RE-OPENING OF HALKI THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL:

BETWEEN POLITICS, RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Cenk Erdal, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
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ABSTRACT

Re-opening of Halki Theological School:
Between Politics, Religion and International Relations

Halki Theological School ("HTS") had educated top tier Orthodox priests including the current Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew, between the years of 1844 – 1971 under the authority of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of the Phanar. The institution remains closed to higher education since 1971 after a Constitutional Court decision annulled associated articles of Private Education Institutions Law. Since then, the issue has been discussed widely and has been under the scrutiny of scholars. This thesis explores the issue by discussing the role of religion in international relations and continues with the motives and rationales behind various policies on re-opening of the HTS from the perspectives of the state and the Greek Orthodox minority. The study focuses on the 2002-2019 period, which has witnessed both very favorable and equally unfavorable approaches to the issue and the question of what caused these significant swings is the main question researched in this thesis. The endeavor by actors associated with the HTS is another aspect that is explored in this thesis. The rapprochement with the EU and the following democratization and human rights improvements had increased the possibility of a viable solution to the HTS case, however the succeeding recovery in Turkey's economic power resulted in its ability to pursue more independent and authoritarian policies and caused the stalemate to remain unresolved.

ÖZET

Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun Tekrar Açılması:

Politika, Din ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Arasında

Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ("HRO"), İstanbul'daki Fener Rum Patrikhanesine bağlı olarak 1844-1971 yılları arasında Heybeliada Ümit Tepesinde bulunan yerleşkesinde, Ortodoks teoloji konusunda üst düzey din adamları yetiştiren bir ilahiyat kurumu olarak faaliyet göstermiştir. Kuruluşundan itibaren şu anki Rum Ortodoks Patriği Bartholomeos da dahil olmak üzere birçok din adamı yetiştiren okul, 1971 yılında anayasa Mahkemesi'nin Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu'nun bazı maddelerini iptal etmesi sonucu kapatılmıştır. Akademik çevrelerin ve kamuoyunun yakından takip ettiği bu konu pek çok yönüyle tartışılmış ve araştırmalara konu olmuştur. Bu tez dinin uluslararası ilişkiler üzerindeki rolünü tartışarak bu çerçevede HRO'nun yeniden açılabilmesi konusundaki çeşitli yaklaşım ve politikaları devlet ve Türk Rum azınlığı perspektiflerinden ele almaktadır. İlk zamanlarda oldukça ılımlı bir tutumun izlendiği fakat bir sonuca ulaştırılamayan politikaların izlendiği 2002-2019 dönemine odaklanmış olan bu tez, bu çözümsüzlüğün nedenini çalışmalarının merkezine koymaktadır. Ayrıca HRO ile ilgili kişiler tarafından güdülen politikalar ve sürdürülen çalışmalar da tezin incelediği bir başka alandır. AB ile yakınlaşma sürecini takip eden demokratikleşme ve insan hakları konularında yapılan iyileştirmeler okulun kalıcı olarak açılabilme ihtimalini arttırmışsa da Türkiye'nin son dönemde benimsediği görece bağımsız politikalar ile paralel olarak konu henüz bir çözüme ulaştırılamamıştır.

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To my daughter Defne Simin

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The setting and the argument of the study

Halki Theological School is located on the picturesque Hill of Hope (Ümit Tepesi) in Heybeliada, the second largest of the Prince Islands. The island lies in the Sea of Marmara in close proximity to Istanbul with approximately 3,000 permanent residents today. Heybeliada – or *Halki* in Greek as it was once known – has been home to a few distinguished higher education institutions (i.e. Halki Theological School, Turkish Naval Academy[1] and the now-obsolete Greek Trade School of Halki[2]) since centuries and possesses a rich cultural, academic and religious heritage compared to the other members of the archipelago.[3]

Halki Theological School was established in 1844 under the authority of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of the Phanar, with the aim of promoting unity on theological issues, regulations and practices of the of the Orthodox population and educating the scholars needed for the continuation of their church.[4] The history of the school dates back to 9th century when a monastery was established by St. Fotios at the same location where monks educated their successors, which was later devoted

[1] First established in 1773 in mainland İstanbul, moved to Heybeliada in 1838. Retrieved from http://www.dho.edu.tr/sayfalar/00_Anasayfa/01_Sabitler/tarihce/tarihce.html (Accessed on 17 Jan 2020)
[2] Established in 1831, continued education until 1916, used as an hospital and orphanage in later years, nationalized in 1942 and transferred to Turkish Navy to be used as Naval High School Erdoğan, A. (2019). *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Kurulan İlk Özel Ticaret Okulu: Heybeliada Rum Ticaret Mektebi*, Avrasya İncelemeleri Dergisi, VIII/1, 36
[3] Gülen, N. (2017). *Nejat Gülen'le Adalı Sohbetler.* İstanbul: Adalı Yayınları, 10
[4] Yalçın, E. (2013). *Can The Holy Theological School of Halki be Reopened?* CTAD, Year 9, Issue 17 (Spring 2013), 107

to the Holy Trinity (Aya Triada) of Christianity by Byzantine Empress Katerina Komnini in year 1063.[5] It had been the only academy-level religious school of the Greek minority within the boundaries of Republic of Turkey educating Orthodox priests until its forced closure in 1971.

The current Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew is the spiritual leader of approximately 260 million Orthodox Christians around the world[6] however the number of his followers is only a miniscule fraction of this figure in his home jurisdiction of Turkey. Despite this demographic disadvantage, its historical importance stemming from the fact that it is granted the title of 'first without equals'[7] during the early years of Christianity makes the Patriarchate of Phanar the most important seat of the Orthodox Christians today. The population exchange between Greece and Turkey after the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 which resulted in displacement of approximately 1.2 million Greek Orthodox minorities[8] from Anatolia has been the main reason of this decline in the early 20th century, leaving an Orthodox population at the order of one hundred thousand within the boundaries of Turkey mainly concentrating in İstanbul and two Aegean islands. Continued tensions coupled with nationalistic rhetoric between the two states

[5] Arnavutköy Greek community webpage Mega Revma. Retrieved from http://www.megarevma.net/ruhbanokulu.htm (Accessed on 23 Oct 2020)

[6] Pew Research Center report published in 2017 by Neha Sahgal and Alan Cooperman claims Christian Orthodox subjects of the Patriarch to be around 260 million around the globe (majority of which is in Russia with a body of around 100 million followers). Retrieved from https://www.pewforum.org/2017/11/08/orthodox-christianity-in-the-21st-century/ (Accessed on 06 Feb 2020), while other sources such as Wikipedia or the website of the Elijah Interfaith Institute. Retrieved from http://elijah-interfaith.org/world-religious-leaders-activity/the-elijah-board-of-world-religious-leaders/christian-leaders (Accessed on 04 Feb 2020) exhibit figures as high as 300 million.

[7] Primus sine paribus... As the Archbishop of Constantinople he is 'one among' equals, as the Patriarch of Constantinople he is 'first among' equals, and as the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople he is 'first without' equal. Retrieved from http://www.patriarchateofconstantinople.com/index.html (Accessed on 22 Mar 2021)

[8] The exact number of refugees absorbed by Greece was 1,221,489 in this obligatory population exchange. Kritikos, G. (2000). *State policy and urban employment of refugees: The Greek case (1923–30),* European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'Histoire, 7:2, 190

especially during the 60s and 70s has exacerbated the exodus and caused the community to further shrink to a few thousand levels as of today[9]. However, this decay in the worshipping Greek Orthodox community within the boundaries of Republic of Turkey did not decrease the importance of Halki Seminary and it remained to be a top priority item among the followers of the Orthodox Christian faith as well as local policy makers due to its repercussions in international relations.

The discussion around the Halki Theological School is not the only contemporary example of its kind stemming from religious sites and the underlying religious motivations in Turkey and abroad. The ruling AKP has been established on the similar principles that its predecessors such as the Virtue Party and the Welfare Party has followed, receiving its power from the same conservative supporter base and the Islamic tradition. Given the underlying religious essence in its making and the policies it pursues, it can be categorized as a party with clear Islamic roots.[10] The so called "one-minute incident"[11] of 2009 was a very strong message given to the international community as well as the local electoral base of AKP, when then-Prime Minister Erdogan criticized then-Israeli President Shimon Perez harshly on Israel's offensive against Gaza and stormed out of the Davos summit.[12] He was greeted by masses at the Atatürk airport upon return, amalgamating his popularity among his supporters and emerged as the patron of the fellow Muslim Palestinians. This religious pattern has been even more visible

[9] Number of Turkish citizens with Greek origins was 1,473 in 2004 according to Baskın Oran. Retrieved from http://www.baskinoran.com/gazete/213)Korku-tr(16-07-2004).rtf (Accessed on 07 Feb 2020)
[10] Ömer Taşpınar, *Turkey: The New Model?*. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/research/turkey-the-new-model/ (Accessed on 08 Jun 2021)
[11] The incident is commonly referred as the "one-minute" incident after Erdoğan has passionately asked for an extra minute from the moderator to address Perez appropriately.
[12] Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/30/turkish-prime-minister-gaza-davos (Accessed on 09 Jun 2021)

through turkey's increased support to the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt due to their ideological proximity and increased relations with the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi. This support continued even at an increasing pace after the removal of Morsi by a military coup d'état in July 2013 and resulted in strained ties the new Egyptian administration and the West. This isolation was defined as "precious loneliness" by the party's senior figures, insisting that Turkey was at the correct side of the history.[13] It is also worth mentioning about the Syrian civil war and Turkey's active involvement as a further deliberation of tendency to cooperate with Islamic oriented groups and pursue political engagement in the former territories of Ottoman Empire. Although it is not officially declared as the state policy, such fractions has found ground under the umbrella that Turkey has provided in an effort to counter the US-backed militia mainly composed of the pro-Kurdish forces. Turkey's plans to create safe zone stretching about 20 miles into Syrian territory seem to be partially achieved, with most Jihadist forces retreating to the Idlib region which remains as a rebel stronghold.[14]

The recent decisions by the Turkish government to transform the 1500-year-old iconic Hagia Sophia museum and similarly the 1000-year-old world-famous Kariye (Chora) museum into mosques highlight the importance of religion and religious sites in domestic and international politics. These symbolic but significant changes can also be considered as a consequence of the deviation from the milder approach observed in early years of the AKP rule when Turkey was seen showing higher tolerance to minority problems which could have resulted in re-opening of

[13] Retrieved from https://www.dw.com/en/support-for-muslim-brotherhood-isolates-turkey/a-17037906 (Accessed on 9 June 2021)
[14] Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717 (Accessed on 9 June 2021)

Halki Theological School. Similarly, the decades long ban to build a mosque in Athens – which was recently built after lots of diplomatic mingling[15] – and the decision by the US government to re-locate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem can also be considered as some international examples of using religion and religious sites as a tool in political affairs.

The closing of Halki Seminary[16] in 1971 has been a well-researched subject by scholars from Turkey and abroad, especially in the context of international relations and from the perspective of minority rights. It has also been on the agenda of various EU progress reports and repetitive recommendations have been made to the Turkish government regarding its re-opening as a condition towards improving and normalizing the relations with the West and continuation of the accession process with the EU[17].

This study aims to discuss the issue from an inclusive perspective by emphasizing the increasing influence of religion in international relations in a global scale and focuses on the Halki Theological School case as an illustrative reflection of this trend in a specific context. Various examples from the Middle East are also introduced in the second chapter as the region is continuously overwhelmed with religion or even sect inflicted conflicts as a result of being home to sacred sites of the

[15] The New York times article titled *"It Took a Century to Open a Mosque in Athens. Then Came the Pandemic."* and dated 14 November 2020 reports that the Athens mosque took more than a century to reopen since the expulsion of Ottoman forces in 1833, finally initiating prayers in November 2020. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/world/europe/athens-mosque-coronavirus.html (Accessed on 14 May 2021)

[16] Halki Theological School is often referred as "Halki Seminary" in various sources and the names will be used interchangeably throughout this document. Other less common usage includes: Halki Patriarchal School of Theology (US Congress Resolution #50, March 1995), Greek-Orthodox Seminary (Akgönül 2019 p.97), Holy Theological School of Halki (Yalçın 2013) and Heybeliada School of Priests

[17] Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession. Retrieved from https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/2004.pdf p.44 (Accessed on 13 May 2018)

three Abrahamic religions. Turkey's centuries-long presence in the region due to its Ottoman heritage makes it a more relevant spot to be scrutinized to better understand the underlying dynamics. The thesis argues that the apparent deviation from the relatively more democratic approach towards minority rights in early 2000s is a result of more independent and authoritarian policies implemented during the second-half of AKP rule and its direct consequence of using religious affairs as a policy instrument. The two distinct periods during the AKP rule can be distinguished from each other in terms of implemented pro-EU policies and passing of a series of reforms in the 2002-2011 period, while the Gezi Park events of 2013, Erdogan's election as the president in 2014 and the purge following the failed coup d'état attempt of 2016 characterizes the latter period when Turkey notably deviated from its earlier trajectory. The Europeanization project and the relatively milder and constructive policies pursued during this initial period can ve attributed to the need to overcome the opposition from the establishment, mainly composed of the top military officials and bureaucrats, intellectuals and some secular political parties.[18] The relative diminishing opposition ability of this block appears to have made it unnecessary to continue following these policies which come at an internal political cost.

This 50-year-old deadlock around an educational institution at the first sight appears that it only concerns the tiny Greek Orthodox minority of Turkey, however its implications on Turkey's relations with the West goes much more beyond its specific consequences and can be considered as an obstacle in front of its democratization and claiming its place in the modern world. Such a solution to this

[18] Çınar, M. (2006). *Turkey's Transformation Under the AKP Rule*, The Muslim World, Volume 96, July 2006, 480

problem would help alleviate Turkey's foreign policy problems, improve relations with some particular states and more generally with the West and would also be supportive for the stability of the region.

1.2 Structure and methodology

This thesis is designed to convey its substance in three main chapters, with the first focusing more on theoretical concepts and the latter two rather on Halki Theological School specific issues in order to draw a conclusion. The findings and discussions in these chapters aim to shed light on the problem lasting for more than 50-years now and illustrate how it fits into a more global perspective.

The second chapter aims to explore how secularism and religion concepts find their place in international relations and the theoretical framework lying in the backstage, with a specific focus on the Middle East region. This chapter is further divided into two sections, with the first focusing on secularism and its relation with religion, while the second one examining how religion has influenced the international relations theory historically and in contemporary times. The secularism section starts with demonstrating the rising importance of secularism especially after the nineteenth century and examines its implications in predominantly Muslim countries and specifically in Turkey. The concepts of tolerance, respect, modernism and accommodation are visited to better understand secularism and its relation with democracy. The section continues with a detailed analysis of the Iranian Revolution, which dramatically changed the political, economic, social and legal structure of a secular country into an Islamic republic. The next section of this chapter examines how religion has emerged as an important field of study under the broader discipline

of international relations. This section further concentrates on conflicts among followers of different religions as well as within the same religion and studies the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s, the Palestinian conflict and visits even earlier examples of the Crusades and the secularism doctrine of the Church as case studies emphasizing how religion has shaped the theory of international relations through history.

The next chapter starts by defining the problem around the closure Halki Theological School and examines its aftermath during the 2002 – 2019 period. The Ecumenical title of the Patriarchate is scrutinized in the first section to understand if the fierce opposition surrounding it is justified. The following section explores Turkey's foreign policy on minorities since 1950s and specifically examines relations with Greece and its reflections on the Greek Orthodox minority. The 6-7 September events and Cyprus related developments are brought into the spotlight and the parallel events concerning the Halki Theological School these times are examined. The next section dives into developments during the Justice and Development Party era and tries to show how Turkey's stance on the Halki Theological School issue has deviated significantly in the twenty-first century under the leadership of AKP and tries to find the reasons behind this important deviation from the point of seeing it as a human rights issue to a hardliner reciprocity topic used for bargaining with the West. The chapter continues with two analytic sections trying to investigate the reasons and motivations behind the sporadic interest into this matter and why it surfaced very significantly during various instances of the period in consideration. An internet keyword search was conducted and Cumhuriyet newspaper archives were analyzed in order to bring up various trends and developments that increased the visibility of the Halki Theological School issue.

The chapter ends with personal interviews with members of the Greek minority and also hardliner nationalists to contrast and compare the conflicting views of the two sides.

The fourth chapter of this thesis studies initiatives led from within the Halki Theological School through its community, graduates, priests and administrators towards its reopening and the transformation that it has staged. It argues that the School also acts as a pressure point itself devising and implementing policies towards re-opening of the school. The chapter is further subdivided into two sections with the first more focusing on the efforts led by the Patriarch Bartholomew and his devotion to environmental issues and how he uses it to increase the visibility of the Halki Theological School and to find a solution for its reopening. The next section focuses on another significant actor, Elpidophoros Lambriniadis, who has been the chief priest and the administrator of the school and now acting as the Metropolitan of the Americas. The effectiveness of these policies by these actors and their international repercussions are discussed in this chapter.

In order to achieve these objectives, the author has spent a significant period of time in the summer of 2018 at the premises of Halki Theological School and was designated as a researcher of the school by the then chief-priest and administrator of the school Elpidophoros Lambriniadis, who currently serves as the Metropolitan of the Americas since 2019. On-site interaction with visiting priests and international Erasmus students in HTS campus as well as qualitative interviews with related parties are among the primary methods of research used for this thesis. Separately, secondary sources such as newspaper archives and internet search query data had been utilized during the course of this study.

The thesis is constrained by 2002-2019 period when the AKP was in power during all of it, and is limited to a brief interaction with members of the HTS community which does not deviate a lot from the official rhetoric of the Patriarchate. Another limitation was the language of the available publications in HTS library, vast majority of which were in ancient Greek and concentrating on theological subjects. Separately, it is worth to state that the comments of the Greek Orthodox community members might not necessarily reflect their true and sincere beliefs as speaking these views out loud could have learned negative consequences for them in the past.

The internet keyword and newspaper archive search sections are limited to the information in the sources and other keywords or newspaper archives could have provided a rather different outcome from what has been achieved in this study. The newspaper archive also appeared to be relatively insufficient for the periods of 1970s and 1980s, but since these dates were outside the period researched no further research was conducted. For readers who would like to access these resources, I note down all the news items from Cumhuriyet newspaper regarding "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu" between the years 1930 and 2020 in Appendix A.

With these aspects and limitations, this thesis aims to distinguish itself from the available literature and the author believes that it would contribute as a step towards building a developed society where living in harmony together with our diverse heritage can lead to a more peaceful and civilized country.

CHAPTER 2:

SECULARISM AND RELIGION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

2.1 Secularism and religion

One can argue that the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries have witnessed the rise of secularism as the society attached greater importance to science and employ it as the source of answering questions of the universe. Similarly, the modern Turkish Republic was also established on secular roots and its founder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was quoted saying "The primary guide in life is science[19]" during a speech to teachers on 25 September 1924 in Samsun, praising positive sciences over religious traditions. Since then separation of religion and the state has been one of the main pillars of the Turkish constitution and it has been an example that a Muslim country can be a modern, liberal and democratic state.[20]

Secularism is a multilayered issue and faces practical difficulties in implementation especially in predominantly Muslim countries and has far reaching consequences reaching beyond the classical definition of separation of religious and state affairs. The key concepts of tolerance, respect, modernism and accommodation are vital to better understand democracy, secularism and its fragile relation with religion – in particular with Islam. As Huntington stunningly asserts, "The

[19] "Efendiler! Dünyada her şey için; uygarlık için, hayat için, başarı için en hakiki mürşit ilimdir; fendir. İlim ve fennin dışında rehber aramak dikkatsizliktir, bilgisizliktir, yanlışlıktır." Retrieved from https://www.atam.gov.tr/ataturkun-soylev-ve-demecleri/samsun-ogretmenleriyle-konusma (Accessed on 21 February 2020)

[20] Lee, R. D. (2014). *Religion and Politics in the Middle East: Identity, Ideology, Institutions, and Attitudes.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 125

underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam."[21]. Despite its intrinsic implication of religious equality, the relationship between secularism and religious freedoms in Turkey occasionally reflected negatively not only on the Islamic majority, but also on minorities following different faiths. Mahmood argues that modern secular governance transforms and, in some cases, intensifies preexisting interfaith inequalities and introduces the concepts of *political secularism* and *secularity*, defining the former as a modern state's relationship with religion and the latter as the set of concepts and norms defining secular societies and its subjectivities.[22] It is worthwhile to distinguish this definition from the set of values mentioned earlier that secularity encircles and to examine the HTS case from this perspective as the influence of various governments on the issue has been decisive on the course of events leading to today.

It can be witnessed in the recent past that effects of political secularism have been similar at various instances on Muslims and non-Muslims in Turkey. In line with the diverging interpretations of secularism by various governments and their desires to regulate some aspects of religious life has caused Islamic oriented schools and courses to trim down their presence during various periods in the contemporary history of the country, and has even been used as an excuse to contest existence of minority religious schools such as the Halki Seminary.[23] The attitude towards religious freedoms relatively improved after 2002 in Turkey leading to a

[21] Huntington, S. P. (1996), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order,* New York: Simon and Schuster, 217

[22] Mahmood, S. (2015). *Religious difference in a secular age: A minority report.* Princeton University Press, 3

[23] A 2005 article titled *'Ruhban Okulu türbana takıldı'* in the Armenian online publication HyeTert claims that the National Security Council (MGK) opposed the reopening of Halki Theological School on the grounds that the priests wearing "traditional Christian clothing" at the seminary would set a precedent for headscarf freedom at universities. Retrieved from https://hyetert.org/2005/10/08/ruhban-okulu-turbana-takildi/ (Accessed on 26 March 2020)

reconciliation especially in terms of minority rights and yielded some concrete positive results, however it did not lead to much awaited re-opening of Halki Theological School.

