

ON THE MARGINS OF NATIONALITY:
PASSPORTS IN LATE OCCUPIED ISTANBUL

ALLISON PANELAS

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

2023

ON THE MARGINS OF NATIONALITY:
PASSPORTS IN LATE OCCUPIED ISTANBUL

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

History

by

Allison Panelas

Boğaziçi University

2023

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Allison Panelas, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.....

Date.....

ABSTRACT

On the Margins of Nationality:

Passports in Late Occupied Istanbul

This study investigates passport policies and their relationship to legal nationality during the last year of the Allied occupation of Istanbul from September 1922 until October 1923. Particularly looking at the attitude of British occupation authorities and British foreign service administrators, we see that passports were a significant source of conflict between the Allies and the newly victorious Turkish National Movement, institutionalized in the Ankara government. This study argues that a nearly violent clash between British and Turkish authorities in December of 1922 marked a turning point after which the Allies retreated from trying to impose their will on the city of Istanbul, particularly in their mission to protect Ottoman Christians. After conceding sovereignty over legitimate movement to the Ankara government, the British would also change their attitude towards travel documents. They would now try to only issue full passports to those who were British subjects, minimize the number of travel passes they were issuing to others, and make sure they had found a state to take in refugees before evacuating them on British expense. This study will follow a number of groups of people under British protection who struggled with the newly implemented passport regime and unpack how this affected their nationality status. By looking at the implementation of the international passport regime in its early years of use, when borders were being negotiated and sovereignty was contested, this study seeks to illuminate some of the foundations for the philosophical and legal connections between passports and nationality.

ÖZET

Tabiiyetin Sınırında:

Son Dönem İşgal Edilmiş İstanbul’unda Pasaportlar

Bu çalışma İstanbul’un müttefikler tarafından işgalinin son yılı olan Eylül 1922 ile Ekim 1923 arasındaki pasaport politikaları ve bu politikaların yasal tabiiyet ile olan ilişkisini incelemektedir. Özellikle, Britanya işgal otoriteleri ile Britanya Dış İşleri yöneticilerinin tutumlarına baktığımızda pasaportların Ankara Hükümeti ile Müttefikler arasında önemli bir çatışma kaynağı olduğunu anlarız. Bu çalışma Aralık 1922’de Britanyalı ve Türk otoriteler arasında yaşanan neredeyse şiddete evrilecek olan bir olayın Müttefiklerin İstanbul şehri üzerinde kendi isteklerini dikte etmesinden, özellikle de Osmanlı Hristiyanlarını koruma misyonundan vazgeçmelerinde bir dönüm noktası olduğunu savunmaktadır. Meşru hareketler üzerindeki hakimiyetini Ankara’ya bıraktıktan sonra Britanya otoriteleri ayrıca seyahat dokümanlarına karşı olan tavırlarını da değiştireceklerdi. Britanya otoriteleri şimdi sadece Britanya tebaasından olanlara tam pasaport vermeye çalışacaklar, başkalarına verdikleri seyahat dokümanlarını minimize etmeye çalışacaklar ve mültecileri tahliye etmeden önce onları alacak bir devlet bulacaklarından emin olmak isteyeceklerdi. Bu çalışma yeni kurulan pasaport rejimi ile sorun yaşayan Britanya korumasındaki birkaç insan grubunu izleyecek ve yeni kurulan pasaport rejiminin nasıl bu insanların tabiiyetlerini etkilediğini açıklayacak. Bu çalışma uluslararası pasaport rejiminin uygulanmasına ilk yıllarındaki kullanımına bakarak – sınırlar müzakere edilirken ve hakimiyet tartışılırken- pasaportlar ile tabiiyet arasındaki felsefi ve yasal bağlantıların temellerini aydınlatmaya çalışmaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of people without whom writing this thesis would not have been possible. First, I would like to thank my advisor, Yaşar Tolga Cora for his encouragement, support, and feedback from the very beginning of this thesis project. I thank Christine Philiou and Paolo Girardelli for reading this thesis and offering their insightful feedback. I would like to thank Mehmet Polatel and the Hrant Dink Foundation for giving me the opportunity to present an earlier version of this thesis and receive feedback on it at a conference hosted on the Allied Occupation of Istanbul. I would like to thank Neil Kaplan for providing me with images of passports from his personal collection for use in this thesis and in the paper presented to the Hrant Dink Foundation. I thank Angela and Dennis Bowen for allowing me to stay in their home for a month while I conducted my research in London. I thank Sarah Cramsey for being my eternal cheerleader and note without Sarah's encouragement and support none of my academic successes would be possible. I thank Myra Cumminskey and Michael Panelas for consistently offering emotional support throughout this thesis and reminding me to take care of myself and focus on the things that matter most. I thank my father, Tom Panelas, for supporting me in every way imaginable and being proud of me no matter what. And last but certainly not least, I thank my partner, Mahmut Polat, without whom this thesis could not have been what it is. I thank you for your love and support and for everything from helping me with Ottoman Turkish and offering me feedback on my ideas to your constant encouragement and pushing me to be better.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The Allied occupation of Istanbul	10
1.2 Sources	18
1.3 Chapter outline	19
CHAPTER 2: PASSPORTS AND NATIONALITY	22
2.1 Passports and nationality in the Ottoman Empire	28
2.2 International law, nationality, and extraterritoriality	37
2.3 Protégés and colonial nationality	40
2.4 World War I	43
2.5 Passports in the postwar world.....	49
2.6 Repatriation and statelessness	53
2.7 Passports during the occupation.....	58
CHAPTER 3: PASSPORTS AND EXODUS	75
3.1 Blood and fire.....	79
3.2 The subtle conquest of Istanbul.....	84
3.3 The passport clash	91
3.4 Clandestine evacuations	96
3.5 Military service as a barrier to a passport	99
3.6 No return	106
CHAPTER 4: CARAVAN OF EXILES (GURBET KAFİLESİ)	129
4.1 Refuge in the British Embassy	139
4.2 Laissez-passer in Bulgaria.....	143

4.3 The S.S. Egypt.....	148
4.4 Journey to the Hejaz.....	160
4.5 Long-term gurbet.....	171
CHAPTER 5: ON THE MARGINS OF NATIONALITY	180
5.1 Compromised Armenians.....	181
5.2 The Khartum stowaways.....	188
5.3 Colonial nationality	195
5.4 British protected persons.....	211
5.5 Conclusion.....	223
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION	225
REFERENCES	231

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Ottoman passport example	60
Figure 2. Mendel Kamakovsky's British laissez-passer to the United States, Nov 10, 1921.....	64
Figure 3. George Nakashidze's French laissez-passer to Paris, Sept 19, 1923	65
Figure 4. Departure Permit issued by Greek authorities in Smyrna to Kayos Hovardian, July 24, 1922	70
Figure 5. Passport issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly to Şeyhoğlu Resul, Aug 22, 1922.....	72
Figure 6. Levon Der-Meguerditchian's French laissez-passer to Marseilles, Dec 6, 1922.....	95

ABBREVIATIONS

Foreign Office (FO)

War Office (WO)

Home Office (HO)

Colonial Office (CO)

The National Archives (TNA)

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA)

Grand National Assembly (GNA)

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM)

The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP)

United Nations Archives at Geneva (UNAG)

Executive Plenipotentiary Commission of Absent Constantinopolitans (EPCAC)

Central Committee of Constantinople (CCC)

GLOSSARY

Turkish Glossary

Gurbet: A feeling of longing for one's homeland, explained at the beginning of
chapter four

Kafile: Caravan, group, convoy, procession

Muhalif/Muhalifat: Opponent, dissident, opposition member(s)

Mülteci: Refugee

Bedel: Price, cost; the tax paid to exempt a person from military service

Mürur tezkeresi: An internal passport issued by the Ottoman government

Greek Glossary

Enosis: Union, unity; the desire for ethnic Greek communities outside of Greece to
be formally incorporated into the Greek state

CHRONOLOGY

1918

- July 4 Vahdeddin becomes Sultan
- Oct 30 Mudros Armistice signed
- Nov 13 Allied forces enter Istanbul (beginning of de facto occupation)

1920

- Jan 28 Last session of the Ottoman Parliament adopts the National Pact
- Mar 16 Beginning of de jure occupation of Istanbul
- Mar 17 Allies announce that no one will be allowed to leave Istanbul without an Allied exit visa
- Apr 23 First Meeting of the Grand National Assembly
- Aug 10 Signing of the Treaty of Sevres
- Oct 21 League of Nations Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities, and Through Tickets held in Paris

1921

- Oct 20 French government officially recognizes the Ankara government

1922

- Sept 9 Turkish Nationalist soldiers enter Smyrna
- Sept 13-22 Fire of Smyrna
- Oct 11 Mudanya Armistice signed
- Oct 19 Refet Pasha enters Istanbul with 126 gendarmes
- Nov 1 Abolition of the Sultanate
- Nov 5 Arrest of Ali Kemal
- Nov 6 150 anti-nationalist Turks gather in the British Embassy

- Nov 15 145 “compromised” Turks are put on the S.S. Egypt and evacuated from Istanbul to Dedeağaç
- Nov 17 Last Sultan Vahdeddin Mehmet VI is evacuated from Istanbul by General Harington
- Nov 18 Execution of Ali Kemal
- Nov 21 First official meeting of the Lausanne Conference
- Nov 25 the gurbet kafilesi on the S.S. Egypt leaves Dedeağaç for Piraeus
- Dec 1 the gurbet kafilesi on the S.S. Egypt is sent from Piraeus to Alexandria
- Dec 4 Passport clash at the port in Galata
- Dec 10 Armenian Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan is evacuated clandestinely on the “Praga”
- Dec 19 King Hussein of the Hejaz gives permission for 30 Turkish refugees to accompany the Sultan to the Hejaz

1923

- Jan 30 Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey is signed
- Feb 4 Talks break down at Lausanne
- April 17 Agreement reached between Ankara government and Allies regarding passports and visas to enter Istanbul
- April 23 Lausanne conference reopens
- Jul 14 Treaty of Lausanne is signed
- Sept 29 the “Khartoum” leaves Istanbul for Alexandria with 125 compromised Armenians and 88 stowaways
- Oct 2 Allies officially withdraw from Istanbul
- Oct 3 S.S. Khartoum arrives in Alexandria and 88 stowaways are discovered
- Oct 6 Turkish Nationalist troops march into Istanbul

1924

- Jan 7 List of 150ers is published
- Apr 23 List of 150s is approved by the GNA
- May 31 League of Nations council agrees to issue Nansen passports to stateless Armenians
- Jul 2 GNA passes the Travel Regulation

1927

- May 23 GNA passes law regarding the invalidation of Turkish citizenship of Ottoman subjects not fulfilling definite conditions
- May 28 the 150ers are officially stripped of their Turkish nationality

1928

- Jun 4 GNA passes Turkish citizenship law
- June 30 League of Nations council agrees to issue Nansen passports to the 150ers

1930

- Jun 10 Ankara agreement between Greece and Turkey

1938

- July 7 150ers are offered amnesty, allowing them to return to Turkey

1964

- Feb 11 GNA passes updated Turkish citizenship law

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In February of 2015, Shamima Begum traveled with two of her schoolmates to Syria to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. Images of the three British school girls traveling through the London Gatwick airport catalyzed fears that ISIS was recruiting young people over the internet to join them from Western countries.¹ After marrying an ISIS fighter, watching him and her three children die, and witnessing the fall of the Islamic State, Ms. Begum told a British reporter in 2019 that she wanted to return home to the UK. In response, the British Home Secretary revoked her British citizenship in the name of national security. Lawyers acting on behalf of Ms. Begum appealed this decision on numerous grounds, among them that it would leave her stateless, as current British nationality law states that a British citizen cannot be stripped of their nationality if to do so would leave them stateless. The British Home Office argued that, because her mother was born in Bangladesh, Ms. Begum is a citizen of Bangladesh by descent, and therefore would not be stateless without British citizenship. Despite the fact that the Bangladeshi government has stated in no uncertain terms that Ms. Begum is not a Bangladeshi citizen and would not be allowed to come to Bangladesh, a British immigration court in February of this year ruled to uphold the Home Office's decision to strip her of her British citizenship.²

Ms. Begum's plight has set off a debate both within Britain and internationally over the nature of nationality and the problem of statelessness. Many argue that this decision sets a dangerous precedent for revoking a person's

¹ "Race to Find Girls Feared to Be on Way to Syria," *Sky News*, February 20, 2015.

² Specia, "U.K. Court Upholds Ruling Stripping Shamima Begum's Citizenship," *The New York Times*, February 22, 2023.

citizenship for political reasons, and that public safety would be better protected if those like Ms. Begum retained their nationality and then traveled home where they could potentially be prosecuted for working for terrorist organizations.³ Indeed, if depriving “deviant” people of their nationality became a common occurrence, the world would end up with many more stateless people. But one of the major questions Ms. Begum’s case has sparked is: what justifies stripping a person of their nationality?

This study will look at a historical context which elicits the same question, though it will pose this question at a time when statelessness was a relatively new problem. At the end of the Allied occupation of Istanbul,⁴ in the transition between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, the Ankara government, which, in its victory in the Turkish War of Independence, claimed sovereignty over what was soon to become the Turkish Republic, proclaimed that any Ottoman subject who left without a Turkish passport had forfeited the right to Turkish nationality and would not be allowed to return. The Ankara government asserted that leaving with a travel document issued by another authority signaled that a person’s allegiance did not lie with the Turkish nation, which justified a loss of Turkish nationality. In this way, the loss of nationality was tied directly to the passport, or lack thereof.

This study will largely look at how the British Empire, and British occupation authorities in Istanbul specifically, dealt with conflict over passports and nationality with the Ankara government. I will argue that a near-violent clash over passports between British occupation authorities and Turkish Nationalists in December of 1922 marked a turning point at the end of the Allied occupation, after which the Allies

³ Specia, “ISIS Cases Raise a Question: What Does It Mean to Be Stateless?” *The New York Times*, February 22, 2019.

⁴ Despite the fact that British sources referred to the city as “Constantinople” during this time period, I will use the name Istanbul for consistency and clarity’s sake.

would relinquish more and more control over the city and its residents leading up to their final evacuation in October of 1923.

This clash would mark not only a turning point in the relationship between the British and Turkish Nationalist administration in Istanbul, but also a turning point in the attitude of the British Foreign Service towards passports and nationality in the post-Ottoman world. Though the British had, throughout the occupation, allowed and even encouraged unclear national status for residents of the Ottoman Empire, after the passport clash, influenced by Ankara's insistence that everyone must have a defined nationality with their passport reflecting it, the British would become much more careful about issuing passports and travel documents, and move towards adopting the attitude that every person should have a discrete nationality with travel documents that define their national status. In this way, during the period under investigation, we will see that the connection between passports and nationality got significantly stronger in a relatively short period of time.

Trying to ensure that every person had a legal nationality was born of multiple waves of refugee crises which hit the Eastern Mediterranean in the aftermath of World War I. The main goal for the British, in trying to make sure that everyone had a defined nationality, was ensuring that every person had a state which would accept and take responsibility for them, lest stateless refugees be found desperate and destitute on the streets of a country under British control—a situation the British certainly found themselves in. The importance of a legal nationality, which stateless people were deprived of, was that it meant that there was a state to which a person could be repatriated. For those who could not return to their country of origin, like Ottoman subjects who left without Turkish passports, the issue was to find a state which would take them in, and in so doing, take responsibility for them

until they could naturalize and become full subjects of that state, though not all stateless people would get such consideration from the British.

At the end of the occupation, the British unwittingly made themselves responsible for a number of groups of people who could not be repatriated anywhere and were thus made essentially stateless. Discussions of where to send these people and how to rid themselves of this responsibility taught the British lessons about evacuation and travel documents. Among these lessons were: do not give people travel documents unless you are going to take responsibility for them, and make sure you have a place to send people before they are evacuated. Discussions about where to send refugees also illustrate a rising affinity for dividing people up into ethno-religious categories and sending them to nation-states affiliated with those identities—what Lord Curzon would famously call the “unmixing” of peoples. These discussions also, however, illustrate how much nationality had to be negotiated, as legal nationality would not always align with ethno-religious identity.

This thesis is also largely the story of exodus. In the last year of the occupation, and particularly in the fall and winter of 1922, large numbers of people would leave Istanbul. Ottoman Greeks and Armenians would represent the bulk of the exodus as well as the majority of Ottoman subjects who found themselves unable to return to Turkey. But there were also a small number of Ottoman Jews who fled, as well as many Muslims who had been branded as “anti-Nationalists,” not to mention the numerous foreign nationals. Passports and travel documents would be central to these experiences of flight, particularly because, for many, the travel documents with which they left would determine whether or not they would ever be able to return. Rather than focus on the *experience* of exodus, which is unfortunately mostly outside the scope of this study, this thesis will primarily focus on the political

developments and legal implications of passport policies during the last year of the Allied occupation, a time we will roughly date from September 1922 until the beginning of October 1923.

This study will, however, showcase the stories of lesser-known people who were thrust onto the margins of nationality by the upheaval of this time period. While it will not be able to fully unpack feelings of exile and refugeehood, this study will, as much as possible, attempt to illustrate to the reader that while passport policies would often be discussed at higher administrative levels in theory, they would then be applied to very real people who would have to live with their consequences.

Because the last year of the occupation was so eventful in terms of changes affecting passports and nationality, this thesis will largely confine itself to developments and movement within that year. While scholarship has begun to look at the Allied occupation more and more in recent years, particularly during the 100-year anniversary of the occupation, only a few historical works have centered this eventful year in their narratives. Nur Bilge Criss, in her seminal work on the occupation, perhaps does the best job of unpacking the complicated power dynamics of this year.⁵ The last year of the occupation, however, in Criss's work as in that of Daniel-Joseph MacArthur-Seal's,⁶ is portrayed as just that: the end of the occupation era. It was a tying up of loose ends and a preparation for the future. Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt address the Ankara government's passport policies and nationality laws, centering negotiations in Lausanne during this period as a turning point, but in their determined focus on the use of the Abandoned Property Law to liquidate Armenian properties, they almost completely ignore the role of Allied occupation authorities in Istanbul and how passport policies played out in the city during this

⁵ Criss, "Towards Evacuation," in *Istanbul under Allied Occupation*, 140-155.

⁶ See, for instance, MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*.

period of exodus.⁷ Some notable works have come out in recent years by Lerna Ekmekçioğlu and Dimitris Kamouzis, looking at the Armenian and Greek communities of Istanbul, which address both the occupation era and the early Republican era, granting more attention to this transitional period.⁸ In these studies we see that this year was both an end and a beginning, a period of time where foundations were laid for policies that would be embraced by the emerging Turkish Republic. Both scholars explore the exodus from Istanbul and what this looked like for their respective communities, touching on the relationship between the travel documents they carried and their future nationality status, but scholarship has yet to center passports themselves as a source of conflict in Istanbul during this period.

Passports and travel documents are an important lens through which to explore this particular year during the occupation for two reasons. The first reason lies in the connections between passports, movement control, and sovereignty. The end of the Allied occupation was a time of conflicting, competing, and overlapping sovereignties, thus any appraisal of regulations during this year must, by definition, look at different government structures. There were the Allies—the British, the French, and the Italians—who attempted to share power through appointing high commissioners and claiming different parts of the city for each power. There was also the Ottoman government, which would come to be known as the Istanbul government as the Nationalists governing from Ankara gained power over Anatolia. And there was, of course, the Ankara government. All of these powers would have administrative structures in Istanbul during the period discussed. And the question of where power truly lay would by no means be a simple one.

⁷ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*.

⁸ Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*; Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*.

In this way, the administration of passports, however haphazard that may have been, makes important statements about power and sovereignty. Having a “monopoly over the means of legitimate movement”⁹ had come to be equated with state sovereignty, especially in the aftermath of World War I. Thus, which powers could issue and legitimate travel documents, and to whom, was directly correlated with power and legitimacy. The fact that passports became such a major flashpoint in the conflict over administrative control over Istanbul illustrates this point precisely. The emerging Turkish state had to assert control over passports and movement in order to claim sovereignty and statehood. While this would not be entirely possible during the last year of the occupation as Allied soldiers were still present in the city, Ankara’s assertion of dominance in this matter would lay the foundations for the sovereign territorial rights of the Turkish state.

The second reason that passports and travel documents are so crucial to explore during this particular year is found in the complicated connection between passports, allegiance, and nationality. While this connection certainly preceded the occupation, the connection between these ideas would become even more direct as the Ankara government decided that the act of leaving without a Turkish passport signified a forfeiture of Turkish nationality. By accepting a travel document issued by another power, the Ankara government asserted, a former Ottoman subject had signaled that their allegiance lay with that power, and if their allegiance had changed, then so too had their nationality, and they no longer had any right to Turkish nationality.

This is interesting legal logic that has not been thoroughly explored in the literature. Scholarship mentioning Ankara’s no return policy has generally dismissed

⁹ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*.

this logic in favor of underlining Ankara's motivations, arguing either that this was a part of a greater policy of ethno-religious homogenization,¹⁰ or arguing that it was financially motivated to facilitate the seizure of property,¹¹ or implying that Ankara's passport policies were a punishment for disloyal Ottoman subjects who became the "protégés" of the Allies.¹² While this study does not dispute that these motivations factored into Ankara's passport policy decisions, it will emphasize that Ankara framed its passport and nationality policies in distinctly legal terms, making no statement publicly and officially that all Ottoman Christians would be unable to return. Instead, Ankara based its entire no return policy around the philosophy of the passport. By asserting that taking a travel document from another power and using it to leave signaled an allegiance to that power, and thus a forfeiture of Ottoman nationality, the Ankara government made the passport itself a vehicle for both allegiance and nationality in a way that ushered in a new era for both passports and nationality.¹³

Throughout this study I will intermittently use the term "refugee" to describe the people whose stories I tell. Some of them would not be officially recognized as refugees, as refugeehood, at the time, was equated with internationally recognized statelessness.¹⁴ But most of the people discussed were forced to leave their homeland and struggled to find a place to go. A few of the people whose stories will be mentioned had issues with their passports and nationalities but were not necessarily

¹⁰ Kamouzis, *Greeks of Turkey*, 235.

¹¹ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations*, 118-119.

¹² Criss, 150.

¹³ The Soviets offer a contemporary example of a mass denaturalization of emigres which offer a close and compelling parallel to Turkey's no return policy, illustrating that this was part of a greater movement to tie the passport to allegiance and nationality. This comparison will be explored further in chapter two. For information on Soviet denaturalization in the context of Russian subjecthood see Lohr, *Russian Citizenship*, 145-151.

¹⁴ Hathaway, "The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 1920—1950," 348-380.

forced to move because of them, meaning that the word refugee would, for these people, be inappropriate. The people whose stories are told also come from different economic backgrounds and represent different demographics—all of which would have a very direct impact on their outcomes. People who moved on their own expense and at their own choice, particularly if they were well connected, would be the most likely to attain stable nationality, even if the journey to claiming said nationality was not easy. Richer and otherwise well-connected refugees were also more likely to find states to take them in and find more stable financial situations. We will also see that young, single, able-bodied men of trade were seen as more desirable refugees to accept and thus would also be more easily settled. But older men with families but with limited resources whose skills were better suited to bureaucratic work, a demographic which many political refugees fell into, would truly struggle to build a new life in exile.

While this thesis centers the city of Istanbul, many of these stories will unfold in geographies across the Mediterranean. All stories told in this thesis will, however, have some connection to Istanbul. Many of them will begin in the city and then unfold as those in exodus try to find a place of refuge. Some stories relate to Istanbul through “Britain’s Levantine Empire,”¹⁵ as British colonial administration communicated with occupation authorities in Istanbul about settling passport and nationality policies in the post-Ottoman Mediterranean. While negotiations were ongoing in Lausanne over a final peace treaty, negotiations over control on the ground would take place in Istanbul. Even regarding Turkish administration in Izmir,¹⁶ communication between the British and the Ankara government would go

¹⁵ MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*.

¹⁶ To illustrate the massive change in the composition of the city before and after the fire in September of 1922, in discussing the period leading up to the fire, I will use the name “Smyrna” and for the period after the Turkish Nationalist army took the city, I will use the name “Izmir.”

through representatives in Istanbul. In this way, the city of Istanbul, in this thesis, will act as a connecting thread, tying together the stories of people for whom the chaos of last year of the occupation and Allied withdrawal from Istanbul acted as a catalyst for the events which thrust them onto the borderlands of nationality.

1.1 The Allied occupation of Istanbul

Allied soldiers entered Istanbul on November 13, 1918. Though the Mudros Armistice, signed just a few weeks earlier on October 30, had only given the Allies the right to occupy strategic points in the Ottoman Empire if Allied security were threatened, the Allies used this ambiguous clause to justify unofficially occupying the city. The de facto occupation of Istanbul would last until March 16, 1920, when the Allies declared their occupation official.

The Ottoman Empire's unequivocal defeat in World War I had provided the Allies—the British and the French particularly—with a long-awaited opportunity: the chance to control the militarily and economically strategic city of Istanbul. Ideas floated around Allied circles envisioning an internationalization of the city or a mandate under possibly American rule.¹⁷ The Allies also saw the occupation as an opportunity to force Allied terms for peace on the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸ As Allied armies occupied the city, the Paris Peace Conference sought to set the terms for the post-war world, culminating, for the Ottoman Empire, in the Treaty of Sevres, which delineated the partition of the empire.

The occupation and the Treaty of Sevres would add fuel to the fire of an already brewing resistance movement. During the war, members of the ruling Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), who had largely controlled the Ottoman

¹⁷ MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*, 138-139.

¹⁸ Criss, 1.

government since 1908, prepared to resist a potential Allied occupation. These plans laid the foundations for what would become the Turkish National Movement. Both the British and anti-CUP opposition members of the Liberal Entente party assumed that the Nationalists and the CUP were one and the same, and that because the CUP had been largely discredited with the Empire's resounding defeat, they had little to worry about from the rising Turkish National Movement. But while many prominent CUP members had joined the National Movement, and the Nationalists used channels and structures set up under the CUP, the Nationalists would prove to be much more powerful than their opponents had expected. The Turkish National Movement's CUP roots, however, explain why there was a large amount of consistency in policy between these two governing entities.¹⁹

While resistance was brewing, the Allies set up an administration in Istanbul that was meant to promote a power-sharing dynamic amongst the Allies, but ended up creating a large degree of administrative chaos. The French took control of the Old City and the peninsula, the British took Pera, Galata, and Şişli, and the Italians were given Kadıköy and Üsküdar on the Asian shores of the Bosphorus. It wasn't long before competition and infighting amongst Allied powers led to cracks in security and administration which could be exploited by the resistance movement, or anyone else who needed to bypass restrictions. Movement controls in the Italian zone, for example, were much less strict, making it easy for the resistance movement to smuggle people in and out of Istanbul through the Anatolian side of the city.²⁰ The French officially recognized the Ankara government in 1921, after battling over Cilicia in Southern Anatolia, and after this, the French took a much more favorable attitude toward the Nationalists and opened up communication with Ankara,

¹⁹ Zürcher, *The Unionist Factor*.

²⁰ Criss, 60.

softening the anti-Ankara stance of the Allies as a whole. As time went on, the British would grow more and more frustrated that they could not get the French and Italians to take a harder line against Ankara, creating an atmosphere of bickering. Criss refers to the inter-Allied infighting as “irreconcilable differences,”²¹ eliciting the image of a marriage that slowly falls apart and eventually ends in divorce. As the occupation dragged on, these relationships would fray and administering Istanbul would become more complicated.

At the same time, the Greek Army, encouraged by the British, claimed the Aegean coast around Smyrna because they had been promised this territory under the Treaty of Sevres. After a conflict between King Constantine I and Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, Greece had entered World War I on the side of the Allies at the end of the war, granting them a place in the postwar settlement. Under Venizelos’s leadership, the Greek Army set up Greek administration in Smyrna. Venizelos then lost the election of 1920, and with the return of King Constantine, the Greek Army invaded further into Anatolia. Greek administration in Smyrna attempted to force much of the local ethnically Greek population into serving in the Greek Army as they battled the Turkish Nationalists, rendering many of them traitors in the eyes of the Turkish National Movement. The Greco-Turkish War would rage from 1919 until 1922, representing the longest front in the Turkish War of Independence, and life in occupied Istanbul would follow the events of the war closely, knowing that these events would determine the future of the postwar Mediterranean.

Leadership of the Ottoman government in Istanbul would change immediately with the end of World War I. In July, Mehmet VI Vahddedin became

²¹ Criss, 16.

Sultan after the death of his brother, Mehmed V. The CUP triumvirate of Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas escaped immediately after the signing of the Mudros Armistice, and the short tenure of Ahmet İzzet Pasha as Grand Vezir, who oversaw the signing of the armistice, would give way for Ahmet Tevfik Pasha. He would spend less than six months in office before being replaced by the profoundly anti-CUP Damad Ferid Pasha, who also happened to be brother-in-law to the Sultan. Damad Ferid Pasha was decidedly pro-British and would pull Vahdeddin in this direction as well, setting the stage for a large degree of cooperation between the Istanbul government and the occupying Allies. Damad Ferid's Liberal Entente party represented a diverse group of people who were united solely by their anti-CUP sentiment,²² though they would end up allying themselves with the British specifically. Because they, like the British, saw the Nationalists and the CUP as one and the same, the Liberal Ententes would also place themselves in opposition to the rising National Movement in Ankara.

Ottoman Parliamentary elections in 1919 were boycotted by the Liberal Entente and much of the Christian population, leaving the last Ottoman Parliament to be composed of mostly Nationalist delegates.²³ In January 1920, these delegates adopted the National Pact, which called for all of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace to be recognized as the homeland of the Turkish nation, in direct protest of plans forming at the Paris Peace Conference to partition much of Anatolia. The Allies then, in response, dissolved the Ottoman Parliament and declared their occupation of Istanbul official. The Nationalists would then convene the Grand National Assembly and declare the Ankara government the true representative of the Turkish people. Though there was some communication between the Sultan and Ankara regarding their

²² Criss, 6.

²³ Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, 138.

objections to the Treaty of Sevres, which the Sultan would never end up signing,²⁴ Ankara and Istanbul would come to represent different centers of power with separate governing structures in opposition to one another.

At the same time, the British were keenly aware that the eyes of British India specifically, and the Muslims of the British empire broadly, were watching their occupation of Istanbul and their interactions with the Ankara government. A movement to save the position of the Caliph of the Sunni Muslim world, which had been vested in the Ottoman Sultan, had swelled in British India, and taken on an anticolonial character, incorporating prominent Hindu activists like Mohandas Gandhi, and threatening British rule. The Khilafat movement quickly sided with the Turkish Nationalist Movement during the Turkish War of Independence and had been lobbying the British on the side of the Nationalists for years. Thus, affronts to the prestige of the British Empire in Istanbul could reverberate to India, the center of the British Empire, and missteps with either the Ottoman Sultan or with the Nationalists could have repercussions for British colonial rule over the majority of the world's Muslim population.²⁵

While the Istanbul government continued to function, the Allies interfered significantly in administration of the city. The Allied commissioners met weekly and issued notes to the Istanbul government requesting policy changes on virtually every subject.²⁶ They reinstated the capitulations and established a complicated judicial system. At first, Allied subjects would be tried by their own courts, and non-Allied foreigners would be tried in courts corresponding to the Allied power in whose district the crime was committed, while Ottoman subjects could be tried in Ottoman

²⁴ Criss, 43.

²⁵ For more on this see Qureshi, *Pan-Islam in British India*; Minault, *The Khilafat Movement*; see also Aydın, *The Idea of the Muslim World*.

²⁶ MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*, 141.

courts unless their crimes were against Allied authorities.²⁷ Over the course of the occupation, however, the Allies developed a mixed court which would consist of one Turkish judge, one judge of the nationality of the non-Ottoman party in the case, and one “neutral” European judge.²⁸

Residents of Istanbul would see and experience the occupation very differently, often depending on their religious community and political affiliation. Many contemporary eyewitnesses and later historians have noted that Ottoman Christians celebrated the entrance of the Allies into Istanbul, and that the Rum, or Ottoman Greeks, in the crowd waved blue and white Greek flags.²⁹ Indeed, for many Ottoman Christians, the Allied occupation would represent safety, especially after being targeted as disloyal subjects during the war. This sense of safety would nurture nationalist and irredentist ideas within the Armenian and Greek communities, facilitating discussions of possibilities for the future of their communities and nations—ones which envisioned them in political power. The occupation allowed Istanbul Armenians to organize aid for the surviving members of their community, and allowed the Istanbul Armenian press not only to call for a revival of the Armenian community, but also to imagine the glory of an Armenian nation-state.³⁰ The Greek community would, during the occupation period, embrace the concept of *enosis*, meaning unity, with “Mother Greece.”³¹ The shared interests and visions of

²⁷ For an example court case that illustrates the complicated nature of these courts see Foreign Office (later FO) 371/7962, E12184, 78-109, The National Archives, London, UK (later TNA). A Russian woman somehow involved a Maltese British subject in the murder of an Ottoman Greek man in Kadıköy in the Italian zone. As the crime was committed by a Russian woman in the Italian zone, she was tried in an Italian court, while the Maltese man was tried in a British court, and there is considerable discussion of the sentencing discrepancies.

²⁸ For more on this system see MacArthur-Seal, “Resurrecting Legal Extraterritoriality in Occupied Istanbul, 1918-1923,” 769-787.

²⁹ Mays, “Recounting the Past, Shaping the Future: Ladino Literary Representations of World War I,” 201.

³⁰ Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 21-80; Ekmekçioğlu, “Mourning Bliss: Remaining Armenian(s) in Occupied Istanbul,” 107-113.

³¹ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 90-225, and Alexandris, “The Constantinopolitan Greek Factor during the Greco-Turkish Confrontation of 1919–1922,” 137-169.

these two Ottoman Christian communities would facilitate more cooperation and a closer relationship than had ever been seen before the occupation.³² While historical memory has traditionally held that the Jewish community of Istanbul greeted the occupation with ambivalence,³³ aligning with Turkish nationalist depictions of Jews as “loyal” in comparison to Ottoman Christians,³⁴ recent scholarship has pushed back against this narrative. Devi Mays argues that, even though Jewish leaders went to great lengths to portray their community as loyal subjects of the Ottoman and then later Turkish state, for the Ottoman Jewish community in Istanbul, the occupation period allowed a space for expression of frustration toward Ottoman authorities and facilitated an imagining of different possible political futures.³⁵ Though all of these studies focus on the more elite elements of their respective communities, and there were certainly individuals within them who felt differently, for the non-Muslim population we may be able to broadly say that the occupation represented a time of possibility and imagination about the future of the post-Ottoman world.

For many of the Turkish Muslims in the city, in contrast, the occupation elicited feelings of anxiety, trauma, and humiliation. Allied soldiers occupying the Ottoman capital signaled the greatest loss of Ottoman sovereignty the empire had ever seen, and this had a lasting effect on Turkish culture. Amy Mills, through her study of a comic newspaper, highlights that during the occupation, comic strips reflected the theme of loss of male dignity, reflected in a number of male characters portrayed as weak. But, in contrast, a strong Turkish man could also be the hero of

³² Şekeryan, “Romioi-Armenian Friendship in the Ottoman Empire during the Armistice Period (1918-1923),” 139-157.

³³ Criss, 48.

³⁴ British Minutes of a committee meeting at Lausanne state that, when discussing Ottoman Jews, “İsmet Pasha said that this hard-working and intelligent element, which had never been mentioned by name in any treaty until recent days, deserved to be held up to all other sections of the population as a pattern of quiet unruffled conduct.” Draft Minutes of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Territorial and Military Commission, Dec 13, 1922, FO 424/645, No. 12, pg. 31, TNA.

³⁵ Mays, “Recounting the Past.”

his nation by, for example, standing up to an Allied soldier.³⁶ Erdağ Gökna, similarly, analyzing Turkish literature set during the occupation (though written during later eras), argues that one of the purposes of this literature was to “conceal the trauma of Ottoman military defeat and imperial loss.”³⁷ This illustrates that the occupation period lingered in Turkish historical memory for the wounds it created.

The existential feeling of trauma and humiliation felt by Turkishness broadly would be coupled with a very real physical abuse by Allied soldiers upon the population of Istanbul. Allied soldiers were known for getting drunk and assaulting local people with little to no consequences, as they could only be tried by their own military courts. In fact, Ottoman subjects who stood up to Allied soldiers ran the risk of being imprisoned themselves as Ottoman police could offer them little protection.³⁸ This would continue into the last year of the occupation, despite the fact that the Nationalists had taken administrative control. Nationalist representatives in Istanbul complained of British troops getting drunk and killing people in late 1922 and early 1923,³⁹ illustrating that although the Nationalists had managed to take administrative control of the city, so long as Allied troops remained in Istanbul, Ankara would not have military control, particularly over Allied soldiers.

³⁶ Mills, “Turkish masculinity in the occupied city,” *Occupied Istanbul: Urban Politics, Culture, and Society, 1918-1923*, Boğaziçi University, filmed July 1, 2022. See also Amy Mills’ published work on the occupation: “The Cultural Geopolitics of Ethnic Nationalism: Turkish Urbanism in Occupied Istanbul (1918-1923), 1179-1193, and “Becoming Blind to the Landscape: Turkification and the Precarious National Future in Occupied Istanbul,” 99-117.

³⁷ Gökna, “Reading Occupied Istanbul: Turkish Subject-Formation from Historical Trauma to Literary Trope,” 323.

³⁸ MacArthur-Seal, “Intoxication and Imperialism: Nightlife in Occupied Istanbul, 1918-23,” 305.

³⁹ Harington to WO, Jan 3, 1923, FO 371/9127, E156, 60, TNA; Adnan Bey to Henderson, Dec 28, 1922, FO 371/9127, E626, 88-91, TNA.

1.2 Sources

This study will largely rely on British Foreign Office documents, and through these will showcase the logic the British applied to passports and nationality at the end of the occupation. I will illustrate that for the majority of the period in question, when it came to negotiations over refugees and nationality, the British were motivated by two things: preserving British prestige and spending as little money as possible.

British discourse must be understood with these motivations in mind. While some British officials who interacted with refugees may have felt some affinity for them, they could not convey such sympathy to the Foreign Office, and any appeal for aid had to be couched in preserving British prestige. Their appeals argued that it would not look good, after all, if those who had aided or been affiliated with the British, due to this connection, became stateless and destitute. In this way, the documents themselves communicate relatively little in the way of compassion or sympathy for those who found themselves in situations of statelessness or contested nationality.

The benefit of using British sources is that there was quite a bit of correspondence between occupation forces in Istanbul and the Foreign Office in London, shedding light on the many of the events which transpired during this year. British documents also tell the stories of numerous groups of people and individuals who created problems for the British administratively, whose stories might be lost to time if not recorded by frustrated bureaucrats. Similar studies could also likely be done utilizing French or Italian documents from this period, as these other occupation powers had their own spheres of people who came under their protection.

In addition to British government sources and personal papers, I will also use some Turkish documents originating from both the Istanbul and Ankara governments as well as correspondence between Ankara and Lausanne regarding negotiations for

a final peace treaty and memoir literature written later by prominent figures remembering this time period. While questions will undoubtedly remain about passports during this period, this study will attempt to shed as much light as possible on the importance of the passport in the transition between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic.

1.3 Chapter outline

The second chapter of this thesis will explore the historiography around the passport broadly and discuss the history of passports and nationality in the Ottoman Empire specifically. It will then look at how the passport regime changed internationally with the outbreak of the First World War, and why war-era passport restrictions could not easily be done away with. Finally, the chapter will explore the kinds of passports and travel documents that were used during the occupation. The exploration of passport and nationality history will seek to underline that Ankara's no return policy had a great deal of precedent and continuity with long standing Ottoman passport and nationality policies, as well as illustrate some of the philosophical connections between passports, nationality, allegiance, and protection.

The third chapter will explore the political developments around passports during the last year of the occupation, between September 1922 and October 1923. This chapter will show that the Ankara government quite quickly infiltrated and took control of the administration of Istanbul in the aftermath of Turkish victory in the Turkish War of Independence. The chapter will then explore the passport clash of December 1922, and argue that this would mark a turning point in the relationship between the Allies and the Ankara government over the administration of Istanbul.

Finally, this chapter will explore Ankara's passport policies and its no return policy for Ottoman subjects who left without Turkish passports.

The fourth chapter will follow a group of Ottoman Muslims who fled as the Ankara government began asserting administrative control over Istanbul. This "caravan of exiles" would be tossed about from place to place across the Mediterranean and Arab world, looking for a state to take them in. Some of them would end up on the list of 150 Ottoman Muslim subjects who would not benefit from the general amnesty in the Treaty of Lausanne. These 150 people would later be officially stripped of their Turkish nationality, and thus be internationally recognized as stateless. But there were also Ottoman Muslims who fled who would not be on the 150ers list, and despite the fact that the Turkish government had agreed to allow Muslims who were not on the 150ers list who fled with irregular passports return, in line with the general amnesty, many of them would still not return to Turkey and they would see themselves as essentially stateless. Their statelessness, however, would not be recognized by the League of Nations, rendering them ineligible for refugee assistance. This caravan of exiles would struggle to find places of refuge and, being largely older Turkish administrators, they would struggle to find work, income, and both social and legal acceptance in exile. By telling the stories of these people, chapter four will paint a vivid picture of the difficulties of refugeehood and statelessness during this period as well as how the newly developed passport regime rendered movement for refugees even more difficult.

The fifth chapter will explore the stories of smaller groups of people or individuals associated in some way with the British who found themselves on the margins of nationality in the last year of the occupation. This chapter will begin by following British discussions about where to send a group of Armenians who had to

be evacuated from Istanbul due to their work for the British. Discussions around where to send these people as well as a group of stowaways who were smuggled onto their boat will illustrate the degree to which the British believed that refugees should be sent to nation-states that corresponded with their ethno-religious identity. The chapter will then explore the awkward relationship between allegiance and colonial nationality and highlight some of the problems and negotiations around British colonial nationality in the Mediterranean during the time period discussed. Finally, the chapter will address the plight of British protected persons, and in doing so will illustrate that the passport clash in December of 1922, in addition to changing the relationship between the British and the Nationalists over the administration of Istanbul, also changed British attitudes towards passports and nationality in Turkey.

This thesis will thus attempt to show how the relationship between passports and nationality became closer during a chaotic period of time, a shift that would have long-lasting consequences for the post-Ottoman world.

CHAPTER 2

PASSPORTS AND NATIONALITY

The passport, in general, arose from situations in which governments (or sometimes other authorities) sought to limit or control the movement of their people. With this in mind, the passport has generally symbolized the permission to move under the protection of the issuing authority. Most modern passports have a phrase to the effect of “All competent authorities are requested to allow the bearer to pass freely without hindrance and in case of need, to give assistance and protection.”⁴⁰ Indeed, some of the passport’s origins lay in the *laissez-passer*, or the safe conduct, as a diplomatic document, in the sense that it requests safe travel for the bearer on behalf of the issuing authority.⁴¹ In this way, we may even be able to go so far as to say that the philosophy of the passport, and perhaps travel documentation in general, is one that communicates both permission and protection with regards to movement.

As the passport has philosophical connections to permission and protection, nationality has philosophical connections to allegiance. Allegiance has its roots in feudal law, wherein the subjects of a lord were bound to him by allegiance. In Europe, allegiance thus became the way the subjects of a kingdom were tied to their king. In the nineteenth century, allegiance evolved into the basis for the concept of nationality.⁴² For the period under discussion, British nationality law, for instance, defined those born as British subjects as “born within His Majesty’s allegiance,”⁴³ implying that allegiance and nationality were one and the same and that allegiance to King and Empire was gained at birth by default. Still, to this day, in order to

⁴⁰ This phrase is taken from the Turkish Passport.

⁴¹ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 160.

⁴² Koessler, “‘Subject,’ ‘Citizen,’ ‘National,’ and ‘Permanent Allegiance,’” 59.

⁴³ British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914.

naturalize as a citizen in many countries, a person must take an oath of allegiance as part of the naturalization process, illustrating a direct link between allegiance and nationality.

In today's world, we often presume a connection between passports and nationality. Today's states only very rarely issue passports to those other than their own nationals, and a passport is often used as proof of nationality. So, to a twenty-first century person, it might not seem like a great leap to consider that, since nationality is philosophically tied to allegiance, if nationality is tied to the passport, then the passport is also somewhat philosophically tied to allegiance. A passport might, in some ways, act as a physical symbol of allegiance. But the philosophical connection between passports and nationality was not always so presumed. Indeed, one of the purposes of this study is to illustrate how passports and nationality, which were once not so closely connected, became more intimately connected in the post-Ottoman world.

One of the reasons that the connection between passports and nationality was, from the beginning, tenuous at best, was because the passport was not used universally or consistently until World War I, making it difficult to have an assumed connection to nationality law, which gained popularity a bit earlier during the late nineteenth century. Both the rise of the passport and the rise of nationality were, however, tied to the rise of the state. As states centralized and consolidated over the course of the nineteenth century, they sought to solidify their sovereignty over everything within their territorial boundaries. This involved solidifying borders,⁴⁴

⁴⁴ For a study on border solidification between the Ottoman Empire and Iran see Ateş, *Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands*; see also Tejel and Öztan *Regimes of Mobility*.

counting subjects,⁴⁵ and undertaking legal reform.⁴⁶ John Torpey links the rise of the passport to the rise of the state, asserting that, as states sought to centralize and assert dominance over their territories, they also sought to “embrace” their subjects, extending their sovereignty from land to individual people. The development of nationality law was similarly tied to sovereignty over people, but it was motivated by the need to distinguish between the local and the foreign. Though travel did not necessarily require a passport for much of the nineteenth century, during this period, the need for nationality law was sometimes motivated by the need to decide who would and would not be entitled to protection from foreign diplomatic legations,⁴⁷ connecting the need for nationality to movement, a connection which might evoke the idea of the passport.

Despite the subtle associations between passports and nationality, to hold a passport was not necessarily to hold nationality, and nationality did not necessarily give a person the right to a passport. States could offer passports to those who didn’t possess that state’s nationality and deny passports to those who were undeniably citizens.⁴⁸ Documents that constituted proof of nationality could be quite different in form and function from documents that permitted travel.⁴⁹ While some of this is still true today, the gulf between travel documents and nationality law was even greater before the mid-twentieth century when institutions of international governance sought to standardize them.

⁴⁵ For more on the use of census in state-consolidation see Anderson, “Census, Map and Museum” in *Imagined Communities*, 163-185; Yosmaoğlu, “Counting Bodies, Shaping Souls: The 1903 Census and National Identity in Ottoman Macedonia,” 55-77; Hanley, “Census” in *Identifying with Nationality: Europeans, Ottomans, and Egyptians in Alexandria*, 98-120.

⁴⁶ For a study placing Ottoman legal reform within a wider context of “global codification” see Rubin, “Modernity as a Code: The Ottoman Empire and the Global Movement of Codification,” 828–856.

⁴⁷ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 10.

⁴⁸ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 160-162.

⁴⁹ For a study on the use of different documents in British colonial Egypt before World War I see Hanley, “Papers for Going, Papers for Staying: Identification and Subject Formation in the Eastern Mediterranean,” 177-200.

Throughout this study, I will rely heavily on Will Hanley’s analysis of the characteristics of nationality,⁵⁰ and in so doing I refer to a nineteenth and early twentieth century conception of state membership, with all the complexity and murkiness that entails. Nationality is sometimes conflated with ethnicity, a connection with deep roots. After all, the word “ethnic” comes from the Greek word *ἔθνος*, meaning nation. Although we will see this connection in discussions of nationality throughout this study, when I use the term, I refer to the legal concept of state membership.

I will also largely use the term “nationality” instead of “citizenship” because nationality is closely linked to subjecthood, which puts an individual under the protection of a state authority, rather than citizenship, which makes an individual an active participant in the nation-state and entitles them to certain rights.⁵¹ Though nationality and citizenship in the later twentieth century became almost interchangeable in international contexts, in scholarship discussing the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the discourse of citizenship is used more carefully, as not all states at that point embraced the idea of “citizenship.” During the period discussed, nationality was both a legal category of affiliation and also often an identity that could be claimed by or imposed upon an individual. This legal category became a founding principle of the post-World War I nation-state system, institutionalized through the League of Nations. World powers, colonial in their outlook and utilizing the new language of international law, operated on the principle that everyone had a nationality that could be “discovered,”⁵² an idea that we will see reflected in British documents of the 1920s. At times, nationality was treated as

⁵⁰ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 5-9.

⁵¹ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 220.

⁵² Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 8.

something intrinsic, as though being of a particular ethnic or religious group inherently linked you to a corresponding nation-state. At other times, nationality was something to be negotiated, debated about, and fought for.⁵³

Passports, on the other hand, before the First World War, were introduced intermittently in various geographies to regulate movement, sometimes with a connection to nationality or national status, and sometimes completely separately. Early passports were adopted to limit vagrancy or to minimize movement from rural areas to overcrowded cities.⁵⁴ Historians focusing on popular immigration routes have associated the late nineteenth century with a certain “freedom of movement” characterized by a lack of passport controls in many European countries and North and South America and minimal to no curbs on immigration from the standpoint of mainly immigrant-receiving states.⁵⁵ Indeed, at many ports of entry all that was required was some kind of a document which established a person’s identity. But more and more historians have begun to highlight that this free mobility in the pre-World War I era was by no means the rule, especially for peasants, colonial subjects, and people in states seeking to limit or control emigration.⁵⁶ Hanley quips, “a well-dressed white traveler did not need a passport.”⁵⁷ Though this may perhaps be an oversimplification if applied on a global scale, Hanley’s point is that at many points

⁵³ For a few studies that explore conflicts over nationality and individuals trying to use the concept of nationality to advocate for themselves in the late Ottoman and post-Ottoman world see Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*; Ispahani, *Building Sovereignty in the Late Ottoman World*; Stein, *Extraterritorial Dreams*; and Fahrenthold, *Between the Ottomans and the Entente*.

⁵⁴ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 21; Herzog, “Migration and the state: On Ottoman regulations concerning migration since the age of Mahmud II,” 119-121.

⁵⁵ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 93; Salter, *Rights of Passage*, 25-26; see also Schneider’s work on the “open door era” in the United States, “The United States Government and the Investigation of European Emigration in the Open Door Era,” 195-210.

⁵⁶ See, respectively, Lucassen, “A Many-Headed Monster: The Evolution of the Passport System in the Netherlands and Germany in the Long Nineteenth Century,” 235-255; Zahra, “Travel Agents on Trial: Policing Mobility in East Central Europe, 1889–1989,” 161-193; Mongia, “Race, Nationality, Mobility,” 527-555; Fahrmeir, “From Economics to Ethnicity and Back: Reflections on Emigration Control in Germany,” 176-191.

⁵⁷ Hanley, “Papers for Going, Papers for Staying,” 179.

of entry, passports were necessary only for those who feared being turned away. Italy, for example, in 1901, began requiring all those who left via steamer to be in possession of a passport, not to limit emigration, but to ensure that Italian emigrants would not be turned back at American ports, where passports, though not required, helped facilitate entry for the working class.⁵⁸

The use of the passport was thus far from universal on the eve of the First World War. The application of nationality law, though perhaps more widespread, was also far from universal leading up to World War I. Hanley goes so far as to suggest that, for the prewar period, statelessness should actually be considered the rule rather than the exception, as more plural forms of membership were gradually subsumed by nationality.⁵⁹ During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many people (depending on the person and the geography) traveled without passports and held no official nationality status, and these things often posed little issue.

The Ottoman Empire was not, however, one of the geographies where traveling passportless and stateless could easily and legally be done. And one of the goals of this chapter will be to highlight how much of Ankara's no return policy, which linked passports and nationality in an entirely new way, had a precedent and acted in continuity with earlier Ottoman policies towards passports and nationality. While vesting betrayal of the Turkish Nation in the passport itself would be Ankara's innovation, the idea that Ottoman subjects who had left in particular ways would not be allowed to return had considerable precedent. The philosophy of the passport or travel document as tied to "protection" would also elicit an association with the protégé/protected person system which had frustrated the Ottoman state for the better

⁵⁸ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 103.

