

National Identity and Ethnic Prejudice
in a Turkish Sample

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by

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Dedicated to the memory of my grandmother Müzeyyen Ersöz, and her neighbors in Kandilli,

Eftelya, Sotiru, and many others...

ABSTRACT

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The study was carried out to investigate Turkish university students' stereotypes of and attitudes toward ten ethnic groups living in urban Turkey. Within the framework of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1982), it was hypothesized that the degree of students' identification with their national and/or religious in-group would have an impact on their attitude toward ethnic minorities. It was also hypothesized that prejudicial attitudes would decline as interethnic contact and socio-economic status of the respondents increased. A modified version of Bogardus' (1928) Social Distance Scale was used to measure ethnic prejudice, and Katz & Braly's (1933) Adjective Checklist was used to identify each group's stereotypes. The results demonstrated that both national and religious identities were highly correlated, and that both identifications predicted the degree of social distance toward the out-groups, religious identity being a stronger predictor. As expected, social distance toward all groups was found to decrease as interethnic contact increased. Although there was a tendency for prejudice to decrease as socio-economic status increased, the homogeneous character of the sample in terms of SES limited the generalizability of the findings. An unexpected implication of the findings was the tendency among university students for prejudice toward some groups to be related more to perceived social class of the groups than to ethnicity per se. The results were discussed with reference to social, political, and historical background of relations with each group.

ÖZET

Milli Kimlik ve Etnik Önyargı

Bir Türk Örnekleme

Nida Bikmen

Araştırma üniversite öğrencisi Türklerin Türkiye'de kentsel alanda yaşayan başlıca 10 etnik gruba karşı tutumlarını ve bu gruplarla ilgili ne gibi kalıp yargılara (stereotip) sahip olduklarını öğrenmek amacıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Sosyal Kimlik Kuramı'na (Tajfel, 1982) uygun olarak, öğrencilerin milli ve/veya dini iç-gruplarıyla özdeşleşme derecelerinin etnik azınlıklara karşı tutumlarında etkili olacağı varsayılmıştır. Ayrıca, gruplar arası temas ve katılımcıların sosyoekonomik düzeyi arttıkça önyargılı tutumlarda bir düşüş gözleneceği beklenmiştir. Etnik önyargıyı ölçmek için Bogardus'un (1928) Sosyal Mesafe Ölçeği'nin bir adaptasyonu, her bir grup hakkındaki kalıp yargıları belirlemek içinse Katz & Braly'nin (1933) Sıfat Listesi kullanılmıştır. Sonuçlar Milli ve Dini Kimliklerin arasında güçlü bir ilişki olduğunu, ve her iki kimliğin de dış-gruplara karşı tutumları belirlediğini, ancak genel olarak Dini Kimliğin daha belirleyici bir rol oynadığını göstermiştir. Beklendiği gibi, tüm etnik gruplarla temas arttıkça sosyal mesafede düşüşe rastlanmıştır. Örneklemin sosyoekonomik değişkenler açısından homojen özellikleri, bu değişkenlerin önyargıya etkisinin incelenmesini sınırladıysa da, sosyoekonomik statü arttıkça önyargının azaldığı yönünde bir eğilim gözlenmiştir. Bazı grupların etnik kimliklerinin yanısıra ait oldukları düşünülen sosyal sınıfın da öğrencilerin önyargısında belirleyici olduğu çalışmanın işaret ettiği beklenmeyen bir etki olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bulgular, her bir grupla tarihi, sosyal ve politik ilişkiler göz önüne alınarak tartışılmıştır.

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National Identity and Ethnic Prejudice in a Turkish Sample

Introduction

Prejudice in intergroup relations is a major cause of the social problems in many parts of the world. Many social groups are targets of prejudice and discrimination: women, homosexuals, religious “heretics”, ethnic/racial/national minorities (or majorities in the case of South Africa), people from low SES, or from older age groups, and so on. Social scientists have long been interested in investigating the formation and nature of negative attitudes toward different social groups. Among this work, studies on ethnic/racial minorities constitute a large part of the literature. The present study will cover the attitudes of young Turkish students to ten ethnic groups living in Turkey.

The twentieth century has been an era of ethnic conflict and internecine wars because of such conflict. Many populations in the world consist of groups with different religious, ethnic, or racial backgrounds. Turkey is one such population with a rich mosaic of different ethnic and religious groups. Not surprisingly, this diversity has given rise to some political and social conflicts, including terrorist movements. This study attempted to explore some of the social consequences of ethnic diversity in Turkey. Mainly, it investigated the relation of the national and religious identity of Turkish youth to attitudes toward ethnic groups. In this section, first, a review of research and major theories on ethnic prejudice and ethnic stereotypes is presented; then, national identity as one form of social identity is examined. Finally, a brief historical background on the formation of national identity and ethnic relations in Turkey provides a better understanding of the hypothesized relationship between the two constructs.

ETHNIC PREJUDICE

Gordon Allport (1954), in his classic work, defined prejudice as "... an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group" (p. **). Allport stressed that prejudice is formed without sufficient warrant, and persists despite contrary evidence. He distinguished between attitudinal, belief, and behavioral components of prejudice, and described the interrelated nature of these components. Prejudicial attitude must be related to an overgeneralized belief, and it is usually acted out. Maluso (1995) has made a similar distinction of components of interpersonal racism as consisting of prejudice, stereotypical beliefs, and overt discriminatory behavior. Stereotypes are dealt with later in this review; first studies on ethnic prejudice are reviewed.

Duckitt (1992) shows how different theories and approaches to explaining prejudice have been dominant in different historical periods. Duckitt's review demonstrates how psychological understanding of prejudice moved from identifying the deficiencies of minorities at the turn of the century to explaining their unfair stigmatization in the 1920s, to identifying universal and personal differences in the 1930s and 1950s, and to sociocultural perspectives such as social transmission and intergroup dynamics of prejudice in the '60s and '70s. By the end of '70s, a more cognitive perspective emerged in understanding universal psychological processes underlying intergroup conflict and prejudice with the appearance of a strong European influence. However, no single cause of prejudice could be identified. It seems that prejudice is caused by an integration of many factors. Recently, the definition of prejudice has become more complex with the emergence of the distinction between blatant, i.e. traditional, hot, close, and direct prejudice, and subtle, i.e. modern, cool, distant, and indirect forms of prejudice, as a result of the development of a norm against prejudice in modern societies (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995).

A complete understanding of ethnic prejudice should take into account how these attitudes develop in the first place. This is probably why the majority of the studies on the issue are conducted with children or adolescents. Aboud & Skerry (1984) reviewed the work conducted until the '80s in the U.S.A and Canada on the development of ethnocentrism in children, mostly with white and black children. They argued that processes related to social cognitive development are responsible for ethnic attitudes. They focused on questions such as the age at which children acquire own-group and other-group attitudes, how these attitudes develop after the age of onset, and what psychological factors contribute to this development. As a result they found out that racial attitudes emerge at around age 4, they peak during middle childhood, and decline with adolescence. While majority children express strong in-group preferences, minority children usually express more preference and positive evaluations of the majority group at early ages, but develop increasing favorability toward the in-group.

More recent studies focusing on cognitive processes found with various samples that children's ethnic attitude development was very closely related to their cognitive developmental stage as defined by Piagetian principles, such as the mastery of conservation (Doyle, Beaudet, and Aboud, 1988), and that their memory is poorer for racial stereotype-inconsistent material (Bigler & Liben, 1993). All these studies indicate that prejudice is expected to decline with age. However, Black-Gutman & Hickson (1996) found that the oldest group of children in their Australian sample showed the same level of prejudice as did the youngest group toward Aborigines. They explained their finding in terms of environmental-learning factors. Older children were about to enter the "adult world" and were more aware of adult attitudes and social norms, thus expressed more negativity toward other groups.

It is apparent that these developmental patterns would not be confirmed in a Turkish sample, since perceptual factors play a crucial role in the formation of a racial in-group, and

ethnic groups in Turkey are not as visible as Blacks or Asians are in U. S. A, for example. For that reason, studies conducted with different ethnic background but same-race groups rather than those conducted with different-race groups would provide better insights for a Turkish study of ethnic relationships.

Tajfel (1982) reviewed the contributions of two lines of research on intergroup relations, that is, the effects of intergroup competition, and those of social comparison. The former line of research focused on intergroup conflict based on competition for scarce resources, on the effects of unequal status and power in intergroup relations. However, Tajfel et al. (1971; cited in Duckitt, 1992) reported that individuals divided into groups with minimal criteria, that is on a completely arbitrary basis, with no contact between groups, and no realistic basis for conflict of interest, showed in-group bias and discrimination. The mere perception of belonging to a certain group was sufficient to produce negative attitudes toward the out-group, and positive ones toward the in-group. Turner, Brown & Tajfel (1979) further found that in a similar minimal intergroup paradigm, individuals may sacrifice personal and group gains in terms of money in order to achieve intergroup differences favoring the in-group, as opposed to the expectations of a realistic conflict view which would suggest that they would maximize the in-group profit without paying attention to the difference. These findings led to the understanding of intergroup bias and discrimination as inevitable outcomes of normal, universal cognitive processes.

The Social Identity Theory, developed in the light of these findings (Tajfel, 1982), suggests that the social group with which the person identifies and perceives himself to be a member functions as a source of positive self-evaluation. In other words, the person idealizes the in-group and devalues the out-group in order to enhance his/her self-esteem. This is done by accentuating within-group similarities and between-group differences, to establish a positive in-group distinctiveness. The need for distinctiveness was also

emphasized by Brewer (1997). In her model of "optimal distinctiveness", she stated that humans have two opposing needs: "a desire for belonging that motivates immersion in social groups" and "a need for differentiation from others". Brewer argued that social identification with "distinctive" groups satisfies both needs simultaneously.

Another dimension of this accentuation is the "depersonalization" of the out-group members, that is, their perception as undifferentiated members of a given category. This phenomenon, together with social stereotyping, tends to increase as intergroup relations get worse (Tajfel, 1982).

Recent studies testing social identity theory in ethnic group relations had confirming results. Individuals differ in the degree to which they identify with their group and this has important implications for their evaluations of the in-group and out-group. Verkuyten (1991) compared the in-group vs. out-group preferences of Turkish, Moroccan, and Surinamese adolescents living in the Netherlands, and found that the importance given to a positive ethnic identity rather than the mere self-description in terms of ethnic origin was associated with stronger in-group preference. In a later study, Masson & Verkuyten (1993) concentrated on the preferences of Dutch adolescents who live in an environment with a high percentage of ethnic minority youth, i.e. the three groups mentioned above. Again, the more positively the Dutch identity was evaluated, the greater level of in-group preference was observed. Interestingly, although the Dutch were not the majority in the environment, they had few contacts with the other ethnic groups, but increased contact was associated with less in-group formation and preference.

While Social Identity Theory stresses the motivational dynamics in intergroup relations, Self-categorization Theory emphasizes the cognitive processes (Turner, 1997). The theory also starts with the distinction between personal and social identities, but argues that these are two levels of identity rather than different forms of identity. People's cognition

depends on the level of identity (social or personal) that is salient in a given context. In line with the theory, Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998) found that when personal identity was salient, prejudice toward the out-group was mainly affected by personality variables such as authoritarianism, whereas when social identity was salient, it was affected by in-group stereotypes.

