

INFORMAL SECTOR THROUGH STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

DENİZ BAYRAM

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

2013

INFORMAL SECTOR THROUGH STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Economics

by
Deniz Bayram

Boğaziçi University
2013

Thesis Abstract

Deniz Bayram, “Informal Sector Through Structural Transformation”

In this study, we investigate the evolution of the informal sector through the course of structural transformation. To this end, we develop both a three-sector and a five-sector dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model, which can simultaneously account for structural transformation between agriculture, industry and services, and between the informal and formal sectors. First, we incorporate the informal sector into an otherwise two-sector (agriculture and non agriculture) DGE model. Then, we augment this model and build a five-sector DGE model extending the non-agricultural sector into industry and services, to separately account for the evolution of informality in these two sectors. The calibrated model performs remarkably well in accounting for the evolution of the sectoral employment shares and the size of the informal sector. Finally, we use panel data econometric tools to investigate the empirical relationship between structural transformation and the informal sector and find a strong negative relationship between the size of non-agricultural sector and informality.

Tez Özeti

Deniz Bayram, “Yapısal Değişim Sürecinde Kayıt Dışı Sektör”

Bu çalışma, yapısal değişim sürecinde kayıt dışı sektördeki değişimi incelemektedir. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, tarım, sanayi ve servis sektörlerinin yanı sıra, kayıt dışı sektördeki yapısal değişimi açıklayabilecek üç sektörlü ve beş sektörlü dinamik genel denge modelleri oluşturulmuştur. Öncelikle, iki sektörlü (tarım ve tarım dışı) bir modele kayıt dışı sektör eklenerek üç sektörlü bir model sunulmuştur. Daha sonra sanayi ve servis sektörlerindeki kayıt dışılığı ayrı ayrı incelemek amacıyla, tarım dışı sektör sanayi ve servis olarak ikiye ayrılarak, beş sektörlü bir model geliştirilmiştir. Kalibre edilmiş modeller sektörel iş gücü paylarını ve kayıt dışı sektörün boyutundaki değişimi oldukça iyi yansıtmaktadır. Son olarak, panel veri ekonometri araçları kullanılarak yapısal değişim ve kayıt dışı ekonomi arasındaki empirik ilişki analiz edilmiştir. Bu analiz, tarım dışı sektör ile kayıt dışı sektörün boyutu arasında güçlü bir negatif ilişkiye işaret etmektedir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Ceyhun Elgin for his encouragement and guidance in all stages of this study. I am thankful to Prof. T. Umut Kuzubaş and Prof. Murat Taşdemir for their participation in the thesis committee and most valuable comments.

I would like to acknowledge the Boğaziçi University Scientific Research Project Fund for funding the research project No. 6710, “Public Debt, Sovereign Default Risk and Shadow Economy”.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friends for their continuous support. I dedicate this thesis to my mother, father and sister.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	4
The Three-Sector Model	4
The Five-Sector Model	8
CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS	15
The Three-Sector Model	15
The Five-Sector Model	17
CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS	23
Methodology	23
Data	24
Estimation Results	25
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUDING REMARKS	27
APPENDIX: COUNTRIES USED IN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS	28
REFERENCES	29

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Economic growth is usually accompanied by substantial changes in the composition of production and employment. These changes occur basically as a shift of resources from the traditional to modern sectors. Over the past decades, the analysis of how structural transformation occurs and its impacts has been an important focus of research. Different papers have tried to explain the source of reallocation of resources among sectors by multi-sector models. However, most papers have focused on sectorizing the economy in terms of agriculture, industry, and services. Therefore, the structural transformation literature has remained silent on the informal sector, which is an integral part of the growth process.

There is a well-known literature that studies structural transformation in the context of home production (see, for example, Gollin, et al., 2002; Ngai and Pissarides, 2008 and Rogerson, 2008). These papers develop models of time allocation across sectors, accounting for both market and home production. Although home production is sometimes defined as a part of the informal sector, we use a different definition. The informal sector is defined by Schneider, et al. (2010) as market-based production activities that are deliberately concealed from state authority to avoid taxation and regulation. Our framework differs from others in this regard, we investigate the evolution of the market-based but hidden sector.

The main contribution of this study is to build up a framework which can simultaneously account for structural transformation between agriculture, industry and services, and between the informal and formal sectors. In this study, we first incorporate the informal sector to an otherwise two sector

structural transformation model. We show that the size of the informal sector decreases through the transformation of the economy from the agricultural to non-agricultural sector. Then, we build a five-sector model extending the non-agricultural sector into industry and services, in order to account for informality in these two sectors separately. We show that informality declines in both sectors while it remains higher in services. Finally, we use panel data analysis to investigate the effect of structural change on informality. Our findings show that a higher non-agricultural sector size is associated with lower levels of informality.

The multi-sector models trying to explain sources of reallocation across sectors rely mainly on two types of approaches. The first-type of models view structural transformation as a supply side phenomenon. In these types of models, changes in the structure of production and employment are driven by sectoral differences in productivity growth rates or capital intensities. The pioneering work emphasizing the importance of differential rates of productivity growth on structural transformation was done by Baumol (1967; Baumol, et al. 1985). Ngai and Pissarides (2007) provide a modern version of Baumol's hypothesis using exogenous differential rates of productivity growth to explain allocation of capital and labor across sectors. Acemoglu and Guerrieri (2008) provide a framework which shows that different capital intensities and capital deepening can together generate structural transformation.

The second-type of models, which view structural transformation as a demand side phenomenon, are based on Engel's law. These types of models make use of sectoral differences in income elasticities of demand by utilizing non-homothetic preferences. One of the first papers in this vein is Gollin, et al. (2002) which explains industrialization by using the relationship between the dynamics of sectoral employment shares and consumer demand. Another paper which makes a strong case for the impact of Engel's law on structural transformation is Kongsamut, et al. (2001). In this paper, they build a

three-sector model where consumers have Stone-Geary preferences over agricultural good, manufactured good and services. The other papers combine two different approaches to build a hybrid model (see, for example, Duarte and Restuccia, 2010 and Rogerson, 2008). Our framework is also based on a hybrid model, in which structural transformation is driven by both non-homothetic preferences and differential rates of productivity growth.

