THE CONCEPT OF *BILDUNG* IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPEAN NOVEL

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ABSTRACT

THE CONCEPT OF *BILDUNG* IN HEGEL'S PHENOMENOLOGY AND NINETEENTH CENTURY EUROPEAN NOVEL

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This thesis presents an analysis of the pattern of *Bildung* (formation, development, education) in Hegel's *Phenomenologie des Geistes* (Phenomenology of Mind/Spirit) upon a background of nineteenth century novel. Focusing on the tradition of romantic realism in European novel from Dickens to Dostoyevsky, the analysis covers a critical review of Hegel's conception of Spirit, and a discussion of the problem of morality in *Phenomenology.*

ÖZET

Bu tez, Hegel'in Fenomenoloji'sindeki oluşum (*Bildung*) temasını 19.yüzyıl romanı ile bağlantılandırarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu inceleme, Avrupa romanında Dickens'dan Dostoyevski'ye kadar uzanan romantik gerçekçilik geleneği çerçevesinde, Hegel felsefesinde tinin (*Geist*) oluşumunu ve ahlak sorununu eleştirel bir yaklaşımla konu almaktadır.

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I. GERMAN IDEALISM AND HEGEL' S PHENOMENOLOGY

"Every realist is a reformed idealist, whose commentary is to be deduced from the ideals he has lived upon"

Harry Levin

Hegel's task in Phenomenology was - like many other philosophers - to offer a systematic account of the ultimate nature of reality. In this quest, what Hegel shares with his predecessors is his vision of philosophy that is based upon maintaining access to a basic truth about reality; as he puts it, philosophy is "the science of the Absolute". However, what makes Hegel unique in the history of philosophy is the solution he presents to the thematic and methodological problems that philosophy has to face on its way towards the Absolute. In dealing with the ongoing problems of philosophy, Hegel radically altered the traditional perspective, and, in a sense, made a fresh start.

The main problem for Hegel, as it was for many others, was to overcome the dichotomy of the subject and the object, the knower and the known. The subject-object dichotomy is the outcome of the dichotomy of knowledge and reality. What is

philosophical activity if not knowing the truth about reality? And if this process of knowing does not overcome the dichotomy at the end of its activity, then the process itself is nullified. Therefore, the aim of this process is to bridge the gap between the knower and the known, and achieve the identity of subject and object, truth and reality. But how can one present a proof of one's truth claims about reality?

This is the very point that moved Hegel to the realization that only a "Phenomenology of Spirit", that presents a process of natural consciousness towards the Absolute in the form of philosophical consciousness, could entail the gradual development from the subjective to the objective, i.e., from certainty to truth. According to Hegel, the validity claims of science can not be justified in any other way than by their emergence in consciousness which constitutes both the structure and meaning of Phenomenology. Thus, what Hegel aims at in Phenomenology is to show that the Absolute is subject, and this is the standpoint from which we can attain the ultimate truth about reality, which is nothing but the journey of consciousness through the moments of self-certainty.

As Joseph C. Flay puts it, Hegel's task in Phenomenology is both separate from, and closely connected to, that of traditional philosophy:

"It is, rather, a work which has a task that is separate from, and yet absolutely necessary for, the system of philosophical sciences. It is separate from the system, because the problem of demonstrating that one has a right to explicate truth is radically different from the problem of actually carrying out that explication of truth. On the other hand, it is necessary for and thus intrinsic to the task of a systematic explication of reality because without such a demonstration one's claims about reality are all simply professions or mere asseverations of certainty, equal but not demonstrably superior to the claims made by others."[1]

Does Hegel break off with traditional philosophy, or does he view his system in continuity with previous systems of Western philosophy? Hegel's answer would be in the affirmative to both. On one hand, Hegel was definitely convinced of the novelty of his system; he set out to accomplish what the tradition had failed to do, i.e., bridging the gap between the subjective and the objective. On the other hand, in rejecting the traditional forms of self-certainty - where truth is claimed to be immediate, self-evident, or innate -, Hegel sees himself as in

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[1] Flay, C. Joseph., "Hegel's Quest for Certainty", State University of New York Press, New York, 1984, p.3

continuity both with the previous philosophical schools and the natural consciousness in progress.

Philosophy, for Hegel, is an experience that individual consciousness goes through, a process of self-discovery, where discovery means the unfoldment of a self-conscious Absolute. All philosophical doctrines, thus, appear as ways of life rather than being expositions of philosophical thought. The experience that consciousness goes through is not only theoretical experience, an activity of knowing, but also a practical experience; it involves not only knowledge of the object, but the whole of experience. Therefore, absolute knowledge requires a complete unity of Praxis and Theoria. As Hegel puts it,

"To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, because what is, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts." [2]

Is Hegel an idealist? His successors and critics find it very hard to agree on this highly debatable issue. Various readings and interpretations of Hegel are available; Marxist, religious

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[2]Hegel, "Philosophy of Right", translated by T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967, p.11

or existentialist analyses all point to different elements in Hegel's philosophy, and sometimes adopt opposite perspectives in evaluating his work. This variety of commentaries on Hegel rests in the originality and broad scope of his philosophy which is clearly outlined in his major work Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes (Phenomenology of Mind/Spirit).

In the introduction to Phenomenology, Hegel poses the problem and determines the method to solve it. Phenomenology, for Hegel, is the knowledge of the Absolute, since "only the Absolute is true, and the True is absolute"[3] The originality of Hegel -which I will further discuss in detail- lies in the point that he starts with knowledge as it is present in individual consciousness, or naive consciousness, as Hegel calls it, and moves step by step from this phenomenal knowledge to absolute knowledge. In doing this, he adopts a specific technique based on the negativity of self-consciousness engaged in experience, which results in a necessary development towards the Absolute.

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[3]Hegel, G.W.F., "The Phenomenology of Mind", translated by J. B. Baille, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1967, p.133

In order to be able to give an answer to the question we posed above, and grasp the meaning of Hegel's philosophy, we have to trace it back to German Idealism, where we will find the first formulations of the problem.

German idealism has its roots in Kant's critical philosophy. Kant had reacted against the claims of rationalist metaphysics which assumed that human reason was capable of knowing ultimate reality. Against this view, Kant established his critical philosophy which consisted in describing the limits beyond which the human mind could never proceed.

Very roughly, his argument is that the mind is structured in such a way that is forever barred from going beyond sense experience, i.e. the realm of phenomena. According to Kant, our interpretation of the world of experience is determined by the categories that the mind imposes upon the objects of experience. The categories such as cause and effect, existence and negation, and all the others, are concepts that the mind possesses prior to experience and employs in relation to

objects, and this, according Kant, is what makes knowledge possible.

Kant's critical method, however, is based on a duality of realms: in addition to the world of phenomena, there is also the world 'beyond' phenomena; i.e. the noumenal world, which is purely intelligible or nonsensual reality. The realm of noumena consists of things-in-themselves (Ding an sich), or things as they really are independent of our perception. According to Kant, we can never have an experience of a nonsensuous perception, or in other words, we can never know the thing-in-itself.

It is this duality, that creates the major difficulty involved in not only Kantian philosophy, but also German Idealism in general. On the one hand, all that we can know are sensible objects, and on the other hand, we still know that the existence of our world of experience is not produced by the mind. The mind rather imposes its ideas upon experience, which is derived from the world of things-in-themselves. This means simply that there is a reality beyond our understanding, a reality that is external to us, and that exists independently

of us, and that we can know it only as it appears to us, or as it is organized by us. Thus, in Kantian philosophy, the concept of thing-in-itself functions as a device determining the limits of our knowledge, rather than a tool used to enlarge it.

However, to have unity of knowledge of experience implies a unity of the self, a subject. All the activities of the mind must occur in some single subject, since, otherwise phenomenal knowledge would be impossible. This single subject that accomplishes this unifying activity is what Kant calls "the transcendental unity of apperception". (It is transcendental because like other objects (Objekt) the self can not know itself directly, and since its knowledge is reflected to itself through a medium, it remains as an "other" to itself.) In the act of unifying all the elements of experience, the self is conscious of its own unity, so that the unity of experience and the unity of self-consciousness occur simultaneously. In other words, this self, just as it does not know things-in-themselves, so it does not know itself in-itself. What the self is granted is only the derived knowledge that any knowledge of experience implies a unified self. This duality between the phenomenal and the noumenal realms makes it impossible for the

knower (the subject) to retain itself in its object of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of knowledge from the point of view of the idealists.

The idealists, especially Fichte, recognized the contradiction in Kant's argument concerning the thing-in-itself. His argument is simply as follows: How is it possible to say that something is and we can know nothing about it? Moreover, Kant does not only say that the thing-in-itself is, but he also asserts that the thing-in-itself is the cause of any given sensation. However, he also argues that the categories of cause and effect, and of existence could not be employed to provide us with knowledge about the noumenal world. Therefore, in Kantian system to say that something is unknowable is contradictory, because such a statement implies that we already know that something is , and to that extent it is knowable. Thus, the conception of the thing-in-itself fails in Kantian system, since it violates Kant's own rules for limiting the categories of cause and existence to objects of sense experience.(Gegenstand)

The idealists put forward the opposite thesis: Instead of detaching the object of knowledge from the knower, they attempted to establish systems of thought where knowledge of the thing-in-itself falls within the scope of the knower. As we shall see, it was not until Hegel that the gap between the knower and the known, between the subject and the object was bridged.

Fichte adopted Kant's method with the exception of the concept of the unknowable thing-in-itself, and attacking the Kantian duality of the noumenal and the phenomenal selves attempted to achieve an integrity of the self which constitutes the sole ground of knowledge. Reversing the traditional point of view that knowledge comes before action, he based his philosophy upon the absolutization of a subject as a moral agent; primarily a doer rather than a knower. According to Fichte, the subject that recognizes itself as a moral agent in its immediate subjectivity is guided only by the principle of <u>freedom</u>. The subject, for Fichte, is nothing but the <u>purpose</u> it actualizes. My will, my moral vocation, being independent of all reality, constitutes the essence of my existence, and is the basis of all certainty. My purpose is not based on any

external truth, on the contrary, all reality is based on and conditioned by it. "Our world is the sensualized material of our duty", which is the essence of all appearances. According to Fichte, if we consult our own inner nature,

"... then you will find that the moral world order is the absolute beginning of all objective knowledge (just as your freedom and your moral vocation are the absolute beginning of all subjective knowledge) and all other objective knowledge must be founded and conditioned by it, while the moral world order itself can not be conditioned by anything else, since outside of it there is nothing else. You can not even attempt the explanation (of the moral order) without falsifying and endangering the nature of the original assumption. The assumption of a moral world order is such that it is absolutely self-evident and it does not tolerate any supporting arguments."[4] (emphasis mine)

Fichte's approach to the problem of Kantian duality between the two worlds is a reductionist one, and like all reductionist theories it fails to present a resolution to the problem, which establishes a unity between the two elements of the dichotomy. He attempts to solve the problem by simply overlooking the existence of the sensible world, the world of appearances. It is reduced to nothing but a reflection of the supersensible world, the world of intelligible laws, our own inner activity.