In sum, ethnic prejudice seems to result from the formation of an in-group which serves as the reference group on the basis of which the person evaluates him/herself. Idealizing the group stems from the need to enhance self-esteem. However, not all members of a given group show the same in-group bias to the same degree. As the identification with the in-group increases, the need to view the in-group more positively and distinct from other groups also increases, leading to derogation of the others. The key factor in the relation of social identity to intergroup prejudice, therefore, is the degree to which the person identifies with his/her in-group. This is also in line with Deaux (1993) who argued that social identities must be considered with the personal meaning that is attached to them.

Racial/ethnic prejudice in children is usually measured using projective techniques like the Katz & Zalk Projective Test (1976; cited in Katz & Zalk, 1978), or several Social Distance measures which require the child to place a target figure representing himself as close to other figures varying in race and sex (Katz & Zalk, 1978; Powlishta et. al., 1994). Doll preference techniques which required the children to choose between dolls with different racial features were also used frequently until the 1970's (Aboud & Skerry, 1984).

Studies done with older subjects most often use open-ended or scaled questionnaires. Some researchers ask their subjects to indicate their degree of liking for a group on an attitude thermometer with degrees from 0 to 100 (Ulgen, 1998). A useful technique is the Social Distance Scale developed by Bogardus (1928; cited in Allport, 1954). This scale asks the respondents to indicate whether they would admit the target group to a number of social

situations ranging from excluding the group from their country to accepting them as close kin by marriage. The present study used an adaptation of the Social Distance Scale.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, ethnic attitudes are thought to be mediated by beliefs about the characteristics of the ethnic groups. The next section will review the work on these perceived characteristics, that is, ethnic stereotypes.

ETHNIC STEREOTYPES

Stereotypes were first defined as incorrect and illogical generalizations that are rigidly resistant to new information (Lippman, 1922; cited in McCauley et. al., 1980). Later, this illogical and incorrect nature of stereotypes was questioned by researchers. Stereotypes do not need to be incorrect by definition. In fact, stereotypes help individuals, who have limited cognitive processing capacity, to form anticipations that are attached to categories of people and events, since there is no time nor energy to deal with every member of a group individually (Brown, 1965). Furthermore, though it is true that people attribute stereotypes to groups of people without sufficient warrant, they do not hold those stereotypes with regard to every single member of that group. McCauley et al. (1980) suggested a new definition of stereotyping as differential trait attribution or differential prediction based on group membership. Accordingly, stereotypes are probabilistic generalizations rather than all-or-none. Since they are probabilistic in nature, the argument that they are incorrect is also not easy to confirm.

According to McCauley et. al. (1980) a stereotype can be misused when its predictions are relied on too heavily. This can occur either by relying on a stereotype when more information is available or by stereotype bias of the data of memory and perception.

Stereotypes are conceptualized as the cognitive component of intergroup discrimination; however, studies do not consistently yield significant correlations between

stereotypes and prejudice. Several studies attempted to explain this lack of relationship between the two components.

Devine (1989) distinguished between knowledge of a cultural stereotype and personal belief about the social group which it applies to, that is the endorsement of the stereotype. Both high and low-prejudiced persons in a society know the cultural stereotypes of different social groups as a result of the similar socialization experiences. However, low-prejudiced persons actively control and inhibit the effects that these stereotypes may have on their attitudes and behavior. Devine demonstrated that both high- and low-prejudiced subjects made stereotype-congruent evaluations of ambiguous behaviors when their ability to consciously monitor stereotype activation was inhibited by a stereotype priming procedure. That is, automatic activation of stereotypes had similar effects on both low- and high-prejudiced persons. However, when subjects were asked about their personal beliefs and feelings about the stereotyped group, important distinctions emerged between high- and low-prejudiced persons, where high prejudiced subjects expressed predominantly negative trait thoughts, as opposed to low-prejudiced subjects who expressed predominantly positive belief thoughts. Devine argued that rather than interpreting these results as the inevitability of prejudice, it is better to conceive nonprejudiced attitudes as "a function of intentional, controlled processes and require a conscious decision to behave in a nonprejudiced fashion" (p. 15).

In line with Devine's reasoning Krueger (1996) investigated the relationship between personal beliefs and cultural stereotypes with Black and White Americans. A model of social projection provided the theoretical framework. Krueger reasoned that people tend to believe that their beliefs, feelings, ideas and acts are what the majority of the group in which they live believe, feel, think and do. As such, one's perception of cultural stereotypes will be correlated with one's personal beliefs about group characteristics. Consistently, he found that

people overproject from their own personal beliefs about group characteristics to what they believe to be the cultural stereotype about that group. They also expect out-group members to have personal beliefs that are correlated with what they think the out-group's cultural stereotypes are. There was a considerable degree of interrater agreement for both kinds of ratings, i.e. for personal beliefs and cultural stereotypes, pointing out the shared nature of stereotypes. Finally, participants in both groups underestimated the favorability of the other group's personal beliefs and cultural stereotypes about their own (the participants') group. This last finding is interpreted by Krueger as a facilitating factor for intergroup hostility.

Kleinpenning & Hagendoorn (1991) found out that context-specific stereotypes, which refer to "the way in which any member of a given group is expected to behave in a specific setting or role" (p. 332), predict better evaluation of interethnic contact than do general stereotypes. They also compared the efficiency of diagnostic ratios, i.e., the typicality of a certain characteristic for a certain ethnic group in comparison with people in general, versus percentage scores, i.e. beliefs about the extent to which members of a certain group have a certain characteristic, as predictors of ethnic contact evaluation, and found out that, as opposed to McCauley et al.'s (1980) argument, diagnostic ratios are not better predictors of prejudice than are percentage scores.

Stephan et al. (1994), on the other hand, argued that the studies which have failed to find consistent correlations between stereotypes and prejudice toward ethnic groups have ignored affect and emotions related to stereotypes but focused on measures of stereotypes that employed indexes of the degree to which the group was stereotyped. Categorizing the traits in the stereotypes into positive and negative groups would reveal more significant relationships between stereotypes and attitudes toward social groups. In fact, in Stephan et al.'s research, adding the stereotype/evaluation index to the hierarchical regression analyses of emotional reactions to three national groups, increased the amount of variance that was

accounted for. The more favorable the traits in a stereotype were perceived to be, the more positive the emotional response was to the group. Thus, there appears to be a direct relationship between the affect associated with the traits in the stereotype and emotional reactions to the group. Also, components of stereotypes were found to be more powerful and consistent predictors of emotional reactions to the national groups than the various personality traits which were found to be associated with prejudice in earlier research, such as authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, self-esteem, empathy, and attributional complexity. These results suggest that modifying stereotype components may be a more reasonable way to reduce prejudice than trying to change personality traits.

The specific mood of people while attributing characteristics to social groups was also found to be important. In a series of studies Esses & Zanna (1995) demonstrated that when people are in a negative mood their descriptions of different ethnic groups tend to be even more negative if they already have slightly unfavorable stereotypes of these groups. The negative mood exerts its influence on stereotypes by changing the meaning attached to different characteristics used to describe the group.

In sum, stereotypes' influence on ethnic attitudes seems to depend on people's conscious monitoring of the cultural stereotypes, on the context-specificity of the stereotype, on the desirability of the stereotype traits, and on the individual's mood while stereotyping.

The best known measure of stereotypes is Katz & Braly's (1933) adjective checklist method. In this measure, subjects are presented with a list of 84 adjectives and asked to select the 5 which are most representative of the group in question. The measure revealed the collective nature of stereotypes and their relative permanence over time.

Katz & Braly's checklist method has been criticized for not providing a measure of individual stereotyping but only of social stereotypes, for artificially forcing people to stereotype, and for its inability to identify idiosyncratic personal stereotypes (McCauley et.

al., 1982). Nevertheless, the present study used an adaptation of Katz & Braly's adjective checklist method to measure ethnic stereotypes. Because it was an exploratory study, the focus was on shared stereotypes, rather than personal ones. Nevertheless, subjects were free to add adjectives that do not exist on the list, but which they thought describe the group. Furthermore, the respondents were not forced to stereotype since they could leave the stereotype question unanswered if they felt they did not have any idea about the target group. The favorability of each adjective in the checklist was also assessed which provided a better index of stereotyping with an evaluative component.

The next section reviews research on national identity as one form of social identity relating to prejudice toward minorities and ethnic groups.

NATIONAL IDENTITY

Smith (1992) commented on the rise of nationalism and tribalism after the major events of the early 1990s, such as the Gulf War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the break up of the Soviet Union, and suggested that the readiness to form groups and to favor the groups we belong to stems from an existential need to create meaning in our lives. Human beings are "seekers and creators of meaning about self and the world", and this meaning was provided by religion or myths in earlier times, and by science and progress in modern times. But the destructive events of the 20th century, such as the two world wars, the Holocaust, collapse of Communism, and the prospects of global disaster, resulted in a general loss of faith in progress. People need something beyond themselves to believe in, to devote themselves to, and it is this existential need that ties one's sense of identity to his/her group membership, and leads him/her to favor the in-group and undermine the out-group. Ethnocentrism serves this basic human need to give meaning to one's existence.

National identity is different from ethnic identity for it is not developed in response to the perception of discrimination by the dominant group as Phinney (1990) suggests in her three stage-model of ethnic identity development, but rather, it is constructed by the dominant group itself. National identity is defined as a belief about how an individual views his/her country (Larsen et. al. 1992), or as attitudes having emotional significance "that involve some concept of nation as an entity" (Feather, 1981). It is shared by a significant number of the people in a nation although differing in the degree of intensity across different members and times. Both historical and contemporary factors are influential in its formation. National identity is constructed and mediated by social institutions. The primary social institutions by which national identity is transmitted are the family, school systems, religious institutions, media, and government (Larsen et. al. 1992). In other words, national identity is transmitted to the developing individual by socialization agents.

Larsen et. al. (1992) investigated the components of national identity in different national groups. They were primarily interested in the collective nature of national identity, that is, whether national descriptions would cluster around some central dimensions or they would be mostly idiosyncratic. If a common identity exists, the researchers expected it to be consistent across different social groups.

The nations under study were Americans, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Greeks. Overall the results confirmed the shared nature of the national identity within a nation, and yielded some unique dimensions across nations such as the deeply pessimistic outlook of the Hungarians, the fatalism of the Bulgarians, and hospitality of the Greeks. For the U.S. based samples, a remarkable concordance was obtained between various social groups, supporting the presence of a common national identity. Further, foreign students living in the U.S.A had very similar views on U.S. national identity, adding a dimension of validity to the identity components. In comparison to other samples, the U.S. national identity emerges as outer

directed, based largely on sociopolitical values and norms. By contrast, other samples attributed more responses to "personality" and individually based components.

Feather (1981) compared the attitudes of a sample of indigenous Papua New Guinea students with Australian expatriate students living in PNG, and Australian non-expatriate students living in Australia. At the time of the study Papua New Guinea had been independent for 6 years after many years of Australian control. It was predicted that PNG students would show stronger identification with their newly independent nation than Australian expatriate and non-expatriate students, and that their self-image would intertwine with the ideas about the new nation .

Results confirmed both hypotheses. Indigenous students were not only more strongly identified with their nation than their Australian counterparts, but also they had parallel evaluations of their own and of Papua New Guinea's past and present, and more optimistic expectations for their own and their nation's future indicating some merging of self-concept and nation. The authors suggested several factors for the unusual strength of national identification just after a nation has been founded. These included social influence processes (mass media, national leaders, and the larger population) which promote strong attitudes of national identification in a nation about to become independent, cognitive consistency pressures among those who supported the decision to become a new nation, group cohesion which increases as the threats to the survival of a group increase, and the creation of a new categorization, i.e. nation, as the new basis of in-group – out-group distinction.

