: Michael H. Hatzel, "Amerikanische Einstellungen zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung" ("American Attitudes concerning German Reunification") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 4, 1990, p. 128. See also Abraham M. Rosenthal, "Too Soon for a Mighty Germany" in *The International Herald Tribune*, May 3, 1989, p. 5.
[30] The Polish American Congress, *News Release*, December 15, 1989.

or against the reunification of East and West Germany?" 76% of those surveyed in the

poll were in favor, 16% against, and 8% did not have any opinion.[31] In January 1990,

The Economist confirmed that there was wide-spread public support in favor of

German unification in the United States, but with decreased figures of approval, that is

to say 61%. These findings were based on public opinion polls conducted by the *Los*

Angeles Times and the *MORI*-Organization in January 1990.[32]

5.2.2.2. The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union's reaction to Chancellor Kohl's announcement of his "Ten-Point-

Plan" was quite negative, because attention solely focused on the Germans' final goal

of unification. Still in December of 1989, official Soviet statements condemned the

denial of legal post-war realities as dangerous. They further pointed to the special

limitations of the German right to self-determination.[33] However, the collapse of the

Communist régime in East Germany soon brought about a revision of the Soviet

approach toward Germany. A communiqué about the meeting between Kohl and

Gorbatchev in Moscow on February 10, 1990, stated that both agreed that "the

Germans had to solve the question of national unity by themselves, and in which

constitutional form, at which point in time, with which speed and under which

conditions they would implement this unity."[34] This statement was not surprising in

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[31] See *Business Week*, November 27, 1989, quoted in: Michael H. Hatzel, "Amerikanische
Einstellungen zur deutschen Wiedervereinigung", p. 127.
[32] See *The Economist*, January 27, 1990, p. 49.
[33] See Eduard Shevardnadse's speech before the European Parliament's Political Committee in
Europa-Archiv, no. 5, 1990, pp. 127-36.
[34] Communiqué concerning the Meeting between the General Secretary of the Communist Party's
Central Committee and Chairman of the Highest Soviet's Presidency of the USSR Michail

view of the fact that a joint declaration by Kohl and Gorbatchev of June 1989, predating the fall of the Berlin Wall, had already contained the provision that "all states have the right to freely determine their fate."[35] In addition, however, Moscow announced one day after Kohl's visit that it was also willing to withdraw all Soviet troops from Central Europe within the next ten years.

The relationship between Bonn and Moscow was based essentially on good personal contacts. Summit-diplomacy and telephone hot-lines, as well as the tirelessly traveling German Foreign Minister ensured final success. In fact, concerning the new developments in Germany, the Soviet Union's "proposals were excessive, alternating rapidly, and were many times incompatible with each other."[36] This was particularly evident when the Soviet Union signaled agreement in February 1990, after Kohl's visit to Moscow, to leave it to Germany "under which conditions" - also implying alliance affiliation - unification should take place. In March 1990, the Soviet attitude was turning negative on this point. This was especially surprising in view of the opinion of Poland's, Hungary's and Czechoslovakia's foreign ministers, who, on a Warsaw-Pact conference in Prague, had declared that united Germany's membership in NATO was desirable. As has been stated above, it was particularly due to the insistence of the United States, and also to intensive lobbying on part of the Federal Republic and France to accommodate Soviet economic interests and needs at the world economic summit in Houston/Texas at the beginning of July 1990, that led to Moscow's final consent concerning Germany's alliance membership.

Gorbatchev and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Kohl in Moscow on February 10, 1990, in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 8, 1990, p. 192.
[35] Joint Declaration, signed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the Soviet Head of State and Party Chairman Michail Gorbatchev in Bonn on June 13, 1989, in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 13, 1989, p. 382.
[36] Hannes Adomeit, "Gorbatchev and German Unification: Revision of Thinking, Realignment of Power" in *Problems of Communism*, July/August 1990, p. 11.

In this context, one aspect, that must be especially noted, in the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic is of a financial nature. It is obvious that ultimately it was "financial support" from Germany for the Soviet Union that persuaded it to give up its satellite state of East Germany. As has been noted before, it cost the Federal Republic some 13 billion D-Mark plus an additional interest-free loan of 3 billion D-Mark. Had the Soviet Union not been in deep economic crisis, and therefore susceptible to such generous support, German unification might never have happened. It is, thus, understandable that Kohl, in his Dresden speech, showed foremost gratitude to Michail Gorbatchev and his policy of *perestrojka*.[37]

5.2.2.3. France

The French reaction to Kohl's "Ten-Point-Plan" was not very positive, especially because of a lacking eleventh point addressing the border question with Poland. It has been stated already that France became the most ardent defender of Poland's position, namely that unification should only happen if existing borders were acknowledged. However, another fact also contributed to France's initial difficulties in dealing with impending German unification. Despite all official rhetoric regarding "surmounting the division of the military blocs", France had lived - "apart from the inconvenient risk of nuclear annihilation"[38] - quite comfortably with the Cold War. The division of

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[37] Helmut Kohl's speech in Dresden on December 19, 1990, p. 258.
[38] Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power", p. 28.

Germany into two German states had solved the *German Question* from the French

point of view.

More than any other European country, France had worked to make West Germany's

integration into the West irrevocable, and was, therefore, not easily prepared to accept

basic changes in the European political landscape.[39] German unification was desirable

as long as it was unattainable.[40] Above all, despite having become the closest of

friends, France and the Federal Republic remained political rivals. In terms of security,

French atomic weapons had lost some of their political significance while at, the same

time, economic resources, regarding which France is in a relatively inferior position

compared to Germany, have become more important. Consequently, Paris has been

much more sensitive to the idea of a more powerful Germany.[41] Paradoxically, despite

this rivalry, it has always been the relationship between these two countries that was

the driving force behind the greatest achievements of the European Community.[42] In a

joint appearance before the European Parliament on November 2, 1989, Kohl and

President Mitterand affirmed that they would not allow the significant changes Europe

was experiencing let them stray from their political course of deepening European

integration.[43] However, in the event of German unification, the French would ask

whether Germany were willing to renounce its new political and economic

sovereignty to a supranational European entity.[44]

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[39] See also Walter Schütze, "Frankreich angesichts der deutschen Einheit" ("France in View of
German Unity") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 4, 1990, p. 134.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Peter Schmidt, "Frankreichs Ambitionen in der Sicherheitspolitik" ("French Ambitions
Concerning Security Policy"), in *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 44, no. 4, 1993, p. 335.
[42] See also Leigh Bruce, "Europe's Locomotive" in *Foreign Policy*, vol. 72, spring 1990, p. 89.
[43] See ibid., p. 68.
[44] See Angela Stent, "The One Germany", in *Foreign Policy*, vol. 81, winter 1990-91, p. 68.

At first, President Mitterand had tried to delay or prevent German unification. When that failed, he turned to a strategy of binding the united Germany tightly into an integrated Europe as a way of "containing German power".[45] France's confusion regarding the question of how to deal with German unification was highlighted by President Mitterand's visit to East Germany in December 1989. At the end of that visit Mitterand stated in a press conference that "the movement for quick unification does not have, at the moment, any spokesman."[46] However, he also stressed the Germans' right to self-determination, yet emphasizing that "no contradiction between the German will and the European will, between German unification and European unification" should exist.[47] Thus, Mitterand's two priorities, that he maintained throughout the "Two-plus-Four" talks, were for Germany to acknowledge existing borders as inviolable and tying German unification with further deepening the European Community.

Concerning public opinion in France, it should be noted that the French people appeared more open towards the prospect of German unification than its political leaders. On November 13, 1989, *Le Figaro* published a public opinion poll according to which 60% were in favor of German unification, and only 19% were against it. 70% of the people surveyed answered "no" to the question whether a larger Germany

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[45] See Julius W. Friend, *The Linchpin: French-German Relations, 1950-1990*, The Washington Papers, no. 154. New York 1991, pp. 78-94.

[46] Press Conference of French President Francois Mitterand at the End of His State Visit to the GDR in East Berlin on December 22, 1989, reprinted in: Jochen Thies and Wolfgang Wagner, eds., *Das Ende der Teilung: Der Wandel in Deutschland und Osteuropa*, 1990, p. 264.

[47] Ibid., pp. 265-66.

would be an obstacle to European integration.[48] In January 1990, *The Economist* confirmed these data (61%).[49]

5.2.2.4. Great Britain

Among Germany's European neighbors, Great Britain was initially the most outspoken critic of German unification. Although formally committed to German unification through the *Bonn Convention* of 1954, Prime Minister Thatcher made a couple of skeptical remarks, foreseeing real dangers emanating from impending German unification. She talked, for instance, about the need to "check the German juggernaut."[50] George Walden, a Tory parliamentarian, said in an article for *Der Spiegel* that Margaret Thatcher "has never understood that the course of time is subject to changes. That is why she was strictly against German reunification."[51] Kaiser thinks that Thatcher was basically "allergic" to the supranational dimensions of European integration. Therefore, she stressed the necessity to put German unification into the larger context of pan-European agreements and demanded that the rights of the Four Powers should be adequately considered.[52] At the beginning, she had advocated the "Four-plus-Two" formula, which she had to give up later under strong American pressure. Another argument put forward by her was that the integration of East Germany into the EC might harm the functioning of the Community. Yet, when

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[48] See *Le Figaro*, November 13, 1989. The poll was conducted by the Louis Harris Institute at the request of *Le Figaro*.
[49] See *The Economist*, January 27, 1990, p. 49.
[50] Cited from Margaret Thatcher's memoirs in *The New York Times*, October 18, 1993.
[51] George Walden, "Kein Beef, kein Beethoven': Die Briten und ihr Hass auf die Deutschen" ("No Beef, No Beethoven': The British and Their Hate for the Germans") in *Der Spiegel*, no. 23, June 3, 1996, p. 29.
[52] See Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte*, p. 65.

in the end even the Soviet Union had agreed to German unification, pragmatism seemed to have won with the British Prime Minister, and she supported German unification in a constructive way.

The most spectacular case of criticism came from British Cabinet Minister Nicholas Ridley, a close confidante of Thatcher. He described the Community as a "German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe" and deplored the idea of giving up British sovereignty to Community institutions because "you might as well give it to Adolf Hitler."[53] Under public pressure, as well as from her own party, Thatcher had to dismiss him later.

Public opinion, on the contrary, was not as negative as governmental statements might suggest. Despite articles like that of O'Brien, who predicted the establishment of a Fourth *Reich* that would rehabilitate the "racial doctrine", and in which a memorial of Hitler would be erected in every city[54], more friendly tones could be heard as well. Jenkins wrote, for instance, that a unified Germany would be "a jewel in the crown of a united Europe."[55] According to one public opinion poll of October 1989, 70% of the British were in favor of German unification as compared to, interestingly, only 56% of West Germans.[56] Yet, according to *The Economist*, in January 1990, only 45% of the British were for German unification, about 30% were against it, but more than half of these 30% feared a return of fascism.[57] Davy has explained this relatively high percentage of opposition to German unification with the

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[53] For Nicholas Ridley's comments see *The Spectator*, July 14, 1990.
[54] Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Beware, the Reich is Reviving" in *The Times* (London), October 31, 1989.
[55] Peter Jenkins in *The Independent*, February 1, 1990.
[56] Quoted in Richard Davy, "Grossbritannien und die Deutsche Frage" ("Great Britain and the German Question") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 4, 1990, p. 140.
[57] See *The Economist*, January 27, 1990, p. 49.

fact that in British public mythology and television the Second World War is still very much alive, and due to Great Britain's late entry into the European Community it had a sense of being dominated by the already present Germans and French.[58]

5.2.3. The Role of the European Community in the German Unification Process

In the 1954 *Bonn Convention*, the Three Powers committed themselves in Article 7, Paragraph 2, to work towards the realization of "a reunited Germany that would have a free and democratic constitution, similar to the one of the Federal Republic, and that would be integrated into the European Community."[59] The strategy of European unification can book German unification as part of its success. This strategy was based on the belief that by overcoming the old state system of classic nation-states, a new European order could be achieved. Since Adenauer, the European Community had been envisaged as the absorbing framework for a united Germany. It has been mentioned already that, in 1989, almost everyone in Germany agreed that German unification could only happen within the framework of the European Community.

The European Community, itself, although falling short of having devised a strategy for German unification beforehand, had included the Protocol on German Internal Trade and Connected Problems into the Treaties of Rome. Item One of that protocol stipulated that trade between West and East Germany did not violate the provisions of

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[58] See Richard Davy, "Grossbritannien und die Deutsche Frage", p. 140.
[59] Treaty on the Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Three Powers of October 23, 1954, in *Bundesgesetzblatt*, Part II, 1955, pp. 306-09.

the Treaties of Rome since such trade was being regarded by the Federal Republic's *Basic Law* as a part of German internal trade. Thus, the German Democratic Republic had always been granted a special status within the European Community and, in terms of trade, was not regarded as a foreign country. Practically, both the *Bonn Convention* and the Community's Protocol on German Internal Trade provided an initial legal starting point for the integration of a united Germany into the European Community.

However, when German unification was becoming a reality, fears within the Community were voiced, especially with respect to economic consequences. The integration of this first case of a former socialist and run-down economy was thought to put a great strain on the Community's budget and those of its members. Especially the poorer countries in the Community feared that a deviation of financial flows into the East German economy would damage them considerably. German Chancellor Kohl tried to disperse these fears by declaring Germany would regard the reconstruction of the East German economy primarily as a national task. In 1990, a report by the European Commission estimated that, in the event of demands on part of the new *Laender* on the EC's structural funds - which Germany had pledged not to make to its full maximum - the financial burden of the Community would amount to about one billion ECU until 1992, and subsequently would fall due to expected economic growth in that region.[60]

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[60] See the Commission of the European Communities, "Die Gemeinschaft und die deutsche Vereinigung" ("The Community and German Unification") in *Bulletin der Europaeischen Gemeinschaften*, supplement no. 4, 1990, pp. 124-25.

At the beginning, the European Community considered three alternative strategies for integrating East Germany into the Community. It could have been a) associated as an independent state, b) integrated as a thirteenth member, or, c) it could have joined the Community by acceding to the Federal Republic via Article 23 of the *Basic Law*. Jacques Delors, then President of the EC-Commission, opted for the last alternative. In fact, it was Delors who told the European Parliament in mid-January 1990 that the Community would continue to move toward full political union, true common foreign policy, and institutional reform. East Germany was invited to join the Community, "should it so wish."[61]

It is noticeable that no real consultation process involving the European Parliament, as is customary in accession cases, took place regarding the incorporation of East Germany into the Community. Yet, approval of the individual member-states was given, albeit only by their heads of state and government. Those met in Dublin in April 1990 and "warmly welcomed German unification", stating the hope that it would be "a positive factor in the development of Europe in general, and in that of the Community in particular."[62]

Item Five of the Council's conclusions stipulated that during the unification process, "the Federal Government will inform the Community about all important measures that are being discussed and agreed upon between the governments of the two German states with respect to political and legal adjustments. Furthermore, the Commission will be fully included in these discussions."[63] The Commission indeed

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[61] Quoted in Leigh Bruce, "Europe's Locomotive", p. 69.
[62] Final Conclusions of the Council, Special Summit of the European Council of Heads of State and Government in Dublin on April 28, 1990, in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 11, 1990, p. 284.
[63] Ibid., p. 285.

accompanied the process of German unification with a great administrative effort through supporting measures concerning economic and monetary union that was to come into force on July 1, 1990.[64] Particularly, the Commission's report on German unification examined all regulations and rules that had been enacted since the beginning of the Community and could possibly affect united Germany.

5.3. Domestic Aspects of the Unification Process

5.3.1. Political Dimensions of German Unification

Concerning the increasingly realistic prospect of German unification at the end of 1989, in much the same way as concerns arose abroad, Germans also felt somewhat uneasy about unification. In view of the fact that national unification had been a long-cherished goal of the Federal Republic, one would have expected more than 56%[65] of West Germans to be in favor of unification. Although Kohl himself had envisaged at first "to create confederate structures between the two German states, with the aim of creating a federal order in Germany", as stated in the fifth point of his "Ten-Point-Plan"[66], this plan "had already been overtaken by events"[67] at the time of its publication. In view of the dramatic flow of immigrants from East to West Germany -

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[64] See also Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte*, p. 99.
[65] Figure according to a public opinion poll as quoted in Richard Davy, "Grossbritannien und die Deutsche Frage", p. 140.
[66] Helmut Kohl, "Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Überwindung der Teilung Deutschlands und Europas, vorgelegt von Bundeskanzler Helmut Kohl in der Haushaltsdebatte des Deutschen Bundestages am 28. November 1989", pp. 728-34.
[67] Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte*, p. 86.

300,000 people alone between October 1989 and January 1990 – the Federal government had to start thinking about more drastic measures.

By January 1990, national unification had become a definite political goal. However, government and opposition disagreed on how to achieve it, and within which time-frame. One of the basic issues of disagreement was the question under which article of the *Basic Law* East Germany was to accede to West Germany. The two options available were either Article 146 or Article 23. Article 146 stipulated for a constitutional assembly to convene and an all-German referendum to be hold on a new constitution. The dangers involved in that procedure, however, were that institutionalizing a new assembly would have been very time-consuming. In such an assembly the GDR would have been represented proportionally in relation to its population (East German population: 16 million) and could have been outvoted by West German representatives (West German population: 60 million). Furthermore, there existed the danger that essential changes could be made to the much-valued *Basic Law* with a simply majority decision of an all-German constituent assembly.[68]

On the contrary, Article 23 stipulated East Germany's direct accession to the Federal Republic, leaving the decision to join entirely up to the GDR. This constituted, at the same time, a constitutionally guaranteed right of East Germany to enter the Federal Republic. West Germany would not have any authority to choose whether or not to accept the East German decision of accession. In fact, Article 23 had been invoked once by the Saarland's decision to join the Federal Republic. The Saarland had been

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[68] See "The Path to Unity: Accession under the Basic Law" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 19, June 1990, pp. 6-7.

occupied by France after the Second World War, but decided in a referendum in 1955 to become a constituent state of the FRG, which it did on January 1, 1957. Further advantages of Article 23, which was in the end applied for the unification procedure, were that it allowed for the synchronization of internal and external aspects of unification, especially the involvement of the Four Powers.[69] The Federal Republic would remain the same legal entity under international law, thus continuing its membership in the European Community and NATO.

Astonishingly, the Social Democratic Party, that had, as it emphasized specifically, tried to act in the interest of East Germany by preventing a "sell-out" to the Federal Republic, and for which many had predicted an election victory,[70] obtained one of its worst results after the Second World War in the East German election on March 18, 1990, namely a mere 21,8%. Many of the SPD's warnings about estimated high costs of unification had been interpreted in East Germany to be directed against the East Germans' wish for unification. East Germans, obviously, did not want any reminders of former communist rhetoric, as expressed, for instance, in the East-SPD's formulation of "recognition of two German states as a consequence of a guilty history", which it had embodied in its 1989 founding program. Probably out of the same reason, SPD-members of the East had objected to be called "comrade" by Western colleagues.[71]

On the other hand, the newly formed "Alliance for Germany" between West and East-CDU seemed to have struck the right tone with its election slogan of "never again

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[69] See ibid., pp. 8-10.
[70] See for instance A. James McAdams, "Towards a New Germany - Problems of Unification" in *Government and Opposition*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1990, p 305.
[71] See Eckart Thurich, "Der Weg zur Einheit", p. 35.

Socialism". With 48,1% of the vote, and 5,3% for the Liberal Free Democrats, a clear

majority of East Germans had expressed their will for fast accession to the Federal

Republic. The SPD joined in a great coalition with the election winners. Despite the

fact that the SPD later withdrew from it, it nevertheless fully supported both state

treaties, that is to say the Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union as well as the

Unity Treaty with which unification was carried out.[72]

In retrospective, former Social-Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt called Kohl's

determined action in uniting the two German states "a great merit".[73] However, it has

been widely acknowledged that also great mistakes were committed during the

unification process result in long-term problems. Lehmbruch has attributed this

circumstance to structural characteristics of the decision-making process.[74] Basically,

he divides the unification process into two phases: The first phase, from the formation

of the transitional GDR-government, headed by Hans Modrow, until the conclusion

of the *Unity Treaty*, was characterized by a highly centralized structure of political

strategy development. The second phase, that is to say the time after the *Unity Treaty*,

has been characterized by a return to decision-making within the framework of

common rules, routines and procedures that had been developed in a long institutional

process.

The first phase was dominated by the personal decision-making style of Chancellor

Kohl. Kohl made use of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the chancellor to

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[72] See ibid.
[73] Helmut Schmidt, "Deutschlands Rolle im neuen Europa" ("Germany's Role in the New Europe"),
in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 21, 1991, p. 618.
[74] See Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Die deutsche Vereinigung: Strukturen und Strategien" ("German
Unification: Structures and Strategies") in *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, vol. 32, no. 4, 1991, pp.
585-604.

determine policy (*Richtlinienkompetenz*) in such an extensive way as has been unusual in the Federal Republic since the days of Konrad Adenauer. Kohl's almost single-handed conduct of the unification process would therefore make for an interesting case-study in decision-making theory. As has been outlined in our chapter on theory, Allison's view was that the concept of a "rational actor" has to be supplemented by aspects of the "organizational" as well as "bureaucratic model". The fact that the unification process involved aspects both of foreign policy as well as domestic policy, makes this case all the more interesting. Here, however, we must restrict our analysis to stating that Kohl largely by-passed institutions that would have normally be involved in the decision-making process. This can be contributed to the fact that events happened very fast. Lehmbruch has even talked about "improvised unification", in order to express the ad-hoc nature with which political decisions were taken.[75] Furthermore, everywhere a sense of political immobility could be observed. This "power vacuum" was filled by the determined Chancellor, who acted both out of the belief that this "historic chance" had to be grasped immediately or would otherwise pass, and out of the motivation to secure himself a place in history as the "Chancellor of unification".

Germany's neighbors and partners, watching the country carefully for signs of new assertiveness, found a first indication of it at the time when Kohl announced his "Ten-Point-Plan". He did so whithout having informed the Federal Republic's key allies and, thus, astonished the world greatly. Although, as has been pointed out already, Kohl's initial plan was not immediate unification, the world at large understood it as

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[75] Seè Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Die improvisierte Vereinigung: Die dritte deutsche Republik" ("The Improvised Unification: The Third German Republic") in *Leviathan*, vol. 18, 1990, pp. 462-86.

such. Nevertheless, by taking the initiative in drawing up such a plan, Kohl clearly

indicated that he was not willing to leave Germany's fate forever in the hands of the

Allied Powers. He asserted his right to initiate a plan which would, in the end, lead to

the unification of the divided country. With regard to West German public opinion, he

was also ahead with this first step. West Germans appeared to be somewhat reluctant,

although not outright opposed to unification, due to their insecurity regarding their

ability to handle their own affairs, and for fear to antagonize their neighbors.

However, the West Germans' characterization of being no great risk-takers when

faced with new, uncertain challenges, is thought to have contributed to their initial

weak support for unification. And, by intuition, many people might have balked at the

idea of sharing their acquired wealth with their "eastern brothers", even though the

magnitude of sacrifices involved could not be estimated at that time.

5.3.2. Economic Dimensions of German Unification

Some of the problems that Germany, both East and West, encountered in the wake of

economic unification - brought about by the Treaty on the Creation of a Monetary,

Economic and Social Union that came into effect on July 1, 1990 - emanated from the

way the unification process was handled politically; others were unavoidable. Due to

domestic pressure and the quick pace with which the decision for economic and

monetary union was taken, economic strategy had to adapt largely to political

circumstances. Since the biggest fears in European Community member-states were

about Germany's growing economic power and its alleged decreased interest in

European integration, we will now turn to the analysis of how Germany's economic

position has been affected by unification. Our main research question being Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration, in the following we will see whether concerns over a dominating German economy have been justified.

By introducing the D-mark as the single currency, economic and monetary union put an end to the division of Germany into two sectors with different currencies, which had existed since 1948. The need to find a just exchange rate, however, involved great problems. Whereas economists, and especially the Federal Bank (*Bundesbank*), had suggested a 3:1 ratio out of economic considerations, the GDR-government demanded a ratio of 1:1. Since bank accounts, salaries and old age pensions would be affected by this regulation, the Federal Bank's proposal provoked outrage among the population in East Germany, to the point that political majorities in East Germany's Parliament were in danger. In the end, due to political pressure, salaries and old age pensions were exchanged at a ratio of 1:1, bank savings up to 6,000 D-mark equally at a ratio of 1:1, bank savings exceeding 6,000 D-mark at a ratio of 2:1.[76]

With respect to economic and monetary union, particularly France criticized the German Government for following two different strategies in German economic unification and in economic unification of the European Community. The main criticism was that, in the Community, Germany allegedly aimed at achieving economic adjustment before setting up common monetary institutions like a European central bank, whereas in its own unification process it followed a different pattern. This criticism has, however, not been completely justified due to the fact that the region to which monetary union was applied in Germany is a much smaller one than

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[76] See Eckart Thurich, "Der Weg zur Einheit", p. 35.

that of the European Union, and by the fact that control of the *Bundesbank* was guaranteed and exchange-rates were fixed and known beforehand.

Another aspect contributing to Germany's economic performance was the so-called "tax-lie" (*Steuerlüge*). Quite naively, to put it at best, the Kohl-government believed it could finance unification and the reconstruction of the East German economy without increasing taxes, as it had promised in the 1990 election campaign. This "blatant miscalculation"[77] was widely criticized and has been called "our greatest mistake"[78]. Already in February 1991, the re-elected Kohl-government had announced a 46 billion D-mark tax-increase package, including a year-long unity surcharge (*Solidaritaetsbeitrag*) on income and corporate tax. While many West Germans had initially been prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of national unification, this willingness was eroding after the "no-tax-increase" promise. From the very beginning, Germans had been promised that they would not be made any worse off by unification. Economic prosperity and equal living standards in East and West would be accomplished within five to ten years, Kohl had promised. This gap between promises made by politicians and the harsh realities Germans found themselves in, have been crucial for understanding the public mood and expectations.[79]

However, more important than economic considerations was the psychological impact on both western and eastern Germans, resulting from this bickering over who would pay what. The mentality of western Germans - *Wessis* as they were now called by

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[77] Christian Hacke, "Deutschland und die neue Weltordnung: Zwischen innenpolitischer Überforderung und aussenpolitischen Krisen", p. 5.
[78] Helmut Schmidt, "Deutschlands Rolle im neuen Europa", p. 619.
[79] See also Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The New Germany: An Overview" in: Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe*, Washington (D.C.) 1992, pp. 11-54.

eastern Germans, who in turn were dubbed *Ossis* by their western compatriots - that the "Ossis first have to learn what it means to work" and "that everything is getting too expensive"[80], buried all feelings of fraternity and led to a "wall in the minds of people"[81]. Further, massive distributional struggles between the Federal Government and the western individual *Laender* over financial contributions to costly unification - some 775 billion D-Mark in one estimate of 1990[82] - hindered German unification to a large degree.[83]

Economic difficulties started to be felt in western Germany especially after 1992. Unification had prolonged the economic boom there for over three years, mainly due to increased demand for western German products from the eastern part and new contracts there. But then, difficulties, that were at heart structural problems and had been covered so far by the favorable economic situation, started to reveal themselves.[84] Other contributing factors were increased inflation and public debt. Thus, Funke has gone to the extreme of calling the Federal Republic's economic power a "mere fiction".[85] To be sure, Germany's economic performance slowly started to increase after it had hit bottom in 1991, and is expected to reach pre-unification levels, and above, at the beginning of the new century. In 1998 already, economic recovery has become evident with economic growth being up to 3%.

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[80] Helmut Schmidt, "Deutschlands Rolle im neuen Europa", p. 619.
[81] Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Die deutsche Vereinigung: Strukturen und Strategien", p. 592.
[82] See Angela Stent, "The One Germany", p. 63.
[83] See Rolf Hasse, "German Unification and European Upheavals", in *Aussenpolitik* (English edition), vol. 43, no. 2, 1992, p. 131.
[84] See also Roman Herzog, then President of the Federal Constitutional Court, in his Inaugural speech at the opening of the new Plenary Assembly Hall on October 30, 1992, in the German *Bundestag*, in *Protokoll des Deutschen Bundestages*, 12th election period, October 30, 1992, pp. 9846-49.
[85] Manfred Funke, "Turning Points in 20th-Century German History: The New Face of Germany", 1992, p. 22.

Yet, economic hardships felt in the eastern part of Germany were particularly great. There, of course, it is not correct to speak of economic recession, because that part of Germany underwent a fundamental economic restructuring. At the heart of this process was the *Treuhandanstalt*, the public body for privatizing former state-owned enterprises. Originally, that is to say in 1990, the *Treuhandanstalt* owned almost 7,500 enterprises and employed 40% of the workforce in eastern Germany. After a large number of companies had been privatized and some had been dissolved, it owned only about 1,900 enterprises and employed about 5% of the workforce in 1993. Despite a rather satisfying performance from an economic point of view, this institution has been prone to wide-spread criticism. Even Helmut Schmidt, the former Social-democratic chancellor and an economist himself, defended the *Treuhandanstalt* against those criticisms, because, in his view, it was overburdened by all the tasks allocated to it, namely privatization, reconstruction and even social goals, like the setting up of companies particularly designed to fulfill job educational aims.[86]

From a humanitarian point of view, many eastern Germans were left destitute. In the three years after unification, the number of jobs there fell from nine million to six million, while at the same time social schemes like cheap housing and free child care were abolished. At the root of the problem was a loss in international competitivity after economic and monetary union.[87] The introduction of the D-mark and the low marketability of domestic products meant that the eastern German economy lost both the domestic market and foreign markets, particularly those in Eastern Europe, all of a sudden. Up to 1989, the Eastern European countries of the former COMECON

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[86] Helmut Schmidt, "Deutschlands Rolle im neuen Europa", p. 619.
[87] See also Franz Josef Link, "New Course for German Economic Policy - More Investment, Less Consumption: The Arduous Path to Reconstruction in Eastern Germany" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 32, October 1993, p. 21.

accounted for 70% of the GDR's foreign trade, the share of the Soviet Union being 40%.[88] While after unification trade fell to zero with some countries like Romania, exports from Hungary and Poland regained some momentum, but continued to be modest. Despite the fact, that eastern Germany has enjoyed by far the most attractive state financial support scheme in the world[89] and is regarded by experts as the ideal location for economic enterprises trying to enter the fast-growing markets in Eastern Europe, these measures did not produce satisfying results at the onset but required time to deliver results.

Parallel to all these events, the German budget was particularly strained by large social benefits to the unemployed, both in the eastern and the western part. In addition, huge migration flows reached Germany and cost the country again large sums in social benefits. Those migrants were immigrants of German origin from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries, refugees from those regions and, especially, from the former Yugoslavia. This influx led, for the first time, to a serious discussion on the Federal Republic's asylum policy and law.[90]

Underlining Germany's economic troubles, a headline of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* asked in March 1996: "Has the German Model Failed?" Indeed, it seemed that the faith in the German model was somewhat shattered abroad, as well as within Germany. Voices talking about the "German disease" instead of the "German model"

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[88] See Fides Krause-Brewer, "Opportunities and Risks for German Trade in a New Situation: Doing Business with the East", in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, p. 60.

[89] See Franz Josef Link, "New Course for German Economic Policy - More Investment, Less Consumption: The Arduous Path to Reconstruction in Eastern Germany", p. 20.

[90] See also Eckart Schiffer, "The Chronic Lack of Realism in the Asylum Debate: Refugee Status in Germany", in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, pp. 78-82.

grew increasingly louder. Thomas has put it this way: "It wasn't just that Germany succeeded after the war. It was the *way* Germany succeeded that was the attraction to the rest of the world."[91] Germany's belief in its social market system has been shattered by unemployment figures that seemed to grow higher every month, some 11% in the summer of 1998. Still, in the face of the recent world economic crisis, triggered by the turmoil on South-East Asian markets and the Russian crisis, Germans are still comparatively well off. Yet, the majority of them do not see it that way but only consider their subjective economic situation. At present, although almost everybody agrees that the German social network system must be reformed, nobody wants to make any sacrifices. Everybody appears to be fighting against everybody else: employers against employees, the employed against the unemployed, families with children against singles, to name but a few.