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[4]Fichte, J.G., "On the Foundation of Our Belief in a Divine Government of the Universe", "Nineteenth Century Philosophy", edited by Paul Edwards and Richard Popkin, The Free Press, New York, 1969, p. 25

Schelling, however, contraposed an ontological conception to the philosophies of reflection of Kant and Fichte. According to Schelling, it is necessary to pass beyond the critical point of view, and to start straightaway with the absolute identity of the subjective and the objective. The knowledge of this identity, for him, is primary and constitutes the basis of all true philosophical knowledge.

Both Schelling and Hegel reacted against the use of knowledge as an instrument which modifies the object to be known, and fails to present it to us as a thing-in-itself. It is because, if knowledge remains as a medium, it necessarily follows that it does not transmit the truth to us without altering it. What we get is the knowledge of knowledge, a second-hand information, if we may call it so. Knowledge as an instrument implies that the subject and the object of knowledge are detached from each other. But then, the Absolute can not become self-knowledge, nor can we claim to have the knowledge of the Absolute.

In his introduction to Phenomenology, Hegel criticizes any philosophy that is only a theory of knowledge:

"It starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument , and as a medium; and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this knowledge. More especially, it takes for granted that the Absolute stands on one side, and that knowledge on the other side, by itself and cut off from the Absolute, is still something real; in other words, that knowledge, which, by being outside the Absolute, is certainly also outside truth, is nevertheless true - a position which, while calling itself fear of error, makes itself known rather as fear of truth." [5]

Philosophy as the science of the Absolute, according to Hegel, should straight away reject such presuppositions as "adventitious and arbitrary ideas", since these conceptions lead us not to the Absolute but to the depths of relativism.

Schelling, when he contraposed phenomenal knowledge to the knowledge of the Absolute, had precisely this problem in his mind. But instead of establishing the identity of the two -as Hegel did - he insisted in the priority of the Absolute, and fell into the same trap where phenomenal knowledge remains cut off from absolute knowledge. The problem with Schelling is that

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[5]Hegel, G.W.F., "The Phenomenology of Mind", p.133

he asserts that phenomenal knowledge is possible once absolute knowledge is posited, but he fails to show how.

Hegel, on the contrary, starts from the other end, and shows how absolute knowledge is possible through phenomenal knowledge, or how individual consciousness necessarily leads to universal consciousness, and , in addition to that, how phenomenal knowledge is the absolute knowledge which does not yet know itself as itself, i.e. as the Absolute. At the beginning of Phenomenology, when Hegel starts with naive consciousness, he, in a sense, returns to the point of view of Kant, where consciousness appears as "the transcendental unity of apperception", capable only of possessing the knowledge of the phenomenal at this stage. However, in Hegel's philosophy the point of view of such naive consciousness is only an early step which will gradually lead consciousness to philosophic knowledge of the Absolute. According to Hegel, one can not begin with the Absolute, as Schelling did:

"For the naive consciousness to give itself up completely and straight away to science is to make an attempt, induced by some unknown influence, all at once to walk on its head. The compulsion to take up this attitude and move about in this position, is a constraining force it is urged to fall in with, without ever being prepared for it and with no apparent necessity for doing so. Let science be per se what it likes, in

its relation to naive immediate self-conscious life it presents the appearance of being the reversal of the latter; or, again, because naive self-consciousness finds the principle of its reality in the certainty of itself, science bears the character of unreality, since consciousness for-itself is a state quite outside of science. Science has for that reason to combine that other element of self-certainty with its own, or to show that the other element belongs to itself, and how it does so. When devoid of that sort of reality, science is merely the content of mind qua something implicit or potential (an sich); purpose, which at the start is no more than something internal ; not spirit, but at first merely spiritual substance." [6]

The target of Hegel's criticism here is, obviously Shelling, who by starting with the Absolute at the first hand rejects the moments that compose it, and makes the Absolute into a thought-entity detached from its content. In other words, what Schelling misses is the justification for dialectical progress and the transition from Idea to Nature.

"(For Schelling) ... pure thought can not result in true movement or in any vital perception of the world, because there is no empirical basis for the deliberate lack of preconditions in its immanent movement. The synthesis of 'becoming' out of pure being and nothingness is an illusion. An 'abstraction of an abstraction' such as pure and vacuous being, can never proceed from itself, go toward something, and return to itself, or even give itself up to nature. This can be done only by something that really is, something positive." [7]

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[6]ibid., p.87-88

[7]Löwith, Karl., "From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought", translated by David E. Green, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1964, p. 116

In Hegel's philosophy, however, what moves the process forward is nothing but the negativity that is at the heart of his dialectical method. In the following chapters we will show the method of Phenomenology in detail, and present a deeper analysis of the concept of negativity.

Hegel's Phenomenology, in a sense, is the actualization of Schelling's absolute not only as substance, but also as subject. For Hegel, Schelling's absolute is only possible, if one starts not with nature but with consciousness, granting it the subjectivity that Fichte regarded as essential in his approach to the problem. Thus, for Hegel, the problem with Schelling and Fichte is that the former bases his philosophy on the absolute mind as substance failing to capture the subjectivity involved in it, and that the latter adopted subjectivism and reduced all reality to it.

For Hegel, the Absolute is the unity of these two moments; it is a dialectical process where Fichte's self, at the end, discovers itself as Schelling's Absolute, i.e. self-knowledge of the Absolute. Hegel's main task in Phenomenology, therefore, is to lead us from empirical to philosophic knowledge, from

certainty to truth. In this respect, Phenomenology presents itself as the 'itinerary of the soul', a history of consciousness, which is identical with this consciousness qua the Absolute.

"Now because this exposition has for its object only phenomenal knowledge, the exposition itself seems not to be science, free, self-moving in the shape proper to itself, but may, from this point of view, be taken as the pathway of the natural consciousness which is pressing forward true knowledge. Or it can be regarded as the path of the soul, which is traversing the series of its own forms of embodiment, like stages appointed for it by its own nature, that it may possess the clearness of spiritual life when, through the complete experience of its own self, it arrives at the knowledge of what it is in itself." [8]

The experience that consciousness goes through is not only theoretical experience, an activity of knowing, but also a practical experience; it involves not only knowledge of the object, but the whole of self-conscious experience. Therefore, absolute knowledge requires a complete unity of Praxis and Theoria which can be regarded as an attempt to regain the Greek notion of "sophrosyne", as Canevi points out:

"Philosophy comes to an end with Hegel not because it has completed its task but because it is robbed of its ground. If the Absolute comes to know itself through the philosophy of Hegel, in so far as the Absolute is all that there is, there

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[8] Hegel, G.W.F., "The Phenomenology of Mind", p. 135

isn't any further need for philosophy. If philosophy does not have its being in sophrosyne, in dispositions of a living man in pluralistic society, it becomes not only meaningless but extinct." [9]

Before we conclude, we should return to the question we posed at the very beginning. At this point, having gone through the philosophies of German idealists, we ought to reconsider the question whether Hegel is an idealist. I would like to emphasize the fact that Hegel was not an idealist in the sense that Schelling and Fichte were. The reactions against Hegel, blaming him of having reduced all reality to Idea (in the sense of an abstract universal lacking empirical content), I find, definitely unfair. Such criticism misses the essence of Hegel's work, his enormous effort to escape from such a point of view, and reduces his philosophy to the narrow limits of idealism.

I prefer to regard and evaluate Hegel's philosophy as the work of a "reformed idealist"; or a realist of a rare kind, who absolutizes the process of self-discovery, where discovery

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[9] Canevi, Pınar, "Subjectivity without Subjectivism: An Essay on Charmides", p. 11

means the unfoldment of a self-conscious Absolute, whether it be called nature, universe, or history.

II. PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT AS AN ITINERARY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The path that Hegel follows in his Phenomenology of Spirit is the one that leads natural consciousness to absolute knowledge. As Hegel puts it, his main task in Phenomenology is "conducting the individual mind from its unscientific standpoint to that of science, ... to contemplate the formative development (Bildung) of the universal (or general) individual, of self-conscious spirit." [10]

This development of natural consciousness into philosophic knowledge presumes the discovery of the necessary stages involved in the process. These stages are already immanent in consciousness at the beginning of the process, since it possesses within itself the whole substance of its time. [11]

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[10]Hegel, G.W.F. "The Phenomenology of Mind", p. 89

[11]Hegel, when he uses substance (Substanz) in the philosophical sense, has Spinoza in mind. He viewed Spinozism as 'a denial of the world', which holds that only God or substance is fully real, while wordly things are only appearances (Scheine). For Hegel, a substance is in constant activity, generating and dissolving its accidents. Substance appears or 'shines' in its accidents and they are its apperance (Schein). But this shining produces not only the accidents, but substance itself: substance is only substance in virtue of producing and dissolving accidents . Thus the accidents are or include substance, just as much as substance includes its accidents.
Hegel, regularly, contrasts substance with the subject, the concept, and Spirit. He argues that the absolute is the subject , as well as substance, and that substance must become a subject. (Michael Inwood, "A Hegel Dictionary", Blackwell Publishers, USA, 1992)

Therefore, the process that consciousness goes through is a process of self-discovery or self-formation. Self-discovery, for Hegel, is a process where individual consciousness rediscovers the universal history of the world in himself. Hegel calls it an "educational progress where we see the history of world culture delineated in faint outline."[12] It is this history of universal culture (Bildung) that Hegel sees essential to the process of formation of individual consciousness towards absolute knowledge. Thus, as Hyppolyte points out in his analysis of Hegel's Phenomenology, there is a certain relation between Phenomenology and philosophy of history, or world history:

"Phenomenology is the concrete, explicit development and formation of the individual, the rise of his finite self to absolute self. But that elevation is possible only through the use of the moments of world history, moments which are immanent in that individual consciousness. Instead of being satisfied with well-known representations which, precisely because they are familiar are in fact not known, individual consciousness must analyze and develop within himself. Thus, it will rediscover within himself the earlier phases of history, and instead of traversing them without seeing what is at stake, it will, on the contrary, have to dwell in them and to reconstitute its past experience in order that the meaning of that experience appear to it. " [13]

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[12]Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Mind", p. 90

[13]Hyppolite, Jean, "Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit", (transl. by Samuel Cherniak and John Heckman), Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1974, pp.40-41

Then we can say that Hegel's Phenomenology is based on a twofold assumption: the attainment of philosophical knowledge through the development of empirical knowledge, and the emergence of individual consciousness from its seemingly isolated position to universal consciousness. Though these two tasks that Phenomenology sets itself are not separable from each other, the first one can be viewed as an epistemological and the second as an ontological approach. While raising natural consciousness from an abstractly specific 'I' to the universal 'I' that embraces, or contains within itself the whole spirit of its time, he also makes it possible for consciousness to attain absolute knowledge, since this knowledge is nothing but the awareness of itself as itself, i.e., the consciousness of spirit. Thus Hegel's primary task is to show that individual consciousness should be aware of its ontological relation to other individual consciousnesses, and this is at the very heart of its being. Therefore, Spirit for Hegel is the experience of a subject that is plural rather than singular, or as Hegel puts it is an "Ego that is 'we', a plurality of Egos, and 'we' that is a single Ego."[14]

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[14]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", p. 227

In order to grasp what Hegel means by "Ego in relation to another Ego", we have to delve a little bit further into some Hegelian concepts, and present a brief analysis of his method in Phenomenology, which, I believe, will be helpful to see the parallelisms between the structure of Hegel's work and Bildungsromane of the time.

Phenomenology is the study of consciousness which goes through a series of experiences and discovers itself at the very end of this process to be identical with universal consciousness, which is nothing but the process itself. The road that leads to universal consciousness is a crooked path full of illusions, and negative consequences. As Hegel states it "this road can be looked on as the path of doubt, or more properly a highway of despair" [15]

In the course of the development, what consciousness takes to be true is seen to be illusory, thus, at every move, consciousness must give up what it previously took to be true,

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[15] ibid., p.135

and move to another belief. Thus, when Hegel mentions doubt, he does not only mean a theoretical doubt, since such a doubt is the product of philosophic meditation. When he talks about "the road of doubt", he means the actual route that consciousness follows in the very course of life, and when he says "despair" he means nothing but actual pain. In the course of its development, consciousness not only loses its truth from the theoretical point of view, but it also loses the sole ground of its existence. Thus, experience is not only related to theoretical knowledge in the strict sense, but also to life itself.

The use of doubt is of extreme importance in Phenomenology, since it constitutes the basis of the dialectic movement. What makes consciousness move from one conviction to another is nothing but the negative character of the consequences it reaches in its experiences. In the flow of its journey towards the universal, consciousness discovers that the truth that it takes to be absolute is, in fact, illusory, and IS turns out to be IS NOT. Consciousness, at this point falls into negativity, and thereby moves into a higher level of truth where this negativity is contained and transcended. Hegel consistently

reminds the reader that the negative result consciousness reaches contains only half of the truth. Thus, for Hegel, there is no absolute truth except for the process itself. In the course of development of individual consciousness towards Spirit, truth is continually completed into a whole as consciousness goes through experiences.

The term that Hegel uses for negativity transcended and contained in a higher level of truth is Aufhebung, which in German has three main senses: 1) 'to raise, to hold, to lift up', 2) 'to annul, abolish, destroy, cancel, suspend', 3) 'to keep, save, preserve'.

When he uses the term, Hegel has all of these senses in mind. For Hegel, to be aware of one's error is to be aware of another truth. Thus the perceived error necessarily implies another truth of a higher level. Error transcended is a moment of truth. Imperfection is the only way that leads to perfection.

It should be noted here, that Hegel's conception of negativity is far from that of skepticism. According to Hegel, every negation is an affirmation, and similarly, every affirmation is

a negation. 'Being' and 'Non-being' are identical, in the sense that they are both contained in a higher truth : 'Becoming'. Thus, nothingness for Hegel "is the nothingness of that of which it is the result."[16] In skepticism, however, negativity is isolated from its content. For Hegel, skepticism ends up with only the abstraction of negativity, a void that has no content. And this is why, skepticism is a black hole, and provides no way for progress. For Hegel, negativity is not a form opposed to content, it not only has a content, but is also the dynamic force that pushes the process forward.

It is hard to grasp Hegel's claim without stating the premise essential to his argument: a determinate negation gives rise to a new content because the whole is always immanent in the development of consciousness, it is present in each of its moments. Hence, Phenomenology can be seen as the unfoldment or actualization of Spirit in the process through mediation.

Mediation and immediacy are two key terms in Phenomenology. The immediate is unrelated to other things, simple, initial or elementary. The mediated, stands in opposition to the

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[16]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", p. 137

immediate. It is related to other things, complex, explained, resultant, or developed.[17] Hegel uses the term mediation (Vermittlung) as a middle term to unite two opposing terms, e.g. he unites the two opposing terms universal and individual by a third term particular.

Universality, individuality, and particularity, for Hegel, are three moments of the concept. Hegel rejects the traditional view that universals, particulars, and individuals are sharply distinct from each other. Hegel's universal is concrete, not abstract, and it maintains itself in the particular and the individual. According to Hegel, universality particularizes itself in individuals. Since universals are embedded in things, things involve the self-differentiation of a universal into particulars, and then a reunification into individuality. For Hegel, universality moves from simplicity towards a rich complexity which overlaps with individuality. In Phenomenology, the 'I' is universal, not only because every one is an 'I', but also because it possesses the richness of self-differentiation

[17]The mediation may be (1) physical, e.g. a seed is immediate but a tree is mediated by the process of growth, or (2) epistemic , e.g. my knowledge of my own existence is immediate, but my knowledge of God is mediated or inferential.

of universality particularized and then unified in an individual.

Particularity appears as a mediating term between universality and individuality in the same way as 'Becoming' acts as a mediator between the two opposing terms 'Being' and 'Non-being'. However, the contrast between mediation and immediacy is itself an opposition and should be overcome. Hegel argues, at this point, that nothing is purely immediate, or purely mediated: every thing is both at once, but there are different levels of mediation in the process relative to each other.[18]

Thus, mediation and immediacy form a triadic structure, in which the middle term appears as the mediated immediacy. This is the pattern that dominates all Phenomenology; a leit-motive that repeats itself consistently at every move: the mediated immediacy that is obtained at the end of one triad, constitutes the immediacy at the beginning of the following triad.

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[18] A seed is both immediate and mediated, since it is both the beginning of a new cycle of growth, and the result of the previous cycle. A tree is immediate as well as mediated, since it has a definite character that can be described without any reference to the process it passed through, and still the process which led up to it is there.

The terms in-itself / for-itself / for-another / in-and-for-itself are also used in accordance with the pattern mentioned above. By a thing-in-itself, Hegel means a thing that has a potential character which will be actualized only by its relations to other things, i.e. a thing that is immediate.[19] For Hegel, in-itself contrasts with for-itself, i.e. the mediated. However, being-for-itself is a very complex notion, since it not only contrasts with being-in-itself, but also with being-for-another. Being-for-itself contains several different ideas depending on the context in which Hegel uses the term:

(1) The most common usage of the term being-for-itself refers to the subject's awareness of itself , e.g. A child is rational in-itself, but not for-itself, since it is not aware of itself as a rational being.

(2) An individual may be a tailor. He is a tailor in-himself, in the sense that he possesses some internal skills that suit him for this role, those that make him a tailor rather than a cook. In addition to that, his being a tailor must be recognized by others. Thus, his being a tailor necessarily

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[19]A seed is a tree in-itself, or an infant is rational in-itself, but in both cases the potentiality of being a tree or of being a rational being has not become actual. This involves a process.

involves his being for others. But a person may be a tailor only for-himself, i.e. in his own eyes. Although, for Hegel, being for-itself necessarily implies a relation with the 'other', in this case it is an I for-itself, in the sense of being aware of itself and of being withdrawn or isolated from the others. Self-consciousness, however, when it distances itself from other consciousnesses, remains as an abstract consciousness.

(3) When there is no question of awareness, in-itself and for-itself may simply mean potential and actual, in the sense that Aristotle would use these terms. For example, a fully developed tree, in contrast to a seed, has become for-itself, in the sense that it has become an actual entity, an actualized potentiality.

(4) The 'I', the individual self-consciousness becomes for-itself through its object, its product or work, e.g. an artist when she works upon the object of art externalizes her thoughts, and as the work develops the artist in-itself becomes for-itself through the work. But for the artist to see herself in-itself in the work requires further activity, and when this

happens the artist sees herself as herself, and becomes in-and-for-itself, i.e. mediated immediacy.[20]

Thus, development for Hegel always involves a return to the beginning of in-itself, but this time possessing the knowledge of in-itself as externalized, actualized potentiality. Spirit, which itself serves as a middle term between Idea and Nature, demands also actualization. This is the end-point of the development as Hegel states it :

"The goal, however, is fixed for knowledge, just as necessarily as the succession in the process. The terminus is at that point where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self as the concept corresponds to the object, and the object to the concept."[21]

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[20]Individual freedom or consciousness is nothing but an abstraction, unless it establishes a relationship with another consciousness by risking its life. In the dialectic of the master and the servant, Hegel defines the master as the abstract consciousness, in the sense that it alienates itself from the objects that surround him, and the servant as the dynamic principle, in the sense that it has the potential of becoming a real/objective self-consciousness through the master he fears and the objects he works upon.