There also are cases in which a strong national identity is not necessarily accompanied by a positive in-group evaluation. In a series of studies with Polish and Dutch university students, Mlicki & Ellemers (1996) found that Polish students had stronger national identity but, interestingly, they also reported more negative national characteristics than their Dutch counterparts. Both negative and positive national characteristics generated by the Poles were

perceived as highly distinctive traits of Polish people. The researchers concluded that the need to be distinct may take precedence over the desire to be more positive than the comparison groups, which, in the Polish case makes sense when we think of their struggle to protect the Polish culture from centuries of external dangers (Davies, 1986; cited in Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). Another interesting finding of the study was that in addition to a strong national identity, Polish students showed a stronger European identity which is explained by Poles' desire to join the European Community. This finding suggests that motivational factors are as important in the identification process as are cognitive factors. It also suggests that different levels of identification are not mutually exclusive.

In the present study national identity was operationalized as the importance given to being a Turk. Ethnic/national identity is usually measured by open-ended or scaled questions such as "To what extent do you identify yourself with being a Turk?", or "How important is it for you to be a Turk?", as well as the Twenty Statements Test (TST) developed by Kuhn & McPartland (1954), and which requires the respondents to generate 20 answers to the "Who am I" question. The present study used a combination of these measures.

TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY AND PREJUDICE AGAINST OUT-GROUPS

Turkish identity has been the problem of the Turkish intelligentsia for more than a hundred years. The Ottoman Empire had an ethnically diverse population and although the ruling class was Turkish, they were, nevertheless, not ethnically pure; intermarriages were common (Keyder, 1993). The rise of nationalism around the world as well as among the populations of the Empire led to concerns about a unifying element. Various ideologies were suggested at that time. In the Republican period, this unifying element became Turkish nationality. In the Ottoman era, no one would define himself as a Turk; they were Ottomans, and the appellation "Turk" had pejorative connotations. The new Republic could not found

itself on the Ottoman identity, for its leaders unequivocally rejected the Ottoman cultural heritage (Güvenç, 1997). Hence, the republican elite promoted nationalism as the official ideology and the principal tool for modernization, which was conceived, at that time, to be synonymous with westernization (Keyder, 1993).

The adoption of Turkish nationality as the official identity required certain policies to raise the self-esteem of Turkish people which were disdained by European countries for a long period of time from the beginning of the Empire's decline and fall. These policies included the creation of an official history to be taught in schools (Güvenç, 1997). Turkish identity was constructed and transmitted to the young citizens by socialization agents, and primarily by schools.

Although this "Turkish Identity" was constructed to encompass all people who would define themselves as Turks, including all ethnic groups, the view of the non-Muslim minorities as collaborators with external enemies led to some discriminatory governmental policies in the period between 1930s and 1960s (see Aktar, 1996; Karabatak, 1996; Köker, 1997, for more information). On the other hand, Kurds, a Muslim ethnic group, have only recently obtained the right to speak their own language and practice their customs (Robbins, 1996). The main purpose of this study was to investigate some of the social consequences of these policies, in terms of ethnic stereotyping and prejudice.

There are nearly 40 ethnic groups in Turkey but not every one of them is recognized by the society at large (Andrews, 1989). Most of them are assimilated into the dominant culture, or live in very closed environments so that they are not known by ordinary urban people. The ten groups which were investigated in this study are the groups best known in urban settings, and they relatively have a more recognized ethnic identity

Another aspect of the ideology of Republican Turkey was secularism. Religious attachment was seen as a force against modernization and nationalization. However, the rise

of Islamist movements in the mid '80s was interpreted by some scholars as the "return of the repressed" (Robbins, 1996). Ülgen (1998) pointed out the duality of identity among Turks in her investigation of the stereotypes attributed to nine national groups by Turkish university students. She suggested that Turkish people differ in the importance they give to their Turkish national identity and their Muslim identity. Consistently, her sample consisted of students who emphasized either their Turkish identity more than their Muslim identity or vice versa, and a small group who gave equal importance to both identities. These differing emphases on the two identities had differential effects on attitudes toward national groups. Those who declared Turkish identity to be more important than their Muslim identity perceived the non-Muslim nations as their in-groups, and the Muslim nations as the out-groups, and vice versa. Ülgen has also shown the influence of political relations with the nations in question at the time of study, and of the official discourse about these nations, especially about Greeks, on attitudes toward these nations.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The present study was similar to Ülgen's study, in the sense that Turkish students' attitude toward different groups and characteristics attributed to them were examined. The difference was that in the current study the groups under examination were domestic minorities instead of foreign national groups. The groups were Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Georgians, the Laz, Armenians, Gypsies, Jews, Greeks, and Assyrians. The first five of these groups are Muslim. Circassians, Georgians and the Laz do not usually claim a separate and strong ethnic identity, and they are not considered as such by the larger public except for the Laz who are usually ridiculed by common jokes. Gypsies were originally Christian but a considerable number among them are converted Muslims. Nevertheless, they are not considered by the general public to have a strong religious attachment (Andrews, 1989).

The study of ethnic relations in Turkey would provide a different account of prejudice. As I indicated earlier, these people are not visible as racial groups are in America, nor are they immigrant laborers as the ethnic groups that are investigated in most European countries are, but they have lived on the same land for centuries side by side with Turks.

This was mostly an exploratory study since it is the first social psychological study conducted on ethnic relations in Turkey. One must be cautious in applying Ulgen's findings to this study, particularly the perception of Muslim groups as in-groups by those who value their Muslim Identity more than their national identity and vice versa. This is because non-Muslim groups would be conceived as the out-group by both Muslim and Turkish Identity holders, for different reasons. For those who valued their Muslim Identity these groups would be the out-group because of their religious beliefs, and for those who valued their national identity they would be the out-group because of their perceived closeness to other nations. Thus, it was expected that there would be no difference between the two identity groups in terms of their attitudes toward the non-Muslim ethnic groups. The Muslim groups, on the other hand, were expected to be evaluated no differently than Turks, except for the Kurds who were expected to be the target of negative attitudes because of their perceived closeness to some terrorist movements. The Gypsies on the other hand would be negatively evaluated by both Turkish and Muslim Identity holders because of their low socio-economic status (they generally occupy non-prestigious jobs), and their perceived lack of religious faith.

In other words, prejudice was expected to arise toward the groups who claim, or are considered by the general public, to have a separate ethnic identity. Turkish ethnic policy has been the melting of all ethnic groups into a single Turkish Identity (Robbins, 1996) rather than promoting multiculturalism. The Circassians, Georgians and the Laz have been assimilated into the dominant culture, and are considered by the general public as Turks. The Kurds, Gypsies, and the non-Muslim groups have emphasized their own ethnic identity

besides their Turkish Identity (Andrews, 1989). This leads to the prediction that they are more readily perceived as the out-group by Turks, both Muslim and secular.

In addition, the prejudice toward these groups was expected to diminish as interethnic contact increases, as demonstrated by several earlier studies (Masson & Verkuyten, 1993, Katz & Zalk, 1978). Formal education was also shown to be negatively related to prejudice in a European study (Wagner & Zick, 1995). However, in this study all respondents were university students, i.e. there was no difference in their formal educational level. Nevertheless, the impact of social class on prejudice was explored by questions about the income, occupational, and educational level of the parents.

HYPOTHESES

1. It was expected that higher scores on in-group identifications (either Turkish and/or Muslim identity) would be associated with more prejudice against the groups who have a separate ethnic identity, that is, Kurds, Gypsies, Armenians, Jews, Assyrians, and Greeks.
2. It was expected that the groups who do not have separate ethnic identity, that is, Circassians, Georgians, and the Laz, would not be evaluated more negatively than Turks by high scorers on in-group identifications (either Turkish identity or Muslim identity).
3. Prejudice was expected to decline with more interethnic contact.
4. Prejudice was expected to decline as subjects' socio-economic status as measured by the parents' educational, occupational, and income level increases.

Method

Respondents: A total of 285 students taking an introductory psychology course in Boğaziçi University participated in the study. Among them, 13 Kurdish, 15 Laz, 4 Greek, 4 Jewish, 1 Armenian, 1 Bosnian (not a Turkish citizen), 2 Circassians, 1 Georgian, and 1 Cyprus citizen were excluded from the analyses. In addition, 5 questionnaires were discarded because of inconsistent responses. The remaining 240 subjects (149 female, 91 male) were between the ages 17 and 25, and their mean age was 19.8.

The majority of the respondents (40.0%) were from public foreign language high schools (Anadolu Lisesi), public schools (21.7%) and private foreign language high schools (19.6%). The remaining 18.7% were mainly from super high schools, Science schools, and a small minority from religious (Imam Hatip Lisesi) vocational high schools. Most respondents described themselves as middle (29.4%) and upper middle class (51.1%), and a few rated themselves as lower middle class and as rich. The majority of the parents were university graduates (56.3% of fathers, 39.7% of mothers), and high school graduates (21.4% and 32.1%, respectively). The majority of the fathers were professionals (32.7%) and small business owners (19.5%), while 52.1% of the mothers were housewives, 19.7% were civil servants, and 16.7% were retired.

Instruments: National Identity was assessed by a short version of the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954), that is, by 10 statements as answers to the question "Who am I?". Responses were classified according to whether the subject mentioned being Muslim and/or Turkish among his/her responses. However, only 19.2% of the respondents mentioned being Turkish, and 6.3% Muslim among their responses to the "Who am I?" question. In addition, subjects were asked to answer 4 seven-point scaled questions about the importance they give to their Turkish and Muslim Identities (see Appendix A). The correlation coefficient between the two questions measuring the Turkish Identity was .90, and between

the two questions measuring Muslim Identity was .913. The means were calculated for each pair of questions and, these means constituted the measures of Turkish and Muslim Identities. The correlation coefficient between these two identity measures was .679, $p < .001$.

Ethnic stereotypes were assessed by the Katz & Braly (1933) Adjective Checklist (see Appendix B). Respondents were asked to select from the list 6 adjectives that they believe best describe each target ethnic group. They were not limited to the adjectives in the list but were free to add others if they were felt to be more descriptive of the group. Respondents also rated the adjectives on the list as to how desirable they believed each trait to be on a 5-point scale ranging from very desirable to not desirable at all. For each adjective a mean desirability score was calculated.

Ethnic prejudice was assessed by an adaptation of the Bogardus' Social Distance Scale (see Appendix C). The scale asks the respondents to indicate whether they would admit the target group to a number of social situations ranging from excluding the group from their country to accepting them as close kin by marriage (Owen et al. 1981). There were 8 steps in the present adaptation of the scale. The steps were: excluding from the country; accepting the citizen rights; to work in the same place; to the same class in school; to the neighborhood; to close friendship; to kinship by marriage; and to marry him/herself. Subjects were required to answer the questions for each of the ten groups. The social distance score for each group was calculated according to the closest step to which the group was accepted. If a respondent accepted a member of a certain group to marry him/herself he/she had a social distance score of 1 for that group. If the respondent indicated that he does not want the group in his country, he had a social distance score of 8. If the subject accepted the group to the neighborhood but not to closer relationships, he/she had a social distance score of 4, and so on.