Secularism and democracy are closely interrelated concepts and Alfred Stepan gives his definition of democracy in his work titled *Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations"* as:

> Democracy is a system of conflict regulation that allows open competition over the values and goals that citizens want to advance. In the strict democratic sense, this means that as long as groups do not use violence, do not violate the rights of other citizens, and stay within the rules of the democratic game, all groups are granted the right to advance their interests, both in civil society and in political society.[24]

In this definition, the phrase ‘violation of rights of other citizens' deserves attention especially in the context of religious freedoms and tolerations. Stepan argues that individuals and religious communities, consistent with institutional definition of democracy, must have complete freedom to worship privately and in addition they must be able to advance their values publicly in civil society. Building on the same premises, Apostolov states that democracy cannot be limited down to a system of dictating what the majority thinks, but rather a guarantee guarding the identity, rights and interests of minority groups for the sake of the society as a whole.[25] Similarly, Mahmood defines that the two key characteristics of secularism as regulation of religious life and keeping religion free from state intervention and

[24] Stepan, A. C. (2000), Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations", *Journal of Democracy Volume 11, Number 4*, 39
[25] Apostolov, M. (2001). *Religious minorities, nation states and security: Five cases from the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.* Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 164

argues that it does mean that secularism constraints religion rather than setting it free.[26]

MacLure and Taylor define the freedom of religion as not only the freedom to hold religious beliefs but also to manifest one's religious affiliation through worship, rites, and the spreading of the faith.[27] At this point MacLure and Taylor introduce the concept of *accommodation,* which they argue it to be conceived as a legal obligation proceeding from more general rights, namely, the right to equality and nondiscrimination or freedom of conscience and religion. In regard to what exactly qualifies as religion, MacLure and Taylor refer to the Amselem decision of 2004 by the Canadian Supreme Court, which declares that the state is in no position to be, nor should it become, the arbiter of religious dogma and the sincerity of belief should be the only criteria to decide about it.[28]

This leads us to the subjective question of what deserves to be accommodated and what not? In order to better address this question, we have to look at various types of secular regimes and their differing aspects in regard to practicing religious beliefs and its relationships with the state. Stepan illustrates the extreme ends of the spectrum concerning religion-state relations in his table[29] titled "Twin Intolerations" to reach the conclusion that "secularism" and the "separation of church and state" are not an intrinsic part of the core definition of democracy. MacLure and Taylor also make a similar categorization of World's secular regimes

[26] Mahmood, S. (2015). *Religious difference in a secular age: A minority report.* Princeton University Press, 4
[27] MacLure, J. & Taylor, C. (2011), *Secularism and Freedom of Conscience,* (J. M. Todd, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 65
[28] MacLure, J. & Taylor, C. (2011), *Secularism and Freedom of Conscience,* (J. M. Todd, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 81-83
[29] Stepan, A. C. (2000), Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations", *Journal of Democracy Volume 11, Number 4,* Table 2, 43

in terms of the relationship they maintain with religious practice and distinguishes between rigid/strict and flexible/open regimes.[30] Similarly, Mahmood describes Middle Eastern states as authoritarian due to violations of individual freedoms and liberties and distinguishes them from the practices observed in Euro-Atlantic democracies, but does not necessarily conclude that Middle Eastern societies are inadequately secular.[31] As she suggests, it can be useful to introduce a new variant to differentiate this authoritarian approach, which also applies to various periods of the contemporary Turkish history when secularism was utilized as a tool to influence various aspects of the religious life in the public sphere.

Secularism is a fragile issue not only in countries with a Muslim majority population, but also in countries expected to be more democratic and civilized such as France. Similar to Turkey, wearing the Islamic veil and other religious symbols has been banned in French public schools in 2004, causing a lot of controversy within France and abroad. It appears that the French state has breached the "twin tolerations" argument of Alfred Stephan and the "accommodation" concept set forth by MacLure and Taylor, which has been visited earlier in this section. In the French experience these mild and tolerant approaches set forth does not seem to be respected. Islamic headscarf and other religious symbols have been banned in public schools in France by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Education. The commission headed by Bernard Stasi – a politician and former presidential advisor who has been appointed by President Chirac in July 2003 to study application of secularism principle in France – has prepared a 77-page report in

[30] MacLure, J. & Taylor, C. (2011), *Secularism and Freedom of Conscience*, (J. M. Todd, Trans.). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 27
[31] Mahmood, S. (2015). *Religious difference in a secular age: A minority report.* Princeton University Press, 4

December 2003 and recommended banning visible religious and political symbols in public schools among other things such as the desirability of an institute of Islamic studies.[32] The French National Assembly adopted a bill in February 2004 prohibiting display of religious belongings in primary and secondary schools. The French laicite is essentially a social and political compromise and has been debated, reshaped and moderated many times, but still seems not to have reached its final form and as Etienne Balibar states it is at crossroads and its principle is in question.[33] This decision can be deemed beneficial and necessary by some as it in a way defends young (mainly Muslim and secondarily Jewish) girls against religious fundamentalism at their young ages, however leaves a lot of controversy behind. The individual motives of young girls who chose to wear veils range from family pressures to personal attempts to silently express their differences in the society. These considerations make it especially fragile to assess laicite in educational framework where religious as well as political symbols are being questioned. Some schools and teachers in France allowed usage of political symbols at some stage as long as they are considered secular, but rather primarily Muslim and secondarily Jewish symbols are banned. Two interpretations of laicite can be applied to the educational sphere: first as the school's neutrality with respect to religious beliefs and equal expression and second as religious beliefs should be suspended within the school walls. Balibar argues both are correct and incorrect and adds that the school is essentially a place of transition between the space of private and public existence, but especially public school as a sovereign power above parties and governments and legally situated in the public space. She defends that the school has to first virtually

[32] O'Brien, R. (2005). The Stasi Report: The report of the committee of reflection on the application of the principle of secularity in the republic. William S. Hein & Co., 7
[33] Balibar, E. (2004). *Dissonances within Laicite,* Constellations, vol.11 no. 3, 353

detach individuals from their primary identities, but must also give individuals the means to represent their ideologies and belongings in political life, without itself being political – or in other words it should constitute an additional neutrality between two non-neutral spaces, which are private and public.[34] It appears that the French Republic has so far engaged secularism related issues in the country with great emphasis but attempts to create the desired version of *French Islam* will probably require more time, achievements and most importantly the consent and consensus of the social groups involved. The French case has similarities to the Turkish experience of secularism – or Kemalist Laicism in one of its strictest forms, which has witnessed closure of various political parties since 1970s and banning of some religious symbols in educational institutions and public sphere. The case of Halki Theological School has also been at the focus of this camp at various times, scrutinizing the issue in terms of possession of religious symbols and outfit during its curricular activities and opposing its reopening on secular grounds.

Secularism is one of the core values of modern liberal states and is adopted in the constitutions of many countries including Turkey. However, despite its expected positive contribution to interfaith relations, some scholars surprisingly argue that secularism adds to communal polarization and makes religion a more important factor in the daily lives of minority and majority identities at the same time.[35] In order to better comprehend the underlying theories, it would be beneficial to complement it with real world examples particularly from Islamic countries in the Middle East. For instance, Iranian Revolution radically changed the political, economic, social and legal structure of a country dramatically and was ignited by

[34] Balibar, E. (2004). *Dissonances within Laicite*, Constellations, vol.11 no. 3, 357
[35] Mahmood, S. (2015). *Religious difference in a secular age: A minority report.* Princeton University Press, 2

polarizations in the population that resulted in religion to become a significant factor for the public's decision making. The Iranian revolution of 1979 resulted in the Shah to be overthrown essentially as a result of his pro-Western policies and a new Islamic republic was established. Secular laws were replaced by the Islamic Shariah law and the political and military leaders elected by the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi were replaced by a new Islamist elite group.[36] The religious identity aspect of International Relations Theory can be observed in this case as it defines who the "actor" and "others" causing polarization in the community are. Determination of the relevant actors contributes to the "threat perceptions" of the public depending on the position whether they are majority or minority.[37]

The regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi took some steps in 1975 to consolidate its power, abandoned the existing two-party regime to run a single dominant party and founded the Rastakhiz Party.[38] At the same time, the regime was trying to control religious elite groups called the Ulema, which gained autonomy through the new party. Religious institutions and traditions were confronted in order to trim the influence of Islam in daily life and strengthen the monarchy. Actions such as replacing the Islamic calendar with a royal calendar has caused unrest among merchants, traders and religious institutions, even encouraging them to form an alliance against himself. The economic policies of the regime resulted in some groups and families close to the Shah to make great fortunes, however the livelihood of the middle class was getting harder with the effect of rising inflation.[39] The first

[36] Afary, J. *Iranian revolution.* Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Iranian-Revolution (Accessed on 25 May 2021)
[37] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 192
[38] Ansari, A. (2014). *Modern Iran*. Routledge, 244
[39] Gross, S. (2019). *What Iran's 1979 revolution meant for US and global oil markets*. Brookings. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/03/05/what-irans-1979-revolution-meant-for-us-and-global-oil-markets/

reactions started to come from this group as the polarization fed by economic problems caused the "other" bloc to strengthen. President Carter exerted pressure to liberalize the regime and implement reforms regarding the prosecution of political opponents and prompting the Shah released around 300 political prisoners since he didn't want to jeopardize his relations and investments with the US.[40] These developments encouraged the opposition to raise its voice, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who quickly became the political, legal and spiritual leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In the conferences he gave at that time, Khomeini claimed that Iran was pursuing policies to defend American interests that destroyed the Islamic identity and was promoting the idea that an Islamic state based on the Koran could be established and the religious leaders could rule the state in accordance with the Islamic faith Tradition with its law and orders.[41] Thus, Khomeini tried to create a religious state and defined its goals parallel with their religious identity, as defined by a structural realism point of view stating that arguing that the religious states strive for power like their secular counterparts.[42] After a certain period of time, Khomeini issued a statement declaring that the government appointed by the Shah was illegal and those who served him betrayed Islam – verifying that the threat to state is actually shaped by a threat to religion.[43]

Islamic tradition and law had an important role in giving a structural shape to the revolution as religious ideology shapes national interest in religious states.[44]

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[40] Hahn, P. L. (2017, October 22). *The Washington Post.* Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/10/22/how-jimmy-carter-lost-iran/
[41] Shadmehr, M. (2017). *Khomeini's theory of Islamic State and the making of the Iranian revolution.* SSRN Electronic Journal, 27. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3037793
[42] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 62
[43] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 177
[44] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 47-50

Religious Institutions founded by Khomeini played a major role in his victory and were subsequently used to give the revolution an organizational structure. The most important of these was the establishment of a new armed force called the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, known as the revolutionary guards, as a branch of Iranian Armed Forces. Its main task was to protect the revolution and prevent "deviant movements" and was mainly consisted of the poor youth in the cities.[45] Religious legitimacy in neorealism is also a critical concept worth exploring, which is a powerful tool of persuasion and it creates a form of social power over the public for the religious states.[46] In this respect, another important religious institution was the revolutionary courts, which led to the execution of former parliamentarians, prime ministers and hundreds of high-ranking secular military officers. In order to give the revolution an organizational structure, an Islamic party possessing direct relations with the Ulema and the people through mosques was formed and soon became Iran's greatest political power.[47]

The final step in establishing a new Islamic order in the country was the referendum approving the replacement of the monarchy with the Islamic system. A draft constitution adopting Islamic state principles was prepared, paving the way for Khomeini to became the strongest authority of the government structure with the highest administrative responsibility. With these changes influenced by religious worldviews, a balance of threat was created in the sense that the balance of power is not just determined by material resources but also the actor's understanding of threats

[45] BBC News (2020, January 3). *Profile: Iran's revolutionary guards.* Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47852262
[46] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 29
[47] Iran Chamber Society. (2021, May 24). *The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran*. Retrieved from https://www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php

as well.[48] As a result, the secular president was dismissed after two years, religious institutions and ideology dominated Iran completely and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the ruler of the country.

In the light of these real-world examples and relevant frameworks to analyze political regimes, it is interesting to see that the 1971 closure of the Halki Theological School fits into the secularism concept from opposing points of view. It will be shown in more detail in the following chapter that the issue is regarded as a matter of freedom of concise according to a group of scholars while some evaluate the same problem from an accommodation perspective arguing that a religious school can only operate under full state control in a secular state. The closure case of HTS also fits into the MacLure and Taylor's rigid/strict and Mahmood's authoritarian secularism definitions in terms of its assessment by the Turkish governments, who rather saw this issue as a political tool and a reciprocity instrument rather than a minority rights issue.

2.2 Religion in international relations theory

Globalization winds prevailing in the world after the collapse of the Eastern Block increased the importance of religion in the field of international relations. Its influence has reached climax after the September 11 events and emerged as a new and popular field of study under the broader discipline of international relations.

The World witnessed a dramatic increase in the influence of religion it following the end of the Cold War as security was confined to military terms and

[48] Walt, S. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security, 9*(4), 3-43. Retrieved from doi:10.2307/2538540

religion was kept out of international relations discussions until then.[49] The U.S. policy to team up with Islamic groups in Afghanistan to defeat the Soviets had initiated the roots of a new structure and led to strengthening of religious ideologies especially through radical Muslim organizations. Specifically, the birth of Al Qaida after this period and the following War on Terror notion led by the United States has been a decisive turning point that has caused religion to emerge as an important factor during the past few decades.

Bringing religion into the study of international relations requires a number of changes in the underlying theories according to Thomas[50] and he argues that some of such transformation has already been taking place for some time. Similarly, Haynes[51] asserts that religion has moved beyond its assigned place in the private sphere in both Europe and the MENA[52] region and became politically active.

Islamic Revolution of Iran, September 11 attacks to the U.S., global strengthening of Al Qaeda and its evolution into ISIS are among some of the contemporary events that caused the influence of religion to increase, while conflicts based on religious differences have been observed in Lebanon, Bosnia or in Palestinian territories not long ago. More recently, ISIS initiated turbulence in Syria and Iraq eventually turned into an assimilation campaign for the Christian and Yazidi minorities in these countries. Earlier events such as the crusades or the conquest of Istanbul can be classified as examples showing the impact of religious beliefs on international affairs and it is not difficult to imagine that similar engagements can

[49] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities. Routledge, 61
[50] Thomas, S. M. (2005). *The global resurgence of religion and the transformation of international relations: The struggle for the soul of the Twenty-first Century*, New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan
[51] Haynes, J. (2009). *Religion and Politics in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa.* London, England: Routledge.
[52] Abbreviation for Middle East and North Africa

take place in the near future especially in territories where different religious groups live in disagreement such as the Middle East – the historical zone of contact between the three main Abrahamic religions.

In addition to the above-mentioned inter-religion inflicted conflicts between different relations, it is also possible to witness conflicts within the same religion among different sects which can be equally or even more destructive in some cases. The prolonged Iran-Iraq war of 1980s is a good example of such an encounter, which helps us to better understand another important motivation that has been turning this particular region of the world into a battle-field for a long time and deserves more detailed analysis in connection with the related theory.

On 17 September 1980, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein announced the abolition of the Kasri-Sirin treaty that was signed in Algeria marking the Iran-Iraq border and ordered his armies to invade parts of Iranian territory on September 22 with the aim of ending Iran's domination of the Persian Gulf.[53] The attack was launched without any official warning in order to take advantage of the chaotic environment in Iran after the Islamic revolution. The conflict becomes even more exacerbated when the southwestern Iranian oil-rich state of Khuzestan turned out to be a major hotspot and withdrew the world's attention. The invasion had multiple objectives behind such as the long history of border problems between the two countries and the concerns over the impact of the Iranian Islamic Revolution on the Shiite population of Iraq, which constitute the majority of the population despite the Sunni-dominated Ba'athist leadership. Here Iraq's national interest was shaped by

[53] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. *Iran-Iraq war*. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/event/Iran-Iraq-War (Accessed on 17 May 2021)

its religious ideology which has significant implications on international relations.[54] Religious countries compete with other countries and religious groups, adding another dimension to balancing behaviours from a balance of threat perspective.[55] Both countries accepted a ceasefire on 18 July 1988, leaving more than a million people dead and oil production facilities suffering severe damage, with both countries losing their economic and political power in their struggle to become regional powers. [56]

The Iran-Iraq war shows how crucial it is to control a region in order to gain influence internationally and building on same premises, controlling a holy territory – such as Jerusalem – even changes the balance of power more dramatically. From a classical realism perspective, sacred territories and sanctuaries are regarded as key points on the security agenda and this can be classified under the transnational religious issues of international relations theory.[57] Therefore, a war to invade Jerusalem, historically an essential position for the three major Abrahamic religions, affects the balance of power since possession of sacred territories give superiority to the owner over other states. Hence, Palestine is a Middle Eastern region invaded by different nations throughout history, including the former Kingdom of Israel and the medieval Islamic Empires. The reason behind these invasions by these countries can be explained by the significance of Jerusalem in their religion and all related religions claim a historical right about the region. The Arabs were promised that all

[54] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 18
[55] Walt, S. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security,9* (4), 3-43. Retrieved from doi:10.2307/2538540
[56] Cowell, A. (1988, August 21). Cease-fire takes effect in 8-Year Iran-Iraq war. *The New York Times.* Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/21/world/cease-fire-takes-effect-in-8-year-iran-iraq-war.html
[57] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 54

territory occupied by the Ottoman Empire would return to Arab rule in exchange for helping defeat the Turks in the First World War according to the McMahon-Hussein treaty of 1915. The Arabs saw Palestine as part of the "Arab Land" promised to them, but the British and French did not agree, and Palestine became a British-ruled mandate. The next issue was the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which blessed the British state for the establishment of a Jewish country in Palestine.[58] Since Jerusalem was the land of Abraham in Judaism and Jewish people believe that they descended from Abraham, they were claiming their right to own Jerusalem.[59] In this case, the Jewish people were contesting their ethnicity and national identity through their religion which can be considered as an example of constructivism in transnational issues. After World War II, the Jewish population in Palestine rose to about a third of the total population and began to drag them into conflict with Palestinian Arabs who were angry with this wave of immigration. The victorious allied powers Britain and France desired to control parts of the Middle East and signed the 1916 Sykes–Picot agreement on how to divide the Ottoman Empire and reach the oil fields in the region.[60] This agreement included two vast regions, one of which to be directly ruled by the British under Palestine. A direct consequence of this accord was continuation of Jewish immigration, causing increasing opposition from the Palestinian Arabs towards the British government in Palestine.[61] In this case, the British government used transnational religious issues to change the

[58] Tahhan, Z. (2018, November 2). More than a century on: The Balfour Declaration explained. *Today's latest from Al Jazeera.* Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2018/11/2/more-than-a-century-on-the-balfour-declaration-explained

[59] Emmett, C. (1996). The Capital Cities of Jerusalem. *Geographical Review, 86(2),* 238

[60] Loevy, K. (2016). The Sykes-picot agreement's regional moment: Drawing lines of development in a new and open space. *AJIL Unbound* (*110),* 120. Retrieved from https://doi.org/10.1017/s2398772300002920

[61] United Nations. (2021, January 22). *Part I (1917-1947). Question of Palestine.* Retrieved from https://www.un.org/unispal/history2/origins-and-evolution-of-the-palestine-problem/part-i-1917-1947/

balance of power and establish a Jewish state. According to classical realists, using religion as a policy-making guide is a bad recipe[62] as observed in this case. When British left the area, the situation was handed over to the newly formed United Nations, who recommended to divide the country into Arab and Jewish districts – a proposal that the Jews accepted but rejected by the Arabs. With no agreement reached, this ultimately pointed to a civil war between the two communities and with Jews extending their control over time. Here, it can be observed that the two religious identities ended up with the revision of their territories, balance of power and threat perceptions.

Throughout history, since sacred places are considered significant places for power balance and security for the worshippers of three Abrahamic religions, they constantly created a definition for "other" or a "we" against "them" situation on an international level.[63] This situation continued since the middle ages through the Church and Papacy, reaching the peak of its political power with the Crusades.[64] With the crusades, it can be seen that the Church can use religious pretexts to mobilize masses and hence use "hard power".[65] Before the Crusades, in the feudal period, the Church had great economic power and it had been the most dominant institution Western Europe through the ownership of land and vast properties in different parts of the continent. In Neorealism, religious institutions may challenge the state from internally and externally in order to gain power or to achieve their

[62] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 3
[63] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 3
[64] History.com. (2010, June 7). *Crusades*. Retrieved from https://www.history.com/topics/middle-ages/crusades
[65] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 175

goals.[66] The Church's claim of superiority over worldly powers began to materialize with the initiatives of Hildebrand, who became Pope under the name of Gregorius VII in 1073. The Pope directly excommunicated the clergy and confronted the Holy Roman-German Empire.[67] The papacy's attempts to intercept the state and weaken the worldly power of the emperor led to an inevitable conflict and when the Emperor Heinrich the fourth invited the Pope to abdicate, the Pope used the excommunication power and threw the emperor out of the Church.[68] The fact that the emperor could be removed from his throne by the Pope demonstrated the great power of religion, paving to way to became the ruler and law maker.