The relation between these elements is a *"a play of forces"*, a *"life-and-death struggle"*. At the beginning of this struggle both the master and the servant are certain of their own selves, but this certainty is far from being objective truth, since they *"haven't revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for themselves, i.e., as self-consciousness"* (The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 232)

For the subjective certainty to become objective truth one has to risk his life in the struggle. The master's situation in this context appears to be a conflict, since self-consciousness can only be gained through recognition of another self-consciousness. In order to exist as a self-consciousness, he has to recognize the servant as a self-consciousness, which is apparently impossible, because if he does this, he can nomore be a master. The servant, on the other hand, recognizes the master, as a self-consciousness from the very beginning, and dialectically establishes his own through the master.

The knowledge that consciousness possesses is always the knowledge of an object. Then, we should expect Hegel to consider knowledge as a movement from concept to object, for as Hyppolyte points out[22], concept is the subjective side of knowledge, and object is the objective one. But as I have stated in the previous chapter, Hegel reverses this order in Phenomenology, and he starts with the objective, the immediate, the in-itself. The discrepancy that consciousness discovers between the object (the object for consciousness), and the concept (the knowledge of itself), moves it to the attainment of their identity. At the level of sense-certainty, we see an empirical 'I' cut off from its concept, the knowledge of itself as itself. In Hegelian terms, its concept lies outside itself. Its being only consists in a 'here' and a 'now', which has other heres and nows outside itself. As Hegel would put it, it should enter into 'the play of forces', and be transcended to a higher level of consciousness by being negated by its 'other', since "that which is confined to a life of nature is unable of itself to go beyond its immediate existence; but by something

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[21]Hegel, "The Phenomenology of Mind", pp. 137-138

[22]Hyppolite, Jean, "Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit", p. 17

other than itself it is forced beyond that." [23] The fight in natural life between empirical "I"s results in an abstract negation, where we can talk of no real Aufhebung. The negation of the empirical 'I' is a negation alien to it, brought about by an "other". At this level negation means nothing but physical destruction. At the level of consciousness, however, negation takes the form of self-negation, since consciousness for itself is its own concept. It continuously negates itself, and reasserts itself, while preserving and transcending this negation into higher levels of consciousness. Consciousness survives the fact of being abolished precisely the way that Phoenix does: everytime it encounters destruction, it is regenerated out of its own ashes in the form of a dove. In consciousness, negation -or death, as Hegel calls it - is a necessary move by which consciousness, being for itself its own concept, survives itself and begins a new life.

Thus it is only through mediation that consciousness reaches absolute knowledge which is both the knowledge of the object and self-knowledge. What Hegel in Phenomenology calls 'Spirit' is the experience of objective spirit becoming absolute spirit.

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[23] op. cit, p.138

"Reason is spirit, when its certainty of being all reality has been raised to the level of truth, and reason is consciously aware of itself as its own world , and of the world as itself."[24]

This world is the consciousness of Spirit which develops itself and at the same time discovers itself. Spirit is at first immediate. It has become in-and-for-itself as the truth of reason, i.e. it writes its own history, creates its own development, but it is not in-and-for-itself for-itself, since it does not yet possess the knowledge of itself as itself in action. In the course of the development at first being immediate, it will oppose itself, and make itself 'the other' in order to regain itself as "the knowledge of Spirit by Spirit". This dialectic is presented in the titles of the chapters concerning Spirit : "Objective Spirit", "Self-alienated Spirit" and "Self-assured Spirit". The movement of the dialectic flows from object to subject reassuring the fundamental thesis of Phenomenology: the Absolute is the subject.

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[24]Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomenology of Mind, p. 457

In the preceding chapter, Reason appears as universal self-consciousness, but when we come to Spirit, we observe that Reason is formal, and, therefore, abstract. Reason was the first reconciliation of the individual and the universal. However, Reason only discovers itself in its other and thus alienated in being. Nature, at the level of Reason is Spirit outside itself. Then, the immediate discovery of Reason of itself as being identical with all reality is only one moment in process which requires further mediation. Thus Reason negates this immediate truth of itself, and grasps its essence in the action and work of the individual. In Spirit it becomes fully actualized in the subject's action, and this is what makes history, where Reason is given life. Spirit is Reason that actualizes itself in history, and through its actions comes to know itself as itself. Hyppolite summarizes fundamental theses of Hegelian idealism, underlining the significance of action in the formation of Spirit:

"Spirit is a 'we': we must begin not with the cogito but with the cogitamus. Spirit is history: it becomes what it is only through a historical development because each of its moments, in making itself essence , must realize itself as an original world, and because its being is not distinct from the action through which it poses itself. Spirit is knowledge of itself in its history: it is a return to itself through, and by means of that history, a return such that nothing alien subsists in or for spirit, and such that spirit knows itself as what it is and

is what it knows itself to be (this being of spirit is nothing but its very action)"[25]

For our approach, what is most striking in the whole of Phenomenology is Hegel's claim that only a multiplicity of self-consciousnesses continuously interacting with each other can be the basis of universal thought which arises from the mutual recognition of subjects in action. Unlike Kant, Hegel does not attempt to figure out universal conditions that cover all experience, and derive general laws concerning everything that presents itself as object to my subjective experience.

For Hegel, the emergence of the abstract individual to the level of concrete universal consciousness is only possible on the mutual relation of the subject and its object. In other words, it is only possible for me to exist, if I exist for another, and the other exists for me. Thus, a plurality of self-consciousnesses is essential to the formation of Spirit, since the I in-itself can become for-itself only through becoming an object for 'the other'. [26]

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[25]Hyppolite, Jean, "Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit", pp. 322-323

[26]Here, as I mentioned above, Hegel definitely reverses the traditional understanding of the concepts of individual and universal. We should regard the triadic developmental pattern of universal-particular-individual to be essential to Hegel's Phenomenology. For Hegel, individuals derive their status from the universality involved in them, and since universals are embedded in individuals, individuals involve the self-differentiation of a universal into particulars, and then the reunification of individuality. The relative

The idea of a development in which Spirit actualizes itself through the intermediary of consciousness has its roots in German Idealism, in the works of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter. However, there is one other influence which has been as important as that of German Idealists. This was the influence of the Bildungsromanen of the time, which I will discuss in the following chapter.

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universality of individuals, on the other hand, depends on the level of self-differentiation. For example, the individuality of State, in which particular needs and interests are highly differentiated, presents a higher universality if compared with the simple universality of the Family.

III. THE CONCEPT OF BILDUNG IN PHENOMENOLOGY AND BILDUNGSROMAN

Bildungsroman can be translated into English as 'educational novel', in which the protagonist completely gives himself up to his conviction, and through a series of events, based on his relations to others, he comes to abandon his first conviction, and discovers what had been truth becomes an illusion. Very much like the development of consciousness in Phenomenology, Bildungsroman also presents the concrete evolution of a consciousness which progressively learns to doubt what it previously took to be true. The path that consciousness follows is its own history; and in the course of the development of his history he discovers himself to be identical with the process he goes through. The steps in Bildungsroman, therefore, resemble the triadic pattern in Phenomenology. The protagonist in-itself starts with a naive consciousness, negates itself and becomes self-alienated consciousness, and then regains itself possessing the knowledge of itself as itself.

Hyppolyte in his Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology points to the fact that Goethe's Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre, probably the earliest example of the genre, was considered as

one of the essential events by the Romantic circles in Jena, and Hegel himself was familiar with the novel. Hyppolyte goes further and states that "Hegel's Phenomenology, for its part, is the novel of philosophic formation: it follows the development of consciousness, which renouncing its first beliefs, reaches through its experiences the properly philosophic point of view, that of absolute knowledge."[27]

In Goethe's novel, the young Wilhelm gradually matures through his relations with people of every social class who represent a wide spectrum of moral and intellectual values. His expectations and enthusiasm is great, but as he progresses, he comes to learn his limitations and responsibilities. At the end of the novel, Wilhelm is accepted into the Society of the Tower as a medical student, and wins the hand of a young girl towards whom he previously possessed conflicting feelings.

Lukacs, in his Theory of the Novel, points out that what distinguishes Wilhelm Meister from other types of novel of nineteenth century is its theme which is based on the

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[27]Hyppolyte, Jean, "Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology", p. 12

reconciliation of the problematic individual with the concrete social reality:

"The type of personality and the structure of the plot are determined by the necessary condition that a reconciliation between interiority and reality, although problematic is nevertheless possible; that it has to be sought in hard struggles and dangerous adventures, yet is ultimately possible to achieve... the soul in such a novel carries within itself, as a sign of its tenuous, but not yet severed link with the transcendental order, a longing for an earthly home which may correspond to its ideal.. Such an interiority represents on the one hand, a wider and consequently more adaptable, gentle, more concrete idealism, and, on the other, a widening of the soul which sees fulfillment in action, in effective dealings with reality, and not merely in contemplation."[28] (emphasis mine)

This type of novel, according to Lukacs, is the most developed genre in the evolution of novel, since it presents a synthesis between its idealistic hero, and social reality that he has to face. In other words, it captures the dialectic in the formation of individual consciousness towards self-knowledge. However, there are some additional defining criteria which distinguish Bildungsroman from other types of novel:

"The Bildungsroman can be construed as biographical, assuming the existence of a coherent individual identity which constitutes the focal point of the narrative; dialectical, defining identity as the result of the complex interplay between psychological and social forces; historical, depicting

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[28] quoted by Jale Parla, "The Victorian Bildungsroman", Boğaziçi University, İstanbul, 1982, pp.28-29

identity formation as a temporal process which is represented by means of a linear and chronological narrative; and teleological, organizing textual signification in relation to the projected goal of the protagonist's access to self-knowledge, which will in practice be realized to a greater or lesser degree." [29]

Phenomenology is the study of the process of formation of individual consciousness into absolute knowledge, i.e. a universal self-consciousness that is aware of itself as being all reality, and that recognizes and exercises itself as that reality. In this sense, Hegel's thesis is that human history is immanent in individual consciousness. Thus, the problem posed by Phenomenology is the education of the specific individual who attains knowledge of reality by becoming aware of its substance. Hegel, in the Preface to Phenomenology clearly states that this process of education bridges the gap between the individual and its substance, which, at the beginning of the process are detached from each other, as separate modes of existence. From the point of view of the universal consciousness, however, they are one and the same being united in one entity: a universal self-consciousness that knows its substance as itself.