Ethnic contact was assessed by 6 questions like "Do you have a neighbor from ethnic group X?", "Do you have a close friend from ethnic group X", etc. (see Appendix D). These

questions aimed to discover how many one to one encounters a subject had in his/her life with members of each group. The contact measure was calculated by summing across types of encounter for each group.

In addition, the respondents completed a biographical data form, which included questions on age, gender, education, parents' education, parents' occupation, and economic class (see Appendix E).

Procedure: Subjects signed up to participate in the study, and received one credit in return. They were not told about the content of the questionnaire before the study began. They were asked not to indicate their names or ID numbers on the questionnaires, and to respond honestly. It took an average of 30 minutes to complete the questionnaire.

Results

Stereotypes

Table 1 presents the mean desirability scores of each groups' stereotypes, and Table 2 presents the ten adjectives most frequently assigned to each of the 10 groups.

Table 1
Mean desirability scores of the ten groups' stereotypes (n=240)

	<i>Mean Desirability</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>
Circassian	3.81	.865
Laz	3.52	1.119
Georgian	3.49	.979
Turk	3.27	.986
Jew	3.09	.965
Greek	3.03	1.031
Syrian	3.01	1.016
Gypsy	2.76	.957
Armenian	2.74	1.233
Kurd	2.43	.961

Range of the scores: 1: definitely not desirable: 2: not desirable: 3: neither desirable nor undesirable:
4: desirable: 5: very desirable

Table 2
Ten adjectives most frequently assigned to the ethnic groups (n=240)

TURKS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Hospitable	115	47.9	4.29
Traditional	107	44.6	2.91
Close to family	85	35.4	4.15
Patriotic	82	34.2	4.09
Lazy	67	27.9	1.54
Warm	65	27.1	4.57
Religious	54	22.5	2.61
Bold	51	21.3	4.45
Helpful	41	17.1	4.44
Honorable	40	16.7	4.15
Missing	2	0.8	

CIRCIASSIANS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Traditional	66	27.5	3.30
Close to family	52	21.7	4.08
Hospitable	43	17.9	4.26
Friendly	40	16.7	4.90
Warm	38	15.8	4.45
Hardworking	35	14.6	4.51
Bold	33	13.8	4.39
Trustworthy	31	12.9	4.90
Ambitious	27	11.3	4.59
Honest	25	10.4	4.80
Don't know	66	27.5	

GEORGIANS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Traditional	32	13.3	3.16
Patriotic	22	9.2	3.86
Friendly	26	10.8	4.10
Close to family	21	8.8	4.69
Peace loving	19	7.9	4.58
Cold	18	7.5	1.78
Ambitious	17	7.1	4.65
Hospitable	17	7.1	4.24
Hardworking	16	6.7	4.31
Trustworthy	16	6.7	4.94
Don't know	118	49.2	

LAZ

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Witty	94	39.2	4.52
Warm	71	29.6	4.55
Talkative	70	29.2	4.01
Hardworking	65	27.1	4.40
Traditional	58	24.2	2.90
Naive	57	23.8	2.23
Honorable	39	15.8	4.34
Hospitable	38	16.3	4.23
Practical	37	15.4	4.62
Close to family	32	13.3	4.00
Don't know	11	4.6	

ASSYRIANS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Traditional	41	17.1	2.70
Religious	40	16.7	3.24
Conservative	31	12.9	1.39
Calm	25	10.4	2.48
Serious	18	7.5	3.33
Close to family	14	5.8	4.14
Peace loving	14	5.8	4.71
Friendly	13	5.4	4.69
Cold	13	5.4	1.62
Hardworking	12	5.0	4.33
Don't know	127	52.9	

GREEKS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Traditional	53	22.1	2.92
Untrustworthy	49	20.4	1.18
Calculating	44	18.3	1.32
Fun-loving	41	17.1	3.93
Religious	38	15.8	2.84
Diplomatic	36	15.0	3.64
Hardworking	35	14.6	4.31
Hypocritical	34	14.2	1.24
Cultured	34	14.2	4.74
Civilized	31	12.9	4.65
Don't know	33	13.8	

JEWS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Hardworking	104	43.3	4.47
Religious	80	33.3	2.55
Traditional	74	30.8	3.16
Intelligent	51	21.3	4.86
Very religious	48	20.0	2.10
Ambitious	47	19.6	4.66
Materialist	41	17.1	2.22
Racist	40	16.7	1.08
Extreme nationalist	37	15.4	1.65
Sneaky	32	13.3	1.56
Don't know	15	6.3	

ARMENIANS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Untrustworthy	48	20.0	1.13
Vindictive	41	17.1	1.90
Hardworking	40	16.7	4.48
Extreme nationalist	39	16.3	1.49
Treacherous	37	15.4	1.16
Traditional	37	15.4	2.86
Sneaky	36	15.0	1.36
Unlikable	32	13.3	1.31
Hypocritical	30	12.5	1.13
Racist	27	11.3	1.30
Don't know	32	13.3	

KURDS

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Ignorant	81	33.8	1.02
Aggressive	67	27.9	1.91
Traditional	61	25.4	3.20
Vulgar	57	23.8	1.30
Dirty	44	18.3	1.41
Treacherous	43	17.9	1.19
Untrustworthy	40	16.7	1.18
Narrow-minded	38	15.8	1.11
Extreme nationalist	37	15.4	1.35
Racist	37	15.4	1.24
Don't know	12	5.0	

GYPSIES

	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Des. Score</i>
Fun loving	148	61.7	3.75
Dirty	97	40.4	1.20
Ignorant	96	40.0	1.01
Untrustworthy	84	35.0	1.17
Warm	66	27.5	4.55
Lazy	63	26.3	1.41
Talkative	59	24.6	4.14
Witty	43	17.9	4.56
Independence loving	43	17.9	4.56
Vulgar	38	15.8	1.37
Don't know	9	3.8	

Social Distance

Table 3 shows the mean social distance scores of each of the ten groups. Accordingly, Turks had the lowest social distance score (1.08) while Gypsies had the highest (4.05) on a scale ranging from 1 to 8. The frequencies of the last steps to which each ethnic group is accepted is shown in Table 4. Turks had the highest frequency of being admitted on the first step of the Social Distance scale, i.e. to marriage (95.4%) while Gypsies were admitted to that step by only 22.8% of the sample. On the other hand, Armenians and Kurds had the highest frequency of being excluded from the country (19.7% and 18.2%, respectively) while the Turks, Circassians and the Laz had nearly no such rating.

Certain respondents (11.7%) declared that they do not want some groups in their country, but then accepted them even up to the marriage step. These respondents were asked about the rationale behind their responses, and answered that they would exclude these groups from their country if they had a chance, but since they are here, they have to accept

them in many aspects of social life. These students' social distance scores were coded as "8" in the scale, i.e. their tolerance for the later stages was not taken into consideration.

Table 3
Mean Social Distance Scores for Ten Ethnic Groups

	Mean	Std. Dev.
Turk	1.08	0.42
Circassian	1.71	1.25
Laz	1.82	1.25
Georgian	2.40	1.79
Jew	2.69	2.20
Syrian	2.92	2.08
Greek	3.24	2.52
Armenian	3.38	2.63
Kurd	3.53	2.65
Gypsy	4.05	2.53

Table 4

Percentages of the respondents naming each step as the closest into which each ethnic group should be admitted.

	<i>Can marry</i>	<i>Kinship by marriage</i>	<i>Close friend</i>	<i>Neighbor</i>	<i>Classmate</i>	<i>Workmate</i>	<i>Citizenship</i>	<i>Exclude from the country</i>
Armenians	34.5	17.1	13.3	7.9	5.4	-	1.7	19.7
Circassians	63.7	19.0	8.0	4.6	3.0	-	1.3	0.4
Georgians	43.0	24.3	10.9	8.7	4.8	1.7	5.2	1.3
Greeks	35.9	14.8	14.8	9.7	5.5	0.8	2.1	16.0
Gypsies	22.8	13.4	11.6	11.2	12.5	-	14.7	13.8
Jews	45.1	15.3	15.3	6.8	5.5	0.4	2.6	8.9
Kurds	32.6	16.5	12.3	8.1	6.4	0.4	5.5	18.2
Laz	55.7	26.2	7.6	4.6	4.6	-	0.8	0.4
Assyrians	33.0	21.9	12.9	13.8	5.8	1.3	5.8	5.4
Turks	95.4	2.9	1.3	-	0.4	-	-	-

Relationship between Stereotypes and Prejudice

The relationship between stereotypes and prejudice were examined by correlating the stereotype desirability scores of each group with their social distance scores. Table 5 presents the correlations of stereotype desirability and social distance. Accordingly, there is a significant negative relationship between each group's mean social distance score and mean stereotype desirability scores. That is, the higher the desirability score, the closer the type of relationship regarded as suitable for that group.

Table 5

Pearson's correlations between social distance and stereotype desirability scores for each target group.

	r(SD*STR)
Gypsy	-.369**
Kurd	-.488**
Armenian	-.430**
Greek	-.465**
Syrian	-.325**
Jew	-.203**
Georgian	-.289**
Laz	-.250**
Circassian	-.138*
Turk	-.217**

*: .05 significance level

**:.01 significance level

Social Identities


As indicated in the method section, the Ten Statement Test was not an adequate measure of national or religious identity, since very few students mentioned such identities among their responses to the "Who am I?" question. Furthermore, those few students who mentioned their national and/or religious identity in the test did not differ in terms of their social distance scores, except for a significant difference in the social distance toward

Circassians and toward the Laz among those who mentioned their Turkish identity ($F= 11.552, p<.001$; and $F= 5.657, p<.05$, respectively). Accordingly, responses to the Ten Statement Test were discarded from the analyses. Hence, the only measures for national and religious identities were the averages of the ratings of each pair of identity questions. Means for Turkish and Muslim Identities are presented in Table 6. Figure 1 shows the distribution of Turkish and Muslim Identities within the sample. It appears that more respondents emphasized their national identity than their religious identity.

Table 6
Means and Standard Deviations of Turkish and Muslim Identities

	Mean	SD
Turkish Identity	4.32	1.96
Muslim Identity	3.90	2.21

Figure 1: The distribution of Turkish and Muslim Identity ratings (n=240)



Relationship between Turkish and Muslim Identities and Prejudice

The first two hypotheses were tested by carrying out stepwise multiple regressions (using a .05 level for inclusion, and a .10 level for removal) on the social distance scores of the ten ethnic groups. The independent variables were Turkish Identity and Muslim Identity. In all but 3 regressions Muslim Identity stood out as the best predictor of social distance, and the Turkish Identity variable was excluded from the analyses. For social distance from Kurds, Turkish Identity was a better predictor. Regressions for Turks and for Circassians were not found to be significant.

However, when simple regressions with one independent variable, Turkish Identity (Muslim identity for Kurds), were carried out, all analyses but one were significant. Social distance for the Laz was not found to be predicted by the respondents' identification with Turkish nationality.

Table 7 shows the contribution of Muslim Identity to the social distance scores of the ten groups, and Table 8 shows the contribution of Turkish Identity.

Table 7

Summaries for stepwise multiple regression analysis with Social Identities (Turkish and Muslim Identities) as the independent variables and social distance scores for each group as the dependent variable.