The main event that marks the absolute power of the Church in worldly affairs is the Crusades, making it clear that it could go to war and shed blood when necessary. As an example of structural realism, the Church shaped the state agenda according to its own interests and eliminated a certain proportion of the knights – namely the nobility –and weakened an important layer in the society. With these aspects, the Church had the power to create and shape the norms of international society as a religious institution.[69] Furthermore, Pope Gregorius VII finally concluded that the Pope is not bound by the laws of the emperor, but on the contrary the emperor, who takes his power from God, is bound by the laws of God, in fact, the Pope. Here religious legitimacy has been used as a tool of persuasion and with

[66] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 61
[67] Catholic News Agency. (2021). *Pope St. Gregory VII*. Retrieved from https://www.catholicnewsagency.com/saint/pope-st-gregory-vii-699 (Accessed on 18 May 2021)
[68] Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. *Henry VI*. Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved from https://www.britannica.com/biography/Henry-VI-Holy-Roman-emperor
[69] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 118-144

the concept of "law of god" is on the top of everything, therefore religion is a form of social power and papal rank is the most powerful rank according to the Bible.

The theory of the two swords mentions a conflict for power between a central state and papacy where the Church seeks to gather both secular and divine power in its own hands.[70] The apparent meaning of this is that the Church wanted to eliminate the distinction and separation between secular power and spiritual power. It desires to combine two separate swords representing two separate powers in one hand, in the hands of the papacy.[71] Here, religious pretexts became a source of religious legitimacy to bring two different powers to be superior to any power, especially the emperor. The first example of this approach was encountered when cardinal Petrus Damianus addressed Heinrich the 4th, the emperor, in a letter he wrote to him in 1065. According to Damianus, if the emperor does not carry the sword to punish those who oppose God, he carried it in vain.[72] With this approach, Damianus assigns a clear mission to organize and punish the world with the sword in the hands of the king, which was given from God who directly attributed this mission to the king. After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, Pope Gelasius I came up with the idea that the Church's autonomy vis-à-vis the Eastern Roman Empire. Thus, the approach about distinction between spiritual authority and worldly power has left its place to the abolition of this distinction.[73] Unlike the Gelasius doctrine, which aimed a distinction between the church and the empire to secure the autonomy of the Church against the empire by placing both players in the

[70] Svolopoulos, C. (2001). The Ecumenical Patriarchate in the Ottoman Empire (1453-1923): Adaptation and Change, *Journal of Modern Hellenism No. 17-18, 2000-2001,* 119
[71] Kainz, H. (2012). *Democracy and the "Kingdom of god"*. Springer Science & Business Media, 83
[72] Ağaoğulları, M. A., Türk, D., Yalçınkaya, A., Yılmaz, Z., & Zabcı, F. (2011). *Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere: Batı'da siyasal düşünceler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 248
[73] Strawn, Brent A., ed. (2015). *"Medieval Period". The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Law.* Oxford University Press, 105

same level of power, but in a different place from each other[74]; this new approach allowed the Church to assert its right to govern spiritual authority as well as earthly power to maintain order and justice.[75] Classical realism point of view about religious legitimacy well explains the church's approach to the subject. In this point of view, religion can be a source of legitimacy of the church and it is a significant tool to form a social power.[76] On the other hand, the Church claimed that the material or earthly sword was in the hands of kings or emperors, but they should be used in accordance with the orders of the Church, thus making kings or emperors servers of the Church.[77] At the end, both swords belonged to the Church and must be subordinated to the Church, even though one of them could have been used by the king. In this context, Pope Gregorius VII disrupted the symmetry between the two swords.[78] The authority of Saint Peter, the apostle accepted to be the founder of the Roman Church, was indivisible referring to the term sword, which expresses the coercive and punitive power of the state in Roman Law.[79] He argued that the Pope kept the material coercion and the dissuasive force under his control. Therefore, all earthly rulers were first in the service of St. Peter and Pope who is deputy St. Peter as servants of God.[80]

[74] New World Encyclopedia, *Gelasius I*. Retrieved from https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Gelasius_I
[75] Ağaoğulları, M. A., Türk, D., Yalçınkaya, A., Yılmaz, Z., & Zabcı, F. (2011). *Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere: Batı'da siyasal düşünceler*., 249
[76] Sandal, N., & Fox, J. (2013). *Religion in international relations theory: interactions and possibilities*. Routledge, 175
[77] Edgar, F., & Lee, G. (1994). *Medieval times 325-1453 ad.* Mark Twain Media Publications, 31
[78] Boston, R. (2004, February). *Of popes and power. Americans United for Separation of Church and State.* Retrieved from https://www.au.org/church-state/february-2004-church-state/featured/of-popes-and-power
[79] Burns, J. H., & Burns, J. H. (1988). *The Cambridge history of medieval political thought C.350-c.1450*. Cambridge University Press, 302
[80] Bollermann, K., & Nederman, C. (2016, August). *John of Salisbury,* Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/john-salisbury/

In the next decade, a man who defined himself as Johannes Parvus, the bishop of Chartres, wrote a text called John of Salisbury that defended the theory of two swords, which was the first comprehensive political study text produced in the middle ages.[81] Another significance of this book for the middle ages was that it used the word politics for the first time to describe the institutions of the state, at a time when Aristotle's Politics was not yet translated into Latin and not well known to Western Europe.[82] John's opinion of the king who does not obey the commandments of the Church was explicit: A prince who breaches the commandments of God, and therefore of the Church, becomes an outlaw and becomes a tyrant. For this reason, killing tyrants with the authority given by the Bible is a lawful and glorious act. John's main point of view was not different from other medieval thinkers, and God gave both swords to the Church.[83] In this case, the prince was a representative of the Church's power and the practitioner of those parts that are not worth the execution of sacred duties through the priests. The explicit meaning of this is that the Church has commissioned the prince as a kind of executioner. John of Salisbury again appeals to religious texts and Roman Law to justify the hierarchical relationship between the commissioning Church and the commissioned prince.[84]

It can be seen that he makes an introduction to the main themes of modern political thought, such as legal relations, the problem of legitimacy versus the arbitrariness of non-conforming power, and the legitimacy of resisting this power.

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[81] Ağaoğulları, M. A., Türk, D., Yalçınkaya, A., Yılmaz, Z., & Zabcı, F. (2011). *Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere: Batı'da siyasal düşünceler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 251

[82] Bollermann, K., & Nederman, C. (2005, July). *John of Salisbury*, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved from https://stanford.library.sydney.edu.au/archives/sum2008/entries/john-salisbury

[83] Ağaoğulları, M. A., Türk, D., Yalçınkaya, A., Yılmaz, Z., & Zabcı, F. (2011). *Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere: Batı'da siyasal düşünceler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 252

[84] Rouse, R. H., & Rouse, M. A. (1967). John of Salisbury and the doctrine of tyrannicide. *Speculum, 42(4)*, 703

Firstly, when John points out or defines who the tyrant is, he is not simply attributing tyranny to the prince or king outside the Church. On the other hand, John pointed out that tyranny may also appeal to members of the Church, and equally reaffirms the legitimacy of resistance against them.[85] There could be three types of tyrants, according to John. The first of these are those who become tyrants in the family and at work, who can easily be controlled and limited by laws. The second is the tyranny of the members of the Church. John is silent about what to do with these potential tyrants, also he defends protecting them from interference by law. Since it is the Church itself with full authority on the laws of the Church, it is doomed to remain an internal problem of the Church, which others cannot interfere with. In this case, there is nothing that non-members of the Church can do against the tyrant church member; other than enduring and being patient. The third type of tyrant is princes or kings. Against a tyrannical prince, according to John of Salisbury, everything is just as permitted. However, if the tyrannical prince can no longer be corrected by the available means, there is only one honourable thing to do; to put him to the sword. Thus, through the killing of the tyrant, an obstacle preventing the people from obeying God's commands will be removed, and the people will also be liberated so that they can serve God. Consequently, tyranny for John does not indicate a situation peculiar to the prince alone. For him, tyranny implies the act of any secular or spiritual power holder without recognizing rights and justice; whether in the family, in the Church, or the kingdom.[86]

[85] Rouse, R. H., & Rouse, M. A. (1967). John of Salisbury and the doctrine of tyrannicide. *Speculum, 42(4),* 709

[86] Nederman, C.J. and C. Campbell, (1991). Priests, Kings, and Tyrants: Spiritual and Temporal Power in John of Salisbury's Policraticus. *Speculum 42(4),* 572

On the other hand, Dante starts from the assumption that society, like Aristotle, has a natural essence. Then, he emphasizes the necessity of a power that will maintain the order of society, which appears as the political society or the state. This means that the Church has no role in the formation of the political power, and the state leads the Church. Moreover, the state is independent of the Church in terms of its purpose.[87] According to Dante, the purpose of humans on this world is happiness and happiness is only possible with the establishment of peace. The state fulfils the function of creating and maintaining an atmosphere of peace with coercive force. For the full realization of this purpose, it is inevitable for the state to have a universal character and to have only one person as a ruler.[88]

For Dante, it is clear that the prosperity of the world requires the existence of a monarchy or an empire. However, Dante does not foresee a situation in which there is any problem in the relations between the two powers.[89] For example, it says nothing about what would happen if the emperor intervened in the spiritual realm and the papacy in the secular realm. He contented himself with emphasizing the principle of mutual independence as the basic rule that both the emperor and the papacy must obey. Nevertheless, the authority of the pope is limited to the spiritual realm, and the emperor is placed in a position of great power, unaccountable to anyone on the earth.[90]

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[87] Ağaoğulları, M. A., Türk, D., Yalçınkaya, A., Yılmaz, Z., & Zabcı, F. (2011). *Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere: Batı'da siyasal düşünceler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 272

[88] Alighieri, D. (1904). *De Monarchia. Introduction.* Retrieved from https://oll.libertyfund.org/title/reinhardt-de-monarchia#lf1477_head_003

[89] Ağaoğulları, M. A., Türk, D., Yalçınkaya, A., Yılmaz, Z., & Zabcı, F. (2011). *Sokrates'ten Jakobenlere: Batı'da siyasal düşünceler*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 274

[90] Querner, J. (n.d.). *The politics of Dante's de Monarchia*. The Lost History of Christianity and a New Quest for the Historical Jesus Through the Christ Myth. Retrieved from https://lost-history.com/monarchia.php

In terms of acting politically and aiming to take all the power in one hand, the Orthodox church was no different from the Catholic church. To understand more deliberately, the history and the geographical position of the Orthodox needs to be examined. The fact that Constantinople was the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire while it was a small local church in the beginning and the emperor made this church in Istanbul a priority instead of the papal church in Rome caused today's Patriarchate of Fener to take its place in the history of the Christian church.[91] During the Byzantine Empire period, the patriarchate, which was at the top of the Christian Church hierarchy with the pressure of the state power, has always been mentioned with the power of the empire. The relation of the Byzantine administration and the church enabled the formation of the Byzantine-type state model, in which religion had a role to maintain the authority of the emperor and manage laws and orders. [92] Religious legitimacy created a social power and a significant tool for persuasion of the public in favour of the emperor. The conquest of Istanbul by the Turks meant the beginning of a new era for the Patriarchate of Fener that was described as the head of the Christian Greek minority within the borders of the state during the Ottoman Period. Together with Fatih Sultan Mehmet the conqueror, the Patriarch of Fener was appointed to a position equal to the vizier of the state.[93] Thus, the Patriarch became the guarantee of the Ottoman Empire's sovereignty over its Orthodox

[91] Bayraktar, T. E. (2010). *The Orthodox Patriarchate of Fener vis-à-vis The Ottoman Administration (1453-1770).* Turkish Culture Portal. Retrieved from https://www.turkishculture.org/architecture/churches-and-monasteries-971.htm

[92] Karpat, K. H. (2002). *Studies on ottoman social and political history: Selected articles and essays*. Brill, 597

[93] Svolopoulos, C. (2001). The Ecumenical Patriarchate in The Ottoman Empire (1453-1923): Adaptation and Change, *Journal of Modern Hellenism No. 17-18, 2000-2001,* 109. Retrieved from https://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/article/viewFile/197/200

subjects. Therefore, the political significance of the church didn't change in terms of importance but changed the form of how it was executed.

From different points of view, religion was a political issue of international relations throughout history as it can be seen. There are different aims to use religion to act politically such as dividing people, clarifying and justifying the political decisions that had been made or to consolidate all the power as the Catholic Church once did. Increasing moral and spiritual awareness especially after the end of the Cold War and religious virtues filling the gap can also be considered as a motive explaining the rising importance of religion in this period.

CHAPTER 3:

SWINGS IN TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 2000s

3.1 Definition of the problem

The issue of Halki Theological School's re-opening has dominated the agenda of Turkey's foreign policy since its closure in 1971 and can be evaluated from the perspectives of human & minority rights, freedom of concise and international politics. The issue has always been a hot topic in terms of relations with Greece, the European Union and the United States in particular. There has been various attempts and proposals in-terms of re-opening of the school, but none has emerged as a viable solution yet.

The Ottoman conquests into the Christian domain created a frontier zone where different religious groups lived together for centuries. Since then, minority constituents have been an integral part of the Turkish society and enjoyed a relatively more liberal status during the Ottoman State which was established on a multi-national and multi-religious constitution. Known as the *millet* system, this administrative structure was the main pillar of Ottoman control over the patchwork of communities.[94] Non-Muslim minorities – mainly Orthodox Christians, Armenian Christians and Jews – were treated with relative tolerance during the Ottoman era and each group was organized as a separate community with its own regulations and religious practices.[95] These ethnic groups were allowed to elect their religious

[94] Apostolov, M. (2001). *Religious minorities, nation states and security: Five cases from the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.* Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 31
[95] Duiker, W. J., & Spielvogel, J. J. (2015). *The Essential World History, Volume II: Since 1500.* Boston, MA: Cengage Learning, 412

leaders, who were granted some privileges such as representation, taxing, marrying couples, issuing birth certificates and organizing funeral ceremonies.[96] Some of these administrative and political concessions – such as being designated as 'leader of a nation' – were not even present during the rule of Byzantium Empire.[97]

Minority schools had initially started to be opened during the Ottoman state primarily to educate their own society, source future teachers for their schools and to educate priests for their religious needs. Traditional minority schools were closely interrelated to the church or synagogue and were present at all the areas that the community existed. The number of minority schools for the non-Muslim communities has shrank significantly during the late Ottoman period from around 6,500 schools in 1894 to around 2,500 schools in 1914, and further declined to 138 in 1924 after the proclamation of the Turkish Republic.[98] These schools had been superior in terms of academic excellence and outnumbered Muslim schools until the establishment of the modern Turkish Republic[99]. However, this new nation-state established around Turkish language, culture and Sunni-Hanafi Islamic values has interpreted diverse ethnic and religious identities as a threat to the unity of the nation and faced restrictive policies.[100]

Halki Theological School – the only school of its kind in Turkey – not only differentiated itself from other domestic civil minority schools, but also outshined its

[96] Eryılmaz, B. (1992). *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Millet Sistemi.* İstanbul: Ağaç Yayıncılık, 6
[97] Lambriniadis, E. (2012). *İlber Ortaylı İle Zaman Kaybolmaz*. (Interview on BloombergHT news channel dated 23 June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyGvLKagr0Y), minute 11:19
[98] From 19 September 2013 press release of Selçuk Akşin Somel's book *Geçmişten Günümüze Azınlık Okulları*, retrieved from http://www.rumvader.org/assets/upload/images/file/rapor_ozeti.docx on 12 November 2020
[99] Topçu, F. (2007), *Türk Egitim Sisteminin Tarihsel Gelisimi ile Yabancı Okullarının Bu Sistem Üzerindeki Etkileri (MA Thesis)*, 106
[100] Oran, B. (2004). *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama.* İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 111

peers among the Orthodox world. Top Greek priests were mainly educated in Halki Seminary or in secular faculties of Greece and Germany as the Orthodox Church lacked such a prestigious institution in the Greek homeland.[101] Since its closure, the Greek Orthodox minority has no means of fulfilling this basic fundamental requirement of themselves and are predominantly dependent on foreign educated priests, leading to a diminishing number of Turkish nationals among its religious elite.

The "Ecumenical" title of the Patriarchate is worth exploring as it attracts a significant amount of debate around it. The etymology of the word comes from late Greek *oikoumenikos,* meaning the "inhabited world" and is defined as "universal" or "representing the whole of a body of churches" in dictionaries.[102] This title has been used by the Patriarchate of Phanar since the 7th century despite the opposition of the Roman Church, but has lost its practical meaning in the 19th century after appearance of Balkan Churches while the Russian Church has never acknowledged this title according to Özel.[103] However, the incumbent Patriarch Bartholomew asserts that Phanar is recognized as *ecumenical* by the whole Orthodox world since centuries despite the rejection of the Turkish state and adds that secularism necessitates their right to act freely on this internal matter of their church.[104] Similarly, the current Metropolitant of the USA Elpidophoros Lambriniadis rejects the political nature of this title and asserts that it is a rather spiritual and administrative designation providing hierarchy within the church. He adds that it is this title that has allowed

[101] Ortaylı, İ. (2010). *Osmanlı'da Milletler ve Diplomasi.* İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 20
[102] From Merriam-Webster dictionary https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ecumenical (Retrieved on 20 March 2020)
[103] Özel, S. (2008). *Fener-Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu.* İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 95
[104] Arhondonis, D. (Greek Patriarch Bartholomeow) (2006). *Bir Patrik Çocukken*. İstanbul: Bizim Deniz Yayınları, 19

the Patriarchate to grant the current status of dependent churches including Russia, Serbia, Georgia, Bulgaria, etc. with the documents carrying the signature of the Patriarchate of Phanar. Lambriniadis also interestingly underlines that the translation of "Rum Orthodoks Patrikhanesi" into English as "The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate" is incorrect as the word "Greek" is associated with the State of Greece with an ethnic implication while the etymology of the word "Rum" dates back to the Roman Empire which had embraced different nations and hence is the basis for the legitimacy of the "ecumenical" title.[105] As it can be seen in the figure below, the "ecumenical" title appears on the official website of the Patriarchate as well as in its official correspondence with foreign institutions.

Figure 1. The Patriarchate of Phanar uses the title "Ecumenical" in its affairs[106]

At this point, Özel claims that practicing of this controversial title does not remain limited to 'internal' affairs of the Patriarchate, but rather is used as a diplomatic title, adding that the Patriarch joined the opening assembly of the European Parliament in 1994 and delivered the opening speech with the title

[105] Lambriniadis, E. (2012). *İlber Ortaylı İle Zaman Kaybolmaz*. (Interview on BloombergHT news channel dated 23 June 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xyGvLKagr0Y), minute 18:49
[106] Retrieved from https://www.patriarchate.org/contact-information (Accessed on 20 March 2020)

"Ecumenical" and opened a representative office in the EU despite the opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey.[107]

Pronunciation of this title by then Istanbul Municipality Mayor candidate Binali Yıldırım during the electoral campaign in 2019 has even been subject to a parliamentary question by an opposition MP, claiming that Turkey does not recognize this capacity of the Patriarchate according to Treaty of Lausanne.[108] This incident highlights the fragility of the issue and its tendency to be used in domestic politics as a propaganda item in the eyes of especially nationalist constituents.

It is also worth examining the practices by the other religious communities and their corresponding governing bodies on the same matter. The main three non-Muslim nations that were part of the *millet* system during the Ottoman rule are relevant as well as the Arabian-Christian minority of Assyrians in this context as its represented by a Patriarchate. The Chief Rabbinate of Turkey represents the Jewish Community of Turkey and after becoming Ottoman subjects it had been responsible for regulating the internal affairs of its followers without going to imperial courts similar to the Orthodox Patriarchate. However, unlike Christians no global hierarchy embracing the Jewish world exist and therefore talking about an international obedience system is not possible.[109] The Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople does not also officially claim or use the 'ecumenical' title despite its faithful churches abroad and also the members of the diaspora scattered across the globe who

[107] Özel, S. (2008). *Fener-Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu.* İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 101

[108] The motion initiated by İYİ Party Antalya MP Mr. Feridun Bahşi on 13 June 2019 was addressed to Vice President Mr. Fuat Oktay, but it was not responded on time and expired. Source: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/yazili_soru_sd.onerge_bilgileri?kanunlar_sira_no=251952 (Accessed on 30 October 2020)

[109] Article by Naim Avigdor Güleryüz in Şalom newspaper dated 18.05.2005 http://www.muze500.com/content/view/369/257/lang,tr/ (Accessed on 6 November 2020)

feel loyal to the Patriarchate.[110] Catholic Assyrians – a Christian Arab community group not ethnically associated with the Armenian race – have been subject to the Armenian Patriarchate since 1517 in the Jerusalem-based hierarchy and since 1783 in the Mardin-based hierarchy, underpinning the de-facto 'ecumenical' status for of Armenian Church. The Assyrian minority of Turkey with a Patriarchate located historically at Mardin Province, is not even designated as a 'minority' by the founding Lausanne treaty after their representative decided not to opt for it due to relatively better relations with the Ottoman State. [111] The headquarters of the Assyrian Patriarchate has been relocated from Deyruzaferan Monastery in Mardin initially to Humus in Syria in 1933, and was later further moved to Damascus in 1953, resulting in loss of an influential institution of Turkish Assyrians and eventually of the Republic of Turkey.[112] It is also worth mentioning that after the proclamation of the Modern Republic of Turkey, the issue of removing the Patriarchate of Phanar from the country has been brought to the table by Turkey at the international conference in December 1922 preceding the Lausanne Treaty, but later it was decided to remain in Istanbul as a religious institution without political powers after Lord Curzon's proposal.[113]

During the operational years of Halki Theological School, the number of international scholars considerably overweighed the number of Greek minority students possessing Turkish citizenship, turning it into an international center for

[110] http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/tarihce-patriklik-makami/ (Accessed on 5 November 2020)
[111] Atalay, T. (2005). *Lozan Antlaşmasi Öncesi Ve Sonrasinda Süryani Eğitim Kurumlari.* Kamu Hukuku Arşivi Degisi , Mart 2005, 63
[112] The Assyrian Patriarchate is officially called *Syrian Orthodox Patriarchate of Antioch*, named after the first established church in Christianity in Antioch in the year 37 AC. https://syriacpatriarchate.org/history/ (Accessed on 5 November 2020)
[113] Gocuk, Y. (2019). Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi Talep Repertuarının Kimlik-Tehdit Bağlamında Kültürel Analizi. *Journal of International Social Research, Volume 12*, 326

Orthodox theological studies. This significant weight of international presence was considered to be a violation of the reciprocity principles of the Treaty of Lausanne and eventually issuance of visas for foreign students was terminated by the Turkish government in 1963.[114] On the same premises, the Patriarchate of Phanar had made a series of resolutions regarding the education quality of the school such as the alumni's ability to be able to represent Orthodox Christianity abroad and continuation of their theological studies abroad with scholarships provided by the World Council of Churches seemed to reinforce this view and undermine unity of higher education in the country.[115]

It can be seen that the suspicion and mistrust around the 'ecumenical' title makes it more difficult for the Halki Theological School to re-open its doors as it is seen as an institution educating the human resources to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Phanar and contributing to its global governance. The deadlock around the applicable laws and related regulations also further complicates the issue, leaving the ground to the political authority and the international actors for a viable solution.