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[29]Felski, Rita., "The Novel of Self-discovery" in "Beyond Feminist Aesthetics", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.135

"The particular individual, so far as content is concerned, has also to go through the stages through which the general mind has passed, but as shapes once assumed by mind and now laid aside, as stages of a road which has been worked over and leveled out. Hence, it is that in the case of various kinds of knowledge, we find that what in former days occupied the energies of men of mature mental ability sinks to the level of information, exercises, and even pastimes for children; and in this educational progress we can see the history of the world's culture delineated in faint outline. This bygone existence has already become an acquired possession of the general mind, which constitutes the substance of the individual, and by thus appearing externally to him, furnishes his inorganic nature. In this respect, culture or development of mind (Bildung), regarded from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what lies at his hand ready for him, in making its inorganic nature organic to himself, and taking possession of it for himself. Looked at, however from the side of universal mind, qua general spiritual substance, culture means nothing else than that this substance gives itself its own self-consciousness, brings about its own inherent process and its own reflection into self." [30]

The history of the world, in this sense, is already completed. What is required from individual consciousness is to go through the stages of development, and to rediscover history in himself. According to Hegel, this can not be done by meditation or introspection. Action is the only medium that leads individual consciousness to higher levels of consciousness. Action, in this context, takes place of the Platonic recollection of ideas. What Hegel means is that the individual of his time possesses in-itself the substance of the spirit of

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[30] Hegel, G.W.F., " Phenomenology of Mind", p. 89-90

that time, he has to attain the knowledge of that substance as himself through his actions.

"The individual whose substance is mind at the higher level, passes through these past forms, much in the way that one who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory forms of knowledge, which he has long made his own, in order to call up their content before him; he brings back the recollection of them without stopping to fix his interest upon them." [31]

In this sense, Hegel's work is specifically pedagogical and biographical, setting itself similar tasks to those of Bildungsroman: individual consciousness is involved in a process of Bildung (culture/education) with the goal of attaining knowledge of itself, i.e. its substance which, at first, appears to it as external. The formation of the individual, i.e. culture, is not detached from the whole; it is a moment of the whole, since the individual's becoming conscious of itself is the consciousness of spirit. Therefore, as individual consciousness moves from one experience to another, the individual rises to the level of universal, and at the same time, the universal becomes conscious of itself through the individual. In Hegel's system the main task of philosophy, i.e. attainment of absolute knowledge, coincides

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[31] ibid., p.89

with the attainment of universal self-consciousness, since, for Hegel, absolute knowledge is inaccessible to individual consciousness if it does not become consciousness of spirit. Absolute knowledge remains only as an abstraction if it is limited to the scope of understanding of detached individuals,

> "but the actual realization of this abstract whole is only found when those previous shapes and forms, which are now reduced to ideal moments of the whole, are developed anew again, but developed and shaped within this new medium, and with the meaning they have thereby acquired." [32]

Thus, we can end up saying that Phenomenology is the biography of an individual consciousness rising to universal consciousness, and of humanity particularizing itself in an individual and becoming a "concrete absolute" through the self-knowledge gained by that individual.

The second move Hegel makes is to assert that spirit is history. This thesis is identical with the thesis that <u>the absolute is the subject</u>. Spirit is history, in the sense that it presents a development of itself by itself, in such a way that it possesses its identity through all of its moments, and when it comes to negate its moments -as a necessary move in the

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[32] ibid., p.76

process- it preserves and raises them to a higher level of existence. It is only spirit that has a past and a future, since it possesses the ability of recollection of its remembrances of the past, and the power of shaping the future: it is Reason discovering itself through development as being all reality.

Hegel insists that "organic life has no history".[33] Organic life is present in each particular living being, but it does not express itself as itself in each of its moments. Every end is related to a beginning also in organic life, but organic life only repeats itself without presenting a development in which self-consciousness or self-knowledge is involved.

"It (organic nature) drops from its universal -life-, immediately into the individuation of existence, and the moments of simple determinateness and individual living activity which are united in this realization, bring about the process of change merely as a contingent movement, wherein each plays its own part and the whole is preserved. But the energy thus exerted is restricted, so far as itself is concerned, merely to its own fixed centre, because the whole is not

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[33] ibid., p.326

Since nature as a whole is thought positing itself as externality, according to Hegel, at the end of the process the distinction between the ideality of thought and the reality of things will be overcome and submerged in the unity of the Absolute Self-consciousness. From the point of Understanding, however, the truth of nature, i.e. its concept, is external to itself, since I can think this concept, whereas nature can not. It is external because it remains outside of its concept, and its externality is relative to my internality.

present in it; and the whole is not there because the whole is not as such here for-itself. [34] (emphasis mine)

Thus, only spirit as individual consciousness presents the possibility of a development towards the absolute, or in Hegelian terms, "the concrete universal". The full scope of Hegel's aim can be said to become more clear: to lead individual consciousness to become aware of itself as the spirit of its times (Zeitgeist)[35], of its own substance, its inorganic nature, and thereby rise to absolute knowledge which transcends all the process that it goes through.

Bildungsroman conceives both the individual and the society as dynamic principles. When the idealistic hero comes into contact with social reality, the individual realizes himself in a process of attaining maturity, and at the same time, the society unfolds itself, and comes to be. Self-recognition or self-understanding is always attained through a self-realization in a society. Only by moving out into the world can the protagonist become critically aware of himself as he really

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[34] ibid., p.326

[35] When Hegel speaks of *Zeitgeist* or the *Geist der Zeit*, he has in mind the mentality, social life and cultural products of a given age, and of a given people (*Volk*) that share a common spirit. The spirit of the age, thus, is a phase of the World-spirit (*Weltgeist*).

is. The process, therefore, is obviously a learning process, and the experiences that the protagonist goes through, though difficult and painful, are presented as the necessary steps to maturation. The synthesis attained at the end is a reconciliation of the individual with the society. The individual abandons his illusions and being confronted with social reality, he becomes a member of "this society", and the society actualizes itself through its members who, at the end of the process, appear as responsible citizens.

The protagonist of Dickens' Great Expectations, for instance, undergoes a learning process that involves three stages. Pip begins as a poor orphan in the country, loved only by his father-figure, Joe, the blacksmith. His acquaintance with the weird and rich Miss Havisham, who first evokes his class consciousness, and with Estella the cold and reserved young girl, who is the source of all Pip's ambitions, mark the beginning of a change in Pip's life. In the second stage, Pip acquires a sudden and mysterious fortune, and by renouncing his own origin and true self, he moves to the city, to the life of useless snobbery. This move is counter-balanced with another turning-point in the third stage of the novel, where Pip is

humbled when he discovers the source of his fortune to be Magwitch, an ex-convict whom he once helped. At the end of the novel, through a negation of negation, Pip abandons his false values, and begins a life of hard work, but this time possessing the knowledge of himself as himself.

What makes Pip to move to self-knowledge is all the moments of self-denial, self-alienation, and recognition of himself. All these moments involve pain and suffering, especially Pip's discovery of the connection between his rise in the world with Magwitch, the convict.

The discovery of the inner self in the Bildungsroman is only possible through an exploration of the outer world. The individual, when he recognizes the contingency and uncertainty of experience, moves to another level of consciousness in the form of a more complete, and determinate self. Thus the naive consciousness, turns out to be an acting consciousness which necessarily errs, and gradually becomes a knowing consciousness discovering himself as identical with the process he goes through.

Therefore, the protagonist's move into society should be interpreted as a move from an abstract, static, shadow-like existence to an actual and dynamic one, which is defined by contingency and change. Here, self-knowledge is defined as a gradually increasing accumulative knowledge. The similarities between Phenomenology and a typical Bildungsroman plot becomes more obvious if we consider the fact that all the aspects of the text gain their value in relation to the development of individual self-consciousness towards its goal; i.e. self-knowledge.

This development is not random. It is a necessary movement towards a pre-established goal. The individual consciousness becomes completed, and more and more determinate in the course of its journey until it fully unfolds itself as, what Hegel calls, "universal consciousness". Similarly, the teleology Hegel applies presents a purpose which is immanent in the subject, and is the subject itself and its own actions. But, since at the beginning of the process the subject is not aware of itself as its purpose, there is a gap between the subject and its purpose.

The problem with consciousness is that after having discovered its first truth to be illusory, it believes to have discovered a second truth which is completely indifferent to the first one. It contraposes this new truth to the first one, and fails to recognize that it is the result of the prior movement in the dialectical process. Thus, consciousness is only able to see the negative result of its past experience, but not the link between its past experience and 'this new truth' which he considers as his object. Therefore, consciousness can only grasp the necessity of the negation of the object tested in experience, but not the necessity of the genesis of a new object from that negation.

"It is this circumstance which carries forward the whole succession of the modes or attitudes of consciousness in their own necessity. It is only this necessity, this origination of the new object - which offers itself to consciousness without consciousness knowing how it comes by it - that to us, who watch the process, is to be seen going on, so to say, behind its back. Thereby, there enters into its process a moment of being per se, or of being for us, which is not expressly presented to that consciousness which is at the grip of experience itself." [36]

Still a question may arise concerning the necessity involved in the development of self-consciousness, since the development

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[36] op. cit, p. 144

from within appears only as a series of particular contingencies. However, at the end of the journey, from the point of view of the universal the contingencies are revealed to be necessary moves. Only after spirit completely unfolds itself, and manifests itself as universal consciousness, can we think universality through particularity, and particularity through universality, and grasp the unity of these two moments as the absolute self-consciousness.

Very similar to the teleological structure of the Phenomenology, the teleology in Bildungsroman also puts a distance between the perspectives of the narrator and the protagonist. While the protagonist -as he moves forward- comes to recognize the contingency and uncertainty of experience, the narrator sees every move as a necessary step of an irreversible process directed to self-knowledge. The narrator wants the reader to see the protagonist's ignorance, and the gap between the protagonist's naive understanding of events and his own all-knowing, all-seeing attitude.

Irony is the outcome of this diversity in the perspectives of the narrator/philosopher and the protagonist/acting

consciousness. Hegel, in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy, asserts that "dialectic is the universal irony of the world". The source of irony is that individual consciousness, in the course of its development, wants to attach himself to some objective cause, but can not do so. By constantly asserting and negating itself, it ends up with self-alienation, detached from its essence, i.e., the knowledge of itself as itself as being all reality. It takes the form of pure subjectivity while still claiming to be the identity of his subjective knowing and willing, on one hand, and the objective cause, on the other.

