

The Freedom Party and Grand Narratives

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Abstract

“The Freedom Party and Grand Narratives”

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This thesis is about a political party in Turkish political history, the Freedom Party, founded by a group of displeased Democrat Party deputies in late 1955 as the result of longstanding intraparty struggles among some cliques. The ultimate crisis that led to the formation of the party was brought to surface when these displeased deputies gave a right to prove bill to the chair of the assembly in a move against their rivals which was backed by the party center before the fourth convention of the DP where a battle for the seats of the general administrative board was expected by public at the time. These DP deputies who resigned or expelled from their party formed the FP. Nevertheless, the party was a flash in the pan; it started to disappear after the 1957 elections which marked total destruction for the party with respect to its results. After this catastrophe, the center of the FP decided to unite with the Republican People’s Party at the end of 1958. This party, which was in existence for three years, has been regarded by researchers using a range of theories determined by grand narratives, that instrumentalized it. Contrary to these, this work suggests that the FP cannot be comprehensively understood based on metanarratives that discard the agencies and it focuses on the internal dynamics of the DP and the personal experiments of the figures of the FP to grasp the actual qualities of it beyond what the previous works suggest.

84,000 words

Özet

“Hürriyet Partisi ve Büyük Anlatılar”

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Profesör M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Tez Danışmanı

Bu tez, 1955 sonunda, uzun süredir süregelen bazı hizipler arasındaki parti içi mücadelelerin sonucu olarak, bir grup hoşnutsuz Demokrat Parti milletvekili tarafından kurulmuş Türkiye siyasal tarihindeki bir parti, Hürriyet Partisi, ile ilgilidir. Partiyi ortaya çıkaran nihai kriz, bu hoşnutsuz vekillerin, kamuoyu tarafından hizipler arasında genel idare kurulu üyelikleri savaşına sahne olacağı beklenen DP’nin Dördüncü Büyük Kongresi öncesinde, parti merkezi tarafından arka çıkılan rakiplerine karşı bir hamle olarak parlamento başkanlığına ispat hakkı önergesi vermesi olmuştu. DP’den istifa eden ve tasfiye edilen bu milletvekilleri HP’yi kurdu. Fakat parti bir anda parlayıp sönmüldü, sonuçları itibariyle büyük bir yıkımla neticelenen 1957 seçimleri sonrasında kaybolmaya başladı. Bu felaketten sonra HP parti merkezi, 1958 sonunda Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ile birleşmeye karar verdi. Bu üç yıllık siyasi parti, araştırmacılar tarafından büyük anlatılar tarafından belirlenen, onu araçsallaştıran bir dizi teoriler kullanılarak ele alınmıştır. Bunlara karşılık, bu çalışma HP’nin, aktörleri yok sayan büyük anlatılara dayalı olarak kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılamayacağını önermektedir ve partinin, önceki araştırmacıların önerdiklerinin ötesindeki, gerçek niteliklerini kavranabilmesi için DP’nin iç dinamiklerine ve HP aktörlerinin kişisel tecrübelerine odaklanmıştır.

84.000 kelime

Anneme ve Babama...

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

DP	Democrat Party
RPP	Republican People's Party
FP	Freedom Party
NP	Nation Party
GAB	General Administrative Board
RNP	Republican Nation Party
NTP	New Turkey Party
PP	Peasant Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

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I regretfully state that although I strongly hope to interview with Şerif Mardin as a still-living witness of the party I was studying, his health did not allow it. While making this research, I received the sad news of his death.

NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, and syntax of this thesis in compliance with professional, ethical standards for the editing of student, academic work.

*Biliyorum Gemiler Götüremez
Neonlar ve Teoriler Işıtamaz Yanını Yöresini*

– Turgut Uyar, “Geyikli Gece.”

*I know ships will not convey it
Neon lights and theories will shine no light on its do-
main*

– Turgut Uyar, “Deer Night,” translated by George Messo in *İkinci Yeni: The Turkish Avant-Garde*.

Introduction

This thesis is about a political party in Turkish political history, the Freedom Party (Hürriyet Partisi), which was founded by a group of disenchanted Democrat Party deputies in 1955 as a result of an intense anger of the opposition within the party when they submitted a proposed law to the chairman of the assembly to provide right to prove for journalists who accuse the members of the government of corruption. This faction within the party was supported by the media and the of intellectual elites at the time.

First of all, in this thesis, I place the FP to its broader historical context of Turkish politics in the period 1946-1960. In doing so, I stress that the right to prove movement did not stem merely from an idealistic reaction to the authoritarian policies of the DP, unlike what is underscored in other works in the literature. Rather, I argue that the FP had relatively a long history before the -so-called- authoritarian turn of the DP. In fact, there were always internal conflicts among cliques within the party trying to eliminate each other to attain more favorable positions and resources from the very beginning of its course to its last days. The reason for these conflicts should be searched for the mass support that given to the party from almost all segments of society in the period of transition to the multiparty period as the DP was being formed in 1946. In other words, the heterogeneity of the DP is one of the reasons for the ensuing oppositional movements within the party. Therefore, it is necessary to search for the roots of the FP in that fragmented structure from the very

beginning. In that regard, unlike other works in the literature, this study shows how the founding date of the DP simultaneously marks also the roots of the FP.

In this study, I accounted for the roots of the FP by examining the internal dynamics of the DP to grasp the features of the FP and its political discourse; among the members of the DP, oppositional movements arouse mostly from personal conflicts and struggles to attain the ruling positions and leadership. Indeed, conflicts between the party center and the internal opposition always ended up with the centralization of power in the hands of the center mainly constituted by the Menderes' circle and the elimination of the opposition a process what I call "centralization of party rule." To illustrate, when one looks at the first dissidents within the DP, it would be observed that the leaders of the party faced some opposition both in the General Administrative Board (GAB), in the parliamentary group, and from some local organizations in some provinces resulting in the partition of the party and, thus, another political party, the Nation Party (NP), was formed in 1948. The leaders of the DP were able to disqualify the alternative leadership which posed threats to their dominance in their party. Nonetheless, the process of centralization of party rule had no intention of stopping after that first incident and the DP came to power. After the party came to power, new dissidents in the inner circle emerged since some took advantage of their positions in the party and the government at the expense of the others. The distribution of the offices in the reputable places resulted in the emergence of new dissidents, who were out of more favorable positions making them uneasy in the first place. On the other hand, the quality of the first Menderes government was controversial. For instance, there were some political celebrities¹ who accounted for the moderates in the opposition party and the partisans of the party, who were in conflict with each other. Both groups desired that the government should be

1 By celebrity, I mean those who were self-proclaimed politicians who had matured in politics through years of experience in politics as well as powerful and famous people having key positions in politics, the military, media, academy such as Fahri Belen, a general in one party era; Dr. Nihat Reşat Belger, one of the doctors of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; Refik Şevket İnce, one of the contributors of the Turkish Civil Code, one of the organizers of Turkish Independence War, the justice ministers of Atatürk era.

composed of figures like them. After the first government was formed, a compromise was found and naturally, some figures of both sides were excluded from it. It is significant to underscore that because they did not have a position in the first DP government, some figures immediately started to form opposition within the party against the government. This tension marks the first dissidence within the DP after it ascended to power. After the government started to operate, the celebrity politicians in the government did not manage to cooperate with PM Adnan Menderes and the partisans; thus, they had disputes with them and resigned individually one by one. Therefore, the first Menderes government lasted only ten months. When the second Menderes cabinet was formed soon after the first, the changes in the cabinet were obvious. Most of the opponents of the previous government took over all the seats in the cabinet, and therefore, the former ministers started to find themselves in the opposition. This was the path what we have witnessed during the 1950s in the DP. Being a moderate or an extremist in the party was not the issue, these positions were adjusted by the politicians according to their distances with the government and the party center. Indeed, some politicians could easily change their positions three times in just five years by making opposition in the first place, after having a ministry being attached to the government with all its uncompromised policies and after dismissed from their positions placing themselves in the opposition again. Nonetheless, this premise does not mean that there were no idealists in the party who believed in the merits of liberal democratic values vis-à-vis the antidemocratic ones including the younger generation composed of Ekrem Alican, Sabahattin Çıracıoğlu, Süleyman Arif Emre, Hüsamettin Cindoruk, Hasan Kangal, and Turan Güneş. History will remember them with respect. Furthermore, there were internal conflicts between the center of the party and the parliamentary group which stemmed from the intervention of the first in the business of the latter. Between 1951 and 1952 after some individual uprisings against the center, the opposition - which had been fragmented up until then - started to become unified through negotiations. Moreover, the DP party center was always confronted with problems coming from local organizations due to the patronizing behavior of the center towards them. While all the opposition within the party was overcome by the leading cadre of the DP, the party was becoming more and more centralized.

The FP has a distinctive place in the Turkish political history because of the fact that it had huge and concrete support from the Turkish intelligentsia of the time, in this regard the party can be considered as an experiment of the Turkish intelligentsia in politics. In the first place, although intellectuals supported the DP almost up until 1953; after that, they increasingly became fervent opponents to it for a couple of reasons. The first concerns the authoritarian manner and practices of the DP which were affected by the international political situation abroad and economic decline at home. Their economic position was seriously damaged as a result of the inflationary economic policies of the government in which their salaries were harmed. Second, their status worsened during the era. They were removed from the ruling elites of which they had been a part before, and moreover, their position and reputation in society had been damaged by the populist discourses of DP leaders which disparaged intellectuals. Thus, intellectuals started to withdraw their support, and this was a milestone in the formation of the FP.

When the disputes coming from both the displeased politicians who had lost intraparty fight with other cliques and the uneasiness of intellectuals became intolerable after a couple of unsuccessful attempts of the opposing wing to depose the leadership, the last resort was to split with the party (after some were dismissed) and to form a new political party to oppose the government from outside the party. That party was the FP.

The third chapter begins by revealing the details of the devastating internal polarization within the DP before the fourth convention, in which the general administrative board would be elected, paving the way for the formation of the FP. This was the real reason behind the right to prove bill submitted to the chairman of the assembly following the immense efforts of Fethi Çelikbaş, a fierce adversary of Dr. Mükerrerem Sarol, who was a close friend of Menderes and his rival in the congress. The response of the Menderes circle to that move was to stage a coup within the party to prevent opponents who could pose a threat to the leadership from attending the convention. This was the classic move of the Menderes circle to defeat potential leaders who opposed them. This coup was the moment when Sarol's clique and others open to cooperating with Menderes won the internal struggle once and for all, triggering the formation of the FP by the figures who were dismissed.

The FP was formed with a massive, enthusiastic support of the media at the time. Soon after its formation, the party, as mentioned in the “Rise and Fall of the Party” chapter, pursued a formidable opposition to the ruling party – which was full of intellectual content - in the streets, parliament, media, universities, and youth organizations. In fact, the party acted hyperactively; many party organizations were established quickly throughout the country in a very limited time. This fervent opposition was crystallized when Cemal Köprülü joined the party, making the FP the main opposition party with forty-two deputies ahead of the RPP. Nevertheless, the party was a flash in a pan. Except for a couple of failed attempts at forming a united front against the DP to depose it before the 1957 general elections by cooperation plans among the opposition parties, the party started to disappear after the 1957 general elections, which were a total frustration for the party. In fact, its fall came with the 1957 elections in which the party gained only four seats in parliament. After this catastrophe, the party joined the RPP at the end of 1958 following a coup staged by the center of the party. Ironically, the FP was founded following a coup staged by the center of the DP and it faded with another coup which was staged by the center of the FP. That was the real dilemma.

The FP is a subject that the Turkish scholars have not focused enough, satisfactory academic attention. Now, I pinpoint the prominent dimensions of the literature related to the party. First, there are a couple of articles published in encyclopedias, that are mostly descriptive short essays. Among them, the writing of Hüseyin Avni deserves attention as it is detailed compared to its counterparts. On the other hand, the significance of the article written by Feridun Ergin is that he was one of the founders of the FP.² Also, there are a couple of master’s theses we need to focus on. The first master’s thesis about

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- 2 Fethi Tevetoğlu, “Hürriyet Partisi,” in *Türk Ansiklopedisi* (Ankara: Maarif Matbaası, 1971.) Feridun Ergin, “Hürriyet Partisi,” in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983). Hüseyin Avni Lifij, “Hürriyet Partisi,” in *Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (1923-1973)* (İstanbul: Kaynak Kitapları, 1974). Lifij’s article gives concrete informations about the party and its very brief history including the conditions that prepared for its formation, the formation of the party, the issue of cooperation and the merger of it with the RPP. Also, the author gives short biographies of four prominent figures of the party; Ekrem Alican, Turan Güneş, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ. Ibid.

the party, *Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Hürriyet Partisi*, was written at Istanbul University by Ayşe Acar in 1986 under the supervision of Cemil Oktay.³ Another master's study was conducted at Ankara University by Çağfer Güler in 1993, titled *Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)*, and supervised by Nejat Kaymaz.⁴ This thesis was followed by another by Sibel Demirci, *Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri* under the supervision of Gökhan Çetinsaya, and defended at Hacettepe University in 2002.⁵ The fourth and the final master's thesis was written at the Middle East Technical University by Burak Özçetin under the title *Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party* under the supervision of Feride Acar.⁶ Apart from these, there are articles published in journals; "Türk Siyasal Tarihinde Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri," "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Bir Muhalefet Partisi Örneği: Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)," and "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri," and, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri ve Önemi."⁷ Moreover, there are some book chapters on the party, too.⁸ It is noteworthy that almost all the academic

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- 3 Ayşe Acar, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Hürriyet Partisi" (master's thesis, Istanbul University, 1986).
 - 4 Çağfer Güler, "Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)" (master's thesis, Ankara University, 1993).
 - 5 Sibel Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri" (master's thesis, Hacettepe University, 2002).
 - 6 Burak Özçetin, "Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party" (master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2004). Moreover, I encountered a PhD thesis made in Marmara University. Bülent Bal, "Aydın Siyaset Bağlamında Hürriyet Partisi" (Phd diss., Marmara University, 2017). However, it is not possible to access this study online, restricted by the author untill 19.01.2020. Even if I personally paid a visit to the University, its library and the related institution; I could not access it as of the date of January 2018. So, this study will be ignored here compulsorily.
 - 7 Gül Tuba Taşpınar Dağcı, "Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri", *Istanbul Üniversitesi Yakın Dönem Türkiye Araştırmaları* 4, no. 8. (2005). Diren Çakmak, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Bir Muhalefet Partisi Örneği: Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)," *Gazi Akademik Bakış Dergisi* 2, no. 3 (2008). Beral Alacı, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasi Hayatındaki Yeri (1955-1958)," *Türk Yurdu*, 31, no. 29 (2011). Mustafa Albayrak, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri ve Önemi, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* 24, no. 71 (2008).
 - 8 Burak Özçetin and Sibel Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Liberalizm*, ed. Murat Yılmaz (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2013). F. Hüsrev "Hürriyet Partisi," in

articles describe the party only within the course of its own and relate it neither to its roots nor the activities of the members after its downfall. Even the names of the studies are almost same; they are repetitive studies which have nothing remarkable to say that is different from each other. Furthermore, the first book about the party, written by Diren Çakmak under the title of *Hürriyet Partisi*.⁹ Lastly, some studies not directly related to the FP are crucial to the literature since they remark on the party. Among them, there are "Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler: 1960, 1971, 1980" by Sungur Savran, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi* by Erik Jan Zürcher, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* by Çağlar Keyder, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* by Ali Gevgilili, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey* by Şener Aktürk, and *A Modern History of the Kurds* by David McDowall.¹⁰

After listing of the works related to the party, I would like to note the main sources with which the students of the FP should cope, and which researchers can use. The data and sources from which the authors of the previous works and this one, too, have benefitted from composed of, first; the personal memoirs of the figures who either witnessed the time period between 1950 and 1960 or were themselves members of the FP. Second, the archives of papers of that time such as *Ulus*, *Yeni Ulus*, and *Halkçı* excessive party journals of the RPP, *Yenigün* (the party organ of the FP), *Zafer* and *Havadis* (the journals of the DP), *Kudret* (the journal of the RNP), newspapers such as *Vatan*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Dünya*, and *Tercüman* which held slippery positions as sometimes opponents sometimes proponents of the DP and the magazine *FORUM* which was a space for prominent intellectuals in Turkey at that time. Furthermore, *Akis* was a popular magazine that was another important publication at that

Türkiye Tarihinde Siyasi Partiler ve Siyasi Düşüncenin Gelişmesi (1839-1965) (Istanbul: Elif Yayınları, 1965).

- 9 Diren Çakmak, *Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)* (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2016).
- 10 Savran, Sungur. "Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler: 1960, 1971, 1980." *11. Tez*, no .6 (1987). Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, trans. Yasemin Saner (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2012). Keyder, Çağlar. *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2015). Gevgilili, Ali. *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987). Aktürk Şener, *Regimes of Ethnicity and Nationhood in Germany, Russia, and Turkey* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). McDowall David, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, Third Edition, 2007).

time. *Kim*, *Siyasi İlimler Mecmuası*, *Millet*, *Yeni Posta*, *Son Telgraf*, *Son Posta*, *Gece Postası*, *Akın*, *Hizmet Yeni Sabah*, *Hürriyet*, *Renk*, *Tan*, *Tanin*, *Türk Sesi*, *Görüşler*, *Zincirli Hürriyet*, *Hayat*, *Yeni İstanbul*, and *İstanbul Express* were other publications of the time. Third, the party documents of the Freedom Party, the Nation Party, the Republican Nation Party, the Democrat Party, the Republican People's Party, and the discourses of their members are other sources for ascertaining political life in the 1950s in Turkey. Parliamentary minutes of the 1950s and *Official Gazette* are other data the researcher can use. Fourth, as one researcher, Diren Çakmak, did, some data can be obtained from the living figures who were active at that time by conducting interviews. Lastly, academic works related to the 1950s in Turkey are another resource albeit secondary, that the authors have strongly wielded. In this work, I benefited most from the memoirs of the figures, some newspapers and magazines of the time, some chronological reference books, the *Official Gazette*, and some of the party documents.

In 1983, the first substantial article that introduces the FP was written by Ergin who was also one of its founders.¹¹ His writing is highly descriptive. The importance of the essay lies not just in its being the first considerable article on the topic but one that reflects the ideas of one of the prominent figures of the party and his perceptions of what they did and why the party had failed. In his article, after giving concrete information about the party such as the date of the party, Ergin unleashes the reasons for its failure in the 1957 general election. The article is significant in the sense that the party evokes just "failure" in one of its leading figures years later. On the other hand, the first chronological study belongs to Ayşe Acar's in which she discusses how the demands of an urbanizing society like Turkey directed to the system differs according to its needs which accord to social mobility that puts some social groups like middle class to the fore demanding more liberal values. She also remarks the legacy of the Committee of Union and Progress in the FP, and the direction of the FP in the modernization process.¹² In this study, the party is cherished as an idealist, democratic, and fighting for freedom, like it is in most studies in

11 Feridun Ergin, "Hürriyet Partisi," 2087-2088.

12 Acar, "Hürriyet Partisi", 3.

the related literature. In that sense, Acar suggests that the proofists strict adherence to their cause depended on their high-honored ideals.¹³ The most important facet of the study is the discussion regarding the social inequalities disrupting the social stability then. According to the writer, investments could not improve the standard of living for all social strata equally, leading to social instability. In fact, the economic data of the 1950s as we cover in the first chapter reflects that the middle class who had fixed salaries were badly affected by the economic policies of the DP as a result of its inflationary development policies and huge taxes through the agricultural sector and industrialists made huge profits. Furthermore, Ali Gevgilili, in his book, lies on more or less the same cleavage with Acar with some additions. He asserts that the FP did its share of the task to put the DP in order by deducing from the external determinants in the world political system.¹⁴ According to him, the world system had its own precise ways to put the rebellious local governments resisting to the international needs and developments in order, provoking the societal opposition is one of them.¹⁵ Considering the book as a whole and the main center-periphery paradigm that guides the work, the FP emerged as a result of social cleavages that occurred in a decade of social transformation in the country. In the new formula, dissidents among the traditional bureaucratic military middle class came to the fore, who were part of an international method of making governments that got out of the line submit. In relation to the discussion of the social base of the FP, some scholars take completely different stances from Acar and Gevgilili. For instance, Sungur Savran, a Marxist scholar, argues that the FP was a product of the industrial bourgeoisie who split from the DP in the second half of the 1950s.¹⁶ In the same vein, Zürcher underlines that the party was supported by the industrial bourgeoisie,¹⁷ and Çağlar Keyder, in his book, argues that the industrial bourgeoisie played a significant role for the formation of the FP.¹⁸ Moreover, Sibel Demirci's work is a

13 Ibid., 9.

14 The term he used in Turkish is "*uslulaştırma*." Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 112.

15 Ibid., 116.

16 Savran, Sungur. "Toplumsal Mücadeleler," 138.

17 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye*, 337.

18 Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 76.

noteworthy descriptive study with respect to revealing the historical trajectory of and prominent dates and occurrences related to the party between 1955 and 1958 from which ensuing studies can benefit from. Demirci, in her study, relies on the newspapers, especially *Cumhuriyet*, *Zafer*, and *Yenigün*. In addition, the study by Özçetin is significant for its suggestion that the FP can be considered the Liberal-Democrat version of Kemalism an "articulation of Kemalist modernization process with a social-liberal synthesis."¹⁹ He also argues that the FP did not dissolve into the RPP after their unification; rather, the figures transferred from the FP contributed to the ideological and structural transformation of the RPP.²⁰ Furthermore, in the first book related to the party, Çakmak points out that in Turkey, the FP is the first and the only political party to acknowledge the social market economy formulized by Alfred Müller-Armack.²¹ Finally, I encountered two studies that associate the FP with Kurdistan in Turkey. According to Aktürk, the party which Yusuf Azizoğlu and Zülküf Bilgin who are prominent figures in their Kurdish speaking regions participated "served as the incubator of future Kurdish political formations, which flourished after 1960." After the 27 May coup, among the members of the FP, Yusuf Azizoğlu and Ekrem Alican formed the New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi) which widely attracted the interest of Kurdish electorates.²²

Of the greatest problems in the literature, what I call the lack of relationality is the most significant. Researchers and their works are not enabled to relate the data related to the FP with its counterparts - other political parties - to place the FP in its own epoch in the course of Turkish political history. Some works come to their conclusions by focusing only on the FP program and by-law along with the memoirs of the FP protagonists without relating the results to that of other political parties of that time. However, it appears that examining only the FP documents cannot give comprehensive results. A comparative

19 Özçetin, "Democracy and Opposition," 121.

20 Ibid., 120.

21 Çakmak, *Hürriyet Partisi*, 495.

22 Aktürk Şener, "Regimes of Ethnicity," 141-142. This matching can be seen also in another study. See McDowall David, *Modern History of the Kurds*, 408. In fact, after the 1957 general elections, an operation was made to the FP organization in Diyarbakır on Kurdistan, the chairman Recai İskenderoğlu rejected the allegations.

study of the programs and bylaw of political parties at that time and the memoirs of the actors of the other political parties would be more beneficial to ascertain the differences between the parties and the perceptions of other parties of the FP. Also, not only the writings of actors and their life stories focusing on the FP but also on the periods before and after the FP have to be analyzed. This is one side of the problem concerning relationality. The second problem concerns the fact is that studies of the FP focus just on the period when the party was in existence, and their studies completed when the FP was abolished and joined the RPP.²³ The continuities and ruptures in the period between 1946 and 1961 should be handled to observe the location of the party in the course of Turkish history in a more comprehensive way. To be more specific, when the FP is being studied, the historical context before 1955 and after 1958 should be taken into consideration, as well, to more satisfactorily address what the place the party occupied in the course of history. The last point is that no study shows how the external political conjuncture affecting the domestic politics in the 1950s in relation to the formation of the FP. Especially between 1950 and 1960, tensions and instability in the international area were so high because of the Cold War that there were wars, revolutions, and coup d'états in both the Eastern and Western Blocs. Furthermore, some works have the common problem that they start telling the history of the FP at the point the right to prove bill was given to the assembly by some DP deputies in 1955. From my point of view, the most crucial reasons that laid the groundwork for the formation of the party can be traced back to even the first days of the DP. As I expand upon in the second and the third chapters of this research, intraparty struggles, especially beginning in 1947, had always resulted in the monopolization of power in the hands of DP leadership, disturbing those who lost influence. In that regards, the right to prove matter must be regarded as a last straw which was not the reason of the formation of the party, but the result of

23 Although some studies have a claim to show the long-term impacts of the FP in the course of Turkish history by relating the demands of the FP with the 1961 Constitution and the left-of-center understanding of the RPP after 1965 without talking much about after the 1960s. They just say that there were that kind of impacts and stops without deepening the problematic. Özçetin's work could be example of a tradition which is making huge claims without satisfactorily supporting it in a detailed way, thus, they are more like a hypothesis than a thesis.

the intraparty conflicts. Therefore, to understand the FP in a more accurate way, the researchers must pay close attention to intraparty conflicts within the DP. Indeed, personal rivalries and struggles among some cliques, especially just before the fourth convention of the DP, were determining factor in the formation of the FP more than all any other, including social mobility, ideological differences, ethnic clashes, and the international determinants. My study shows that the formation of the FP was nothing but the result of the fights over leadership between some cliques dating back to the first days of the DP.

As a result, it is fair to assert that the judgments regarding the FP were stucked by some clichés. While the party is regarded as the extension of the industrial bourgeoisie from a Marxist point of view, it is also considered the party of the civil and military bureaucracy based on center-periphery paradigm. Yet, some of the founders of the party had a vision to be supported by the working-class people. A study influenced by the modernization paradigm asserts that because Turkey was in the third stage of modernization, the FP had the vision to carry Turkey a step further guided by German Liberalism, which was most suitable for that goal. Moreover, a research argues that the party had a Liberal Kemalist discourse. Some works underlined that the party came to the fore as a result of the DP's antidemocratic turn, which was a betrayal of the 1946 idealist spirit of the movement. How can a political party in the 1950s be at once an idealist movement and successor of the spirit of 1946 that the DP had betrayed, an extension of the industrial bourgeoisie, a response to the dissidents in the middle class with the discourses of Liberal Kemalist synthesis together with German Liberalism seeking to form Anglo-Saxon political institutions by wishing to depend on working class in alliance with Kurdish intelligentsia and open to cooperation with all opposition parties? The answer is simple. It cannot. The real story behind the FP was far more complex than any such superficial assessments. I assert that the previous studies taking the FP - as a subject - most of which were like party bulletins that uncritically express the party as it expressed itself to not give a satisfactory account and leave thousands of questions. Contrary to these researches of the related literature, this work suggested that the FP cannot be understood comprehensively based on modernist metanarratives discard a human perspective.

That said, it would be a myth to attribute to the party some transcendental, idealized, romantic missions like previous works have done. To avoid this, I engage the internal dynamics of both the DP and the FP to indicate the significance of focusing on the actors that constituted the party and their personal experiences from below. If a political party is a collective form of institution filled by social agents, turning our attention to these constituent pieces would be the real method of understanding it more clearly, rather than addressing imported theories above and outside of the party. Therefore, focusing on persons and their personal experiences as units of analysis in a particular sense and their weaknesses, greed, passions, and intelligence, would be better to explain intraparty fighting among the cliques within the DP. Most of the time, emotions - including those mentioned just now - are much more persuasive than logic in daily politics which explains why humans are driven mostly by their instincts. Therefore, it will be seen that grand narratives that depend on some logical justifications failed to explain the party. We conclude that there were neither doctrinaire positions nor apparent class determinations with their respective, specified goals dependent on some structural basis in the formulation of the FP and in a broader context, Turkish politics of the 1950s did not harbor doctrinaire positions. Of course, like its counterparts, the FP was just an example of that doctrinairelessness of the political nature. From this point on, I advise researchers that for studying the political life of Turkey in these years needs, one must pay attention to cope with personalities.

In the fourth chapter, in detail, I show that the FP was a political party that cannot be understood with reference to political programs or doctrines, social classes and their goals, and grand historical narratives. Rather than these kinds of holistic accounts, the party came into existence because of and as a response to the political situation in Turkey at that time, which made it eclectic regarding its class basis and political discourse. The main thrust of its emergence was intraparty struggles in the DP. This eclectic style comes from the elites of the party who had once been the prominent figures in the DP and took part in its practices, which they later strictly criticized. While criticizing the policies of what they themselves were responsible for, their outlook became more eclectic and inconsistent rather harmonious with reference to a certain political standpoint. In other words, they adjusted their political

discourse in response to the needs of the political atmosphere at the time. In fact, the founders and members of the FP can be defined as a group of political travelers loaded from one political party to another in the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, they easily travel between all the parties at that time and were open to cooperating with these of which they were not part of. Furthermore, if we look closely at the founders and prominent actors of the party, they were completely dissimilar and came from different political spectra and stances. The question is what brought these different kinds of people from different social and political backgrounds together? The answer is simple, hostility towards what they saw as the Bayar-Menderes “gang.”

In a broader context, I indicate that the differences between the two main political parties of the 1950s in Turkey, the DP, and the RPP, were blurred, and I observe that they had no strict ideological differences. There was a complete continuity between the terms of the two parties' policies regarding their principles, foreign policy, fiscal policy, and manner vis-à-vis the media and opposition. Apart from this, the ideological predominant stance of Turkish intellectuals of that period was not strictly polarized, as suggested by the discourses *FORUM* magazine, which backed the FP, which were more or less paralleled the continuous ideological discourses of the two main political parties. In fact, in these years marginal political doctrines were officially illegal. Therefore, the blank left by the lack of ideological differences among political parties and intellectuals was filled by personal urges, ambitions, leaders' charisma and that sort of things that depended on personalities. In other words, politics and politicians were relatively free to act on their own without being compelled to address social structures. This is a premise which is not only theoretical; it was valid in the perceptions of the actors of the time, which can be counted as their reality, whatever their political positions they occupied.

To sum up, I suggest that the FP was a political party formed by displeased DP deputies with the help of media organizations as driving forces, and soon after, the party became a coalition of dissident politicians and the large majority of Turkish intellectuals. First, in the process of the centralization of the DP at the time, the party was in opposition to the formation of the FP, there were vital dissidents among DP members. The trouble within the party ended up with its partitioning and the formation of the Nation Party in 1948, arguments

in the inner circle of the party regarding the allocation of offices when the party came to power, conflicts between partisans in the party and respectable figures resulted in the emergence of the 61's movement, and lastly, conflicts between the center of the party and both parliamentary group and local party organizations were among milestones of the formation of the FP. These uneasinesses can be regarded as the roots led to the formation of the FP. As a result of the governments' antidemocratic measures and the economic decline and the decay of the status of intellectuals in the DP era, intellectuals parted ways with the DP. The moment all these sorts of dissidents piled up marks the cause of the formation of the FP. Just a tiny reason to boom was necessary for the formation of the party. The bill mending that the right to prove should be granted to journalists submitted in late 1955 caused all the way up to the formation of the FP.

The Historical Roots of the Freedom Party

*Just a few years back among the founders of the Democrat Party, he (Karaosmanoğlu) was the emotion of the party if Köprülü was the brain of it; if Menderes was the action of the party, he was the organizer of it to be; if Bayar was the flag, he was the standard bearer of it!*¹

– Samet Ağaoğlu, *Aşina Yüzler*.

The Freedom Party was formed by Democrat Party deputies who felt intense resentment towards their party and were mostly at odds with its oligarchic structure centered around Adnan Menderes, who was both the party leader and the head of the government. It was initiated by some nineteen DP deputies who allegedly split with their political party, in response to economic problems and problems concerning democratic social and political rights in December 1955 after a dispute about the right to prove issue within

1 Samet Ağaoğlu talks about Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, one of the leading figures of the DP in the first half of the 1950s and the leader of the FP in the second half of the 1950s. For the original, see the first point in *Originals*, Appendix A.

the party, as it will be seen in a detail in ensuing chapters.² Before going into the details of the FP, it is necessary to pay attention to the historical roots of the party dating as far back to the time the DP was being formed to see the real dynamics that paved the way for the formation of the FP.

§ 2.1 Personal Disputes within the DP

The antecedents of the Freedom Party can be traced back to the beginning of the Democrat Party. This section reveals the conflicts within the DP that can be accounted for as both the seeds and the reasons for the formation of the FP. At the time the DP was in the opposition and during the first three years of its rule in Turkey, oppositional movements within the party emerged mostly from personal conflicts about reaching the ruling position or from differences in ideas regarding some issues between members of the opposition and the leadership of the DP. These early disputes ended up such that the position of Adnan Menderes, the party leader, and his accomplices became stronger day by day and all sorts of opposition were eliminated. This process can be defined as the centralization of the rule of the DP in the hands of Menderes and the central organization of the DP. Naturally, in all disagreements within this centralization process, figures who lost the battle against the party center started to make opposition within the party after that.

2.1.1 *The Formation of the Democrat Party*

The Democrat Party (DP) as a centre-right political party was formed by four deputies who split up the Republican People's Party (RPP) because of a dispute

2 The word "allegedly" is not used in an ordinary way. Some researchers regard the FP as a political party with a determined political program or doctrine as a remedy for Turkey which had suffered economic decline under the DP rule. However, as I will show, the party was a formed because of intraparty struggles mostly by the actors who lost them. Most of the initiators were among these responsible for the centralization of party rule in the hands of that oligarchy which they complained about. Still, part of the movement was comprised of these believed in the need for formation of the democratic reforms idealistically. Unfortunately, these who left their mark on the movement were not these idealists.

that occurred between these deputies (and some others) and executives of the RPP about a land reform which would have provided land for the peasants without land at the expense of the large farms. The debates occurred after the executives of the RPP brought the land bill to the assembly. After the harsh discussions, the four deputies submitted a proposal to the chairman of the parliamentary group of the RPP for the government to adopt some democratic reforms on 7 June 1945.³ In the end, three deputies were expelled from the RPP for activities in conflict with intraparty discipline, and one resigned from his deputyship.⁴ Those who had submitted the proposal formed the DP in 1946, and the party joined the general election held in the same year. Thus, the first considerable political party opposing the RPP after long years of single-party rule by national chiefs emerged.⁵

The DP came to power in the 1950 general elections in which the turnout was an incredibly high, 89.3 percent. Doubtless, the results were terrible for the RPP. The DP gained 416 seats in parliament with 55.2 percent of the vote; the RPP one 39.6 percent votes which amounted to sixty-nine seats in parliament, and last, the Nation Party earned 4.6 percent and one seat in the assembly in what is described many as a White Revolution.⁶ It is significant to note that the massive support given to the DP came from almost all segments of

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- 3 Cavit Oral, Emin Sazak, and Yusuf Hikmet Bayur were among the opponents to the land reform of the ruling party. Other than those who signed “memorandum of four” (*4'lü Takrir*). These four deputies who signed that proposal were Celal Bayar, Fuad Köprülü, Adnan Menderes, and Refik Koraltan.
 - 4 While Fuad Köprülü, Adnan Menderes, and Refik Koraltan were dismissed, Celal Bayar resigned.
 - 5 This transition to multiparty politics has two main causes. An external dynamic, the outcome of World War II, paved the way for the transition on one hand - that is, the decline of totalitarian rule vis-à-vis liberal democratic regimes -, and Turkey wanted to be a part of the Western world. On the other hand, as an internal dynamic, some social groups in Turkey started to develop political consciousness to a certain degree during the war, which rose to the occasion as demanding of liberal political rights. Some other ethnic groups were against RPP rule, and on the top of that, most people desired a change after years of antidemocratic one-man rule.
 - 6 These numbers are gathered from *Milletvekil Genel Seçimleri 1923-2011* (Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu Matbaası, 2007), 25.

society -including intellectuals- from a different space of the political spectrum; liberals, Islamists, conservatives, and even socialists; social groups such as agriculturalists, the commercial bourgeoisie, villagers, and some factions of military officers; and various identities such as some religious sects, some Kurdish citizens, and non-Muslims.⁷

This massive, heterogeneous support for the DP meant the party was an umbrella organization encompassing all the dissidents of one-party rule in Turkey. This heterogeneity marked one of the reasons for ensuing oppositional movements within the party. Therefore, it is necessary to search for the roots subsequent oppositional movements within the DP from this fragmented structure. Before moving on to the 1950s and the oppositional movements of that time period, it is necessary to look at the very first intraparty crisis which occurred in the DP even before the DP came to power.

2.1.2 *The First Dispute within the DP*

In the first years of the DP, the leaders of the party were confronted by a concrete opposition from some local organizations in some provinces, parliamentary group and the general administrative board, which resulted in the partitioning of the party and the birth of another political party- the Nation Party (Millet Partisi or NP) which was formed in 1948.⁸

7 This heterogeneity of DP electorates is best characterised by Necip Fazıl, a journalist and poet at the time. He says that the general view of the party was that it was like a rag bag (“yamalı bohça”). Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Benim Gözümde Menderes* (Istanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1988), 323.

8 The process of the centralization of the DP started even before the program of the party was completed. In other words, even before the the party was officially formed, struggles occurred among the founders of the party pursuing the goal of monopolizing power. I present the intellectual and a politician, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, an unknown actor who had been worked together with the founders of the DP in addition to the four – that is the fifth founder of the DP, as he characterized himself. He was eliminated from the activities of preparing the program for the party by Menderes and Köprülü. I regard this as the moment that the monopolization of the DP began. See Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Ahmet Hamdi Başar’ın Hatıraları: Demokrasiye Geçiş, DP İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs*, comp. Murat Koraltürk (Istanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 103-111. Moreover, Gevgili, a journalist, argued that Tefik Rüştü

In 1946, for the first time, a considerable opposition party entered a general election signifying the transition to multiparty politics in Turkey. Nevertheless, although the transition was smooth and bloodless, there were ebbs and flows in the period between 1945 and 1950 regarding the fate of this transition. For instance, the Turkish people witnessed some scandalous measures of the administration in the election of 1946.⁹ People went to the ballot box and voted openly, which meant that election officers loyal to single-party rule could detect who voted for whom. While the votes were counted closely, the elections were far from being under judicial control. These were thoroughly against the principles of free, fair elections. Naturally, after the elections the DP alleged that there was fraud in many electoral districts. Nevertheless, it was announced that the RPP had won the elections against the DP, and Recep Peker who was known as an extremist, authoritarian politician eager to pursue uncompromising policies vis-à-vis the opposition party, was assigned to the Prime Ministry by İsmet İnönü, the leader of the RPP and the President of Turkey. As expected, the new PM, Peker, adopted negative and aggressive attitudes towards the opposition from the first days of his term. The heavy-handed attitude of the Peker government, backed by state forces, sought to suppress the opposition party, making the relations between two nervous and to a certain degree posing a threat to the future of multiparty politics in Turkey. DP rulers had struggled with the RPP after the elections until 1947. During discussions over the 1947 budget, which had been introduced by Peker's cabinet just after the 1946 general elections, one of the biggest crises in the transition period took place. After the budget was criticized by Adnan Menderes on behalf of the opposition, Peker angrily took the floor and characterized Menderes as "psychopath." In response, the DP parliamentary group immediately

Aras also joined the preparation of the party; however, he was dismissed by the [other] founders. See Ali Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 43. It is possible that the leaders did not want to share the leadership because they were the ones who stuck their necks out while rising up against one-party rule.

- 9 For a meticulous documentation of election fraud in Istanbul Province, see the book of the DP's Provincial Head of the Istanbul party organization: Kenan Öner, *Siyasi Hatıralarım ve Bizde Demokrasi* (Istanbul: Osmanbey Matbaası, 1948).

left the assembly. This moment caused a deep fragmentation within the DP regarding what kind of policy should be followed towards the authoritarian government. These in favor of boycotting parliament and relying on the will of the people argued that the only outcome of returning to parliament would be to justify totalitarian policies and the election fraud in 1946.¹⁰ Moderates favored negotiating with the government indispensably, believing that this was the only way to further democracy in Turkey without interruption. Doubtless, the final decision was made by the leading cadres of the party who were former RPP deputies who wished to collaborate with the government even though the legality of parliament was in question. Because the leaders had all the possessions of making decisions, the dismissal of opponents who refused to accord with them was in sight. The struggle between the two wings to dominate the administration of the party and thus the fate of the party and Turkey played out in the elections for the general administrative board (GAB) of the party.

In the first convention of the DP gathered on 7 October 1947 in Ankara Palace, the party center desired to strengthen its authority over these delegates who had the substantial support of local party organizations. To do so, they wished to restrict the number of seats in the GAB to nine members to prevent newcomers. Opponents sought to increase the quota to fifteen members to provide them a foothold on the board. Moreover, leaders, Bayar, Köprülü, and Menderes stressed that members of the GAB should be composed of deputies.¹¹ Among the opponents, Samet Ağaoğlu and Osman Bölükbaşı agreed upon their membership for the GAB, which was necessary for them, although the leaders did not favor them. In his diary, Ağaoğlu underscores that Osman Kibar, who represented the leaders, came to dissuade them from their goals.¹² Even though Bölükbaşı and Ağaoğlu negotiated together to withdraw from the elections for the GAB, Ağaoğlu pulled a trick and continued to run a campaign within the party for a seat in the GAB. It turned out that he was elected,

10 Kenan Öner, Mükerrerrem Sarol, Mustafa Kentli, Osman Kapani, Samet Ağaoğlu, and Osman Bölükbaşı were among them. Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Türk Siyasetinde Anadolu Fırtınası: Osman Bölükbaşı* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005), 54.

11 Samet Ağaoğlu and Osman Bölükbaşı were supporters of the latter. Ibid., 55.

12 Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 56.

but Bölükbaşı was out of the board. Ağaoğlu states in his diary that Bölükbaşı's defeat via a scam left "a deep wound in his soul."¹³ Thus, according to Deniz Bölükbaşı, his son, Osman Bölükbaşı and his friends left the convention with despair.¹⁴ In fact, Bölükbaşı resigned from his duty of the inspectorship in the party soon after the convention. However, this was not the only matter of debate that emerged during the convention. The delegates resisted the thinking of the leaders that the party center would have the privilege of determining 20 percent candidates in the elections. The delegates argued that a new era had begun which should not be an age of appointments.¹⁵ In response, Bayar came to the rostrum and made a speech stating that the party would need technocrats to be appointed by the center, and with that, the delegates was appeased.¹⁶ All in all, the first convention of the DP marked the first deep cleavages within the party, which would lead to the partitioning of the party. That said, Kemal Karpat argues that there was an apparent tendency towards unanimity in the convention: whenever a delegate objected to the common view, "the immediate reaction was to stop him from talking."¹⁷

At the end of the convention, the Freedom Pact (*Hürriyet Misakı*) was accepted, which threatened the government with the consciousness of the Turkish people (*Sine-i Millet*) if its antidemocratic rules and regulations were not abolished, a law guaranteeing free, fair general elections under the supervision of the judiciary were not introduced and the administrative organs of the state not treat all political parties equally. In response, the government cues the DP of calling on the people for a rebellion against the state using the methods of

13 Ibid., 58.

14 Ibid.

15 İsmet Bozdağ. *Başvekilim Adnan Menderes: Celal Bayar Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: Baha Matbaası, 1969), 68.

16 Turkish State Television recently opened part of its archive, and one can hear Celal Yardımcı's views about the convention and the dispute which was mentioned. Hıfzı Topuz. *Celal Yardımcı'nın Demokrat Parti 1. Kongresi Hakkındaki Açıklamaları*. Part 1. Geçmişte Bir Olay. (*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*, 1971), <http://www.trtarsiv.com/izle/82256/celal-yardimci-nin-demokrat-parti-1-kongresi-hakkindaki-aciklamalari>

17 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 181.

Balkan committees which were seeking revolutions through illegal methods before the Great War. At the end of these discussions, İnönü declared his impartiality as a president, an act welcomed by DP leaders.¹⁸ Thereafter, PM Peker was forced by İnönü to resign from his position and parliamentary group of his party in which a group composed of 35 moderate deputies took the upper hand. Then, Hasan Saka was appointed to form the government and Faik Ahmet Barutçu, who was among the 35s who opposed the government's heavy-handed measures, became the vice prime minister. Nihat Erim, from among the 35s, became the chief editor of the party paper in place of Falih Rıfkı Atay, who was known as an extremist.¹⁹ Furthermore, at the end of 1947, the seventh convention of the RPP gathered in Ankara resulting in the liberalization of the party. The party organization, its duties, the press, youth organizations, the teaching of religion in schools, and statism were discussed, and with the amendments the party, its revolutionary philosophy was abandoned and it became a moderate party.²⁰ In 1950, one who will supervise the first fair, free general election in Turkey was PM Şemsettin Günaltay, who had a religious background and had been appointed his office in 1949. This new era brought a slight peace between the political parties; in other words, the future of democracy was guaranteed. On the other hand, this new peaceful environment effectively deepened internal fragmentation within the DP. Because some extremist DP actors were disturbed by the peaceful political atmosphere, they accused their leaders colluding (*muvaazaa*) with the government at the cost of their liquidation with joint effort, ignoring the national will which send them to parliament. Therefore, according to them, the DP was not a decent opposition party; it was just a facsimile of the RPP. One of the dissidents was Kenan Öner, a lawyer and the provincial head of DP's Istanbul party

18 Known as the 12 July declaration. For the full text, see Tekin Erer, *Türkiye'de Parti Kavgaları* (Istanbul: Ticaret Postası Matbaası, 1963), 436-439. Also see Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 83-84.

19 Atay had experience publishings in opposition to multiparty politics long before 1946. He made great effort to terminate of the Free Republican Party in articles in 1930. Cem Emrence, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası: 99 Günlük Muhalefet* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 38.

20 Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 207.

organization, asserted that İnönü wanted Bayar to dismiss of him from the party.²¹ Also, Osman Bölükbaşı, who had been excluded from the GAB in the convention, stated that the leading cadres of the DP has enough abilities to teach Machiavelli.²² That said, the pressure of the center on the dissidents was harsher after the first convention. For instance, in June 1947, the GAB decided that an article by Bölükbaşı not be published in *Kudret* because its essence was against to the interests of the party.²³ As a consequence, Bölükbaşı started to think of resigning from the party. His letter of resignation was accepted by Celal Bayar on 6 September 1947.²⁴ Meanwhile, there were other dissidents within the DP. For example, Hikmet Bayur was also being disturbed from the secrecy of the GAB.²⁵

These in favor of firm action against the government gathered around Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, whose proponents always defended him in every instance against the accusations of the Republicans. For example, in these years the famous Hasan Ali Yücel-Kenan Öner Case occupied the agenda in Turkey in a while. It stemmed from an accusation. Şükrü Sökmensüer, the minister of the interior, accused the Marshall of being communist. In response, Çakmak argued that he had always opposed communism, but one former minister of education supported communist activities while in his office. Hasan Ali Yücel, who had once been the minister of education, asked: "Is this Minister me?" Instead of Çakmak, Öner immediately responded: "Yes!" In response, Yücel filed a libel suit against Öner.²⁶ On the other hand, another hardliner, Mustafa

21 Öner, *Siyasi Hatıralarım*, 16.

22 Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 95.

23 Ibid., 79.

24 Ibid., 82.

25 Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 211. Celal Bayar states that after the 1946 general elections, the center decided that only Menderes could make public statements on behalf of the party, which was poorly received by the local organizations. Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 60-62. The center silenced locals, a common pattern we would be familiar.

26 Both sides, Öner and Yücel, published the details of this trial. Kenan Öner, *Öner ve Yücel Davası*, 2 vols (Istanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1947). Hasan Ali Yücel, *Davam* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1947). Hasan Ali Yücel, *Hasan Ali Yücel'in Açtığı Davalar ve Neticeleri* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1950).

Kentli, resigned from the board of discipline of the DP because when Çakmak was exposed to the accusations of being communist, leaders of the DP fell silent. He stated that "If the Marshall desire to take the lead of the DP, we would accept that as an indicator of absolute victory of the DP."²⁷

While the hardliners gathered around the marshall, the leaders of the DP found enough reason to dismiss Çakmak who had become a potential candidate for the leadership of the party. He was charismatic enough to lead the party having some supporters. He was a national hero and the second person to have received the rank of "marshall" after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the republic. In fact, the anxiety among the leaders of the DP was not in vain. In the first convention, some opponents made an investigation to see whether it was possible to elect Marshall Çakmak to the chairmanship instead of Bayar. Bölükbaşı stated that

the attitude exhibited towards the Marshall indicated that the founders of the DP desired to establish absolute domination, would not see any harm in resorting to the non-democratic methods for this purpose, and would make every effort to ward Marshall off from the party.²⁸

The hate of the leaders of the party towards Çakmak was so tense that it did not end even after his death. Cerrahoğlu, a member of the party at the time, tells in her memoir that the leaders Bayar, Menderes, and Köprülü were not in favor of sending a telegram to express condolences on behalf of the DP when Çakmak died in 1950. Cerrahoğlu found them and tried to explain their faulty attitude. They responded that the marshall had harm their party in an enormous degree.²⁹ This anxiety for leadership overlapped with differences in opinion regarding the policy the party should adopt towards the RPP. In parallel, Metin Toker, a journalist at the time, underscores that party divisions in 1947 were conflicts of personalities, emphasizing that Öner and Köprülü, Tengirşenk and Köprülü, and Bayar and Bölükbaşı could not get along with

27 "Eğer Mareşal DP'nin başına geçmek isterse, bunu biz DP için kati bir zafer amili olarak kabul ederiz." Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 62-63.

28 Ibid., 63. For the original text, see point two in *Originals*, Appendix A.

29 Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996), 37-39

each other.³⁰ In addition, within the Istanbul party organization a lawyer, Kenan Öner, maintained a faction opposed to the faction of the founders of the DP, which gathered around Professor Fuad Köprülü - a famous historian in the field of Turkish literature in international academic circles and one of the founders of DP - and his son, Orhan Köprülü.³¹ They were in battle in Istanbul in 1946 to dominate the Istanbul local party organization.³² The latter was also endorsed by also some actors like Mükerrer Sarol, a close friend to Menderes, Fevzi Lüfti Karaosmanoğlu, the leading figure of the party in Manisa Province, and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, who led the Izmir local party organization which became the headquarters of leaders during the struggle to reach the top of the party and rule it.³³ When this division occurred Menderes, Koraltan, Köprülü, and Karaosmanoğlu arrived at the Izmir local party organization; after minor hesitation, Celal Bayar joined them.³⁴ Years later, Bayar explained that he was

30 Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 84.

31 Ibid., 88. According to Karpat, Öner's clique was composed of self-evident politicians with strong personalities whose temperaments were not eligible to act in parallel with party discipline. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 214.

32 Other than the marshall problem, Öner's book reveals that Köprülü was interested in forming the Istanbul party organization from the representative actor of the party center from the beginning. He proposes three people appointed by the center for Istanbul: İbrahim Çehreli, Hüseyin Avni Sağıroğlu, and General İlyas Pasha Öner, *Bizde Demokrasi*, 11-12. On the other hand, he wanted to work with a retired solicitor Cevad Bey, and in the first meeting of the entrepreneurs Cevad Bey was shocked when he saw Çehreli because their earlier trade partnership had ended problematically. Ibid., 12. Öner always complained about the members appointed by the center; according to him, their only goal was to be a deputy. As a solution he got the second manager of the Bank of Selanik, Selâhaddin Güvendiren and a muhtar (a chief official in a sub-district), Muhtar Akman, to join the committee to deal with the others. Ibid., 20. All Öner's complaints and endeavours show that even before the formation of the Istanbul party organization, there were some struggles for power between these who were backed by the center and the ones of Öner.

33 Kısakürek, *Benim Gözümde Menderes*, 88. He stresses that Sarol and Ağaoğlu were initially on Öner's side; after that, they changed their minds. According to him, this conflict did not actually stem from differences, the conflict was an instrument for personal ambitions, which can be characterized as "disputes of egos" (enâniyet-benlik tablosu). Bayar confirms this; Ağaoğlu and Sarol were initially on the extremists. Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 70.

34 Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), 380.

obliged to sacrifice one of the two wings.³⁵ This was a well-calculated decision. Bayar, in a speech made in Balıkesir, said that those who acted contrary to party bylaw would be brought before the board of discipline and be "out on their ear." If that were not enough, they would be expelled from politics, a speech was regarded as foretelling the repressive regime of the DP when the party ascended to power.³⁶

These two cliques targeted to capture the Istanbul party organization and, thus, the party.³⁷ Just before the Istanbul provincial convention, Kenan Öner, the chairman of the province, resigned from his position on 14 January 1948.³⁸ The first pitched battle took place over Istanbul, and both parties fiercely attacked each other. On the other hand, the deepest division was between the GAB and parliamentary group. Whereas the former was dominated by the leaders, the latter was dominated by their opponents. After a couple of struggles between the rivals occurred; five DP deputies from the Öner clique were expelled from the party by the center.³⁹ The campaign of the center was concrete, short, and painful: all opposition shall be destroyed whatever the cost. Six members of the GAB of the party resigned from their positions, protesting the center's measures against their friends.⁴⁰ According to his son, Osman Bölükbaşı always thought that the source of the purge behind the scenes was Celal Bayar and that he authorized Fuad Köprülü to conduct the operation.⁴¹

35 Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 90.

36 Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 214.

37 The Istanbul Party Organization was like a miniature version of the entire party not only for the DP, but for all political parties in Turkey, which is still true today. The direction of the party organizations of Istanbul mostly considered by the analysts the direction of the party.

38 "Celâl Bayar şehrimizde," *Cumhuriyet*, January 16, 1948.

39 "Sadık Aldoğan, Kemal Silivrili, Necati Erdem, Mithat Sakaroğlu, and Osman Nuri Köni. "Demokrat Partide Tasfiye Başladı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 11, 1948. Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), 40.

40 These were Yusuf Kemal Tengirşenk, Enis Akaygen, Emin Sazak, Ahmet Tahtakılıç, Ahmet Oğuz, and Hasan Dinçer. "Altı milletvekili daha "D.P., den çıkarıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, March 25, 1948.

41 Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 96. The battle between parliamentary group and the GAB was called the Köprülü Question (Köprülü Meselesi). He was at the center of that struggle. "Fuat Köprülü," *Akis*, April 30, 1955.

In a similar vein, Ağaoğlu tells that Köprülü characterized the opponents as "gangrene that should be cut off" on 18 December 1947 in a GAB meeting.⁴² During the process of the liquidation, "the board of discipline of the Democrat Party was operated like a revolutionary court."⁴³ It is fair to suggest that Köprülü, Karaosmanoğlu, and Üstündağ, who would become the members of the FP, played an active role in this liquidation. According to some, Karaosmanoğlu was so determined that he stated that "under these circumstances, the bylaw will be shut down."⁴⁴

In the end, in July 1948, the Nation Party (NP) was formed, under the leadership of Fevzi Çakmak, by deputies who were expelled or who resigned from the DP.⁴⁵ On the other hand, some deputies dismissed from the DP established the Independent Democrats' Group (Müstakil Demokratlar Grubu) in parliament and later joined the NP.⁴⁶ Also, the Core Democrats Party (Öz Demokratlar Partisi) joined the NP on 5 July 1949.⁴⁷

The effects of this first conflict were dramatic for the party. The DP lost almost half its deputies as a result of the separation. On the bright side, leaders at the center managed to consolidate their positions. Nonetheless, some DP members for the first time began to question the level of intraparty discipline being imposed by the founders and their personal ambitions, and the idealism of the party.⁴⁸ These suspicions of some DP members, increased one and a half years after the first convention when the second one was called. According to

42 Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 89.