⁵⁹ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 284; Hanley, "Statelessness: An Invisible Theme in the History of International Law," 326-327.

part of a century before the rise of the Turkish National Movement, paving the way for the logic behind Ankara's no return policy.

2.1 Passports and nationality in the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire utilized travel documents to control the movement of its subjects within the boundaries of the Empire as well as emigration—at times blurring the lines between internal and external movement. An internal passport or *mürur tezkeresi*, was first adopted in the Ottoman Empire in 1826 when Mahmud II abolished the Janissaries and the state sought to prevent former Janissaries from returning to Istanbul, though the requirement theoretically applied to anyone seeking to travel within the Empire. Within a few decades this requirement was extended to foreign travel.⁶⁰ The Ottoman state intentionally made passports for foreign travel both expensive (costing ten times that of the *mürur tezkeresi*) and difficult to obtain in order to limit state-sanctioned international travel to a small group of well-connected elite.⁶¹ Although the use of these travel documents expanded throughout the nineteenth century, in practice, the Ottoman government's attempts to regulate movement could have wildly different effects on different people.

In his study contrasting the Ottoman state's approach to the mobility of Maronite Christians in Mount Lebanon with Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, David Gutman illustrates that the state sought to limit certain groups' mobility while permitting others. Many Lebanese emigrants would use a *mürur tezkeresi* to travel to Egypt, an area technically still part of the Ottoman Empire but under de facto British occupation since 1882. After reaching Egypt, Ottoman emigrants could depart for the

⁶⁰ Herzog, 119-121.

⁶¹ Gutman, "Travel Documents, Mobility Control, and the Ottoman State in an Age of Global Migration, 1880–1915," 354 fn 26.

Western Hemisphere without having paid the significantly higher price of an Ottoman passport or jumped through other financial and bureaucratic hoops.⁶² The fact that Ottoman immigrants had little issue entering countries in North and South America with a *mürur tezkeresi* rather than an official Ottoman passport illustrates that, at the time, there were fewer passport restrictions in the Americas.

Acknowledging that between the illegal use of the *mürur tezkeresi* to travel internationally and the extensive smuggling network which carried emigrants out of the Empire, vast numbers of Lebanese were fleeing the empire without official permission, the Ottoman government adopted a new policy specific to people in Mount Lebanon which would make getting official permission to leave easier. So long as Lebanese emigrants promised to maintain their Ottoman nationality, not engage in “seditious” political activity, and not seek financial support for repatriation, they would be granted official permission to leave in the form of a passport.⁶³ In short, the Ottoman government eventually sought to ease and even condone Lebanese emigration, knowing that remittances sent back to the Mountain from the Lebanese diaspora played a crucial part in the local economy.

Armenians in Eastern Anatolia, likewise, used the *mürur tezkeresi* to travel to the Americas, sending remittances home to family members. The Ottoman state’s reaction to this emigration, however, was quite different to that of the Lebanese. The Ottoman government was particularly afraid that Armenian immigration to the United States would lead to widespread political organizing against the Ottoman government amongst the Armenian diaspora due to the freedom of political expression in the US. In the hopes of preventing Armenians from using a *mürur*

⁶² Gutman, “Travel Documents,” 352.

⁶³ Presumably they still had to pay the high fee for the passport, but other bureaucratic and financial requirements such as having a guarantor were lifted. Gutman, “Travel Documents,” 356.

tezkeresi, ostensibly for travel to Istanbul, to instead travel to the Americas, the office of the Grand Vizier began requiring the Armenians from Eastern Anatolia who requested a *mürur tezkeresi* to put down a cash bond with a guarantor which would be collected if the bearer of the *mürur tezkeresi* failed to register with local authorities every three months in the destination printed on the document.⁶⁴

In addition to hardening the *mürur tezkeresi* system for Armenians specifically, in 1888, the Ottoman government decreed that passports for Armenians hoping to travel to North America would be denied and Armenian migration to the US would be banned with limited exceptions for those traveling for trade.⁶⁵ Gutman highlights that Ottoman officials' fears about Armenian migration were not so much in their leaving the Ottoman Empire, but in that Armenians might return radicalized by the politically open environment of the United States, poised to rally Ottoman Armenians around a separatist nationalist cause and threatening the integrity of the empire.⁶⁶ Furthermore, due to the ease of obtaining American citizenship and an American passport for Ottoman Armenians who immigrated, the Ottoman government feared not only that these Armenians would return with seditious ideas in order to poison other Ottoman Armenians, but that they would do so under the protection of a foreign government. Motivated by this fear, in 1893 the Ottoman government decreed that Ottoman Armenians who acquired US citizenship, even if they carried US passports, would not be allowed to reenter the Empire.⁶⁷ This fell roughly in line with the Imperial Council's right to, at its discretion, strip Ottoman subjects who acquired foreign nationality of their Ottoman nationality and bar them

⁶⁴ Ibid, 360.

⁶⁵ Gutman, *The Politics of Armenian Migration to North America*, 22.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 39.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 103.

from returning to Ottoman territory.⁶⁸ In continuity, decades later, Republican Turkey would take a similar stance toward many former Ottoman subjects.

At roughly the same time, the Ottoman state adopted a policy almost entirely opposite that taken toward Ottoman Lebanon. In order to sanction some degree of Armenian emigration and hopefully undermine the extensive smuggling networks that carried Armenians to the Americas,⁶⁹ the Ottoman state offered a modified version of the *mürur tezkeresi* to Armenians who agreed to forfeit their Ottoman nationality, property rights, and vowed never to return to Ottoman domains.⁷⁰ In contrast to Ottoman policy toward the Lebanese, who were required to promise to retain their Ottoman nationality in order to leave, Armenians were required to forfeit theirs and never come back. This, the state hoped, would prevent the return of dangerous politicized Armenians, a fear that would echo into the early Republican period.

Here we see the roots of the relationship between travel documents, movement, and nationality. The fact that the Ottoman state, in the case of Lebanese emigrants, required them to maintain their nationality in order to be issued a passport, and in the case of certain Armenian emigrants, required them to relinquish their nationality in order to be given permission to leave, illustrates both that the idea of nationality had become more important to the Ottoman state and that movement could cause a person to lose or gain nationality. The kind of travel document a person left with and the promises made and documents signed in order to get it, had now, in a certain way, started to become a physical manifestation of whether or not a person was legally allowed to return.

⁶⁸ Hanley, "What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not," 284.

⁶⁹ For more on these networks see chapter two "Smugglers" in Gutman, *The Politics of Armenian Migration to North America*, 44-66.

⁷⁰ Gutman, "Travel Documents," 362.

The Ottoman Empire largely used passport controls to maintain and assert sovereignty. Passports, we have established, are fundamentally about the control of movement. As passports directly relate to state control, they also have deep implications for state sovereignty. In her PhD thesis, Merve Ispahani explores how the Ottoman government and the Bulgarian principality, during the period preceding full Bulgarian independence, used travel documents and passport controls to vie for sovereignty. She asserts that although the emergence of an international passport regime is widely considered to have emerged from World War I, Ottoman travel document regulations illustrate a prolonged period of experimentation with travel documents and movement controls.⁷¹ Indeed, the Ottomans were one of the earliest and most forceful adopters of internal and external passports, and Ispahani illustrates that these were intimately linked with struggles for state sovereignty.

Though the Ottoman Empire embraced passports and travel documents long before the internationalization of the passport regime, it does not follow that the Ottoman government always intended to control movement in this way. In 1910, during the Second Constitutional Period, many members of the Ottoman Parliament advocated for the abolishment of the passport. In a vote that was later invalidated, the majority of parliamentarians voted to make the passport optional.⁷² Indeed many of the supporters of the 1908 revolution were in favor of the freedom to travel.⁷³ Although the law would later be amended to make a passport optional only when leaving the Empire, this lively debate illustrates that the Ottoman government's relationship with passports could have gone in a different direction in the lead up to the First World War. The rise of the passport was certainly not inevitable.

⁷¹ Ispahani, 133-148.

⁷² Herzog, 129.

⁷³ Gutman, *The Politics of Armenian Migration to North America*, 191.

Though the Ottomans had long experimented with passports and, at times, connected the ideas of movement and nationality, the relationship between passports and nationality was by no means clear-cut, even though the Ottomans passed comprehensive nationality legislation earlier than many other states. Hanley refers to the Ottomans as “early adopters” of legal nationality in his discussion of the 1869 Ottoman nationality law. Whereas some states had enacted laws governing citizenship through civil and political rights, few, by this point, had passed legislation designed specifically to manage the loss and acquisition of state membership through nationality.⁷⁴ Selim Deringil illustrates that, as the concept of Ottoman nationality developed, there was an intimate link between being Muslim and having Ottoman nationality. People fleeing prosecution or persecution would be able to cross into Ottoman territory, convert to Islam, and then be granted Ottoman nationality and no longer be subject to extradition treaties. Likewise, if a Muslim Ottoman subject fled to a surrounding Christian state and then converted to Christianity, those states would also refuse to extradite. This automatic granting of Ottoman nationality upon conversion to Islam changed with the 1869 nationality law, as Ottoman authorities had long looked with suspicion at people who may have crossed borders and then embraced Islam simply to avoid being prosecuted as thieves or murderers.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, even after the 1869 law, which acted as a secular legal document defining nationality regardless of religion, there remained a close connection between Islam and Ottoman nationality. Though conversion to Islam no longer automatically granted a foreigner Ottoman nationality, it would certainly help one’s case. Going further, Ispahani’s investigations of cases of disputed nationality show that Ottoman authorities often resisted claims of foreign Muslims to foreign

⁷⁴ Hanley, “What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not,” 277.

⁷⁵ Deringil, *Conversion and Apostasy in the Late Ottoman Empire*.

nationality—particularly for British Indians living within the Ottoman Empire.⁷⁶

Though we see a relationship between religion and nationality (a motif that would echo into the era of nation-state formation and even linger into the secularist rhetoric of modern Turkey⁷⁷), we must remember that the most important reason for explicitly outlining Ottoman nationality law was to try to maintain Ottoman sovereignty over those within the Empire—regardless of religion.

The capitulations, a group of treaties that offered special privileges to those protected by nations subject to these treaties, had begun as agreements meant to facilitate trade during a period of Ottoman military strength vis-a-vis Europe, but by the nineteenth century had led to the erosion of Ottoman sovereignty over the empire's own subjects. European capitulatory powers had, over the years, claimed many Ottoman subjects, mainly non-Muslims, as their “protégés” or “protected persons,” and even sometimes as full subjects, allowing them to avoid paying taxes and military service and allowing them to be subject to the laws of their protecting nation.⁷⁸ European countries had often specifically named themselves as the protectors of Ottoman Christians, claiming that they required outside protection as religious minorities.⁷⁹ Frustrations at the erosion of Ottoman sovereignty posed by these foreign subjects, many of whom had been in the Ottoman Empire for generations with weak claims to foreign protection, grew over the course of the nineteenth century as many of these “foreigners” came to dominate commerce while avoiding many of obligations that Ottoman nationality would require.

⁷⁶ Ispahani, 185-193.

⁷⁷ Özyürek, “Christian and Turkish: Secularist Fears of a Converted Nation,” 398-412.

⁷⁸ For an analysis of this “protégé” system see Sonyel, “The Protégé system in the Ottoman Empire,” 56-66; For a comparative analysis of this legal extraterritoriality in the Ottoman Empire with China and Japan see Kayaoğlu, *Legal Imperialism*; for an investigation of Sephardic Jews who sought this extraterritoriality see Stein, *Extraterritorial Dreams*.

⁷⁹ See Sonyel.

The Ottoman nationality law of 1869, for this reason, sought to clarify the nationality status of anyone living within the Ottoman Empire. The law incorporated a mixture of jus sanguinis and jus soli nationality law. Jus sanguinis nationality law offers nationality by principle of descent, so children of Ottoman fathers were Ottoman subjects. Jus soli nationality law offers nationality by right of soil or birthright. In this vein, foreigners born in the Ottoman Empire could acquire Ottoman nationality at the age of majority, ensuring that all those born within Ottoman domains had the right to choose to be Ottoman subjects. The law also stated that all those residing within the Empire would be considered Ottoman subjects by default unless they could prove otherwise,⁸⁰ putting the onus for proving foreignness on the individual. For those who could prove foreign nationality, even if they were born, raised and lived their entire lives within Ottoman territory, instead of being subject to Ottoman law, they could instead take their legal cases to consular courts, creating a kind of legal extraterritoriality, a practice that would later expand during the Allied occupation.⁸¹ Foreign subjects would also be exempt from most taxation and military service, making foreign nationality advantageous for the merchant class.

It might be tempting based on previous statements to assume that many viewed Ottoman nationality as something of low value, to be discarded at the first opportunity to be embraced by another state, save for those fleeing foreign authorities. But this conclusion is erroneous. Many clung to their Ottoman nationality. Others, at times, claimed Ottoman nationality in order to have property and inheritance rights within the Ottoman Empire but then later claimed foreign nationality for other benefits.⁸² As most studies of contested nationality show, many

⁸⁰ Hanley, "What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not," 284.

⁸¹ MacArthur-Seal, "Resurrecting Legal Extraterritoriality."

⁸² Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 249-250, TNA.

people, until the cementing of nationality law well into the twentieth century, did not approach nationality as something intrinsic or steadfast, but instead something to be negotiated and leveraged.⁸³ Others maintained their nationalities as a way to maintain a connection to a homeland they had long been separated from. Many Ottoman emigrants in Latin America consistently sought to maintain their Ottoman nationality, utilizing Ottoman consular networks to prove their nationality status.⁸⁴ As late as 1928, Ottoman immigrants in Argentina held onto their *mürur tezkeresi* as their sole proof of identity and nationality, refusing to take Argentinian citizenship even though the Ottoman Empire had collapsed.⁸⁵

Despite the fact that there were many Ottoman emigrants who sought to maintain their Ottoman nationality rather than adopt a new one, there were also many who sought foreign nationality. One way that the Ottoman state consistently tried to prevent Ottoman subjects from gaining foreign nationality and then returning to the empire under the protection of other powers was to make it illegal to give up Ottoman nationality without the permission of the Ottoman state.⁸⁶ In practice, however, foreign governments often granted nationality to Ottoman subjects with little interest in whether or not they had sought permission to renounce their Ottoman nationality.⁸⁷ Ottoman subjects returning to the empire with foreign nationality, or Ottomans living as protégés of foreign powers, posed a frustrating threat to Ottoman sovereignty that the Sublime Porte consistently tried to solve.

⁸³ See Stein, *Extraterritorial Dreams*; Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*; Fahrenthold, *Between the Ottomans and the Entente*; Ispahani.

⁸⁴ Ispahani, 108.

⁸⁵ It is not clear whether or not these people may have been from Mt. Lebanon and if so if they had been given permission to leave the Ottoman Empire only if they maintained their Ottoman nationality. Fahrenthold, *Between the Ottomans and the Entente*, 29.

⁸⁶ Hanley, "What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not," 286.

⁸⁷ Fahrenthold, "Claimed by Turkey as Subjects': Ottoman Migrants, Foreign Passports, and Syrian Nationality in the Americas, 1915-1925," 220.

2.2 International law, nationality, and extraterritoriality

These ideas of nationality and extraterritoriality developed within the context of the evolution of “international law,” a concept with its own complicated history. Antony Anghie argues that colonialism was central to the development of international law in the nineteenth century, particularly sovereignty doctrine. These building blocks of international law “were forged out of the attempt to create a legal system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds in the colonial confrontation.”⁸⁸ Making this argument more specific, Turan Kayaoğlu argues that British interpretations of international law, specifically regarding sovereignty, were designed to exclude Asian entities from claiming it.⁸⁹ Throughout this study, we will see examples of British administrators using principles of international law—principles that were very much evolving and being reshaped in this historical moment—to undermine and delegitimize moves made by both Ottoman and Turkish Nationalist officials. Remembering that Western European understandings of sovereignty were evolved to deny sovereignty to large swaths of the world is crucial for understanding the language of international law as a colonial tool.

Complicating this picture, however, Ispahani illustrates that Ottoman administrators in the nineteenth century also used the language of international law in claiming their own sovereignty rights.⁹⁰ Aimee Genell similarly analyzes the work of the Office of Legal Counsel for the Ottoman Foreign Ministry, illustrating that in the late nineteenth century, Ottoman lawyers embraced international law as a tool which could potentially protect the empire from breaches of sovereignty by other European empires. In the years leading up to the First World War, however, Ottoman

⁸⁸ Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law*, 3.

⁸⁹ Kayaoğlu, 3.

⁹⁰ Ispahani, “Ottoman Legal Imagination and Claiming Imperial Sovereignty,” in “Building Sovereignty in the Late Ottoman World,” 52-85.

officials had largely grown disillusioned with the concept of international law and began to see it as a tool of European imperialism which was consistently used to justify the unequal treatment of the Ottoman Empire in the concert of Europe.⁹¹

One of the most important things to remember about the concept of “international law” is that, particularly for the period under discussion, it was largely just that—a concept. Before the inauguration of international courts and structures of international governance, or even in their early days, concepts of international law were only powerful to the extent that they could be enforced by more powerful states. Similarly, powerful states could use international law to chastise other states and then ignore their own breaches of norms of international law. And because, as we have established, the development of international law was intimately tied to international justification for colonialism, this often put the balance of power in the international arena squarely in the hands of European colonial powers, but only to the extent that they were willing to enforce their will.

Despite the amorphous state of norms of international law at the time, there are a few things we can say about international trends in nationality law during the period discussed. One is that nationality was largely patriarchal. For most countries that had defined nationality law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, within recognized marriages, a child would take their nationality from their father, and a wife, upon marriage, would take the nationality of her husband.⁹² Laws differed for children born out of wedlock and often depended on geography and sometimes took on jus soli nationality principles. According to Ottoman nationality

⁹¹ Genell, “The Well-Defended Domains: Eurocentric International Law and the Making of the Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel,” 36-54.

⁹² For an exploration of gender and nationality in British nationality law as well as feminist agitation against policies which prevented women from having their own nationality, see Baldwin, “Subject to Empire: Married Women and the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act,” 522-556.

law, for instance, an illegitimate child born to an Ottoman mother was an Ottoman subject.⁹³ For British nationality law, in contrast, anyone born within British dominions would be considered a British subject, negating the need for marital legitimacy within the British Empire in terms of nationality, but British children born in extraterritorial settings (like the Ottoman Empire) would only be considered British subjects if their father was a British subject and his marriage to their mother was considered legitimate at the time of the child's birth. In chapter five we will see that, for this reason, illegitimate children would make up a significant proportion of those defined as "British protected persons" because they were not entitled to full British nationality.

Because nationality was so closely tied to the idea of allegiance, dual nationality was generally seen as a conflict of interest and an administrative problem to be corrected. Overlaps in nationality coverage needed to be reconciled lest people have their allegiance split between two powers, particularly if a state's subjects might be used as a reserve army.⁹⁴ This is why those of potentially dual nationality (like foreigners born in the Ottoman Empire) were meant to decide their nationality at the age of majority, choosing allegiance to one state over another. Ottoman nationality law was meant to correct issues of ambiguous nationality for those residing within the empire in the hopes of asserting full sovereignty over Ottoman subjects and minimizing those who held extraterritorial privileges. As we will see, however, it was not entirely successful.

⁹³ Hanley, "What Ottoman Nationality Was and Was Not," 290.

⁹⁴ For a source from the 1920s which reflects these ideas about nationality see Miller, "Nationality and Other Problems Discussed at the Hague," 632-640; Lohr, *Russian Citizenship*, 103-104.

2.3 Protégés and colonial nationality

We must here make a clear distinction between those with official foreign nationality and foreign “protégés” who claimed protection of foreign governments but were not officially foreign nationals. For all intents and purposes, in extraterritorial settings, foreign nationals of a particular country, colonial subjects of that empire, and protégés would often be treated remarkably similarly despite the difference in status between them.⁹⁵ In a discussion of how this protégé system had worked in the past, a member of the British foreign service explained, “the status was so fully recognised in practice that the status of protection was in fact a substitute for a true national status, carrying with it extraterritorial rights indistinguishable from those of full nationals.” He went on to say that if they had “looked for” a real national status for many of these people they would have found that many of them had Ottoman nationality, no nationality, or were nationals of other states “but for all practical purposes any real nationality was submerged in the protected status.”⁹⁶

In this discourse, we see a few things, first, the assumption on the part of the British civil servant that nationality is something that can be “looked for” or something most people have (though there is an acknowledgement that some people have no nationality). Second, we see that from the British perspective, previously, investigating the “true national status” of protégés was unnecessary because so long as they were allowed to be considered protégés in the Ottoman Empire, this gave them a national status for all practical purposes. And third we see that there was little distinction between those with true British nationality and British protégés so long as they were in the Ottoman Empire, but national status could potentially come into

⁹⁵ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 176-181.

⁹⁶ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 248, TNA.

question if protégés were to, for instance, try to travel to and reside in the United Kingdom.

A Mr. I. de Botton, for example, who was likely born in the Ottoman Empire but was noted as having no nationality, requested, from the British Vice-Consul in Skopje, a pass to travel to England in order to take up residence and eventually qualify for British naturalization.⁹⁷ The Home Office responded that,

There is no objection to the issue of a pass to Mr. Button of not more than six months' validity and not describing him as of British nationality... He should also be warned that this permission is no indication that residence in the United Kingdom with a view to qualifying for naturalization will be sanctioned. This question will be considered on his arrival if so desired.⁹⁸

To be a British protected person or to be issued a travel document by the British would not guarantee residence or naturalization in the British Empire.

The previous discussion of the protégé system also illustrates that the protégé system was a remnant of an older system of protection which, by the end of the nineteenth century, was gradually being phased out and integrated into the growing system of nationality. Christian countries had less legitimate claim to need to protect wide swaths of Christian populations of the Ottoman Empire as Tanzimat reforms had given legal equality to non-Muslim communities, and at the same time, many capitulatory nations saw these protégés as less economically useful and more of a liability.⁹⁹ The British in particular had consciously made an effort to whittle down their list of “protégés” to a minimum, beginning in the decades before the war, by denying consular protection to descendants of certain protégés and investigating

⁹⁷ Vice-Consul Stonehewer Bird (Skoplje) to Home Office (later HO), May 28/June 7, 1922, FO 1103/1775, TNA.

⁹⁸ HO to Stonehewer Bird, July 3/July 4, 1922, FO 1103/1775, TNA.

⁹⁹ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 211-216.

those with dubious claims to protection.¹⁰⁰ Hanley places this transition within the development of the idea of nationality within international law in the late nineteenth century. Though it was haphazard and uneven, many people who would have at one point been considered “protégés,” with the unclear national status that that carried, started being nationalized into one state or another (either the protecting state or the state of their birth), their nationality clarified through the implementation of international law—an incomplete and inconsistent process which still left many people on the margins.¹⁰¹ This process would later be complicated by Allied presence in Istanbul after Ottoman defeat in World War I, as the Italians and French would actually take on more protégés, and the British would enable and encourage ambiguous nationality status for many Ottoman subjects.

As implied earlier, protégés were seen as particularly problematic to the Ottoman state, as many of them, were it not for this particular designation of protection, might be Ottoman subjects and thus subject to Ottoman laws, taxes, and military service. A protégé, to the extent that a person might have been actually Ottoman, was considered disloyal, as, to Ottoman officials, their allegiance clearly lay with another power. The Ottoman state thus tried consistently over time to place limitations on the protégé system, even when their numbers dwindled to the point where the affront to Ottoman sovereignty was perhaps more in the *idea* of protégés than their actual numerical significance.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ By the time the emerging Turkish state made it clear that they would outlaw “protected” status, the British had only 9 names of people who they considered to be British protected persons. This will be discussed in the final section of chapter five. FO 372/2056, T11981, 237, TNA.

¹⁰¹ Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 215-216.

¹⁰² Hanley critiques Sonyel along with a few other sources for overblowing the numerical significance of protégés by the beginning of the twentieth century, arguing that, because this group of people was actually quite small in number, the Ottoman panic around protégés was more rooted in a moral outrage over an affront to Ottoman sovereignty. Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 199-201.

The expansion of European colonial empires also complicated the idea of nationality. Although colonialism, at its fundamental premise, created a division between colonizer and colonized, for foreign subjects within the Ottoman capitulatory system, this line could often be blurred. The French Empire, for instance, made a particular distinction between French citizens and French subjects, thus separating colonizer from colonized. Yet both French citizens and, for instance, Algerian or Tunisian French subjects, would be subject to French consular courts in the Ottoman Empire. The British would categorize people as, for instance, a “Maltese British Subject,” but “British nationality” was held by all British subjects.¹⁰³ In terms of mobility there was a strong difference between being a colonial subject and being from the metropole, and some scholars have in fact argued that the development of the passport regime and mobility restrictions were intimately connected to the evolution of colonial empire.¹⁰⁴ And yet, these distinctions were far more complicated than a simple colonizer/colonized dichotomy. As these empires expanded, they claimed more and more foreigners in the Ottoman Empire as their subjects—an issue that we will see particularly complicating matters of nationality as the British officially annexed Egypt and Cyprus.

2.4 World War I

In September 1914, the Ottoman government unilaterally ended the capitulations which had enabled extraterritoriality within the Empire. Then, on November 1, the Ottoman government entered World War I on the side of Germany and Austria. The war was a major turning point both in the history of the Ottoman Empire and in the

¹⁰³ For an in-depth analysis of this system in Alexandria see Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 176-181.

¹⁰⁴ See Mongia and Radhika Singha, “The Great War and a ‘Proper’ Passport for the Colony: Border-Crossing in British India, c.1882–1922,” 289-315.

international use of passports. As war broke out, states imposed passport controls at the border to prevent foreigners from belligerent nations (or others deemed suspicious) from entering, as well as local male populations liable for military service from leaving. These newly implemented passport controls were generally seen as a temporary necessity during times of war, but they ended up being the point when passport controls were enacted between borders, and then never removed. Though some scholars take issue with some of Torpey's arguments about passports,¹⁰⁵ the idea that the First World War marked a major shift in the use of passports is relatively undisputed.¹⁰⁶

The Ottoman Empire was certainly no exception to this tightening of the passport regime. Çiğdem Oğuz explores the “anti-enemy alien regime” in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War under the CUP, noting that enemy aliens had to be registered, were sometimes banished to other provinces, and could potentially be imprisoned for espionage. British, French and Russian subjects along with their protégés or protected persons were all considered enemy aliens, as well as Montenegrins, Serbs, Belgians, and then later Italians, Americans and Hellenic Greeks.¹⁰⁷ In Ottoman Syria and Palestine, large numbers of enemy aliens were expelled, largely ending up in Egypt, while a certain number of French subject North African Muslims were sent to the Ottoman interior to join the army as “Muslim refugees who migrated to Ottoman lands.”¹⁰⁸ This outraged French and American

¹⁰⁵ See, for instance, Gutman's critique of Torpey's arguments on internal passports, “Travel Documents,” 348, or Radhika Singha's criticism that Torpey's arguments overlook the role of colonialism in developing the international passport regime, “The Great War and a ‘Proper’ Passport for the Colony,” 290.

¹⁰⁶ Torpey, “The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Passport System,” 256-270; and Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*.

¹⁰⁷ Oğuz, “Practicing National Hegemony: The Anti-Enemy Alien Regime on the Ottoman Homefront During the First World War,” 151-171.

¹⁰⁸ Stein, *Extraterritorial Dreams*, 69.

authorities who protested on the grounds that individuals had the right to maintain their subjecthood.¹⁰⁹

Those who were registered as enemy aliens during the war were later understood to have experienced hardship on account of this foreign status, and would later be able to use this experience to justify their claim to foreign protection. For example, a Mr. Leonidas, who was the illegitimate son of a Maltese British subject and his Greek mistress, was recognized as a British protected person because he could not legally be granted British nationality as he was born out of wedlock. In evaluating his case in 1922, the British Consul General decided that because “he suffered great hardships during the war on account of his nationality”—implying that he was considered a British national despite not having official British nationality—that he be maintained as a British protected person but that his children would not be entitled to such protection.¹¹⁰ Here the fact that he was considered British during the war and registered as such led the British Consul to conclude that they could not simply abandon him, as even his perceived affiliation with the British Empire during the war had already caused him hardship.

The wartime CUP, in order to maintain their anti-enemy alien regime, scrutinized nationality status. The government banned most changes of nationality and largely viewed with heightened suspicion former Ottoman subjects who were now subjects of Allied colonial powers, particularly if they had officially accepted Allied colonial nationality. Russian Muslims who requested Ottoman nationality, on the other hand, could be provided with property upon their naturalization.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Consul General Waugh, Constantinople, Mar 24/April 5, 1922, FO 1103/1775, TNA.

¹¹¹ Oğuz, 165-166.

In addition to measures against enemy aliens, the Ottoman state introduced strict restrictions for entering the country, among them that those who left the country without the permission of the Ottoman government and those who lost their Ottoman nationality by taking another nationality would not be allowed to return. Ottoman subjects entering Ottoman domains with a foreign passport could be imprisoned for up to two years.¹¹² This, along with other strict movement restrictions, would prevent the free movement and return of large groups of Ottoman subjects until the Armistice period.¹¹³

Those with foreign nationality in the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman subjects abroad were certainly not the only people to be considered suspect. Throughout the war, a number of minority groups were held under deep suspicion on the assumption that they were allied with the enemy, and as such were subject to extreme measures despite being Ottoman subjects. Substantial scholarship has engaged with the history of the massacres and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during the war.¹¹⁴ Some scholars have investigated the abandoned property law which seized largely Armenian property at first but later the property of Greeks and other “absent” groups,¹¹⁵ while others have written about the structural violence and surveillance experienced by Greek and Armenian communities in Istanbul during the war.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 45; See also “Summary of Turkish Passport Law dated 20th November, 1918,” FO 372/2055, T10804, 171-172.

¹¹³ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 34-37.

¹¹⁴ See, for instance, Suny, “*They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else*”: *A History of the Armenian Genocide*; Akçam, *The Young Turks' Crime against Humanity: The Armenian Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*; and Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism*.

¹¹⁵ See Morack, *The Dowry of the State?: The Politics of Abandoned Property and the Population Exchange in Turkey, 1921-1945*; Üngör and Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property*; Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*.

¹¹⁶ See Kamouzis, “Out of Harm's Way? Structural Violence and the Greek Orthodox Community of Istanbul during World War I,” 189-211, and Dölek-Sever, “Policing the ‘suspects’: Ottoman Greeks and Armenians in Istanbul, 1914-18,” 533-550.

Many of these authors understand these measures as demographic engineering on the part of the wartime CUP.

What is more important for us to understand in this context is that regardless of the intentions of the CUP, these measures were part of a greater shift during the war which set the stage for particular developments in the nation-state system. Tighter controls and surveillance on the population was a widespread adoption which would, to the chagrin of many, continue after the war in the form of border control and passports, but also an overall greater devotion on the part of states to document the identity of individuals within their borders.¹¹⁷ In the ideas of demographic engineering and distrust of minority populations, we see something coming to a head which would prove highly influential for the post-war settlement¹¹⁸ and linger as a value until the brutality of the Second World War led many to question it—the idea that homogeneity in a given region or state would make that state more stable.¹¹⁹ The combination of population surveillance and the idea of homogeneity as something to be valued had deep implications for the rising importance of nationality in the postwar world. Though sometimes unintentionally, governments which began to suspect, surveil, and perhaps even dispose of their minority populations, began the process of drawing lines between who would and would not belong to the nation-state.¹²⁰

¹¹⁷ For full edited volume on this subject see Caplan and Torpey, *Documenting Individual Identity*.

¹¹⁸ For a lengthy and in-depth analysis of the post-WWI negotiations and settlement including the emphasis on “national self-determination” and carving out nation-states largely along ethnic lines see MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World*

¹¹⁹ In her chiding of the statesmen who carved the Balkans and Eastern Europe into nation-states after the First World War, Hannah Arendt stated that these areas lacked the conditions which give rise to nation-states: “homogeneity of population and rootedness in the soil.” Her criticism was more focused on the idea that it was foolhardy to carve out these nation-states and then think that minority treaties would be enough to maintain peace, but her comments about the conditions which give rise to the nation-state reflected a prominent idea at the beginning of the twentieth century: that the more homogenous the nation-state, the more of a nation-state it was. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 270.

¹²⁰ Michael Marrus makes this point and argues that the growth of the modern nation-state necessitated naming certain people enemies of the nation and disposing of those the state would not

Eric Lohr makes a direct comparison between Tsarist Russia's policies against both local subject minorities and foreigners with Ottoman policies toward Armenian, Greek, and foreign communities during the war. In contrast to Oğuz, who makes a definite distinction between foreign "enemy aliens" and Ottoman subject "enemy aliens within,"¹²¹ Lohr uses the term "enemy alien" to encompass both foreign enemy subjects and local subjects whose loyalty was questioned due to their ethnicity or religion. Lohr argues that Tsarist Russian measures which targeted these enemy alien populations nationalized the Russian state. Measures including property seizure and deportations were aimed both at enemy foreigners and Russian-subject ethnic Germans, Jews, and Muslims. Lohr explains that

The wartime program broke with prewar Russification in that it no longer tried to nationalize individuals by assimilating them. Rather, it took identities as given and tried to nationalize larger abstractions, such as the commercial and industrial economies and the demographic make-up of the population, through the radical means of expropriation and deportation.¹²²

Paralleling these measures with those taken by the Ottoman government during the war, we can see some of the more specific and brutal tools which, intentionally or unintentionally, were part of a greater movement from empire to nation-state catalyzed by the war.

Looking at Russia and the Ottoman Empire more specifically, but also Europe and European empires more broadly, with the outbreak of World War I, we see a suspicion of the alien or foreigner in a new kind of way. Most states involved in the war imposed passport control barriers, required foreigners to register with the

take responsibility for. *The Unwanted: European Refugees from the First World War through the Cold War*, 51.

¹²¹ Oğuz, 167.

¹²² Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*, 7.

police, and many seized the property of enemy nationals.¹²³ Thus, with the outbreak of war, both passports and nationality became much more relevant than they ever had before, and this relevance would not go away at war's end.

2.5 Passports in the postwar world

This particular understanding of the nation-state, wherein there is a stronger divergence between those who belong and those who do not, must be understood as a part of the same worldwide changes which saw the rise and internationalization of the passport regime. The League of Nations embodied the institutionalization of this understanding of the territorially-bounded nation-state. In trying to become the mechanism through which the international would be governed,¹²⁴ the League held a number of passport conferences in the 1920s seeking to build a consensus on the use of passports. The first "Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities, and Through Tickets," was held in October 1920, before even the first League of Nations Assembly in November, as passports were seen as a particularly urgent issue.¹²⁵ The both strict and haphazard passport and visa regulations put into place during the war had slowed transportation and travel. Most attending the conference hoped that the passport could soon be done away with entirely, though the conference begrudgingly accepted that due to the security concerns of various nations, the passport system, for the time being, would have to be a bit more standardized and streamlined rather than

¹²³ The British acknowledged, when Turkish Nationalist administration began confiscating the property of Greek nationals, that it was hard for them to justify a formal complaint "in view of fact that allies during war confiscated and sold enemy property." Henderson to FO, Jan 11, 1923, FO 371/9128, E506, 7.

¹²⁴ Some scholars identify the league as a colonial institution, pointing out that, similar to the idea of international law, it was developed in the hopes of maintaining colonial power. For an in-depth analysis of the League and its relationship to colonialism through the Mandate system see Pedersen, *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire*.

¹²⁵ Kalm, "Standardizing Movements: The International Passport Conferences of the 1920s," 23.

abolished. A tone of resignation is palpable in the opening paragraphs of the publication on the conference, reading,

Being of the opinion... that the legitimate concern of every Government for the safeguarding of its security and rights, prohibits, for the time being, the total abolition of restrictions and that complete return to pre-war conditions which the Conference hopes, nevertheless, to see gradually re-established in the near future; Proposes that the League of Nations should invite the Governments to adopt the following measures with as little delay as possible.¹²⁶

The League hoped to facilitate rather than restrict freedom of movement internationally, thus, in the beginning, the continuation of passport controls was somewhat of a disappointment to those League administrators who believed so fervently in the power of internationalism. The conference went on to lay out agreed upon practices for passports. The majority of passports, at this time, were issued for just a single journey, though the conference decided that countries could choose to give them two-year validity. Whereas many passports before had been on a single page now they would be in a cardboard bound booklet with recommended dimensions. The conference also recommended the abolition of the exit visa for all except “nationals.”¹²⁷

Still, in the first few years after the war, many looked at the passport as a temporary necessity, and one that, with international agreements, could be done away with. The French government, responding to a survey on the matter in 1922, stated that they had decided against a costly change to the French passport because they had reason to believe that the passport system would soon be abolished.¹²⁸ Mark Salter points out that one of reasons it was so difficult to get rid of the passport, despite the desire of many countries to do so, was that so long as a few countries

¹²⁶ *Passport Conference Preparatory Documents: II. Resolutions Adopted by the Conference on Passports, Customs Formalities and through Tickets in Paris on October 21st, 1920*, 1.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

¹²⁸ Kalm, 24.

were unwilling to give up passport requirements to enter, other countries could not stop issuing passports, lest their nationals be unable to cross international borders.¹²⁹ Thus, despite complaints that passports limited freedom of movement and were an unreasonable burden on travelers, the passport system began to be standardized and actually expanded in the 1920s.

Peter Becker offers compelling reasons for why, even in the midst of such disdain for passports, states could not seem to be rid of them. In his analysis of passport negotiations at the Graz conference in 1922, he argues that although passport restrictions had become so frustrating for former Austro-Hungarian subjects after the breakup of the Dual Monarchy, “the desire for freedom of movement was more than counterbalanced by the need for control.”¹³⁰ Despite the fact that territories which were so close and had been so intimately linked for so long had now become subject to major hassles due to the implementation of passport controls, suspicion of particular ethno-national groups and foreigners in general along with the desire to limit labor migration in the midst of economic instability made open borders impractical for post-Habsburg states. Though many attended the Graz conference hoping to achieve a multilateral agreement for freedom of movement in the former Habsburg lands, bilateral agreements on simplifying passport requirements were the best they could do.¹³¹

Though the process of standardizing and internationalizing the passport regime had begun with the 1920s passport conferences, the link between passports and nationality in the form that we understand it today was still far from established. In fact, the 1920s represent a particularly chaotic period of time for passports and

¹²⁹ Salter, 80.

¹³⁰ Becker, “Remaking Mobility: International Conferences and the Emergence of the Modern Passport System,” 206.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

nationality because the international requirement to have a passport to travel had been newly established but state boundaries and governing bodies were in flux. Furthermore, who could issue passports to whom was far from standardized in practice. Thus, looking at passports from this time offers a particularly chaotic picture of different governing bodies issuing passports to different groups in an attempt to claim sovereignty over subject populations.

While in some cases, authorities would only supply passports or travel documents to their subjects or those who had particular protection from the state, in other cases, states would give out passports quite liberally either in the hopes of ridding themselves of particular populations or claiming certain populations (and thus certain territory) as their own. Stacy Fahrenthold's work illustrates that France made particular work of issuing safe conduct travel documents to "Syrians" resident in the United States, despite the vagueness of that term and despite the fact that French control over Syria was not yet official, nor had official boundaries been drawn. Fahrenthold argues that this was an attempt on the part of the French to claim sovereignty over Syria by claiming Syrians as subjects, even though who was or was not "Syrian" was open to wide interpretation. This resulted in a number of Turks and Kurds from Southeastern Anatolia, residing in the US, being issued French safe conducts defining them as "Syrian."¹³² Overlapping with the French issue of safe conducts, the short-lived Arab Kingdom of Syria also issued passports,¹³³ a move which attempted to assert Hashemite sovereignty over Syria. Rival passports often reflected competing sovereignties.

¹³² Fahrenthold, "Traveling Syrians, Immovable Turks," in *Between the Ottomans and the Entente*, 112-136.

¹³³ Passport issued by the Arab Government in Damascus to Varter Nazarian - "Passports Issued by the Arab Government in Damascus in 1918-1920," *Syrianhistory.com*.

2.6 Repatriation and statelessness

In this chaotic moment of travel document-issuing, the primary question which arose regarding the issue of these documents was whether or not the authority who issued a person a travel document had any responsibilities toward that person, especially regarding repatriation. If the French issued a safe conduct to a Syrian did that mean that they must allow that Syrian to return to French territory? If the British issued a travel pass to a protégé did that mean that they had a responsibility to ensure that if that person became destitute in a foreign country that the British Foreign Office would have to pay to get them home (wherever that might be)? The resounding answer coming from these issuing authorities was no. The issuing of a travel document and even the status of “protection” or “protégé” did not necessarily confer the right of repatriation or support.¹³⁴ Despite the philosophical association between a travel document and protection, in this period, states often issued documents to people they had no interest or inclination to offer any kind of protection to. In fact, issuing a travel document was even at times seen as a way for an authority to rid themselves of certain groups of people in a given area.¹³⁵

This had not been a widespread issue before the war for multiple reasons. First, there had never before been such large numbers of people who found themselves outside their state of residence without the ability to return home, so the plight of those who did, in the past, could easily be pushed together with the issues of other itinerant poor without connection to nationality.¹³⁶ Second, as passports had never been so vital for travel before, those who traveled did not necessarily need to be claimed by a state in order to transit to another place. And third, limits on

¹³⁴ For how British and French authorities rejected the idea of “repatriating” their protégés during the war see Stein, “Protégé Refugees,” in *Extraterritorial Dreams*, 50-72.

¹³⁵ Hanley, “Papers for Going, Papers for Staying,” 183.

¹³⁶ Marrus, 4.

immigration and foreigners entering states increased massively during and after the war,¹³⁷ meaning that should a state choose to deny entry to a particular person, that state needed a place where they could return that person to. Torpey calls this the “fundamental purpose” of passports in international law—providing a guarantee that the person in question has a place to return to should they be denied entry to the state they are trying to enter.¹³⁸

Though repatriation had generally been a right of nationality, states frequently sought to avoid the expense of repatriating their economically distressed subjects wherever they could. As we will see in chapter five with Maltese British subjects, governments sometimes even denied repatriation to large groups of their subjects even while acknowledging their legal nationality. The idea of “repatriation” became even more complicated for those who held the nationality of a state they had never lived in, a not uncommon situation for certain groups of foreign subjects in the Ottoman Empire.¹³⁹ Repatriation, after all, implies a *return*. This would become even more relevant as states sought to sort people into national categories, at times using the word “repatriation” to send people to places they had never actually been to because that particular nation-state aligned with their ethno-religious identity.

For those who had no place to be repatriated to, the internationalization of the passport regime and its changing relationship to nationality brought a new issue in the postwar world—statelessness. We will remember that Hanley argues that statelessness was actually the norm in the nineteenth century, largely because there were more plural forms of state membership and also because, internationally, there was less of an emphasis on every single person needing a discrete nationality. For the

¹³⁷ For an in-depth analysis of immigration controls and its implications for the world order see McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders*.

¹³⁸ Torpey, 163.

¹³⁹ See Stein, *Extraterritorial Dreams*, 65-57.

same reasons that repatriation had not been as widespread an issue before the war, statelessness was also largely not an issue. The war and the rise of the passport brought to the forefront the issue of the stateless refugee.

In his study of the evolution of refugee status in international law, James Hathaway argues that between 1920 and 1935 refugees were seen from what he calls the “juridical perspective,” meaning that refugees were seen as an error (due to their lack of nationality) in the international system which had to be remedied. Later understandings of refugeehood in international law would expand the definition of refugee to many who were deprived of state protection, either de facto or de jure, and take into consideration the individual’s relationship with their former state (even if a new state had taken them in), but in the early days of the League’s discussions on refugees, League members were concerned primarily with very specific groups who no longer had any state to return to.¹⁴⁰

The first group which sparked League discussions of statelessness was the rather large group of Russian refugees who had fled after the Bolshevik Revolution. In 1921 the Soviet government stripped large swaths of Russian emigres of Russian nationality. The policies of the Soviets toward Russians who fled during the civil war is the best parallel for Ankara’s no return policy. On certain levels the comparison runs even deeper as Tsarist Russia, like the Ottoman Empire, also required internal and external passports for much of the nineteenth century, tightly restricted the movement of its people (much more so than the Ottoman Empire), and largely refused to acknowledge the foreign naturalization of Russian subjects.¹⁴¹ As stated earlier, during the war, Tsarist Russia, like the Ottoman Empire, conflated certain

¹⁴⁰ Hathaway.

¹⁴¹ For more on the Russian Empire’s “attract and hold” policies see Lohr, “Emigration and Denaturalization,” in *Russian Citizenship*, 83-114.

local populations with “enemy aliens” and used brutal tactics against them.¹⁴² Not long after the Soviets had definitively beat the White Army, the Soviet government took a strong stance against Russians who did not return immediately. They declared the denaturalization of any Russian who had been abroad for more than five years and had not received a passport from Soviet representatives by June 1922, as well as anyone who fled Russia after November 7, 1917 without the permission of Soviet authorities, and those who served in the White Russian Army or any counterrevolutionary organizations.¹⁴³ While this decree is extremely close to Ankara’s policy, even in connecting denaturalization to the fact of not having a Soviet passport, some subtle differences remain. The major difference, for our purposes, is that Soviet policy was not largely directed at Russians who fled with travel documents issued by other states or religious authorities. The Soviets were, however, very specifically trying to exclude those allied with the Tsarist regime or the White Russian Army, thus those who fled with Tsarist documents would certainly be excluded. In contrast, as we will see in the next chapter, Ankara’s policies towards those who fled with passports issued by the Istanbul government were more nuanced. The Soviets also made the clear and blanket statement that all of these people would be denaturalized, whereas the Ankara government reserved the right to deny passports or denaturalize on a case-by-case basis, maintaining more internal policies which denied the return of large swaths of Ottoman subjects, mainly Ottoman Christians.

By the summer of 1922, Soviet policy had created a large population of stateless people across the Black Sea region, the Mediterranean and Europe. The League of Nations asked the Norwegian explorer, Fridtjof Nansen, to head a High

¹⁴² Lohr, *Nationalizing the Russian Empire*.

¹⁴³ Lohr, *Russian Citizenship*, 147-148.

Commission for Refugees after he had successfully negotiated and overseen the repatriation of large numbers of prisoners of war. To address the lack of identity papers and passports among Russian refugees (which rendered them stateless and stuck, many of them in occupied Istanbul¹⁴⁴), in July 1922 Nansen convened a conference wherein League participants agreed to provide Russian refugees with “Nansen Passports.” While these passports did not solve the issue of nationality for Russian refugees, it did solve the issue of mobility. As all participants agreed to recognize the Nansen passports as identity documents, Russians in possession of these passports could theoretically now travel to any country willing to take them—though no country was obliged to take them and even the issuing country was under no obligation to take back a Russian to whom it had issued a Nansen passport.¹⁴⁵ Though the Nansen passport initially was only offered to Russian refugees, throughout the 1920s the program would be expanded and offered to Armenian refugees along with specific groups of Ottoman subjects who found themselves stateless.

While some of the circumstances of these post-Ottoman stateless people will be discussed further in this study, the point here is to understand that by the early 1920s, the relationship between nationality and passports had become much more intimately linked. The two had become so linked and also so vital that one of the primary issues which concerned those who found themselves without a nationality was that they did not have a passport—an idea that would have been incomprehensible before the war.

¹⁴⁴ Charles King, in his popular history book, *Midnight at the Pera Palace*, paints a vivid picture of the impact of Russian refugees on the city, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2015) 91-110. See also Olcay, “The Cultural Heritage of the White Russian Emigration in Istanbul,” 1318-1333; Aygün, “What Russian-Language Publications Tell Us about Refugee Life in Occupied Istanbul,” 99-105; Bilge, “İşgal İstanbul’unun Kentsel Dönüşümünü Beyaz Ruslar Üzerinden Okumak,” 101-122.

¹⁴⁵ Marrus, 94.

2.7 Passports during the occupation

When the Allies officially occupied Istanbul in March of 1920, in gutting Ottoman sovereignty, they also took control of the legitimate means of movement. The Allies had set up the Allied Passport Bureau in Salonica during the war under the auspices of military security,¹⁴⁶ and extended this structure to Istanbul at the beginning of the de facto occupation,¹⁴⁷ though they tightened their controls as time went on. On March 17, 1920, the day after declaring the de jure occupation of Istanbul, the Allies announced that no one would be allowed to leave the city without an exit visa from the Allied Passport Bureau.¹⁴⁸ The Passport Bureau, however, like many of the structures of Allied administration, suffered from a lack of central control. The French and Italian passport control answered to their High Commissioners, whereas British passport control answered to General Harington. As there was no single authority ensuring that passport regulations were uniform across Allied authorities, the three Allied powers could embrace different passport policies, and facilitate movement for people based on their own interests. Later in the occupation, many Turkish nationalists were able to get fake papers from French and Italian authorities, enabling them to move in and out of Istanbul.¹⁴⁹ The British, over time, grew frustrated that the Italians particularly, and to a lesser extent the French, were so liberal about issuing passports, travel documents, and protégé status to Ottoman subjects or people of ambiguous nationality.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ FO 286/710/211, FO 286/667/384, FO 286/669/52.

¹⁴⁷ MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*, 62.

¹⁴⁸ Criss, 14.

¹⁴⁹ Criss, 75.

¹⁵⁰ Horace Rumbold noted, "We have had considerable trouble with the Italians owing to the indiscriminate protection accorded by them to Ottoman subjects." Handwritten note, Jul 10, 1922, FO 371/7947, E6618, 10, TNA.

In order to enter Istanbul from outside Ottoman territory, everyone, including Allied subjects, needed Allied permission to enter.¹⁵¹ As passports were often issued for just one journey, an Allied passport with the destination stated as Constantinople would usually work. Non-Allied nationals would need a passport from their country of nationality stamped with a visa from either the British, the French, or the Italians,¹⁵² though in place of a passport, an Allied laissez-passer endorsed for Constantinople would have sufficed. Such may have been the case of a Mr. Nicolas Israelians, an Armenian businessman who planned to travel between Istanbul and Black Sea ports and requested a letter of introduction to the British member of the Inter-Allied Passport Control.¹⁵³ Ottoman subjects did not require an inter-Allied visa to enter from Ottoman domains (though the Allies at one point threatened to implement such a regulation¹⁵⁴), but in theory, their identity documents were meant to be inspected upon entering the occupation zone. In practice, as stated above, entrance from Anatolia through the Italian zone was quite accessible.

In general, in order to leave Istanbul for a foreign destination, a person would have needed a passport with an inter-Allied exit visa stamped upon it and a visa for the foreign country the person was traveling to. In reality, until December 1922, the only thing required to leave legitimately was a pass or a visa from an Allied authority.¹⁵⁵ A full passport was not strictly necessary. This enabled many people of ambiguous nationality to move without having to settle the question of said nationality by acquiring a passport. Foreigners living in the city who maintained their

¹⁵¹ The last version of visa regulations can be found here: "Visas for Constantinople," Aug 8, 1922, FO 372/2055, T6158, 99, TNA.

¹⁵² Williers to Morgan, Aug 14, 1922, FO 372/1935, T8695, 240, TNA.

¹⁵³ Sir W. Garthwaite to FO, Jan 24/Jan 25, 1922, FO 1103/992, TNA.

¹⁵⁴ Rumbold to Curzon, April 17, 1923, FO 372/2055, T4435, 76-77, TNA.

¹⁵⁵ Rendel, Departure of non-Turkish Ottoman Subjects from Constantinople," Mar 28, 1923, FO 371/9128, E3393, 23, TNA.

foreign nationality through their country's embassy would, naturally, turn to their embassy for passports. Colonial subjects of European empires would turn to their respective colonial power's embassy for passports (i.e.: a person from British India would get a colonial passport from the British Embassy), though this would soon become more complicated for former Ottoman subjects whose country of origin had recently been claimed by a European power (more on this later in chapter five). Usually, Ottoman subjects would request passports from the Istanbul government until late 1922 (see figure 1). In a curious twist, however, a major exception to this developed during the occupation for Ottoman Christian communities.