In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel points out that "Irony" is the supreme form in which the above mentioned subjectivism is expressed. He argues, however, that this type of irony differs from "Socratic irony". According to Hegel, "It (Socratic irony)was only a manner of talking against people".[37] By questioning the Sophists, what Socrates aimed at was to show the falsity and incoherence of their doctrines, and thereby, finding enlightenment for himself. Thus, for Hegel, Socratic irony was only a dialectical method of inquiry leading towards

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[37]Hegel, G.W.F., "Philosophy of Right", p. 101

the truth. But, the truth, itself, was outside this method. It stood apart as an unmoved, eternal object, as Plato conceived it.

For Hegel, however, dialectic is the self-creative movement of thought. The universal is embedded in the moments of the dialectic movement. While Spirit constantly transcends itself i the process of development towards the Absolute, all "worthy causes" and "objective values" are shown to be worthless by the fact that they contradict in the individuals who embody them. Irony emerges from these contradictions or paradoxes in the development of Spirit. Hence, it is inherent in the very nature of Spirit. Irony, in the course of the development, trivializes everything that consciousness takes to be the Absolute - even the divine as we shall see in the last chapter.

The protagonist of Bildungsroman, and the natural consciousness in Phenomenology in the course of their formation, constantly assert, negate, and reassert themselves. However, as natural consciousness in action, they do not possess the knowledge that acting consciousness is necessarily erring consciousness. Only the novelist/philosopher perceives the genesis of a new truth

from the negation of an error. The protagonist/acting consciousness does not perceive the progressive move he makes.

Lukacs agrees with Hegel that irony is the product of the "paradoxical activity" of a constant assertion, negation, and self-correction. According to Lukacs, however, irony does not emerge from its author's intentions, but from the gap between the idealistic novelist's view of the world and the world as it really is.

"... according to Lukacs, the novel's irony emerges merely from this formal activity of assertion and self-correction, quite independent of the author's volition, for this irony is embedded within the subjectivity of the author and the objectivity of lived experience which are in a rapture ever since the totality of the epic world was lost"[38]

I find the Lukacsian interpretation of irony rather interesting, since it derives its essence from the conflict between art and life. However, coming back to Bildungsroman, it seems to me rather unrealistic to claim that the irony is there regardless of the intentions of the author. In any example of modern fiction, we should take it for granted that there is a gap between the perspective of the author and the outside

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[38]Parla, Jale, "The Victorian Bildungsroman", pp. 23-24

reality, but to assert that the author is unaware of this conflict is not only underestimating his/her artistic capacities, but also degrading the very nature of art, which is based solely on the awareness of this conflict. Irony governs not only our lives, but also the works of art, where the artist becomes critical with respect to the world, its values, oneself, and even one's art. While setting the scene in Great Expectations which portrays Pip as a would-be-gentleman, who is disturbed by the sudden visit of his good old friend/father Joe, Dickens, surely, wants to inform the reader about the error which Pip has not yet recognized.

Another example is, when we encounter Pip as a good-hearted young boy at the beginning of the novel. Dickens tells us that he is a real gentleman in-himself (Pip helps Magwitch despite his fear, and without expecting anything), but not for-himself since he does not possess the knowledge of himself as himself.

Hegel, very similarly, constantly reminds the reader of the discrepancy between the perspectives of individual consciousness and the philosopher. This aspect of both Phenomenology and the Bildungsroman reveal their didactic

character. The educational process the individual consciousness goes through also contributes to the development of the reader.

Great Expectations, surely, is the story of an individual consciousness that goes to find itself, and centering around the most popular theme of nineteenth century novel, the theme of disillusionment, it presents a development towards self-discovery. For his part, Pip learns through pain - the outcome of his confrontation with social reality -, abandons his dreams and ends up as a "good" man having achieved harmony with the society.

In all his novels, and especially in Great Expectations, Dickens is deeply concerned with the demands of society, so his novels reflect the values of the society of his time, namely the Victorian values. In the Dickensian world the characters are sharply divided into two camps: the good, and the evil. The division is so sharp, and the characters so angelic or grotesque, that they appear as abstractions of 'virtues and vices' rather than characters. Only the main character shows an ability for development, since it is portrayed as a willful subject, an agent that has the freedom of choice between good

and evil, right and wrong. According to Fanger, Dickens very intentionally puts this distinction between his protagonist and the secondary characters:

"If Dickens rarely presents a protagonist who can himself be called grotesque, this is due in large part to the nature of his constant myth, which deals with the attempts of an alienated good individual to find a place in society. The necessity of pure goodness - a goodness often stiflingly conventional in the portrayal - precludes quirks at the same time that it calls for them as foils, and it sets up a descending series, whereby the unnatural purity of the good finds compensation in the motley grotesque of the secondary characters, and whereby they, in turn, maintain their reality."[39]

In the course of the development of the protagonist, the secondary characters remain as static entities, who stand outside of the process of becoming. Therefore, what is attained at the end of the novel, is not a real synthesis of the individual's ideals and the social reality, in Dickens' case it is only a reconciliation of the individual with the society, where reconciliation means the protagonist's attainment of the Victorian ideal of self-actualization, which, for Parla, is honest work:

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[39]Fanger, Donald, "Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism", University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1967, p. 98

"The glorification of work as a supreme virtue was a landmark of Victorian Bildungsideal, and it's duly incorporated into the Bildung of Pip. The theme of work, in fact, is parallel to the theme of Pip's growing up throughout the novel; Miss Havisham does not work, and is therefore prey to the self-centered obsession that feeds upon her, Joe is always associated with honest work at the forge, and even the convict is redeemed because he has later earned his fortune by work...Having left snobbery for good and bowed before Joe and Biddy in true humility and repentance, Pip loses the chance of living as a polished gentleman of leisure after Magwitch's death and the confiscation of the convicts property, but he becomes a man."[40]

Pip's consciousness at the end of the novel, in Hegelian terms, has gone through a Bildung which is neither moral nor philosophical, but rather ethical. Hegel distinguishes between ethical life (Sittlichkeit) and Morality (Moralitaet). Moralitaet, unlike Sittlichkeit, stresses the inner will and intention of the agent in contrast to its outer conduct and consequences. Thus, in Sittlichkeit, guilt and responsibility is ascribed to an agent for what he does (his Tat, Deed) regardless of his knowledge and intentions. However, in Moralitaet, one is responsible for one's intentions and of the intended deed (the Handlung, Action).

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[40]Parla, Jale, "The Victorian Bildungsroman", p. 113

In the Phenomenology, published fourteen years before the Philosophy of Right, the transition is from morality to conscience, and then direct from conscience to religion, not as in the Philosophy of Right, where it is from subjective morality to a concrete rational order embodying both subjective convictions and objective institutions, i.e. ethical life. Accordingly, in the Philosophy of Right, though morality is a higher phase in the development of Spirit, it must be subordinate to ethical life, and confine itself to the norms and institutions of the society, since Hegel's main aim in this work is to establish the Absolute in the form of the State.

As Hegel states, in the Phenomenology, unlike the ethical life (Sittlichkeit), morality (Moralitaet) does not vary over history; and, thus it is a higher level of consciousness which leads Spirit into the Absolute. In relation to this point, Hegel's view on the ideals of the Bildunsromane of his time should be noted here:

"This novelistic is born when the knightly existence is again taken seriously, is filled out with real substance. The contingency of outward, actual existence has been transformed into the firm, secure order of bourgeois society and the state so that now the police, the law courts, the army occupy the position of those chimerical goals which the knight used to set himself. Thereby, the knightly character of those heroes whose deeds fill recent novels is transformed. They stand as

individuals with their subjective goals of love, honour, ambition, or with their ideals of improving the world, over against the existing order and prose of reality which from all sides places obstacles in their path...These struggles are, however, in the modern world nothing but the apprenticeship, the education of the individual at the hands of the given reality... For the conclusion of such an apprenticeship usually amounts to the hero getting the corners knocked of him... In the last analysis, he usually gets his girl and some kind of job, marries and becomes a philistine just like the others." [41]

The main task of this study is to assert that the dialectic in Bildungsroman, involves the self-realization of the individual in a society, and thus it presents an ethical Bildung, where individual consciousness discovers itself to be identical with Zeitgeist (the spirit of its times), which, according to Hegel, is only a moment of the Absolute, but not the Absolute that has completely unfolded itself. In the development of the novel, it is not until we come to Dostoyevsky, that we can move to higher levels of consciousness where we observe moral, religious, and philosophical Bildung, and attain the self-conscious Absolute, as Hegel conceives it.

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[41] Hegel, G.W.F., "Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art", translated by T. M. Knox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1975, p.20

IV. KANT 'S HERITAGE: THE DUAL NATURE OF MAN AND THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY

Before giving a brief account of Kant's theory of ethics, it is necessary to state that his theory diverges from the theories of his predecessors in the sense that it is heavily based upon the notion of duty or obligation. The former ethical theories, especially Hume's, consider the notions of good and evil of primary importance, and those of right and wrong as derivations from them. At the heart of Kant's theory of ethics, however, lies the notion of duty, and the notions of right and wrong are explained in terms of it.

The first section of the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals opens with the following lines:

"Nothing in the world - indeed nothing even beyond the world - can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will."[42]

It is interesting to see that from the very beginning, Kant tries to distinguish between "pure good will" and "other goods"

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[42]Kant, Immanuel, " Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals",translated by Lewis W. Beck, Bobbs-Merill Educational Publishing, Indianapolis,1980, p.9

that are based upon external factors. When claiming that "nothing is intrinsically good but a good will", he tries to demonstrate that other goods, such as happiness or intellectual eminence etc., may be worthless or evil if not combined with a good will. Kant's chief point here is that the essence of the morally good act is the principle that a person affirms when he wills an act.

"The good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes or because of its adequacy to achieve some proposed end; it is good only because its willing is good of itself." [43]

A good will is one that consistently wills rightly. At this point, Kant makes a distinction between intention and action: the rightness or wrongness of a volition depends purely on the nature of its motive; it does not depend on its actual consequences.

"The moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect which is expected from it or in any principle of action which has to borrow its motive from this expected effect"[44]

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[43] ibid., p.10

[44] ibid., p.17

Accordingly, we can say that provided we try to carry out our intention, and provided our motive is right, then the volition is right no matter what its consequences may be.