The informal sector is considered to be an important characteristic of both less-developed and advanced economies, and one which has serious economic and social consequences. Many studies so far have utilized theoretical models to illuminate the determinants and complexities of informality. For example Fortin, et al. (1997), in order to study the effects of taxation and wage controls on the extent of informal economy, builds a model with firm heterogeneity, where a formal and an informal sector endogenously emerge in some productive branches of the economy. Ihrig and Moe (2004) use a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate the effects of tax rates and enforcement policies on the size of the informal sector. Antunes and Cavalcanti (2007) construct a model with credit constrained heterogeneous agents, financial frictions and occupational choices over formal and informal businesses. In this paper we use Ihrig and Moe's framework to build up the interaction between the formal and informal sectors.

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 lays out the theoretical framework, which includes descriptions of the environments and characterization of the equilibria. Chapter 3 presents the quantitative implications of the model. Chapter 4 provides the empirical analysis in line with the model predictions. Finally, Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter includes three- and five-sector models of structural transformation. In the three sector model, we lay out a framework which accounts for transition from the agricultural to non-agricultural sector. The structure of the agricultural sector is built on the work of Gollin, et al.(2002), where a one-sector neoclassical growth model is extended to include a explicit agricultural sector. In our model, the non-agricultural sector involves both the formal and informal sectors. To account for resource allocation between the formal and informal sectors, we use the framework of Ihrig and Moe (2004).

Then, we extend our framework to a five-sector model, in order to also investigate resource allocation between industry (manufacturing henceforth, to avoid confusion) and services. Here, informality is incorporated into both of the non-agricultural sectors. Allocation of resources between these two sectors is driven by differential rates of productivity growth as emphasized by Ngai and Pissarides (2007). Therefore, structural transformation in the economy is explained by both the non-homothetic preferences and sectoral differences in productivity growth (for a similar environment, see also Bah, 2009).

The Three-Sector Model

Environment

There is a representative household, which has K_0 units of initial endowment, owns the total land for the economy and has a time endowment $T > 0$. It allocates its time endowment across three sectors every period inelastically and consumes two types of goods: agricultural and non-agricultural. The lifetime

utility of the household is given by a Stone-Geary variety:

$$\sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left[\log(C_{M_t}) + V(C_{A_t}) \right]$$

where C_{A_t} and C_{M_t} stands for consumption of agricultural good and non-agricultural good, respectively. Utility from agricultural consumption $V(C_{A_t})$ takes the form

$$V(C_{A_t}) = \begin{cases} -\infty & \text{if } C_{A_t} < \bar{C}_A \\ \min(C_{A_t}, \bar{C}_A) & \text{if } C_{A_t} \geq \bar{C}_A \end{cases}$$

which implies that the household has to consume at least \bar{C}_A units of agricultural good. After reaching agricultural consumption level \bar{C}_A , it will only desire non-agricultural good. Introducing this non-homotheticity will allow labor to flow out of the agricultural sector after reaching the subsistence level agricultural good, regardless of the state of non-agricultural sector (Gollin et al, 2002).

The economy consists of three sectors: agriculture, formal non-agriculture and informal non-agriculture. Agricultural production has a Cobb-Douglas form of technology which employs land (L_t) and labor (N_{A_t}) as factor inputs. The effect of capital can be viewed as captured in the agricultural TFP (θ_{A_t}). A proportional tax τ is levied on agricultural income. The output of the agricultural sector is used only for consumption. Therefore, the resource constraint becomes:

$$C_{A_t} = (1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t} L_t^{1-\psi} N_{A_t}^\psi$$

where TFP evolves as $\theta_{A_t} = \theta_A(1 + \xi_{A_t})^t$.

Non-agricultural good is produced in both the formal and informal sectors. Production technology in the formal non-agricultural sector has a Cobb-Douglas form using capital (K_{M_t}) and labor (N_{MF_t}) inputs. The informal non-agricultural sector has a production technology which utilizes labor (N_{MI_t})

and exhibits diminishing returns to scale. A proportional tax τ is levied on both the formal and informal sector income. However, when operating in the informal sector, the household tends to hide income generated from this sector. So, it only pays taxes at the rate $\rho\tau$, where ρ can be interpreted as the level of enforcement government imposes on the tax collection from the informal sector (see Ihrig and Moe, 2004). The non-agricultural sector's output is used for both consumption and investment, therefore the resource constraint becomes:

$$C_{M_t} + I_t = (1 - \tau)\theta_{MF_t}K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{MI_t}N_{MI_t}^\phi$$

where TFPs evolves as $\theta_{MF_t} = \theta_{MF}(1 + \xi_{MF_t})^t$ and $\theta_{MI_t} = \theta_{MI}(1 + \xi_{MI_t})^t$. The law of motion for aggregate capital stock is given by $K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t$.

We assume that government policy variables ρ and τ are exogenous and tax revenues are used for non-productive activities.