DH.EUM.SSM.00052.00047.001

Figure 1. Ottoman passport example
DH.EUM.SSM. 52/47, Aug 12, 1923, a.g.y.tt., BOA

From 1919 to 1922, the Allied High Commissioners allowed Ottoman Greeks and Armenians to leave with travel documents issued by their respective Patriarchates. In mentioning these papers, General Harington referred to them distinctly as “passports,” on which were stamped inter-Allied exit visas.¹⁵⁶ In slight contrast, Turkish sources referring to these papers call them “vesikalar/vesaik,” meaning simply “documents,” which Rum and Armenians got from their Patriarchates, and a notice sent to the Dutch delegation from the Ankara government written in French refers to these documents as “feuilles d'identité,”¹⁵⁷ meaning “identity papers.” This language implies that Turkish sources did not consider these to be passports at all but identity documents issued by the Patriarchates. Though these sources (both Turkish and British) were concerned less with their terminology and more with the fact that these papers, whatever they were, were not Ottoman passports, it begs the question: at this time and in this geography, what was the difference between a general travel document and a full passport? For most logistical purposes at the time, there probably wasn't much of a difference. For the Allied forces, so long as a document confirmed a person's identity, showed that they had permission to leave one territory, and permission to enter their destination, it seemed to matter little, for practical purposes, whether it was an official “passport” or not. Distinctions between travel documents, which would simply confirm a person's identity and allow them to move, and passports issued by a sovereign state or governing body which would accept responsibility for repatriation of the person in question, would, however, become more relevant as the occupation unraveled.

¹⁵⁶ Harington to WO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13750, 178, TNA.

¹⁵⁷ Hariciye Nezareti, İstanbul Murahhaslığı (later HR. İM.) 49/17, Apr 30, 1923, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Turkey (later BOA); HR. İM 49/35, June 21, 1923, BOA.

If we take for granted that the papers issued by the Greek and Armenian Patriarchates were considered passports, at least by the Allies and the Patriarchal authorities issuing them, then the fact that these religious and communal authorities were issuing passports to members of their communities supports the assumption that Greeks and Armenians represented separate nations, not in the *millet* sense of a religious community during the late Ottoman period,¹⁵⁸ but in the sense of legal nationality tied to a nation-state. Though the patriarchates did not represent nation-states, whatever unofficial connections they might have had to the Kingdom of Greece or the emerging Armenian Republic, the act of issuing passports illustrated that these Patriarchates claimed legal sovereignty over the individuals of their communities separate from the Ottoman state and the apparatus of the Istanbul government.

It is possible that the Allies wished to support this idea as much as possible, allowing Ottoman Christians to sidestep the authority of the Istanbul government despite being, clearly, Ottoman subjects. In this way, the Allies enabled and possibly even encouraged unclear state affiliation in the use of travel documents. It is also likely that some members of these communities had problems getting passports from the Istanbul government. In late 1921, the Archbishop of Chalcedon (Kadıköy) and another lay member of the church were attempting to travel to London, and although the British authorities agreed to give the “usual consideration” for a visa, the main issue, British High Commissioner Horace Rumbold stated, was that neither Turkish nor Hellenic Greek authorities were likely to give them passports.¹⁵⁹ Presumably, the Greek authorities did not want to issue passports to these people because they were not Hellenic Greek subjects. The Istanbul government may not have wanted to issue

¹⁵⁸ For more on this see Braude, “Foundation Myths of the Millet System,” 69-88.

¹⁵⁹ Rumbold to FO, Dec 27, 1921, FO 1103/992, TNA.

passports to these people because they did not want to enable this particular trip for political reasons. Regardless, it is clear that the Istanbul government retained the ability to deny Ottoman passports to subjects it deemed suspicious. Though, during the occupation period, because Ottoman Christians could avail themselves of other kinds of travel documents and passport control was in the hands of the Allies, a denial of an Ottoman passport did not necessarily prohibit legitimate movement. Many Ottoman Greeks and Armenians did, however, acquire Ottoman passports for their travels, but these Patriarch-issued “identity documents” were one of the many kinds of travel documents passing through Allied passport control.

The laissez-passer represented yet another kind of travel document used with frequency during the occupation. While the French phrase was once associated mainly with diplomatic documents,¹⁶⁰ these laissez-passers did not give the bearer any special status and offered them no protection from the issuing state. Many of them bore a line which specifically stated that the pass was valid for one journey which the person carrying the document undertook at their own risk.¹⁶¹ While the British often referred to their laissez-passer as “special passes” or simply “passes,” they were visually almost exactly the same as the French laissez-passer. During and after the occupation, these passes were frequently issued to White Russians (see figures 2 and 3), as they did not get access to Nansen passports in other states until 1922, and the Ankara government would allow Allied powers to continue to issue laissez-passer to Russians after the withdrawal of Allied forces (see figure 3). During the occupation, laissez-passer could, however, be issued to anyone for whom the Allies wanted to facilitate movement who was unable to get an actual passport, and

¹⁶⁰ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 160.

¹⁶¹ “Laissez-passer valable pour le Voyage seulement lequel est entrepris aux risques et perils de l’interesse.” See figures 2 and 3.

the British issued quite a number. In the year 1921, the British Embassy in Istanbul issued 1753 “passes” and 94 passports.¹⁶²



Figure 2. Mendel Kamakovsky’s British laissez-passer to the United States, Nov 10, 1921
 Personal Collection of Neil Kaplan

¹⁶² “Statistical Returns,” Feb 15, 1922, FO 369/1816, K3202, 5, TNA.

AFANK.60002

CONSULAT DE FRANCE

N'EST PAS VALABLE POUR RÉSIDER A CONSTANTINOPLE

N° 143-91
Constante 19-9-23

LAISSEZ-PASSER

Noms et prénoms *Georges Nakashidze*

Nationalité *Russe*

Age et lieu de Naissance *Setigenech - 17 ans*

Domicile . . . { 1^o en Russie *Charkov - 1^{er}*
2^o Constantinople *my Arouslar appart Jm Pau*

Profession *étudiant*

Marié *non*

Nom et nationalité de la femme avant le mariage *—*

Se rendant à *Marseille Paris France*

Par voie de *mer*

Motif *voir au verso*


Je certifie l'exactitude des renseignements ci-dessus

Signature de l'intéressé : _____

**Laissez-Passer valable pour le Voyage seulement
qui est effectué aux risques et périls de l'intéressé.**

Pièces d'identité *Passport n° 3324 remis Jarda
Mission Diplomatique Nulk à Grouple de*

Observations *H-9-23*



HAUT COMMISSARIAT
RÉPUBLIQUE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DES PASSAPORTS

8-23-IMP. FRANÇAISE, L. BOURKIDÉS

Figure 3. George Nakashidze's French laissez-passer to Paris, Sept 19, 1923
French Consulate Collection, SALT Research.

Due to the difference in status between nationals, protégés, and anyone else they wanted to issue travel documents to, states issuing passports often differentiated between the issue of laissez-passer, safe conducts, or passes, and the issue of official passports, hoping that the issue of less official paperwork would allow the people in question to travel without obliging the state in question to provide them assistance. Fahrenthold asserts that France's liberal issue of laissez-passer to certain groups of people allowed France to embrace these people "as clients without simultaneously claiming them as citizens."¹⁶³ The British likewise differentiated between issuing "passes" for travel and full passports. Alexander Lambros, the son of a Hellenic Greek father who nationalized in England prior to Alexander's birth, was intimately familiar with the difference. After applying for a British passport as a British subject, he was furnished instead with a pass referring to him as a "British protected person." Frustrated at this denial of his British nationality, Alexander hired a lawyer to contest this decision who wrote to the Foreign Office, "Our client... does not consider that this affords to him the same protection as would a pass port [sic] given to him as a British Subject which he appears to be."¹⁶⁴ Though the details of Alexander's case will be explored later, the point here is that the issue of different kinds of travel documents sometimes detailed different levels of obligation the state had toward the individual in question, as well as whether or not they actually possessed nationality.

That being said, the British had, historically, issued full passports to British protected persons, despite the fact that they did not hold British nationality. Rosalie Rafaelli was the widow of a man who was classified as a British protected person, though there was no recorded reason for him being taken under British protection. During an 1887 census of British residents of Constantinople, Rosalie's husband had

¹⁶³ Fahrenthold, *Between the Ottomans and the Entente*, 117.

¹⁶⁴ Downing, Middleton & Lewis to FO, Nov 22, 1922, FO 372/1935, T13642, 289, TNA.

said that his great-great-grandfather was a British Vice Consul and the notes on the census file state “this is a doubtful case.”¹⁶⁵ Despite the doubtful nature of her husband’s registration, Rosalie was granted a passport in 1911, which was later used as evidence of her long-standing registration and use of British protection when her case came under investigation in 1922.¹⁶⁶ A handwritten note on another Foreign Office file explained, “We have for some time issued passports to “British protected persons” who do not possess British nationality.”¹⁶⁷ Because of cases like this, possessing a particular nation or empire’s passport could not prove nationality, as they could sometimes be issued to protected persons or protégés who were not actually nationals. Indeed, a 1911 Ottoman passport regulation expressly stated that passports could not be used as proof of foreign nationality,¹⁶⁸ and the Ottoman Empire itself had sometimes issued passports to foreigners.¹⁶⁹

Even though, in cases of disputed nationality, a passport would not suffice as proof of nationality, the British did sometimes consider the use of a British passport as evidence of consistent affiliation in the absence of an official naturalization certificate. This was the case for the Ventura family, an Ottoman Jewish family from Smyrna, the father of whom had gained British nationality when he lived for an extended time in South Africa. Though they were unable to produce Isaac Ventura’s naturalization certificate, the fact that he was regularly traveling on a British passport provided enough support for his nationality case that the British consul was

¹⁶⁵ Copy of Census Record No. 307 in FO 372/1935, T13250, 334, TNA.

¹⁶⁶ Hubert Montgomery (FO) to A.T. Waugh Esq., Nov 23, 1922, FO 372/1935, T13250, 337, TNA.

¹⁶⁷ Handwritten note Nov 21, 1923, T11981, FO 372/2056, 232 (backside) TNA.

¹⁶⁸ Ispahani, 131.

¹⁶⁹ See translation of the Ottoman passport of Constantine Zafiri, dated May 16, 1899, whose nationality is stated as British and birthplace is stated as Great Britain, FO 372/2056, T702, 41, TNA.

instructed to register his wife and daughters as British Subjects in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁰

Protégés or “protected persons” would occupy an interesting place in the passport nexus of the occupation because they were sometimes issued full passports (relying on the idea that passports did not prove official nationality) and at other times were issued laissez-passer which emphasized their protected person status. This would shift over the course of the occupation, particularly after the passport clash of December 1922, and, as we will see in chapter five, by the end of the occupation, the British would be much more careful about not issuing passports to anyone who did not have full British nationality. Adding to this confusion, according to the British, the French and Italians, during the armistice period, made more and more Ottoman subjects their protégés, particularly in Smyrna. The British Consul in Smyrna, Harry Harling Lamb, wrote to the Foreign Office,

Shortly after the Greek occupation three years ago, it was reported that the Italian authorities and in a less extent the French were issuing to Turks, Jews and in general members of communities other than Greek, passports or papers of protection. These reports seemed to be well founded, and it appeared that such papers were delivered on very slight grounds; the vaguest connexion with Syria, Rhodes or Tripoli being considered sufficient. The French Consulate has assumed a general protection over as many Armenians as wish to avail themselves of it. But I am of opinion that the motives underlying this course were purely political, and in no sense governed by commercial considerations.¹⁷¹

Lamb’s assessment lines up with the understanding that powers sometimes offered travel documents to individuals as an attempt to extend their influence and assert their sovereignty. During the Greek occupation of Smyrna, wherein the Greek government was trying to assert its own sovereignty, issuing travel documents of its

¹⁷⁰ “Enclosure No. 1 in South Africa Dispatch No. 468 of 21 August, 1922,” FO 372/1935, T10822, 206, TNA.

¹⁷¹ Lamb to FO, May 17, 1922, FO 372/1935 T 6314, 170, TNA.

own (see figure 4), the Italians and French saw an opportunity to extend their influence in the region, asserting their own claims of protection over individuals, even though it brought them little economic benefit. Before the Nationalists started winning the war, the sky seemed to be the limit for European countries claiming influence in former Ottoman lands. The newly given protégé status of these former Ottoman subjects would, however, outlast Greek rule in Smyrna, leaving a relatively large group of people who claimed the protection of Allied countries, often carrying Allied-issued travel documents.

In addition to protégés, there were numerous former Ottoman subjects who had availed themselves of foreign nationality officially, and thus carried the passports of foreign nations. As explained earlier, these nationality changes had a long history of contention with the Ottoman government. In an attempt to settle this in their favor, the Allies placed an article in the Treaty of Sevres which stated that Turkey would agree to recognize the new nationality of any former Ottoman subject who acquired foreign nationality and consider them as having lost their Turkish nationality without losing their property or ability to reside in Turkey as foreign nationals.¹⁷² This would enable former Ottoman subjects who had acquired foreign nationality to be treated as full-fledged foreign subjects, capitulations and all, while in Turkish territory. As the Nationalists won the war, however, it would become clear that the Treaty of Sevres would be scrapped, and the likelihood of including an article like 128 in a new treaty was next to none.¹⁷³

¹⁷² “The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey,” signed at Sevres Aug 10, 1920, Article 128.

¹⁷³ See FO 372/1934, T12063, 25-26, TNA.



Figure 4. Departure Permit issued by Greek authorities in Smyrna to Kayos Hovardian, July 24, 1922 Houshamadyan.

Throughout the war, the Nationalists were in control of large and growing swaths of Anatolia, and, in asserting their sovereignty, they also forbade unsanctioned movement and issued passports (see figure 5). A large part of this was, of course, that there was a war going on and it wouldn't do to have civilians wandering around a war zone, and initial bans on movement made no distinction

between Muslims and Non-Muslims, requiring all to get specific permission to travel.¹⁷⁴ By late 1921, however, Ankara decreed that Muslims would no longer need to get passports issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly (GNA) from the Interior Ministry in order to travel within Anatolia, as regular identity documents would be sufficient, marking a difference between more and less suspicious subjects.¹⁷⁵ Figure 5 shows an image of a passport issued in the name of the GNA to a Muslim man and his family traveling to Tbilisi in August of 1922, hence why it is printed in both Turkish and Russian.

Destinations printed on passports were sometimes particular ports, cities, or countries. One person's passport might have the destination stated as "Paris," indicating the final destination of the person, another person's passport might say "Marseilles," indicating the port to which they were destined, while another's might simply say "France," even if all three people were ultimately taking the same route to the same place. There seemed to be little standardization regarding how destinations were to be described on travel documents.

¹⁷⁴ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 48.

¹⁷⁵ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 49.




Figure 5. Passport issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly to Şeyhoğlu Resul, Aug 22, 1922

Trabzon Şehir Müzesi, photograph by Yaşar Tolga Cora

The early 1920s were a chaotic time when world powers began to attempt to sort the world's people into discrete national categories to ensure that everyone had a

nationality tied to a territorially-bounded nation-state. In the breakup of multinational empires into nation-states and the complete redrawing of the map, many people found themselves on the borderlands of national identity as states tried to navigate movements of people. Individuals themselves also tried to harness whatever power they could to ensure their own futures in the midst of world upheaval. In analyzing negotiations about nationality, we will see many conflicting ideas about the relationships between ethnicity, language, religion, birthplace, and nationality. We will see these even further complicated by colonialism and empire. At times, we will even see government administrators throw up their hands in confusion over the idea of nationality, as for example, in the case of a number of Baghdadi Jews who took British nationality in India in 1921-1923. Under “nationality” (meaning nationality before the procurement of British nationality), the British administrator in Calcutta wrote “Doubtful–Turkish Jew by birth.”¹⁷⁶ A number of things about this line are striking. Although British administrators generally operated on the assumption that everyone had a nationality that could be “discovered,” there were those, like Baghdadi Jews, who, to some, were of “doubtful” nationality.¹⁷⁷ Part of this could be due to the new and unsettled nature of British Mandate Iraq, the boundaries of which were in dispute even years after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne¹⁷⁸—a fact which shows us that as boundaries shifted and changed so too (in some situations) did the perceived nationalities of those who were born there. But it also shows us, as we will see in other examples throughout this study, that often when nationality was

¹⁷⁶ Home Office 334/249, TNA.

¹⁷⁷ For a dynamic study which illustrates the complicated relationship between Baghdadi Jews and British nationality law see Stein, “Protected Persons? The Baghdadi Jewish Diaspora, the British State, and the Persistence of Empire,” 80-108.

¹⁷⁸ For more on the negotiations between the British and Turkish Nationalists over Mosul see Demirci, “Turco-British Diplomatic Manoeuvres on the Mosul Question in the Lausanne Conference, 1922-1923,” 57-71.

in doubt, British administrators would identify an individual by religious or ethnic group, often with the very direct intention of sorting them into a national category based on this affiliation.

Looking at the Allied occupation of Istanbul is fruitful for unpacking this chaotic moment in passport history because it added even more chaos into the mix. Boundaries were changing, sovereignty was contested, refugees were everywhere, there were various points of authority within the city, people were moving either by choice or by force, and no one knew what the future would hold. Passports and travel documents from the end of the occupation reflect both the chaotic administration of the city and the unsettled nature of passports and nationality broadly at this time. Thus, two messy histories intersect to show us how people negotiated and navigated nationality and travel documents at a moment which forged the system of nationality and citizenship we have today.

CHAPTER 3

PASSPORTS AND EXODUS

On December 4, 1922, droves of people lined up at the port in Galata, shivering in the cold, clutching travel documents of various kinds, and praying to get safely on a ship which would ferry them away from Istanbul. For over two months the port had been filled with people, mainly Ottoman Christians, clamoring to get away. Many feared a bloodbath as the Turkish Nationalist government in Ankara took control of the city and Allied soldiers withdrew, the wounds of the devastating fire of Smyrna still fresh. In their frenzied flight, many desperately sought passports, visas, and all manner of travel documents from numerous different authorities that might allow them to escape. The ones gathered at the port on this day had secured inter-Allied exit visas, visas to their foreign destinations, and ship tickets. They first had to go through Turkish customs, which had been taken over by police loyal to the Ankara government in November. Up until this day, the Turkish police had inspected the documents handed to them, stamped a final exit visa, and then allowed the passengers to move through Allied passport control, after which they could board the ship. But on December 4, the Turkish police began tearing up any travel documents of Ottoman subjects that were not passports issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly. The documents they tore up may have been issued by any number of different authorities. They may have been French or British laissez-passer, they may have been identity documents issued by the Greek or Armenian Patriarchates, or even temporary passports issued by the Greek Consulate. But these papers were certainly not issued by Turkish Nationalist authorities, and the Turkish police thus deemed them illegitimate.

In tearing up these documents, the Nationalist police, as instructed by Refet Bele Pasha, Ankara's representative in Istanbul, made a firm statement about Turkish sovereignty. Refet Pasha had decreed, on this day, that no Ottoman subject was to leave Istanbul without a Turkish passport, because to leave without a Turkish passport was to leave without the permission of the Ankara government. And the Ankara government would now claim sovereignty over all Ottoman subjects, starting with their movement.

When word got to General Charles Harington, commander of the British occupation forces who controlled the port at Galata, he was infuriated at the insult to Allied control. He immediately sent a squadron of British marines down to the port. They arrived brandishing machine guns and, through this show of force, ensured that those who carried inter-Allied exit visas, regardless of the travel document they were stamped upon, were allowed to board their ships and leave.¹⁷⁹

This day would mark a watershed moment in the power struggle between Allied occupation forces and Turkish Nationalists over the administration of Istanbul. After this nearly violent encounter, the British, who of the Allies had been resisting Ankara most vehemently, acknowledged that it was unsustainable to force their will "by virtue of British machine guns,"¹⁸⁰ especially in regard to Ottoman Christians. On December 5, 1922, the Allies began their administrative retreat from Istanbul, conceding more and more control to Ankara. This shift was symbolized by Allied agreement that no Ottoman subject should leave without a Turkish passport, followed by a relinquishing of police control over Ottoman Christians to the Turkish police.

¹⁷⁹ Henderson to Rumbold, Dec 5, 1922, MS Rumbold 30, 121-122, Rumbold Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.

¹⁸⁰ RCL handwritten note, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13664, 133 (backside), TNA.

This day would also mark a turning point in the story of the exodus from Istanbul at the end of the Allied occupation. In discussing emigrants from Istanbul during this time period, we must necessarily divide them into two groups: those who left before December 5, and those who left after. As the previous chapter illustrated, those who left before December 5 were able to leave with all manner of travel documents as long as they had Allied permission to leave. But this would have serious consequences for them later, as the Ankara government would decree that any Ottoman subject who left without a Turkish passport had forfeited their right to Turkish nationality, and consequently would not be allowed to return. Those who left after December 5 would have to be furnished with a Turkish passport, which, for men of military age, would require the payment of a large fee to exempt them from military service in addition to the passport fee. Any Ottoman subject who was unable to acquire a Turkish passport who wished to leave would have to be smuggled out.

This chapter will look at the political developments and conflicts around passports during the last year of the occupation, roughly dating from September 1922 to the beginning of October 1923. This chapter will also, largely, focus on travel documents and legal implications for people *leaving* Istanbul during this year for two reasons. The first is that, as this chapter will argue, it was a clash over people leaving which marked such a major turning point in the relationship between Allied occupation authorities and Nationalist authorities in Istanbul. The second is that it was the travel documents with which they left that had such long-lasting implications for their nationality status. The successful entrance of people into the city during the occupation would not have the same far-reaching consequences for nationality status. For this reason, entry requirements will be discussed most substantially in the section

devoted to Ankara's policy of no return for Ottoman subjects who left without Turkish passports.¹⁸¹

This chapter, in highlighting the power of the Ankara government over Istanbul during this period, complicates the image of Turkish Nationalist troops triumphantly entering Istanbul and "liberating" the city on October 6, 1923, after the last of the Allied soldiers had left. While this image, and the celebration of this date for nearly a century,¹⁸² promote an assumption in the popular imagination that this was the date on which the Ankara government took control of Istanbul, in contrast, this chapter will illustrate that the Ankara government had actually largely controlled the administration of the city for the better part of a year before the official entrance of Nationalist troops. The administrative if not military conquest (or reconquest) of Istanbul in the name of the Turkish Nation was, in fact, much more stealthy and subtle than many at the time would care to admit.

After the Ankara government had seized control of Istanbul administration and asserted their authority over Ottoman subjects leaving Istanbul, for men of military age who wanted to leave Istanbul, the process would become quite different. As all male Ottoman subjects were liable for military service, those who wanted passports to leave would often have to pay a large fee to exempt them from their military service or be sent to the interior to serve in brutal labor battalions. For Ottoman Christians of means this was often worth the price of escape from an uncertain future in Istanbul, but those who could not pay could not leave.

¹⁸¹ In this chapter I will occasionally use the vague phrase "Turkish passports" deliberately. Where it is necessary to differentiate between passports issued in the name of the GNA and Ottoman passports issued by the Ankara government, I will do so, but as the last section of this chapter will illustrate, although those who left with Ottoman passports were still investigated before being given a visa to return to Turkey, the general policy, in theory, was to allow those who left with Ottoman passports to return. In this way, the people who were, in general, completely disbarred from returning (with possible exceptions depending on religious community) were those who left with neither Ottoman passports nor passports issued in the name of the GNA.

¹⁸² Criss, xiii.

For those who had managed to escape before the passport clash in December of 1922, in the spring of 1923 when negotiations in Lausanne were going in a more productive direction and panic had largely subsided, many found that they were being prevented from returning. As Ankara then asserted that no Ottoman subject could enter Turkey without a Turkish visa approved by Ankara, Ankara's policy of no return for those who left with irregular passports started to take shape. This policy would have far-reaching consequences for those who left Turkey, as the majority would not be able to return.

It is crucial to keep in mind that throughout this year (albeit sometimes intermittently) negotiations were ongoing in Lausanne over a final peace treaty. But while at various points government representatives in Istanbul would defer to their delegations in Lausanne to hash out broader disagreements between the powers in question, Istanbul was the theater upon which these disagreements would play out. For the residents of Istanbul, this was a year of tumult and uncertainty.

3.1 Blood and fire

In March of 1922, Harry Harling Lamb wrote, in a private letter to Horace Rumbold, that after witnessing the Greek Army burning Turkish villages and mosques, he believed that if and when the Greek Army withdrew, they would leave utter destruction in their wake. He believed that “unless Allies are prepared to cover Greek withdrawal with an adequate force, [the] fate of Anatolia will be settled by blood and fire alone.”¹⁸³ These words would prove to be ominously clairvoyant.

The Turkish Nationalist Army would defeat the Greeks in Anatolia, sending the Greek Army into a rapid withdrawal during which they burned even more

¹⁸³ As quoted from telegram summary, Rumbold to FO, Mar 6/Mar 7, 1922, FO 1103/992; Full telegram in FO 371/7876, E2591, TNA.

Turkish villages. In response, the Nationalist Army began to expel the Greek Orthodox population of Anatolia in their march west. The violence would culminate in the fire of Smyrna, wherein hundreds of thousands of refugees crammed into the port, desperate to get on a boat to escape the flames and convinced that if they fell into the hands of the Turkish Army they would be slaughtered. Estimates for the number of people who died range from tens of thousands to over 100,000.¹⁸⁴ The fire destroyed the Greek and Armenian quarters of the city and sent hundreds of thousands of refugees streaming into Greek ports.

The fire of Smyrna sparked a panic amongst Greek and Armenian communities in Istanbul who feared that their city would meet the same fate, and many rushed to flee. By the end of October 1922, Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner to Istanbul, estimated that around 3,000 Ottoman Greeks were leaving the city every week.¹⁸⁵ Lord Curzon reported that he'd heard that 15,000 Greeks had left Istanbul in October alone.¹⁸⁶ Throughout the month of November, around 4000 Armenians arrived just in Varna, Bulgaria from Istanbul.¹⁸⁷ Between October and December 1922, around 50,000 non-Muslim Ottoman subjects left Istanbul.¹⁸⁸

People crowded the Greek Embassy seeking entry visas and ferry companies

¹⁸⁴ KIRLI, "Forgetting the Smyrna Fire," 31.

¹⁸⁵ Rumbold to Curzon, Oct 24, 1922, FO 371/7957, E11823, 26, TNA. Both Kamouzis, (*Greeks in Turkey*, 231) and Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, 82, state that Rumbold said that Ottoman Greeks were leaving Istanbul at the rate of 3,000 *a day*. I believe this discrepancy arose from the fact that a certain R.C.L. in the Foreign Office misread and misrepresented Rumbold's statement in his notes in on Nov 2, 1922, FO 371/7957, E11924, 122 (he explicitly references Rumbold's dispatch No. 933 (cited above) wherein Rumbold states "the Oecumenical Patriarchate is sending away about 3,000 Greeks a week") and from there G.W. Rendel wrote a "Memorandum on the Proposed Exchange of Greek and Turkish Minorities" (Nov 30, 1922, FO 371/7959, E13044, 84, backside) where on page 6 he repeated the rate of 3,000 *a day*, a report which both Kamouzis and Alexandris cite. Considering that all sources are aware that these numbers were taken from Rumbold, and Rumbold's telegram specifically says 3,000 *a week*, I conclude that this was an error on the part of the Foreign Office which was then repeated in the scholarship.

¹⁸⁶ Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, Territorial and Military Commission Minutes, Dec 1, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 829, pg. 755, TNA.

¹⁸⁷ Vice-Consul Gilliat-Smith to Erskine, Dec 4, 1922, FO 424/644, Enclosure in No. 837, pg. 781, TNA.

¹⁸⁸ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, 82.

advertised in minority newspapers promising an immediate departure.¹⁸⁹ Those who left were mostly composed of the wealthiest section of the population, as they could pull their connections and finances to facilitate a speedy departure. The Armenian Patriarch, Zaven Der Yeghiayan, in discussing this exodus in his memoirs would write, “These people, bewildered in their struggle for physical and economic survival, were unable to do anything, and almost the entire [Armenian] Nation scattered to various parts of the world, like dust carried by the wind.”¹⁹⁰

In the days immediately following the fire, two-thirds of the people receiving Ottoman passports from the Istanbul government were non-Muslim. A ledger from the traffic office¹⁹¹ of the Ottoman Interior ministry tracking the people given passports between September 16 and September 27, 1922, reflects 336 names, 53 of whom were women, with destinations largely in Europe and the United States. Though the ledger does not list the religious communities of each passport holder, a rough analysis of names on the list indicates that 114 of these people were likely Orthodox, 112 of them Muslim, 75 of them Armenian, and 24 of them Jewish. The numbers of people receiving passports were also largely going up day by day.¹⁹² Unfortunately, we do not have subsequent ledgers of this kind, making it difficult to draw any conclusions about how many people who left during this exodus did so with Ottoman passports. We also cannot, of course, infer the reason for these

¹⁸⁹ Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 83.

¹⁹⁰ Zaven Der Yeghiayan, *My Patriarchal Memoirs*, 240.

¹⁹¹ Seyrüsefer Kalemi.

¹⁹² Analyzing names to infer ethno-religious community is by no means exact, thus, in terms of different religious communities, this data could be subject to quite a reasonable degree of error. I am, however, relatively confident in the Muslim/Non-Muslim differentiation, though not as confident in the differentiation of particular non-Muslim communities. There were, of course, many Ottoman subjects who did not quite fit into any of these religious categories, many of whom would be considered “Levantine” by European observers. For an investigation of one “Levantine” group and an explanation of the term see Tagliaferri, “In the Process of Being Levantines. The ‘Levantinization’ of the Catholic Community of Izmir (1683–1724),” 86-112. Reflected in the numbers given above are 11 names which I designate as non-Muslim but do not put into any of the non-Muslim religious categories, as their names do not reflect a clear ethno-religious affiliation. Dahiliye, Seyrüsefer Kalemi (DH.EUM.SSM) 51/13, Sept 28, 1922, BOA.

people's passport requests, as some of them may have routinely traveled or had business in other places. What we can say is that the Istanbul government was issuing decent numbers of Ottoman passports in late September 1922, with 34 issued to non-Muslim Ottomans on Sept 27th alone.¹⁹³

The Greek Consulate also started giving out emergency travel documents to both Hellenic Greek subjects and Ottoman Greeks, without distinction to their legal nationality, in the panic of the fall of 1922.¹⁹⁴ Seeing this panic, on September 17, Greek Patriarch Meletios, in an effort to discourage this mass exodus, wrote an encyclical saying that the situation was not so alarming “as to justify the crowds in front of the passport issuing offices and the haste to leave our city.”¹⁹⁵ *Which* passport offices he's referring to is not entirely clear. He may have been referring to the Patriarchal office issuing identity documents, Ottoman passport offices, as well as the Greek Consulate. What is clear is that Ottoman Christians rushed to acquire passports from any authority they could very shortly after the fire of Smyrna.

The British by no means encouraged the flight of Istanbul's Christian population, as they believed that British trade would suffer along with Istanbul's larger economy should the Christians flee,¹⁹⁶ but they did facilitate the flight of those who wished to leave and had the means to do so. Beginning in late September, shortly after the fire, Rumbold arranged for passes to be issued to all those who wanted to leave. British authorities agreed that these passes should be issued in the name of General Harington, as commander of the armed forces, rather than Rumbold, as High Commissioner, “to avoid as far as possible the appearance of

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 245.

¹⁹⁵ As quoted in Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 227.

¹⁹⁶ RCL Minutes, Nov 2, 1922, FO 371/7957, E11924, 122, TNA.

affording protection on purely political grounds.”¹⁹⁷ These new passes would be roughly the same as the “special passes” the British had been issuing from Istanbul for years, except that they would now bear Harington’s name in order to make their departure look more like a military necessity than a political one. Though Rumbold said he would try to limit the number of passes and would try to vary destinations to which people carrying these passes would go, there were already slight murmurs in the foreign service about the problems issuing these passes might create. The British Consul in Bucharest had already long complained about how many “special passes” were issued from Constantinople and asked for the cessation of this practice.¹⁹⁸ The Consul General in Istanbul responded to his complaint explaining that special passes were issued to four groups:

- (1) Ottoman subjects whose departure is desirable on political grounds but who cannot obtain regular passports;
- (2) Natives of Palestine, Mesopotamia and Egypt who desire to return to their homes.
- (3) Distressed British subjects repatriated to the United Kingdom ...
- (4) Persons claiming British protection whose presence in Constantinople is undesirable, but who cannot produce proof of their claim.¹⁹⁹

These policies had already been in place throughout the occupation, but after Smyrna the number of people who fell into the first and fourth categories increased substantially. Groups of people clamoring to leave now included large swaths of Ottoman Christians, Ottoman Muslims who had placed themselves in opposition to the Ankara government, and Ottoman subjects of all communities who had either worked for or aided the Allies.

Unsure whether or not the Allies may need to make a hasty evacuation from Istanbul, the Foreign Office started discussing how to protect those employed by the British. Rumbold proposed issuing them his emergency passes in order to escape,

¹⁹⁷ Rumbold to Curzon, Sept 26, 1922, FO 424/644, E10389, 27, TNA.

¹⁹⁸ Consul Keyser (Bucharest) to FO Sept 16/Sept 21, 1922, FO 1103/1775, TNA.

¹⁹⁹ Consul-General Waugh., Constantinople, Oct 18/Oct 30, 1922, FO 1003/1775, TNA.

while others in the Foreign Office proposed giving them certificates as British protected persons. But George William Rendel, a Foreign Office administrator, noted, “Certificates of any kind issued by us to people who we cannot physically protect and who are not British subjects are worse than useless.” He pointed out that they had given out such certificates to Venizelists who were in the British service in Athens in December of 1916 who were then shot because of them.²⁰⁰ Those who feared for their lives would need to leave, for possessing any kind of paperwork that tied them to the British and staying in Turkish territory could threaten their lives. For those with direct ties to the British, the British military would assist in their escape, sometimes evacuating people directly. For all others, they sought to speed up the process of getting a pass and an exit visa to leave in order to minimize any unnecessary delay.²⁰¹

3.2 The subtle conquest of Istanbul

The Turkish National Army’s decisive victory in Smyrna put the Allies in an uncomfortable military position, as nothing stood between the victorious Turkish Army and the Allied occupied Zone of the Straits. Conflicting policies toward Turkey from Prime Minister Lloyd George and the Foreign Office culminated in the Chanak crisis, wherein General Harington refused to relay an order from the UK government to the Nationalists to withdraw from the area around the Straits or be fired upon.²⁰² Choosing instead to negotiate an armistice, the Allies, the Grand

²⁰⁰ Rendel Handwritten Note, Oct 19, 1922, FO 371/7947, E10997, 18 (backside), TNA. In the conflict between King Constantine I and Venizelos, the British were decidedly on the Venizelist side. Though the British likely thought that these papers would offer people who worked in their service some kind of immunity, it ended up labeling them as traitors to the crown.

²⁰¹ Henderson to Curzon, Nov 28, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 723, pg. 611, TNA.

²⁰² Macarthur-Seal, “Intelligence and Lloyd George’s Secret Diplomacy in the Near East, 1920–1922,” 707-728.

National Assembly, and the Kingdom of Greece signed the Mudanya Armistice in mid-October 1922.²⁰³ Under the terms of the armistice, the Greek Army was to withdraw from Eastern Thrace and transfer it over to Turkish Nationalist administration within thirty days, and in return the Turkish Nationalist Army would not move into the Zone of the Straits (including Istanbul), which were under Allied control, until a final peace treaty was agreed upon. British public opinion had decidedly turned against investing more money and troops into conflict with Turkey.²⁰⁴ The Chanak crisis and Lloyd George's unpopular, steadfast support for Greece in defiance of the government's stated policy of neutrality²⁰⁵ would result in the fall of Lloyd George's coalition government on October 19. The appetite for war was gone, and the Allies would have to negotiate a peace knowing that threatening a resumption of hostilities was unlikely to be an option.

On October 19, the same day Lloyd George's government fell, Refet Bele Pasha, Ankara's representative sent to take control of Eastern Thrace, entered Istanbul with 126 gendarmes. Stating that these guards were his personal attendants, the Allies allowed him his large entourage.²⁰⁶ Refet Pasha was greeted by significant fanfare from the Turkish population of the city. Crowds gathered waving red and white flags as he made his way from Kabataş to Fatih.²⁰⁷ Though the Allies initially thought that Refet Pasha's focus would be on Turkish administration in Eastern Thrace, they would soon realize that he was subtly extending Ankara's influence over Istanbul, despite the city still being under Allied occupation. Neville Henderson,

²⁰³ The Allies and the GNA signed on October 11 and the Kingdom of Greece agreed on October 14.

²⁰⁴ MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*, 207.

²⁰⁵ For a full analysis of the extent to which Lloyd George covertly supported Greece until the end of the war in conflict with the Foreign Office see MacArthur-Seal, "Intelligence and Lloyd George's Secret Diplomacy in the Near East, 1920–1922."

²⁰⁶ Henderson to Curzon, Dec 7, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 793, pg. 712, TNA.

²⁰⁷ Criss, 146; See also Rumbold to Curzon, Oct 24, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 350 pg. 242-244, TNA.

the acting British High Commissioner for Istanbul while Horace Rumbold was in Lausanne, would write, in hindsight, “Generally speaking, it may be said that Refet and his 120 gendarmes succeeded, in a fortnight, in imposing a Nationalist administration on Constantinople.”²⁰⁸

Refet quickly began infiltrating Istanbul government structures, ensuring that well-placed people in the bureaucracy and police were loyal to Ankara. The “Friends of Armenia” group reported in early November that Nationalist soldiers were entering Istanbul in large numbers disguised as peasants.²⁰⁹ The process of infiltration would be virtually complete by the end of December, when the Allies would realize that Ankara had replaced almost all members of the gendarmerie, police, and fire brigade with Nationalist officers.²¹⁰ Refet’s subtle conquest of Istanbul was paralleled and assisted by declarations from the Grand National Assembly in Ankara. In short succession, the Grand National Assembly declared all laws, treaties, and financial agreements entered into by the Istanbul government since the beginning of the Allied occupation null and void, then abolished the Sultanate and declared that sovereignty over the Turkish people was vested solely in the Grand National Assembly. This led to the almost immediate resignation of the remaining members of the Istanbul government, and Refet Pasha declared himself acting governor of Istanbul.²¹¹ Having asserted administrative control over Istanbul, the GNA then began encouraging the Allies to withdraw their troops from the city. After a panicked meeting between Allied High Commissioners regarding this request, where they decided they needed to take a firm line with Ankara regarding control over Istanbul, Rumbold wrote,

²⁰⁸ Henderson to Curzon, Dec 7, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 793, pg. 712, TNA.

²⁰⁹ Friends of Armenia to FO, Nov 9, 1922, FO 1103/995, TNA.

²¹⁰ Harington to WO, Dec 23, 1922, WO 106/1430, TNA.

²¹¹ Criss, 147.

It was recognised at the meeting that the situation in Constantinople was even more dangerous than at the time of the Mudania crisis. The Turkish police and gendarmerie here were no longer at the disposal of the Allied army of occupation. They had now given their allegiance to the Angora Government, and could not be trusted to act as auxiliaries and might even have to be considered as active enemies.²¹²

The Allies realized, perhaps a little too late, that their control over Istanbul was slipping. As delegations were preparing to meet in Lausanne to discuss a lasting peace settlement, the Allies were negotiating and clashing with Refet Pasha over control of Istanbul, and this tension would build for the better part of a month.

Almost immediately after taking official administrative control over Istanbul, the GNA would also take control of customs dues, close the British mixed courts, take control of the sanitary commission, and declare that no passports should be given to Ottoman subjects without the final visa of the Turkish police.²¹³ This last declaration reflected the assertion that no Ottoman subject should leave Turkish territory (including Istanbul) without the permission of the Ankara government. A person leaving Istanbul for a foreign destination would first go through Turkish customs and then through Allied Passport control.²¹⁴ Most likely, during the month of November, after the Nationalists took charge of Turkish customs, Nationalist police were bestowing this “final visa” as people passed through Turkish customs. Thus, while Ankara was attempting to assert its right to say who could leave and who could not, the procedure for leaving did not yet change significantly. In the eyes of the Allies, passport control still remained solely in their hands.²¹⁵

As noted in the last chapter, the GNA had been issuing passports in its name in Anatolia throughout the war, so it is also likely, at this point, that they quite

²¹² Rumbold to Curzon, Nov 7, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 546, pg. 372, TNA.

²¹³ Henderson to FO, Nov 16th, 1922, FO 371/7913, E12805, 204, TNA.

²¹⁴ Henderson to Rumbold, Dec 5, 1922, 121-123, MS Rumbold 30, Rumbold Papers.

²¹⁵ Henderson to Curzon, Dec 18, 1922, FO 371/7918, E14185, 131, TNA.

quickly started issuing passports in the name of the Grand National Assembly in Istanbul, and the general ban on movement (as legitimized by the Ankara government) had largely been lifted in late October 1922.²¹⁶ It is not entirely clear when Ottoman passports stopped being issued, though they were certainly still being issued in late October 1922.²¹⁷ There is a blank example of an Ottoman passport booklet in the Ottoman archives which is archived with a date of August 12, 1923 as its last possible date of inception (see figure 1 in chapter two), but this was a date affixed to a large number of undated documents from the traffic office of the Ottoman Interior Ministry, which included documents from both the Istanbul government and the Ankara government during the last year of the occupation. Due to later Nationalist correspondence which emphasized passports issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly, we may infer that once Refet Pasha and the Nationalists took control of these particular structures of the Istanbul government, Ottoman passports were no longer issued. Instead, passports would now bear the name of the Grand National Assembly. In this way, Ankara began to claim sovereignty over the movement of Ottoman subjects.

A month earlier, in negotiations at Mudanya, İsmet İnönü Pasha, Ankara's delegate, would make absolutely certain that linguistic distinction was made between Ottoman Greek subjects and Hellenic subjects—signaling an assertion of Turkish sovereignty over Ottoman Greeks and drawing a clear line between ethnicity and nationality in a legal sense.²¹⁸ This did not mean, of course, that Ottoman Greeks would be welcomed into the Turkish nation in an ideological sense, nor even that Ankara wished to retain its Ottoman Greek population. What it meant was that

²¹⁶ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 50.

²¹⁷ DH.EUM.SSM 51/23, Oct 24, 1922, BOA.

²¹⁸ Harington to Rumbold, Oct 14, 1922, FO 424/644, Enclosure 2 in No. 297, pg. 219, TNA.

anyone who the Ankara government considered as retaining Ottoman nationality (which would soon become Turkish nationality), should fall under the jurisdiction and authority of the Grand National Assembly. This would mean, particularly, in the context of Mudanya, that Ottoman Greeks who assisted the Greek Army would be prosecuted as traitors under Ottoman law.

In slight tension with this approach, in early November, the Nationalists published a warning to the Greeks of Istanbul that all those who considered themselves to be Hellenic subjects rather than Ottoman subjects should leave before November 18.²¹⁹ On the one hand, Ankara claimed complete sovereignty over Ottoman Greeks, but on the other, Istanbul Rum were offered an apparent choice in nationality—one they would make with their movement. This was an early signal that the Nationalists linked legal nationality with loyalty and allegiance, and that they believed that the act of leaving, for Ottoman subjects, signaled an allegiance to other nations over the emerging Turkish State. This also set the stage for Ankara's later argument that Istanbul Rum who left during this time had forfeited their Turkish nationality.

Now fully aware of the extent to which Ankara was trying to assert its sovereignty over Istanbul, the Allies prepared for a fight. While they had acknowledged at Mudanya that they would only stay in occupation pending a final peace treaty, Refet's quick moves to wrestle as much administrative control over Istanbul away from them as possible struck the Allies as not only a security threat but an attack on the prestige of the occupation. The word "humiliating" was used in many British documents during this particular period, illustrating that British occupation authorities believed that many of Ankara's moves were a malicious

²¹⁹ Criss, 148.

attempt to undermine British authority in the eyes of the world.²²⁰ General Harington was so alarmed by Refet's actions that he wrote to the War Office asking for permission to declare a state of siege. The declaration of martial law, imposition of a curfew, and the forced disarmament of Turkish police and gendarmerie would be the only way to maintain occupation in anything other than just name.²²¹ Such a direct military move, however, would likely instigate a confrontation with Nationalist forces. To take such action, the Allies would need more troops. After telegraphing their home countries to ask if reinforcements could be sent, it became clear that maintaining firm Allied control of Istanbul could not justify further troop deployments from the war-weary Allies. France and Italy made it clear that they did not want to assert Allied police control by force.²²² To the frustration of British occupation personnel, the Allies would have to negotiate control over Istanbul with Refet Pasha.

The issue of police control would be the heart of the matter, and these negotiations would drag on, making little headway, until the beginning of December. The Allies eventually conceded that Turkish police should have jurisdiction over Ottoman subjects, except if crimes were committed against Allied forces—a move which they admitted would limit their ability to protect Ottoman Christians. The Nationalists would eventually concede that Allied forces would have jurisdiction over Russian and Hellenic subjects, but this agreement would take time and rising tension to hammer out, and a very tentative agreement would not be reached until December 2.²²³ During this time, the Allies continued to issue passes and laissez-

²²⁰ As mentioned earlier, the British were keenly aware that the eyes of British India and the Khilafat movement were watching events that transpired in Istanbul. See Qureshi, Minault, and Aydın.

²²¹ Harington to WO, Nov 7, 1922, FO 371/7909, E12232, 238, TNA.

²²² Henderson to FO, Nov 16th, 1922, FO 371/7913, E12805, 204, TNA.

²²³ Harington to FO, Dec 2, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13623, 87-88, TNA.

passer to Ottoman subjects, enabling them to leave Istanbul if they felt their lives or livelihoods were in danger. And many who were in a financial position to do so did.

3.3 The passport clash

For many months yet the Allied forces remained nominally in control while the Nationalist Turks gradually cut the ground from under their authority. One such crisis I well remember. All the wealthier Christians were using the respite given by the long negotiations at Lausanne to fly from the doomed city. Suddenly one day the Turks, who had already subterraneously ousted the Ottoman officials under British orders, established their own police and passport offices on the Galata quays and stopped further embarkations of Christians. To this open challenge there could be only one reply. A body of British Marines with machine-guns appeared on the quays and the Turks withdrew. But for weeks Constantinople lived under the shadow of death. The city could clearly not be held against the Nationalist rising that any unwelcome development at Lausanne might at any moment excite... All day long the wretched refugees lined up along the quays for the chance of a passage on an outgoing Greek steamer with a British name hastily painted on her bow and a makeshift 'Jack' hoisted at her stern. It was the agony of 1453 over again, but long-drawn-out, and with the British in place of the Genoese.²²⁴

The British diplomat who wrote the vivid description above displays the interesting mix of paternalism, orientalism, and philhellenism²²⁵ often seen among the British ruling class of his day—some of which is perhaps best evidenced by the fact that he refers to Greek Pontic refugees as pack-animals on the subsequent page. Nonetheless, the image he paints serves to illustrate both the desperation of those seeking to flee and the degree to which the passport clash described on the first page of this chapter jarred the occupying British and lingered in their memory as an abrupt

²²⁴ Young, *Constantinople*, 293.

²²⁵ I refer to George Young as a philhellene because of his fascination with ancient Greek, ancient Roman, and Byzantine heritage and his fixation on these legacies and histories in his explanations of Eastern Europe and the Ottoman Empire. I say this despite the fact that George Young most likely did not think of himself as a philhellene as he was distinctly dismissive of the romantic idea that there should be any kind of philosophical connection between the English ruling class and Greek peasantry and definitely did not see modern Greeks as the heirs to Classical Greece. He, nonetheless, believed that Britain's support for Greek independence was a positive policy choice, despite the generally backward and uncivilized nature of the Greek people. For a book that explicitly expounds on his perspective see Young and Courtney, *Nationalism and War in the Near East*.

affront to British control. This would prove to be a turning point in their power struggle over administrative control of Istanbul.

Immediately after the incident, British officials would admit that they could not continue to help Ottoman subjects escape through force. They also acknowledged that Refet Pasha had a point: Ottoman subjects should not be leaving without Ottoman or Turkish passports. Henderson admitted,

Of course the Turkish argument is fundamentally sound; except in virtue of a military occupation in time of war, it is really an indefensible practice to allow subjects of another country to travel without any national papers. But the situation here is abnormal and the procedure however illegitimate has been legitimised by habit. It is a habit too that has been a great protection to the minorities, even though they are Ottoman subjects.²²⁶

Here we see Henderson admit that the British knew that allowing people to travel without official passports or with unclear national status was inappropriate within the postwar world, and he justified this largely by saying that it was simply out of habit.

For the British, however, the issue was not just a matter of passport norms, this issue went straight to the heart of the prestige of Allied power. General Harington, in his version of the incident, emphasized that he called in the marines to ensure that those with inter-Allied visas should be allowed through,²²⁷ illustrating that the provocation which was most humiliating, prompting an almost violent response, was not that Turkish customs officials were not letting Ottoman Christians leave, but that they were tearing up inter-Allied visas. Inter-Allied exit visas symbolized Allied permission to leave, thus the dismissal of them as legitimate travel documents and their physical defilement was a direct attack on Allied control over

²²⁶ Henderson to Rumbold, Dec 5, 1922, MS Rumbold 30, 122, Rumbold Papers.

²²⁷ Harington to WO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13750, 178, TNA.

Istanbul. Harington noted bitterly, “inter-allied visas have now lost much of their value.”²²⁸

Though the Allies agreed almost immediately to Refet Pasha’s demand that no Ottoman subjects be allowed to leave without passports issued by Turkish authorities, the clash at the port brought to the forefront all the issues the Allies had been fighting with Refet over during the preceding month. Henderson wrote to the Foreign Office in the days following the incident, again asking that Allied forces be given permission to declare martial law. He explained that the Nationalists argued that although the Mudanya Armistice had allowed the presence of Allied troops, it had not given the Allies permission to interfere in local administration. And while they conceded that Allied troops had inherent rights to self-protection, including the protection of Allied subjects, this right of protection and control did not extend to Ottoman Christian subjects. Though the Allies had already begun to concede that Ottoman Christians should, in theory, be subject to Turkish police, Henderson believed that this was their last moment to take a firm stand and ensure that the occupation was an occupation in more than just name. The concession that Ottoman Christians would need passports from Turkish authorities in order to leave Istanbul was the final step in the British abandonment of Ottoman Christians, but it was not too late to declare martial law and enforce Allied jurisdiction.²²⁹

But the factors which had prevented the Allies from declaring a state of siege the previous month had not changed. The French and Italians were unwilling to provoke a confrontation and no reinforcements would be sent to support a declaration of martial law. Negotiations were ongoing in Lausanne and the Allies had no appetite to threaten a final peace treaty. The UK government and the Conservative

²²⁸ Harington to WO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13750, 178, TNA.

²²⁹ Henderson to FO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13729, 168-170, TNA.

party under Bonar Law would seek a more conciliatory approach with Turkey, and the British Cabinet instructed General Harington “to make the best of the situation without enforcing martial law.”²³⁰ Though British officials would refer to this concession as their final abandonment of Ottoman Christians, it would also mark the end of fierce negotiations between the Allies and Refet Pasha over administrative control over Istanbul, and there would be no going back. From here on out, British officials in Istanbul would mainly leave negotiations to the delegations in Lausanne, and while they would advocate to Ankara’s representatives in Istanbul, they would shy away from making demands to assert their authority. The Allies would accept that they were on the way out.

The Allies did, however, after conceding the principle that Ottoman subjects should only be leaving with Turkish passports, request a one-month grace period during which Ottoman Christians might leave. To this Refet Pasha responded that they could give him a list of protégés they wanted to evacuate within five days, which was later negotiated to extend to one month, but after that no one would be permitted to leave without a Turkish passport.²³¹ This would mean little to the Ottoman Christians of Istanbul because anyone the British wanted to evacuate enough to consider them “protégés” could potentially be evacuated clandestinely by British naval ship. But the general populace of Greek and Armenian Istanbul would not benefit from such a privilege.