	<i>Variables in the equation</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Armenians	Muslim Identity	.411	6.881	<.001
Georgians	Muslim Identity	.311	4.913	<.001
Greeks	Muslim Identity	.445	7.565	<.001
Gypsies	Muslim Identity	.397	6.520	<.001
Jews	Muslim Identity	.403	6.686	<.001
Kurds	Turkish Identity	.316	5.082	<.001
Laz	Muslim Identity	.191	2.967	<.01
Assyrians	Muslim Identity	.447	7.405	<.001

Table 8

Summaries for simple regression analyses with Turkish Identity (Muslim Identity for Kurds) as the independent variable and social distance scores for each group as the dependent variable.

	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Armenians	Turkish Identity	.271	4.312	<.001
Georgians	Turkish Identity	.203	3.122	<.01
Greeks	Turkish Identity	.360	5.907	<.001
Gypsies	Turkish Identity	.308	4.892	<.001
Jews	Turkish Identity	.303	4.837	<.001
Kurds	Muslim Identity	.245	3.854	<.001
Assyrians	Turkish Identity	.281	4.344	<.001

Contact and Prejudice

Table 9 shows the mean number of types of one to one encounters the sample had with the members of each ethnic group. Excluding the Turks, the most contact reported was with the Laz (2.37) and the Kurds (2.01). Assyrians were the least encountered group, 86.3% of the respondents claiming to have no contact with them during their lifetime. Table 10 presents the correlation of contact with social distance and the mean desirability of the stereotypes assigned to each group. All correlations of social distance with contact were significant except for that of Georgians who had very few contact scores. All correlations were negative, indicating that the greater the number of types of social contact, the closer the type of relationship regarded as acceptable for that group. All correlations between number of types of contact and desirability scores were positive, indicating that the greater the number of types of social contact, the more socially desirable the stereotype.

Table 9

Means and standard deviations of contact scores of each group and frequencies of the amount of contact (n=240)

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Frequencies</i>		
			<i>No contact</i>	<i>1-3 encounters</i>	<i>4-6 encounters</i>
Armenians	0.81	1.05	125	105	7
Circassians	1.25	1.34	95	129	15
Georgians	0.42	0.90	181	53	5
Gypsies	0.27	0.64	196	43	0
Jews	1.12	1.21	98	131	10
Kurds	2.01	1.64	56	128	55
Laz	2.37	1.70	40	120	79
Greeks	0.66	0.96	140	95	4
Assyrians	0.18	0.52	207	31	1

Table 10

Pearson correlations between contact and social distance and desirability scores of group stereotypes

	<i>Social Distance*Contact</i>	<i>Stereotypes*Contact</i>
Gypsy	-.113**	-
Kurd	-.303**	.327**
Armenian	-.270**	.303**
Greek	-.231**	.189**
Syrian	-.147*	-
Jew	-.215**	.133*
Georgian	-	-
Laz	-.173**	-
Circassian	-.248**	-
Turk	-.197**	-

*: .05 significance level

**:.01 significance level

Contribution of SES to Social Distance

Simple regression analyses were carried in order to investigate the contribution of SES to prejudice. Subjective economic level was not found to predict social distance for any of the groups. Also none of the SES variables were found to predict social distance for Circassians, Georgians, the Laz, and Turks. Table 11 shows the summary of the simple regression analyses with parents' education as the independent variable and social distance score for each group as the dependent variable. Parents' education was operationalized as years of education. Accordingly, both parents' education significantly predicted prejudice toward non-Muslim groups. In all cases but one, for Greeks, mother's education was a better predictor of prejudice than father's education.

In order to analyze the influence of mothers' occupation on prejudice, the mothers were categorized into "non-working", "civil servants", "professional" and "other" (which mainly consisted of retired mothers (84.8%), but also included the few small business owners and blue collar workers) groups. Table 12 shows how mothers' membership in each career group predicts children's social distance toward ethnic groups. Accordingly, having a non-working mother predicted greater social distance toward all separate identity groups. In addition, having a professional mother predicted less social distance toward Armenians and Jews, and a mother who work as a civil servant predicted social distance toward Jews. Finally, having an "other", i.e. most probably a retired mother predicted less social distance from all separate identity groups, except for Gypsies. These "other" mothers were mainly university (50.0%) or high school (39.1%) graduates, had primarily university graduate (63.0%), professional (40.9%) or civil servant (22.7%) husbands, which all together explains their influence on less social identity toward non-Muslim groups and Kurds.

On the other hand, fathers who were mainly small business owners or professionals predicted their children's prejudice toward separate identity groups. These results are shown

in Table 13. Accordingly, having a professional father was associated with less social distance toward Armenians, Jews, and Assyrians, and having a small business owner father was associated with more social distance toward all separate identity groups but Armenians. The fact that small business owner fathers had predominantly non-working wives (76.7%) helps to explain why it was associated with children's higher social distance toward separate identity groups.

Table 11

Summary of the simple regression analyses with parents' education as the independent variable and social distance scores for each group as the dependent variable

	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Armenians	Mother's education	-.212	-3.313	<.001
	Father's education	-.143	-2.209	<.05
Greeks	Mother's education	-.195	-3.022	<.01
	Father's education	-.221	-3.458	<.001
Jews	Mother's education	-.264	-4.156	<.001
	Father's education	-.188	-2.912	<.01
Assyrians	Mother's education	-.234	-3.560	<.001
	Father's education	-.183	-2.756	<.01

Table 12

Summary of the simple regression analyses with mothers' occupation as the independent variable and social distance scores for each group as the dependent variable

	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Armenians	Housewife	.286	-3.408	<.001
	Professional	-.155	-2.383	<.05
	Other	-.162	-2.438	<.05
Greeks	Housewife	.248	2.896	<.01
	Other	-.130	-1.981	<.05
Gypsies	Housewife	.203	2.300	<.05
Jews	Housewife	.340	4.134	<.001
	Civil Servants	-.146	-2.216	<.05
	Professionals	-.166	-2.541	<.05
	Other	-.170	-2.604	<.01
Kurds	Housewife	.222	2.563	<.05
	Other	-.137	-2.089	<.05
Assyrians	Housewife	.274	3.173	<.01
	Other	-.145	-2.158	<.05

Table 13

Summary of the simple regression analyses with fathers' occupation as the independent variable and social distance scores for each group as the dependent variable

	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Armenians	Professional	-.169	-2.548	<.05
Greeks	Small Business Owners	.170	2.555	<.05
Gypsies	Small Business Owners	.140	2.095	<.05
Jews	Professionals	-.172	-4.156	<.001
	Small Business Owners	.185	2.797	<.01
Kurds	Small Business Owners	.145	2.174	<.05
Assyrians	Small Business Owners	.137	1.997	<.05
	Professional	-.150	-2.193	<.05
	Retired	.147	2.143	<.05

Contribution of SES to Social Identities

Another series of simple regressions were carried out in order to see how SES variables influenced respondents' degree of in-group identification. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 14. Accordingly, both parents' education was involved in religious identification, while only father's education predicted national identification. In each cases, identification decreased as educational level increased. Having a non-working mother and a small business owner father predicted more national identification, while unemployed fathers and "other" mothers tended to have children who were low on national identification. Professional fathers, civil servant mothers, and "other" mothers were more likely to have low-religious identification children, while having a business owner father predicted more religious identification.

Table 14

Summaries of the simple regression analyses with SES variables as independent variables and Social Identities as dependent variables

	<i>Variables</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>p</i>
Turkish Identity	Father's Education	-.139	-2.151	<.05
	Small Business Owner Father	.160	2.423	<.05
	Unemployed father	-.157	-2.372	<.05
	Housewife Mother	.224	3.486	<.001
	"Other" mother	-.164	-2.526	<.05
Muslim Identity	Father's education	-.226	-3.543	<.001
	Mother's education	-.226	-3.528	<.001
	Professional father	-.160	-2.403	<.05
	Small Business Owner father	.132	1.979	<.05
	Civil Servant mother	-.168	-2.581	<.05
	"Other" mother	-.162	-2.486	<.05

Discussion

This study aimed to explore the attitudes of Turkish university students towards different ethnic groups living in Turkey. Stereotypes attributed to ethnic groups and the degree of social distance to each group were examined in relation with the students' national and religious identifications. The results demonstrated that the degree of social distance toward different ethnic groups is not high among students. The maximum social distance was toward Gypsies (4.05 / 8.00, i.e. accepting the group in the neighborhood but not in closer relationships). However, when the sample's characteristics are taken into account, social distance is, nevertheless, critical. These students were mainly from middle and upper-middle social classes. The majority were graduates of public or private foreign language high schools, and their parents, especially fathers, had university education. Thus, this was a highly selected group. If we take into account that prejudice declines with the increase in formal education and upward move in social class, the findings of the present study suggest considerably more prejudice for the larger population.

The first hypothesis, suggesting that stronger in-group identification will be related to more prejudice toward groups that are perceived to have a separate ethnic identity, was confirmed. The "separate identity groups" were Kurds, Gypsies and the non-Muslim groups, and their social distance scores were higher than those of Turks, and other Muslim groups, i.e. Circassians, Georgians, and the Laz. Although both identities, national and religious, were correlated with social distance, regression analyses showed that Muslim Identity was a stronger predictor of ethnic attitudes for all groups but one, the Kurds. Social distance toward Kurds was mainly determined by Turkish identity.

The second hypothesis, which suggested that stronger in-group identification would not have a differential effect on social distance toward Turks and the groups who are not perceived to have a separate ethnic identity, i.e. Circassians, the Laz, and Georgians, was

partially confirmed. Although social distance scores toward these groups were significantly lower than those of the "separate identity groups", they were, nevertheless, higher than social distance toward Turks. There was nearly no difference between Circassians and the Laz, but Georgians had a higher social distance score. This is largely due to the fact that Georgians are not known to many of the respondents. Respondents may not even know that they are Muslim, since social distance toward Georgians was predicted by Muslim Identity.

The third hypothesis, which suggested that prejudice decreases as interethnic contact increases, was confirmed. All correlations between social distance scores of groups and degree of contact were significant, except for Georgians who had low contact scores. Ethnic contact exerted its influence on prejudice mainly through stereotypes in the case of Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. The mean stereotype desirability of these groups was significantly correlated with interethnic contact.

The fourth hypothesis, which suggested that prejudice would decrease as the subjects' socioeconomic level increases, was partially confirmed, mainly due to the sample's characteristics. The majority of the subjects were from similar backgrounds in terms of socioeconomic status, hence, the study of SES influences on prejudice was not quite successful. None of the SES variables significantly predicted social distance for the Turks, Circassians, the Laz, and the Georgians, i.e. the low distance, Muslim groups. Education of both parents significantly predicted prejudice toward non-Muslim groups. Children of professional parents were less likely to be distant to Armenians and Jews; and housewives and fathers who owned their business were more likely to have children with higher distance to all separate identity groups. The fact that those variables that were related to the mother were better predictors of social distance can be explained by the role of the mother as the major agent of the child's socialization in the Turkish society. Fathers' role in this respect is very limited compared to that of mothers.

It was interesting that although students stressed their Turkish identity more than their Muslim identity, the latter had more influence on prejudice. It is probable that third variables related to SES played some role on this finding. High Muslim Identity was found to be predicted by having a small business owner father, which also predicted more social distance from nearly all separate ethnic identity groups. Furthermore, as parents' educational level increased, Muslim Identity decreased, which in turn was associated with less social distance from non-Muslim groups. Having a housewife mother also predicted more social distance from all separate identity groups. Housewife mothers, who constituted the majority of the sample's mothers, were mostly primary school (32.0%) or high school graduates (40.2%). Thus, their overall educational level was lower than the whole sample. It was also found that Small business owner fathers tended to have mostly non-working wives. All these influences combined help to explain the relatively greater contribution of religious identity to prejudice.