Definition 1. Given K_{M_0} , θ_{MF_t} , θ_{MI_t} , θ_{A_t} , \bar{C}_A , ρ , τ ; a competitive equilibrium of this three-sector model is the set of allocations $C_{A_t}^$, $C_{M_t}^*$, K_{t+1}^* , L_t^* , $N_{MF_t}^*$, $N_{MI_t}^*$, $N_{A_t}^*$, G_t^* such that:*

1. The household chooses C_{A_t} , C_{M_t} , K_{t+1} , L_t , N_{MF_t} , N_{MI_t} , N_{A_t} to solve the following maximization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left[\log(C_{M_t}) + V(C_{A_t}) \right] \\ \text{where} \quad & V(C_{A_t}) = \begin{cases} -\infty & \text{if } C_{A_t} < \bar{C}_A \\ \min(C_{A_t}, \bar{C}_A) & \text{if } C_{A_t} \geq \bar{C}_A \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{subject to} \quad & C_{M_t} + I_t = (1 - \tau)\theta_{MF_t}K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{MI_t}N_{MI_t}^\eta \\ & K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \\ & C_{A_t} = (1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t}L_t^{1-\psi}N_{A_t}^\psi \\ & N_{MF_t} + N_{MI_t} + N_{A_t} = T \end{aligned}$$

2. Government revenue G_t equals $\tau\theta_{MF_t}K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + \rho\tau\theta_{MI_t}N_{MI_t}^\phi + \tau\theta_{A_t}L_t^{1-\psi}N_{A_t}^\psi$ and is thrown away.

Characterization

First, for simplicity, we normalize the size of total land in the economy to 1. Then equalizing the agricultural consumption to subsistence level, we can easily find the employment in agricultural sector as:

$$(1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t}L_t^{1-\psi}N_{A_t}^\psi = \bar{C}_A \quad (1)$$

$$N_{A_t} = \left[\frac{\bar{C}_A}{(1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t}} \right]^{1/\psi} \quad (2)$$

After finding the agricultural employment, our problem is reduced to a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model similar the to the one in Ihrig and Moe(2004). Denoting the time endowment left as $T - N_{A_t} = N_t$, the maximization problem becomes:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{C_t, N_t, L_t, K_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^T} \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \log(C_{M_t}) \\ & \text{subject to} \quad C_{M_t} + I_t = (1 - \tau)\theta_{MF_t}K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{MI_t}N_{MI_t}^\phi \\ & \quad K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \\ & \quad N_{MF_t} + N_{MI_t} = N_t \end{aligned}$$

Combining the first order conditions of this problem yields the Euler equation and the marginal product equality of the formal and informal sectors, given respectively as:

$$\frac{C_{M_t}}{C_{M_{t+1}}} = \beta \left[1 - \delta + (1 - \tau)\gamma\theta_{MF_{t+1}} \left(\frac{K_{M_{t+1}}}{N_{MF_{t+1}}} \right)^{\gamma-1} \right] \quad (3)$$

$$(1 - \gamma)(1 - \tau)\theta_{MF_t} \left(\frac{K_{M_t}}{N_{MF_t}} \right)^\gamma = (1 - \rho\tau)\phi\theta_{MI_t}N_{MI_t}^{\phi-1} \quad (4)$$

Rearranging the Euler Equation one can obtain the relative utilization of capital

and labor in the informal non-agricultural sector as:

$$\frac{K_t}{N_{Ft}} = \left[\frac{(1 + g_{C_M})/\beta + \delta - 1}{\gamma(1 - \tau)\theta_{MFt}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \quad (5)$$

where $g_{C_M} = \frac{C_{M_{t+1}} - C_{M_t}}{C_{M_t}}$ is the growth rate of non-agricultural consumption.

Combining equations (4) and (5) we obtain:

$$N_{MI_t} = \left[\frac{(1 - \gamma)(1 - \tau)\theta_{MFt}}{(1 - \rho\tau)\phi\theta_{MI_t}} \left[\frac{(1 + g_{C_M})\beta + \delta - 1}{\gamma(1 - \tau)\theta_{MFt}} \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}} \quad (6)$$

which gives the evolution of the informal sector in non-agriculture.

The Five-Sector Model

Environment

There is a representative household which has K_0 units of initial endowment, owns the total land for the economy and has a time endowment $T > 0$. It allocates its time endowment across five sectors every period inelastically and consumes three types of goods: agricultural good, manufactured good and services. The lifetime utility of the household is given by:

$$\sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left(\log [\alpha C_{M_t}^\epsilon + (1 - \alpha)C_{S_t}^\epsilon]^{1/\epsilon} + V(C_{A_t}) \right)$$

where C_{A_t} , C_{M_t} and C_{S_t} stands for the consumption of agricultural good, manufactured good and services respectively. The parameter ϵ is the elasticity of substitution between non-agricultural goods and α gives the weights of two goods in allocation of consumption. Utility from agricultural consumption $V(C_{A_t})$ again takes the form of Stone-Geary variety.

The specification of the agricultural sector is the same as in the three-sector model. Non-agricultural goods, this time extended into manufactured good and services, are again produced in both the formal and informal sectors.

Production technology in formal manufacturing and formal services have Cobb-Douglas forms using capital (K_{M_t}, K_{S_t}) and labor (N_{MF_t}, N_{SF_t}) with identical intensities, following Herrendorf and Valentiyi (2008). Informal manufacturing and informal service sectors have diminishing returns to scale technologies with labor (N_{MI_t}, N_{SI_t}) . The degree of diminishing returns to scale in two sectors are different. As in the three sector model, a proportional tax τ is levied on both the formal and informal sector income, with an enforcement level ρ on tax collection from the informal sector. The manufacturing sector's output is used for both consumption and investment, while the service sector's output is only used for consumption. Therefore the resource constraints become:

$$\begin{aligned} C_{M_t} + I_t &= (1 - \tau)\theta_{MF_t}K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{MI_t}N_{MI_t}^\phi \\ C_{S_t} &= (1 - \tau)\theta_{SF_t}K_{S_t}^\gamma N_{SF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{SI_t}N_{SI_t}^\eta \end{aligned}$$

where TFPs evolves as $\theta_{MF_t} = \theta_{MF}(1 + \xi_{MF_t})^t$, $\theta_{MI_t} = \theta_{MI}(1 + \xi_{MI_t})^t$, $\theta_{SF_t} = \theta_{SF}(1 + \xi_{SF_t})^t$ and $\theta_{SI_t} = \theta_{SI}(1 + \xi_{SI_t})^t$. The law of motion for aggregate capital stock is given by $K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t$.

We again assume that government policy variables ρ and τ are exogenous and tax revenues are used for non-productive activities.