Now the question is: "How do I know that my motive is right?" or "What guarantees the rightness of my motive?" Before answering this question, one has to distinguish between two types of action. A rational being strives to do what he ought to do, and this Kant distinguishes from an act a person does from inclination or self-interest. The moral worth is nowhere but in the will, and good will is the one that acts out of a sense of duty; and an action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination. Kant's philosophical approach to morality is based on a practical[45] ontology, which is possible only with objective action. Therefore, his concern is to present the faculty of practical reason, to show how the concept of duty arises out of this faculty. According to Kant, we must

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[45]When Kant says "practical", he does not mean something useful and prudential. What he means by "practical" is almost antithetical to the common usage of this term. "Practical" for Kant is, what is related to autonomous action. As Kant states it, being an object of practical knowledge signifies only the relation of the will to the action, by which the object would be realized.

approach morality as a definite object of understanding, that is to say, an object capable of being articulated. It is not, however, an empirical object. The objects of morality are found in pure reason. If these objects are non-empirical, and reason is the sole ground for them, then they are a priori.

Objects of pure reason have a rational content apart from experience. In this case, content is not to be understood as a "filling", but must be regarded as "determination", limitation or specification so as to constitute a fact. Sense of duty, for Kant, is such an object with a rational content. What we mean by rational content is that it is not a set of rules and principles, but a locus, a center of determination. Kant's position here is that objectivity is grounded in rational determination, and rational determination only.

Duty emerges as a moral fact given by pure reason, and independent of our experience. It is completely tied up with the concept of good will, and is completely disassociated from any concern of happiness.

Kant states three different propositions of morality: 1) In order to have moral worth an action must be done from duty, 2)Its moral value, therefore, does not depend on the realization of the empirical object of the action but merely on the principle of volition by which the action is done, 3) Duty is the necessity of an action executed from respect for law.

Here we have the general framework of Kant's philosophy of ethics. The reason that Kant makes the rather surprising remark that the "good will is good not because of what it accomplishes", becomes more meaningful when he introduces the concept of duty. Since the good will is one that acts out of a sense of duty, and it is not enough for the effects or consequences of our behavior to agree with the moral law; the truly moral act is done for the sake of the moral law. What Kant wants to emphasize here is the dominant role of the will in morality. For him, an action done for the sake of the moral law, i.e., from duty, must wholly exclude the influence of inclination. If the effects of our action could have been brought about by other causes, then there would have been no need for the will of a rational being.

Duty implies that we are under some kind of obligation, a moral law, and Kant says as rational beings we are aware of this obligation as it comes to us in the form of an imperative. He makes a distinction between the moral law which is the objective principle, and our maxim which is the subjective principle of our volitions. Our volitions are subject to our desires, and our desires are not always rational. Therefore, they can not constitute the ground of morality.

What constitutes morality is that an action should follow from a law, an objective principle. Since all laws are pure as a priori principles given by reason, and since action must be performed because of respect for such a law, then reason must be will.[46] Then will seems to have two aspects: objective and subjective. As object it is the ground of principles, as subject it is the active agent that performs the action. However, my subjective maxims are not in conformity with the objective law. Every time I act my desires and inclinations intervene. Although I know my duty to be the sole ground that constitutes my essence, I can not be in complete accord with the moral law in my action. In pure good will these two aspects

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[46]ibid., p.29

coincide. However, man, by definition, does not possess absolutely good will. He can not compromise his noumenal and phenomenal selves. Therefore, the moral law manifests itself in our volitions as a command.

Kant defines imperative as follows:

"The conception of an objective principle, so far as it constrains a will, is a command (of reason), and the formula of this command is called an imperative."[47]

Not all imperatives are connected with morality, for they lack the quality of unconditionality that the moral law requires. There are the hypothetical imperatives , for example, which presuppose a desire for some particular end. In the case of the categorical imperative, on the other hand, reason is interested in the moral action itself. In this sense, it is not conditional. The categorical imperative, unlike the hypothetical imperative, does not involve an "if-then" clause, but applies to all men and commands an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, that is, as objectively necessary. It is categorical because it applies to

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[47]ibid., p30

all rational beings, and it is imperative because it is the principle on which we ought to act. Kant makes an important distinction in terms of interest. The moral agent may be interested in the object of action, or in the action itself. In the former, his interest is not moral, because he gears his attention to the attainment of the object, but in the latter, he is interested in the action, and the action proceeds on the basis of the moral law. The former, Kant calls the "practical rule" which rests on hypothetical judgments that can be classified as problematical and assertorical imperatives. Kant also states that the hypothetical imperatives are analytic, whereas the categorical imperative is synthetic a priori. [48]

Then the question is "What characteristic must a principle of morality have in order to be accepted by every rational being?". Kant answers this question saying that such a

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[48] According to Kant, all hypothetical judgments are analytic because they involve an "if-then" clause, and the "if..." part intrinsically implies the "then..." part. Like in the statement "If you want to pass the exam, then work hard". The concept of working hard is included in the concept of passing the exam. However, in the case of the categorical imperative, the necessity is grounded in the determination of the will. It is synthetic because a rational being as a free agent may or may not act in accordance with the law. Therefore, the categorical imperative is a priori, because it is necessary, and it is synthetic, because "being moral" as a predicate, is not contained in the subject "the active agent".
Canevi, Pınar, "Lecture notes on 'Kant's Theory of Ethics'"

principle should have a certain characteristic of form, not that of content. And the formal criterion is as follows:

"Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law."[49]

Hegel criticizes Kant saying that no particular rules of conduct can be deduced from his general principle; it is abstract, empty or a "mere thought-entity". Still, this was exactly what Kant thought that moral philosophy should provide us in order to guide our moral behavior - although he would not accept the term "thought-entity" and would insist that duty as a moral object of understanding possesses not an empirical but a rational content. He would say that it is not the business of ethics to provide us with rules of conduct. The aim of ethics is to provide us with a method to test the validity of these rules, for once we understand the fundamental principle of the moral law, we can then apply it to specific cases.

Kant points out that there is something about a human being that makes him resist being treated as a thing instead of a person. It is this fact that rules out the possibility of universalizing a subjective maxim on the basis of self-love.

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[49]Kant, Immanuel, "Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals", p.39

What makes us persons is our rationality, and to be a person, or a rational being is, therefore, an end in itself. We become a thing when someone uses us as a means for some other end. And thus, self-love makes a person a means not an end. However, the individual human being as possessing absolute worth is the basis of the supreme principle of morality: rational nature exists as an end in itself.[50] All men everywhere want to be treated as persons instead of things, just as I do, and this leads to a second formulation of the moral law:

"Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." [51]

A rational being belongs to the realm of ends, both as a legislator of universal laws, and as an active agent that obeys these laws. Since the realm of ends is not a given realm, but is created through the legislative activity of pure reason, Kant declares a war against teleology which considers nature as a given realm of ends. Morals, however, regards a possible realm of ends as a realm of nature. In the former the realm of

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[50] ibid., p.52

[51] ibid., p.57

ends is a theoretical idea for the explanation of what actually is. In the latter, it is a practical idea for bringing about that which is not actually real, but which can become real through our conduct, and which is in accordance with this idea.[52]

The problem is how man can think of the will as free and at the same time regard himself as subject to the moral law. Since we possess the faculty of reason, we belong to the intelligible world. But, on the other hand, as far as our "lower" faculties are concerned, we are all members of the sensible world, or in other words, we are all a part of nature. Because we stand in between the two worlds, and are not purely rational beings, our will may not always coincide with the moral law. Our "earthly" desires, and interests mislead us. If we were otherwise, the moral law would not mean anything to us, since it would not come as a command. We would be one and the same with the "holy will".

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[52] Kant, Immanuel, Foundations of Metaphysics of Morals , p.55, footnote 17

On the other hand, if we were purely sensible beings, we would act only according to the laws of nature, and since we would have no capacity of reasoning, again the moral law would have no sense for us. But only because we are members of both the sensible and the intelligible worlds at once, we are "under necessity qua phenomenon and free qua noumenon".

Syntheticity emerges from this view. I, as a moral agent, may not act in accordance with the moral law. I do not obey the rule naturally, rather qua freedom I stand in face of the law. Universal law is connected to individuals by means of freedom. According to Kant, ethics proper can not be teleological, because teleology supports and invites heteronomy, i.e. the determination of a law or action by someone or something other than the self. If it were heteronomous, it would either be subject to the laws of nature, or it would be subjective. In the former case it would not involve freedom, and in the latter it would not be necessary, which are both, obviously, not acceptable for Kant. For him, morality has to be necessary and unconditional which is possible only with the autonomy of the will.

The third formulation of the categorical imperative concerns the autonomy of the will:

"Never choose except in such a way that the maxims of the choice are comprehended in the same volition as a universal law." [53]

What Kant means here is that each person through his own act of will legislates the moral law. He distinguishes autonomy from heteronomy. A heteronomous will is influenced or determined by desires or inclination, and this is what Kant wants to rule out.

The idea of freedom is central to the concept of the autonomy of the will. Kant employs freedom as a denominator between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. Freedom connects the will that legislates (the objective will), and the will that obeys this legislation (the subjective will) to each other. As a free agent I enact my own laws, and I find that I am obliged to act in accordance with the laws I make. Kant strongly emphasizes that every rational being who has a will has the idea of freedom.

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[53] ibid., p.59

"Reason must regard itself as the author of its principles, independently of foreign influences, consequently as practical reason or as the will of a rational being , it must regard itself as free." [54]

There is a circularity in this explanation, since on one hand, we assume freedom, and on the other, we assume that there are moral agents, and we justify one on the basis of the other and vice versa. The only point Kant makes clear concerning this problem is that we find in reason the concept of freedom which gives us the hope that our belief in freedom is justified. However, the theoretical reason can not explain how pure reason can be practical, how freedom is possible. Still freedom is an idea that is necessary to assume because of our sense of our moral obligation, that is "because I must, I can." Therefore, freedom is the first postulate of morality.