Suddenly, the understanding between labor unions and business management for which the German model has been known appeared not to work any more. Despite some compromises, like the one of Germany's most powerful union the *IG Metall* to freeze wages in 1996, relations have remained strained. The combination of underworked and overpaid workers have made many companies less competitive. Furthermore, the close relationship between the powerful German banks and German companies has changed. Whereas banks had provided enterprises with capital designed to bring about long-term revenues for a long time, now a shift towards a system in which shareholders, usually more focused on short-term earnings, have a greater say can be observed, thus weakening the banks' position in the "German

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[91] Cited by Bill Powell, "Germany: Sick at Heart?" in *Newsweek International*, March 18, 1996, p. 18.

model".[92] In February 1996, the Kohl-government announced a 50-point plan for economic relief, promising especially tax cuts and state deregulation. However, not much action has followed. The SPD's candidate for the 1998 federal election, Gerhard Schröder, had even announced in the wake of the plan that "deep cuts" in Germany's social safety net were unavoidable.[93]

In summary, it appears that Germany's post-unification recovery is more arduous than expected. What is at stake is Germany's reputation as the most powerful European economy, often feared, yet equally relied upon as the motor for Europe's economy, both in the European Union as well as in Eastern European countries. The Eastern European economies look upon the German experience for guidance concerning their own transformation into market economies, not to mention financial support. The European Union, on the eve of the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, relies upon a strong German economy with the D-mark as Europe's most important currency. The Germans' confidence to be able to deal with yet another crisis, rooted in their experience of the *Wirtschaftswunder*, and the still admirable success of large German businesses like BMW and the slow recovery of Daimler-Benz, have provided reasons for hope. As for European fears of a German economic superpower, it can be stated that the old Federal Republic had already been one of the three largest economic powers in the world, and the largest in Europe. Former economic disputes between the Federal Republic and its European Community partners like the one over its huge trade surplusses, are likely to continue in the future. It seems, however, that Germany with its present economic problems is more aware than ever that, in its own

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[92] Daimler-Benz's CEO Jürgen Schrempp, for instance, has talked frequently about raising "shareholder values". With the new-found interest of Germans in the country's stockmarket, this trend is likely to continue.

[93] Quoted by Bill Powell, "It's a Global Thing" in *Newsweek International*, February 26, 1996, p. 28.

best, particularly long-term, interest, it depends increasingly on successful cooperation with other countries. This is not just limited to European Union member-states. Germany has been particularly active, for instance, in pushing for the opening up of markets to products from Eastern Europe, and also increasingly from Third World countries.

5.4. Conclusions

Regarding united Germany's alleged new "assertiveness", this chapter has found that the way the German unification process was handled has indeed contained elements confirming that assumption. Chancellor Kohl has undoubtedly taken the lead in the unification process by successfully avoiding an international peace conference and directly negotiating, above all, with the United States and the Soviet Union. That move has provoked criticism and anxiety among Germany's neighbors, who were nevertheless appeased by the outcome of these negotiations, namely that united Germany remained firmly anchored in the European Community and in NATO and recognized its existing borders. Kohl's initiative was politically justified with three developments, namely East Germany's specific wish of joining the Federal Republic as soon as possible, by the fact that mass migration from East to West had started to put too great a burden on the West, and by the unstable political situation in the Soviet Union that could change any time soon making German unification again impossible.

Regarding the reaction of Germany's partners and neighbors to unification, it can be stated that, among Western countries, public opinion was more favorable than the

statements of leading politicians implied.[94] Yet, the tradition of high politics, particularly within the European Community, was continued. Public opinion, neither abroad nor in West Germany, counted for much. Especially the lack of formal consultation of the European Parliament has been noted. Despite the fact that accession by the GDR to the FRG was legally possible via Article 23 of the *Basic Law* without consulting the European Parliament, and for that matter even without consulting the *Bundestag*, the democratic deficit within the Community has become obvious. Again, however, the argument that lengthy consultation procedures might have rendered the whole unification process impossible can be put forward.

Concerning domestic aspects of the unification process, it has been found that the new Germany has encountered serious political and economic problems affecting the general mood in the country. Particularly the gap between political promises about the effects of unification and unfulfilled hopes and harsh realities is worth mentioning. Due to economic hardships in eastern as well as western Germany, political confrontations have increased and the psychological feeling of living in one united country has still to come for the majority of Germans. This can be taken as a starting point of the search for an explanation of Germany's alleged decreased enthusiasm for European integration that will be examined, together with the position of political parties on this issue, in the following chapter.

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[94] For Eastern European countries, data on public opinion were not available.

6. THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES AFTER UNIFICATION

This chapter explores in which way the attitudes of German political parties and the German public have changed regarding European integration after national unification. As has been explained already in Chapter Four, political parties and public opinion play an important role in the shaping of national policies, that is to say here of Germany's European policy. Apart from the general impact political parties have as political institutions on the decision-making process, the fact that German governments since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany have always been coalition governments, in which the junior-coalition partner traditionally has taken over the Foreign Ministry, warrants an examination of all parties represented in the *Bundestag* and the different strands of thinking within them. This will be done by analyzing the various statements political parties and their members have made on European integration. In view of the fact that the European Union has been striving to increase its legitimacy by increasing the powers and functions of the European Parliament that is directly elected by European citizens, and the fact that German political policy-makers are influenced increasingly by public opinion, factors determining the German public's commitment on European integration as well as their influence on political decision-makers deserve special attention.

6.1. German Political Parties and European Integration

The first all-German national election of December 1990 has brought about a slight change in the German political landscape. Since then, apart from the four established parties CDU/CSU, FDP, SPD, and *Die Grünen,* a fifth party has been represented in the *Bundestag*. The former East German SED, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, has been transformed into the PDS, the Party of Democratic Socialism, and has entered the *Bundestag*, making it a potential coalition partner. This has been possible due to the German election system that allows a party to be represented in the *Bundestag* if it has gained any direct mandate, without having passed the national 5% threshold. In the election of October 1994, the PDS gained 4,4% of the national vote and entered the Bundestag with four direct mandates. In June 1994, the "Magdeburg Model" was born, that is to say the minority government of SPD and Greens in the eastern federal state of Sachsen-Anhalt (the capital of which is Magdeburg) was tolerated by the PDS. The PDS can be called a "modernized Communist party"[1], that has tried to incorporate new ideas into traditional Communist assumptions.

Concerning their orientation towards Europe and the European Union, all parties, except the CSU and the PDS, can be said to have increased their support for European integration after unification to varying degrees. Due to the traditional lack of foreign policy issues in German national election campaigns, which are usually fought on economic grounds, voting behavior in national elections cannot be taken as a measure of public support for European integration. Another particularity of

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[1] Patrick Moreau, "Die PDS: eine postkommunistische Partei" ("The PDS: A Post-Communist Party") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, January 24, 1992, p. 37.

German politics is that alomost all parties, even those not represented in the *Bundestag*, have formed "sister parties", representing them in European Parliament elections. European Parliament elections - for which voter-turnout is much lower than in national elections, mostly around 70% - are, however, rarely fought on the grounds of issues relating to the European Union, but on issues relating to national politics in Germany. Therefore, European Parliament elections can be considered as an extension of German national elections. Since national and European Parliament elections do usually not take place in the same year[2], the latter are mostly taken as approval rating for the current federal government.

Yet, assuming that voting behavior is largely the result of a four-year legislation period, during which the parties' position on European integration has influenced the decision of voters at least to some extent, we will examine the particular positions of German parties on this issue. In the forefront is, of course, the position of the ruling coalition partners CDU/CSU and FDP. Particularly with regard to a predicted change in government after the September 1998 elections, however, the position of opposition parties is also of great importance. Despite the fact that the political parties represented in the *Bundestag* have diverging positions on the detailed shaping of European integration, it can be stated that overall consensus does exist on this issue. Examining the positions the supporters of these parties hold regarding European integration - they were given the option of choosing among "political union", "status quo" and a "national, independent policy" - Weilemann has concluded that due to the

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[2] Federal elections are held every four years, European Parliament elections every five years.

support pattern for European integration among supporters, no party will choose an

"anti-European course".[3]

6.1.1 CDU/CSU

The CDU, which has liked to portrait itself as "the European integration party"[4], has

become even stronger in its support for the European Union after national unification

for basically two reasons. As has been noted earlier, the CDU was well aware of the

fact that German unification would only be acceptable to its partners and neighbors if

it took place within the framework of the European Community. Therefore, during

the unification process in 1990, both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher

stressed continuously that the new Germany would be equally committed to European

integration like the old Federal Republic. The second reason was increased awareness

among leading CDU-politicians that growing international interdependence warranted

successful international cooperation if the Federal Republic were to maintain, and

preferably extend, its economic position.

After unification had been successfully completed, the second argument for European

integration has been stressed even more and has been complemented by other factors

arising from changes in the international environment. In contrast to older

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[3] Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht" (Attitudes towards the European Union after Maastricht"), internal study no. 30/1992 for the Research Institute of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, St. Augustin, January 22, 1992.

[4] See for instance Peter Hintze, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik fünf Jahre nach dem Umbruch in Europa" ("German Foreign Policy Five Years after the Upheaval in Europe"), manuscript, 1994, p. 12; and CDU, "Zukunftsprogramm der CDU Deutschlands" ("Program of the German CDU for the Future"), resolution by the tenth Party Congress of the CDU, May 17-19, 1998, p. 59.

Conservative concepts, "supranational action" is now seen as the only adequate means to deal with contemporary risks arising from international interdependence.[5] International cooperation, viewed as realpolitical "self-preservation" of the fatherland, was no longer regarded as a "zero-sum game".[6] The "old" version of the traditional nation-state was considered a thing of the past[7], because meeting modern challenges alone represents an "overstrain for nation-states"[8]. In view of globalization and increased challenges across different continents, the CDU believes it can preserve "freedom, peace, development and welfare as well as the Creation" only by means of international cooperation.[9]

Especially the turmoil Eastern European countries have gone through after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact has deeply worried the CDU. Stability in Eastern Europe has become the foremost task facing Germany and the European Union. The European Union is now regarded as the basic foundation for ensuring economic and political security and, increasingly, military security as well: "Today, the whole of Europe is in need of a secure and firm anchor more than ever before. This role and mission can only be taken over by the European Community."[10] Stabilizing the former Communist countries means for the CDU to approximate their economic and political

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[5] Willy Wimmer, speech at the Gildehaus-Institut on September 25, 1990, manuscript, p. 16.
[6] See Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, London/New York 1994, p. 42.
[7] See CDU, "Die Zukunft gemeinsam gestalten: Die neuen Aufgaben deutscher Politik" ("Shaping the Future Together: The New Tasks of German Politics"), Dresdner Manifest, resolutions by the second Party Congress of the CDU, December 14-17, 1991, in *CDU-Dokumentation*, no. 39/40, 1991, p. 3.
[8] CDU, "Zukunftsprogramm der CDU Deutschlands", 1998, p. 58.
[9] CDU, *Freiheit in Verantwortung* ("Freedom in Responsibility"), the CDU's Basic Program, February 1994, p. 85.
[10] Helmut Kohl in a statement on the third Party Congress of the CDU in 1992, quoted in: CDU, *50 Jahre CDU* ("50 Years of CDU"), Bonn 1996, manuscript.

systems to those of Western Europe. Incorporating these countries into the European Union is a logical consequence of this goal.

Concerning the internal condition and development of the European Union, the CDU has warned repeatedly about the possibility of "stagnation".[11] The standard and goal of the CDU's policy, therefore, must be "to make European integration irreversible."[12] Apart from economic considerations, that have been discussed earlier, the CDU stresses that Germany has a special political interest in the success of the European Union as well. Due to Germany's geographic location, size and history, the drifting apart of Europe could put Germany again into its old "middle position", which has in the past made it difficult for Germany to erect an inner order and establish a permanent and firm external balance.[13] All efforts to change this position by hegemonial aspirations have resulted in disaster. Thus, by being integrated into the European Union - and being surrounded by its member-states, if some of the Middle European countries should accede - Germany would be protected from itself, that is to say from its domineering and expansionist ambitions.

With regard to foreign policy and security, the European Community, as a "community of fate", has to pull its forces together if it wants to succeed globally with its interests and moral values.[14] The CDU has also been stressing the importance of a

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[11] See for instance CDU, *Geschichte der europaeischen Einigung und ihre Lehren* ("History of European Unification and Its Lessons"), brochure, 1998, p. 12; and Karl Lamers, "Überlegungen zur europaeischen Politik" ("Reflections concerning European Policy"), manuscript, September 1, 1994, pp. 1-2.

[12] Helmut Kohl, "Aktuelle Fragen der Europapolitik, insbesondere Vorschau auf den Europaeischen Rat in Madrid am 15./16. Dezember 1995" ("Current Issues in European Policy, Particularly Preview of the European Counil in Madrid on December 15-16, 1995"), a declaration by the German Chancellor before the German *Bundestag* on December 7, 1995, manuscript.

[13] See Karl Lamers, "Überlegungen zur europaeischen Politik", p. 2.

[14] CDU, "Beschluss Nr. B1 - Gemeinsame Verantwortung in Europa und in der Welt wahrnehmen" ("Resolution No. B1 - Perception of Joint Responsibility in Europe and in the World") in:

Western European defense union. The WEU has been regarded by German Conservatives as a mediating tool between Atlantic and European organizations.[15] French-German military cooperation, such as the initial bi-national brigade stationed in Böblingen, has been considered as an important experiment for military integration. It constituted another example of the "locomotive function" of German-French cooperation. Another military corps has later been established in cooperation with the Netherlands. Altogether, it can be said that the CDU is gradually striving to establish the European Union's independence of the United States in terms of security. Nevertheless, the Atlantic partnership is still very important and figures prominently on all foreign-policy agendas of the CDU.[16] The CDU envisages the European Union to be an equal partner with the United States and, then, to tackle global challenges in unison with its Atlantic partner. To this end, the CDU has also put special emphasis on Germany's ability to participate in international out-of-area missions.

Concerning pan-European security institutions, the CDU has attributed a rather marginal, albeit "important role"[17] to the OSCE. Although the CDU has given up its complete rejection of the Helsinki-process as had existed during the 1970s and early 1980s, it relies predominantly on the European Union as the center of European integration. Only a sub-group within the CDU, the "liberal conservatives", has

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"Beschlüsse des 3. Parteitages der CDU Deutschlands: Beschlüsse zur Europapolitik" ("Resolutions by the Third Party Congress of the German CDU: Resolutions concerning European Policy"), October 25-28, 1992, manuscript, p. 6.

[15] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 14, 1991.

[16] See for instance Peter Hintze, "Deutsche Aussenpolitik fünf Jahre nach dem Umbruch in Europa", p. 4.

[17] CDU, "Die Zukunft gemeinsam gestalten: Die neuen Aufgaben deutscher Politik", p. 5.

particularly emphasized the functions of the OSCE and has referred to Social-democratic concepts such as "common security".[18]

Regarding the different factions within the CDU and their respective outlook concerning European policy, we have found that today the "pragmatists" around Helmut Kohl and "Euro-conservatives" dominate the party. The CSU continues to be conservative and nationalistic in its European policy. Especially the debate over the introduction of the ECU - the "Euro" - has brought about serious tensions between Chancellor Kohl and Bavaria's Prime Minister Edmund Stoiber of the CSU. Therefore, the CSU's incorporation of populist right-wing elements into party politics continues to exist along the CDU's pragmatic European policy, causing sometimes heated discussions, but posing no serious threat to the government's European approach.

Summing up, European policy is, today, even figuring more prominently among the CDU's foreign policy priorities. In election campaign rhetoric it has even become a preferred issue in order to distance the CDU positively from the other political parties, which are considered to be less "Europe-friendly". The CDU has noted that the SPD's chancellor candidate Gerhard Schröder has called the Euro a "sickly premature birth"[19] despite his parliamentary group's support for the new European currency. The Greens' abstention during the vote for the Amsterdam Treaty has made them "unfit for governing", in the eyes of the CDU.[20] The PDS is said to be against

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[18] See Rita Süssmuth, speech by the President of the German *Bundestag* at the IEWSS International Conference, June 9, 1990, manuscript, especially pp. 2 and 5.
[19] As quoted in: CDU, "Deutschland in Europa" ("Germany within Europe") in: *Handbuch für Wahlkaemfer* ("Manual for Election Campaigners"), manuscript, 1998, p. 13.
[20] Ibid.

European integration because of its opposition to European economic and monetary union, and the fact that it has voted against the Amsterdam Treaty in the *Bundestag*. The negative consequences for European integration in the case of a coalition between SPD and the Greens, possibly tolerated by the PDS, after the 1998 election are mentioned.[21]

With its support for the European Union and the incorporation of Eastern European countries, the CDU has clearly helped promoting the European integration process. Concerning its motivation to do so, national interests are not hidden. Thus, it is equally clear that the CDU, as the senior coalition partner in the German Government, in a modified version of *realpolitik*, is using its increased political influence in the European Union to further national interests that allegedly coincide with European interests.[22] These are said to be peace, freedom and economic prosperity.

6.1.2. FDP

As has been outlined earlier, the FDP's former dominant political figure Foreign Minister Genscher has, like Chancellor Kohl, repeatedly pledged Germany's continued commitment to the European Community after unification. Although the FDP does not go as far as the Social Democrats and regard nation-states to have become obsolete, they hold the view that modern states have to adapt to the changed

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[21] Ibid., p. 14..
[22] See Roman Herzog, "Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher Aussenpolitik" ("The Basic Coordination of German Foreign Policy"), keynote speech by the German President at the 40th anniversary of the German Foreign Policy Institute on March 11, 1995, reprinted in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 4, 1995, p. 8.

global environment and challenges, in part, by pooling their sovereignty: "European

integration is and remains the priority of German foreign policy."[23] The goal of the

FDP's European policy, which had not been formulated like this before, is now to

establish "the United States of Europe".[24]

Within the European Union, the FDP has especially advocated greater democratic

control of the EU's institutions. Through increased democratization, the EU would

gain in legitimacy and support by its citizens.[25] The Liberals are in favor of fast

integration of Eastern European states into the European Union. For the FDP,

"deepening and widening of the European Union are not in opposition to each

other."[26] The party expressly welcomes the CDU/CSU's final rejection of the concept

of a "European core", that had been brought forward by CDU-politicians Wolfgang

Schaeuble and Karl Lamers.[27] Instead, the FDP favors "progressive integration"[28], a

concept that is anchored in the principle of common progress for all member-states,

while allowing slower member-states to stay out of individual integrative steps

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[23] FDP, "Für eine bürgernahe und handlungsfaehige Europaeische Union - Europapolitische Positionen der Freien Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands" ("For a Functioning European Union Close to the Citizen - Positions of the German Free Democratic Party regarding European Policy"), resolution by the FDP's Federal Board of September 25, 1995, p. 1.

[24] FDP, "Liberale Aussenpolitik für das vereinte Deutschland" ("Liberal Foreign Policy for a United Germany"), resolution by the Federal Central Committee, brochure, May 25, 1991, p. 5.

[25] FDP, "Für eine bürgernahe und handlungsfaehige Europaeische Union - Europapolitische Positionen der Freien Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands", p. 2-3.

[26] FDP, "Leitsaetze der F.D.P. zur Europawahl 1994" ("Guidelines of the FDP for the 1994 European Elections"), resolution by the FDP's fourth Federal Representatives's Assembly on January 22, 1994, p. 11.

[27] See Georgios Chatzimarkakis, "Aus für Kerneuropa!" ("The End for Core-Europe"), statement by the member of the FDP's Federal Committee, in *fdk - freie demokratische korrespondenz*, no. 110, June 16, 1995; and Helmut Haussmann and Ulrich Irmer, "Abkehr von Kerneuropa" ("Renunciation of Core-Europe"), statement by the FDP's spokesman for European policy and its foreign-policy speaker, in *F.D.P. Bundestagsfraktion-Tagesdienst*, no. 415, June 13, 1995.

[28] Helmut Haussmann, "Für eine progressive Integration Europas - Europapolitische Positionen der F.D.P.-Bundestagsfraktion" ("In Favor of Progressive European Integration - Positions of the FDP's Parliamentary Group on on European Policy") in *F.D.P. Bundestagsfraktion - Dokumentation*, March 24, 1995.

through flexible time-frames. The application of this type of integration modus is being applied in European Economic and Monetary Union.

With regard to security issues, a certain change in the FDP's position after unification, and especially after the new Foreign Minister took office in 1992, can be observed. As has been outlined earlier, Genscher's "policy of responsibility" of the 1980s was a distinct rejection of traditional *realpolitik*, while emphasizing human progress with multilateral means - particularly human rights - over power politics. Genscher insisted that Germany's foreign and defense policy was to be linked tightly to the values of democracy and liberty.[29] In this, the Liberals took a medium stand between the Conservatives' inclination towards *realpolitik* and the social-democrats' call for a fundamental change of the international system in order to civilize conflicts.

When the FDP proclaimed, in the spring of 1991, that "Liberals do not want more power for Germany, but more responsibility"[30], they were implying that Germany should play a greater role in international politics. Although Genscher's successor Klaus Kinkel has continued the "policy of responsibility" by calling for a "global domestic policy", the experience of the Gulf War has convinced him and other Liberals that a dilemma exists between this approach and new security challenges. Therefore, Kinkel has adopted the view that the *Bundeswehr* should be put into a position as "to be able to participate in an unlimited way in missions of international crisis management"[31], thus approaching the position of the CDU/CSU. At the same

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[29] Hans-Dietrich Genscher as referred to in Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 83.
[30] FDP, "Liberale Aussenpolitik für das vereinte Deutschland", p. 3.
[31] Klaus Kinkel, article by the German Foreign Minister on the European security architecture for *Die Welt* of November 11, 1994, press communiqué by the Foreign Office, no. 1128/94, November 29, 1994, pp. 3-4.

time, Kinkel assured that the *Bundeswehr* would be sent abroad only occasionally, and that the "culture of caution" would be continued. Nevertheless, it appears there has been a gradual shift in emphasis from "responsibility" to "a partnership for stability".[32]

Kinkel has also stressed, in contrast to Conservatives, that a concept of "enlarged security" is needed, consistently linking political, economic and military elements.[33] In doing so, the FDP clearly goes beyond its former approach of relying basically on economic power and rejecting military power implicitly by regarding it as outdated for the conduct of modern international relations. This shift towards power politics is, however, weakened by the fact that the FDP has repeatedly put the political in the foreground, and has stressed that "it is better to prevent fire than to extinguish it, (that is to say) conflicts must be prevented."[34] Yet, another indication of the FDP's rapprochement to Conservative positions is found in the introduction of the word "interest" into their political vocabulary. Whereas, similar to the CDU, this term was non-existent during Genscher's time in office, the party's new line is: "German foreign policy is a policy for peace. At the same time, however, our foreign policy, like that of any other country, must be, and has the right to be, a policy of interest."[35]

With respect to the role of the European Union in the European integration process, the FDP, in unison with the Conservatives, has considered it "a core element and

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[32] FDP, "Liberale Aussenpolitik für das vereinte Deutschland", p. 11.
[33] See ibid., p. 1; and FDP, *Das Programm der F.D.P. zur Bundestagswahl 1994: 'Liberal denken. Leistung waehlen'*, resolution by the FDP's 45th ordinary federal Party Congress on June 3-5, 1994, p. 118.
[34] Klaus Kinkel in his speech before the 49th General Assembly of the United Nations on September 27, 1994, in *Bulletion des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, no. 89, September 30, 1994, p. 827.
[35] FDP, *Das Programm der F.D.P. zur Bundestagswahl 1994: 'Liberal denken. Leistung waehlen'*, p. 117.

nucleus for a pan-European process."[36] In order to create a European defense policy, the development of the WEU into NATO's European pillar should be completed until the end of 1998. NATO is considered to remain the most important guarantor for European security and stability in the future. The development of a European defense arm, i.e. the WEU, does not represent a contradiction to this, but is seen as a complementation to NATO's function.[37] To overcome the inability of the European Union to act in times of crisis and help building a European security identity, Kinkel has proposed to build up European peace-keeping forces - "green helmets"[38] - similar to the United Nations' blue helmets. The OSCE is attributed, in contrast to the CDU, a "central function" in the development of a European peace order. It is envisaged as the principle forum for cooperation and dialogue, and intended to develop "functional relationships" with other European institutions.[39]

Summing up, our analysis shows that the FDP has undergone a certain change in the way it perceives of international challenges after unification. While being aware that global problems can only be solved together with other nation-states, the FDP's approach to problem-solving has become more pragmatic, or "realistic". This change has basically been influenced by the experience of the Gulf War and the inability of the European Union to intervene effectively in the Yugoslav Crisis. As a consequence, Foreign Minister Kinkel has repeatedly called for "a realistic, effective

[36] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Europa im Übergang: Auf dem Weg zu einer gesamteuropaeischen Friedensordnung" ("Europe in Transition: On the Road to a Pan-European Peace Order"), speech at the 68th Eurochambres-Congress on October 19, 1990, press communiqué by the Foreign Office, no. 1214/90, 1990, p. 6.
[37] See FDP, "Für eine bürgernahe und handlungsfaehige Europaeische Union - Europapolitische Positionen der Freien Demokratischen Partei Deutschlands", 1995, p. 7.
[38] Klaus Kinkel as quoted in Martin Winter, "KSZE soll mehr Macht erhalten" ("CSCE Shall Receive More Power") in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, January 31, 1992.
[39] Ibid.

multilateralism".[40] With its emphasis on political means, crisis prevention and a global domestic policy, however, the FDP continues to take a middle position between CDU/CSU and SPD, although, after Genscher's resignation in 1992, a certain rapprochement towards Conservative positions has been observed.

6.1.3. SPD

The Social Democratic Party has predominantly been occupied with the establishment and preservation of peace, both in its domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, peace is to be attained through economic equality, in international relations through the building of common institutions and the negation of military force. Regarding weapons of mass destruction, ecological problems and technological progress, Willy Brandt saw "co-existence (...) (not as) one of several accepted options, but (as) the course for survival."[41] Similarly, the SPD has emphasized in its election manifesto of 1990 that "we live in one world."[42]

For the SPD, nation-states have become dysfunctional since they cannot cope anymore on their own with economic and political problems. Because of this, the Social Democrats have called for the establishment of "the United States of Europe" in all of their statements regarding the European Union. In the case of Germany, due to its historic record, the SPD has always regarded it as Germany's special

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[40] Klaus Kinkel, speech by the Foreign Minister before the Koblenz Army Command and the *Bundeswehr's* Center for Inner Leadership on October 6, 1994, press communiqué by the Foreign Office, no. 1115/94, 1994, p. 9.
[41] Willy Brandt, *Erinnerungen* ("Memories"), Frankfurt a. M. 1989, p. 432.
[42] SPD, "Der neue Weg: Regierungsprogramm 1990-94" ("The New Road: Government Programm for 1990-94"), resolution by the SPD Party Congress of September 28, 1990, brochure, p. 23.

responsibility "to reject the legacy of militarism and national *realpolitik*."[43] When the bi-polar world discontinued to exist in 1989, the Social Democrats were completely caught off guard by these changes, and have been slow to adjust and develop new strategies regarding new realities. Consequently, old concepts - like that of "common security" - linger on without having been mòdified in such a way that takes into account altered realities, particularly the changes in Eastern Europe. Europe, for the Social Democrats, remains "intention without conception", as Spanger has criticized.[44]

The goal of establishing a "United States of Europe" has, however, been somehow weakened by the SPD's choice in favor of a "union of European peoples" in a resolution of its 1994 Party Congress. Yet, one year later, the Social Democratic Party declared itself in favor of European political union.[45] Weilemann has even found that the supporters of the SPD are more "Europe-friendly" in some areas - noteably when referring to political union - than supporters of "Adenauer's party", that is to say the CDU.[46] It is evident that the SPD has put more emphasis on political union than on economic and monetary union, because political union is mentioned first and elaborated on much further.[47] The SPD has particularly demanded to apply the principle of subsidiarity in order to take into account regional and cultural diversities within the community. Furthermore, decisions by the Council of Ministers shoud be taken unanimously, the Commission's president should be elected by the European

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[43] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 112.

[44] See Hans-Joachim Spanger, "Europa als Wille ohne Vorstellung" ("Europe as Intention without Conception") in *HSFK-Standpunkte*, publications by the Peace Research Institute in Frankfurt, no. 11, November 12, 1995, pp. 1-24.

[45] See SPD, "Wir brauchen Europa" ("We Need Europe"), resolution by the SPD Party Congress, November 14-17, 1995, brochure, p. 6.

[46] See Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht", p. 27.

[47] See SPD, "Wir brauchen Europa", 1995, p. 6.

Parliament and be appointed by the European Council, and a European domestic policy should be established.[48] The SPD has also put emphasis on the enforcement of European citizens' social rights. It has further demanded a "European environmental union", and more effective consumer protection to be enshrined in Article 2 of the EC-Treaty.[49]

With respect to economic and monetary union, the SPD has confirmed its commitment. Monetary union is said "to offer a chance of organization under the new conditions of globalization"[50], and is expected to serve the welfare of all European states by producing more growth and employment. Monetary union is conceived of as a "union of stability", in which "the compliance with criteria of stability has priority over rigid time-tables", thus enabling "as many countries as possible to participate."[51] This has been criticism directed at the CDU/FDP Government that favored going ahead with economic and monetary union as scheduled, with as many countries as will be ready at the time. The SPD has, thus, tried to be in line with German public fears over losing control and giving up the symbol of German national identity and pride, namely the D-mark.

Concerning European security, the SPD has tried to revive one of the main factors of its successful *Ostpolitik*, that is to say the OSCE as the embodiment of European common security. Since the Social Democrats do not envisage a military function for

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[48] See ibid., and SPD, overview of resolutions on European perspectives by the SPD Party Congress on May 28-31, 1991, press communiqué by the SPD of May 29, 1991.
[49] See SPD, "Wir brauchen Europa", p. 7.
[50] SPD, "Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit" ("Work, Innovation, and Equality"), the SPD's election program for the federal election of 1998 (brochure), decided upon by the SPD's extraordinary Party Congress in Leipzig on April 17, 1998, p. 74.
[51] SPD, "Wir brauchen Europa", p. 9.

the European Union, the OSCE is at the center of attention. Despite wide-spread resistance by Social Democrats to NATO during the 1980s, the party's "realist" wing - which has gained still more influence after unification as compared to "idealists" - is firmly committed to Germany's membership in the Alliance.[52] Increasingly, however, the SPD has started to realize that if the European Union is to develop into a true political union with a common foreign and security policy, which the SPD approves of[53], it will need to approve of the WEU as well. Yet, the SPD's pan-European outlook is manifested in its call for the creation of "a European space of collective security"[54]. In 1994, the party has decided to opt for a gradual "interweaving of the existing European security systems and organizations"[55], that is to say NATO, NATO's Cooperation Council, WEU and OSCE. Yet, a concrete outline of such "interweaving" has not been undertaken up to date.

Important in this is for the SPD that the OSCE is the only pan-European institution, whereas all other organizations are geographically limited. The OSCE is to become the regional branch of the UN, with its own OSCE "blue helmets". The basic difference to the CDU/CSU and FDP is, however, that the SPD has insisted to limit both UN and OSCE military actions to "peace-keeping", instead of "peace-enforcing" missions. In general, the SPD has blamed the Government to distract from searching

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[52] See for instance Hans-Ulrich Klose, "Kontinuitaet und Wandel: Perspektiven einer neuen deutschen Aussenpolitik" ("Continuity and Change: Perspectives of a New German Foreign Policy") in *Evangelische Kommentare*, June 6, 1994, p. 329; Rudolf Scharping, speech by the SPD-chairman on common Transatlantic security at the Munich Conference on security policy on February 5, 1995, in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 4, 1995, pp. 96-103; and SPD, "Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit", p. 77.