Definition 2. Given $K_{M_0}, \theta_{MF_t}, \theta_{SF_t}, \theta_{MI_t}, \theta_{SI_t}, \theta_{A_t}, \bar{C}_A, \rho, \tau$, a competitive equilibrium of this five-sector model is the set of allocations $C_{A_t}^, C_{M_t}^*, C_{S_t}^*, K_{t+1}^*, K_{M_t}^*, K_{S_t}^*, L_t^*, N_{MF_t}^*, N_{MI_t}^*, N_{SF_t}^*, N_{SI_t}^*, N_{A_t}^*, G_t^*$ such that:*

- 1. The household chooses $C_{A_t}, C_{M_t}, C_{S_t}, K_{t+1}, K_{M_t}, K_{S_t}, L_t, N_{MF_t}, N_{MI_t}, N_{SF_t}, N_{SI_t}, N_{A_t}$ to solve the following maximization problem:*

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max \quad \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left(\log [\alpha C_{M_t}^\epsilon + (1 - \alpha) C_{S_t}^\epsilon]^{1/\epsilon} + V(C_{A_t}) \right) \\
& \text{where} \quad V(C_{A_t}) = \begin{cases} -\infty & \text{if } C_{A_t} < \bar{C}_A \\ \min(C_{A_t}, \bar{C}_A) & \text{if } C_{A_t} \geq \bar{C}_A \end{cases} \\
& \text{subject to} \quad C_{M_t} + I_t = (1 - \tau)\theta_{MF_t} K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^\eta \\
& \quad K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \\
& \quad C_{S_t} = (1 - \tau)\theta_{SF_t} K_{S_t}^\gamma N_{SF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau)\theta_{SI_t} N_{SI_t}^\eta \\
& \quad C_{A_t} = (1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t} L_t^{1-\psi} N_{A_t}^\psi \\
& \quad K_{M_t} + K_{S_t} = K_t \\
& \quad N_{MF_t} + N_{SF_t} + N_{MI_t} + N_{SI_t} + N_{A_t} = T
\end{aligned}$$

2. Government revenue G_t equals $\tau\theta_{MF_t} K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + \rho\tau\theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^\eta + \tau\theta_{SF_t} K_{S_t}^\gamma N_{SF_t}^{1-\gamma} + \rho\tau\theta_{SI_t} N_{SI_t}^\eta + \tau\theta_{A_t} L_t^{1-\psi} N_{A_t}^\psi$ and is thrown away.

Characterization

First, for simplicity, we normalize the size of total land in the economy to 1.

Then, equalizing the agricultural consumption to subsistence level, we can easily find the employment in the agricultural sector as:

$$(1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t} L_t^{1-\psi} N_{A_t}^\psi = \bar{C}_A \quad (1)$$

$$N_{A_t} = \left[\frac{\bar{C}_A}{(1 - \tau)\theta_{A_t}} \right]^{1/\psi} \quad (2)$$

After finding agricultural employment, our problem is reduced to a four-sector maximization problem. Denoting the time endowment left as $T - N_{A_t} = N_t$, the

maximization problem becomes:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \max_{\{C_t, N_t, L_t, K_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^T} \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \log [\alpha C_{M_t}^\epsilon + (1 - \alpha) C_{S_t}^\epsilon]^{1/\epsilon} \\
& \text{subject to} \quad C_{M_t} + I_t = (1 - \tau) \theta_{MF_t} K_{M_t}^\gamma N_{MF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau) \theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^\phi \\
& \quad K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + I_t \\
& \quad C_{S_t} = (1 - \tau) \theta_{SF_t} K_{S_t}^\gamma N_{SF_t}^{1-\gamma} + (1 - \rho\tau) \theta_{SI_t} N_{SI_t}^\eta \\
& \quad K_{M_t} + K_{S_t} = K_t \\
& \quad N_{MF_t} + N_{SF_t} + N_{MI_t} + N_{SI_t} = N_t
\end{aligned}$$

Combining the first order conditions, and denoting $[\alpha C_{M_t}^\epsilon + (1 - \alpha) C_{S_t}^\epsilon] = \chi_t$, we obtain the following equations:

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \left(\frac{C_{M_t}}{C_{S_t}} \right)^{\epsilon-1} = \frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \left(\frac{K_{S_t}}{K_{M_t}} \right)^{\gamma-1} \left(\frac{N_{SF_t}}{N_{MF_t}} \right)^{1-\gamma} \quad (3)$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \left(\frac{C_{M_t}}{C_{S_t}} \right)^{\epsilon-1} = \frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \left(\frac{K_{S_t}}{K_{M_t}} \right)^\gamma \left(\frac{N_{SF_t}}{N_{MF_t}} \right)^{-\gamma} \quad (4)$$

$$(1 - \gamma)(1 - \tau) \theta_{MF_t} \left(\frac{K_{M_t}}{N_{MF_t}} \right)^\gamma = (1 - \rho\tau) \phi \theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^{\phi-1} \quad (5)$$

$$\left(\frac{C_{M_t}}{C_{M_{t+1}}} \right)^{\epsilon-1} \frac{\chi_{t+1}}{\chi_t} = \beta \left[1 - \delta + (1 - \tau) \gamma \theta_{MF_{t+1}} \left(\frac{K_{M_{t+1}}}{N_{MF_{t+1}}} \right)^{\gamma-1} \right] \quad (6)$$

$$\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \left(\frac{C_{M_t}}{C_{S_t}} \right)^{\epsilon-1} = \frac{\theta_{SI_t} \eta N_{SI_t}^{\eta-1}}{\theta_{MI_t} \phi N_{MI_t}^{\phi-1}} \quad (7)$$

$$(1 - \gamma)(1 - \tau) \theta_{SF_t} \left(\frac{K_{S_t}}{N_{SF_t}} \right)^\gamma = (1 - \rho\tau) \eta \theta_{SI_t} N_{SI_t}^{\eta-1} \quad (8)$$

Equations (3) and (4) equate the marginal products of capital and labor in formal manufacturing and formal services. Equation (5) equates the marginal product of labor between informal manufacturing and informal services.