Another concern of this study was to test the predictive value of stereotypes. All correlations between mean stereotype desirability and mean social distance scores were significant. However, they were not substantially high. The maximum correlation coefficient was $-.488$ (Kurds). This suggests that interventions which aim at changing the stereotypes alone in order to reduce prejudice cannot be fully successful.

A last point that needs consideration is the nature of stereotypes. In Ulgen's (1998) study, there was a higher consensus on the stereotypes attributed to different national groups. Ten traits had a percentage higher than 50% and some of these percentages were substantially high, for example, Americans were found to be individualistic by 93.04% of the respondents and the trait hard-working was assigned to the Japanese by 75.22% of the sample. Ulgen argued that as information about a group increases stereotype consensus increases, and when information is limited, people fill in the for the missing information with hearsay. In the

present study, however, only one trait had a percentage higher than 50. The "fun loving" trait was assigned to Gypsies by 61.7% of the respondents. For Georgians, Assyrians, Armenians and Greeks there was very low stereotype consensus. The difference between the two studies probably stems from the target groups. Knowledge of the national groups studied in Ulgen's research is limited to what the respondents hear or read in the mass media, and learn in school. They may have very few, if any, one to one contacts with members of the different national groups, hence, they derive their stereotypes from common sources, and make few idiosyncratic assumptions. Domestic groups in a country, however, are better known through one to one encounters. These contacts make it possible for personal beliefs to develop apart from the common stereotypes. In sum, the consensual nature of the stereotypes is influenced not only by the amount of information about a group, but also by how that information is obtained.

The next section discusses stereotypes assigned to and prejudice toward each group separately, with some reference to the current and historical, political - social events.

TURKS

Not surprisingly, least distance was expressed by Turkish students toward their own group. The few students who did not accept Turks at the last step, i.e. marriage, declared that they do not think of getting married at all. Neither Muslim identity nor Turkish identity influenced social distance toward Turks. Both high and low identity groups, Turkish or Muslim, were equally close to their own group. Hence, respondents did not differ in their need to feel positive about the group they belong to on the basis of their identification with this group.

The stereotypes attributed to Turks had in general very high desirability scores, except for Lazy (1.54) which was selected by 27.9% of the sample. The traits Traditional (2.91) and

Religious (2.61) also had lower than average desirability scores. The trait "Traditional" was mentioned frequently for all groups except Gypsies, but Turks had the highest frequency of being described as traditional. The trait most frequently mentioned by the students was "Hospitable" (47.9%). Turks are proud of their hospitality and they want to be internationally recognized as hospitable people. The third most frequently mentioned trait was "close to family" (35.4%). Family is the most important social unit in Turkish society. Kinship is more important than other social relationships, and people are expected to stay loyal to their family, and favor their kin over even their closest friends for their whole lives. Islam also highly values the family relations and preaches absolute obedience on the part of the children. Young Turkish people are relatively more dependent on their family because of these social and religious norms, as well as overall economic instability.

Other traits mentioned were Patriotic (34.2%), Warm (27.1%), Religious (22.5%), Bold (21.3%), Helpful (17.1%), and Honest (16.7%). All these traits were also mentioned by Ulgen's sample. The first three traits remained the same in the present study also.

Although the first ten traits were usually positive ones, the overall mean desirability score of Turks' stereotypes was not the highest among all ten groups. Turks scored the fourth after the Circassians, the Laz and the Georgians. This is because the respondents were also critical toward their own group. Although not mentioned frequently enough to place among the first ten traits, some pejorative traits were also assigned to Turks, such as Narrow-minded (15.4%), and Conservative (15.0%). These traits lowered the overall desirability of the Turkish stereotype.

CIRCIASSIANS

The Circassians was the second least distant group after Turks, together with the Laz. Again, neither Turkish identity, nor Muslim identity accounted for the low degrees of social

distance toward Circassians. This is probably because Circassians have been assimilated to such an extent that they are not perceived as a different ethnic group. The small (but significant) difference in the social distance scores of Turks and Circassians may stem from the fact that the ethnicity of Circassians was stressed by the nature of the questions in the study, and as such, a perception of difference, although to a very small extent, was activated.

Circassians were also the group which had the highest overall mean stereotype desirability. They share with the Turks the first three traits most frequently assigned: Traditional (27.5%), Close to family (21.7%), and Hospitable (17.9%). The traits Warm, Friendly, Trustworthy and Honest underline the acceptance of Circassians as the in-group. However, a considerable portion of the sample (27.5%) left the stereotype questions unanswered for the Circassians due to the lack of sufficient knowledge about the group. It seems that they are not a totally open group, but for those who get in contact with them Circassians are not regarded as an out-group.

Circassians are especially famous for their nice-looking and skillful women. To some extent, the integration of the Circassians to the dominant Turkish culture has been due to the reputation of Circassian women as desirable brides. Not surprisingly, although not in the adjective list provided, the trait "beautiful" was assigned to Circassians by 13 respondents.

THE LAZ

Prejudice toward Laz, although minimal, was predicted by religious identification. This is interesting because the Laz are a Muslim group and they are generally perceived to be quite conservative Muslims, even to the degree of narrow-mindedness (Andrews, 1989). Although they were Christians until the end of the 16th Century, it is highly unlikely that this information is available to the sample studied. Hence, further research with in-depth interviews is necessary in order to elaborate prejudice toward Laz.

Another difficulty in studying attitudes toward Laz is that Turks usually confuse the real Laz with the people of the Black Sea region. For people living in the western regions of Anatolia, all inhabitants of the Black Sea shore are Laz. Most people are not aware that the Laz are an ethnic group with a separate language. Hence, it is not known whether people refer to the ethnic group Laz or to Turks of the Black Sea region when they talk about the Laz. This is another reason why the study of attitudes toward Laz needs more elaborate research methods.

Not surprisingly, the first three traits assigned to Laz reflect the image drawn by the "Laz jokes". The Laz were seen as Witty (39.2%), Warm (29.6%), and Talkative (29.2%). These jokes present the Laz as quite naive people which was also how they were seen by 23.8% of the present sample. Honor which manifests itself especially in the control of women was perceived as an important trait of the Laz stereotype (16.3%). Finally, like other Muslim groups, the Laz were also seen as Hospitable (15.8%), Traditional (24.2%), and Close to family (13.3%). All of the traits in the Laz stereotype had very high desirability scores, except for Traditional (2.90) and Naive (2.23).

GEORGIANS

Georgians were the most distant Muslim group after the Kurds and the Gypsies. As was the case with the Laz, religious identity was again the best predictor of social distance. The main reason for this is probably that Georgians were known by only half of the sample studied. The respondents may not even know that they are Muslims, and a small portion of Georgians living in Turkey are, in fact, Christians (Andrews, 1989). To a lesser extent, Turkish identity was also a significant predictor of social distance. The closed nature of Georgian society also manifests itself in the low contact score. Nearly 75% of the sample had

no one to one contact with a Georgian, and they were the only group for which contact had no correlation with social distance.

The traits assigned to Georgians were in general the same as those assigned to Turks and Circassians. They were mostly seen as Traditional (13.3%), Friendly (10.8%), and Patriotic (9.2%). The only different traits assigned to Georgians were Peace-loving (7.9%) and Cold (7.5%). The trait "Cold" was also assigned to Assyrians, another "unknown" group. It seems that the students tend to label the people they have little or no contact with as cold and distant.

JEWS

Jews were the least distant non-Muslim group. They were accepted until the last step of the social distance scale by 45.1% of the sample, a percentage higher than even some Muslim groups, Kurds and Georgians. Both Muslim and Turkish identities were influential on prejudice toward Jews, but Muslim identity was a better predictor. They also had the highest mean contact score among non-Muslim groups, and a higher score than Muslim Gypsies and Georgians. Jewish stereotypes were significantly influenced by the degree of contact ($r=.133$, $p<.05$).

There was relatively high consensus on the Jewish stereotype. Nearly half of the sample agreed that they are Hardworking (43.3%) a trait which also had high desirability (4.47). Thirty-three percent of the sample found them as religious, and another 20.0% as very religious. Thus some religiosity was assigned by more than half of the sample. The traits Intelligent (21.3%) and Materialist (17.1%) were assigned only to Jews among all ten groups. These traits are the reflections of the "rich, astute, and hardworking Jewish merchant" image. Although not in the adjective list provided, the trait "merchant" was assigned to Jews by some respondents.

The last three traits Racist (16.7%), extreme nationalist (15.4%), and sneaky (13.3%) had very low desirability scores. It is interesting that racism is attributed to people who have suffered the most from it. This is probably because the Jewish community is a very closed one, especially in terms of marriage. Although migration to Israel lowered the number of potential marriage partners and increased interethnic marriages (Andrews, 1989), endogamy is still highly valued. This probably stems from the desire to continue their existence as a group, a desire which gains strength as the number of Jews diminishes all over the world.

Both parents' education, mothers' working status, and fathers occupation were significant predictors of social distance toward Jews. The SES variables accounted for prejudice toward Jews more strongly than they did for prejudice toward other groups. This highlights the importance of social class discrimination in the Turkish society. Şarhon (1997) reports that after the migration of the poorest sections of the community to Israel, there remains, now in Turkey about 25,000 Jews, who are mostly businessmen, or have liberal professions, i.e. a community of bourgeoisie, residing in the most prestigious districts of the big cities. It is not surprising that the current sample which consisted of mainly middle and upper-middle class students was least prejudiced toward Jews among non-Muslim groups, and even less prejudiced than toward Kurds and Gypsies who are Muslim but usually from lower social strata.

In a recent research studying prejudice toward four racial/ethnic minority groups in the U.S., Wilson (1996) found that American Whites preferred least social distance toward Jews when compared to Asians, Hispanics, and Blacks, and Jews had more favorable stereotype ratings than these three minorities and even than Whites. The traits hardworking and intelligent were rated for Jews with stronger agreement than for any other group including Whites, in line with the findings of the present study. It seems that these traits of the Jewish stereotype have cross-cultural recognition. Although the fact that Jews are not a racial group

like the other groups in Wilson's study might have a positive impact on their evaluation compared to racial groups, the results of the present study and those of Wilson's study suggests that Jews are usually considered as the most approachable alternative among a group of "untouchables", in multicultural societies in which they live.

ASSYRIANS

Assyrians were the least known group. More than half of the sample refused to answer the stereotype question for Assyrians claiming that they have no idea about the group. Only 13.7% had one to one contact with Assyrians. Not surprisingly the correlation between the social distance scores toward Assyrians and contact scores was the lowest among the ten groups, although significant.

Both religious and national identifications were influential on prejudice toward Assyrians, Muslim identity being, again, a stronger predictor.

The first three traits of the Assyrian stereotype were Religious (16.7%), Traditional (17.1%) and Conservative (12.9%). These traits are not surprising since Assyrians are Catholics. The trait Cold which was assigned to another "less known" group, the Georgians, was also assigned to Assyrians, and other neutral (i.e. average desirability) traits such as Calm (10.4%) and Serious (7.5%) seem to reflect the distance toward Assyrians because of unfamiliarity. Other traits in the Syrian stereotype had high desirability such as Close to family, Peace loving, Friendly, and Hardworking. It should be kept in mind, however, that only half of the sample assigned traits to Assyrians, i.e. although some traits entered the first ten, they had low frequencies, and one must be cautious about generalizing the findings.