43 "Demokrat Parti Disiplin kurulu bir ihtilal mahkemesi gibi işletilmiştir." Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 89.

44 "Bu şartlar altında tüzük kapanır." Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı*, 80. Also Öymen, *Ve İhtilal*, 6th Edition (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013) 192.

45 The eight founders of the party were Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, Enis Akaygen, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, Kenan Öner, Mustafa Kentli, Bölükbaşı, Osman Nuri Köni, and Sadık Aldoğan.

46 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partiler 1859-1952*, vol 3 (Istanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1952), 655-657.

47 Fehmi Akın, "Afyonkarahisar'da Öz Demokrat Partisi (1948)," *AKÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, no. 9, (2007): 51-61.

48 The DP presented itself as an idealist movement for benefit of the Turkish people like the NP and the Freedom Party.

Emrullah Nutku, who would become one of the founders of the Freedom Party, there were more dissents among party delegates in the second convention, held on 20 June 1949, compared to the first. He tells that there was a lack of thrill for freedom among the delegates in the second convention.⁴⁹ Furthermore, he goes on to argue that idealism within the party have been destroyed; the party had been captured by opportunists.⁵⁰ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir also regards this first move of the center to consolidate its position as indicative of the DP's authoritarian turn.⁵¹

To sum up, the first partitioning of the DP also indicated that the heterogeneity of the party opened it to further divisions, and the path to the formation of the FP began to be laid. As the NP experiment indicated, personal rivalries were important components of that party.⁵² What is interesting is that as Bölükbaşı pointed out some DP chiefs who had a hand in deepening the separation within the party between extremists and the moderates would leave their party and later approach the RPP.⁵³ In that context, Karpat states:

the question of party discipline is somewhat different. The forceful and arbitrary manner in which opposition within the Democratic Party was liquidated, supposedly in order to enforce this discipline, cannot be justified or explained except by a tendency to domination from the top. This was not assessed properly at that time by the press or by the public because maintenance of solidarity within that party was considered essential for a final victory to end one-party rule and establish a stable democratic regime. The press insisted on a quick end to the

49 Emrullah Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü ve Politika'da Yitirdiğim Yıllar (1946-1958)* (İstanbul: Üniversiteler Matbaası, 1979), 115.

50 Ibid., 129.

51 “Özellikle bu parçalanmadan sonra DP’de artık otoriter bir hava esmeye başladı.” Retrived from Bölükbaşı. Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 91.

52 Fahri Belen, a Bolu deputy of the DP in the 1950s, argues that even before the DP was in the opposition, its leaders had a vision to form their sultanate. He argues that Bayar opposed his deputyship because of his popularity in the organization. Fahri Belen, *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1960), 7-8.

53 Bölükbaşı, *Osman Bölükbaşı*, 86. There is sufficient reason to think that the writer is talking about FP members.

conflict, regardless of means used or price paid for it. In the fight to end one kind of despotism a new method of oppression was favored."⁵⁴

Although this was the first time party leaders acted in an uncompromising manner against those who thought differently, it would not be the last given their attitude and political culture which they had been through.

2.1.3 *The First Menderes Cabinet*

After the gorgeous triumph of the DP in the 1950 general elections, Celal Bayar, the leader of the DP, became the third president of the young Turkish Republic as a consequence of a decision made by the DP parliamentary group on 20 May 1950. His presidency was confirmed by parliament two days later.⁵⁵ After that, Bayar, as the new president, appointed Adnan Menderes to the Prime Ministry to form the first government apart from the RPP in the multiparty era. Menderes was also elected as the new chairperson of the DP by the GAB. Nevertheless, these decisions became the source of new disappointments within the DP, as we will see below.

2.1.3.1 Disputes in the Inner Circle

After Bayar became president, he gave up his leadership of the political party due to the fact that when the DP was in the opposition, leaders of the party had always defended the view that party leadership should be distinct from the presidency for the sake of democracy. In other words, for a decent democracy, party leadership and presidency should not be concentrated into one person; rather they, should balance each other out. Menderes became the new leader of the party and he was appointed by Bayar to be the prime minister of the new era, as mentioned. However, some deputies of the DP favored Bayar

54 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 218.

55 Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayatın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1976), 70. Muzaffer Gökman, *50 Yılın Tutanağı*, (İstanbul, Hürriyet Yayınları, 1973), 139.

himself the prime minister.⁵⁶ He had experienced in politics after long years in Turkish politics. He was one of the prominent ministers from Atatürk's era, and more importantly, he had experienced as PM between 1937 and 1939. Thus, Bayar was a trustworthy politician and Turkish democracy can go through against the possible impedes before the democracy without interruption. In fact, some figures like Halil Özyörük and Ali Fuad Cebesoy were alternative candidates for the presidency instead of Bayar.⁵⁷ Therefore, some figures were dissatisfied with the premiership and the party leadership of Menderes.⁵⁸ He was young and had less charisma to lead the premiership compared to Bayar. Doubtless, these experienced politicians at high levels with years of experience and long-standing reputation could not accept Menderes's command. In fact, before the elections, while Köprülü considered himself best suited for the premiership as the second man in the party after Bayar,⁵⁹ Karaosmanoğlu had prepared himself for party leadership.⁶⁰ Interestingly, not only Köprülü but also Menderes considered Köprülü to be the successor of the premiership. In parallel, years later, Bayar explained that after the elections, although Menderes supported premiership of Köprülü, he thought Menderes was best available for that office. According to him, Menderes visited him in the presidential palace in Çankaya and endorsed Köprülü for the premiership. The response of Bayar was: "The PM is you, Mr. Menderes."⁶¹ Needless to say, Köprülü did

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- 56 Halil İmre, *Bir Ömür Üç Kitap* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1976), 164-165. Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 160. Nadir Nadi, *Perde Aralığından* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Yayınları, 1964), 277.
- 57 Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 107.
- 58 The leap of Menderes was found odd and surprising by many. As an example, see Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Yeni İktidar, Yeni dönem 1951-1954* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), 57.
- 59 Köprülü, a professor, had in mind that he should be the new PM and could train Menderes for the premiership. I unsure the veracity of this assertion, but I have encountered this argument in many witnesses. For an example, see "Fuat Köprülü," *Akis*, April 30, 1955.
- 60 This was underscored by many witnesses at the time. See Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları (1950-1960)* (Ankara: Nürol Matbaacılık, 1998), 51. Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 362. Menderes also emphasized this point in the fourth great convention of his party. "Menderes dün kongrede 19 lara mukabele etti," *Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 1955. Samet Ağaoğlu, *Arkadaşım Menderes İpin Gölgesindeki Günler* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2004), 103.
- 61 Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 103.

not welcome the decision to appoint Menderes as the PM and worried about it. A journalist at the time, Ahmet Emin Yalman, emphasizes in his memoirs that because Köprülü could not be the PM, he was resentful and thought that he needed to at least be the chairman of the party.⁶²

When Menderes became the PM, Karaosmanoğlu put himself up for the chairmanship of the DP. In fact, the chairmanship of the DP was promised to Karaosmanoğlu behind the closed doors, according to some allegations.⁶³ When the day of the elections for the chairmanship which Bayar left after became president came to the fore, two candidates, Menderes and Karaosmanoğlu, came across to each other. In the end, Menderes was elected to follow Bayar. Karaosmanoğlu was so certain of his leadership that he voted for Menderes in a gentlemanly way, and dramatically, Menderes was elected by the GAB of the party with just one vote difference.⁶⁴ Doubtless, this razor-thin victory by Menderes was gruesome for Karaosmanoğlu and he felt great despair and betrayed by his comrades. His discouragement crystallized during the elections for the speakership of the assembly. Refik Koraltan, who was one the fourth founder of the party, was considered a fit, though again, some argue that Karaosmanoğlu considered himself for the position.⁶⁵ Finally, when the new cabinet was formed, Karaosmanoğlu was left out. In the next years, the leadership of Karaosmanoğlu of the FP was affected by these series of shocks. Moreover, when Köprülü attended rallies of the FP to advise people to vote for the FP, he was probably affected by his despair the substitution for him for the premiership. To sum up, in the new formulation and distribution of offices, some in the inner circle of the party took advantage of their political positions at the expense of the others. Whereas Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes were winners in the new era, Fuad Köprülü and Fevzi Lüfti Karaosmanoğlu were

62 Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim ve Geçirdiklerim (1922-1971)* (Istanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret A.Ş, 1997), 1528.

63 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 362.

64 Ibid., 362.

65 Mükerrerrem Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, (Istanbul: İnkılap Yayınevi, 2014), 119.

among the losers.⁶⁶ It will not mere coincidence that Karaosmanoğlu would become the leader of the FP and Köprülü its supporter a couple years later.

2.1.3.2 Disputes between Celebrities and Partisans

After Bayar became president and appointed Menderes to be the new PM, the first Menderes cabinet was formed.⁶⁷ But this new cabinet was again ripe for new disputes. First of all, as revealed in the previous subsection, the party was divided with respect to who would become the president and who would become the next prime minister. When Bayar became president and Menderes became PM, some deputies were discontented. There were a considerable number of deputies who did not believe Menderes have enough ability for the premiership. This meant that in the ensuing years, there would be a great trouble to arise either for Menderes or for his opponents.

Another dispute within the party became dominant, even before the first Menderes government was formed, a conflict within the party that we need to give attention to concerned the composition of the cabinet. Led by Köprülü, some desired that the first cabinet be composed of respectable, famous people who were above narrow political interests - in other words - impartial to partisan interests.⁶⁸ It is noteworthy that according to the proponents of this view,

66 Among the four founders of the DP, Bayar and Menderes took the lion's share, Köprülü was unhappy, and Refik Koraltan was of secondary importance. Emin Karakuş, *40 Yıllık Bir Gazeteci Gözüyle İşte Ankara* (Istanbul: Hür Yayın ve Ticaret, 1977), 188. In fact, as Bayar and Menderes became stronger within the party in the DP era, Köprülü and Koraltan became marginalized in parallel. Arcayürek, *Yeni İktidar*, 148. As a result, while Köprülü would support the FP, the personal notes of Koraltan which were highly opposed to Menderes, as evinced in the Yassıada trials against Bayar and Menderes after 27 May coup.

67 The first Menderes cabinet was as follows: Adnan Menderes (Prime Minister), Halil Özyörük (Minister of Justice), Fuad Köprülü (Foreign Minister), Avni Başman (Minister of Education), Refik Şevket İnce (Minister of Defence), Rükneddin Nasuhoğlu (Minister of the Interior), Fahri Belen (Minister of Public Works), Zühtü Velibeşe (Minister of Economy and Trade), Halil Ayan (Minister of Finance), Nihat Reşat Belger (Minister of Health), Nuri Özsan (Minister of Customs and Monopolies), Nihat Eğriboz (Minister of Agriculture), Tevfik İleri (Minister of Communications), Hasan Polatkan (Minister of Work), and Muhlis Ete (Minister of Businesses). Gökman, *50 Yılın*, 140.

68 Samet Ağaoğlu, *Aşına Yüzler* (Istanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1965), 177.

a cabinet composed of such moderates, would serve as a showcase and guarantee the democratic, multiparty system. It would give both the RPP and the Turkish people confidence that the DP would not have a partisan and revanchist agenda vis-à-vis RPP in the name of the democratic system of Turkey in the long run. Moreover, because these moderates were experienced in politics, they could reliably overcome governmental issues as compared to figures with no political experience. Even though he was himself among partisans, Samet Ağaoğlu explains the reasons why well-known, respectable persons were made ministers in parallel with our premise. First, they provided confidence to the public and to non-political forces; also, it softened the transition to the multiparty system.⁶⁹ Last, those who favored a technocratic cabinet and those who had been suspicious of the leadership of Menderes actually had parallel ideas and shared common assumptions.

On the other hand, some desired that the first cabinet be composed of people who had exerted considerable effort to bring the party into power under difficult circumstances - sometimes at the cost of being arrested for allegedly rebelling against one-party rule. Furthermore, they had followed the disputes in local party organizations and endeavored to solve them for the benefit of the central organization of the party; they had shaken hands with every single person to gain their votes; and they had gotten the party into power. After the elections, these partisans expected to be granted rewards such as ministerships in return for their efforts.

In spite of the expectations of the partisan wing of the party, a compromise was found between the two approaches in the first Menderes government. The new cabinet was composed of extremists and moderates together. Not surprisingly, this cabinet did not satisfy the partisans despite their being present in the cabinet. For example, one of the partisans of the DP, Mükerrerrem Sarol talks in his memoirs about this issue in a negative way. Regarding the day he heard the declaration of the first government, he stated that "finally, the lists of the ministers became clear; it was a scandal!"⁷⁰ He also expresses, in parallel with our statement, that "the first cabinet was not a partisan one."⁷¹

69 Samet Ağaoğlu, *Arkadaşım Menderes*, 104.

70 "Sonunda bakanlar listesi belli oldu, Rezalet!" Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol. 1, 117.

71 *Ibid.*, 118.

It is significant to underline that because they had no position in the first DP government, some DP members left out of the cabinet - such as Samet Ağaoğlu, Sıtkı Yırcalı, Mükerrer Sarol, Kazım Taşkent, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu - started to create an opposition within the party against the government immediately. They gathered around Karaosmanoğlu, Yırcalı, and Taşkent in the lobby of Ankara Palace to mobilize other DP deputies against the government.⁷² They were called *yaylacılar* which is a political term for the opponents within a party. They were called such since they sat in the rear of parliament, where the seats are higher like highland which is a translation of *yayla* in Turkish, to indicate their discontent and to distinguish themselves from ministers sitting in the front seats of parliament.

Because of this external pressure on the government and the internal disputes between the ministers and the PM, the first Menderes cabinet was short-lived. Some members of the cabinet resigned from their offices because of personal disputes with Menderes and Bayar. In fact, Bayar argued that after the first cabinet was formed, he and Menderes put pressure on the ministers which disturbed them.⁷³ Therefore, resignations came into existence one by one. On 15 September 1950, Dr. Nihat Reşat Belger, one of the doctors of the Mustafa Kemal and a comrade of an important Turkish intellectual Prince Sabahattin resigned. According to a researcher, Belger called for the retirement of 160 doctors, but Menderes, revealed that decision. Therefore, he was exposed to work with an undersecretary, favored by Menderes, who he did not want to promote in the ministry.⁷⁴ Thus, Belger resigned and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ became the new minister of health in his place. Furthermore, in October 1950, Fahri Belen, the minister of public works, resigned.⁷⁵ After that, in place of

72 According to Sarol, Karaosmanoğlu spearheaded that faction after he could not get what he wanted. Ibid., 113. Celal Fuad Türkgeldi, Hüsnü Yaman, and Fűrüzan Tekil were among the opponents.

73 Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 138-139.

74 Nacar, "Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanı Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ'ın Hayatı ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1885-1956)" (master's thesis, Uşak University, 2016), 44. Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 384.

75 Gökman, *50 Yılın*, 75. Belen complains about interventionist behaviors of Menderes in the first cabinet. To illustrate, in one project related to his office was conducted by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, he was bypassed. Belen, *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe*, 14.

Belen, Aġaoġlu who was known as one of the partisans of the DP, was appointed to the ministry. Belen remained an opponent within the party until his resignation from the DP soon before the 1957 general elections. In addition to these, another technocrat minister, Nihat Eġriboz, resigned from the ministry of agriculture and Nedim Ökmen became the minister. On 4 August 1950, Avni Bařman, the minister of education, who was known as an idealist figure, resigned because of health problems.⁷⁶ After him, Tevfik İleri, who was one of the severe partisans of the party, became the minister.⁷⁷ At the end of 1950, Halil Ayan, the minister of finance, resigned from his office following a dispute over the budget,⁷⁸ reportedly because of health problems; Hasan Polatkan became the minister after him.⁷⁹ In March 1951, another moderate figure, Refik řevket İnce, resigned from the ministry of state because of health problems.⁸⁰ In these examples, it is striking that when moderate figures resigned from their positions, partisans filled them thereafter. This was the sole indicator of the dispute between two different, opposing camps. Although the first cabinet was heterogeneous with respect the positions of moderates and partisans, the former could not resist to the latter. This shaky position of the latter both in the parliament and in the party administration would be one of the sources of opposition within party in coming incidents.

2.1.4 61's Movement

As mentioned in the previous section, there were intraparty conflicts regarding the composition of the first cabinet, and some moderate ministers did not manage to cooperate with Menderes and the partisans of the DP. Thus, some members of the cabinet individually resigned one by one. Therefore, the life of the first Menderes government lasted only ten months. On 8 March 1951, the cabinet terminated itself, and the second Menderes cabinet was formed on 2

76 Ibid., 73.

77 He was like a Turkish version of McCarthy, who was a communist hunter in the state department while he in office.

78 Arcayürek, *Yeni iktidar*, 52.

79 Gökman, *50 Yılın*, 78.

80 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 82.

April 1951.⁸¹ Naturally, when the first cabinet resigned, the idea of Köprülü which favored a moderate cabinet was pushed out of the government respectively. In the new cabinet, technocrats were expelled from the cabinet and, partisans took over their seats. Thus, the technocratic character of the cabinet was out, and partisanship was in. As a result, those who had been on the shelf in the first cabinet found themselves in the opposition within the party when they were moved from power under the second cabinet. The effects of this mobility disturbed some intellectuals at the time. To illustrate, Yalman accused Menderes of having monopolized the political power when that technocratic cabinet fell.⁸²

Sixty-one deputies of the DP voted no-confidence on the budget of the new government.⁸³ Actually, this was an indirect sign that dissatisfied figures who had then been excluded from their positions started to increase their negative attitude towards their party leaders and the government concurrently. However, opponents were just reacting to the leadership. They were not organized, just came together two or three deputies at a time, without making a unified group. They were of the mind that the government offered no hope for

81 Ibid., 82.

82 Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1553. However, it was well-known that Yalman's reaction was in opposition to Ağaoğlu with whom he could not get along.

83 These sixty-one deputies were Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Hamdi Bulgurlu, Ramiz Eren from Ankara, Ahmet Tokuş, Ahmet Tekelioğlu, İbrahim Subaşı, Burhanettin Onat from Antalya, Esat Budakoğlu, Muzaffer Emiroğlu, Enver Güreli, Arif Kalıpsızloğlu, Ahmet Kocabıyıkoglu, Selâhattin Baskan, Müfit Erkuyumcu, Yahya Pelvan from Balıkesir, Vahit Yöntem from Bolu, Fethi Çelikbaş from Burdur, Necdet Yılmaz, Haluk Şaman, Raif Aybar from Bursa, Nihat Eğriboz from Çanakkale, Ahmet Başbüyük, Hüseyin Ortakçioğlu from Çorum, Mehmet Enginün, Arif Altınalmaz from Edirne, Emrullah Nutku, Bahadır Dülger from Erzurum, Arif Hikmet Pamukoğlu from Giresun, Vasfi Mahir Kocatürk, Kemal Yörükoğlu from Gümüşhane, Sait Kantarel from Kastamonu, Ziya Atıg, Ekrem Alican from Kocaeli, Muammer Obuz from Konya, Şemi Ergin, Faruk ilter, Nafiz Körez, Adnan Karaosmanoğlu from Manisa, Abdulkair Kalav from Mardin, Kemal Balta from Rize, Ferit Tüzel from Samsun, Yusuf Ziya Eker, Reşat Güçlü from Seyhan, Bahattin Taner, İlhan Dizdar, Rifat Öçten, Şeki Ecevit, Nurettin Ertürk, İbrahim Duygun, Hüseyin Yüksel from Sivas, Süleyman Fehmi Kalaycıoğlu, Mahmut Goloğlu from Trabzon, Feridun Ergin from Urfa, İzzet Akın from Van, and Hüseyin Balık from Zonguldak. Burçak, *On Yılım Anıları*, 83.

radical reforms.⁸⁴ In fact, that six of eleven deputies who submitted the right to prove bill in 1955, which was the event which led to the formation of the FP, were among 61's movement.

2.1.5 *Unrest Against the Centralization of the DP in the Hands of Menderes Circle*

There was always some opposition within the DP to the party center, and all disputes were resolved in such a way that the position of Adnan Menderes and his entourage were consolidated because they always eliminated the opposition in the party. Again, we referred to this phenomenon as the centralization of the party rule of the DP in the hands Menderes and his circle. In this subsection, I narrate the internal conflicts within the parliamentary group of the party and the disputes between the central organization of the DP and its local organizations.

2.1.5.1 Within the Parliamentary Group

Dissidence within the party was not limited to figures in the inner circle of the party. There were disputes within the party at other levels, too. These disputes came mostly from the interventionist moves of the DP center vis-à-vis some levels of the party. In the same vein, the GAB of the party adopted a rough manner not only against the opposition party but also against their party at the beginning of the 1950s. In the first term of DP rule, there was conflict between parliamentary group and the central organization of the party like the one took place in 1947 resulted with the formation of the NP. The first resignation from the DP in protest Nazım Önen, the Diyarbakır deputy, when the DP had not even fulfilled its first year in power.⁸⁵

The conflict between the party center and parliamentary group crystallized in a struggle between the director of parliamentary group (meclis grubu

84 Gül Tuba Taşpınar Dağcı, "Ekrem Alican'ın Siyasal Hayatı" (PhD Diss. Istanbul University: The Atatürk Unstitute For Modern Turkish History, 2003), 12-13.

85 For the reactions of that resignation, "Nazım Önen için çekilen telgraflar," *Milliyet*, October 28, 1950. Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları (1944-1973): DP'nin Altın Yılları (1950-1954)* (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 114-115.

yöneticisi), Refik Şevket İnce, and the leader of the party, Menderes. In 1952, İnce resigned from office following the debate with Menderes who adopted a vulgar tone to him a speech during the occasion.⁸⁶ According to Emrullah Nutku, İnce thought that if Menderes left office, everything would be good.⁸⁷ In his eyes, all the problems of the party and Turkey were came from Menderes' personality. Those who were suspicious of Menderes's eligibility for the premiership when he was appointed as PM were now opposing him again. In fact, the criticisms that İnce put forward against the PM had the support of the opposition in the parliamentary group. In other words, İnce's objections to Menderes were made on behalf of the opposition within the party against the center. To a large extent, while Menderes and İnce were conducting the debating, which was actually happening between the center and the *Yaylacılar*. The opponents in parliamentary group desired that the center of the party not interfere with the parliamentary group for the sake of democracy. After harsh discussions, İnce resigned from his position and Menderes was victorious, defeating parliamentary group once again.⁸⁸ Not only the ones of Önen and İnce but also some other personal uprisings against Menderes occurred in the first years of the DP rule. In the beginning of 1952, Abdurrahman Boyacıgiller, a DP deputy from Zonguldak, was excluded from the DP because he did not get along with Menderes, Köprülü, and Koraltan.⁸⁹ Bedii Faik, a journalist at the time, argues that Boyacıgiller asserted that one-man rule in the DP tended

86 Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 227. Menderes argued that İnce was provoked by Karaosmanoğlu. The dispute of Karaosmanoğlu and Menderes had a long history, that showed itself in almost all the problems within the DP. Even though it is not certain that İnce problem was provoked by Karaosmanoğlu, this was perception of Menderes, and it guided his acts within the party. Also see Karakuş, *İşte Ankara*, 317.

87 Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 236.

88 After that defeat, İnce remained in the opposition within the party until his death. The law regarding unfair acquisition of properties by the RPP in the single-party era, which aimed to transfer these properties to the treasury, İnce spoke in opposition at the end of the 1953 assembly session. Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 117.

89 Boyacıgiller joined the NP. Former DP deputies Arif Hikmet Pamukoğlu and Nazım Önen, the latter a deputy from Diyarbakır, attended the NP. Adnan Ferruh Pancaroğlu, "Yakın Tarihimizde Millet Partisi Olgusu (1948-1977) " (master's thesis, Afyon Kocatepe University, 2006), 43. Two of them would be the FP members in the coming era.

toward chieftainship system like the RPP era under National Chief, İnönü.⁹⁰ Furthermore, in 1953, Kazım Taşkent, the founder of Yapı ve Kredi Bank, resigned from the DP.⁹¹ He had gone a great deal of trouble for the development of the DP by making donations to the party several times and also by recruiting members including Nihat Reşat Belger.⁹² According to Erer, the anxiety of the leaders about their leadership led to the exclusion of Taşkent. It was thought that there were at least seventy to eighty deputies loyal to him, which was sufficient reason for the leaders to worry about Taşkent. In fact, Menderes was always suspicious of his group and worried about that one day Taşkent would dominate the party. In response, Taşkent resigned; he did not want to be seen as having a conflict with Menderes.⁹³

It is important to note that between 1951 and 1952 after individual uprisings against the Menderes circle on behalf of parliamentary group, which was composed of party figures with strong personalities who were suspicious of the Menderes' premiership -, the party center gained the upper hand. However, dialectically, the opposition had been dispersed started to be canalized and unified - not entirely but partially.⁹⁴

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- 90 Bedii Faik, *Matbuat Basın derkeen Medya*, vol. 3, (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık A.Ş., 2001), 238.
- 91 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 107. The reason for the resignation was Taşkent's health problems.
- 92 Tekin Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi* (Istanbul: Ticaret Postası Matbaası, 1963), 228.
- 93 According to Erer, another businessman, Üzeyir Avunduk, was appointed to serve the General Directorate of İş Bank. However, Taşkent was being neglected by the center. That can be explained with nothing but concerns for the leadership of the party leaders against Taşkent who posed a potential threat. Ibid., 229-230. This anxiety of Menderes accounts for one main reason for all the dismissals; Menderes was always suspicious that the opponents would one day stage a coup within the parliamentary group to overthrow himself. Menderes's lawyer, Burhan Apaydın, stresses this point. He goes on to assert that his concerns about the opponents occupied him so much that precautions against a military coup escaped his attention. Yurdakul Doğan and F. Cengiz Erdinç, *Adalet Savaşçısı: Menderes'in Avukatı Burhan Apaydın'ın Anıları* (Istanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınları, 2012), 132.
- 94 In the first term of the DP, there were other figures within parliamentary group of the DP who broke with the party including Halil Atalay, Salih İnankurt, Şahap Tol, Selahattin Hüdayioğlu, Ali Fahri İşeri, Süreyya Endik, Kazım Acar, Kemal Atakurt, İrfan Aksu, Said Bilgiç, Tahsin Tol, Fehmi Ustaoglu, Şevket Mocan, Hıdır Aydın, and Faik Erbaş. Tuncer, Erol and Bülent

2.1.5.2 Rebellions in Local Party Organizations

The DP party center was always confronted with problems coming from local organizations due its patronizing behavior towards locals. The reasons for these disturbances of local organizations were various. First, some disputes came into existence regarding candidate selection - who would be nominated for the general elections was always a concern. While local organizations demanded deputies from their districts be nominated on their own initiative based on their right to conduct primary elections in their organizations, the party center demanded a larger quota for itself. Especially in the 1954 general elections, many DP deputies, mostly from celebrities, failed to win the primary elections in the local organizations, including some FP members such as Emrullah Nutku and Nihat Reşat Belger.⁹⁵ In fact, Nutku's failure can be traced in his memoirs: he expresses that the primary elections were wrong and unjust.⁹⁶ In fact, Rıfki Salim Burçak, a member of the GAB of the DP at the time, argues in his memoirs that those who did not win the primaries complained about it.⁹⁷ This provides a vital clue about the tension between local organizations and the celebrities. On the other hand, the DP center did not abandon these personalities; it needed their knowledge and expertise, Menderes nominated these moderates who could not garner the support of local delegates for the elections by requesting from some candidates from the locals to give up their rights in favor of these technocrats. In fact, this quota was sometimes used as a bargaining chip by the DP center, as Feroz Ahmad underlined, stating that in the by-election of 1951 the DP center organization did not nominate any candidate for twenty vacant seats. These concessions were made to local districts in the exchange for the diluting of local opposition in the districts.⁹⁸

Tuncer, *Meclis Aritmetiğinde Yaşanan Değişim (1943-1960)*. Ankara: TESAV, 2015) http://www.tesav.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2.Meclis_Aritmetiginde_Yasanan_Degisim1943-1960.pdf.

95 Also; Salih Keçeci, Hüsnü Yaman, Fuad Hulusi Demirelli, Halil Özyörük, Sadık Giz, Zühtü Velibeşe, Zeki Rıza Sporel, Bahadır Dülger, and Refik Şevket İnce were among these who did not pass the primary elections in their electoral districts. Toker, *DP'nin Altın Yılları*, 297.

96 Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 271.

97 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 198.

98 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 87.

This tension was strictly correlated with the natural and traditional dispute between the respectable, famous figures and the partisans. While locals can be regarded as partisans who appealed to local needs, the famous figures at the center were more interested in the general outlook of Turkey independent of local needs, which meant they were far from populist discourses. Given the populist tendency of the DP, the tension between locals and technocrats intensified to the detriment of technocrats especially between 1954 and 1955, when the opposition in the party was getting stronger and the Freedom Party was formed. As we have said, the center of the party requested that some local candidates give up their candidacy before the 1954 elections. Because the local politicians did not forgo their right willingly, ticks were running out for the technocrats given the unrest of the locals against themselves. The situation was a sign that technocrats were alienated from their political party and felt their necks were sticking out too far especially after 1954. The locals did not forget their renunciation and would oppose these respectable figures, respectively. This can be understood from the point of view of an opponent, Baban who would become a member of the FP; in the tension between locals and moderates, moderates referred to locals as "lickspittle."⁹⁹

On the other hand, it is noteworthy that deputies who came from local organizations sometimes behaved contrary to the center when they felt responsible to their local organizations rather than to the center. A deputy nominated by the center was expected to be more engaged compared to deputies nominated by their local grassroots. In a nutshell, the latter did not feel indebted to the center, and this provided them room to move freely in politics. These phenomena compared to the claims made in the previous paragraph, it can be suggested that when these locals came to parliament, they could be opposed both by the technocrats and the center of the party. When they had disputes with the center, they were dismissed from the party; when they had disputes with the technocrats, they had considerable efforts to dismiss from the party by igniting Menderes and his circle against their rivalries. Both scenarios were witnessed in the party throughout the 1950s.

99 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 177-182.

Third, the tension between locals and the center was again highlighted when the Grand National Assembly was adjourned. When deputies from among the locals returned to their electoral districts, they sometimes felt uncomfortable as they had not responded to the needs of locals or their promises made before the elections. When they returned to Ankara, they started to put pressure on the government so that they could keep their word given to the residents of their districts.

For example, the GAB of the party dismissed eight executives of the Istanbul local organization to consolidate its authority in 1951 vis-à-vis local mutiny.¹⁰⁰ The chairman of the Istanbul Province resigned because of the dispute within the party.¹⁰¹ Antagonisms within the Istanbul organization were longstanding, back to 1946, the struggles there went back the first years of the DP's opposition. The center took control of Istanbul in 1951, but after 1956 when Köprülü had problems with Menderes conflicts over Istanbul started again. That said, the disputes in Istanbul continued till 1957 when Orhan Köprülü and his father Fuad Köprülü tried to exert their domination, but could not do so, losing to Dr. Sarol's clique. Not surprisingly, Orhan and his father would support the FP when they lost their position in Istanbul. In addition, in 1951, opponents of the party gathered in the Zonguldak party convention separate from the convention held with the support of the center.¹⁰² A deputy from Zonguldak, Abdurrahman Boyacıgiller, was dismissed from the party about which Ahmad commented that the incident determined the campaign of the center vis-à-vis locals with different views.¹⁰³ On 15 July 1951, the convention of the Eskişehir Province was divided into two camps - the opponents and the proponents of the center.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the economic policies of the DP government were criticized in the convention of Manisa.¹⁰⁵ Disputes were seen in Bursa, Balıkesir, and Beşiktaş organizations, as well. In the convention of

100 Cem Eroğlu, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), 74.

101 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 136.

102 Ibid., 74.

103 Ibid., 93.

104 Ibid., 86.

105 Ibid., 136.

the Ankara organization, tensions between locals and the center was an issue. Ahmad claims that especially in the Aegean districts, factions were common.¹⁰⁶ For instance, in 1951, a partition occurred because of conflicts between the center and local organizations of the party.¹⁰⁷ In the same vein, this kind of challenge between locals and the center was salient and prominent in Adana district. The conflict was so devastating for the party that a new political party was formed, the Peasant Party (Köylü Partisi, or PP) which was another party given birth to by the DP after the National Party, between 28 and 29 May 1951 in the DP congress of Adana.¹⁰⁸ Some fervent discussions were made, Refik Koraltan, Adnan Menderes, Fuad Köprülü, and Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu attended the convention to appease the delegates. The PP was another crisis that ended with the centralization of the DP and the dismissal of opponents.

Last but not least, in some Kurdish-speaking regions, the support of local Kurds for the DP had slowed a couple of years after the 1950 elections because, as Tarık Ziya Ekinici, a Kurdish intellectual, puts it, the Kurds could not get what the leaders of the DP had promised.¹⁰⁹ In the same way, another rebellion towards the center occurred in Muş Province due to high pressure from the center put on local organizations. It ended up with the resignation of Hadi Özdemir, and that clique would join the FP when it was formed in 1955.¹¹⁰ In fact, the memoirs of Burçak, one of the members of the GAB of the DP, state that the most troubling issues for the board were conflicts within the party in local organizations; almost all provinces were divided into two camps. The sources of the problem dominated the organization to guarantee some deputyships in coming terms.¹¹¹ In fact, when the FP was formed, the party recruited along the lines of this schism in local organizations divided into two factions: representatives of the center and opponents who had lost the struggle

106 Ibid., 148.

107 Ibid., 79

108 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 453.

109 Tarık Ziya Ekinici, *Lice'den Paris'e Anılarım*, ed. Tanıl Bora, Derviş Aydın Akkoç, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 346.

110 Mehmet Pınar, "Demokrat Parti'nin Muş Teşkilatlanması ve Faaliyetleri," *Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, no. 21 (2015), 128.

111 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 85.

in their organizations. For example, in Elazığ Province, these sent to the board of discipline of the DP in late 1956 - Oğuz Karazaim, Atik Erbaş, and Dursun Çolakolu - and others fired from the party joined the FP and were nominated for the 1957 elections.¹¹²

§ 2.2 Disputes between Intellectuals and the DP

The support of intellectuals for the DP started to decrease after 1953, and the Turkish intelligentsia became a fervent opponent of the government after 1954. After 1955, intellectuals formed a coalition with the FP through *FORUM* and *Akis* magazines. In this section, I explain how and when the intellectual support for the DP decreased.

2.2.1 *The First Warnings by Intellectuals about the Authoritarian Manner of the DP*

Despite the fact that the media and intellectuals were among the supporters of the DP when the party was in the opposition, their support did not continue to the end. Until the relationship between them and the DP was broken, some journalists warned the government about the danger of embracing authoritarian rule like the RPP did in the single-party era, which had been strictly criticized by both intellectuals and the DP in the second half of the 1940s.

One of the first journalists to warn the DP about the authoritarianism was Nadir Nadi, who expressed suspicion of Menderes leadership when he was appointed to the premiership in one of his articles in *Cumhuriyet*.¹¹³ He described the top-down pressure exerted by leading figures of the party - in his term, as "aghas." Furthermore, in his memoirs, Yalman asserts that he first warned the DP and Menderes against authoritarianism in June just after the 1950 elections in an essay titled "Menderes Nereye Gitmek İstiyor" (Menderes

112 Emine Pancar and Aydın Öğrendik, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Elazığ'da Siyasi Hayat (1954-1957)," in *Geçmişten Geleceğe Harput Sempozyumu*, ed. Enver Çakar (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Harput Uygulama Ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2013), 480.

113 Nadir Nadi, "Ağababaları," *Cumhuriyet*, September 7, 1951.

Quo Vadis) in June 1950.¹¹⁴ He said that the DP should not revive the single-party era.¹¹⁵ Moreover, he showed his disappointment with the DP with one of his article "Allah'a Niyaz" (Pray to God) in 1951.¹¹⁶ Moreover, Ahmet Hamdi Başar - one of the most interesting figures of Turkish intellectual history - resigned from the DP in 1953 as a result of a dispute with the party. As an atypical intellectual, Başar was a lone wolf and backed always the wrong horse in politics from the period of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to the 1960 coup d'état. He was in the process of the formation of the DP as the fifth founder. While the founding-fours were preparing the program of the DP, Başar attended their meetings. However, his ideas conflicted with these of Menderes and Köprülü, and after a short while, before the program of the party was complete, he was dismissed from among the founders of the party by the founders. The reason for this premature liquidation within the DP was that Başar was in favor of economic planning, but Menderes and Köprülü were against it. He did not manage to impose his ideas on the other four. Nonetheless, Başar became a deputy of the DP in 1950 with the support of Refik Koraltan.¹¹⁷ As a deputy, he was one of the first to come out against DP rule in 1953, bringing a bill to the assembly – floor called the Development Together with the Nation (Milletçe Kalkınma Kanunu). Even though he worked hard to persuade the DP deputies of the law, he was not successful. This is crucial with respect to the fact that the law advised the government on the idea of economic planning, but the members of DP - even these who would become the FP members which stressed the need of economic planning did not advocate it. In this sense, he can be thought of the harbinger of the FP because he was one of the first figures among DP members to advocate economic planning and object the economic

114 Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1552. Yalman, owner of *Vatan* paper, was among the figures who adjusted their positions towards the DP rule regarding his interests with his paper. Ironically, in 1955, Yalman opposed the right to prove movement which resulted in the formation of the FP. Therefore, being moderate or extremist in these years strictly related with the figure's position with and within the DP. Therefore, these terms could not be taken into consideration in an essential way.

115 Ibid., 1553.

116 Ibid., 1556.

117 Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Yaşadığımız Devrin İç Yüzü* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1960), 39.

policies being pursued by the DP. On the other hand, while the founders of the FP favored a law targeted at confiscating some of the properties belonging to the RPP, Başar was one among the DP deputies who objected to this.¹¹⁸

After these premature objections to the DP, the intellectual support considerably decreased after 1954. In parallel with the worsening relations between intellectuals and the DP, as the source of the intellectual opposition *FORUM* journal began to be published in April 1954 and *Akis* in May 1954.

2.2.2 *Antidemocratic Measures of the DP Starting in 1952*

While the DP was in the opposition, leaders of the party heralded democratic reforms promising that if they ascended to power, they would abolish the antidemocratic laws and regulations of the single-party era. In parallel, when the DP came to power, some antidemocratic laws were terminated as promised. For example, state pressure on religious people was immediately softened, a general amnesty for convicted press members was granted, some prohibitions on the right to form associations were abolished, and a new, liberal press law was enacted.¹¹⁹ Contrary to such liberalization in the regime, starting in 1952 DP governments started to embrace a string of laws and regulations designed to constrict the movements of opposition parties, and moreover, some antidemocratic laws began to be enacted.¹²⁰ To illustrate, People's Houses through which Kemalist ideas were spread among the people in the hands of single party rulers to consolidate the reforms were confiscated and transferred to the national treasury in 1952.¹²¹ Moreover, 1952 was a landmark with respect to the

118 Başar, *DP İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs*, 277.

119 Interestingly, while antidemocratic regulations were terminated, some figures including Fethi Çelikbaş, one of the founders of the FP and Köprülü, an honorary member of the FP, had their objections to these liberalizations.

120 In reality, it is not possible to clearly differentiate the democratic DP and its antidemocratic regulations. The antidemocratic and uncompromising manners of the DP arguably started in the Korean War less than a year after the party came to power. The party decided to send military forces to Korea without consulting or even informing parliament. Bayar and Menderes declared this decision to public in Bursa on the first day of July in 1951.

121 Actually, this was not entirely an antidemocratic, unjust regulation of the DP. In the single party era, the state and the party were so interpenetrated that hundreds of state properties,

approach of the government to Islamic reactionism. In that year, Hüseyin Üzmez, a religious fanatic, attempted to kill a journalist, Yalman, who had a worldwide reputation. Üzmez was under the influence of writings published in *Büyük Doğu* journal by a famous Islamist intellectual, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. The assassination attempt shook Turkey and political circles because Yalman had worked for the formation of the DP as the "fifth of the fours" (Dörtlerin Beşincisi).¹²² In fact, he was called as the "wet nurse" of the party having added "Democrat" to the party's name. Also, the dangerous reactionism in Turkey was still an issue about which the ruling elite was afraid. That said, the government started to take strict precautions against reactionism. For example, on 22 January 1953, the Nationalists Association (Milliyetçiler Derneği) was closed because the investigation into aforementioned assassination found that the persons who planned the assassination had ties with the association, and that it had a role in the attempt.¹²³ Furthermore, the authoritarization of the DP continued with the termination of the Nation Party in 1953 in response to its reactionary wing.¹²⁴ This was one of the most antidemocratic actions of the DP; the only evidence was the claims of Hikmet Bayur who had lost the leadership race of the NP. This action by the DP hurt even the conscience of some DP supporters. Ali Fuad Başgil, a professor at Istanbul University who was a respected figure in the eyes of DP leaders, argued that the motive of the ruling party was to prevent the rise of potential rival parties but

which were funded by the state, with all their revenues were registered to the party. Sometimes state confiscated civil associations such as Turkish Hearths. Among them, there were properties registered to the party, not to the state. Because of these, the return of People's Houses to treasury was not a clear example of the antidemocratic measure of the DP. Nevertheless, when we look at the coming measures of the DP and the DP period from a larger perspective, it is possible to regard it as antidemocratic within that larger process.

122 Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1315.

123 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 106.

124 Ironically, Baban who would be one of the founders of the FP, wrote an article supporting to the closure of the NP in *Zafer* paper. Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 152. Also See Eroğlu, *Demokrat Parti*, 88.

that this was a huge mistake.¹²⁵ Even one fanatic writer for the DP, Tekin Erer, who published the paper *Akın* on behalf of the party, expressed that this action would pass into history. Pulling down more than twenty thousand plates of the party in one night was a severe blow to the multiparty system.¹²⁶ Indeed, there was no solid evidence to prove the allegations against the party.¹²⁷ In fact, the Menderes circle was taking revenge for the 1947 splinter of from the NP given that the 1954 general elections were in sight.

The restrictions were not confined to the Islamist figures and organizations. When some of the professors from the Ankara University rose their voices against the DP government, the response of the government was to pass Law 6185 which prevented them from taking part in political parties and engaging in daily politics.¹²⁸ In response to opposition to the law in the academic circles, Fethi Çelikbaş who would become one of the founders of the FP said that "it is proven by their critiques that those who claim to be academics do not understand what they have read"¹²⁹

The DP continued with its restrictive policies in domestic politics. On 24 July 1953, Law 6187 on the protection of conscience and the freedom of meetings and demonstrations was accepted.¹³⁰ In October 1953, 167 communists were sent to trial.¹³¹ Furthermore, although the leaders of the DP had promised not to take a vindictive approach with respect to the opposition when they came to power, tensions between the government and the opposition enhanced with a law enacted in 1953 that transferred unjustly acquired properties of the RPP, which had been gained in the single-party era with the force of the

125 Ali Fuad Başgil, *27 Mayıs İhtilâli ve Sebepleri*, trans M. Ali Sebük and İ. Hakkı Akın (İstanbul, Çeltüt Matbaası, 1966), 98.

126 In his words, "Bir gece içerisinde yirmi bin parti tabelasının indirilmesi, çok partili hayata vurulmuş bir darbe olarak tarihe geçecektir." Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 152.

127 Ibid., 154.

128 *Resmi Gazete*, no. 8469, July 23, 1953: 6836.

129 "Kitabî olduklarını iddia edenlerin, okudukları kitaptan da anlamadıkları, yaptıkları tenkitlerle de sâbittir." Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 164. Ironically, he will be among the founders of the FP, which presented itself as a "thought club."

130 *Resmi Gazete* 8470, July 29, 1953: 6843.

131 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 115.

state, back to the national treasury. Even the headquarters of the RPP and *Ulus* journal, which had been legated by Mustafa Kemal, was confiscated by the state. Compared to the acquisition of the People's Houses, the scale of these activities of the ruling party against the opposition party hurt the feelings of many people at the time.¹³² It was a political decision, not a judicial one, and was intended to weaken the RPP just before the 1954 general elections. İnönü stated in the parliament: "I am watching you from the chair of history. You are in a hurry of criminals. You're afraid of the light."¹³³

As we have seen, there had always been disputes within the DP from the beginning. Yet these were mostly personal, local, and ad hoc. Starting in 1953, opposition within the party became concrete and spread to the grassroots of the party. Henceforth, as we have seen, some of the intellectual supporters of the DP started to withdraw support, which was the landmark of the formation of the Freedom Party. Because the activities of the government in the first three years alienated many intellectuals and turned their support given to the DP before 1953 upside down.¹³⁴ Therefore, the formation of the FP gained

132 The law was not entirely unjust like appropriation of the People's Houses. Indeed, in the single party era, the state and the party had so converged that some state properties were registered to the party, which was not objected to by the RPP, either. However, the way the DP enacted that law to that level just before the 1954 general elections was disturbing for the democracy. In the year before the 1954 elections, the NP was closed. Considering the two together, the real aim is more apparent. For reflections of the action on the journalists of *Ulus* paper at the time, see Cüneyt Arcayürek, *Yeni İktidar*, 134-135 and Altan Öymen, *Öfkeli Yıllar*, 10th Edition (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014), 439-440.

133 "Tarih kürsüsünden halinizi seyrediyorum. Suçluların telaşı içindesiniz. Işıktan korkuyorsunuz." There were opponents who voted against the acquisition law within the DP including Raif Aybar, Enver Adakan, Ekrem Alican, Refik Şevket, and Rıfat Alabay.

134 Liberalization with respect to religious issues and the acquisition of RPP properties together with the vulgar tone of the leaders of the ruling party towards İsmet İnönü, a national hero, hurt the feelings of many intellectual elites, which was another significant reason for their uneasiness. To illustrate, in speeches Menderes described İsmet İnönü as a "professional manslayer" (profesyonel cani), "tyrant" (müstebit), and "national informer" (milli jurnalci). These words are reflected by Muammer Aksoy, one of candidates of the FP in the 1957 general elections, who condemned the language of Menderes towards İnönü in his book. Muammer Aksoy, *Partizan Radyo ve D.P.* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1960), 113-114. Also, Turan Güneş, one of the founders of the FP, argues that removal of the ban on the Arabic adhan hit like a

momentum in these years. Before continuing on to this historical trajectory, it would be beneficial to identify the reasons for the authoritarianization of the DP throughout the 1950s, and especially after 1953.

The first reason for the authoritarian outlook of DP governments at home reflected high tensions in the international arena rooted in the Cold War atmosphere. In the decade between 1950 and 1960, tensions between the two poles in the Cold War peaked by which Turkey had her share. Thus, the decade witnessed many disputes between and within the two poles. The Korean War 1950, formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a coup in Argentina which overthrew Peron in 1955, crises in the Suez Canal in 1956, intervention of the Red Army in Budapest in 1956, and the problems of China and Taiwan in the United Nations were the primary events that polarized the world. This nervous atmosphere caused governments within the blocks to adopt authoritarian domestic policies because the oppositional movements backed by the other pole, were allegedly, dangerous for them.

Turkey always sought to follow its traditional foreign policy looking to the West within the boundaries of balancing it with the East, benefitting from its relative autonomy which was provided by the international arena in which no absolute power dominated the world. However, in the period from 1945 to 1960, its policy had biases favoring relations with the US, and given that it was more inclined towards the interests of the US, it discarded the traditional balance policy.¹³⁵ Not only the DP but also other political parties and the mainstream intellectual tradition supported a foreign policy that targeted integration with the western world and becoming an ally of the USA.¹³⁶ Especially

ton of bricks (as his words) at the time. Turan Güneş, *Araba Devilmeden Önce* (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983), 102. The reaction against that initial action by the DP can be observed from authors at that time. See Celalettin Çetin, *İşte Babıali: Çuvaldızı Kendimize* (Istanbul, Cem Yayınevi, 1991), 72. Faik, *Matbuat Basın Derkeen*, vol 2, 108-109.

135 Baskın Oran, "Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgunlar, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, (Istanbul: İletişim, 2014), 498.

136 It is not possible to cite all the pro-NATO writings in the 1950s because of their excessive quantity, so I will give a couple examples. See "Atlantik Camiası ve Türkiye," *FORUM*, April 15, 1955. "Türkiye-Suriye," *FORUM*, May 1, 1955. NATO was defined as "a solid, far-reaching

with the leadership of Turkey in the formation of the Baghdad and Balkan Pact, Turkey lost its relative autonomy and became the agent of the imperialist western world in its region. This biased foreign policy under the influence of American hegemony and McCarthyism led Turkish governments to have an authoritarian view to a certain degree. In that sense, there was a reciprocal relationship between the internal and external policies of the government in the 1950s. This relationship became apparent whenever the government got into predicaments outside, and it became more intolerant towards the opposition at home. It means that the internal and the external politics stirred each other up. To illustrate, Turkey, Great Britain, and Greece negotiated on the status of Cyprus island, but the sides could not reach a conclusion about its fate. This tension had an enormous impact on Turkish domestic politics, especially when on 6-7 September 1955 protests about Cyprus in two Turkish cities, Istanbul and Izmir, turned into mass anti-minority outlook. In another example, when a coup was staged in Iraq and King Faysal, his regent Abdül İlah, and the prime minister were killed, the level of the aggressiveness of the government went up. According to Sarol, a close friend of Menderes, "the calamity of the Baghdad Revolution was engraved on the soul of Menderes."¹³⁷ In fact, the brutality occurred there almost brought Menderes to declare war on Iraq. From that point on, he started to worry about a possible coup which could cost his life. As a result, he became more aggressive to defend his life. To

security organization unique in history." "Sovyet Yakınlaşma Gayretleri," *FORUM*, April 1, 1956. No article strongly criticizing NATO was found while conducting this study despite extensive examining of the press. As Faik said, NATO did not confront with such massive welcome in any other country. Bedii Faik, *Matbuat Basın derkeen*, vol 2, 173. Also See *Symbolic Representatin of Americanism in Turkey*, Appendix D. Furthermore, even today Turkish citizens lived through those years remember the American markets where goods from American Post Exchange sold. Among the people, working for NATO was viewed as a privileged occupation. Turkish people who consumed American goods felt privileged at the time, and American movies, cartoons, fashion and the American way of life, started to become popular. The strong US hegemony was evident among intellectuals. In 1950s Turkish intelligentsia was in favor of the USA without question.

137 Bağdat İhtilal faciası Menderes'in ruhunda çok derin izler bıraktı. Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 2, 243.

sum up, this atmosphere contributed the authoritarian manners of the government in domestic politics.¹³⁸

The second reason for the authoritarian measures of DP governments in these years at home was the downward economic trend witnessed after 1953. In the first term of the DP government, Turkey had witnessed unprecedented economic development that accompanied unrestrained liberal economic policies. Nevertheless, this recovery of the economy started to diminish after roughly 1953 for the same reasons for that development; unrestrained economic policies. That economic development stemmed from a couple of causes. The first reason was related to the Marshall Aid which provided machines in the agricultural sector, enhancing the productivity. According to Akşin, while the number of tractors in 1950 was 9905, by 1956 it had increased to 43,727.¹³⁹ Moreover, optimal meteorological factors had a considerable effect on the increase in crops in the first half of the 1950s. Furthermore, these optimal conditions intersected with the positive effects of the Korean War. In effect, the demand for agricultural products produced in Turkey increased considerably, and their prices went up in the international market. Furthermore, in that period the area under cultivation was increased by the government. According to Akşin, planted fields went up from 9.5 million hectares in 1948 to 14.6 million hectares in 1956.¹⁴⁰ Last, the DP government had resources given the gold reserves that had been collected in the single-party era, especially given the tight monetary policies of World War II. Yet after 1954, agricultural productivity started to decrease because the effects of the Korean War were being compensated for on the international market, and thus, demand for Turkey's agricultural products went down. Besides, weather conditions were not as optimal as they were in the DP's first term. Also, farmers suffered the shortage of auxiliary equipment for their machines that had, with the Marshall Plan.

138 Also, considering the opposing media at the time, these kinds of external events were considered a message to Menderes and included the protest of university students in Madrid and the coup in Korea where Rhee was overthrown.

139 Sina Akşin, "Siyasi Tarih (1950-1960)," in *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye (1908-1980)*, ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008), 215.

140 Ibid., 243.

According to Zürcher, these were the signs of the weakness of the agricultural sector in Turkey at that time.¹⁴¹ It was open to and defenseless against potential negative external conditions. In fact, what's worse was that Turkey imported wheat in November 1955 after the government concluded a treaty with the US under which 300 thousand tons of wheat and 200 thousand tons of barley were exchanged for chromium.¹⁴² Therefore, in parallel with decreasing productivity, inflation rates went up. In 1951 the inflation rate was 6.7 percent; in 1952 it was 0.8 percent in 1953 it was 2.3 percent. Rates increased starting in 1954 when the rate was 11 percent, and it would reach 18.7 percent in 1957.¹⁴³ On the other hand, in the second term, economic growth dropped from 13 percent to about 4 percent and the trade deficit went up eightfold compared to 1950.¹⁴⁴ In addition to this, 550 million dollars' worth of imports in 1952 decreased to 315 million dollars' worth in 1958.¹⁴⁵ In effect, the economic decline starting in 1953 harnessed four DP deputies to criticize the DP government for its economic policies at the beginning of 1955.¹⁴⁶ The reaction of the government to these critics was harsh and uncompromising.

2.2.3 *The Position of Intellectuals in the DP Era: A General Outlook*

In this section, I indicate the position of intellectuals in the politics and society in the DP era as the DP was becoming more authoritarian day by day. Because I revealed some of the antidemocratic regulations of the term before, I will not repeat them in detail again. Only a couple of laws and regulations that directly impacted intellectuals negatively will be discussed here. More importantly, a general picture of the relations between intellectuals and the government will

141 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, trans. Yasemin Saner (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2012), 333.

142 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 130.

143 Oran, "Batı Bloku Ekseninde," 487. The economic data can be examined in detail in *Economic Indicators of 1945-1960*, Appendix C.

144 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye*, 333.

145 Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)," in *Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye IV (1908-1980)*, ed. Sina Akşin, (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008), 350.