Equations (6) and (7) are the marginal product equality of labor between the informal and formal sectors in manufacturing and services, respectively. Finally, equation (8) is the Euler equation.

Combining equations (3) and (4) with resource constraints, we find that

capital and labor ratios are equal between formal sectors:

$$\frac{K_{M_t}}{N_{MF_t}} = \frac{K_{S_t}}{N_{SF_t}} = \frac{K_t}{N_{F_t}} \quad (9)$$

Combining equations (4) and (9) we obtain:

$$\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \left(\frac{C_{M_t}}{C_{S_t}} \right)^{\epsilon-1} = \frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \quad (10)$$

which implies that the relative consumption of manufactured good and services depends on the productivity ratios of formal manufacturing and service sectors. Then rearranging equation (9), one can obtain the relative utilization of capital and labor in formal sectors as:

$$\frac{K_t}{N_{F_t}} = \left[\frac{\frac{g_{C_M}^{\epsilon-1} g_\chi}{\beta} + \delta - 1}{\gamma(1-\tau)\theta_{MF_t}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}} \quad (11)$$

where $g_\chi = \frac{\chi_{t+1} - \chi_t}{\chi_t}$ is the growth rate of $\chi_t = [\alpha C_{M_t}^\epsilon + (1-\alpha)C_{S_t}^\epsilon]$. Combining this ratio with equation (9) and substituting into Euler equation yields:

$$N_{MI_t} = \left[\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)\theta_{MF_t} \left[\frac{g_{C_M}^{\epsilon-1} g_\chi}{\beta} + \delta - 1 \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}}{(1-\rho\tau)\phi\theta_{MI_t}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\phi-1}} \quad (12)$$

which gives the evolution of informal labor used in manufacturing sector. Now we can easily find the evolution of informal labor in services by using equation (5):

$$N_{SI_t} = \left[\frac{(1-\gamma)(1-\tau)\theta_{SF_t} \left[\frac{g_{C_M}^{\epsilon-1} g_\chi}{\beta} + \delta - 1 \right]^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}}{(1-\rho\tau)\eta\theta_{SI_t}} \right]^{\frac{1}{\eta-1}} \quad (13)$$

The aggregate expenditure for non-agricultural goods are given by

$C_t = p_{M_t} C_{M_t} + p_{S_t} C_{S_t}$, where p_{M_t} and p_{S_t} are the prices of manufacture goods and services, respectively. Also, given the wage rate equality between the sectors, we find the relative equilibrium prices as $\frac{p_{S_t}}{p_{M_t}} = \frac{\theta_{MF_t}}{\theta_{SF_t}}$. Normalizing the price of manufactured good to 1, the aggregate expenditure for manufactured

goods and services can be denoted as:

$$C_t = C_{M_t} + \frac{\theta_{MF_t}}{\theta_{SF_t}} C_{S_t} \quad (14)$$

Substituting for C_{M_t} and C_{S_t} from the resource constraints, we obtain the following equation for non-agricultural consumption

$$C_t = \theta_{MF_t} (1 - \tau) \left(\frac{K_t}{N_{F_t}} \right)^\gamma N_{F_t} + (1 - \rho\tau) \theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^\phi \left[\frac{N_{SI_t} \phi}{N_{MI_t} \eta} + 1 \right] + (1 - \delta) K_t - K_{t+1} \quad (15)$$

Finally, we need to derive the labor and capital in the formal sectors. Using equation (10), we can denote the manufactured good consumption C_{M_t} as:

$$C_{M_t} = \left(\frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} C_{S_t} \quad (16)$$

Substituting for services consumption C_{S_t} in this equation yields the following equation for manufactured goods consumption:

$$C_{M_t} = \theta_{MF_t} \left(\frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} (1 - \tau) \left(\frac{K_{S_t}}{N_{SF_t}} \right)^\gamma N_{SF_t} + \left(\frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} (1 - \rho\tau) \theta_{SI_t} N_{SI_t}^\eta \quad (17)$$

Combining equation (14) with equation (16) and substitution services consumption C_{S_t} , we can obtain the following:

$$C_t = \left[1 + \left(\frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \right] \left[(1 - \tau) \theta_{MF_t} \left(\frac{K_t}{N_{F_t}} \right)^\gamma N_{SF_t} + \frac{(1 - \rho\tau) \phi \theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^{\phi-1} N_{SI_t}}{\eta} \right] \quad (18)$$

Rearranging the last equation, we find the evolution of labor in the formal service sector:

$$N_{SF_t} = \frac{C_t / \left[1 + \left(\frac{\theta_{SF_t}}{\theta_{MF_t}} \right)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon-1}} \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \right)^{\frac{1}{\epsilon-1}} \right] - \frac{(1 - \rho\tau) \phi \theta_{MI_t} N_{MI_t}^{\phi-1} N_{SI_t}}{\eta}}{\theta_{MF_t} (1 - \tau) \left(\frac{K_t}{N_{F_t}} \right)^\gamma} \quad (19)$$

Given these, one can easily derive the evolution of labor in formal manufacturing, capital in formal manufacturing and formal services, and all sectoral outputs.