Levon Der-Meguerditchian was likely one of the protégés who were allowed to leave just after the passport clash. His laissez-passer was issued on December 6, 1922, and he exited on December 7. Though there is a stamp at the top of the laissez-passer which says that this passport is valid for one journey and does not entitle the

²³⁰ Cabinet Office to FO, Dec 7, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13789, 215, TNA.

²³¹ Criss, 151.

bearer to French protégé status,²³² “Armenian, special protégé” is handwritten under his name (see figure 6).



Figure 6. Levon Der-Meguerditchian's French laissez-passer to Marseille, Dec 6, 1922 Houshamadyan.

In late December, Dr. Adnan (Adivar) Bey took the place of Refet Pasha as Governor of Istanbul. During the handoff, when Adnan Bey asked the Allies why they complained so much about Refet, Henderson pointed to the passport clash, explaining that it was not the principle involved, but the fact that Refet Pasha had not consulted Allied representatives or given any warning before suddenly decreeing that no Ottoman subjects should leave without Turkish passports.²³³ Having already

²³² “Le présent passeport, valable pour un seul voyage ne donne pas droit au statut de protégé français.”

²³³ Henderson, Dec 19/28, 1922, FO 1103/996, E 14506/13867/44, FO 371/7968, TNA.

accepted Ankara's dominance in the administration of Istanbul, the British now walked back their outrage which had, only a few weeks before, led them to consider declaring martial law. Chastened, they would now say that they only ask to be informed in advance of major policy shifts.

Remembering the Allies' abandonment of Ottoman Christians, Armenian Patriarch Zaven would later note, "The Allied countries' representatives, despite having occupation armies in the city, started to submit to the *Milli* [Turkish Nationalists] and withdrew on every front."²³⁴

3.4 Clandestine evacuations

The Nationalists had, by the end of December 1922, taken control of the legitimate means of movement for all but Allied occupation forces and those under Allied protection.²³⁵ The Allies still, however, retained the facilities to enable *illegitimate* movement for all those they wanted to evacuate. The most prominent figure clandestinely evacuated by the British after the passport clash was the Armenian Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan.²³⁶

According to Henderson, Refet Pasha summoned Patriarch Zaven on December 4 and told him to send a telegram to the Lausanne conference disavowing the Armenian delegation there (which was advocating for an expanded Armenian state) and stating that the Turkish delegation alone would represent his community.²³⁷ Patriarch Zaven did not send such a telegram but he intimated that he

²³⁴ Der Yeghiayan, 238.

²³⁵ In December 1922, the Ankara government began to require all foreigners entering Istanbul to acquire a Turkish visa approved by Ankara before entrance. Swedish Minister, Dec 18/Dec 19, 1922, FO 1103/1775, TNA. In practice, however, Allied subjects largely ignored this requirement and simply paid a fine. This will be discussed later in the chapter.

²³⁶ The most prominent figure clandestinely evacuated by the British at all was the Sultan himself, but he was evacuated on November 17, before the passport clash, and the secrecy of his evacuation had nothing to do with passport restrictions. His evacuation will be discussed in the next chapter.

²³⁷ Henderson to Curzon, Dec 12, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 794 pg. 715, TNA.

might be willing to resign. Refet Pasha communicated to the Armenian Representative Assembly in no uncertain terms that Patriarch Zaven should resign if the Armenian community expected to live in the new Turkish state in peace. The assembly was repeatedly unable to form a quorum as so many of its members had recently fled, but those who remained chose to sacrifice the Patriarch for the safety of the community and asked him to resign.²³⁸ Patriarch Zaven expressed that he would resign as soon as a vicar was elected, but then quickly started forming plans to escape without officially resigning as Patriarch, as he believed that his resignation would undermine advocacy at Lausanne for an expanded Armenia. He wrote a letter to the British stating that he was afraid for his life and requesting British protection to proceed to Bulgaria. He insisted that if Refet Pasha knew of his plans for departure he would prevent it.²³⁹

Because the Allies had just agreed that Ottoman subjects should not leave without Turkish passports, Patriarch Zaven could not leave through normal channels without alerting Nationalist police. The British prepared special passes for the Patriarch, his nephew, two nieces and his dragoman.²⁴⁰ On the afternoon of December 10, 1922, the party was put on a steam tug which brought them to the “Praga,” a British warship anchored at Maiden’s Tower in the middle of the Bosphorus. Patriarch Zaven noted that there were a number of other prominent Istanbul Armenians on the ship, some traveling with legitimate Turkish passports, others, like him, traveling clandestinely with only British laissez-passer.²⁴¹

The flight of those on the “Praga” illustrates that although the Nationalists claimed a monopoly over the means of *legitimate* movement, the British still had

²³⁸ Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 87; Der Yeghiayan, 246.

²³⁹ Der Yeghiayan, 246-247.

²⁴⁰ Henderson to Curzon, Dec 12, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 794 pg. 715, TNA.

²⁴¹ Der Yeghiayan, 247.

plenty of ability to facilitate *illegitimate* movement. The illegitimacy of this movement is evidenced by the fact that the Patriarch had to be secretly ferried to a ship anchored in the middle of the Bosphorus, rather than one docked at the port. Though his flight has been compared to that of Greek Patriarch Meletios Metaxakis in the summer of 1923 because they both left aboard British warship,²⁴² Patriarch Meletios requested and secured a Turkish passport for his exit to Mount Athos, illustrating that his movement was legitimized by Turkish authorities. Henderson noted that since the Greek Patriarch had availed himself of a Turkish passport there was “no special reason to afford him the hospitality of a British warship,” but since they had already offered they couldn’t very well take it back.²⁴³ The politics surrounding Patriarch Meletios’s exit were decidedly different, as he had recently been dragged out of the Patriarchate and assaulted by members of his own community, and his resignation and exit was desired by both the Turkish and Hellenic governments. Though it is, perhaps, interesting to note that one of the methods the Nationalists used to speed up his exit was a court order which charged him with entering Istanbul without a regular passport,²⁴⁴ after which they provided him with one to facilitate his departure. Nonetheless, as Patriarch Meletios left with a Turkish passport, signifying the approval of Ankara, his exit was legitimate, in contrast to that of Patriarch Zaven.

The British continued to smuggle people out of Istanbul on warships until their final evacuation from the city. Most of the people whose clandestine flight they facilitated were people who had, in some way, helped the British. For many of these people, British Foreign Office administrators would express a sense of responsibility

²⁴² Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 87.

²⁴³ Henderson to Curzon, July 3, 1923, FO 424/645, Part III, No. 45 pg. 41, TNA.

²⁴⁴ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, 148.

(though not too much) for their survival. Though, occasionally, they would facilitate the exit of people who simply had passport issues and were able to pay their own way. Mr. Tahtadjian, representative of the short-lived Armenian Republic to Allied authorities in Turkey, was smuggled out on a British ship in September of 1923 because he carried a passport issued by the Armenian Delegation in Paris, which Turkish authorities did not recognize. He paid for his own passage and the Allies stamped visas of the Allied High Commissioners on his passport and set him on a ship for Malta.²⁴⁵

3.5 Military service as a barrier to a passport

Shortly after asserting its power over passport control, the Ankara government began a close surveillance of those leaving Turkish territory. Refet had given verbal assurance to the Allies that Ottoman Christians would not be prevented from leaving, nor extorted in order to get Turkish passports in order to do so,²⁴⁶ though the Allies at that point had neither the willingness nor the ability to force this issue particularly far. The major barrier to obtaining passports for many non-Muslim Ottomans was that all male Turkish subjects were liable for military service. Shortly after the passport clash, Turkish police started preventing men of military age from leaving Istanbul.²⁴⁷

The link between passports and conscription was quite fundamental across many geographies at this point in time. Preventing men from escaping military service had been a prime factor in the establishment of the passport regime across

²⁴⁵ Henderson to FO, Sept 16/Sept 24, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

²⁴⁶ Henderson to FO, Dec 5, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13664, 135, TNA.

²⁴⁷ "Ottoman Greeks and Armenians who have already left, or who are awaiting shipment from the Pontic coast," Foreign Office Minute, Feb 26, 1923, E2239, FO 371/9092, 60, TNA.

Europe during the First World War.²⁴⁸ During a time of war, preventing desertion was a leading priority in movement control, and the Ottoman Empire had quite a history of desertion, particularly during World War I.²⁴⁹

But non-Muslim men serving in the armed forces had been a contentious issue in the Ottoman Empire for the better part of a century, igniting debates about loyalty and equality. Non-Muslims were generally not thought to be loyal enough to the state to serve in the army, and non-Muslim communities, for their part, were often happier not to fight. Though theoretically liable for military service beginning in 1856, in practice, until 1909, Ottoman Christians paid a *bedel* to exempt them from serving in the Ottoman military.²⁵⁰ This changed in 1909 and non-Muslims served as active combatants in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, during which devastating Ottoman losses were blamed on the betrayal of non-Muslim populations.²⁵¹ In order to prevent a repeat of this fiasco, non-Muslim conscripts were largely relegated to labor battalions during World War I.²⁵² Continuing this policy, the Turkish National Movement asserted mandatory military service for all its subjects—Muslim and non-Muslim alike. After taking control of Smyrna, Nureddin Pasha, commander of the Nationalist Army in Izmir, issued a proclamation stating that anyone “being essentially of Ottoman nationality” would be treated as a Turkish subject, and that all male Turkish subjects between the ages of 18 and 45 would be

²⁴⁸ Torpey, “The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Passport System,” 263.

²⁴⁹ Zürcher, “Between Death and Desertion. The Ottoman Army in World War I,” 235-258; Zürcher, “Refusing to serve by other means: desertion in the late Ottoman Empire,” 45-52. Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War*, 248-309.

²⁵⁰ Zürcher, “The Ottoman Conscription System in Theory and Practice, 1844-1918,” 88-89.

²⁵¹ Adanır, “Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman Defeat in the Balkan War of 1912-1913,” 113-125; Ginio, *The Ottoman Culture of Defeat: The Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath*, 104-109; see also Pece “The Conscription of Greek Ottomans into the Sultan’s Army, 1908–1912,” 433-448.

²⁵² Beşikçi, 130; Zürcher, “Ottoman labour battalions in World War I,” 187-195; Mays, “Recounting the Past,” 202; Minasidis, “Experiencing and Surviving the Great War: Greek Orthodox Citizen Soldiers under the Ottoman Banner,” 341-373.

sent to their garrisons (as prisoners if necessary) to fulfill their military service.²⁵³ As in World War I, non-Muslim men would be sent to brutal labor battalions, largely in the Anatolian interior, to serve the Turkish Nationalist Army.

Earlier, during the Greco-Turkish War, considerable effort was made by both Turkish and Greek armies to recruit their coreligionists. While the Allies theoretically tried to prevent recruiting within occupied Istanbul, they agreed in 1921 that Ottoman subjects could volunteer for their respective ethnic armies (meaning ethnic Greeks were free to volunteer for the Greek army and ethnic Turks were free to volunteer for the Turkish army).²⁵⁴ The British did, however, argue with Greek authorities in Smyrna who began trying to forcibly conscript Ottoman Greeks into the Greek Army, particularly when they claimed the right to search British businesses for Ottoman Greeks hiding from military service. Greek authorities repeatedly denied any forced conscription of Ottoman Greeks, making a test case of an Ottoman Greek working in a British firm in Smyrna who they claimed had become a Hellenic subject by previously volunteering for the Greek Army (possibly during the First World War).²⁵⁵ Lamb referred to this man as an “involuntary Greek subject,”²⁵⁶ to which Rumbold replied, “We cannot admit that Greek municipal law can affect national status of an Ottoman subject in Smyrna area.”²⁵⁷ Lamb later explained that he had been asked to intervene in over 100 cases such as this, to no avail.²⁵⁸

²⁵³ Translation of Proclamation signed by Nureddin Pasha, Sept 23, 1922, FO 371/7898, E10388, 73, TNA.

²⁵⁴ WO to FO, June 22, 1922, FO 371/7883, E6253, 194, TNA.

²⁵⁵ Lamb to FO, June 8, 1922, FO 371/7921, E5838, 229, TNA.

²⁵⁶ Lamb to FO, June 11, 1922, FO 371/7921, E5864, 235, TNA.

²⁵⁷ Rumbold to FO, June 12, 1922, FO 371/7921, E5918, 237, TNA.

²⁵⁸ Lamb to FO, June 12, 1922, FO 371/7921, E5919, 239, TNA.

The Greek argument regarding nationality stood in stark contrast to Turkish nationality arguments. To the Greek government, by joining the Greek army, ethnic Greeks had claimed Greek nationality, and thus fell under the authority of the Kingdom of Greece. To the Turkish National Movement, at this point, Ottoman Greeks who joined the Greek army were still Ottoman subjects and thus traitors to the nation and should be prosecuted as such under Ottoman law. Both states would, for a time, claim sovereignty over these men, and both would link allegiance to military service but in different ways. This would change as the population exchange and general amnesty provisions of the final peace treaty were negotiated, but in the meantime, beginning in December 1922, Turkish police ensured that no male Ottoman subject could leave Istanbul without satisfying the terms of his military service.

The fear of being conscripted and sent to do hard labor in camps in the interior was a major motivating factor for non-Muslim men in the exodus from Istanbul.²⁵⁹ A note to the British Foreign Office from October 12, 1922 stated that “thousands of young Greeks and Armenians are leaving the country on this ground only.”²⁶⁰ And in November, the Greek government asked the British to give particular assistance to Greek Ottoman men of military age trying to flee.²⁶¹

Initially, when Refet promised the Allies that Ottoman Christians would be able to acquire Turkish passports and leave if they chose to without extortion or major barriers, General Harington told the War Office that “100 Turkish pounds have to be paid by all Ottoman subjects of military age,”²⁶² without explanation about

²⁵⁹ For a study on these labor battalions and how and why Greek Orthodox soldiers tried to avoid them as much as possible during the First World War see Minasidis.

²⁶⁰ FO minute, Oct 12, 1922, FO 371/7956, 184, TNA.

²⁶¹ Caclamano to Curzon, Nov 12, 1922, FO 371/7911, E12522, 181, TNA.

²⁶² Harington to WO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7917, E13750, 178-179, TNA.

whether or not this would suffice as the *bedel* to exempt Ottoman subjects from military service. Hüseyin Rauf Orbay, the Prime Minister of the Grand National Assembly wrote to İsmet Paşa in Lausanne in January stating that they would give the Greeks of Istanbul one year to sell their property and leave, which would exempt them from military service, but if they wanted to stay they would have to serve.²⁶³ He did not, however, say that such an exemption would come free of charge. Though it is unclear precisely how much the *bedel* for military exemption was meant to be, in August of 1923, a Samuel Halfon from Rhodes was prevented from returning to Rhodes until he paid 1200 lira in cash to Turkish authorities to exempt him from military service.²⁶⁴

In January, Dr. L.P. Chambers, a representative of the Lord Mayor's Fund, a charity particularly concerned with Ottoman Armenians, wrote to the Foreign Office to plead that the British military evacuate Greek and Armenian boys of military age. He wrote that many of these young men would have left long ago if they had realized that the city would be handed over to Turkish administration before the ratification of a final peace treaty. He argued that the British owed it to the Christian young men of the city to evacuate them because the administration of the city was handed over to Turkish authorities without giving Christian communities due notice. He complained that he could not get the poorer young men out of the city because between the *bedel* and other taxes (likely passport fees), only the rich could afford to get a passport to leave.²⁶⁵ No one in the foreign service responded to this particular letter, as they felt

²⁶³ Hüseyin Rauf to İsmet Paşa, Jan 7, 1923, *Lozan Telgrafları* Volume 1 edited by Bilâl N. Şimşir, No. 292 pg. 343.

²⁶⁴ Though Rhodes was ceded to Italy in the Treaty of Lausanne, Halfon, regardless of ethnic background, would have been considered a former Ottoman subject. The Italians protested the demand that he pay the military exemption tax to Adnan Bey. HR.İM.. 236/26, Aug 8, 1923, pg. 6, BOA.

²⁶⁵ L.P. Chambers (Lord Mayor's Fund) to FO, Jan 6, 1923, FO 371/9091, E454, 105, TNA.

that their previous responses to Dr. Chambers had explained their position. Henderson, for his part, wrote that he believed that Dr. Chambers did not grasp how much had changed in the power dynamics of Istanbul.²⁶⁶ He referred to an earlier response to a similar letter wherein a foreign service member in Istanbul told Dr. Chambers, “We have... no means of active interference, and our only weapon that remains is such moral influence as we can exercise by means of general representations based on the fear of publicity. Such representations to be in any way effective, must be used most sparingly...”²⁶⁷ For the rest of the occupation, this would be the response of the British to any pleading from Ottoman Christian communities or organizations on their behalf. They would promise to do what they could for Ottoman Christians in the negotiations at Lausanne, but that was all they could do. As for evacuating people from Istanbul, they would only be evacuating those who were “compromised” by their work for or association with the allies, and some of their stories will be told in the subsequent chapters. But the general population of Ottoman Christians would just have to find their own way to deal with the Turkish Nationalist administration.

Young Ottoman subjects of military age were not the only people the Ankara government wanted to be careful not to let leave. A note to the Istanbul delegation of Ankara’s Foreign Ministry on December 9, 1922, warned that Turkish passport control needed to be careful to make sure that any foreign passport holders trying to leave weren’t former Ottoman subjects, as the Ankara government did not recognize such nationality changes. Anyone deemed to be a former Ottoman subject carrying a foreign passport should be prevented from leaving.²⁶⁸ The note specifically said,

²⁶⁶ Henderson to Curzon, Jan 30, 1923, FO 371/9092, E1445, 66, TNA.

²⁶⁷ G.G. Knox to L.P. Chambers, Jan 4, 1923, FO 371/9092, E1445, 67, TNA.

²⁶⁸ HR. İM.. 63/33, Dec 9, 1922, BOA.

“like during the Great War,”²⁶⁹ indicating a continuity of policy between the World War I CUP and the Grand National Assembly.

While the Nationalists took control of movement in and out of the city, delegations were negotiating in Lausanne. Toward the beginning of the negotiations at Lausanne, Ismet Pasha was sent to Lausanne with instructions to deal with the issue of Greeks and Armenians on the basis of exchange, looking to exchange Ottoman Christians for Muslims in other territories. In terms of Armenians, however, it quickly became clear that because Ankara did not want to involve Moscow in these negotiations, there would be no one with whom Turkey could exchange Armenians with, so Ankara would have to keep, as Turkish subjects, the Armenians who remained in Turkey.²⁷⁰ At the end of January 1923, a population exchange was signed wherein the Muslims of Greece would be exchanged for the Greek Orthodox of Turkey. The Greeks of Istanbul and the Muslims of Western Thrace would be exempted from this exchange, meaning that the Greeks of Istanbul established before October 1918 would remain Turkish subjects and have the right to stay in Istanbul and retain their property.²⁷¹ The first group to be exchanged would be male prisoners taken by both the Greek and Turkish armies, including the ethnically Greek men from Anatolia put into labor battalions.²⁷² But negotiations broke down at the beginning of February over the capitulations and the financial terms of the treaty. A resumption of hostilities seemed very possible.²⁷³ This was a time of frightening

²⁶⁹ “Harb-i Umumi sırasında olduğu gibi,” Ibid.

²⁷⁰ Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 91-92; Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 84-85.

²⁷¹ Article 2, “Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations,” signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923, full text at Cambridge University Press.

²⁷² Article 4, Ibid; “Agreement Respecting the Reciprocal Restitution of Interned Civilians and the Exchange of Prisoners of War,” signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923, *League of Nations Treaty Series*, Volume 36, No. 912 pg. 137.

²⁷³ Criss, 153.

uncertainty for the residents of Istanbul, and many who could secure passports to leave did.

The Armenian novelist, Shahan Shahnur, was one of the many Ottoman Christians who left Istanbul in 1923,²⁷⁴ meaning that he left with a Turkish passport having successfully paid all the fees required by the Turkish Nationalist police. His novel, *Retreat without Song*, opens with a young Armenian Bedros leaving occupied Istanbul for France, just as Shahnur did. As Bedros's parents put him on the ship, they didn't cry, just as they had promised, but they didn't say a word either. As the ship sailed away from Sarayburnu, in the French-controlled district of the city, he said goodbye to the neighborhoods he had spent his life in, memories of his childhood and adolescence flooding his mind. As the city got further and further away, it was hidden by the large French flag on the ship, then disappeared as if under a magician's handkerchief. "A life ended here,"²⁷⁵ Shahnur's words echoed the loss of those who made up the exodus from Istanbul of 1922-1923.

3.6 No return

Shortly after the passport clash, the Ankara government decreed that foreigners coming to Turkey, including Istanbul, would need a Turkish visa.²⁷⁶ The Allies insisted that only an inter-Allied visa was needed to enter Istanbul,²⁷⁷ but decided that to communicate their protests to the Ankara government would create unnecessary conflict.²⁷⁸ So they continued to allow passengers to enter Istanbul with

²⁷⁴ Most sources indicate that Shahnur left Istanbul in 1923, though they are vague on the source of this information; Aktokmakyan, "Hearing The Retreat of Shahnur. The Uncanny Song of Home and the Self as Other," paragraph 6.

²⁷⁵ Şahnur, *Sessiz Ricat* [Silent Retreat], translated from Armenian to Turkish by Maral Aktokmakyan and Artun Gebenlioğlu, 33-34.

²⁷⁶ Sir R. Graham (Rome) to FO, Dec 29, 1922, FO 372/2055, T128, 4, TNA.

²⁷⁷ Henderson to FO, Jan 10, 1923, FO 372/2055, T513, 14, TNA.

²⁷⁸ Mounsey to Sir R. Graham (Rome), Jan 22, 1923, FO 372/2055, T513, 16, TNA.

only inter-Allied visas, as Turkish police were initially more strictly checking those leaving. The matter seemed to be avoided until Turkish Police boarded a train as it arrived in Istanbul and fined a British subject for traveling without a Turkish visa in late January of 1923.²⁷⁹ In early March, the Allies decided to push the issue and protested to Adnan Bey that Allied subjects should not be fined for entering Allied-occupied Istanbul without a Turkish visa and asked that he remove the fine, to which Adnan Bey responded with a flat no.²⁸⁰ While British officials were strongly opposed in principle to the idea that the Turkish government could potentially deny entry visas to Allied subjects if they had to apply for them, because the fine for not having a Turkish visa was “the inconsiderable sum of 150 piastres,”²⁸¹ the British decided to simply privately warn British passport holders that they would be expected to pay this fee upon entry into Turkey.

In April, the Allies reached a written agreement with Adnan Bey about visas and passport requirements to enter Istanbul, transit through, and exit by sea. All passengers would have to go through customs at either Sirkeci (in the French Zone) or Galata (in the British Zone). Everyone would be required to have Turkish visas to enter or exit Istanbul except for those carrying diplomatic passports, Allied personnel, and Allied military and their families. The fine for Allied subjects without a visa to enter would be 151 piastres, and the exit-visa fee would be 101 piastres. Foreign subjects of other nationalities would also be expected to have Turkish visas, but the Turkish police would consider, on a case-by-case basis, where they were traveling from and whether or not there was a delegation there representing Turkey and issuing visas. All travelers would be expected to have full passports except for

²⁷⁹ Passport Office Minute to Eastern Department, Jan 24, 1923, FO 372/2055, T1076, 34, TNA.

²⁸⁰ Rumbold to Curzon, Mar 5, 1923, FO 372/2055, T2915, 59, TNA.

²⁸¹ Ibid, 60.

Russians who could travel by Allied laissez-passer or Nansen passport, and Allied subjects who were also allowed to leave on their respective countries' laissez-passer. Turkish subjects would also require Turkish visas for entry and exit and could only travel on passports issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly. The agreement specifically stated that the absence of a Turkish visa on the passport of a Turkish subject would be seen as abnormal and, under those circumstances, Turkish police could take any measures they deemed necessary.²⁸²

This is how the Ankara government would ensure that many Ottoman subjects could not return to Turkey. All Ottoman subjects would have to apply for a Turkish visa, a process during which their backgrounds and documents would be inspected, and the issue of this visa, for many, had to be approved directly from Ankara.²⁸³ For consular services in many countries, communication and approval went through either the Swedish, the Spanish, or the Dutch diplomatic legations. In many of these places it was quite literally, for example, Swedish diplomats in Aden, issuing Turkish visas.²⁸⁴ But in Athens, for instance, there was a Turkish representative at the Dutch Embassy who communicated with Ankara through the Dutch diplomatic network. A Turkish subject wishing to return to Turkey would approach the diplomatic delegation responsible for Turkish affairs in whatever country they were in and present their passports or travel and identity documents to be inspected. Depending on the background of the person, they would either be approved, denied, or they would have to await a response from Ankara.

²⁸² Agreement about passengers arriving and departing by sea, Rumbold to Curzon, April 17, 1923, FO 372/2055, T4435, 78-81, TNA; see also HR.IM.. 69/50, Mar 21, 1923, BOA.

²⁸³ The Soviets used a similar policy to prevent Russian subjects from returning to Soviet Russia. Lohr, *Russian Citizenship*, 135.

²⁸⁴ CO to FO, Dec 3, 1923, FO 372/2055, T12807, 190, TNA.

In February of 1923, Ankara's Foreign Ministry sent out a note to its diplomatic representatives abroad saying, "Armenians and Greeks who have betrayed the Fatherland should no longer enjoy protection. They are considered to have broken all relations with Turkey."²⁸⁵ A certificate of Turkish nationality could only be granted to Ottoman Greeks or Armenians on the following conditions: a) if they had been living abroad for a long time and were beyond the age of military service b) they had not taken any hostile action toward Turkey and c) if they had regularly renewed their registration at the Ottoman Consulate each year. Even under these circumstances, the Foreign Ministry would need to approve before a certificate of nationality could be granted.²⁸⁶ This was the first indication from Ankara that they would deny Turkish nationality to large numbers of Greeks and Armenians on the grounds of communal betrayal, and that any abroad who sought to claim their Turkish nationality would be scrutinized.

In March, the Armenian Delegation to Lausanne began to protest that Armenians were being refused passports and visas to enter Turkey from Turkish consular legations. They asked for specific mention in the upcoming peace treaty that Armenians have the right to get Turkish passports from Turkish consulates in order to ensure that Armenians could return.²⁸⁷ At the same time, a group which had formed to represent the absent Greeks of Istanbul in exile in Greece (meaning mainly those who left in the fall and winter of 1922), the Central Committee of Constantinople, or the CCC, sent a memorandum to the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs protesting the fact that they were being denied passports and visas to return to

²⁸⁵ "Les Arméniens et les Grecs qui ont trahi la Patrie ne doivent plus profiter de protection. Ils sont considérés comme ayant rompu tout rapport avec la Turquie." Extract from note 7814/6 Feb 10, 1923, HR. İM 49/35, June 21, 1923, BOA.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Malcom to FO, Mar 23, 1923, FO 371/9128, E3134, 17, TNA.

Istanbul. Istanbul Rum who had somehow managed to acquire Turkish visas were being sent to the interior upon arrival in the city, and those who arrived without appropriate visas were being turned back.²⁸⁸ The group begged the Greek government to intervene and ensure that Istanbul Greeks, who were not meant to be exchanged, would be able to return to Istanbul. Though these protests were taken under advisement by the governments who had delegations at Lausanne, ensuring the return of Ottoman subjects to Turkey was not a major priority in the newly restarted negotiations.

Meanwhile, a memorandum from the GNA Foreign Ministry issued to the Swedish Delegation in late March outlined the conditions under which Jews, Greeks, and Armenians could be issued passports and visas for Turkey. Jews carrying passports issued by the GNA could be issued visas for Turkey without checking with the Turkish Foreign Ministry. For Jews carrying passports issued by the Istanbul government after March 16, 1920, direct permission from the Foreign Ministry would be necessary. Greeks subject to the population exchange would have no right to enter Turkey, and for Greeks not subject to the population exchange and for Armenians in general, prior authorization from the Foreign Ministry would also be necessary. For those who needed authorization from Ankara, copies of their identity and travel documents and a signed declaration about their last residence in Turkey would have to be sent to the Foreign Ministry in Ankara to await a decision.²⁸⁹

To the outside world the Ankara government made no blanket statement that Rum and Armenians would be unable to return. The Ankara government simply asserted that they had the right to decide who would and would not be allowed to enter Turkey. Yet, as we see with Ankara's policies towards Jewish Ottomans

²⁸⁸ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 235.

²⁸⁹ HR.İM.. 100/60, March 23, 1923, BOA.

abroad, a policy was quickly forming which would argue that the travel documents on which a person left Turkish territory, by illustrating who exactly gave this person permission to leave, would also illustrate their allegiance and thus whether or not they should be allowed to claim Turkish nationality and return to Turkey.

With its own diplomatic representatives, however, the Ankara government had to be a bit more explicit about refusing visas for Ottoman Christians who left. In late March, Ahmed Cevad Bey, the Turkish representative at the Dutch Embassy in Athens wrote to Ankara for clarification on, along with other questions, whether or not he could give visas to Ottoman Greeks and Armenians who came to Greece with passports issued in the name of the GNA, as well as Greeks and Armenians who left Istanbul for Greece after the 1918 Armistice.²⁹⁰ In response to these questions, the Foreign Ministry responded that “Rum and Armenians who left before or after the population exchange will not be given visas.”²⁹¹ This cryptic statement left Ahmet Bey confused, and he wrote to the Foreign Ministry multiple times after this, still seeking clarification.

As April and May drew on, the Ankara government began making more direct connections between the travel document with which an Ottoman subject left and whether or not they would be given visas to return. The Foreign Ministry stated that many Rum and Armenians “ran away”²⁹² with identity documents issued by their patriarchates or travel documents and passports issued by foreign governments, implying a disrespect towards the Turkish passport and thus Turkish rule. The Foreign Ministry insisted that whether or not these people would be allowed to return would be subject to the discretion of the Grand National Assembly Cabinet

²⁹⁰ HR.İM.. 17/150, Mar 26, 1923, BOA; HR.İM.. 27/36, Mar 26, 1923, BOA.

²⁹¹ “Mübadeleden evvel veya sonra giden Rum ve Ermeniler’in pasaportları vize edilmeyecektir.” HR.İM.. 28/5, Apr 8, 1923, BOA.

²⁹² “Fırar etmiş” HR. İM 49/17, Apr 30, 1923, BOA.

Council.²⁹³ In May the Ankara government placed an announcement in the “Journal d’Orient” stating that anyone who left Istanbul since the establishment of the national regime without a passport issued by the GNA would not be allowed to return.²⁹⁴ But simply having a passport issued in the name of the GNA would not necessarily be enough, as some passports issued by the GNA explicitly said in writing on the passport that the bearer would not be allowed to return, while others stated that the bearer could leave and come back.²⁹⁵

Ahmed Bey wrote again to the Foreign Ministry in June seeking clearer instructions about who he could issue documents to. He wrote that, in trying to stay in line with Foreign Ministry policy, he was not currently issuing visas or passports to anyone in Athens at all, regardless of what documents they provided, including Muslims. He asked if he could issue passports to Rum and Armenians who carried passports issued in the name of the GNA which stated that they were allowed to leave and return, as well as those carrying passports issued by the Istanbul government. He begged for clarification on these policies as soon as possible.²⁹⁶ Though the Nationalists had told the British in April that they would no longer refuse passports and visas to Armenians who left carrying Ottoman passports issued by the Istanbul government,²⁹⁷ whether or not this communication actually resulted in Armenians acquiring Turkish passports abroad during this period is unclear. When in doubt, Turkish representatives clearly erred on the side of not giving visas. Thus, while Ankara’s policies in letter and in theory allowed for certain groups of people to

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Henderson, May 8/May 14, 1923, FO 1103/1005, TNA.

²⁹⁵ Ibid. See also HR. İM 49/35, June 21, 1923, BOA.

²⁹⁶ HR. İM 49/35, June 21, 1923, BOA.

²⁹⁷ Henderson to Curzon, April 30, 1923, FO 371/9128, E4313, 25, TNA.

return and certain exceptions, in practice, representatives like Ahmed Bey would end up refusing visas to large numbers of Ottoman subjects.

Delegations representing Turkish affairs also had to investigate those with foreign nationality applying for Turkish visas, particularly to ensure that they were not former Ottoman subjects. They were particularly concerned about former Ottoman subjects trying to return to Turkey on Italian passports,²⁹⁸ partially because, as stated earlier, the Italians had been giving out passports generously. Anyone, regardless of nationality status, who had an Armenian or Greek last name, or who was suspected of having Catholic Ottoman origins, would be investigated and could potentially be denied a visa to enter Turkey.²⁹⁹ As the Ankara government did not recognize most, if not all, changes of nationality, they notified the Allies that any Ottoman subject who was naturalized or accepted the protection of any other nation would be denied permission to return to Turkey.³⁰⁰ While the Allies were certainly expecting this, knowing that something like Article 128 of the Treaty of Sevres would not end up in the final peace treaty in Lausanne, the phrase referring to “accepting protection” of another power could certainly be interpreted widely. Sir George Mounsey in the Foreign Office acknowledged, “Where Turkish subjects have become naturalised abroad and so lost their Turkish nationality, there is of course no compulsion on the Turkish government to receive them back; but the second phrase ‘have accepted protection of any other nation’ is vague.”³⁰¹ Undoubtedly this was partially aimed at European powers’ Ottoman protégés who had never officially naturalized as European subjects, as the Ankara government also soon moved to

²⁹⁸ Hüseyin Rauf to İsmet Paşa, Jan 12, 1923, *Lozan Telgrafları* Volume 1, No. 329, pg. 370.

²⁹⁹ HR.İM.. 49/21, May 10, 1923, BOA; FO 372/2055, T7480, 126, TNA.

³⁰⁰ General Headquarters Constantinople to WO, June 9, 1923, FO 372/2055, T6510, 108, TNA.

³⁰¹ Mounsey, handwritten note, June 21, 1923, FO 372/2055, T6519, 105 (backside)-106, TNA.

remove recognition for “protected person” status.³⁰² But this phrase could also be interpreted even wider, speaking to the philosophy of travel documents in general, as passports and other travel documents often either explicitly stated or implied that the traveler possessing the passport is under the protection of the issuing power. Thus, by Ankara’s logic, traveling with a document issued by another government was accepting the protection of that government, which reflected a betrayal of Turkish authority.

The British, though they had no stomach to fight the Turks on this, did not agree with this logic. Mounsey continued,

The principle which the Turks, in common with all other countries, must be made to accept is that persons who are actually of ~~Ottoman~~ Turkish nationality have to be re-admitted to Turkish territory on application. It is an elementary principal of international law; and it is only the present Soviet government who are showing their ignorance and disregard for such a principle who dispute it.³⁰³

“International law” could be quite a convenient concept to use, as it was, at this point, rarely codified by broad consensus, had virtually no means of enforcement, was developed to maintain colonial power, and could be both ignored if it suited the power in question and also used as a tool for ensuring that states bowed to the will of more powerful states.³⁰⁴ Yet, the British knew that this policy had a great deal of continuity with long standing Ottoman nationality policies. Another Foreign Office administrator noted,

This is reverting to the old principle which prevailed in years gone by in Turkey, and also in Russia, whereby an Ottoman or Russian subject who became nationalized in a foreign country was permanently penalized by banishment for life from his native country.³⁰⁵

³⁰² Consul-General Waugh (Constantinople) to FO, Aug 11, 1923, FO 372/2056, T8921, 220, TNA.

³⁰³ “Ottoman” is crossed out on the file and replaced with “Turkish.” Mounsey, handwritten note, June 21, 1923, FO 372/2055, T6519, 106, TNA.

³⁰⁴ See discussion of the development of international law in the previous chapter.

³⁰⁵ Martin, handwritten note, June 15, 1923, FO 372/2055, T6519, 105, TNA.

Though his frustration is palpable, his comment illustrates both that the British realized that this policy had long standing precedent in the Turkish context as well as precedent in another geographic context.

The Istanbul Greeks in exile in Greece, as represented by the CCC, also objected to Ankara's no return policy on legal grounds. But instead of citing general principles of international law, the CCC, in claiming the particular right of Istanbul Greeks to return, cited the population exchange agreement. Article 16 of the agreement stated,

No obstacle shall be placed in the way of the inhabitants of the districts excepted from the exchange under Article 2 [meaning the Greeks of Istanbul and the Muslims of Western Thrace] exercising freely their right to remain in *or return to* those districts and to enjoy to the full their liberties and rights of property in Turkey and in Greece.³⁰⁶

Though the population exchange agreement was not yet ratified, as it would be included in the final treaty, the CCC argued that this clause entitled the Greeks of Istanbul to return, and they put pressure on the Greek government to ensure that this was the case.³⁰⁷

In general, when approached with legal arguments for allowing Ottoman Christians to return, Ankara's representatives argued that Turkey had the right to refuse reentry for those who, from Ankara's perspective, allied themselves with another power and thus betrayed the Turkish nation. In the case of Armenians, they would also cite security concerns as the reason for barring many from returning. Ankara's representatives did not, however, have to extensively unpack their argument for their policy of no return because no one forced them to. The closest the Allies came to pushing Ankara's representatives to defend this policy was during

³⁰⁶ "Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations," signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923; my emphasis.

³⁰⁷ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 239.

discussions of the amnesty declaration at Lausanne in May and June of 1923. In a particular session, Horace Rumbold and General Pellé, as the French representative, tried to pressure İsmet Pasha to make a statement to the effect that the majority of Armenians would be allowed to return to Turkey unless there was definite proof of wrongdoing. İsmet Pasha was evasive and insisted that those of good character would be able to convince Turkish authorities of their innocence. According to Rumbold, İsmet Pasha “took refuge in the quibble that the amnesty only concerned persons in Turkey or after they had entered Turkey and in no way affected the Turkish Government’s right to prevent those of its subjects who had left from returning.”³⁰⁸

After this, the Allies largely gave up on pushing for the return of Armenians, and İsmet Pasha understood the matter to be closed.³⁰⁹ Venizelos, however, who had taken back power after Greece’s catastrophic loss and represented Greece at Lausanne, brought up the return of the Greeks of Istanbul who were prevented from returning. As they were unable to reach a conclusion on that matter publicly, it was agreed that İsmet Pasha and Venizelos would discuss it privately one on one.³¹⁰ In a similar exchange, toward the end of the conference, in July, Venizelos again agreed to speak directly with İsmet Pasha on the subject, rather than discussing it publicly.³¹¹ But Venizelos was not able to get an explicit on-the-record commitment from İsmet Pasha that the Greeks of Istanbul could return, and so the matter remained unsettled at the signing of the treaty.

³⁰⁸ Rumbold to Curzon, Jun 5, 1923, No. 590, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, Series 3*, Volume 7, 840.

³⁰⁹ İsmet to Hüseyin Rauf, Jun 4, 1923, *Lozan Telgrafları* Volume 2, No. 369, pg. 396.

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Rumbold to Curzon, July 17, 1923, FO 424/645, Part III, No. 107, pg. 79, TNA.

The fact that the return of Istanbul Greeks and Armenians was not explicitly settled at the conference illustrates that, to both the Allies in occupation and to the Greek government, it was not a major priority. The Foreign Office had, indeed, warned the Armenian National Delegation, after the discussion of the amnesty declaration in June, that they would not force the issue. Their note to the Armenian National Delegation read,

His Majesty's Government regret, however, that it is not possible, in existing circumstances, to press this matter to the point of a rupture of negotiations and they are therefore unable at present to hold out any hope of a complete or immediate change in the attitude of the Turkish Government.³¹²

Because these delegations were unwilling to push the matter, the power over the return of Ottoman subjects remained entirely in the hands of the Ankara government.

In telegrams exchanged between Ismet Pasha in Lausanne and Hüseyin Rauf Bey in Ankara, the issue of the return of Ottoman Christians was closely linked to Ankara's implementation of the abandoned property law.³¹³ In every telegram discussing the return of these populations, the seizure and liquidation of their properties was also mentioned. Though Ismet Pasha publicly evaded the question of return for Ottoman Christians, he privately³¹⁴ acknowledged that Ankara's passport policies might prove unsustainable. In discussing negotiations around the general amnesty, during which the return of these people was discussed, he said,

I am worried that the issue of the return of Armenian refugees will be provoked in connection with the general amnesty. On the other hand, because the return of those not subject to the exchange agreement would be considered natural, due to the liquidation of assets of the Istanbul population and the obstruction of their return, it put us in a position where we're acting against our word. It won't be acceptable

³¹² FO to Armenian National Delegation, June 20, 1923, FO 424/645, Part II, No. 524, pg. 341, TNA.

³¹³ For more information on this series of laws see Morack and Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*.

³¹⁴ I say privately because Ismet Pasha intended for his telegrams to be private. They were, however, intercepted by British intelligence during the conference. Jeffery and Sharp, "Lord Curzon and Secret Intelligence," 114-115.

to deprive people of their homeland forever because their passports aren't right.³¹⁵

Publicly, however, Ismet approached the return of Istanbul Rum and Ottoman Armenians differently. When prodded about the return of absent Istanbul Rum, and the seizure of their properties, Ismet Pasha would point out that the Greek government had also seized the properties of numerous West Thracian Muslims in order to house refugees, underlining a similar violation of the population exchange agreement on the part of Greece. We may infer that this was his rebuttal during his private conversations with Venizelos.³¹⁶ The issue of the return of absent Istanbul Rum was quickly becoming an issue to be negotiated bilaterally between Greece and Turkey. When confronted about the return of Ottoman Armenians, however, Ismet Pasha would respond by insisting that Turkey had the right to keep out potentially dangerous Armenians who posed a security threat, but that well-behaved Armenians would be allowed to return.

His correspondence with Rauf Bey indicates that he believed this to be true, and that he even believed that eventually Turkey would have to let some of these people return and then compensate them for their seized properties and assets.³¹⁷ Correspondence between Ankara and Lausanne betrays a disconnect between what Ismet Pasha assumed and was negotiating on behalf of in Lausanne and what was actually being planned and implemented on the ground in Turkey. The lack of response and evasion to some of Ismet Pasha's inquiries begs the question of whether

³¹⁵ "Afv-ı umumi münasebetiyle Ermeni muhacirlerinin avdeti mes'elesinin tahrik edilmesinden endişe ediyorum. Diğer taraftan mübadele mukavelesine tab' [sic] olmadıkları cihetle avdetleri tabii addedilmek lazım gelen İstanbul ahalsinin emvallarının tasfiyesi ve avdetlerine mani' olmak keyfiyeti bizi mugayir-i ahd bir vaz'iyete koyuyor. Pasaportu doğru olmadığından dolayı müebbeden vatandan mahrumiyet kabul edilmiyor." Ismet to Hüseyin Rauf, May 19, 1923, *Lozan Telgrafları* Volume 2, No. 255, pg. 323-324.

³¹⁶ Ismet Pasha recounted one such conversation, Ismet to Hüseyin Rauf, Jun 13, 1923, *Lozan Telgrafları* Volume 2, No. 435, pg. 438-439.

³¹⁷ Ismet to Hüseyin Rauf, Jun 4, 1923, *Lozan Telgrafları* Volume 2, No. 369, pg. 396.

Ankara was deliberately keeping Ismet Pasha in the dark on this subject. Akçam and Kurt also note this tension in their analysis of the Lausanne telegrams, but rather than highlight the disconnect between Ismet and Ankara, they use this correspondence as evidence that the Ankara government was planning on seizing and liquidating the property of Ottoman Christians who had fled, despite knowing that they had a legal right to reclaim it.³¹⁸ But it is clear from Ismet Pasha's correspondence and his memoirs later that he truly believed that only those who posed a serious security concern to the Turkish government would be kept from returning.³¹⁹ His diplomatic evasion on the subject, however, kept the emerging Turkish state from having to make any kind of commitment to allowing Ottoman subjects who left on irregular passports return. And, ultimately, this would mean that most of them could not return.

The British largely attributed Ankara's no return policy to the desire and need to appropriate the properties of rich Ottoman Christians. In discussing the matter Henderson stated matter-of-factly, "There is also little doubt that the refusal... of the Turkish authorities to permit the return to Constantinople of those Ottoman subjects who left last autumn without Turkish passports, is chiefly prompted by the desire to secure additional funds for the Public Treasury by the confiscation of their properties."³²⁰ Considering the frequency with which Ankara's representatives mentioned property liquidation in discussions of the return of these Ottoman Christian groups, this cannot be dismissed as a factor. The fact that these groups of people also fled in fear of the coming of the Turkish Nationalist Movement, while perhaps understandable given the circumstances, certainly did not endear the Ankara

³¹⁸ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 86-88.

³¹⁹ See quote from Ismet Pasha's memoirs in Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 83.

³²⁰ Henderson to Curzon, May 17, 1923, FO 424/645, No. 353 pg. 227.

government to those who left. And the fact that no major pressure was ever put on Ankara to take these Ottoman subjects back certainly made the continuation of their no return policy easier.³²¹

Akçam and Kurt also argue that the motivations behind Ankara's no return policy were entirely to prevent large numbers of Ottoman Christians from returning and claiming their property. Akçam and Kurt argue that, by preventing the mass return of Armenians, but allowing the theoretical return of some Armenians on an individual basis subject to approval from Ankara, the Turkish Republic was then later able to claim that because Armenians were still Turkish subjects, the Turkish government had the right to appropriate their property and other countries had no right to push for the return of Armenian property in international courts.³²² By maintaining Armenians as Turkish subjects, the Turkish Republic was also able to keep Armenians from returning to claim their property, because, as Akçam and Kurt argue, if Ankara undertook a mass denaturalization of Armenians, the Turkish government would then be forced to acknowledge the foreign nationality of former Ottoman subjects and let them return to Turkey under the protection and documentation of the states to which they had naturalized. Thus, to Akçam and Kurt, keeping Armenians out of Turkey without officially and openly stripping the entire group of their Turkish nationality was entirely in the interest of preventing them from reclaiming their property or claiming compensation.³²³

But what is perhaps most interesting about the Ankara government's approach to its no return policy is the way that it so closely linked allegiance and

³²¹ The American government did give a bit of push-back on this policy, particularly on behalf of its naturalized Armenian-American citizens, but they ended up giving in and not seeking reparations on behalf of their Armenian citizens in acquiescence of Turkey's policy of not recognizing the American nationality of Ottoman Americans. See Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 114-119.

³²² Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 104-126.

³²³ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*.

thus nationality to the passport. Through Ankara's logic, taking a British travel pass meant that you were allied with the British, leaving with a French laissez-passer signaled an allegiance to France, the acceptance of a Greek temporary passport meant that your loyalty lay with Greece, and traveling with a Greek or Armenian Patriarchal identity document illustrated that you considered yourself Greek or Armenian before you considered yourself Ottoman. Even traveling on an Ottoman passport might potentially mean that you were politically aligned with the former Istanbul government, who were guilty of signing the Treaty of Sevres. In this way, Ankara's policies illustrate the potentially stark difference between a travel document and a full passport. The implication of a full passport issued by a state whose nationality you possess is that you can always be repatriated to your country of origin. While accepting a travel document from another authority may or may not have actually indicated where an Ottoman subject's loyalty lay, none of these issuing authorities guaranteed the protection of the issuing state or that an Ottoman subject would be eligible to claim that state's nationality. Thus, a large number of people who left with these various forms of travel documents would find themselves at least temporarily stateless.

In 1927, the Grand National Assembly passed a law which explicitly gave the Cabinet Council the permission to revoke the Turkish citizenship of Ottoman subjects who did not participate in the National Struggle,³²⁴ remained outside the country, and who had not returned between July 24, 1923 and the publication of the law on May 23, 1927.³²⁵ As those who had left before the signing of the Treaty of

³²⁴ Meaning the Turkish War of Independence.

³²⁵ "Şeraiti muayyeneyi haiz olmayan Osmanlı tebaasının Türk vatandaşlığından iskatı hakkında kanun [Law regarding the invalidation of Turkish citizenship of Ottoman subjects not fulfilling definite conditions]" May 23, 1927, Kanun No. 1041, Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) II. Dönem.

Lausanne were not able to reenter due to visa and passport regulations, this law codified that those who left could be stripped of their Turkish citizenship. In 1928, the Turkish Republic's first comprehensive nationality law stated that those who adopted a foreign nationality without the permission of the Turkish government could be stripped of their Turkish citizenship at the discretion of the Cabinet Council.³²⁶ It would also state that those whose Turkish citizenship had been invalidated would, in general, be forbidden from returning to Turkey.³²⁷

But without an explicit denaturalization decision from the Cabinet Council, a former Ottoman subject would be treated as a Turkish citizen, as the Turkish Interior Ministry noted in 1939.³²⁸ This did not, of course, mean that someone who had not had their nationality officially stripped would be allowed to return, as passport and visa policies largely ensured that unwanted Ottoman subjects were denied entry. But legally speaking, these people still retained Turkish nationality, even if they could not return to Turkey. But the Cabinet Council did revoke the Turkish citizenship of a number of people over the years through these laws, including Ottoman Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Maronites, Catholics, Kurds, Circassians, Alevis, and Arabs. The majority were non-Muslim, but a fair number came from Muslim ethnic minority communities. Very few were ethnically Turkish. Soner Çağaptay notes that “denaturalization orders universally mentioned the ethnicity of the people who lost their citizenship,”³²⁹ highlighting the disloyalty of non-ethnic-Turks.

The issue of the return of the absent Greeks of Istanbul would be unsettled for the next seven years. The absent Greeks of Istanbul would form organizations in

³²⁶ “Türk vatandaşlığı kanunu [Turkish citizenship law],” June 4, 1928, Kanun No. 1312, Article 9, TBMM II. Dönem.

³²⁷ Ibid, Article 12.

³²⁸ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 92.

³²⁹ Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* 74.

Greece, like the CCC, to persistently petition the Greek government to advocate for their return, compromising a powerful pressure group.³³⁰ Although in Istanbul they had been some of the wealthiest of the Greek community, because the Greek government saw them as “non-exchangeable” and thus temporary exiles rather than refugees, they were not eligible for refugee resettlement programs. Unable to utilize their wealth in property, some of them died penniless in Greece.³³¹ The Mixed Commission established by the population exchange agreement would attempt to settle the issue, but the Turkish government claimed that passport policies were a domestic issue and not within the purview of the Mixed Commission.³³² Bilateral negotiations between Greece and Turkey failed to settle the issue of the absent Greeks of Istanbul until the Ankara agreement of 1930, which stated,

Non-exchangeable Greek Orthodox Turkish nationals at present absent who left Istanbul without providing themselves with passports issued by the authorities of the Turkish Republic, and non-exchangeable Moslem Greek nationals at present absent who left Western Thrace without providing themselves with passports issued by the authorities of the Greek Republic shall not be entitled to return under the present Convention.

The two Governments declare that they respectively recognise the Greek nationality of Greek Turkish nationals from Istanbul, debarred from returning under the previous paragraph... and the Turkish nationality of Moslem Greek nationals of Western Thrace debarred from returning under the previous paragraph...³³³

Though Istanbul Rum would be granted Greek nationality through this treaty, ending their stateless legal limbo, they would not be able to return to their homes in Istanbul. And this would be a devastating blow both to the absent Istanbul Rum, and to many

³³⁰ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, 119; Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 246-312.

³³¹ Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul*, 119.

³³² See Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* 477, see also 399-413 for attempts at negotiating this issue.

³³³ “Convention Between Greece and Turkey Regarding the Final Settlement of the Questions Resulting from the Application of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Agreement of Athens Relating to the Exchange of Populations,” signed at Ankara June 10, 1930, Article 28, *League of Nations Treaty Series* 108, No. 2511 (1930): 251; there are errors in the English translation which I have fixed to match the French document.

of their community who remained in Istanbul hoping for their return. Legally speaking, the 1930 Ankara agreement would also codify in an international treaty that leaving without a valid passport could be justification for loss of nationality, officially and internationally making the passport a vehicle for allegiance and thus nationality.