146 In January 1955, four deputies - Feridun Ergin, Haluk Timurtaş, Ekrem Cenani, and Kenan Akmanlar - criticized the government. One of them, Feridun Ergin would be one of the founders of the FP.

be revealed. After that, we will claim that the manner of the DP towards the petty-bourgeoisie was problematic, which made them oppose the government and, as we will see in the next chapter, become more engaged in the Freedom Party. It should be underlined that the authoritarianism of the ruling party that did not appeal to intellectuals had a twofold character. Their position and reputation in society were shaken by the discourse disturbing intellectuals – that is to say, they were deprived of their status. Second, their economic position was seriously damaged as a result of the inflationary developments that caused their salaries to be harmed. In short, it was inevitable intellectuals who suffered in both economic and social senses to oppose the government.

Before talking about the economic welfare of intellectuals, it is significant to note two antidemocratic laws that had a negative effect on their social position in society. The first one passed in 1954 which made possible that judges and professors who surpassed twenty-five years of duty or were sixty years old could be compelled to retire by the government.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, another law gave the government the ability to dismiss or retire civil servants whenever it liked.¹⁴⁸ These two aimed at extending the influence of the government over both university professors and the bureaucracy. Not surprisingly, those subjected to these laws were not pleased with the situation.

Beyond particular examples, Eroğlu argues that intellectual circles were among the most affected social groups by the restrictions on the freedom in general: “Freedom is valuable only for the ones who benefit from it.”¹⁴⁹ Despite the satisfaction of the vast majority of the public with the level of freedom at the time, intellectuals found the government antidemocratic because of limitations on the freedom of speech, and the independence of the judiciary from which they desired to benefit. Thus, the choice of a populist discourse DP was not accidental, they were in favor of the ordinary people and their concern was to defend the freedom of these people. In this scheme, concerns regarding freedoms of intellectuals were considered nothing but arrogance in the DP circles. In fact, this populist outlook sometimes involved anti-intellectualism.

147 Ahmad, Turgay, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili*, 126.

148 Ibid., 126. Eroğlu, *Demokrat Parti*, 149.

149 “Hürriyetler ancak ondan yararlanabilecekler için değerlidirler.” Ibid., 148.

To sum up, as Eroğul states that traditionally ruling elites were discarded at that time.¹⁵⁰ To illustrate this premise, Menderes felt confident as a result of the 1954 elections. He started not to benefit from the journalists that had been like a consultative committee for him up until the elections, and they fell from his grace.¹⁵¹ Güneş stresses that civil and military bureaucracy was deprived of their status, and university professors were belittled by the PM several times. Menderes, in one of his speeches, called them “black cloaked” (kara cüb-beliler). He also stated that “I handle the army with reserve officers,” marking the psychological face of dissident of intellectuals.¹⁵² On the other hand, the economic troubles of intellectuals and bureaucrats were coming apparent in these years. First, the priority of the government in an economic sense was to satisfy peasants and big farmers whose votes were crucial given the party’s populist approach. Almost 80 percent of the population lived in the rural areas and comprised an essential vote reservoir that the government could not ignore. The priority of the government on the agricultural sector had an external dynamic, on the other hand. Because the Marshall Aid and credits had given to the government focused on these sectors. Moreover, the inflationary economic policies of the DP harmed to the occupational groups with fixed incomes. Needless to say, professors, soldiers, and bureaucrats were among them. As Zürcher puts it, increasing economic troubles related to increasing inflation had a negative effect on the people; however, the effects were more concrete for civil servants, teachers, professors, and army officers.¹⁵³ In their eyes, the economic policies of the DP created social injustice and income inequality. In fact, empirical data confirms this.¹⁵⁴

In conclusion, the populist practices and economic policies of the government had negative impacts on intellectuals and bureaucrats whose collective

150 Ibid., 148.

151 Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1640.

152 “Ben orduyu yedek subaylarla da idare ederim.” Turan Güneş, *Araba Devrilmeden Önce* (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1983), 106-107.

153 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye*, 335.

154 “Piyasa,” *Akis*, July 2, 1955. Also, Simav Akın, *Turan Güneş’in Siyasal Kavgaları* (İzmir: İstiklal Matbaası, 1975), 60.

interests were harmed. I end this section with a quotation from Karpat, which is a good summary of the situation:

The economic development and the uneven distribution of income, as well as a series of cultural and social developments occurring after 1946, dislocated the bureaucratic and intellectual groups from power positions and at the same time provided them with new arguments, such as the need for rapid modernization the establishment of an egalitarian scientifically-minded society, to justify their claim for power.¹⁵⁵

§ 2.3 Increasing Tensions within the DP after 1954

After 1954 election, the tension within the party started to become intolerable and reached a boiling point. As we look at disputes that happened in 1954 and 1955, we see that the opposition tried to move against the party leadership in a couple of ways in order to oppose the party rule within the party. Nonetheless, after failing to Menderes and his circle again, there was no choice but to split from the party and form a new one to oppose the government from outside the party and bring Menderes to his knees.

2.3.1 1954: *The Last Exit Before the Bridge*

The results of the general elections held in May 1954 were a formidable victory for the DP and Menderes, contrary to all the predictions. Therefore, the results were not expected to all parties. The DP won 490 seats in parliament, the RPP 30 seats, and the Republican Nation Party had 5. There were also 10 independent candidates. The DP consolidated its position as the ruling party with an increased percentage of the vote vis-à-vis the number of seats. On 17 May 1954, the third Menderes cabinet was formed.¹⁵⁶ Menderes interpreted in such a way

155 Kemal Karpat, "Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70," *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 3 (1972): 351.

156 The government after the elections was composed of the following figures: Adnan Menderes (Prime Minister), Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (Minister of State), Mükerrrem Sarol (Minister of State), Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ (Minister of Justice), Etem Menderes (Minister of National Defence),

that while the Turkish nation had degraded the RPP from power, this time, the RPP was liquidated from the opposition.¹⁵⁷ In a similar vein, an expression which was attributed to President Celal Bayar was significant, and one of most unfortunate statements of his political career (if he really stated that): "Quit the delicate democracy."¹⁵⁸ It is significant in the sense that starting after the elections, in a new era, DP leaders thought that the people had given them all the rights to the country, even in conflict with democratic principles to a degree. As all the statements of ruling party representatives attest, the DP was on the edge of absolute power which tended towards absolute corruption. Nevertheless, the zenith was the point that its downfall began. Even though mass support of the DP in the elections was huge, the election marked the last occasion when intellectuals and the DP were in the same picture. After the elections, Turkey witnessed some economic problems along with the authoritarian policies of the DP, and intellectuals started to fiercely criticize the economic policies of the government. In early 1955, four deputies of the ruling party published a report indicating how and why the economic policies of the government had failed. Moreover, the DP and its leaders were beginning to be criticized in the media. The reaction of the government to critiques distanced intellectuals from the ruling party was to tighten the freedoms of professors and restrict the autonomy of the universities with a string of laws. Menderes and his cabinet imagined that both the political and individual rights and freedoms and economic developments cannot be managed at the same time.¹⁵⁹

Namık Gedik (Minister of Internal Affairs), Fuad Köprülü (Foreign Minister), Hasan Polatkan (Minister of Finance), Celal Yardımcı (Minister of Education), Kemal Zeytinoglu (Minister of Public Works), Sıtkı Yırcalı (Economy and Trade Minister), Behçet Uz (Minister of Health), Emin Kalafat (Minister of Customs and Monopolies), Nedim Ökmen (Minister of Agriculture), Muammer Çavuşoğlu (Minister of Communication), Hayrettin Erkmen (Minister of Works), and Fethi Çelikbaş (Minister of Businesses). Gökman, *50 Yılın*, 160.

157 Faik, *Matbuat Basın derkeen*, vol 2, 137

158 "İnce demokrasiye paydos." Metin Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı (1954-1957)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 11. See also Nadir Nadi, *Perde Aralandığında*, 293.

159 Sibel Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri" (master's thesis, Hacettepe University, 2002), 44. Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye*, 355. Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1961): 442.

The heavy-handed policies of the government strengthened after the elections. On 30 May 1954, a law which demoted Kırşehir Province to a district of Nevşehir, which had formally been a district of Kırşehir, was accepted because the province had not voted for the DP. This punishment of Kırşehir was attributed to Bayar's urge.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, Metin Toker, the son-in-law of İsmet İnönü, was called to the prosecutor's office. In his magazine, *Akis*, he was published articles opposing to Mükerrerem Sarol, a minister and one of the hardliners of the DP at time time. Soon after, another journalist, Bedii Faik, was arrested for the same reason. His paper, *Dünya*, was making publishings against Sarol, as well.¹⁶¹ Furthermore a veteran 80-year-old journalist, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, was sent to Üsküdar Paşakapı prison in December 1954.¹⁶² In 1955, Kasım Gülek, the general secretary of the RPP, was arrested while on a journey to the Black Sea region to campaign for his party.¹⁶³

2.3.2 *Disputes in Parliamentary Group in 1955*

Starting in 1955, Menderes started to encounter some heaviest troubles of his political life. Especially in 1955, his premiership of Menderes was shaken by shock waves coming from opposition within the party, and the DP gave birth to a new political party, the Freedom Party. In parallel, in 1955 the party was in danger of breaking into pieces which may join the FP, the central organization of the DP needed to control local organizations to prevent that possibility.

As revealed, although the 1954 general elections were a total victory for Menderes and his party, this did not end problems within the party - problems that started to be unleashed in an unprecedented way after the elections. One of the first clashes which discredited Menderes rule concerned the mass protests that occurred in Istanbul and Izmir on 6-7 September 1955 over a conflict between Turkey, Greece, and the UK over Cyprus which occupies an important geographical and geostrategic place in the eastern Mediterranean as a natural extension of the Anatolian peninsula. While Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the

160 *Resmi Gazete*, no. 8748, July 07, 1954: 9558.

161 Toker, *Yokuş Aşağı*, 62. Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 258. Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 130.

162 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 246-247.

163 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 139.

foreign minister, was in London to negotiate the terms of Cyprus with the other the parties, mass demonstrations in Istanbul and Izmir were organized to show the support of Turkish citizens for the government with respect to the question. The crowds in both Istanbul and Izmir were provoked by an article in a Turkish newspaper claiming that the house of Atatürk was bombed in Salonika in Greece.¹⁶⁴ Thus, mass demonstrations turned into the mass destruction and violation of the houses and stores of Turkish citizens with Greek origins and other Christian minorities. The belongings of thousands of minority Turkish citizens were looted, the police officers did not adopt sufficient measures to prevent it. The outcome of these events was repressive for the government. After quelling the protests with the help of the military, members of the DP parliamentary group gathered in an atmosphere in which most of the deputies were angry with the government as a statement by Sarol attests: the group was like a "powder keg."¹⁶⁵ Because the group would not accept any excuse for the destruction of the properties of the citizens of Turkey whatever their origins, Menderes and Köprülü did not manage to sooth the group in group talks.¹⁶⁶ Fahri Belen, Fethi Çelikbaş, and Adnan Karaosmanoğlu were among those who strictly criticized the government.¹⁶⁷ This was the first huge wave that shook the government in that year.

After this first wave, a second, a trouble within the party regarding the right to prove issue exploded and some DP members were expelled from the party while others resigned. The FP was formed after this incident by them. For now, I leave the details of the dispute that resulted in the formation of the FP for the next chapter. Before completing this chapter, I present the riot of the parliamentary group, after the fourth convention, which took place in a fevered atmosphere in November 1955.

Despite the dismissal of most of the opponents and the coup within the party before the convention, discontent among the deputies was still an issue,

164 The news was announced in the *Turkish Express* paper managed by Gökşin Sipahioğlu who would become a member of the FP.

165 Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 408.

166 The immediate reaction of the government was to blame the communists on the incidents.

167 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 319.

and their aggression was high because of a string of events that had made the group worried; the 6-7 September events, the right to prove issue, and the way the fourth convention was administered. Therefore, resentments boiled over in the meeting of parliamentary group on 29 November 1955.¹⁶⁸ An interpellation was given to inquire about the responsibilities of related ministers vis-à-vis economic problems, especially the shortages of some products and foreign currencies, which heated the debate. First, Sıtkı Yırcalı, the minister of economy and trade, resigned without resisting to the will of the group for his resignation. Yet the group was still like a tinderbox and needed more heads to hang. After the resignation of Yırcalı, Hüseyin Ortakçoğlu the issuer of the interpellation set on the fire with a fervent conversation, which incited tension more. The group did not have any intention of stopping, had no patience for hearing any explanations. Menderes could not manage to appease the group and quell the attacks. He noticed that it was not possible to take a stand against them. He offered up the ministers to defend themselves one by one against the questions of the group. Hasan Polatkan, the minister of finance, was forced to resign after that; he was the second victim of the day. After him, foreign minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu went up to the rostrum to defend himself against economic problems related to his ministry, and some members of the group shouted for him to resign. Zorlu could barely speak and had no choice but to resign from the ministry, from commission of foreign currency and the delegation to NATO together. The day was one of two doomsdays in Menderes' premiership. Even though Menderes decided to resign with the other ministers while parliamentary group was whining; a short break from the talks was called just before Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ, the minister of justice, was to take the floor as the next victim.¹⁶⁹ In this pause, intimate friends convinced Menderes not to resign. Sarol found a way to cope with the insurgency. According to his formula first, the PM first took the floor and demanded a vote of confidence from the group for himself, not for his cabinet. Although the group was angry with the cabinet, most deputies were still affiliated with the Menderes. Therefore, the PM exceeded in getting the vote of confidence. Despite the

168 According to Bayar, the schism within the party was an important component of the insurgency within parliamentary group. İsmet Bozdağ, *Başvekilim Menderes*, 165.

169 Güneş, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 44.

solution was like saving the day, but the crisis was huge. All in all, Menderes overcame it. This was a milestone regarding no longer it was possible to talk about a collective responsibility of the government. Rather, the rule of Turkey started to be characterized as one-man rule with Menderes himself being seen the only responsible factor in Turkish politics both in internal and external affairs in the ensuing era. Still, there were naysayers within the group, some ninety deputies had voted veto the new government. The formula that Sarol introduced to rescue Menderes could only be considered a pyrrhic victory. In fact, in his memoirs he also wrote that he was sorry for his formula.¹⁷⁰ On the other side, this last considerable move of the opposition to change the party from within the party came to nothing. The centralization process of the party resulted in one-man rule with absolute power. The new cabinet was formed in december of that year.¹⁷¹ In the program of the new cabinet, the government declared that all democratic reforms would be accomplished to appease the group and public. However, these promises were received with suspicion by the FP-FORUM circle because the government was formed by the same person, Menderes again.¹⁷² Indeed, the expected democratic reforms never came up on the agenda of the government.

170 Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 2, 31.

171 Mehmet Cemil Bengü (State of Minister), Şemir Ergin (State of Minister), Emin Kalafat (State of Minister), Celal Yardımcı (State of Minister), Hüseyin Avni Göktürk (Minister of Justice), Ethem Menderes (Minister of Interior), Fuad Köprülü (Foreign Minister), Nedim Ökmen (Minister of Finance), Ahmet Özel (Minister of Education), Muammer Çavuşoğlu (Minister of Public Works), Fahrettin Ulaş (Minister of Economy and Trade), Nafiz Körez (Minister of Health), Hadi Hüsman (Minister for Customs and Monopolies), Esad Budakoğlu (Minister of Agriculture), Arif Demirer (Minister of Transportation), Mümtaz Tarhan (Minister of Labour), and Samet Ağaoğlu (Minister of Businesses). Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 370.

172 "İmtihan Zamanı," *FORUM*, April 15, 1956. Eroğlu also emphasizes that the failure to fulfill these promises was because the PM had not changed. Cem Eroğlu, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71," in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed. C. Shick, E. A. Tonak (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 114.

Rise and Fall of the Freedom Party

*Şimdi sıra esnafta, onunla bütünleşip
Siyaset aleminde hepimiz esnaf olduk.
(Now it is the tradesmen's turn, to integrate
In politics, all of us became tradesmen.)*

– Turan Güneş, *Cahit Kayra, Turan Güneş'in Siyaset Şiirleri*

Intraparty struggles among cliques that resulted in the success of some at the expense of others compounded with intellectual unrest concurrently paved the way for the formation of a new party in an unimpressive political and economic climate in 1955. It was a coalition of professional politicians who had lost their power and influence in the DP and the dominant part of intellectual elites of the time. Although the FP sought social alliances with laborers, civil servants, and industrial elites by adopting a political discourse that appealed to each, the party did not transcend its narrow circle given the general profile of its members, the social backgrounds of the candidates of the party in 1957 general elections, and the results of the elections. The influence of the party did not even reach most dissidents in the DP. Although the party put some dissidents of the DP together after it was formed, it did not appeal to all of them as was intended. This was because the party was formed through

vengeance and did not have an independent, consistent political ideology or and program. The life of the FP was short-lived, it lasted approximately three years. In this chapter, I give an account of the party focusing first on its the formation, second, on its rise, and third, on its fall.

§ 3.1 The Road to the Formation of the FP

In this section, I reveal the period just before the formation of the FP to understand and assess the main internal dynamics behind its emergence and touch upon some internal struggles of different between cliques within the party before the fourth convention of the DP. I also narrate the period when the party was on the rise, its sudden fall, and lastly, its participation with the RPP to opposed DP rule and form a unified opposition at the end of 1958.

3.1.1 *The Battle of Cliques*

In autumn 1954, an essay, in *Akis* revealed that members of the GAB of the DP were unhappy with the manner of party leaders, especially regarding the date of the convention, which they only learned from the newspapers, and which caused them to feel bypassed and ignored.¹ Although Menderes was the only person who could determine the date, members thought that such decisions should be made by the GAB.

When rumors regarding the convention spread, lobbying started for seats on the GAB; elections for the seats would be held by a vote of the delegates at the convention. According to *Akis*, there were two sorts of politicians in the party competing for those seats. There were those who had earned a reputation in their local party organizations, which made them more independent of the party center. The others were trying to obtain seats in the party and in parliament by being close to the leaders of the party, and they needed these leaders' support to maintain their positions. Thus, they were dependent on the center, and it was not expected they would act on their own against the will of the center. The first group called the latter lickspittle.² In the first days of

1 "Kongre Gerekiyor," *Akis*, September 18, 1954.

2 "D. P.: Çantadaki Keklik," *Akis*, October 16, 1954.

autumn, the general outlook of the conflict among different factions was that. A quotation from an article strikingly indicates the level of the opposition within the party:

There were factions in almost sixty-four provinces, and most of them were at it hammer and tongs rather than struggling with the rival party. Some were ready to cooperate with the rival party to prevent their rivals within the party from winning.³

In fact, the quality of the intraparty struggles before the fourth convention is underlined in *FORUM* a couple of years later in an article titled "İktidar Partisindeki hizip Mücadeleleri" (Struggles of factions in the ruling party) which revealed that the source of the struggles among the cliques did not stem from differences of the opinions; it was related to disputes over material benefits.⁴

The conventions of local party organizations before the fourth convention were crucial because delegates who would elect GAB members and the party leader at the national convention would come from local organizations. Because of that, the struggles of different cliques in locals to capture whole organization were solid, especially in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. In an article published on 10 July 1954, "D.P. de yumruk dögüşü" (Fist fight in the DP), *Akis* discussed some groupings within the DP, in particular two factions fighting to dominate the party organization of Ankara Province.⁵ Atıf Benderlioğlu and Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ represented the party center as members of the GAB on one side, while Necmi İnanç and Zafer Gökçer were being backed by Dağıstan Binerbayın, the Ankara deputy from the parliamentary group, and represented the opponents within the DP on the other.⁶ The traditional conflict within the DP between the GAB and the parliamentary group was repeating itself. Power of the two sides in the contest was disproportionate; the former had the strength of the executive power within the party and desired

3 "D. P.: Tasfiyeye Doğru," *Akis*, July 17, 1954. For the original text, see point three in *Originals*, Appendix A.

4 "İktidar Partisindeki Hizip Mücadeleleri," *FORUM*, August 15, 1959.

5 "D.P. de Yumruk Dögüşü," *Akis*, July 10, 1954.

6 Ibid.

to dismiss their rivals. In fact, they accomplished this when twenty-seven members of the party were dismissed from the party following a decision of the board of discipline directed by the center. Binerbayın, the defender of the these dismissed from the party by the Çiçekdağ-Benderlioğlu clique, responded to this decision by stating that the turn will come for the deputies, as well (sıra mebuslara da gelecektir).⁷ This was not merely a prophecy of a messenger, it was an accident waiting to happen for him, a figure who witnessed the boiling up of the party starting at the very low levels. In fact, three weeks later, a liquidation in Istanbul party organizations took place followed by Ankara. Six members of the organization were dismissed from the party by the board of discipline under the pressure of Celal Türkgeldi.⁸ According to *Akis*, the only infaction was to act contrary to the desires of Dr. Sarol (Dr. Sarol'un arzularına muhalif hareket etmektir).⁹ Dr. Sarol, a state minister, made an appearance in Istanbul before the convention after Benderlioğlu and Çiçekdağ.

Soon afterwards, in September 1954, Fethi Çelikbaş, the minister of businesses, declared that coal production was insufficient to satisfy needs of the people and that shortage could be long-term, Dr. Sarol, like Çelikbaş, a minister, attacked him publicly.¹⁰ As an adversary to Çelikbaş, he got an article written to Burhan Apaydın to publish, in his paper, *Türk Sesi*. Naturally, Çelikbaş was angry about the article as he thought that such disputes should remain within the government; attacking another member of the government in public was not proper. Sarol, in his memoirs, asserts that Çelikbaş along with Köprülü's team including Fuad Türkgeldi, Firuzan Tekil started to provoked Menderes against him after Çelikbaş's declaration on the coal issue.¹¹ Therefore, the first pitched battle started before the convention between Sarol and Çelikbaş. The declaration by Çelikbaş was welcomed in the media which considered it an honest statement rather denial vis-à-vis the accountability of

7 Ibid.

8 Hayri Doğdu, Ahmed Efe, Niyazi Karaduman, Ali Taşkın, Maruf Bilgin, and Hüseyin Coşkun.

9 "D. P.: İhraç etmeyenleri ihraç," *Akis*, August 7, 1954.

10 "Kongre Gerekiyor," *Akis*, September 18, 1954. Whereas Çelikbaş was a member of the GAB, Sarol was not and he sought to be in the coming convention.

11 Mükerrerem Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1 (Istanbul: İnkılap Yayınevi, 2014), 295-299.

these occupying governmental positions to the people.¹² Çelikbaş could not withstand the resulting pressure within the government and resigned from office. His resignation was a politically motivated rather actually related to the coal shortage. He was constantly bothered by some of his friends within the cabinet, including Sarol, in order to weaken his reputation before the convention where GAB members would be elected. An interesting comment in *Akis*, which was friendly towards Çelikbaş stated that it is possible that Fethi Çelikbaş preferred to resign considering that he would someday be excluded from the cabinet.¹³ According to the magazine, three more ministers and some deputies were mobbed by same peers of Sarol-Benderlioğlu-Çiçekdağ, as well, including Emin Kalafat as the minister of customs and monopolies, Hayrettin Erkmen, the minister of labour; Etem Menderes, the minister of national defense and some other deputies such as Sıtkı Yırcalı and Zühtü Velibeşe.¹⁴ To illustrate, while Emin Kalafat was abroad, the prices of some monopoly products were increased without his knowledge. Therefore, Kalafat became one of the natural allies of Çelikbaş within the party against Sarol. It was no secret that throughout their political careers, at least to a certain point, until Kalafat engaged himself to the party center different from Çelikbaş, Kalafat and Çelikbaş acted together like a duo both when they were inside the government as proponents of the party center and outside the government as the opponents of the center.¹⁵ For example, they entered the GAB of the DP together,

12 For instance, "Kabine: Bir vekil istifa etti," *Akis*, December 11, 1954.

13 "Fethi Çelikbaş'ın bir gün hakikaten kabine dışı bırakılması ihtimalini düşünerek istifayı tercih etmiş bulunması da mümkündür." Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 It is interesting that the duo had been a trio during the first term of the DP between 1950 and 1954. Kalafat and Çelikbaş acted together with Enver Adakan in the opposition within the party. "Kabine: Bir vekil istifa etti," *Akis*, December 11, 1954. Nevertheless, Adakan resigned from the party in 1953 in reaction to antidemocratic actions of the DP. His resignation was not followed by Kalafat and Çelikbaş, who continued conducting politics within the DP. The trio became a duo. When Kalafat managed to integrate himself to the government different from Çelikbaş, Kalafat left alone Çelikbaş who were opposing the government which Kalafat was its member. Years later, Çelikbaş and Adakan would join again in the FP against the government of which Kalafat a member. This is a significant example of how positions of politicians were volatile, dynamic.

they criticized the government and in the budget commission together in 1952, they accepted the appointments to the ministries on the condition that Samet Ağaoğlu would be taken out of the government, they vetoed Ağaoğlu in the first half of the 1950s.¹⁶ Even though they opposed Ağaoğlu in the first half of the decade in the government, the pattern of the struggle among cliques changed just before the convention. Samet Ağaoğlu, Fethi Çelikbaş, and Emin Kalafat united against Sarol's faction in Istanbul and they strived to prevent Sarol from entering the GAB. In fact, *Akis* reported that Ağaoğlu, Kalafat, and Çelikbaş met in Ankara to form alliance for the common cause of preventing lickspittles from being members of the GAB.¹⁷ Ağaoğlu, Kalafat, and Çelikbaş did not want Sarol in the GAB;¹⁸ nevertheless, after Çelikbaş left office, Ağaoğlu accepted to lead the office as minister of business.¹⁹ This meant that the trio of Ağaoğlu, Çelikbaş, and Kalafat was crushed as Ağaoğlu became integrated into the center. Ağaoğlu was in the opposition within the party after the 2 May 1954 general elections, and opposed the laws enacted after the elections, suggesting that they were antidemocratic. His ministership following the resignation of Çelikbaş was not received positively by the opponents. For example, in writings of the time and the memoirs, it is argued that this shift to the government from the opposition proved that becoming a minister can be accomplished by opponents within the party by being loyal to the PM himself.

While Sarol was publishing opposing Çelikbaş and other rivals in his paper, *Akis* magazine targeted Dr. Sarol beginning in its first issues emphasized his political ambitions and backed Çelikbaş.²⁰ While *Türk Sesi* (which means

16 "Çantadan Çıkan Keklik," *Akis* October 9, 1954.

17 Doubtless, it included Sarol, Çiçekdağ, Benderlioğlu, Kavrakoğlu, and some others.

18 Ibid.

19 "Bir vekil istifa etti," *Akis*, December 11, 1954. Sarol states that he was among these who suggested Ağaoğlu for that office to Menderes. Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 321. This is a good example of the struggle of the inner circle and the outsiders.

20 For an example of opposition to Sarol, see "Kabine: Tahminler - Temenniler," *Akis*, May 15, 1954. For an example of the praise of Çelikbaş vis-à-vis Sarol "Hükûmet: Bir beyanat etrafında," *Akis*, October 2, 1954.

Turkish voice) was actually the Voice of Sarol, *Akis*,²¹ which allied with Çelikbaş against Sarol, was Çelikbaş's voice in the first one and half of years of publication. *Akis* was the headquarters of the anti-Sarol campaign which peaked in the 30 October issue where a declaration was revealed titled, “Bu vekil İstifa Etmelidir” (That Minister should Resign). It concerned Sarol's dual position as a member of the cabinet interested in press issues, on one hand, and his ownership of a newspaper, on the other.²² An intriguing point revealing the real purpose of the campaign was that *Akis* called Sarol to resign rather than to sell his paper. Two weeks later, *Akis* broke a striking story of that ignited the daily politics. It reported that Çankaya Primary School subscribed to *Türk Sesi* newspaper, which was owned by Sarol, the state minister responsible for press issues.²³ The news was cooperated with a photo of unpacked stacks of newspapers. Furthermore, the magazine urged that 35 thousand schools around Turkey were also subscribed to the paper with suggestions given by the ministry of national education led by Celal Yardımcı. The response of the center was implacable. First, Metin Toker, the son-in-law of İsmet İnönü and the owner of *Akis*, and then Bedii Faik, one of the shareholders in *Dünya*, were imprisoned upon Sarol's request. The battle was getting harsher.

Kalafat, Ağaoğlu, and Çelikbaş were not the only ones uncomfortable with their positions vis-à-vis the Sarol's and Çiçekdağ-Benderlioğlu cliques in the party. Fuad Köprülü, the foreign minister, was among the dissidents because of Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, who acted on behalf of the foreign minister under the title of Assistant to the PM, was backed by Menderes.²⁴ Menderes was conducting foreign policy together with Zorlu, bypassing Köprülü, which was the

21 On 15 May 1954, the first issue of *Akis* was circulated. It is a valuable resource for understanding politics in Turkey in the 1950s - to ascertain the prominent figures and their relations to each other.

22 “Bu Vekil İstifa Etmelidir,” *Akis* October 30, 1954. Also see “Madem ki istifa etmiyor...,” *Akis*, November 13, 1954.

23 “Demokrasi: Mektepteki hazine,” *Akis*, November 13, 1954.

24 “D. P.: Çantadan Çıkan Keklik,” *Akis*, October 9, 1954.

source of a dispute between Menderes and Köprülü.²⁵ In the light of this, many in the new cabinet regarded the ministership of Köprülü as symbolic. Zorlu was made the assistant to the PM (Başvekil Muavini), an office created "under the PM and above the ministership of foreign affairs" by Menderes who envisaged leading the foreign policy directly himself through Zorlu.²⁶ Already, Köprülü was complaining about the interventionist acts of Menderes in issues related to his ministership.²⁷ At the end of 1954, it was rumored that Köprülü would be replaced by Zorlu, which soon came to pass.²⁸ The former foreign minister, Köprülü, was left to focus intensely on the party affairs on behalf of the center with some of his fellows, such as Firuzan Tekil, under the title of vice president of the party. He was also made state minister at the same time.²⁹ On the other hand, Zorlu took measures to consolidate his position in the ministry. To illustrate, all the officers in the ministry known as Köprülü supporters including, his son-in-law, Coşkun Kırca, were dismissed by Fatinists.³⁰ While Köprülü supporters were being cleared from the ministry, Köprülü was trying to crush the Sarolists in the Istanbul organization in favor of his son, Orhan Köprülü, in order to consolidate his position in Istanbul. Köprülü succeeded in taking control of Istanbul; most of the Sarolists were dismissed so that his son could be made the chairman of the organization. Because Köprülü gained the upper hand in Istanbul against the Sarol clique, he desired that the convention be held as soon as possible in spring of 1955, which Sarol did not want.³¹

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- 25 "Kabine: Yerleri garanti olanlar," *Akis*, May 15, 1954. Before 1955, Menderes and Köprülü were always on the same side when dissidentes within the party were cleared out, including the 19's - the founders of the FP.
- 26 "Kabine: Mecliste tefsirler," *Akis*, May 22, 1954.
- 27 Füzruzan Tekil, *Politika Asları* (Istanbul: Geçit Yayınları, 1973), 65.
- 28 "Kabine: Bir vekil istifa etti," *Akis*, December 11, 1954.
- 29 "Hükûmet: Altüst olan protocol," *Akis*, October 30, 1954.
- 30 It is also argued that Fatinists had problems with Feridun Ergin in the foreign ministry: Ergin, Turan Güneş, and Zeyyad Ebuzziya, founders of the FP, were three of the seven Turkish delegates to the European Assembly.
- 31 "D. P.: Nihayet Kongre," *Akis*, August 20, 1955.

After Ankara and Istanbul, the schism arose in the Aegean region, the house of Karaosmanoğlu who had strength in the local organizations. Osman Kibar, the representative of the center, and Burhan Maner, chairman of the party in Izmir, were fighting each other. The center was angry about the schism in the Izmir party organization and needed to intervene. Rauf Onursal was appointed as party inspector to Manisa as the agent of the party center in the Manisa convention, in which Fevzi Lûtfi Karaosmanoğlu had the upper hand. In the words of *Akis*, Karaosmanoğlu was quarantined.³² In Izmir, the faction allied with the center were propagating the idea that Karaosmanoğlu would run against Menderes to capture the party in the next convention. They explained their aim to not allow delegates who would support him to go to the convention which would be held in Spor ve Sergi Sarayı. The day of the convention came. The center sent Muzaffer Kurbanoğlu for the chairmanship of the convention, while the Maner faction nominated Muzaffer Balaban for the seat. The Maner faction was heavily accused pro-Karaosmanoğlu stance and of plotting against Menderes. All in all, neither faction won an absolute victory; a cadre composed of the members of both factions was elected to the provincial administrative board.³³ These intraparty struggles were showing that the harsh struggles for the seats of the GAB would take place at the next convention.

Power struggles did not take place only in the parliamentary group of the party over seats in the GAB. The newspaper of the party, *Zafer*, was also a field of battle among the rivals. Sarol, a focal person in the intraparty struggles, colluded with Burhan Belge who desired to replace Mümtaz Faik Fenik as the chief editor of the paper. Sarol supported Belge by allowing him to write in his paper, *Türk Sesi*. Sarol also attacked Zühtü Velibeşe who headed the administrative board of *Zafer*.³⁴

32 "Fevzi Lûtfi Karaosmanoğlu karantina altına alınmıştır." "D. P.: Ege'de karışıklık," *Akis*, March 19, 1955.

33 Ibid.

34 Almost all media organs in Turkey suffered from schism in those years. For example, in *Halkçı* and *Ulus*, Nihat Erim was criticised by opponents; in *Tercüman*, there was a struggle between Cihad Baban and his opponents; in *FORUM*, Aydın Yalçın was pacificized by others, and in

As has been stressed, the economic decline that started in 1953 brought some four DP deputies in criticizing the DP government's economic policies in a report in the beginning of 1955.³⁵ Opposition within the party and the Turkish intelligentsia were raising their voices more often. At the end of the year, Feridun Ergin and Kasım Küfrevi criticized the budget of Hadi Hüsmen that the government presented to the budget commission in parliament.³⁶ According to Ergin, import rates should not be increased and export rates should be increased instead, this could be achieved by investing in agriculture. Furthermore, he pointed out that Turkey should put more emphasis on foreign capital. In budget talks in the related commission, the PM Menderes took the floor after Ergin and gave some responses to him. Hasan Polatkan, the minister of finance, also defended the view of the government. Among the reporters, Kenan Akmanlar, a nephew of Menderes, and Haluk Timurtaş, the son-in-law of Koraltan, changed their minds and expressed their satisfaction as a result of the discussion.³⁷ The report and criticisms was an important indicator of unrest within the party.

After those in Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir in spring of 1955, an intraparty struggle took place in the Adana party organization which was headed by Ömer Başıoğlu, who was forced to resign. All big cities were in flames. Başıoğlu, the owner of *Demokrat Adana* paper, had led the party in the province since the party's the first years. He was among those who compelled the

Dünya, it was rumored that Bedii Faik was trying to eliminate Falih Rıfkı. In *Vatan* there was a struggle between some groups. Celâlettin Çetin, *İşte Babîâli: Çuvaldızı Kendimize* (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1991), 40-57. Moreover, *Milliyet*, owned by Ali Naci Karacan and led by Abdi İpekçi and Ercüment Karacan, had opponents that included Peyami Safa, Refii Ulunay and some others. Tufan Türeñç and Erhan Akyıldız, *Gazeteci* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1986), 131, 146, 147, 155, 178, 179.

35 "Ümit Verici Bir Rapor," *FORUM* April 15, 1954. The report was considered encouraging.

36 "Bütçe: Bir butçenin hikayesi," *Akis*, December 25, 1954.

37 İhsan Hamit Tiğrel, a deputy from Diyarbakır, also argued with Celal Yardımcı, the minister of national education, about opening a school. Yardımcı, as the representative of the government, wished that schools be opened in Izmir, Konya, and Eskişehir, while opponents suggested Diyarbakır and Samsun instead. İhsan Hamit Tiğrel, Muhlis Ete, Halil Ayanoğlu, Mehmet Ünal, Burhanettin Onat, Fethi Ülkü, and Bahadır Dülger were among these DP deputies who criticized the budget.

resignations of some members of the DP who subsequently formed the Peasant Party in 1952 following intraparty fighting in Adana. In fact, *Akis* reported, when he faced difficulties within the party, he went to Ankara and to have his adversaries dismissed from the party with the help of powerful friends at the center.³⁸ Nevertheless, after 1955 the situation was changed; the party center no longer favored him. Dr. Sakıp Önal emerged as a more preferable local politician.³⁹ Ironically, this time Başeğmez was forced to resign by the center. The person who forced his resignation on behalf of the center was Fuad Köprülü. The real story behind closed doors was more intriguing: Cavit Oral, a former minister of agriculture from the RPP, approached Menderes to regain this ministry. *Akis* quoted in: "it would be a pleasant test of power to take Ömer Başeğmez down."⁴⁰

In April 1955, eleven deputies of the ruling party led by Fethi Çelikbaş signed a bill to grant the right to prove (İspat Hakkı) for journalists who accuse a member of the cabinet of corruption.⁴¹ The bill meant that when a journalist accuses a minister of corruption - of abusing their position to take advantage or accept a bribe -, that journalist should have the right to prove to defend their allegations without becoming criminal for insulting a minister or the state. Up to then, journalists did not have the ability to interrogate corruptions

38 "D. P.: Kongreye hazırlık," *Akis*, April 9, 1955.

39 Kasım Öner and Tevfik Kadri Ramazanoğlu also supported Oral. Ibid.

40 "Ömer Başeğmez'i devirmek güzel bir kuvvet denemesi olacaktı." Ibid.

41 Altan Öymen, *Ve İhtilal*, 6 th Edition (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014), 168. Six of these eleven deputies were among the 61's movement. The elevens were: Fethi Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, Kasım Küfrevi, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Şeref Kamil Mengü, Seyfi Kurtbek, Ekrem Alican, Turan Güneş, İbrahim Öktem, Raif Aybar, and Mustafa Ekinci. The right to provide issue had relatively a long history in Turkey. It emerged when Hasan Ali Yücel, an insulted minister, sued Kenan Öner for compensation. Öner wanted right to prove his allegations and proved them according to the court. Yücel brought the decision to the Supreme Court on appeal. While the court was examining the case, Öner died unexpectedly. Halil Özyörük, the first president of the court of cassation, decided of joint chambers which rejected defendant's the right to prove allegations directed at ministers. In March 1954, a new law regarding the press was passed in the Grand National Assembly which imposed restrictions with regard to allegedly abusive publications by the press, towards ministers and the state. Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayatın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1976), 120.

by the ministers because if they did, they were automatically considered to have committed a crime whether or not the allegations were true. According to the government, if journalists had that right, they would abuse it and accuse the ministers without any kind of evidence. By the time the accusations would be investigated by the courts, the minister would have been forced to resign from office. Thus, the people would believe the charges and opposition parties would take advantage of the situation even if the minister were not guilty. In the worst-case scenario such accusations could be made just before an election, and how would be possible to refute them before the election in such a short time? The question arose: who would pay the price if a lost election based on false allegations?

In summer 1955, the political climate in Turkey was tense. The DP adopted the carrot and stick policies against the proofists. Muammer Karaca was assigned by the party center to negotiate with the proofists and dissuade them from pursuing their claims since the bill demanding the right to prove was viewed as an uprising. Actually, the focal person of the debates was a minister, Dr. Sarol, who was in the inner circle of the party.⁴² He was accused of abusing his power to obtain a real estate in Etiler to make use of it as his own clinic. In addition, Sarol was the owner of *Türk Sesi*, paper which had a low circulation. Despite this, Sarol was the state minister responsible for the press and determined the fate of formal notices, in other words, he decided in which publication the state would print notices that interested the public. This naturally aroused suspicion. People thought that the minister could transfer state funds directly to his of paper. Even if he did not abuse his power to provide for his personal interests, it was always possible to raise doubt. A sword of Damocles hung over Sarol's head. These allegations were claimed in *Dünya* newspaper led by Falih Rıfkı Atay and Bedii Faik and in *Akis* journal led by Metin Toker. Rıfkı Salim Burçak, argues in his memoirs that Kasım Küfrevi, a deputy from Ağrı Province, said to Menderes that these deputies who wanted to allow the

42 *Akis* revealed that right to prove bill targeted two ministers; Mükerrerrem Sarol and Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ. "D. P.: Yeni Cereyanlar," *Akis*, July 23, 1955. It is also asserted that when Sarol's case was discharged by the Supreme Court, he had an argument with Çiçekdağ, the minister of justice at time. "D. P.: Münakaşa edilen lider," *Akis*, July 9, 1955.

right to prove had a file about Sarol's corruption.⁴³ After Menderes backed and protected Sarol against his adversaries, the battle was declared not only against Sarol but Menderes, as well. A close friend of Menderes, Sarol was not selected randomly by the opposition in the party. Since the deputies opposing Menderes and his rule did not have the power and means to attack Menderes directly, they attacked Sarol to get to Menderes. Obviously, the actual target was Adnan Menderes. As we have said, Dr. Sarol was an intimate friend of Menderes, and described his relationship with him as being like that of Dr. Goebbels and the Fuhrer.⁴⁴

The question is, why did a couple of deputies within the party want to throw Sarol out by putting pressure on him with some parliamentary measures? The answer lies in the intraparty struggles among some cliques before the convention, in which the right to prove bill covered all the intraparty struggles from the public. Let us go into the details of these fights behind closed doors to dominate the GAB before the convention.

In summer 1955, with the wind of the proofist movement, *Akis* launched a new campaign targeting Menderes - after having targeted Sarol - stressed that Menderes should resign because he preferred Sarol over Sarol's fierce rivalries.⁴⁵ From that point on, it was impossible to distinguish Menderes from his peers because Menderes made his final choice. Therefore, the only choice of the opponents was to get him out.⁴⁶ Possible candidates for leadership of the party in Menderes' place began to be sought. The magazine asked, "who?" Some possible candidates came to front such as Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, Sıtkı Yırcalı, Samet Ağaoğlu, Fuad Köprülü, and Fethi Çelikbaş. Although these names were announced, the most plausible candidate for *Akis* was Karaosmanoğlu who was characterized as a successor candidate (bir halef

43 Burçak, Rıfıkı Salim, *On Yılın Anıları (1950-1960)* (Ankara: Nurol Matbaacılık, 1998), 329-330.

44 Mükerrerem Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 296. On the other hand, Nutku resembles him "Himmler" besides Führer. Emrullah Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü ve Politika'da Yitirdiğim Yıllar (1946-1958)* (İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası, 1979), 197. See also, Tekil, *Politika Asları*, 159. *Akis* also characterizes Sarol as the one who emulates the role of Dr. Goebbels. "D. P.: Beliren iyi temayüller," *Akis*, October 30, 1954.

45 "Demokrasi," *Akis*, June 25, 1955.

46 Ibid.

namzedi). It was underlined that his popularity among party organizations was huge, putting him a step ahead of other candidates; in the conventions of the DP, he had always collected the highest number of votes after Menderes. The candidate of *Akis* for the premiership was already determined: it was Karaosmanoğlu, who would become the chairman of the FP. For the leadership, *Akis* pondered over Köprülü, as well.⁴⁷ It was possible that the opponents within the party could make him the chairman. In fact, Menderes concerned Köprülü's possible participation to the opponents, to the pro-proofists, because Menderes had already noticed that the proof movement targeted to him and thus, the chairmanship of the party. Nevertheless, it was not possible to take Menderes down. The only thing that the opponents could do was prevent Sarol from gaining a seat in the GAB in the convention. *Akis* underlines that:

To be honest, just as the «right to prove» became a symbol within the party, «Mükerrem Sarol» became a symbol, as well. If Dr. Mükerrem Sarol had not been elected, this would a victory for the pro-proofists.⁴⁸

Finally, the date of the long-expected convention was determined: it would be held on 15 October 1955. Therefore, the competition among rival cliques to prepare for the convention got harsher. Just before the convention, fighting between the cliques was so tense that one observer described the situation as follows: "the DP was presenting such a scene that it was not possible to understand the combinations within the party."⁴⁹ The composition of the sides was like a game of chess changing with each move - breaking and reestablishing themselves according to current conditions again and again. Just before the convention, all the factions started to cooperate and put aside minor differences against the other block. To a large extent, the groups started to converge into two main poles: Menderes and his entourage, and the opponents. Menderes's team could in turn be divided into two main camps, the Fuatists and

47 "D. P.: Bayram Hediyesi," *Akis*, August 6, 1955.

48 "D. P.: İki cephe," *Akis*, September 24, 1955. For the original text see fourth point in *Originals*, Appendix A.

49 "D.P. öyle bir manzara gösteriyor ki içindeki kombinezonları bile anlamak kabil değildi." "D. P.: Nihayet Kongre," *Akis*, August 20, 1955.

the Sarolists.⁵⁰ That was the cleavage that followed all the lobbying and struggles within the party just before the convention. On the other hand, the groups of Samet Ağaoğlu, Emin Kalafat, and Sıtkı Yırcalı were in the middle of the factions.⁵¹ However, there was an attempt pioneered by Köprülü clique, to form a third block. They thought they could collude with the Benderlioğlu and Çiçekdağ factions. However, Köprülü did not approve the attempt and the intended alliance had a premature death.⁵² The clique led by Dr. Sarol who was considered a delirious adversary by Çelibaş's clique, and the cliques of Ağaoğlu, Yırcalı, and Kalafat cliques also opposed to Sarol. The tension was high and Sarol's moves shattered the Menderes team. Sarol did not let Köprülü go silently, remained unresponsive to Köprülü's actions against him, and took action against Köprülü.⁵³ He prepared to take over vice presidency of the party, second man after Menderes, from Köprülü.

Just before the convention, Sarol maneuvered by resigning from his position as minister of state to prepare himself for the elections for the GAB. He stated that membership in the GAB should not be compounded by membership in the government.⁵⁴ The reason for this statement was to pave the way for his membership in the GAB; because his main rivals Ağaoğlu, Kalafat, Benderlioğlu, Çiçekdağ, and Yırcalı were all ministers. So, he tried to pressure them in the guise of check and balance discourse. It was a genuine move of Sarol against his rivals.

The proofists directly targeted Menderes in their radical move to capture the party through chairmanship vis-à-vis the seats in the GAB, the mechanism by which the party was controlled. However, the opponents did not come to a consensus regarding who would be the one to go up against Menderes. When Karaosmanoğlu and Üstündağ joined the right to prove movement, the matter

50 Tevfik İleri, Muzaffer Kurbanoğlu, and Osman Kavrak had their faction. Sebati Ataman will join them after.

51 "D. P.: İki cephe," *Akis*, September 24, 1955.

52 By looking at the results, it seemed that after the Çelibaş-Karaosmanoğlu factions were dismissed from the party, Köprülü's group and the Benderlioğlu-Çiçekdağ's team colluded to prevent Sarol to the GAB.

53 "D. P.: Kongre," *Akis*, October 15, 1955.

54 "Dr. Mükerrer Sarol dün gece istifa etti," *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1955.

became politically symbolic rather than the mere matter of a bill. The importance of their participation was not only significant in this respect to that; these two figures would become the leaders of the movement.⁵⁵ The meaning of their participation was that the needed leaders to oppose Menderes circle had been found: Üstündağ and Karaosmanoğlu.

3.1.2 *A Coup within the Party*

In September, Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, a member of the GAB, signed the bill, joined the nineteen deputies and stated that "I agree that the right to prove is bestowed to the press."⁵⁶ The same day, another leading figure of the DP, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, joined them, as well.⁵⁷ While these participations were welcomed by the proofists because they regarded them as natural leaders, it was reacted harshly by the DP center. Taking action, the GAB convened immediately upon the order of Menderes that night and summoned Karaosmanoğlu. On 8 October 1955, under the chairmanship of Fuad Köprülü, the GAB inquired about his participation in the right to prove movement, even though Karaosmanoğlu was a member of the same board.⁵⁸ He resisted the GAB and stood behind his decision. After him, Çelikbaş was interrogated by Köprülü in front of the board.⁵⁹ The move of the center against the uncompromising delegates was determined, the GAB reached the decision to terminate the memberships of Karaosmanoğlu and Çelibaş in the GAB by unanimous vote, disrupting the unity of the board.⁶⁰ In doing this, the most crucial

55 "D. P.: Pratik neticeler," *Akis*, September 24, 1955.

56 "Matbuaata ispat hakkının tanınmasından yanayım." Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 139.

57 "Basına isbat hakkı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 15, 1955.

58 "D.P. Genel Kurulu Fethi Çelikbaş ve F.L. Karaosmanoğlunu dinledi," *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 1955.

59 *Akis*, October 15, 1955. Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları (1944-1973): DP Yokuş Aşağı (1954-1957)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 105. Samet Ağaoğlu, *Aşına Yüzler* (İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1965), 181.

60 Even though some rumors said that some moderates of the GAB members such as Rıfki Salim Burçak, Sıtkı Yırcalı and Emin Kalafat were against dismissal of the nineteens, they denied that. "Karaosmanoğlu'nun D.P. idare kuruluna cevabı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1955. On the

urge of the decision was to prevent the attendance of the proofists from the convention which would be an arena for the leadership struggle and to eliminate proofists from that expected contestation. A couple days later, Karaosmanoğlu told the press that he had received an angry letter from the DP chairman accusing him of being a troublemaker, abominable, and in response, he refused all the accusations of Menderes.⁶¹ Furthermore, six deputies from the party later joined the pro-proofists, and all nineteen deputies were sent to the board of discipline.⁶² The board met to discuss the attitude of the party against the nineteens and sent a telegram to the insurgents asking for their defense.⁶³ When the nineteens were indited, some deputies known as the intercessors (Şefaatçiler) emerged to prevent their dismissal from the party.⁶⁴ Yet the board of discipline dismissed nine signatories of the right to prove bill.⁶⁵ The purpose of the center was clear. The board made a distinction between those who initiated the movement and those who joined it. The former was not regarded as insurgents. They did not act against the party discipline since deputies could submit bills to the assembly in the scope of parliamentary legislative activity. In contrast, those who joined the movement were regarded as insurgents who had acted contrary to party discipline and risen

other hand, it is remarkable that Samet Ağaoğlu and Emin Kalafat attended the decision of the dismissal of nineteens.

- 61 "Karaosmanoğlu Menderes'in ithamlarına cevap veriyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 19, 1955.
- 62 Behçet Kayaalp, Sefaeddin Karanakçı, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, Muzaffer Timur and Ziyad Ebüzziya "İspat hakkı dün altı mebus daha katıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 13, 1955. "19 Demokrat Partili Mebus Haysiyet Divanına verildi," *Milliyet*, October 13, 1955.
- 63 "Haysiyet Divanı dün toplandı, karar bu akşam verilecek," *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1955. "19 Mebusa müdafaa için mehil verildi," *Milliyet*, October 14, 1955.
- 64 Yusuf Azizoğlu, Halit Zarbun, Rifat Öçten, Mustafa Akçalı, Nurettin Ertürk, Hamdi Başak, Esat Budakoğlu, Muammer Obuz, and Himmet Ölçmen. Sibel Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri" (master's Thesis, Hacettepe University, 2002), 26.
- 65 "D. P. den ayrılan milletvekilleri," *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1955. Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Safaettin Karanakçı, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, Behçet Kayaalp, Ziyad Ebüzziya, Mustafa Timur, and Sabahaddin Çıraoğlu. Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 142. The Board of discipline was composed of Osman Kavrakoğlu and Celal Fuad Türkgeldi as having key positions, Ahmed Kadioğlu, Reyhan Gökmenoğlu, Nail Geveci, Ömer Saraç, and Halid Tokdemir.

up against the center after party center delivered its opinion contrary to the bill. Thus, their memberships and delegacies needed to be terminated. Later, Karaosmanoğlu held an impromptu press conference; he complained about the oligarchic structure of the DP, insecure democratic regime without constitutional guarantees, plots within the party, and the ignoring of the party program.⁶⁶ The nine deputies were dismissed from the party and their delegacies at the fourth convention were canceled by the GAB, too. In reaction, the other ten deputies resigned from the party one day later protesting the dismissal of their friends.⁶⁷ Therefore, all the opposition delegates to the convention who signed the bill were terminated by the center to consolidate its authority in the convention since Menderes did not want to go against them and their followers, the centralization of DP rule in the hands of Menderes through the elimination of the intraparty opposition was almost complete. That was a coup within the party. According to Güneş, the DP parliamentary group attributed the dismissal of the nineteens directly to Sarol.⁶⁸ Actually, the conflict was directly between Karaosmanoğlu and Menderes, Çelikbaş, and Sarol. After the pro-proofists were dismissed from the party, their electoral districts and party organizations were seized by the center of the DP. For instance, the delegacies of Manisa Provincial Chairman Hasan Uncu; district head of Alaşehir, Süleyman Çağlar; and Ahmet Kantarcı and Esat Gezgin from Kırkağaç were abolished by the center at the hands of Muzaffer Kurbanoglu.⁶⁹ Because the opponents and especially Karaosmanoğlu and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ had the upper hand in Aegean districts. Also, the delegates from Turgutlu, a district of Manisa, were dismissed on the ground of being supporters of the opposition.

66 “F. L. Karaosmanoğlu’nun Menderese mektubu,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1955.

67 “D.P. deki hâdisenin dün gece vardığı netice,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1955. One day later, the other ten deputies gave their letters of resignation to the local organizations where they were registered. They were Fethi Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, Dr. İbrahim Öktem, Raif Aybar, Şeref Kamil Mengü, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Ekrem Alican, Turan Güneş, Mustafa Ekinci, and Kasım Küfrevi. “Demokrat Partide Niçin İstifa Ettik?” *Cumhuriyet*, October 18, 1955.

68 Akın Simav, *Turan Güneş’in Siyasal Kavgaları* (İzmir: İstiklal Matbaası, 1975), 42.

69 *Ibid.*, 38.

3.1.3 *The Fourth Great Convention*

The long-awaited Fourth Great Convention was held on 15-18 October with the participation of more than 1300 delegates in a theater called Büyük Sinema in Ankara after the dismissal of the opposition from the party. The convention was paid great attention by the Turkish media. It was fateful not only for the party leaders, their cadres, and their opponents, but for Turkey as a whole. Tevfik İleri, the agent of the center, became the chairman of the convention.⁷⁰ Meanwhile the former head of the youth branches of the DP, Hüsametdin Cindoruk, submitted his resignation from the party on the first day of the convention and first called on the nineteens to establish a new political party.⁷¹ He also stated that 200 of 250 members of the Ankara youth organization had either resigned or were about to resign. During the convention, Adnan Menderes repeatedly and heavily attacked the signatories of the right to prove bill. For instance, he announced that the conflict within the party had a five-year history going back to when the party ascended to power and the first government was formed. He stressed that approximately 100 deputies led by Karaosmanoğlu desired to form an independent group both within the party and within the parliamentary group. The main impetus his disappointment from not undertaking the speakership of parliament. Menderes continued to argue that even though he invited Karaosmoğlu to the cabinet repeatedly, he rejected all offers. Although he finally accepted the state ministry, he began to sabotage the government immediately after stepping aside from his duty. According to Menderes, the motive of the eleventh, who initiated the movement, was to overthrow the government - himself.⁷² A day later, Karaosmanoğlu answered him and his allegations by stating, "I say that it is wrong in order to not say a lie." He explained that on 14 May 1950, when the elections were held, he was in Manisa together with Samet Ağaoğlu.⁷³ While one of them had to go to

70 The candidate of the dissidents would be Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, one of the signatories of the right to prove bill, if he had not been dismissed. "Partide dünkü ictimalar," *Cumhuriyet*, October 12, 1955.