CHAPTER 3

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Having characterized the equilibrium, we will now evaluate the performance of the three-sector and five-sector models under the assumption that the economy is in a steady state. We will compare the implications of our framework with the US and world average time series. The data of sectoral hours worked for the US and sectoral employment shares for other countries are obtained from the Groningen 10-Sector Database. For the informal sector size, we use the estimates of Elgin and Öztunalı (2012).¹

The Three-Sector Model

Before running the numerical simulations, we have to determine the parameter values. We normalize the initial TFP levels in agricultural (θ_A) and non-agriculture sectors (θ_{MF}) to 1. Given these, we set the value of the initial TFP parameter in informal non-agriculture (θ_{MI}) to 20 in order to match the initial size of the informal sector in the US, and subsistence level consumption (\bar{C}_A) to 2 percent in order to match the initial size of the agricultural sector in the US. To match the world average informal sector size and subsistence level consumption, we set θ_{MI} and \bar{C}_A to 30 and 6,5 percent, respectively. We take the values of TFP growth rates in agriculture (ξ_A) and non-agriculture (ξ_{MF}) as 0.0326 and 0.013 from Gollin, et al. (2002) and Rogerson (2008), where the environments are similar to ours. We set the TFP growth rate in informal non-agriculture (ξ_{MI}) to 0.016.

¹We use an average of 27 countries to resemble the world average. These countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US.

The capital share in non-agriculture (γ) is chosen as 0.3 which is standard in the literature. The labor share in agriculture (ψ) and the degree of diminishing returns to scale in informal non-agriculture (η) are set to 0.7 and 0.495 following Restuccia, et al. (2008) and Ihrig and Moe (2004), respectively. We choose the values of β and δ as 0.96 and 0.08 from the standard values found in literature. We also set the parameter value of tax rate (τ) to 0.093 following Ihrig and Moe (2004). Finally, we choose the value of (ρ) as 0.8, however the results are not sensitive to small changes in the enforcement rate. The parameter values are summarized in table 1.

Table 1: Parameter Values for the Three-Sector Model

γ	0.33	β	0.96
η	0.495	δ	0.08
ψ	0.7	ξ_A	0.0326
τ	0.093	ξ_{MF}	0.013
ρ	0.8	ξ_{MI}	0.016

The results are shown in figures 1,2,3 and 4. As seen in figures 1 and 2, the model can track the reallocation of hours worked between agriculture and non-agriculture and the share of the informal sector remarkably well for the US. The share of employment decreases from 9 percent to 2 percent in the US between 1950 and 2005. The model predicts this decrease to be from 9 percent to 1 percent. The size of the informal sector decreases from 13 percent to 8 percent between 1960 and 2009, both in the model prediction and its data counterpart. Therefore, the model has a good predictive power for the US economy. Figure 3 shows that, for the world average, the model predicts a faster decrease in agriculture, and therefore a faster increase in non-agriculture than its data counterpart. For the period 1951-2005, the model predicts a 9 percent larger decrease for the share of agricultural employment. Similarly, for the size of the informal sector, the model is able to pick up the downward trend, but predicts a faster decrease. The informal sector size falls from 39 percent to 25




Figure 1: Sectoral share of hours worked in the US




Figure 2: Size of the informal sector in the US

percent during the period of 1961-2008, while the model predicts this decrease to be from 39 percent to 20 percent (see Figure 4).

The Five-Sector Model

The choices of parameter values are mostly similar to the three-sector model. We normalize the TFP levels in agriculture (θ_A), formal manufacturing (θ_{MF}) and formal services (θ_{SF}) to 1. Given these, we set the initial value of TFP in informal manufacturing (θ_{MI}) to 11 and informal services (θ_{SI}) to 17 in order to




Figure 3: Employment shares in world average




Figure 4: Size of the informal sector in world average

match the initial size of the sectoral shares and informality in the US, and subsistence level consumption (\bar{C}_A) to 2 percent in order to match the initial size of agricultural sector in the US. To match the world average informal sector size and sectoral shares, we set the initial value of TFP in informal manufacturing (θ_{MI}) to 13 and informal services (θ_{SI}) to 30. We also set \bar{C}_A to 5 percent to match the initial agricultural employment. We take the values of TFP growth rates in formal agriculture (ξ_A), formal manufacturing (ξ_{MF}) and formal services (ξ_{SF}) as 0.0326, 0.0247 and 0.0126 from Rogerson (2008). We choose the TFP growth rates in informal manufacturing (ξ_{MI}) and informal services (ξ_{SI}) as 0.03 and 0.024, respectively. Notice that the TFP growth rate in informal manufacturing is higher than that of informal services and similar to that of the formal sector.

The capital shares (γ) in manufacturing and services are both set to 0.33 (see Herrendorf and Valentinyi, 2008). Similar to the three sector model, we set the labor shares in agriculture to 0.7. The degree of diminishing returns to scale in informal manufacturing and informal services (η) are set to the same parameter value in order to be consistent with the formal sectors. This value is chosen as 0.495 following the estimates of Ihrig and Moe (2004), as in the three-sector model. The choices of the parameter values for β , δ , tax rate (τ) and enforcement rate (ρ) are similar to the three-sector model. Finally the elasticity of substitution parameter ϵ and α are set to -2.65 and 0.01 respectively, following Rogerson (2008) and Ngai and Pissarides (2008). Table 2 summarizes the parameter values for the five-sector model.

Table 2: Parameter Values for the Five-Sector Model

ϵ	-2.65	ψ	0.7	ξ_A	0.0326
α	0.01	β	0.96	ξ_{MF}	0.0247
γ	0.33	δ	0.08	ξ_{SF}	0.0126
η	0.495	τ	0.093	ξ_{MI}	0.03
ϕ	0.495	ρ	0.8	ξ_{SI}	0.024

Figure 5 shows the allocation of hours worked in agriculture, manufacturing and services in the US economy between 1950 and 2005. The model makes a good prediction of the decrease in agriculture. As also seen in three-sector model predictions, agriculture decreases from 9 percent to 2 percent in that period. The model predicts this decrease to be from 9 percent to 1 percent. The model also picks up the upward trend in services, however predicts a slower increase. Share of service sector increases from 57 to 78 percent in that period and the model predicts a 10 percent smaller increase. Also, the model is successful in tracking the share of employment in manufacturing in the first half of the period. However, it underperforms in capturing the decrease in the second half. After 1980, the share of manufacturing employment falls from 30 percent to 21 percent, while the model predicts only a 2 percent decrease.