[53] See SPD, "SPD Sofortprogramm" ("The SPD's Urgent Programm"), resolution by the SPD's extraordinary Party Congress on November 16-17, 1992, brochure, p. 14.

[54] See SPD, Government Program for the 1994 Federal Election, Bonn 1994.

[55] Quoted in Hans-Joachim Spanger, "Europa als Wille ohne Vorstellung", p. 3.

for conflict-preventive measures, that are at the heart of Social-democratic management of international relations, by calling for armed missions.[56]

Since 1995, a gradual shift in the SPD's security concept has been observed. Being confronted with post-cold war realities, and looking for a way to adapt to them, the SPD has apppeared to distance itself gradually from an idealistic outlook by stressing that international politics, and implicitly German foreign policy, have to be subordinated to two principles, namely "realism and responsibility"[57]: "Realism, when evaluating our possibilities in shaping Europe and the world. Responsibility, when setting priorities: Our goal is the prevention of wars and the strengthening of peace through cooperation and integration."[58]

This shift towards "realism" within the SPD became practical reality in the historic decision of the *Bundestag* on June 30, 1995, to sent German soldiers to the former Yugoslavia; the resolution was passed with votes of the SPD and even with parts of the Greens. The SPD has made it clear, however, that it will only tolerate "out-of-area" missions with German participation under the auspices of the United Nations, with the Security Council's approval - and not missions like that during the Gulf War - or under the auspices of the OSCE.[59] In so far, the SPD may act as a "brake" on the

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[56] See for instance Günter Verheugen, "Stabilisierung und Friedenssicherung im Osten Europas: Herausforderung für die deutsche Aussenpolitik" ("Stabilization and the Securing of Peace in Eastern Europe: Challenge for German Foreign Policy"), speech by the SPD's top foreign-policy expert at a meeting of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, press communiqué by the SPD, no. 691/94, September 7, 1994, p.5.

[57] Johannes Rau and Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, "10 Punkte zur Neuorientierung deutscher Aussenpolitik" ("Ten Points for a New Orientation in German Foreign Policy"), press communiqué by the SPD, no. 333/92, May 14, 1992, p. 1.

[58] SPD, "SPD Sofortprogramm", p. 13.

[59] SPD, "Arbeit, Innovation und Gerechtigkeit", p. 77.

realpolitical ambitions of the CDU/CSU, because the Constitutional Court has ruled that "out-of-area" missions are only permissible if parliament consents.

Another indication of the Social Democrats' orientation towards "realism" has been the use and definition of the word "interest", formerly an outlawed word. With respect to Eastern Europe, the SPD's foreign-policy spokesman Günter Verheugen has remarked:[60]

> (...) We need to undertake a clear definition of our interests, and have to say openly what we consider as our 'essentials' regarding our relationship with the East. Naturally, we Germans have to be very careful in using the term 'national interests'. Something that is normal in other democratic nations, has to be regarded in Germany always in the light of recent history. It would be foolish, however, to deny that Germany did not have its own interest with respect to Eastern Europe. It is especially the lack of defining those interests that arouses our neighbors' suspicion.

What is needed in Verheugen's view is "a definition of our interests that is free of arrogance and megalomania, realistically weighing our capabilities and constraints."[61]

In the election year 1998, despite all rhetoric of differentiating Social-democratic policy from Conservative positions, the SPD's chancellor candidate Schröder has assured voters over and over again that "a new government would not change the fundamentals of foreign policy. Neither our healthy German-American relations, nor our *Europapolitik* will change."[62] Considering a possible government coalition with the Greens, Verheugen has assured that the Greens' negative attitude towards NATO

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[60] Günter Verheugen, "Stabilisierung und Friedenssicherung im Osten Europas: Herausforderung für die deutsche Aussenpolitik", p. 3.
[61] Ibid.
[62] "The Man Who Would Be Kohl", interview with the SPD's candidate for chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, in *Newsweek International*, July 27, 1998, p. 24.

and the Alliance's Eastern enlargement, or negativism regarding European defense would not be tolerated by a SPD-led government.[63]

With regard to another, equally, outlawed term - "patriotism" - Schröder, as a representative of the post-war generation, again approaches Conservative positions: "I think Germans have a right to use terms like nation and fatherland without complexes. Patriotism is something you do for your country and not against others, respecting other countries, cultures and peoples. The Germans have earned the right to this kind of patriotism."[64] Despite the fact that such statements are clearly a manifestation of election rhetoric, aimed at not frightening and winning over moderate Conservative and Liberal voters, they seem to be an indication of the party's orientation towards "realism" and pragmatic politics. Schröder, a former radical leftist turned moderate, appears as the personification of the change the SPD has gone through. Another contributing factor is surely that, after 16 years in the opposition, Social Democrats have gotten somehow "out of touch" with pragmatic, day-to-day political decision-making. If they are to win the elections and form, subsequently, a capable government, they need to revise that.

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[63] "SPD gegen neue Aussenpolitik: Verheugen erteilt Grünen-Position zur NATO eine Absage" ("SPD against New Foreign Policy: Verheugen Says No to Green Position on NATO") in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 26, 1998, p. 6.
[64] "The Man Who Would Be Kohl" in *Newsweek International*, July 27, 1998. p. 25.

6.1.4. Die Grünen / Bündnis 90

In the first all-German election of December 1990, the Greens[65] were not able to enter the *Bundestag*. This was mainly due to the Greens' opposition to German unification. The Treaty on Economic and Monetary Union between the old Federal Republic of Germany and the German and East Germany was opposed because of "grave constitutional, political and economic considerations, and because of the deep social effects owing to the irresponsible time-table for monetary union."[66] Concerning national unification, the Greens feared that a, greater Germany would inevitably become a hegemonial power.[67] Consequently, the Greens did not manage to take the 5% hurdle in the 1990 election. Only its eastern alliance partner *Bündnis 90* entered the *Bundestag* because it was able, similar to the PDS, to attain three direct mandates. Since 1994, however, *Die Grünen / Bündnis 90* achieved a combined 7,3% of the national vote and have, thus, became again the a parliamentary opposition party.

With respect to the Greens' program after unification, their two main pillars or goals have remained to subordinate the economy to ecological considerations and to achieve positive peace. These goals are also reflected in their European policy. The Greens, while affirming European political integration, continue to regard Europe to be "more than the EC".[68] In line with this, Gerd Poppe declared that concentrating on

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[65] After unification, *Die Grünen* have formed an alliance with their eastern counterpart *Bündnis 90*. In the following, both alliance partners will be treated as one party and will be referred to as "the Greens".

[66] Die Grünen, "Erklaerung zum Staatsvertrag und zur Deutschlandpolitik" ("Declaration on the State Treaty and on *Deutschlandpolitik*") in *Basisdienst*, regular circular letter by the Greens' federal office, no. 6, June 1990, p. 26.

[67] See also Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 156.

[68] Die Grünen, "Europa braucht Grün" ("Europe Needs Green"), Green platform for the European Parliament elections of 1989, brochure, p. 3, and Die Grünen, "Lieber Europa erweitern als

deepening, as has happened during the Maastricht Conference, is wrong, but widening should instead be the first priority.[69] In 1994, however, this position has been somewhat modified, and the Greens now favor "a strategy of gradual step-by-step integration for the Central and Eastern European reforming states."[70] Taking into account challenges that the European Union would face when integrating economies and societies in transition, the Greens have admitted that a differentiated strategy is needed, because not all countries are ready to join at the same time and, "without gradation, the European Union would be overstrained."[71] This opinion probably also reflects the ongoing difficulties that were encountered during German unification.

Concerning the structure of the European Union, the Greens do not want "a fully built European federal state"[72] for fear that the European Union could become another hegemonial power. According to the Greens, a report by the European Parliament, entitled "Western European Security", has demanded that Europe, as a "world power in the making", has to obtain "all attributes of a superpower, including an independent defense system"[73], while remaining loyal to the Atlantic Alliance. Therefore, the Greens are opposed to the WEU and the enlargement of its functions, because it would not serve pan-European security, but rather the building of a West European superpower.[74]

Demokratie beschraenken" ("It Is Preferrable to Enlarge Europe than to Restrict Democracy"). program for the 1994 European Parliament election, brochure, p. 5.
[69] Gerd Poppe, "Der Traum von Europa" ("The European Dream"), speech on November 1, 1991, in *Ein Jahr Bündnis 90/Die Grünen im Bundestag*, Bonn, February 1992, p. 54.
[70] Die Grünen, "Lieber Europa erweitern als Demokratie beschraenken", p. 11.
[71] Ibid.
[72] Ibid., p. 8.
[73] Quoted in: Die Grünen, "Europa braucht Grün", p. 5.
[74] Die Grünen, "Lieber Europa erweitern als Demokratie beschraenken", p. 11.

Germany's foreign policy is also criticized for trying to attain superpower status disguised as West European defense. German ambitions and Western European military integration are not thought to be mutually exclusive. In reality, the Greens maintain, the European Union and WEU-integration only serve as "a stepping-stone for national ambitions in Western European guise."[75] Instead, the Greens strongly favor building a pan-European security system through strengthening the OSCE[76], that should become a "sub-institution" of the UN.[77] A "one-sided West European 'security policy", they fear, will only divide the European continent again.[78] For that reason, German-Franco military cooperation is opposed[79], and the dissolution of NATO remains a fundamental demand of the Greens.[80] Equally, the dissolution of the *Bundeswehr* continues to be a cornerstone of Green policy, in order to "de-militarize politics".[81]

As has been mentioned earlier, foreign-policy concepts of the Greens were rather vague in their outline and formulation during the 1980s. Apart from difficulties in formulating new concepts, as befits a new party that strives for seriousness, this has been due to the fact that the Greens were basically preoccupied with domestic

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[75] Ibid.
[76] For a more detailed ellaboration of the envisaged OSCE institutions, see: Die Grünen, "Lieber Europa erweitern als Demokratie beschraenken", p. 47.
[77] Achim Schmillen, "Der deutsch-französische Vorschlag und die Westeuropaeische Union" ("The German-French Proposal and the West European Union"), manuscript, Bonn, October 27, 1991, p. 2.
[78] Ibid., p. 46. For the Greens' rejection of attempts of West-Europeanizing security, see also Volker Böge, "Die Zukunft der NATO in einem 'Geflecht ineinandergreifender Institutionen" ("NATO's Future in a 'Network of Interlocking Institutions") in *Aerzte gegen den Atomkrieg*, January 1992, p. 40, and Berthold Meyer and Roberto Zadra, *Die Grünen und List Verdi - Sicherheitspolitische Alternativen für Europa?* ("The Greens and *List Verdi* - Alternatives for a European Security Policy?"), Münster/Hamburg, 1992, p. 67.
[79] See for instance Achim Schmillen, "Der deutsch-französische Vorschlag und die Westeuropaeische Union", p. 1.
[80] See for instance "SPD gegen neue Aussenpolitik: Verheugen erteilt Grünen-Position zur NATO eine Absage", p. 6.
[81] Die Grünen, "Lieber Europa erweitern als Demokratie beschraenken", p. 47.

policies. The changes brought about by the 1989 peaceful revolution, have, however, challenged the Greens to bring forward more concrete programs. Yet, in most aspects, Green innovative ideas have remained rather superficial. After unification, the party has tried to deal with foreign policy issues in a more concrete way. Inra-party discussions in this area have increased, which is due to the fact that the *Realos* have gained in influence.

This is exemplified by the most spectacular shift that some Green politicians have made on the issue of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Most notably, the party's most prominent figure, Joschka Fischer, has demanded military protection for the UN's defensive forces in Bosnia. He has brought about the discussion of the conflict between the two basic principles of Green policy: "Defense of life and freedom on the one hand - a civilian order of non-violence on the other."[82] The mere fact that such a discussion is taking place in the ranks of the Greens, can be taken as a sign that Green politics, similar to that of Social-democratic politics, have taken a turn towards more pragmatism, despite being - rhetorically - completely opposed to *realpolitik*.

Equally, the former rhetoric of opposing the European Union as such, and merely using it as a platform for change, has been changed recently. Despite the fact that the Greens abstained from the ratification vote on the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty in the Bundestag, they have repeatedly stressed that their critique on that treaty "does in no way question Germany's participation in the European integration process."[83] The

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[82] "Das waere blutiger Zynismus" ("That Would Be Bloody Cynicism"), interview with Joschka Fischer, in *Der Spiegel*, no. 34, August 21, 1995, p. 29.

[83] See for instance the Green European Union experts Christian Sterzing and Albert Statz, "Der Vertrag von Amsterdam: Ein Memorandum zur Einschaetzung seiner Ergebnisse" ("The Amsterdam Treaty: A Memorandum on the Evaluation of Its Results"), manuscript, Bonn 1998, p. 4.

Laender-governments, in which the Greens participated, have voted for the Amsterdam Treaty in the *Bundesrat* - the German upper house of parliament in which all *Laender*-governments are represented - despite the critique of the Green parliamentary group. They consented because their coalition-partner SPD voted for the treaty, and the voting modus in the *Bundesrat* does not provide for abstention of vote. Regardless of their critique - which consists primarily of the position that democratic reform in the European Union was not promoted sufficiently - they Greens emphasize that they are in favor of introducing the Euro, and that they will work towards a constructive reform policy and deepening of integration.[84]

In view of a predicted coalition between the SPD and the Greens after the September 1998 election, the Greens are expected to distance themselves further from "idealistic" positions. If they will get the chance to participate for the first time in a government at the national level, they will need to adapt more to the SPD's positions. Concerning a likely clash of these two coalition partners over fundamental issues, such as Germany's membership in NATO, of Germany's commitment to European integration - especially economic and monetary union for which the Greens had developed alternative ways - as well as ecological aspects of economic activities, the SPD is predicted not to give way to Green positions in general, but rather in questions of detail. Much would depend upon the distribution of seats in the German *Bundestag*, that is to say how large a majority of SPD and Greens would be. Equally important would be the future intra-party devlopment of the Greens, that is to say the relative influence *Realos* will be able to gain over *Fundis*, and on whether party-discipline, which has been very unruly in the past, could be tightened.

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[84] See ibid., pp. 2-4.

6.1.5. PDS / Linke Liste

The PDS perceives of itself as a modernized Communist party[85], preserving a great amount of traditional Communist ideas and concepts while, at the same time, advocating the "New Thinking" as well.[86] Among the German public, the party's image has been tarnished by allegations over collaboration of various members with the former East German state security apparatus (*Stasi*). Former dissident groups have, thus, repeatedly called the PDS the "party of the guilty"[87].

Concerning foreign policy, the PDS has vehemently rejected German aspirations to become a greater political power. Such aspirations are evaluated as a symptom of capitalist expansionism. Yet, its former chairman, Gregor Gysi, has demonstrated his sense of "realism" and the concept of "power" when he remarked: "Nothing could be more dangerous (...). Those who have the money, have the power."[88] Furthermore, the PDS has been the only party in the *Bundestag* favoring German neutrality, since NATO is regarded as the prime instrument of world domination.[89] Thinking in terms of national sovereignty, the PDS does not want to create a "United States of Europe" either. European states are merely envisaged to "work closely together".[90] Consequently, widening is to be given priority over deepening. There are even party-

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[85] See Patrick Moreau, "Die PDS: eine postkommunistische Partei" ("The PDS: A Post-Communist Party") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, January 24, 1992, p. 37.
[86] See Axel Vornbacumen, "Das Laufen vorgetaeuscht, aber nur auf der Stelle getreten: Die PDS ist unaufhaltsam auf dem Weg zur Splittergruppe" ("Pretending to Be Running, But Actually Only Marking Time: The PDS Is Unstoppably on the Way to Becoming a Splinter Group") in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, December 16, 1991.
[87] See *Neues Forum* as quoted in: Patrick Moreau, "Die PDS: eine postkommunistische Partei" ("The PDS: A Post-Communist Party") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, January 24, 1992, p. 42.
[88] Gregor Gysi in a speech before the German *Bundestag* on January 17, 1991, manuscript, p. 2.
[89] See PDS/LL (Linke Liste), "NATO und WEU vor dem Hintergrund der Ambitionen deutscher Militaerpolitik" ("NATO and WEU before the Background of German Ambitions concerning Military Policy"), brochure, Bonn, February 1992, pp. 2-4.
[90] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 165.

members who reject the European idea as a whole, because they think this would dissociate Europe from the Third World.[91] Due to the fact that the PDS opposes building a new military superpower[92] in the shape of the European Union, they completely reject the militarization of the WEU.[93]

Major emphasis, however, is put on the OSCE which is to provide the main structure in a "common European house".[94] With regard to out-of-area missions of the *Bundeswehr*, the PDS has sharply criticized the SPD for lending its support to the Government, thus opening up new ways for German imperialism.[95] Since the PDS does not reject military power per se, but only as a "function of capitalism"[96], it cannot be called "idealistic" in its approach. It rather interprets and recognizes existing realities and, thus, opposes "imperialistic states", especially the United States, that are said to exploit and dominate weaker countries - mostly in the Third World - by military means.

The PDS has been widely predicted to give support to a possible red/green coalition after the 1998 election, without entering into a formal coalition. Especially Helmut Kohl has frequently evoked the "Communist threat" during his 1998 election

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[91] See Knut Mellenthien, "Der Umbruch in Osteuropa: Thesen zur europapolitischen Diskussion in der PDS" ("Upheavals in Eastern Europe: Theses on Discussion concerning European Policy in the PDS"), discussion paper published by the office of PDS-parliamentarian Andrea Lederer, Bonn, June 10, 1991, p. 7.

[92] See PDS/LL (Linke Liste), "NATO und WEU vor dem Hintergrund der Ambitionen deutscher Militaerpolitik", p. 5.

[93] PDS/LL, "Europa - Wandel und Neugestaltung: Europapolitische Vorstellungen der Abgeordnetengruppe der PDS/LL im Deutschen Bundestag" ("Europe - Change and New Formation: European Policy Concepts of the PDS/LL Faction in the German *Bundestag*") in *Pressedienst*, June 28, 1991, p. 17.

[94] PDS, "Position der PDS zur Europapolitik und zum Pariser KSZE-Treffen" ("Positions of the PDS on European Policy and the CSCE Conference in Paris"), brochure, November 16, 1990, p. 9.

[95] PDS, "Friedenspolitische Positionen" ("Positions on Peace Policy"), resolution by the second PDS Party Congress, in *Pressedienst*, July 12, 1991, p. 10.

[96] See Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, p. 163.

campaign. If a new government, led by the Social Democrats, had to rely upon the support of the PDS in foreign policy matters, in addition to diverging Green positions, that government is predicted to encounter serious difficulties and might, possibly, not last very long. This is particularly so because the PDS, unlike the Greens, is not seen to show much potential for change or compromise on fundamental foreign-policy positions.

6.2. Public Attitudes towards the European Union

6.2.1. Does the "Burden" of History Continue?

The short answer to the question of whether the "burden" of history continues for united Germany is "yes", but in modified form. The fact that the Germans cannot and, to their credit, do not want to, forget about their Nazi-past has been outlined in the discussion of the way the unification process was handled. The overriding concern, as we have seen, was to assure Germany's neighbors and partners that the country would stick to its international obligations and continue its policy of multilateralism. Especially Germany's continued membership in NATO and the EC were to ensure that the newly united state would remain embedded in a multilateral context, designed to prevent any German go-it-alone.

Regarding the Germans' own preoccupation with their history, a discussion about the question whether Germany should move slowly beyond the restrictions imposed upon

it by its historic legacy, and start acting in ways similar to that of its neighbors, or not, had been started in the mid-1980s. The so-called "historians debate" (*Historikerstreit*) of 1985-88 among leading German historians concentrated on the issue of whether the enormity of Stalin's crimes somehow diminishes the uniqueness of and the relative magnitude of atrocities committed by Hitler-Germany. Whereas for many, the mere opening of such a debate equaled the escape from collective responsibility for Nazi-crimes, others argued that it was time to move on and put those crimes into a historic perspective.

After unification, this debate was, in a way, continued in the form of calls for a "normalization" of German foreign policy by, mostly, Conservative circles. What was needed in the first place, it seems, was a justification for employing German military personnel outside of NATO-territory; for leftists that meant upon an UN-mandate, for some Conservatives even without UN-approval, like operation "Desert Storm". Politicians in favor of "normalization" have been those shaping German foreign policy so far[97] and, again, German public opinion has followed their lead. Formerly, until the late 1980s, a majority of West Germans had believed that their history inhibited them to participate even in UN-authorized missions abroad. In 1993, however, various polls have revealed that 62% of the Germans believed that the Federal Republic should assume a more active international role, 51% that Germany should accept "more international responsibility", 53% that Germany should participate in peace-keeping operations, 50% that Germany should participate "exactly as England, France or the

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[97] This means, in the first place, Foreign Minister Kinkel and Chancellor Kohl. However, in the ranks of the SPD, former candidate for the Chancellorship in the 1994 election, Rudolf Scharping, has also greatly contributed in leading his party away from traditional leftist foreign-policy positions.

Americans" do, and 77% that Germany is the country best equipped to lead a European foreign policy.[98]

Yet, as Asmus has stated with regret, Germans are only "theoretically" in favor of UN-sponsored peace-keeping missions.[99] When it comes to concrete cases, such as the discussion of German participation in military operations like that in the Persian Gulf, only 20% supported that idea.[100] These seemingly opposite views are, as Tönnies has pointed out, an indication of "fluid public opinion".[101] It appears, accordingly, that public opinion in Germany has not yet come to a final conclusion. It is also because of this open-ended discussion that publications like Goldhagen's book *Hitler's Willing Executioners* in 1996, can still spark a new, heated debate on German guilt in the Holocaust, similar to the "historians debate" of the 1980s. History continues to place special limits on Germany's role in the world. Many Germans still think the way Peter Glotz has put it: "Germans have done enough shooting in this century."[102]

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[98] See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation*, Santa Monica (CA), February 1993; *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 11, 1993; Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung, ed., *Einstellungen zu Aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik 1993 in Deutschland* ("Attitudes on Current Issues of Domestic Policy in 1993 in Germany"), Mannheim 1993.

[99] See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation: Public Opinion and Security Policy in 1994*, Santa Monica (CA), January 1995, p. XII.

[100] See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation*, Santa Monica (CA), February 1993, p. 3.

[101] As quoted in Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Öffentliche Meinung und Aussenpolitik" ("Public Opinion and Foreign Policy") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 8, 1995, p. 6.

[102] Peter Glotz, "Der Mannbarkeits-Test" ("The Maturity Test") in *Der Spiegel*, March 8, 1993.

6.2.2. Support for the Political Far-Right

In the face of Germany's fascist past, right-wing extremism is very sensitively observed and condemned within Germany and abroad. Whereas extremist parties on the right had drawn only marginal national support since 1945, this started to change in the early/mid-1980s. The *Republikaner* Party was founded in 1983. The reason for their formation was discontent in Conservative circles about an "ideological/moral change" after the political about-turn (*Die Wende*) of 1982.[103] Its founder, Franz Schönhuber, had in fact been a long-standing member of the CSU.

The German public woke up to the existence of rightist parties in 1989, when the *Republikaner* managed to overcome the 5% threshhold twice: In the Berlin state-election they wan 11 seats, and in the European Parliament election six seats. They even increased their success and wan 10.9% in 1992 in the Baden-Württemberg state-election. Most recently, the German People's Party, DVU (*Deutsche Volksunion*), under Gerhard Frey, has won 12.9% in the eastern state of Sachsen-Anhalt in May 1998. Although the far-right has so far not managed to win any seats in nation-wide elections, and is not expected to do so in the 1998 election, Stöss foresees the German political landscape evolving into a "five-party system"[104]. The world outside Germany

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[103] See Claus Leggewie, *Ein Phantom nimmt Gestalt an* ("A Phantom Is Materializing"), Berlin 1990; Hans-Gerd Jaschke, *Die "Republikaner": Profile einer Rechtsaussen-Partei* ("The 'Republikaner': Profiles of a Rightist Party"), Bonn 1992 (second edition); and Hans-Joachim Veen et al., "Die Republikaner-Partei zu Beginn der 90er Jahre. Programm, Propaganda, Organisation, Waehler- und Sympathisantenstrukturen" ("The 'Republikaner' Party at the Beginning of the 90s: Program, Propaganda, Organization, Structures of Voters and Sympathizers"), internal study no. 14/1991-1992 for the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, St. Augustin 1992.

[104] Richard Stöss, "Rechtsextremismus und Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik" ("Right-Wing Extremism and Elections in the Federal Republic") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 11, March 12, 1993, p. 52. It appears, however, that Stöss has neglected the PDS, which is already represented through direct mandates in the *Bundestag*. Therefore, it is more correct to speak in this context of a "six-party system".

was shocked over right-wing radicalism in that country, after unification, by the

drastically increased occurrence of hideous violent acts against foreigners. In 1992

alone, over fifteen thousand "acts of hatred" were committed in Germany[105], ranging

from fire-bomb attacks against shelters for asylum-seekers, foreign (particularly

Turkish) businesses and private homes, to the desecration of Jewish graveyards. Most

criminal actors were young people.

Regarding the profile of Germans voting for and sympathizing with right-wing

extremist parties, two questions must be asked[106]: "What does the right-wing extremist

vote for?" And: "Who votes for right-wing extremist parties?" The underlying

assumption in posing the first question is, that a certain amount of right-wing

extremists are voting for the established parties. Although studies regarding the right-

wing potential in Germany have been scarce[107], a limited analysis by Stöss for West

Berlin in 1990[108] has shown that about 60% of the far-right potential prefer the CDU,

25% the SPD, and only 6% the *Republikaner*. In so far, the performance of the

Republikaner in national elections is not necessarily an indication of the far-right

potential in Germany.

The assumption, on which the second question is based, is that not all voters voting

for extremist parties are "real" right-wing extremists. The fact that the *Republikaner*

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[105] See *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1993.
[106] Richard Stöss, "Rechtsextremismus und Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik", p. 50.
[107] See for example the SINUS-study of 1981 on right-wing extremism in the Federal Republic, "Wir sollten wieder einen Führer haben..." ("We Should Again Have a 'Führer'..."), Reinbek, 1981, or Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and Erp Ring, "Das Extremismus-Potential unter jungen Leuten in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1984" (The Potential for Extremism among Young People in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1984"), a study for the Allensbacher Insitute for Public Opinion, 1984.
[108] See Richard Stöss, "Rechtsextremismus und Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik", p. 58.

and the NVU have so far only been successful in less important elections, like *Laender* and European Parliament elections, allows the conclusion that we are dealing in these cases with protest voters, dissatisfied with the established parties, and "warning" them thus. However, since empirical data are not sufficiently available, such statements are more based on speculation than fact.

Regarding the motivation for voters to sympathize with, and vote for, the far-right, it is usually stated that economic and social aspects are the most important reasons. The fact that these aspects play an important role, is obviously true if one looks at eastern Germany. There, in some areas, unemployment figures sometimes amount to 25%, roughly doubling the national figure of some 11%. Particularly hard hit is the younger generation who, coming out of school, often do not even find a vacancy for an apprenticeship. This fact is also valid for western Germany.

As Stöss has pointed out[109], given economic and social dissatisfaction, it is also important to which degree democratic methods of integration, consensus formation and representation are working, or not. Keithly has shown in which way the former GDR has formed young people in a military way through its highly controlled system of youth organizations such as the Young Pioneers (*Junge Pioniere*), the Free German Youth (*Freie Deutsche Jugend*, the FDJ), and the Society for Sport and Technology (*Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik*, the GST). At the same time, any kind of political spontaneity by forming independent groups was forbidden. After unification, these organizations were dissolved with little alternatives to fill the gap.

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[109] Ibid., p. 50.

Thus, Keithly concludes, "the organizational skills acquired in real existing socialism, and the personal ruthlessness necessary for success in it, partially explain the rapid ascent of neofascist groups in Germany."[110] Stöss summarizes that the success of organized far-right extremism is partially correlated with crises and upheavals in society and politics.[111] In such a situation, sympathizers of extremist parties are characterized by an extreme right-wing basic orientation, strong political alienation, and the experience of a feeling of socio-economic threat.[112] It is, therefore, that the political establishment faces the task of listening more carefully to these voices of discontent, try to integrate them into politically established life and, possibly, abolish their causes.

6.2.3. Public Opinion and the European Union

Despite the interest of political scientists in the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy, or rather in the question of who influences whom, no theory has so far explained this complicated relationship.[113] Especially in an era when the mass media are exercising a growing influence on public opinion as well as on politicians' decisions, and in a time when a growing number of foreign-policy actors influence the decision-making process, it is very difficult to make predictions on foreign-policy decisions and public attitudes. In the following, we will examine basic trends in

[110] David M. Keithly, "Shadows of Germany's Authoritarian Past" in *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 2, 1994, p. 209.
[111] See Richard Stöss, "Rechtsextremismus und Wahlen in der Bundesrepublik", p. 54.
[112] Ibid., p. 57.
[113] See for instance Hans Rattinger et al., *Aussenpolitik und öffentliche Meinung in der Bundesrepublik. Ein Datenhandbuch zu Umfragen seit 1954* ("Foreign Policy and Public Opinion in the Federal Republic: A Data Manual on Polls since 1954"), Frankfurt a. M. 1995.

German public opinion on the European Union after unification, as can reasonably be deduced from available opinion polls.

While it has been established earlier that the initial keen support for European integration of West Germans had somewhat faded over the years, a continuation of this trend after unification has been observed. In the "acute phase" of German unification, that is to say in the fall of 1989, when such a possibility appeared to become a reality for the first time since the country's division, "the overwhelming majority of West Germans was in favor of incorporating the two unified German states into the European Community."[114] Shortly after unification, 50% of all Germans - and 56% of eastern Germans - believed that "due to unification, European integration does become rather more important."[115] In June 1991, 46% of the Germans wanted to continue on the way to political union, 36% preferred to keep the status quo, and 17% opted for an independent German policy. In the first weeks after the Maastricht Summit, however, this relationship has been reversed with only 36% favoring political union, and 46% preferring the status quo; 16% wanted an independent policy.

When looking for differences between western German public opinion and eastern German public opinion, it has been noted that support for political union was much higher in eastern Germany (53% in June 1991), but the plunge in support has also been more remarkable (a drop of 12% down to 41% in January 1992).[116] The reason

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[114] Peter R. Weilemann, "German Loyalty to the West: Public Opinion on the Eve of Unification", in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 19, June 1990, p. 27.
[115] Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht", figure 3, p. 6.
[116] Peter R. Weilemann, "German Loyalty to the West: Public Opinion on the Eve of Unification", table 1, p. 2.

for this deviation between eastern and western German public opinion may be explained by the fact that eastern Germans associated particularly with the European Community an increase in welfare. By January 1992, disillusionment due to the collapse of the eastern German economy might have affected public opinion there more than in the western part.

Other interesting results were found by a poll of the German decision-making elite in economy, politics and administration. In 1993, the German economic journal *Capital* asked this elite about their opinion concerning German foreign policy: "How do you evaluate German foreign policy: Do we have clear goals that we pursue, or do we not have clear goals and try to please everyone?"[117] While 22% stated that "we do have clear goals", the overwhelming majority (74%) said: "We do not have clear goals." In September 1993 and in March 1995, respectively, this elite was again questioned about their opinion on foreign policy goals and Germany's national interests. Being presented with twelve different goals, they had to decide whether they considered each one as a very important goal, or not.[118] While overriding, constant importance was given to the categories of "good relationship with France" and "good relationship with the United States" (in both years the percentage for each goal was between 95% and 98%), "acceleration of the European unification process" experienced a decline from 62% in 1993 down to 55% in 1995.

At the same time, however, support for the goal of "getting the Maastricht Treaty carried out" climbed from 43% in 1993 to 51% in 1995. This inconsistency might

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[117] See the *Capital* poll carried out by the Allensbacher Institute for Public Opinion. Data can be found in: Allensbacher Archiv, IfD-Umfrage 3241, September 1993.
[118] For data see Allensbacher Archiv, *Capital*-Elite-Panel 3241, September 1993; and Allensbacher Archiv, *Capital*-Elite-Panel, March 1995.

again be explained with the above-mentioned "fluid public opinion" in Germany. With regard to Germany's international military role, support has also been vanishing. The category "taking international responsibility through blue-helmet missions" was considered to be very important by 76% in 1993, but in 1995 this figure was only 67%. Equally, the figure of those in favor of "participation in UN combat-missions" was reduced from 38% in 1993 to 31% in 1995. Another pronounced decline was experienced by the described goal of obtaining a "seat on the UN Security Council". Here, support fell from 65% in 1993 to 49% in 1995.