71 "19 lardan parti kurmalarını istiyoruz," *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1955.

72 "Menderes dün Kongrede 19 lara mukabele etti," *Cumhuriyet*, October 17, 1955.

73 "Karaosmanoğlu Menderes'in ithamlarına cevap veriyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 19, 1955.

the party center in Ankara to meet with the party leaders, the other needed to stay in Manisa to oversee issues related to the election because the RPP had objected to some stained voting papers claiming they had been marked unlawfully. They decided that Ağaoğlu was to go to Ankara while Karaosmanoğlu stay. Before he left, Karaosmanoğlu proposed to him that they work for the party not to take any official duty in the government. Ağaoğlu confirmed this and headed to Ankara.⁷⁴

On the last day of the convention, the tone of the Menderes's speeches became more extreme and discriminatory. To illustrate, one of his famous statements made then was, "if those who got out left their tails in this party and their tails take the action, we will cut them out, as well."⁷⁵ He also stated that the source of the problem was not the right to prove issue; the nineteens only desired to make this a symbol.

Will we feel the treacherous knife in our backs every morning we wake up? We are certainly going to take measures against the ones who kick at the party after being elected as a deputy. I express that the matter is not the right to prove, they only desired to make this a symbol.⁷⁶

That said, tensions escalated more on the last day of the convention. Menderes proposed a law be passed called the Right to Annulment (*Iskat Hakkı*), which calls that after a deputy resigned or is dismissed from his party, his deputyship should be annulled simultaneously. After this odd proposal was given, many delegates were angered and immediately objected, and the room was upside down.⁷⁷ In the chaos, the chairman of the convention, Tevfik İleri, put the proposal to a vote and announced that it was accepted. However, in that

74 Ibid. This was not denied by Samet Ağaoğlu at the time. However, it is well known that Samet did his best to be in the government after the elections.

75 "Eğer çıkanlar kuyruklarını bu partinin içinde bırakmış ve kuyruk harekete gelmiş ise onu da kesip atacağız." "D.P. Kongresi dün büyük gürültüler içinde kapandı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 19, 1955.

76 Tekin Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi* (İstanbul: Ticaret Postası Matbaası, 1963), 259. See the original text in the fifth point in *Originals*, Appendix A.

77 Yusuf Azizoğlu, Osman Turan, Zeki Erataman, Elil Turgud, Şefik Bakay, Fahri Belen, İlhan Sipahioğlu, and Halûk Şaman were among these who reacted to the proposal.

atmosphere the result was far from clear; the winners of the convention created a fait accompli ignoring the will of most of the delegates in attendance.⁷⁸

When we think of the meaning of the congress for the leaders and each faction, the level of tension is more easily understood. The fate of the convention was clearly a matter of life and death for all parties involved. It was a zero-sum game, and no one conceded anything with their consent. A significant anecdote is enough to identify the level of tension between different cliques. As we have said, before the convention, Köprülü's faction colluded with some others in an anti-Sarol campaign to prevent him from becoming a member of the GAB. In spite of their efforts, Sarol managed to enter the board from the back door with the help of a last-minute move of outlying with Ramiz Eren group of Ankara delegates.⁷⁹ Köprülü, in particular, was furious about the results, and after they were announced and Sarol approached him to shake hands, Köprülü started to yell and swear at him.⁸⁰ Menderes then intervened to soothe the atmosphere.

When we look at the results, Sarol was the winner of the convention in spite of being seriously exhausted. He fought on many fronts but could gain his seat in the GAB. If we say Rauf Onursal and Mükerrerrem Sarol took the seats of the former two members of the board, Karaosmanoğlu and Çelikbaş, who were dismissed from their positions before the convention, the real challenge within the DP and the formation of the Freedom Party became clear. Because the other twelve seats in the GAB stayed in place. Çelikbaş and Karaosmanoğlu were the losers of a convention where they could not attend, but Köprülü was among the most disappointed actors. It would be no mere coincidence that these three figures would later meet in the FP. That said, time would show that the real loser of the convention was nobody but Adnan

78 "D.P. Kongresi dün büyük gürültüler içinde kapandı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 19, 1955.

79 "D. P.: Genel İdare Kurulu seçimleri," *Akis*, October 22, 1955.

80 "Köprülü ile Sarol arasında çok şiddetli bir münakaşa," *Cumhuriyet*, October 18, 1955. Altan Öymen, *Ve İhtilal*, 198-199. Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 458-459. The results for the GAB were as follows: Mehmet Fuad Köprülü (1004), Refik Koraltan (986), Samet Ağaoğlu (967), Sıtkı Yırcalı (935), Rıfık Salim Burçak (809), Atıf Benderlioğlu (624), Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ (556), Kamil Gündeş (631), Emin Kalafat (845), Tevfik İleri (852), Remzi Birant (569), Mükerrerrem Sarol (339), Rauf Onursal (391), and Celal Ramazanoğlu (408). "D.P. yeni Genel İdare kurulu," *Cumhuriyet*, October 17, 1955.

Menderes himself. His rivals made every effort to assist in his disposal in his sentence in Yassıada where the DP members were put on trial after 27 may coup occurred. Menderes was elected chairman of the party once again after defeating his rivals with a coup before the convention. The convention was another milestone of the DP's process of centralization. Menderes became a more one-man party. The opposition within the party failed against him one more time. As the observants underscored, the hero of the convention was Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, who would become a member of the FP, who gave a speech against the Menderes team.⁸¹

3.1.4 *After the Convention*

Despite the fact that Sarol entered the GAB through the back door, his situation was not assured. He became a member of the board in spite of the joint efforts of some cliques and of Köprülü's, the vice president of the party. Köprülü's anger did not cool off even after the convention. It is rumored that he was often reprimanded Sarol in front of all the members of the board, and because of that Sarol preferred not to attend the meetings. Also, Atıf Benderlioğlu and Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ behaved badly to Sarol. Sarol entered the GAB with the help of the Eren brothers from Ankara Province where Orhan Eren was competing with Adil Ünlü for the governorship. Therefore, in exchange for their help at the convention, Eren expected the support of Sarol from the center for gubernatorial contest. However, Adil Ünlü was backed by Benderlioğlu and Çiçekdağ in the GAB against Sarol's faction.⁸² Sarol's faction had problems in the Istanbul organization where two Köprülüs were dominant. In short, even though Sarol managed to become a member of the GAB, he was not sympathized by the other members, so some bit hard days for his political career was in sight. In fact, he would soon be dismissed from the board soon after and fallen out of favor with the leaders of the party.⁸³ However, the proofists who would form the FP had already gone.

81 Öymen, *Ve İhtilal*, 195-198. See also Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları: 1996), 76-88.

82 "D. P.: Hizip Mücadeleleri," *Akis*, October 29, 1955.

83 In December 1955, Sarol was brought before to the board of discipline by the GAB to exlude him from the party.

Despite all the efforts of the center and the great purge within the party, unrest within the parliamentary group did not cease. When the elections for some offices were held within the parliamentary group after the convention, the unrest revealed itself again. First, Koraltan, the natural candidate of the center for the speakership of parliament, faced Fahri Belen, the Bolu deputy, and candidate of the dissidents. Koraltan was elected with 198 votes to Belen's 147 votes despite being indifferent to the election because Belen was not seeking the position.⁸⁴ The exclusion of Karaosmanoğlu left Menderes with no rival for the chairmanship, and the dismissal of Üstündağ left Koraltan with no rival. Üstündağ was seen a natural candidate for the speakership of parliament by the consensus of dissidents and given the power of the dissidents within the party even after the great purge, Üstündağ would probably have taken over the speakership if he had not been dismissed.⁸⁵ The center could attain its goal. On the other hand, Pertev Arat, the candidate of the dissidents for the deputy speaker of parliament (meclis başkanvekilliği) beat Tevfik İleri, who was loyal to Menderes, by 208 votes. Burhanettin Onat, a candidate of the dissidents, was elected for the group presidency (grup başkanlığı).⁸⁶ If the coup had not been achieved, Çelikbaş would probably be the president of the group. For the general deputy chairmanships (grup başkanvekilliği), Fikri Apaydın, Esad Budakoğlu, and Şem'i Ergin, who were also trustworthy to the dissidents won enough votes to be elected. For group deputy chairmanships, Haluk Şaman among the dissidents and Muzaffer Kurbanoglu among the hardliners were

84 Belen argues that there was fraud in those elections. Fahri Belen, *Demokrasiden Diktatörlüğe* (Istanbul: Istanbul Matbaası, 1960), 58.

85 "B.M.M: Rakipsiz kalan adaylar," *Akis*, October 29, 1955.

86 Burhanettin Onat and Dağıstan Binerbay would resign from the DP in the next era because of the conflict between the two factions. When Benderlioğlu's faction fared better in the Antalya party organization, Onat and Binerbay felt excluded. Then the center appointed Ahmet Salih Korur to take care of the administration because it was unhappy with the fighting between the schism of this. Kenan Akmanlar dominated the organization as he was close to the center and a relative of Menderes. Onat even decided not to run in primary elections. He expressed before 1957 general elections that he would not work against the DP and that if the party returned to the principles upon which it was built in 1946, he would not hesitate to join the party again. "İki milletvekili daha dün D.P. den istifa ettiler," *Cumhuriyet*, October 2, 1957.

elected. For group executive board (grup idare heyeti), Yusuf Azizoğlu and İlhan Sipahioğlu were elected among the dissidents. This was a significant indication of the continuation of the riot against the center and its extent.

Even after the dismissal of the nineteens, the schism was still an important issue for the DP - like a serious disease from the first days of the party to its last. One can argue that the death of the party was strictly tied to this schism and its vulgarity.

After the great purge and the convention, DP leaders began to reorganize local party organizations in twenty provinces and appointed Muzafer Kurbanoglu to this duty. Manisa organization was the main target of the center for obvious reasons.⁸⁷ On the other hand, from the end of the convention to the 1957 general elections, within two years, fights between opposing cliques in Samsun, Sakarya, and Zonguldak occurred. In Samsun, Tevfik İleri's clique acted against Hacı Şükrü' clique.⁸⁸ A struggle between rival groups in Ankara took place, and the Ramiz Eren and Benderlioğlu groups were harmed. Nine people from these cliques did not enter candidate list. Mehmet Ali Sebük, Abdullah İzmen, Rüştü Özal, and Muammer Obuz submitted their resignations to the party. Baha Koldaş, the Çorum deputy, announced that he did not want to be nominated again. In Afyon, Ali Celâl Akyüz won the primary election, but the Kâzım Özer faction vetoed him. Murad Ali Ülgen nominated upon this faction's intervention, which prompted some resignations.⁸⁹ Meanwhile, the center of the party consistently intervened in local organizations before the elections of 1957. In fact, the DP generally preferred to avoid local primaries to prevent the schism from getting out of control. In conclusion, it can be argued that intraparty struggles dominated the history of the DP from its first days to the 27 May coup. The FP experiment can be regarded as part of this mechanism.

87 The provinces in which the opponents were strong were Diyarbakır, Urfa, Elazığ, Burdur, Adana, Mersin, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Kırklareli, Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, and Kocaeli. The center made a huge effort to make these places a stronghold. "D.P. 20 Vilaâyette yeniden teşkilatlanıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1955.

88 "İki milletvekili daha dün D.P. den istifa ettiler," *Cumhuriyet*, October 2, 1957.

89 "Afyonda D. Partiden istifalar," *Cumhuriyet*, October 10, 1957.

§ 3.2 The Formation and Rise of the FP

The Freedom Party was formed by a group of deputies who had once the members of the DP but were dismissed or resigned from the party, resulting from disputes within the party that came to the forefront with a bill, allowing journalists to prove made against ministers in late 1955.

Before the party was formed, the nineteens did not have a specific place or room in parliament building where they met. They held several meetings in homes - such as that of Behçet Kayaalp which was often used for these meetings - or in parliament, budget commission office.

The DP administration adopted two different measures concurrently to prevent the formation of the party. On one hand, the party took heavy-handed measures to oppress party organizations and punish the remaining opponents within the party. For instance, as we have said, in at least twenty provinces changes and novelties from the top were adopted to consolidate the central power of the party in locals as a preventive action against the dissolution of the local party organizations and their possible participation to the opponents who would form the FP. Moreover, the DP center disqualified forty-one members party organization in Izmir.⁹⁰ Here we need to remember the speech of Menderes at the convention regarding the "tails" in order to understand the reason behind these operations - the party was cutting the tails. Therefore, the centralization of the DP which was a never-ending process took place against the tails, to use Menderes's term. On one hand, the party tried to convince former party members to return their homes by making public calls or tried to benefit from mediators to reconcile with and reward them. The headquarters of the DP reached the decision to accept the return of those who had been fired from the party after 1952, which meant that all the doors were opened to them in late 1955.⁹¹ This was done to prevent the formation of the FP and divide the opposition by dissuading some deputies from supporting the right to prove movement.

In spite of the carrot and stick policies of the center, some deputies continued to join the opponents. Şekip İnal, a deputy from Hatay, joined the

90 "D.P. İzmir teşkilâtından ihraçlar," *Cumhuriyet*, November 1, 1955.

91 "Demokrat Parti içinde umumî af kararı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 12, 1955.

opponents, stressing the backward direction of the DP. He argued that the party had been set back ten years and that it had nothing to do with the notion of democracy.⁹² Moreover, Feridun Ergin, a deputy from Urfa, supported the opposition.⁹³ With İnal and Ergin, these nineteen deputies became twenty-one.⁹⁴ Furthermore, some deputies of the DP joined the nineteens after the convention.⁹⁵ On the 16 November 1955, these dismissed and resigned deputies declared that they had reached a decision to form a new political party in December 1955.⁹⁶

The declaration of the Freedom Party was officially made in the house of Şeref Kamil Mengü, one of its founders, in Menteşe Street on 20 November.⁹⁷ From its first days, the party was characterized as a party of ideals, not doctrine, and the founders sought new participants.⁹⁸ "Our door is open to all citizens known for their honesty and goodwill," said Ebüzziya.⁹⁹ The question arose, why did they form a new political party instead of joining the RPP? The answer can be traced in an article published in *FORUM*, which supported the party. According to the journal, the RPP was formed within the boundaries of one party and a dominant chief; the party was unable to adjust itself to political life in a dynamic time. Furthermore, the RPP was still responsible for its

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- 92 "Belediye Seçimleri yüzünden 19 lara bir milletvekili daha kazandı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 19, 1955.
- 93 Ergin had been dismissed two months earlier because of his article published in August in *Cumhuriyet*. According to Toker, Menderes declared the war against academics starting with Ergin. Toker, *DP Yokuş Aşağı*, 112.
- 94 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 337.
- 95 For instance, Yusuf Azizoglu, a DP deputy from Diyarbakır; Muammer Alakant, a deputy from Manisa; Hasan Kangal, a deputy from Tokat; Emrullah Nutku, a deputy from Trabzon; Muhlis Ete, a deputy from Ankara; Asım Okur, a deputy from Antalya; Ekrem Ocaklı, a DP deputy from Gümüşhane, and İhsan Hamit Tiğrel split with the DP. Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 145.
- 96 "19 lar dün Mecliste," *Cumhuriyet*, November 17, 1955.
- 97 "Hürriyet Partisi'nin kurulduğu açıklandı," *Milliyet*, November 20, 1955.
- 98 "Hür. P.: Evvelâ vasat," *Akis*, November 26, 1955.
- 99 "150 den fazla mebusun H.P. ne geçmeleri bekleniyor," *Cumhuriyet*, November 23, 1955.

miserable past.¹⁰⁰ This approach disregards the fact that most antidemocratic measures by the DP were undertaken by FP founders while in the DP.

3.2.1 *The Freedom Party on the Rise: A Flash in the Pan*

After the public declaration of the FP, a leadership problem took place. Two possible candidates for the chairmanship emerged: Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ and Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu. Turan Güneş and his close friends were on the side of Üstündağ. In his memoirs, Güneş states that "there was also a Çelikbaş problem because he led the issue."¹⁰¹ A middle way was found by Enver Güreli, according to which Üstündağ was elected as the first chairman of the FP; however, in the same session he handed over the leadership to Karaosmanoğlu by resigning because of his health problems.¹⁰² Therefore, Karaosmanoğlu became the chairman and İbrahim Öktem became the general secretary of the party. Yet the FP never became a political party centered around a strong, charismatic leader, unlike its counterparts.¹⁰³ The party leader was the first among the equals. In fact, the party was always characterized itself as an "idea party" (fikir partisi).

In order to carry out the works, the party immediately established five commissions: the Bylaw Commission (Tüzük Komisyonu) composed of Raif Aybar, Ekrem Alican, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, and Sabahattin Çıracıoğlu; the Program Commission (Program Komisyonu) composed of Enver Güreli, Turan Güneş, Feridun Ergin, and İbrahim Öktem; the Press Commission (Basım Komisyonu) composed of Ziyad Ebuzziya, Safaeddin Karanakçı, and Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu; the Organization Commission (Teşkilat Komisyonu) composed of Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, Şekip İnal, Muzaffer Timur, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Mustafa Ekinci, and Şeref Kamil Mengü; and the Parliamentary Works Commission (Meclis Çalışma Komisyonu) composed of Kasım Küfrevi, Behçet Kayaalp, Safaeddin Karanakçı, Turan Güneş, and Fethi

100 "Türkiye'de Siyasi Buhran ve Muhalefet," *FORUM*, June 15, 1955.

101 "Bir de Fethi Çelikbaş sorunu vardı. Çünkü, işin başını Çelikbaş çekmişti." He was talking about the right to prove issue. Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 49.

102 Ibid., 50.

103 Perhaps party did not last long enough for that.

Çelikbaş.¹⁰⁴ Above all, an Executive and Coordination Committee was formed with one representative from each of the sub-commissions together with Karaosmanoğlu and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ. The busiest among these in the early stages of the party was the Organization Committee because the party undertook intense activities to establish organizations across Turkey. And there was, of course, a need to recruit new members to the party. In fact, after its declaration, the FP was mostly engaged with fulfilling its organizations around Turkey. They chose the Aegean region as their primary field of activity for their political movement.¹⁰⁵ For that purpose, while Karaosmanoğlu paid some visits to Akhisar, Salihli, and İzmir, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ made contacts in İzmir. In fact, the first two party organizations were formed in Manisa and İzmir in January 1956.¹⁰⁶ After the Aegean region, the party began organizing in the Black Sea region.¹⁰⁷ A week later, the Zonguldak and Diyarbakır party organizations were formed.¹⁰⁸ In Istanbul, Enver Adakan pioneered efforts to form the organization.

The deputies of the FP argued that there was an obvious depression in the political regime and the corresponding remedy was to immediately embrace economic planning and enlarge social and political freedoms at the same time. After the formation of the party, losing no time, deputies of the party started

104 “Hür. P. İlk hedef: Seçim Kanunu,” *Akis*, December 3, 1955.

105 “19 ların Ege bölgesinde faaliyet ve temasları,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 31, 1955. The Free Republican Party opposed one-party rule in 1930; the DP opposition to RPP rule in 1946 followed the same pattern. İzmir was always a home for the opposition both within the parties and against the dominant party in the first decades of the Turkish Republic. One comment came from Oran, who argues that there are two aspects to this; the socioeconomic and demographic structures of the region. İzmir was home for Levantines and non-Muslims who gave the region a liberal, individualist social atmosphere. On the other hand, pattern of external trade was increased the importance of İzmir, the biggest port of export at the time, because Turkey was exporting mostly agricultural products. This factor enhanced the welfare of the region. This also enhanced liberal thought in the region. Baskın Oran, *Kürt Barışında Batı Cephesi*, “Ben Ege’de Akilken...” (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), 35–37.

106 Ayşe Acar, “Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Hürriyet Partisi” (master’s thesis, Istanbul University, 1986), 68.

107 “Hür. Partisi Karadeniz İllerinde de Kuruldu,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 12, 1956.

108 “Hür. P. iki vilâyette daha teşkilat kurdu,” *Cumhuriyet*, January 24, 1956.

to strictly oppose the government in the assembly, addressing ways to provide parliamentary control over the government such as attendance in parliamentary discussions regarding bills brought by the ruling party, and criticism in budget talks.¹⁰⁹ In fact, the deputies of the party were more aggressive towards the government and its political activities than even the RPP. Meanwhile, the bill submitted by the ninetens to provide the right to prove to journalists was rejected by the justice commission under the umbrella of parliament on 20 April 1956.¹¹⁰ In fact, June 1956 was the period when the FP was present parliamentary activities most effectively.¹¹¹

The opposition of FP faced the intolerant attitudes of the government. To illustrate, on 13 February 1956, while Muammer Alakant from the FP was talking about the agricultural situation in Turkey, parliament suddenly became very angry. When Hüseyin Balık, an independent candidate, objected to the chairman of parliament's treatment of the deputy and his right to free speech, he was suspended for two parliamentary sessions. Alakant said that he would not speak under this administration and left the rostrum. Then, FP deputies followed him and left the parliament.

Joinings to the FP from the DP continued. On 7 April 1957, İrfan Aksu from Isparta, on 16 April 1956, Ziya Termen from Kastamonu deserted for the

109 For example, Çelikbaş prepared a bill to provide loans for artisans. "Esnafa daha fazla kredi," *Cumhuriyet* June 11, 1956.

110 "Adalet komisyonu dün ispat hakkını reddetti," *Cumhuriyet*, April 21, 1956. Those from the DP in the related commission who did not want to grant the right to prove bill were as follows: Halil Özyörük, Nail Geveci, Cevad Ülkü, Selâmi Dinçer, Nusret Kirişçioğlu, Muzaffer Önal, Şevki Hasırcı, and Vacid Asena. Those who voted for the bill were as follows: Tevfik Fikret Baran, Servet Sezgin, Şekip İnal, Hidayet Aydın, Behçet Kayaalp, and Nuri Özsan.

111 Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri," 51. We can account for some other activities of the party in the assembly between 1956-1957 as follows: On 27 November 1955, Mustafa Ekinci asked questions with respect to individuals rights to Ethem Menderes about his journey to Diyarbakır, Karaosmanoğlu joined discussions over opening a parliamentary inquiry for 6-7 September incidents in 1956, FP deputies criticized the 1956 budget, and Turan Güneş gave a proposal related to the academic situation of Aydın Yalçın whose professorship had been prevented by the government. *Ibid.*, 40-51.

FP.¹¹² Even though there were some participants in the FP from the DP, participation did not reach the level FP founders expected. Although there were more opponents within the DP, the FP could not manage to mobilize them. Also, from its first days to its last, the FP party was always optimistic about its potential power. For example, after the party formed, Ziyad Ebuzziya stated that they initially expected 50-60 deputies and eventually 150 more DP deputies to transfer to the party.¹¹³ It was also reported that approximately some 3000 people from across Turkey had made applications to establish party organizations in their districts.¹¹⁴

The intellectual support given to the FP was on the rise, as indicated by articles in *FORUM* magazine. At the end of 1956, a veteran journalist, Cihad Baban, a DP deputy from Istanbul, and one of the shareholders in *Tercüman* paper, resigned from the DP protesting ad hoc antidemocratic laws.¹¹⁵ In his letter, he stressed the need for Menderes to resign from both his party leadership and the premiership.¹¹⁶ Intellectual support accelerated in November 1956 when Turhan Feyzioğlu, the dean of the Ankara University Political Science Faculty, was laid off from his position temporally with ministerial order of the ministry of education headed by Celal Yardımcı following the opening speech of the university in which Feyzioğlu had emphasized the necessity of the autonomy of the university and responsibility of being an *aydın* (intellectual).¹¹⁷ The reaction of university professors to the decision made by the government was negative, and a series of resignations took place. First, Aydın Yalçın, a

112 “Ziya Termen dün Hürriyet Partisine girdi,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 17, 1956. About two weeks before that, he had been brought before the board of discipline.

113 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 338.

114 A clear majority of the media welcomed the party. During the party's lifetime, *Cumhuriyet* especially backed it, even in its final days. Needless to say, *FORUM* was one of the most enthusiastic media organs regarding the formation of the new party. “Yeni Parti ve Hürriyet,” *FORUM*, January 1, 1956.

115 “Cihad Baban, dün D.P. den istifa etti,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 4, 1956.

116 *Cumhuriyet*, November 28, 1956. “Cihad Baban dün Hürriyet Partisine girdi,” *Cumhuriyet*, December 3, 1956.

117 “Feyzioğlu Bakanlık emrine alındı!” *Cumhuriyet*, December 2, 1956

professor of economics at Ankara University, resigned in reaction.¹¹⁸ His professorship was procrastinated by government authorities in spite of the positive reports of the senate. Muammer Aksoy, Münci Kapani, and Şerif Mardin resigned from their universities one after another.¹¹⁹ Four months later, in March 1957, they joined the FP and joined the idealist wing of the party together with Ekrem Alican, Raif Aybar, and Turan Güneş.¹²⁰ In that manner, the intellectual support for the FP crystallized.

Although the party strived to rapidly form local organizations just after its formation, the speed of the formation of new organizations was slowed after an initial phase. Close to the elections, the emergence of new provincial organizations came to a halt. As Acar revealed, within six months of the party's formation, by June 1956, thirty-four provincial organizations had been formed. From then until June 1957, eighteen more provincial organizations were formed. Between June 1957 and September 1957, just before the general elections, only four more were formed.¹²¹

3.2.2 *The First Convention*

The first convention of the FP was held in Alemdar Sineması in Ankara on 14-15 September 1957 with around 500 delegates.¹²² After a long dispute over the chairmanship, Yusuf Azizoğlu became the chairman of the convention and Mahmud Yalay and Hamdi Başar became his assistants. Kasım Gülek, Turgut Göle, and Faik Ahmet Barutçu from the RPP and Orhan Öztrak and Mehmed Hazer from the RNP attended the event. Furthermore, those who had resigned from the DP - Rüştü Özal, and Muammer Obuz - were asked to give a speech.

118 "Profesör Feyzioğlu hâdisesinin devamı," *Cumhuriyet*, December 3, 1956.

119 "Doçent Dr. Muammer Aksoy da istifa etti," *Cumhuriyet*, December 6, 1956. "İstifalar Ankara Hukuk Fakültesine sirayet Etti," *Cumhuriyet*, December 8, 1956. "Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesinden bir istifa daha," *Cumhuriyet*, December 11, 1956.

120 "Hürriyet Partisine iki iltihak," *Cumhuriyet*, March 3, 1957.

121 Ayşe Acar, "Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Hürriyet Partisi" (master's thesis, Istanbul University, 1986), 104.

122 For the report of the GAB introduced to the convention and the decisions made in it was published by the party. *İleriye Atılış: Hürriyet Partisi Birinci Umumi Kongresi* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957).

Obuz emphasized that the main action was to beat the clique that was acting against the people's interest. The opposition was seeking cooperation to take the DP down. In fact, on 16 September 1957 *Cumhuriyet* revealed that the FP had authorized cooperation by any means. Ecved Güresin, a reporter for the paper, argued that a report prepared by the election committee was accepted without reservation by the delegates, which indicated that cooperation was accepted even at lower levels of the party.¹²³ This was wishful thinking, indicating the position of the press regarding cooperation. Moreover, another decision made at the convention was that those who abused their authorities would be brought to account. Interestingly, according to another decision, primary elections in the party organizations to determine candidates could be ignored by the GAB. The party also called deputies to declare their properties. In addition, the FP expressed its appreciation for the attention of the press to the party.¹²⁴ On the other hand, before the election, three and four lists for the GAB of the party went around and lobbying activities among the delegates occurred. That said, Karaosmanoğlu made a speech, and he heard that some made propaganda for themselves to be elected to the GAB. Therefore, delegates thought that these activities are imposed by the center.¹²⁵ On the last day of the convention, duties were divided up, Karaosmanoğlu again became chairman of the GAB, Enver Güreli was elected as the party's second chair, and the general secretary became İbrahim Öktem. Muhlis Ete was elected as the account member (muhasip üye).¹²⁶ In the first party convention, the GAB of the party was elected, as well.¹²⁷ According to the bylaws of the party, group president, Çelikbaş, was automatically on the GAB. Thus, he needed to resign either from his office as group president or from his membership on the GAB. Çelikbaş resigned from GAB and Ziyad Ebüzziya entered instead of him. The

123 Ecved Güresin, "Kongreden notlar," *Cumhuriyet*, September 16, 1957.

124 *İleriye Atılış*, 16.

125 Güresin, "Kongreden notlar."

126 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 341.

127 Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, Enver Güreli, Turan Güneş, Ekrem Alican, İbrahim Öktem, Fethi Çelikbaş, Cihad Baban, Muhlis Ete, Raif Aybar, Mustafa Ekinci, Yusuf Azizoglu, Feridun Ergin, Safaeddin Karanakçı, Aydın Yalçın, and Hasan Kangal were elected in the first round, and Emin Paksüt and Muhlis Bayramoğlu in the second round were elected. *Ibid.*, 341.

GAB was authorized to negotiate cooperation with opposition parties, and in addition, the party declared it did not accept the idea that one opposition party with attending the elections alone and that the rest would support it.

The convention was significant not only because it was the first convention of the party, but also because it provided an opportunity for the party members who did not know each other to come together for the first time. As *FORUM* put it, the sharpest significance of the convention was the general outlook of the delegates. They are young, elite, and civilized.¹²⁸ The convention ended with repeating of the Freedom Oath (*Hürriyet Andı*) with the instructions of Emin Paksüt.

Just after the convention, Muammer Alakant resigned from the party. According to *Cumhuriyet*, it was expected that Alakant would soon be appointed to an ambassadorship by the government.¹²⁹ The stick and carrot policy achieved results to a degree. That said, Alakant was not the only one to change his mind about the FP. Even before the party was formed two of eleven initiators of the right to prove movement, Kasım Küfrevi and Seyfi Kurtbek, withdrew their signatures. Kurtbek was deceived by the center. On the other hand, according to the journalist Nimet Arzık, Kasım Küfrevi was blackmailed with respect to private issues.¹³⁰ Interestingly, he would become one of the fervent supporters of the Motherland Front (*Vatan Cephesi*) formed by Menderes to oppose the opposition front, which Menderes called the hatred and hostility front. Furthermore, in March 1957, Muzaffer Timur, one of the founders of the FP, resigned from the FP and returned to the DP. Interestingly, when he resigned he complained that the FP was becoming centralized and following a policy that distanced from democratic ways. This was a nationwide discourse of the time. Anyone who broke their ties with their political parties tended to accuse the party of being antidemocratic. When Baban, a member of the FP, discussed Timur and his resignation, he wielded the phrase “a very touchy friend” (*çok alıngan bir arkadaş*).¹³¹ Timur made a statement to the press

128 "Hürriyet Partisi Kongresinden Notlar," *FORUM*, October 1, 1957.

129 "Alakant Hür. P. den çekildi," *Cumhuriyet*, September 18, 1957.

130 Nimet Arzık, *Menderes'i İpe Götürenler* (Ankara: Kurtuluş Matbaası, 1966), 129-130.

131 "Hür. P. kongresinde dün yapılan tenkitler," *Cumhuriyet*, March 25, 1957.

asserting that the FP had begun to be closed and to close its doors to outside was getting more hierarchical and absolute centralization within the party had become mainstream.¹³² However, according to one allegation, he was also the victim of threats from the DP. He was blackmailed by the government because he had a land dispute in Urfa.¹³³ Moreover, İsmail Hakkı Akyüz, another founder, resigned from the FP before the first convention. It is argued that the reason for his resignation was that he was displeased about the opposition of the FP to the termination of Bölükbaşı's immunity. Akyüz gave a memorandum to the GAB about the issue in which he criticized his political party; he was also known as opponent to cooperation with the RPP.¹³⁴ Beyond these, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Şeref Kamil Mengü, and Mustafa Ekinci died before the party entered the elections. These departures indicated that a considerable loss within the FP occurred in a limited time period while the party was in the stage of formation, which badly harmed it.

3.2.3 *The Köprülü Crisis*

As we have said before several times, there had some disputes within the Istanbul party organization of the DP since its formation. If we remember, the disputes were a milestone in the formation of the NP in 1947, and the former chairman of the Istanbul organization, Kenan Öner, became one of the founders of the NP. The struggles in Istanbul never ended. As revealed in the "Battle of Cliques" sub-section, there was a longstanding dispute within the party between Köprülü and Sarol which resulted in the victory of Köprülü. The Sarolists were initially damaged; however, Istanbul was still a battlefield. The son of Fuad Köprülü, Orhan Köprülü, was the chairman of the organization opposed to Sarol's faction. In the fourth great convention, Köprülü made a huge effort to prevent Sarol from entering the GAB, as we remember. On the other hand, Köprülü was also a struggling with Zorlu in the foreign ministry - his second front. These ongoing personal disputes grew, especially after the

132 Ibid.

133 Toker, *Yokuş Aşağı*, 236.

134 "Hür. P. den bir istifa," *Cumhuriyet*, September 8, 1957.

convention, which led to a crisis in the party regarding the Köprülü family and resulted in their exclusion and subsequent participation in the FP.

In summer 1956, the Köprülü family was pushed to the periphery of the party. In effect, Fuad Köprülü started to pursue a veiled opposition within the party. To illustrate, *Cumhuriyet* announced that Köprülü was critical of the dismissals that had taken place in November.¹³⁵ On 12 May 1956, the headline of the paper read “Controversy between Fuad Köprülü - Adnan Menderes is the Subject of the Day” and argued that the power of Köprülü within the party was being diluted in party affairs, which made him unhappy.¹³⁶ In the same article, it was written that Cemal Köprülü, a deputy from Edirne and cousin of Fuad, was on the edge of resigning because he was brought before the board of discipline by the center.¹³⁷

In May 1956, there were rumors that Orhan Köprülü also had some conflicts with the center of the party. Soon after, Orhan was thrown out of office by the provincial administration board of the Istanbul organization. In place of Köprülü, the provincial administration board elected Hayri Gönen as the new chairman.¹³⁸ Orhan resisted the decision, arguing that the board did not have such authorization, and so he tried to continue to lead his duty like nothing had happened. The next day, Istanbul party inspectors Atıf Benderlioğlu and Tevfik İleri, who were close to Menderes, forced Orhan to sign a declaration clarifying his statement about Bölükbaşı, the leader of the RNP. Because Orhan had expressed his regret about the deputy's arrest before.¹³⁹ Köprülü refused to do and this broke the ties of the Köprülü family with their party. After receiving the counsel of his father, he abdicated from the chairmanship, as expected. Cemal Köprülü gave a statement to the press that Fuad Köprülü could not be indifferent to Orhan's move.¹⁴⁰ This was regarded by some as the

135 Ironically, Köprülü was the one who conducted the dismissal of nineteen on behalf of the center.

136 "Fuad Köprülü- Adnan Menderes ihtilâfı Ankara'da günün mevzuu," *Cumhuriyet*, May 12, 1956.

137 Ibid.

138 "İstanbul'da D.P. il başkanları ikileşti," *Cumhuriyet*, July 12, 1956.

139 "D.P. il başkanı Orhan Köprülü İskat edildi," *Cumhuriyet*, July 5, 1957.

140 "«Köprülüler» dün baş başa konuştular," *Cumhuriyet*, July 20, 1957.

first victory of Sarol's hard work in the Istanbul organization and in his dispute with Köprülü.¹⁴¹ Moreover, according to Ahmad, this was the result of the divergence between the center of the party and local organizations led by Fuad and Orhan Köprülü.¹⁴²

After his resignation, the FP immediately invited Orhan to join the party in a telegram. Though invited by the RPP, as well, Orhan preferred to join the FP and soon became the provincial head of the Istanbul organization of the FP.¹⁴³ Meanwhile, it was rumored that Fuad had contact with the FP; it was a matter of time for him to join the FP with the twenty-five deputies supported him.¹⁴⁴

On the other hand, Cemal was under pressure from the DP administration because of a proposal he gave to the assembly, and he was interrogated directly by Adnan Menderes and hold to withdraw his proposals. The proposal given by Cemal complained about the costliness in prices, refusal of the right to prove bill, and amendments to the electoral law. As a result of the dispute, Cemal was dismissed from the party in May 1956.¹⁴⁵ When Cemal, the deputy from Edirne Province, transferred to the FP from the DP, the FP became the main opposition party with thirty-two seats in parliament, ahead of the RPP which had only thirty-one.¹⁴⁶ It is fair to say that the effective opposition of the DP was rewarded with becoming the main opposition party.

The roots of the Köprülü crisis can be traced to a change in the cabinet, Zorlu became the foreign minister instead of Köprülü, who did not get along with Menderes regarding foreign policy.¹⁴⁷ In September 1955, Köprülü started to interest in the party affairs after he was replaced by Zorlu. Given the intra-party struggles in Istanbul organization which weakened Köprülü's position with the exclusion of Orhan, after he lost the ministership, he saw that the

141 "O. Köprülü, sözlerimi tavzih etmiyorum, dedi," *Cumhuriyet*, July 6, 1957.

142 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 164.

143 Ibid., 164. "O. Köprülü Hür. P. il başkanı oldu," *Cumhuriyet*, September 7, 1957.

144 "Orhan Köprülü Hür. P. ye geçti," *Cumhuriyet*, August 24, 1956.

145 "Cemal Köprülü dün D.P den ihraç edildi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 19, 1956.

146 Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri," 57.

147 "Köprülü dün Dışişleri Bakanlığından istifa etti," *Cumhuriyet*, June 20, 1956.

party was slipping through his hands, either. Because from the first days of the DP, Köprülü dominated party organizations, especially Istanbul organization. In July 1957, the moment Köprülü's proposal to open a parliamentary investigation Sarol's unfair acquisitions while he led the ministry of the state was rejected by the parliamentary group, Köprülü resigned from the DP, of which he was one of the founders.¹⁴⁸ Köprülü stated,

I have withdrawn from the current DP which abandoned its program [and] changed its previous identity. It will be a national service that all Turkish citizens who believe in democratic order cooperate for the sake of that cause by putting aside all sorts of controversies between each other.¹⁴⁹

It is important to note that Köprülü was talking about cooperation between political parties and putting aside narrow interests. That cooperation issue will now be enlarged in a detailed way in the next section. It should be emphasized that Fuad Köprülü actively supported the FP in the campaign for the 1957 general elections by giving public speeches side by side with FP members. For example, in Balıkesir Province, he said about that the election would be an election between a man who wanted to revive the one-party rule of the single party era and cooperation of the Turkish people.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, I regard Köprülü as an honorary member of the FP because there is no record that indicates his enrollment in the FP, unlike his son.¹⁵¹ It is more plausible to think that Köprülü did not manage to become part of the FP since he was precluded from doing so by the government with a law amendment, as we will see. He had already gotten his son, Orhan Köprülü enrolled in the party, and according to

148 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 427-428. Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 421.

149 Feroz and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 166. Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portreler* (Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), 393-405. For the original text, see point six in *Originals*, Appendix A.

150 Ibid., 170. see also Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 186.

151 In fact, according to one source, he was a member of the FP. İhsan Güneş, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi TBMM - V. Dönem (1935-1939), Vol. II* (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), 405.

Baban if the new election law had not been enacted, Köprülü would have become a part of the FP.¹⁵² His son-in-law, Coşkun Kırca, would be an active member of the FP, as well. After Fuad Köprülü, it also rumored that Celâl Boynuk, the Çankırı deputy, and nephew of Fuad Köprülü, was on the verge of resigning from the DP.¹⁵³ To sum up, before the 1957 general elections the Köprülü family integrated themselves into the FP by burning their bridges with the DP, which was a significant moment for the Freedom Party which was on the rise.

3.2.4 *The Issue of Cooperation among Opposition Parties before the 1957 Elections*

Before the 1957 general election, the opposition parties felt the need to form a united front against the DP in order to overthrow it and, for a restoration period to implement necessary democratic reforms such as adopting proportional representation, establishing a constitutional court, providing an independent administration, and establishing a second parliamentary chamber - reforms which were not conducted by the governmental party. Nevertheless, some figures opposed cooperation among all opposition parties. To illustrate, some figures of the RPP were of the idea that there was no need to cooperate because if the RPP enter the elections alone, it would most probably win the elections.¹⁵⁴ On the other hand, some figures of the FP worried that İnönü would trick them and worried that the RPP would swallow other, smaller opposition parties - including theirs if cooperation took place.¹⁵⁵ Some extremist figures thought that the FP could challenge both the DP and the RPP at the same time and that there was no need to cooperate.¹⁵⁶ Not only FP extremists but also RNP extremists thought that the RPP was going to dominate the opposition if cooperation occurred.¹⁵⁷ They were also mostly anti-RPP and did

152 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 349.

153 "Köprülü'nün istifasının akisleri," *Cumhuriyet*, September 9, 1957.

154 Feroz and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 165.

155 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politika'da 45 Yıl* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), 222.

156 Ibid., 225.

157 Feroz and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 164.

not have a strong inclination to cooperate with İnönü's party so willingly. However, because moderates in these opposition parties were more dominant in their parties, the Republican People's Party, the Republican Nation Party, and Freedom Party were eager at the beginning of 1956 to negotiate a cooperation for the next general elections in order to adopt democratic reforms. In April 1956, the RPP parliamentary group published a notice advising cooperation with other opposition parties with the İnönü's authority.¹⁵⁸ While Ahmet Tahtakılıç and Sadık Aldoğan from the RNP supported of cooperation among opposition parties, Kasım Gülek, the general secretary of the RPP, maintained that the opposition should share a common fate against the DP.¹⁵⁹ To sum up, the three opposition parties, especially the FP, were willing to determinedly fight for democracy together. On 22 April 1956, with a declaration, the first public call for cooperation came from the FP to save the democratic regime.¹⁶⁰ However, the FP invited the DP along the opposition parties to work together for the cause. While the DP objected to this and adopted preventive measures, the FP turned to the opposition parties to form an opposition front. For that, the FP gave an official written memorandum to the RPP and the RNP,¹⁶¹ and Gülek took the memorandum and headed to Istanbul to discuss terms with İnönü.¹⁶² The top priority of the FP was that if in the next general elections, the opposition parties working as a body one, the leaders of these opposition parties - especially İnönü and Karaosmanoğlu - would neither be the president or the speaker of parliament. Especially, İbrahim Öktem, the general secretary of the FP, insisted on this.¹⁶³ The reason, the FP argued, was that leaders of the opposition should not be a part of this attempt to further their own interests. They should declare to the nation that their motivation was for a bigger cause, not for the narrow interests of political parties and politicians. However, these points in the memorandum were considered problematic for

158 Ibid., 149. Sibel, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri," 48.

159 "C.M.P. Genel İdare Kurulunda tartışmalar," *Cumhuriyet*, May 6, 1956. *Cumhuriyet*, July 21, 1956.

160 "Hür. P. rejim dâvasında bütün partileri işbirliğine davet ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, April 23, 1956.

161 "Hür. P. nin C.H.P. ve C.M.P. ye dün yaptığı teklifler," *Cumhuriyet*, September 16, 1956.

162 "Halk Partisi Hür. Partisine evet, diyecek," *Cumhuriyet*, September 19, 1956.

163 Feroz and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 154.

the RPP. Also, the FP expected that around 108 seats in the constituent assembly which would be the parliament where opposition front had the majority together and ready to adopt democratic reforms would be given to independent deputies, which was not welcomed by the RPP, either.

It is not surprising that the RPP declined the offer made by the FP. In the first days of October, the RPP answered the FP expressing that the two parties agreed on the core problem, which was the need for the formation of a democratic regime. The rest the FP brought up were secondary and open to negotiate in the future.¹⁶⁴ The FP considered this a rejection even Gülek declared that it was a positive answer and meant that the RPP was eager to negotiate. On the other hand, the RNP did not even answer the memorandum.¹⁶⁵ According to the FP, the RPP did not accept the impartial presidency and the independent deputies within the constituent assembly. Karaosmanoğlu urged that the answer of the RPP wasted time and was unambiguous.¹⁶⁶ Öktem and Güneş also attacked the RPP and İnönü regarding the failure of cooperation.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the DP indicated its discontent fiercely attacking that endeavors of the opposition for cooperation.¹⁶⁸ Also, while the center of the FP was eager to cooperate, there were some doubts about this attempt showing themselves in some local party organizations.¹⁶⁹ To illustrate, the Eskişehir and Bilecik party organizations were not a fan of cooperation, and some figures in local organizations suspected that this cooperation was a step towards the joining RPP.

164 “Hür. P. muhtırasını C.H.P. dün cevabını bildirdi,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 2, 1956.

165 The FP published a book on October 1956 indicating its views and the history of cooperation in their eyes. *Hürriyet Partisinin İşbirliği Mevzuunda Vatandaşlara Tebliği* (Ankara: Yıldız Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T.A.Ş, 1956). For a brief history of the negotiations, also see “İşbirliği Neden Olmadı,” *FORUM*, October 1, 1956.

166 “Hür. Partisinin lideri C.H. P’yi itham etti,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 10, 1956.

167 “Hür. P. Genel Sekreteri İnönü’yü tenkit etti,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 14, 1956. “Hür. Partisi – C.H.P. dâvası,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1956.

168 Menderes called this attempt as as destructible and worthless (“mezbuhan ve seviyesizce”). “Dün İzmir’de konuşan Başbakan muhalefete sert hücumlarda bulundu,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 19, 1956.

169 “İş Birliği için C.H.P ve Hür. P. merkezlerindeki toplantılar,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 5, 1956.

After the failure of the cooperation, the relations between the RPP and the FP worsen, and those between the RPP and the DP got better. The two parties entered a new stage in their relations called Spring Weather, a term that describes the relations between the RPP and DP in the 1950s in Turkey as soft and tolerant towards each other, like a cohabitation or armistice, refraining from fighting. Because of that situation, the harshest criticisms in the budget discussions for the 1957 term came from the FP, while İnönü used a soft and careful tongue to neither offend and nor annoy DP leaders.¹⁷⁰ Thus, this era was interpreted by the FP as to attempt to eliminate them through the joint efforts of the DP and the RPP, the latter of which did not show a strong endeavor to monitor or criticize the government in budget talks. In exchange for the friendly manner of the RPP in domestic politics, the ruling party decided to make Kırşehir a province again as a gift. If remembered, Kırşehir was downgraded down a sub-province by the ruling party to punish the electorates who voted for the RNP after 1954. However, in discussions regarding the Kırşehir, Bölükbaşı, the leader of the RNP and a deputy from Kırşehir, spoke so bitterly that parliament decided to suspend him from parliament for three sessions. Moreover, parliament decided to abolish his parliamentary immunity thanks to DP majority in June 1957.¹⁷¹ This action by the DP was received badly by the other opposition parties. The representatives of the three opposition parties declared in the joint committee in parliament to discuss the situation of

170 The FP published the speeches of its members criticising the government on almost every issue such as the general budget criticism for the table by the ruling party, the budget for defence, the bugdet for the economy, and the budgets for the foreign ministry and ministry of education. See *Görüşümüz* (Ankara: Balkanoğlu Matbaacılık, 1957). The party was arguably well-prepared for the budget talks. Especially critiques of Ekrem Alican were respected even by the hardliners of the ruling party. For example, Nusret Kirişcioğlu, who would be the reporter of the Inquiry Comission formed before the 1960, coup which was strictly criticized back then, characterized Alican characterized as a wise, honest politician who criticized the budgets of the DP in a well-prepared way while they were in power. Kirişcioğlu says that they listened to even the heaviest criticisms of Alican with pleasure. Nusret Kirişcioğlu, *Partilerimiz ve Liderleri* (Baha Matbaası: İstanbul, 1975), 6.

171 “Bölükbaşının dokunulmazlığı kaldırıldı,” *Cumhuriyet*, June 25, 1957. Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Türk Siyasetinde Anadolu Fırtınası: Osman Bölükbaşı* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2005), 220-221.

Bölükbaşı that deputies shall not be prosecuted while doing their parliamentary duties.¹⁷² In fact, the FP made a statement from the headquarters of the party that a commission composed of lawyers including Hüsametdin Cindoruk and Talat Asal and under the chairmanship of Ferruh Agan were ready to defend Bölükbaşı in court.¹⁷³ The arrest of Bölükbaşı again brought each the opposition parties regarding the need for cooperation one more time. In fact, Ferdidun Ergin of the FP revived the issue of cooperation once more in the beginning of July.¹⁷⁴ Meanwhile, another factor facilitated the opposition parties' cooperation in the first half of 1957: opposition parties asserted that the government would probably hold general elections, which would normally would be held in 1958 - four years after 1954 - a year early, in 1957.¹⁷⁵ In fact, Menderes, in Sivas, stated that the elections were near.¹⁷⁶ In response to suspicions and hearsay, a notification from the FP center signed by Öktem was sent to local party organizations instructing that they "be ready!"¹⁷⁷ Meanwhile, all the opposition parties declared that they had a common understanding about cooperation principles. Accordingly, when they came to power, they would act as a constituent assembly and put an end to all antidemocratic laws and regulations. After completing that, they would move on to an early election with proportional representation. On the first day of August, PM Menderes declared the date for the next general elections.¹⁷⁸ For the first time, the FP called the opposition parties together for a conference in August.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, İsmet

172 Ibid., 226.

173 Ibid., 233.

174 "Üç muhalif parti lideri C.M.P merkezinde buluştu," *Cumhuriyet*, July 5, 1957. In fact, both parties were flirting in July when they made separate declarations regarding the economic course of the country, which had points in common. On 7 and thirteen July, the FP and the RPP respectively stressed the problems of the economy resulting from the policies of the ruling party which had no ability to overcome them. *FORUM* interpreted these declarations as a sign that the two parties agreed on economic issues. "Muhalefet Bildirisi," *FORUM* July 15, 1957.

175 "Muhalefet seçimlerin öne alınacağına ısrar ediyor," *Cumhuriyet*, May 17, 1957.

176 "Başbakan dün Sivasta «seçimler yakındır» dedi," *Cumhuriyet*, May 26, 1957.

177 "Hür. P. teşkilâtına «Seçime hazır ol» Emrini Verdi," *Cumhuriyet*, June 18, 1957.

178 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 295.

179 "Hür. P. «yuvarlak masa» toplantısına iştirake hazır," *Cumhuriyet*, August 5, 1957.

İnönü, the leader of the RPP declared that he was open to negotiating with both the FP and RNP.¹⁸⁰ The opposition immediately started to have roundtable talks. On 12 August, the first meeting was held in İnönü's house on Heybeliada to talk about a common program and to determine the conditions of cooperation, and these meetings continued through 21 August.¹⁸¹ While the first two meetings were held in İnönü's home in Heybeliada, the third and fourth were held in İnönü's home in Taşlık. The negotiations took place in a friendly, positive environment. The headline of *Cumhuriyet* on 22 August they "Fully Compromised Regarding Cooperation Issue."¹⁸²

Still, some local party organizations of the FP were annoyed about the co-operation talks. While the party center was trying to deceive the locals, an interesting statement came from Çelikbaş from the Ankara convention of the party. "No FP member was to talk against cooperation in the election."¹⁸³ This can be thought of as pressure on locals by the center, the reason for the formation of the party by splitting with the DP. About one week later, in Bandırma, Çelikbaş stated that "if we had to merge with a party, we would not have formed our party."¹⁸⁴

On the last day of August, the congress of the Istanbul party organizations of the FP started in a room in Beyoğlu district, Taksim Belediye Gazinosu.¹⁸⁵ Because of the peaceful atmosphere among the opposition parties resulting from the roundtable talks, some opposition party agents, such as Sadık Aldoğan and Fuad Arna, and Şemsettin Günaltay, visited the convention where cooperation between the parties was praised in almost all the

180 "İnönü, C.M.P. ve Hür. P. ile görüşmeğe hazırım dedi," *Cumhuriyet*, August 8, 1957.

181 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 295. The RPP was represented by İsmet İnönü, Kasım Gülek, and Turgut Göle; the FP was represented by Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, Enver Güreli, and İbrahim Öktem; and the agents of the RNP were Fuad Arna, Ahmet Bilgin, Nurettin Arıçoğlu.

182 "İşbirliği mevzuunda tam bir anlaşmaya varıldı," *Cumhuriyet* August 22, 1957.

183 "Hiçbir Hür. P. li seçimlerde işbirliği yapılması aleyhinde bulunamaz." "F. Ergin D.P. nin iktisadi politikasını tenkid etti," *Cumhuriyet*, September 2, 1957.

184 "Eğer bir parti ile birleşecek olsaydık partimizi kurmazdık." *Cumhuriyet*, September 12, 1957.

185 "Hür. P. İl Kongresi dün çalışmalarına başladı," *Cumhuriyet*, September 1, 1957.

speeches.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, one delegate, İhsan Yıldırım, remarkably confessed that he had been forced by Mükerrer Sarol to enter the convention to provoke dissension within the party. A striking indicator of the direct struggle between Sarol and the founders of the FP, which was inherited by the intraparty struggles within the DP where they were having struggle before the fourth convention of the DP.¹⁸⁷ Even though the clique had left the DP and formed another political party, their infighting had not been put to an end.

After longstanding negotiations, opposition parties came together and declared a common program.¹⁸⁸ It was decided that the opposition parties would share the deputies as follows: 45 percent of deputies will be given to the RPP, 25 percent to the FP, 25 percent to the NP, and 5 percent to the independents. Nonetheless, the plan would be damaged by the DP. The response of the government to cooperation negotiations was aggressive; Menderes insulted the political parties for seeking cooperation each other in an unethical way. For him, although these parties had had severe disputes before, they were currently trying to join together against the DP. Also, Emin Kalafat who had once been among the moderates in the DP, attacked cooperation characterizing the attempt as a hostility front.¹⁸⁹ A counterattack came from the government in response to these efforts of the opposition parties that were maneuvering to cooperate. A law amendment regarding general elections was passed to hinder the cooperation among opposition parties.¹⁹⁰ The amendment to the electoral law did not allow political parties whose writ of elections were not completed in their districts to enter the elections. All parties would make a full list of all electoral districts they wanted to enter, and one political party member could

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- 186 *Cumhuriyet*, September 1-3, 1957. The party published the report of the Istanbul committee. *Hürriyet Partisi İstanbul Vilâyet Müteşebbis Heyeti 1956-1957 Faaliyet Raporu* (Istanbul: Hüsniyat Matbaası, 1957).
- 187 Erol Dallı, "F.L. Karaosmanoğlu «Bu iktidar değişmelidir» dedi," *Cumhuriyet*, September 3, 1957.
- 188 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 166. "Üç Muhalefet Partisinin Müşterek Tebliği," *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 1957.
- 189 "E. Kalafat muhalefet tebliğine cevap veriyor," *Cumhuriyet*, September 9, 1957.
- 190 "İktidarın İşbirliğine Karşı Beş Tedbiri," *Cumhuriyet*, September 11, 1957. Law 7053 prevents opposition parties from forming a united front. *Resmi Gazete*, no. 9705, September 13, 1957: 17850.

not be nominated by another political party. Also, those who had already attended to the primary election in one of the parties' local organization or were nominated on a party list for an election could not be presented as a candidate in the general elections for another party. Moreover, the law stressed that candidates who would not enroll a political party six months before the Grand National Assembly declared the date of general elections could not be nominated. And furthermore, candidates who resigned within two months of the elections could not be nominated by another political party. This specifically targeted Fuad Köprülü who had resigned from the DP before the law was amended and intended to be a member of the FP after his son, Orhan Köprülü, who had already become a member of the FP.¹⁹¹ This is a significant indicator of the conditions the ruling party brought to Turkey before the next general elections.