Figure 6 shows that for the size of the informal sector in the US, the model makes a reasonably well prediction as in three-sector model. It is successful in capturing the 4 percent decrease. Informality in both manufacturing and services is decreasing, while there is a sharper decrease in services. However, informality in services still remains approximately two times higher than in manufacturing.

The results for the world average are shown in figures 7 and 8. The model is again successful in capturing the downward and upward trends for agricultural and services employment although it predicts a faster decrease in agriculture. Employment in the service sector increases from 31 to 65 percent in the given period, and the model predicts this increase to be 31 to 62 percent. However, while the data shows a 32 percentage points decrease in agricultural employment from 45 percent, the model predicts a 42 percentage points decrease. As observed in the US predictions, the model captures the rise in the manufacturing employment in the first half of the period, however it falls short of tracking the inverse-U trend. We should also note here that although it successfully captures the employment shares, the 5-sector model generates




Figure 5: Sectoral share of hours worked in the US




Figure 6: Size of the informal sector in the US

counterfactual results on output shares.

Finally, as seen in figure 8, the model succeeds in picking up the decrease in the informal sector. During the period 1960-2008, size of the informal sector decreases from 38 percent to 25 percent. Similarly in the model counterpart, it decreases from 38 percent to 22 percent. Notice that again, informality in services is significantly higher than in manufacturing. This is consistent with the findings of various surveys (see, for example, Lubell, 1991).




Figure 7: Employment shares in world average




Figure 8: Size of the informal sector in world average

CHAPTER 4

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

As documented in the previous chapter, our model performs remarkably well in accounting for the evolution of informal economy size in different sectors of the economy as well as the overall size of the informal economy and the sectoral employment shares. The size of informality decreases substantially as the labor force moves out from agriculture to industry and services. The negative cross-country correlation between the informal sector and non-agricultural sector for 161 countries (see Appendix) between 1960 and 2009 is also depicted in Figure 9. In this chapter, we will batter this result to a battery of econometric tests and analyze the relationship between informality and the size of non-agricultural sector.

Methodology

In order to establish a correlation between informal economy size and non-agricultural sector size, we will estimate the following regression equation using the fixed-effects (FE) estimator:²

$$IS_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 NONAGR_{i,t} + \sum_{k=2}^n \alpha_k X_{ki,t} + \theta_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

Here, $IS_{i,t}$ is the informal sector size and $NONAGR_{i,t}$ is the non-agricultural sector size as % of GDP in country i in year t . $X_{ki,t}$ denotes the other explanatory variables, which are GDP per-capita, trade openness, government spending, capital-output ratio, growth rate, law and order index, corruption

²For robustness checks, we also have estimated the same equation using different estimators and obtained qualitatively similar results.




Figure 9: Size of the informal sector in world average

control index and bureaucratic quality index. θ_i , γ_t are the country and period fixed effects, respectively. Finally, $\epsilon_{i,t}$ denotes the error term.

Data

Table 3: Complete Dataset Summary Statistics: 5-year Averages from 1960-2010

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Informal Sector Size (%)	35.98	14.30	8.09	80.01
Non-agricultural Sector Size (%)	80.73	15.88	11.62	100
GDP per-capita (thousand USD)	8.68	11.63	0.16	125.37
Trade Openness	72.25	48.93	2.51	415.28
Govt. Spending (%)	11.03	7.29	0.35	56.49
Capital-Output Ratio	1.92	0.89	0.22	11.67
Growth (%)	2.24	4.26	-31.59	54.45
Law and Order	3.65	1.48	0.73	6.00
Corruption Control	3.10	1.35	0.00	6.00
Bureaucratic Quality	2.16	1.19	0.00	4.00

Empirical studies on informality are rare because of limited data availability, since informality is hard to measure by definition. The largest data set in the literature was the one constructed by Buehn and Schneider (2012), and this included data from 162 countries but only for 9 years (from 1999 to 2007).

However, the size of the non-agricultural sector, which is the central component

of our empirical analysis, does not vary much over a short time horizon such as 9 years. Since we aim at examining the evolution of the shadow economy through the course of structural transformation, we borrow from the shadow economy estimates constructed by Elgin and Öztunalı (2012) for 161 countries over the period from 1950 to 2009.

We measure the size of the non-agricultural sector as the total of industry (ISIC Rev.3 divisions 10-45) and services value added (ISIC Rev.3 divisions 50-99) as % of GDP. The data is extracted from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Other control variables that we use are GDP per-capita, trade openness (defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP), government spending (as % of GDP), capital-output ratio and three institutional quality indices, i.e. corruption control, law and order and bureaucratic quality. The indices are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide of the PRS Group and the rest of the variables from Penn World Tables 7.1. The list of countries used in the empirical analysis is given in the Appendix.

The dataset covers 161 countries for the years between 1960 and 2009. However, in order to avoid identifying business cycle effects, we took five year averages, reducing the time dimension of the panel to 10. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis.

Estimation Results

Estimation results are reported in Table 4. We observe that a larger non-agricultural sector size is associated with a larger informal sector size in 1 percent significance level, and this result is robust to the inclusion of different control variables. Another variable that seems to have an important effect is capital-output ratio. Capital-output ratio has a negatively significant coefficient in all regression equations. We also observe that government spending is significantly correlated with the informal sector size when all of the explanatory

Table 4: Informality vs. Structural Transformation: FE Estimations (5-year averages)