Respondents who had non-working mothers, and business owner or retired fathers were more likely to be distant to Assyrians. Children of professional fathers and retired mothers on the other hand were less distant to Assyrians.

GREEKS

All respondents were reminded that the Greeks studied were not those living in Greece or Cyprus, but Greeks who are Turkish citizens living in Turkey. However, while only 41.3% of the sample had one to one contacts with Greeks, 83.3% answered the stereotype questions. This discrepancy suggests that the warning against the confusion of Turkish Greeks with the Greeks of Greece or Cyprus was not seriously taken into consideration by the respondents.

An important portion of the sample (16.0%) declared that they do not want any Greeks in their country. This percentage is the third highest after Armenians and Kurds. As was the case with other groups, Muslim identity was a better predictor of social distance toward Greeks, although national identity was also significantly involved. Having a non-working mother and a business man father predicted greater distance toward Greeks.

The correlation between the Greek stereotype desirability score and social distance was the strongest after that of the Kurds. As the stereotype desirability increased, prejudice decreased. Stereotype desirability was also significantly correlated with the degree of contact. Greeks were found as Untrustworthy (20.4%), Calculating (18.3%), and Hypocritical (14.2%) by the respondents, which is not surprising since they are the "national enemy" in the official Turkish discourse, and those who live in Turkey are worse because they are regarded as traitors. These three traits were also assigned to Greeks by Ulgen's sample, which is another evidence for the sample's non-differentiation between Turkish Greeks and those living in Greece. However, the first ten traits assigned by Ulgen's subjects were completely negative traits, while the current sample assigned also high desirability traits such as Hardworking, Cultured, Civilized, and Fun loving. These traits suggest that at least some respondents were able to evaluate Turkish Greeks separately.

ARMENIANS

Armenians had the second highest social distance score after Gypsies, together with the Kurds. Nearly one fifth of the respondents did not want any Armenians in their country. This was the highest "out of country" rate.

Historical and political factors play a crucial role in this finding. Armenians were always seen as the collaborators of external enemies, mostly because they are Christians. They actually had some counter activities during the first World War (Akçam, 1992), and in the near past, Turkish diplomats in foreign countries were under the threat of an Armenian terrorist organization, ASALA. Finally, last year, the arguments about the Armenian genocide in the First World War, which the official Turkish history emphatically rejects, gained momentum in the international arena due to some Armenians' efforts. Not surprisingly, all these factors had their influence on the society's evaluation of Armenian people.

Both types of identities predicted social distance toward Armenians, religious identity again being the stronger predictor. Mother's occupation was the most important SES variable in prejudice, while father's occupation and parents' education had also significant contributions. Professional parents were more likely to have less distant children toward Armenians. More than half of the sample had no one to one contact with Armenians.

There was a relatively high correlation between Armenians' stereotype desirability and social distance score ($r = -.430$, $p < .001$). Stereotype desirability was also correlated with the degree of contact ($r = .303$, $p < .001$). Thus, although contact was minimal between Turkish students and Armenians, it had an important influence on improving the Armenian stereotype, which, in turn, reduces social distance.

Only one trait in the Armenian stereotype had high desirability: Hardworking (16.7%). All other traits reflect the "traitor" image dominant in the Turkish society for Armenians.

Untrustworthy (20.0%) was the most frequently assigned trait followed by Vindictive (17.1%). Extreme nationalist (16.3%), Treacherous (15.4%), Sneaky (15.0%), Unlikable (13.3%), Hypocritical (12.5%), and Racist (11.3%) were other frequently assigned traits.

A recent study by Harlak & Meşe (1994) investigating attitudes toward different nations in a much larger sample consisting of adults as well as students also found that Armenians (as a nation, not an ethnic group) were among the five most hated nations. They related this finding to the Azeri (a Muslim and Turkic nation) - Armenian war that was taking place at the time of their study.

KURDS

Kurds were the only group where prejudice was predicted better by national identity than by religious identity, although both were significantly related variables. This finding is not surprising when the current social and political climate in Turkey is considered. There has been a war going on for more than 15 years between the Turkish army and the Kurdish terrorists in the southeastern region of the country, where thousands of Turkish and Kurdish people have died. The leader of the terrorist organization was caught shortly before the study had begun, and the organization continued its terroristic attacks in the urban areas during the study. Expectedly, a high percentage of the sample studied (18.2%) declared that they do not want any Kurdish people in their country. The rate of accepting a Kurd as a marriage partner was quite low for a Muslim group (32.6%).

Kurds had the highest correlation between stereotype desirability and social distance ($r = -.488$, $p < .001$), and also the highest correlation between stereotype desirability and degree of contact ($r = .327$, $p < .001$). Thus, as the number of one to one encounters with Kurds increases, the Kurdish stereotype becomes more positive which, in turn, leads to less prejudicial attitude toward them on the part of Turkish students. There was also relatively

higher interethnic contact with Kurds, their contact score being the third highest after Turks and the Laz, which is not surprising since they are a quite numerous group.

The Kurdish stereotype reflects both the "traitor" image, as was in the case of Armenians, and the "lower class" image. The first five traits, Ignorant (33.8%), Aggressive (27.9%), Traditional (25.4%), Vulgar (23.8%), Dirty (18.3%), and the trait Narrow-minded (15.8%) represent the view of Kurdish people as uneducated and impulsive "peasants". To some extent, the stereotype is not incorrect, since many Kurds especially those living in Southeast Anatolia, have little or no education, and have moral codes which often lead them into actions such as blood feuds and honour-related murders which constitute crimes in the legal system. When young urban Turkish people are asked to state their opinions about Kurds, it is unlikely that they think of a Kurdish intellectual. Thus, although the only SES variable that predicts social distance in the present study was found to be parents' occupation, socioeconomic status is actually a more important factor in explaining prejudice toward Kurds, and should be investigated in further detail.

The remaining traits in the Kurdish stereotype reflect the dislike resulting from the terrorist actions. Treacherous (17.9%), Untrustworthy (16.7%), Extreme nationalist (15.4%), and Racist (15.4%) represent the dominant view in the Turkish society about Kurds as separatist terrorists.

GYPSIES

The finding that the greatest social distance was toward Gypsies was a bit surprising because they have never caused a political problem for the Turkish state. They have a reputation for engaging in some illegal activities like theft which causes social problems, and many Gypsies perform non-prestigious jobs, such as fortune telling, bear playing, selling flowers on the street, etc. Their lack of religious faith is another problematic issue for their

integration to the society. They are originally Christians who have converted into Islam, but many still continue their Christian traditions. Gypsies live together in closed environments, in certain districts of the cities, and are highly endogamous (Andrews, 1989). The results of the study demonstrate that endogamy is not only their own choice. Gypsies had the lowest rate of being accepted at the marriage step of the social distance scale (22.8%). They also had a considerable rate of being excluded from the country (13.8%).

Once again, both types of identifications were influential on prejudice, but Muslim identity was a better predictor. Although parents' occupation was the only significant SES predictor, as in the case of Kurds, social class may play a more important role in social distance toward Gypsies than was discovered in the present study. Not surprisingly, they were found to be the second least contacted group after Assyrians, although they are a more numerous group than Assyrians. The correlation between social distance and degree of contact was very low, although significant ($r = -.113$, $p < .05$).

However, in terms of stereotype desirability, Gypsies were not the lowest group. Half of the Gypsies' ten most frequently assigned traits had high mean desirability scores. These were Fun-loving (61.7%), Warm (27.5%), Talkative (24.6%), Witty (17.9%), and Independence loving (17.9%). These traits reflect the common Gypsy stereotype as happy-go-lucky people who are dancing, singing, and having fun most of the time. The trait Fun-loving assigned to Gypsies had the highest rate of consensus among the traits in the adjective list. In general, Gypsy traits had relatively high consensus. Other traits assigned reflect the dislike caused by the social class that the Gypsies belong to such as Dirty (40.4%), Ignorant (40.0%), Untrustworthy (35.0%), Lazy (26.3%), and Vulgar (15.8%).

The prejudice toward Gypsies does not reflect a general hatred as was in the case of Armenians, or Kurds, but a distance stemming from the discrepancy in the social reality that

the two groups live in. It is common practice among Turkish parents to threaten their children by telling them "I will give you to the Gypsies if you don't stop misbehaving".

Conclusion

The main limitation of the present study is obvious: the sample. As mentioned above, the sample is constituted mostly of middle and upper middle class first year university students. The remarkably higher SES level compared to the general population makes the generalization of the findings suspect. However, other studies with nationally representative samples have had parallel results to the present one.

One such study was conducted by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (K. A. F) in 1999, a German foundation in Turkey, with more than 2000 respondents from different regions of the country. Investigating the life style, values and attitudes of urban youth, the researchers found that a great majority of the sample agreed with either the statement "no good ones exist" or with "most of them are bad" for Armenians (73.4%), Jews (70.6%), Greeks (68.9%), and Gypsies (67.2%). The only groups who had higher ratings than these were the Masons, homosexuals, and atheists. Although the ranking differs a bit, these ethnic groups were the most distant groups in the present study also (ratings for Kurds were not asked because the sample contained a considerable number of Kurds). Thus, it can be concluded that there is a serious prejudice toward these ethnic groups in the larger population, and although to a much lower degree, this trend exists in this relatively "elite" and small sample.

Esmer (1999), on the other hand, with a similar but older sample than that of the K.A.F, found that 61% of his respondents would not want to have Christian neighbors. This finding is also in line with the present study's findings, i.e. relatively higher social distance toward Armenians, Greeks and Assyrians, compared to Muslim groups, except Kurds. Esmer's investigation focused on attitudes toward "different" groups, such as homosexuals, drug users, political extremists, people with AIDS, from other racial groups, or migrant laborers, etc. in addition to Christians, as an indicator of democratic values. The results

showed that tolerance for the "other" was quite low among Turks compared to the "democratic" countries.

The current findings also point out the importance of Islam even among such a young and "modern" sample. Prejudice toward all but one group, the Kurds, was mainly predicted by Muslim identity, although Turkish identity was also a strong correlate. The K. A. F study demonstrated that urban youth all over the country defined themselves primarily by Islamist or nationalist terms. These two terms were also very much intertwined, such that more than half of those who described themselves in nationalist terms also used religious-traditional terms, and vice versa. However, when identifications were polarized into a "modernist" camp on one side and a "traditional/religious" camp on the other, the latter was more dominant. A similar trend was evident in the present study. Although mean ratings for Turkish identity were higher than mean ratings for Muslim identity, the correlation between Turkish identity and Muslim identity was quite high ($r=.68$). Religious practices, although usually on an irregular basis, were widespread among urban youth, according to the findings of the K. A. F. study. Thus, Turkish youth is more religious than one might guess, and this has important implications for attitudes toward non-Muslim groups.