As we see it, there are several reasons for the decline in German public support for the European Union. In the first place, the Danish referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, which resulted in a "no" in the first round, had a "liberating, taboo-razing effect"[119] in so far as Germany's European policy was not excluded from political discussions any longer, as had frequently happened in the past. The political oppositon contributed to this by trying to incorporate the necessity for a national referendum for occasions such as amendments to the European treaties, or even new ones, into the *Basic Law*. The motion was, however, unsuccessful. Furthermore, with the new turn that the European Union was about to take - political union and economic and monetary union most importantly - individual citizens started to be affected in a way they had not been before. "European policy" now became truly "domestic policy" by conferring direct rights and duties upon EU-citizens. Furthermore, the Maastricht Conference has risen the "constitutional question"[120] of the European Union, as more

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[119] Gerd Langguth, "Will Europe Become More German or Germany More European? - Germany's Role in Europe" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 31, October 1993, p. 8.
[120] Karlheinz Reif, "Wahlen, Wachler und Demokratie in der EG: Die drei Dimensionen des demokratischen Defizits" ("Elections, Voters and Democracy in the EC: The Three Dimensions of the Democratic Deficit") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 19, 1992, pp. 43-52.

citizens have become aware that in Brussels policies are made affecting them directly, but on which they have hardly any influence.

In the second place, citizens were not sufficiently informed about the contents of the Maastricht Treaty and, thus, felt alienated. Furthermore, as Langguth has criticized, Germany does not have "a sufficiently assertive European lobby", with pro-Europeans keeping increasingly quiet.[121] In the third place, the concrete time-table laid out for the substitution of the D-mark for the Euro, has frightened a majority of Germans more than anything else. In December 1991, 52% were against monetary union, only 24% were in favor.[122] And in the last place, German decreased support for European integration is due to financial considerations. Many Germans might were not prepared to play the "paymaster" role in the European Union as they used to, in the face of growing evidence that German unification was more expensive than the public had been led to believe by Chancellor Kohl, and ongoing economic hardships.

Yet, as Rattinger has pointed out[123], public support for the European Union should not be measured with one yardstick, but according to the different areas of integration. In this way, Rattinger has found that economic integration within the European Union is viewed rather positively, and that Germans are also quite supportive of military co-operation. A majority, however, says "no" to political union, that is to say to a common political decision-making structure. Yet, many of these attitudes are found to be strongly polarized by party preference, with supporters of the

[121] Gerd Langguth, "Will Europe Become More German or Germany More European? - Germany's Role in Europe", p. 11.
[122] See Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht", table 9, p. 18.
[123] Hans Rattinger, "Public Attitudes to European Integration in Germany after Maastricht: Inventory and Typology" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 32, no. 4, December 1994, pp. 525-540.

CDU/CSU, FDP and SPD being almost always more supportive of integration. This finding is, however, contradicted by Weilemann's results that suggest that support for political union is by far strongest among supporters of the Greens (56%) as compared to CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP (between 39% and 31%).[124] Rattinger's study has further found that the percentage of pro-integration positions are considerably more frequent than outright opposition.

Yet, the share of full supporters is only half as large as those who view integration rather indifferently. On the direction that this last category will take eventually, towards support or towards opposition, one can of course only speculate. It appears, so much will depend on the economic success of economic and monetary union. As Eichenberg and Dalton have shown, current "economic conditions affect citizen evaluations of the EC", so that they may "place greater weight on the community's growth and employment performance."[125] This is particularly important in light of the high unemployment rate in Germany, specifically among young people. It has been customary to assume that younger people - two thirds of Germans were born and educated after the Second World War - were more pro-European than elder people. Today, this must, however, be questioned as present data suggest.[126] As a poll conducted for *Der Spiegel* has revealed, about one third of young German people identify themselves primarily as Germans. The rest identify with the city or federal

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[124] See Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht", p. 26.
[125] Richard C. Eichenberg and Russell J. Dalton, "Europeans and the European Community: The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration" in *International Organization*, vol. 47, no. 4, fall 1993, p. 530.
[126] See also J.I.H. Janssen, "Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Public Support for Leuropean Integration" in *British Journal of Political Science*, no. 21, 1991, pp. 443-68; and M. Piepenschneider and A. Wolf, "Jugend und Europaeische Integration: Einstellungen und Perspektiven" ("Youth and European Integration: Attitudes and Perspectives") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 45, 1991, pp. 27-36.

state they were born in and are living in now. Again others call themselves "Europeans", or even "world citizens".[127] In short, the experience of public reactions to the Maastricht Treaty has shown that the notion of a "permissive consensus"[128], that had allowed previous governments to proceed with European integration, cannot be taken for granted any longer. The times of "enlightened despotism", as Jacques Delors has put it[129], where European integration was promoted in virtually secret missions and the public gave their approval in retrospect, are over; not only in Germany, but in other member-states as well.

6.3. Conclusions

As our analysis of German political parties after unification has shown, the three oldest parties CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP are continuing their commitment to European integration, while the Greens have discovered the attraction of the European Union only after unification. It has been observed that all four parties have started to view international politics, and here especially European policy, in a different, more pragmatic light. While for all parties external political conditions have changed in the same way, their perception and response to them has varied. In addition, domestic political considerations are thought to have played a role as well. Furthermore, the CDU, FDP and SPD have revealed clear signs of a new-found,

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[127] See the Emnid Poll "Youth '94" in *Der Spiegel*, no. 38, 1994, pp. 65-68.
[128] See Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's Would-Be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community*, Englewood Cliffs (NJ) 1970); and Mark Franklin, "Uncorking the Bottle: Popular Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Maastricht" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 32, no. 4, December 1994, p. 468.
[129] Delors as quoted in Gerd Langguth, "Will Europe Become More German or Germany More European? - Germany's Role in Europe", p. 9.

stronger self-confidence in international politics. All three are speaking nowadays openly of the existence of German "national interests", thus signaling that they are not willing to let history subdue them forever.

The CDU has been found to have increased its already positive commitment to European integration. The main reason for this, as we have seen in our previous chapter, has been the fact that, during the unification process, leading politicians had realized that German unification would only be acceptable to, and be approved by, its partners and neighbors if it were to happen within the framework of the European Community and NATO. This awareness has apparently trickled down from Chancellor Kohl - who has dominated the discussion of European issues within the CDU with his forceful personality and dedicated position regarding the progress of integration - to lower echelons of his party. The result has been that pro-European, federation-oriented strands within the party were strengthened. The CSU, the CDU's Bavarian sister party, continues to be more nationalistic in outlook and, therefore, rather skeptical of European integration. However, this fact as been dismissed as rather irrelevant for Germany's European policy, in which the influence of the CDU and FDP clearly dominates.

The other important reason for the CDU's increased commitment to European integration has been that increasing globalization has made the new Germany dependent on successful international cooperation more than ever, especially if it wants to maintain, or even extend, its economic position in times when it is coping with the difficult task of integrating the eastern and western German economies.

The FDP has been found to have equally increased its commitment to European integration. This was especially the case in the first two years after unification, when the party was still headed by Foreign Minister Genscher, basically for the same reasons as the CDU. His successor, Klaus Kinkel, has been found to have approached Conservative positions on security and defense, particularly concerning the link between economic and military might. Whereas, traditionally, the FDP had subordinated military aspects to economic aspects to the extent that they were almost neglected, Kinkel has changed this. The cause for this has particularly been seen in the Gulf War and in the war in the former Yugoslavia, and the inability of Germany and the European Union to take any significant influence on these events. This awareness has prompted the new FDP-leader to support the development of the WEU into NATO's European pillar at the level of the European Union. With its emphasis on further development and improvement of OSCE structures, however, the FDP has continued its commitment to pan-European security structures, that is nearer to the SPD's security concept. The FDP also continues to emphasize political means and crisis prevention rather than military means.

The SPD has been found to support political union more than economic and monetary union, despite its professed support for the latter. Political union is seen in the first place as a way of democratizing the European Union and giving the European Parliament and EU-citizens a greater say in European developments. However, the SPD has encountered a dilemma there; if it is in favor of a European federation, political union will have to involve in the end a common foreign and defense policy. In this, the perception of new international challenges has become more "realistic", a word that is increasingly found in the vocabulary of the SPD. An

indication of this has been the fact that a majority of SPD-parliamentarians has voted in 1995 for the first time for the proposal of sending German soldiers outside NATO-territory, namely to the former Yugoslavia.

The Greens have equally moved a bit away from idealistic positions. On the one hand, the party has repeatedly professed its commitment to the European integration process, that had formerly been withheld. On the other hand, the party leadership, most notably Joschka Fischer, has initiated a discussion - in connection with the Bosnian War - on the conflict of Green idealistic principles and reality. That means, as Fischer has put it, the conflict of defending life and freedom on the one hand, and maintaining a civilian order of non-violence on the other hand, in the face of atrocities committed in war against defenseless civilians, who are in need of outside protection. The fact that the Greens have, for the first time, a serious effort at considering and discussing pragmatic problems can be seen as an indication that the party is preparing to take over government responsibility after the 1998 national election.

The newly-founded PDS has been found to reject the establishment of a "United States of Europe". European states should only cooperate closely. Similar to the Greens, they especially fear that the European Union could turn into a superpower. Therefore, the militarization of WEU is vehemently opposed. The PDS, that is built upon Communist ideology while trying to incorporate new elements as well, regards any kind of use of military might as imperialism, designed to dominate weaker countries, especially the Third World.

With respect to public attitudes towards European integration, our analysis has shown that Germany's history still continues to place constraints on the country's international scope of action and influences the public mood. We have found that the domestic debate about Germany's international role between proponents of "normalization" - who are usually found on the right political spectrum - and those - usually on the left political spectrum - who believe that Germany can never act like other countries, has not yet come to an end, and is not expected to any time soon. Public opinion has been shown to be inconsistent and fluid on this issue, reflecting the ongoing debate. Political right-wing support has, so far, not been found to be substantial, or rising, despite very disturbing and much-publicized manifestations and criminal acts. Research on the hidden potential of right-wing support has, however, not been very extensive and conclusive.

Regarding public support for the European Union, it can be stated that the trend regarding the disappearance of a "permissive consensus", that had been observed before unification, has continued. This has been linked to the nature of the European Union that is increasingly conferring rights and duties on individuals. This fact has aroused the interest of EU-citizens and has brought about the discussion of the Union's legitimacy. Especially in the wake of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, support for economic and monetary union - and particularly for the introduction of the Euro - had subsided substantially. However, opposition to European integration, in general, has never been a majority. The relative high percentage of "undecided" people in surveys reveals the need for further, detailed information on the European Union.

Summing up, it can be said that the attitude of German political parties and public opinion regarding European unification has changed to a certain extent after unification, although not fundamentally. In order to further explore the political mood and atmosphere in united Germany, we will examine in our next chapter the changes that German foreign-policy making, of which German European policy is a part, has undergone so far.

7. UNITED GERMANY: A NEW FOREIGN POLICY?

As has been shown in Chapter Three, West German foreign policy after World War II had been conducted under very exceptional circumstances due to the burden it carried stemming from its historic role. West Germany conducted a foreign policy that was mainly characterized by being a "policy of responsibility", a "civilian policy", and a "parochial policy" with an overall "multilateral approach". The main question Germany's neighbors and partners, as well as a large portion of the German public, were interested in after unification, was whether the nature of German foreign policy had undergone a change, or not.

We have outlined earlier in our literature review that the choice of words describing German foreign policy suddenly became very important. Whereas some have observed and supported a "normalization" of German foreign policy, others have warned of a more "assertive" Germany in the international arena. Implied in the word "normal" is the notion that a country, very legitimately, is entitled to pursue its own national interests. Whereas this understanding corresponds to that of political realists, the warning against an "assertive" German foreign policy reflects the anxiety of idealists to overcome traditional politics oriented towards the pursuit of national interests, usually including military means. However, these two views may also be reversed, depending on the point of view. This means that a foreign-policy analyst may fear an "assertive" Germany based on its aggressive historic record. Whereas, once it has been accepted that the threat historically emanating from Germany has been erased by its democratic performance after the Second World War, "normalization" of German foreign policy can imply that Germany will be more active

and use its increased political weight for the purpose of supporting and increasing international cooperation and peace.

In the following, we will explore the most important foreign-policy decisions Germany has taken so far. We consider the analysis of German foreign-policy decisions, that go beyond the scope of the European Union, to be important, as far as a more general image of the country's foreign policy is concerned. Without the latter, Germany's commitment to and impact on the European Union after unification cannot be fully appreciated. It must be noted that we do not regard the division into two categories of political behavior, that is to say realists versus idealists, very helpful and appropriate. Political realities are much too complex to be presented in a picture painted with black and white. We can at best hope to detect a certain inclination towards one or the other direction.

7.1. Global Challenges and German Unification

A fundamental mistake, when evaluating the foreign policy of the new Germany, is ignoring the impact of the changed international climate. German foreign-policy decisions are, in part, to be regarded within the light of the huge transformations that have affected Europe and the rest of the world. The foremost feeling these changes have brought about is a feeling of uncertainty. The old, and to a certain extent predictable, world of antagonism and rivalry between the two superpowers Soviet Union and United States has come to an end. Despite the fact that the United States have made an effort since 1996 to regain some of their international influence, the

reduction of their political leadership has contributed to a power vacuum which no country has so far been able to fill. Although, at the insistence of Germany and France, the European Union has shown some ambition towards playing a larger international role after the Maastricht Treaty, this effort has mainly been limited to well-meant intentions, and has still a long way to go.

The international challenges that Germany, as well as the world at large, are facing currently, are of a political, economic and social nature. Distinctions between them are not always clear since they encroach upon each other. Some of the most important challenges, have partly been brought about by the upheavals Europe has experienced since 1989. The most important change affecting Germany and Europe is the structural breakdown of the Soviet Union. In terms of security, the old organized nuclear threat posed by the former Soviet Union has been replaced by the uncertain ownership over the vast nuclear arsenal of its contending successor states. Furthermore, the former Eastern Bloc countries are now free from Soviet influence and have embarked on the difficult way of transforming their countries into efficient market-oriented economies and democratic political systems. In doing so, they have been looking for support from the West, particularly from Germany, that has had good relations with those countries since the beginning of its *Ostpolitik.*

Germany has also become a sort of a role model for Eastern European countries by transforming the former East German socialist economy into a free market model and incorporating it into the West German democratic system. In terms of economics, the challenge that Russia and the other Eastern European countries are presenting particularly to Germany and the European Union is evident, above all when

considering the prospect that some of these states are to become members of the European Union. In both social and economic terms, the huge flows of migration into Germany, originating from these states, are worth mentioning. Migrants are Eastern Europeans of German origin claiming German citizenship, huge numbers of illegal workers driven out of their home-countries by economic hardships that increased after the collapse of socialist regimes, and high numbers of political refugees fleeing often from ethnic violence that has erupted in many Eastern European countries once the oppressing force of Soviet dominance was lifted. Alone in the aftermath of the 1992 Yugoslav War, Germany accepted half a million refugees from that region, mostly Bosnians.[1]

Apart from these events, there are a number of other developments that have changed, and continue to change the global environment. Many of them originate in the Third World and have a serious international impact as well as domestic implications, on Germany and its partners, in so far as they are contributing to the deterioration of conditions for world peace and influence economic developments both in the developed and underdeveloped world. In the first place, there is continued population increase and, resulting from it, a still growing percentage of the world population living under the poverty line. Second, the increase of developing countries' military potential through exports from industrialized countries and the development of domestic armaments industries contributes to regional instabilities and tensions. Third, economic mismanagement, local wars, population explosion and environmental changes all contribute to deteriorating environmental conditions in Third World

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[1] On the controversy of changing Germany's liberal asylum policy and laws, as well as the refugee problem in general, see for instance Eckart Schiffert, "The Chronic Lack of Realism in the Asylum Debate: Refugee Status in Germany" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, pp. 78-82.

countries that, on their part, result in regional crises and migration movements towards industrialized regions.

Furthermore, the world at large has to cope with a global ecological crisis, international terrorism and organized crime. The world economy is increasingly characterized by interdependence due to communication and improved transport facilities. While this means new economic opportunities, it harbors at the same time great dangers inherent in an international interdependent network that transmits disturbances more easily. While modern states cannot evade these global interactions without endangering their technological and social progress as well as prosperity, international management and cooperation regarding these challenges and opportunities is paramount.

In economic terms, the Federal Republic of Germany, as one of the leading economic nations in the world, is particularly exposed to this global network of interdependence. While being offered enormous opportunities on an ever-growing global market, as a leading export nation it is often hit hard by global recession. That is why Germany has had, and continues to have, a special interest in, and is one of the most important actors in, organizing and developing the cooperative management of the interdependent world economy. Concerning support for the Third World, Germany has, compared with other industrialized nations, provided intensive financial resources and technological expertise. It was in fact one of the first industrialized countries to enter into an organized relationship with the Third World through the establishment of a "Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation" in the early 1970s. Yet, although financial aid to the Third World is relatively high when compared to

other developed nations, it has often been criticized to be only "a drop of water on a hot stone" by many developmental economists.

In security terms, the new challenges that Germany faces have already been outlined above. However, the security arrangement of the post-war world, i.e. the protection of Germany by the Western Allied Powers, does no longer continue as before. Although Germany remains firmly embedded in NATO, it has been forced to modify its strategic thinking and defense. Being committed to never possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, Germany can only find security in cooperative, multilateral security patterns. Germany has now the largest Western European army. Germany's political challenge, here, lies in the way how to use military capabilities in order to achieve its declared non-aggressive, humanitarian foreign-policy goals.

7.2. Paradigmatic Changes after Unification?

German political leaders across the political spectrum have, at the risk of boring their audiences, repeated over and over again that the united Germany would stick to the foundations of its multilateral and civilian foreign policy. Shortly before unification, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher emphasized that the new Germany would not "use its greater weight to strife for more power", but would instead be "more conscious of the responsibility that grows out of this weight."[2]

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[2] Hans-Dietrich Genscher, *Wir wollen ein europaeisches Deutschland* ("We Want a European Germany"), Berlin 1991, p. 275.

There were, however, some indications that made international observers doubtful of these assurances. The first mistake made by Chancellor Kohl during the unification process was his ambiguous stance on the Polish border question. The lack of an eleventh point in Kohl's "Ten-Point-Plan", concerning the final settlement of the German-Polish border, has already been mentioned. However, despite the fact that both Foreign Minister Genscher, in his September 1989 speech before the United Nations[3], and the German *Bundestag*, in its resolution of November 8, 1989, confirmed that Germany would never again make any claims on Polish territory, Kohl consciously omitted such a statement during his visit to Poland in the middle of November in 1989. In the end, it was Genscher who pressurized Kohl to confirm the existing border during his visit to France in January of 1990.[4] Although Kohl's ambivalent position has been sought to be explained by the fact that he only tried to win over voters from the far-right[5], that had started to attain unprecedented high votes in the summer of 1989[6], this incident can be regarded as the starting point for suspicions concerning united Germany's foreign-policy ambitions. In the following, we will examine further incidents that have nursed suspicion against Germany.

Changes in Germany's foreign policy have been observed due to several reasons. In the first place, it is quite unrealistic to expect a country to go through the changes Germany went through without making amendments to its foreign policy of a certain

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[3] See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Das Rad der Geschichte wird nicht zurückgedreht" ("The Wheel of History Will Not Be Turned Back"), speech by the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany before the General Assembly of the United Nations, in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 22, 1989, pp. 654-61.
[4] See Helmut Kohl, speech by the Federal Chancellor during his visit in Paris on January 17, 1990, reprinted in *Bulletin*, no. 9, January 19, 1990, p. 61.
[5] See for example Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte* ("German Unification: International Aspects"), publications by the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Policy, Bonn,/Bergisch-Gladbach 1991, pp. 89-92.
[6] The Republican Party ("Republikaner") attained 7,5% in the elections for the Berlin Senate and 7,1% of the federal vote in the European Parliament elections - alone in Bavaria 14,6%.

kind. Suddenly, united Germany is facing nine neighbors, more than most other countries in the world, and has to accommodate all different kinds of expectations and relationships.

In the second place, with the change in the Foreign Ministry in 1992, not only the personal style of Hans-Dietrich Genscher was replaced with that of Klaus Kinkel, but a change in generation took place as well. Whereas Genscher had experienced the Second World War and its implications first hand, the much younger Kinkel belongs to the post-war generation and has, therefore, a different background and outlook than his predecessor. Some of Germany's partners have equated the more out-spoken style of Kinkel, as opposed to Genscher's low-key, modest diplomacy, with Germany's new assertiveness.

It is in this connection that Willy Brandt has warned against assertiveness in a negative way, and describes Germany's new, ideal role in the world as follows: "National self-confidence is something else than arrogance and overestimating one's own value regarding other peoples. It is founded on the secure judgment of one's own strength, achievement and virtue - and one's own limitations."[7] Quite to the contrary, others have urged Germany to take on a more active role in world politics. Sontheimer has stated: "Through reunification, Germany has again become identical with itself."[8] That is to say that Germany has returned to normality and its political influence will, consequently, increasingly match its economic influence. Stürmer has suggested that "in the Euro-Atlantic school of (national) interests, Germany still has some homework

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[7] Willy Brandt as quoted in: *Der Spiegel*, no. 42, October 12, 1992, p. 21.
[8] Kurt Sontheimer, "Nationale Identitaet in Europas Haus" ("National Identity in the European House") in *Die Welt*, September 16, 1991.

to do."[9] Böhr has exercised harsh self-criticism concerning Germany's "inactive" pre-unification foreign policy: "German responsibility was that of the columnist, the commentator, the political reviewer. Others wrote the script, and we liked ourselves to be in the role of an audience judging the quality of the play."[10]

The above statements have to be regarded particularly in relation with the debate over the employment of German military personnel and equipment outside of NATO-territory, especially in the Balkans. As will be shown later on in this chapter, no serious German politician, apart from the far-right, has any intentions to employ German military force in a different context but a multilateral one. The whole debate centers around the question whether Germany should move slowly beyond the restrictions imposed upon it by its historic legacy, and start acting in ways similar to that of its neighbors, or not.

Apart from the domestic debate, in foreign-policy matters, Germany faces new demands concerning its international role and responsibility. The first test in this regard was the Gulf War of 1991. Germany, still engrossed in national unification, was suddenly confronted by its disappointed allies with the "paymaster" argument. Germany was accused of shunning from its international responsibilities and hiding behind generous financial contributions to the international entente. This dilemma has been brought to the point in the expression that "the Germans are damned if they do

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[9] Michael Stürmer in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 3, 1993.
[10] Christoph Böhr, "An der Schwelle zu einer neuen Epoche - Die Vision der Verantwortungsgesellschaft: Orientierung auf dem Weg zur inneren Einheit Deutschlands und Europas" ("At the Threshold to a New Era - The Vision of the Responsible Society: Orientation on the Way to Germany's and Europe's Inner Unity") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, July 30, 1993, p. 28.

and damned if they don't."[11] In the case of European integration, this means that if the Germans "speak for Europe, they're accused of bullying; if they don't, they're accused of failing to shoulder their responsibilities as the greatest power on the Continent."[12]

In most external ways, Germany has become a normal country because it is no longer artificially divided and has become again a sovereign state. It is a model democracy and two thirds of its population were born after the Second World War. Yet, history holds the Germans still in its grasp. Chancellor Kohl, despite his long-held wish of being invited to the Allies' celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Normandy Invasion, was excluded. One year earlier, Kohl's candidate for the presidential office, Stefan Heitmann, had to quit after he had remarked that the post-war era had come to an end and that Germany should not be burdened with Nazi-crimes indefinitely.[13] Perhaps, the number of years passed is not a criterion for deciding whether new times have arrived. It has been suggested that it is not up to Germany to decide whether it has become a normal state: "That lies with the collective understanding of other nations; it is for them to decide."[14]

In the meantime, German foreign policy maintains its former characteristics. Its continued aims are to actively promote the development of the European Union - after unification and the changes in Eastern Europe, that means both deepening and widening - maintain close c cooperation with the United States and preserve

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[11] Michael Elliott, "Who Can Lead?" in *Newsweek International*, no. 4, January 22, 1996, p. 11.
[12] Ibid.
[13] For a more extensive discusssion of Heitmann's views see *Financial Times*, October 21, 1993.
[14] See "Germany: Nearly Normal" in *The Economist*, April 15, 1995, p. 29.

America's engagement in Europe, and make a contribution to peace and democracy in Europe and the developing world.

As we have seen in our analysis of political parties, the majority of the coalition-government between CDU/CSU and FDP is in favor of normalizing German foreign policy. This does not, however, constitute a paradigmatic change. Paradigmatic change is considered to be more abrupt, whereas what we are dealing with in the case of Germany, is a slow, gradual shift towards "benign" realism. This means that the new Germany remains primarily a trading state but with slightly increased emphasis on its military might. United Germany appears to be readier to speak its mind on international issues, especially when they affect its national interests. Yet, German leaders have increasingly realized that national and international interests are overlapping and call for pragmatic solutions.[15] Foreign Minister Kinkel has joined his predecessor Genscher in stressing the moral component of German foreign policy by calling for a new "global domestic policy" (*Weltinnenpolitik*), that upholds human rights, freedom and self-determination.[16] By doing so, he pays tribute to the fact that the world is interdependent, not just economically, but politically as well.

President Herzog, as has been pointed out earlier, has reclaimed the right for the middle political spectrum to speak of German "national interests"[17] from the political far-right. These interests are interwoven and correspond with the above-mentioned

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[15] See for instance Roman Herzog, "Die Grundkoordination deutscher Aussenpolitik" ("The Basic Coordination of German Foreign Policy"), keynote speech by the German President at the 40th anniversary of the German Society for Foreign Policy, reprinted in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 4, 1995, pp. 3-11.
[16] Klaus Kinkel in *This Week in Germany*, October 1, 1993, p. 1.
[17] See Roman Herzog, "Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher Aussenpolitik", 1995, pp. 8-9.

characteristics of German foreign policy. They can, basically, be divided into five[18]:

First, German foreign policy has a fundamental interest in protecting and promoting institutionally guaranteed human and civil rights. With respect to the creation of a peaceful European order, international cooperation is important. If the European states, not all of which have the same political order and objectives, want to create a European peace order, they must adhere to joint declarations and deocuments on human rights. This is so because countries with similar political order and objectives have a greater chance of achieving a peace order than countries with diverging systems. Therefore, in this context, German foreign policy oriented towards national interest becomes a policy based on moral values.

Second, united Germany's western orientation is not only desirable - i.e. presenting a policy option - it is irreversible. In the sphere of economics, the new Germany remains as much an economic power focused on Europe as the old Federal Republic. The fact that Germany is globally a leading export nation may be misleading; in reality, almost two thirds of Germany's trade are conducted with other European Union states. Another ten percent or so are with the USA, Canada, and Japan. Thus, Germany's basic orientation towards multilateralism is indispensable for the successful conduct of its trade relations.

Third, Germany's extremely exposed position in foreign trade can only be cushioned with a policy of integration. In the wake of unification, this orientation was not only stressed rhetorically by German politicians, but was underlined by a further push for

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[18] See also Dieter Senghaas, "Deutschlands verflochtene Interessen" ("Germany's Interwoven Interests") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 8, 1995, pp. 31-37.

integration resulting in the Maastricht Treaty. However, the German rationale of the positive effects of decreased national sovereignty and integration into an ever-larger framework, has not resulted in general agreement on part of other European Union member-states, especially smaller ones. They fear German political hegemony in Europe. Therefore, it would have counter-productive effects on German national interests, both in political and economic terms, if Germany openly tried to obtain hegemonial status.

Fourth, Germany's national interest has to be oriented towards a pan-European peace order. A return to re-nationalizing security policy, and the inevitable building of military alliances and counter-alliances, would be highly detrimental to Germany. In order to prevent such developments, Germany must, apart from setting a good example, make an effort to bring about a well-functioning, institutionalized European security structure.

Fifth, a German global policy has to be particularly preoccupied with strengthening the United Nations, especially its institutions designed to support developing nations and bind them into international decision-making. In the growing interdependent world, Germany is, as has been realized quite some time ago, easily effected by international disturbances. These include migration movements, wars, ecological, political and economic crises.

Germany's national interests, thus presented, are interlinked and require appropriate policy decisions. Germany's greatest vulnerability is that it is exposed economically. Therefore, the new Germany must, predominantly, remain a "trading state"; recourse

to "power politics" would be detrimental to German interests. Before unification, West Germany had already been Europe's foremost power. After unification, geographic size and location, as well as population size added to this factor. Whether it wants or not, Germany has become Europe's "central power". It is up to its foreign-policy makers to conduct a responsible and modest foreign policy, while taking into account international interdependence and the imperatives resulting from it in its own best interest.

7.3. Political Capabilities and Constraints after Unification

Nobody could expect the new Germany to adapt to the major changes it has gone through in a very short time. Domestic and international implications of unification have been too great. Germany has had to identify gradually with its new role, and find a sensible way to adapt its increased weight and political influence to the new circumstances. This is a long process, and cannot be expected to end any time soon. This is so, as we have shown above, because Germany has not only adapt to its own new role within a fixed environment, but is facing significant international challenges as well. In the following, we will look at some of its foreign-policy decisions that have drawn international criticism, and are thought to be indicative of the new trend in German foreign policy. We will particularly analyze whether they contain elements of "power politics" in the sense of political realism, or not, in order to determine whether united Germany's foreign policy has become more assertive.

7.3.1. Policy during the Gulf War

As has been mentioned already, the first test for united Germany's foreign policy was the Gulf War. When Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait in August 1990, Germany was on the eve of unification. Foreign Minister Genscher and Chancellor Kohl were still busy to convince the world of the new Germany's peaceful intentions. On the day Germany's division came to an end, the German Chancellor sent the following message to all governments in the world: "With its regained national unity, our country wants to serve world peace and promote European integration. (...) In the future, only peace will emanate from German soil."[19]

It appears to be a "historic misfortune"[20] that the Germans were not given the opportunity to define their new role after unification in a quiet and orderly process. On the contrary, Germany was immediately exposed to the criticism that it would not live up to its new responsibilities and "free-ride" on international security. The Anglo-American press even wanted to know where the German "desert foxes" and "Rommels" were.[21] The German Government, instead, decided to support the war effort against Iraq with 15 billion D-mark, an act which gained Germany the reputation of "paymaster". Despite voices from Conservative circles that at least logistic army personnel should be sent to the Gulf, Genscher - known for his pacifist beliefs - prevented this through his firm grip on the Foreign Ministry.

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[19] Helmut Kohl, message of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany to all governments in the world on the day of German Unity of October 3, 1990, reprinted in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 21, 1990, p. 540.
[20] Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte*, p. 128.
[21] Quoted in: Manfred Funke, "Turning Points in 20th-Century German History: The New Face of Germany" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, p. 17.

However, the main obstacle against German participation in the war was public opinion. Only 22% of Germans thought that Germany should send armed forces to the Persian Gulf.[22] The decision to abstain brought temporary popularity at home, but led to considerable irritations on part of Germany's partners. After a drawn-out discussion, Germany consented in the end to sending war planes and other personnel to Turkey for the defense of this fellow NATO-member. Nevertheless, the damage to Germany's new image was done. Yet, if anything, this attitude sprang from German uncertainty over its national role - it was definitely not a sign of renewed nationalism - and alleged constitutional restrictions. Furthermore, the country's image was tarnished by the infamous role some German firms had played in providing Iraq with materials to build up chemical weapons facilities. The only apparent good thing to have come out of this whole episode is that Germany is, nowadays, a country with one of the strictest export controls in the world[23], befitting one of the world's largest export nations.