3.2 Impact of Turkey's foreign policy on minorities and HTS

Religion has been a significant foreign policy factor for Turkey through various times and has been used as a tool for influencing domestic politics as it can be observed in the case of Halki Theological School. It has been employed as means of

[114] Özyılmaz, E. (2000). *Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu.* Ankara: Tamga Yayıncılık, 89
[115] Yıldırım, M. (2006). *Dünden Bugüne Heybeli Ada Ruhban Okulu Sorunu Ve Etrafindaki Tartişmalar.* Ç.Ü. Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, Cilt 15, Sayı 2, 2006, 390

bargaining with foreign states as well as domestic minorities in various occasions concerning religious sites, symbols and institutions.

Recent examples include conversion of the 1500-year-old iconic Hagia Sophia museum and the 1000-year-old world-famous Kariye (Chora) museum into mosques by the Turkish government in the year 2020. Hagia Sophia was originally built as a Christian Orthodox church, but was later transformed into a mosque by the Ottomans following the conquest of İstanbul in 1453 and was finally declared a museum by modern Turkey's founder Atatürk in 1934 and is now a Unesco World Heritage site. However, a court annulled its status as a museum in July 2020, paving the way for President Erdoğan to declare it to become a mosque again with prayers resounding from its minarets.[116] In a following parallel development, the historic Kariye (Chora) church was also converted to a mosque in August 2020 and 14th century Byzantine mosaics and frescoes were covered with curtains. These symbolic but significant changes can also be considered as a consequence of the deviation from the milder approach observed in early years of the AKP rule when Turkey was seen showing higher tolerance to minority problems which could result in the potential re-opening of Halki Theological School. Similarly, the decades long ban to build a mosque in Athens – which was recently built after lots of diplomatic mingling[117] – and the decision by the US government to re-locate its embassy in Israel to Jerusalem can be considered as some international examples of using religion as a tool in political affairs.

[116] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-53366307 (Accessed on 18 May 2021)
[117] The New York times article titled *"It Took a Century to Open a Mosque in Athens. Then Came the Pandemic."* and dated 14 November 2020 reports that the Athens mosque took more than a century to reopen since the expulsion of Ottoman forces in 1833, finally initiating prayers in November 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/14/world/europe/athens-mosque-coronavirus.html (Accessed on 14 May 2021)

The main counterpart and patron of the Halki Theological issue is the state of Greece, possessing immediate kinship to Orthodox Christians in Turkey and following the faith represented by the Patriarchate of Phanar. The policies implemented by the Turkish and Greek governments naturally have immediate consequences in terms of the minorities in both countries and their reflections on the case of Halki Theological School has been instrumental. There have been relatively milder times in terms of relations with Greece as well as extremely hostile periods which almost turned into armed confrontation. Although this thesis mainly focuses on 21st century developments, looking at the past century provides important insights for better understanding of the status quo.

The school enjoyed an almost uninterrupted education life from 1844 to 1971, despite being briefly nationalized and assigned to Turkish Navy in 1918 during the World War I and some other administrative problems that has caused rolling graduates in some years[118]. Nejat Gülen, a native of Heybeliada who studied the primary and high schools in the island, expresses that the brightest times for the Halki Seminary were encountered after proclamation of the new Republic of Turkey in 1923 and many foreign students from the Orthodox world came to the island to pursue their theological studies.[119] Early 1950s has witnessed reciprocal positive relations as friendship prevailed in many aspects of the relations between the two countries in the form of high-level state visits with direct consequences on minorities. In year 1952 alone, these visits included Greek Prime Minister Sofokles Venizelos, Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and reached its climax by the following corresponding visits by King of Greece Pavlos – who paid a visit to the

[118] İnci, S. (2011). *Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu* (2nd ed.). İstanbul: Yedirenk Kitapları, 369
[119] Gülen, N. (2017). *Nejat Gülen'le Adalı Sohbetler.* İstanbul: Adalı Yayınları, 38

Ecumenical Patriarchate of Phanar – and Turkish President Celal Bayar, covered a vast area of subjects including regional security, revoking visas, economic cooperation and more. The 1951 agreement regarding cultural issues and 1952 memorandums on assignment of foreign instructors allowed teachers with Turkish citizenship to be appointed to Turkish schools in Western Thrace and correspondingly appointment of teachers with Greek citizenship to Greek minority schools within Turkey. Similarly, in the context of 1951 agreement, foreign national students from Greece and other Christian countries were allowed to study at Halki Theological School.[120] This fruitful exchange even led to Ministry of Education's recommendation body to grant the Seminary the status of "Higher Theology Institution" possessing a 4-year curriculum[121], which was clearly an achievement in terms of academic distinction although did not qualify it as an official higher education institute and its graduates still had to do serve their military service as private soldiers as opposed to graduates of regular universities serving as reserve officers.

The 6-7 September 1955 events, which started after unconfirmed reports that Turkey's founder M.K. Atatürk's house in Thessaloniki was set on fire, turned into violent street riots and looting targeting goods, shops, schools and churches belonging mainly to Greek Orthodox citizens, caused the relations between the two countries to deteriorate and marked the end of the positive period experienced at the beginning of the decade.[122] Thankfully, the events were not that severe in

[120] Oran, B. (Ed.). (2004), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. Cilt I: 1919-1980* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 592
[121] *"Talim ve Terbiye Kurulunun 25.09.1951 tarih ve 151 sayılı kararıyla onaylanan yönetmeliğe göre, Teoloji Bölümünü bitirenler, Lise üzerine en az bir yıllık mesleki tahsil veren okullar derecesinde öğrenim görmüş sayılırlar."* Oran, B. (Ed.). (2006), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. Cilt II: 1980-2001* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 451
[122] İşyar, Ö.G. (2017). *Türk Dış Politikası: Sorunlar ve Süreçler.* Bursa: Dora Yayınları, 376

Heybeliada and only resulted in a few smashed windows and damaged power lines of Halki Seminary, when the then-Patriarch Atinogaras was at the premises overnight.[123] Patriarch Bartholomeow was enrolled as a high-school student in the premises of Halki Theological School during the incidents and was spending his summer holiday in his hometown of Aegean island of Gökçeada (or İmbros in native Greek). He later wrote in his reminiscences that the events were insignificant in Gökçeada, but awaiting his return to İstanbul to continue his education, he has written to the school faculty to ask about the situation and received an answer saying that the island was calm and the school would start education as planned.[124]

Another important blow to the livelihoods of the Turkish Greek minority has been the repercussions of 1963 events of in Cyprus, when the Greek Cypriots intensified attacks on the Turkish population in the fragmented island state. The attacks reached its climax on December 21st, 1963 and was nicknamed 'bloody Christmas' leading to intercommunal violence and deaths of hundreds of Cypriots.[125] These events reflected quite adversely on the Turkish Greek minority residents of Gökçeada resulting in expropriation of the island's three most fertile meadows and confiscation of their land as well as establishment of a half-open prison in the island. Journalist Celal Başlangıç claims that this was a policy designed by the National Security Council (MGK) aimed at assimilating the population in the island which caused the number of Greek minority residents to shrink from around 8,000 to just 200-250 mainly consisting of the elderly.[126]

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[123] Gülen, N. (2017). *Nejat Gülen'le Adalı Sohbetler.* İstanbul: Adalı Yayınları, 8
[124] Arhondonis, D. (Greek Patriarch Bartholomeow) (2006). *Bir Patrik Çocukken*. İstanbul: Bizim Deniz Yayınları, 16
[125] Oran, B. (Ed.). (2004), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. Cilt I: 1919-1980* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 685
[126] Arhondonis, D. (Greek Patriarch Bartholomeow) (2006). *Bir Patrik Çocukken*. İstanbul: Bizim Deniz Yayınları, 16

The Cyprus related issues and other chronic problems such as the problems regarding the status of the Aegean Sea dominated the Turkish-Greek relations after 1955 and both states did not refrain from using the minority issues as bargaining items including the Halki Theological School issue. Similarly, the military coup of 12 September 1980 and the following pressure on fundamental rights and freedoms also exacerbated the outflux of Greek minority citizens and as anticipated added on the already piled up problems surrounding this issue. Unfortunately, the minorities in both countries had to once again carry the burden of the deteriorating relations between the two countries.

3.3 Justice and Development Party era

The approach to the Halki Theological School case during the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era from 2002 until early 2019 deserves special attention and is one of the main topics that this thesis aims to explore. Especially the swings within this period are worth exploring as the climate towards the minority issues in general – and naturally towards the solution of the Halki Theological School issue – have experienced a dramatic U-turn during this era. Improving relations with the west – in particular with the EU, focus on democratic freedoms and human rights issues especially during the EU accession process, the increased anti-western stance of the government after Gezi Park events of June 2013 and the failed coup d'état attempt of July 2016 can be considered as important milestones of this period that will be scrutinized in terms of the case of Halki Theological School. The period aforementioned starts with November 2002 elections when AKP first came to power

and ends with Greek PM Alexis Tsipras' historic visit to Halki Theological School in February 2019.

It would be fair to say that Turkish President Erdoğan and his party AKP has transformed Turkey's place in the world, both economically and politically. Excellent economic results in the initial years of AKP rule has attracted foreign capital – both in the form of green-field and portfolio investments – creating hundreds of thousands of new jobs and lifting millions from poverty. Turkey's per capita income more than tripled from $3,660 in 2002 to almost $12,520 in 2013 and has been hovering around $10,000 levels in the last few years[127], providing the financial muscle for Turkey to shift the direction of its foreign policy notably especially in the second half of Erdoğan's rule. The economic development did not happen overnight, but rather was the consequence of more neo-liberal and pro-western policies implemented by initial AKP governments as well as the earlier austerity measures and structural reforms by pre-AKP administrations. Improving relations particularly with the EU and starting of accession talks in 2004 had produced a more democratic environment and policies targeting full EU membership yielded more room for human rights. Minority problems also came under the spotlight and some concrete outcomes had been achieved such as returning some of the confiscated assets of minority foundations and re-opening of some primary and secondary level minority schools.

After being nominated as a candidate country in 1999 EU Helsinki Summit, Turkey has initiated a series of reforms centered around human rights issues, including abolishing the death penalty and allowing education in mother tongue for

[127] World Bank and OECD national accounts data files. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=TR on 19 October 2020

minorities in general.[128] The total number of the so-called "EU Harmonization Law" packages reached 8, making 218 amendments in 53 laws and were later constitutionalized in various installments until May 2004.

The implementation of these legislations was not always smooth and was criticized in various EU progress reports as concrete results were expected for further steps. The continuation of the talks was even tied to Turkey's fulfillment of its obligations to the Patriarchate and to the Greek Orthodox minority by the Greek government.[129] A prime ministry statement issued in May 2010 with the signature of then Prime Minister Erdoğan has emphasized that all non-Muslim nationals are equal citizens of the Republic and in line with the recent democratization framework, no discrimination should be tolerated in their affairs with the state. Proper maintenance of non-Muslim cemeteries, compliance with court decisions resulting in favor of non-Muslim community foundations by the land registry offices, invitation of non-Muslim community leaders to the state protocol and legal action against publications encouraging hatred and hostility against non-Muslim communities were among the subjects advised in the communiqué.[130] This has been a striking example highlighting the change in the rhetoric towards the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey during the AKP rule.

Undoubtedly these efforts led to positive developments for minorities in general and specifically for the Greek-Orthodox community awaiting a resolution to their prolonged problems. The Holy and Sacred Synod, which is the governing body

[128] Enacted by the third constitutional amendment package dated 9 August 2002 https://www.ab.gov.tr/files/pub/tsr.pdf (Accessed on 3 November 2020)
[129] Oran, B. (Ed.). (2017), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. Cilt III: 2001-2012* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 569
[130] From official gazette no 27580 dated 13 May 2010 https://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2010/05/20100513-17.htm (Accessed on 3 November 2020)

of the Patriarchate of Phanar, is comprised of twelve hierarchs each serving a year-long term.[131] According to the Treaty of Lausanne and related laws, The hierarchs are not necessarily required to be Turkish citizens unlike the Patriarch, but as a new Patriarch has to be chosen among the members of the Holy Synod, the options become restrained as the number of Turkish nationals in the Synod diminishes. In a demonstration of goodwill, Turkish government had granted Turkish citizenship to 17 foreign hierarchs in November 2010, allowing the successor to the current Patriarch Bartholomew to be elected comfortably among the members of the Holy Synod who were mostly foreign nationals at the time.[132] Another positive development in the same year was allowing the Patriarch to arrange prayers in the Sümela Monestary of Trabzon after an 88-year silent period.[133] Since then, these prayers are being held annually with the attendance of top Patriarchate officials.[134] Similarly, returning of the Greek Orthodox orphanage in Büyükada in the year 2010 after a legal battle involving the European Court of Human Rights might be considered as another concrete example of positive developments in this period.[135] Reinstating the legal entities of some minority foundations – such as the Beyoğlu Greek High School for Girls in 2011[136] – also continued to boost the favorable sentiment observed in this period.

[131] The Holy and Sacred Synod information from the Patriarchate web page, https://www.patriarchate.org/holy-and-sacred-synod (Accessed on 4 November 2020)
[132] https://www.milliyet.com.tr/dunya/bartholomeos-son-patrik-olmayacak-1301746 (Accessed on 4 November 2020)
[133] Oran, B. (Ed.). (2017), *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar. Cilt III: 2001-2012* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 616
[134] https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/kultur-sanat/sumela-manastirinda-ayin-basladi/1942604 (Accessed on 5 November 2020)
[135] Gocuk, Y. (2019). *Fener Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi Talep Repertuarının Kimlik-Tehdit Bağlamında Kültürel Analizi.* Journal of International Social Research, Volume 12. 324-334
[136] https://www.turkishgreeknews.org/tr/rum-kiz-lisesi-ne-41-yil-sonra-iade-i-statu-7695.html (Accessed on 11 November 2020)

However, despite AKP's willingness to solve the issue and intense pressure from abroad, these positive developments cited above did not yield the way to a viable solution for re-opening of Halki Theological School. This change be associated with two main drivers that has changed the course of action and influenced

The final and maybe the most significant development regarding the Halki Theological School during the AK Party era has been Greek PM Alexis Tsipras' historic visit in February 2019. The visit was the first of its kind in terms of a sitting Greek Prime Minister visiting the Seminary and he was accompanied by the then Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın, giving it an official characteristic rather than a symbolic visit.

Figure 2. Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın (L), Patriarch Bartholomew (centre-left), Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras (centre-right) and HTS Chief-Priest Prof. Dr. Elpidophoros Lambriniadis (R) seen in one of Halki Seminary's historical classrooms in February 2019.[137]

[137] Retrieved from https://ipa.news/2019/02/07/tsipras-visits-orthodox-halki-seminary-and-lives-with-hope-erdogan-can-join-him-in-the-next-visit-and-open-the-seminary-doors/ (Accessed on 29 March 2020)

However, this government representation was interpreted as official recognition of the school especially by ultra-nationalist circles and some of then-Halki Theologial School's Chief Priest and Archbishop Elpidophoros' titles were heavily criticized.

Tsipras' visit created excitement among the Turkish Greek Orthodox community as well as in the tiny community of Heybeliada. He was met at the boat station by a small but hopeful crowd and was also received very warmly by the local residents in the island, where he has even stopped in a local book shop to chat with the owner. During his speech to the press in the Halki Theological School, Tsipras stressed that governments are obliged to provide equal citizenship rights to minorities and protect their religious freedoms, adding that reciprocity is not a matter of negotiation here. Tsipras also stated that he was hopeful to walk through the gates of Halki Theological School together with President Erdogan during his next visit, implying how optimistic he was on the reopening of the school. However, in contrary to Tsipras remarks on reciprocity, the Greek Ministry of Education later commented that they are conducting an adequate regulation change on the mufti selection process in Western Thrace, which Erdoğan has put as a pre-condition in front of reopening the school.[138]

3.4 Sporadic interest over time

The appearance of Halki Theological School related news articles in the media and related search inquiries over the internet has fluctuated significantly over time. In

[138] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-47169889 (Accessed on 24 May 2020)

order to better understand the dynamics of the Halki Theological School issue, looking at which developments caused interest, when and from which parts of the world appears as a plausible approach to be pursued at this stage. This section tries to examine what factors and events caused that volatility of interest and scrutinizes the related quantitative data. The data is retrieved from Google Trends website[139] which analyses the popularity of search queries in time and across regions. Raw data is tabulated and stored in a separate document by the author.

The three related keywords to be examined are chosen as the "Halki Seminary" – which is the main subject of this thesis, "Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople" – the body that the seminary is associated with and finally "Bartholomew I of Constantinople" – the person who ultimately leads these institutions. The time period covered in this analysis extends from January 2004 (the oldest value that can be reached through this database) to January 2020 (the date when the analysis was conducted), overlapping the timeframe of this thesis.

The relative interest over time for keyword "Halki Seminary" is plotted in Figure 3. An initial visual assessment of the chart below and analyzing the underlying data reveals that interest peaks in two occasions in April 2009 and in February 2019 and creates local maxima at these dates, as well as following a fluctuating pattern in the first half of 2004.

[139] https://trends.google.com/



Figure 3. Relative interest chart for keyword "Halki Seminary". (Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=%2Fm%2F09gksq accessed on 21 January 2020)

Looking at the geographical distribution of interest data for "Halki Seminary" reveals that the attention was concentrated in only three countries, namely Greece, Turkey and Cyprus as can be seen in Figure 4 below. Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US are the next four countries where the queries has originated from, but their magnitude is just a miniscule fraction of the top 3 countries mentioned above.



Figure 4. Geographical distribution of interest chart for keyword “Halki Seminary”. (Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=%2Fm%2F09gksq Accessed on 21 January 2020)

Repeating the same analysis for keyword “Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople” instead of the “Halki Seminary” depicts a similar picture in terms of peak interest dates which can be seen below in Figure 5.



Figure 5. Relative interest chart for keyword “Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople”. (Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=%2Fm%2F01f52v&date=all accessed on 29 January 2020)

However, the geographical distribution of interest for keyword “Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople” depicts a much more diversified picture compared to “Halki Seminary”, with interest especially from other Christian Orthodox countries such as Montenegro, Serbia, Ukraine and Russia – emphasizing the ecumenical nature of the Patriarchate.



Figure 6. Geographical distribution of interest chart for keyword "Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople". (Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?q=%2Fm%2F01f52v&date=all accessed on 29 January 2020)

In order to be able to compare and contrast if these two keywords show a similar pattern, they are plotted on the same chart with the addition of another related keyword "Bartholomew I of Constantinople" to help differentiate the trends underlying our main subject of "Halki Seminary" from the rest of related surrounding issues. Figure 7 below clearly shows that the pattern underlying keyword "Halki Seminary" differs from the other two relevant keywords, stressing the significance of two peak dates of April 2009 and February 2019.



Figure 7. Relative interest chart across keywords. (Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=%2Fm%2F09gksq,%2Fm%2F01f52v,%2Fm%2F0gpg9 accessed on 29 January 2020)

The geographical analysis for these three keywords also highlights the concentration of the interest mainly from Turkey, Greece and Cyprus for "Halki Seminary", as opposed to more dispersed distribution for the other related search inquiries as can be seen in Figure 8.



Figure 8. Geographical distribution of interest chart across keywords. (Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&q=%2Fm%2F09gksq,%2Fm%2F01f52v,%2Fm%2F0gpg9 accessed on 29 January 2020)

The data above suggest that public interest towards Halki Theological School has been scattered over time but peaks around two specific dates, which differ from the other two related keywords. Conducting an online archive search on two mainstream Turkish newspapers[140] for the dates of April 2009 and February 2019 revealed that the main events behind this were the Turkey visits of two

[140] Cumhuriyet and Milliyet daily newspapers

prominent political figures, namely US President Barack Obama and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, respectively.