In 1964, the Grand National Assembly passed a new Turkish Citizenship Law with a clause relating to “lost people,” stating,

For those who left Turkey with documents from the Grand National Assembly marked “return unlawful” or with passports or documents from the representatives of states occupying Istanbul up until the year 1930, whether they have died or survived, whose names are only listed in population registers, from the date of this law coming into effect will be counted as having lost their Turkish nationality.³³⁴

At this point, all those who had left and been unable to return, who had not been officially stripped of their nationality individually by the Cabinet Council, were officially no longer Turkish citizens.

This does not mean, however, that absolutely no one who left without a passport issued in the name of the GNA was able to return to Turkey in the 1920s. Because Ankara insisted that those who left would potentially be allowed to return on a case-by-case basis, this opened the door for re-entry through bribery. In 1924, a number of Ottoman Armenians had managed to bribe Turkish officials in order to enter Turkey, causing a massive scandal in the new Republic which eventually forced the resignation of the Minister of the Interior.³³⁵ The uproar around the depths of the scandal, which stretched from the Interior Ministry to the Istanbul police,

³³⁴ “Millî Mücadeleden sonra, «avdeti gayricaizdir» şerhini havi Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti veya işgal devletlerinin İstanbul temsilcileri tarafından verilen pasaportlarla veya belgeleri olmaksızın Türkiye'den 1930 yılının sonuna kadar ayrılmış bulunup da halen ölü veya sağ oldukları bilinmeyen ve sadece nüfus sicillerinde kayıtlı bulunan kişiler, bu kanunun yürürlüğe girdiği tarihte Türk vatandaşlığını kaybetmiş sayılırlar.” “Türk vatandaşlığı kanunu [Turkish citizenship law],” Feb 11, 1964, Kanun No. 403, Fifth Chapter, Article 2, pg. 133, TBMM Law Publication Volume 47.

³³⁵ Akçam and Kurt, 137-142.

prompted the passing of a Travel Regulation which would say who could and could not attempt to re-enter Turkey. The first article stated that Muslims who had left without a Turkish passport, except for the 150 Ottoman Muslims who were exempt from the amnesty declaration, would be allowed to return.³³⁶ The third article stated that Greeks of Istanbul who were exempt from the population exchange, having left with or without a Turkish passport, could re-enter Istanbul “in a recognized way.”³³⁷ This meant that they would have to apply for a Turkish passport and visa from a consulate representing Turkish affairs, and if secured, which was unlikely considering it would need to be approved directly from Ankara, could potentially return to Istanbul. The fourth, fifth, and sixth articles stated that Armenians who left with Ottoman passports or passports issued in the name of the GNA which stated that returning was permitted would also be allowed to enter Turkey.³³⁸ The seventh article stated that Ottoman Jews abroad without appropriate passports would have to apply to Turkish consular authorities, and if permitted by Ankara, would be allowed to return.³³⁹

Theoretically, depending on the ethno-religious category of the person, the travel document on which they left, and the mood of the Turkish Interior Ministry, some people who left without passports issued in the name of GNA were likely able to return. Based on the more favorable attitude given to those carrying Ottoman passports, it is likely that those who were able to re-enter successfully left with Ottoman passports. There were, however, likely a decent number of people who left with Ottoman passports and passports issued in the name of the GNA with “return permitted” printed on them who would never be given permission to return. After all,

³³⁶ Akçam and Kurt, 150.

³³⁷ As quoted in Akçam and Kurt, 151.

³³⁸ Ibid.

³³⁹ Ibid.

policies in theory are one thing, and policies in practice are often quite different. Çağaptay points out that, during the investigation of Ottoman subjects seeking repatriation to Turkey, a person could easily be accused of having evaded military service, naturalized elsewhere, or committed some offense which did not align with their Turkish allegiance, giving the Turkish government grounds to prevent their return.³⁴⁰

A group of Armenian American citizens, carrying passports appropriately visaed by the Spanish consul in New York, who was representing Turkish affairs, would find this out the hard way in August of 1923. Despite the fact that their visas to enter Turkey had been approved, upon arrival in Turkey, they were refused permission to land and sent back. Adnan Bey told the American High Commissioner in Istanbul, Mark Bristol, that naturalized Armenian-Americans of Russian origin and naturalized Greek-Americans of Hellenic origin would be allowed to come to Turkey as American citizens, but Greek and Armenian Americans of Ottoman origin would be sent back immediately.³⁴¹ While the US government refused to make distinction between different origins of naturalized American citizens, they resolved to warn Americans of Ottoman origin that they could be turned back at Turkish borders and that there was little the American government could do about this.³⁴²

John Chrystopoulos would receive a similar warning from the British in 1932. Mr. Chrystopoulos was born in Istanbul on March 27, 1895, and grew up as an Ottoman Rum. He joined the service of the British in February of 1919, shortly after the British entered the city. He worked faithfully for the British until they evacuated in 1923. As Mr. Chrystopoulos was an Ottoman subject “compromised” by his work

³⁴⁰ Çağaptay, 74.

³⁴¹ Akçam and Kurt, 134.

³⁴² Akçam and Kurt, 135.

for the British, when withdrawing from the city, the British evacuated him clandestinely to Alexandria, where he continued to work for the British Empire. Mr. Chrystopoulos lived the better part of a decade without official nationality until, finally, in May of 1932, he was able to become a naturalized British subject. The first thing he did when he finally got his hands on his British passport was to apply for a Turkish visa to go to Istanbul, as he longed to see his family and home. The Turkish Consulate in Alexandria, however, immediately rejected his visa on the grounds that he was of Ottoman origin. Because he worked for the British colonial authorities as a clerk in the service of the Sea Transport Officer at Port Said and was well-liked by a few high-ranked people within the British Navy, the British Consulate in Port Said asked the British Chancery if anything could be done. The Chancery wrote back to explain the specifics of the 1928 Nationality law, explaining that while the Turkish Cabinet Council had not officially decreed that Mr. Chrystopoulos had forfeited his Turkish nationality, as soon as his case was brought to their attention they were likely to do so. Unfortunately, there was nothing the British could do to make representations to the Turkish government on this matter. A Colonel at Port Said then wrote to the Chancery to ask whether or not they could remove the words “Ottoman origin. Greek birth” which were affixed to the bottom of his British passport, making it impossible for him to get a Turkish visa. The Chancery responded that they could not, as this was regulation for naturalized British subjects, and,

In the very unlikely event of a British subject bearing his name securing a visa from the Turkish authorities without previous inquiries regarding his antecedents, he would liable to expulsion immediately on arrival in Turkey and the consequences to an ex-Ottoman such as Mr. Chrystopoulos who served at Constantinople with the British forces would probably be still more unpleasant. As in Turkish law he is still an Ottoman subject and [His Majesty's] Ambassador would be unable to assist him in any way if he got into trouble.³⁴³

³⁴³ FO 141/697/11, TNA.

The writer's comments illustrate that anyone applying for a Turkish visa with a Greek or Armenian last name would be flagged for investigation as potentially having Ottoman origins. And once said origins were established, there would be nothing the British could do for him. The writer continued, "I think Mr. Chrystopoulos should be made to realise that having at last achieved his desire to become a British subject he must be prepared to bear the disadvantages as well as to enjoy the privileges of his new status."³⁴⁴ The writer from the Chancery clearly believed that British nationality was a gift bestowed upon this man, likely not putting together that Mr. Chrystopoulos, prior to his British naturalization, had been essentially stateless. For even if he had approached Turkish authorities in an attempt to claim his Turkish nationality, on account of his work with the British, his evacuation without a Turkish passport, and his lack of ability to return before 1927, Turkish authorities would have been well within their rights to deny him a passport to return and then have his nationality officially revoked. Mr. Chrystopoulos under no circumstances would have been able to return to Istanbul to see his family.

Though Mr. Chrystopoulos was eventually able to avail himself of British nationality, he lived as a stateless person for nearly a decade in Egypt. The next two chapters will be devoted to other people who, like Mr. Chrystopoulos, were made stateless or thrust onto the margins of nationality by this tumultuous year.

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

CHAPTER 4

CARAVAN OF EXILES (GURBET KAFİLESİ)

The word *gurbet* in Turkish does not quite mean “exile,” for which the word *sürgün* is generally used. *Gurbet* refers to an absence from home or a time of living in a foreign land. But the feeling of the word is a kind of alienation, or a detachment from home. It carries with it a sense of longing for one’s homeland. The word *kafîle* refers to a caravan, a convoy, a procession, or a group of people in general. Thus, my translation of *gurbet kafilesi* as “caravan of exiles” is perhaps more stylistic than it is strictly accurate. It is meant to convey the general meaning of the phrase along with the feeling of a long, odyssey-like journey, wherein a group of people find themselves in far-flung foreign lands longing for home. I take this phrase from Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, a member of this *gurbet kafilesi* who wrote about the last Ottoman Sultan, Vahdeddin, and his life in exile. Tarık Mümtaz was commander of the machine gun unit of the Caliphal Army (Kuva-yi İnzibatiye) which fought on behalf of the Sultan against the nationalists, and Aide-de-Camp to Damat Ferid Pasha, the Grand Vezir who oversaw the Treaty of Sevres. These two positions put him squarely in the category of people who the nationalists saw as traitors, leading him to flee Istanbul in November of 1922 for Bulgaria, later joining the group of exiled Turks who surrounded Vahideddin. His book, *Osmanoğulları’nın Son Padişahı Vahideddin Gurbet Cehenneminde* (*The Osmanoglus’ Last Sultan Vahideddin In the Hell of Exile*), conveys the bitter anguish felt by the last Sultan himself and those who surrounded him in their *gurbet*.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁵ Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, *Osmanoğulları’nın Son Padişahı Vahideddin Gurbet Cehenneminde*.

In discussions of refugees in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, scholarship has, understandably, focused on the largest groups of post-Ottoman refugees: the Armenians after 1915 and the Greeks of Anatolia.³⁴⁶ Discussions of statelessness have primarily focused on the many White Russians who flooded into Istanbul after the Bolshevik revolution, along with, later, the Armenians who were never allowed to return to the Turkish Republic.³⁴⁷ Scholarship on Muslim refugees has primarily focused on Balkan Muslims after the Balkan Wars³⁴⁸ or on Muslims from Greece who were part of the population exchange.³⁴⁹ Yet there were also a fair number of Muslims who fled from what would become the Turkish Republic and in so doing found themselves stateless.

The 150ers (*yüzellilikler*) would represent the primary group of stateless Ottoman Muslims in the post-war period. The Ankara government insisted upon the right to exempt 150 names of Ottoman Muslims from the general amnesty signed in the Treaty of Lausanne. These people would be unable to return to Turkey lest they be tried as traitors to the Turkish National Movement and executed. They would also lose their property rights in Turkey and later be officially stripped of their Turkish nationality. Numerous Turkish language monographs have compiled information about the infamous 150ers, emphasizing their betrayal of the Turkish nation and quite thoroughly reporting information that Turkish intelligence gathered about them in exile.³⁵⁰ Prominent English language scholarship has generally looked at this

³⁴⁶ See, for instance, Watenpaugh, and Renee Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe*.

³⁴⁷ This is because they were the two largest groups to be recognized as stateless by the League of Nations in the 1920s, discussions of stateless people at the time also centered around these two groups, see United Nations Archives at Geneva (later UNAG) League of Nations Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds) 1919-1947.

³⁴⁸ See, for instance, Üngör, "Becoming and unbecoming refugees: the long ordeal of Balkan Muslims, 1912-34," 304-327.

³⁴⁹ See, for instance, Koufopoulou, "Muslim Cretans in Turkey: The Reformulation of Ethnic Identity in an Aegean Community," 209-219.

³⁵⁰ See, for instance, Erdeha, *Yüzellilikler, Yahut, Milli Mücadelenin Muhasebesi* and Bingöl, *150'likler Meselesi: Bir İhanetin Anatomisi*.

group of people through the lens of intellectual history, emphasizing their ideas and writings which put them into conflict with the Ankara government. Christine Philliou, in her book, *Turkey: A Past Against History*, extensively explores the idea of the *muhaliif* in her intellectual history of opposition through the lens of Refik Halit from the late Ottoman period through the occupation and well into the Turkish Republic.³⁵¹ *Muhaliif*, meaning opponent or dissident, was a popular word to describe the people of this group, often used by those within the gurbet kafilesi to describe themselves. Hakan Özoğlu's book, *From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic*, similarly approaches the 150ers as representing opposition to Ankara, placing them within a wider context of power struggle within the early days of the Republic.³⁵²

It should be noted, however, that what united this group of people was not their ideas. This was a diverse group of people who made enemies of the Turkish National Movement for different reasons; thus they held widely varying views. For many of them we know little about their viewpoints in the first place. Unlike the more prominent intellectuals and politicians in the 150ers, the majority of the group left little in the way of writing, though we know that there were certainly major disagreements within the group. The one thing that united these people completely was that they could not return to their homeland.

Instead of approaching this group of people as *muhaliifat*, this chapter will approach these people as *mülteciler*, or refugees, a word which the philosopher Rıza Tevfik used to describe this group.³⁵³ We must remember, of course, that the defining feature of legal refugeehood during this time period was statelessness,³⁵⁴

³⁵¹ Philliou, *Turkey: A Past Against History*.

³⁵² Özoğlu, *From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic*.

³⁵³ Rıza Tevfik, *Biraz Da Ben Konuşayım* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993) 359.

³⁵⁴ See earlier discussion of this, Hathaway.

though not all stateless people would be legally recognized as refugees. Thus, in an attempt to illustrate the connection between statelessness and the passport regime, this chapter will follow the journey of this gurbet kafilesi for roughly the first year of their exile, as they would move or be moved from place to place seeking refuge. The gurbet kafilesi would be one of the first groups of refugees to struggle moving through the passport regime and visa restrictions in multiple countries as stateless people. Even a decade earlier, such a journey through so many ports and cities with movement forced or prohibited through state bureaucratic channels would have been unthinkable.

The Odyssey of the gurbet kafilesi is partially the story of British incompetence. British military officials evacuated these people without an established plan for where they would go and how they would support themselves, then communicated haphazardly amongst themselves, passing the buck on which country would take these people in. The British would learn their lesson after this. They would be much more careful about making sure that people had a place to go and a way to support themselves before evacuating them and furnishing them with British travel documents. After this they would also try to avoid giving out British travel documents wherever they could to avoid the implication of responsibility for the bearer. But as time went on, the journey of these people would only get longer and harder and the British would only become less willing to shoulder the expense of their maintenance.

In following the gurbet kafilesi for the first year of their exile, this chapter will tell the story of a group of refugees who were all, legally speaking (but also sometimes quite literally), in the same boat. After the list of 150ers was published in

January 1924,³⁵⁵ however, the refugees would be split into two categories: those who were on the list and those who were not. Those who found themselves on the list of 150ers would be unable to return to Turkey and after they were officially stripped of their Turkish nationality in 1927, the League of Nations would then, in 1928, officially recognize their statelessness by offering them Nansen passports and a small amount of financial aid through the Refugee Commission. The people whose names were not on the list, however, would find themselves completely outside this system of refugee aid.

In theory, after the list of 150ers was published and the Travel Regulation was passed in July of 1924,³⁵⁶ those whose names were not on the list were free to return to Turkey and resume their lives as Turkish citizens in line with the general amnesty. In practice, however, many remained in exile, either convinced that they would not be allowed to return to Turkey or afraid of retribution if they did. For many of them, their property in Turkey had likely long been confiscated. The League of Nations would be quite strict that only the people whose names were on the 150ers list would be eligible for Nansen passports and refugee aid, though they would acknowledge that there were still Turkish refugees who were not on the list but still had no clear nationality. Why exactly these people felt they could not return to Turkey is not entirely clear and probably varies from case to case, as some, in practice, might have been able to approach Turkish consulates and embassies and request papers for repatriation. Others may have been afraid to do so, stemming from the reason for their original flight. It is also possible that some of them did not know about the Travel Regulation that would allow them to return. But at least for the first

³⁵⁵ The list was published in the GNA's official newspaper on January 7, 1924, approved by parliament on April 23, 1924, due to the death of one person on the list, a new name was added on June 1, 1924. Özoğlu, 33.

³⁵⁶ Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 149-150.

year of their exile, the reason that these people could not return was that many of them left without Turkish passports.

In the immediate aftermath of the Turkish War of Independence, flight without a Turkish passport had come to represent tangible proof of guilt and a physical manifestation of a person's betrayal of the Turkish nation. Though some of the gurbet kafilesi left with Ottoman passports issued before the resignation of the Istanbul government, most of them left with only British laissez-passer, and their travel by way of British laissez-passer and/or their direct evacuation by the British military, represented an alliance with the British against the Nationalists, and Turkish authorities would categorically deny the return of Ottoman subjects who left in this manner. In this way, their story illustrates the intimate relationship between passports and statelessness. To flee under the protection of another power was to ally oneself with that power. And, at the time, as nationality and allegiance were closely linked, in the mind of the Ankara government, to ally with another power in this fashion signaled a rejection of Turkish nationality.

This gurbet kafilesi is an interesting story because it offers a rare example of a rather large group of refugees that can be tracked through multiple destinations in their journey into exile. Though at most destinations people left the group or were added to it, the gurbet kafilesi remained a rather cohesive group for at least the first six months of their exile. This chapter will use the story of this odyssey as a main thread, tying together the stories of other stragglers who may or may not have joined this group for a period of time, but were nonetheless Ottoman Muslims who fled the Turkish National Movement and found themselves stateless as a result. This group of people can be categorized in many ways, some of which we have already discussed: anti-Nationalists, *muhlifat*, Muslim Ottoman or Turkish refugees. Özoglu refers to

them as “the Istanbul circle,” contrasting them with those allied with Ankara.³⁵⁷

British sources refer to them as “compromised Turks” because many of them were “compromised” by their association with the Allies. It should be noted, however, that although the British refer to them as “Turks” because they were Muslim, many of them were actually ethnically Circassian and Kurdish.³⁵⁸

The different people who made up this gurbet kafilesi also makes this a rather interesting story. Among this group were prominent intellectuals, writers, and newspaper owners, but also members of the Sultan’s staff and entourage, former statesmen and military leaders. There were also Circassian nationalists and Turkish civil service administrators who had either allied themselves with or acquiesced to Greek rule in Smyrna.³⁵⁹ The flight of many of these people was not unexpected. British occupation authorities, in May 1922, anticipated an exodus of Ottoman Muslims from Smyrna and its surroundings in the event of a Turkish Nationalist victory. In conversations about a yet potential Greek evacuation of the Aegean region, the War Office estimated that there were “between 6,000 and 10,000 Circassians and approximately 2,000 Turks fighting with the Greek army.”³⁶⁰ In combination with the Turkish officials who integrated into the Greek Administration in Smyrna, the number of Muslims who the British thought would likely flee Smyrna

³⁵⁷ Özoğlu, 15.

³⁵⁸ Rumbold believed that there were considerable numbers of Circassians and Kurds that would be targeted by the Nationalists due to their collaboration with the British if a general amnesty were not negotiated. Rumbold to Curzon, Oct 30, 1922, FO 424/644, No. 431, pg. 294. While the British were fully aware of these ethnic differences, they only acknowledged them and advocated for recognition of ethnic minorities when they thought it might serve British aims. In negotiations at Lausanne, the Nationalists vehemently opposed recognizing Muslim ethnic minorities in minority protections or in the general amnesty, arguing that it was only religious minorities who required protection. The British tried to push for ethnic minority recognition only when they thought it might support their claim to Mosul, Özoğlu 22-23.

³⁵⁹ For more on the alliance between Circassian Nationalists and the Greeks see Gingeras, “Notorious Subjects, Invisible Citizens: North Caucasian Resistance to the Turkish National Movement in Northwestern Anatolia, 1919-23,” 89-108.

³⁶⁰ “Evacuation of Christian and Other Refugees from Asia Minor,” May 13, 1922, WO 106/1430, TNA.

in the event of a Nationalist victory would number around 30,000.³⁶¹ Though these numbers may be inflated, and there is no way to know exactly how many Muslim Ottomans fled in the wake of Nationalist victory, we do know that many Turks and Circassians did flee with the Greek army and end up settling in Greece. Edhem the Circassian, the leader of the Circassian nationalist movement, in a letter to the League of Nations in 1928 which noted the geographical distribution of the 150ers, stated that 37 of the 150ers were in Greece, a larger number than in any other country.³⁶² This was largely because so many people fled with the Greek army, and the 37 that ended up on the 150ers list would only be a small portion of them.

Other members of this group, like Tarık Mümtaz, fled because of their intimate associations with the Sultan and the Istanbul government. Indeed, the last Ottoman Sultan, Vahdeddin himself, could be included in this category of “compromised Turks,” and he was certainly the central figure of the *gurbet* kafiləsi. On November 16, Vahdeddin wrote to General Harrington, explaining that he believed his life to be in danger and asking that the British evacuate him from the city.³⁶³ The following day, British officers whisked the Sultan, his son, and a few loyal servants away from Yıldız Palace to the naval dockyard where they were put on a ship to Malta.³⁶⁴ The former Sultan, his family and those close to him would, also, within the first year of this *gurbet*, have to request passports from the British,³⁶⁵ and

³⁶¹ “Evacuation of Christian and Other Refugees from Asia Minor,” May 13, 1922, WO 106/1430, TNA.

³⁶² Cherkes Edhem to the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Jan 28, 1928, C1423-319-R-419-2-34-1, International Labour Office Refugees Service - Turkish Refugees (Heimatlos) - Edhem Beg Cherkas [Cherkes], Baghdad, requesting Assistance, pg. 5, UNAG; According to information compiled by Hakan Özoğlu, at least 16 people whose names were on the list of 150 people who would not be granted amnesty in the Treaty of Lausanne ended up in Greece. Some of them acquired Greek citizenship and a few even converted to Greek Orthodox. Özoğlu, 37-75.

³⁶³ General Harrington insisted that this request be in writing so that he could not be accused of kidnapping a Sultan. He kept this note, framed it, and published it in his memoirs. Sir Charles Harrington, *Tim Harrington Looks Back*, 125.

³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 130-131. King also includes a vivid and entertaining summary of this escape, 85-87.

³⁶⁵ Graham (Rome) to FO, Sept 29, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

their statelessness would be made final in March of 1924 when the members of the House of Osman would officially be stripped of their Turkish nationality. The British would later ask the Refugee Commission at the League if they would supply the royal family with Nansen passports, to which the League would respond that they could not because they were not on the list of 150ers.³⁶⁶ The fact that the League would not make an exception even for the former Sultan highlights the strictness with which the legal identity of “refugee,” and through that the Nansen passport, was extended to the 150ers and the 150ers only.

Most scholarship on the 150ers has almost entirely relied on Turkish sources to tell this story. Scholars have generally relied on a mix of memoir literature and Turkish intelligence files which reported on the 150ers in exile. For this reason, the story of this exile has largely centered the experiences and stories of the most prominent members of the 150ers, almost entirely overlooking the many people on this journey who would not find themselves on the list. This focus is completely understandable considering how little documentation exists on large swaths of people who were on the 150ers list, let alone the people who weren't. The less prominent the refugee, the harder they were to follow through time.

To offer another perspective of this journey and fill in some of the holes, I will utilize British Foreign Office documents and a few League of Nations files in addition to memoir literature. League of Nations files are limited in their coverage of this group's flight because they would only come under the purview of League of Nations Refugee Commission in 1928, but these files contain letters from refugees (both prominent and not-so-prominent) appealing for aid in the late 20s and early 30s, allowing us a window into their more long-term fate. British Foreign Office

³⁶⁶ Johnson to Buxton, June 1, 1929, C1416-312-R-409-0-8, International Labour Office Refugees Service - Legal Status - Turkish Refugees, pg. 14, UNAG.

papers follow the movements of gurbet kafilesi for most of the first year of their exile, approaching the gurbet kafilesi as a whole group, thus documenting the journeys of less prominent refugees as well as those who were more well-known. Prominent exiled figures, like the memoirists cited in this chapter, were more likely to find support from sources other than the British due to their connections and status, thus they were likely able to settle earlier in the journey than the destitute and unconnected members of the group.³⁶⁷ As all those who could find other options for movement and settlement went their separate ways over the course of the journey, the British were left largely with the refugees who were the most destitute, and their journey would be the longest.

British documents will also underline that many of this group, as older men, sometimes with families in tow, many of whom had previously only worked in civil service, would be a particularly difficult group to settle because finding employment outside of Turkey was particularly difficult. They would be carted around the Eastern Mediterranean and in most potential places of refuge, British foreign service personnel would emphasize that there was little chance of them finding employment, leading to the extreme destitution and even starvation of those who could find no escape from the caravan of exiles.

While this study will attempt to highlight some of the experiences and stories of less-prominent members of the gurbet kafilesi, many of the files about this group, including the lists of names of people transported, were not kept by the Foreign Office archives. Instead, we have only telegram summaries with red “NOT KEPT”

³⁶⁷ This is not to say that the more prominent members of the group were not also destitute, as even the last Sultan, Vahddedin, in his exile, would find himself utterly without resources and reliant on the British for aid, FO 371/7962, TNA; but the more prominent members of the group were more capable of using their names, connections, and reputations to secure some measure of stability. Rıza Tevfik, for example, was invited by his good friend, Abdullah, King of Jordan, to become the director of the National Museum and Library, Özoğlu, 49.

stamps on them. This makes it particularly hard to figure out how many refugees the British transported around the Mediterranean who didn't actually end up being on the list of 150ers, as well as following which people were where and when. British documents do, however, vividly illustrate how long and difficult this journey was, and how much more difficult it was made by passport and visa restrictions, largely placed by the British.

In considering the British perspective on the gurbet kafillesi, we must remember that British documents on this particular group of people were largely motivated by a need to justify expenses spent on them to the British Treasury, thus they emphasize both frugality and urgency and downplay any personal attachment or connections. While those in the Foreign Service working in British consulates and embassies may have displayed a bit more sympathy to the plight of these refugees because they actually interacted with them face-to-face (as opposed to the Foreign Office administrators in London who offered comparatively less sympathy), the two main goals of British administration at this point were saving money and saving face. In instances where British prestige and power were not greatly undermined or threatened, the British would seek to spend as little money as possible and that would prove to be their major motivation when it came to the settlement of refugees.

4.1 Refuge in the British Embassy

On November 5, 1922, Ali Kemal, editor of the anti-nationalist newspaper *Peyam-i Sabah*, was kidnapped by nationalist agents in Beyoğlu, just weeks after Refet Pasha entered Istanbul. He was approached in a barbershop while getting his hair cut and told, "Refet Pasha wants you." Remembering many other times when, as a prominent opposition writer, he had escaped the hangman's noose, Ali Kemal made little

attempt to escape. The agents took him to a private house, carefully avoiding the notice of the British soldiers policing the area, then, under the cover of night, drove him to Nurettin Pasha's house in Izmit. On November 18, Nurettin Pasha ordered soldiers to take Ali Kemal to the yard, where a crowd had formed, to be executed. Ali Kemal was then stoned to death and hung from a tree.³⁶⁸

As the news of Ali Kemal's arrest by Nationalist authorities spread across anti-Nationalist circles in Istanbul, around 150 *muhallif* took refuge in the British Embassy. Many of these were former Istanbul government officials, members of the Liberal Entente Party, and the "Friends of England" Association.³⁶⁹ This was a time of chaos and fear for those with close ties to the Istanbul government or to the Allied powers. The Turkish Grand National Assembly had abolished the Sultanate on November 1, and, over the course of the next few days, the remaining members of the Istanbul government had resigned. The Ankara government had begun flexing its muscles and asserting its sovereignty. Though Allied forces still occupied Istanbul, Ali Kemal's arrest undermined the image of Allied control. If a prominent Turkish intellectual could be snatched out from under the British army's nose, how much could the Allies actually protect any opponents to Ankara in Istanbul? Many people who fell into this category feared that they would be next.

Among the Turks who gathered at the British Embassy was Refik Halit, a prominent and longstanding *muhallif*. Remembering the fear and anticipation of those days, Refik Halit wrote that he walked around with a passport in his pocket—one that

³⁶⁸ This information comes from journalist Asım Us, who interviewed one of the police officers who arrested and oversaw the execution of Ali Kemal. Karaveli, *Ali Kemal*, "belki de bir günah keçisi," 97-105. Later writings make a point of divorcing this brutal lynching from the Nationalist cause. Rıza Tevfik emphasized that the death of his dear friend was not the responsibility of Mustafa Kemal, 358. The account of Ali Kemal's execution cited above states that shortly after Ali Kemal was killed, a telegram came from Ankara ordering that he be sent there, Karaveli, 105. Nur Bilge Criss emphasizes that although Ali Kemal was murdered by a crowd, Nurettin Pasha acted on his own initiative and had his thugs orchestrate the execution. It was not ordered by Ankara, 149.

³⁶⁹ Oliphant to FO, Dec 5, 1922, FO 371/7960 E13466, 62, TNA.

he had requested from the Istanbul government around the time of the fire of Smyrna—in preparation for a last-minute escape if he were targeted by the Nationalists.³⁷⁰ Having already been exiled before under the CUP government, Refik Halit was no stranger to being a *persona non-grata*. After hearing of Ali Kemal's arrest, he went to Ali Kemal's office where someone told him that the other *muhalis* were taking refuge at the British Embassy. Refik Halit then went to the British Embassy, and, along with roughly 150 others, was taken to the Taşışkla barracks as guests of General Harrington. Being in the barracks with the other *muhalis*, some of whom he knew from his previous exile, brought back traumatic memories and Refik Halit decided to leave. He was granted permission to go so long as he understood that he would no longer be under British protection if he left. Other than him, from the roughly 150 people who had taken refuge with the British, only one member of the ulema and a police officer elected to leave British protection at that point.³⁷¹

When these anti-Nationalists gathered in the British Embassy garden, the British still hoped that they could put pressure on Ankara to accede to British demands, despite the fact that Refet Pasha was quickly assuming and asserting greater influence in Istanbul. Upon Ali Kemal's arrest and disappearance, the Allies demanded that Refet Pasha tell them of his whereabouts. Refet Pasha denied any knowledge of Ali Kemal's disappearance, though General Harrington did not believe him and took this as a sign that the British must reassert their authority and dominance.³⁷² Writing to the Foreign Office on November 7, Rumbold warned that hundreds if not thousands of Turks (not to mention Greeks and Armenians) would flee Istanbul if Allied troops were withdrawn, perhaps overstating their close

³⁷⁰ Philliou, 129.

³⁷¹ Philliou, 131.

³⁷² Harrington to WO, Nov 8, 1922, E12363, 233-234

relationship with the Turkish population. He went on to say, “If allies adopt strong line here, Turks at present under military protection, will return to their homes and question of ultimate disposal of compromised Ottomans will of course lapse temporarily at any rate.”³⁷³ He was, of course, quite wrong. The issue of compromised Ottomans, where they would go, who would support them, and how the British could rid themselves of responsibility for them, would demand the attention of both the Foreign Office and the War Office for at least the next year. The journey of this gurbet kafilesi would prove to be long, arduous, and expensive.

Refik Halit stayed with a friend after leaving the barracks and the next day the head of French security escorted him to the Pierre Loti ship in Sarayburnu, in the French-controlled area of Istanbul, on November 9, and from there he sailed to Beirut.³⁷⁴ Rıza Tevfik wrote that Mehmet Ali, the former Minister of the Interior, tried to convince Rıza Tevfik to go to Paris with him in the chaos of those few days and then ended up joining Refik Halit on the Pierre Loti,³⁷⁵ though Refik Halit’s account mentions no companions and Tarık Mümtaz’s account disputes this.³⁷⁶ It is possible that Rıza Tevfik assumed that Mehmet Ali left on a French ship because he ended up in France,³⁷⁷ so he lumped his exit together with that of Refik Halit. The same week, Tarık Mümtaz, Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, chief aid-de-camp to the Sultan and Süleyman Sururi Bey, a leading member of the Liberal Entente Party, would leave Istanbul carrying exit documents issued by the British, and then make their way to Bulgaria. The biggest group of Muslim Ottomans who fled during this period,

³⁷³ Rumbold to FO, Nov 7, 1922, FO 371/7910, E12384, FO 371/7910, 278, TNA.

³⁷⁴ Hikmet Münir Ebcioğlu, *Kendi Yazılarıyla Refik Halid*, 57.

³⁷⁵ Tevfik, 260.

³⁷⁶ Tarık Mümtaz writes that Mehmet Ali was on the S.S. Egypt and then get off at Dedeğaç, and from there headed to Romania with Colonel Sadık Bey and Gümülcineli İsmail, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 43.

³⁷⁷ In France he wrote an anti-nationalist newspaper, “La Republique Enchainee,” for a full issue from 1933 see S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 148-151, UNAG; see also Tunçay, “Zincire Vurulmuş Cumhuriyet,” 6, 19.

however, would be evacuated directly by the British on November 15, and put on the S.S. Egypt. Rıza Tevfik was among this group. Years later, in his memoirs, he would still remember the franticness with which the *muhafizat* in his circle clamored to leave Istanbul, gathering in the British Embassy, then waiting on the S.S. Egypt for a number of days before it set sail. He had the forethought to pack a get-away bag in advance, along with a passport that he, like Refik Halit, had requested earlier from the Istanbul government.³⁷⁸ He would be one of the few of this group who would leave with an actual passport, stamped with an inter-allied exit visa, and this would be the last regular passport he would hold for a long time.

4.2 Laissez-passer in Bulgaria

The majority of Ottoman Muslims who left Istanbul in the fall and winter of 1922 would leave carrying British laissez-passer, issued in General Harington's name. At the time, the British thought little about the longer-term effects of granting these travel documents. They believed that by expediting the bureaucratic processes needed to exit and providing people who were afraid for their lives with travel documents which allowed them to leave, they had done their duty. But these passes would be a source of confusion and frustration shortly thereafter.

In December 1922, a number of former Ottoman officials who had fled to Bulgaria, Tarık Mümtaz, Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, and Süleyman Sururi Bey among them, approached the British Consul in Varna asking for further travel passes. As the passes the British gave them to leave were only valid for one journey within a one-month time period (as many passports and other travel documents were at that time), they were stuck in Bulgaria, unable to travel elsewhere. Believing that an agreement

³⁷⁸ Tevfik, 239-270.

between Ankara and the Bulgarian government might be reached which would compel them to return to Turkey and stand trial, they pleaded with the British Consul to provide them with passes to proceed elsewhere.³⁷⁹

The Foreign Office immediately went on the defensive, justifying that they owed these people no other support. Neville Henderson, writing from Istanbul regarding the laissez-passer, explained,

Except for the fact that they were printed in English, the passes were in no sense British papers, and they bore the Inter-Allied visa and the visa of the country of destination. As the passes were issued, it was definitely stated that, in providing them, neither the British nor the Allied Authorities would accept any further liability in respect of them. The bearer of each pass was at liberty to choose his destination and was informed that he must provide for himself on arrival there. It is therefore clear that such persons have no further claim on His Majesty's Government.³⁸⁰

Henderson then went on to state that he thought that the British should stop issuing laissez-passer to Ottoman subjects "as such procedure would probably give rise to future trouble," and that these people should be informed that the British would not intervene on their behalf. They should be informed that they must continue to travel on Turkish papers without British assistance.³⁸¹ The implication of this statement was either that these Turks must approach Turkish consular authorities (who they believed were actively trying to get them extradited to Turkey) for new passports, or try to use their expired passports and laissez-passer for multiple journeys, which would likely be impossible without another power's assistance. Though it is unclear what Henderson was suggesting these people might do to continue to be able to travel, it also seems that he gave little thought to the matter beyond the fact that it was not his problem.

³⁷⁹ Erskine (Sofia) to Curzon, Dec 18, 1922, FO 371/7962, E14520, 10, TNA.

³⁸⁰ Henderson to Curzon, Jan 1, 1923, FO 371/9125, E339, 186, TNA.

³⁸¹ Ibid 186-187.

This group of ex-Ottoman officials in particular had requested passes which would enable them to travel to Malta to join the former Sultan.³⁸² In response to both their request to go to Malta, and their fear that the Bulgarian government would reach an agreement with Ankara that would force their return to Turkey, Henderson was dismissive, writing,

With the possible exception of Hamdi Pasha, none of these can be considered as prominent personages, and I think it most improbable that the Nationalist Authorities would be at pains to secure their return to Constantinople. Further, Hamdi Pasha apparently considered himself in so little danger that, even when the situation was critical in early November, he remained in Constantinople some days after his special pass had been issued to him. Also, in view of the fact that he preferred flight to remaining with his master, it seems unlikely that the Sultan would desire his presence in Malta or elsewhere.³⁸³

Henderson here sought to undermine the danger that these people found themselves in on multiple points. First, he asserts that they were not high profile enough people for the Nationalists to fight for their return to Turkey to be tried. While this turned out to be true, as the Ankara government did not go so far as to fight for these people's extradition, Kiraz Hamdi Pasha and Tarık Mümtaz were prominent enough to, a little over a year later, find themselves on the list of 150ers. Süleyman Sururi Bey would not, and what happened to him after this is unclear. Henderson then went on to dismiss Hamdi Pasha's fears specifically, asserting that if he were really in so much danger from the Nationalists, he should have left Turkey as soon as the British issued him an emergency pass. From this we can infer from Henderson's language that Hamdi Pasha left Istanbul before the evacuation of the Sultan on November 17, as he implies that Hamdi Pasha abandoned the Sultan. In dismissing and attacking Hamdi Pasha like this, Henderson further asserted that the British had no responsibility toward him. If he abandoned the Sultan, then the Sultan is better off

³⁸² Erskine (Sofia) to Curzon, Dec 18, 1922, FO 371/7962, E14520, 10, TNA.

³⁸³ Henderson to Curzon, Jan 1, 1923, FO 371/9125, E339, 185-186, TNA.

without him, and the British would have no reason to lift a finger to help him join his former master in Malta.

The file containing this correspondence is littered with notes from Foreign Office personnel agreeing with Henderson's assertion that the British had no responsibility to this group of compromised Turks. Sir George Mounsey scribbled,

“I agree that we should grant these people no further facilities. The [Home Office] will almost certainly not allow them to come here, and it is not fair to give them British papers to enable them to proceed elsewhere when we refuse them admittance here.”³⁸⁴

Overlooking the fact that many of these people had already been given “British papers,” Mounsey's comments highlight a major tension in the issuing of travel documents during this period: that while colonial powers were sometimes generous with issuing travel documents, they often did not want the people to whom these documents were issued to enter the metropole, or even, quite frequently, other colonies. This desire to keep people out would contribute to a growing trend toward issuing passports only to those who held subjecthood or citizenship. Largely because of this group, by the beginning of 1923, the British would become much more careful about issuing British documents to non-British subjects. In an almost illegible note written on the same page, someone scribbled, “the further stray people about furnished with British papers, the less the danger of political difficulties.”³⁸⁵ In light of these comments, the Foreign Office wrote back to William Erskine, the British Ambassador in Sofia, saying, “You should not issue passes, and visas should only be given in accordance with existing regulations.”³⁸⁶

Tarık Mümtaz, at the very least, did somehow manage to join the Sultan at some point on this gurbet kfilesi, but Tarık Mümtaz's writing style is particularly

³⁸⁴ Mounsey, Jan 3, 1923, FO 371/7962, E14520, 9, TNA.

³⁸⁵ Indecipherable name, Jan 3, 1923, FO 371/7962, E14520, 9, TNA.

³⁸⁶ FO to Erskine, Jan 6, 1922, FO 371/7962, E14520, 13, TNA.

unclear about his own place in the journey. His writings generally include no dates and discuss events that happened that he could not have been present for without explicitly stating that he heard this from others later. For instance, because we know he was in Bulgaria in mid-December, he could not have been present for the first few stops made by the S.S. Egypt, yet he describes these events in detail, making no mention of where he was at that time. He did, at some point, join the Sultan and the main group, which is likely when he heard about these events, and he remained the companion of the Sultan until Vahdeddin's death in 1926. But it is hard to discern what he witnessed first-hand and what he was told about later. Though it is not clear when, how or on what kind of paperwork Tarık Mümtaz managed to leave Bulgaria, the travel document issue clearly remained vivid in his mind. Decades later, writing about his flight from Istanbul, on the last page of his book, *Osmanoğullarının Son Padişahı Vahideddin Mütareke Gayyasında (Vahdeddin, The Last Ottoman Sultan in the Hell-Pit of the Armistice)*, Tarık Mümtaz described the temporary laissez-passer he was given, which was only good for one month, almost as a symbol of the wretchedness of his *gurbet*.³⁸⁷

But there was another reason the Foreign Office didn't want Erskine issuing travel documents to Turkish refugees in Bulgaria: the British were afraid that they would go to Greece. George William Rendel, another Foreign Office administrator and diplomat, worried that if Erskine issued passes to Turks in Bulgaria, some would try to go to Greece while the British Ambassador in Athens, Charles Henry Bentinck, was trying to send some of the Turkish refugees in Greece to Bulgaria. He summed up, "it looks as though any facilitation of the journeys of these people will merely end in an exchange of undesirable refugees."³⁸⁸ Refugees were, indeed, generally

³⁸⁷ Tarık Mümtaz Göztepe, *Osmanoğullarının Son Padişahı Vahideddin Mütareke Gayyasında*, 461.

³⁸⁸ Rendel Handwritten note, Jan 3rd, 1923, FO 371/7962, E14520, 8, TNA.

“undesirable” to British administrators, whose language made it clear that they saw anyone displaced by this war as a financial and administrative burden to be rid of. But Rendel’s comments also reflected an awareness of the massive refugee crisis taking place in the Eastern Mediterranean and the fact that there were fewer and fewer places open to displaced people.

4.3 The S.S. Egypt

Greece, most obviously, was completely overwhelmed by refugees by this point. After the expulsion of the Greek population of Anatolia and the fire of Smyrna, hundreds of thousands, eventually reaching a million, Greek refugees poured into Greek ports and into Grecian Thrace. The S.S. Egypt, which carried the 145 anti-Nationalists who had taken refuge in the British Embassy and then were evacuated on British expense, discovered just how overwhelmed Greek ports were the hard way. On November 15, because “their presence in Constantinople was likely to prove a source of serious embarrassment to the [Allied] military authorities,”³⁸⁹ these 145 people were put on the S.S. Egypt bound for Dedeğaç/Alexandroupoli. British occupation authorities believed that once these people had been evacuated to Dedeğaç, a port city under Greek Control, those who had funds and British-issued passes would then be able to make their own way to Egypt.³⁹⁰ A later report to the Treasury, however, highlighted that the majority of this group were “entirely destitute.”³⁹¹ A mixture of a breakdown in communication and a lack of forethought would lead to this plan going very much awry.

³⁸⁹ Oliphant to Treasury, Dec 5, 1922, FO 371/7960 E13466, 62, TNA.

³⁹⁰ Henderson to FO, Nov 21, 1922, FO 371/7916, E13263, 58, TNA.

³⁹¹ Oliphant to Treasury, Dec 5, 1922, FO 371/7960, E13466, 62, TNA.

When the S.S. Egypt arrived in Dedeğaç, the port was deluged with ships and refugees coming from Smyrna. According to a League of Nations document, the British had approached the League's Refugee Commission in Istanbul asking that they take charge of these Turkish refugees in Dedeğaç and in return, the British would send needed food and hospital equipment along with them on the ship. The S.S. Egypt, however, left earlier than expected and the stores had to be sent on another ship. After landing in Dedeğaç, Greek authorities asked that the ship be sent to Piraeus, meaning that the Refugee Commission could not hold up their end of the bargain and assume responsibility for the group. As most of the gurbet kafilesi at that point expressed a desire to go to Egypt, the British were told to prepare passports for them.³⁹² Somehow, this communication to prepare to accept the group of refugees in Alexandria did not get transmitted.

Tarık Mümtaz states that a few people from the gurbet kafilesi were able to disembark from the S.S. Egypt at Dedeğaç, including Colonel Sadık Bey, Gümülcineli İsmail Bey, and Mehmet Ali Bey, who then headed for Romania.³⁹³ This version of events certainly lines up with the whereabouts of Colonel Sadık Bey, who remained in Romania for the duration of his exile.³⁹⁴ There is likewise no conflicting information about the whereabouts of Gümülcineli İsmail, who later joined the Sultan in San Remo and tried to cheat many in his entourage as well as the last Sultan himself,³⁹⁵ and in the 1930s was given multiple Nansen passports to go to

³⁹² This document is an unsigned, undated, and unnumbered "Secret Memorandum" seeking to explain expenses incurred in order to feed the refugees and seeking compensation. Other correspondence in the file questions its validity in terms of the justification of expenses, but there is nothing that undermines the factual information presented in it. R1763-48-25579, Refugees from Asia Minor, Evacuation from Constantinople of Certain Turks in the Service of the British Forces, pg. 6, UNAG.

³⁹³ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 43.

³⁹⁴ Özoğlu, 55.

³⁹⁵ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 140-142.

Yugoslavia and Greece.³⁹⁶ There is, however, among memoirists, disagreement about how Mehmet Ali Bey left Istanbul.³⁹⁷

The S.S. Egypt was quite shortly thereafter sent to Piraeus, the Athenian port, due to the refugee traffic in the North Aegean. No sooner had they landed than the Greek government demanded they be removed. Already overwhelmed by Greek refugees from Anatolia, the Greek state had little willingness to allow Turkish refugees to stay. Tarık Mümtaz, however, wrote that Colonel Nikolaos Plastiras, after demanding that the British take the whole group away immediately, recognized a few faces among the group of people who had assisted the Greek Army in Smyrna and allowed them to stay in Greece and even gave them jobs in the Greek government.³⁹⁸ Tarık Mümtaz makes a point of displaying disgust towards those of the gurbet kafilesi who helped the Greek army and then later stayed and worked for the Greeks, likely in an attempt to distance himself from other groups within the 150ers, implying that some were greater traitors than others. Time would tell just how hospitable Greece would be to the Turkish refugees who stayed, but a number of the 150ers would stay in Greece, get Greek citizenship, some even converted to Greek Orthodox.³⁹⁹ Greece would end up with so many Turkish political refugees that they would eventually form a League of Turkish Refugees to advocate on their behalf.⁴⁰⁰ It is not clear exactly how many of the gurbet kafilesi got off at Dedeğaç and Piraeus, but an additional thirty-six compromised Turks were given special passes

³⁹⁶ R3656-1-15279, 1934-1936, Situation of 150 persons proscribed by the Turkish Government under Declaration VIII annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne, UNAG.

³⁹⁷ See previous mention of this inconsistency between Tarık Mümtaz's account and Rıza Tevfik's.

³⁹⁸ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 44-46.

³⁹⁹ Özoğlu, 37-75.

⁴⁰⁰ S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, UNAG.

for Egypt and added to the group in Athens.⁴⁰¹ While some would begin to go their separate ways, others would join the group.

The British, reacting to the Greeks' refusal to allow the gurbet kafilesi to stay, immediately started working to get them to Alexandria. Bentinck frantically wrote to the Foreign Office stating that he saw no alternative but to get them on a boat to Alexandria on December 1 while attempting to incur the least possible expenses, and asking to whom he could send the bill. Considering the Greek government was already overwhelmed by Greek refugees from Anatolia, there was little chance that he could ask the Greek government to take on Turkish refugees as well. He noted that only 34 of them had passports. We can infer that the rest carried the one-month laissez-passer that Tarık Mümtaz later recalled so vividly, while the 34 likely held Ottoman passports which, like that of Refik Halit and Rıza Tevfik, had been requested from the Istanbul government in anticipation of flight. As it was unclear what country would take these people, sooner or later the question of their travel documents as well as their place of refuge would have to be solved. Bentinck ended his note imploring, "I venture urgently to request that no more British or protégés be sent to Greek territory."⁴⁰² This was why Rendel specifically feared that if the British issued travel passes to Turkish refugees in Bulgaria that they would end up in Greece.

A few months later, Bentinck would write to Henderson in Istanbul, expressing frustration at the number of Turkish refugees who were still finding their way to him in Greece. He expressed empathy for their plight and underlined that it was due to their assistance to the British that these people found themselves stateless and destitute:

⁴⁰¹ Henderson to FO, Nov 27, 1922, FO 1103/996, TNA.

⁴⁰² Bentinck to FO, Nov 29, 1922, FO 371/7960, E13395, 14, TNA.

I need hardly say that I have no funds at all for relieving these people, many of whom, from the papers they hold, appear to have done good work for the British Military Authorities. They come and ask us to do anything for them, saying that they have no money, etc. and when informed that we can do nothing, point out that it is only through the fact of their having done good work for the British that they are reduced to their present condition. They are then apt to make disparaging remarks of a Government which uses them while they can serve its purpose, and then throws them overboard immediately they cease to be useful.⁴⁰³

After expressing empathy for these people, he questioned why these people were being sent to Greece in the first place: “we are here overwhelmed with refugees of every description and of many different races and it is a little difficult to understand why our people should select Greece of all countries in the world for sending Turkish refugees to.”⁴⁰⁴ He went on to say, “It would, I think, be kinder to send them to a British possession and certainly there would be less chance of their succumbing to disease or starvation if kept away from this unhappy country.”⁴⁰⁵

It is unlikely that British officials were intentionally sending Turkish refugees to Greece. It is more likely that, focused only on facilitating their escape from the city, British authorities furnished them passes and exit visas, caring little about where they ended up, just that they avoid the optics of another Ali Kemal. After all, it would do little for British prestige and power if Turks who had helped or been affiliated with the British were successfully targeted en masse by Nationalist authorities. But once these now-refugees had escaped Turkey, their fate was less directly relevant to the image of British authority. This is, perhaps, why Bentinck underlined that these people would begin to talk negatively of their work for the British if the result was their statelessness and destitution. He sought to argue that not caring for these people would negatively impact the British image—as simple

⁴⁰³ Bentinck to Henderson, Feb 19, 1923, FO 371/9125, E2431, 195-196, TNA.

⁴⁰⁴ Ibid, 196.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid, 197.

empathy would not elicit funds from the treasury for their evacuation and maintenance.

Bentinck's letter would have an impact. The War Office shortly thereafter appealed to the Treasury asking for a lump sum of £5,000 for evacuating compromised Ottomans. The evacuation of 1830 people (not all of them Ottoman subjects) would be paid for by the British and partially facilitated by the League of Nations, creating the façade of international responsibility for them.⁴⁰⁶ The British had learned their lesson with the Turkish refugees who were still stateless and drawing on British funds—they would, from here on out, make sure that those who were evacuated would go to a state or community that could cover their maintenance, ensuring that after their evacuation they would no longer be the British's problem. While this resolution would attempt to prevent the creation of more stateless and destitute people, it would do little for the people who had already left. The prospects of the gurbet kafilesi were looking worse and worse. And they were still the responsibility of the British.

By early December 1922, shortly after the gurbet kafilesi had been sent from Athens to Alexandria, complaints and accusations about how such expenses on this group came about were being thrown around the Foreign Office. As they were writing to the Treasury to try to explain how the movement of these people incurred so many expenses, a disgruntled Foreign Office administrator wrote, "I cannot but feel that they have got us into a bad mess over this business,"⁴⁰⁷ referring to both occupation authorities in Istanbul and Mr. Bentinck. Harington and Henderson had been told that Cyprus could take up to one hundred Turks who were able to financially provide for themselves, but that the Treasury would not provide any

⁴⁰⁶ FO 371/9125, TNA.

⁴⁰⁷ Butler note, Dec 4, 1922, FO 371/7960, 57, TNA.

money for this group. Yet, from a mixture of military and consular funds, these people were being whisked all around the Mediterranean. The employee then griped that Bentinck had sent the group to Egypt without bothering to figure out which of them could pay for their own voyage, expressing concern that Egypt would also be unable or unwilling to take them.