In response to the move of the DP, the three opposition party leaders made a joint statement saying that cooperation adopted by the nation could not be prevented by austerity measures.¹⁹² On 11-15 September 1957, the thirteenth convention of the RPP was held, in which the need for a cooperation among the political parties was emphasized. In a similar vein, on 18 September, the RNP convention accepted the cooperation. Therefore, all opposition parties agreed on the need for and fully supported cooperation among themselves.¹⁹³ However, the electoral amendment made cooperation almost impossible. Only two ways were left to cooperate in the new situation: either the parties would divide electoral districts (bölge taksimi) among themselves and all opposition parties would support the one who entered the election in a given province or one political party from the opposition would enter the elections throughout Turkey alone, and the rest would support it without reserve.¹⁹⁴

191 Cem Eroğlu, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71," in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed. C. Shick, E. A. Tonak, (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 115.

192 For their initial efforts to prepare the program and the bylaws of the future party "3 Muhalif parti liderleri dün bir toplantı yaptılar," *Cumhuriyet*, September 13, 1957.

193 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 297.

194 While public was occupied with cooperation negotiations, *FORUM* magazine acted like the bureau of press and public relation of the negotiations making several publications with wishful thinkings in favor of the success of the cooperation. To illustrate, in several articles, it

Nevertheless, the longstanding negotiations and meetings came to nothing, and all the oppositional parties blamed each other for the outcome.¹⁹⁵ The FP and RNP accused the RPP of the failure, stressing that the RPP desired to enter the elections by itself and be supported by the rest. The RPP thought one party, the RPP of course, should enter the elections alone and the rest should support it.¹⁹⁶

All in all, the opposition parties failed to cooperate with each other to dispose of the DP in the next general elections; they could not manage to agree on the terms. And as one would expect, this situation was contrary to their interests. In a nutshell, cooperation idea did not reach a conclusion, and the three opposition parties declared that they were entering the general elections separately.¹⁹⁷ The results of the 1957 general elections indicate that the opposition paid a tragic price for the failure to cooperate.

Last but not least, it is important to underline that in September 1957, the well-known leader of the Turkish Hearths, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver,

claimed that there were no differences between the parties, so separation of the RPP from the FP was meaningless. "İşbirliğinde İlk Adım," *FORUM*, July 15, 1956. Also "Madem ki İktidar Şekilleniyor," *FORUM* and April 1, 1957. The matter was to beat the ruling party which had created the regime depression (rejim bunalımı), as what they called for the political and economic instability of the country. For that, the opposition parties should form a united front, the number one priority of which to defeat the DP. "Muhalefet Buhranı," *FORUM*, October 15, 1956. "Muhalef Partiler ve İşbirliği," *FORUM*, August 1, 1957. *FORUM* considered inclusion of the FP to the opposition front. Because according to them, with the help of FP members who had a significant reputation in public opinion, irresolute electorates who were inclined to the DP could be appealed by the opposition to the RPP. This was an interesting view of *FORUM* with respect to the FP's mission. "İşbirliği Konusunda Vuzuha Doğru," *FORUM*, November 1, 1956. When cooperation fell through, *FORUM* together with the FP criticized the RPP for being arrogant who not wanting to be equal to other parties. It was argued that the RPP was not sufficient intellectually. Münci Kapani and Muammer Aksoy, writers for *FORUM* also wrote some articles labor of cooperation in *Cumhuriyet*. Muammer Aksoy and Münci Kapani, "Muhalef Partilerin İşbirliği Derhal Gerçekleşmelidir," *Cumhuriyet*, September 22, 1957.

195 "Üç Parti Ayrı Ayrı Tebliğ Neşrettiler," *Cumhuriyet*, September 21, 1957.

196 Ibid.

197 Ibid.

invited by Ziyad Ebuzziya join the FP.¹⁹⁸ On the same day, Sabahattin Sönmez, a journalist, join the FP.¹⁹⁹ Tanrıöver was the last deputy who joined the FP from the DP. Henceforth, at its height, the FP had forty-two seats in parliament.

§ 3.3 The Fall of the FP

After the unsuccessful cooperation attempts, the FP, like the other opposition parties, entered the 1957 general election alone. Despite an elevated level of self-esteem and optimism, the results show that the party had no credibility within Turkish society. After the shocking results, the party was left to die. The short-lived FP shut down in 1958 by joining the RPP

3.3.1 *The 1957 General Elections and the Freedom Party*

The Freedom Party had run an intense propaganda program starting in 1956. For that, the party prepared a tour program all around Turkey and was divided into two groups. The first was composed of İbrahim Öktem, Ekrem Alican, Raif Aybar, and Ziya Termen were responsible for Northern and Eastern Anatolia starting in Ankara. The latter presided by Çelibaş was responsible for Kocaeli, Adapazarı, Bilecik, and Bursa Provinces.²⁰⁰ These tours around the Anatolian peninsula to get in touch with ordinary people were called as duty tours (vazife gezileri) and were tours for listening the people's troubles (dert dinleme gezileri). Those who were on tour called themselves the Thunderbolt Team.²⁰¹

198 Fethi Tevetoğlu, *Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver: Hayatı ve Eserleri* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı, 1986), 213

199 “Hamdullah Suphi ve Sabahaddin Sönmez dün Hür. Partisine girdiler,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 11, 1957.

200 “Hür. P. İl Merkezindedün yapılan toplantı,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 1, 1956.

201 However, the ruling party tried to prevent this campaign at every opportunity. The members’ visit to the Atatürk mausoleum in November 1956 is a crucial example. The governor of Ankara, Cemal Gökten, prevented the meeting of the party and prevented its members from placing a wreath at the mausoleum. Moreover, the governor also forbade the party leaders

The party published some books during the electoral campaign to explain and spread its ideas.²⁰² That said, the party published 300 thousand brochures under fifteen mottos.²⁰³ The first collective meeting of the FP was held in Adapazarı.²⁰⁴ On 19 October 1957, the FP published its election manifesto.²⁰⁵ All the candidates for all the political parties were announced in the press in October 1957.²⁰⁶ The FP decided to enter the elections in 56 cities with 550 candidates, but the party did not manage to enter in the eleven cities because of it had no party organizations in these districts.²⁰⁷

When we look at the electoral campaigns of all the parties in the 1957 general elections, we can see that the DP made no promises in the campaign, relying instead on its practices especially in terms of economics made in its

from giving a dinner in their own home. "Ankara Valisinin Hür. P. için iki yeni kararı," *Cumhuriyet*, August 12, 1956.

- 202 Among them, *Hürriyet ve Refah Yolu* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), *İleriye Atılış* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), *Hürriyetçi Ne Diyor* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), *İçtimai Adaletle Doğru* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), *Hürriyet Mektupları* (Ankara: Şaka Matbaası, 1957). We will look at these in the final chapter.
- 203 For some examples, see *The Brochures of the Party in the Elections*, Appendix B.
- 204 "Hür. P. ilk büyük mitingi dün Adapazarında yaptı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 16, 1957.
- 205 *Hürriyet Partisi Seçim Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957).
- 206 The lists of all political candidates' names printed on a full page in *Milliyet*. "Hürriyet Partisi Adayları," *Milliyet*, October 8, 1957.
- 207 *FORUM*, in one of its issues, produced statistics regarding their candidates' occupations. "Parti Adayları," *FORUM*, October 15, 1957. There were 11 academicians, 137 lawyers, 43 doctors, 23 journalists, 21 certified engineers, 18 pedagogs, 6 generals, 2 admirals, 10 military officers, 80 agriculturalists, 25 economists, 14 mayors and aldermans, 15 workers and drivers, 20 pharmaceutists and chemists, 3 vets, 92 notables and traders, 5 factory owners, and 15 with various other occupations. In the RPP, there were 211 lawyers, 50 doctors, 30 journalists, 6 phameceutists, 20 factor owners, 9 workers, 9 agriculturalists, 21 managers, 18 pedagogs, 36 engineers, 12 economists, 58 tradesmen, 57 farmers. There is no clear-cut difference between the two parties regarding their candidates' social backgrounds. Lawyers dominante both lists. Also, there are more industrialists on the RPP list while there are more agriculturalists on the FP list.
- The eleven cities in which the party did not attent the elections were Ağrı, Van, Mardin, Maraş, Sivas, Bolu, Sinop, Tekirdağ, Afyon, Kırşehir, and Nevşehir. Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri," 68.

previous terms of offices.²⁰⁸ In fact, the party did not publish a manifesto for the elections. In parallel, Karpas states that “the Democrats claimed that economic prosperity was more important to the general public than the political freedom, demanded by but a small group of intellectuals.”²⁰⁹ On the other hand, in its electoral campaign, the RPP complained about restrictions on individual and political freedoms and pledged a proportional representation system instead of the majoritarian system valid at the time which caused electoral injustices. Like the RPP, the RNP emphasized the limitations on freedom throughout the country. In the electoral campaign, the FP stressed that individual and political freedoms were restricted, too. For example, a brochure the party prepared for the general elections argued that the mass demonstrations that occurred 6-7 September 1955 showed the weaknesses of the government and was an important theme with respect to individual rights and freedoms. On the other hand, the party complained about the economic state of Turkey. Respectively, as we can observe from the brochures, inflation was another significant, underscored theme for the FP, as were the shortages of some goods and the need to terminate of the National Security Law.²¹⁰ In fact, both the FP and RPP promised that the law would be abolished if they came to power.²¹¹ The FP presented its remedies for both the regime depression (*rejim bunalımı*), as they call in some of its publications which indicates the instability in the country and the economic problems.

The FP was overconfident and optimistic about the results. Such optimism is best illustrated an article published in *FORUM* by Cemal Aygen wherein he asserted that the party, which had 1,092,750 members, could win 22.16 percent of the votes equal to 136 deputies - while the RPP could win 29.78 percent of the vote amounting to 181 deputies and the RNP could take 10 percent vote and 61 deputies. According to him, the DP would only take 38.15 percent of

208 Orhan Aldıkaçtı, "27 Ekim 1957 Milletvekilleri Seçimi," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası* 24, 1-4 (1959), 18-19.

209 Kemal H. Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1961): 442.

210 See *the Brochures of the FP in the 1957 Elections*, Appendix B.

211 "C.H.P ve Hür. P. nin iktidara hücumları," *Cumhuriyet*, September 25, 1957.

the vote and 232 deputies.²¹² Nevertheless, two weeks later, a reader, Saffet Şav, strongly criticized the article stating that he was astounded by Aygen's calculation. Though Aygen knew that the electoral system was majoritarian one, Şav did not understand how Aygen could make such a calculation by summing up the votes and predicting the possible number of seats accordingly.²¹³ The optimism of the party was not only valid for intellectuals connected with the FP. In meetings, the FP leaders made hopeful speeches. To illustrate, Çelikbaş stated in one speech that "we will win in twenty provinces."²¹⁴ Moreover, FP candidates in Bursa Province - the general secretary of the party İbrahim Öktem and founders Raif Aybar and Sabahattin Çıracıoğlu - were so sure of their victory in the elections that they became candidates in only in one province.²¹⁵ According to Öktem this was an indicator of their self-confidence.²¹⁶ Moreover, Yaşar Kemal, a reporter for *Cumhuriyet*, reported that in Adıyaman the real race would be happen between the Fırat brothers and the sons of the

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- 212 Cemal Aygen, "Önümüzdeki Seçimin Muhtemel Neticeleri," *FORUM*, October 1, 1957. The outcome was far from these predictions: the FP gained only four seats in parliament. On the hand, this article can be considered a sign that the magazine had become a propaganda magazine of the party despite all denials and claims to objectivity. This shattered objectivity can be traced to many articles defending the FP and criticizing the rest. Especially before the elections, it appears that the journal started to back the FP in an unprecedented way. For instance, it was possible to see the stump speeches of party members in the pages of the magazine, but those of the opposition (such as *FORUM*, September 15, 1957.) This biased objectivity of the bulletin was criticized by readers, as well. To illustrate, Vasıf Arna criticized it in an article. Furthermore, Naki Arpacıoğlu asked "Do not you realize that the spirit and content of Forum is being lost slowly?" ("Forum'un ruh ve muhtevasını yavaş yavaş yitirdiğini farketmiyor musunuz?") Vasıf Arna, letter to the editor, *FORUM*, November 1, 1957. Naki Arpacıoğlu, letter to the editor, *FORUM*, November 1, 1957.
- 213 Saffet Şav, "Seçimin Neticeleri Hakkında," *FORUM*, October 15, 1957.
- 214 "Çelikbaş, 20 ilde kazanacağız, dedi," *Cumhuriyet*, September 24, 1957.
- 215 In the 1950s, one person had a chance to be nominated in more than one province at the same time to enhance the chance of being elected. Political parties nominated their essential figures, including leaders, in more than one province to guarantee their deputyships.
- 216 Yaşar Kemal, "Adayların yüzde 70 i siyasete yeni atılmış olan elemanlar," *Cumhuriyet*, October 8, 1957.

famous Bedi Agha, and victory for the FP was possible.²¹⁷ To sum up, the FP was confident of its power given the help of the media.²¹⁸ In the same vein, Karpat argues that the “Freedom Party entered the election campaign with an exaggerated belief in its own strength and importance.”²¹⁹ Notwithstanding, the general election held in 1957 resulted in the total destruction of the party.²²⁰ The party won in only one province, Burdur and took four seats in parliament, with the help of the personal influence of Fethi Çelikbaş.²²¹

All the opposition parties suffered from the majoritarian electoral in effect at that time. This premise can be clarified if one looks at the results of the

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- 217 Nonetheless, the DP won the election in Adıyaman with 37,868 votes against the RPP's 28,684 votes. The number of votes for the third party, the FP, was 9236. The FP was consistently artificially aggradized by the media.
- 218 In fact, along with the efforts of *Dünya*, *FORUM*, *Akis*, and *Cumhuriyet* supported the party. Moreover, the Ankara bureau of *Vatan* also supported the party. Kemal Bağlum, *Anıpolitik (1945-60)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991), 149. The FP expressed its appreciation for the media in the convention of the Istanbul party organization and at its first convention. *İstanbul Müteşebbis Raporu*, 7. Also “Hür. P. Büyük Kongresi dün Ankarada toplandı,” *Cumhuriyet*, September 15, 1957.
- 219 Karpat, “The Turkish Elections,” 441. In a similar way, Yalman confirms this point. Ahmet Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim Geçirdiklerim (1922-1971)* (Istanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret A.Ş., 1997), 1651.
- 220 According to some analysts, the FP could not even win the votes of all its own members. “Seçimler ve Hür. P.,” *FORUM*, November 1, 1957. In many districts, the number of the votes given to the FP was below its number of members.
- 221 Demirci, “Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri,” 70. In fact, before the elections it was stated by media that the fate of the election in the district strongly depended on the ability of Çelikbaş himself, who was an influential politician in rural areas of the province, unlike in the center where the RPP was more popular. In fact, even if Çelikbaş had been nominated by the RPP, he would be elected there. “Burdurda D.P. geri plâna düşmüş vaziyette,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 1957. In my point of view, this is a sign of clientalistic relations in districts where the FP dominated. Çelikbaş was “the Agha of Burdur” as Arzık puts it. Nimet Arzık, *Tek At Tek Mızrak Anılar*, vol 2 (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984), 183. If a candidate has enough power to dominate elections in a specific district whatever political party he is a member of, I am not sure how and why his party differs from its counterparts in the minds of electorates. In fact, when Çelikbaş was a member of the DP, he was elected in Burdur in the 1955 general elections. When he was a candidate for the FP, he was elected again. After the unification of the RPP and FP, he was elected on behalf of the RPP in the same region, as well.

election. In the election, the DP won 424 deputies by obtaining 48 percent of the vote, while the RPP had 178 deputies in return for 41 percent of the vote.²²² The DP obtained less than 50 percent of the votes, and with reference to that, the leader of the main opposition party, İsmet İnönü, called the DP a minority government, questioning its legitimacy.²²³ According to calculations by Aldıkaçtı, if the 1957 general elections had been held according to a proportional representation system, the FP would have gained 9-22 more deputies.²²⁴

We need to shed light on the reasons for the failure of the FP in the 1957 general elections. First, the sudden moves of Menderes by moving the elections up one year did not allow the FP to become stronger and prepare. While the FP was striving to handle establishment of its local organizations throughout country, it encountered a sudden election which caught the party off balance. This was a dreadful attack by Menderes. The result had effects even after the elections such that the spirit of the FP started to be extinguished. Furthermore, according to Ergin, one of the founders of the party, there were other reasons behind the failure of the party in the 1957 elections. First, members in the headquarters of the party did not manage to create a regular, rational working environment. Second, they lost considerable time when the party was about to be formed after splitting with the DP. This delay reduced the number new members joining the party. If it had been formed more quickly, in the exciting environment more people would have joined the party. Third, the board of directors of the party organizations, especially in rural areas, lacked experience in politics. Fourth, even though the FP ran intense political campaigns in certain districts, these activities were not broadcast to the rest of Turkey; the media did not have enough freedom and independence, restricted as it was by governmental the authorities, the strongest rival of the FP.²²⁵ That

222 Sina Akşin, "Siyasi Tarih (1950-1960)," in *Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye IV (1908-1980)*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008), 218.

223 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 171.

224 Aldıkaçtı, "27 Ekim 1957," 22. For the tables of results of the elections see, *The 1957 General Elections*, Appendix C.

225 Feridun Ergin, "Hürriyet Partisi," in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), 2088.

the FP was a political failure, underscored by Ergin, is a shared notion among other researchers in the literature. According to Karpas, the reasons the FP was a political failure are that the party could not manage to “communicate with the masses:” the party had “no concrete policy for the problems” and had an “organization shortage.” Thus, the party offered a “confused liberalism” that had no solution for the problems of daily life, which is what the electorate expected.²²⁶ According to Demirci, the party failed in the elections because it behaved selectively when enrolling the new members to the party. Also, the date of the elections was brought forward by the government which was a setback for the development of the party, it had some troubles in organizing in rural areas. Furthermore, tendency of the voters to vote for the strongest opposition party in the districts was another factor which weakened the party in the elections.²²⁷ On the other hand, because there was not an equal competition between the political parties in the election campaign, because the elections was held one year early, and because the opposition parties failed to combine in a united front against the DP, the FP failed in the general election of 1957.²²⁸ Furthermore, *FORUM* blamed the RPP for the failure, undermining the possible cooperation and forced the electorate to choose between the RPP and the DP; therefore, minor parties squeezed between the two poles and a considerable number of potential votes went to the RPP.²²⁹ In fact, in the electoral campaign, the FP leaders and the media recommended that the

226 Karpas, “Turkish Elections,” 454.

227 Demirci, “Hürriyet Partisi'nin Yeri,” 70-71.

228 Burak Özçetin, “Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party” (master’s thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2004), 91.

229 “Seçimin Düşündürdükleri,” *FORUM*, November 1, 1957. On 5 November 1957, after the elections, the party declared and gave the reasons for its failure; the election system and the pressures over themselves put by the state was put forward. “C.M.P memnun, Hür. P. müteessir görünüyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 29, 1957. Karaosmanoğlu expressed his regret for the results, he regarded the nation as faulty. “Hür. P. nin takib edeceği politika,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 18, 1957. The general secretary of the party, İbrahim Öktem, also stated that when the cooperation fell through, the RPP took advantage of it: most of votes in FP districts were redirected to the RPP, the most powerful party opposing the DP.

electorate vote for the opposition party that was most powerful in their region.²³⁰ For instance, Orhan Köprülü, in the first meeting of the FP in Istanbul, urged "vote for the party which is the strongest one in your judgement."²³¹ This was a significant statement showing the stance of the FP, or at least some members, in the general elections. The party had a vision to defeat the DP even at the cost of its own possible success. It turned out that that cost facilitated its own fall.

3.3.2 *The Fall of the Freedom Party and the Merger with the Republican People's Party - Ya Devlet Başa Ya Kuzgun Leşe*²³²

After the catastrophe of the 1957 election, the FP started to become disappeared in the Turkish political arena. The results were a shock to the party, and party members were discouraged about continuing their political lives under the umbrella of the FP roof like nothing had happened.²³³ Just after the election, most of the figures of the party initially fell into silence. Not only the FP but also *FORUM* lapsed into silence. Süleman Arif Emre, in his memoirs, says that when he visited the party center, everybody felt too upset to even say a word. "If this cadre who expected a victory did not find what they expected, they would perish. As a matter of the fact, it happened like that."²³⁴ Most members were paralyzed and shocked by the results as the expectations had been huge. Thus, the FP entered a new era – namely, downfall. The chairman of the party, Fevzi Lütüf, departed for Ankara hugely disappointed keeping his hands

230 "Vatandaş Ne Yapacak," *FORUM*, October 1, 1957.

231 "Kuvvetli olduğuna hükmettiğiniz muhalefet partisi varsa, o yerde reynizi ona verin." "Hür. P. dün şehrimizdeki ilk mitingini yaptı," *Cumhuriyet*, October 5, 1957. Also, *İleriye Atılış*, 20.

232 A phrase like "crossing the rubicon" - which indicates burning bridges to attain a divine goal of power even if it came the cost of life - was also the spirit that led Turkey to a military coup, as well. Before the 1960 coup, *FORUM* magazine threateningly announced the danger of the slipping of the struggle from the "arena" to the "field," marking a moment when intellectuals started to become militarized. "Türkiye'de Demokrasi," *FORUM*, March 15, 1959.

233 Looking at articles published after the elections, it can be argued that not only the party but also *FORUM* magazine was paralyzed about the results.

234 "İlk seçimde zafer bekleyen bu kadro umduğunu bulamazsa perişan olacaktı. Nitekim olmuştu." Süleymen Arif Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl*, vol. 1 (Istanbul: Keşif Yayınlar, 2002), 86.

off the party. Güneş says that he spent all his time in Izmir and Manisa after 1955.²³⁵ Enver Güreli, the vice president of the party, resigned from his position and moved to Istanbul. His position was filled by İbrahim Öktem.²³⁶ In the place of Öktem, Güneş became the general secretary of the party. The accountant member became Aydın Yalçın in place of Muhlis Ete who himself left the party after the elections. The press argued that he and Safaettin Karanakçı and Muhlis Ete had approached the government in exchange for an appointment. Cemal Kıpçak, Muhlis Bayramoğlu, Ziya Termen, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, Sabahattin Çıracıoğlu, and Selahattin Toker resigned from the party one after the other.²³⁷ Some members of the party in the Burdur organization resigned together, and some resignations occurred in the Manisa organization.²³⁸ With respect to the resignations, Güneş claimed that "the rubbish has gone" (döküntüler gitti).²³⁹ However, this was neither a remedy for the disappearing party members or an act to slow their departures down. Resignations continued. In Ankara organization, Yusuf Topçu, the sub-provincial administrative board chairman, resigned.²⁴⁰ In Diyarbakır, a group of FP members transferred to the RPP.²⁴¹ Even in the party paper, *Yeni Gün*, some resignations happened.²⁴² Meanwhile, even though the speaker of the party, Çelikbaş, speaking on behalf of the party, made his strong, well-prepared criticisms towards the 1958 budget of the government after the elections occurred; the voice of the

235 Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 64.

236 Ibid., 59.

237 Ibid., 59. "İki Hür. P.li milletvekilinin yeni vazifeleri," *Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 1958. *Cumhuriyet*, May 13, 1958. "Eski bir milletvekili Hür. P. den ayrıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, May 24, 1958. It is argued that Muhlis Bayramoğlu was appointed to Gureba Hospital as a pediatrician.

"Eski milletvekili Ziya Termen Hür. P. den istifa etti," *Cumhuriyet*, May 24, 1958. "Cemal Kıpçak Hür. P. den istifa etti," *Cumhuriyet*, May 31, 1958.

"Hürriyet Partisinden istifalar çoğalıyor," *Cumhuriyet*, May 30, 1958.

"Hür. P. de yeni bir istifa," *Cumhuriyet*, June 1, 1958.

238 "Burdurda Hür. P. den istifalar," *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1958. "Hür. P. dimdik ayakta," *Cumhuriyet*, May 30, 1958.

239 "Hür. P. liderlerinin C.H.P.ye hücumları," *Cumhuriyet*, June 23, 1958.

240 "Ankarada Hür. P. de istifalar," *Cumhuriyet*, July 13, 1958.

241 "Hür. P. den C.H.P.ye geçti," *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 1958.

242 "Hür. P. gazetesinde toptan istifalar," *Cumhuriyet*, September 4, 1958.

four FP deputies, in the assembly, was heard less and less because they could not form a group in parliament with just four deputies.²⁴³

While the party was on the verge of dissolving, the leading cadre desired to shut it down and continue their political life in another political party by colluding with other opposition parties. Also, other opposition parties desired cooperation. In that period, there were some calls for the unification of the opposition parties by the Peasant Party to the RNP and the FP one after. The GAB of the FP had already been in meetings to discuss the future of the party since 2 October 1957.²⁴⁴ It declared a memorandum all opposition parties needed to cooperate under a united front based on the principles determined before the 1957 general elections.²⁴⁵ The board thought that the party could not go on in these circumstances, local organizations of the party in danger of dissolving given the resignations. A couple days later, İsmet İnönü invited the FP into his political party. He was consistently emphasizing the need for the unification of opposition forces for democratic ideas in his speeches.²⁴⁶ The FP answered İnönü that the party was determined to participate in the RPP to form a power block (*güçbirliği*).²⁴⁷ The declaration included three points and referred to the PP because the initial unification call had come from that party. The FP welcomed the effort of the PP, but it had a vision to deepen that call articulating other opposition parties to the block. When the FP demonstrated its eagerness for the unification, some discussions within the party came to the fore. Some members of the FP fiercely objected to the RPP and to İnönü himself. Behçet Kayaalp, one of the four deputies of the FP, criticized the declaration of the party asserting that the real aim of the declaration was to

243 1958 *Bütçesi* (Ankara: Balkanoğlu Matbaacılık, 1958). Çelikbaş took the floor for representing himself, not for the FP group, in his budget talks. Because the bylaws of the assembly were changed by the ruling party after the elections, the FP could not form a group in parliament.

244 "Hürriyet Partisi'nin İstişari Kongresi," *FORUM*, April 1, 1958.

245 "Üç muhalefet partisinin müşterek tebliği," *Cumhuriyet*, September 5, 1958.

246 Tekin Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 348.

247 Ibid.

destroy the party.²⁴⁸ When FP leaders started to negotiate with the leaders of the RPP, the Kayaalp crisis got bigger.²⁴⁹ On 9 October 1958, Kayaalp argued that joining in the RPP was not compatible with the principles of the party and its decisions; it clearly contradicted the Freedom Vow made in the first convention.²⁵⁰ In return, some FP leaders accused Kayaalp of acting contrary to the principles of the party by looking for opportunities to leave the party. Ironically, these who left the DP crying that it was devoid of intraparty democracy became those who wielded the solid power to suppress these who thought that the party should not join the RPP. The iron law of oligarchy demonstrated itself here. While the two parties negotiated their unification, the RNP invited the FP to merge with it. Nonetheless, the FP was not favor this kind of unification in which the RPP was excluded. On the other hand, PM, Menderes, angrily responded to the efforts characterizing this kind of merger as the hatred and hostility front and he invited the people to form a Motherland Front under the wings of the DP to oppose it. The merger of the opposition was called also as crime front (Suçbirliği).²⁵¹ He, in one speech in Lüleburgaz called it crusaders' front (Ehlisalip Cephesi).²⁵²

The GAB of the FP informed party organizations on 22 October 1958 that the unification of opposition parties would be negotiated in an extraordinary convention to be held on 23 November 1958.²⁵³ The RPP was also discussing the details of a possible unification in a meeting under the chairmanship of İnönü together with the joining of FP leaders.²⁵⁴ However, the Ankara party organization of the FP was strictly against their participation, and most of the administrative board members considered resigning.²⁵⁵ In fact, Orhan Tan

248 “Hür. P. Burdur İdare Heyeti istifa etti,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 28, 1958. The other three FP deputies from Burdur were among the proponents, including Fethi Çelikbaş. “Hür. P. yi tenkid eden Hür. P. mebusu,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 7, 1958.

249 “Hür. P. deki ihtilaf geliyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 9, 1958.

250 For the text of the vow, see *İleriye Atılış*, 21. Ibid.

251 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 349.

252 Ibid.

253 “Hür. P. olağanüstü kongresi toplanıyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 20, 1958.

254 “C.H.P. ile Hür. P. liler bir toplantı yaptılar,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 22, 1958.

255 “Hür. P. de istifalar bekleniyor,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 21, 1958.

from among Ankara party organization, resigned from the party.²⁵⁶ Furthermore, administrative board of İzmir resigned, Kayaalp in particular was against the unification. İlhan Kalkanoğlu was among the FP members who led the opposition within the party against unification with the RPP. There were also opponents in Istanbul, Eskişehir, and Sakarya Provinces.²⁵⁷

The FP extraordinary convention was not held on 23 November as planned because there was not the necessary quorum to open a convention; it was postponed to the next day.²⁵⁸ In this convention in Ankara where the party would terminate itself only 404 delegates participated. The low number indicates the low level of enthusiasm of the delegates about the unification. In fact, in his memoirs, Arif Emre stresses that most opponents to merger did not attend the convention.²⁵⁹ Selahattin Tandal was elected chair along with the vice presidents Selahattin Cizrelioğlu and Aydın Bolak. Lobbying before the convention indicated that some opposed unification by any means, and they led an anti-unification campaign and continually made objections during the convention. For instance, one of the İzmir delegates, Şeref Balkanlı was strictly against abolishing the FP.²⁶⁰ Moreover, Tahsin Marmara, Hüsametdin Cindoruk, and Avni Yurdabayrak were among the opponents to the merger. As the report of the GAB regarding unification was read out to the delegates by Güneş²⁶¹ some noises and murmurs were sometimes to be heard. When Cindoruk took the floor, he said that although he was not against the termination of the party, he did not indigenize a decision of unification.²⁶² As he was speaking, it was

256 "Hür. P. İstanbul teşkilatı «güçbirliğini» görüştü," *Cumhuriyet*, November 5, 1958.

257 In *FORUM*, it was questioned whether the unification had been negotiated in the upper echelons of two parties without the counsel of the organizations. İsmail Nafiz Alkan, "Hürriyetçiler Suçlu mu?" *FORUM*, November 15, 1958.

258 "Hür. P. Kongresi ekseriyet olmadığından yapılamadı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 24, 1958.

259 Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl*, 86.

260 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 31.

261 For the full text of the report, see *Hürriyet Partisi 23 Kasım 1958 Fevkalâde Kongresinde Sunulan Umumi İdare Heyeti Raporu* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1958).

262 He stated "let's make the decision of annulment. However, think about joining the RPP." "Fesih kararı verelim. Fakat C.H.P. ye iltihak üzerinde düşünelim." Ekrem Alican of the same mind. According to him, the party could recuse itself without making a choice between the RPP and

rumored that the police would raid and put an end to the convention. At that moment, Karaosmanoğlu took the microphone from Cindoruk and said, "the district governor of Çankaya is coming; he is going to raid the convention. My dear boy, you can talk then, I will put the matter to a vote. Who consents to participation with the Republican People's Party and who does not agree to it?" Cindoruk later describes what happened next as follows: "whereas no one could understand whether it was accepted or not, he said, "accepted!" and gave me the microphone. Said, "you keep going on, my child." I said, "Sir, you killed the party." "Oh really" he said and shut the convention down."²⁶³ According to Cindoruk, the seven leading figures of the party made the agreement with the RPP in order to enter the administration of that party. At the end of the convention, Cindoruk waited for the situation to settle. He later said that, "I did not consider this decision suitable given the three-year history of the FP."²⁶⁴ Furthermore, Balkanlı took the floor and sustained that Karaosmanoğlu had said to him, "there are two leaders in Turkey: İsmet İnönü and Adnan Menderes. We will take Menderes down by cooperating with İnönü."²⁶⁵ After this, the convention became upside down. Then, Avni Yurdabayrak made a speech opposing the decision, but these opponents were speaking after the decision had already been made, thus, their speeches opposing that were futile, too late.

All in all, the FP lasted two years, eleven months, three days and twenty-two hours and was put an end on 24 November 1958 by the decision of 175 positive votes to five negative ones. "While delegates were singing Independent March anthem, Hasan Kangal was crying his eyes out."²⁶⁶ Hamdullah

the DP. Gül Tuba Taşpınar Dağcı, "Ekrem Alican'ın Siyasal Hayatı" (PhD Diss. Istanbul University: The Atatürk Unstitute For Modern Turkish History, 2003), 31.

263 "Hüsamettin Cindoruk Anlattı: DP'lilerin Hürriyet Macerası," *NTV Tarih*, May 16, 2010. For the original expression, see the seventh point in *Originals*, Appendix A

264 "Bu kararı Hür. P. nin 3 yıllık mazisine yakışır bir karar olarak telâkki etmiyorum." "Hürriyet Partisi dün kendi kendini feshetti," *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1958.

265 "İki lider var Türkiyede biri İsmet İnönü ikincisi Adnan Menderes. Biz İnönü ile birleşerek Menderes'i yıkacağız." Ibid.

266 "Delegeler İstiklal Marşı okurlarken Hasan Kangal hüngür hüngür ağlıyordu." Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 371.

Suphi was very disappointed.²⁶⁷ As Karpat stated, the RPP absorbed the FP.²⁶⁸ In his memoirs, Güneş, the general secretary of the party at the time, confessed that the center tried to deceive the local organizations who were opposed the unification by stating that

actually, this was not a unification; it was a joining. However, we called it “unification” by taking the psychological aspect of it into consideration in the earlier negotiations. As a matter of fact, the Proclamation of Primary Aims prepared before the unification was written for the same reason. The content of the proclamation was comprised of ideas that the RPP had been defending all along. Yet we acted like it had been prepared by us to satisfy the supporters of the Freedom Party. In fact, this proclamation became a good reference by which to satisfy our organizations.²⁶⁹

The results of the Extraordinary Convention were extraordinary. I consider it a coup of the center over the delegates. If we recall, the FP was born as a result of a coup within the DP made by Menderes and Köprülü. Ironically, it turned out that the party was closed down by a coup of the center, as well.²⁷⁰ These

267 “Hürriyet Partisi dün kendi kendini feshetti,” *Cumhuriyet*, November 25, 1958.

268 Kemal Karpat, “Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 3 (1972): 356.

269 Simav, *Turan Güneş’in Kavgaları*, 68. For the whole text, see the eighth point in *Originals*, Appendix A. This proclamation was a summary of the prominent elements of the political discourses of both the FP and the RPP, mostly regarding the political regime related to some constitutional institutions, in the second half of the 1950s. It was read out by Turan Güneş to delegates at the Fourteenth RPP convention. The proclamation also summarized the party’s to-do list to be adopted after it comes to power. According to it, antidemocratic regulations and mentality would be abolished. A constitutional amendment would be enacted to provide popular sovereignty and social justice under rule of law. Freedom of speech, freedom of the arts and sciences, freedom of consciousness, freedom to form professional organizations, the right to strike, equality before the law - impartial administration of which would be under the judicial control -, a constitutional court, an impartial presidency, a second legislative chamber, impartial courts, proportional representation, and the right to prove would be adopted.

270 Also, the *FORUM* wing of the party did its best to support the unification process with strong efforts by Muammer Aksoy, Münci Kapani, and Coşkun Kırca. Unification was welcomed in

actors dismissed from their political party as a result of a coup played the role of staging a coup themselves three years later. It is also ironic that most of the figures among the leading cadre of the FP had allegedly risen up against one-man rule in the DP. In the end, they made a decision to participate in the RPP which was led by İsmet İnönü, and even more charismatic and powerful historical figure in 1950s Turkish politics - a national hero, or Pater Patrie, as Arzık puts it.²⁷¹ Ironically though, while some of the FP founders had built a considerable part of their political discourse since 1946 on opposition to İnönü and his "dictatorship" - as some of them sometimes called it -,²⁷² they became a part of the RPP under his leadership of İnönü in the end.²⁷³ After the party annulled itself, the leaders who had complained of charismatic leaders in their party ardently instructed the party organizations to participate in the RPP controlled by, probably the most charismatic leader of Turkey at the time, İnönü, a veteran of the national struggle of Turkey. How the FP members expected intraparty democracy under the leadership of a historical hero, İnönü, is a remarkable question in my mind.²⁷⁴

some articles published in the magazine. To illustrate, "Güç Birliği," *FORUM*, December 1, 1958. *FORUM* argued that the reason leaders of the FP had formed the party and did not join the RPP was that they could more effectively defeat the DP that way.

271 Nimet Arzık, *Tek At Tek Mızrak Anılar*, vol 2, 28. Arzık calls İsmet İnönü "the last Sultan." *Ibid.*, 15.

272 For example, journalist Karakuş argues that Muammer Alakant, one of the founders of the FP, was among the extremists within the DP who called İnönü "dictator," and "provocateur" in his speeches. Karaosmanoğlu also characterize the single party era as a dictatorship.

273 In one article published in *FORUM*, T. Hasan argued that the participation of the FP in the RPP was a machiavellist way of doing politics. Just one year before their unification, the FP considered the RPP as "a wolf in sheep's clothing." The change in the attitude of the FP signaled that the main target of the FP was to take the DP down whatever the cost instead of practicing politics in order to provide for the democratization of the country. T. Hasan, "Güçbirliği Yazısı," *FORUM*, February 15, 1959. The translator of *The Prince* by Machiavelli into Turkish was a member of the FP. Niccolo Machiavelli, *Hükümdar*, trans. Yusuf Adil Egeli (Ankara: Yıldız Matbaası, 1955).

274 I can explain the merger only with the determination of opponents to depose the Menderes circle, of which we will give a detailed account in ensuing chapters. They acted like ones who had sworn to get the Menderes team out.

After the operation of the center for unification was made in the convention, İsmet İnönü paid a visit to the FP center together with Kasım Gülek, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Faik Ahmed Barutçu, Turgut Göle, Memed Hazer, and Necati İlder; Fevzi Lütü and other prominent figures of the FP met them at the door. A couple days later, a memorandum signed by Karaosmanoğlu was given to local party organizations of the FP to instructing them to join the RPP organizations.²⁷⁵

The fourteenth convention of the RPP was held in January 1959 where The Proclamation of Primary Aims (İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi) was accepted and the leaders of the former FP were welcomed by the RPP. Some entered the party administration as negotiated.²⁷⁶ Based on the agreement, prominent figures of the FP would not lose their positions after the merger of the two parties; rather, they would be given equivalent office in the RPP.²⁷⁷

This was the whole story of the FP.

§ 3.4 The Road to the 27 May Coup

In this subsection, even though the coup was not directly related to the Freedom Party, a brief account of the historical background of Turkey from 1958 to the 27 May 1960 military coup that ended the DP era which had lasted between 1950 and 1960 will be briefly revealed.

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- 275 "Hür. P. teşkilâtına tamim," *Cumhuriyet*, November 28, 1957. Not all members joined the RPP after the party decided to do so. Among the FP members, some did not have a problem with the DP; their anxiety was about Menderes, and his entourage, and their administration. For them, it was not possible to join the RPP. Because of that, some members returned to the DP, such as Hüsametdin Cindoruk and Talat Asal. According to them, the mission of FP for a more democratic Turkey was divine and it was not stained. Some preferred not to join neither parties such as Emrullah Nutku and Ekrem Alican. According to Alican, the party should not have made a choice between two prominent parties. Tuba, "Ekrem Alican'ın," 31.
- 276 Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 70. Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, Turan Güneş, Enver Güreli, Cihad Baban, İbrahim Öktem, Emin Paksüt, Feridun Ergin, and Muammer Aksoy. Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 190.
- 277 Metin Tokar, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşalı Yılları (1944-1973): Demokrasiden Darbeye (1957-1960)*, (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 172.

The political and economic climate in Turkey after the 1957 general elections further deteriorated. This era can be summarized in one sentence: the DP increased the political pressure on all sorts of oppositions ever more tirelessly. In this era, a common view began to form in the minds of the opposition that the ruling party would not leave power consensually and that all opposition parties would soon be demolished. In fact, some argued that the party even would not enter elections again. The DP had exclusive authorization to wield the power of radio for political purposes in the guise of informing people about the activities of the government.²⁷⁸ The pressure on the press became so strict that papers sometimes went to print with blank columns because of censorship. Newspapers sometimes closed for a month.²⁷⁹ Several journalists were imprisoned.²⁸⁰ On the other hand, the traditional anxiety of the Kemalist elites for Islamic reactionism was equalized with the ruling party by some political and intellectual elites of the time. To illustrate, *FORUM* and *Akis* magazines published several articles about sheik Said Nursi, his religious sect, and its allegedly organic relations with the DP. The only goal in the mind of the opposition was to dispose Menderes and the DP from power whatever the costs.

Especially following the formation of The Inquiry Commission (Tahkikat Komisyonu) under the umbrella parliament on 11 August 1958 to monitor the antidemocratic actions of the opposition and the media which gave it judicial authority to a certain degree, the opposition became more suspicious of the government and feared that the opposition would crack down upon soon.²⁸¹ Despite the fact that one month before the coup, Menderes, as PM, announced that the commission was being abolished because it had completed its duties. Nevertheless, this was a futile announcement. Time was running out and nothing would stop the preparations of some military and civil servants.

278 For detailed criticisms by Muammer Aksoy of the use of radio in these years, see Muammer Aksoy, *Partizan Radyo ve D.P.* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1960).

279 *Ulus* paper was closed for a month. "Ulus gazetesi dün bir ay müddetle kapatıldı," *Cumhuriyet*, April 10, 1958.

280 For instance, Ahmet Emin Yalman, Naim Tirali, and Şahap Balcıoğlu were sent to prison for publishing the translation of an article by Pulliam attacking the government in March 1960.

281 Cem Eroğlu, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), 160.

In 1958 an event took place known, as the Nine Officers Case (9 Subay Olayı), signaling that some officers in the military were making preparations for a coup. A military officer, Samet Kuşçu, reported that a military junta composed of nine officers including himself had some plans to stage a coup. As a result, all nine officers were arrested; however, the government did not pay enough attention to the warning. The suspects were discharged except for the informant who was sentenced to prison as making a false accusation. The incident is accounted for most of the figures of the time, including then-President Celal Bayar, as the turning point in the development of the 1960 coup.

In April 1959, İsmet İnönü, the leader of the RPP, began making his nationwide tours called the spring offense starting in the provinces of Thrace.²⁸² Shortly after, he began his Aegean Offence, simulating his duty as the commander of the western front, starting in Uşak, a province in the inner Aegean region, a historical place where he had taken a Greek officer as a prisoner during the Turkish War of Independence.²⁸³ But he was injured by a stone thrown at him in incidents instigated by the local people.²⁸⁴ The tension escalated without cease. After that, he went to Manisa and Izmir to make speeches attacking the government. When he came to Istanbul, he was attacked by DP partisans with sticks and stones at Topkapı. His life was saved by the chance of a presence of a gendarmerie unit. Furthermore, in Çanakkale, another historically meaningful place for Turkish nationalism, some incidents occurred while the RPP entourage was on its propaganda tour. İnönü had not had any intention to stop, he started tours in center Anatolia after some incidents occurred between RPP and DP members on 23 March 1960. In Yeşilhisar, on the way to Kayseri, İnönü was blocked on his way to visit the town by the orders of the government. When İnönü insisted on entering the city, the military official let him go on his way in defiance of the orders. İnönü's reputation was more effective than the orders of governmental officials.

282 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 360.

283 Ibid., 362.

284 Poet Behçet Kemal Çağlar wrote a poem about this incident titled of Başına Çal Taşını. Arzık, *Tek At Tek Mızrak*, vol 2, 110. I was not aware of this that poet; I am grateful for the note in Nimek Arzık's book.

Just before the coup, a bill was given to the assembly by Mazlum Kayalar and Baha Akşit to form an inquiry commission to investigate the revolutionary activities of the opposition – especially of the RPP and the media - provoking people to raise an insurrection to overthrow the government. As the law was discussed in parliament, İsmet İnönü made a speech saying that “when the conditions are right, the revolution would be a legitimate right for the nations” comparing the situation with Korea in which dictator Rhee was overthrown by protestors. He warned the DP leaders about the political situation which would be resulted with a catastrophe and he himself would not help them in that case. In response, İnönü was suspended from the assembly for twelve meetings on 27 April. After that, another deputy of the RPP was be suspended, as well, and therefore, parliament decided to form the commission on 18 April 1960.

On 28 April 1959, there was student unrest in Istanbul.²⁸⁵ One student, Tü-
ran Emeksiz, died in an incident in Beyazıt.²⁸⁶ One day later, the protests
spread to Ankara. On 5 May, in Kızılay square, a subdistrict in Ankara, huge
protests occurred. PM, Adnan Menderes, was attacked and escaped from the
square by getting into a car belonging to a journalist.²⁸⁷ On day later, *Zafer*
paper was shut down.²⁸⁸ The leaders of the party called Ali Fuad Başgil, a pro-
fessor, from Istanbul to discuss the current matters that had gotten out of con-
trol. He came to Ankara and a secret meeting was held between Bayar, Men-
deres, Koraltan, and Zorlu. Başgil advised that the Inquiry Commission be
removed that the PM resign. Bayar rejected the proposal without discussion,
however. On 3 May 1960, Cemal Gürsel, the commander of the Turkish land
force gave a famous warning letter to Etem Menderes, the minister of national
defense, indicating his unease. One week before the coup, on 21 May, Military
College students marched silently on the streets of Ankara. The coup was in
sight. As Arzık said, “one had to be in power not to see it coming.”²⁸⁹

285 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 402.

286 Upon his death, Nazım Hikmet wrote a poem, *Beyazıt Meydanındaki Ölü* (A corpse in Beyazıt Square), in his memory.

287 Karakuş, *İşte Ankara*, 479-483.

288 Erer, *On Yılın Mücadelesi*, 419.

289 “Duymamak için iktidar olmak gerekiyordu.” Arzık, *Tek At Tek Mızrak Anılar*, vol 3, 10.

Finally, on 27 May 1960, a Captain, Alparaslan Türkes, on behalf of the National Unity Committee, declared on Turkish radio that the committee had seized power and declared a curfew. On 16 September 1961, Hasan Polatkan, the former minister of finance, and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the former minister of foreign affairs, were executed. One day later, the former PM, Adnan Menderes, was hanged on a decision made by the authorized court in Yassıada. As Ali Gevgili expressed, “absolute power brought about the absolute tragedy in the end.”²⁹⁰

290 "Mutlak iktidar en sonunda mutlak trajediyi getirmişti." Ali Gevgili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 151.

The Eclectic Character of the Freedom Party

His past is a greatest unknown; as for his future, a terrible darkness.

– Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları*.

In the light of the explanations that will be revealed in this chapter, I reach the conclusion that the Freedom Party of the 1950s was a political party that cannot be understood with reference to political programs, doctrines, or social structures. Rather, the party came to fore as the result of and as a response to intraparty struggles within the DP among some cliques, conflicts described in the second and third chapters. Therefore, the FP was a political party that adjusted its political discourse to the political atmosphere, and the keyword for understanding the party is eclectism. In that regard, I first touch upon the internal dynamics of the party in the first sub-section, and then, I continue to indicate the importance of focusing on the figures of the party. In the second sub-section, I shed light on what brought the members of the FP together. Then, I reveal that there were no doctrinaire positions in the Turkish political context more broadly, and the FP was just a particular example of this.

§ 4.1 The Internal Dynamics of the Party

The aim of this section is to show that the FP was a political coalition of eminent intellectuals of the time and displeased DP deputies expelled from high positions in their party as a result of losing battles to rival cliques. So, the party cannot be regarded as a mere political party of idealist intellectuals, as some researchers in the field have done.

4.1.1 *A Coalition of Intellectuals and Displeased Politicians*

Even though it had a short lifespan, the FP, which presented itself as a thought club has a significant place in the course of Turkish political history. It can be considered an important experiment of mainstream Turkish intellectuals of the 1950s, on one hand. But on the other, even though most researchers in the field disregard them, some ordinary, professional politicians with strong political ambitions who were far from being idealistic or democratic while in the DP were also members of that coalition and even the pioneers of the nineteen's movement which led to the formation of the FP. In this regard, the party had a twofold character. Our suggestion is that the FP was a political party formed and driven by some professional DP deputies with the help of some media organizations, and soon after, the party became a coalition of these dissident politicians and the body of Turkish intellectuals.

First of all, as we have already discussed in the first chapter, in the process of the centralization of the DP from the time when the party was still in the opposition until to the formation of the FP, there were vital dissidents among its DP members. Troubles within the party resulted in its partition and the formation of the NP in 1948, arguments within the inner circle of the party regarding the allocation of offices once the party came to power, conflicts between partisans of the party and its technocrats resulting in the emergence of the 61's movement, and lastly, conflicts between parliamentary group and the center of the party as well as between local party organizations and the center. These dissidents can be regarded as the roots that led to the formation of the FP. Notwithstanding, dissidents within the party represent just part of the picture.

As we have seen in the second part of the first chapter, the partition of intellectuals from the DP was a milestone in the formation of the party. It is underscored that starting just after the DP came to power and intensifying after 1953, intellectuals started to raise their voices against the DP as a result of a potential antidemocratic turn which actually happened as predicted. As a result of the antidemocratic measures of the government, economic decline, and the decay in the status of intellectuals in the era, intellectuals, and the DP parted ways. To put in another way, it was not mere coincidences that the decline of intellectual support given to the DP and the formation of the FP overlapped. Putting aside the role of *Akis* magazine and *Dünya* journal for the formation of the FP, the massive support given to the party by the Turkish media when it was formed and the symbolic connotation of the right to prove bill, which harmed intellectuals and their free speech, were also crucial for the marriage between FP and the intellectuals. When the FP was established in late 1955, the news was welcomed in a declaration in *FORUM* magazine. *FORUM* can be considered as the ideologue of the FP; in other words, the approaches of the journal and the party to several issues were almost identical. The striking parallelism was not just about political discourses which they were attached; the actors of the two institutions were overlapped. When Turhan Feyzioğlu the dean of the Ankara University, was suspended from his duty with an order of the government, some professors at his university, such as Şerif Mardin, Aydın Yalçın, Muammer Aksoy, Münci Kapani, and Coşkun Kırca – all of whom were among the writers of *FORUM* - resigned from their departments in response and joined the FP, which materialized as the coalition of intellectuals and the FP. Although the cadres of the journal had supported the FP from the outside not acting within the party before joinings, they became active participants in the FP after that. For example, Aydın Yalçın and Şerif Mardin among *FORUM* writers were candidates on the Ankara and Eskişehir ballot lists for the FP in the 1957 elections, the only general election with which the party engaged. Muammer Aksoy and Coşkun Kırca were nominated in both Balıkesir and Istanbul, Münci Kapani in Istanbul and Manisa, and Vasfi Raşit Sevig in Konya.¹ To understand the reasons for the

1 “Hürriyet Partisi Adayları,” *Milliyet*, October 8, 1957.

disengagement of intellectuals from the DP, as we have released in the first chapter, their status deprivation, anti-intellectual discourses of the DP in accomplice with the populism, and their relative impoverishment as a result of the inflationary economic policies of the government were important. After underscoring the connection between the FP and *FORUM*, I further consider *FORUM* and its importance for our framework.

In the second half of the 1950s, most prominent Turkish intellectuals from various political stances gathered on the pages of *FORUM* magazine, which was thereby a representation of mainstream Turkish intellectuals - like a blueprint that can be read. In 1954, *FORUM* was formed by Professor Aydın Yalçın, among the faculty of Ankara University, together with his wife, Nilüfer Yalçın. It was "a scientific journal 'which uses empirical method', as opposed to 'a theoretical journal of philosophy and ideas, which relies on speculation.'"² Metin Ant, one of the writers for the magazine, says that when Yalçın and his wife were in London before 1954, he became interested in the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy and ideas. Thus, *FORUM* resembles magazines such as *New Statesman* and *Nation* from Anglo-Saxon world.³ Furthermore, according to Okyar, the reason for publishing of the journal was to adapt the English democratic tradition for Turkey.⁴ On 1 April 1954, the magazine published its first issue with about issues which were of wider interest to society.⁵ Indeed, *FORUM* presented itself as open to all political approaches - an arena where different political ideas would be met and crushed. Nevertheless, political

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- 2 Özçetin, "Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party" (master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2004), 96-97.
 - 3 Okan İrketi, *Ricat Eden Cumhuriyet: DP ve AKP Döneminde Aydınlar*. (Ankara: Tan Kitabevi Yayınları, 2010), 128.
 - 4 Ibid., 129.
 - 5 In the first editorial article, these points were explained in. In antiquity, the common issues of society were discussed in places called forums, which as a concept idea need to be transferred to the Turkish media. The magazine would be a place for intellectuals to talk about issues that mattered to the nation as a whole in order to establish an order in which the notion of "freedom" was central. Editorial, "Forumun Davası," *FORUM* April 1, 1954. Also, Aydın Yalçın years after, told the story of *FORUM* again. See Aydın Yalçın, "Fikir Mihrakları Kurmak," *FORUM* April 15, 1961.

doctrines such as liberalism and socialism were regarded as artificial and worthless; it seems that these kinds of views were out of the arena. Also, *FORUM* always stressed that the journal was independent and impartial and did not have relations with any political parties.⁶ It turned out that especially after most of its writers joined the FP, the party propagandized of its behalf before the 1957 general elections in the guise of infallible scientific facts, which even disturbed some readers. The magazine was also interested in economic planning for the Turkish Republic, an idea which was propagated in most its issues in discussion the economic planning of other countries such as Pakistan, Israel, Italy, India, Greece, and Mongolia.⁷

Before moving off this subject, it is important to realize that even though we propose that *FORUM* represented the mainstream Turkish intelligentsia at the time, there were other ideological wings that the journal did not cover or have any affiliation with or sympathy for at that time. Indeed, these were mostly considered officially illegal. For instance, after the DP came to power and the PM Menderes announced the program of the government, he declared that it was important to struggle with extreme rightist and leftist streams of ideas.⁸ In the first months of 1953, in one of his speeches, he again argued that there were four dangers which threatening the democratic regime: political reactionism, religious reactionism, nationalism, and communism.⁹ He asserted that extremist leftist movements cannot be considered within the scope of freedom of thought.¹⁰ This approach of political elites and the mainstream

6 "Forum ve Tarafsızlık," *FORUM* 15 May 1956. Of course, impartiality in those years was essentially support for the FP.