President Obama conducted a Turkey visit on 5-7 April 2009, expressed support for re-opening of Halki Theological School during his speech in the Turkish Parliament[141] and met with Patriarch Bartholomew in Istanbul, who stated that Turkey's EU membership would be essential for solution of Greek minority's problems.[142]

The other big occasion that attracted vast media and internet attention was Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras' Turkey visit on 5-6 February 2019, including a flash trip to the Halki Theological School and Aya Triada Monastry located in the premises of the Seminary. This was the first by an acting Greek Prime Minister in office since the school was established in 1844[143] and was symbolic in many aspects. Tsipras was accompanied by Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın and Patriarch Bartholomew, who said he hoped to enter through the school's closed doors together with President Erdoğan during his next visit.[144]

Apart from these two peaks, another period that saw relatively high attention was in 2004-2005. The activity at this time can be attributed to EU accession talks and the related change of attitude towards minorities and their problems.

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[141] Turkish Parliament Minutes of Meeting dated 6 April 2009, Monday https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/Tutanak_B_SD.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20373&P5=B&PAGE1=11&PAGE2=16 Accessed on 15 October 2020)

[142] https://www.dunya.com/gundem/quotobama039ya-ruhban-okulu-konusunda-tesekkur-ettimquot-haberi-74286 (Accessed on 15 October 2020)

[143] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-47169889 (Accessed on 15 October 2020)

[144] https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201902061037516775-ciprastan-ruhban-okulu-cagrisi/ (Accessed on 15 October 2020)

3.5 Cumhuriyet newspaper archives

Another valuable tool to evaluate the frequency and dominance of Halki Theological School related issues in the media and public opinion would be through conducting an archive search. In order to achieve this goal, online archives of Cumhuriyet newspaper is selected, which is considered as a serious newspaper with a track record dating to as early as the Republic of Turkey. Established in 1924, it has been described as the most important independent public interest newspaper in contemporary Turkey.[145]

Cumhuriyet newspaper archives date back to 1930s and contain more than 5.5 million news clips in Cumhuriyet newspapers and its supplements. A simple query search with the keyword "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu" is conducted in order to analyze the frequency of interest to this topic as well as the important development that cause the visibility of the issue to surface in various time periods.

The query search has revealed 152 related articles from Cumhuriyet archives database since 1930 and the results are presented in Appendix A together with the date it is published, title and a short excerpt from the news clip. Although this thesis focuses on 2002 – 2019 period, the search query is not confined to this interval and is conducted over the entire database since 1 January 1930 to be able to interpret how the issue developed over time. The oldest article in the archive is dated 10 February 1962 and a vast majority of the related news clips – some 126 out of 152, or 83% – are dated 2002 or newer, while most of the remaining articles date

[145] https://www.rightlivelihoodaward.org/laureates/cumhuriyet/ (Accessed on 9 May 2021)

back to early 1990s. A striking initial implication of this distribution is that the school has attracted most media attention not during the years that it was shut down, but during the years when its reopening was debated – largely overlapping with the period examined in this thesis. The distribution of the number articles through years as well as some related developments in those years are shown Appendix B.

In line with the internet keyword search results presented in the previous section, the newspaper article search also yields similar volatile results with most of the attention concentrating on a few selected years. It appears that the periods of 2017-2019, 2009-2011 and 2004-2007 were relatively more occupied with HTS related news clips. Looking at the content and the related developments in these periods, the main themes in these three periods can be summarized as "Greek PM Alexis Tsipiras' visit in February 2019", "US President Obama's Turkey visit on 2009" and "the EU Progress reports and the accession talks in 2005"; respectively. These key themes and the surrounding debate represent a perfectly overlapping pattern with the internet keyword search conducted and verify that the issue has been away from the public opinion during substantive periods and only appears during times when it is discussed as part of an international exchange rather that being a fundamental human and minority rights issue.

Another surprising and striking outcome of the newspaper archive search is that the school has not attracted any media attention at all during the years when it was closed and has only been popular in the last two decades particularly when its reopening was in question. The lack of coverage during the earlier decades could be attributed to relatively limited democracy and human rights standards in those years as well as the bitter relations with Greece stemming from the Cyprus related events

in the 70s. However, as these intervals remain outside the time scope of this thesis, coverage before the year 2002 is not deeply scrutinized.

Finally, it might be worthwhile to look at the opinions conveyed by columnists in Cumhuriyet newspaper and see how it differentiates from the news flow. It can be observed that the columnists mentioning the issue include Mustafa Balbay, Mümtaz Soysal, Hikmet Çetinkaya, Orhan Çekiç, Ali Sirmen, Ümit Zileli, Özgür Acar, Toktamış Ateş, Oral Çalışlar and Sibel Özel. These columnists might be classified into three categories, with those in the positive camp include Oral Çalışlar and Toktamış Ateş, those in the negative camp include Hikmet Çetinkaya, Mümtaz Soysal and Orhan Çekiç, and the remaining group appears to pursue a more neutral view. It can be stated that the human rights and democracy concerns are observed as the main theme in the supporting group compared to the nationalistic rhetoric and the skeptical attitude in the opposite end of the spectrum, while actual international developments and domestic political responses were the main focus of the columns in the neutral camp. Another remark worth highlighting was to see that opinions of some particular writers did not change or evolve over time with respect to the changing conjuncture or related developments and rather stayed staunchly uncompromised. It was further interesting to notice that some of these writers used the exact same phrases and repeated themselves, publishing almost the same columns using the same sentences after years.[146]

[146] For example, columnist Hikmet Çetinkaya published two articles with the exact same title "Patrik Hoca" and very similar content on 17 December 2017 and 8 April 1996. Please see Appendix A for details

3.6 Views of the Greek minority and the ultra-nationalists

The issue of Halki Theological School had attracted noticeably varying interest from different interest groups over time. In order to understand the underlying dynamics better, looking at the two ends of the spectrum – the Greek Orthodox minority and the ultra-nationalists – would be beneficial.

A total of three interviews has been made with Greek Orthodox minority residents of Heybeliada, but their exact identities will not be disclosed due to their requests and social sciences ethics. The interviews are not designed as formal questionnaires and has taken place in the form of friendly discussions contributing to the oral history available for the subject. The common characteristics of all three interviewees include to be male, university graduates and all are actively maintaining their close ties with the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul. Two out of three interviewees work in institutions affiliated with the patriarchate while one is performing a reputable licensed profession for around 40-years.

An initial observation worth emphasizing is the lack of interest and enthusiasm towards the case of Halki Theological School at the personal level, differing from the official rhetoric of the Patriarchate. This can be attributed to reservations that the interviewees might have in terms of conveying their thoughts or the result of daily life responsibilities weighing on ideals.

The first Greek-minority person interviewed has interestingly stated that the spiritual class of their community have created their own elites and have a tendency to overlook their subjects. According to him, Halki Theological School related issues have also been discussed within this group in closed circles and does not really occupy the agendas of ordinary people. He adds that the representation of

their community is naturally through the Patriarch, who again is appointed through a council of spiritual class – but not by popular vote. He also claims that the local policy in terms of administration of the School premises also differs widely according to the chief-priest in charge, for example allowing visitors to the campus, promoting the school activities abroad and in Turkey and interaction with the local community. According to him the period of Elpidophoros has differentiated his term vastly from his predecessors and successfully created public awareness. However, achieving an outcome on this matter is not an occasion dependent on their miniscule community, but rather is a matter of international powers who are using the situation as an instrument of global politics.

Despite being very friendly and constructive, the second interviewee had concerns on expressing his views due to the substantial suffering the minority citizens of this country – not only Greek Orthodox, but all others including Armenians, Jews, Kurds, etc. – had experienced in the near past. He has self-defined himself as a person not very religious or affiliated with the Greek community, and therefore did not care a lot about the current status or the future of Halki Theological School. However, he has stressed that he is a Turkish citizen – without any other dual citizenship including the Greek state – paying his taxes and serving in the military, and regarding a matter which directly interests a Turkish citizen such as himself, he doesn't find the official "reciprocity" rhetoric correct. He adds that Turkey's deviation from the West camp and moving towards the Russian influence is the main reason he sees no solution alternatives in the near future for the case of Halki Theological School. Turkey has to set its mind first on where it believes it belongs to in terms of mentality, then this issue can be discussed – and might even be resolved – after this step.

The third Greek-minority person interviewed has mentioned that Heybeliada has been an island of academic institutions in the past, and was even nicknamed "the island with 7 schools" and tried to count them: Halki Theological School, Naval Academy, Navy High School, Hüseyin Rahmi Gürpınar High School, the Greek primary school, the primary school and the nursing academy once present in Heybeliada Sanitarium Hospital – adding that these are the ones he could recall[147]. He adds that opening of the Halki Theological School would contribute very positively to the economy of the island as local and international tourism would develop, the families of students would rent houses, and some of the Greek diaspora members would even buy property and relocate in the island, creating wealth for the islanders. When it comes to opening of the Halki Seminary, he says he has no near-term expectations and it is matter where he finds himself unable to comment on as it is a political matter and he has no idea about what politicians do. Finally, he conveys that despite being born in the island, he has studied university in Athens, and came back to the island to practice his profession, served as a reserve officer in the Naval Academy located in the island and feels more Turkish than Greek and calls the island his 'home'.

To be able to shed light to the other end of the spectrum, the views of the ultra-nationalists are also worth exploring. This segment of the society is known to approach the issue of Halki Theological School with great suspicion and believe the School and its graduates act against the unity of the state.[148] Therefore

[147] Author's note: Established in 1831, the Greek Trade School of Halki was another reputable institution located in Heybeliada, but was later confiscated and the premises were turned into Navy High School, which now remains closed after the 15 June 2016 military coup d'état attempt
[148] İnci, S. (2011). Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu (2nd ed.). İstanbul: Yedirenk Kitapları, 11

understanding their position comprehensively and through a direct interview with a well-equipped expert would contribute positively to the discussion around this topic.

In this perspective, journalist and retired military officer Ümit Yalım, is interviewed[149] to be able to gain deeper access to the views of the ultra-nationalist camp. During the entire interview, Mr. Yalim makes considerable amount of references to the Treaty of Lausanne and evaluates the issue mainly from the perspective of reciprocity and emphasizes the related articles of no 40 on equal rights and no 45 on reciprocity. Accordingly, he claims that all religious schools in Greece are directly under the authority of Ministry of Education and while this is the situation there no exception can be granted to Halki Theological School, which is an institution under the sovereignty of Republic of Turkey. Another point that he makes is regarding the then-Chief Priest of Halki Theological School, Mr. Elpidophoros Lambriniadis, who also possessed the title of "Metropolitan of Bursa" at the time. Mr. Yalım claims that this "so-called" title is a proof of the Patriarchate's Ecumenical aspirations, adding that article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne grants the right for religious organization only at jurisdictions of Istanbul and Aegean islands of Gökçeada and Bozcaada – therefore voiding the possibility of having a "Metropolitan of Bursa" under the supremacy of this international agreement. Mr. Yalım also criticizes official reception of Elpidophoros by Turkish officials and appearing in the same picture with Presidential Spokesperson İbrahim Kalın during the February 2019 visit by Greek PM Alexis Tsipras, saying that this attributes legitimacy to his position and his controversial title. He asserts such official photoshoots should be done with caution as they might carry strong representational meanings and gives the example of 2004 European Union

[149] Ümit Yalım interview was conducted on 2 May 2019 at Khalkhedon Café in Fenerbahçe, Kadıköy

enlargement photoshoot, when EU leaders embraced Cyprus leadership, endorsing its place in the union.

Other areas of interest by Mr. Yalim interrelated with this topic include his piece on status of Greek island of Crete, claiming that three quarters of the Mediterranean island and the adjacent 14 islets now fall under the sovereignty of Turkey due to international treaties which are not valid today[150]. Accordingly, Yalim argues that Crete was handed over to 4 allied states – Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia – with 30 May 1913 London Agreement, but the latter three states have withdrew from their rights after the Treaty of Lausanne and since no waiver was made in favor of Greece, returning the sovereignty over these three quartiles to Turkey – the legal and complete successor of the Ottoman Empire. The borders of this claim can be seen in Figure 9 below, which has also caused repercussions in the Greek media and TV channels[151]. However, when asked which three quarters of the island belong to Turkey – as the capital city of Heraklion seems to remain in the Turkish partition – Mr. Yalim answered that that is not the crux of the discussion and he has drawn his map arbitrarily, assigning the Eastern territories to Turkey.

[150] https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2019/gundem/giritin-dortte-ucu-turkiyeye-ait-4013470/ (Accessed on 22 December 2020)
[151] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=utQpy-U1KkE Greek TV hosts discuss Ümit Yalim's Crete map and claims (Accessed on 22 December 2020)

Figure 9. Ümit Yalım's own presentation slide depicting Turkish sovereignty on the island of Crete (Source: Ümit Yalım's personal archives)

In one of his articles published after this interview was conducted, building up on the discussion with the author, Mr. Yalim reported that the Halki Theological School has de-facto opened its doors and started education by welcoming Erasmus students from various Greek universities[152]. Mr. Yalim describes this as a blatant violation of Turkey's sovereignty and the 1971 decision closing the school for higher education.

Another fierce supporter of the view that HTS should not and cannot be opened is Mr. Emruhan Yalçın, another retired officer and a scholar.[153] Yalçın

[152] http://www.turkdevrimi.com/yazarlar/umit-yalim/heybeliada-ruhban-okulu-erdoganin-basbakanligi-doneminde-egitime-acilmis/2130/ (Accessed on 22 December 2020)
[153] Emruhan Yalçın is a retired army staff officer and holds a PhD degree in history from Atatürk University, Erzurum. Yalçın has published three books and lectured part-time at Bilkent University.

defends the position that the demand by the Patriarchate to operate independently from the regulation and monitoring of the state will allow it to increase its influence in the Orthodox world through appointing religious elite educated by Phanar and is a clear confirmation its claim to be Ecumenical. Yalçın states that the demands by the Patriarchate include the school to admit not only students with Turkish citizenship, but also from all around the world, the curriculum and education to be independent from state intervention and the required condition of being a Turkish citizen to become a Patriarch or a metropolitan.[154] He continues to summarize the legal obstacles in front of a successful opening as:

- The 1971 law was not only applicable to HTS, but all private higher education institution at the time.
- The Lausanne treaty assures equal rights to the non-Muslim minorities – not privileges, therefore the foreign national instructors in minority schools can only be utilized to educate the non-Muslim constituents of the Republic of Turkey.
- The fact that the school was present and operational before does not constitute a legal precedence as the state possesses the authority to reestablish the order and execute as the only lawmaker.
- Turkey is a secular state according to the 2nd article of its constitution and related laws does not permit private military, police or religious institutions to operate in the country. Similarly, article 24 of the constitution clearly states that religious education can only be carried out by the state. Therefore, such a privilege cannot be granted to non-Muslims while the Muslim majority is not allowed to run private religious schools.
- Private higher education institutions can only be opened by real persons or foundations as a commercial entity, but neither the Patriarchate nor the Holy Synod possesses these requirements. The 40th article of the Lausanne Treaty does not grant an institution status to the Patriarchate and does not grant an application right to the ECHR.[155]

[154] Yalçın, E. (2009). *Son Haçlı Kalesi: Heybeliada.* Ankara: Elips Kitap, 126

[155] Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty regulates the religious education rights of the minorities and states that *"Müslüman olmayan azınlıklara ilintili olan Türk yurttaşları hukuk bakımından ve fiilen öteki Türk yurttaşlarına uygulanan işlemlerin ve sağlanan güvencelerin tıpkısından yararlanacaklar ve özellikle, harcamaları kendilerince yapılmak üzere, her türlü yardım, dinsel ya da sosyal kurumları, her türlü okul ve benzeri öğretim ve eğitim kurumları kurma, yönetme ve denetleme ve buralarda kendi dillerini özgürce kullanma ve dinsel ayinlerini serbestçe yapına bakımından eşit bir hakka sahip bulunacaklardır"*. Yalçın defends the position that if this article allowed the Patriarchate to appeal to ECHR, they would have done this already. Yalçın, E. (2009). *Son Haçlı Kalesi: Heybeliada.* Ankara: Elips Kitap, 128

- The Private Education Law does not allow the proportion of foreign students in a certain school to exceed 20% of Turkish citizens in that particular institution
- 1973 law of National Education and the 1981 law of Higher Education necessitates the curriculum of every educational institution to be designed in line with the principles set in these texts.

Yalçın argues that the status of the Patriarchate is a local institution fulfilling the religious needs of the Greek-Orthodox minority mainly concentrated in Istanbul according to Republic of Turkey and therefore its international responsibilities and obligations should not be a concern for the state. He adds that the Patriarcate has never run out of religious staff in the past 50 years and possesses a variety of options to educate their priests such as its affiliated education institutions in Connecticut, U.S. and Thessaloniki, Greece.[156] He also opposes the view that the re-opening of the HTS would be a source of prestige and international soft power for Turkey saying that history is full of examples of graduates of this school working against Turkey – but could only be to the benefit of Hellenism and Greek interests.[157]

It can be summarized that the ultra-nationalists view the efforts to re-open the school do not stem from the need to educate religious scholars as it is typically presented to the public opinion and demanded from various levels of Turkish leadership, but is rather a step towards achieving the ultimate and secret goal towards being "ecumenical" by the Patriarchate. They also commonly associate the issue to the security policy implemented by the U.S. after 9/11 attacks and defend that it is not related to human rights or democracy as it appears in the surface.[158] However, the members of Greek minority Turkish citizens are naturally inclined to see this as an integral part of their religious beliefs and manifest it as a necessity to be fulfilled

[156] Yalçın, E. (2009). *Son Haçlı Kalesi: Heybeliada.* Ankara: Elips Kitap, 136
[157] Yalçın, E. (2009). *Son Haçlı Kalesi: Heybeliada.* Ankara: Elips Kitap, 134
[158] Yalçın, E. (2009). *Son Haçlı Kalesi: Heybeliada.* Ankara: Elips Kitap, 130

by the state in regard to their full and only citizenship, further underpinned as an obligation stemming from the universal human rights.

CHAPTER 4:

INITIATIVES FROM WITHIN AND WITHOUT

4.1 The Green Patriarch and pressure points linked to HTS

Influential people affiliated with the Halki Theological School are actively pursuing policies to promote re-opening of the institution. These leaders and religious actors naturally engage in the problem to create public awareness and work as pressure points trying to a find solution to the stalemate.

As a graduate of Halki Theological School and a native of Aegean island of Gökçeada, Greek Patriarch Bartholomew devoted an important amount of his energy towards re-opening of the School. In a press article, the Patriarch has stated that they don't see this issue as a matter of prestige for their Church, but rather a real need in terms of fulfilling religious duties of the religious community he represents and educating their priests on the soil where they are based.[159]

Patriarch Bartholomew, who is also recognized with the nick name "Green Patriarch" is awarded with an honorary doctorate degree from Boğaziçi University in 2013 due to his work and messages on climate change and environmental issues.[160] Patriarch Bartholomew was also named one of Time Magazine's 100 Most

[159] https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/obama-bartholomeosla-gorustu-53920 (accessed on 15 October 2020)
[160] Boğaziçi University honorary doctorates web page http://boun.edu.tr/tr-TR/Content/Genel/FahriDoktora (accessed on 12 March 2020)

Influential People in the World in 2008 for his vision dominated by his concern for the environment and his endeavors regarding ecological questions.[161]

The Patriarchate of Phanar has organized a series of conferences and seminars on this topic with the initiative of the Patriarch, some of which were held in situ at Halki Theological School campus on Heybeliada. These four gatherings were titled "The Halki Summits" and brought together activists, scientists, journalists, business leaders, theologians and academics working to bring a new dimension to the global environmental discussion. The first meeting of the series nicknamed "Halki I" was held in June 2012 with a theme of "Global Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability", the second meeting "Halki II" focused on "Environment, Literature and Arts" in June 2015 and the following gathering "Halki III" was held in June 2019 focused on "Theological Formation and Ecological Awareness". [162] These interfaith summits were not only limited to Orthodox community, but were also attended by Catholic and Protestant theologians with an aim of developing an ecological curriculum for theology faculties across the globe.[163]

Halki Summit IV, which has been very recently held in January 2021, again focused on environmental issues, and was broadcasted through internet conferencing system Zoom with attendance of around 1100 live participants, unlike some of the earlier summits which were held with a more intimate audience at the edifice of the Halki Theological School. The topic of this year's summit was "Covid-19 and

[161] http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1733748_1733757_1735535,00.html (accessed on 5 November 2020)
[162] Halki Summit official website http://www.halkisummit.com/about/ (Accessed on 29 October 2020)
[163] https://www.hristiyanhaber.net/2019/06/01/heybeliadada-ekolojik-farkindalik-zirvesi/ (Accessed on 29 October 2020)

Climate Change: Living with and Learning from a Pandemic" and was composed of three sessions, namely "Impact On Nature", "Importance Of Science" and "Implications for Health" – all concentrated around the usual theme of environmental responsibility and sustainability. The keynote speech for this virtual conference was given by His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew with a special focus on the Covid-19 pandemic and the lessons learned from it. The Patriarch has mentioned that "the pandemic has reminded us that the world is larger than our individual concerns and ambitions, larger than our church and faith communities, and larger than our political powers and national interests" and also stressed that "the Patriarchal School of Theology has remained silent for exactly 50 years since the end of the academic year of 1970-1971" during his keynote address.[164] Ironically, the session titled "Importance of Science" focused on the sometimes troubled relationship between politics, religion and science; and showed how interrelated the responses by the governments, churches and scientists was. The video recordings of the final Halki Summit IV were later posted on the YouTube channel of the Ecumenical Patriarchate[165] and once again proved the dedication of the Patriarch not only on environmental responsibility and sustainability, but also on the re-opening of the Halki Theological School – which gives its name *Halki* to this initiative.