His concern was well founded. Lord Allenby, High Commissioner in Egypt, had been warning that Egypt could not take in substantial numbers of refugees since September.⁴⁰⁸ Despite his protests, refugees whose passports carried British visas flowed into Egypt after the fire of Smyrna. Allenby again renewed his request that no one other than British, French, Italian, American or Egyptian subjects be given visas to Egypt unless they had close business connections or immediate family there.⁴⁰⁹ A Foreign Office administrator noted that there were no longer any British representatives in Smyrna issuing visas, so these refugees must either have gotten their visas before the fire or, he speculated, refugees could be coming from other British colonies like Cyprus or Malta where they had received visas for Egypt. As both Malta and Cyprus were also trying to minimize the number of refugees they were taking from Smyrna, British authorities on these islands may have been issuing visas to Egypt in the hopes of getting rid of some of the refugees coming in. Allenby's request was forwarded to the Colonial Office and administrators across the Mediterranean were instructed to limit visas to Egypt.⁴¹⁰ Into the fall and winter of 1922, the refugee crisis would only get worse, touching every corner of the Eastern Mediterranean, and doors would continue to close to refugees.

⁴⁰⁸ On September 10, Allenby wrote to the Foreign Office that any influx of Greek or Armenian refugees to Egypt would "constitute danger to public security." Exceptions should only be made for Greeks who could be self-supporting and had close family or business interests in Egypt. Allenby to FO, Sept 10, 1922, FO 371/7886, E9088, 163, TNA.

⁴⁰⁹ Allenby to FO, Sept 27, 1922, FO 371/7895, E10044, 102, TNA.

⁴¹⁰ Oliphant to CO, Sept 30, 1922, FO 371/7895, E10044, 108, TNA.

The list of compromised Turks who Bentinck put on the S.S. Egypt to Alexandria on December 1 would not be forwarded to Lord Allenby until December 5. Because word of the arrival of these refugees came to Allenby so late, he had no opportunity to protest. In a frustrated telegram sent off the following day, Allenby complained that he could only have prevented their landing in Alexandria by use of martial law, in which case the shipping company could have sued Bentinck in Athens for the expense of the journey. Allenby assumed that if he had stopped their arrival with such strong measures, not only would the British government be liable for a financial claim from the shipping company, but the Turkish refugees would be returned to Athens, where the Greek government would likely have sent them back to Turkey. Thus, begrudgingly, he put the destitute members of the party in a dismantled military camp. He then kicked them out ten at a time, giving them 35 piastres a day for 10 days. In order to avoid them starving to death on the streets of Egypt, Allenby requested permission to spend up to £500 Egyptian on their maintenance.⁴¹¹ Though the expenditure was approved, Rendel wrote on the file, “We have been forced by circumstances to abandon so many people who relied on our assistance that there would be nothing unreasonable in abandoning these Turks now.”⁴¹² It was interesting logic: that because the British had abandoned so many refugees, why not abandon more? Any rationale that would minimize expenses on refugees would work.

Tarık Mümtaz, in contrast, painted a slightly rosier picture of the gurbet kafilesi’s stay in Egypt. He described the group being put up in a nice hotel, given all kinds of delicious foods and actually being hosted quite lavishly due to British

⁴¹¹ Allenby to FO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7960, E13706, 139, TNA.

⁴¹² Rendel, Handwritten note, Dec 7, 1922, FO 371/7960, E13706, 137, TNA.

hospitality and that of other friends of the group.⁴¹³ We can, however, at this point, be relatively certain that Tarık Mümtaz was not with the group in Egypt as he was in Bulgaria. This means that all of his descriptions of nice hotels and meals were told to him after the fact by other members of the group. One motive that the members of this group (or Tarık Mümtaz himself) may have for overstating their reception in Egypt could be to make it seem like they were valued guests of the British. It is, after all, more glamorous to imagine oneself to be hosted in a fine hotel befitting one's station as an important ally to the British Empire, than to imagine oneself as a destitute refugee thrown in a military barracks and given scraps to live off. On the other hand, Allenby could not very well inform the treasury that he had spent money on nice accommodations for this group, so he may have downplayed, to a certain extent, what he did for them. It is probably more likely, however, that other members of the *gurbet kafilesi* told Tarık Mümtaz a tall tale about their time in Egypt.

Tarık Mümtaz also mentions that the longer the group was in Egypt, the more the group came to look like “a women's bathhouse”⁴¹⁴ with all the bickering and gossip. This is, perhaps, when it becomes clear how much this group of people actually had different ideas about politics, the war, and the Istanbul and Ankara governments. The group started breaking into different political camps and arguing amongst each other, incorporating slander and gossip about other people they knew. Tarık Mümtaz wrote that it got so bad that the British threatened to cut them off financially if they didn't stop fighting amongst themselves.⁴¹⁵ Though, based on British documents, it seems unlikely that they cared how much the group was fighting, just how expensive they had become.

⁴¹³ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 48.

⁴¹⁴ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 49.

⁴¹⁵ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 49.

What the British did, however, care about was the reaction of the Egyptian population to the British sheltering this group. Tarık Mümtaz mentioned that there was a large Turkish colony in Alexandria that was aligned with Ankara and saw this group as traitors to the Nationalist cause.⁴¹⁶ Allenby, in his telegram, specifically mentioned that the “local population is hostile to these refugees on the ground that they have assisted us against [the] Kemalists.”⁴¹⁷ A nationalist uprising in Egypt had broken out in 1919, forcing the British to end the British Protectorate and grant nominal independence. There were certainly pro-Turkish elements within the Egyptian population and some degree of sympathy between Turkish and Egyptian nationalist movements.⁴¹⁸ Thus the landing of anti-Nationalist Turks in Egypt who had allied themselves with the British sparked an outcry from the Egyptian press, threatening Britain's already strained control over Egypt.

Allenby immediately began looking for a place to send these refugees who he had so begrudgingly accepted despite the negative political optics. He wrote to British Mandate authorities in Jerusalem and Baghdad and then asked whether mandatory authorities in Transjordan might take them off his hands.⁴¹⁹ When his pleas yielded no results, he asked the War Office if the League of Nations might step in, to which the War Office replied: “League of Nations are already experiencing utmost difficulty in finding refuge for Russian and Armenian refugees from Constantinople and there is no chance of their being able to help these Turks.”⁴²⁰ He did succeed in finding financial support for a Hilmi Emer Bey through the Anglican church. Bishop Llewellyn Gwynne, Anglican Bishop of Egypt and Sudan, advocated

⁴¹⁶ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 47.

⁴¹⁷ Allenby to FO, Dec 6, 1922, FO 371/7960, E13706, 139, TNA.

⁴¹⁸ Gifford, *Britain in Egypt: Egyptian Nationalism and Imperial Strategy, 1919-1931*, 131-132; MacArthur-Seal, *Britain's Levantine Empire*, 149.

⁴¹⁹ Lord Allenby, Dec 19, 1922, FO 1103/996, TNA.

⁴²⁰ WO to Allenby, Dec 22, 1922, WO 106/1430, TNA.

for this man to be allowed to enter England with his passage paid for by Woodbrook College in Birmingham, which would guarantee his maintenance.⁴²¹ But few others of this group were able to find such support.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in the Mediterranean, questions were being asked about this group. In Turkey, the Ankara government wasted no time sequestering the property of anti-Nationalists in line with the abandoned property law.⁴²² While in Athens, Greek police arrested an “Atıf Bey,”⁴²³ who had been evacuated with the rest of the group and then arrested in Piraeus by the Greek police and held in custody. He admitted to being a member of the Grand National Assembly in Ankara, and the British Foreign Office stated that he was one of the men who were tried for their part in the Armenian massacres and then exiled to Malta before being released in 1921.⁴²⁴ The Dutch legation intervened in the matter on behalf of Ankara, and, because the man in question was held on suspicion but not charged, the Dutch were able to advocate for his release. In late January 1923, he was able to leave for Sofia.⁴²⁵ While the journeys of this man beg many questions that this study will not be able to answer,⁴²⁶ what is relevant to the journey of the rest of the Turkish refugees, is that the British started to be even more suspicious about who they had taken under their

⁴²¹ Lord Allenby, Dec 18, 1922, FO 1103/996, TNA.

⁴²² HQ Constantinople to WO, Dec 9, 1922, WO 106/1430, TNA.

⁴²³ There are two “Atıf Bey”s on the list of Turks who were exiled to Malta for their part in the Armenian massacres, one Atıf Kamçıl and one Mehmet Atıf. Talha Barak Ünlü’s master’s thesis on Atıf Kamçıl mentions nothing about an escape to Greece and an arrest in 1922 and even notes that he was receiving a civil servant salary in October 1922, “II. Meşrutiyet ve Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemlerinde İttihatçı Bir Fedai ve Milletvekili Atıf Kamçıl,” 132. We might infer then that the gentleman in question was likely Mehmet Atıf Bey, but as little is known about him this cannot be confirmed. There were four members of the GNA bearing the name “Atıf,” two of which were “Mehmet Atıf,” but there is sparse information about either of them and no apparent information linking either of them to the Malta exiles. Ottoman documents about this arrest refer to him only as “Atıf Bey,” offering no further information about him.

⁴²⁴ Bentinck to FO, Dec 11, 1922, FO 371/7961, E13892, 199, TNA.

⁴²⁵ HR.İM.. 48/1, Feb 2, 1923, BOA.

⁴²⁶ Not least among them: Who was “Atıf Bey?” See above footnote. Why was he in Greece at this point? What caused him to flee with the *muhالیfat*? If he fled because he feared retribution from Ankara, why would Ankara have the Dutch intervene on his behalf?

protection. A handwritten note on the telegram file in question worried, “If the party sent from Constantinople to Dedegatch, on account of whose escape from the Kemalists and subsequent maintenance in Egypt we have incurred heavy expenses, include many such individuals we shall look somewhat foolish.”⁴²⁷ While the British clearly knew some of the more prominent members of the Turkish refugee group they had evacuated across the Mediterranean, it is possible that they had neither the time nor the resources to adequately confirm the identities of all 145 people. And then, as a number of people disembarked at Dedeğaç and Piraeus and others joined the party, they could hardly be sure of the backgrounds of all the people they were transporting with such haste. If some of them turned out to be criminals, spies, or politically anti-British, then the optics of transporting them at such expense could blow up in the face of the British Empire.

As time went on, the situation for refugees in Egypt became more dire. By late January, Lord Allenby wrote to Constantinople saying,

It is quite impracticable to permit further refugees from Constantinople to land in Egypt, as those already there are in a state of acute destitution. The only method of dealing with fresh arrivals would be to place them in concentration camps but neither camps nor necessary personnel are available.⁴²⁸

Allenby was able to secure a small amount of money from King Fuad, the Egyptian monarch, through the Ministry of Wakfs for the relief of Turkish refugees to save them from “immediate destitution,”⁴²⁹ but only on the condition that they would be removed from Egypt. Lucky for Allenby, the gurbet kafilesi would soon move on and leave him with a few less refugees to support.

⁴²⁷ Handwritten note, E13892, FO 371/7961, 199, TNA.

⁴²⁸ Lord Allenby to Constantinople, Jan 29, 1923, FO 1103/710, TNA.

⁴²⁹ Allenby to FO, Apr 23, 1923, FO 371/9126, E4111, 25, TNA.

4.4 Journey to the Hejaz

Sultan Vahdeddin, while he was in Malta after his escape from Istanbul, received an invitation from King Hussein of the Hejaz to come visit the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. While Vahdeddin accepted the invitation, the dynamics were not without tension, as Hussein, as the Sherif of Mecca, had allied himself with the British against the Ottomans, and now, Vahdeddin, the exiled Sultan of a lost empire, would have to take advantage of his hospitality.⁴³⁰ On his way to the Hejaz, Vahdeddin and his entourage from Malta (which may have by this time included Tarık Mümtaz), stopped in Suez. Many of the members of the group who were under the care of the British, including Rıza Tevfik, traveled from Cairo to see the Sultan on his way. Whereas Rıza Tevfik says little about this visit, Tarık Mümtaz's version of events highlights Rıza Tevfik's role in moving the gurbet kafilesi to the next destination on their journey.

King Hussein's son, Abdullah, was on his way to London to advocate to the British that he should be given the throne of Transjordan. On his way, he went to Cairo where he met with the group of exiles, particularly Rıza Tevfik, who had been a friend of Abdullah since they had served in the Ottoman Parliament together.⁴³¹ Abdullah then accompanied the group to meet the Sultan, where Abdullah assured the Sultan of his father's hospitality. According to Tarık Mümtaz, when the Sultan saw Rıza Tevfik, he was overjoyed, as Rıza Tevfik was a close friend of his and contributed significantly to uplifting the Sultan's mood. Vahdeddin asked if Rıza Tevfik might join him and his entourage in their journey to the Hejaz, but Rıza Tevfik noted that he had his family with him in Egypt and he could hardly leave

⁴³⁰ Tarık Mümtaz writes that a few people warned Vahdeddin that the Hashemites were simply trying to use him to validate and support their claims to the thrones of Arabia, Transjordan and Iraq. *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 66.

⁴³¹ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 54; Tevfik, 359.

them behind again.⁴³² Abdullah, seeing the Sultan's face fall when Rıza Tevfik said that he could not join, decided to invite the entire party to the Hejaz, wives and all. At this the Sultan and the group rejoiced. A boat would be rented to take the gurbet kafiləsi down the Suez Canal to the Red Sea to Jeddah, following the path of the Sultan's entourage.⁴³³

Allenby, likely with a sigh of relief, happily granted this group passes to travel to the Hejaz, and perhaps believed that he had gotten rid of them. King Hussein, true to his word, was an excellent host, sparing no expense to host the Sultan and his now larger-than-anticipated entourage, and the beautiful memory of their trip to the holy cities would certainly have a long-term impact on the gurbet kafiləsi.⁴³⁴ But the Hejaz did not have a state budget, so all money spent on this lavish trip came straight out of King Hussein's pocket. According to Tarık Mümtaz, King Hussein was also giving sums of money and goods to each member of the group based on their previous rank in the Ottoman government. At the same time, King Hussein was actively trying to fight off the Wahhabists, a considerable difficulty and expense in and of itself, and a battle he would eventually lose. Tarık Mümtaz remembered that on their trip, they visited the city of Taif, and then as soon as the group left, the Wahhabists conquered the city.⁴³⁵

By March, however, the Turks still in the Hejaz had overstayed their welcome. It is not clear exactly when the Sultan left the Hejaz for San Remo, but the British continued to send refugees who fell under the category of "compromised Turk" to join the gurbet kafiləsi in the Hejaz, adding stragglers who were not present

⁴³² He had been forced to leave them behind when he escaped Istanbul because he didn't have the money to get them on the S.S. Egypt, but then later sent for them.

⁴³³ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 73-75.

⁴³⁴ Both Tarık Mümtaz and Rıza Tevfik would write about this part of the trip extensively, Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 81-89, Tevfik, 365-379.

⁴³⁵ Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 90.

at the original invitation from Abdullah. A telegram from the British Vice Consul in Jeddah, Sir Laurence Barton Grafftey-Smith, to the Foreign Office notes that there was an original batch of 30 refugees who were accepted by King Hussein and given permission to come to the Hejaz on December 19, but that there was a later batch of refugees who “state they never asked to go to Hedjaz, and never saw Arab agent, and King Hussein considers their transport to Hedjaz unjustifiable.”⁴³⁶ The British had ended up sending another 75 refugees to the Hejaz in addition to the original 30 refugees who were originally invited,⁴³⁷ and they quickly became a strain on King Hussein’s meager budget and he began to demand that the British allow them to return to Egypt.

But because Allenby had been so adamant that no Turkish refugees should be given visas to go to Egypt, citing the anger of the Egyptian population at the arrival of the anti-Nationalists as well as refugee overcrowding, the British Vice Consul in Jeddah could not give the approval for any of these people to return without Allenby’s express permission. He wrote a lengthy letter to Allenby describing the circumstances of these people saying,

The conditions in which they live in Mecca appear to be of the most miserable. They have no money and no occupation, and they suffer much from the climate. King Hussein has, since their arrival, doled out to each of them a total of Turkish Piastres 440... thus they depend mainly upon the charity of the Egyptian Tekieh, which they share with indigent negroes and with the mendicants of Mecca, for their sustenance. The King has no desire to find employment for Turkish ex-officers and officials; were his racial prejudices less keen, his own Civil Services and Army are many months in arrears of their inconsiderable pay, while little opportunity offers for the employment of even highly qualified Engineers in a country whose ruler prohibits the importation of any sort of machinery. This country has no industry, other than the exploitation of Pilgrims. It is in no way suited to be a refuge or a labour-market for a large contingent of Turkish ex-Government employees.”⁴³⁸

⁴³⁶ Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to FO, April 27/April 30, 1923, FO 1103/1005, TNA.

⁴³⁷ Oliphant to the Secretary of the Treasury, Apr 21, 1923, FO 371/9126, E3820, 11, TNA.

⁴³⁸ Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to Allenby, March 22, 1923, FO 371/9125, E3604, 209-210, TNA.

This grim picture painted by Grafftey-Smith was meant to illustrate the unsustainability of leaving these people where they were. He then, like Bentinck in Greece, made reference to their relationship with the British:

“I am not aware how well-founded is their frequent assumption that friendliness to Great Britain is the cause of their present misfortunes, but this assumption, however erroneous, and the fact that their departure from Constantinople appears to have been originally arranged by the British authorities constrain me to point out that their present lot is suggestive rather of punishment than of reward.”⁴³⁹

Grafftey-Smith then went on to discuss a particular subset of this group requesting assistance leaving the Hejaz. Lieut. Colonel Fettah Bey, a former member of the Caliphal Army, and his three companions Mamoud Shoukry, Roshan Othman, and Ibrahim Mohammed,⁴⁴⁰ originally approached Grafftey-Smith in Jeddah asking for free passage to Egypt, from which the Greek Consul in Alexandria was supposedly going to arrange for their transport to Greece. Grafftey-Smith replied that passage on British expense would be absolutely out of the question, after which King Hussein offered to pay for their transport to Egypt out of his own pocket. So, desperate to rid himself of these refugees, King Hussein was willing to pay for their travel if only they could cease to be his problem. He then “bombarded” Grafftey-Smith with telephone calls, demanding that he grant them visas to return to Egypt, but because Allenby had categorically forbidden the “landing of indigent Turks in Egypt,” Grafftey-Smith had so far not granted them. He noted, “This has made the King, as might be expected, furious.”⁴⁴¹

⁴³⁹ Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to Allenby, March 22, 1923, FO 371/9125, E3604, 210, TNA.

⁴⁴⁰ We cannot say for certain who these three people were, they were certainly not on the 150ers list with Fettah Bey, and their names seem more Arabic than Turkish, although that could simply be the Anglophone transliteration. We see their names mentioned nowhere else and there is no mention of their nationality status.

⁴⁴¹ Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to Allenby, March 22, 1923, FO 371/9125, E3604, 210-211, TNA.

For a quick aside, Tarık Mümtaz described Fettah Bey as a sweet and funny man who was always telling silly stories. While they were in Alexandria, he apparently decided to sell baklava on the street to make a bit of money but ended up eating the whole tray himself. He would eventually end up in Aleppo, from where he would regularly send letters to Vahddedin in San Remo filled with silly entertaining stories which often didn't make sense but would always brighten the ex-Sultan's day, and he would always end his letters with a plea for money.⁴⁴² But, needless to say, the Greek government did not end up taking him in.

King Hussein stated that Fettah Bey and his companions were part of the group of 75 Turkish refugees whose entrance into the Hejaz he never actually approved. Though he approved the initial group invited in December, further Turkish refugees had been sent to him from Egypt. Grafftey-Smith thought this may have been a miscommunication between King Hussein and British authorities,

But it is certain that King Hussein never intended to do more than allow these Turks to enter the Hejaz. He did not guarantee hospitality or maintenance, and the wishes of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior are of little weight against his conviction that, if a man, arriving in the Hejaz from Egypt, cannot make a living here, and if the Hashemite Government pays his passage back to Egypt, that man should not be refused permission to depart.⁴⁴³

The hesitancy to grant these people visas, despite the fact that their transport was paid for, reflects the new era of travel controls the world had entered into. King Hussein and Grafftey-Smith could not wrap their heads around why, if these refugees could not possibly support themselves in the Hejaz, and the King had decided to pay for them to leave, the British would deny permission, as it seemed to cost them nothing to allow these people to transit. But in the era of the post-war stateless refugee, the British had come to fear that they would be stuck with these people, as

⁴⁴² Göztepe, *Gurbet Cehenneminde*, 183-187.

⁴⁴³ Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to Allenby, March 22, 1923, FO 371/9125, E3604, 211, TNA.

they had no state to be deported or repatriated to. Thus, the movement of stateless people became a game of “hot potato” for surrounding states, wherein they would often grant them travel documents to leave, but rarely permission to enter.

Grafftey-Smith understood that the British government didn’t want to set a precedent that all the Turkish refugees in the Hejaz could return to Egypt and was mindful that this might be why Allenby was so hesitant to allow them to enter. But he assured Allenby that local authorities did not believe that the gurbet kafilesi would leave “en bloc” until after the Hajj, which would be in July and August of that year. He also noted that he would endorse “transit-visas” for any of the refugees who could show proof that they had the means of going somewhere else from Egypt (a vague mention of the Greek government paying their way would not suffice). The fact that someone would have to show proof that they would be moving on from Egypt before being granted a “transit-visa” illustrates how little difference there was in practice between different kinds of paperwork that allowed a person to enter a country at that time. The British were aware that any permission granted to enter Egypt could lead these refugees to staying there—a prospect that they wanted to be careful to avoid. Grafftey-Smith ended his letter pleading,

I earnestly hope that I may be spared the most unpleasant task of endeavoring to compel King Hussein to support Turks who neither desire, nor are by him desired, to stay in the Hejaz, and I trust that the Egyptian Government may see fit to relax their restrictions on immigration as to allow these unfortunates to escape from the rat-trap wherein they find themselves at present, and to look for work where some hope of finding work exists.”⁴⁴⁴

After significant pleading and “bombarding,” the Treasury acknowledged that more money would have to be spent on settling these people, as the “rat-trap” of their statelessness was indeed the responsibility of the British. The Treasury noted,

⁴⁴⁴ Grafftey-Smith (Jeddah) to Allenby, March 22, 1923, FO 371/9125, E3604, 212, TNA.

though, that their initial evacuation from Constantinople may have been “premature.”⁴⁴⁵ This comment likely came from Oliphant’s note to the Colonial Office, which broke this group up into two categories: people who played important political roles in Istanbul who were likely in need of evacuation and “persons of no particular importance whose flight was due to terror.”⁴⁴⁶ The idea would be floated in the coming months as the conference at Lausanne wrapped up that the general amnesty would cover many of these people, or at least that the British might be able to advocate for their return. Regardless, due to their flight without passports issued in the name of the GNA, these people would not be able to return to Turkey in the near future, and in the meantime, they would have to go somewhere.

By late April, the Treasury believed that the 30 people that King Hussein had been particularly anxious to get rid of had been sent or shortly would be sent at his expense to Egypt—though it seems that there was further holdup as the British discussed where they would go. The Treasury seemed to think that the other 75 ought to be sent back to Egypt on King Hussein’s expense as well, and from there sent perhaps either to Palestine or Cyprus, with the understanding that they be told that the British would not support them indefinitely. The Treasury also assumed that the remainder of “the original 130 refugees” were now settled “outside British Control or liability.”⁴⁴⁷ The number 130 we can perhaps assume was taken from the number of people on the ship from Piraeus to Alexandria, as the British in Egypt did not seem to take great pains to note how many Turkish refugees they sent to the Hejaz, though the idea that British authorities were able to ensure that all the people in transit were in fact the same people they had evacuated from Istanbul is a bit improbable.

⁴⁴⁵ Treasury to FO, April 24, 1923, FO 371/9126, E4256, 28, TNA.

⁴⁴⁶ Oliphant to CO, Apr 21, 1923, FO 371/9126, E3820, 20, TNA.

⁴⁴⁷ Treasury to FO, April 24, 1923, FO 371/9126, E4256, 28 (backside), TNA.

Unfortunately, many of the Foreign Office records regarding the movement of these people from April of 1922 on were not retained in full. Thus, our information about the remaining movements of the gurbet kafilesi comes only from telegram summaries, most of which were marked with a red “NOT KEPT” stamp. There is also, unfortunately, little in the way of memoir literature about this particular phase of the gurbet kafilesi. Tarık Mümtaz likely returned with the Sultan to San Remo, and Rıza Tevfik, who would move on to Jordan at the invitation of his friend, King Abdullah,⁴⁴⁸ says nothing about this part of the journey. It is also possible that the most famous of the refugees, and thus those most likely to leave a followable paper trail, had found places to go or made arrangements for themselves by this point, leaving mostly a group of people who were hard even for the British at the time to identify.

In May, as they were debating what to do with the refugees still in the Hejaz, Grafftey-Smith wrote to the Foreign Office noting that the immediate issue was the twenty-four refugees who decided not to stay for the Hajj. King Hussein had arranged temporary hospitality for the rest until the end of the pilgrimage, so their fate could be discussed in a few months’ time. The fact that Grafftey-Smith was still corresponding with the Foreign Office about these twenty-four people illustrates that they had not yet left the Hejaz, and he was waiting to grant them permission to leave to make sure that their destination was confirmed and they would not remain in Egypt. The plan was clearly that they be moved to Cyprus, but Grafftey-Smith argued that simply resettling these people in Cyprus would not end the question of British responsibility for them. He suggested instead that they be “allowed to scatter”

⁴⁴⁸ Özoğlu, 49.

to Salonica or Bulgaria, safely outside the British Empire and outside British responsibility.⁴⁴⁹

It seems, though, that by early June the group had made it to Cyprus. The Colonial Office took an immediate account of them and wrote to the Foreign Office that “it is quite clear that these people would be unable to obtain employment on the Island and would require relief as long as they remained.”⁴⁵⁰ A subsequent telegram stated that 17 (of the presumably 24) refugees were entirely destitute and pointed out that there was no possibility that they would become self-supporting, thus the Colonial Office requested money from the Treasury for their maintenance and asked that they be moved as soon as possible.⁴⁵¹ Though it was likely hoped that Cyprus, being a British colony with a sizable Turkish minority, would be a place where former Turkish civil servants might find employment, these hopes were quickly dashed by the Colonial Office. Many of gurbet kafilesi, having just a year earlier been respectable people in the Ottoman government, would be reduced to unemployable refugees that no one wanted to take in.

So, the British decided to take another approach. They would beg the Ankara government to take these people back. Henderson, in Istanbul, requested a list of the compromised Turkish refugees which he would take to Adnan Bey to plead that they be allowed to return. He wrote, “There is little hope, however, that any may be able to return, as Turks are stringently enforcing regulation prohibiting return of any Turks who left Turkey without Turkish passport.”⁴⁵² Thus, despite the warming relations between the British and the Ankara government as the Treaty of Lausanne was being finalized, it was the travel documents that these people carried (or didn’t

⁴⁴⁹ Grafftey-Smith to FO, May 11/May 12, 1923, FO 1103/1005, TNA.

⁴⁵⁰ CO to FO, June 6/June 7, 1923, FO 1103/1005, TNA.

⁴⁵¹ CO to FO, June 6/June 7, 1923, FO 1103/1005, TNA.

⁴⁵² Henderson to FO, June 26/July 2, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

carry) that drove the nail into their coffin of statelessness and made it difficult for the British to lobby for their return.

The Foreign Office submitted this list to Henderson nonetheless. Though it is unclear exactly how many names were on the list, Henderson later wrote back to the Foreign Office for clarification on who twenty-three of these refugees were.⁴⁵³ This perhaps illustrates that many of the remaining refugees in British care weren't particularly high-profile exiles. While Henderson was trying to figure out who some of these people were and entering into discussions with Adnan Bey about whether they would be allowed back, a telegram came from the Colonial Office which stated that some of the refugees in Cyprus were willing to undertake the risk of being repatriated to Constantinople.⁴⁵⁴ It is unclear who those particular people were, and whether it was the fact that their *gurbet* had been so long and difficult that they thought it might be better to take their chances in returning to Turkey, or that they thought perhaps their crimes were not so bad as to garner a death sentence from Ankara, or a mix of both.

By early August, Henderson reported that Adnan Bey had agreed to transmit the list of Turkish exiles in Cyprus to the Ministry of the Interior, but said that no exception would be made for them until the publication of the list of 150 people who would not be given amnesty. Henderson promised to discuss the matter with Ismet Pasha as he passed through Istanbul.⁴⁵⁵ At the same time, the Hajj was finishing up in the Hejaz, raising again the question of the members of the *gurbet kafiləsi* who had remained for the pilgrimage, while, in Cyprus, the Colonial Office began running out of money that the Treasury had allotted for the maintenance of Turkish refugees on

⁴⁵³ Henderson to FO, July 16/July 23, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁴⁵⁴ CO to FO, July 31, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁴⁵⁵ Henderson to FO, Aug 8/Aug 13, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

the island.⁴⁵⁶ The Treasury sanctioned more money for the support of these refugees but expressed that the Foreign Office should work harder to lobby the Turkish government to ensure that these refugees would be part of the general amnesty.⁴⁵⁷ But by the end of September, Foreign Office administrators had to admit that “There is no prospect of admission of refugees to Constantinople.”⁴⁵⁸

Though the British were no closer to entirely ridding themselves of these refugees, their numbers had dwindled, as many made their own way to other places or found support elsewhere. The consulate in Jeddah submitted a list of 21 refugees still in the Hejaz at the end of September, noting that some had left for other places recently (presumably places outside the British Empire), and three or four were still being supported by King Hussein “who, however, constantly enquires why matter is not definitely settled.”⁴⁵⁹ Indeed, his frustration was understandable. The settlement of these refugees was clearly nowhere near a priority for the Foreign Office and the slow pace of their movement and unwillingness to spend money would force most of the refugees to fend for themselves or look for support elsewhere. An update from Jeddah at the end of November stated, “One of refugees left for Syria recently; one has died, and seven others have secured visas for Syria and raised money for their journey, and left Jeddah on 22nd November.”⁴⁶⁰ By December, there were only 12 left in the Hejaz after “a certain number of the refugees [had] already died, presumably from starvation.”⁴⁶¹ The Colonial Office would then, finally, convince

⁴⁵⁶ CO to FO, Aug 27/Aug 28, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁴⁵⁷ Treasury to FO, Sept 4, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁴⁵⁸ Bullard (Jeddah) to FO, Sept 24/Sept 25, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁴⁵⁹ Bullard (Jeddah) to FO, Sept 24/Sept 25, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁴⁶⁰ Bullard (Jeddah) to FO, Nov 22/Dec 5, 1923, FO 1103/1007, TNA.

⁴⁶¹ Oliphant to the Secretary to the Treasury, Dec 6, 1923, FO 371/9126, E11445, 63, TNA.

the Commissioner for Palestine to accept Turkish refugees “until they find means of supporting themselves or are disposed of elsewhere.”⁴⁶²

4.5 Long-term gurbet

The members of the gurbet kafilesi would continue to struggle to find places where they could make a living. As a group of largely civil servants, government officials, and intellectuals, they had few applicable skills that could earn them a living in countries where they did not speak the local language. Many of this group were also older, minimizing their ability to do physical labor. And while many of them had owned property or possessed assets in Turkey, these were seized by the Turkish government shortly after their flight, leaving most of them with few resources with which to build new lives. While many of them would find ways to get by, League of Nations archives are filled with letters from destitute Turkish refugees pleading for financial aid.

The list of 150ers would be published in January 1924, and in May 1927, these 150 people would be officially stripped of their Turkish citizenship. Shortly following that, in 1928, Nansen passports would be extended to the 150ers, along with Assyrians and Assyro-Chaldaeans who had been forced to leave Turkey in 1922. While the extension of the official legal title of “refugee” would be extended to any stateless person of Assyrian origin quite broadly, only the 150 Turks on the 150ers list would be officially recognized as refugees.⁴⁶³ The definition of refugeehood, tightly tied to statelessness, would become even more strict as more and more people became stateless. A League official, during the discussions about extending refugee recognition, stated, “The mere fact that certain classes of persons

⁴⁶² CO to FO, Dec 24/Dec 27, 1923, FO 1103/1007, TNA.

⁴⁶³ Hathaway, 356.

are without the protection of any national Government is not sufficient to make them refugees; for on that theory all classes of persons without nationality would have to be included.”⁴⁶⁴ Thus those who were not on the list of 150ers, even if they were essentially stateless, would not be legally recognized as refugees and would not be eligible for Nansen passports or League of Nations aid.

After the list of 150ers was published, those whose names were on the list would know that their exile would be long-term. But many whose names were not on the list would also not return to Turkey. Particularly in Greece, many Muslims (both Circassian and Turkish) who had collaborated with Greek administration in Smyrna and Western Thrace, who then left with the Greek army, would remain in Greece. Dr. Nurreddin Talat, an ear, nose, and throat doctor who was hired by the Greeks to work at a military hospital in Uşak during the war, left with the Greek army and moved to Athens in 1922. He asked for compensation or a job with the Greek government in order to provide for his family, but the Greek government replied that they had no budget to support him. He then moved to Xanthi, where he tried to open his own practice, but he said that his Greek colleagues prevented him from getting any patients. He wrote to the Nansen office in 1932, requesting help getting to either Syria or French North Africa (as he spoke both French and Arabic), where he hoped he might be able to make a living and support his family.⁴⁶⁵ He received a boilerplate response from the League, identical to those that many in his situation received, stating that they could not help him because he was not on the list of 150ers,⁴⁶⁶ though his request was forwarded to Geneva where a League official noted that

⁴⁶⁴ Comnene, quoted in Hathaway, 355.

⁴⁶⁵ Nurreddin Talat to Kotelnikon, Aug 31, 1932, S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 50, UNAG.

⁴⁶⁶ Kotelnikon to Nurreddin Talat, Sept 4, 1932, S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 60, UNAG.

perhaps they should investigate the issue of his nationality.⁴⁶⁷ It is not clear whether or not Dr. Nurreddin Talat tried to contact any Turkish representatives to see if he might be able to return to Turkey, and if he did, on precisely what grounds this request was rejected. What is clear is that by 1932 he was quite convinced that a return to Turkey was not a viable option, despite the fact that he was not on the 150ers list. But to the League, because he was not on the list, his statelessness was not officially recognized, and he was thus not eligible for a Nansen passport or funds earmarked for Turkish refugees. It is unclear whether or not Dr. Nurreddin Talat made it out of Greece and if so to where, but his story would exemplify the struggle of the unrecognized stateless refugee.

The League got so many letters like this one, from Turks and Circassians not on the 150ers list, that they asked the League representative to Greece to tell these people to stop sending them, as there was nothing the League could do to help.⁴⁶⁸ The strictness of the extension of refugee status to the 150ers would mean that while many who were not on the list would feel as if they were still stateless, though theoretically they were allowed to return to Turkey, because their statelessness was not internationally recognized, they would fall even deeper into the cracks of nationality than those who were officially stateless.

Though those on the 150ers list would have access to Nansen passports and a very small amount of financial aid from the League, statelessness would be no walk in the park for them either. Said Molla, an opposition newspaper owner and another member of the gurbet kafiləsi who left on British laissez-passer and found himself on a long journey around the Mediterranean, would eventually end up in Cyprus and ask

⁴⁶⁷ Secretary General to Kotelnikon, Sept 12, 1932, S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 49, UNAG.

⁴⁶⁸ Secretary General to Kotelnikon, Sept 3, 1932, S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 57, UNAG.

to be made Chief Kadi (judge in an Islamic court) of Cyprus. In his application, he explained that, in his exile, the Turkish government had made attempts to arrest him while he was in Europe, and perhaps would have executed him like they did to Ali Kemal. He also said that the Turkish government acted through Turkish Consuls abroad and “annoyed me in countries outside of Turkey with such intrigues and tragedies that if I attempt to give a picture of them, they would present very sad pages.”⁴⁶⁹ He went on to say that he believed the Turkish Consul in Cyprus was plotting against him and that any negative things the Colonial Office had heard about him likely stemmed from that. Though at first glance these words may seem like the imagination of an eccentric man, the idea that Ankara, through Turkish Consuls, had sought to make life hard for Turkish political refugees was echoed by other letters. Mustafa Sabri Efendi, formerly the Şeyhülislam, also mentioned to the League that the Turkish government engaged in many “intrigues” through Turkish Consuls to make life more difficult for him, including pressuring the Romanian government into denying him permission to enter despite the fact that his wife owned property in Romania.⁴⁷⁰

While virtually all those writing to the League for aid had financial problems due to their exile, many also expressed social problems living in places where customs and religions were different. Osman Nuri, former counselor for the Ministry of the Interior, wrote to the League explaining that he lived in utter misery in Greece. A Greek chauffeur had “kidnapped” his wife—meaning she ran away with him—and he was kept from seeing his child in defiance of Muslim law. He begged for the League’s help to leave for Bulgaria or Italy with his child.

⁴⁶⁹ Said Molla to Chamberlain, Dec 11, 1925, CO 67/216/3, 16, TNA.

⁴⁷⁰ Mustafa Sabri to the League of Nations, S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 131, UNAG.

According to Edhem the Circassian, in 1928, 37 of the 150ers were in Greece, 32 in Romania, 30 in Syria, 14 in Egypt, 5 in Bulgaria, 5 in Iraq, 3 in the Hejaz, 3 in Transjordan, 3 in Nice, 2 in Paris, 2 in Albania, and 11 had died.⁴⁷¹ For the Turks in Greece, who formed the largest group and also the group most vocally requesting aid from the League, the warming of relations between Greece and Turkey, beginning with the Ankara Convention of 1930, would make their position as anti-Kemalists more precarious. Many of their letters expressed the fear that, as Greece and Turkey had commenced friendly relations, they would no longer be welcome in Greece. They believed that the political climate had become dangerous for them. Many of them asked to be granted Nansen passports and visas for Syria where they believed they would be safer and could also work to make a living, but League officials believed that there was little likelihood that they would be able to get entry visas for Syria. There was a labor crisis everywhere stemming from the global economic depression and this had led French Mandate authorities to limit immigration.⁴⁷² Visa limits would more and more be linked to economic conditions, making the plight of stateless people even harder.

The League of Turkish Refugees, established in Greece to advocate for this group (both those on the list and those not on it), offers an interesting parallel to the Executive Plenipotentiary Commission of Absent Constantinopolitans (EPCAC), an advocacy group for Greeks of Istanbul who, in theory, had the right to remain in Istanbul and retain their property, but because they left without Turkish passports, were denied the right to return.⁴⁷³ Both groups were composed largely of people who

⁴⁷¹ Cherkas Edhem to the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, Jan 28, 1928, C1423-319-R-419-2-34-1, International Labour Office Refugees Service - Turkish Refugees (Heimatlos) - Edhem Beg Cherkas [Cherkas], Baghdad, requesting Assistance, pg. 5, UNAG.

⁴⁷² Secretary General to Kotelnikon, April 4, 1932, S545-4-4, Nansen International Office for Refugee - Turkish Refugees, pg. 69, UNAG.

⁴⁷³ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 278-330

left what would become the Turkish Republic in late 1922, both groups were formed in Greece during roughly the same time period, both were composed of people who had fallen through the cracks in nationality and refugee programs and sought to advocate for themselves internationally, and both groups would be devastated by the 1930 Ankara convention and subsequent warming relations between Greece and Turkey. EPCAC's cause would be lost after the convention as Greece would agree that they would lose their right to return.⁴⁷⁴ For the League of Turkish Refugees, the amicable relationship between Greece and Turkey would raise the specter that they could be deported from Greece, or at the very least that the Greek government's sympathy to their cause would wane, a fear that would prove to be somewhat warranted.

There are, however, obvious differences between the circumstances of these groups, as the absent Cosmopolitans would be able to get Greek citizenship after the Ankara Convention in 1930, though they were not eligible for refugee programs in Greece for the first few years due to the fact that they were theoretically "unchangeable," so while they would not get aid available to "exchanged" Greek refugees, they would not, legally speaking, remain stateless after their fate was settled.⁴⁷⁵ The EPCAC and the League of Turkish Refugees would also advocate for different things, while both would lobby for the restoration of their property in Turkey or compensation for it, EPCAC advocated for its members to be able to return to Istanbul while the Turkish Refugees pleaded to be able to go elsewhere. The League of Turkish Refugees was also composed of two different groups with very different statuses: those who were on the 150ers list, whose statelessness was internationally recognized, making them theoretically eligible for League refugee

⁴⁷⁴ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 308.

⁴⁷⁵ Kamouzis, *Greeks in Turkey*, 308.

programs, and those whose names were not on the list, who would be entitled to nothing.

In the negotiations over the Ankara agreement, the Turkish government would demand that the 150ers who had been living in Western Thrace be expelled, likely due to their encouragement of anti-Kemalism amongst West Thracian Muslims. The Greek government would concede and remove those of the 150ers who were in Western Thrace to Athens in March of 1931, providing a one-time relocation allowance of 11,875 drachma. They were, however, allowed to stay in Greece in acknowledgement of their assistance to the Greek government.⁴⁷⁶

In 1938 the 150ers would be offered amnesty by the Turkish Republic and would be allowed to return to Turkey. Of those who were still alive, many elected to return, reclaim their Turkish citizenship, and live out the rest of their lives in Turkey.⁴⁷⁷ While it is hard to say what happened to those of the *gurbet kafilesi* who were not on the 150ers list, and whether or not they were able to return to Turkey and when, we may interpret the return of so many of the 150ers to be reflective of a wider desire amongst Turkish refugees to return. The pull back to Turkey was likely twofold: first, the experience of *gurbet* was deeply emotionally difficult for these people both because they would miss their homeland, and because they would live in places that would not quite accept them as their own. And second, few of the 150ers were able to naturalize in other countries during their exile and the legal difficulties of being stateless had certainly taken their toll.

The journey of the *gurbet kafilesi*, and their odyssey during the first year of their exile is a vivid example of the plight of the stateless refugee. A journey of this

⁴⁷⁶ Divani, *Ελλάδα και Μειονότητες: Το Σύστημα Διεθνούς Προστασίας της Κοινωνίας των Εθνών*, 189.

⁴⁷⁷ For a comprehensive list of all 150ers and a compilation of information of their whereabouts see Özoğlu, 37-75.

sort would have been unlikely only a decade earlier, as pre-World War I refugee movements were rarely hampered by the passport and visa restrictions of multiple states. The proliferation of the passport was also intimately connected at multiple points to the statelessness of these people. For many of them, their initial inability to return to Turkey was due to the fact that they left without a Turkish passport. They were then forced to plead with multiple powers (the British Empire and the League of Nations among them) for travel documents and visas in order to find a place of refuge and livelihood, and would often be denied. The connection between statelessness and a lack of a passport would grow to the point of being quite obvious as the twentieth century went on, but we must remember that the gurbet kafilesi was one of the earliest examples of a group of people victimized by the passport regime. Some because they were officially stateless, and others because they weren't.

The British would learn their lesson from this group. Before evacuating any other groups of "compromised" Ottoman subjects, Foreign Office administrators would make absolutely certain that they had a state which would accept them and that the cost of their maintenance would not fall on the British Treasury. In August 1923, they would double check with the Greek government that they would accept around 100 Ottoman Greeks who had been employed by the British during the occupation, so long as they were evacuated on British expense.⁴⁷⁸ The British would be careful not to assume that Greece would take any more refugees, even if they were ethnically Greek. But where they might send their "compromised" Armenians offered a different issue. The British would proceed carefully, making sure not to evacuate anyone that they might have to take responsibility for later without first ensuring that another entity would provide for them. In discussions regarding where

⁴⁷⁸ R1766-48-29692 Evacuation from Constantinople of Certain Ottoman Greek Employees of the British Army, UNAG.

to send “compromised” Armenians, Foreign Office workers would specifically reference the gurbet kafilesi:

The compromised Turks who were sent from Constantinople to Athens, from Athens to Egypt, from Egypt to Jeddah, from Jeddah to Cyprus and are still on the verge of starvation are a warning that it is really better not to move people at all unless there is a reasonable prospect of their maintaining themselves. It is not the best use pressing the C.O. again to admit refugees to Palestine or Cyprus nor is it fair to ask the H.O. to admit them to the U.K. where they would be sure to come onto the rates in time, whether the Armenian community might guarantee. The only place where the Armenians might honestly be able to support themselves is in Russian Armenia.⁴⁷⁹

⁴⁷⁹ W.S. Edmonds handwritten note, Aug 22, 1923, E8500, FO 371/9161, 47-backside, TNA.

CHAPTER 5

ON THE MARGINS OF NATIONALITY

While the previous chapter told the story of a single group of people (or at least a number of people who could be grouped together), this chapter will tell the stories of comparatively smaller groups of people or individuals who, in one way or another, found themselves on the margins of nationality on the eve of the Allied evacuation from Istanbul. Focusing on British Foreign Office documents, largely from the Treaty Office, this chapter will look at the cases of a number of different people who were either associated with the British or under British protection when the Allies withdrew. Some of them found themselves in a situation of contested or questionable nationality by unfortunate circumstance. Others threw themselves into the cracks between nationalities. Some would find themselves essentially stateless, while others would find that multiple states claimed them as subjects—a situation which created a different set of problems. Many of these people’s problems would relate to the passports they carried or didn’t carry, but a few would be reliant on British military transport, which would negate the need for proper travel documentation.

The purpose of this chapter is to vividly describe the chaos surrounding nationality at the end of the Allied occupation through the stories of people whose nationality was in some way questioned. Through these stories we can more vividly unpack the way the British Empire sought to ensure that every person they were responsible for had a state that agreed to take them, and in so doing tried to sort people into discrete categories of legal nationality. Like in the previous chapter, the British looked for governments to accept refugees in the context of a refugee crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean, motivated by the need to save British Treasury funds and

British prestige and little else. In attempting to find states to accept these people, which would eventually allow them to gain a legal national status, we will also see the association between ethno-religious identity and legal nationality strengthen. Some of these stories will also shed light on the awkward relationship between nationality and allegiance, along with negotiations over colonial nationality. Showcasing the chaos of this particular historical moment, these stories will illustrate how unsettled the concept of nationality was, and how much the use of passports and their relationship to nationality had to be negotiated.

This chapter will also reflect changing ideas about passports and nationality on the part of British administrators. By the end of the occupation, British officials believed that, as much as possible, every person should have a discrete, legal nationality which should be reflected accurately on their passports. Those who fell on the margins of nationality were a problem to be solved either by finding a state to take them in where they could later naturalize, or by negotiating and settling upon a definite national status. While the Allies had tolerated and even encouraged murky and unsettled national identities during the occupation period, a mix of insistence by the Ankara government and growing consensus in the post-World War I world would push the British to try to settle, once and for all, the legal nationalities of those who fell under their protection and responsibility.

5.1 Compromised Armenians

In the final weeks of negotiations over the Treaty of Lausanne, the precarious situation of Ottoman subjects employed by the British in the occupation area came to the attention of British officials. Six Ottoman Greeks who worked in British labor battalions in Çanakkale were arrested by Turkish police at a checkpoint when trying

to return to Istanbul from Çanakkale. Henderson immediately approached Adnan Bey in protest, to which Adnan Bey informed him that all Turkish subjects who had served in the British forces would be expelled from Turkey and be regarded as having forfeited their Turkish nationality through their service to the British.⁴⁸⁰

The Foreign Office immediately sent a telegram to Rumbold in Lausanne explaining the situation, and asking him to make sure that this “monstrous regulation” was revoked or nullified, perhaps through an addition to the evacuation protocol.⁴⁸¹ The telegram reached Rumbold while he was in a private meeting of delegates, and he immediately turned to Ismet Pasha and complained that such a regulation was “entirely contrary to [the] spirit of [the] amnesty declaration.”⁴⁸² Ismet Pasha seemed utterly confused and said that Adnan Bey must have misstated the law. Rumbold snapped back that “Adnan was not [an] imbecile and must have known what he was talking about.”⁴⁸³ Ismet then promised to look into the matter further. As indicated in chapter three, Ismet Pasha was sometimes negotiating with assumptions that differed from policies implemented on the ground in Turkey.

The British then took two courses of action. The first was to begin negotiations with the Turkish delegation at Lausanne to extend the date of the general amnesty until the withdrawal of Allied forces from Istanbul. The amnesty declaration in the Treaty of Lausanne stated that no one would be prosecuted for political or military crimes committed between August 1, 1914, and November 20, 1922, which would leave Turkish subjects who collaborated with Allied administration after November 20 vulnerable to Turkish prosecution. Over the course of the next few months, the British negotiated an extension of this amnesty until the

⁴⁸⁰ Henderson to FO, Jul 11, 1923, FO 371/9160, E7184, 168, TNA.

⁴⁸¹ FO to Rumbold, Jul 13, 1923, FO 371/9160, E7184, 169, TNA.

⁴⁸² Rumbold to FO, Jul 13, 1923, FO 371/9160, E7275, 182, TNA.

⁴⁸³ Ibid.

date of Allied evacuation, and reciprocally promised not to prosecute anyone for assisting the Turks in former Ottoman territories now under the control of the British and French empires (particularly Palestine and Iraq).⁴⁸⁴ The hope was that once the Allies left, any Ottoman subject who had worked for Allies in a non-combatant capacity would be able to remain in Turkey unmolested.

The second course of action was to prepare to evacuate all Ottoman subjects whose lives were thought to be in danger through their service to the British, in case the general amnesty could not be extended. British officials managed to get the six men who were arrested released on bail. They had been told that they would be deported on the grounds that they had left and returned to Istanbul without a Turkish visa. Again, unsanctioned movement would have consequences for a person's national status. The British then transported them away on a British naval ship to avoid Turkish passport control and customs police.⁴⁸⁵ While the Allies hoped that negotiating an extension to the general amnesty would protect most of their employees, they were now well aware that at least some of them would have to be evacuated. Although the British had little trouble finding countries to take most of their employees, particularly after Greece agreed to take the Ottoman Greeks, the Foreign Office, the War Office, and the Colonial Office would go back and forth for over a month trying to figure out where to send the Ottoman Armenians employed by the British.

At the end of August, General Harington had exhausted his own resources to try to find a place of refuge for a group of 80 Armenian employees with 116 dependents. Although he had been able to find countries to take Russian Jews, Ottoman Greeks, Serbians, and Albanians employed by the British, "the entry of

⁴⁸⁴ CO to FO, Sept 26, 1923, FO 371/9162, E9576, 129-130, TNA.

⁴⁸⁵ Henderson to FO, Jul 15, 1923, FO 371/9160, E7307, 187, TNA.

Armenians has been definitely refused by every country including Greece, Egypt and all British Colonies.”⁴⁸⁶ The ongoing refugee crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean had taken a toll, and few countries were willing to take anyone they were not required to take by virtue of their nationality. But, Harington explained, “these [Armenians] are compromised so seriously with Turks that no amnesty or pardon would cover them.”⁴⁸⁷ After noting that the French and Italians were taking their Armenian employees with them, he wrote, “if Great Britain alone were to abandon such persons most unfavourable impression will be created.”⁴⁸⁸

He asked if the Home Office might be willing to let these people come to England, and if not, if the Colonial Office would allow them to go to Cyprus or Palestine. Palestine would be preferable because “when recent events are forgotten, it would be easier for them to return.”⁴⁸⁹ Although he had promised these people that the British would evacuate them before the Allies withdrew from Istanbul, Harington clearly maintained the hope that someday these Ottoman Armenians would be able to return to Turkey. Harington might have assumed that because there was generally more support in Palestine for the Turkish National Movement,⁴⁹⁰ as opposed to the charged Greco-Turkish ethno-religious politics of Cyprus, the Ankara government might one day be more disposed to allow Ottoman subjects who had been in Palestine to return to Turkey. The “compromised” Armenians themselves may have held out a similar hope.

It was on this Foreign Office file that W.S. Edmonds made the suggestion, mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, that the Armenian employees of the

⁴⁸⁶ Harington to WO, Aug 20, 1923, FO 371/9121, E8500, 50, TNA.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁰ Halabi, “Liminal Loyalties: Ottomanism and Palestinian Responses to the Turkish War of Independence, 1919–22,” 19–37.