Another finding of the Esmer (1999) study was the dramatically low levels of trust in interpersonal relations. Again, Esmer stressed the importance of interpersonal trust in democratic functioning. LeVine & Campbell (1972; cited in Brewer, 1997), in their cross-cultural investigation of ethnocentrism found some specific attitudes and perceptions against in-groups and out-groups such as "...viewing 'us' as peace-loving and cooperative, 'them' as treacherous and untrustworthy..." (pp. 60). An overall look at the current study's findings, especially the stereotypes, demonstrates that the same tendency is present among higher class, Turkish university students. "Untrustworthy" was among the most frequently assigned traits for all "most distant groups", i.e. Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, and Gypsies. Armenians and

Kurds were also described as "Traacherous". Combined with Esmer's findings, these findings suggest that Turkish people tend to expect harm and betrayal from all the "others". The low level of contact, especially with non-Muslim groups, was another evidence of this lack of trust and distance. It is true that contact was not high for Circassians and Georgians either. But this probably stemmed from the fact that people usually are not aware of the ethnic origin of their Muslim acquaintances, because they are highly integrated into the dominant culture, and not as visible as non-Muslims who have foreign names, and in some cases, a clear accent. It is also true that these are, by definition, minorities, i.e. they do not have large enough populations for every Turk to get acquainted with them. However, it should be kept in mind that the study was conducted in the most cosmopolitan city of Turkey, with students from mostly private and public foreign language high schools, which non-Muslim minority children frequently attend. Thus, we can say that although ethnic groups live side by side in Turkey, they do not have sufficient contact to facilitate tolerant and friendly relationships.

Another important aspect of the present study was that it opened the way to investigate the influence of social class in intergroup prejudice, although its own contribution remained quite limited in this respect, because of the sample's homogeneity. There is a great deal of research done in the U. S. and some industrialized European countries, about middle class attitudes toward poverty (Bullock, 1995). These studies demonstrated that middle class life style is considered as the norm and the lives of the lower classes are perceived to deviate from this norm. Furthermore, middle class people are more prone to make individualistic attributions for the causes of poverty, that is blaming poor people for being lazy for example, rather than structuralist ones, like criticizing the political or the economic system. Turkish society is a highly stratified one, and the boundaries between classes are clear-cut, that is, there is usually little interclass social contact, such as marriage or friendship. The fact that the Gypsies, the group which belongs to the lowest social class among all other groups studied,

was the most distant one is evidence of some classist attitudes among Turkish middle class youth. Likewise, the similarity between the Kurdish and the Gypsy stereotype demonstrate that the image of the Kurds, also, is influenced by this attitude. On the other hand, Turkish Jews, as an elite bourgeois group, were the least distant non-Muslim group, which provides another evidence of the importance of social class in intergroup relations. Future studies with more heterogeneous samples in terms of SES should definitely be carried out in order to clarify the relative role of classism in Turkish social relations.

A last word needs to be said about the impact of the Kurdish - Turkish war on the rise of nationalism among Turkish youth. According to official figures, the war has caused the death of more than 30,000 people, both Kurdish and Turkish. It is not difficult to understand the sensitivity of so many people who have lost their loved ones. In such a context, nationalism was instigated by certain media, and ideological sections of the population. Not surprisingly, a nationalist party which could not gather enough votes to enter the parliament in the previous elections, became the second party in the election held right after the fieldwork for the current study was finished. Their voters were mainly the youngest sections of the population who used their right to vote for the first time in their lives.

Finally, the degree of prejudice as measured by social distance needs to be discussed. Allport (1954) states that "it is not discrimination when we do so [separate ourselves from people whom we find uncongenial], so long as it is *we* who move away from them.... It occurs when we take steps to exclude members of an out-group from our neighborhood, school, occupation, or country" (p. 51). Thus, feelings and attitudes which remain personal are not that dangerous to the society's peaceful functioning. One may not want to become close friends with a member of an ethnic group he/she finds impossible to get along with. We have seen the importance of Islamic principles in the Turkish society, and according to Islam, one should not marry a non-Muslim person unless he/she converts to Islam. In fact, in the

K.A.F. survey, 23.9% of the respondents were opposed to the marriage of people from different sects or religions, and another 20.2% were not sure about the answer. The rate of accepting to marry a member of a non-Muslim group ranged from 33.0% to 45.1% in the current sample, which is somewhat lower compared to the K. A. F. sample. However, one should be cautious when attributing prejudice to people with strong religious faith. These people may avoid potential partners from different religions rather than trying to convince them to change their religion. It appears that serious levels of prejudice start from the fourth step of the Bogardus' social distance scale, that is, the neighborhood step. In this regard, it is true that the present sample showed optimum levels of social distance, since the maximum mean social distance score (toward Gypsies) was just at the neighborhood step. However, as mentioned before, the sample's characteristics should be kept in mind when generalizing these findings.

In conclusion, the present study, with a very limited and homogeneous sample, found the same tendencies as found in the larger population investigated by previous nationally representative studies, although differing in degree. The findings provide further evidence for Social Identity Theory. As mentioned before, the theory suggested that people differ in the degree of their identification with social groups they belong to, and this has consequences for how they view the out-groups. In line with the predictions, high in-group identification (Turkish and/or Muslim) was associated with more social distance toward groups that were perceived to be the out-groups. The fact that even groups thought to be perceived as the in-group (Circassians, Georgians, and the Laz) were found to be more distant than Turks (although much less than the others) was further evidence for the theory: Even very similar groups may become "relative" out-groups when the contextual factors activate the mild differentiation between the groups (like asking the respondents to assign traits to Circassians and to Turks separately in this study).

This was mainly an exploratory study, attempting to find out Turkish university students' stereotypes of and attitude toward ten ethnic groups living in metropolitan area. The findings should light the way to more elaborate studies of ethnic prejudice in Turkey, since this seems to be a nation-wide phenomenon, according to K.A.F and Esmer's findings. Another important issue in need of investigation is the other side of the coin, i.e. ethnic minorities' attitudes toward each other and toward Turks, to have a fuller picture of the issue. These studies should have samples drawn from all social strata, rather than university students, in order to generalize the findings to the larger population.

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APPENDICES

YÖNERGE

Bu anket birkaç bölümden oluşmaktadır. Araştırılan konular her bir bölümün başında belirtilmektedir. Bu anketin sonuçları bireysel olarak bir şey ifade etmemektedir. Cevaplarınız diğer katılımcıların verdiği cevaplarla birleştirilerek anlam kazanacaktır ve toplu olarak değerlendirilecektir. Bundan dolayı anketin hiçbir sayfasına isim ya da kimliğinizi belirtecek bir ifade yazmayın ve lütfen içtenlikle cevap verin. Katılımınız için şimdiden teşekkür ederiz.

APPENDIX A

Bu bölümde kişilerin kendilerini nasıl tanımladıkları öğrenilmek isteniyor. Aşağıda numaralandırılmış boşluklar bulunmaktadır. Lütfen bu boşluklara **“BEN KİMİM?”** sorusuna karşılık olarak 10 farklı cevap yazınız. Cevapları başkasına değil de kendinize veriyormuş gibi düşününüz ve aklınıza geldiği sırayla yazınız.

Cevaplarınızın tutarsız ya da önemsiz olabileceğinden çekinmeyiniz. Zamanımız kısıtlı olduğundan anketi mümkün olduğu kadar hızlı cevaplayınız.

1.

2.

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APPENDIX B

Anketin bu bölümünde bir sıfat listesi bulunmaktadır. Bu listede bulunan özelliklerin kendinizde bulunmasını ne kadar istediğinizi düşünün ve sıfatların yanındaki boşluklara işaretleyerek belirtin.

SIFAT LİSTESİ

Bu özelliğin bende olmasını:

	çok isterim	isterim	farketmez	istemem	hiç istemem
Acımasız					
Aileye bağlı					
Akıllı					
Antipatik					
Aptal					
Aşırı milliyetçi					
Çok dindar					
Azimli					
Bağnaz					
Barışsever					
Baskıcı					
Batıl					
Bilimsel					
Bireyci					
Cahil					
Cesur					
Ciddi					
Çalışkan					
Dar görüşlü					
Güçlü					
Dindar					
Diplomatik					
Dost					
Duygusal					
Dürüst					
Düşünceli					
Eğlenceye düşkün					
Esprili					
Geleneklerine bağlı					
Gururlu					
Güvenilir					
Güvenilmez					
Hain					
Irkçı					
İçten pazarlıklı					
İdealist					
İkiyüzlü					
Kaba					

	çok isterim	isterim	farketmez	istemem	hiç istemem
Kahraman					
Kıskanç					
Kibar					
Kibirli					
Kinci					
Korkak					
Konuşkan					
Konuksever					
Kuşkucu					
Kültürlü					
Materyalist					
Medeni					
Namuslu					
Otoriter					
Özgürlüğüne düşkün					
Pis					
Pratik					
Saf					
Saldırgan					
Sanata eğilimli					
Sessiz sakin					
Sıcakkanlı					
Sinsi					
Soğuk					
Soğukkanlı					
Taklitçi					
Tembel					
Tutucu					
Yardımsever					
Yurtsever					
Zevk sahibi					

Anketin bu bölümü gençlerin Türkiye'de yaşayan diğer etnik gruplar hakkında neler düşündüğünü, akıllarında ne tip kalıplar olduğunu belirlemek için uygulanmaktadır. Bu ankette doğru veya yanlış cevap yoktur, sadece kişilerin farklı etnik gruplardan insanlar hakkında neler düşündükleri öğrenilmek istenmektedir. Önceki sayfalarda bulunan listedeki sıfatlar arasından size göre o etnik grubun üyelerini en iyi tanımlayan en az 6 sıfatı seçip aşağıdaki boşlukları doldurunuz. Listede olmayan ama uygun bulduğunuz sıfatları da ekleyebilirsiniz.

TÜRKLER

ÇERKEZLER

ERMENİLER

KÜRTLER

YAHUDİLER

ÇİNGENELER

SÜRYANİLER

GÜRCÜLER

LAZLAR

RUMLAR

APPENDIX E

Lütfen aşağıdaki soruları cevaplandırınız ve isim yazmayınız.

1. Yaşınız?

2. Cinsiyetiniz? Kadın 1 Erkek 2

3. Türk kimliğinizin yanısıra başka bir etnik kimliğiniz de (Ermeni, Çerkez, Rum, Yahudi, Kürt, Laz, vs.) var mı?

Evet (Lütfen hangi grup olduğunu belirtiniz))

Hayır

4. Evinizde Türkçe'den başka konuşulan dil var mı?

Evet (Lütfen hangi dil olduğunu belirtiniz))

Hayır

5. Hangi tür liseyi bitirdiniz?

Anadolu lisesi	1
İmam-Hatip Lisesi	2
Meslek Ticaret Lisesi	3
Normal lise	4
Özel Lise/Kolej	5
Diğer (Belirtin.....)	6

6. Babanızın tahsili:

Kaçıncı sınıfa kadar okumuş?

7. Annenizin tahsili:

Kaçıncı sınıfa kadar okumuş?

8. Babanızın mesleđi nedir, řu anda ne iř yapıyor? Ltfen ayrıntılı olarak belirtiniz. (rnek: mesleđi bankacılık, řu anda emekli alıřmıyor..... mesleđi emekli subay, řu anda zel bir řirkette pazarlamada alıřıyor..... mesleđi doktor, řu anda doktorluk yapıyor..... mesleđi iřletmecilik, řu anda kendi restoranını iřletiyor gibi.)

9. Annenizin mesleđi nedir, řu anda ne iř yapıyor? Ltfen ayrıntılı olarak belirtiniz. (rnek: Mesleđi emekli đretmen, řu anda zel ders veriyor..... mesleđi ev hanımı, řu anda ev hanımlıđı yapıyor..... mesleđi mimarlık, řu anda alıřmıyor, ev hanımı gibi.)

10. Size gre aileniz hangi ekonomik gruba girer?

ok fakir	1
Fakir	2
Orta altı	3
Orta halli	4
İyi halli	5
Zengin	6
ok zengin	7