7 For an example, see "Pakistan İktisadi Planı," *FORUM*, Ağustos 1, 1956.

8 Feroz Ahmad and Bedia Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayatın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1976), 70-71.

9 Ibid., 105.

10 In the speeches of the leaders of the DP including those of President Celal Bayar, such kinds warnings were always made. "Communism is coming this winter" was a famous discourse to frighten people. This is remembered today with honour by many Turks. Not only the DP but also the leaders of the RPP and RNP stressed the threat of communism and reactionism in those years, sometimes to the point that they accused one another of being communist. To illustrate, sometimes the opposition party accused the ruling party of being communist or

intellectual elites of Turkey was bolstered by laws. Articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Criminal Law prevented communism, and the Article 163 was designed to prevent Islamic reactionism.¹¹ In practice, it was symbolic at that time that a novel by Mahmut Makal titled *Bizim Köy* (Our Village) was banned and the writer was arrested and accused of making communist propaganda.¹²

As has been said, there were three unpermitted political ideologies in the 1950s under DP rule. At one extreme, there were radical Islamists who were against the secular system and Kemalist reforms including Ticanis, a religious sect led by Kemal Pilavoğlu, *Büyük Doğu* journal, founded and led by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and; *Sebil-ür-reşat* journal led by Eşref Edip Fergan; and *Millet* journal led by Cemal Kutay. They were expelled from the political arena at every turn. Especially after Ahmet Emin Yalman was assassinated in 1952, pressure on Islamists and Turkists who worked hand in hand in these years increased. Some Islamic and conservative figures were arrested for allegedly reactionist activities, and some journals and associations were abolished.¹³ Also, Tevfik İleri was dismissed from his position as the ministry of education, because he supported an extreme nationalist association, the Nationalists' Association, and soon after, the association was itself abolished.¹⁴

At another extreme was communism. There were some prominent communist intellectuals and some socialist associations such as the Peace Lovers Association (Barışseverler Derneği). When the association protested the decision to send military forces to Korea in 1951, the chairman of the association, Behice Boran, and the general secretary, Adnan Cemgil, were arrested and the association was terminated soon after.¹⁵ Also, in 1951, a far-reaching wave of the arrests of leftists took place, and almost 200 leftists were arrested.¹⁶

anti-secular; sometimes the ruling party accused the opposition parties of being communist or Islamist. These accusations were always viewed as insults by the recipients.

11 Kemal H. Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System* (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), 387. Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları (1944-1973): DP'nin Altın Yılları (1950-1954)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 128.

12 Ibid., 20.

13 Süleyman Arif Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl*, vol 1 (İstanbul: Keşif Yayınları, 2002), 39.

14 Ahmad and Turgay, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 106.

15 Ibid., 85.

16 Cem Eroğul, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), 108.

Moreover, most proponents of these illegal ideologies were either forced to leave the country, like Nazım Hikmet or arrested and imprisoned for many years, such as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı and Kemal Tahir.

There were some radical nationalist figures and publications at the time among the extremists; nevertheless, as for communism and Islamism, there was no *pasarán* for radical nationalism, either. As Karpas suggested, no organization in these years could monopolize nationalist discourse. For example, the political party formed by Yaşar Çimen in 1946 that adopted the Italian Fascism, called Only for the Homeland Party (Yalnız Vatan İçin Partisi), was dissolved in 1952.¹⁷ Those are just examples, but they show the scope of the fear and the atmosphere of opposition to the ideas which were outside of the legal scheme.

Nevertheless, it would be mistaken to regard the restrictions on ideas as characteristic only of DP rule. There is an apparent continuity between the RPP and DP administrations in that respect. For example, during the RPP era, radical nationalists were arrested in 1944, Tan Printing House known for its socialist bent was attacked and looted in 1945, in 1948 some professors including Pertev Naili Boratav, Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes, and Adnan Cemgil were suspended from their universities, and in the same year, Sabahattin Ali, a socialist writer, was killed while trying to escape to Bulgaria.¹⁸

In the light of these examples, one can question the merit of the assumption revealed in this section. “How could *FORUM* represent Turkish intellectual elites while excluding some Islamists, communists, and nationalists?”¹⁹ To answer that we need to clarify our premise. Although there were various marginal movements at the extremes of the political spectrum, they had no freedom to act. In other words, these extremist movements and ideologies in the

17 Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 259.

18 Baskın Oran, “Batı Bloku Ekseninde Türkiye,” in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgunlar, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014), 492-493. Poet Nazım Hikmet wrote his “Enemy” (Düşman) poem in memory of the incident occurred in Tan Printing House.

19 There were also some intellectuals bound to the RPP and the DP at that time. It can be argued that *FORUM* covered the first group of intellectuals since *FORUM* harboured some writers close to the RPP.

period of 1945-1960 were officially illegal and out of the arena. Also, the defenders of both these extreme ideologies and the DP were few in number among the intelligentsia. In a nutshell, from between 1945-1960, extremist political ideas were not on the agenda of the mainstream Turkish intellectuals. Therefore, I have argued in this research that the mainstream intellectuals were among the constituents of the FP through *FORUM* bridge; however, still, we cannot argue that all of the intelligentsia supported of the FP.

To summarize, *FORUM* is an open door to the mindset of prominent, legal and mainstream Turkish intellectuals in the 1950s; the other movements were marginal, ineffective, and partial and had no impact on the society, politics, and the mainstream Turkish intellectuals.²⁰ *FORUM* and the FP, in parallel with the nature of the time, follow same ideological position whose scope was sketched by the Kemalist principles. Neither the FP nor *FORUM* regarded communism, Islamism, and other extremes to be within the freedoms of speech and thought.²¹ Both the party and the journal held the same line and they were against these extreme ideologies. Therefore, we can say that the FP was a political coalition of some dissident DP deputies and the dominant wing of the intellectual elites through the bridge of *FORUM*.

4.1.2 *Personal Disputes and Struggles among Cliques*

After talking about the intellectual wing of the FP, in this sub-section we indicate the effects of personal disputes, ambitions, and vengeance on the formation of the FP based on personal memoirs of the FP actors that emphasize that the significance of conflicting personalities should not be underestimated

20 A naive justification of that fruitless view of the Turkish intelligentsia came from Şeref Bakşık in an article arguing that when the DP downgraded the democratic regime, the RPP was compelled defend basic democracy and individual rights. This caused discussions of leftist and rightist ideas to be postponed at least ten years. Şeref Bakşık, "Demokrasi, DP ve İnönü," *Tarih ve Toplum* (1988), 272-273.

21 For example, the program and bylaws of the Freedom Party emphasize that candidates who desired to be a member of the party should not hold communist or fascist ideas. *Hürriyet Partisi Ana Nizamnamesi ve Programı* (Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1956), 4. On the other hand, curses these ideologies were always present in the pages of *FORUM* during the 1950s.

in the consideration of the FP. Especially intraparty struggles among cliques within the DP before the fourth convention has significant influence on formation of the FP.

In late 1955, when the right to prove bill which was designed for journalists submitted to the assembly by nineteen deputies from the DP parliamentary group deepened the conflicts among different cliques within the party and, thus, accelerated the process of the formation of the FP. As we mentioned, this bill specifically targeted one person, Mükerrerrem Sarol. It was a result of personal rivalries between him and Fethi Çelikbaş with respect to entering the GAB.²² The process that ended up with the formation of the party started with such a personal issue from the beginning. Even before that, when we consider the historical roots of the FP with a reference to the first chapter, it is obvious that the uneasiness and opposition within the DP mostly derived from the personal conflicts and schisms related to occupying ruling positions, especially those on the GAB. There were consistently two sides: Menderes and his crew and outsiders who were expelled from higher positions. To illustrate, when Menderes was elected as the chairperson of the DP after Bayar and was appointed as PM by him, this caused new disappointments in the inner circle of the party. As revealed in the first chapter, those who were suspicious of the premiership of Menderes started to create an opposition within the party. It was not acceptable for popular, experienced figures such as Refik Şevket İnce, Nihat Reşat Belger, Fahri Belen, and Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ to work with or under a relatively inexperienced politician like Menderes. In fact, after the 1950 general elections when the DP ascended to power, Köprülü desired to be the PM in parallel,²³ he prepared himself for the premiership long before the party came to power when the DP was still in the opposition.²⁴ After this initial

22 Metin Toker, *Demokrasimizin İsmet Paşa'lı Yılları (1944-1973): DP Yokuş Aşağı (1954-1957)* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 105. For a detailed account, see Chapter 3.

23 Rıfkı Salim Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları (1950-1960)* (Ankara: Nurol Matbaacılık, 1998), 50. Mükerrerrem Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, (İstanbul: İnkılap Yayınevi, 2014), 104. According to Tekil, Köprülü regarded the DP as his handicraft. Füzruzan Tekil, *Politika Asları* (İstanbul: Geçit Yayınları, 1973), 154.

24 Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi: Büstler ve Portler* (Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), 30.

disappointment, Köprülü and Sarol had problems with each other regarding the Istanbul party organization in the mid-1950. On the one hand, if we recall from the third chapter, Köprülü acted to prevent the membership of Sarol in the GAB before the fourth convention and did his best to block Sarol's way to the board. Even though Sarol managed to enter to the GAB via the back door, Köprülü behaved badly toward and humiliated Sarol on the board. He also pressed the board of discipline for Sarol's exclusion from the GAB.²⁵ Köprülü had problems in the ministry of foreign affairs where the Fatinists and Fuatists were struggling with each other, resulting in the victory of the former over the latter.²⁶ When Köprülü was dismissed from the cabinet and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu became the new minister in his place, Fuatists were cleaned from the ministry in the hands of Zorlu who was backed by Menderes.²⁷ One of figures who were dismissed from the ministry was Köprülü's son-in-law, Coşun Kırca who would become a member of the FP in 1956.²⁸ Feridun Ergin, one of the founders of the FP, also had problems with Zorlu while Ergin was a representative of Turkey in the European Assembly. In fact, after Köprülü was dismissed from the ministry and replaced by Zorlu, he started to become interested in party affairs especially in the Istanbul organization where there was a conflict between his and Sarol's faction. Nonetheless, the Köprülüs lost their control over the Istanbul organization when Orhan Köprülü, who would become a member of the FP, was dismissed in 1956. Having lost control of the party, of Istanbul, and of the ministry, Köprülü set his gaze upon parliamentary group of the DP. Nevertheless, his relatives including Cemal Köprülü and Celal

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- 25 When Sarol was excluded from the GAB, he along with Necip Fazıl Kısakürek continued to act against Köprülü with increasing intensity. In his book, Kısakürek underlines that he together with Sarol, wrote such heavy things that Köprülü sued him. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, *Benim Gözümde Menderes*, (Istanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 1998), 368-369.
- 26 Mükerrerrem Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 2, 144.
- 27 The disputes of which Zorlu were not restricted only to that ministry. Kurdaş, as a witness, describes the disputes between the Fatinists and the supporters of Nedim Ökmen within the undersecretariat in a detail. Şengül Kılıç Hristidis, *Hayatım Mücadeleyle Geçti: Kemal Kurdaş Kitabı* (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), 104-122.
- 28 When Kırca, who thought that there was some corruption, refused to sign a document, he was forced to resign. İzzedin Çalışlar, ed., *Ekselans: Coşkun Kırca* (Istanbul: Galatasaray Eğitim Vakfı, 2009), 13.

Boynuk had problems with the party center because of their actions in parliament. The moment when Köprülü burned the bridges with the party was when the parliamentary group rejected his proposal to open an investigation into Sarol's unfair acquisitions. Köprülü resigned, which can be interpreted as Sarol's the final victory over him. To understand the nature of the conflict between Köprülü and Menderes, we need to consider Fűrüzan Tekil, a member of Sarolists at that time. He argued that what distinguished the politicians was not generally differing opinions but rather antipathy and personal envy. The resentment between Menderes and Köprülü was not related to differences in their opinions; they were agreed on the way the domestic and foreign politics is conducted without the least difference. Even their stances on the approach that should be taken towards the opposition, the right to prove, and the economy were the same.²⁹

Fuad Köprülü was not the only one who thought that the chairmanship of the party should not be amalgamated with the leadership of the government when, after 1950 Adnan Menderes became both the leader of the party and the government. Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu agreed with that idea, as well.³⁰ As we have said in the second chapter, many witnesses of the time stress that after Menderes became PM, he saw himself fit for the position of chairman of the DP.³¹ After Bayar became president, Karaosmanoğlu was so sure that he would be elected to the office of the chair of the party that even he voted for Menderes, his rival. Yet Menderes was elected with the GAB of the party with just one vote.³² Just after the first cabinet was formed, Fevzi Lütü led the opposition within the party. In fact, some ministers could not bear the pressure put on them themselves by Menderes and the partisans; they resigned one by one as a result of the conflict. Those who resigned included Dr. Belger, Fahri Belen, Nihat Eğriboz, Halil Ayan, Seyfi Kurtbek, and Refik Şevket İnce. Among them, Belger became one of the founders of the FP and Seyfi Kurtbek was one of

29 Tekil, *Politika Asları*, 67.

30 "D. P.: Başbakanlık ve Genel Başkanlık," *Akis*, July 23, 1955.

31 Toker, *Altın Yılları (1950-1954)* (Istanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), 118-119. Also, Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 168.

32 *Ibid.*, 362.

signatories of the right to prove bill. After the first cabinet withdrew, the second one was formed. However, this time 61 deputies in parliament - the outsiders - voted no confidence regarding the budget of the new government. Those 61 deputies were among the signatories of the right to prove bill. Refik Şevket İnce, Muammer Alakant, Fevzi Lütüf Karaosmanoğlu, Nuri Özsan, Enver Güreli, and Rüknettin Nasuhioğlu resigned from the second cabinet.³³ Some of them would become the founders of the FP. Meanwhile, Fevzi Lütüf held the office of the minister of interior, and there were some disputes between him and the PM. For instance, because Menderes did not defend himself when a corruption issue was boomed, Karaosmanoğlu became disappointed, according to Baban.³⁴ Furthermore, when the new government was formed after the 1954 general elections, Karaosmanoğlu was again excluded from it and warned Menderes in a letter of his discontent with the government of which he was not part of.³⁵ As a result, he became one of the leaders of the right to prove issue and later the chairman of the FP in 1955. As indicated in the third chapter, by the time of the fourth convention of the DP, the conflict between Menderes and Karaosmanoğlu, who was the candidate of the opponents, had evolved into a leadership struggle. As we recall from that chapter, though he was a member of the GAB, he was dismissed from the board and his delegacy was abolished along with those of his supporters, preventing them from participating in the convention. The conflict between them was so intense that a journalist expresses that at one point Menderes walked up to Karaosmanoğlu angrily, but Mustafa Ekinçi, another of the founders of the FP, put his hand into his pocket as if drawing his gun, Menderes stepped back.³⁶ This was an important indicator to disclose the nature of the dispute which

33 Like Çelikbaş, Enver Güreli, one of the founders of the FP, resigned from the ministry of economy and trade because of a discussion with Menderes. Ahmad and Bedia, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 110. According to Karakuş, the reason for his resignation was an operation conducted with the decision of Menderes ignoring him. Karakuş, *İşte Ankara*, 215.

34 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 360-362.

35 According to Burçak, this letter was a sign of a movement within the party which was about to be emerged and the main impetus for disclosing that document was to justify the coming opposition within the party. Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 228.

36 Emin Karakuş, *40 Yıllık Bir Gazeteci Gözüyle İşte Ankara* (İstanbul: Hür Yayın ve Ticaret, 1977), 293.

was highly dependent on conflicting between personalities. In other words, personal rivalries sometimes reached an intolerable point. For example, one of the leading figures of the DP and subsequently the FP, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, was devastatingly belittled by the leaders after the 1954 general elections just before the program of the new government was declared. One of the members of the FP, Baban, tells that Üstündağ was not told that he would not be in the new cabinet after the 1954 elections. Because he had been the minister of health before the election, he naturally thought that he would be in the new cabinet again, and he sat one of the seats reserved for the council of ministers in parliament after the elections. Later, the fellows of Menderes laughed at him with contempt.³⁷ Üstündağ never tolerated the humiliation, and at the first opportunity, he acted opposed to the rulers of the party.³⁸

It was unleashed in the third chapter that the resignation of Fethi Çelikbaş from the ministry of businesses was another moment of the movement that brought about the formation of the FP. While running the ministry before the fourth convention, he faced with Sarol, because Sarol wanted to be a part member of the GAB. Not surprisingly, Çelikbaş became one of the founders of the FP, too. In fact, Sarol was elected to the GAB and he filled the vacancy left by Çelikbaş who had been dismissed from the party before the convention. This was the source of the problem between Çelikbaş and Menderes crew.³⁹

Apart from these examples, another founder of the FP, Ergin, had a personal conflict with Menderes. According to Baban, Ergin, the deputy of the DP from Urfa Province, exerted a remarkable effort in the 1954 general election campaign for the victory of his party. In fact, he wrote three-fourths of the propaganda book of the party which was prepared for the elections. Yet he

37 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 385-386.

38 Emin Karakuş, a journalist at the time, argues that Üstündağ had said to him that he did not understand why he was humiliated by Menderes while he was minister, he could not never tolerate it. Karakuş, *İşte Ankara*, 248.

39 In fact, when we look at all the intraparty conflicts within the DP, there were some focal people seen as the source of all problems, such as Mukerrem Sarol, Samet Ağaoğlu, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Celal Yardımcı, Hüseyin Avni Göktürk, Celal Fuad Türkgeldi, Osman Kavrakoglu, Zeki Sporel, Hasan Polatkan, Muzaffer Kurbanoglu, Esat Budakoglu, Tevfik İleri, Nedim Ökmen, Namık Gedik, Kemal Biberoglu, Zühtü Velibeşe, Burhan Apaydın, and Rauf Onursal.

was not respected by the rulers of the party, so he started to criticize the government.⁴⁰ Soon after, he was dismissed from the party and became one of the founders of the FP. Among the members of the FP, Baban was also one who experienced personal conflicts within the DP. As Altan Öymen, another journalist of the time, explains in his memoirs that Baban, had problems with DP members because he was one of the shareholders of *Tercüman* journal, which was shut down after the 6-7 September incidents.⁴¹ Yakup Kadri, a journalist at the time, argued that there was a plot within the DP against him that resulted in his marginalization within *Tercüman*. According to him, the exclusion of Baban and his opposition to the government did not stem from differences in opinion; they were merely a conflict over material interests.⁴² He says that the shareholders of *Tercüman* had no dispute with Baban over his criticisms of the ruling party for the sake of democracy; if it had been so, Yakup Kadri would have been the first to be fired from the journal. He wrote more severe criticisms for the paper and he was known with his republican identity.⁴³ Baban's close colleague, Bedii Faik, argued that the political ambition of Baban was so powerful that the real reason for his resignation from the DP was that he did not find what he expected.⁴⁴ He gives a couple examples of his political ambition. In one of them, he argues that during the single-party era Ziyad Ebuzziya, the owner of *Tasfir* paper, was hospitalized because of his health problems. The editor in chief, Baban caused the suspension of the paper, in the hands of single-party officers, by making a plot to dominate the paper which Ebuzziya did not prefer.⁴⁵ Last, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, who was as known as the National Preacher, supported the Turkish National Struggle with impressive speeches during the War of Independence, and devoted

40 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 164-165.

41 Altan Öymen, *Ve İhtilal* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2014), 362-363. Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 200-203.

42 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politika'da 45 yıl* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), 203-206.

43 Ibid., 205.

44 Bedii Faik, *Matbuat Basın derkeen... Medya*, vol 1 (Istanbul Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001), 74. Faik also talks about Baban's political ambitions. Ibid., 32-39.

45 News about İsmet İnönü's familiy was not printed in the paper, which would be a reason to close a paper for a month in the one-party era. For the whole story, see Ibid., 68-71.

himself to improving Turkism through Turkish Hearths.⁴⁶ In fact, he was the one remembered when it comes to the Turkish Hearths. Nevertheless, in 1931, these institutions were shut down upon the order of Mustafa Kemal, and Tanrıöver was exiled to the Romanian embassy. After that Tanrıöver, who had set his heart on that cause felt offended.⁴⁷ Because of his disappointment, he remained distant from his party, the RPP, until multiparty politics took over Turkish politics. He supported the opposition against the RPP and was on the electoral list of the DP in the 1950 general elections. Nevertheless, he would split with the DP, as well. After the DP came to power, the government enacted laws to appropriate the People's Houses and the unjust property acquisitions of the RPP in the single-party era with the the force of the state.⁴⁸ In parallel, Tanrıöver began to hope that the properties of the Turkish Hearths, which had been seized by the state during the single-party era, would be given back, and he defended such a law in parliament during the discussions. Nonetheless, the DP did not carry out that law according to his expectations. Therefore, he left the DP disappointed and distanced himself from the party. After that he joined the FP.⁴⁹

These examples show that there was a continuous covert war between politicians excluded from the reputable offices and those in the inner circle of the party. Menderes was a chess player in the middle of all the factions and was making moves to strengthen his position. When outsiders opposed the actions of the government, Menderes satisfied them by giving them positions such as ministership. They would then abandon the opposition and walk down from the highland, *yayla*, as we defined in the first chapter as a political term for the opponents within the party who were sitting distant from the members of government. Thus, in the DP era, the *yayla* was a bench or waiting room where opponents waited until their desires were satisfied. Those who gained what

46 Ahmet Yıldız, "Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 4: Milliyetçilik*, edited by Tanıl Bora, 3rd ed., (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2008), 642.

47 Mustafa Baydar, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları* (Istanbul: Menteş Kitabevi, 1968), 74.

48 *Resmî Gazete*, no. 8584, December 16, 1953: 7773.

49 This deep disappointment can be observed in memoirs of Ağaoğlu. Even on his deathbed, Tanrıöver complained to Menderes about this disappointment. Samet Ağaoğlu, *Babamın Arkadaşları* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), 186.

they desired became engaged with the center of the party and put away their criticisms aside. Those whose situations were problematic climbed up to the *yayla* and to take some fresh air until their expectations were met. For example, when the first cabinet was formed, figures like Karaosmanoğlu, Yırcalı, and Sarol gathered in Ankara Palace, a historical hotel in which opposition within the party were lobbying, to create opposition within the party. In the second cabinet, they were appointed to ministries, and the opposition aroused in Ankara Palace became idle.⁵⁰ Just after the 1954 general elections, Ağaoğlu and Karaosmanoğlu were in opposition. However, after Ağaoğlu was appointed to the cabinet when Çelikbaş abdicated, he became one of the partisans of the party by integrating himself to the center. In the 1955 DP group meeting, Yırcalı, the minister of the interior, was forced to resign together with Zorlu and Polatkan. While Polatkan was forced to resign in the same group meeting vis-à-vis Yırcalı, Polatkan was appointed to the cabinet once more unlike Yırcalı. A parliamentary investigation was conducted into Yırcalı. Therefore, there was some opposition taking root around Yırcalı in the *yayla*. To illustrate, he started to lead the opposition against tax reform.⁵¹ According to Ağaoğlu, as it was necessary to satisfy him, Yırcalı became the minister of press, publications and tourism.⁵² Furthermore, Emin Kalafat was another example. At one point, he was among the opposition to the government inside the party with a group that included Çelikbaş. He was seen in the *yayla* when not in the cabinet. Nevertheless, when integrated into the DP and given a ministry, he became one of the extremists of the party and ever after, he stood with the Menderes circle of until the 1960 military coup. When Kalafat and Çelikbaş were in the opposition, they were friendly with Metin Toker, who was imprisoned in 1956. When Kalafat managed to integrate himself into the party center, he moved away from Toker.⁵³ On the other hand, among the 61s who opposed the second Menderes cabinet, Enver Güreli, Muhlis Ete, and

50 Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 124.

51 Cahit Kayra, '38 *Kuşağı: Anılar* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2002), 139-140.

52 Samet Ağaoğlu, *Arkadaşım Menderes İpin Gölgesindeki Günler* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2004), 141-142.

53 Nimet Arzık, *Tek At Tek Mızrak Anılar*, vol 2 (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1984), 181.

Muammer Alakant put aside their opposition when they were appointed to ministries. Also, Osman Şevki Çiçekdağ among the 61s, being made the minister of justice in the second Menderes government, abandoned the opposition within the party and supported some antidemocratic laws and regulations as minister.⁵⁴ This structure marking the main dynamics of the intraparty relations between the two camps - the inner circle of the DP around Menderes and the outer circle on the periphery of the party - was also underlined by a person who was engaged in these conflicts - Füzûzan Tekil.⁵⁵ Most of the time, those in the opposition arranged their political discourse in accordance with their positions in the party or the government. Especially Ağaoğlu, Sarol, Yırcalı, Çiçekdağ, Çelikbaş, and Kalafat perfectly fit that pattern in the 1950s. When PM Menderes complained about the opposition in a speech, he argued that Çelikbaş had changed his color and opinion three times since 1951.⁵⁶

Finally, it is necessary to talk about the domestic politics in the Eastern part of Turkey where some feudal relations were ongoing because the RPP had not achieved the land reform that would abolish the feudal order. Rather than abolishing the feudal structure in the east, it was more rational for the RPP to operate with local feudal lords in exchange for their support in the region. Since there were no significant differences among the political parties in the eyes of the population there. When the DP came to power, such clientelist relations between political authorities and feudal lords did not changed. In

54 As justice minister, he defended the electoral law, which was indicated as one of the antidemocratic laws of the DP. Akın Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Siyasal Kavgaları* (Izmir: İstiklal Matbaası, 1975), 26.

55 Tekil, *Politika Asları*, 20. There were some who do not fit that mould. For example, Tevfik İleri was always side by side with Menderes even after he was dismissed from the government. And Ekrem Alican always criticized the government regardless of his personal interests.

56 This reward system of DP rulers and the tactics opponents use to provide some personal material benefits was underlined in *FORUM* magazine. Accordingly, the real motive behind opposition movements within the party against the leadership of Menderes was argued to have always been to be appointed to ministries in a way that they showed themselves as harmful to the center. In return, the PM always managed to cope with the opposition leaders by satisfying them. Providing ministries was a common method of the center to compromise with the opponents. "D.P. içindeki hareketler," *FORUM*, November 15, 1958.

parallel, the FP also maintained this understanding of politics in the region. The party hinged on the aghas – chieftains - in these districts just like the DP and RPP. As it can be deduced from the writings of Tarık Ziya Ekinci, a Kurdish intellectual, the DP had lost considerable respect and power by 1955 in Lice, one of the districts of Diyarbakır Province. The support of local Kurds for the DP waned a couple years after the 1950 elections. One of the reasons was that two deputies for Diyarbakır, Mehmet Ekinci and Yusuf Azizoğlu, had left the DP and joined the FP.⁵⁷ According to Ekinci, the state-oriented Kurdish intelligentsia bound up with local lords had no democratic consciousness at the time.⁵⁸ This meant that political attitudes of intellectuals of the region and the social cleavages or social mobility were not a decisive factor for the attention given to the FP in 1955 in the region. Rather, feudal lords were more effective and got a hold of the dynamics on local politics. Among the FP members, İhsan Hamit Tığrel, Yusuf Azizoğlu, and Mustafa Ekinci were among the strongest feudal lords in the area.⁵⁹ In the region, what made political parties different from each other was mostly related to the conflicts among the tribes.⁶⁰ To illustrate, according to Ekinci, Hasan Oran was the leader of the Bucak tribe, while Muzafer Timur, one of the founders of the FP, led another large tribe in Siverek and single these two were rivals.⁶¹ Thus, metanarratives about the FP are not valid for the eastern part of the Turkey where politics was stuck in the area of clientelist relations and hostilities between tribes in local level. Not only in Eastern Turkey but also in the rest of Anatolia, ongoing intraparty struggles in local organizations were a source from which the FP recruited new members to its party – that is, it recruited among the opponents who lost struggles in their given districts. In fact, as stated in the first chapter, Burçak, one of the

57 Ibid., 346.

58 Ibid., 356-57.

59 Ibid., 355.

60 This political structure valid in rural areas became a source of irony for satire writer Aziz Nesin. He has some short stories including, *Bir Parti Örgütü Kuruldu, İşiniz Oldu Gayri!* and *İleri Gelen Adamlar* that reflects on politics in rural areas in one of his books. See Aziz Nesin, *Damda Deli Var: Mizah Hikayeleri* (İstanbul: Akbaba Mizah Yayınları, 1956).

61 Tarık Ziya Ekinci. *Lice'den Paris'e Anılarım*, ed. Tanıl Bora, Derviş Aydın Akkoç, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 277

members of the GAB of the DP, explained that the most troublesome issue for the board was conflicts within the party in local organizations. Almost all provinces were divided into two camps, and the issue of the problem was to dominate their organization to guarantee some deputyships in the coming term.⁶² After 1955, the FP recruited people from local organizations that were divided into two factions: the representatives of the center and opponents who lost the struggle for their organizations. For example, a rebellion against the center occurred in Muş Province due to the high pressure of center on local organizations, which resulted in the resignation of the Hadi Özdemir clique which would have joined the FP when it was formed in 1955.⁶³ In Elazığ Province, members who were sent to the board of discipline of the DP in late 1956 - Oğuz Karazaim, Atik Erbaş, and Dursun Çolakolu - and others fired from the party joined the FP and were nominated by its center for the 1957 elections.⁶⁴ Şeref Balkanlı was among the FP members who were recruited from the Izmir party organization of the DP in the first years of the party was in power. Again, even at the low levels of the party, personal urges and struggles for favourable positions were the most determining factor on the formation and the rise of the FP. Most figures among the party founders and members consented to the decisions and manner of DP rule when they had positions in the party, including some of its antidemocratic measures – indeed, sometimes even its most anti-democratic ones, as we shall see. Those who did not have any affiliation with the antidemocratic laws and regulations of the DP joined these who had a tainted past with regard to democracy. The last two points meant the party was eclectic.

To conclude, in this sub-section, I indicated that personal conflicts, urges, ambitions, grudges, a sense of revenge, efforts to reach the inner circle of the party, and patronage relations were more determining factors in the formation of the FP than any other factors that the previous authors have suggested.

62 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 85.

63 Mehmet Pınar, "Demokrat Parti'nin Muş Teşkilatlanması ve Faaliyetleri," *Akademik Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, no. 21 (2015), 128.

64 Emine Pancar and Aydın Öğrendik, "Demokrat Parti Döneminde Elazığ'da Siyasi Hayat (1954-1957)," in *Geçmişten Geleceğe Harput Sempozyumu*, ed. Enver Çakar (Elazığ: Fırat Üniversitesi Harput Uygulama Ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2013), 480.

When I looked both at the pioneers of the FP and their disputes with Menderes circle as well as those who integrated themselves into the party center against them, I witnessed that apparent ideological motives among founders of the party were not evident. The issue was more related to a group of elites who sworn to destroy the other fronts and their struggles, which became intolerable in 1955, with each other. This is conceptualized as the politics of persons. Therefore, these factors did not have a room for adoption of a particular political program or the determination of certain economic classes or structures, as previous authors have suggested. On the other hand, the DP had its most concrete victory in the 1954 general elections, which led to the swelling of its parliamentary group. Nevertheless, the reputable seats were not enough to satisfy all leaders within the group. In addition, when economic indicators of the time were running against the government, so after opponents within the party lost faith in making a war within the party, they sought some alliances with intellectuals, which was a turning point of the formation of the FP. After revealing the internal dynamics of the DP, we need to go into the details on the politics of persons which dominated the politics of Turkey during the 1950s and which gave the FP its eclectic character.

§ 4.2 The Politics of Persons: The Nature of Turkish Politics during the 1950s

Until now, I showed that personal problems between Menderes' circle and politicians positioned at the periphery of the party caused the birth of the FP and that the party enlisted the mass support of intellectuals of the time through *FORUM* magazine. This marriage between the displeased politicians to intellectuals gave a coalition view to the party. Just before ending the previous section, I introduced a new concept - politics of persons - which dominated the Turkish politics during the 1950s. In this section, I indicate that most of the elites of the FP, who had been among the prominent figures of the DP, had played a role in practices that they then strictly criticized when forming the new party. On the other hand, while criticizing policies for which they were also responsible, their outlook became more eclectic rather than harmonious. Therefore, political discourse and outlook of the party became impervious to

any theoretical explanations. Furthermore, after I show that the members of the party were dissimilar and ununiform, we will seek the answer to the question: What brought together these different kinds of people from different social and political backgrounds?

4.2.1 *The Members of the FP: Former Prominent Figures of the DP*

In this section, I am going to reveal that some FP leaders were among these who took part in the DP and its governments and played active roles in the centralization of party rule and the authoritarianization of the DP, processes about which they would complain when they themselves were harmed. Therefore, when criticizing the practices of DP governments under the umbrella of the FP, they were naturally criticizing the practices that they had been part of.

First, it is vital to realize that the DP did not centralized and become authoritarian overnight. There were significant moments of that process including the 1947 split and formation of the NP by members excluded from the DP, the issue of the Korean War about which the ruling party did not even counsel to its own parliamentary group, the clearing of the party of opponents, the formation of the Peasant Party as a result of a dispute within the party, the disproportionate acquisition of RPP properties, the closing of the NP before the 1954 general elections, and a string of laws regarding the press, civil servants, and elections which tightened the democratic order. While the DP was authoritarian with respect to domestic politics and was centralized with respect to party affairs, the positions of the figures who would found the FP are vital for understanding the nature of the FP. Unfortunately, most of the time most of the FP founders were among the facilitators of those antidemocratic actions of the DP.

When the DP was still in the opposition in 1947, the party separated into two camps after President İnönü gave his declaration on 12 July. In that split, the real battle between the two cliques was related to the question of who would lead the party. While the party center was led by founders of the DP, the parliamentary group was led by opponents. This conflict was regarded as a Köprülü-Öner conflict by most of its witnesses. The first field of battle between the two cliques was the Istanbul party organization led by Kenan Öner, one of the leaders of the opposition. Among future FP cadres; Fevzi Lütfi

Karaosmanoğlu, Enver Adakan, and Orhan Köprülü acted against Öner's faction in the Istanbul organization together with Mükerrerrem Sarol, with whom they would be in dispute after 1954. Adakan acted as the representative of the party center against the Öner clique in Istanbul Province at the time the different factions were fighting each other for control of the local party organization and thereby the central party organization.⁶⁵ In that hectic atmosphere, Köprülü, Karaosmanoğlu, and Menderes use the Izmir party organization which was led by Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, who would be among the FP members, as a headquarters from which to manage the intraparty battle and control the situation on behalf of the center vis-à-vis the deputies.⁶⁶ Üstündağ was among this inner circle and took part in eliminating half of the parliamentary group of the DP at the hands of Köprülü and Karaosmanoğlu. While Üstündağ was complaining about the Öner faction to the party center, Fevzi Lütüfi was nominated as the center's candidate for the chairmanship of the first DP convention in 1948 in opposition to the Öner's faction.⁶⁷ That split occurred in 1948, Karaosmanoğlu, fought tooth and nail for the center of the party - and, naturally, for the sake of Menderes and the centralization of the party - by eliminating the opposition. His role was significant because when the center of the party was unable to fire these opponents within the party due to impediments in a bylaw of the party according to each the center could not impose its will on the board of discipline -, Karaosmanoğlu stated that "under these

65 Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 104. Adakan was also chairman of the budget commission in the first Menderes government. Interestingly, Halil Ayan, the minister of finance at the time, objected to the inflationary policy of the DP which would be a crucial theme for the FP later on. Sarol, in his memoirs, also emphasizes that Adakan made an extraordinary effort to prepare the first budget of the DP government.

66 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 37-38. Üstündağ was an influential, leading figure of both the DP and the FP in the Aegean region and was among the founders of the Izmir party organization of the DP in 1946. In fact, he spent remarkable efforts for the party, attending to the formation of more than sixty party organizations (in Izmir alone) when the party was in the opposition. For the list of the organizations, see Fatih Nacar, "Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanı Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ'ın Hayatı ve Siyasi Faaliyetleri (1885-1956)" (master's thesis, Uşak University, 2016), 25-26.

67 Ibid., 30.

circumstances, the bylaw will be closed down."⁶⁸ The statement was striking and indicative of the efforts and determination of the future chairman of the FP in the process of the centralization of the DP, about which he would complain a few of years after. Ironically, a few years later, the bylaw of the party would be disregarded one more time vis-à-vis Karaosmanoğlu who would be dismissed from the GAB of which he was a member.

Interestingly, in 1950, internal conflicts within the Istanbul party organizations were repeated in which Esat Çağa, who was leading the organization, was of against the cliques backed by the center. As an outcome; Esat Çağa, Selahattin Güvendiren, and Kazım Yurdakul were forced to resign by a team composed of some future of the founders of the FP, including Belger and Adakan, together with Sarol, with whose interests would be in conflict in the future when the fourth convention of the DP came. Sarol would gain a seat in the GAB, while Belger and Adakan would be among the founders of the FP.⁶⁹

There were other disputes within the party's local organizations in the first half of the 1950s which were overcome by cleansing them of opponents - with the help of some future FP members. For instance, in 1951, a partition occurred because of the conflict between the center and the local organization of the Seyhan district which gave birth to a new political party, the Peasant Party.⁷⁰ There were disputes in a convention held in Adana, and Karaosmanoğlu was again authorized by the party center to intervene in the situation. This crisis, like the previous ones, ended with the centralization of the DP and the dismissal of opponents by the center – again with the help of Karaosmanoğlu.

68 "Bu şartlar altında tüzük kapanır." Piraye Bigat Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1996), 80. Also Öymen, *Ve İhtilal*, 192. In this split, some other figures who would be in the opposition within the DP in coming years supported the center of the party against the opponents. To illustrate, Hamit Şevket İnce was the chairman of the board of discipline of the party and had exerted great efforts to exclude the opponents from the party. He would be the one who shouted, "let's show the presence of the group" (Grubun var olduğunu gösterelim) at the end of 1955 when the party group disputed to the center. Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1652.

69 Tekin Erer, *Türkiye'de Kavgaıarı*, 514.

70 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 453.

Before moving on the subject, it is significant to quote a statement made by Ağaoğlu to indicate the importance and place of Karaosmanoğlu in the DP

Just a few years back among the founders of the Democrat Party, he was the emotion of the party if Köprülü was the brain of it; if Menderes was the action of the party, he was the organizer of it to be; if Bayar was the flag, he was the standard bearer of it!!⁷¹

Recalling disputes over the right to prove bill from the third chapter, two founders of the FP, Karaosmanoğlu, and Çelikbaş, who were members of the GAB, were interrogated by Köprülü after they signed the right to prove bill. This time, Köprülü as vice president of the party, dismissed Karaosmanoğlu from the party without applying the legal procedures, just like those who were excluded at the hands Karaosmanoğlu in 1947. In fact, Köprülü and Menderes were "two peas in a pod."⁷² The significance of Köprülü for the DP can be traced to a comment by Burçak, one of the members of the GAB, when Köprülü split with the DP, which he described as a heavy loss (ağır bir kayıp).⁷³ Köprülü as vice president played a part in the great purge of the DP including the purge of the founders of the FP. Notwithstanding, this was not an obstacle for Köprülü - after his resignation from the DP because of personal disputes - to support and propagandize on behalf of the FP in the 1957 general elections.⁷⁴ Also, he got his son, Orhan Köprülü, enrolled in the FP. Ironically, Karaosmanoğlu and Köprülü met at the Balıkesir meeting of the FP before the 1957 general elections. In fact, he was in the inner circle of the DP and took part in all the processes of its centralization including the dismissals that resulted in the formations of the NP in 1948 and the FP in 1955, about which he would complain in 1955. For instance, the memoirs of Emrullah Nutku, a founder of the FP, are aggressive with respect to Köprülü when he took part in

71 Samet Ağaoğlu, *Aşına Yüzler* (İstanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1965), 120. For the text, see the first point in *Originals*, Appendix A.

72 Fűrüzan Tekil, *Politika Asları*, 58.

73 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 422.

74 Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1659.

intraparty fights and the centralization of the DP⁷⁵ and defined Karaosmanoğlu as Sarolist at the same time.⁷⁶ His anger can be observed in the following sentence; "[When] Fuad Köprülü wrote the lead article for the day of Vatan, the title of which was 'Moral Principles of Democracies,' I smiled."⁷⁷ Nutku sustains that Köprülü resigned from the DP, he was one of the actors responsible for the unstable situation of the political regime of Turkey.⁷⁸

Furthermore, Yusuf Azizoglu and Mustafa Ekinici, the DP deputies from Diyarbakır, a province in Eastern Turkey, were among the FP founders. An important experience in the life of Tarık Ziya Ekinici indicates how these two deputies can be counted among the partisans of the DP when they were doing politics from within that political party. Without going into the details, I submit that in their region, Siverek, the deputies treated Ekinici poorly because of their partisan leanings, and in response, Ekinici wrote them a letter, which is published in his memoirs.⁷⁹ In the end, Azizoglu filed a claim for compensations to some signatories of the letter Ekinici wrote as an insult to Lice court of law.⁸⁰

Fuad Köprülü has his hand in almost all the antidemocratic moves of the DP. He also supported the arrest of veteran Turkish journalist Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın in late 1954.⁸¹ This is interesting because as we know the FP was formed as a result of a question within the DP related to the freedom of the press through right to prove bill. Furthermore, when the DP came to political power, religion, the press, and civil society were somewhat liberalized as promised while the party was in the opposition. When the party negotiated the removal of legal obstacles to a free press just after coming to power in 1950,

75 Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 109.

76 Ibid., 138. Nevertheless, Nutku, Karaosmanoğlu, and Köprülü were on the same side in ensuing years.

77 "Bugünkü Vatan'ın başmakalelerini Fuad Köprülü yazmış, başlığı 'Demokrasilerin ahlaki esasları,' güldüm." Ibid., 145.

78 Ibid., 357.

79 Ibid., 307-309.

80 Ibid., 301.

81 Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 286-87.

some future FP members and supporters, including Köprülü, were suspicious and thought of the possible problems of a new liberal press regime.⁸²

Muammer Alakant and Hamid Şevket İnce were among issuers of the law which aimed to seize the unjust acquisitions among the properties of the RPP in 1952. While Alakant was among the founders of the FP, İnce was among the opponents of Menderes within the DP after resigning from the ministry of interior. Furthermore, Karaosmanoğlu was among the signatories and defenders of the acquisition of these properties of the RPP on behalf of the DP in parliament.⁸³ In fact, Nutku states in his memoirs that “I am unable to understand how F. L. Karaosmanoğlu signed that shameful document.”⁸⁴ Moreover, some FP members were among the issuers for the law - such as Alakant, and İsmail Hakkı Akyüz - and almost all FP founders were among those who voted for the bill.⁸⁵ In that regard, especially Fethi Çelikbaş deserves more elaborate attention. Not without a reason it is fair to consider him the leader of the right to prove movement which led the formation of the FP of which Çelikbaş was one of the founders. However, Çelikbaş was one of the partisans of the DP when he was the head of ministries, and he was the one who proposed some antidemocratic laws. As spokesman of the DP, he defended those laws in front of the assembly on behalf of the party. To illustrate, he defended of the law that authorized the government authorities to force to retire the civil servants when it was considered as necessary.⁸⁶ He was also the issuer for Law 6185 which harmed to the freedom of universities,⁸⁷ and he also supported of the

82 Ibid., 291.

83 A caricature represents the key rol of Karaosmanoğlu's involvement *A caricature* in Appendix N. Arcayürek, *Yeni İktidar*, 131.

84 "F. L. karaosmanoğlu bu çirkin belgeyi nasıl imzaladı aklım almıyor." Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 243. Nevertheless, Nutku and Karaosmanoğlu became the founders of the FP on the same side against DP rule.

85 Ibid., 234-237.

86 Law 6122 was defended by Çelikbaş on behalf of the government in parliament on 09.07.1953. *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi* 24, no. IX (1953): 334-404.

87 *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi* 24, no. IX (1953): 937.

law aimed at seizing the properties of the RPP.⁸⁸ Ironically, as Muammer Aksoy puts it, Çelikbaş supported the acquisition of the properties of the RPP but later became a minister for the RPP in 1961.⁸⁹ In addition, the Law 6422 which threatens the independence of the courts, was proposed by Çelikbaş, as was the law that curtailed the independence of the state radio by banning its use by opposition parties.⁹⁰ Furthermore, Çelikbaş was among the of the signatories of the Kırşehir law directly targeted the electorate of Kırşehir.⁹¹ These electorates were punished by DP authorities because the party had not managed to win the elections in that province. Rather, the RNP, led by Osman Bölükbaşı was victorious there. Moreover, at least nine DP deputies who would split from the DP and form the FP or supported the FP voted “yes” to that law, including Şeref Kamil Mengü, Asım Okur, Cemal Köprülü, Selahattin Toker, Fuad Köprülü, Cihad Baban, Adnan Karaosmanoğlu, Hasan Kangal, Cemal Kıpçak, and Avni Yurdabayrak.⁹²

Law 6435 in 1954 damaged the autonomy of universities but was defended by Çelikbaş, as well.⁹³ This is interesting because when Çelikbaş made politics in line with the FP, he advocated the autonomy of universities in parallel with the party program.⁹⁴ One of the most surprising things was that he was among the signatories of the bill numbered 6334 in 1954 which aimed to restrict the freedom of the press.⁹⁵ In the end, he initiated of the right to prove bill after 1955. Moreover, some FP founders were among the supporters of the law, such

88 Samet Ağaoğlu, *Marmara'da Bir Ada İpin Gölgesindeki Günler* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, 2004), 270.

89 Muammer Aksoy, *Sanayi Bakanı Çelikbaş'ın Rejime, Hukuka ve Memleket Menfaatlerine Aykırı Tutumu* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963), 363.

90 Ibid., 257.

91 Ibid., 258.

92 *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi* 1, no. X (1954): 378-380. Among the founders of the FP, Ekrem Alican and Turan Güneş were among who rejected this law.

93 Ibid., 258.

94 *Hürriyet Partisinin İşbirliği Mevzuunda Vatandaşlara Tebliği* (Ankara, Yıldız Matbaacılık ve Gazetecilik T.A.Ş, 1956), 5. *Hürriyet Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi* (Ankara, Örnek Matbaası, 1956), 7. *Hürriyet Partisi Ana Nizamnamesi ve Programı* (Ankara, Örnek Matbaası, 1956), 70.

95 Aksoy, *Sanayi Bakanı Çelikbaş'ın*, 258.

as Raif Aybar, Mustafa Ekinci, Feridun Ergin, Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, Cemal Köprülü, Emrullah Nutku, Adnan Karaosmanoğlu, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, and İsmail Hakkı Akyüz.⁹⁶ Furthermore, some FP members – Fethi Çelikbaş, Behçet Kayaalp, Cemal Köprülü, Asım Okur, Cihad Baban, Muhlis Ete, Ragıp Karaosmanoğlu, Selahattin Toker, Ziya Termen, Ziyad Ebüzziya, Suphi Ergene, İsmail Akyüz, Emrullah Nutku, Cemal Köprülü, and Adnan Karaosmanoğlu - were among the supporters of the amendment Law 5434 which designed for the government chance to easily compel to civil servants to retire, and Fevzi Lütfi and Fethi Çelikbaş were among the spokespersons of the law in the assembly.⁹⁷ In addition to that, the statement made in 1952 by Muhlis Ete while minister - "the government is of the opinion that it is not possible to put economic plan to the point from production to the point of consumption" is surprising due to the fact that just three years later, Ete would criticize the DP because the party did not favor economic planning.⁹⁸ Last, Sarol, in his memoirs, argues that before 1955, when he presented a bill to provide right to prove to the media, in 1950 no one among the FP founders supported it.⁹⁹

To sum up, when the centralization process of which they were part within the DP started to threaten to some figures who were pushed to the periphery of the party, became excluded from the sources, and were replaced by rival cliques. In effect, they rose up against the center and split with the DP. This process was completed with the birth of a new political party, the FP. Nevertheless, some figures of the FP were supporters of the DP center both in party and governmental affairs and were partisans while in the DP and its governments. Thus, it is logical to assert that when they criticized the economic decline and the antidemocratic measures of the DP, they were in fact criticizing the outcome of politics for which they also shared responsibility to a degree. This made them eclectic, adjusting their political discourse in response to the

96 *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi* 29, no. IX (1954): 569-571.

97 *T.B.M.M Tutanak Dergisi* 1, no. X (1954): 241, 252-254.

98 "Hükümet istihlalden, istihlake kadar uzayacak bir plan tanzim edilemeyeceği kanaatindedir." Cem Eroğlu, *Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), 102.

99 Sarol, *Bilinmeyen Menderes*, vol 1, 424-425.

changing political atmosphere. As a result, most of the founders of the FP were among the former prominent figures of the DP when they were in the party; indeed they worked hard for the process of centralization of the DP. Hence, Frankenstein felt frightened at the results of the monster for which he was responsible when he saw the creature's horrible face. When the opponents founded the FP, they were thinking of stopping Menderes and his circle. Yet the die was cast. As an old Arabic phrase states *Bad  l Harab el Basra*.¹⁰⁰

4.2.2 *Dissimilar Figures on the Same Front*

In the broader sense of the Turkish political history, the political positions of the individuals who formed and supported the FP are confusing, which need to be paid attention to.

The eclectic character of the FP is manifest when one examines the figures who contributed in one way or another to the FP. In fact, Turan G ne , one of the founders of the FP and its general secretary, admires the heterogeneity of the FP, underlying that "the various movements among both the administrators and the organizations of the Freedom Party showed itself in ensuing incidents."¹⁰¹ He continues, suggesting that even the idea of rapid industrialization was regarded as socialism by some among their peer. For instance, according to Muhlis Ete, Aydın Yal ın was a socialist in that sense.¹⁰² Together with

100 Like closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.

101 Simav, *Turan G ne 'in Kavgaları*, 55-56. "H rriyet Partisinin gerek y neticileri ve gerekse  rg t  arasında  e itli akımların varlıđı daha sonraki olaylarda kendisini g stermi tir."

102 Aydın Yal ın was a writer for *FORUM*. His ideas about the peasantry, urbanization, and industrialization can be traced in old issues of the journal. Aydın Yal ın, "K lt r Deđi tirmemizin Temel  artı," *FORUM*, May 1, 1955. According to him, industrialization in parallel with urbanization to put an end to peasantry was the only way for democratization. Although he supported individualism in the Anglo-Saxon sense in state and society relations (Aydın Yal ın, "Aydınların Ferdiyet iliđi," *FORUM*, June 1, 1955), more interesting assertions are revealed by his political life. A journalist C neyt Arcay rek argues that Yal ın had guaranteed the presidency to Faruk G rl r in the interim regime in 1971 when military officers threatened to kill deputies if they did not elect General G rl r as president. (C neyt Arcay rek, *Bir iktidar bir ihtilal (1955-1960)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1985), 159. He also voted for the execution of three students - Deniz Gezmi , H seyin İnan, and Yusuf Aslan - in 1971. While in the Justice

Güneş, İbrahim Öktem, the first general secretary of the party, was among the radical group that advocated that the FP be a class party hinged on the working class. In one of his speeches, Güneş stated that "they say that the party with which that I am connected has the intention to appeal to the sympathy of the workers. Doubtless, we have that desire."¹⁰³ This desire of that team to transform the party into a working-class party disturbed others within the party such as Cihad Baban.¹⁰⁴ In fact, after the 1960 coup, Güneş became a prominent figure in RPP along with İbrahim Öktem and Bülent Ecevit and defended the left-of-center view which was an accumulation of Kemalist and social democratic views. However, even though Güneş was probably one of the most doctrinaire among FP members, he was arguably a pragmatist politician - more interested in the activities and practices of political parties than their programs.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, after the FP joined the RPP, it was always argued by some that former FP members brought dynamism to the RPP that led to the democratic-left turn of the RPP after the 1960 coup. However, it should not be forgotten that FP members who favored of left-of-center view were not strong vis-à-vis the opponents of that view within the RPP. Unlike the leaders and their decisions imposed in the last convention, most of the party organizations of the FP returned the DP after the FP officially joined to the RPP. Left-of-center movement had its most powerful support from the party organizations of the RPP. Therefore, the internal dynamics of the RPP were more prominent factor than the activities of former FP members. In fact, it is possible to count more opponents of that view from the FP were more in number. When the internal conflict within the RPP exploded between conservative Kemalists and

party led by Süleyman Demirel, he opposed him and was dismissed from the party along with his forty-one followers. He opposed the liberal wing of the JP as representative of the nationalist wing. After that, those forty-one figures would form the Democratic Party. Ali Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş* (Istanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1987), 473.

103 "Mensup olduğum partinin işçilerin sempatisini kazanmak niyetinde olduğundan bahsediyorlar. Hiç şüphe etmesin ki, böyle bir arzumuz vardır." Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 54.

104 Ibid., 52.

105 Cemal Fedayi, "Turan Güneş," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 9: Dönemler ve Zihniyetler*, ed. Ömer Laçiner. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2009), 533-534.

the social democrats - which caused the partition of the RPP and the formation of a new political party, the Reliance Party (Güven Partisi), which had strong ties with some military juntas - members who had come from the FP strikingly played roles in both opposing camps at the same time.¹⁰⁶ While Öktem and Güneş were among the leaders of the left-of-center view, Fethi Çelikbaş, Cihat Baban, Emin Paksüt, Kasım Küfrevi, and Coşkun Kırca were fierce opponents. So how the FP influenced to the evolution of the RPP is not clear. Likewise, Muammer Aksoy, one of the leading figures on the National Petrol issue, along with his leftist friends, became a fierce, personal opponent to Fethi Çelikbaş. When Çelikbaş was among the ministers in both the 1953-1954 and 1962-1963 periods, Aksoy urged, in his book, named *Sanayi Bakanı Çelikbaş'ın Rejime Hukuka ve Memleket Menfaatlerine Aykırı Tutumları* that he harmed the Turkish nation and the national economy because of his ambition and enactment of two laws, known as the Petroleum Law and the Law for the Encouragement of Foreign Capital which resembled the capitulations of the Ottoman era.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, after the 1960 coup, Ekrem Alican formed the New Turkish Party with friends from the FP such as Raif Aybar, İrfan Aksu, Yusuf Azizoglu, Aydın Yalçın, İhsan Hamit Tığrel, and Şekip İnal, and he became its leader. Alican was another figure who supported the welfare

106 İzzedin Çalışlar, *Ekselans*, 29, 51. Kırca and Paksüt would become the advisors to the 12 September 1980 coup and that military officers first thought of making Kırca the PM after the coup.