British be sent to Soviet Armenia, citing the gurbet kafilesi as a reason to have this completely settled before evacuation.⁴⁹¹ The short-lived Armenian Republic had lasted two and a half years before being defeated by Turkish Nationalist Forces and becoming a Soviet Socialist Republic in order to save what was left of Eastern Armenia.⁴⁹² Under the control of the Bolsheviks since the end of 1920, Soviet Armenia seemed a new, foreign, and unknown place to many Western Armenians. To the suggestion that Armenian employees be sent to Soviet Armenia, Lancelot Oliphant replied that although such a solution would be “ideal,” he doubted that the Soviets would accept, particularly because the British had recently raided the Bolshevik office in Istanbul.⁴⁹³ The League of Nations had also considered Soviet Armenia as a potential country of settlement for the larger group of stateless Armenians, but the Soviet Union rejected this prospect and would only allow the settlement of Armenians who could entirely pay their own way.⁴⁹⁴ British officials in Istanbul approached some of their Armenian employees about the idea of going to Soviet Armenia and received a solidly negative response. In relaying this information, Harington wrote,

The idea of sending Armenians to Armenia via Batum is quite impossible in my opinion and in that of Mr. Henderson. Armenia as Armenia really only exists on map, no one would dare to go. Enquiries have been made amongst several and each one replied definitely that if that is all that can be offered, they would rather remain here and be killed by Turks. To save them from Turks this end and hand over to Bolsheviks at the other, cannot be called a solution.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹¹ W.S. Edmonds handwritten note, Aug 22, 1923, E8500, FO 371/9161, 47-backside, TNA.

⁴⁹² Ekmekçioğlu, *Recovering Armenia*, 59; Şekeryan, *The Armenians and the Fall of the Ottoman Empire: After Genocide, 1918-1923*, 172.

⁴⁹³ Oliphant note, Aug 24, 1923, FO 371/9161, E8500, 43, TNA.

⁴⁹⁴ Lohr, *Russian Citizenship*, 163.

⁴⁹⁵ Harington to WO, Sept 10, 1923, FO 371/9161, E9132, 147, TNA.

Apparently, to some of the Armenian employees of the British, to be evacuated to Soviet Armenia was to be taken out of the frying pan and thrown into the fire. In the meantime, Turkish police were preventing Ottoman subjects who had worked for the British from leaving the country, likely by denying them passports, which prompted more British employees to request evacuation from the British.⁴⁹⁶ Tensions were growing as these people's fate remained unsettled.

The representative of the Armenian community⁴⁹⁷ had initially recommended that compromised Armenians be sent to either England or Egypt, as the Armenian communities in these places had the funds to support them. The Armenian community in Cyprus was small and poor and would be less able to take in large numbers of refugees.⁴⁹⁸ To the suggestion of sending compromised Armenians to England, the Home Office replied with a definitive "no" due to the state of domestic unemployment.⁴⁹⁹ The Colonial Office felt that Iraq or Palestine would be impractical, alluding to problems with "local conditions," though Cyprus might be able to take them temporarily, despite being overrun with refugees, so long as the Imperial Treasury paid for them, as there was no chance of them finding employment in Cyprus.⁵⁰⁰ The clock was ticking as Allied forces prepared to withdraw from Istanbul, and a Foreign Office official noted, "Dumping these people temporarily in

⁴⁹⁶ Harington to WO, Sept 7, 1923, FO 371/9161, E9081, 145, TNA.

⁴⁹⁷ Harington's correspondence refers to this person as "the Armenian Patriarch," but as the Armenian Patriarch Zaven Der Yeghiayan had long been in Bulgaria by this time, he could not be referring to him. The manner with which Harington says this person gave "verbal reassurance" illustrates that this person must have been present in Istanbul. Because Patriarch Zaven left without resigning as Patriarch, the community was unable to officially fill the post of Patriarch until he resigned in 1927. During this period a vicar was elected to hold the post without officially being the Patriarch. This is most likely who Harington is referring to. I refer to this person as the representative of the Armenian community for simplicity and to avoid confusion.

⁴⁹⁸ Harington to WO, Sept 3, 1923, FO 371/9161, E8930, 116, TNA.

⁴⁹⁹ WO to CO, Sept 3, 1923, FO 371/9161, E8901, 96, TNA.

⁵⁰⁰ CO to WO, Sept 4, 1923, FO 371/9161, E8934, 119-120, TNA.

Cyprus is merely postponing a solution.”⁵⁰¹ Harington declared, “This I feel will be our most difficult problem at the end.”⁵⁰²

Harington again wrote to the War Office begging for them to find a place for the compromised Armenians. Noting that he was quite sure that Turkish authorities had marked everyone who had been in British employment, especially the interpreters, clerks, and Intelligence Service, he said, “I realise that no one wants them, but, if as I hope that we are so nearly through with a clean sheet it seems such a pity to sacrifice these people at the end and bad for prestige.”⁵⁰³ The threat to these people’s lives was a threat to British prestige, which was the major motivating factor for ensuring their safe exit from Turkish territory. Or, at the very least, this was the only way to frame it to get Foreign Office officials to see the evacuation and settlement of these people as important.

At the last minute, Harington again asked if Egypt might be willing to take the compromised Armenians, as the Armenian representative had given verbal assurance that the Armenian community in Egypt would take responsibility for their upkeep.⁵⁰⁴ Their numbers had been reduced to around 120 as some “regained [a] certain amount of confidence” and others disappeared.⁵⁰⁵ Some of them likely believed that they could remain in Turkey as Turkish subjects without being targeted for their work for the British. On September 29, the day that the compromised Armenians were setting out, confirmation arrived from the British government in Egypt that they could be admitted so long as the Armenian Archbishop in Cairo ensured that the Armenian community would pay for their maintenance.⁵⁰⁶ After

⁵⁰¹ Morgan, handwritten note, Sept 6, 1923, FO 371/9161, E8934, 117, TNA.

⁵⁰² Harington to WO, Sept 3, 1923, FO 371/9161, E8930, 116, TNA.

⁵⁰³ Harington to WO, Sept 10, 1923, FO 371/9161, E9132, 147, TNA.

⁵⁰⁴ Harington to WO, Sept 21, 1923, FO 371/9161, E9516, 190, TNA.

⁵⁰⁵ Harington to WO, Sep 23, 1923, FO 371/9161, E9517, 194, TNA.

⁵⁰⁶ G.H.Q. Egypt to WO, Sept 29, 1923, FO 371/9162, E9726, 164, TNA.

months of back and forth about this group of people, the British Empire had finally found a place to settle them where they would not become a charge on British imperial funds after their transportation. Having learned their lesson from the gurbet kafilesi, British occupation officials congratulated themselves on having successfully evacuated their Armenian employees while also ridding themselves of responsibility for their maintenance.

When the S.S. Khartum arrived in Alexandria on October 3, however, British Naval officials found on board, in addition to the 125 compromised Armenians, 88 stowaways.

5.2 The Khartum stowaways

Initial reports to the Foreign Office said that there were 91 stowaways on board the Khartum and assumed they were all Armenian. British authorities in Egypt initially prevented the Khartum from docking upon hearing of the stowaways, only allowing it to pull into port after the on-board military command assured them that only the 125 Armenians that the Government of Egypt had agreed to take would disembark. The stowaways were then whisked away to Cyprus, where they were given permission to land, while British officials debated their fate.⁵⁰⁷

The Foreign Office immediately started questioning what level of incompetence on the part of military authorities in Istanbul could possibly allow 91 people to sneak onto a British warship undetected. One Foreign Office worker wrote, “There is something more than blundering when 91 [double underline] stowaways get on board a Government Transport.”⁵⁰⁸ Though nothing in the Foreign Office file accused the military of deliberately allowing these people on board, it does seem far-

⁵⁰⁷ G.H.Q. Egypt to FO, Oct 4, 1923, FO 371/9162, E9908, 172, TNA.

⁵⁰⁸ RCL, handwritten note, Oct 6, 1923, FO 371/9162, E9908, 170, TNA.

fetches that so many people could have gotten onboard a British warship without the consent of any of the naval officers.⁵⁰⁹ These were the last days of the occupation and the Khartum was one of the last ships that an Ottoman subject could potentially board without going through Turkish passport control. With this in mind, it is possible that military authorities in Istanbul looked the other way and allowed these people to smuggle themselves on board, knowing that this might be their last chance to leave.

When the Khartum landed in Limassol on October 10, British authorities in Cyprus realized that there were three less stowaways than they had been told, and only 26 of them were Ottoman Armenians. 58 of them were Ottoman Greeks, and on board were also 4 Ottoman Jews, all young men over the age of 14. Presumably the British jumped to the conclusion that all the stowaways were Armenian because they had “snuck” onto the ship carrying compromised Armenians. British authorities likely assumed that the Armenians under British protection had alerted young men within their community who hoped to escape to the time and place where the ship would disembark. But word of this opportunity clearly spread beyond the Armenian community, and young men from three non-Muslim communities, both literally and figuratively, found themselves in the same boat.

The first issue that these stowaways brought to the forefront was that of repatriation. Being Turkish subjects, in theory they should be returned to Turkey. The Foreign Office quite quickly predicted that this would be impossible. As they had left without Turkish passports, if sent back they would either be denied permission to land or if landed would then face grave consequences for their

⁵⁰⁹ I thank a particular German professor who did not wish to be named in this study for pointing out to me the virtual impossibility of 88 people sneaking onto a British warship.

attempted flight.⁵¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Foreign Office would ask Henderson, who became the British Ambassador to Turkey upon the evacuation of Allied troops, to ask Adnan Bey whether a deal could be reached for their return.

A reply to Henderson's request would not be received until late November, when, to no one's surprise, a short, curt note arrived from Adnan Bey stating that the stowaways in question would not be allowed to return to Turkey.⁵¹¹ Harington, upon writing to Adnan Bey in early October, told the Foreign Office that he suspected that even if Adnan Bey considered readmitting these young men, because they were likely liable for military service, "their forcible return here will amount if not to condemnation to death to something not very different therefrom." Even furnishing their names, he thought, might bring about reprisals against their families. He thus begged the Foreign Office to make other arrangements for these people "on the grounds of humanity."⁵¹²

These young men had thrown themselves into the cracks between nationalities, rendering themselves technically stateless. In the eyes of the Turkish state, their unsanctioned departure had forfeited their right to return. Considering the fact that Ottoman subjects who left without Turkish passports had been unable to reenter the country for the better part of a year, it is likely that these young men, in making their decision to sneak onto the Khartum, knew that they would not be able to return. They may have even relied on the idea that once the British military discovered them on the ship outside of Turkish waters, they would not try to send them back.

⁵¹⁰ Rendel, Handwritten Note, Oct 5, 1923, FO 371/9162, E 9908, 168 (backside), TNA.

⁵¹¹ Adnan Bey to Henderson, Nov 29, 1923, FO 371/9162, E11683, 251, TNA.

⁵¹² Henderson to FO, Oct 7/Oct 8, 1923, FO 371/9162, E 9921, 181, TNA.

The British, exasperated at the idea of having to take responsibility for any more refugees, frantically set out to find countries that would accept the young stowaways. In the meantime, “every incentive” was given to them to find employment in Cyprus.⁵¹³ After ruling out their return to Turkey (even in the event that Adnan Bey gave consent), the War Office saw no reason why the Greek and Jewish young men could not be “repatriated immediately” to Greece and Palestine.⁵¹⁴ This assumption illustrates the intimate link between ethnicity, religion, and nation in the eyes of British military administrators.⁵¹⁵ The word repatriation, after all, implies a *return*. The idea that these people could be “repatriated immediately” to Greece and Palestine based on their ethno-religious background without prior agreement from their respective governments implies that the War Office assumed that being a member of an ethno-religious community in and of itself entitled a person to legal nationality in the state associated with that ethno-religious community. Though this wasn’t a radical assumption to be made at the time, as Greece had recently accepted around a million Ottoman Greek refugees and the British Mandate for Palestine had explicitly recognized a “national home” for the Jewish people in Palestine,⁵¹⁶ it nonetheless vividly illustrates that the British understanding of the breakup of multinational empires into discrete nation-states after World War I was that people should, unless otherwise specified, be sorted into ethno-religious categories which would correspond to the nation-state they legally belonged to.

⁵¹³ G.H.Q. Egypt to WO, Oct 13, 1923, FO 371/9162, E10387, 197, TNA.

⁵¹⁴ WO to FO, Oct 25, 1923, FO 371/9162, E10483, 203, TNA.

⁵¹⁵ While this relationship between religion and nationality was certainly complicated and in flux at the time, it should be noted that both Greece and Israel to this day utilize official religious affiliation as one of the markers of a member of the diaspora for citizenship attaining purposes.

⁵¹⁶ See the Balfour Declaration, originally contained in Balfour to Rothschild, Nov 2, 1917, published in the press on Nov 9.

This was, however, a slightly problematic assumption in the eyes of the Foreign Office. A Foreign Office administrator scribbled on the telegram from the War Office,

The Greeks are presumably Ottoman subjects and natives of Constantinople. They therefore have no claim on Greece either on account of nationality or under the Exchange of Populations Convention. It is not easy to approach the Greek Government in a case of this kind and to use the word 'repatriation' is begging the question.⁵¹⁷

Because the Greeks of Istanbul were explicitly exempt from the population exchange, the Greek government was under no obligation to accept these young men, and had they used the word "repatriation" in their correspondence with the Greek government, it would have opened the door for the Greek government to decline on the grounds that these young men were Turkish and not Greek subjects. The Foreign Office administrator ended his note by saying "we can hold out comparatively little hope the Greeks will agree."⁵¹⁸ Another civil servant commented that the 58 Greeks might stand a better chance of finding a living and getting absorbed into the local population if they remained in Cyprus,⁵¹⁹ considering the substantial Greek-speaking population. Though the British Colonial government in Cyprus had expressed little willingness to accept Greek refugees from Asia Minor, the British held out the hope that because these were healthy young men of various trades, they might find employment in Cyprus, removing the need to send them elsewhere.

Indeed, by late November, six of the 26 Armenians and 13 of the 58 Greeks found work in Cyprus,⁵²⁰ enabling them to be absorbed into the local community, and, within time, to acquire British Cypriot nationality. Although the British

⁵¹⁷ Rendel, Handwritten Note, Oct 26, 1923, FO 371/9162, E10483, 203, TNA.

⁵¹⁸ Ibid, (backside).

⁵¹⁹ Murray, handwritten Note, Oct 26, 1923, FO 371/9162, E10483, 204 (backside), TNA.

⁵²⁰ WO to FO, Nov 21, 1923, FO 371/9162, E11250, 242, TNA.

approached the Armenian Archbishop in Cairo requesting that the Armenian community in Egypt take on the Armenian stowaways in the manner they had accepted the 125 compromised Armenians, resources in the Armenian community were reaching their limit, which could mean that financial responsibility for the remaining Armenians might fall on the British Colonial government in Egypt if the stowaways were sent there.⁵²¹ Instead, the Armenian community in Cyprus agreed to take responsibility for the 20 Armenian stowaways who had not yet found employment.⁵²²

The question of sending the four Jewish stowaways to Palestine was comparatively less fraught. The War Office wrote directly to the Colonial Office requesting “repatriation” for the four young men to Palestine, emphasizing that the War Office would bear the cost of their transport.⁵²³ The idea that they were being “repatriated” to a place where they had physically never been would align broadly with British policy toward speedy naturalization for Jewish immigrants in Palestine.⁵²⁴ As the Colonial Office was, at that point, not consistently restricting Jewish immigration to Palestine,⁵²⁵ this posed no issue, and accepting only four young men seemed little to ask.

This left 45 young Greek men for the British to plead with the Greek government to accept, after the British concluded that there was little possibility that they could find work on the island.⁵²⁶ Bentinck, as British Ambassador to Greece, begged the Greek government to take these young men despite the unmanageable refugee crisis in Greece, underlining the fact that they were young healthy men of

⁵²¹ Allenby to FO, Nov 9, 1923, FO 371/9162, E10870, 234, TNA.

⁵²² WO to FO, Nov 21, 1923, FO 371/9162, E11250, 242, TNA.

⁵²³ WO to CO, Nov 9, 1923, FO 371/9162, E10955, 235, TNA.

⁵²⁴ Banko, *The Invention of Palestinian Citizenship, 1918-1947*.

⁵²⁵ Auerbach, “Before the Mandate: British Rule in Palestine, 1920–1922,” 5-23.

⁵²⁶ G.H.Q. Egypt to WO, Nov 19, 1923, FO 371/9162, E11250, 244, TNA.

various trades who might be useful refugees to accept. When the telegram arrived that the Greek consul-general at Nicosia had been instructed to allow the stowaways to come to Greece, Rendel wrote “This is really rather good of the Greeks.”⁵²⁷

Although these young men had thrown themselves into the cracks between nationalities, rendering them stateless, the fact that they were able-bodied, single, young men made them more desirable refugees to take. Although the Colonial Office had said with such assurance that none of the compromised Armenians would be able to find work on Cyprus, six of the Armenian stowaways did. The ease with which this group was resettled illustrates that demographic and labor factors played a large role in governmental consideration in receiving or rejecting refugees. Married men were usually accompanied by dependent women and children, as in the case of the compromised Armenians, requiring more support than single men. In the largely gendered economy of the 1920s Mediterranean, widowed women and children as refugees would require even more support, as there was no man to work and take responsibility for supporting them. As illustrated by the previous chapter, older men or men who were capable only of location-specific work could be some of the least desirable refugees to accept because finding work for them was so challenging. The Khartum stowaways, in contrast, as single young men of various physical trades, could be most easily economically integrated into a new environment, making them more desirable refugees to accept.

When these governments agreed to accept the Khartum stowaways, they essentially agreed to take responsibility for them before they officially naturalized. The Khartum stowaways who were sent to Greece would likely be eligible for full Greek nationality rather quickly, as the Greek government’s nationality principles

⁵²⁷ Bentinck to FO, Nov 22, 1923, FO 371/9162, E11253, 245, TNA.

were based on *jus sanguinis* nationality, making the acquisition of Greek nationality for ethnic Greeks simpler.⁵²⁸ Assuming they remained in Palestine, the young men who were sent to Palestine would acquire Palestinian nationality in August of 1925 when a British Order-in-Council would grant Palestinian nationality to all Turkish subjects habitually resident in Palestine on August 1, 1924.⁵²⁹ The Khartoum stowaways and compromised Armenians who stayed in Cyprus or were sent to Egypt, would be eligible for British nationality after five years of residence within the British Empire,⁵³⁰ but until then they would live without an official national status. Though they would be technically stateless until they naturalized, this would pose little issue so long as they did not try to move. After naturalizing, they would become British colonial subjects.

5.3 Colonial nationality

In November of 1922, a pale-faced, blue-eyed, 19-year-old named Muhayuddin arrived in Quetta, on the Western edge of British India, carrying both a British passport and an Ottoman passport, on his way to Afghanistan. Local police in Quetta interrogated him about who he was and where he was going, during which he made a number of suspicious and contradictory claims. Among them, that he had been sent to Afghanistan on a secret mission by the Government of India, that his father was an officer in the Ottoman Army, that he had attended the military college in Harbiye in Istanbul for three years before the Allied occupation, and that, during the occupation, he and 300 of his classmates were arrested by the British and sent to Ahmednagar, near Bombay, where he had been kept as a prisoner of war for three years before

⁵²⁸ Sitaropoulos, "Discriminatory Denationalisations Based on Ethnic Origin: The Dark Legacy of Ex Art 19 of the Greek Nationality Code," 110-111.

⁵²⁹ Banko, 50.

⁵³⁰ British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914.

being released, after which he received a passport to return home to Bursa. He was traveling in the company of an Afghan employee of the Amir of Kabul, and seemed to be collecting money from Muslims, supposedly for himself. Parts of his story seemed to align with his Ottoman passport that defined him as an Ottoman subject,⁵³¹ but the fact that he also carried a British passport which identified him as a British subject was puzzling. Because of the British passport, which carried a visa from the Afghani legation in Delhi, the local police in Quetta decided to let him go and continue on his journey, but telegraphed their higher-ups to ask how this “slippery customer” came to possess a British passport.⁵³²

Upon his entry into Afghanistan, Afghani authorities in Kandahar put Muhayuddin under surveillance. He apparently applied for employment from the Afghani government, and the British Legation in Kabul was alerted to his presence. A British representative in Kabul then telegraphed Delhi asking whether or not Muhayuddin was entitled to British protection while in Afghanistan, noting that he professed no allegiance to the British King and Emperor, and that he carried an Ottoman passport in addition to his British passport.⁵³³

Muhayuddin’s true origins then started to come to light. His father, Nurullah, was originally from Punjab. Nurullah left India at the age of 20 and then spent 40 years in the Ottoman Empire. He returned to India in 1920 with his Turkish wife, two sons, and two daughters in order to settle the breakup of his ancestral property with his brothers. The family spent a year and a half in India in order to sell the property

⁵³¹ It was not noted in the file when this Ottoman Passport was issued, nor under whose authority, and the correspondence is confused about whether he obtained an Ottoman passport before or after he received his British passport.

⁵³² Assistant for Superintendent of Police, Quetta-Pishin and Sibi to Governor General in Baluchistan, Quetta, Nov 30, 1922, FO 372/2056, T3253, 78, TNA.

⁵³³ Lieut. Colonel Humphreys, Kabul to The Secretary to the Government of India, Delhi, Dec 30, 1922, FO 372/2056, T3253, 71, TNA.

and then prepared to return to Turkey. The British suspected that, towards the end of their time in India, the family was getting financial assistance from the Khilafat Committee. The men of the family were issued passports as British subjects in May of 1922 endorsed for Constantinople so that they could return home to Bursa.⁵³⁴ Muhayuddin had, for some reason, separated from his father and brother and began traveling with a man in the service of the Emir of Kabul. Whether or not he would continue on and make his way to Istanbul as originally intended was unknown, but British authorities sent copies of the correspondence about him to the British legations in Tehran and Istanbul to keep an eye out for this suspicious young man.⁵³⁵

The way that British administrators discussed Muhayuddin holds interesting comparisons for the Ankara government's logic behind its no return policy. In responding to whether or not British protection should be afforded to this young man, the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department wrote, "Technically Mohi-ud-din is a British subject, but as he does not profess allegiance to the King Emperor and holds a Turkish passport, there is no necessity to accord him British protection unless he asks for it."⁵³⁶ A Foreign Office administrator then scribbled on the file in response,

It is not explained why the government of India allowed this obviously dangerous person to go back to Constantinople... nor is it clear to me why he should now be accorded British protection if he asks for it, as he has renounced his British allegiance.⁵³⁷

Both administrators, at minimum, imply that Muhayuddin's lack of allegiance to the British and the fact that he carried an Ottoman passport meant that the British

⁵³⁴ Deputy Inspector General of Police, Punjab to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay, Jan 4, 1923, FO 372/2056, T3253, 80, TNA.

⁵³⁵ Secretary to the Government of India to British Envoy in Kabul, Feb 13, 1923, FO 372/2056, T3253, 82, TNA.

⁵³⁶ Secretary to the Government of India to British Envoy in Kabul, Feb 13, 1923, FO 372/2056, T3253, 82, TNA.

⁵³⁷ Colliers handwritten note, Mar 22, 1923, FO 372/2056, T 3252, 73, TNA.

protection implicit in his nationality should not necessarily be afforded him while traveling in foreign countries. The second administrator goes so far as to say that because Muhayuddin does not profess allegiance to the British, this should signal a forfeiture of his right to British protection. This illustrates that, like the Ankara government, the British also linked the ideas of allegiance and protection, and that the carrying of a foreign passport could also signal a shifting allegiance, which could threaten the protections of subjecthood.

These British administrators did not, however, go so far as to claim that Muhayuddin should be officially stripped of his British nationality. As his father was clearly a British Indian subject, his son too held British nationality. Though they were suspicious of the family's connection to the Khilafat movement, and the fact that Muhayuddin himself openly declared that he had no allegiance to the King and Empire, the British were in no position to revoke the British nationality of everyone in the British Empire whose allegiance to the King could be questioned. As the nature of British colonial rule was that of rule by duress,⁵³⁸ and British India in particular was facing massive anti-colonial sentiment in the Khilafat movement, mass-denaturalization would have been an extremely difficult tool to use for the British Empire to rid itself of difficult subjects—not to mention that it had become politically unfeasible within British India.⁵³⁹ This nevertheless exposes the almost contradiction of colonial nationality: if nationality is based on allegiance⁵⁴⁰ and colonialism is based on duress, how much allegiance can you truly have under

⁵³⁸ Stoler, *Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times*.

⁵³⁹ Singha, 310-311.

⁵⁴⁰ British nationality law defined those born as British subjects as “born within His Majesty’s allegiance,” implying that allegiance and nationality were one and the same and that allegiance to King and Empire was gained at birth by default. See British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914.

duress? And what would questionable allegiance mean for a subversive subject's legal nationality?⁵⁴¹

The pan-Islamic connection between Turkey and South Asia had been at its strongest in the preceding years, and fears that the Khilafat movement could threaten British rule in India echoed through British colonial decisions. The tenuous grip of Allied control over Istanbul coupled with anticolonial agitation in British India made British rule, at times, seem precarious. A mobile young man, like Muhayuddin, with questionable allegiance and murky national status, moving between India and Turkey through the Muslim world, potentially collecting money for a movement which had taken on a distinctly anticolonial character, seemed like a threat to the British Empire. Like the Ottoman Empire's fears of mobile Armenian subjects, the British also feared and tried to minimize the mobility of British colonial subjects they deemed suspicious.⁵⁴²

The British police in Quetta who interrogated Muhayuddin did not know his full background. They found Muhayuddin suspicious largely due to the fact that he carried two passports which defined him as both an Ottoman and a British subject. Because nationality and allegiance were so closely associated, holding dual nationality was enough on its own to make a person suspect. Dual nationality, at the time, was seen as a problem to be corrected partially because it split the allegiance of an individual between two states, and partially because it created an overlap of "protection." Often, when a child born into dual nationality came of age, they would choose which nationality to retain, minimizing the numbers of dual nationals. Like statelessness, dual nationality was seen as an administrative error that needed to be

⁵⁴¹ For an investigation of subversiveness and allegiance in colonial British India, see May, "'The Starched Boundaries of Civilization': Sympathetic Allegiance and the Subversive Politics of Affect in Colonial India," 61-84.

⁵⁴² Singha, 309-311.

corrected.⁵⁴³ Despite all the reasons Muhayuddin's existence seemed to pose an issue for the British Empire, due to the fact that he had secured a British passport for Constantinople, he was allowed to continue his potentially subversive journey.

4.3.1 The Maltese

The complicated situation for British colonial subjects in the Ottoman Empire was certainly not confined to British Indians, and because different British colonies often had different policies and different statuses, British colonial subjects from different colonies could sometimes face different issues. A fairly large number of Maltese British subjects had made their way to the Ottoman Empire over the years, and quite a few of them had settled in Smyrna. In early 1922, before the fire of Smyrna and the ensuing refugee crisis, the British governor of Malta, Herbert Plumer, wrote to the Consul General in Smyrna explaining that the government of Malta “disclaims responsibility for the maintenance and repatriation of such persons of Maltese descent as have not themselves been born in these islands.”⁵⁴⁴ He went on to explain that this was not meant to deprive anyone of British nationality, and specifically noted that “the children of British subjects of Maltese descent born in Turkey or Egypt retain, under the Capitulations, their Maltese British Nationality without limitation.”⁵⁴⁵ This meant, however, that the colonial government in Malta would not pay for repatriation or maintenance of non-Malta-born Maltese subjects in distress abroad, and this would include not allowing them to return if they could not support themselves. Though the government of Malta was not depriving these people of their nationality, it was denying them a fundamental aspect of legal nationality—the right to

⁵⁴³ Miller, 633.

⁵⁴⁴ Plumer to Lamb, May 19, 1922, FO 369/1817, 265, TNA.

⁵⁴⁵ Ibid.

repatriation. This denial of responsibility was rooted in the fact that the government of Malta was quite broke, and they believed that minimizing their responsibility for the large Maltese diaspora (who were also often quite broke) would minimize their expenditures. Because the Maltese in the Ottoman Empire generally constituted a working-class immigrant group, placing them financially closer to destitution,⁵⁴⁶ there had likely been many calls for the Maltese government to provide repatriation and assistance for Maltese subjects in financial distress. And the Maltese government would do it no longer for those who were not actually born in Malta.

When the fire of Smyrna broke out, the British rushed to evacuate all British subjects, including the Maltese, many of whom were not born in Malta. The British then set up a camp in Malta with British subject refugees evacuated from Smyrna with the understanding that the British Treasury would reimburse the Maltese government for any expenditure on the non-Maltese refugees. But the Maltese government quickly protested that, as stated earlier, they would not take financial responsibility for Maltese British subjects who were not born in Malta. When, at roughly the same, Foreign Office conversations began about a potential evacuation of British subjects from Istanbul⁵⁴⁷ which included 1500 Maltese, the government of Malta again protested that they could not receive the bulk of these potential refugees.⁵⁴⁸ As the year went on, the British began trying to negotiate a return to Smyrna for the Maltese who had been evacuated, while the British Imperial Treasury negotiated with the colonial government of Malta over who would pay for the non-

⁵⁴⁶ For a look at the peculiar place of the Maltese diaspora in Egypt before the First World War see Hanley, *Identifying with Nationality*, 163-167.

⁵⁴⁷ These conversations initially began as preparation for a full-scale withdrawal from Istanbul in the event that negotiations broke down in Lausanne and hostilities broke out between the Allies and the Turkish Nationalists. As time went on, however, these plans evolved into a more deliberate withdrawal after the final peace treaty. By the time the final peace treaty was signed, the British no longer expected an exodus of Maltese British subjects from Istanbul.

⁵⁴⁸ Plumer to FO, Jan 7/Jan 8, 1923, FO 1103/710, TNA.

Malta-born Maltese refugees who were still languishing in a refugee camp on the island.⁵⁴⁹ As Malta had never been an Ottoman possession, the Ankara government had no problem recognizing the British nationality of the Maltese, and by the time Allied forces had evacuated, the Ankara government assured British representatives that there would be no issue with the return of the Maltese to Izmir.⁵⁵⁰ Ensuring that the Maltese could return unhindered became a priority for the British out of fear that the longer they remained away from Izmir, the longer they would be an expense on the British Treasury, for the Maltese government would offer no help.

Although these people were Maltese British subjects, meaning that they undisputedly had a legal nationality, they lacked a fundamental component of nationality: the right to repatriation. The government of Malta, in disclaiming responsibility for all non-Malta born Maltese, created a group of people who were legally British subjects but practically had nowhere to go. Although such a move undermines a crucial aspect of the logic behind legal nationality, it also illustrates that legal logic could be bent at the will of any government which deemed it necessary. The Maltese government, financially strapped as it was, sought to rid itself of responsibility for its impoverished diaspora. It should be noted that, for many in this diaspora, cultural ties to Malta were often quite tenuous, illustrated by the fact that many of them did not speak Maltese.⁵⁵¹ But the fact that, despite being British Maltese subjects for the purposes of legal nationality, the government of Malta would not accept non-Malta-born Maltese made it crucial for the British to

⁵⁴⁹ CO to FO, May 30, 1923, FO 1103/710, TNA.

⁵⁵⁰ Henderson, Sept 4/Sept 5, 1923, FO 1103/1006, TNA.

⁵⁵¹ See the case of a Mr. Valsamakis, who was “a well-known good-for-nothing” who, after being convicted of conduct calculated to breach the peace, was sentenced to be deported to Malta as he claimed British nationality because his father was born in Malta. Mr. Valsamakis later requested a stay of execution on his deportation order on the grounds that, as an ethnic Greek, he did not speak Maltese. Judge Thorp, Feb 21/Mar 6, 1923, and Mar 1/Mar 13, 1923, FO 1103/1004, TNA.

secure the return of this group to Izmir. Once they returned, they would continue to live and be recognized as British subjects in Turkey.

The case of the non-Malta born Maltese illustrates the strange nexus of colonial nationality: while the British Empire had an umbrella nationality policy, individual colonial governments within the British Empire had their own policies regulating colonial nationality. The breakup of the Ottoman Empire would create even more conflict and inconsistency with regards to British nationality in the Mediterranean, particularly as former Ottoman territories were formally incorporated into the British Empire. In this transition, many former Ottoman subjects now found themselves to be British colonial subjects, though this status was sometimes contested.

4.3.2 Cypriots

Colonial national status would become particularly complicated for Cypriots and Egyptians, as the Turkish Nationalists initially refused to recognize their British subjecthood on the grounds that Cyprus and Egypt had not been officially ceded to the British Empire. Though the British had formally annexed both territories at the beginning of the First World War and passed Imperial Orders-in-Council officially claiming Egyptians and Cypriots as British subjects, this had not been agreed to by international treaty.⁵⁵² In January 1923, Turkish authorities in Izmir began requiring

⁵⁵² At the Congress of Berlin in 1878, the Ottoman Empire agreed to transfer the occupation and administration of Cyprus over to the British Empire, though the Ottoman Empire would retain its sovereignty over the island. The British invaded Egypt in 1882 in order to ensure repayment of Egyptian debt, but Egypt remained technically part of the Ottoman Empire, though occupied and controlled by the British. Thus, in both the cases of Cyprus and Egypt, territories had long been integrated into the British Empire while remaining in name part of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, Cypriots and Egyptians had largely remained Ottoman subjects while living under British administration. Both territories were formally annexed by the British Empire with the outbreak of war with the Ottoman Empire in 1914, but this was, of course, not recognized by the Ottoman government, nor would it be recognized later by the Turkish National Movement. For an analysis of British colonial rule in Cyprus in international law see Kornioti, "The Island of Cyprus, Sovereignty,

Egyptians who wished to return to Egypt to get Turkish passports in order to do so,⁵⁵³ ignoring their Egyptian passports and British laissez-passer. Some approached the British consul asking for protection should Turkish authorities try to require them to do military service.⁵⁵⁴ The French and Italians likely encountered similar issues in Smyrna, and potentially on a much larger scale, due to their generous issuing of passports and nationality documents to those with connections to their colonies. By April, however, the Ankara government agreed to recognize British, French, and Italian passports issued to those domiciled in Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Egypt and in the Dodecanese islands.⁵⁵⁵ While many of these colonized peoples would not be officially European colonial subjects until the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, by recognizing their Allied-issued passports, Ankara agreed to recognize their foreign status in the interim.

Cypriots, on the other hand, would be a different story. The issue first arose when it was brought to the attention of the British consul in Izmir that a number of Cypriots had been arrested by Turkish authorities. Acting Consul General Urquhart had, in a number of cases, been able to smooth things over with the Turkish authorities and noted that they sometimes even seemed glad for him to take Cypriot prisoners off their hands. But in the case of a Cypriot priest, Iconomos Pappaioannou, who carried both a certificate of British nationality and a British passport, Urquhart had been unable to secure his release and was denied permission to visit him. After reminding Urquhart that the Ankara government did not recognize

and International Law in the Early Decades of British Rule (1878-1923),” 105-121; for an analysis of Egyptian nationality under British rule before World War I, see Hanley, “When did Egyptians Stop Being Ottomans? An Imperial Case Study,” 89-109.

⁵⁵³ Henderson to FO, Jan 30, 1923, FO 372/2055, T1321, 40, TNA.

⁵⁵⁴ Urquhart to Henderson, Jan 24, 1923, FO 372/2055, T1507, 44, TNA.

⁵⁵⁵ Agreement about passengers arriving and departing by sea, Rumbold to Curzon, April 17, 1923, FO 372/2055, T4435, 80, TNA.

the British nationality of Cypriots, Turkish authorities told him that Pappaioannou had come from Athens to work with the Greek Committee for National Defense in Izmir and thus was an active enemy of Turkey and would be court-martialed as such.⁵⁵⁶ At the end of April, Urquhart sent a list of ten Cypriots supposedly held prisoner by Turkish authorities (as reported to him by their relatives), one of whom had died in a hospital of unspecified causes. Urquhart could not convince Turkish representatives to track down or offer information as to the whereabouts of these men and he admitted that there was little else he could do in Izmir to find them and secure their release.⁵⁵⁷ As Ankara claimed these men as Turkish subjects until Cyprus was officially and formally ceded to Britain, they also claimed the right to prosecute them as traitors.

Although British administrators were frustrated at Ankara's approach to Cypriots, they had to admit that technically Ankara was right. A Foreign Office worker scribbled in acknowledgement that, "strictly speaking the Turks can still claim Cypriots as Ottoman subjects."⁵⁵⁸ Rumbold, in Lausanne, was busy negotiating and redrafting articles of the upcoming treaty which would pertain to Cyprus, and had to admit that it seemed unlikely that the British could secure the release of these Cypriots before the signing of a final treaty.⁵⁵⁹ Henderson, nevertheless, continued to send letters to Adnan Bey asking for the release of Cypriot prisoners on the grounds that they were British subjects. To which, as late as July 4, Adnan Bey replied, "The island of Cyprus not being at present ceded to England by a treaty, Cypriots residing in Turkey cannot be treated there on the same footing as English subjects."⁵⁶⁰

⁵⁵⁶ Urquhart to Henderson, Jan 24, 1923, FO 372/2055, T1507, 43, TNA.

⁵⁵⁷ Urquhart to Henderson, Apr 26, 1923, FO 372/2055, T5268, 88-89, TNA.

⁵⁵⁸ Illegible name, handwritten note, May 16, 1923, FO 372/2055, T5268, 86 backside, TNA.

⁵⁵⁹ Rumbold to Henderson, May 21, 1923, FO 372/2055, T5636, 95, TNA.

⁵⁶⁰ Adnan Bey to Henderson, July 4, 1923, FO 372/2055, T7951, 134, TNA.

Although the same could be said for Egypt and other former Ottoman territories, the Ankara government had begun, in practice, to recognize the foreign status of many former Ottoman subjects whose origins now lay within the territories of European empires. This illustrates that the status of Cyprus was considerably more contentious than that of other former Ottoman territories. While this is not explicitly stated in the correspondence, we can infer that the reasons behind this lie in the ethno-religious dynamics of the Greco-Turkish world. Cyprus, at this point largely divided between an ethnically Greek majority and an ethnically Turkish minority⁵⁶¹ was (and still is) more easily embroiled in the ethno-national dynamics of conflict between Greece and Turkey than say Egypt. Egypt, while still at this point housing a significant Greek community and as well as a small Turkish community, sat solidly in the Arab world, and thus at a larger distance both ethnically and politically from Greco-Turkish conflict. Continuing to claim Cypriots as Ottoman subjects until the signing of the final peace treaty was about asserting sovereignty over people rather than sovereignty over land. And Cypriots, being largely ethnically Greek or Turkish, were more important to the Ankara government to be able to control.

Article 20 of the Treaty of Lausanne would formally recognize British annexation of Cyprus and Article 21 would address the nationality of Cypriots. Cyprus would be the only “detached” Ottoman territory to have an article of the treaty entirely devoted to settling the nationality of its inhabitants. Article 21 stated that Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus on November 5, 1914, would

⁵⁶¹ This is not to say that there were no other ethno-religious communities, nor that the majority/minority political dynamic of Cyprus was primordial or even applicable to Ottoman Cyprus. But the dynamics of majority/minority politics developed largely under British colonial rule, and had started to gain steam during the period discussed. See Jan Asmussen, “Early conflicts between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus,” *Cyprus Review* 16, no. 1 (2004): 87-106; For a parallel between the majority/minority dynamic in British colonial Cyprus and that of Mandate Palestine in 1931 see Gordon, “Rejecting Partition: The Imported Lessons of Palestine’s Binational Zionists,” 179-180.

acquire British nationality and lose their Turkish nationality. While a similar situation was true of all other former Ottoman territories (as established by Article 30), the nationality change of Egyptians, for example, did not need to be explicitly spelled out in the same way. Article 21 also stated that Cypriots who wanted to retain their Turkish nationality would have two years from the signing of the treaty to opt for Turkish nationality, and then after so choosing, would have one year to depart the island for Turkey. This likewise held true for any former Ottoman subject who wanted to opt for Turkish nationality in any other former Ottoman territory, as spelled out in Article 31, but this was stated specifically and separately regarding Cyprus. Although the British Cyprus Annexation Order-in-Council of 1917 had allowed Cypriots to opt for Ottoman nationality by leaving the island,⁵⁶² the Treaty of Lausanne offered Cypriots resident in Cyprus on the date of annexation another opportunity to opt for Turkish nationality.

But the date on which those ordinarily resident in Cyprus would gain Cypriot nationality would have serious implications for Cypriots who were residing outside Cyprus on that date, as the Treaty of Lausanne would not give them an extra opportunity to choose their nationality. A Foreign Office worker foresaw such consequences and wrote, a few days after the signing of the final treaty,

The Treaty will not affect the numerous persons born in Cyprus or of Cypriot origin, who were resident in Asia Minor on Nov 5, 1914. These will presumably remain Turkish subjects. Undoubtedly they were in Turkey against their will on Nov 5, 1914 but this cannot be helped.⁵⁶³

The Cyprus Annexation Order in Council of 1917 had allowed Cypriots who were resident outside Cyprus on that date to travel to Cyprus within two years of the end

⁵⁶² Cyprus Annexation Order in Council, printed in *The London Gazette*, Dec 4, 1917, issue 30413, pg. 12678.

⁵⁶³ Illegible name (same as above), handwritten note, July 26, 1923, FO 372/2055, T7951, 132 backside, TNA.

of the war (meaning the end of the First World War in November of 1918) and request, from the High Commissioner, a certificate of British nationality if they sought to claim it.⁵⁶⁴ But those who could not or did not travel back to Cyprus during that time period would be Turkish subjects by default.

George Evangelo Louizo, a Cypriot living in London who had carried a British passport since 1912, was in for a rude awakening when he went to the passport office in London in order to get his wife's name added to his passport in July of 1922. The passport officer took his previous passport and documents and told him to come back in a few hours and his passport would be ready. When he returned, he found that, instead of being presented with a new passport with his wife's name added, his previous passport had been revoked on the grounds that he was not a British subject and that this passport had been given to him in error by the British Consulate in Paris. To Mr. Louizo's dismay, he discovered that he had accidentally become a Turkish subject.

In his letter to the Home Office he implored,

I am a native of Cyprus. Every member of my family is a British subject. I had, unfortunately, left Cyprus two years previous to the war and the annexation of the island to go to the heart of Africa (namely Abyssinia) in order to commence a commercial training.⁵⁶⁵

He had registered as a British subject in Abyssinia,⁵⁶⁶ and traveled on a British passport to Paris during the war, where he received another passport to proceed on to a destination in the British Empire. The Foreign Office later explained that Louizo's Paris-issued passport had been revoked because he had used it incorrectly. The passport was issued in 1919 as a passport to a British protected person for travel to Cyprus or somewhere in the British Empire in order to qualify for British nationality

⁵⁶⁴ Cyprus Annexation Order in Council 1917.

⁵⁶⁵ Louizo to Home Office, Feb 5, 1923, FO 372/2056, T3391, 123 backside, TNA.

⁵⁶⁶ Ethiopia

either by claiming it in Cyprus by virtue of the 1917 Order in Council, or by beginning the process of naturalization somewhere else in the British Empire. But because Louizo stayed in Paris after the passport was issued to him and began working at Lloyd's bank until 1922 rather than traveling home to Cyprus or to England as he had originally intended, Louizo currently had no claim to British nationality. Yet again, the use of a passport would have unforeseen consequences for the bearer's national status. At the thought of having become a Turkish subject by default, Louizo protested,

I know that there exists a law whereby any Cypriot absent from his native land at the time of the annexation is not considered as a British subject except under certain conditions but since I had to take up a commercial career should I be condemned to suffer for this now by being considered as a Turkish subject I who by natural inclination religion and upbringing hate Turkey from the depth of my being and am fervently pro-British?⁵⁶⁷

In this case, allegiance, while not insignificant, would not align with legal nationality in the way that Mr. Louizo wished it would. The Foreign Office, however, responded that, as he was established in London and had a history as a British protected person, Mr. Louizo could request a passport which identified him as a British protected person, which would allow him to travel, so long as he took all necessary steps to qualify for British naturalization through his residence in England within a reasonable amount of time.⁵⁶⁸

Though everything seemed settled, Louizo's situation created quite a stir, prompting a parliamentary question from Sir Herbert Nield, a Conservative Member of Parliament representing Ealing, asking why Mr. Louizo had been denied a passport.⁵⁶⁹ The MP's attention was brought to Louizo's plight by a businessman

⁵⁶⁷ Louizo to Home Office, Feb 5, 1923, FO 372/2056, T3391, 124, TNA.

⁵⁶⁸ Mounsey to Louizo, May 3, 1923, FO 372/2056, T4665, 132, TNA.

⁵⁶⁹ Parliamentary Question by Sir Herbert Nield, May 4, 1923, FO 372/2056, T5083, 134, TNA.

named Mr. Fraser, likely an associate of Mr. Louizo's, who wrote to the Foreign Office on his business stationery from R.S. Fraser & Co. in London,

One does not seek to be unreasonable and I recognise that in question of nationality there is room for a difference of opinion and judgment, but one should be informed upon what principle a man could be treated as a British Subject in 1911 and be asked to qualify within a reasonable period to obtain naturalisation as a British Subject in 1923. I have long pressed for a Committee of Enquiry that the subject could be adequately considered. Were some of our officials to visit Rio or Buenos Aires, as I did last year, they would be awakened to the fact which much be recognised to-day, that men have outgrown the limitations of serfdom and do not recognise the authority of any State to bandy them about from one nationality to another. Were further argument necessary for pressing for a Committee on nationality it would be found in the illustration which Cyprus affords that nationality is determined in some parts not by race, nor by allegiance, but by religion. The outstanding fact there is, that men of the Mohammeden Faith regard themselves as Turkish Subjects, whilst men of the Christian Faith with equal insistence regard themselves and are recognised as British Subjects.⁵⁷⁰

He was, of course, largely wrong. The Greek community of Cyprus largely longed for *enosis* with Greece (thus ideologically envisioning themselves as aligned with Greece over Britain), and the Turkish minority was sometimes more collaborative with British rule for fear that the island would be handed over to Greece.⁵⁷¹ In 1917, when Turkish Cypriots were given the option of accepting British nationality or leaving the island, only one eighth of the Turkish Cypriot population left.⁵⁷² What Fraser reflects, in terms of the Christians of Cyprus's desire to be recognized as British subjects, is likely more a reflection of the feelings of his particular friend, Mr. Louizo, than that of Christian Cypriots in general. Nevertheless, considering the defining feature of identity determining who would be exchanged in the population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey was religion,⁵⁷³ Mr. Fraser's

⁵⁷⁰ Fraser to Montgomery, May 7, 1923, FO 372/2056, T5160, 140-141, TNA.

⁵⁷¹ Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, 8; Asmussen, 90.

⁵⁷² Asmussen, 96.

⁵⁷³ Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923, Article 1.

comments do accurately reflect an association in the Greco-Turkish world between religion and nationality. Mr. Fraser's words also echo a frustration likely held by the many people this study has discussed: that in the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, many people were assigned nationalities or forced to change their nationality and sometimes were offered little to no choice in the matter. Mr. Fraser called for a committee of enquiry on the matter of nationality, asserting that the concept needed to be standardized due to this chaos. The shifting world order after the First World War indeed led many people to be "bandied about" from one nationality to another.

5.4 British protected persons

Up until this point, this study has largely focused on people who left Turkey or were outside the country in the lead up to the evacuation of Allied soldiers. This next section will focus on discussions around nationality for some of those under British protection who were to remain in Turkey after the withdrawal of the British.

Petro Damato, in late July of 1923, discovered that the Turkish government had refused to issue him a foreign resident card because his British passport, issued in October 1922, described him as a "British protected person" and not a "British subject." Petro was born in Istanbul in 1889 to Constantine Damato, a Maltese British subject, and Elpis Tomboulougrou. Petro's mother was most likely ethnically Greek, though her national status was not recorded in these files as it was irrelevant to her son—women at that time generally could not pass on their nationality to their children, and, upon marriage, women would acquire their husbands' nationality.⁵⁷⁴ Fathers could pass on their nationality to their children, but only their "legitimate" children born in wedlock and Petro's parents did not get married until four months

⁵⁷⁴ For an exploration of gender and nationality in British nationality law as well as feminist agitation against policies which prevented women from having their own nationality, see Baldwin.

after he was born.⁵⁷⁵ Under Maltese law, Petro's parents' subsequent marriage would have legitimized him. But because the British applied English law to extraterritorial British subjects in Turkey, the fact of his parents' later marriage did not make Petro a legitimate child in the eyes of English law and thus he was not entitled to British nationality.⁵⁷⁶ Illegitimate children born to British parents in the Ottoman Empire had long held "British protected person" status, and this had rarely presented much of an issue, as British protected persons in the Ottoman Empire had, for practical purposes, been treated largely the same as British subjects.⁵⁷⁷ At the end of the Allied occupation, however, Petro, along with nine other British protected persons, found himself in complicated legal waters with regards to his nationality.

In the last year of the occupation, the British, knowing that they were preparing to withdraw and not wanting to acquire more people they were responsible for, began scrutinizing anyone asking for a British passport. Though they had given out laissez-passer generously in the fall of 1922, and Petro Damato's passport illustrates that they were issuing full passports to British protected persons at that time, the issue of British passports quickly became stricter. By January 1923, the British in Istanbul began to try to minimize both the number of people who could claim British protection in Istanbul as well as the number of passports they were giving out to people who were not British subjects. Ada Whiteley discovered this in January 1923 when she tried to get a British passport for her son, Albert.

Ada Whiteley had originally come to Istanbul as a governess in 1892, after which she found employment in the service of Mediha Sultana, the older sister of Sultan Vahdeddin. After five years in the service of Mediha Sultana, she married

⁵⁷⁵ Alfred Rizzo esq. to British Consular General, Constantinople, Aug 4, 1923, FO 372/2056, T8921, 225, TNA.

⁵⁷⁶ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 250, TNA.

⁵⁷⁷ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 248, TNA.

Madia Sultana's son, Sultanzade Sami Bey, through an Islamic marriage ceremony, and shortly thereafter started feeling ill. Fearing that she was being poisoned, she left the palace and stayed at a hotel until she realized that the true source of her illness was pregnancy. Sultanzade Sami Bey never acknowledged Albert (b. 1899) as his son, and Ada then found other employment and raised her child as a British boy in Istanbul with no further contact from his father, and very few people knew the particulars of his birth.⁵⁷⁸

Ada Whiteley was told by the British Consular General, when her son was born, that her Islamic marriage to Sultanzade Sami Bey was not a true marriage because it was only in the "Turkish form," and because he had not acknowledged his child nor attempted to get her back or have further communication with her. To the British, her marriage was considered illegitimate. Ada was also told that when her son, Albert, was of age, he could choose his nationality. During the war, both he and his mother were considered British subjects by the wartime Ottoman government and carried passes describing them as such. Albert was also imprisoned for 53 days during the war (on what charges is unclear).⁵⁷⁹ But when, in late 1922, the Whiteleys sought a British passport for Albert, the British Embassy denied it. Whether Ada's marriage to Sultanzade Sami Bey was legitimate or illegitimate, either way, Albert would not be a British subject. If the marriage was legitimate, then Albert would be a Turkish subject, taking his father's nationality. If the marriage was illegitimate, then

⁵⁷⁸ "In the Matter of Mrs. Ada Whitely," Waugh to Curzon, Dec 28, 1922, FO 372/2055, T234, 212, TNA. Sultanzade Sami Bey had a legitimately acknowledged son in 1909 named Fethi Sami Baltalimanı. Mediha Sultana, after the death of her first husband, married Damad Ferid Pasha and fled with him to Nice in September 1922. Sultanzade Sami Bey fled along with her to France with his family, where they would also become stateless as part of the Ottoman dynasty in exile. The family eventually moved to London, where they remained. Fethi Sami Baltalimanı died in Oxford in 2006. As it is very possible that Albert Adair Whiteley also moved to England, both Sultanzade Sami Bey's acknowledged and unacknowledged sons likely came to live in the same country. "Oxford: Sultan Abdülmecid'in Torunu Fethi Sami Baltalimanlı Vefat Etti," Haberler, December 22, 2006.

⁵⁷⁹ "In the Matter of Mrs. Ada Whitely," Waugh to Curzon, Dec 28, 1922, FO 372/2055, T234, 212-213, TNA.