7.3.2. Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia

If German foreign policy appeared hesitant and confusing during the Gulf War, this changed only a couple of months later during the war in the former Yugoslavia. After months of civil war and repeatedly broken truces, Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence simultaneously on June 25, 1991. The West protested this move at the

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[22] See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1993, p. 3, and Volker Rittberger, "Zur Politik Deutschlands in den Vereinten Nationen" ("On Germany's Policy within the United Nations") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 36, August 30, 1991, p. 14.
[23] See Michael Mertes, "Germany, the EC and Jewish Concerns: Shouldering New Responsibilities" in *German Comments: Review of Politics and Culture*, vol. 25, January 1992, p. 70.

beginning. Especially the United States, Great Britain and France believed that the status quo in Yugoslavia could be maintained. After all, Tito's Yugoslavia had been, despite its Communist ideology, the West's ally during the Cold War. Germany and Austria and, to a certain extent Denmark and Belgium, advocated early recognition of the two break-away states in order to pressurize Serbia into abstaining from further violence.[24]

The European Community's foreign ministers met at the end of June in 1991, and again in Rome on November 8, 1991, and declared diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would only be considered within the framework of an all-Yugoslav solution. However, the German Government repeatedly threatened to bypass the Community and unilaterally recognize the two states. On December 17, 1991, Foreign Minister Genscher succeeded in obliging all Community member-states into recognizing Slovenia and Croatia until January 15, 1992. Germany, unilaterally, already recognized the independence of the two states on December 23, 1991.

Although Foreign Minister Genscher reportedly first opposed early recognition[25], he then gave in to his coalition's views, parliament and public opinion. In fact, a broad party consensus existed on the issue. Public opinion was particularly impressed by, and sensitive to, the atrocities committed in the Yugoslavia. Therefore, Axt has considered the change in Genscher's position as a "good example of the (...)

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[24] See also Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, "The Implications of German Unification for Western Europe" in: Paul B. Stares, ed., *The New Germany and the New Europe*, Washington (D.C.) 1992, p. 259. (pp. 251-278)
[25] William Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy" in *Millenium*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1992, p. 240.

democratization of foreign policy."[26] This conforms also with Klaus Kinkel's view that the separation between foreign policy and domestic policy is fading.[27]

Despite accusations to the contrary, the German public had no special interest in the Balkans, apart from putting an end to the bloodshed.[28] Furthermore, millions of Germans had pleasant holiday remembrances from past vacations on the Adriatic coast in Croatia and had developed friendly relations with over half a million Croats and Slovenes who were living as guest-workers in Germany.. Yet, the German move constituted a clear deviation from its long-propagated principle of "common action" within the European Community. From that point of view, it is understandable that fears of a politically dominant Germany within the Community found new nourishment. Furthermore, Germany has been criticized to have given in to short-term considerations of domestic public opinion, without taking into account the long-term affect this decision would have on the rest of Yugoslavia.[29]

Germany's relationship with the United Nations was especially strained during the time of early recognition. The special UN-envoy to Yugoslavia, Cyrus Vance, had vehemently opposed recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, and had clashed in December and January with the European Community states, especially Germany. On December 10, 1991, UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar wrote a letter to the

[26] Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? - Mythos und Fakten der Aussenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands" ("Has Genscher Divided Yugoslavia? - Myth and Facts of United Germany's Foreign Policy") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 48, no. 12, 1993, p. 354.
[27] See Klaus Kinkel, "Verantwortung, Realismus, Zukunftssicherung" ("Responsibility, Realism and Securing the Future") in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 19, 1993, p. 8.
[28] See also Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe" in *Foreign Affairs*, New York, vol. 71, no. 2, spring 1992, p. 128.
[29] See William Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy", p. 240.

Dutch Foreign Minister who, at the time, held the EC-presidency. De Cuellar warned

of recognition as a "potential time bomb"[30] and the disastrous consequences for the

rest of Yugoslavia. The letter, in reality addressed to German Foreign Minister,

prompted a reply by the latter and led to an exchange of heated arguments between

the two. There were even efforts to blame Germany for its recognition plans and bind

its hands through the UN resolution 724 of December 15, 1991.[31] This, however,

failed when France, after its initial pro-Serbian position, suddenly sided with Germany

and caused the other Community member-states to adopt a joint position with

Germany.

The criticism directed at Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia[32] has been

found to be only partly justified. The implication that Germany might have had

territorial ambitions in Slovenia and Croatia is unconvincing. The fact that Slovenia's

capital Llubljana is still known by many Germans by "its old colonial name of

Laibach"[33] cannot be seen as an indication of this. It is rather a nice reminiscence of

"old times", although not a politically correct one.

However, within the European Community, Germany has clearly chosen unilateral

action. When a compromise was reached within the Community that secessionist

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[30] Quoted in: "Aus dem Bereich der Vereinten Nationen: Berichte - Nachrichten - Meinungen"
("Within the United Nations: Reports - News - Opinions") in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 40, no. 2, 1992,
p. 57.
[31] Ibid.
[32] For further reactions to Germany's diplomatic recognition of the two states see for instance Hans
W. Maull, "Assertive Germany: Cause for Concern" in *International Herald Tribune*, January 17,
1992; Christoph Bertram, "Eine Macht ohne Augenmass? Im Ausland weckt die Bonner
Jugoslawienpolitik alte Zweifel" ("A Power without Sense of Proportion? Bonn's Yugoslavian Policy
Awakens Old Doubts Abroad") in *Die Zeit*, January 3, 1992; Dieter Schröder, "Der deutsche
Alleingang" ("The German Go-It-Alone") in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, December 22-23, 1991.
[33] William Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy",
p. 239.

states should be recognized if they met a catalogue of principles - including the guarantee of minority rights - Germany decided by itself that the two states in question met these criteria anyway. The fact that Germany recognized the two states earlier than the other EC-members, has been evaluated as a "substitute" for Germany's inability to put an end to the fighting.[34] Another objection to recognition is a legal one. Germany disregarded the principle of the inviobality of international borders (Principle III of the Helsinki Act). At the same time, however, this has also demonstrated that this principle is in contradiction to the principle of self-determination (principle VIII of the Helsinki Act). Furthermore, as has been pointed out, Germany's ignoring of long-term consequences of diplomatic recognition was made worse by Germany's position that it could not be involved in international peace-keeping in Yugoslavia. Thus, as Horsley rightly concludes, "Germany chose to make what was described as its first active diplomatic intervention since World War Two in an area where it could not take responsibility if things went wrong."[35] Yet, despite all criticism of the German position, it should be noted that Germany was the country that granted refuge to most of the people escaping from the Yugoslav War. Between 1992 and 1993 alone, some 250,000 refugees were taken in by Germany, compared to 74,141 by Sweden, 70,450 by Switzerland, 68,500 by Austria, 58,000 by France, 17,000 by Italy, 15,000 by Turkey, 15,000 by the Netherlands, 9,708 by Denmark, and 100 by Greece.[36]

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[34] See Wolfgang Wagner, "Acht Lehren aus dem Fall Jugoslawien" ("Eight Lessons from the Yugoslavian Case") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 2, 1992, p. 37.
[35] Ibid.
[36] See Auswaertiges Amt, "Die humanitaere Hilfe der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Opfer des Konflikts im ehemaligen Jugoslawien: Aktueller Stand und Ausblick" ("Humanitarian Aid by the Federal Republic of Germany for the Victims of the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia: Current Situation and Outlook"), press release no. 1030, February, 25, 1993, pp. 5-7.

Although everybody appeared to be interested in an end to the fighting, all Europeans, and also Americans and Russians, have, as Czempiel has put it, boiled "their own soup in the Balkans as they did one hundred years ago."[37] Despite common interests, each state has been interested predominantly in securing its influence for the time after the conflict. In so far, the German action can be called "normal" in the sense that it pursued national interests, that can be called here, in the first place, "moral interest", although the intent of widening Germany's political influence cannot be discarded. However, the incident of diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia also demonstrates the shift in Germany's foreign policy towards "benign" realism, because Germany asserted itself politically in a way its neighbors and partners were not used to. Yet, at this point in time, Germany has still explicitly rejected the possibility of using military force.

7.3.3. The "Out-of-Area" Debate and the New Mission of the 'Bundeswehr'

The debate over the question of whether German military personnel should be deployed outside NATO-territory, has been at the heart of discussions over Germany's changed international role. As we have seen, the question was first brought up during the Gulf War when the Government declined the Allies' wish for German participation in the war effort against Iraq. Since then, German Army

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[37] Ernst-Otto Czempiel, "Einfluss für die Zeit danach" ("Influence for the Time thereafter"), interview with the Frankfurt-based peace-researcher on the Balkan War and the West, in *Der Spiegel*, vol. 35, August 28, 1995, p. 43.

personnel has been deployed outside NATO-territory on various occasions. We will briefly trace the evolution this issue has experienced so far.

Until 1989, three main arguments were brought against deployment outside NATO[38]: First, at a time, when two alliances were facing each other with the highest concentration of military potential in the world on German soil, the danger of transferring the conflict from outside NATO into Europe, i.e. Germany, was too great. Since the Soviet Union was always directly or indirectly involved in conflicts throughout the world, German participation would have harbored the danger of military blackmail on part of the Soviet Union. Second, Hitler-troops had invaded foreign countries and had caused immeasurable destruction and sorrow. Even under the conditions of a democratic Germany, no foreign country should be exposed to German soldiers, some of whom had already served under Hitler. Third, with reference to the *Basic Law*, deployment of the German Army outside NATO was declared to be unconstitutional.

The first obstacle to sending German soldiers outside NATO-territory has been erased with the end of the East-West conflict and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from German soil. Moreover, ideological differences in the Third World play a decreasing role. Thus, Germany is not vulnerable to blackmail anymore. The second argument has also been weakened, in part by the fact that most countries have come to terms with German unification and do not feel overly threatened by the German army. In fact, notably the United States and Great Britain have repeatedly called for German military support in armed conflicts. After the Federal Republic has been able to build a

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[38] See also Karl Kaiser, *Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die internationalen Aspekte*, pp. 112-14.

reliable democratic system with federal structures, main objections to German participation in out-of-area conflicts have been more of a domestic nature than international opposition. This is manifested in public opinion and the attitude of political parties.

Yet, after unification, a gradual evolution has been observed. A growing percentage of the public is now favoring a more active German role in the international sphere. In 1993, 62% of the German public believed that Germany should engage in a more active international role; 51% believed that Germany should shoulder greater international responsibility; 53% believed that Germany should participate in peacekeeping operations.[39] Until 1989, a majority had believed that Germany should abstain from doing the latter.[40] However, by 1993, only 31% opposed German participation, and 50% held the view that Germany should participate "exactly as England, France or the Americans."[41] On the grounds of interviews conducted in 1992-93 in high schools and universities, Gordon has found that support for a German role "more like that of other states" is even stronger in younger age groups (fifteen to twenty-five years of age), at least in the West.[42] Although many Germans approve of the *principle* of intervention, they have difficulties in seeing Germany play such a role. In fact, only 22% would have supported German military participation in operations like operation "Desert Storm" in the Persian Gulf.[43] Furthermore, 55% of

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[39] See *Einstellungen zu Aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik 1993 in Deutschland* ("Opinions on Current Domestic Issues in Germany in 1993"), Institut für praxisorientierte Sozialforschung, Mannheim 1993, pp. 96-97.

[40] See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 11, 1993.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Philip H Gordon, "The Normalization of German Foreign Policy", in *Orbis*, vol. 38, no. 2, 1994, p. 236.

[43] See Ronald D. Asmus, *Germany's Geopolitical Maturation*, p. 3; and Volker Rittberger, "Zur Politik Deutschlands in den Vereinten Nationen" ("On Germany's Policy within the United Nations") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 36, August 30, 1991, p. 14.

eastern Germans believe that the country should not assume more international responsibility.[44]

However, just as public opinion was shifting towards more support for a growing German engagement in international conflicts, so did political parties. Before unification, especially the political left and German intellectuals routinely condemned American power-politics, and especially stressed their own pacifist agenda.[45] Whereas Conservatives were quick to argue for a normalization of Germany's international role[46], the adjustment in the SPD has been rather slow. When the Kohl-cabinet approved support for multilateral forces in Bosnia in June 1995, the SPD was vehemently opposed at first. Although party-deputy Oskar Lafontaine said "no"[47], in October 1995 party-chairman Rudolf Scharping and his foreign-policy spokesman Günther Verheugen consented.[48] At the end of November 1995, the SPD - under its new chairman Lafontaine - gave its consent to sending 4,000 German soldiers to Bosnia.

The shift of the Greens away from their long-held dislike of NATO was even more extraordinary. Known as *the* pacifist party, by the mid-1990s the battle between *Realos* and *Fundis* appears to have been won by *Realos* under the leadership of Joschka Fischer. The Greens, outraged by human-rights violations in the former

[44] See *Einstellungen zu Aktuellen Fragen der Innenpolitik 1993 in Deutschland*, p. 102.
[45] See also Elizabeth Pond, "Germany Finds Its Niche as a Regional Power", in *The Washington Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 1, winter 1996, p. 34.
[46] See for instance statements by Klaus Kinkel, "Germany's Post-reunification Foreign Policy" in *Statements and Speeches* (New York: German Information Center), vol. 15, no. 16, and the CDU's foreign-policy spokesman Karl Lamers in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, November 15, 1991.
[47] See interview with Oskar Lafontaine, "Die SPD muss nein sagen" ("The SPD Must Say No") in *Die Zeit*, June 9, 1995, pp. 6-7.
[48] See "Balkankrieg: Wir sind jetzt dran" ("Balkan War: Now It's Our Turn") in *Der Spiegel*, October 30, 1995, p. 34.

Yugoslavia - and already discussed by some CDU-members as a future coalition-partner - have become more pragmatic about the use of the *Bundeswehr* outside NATO.[49] In a historic vote at the beginning of December 1995, the German *Bundestag* voted for the deployment of German troops in Bosnia, including the votes of several Green-parliamentarians.

The third objection to German participation in NATO's out-of-area missions was that the country's Constitution would not allow it.[50] However, most legal experts concurred that the *Basic Law* does not include any such obstacle. The German Constitutional Court agreed and ruled on July 12, 1994, that the *Bundeswehr* might constitutionally be sent abroad if the *Bundestag* approves. In fact, Article 87a of the *Basic Law* states that the *Bundeswehr* serves "defensive purposes": "Apart from defense (...) (it) may only be used to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law". Article 24 permits the Federal Republic to enter into "a system of mutual collective security" in order to bring about "a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world." Before unification, the term "defensive purposes" had been interpreted as the protection of German territory against any outside attack, excluding military action outside the Federal Republic. The majority of the CDU/CSU, parts of the FDP, as well as military officials disagreed.[51]

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[49] See the interview with Joschka Fischer, "Es geht um die 'moralische Seele" ("It Is a Question of One's 'Moral Soul") in *Die Zeit*, August 11, 1995, p. 8; the statement of Green-parliamentarian Schoppe that "Germany has to demonstrate reliability. We can't always take security, we must also provide security." in: "Grüne uneins über möglichen Einsatz" ("Greens Split on Question over Possible Deployment") in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 14, 1995, p. 2; and the earlier interview with Helmut Lippelt, a member of the Greens' executive committee, "Die Lager müssen befreit werden" (The Camps Must Be Liberated") in *Der Spiegel*, August, 24, 1992.

[50] See also the discussion in the German Bundestag, in *Protokoll des Deutschen Bundestages*, 12th election period, 101st sitting, July 22, 1992, pp. 8607-8655.

[51] For the debate in the German *Bundestag* concerning an appeal to the Constitutional Court see also: *Protokoll des Deutschen Bundestages*, 12th election period, 150th sitting, March 26, 1993, pp. 12867-81.

All in all, the new constitutional practice requiring the *Bundestag* to approve any out-of-area deployment of German forces is seen here as being preferable to a constitutional amendment, as has been demanded by several Conservatives. Giving the Government the unrestricted right to such missions by changing the *Basic Law*, would almost certainly decrease the self-imposed German reserve on the use of military force in general.

In anticipation to and as a result of the Constitutional Court's ruling, German soldiers have served in various UN and OSCE-missions outside NATO-territory. Since 1994, the German government has sent minesweepers to the Persian Gulf and to Iran to bring assistance to threatened Kurds. It has further sent some 1,500 army medical personnel to the UN-deployment in Cambodia - the first time that German soldiers belonged to a "blue helmet" mission of the UN - and has manned about 30% of flights for the airborne surveillance of the international embargo on Serbia. Some 1,700 German soldiers joined the UN peace-keeping mission in Somalia, and Germany participated actively in the airlift of medical supplies and food to besieged Sarajevo. In 1994, nine German officers joined the first UN military observer mission in the former Soviet republic of Georgia, and in 1995, army medical personnel was sent to Split in Croatia and Tornado war-planes to survey the skies over the former Yugoslavia. *Bundeswehr*-forces have further been employed in Chechnya, Latvia, Estonia, Macedonia, Moldavia, Tatchikistan, and Ukraine.

Although international restrictions on Germany's sovereignty were lifted when the Allied Powers gave up their rights on Germany in 1991, domestic restrictions have

continued to exist despite a slow evolutionary process towards more "normality". Germany's past continues to throw its shadow on the present, and will not be lifted any time soon. All major German parties agree now that unilateralism does not have a place in Germany's foreign and security policy; all are committed to multilateralism. Yet, as international challenges have changed, so has Germany's perception of meeting them. Regarding the solution of international crises, political pragmatism has won even with the political left. With the growing likeliness of a coalition between the SPD and the Greens after the federal election of September 1998, Germany can, however, reasonably be expected to continue emphasizing the humanitarian aspect of military actions outside NATO.

In the foreseeable future, Germany's new generation of political leaders will, in all probability, not be less inhibited by and conscious of its past, but will see the need to meet new challenges with new, or "normal", measures. Germany will, perhaps increasingly, favor non-military options and preventive measures to solve international conflicts. The country's "missionary zeal" to spread democracy and recognition of human rights continues to be fueled by national interest, because Germany's aim of economic prosperity will be achieved best in a peaceful world. Yet, as long as international institutions are not fully equipped to solve international conflict, Germany might resort to carefully chosen and considered options of military force in a multilateral framework, thus increasing the realist element in its foreign policy. Clemens has rightly described this "logical, even inevitable, step on the road back to *realpolitik*" as being undertaken in a "reluctant and conditional way that is largely

consistent with the ambivalence about military force that has characterized the country's foreign policy since 1945."[52]

7.3.4. Quest for a Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council

In his address to the General Assembly of the United Nations of September 23, 1992,[53] the new Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel announced that Germany would declare its wish for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council if a change of the council's current composition were envisaged. Subsequently, Kinkel, in his annual speeches at the General Assembly, referred repeatedly to this German wish. UN General Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated in 1993 that "the time has come for Germany to play a greater and more dynamic role on the international stage, that is to say a role commensurate with its position, its economic weight and cultural aura."[54] In an interview with RTL on December 27, 1994, Boutros-Ghali declared that he supported Germany's wish to join the Security Council if they themselves wanted it. Two days later, it was announced that Germany were to become a member for two years, without veto-power.

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[52] Clay Clemens, "Opportunity or Obligation? Redefining Germany's Military Role Outside of NATO" in *Armed Forces & Society*, vol. 19, no. 2, winter 1993, p. 231.
[53] Klaus Kinkel, "Wir wollen unsere Streitkraefte den Vereinten Nationen zur Verfügung stellen" ("We Want to Put Our Armed Forces at the Disposal of the United Nations"), speech by the German Foreign Minister before the 47th UN General Assembly, in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 40, no. 5, 1992, pp. 160-62.
[54] Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Globalisierung und Erwachen der Nationen" ("Globalization and the Awakening of Nations"), speech by the UN General Secretary before the German Society for the United Nations, in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 41, no. 1, 1993, p. 1.

The signals that Germany has been sending with the announcement of its wish to join the UN Security Council, have been found to be in contrast to its claim to stand for multilateralism and international cooperation, especially within the European Union. A logical consequence following political union, would be for the European Union to apply as a member, and not increasing the number of sovereign states by the German application. In this context, Seebacher-Brandt has remarked that "demanding political union, and obstructing it at the same time, is not befitting for a nation that wants to be one."[55] The sometimes-heard German position of "we are again somebody", is reflected in Germany's wish to join the Security Council and in Kinkel's statement that "we want again to have a stronger hand in world politics."[56] Such statements are certainly not adequate to disperse international fears of a dominant Germany and are in contrast to Genscher's more sensitive, diplomatic style. Hacke, for instance, claims rightly that Kinkel's statement would be more adequate in a round of poker, than in the world of diplomacy.[57]

Furthermore, Germany with its proclaimed progressive foreign policy, demanding a new "global domestic policy"[58], should be looking for alternative ways rather than revive an institution that had brought together the winners of the Second World War. A "new world order", as envisaged by George Bush, would need a Security Council as a collective institution, uniting the major powers. Yet, a look at the amount of

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[55] Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, "Nation im vereinigten Deutschland" ("Nation in the United Germany") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 42, October 21, 1994, p. 9.
[56] Kinkel in an interview with *Die Welt am Sonntag*, August 23, 1992.
[57] Christian Hacke, "Deutschland und die neue Weltordnung: Zwischen innenpolitischer Überforderung und aussenpolitischen Krisen" in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 46, November 6, 1992, p. 16. For further criticism see also Claus Gennrich, "Kinkel und der Sitz im Rat - Briten und Franzosen mokieren sich" ("Kinkel and the Seat on the Council - The British and French Are Sneering at the Idea") in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, September 25, 1992, p. 3.
[58] See Klaus Kinkel in *This Week in Germany*, October 1, 1993, p. 1.

vetoes on the UN Security Council, blocking common action, shows that that has hardly ever been the case.[59] The zeal with which Boris Yeltsin has taken over the Soviet Union's permanent seat for Russia at the beginning of 1992, has made it clear that once a position of power has been attained, no state is easily inclined to undertake self-approved changes to that position. That is also valid for Germany.

At a time when calls for a reform of the United Nations, including the Security Council, have become even louder, it appears that Germany could have made a more constructive contribution to the United Nations than applying for a permanent seat. Although Germany has advanced to become number three of the UN's global financiers, it has equally done so as a global exporter of military equipment,[60] despite restrictive export controls. The first step towards a policy preventing political tensions can only be to restrict the supply of military equipment while, at the same time, helping to spread democracy and achieve economic growth. This is thought to be a more adequate policy than supporting an institution, that has been called by many an "anachronism".[61]

Another element in Germany's new approach towards the UN, is Kinkel's promise for a German contribution to the UN's blue helmets. As the strong reaction to the death of the first German soldier dying in a UN-mission in Cambodia and the deaths of two German soldiers in Croatia, who died during the deployment of German forces under the UN-mission to help reconstruct war damages in Bosnia, has shown, German

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[59] See Volker Löwe, "Die Vetos im Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen (1983-1990)" ("Vetos in the Security Council of the United Nations (1983-1990)") in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 39, no. 1, 1991, pp. 11-13.
[60] See also Hans Arnold, "Der Deutschen UNO" ("The Germans' UN") in *Vereinte Nationen*, vol. 41, no. 4, 1993, p. 135.
[61] See for instance Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, "Nation im vereinigten Deutschland", p. 8.

public opinion would, at this point, not be willing to make the same sacrifices in human lives like the United States or Great Britain.

The German application for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council seems to have been motivated in part by the criticism of its "partners in leadership" during the Gulf War. With this move, Germany intended to appear as a reliable partner, determined to shoulder global responsibilities, even if, in reality, the country has not yet evolved into such a role. The move appears, therefore, a little artificial and hastened. Another motif for Germany's sudden engagement in the international arena is its wish, not to attain power, "but to help, help, help"[62], thus emphasizing the humanitarian and moral component of its foreign policy. That is what has, basically, inspired the missions in Somalia, Iran and Bosnia.

Concluding, Germany's quest for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council can be interpreted as an attempt at the return of *realpolitik*. However, the German motivation appears to be rather influenced by humanitarian considerations, that is to say the country is looking for a way to influence world politics in order to achieve its goal. of economic prosperity in a peaceful world. Yet, the tool chosen for this end - membership on the Security Council - is not appropriate. Germany's role in world politics should be to support the United Nations in general, and undertake efforts to reform them. Germany's membership in NATO and the opportunity to participate in UN-peacekeeping, and if necessary peace-enforcing, missions should be enough for the country to show its partners, and itself, that it does not shrink from global responsibilities.

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[62] See Hans Arnold, "Der Deutschen UNO", p. 135.

7.4. Conclusions

This chapter has set out to examine the question whether the foreign policy of the new Germany has, from the point of view of political realists, returned to "normality", that is to say pursuing openly national interests, possibly with the use of military might. Based upon Germany's historic record, this question has also been asked by using the term "assertiveness" instead of "normality", thus expressing the anxiety over Germany's future role. In the first place, we have emphasized the fact that changes in the foreign policy of united Germany cannot only be seen in the light of unification, but changes in the global environment must be considered, too. Regarding these new challenges, it has been noted that they have produced a feeling of uncertainty, not only in Germany, but elsewhere as well. However, Germany is even more affected by them than other countries. On the one hand, the upheavals in Eastern Europe have produced migration flows that are primarily targeting Germany and can, possibly, increase in magnitude. Furthermore, unstable democratic regimes in that region pose a direct threat to the Federal Republic's national security. On the other hand, Germany, as a leading export nation, is especially vulnerable to instabilities not only in Eastern Europe but world-wide, due to increasing globalization. German foreign-policy makers are aware of the fact that their country's economic prosperity and security can only be ensured in a peaceful world. Hence, it is in the country's own best interest to work towards peace in a multilateral framework.

Regarding paradigmatic changes in united Germany's foreign policy, our analysis has shown that the country is continuing to build on the multilateral and civilian elements of its foreign policy before unification. Increasingly, humanitarian and moral aspects

have been put in the foreground of its new foreign policy, exemplified in Klaus Kinkel's call for a "global domestic policy" based on human rights, freedom and self-determination. We have, therefore, refrained from speaking of paradigmatic changes, but consider it more appropriate to speak of changes in style rather than in substance. At the same time, however, a shift towards "benign" realism has been observed. This is in line with the shift of Germany's major political parties towards pragmatic solutions to new security challenges, that had been worked out earlier.

This new "pragmatism" is seen as a bridge between foreign-policy ideals and reality. As long as a gap between ideals and reality exists, Germany's new foreign policy is increasingly prepared to resort to the use of military means. The interplay of government-coalition - that is to say the CDU/FDP that is more inclined towards using military force - and opposition - that is to say the SPD and the Greens that are rather inclined not to use military force - ensures that, in the foreseeable future Germany's military forces are likely to be employed rather less than some of Germany's allies would wish for.

The analysis of selected foreign-policy decisions after unification, has shown, however, that there were certain incidents - most notably the Polish border question, early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and Germany's application for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council - that could not be reconciled with Germany's professed ideals in foreign policy. The reasons for this have been found to be numerous. They range from Germany's difficulties in adapting to the new situation of being a unified country while, at the same time, having to meet new international

challenges, to the fact that the Foreign Ministry had to reckon with public opinion when taking its foreign-policy decisions.

Some decisions were not well-thought out and have, thus, produced international anxiety. Yet, despite a shift towards "benign" realism, that had already been observed in the position of main political parties, our analysis has not revealed any indications that Germany will continue any further on the way to *realpolitik* by primarily stressing national interests. The shift that has occurred has been attributed to increased pragmatism regarding the new challenges that Germany is facing. Therefore, we have decided not to talk yet about paradigmatic changes in Germany's foreign policy, but rather of a change in style as opposed to substance.

This trend towards a more pragmatic foreign policy has been accompanied with an increased tone of self-confidence, that, on its part, has been traced back to the change in generation among political leaders. This includes, most notably, Klaus Kinkel, Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer. This new generation of leaders has been raised after the Second World War, just as two thirds of the German population. Although the "burden" of history ensures that a return of Germany's foreign policy to "normality" has still a long way to go, Germany has embarked on the way towards achieving it. Yet, German foreign-policy leaders will continue to listen carefully to the response that Germany's neighbors and partners are voicing regarding their policy decisions. Germany has realized that it cannot afford not to listen. The country's embedding in multilateral frameworks is guaranteed; it has advanced too much to withdraw from them.

Having established the environment and general atmosphere in which German foreign policy is conducted today, we will now turn to our analysis of Germany's impact on European integration after unification. We will determine the influence that Germany has had so far on economic, political and security issues within the context of the European Union, as well as its role in dealing with Central-East European countries that are going through an economic and political transformation process and are aspiring to obtain membership in the European Union.

8. UNITED GERMANY'S IMPACT ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

At the same time when German unification occurred, the challenges that the European Community faced also started to change. The biggest challenge of all was the transformation in Eastern Europe. Although the Cold War was over, all of a sudden new security threats arose in the form of the newly emerging unstable democratic and economic systems in the former Eastern Bloc, and the Community was faced with new aspiring members. The most pressing question became how to deal with those upheavals at the Community's doorstep, without jeopardizing its internal stability. The position of Germany, now an enlarged Germany, as a front-line state has remained. It is no longer separated from its Eastern neighbors by an Iron Curtain, but by an invisible border separating the consolidated democracies and economic systems of Western Europe from the Eastern European countries that are looking upon the West, especially upon Germany, as a model for their own systems. Its geographic middle position has now made Germany the East of the West and, simultaneously the West of the East. Germany, in its own best interest, has to use this position to reconcile and help bringing together again the two parts of the European continent.

As we have seen previously already, the nature of united Germany has changed in several aspects - whether the world, and Germany in particular, like it or not.[1] In the

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[1] See also Bruno Schoch, "Germany Assumes a Dominant Position in the 'European House" in: Baranovsky, Vladimir and Hans-Joachim Spanger, eds., *In from the Cold: Germany, Russia, and the Future of Europe*, Boulder (CO) 1992, pp. 189-92.

first place the restrictions on sovereignty, applied by the victors of the Second World War to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, have been lifted.

Secondly, Helmut Schmidt's description of the Federal Republic as "an economic giant and a political dwarf" has begun to lose some of its previous certainty. With the inclusion of the former East German economy, united Germany has secured an even stronger position of dominance in Europe. The new Germany produces more than a quarter of the gross national product of the EC. Even without European currency union, the D-mark plays *de facto* already the role of leading currency in Europe; moreover, it is, after the dollar, the second most important reserve currency in the world. Despite some short-term risks and costs after unification, most experts believe that Germany's leading position as the leading economic power in Europe has, in the medium term, been strengthened.[2]

In the third place, Germany's territory has increased by almost one third. Germany is now the third largest territorial state in the Community, after France and Spain, and the most populous after Russia (almost 79 million) with almost a quarter of the total population of the EC in 1990.

In the fourth place, the unity of Germany and the disintegration of the Eastern Bloc are two facets of one and the same historic event. The same principle that led to the unification of German - namely the right to national self-determination - harbors a

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[2] See Reinhard Rode, "Deutschland: Weltwirtschaftsmacht oder überforderter Euro-Hegemon?" ("Germany: World Economic Power or Overstrained Euro-Hegemon?") in *HSFK-Report*, no. 1, 1991; also Reinhard Büscher and Jochen Jomann, *Japan und Deutschland: Die spaeten Sieger?* ("Japan and Germany: The Late Victors?"), Zürich 1990.

dynamic which, for multi-ethnic communities such as Yugoslavia, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, led to fragmentation.

In the fifth place, because of its increased economic power, the Federal Republic has become the most important political partner of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as its major successor states, in Europe.

Finally, there is the fact that with the formation of a sovereign Germany, France and Britain have lost their militarily based advantages as victorious powers, charged with keeping a watchful eye on Germany. As the disarmament process continues and economic performance tends to replace nuclear capabilities as the crucial ingredient of international power, the importance of French and British nuclear weapons is, in any case, being diminished.[3]

Germany's new international standing is often characterized in the following way: "On October 3, 1990, Germany re-entered European politics as a great power."[4] Or, as Augstein sees it, Germany is now one of the three most potent countries in the world. It belongs in the great-power category; indeed, in Europe it is the only real superpower.[5] As we see it, Germany's influence is growing and declining at one and the same time. A growing number of decisions are taken at the level of the European Union. Today, international relations in Europe are characterized by the overcoming

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[3] See Walter Stützle, "Auf dem Weg zu einer neuen europaeisch-amerikanischen Sicherheitsstruktur" ("On the Road to a New European-American Security Order") in: Werner Weidenfeld and Walther Stützle, *Abschied von der alten Ordnung* ("Farewell to the Old Order"), working paper no. 5, Gütersloh 1990, p. 21.