107 I am not sure why Aksoy only accused Çelikbaş for the laws. Among his friends from the FP, Muhlis Ete, Feridun Ergin, and some others also favored of those laws. For instance, Dr. Muhlis Ete. "Seçimde Bahis Mevzuu edilen meseleler," *Akis*, May 15, 1954. Here, Ergin emphasizes need for foreign capital in "Bütçe: Bir bütçenin hikayesi," *Akis*, December 25, 1954. In fact, the FP by which Aksoy himself was nominated in the 1957 general elections favored co-operation with the foreign capital in its program (Article 67). Given that became angry with Çelikbaş because of his activities in office in the 1950s, he could not explain how he followed a movement led by Çelikbaş. Aksoy maintains that it was a coincidence that Çelikbaş signed the right to prove bill upon the persistence of his friends and an expectation that Menderes would be overthrown. According to him, he did not expect to be dismissed from the DP. However, this is not sufficiently explanatory for the questions.

state tradition.¹⁰⁸ In a similar vein, Feridun Ergin was a Keynesian economist.¹⁰⁹ These figures were completely outside of the intraparty discussions of the RPP. Furthermore, another figure from the FP, Hüsameddin Cindoruk, would become an important figure in the right-wing political tradition in Turkey. Talat Asal would become the vice president of the Justice Party, a center-right political party that presented itself as the successor to the DP after 1960 coup. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver was an unyielding Turkist given his leadership of the Turkish Hearths. In fact, "he was the eternal flame of the ideal of Turkism."¹¹⁰ That said, Dr. Nihat Reşat Belger was, a follower of Prince Sabahattin, a Turkish sociologist influenced by French sociologists such as Edmond Demolins and Frédéric Le Play. He followed this sociological intellectual tradition underscoring the significance of decentralization and private initiative.¹¹¹ He cherished the advancement of entrepreneurship and was influenced by Anglo-Saxon notion of individualism.

In his memoirs, Turan Güneş confirms that there was some theocratic residue within the party.¹¹² In fact, figures such as Ziyad Ebuzziya, Süleyman Arif Emre, and Ekrem Ocaklı can be considered moderate Islamist figures. Bedii Faik, one of the colleagues of Ebuzziya, argues that as descended from of a very conservative family, he was nominated by the DP in the conservative province of Konya because it was thought he would appeal the electorate there.¹¹³ Arif Emre, a candidate of the FP in Adıyaman in 1957, and Ekrem Ocaklı, one of the founders of the FP, became especially key figures for the National Order Party (Milli Nizam Partisi), an Islamist political party that was shut down after the military intervention in 1971 because, according to the

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- 108 Gül Tuba Dağcı, "Ekrem Alican'ın Siyasal Hayatı" (PhD Diss. Istanbul University: The Atatürk Unstitute For Modern Turkish History, 2003), 31.
- 109 Emrah Akkurt, "Feridun Ergin," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 7: Liberalizm*, ed. Murat Yılmaz (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2005), 323.
- 110 "Türkçülük idealinin sönmeyen meş'alesi." Baydar, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver*, 13.
- 111 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 454.
- 112 Simav, *Turan Güneş Kavgaları*, 52.
- 113 Bedii Faik, *Matbut Basın derkeken... Medya*, vol 2 (Istanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 2001) 32. Today, his personal archive is in the İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi (Center for Islamic Studies) in Üsküdar, Istanbul.

allegations, it opposed the secular regime. Moreover, Fuad Köprülü, an honorary member of the FP, was among the prominent figures of Turkish conservatism¹¹⁴ and Tarık Buğra, who was nominated by the FP in 1957 in Malatya,¹¹⁵ was the chief editor of the party paper, *Yeni Gün*,¹¹⁶ and a conservative novelist.¹¹⁷ Moreover, Muhlis Ete, one of the founders of the FP, joined the Republican Peasant Nation Party after the 1960 coup. Furthermore, Yusuf Azizoğlu and Mehmet Ekinci, who had been deputies of the DP before splitting with it and joining the FP, were interested in the local problems of Eastern Turkey. To illustrate, they were closely interested in Özalp incident - the murder of thirty-three Kurdish citizens in the Özalp district of Van in 1943.¹¹⁸ In fact, Azizoğlu, among the exiled Kurdish families, was forced to resign from the ministry of health in 1962 accused of regionalism and "Eastism."¹¹⁹

To sum up, in this section, we have revealed that the founders and supporters of the FP positioned themselves in a wide range of political positions within a narrow political spectrum throughout the 1950s and 1960s including, Kemalism, social democracy, liberalism, Islamism, conservatism, Kurdistanism, and Turkism.¹²⁰ These political stances of FP supporters mentioned here were obviously sometimes even conflicting within the party. This heterogeneity vis-à-vis the places of the figures of the FP on the political spectrum does not allow researchers to make clear-cut conclusions. It is concluded here that the members of the party did not share tightly affiliated views in a unified way.

114 Yalın Alpay, "Fuat Köprülü," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 5: Muhafazakarlık*, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2009), 136.

115 "Hürriyet Partisi Adayları," *Milliyet*, October 8, 1957.

116 Öymen, *Ve ihtilal*, 398.

117 Mehmet Can Doğan, "Tarık Buğra," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce 5: Muhafazakarlık*, ed. Ahmet Çiğdem, 4th ed, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 2009), 544.

118 Samet Ağaoğlu, *Aşina Yüzler* (Istanbul: Ağaoğlu Yayınevi, 1965) 33. In fact, Musa Anter, an important figure in the Kurdish intelligentsia, emphasizes that these two deputies were Kurds. Musa Anter, *Hatıralarım* (Diyarbakır: Aram Yayınları, 2011), 129. Also, Azizoğlu was regarded as one of a hero of the Kurdish consciousness in Turkey.

119 See McDowall David, *A Modern History of the Kurds* (London-New York: I.B. Tauris, Third Edition, 2007), 408.

120 "Forumsuzluk Korkusu," *FORUM*, April 1, 1958. Not only the FP but its ideologue, *FORUM*, was prepared by people who differed on a wide range of political ideas.

The points of view that defined the FP, reference to a political doctrine or program cannot explain how and to what ends those completely different people came together under the same umbrella. The heterogeneous structure of the Democrat Party was the source of the opposition caused the formation of the FP. The heterogeneity that gathered all the dissidents within the DP emerged as a united front under the FP in the second half of the 1950s. Even though the opposition within the DP that converged to form the FP was fragmented, they shared some common assumptions. Hence, these figures set some common goals for the party, ignoring their differences for the sake of a larger, more important cause: hostility towards Adnan Menderes and his circle.

4.2.3 *Hostility Towards Adnan Menderes and His Circle*

After we have showed that the FP was a coalition of dissident politicians and the mainstream Turkish intellectuals at the time, we explained that the FP adopted a heterogeneous outlook regarding ideological orientations and the social backgrounds of its leading cadres. The previous sub-section was concluded by suggesting that these dissimilar actors in the party gathered together - ignoring their personal differences for the sake of a huge goal: to defeat Menderes and his team whatever the cost. This cause was deeply rooted in the party and in the behaviors and discourses of its members.

The personal feelings of FP members vis-à-vis Menderes and his crew were entirely negative and included personal anger and unlimited antipathy. Those negative feelings started just after the party came to power and Menderes was appointed as PM. Those who were suspicious to him even before he formed his government gathered together in the FP, indicating that the formation of the party was not merely a reaction to the so-called antidemocratic turn of the party. Now, I give a few examples that indicate the level of anger against Menderes and his crew among FP members. Emrullah Nutku opposed the premiership of Menderes in 1950, preferring Bayar for the office. While talking

about Menderes in his book, he expresses that “he was a psycho, I guess.”¹²¹ He also had huge hostility towards Sarol who was considered the leader of the opportunists according to Nutku.¹²² While talking about Sarol, Nutku calls him Menderes’s “Himmler.”¹²³ In the same vein, long before 1955 after the second Menderes cabinet was just formed, Enver Adakan, one of the founders of the FP, was of the opinion that Menderes should resign. He called Menderes on resigning on behalf of the opposition in the parliamentary group.¹²⁴ On the other hand, Baban argues, in his memoirs, that he was of the opinion that Menderes should resign in 1954, stating “ah, I wish he could resign” (“Ah bir istifa edebilse”).¹²⁵ In fact, he called Menderes on resigning after he himself resigned from the DP in a letter.¹²⁶ Moreover, in March 1955, a reporter asked Çelikbaş: “does the Freedom Party accept Menderes?” “No,” said Çelikbaş.¹²⁷ Also, we know from the memoirs of Sarol that after Çelikbaş resigned from the ministry in 1955, he threatened Menderes and wanted to settle old scores. On the other hand, in his memoirs, Tanrıöver talks about Menderes as follows: “his past is the greatest unknown; as for his future, it is a terrible darkness.”¹²⁸ Even when he was sick and on his deathbed, Tanrıöver complained about

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- 121 “O bir ruh hastasıydı bence.” Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 5. In one parliamentary session, while Menderes and Nutku were arguing about a citizen who was beaten by officers in a police station – an action which was criticized by Nutku -, Menderes attacked him saying that, “all of them are working. If there is one who does not work, it is you. Mr. Emrullah says that he has no specific contact with me. When he lost the primary election in Erzurum because he did not work, he came in and asked for a deputyship.” Nutku responded that while Menderes was talking about the 20 percent quota of the center, he was not only attacking himself but also all the deputies nominated by the center. “Mecliste dün şiddetli bir söz düellosu cereyan etti,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 16, 1957.
- 122 Nutku, *Demokrat Parti Neden Çöktü*, 88.
- 123 Ibid., 197.
- 124 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 81-82.
- 125 Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 225.
- 126 Ibid., 194-195.
- 127 “Çelikbaşın «hayır» dediği sual «Menderesi Hürriyet Partisine kabul eder misiniz?»” *Cumhuriyet*, March 24, 1956.
- 128 “Mazisi bir meçhulü a(şapkalı)zam istikbali ise korkunç bir karanlık.” Baydar, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver*, 388.

Menderes. To show the hostility towards Menderes' personality, independent of the politics of his party, Güneş tells a striking story in his memoirs. One day in parliament, Menderes asked Güneş: "What do you want from me?" The response was clear: he said, "We want you [to resign]." He continued, "If you will not resign we will remain like that."¹²⁹ This rejection of Menderes was common to almost most all FP members. One of the founders of the FP, Raif Aybar, in his book of poetry, wrote a poem called "gentleman" (beyefendi), dedicated to Adnan Menderes - because people called him the gentleman at the time, Aybar calls him a shameless mugger emphasizing his private life.¹³⁰ Moreover, this hostility is most apparent in a document, *Hürriyetçi Ne Diyor?* Published by the FP just before the 1957 general elections. It argues that deputies sent to parliament by the will of the people operated by the will of Menderes.¹³¹ It is said that waiting for Menderes's instruction before acting was a sign of immorality. In the two-page document, the name Menderes is used fifteen times with a vulgar tone.¹³² Furthermore, Burçak, one of the GAB members of the DP, suggested that Köprülü was so overwhelmed by ambition that when Refik Koraltan was arrested on the morning of the 27 May, he watched and laughed loudly. Burçak said that he would not believe this if he heard it from Koraltan himself.¹³³ Not only FP members but also *FORUM* writers blamed the leaders of the DP for all the political problems.¹³⁴ Also, *FORUM* welcomed the military coup arguing that the 27 May movement was the most gentlemanly coup, in history - a unique victory for civilization and humanity.¹³⁵ It is fair to assert

129 Güneş, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 45.

130 Raif Aybar, *Kaftan* (Ankara: Yarın Yayınları, 1969), 68. The entire poet is as follows: Nufuz ticaretilerle çarpıp karaborsayı, / İki yılda beş milyon sahibi olmuş diye, / Çiftliği zannediyor İstanbul'u Bursa'yı. / O edepsiz eşkiya, cepleri dolmuş yine. / Arabası; villası, köpeği, metresi var. / İnanmış kudretine, zekâsına sahiden, / Ahlâk ölçülerile alay eden cüretkâr, / Can havliyle kaçıyor bıraktığı maziden. / Beyefendi diyorlar ona her yerde şimdi! / Ayağının ucuyla kapıları açarken. / Ucuz erzak arayan hakiki beyefendi, Pazar Pazar sürünür, esnaf sergi kaparken...

131 *Hürriyetçi Ne diyor?* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), 3.

132 Ibid.

133 Burçak, *On Yılın Anıları*, 423.

134 "Devrimler ve Demokrasi Meselelerimiz," *FORUM* August 15, 1956.

135 "İhtilâllerin En Centilmeni," *FORUM*, June 1, 1960.

that the champion of the hostility was Muammer Aksoy, whose writings after the 1960 coup must be read by all students of the FP. Just after the coup, Aksoy praised it, writing an unprecedented article arguing that the mercy of the Turkish nation could be deceptive and groundless mercy was a great danger. The Menderes-Bayar gang and all the DP deputies without exception, regardless of gender or positions as extremists or moderates should be arrested.¹³⁶ In fact, while he was on trial on Yassıada, one of Menderes' lawyers, Burhan Apaydın, argued that Aksoy prepared the justification of the decision to execute Menderes and others.¹³⁷ Aksoy provided evidence against Menderes in the Yassıada military court, making speeches for hours. It is also interesting that the lawyer who shut the DP down by suing the party for acting contrary the law of associations was Cemal Özbey, a former FP member, who was one of the candidates of the party in Malatya in the 1957 elections.¹³⁸ Before the elections, *FORUM* declared that the DP had lost its legitimacy.¹³⁹ And a FP member put an end to it.

In a nutshell, the negative feelings towards Menderes were clearly crucial for the formation of the FP in which figures with differing political views felt the need to form a united front against the so-called Menderes-Bayar "gang" and ignored their differences for the sake of destroying DP rule. When Fuad Köprülü resigned from the DP, he advised that all Turkish citizens should cooperate and put aside their controversies, as we saw in the third chapter. That said, while his resignation was welcomed by the FP, *FORUM* magazine congratulated him.¹⁴⁰ That very day, Karaosmanoğlu stated that even though Köprülü had made mistakes in the recent past, the country would benefit from him.¹⁴¹ If we recall, the one who interrogated Karaosmanoğlu when he participated in the right to prove movement was Köprülü. It seems that hostility

136 Muammer Aksoy. "En Büyük Tehlike: Yersiz Acıma Hissi," *FORUM*, June 1, 1960.

137 Yurdakul Doğan and F. Cengiz Erdinç, *Adalet Savaşısı: Menderes'in Avukatı Burhan Apaydın'ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Kırmızı Kedi Yayınları, 2012), 129.

138 Özbey, Cemal. *Demokrat Parti Nasıl Kapattırıldı?* (Ankara: Emek Basım Yayınevi, 1961).

139 "Ey Ruh Geldinse..." *FORUM*, October 15, 1959. A fetwa was given by the *FORUM* that the DP lost its legality.

140 "D.P. deki Manevi Boşalma," *FORUM*, August 1, 1957. "Eski Bir Hocanın Mesajı," *FORUM*, September 15, 1957.

141 "Kurucu Fuad Köprülü dün Demokrat Partiden istifa etti," *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1957.

towards the Menderes circle reunited them. Before the 1957 general elections, Köprülü made a speech in the Balıkesir meeting of the FP against the DP side by side with Karaosmanoğlu; he also called on the Manisa electorate to vote for the FP in a telegram.

It has been indicated that FP members coming from different political stances came together to defeat Menderes circle without worrying about their differences. In the next sub-section, I explained the place of the FP in the general picture of the 1950s, showing that to a large extent there were no strict ideological differences in 1950s and that the lack of doctrine was not unique to the FP.

§ 4.3 No Clear Ideological Differences between Political Parties

One of the important pieces of advice for life given by İsmet İnönü to his son, Erdal was "Do not be doctrinaire!" (doktriner olmayacaksın!)¹⁴² Actually, this was more than the ordinary advice of a father to his son; it was the advice of a founding father of Turkey - a command and an indicator of a certain mentality that prevailed in Turkish politics until the 1960s. In this section, I figure out that the differences between the two considerable political parties of the 1950s in Turkey, the DP, and the RPP, were indistinct. I confirm the premise by looking at the differences between the policies of the governments of these political parties with respect to issues like foreign, fiscal, and social policy. In fact, marginal political doctrines were already officially illegal.

4.3.1 “Political Travelers” Floating from One Party to Another

Examining the moves of the deputies of the FP in particular, as well as the deputies of other political parties, sheds light on the political positions of political parties of the 1950s in general and the FP in particular.

The members of the FP can be defined as a group of political travelers floating from one party to another. In this section, I will not list all the figures who oscillated between different political parties; rather, I will give just a few

142 Erdal İnönü, *Anılar ve Düşünceler 2* (İstanbul: Yorum Kitapları, 1998), 148.

examples that cover almost all the leading figures of the FP. Before going into the examples, we first need to underscore that there were some figures who were once in the RPP - such as Fuad Köprülü, Enver Adakan, Yusuf Azizoğlu, Ziyad Ebuzziya, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, İhsan Hamit Tığrel, and Muammer Alakant - before the advent of multiparty politics. Therefore, they made politics in at least three political parties within the fifteen-year period between 1945 and 1960. For instance, Enver Adakan, became the Istanbul deputy for the RPP in 1935.¹⁴³ In 1950, he became the Istanbul deputy for the DP.¹⁴⁴ Then, he became one of the founders of the FP, and in the 1957 general elections he was a candidate of the FP in Istanbul. After 1961, Adakan formed Nationalist Free Party (Memleketçi Serbest Parti) after the coup to gather former DP members. On the other hand, Tanrıöver was a friend of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and had been a deputy and a minister for the RPP. After that, the fate of the RPP and that of Tanrıöver separated as a consequence of disputes related to the Turkish Hearths. In 1945 Tanrıöver was a deputy from Istanbul in the RPP, he became a deputy for the RPP in 1946.¹⁴⁵ In the Seventh Convention of the RPP held in 1947, he was harshly criticized from his party because of his religious tendencies.¹⁴⁶ While in 1950 he was nominated by the DP in Manisa, in 1954 he again became an independent candidate from the DP list.¹⁴⁷ He split with his party and became a member of the FP upon the advice of Ziyad Ebuzziya.¹⁴⁸ Ebuzziya conducted politics under the umbrellas of the RPP, DP, FP, and NTP, consecutively. Üstündağ was one of the founders of the Free Republican Party in Izmir in 1930. After the transition to the multiparty politics, he became a prominent figure of the DP with his huge efforts in Izmir. After

143 *Türk Parlamento Tarihi: TBMM - IV. Dönem (1931-1935)*, Vol. II (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), 96.

144 Kazım Öztürk, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi: TBMM - IX. Dönem (1950-1954)*, Vol. VII (Ankara: Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), 495.

145 Halim Serarslan, *Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1995), 157.

146 *Ibid.*, 159.

147 Fethi Tevetioğlu, *Hamdullah Subhi Tanrıöver: Hayatı ve Eserleri* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1986), 213.

148 *Ibid.*, 213.

signing the right to prove bill, he became among the founders of the FP and, moreover, he would be the first chairman of the party. In addition to these figures, the honorary member of the FP, Fuad Köprülü, was a deputy in 1935 from Kars. In 1946, he became one of the founders of the DP.¹⁴⁹ When he had problems with friends in the party, he resigned and supported the FP. Yusuf Azizoğlu was a deputy for the RPP, DP, FP, and NTP, consecutively, between 1945-1963.

Nonetheless, the permeability among the political parties for the politicians was not specific to the members of the FP; rather, it was valid for all deputies from all parties in those years because there were no significant differences between the parties. The political career of Ahmet Hamdi Başar, in particular, was an excellent example in that regard. In the 1930s, he was on the crew of Mustafa Kemal when the national leader was undertaking the nationwide tour to investigate the problems of the people and find solutions for them after the termination of the Free Republican Party which was an experiment showed the dissidence of the people. Başar became a deputy of the RPP in the 1930s and resigned from the party in 1945.¹⁵⁰ In the 1946 election even though he was an independent candidate from Istanbul, but he did not manage to get elected. After that, he participated in the foundation of the first considerable opposition party, the DP. Soon after, he was excluded from the preparations of the DP because he could not compromise with Menderes and Köprülü. They favored a fully liberal program politically and economically, whereas he represented a sort of economic statism. When Bayar put his weight behind the Menderes-Köprülü side, Başar was pushed out from the formation of the party.¹⁵¹ While between 1950 and 1953 he was a deputy for the DP, he resigned in 1953, and between 1953 and 1954, he remained as an independent deputy. Although in the 1954 general election, he was on the list of Republican Nation

149 Orhan Köprülü, *Fuad Köprülü* (Ankara: Gaye Matbaası, 1987), 7. Also see İhsan Güneş, *Türk Parlamento Tarihi: TBMM: V. Dönem (1935-1939)*, 405.

150 Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Ahmet Hamdi Başar'ın Hatıraları: Demokrasiye Geçiş, DP İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs*, comp. Murat Koraltürk (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 65.

151 *Ibid.*, 40.

Party candidates, he did not get elected.¹⁵² After that, in 1955, he tried to form a new party with some friends.¹⁵³ However, the team could not agree on common principles. Before they formed the party, the nineteen who split with the DP together with some his friends with whom Başar was working to form a new party formed the FP. Although he wanted to be a member of the new party, the other FP members different from his friends with who he tried to form a new party refused him for unknown reasons. In the 1957 general elections, Başar was again nominated by the RPP; nevertheless, he did not get elected.¹⁵⁴ Before the election, Başar's efforts to unite opposition parties in a single front attracts attention.¹⁵⁵

These kinds of figures floating from one political party to another did not have well-defined political doctrines or distinctive programs. Rather, their political discourses had an eclectic character vis-à-vis their political parties, which were eclectic, as well. This volatile stance can explain their moves from one political party to another. In other words, that the politicians could easily transferred between the parties demonstrates that there were no considerable differences among the parties at that time with respect to their approaches to the foreign, domestic, fiscal, and social policy. In fact, as we already indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the priority of the FP, which was emerged as a result of personal disputes between Menderes and his circle and the founders of the FP, was to put an end to the Menderes rule in Turkey.

There is a possible criticism of our approach in this section. Some could argue that our judgment assumes that ideological and discursive positions of political parties in the period from 1945 to 1960 were fixed and ignores the historicity and dynamics of the time period. However, to refute this kind of objection, I have previously tried showed that the position of these political figures was strictly dependent on their positions within their party. To illustrate, when a politician was excluded from the government or high offices by his party, he adjusted his tone accordingly. Moreover, the politics of the DP

152 Ibid., 279.

153 Including Şemsettin Günaltay, Enver Adakan, Nihat Reşat Belger, Avni Başman, Avni Doğan, and Alaaddin Tiritöğlu Ibid., 320. See also, Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim*, 1651.

154 Başar, *DP İktidarı ve 27 Mayıs*, 546.

155 Ibid., 517-532.

regarding foreign policy, the economy, the manner towards the opposition did not change at a massive scale in the 1950s; there were no ebbs and flows with respect to these. Regarding the authoritarianization of the DP, it is not possible to identify an antidemocratic turn in DP rule. The ruling party always undertook strict measures to oppose both opposition parties and opponents within the party. By the same token, ideological discourses of the RPP were stable during the 1950s. It complained about authoritarianism and the need for constitutional reforms. The motives of the founders of the FP were not really about the antidemocratic turn of the DP; rather, the positions of the party were based on worsening their personal problems with Menderes and his circle. When they split with the DP and formed the FP, of course, they attacked the DP with respect to its lack of financial planning by observing the outcomes of the limitless liberal policies of the DP and with respect to problems of human rights and social and political freedoms. On the other hand, how can one explain the difference between the RPP and the DP, especially after the formation of the DP? Moreover, if the positions of the parties had quickly changed within ten years these figures had changed their political parties in response, this would only support and confirm the hypothesis that political parties and politicians of the 1950s in Turkey had no ideological and temporal stance; rather, they adjusted their agendas according to the situation - making them eclectic. For example, when we consider the unification of the FP and the RPP in 1958, we see that there were no ideological or political differences between them, so they merged. Even at time when the FP was formed, it is not possible to identify clear-cut differences between the FP and the RPP. In fact, one of the most important political agendas of opposition parties before the 1957 general elections was to form a united front against the DP. A common declaration suggested that the opposition parties had agreed to make necessary reforms after the elections for judiciary independence, freedom of the press, autonomy for universities, a constitutional court, and independent presidency. This shows that these opposition parties had the same fundamental vision which was not to conduct a doctrine or program with alliance some social groups. Briefly, it is fair to suggest that opposition parties had more or less the same views as the FP regarding these reforms and the same approach to the issues of democracy, the economy, the foreign policy. To illustrate, Süleyman Arif Emre, in his

memoirs, says that he changed political parties five times in his political life. While being interrogated by judge after the 12 September 1980 coup, the judge was surprised, and asked how it was possible. Emre said that the reason for these changes was not his changing ideas; rather, fluctuations in the political life in Turkey were their cause.¹⁵⁶ This expresses not only the volatile outlook of political parties but proves that the figures adjusted their moves in accordance with daily changing political situation.

4.3.2 *The Differences between the Political Parties*

In this sub-section, I discuss the ideological differences between two considerable political parties of the 1950s in Turkey - the RPP and DP - to explain the broader nature of the politics at the time of which the FP was just a part. My hypothesis is that during the 1950s, there were no significant differences between the parties regarding ideology and policies on major issues such as the economy, foreign policy, extreme ideologies, media and social background of cadres.

To grasp the differences between the DP and the RPP, paying attention to the principles of these parties and the social background of leading cadres of two parties is necessary. These two were actually more or less the same regarding these. As Şevket Süreyya Aydemir puts it, "we see that the Democrat Party derived not only its cadre from the Republican People's Party but also its program."¹⁵⁷ In fact, when we look at the upper echelons of the hierarchies of both parties, we cannot escape the similarities between them regarding social and educational backgrounds.¹⁵⁸

Furthermore, when the principles of these parties are examined, it is seen that both the DP and RPP adopted the principles of nationalism, republicanism, and laicism. For instance, Zürcher states that the DP appropriated the principles of the RPP such as laicism and nationalism in the period 1947-1950

156 Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl*, vol 1, 70.

157 "Ve görürüz ki Demokrat Parti, Halk Partisinden, yalnız kadrosunu değil, programını da aktarmıştır." Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, 150.

158 Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 336.

- thus, differences between them were dissolved.¹⁵⁹ Regarding the principle of populism (Halkçılık) - one of the six Kemalist principles - both parties opposed class-based politics which, allegedly, threatened the unity of the nation and the state. Therefore, class cleavages were seen as dividing the nation, which is one reason class politics did not emerge in the 1950s among the political parties, as they did among their counterparts in Europe. Moreover, Samet Ağaoğlu, a member and one of the ideologues of the DP, in his book, *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar*, he tries (but, as will be demonstrated, fails) to explain the differences between the DP and RPP but in his explanation, it is possible to see that the DP rejected the mentality which equalized the interests of social classes with certain political parties.¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, as we saw in the beginning of this chapter, both parties approaches strictly opposed the extremist political ideologies including communism, radical nationalism, and Islamism in their terms. However, regarding religion in private life, the RPP and the DP acted more or less the same, especially after the 1947 convention of the RPP wherein the RPP became closer to the DP by liberalizing its program with respect to religion and education. (the term Zürcher uses is the "liberalization in the religion.")¹⁶¹ In fact, this liberalization was evident itself in the actions of the RPP - for example, in the opening İmam Hatip High Schools which is to train Muslim religious officials to serve people in mosques.¹⁶²

Moreover, these two parties were in unison regarding revolutionism, according to Karpāt. Both parties saw the necessity of adapting the changing values of advanced civilizations, basing them on Turkish tradition while disposing of harmful elements. Also, both parties placed importance on protecting the Kemalist reforms and principles.¹⁶³

159 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, trans. Yasemin Saner (Istanbul: İletişim, 2012), 312-313.

160 Samet Ağaoğlu, *İki Parti Arasındaki Farklar* (Ankara: Arbas Matbaası, 1947).

161 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 314.

162 Karakuş, *İşte Ankara*, 132.

163 Karpāt, *Turkey's Politics*, 338.

Other than these principles, the economic and foreign policies of the governments of both parties had no major differences. When in 1947 the RPP liberalized its policies, it was a milestone not only regarding the political reform and liberalization of the regime but also regarding fiscal policies.¹⁶⁴ The government devalued the currency to secure IMF credits. With the economic reform decisions made on 7 September, by which Turkey started to integrate into the world economic system, the tone of the statism in the field of economics was downed out.¹⁶⁵ "Henceforth, differences between the economic policies of the DP and that of the RPP barely remained," as Zürcher puts it.¹⁶⁶ This point was underlined by almost all experts in the field. Pamuk underlines that the direction of the economy did not change in 1950; the change occurred in 1947 when the RPP put aside the Third Industrialization Plan and focused its attention on private entrepreneurship.¹⁶⁷ Zürcher confirms this, asserting that the essential turning point regarding the direction of the economy did not occur under the DP; decisions made by the İnönü government in 1947 were the real break.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, Korkut Boratav confirms this common view, suggesting that when the DP came to power, contrary to popular wisdom, it did not undertake distinctive changes in fiscal policy. This continuity was also evident regarding the foreign economic relations.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, the continuity in the economic policies of the two eras was frequently emphasized, and thus, the differences between the DP and the RPP became indecisive.

After talking about the lack of differences between these parties in some respects, we need to pay attention to the foreign policies which these parties

164 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, 315.

165 Ibid., 316.

166 "Bu andan itibaren DP'yle CHP'nin ekonomi siyasetleri arasında hemen hiç fark kalmamıştı." Ibid., 317.

167 Şevket Pamuk, *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*, 7th Edition (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları), 226.

168 Ibid., 327.

169 Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1950-1960)," in *Türkiye Tarihi IV: Çağdaş Türkiye (1908-1980)*, ed. Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 2008), 342-343. This resemblance respect to statism was emphasized by Aydemir also argued that the statism of the DP and RPP were almost identical. Aydemir, *Menderes'in Dramı*, 150.

pursued while they were in power. Again, that no divides between the political orientation of the parties were stressed in the period 1945-1960 (of which the period 1945-1950 was the era of the RPP, and 1950-1960 was that of the DP) by experts of the history of the foreign policy of the republic.¹⁷⁰ In both periods, the relative autonomy of Turkey in foreign policy was shattered by the Cold War atmosphere in which Turkey's bias was for the West, especially the US.¹⁷¹ There was a continuity between them in that sense.

To conclude, when we look at the principles and policies of the two parties, we see that they do not demonstrate clear-cut differences. In fact, when the DP was formed with the permission and under the direction of Pater Patriae (as Arzık called¹⁷²) İnönü in 1946, the new opposition party and its discursive limits were defined by the RPP. "The only opposition granted legitimacy was a semi-liberal rightist opposition whose ideology did not differ significantly from that of the ruling party."¹⁷³ Therefore, the blank left by the lack of differences between the political parties was filled by personal urges, ambitions, leaders' charisma and personalities and autonomy of the political sphere was larger. Therefore, politics of persons prevailed in the nature and dynamics of politics of those years. This is not only a premise that is academically confirmed, but it was also valid in the perceptions of the actors and observers of the time, whatever their political party or ideas. For example, Asım Us, a politician of the time from the RPP, stated that "there are no essential differences between the RPP and the DP regarding foreign and domestic politics."¹⁷⁴ Arçayürek, a journalist at the time, argued that the approaches of authorities towards the press in both eras were similar; how single-party rule regarded the

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- 170 Baskın Oran, "1945-1960: Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc-1," in *Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran, trans. Mustafa Akşin, (Salt Lake City: The University of Utah Press, 2010).
- 171 Ibid., 297.
- 172 Arzık, *Tek At Tek Mızrak*, vol 2, 28.
- 173 Cem Eroğlu, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule: 1945-71," in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed. C. Shick, E. A. Tonak (New York Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 104.
- 174 "Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ile Demokrat Parti arasında harici ve dahili siyasetin ana hatları bakımından esaslı bir fark yoktur." Asım Us, *Asım Us'un Hatıra Notları: 1930'da 1950 Yılına Kadar Atatürk ve İsmet İnönü Devirlerine Ait Seçme Fıkralar* (İstanbul: Vakıf Matbaası), 668.

press was similar to how it was considered by the DP. In both terms, the press was under pressure and falsified news was the pretext for that.¹⁷⁵ In other words, when the government desired to attack the media, “media makes falsified news which violate personal honor of officials” was the same argument. Interestingly, a similar kind of law to the Kırşehir Law that made Kırşehir a sub-province after the 1954 general elections in order to punish the electorate of Kırşehir which did not vote for the DP, was enforced by the RPP when Free Republican Party candidates won elections in Silifke which was also downgraded from a province to a sub-district.¹⁷⁶ Thus, the DP did not bring a new understanding of domestic politics in Turkey, as it has been suggested by thousands of observers at the time.¹⁷⁷ This era was characterized by Gevgilili as a single-party rule in the guise of a two-party system.¹⁷⁸ The most literary, fruitful expression describing the resemblance of the DP and RPP was authored by the Islamic intellectual Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. He defined the DP as “a separate herb flowered from the same family.”¹⁷⁹ He argues that the DP was an unfruitful experiment stemming from the same seed that nourished the RPP because

175 Arcayürek, *Bir İktidar Bir İhtilal*, 93. Regarding formal advertising, resemblance of the two periods can be seen in the memoirs of another journalist. Karakuş, *İşte Ankara*, 190. Karakuş argues that the mission of the DP was not to oppose the RPP but to be a better form of the RPP. The only thing the DP opposed was certain and their faulty actions. *Ibid.*, 61.

176 Karpas, *Turkey's Politics*, 66.

177 Celal Ertuğ, *Çözumsuz Demokrasi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1998), 19-20. Also, Cerrahoğlu, *Demokrat Parti Masalı*, 9. *Akis* magazine also stresses that there were no differences between the DP and the RPP regarding these ideas. Their differences did not stem from the differences in its figures, either. Instead, it is the position of the politicians whether they were in opposition or in power. Editorial, *Akis*, January 8, 1955. Some such as Alattin Tiritöğlu felt the need for real opposition parties organized according to doctrines based on respective social groups. He stated that two factions struggling for power (at the time) did not differ scientifically. Thus, the DP which was formed because of divisions within the RPP, was not a different political party with respect to its program. Alaattin Tiritöğlu, “Hakikî Partilerin Zamanı Gelmemiş Midir?” *Akis*, March 12, 1955. For more detailed information about, Tiritöğlu see Serdar Sarısır, “Millî Mücadeleden Türk Siyasal Hayatına; Alaattin Tiritöğlu (1903-1969),” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 11, no. 44, (2009): 649-671.

178 Gevgilili, *Yükseliş ve Düşüş*, 151.

179 “Aynı aileye bağlı ayrı bir nebat.” Kısakürek, *Benim Gözümde Menderes*, 20.

the party did not differ from the RPP on any fundamental issue.¹⁸⁰ According to him, these two parties were derived from the same protoplasm of the RPP.¹⁸¹ What changed when the DP came to power was the individuals who held the offices. After the DP ascended to power, the president was Bayar instead of İnönü; Mümtaz Faik Fenik became the editorial writer for the ruling party in place of Falih Rıfkı Atay. Nonetheless, there were some exceptions, Behçet Uz, a minister of health from the single-party era, achieved to have that ministry in 1954 one more time for the DP.

Before dropping the subject, I utilise ideas of Bahri Savcı, a scholar at the time in Ankara University, who asserted that the most significant characteristics of the political parties in Turkey were that they were formed as a result of subjective, psychological factors including jealousy, sympathy, faith, and holy hatred (*mukaddes bir kin*); therefore, political parties not only did not arise from ideas, they could not evolve to adopt a doctrine with ideological content. The struggles between parties were obliged to remain limited in scope to personal hatred and faith.¹⁸² This premise of Savcı is empirically evident, as we have tried to reveal. Also, Arif Emre stresses what distinguished the political parties was not different world-views, political systems, and models that they envisaged. Rather, people with the same political views present themselves as different political parties.¹⁸³

To sum up, what we have talked detailed here enlightens the resemblance of the political parties in Turkey in the 1950s regarding their principles and policies. In fact, even if we put aside these principles of the different political parties and their internal and external policies and political discourses, the perception - which shall be taken into consideration as reality - of political and intellectual elites in Turkey in the 1950s was similar. There were no doctrinaire positions in politics and the political parties had more or less the same features. Their distinctive features should be identified in their leadership. This is

180 Ibid., 50.

181 Ibid., 119.

182 Bahri Savcı, "Siyasi Parti Rejimimizin Her Zamanki ve Şimdiki Çıkmazı," *FORUM*, April 1, 1961.

183 Emre, *Siyasette 35 Yıl*, 72.

not only valid for the DP and RPP, it was also for the FP. For example, when the FP was formed, Nadir Nadi, a columnist at the time and former deputy of the DP in its first term, underlined that there were no differences between the programs of political parties including the FP.¹⁸⁴

§ 4.4 The Ideological Discourses of the FP

After a close look at the history of the FP, the process that gave its birth, and the nature of the Turkish domestic politics in the 1950s, in this section, I am going to reveal the ideological codes of the FP, mostly by addressing party documents as well as the discourses of its members. I suggest that the basic philosophy around which all the ideological elements of the party revolved was based on restricting executive power at home and abroad and adopting the necessary preventive measures to guarantee that an era such as that of the DP would not be experienced again. This idea also laid the foundation for of the 1961 Constitution in which some members of the FP played a role. If this core principle in the minds of FP members is understood, the rest becomes clearer. Thus, the most suitable word to understand the party is "eclectism." In the second half of this section, I refute the arguments of the previous scholars on the basis of the explanations given this chapter.

4.4.1 *Reflections on Party Documents*

The FP was declared to the public in November 1955. The first document of the party, its bylaws, was published to regulate its domestic affairs.¹⁸⁵ When we look at the domestic affairs of the party sketched by the document, it is possible to see that party leaders strived to form an institution organized in such a way to ensure intraparty democracy and free speech by making a special emphasis on the distribution of the offices in order to prevent the centralization of the party. To restrict possible extremism of leading echelon was prominent. In fact, the party presented always itself a party of ideas, not the party of a

184 Nadir Nadi, "Parti Adları," *Cumhuriyet*, November 22, 1955.

185 *Hürriyet Partisi Ana Nizamnamesi* (Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1955).

charismatic leader.¹⁸⁶ Let us look at the program and bylaws of the party. First, the name of the party, the Freedom Party; its center, Ankara; and its goal, to adapt its principles to the people and to serve the country within the scope of the republican laws, were introduced (Articles 1 and 2). After that, the registration to the party is regulated in the document. To be a member of the party, candidates must be Turkish citizens and eligible to vote. Also, the candidates that adopted Turkish culture by heart and accept the bylaws of the party should not have committed a shameful crime. Moreover, it was important that candidates not have any antidemocratic acts or inclinations in pasts. Most interestingly, candidates should not be got stuck in the ideologies not compatible with the national sovereignty, such as fascism or communism.¹⁸⁷ According to the party, the premiership should not be compounded with the membership of the GAB of the party. Also, membership in the government and membership on the GAB cannot be compounded into one person. (Article 45).¹⁸⁸ In doing so, founders visioned that the government should be monitored by the party first. This clearly indicates that the party was formed as a reaction to the DP given the differences in the approaches of the GAB and parliamentary group in the DP, a conflict that always resulted in the centralization of the party in the hands of the GAB pioneered by its leaders at the expense of the parliamentary group.¹⁸⁹ So the logic of these FP regulations was to restrict the elected executive power first within the party. Another example of how the GAB was empowered vis-à-vis the elected government was that the duty to form expertise commissions within the party was given to the GAB (Article

186 *İleriye Atılış: Hürriyet Partisi Birinci Umumî Kongresi* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), 8. Interestingly, two months after of the refusal of the memorandum of the four in 1945, which caused the formation of the DP, Karaosmanoğlu resigned from the RPP saying "the RPP in power means the dictatorship of the intelligentsia." (CHP iktidarı, aydınların diktatörlüğü demektir). He became leader of the party of the intelligentsia around ten years later. Bedii Faik, *Matbuat Basın derkeen... Medya*, vol 1, 14.

187 *Ibid.*, 4. Candidates who fulfill the conditions sign a bill of entry. For an example, see *Bill of Entry*, Appendix H.

188 *Ibid.*, 34.

189 The partition of the DP resulted in the formation of the NP and the resignation of Refik Şevket İnçe in 1952, as noted in the first chapter.

49). Also, membership on the board of discipline could not overlap with membership in the government, either (Article 50).¹⁹⁰ Nevertheless, these articles could lead to party dictatorship. For example, if the PM acted against the decision of the GAB (which Article 52 forbids), he or she would be dismissed from the party and their premiership would naturally be invalid. This seems contrary to the balance of power and responsibility. Therefore, these duties and responsibilities could pose a danger to the legitimacy of the system under the tutelage of the party. A government formed by the party from among its elected deputies by the will of the people could be suppressed by party members elected by the delegates of the party. A legitimacy crisis could be emerged in that case, because accountability of any government which is formed by a political party which grants the majority within the assembly which is elected by people have to direct to the assembly in parliamentary systems. The GAB of the party could direct the government even if they were outside of the assembly, and this would contradict the democratic system. Thus, while escaping one extreme and preventing the concentration of power within the elected party leaders, the FP fell into the trap of another extreme, weakening the legitimacy and power of potential governments.

As said, when we look at the suggestions of the party in its program and other documents, the restriction of the executive organs was central. In its founding declaration, the party sustained that it emerged as a result of the decision of the Turkish nation to look after her freedoms as a new step towards the civilized world.¹⁹¹ The party believed that the obstacle for the operation of a democratic regime and its necessary institutions was the current government led by a failed institution, the DP, which continued an arbitrary, partisan administration inherited from the one-party rule which was depended on national chiefs.¹⁹² So, the partisanship in the public services and bureaucracy need to be demolished in order to overcome what the party called the regime depression, political and economic instability within the country, and to adopt democratic reforms which were based on the notion of freedom.¹⁹³ Therefore,

190 Ibid., 39.

191 *Hürriyet Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi* (Ankara: Örnek Matbaası, 1956), 3.

192 Ibid., 4.

193 Ibid., 4.

the top priority of the party was to prepare a new constitution along with principles through establishing some constitutional institutions to maintain a Western, liberal-democratic regime with rigid constitutional guarantees that no government could take it down. Almost all the documents the party published concentrated on regime issues. The party proposed a series of amendments regarding the constitution and regulations on a massive scale. In parallel, four pages of the program were reserved solely for political regime issues.¹⁹⁴ To begin, the party advocated that the first parliament after the next elections needed to work like a constituent assembly, whose duty was to make necessary constitutional reforms above narrow partisan interests, to guarantee the social and constitutional institutions necessitated by democratic society (Article 3). For the party, a proportional electoral system in which parties would gain seats in parliament according to the percentage of the vote they won instead of the majoritarian, winner-takes-all representation by which all seats in an electoral district are allocated to the political party that won the most votes and the rest - whatever the percentage the other parties -. This sort of representation was necessary to ensure parliamentary control over the government and to better reflect public opinion to parliament better (Article 4).¹⁹⁵ Also, the voting age would be decreased to 18, as the party argued in its founding declaration.¹⁹⁶ The legislative suggestions of the FP went on to suggest a second legislative chamber to balance out Grand National Assembly; the number of the deputies would be decreased, as well (Article 5). The president as watchdog of the democratic system would have to be an impartial actor standing outside narrow political interests and above the political parties (Article 6). He or she could not be elected more than twice.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, necessary measures would have to be taken to ensure that political parties operate under democratic structures and are equal before the law (Article 7). Maybe most importantly, a constitutional court should be formed (Article 8) by the constituent assembly to monitor the constitutionality of laws, on one hand, and to establish judicial control

194 *Hürriyet Partisi Programı*, 68-72.

195 *Hürriyet Partisi Kuruluş Beyannamesi*, 6.

196 *Ibid.*, 6.

197 *Ibid.*, 6.

over the political parties, on the other. Indeed, all sorts of administrative functions should be subjected to judicial control according to the principle of the rule of law. It was clear that these judicial controls would be meaningful only with independent, free, impartial courts (Article 14). So, legal guarantees for judges have to be provided.¹⁹⁸ Therefore, an impartial administrative body under the rule of law has to be established (Article 19). Furthermore, for the FP, antidemocratic laws and regulations need to be terminated (Article 13). On the other hand, universities should have autonomy with respect to their administration and their scientific activities and finances (Article 9). Not only universities but also the state radio should be autonomous (Art 12). Furthermore, the press has to be free from the pressure and influence of the governments (Article 10). As we have repeatedly said, the party had a strong desire to restrict ruling parties by all means. Interestingly, according to the party, the centralized organization of civil service should be excluded (Article 22); local administrations should be formed with strengthened responsibilities articulated with financial power (Article 23). Regarding the relations between the army and politics, the standpoint of the party was precise: the army should be outside of politics (Art 24). To sum up, even though the FP program consisted of 117 articles organized eleven sub-sections including the purpose of the party, and matters regarding the political regime, public administration, national defense, foreign policy, religion, education, economy, social policy, health, and housing, of these issues, the priority of the party was regime issues.

Second, the party gives its stance regarding economic issues after giving its remedies for the political regime. First, the party stressed that the economy should be organized based on the principles of private entrepreneurship and protection of the right to property. The state can engage in economic activities in sectors that private entrepreneurs cannot afford (Article 51). All economic activities should be run with the ideas of economic planning, improving industrialization, and maintaining social justice. Therefore, there is a need to coordinate the economic activities of the country. For that "The Institute of Economic Research and Coordination" (İktisadi Araştırma ve Koordinasyon Enstitüsü) composed of experts and successful business leaders shall be

198 Ibid., 7.

established to coordinate the varied economic activities including the agriculture, industry, transportation, imports and exports, and finance in harmony (Article 52). Together with domestic experts, the party underlined the need to utilize foreign experts to make economic plans and provide the national development according to economic scientific facts (Art 54). This common "infallible scientific facts" discourse indicates the technocratic mindset of the founders in reaction to the policies of the elected government and the desire to limit that executive power. Because when an economic plan is made by technocrats, the government should accord it. The notion of planning has two main implications for the party. First, it is a reaction to the inflationary economic policies that the DP followed. The FP aim for economic development while reducing inflation at the same time. In one paper the party published just after the first convention - where the decision to publish such documents was made in line with Art 54 of the program, *Hürriyet ve Refah Yolu* (The Road to Freedom and Welfare), a detailed five-year economic plan, was introduced by the Committee for Research and Publishings (Araştırma ve Yayın Komitesi) under the head of Ekrem Alican.¹⁹⁹ It was publicized before the 1957 general elections to spread its ideas regarding the economic policies that the country should adopt. In the report, the committee made a distinction between two periods regarding the efficiency of the economic policies of the ruling party. In the period between 1950 and 1953, the general outlook of the economy was satisfactory because foreign credits were given to the agricultural sector along with its mechanization, there were optimal meteorological factors, and the government made efforts to increase cultivated lands.²⁰⁰ Economic development, financial stability, and the foreign trade volume along with other economic indicators were satisfactory in that period, but 1953 was a turning point, which economic indicators were not favorable because of the

199 While Aydın Yalçın was the spokesperson of the report, Enver Güreli, Fethi Çelikbaş, Feridun Ergin, Muhlis Ete, Osman Okyar, and Coşkun Kırca made contributions. *Hürriyet ve Refah Yolu* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), 1.

200 Ibid., 9-23.

free, unstable economic policies.²⁰¹ To illustrate, budget deficits began to grow in unprecedented ways, prices went up along with a decrease in living standards, and the real income went down resulting from high inflation rates. Especially foreign trade deficits harmed the economy as export revenues decreased, there was a shortage of foreign currency which led to a shortage of many industrial products and inflation. As a remedy, the party stressed that the economy should be run in the framework of economic plans, for both the long and short run - not in an inflationary way. Therefore, one of the first goals regarding financial policy should be to fight inflation, the high cost of living, and the shortages of certain goods. The Central Bank should be safe an autonomous institution immune from the pressure and interventions of the government to prevent the inflation (Art 56). (The government always addressed the Central Bank to print more money for circulation in the economy to settle budget deficits.) The FP stated that after settling the balance of economy, the National Security Law would be abolished.²⁰² Investments would be made in sectors that will help to increase export revenues, which would decrease the inflation spendings less in the importation.²⁰³ Furthermore, just taxation needed be maintained to end the inflation that was causing the deterioration of living standards due to the high cost of living. The taxes that made it difficult to invest in industrial branches need to be abolished or reduced (Art 68).

Industrialization vis-à-vis urbanization occupy a central role in the economic plan of the FP. The leaders thought that without industrialization together with urbanization, it was impossible to form a fully democratic regime. The party came to the conclusion that urbanization was an urgent indicator of the civilization by looking at developed, and civilized countries, all of which were urbanized. Therefore, the main focus of the five-year economic plan that

201 After the general elections and the last victor of the DP, the ruling party brought the 1958 bugdet to the assembly. The bulletin, *1958 Bütçesi*, was composed of the speech by Fethi Çelikbaş, one of the party's four deputies, made in the assembly. Here, the party made a distinction between the two periods of the DP era; 1950-53 and 1953-1957. The first witnessed economic development, but the latter suffered from the lack of an economic plan. *1958 Bütçesi* (Ankara: Balkanoğlu Matbaacılık, 1958).

202 *İleriye Atılış*, 12.

203 Ibid.

the party prepared was to enhance the levels of industrialization and urbanization. Economic planning was aimed at producing export goods at home to decrease inflation through savings of people which would provide new sources to make new investments rather than spending money on consumption goods. The party also did not find it suitable to make investments in light industry along with consumption goods.²⁰⁴ Priority would be given to heavy industries such as the construction sector, chemical industry, machine industry, electronics and transportation.²⁰⁵ Nevertheless, the party was conscious that Turkey did not have enough capital to achieve these goals. Therefore, the country needed to make cooperation with the foreign expertise and credits at the same time. Furthermore, according to the party, the industrialization needed to be as rapid as possible; Turkey needed to be rapidly industrialized by savings which is canalized to production by limiting the consumption and luxury with self-sacrifice of its people. Logically, in the mindset of the party, rapid industrialization would also cause rapid urbanization that should be arranged with a planned housing policy to satisfy the needs of the workers who emigrated from their villages.²⁰⁶ To stipulate to the owners of the means of production to investment in housing, tax reductions would be provided to the institutions that built cheap, healthy, and comfortable residences for their workers (Article 70). On the other hand, they regarded the reconstruction movement of the DP, especially in the second half of the decade, as unplanned and arbitrary.²⁰⁷ Thus, the party argued that the government should prepare city plans, as well - that is, a general construction plan for cities and villages (Article 89). The cities and the villages should be connected to each other with highways (Article 91). A modern scientific approach should be implemented in the villages. The government should provide health and education services in rural areas.²⁰⁸ All in all, the FP promised the electorates, that Turkey could

204 *Hürriyet ve Refah Yolu*, 39.

205 *Ibid.*, 39.

206 *Ibid.*, 40.

207 *Hürriyet Partisi İstanbul Vilâyet Müteşebbis Heyeti 1956 - 1957 Faaliyet Raporu* (İstanbul: Hüsnütabiat Matbaası, 1957), 22-25.

208 *İleriye Atılış*, 10-11.

reach a 6,6 percent increase in national income in the period between 1957 and 1962, 33 percent increase in total within this five years.²⁰⁹ The spirit of the economic policies of the FP came from the Venoni Plan conducted in Italy. After the World War, Europe was almost completely ruined, and the US planned to provide aids to Europe for restoration in both economic and social senses. This Marshall Plan would also prevent these European countries from falling into the communist trap which was nourished by the poverty in the minds of the American officials. In the mid-1950s, most countries in Europe put their economies in order with the help of the American plan. When it came to the second half of the 1950s, three countries including Italy, Greece, and Turkey had obviously not repaired their economies to the preferred level. Nevertheless, the USA did not want to pour credit into these countries arbitrarily. Rather, they preferred that new credits and aid be provided in accord with the domestic economic programs of these countries. Nevertheless, the ruling DP opposed the idea of economic planning because the plan was equated with communism in its minds. While Turkey was discussing economic planning, Italy made its wise move by adopting an economic plan by Venoni, a member of the Italian parliament. That plan was approved in the international arena, and Italy could obtain loans and credits it needed. In parallel, Feridun Ergin, one of the founders of the FP, had studied that kind of plan favored by international actors in the mid-1950s, as a representative of Turkey in the European Assembly. In spite of his efforts, and because of differences of opinions Ergin had problems with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, the foreign minister. In August 1955, when Ergin was dismissed from the party, the government tried to annul his membership in the European Assembly by appointing another member, Baki Erdem. But colleagues in the European Assembly stood behind Ergin because his ideas regarding Turkish economy were preferable for them.²¹⁰ That was the short story of the external dynamics of the idea of economic planning in the FP.

The party also maintained that for the first time in Turkish political history, an attempt to solve the problems of village development was brought by

209 Ibid., 42.

210 “Dış Yardım,” *Akis*, November 19, 1955.

the FP from imagination and romance to reality.²¹¹ To improve the industry, the party addressed the need to provide necessary credit and loans from both the savings of ordinary people and the state through budget adjustments and external funds (Article 67). According to the FP, agricultural production and industrialization are strongly tied to each other with regard to industrial development; the surplus from agricultural production needed to be transferred to industrial investment. To enhance agricultural production, the FP offered some measures. One of the most important things was to wield the agricultural machines in the sector (Article 76) and form agricultural cooperatives. As the country became industrialized, the hidden unemployed in villages would participate in the labor force.²¹² According to the party, the kind of agricultural output to be produced should be determined after a soil survey together with foreign experts (Article 74). The party stressed that incentives for stock farming (Article 79), fruit growing and canning (Article 80), bee keeping (Article 81), and water production needed to be studied to increase exports and reduce inflation and the budget deficit.

The second element of the FP's economic policy beyond the industrialization and urbanization was to maintain social justice, which the party counted as urgent for national development. The issue was regarded as an indispensable principle of its discourse. According to the party, in the social order bequeathed by the DP, the rich were getting richer at the expense of the poor who were getting poorer; where it was not possible to talk about the notion of development. The party regarded development as an increase in GDP per capita, which is valid for all layers of society together. To maintain a fair distribution, national development for all layers of society could only be achieved by addressing the key notion of "social justice" which was considered as the backing of weak social groups by the state while taking precautions to prevent class conflicts at the same time (Article 100). Social justice was equated with the situation of workers. In fact, when we look at the documents the party published, we will see that there is an overemphasis on the working class compared to those of other political parties at the time. The party argued that

211 *İleriye Atılış*, 42-43.