Albert was born out of wedlock and thus not eligible for British nationality.⁵⁸⁰ There was no way for his mother to pass on her nationality to her son. The best the British would do was to consider him a British protected person, but even in such a scenario they were reluctant to issue him a passport. A Foreign Office administrator wrote, “We want as far as possible to confine the issue of passports to persons who are undoubtedly British subjects.”⁵⁸¹

Although in October 1922, Petro had been issued a passport as a British protected person, by January of 1923, British officials were unwilling to issue a passport to Albert, even though he held the same status. The passport clash in December of 1922 had not only changed British passport policy towards Ottoman subjects, it had also changed British policy towards issuing passports to its own protégés. Instead, they offered to issue an emergency pass to Albert if he wanted to leave Turkey. If he left and resided in British territory for five years or so, he would then be entitled to a certificate of British naturalization.⁵⁸² We can infer that this is what Albert ended up doing, as he was not listed among the British protected persons remaining in Turkey in late 1923.

If things had continued as they were, Albert might have remained in Istanbul as a British protected person, treated essentially as a British subject. But the Ankara government would not allow any such status in the emerging Turkish Republic. As protected person or “protégé” status had been a product of the capitulations, the Ankara government made it very clear that with the abolishment of the capitulations, they would no longer recognize anything along the lines of foreign “protection.” The question of these peoples’ nationality would have to be settled. Because the 1869

⁵⁸⁰ Mounsey to Waugh, Jan 23, 1923, FO 372/2055, T234, 215, TNA.

⁵⁸¹ Malkin, Handwritten note, Jan 12, 1923, FO 372/2055, T234, 210 backside, TNA.

⁵⁸² Mounsey to Waugh, Jan 23, 1923, FO 372/2055, T234, 215, TNA.

Ottoman nationality law was still in effect, the Ankara government could claim that anyone residing in Turkey was a Turkish subject unless they could prove otherwise.⁵⁸³ In this way, protected people, if not officially naturalized by their “protectors,” would become Turkish subjects by default. For people who had enjoyed extraterritorial rights for generations and generations, this seemed like a dismal thought, particularly if they thought they might be targeted for their previous allegiance to European capitulatory powers.

This presented a much larger issue for the French and Italians, who had created a large class of protégés during the occupation and before the war.⁵⁸⁴ Upon hearing of Ankara’s policy against protected persons, the French and Italians decided to explore naturalizing many of their protégés. Italy had two levels of naturalization, “grande” and “petite,” and elected to naturalize their protégés of “non-Turkish origin” through “petite” naturalization.⁵⁸⁵ The term “non-Turkish origin” applied to protégés who long held Italian protection under the theory that they were originally European. It also applied to those of Libyan and Rhodian descent who would now become Italian colonial subjects. The Italians agreed to relinquish protection for those who could be “reasonably” claimed as Turkish subjects⁵⁸⁶—likely meaning those of Turkish, Greek, or Armenian ethnicity who were born in what was now Turkey and had recently acquired Italian protection. The French, similarly, had approached their government to extend French subjecthood to its protégés in Turkey.⁵⁸⁷

⁵⁸³ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 249, TNA; See also Ispahani, 152.

⁵⁸⁴ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 246, TNA.

⁵⁸⁵ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 247, TNA.

⁵⁸⁶ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 246, TNA.

⁵⁸⁷ France, like Italy, had two tiers of nationality: French citizenship and French subjecthood, see chapter two.

One of the major questions involved in this discussion was whether or not, if European powers provided these protégés with certificates of naturalization, the Turkish government would accept these people as foreign subjects. Looking at Ankara's other policies, the Ankara government could easily consider the naturalization of protégés as illegal changes of nationality and refuse to recognize their foreign status. Andrew Ryan, of the British Consulate in Istanbul, suspected that the Italians had negotiated some kind of an agreement with the Turkish delegation in Lausanne to the effect that if the Italians dropped their claims to the masses of protégés they had recently claimed during the Armistice period, the Ankara government would recognize the naturalization of Italian protégés of European origin.⁵⁸⁸ Initially, when this issue came to his attention, Consular General Telford Waugh requested that he too be authorized to issue passports to the ten British protégés as British subjects, in rough approximation of what the French and Italians were doing.⁵⁸⁹ Henderson concurred, writing,

It appears to me most undesirable to leave matters as they stand, as such holders of British passports are placed in an utterly false position. The Turkish argument is logical. Either they are British subjects and should receive passports so describing them, or they are not British subjects and have no right to British protection.⁵⁹⁰

Henderson's stance reflected the rising consensus, particularly in the aftermath of the passport clash, that there should be no in-between in terms of nationality. To this end, Henderson supported the idea of giving these protected persons passports as British subjects but making it clear that this status would not pass on to their children.

⁵⁸⁸ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 247, TNA.

⁵⁸⁹ Waugh to Curzon, Aug 11, 1923, FO 372/2056, T8921, 221, TNA.

⁵⁹⁰ Henderson to Curzon, Nov 14, 1923, FO 372/2056, T11981, 235, TNA.

The Foreign Office pointed out, however, that these British protected persons could only become British subjects by a special act of Parliament, as there was nothing in current nationality law that gave them a path to naturalization.⁵⁹¹ Considering the concern that even if they granted their protégés British certificates of nationality, the Turkish government might not recognize them as foreign subjects, the Foreign Office recommended taking no action on this front and waiting to see what would happen with the Italian and French protégés.

In the meantime, they assessed the situation of the ten British protected persons. Three of them, like Petro Damato, were born out of wedlock. One of those, Marcelle Harrison, was somehow able to be legitimized by her parents' later marriage⁵⁹² (though it is unclear why she was able to be identified as legitimate and then added to her father's passport but Petro was not). Frederick Todman, the son of two British subjects born out of wedlock in 1878, would have no such option, as his parents never married. Marcelle (b. 1889) and Eugenie (b. 1871) Pappi were the descendants of a man who rendered service to the British and was first registered as a protected person in 1850.⁵⁹³ Ryan believed that the Pappis might be able to claim Persian nationality which would exempt them from being Ottoman subjects, though he thought this would offer them little comfort.⁵⁹⁴ The five remaining protégés (George (b. 1855) and Helen (b. 1859) Petala, Sylvia Troyano (b. 1873), and Armand (b. 1860) and Rosalie (mother of Armand, birth year unknown) Raffaelli)⁵⁹⁵ were theoretically of "Ionian" origin, meaning that they might be able to claim Greek nationality even if they were not ethnically Greek, but this would be difficult to

⁵⁹¹ Malkin, handwritten note, Nov 21, 1923, FO 372/2056, T11981, 232 backside, TNA.

⁵⁹² Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 250, TNA.

⁵⁹³ Waugh to Curzon, Aug 11, 1923, FO 372/2056, T8921, 222, TNA.

⁵⁹⁴ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 251, TNA.

⁵⁹⁵ Waugh to Curzon, Aug 11, 1923, FO 372/2056, T8921, 222, TNA.

prove after so many generations in Istanbul.⁵⁹⁶ Even if it could be proved, considering the conflict between Greece and Turkey, there would be little chance of these people being able to claim Greek nationality and then remain in Istanbul.

The national status of British protected persons in Turkey was not settled by the end of 1923, and after the withdrawal of British troops and “compromised” people, the issue of British protected persons was less pressing to the Foreign Office. Most of those who held British protected person status left Istanbul before the final British military evacuation. The Ankara government allowed “Allied subjects” to leave Istanbul with passes or laissez-passer issued by their respective countries.⁵⁹⁷ Although protégés were theoretically given only a month to leave after the passport clash in December of 1922, due to the recognition of laissez-passer for Allied subjects, and the fact that it seems that the distinction between British subjects and British protected persons on travel documents wasn’t scrutinized until the summer of 1923, British protected persons were likely able to leave either on passports or emergency passes even after the passport clash. And any who might have been flagged by Turkish police in exiting could be evacuated clandestinely. Because so many British protected persons had already left, very few remained after the withdrawal of the Allies, and the leisurely pace of correspondence regarding the ones who stayed illustrates that they were not a priority to the British.

It should be noted that, of the very few British protected persons who remained in Turkey after the British evacuation, many of them were quite old. The British had, in the last few decades, tried to avoid creating more British protected persons in Istanbul, seeing little economic benefit from protégés and believing that

⁵⁹⁶ Ryan to Malkin, Dec 18, 1923, FO 372/2056, T13292, 251, TNA.

⁵⁹⁷ Agreement about passengers arriving and departing by sea, Rumbold to Curzon, April 17, 1923, FO 372/2055, T4435, 80, TNA.

they only created more of a headache with the Ottoman and later Turkish government. One way that the British began to reduce their number of British protected persons was to inform their protégés that they would not be able to pass on their status to their children. When Leonidas Eynaud gained his status as a British protected person in 1922 due to being the illegitimate son of a Mr. Eynaud and “a Greek girl other than his wife,” he was informed that while he would be registered as a British protected person, this protection would not be extended to his children.⁵⁹⁸

The British took a similar approach to those with full British nationality. At the same time, they also began to scrutinize “doubtful” cases of British nationality in Turkey, particularly in late 1922 in anticipation of conflict with the Turkish government over those who might be claimed as Ottoman subjects. Waugh wrote to the Foreign Office with six cases of people and families who were registered as British subjects but who had “doubtful” claims to British nationality.⁵⁹⁹ Among these were two Sephardic Jewish families who spoke no English and had maintained their registration as British subjects for at least fifty years. In particular, the Tarragano family’s ancestor, Haim, was the British consul in the Dardanelles in the late 1700s. This family had proven to be quite prolific and sent an extensive family tree to the British Embassy through a lawyer in order to prove their claim to British nationality.⁶⁰⁰ The Foreign Office adopted a policy that families such as this, large though it might be, could maintain their registration as British subjects throughout their lifetimes, but would not be able to pass on their British nationality to further generations.⁶⁰¹ Another family, whose Huguenot ancestor gained British nationality through a Private Act of Parliament in 1762, would be able to maintain their British

⁵⁹⁸ Waugh to FO, Mar 24/April 5, 1922, FO 1103/1775, TNA.

⁵⁹⁹ Waugh to Curzon, Dec 26, 1922, FO 372/2056, T418, 2, TNA.

⁶⁰⁰ Alfred Rizzo to Waugh, Jan 22, 1923, FO 372/2056, T1535, 61-62, TNA.

⁶⁰¹ Montgomery to Waugh, April 13, 1923, FO 372/2056, T3924, 68, TNA.

nationality and pass it on to their descendants due to the very particular manner in which they received British nationality.⁶⁰² Other doubtful cases of British nationality would simply cease to be registered as British,⁶⁰³ putting some who had long enjoyed an extraterritorial British status in a position where they either had to accept Turkish nationality or leave Turkey with the help of the British.

Many of these people would end up leaving Turkey before the withdrawal of British troops, and it was in trying to leave that their national status was often questioned. Alexander Lambros, whose story was mentioned briefly in chapter two, first requested a British passport in September 1922 due to “the growing alarm respecting safety” in Istanbul.⁶⁰⁴ He was particularly concerned for his position at the Imperial Ottoman Bank. In response to his request for a British passport, he received “a mere pass” describing him as a British protected person.⁶⁰⁵ As his father was previously a Hellenic Greek subject who naturalized in England in 1887, Alexander was approved for a full British passport as a British subject in late December 1922,⁶⁰⁶ saving him the rude awakening that Petro Damato would have in the summer of 1923 when his passport describing him as a British protected person was rejected by Turkish authorities.

The fact that Mr. Lambros’ father was a Hellenic subject and not an Ottoman Greek was important. The British showed a distinct reluctance to offer certificates of naturalization to Greeks in Turkey who could not show definitively that they were of Hellenic origin, for fear that if these people turned out to be Ottoman Greeks or have

⁶⁰² FO 372/2056, T2329, T2885, T4588, 94-111, TNA.

⁶⁰³ Some would even have their passports impounded, as in the case of a Mr. Whithall, who, after he was discovered to be the illegitimate child of a British subject, had his passport impounded. Acting Consul General Dickson, Marseilles to Consulate, Oct 23, 1923, FO 1103/710, TNA.

⁶⁰⁴ Alexander Lambros to Curzon, Oct 21, 1922, FO 372/1935, T12620, 286, TNA.

⁶⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁶ Montgomery to Waugh, Dec 26, 1922, FO 372/1935, T14639, 297, TNA.

Ottoman Greek paternity, their British naturalization would be seen as an illegal nationality change by the Turkish government. The Foreign Office believed, however, that the naturalization of Hellenic Greeks to British nationality would stand up to Turkish scrutiny.⁶⁰⁷ It is unclear whether Mr. Lambros took his British passport and left, or chose to stay in Istanbul now that his national status as a British subject was confirmed and Turkish authorities were theoretically less likely to view him as a former Ottoman subject.

The British had very little interest in leaving people of controversial nationality who were affiliated with the British behind in Turkey after they left, which is why the list of British protected persons at the end of 1923 was so short. Many left of their own accord or through British evacuation, others solidified their status as full British subjects, entitling them to a certain degree of British consular protection (though nowhere near the extraterritoriality they had enjoyed under the capitulations), while still others remained in Turkey and accepted Turkish nationality, hoping that their previous affiliation with the British had not branded them as traitors, similar to the way some of the compromised Armenians had chosen to remain behind in Istanbul.

The only person of controversial nationality for whom the British specifically tried to negotiate a way to remain in Istanbul before they withdrew was a Mr. S. de Bilinski, who was the Chairman and Managing Director of the National Bank of Turkey, which was bought by the British Trade Corporation during the occupation. Mr. Bilinski had previously been an Ottoman subject, though before the war in 1914, he had been under Austrian protection due to his Polish origins. He naturalized as a

⁶⁰⁷ This falls in line with the communication between Adnan Bey and Admiral Bristol regarding Armenian-Americans of Russian origin and Greek-Americans of Hellenic origin. Akçam and Kurt, *The Spirit of the Laws*, 134.

British subject in early 1922, likely due to the fact that he was in charge of managing quite a bit of British money and had been appointed as Commercial Advisor to the British Consulate General in Istanbul. In October 1922, when it was clear that the Treaty of Sevres and Article 128 were to be scrapped, upon realizing that his British nationality would no longer be recognized, he wrote to Rumbold asking for some amount of negotiated protection upon the withdrawal of Allied soldiers. He wrote,

I have, moreover, personally received some warnings and one in particular which I cannot disregard, that my liberty and possibly my life will be in danger if I remain in Constantinople after the Kemalists take over the city and this on the ground that, though I may consider myself a British subject, I am, under Turkish law, an Ottoman subject who has been "aiding and abetting England - the enemy."⁶⁰⁸

He went on to say that if it were just his personal safety, he would have no problem simply leaving the country, but because he was financially in charge of so many British interests, his departure might negatively affect those. Mr. Bilinski and a clerk who worked at the British Consulate were the only Ottoman subjects naturalized by the British who the British wanted to ensure could remain in Turkey after they withdrew. They believed that the clerk would be okay so long as he continued to work at the consulate, but in April 1923, the Foreign Office asked Rumbold to negotiate a special agreement specifically so that Mr. Bilinski could remain in Turkey recognized as a British subject.⁶⁰⁹ It is unclear whether or not such an agreement was arrived upon, as this was the last correspondence in the file, but it was obvious that without a special arrangement with the Ankara government, Mr. Bilinski would have to leave Turkey before the British withdrew.

⁶⁰⁸ Bilinski to Rumbold, Oct 12, 1922, FO 372/1934, T12854, 55, TNA.

⁶⁰⁹ Mounsey to Rumbold, Apr 9, 1923, FO 372/1934, T12854, 58, TNA.

By the time the last British troops left Istanbul in October 1923, the only people affiliated with the British who were left behind with ambiguous nationality were not considered a priority.

5.5 Conclusion

In 1922, many former Ottoman subjects had unclear or undefined nationality. Nation-state lines were being negotiated and redrawn, and many had to await a final peace treaty to find out where they would end up or where they could go. While many things changed in the last year of the Allied occupation of Istanbul, I have argued that one of the things that changed which would influence the nationality status of many post-Ottoman peoples was the attitude of the British towards passports and nationality. Whereas through most of 1922 the British had taken a laissez-faire attitude towards the issue of travel documents to those of ambiguous nationality, by 1923 and even more so by the end of the occupation in October, they would be much more careful. Having learned their lesson from the gurbet kafilesi, they would now make sure that they had found a state to take in refugees before they evacuated them, ensuring that they would theoretically have a path to full nationality without becoming an expense on the British Treasury. By 1923, the British would also be very careful about who they issued passports and travel documents to, even at times denying passports to their own protected persons. This shift in British attitude was largely a result of the passport clash in December of 1922, when the Ankara government asserted that no Ottoman subject should be leaving Istanbul without a Turkish passport. While post-World War I attitudes internationally were gravitating towards the idea that every person should have a defined nationality with their passport reflecting that, the Ankara government pushed the British to apply this

principle to people in Istanbul. Once the British had acquiesced, they started to embrace a policy that full passports, in general, should only be given to British subjects, marking a more intimate connection between passports and nationality, and passes or laissez-passer should only be given to people for whom the British had found a state willing to take them in and eventually naturalize them.

Colonial nationality would continue to be a messy concept, particularly as governments within the British Empire imposed passport and visa restrictions more and more along racial lines.⁶¹⁰ In the years after the Treaty of Lausanne, however, the question of legal nationality in former Ottoman territories which were now part of the British Empire would become more settled. The status of “British protected person” would linger in other extraterritorial settings for a few years longer,⁶¹¹ but the status would eventually morph into something only given to those born in British Protectorates, and there would certainly be no more in the new Turkish Republic. As the interwar period took hold, there would be less and less acceptance of nineteenth-century forms of national status.

⁶¹⁰ See Mongia.

⁶¹¹ See Stein, “Protected Persons?”

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

Mustafa Salioglu traveled from Greece to Turkey for work in 1960. He was a Greek citizen and an ethnic Turk of Western Thrace, a member of the Muslim community in Greece which had been exempt from the population exchange signed with the Treaty of Lausanne. He returned to his hometown of Komotini in Greece in 1961 and never left. His Greek nationality was revoked in 1964, and from then until 1997 at least, he lived as a stateless person in Greece, unable to collect his pension, travel, or use Greek government structures. What was the trigger which likely led to the revocation of his Greek nationality? The fact that he traveled to Turkey in 1960 and returned in 1961 without a passport.⁶¹²

Mustafa Salioglu was one of the 60,004 Greek citizens who lost their Greek nationality through Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code between 1955 and 1998⁶¹³ which stated that, “A person of non-Greek ethnic origin leaving Greece without the intention of returning may be declared as having lost Greek nationality... The Minister of the Interior decides in these matters with the concurring opinion of the National Council.”⁶¹⁴ Similar to the way the Turkish Cabinet Council reserved the right to revoke the Turkish nationality of its subjects, the Greek Minister of the Interior would be given similar powers during a later period of time. In contrast to Turkey’s denaturalization laws, passport violations were generally not the impetus behind many of these Greek citizens’ denaturalizations, but travel to Turkey was

⁶¹² Human Rights Watch interview with Mustafa Salioglu in 1997, “The Turks of Western Thrace,” Human Rights Watch Report, 18.

⁶¹³ Sitaropoulos, 107.

⁶¹⁴ “The Turks of Western Thrace,” 15.

often a factor and Greek passports were often seized in the process of denaturalization.⁶¹⁵

Article 19 was preceded by a Presidential Decree in August of 1927 which stated that “Greek citizens of non-Greek descent who leave the Greek territory with no intent to return shall lose their Greek nationality.”⁶¹⁶ We must remember that in 1927, the absent Istanbul Greeks were putting a significant amount of pressure on the Greek government to advocate for their return to Istanbul, and the Turkish Republic had just passed a law which gave the Turkish Cabinet Council the right to revoke the Turkish Nationality of anyone who had remained outside the country from the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne until the signing of the law. It is not much of a stretch to infer that these two factors were on the minds of those in the Greek government who advocated for such a decree. After all, if any one state felt the effects of Ankara’s no return policy, it was Greece. Nicholas Sitaropoulos, indeed, notes that denationalization measures in Greece were generally taken as countermeasures against policies of the Turkish Republic towards the Greeks of Istanbul, with denaturalizations of Muslim Greek citizens spiking during times of conflict between Greece and Turkey.⁶¹⁷ Ankara’s no return policy would have a ripple effect across the Aegean.

The international impact of Ankara’s no return policy is, of course, hard to measure. Between the denaturalization policies of Soviet Russia and Ankara’s no return policy, around 450,000 people would receive Nansen passports, which were issued until 1942.⁶¹⁸ As this thesis has intimated, however, this number could

⁶¹⁵ “The Turks of Western Thrace,” 17.

⁶¹⁶ As quoted in Sitaropoulos, 113.

⁶¹⁷ Sitaropoulos, 118.

⁶¹⁸ Gatrell, “The Nansen passport: the innovative response to the refugee crisis that followed the Russian Revolution.” *The Conversation*, November 6, 2017.

nowhere near scratch the surface of how many people were displaced and unable to return to their homelands in the aftermath of these tumultuous years.

Many stories of those who found themselves in the borderlands of nationality would be lost to time, and not all of them would be put in situations of murky national identity by the Soviets or the Turkish nationalists. A British consul in Skopje, for instance, in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, soon to become Yugoslavia in 1929, issued a number of visas for Istanbul to Slavic Muslims hoping to immigrate to Turkey in the spring of 1923. In exchange for extortionate amounts of money, this British consul promised these Muslims, scared for their place in the Balkans after the First World War, that they could immigrate to the newly forming Turkish Republic and provided them with entrance visas for Istanbul upon their Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes passports. Upon arrival, however, the Ankara government refused them permission to settle. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who were having their own issues with “abandoned property,”⁶¹⁹ then refused them permission to return, despite clearly being their subjects. It is unclear what happened to these people, as they appeared stuck between two states which refused to allow them in and one which had facilitated their movement but then cared little for their outcome. The British simply told the consul in Skopje to stop issuing visas for Istanbul and washed their hands of the matter.⁶²⁰

Many people would be victimized by the passport regime in its early days of near-universality. By grounding this study in the perspective of British occupation forces and foreign service administrators in Istanbul, this thesis has attempted to shed light on the complex intersection of the passport regime, nationality law, colonial

⁶¹⁹ Tasic, “Between Occupation, Exile and Unification: Sequestered and ‘abandoned’ Properties in Serbia and Yugoslavia during and after the First World War,” 176-198.

⁶²⁰ FO 372/2055, T6158, 96-104, TNA.

empire, nation-state formation, and newly-created statelessness at a time when all of these things were in flux. This study has illustrated that for most of the occupation, Allied occupation authorities enabled movement with many different kinds of travel documents, and deferred the settling of many people's national status, in a sense ignoring the cracks in nationality which would come to the surface as the Allies prepared to withdraw. The passport clash of December 1922 would mark a turning point wherein the Allies would surrender almost all control over the administration of Istanbul to the Ankara government, and would also begin to be much more cautious in their approach to passports, travel documents, and nationality. This would not, however, help the people who had already fled during the exodus in the fall and winter of 1922, many of whom would never be allowed to return to Turkey. The Odyssey of the gurbet kafilesi illustrated how harrowing the plight of stateless people could be across the Mediterranean and how quickly doors closed to many refugees. The journey of both the "compromised" Armenians and the stowaways on the Khartum illustrated that the British, in general, believed that when finding states to take in refugees, people should, wherever possible, be sent to nation-states which aligned with their ethno-religious identities. Complications and negotiations over colonial nationality and protégés would also illustrate the degree to which national status frequently had to be negotiated.

The city of Istanbul has acted as a connecting thread in this thesis, tying together the stories of people who found themselves on the margins of nationality. Between September 1922 and October 1923, the city of Istanbul saw numerous administrative structures and powers vying for control. But by the passport clash of December 4, administrative, though not military control, would solidly lie in the hands of the Ankara government. In this way, the Ankara government, through their

subtle conquest in October and November of 1922, essentially took the city hostage while negotiations were ongoing at Lausanne, pushing the Allies further and further towards accepting Turkish sovereignty.⁶²¹ The Allies, though retaining military occupation through the presence of their soldiers, were rendered more and more powerless over the city as the year went on. Many residents of Istanbul would watch and wait as the year unfolded and the fate of the city hung in the balance. Others would attempt to take their fate into their own hands and leave carrying any travel document they could get their hands on. And many of them would be unable to return.

This study has focused significantly on Ankara's no return policy, arguing that the legal logic behind it, wherein the passport became the vehicle and physical manifestation of a person's allegiance, was, despite having considerable precedent in Ottoman policy, something quite interesting and novel, holding a striking parallel with contemporary Soviet policies. While the passport would not necessarily continue to be a vehicle for state allegiance in the way that the Ankara government would assert in the 1920s, the passport and movement would become more and more intimately tied to nationality and thus statelessness as the twentieth century progressed. In thinking about the significance of Ankara's no return policy and the impact of it on the newly stateless population of the post-Ottoman world, we thus see a link between the flying-blind days of the passport regime and the later twentieth century when a passport, by and large, would come to represent a person's legal nationality, with all the facilities and barriers to movement that that would come to encompass. In this way, the period addressed in this study offered a crucial building

⁶²¹ I thank Christine Philliou for pointing this out to me.

block to the structure of the nation-state system that we have so institutionalized today.

One of the biggest benefits of unpacking this history of passports and nationality is in realizing and remembering that there was a time, not terribly long ago, when passports were not so ubiquitous. There was a time when, as Hanley might say, statelessness was almost the norm. When we look at the modern-day issue of statelessness, as in the case of Shamima Begum, with whose story this thesis began, we can point to institutional decisions which have been made to build a world wherein a person can be stripped of their nationality, and then find themselves unable to move or find refuge due to a lack of a passport.

Understanding when and why these decisions were made, along with the precedents which have paved the way for them, can allow the world to make different decisions. In the aftermath of the Second World War, which saw a humanitarian crisis which dwarfed that of the First World War, the new United Nations enshrined the right to a nationality in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,⁶²² and following that a number of international conventions on limiting statelessness wherein a large majority of countries have enshrined jus soli nationality rights for those born in their states who would otherwise be stateless.⁶²³ Nevertheless, statelessness persists, and due to the rise of the passport regime, it continues to be a problem.

⁶²² The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, December 10, 1948.

⁶²³ There were two UN conventions on statelessness in 1954 and 1961, for more on UN efforts to minimize statelessness see “UN Conventions on Statelessness,” UNHCR.

REFERENCES

ARCHIVES

The National Archives, London, UK (TNA)

Foreign Office (FO)

Home Office (HO)

War Office (WO)

Colonial Office (CO)

Rumbold Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, UK

MS Rumbold 30

Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Istanbul, Turkey (BOA)

Hariciye Nezareti, İstanbul Murahhaslığı (HR. İM.)

Dahiliye, Seyrüsefer Kalemî (DH.EUM.SSM)

United Nations Archives at Geneva (UNAG)

League of Nations Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds) 1919-1947

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES, TREATIES, AND DECLARATIONS

Agreement respecting the reciprocal restitution of interned civilians and the exchange of prisoners of war. Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923, *League of Nations Treaty Series* 36 (No. 912) 137-143.

Convention between Greece and Turkey regarding the final settlement of the questions resulting from the application of the Treaty of Lausanne and the Agreement of Athens relating to the exchange of populations. Signed at Ankara June 10, 1930. *League of Nations Treaty Series* 108 (No. 2511) 233-253.

Convention concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. Signed at Lausanne, January 30, 1923. Full text at Cambridge University Press, https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/C687F90FF3A2FDDFFB5D77551A224ABA/S0002930000109261a.pdf/vi_convention_concerning_the_exchange_of_greek_and_turkish_populations.pdf.

League of Nations, advisory technical committee for communications transit, *Passport conference preparatory documents: II. Resolutions adopted by the conference on passports, customs formalities and through tickets in Paris on October 21st, 1920*. Geneva, 1925. Full text at Almendron, <https://www.almendron.com/tribuna/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/c-641-m-230-1925-viii-en.pdf>.

The treaty of peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey. Signed at Sevres Aug 10, 1920. Full text via UK Treaties Online (UKTO), Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, Treaty Section, Treaty Series No. 11, <https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/awweb/pdfopener?md=1&did=6398>.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris, December 10, 1948. Full text at <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

LAWS, DECREES, AND GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS

UK

British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act 1914. Enacted Aug 7, 1914. Full text at <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/4-5/17/enacted>

Balfour Declaration, originally contained in Balfour to Rothschild, Nov 2, 1917. Published in the press on Nov 9th, an image of the original letter can be found at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration#/media/File:Balfour_declaration_unmarked.jpg

Cyprus Annexation Order in Council. Printed in *The London Gazette*, Dec 4, 1917, issue 30413, pg. 12678, <https://www.thegazette.co.uk/London/issue/30413/page/12678/data.pdf>

Turkey

Şeraiti muayyeneyi haiz olmayan Osmanlı tebaasının Türk vatandaşlığından iskatı hakkında kanun [Law regarding the invalidation of Turkish citizenship of Ottoman subjects not fulfilling definite conditions]. Enacted May 23, 1927, Kanun No. 1041, TBMM II. Dönem, full text at https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc005/kanuntbmmc005/kanuntbmmc00501041.pdf

Türk vatandaşlığı kanunu [Turkish citizenship law]. Enacted June 4, 1928. Kanun No. 1312, TBMM II. Dönem, full text at https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc006/kanuntbmmc006/kanuntbmmc00601312.pdf.

Türk vatandaşlığı kanunu [Turkish citizenship law]. Enacted Feb 11, 1964. Kanun No. 403, TBMM Law Publication Volume 47, full text at https://www5.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc047/kanuntbmmc047/kanuntbmmc04700403.pdf

PUBLISHED PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENTARY COLLECTIONS

Şimşir, B. (1990). *Lozan telgrafları: Türk diplomatik belgelerinde Lozan Barış Konferansı*. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi.

Woodward, E., Butler, R., & Bury, J. (1949). *Documents on British foreign policy, 1919-1939. Series 3*. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office.

MEMOIR LITERATURE, NOVELS, AND CONTEMPORARY PUBLISHED SOURCES

Der Yeghiayan, Z. (2002). *My Patriarchal memoirs* (A. Misirliyan, Trans.). Barrington RI: Mayreni.

Ebcioğlu, H. M. (1940). *Kendi yazılarıyla Refik Halid*. İstanbul: Semih Lutfi Kitabevi.

Göztepe, T. M. (1968). *Osmanoğulları'nın son Padişahı Vahideddin gurbet cehenneminde*. İstanbul: Sebil Yayinevi.

Göztepe, T. M. (1969). *Osmanoğullarının son Padişahı Vahideddin mütareke gayyasında*. İstanbul: Sebil Yayinevi.

Harington, C. (1940). *Tim Harington looks back*. London: J. Murray.

Ladas, S. (1932). *The exchange of minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*. New York: Macmillan.

Miller, D. (1929). Nationality and other problems discussed at the Hague. *Foreign Affairs (New York, N.Y.)*, 8(1), 632.

Şahnur, Şahan. (2016). *Sessiz ricat* [Silent retreat] (M. Aktokmakyan & A. Gebenlioğlu, Trans.). İstanbul: Aras Yayıncılık.

Tevfik, R. (1993). *Biraz da ben konuşayım*. İstanbul: İletişim.

Young, G. & Courtney, L. (1915). *Nationalism and war in the Near East*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of Economics and History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, G. (1926). *Constantinople*. London: Methuen & Co.

MODERN-DAY NEWS SOURCES, REPORTS, AND WEBSITES

Oxford: Sultan Abdülmecid'in torunu Fethi Sami Baltalimanlı vefat etti. (2006, December 22). *Haberler*. <https://www.haberler.com/guncel/oxford-sultan-abdulmecid-in-torunu-fethi-sami-haberi/>

Race to find girls feared to be on way to Syria. (2015, February 20). Sky News. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from <https://news.sky.com/story/race-to-find-girls-feared-to-be-on-way-to-syria-10370681>

Specia, M. (2019, February 22). *ISIS cases raise a question: What does it mean to be stateless? (Published 2019)*. The New York Times. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/22/world/middleeast/isis-shamima-begum-citizenship-stateless.html>

Specia, M. (2023, February 22). *U.K. court upholds ruling stripping Shamima Begum's citizenship*. The New York Times. Retrieved April 26, 2023, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/22/world/europe/shamima-begum-uk-citizenship-isis.html?searchResultPosition=1>

The Turks of Western Thrace. (1999, Jan) *Human Rights Watch Report 11(1)*.

UN Conventions on Statelessness. (n.d.). UNHCR. Retrieved April 28, 2023, from <https://www.unhcr.org/what-we-do/protect-human-rights/ending-statelessness/un-conventions-statelessness>

IMAGES

Departure Permit issued by Greek authorities in Smyrna to Kayos Hovardian, July 24, 1922. Houshamadyan. Retrieved from <https://www.houshamadyan.org/oda/europe/djelalian-collection-gr.html>

Mendel Kamakovsky's British laissez-passer to the United States, Nov 10, 1921. Personal Collection of Neil Kaplan.

George Nakashidze's French laissez-passer to Paris, Sept 19, 1923. French Consulate Collection, SALT Research. Retrieved from <https://archives.saltresearch.org/handle/123456789/29918>

Passport issued in the name of the Grand National Assembly to Şeyhoğlu Resul, Aug 22, 1922. Trabzon Şehir Müzesi, photograph by Yaşar Tolga Cora.

Passport issued by the Arab Government in Damascus to Varter Nazarian. Passports Issued by the Arab Government in Damascus in 1918-1920. *Syrianhistory.com*, Retrieved from <http://www.syrianhistory.com/en/photos/3734>

Levon Der-Meguerditchian's French laissez-passer to Marseilles, Dec 6, 1922. Houshamadyan. Retrieved from <https://www.houshamadyan.org/oda/europe/der-meguerditchian-coll-ger.html>

SECONDARY SOURCES

Adanır, F. (2011). Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Army and the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan War of 1912-1913. In R. G. Suny, F. M. Göçek, & N. M. Naimark (Eds), *A question of genocide: Armenians and Turks at the end of the Ottoman Empire* (pp. 113-125). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Akçam, T. (2012). *The young Turks' crime against humanity: The Armenian genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Ottoman Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Akçam, T. & Kurt, U. (2015). *The spirit of the laws: The plunder of wealth in the Armenian genocide*. New York: Berghahn Books.

Aktokmakyán, M. (2021). Hearing the retreat of Shahnur. The uncanny song of home and the self as other. *Études arméniennes contemporaines*, (13), 157-182.

Alexandris, A. (1983). The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the Greco-Turkish confrontation of 1919–1922. *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 8, 137-169.

Alexandris, A. (1983). *The Greek minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations, 1918-1974*. Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. New York: Verso.

Anghie, A. (2005). *Imperialism, sovereignty, and the making of international law*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arendt, H. (1958) *The origins of totalitarianism*. 2nd English Edition. Cleveland: Meridian Books.

Asmussen, J. (2004). Early conflicts between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus. *Cyprus Review*, 16(1), 87-106.

Ateş, S. (2013). *Ottoman-Iranian borderlands: Making a boundary, 1843-1914*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Auerbach, J. (2021). Before the mandate: British rule in Palestine, 1920–1922. *Israel Studies*, 26(3), 5-23.
- Aydin, C. (2017). *The idea of the Muslim world: A global intellectual history*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Aygün, E. (2022). What Russian-language publications tell us about refugee life in occupied Istanbul. *YILLIK: Annual of Istanbul Studies*, 4, 99-105.
- Baldwin, P. (2001). Subject to empire: Married women and the British Status of Aliens Act. *The Journal of British Studies*, 40(4), 522-556.
- Banko, L. (2016). *The invention of Palestinian citizenship, 1918-1947*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Becker, P. (2020). Remaking mobility: International conferences and the emergence of the modern passport system. In P. Becker and N. Wheatley (Eds), *Remaking Central Europe: The League of Nations and the former Habsburg lands* (pp. 193-211). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Beşikçi, M. (2012). *The Ottoman mobilization of manpower in the First World War: Between voluntarism and resistance*. Leiden: Brill.
- Bilge, A. R. (2019). İşgal İstanbul'unun kentsel dönüşümünü Beyaz Ruslar üzerinden okumak. *YILLIK: Annual of Istanbul Studies*, 1(1), 101-122.
- Bingöl, S. (2010). *150'likler meselesi: Bir ihanetin anatomisi*. Istanbul: Bengi Yayınları.
- Braude, B. (1982) Foundation myths of the Millet system. In B. Braude and B. Lewis (Eds), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The functioning of a plural society* volume 1 (pp. 69-88). New York: Holmes & Meier.
- Caplan, J. & Torpey, J. (2001). *Documenting individual identity: The development of state practices in the modern world*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Criss, B. (1999). *Istanbul under Allied occupation, 1918-1923* Leiden: Brill.
- Çağaptay, S. (2006). *Islam, secularism and nationalism in modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* London: Routledge.
- Demirci, S. (2010). Turco-British diplomatic maneuvers on the Mosul question in the Lausanne conference, 1922-1923. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 37(1), 57-71.
- Deringil, S. (2012). *Conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Divani, L. (1995). *Ελλάδα και μειονότητες: Το σύστημα διεθνούς προστασίας της Κοινωνίας των Εθνών*. Athens: Εκδόσεις Νεφέλη.
- Dölek-Sever, D. (2017). Policing the ‘suspects’: Ottoman Greeks and Armenians in Istanbul, 1914-18. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 53(4), 533-550.
- Ekmekçioğlu, L. (2016). *Recovering Armenia: The limits of belonging in post-genocide Turkey*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Ekmekçioğlu, L. (2022). Mourning bliss: Remaining Armenian(s) in occupied Constantinople. *YILLIK: Annual of Istanbul Studies*, 4, 107-113.
- Erdeha, K. (1998). *Yüzellilikler, yahut, Milli Mücadelenin muhasebesi*. Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi.
- Fahrenthold, S. (2019). *Between the Ottomans and the Entente: The First World War in the Syrian and Lebanese diaspora, 1908-1925*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fahrenthold, S. (2020). “Claimed by Turkey as subjects”: Ottoman migrants, foreign passports, and Syrian nationality in the Americas, 1915-1925. In L. Can, M. Low, K. Schull and R. Zens (Eds), *The subjects of Ottoman international law* (pp. 216-237). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Fahrmeir, A. (2007). From economics to ethnicity and back: Reflections on emigration control in Germany, 1800-2000. In N. Green and F. Weil (Eds), *Citizenship and those who leave: The politics of emigration and expatriation* (pp. 176-191). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Gatrell, P. (2017, November 6). The Nansen passport: the innovative response to the refugee crisis that followed the Russian Revolution. *The Conversation*. Retrieved April 28, 2023, from <https://theconversation.com/the-nansen-passport-the-innovative-response-to-the-refugee-crisis-that-followed-the-russian-revolution-85487>
- Genell, A. The well-defended domains: Eurocentric international law and the making of the Ottoman Office of Legal Counsel. In L. Can, M. Low, K. Schull and R. Zens (Eds), *The subjects of Ottoman international law* (pp. 36-54). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Gifford, J. (2020). *Britain in Egypt: Egyptian nationalism and imperial strategy, 1919-1931*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Gingeras, Ryan. (2008). Notorious subjects, invisible citizens: North Caucasian resistance to the Turkish National Movement in Northwestern Anatolia, 1919-23. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 40(1), 89-108.
- Ginio, E. (2016). *The Ottoman culture of defeat: The Balkan Wars and their aftermath*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Gordon, A. (2019). Rejecting partition: The imported lessons of Palestine's binational Zionists. In A. Dubnov and L. Robson (Eds). *Partitions: A transnational history of 20th Century territorial separatism* (pp. 179-180). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Gökner, E. (2014). Reading occupied Istanbul: Turkish subject-formation from historical trauma to literary trope. *Culture, Theory and Critique*, 55(3), 321-341.
- Gutman, D. (2016). Travel documents, mobility control, and the Ottoman State in an age of global migration, 1880–1915. *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, 3(2), 347-368.
- Gutman, D. (2019). *The politics of Armenian migration to North America, 1885-1915: Sojourners, smugglers and dubious Citizens*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Halabi, A. (2012). Liminal loyalties: Ottomanism and Palestinian responses to the Turkish War of Independence, 1919–22. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 41(3), 19-37.
- Hanley, W. (2013). When did Egyptians stop being Ottomans? An imperial case study. In Willem Maas (Eds), *Multilevel citizenship: Democracy, citizenship, and constitutionalism* (pp. 89-109). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Hanley, W. (2014). Statelessness: An invisible theme in the history of international law. *European Journal of International Law*, 25(1), 321.
- Hanley, W. (2015). Papers for going, papers for staying: Identification and subject formation in the Eastern Mediterranean. In L. Kozma, C. Schayegh, and A. Wishnitzer (Eds), *A global Middle East: Mobility, materiality and culture in the modern age, 1880-1940* (pp. 177-200). London: Tauris.
- Hanley, W. (2016). What Ottoman nationality was and was not. *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, 3(2), 277-298.
- Hanley, W. (2017). *Identifying with nationality: Europeans, Ottomans, and Egyptians in Alexandria*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Hathaway, J. (1984). The evolution of refugee status in international law: 1920—1950. *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 33(2), 348-380.
- Herzog, C. (2011). Migration and the state: On Ottoman regulations concerning migration since the age of Mahmud II. In U. Freitag (Eds), *The city in the Ottoman Empire: Migration and the making of urban modernity* (pp. 119-121). London: Routledge.
- Hirschon, R. (1998). *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The social life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus*. New York: Berghahn Books.

- Holland, R. (1998). *Britain and the revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ispahani, M. (2018). *Building sovereignty in the late Ottoman world: Imperial subjects, consular networks and documentation of individual identities* (Unpublished PhD Thesis. Columbia University, New York).
- Jeffery, K. & Sharp, A. (1987). Lord Curzon and secret intelligence. In C. Andrew & J. Noakes (Eds), *Intelligence and international relations 1900-1945* (pp. 103-126). Exeter, UK: University of Exeter.
- Kalm, S. (2017). Standardizing movements: The international passport conferences of the 1920s. *STANCE Working Papers Series*, 2017(8), 1-38.
- Kamouzis, D. (2017). Out of harm's way? Structural violence and the Greek Orthodox Community of Istanbul during World War I. *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, 4(1), 189-211.
- Kamouzis, D. (2020). *Greeks in Turkey: Elite nationalism and minority politics in late Ottoman and Early Republican Istanbul*. London: Routledge.
- Karaveli, O. (2009). *Ali Kemal, "belki de bir günah keçisi."* Istanbul: Doğan Kitap.
- Kayaoğlu, T. (2010). *Legal imperialism: Sovereignty and extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- King, C. (2015). *Midnight at the Pera Palace: The birth of modern Istanbul*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company.
- Kırlı, B. K. (2005). Forgetting the Smyrna fire. *History Workshop Journal*, 60(1), 25-44.
- Koessler, Maximilian. (1946). "Subject," "Citizen," "National," and "Permanent Allegiance." *The Yale Law Journal*, 56(1), 58-76.
- Kornioti, N. (2020). The island of Cyprus, sovereignty, and international law in the early decades of British rule (1878-1923). *Cyprus Review (Nicosia, Cyprus: 1989)*, 32(2), 105-121.
- Koufopoulou, S. (2003). Muslim Cretans in Turkey: The reformulation of ethnic identity in an Aegean community. In R. Hirschon (Eds). *Crossing the Aegean: An appraisal of the 1923 compulsory population exchange between Greece and Turkey* (pp. 209-219). New York: Berghahn Books.
- Lohr, E. (2003). *Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The campaign against enemy aliens during World War I*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

- Lohr, E. (2012). *Russian citizenship: From empire to Soviet Union*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Lucassen, L. (2001). A many-headed monster: The evolution of the passport system in the Netherlands and Germany in the long Nineteenth century. In J. Caplan and J. Torpey (Eds), *Documenting individual identity: The development of state practices in the modern world* (pp. 235-255). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- MacArthur-Seal, D. (2013). Intelligence and Lloyd George's secret diplomacy in the Near East, 1920–1922. *The Historical Journal*, 56(3), 707-728.
- MacArthur-Seal, D. (2017). Intoxication and imperialism. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, 37(2), 299-313.
- MacArthur-Seal, D. (2018). Resurrecting legal extraterritoriality in occupied Istanbul, 1918-1923. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 54(5), 769-787.
- MacArthur-Seal, D. (2021). *Britain's Levantine empire, 1914-1923*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MacMillan, M. (2002). *Paris 1919: Six months that changed the world*. New York: Random House.
- Marrus, M. (2002). *The unwanted: European refugees from the First World War through the Cold War*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- May, A. (2015). "The Starched boundaries of civilization": Sympathetic allegiance and the subversive politics of affect in colonial India. In W. Jackson and E. Manktelow (Eds), *Subverting empire: Deviance and disorder in the British colonial world* (pp. 61-84). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Mays, D. Recounting the past, shaping the future: Ladino literary representations of World War I. In M. Rozenblit and J. Karp (Eds), *World War I and the Jews: Conflict and transformation in Europe, the Middle East, and America* (pp. 201-221). New York: Berghahn Books.
- McKeown, A. (2008). *Melancholy order: Asian migration and the globalization of borders*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Mills, A. (2017). The cultural geopolitics of ethnic nationalism: Turkish urbanism in occupied Istanbul (1918-1923). *Annals of the American Association of Geographers*, 107(5), 1179-1193.
- Mills, A. (2018). Becoming blind to the landscape: Turkification and the precarious national future in occupied Istanbul. *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association*, 5(2), 99-117.

- Mills, A. (2022, Jul 1). *Turkish masculinity in the occupied city* [Conference presentation]. Occupied Istanbul: Urban Politics, Culture, and Society, 1918-1923, Boğaziçi University, video of presentation, 21:48. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TvhZQ5sH-qo>
- Minault, G. (1982). *The Khilafat movement: Religious symbolism and political mobilization in India*. New York ; Guildford: Columbia University Press.
- Minasidis, C. (2020). Experiencing and surviving the Great War: Greek Orthodox citizen soldiers under the Ottoman banner. *Archiv Orientalní*, 88(3), 341-373.
- Mongia, R. (1999). Race, nationality, mobility: A history of the passport. *Public Culture*, 11(3), 527-555.
- Morack, E. (2017). *The dowry of the state?: The politics of abandoned property and the population exchange in Turkey, 1921-1945*. Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press.
- Oğuz, Ç. (2021). Practicing national hegemony: The anti-enemy alien regime on the Ottoman homefront during the First World War. In M. Aglietti (Eds), *Citizenship under pressure: Naturalisation policies from the late XIX century until the aftermath of the World War I* (pp. 151-171). Rome: Temi E Testi.
- Olçay, T. (2022). The cultural heritage of the White Russian emigration in Istanbul. *Quaestio Rossica*, 10(4), 1318-1333.
- Özoğlu, H. (2011). *From caliphate to secular state: Power struggle in the early Turkish Republic*. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger.
- Özyürek, E. (2009). Christian and Turkish: Secularist fears of a converted nation. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East*, 29(3), 398-412.
- Pece, U. Z. (2020). The conscription of Greek Ottomans into the Sultan's army, 1908–1912. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 52(3), 433-448.
- Pedersen, S. (2015). *The guardians: The League of Nations and the crisis of empire*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Philliou, C. (2021). *Turkey: A past against history*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Qureshi, M. (2009). *Pan-Islam in British India: The politics of the Khilafat movement, 1918-1924*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rubin, A. (2016). Modernity as a code: The Ottoman Empire and the global movement of codification. *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, 59(5), 828-856.

- Salter, M. (2003). *Rights of passage: The passport in international relations*. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Schneider, D. (2007). The United States government and the investigation of European emigration in the open door era. In N. Green and F. Weil (Eds), *Citizenship and those who leave: The politics of emigration and expatriation* (pp. 195-210). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Sonyel, S. (1991). The protégé system in the Ottoman Empire. *Journal of Islamic Studies (Oxford, England)*, 2(1), 56-66.
- Stein, S. (2011). Protected persons? The Baghdadi Jewish diaspora, the British state, and the persistence of empire. *The American Historical Review*, 116(1), 80-108.
- Stein, S. (2016). *Extraterritorial dreams: European citizenship, Sephardi Jews, and the Ottoman twentieth century*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Stoler, A. (2016). *Duress: Imperial durabilities in our times*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Şekeryan, A. (2019). Romioi-Armenian friendship in the Ottoman Empire during the Armistice period (1918-1923). *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 46(1), 139-157.
- Şekeryan, A. (2022). *The Armenians and the fall of the Ottoman Empire: After genocide, 1918-1923*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Singha, R. (2013). The Great War and a 'proper' passport for the colony: Border-crossing in British India, c.1882–1922. *The Indian Economic and Social History Review*, 50(3), 289-315.
- Sitaropoulos, N. (2006). Discriminatory denationalisations based on ethnic origin: The dark legacy of ex art 19 of the Greek Nationality Code. In P. Shah and W. Menski (Eds), *Migration, diasporas and legal systems in Europe* (pp. 107-125). London: Routledge-Cavendish.
- Suny, R. (2015). *"They can live in the desert but nowhere else": A history of the Armenian genocide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tagliaferri, F. V. (2016). In the process of being levantines. The 'levantinization' of the Catholic community of Izmir (1683-1724). *Turkish Historical Review*, 7(1), 86-112.
- Tasic, D. (2021). Between occupation, exile and unification: Sequestered and 'abandoned' properties in Serbia and Yugoslavia during and after the First World War. *European Review of History: Revue Européenne D'histoire*, 28(2), 176-198.

- Tejel, J., & Öztan, R. (2022). *Regimes of mobility: Borders and state formation in the Middle East, 1918-1946*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Torpey, J. (2000). *The invention of the passport: Surveillance, citizenship and the state*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Torpey, J. (2001). The Great War and the birth of the modern passport system. In J. Caplan and J. Torpey (Eds), *Documenting individual identity: The development of state practices in the modern world* (pp. 256-270). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Tunçay, M. (1991, July). Zincire vurulmuş cumhuriyet. *Tarih ve Toplum* 16 (91), 6, 19.
- Üngör, Ü. (2017). Becoming and unbecoming refugees: the long ordeal of Balkan Muslims, 1912-34. In P. Gatrell & L. Zhvanko (Eds), *Europe on the move: Refugees in the era of the Great War* (pp. 304-327). Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Üngör, Ü. & Polatel, M. (2011). *Confiscation and destruction: The young Turk seizure of Armenian property*. London: Continuum.
- Ünlü, T. (2019). II. Meşrutiyet ve erken Cumhuriyet dönemlerinde İttihatçı bir fedai ve Milletvekili Atıf Kamçıl (Unpublished Master's thesis). Fatih Sultan Mehmet University, Istanbul, Turkey.
- Watenpaugh, K. (2015). *Bread from stones: The Middle East and the making of modern humanitarianism*. Oakland: University of California Press.
- Yosmaoğlu, I. (2006). Counting bodies, shaping souls: The 1903 census and national identity in Ottoman Macedonia. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 38(1), 55-77.
- Zahra, T. (2014). Travel agents on trial: Policing mobility in East Central Europe, 1889–1989. *Past & Present*, 223(223), 161-193.
- Zürcher, E. J. (1984). *The Unionist factor: The role of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish National Movement, 1905-1926*. Leiden: Brill.
- Zürcher, E. J. (1996). Between death and desertion. The Ottoman Army in World War I. *Turica* 28, 235-258.
- Zürcher, E. J. (1999). The Ottoman conscription system in theory and practice, 1844-1918. In E. Zürcher (Eds), *Arming the state: Military conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia, 1775-1925* (pp. 88-89). New York: I.B.Tauris & Co.
- Zürcher, E. J. (2002). Ottoman labour battalions in World War I. *The Armenian Genocide and the Shoah*, 187-195.

Zürcher, E. J. (2009). Refusing to serve by other means: desertion in the late Ottoman Empire. In Ö. H. Çınar & C. Üsterci (Eds), *Conscientious objection: Resisting militarized society* (pp. 45-52). London: Zed Books.

Zürcher, E. J. (2017). *Turkey: A modern history* (Fourth ed.). London: I.B. Tauris.