[4] Eberhard Schulz, "Die Doppelkrise im Baltikum und am Golf" ("The Double Crisis on the Balkans and in the Gulf") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 46, no. 3, 1991, p. 78.

[5] As quoted by Christoph Bertram, "Der Riese, der ein Zwerg sein möchte" ("The Giant Who Would Like to Be a Dwarf") in *Die Zeit*, April 26, 1991.

of the former power-oriented nation-state. As Stuth has put it: "There is a German influence in Europe which is hardly identical with that of the nation-state Germany."[6] Certainly, Germany is, as far as the will to promote integration is concerned, the leading country in the European Union, together with France.

On a theoretical level, we can differentiate between two schools of thought that have influenced Germany's impact on European integration. These are the integrationist and the realist schools of thought. The integrationist school of thought is regarded as an idealist approach within the context of European integration. It foresees joint action, supranational decision-making and the creation of common institutions as an appropriate way of responding to economic and political challenges. Therefore, in view of the upheavals in Eastern Europe and the changed nature of united Germany, this approach favors deepening the European Community, in order to bind Germany tightly into the Community and to provide a pole of stability for Europe.

The realist school of thought draws upon the concepts of the balance of power, and considers international relations mostly as a zero-sum game. After German unification, realists have argued that unification strengthened Germany's power-potential and that further integration of the European Community, in which Germany would play a dominant role, should be avoided. Common institutions and legal frameworks to contain nation-states and their inclination to pursue national interests are not considered to be adequate by this school.

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[6] Reinhard Stuth, "Germany's New Role in a Changing Europe" in *Aussenpolitik* (English edition), vol. 43, no. 1, 1992, p. 26.

The difference between these two approaches can also be reduced to the question over the relationship between politics and economics, or the "private sector dynamic and the more traditional government-led process of formal integration".[7] As we have seen in our initial discussion of schools of thought, integration theorists do not agree upon the factors bringing about integration. Some regard "spill-over" from the economic sphere into the political as the foremost factor, while others stress political leadership and "political acts of will" to be most important. We hope that our analysis will provide some insight into this debate, at least as far as Germany is concerned.

As we have outlined before, the Federal Republic's foreign policy prior to 1989 was strongly influenced by the integrationist school of thought, which manifested itself in the country's emphasis on multilateral cooperation and its commitment to the European Community. After unification, however, a shift towards "benign" realism has been observed. This is mainly due to the changed international environment and to pressures from Germany's partners and neighbors. In the following, we will examine whether the realist or integrationist schools of thought have had any impact on the foreign-policy making in the new Germany.

While it has been widely recognized that German unification acted as a "catalyst of change"[8], we will analyze in which particular way Germany has influenced European economic and political integration, a new security structure, and determine what the nature of Germany's involvement in Eastern Europe is. To this end, we will discuss

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[7] Albert Bressand, "The 1992 Breakthrough and the Global Economic Integration Agenda" in: Jonathan Story, ed., *The New Europe: Politics, Government and Economy since* 1945, Cambridge (MA) 1993, p. 317.

[8] Barbara Lippert et al., *German Unification and EC Integration: German and British Perspectives*, London 1993, p. 1.

the new course the European Union has taken since the Maastricht Treaty, new European security arrangements, and Germany's relationship with Eastern Europe. In the process, we hope to shed some light on the question of whether Germany has become, or is on the way of becoming, Europe's new "superpower" or "hegemon". We will further see whether Germany's commitment to European unification has undergone any change when compared to the time before unification. In view of the ongoing debate between Euro-skeptics and European federalists, we will work out which contribution united Germany has made, and will make, to the future of the European Union.

8.1. United Germany's Impact on European Economic Integration

For a very long time, the dream of creating a single European currency has been at the heart of European unification, particularly of economic integration. This dream, which had already been harbored by the old Romans, has never gained momentum until the American President Nixon announced in mid-1971 that the US-dollar was no longer to be automatically convertible into gold. The chaos that followed convinced Europeans that they had to stand together and respond collectively to this challenge. The first defense system Europeans invented in 1972, was the "snake in the tunnel". This system envisaged to limit the fluctuations between the currencies of the European Community member-states to 2.25%, up or down. The graphic representation of the fluctuating currencies within this 4.5% band resembled a moving snake. Unfortunately, the system proved unable to contain currency fluctuations. When the D-mark started to rise the following year, half of the members left the system.

The response to that crisis was the invention of a scheme of "combined floating", in which exchange rates were agreed upon and readjusted, whenever market conditions required it. This system continued for six years, with the D-mark steadily appreciating against the other national currencies. In 1978, French President Giscard d'Estaing and German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt reformed the snake-system and called it the European Monetary System (EMS). This system continued to be based on "fixed but flexible" exchange rates. However, it introduced a new element: It calculated currency values by comparison with the European Currency Unit (ECU), a newly invented unit that existed only as book money in banks and finance ministries.

While opposition to the EMS - especially among neo-liberal economists - was great before it was introduced, it turned out to work remarkably well and steady European money markets. Critics note, however, that exchange rates had to be realigned as much as 18 times a year. The EMS underwent its biggest crisis in September 1992, when four national currencies - the British pound, the Italian lira, the Spanish peseta and the Portuguese escudo - had to leave the system. In consequence, exchange-rate fluctuations were for some time permitted to be up as high as 15%, a fact which was criticized to characterize a "non-system".

In the second half of the 1980s, EC-Commission President Delors, in an effort to overcome "Eurosclerosis", proposed to create a true Common Market in goods, services, labor, and capital. This resulted in the Single Market, that came into effect on January 1, 1993. Delors also proposed further intensification of European cooperation in foreign, economic and monetary policy. Whereas most countries were

opposed to cede significant sovereignty to the European Community in foreign policy, France and Germany both backed Delors' monetary suggestions. Delors' proposals resulted in the Maastricht Conference of December 1991.

After much discussions and some national referenda (in Denmark, France and Ireland), the Maastricht Treaty was ratified by all European Community member-states in 1992. The Maastricht Treaty ended the negotiations of an intergovernmental conference started in Rome one year earlier on political union and economic and monetary union. It established a *European Union*, consisting of three pillars[9]: One is the old European Community, based on a revision of the Treaty of Rome and including provisions for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The second new pillar covered foreign and security affairs, enlarging institutionalized European Political Cooperation (EPC), and leading to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The third new pillar envisaged cooperation on justice and domestic affairs, i.e. policies on asylum, immigration, frontier rules, crime, customs, terrorism and drugs.

In order to establish the nature of Germany's impact on European economic integration after unification, we will, in the first place, examine its influence on economic and monetary union. We will do this by examining the German rationale for its support, and the way the German population has reacted to the prospect of having to give up the D-mark. In the process, we will find our hypothesis confirmed that

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[9] For a brief and concise overview see: "Maastricht at a Glance" in *The Economist*, October 17, 1992, pp. 60-61.

European integration is, above all, brought about by political "acts of will", rather than automatic spill-over from the economic sphere into the political.

Despite some claims to the contrary, European integration, as we perceive it, has been a direct reaction to World War Two, that is to say its main purpose was to make war impossible. This has been particularly valid for its two major promoters, Germany and France. The reconciliation between the two old war enemies developed into the legendary French-German friendship, institutionalized by a friendship treaty, and has many times provided new impetus to European integration. Throughout the Community's history, economics has been "the handmaiden to politics"[10], that is to say economic arguments were used to achieve political goals. The latest proof for this suggestion is the way German Chancellor Kohl has pushed for economic and monetary integration.

In the forefront, of course, there are abundant economic reasons for economic and monetary union, at the heart of which is the introduction of the ECU, the "Euro", as it is referred to in Germany and elsewhere. As the CDU claims: "The introduction of a common European currency is the logical complementation to the Single Market. (...) A common stable European currency is of a considerable advantage to our economy, which is especially strong in the export sector."[11] German Finance Minister Theo Waigel has said that "economic and currency union is Europe's forward-looking answer to globalization."[12] The SPD calls the Euro an "inflation killer" and defends its

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[10] Michael Elliot, "A New Europe", special report, in *Newsweek International*, February 3, 1997, p. 10.

[11] CDU, "Der Euro: Auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen europaeischen Waehrung" ("The 'Euro': On the Road to a Common European Currency"), brochure, 1998, p. 2.

[12] Theo Waigel, "Our Future is Europe" in *Newsweek International*, February 3, 1997, p. 23.

introduction as a necessary means for the European Union "to defend itself self-consciously on the global marketplace."[13] In fact, a single currency and convergence of national macroeconomic policies follow directly from the existence of an open economic space. The Single Market has undoubtedly stimulated European economies and has accelerated technological progress, that is necessary for European states in order to adapt to the new conditions of the global economy. In the words of Jacques Delors, in the longer run, "EMU should also promote the partial harmonization of national tax and labor policies. In other words, the virtuous cycle now underway should lead, via a single currency, to still further economic integration."[14]

German entrepreneurs take a, reportedly, positive stance towards the Single Market and regard economic and monetary union as an "indispensable complementation to the Common Market which, in monetary terms, will be perfected through the introduction of a common currency."[15] Bressand is of the opinion that "the 1992 process has been initiated by large European firms acutely aware of the decreasing - and often counter-productive - role of protected national markets in today's global competition."[16] In his view, "European politicians of all creeds have been taken by surprise by the process they had themselves put in motion." Thus, he implies that the relationship between this private sector dynamic and the more traditional government-led process of formal integration is undergoing a change in favor of the former. Nevertheless, most analysts recognize the superiority of politics to economics. Delors

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[13] Die SPD-Abgeordneten im Europaeischen Parlament, "In unserem Interesse: Der Euro" ("In Our Own Interest: The 'Euro'"), brochure, 1998.
[14] Jacques Delors, "Keep on Keeping on" in *Newsweek International*, February 3, 1997, p. 15.
[15] Hans Peter Stihl, "Chance Europa: Die europaeische Einigung aus Sicht der deutschen Wirtschaft" ("Opportunity Europe: European Integration from the Point of View of the German Economy") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, January 1, 1993, p. 26.
[16] Albert Bressand, "The 1992 Breakthrough and the Global Economic Integration Agenda", pp. 314-17.

regards EMU as "the crowning effort of a decade of efforts that were undertaken und pursued for compelling reasons, both political and economic. Here, as elsewhere, politics has been the dominant force."[17]

The rationale behind Chancellor Kohl's push for economic and monetary union at the Maastricht Conference, and again at the 1996 Amsterdam Conference, was to bind Germany irrevocably into the European Union. By giving up the D-mark, the love of which comes closest to pronounced nationalism in Germany, the Germans would demonstrate that they are truly committed to European integration, even if such sacrifices are the price to be paid. France, especially, shared the view that a common currency would tie Germany closer to Western Europe and, at the same time, also diminish German economic hegemony.

As has been outlined earlier, Chancellor Kohl was going to great lengths during the unification process to ensure that the grounds for the fear of Germany among several neighboring countries were weakened. His European vocation has not been questioned, and yet it is evident that the decision to go all the way for a European currency was part of Germany's political strategy of dealing with national unification. Astonishingly, support for the introduction of a European currency was not even been withheld by the oppositional SPD, at least not publicly. When Gerhard Schröder, Kohl's challenger in the 1998 national election, rose some hard questions about monetary union in 1996, that were in line with public concerns about a devaluation of the D-mark, he was quickly silenced by his co-party leaders. In political circles, support for currency union equals support for Europe. Those against currency union

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[17] Jacques Delors, "Keep on Keeping on", p. 15.

are accused of being against European integration which equals peace. Volle has summed up the discussion about the introduction of the Euro adequately by stating that "Germans would probably resent it if they were told that the main rationale for the Euro is that Germany is not trusted. But that is the rationale."[18]

In contrast to the political elite, public opinion has been largely opposed to EMU. Stopping short of rebellion, opposition in 1996 reached such levels that some talked about "Europhobia".[19] Especially in France and Germany, anti-European voices became so loud that the 1999-deadline for the introduction of the Euro seemed in danger. In Germany, the mass daily *Die Bildzeitung* launched an "anti-Euro" campaign stirring up public opinion against EMU. At the beginning of 1998, four German academics, who believed that EMU should be postponed, filed a complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. Although the case was later dismissed, the damage had been done. About the same time, however, a group of 155 economists from Germany and Austria published a manifesto calling for a controlled delay of monetary union. This was being dismissed by the Federal Government with the argument if currency union were delayed it would never happen.

In an investigation for *The European* newspaper, the following data for Germany on this issue have been found[20]: Support for a European central bank fell from 54% in 1994 to 43% in 1996 (with 51% to 57% respectively in France), while opposition to a

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[18] Angelika Volle, the editor of the journal *Internationale Politik*, as quoted by Andrew Nagorski, "Nothing to Debate about" in *Newsweek International*, February 3, 1997, p. 22.
[19] See for instance Michael Hirsh, "Dreading EMU" in *Newsweek International*, January 29, 1996, p. 36.
[20] Data are reprinted in: Robert M Worcester, "The Vital Statistics" in *Newsweek International*, February 3, 1997, p. 21.

single European currency grew from 50% to 52% in the same period[21] (with 25% to 29% respectively in France). Astonishingly, support for a "United States of Europe", with a federal government, grew in Germany from 25% in 1994 to 41% in 1996, opposition declined from 67% in 1994 down to 45%, while 8% had no opinion in 1994, and 18% in 1996. The data have also revealed that, in 1996, fewer Germans were opposed to a United States of Europe than the French (52%). Support in France amounted only to 38% in 1996. Worcester has interpreted the data for Germany with the skepticism there about the strength of the Euro as compared with the D-mark, and that these fears may have been nurtured by reports at the time that the first head of the European Central Bank could be a "French bureaucrat-politician".[22]

The German Government's answer to public fears were assurances that they would use all their influence to make the Euro as hard and stable as the D-mark. The CDU has, in fact, maintained that the introduction of the Euro is "a mere technical currency conversion. (...) Purchasing power and the price-service relationship remain unaltered."[23] In order to make the Euro a stable currency, Germany has used all its influence during the Maastricht and Amsterdam Conferences to set up criteria for countries wishing to enter EMU. The conditions, under which sufficient economic convergence for a currency union is believed to be achieved, are the following:[24]

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[21] Axel Bunz, the head of the European Commission's representation in Germany, is quoted by the CDU as having stated on May 9, 1996, that the percentage of those opposed to the Euro has declined to 48% according to a poll conducted for the European Commission. In: CDU, "Franzosen und Deutsche einig: "Europa" Voraussetzung für Frieden" ("The French and Germans Agree: "Europe" is the Precondition for Peace"), manuscript, Bonn 1996, p. 2.
[22] Ibid.
[23] CDU, "Der Euro: Auf dem Weg zu einer gemeinsamen europaeischen Waehrung", p. 9.
[24] Rolf H. Hasse, "Europaeische Zentralbank: Europaeische Waehrungsunion ante portas?" ("The European Central Bank: A European Currency Union Ante Portas?") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, February 7, 1992, p. 29. Haas provides a good overview over the critique of envisaged economic and monetary union.

1. Budgetary discipline: Annual new debts shall not surpass 3% of gross domestic product, and overall indebtedness of all public households is not to exceed gross domestic product by more than 60%. This criterion has, however, been weakened by the stipulation that countries, like Belgium, with a much too high budget deficit (here over 150%) need merely to show a clear tendency to approach the goal of 60%. It was due to this arrangement that Belgium was finally able to join the other ten European Union members in the start of EMU on January 1, 1999.

2. Inflation rate: One year before the final phase of EMU starts, i.e. in 1998, the increase in consumer prices shall not exceed the figure of the three most stable EU-countries by more than 1.5.%.

3. Strength of national currencies: The respective national currency is required to have been noted without depreciation within the bands of the EMS exchange-rate mechanism for at least two years.

4. Interest rates: Long-term interest rates shall not have exceeded those of the three most stable EU-countries by more than 2% for at least a year.

Despite Germany's pressure for tight entry conditions, still in 1997, it seemed unsure whether Germany itself would be able to meet these criteria. At the beginning of 1997, in fact, of all European Union countries only Luxembourg fulfilled all criteria. In 1997, an outcry went through Germany when Finance Minister Waigel considered using the gold reserves of the *Bundesbank* to pay for national debts. Surprisingly, by 1998, there were 11 states that applied for, and fulfilled, the conditions for being

included in the first round of EMU-participants. Left out were Greece and Portugal, that did not meet the criteria, and Denmark and Great Britain, that had reserved the right to "opt-out". Additionally, the German insistence on strict entrance criteria for currency union was carried even further by the "stability pact" - initiated by Finance Minister Waigel - which envisages fines for EMU-participants that run high budget deficits and allow high inflation.

On an institutional level, the German Government has been leading the efforts of setting up the European Central Bank (ECB). The first major obstacle to be taken was the location of the Bank. Kohl and his aides were able to convince the rest of the European Union that the Bank had to be located in Frankfurt. Since 1994, with the beginning of stage two of EMU, the European Monetary Institute has been working in close cooperation with national federal banks. In 1999, the ECB will be established and is scheduled to take control of monetary policy in the participating countries by the year 2000. In 2002, then, Euro notes and coins will replace national currencies. It was, of course, much discussed who would head the ECB. Germany, satisfied for the beginning with the Bank's location, nevertheless openly supported its selected candidate, a Dutchman. Yet, in the summer of 1998, France suddenly challenged the candidate, and only a compromise - the Dutchman Wim Duisenberg would serve the first half of his term, and the French candidate the second half - saved the reputation of the ECB, not after having done damage to its reputation caused by political bickering, before EMU even got into its last phase. German influence on monetary policy is not likely to be as great as it would like. Yet, the new European Central Bank Council is modeled upon the German banking organization. National central banks will not to be abolished, but will rather become a part of the European Central

Bank System, their presidents will be represented together with the ECB's President, vice-president and up to four directors in the Council.[25] Today, the present German *Bundesbank* is already the center of a central bank system, which is composed of nine federal state central banks.

The fact that the new ECB will be independent in fixing the value of the Euro and set interest rates, reflects equally the nature of the German *Bundesbank*. This constitutes a German victory over the French model of a central bank, in which the French Central Bank is traditionally subjected to political control. The *Bundesbank's* crusade against inflation - traditionally the highest monetary policy goal in the Federal Republic - is meant to set an example for the ECB. The *Bundesbank* had most spectacularly proven its independence in December 1991, when it raised the leading market interest rate, the "Lombard rate", to a record 9.75%. In July 1992, it decided to raise the discount rate to 8.75%.[26] These measures were necessary, as the Bank explained, in order to cope with economic difficulties arising from national unification. It has already been mentioned that the *Bundesbank* had opposed the exchange ratio of 1:1 for the East German mark to the D-mark, and this was its way of reacting to political decisions. Its decision, however, sent shock waves across Western Europe and provoked the rightly claimed criticism that Germany's neighbors were made to pay for German unification. The German Government, however, could not be held responsible for the Bank's actions; it was only to be blamed for policies leading to an explosion of demand and

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[25] For a good overview of what the new European Central Bank System will look like, see: "Die neuen Waehrungshüter" ("The New Currency Guardians") in *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, February 26, 1998, p. 24.

[26] See William Horsley, "United Germany's Seven Cardinal Sins: A Critique of German Foreign Policy" in *Millenium*, vol. 21, no. 2, 1992, p. 237.

the supply of money. Nevertheless, the Bank's President, Karl-Otto Pöhl, resigned later over these disputes with the Government.

8.2. United Germany's Impact on European Political Union

Among political issues concerning the European Union, the so-called "democratic deficit", that is to say the lack of legitimacy of the Union's institutions and their decisions, is thought to be the most significant one. This critique, or the debate over how to eliminate the democratic deficit, is as old as the Community itself. However, the debate was traditionally restricted to segments of European political elites and experts. A former vice-president of the European Parliament has remarked that, under the traditional understanding of the rules for democratic life, one has to make certain reservations concerning the European Parliament. He called the European Commission an "embryo of a government which has not yet evolved into one", the European Parliament an "itinerant circus in search of location and destiny", and the Council of Ministers a "controlling organ that concentrates authority and decision-making power onto itself."[27] Apart from the fact that the Parliament has found a permanent location, this characterization is still valid today.

The democratic deficit is noticeable on three different levels: the level of institutions, the level of socio-political mediating structures - that is to say parties, associations,

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[27] Enrique Baron Crespo, "Europa als demokratische Herausforderung: Kein Binnenmarkt ohne starkes Parlament" ("Europe as a Democratic Challenge: No Single Market without a Strong Parliament") in *Integration*, vol. 12, no. 1, 1989, p. 4.

and press - and the level of individual citizens.[28] Since the Maastricht Treaty - or the Treaty on European Union, as it is officially called - it has become apparent that the last two levels, which have formerly been neglected due to the assumption of an existing "permissive consensus", are factors not to be left outside of political considerations by integrationist elites. As has already been shown, especially since the completion of the Single Market and the Maastricht Treaty, ordinary citizens have started to be aware of the direct impact the European Union has on them and, in contrast, the little, indirect influence they themselves have on policy-making at the European level. Public upheavals, not only in Germany, in the wake of Maastricht, have made it clear that, on the one hand, citizens are not sufficiently informed on European affairs, but that, on the other hand, they insist very much in being consulted about their opinion concerning future European developments.

The "permissive consensus" made it possible for European integration to be dominated by the "confederate-intergovernmental component"[29]. This means that citizens, literally, did not have a choice within the political system of the Community. The Council of Ministers, the place where political decisions encroaching upon the national sovereignty of the Union's member-states are taken, used to meet behind closed doors, not revealing which national minister took which position on a certain issue. This practice, however, has changed. The Council now even allows some parts

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[28] For literature on the democratic deficit at different levels see: Werner Weidenfeld, ed., *Wie Europa verfasst sein soll* ("The Way Europe Shall Be Constituted"), Gütersloh 1990; Karlheinz Reif, "Wahlen, Waehler und Demokratie in der EG: Die drei Dimensionen des demokratischen Defizits" ("Elections, Voters and Democracy in the EC: The Three Dimensions of the Democratic Deficit") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, May 1, 1992, pp. 43-52; M. Rainer Lepsius, "Nationalstaat oder Nationalitaetenstaat als Modell für die Weiterentwicklung der Europaeischen Gemeinschaft" ("Nation-State or State of Nationalities as a Model for the Development of the European Community") in: Rudolf Wildenmann, ed., *Staatswerdung Europas?* ("Is Europe Becoming a State?"), Baden-Baden 1991.

[29] Karlheinz Reif, "Wahlen, Waehler und Demokratie in der EG: Die drei Dimensionen des demokratischen Defizits", p. 44.

of formal sessions to be televised, and has also increased information on its activities and decisions by publishing the results of votes when it acts as a legislator. The Commission's president, a figure trying to resemble a European prime minister, used to be appointed by the Council of Ministers exclusively. Due to the lack of a true European party system where parties run on European issues, European parliamentary elections were an extension of national elections, seen as an opportunity to approve or disapprove of incumbent national parties.

The main focus of democratic participation for citizens is, of course, the European Parliament. It has come a long way since it was set up as a purely consultative body by the Treaties of Rome in 1958. Then, its only real power was the right to dismiss the European Commission through a vote of censure. In 1975, the Parliament acquired the right to reject the annual budget. In those days, the Parliament's members were nominated from amongst the members of the national parliaments of the Community's member-states. The first direct elections, whereby European parliamentarians were elected under universal suffrage by voters in the member-states, took place in 1979. The first real extension of the Parliament's legislative powers came in 1987 with the Single European Act. Through the so-called cooperation procedure, the Parliament was given the right to a second reading on draft legislation concerning the Single Market and to propose amendments. It also acquired the right to veto treaties signed by the Community concerning the accession or association of third countries.

As a Eurobarometer survey of 1992 has shown[30], the two most important aspects of western Germans' motivation (there are no data for eastern Germans) to participate in

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[30] As quoted in ibid., p. 48.

national parliamentary elections were "to help strengthening a party" (59%) and "contribute to preserving, or ousting, the incumbent government" (36%). Since there are yet no true European parties for which citizens could vote, the second aspect is all the more important within the context of the European Union. To this end, the two intergovernmental conferences of 1992 and 1996 (Maastricht and Amsterdam respectively), have brought about some significant changes for the European Parliament, particularly at the insistence of Germany. Yet, participation in European parliamentary elections, which has from the beginning been considerably lower than in national elections, has steadily declined from 65.7% in 1979 to 60.1% in 1994.[31] However, explanations for this are numerous and most of the time based on speculation.[32] Therefore, it must suffice here to note that this fact is another indication of the democratic deficit. Concerning the level of satisfaction with democracy in the Union, a Eurobarometer survey of 1993[33] has found data for Germany (47% were satisfied) to be slightly above the European average (44%). The level of satisfaction Community-wide ranged from 60% in Luxembourg to only 34% in Italy.

The negotiations on European political union must be regarded in the light of the different perceptions member-states held regarding the nature and future of the Community. Political union was viewed in the first place, and continues to be viewed, especially by France and Britain as a question of common foreign policy, to be coordinated and practiced at an intergovernmental level. In short, it was viewed as an intensification of European Political Cooperation (EPC) that had been established in

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[31] See Rudolf Hrbek, "Das neue Europaeische Parlament: mehr Vielfalt - weniger Handlungsfaehigkeit?" ("The New European Parliament: More Diversity - Less Capacity to Act?") in *Integration*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1994, p. 159.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Eurobarometer survey no. 40, 1993, reprinted in: European Commission, "Democracy at Work in the European Union", brochure, 1994, p. 7.

1987. On the other hand, Italy, Belgium, and especially Germany, regarded a political union primarily as the reform of European institutions, democratizing the European decision-making process and deepening federal components.

Shortly after the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had been born, its Parliamentary Assembly worked out a "European Defense Treaty" and a treaty for a "European Political Community". However, after the treaties had been ratified by five national parliaments, the sixth and last one, the French Parliament, failed to give its support in 1954. After integration in the security area had been transferred to NATO, the European Community stayed clearly behind the envisaged "European Political Community" regarding its democratic nature. All following attempts towards a political union were hampered by the French resistance, and direct European parliamentary elections postponed for more than a decade until 1979.

Before the Maastricht Summit, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, in his special effort to promote European integration after German unification, had made it clear that, for Germany, economic and monetary union had to go hand in hand with political union, the second one being an indispensable fundament for the success of the first.[34] Also Jacques Delors, in a speech to the European Parliament in 1990, reiterated the significance of institutional reform:[35]

> (...) It will be impossible from now on to separate the Community's economic role from its political one, (...) whether the topic is economic and monetary union or political cooperation, we come back in the end to the question of institutions, because this is the only way of strengthening the Community's authority and giving it greater scope for action.

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[34] See also: Helmut Kohl, declaration by the German Chancellor at the end of the European Council in Luxembourg on June 29, 1991, in *Bulletin*, no. 78, July 9, 1991, p. 635.
[35] As quoted by Leigh Bruce, "Europe's Locomotive" in *Foreign Policy*, vol. 78, spring 1990, p. 71.

Yet, it became soon evident that this demand was mere fiction, and was later dismissed. This was due to the level of progress in integration that had been previously reached in these two areas. Integration in the economic and monetary field had already considerably advanced during the preparations for the Single Market, and the so-called "Delors-Committee" had already worked out many details for economic and monetary union. Therefore, negotiations in this area proceeded much faster and smoother than the negotiations on political union, where negotiators had to start practically from zero and had to address much more disputed topics such as a common foreign and defense policy.

Despite extensive critique - the Greens, for instance, voted against the Amsterdam Treaty in the *Bundestag* on October 2, 1997, on the grounds that "it is disappointing, measured against the promises for a political union given in Maastricht"[36] - the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties nevertheless introduced new powers for the European Parliament, thus helping to reduce the democratic deficit. Perhaps the most important change, from the point of view of European voters, is the Parliament's participation in deciding, together with the European Council, who will head the European Commission, and who its commissioners will be. To that end, the previously deviating time in office of the Commission's (four years) and the European Parliament's legislative period (five years) have been harmonized by raising the Commission time in office also to five years. Previously, the Parliament could merely vote the whole Commission out of office with a two-thirds majority. The Parliament's

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[36] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, "Beschluss zum Amsterdamer Vertrag" ("Decision on the Amsterdam Treaty"), decision by the 9th Ordinary Federal Assembly in Kassel on November 14-16, 1997, p. 1.

new function was first put into practice, when the new Commission under Jacques Santer took up its work.

Furthermore, the European Parliament does now have the power to ratify all agreements concluded between the European Union and third countries, if they are of a political, economic or financial nature. Previously, the Parliament had already the right to consent to association and accession treaties. The Parliament has now also been made an equal partner with the Council of Ministers in decisions to be taken with qualified majority in the Council. In decisions affecting the Single Market and other selected issues, such as research and development, the Parliament has to consent with absolute majority.

Additionally, the Parliament is now authorized to exercise control over the bureaucracies of the Commission, as well as the Council of Ministers, by setting up committees conducting inquiries into certain issues. In case the European parliamentarians reject a draft law of the Council, or if the Council rejects amendments made by Parliament, the two sides form a "conciliation committee", modelled upon the German system.[37] If the committee cannot find a compromise, the law cannot pass. If a compromise does emerge, both the Parliament and the Council must endorse it. Despite these changes, however, a number of fundamental goals have not yet been achieved, as the Parliament's former president Egon Klepsch has pointed

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[37] Peter Hort, "Europas Aussenpolitik - ein Fernziel" ("Europe's Foreign Policy - A Distant Goal") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 46, no. 20, 1991, p. 579.

out.[38] These are full co-decisional powers in all the Union's legislation, full budgetary

powers including revenues, and the right to consent to modifications in the treaties.

During its last presidency of the European Union, which Germany held in the second

half of 1994, the country used its influence in setting the European agenda.[39]

Particularly the European Summit in Essen in December 1994, which marked both

the end as well as the climax of the German presidency, brought about the following

results[40]. In the first place, the European Union's Eastern enlargement was basically

approved by the summit-members. As will be outlined a little later, Germany has a

special interest in Eastern enlargement. Due to the fact that the Kohl-government

regards European unification primarily as a task to preserve peace and stability in

Europe, Germany has laid special emphasis in its presidency on strengthening the

Union's "influence as a political and economic anchor of stability"[41] in that region. To

that end, opening up the European market to products from Middle and Eastern

European countries, an ever closer partnership with these countries, especially

through opening the possibility of membership in the European Union and a program

designed to approach these countries to the Union, was initiated.

Furthermore, during its presidency, Germany worked towards creating new, and more

attractive jobs within the European Union. This was especially important to Helmut

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[38] See Egon A. Klepsch, "Das Europaeische Parlament und das europaeische Einigungswerk: Einschaetzungen und Vorschlaege" ("The European Parliament and European Unification: Assessment and Proposals") in *Integration*, vol. 17, no. 2. 1994. p. 62.

[39] For a detailed preview of the German EU-presidency see: Friedrich Bohl, "Ziele der deutschen Praesidentschaft in der Europaeischen Union" ("Goals of the German Presidency in the European Union") in *Integration*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1994, pp. 133-147.

[40] See also Anke Gimbal, "Der Gipfel in Essen: Rückblick und Ausblick" ("The Summit in Essen: Review and Outlook") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 1, 1995, pp. 64-65.

[41] Klaus Kinkel, speech by the German Foreign Minister on December 14, 1994, before the European Parliament in Strasbourg, in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 1, 1995, p. 123.