As another strong gesture of interest in environmental issues, the Patriarch has praised the highly symbolic decision by the new US President Joe Biden to rejoin the Paris climate agreement in his first day in office on January 20th, 2021 and

[164] http://www.halkisummit.com/hs4/keynote-address-by-his-all-holiness-ecumenical-patriarch-bartholomew/ (Accessed on 8 February 2021)
[165] The official YouTube channel of the Ecumenical Patriarchate https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCB1m35vlB1QMiqE_OMGFCUw (Accessed on 8 February 2021)

expressed his delight as an environmental enthusiast adding that it coincides with his longstanding policies.[166]

According to law professor Hüseyin Hatemi, the Patriarch's enthusiasm on the environmental question originates from his responsibility to nature and the need for implementation of the God's will.[167] However, Özel attributes this special attention to his aspirations for using the ecumenical title and seeking international recognition for it.[168] The Patriarch himself defines the environmental problems also theological and associates it with social abuses related to the abuse of God's creation. He remains convinced that reversing climate change and the depletion of the earth's resources requires a radical change in values and beliefs in people's lives and practices to include the ethical and spiritual dimension of environmental sustainability.[169]

At this point, it is also worthwhile to mention the works of other graduates of Halki Theological School and the related alumni associations. During its academic life between 1844 and 1971, the School has given 938 graduates, including 11 students who were continuing their education in interim classes and were transferred to Thessaloniki University Faculty of Divinity to finish their studies.[170]

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[166] https://www.archons.org/-/patriarchate-expresses-delight-exec-orders (Accessed on 22 January 2021)
[167] Eulogy to Arhondonis, D. (Greek Patriarch Bartholomeow) (2006). *Bir Patrik Çocukken*. İstanbul: Bizim Deniz Yayınları, 9
[168] Özel, S. (2008). *Fener-Rum Patrikhanesi ve Ruhban Okulu.* İstanbul: IQ Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 101
[169] From opening remarks of Halki II Summit, June 2015 http://www.halkisummit.com/hs2/word-of-welcome/ (Accessed on 29 October 2020)
[170] İnci, S. (2011). *Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu* (2nd ed.). İstanbul: Yedirenk Kitapları, 294

4.2 Elpidophoros as an international actor

Prof. Dr. Elpidophoros Lambriniadis[171], has served as the administrator and chief-priest of Halki Theological School between 2011 and 2019, is an influencer and policy maker in many aspects. Archbishop Elpidophoros is a Turkish citizen born in 1967[172], a native of İstanbul's Bakırköy district, a member of the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, and recently he has been selected as the Metropolitan of the Americas in 2019. During his tenure in Halki Theological School, he has made striking achievements towards the re-opening of the school and increased public awareness regarding the problem.

Given the amount of intensity of lobbying and public awareness campaigns during the term of Elpidophoros, it would be correct to divide the period that the school remained closed into two intervals: before-Elpidophoros (1971-2011) and the after-Elpidophoros (2011-2018) periods. The latter episode mentioned differentiates itself from the previous one by its extrovert character and its successful communication initiatives led by the archbishop. Among other things, granting free access to visitors was the signature development of his tenure which raised visibility of the school in related circles.

During his studies for this thesis, the author has been approved by Prof. Elpidophoros Lambriniadis as a researcher of the Halki Theological School and was granted permission to use the premises as necessary including its famous library featuring some of the world's oldest printed books and manuscripts. The collection

[171] Prof. Dr. Elpidophoros Lambriniadis' official titles included "Metropolitan of Bursa and Abbot of the Holy Trinity Patriarchal & Stavropegial Monastery" according to e-mail correspondence with the author dated September 2018

[172] According to Greek newspaper Ekathimerini 11 May 2019 article http://www.ekathimerini.com/240369/article/ekathimerini/news/elpidophoros-selected-new-archbishop-of-america (Accessed on 3 March 2020)

of around 69,000 volumes dating back to 15th century covers a wide range of subjects including religion, philosophy and literature, while some rare Bible manuscripts had been moved to the Patriarchate library in Phanar in 1930s.[173]



Figure 10. Chief-Priest Elpidophoros strolling through corridors of HTS library.[174]

The author had the opportunity to receive first-hand information about some of the initiatives led from within the Halki Theological School during an in-person interview with Archbishop Elpidophoros on September 8th, 2018 at his office located in the second floor of the Halki Seminary. Archbishop Elpidophoros, who has been the Chief-Priest and administrator of HTS since 2011 conveyed information about his efforts to create public awareness towards re-opening of the school and achievements during his tenure. He has given a detailed briefing of the achievements during his term, relations with the local authorities and the civil public. He has also frankly mentioned that some of the social and cultural activities that he

[173] Pinguet, C. (2018). *Adalar'a Çıkmak: İstanbul Açıklarındaki Bir Takımadanın Öyküsü.* İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 50

[174] Retrieved from https://www.dailysabah.com/arts-culture/2014/10/03/halki-seminarys-treasure-of-books-to-be-digitized (Accessed on 30 March 2020)

has organized to be held in the campus of HTS was disapproved by the local government on grounds that it was promoting Christianity to children at various grades, but he has never given up from his aim of making it a cultural and intellectual attraction site. He has also mentioned about the legal status of the properties of the school, explaining that the vas majority of the Hill of Hope belongs to the school and the legal deeds were returned to them in during the early 2000s. However, parts of it has been occupied by private persons and even the historical threshing floor of the monastery has been turned into a recycling plant for the island without seeking their consent. Strikingly, he has asserted that the school is being maintained as if it would be reopened tomorrow and all facilities including the library, classrooms, dining halls and even the laundry has been kept active for the visitors and residents of the school. Currently, there are around 15 service staff employed in the school such as librarians, cooks, waiters, gardeners, mechanics and guards as well as visiting scholars and priests staying in the facility.

Among other things Elpidophoros conveyed, one of the most important activities that has been going on during his tenure has been initiation of Erasmus programs with some foreign universities mainly from Greece. Archbishop explained that students mainly majoring subjects such as history, museology, librarianship and archive sciences are visiting the school as part of their Erasmus exchange programs and working on transferring some of the world's oldest printed books to digital platforms with the help of experts and priests. Ionian University at Corfu, Western Greece is among the universities collaborating with Halki Seminary, whose Rector Prof. Anastasia Sali-Papasali praised the efforts by the Archbishop for providing

internship opportunities for its students and even providing free accommodation and board during their stay in the island.[175]

During his tenure, in line with the Green Patriarch's mission, Elpidophoros has put great emphasis on the environment in general and also the garden and the surroundings of the school in particular. A project was initiated in September 2013 in order to create a spiritual link between contemporary garden design and Byzantine heritage. Thematic botanical gardens nicknamed "The Garden of Virtues" were setup in a manner to promote the dual meaning of the historic site both as a spiritual place and a land of virtues. The plants to be used in the project were chosen according to their symbolic meanings in holy texts such as olive trees symbolizing charity and lemon trees symbolizing prudence.[176] The sections of the five thematic gardens include the path of virtue, the collection of the plants mentioned in the Bible, gardens of edible plants (vegetable gardens, vineyards, fruit trees and aromatic plants), the Byzantium Meadow and the Open Museum of Garden design. Separately, beekeeping, poultry and domestic livestock farming is conducted in the premises, as a traditional method of feeding the priests and visitors. The garden project was conducted by agricultural engineer Nikos Thymakis from the University of Neapolis in 2014 according to a plate at the entrance of the school which can be seen in the figure below.

[175] Collaboration of the Ionian University with the Holy Theological School of Halki, Retrieved from https://sites.ionio.gr/international/gr/news/7251/ (Accessed on 14 April 2020)
[176] Georgi, J. (2014). The Byzantine Gardens: Landscape gardens of Patriarchate's Theological School of Halki, 400



Figure 11. The plate explaining the thematic gardens of Halki Theological School. (Source: The author's personal archive, 23 July 2018)

In an address to the faithful, Archbisop Elpidophoros shared that he has started with himself and one more priest, blessed the Monastry of Holy Trinity alone with only one more person helping in the alter, but at the end of his term there he ended up with 8 more friends, and now 5 of them are in the U.S. with him.[177] He continues to promote the closure of the Halki Theological School during his mission in the U.S. and expresses his concerns on the increasing hostility towards religious minorities in Turkey. He appears and acts more than a representative of a religious group, but rather acts as an ambassador of a state and conducts high level meetings with statesman and politicians. His actions verify the increasing importance of

[177] From Archbishop Elpidophoros' virtual Town Hall address broadcasted live on Twitter account @Elpidophoros on April 11th, 2020 during the Covid-19 pandemic.

religion and religious actors in international relations and continue to keep the Halki Theological School issue warm in the global political arena with a target of reopening in the foreseeable future.

4.3 Tertiary actors

The initiatives towards the re-opening of the Halki Theological School are not only limited to internal or the related parties, but also constitutes an important place in the international agendas of various states, organizations and institutions. This study places the Patriarchate of Phanar and Halki Theological School in the center of its research and defines internal actors related to it as the primary factors. The Republic of Turkey and the Hellenic Republic are defined as secondary factors due to their natural position making them sides of this conflict. This section investigates the tertiary factors and sides remaining outside the above-mentioned parties, which has been actively pursuing policies regarding the Halki Theological School issue and following up with consequences. These parties include state actors such as the United States and the United Kingdom; religious actors such as the Holy See; governing bodies such as the European Union and its affiliated institutions; and various non-governmental organizations.

The strongest and most effective international support for the Patriarchate and the Halki Theological School issue is provided by the United States, which has even brought the Halki Theological School issue to the Congress in various occasions and has urged the Turkish Government to ensure the proper protection for the Patriarchate and all Orthodox faithful residing in Turkey and assure that positive

steps are taken to reopen the Halki Patriarchal School of Theology in March 1995.[178] It is also very interesting to see that the same bill mentions concerns about conversion of Hagia Sophia museum into a mosque in the year 1995 – an accurate foresight which turned into reality after a quarter century as mentioned in earlier chapters of this thesis. This is not the only specific resolution of the U.S. Congress, as a further simple search in its website reveals some 30 more resolutions calling upon the Government of Turkey to facilitate the reopening of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's Theological School of Halki without condition or further delay.[179]

Another important powerhouse advocating the reopening of Halki Theological School has been the European Union and its affiliated bodies, which has repetitively brought the issue to its agenda through reports, resolutions or by the governments of its member countries. The 2004 EU Accession report has been mildly addressing the issue by saying that The Greek Orthodox Halki (Heybeliada) seminary, which has been closed since 1971, has still not been reopened. The same report also mentioned the nationality criteria restricting the ability of non-Turkish clergy to work for certain churches and the ban regarding public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch as well as difficulties with respect to the granting and renewal of visas and residence and work permits of non-Turkish Christian clergy as examples of negative treatment in regard to religious freedoms and minority rights.[180]

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[178] United States Congress Resolution #50, (1995, March 28) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-104hconres50ih/pdf/BILLS-104hconres50ih.pdf (Accessed on 17 January 2020)

[179] A simple keyword search conducted at the U.S. Congress website www.congress.gov on 24 July 2021 with keywords "*Halki Theological*" revealed 30 hits between 1995-2021, while a similar search conducted with keywords "*Halki Patriarchal*" revealed 17 hits between 1995-2014

[180] Commission of the European Communities, 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession, https://www.avrupa.info.tr/sites/default/files/2016-11/2004.pdf p.44 (Accessed on 13 May 2018)

The issue also frequently appears in the agenda of the European Parliament through motions, declarations and questions, urging the European Commission to exert the necessary pressure on Turkey to persuade it to embark on the process of reopening the seminary.[181] Naturally, most of these inquiries has been made by Greek MEPs, but Italian, Polish and Belgian MEPs has also shown interest towards the reopening of Halki Theological School. The declaration dated December 2009 by Polish MEP Filip Kaczmarek, calling the Turkish authorities to reopen the theological academy on the island of Halki and stressing that this decision to be important, not only for the Ecumenical Patriarchate but also for Turkey's commitment to dialogue and ensuring religious freedom, was signed by 50 MEPs until the lapse date of March 2010.[182] Another declaration dated November 2007 and signed by 37 MEPs claimed that an Orthodox monastery on the island of Halki was partially demolished by the Turkish authorities and called for the monastery to be restored to its original condition and compensation to be paid to the Orthodox community as an official apology.[183] Various EU officials has also visited the Halki Seminary, most recent of which was The Head of the European Union Delegation to Turkey, Nikolaus Meyer-Landrut, who paid an official visit to the island on March 5, 2021. He was accompanied by the Mayor of Princes' Islands, as well as by the

[181] The keyword "Halki Theological" appears in 8 articles in the European Parliament, spanning the period of 1994-2019.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/portal/en/search?planet=_all&searchQuery=halki+theological (Accessed on 25 July 2021)
[182] Written Declaration pursuant to Rule 123 of the Rules of Procedure on opening the theological academy on the island of Halki, by Filip Kaczmarek
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/DCL-7-2009-0070_EN.pdf (Accessed on 25 July 2021)
[183] Written Declaration pursuant to Rule 116 of the Rules of Procedure on the partial demolition by the Turkish authorities of an Orthodox monastery on the island of Halki, by Philip Claeys, Frank Vanhecke and Koenraad Dillen
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/DCL-6-2007-0107_EN.pdf (Accessed on 25 July 2021)

Greek Ambassador to Ankara, M. Diamesis and expressed his current and future support to the just request of the Patriarchate for its reopening.[184]

Among other influential world leaders, Pope Francis has visited Turkey in November 2014 for a three-day trip, aiming to promote interfaith dialogue and highlight the refugee situation in the Middle East.[185] The Pope has met with President Erdogan, the then-top cleric Mehmet Görmez and signed a joint declaration with Patriarch Bartholomew intending to bridge the divide between Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity. During a joint press conference following the visit, the Halki Theological issue has also been brought up as an example that the Christian community has been facing in Turkey in terms of religious freedoms. Metropolitan Elpidophoros, who was also present at the event mentioned that "Halki seminary is not just a minor problem, is the possibility of this church to renew itself" and added that "If there is no possibility to educate this this clergy, then the freedom of worship has a time limit that will end with the life of the priest leading the community", in an attempt to highlight the Halki Theological School issue in such a rare meeting of the two powerful churches.[186]

As it can be seen from the above actions of interest, the Halki Theological School issue continues to dominate the agendas of international tertiary actors, which continue to pursue their own initiatives towards the reopening of the school. It appears that the issue will be in the focus of the international community at least in the foreseeable future until a solution the situation is introduced.

[184] Head of EU Delegation to Turkey paid a visit to Halki seminary, https://orthodoxtimes.com/head-of-eu-delegation-to-turkey-paid-a-visit-to-halki-seminary/ (Accessed on 25 July 2021)
[185] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30239233 (Accessed on 21 July 2021)
[186] https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/francis-decries-forced-uniformity-receives-blessing-patriarch-bartholomew (Accessed on 23 July 2021)

CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION

The interest groups and policy makers surrounding the issue of re-opening of the Halki Theological School represent a wide variety of opinions. The conflicting views by the related groups as well as the complex legal constraints appear to be shaped according to the standpoint of the related parties. Adding on the international dimension and the tendency of the governments to exploit the issue as a political tool further complicates the subject.

The discussion around Halki Theological School is closely related to secularism and the place of religion in international relations. As discussed in detail in the second chapter of this thesis, religion is not constrained only by its faith dimension anymore and commands a power that can deeply influence international relations and local politics. Intrinsically the HTS issue is genuinely interrelated to religious needs of an integral community of the Republic of Turkey, however this only contributes as the initial stage of a multilayered debate which kept the public opinion busy for decades.

The initial layer of the debate at the regulatory level originates from Turkey's constituting agreement Lausanne granting minorities the right to educate and raise their religious staff according to their religious needs. However, this international treaty which should have superiority over local laws, is often confronted by a set of legal obstacles including the 1972 higher education law ordering closure of private higher education institutes as well as related regulations

ordering it to be established under a faculty of a local university. This fruitless debate often ends at a stalemate as the point of view differs significantly between the sides and lack of willingness by the related authorities to solve the problem appears as the main hurdle in front of a legal solution.

Another important perspective in favor of reopening the school is in terms of human rights and naturally a much wider group of political actors and intellectuals defend this position on liberal grounds. Minority rights – which is a subset of the broader definition of human rights – reach far beyond a mere concept concerning only the related group in question, but is a necessity to support the disadvantaged groups as matter of concise and a moral result of being a human being.

At this point, a skeptical group of nationalistic opposition confronts the subject on grounds that the Halki Theological School issue is not just a matter that interests domestic minorities but rather a part of an international effort to deteriorate the Republic of Turkey and even divide it. This camp evaluates the efforts to reopen the school as a step towards achieving the ultimate and secret goal of being "ecumenical" by the Patriarchate, which would eventually lead to an establishment similar to Vatican, with sovereign powers independent from the Republic of Turkey. It is also possible to add a relatively smaller group with extremely high sensitivity on the secularity issues to this faction, who believe that reopening of the Halki Seminary would lead to emergence of similar independent Islamic oriented schools enjoying freedom on admissions, curriculum, dress code, etc. and might alleviate concerns similar to the headscarf issue of the 1990s.

One of the main points that this thesis explains is that religion has long been a tool to influence domestic politics and also negotiate with international powers. It

has been no different with Turkish governments and minority issues as well as religious sites have been used as a bargaining instrument at various occasions. In specific regard to the Halki Theological School, its name has been mostly heard during the 2000s due to its emergence as an important policy factor to achieve other goals by the related governments. Especially in regard to the relations with the EU and in line with Turkey's then ambition to become a full member, democratization has been central to government policy and warm messages were conveyed towards the re-opening of the school. Erdogan's AKP governments had appeared to be very friendly and responsive towards the opening of Halki Teological School at the earlier years of their rule and seemed to put in a lot of emphasis into this matter. Improving relations with the EU had an enormous positive impact on minority rights at the earlier years of AKP's rule and had yielded some concrete positive results not only in terms of the Halki Theological School, but also in other related topics such as returning various significant property back to minority foundations and re-opening of primary and secondary level schools at some locations such as the Aegean island of Gökçeada.

Secondly the thesis explores and finds out that this issue was only visible to media and the general public when it was cited in a report -such as EU progress reports – or was subject to an important visit by a foreign statesman, confirming that it is indirectly far more important that a standalone issue than needs to be addressed due to its self-significance. This sporadic interest was verified by an internet keyword search section and a similar newspaper archive study section, which yielded similar results confirming that the media and naturally the public opinion interest was only concentrated at various time intervals and was due to a more comprehensive issue. The division between opinions regarding the opening of the

school was also deeply divided between journalists and columnists, who tended to convey the issue according to their position on the interrelated political development and also their more general philosophy of life such as being more liberal or nationalistically oriented.

Thirdly, the views of the Greek minority and Halki Theological School related institutional efforts overlap in the sense that opening of the school is a result of their constitutional citizenship rights backed by international treaties, but differ slightly in terms of their perceived solution of the problem. The ordinary Greek minority citizens seem to less care about it as some of them are secular individuals without great spiritual ties to the Patriarchate and do not attribute a great chance of reopening of the school unless the current government receives an important bargaining chip in return. However, the Patriarchate related circles continue their propaganda uninterruptedly with the help of the support from the international public and seem to enjoy a greater power that they would normally control only with the support of the Orthodox Christians under their authority. On the other end of the spectrum, it is also worth to mention that the ultra-nationalistic circles in the county usually see the issue as a concession given to foreign powers and privileges granted to a specific minority which is not provided to the rest of the public. These circles usually allege that Halki Theological School is part of a secret plan that would educate staff to be appointed at jurisdictions under the authority of the Patriarchate, thus strengthening its "ecumenical" position leading to an independent and autonomous establishment.

Inferring from the above main points, it can be concluded that Turkey's combative foreign policy especially in the last decade is seen as the main obstacle in front of the opening of the Halki Theological School as this major shift had

consequences in many aspects of policies implemented. A major deviation observed in this era was that Turkey has chosen not to wait at the gates of the European Union, but rather to become a regional power who could again project strength over its former imperial subjects mainly in the Middle East, Africa and in Eastern Mediterranean – owing to its relative economic development in early 2000s and consolidation of power domestically. Normally it would be easier to find a solution to this issue in a stronger economic environment and a more independent foreign policy framework, however in this case it appears that Turkey no longer needs to address this issue given the stalled EU accession process, increased tensions with Greece particularly following the Syrian civil war related refugee flow and sour relations with the U.S. after the failed coup d'état attempt of 2016. This major change in Turkey's foreign policy and more authoritarian rule domestically has stirred resistance from the West – especially from the US and France in particular – and thus making reconciliation efforts much more difficult than before. Turkey has criticized the West for being hypocritical frequently and increased polarization to consolidate power domestically. Starting with Gezi Park events of 2013 and continuing with the coup d'état attempt of 15 July 2016, Turkey has blamed the West for orchestrating such developments and crippling its economy. The US administration has taken detrimental steps such as ousting Turkey from key defense projects such as the F-35 program and imposing sanctions, while France has chosen to team up with Turkey's regional rivals especially in the Eastern Mediterranean and supported Turkey's opponents in various conflicts. Therefore, the Halki Theological School, which could have been opened as a precondition of Turkey becoming a full EU member during the earlier years of the millennium, now appears as a much

distant possibility given that most positive exchanges with the West seem to be shelved for the time being.