212 *İçtimai Adaletle Doğru* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), 10.

workers with fixed salaries were among social groups badly affected by the inflationary politics of the DP. To provide social justice, the real incomes of workers need to be increased, and their standards of living enhanced. Furthermore, to provide social justice, annual leaves should be provided to workers and unemployment insurance should be provided. According to the party, for both employers and employees freely forming professional organizations without permission and freely forming federations and confederations are natural rights of every citizen including civil servants, workers, and employers (Article 11). Their unions could also attend international workers' associations.²¹³ Workers have the right to form associations (Article 105) and can make collective labor bargaining (Article 106).²¹⁴ The housing policy came to the fore again.²¹⁵ Along with the points mentioned before, the party stressed that the transportation of workers from their homes which were mostly in the suburbs far from their workplace needed to be cured.

In one document of the party, it is argued that social matters have always been regarded using two extreme, non-scientific approaches among intellectual and the political elites in Turkey. One approach was to strengthen the state and its dominance in the economy against the will of the nation (statism). On the other hand, another approach was Marxism which was always regarded by the FP circle as separationist ideology against the unity of the nation. Needless to say, these were authoritarians, antidemocratic, and semi-fascists.²¹⁶ The Marxists did not have the vision to form social justice and unity because they desired to perpetuate class conflict - rejecting any compromise or negotiation - by following the materialistic laws to destroy the social order and form a proletariat dictatorship.²¹⁷ So, some rights such as the right to form trade

213 Ibid., 13.

214 By workers, the party intended both industrial workers and agricultural workers (Article 102).

215 *Hürriyet Partisi Müteşebbis Raporu*, 21-25.

216 *İçtimai Adaletle Doğru*, 5. This understanding is also parallel the speeches of some public figures of the FP. Not only the party, but also Turkish intelligentsia at the time regarded Marxism as unscientific. As we have revealed in the third chapter, Çelikbaş, from the FP, stated that the party would not get stuck into some non-scientific and outmoded doctrines such liberalism and Marxism.

217 Ibid., 6.

unions and the right to strike should be bestowed on the working class to provide social justice and prevent them from being dragging these non-national ideologies. In fact, if social justice were not provided, communism would appeal to workers.²¹⁸ Therefore, the two bases on which the legal order regarding the relations between labor and capital needs to be grounded as preventive measures against communism are the freedom to form unions and to strike.²¹⁹ Mentioning social issues could pave the way for negative propaganda by other political parties at the time, so the party felt obliged to stress that it had no connection to socialism to appease the common fears of the Turkish intelligentsia other than Islamic reactionism in those years.²²⁰ On the other hand, in *Hürriyet Mektupları* (Freedom Letters), published just before the 1957 general elections, there is a significant article entitled *Türk İşçisi ve Hürriyet Partisi* (Turkish Worker and the Freedom Party) emphasizing working class interests to reach a democratic society wherein development is provided to all layers of society together without leaving room for social instability which could lead to a social depression.²²¹ The party believed that the day when workers together with peasantry would be called "the masters of the nation" as Mustafa Kemal put it, a great revolution would occur.²²² All in all, those rights foreseen for the working class would not be able to be terminated by the executive power as they would be constitutionally guaranteed. Nonetheless, akin to the Kemalist principles, the party regarded the working class as a social stratum of the Turkish nation, not a self-proclaimed stratum.

The notion of planning is one of key elements of its discourse. While talking about what needs to be done, the party also tries to explain how these things should be done. For instance, the suggestions I have revealed up to this point needed administrative regulations in order to conduct them. In the document, *Daha İyi Bir İdare Cihazı İçin* (For Better Administration), the party tries to show the administrative measures needed to reach the goals. First, the

218 Ibid., 8.

219 Ibid., 11.

220 Ibid., 8.

221 *Hürriyet Mektupları* (Ankara: Şaka Matbaası, 1956), 7.

222 Ibid.

party complains about the legal positions of general directorates (umum müdürlükleri) under the direction of the prime minister's office. According to the party, they should be allocated to the related ministries according to their fields of activity.²²³ To rationalize the administration, the idea around which the document revolves is the decentralization of administrative organs. For example, the party asserted that the country is administrated in a highly centralized, not so rational way. Therefore, decentralization should be spread throughout the country as a principle. There intermediary administrative organs should be established between Ankara - the center of state apparatuses - and local provinces with Divisional Governorships.²²⁴ In other words, centralization would be softened by establishing an intermediate institution. Finally, while the party argued that the salaries of civil servants negatively affected by the inflation should be increased to satisfy their daily needs and their reputation within the society, which was harmed with the discourses of the DP leaders, need to be healed.²²⁵ All of the issues related to civil servants would be conducted in the hands of Central Department of Personnel.

Lastly, I mention the foreign policy of the party, the foundation of which was to protect and maintain peace under the umbrella of the UN in parallel with national interests (Article 29 and 30). Moreover, in the foreign affairs, the party also stated that Turkish populations living in Western Thrace, Cyprus, and the Aegean Islands would be protected.²²⁶ However, this did not imply a policy of treating non-Muslims in Turkey - especially to Rums who are Turkish citizens with Greek origin not from Greece - worse. In that context, the party put forward human rights and citizenship to oppose the incidents that occurred on 6-7 September which harmed country's reputation and the Cyprus cause in the international arena. It was not acceptable the state be unable to protect its citizens whatever their origins in the context of the Cyprus issue. The party underlines that all citizens people living in Turkey are equal regardless of race, origin, or gender.²²⁷ The party goes on to criticize the

223 *Daha İyi Bir İdare Cihazı İçin* (Ankara: Ayyıldız Matbaası, 1957), 3-4.

224 *Ibid.*, 4-5.

225 *Ibid.*, 6-7.

226 *Hürriyet Partisi Mütешеbbis Raporu*, 21.

227 *Hürriyet Mektupları*, 10.

indecisiveness and incoherence of the DP on the Cyprus question. In the beginning, the DP had asserted that Cyprus should be a country under British Commonwealth. After that, officials argued that the island should be given to the Turkish administration. When this proposal was not well-received in the international arena, the DP changed its thesis by arguing that the island should be separated into two. Nonetheless, according to the FP, this proposal also had problems.²²⁸ Although in foreign policy, the party declares its loyalty to NATO, the Baghdad Pact, and the Western Block, as did the DP, they criticized the foreign policy of the ruling party, which paralleled that of the Western Block for neglecting the third world countries - which was actually the natural result of a Western-oriented foreign policy that the FP held in common with it. Cyprus was led by Makarios, an important figure for the non-aligned movement backed by third world countries in the UN who opposed Turkey which was counted as an agent of imperialist interests in the Middle East and the Balkans. On the other hand, the party reflected its uneasiness regarding Syria which began to be an extension of the USSR.

For a general overview of the ideological discourses of the FP, the document *İleriye Atılış* (Leaping Forward), is a precious resource. In this document, the activity report of the general administrative board of the party presented to the first convention and the decisions made in that convention, which was held in 1957, are given. In this report, the reasons for the emergence of the party, political developments that took place after the formation of the party, the main ideas of the party regarding the constitution and the regime, culture, fiscal policy and stability, investment, social justice, and foreign policy as well as organizational news of the party and cooperation issue among opposition political parties, and lastly, the general elections were explained to delegates.²²⁹ Also, this document indicates the decisions of the convention regarding the elections and cooperation issue, economic issues such as inflation stability, development, agricultural development, industrialization and urbanization, investments by the state and by private entrepreneurs, economic planning, the

228 Ibid., 21-22.

229 *İleriye Atılış*, 3-20.

freedom to form trade unions, the right to strike and lockout, and social justice.

4.4.2 *Some Discussions in the Literature*

Now we should talk about discussions centered around the party program of the FP, which has been approached differently from a wide range of perspectives among researchers.

Until 2016, when Diren Çakmak published the first book related to the party, the dominant understanding in the literature was that the political party followed an Anglo-Saxon political democratic tradition, a conclusion that is deduced mostly with the evidence of *FORUM* magazine, which followed that tradition. In fact, some figures of the magazine such as Aydın Yalçın, Nilüfer Yalçın, and Turhan Feyzioğlu educated in the Anglo-Saxon world. Çakmak opposed this dominant view, arguing that the FP adopted the German type of liberalism, Ordoliberalism, in which a strong state with historically deep roots in society can be used as a tool to provide economic growth. According to her, the founders of the party considered Turkey to be in the third stage of modernization according to Cyril Edwin Black's conceptualization of modernization.²³⁰ Therefore, party elites thought that Turkey should benefit from that strong state to create economic growth within the bounds of social justice. In that sense, according to her, party has a specific place in the course of the Turkish politics, being the first and the only party with a political program which is accorded to the social justice theory conceptualized by Alfred Müller-Armack, rather than being one formed by DP deputies resentful of their former party.²³¹ She argues that because Turkey fits fifth model of modernization according to Black's approach wherein there is a strong state tradition historically, founders of the party maintained that the economy and society should be organized in accordance with Alfred Müller-Armack's social market economy in which the state can be used as a driving force for development. The merit of the FP was to bring Turkey to the fourth stage of modernization.

230 Diren Çakmak, *Hürriyet Partisi (1955-1958)*, (Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık, 2016), 157.

231 Ibid., 20.

Indeed, the main concern of the FP was not limited to political modernization; the party also had economic, social, and psychological reflections in parallel with German liberalism. It introduces the optimal development model for Turkey in the second half of the 1950s. Yet naturally, the first critique of Çakmak's point is the anachronism: Black's book was published in 1966, eleven years after the FP was formed and eight years before it was abolished.²³² Thus, it was not possible for the founders of the FP to analyze Turkey exactly as Black would have and to envisage Ordoliberalism as a comprehensive method for modernization respectively. Still, the book is significant to a certain degree due to its assertion that the FP embraces Ordoliberalism one way or another. This is a crucial claim that we should examine; putting aside Black's modernization theory, we need to discuss whether the FP adopted Ordoliberalism. First of all, the lack of relationality we mentioned, would show itself again. When the FP abolished itself and joined the RPP, the political discourses of FP and the RPP were equivalent, in fact, it is because of that that merger happened. Moreover, after the FP joined the RPP, seven seats on the GAB of the RPP were given to new members who came from the FP. In that regard, is it possible to propose that the RPP advocated Alfred Müller-Armack's social market economy, as well? Moreover, when we look at the demands of the FP, almost all were provided by the 1961 constitution. In fact, some of the writers of the constitution had been among the members of the FP. So is it possible to argue that after 1961 Turkey was organized according to Alfred Müller-Armack's social market economy? If so, how was the FP unique in that regard, as Çakmak claims? If it is not, the writer should have shown the differences between the FP and RPP at the end of the 1950s and the political economy of Turkey after 1961. Or if the political stance of the RPP after the merger with the FP was not the same, it should have been showed in what sense or to what they converged with the Ordoliberalism and in what respects moved away from it. On the other hand, since the founders of the FP were among the members of the DP, why cannot the DP be regarded as the political party of Ordoliberalism? After all, the FP presented itself as maintaining the

232 Black, Cyril Edwin. *The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.

principles and values of the 1946 spirit of the DP that the DP had lost. When the FP founders led some ministries, they did not oppose the liberal policies of the DP in which the state was not a significant actor - at least ideally - that should intervene the market. Indeed, some FP figures advocated of the unlimited liberal economic policies of the DP when they occupied high positions both in government and in the administration of the DP. In fact, this is crucial evidence that they were political actors who adjusted their positions according to the conditions and were not ideologically oriented. Finally, the Çakmak's main argument is neither historically nor empirically evident; rather, it is theoretically justifying itself. For social scientists, it would not be the way to put a social phenomenon into a table and come up with conclusions according to a doctrine or program resulting from comparing the existences and non-existences respectively. History matters. Moreover, the party declared that it is a mistake to be stuck in doctrines like liberalism and statism which are devoid of scientific values.²³³ Baban, one of the members of the FP, further asserts that Turkish elites during the 1950s were not only uninterested in political doctrines but also anxious about them.²³⁴ Also, there was no strict ideological stances or polarization among political and intellectual elites of Turkey in the 1950s.

Moreover, while Özçetin describes the FP as the Liberal-Democratic version of Kemalism, he discards the relationality what we have put forward before. According to him, this Kemalist stance came from "their elitist outlook [which] had a close affinity with [the] Kemalist modernization project."²³⁵ Nevertheless, when we look at the party program and economic policies of the DP, especially in its first two years and the ideologues of the party such as Samed Ağaoğlu, and Ahmet Emin Yalman, who were liberal figures, how can one describe the FP as Kemalist-liberal and not also do so for the DP? As said, the FP identifies itself with the spirit of 1946 from which the DP departed, as they argued, so the focus of the FP was not to abandon the views of the DP;

233 Sibel Demirci, "Hürriyet Partisi'nin Türk Siyasal Hayatındaki Yeri" (master's thesis, Hacettepe University, 2002), 33, 104.

234 Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi*, 201.

235 Burak Özçetin, "Democracy and Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party" (master's thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2004), 121.

rather, it claimed to protect the real principles of the DP. If the FP is to be regarded as a Kemalist version of liberalism, the DP (at least the DP in 1946) and the 46 Spirit, should be. Surely, that does not make the FP specific in the course of Turkish history as Özçetin states. While underlining the populist tendency of the DP as opposed to the institutional reforms that the FP-*FORUM* circle offered within the framework of an elitist, Kemalist modernization project, writer differentiates between the DP and FP. However, the ideas and discourses of the FP were not centered around a well-calculated modernization project; rather, this emerged as an outcome of the intraparty crisis within the DP and mostly the personal and clique conflicts before the fourth convention of the party. The matter was to overthrow the Menderes circle whatever the cost which was underlying the spirit of all discourses of the party. Most of the members of the FP participated in the very actions they subsequently criticized. It was just a matter of significance of the places they occupy in the political system, those who were in the opposition defended institutional changes to gain a more preferable position for themselves. Even, the DP had advocated some of the institutional reforms that the FP supported while leading opposition before 1950. Moreover, after the 1960 coup, the RPP and some *FORUM* writers started to change their tone and argue that proportional representation was problematic because it could lead to weak governments. This cannot be explained as some sort of modernization project. Furthermore, when we look at the discourses of the FP especially during the 1957 general election campaign, they used the 6-7 September incidents to criticize rule of the DP.²³⁶ About the incidents, they did not get stuck into the *raison d'etat* about; rather, their ideological stance hinged on citizens and citizenship backing civil society against the state. Thus, regarding the 6-7 September events, it would be expected that from Özçetin's point of view, with a Kemalist outlook would embrace the state rather than individual rights of the minorities. In addition, as I showed, in the 1950s there were no remarkable differences between political parties with respect to their attitudes towards political and ideological issues of the time. Moreover, no ideology except Kemalism, the official ideology, was permitted. Most of the figures of the FP supported the 1960 military

236 See, *The Brochures of The FP in the 1957 General Elections*, Appendix B.

coup, and moreover, they took part in the interim cabinets and some were among the preparers of the 1961 constitution. The question arises: How can a liberal-democrat support a military coup? Given the eclectic character of the FP, it would not be associated with Kemalist Liberalism because compared to its counterparts being a Kemalist did not pose a distinctive feature for the party. Also, given the political discourses of the other oppositional political parties including the RPP and the RNP, advocating some constitutional reforms did not differ parties, either. Thus, it is not possible to be sure that the political program of the FP was specific given the similarities of the discourses of the political parties at the time. Almost all the constitutional and institutional demands of the FP had been demanded by the RPP and NP even before the FP formed and the ensuing FP founders were defending opposite. In fact, when the NP was formed in 1947 as a result of an intraparty struggle, some future FP members were running the operation to clean DP of the opposition. With respect to the discussion, I propose that a comparison of the two political parties - the Freedom Party and the Nation Party - could be interesting for the literature of the political history of Turkey. When we look at the political discourses and programs of the two parties, the striking similarities are inescapable. Their special emphasis on the idea of freedom was held in common, and they characterized themselves as idealists who were fighting for democracy and freedom. The program of the NP states that "Freedom is the cornerstone of our entire political program" (Article 26).²³⁷ Both parties introduced themselves as victims of the oligarchic leadership of their former party that denied them free speech. Long before the formation of the FP, Kenan Öner, one of the founders of the NP, stressed that the transition to multiparty politics was nothing but oligarchy wearing the mask of democracy.²³⁸ Moreover, like the FP, the NP also identified itself with "the Spirit of 1946." Both parties were Kemalist, nationalist, anti-communist, and secular, and both valued social justice by following Western democracies with their institutions. Both parties characterized themselves fiscally liberal which is distinct from the classical liberalism known as laissez-faire formulated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo. The NP

237 "Hürriyet bütün siyasî programımızın temel taşıdır."

238 Kenan Öner, *Siyasi Hatıralarım ve Bizde Demokrasi* (İstanbul: Osmanbey Matbaası, 1948) 21.

avored economic planning for national development (Article 127) and were open to the foreign capital. Moreover, like the FP, the NP also defended the right of workers to strike for workers (Article 121), the formation of a constitutional court, a bicameral legislature (Article 35), and an impartial presidency (Article 40) to limit the executive power. Both parties emphasized human rights. Intriguingly, the NP like the FP even defended the jury system for press offenses (Article 59). The NP underlined the need for the separation of the military from politics. Both parties placed importance on raising new generations according to democratic values.²³⁹ While the FP took pains to avoid being a party with charismatic leaders who dominated every single issue in the party, the NP intriguingly adopted rotating presidency. The party was formed under the leadership of Fevzi Çakmak. In the first convention, Yusuf Hikmet Bayur became the chairman of the party. One year later Dr. Mustafa Kentli was elected as the new chairman of the party. In 1953, Enis Akagen became the leader by a vote at the convention. After that, Bölükbaşı was called for the chairman of the party, and accepted. In its six years before being closed by the ruling party, the NP had five changes of leadership. When we look at cooperation issue, to which the FP paid a great deal of attention, we see that cooperation before the general elections was also not invented by the FP. Before the 1954 general elections, the RPP and the NP negotiated a cooperation to form a constituent assembly to adopt democratic reforms for the regime – even the goal was the same.²⁴⁰ Lastly, whereas most of former FP members supported the 27 May coup and its activities, some further advised the military coup that no mercy should be shown to the ousted leaders. Bölükbaşı, the leader of the RNP, was the only one who took a stand against most of some military measures - including the execution of the three leaders of the DP - despite being threatened by the military.

239 *Millet Partisi: Program ve Tüzük* (Ankara: Sakarya Basımevi, 1948).

240 For a detailed account of the negotiations, see "Neden Bir Seçim İttifakı Yapamadılar," *FORUM*, April 27, 1954. However, like the first attempt of opposition parties to cooperate to overthrow the DP, two subsequent attempts led by the FP would fail. "History repeats itself first as tragedy second as farce" said Marx. How to define the third failure would be a good question.

Another controversial point discussed in the literature center around assumptions about a class basis for the party, which could be emerged if the eclectic character of the party and the intraparty struggles among some cliques within the DP was ignored. When we look at the details of arguments that associate the party with the industrial bourgeoisie, we confronted with Savran's assessments. He argues that throughout the 1950s, the economic policies of the DP prioritized the economic interests of the agrarian bourgeoisie. The industrial bourgeoisie was unappreciated and, as an economic class, was in a secondary position, though they had been getting stronger in the second half of the 1950s leading up the 1960 military coup.²⁴¹ *FORUM* was the voice of the industrial bourgeoisie, and the FP was their party.²⁴² However, according to Boratav, in the economic policy of the 1950s, import substitution on some consumer goods which paved the way for the development of industrial production.²⁴³ Shortages stemming from the protectionist policies regarding foreign trade resulted in remarkable growth for some trades and bourgeoisie, emerged in that kind of atmosphere. Furthermore, industrialists, who tried to overcome the difficulties of exporting by producing import goods that provided some gains from the domestic market, caused the industrial sector to grow more rapidly compared to the agricultural sector in the 1954-1961 period.²⁴⁴ Furthermore, according to Zürcher, there were economic incentives for the industrialists in the DP era and capital accumulated in the hands of that class; however, the industrial bourgeoisie was not willing to invest.²⁴⁵

These points confirm Savran's in the sense that an industrial bourgeoisie started to emerge after the second half of the 1950s. However, it is significant that the industrial bourgeoisie became better off compared to the agrarian sector after 1954. It is possible to say that the industrial sector had a larger role in

241 Savran, Sungur. "Toplumsal Mücadeleler, Askeri Müdahaleler: 1960, 1971, 1980." *11. Tez*, no. 6 (1987), 139.

242 Ibid., 139.

243 Korkut Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi (1908-1980)," *Türkiye Tarihi: Çağdaş Türkiye IV (1908-1980)*, ed. by Sina Akşin, (Istanbul: Cem, 2008), 348.

244 Ibid., 351.

245 Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye*, 328.

the distribution of resources compared to the agricultural sector. For the first time, a bank - the Bank for the Development of Industry (Sınai Kalkınma Bankası) - was formed in 1950 to promote private entrepreneurship and provide credit.²⁴⁶ One can ask, is it possible that the industrial bourgeoisie was complaining about the very political and economic situation in which they emerged and got stronger and about an atmosphere that was more beneficial to them than to other economic groups?" Citing a statement of Boratav: "It is possible to say that among the block of dominant powers, traders oriented towards the commercialization of the products of the industrial bourgeoisie and of manufactured products expanded to the detriment of farmers and traders oriented towards the foreign trade."²⁴⁷ In a nutshell, there is no solid evidence to prove that the industrial bourgeoisie was neglected social strata in the DP era.

When we look at the empirical data, more importantly, we should not forget that among the leaders of the FP were some landowners whose interests were contrary to those of industrialists in the scheme we have criticized. To illustrate, Karaosmanoğlu, owner of Salihli Çiftliği, can be regarded as from among the agrarian bourgeoisie. He was one of the biggest landowners of the time and the chairman of the party. Moreover, Fethi Çelikbaş, who was called as Agha of Burdur, was influential in the rural areas of Burdur. He was the leader of the right to prove bill in the assembly which paved the way for the formation of the party. In a similar vein, while Enver Güreli was among notables in Balıkesir, other founders such as Mehmet Ekinci, Yusuf Azizoğlu, and Muzaffer Timur who were among landholders processing a huge proportion of the agrarian land in Eastern Anatolia. Also, mostly solicitors were among members of the party in local districts. Empirically, there was not a considerable number of wealthy people among them. So what I am trying to indicate is that Marxist point of view that implies that the social cleavage between agricultural and industrial blocks provided the foundation for the party is

246 Ahmad and Bedia, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili*, 73. Eroğlu, "The Establishment of Multiparty Rule," 110.

247 "Egemen güçler bloku içinde ise, sanayi burjuvazisi ile sınai ürünlerin pazarlanmasına dönük ticaret sermayesinin çiftçi gruplar ile dış ticarete dönük ticaret sermayesi aleyhine genişlediği söylenebilir." Boratav, "İktisat Tarihi," 353.

invalid given the leadership of the party. On the other hand, the general profiles of the candidates of the party in the 1957 general elections were noteworthy. Most of the candidates of the party were lawyers. 315 of 530 were middle class, such as academics, lawyers, doctors, and journalists. While there were only fifteen workers and chauffeurs together with five factory owners and ninety-two notables in their local districts and traders. Furthermore, the RPP list interestingly included more factory owners than the FP list in those elections, but I would not claim that this made the RPP the voice of industrialists. Also, the spending of the parties in the 1957 general elections indicates that the RPP spent two million lire, the FP one million, the RNP 226,500 lire.²⁴⁸ Güneş said that he paid for his travel costs, Alican expressed that they were making payments for the party from their limited personal finances.²⁴⁹ If industrialists had supported the party, I would expect more than these spendings. Last, Özçetin's criticisms of that perspective:

This evaluation can be criticized on several grounds. First, it presupposes an instrumentalist and functionalist account of the formation of the HP. Second, it holds "the tension between industrialist faction of industrial bourgeoisie and the DP" as an *a priori* statement. Third, it attributes a homogeneous ideological stand to the actors of the period; as if one could talk about "the ideology of industrial faction of the Istanbul bourgeoisie."²⁵⁰

Furthermore, as we have put it, some authors regarded the FP as the outcome of social transformations in the country in the 1950s which caused the dissidence among civil and military bureaucrats. This identification of the party with the middle class is another thing we need to examine. In fact, the economic data from the 1950s points out that the middle class working on fixed salaries were badly affected by the economic policies of the DP era because of inflationary development policies and heavy taxes. Meanwhile, the agricultural sector and industrialists made huge profits. Some empirical data support this premise in the media at the time. For instance, one article in *Akis* journal

248 "Muhalif partilerin seçim masrafı," *Cumhuriyet*, November 5, 1957.

249 Dağcı, "Ekrem Alican'ın Siyasal Hayatı," 143. Güneş, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 60.

250 Özçetin, "Democracy and Opposition," 83.

suggested that the middle class was overwhelmed by taxes, and there should be additional reasonable precautions to prevent inflation such as fixing taxes on the part of landowners. The middle class could no longer bear the burden; landlords who profited most from the economic policies of the government should bear these economic problems.²⁵¹ In an article published in *FORUM*, written by Osman Okyar, it is argued that the middle class was unhappy with the pouring of financial credit into agriculture and the luxury spending of the agricultural bourgeoisie which should be taxed accordingly. He also argued that the spending of the agriculturalists should be transferred to investment – rather than luxury consumption – through fairer taxation.²⁵² In fact, Karpat stresses that only a small percentage of families benefitted from the mechanization program of Turkey through the 1950s; around one percent farming families, which was equal to between 25,000 and 27,500 families, wielded from these credit programs.²⁵³ The unrest of the middle class can be traced back to the motto of the DP regarding economic policies. Menderes stressed that a millionaire would be created in every district. However, when the social background of the candidates of the FP and those of the RPP do not represent clear-cut differences. Therefore, regarding the social backgrounds of its members, it is not possible to draw a clear line between political parties: a class perspective was not a distinctive feature of the parties at the time. More importantly, when we look at the election results in 1957, the FP did not receive a high percentage of the vote in urban districts. Although the list of the FP in the Istanbul district was very powerful, the party did not receive more than a few thousand votes; the party received most of its votes in feudal and rural areas such as Isparta, Diyarbakır, and Burdur. The FP won the highest percentage of votes in Burdur (35.7 percent), Isparta (23.5 percent), Diyarbakır (20 percent), Muş (14.5 percent), and Adıyaman (12.2 percent) – highly rural areas.²⁵⁴ Also, in the program and the political discourse, the party strived to

251 “Piyasa,” *Akis*, July 2, 1955.

252 Okyar, Osman. “İktisadi Plancılığımızın Şekil ve Muhteva Meselesi,” *FORUM*, July 1, 1955. Also “Kalkınma ve Zirai Kazançlar,” *FORUM*, April 1, 1956.

253 Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, 306.

254 Ayşe Acar, “Türk Siyasal Yaşamında Hürriyet Partisi” (master’s thesis, Istanbul University, 1986), 68.

appeal to almost all social groups including the civil servants (Article 20), teachers (Article 37), peasants (Article 84), industrialists (Article 68) and workers (Article 70, 103, 105). Again, we should not forget that some landlords including Karaosmanoğlu, Çelikbaş, Mehmet Ekinci, and Yusuf Azizoğlu were among the leaders of the party. Last, regarding the class basis of the FP, a statement of one of the founders and the general secretary of the party after the 1957 general elections, Turan Güneş was that "they say that the party with which I am connected has the intention to appeal the sympathy of workers. Doubtless, we have that desire."²⁵⁵ While the general secretary of the FP was expressing an aim to appeal working class, researchers simultaneously place the party in the hands of industrialists, on one hand, and the middle class, on the other. Therefore, I do not think that the party had a certain social layer as its base. In the 1950s in Turkey social classes were not evident and the populist principle of Kemalism which sought to see society as an inseparable whole was still dominant. I would like to repeat the question which I asked in the introduction chapter of the study: How can a political party in the 1950s be at once an idealist movement and successor of the spirit of 1946 that the DP had betrayed, an extension of the industrial bourgeoisie, a response to the dissidents in the middle class with the discourses of Liberal Kemalist synthesis together with German Liberalism seeking to form Anglo-Saxon political institutions by wishing to depend on working class in alliance with Kurdish intelligentsia and open to cooperation with all opposition parties?

When we look at previous works, we see that their assumptions depend on totalizing metanarratives that revolve around structural premises such as the class formation of Turkey in the 1950s, the center-periphery paradigm, or some doctrines as points of departure that furthermore contradict each other. Those studies imposed the FP some tasks to complete their theoretically motivated big pictures which ignore the particularities of the subject by discarding some empirical facts and internal dynamics of the party contrary to these narratives. Therefore, I consider most of the studies revealed here to be under the influence of a missionary historiography, as what I call, undertaking some

255 "Mensup olduğum partinin işçilerin sempatisini kazanmak niyetinde olduğundan bahsediyorlar. Hiç şüphe etmesin ki, böyle bir arzumuz vardır." Simav, *Turan Güneş'in Kavgaları*, 54.

missions by institutionalizing the party to reach some divine ends. For instance, a Marxist point of view tends to see the FP as the party of industrialists, that would start to become a partner of power bloc in 1960 in a coup. The party is assigned to complete that envisioned end as a step before. The narrative is so typical. The industrialists were not happy with the economic policies of the government which provided a limited share of the national product compared to other stratas. They make some attempts to act against the ruling party with which they have no sympathy, including the formation of the FP. After these attempts came to nothing, hard power – a military coup- came onto agenda of the industrialists. The story explains how the industrial bourgeoisie would take power absolutely into its own hands, providing the necessary atmosphere for a working-class revolution. In this teleological understanding of history, all actors have their own roles. Furthermore, the liberal point of view eagerly regards the FP as the movement of the middle class, which is crucial to provide a democratic order. The civil-military bureaucracy, having been thrust to the periphery in power relations, would carry democratic values to the system which marks the divine end in this scheme. Some are willing to regard the FP as the party of the laborer in a process of class consciousness. Also, some are eager to regard the party as a milestone for the awakening of Kurdish political identity. Another one argues that the FP chose ordoliberalism to complete Turkey's modernizations modernization in a modernization paradigm. Behind all these paradigms, some missions can be found, that is why I called them as under the influence of missionary historiography. They marginalize the actual historical significances of particularities like the FP with all-encompassing truths determined by official explanations. However, when the internal dynamics of this was taken into consideration, the actual specificities of the subject would be more clearly seen. Because meta-narratives must discard actual qualities of particularities with the help of their totalizing inclinations. Related to that, the researchers of the FP did not give a place for the very notion of the human with its weaknesses, passions, intelligence, hatred, favoritism, and hostility to understand the real reason behind all the fights within the DP among the factions seeking favorable positions. Because agent-made history is squeezed by structures, there are no agents in itself. Therefore, the FP is, like a myth, sometimes idealized according to the researcher's stance.

To a large extent, I argue that researchers studying political life in the 1950s in Turkey must engage with the agents themselves. Agents were the most determining factor in the 1950s when political sphere had some autonomy, free from structural constraints, because of the reasons I have presented. Therefore, it was not possible for me to pursue grand narratives, the structure of society, and class politics because they were not valid for the FP in the 1950s. Maybe the most suitable term to explain the discourse of the party is that of Kemal H. Karpaz who says that the party showed a “confused liberalism.”²⁵⁶

256 Kemal H. Karpaz, "The Turkish Elections of 1957," *The Western Political Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (1961): 454.

Conclusion

The first considerable opposition party, the Democrat Party, was formed in 1946 as a result of a dispute within the parliamentary between four RPP deputies and the rulers of the party. Unprecedented support was given to the DP from almost all segments of Turkish society at the time. The roots of the Freedom Party should be searched for in that heterogeneous character.

The heterogeneous character of the DP caused internal disputes that led the party to split even before coming to power. A new political party, the Nation Party, emerged in 1948 when displeased members of the DP resigned or were excluded from the party. After the DP came to power in 1950, the common interests of the elites of the DP started to come into conflict. New disputes within the party emerged because some members were neither satisfied with their positions in the party nor with the composition of the cabinet. After the first cabinet was announced, some figures holding the highest positions in the party started to have personal disputes with Menderes and his inner circle. As a result, they lost their offices which would then be filled by close friends of Menderes. This was a common pattern. Battles for the highest positions caused intraparty opposition; however, intraparty oppositions were always dismissed by the party, which was a process I call the centralization of party rule. The conflict between two camps - the inner circle of the party and the outer circle - was becoming evident by 1955. Besides, some disputes between the center and local organizations of the party happened because of the

interventionist manner of the center that conflicted with the desires of locals. Furthermore, intellectuals particularly started to be disappointed with the practices of the DP after 1953 because of their own status deprivation vis-à-vis the populist discourses of the government, and economic problems, resulting from inflationary economic policies, and the authoritarian measures of the party. Therefore, existing discontent among DP members sparked a revolt against the leaders of the party. When the economic problems compelled after 1953, dissidents in the DP were encouraged to rebel against DP authorities.

In 1955, nineteen deputies pioneered by Çelikbaş signed a bill to design a right to prove for journalists. The dispute over the right to prove provided the opponents a front to revolt against the oligarchic center of the party. Because some opponents within the DP gave up hope of gaining ground inside the party, especially after losing intraparty struggles to rival cliques, conflicts before the fourth convention of the DP were a decisive point in the right to prove bill movement. The attitude of the opponents turned into a wind of change with a spectacular riot. This dispute also had a symbolic connotation touching on intellectuals and their right to free speech. In that regard, political worries and personal revenge and the support of intellectual elites pulled these DP deputies to form a new political party. Nevertheless, it is not possible to pursue a political program, class basis, or harmonious political doctrine that would prevail in the party. Rather, the keyword or understanding the party is eclecticism, and the party was formed in response to a certain historical situation. Thus, the party program and the political discourses of the party should be considered in relation to that premise. Indeed, this political party was so eclectic that its main goal was to deal with Adnan Menderes and his accomplices, the rest was just details.

On the other hand, the party was eclectic because most of its founders were supporters of the DP at the beginning of the 1950s and some were among the most prominent figures of the DP played a role in the centralization and authoritarianization of party rule in the hands of Menderes' crew. Thus, they were criticizing practices to which they themselves had contributed while conducting politics in the FP. Moreover, the figures who founded and supported the party came from a wide range of positions on the political spectrum including, Kemalism, social democracy, liberalism, Islamism, conservatism,

Kurdism, and Turkism. The question arises, how was possible to include all those kinds of people with dissimilar backgrounds under the same umbrella? Their point in common cannot be considered to be a totalizing theory or political program. The party program the party refused to get mired in a doctrine or program. This thesis shows that the only reason these heterogeneous people were together brought together and put aside their differences was hostility towards Menderes and his circle. The issue of cooperation before the 1957 election and the joining of the party with the RPP, which were the most significant issues on the political agenda of the party, indicate that the FP was open to collaborating with other political parties to enlarge its front against the Menderes regime.

To a large extent, there was no ideological polarization in the political arena and no fundamental differences among political parties regarding internal and external politics in Turkish politics of the 1950s. The FP was just a part of that political nature. In those years, the behavior of agents towards different issues was more significant in politics. Our conclusion meets with general attitudes of intellectuals and other political parties in the 1950s of Turkey, which lacked ideological positions.

These points make the actors of the FP politicians who were dynamic adjusting its political discourse and agenda in parallel with changing political conditions. In other words, conditions created this political movement, not ideologies and doctrines. The eclectism of both the party and intellectuals of that era can be assessed with the following of Kemal Karpaz:

The ideological shortcomings of Ottoman bureaucracy may have prevented it from discerning the economic and social roots of the political and religious conflicts it had to cope with but did not it prevent from seeking some solutions to these conflicts."¹

He continues,

The Republican bureaucracy inherited the political experience of its predecessor and applied it successfully to the occasion arose. The

1 Kemal Karpaz, "Political Developments in Turkey, 1950-70," *Middle Eastern Studies* 8, no. 3 (1972): 350.

adoption and the maintenance of parliamentary democracy in 1945-50 was one of these major occasions. It developed not so much as the result of a commitment to lofty political principles but mainly as the outcome of a calculated decision to find a practical political solution likely to soothe and eventually to quell the rising social, economic and cultural discontent.²

To sum up, I have focused on the internal dynamics of the FP which had roots dating to the beginning of the formation of the DP. This kind of approach was vital to grasp the codes of the discourse of the FP and is different from research that accounts for it in different ways - for example, by referencing grand narratives. In this work, I conclude that between 1950 and 1960, Turkish did not harbor strict ideological standpoints, doctrines, and constraints of social structures; political sphere has its autonomy and politics was conducted by politicians who did not have to address structural bases. Therefore, the formation of the FP and its characteristics can best be understood by examining intraparty struggles within the DP, especially before its fourth convention. Even though it had a short lifespan, today the Freedom Party is regarded back upon with awe and respect because of the political discourse it attached, effective opposition in every possible platform and its struggle with DP extremists. Yet this should not prevent us from thinking that the formation of the FP was a result of some personal disappointments of some DP leaders and struggles among some cliques in the DP.



2 Ibid.

Appendix A Originals

- 1 Daha birkaç yıl, işte Demokrat Parti'nin bir bakıma kurucuları arasında Köprülü partinin dimağı ise, o hissi; Menderes partinin aksiyonu ise, o ocakçısı; Bayar partinin bayrağı ise o bayrak taşıyanı!
- 2 Mareşal'e karşı sergilenen bu tutum DP kurucularının partide mutlak hâkimiyet kurmak istediklerini, bu amaçla demokrasi dışı yöntemlere başvurmakta sakınca görmeyeceklerini ve Mareşal'in partiden uzaklaştırılması için her yolu deneyeceklerini göstermişti.
- 3 Hemen 64 vilâyette hizipler vardı ve bunların çoğu, karşı partiyle mücadele edecek yerde birbirlerini yiyordu. İçlerinde öyleleri mevcuttu ki rakiplerinin kazanması için muhaliflerle işbirliğine hazırdılar.
- 4 Doğrusu istenirse nasıl «isbat hakkı» parti içinde bir sembol haline gelmişse «Dr. Mükerrerrem Sarol» da bir sembol haline gelmişti. Eğer büyük Kongrede Dr. Mükerrerrem Sarol Genel İdare Kuruluna giremezse, bu «isbat hakkı» taraftarlarının zaferi olacaktı.
- 5 Her sabah uyanınca sırtımızda hıyanetin hançerini mi hissedeceğiz? Mebus seçildikten sonra partiyi tekmeleyenlere karşı elbette tedbir bulacağız. Şunu arzedeyim ki, mesele isbat hakkı değildir. Bunu sadece bayrak yapmak istiyorlar.

- 6 Programından ayrılmış, eski hüviyetini tamamen değiştirmiş olan bugünkü DP'den çekiliyorum. Demokrasi nizamına iman etmiş bütün Türk vatandaşlarının, aralarındaki her türlü ihtilafları bir tarafa atarak bu gaye uğrunda işbirliği yapmaları bir vatan borcudur.
- 7 Çankaya Kaymakamı geliyor, kongreyi basacak. Sevgili çocuğum, sonra konuşursun, ben bir oylama yapacağım. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'ne katılmayı kabul edenler, etmeyenler? Kabul edildi mi edilmedi mi kimse anlamadan "Edilmiştir!" dedi ve mikrofonu bana verdi "Sen çocuğum devam et" dedi. "Muhterem efendim, siz partiyi öldürdünüz" dedim. "Ya öyle mi" dedi kapattı kongreyi
- 8 Aslında bu bir birleşme değil, katılma idi. Ama, daha önce yapılan görüşmelerde işin psikolojik yönünü de dikkate alarak adına «birleşme» demiştik. Zaten birleşmeden önce hazırlanan İlk Hedefler Beyannamesi de bu sebepten kaleme alınmıştı. Beyannamenin içindekiler aslında CHP'nin ötedenberi savunduğu fikirlerdi. Ancak Hürriyet Partisi'nin tabanını tatmin edebilmek için bizim tarafımızdan hazırlandığı görüntüsünü verdik. Fakat bu beyanname bizim örgütü tatmin için iyi bir dayanak oldu.

Appendix B Some FP Brochures from the 1957 Elections





SOURCE of the Brochures: Özkan, Necati. *Türkiye ve Dünyadan Örneklerle: Seçim Kazandıran Kampanyalar*. Istanbul: MediaCat, 2002.



“Muhالیf partilerin seçim beyannameleri,” *Cumhuriyet*, October 11, 1957.

Appendix C 1957 General Elections

TABLO : I

	1950			1954			1957		
		Kazandı il	Mebus		Kazandı il	Mebus		Kazandı il	Mebus
Seçmen	8.905.743	—	—	10.262.063	—	—	12.120.767	—	—
Oy veren	7.953.055 % 89.36	—	—	9.095.617 % 88.63	—	—	9.337.301 % 77.3	—	—
DP	4.243.092 % 53.31	53	408	5.313.659 % 58.42	60	503	4.407.993 % 48.09	46	424
CHP	3.159.828 % 39.79	10	69	3.193.471 % 35.11	3	31	3.767.949 % 41.21	19	178
CMP	237.828 % 3	—	1	480.249 % 5.25	1	5	616.420 % 6.72	1	4
HP	—	—	—	—	—	—	362.749 % 3.94	1	4
KP	—	—	—	50.935 % 0.01	—	—	—	—	—
Muhtelif	312.342 % 3.92	—	—	57.303 % 0.63	—	2	3.591 % 0.04	—	—

1) Köylü aPartisi

SOURCE Aldıkaçtı, Orhan. "27 Ekim 1957 Milletvekilleri Seçimi." *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası* 24, no. 1-4 (1959): 13-25.



Appendix D Economic Indicators in 1945-1960

Table 4-2. Basic Economic Indicators of Turkey, 1945-1960

YEAR	GNP AT CURRENT PRICES (MILLION TL)	INFLATION (WHOLESALE PRICES) (%)	TL/\$ RATE	GNP (MILLION \$)	EXPORTS (000 \$)	EXPORTS AS % OF GNP	IMPORTS (000 \$)	IMPORTS AS % OF GNP	FOREIGN TRADE AS % OF GNP	CUMULATIVE FOREIGN DEBTS (MILLION \$)	FOREIGN DEBT AS % OF GNP	FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS (000 \$)
1945	5,469.8	-3.2	1.30	4,207.5	168,264	3.99	96,969	2.30	6.30	120	2.85	—
1946	6,857.6	-3.8	2.01	3,411.7	214,580	6.29	118,889	3.48	9.77	—	—	—
1947	7,542.6	1.3	2.80	2,693.8	223,301	8.29	244,644	9.08	17.37	—	—	—
1948	9,402.9	7.7	2.80	3,390.3	196,799	5.80	275,053	8.11	13.92	—	—	—
1949	9,054.4	7.9	2.80	3,233.7	247,825	7.66	280,220	8.97	16.64	—	—	—
1950	9,694.2	-10.2	2.80	3,462.2	263,424	7.61	285,664	8.25	15.06	373	10.77	—
1951	11,644.3	6.7	2.80	4,138.7	314,082	7.55	402,086	9.67	17.22	—	—	—
1952	13,389.3	0.8	2.80	4,782.0	362,914	7.59	555,920	11.63	19.21	355	7.42	—
1953	15,607.4	2.3	2.80	5,574.1	396,061	7.11	532,533	9.39	16.66	—	—	2,800*
1954	15,914.5	11.0	2.80	5,683.8	334,924	5.89	478,359	8.42	14.31	—	—	2,200
1955	19,117.4	7.2	2.80	6,827.6	313,346	4.59	497,637	7.29	11.88	—	—	1,200
1956	22,047.0	16.8	2.80	7,873.9	304,990	3.87	407,340	5.17	9.05	—	—	3,400
1957	29,309.9	18.7	2.80	10,467.8	345,217	3.30	397,125	3.79	7.09	1,011**	9.66	1,300
1958	34,999.9	15.1	2.80	12,500.0	247,271	1.98	315,098	2.52	4.50	620	4.96	1,100
1959	43,670.0	19.5	2.80	15,596.4	333,799	2.27	469,982	3.01	5.28	—	—	3,400
1960	46,664.3	5.3	4.73	9,865.6	320,731	3.25	468,186	4.75	8.00	992	10.05	1,900

Sources: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (DIE), *İstatistik Yıllığı* 1945-1958 (pp. 454, 455, and 488); Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınevi, 1987-88), vol. 15, 16, 17, pp. 471-108; Anne O. Krueger, *Foreign Trade and Economic Development: Turkey*, vol. 1 (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1970), p. 10.
 GNP, Gross National Product. TL, Turkish Lira.
 * Cumulative amount of foreign direct investments in Turkey up to 1954.
 ** Derived from OEEC, *Economic Situation in Turkey 1959* (Paris: OEEC, 1960), p. 30.
 (Compiled and interpreted by Hakan Uygur)

SOURCE Baskın Oran, "1945 - 1960 Turkey in the Orbit of the Western Bloc -1," in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran, trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 290

Appendix E Symbolic Representation of Americanism in Turkey







SOURCE Çağrı Erhan, "Relations with the USA and NATO," in *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1919-2006: Facts and Analyses with Documents*, ed. Baskın Oran, trans. Mustafa Akşin (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2010), 312.

Appendix F Fevzi Lutfi Karaosmanoğlu with the DP Group



Appendix G Party Documents



Appendix H A Bill of Entry

KAZAYA GİDECEK İŞİ

H Ü R R İ Y E T P A R T İ S İ
(GİRİŞ BEYANNAMESİ)

Vilâyeti :
Kazası :
Nahiyesi :

A — Azalık talebinde bulunanlar tarafından doldurulacak kısım :

Adı ve Soyadı :
Baba adı :
Doğum tarihi ve yeri :
İkametgâhı adresi :
İş ve iş yeri adresi :
Daha evvel Hürriyet Partisine girmiş ve ayrılmışsa ayrış tarihi ve sebebi :
Daha evvel başka bir partinin mensubu olarak mebusluk yapmış veya bir partinin merkez teşkilâtında vazife görmüş ise :
a - Hanga parti mensubu olarak hangi devre mebusluğunu yapmıştır :
b - Hangi partinin merkez teşkilâtında vazife görmüştür, vazifesinin mahiyeti nedir :
c - Vazife gördüğü tarihler :

Hürriyet Partisi'nin ana nizamnamesini ve programını okudum. Nizamnamenin 3 üncü maddesindeki Parti'ye aza olabilmek için lüzumlu şartları halîz bulunmaktayım.

Partinin nizamnamesinde ve programındaki prensipleri düğünce ve kanaatlerime tamamiyle uygun buluyor, her hal ve şartta, bu prensiplere sadık kalacağıma namus ve şerefim üzerine söz veriyorum.

B — Ocak ve kaza idare heyetlerince doldurulacak kısım :

Ocağın adı :
Aza kayıt numarası :
Ocak idare heyetî kararının Tarihi :
Numarası :
Kazanın adı :
Kaza kayıt numarası :

Appendix I The Founders at the Atatürk Mausoleum on
November 10, 1956



From left to right, Muhlis Ete, Sefaettin Karanakçı, Muammer Alakant, Ziyad Ebuzziya, Unknown, Feridun Ergin, Fevzi Lütü Karaosmanoğlu, Fethi Çelikbaş, Sabahattin Çiracıoğlu, Ekrem Alican, and Turan Güneş



Appendix J Adapazarı Party Members




Ekrem Alican, third from the left together with members of Adapazarı organization



Appendix K Candidates from İstanbul in the 1957 General Elections

 Hür. P.	
Fevzi İrfan	Manisa Mebusu, Umumi İdare Heyeti
Karacamanoglu	Kreis
Eyüp Güneş	Bahadır Mebusu, Umumi İdare Heyeti 2 nci Kreis
Hamdullah Suphi	İstanbul Mebusu
Tuncmire	
Doktor Nihat Beşat	Eski Şişli ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekili
Belcer	
Profesör Muhlis Ete	Ankara Mebusu, Eski Eczacı ve Tıbbi Vekili
Çiğdem Baban	İstanbul Mebusu, Yenigün Gazetesi Baş Muharriri
Feridun Ergin	Uda Mebusu
Cemal Kırıcı	Kütahya Mebusu
Emullah Nefi	Typhon Mebusu
Muklis Beyazoglu	Ankara Mebusu
Hasan Kızılcı	Tekirdağ Mebusu
Eyüp Elazcı	Konya Mebusu
Edizhan Karaman	Çankaya Mebusu
Abdullah Bey	Ereğli Organisi
Muharrem Şakir	Ereğli Organisi, İstanbul Vilâyet Meclisi Heyeti Azası
İsmail	İstanbul Eski Meclisi Meclisi, İstanbul Disiplin Kurulu Başkanı
Şakir Ertürk	Avukat, İstanbul Disiplin Kurulu Azası
Muallim Akın	Mebus İdarisi Eski Umumi Müdür, İstanbul Vilâyet İdare Heyeti 2 nci Kreis
Profesör Bekirhan	Sevici, Vilâyet Meclisi Heyeti Azası
Tanrı	
Doktor Seyithan	Ereğli Sanatoryumu Başhekim, Vilâyet İdare Heyeti Azası
Kökse	
Hayri Şaher	Ereğli Kurum Yönet, Banka Müdür
Talib Akınhan	Avukat, Vilâyet İdare Heyeti Azası
Doktor Beşirhan	Vilâyet İdare Heyeti Azası
Emrah Güneş	Avukat, Vilâyet İdare Heyeti Azası
Mehmet Kapan	Ankara Hukuk Fakültesi eski Öğretim Üyesi (Mebus)
Muammer Akar	Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi eski Öğretim Üyesi (Mebus)
Kemal Uluoğlu	İstanbul Şişli Cemiyeti Başkanı
E. Galip Sarıhan	Muharri ve Gazeteci
Ceyhan Kırca	Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi eski Öğretim Üyesi
Doktor Yavuzhan	Bilimsel İsmi Hastanesi Operatörü
Andran	
Ömer Beşirhan	Şişli Cemiyeti İdare Heyeti Azası
Anı Yavuzhan	İstanbul, Eski Banka Müdür
Leva Parman	Mühürhan
Sait Bayar	Mali Mühürhan
Saithan	Haydarpaşa Lisesi eski Müdür
Arif Ertanhan	Fakülte Sanatları Genel Sekreteri
İbrahim Güneş	Bakanlar Kurulu Sanatları Genel Sekreteri
Mehmet Güneş	14 Mahkeme Üyesi
Burhanhan	Teknik Sanatları Meclisi Üyesi

Appendix L Candidates from Giresun in the 1957 Elections




Appendix M Press Clippings




DON JUAN





Adalet Ke miyyan İptidarkun reddetti — Gasetler —



— 27 EKİM KULUÇKANI —

TEL. SÖMURDA
2. BAĞCI Kİ
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Mısır Pırı Mısır
DOĞUBANK

Cumhuriyet

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11. 10. 1954

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Yıldırım ve Mısır...

11. 10. 1954

19 lar kuracakları partiye dün (Hürriyet) adını koydular

Beklenen basın toplantısı dün yapıldı, gazetecilere yeni partinin için kurulmakta olduğu, neler yapmak istediği etraflı bir şekilde anlatıldı



Dünkü basın toplantısından intibaklar

Başbakan dün akşam bir basın toplantısı yaptı

Menderes, bazı gazete başmuharirlerinin -bulundukları toplantıda yeni partiye ve ispat hâkkı mevzuuna dair düşünce ve görüşlerini anlattı



Başbakan dün akşam bir basın toplantısı yaptı

Tokyo'da yapılan güreş karşılaşması dün 4-4 beraberlikle neticelendi

Başbakan dün akşam bir basın toplantısı yaptı

150 den fazla mebusun H.P. ne geçmeleri bekleniyor

19 lardan dün şehrimize gelen ve İstanbulda temastılara memur edilen Ziyad Ebüzziye yeni parti hakkında izahatla bulundu.

Dün sabah ekspresle Ankara'dan İstanbul'a gelen ve halen 22 ye yitirilmiş olan 19 lardan Ziyad Ebüzziye, Hürriyet Partisinin 1 ocak 1954 tarihinde resmen teşekkül - Arkeon So. 5. s. 6 de -



Ziyad Ebüzziye, mebuslarının katılacak olan parti hakkında izahat verirken

Şur. F. İslanbul il keşmali dñm
mst 10 dan İlgıran salımlarına
Tırları Nıslıde Gırlımlara bağı-
mlıdır.
Kongre C. W. Partisi İsmail
İslanbul İdare Heyet. C. M. R. yi tem-
silan Fıat Ayar, Kadık Alıoğlu ve
İ. İdare Heyet üyeleri karm bulun-
maktadır.
Roman hıman İslanbul E. F. İdare-
lerin İdaremleri Kongre, İle şlar-
k başkanı şeyfı şeyfı. şeyfı. şeyfı.
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Doçent Dr. Muammer Aksoy da istifa etti

İstifanameden bir parça: «Bir hukuk hocasının vazifelerinin başında hukuk devletinin gerçekleştirilmesi ve korunması gelir. Bugün benim C.H.P. nin âleti olduğumu söyleyenler vaktile C. H. P. mensubu iken dahi bu fikrimi en aşağı bugünkü enerji ile ifade etmekten çekinmedim»

Muammer Aksoy Savcılığa çağırıldı

Ankara, 5 (Telefonla) — Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi doçentlerinden Dr. Muammer Aksoy bugün hocalık vazifesinden istifa etmiş ve dilekçesini Fakülte dekanlığına göndermiştir. Aksoy, istifa dilekçesinde şöyle demektedir:

«1929 yılında başlayan mesleki hayatımda bir hukukçu ve hukuk hocasına düşen vazifeleri, mühtaş-
ran memleketimin menfaatlerini bu plânda tutarak ifa etmeye çalıştım. Daha 22 yaşında bir asistan iken ta-

zıdığım kanaati, bugüne kadar muha-
faza etmiş bulunuyordum. O da, bir
hukukçunun ve hele hukuk hocası-
nın, vazifelerinin başında, «Hukuk
devletinin gerçekleştirilmesi ve korun-

— Arkas Sa. 5, Sü. 5 te —



Serif Mardin

Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesinden bir istifa daha

Siyasal İlimler Asistanı Serif Mardin dün bir dilekçe vererek Fakültenin ayrıldı

Ankara 10 (Cumhuriyet-Tehke) — Siyasal Bilgiler fakültesi Dekanı Profesör Dr. Turhan Feyzioğlu'nun Başkanlık emrine alınmasını müteakib Üniversite Şurasının üyeleri arasında başlayan istifalar devam etmektedir.

— Arkas Sa. 5, Sü. 8 de —

Appendix N Caricature



A Caricature drawn by Ratip Tahir criticizing the appropriation of RPP properties. From the left: Adnan Menderes, Samet Ağaoğlu, Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoğlu, Fuad Köprülü, and Refik Koraltan.

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