Kohl, in accordance with Germany's unemployment problems and efforts to secure the "industrial location Germany" (*Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland*). Another focus of attention during the German presidency were activities of the European Union in the area of domestic and justice affairs, the third pillar of European political union. Here, especially the creation of a European police force, Europol, was promoted but not yet brought to a conclusion. Regarding efforts to democratize the European Union, a directive to allow European citizens to vote and stand as candidates in European and local elections, regardless of their place of residence, was introduced. This right had been granted to citizens in the Treaty on Political Union, thus enhancing the legitimacy of the European Parliament. However, up to date, this directive has been implemented in only a few communal districts in Germany. Despite the fact that Foreign Minister Kinkel has confirmed that the European Parliament and strengthening democratic control are "an important element for European identity"[42], it is striking that this point has been raised only at the end of a catalogue of priorities.

The judgment of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty on European Union has caused some irritation in Germany, and is therefore worth mentioning here. The ruling, which was passed on October 12, 1993[43], appears at first sight to welcome the treaty. However, despite the fact that the Court has stressed the "supporting function" of the European Parliament and emphasized that its powers must be broadened as the European Union's activities increase, legitimacy is exclusively derived from the peoples of the Union's member-states. This means that democratic legitimacy of the Union's legislative power is derived from national parliaments, while the European

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[42] Ibid., p. 126.
[43] The text of the ruling can be found in *Neue Juristische Wochenschrift*, October 1993, p. 3047.

Parliament has, due to its lack of a basis within a European people, only a supporting function.

Theoretically it can hardly be challenged that the member-states have the power to dissolve the Union or, at least, regress it substantially, thus supporting the view that the Union is a confederation of states. It has, however, been criticized that practically, apart from quite revolutionary developments, the degree of complexity and interweaving, and the existence of rights for European citizens, this appears to be impossible.[44] In fact, apart from the fact that the state of the European economy has reached such a level, even at the time of the ruling in 1993, that rolling back previously achieved economic integration would involve such high costs that no government is thought willing to bear, citizens and economic enterprises are directly involved. On the one hand, they are directly affected by the Union's legislation. On the other hand, they take direct influence on the Union's political nature by electing representatives to the European Parliament. Moreover, in united Germany, the modification of Article 23 of the *Basic Law* has raised the integration of the Federal Republic into the European Union to a national goal.

To be sure, democracy in a mass society cannot exist without a representative parliament. However, the representation of the European people does not correspond to the requirements of constitutional states, not least because of special regulations for smaller member-states with low population figures. Yet, some important elements do exist and continue to be broadened, thus contributing to a certain degree to the

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[44] See Ulrich Everling, "Das Maastricht-Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Europaeischen Union" ("The Maastricht-Ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court and Its Significance for the Development of the European Union") in *Integration*, vol. 17, no. 3, 1994, p. 166-67.

Union's legitimacy. Accordingly, it must be recognized that the European Union's powers are already democratically legitimate in a twofold sense. In the first place, legitimization is derived directly from the member-states. National parliaments have given their consent to the transfer of national sovereignty, and democratically elected and responsible representatives shape policies in the Council of Ministers. In the second place, the Union legitimizes itself through the European Parliament, which gradually expands its powers. In this sense, the Union is not merely a confederation of states anymore, but also a community of citizens.

In this context, Germany's impact on the development of the European Union's federal structure must also be mentioned. As we have shown already, the declared goal of all major German political parties is to develop the European Union into a federation. This consensus among politicians can be explained with the positive experience Germany has made with its own federal system after the Second World War, a system that had not been artificially imposed on it by the Allied Forces, but was an outgrowth of centuries of splintered principalities. For the Germans, a federation stands for decentralized power, whereas, for instance, in the minds of many British people it stands for a European centralized state, in which all major decisions are taken in Brussels, far away from home. Hence, the German fervor for a European federal state, and the British opposition to it, may be explained.

The German Government's enthusiasm for a European federation can be observed in two developments. In the first place, Germany has pushed for the introduction of majority voting instead of unanimity. In this way, the nation-states' sovereignty was sought to be further weakened and deadlocks in the Union's decision-making process

to be avoided. Since this proposal has failed over the resistance of some countries, an alternative way that was developed is the "majority-plus-one" formula, which allows one country to abstain from especially sensitive decisions, without blocking the others to go ahead. Majority-voting in general, however, is rather rare and often subject to intensive negotiations regarding to which areas it might apply. Yet, the CDU has not given up on introducing the principle of majority-voting in all decisions, including even important military decisions within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.[45]

The second development is Germany's outspoken support for the "principle of subsidiarity", enshrined in the Treaty on European Union, and designed to become the key-term for the future development of the Union. Superficially, this principle shall solve the dispute over which policy areas are to be regulated by the Union, and which ones are to remain within the competence of the member-states. In practice, the subsidiarity principle results in increased competence of the Union. Alone the stipulation that the Union can act in the event of direct or indirect distortions of economic competition, allows a broad enlargement of the EU-Commission's activities, such as in the energy and transport-infrastructure sectors, or in the educational sector, not to mention foreign and security policy that are the classic policy fields of the central power in almost every federation.[46] Critics ask, of course,

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[45] See: "Vorstand der Unionsfraktion für Mehrheitsprinzip in der EU" ("The Board of the Union's Parliamentary Group for Majority Voting Principle in the EU") in *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, June 14, 1995, p. 1.

[46] See also Markus Jachtenfuchs, "Die EG nach Maastricht - Das Subsidiaritaetsprinzip und die Zukunft der Integration" ("The EC after Maastricht - The Subsidiarity Principle and the Future of Integration") in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 47, no. 10, 1992, p. 283.

whether increasing globalization in the economic and political sphere can be solved with an increased shift of state competence to higher levels.[47]

In Germany, the term "federation" is often equaled with "subsidiarity". While the subsidiarity principle forces the Commission to give reasonable explanations for its legislative proposals, the aim of a "Europe of regions" foresees to assure citizens that they will not be absorbed into a European unitary state. Again, especially Germany sees this approach - in accordance with its federal experience - as a way to preserve cultural identities both at a national and sub-national level. A "Europe of regions" is thought to make "diversity in unity" possible, a goal that is certainly idealistic and cannot be realized in the near future. Yet, a first step in this direction has been made in the Treaty on Political Union, which has created a "Committee of the Regions", consisting of representatives from the regions and local authorities within the member-states. The new body must be consulted on certain items of draft legislation.

8.3. United Germany and the European Common Foreign and Security Policy

As has been outlined already, the European Union's efforts to add a political dimension to economic integration, date back to its founding years. After the European Defense Union had been rejected by the French Parliament in 1954, efforts throughout the 1960s resulted in the so-called "Davignon-Report" that introduced

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[47] Ibid., p. 279.

regular meetings between the member-states' foreign ministers and the political directors of their ministries. That was the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC). Despite slow progress in developing EPC, member-states, more often than not, undertook national go-it-alones in foreign policy, so that a representation of common European interests was not guaranteed.

With the Single European Act of 1987, EPC was enshrined into the Community's treaties. However, all decisions continued to require unanimity, and security issues remained confined to political and economic aspects. The member-states merely coordinated their policies, thus making quick action in a situation of crisis very difficult. At that time, the European Community's foreign policy was characterized by a "civilian" nature, due to the fact that military aspects were excluded. The Community's foreign-policy instruments were basically of a diplomatic nature.

After the end of the Cold War, the perception of European leaders about the Community's international role changed considerably. This was triggered by a number of events. In the first place, German unification itself acted as a stimulus for further integration, including the political area. Helmut Kohl's determination to bind united Germany into an ever-closer European Community, applied both to economic and political issues. Furthermore, the Gulf War, the Yugoslav Civil War, the end of the Soviet Empire and upheavals in Central Europe posed new security challenges to the Community, and made its leaders aware that the need for Europe to speak with one voice was greater than ever. As Regelsberger has noted, the motivation to reform EPC was not only founded in its own weaknesses. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, primarily the dynamic within the Community produced by the Single

European Act and the European Single Market, as well as the American Government's insistence that the Europeans take over greater international responsibility, played an important role.[48]

The Treaty on European Union, apart from economic and monetary union, introduced two new pillars, the first one covering foreign and security policy, the second one justice and domestic affairs. The fact that for the first time the term "Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP) has been accepted by all member-states, is a small success for integration. However, this term does not have the same meaning in the sense of a common policy field, such as the "Common Agricultural Policy" or "Common Trade Policy". Apart from CFSP, which is based upon common interests of the member-states, national foreign policies will continue to exist in the future. Yet, in contrast to EPC, the Treaty on European Union contains a detailed description of the goals of CFSP in Article J.1. These are:[49]

- securing common values, basic interests and independence of the Union;

- strengthening the Union's security and that of all member-states;

- securing world peace, as well as strengthening international security;

- promoting democracy, the rule of law, as well as securing human rights and basic rights.

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[48] See Elfriede Regelsberger, "Gemeinsame Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Maastricht - Minimalreformen in neuer Entwicklungsperspektive" ("Common Foreign and Security Policy after Maastricht - Minimal Reforms in a New Development Perspective") in *Integration*, vol. 15, no. 2, 1992, p 83.
[49] See Otto Schmuck, "Der Maastrichter Vertrag zur Europaeischen Union: Fortschritt und Ausdifferenzierung der Europaeischen Union" ("The Maastricht Treaty on European Union: Progress and Differentiation in the European Union") in *Europa-Archiv*, no. 4, 1992, p. 104.

The most important challenge to CFSP is the Union's member-states' will and capability to make the transition from "civilian diplomacy"[50] to a foreign policy based on military force. In the early 1980s, Bull[51] had argued already that the Community would need to develop military capabilities, if it were ever to be taken seriously in the international arena. In his opinion, however, this could only amount to a military alliance, due to the fact that supranationalism would not work in foreign policy. The academic discussion about the Union's ability to form a genuine common foreign and security policy circles around the question of what the Union actually is. Neumann and Welsh, for instance, have discussed the multiple identities of Europe and the European Community after the Cold War, that is to say whether it is a cultural entity, security community, or group of developed capitalist economies etc.[52] Wallace has found that identifying criteria for the European Community can be political, institutional, geographical, economic or moral, or any combination of the five.[53] Therefore, identifying the characteristics of the European Union appears difficult, especially in view of the fact that its nature is changing every time new members accede, a process that is not expected to end in the near future.

Concerning the motivation for member-states to create a common foreign and security policy, realist motifs have been found to outweigh idealist ones. This can be derived from the above-described challenges the Community has found itself facing since the end of the Cold War. That is to say, Germany's new found identity as a

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[50] Christopher Hill, "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role" in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 31, no. 3, September 1993, p. 305.
[51] H. Bull, "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" in: L. Tsoukalis, ed., *The European Community: Past, Present and Future*, Oxford 1983.
[52] I.B. Neumann and J.M Welsh, "The Other in European Self-Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on International Society" in *Review of International Studies*, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991.
[53] See W. Wallace, *The Transformation of Western Europe*, London 1990.

united country with unlimited sovereignty, yet willing to integrate itself increasingly into the Community, still haunted by its past, but increasingly less so, and the occurrence of the Gulf War and the Civil War in the former Yugoslavia have awakened again the willingness of Germany's political leadership to promote European military integration in the view of new security threats.

Here again, as before in economic integration, the "political will" for integration seems to be crucial. This is manifested in the initiative that Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterand took on the issue of European foreign and defense policy in a common statement in October 1991.[54] The proposal includes several stipulations about the gradual development of the WEU as the military arm of the European Union and an "organic relationship" between the two institutions, as well as the specific mentioning of close cooperation between WEU and NATO and their "complementarity". Most of the items included in Kohl's and Mitterand's proposal later found their way into the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties.[55]

However, Germany's proposal to apply majority-voting to military issues has not found sufficient support among the member-states.[56] Despite the fact that the German Government was prepared to cede sovereignty in such a highly sensitive area, the move to militarize the European Union has been criticized by the Greens as a way for Germany to achieve superpower status under the disguise of European defense. The

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[54] Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl, message by the President of the French Republic and the German Chancellor to the acting Head of the European Council and Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Ruud Lubbers, on the issue of a common European foreign and security policy, of October 14, 1991, reprinted in: *Europa-Archiv*, no. 22, 1991, pp. 571-574.
[55] For developments regarding the relationship between WEU and EU, and WEU and NATO, see: Communiqué by the WEU's Council of Ministers on their meeting in Lisabon on May 15, 1995, in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 8, 1995, pp. 97-104.
[56] See Peter Hort, "Europas Aussenpolitik - ein Fernziel", p. 581.

agreement reached among the member-states concerning the voting modus, is that the European Council fixes common guidelines for foreign and security policy, with unanimous vote. The European Council, however, can declare specific areas as a subject of "common action", particularly for pressing, current affairs. For such "common action", then, the Council may determine that individual questions of that action will be decided upon with qualified majority instead of unanimity. In order to facilitate decisions, the member-states have further declared not to veto decisions requiring unanimity, if a qualified majority exists. The position which has been decided upon by the Union concerning a "common action" is binding for all members.

When discussing military unification of the European Union, the German-Franco alliance deserves special attention. Apart from the legendary reconciliation between the two former war-enemies that has built the cornerstone, or "motor", of European unification throughout the Union's history, military cooperation between the two countries is also important. The Elysée-Treaty of 1963 provided already for consultation mechanisms between the two countries concerning security and defense policy that have been improved throughout the decades.[57] In 1988, the Franco-German Security and Defense Council was established. In the same year, the first German-French brigade was set up, which was enlarged in the mid-1990s by the participation of Dutch troops, thus building the first milestone towards a European army.

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[57] For a detailed analysis of Franco-German security cooperation see: Peter Schmidt, "Der Deutsch-Französische Rat für Verteidigung und Sicherheit" ("The German-French Council for Defense and Security") in *Aussenpolitik*, vol. 40, no. 4, 1989, especially p. 371.

Especially regarding the diverging views of defense and security - France had left NATO in 1966, whereas Germany continued to be a committed member of the Alliance - Germany's efforts to tie France, as one of two European atomic powers, into the European context are worth mentioning. Particularly the fact that Germany's and France's interests in foreign and defense policies have traditionally been wide apart, has inspired hope. It is believed if these two countries can overcome their differences, another important milestone on the way to European integration will be reached. After the end of the Cold War, Germany continued to act as a "bridge" between France and the Alliance, and overcame initial French resistance to proclaiming the WEU as the "European pillar of NATO".

8.4. United Germany's Relationship with Eastern Europe

The connection between political transformation in Central-East Europe and international cooperation has been expressed in the slogans of "a return to Europe", of a "common European house" and of "European integration". Although the term "Europe" may have different meanings, it is clear what it stands for in this case: social market economy, political pluralism, democratic processes and the rule of law.[58]

From the point of view of the European Union, Central-East European countries are important due to several reasons, as Ehrhart[59] has pointed out. In the first place,

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[58] See also Martyn Rady, "East-Central Europe and the EC", review article, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, vol. 31, no. 1, March 1993, p. 117.

[59] See Hans-Georg Ehrhart, "Die EG, die osteuropaeische Herausforderung und die Sicherheit Europas" (The EC, the East European Challenge and European Security") in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, March 5, 1993, p. 37.

Europe has again become a political and cultural unity after the cold war, involving the problem of values. In the second place, Europe is a geographic unity, involving the problem of migration. In the third place, Europe is an ecological unity, involving the problem of ecological disaster like that of Chernobyl for instance. In the fourth place, Europe should form an economic unity, involving the problem of competition. In the fifth place, Europe should form a military unity, involving the problem of peace. Finally, Europe should form a political unity, involving the problem of conflict resolution and military alliance.

As has been demonstrated before, within the European Union, Germany's influence after unification has grown. The old Federal Republic used to be the "front-state"[60] during the Cold War. However, this position, or function, has not been erased after the upheavals in Central-East Europe. Formerly, the Federal Republic's openness, economic prosperity, political stability and international embedding had posed a constant challenge to the Eastern European states. Yet, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON, Germany's function as a "front-state" has not been lost, merely a change in conditions and tasks has taken place. The Eastern European countries are going through the inevitable transformation crisis of democratization and market liberalization. Despite a certain integration "fatigue" in the wake of Maastricht, the European Union has lost nothing of its attractiveness to its Eastern neighbors. The Union has become an "anchor", or focal point, of economic and political stability on the continent.

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[60] Rolf Hasse, "German Unification and European Upheavals" in *Aussenpolitik* (English edition), vol. 43, no. 2, 1992, p. 123.

The European Union, and especially Germany, have become the yardstick for the restructuring of economic and political systems in Central-East Europe. At the same time, they are the main source of public financial transfers and private investment, as well as the main market for the produce of these countries. Particularly Germany has been in the limelight, due to its historical ties with the region, as the strongest European economy, and the fact that, in its own territory, it has faced the same challenge of integrating the economic and political system, as well as society of a former Communist country into its own Western system. Furthermore, Germany is seen as a promoter of free trade within the European Union and internationally.

From the beginning, the German Government has assumed a leading role in supporting Eastern Europe. As of 1992, Germany's financial contribution accounted for over 56% of all western aid to the Soviet Union, and for 32% to Central-East and Southeast Europe.[61] Other forms of German involvement in the region[62] included German jurists helping Estonians write a constitution, providing aid to Hungarians in adopting the entire German civil code, and sponsoring meetings of justice ministers from East European and Soviet successor states. Similar to what they did at the time when Spain and Portugal were striving to attain Western European standards, the German Social Democratic, Christian Democratic and Liberal think tanks were sharing the techniques of political and social organization in Eastern Europe. The more liberal German Catholic Church has had some impact on the less modern Polish and Lithuanian Catholic hierarchies - as have the German Protestants done on the Latvian and Estonian Protestants.

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[61] See Reinhard Stuth, "Germany's New Role in a Changing Europe", p. 29.
[62] For a detailed overview of German activities in Eastern Europe see: Elizabeth Pond, "Germany in the New Europe" in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 71, no. 2, spring 1992, especially pp. 124-27.

Furthermore, there have been scores of bilateral student and teacher exchanges, training programs for business managers and local administrators, workshops for parliamentarians, legislative staff and librarians, joint history and textbook-writing projects, as well as city-partnerships. The Goethe Institute has been busy opening up new branch-offices and satisfying increased demand for knowledge of the German language, politics and culture. In many newly democratizing Eastern countries, the Germans are considered to be particularly suited to help nurture democracy because of their own relatively egalitarian society, and by their own post-war experience in turning an authoritarian into a democratic mentality.

Germany's geographic location is of special importance in understanding the country's position in the region. Germany now shares a long border with Poland and the former Czechoslovakia. Large numbers of ethnic Germans - all potential claimants to German nationality, according to the German principle of blood descent - live throughout the whole region. The use of the German language is still widespread, and increasing as the language of trade. The contacts of eastern Germans with the people of Eastern Europe is also worth mentioning, due to the fact that for decades their only traveling destination outside their home-country was the Eastern Bloc. Germany, therefore, has had a good basis to enlarge its influence and contacts in the Central-East countries and, of course, a particular interest in helping them overhaul their political and economic systems since any disturbances could easily affect Germany.

In Europe, the chief partner for Russia has been united Germany, both in a political and economic sense. Germany has been instrumental in helping Russia to reduce its

feeling of lost influence in, and the opportunity of, participating in the development of a new European order. So far, with considerable German mediation, Russia has been made a member of the Council of Europe in 1996, it has signed a charter with NATO in 1997 and, in the same year, has been included in the G7-group. In December 1997, an agreement on partnership and cooperation between the EU and Russia has entered into effect. Germany has managed, in cooperation with the USA, to lessen Russia's objections against NATO-membership of the Central European states.[63] Proof of this is the fact that Helmut Kohl was the first foreigner to be honored with Poland's highest state medal for his efforts of bringing Poland into NATO in October 1998.

Concerning Germany's engagement in Eastern Europe, there has been a lot of speculation. Some[64] have especially acknowledged Germany's interest in averting mass migration movements from the East with the main destination being Germany. Yet, they have also highlighted the country's feeling of political and moral obligation to take action, while being aware of the fact that, founded in German history, great importance is attached by all political leaders to sharing tasks and commitments with others, i.e. the EU in the first place. On the contrary, others have contended that, although a power-political position of Germany in Eastern Europe, comparable to the United States' global hegemony after 1945, was not "the Conservatives' declared aim, it was still an option."[65] Spaulding has stated that "no aspect of the German presence in Eastern Europe has been more enduring than the economic connections between

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[63] See for instance: "NATO: Wirre Angst" ("NATO: Confused Fright") in *Der Spiegel*, August 21, 1995, pp. 32-33.
[64] See for instance Reinhard Stuth, "Germany's New Role in a Changing Europe", p. 30.
[65] Lothar Gutjahr, *German Foreign and Defence Policy after Unification*, London/New York 1994, p. 53.

Germany and its Eastern neighbors."[66] Yet, he concludes that trade leverage as a tool

of foreign policy, that Germany has been able to apply to varying degrees from 1890

to 1990, is not likely to continue in the post Cold-War era.[67]

Although it is difficult to determine whether the German Government acted the way it

did out of realpolitical considerations or out of idealist convictions, it is not difficult to

see that Germany was once more the prime force in accelerating Community action.

According to Art. 238 of the EC-Treaty, the European Community started to create a

network of association agreements with Central-East European countries, the so-

called "European Agreements". Provided that these countries adhere to a catalogue of

conditions - observing human rights, advancing towards the rule of law, political

pluralism, secret and free elections, liberalizing the economy - these agreements have

been meant to present an important step on the road to political integration. The

special Summit of the European Council, held in Dublin in April 1990[68], stated, on the

one hand, that these association agreements had to be considered apart from the

possibility of future membership according to Article 237 of the EC-Treaty. On the

other hand, the European Council did not rule out the possibility of future

membership.

As of 1995, ten countries were associated with the European Union: the four

Visegrad-countries Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as well as

Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia. The European Summit in

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[66] Robert Mark Spaulding, Jr., "German Trade Policy in Eastern Europe, 1890-1990: Preconditions for Applying International Trade Leverage" in *International Organization*, vol. 45, no. 3, 1991, p. 343. pp. 343-368.
[67] See ibid, pp. 367-68.
[68] See: Special Summit of the European Council of Heads of State and Governement in Dublin on April 28, 1990, final conclusions, in *Europa-Archiv*, vol. 45, no. 11, 1990, pp. 284-88.

Copenhagen in 1993 has promised, and the summits in Corfu and Essen in 1994 have confirmed it, that all Central-East European states that are associated with the European Union can become full members one day. From the beginning, Helmut Kohl has emphatically embraced the idea of the European Union's Eastern enlargement. In 1994, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel declared: "United Germany will not remain the Eastern outpost of the European Union. (...) The Federal Government has never identified with the concept of a western union or a south-western union; it has always declared itself for the whole of Europe."[69]

The consequences for the European Union of enlarged membership have frequently been addressed in terms of "deepening" versus "widening". The extension of the Union is seen to be incompatible with the economic and political goals formulated at Maastricht and with the aim of a "single-speed" Europe. With Germany's trade record and economic influence in the region, not binding the Central-East countries closely to the Union would result in a growing German influence there, a situation which nobody, including the countries concerned themselves, would appreciate. Deepening and widening the Community must go hand in hand, as most political leaders and analysts agree. In the case of Germany, Kohl's insistence that political union shall accompany economic and monetary union has already been mentioned. Pinder has remarked correctly that monetary union, which stands for deepening, "would anchor Germany more firmly in the Community and thus help to ensure that Germany does not play an increasingly independent role in the East."[70]

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[69] Klaus Kinkel, government declaration on the European Community's enlargement, in: Protocol of the German *Bundestag*, 12th legislative period, 216th sitting in Bonn on March 10, 1994, pp. 18590-91.
[70] John Pinder, *The European Community and Eastern Europe*, London 1991, p. 106.

In order to appreciate the impact Germany has had on European integration with regard to its influence on the Union's enlargement, we will briefly discuss the conditions for, as well as advantages and disadvantages of enlargement. As Baldwin has rightly stated, "the wishful thinking that usually surrounds Eastern enlargement of the European Union must be seasoned with a great dose of realism. Quick enlargement is the best solution but - unfortunately - no politically possible solution."[71]

Foretold disadvantages of enlargement on the economic side revolve around the argument that economic failure in the East can have serious repercussions for the whole of Europe. Even if the threat of a return to authoritarian rule were be thwarted, it could result in massive migration and the loss of confidence by investors in the European market. In this respect, the main obstacles to enlargement are that, in the first place, the Central-East European countries are too poor, and secondly, that the percentage of agriculture in GNP is still too high and, finally, that population figures are too high. These realities would make integration into the European Union, especially a non-reformed one, very difficult. Powerful interest groups within the member-states are feeling threatened. Especially farmers and poorer regions are objecting to enlargement for fear of having to share their piece of the Union's financial cake.

Baldwin, on the basis of several financial analyses, estimates that, in the year 2000, the four Visegrad-states would raise the Union's annual spending by some 5.8 billion

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[71] Richard E. Baldwin, "Osterweiterung der Europaeischen Union" ("Eastern Enlargement of the European Union") in *Internationale Politik*, vol. 50, no. 6, 1995, p. 34.

ECU. In view of the fact that Great Britain lived through a parliamentary crisis in 1995, when the British contribution was envisaged to be raised from 1.20% to 1.27% of GNP, the difficulties that a much higher increase in the two-digit range could raise are evident. Similarly, the reluctance of western Germans to pay for national unification - as has been outlined previously - can be taken as an indication of how Germans would react to the prospect of financing Eastern enlargement. Despite the fact that a large majority of Germans look favorably upon Eastern enlargement - in 1992, 82% expressed the view that the European Community should help reconstructing Eastern European countries[72] - it is hard to conceive that, with high unemployment and the general feeling of economic crisis, they would willingly repeat the financial sacrifices which they had grudgingly accepted when helping their own compatriots. Therefore, from this point of view, the chances that all 15 national parliaments within the Union - in the case of accession all member-states have to approve - will ratify the accession treaties for the new members is highly doubtful.

Reality will probably lie somewhere between these two extremes, but their illustration shows that Europe is at a historic crossroads. The historic challenge facing European politicians is the fulfillment of the promise given in Copenhagen. Yet, some realistic thinking has returned to the CDU who, in a timetable for European issues, has stated that the first Central-East countries are to be expected to join the European Union not before the year 2003.[73] This return to a more realistic approach concerning Eastern enlargement becomes comprehensible if it is understood that the positions for and against enlargement on both sides, that is to say the European Union and the aspiring

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[72] See Peter R. Weilemann, "Einstellungen zur Europaeischen Union nach Maastricht" ("Attitudes towards the European Union after Maastricht"), internal study no. 30/1992 for the Research Institute of the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation, St. Augustin, January 22, 1992, figure 5, p. 10.
[73] See CDU, "Europapolitische Agenda" ("European Policy Agenda"), internal paper, 1998, p. 3.

new members, can be classified into three categories[74], namely economic arguments, and high and low politics.

At the economic level, considerations involve the general aggregated growth, or loss, in prosperity which is usually expressed in percentages of GNP. On the side of the future Union-members, substantial financial transfers would result in growth figures. On the side of the member-states the result would depend upon the degree to which the loss caused by financial transfers could be compensated by gains for exporters in a new market and the time-range - short-term versus long-term - within which these results would manifest themselves.

At the level of high politics, the role of European integration for sustaining peace and democracy is crucial. High politics is the most important argument for both sides. For East Europeans, full membership in the European Union would, on the one hand, place those states again in their historic position among the advanced industrialized states on the European continent. On the other hand, full membership would exercise a decisive influence upon domestic stability in those countries, and would probably place a definite end to authoritarianism, similar to the experience of Greece, Portugal and Spain. Equally, high politics is the most important factor in the EU's decision for Eastern enlargement. Even if enlargement is not an immediate prospect, and certainly not for all aspiring East European countries, the offer alone has contributed to giving those countries a perspective towards which to work in their endeavor of radically overhauling their political and economic systems. In this respect, Germany has played an especially important role.

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[74] See also Richard E. Baldwin, "Osterweiterung der Europaeischen Union", pp. 31-32.

It is evident that "high politics has led to the promise of full membership; (but) low politics will determine when this promise will be honored."[75] Economic change usually affects certain groups within the economy more than others, by demanding more sacrifices from them. It is obvious that the larger the area (or amount of countries) to be integrated will be - especially if they are as poor as the countries in question - the more painful the adjustment process will be, meaning the higher the level of expected opposition to enlargement will be. Alone the four Visegrad-countries - the most developed among aspiring new members from Eastern Europe - are poorer in terms of per capita income, have a larger percentage of the population working in the agriculture sector, and have a higher population density than the four least developed member-states of the EU (Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece).

From the point of view of aspiring candidates for full membership, there are also a number of reasons why they are not likely to make an easy transition to West European norms. Some analysts highlight the "inexperience of (...) politicians, the naiveté of popular expectations, the weakness of democratic political culture and the reemergence of intransigent nationalism" as important impediments to a successful transformation.[76] Others stress the dangers of economic interventionism and obstacles to the creation of free markets in East-Central Europe.[77] It is easy to imagine that what happened to the eastern German economy after unification - mass unemployment and the breakdown of production - is very likely to happen to the other ex-Communist countries, were they to join the Union quickly. The example of

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[75] Ibid., p. 32.
[76] See Judy Batt, *East Central Europe from Reform to Transformation*, London 1991, p. 104.
[77] See the edited volume by Herbert Giersch, ed., *Towards a Market Economy in Central and Eastern Europe*, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1991.

Greece's first years in the European Community shows that even large investments in supporting infrastructure on part of the Community did not prevent a deteriorating balance of payments, a doubling of unemployment and the net outflow of capital.[78] The transition of time has shown that these warnings were justified. With the exception of the Czech Republic, the pace of privatization has been very slow. On an institutional level, political parties, often employing the same techniques of patronage as their Communist predecessors, and weak state institutions, present serious handicaps for a democratic transformation.[79] In 1991, Pinder estimated that "it will be the better part of a decade before the economies will be internationally competitive without special measures of protection, and some time before we can be sure that democracy has really taken root."[80]

Dahrendorf has mentioned the "incompatible time-scales of political and economic reforms."[81] By this, he addresses the dilemma between economic arguments against speedy full membership, and political arguments for it. Whereas the economies of Central-East Europe have been found to be likely to suffer considerably if they are not well prepared for membership, the political argument for fast integration sustains that membership in the strong institutional framework of the Union will help the process of democratic transformation and stabilize the weak political institutions. This presents the old dilemma that Germany, and other Western countries, have encountered when considering to offer developmental aid to unstable democratic, or even authoritarian, regimes in the Third World. Germany's general guideline has been the maxim of "help

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[78] See Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Europaeische Gemeinschaft: Osteuropa ante portas" ("European Community: Eastern Europe ante portas") in *Südosteuropa*, vol. 40, no. 6, 1991, pp. 283-306.
[79] See for instance Martyn Rady, "East-Central Europe and the EC", pp. 118-19.
[80] John Pinder, *The European Community and Eastern Europe*, p. 60.
[81] Ralf Dahrendorf, *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, London 1990, p. 85.

for self-help", meaning support for small economic enterprises and infrastructure, in the hope that growing economic prosperity will eventually result in a more stable democratic system or the overthrow of a dictatorship. The case of Eastern Europe, however, is in so far different for Germany as any political and/or economic instability will happen at the country's doorstep and may have deep effects on Germany's own political and economic life.

Only a strong European Union is capable of uniting the whole of Europe. There is no alternative to this role, except the possibility of peace-endangering, nationalistic policies. Deepening and widening are not opposed to each other, but rather complementary processes, as long as they help creating mutual interdependence and a European legal space, and thus stabilize peace in Europe. Germany's influence on the development in Central-East Europe is to be seen especially in the area of high politics. Whereas it is considered unlikely that Germany had originally envisaged to play a hegemonial role there in the realist sense, it is, on the other hand, feasible that Germany's engagement in Central-East Europe was born out of economic considerations. That can be understood by the fact that Germany has held traditional economic relations with the area, and by Germany's awareness that political and economic upheavals should be helped to be kept low as they would in any event affect Germany directly.