Finally, it would be correct to conclude that the related legislative debate around the reopening of the Halki Theological School serves as an excuse to delay an outcome as the legislative decisions to close the institution is inconsistent with the supreme texts such as international accords and there is no obstacle in front of granting a private higher education institution status and opening it as a seminary as before. Moreover, the fact the school was operational until 1972 in accordance with the constitution, laws and regulations of the Republic of Turkey, should be considered as a confirmation that a similar setup can lead to revival of this valuable organization again. However, lack of political determination seems to be the main missing element in front of such an outcome.

It appears that a viable and sustainable solution to the issue is not visible in the immediate future and remain as a deadlock for the time being while the Halki Theological School remains as a tourist attraction with deep cultural, religious and political repercussions.

APPENDIX A

CUMHURİYET NEWSPAPER ARCHIVES

A total of 152 articles has been found since 01 January 1930 by using the keyword "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu".

1. Cumhuriyet, 24 June 2020, Sayfa 12, Barış Doster, "Yunanistan, Türkiye'ye karşı kimlerle ittifak yapıyor?"

   "… Akdeniz'deki gerilim, Yunanistan'ın terör örgütlerine verdiği destek, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nin statüsüne ilişkin tavrı, ilk akla gelenler. Son günlerde Atina …"

2. Cumhuriyet, 07 February 2019, Sayfa 1, "Çipras'tan Köprü Mesajı"

   "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorunu Lozan Antlaşması madde 40, azınlıkların istediği şekilde okul açmasına izin ... Patrikhane Türk hukukuna aykırı statü istiyor. Prof. Dr. Sibel Özel'in yazısı 2'de"

3. Cumhuriyet, 07 February 2019, Sayfa 2, "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorunu"

   "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu' sorunu Lozan Antlaşması madde 40, azınlıkların istediği şekilde okul"

4. Cumhuriyet, 05 February 2019, Sayfa 1, "Var olan bölünmeyi tedavi çabası"

   "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Başrahibi Lambriniadis, kilise tartışmaları ve Çipras'ın ziyaretini ... Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nde, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Başrahibi de olan Lambriniadis ile söyleşimizden"

5. Cumhuriyet, 05 February 2019, Sayfa 7, “Gözler Çipras’ın Ziyaretinde”

“Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Başrahibi de olan Lambriniadis ile söyleşimizden satırlar... Moskova Kilisesi’nin... Rusya ile araları çok iyi… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Başrahibi de olan…”

6. Cumhuriyet, 24 November 2018, Sayfa 12, “Açılması için hoşgörü yeter”

“en önemli okullarından biri olan Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, YÖK’e bağlanmadığı için 47 yıldır kapalı... ruhbanları Neden kapalı? Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Patrik Photios tarafından kuruldu. 1844’te eğitime başladı”

7. Cumhuriyet, 10 October 2018, Sayfa 12, Barış Doster, “Avrupa Birliği üyeliğini oylamak!”

“Fener Rum Patrikhanesi’nin statüsü, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Kürt sorunu gibi başlıklarda ciddi tavizler”

8. Cumhuriyet, 26 September 2018, Sayfa 13, “Adalar Çocuk Orkestra’sına destek”

“Filarmoni Orkestrası müzik kampının yanı sıra Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve Anadolu Kulübü’nde davetliler için”

9. Cumhuriyet, 29 April 2018, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, “Maske Düştü”

“Yunanistan’la ilişkilerini, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu için Fethullah Gülen’in kimleri devreye soktuklarını”

10. Cumhuriyet, 17 December 2017, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, “Patrik Hoca”

“Selanik’e bir Fethullahçı okul açıp, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorununun çözümlenmesi için adım atmaya”

11. Cumhuriyet, 24 August 2017, Sayfa 16, “Barışın Sesi Heybeliada’da”

"… ücretsiz konserde Adalar Belediyesi, birbirinden güzel parçalar, Barış Stone Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …"

12. Cumhuriyet, 27 March 2017, Sayfa 1, "Ağlama çocuk ağlama"

"Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi konuların da ele alınması bekleniyor. Tillerson'un, Türkiye'nin AB sürecinde"

13. Cumhuriyet, 27 March 2017, Sayfa 13, "Rakka'da yer arayışı"

"… geleceği ve Rakka operasyonunun yanı sıra NATO işbirliği, Irak, Kıbrıs, Ermeni meselesi, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi konuların da ele alınmasıbek leniyor. Tillerson'un, Türkiye'nin AB sürecinde …"

14. Cumhuriyet, 07 September 2015, Sayfa 18, "Yeni 6-7 Eylül'ler yaşanabilir"

"… yıllardır söz verilip sonunda Atina ile mütekabiliyete mahkum edilen Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Ankara'nın …"

15. Cumhuriyet, 02 October 2014, Sayfa 17, "Eğitime kapalı, kültüre açık"

"CUMHURİYET KÜLTÜR: Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Müzik Direktörü Pandelis …"

16. Cumhuriyet, 24 September 2013, Sayfa 20, "Türk ve Yunan sanatçılar birlikte sahne aldı: Heybeli'de anlamlı konser"

"Patriği Neofitos ile Bursa Metropoliti ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Başrahibi Elpidophoros Lambriniadis …"

17. Cumhuriyet, 08 September 2013, Sayfa 1, "Ruhban Okulu Avantaj"

"Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 1971'den bu yana kapalı İstanbul'dan öğrenci gelmez Hatemi: Hukuken yanlış bir …"

18. Cumhuriyet, 08 September 2013, Sayfa 8, "Ruhban Okulu Türkiye için avantaj"

"indiklerinde, alay edilmesin, onlara taş atılmasın. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 1971'den bu yana kapalı … bir yazıyla açılır …"

19. Cumhuriyet, 21 August 2013, Sayfa 13, Ahmet Özgüneş, "Yabancı Vatandaşlar (!)"

"… zamanıdır. Öncelikle Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalıdır. Bu bir insan hakları meselesidir. 1844 yılından …"

20. Cumhuriyet, 11 January 2013, Sayfa 9, "Ruhban Okulu'na 190 dönüm iade"

"… bakımından en büyük iadesi gerçekleşti. Aralarında Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu olarak bilinen Aya Triada …"

21. Cumhuriyet, 17 October 2012, Sayfa 6, "Eşitsizlik raporda"

"… oluşturulmamıştır. Tüm çağrıları rağmen Heybeliada ruhban okulu hâlâ kapalıdır. Ermeni Patrikhanesi'nin …"

22. Cumhuriyet, 09 July 2012, Sayfa 1, "Yunanistan'ın yeni dışişleri bakanı: Casus belli kararı kaldırılsın"

"Ruhban Okulu"nun yeniden faaliyete geçirilmesi gibi Patrikhane'yle ilgili konuların çözümü için ... bulunduğunu iddia etti. Yunanistan'ın, Türkiye ile ilişkileri iyileştirme çabaları çerçevesinde Heybeliada …"

23. Cumhuriyet, 09 July 2012, Sayfa 12, "Yunanistan'ın yeni dışişleri bakanı: Casus belli kararı kaldırılsın"

"… ilişkileri iyileştirme çabaları çerçevesinde Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun yeniden faaliyete geçirilmesi …"

24. Cumhuriyet, 10 May 2012, Sayfa 13, "Kılıçdaroğlu: Ruhban Okulu için destek"

"… çekti. Araks, Kılıçdaroğlu'nun "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konusunda, eğer hükümet yeniden açılması lehinde …"

25. Cumhuriyet, 05 December 2011, Sayfa 9, “Biden-Erdoğan buluşması: Görüşmede Irak öne çıktı”

“… konulara değindi. Görüşmede, İsrail, Kıbrıs, Balkanlar, Ermenistan, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, yeni anayasa …”

26. Cumhuriyet, 02 October 2011, Sayfa 17, “Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nun Açık Kapı’sı”

“… Hastanesi gibi merak uyandıran yapıların keşfine çıkabilir. Biz festivalin ilk günü Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …”

27. Cumhuriyet, 03 August 2011, Sayfa 1, “Yapılar kapılarını açıyor”

“… Cumhurbaşkanlığı Yazlık Köşkü, Göztepe Şahkulu Sultan Dergâhı, Haliç Tersanesi, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Hollanda …”

28. Cumhuriyet, 03 August 2011, Sayfa 14, “Yapılar kapılarını açıyor”

“… Tersanesi, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Hollanda Konsolosluğu, Huber Köşkü, İstanbul Erkek Lisesi, İstanbul …”

29. Cumhuriyet, 17 July 2011, Sayfa 1, “Gençler endişeli”

“… ki yakın bir zamanda Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nu açmak gibi ek adımlar- la Türkiye, demokrasisinin …”

30. Cumhuriyet, 17 July 2011, Sayfa 4, “Desteğimiz sarsılmaz”

“… ki yakın bir zamanda Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nu açmak gibi ek adımlarla Türkiye, demokrasisinin …”

31. Cumhuriyet, 01 June 2011, Sayfa 17, “Paros’un ışığı yandı”

“… ışık tutan “Gökgürültüsünün Çocukları Hayata Dönüyor” yazısı, Kezban Hatemi’nin Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …”

32. Cumhuriyet, 24 May 2011, Sayfa 17, “İstanbul’lu Rum Ressamlar’ın sergisi”

“… Topkapı Sarayı, Rum Ortodoks Patrikhanesi ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu koleksiyonlarının yanı sıra …”

33. Cumhuriyet, 21 September 2010, Sayfa 10, “AB ve Mütekabiliyet: Türkiye”

“… Ruhban Okulu, Dedeağaç’a kadar destekçileri ile Mor Gabriel ve Tarsus gibi bir dizi gelmişti. diğer ... girişimlerde bulunmakla gelişme. Din özgürlüğü bizim için kalmamış, Edirne’nin komşusu Sümela, Heybeliada …”

34. Cumhuriyet, 20 September 2010, Sayfa 1, “Akdamar’da tarihi bir gün yaşandı”

“… olumlu bir gelişmedir. Din özgürlüğü bizim için Sümela, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Mor Gabriel ve Tarsus …”

35. Cumhuriyet, 20 September 2010, Sayfa 3, “95 yıl sonra ilk ayin”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Mor Gabriel ve Tarsus gibi bir dizi diğer durumda da önem taşımaktadır” dedi …”

36. Cumhuriyet, 28 August 2010, Sayfa 14, “İstanbul’un İzini Sürmek”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 30 yıl aradan sonra Yunan sanatçıların sergisiyle kapılarını açıyor ... ruhunu ortaya çıkaran Yunanlı sanatçılardan oluşan bir sergi. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 30 yıldan sonra ilk …”

37. Cumhuriyet, 15 June 2010, Sayfa 19, “Okan’da kültürlerin diyaloğu”

“… Akfırat Kampusu, Pera Müzesi, Tütün Deposu, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi farklı mekânlarda yapılıyor …”

38. Cumhuriyet Pazar, 23 May 2010, Sayfa 4, “İstanbul’un kapıları açılıyor”

“… ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi yapılar bulunuyor. Festival 22-30 Mayıs tarihleri arasında …”

39. Cumhuriyet, 12 March 2010, Sayfa 4, “Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacak”

“… Arınç: Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacak Devlet Bakanı ve Başbakan Yardımcısı Bülent Arınç …”

40. Cumhuriyet, 03 March 2010, Sayfa 10, “Yunanistan’ın Helen Müslümanları”

“… Yunanistan’ın Avrupa Ekümenikliği, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu” İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi içtihat diye diye, dünya …”

41. Cumhuriyet, 05 January 2010, Sayfa 1, “Kurban’da yakalama kararı çıktı”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, TürkiyeErmenistan ilişkileri gibi konular geliyor, AB yolculuğunu yavaşlatabiliyor ... nedenimizdir’ derse mahkeme ne yapsın?” dedi.”

42. Cumhuriyet, 05 January 2010, Sayfa 1, “Gözler zirvede”

“… Dış politika konularına da değinen Gül, “Kıbrıs, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Türkiye Ermenistan ilişkileri …”

43. Cumhuriyet, 05 January 2010, Sayfa 9, “Gül’den aramaya destek”

“… Dış politika konularına da değinen Gül, “Kıbrıs, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Türkiye Ermenistan ilişkileri …”

44. Cumhuriyet, 25 December 2009, Sayfa 4, “Patrik haksız mı?”

“… Ekümeniklik, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorunlarını tartışırız, görüşlerimizi belirtiriz, ama şimdilik bırakalım …”

45. Cumhuriyet, 15 December 2009, Sayfa 6, “Bağış: Ruhban Okulu’nu biz kapatmadık”

“… Egemen Bağış, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ile ilgili olarak, “Ben Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nun mütekabiliyet …”

46. Cumhuriyet, 02 October 2009, Sayfa 9, "TRT'de Kürtçe yayın kavgası"

"… çalışılıyor, azınlık vakıfları, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve ekümenikliğe yeni açılımlar getiriliyordu."

47. Cumhuriyet, 01 September 2009, Sayfa 1, "Açılımın adı var"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacak mı" sorusuna Atalay, 'Tek tek o konuları zikretmiyorum ama demokratik açılım ...' yönelik çalışmaların yanında diğer sorunlar, mesela Alevilerin beklentileri de çözülecek mi?"

48. Cumhuriyet, 01 September 2009, Sayfa 4, "Açılımın sadece adı var"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacak mı" sorusuna Atalay, 'Tek tek o konuları zikretmiyorum ama demokratik açılım ...' yönelik çalışmaların yanında diğer sorunlar, mesela Alevilerin beklentileri de çözülecek mi?"

49. Cumhuriyet, 07 July 2009, Sayfa 2, Yrd. Doç. Dr. Orhan ÇEKİÇ, "Türkiye Bir Hukuk Devletiyse Ruhban Okulu Açılamaz"

"… yüksekokulların devletleştirilmesine karar verdi. Bunun üzerine bütün bu özel okullar, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …"

50. Cumhuriyet, 07 July 2009, Sayfa 8, Yrd. Doç. Dr. Orhan ÇEKİÇ, "Türkiye Bir Hukuk Devletiyse Ruhban Okulu Açılamaz"

"(Baştarafı 2. Sayfada) … Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu üzerinde hiçbir denetim hakkı olmamalı, Fener Patrikhanesi …"

51. Cumhuriyet, 26 June 2009, Sayfa 2, Mümtaz Soysal, Açı, "Ulusal Davalar ve Hukuk"

"Ruhban Okulu hafta başında İstanbul Barosu'nca düzenlenen bir …"

52. Cumhuriyet, 24 June 2009, Sayfa 6, "Patrikhane denetim dışı olamaz"

"… günümüze Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu' başlıklı panel düzenlendi. İstanbul Barosu Başkanı Muammer Aydın YÖK …"

53. Cumhuriyet, 16 June 2009, Sayfa 15, "5N 1K, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu"

"CNN Türk 22.00 Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu TV Servisi – 'Açılacak mı, açılmayacak mı' tartışmalarıyla hep gündemde olan Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, 5N 1K'nın bu akşamki konusunu …"

54. Cumhuriyet, 12 June 2009, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "AB Oyalıyor…"

"… devlet iki millet olmalıdır. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı, Patrik Bartholomeos'un ekümenlik konusu …"

55. Cumhuriyet, 18 April 2009, Sayfa 1, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "Özür Dilerim…"

"… açılırsa keyiflerine diyecek yok! Bir de Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu! Gün onların... İktidar onların. Ne …"

56. Cumhuriyet, 18 April 2009, Sayfa 19, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "Özür Dilerim…"

"… bırakmıyorlar! Şu Ermenistan sınırı da bir açılırsa keyiflerine diyecek yok! Bir de Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu! Gün …"

57. Cumhuriyet, 14 April 2009, Sayfa 2, "Kete"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu.. önceden söylendi. Kuzey Irak, Afganistan ve Kıbrıs, söylenecek. Yunanistan ile …"

58. Cumhuriyet, 12 April 2009, Sayfa 8, Cüneyt Arcayürek, "Güncel"

"… başkanlarının Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Ermeni sorunu, Kıbrıs ve Kürt konularındaki açıklamaları arasında da fark …"

59. Cumhuriyet, 11 April 2009, Sayfa 10, "Atina ile pazarlık: Ruhban Okulu'na karşılık Batı Trakya"

"… Başkanı Barack Obama'nın Türkiye ziyaretiyle yeniden gündeme gelen Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konusunda …"

60. Cumhuriyet, 09 April 2009, Sayfa 9, "AKP hükümeti Heybeliada'ya sıcak bakıyor"

"… konuşmasında gündeme getirdi. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, 9 Temmuz 1971'de kapatılmıştı. Bu konu özellikle AB ile …"

61. Cumhuriyet, 07 April 2009, Sayfa 1, Emre Kongar, "Obama'nın Mesajları"

"… yaptı. Laik bir ülke olarak tanımladı. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorununu, hukuk devleti Devlet için …"

62. Cumhuriyet, 07 April 2009, Sayfa 3, Emre Kongar, "Obama'nın Mesajları"

"… demokratik ve laikliğe vurgu yaptı. Laik bir ülke olarak tanımladı. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorununu, hukuk …"

63. Cumhuriyet, 28 November 2008, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "Laikliğin Tanımı"

"… Yunanistan'la pazarlıkları sürüyor... Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu yeniden açılırsa, Fethullahçılar Yunanistan'ın …"

64. Cumhuriyet Almanya, 27 June 2008, Sayfa 6, "ABD'den Türkiye'ye eleştiri"

"… din özgürlüğünü koruyarak Rum Ortodoks Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi gayrimüslim din kuruluşlarının …"

65. Cumhuriyet, 21 June 2008, Sayfa 1, "ABD ülkeler raporu: Türkiye eleştirisi"

"… din özgürlüğünü koruyarak Rum Ortodoks Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi gayrimüslim din kuruluşlarının …"

66. Cumhuriyet, 21 June 2008, Sayfa 8, "ABD'den Türkiye'ye eleştiri"

"… arttırmasını; din özgürlüğünü koruyarak Rum Ortodoks Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gibi gayrimüslim din …"

67. Cumhuriyet, 10 May 2008, Sayfa 6, “AB’den yeni formül”

“… müzakerelerde eğitim faslının açılmasını Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmadığı için engelliyor. Sürecin …”

68. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 04 February 2008, Sayfa 4, “Batı’nın ahlaksızlığı, yalanları, yanlışları…”

“… Türkiye'ye elindeki sopayı gösteren şu açıklamayı yapıyor: "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılsın, Patrikhane sizin …”

69. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 04 February 2008, Sayfa 5, “Batı’nın ahlaksızlığı, yalanları, yanlışları…”

“… açıklamayı yapıyor: "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılsın, Patrikhane sizin Avrupa Birliği pasaportunuz." Bu …”

70. Cumhuriyet, 30 November 2007, Sayfa 10

“… sahiplerinin 35 kuruş uğruna “umuda yolculuğa” çıkan bu… Vatikan gibi küresel olsun. Üç... Heybeliada Ruhban ... Okulu açılsın... Dört... sanların yaşamları ile oynamaları gün Azınlık vakıflarının mal varlıkları …”

71. Cumhuriyet, 17 November 2007, Sayfa 11, “Kıbrıs’ta ABD sesine ihtiyaç var”

“… diyen Burns, “Heybeliada ruhban okulu yeniden açılırsa bu çok önemli dini kurumun gelecekte kendini …”

72. Cumhuriyet, 09 November 2007, Sayfa 1, Mustafa Balbay, “AB Raporu: AKP’ye Övgü, Türkiye’ye Yergi!”

“… Fener Rum Patrikhanesi’ne ekümenik sıfatı verilmeli. 4 Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı. 5 Vakıflar …”

73. Cumhuriyet, 09 November 2007, Sayfa 2

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu kapalı tutularak din adamlarının yetiştirilmesi engellenmiş. Bunları okudukça Batı ... , dinsel azınlık vakıflarının mal edinme hakları geri verilmemiş, ombudsmanlık kurulmamış, …"

74. Cumhuriyet, 09 November 2007, Sayfa 8, Mustafa Balbay, "AB Raporu: AKP'ye Övgü, Türkiye'ye Yergi!"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı. 5 Vakıflar Yasası çıkmalı. Türkiye'nin halen tartışılmakta olan sorunları …"

75. Cumhuriyet, 26 October 2007, Sayfa 17

"… patrikhanenin statüsü, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, azınlık vakıfları, anadilde yayın ve eğitim gibi başlıklar …"

76. Cumhuriyet Almanya, 05 October 2007, Sayfa 15, "Vitrindekiler"

"… statüsü, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, azınlık vakıfları, anadilde yayın ve eğitim gibi başlıklar üzerinden …"

77. Kitap Eki, 27 September 2007, Sayfa 35, "Vitrindekiler"

"… statüsü, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, azınlık vakıfları, anadilde yayın ve eğitim gibi başlıklar üzerinden …"

78. Cumhuriyet, 31 May 2007, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "Saldırı Dört Koldan…"

"… dağlarımızı, ovalarımızı delik deşik ederken susuyor, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu gündeme gelince konuşuyor …"

79. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 21 May 2007, Sayfa 4, "Milli Mücadele Stratejisi"

"… Ege, Güneydoğu Anadolu, etnik terör, sözde soykırım iddiaları, patrikhanenin statüsü, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, azınlık hakları ve vakıfları gibi konu başlıkları üzerinden Türkiye sıkıştırılırken …"

80. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 21 May 2007, Sayfa 5, “Milli Mücadele Stratejisi”

“… Ege, Güneydoğu Anadolu, etnik terör, sözde soykırım iddiaları, patrikhanenin statüsü, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, azınlık hakları ve vakıfları gibi konu başlıkları üzerinden Türkiye sıkıştırılırken …”

81. Cumhuriyet, 29 November 2006, Sayfa 2, “Çok mu Zor?”

“… ortak yönetimi deniliyor; Fırat, Dicle ırmaklarının denetlenmesi isteniliyor. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …”

82. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 27 November 2006, Sayfa 8

“… Cephe Hükümeti’nin bu kararı, zamanın Dışişleri Bakanı İhsan Sabri … ülkeleri Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …”

83. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 27 November 2006, Sayfa 9

“… Cephe Hükümeti’nin bu kararı, zamanın Dışişleri Bakanı İhsan Sabri … ülkeleri Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …”

84. Cumhuriyet, 20 November 2006, Sayfa 2

“… düşen Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorununu diline dolayıp “Özal yaşasaydı açardı” ve “Herhalde derin devlet …”

85. Cumhuriyet, 26 September 2006, Sayfa 5, “Ruhban okulu yeniden görüşülecek”

“… Tasarısı’nın Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’nun açılmasına yasal zemin hazırladığı uyarısını yapınca AKP geri adım …”

86. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 25 September 2006, Sayfa 18, “Söylem gerçeklerle örtüşmüyor”

“… Kıbrıs’ta, Ege’de, Güneydoğu Anadolu’daki gelişmelerde, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve patrikhanenin statüsüne …”

87. Cumhuriyet, 21 September 2006, Sayfa 1, “AKP’den tartışmalı değişiklik: Ruhban Okulu girişimi”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacaktır dedi. CHP’lilerin, AKP’lilere ‘Ruhban Okulu’nu açtınız, hayırlı olsun …”

88. Cumhuriyet, 21 September 2006, Sayfa 9, “AKP’den Ruhban Okulu girişimi”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacaktır dedi. CHP’lilerin, AKP’lilere ‘Ruhban Okulu’nu açtınız, hayırlı olsun …”

89. Cumhuriyet, 14 September 2006, Sayfa 1, “Rumlardan ek kriterler”

“… değinilerek, ekümenik patrikhane ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konularına atıfta bulunuyor.”