Informality	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Non-Agr.	-0.28*	-0.28*	-0.28*	-0.25*	-0.25*	-0.15*	-0.15*	-0.14*
	(-7.61)	(-7.63)	(-7.62)	(-6.16)	(-6.03)	(-3.66)	(-3.66)	(-3.29)
GDP		-0.03	-0.03	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
		(-0.49)	(-0.44)	(-1.09)	(-1.06)	(-0.61)	(-0.57)	(-0.47)
Openness			-0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
			(-0.45)	(0.98)	(0.95)	(0.95)	(1.03)	(1.08)
Govt. Sp.			-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.12	-0.12	-0.13***
			(-0.67)	(-0.12)	(-0.08)	(-1.51)	(-1.57)	(-1.73)
Capital				-3.75*	-3.65*	-2.90*	-2.90*	-3.04*
				(-4.96)	(-4.31)	(-3.53)	(-3.43)	(-3.92)
Growth					0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.01
					(0.46)	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.28)
Law						-0.54*	-0.60*	-0.49**
						(-2.69)	(-2.99)	(-2.38)
Corruption							0.24	0.39
							(0.93)	(1.55)
Bur. Qual.								-0.66**
								(-2.23)
<i>R</i> -squared	0.27	0.29	0.28	0.36	0.36	0.30	0.28	0.30
Observations	1063	1063	1063	895	895	522	522	522
F-Test	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Time F-Test	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

All panel regressions include a country fixed effect and year dummies. Absolute values of robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** denote 1, 5 and 10% confidence levels, respectively. F-test refers to the p-value of the joint significance of all the coefficients, whereas Time F-test refers to the joint significance of the year dummies.

variables are included. A higher government spending indicates lower levels of informality. Finally, we observe that institutional quality matters. Higher values of law and order and bureaucratic quality indices are significantly associated with a lower informal sector size.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The importance of informality in both less-developed and advanced countries is widely acknowledged. In this paper we aim to shed light on the evolution of the informal sector through the process of structural transformation. We show that a combined framework of non-homothetic preferences and differences in sectoral productivity can drive the labor reallocation between agriculture, industry and services, and between the formal and informal sectors. We find that labor moves to the sectors with lower rates of productivity growth, as emphasized by Ngai and Pissarides (2007). We also find that the size of the informal sector decreases through structural transformation, with informality decreasing in both industry and services.

The quantitative implications of our models are consistent with the data where employment share in agriculture decreases, industry follows an inverse-U trend and services increases through the period 1950-2005. Predictions of the model also match well with the informal sector dynamics observed in the data set. Finally, using panel data estimations, we find strong empirical support for our observation in the model on the relationship between the size of non-agricultural sector and informality. We show that a larger non-agricultural sector is associated with a smaller informal sector size.

APPENDIX: COUNTRIES USED IN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote Divore, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea Republic, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D. and Guerrieri, V. (2008). Capital Deepening and Nonbalanced Economic Growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(3), 467-498.
- Amaral, P. and Quintin, E. (2006). A Competitive Model of the Informal Sector. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 53(7), 1541-1553.
- Antunes, A. and Cavalcanti, T. (2007). Start-up Costs, Limited Enforcement and the Hidden Economy. *European Economic Review*, 57(1), 203-224.
- Bah, E. (2009). A Three-Sector Model of Structural Transformation and Economic Development. Retrieved May 27, 2013 from <http://homes.eco.auckland.ac.nz/ebah002/pdf/SectoralTFP1.pdf>.
- Baumol, W. J. (1967). Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: The Anatomy of Urban Crisis. *American Economic Review*, 57(3), 415-426.
- Baumol, W. J., Blackman S. A. B. and Wolff, E. N. (1985). Unbalanced Growth Revisited: Asymptotic Stagnancy and New Evidence. *American Economic Review*, 75(4), 806-817.
- Buehn, A. and Schneider, F. (2012). Shadow Economies Around the World: Novel Insights, Accepted Knowledge and New Estimates. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 19(1), 139-171.
- Duarte, M. and Restuccia, D. (2010). The Role of Structural Transformation in Aggregate Productivity. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(1), 129-173.
- Elgin, C. and Öztunalı, O. (2012). Shadow Economies around the World: Model Based Estimates. *Working Papers 2012/05, Bogazici University, Department of Economics*.
- Fortin, B., Marceau, N. and Savard, L. (1997). Taxation, Wage Controls and the Informal Sector. *Journal of Public Economics*, 66, 239-312.
- Gollin, D., Parente, S. L. and Rogerson, R. (2002). The Role of Agriculture in Development. *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings*, 92(2), 160-164.

- Gollin, D., Parente, S. L. and Rogerson, R. (2004). Farm Work, Home Work, and International Productivity Differences. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 7, 827-850.
- Gollin, D., Parente, S. L. and Rogerson, R. (2007). The Food Problem and the Evolution of International Income Levels. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, Volume 54(4), 1230-1255.
- Herrendorf, B. and Valentinyi, A. (2008). Measuring Factor Income Shares at the Sectoral Level. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 11(4), 820-835.
- Ihrig, J., and Moe, K. S. (2004). Lurking in the Shadows: The Informal Sector and Government Policy. *Journal of Development Economics*. 73(2), 541-557.
- Kongsamut, P., Rebelo, s. and Xie, D. (2001). Beyond Balanced Growth. *Review of Economic Studies*, 68 (4), 869-882.
- Lubell, H. (1991). The Informal Sector in the 1980s and 1990s. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
- Ngai, L. R. and Pissarides, C. A. (2007). Structural Change in a Multi-Sector Model of Growth. *American Economic Review*, 97(1), 429-443.
- Ngai, L. R. and Pissarides, C. A. (2008). Trend in Hours and Economic Growth. *Review of Economic Dynamics*, 11, 239-256.
- Parente L. S., Rogerson, R. and Wright, R. (2000). Homework in Development Economics: Household Production and the Wealth of Nations. *Journal of Political Economy*, 108(4), 680-687.
- Restuccia D., Yang, D. T. and Zhu, X. (2008). Agriculture and aggregate productivity: A Quantitative Cross-country Analysis. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 55(2), 234-250.
- Rogerson, R. (2008). Structural Transformation and the Deterioration of European Labor Market Outcomes. *Journal of Political Economy*, 116(2), 235-259.
- Schneider, F., Buehn, A. and Montenegro, C. E. (2010). Shadow Economies all over the World. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper*, 5356.