Furthermore, Helmut Kohl's European vocation has certainly persuaded him to do anything possible to help stabilize the region and work for the historic chance of uniting the two European halves, as he had done in the case of his own country, in a peaceful manner. By urging for fast integration of the aspiring Central-East European

into the European Union and NATO, Germany is thought to have realized that the help needed for carrying out the transformation process, necessary for this unification process on a grand scale - when compared to national unification - would prove too much to handle for one single country and would need the full support of the Union. Eastern enlargement will, apart from the prospect of peace, especially benefit German exporters. Germany, careful not to stir any anti-German feelings after unification, has chosen the path to make its partners in the European Union share the financial burden and general support needed by Central-East countries. Fears of a German go-it-alone in that region have once more made Germany's neighbors pull together and engage in a cause, the benefits of which will might be reaped by the whole of Europe.

8.5. Conclusions

Our analysis of united Germany's impact on European integration has found that, after unification, Germany has retained its position on the European continent as a "front-state"; it is now the East of the West and, simultaneously, the West of the East. This position has given united Germany space to broaden its influence but, at the same time, has made it more vulnerable to political and economic upheavals in Eastern Europe. As the largest economic power in Europe, and as the country from which the East-Central countries expect most help for the transformation of their economic and political systems, Germany is in a unique position to make its impact on European integration.

Regarding Germany's impact on European economic integration, we have found that its major contribution has been Chancellor Kohl's decision to consent to economic and monetary union, that implies for Germany to give up its much-valued national currency, the D-mark, for the Euro. Although opposition among the German public to this plan has been considerable, it has decreased during the last two years. This has been attributed to the fact that the German Government has been instrumental in setting up criteria for a stable Euro, that must be rigorously enforced by EMU-participants. Furthermore, the European Central Bank will be located in Frankfurt and will be modeled upon the German banking system. These, and the fact that the German Government has launched a campaign of advertising the Euro and ensuring the public that the switch will be a mere technicality, have helped reduce opposition to a tolerable level.

When analyzing Germany's contribution to EMU, it has become evident that the "political will" of Helmut Kohl has taken the lead in bringing about the introduction of the Euro, in addition to the fact that it has become economically feasible since the completion of the Single Market. Among German major political parties, no significant opposition to monetary union has been detected. This has been found to be based on the political consensus that European integration is equated with peace, which no party would be liked to be seen opposed to. It has also been implied that, without German unification, and Germany's need to demonstrate its neighbors and partners that it is willing to bind itself increasingly into the European Union and that nothing has to be feared from unification, the introduction of the Euro might not have been brought about.

Regarding European political issues, we have considered the "democratic deficit" in the European Union to be the most important one. Whereas before, the "democratic deficit" mainly preoccupied European political elites and experts, it has also been discussed by the German public since the Maastricht Treaty. This treaty has expanded direct rights and duties for individuals and has made them aware that they, themselves, cannot take great direct influence on the Union's decision-making process; the "permissive consensus" of old does not continue to exist any longer. The German insistence after national unification that economic and monetary union should go hand in hand with political union, can be seen as the awareness of this fact, and the attempt to increase the Union's legitimacy and make it more democratic. Despite the fact that the degree of democratization in the Union is not yet very satisfying - as the Greens have also rightly criticized when explaining their decision to abstain from the parliamentary vote on the Amsterdam Treaty - some important steps for enhancing the European Parliament's political authority have been achieved with German assistance.

Another contribution to the political nature of the European Union worth-mentioning is Germany's emphasis on the principle of subsidiarity and, in connection with it, on the preservation of regional cultural identity. Both measures are aimed at ensuring that the envisaged European federation will not take a turn towards a European unitary state, but work similarly to the German model. Furthermore, in its drive for building a European federation, Germany has been instrumental in gradually overcoming opposition among member-states to the principle of majority-voting instead of unanimity, that has often blocked progress in European integration.

Regarding the establishment of a European foreign and security policy, that is a part of political union, Germany has once more made its influence felt. The pooling of sovereignty in foreign and security policy is the backbone of any federation, and the most difficult one to achieve. The historic friendship treaty, the Elysée-Treaty of 1963, between Germany and France has served as the fundament between these two countries for security cooperation. The progress in this area between Germany and France has also given rise to hope that cooperation and integration will be increasingly achieved among other member-states. Germany's and France's special interest in reviving the WEU, can also be seen as the European equivalent for Germany's attempt towards "normalization" in its national foreign and defense policy. Whereas this move has been justified by the German Government with changes in the international environment warranting a European military force, it has, on the other hand, been vehemently opposed by the Greens and the PDS. They foresee the evolution of the European Union into a superpower, and have accused the German Government of using it as a disguise for national ambitions.

Regarding Germany's relationship with Eastern Europe, the expectations that these countries have on Germany, as well as the German interest in stability in that region, have been outlined. Not least due to the fact that no European country would like to see Germany broaden its historic influence in Eastern Europe, the European Union has set up a network of agreements with these countries, thus tying them to Western Europe and giving them the political prospect of becoming one day a member of the European Union. Whereas Germany has initially been urging for fast Eastern enlargement, it has recently become more pragmatic about this perspective, thus reflecting economic, political and social objections. When discussing the possibility of

forestalling the Union's goal to establish a federation through the admittance of more members, the fact that Germany has succeeded in giving East-Central states a target towards which political and economic transformation processes can work, must be taken into consideration.

9. Conclusions

By conducting a comparative analysis over time, that is to say by contrasting West Germany with united Germany, our study has sought to determine whether Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration has undergone any change, or not. In order to analyze Germany's commitment to European integration, we have found that national political leaders, particularly the chancellor and foreign minister, as well as political parties and public opinion are most indicative. From their decisions and attitudes we have evaluated the impact that both the old Federal Republic of Germany and united Germany have had so far on European integration.

Regarding the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany, it has been found that the conditions the country was facing at the end of the Second World War were the basic determinants for West Germany's Western integration. It has also been stated that Western integration was the precondition for West Germany's existence, meaning that the Western Allied Powers would not have consented to the country's (limited) sovereignty if they had not been sure that, by being tied into the West, it would not pose a threat to European security any more. The personal background of the country's first chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, was conducive for this goal. With his forceful, western-oriented personality, Adenauer's contribution to the founding of the European Community has been acknowledged. The fact that Adenauer's position combined both the Chancellor's Office as well as the Foreign Ministry ensured the success of his European policy. It has been mentioned that Adenauer's political motivation was to make the best out of the restrictions his country was subjected to at that time. That is to say, from the beginning he sensed that the Federal Republic's

future lay in attaining an economically dominant position within Western Europe, since the Allies would not consent to a military role played by it. In so far, Adenauer was, in the first place, a realist who tried to guide his country towards a powerful position based on economics, that would, in the end, involve also large political influence.

The birth of the European Community was a product of the political understanding between the Federal Republic and France, based on their historic reconciliation. The devastating experience of the Second World War acted as a catalyst for the political will of the two leaders of France and Germany, and the other four whose countries were to join the Community, to establish lasting peace on the European continent. While Adenauer had laid the foundation for the Federal Republic's future, subsequent leaders reinforced the country's Western orientation. Although Willy Brandt recognized for the first time the existence of *two* German states and enhanced the country's influence in Eastern Europe through his *Ostpolitik*, European integration and NATO-membership remained for him the fundament on which to built future foreign-policy decisions. Helmut Schmidt supported further economic integration within the Community and was instrumental for the introduction of the European Monetary System while, at the same time, focusing on transatlantic relations with the United States.

Continuity in West Germany's European policy was particularly ensured by Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who took over the Foreign Ministry under Brandt and remained in office until after German unification. Influenced by his personal background, Genscher's commitment to European integration was steadfast. Yet, he did not regard

Europe to stop at West Germany's Eastern border. In an idealistic manner, Genscher always stressed in words, and in action, that he was working towards overcoming the division of the whole continent, and ultimately of his home-country. By shaping West Germany's foreign policy in a responsible and widely-estimated manner for almost twenty years, Genscher helped later disperse international fears about an all-too mighty Germany, when national unification became eminent, by being able to demonstrate through the record of his long work that a united Germany would be irrevocably tied into the European Community and the Western Alliance.

Regarding the other two factors, thought to have been important for the evaluation of West Germany's commitment to European integration, namely West German political parties and public opinion, our analysis has produced the following results. Due to the fact that the large established West German parties were catch-all parties, with the possible exception of the Greens, different strands concerning foreign and security policy - including European policy - could be found in them. These strands covered pro-European positions as well as outright opposition. The largest opposition to the European Community was found in the CSU and the Greens. Whereas the CSU rejected the idea of ceding national sovereignty to a supranational body for nationalistic reasons, the Greens rejected the European Community as an institution with an undemocratic decision-making structure and the potential to evolve into a military power. The other parties - CDU, SPD and FDP - have been found to be pro-European in outlook, although their motivations for this differed. Especially the CDU, in the tradition of Konrad Adenauer, claimed to be *the* European party in West Germany. Helmut Kohl, who was Chancellor during the last eight years before German unification, was particularly engaged in the European cause. His personal

background made him - similarly to Hans-Dietrich Genscher - devoted to European unification, which he saw as the only way to overcome the division of Germany and ensure peace in Europe.

Among a large majority of West German political leaders, and parties alike, there was consensus on the goal of promoting European integration as a means to end the division of the continent, and of Germany, and thereby ensure lasting peace that would make a repetition of war impossible. A return back to nationalistic policies was rejected. Although the term "national interest" was a political taboo in the Federal Republic of Germany, these interests nevertheless existed. Yet, in view of increasing globalization, supranationality was regarded as the only solution to meet the challenges encountered by nation-states. West Germany's foreign policy, and here particularly its European policy, was characterized by long-term considerations. Since the country's economic performance had been extraordinarily successful, and a military role was excluded anyhow, West Germany relied on an open Western European market as the main selling-place for its exports. European integration was seen to bring long-term net advantages, even if in the short-term financial disadvantages arose and political concessions had to be made. In general, European integration was seen primarily as a long-term investment in peace. In so far, West Germany's commitment to European integration constituted a learning process through which political leaders had gone, with the result that withdrawal from the Community became an unthinkable policy-choice.

The situation regarding public commitment to the European Community was, however, slightly different. Until the 1980s, European integration had been

appreciated for its contribution to peace and the favorable opportunities that the Common Market offered for West German products. Since almost two in three jobs were directly, or indirectly, dependent on exports, the Common Market was viewed favorably by most West Germans since it had contributed to the achievement of high living standards in the country. Furthermore, and equally important, German history and the subsequent re-education West Germans had gone through made them realize that the Federal Republic's future, including the possibility of national unification, that most West Germans did not believe would ever happen anyway, could only lie with the European Community. In that Community, West Germans had found again a place as a respected nation, based on their economic success and solid democracy that constituted tokens of national pride while, at the same time, protecting them from themselves.

In the 1980s, however, along with a general feeling of "Europessimism", growing dissatisfaction with West Germany's perceived role of "European paymaster" could be observed. Yet, instead of talking about a general, long-term negative attitude concerning European integration, we have attributed anti-European feelings among the West German public rather to short-term economic considerations. It was found that the "permissive consensus", that is to say the consent to leave European policy in the hands of leading politicians, who continued to negotiate about the promotion of European integration at the level of high politics, continued.

The most critical test to the Federal Republic's commitment to European integration has been national unification. As our analysis has revealed, there were serious doubts abroad about a return of united Germany to nationalistic policies. The most crucial

insurance, therefore, that Helmut Kohl and Hans-Dietrich Genscher had to make to their partners and neighbors, was about Germany's continued membership in NATO and continued dedication to European integration. Kohl's central role in the unification process has been pointed out. Whereas West Germans were initially not very enthusiastic about unification - astonished observers abroad even noticed that the winning of the Soccer World Championship in 1990 brought about more national euphoria than the event of unification - East Germans clearly demonstrated that they desired unification in the East German parliamentary election of 1990.

It was, however, Kohl who took the lead, and conducted the negotiations leading to unification almost single-handedly. Inspired by the "favorableness of the hour", or "window of opportunity", he used the framework of the "Two-plus-Four" talks to secure united Germany's unlimited sovereignty and the Soviet Union's approval of Germany's membership in NATO. In doing so, he by-passed the possibility of an international peace-conference, leaving some of Germany's neighbors feeling left out in this important issue. Within the "Two-plus-Four" negotiations, Kohl concentrated mainly on the United States and the Soviet Union, leaving France and Great Britain somewhat aside. Poland's invitation to the talks, at the insistence of France, smoothed the question over the Oder-Neisse border, regarding which Kohl had previously been consciously ambiguous. This mistake, however, has later been rectified with friendship treaties between the two countries that laid the fundament for a German-Polish reconciliation, similar to the German-French reconciliation after the Second World War.

Moreover, it has been noticed that the European Community - particularly the European Parliament - which was being enlarged through German unification, was left out of the consultative process, and was merely informed about Germany's plans. In retrospective, it appears justified that Helmut Kohl did not engage in lengthy consultation and negotiation with all of Germany's partners and neighbors, because subsequent developments in the Soviet Union made it likely that any postponement in Germany's unification plans might have resulted in no unification at all, and possibly not in the Eastern European revolutionary developments. The fact that no outcry went across Europe regarding the way German unification was handled is thought to be rooted in two reasons. On the one hand, obviously no foreign government felt seriously threatened by German unification, but only rather disturbed regarding its own future position of influence on the European continent. On the other hand, everybody recognized that, although being tied firmly into the European Community, Germany's future weight would be even more increased, and nobody wanted to jeopardize future relations with this country.

Yet, despite the indisputable fact that Germany's weight has increased after unification, we found that political and economic problems have seriously hampered united Germany's position. The most important problem is without doubt the economic hardships, particularly caused by a high unemployment rate, experienced by eastern Germans and increasingly by western Germans, that have led to disillusionment and a general feeling of doom among the public. Political promises had led the population into believing that within a relatively short time the restructuring of the eastern German economy would be completed and that living

standards in the eastern part would equal those in the western part, but this proved to be untrue.

This gap between expectations and their actual fulfillment led to antagonistic feelings between *Ossis* and *Wessis* that have not made psychological unification of the country any easier. Talk about a "wall in the heads" made the round, that will not be overcome in the near future. In fact, it is estimated that an equalization of economic and social living conditions will be achieved even before the deep-rooted divergence in civic culture, contemporary history and ideas can be overcome. In so far, German unification may also serve as an example how difficult European unification will be to achieve. Although the two Germanies were separated for only a relatively short time, and look back upon a common history and culture, including a common language, the time after the Second World War until unification has left a deep impact on them.

Our post-unification analysis of political parties and public opinion regarding European integration has revealed some important findings. Most importantly, while the CDU, FDP and SPD have been steadfast in their commitment to European integration, or have even still intensified their commitment, the Greens have abandoned their negative attitude about the European Union as an institution. They are now willing to work within its framework, yet without the formerly declared goal of radical change. To be sure, the criticism of the European Union's democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy have remained the same, but the criticism directed at it is more constructive. This has been attributed to several reasons. In the first place, the Greens have become a more established party, that has given up some of its protest rhetoric against the political establishment, and that has also found time to concentrate

more on foreign policy issues, whereas prior to unification it was foremost concerned with domestic politics. In the second place, due to the fact that the Greens became serious contenders for a government coalition-partner, some pragmatism has made room for previous idealistic positions. This has become evident in the slow, but steady increase of influence by the realist wing of the party (*Realos*).

The CDU/CSU has been found to favor a return to "normalization" in Germany's foreign and defense policy. This has been manifested in the party's support for breaking with the country's self-imposed taboo of employing the *Bundeswehr* outside NATO, a move that has been founded in the evolution of an internationally changed environment of insecurity, confronting Germany with new security challenges. Translated into the context of the European Community that meant that Germany has further promoted bilateral military cooperation with France - the French-German brigade is generally regarded as the foundation of a future European army - and with the Netherlands, recently also with Denmark and Poland, as well as that it has professed renewed interest in the WEU as the European pillar of NATO. In fact, Germany has been found to have taken the initiative, along with France, to form a new identity for WEU and forge links with NATO.

This new approach of the CDU/CSU towards *realpolitik* and the emphasis of the need for increased military capabilities has been said to be based on the emergence of new international security challenges. Although not explicitly mentioned, but nevertheless implied, has been the idea of building a future, more independent European competitor to the United States for the role of global power. This is precisely what especially the Greens and the PDS have reproached the CDU/CSU-

FDP coalition of doing. Namely, that the Kohl-government has tried to build a European superpower, under the disguise of which it has aimed to satisfy national great power ambitions. This has, in the eyes of the Greens and parts of the SPD, constituted a breach with Genscher's idealistic approach to foreign policy and his "policy of responsibility". At the European level, that means that the Kohl-government has tried to alter the European Union's former civilian character.

An important role in the government's shift towards *realpolitik* has been attributed to the FDP under the leadership of Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel. The FDP has advocated, like the CDU/CSU, a gradual return to "normalization". Whereas, traditionally, the party subordinated military aspects to economic aspects, the new foreign minister has changed that. As we see it, there are basically two reasons for this. On the one hand, the Gulf War and the Yugoslav War were crucial incidents that raised the awareness in the party that sometimes aggressors cannot be subdued merely with diplomatic measures and economic sanctions. The security of Germany was seen to be especially threatened by the spread of ethnic violence in its neighborhood.

In the second place, with Klaus Kinkel, a new generation has entered the Foreign Ministry. Raised after the Second World War, Kinkel had no personal experience of war and this has led to a different outlook than in the case of Genscher. Helmut Kohl did have equally first-hand experience of war and has still favored employment of German armed forces outside NATO. This may be attributed to the fact that, as a Conservative, he has had a different understanding about the use of force than the liberal Genscher. Despite the fact that Kinkel has been seen to have approached Conservative positions on security and defense, it has also been noted that the FDP

still takes a middle position between the more idealistic outlook of the SPD and the more realist outlook of the Conservatives by placing more emphasis on politics and crisis prevention rather than military means.

Summing up, the observed gradual shift of Conservatives and Liberals towards "normalization" has been called a shift towards "benign" realism, which is in this case a better term than *realpolitk*. This is due to the fact that united Germany continues to be, in the first place, a trading state. Therefore, the country continues to be aware that it can best achieve its interest of having access to open, prosperous markets in an environment of international cooperation that promotes peace and, consequently, leads to increased economic and social welfare. The use of military might has not been found in any party to be a purpose in itself, but military force is viewed as a last resort in order to stop aggressors and make the transition to peace possible. In this, the new Germany's missionary zeal for spreading peace and democracy has also been noted.

Yet, although all political parties subscribe to the goal of peace and democracy that is to be achieved on the European continent through European integration, the road to this goal is disputed. The SPD, the Greens and parts of the FDP have, guided by the more idealistic approach of placing confidence in international law and conflict-solving institutions, put major emphasis on the OSCE as a forum for all European countries. Regarding the European Union, the SPD, similar to the Greens, has been found to stress political issues, particularly the need for overcoming the democratic deficit, rather more than economic issues, despite its professed support for economic and monetary union.

Concerning security and defense policy, a shift towards more pragmatism has been observed in the SPD as well as among the Greens. This has been attributed particularly to the fact that both parties prepared to take over government responsibility after the 1998 election. The most important recent event affecting Germany has been the election of September 27, 1998, just a couple of weeks before the completion of this study. The outcome of this election has been a new government-coalition between the SPD and the Greens, putting an end to the Kohl-era.[1] Much anxiety has been observed abroad regarding the coalition between the SPD and the "undisciplined" Greens, as well as over the installment of the Green politician Joschka Fischer as the new foreign minister.

The first foreign-policy decision, however, that the new *Bundestag* has taken - even before Gerhard Schröder had been sworn in as new chancellor and Fischer had been nominated as foreign minister - was to consent with an overwhelming majority (500:80) to a NATO-mission in Kosovo with German participation, including many Green parliamentarians; only the PDS parliamentary group abstained as a whole. This consent was given although no clear UN-mandate existed, and the SPD's position has been that, generally, it would consider consenting to the deployment of German forces outside of NATO only in the case that a clear UN-mandate exists. The Greens never considered such an option at all, because they were completely opposed to the use of military force under any circumstance. Their goal of dissolving NATO has never been officially modified before the 1998 election; yet, it was never an important issue in the Greens' election campaign.

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[1] The result of the election for parties entering the *Bundestag* was as follows: SPD - 40.9%; CDU/CSU - 38.2%; the Greens - 6.7%; FDP - 6.2%; PDS - 5.1%.

As we see it, there are two explanations for the Greens' vote in the recent parliamentary decision. First of all, the growing influence of *Realos* over *Fundis*, as well as the fact that Fischer has emphasized the dilemma in the Greens' idealistic principles of establishing a civilian, non-violent order when being confronted with the reality of ethnic cleansing and war atrocities, has been noted already earlier. In the second place, the dream of the Greens to share government responsibility has finally come true, and the majority of Green parliamentarians, favoring a red-green coalition, are not prepared to endanger this coalition in the first test. It remains to be seen, however, in which way future decisions will be handled.

In the context of the European Union, the new government is expected to emphasize the civilian character of the Union more than the previous government. A close confidante of Fischer, the Green parliamentarian Volmer - who has abstained in the parliamentary vote on the Kosovo-mission - has called Helmut Kohl's European policy "very successful"[2], despite being "naive" and influenced by the realist school of thought. Yet, the Greens are prepared, and this is shared by a majority of SPD-parliamentarians, to explore new ways of enforcing a "civilian foreign policy". "Green pacifism" seeks "to strengthen civilian options of intervention, so that the necessity for military intervention will increasingly diminish."[3] This statement does not exclude the use of military means completely, as pacifists and idealists used to do formerly, but rather acknowledges the fact that a certain amount of military intervention might be necessary to ensure peace, but increasingly less so. In this sense, it cannot be excluded

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[2] "Wir sind da im Dilemma" ("We Are Facing a Dilemma There"), interview with the Green foreign-policy expert Ludger Volmer, in *Der Spiegel*, October 19, 1998, p. 31.
[3] Ibid.

that the new government will continue to strengthen the WEU - that is to say multilateral defense which, in their eyes, is much preferable to a national defense policy - while, at the same time, making a greater effort than the previous government to discover conflict-preventing measures.

Regarding political issues within the European Union, the emphasis of the red-green coalition is expected to put much greater emphasis on strengthening the influence of the European Parliament and overcoming the democratic deficit. Since both parties attribute only a secondary place to economics - the SPD subordinates it to economic equality, the Greens to ecology - it can be reasonably expected that issues affecting individual citizens - like unemployment, democratic influence and participation in the European Union, environment pollution, minimum wages, equality of women, to name but a few - will occupy a more prominent role than was hitherto the case.

Such an approach will be especially important in view of our finding that, after the Maastricht Treaty, individual citizens are more directly involved in the European Union, and that growing awareness by Germans of how little they can directly influence the shaping the Union's policies has led to increased voicing of dissatisfaction and to an erosion of the former "permissive consensus". Regarding public attitudes after unification, we have found that, in contrast to political parties where support for European integration - including economic and monetary union - has not wavered, at least not in public, opposition to the Maastricht Treaty was rooted in two reasons. Public discussion of European integration, as affecting European citizens across different nation-states, was sparked by the fact that the ratification of this treaty depended upon national referenda in some countries. This has made

citizens aware, together with the fact that the new treaty included provisions affecting them directly, that they, too, have a say in European affairs which had, up to then, been decided upon by political elites.

Furthermore, information about the contents of the new treaty was sparse, and the treaty, itself, was difficult to understand for laymen. This was highlighted in the high percentage of people questioned in polls, who did not have any opinion about the Maastricht Treaty and related issues. Whereas opposition to European integration in general has not found a majority in Germany, opposition to one specific point, that is to say to the replacement of the Euro for the D-mark, was very high. However, when the Kohl-government did not waver in its support for monetary union, the public has gradually become accustomed to this idea. The Kohl-government's insistence in criteria aimed at making the Euro as "hard" as the D-mark, and a campaign explaining what the Euro's aims and nature specifically are, have played a crucial role.

We think that the German public's initial, and still not completely overcome, opposition to the Euro was stemming particularly from insecurity over the effects it would have on their economic well-being. The D-mark has been a national symbol of pride in the country's economic achievements. The Germans have been found to be essentially a nation oriented towards economic success and high living standards. Pride in economic success had replaced other nationalistic feelings after the Second World War. It is, therefore, not astonishing that at a time, when German living standards were declining due to costly unification, any suggestion that this situation might be further deteriorated through the introduction of a new currency would be vehemently opposed.

Our analysis has established the fact that Helmut Kohl's decision to substitute the D-mark for the Euro has been a politically motivated decision. Despite the fact that a single currency is the logical continuation of the Single Market, and monetary union has been sold to the German public primarily on economic grounds, it has constituted in reality the strongest evidence of Germany's continued, or even increased, commitment to European integration, that has often been doubted by Germany's neighbors and partners. It is for this reason, that the former political opposition - now the Federal Government - has not pursued public objections to it any further, but has succumbed to the political wisdom that further European integration equals increased unlikeliness of war. This reinforces our view that German public opinion is rather oriented at short-term economic gains as opposed to long-term political - that is to say peace - and economic - that is to say the awareness that the German economy can only be successful in a peaceful and cooperative environment - considerations, as pursued by, and represented in the consensus of, German political parties.

The political risk that Helmut Kohl has undertaken by pushing for the introduction of the Euro is considerable. The government's council of economic advisers has already issued the warning that the new red-green government may face higher budget deficits if it will not cut down on costly social welfare programs. Despite Schröder's acknowledgment during the election campaign that that is what will have to be done, first signs after the new government has taken over are not pointing clearly in that direction. Yet, if the trend of falling deficits that was initiated under the Kohl-government is reversed, Germany will be directly contributing to the Euro's

instability, which could have serious economic repercussions for the whole European Union.

The recently attempted pressure by the new finance minister, Oskar Lafontaine - who is now called the "super minister" due to the large influence he has also secured from the Economics Ministry in addition to his own - on the German *Bundesbank* to lower interests rates has led to tensions with the independent Bank and has not contributed to increase the economy's confidence in the new administration. Lafontaine is also currently at the center of speculation about a candidate for the upcoming post of European Commission president. Yet, his influence, even in such a position, on the Union's monetary policy would be limited due to the fact that the Kohl-government has ensured that the Central European Bank will be as independent as its German counterpart.

The current largest economic problem within the Union is unemployment. Chancellor Schröder has already declared that bringing down high unemployment rates will be at the top of his European-policy priorities. It remains to be seen in which way the new European currency will help creating new jobs. As neo-liberals like to point out, the European Union's situation is very different from the United States where a single currency works because labor is mobile and wages are more flexible. Yet, the advantages of the Single Market are indisputable, and the logic - in the words of the last president of the European Monetary Institute - is that "in order to have a genuine single market, you need one single currency."[4]

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[4] Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy, "The Market Needs a Single Currency" in *Newsweek International*, February 3, 1997, p. 19.

The crux of the debate surrounding monetary union is the question whether further European integration is needed, or not. Despite the fact that a generation change has taken place among German politicians, and two thirds of the population were born after the war, we have seen that the "burden of history" continues for Germany. Although efforts towards "normalization" are present, the country will still have a long way to go before it is considered "normal" in the eyes of its neighbors and partners. The Germans cannot, and do not want to, forget their history. The distaste with which the Germans, especially the political establishment, view the nation-state has been at the heart of their motivation to promote European integration. It has, however, been disputed whether other countries should follow the same rationale and equally dislike the nation-state. Fears of a backlash, that is to say a return to nationalistic policies, in case the "experiment" European Union - including monetary union - fails have been pointed out. Similarly, the fact that the European Union will never speak with one voice, or rather in one language, has been highlighted. Cultural diversity is thought to be too great to allow the development of federal structures like those in Germany, or Switzerland and the United States to develop. Yet, Germany has always believed that its own positive experience with federalism can be transferred to the European Union.

As we see it, the future of the European Union hinges primarily on its economic success. Germany's drive for overcoming the democratic deficit, that is predicted to increase with the new German government, will increasingly involve European citizens in the shaping of European policies. German voters are thought to continue their habit of concentrating, in the first place, on economic issues when evaluating a

future European government. The present situation of fighting European elections on the grounds of national, mostly economic, issues may further erode support for European integration if the living standards and employment opportunities in Germany cannot be stabilized. Yet, with increasing democratization, the emergence of true European parties, fighting European elections on European issues, might "enlighten" voters regarding the European "mission" for peace; but that is only speculation.

On the other hand, increased influence of the European Parliament in deciding a large amount of technical and political details of European integration might also hinder the progress of integration. At present, language and cultural barriers are still very high, and often do not allow citizens to look beyond their national border. Up to now, European integration has continuously progressed, yet often it was more "dragging" than moving swiftly. European political elites that have so far primarily influenced European integration can be said to have adhered to de Weck's statement that "there are many irrational things in the European Community, yet there is no rational alternative to the Community."[5] Whether European citizens see it the same way, when their influence on the future of the European Union will have grown, remains to be seen.

Regarding the debate about "deepening" or "widening" the European Union, we have mentioned the expected resistance by the German public to fast Eastern enlargement. Whereas in general, support for overcoming the division of the European continent

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[5] Roger de Weck, "Ein Wechsel auf Europas Zukunft" ("A Bill of Exchange on Europe's Future") in *Die Zeit*, December 13, 1991.

through including Germany's Eastern neighbors is substantial, this will be likely to change when public awareness about actual financial contributions to be made for this goal grows. The Kohl-government initially favored fast enlargement, while deepening the Union at the same time. These two options were not regarded as mutually exclusive goals. However, the problems that arose in the German unification process made the government aware that the magnitude of problems arising from accession of East-Central countries would be even greater. The Kohl-administration had become increasingly pragmatic about membership of these countries in the European Union and had worked a time-schedule that did not foresee accession of the most advanced countries before the year 2003. The new Schröder-government has even been more vague about setting up a date for membership. During the new chancellor's first visit to Poland in November 1998, he stressed that Poland should not become a European Union member before both sides were ready and that such a decision should not be taken in a hasty manner. This indefinite postponement puts the new government on the side of those who favor deepening over widening. It remains to be seen whether this weakening of the political perspective, along which reform efforts in East-Central Europe have oriented themselves for several years, will have negative consequences for the transformation of political and economic systems in those countries.

Summing up, while analyzing whether Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration has changed after national unification or not, as compared to the post-unification period, we have found the following results. The consensus among political leaders and parties regarding European integration continues after German unification. In fact, the commitment to further integration has even grown, basically out of political considerations - that is to say the country's need to demonstrate to its

partners and neighbors that united Germany will not return to nationalistic policies, quite the opposite - as well as out of economic considerations - that is to say, Germany continues to be primarily a trading state and realizes, due to increasing globalization, that its export-oriented economy can only thrive in a peaceful, cooperative environment.

However, some incidents have pointed to the fact that Germany has become more self-confident, or "assertive", and is more ready to speak its mind on international issues than has been formerly the case. Changes in the international environment have made the country realize to varying degrees that greater pragmatism is called for in meeting new security challenges. In this, we have refrained from speaking of paradigmatic changes in Germany's new foreign policy but rather of "benign" realism. Germany remains basically a trading state with emphasis on economic might. Its increased political weight, however, is now backed with the carefully considered and sparsely adopted option of using military capabilities if peace is endangered. With the new red-green government coalition, however, idealist ideas are expected to prevail and more emphasis will be on creating a civilian order. In the context of European integration, this translates into stressing the European Union's civilian nature without completely ruling out the use of military force. Yet, such an option will be sought to be of a transitional nature.

Germany's political influence has increased in the European Union. Presumably, the country's influence will continue to grow in relation to its increasing economic position, once the constraints imposed upon it by national unification will have been lifted. Yet, Germany's influence in the Union cannot be equaled with that of the

German nation-state, because Germany continues to work towards decreasing its influence as a nation-state by seeking to introduce majority-voting into many areas encroaching upon the nation-state's sovereignty. Therefore, German influence is increasing and decreasing at the same time. We would therefore like to answer our research question as follows: "Germany's commitment to and impact on European integration: continuity *in* change." With this statement we will end our study and hope that it inspires new research in the field of German politics and European integration.

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