90. Cumhuriyet, 14 September 2006, Sayfa 1, “Partini bırak bakan yapalım”

“… değinilerek, ekümenik patrikhane ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konularına atıfta bulunuyor.”

91. Cumhuriyet, 14 September 2006, Sayfa 11, “Rumların, Türkiye için ek kriter listesi belli oldu”

“… ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konularına atıfta bulunuyor.”

92. Cumhuriyet, 08 September 2006, Sayfa 1, Mustafa Balbay, “349 Delikli AB Raporu!”

“Rapordaki ana ... giderilsin. AB reformları yavaşladı, hızlandırılsın. Limanlar Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi’ne açılsın. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve Patrikhane’ye ekümeniklik verilmesine ilişkin gelişme sağlansın.”

93. Cumhuriyet, 08 September 2006, Sayfa 8, Mustafa Balbay, “349 Delikli AB Raporu!”

“… hızlandırılsın. Limanlar Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi’ne açılsın. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve Patrikhane’ye ekümeniklik …”

94. Cumhuriyet Pazar, 25 June 2006, Sayfa 11, “Bir Patrik Çocukken…”

“… Rumları da etkiledi. Rumlar adayı terk etmek zorunda kaldığı gibi, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu da kapatıldı …”

95. Cumhuriyet, 14 June 2006, Sayfa 2

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılacak, bölücülüğü savunmak meşrulaştırılacak, Ermeni soykırımı tanınacak ve …”

96. Cumhuriyet, 29 April 2006, Sayfa 11, “Atina yönetimi kiliseye teslim”

“… Türkiye’ye Fener Rum Patrikhanesi ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konusundaki baskılarını sürdüren Yunanistan …”

97. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 24 April 2006, Sayfa 23, “Türkiye üzerine kitaplar”

“… kapılarına tek yanlı bağlanmasının, Kıbrıs, Ege, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, patrikhanenin statüsü …”

98. Cumhuriyet, 13 April 2006, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, “Oyalama…”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı... Ankara önceleri ‘Hemen şimdi’ diyordu, bir süredir karşı çıkıyor ... gündeme geliyor: ‘Kürtçe eğitim ve Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu’. Sanırım on gün önce bu konulara ilişkin …”

99. Cumhuriyet, 16 March 2006, Sayfa 6, “Ruhban Okulu defteri kapandı”

“… açıklamıştı. 127 YIL AÇIK KALDI Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Ortodokslar arasında teolojik konular, kurallar ve …”

100. Cumhuriyet, 07 December 2005, Sayfa 1, “Washington: Patrik Ekümenik”

“… yönelttiği soru üzerine yazılı açıklama yaptı Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Sean …”

101. Cumhuriyet, 07 December 2005, Sayfa 10, “Washington: Patrik Ekümenik”

“… açıklama yaptı Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Dışişleri Bakanlığı Sözcüsü Sean McCormack adına yayımlanan …”

102. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 06 December 2005, Sayfa 15, “Ankara üyelik denklemi kurmalı”

“… yasaklamaların devam ettiğine değiniliyor. Gerçekten de Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 1971’e kadar eğitim vermeye devam …”

103. Cumhuriyet Strateji, 14 November 2005, Sayfa 19, “Ruhban Okulu çıkmazı”

“… yapmıştır. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 1965 tarih ve 625 sayılı 'Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu'nun bazı …”

104. Cumhuriyet, 07 November 2005, Sayfa 5, “AB yolu çıkmaz sokak”

“… hakaret hoş görülecektir. Bölücülük ve terör propagandası serbest kalacaktır. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …”

105. Cumhuriyet, 21 October 2005, Sayfa 8, “Ruhban okulu için gözdağı”

“… Partisi’nin (AHP) Ortodoks Kilisesi ile düzenlediği 9 Diyalog Toplantısında, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve …”

106. Cumhuriyet, 21 October 2005, Sayfa 8, “Ruhban okulu için gözdağı”

“… Kilisesi ile düzenlediği 9. Diyalog Toplantısında, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve ekümeniklik …”

107. Cumhuriyet, 10 October 2005, Sayfa 5, “Taşeronlukla iktidar olunmaz”

“… Devleti, patrikhanenin ekümenik olma çabalan, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, bölücü terör gibi konularda …”

108. Cumhuriyet, 05 May 2005, Sayfa 1, “Schröder: İşiniz Tanrı’ya kalmış”

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun açılmasının gecikmesinin yarattığı rahatsızlığa da işaret ettiği öğrenildi …"

109. Cumhuriyet, 05 May 2005, Sayfa 8, "Schröder: İşiniz Tanrı'ya kalmış"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun açılmasının gecikmesinin yarattığı rahatsızlığa da işaret ettiği öğrenildi …"

110. Cumhuriyet, 05 February 2005, Sayfa 17

"… Avrupa Birliği'ne giriş sürecinde bu isteğin koşul oluşu, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorununun gündeme …"

111. Cumhuriyet, 07 December 2004, Sayfa 11, "Erdoğan'ın güç savaşı"

"… tanınmasının ardından Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, azınlıklar ve diğer konulardaki tüm sorunların AB kriterleri …"

112. Cumhuriyet, 03 December 2004, Sayfa 1, "Rum Patriği Türkiye'yi şikâyet etti"

"… olduğumuzu söyleyecek değiller diyerek Ankara'yı hedef aldı. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu`nu da gündeme …"

113. Cumhuriyet, 03 December 2004, Sayfa 4, Ali Sirmen, "Kendi Yarattığımız Gereksiz Sorunlar"

"… kurulmuş olan Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 126 yıl faaliyet gösterdikten sonra, Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin 1971 … Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin verdiği karar üniversite ve yüksekokullarla ilgilidir. Oysa Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …"

114. Cumhuriyet, 01 December 2004, Sayfa 8, "Alpogan: Fişleme, belge yakma yok"

"… düzeltildi. … Ruhban okulu soruldu Alpogan, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ile Yunanistan'ın tehdit olarak …"

115. Cumhuriyet, 14 October 2004, Sayfa 17, Ümit Zileli, “Gerdan Kırarak, Bel Bükerek”

“… kavramı yaratılarak, Alevilere de azınlık hakkı verilmelidir diyor! - Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılsın …”

116. Cumhuriyet, 21 September 2004, Sayfa 10, Özgen Acar, “Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Antik adı ‘Halki’ olan Heybeliada'daki …”

117. Cumhuriyet, 11 September 2004, Sayfa 3, Toktamış Ateş, “Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu”

“… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ile ilgili bir panele davetliydim. Değerli arkadaşım Dr. Halit Kakınç a, çok uzun ... engelleyecek yollar arıyorlarsa, biraz daha ‘risk’ üstlenmek zorundalar... Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, 1971 …”

118. Cumhuriyet, 29 August 2004, Sayfa 14, “Ruhban Okulu Sempozyumu”

“… ve Adalar Vakfı iş birliğiyle düzenlenen 'Adalarda Yaz Sohbetleri'nin yedincisi olan ‘Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Sempozyumu’ bugün saat 17.30'da Büyükada Su Sporları Kulübü'nde gerçekleşecek. Sempozyuma Mehmet …”

119. Cumhuriyet, 27 August 2004, Sayfa 1, Mustafa Balbay, “Ruhban Okulu… Hz. Ali Türbesi…”

“… iki durumu başlığa almamızın nedeni şu: Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve Necef'teki Hz. Ali Türbesi önceki gün gazetemizin birinci sayfasına haber oldular …”

120. Cumhuriyet, 02 August 2004, Sayfa 8, Mustafa Balbay, “Ruhban Okulu… Hz. Ali Türbesi…”

“… Türkiye'den Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Patrikhane başta olmak üzere kendi dini değerlerine yönelik istemlerde …”

121. Cumhuriyet, 25 June 2004, Sayfa 4, Oral Çalışlar, “Şu Ruhban Okulu Sorunu”

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 127 yıl boyunca Türkiye'yi bölmedi ... yararlı. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu bu ülkenin topraklan içinde 127 yıl eğitim verdi. Bu okulun varlığı …"

122. Cumhuriyet, 02 June 2004, Sayfa 11, Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Yol Haritası, Yol Ayrımı"

"… gerek. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu, Patrikhane'nin "ekümenik" olma iddiası, Ermenistan'la ilişkiler konusu da …"

123. Cumhuriyet, 24 November 2003, Sayfa 5, "Ruhban okulu bilmecesi"

"… ağızlardan "açılması gerektiği" tartışılan Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu zaten açık bulunuyor. Üstelik Milli Eğitim ... Fakat İl Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü'nden alınan bilgiye göre kamuoyu tarafından "Heybeliada Ruhban …"

124. Cumhuriyet, 03 November 2003, Sayfa 4, "Açılmasına sıcak bakıyorum"

"… Milli Eğitim Bakanı Çelik: Açılmasına sıcak bakıyorum …"

125. Cumhuriyet, 08 September 2003, Sayfa 2

"… hukukçularla birlikte gelen Fener Rum Patriği Bartholomeos'a Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılsın isteniyorsa …"

126. Cumhuriyet, 04 September 2003, Sayfa 17, "Ruhban"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu mezunudur. O dönemde yurdumuzda yaşayan Ortodoks vatandaşlarımızın yanında …"

127. Cumhuriyet, 18 May 2000, Sayfa 10, "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı"

"… Albright'tan Yunanistan'a destek 'Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı' ABD'li Ortodokslara bir …"

128. Dergi Eki, 20 February 2000, Sayfa 1, "30 Yıldır Mezunu Yok"

"… Yaklaşık otuz yıldır yeniden açılmayı bekleyen Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ÖSYM kapsamına …"

129. Dergi Eki, 20 February 2000, Sayfa 2, "Öğrencisini bekleyen üniversite"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu. Ortodoks teolojisi eğitimi verilen ve papaz yetiştiren Ruhban Okulu 1971'de …"

130. Cumhuriyet, 18 November 1999, Sayfa 9, "Dünya Liderleri İstanbul'da buluştu"

"… ziyaretinde Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konusunun açılıp açılmadığı. Gazetecilerin konukların bulunduğu salonda …"

131. Cumhuriyet, 19 October 1999, Sayfa 4, "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Türkiye'nin önünü açar"

"… adamlarının yetiştirildiği Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu 1971 ile bütün özel yüksekokulların devlete …"

132. Cumhuriyet, 23 November 1998, Sayfa 1, "Dinlerarası diyalog Ankara gündeminde"

"… yanlışlığı anlatılacak. Rum Patrik I. Barthalomeos, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Vakfı Yönetim Kurulu'nun iptalini …"

133. Cumhuriyet, 14 November 1998, Sayfa 5, "Bartholomeos Venedik'te"

"… Metropolitliği'nin merkezi olduğunu anımsattı. Bartholomeos, 'Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Vakfı Yönetim Kurulu üyelerinin …"

134. Cumhuriyet, 13 November 1998, Sayfa 8, "Yunan ve Rumlardan lobi"

"… Bakanlığı da konuya ilişkin yaptığı açıklamada, Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu Vakfı Yönetim Kurulu üyelerinin görevden alınması ABD'deki Rum ve Yunan lobisini harekete …"

135. Cumhuriyet, 13 December 1997, Sayfa 5

"… gösterilmesi bir mütekabiliyet esasıdır dedi. Heybeliada Ruhban …"

136. Cumhuriyet, 04 December 1997, Sayfa 1, "ABD'den destek"

"… politikayı izlemekteyiz" dedi. Cem, Heybeliada ruhban okulu ile ilgili olarak Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın bir …"

137. Cumhuriyet, 04 December 1997, Sayfa 17, "İsmail Cem ABD'den destek aldı"

"… politikayı izlemekteyiz dedi. Cem, Heybeliada ruhban okulu ile ilgili olarak Dışişleri Bakanlığı'nın bir …"

138. Cumhuriyet, 22 October 1997, Sayfa 9, "Patrik'ten dostluk çağrısı"

"… yardımını isteyeceği Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu konusundaki bir soruya da şu yanıtı verdi …"

139. Cumhuriyet, 03 August 1997, Sayfa 6, "Patrik'e yasal bir sıfat verilmeli"

"… İsrail'le birlikte Türkiye'ye karşı kurulmuş ve 'KiliseHanci' ittifakı var. 'Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu özerk ... olarak açılamaz. Bir de Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu meselesi var. Bu okul, özel üniversiteler kapsamına …"

140. Cumhuriyet, 20 July 1997, Sayfa 1, "Patrik'ten 5 önemli mesaj"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun açılması yönünde bir umut ışığı var mı? Buna defalarca değindim. Ruhban okulu …"

141. Cumhuriyet, 20 July 1997, Sayfa 6, "Din adına savaş dine zarar verir"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu'nun açılması yönünde bir umut ışığı var mı? Buna defalarca değindim. Ruhban okulu …"

142. Cumhuriyet, 30 April 1996, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "Keriman Halis"

"… Bu buluşma sırasında hoşgörü adı altında Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu ve Batı Trakya'da kurulması …"

143. Cumhuriyet, 08 April 1996, Sayfa 5, Hikmet Çetinkaya, "Patrik Hoca"

"… haberinin başlığına bakıyoruz: "Heybeliada, Ruhban Okulu'na karşı".. Bir gün önceki başlığı ise şu ... . Selanik'e bir Fethullahçı okul açıp. Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu sorununun çözümlenmesi için adım atmaya …"

144. Cumhuriyet, 29 August 1994, Sayfa 20, "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılmalı"

"… kuruluşunun 150. Yılı … Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı …"

145. Cumhuriyet, 09 July 1994, Sayfa 1, "Venizelos yaşasaydı her şey iyi olurdu"

"… konusunda, derhal ve kararlı bir biçimde… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu: Benzer nedenlerle onun anısını …"

146. Cumhuriyet, 09 July 1994, Sayfa 10, "Atatürk ve Venizelos olsalardı"

"… konusunda, derhal ve kararlı bir biçimde… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu: Benzer nedenlerle onun anısını …"

147. Cumhuriyet, 22 February 1992, Sayfa 19, "Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu açılsın"

"AA (Atina) Yunanistan Dışişleri Bakanı Andonis Samaras …"

148. Cumhuriyet, 14 July 1990, Sayfa 3, "Fener Patriği'nden geri adım"

"… Ruhban Okulu nun açılmasını istediklerini kaydetti. Fener Patriği Dimitrius'un ve patrikhane ... , bir soru üzerine Dimitrius: "Türkiye'de dini eşitlik ve özgürlüğe sahibiz" ne de Heybeliada …"

149. Cumhuriyet, 05 November 1967, Sayfa 1, "Kıbrıs'ta Türkler büyük prosto mitingi yaptı"

"… bulunan Athenagoras'ın yurda sokulmamasını. Patrikhane davası nedeniyle Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …"

150. Cumhuriyet, 05 November 1967, Sayfa 7, "Kıbrıs'ta Türkler büyük prosto mitingi yaptı"

"… bulunan Athenagoras'ın yurda sokulmamasını. Patrikhane davası nedeniyle Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu …"

151. Cumhuriyet, 13 April 1964, Sayfa 7, "Emilyanos"

"… Heybeliada Ruhban Okulu mezunu olan Emilyanos 1951 yılında Patrik vekilliğine seçilmiştir. Türk tâbiiyetinde …"

152. Cumhuriyet, 10 February 1962, Sayfa 5

"… Ruhban Okulu yüksek kısmını 1961 ve daha önceki yıllarda bitirmiş olanlar katılacaklardır. ... İstanbul Teknik Okulu ile Yüksek Denizcilik Okulu, Robert Kolej ve nihayet Heybeliada …"

APPENDIX B

HISTOGRAM OF CUMHURİYET NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Year	Frequency	Main developments / themes / keywords
2020	1	Tsipras
2019	4	Greek PM Tsipras's visit, minorities,
2018	4	tolerance, EU membership, Prince Islands Children's Orchestra,
2017	4	Barış Stone concert, US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson's visit
2016	0	
2015	1	reciprocity
2014	1	culture, music
2013	5	concert, 190 acres (dönüm) of HTS land returned
2012	4	EU Progress Report, Kılıçdaroğlu (main opposition) support
2011	8	'Open Door' festival, Rum Painters of Istanbul exhibition
2010	11	reciprocity, Akdamar, Vice-PM Arınç support, exhibitions, concerts
2009	19	EU Minister Bağış support, minorities initiative, legal obstacles
2008	7	Secularism, US country report
2007	11	EU Progress Report, ecumenical, minority foundations
2006	19	Government support for opening of HTS, Greek additional criteria, 'Bir Patrik Çocukken' book
2005	11	ecumenical, US State Department support, Dialogue Conference, Schröder's remarks
2004	12	Patriarchate, HTS Symposium, roadmap,
2003	4	Minister of Education Çelik support

2002	0	
2001	0	
2000	3	US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright support
1999	2	leader's summit
1998	3	Interfaith Dialogue, Greek lobby
1997	7	reciprocity, Foreign Minister İsmail Cem support, Patriarchate's legal title, war in the name of religion
1996	2	tolerance, Western Thrace
1995	0	
1994	3	Venizelos - Atatürk
1993	0	
1992	1	Greek Foreign Minister Andonis Samaras
1991	0	
1990	1	Patriarch Dimitrius
…		
1967	2	Cyprus, protest, Patriarch Athenagoras
…		
1964	1	HTS graduate Emilyanos, acting Patriarch
…		
1962	1	HTS graduation
TOTAL	152	

APPENDIX C

HALKI THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL PHOTOS

Figure 12. The outer gate of the Halki Theological School. Please note that the sign on the right reads "T.C. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Özel Heybeliada Rum Erkek Lisesi" [Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Education, Heybeliada Private Greek High School for Boys]. (Source: The author's personal archive, 23 July 2018)

Figure 13. The main entrance of the Halki Theological School with visiting Boğaziçi University MIR Program students. (Source: The author's personal archive, 30 September 2018)

Figure 14. Plan of the Halki Theological School. The pink rectangle is the main building, surrounding the Byzantine-era Monastery of the Holy Trinity. (Source: The author's personal archive, 23 July 2018)

Figure 15. A peacock strolling freely in the garden of Halki Theological School. Monastery of the Holy Trinity in the background. (Source: The author's personal archive, 23 July 2018)

Figure 16. The lawn in Halki Theological School where various public concerts were held during the term of Elpidophoros. (Source: The author's personal archive, 23 July 2018)

Figure 17. One of the classrooms of Halki Theological School maintained ready to start education. (Source: The author's personal archive, with visiting Boğaziçi University MIR Program students. 30 September 2018)

Figure 18. The dining hall of Halki Theological School, currently serving the priests, staff and visiting scholars. (Source: The author's personal archive, 30 September 2018)

Figure 19. Electric vehicles of the Halki Theological School, used for transporting visitors up and down the Hill of Hope, especially after abolishing horse carriages in the islands since summer 2020. (Source: The author's personal archive, 23 July 2018)

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