The line of reasoning which leads Kant to postulate immortality begins with his conception of summum bonum, the supreme good. Although virtue is the supreme good, and the moral action is determined solely on the basis of virtue, we as rational beings

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[54] ibid., p.67

are fully satisfied when there is a union between virtue and happiness, that is the bonum consummatum, the perfect good. Though it does not always happen so, we assume that virtue ought to produce happiness. However, in experience we can see no necessary connection between virtue and happiness. If we were to limit human experience to this world, it would then be impossible to achieve the supreme good in its fullness. The moral law, on the other hand, commands us to strive for perfect good, and this implies an indefinite progress towards this ideal, but this is "only possible on the supposition of the immortality of the soul".[55]

The moral world also forces us to postulate the existence of God as the ground for the necessary connection between virtue and happiness. If we mean by happiness "the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will"[56], then happiness implies a harmony between man's will and the phenomenal world. But man is not the author of the world, nor is he capable of ordering nature, so

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[55]Kant, Immanuel, "Critique of Practical Reason", translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbot, Longmans, Green and Co., London, p.219

[56]ibid., p.221

that a necessary connection between virtue and happiness can be established. Then we must postulate: "the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature itself, and containing the principle of this connection, namely of the exact harmony of happiness with morality"[57]

Kant, definitely, does not mean that there cannot be morality without religion, for he has already indicated that a person can recognize his moral duty without the idea of God, and must obey the law simply out of respect for the law. When saying that it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God, what he means is "moral necessity" -unlike the objective[58] necessity of freedom - in the sense that we need God to guarantee that happiness will follow moral action.

Hegel's main criticism of Kantian account of morality can be summarized as follows: According to Kant, moral consciousness is satisfied by the mere performance of duty: the nature, i.e., the phenomenal world, provides only the setting for this performance, and it may or may not reward the performance.

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[57]ibid., p.221

[58]What Kant means when he uses the term objective is something universal and necessary in contrast to the contingency, particularity and subjectivity of our sensations.

However, moral consciousness can not be satisfied by the accomplishment of an impersonal, universal purpose. The individual also must be satisfied. Kant, at this point, necessarily postulizes God and Immortality to meet the demands of the individual's personal satisfaction.

Still there is a more serious problem: the moral consciousness should operate on an actuality that presents many distinct 'cases'. This gives rise to a duplicity in moral consciousness. On one hand, there is the moral consciousness acting in accord with the categorical imperative, a law of duty indifferent to a special content, and on the other hand, there is the other moral consciousness particularizing this law into special rules. Here we have the concept of a divine legislator who pluralizes duty and connects it with happiness. However, the actuality presents a different situation: the moral agent is always an individual who aims at achieving a result in the real world. He leaves the unpluralized law of duty to another consciousness, the divine lawgiver.

So the individual moral consciousness, considering himself as imperfect before contingent facts, locates its moral ideal in

another perfect being as a mere representation in its mind. Therefore, it does not recognize itself as a "concept" that links these opposing moments with one another, but he merely deals with abstractions, or picture-thoughts. Both the imperfect individual and the perfection it aims become mere presentations. Thus one of Hegel's main criticisms of Kant's "Metaphysics of Morals" is that there is and there can be no transcendent moral perfection, but an ideal of a moral transcendence is treated as if it were such a perfection.[59]

Kantian philosophy, for Hegel, is based on the dichotomy of spirit and nature - hence, bound to remain at the level of consciousness; not self-consciousness -, and proves incapable of overcoming the duality inherent in consciousness, that between subject and object, and truth and reality. As Jean Hyppolite puts it:

"Kant rises to an idea of nature and of spirit, but this idea has only subjective significance, and is hence only a manifestation, and not truth that knows itself in-and-for-itself. Phenomenology, the general introduction to the whole system of absolute knowledge, becomes a specific moment of the system, the moment of consciousness, while at the same time, it loses part of its content. Consciousness pertains to subjective spirit, but there are also objective spirit, which rises above consciousness, and absolute spirit (in art, religion and

[59]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", pp. 626-627

philosophy) which is not only a manifestation of the true, but the true itself."[60]

Spirit at the level of morality seems to have provided us with what the whole Phenomenology was looking for: the identity of the knower and the known. Neither in the world of culture, nor in the world of faith, was the spirit capable of bearing its object within itself. However, at this level of self-certainty, its object is no longer an alien reality - like power or heaven -, but rather pure duty. Then the "I" can will nothing other than itself; its absolute goal lies within itself.

"Here then knowledge seems at last to have become entirely adequate to the truth at which it aims; for its truth is this knowledge itself. All oppositions between the two sides has vanished, and that, too, not for us (who are tracing the process), not merely implicitly, but actually for self-consciousness itself."[61]

As we have already mentioned in the previous chapters, morality (Moralitaet), for Hegel, is a higher phase of the development than ethical life (Sittlichkeit), since it enhances our self-consciousness. At the level of morality, a subject is universal will embodied no longer in universal rights but in a particular will, therefore from the point of view of the subject the law

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[60] Hyppolite, Jean, "Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit", pp. 61-62

[61] op.cit., p.613

that he breaks is his own law. In the ethical sphere, the contradiction is between the legal (rechtliche) or ethical (sittliche) values of the society and the particular will, whereas at the level of morality, the contradiction is in the particular will of the individual, thus, it is rather a self-contradiction. As soon as the rational agent realizes this self-contradiction, he determines himself as self-related negativity, transcends the sphere of Sittlichkeit, and becomes a moral agent.

The "Moral World View" begins with a demonstration of the structure of the Kantian system of morality, which presents an obvious duality of the noumenal and the phenomenal existence of self-consciousness: (1) on one hand, moral self-consciousness knows duty to be its pure essence, (2) on the other hand, self-consciousness has another nature which is not pure duty, and which must be overcome. So, there are two independent realities which are antithetical: freedom in which the self identifies itself with the moral life, and nature, in which the self is unable to find itself, but knows its other.

"This other, because duty constitutes the sole essential purpose and object of self-consciousness, is a reality completely devoid of significance for self-consciousness. But

again because this self-consciousness is so entirely confined within itself, it takes up towards this otherness a perfectly free and detached attitude.; and the existence of this other is, an existence completely set free from self-consciousness, and in the like manner relating itself merely to itself." [62]

That is to say, what is essential to me is to do my duty, and this duty has no relation to nature, where laws that govern phenomena are in charge, which are completely indifferent to what constitutes my essence. Then the problem is the moral self-consciousness that finds itself in both worlds considers morality as <u>essential</u>, and nature as <u>inessential</u>. This implies the dependence of the latter on the former. As Hegel puts it:

"This relation presupposes both thorough reciprocal indifference and specific independence as between nature and moral purposes and activity; and also, on the other side, a conscious sense of duty as the sole essential fact, and of nature as entirely devoid of independence and essential significance of its own. The moral view of the world, the moral attitude, consists in the development of the moments which are found present in this relation of such entirely antithetical and conflicting presuppositions." [63]

A synthesis must be postulated, since, on one hand, nature and morality are considered as indifferent with respect to each other, but on the other hand, nature must be dependent on morality. The synthesis is based on the Kantian postulas of (1)

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[62] ibid., p.615
[63] ibid., p.616

harmony of happiness and morality, (2) immortality and (3) God. As the postulates develop, Hegel shows us, the contradiction that lies at the heart of the Kantian system, becomes more obvious. The contradiction arises because the idea of duty, by definition, contains a necessity of concrete action. Moral consciousness does not only know its essence as an abstraction, a thought-entity, but it wills it, and willing contains the realization of an action, which is a moment of actuality, a moment of nature.

According to Kant, virtue is what makes us worthy of being happy.[64] And it is by supposing the actual existence of a moral self-consciousness that we can talk of the unity of happiness and virtue. What guides the moral consciousness is the law, which it obeys out of pure respect for the law. Every time it acts, it aims for duty, hence its intention is pure. But as we mentioned above, it not only knows duty, it desires to realize duty, since, by definition, moral consciousness is an active consciousness. Pure duty exists only because it is realized in a world of action. But the rules of the world of action qua nature are completely independent of the moral order.

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[64]Kant, Immanuel, "Critique of Practical Reason", pp. 206-207

Therefore, moral consciousness is doomed to a tragic existence. On one hand, it is aware of the independence of nature, and on the other, it intends to act with respect to the moral law in the very same nature. Thus, happiness does not immediately follow moral action or virtue.

It is of great importance to note here that Hegel defines happiness as "the enjoyment of achievement" or realization [65], whereas Kant defines it as the realization of desires.

"Happiness is the condition of a rational being to whom everything happens according to his wish and will."[66]

This empirical definition is what urges Kant to conclude that the unity of virtue and happiness is synthetic and not analytic. According to Kant, Epicureans deduce virtue from happiness which is immoral, and Stoics deduce happiness from virtue, which is impossible.[67]

For Hegel, however, consciousness is happy when it manages to express itself in its deeds. Therefore, by demanding happiness,

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[65]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", p.616
[66]op.cit., p.221
[67]ibid., p.208

moral self-consciousness demands nothing but self-fulfillment (Erfüllung), which duty lacks because it is cut off from actuality. This point is a reformulation of Hegel's main criticism of Kantian morality. Kantian system of morality tends to see the good as something that ought to be achieved - as something detached from the particular deeds of the individual-, and the present state of the individual as evil. Hegel, on the other hand, believes the good to be realized in the present state of affairs, i.e., the actual. As I shall discuss in the following two chapters, morality in Kantian terms draws a sharp contrast between good and evil, and holds that the realization of the good requires the complete elimination of evil, whereas Hegel sees evil as a necessary step involved in the development towards the realization of good in terms of the actual.

"This moment in the objectified purpose, in duty fulfilled, is the individual consciousness seeing itself as actually realized. In other words, this moment is that of enjoyment, which thus lies in the very principle of morality, not indeed of morality immediately in the sense of a frame of mind, but in the principle of the actualization of morality."[68]

Therefore, according to Hegel, happiness, that is, the fulfillment of the absolute goal, can only be realized when

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[68]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", p.618

there is a reign of virtue on earth. In the case of Kant, however, the problem of happiness brings us to the second postulate; immortality. Man has a dual nature: he is not only a rational, but also an empirical entity. As a rational entity, he knows duty to be his sole essence, and as an empirical entity, he is linked to the sensible world by impulses and inclinations. These two opposing selves unite within a single consciousness. Moral life, therefore, is nothing but man's struggle against his nature to transform it, and to make it conform to the law. These two opposing selves must be brought into a unity, so that man can attain virtue and happiness. We must postulate an indefinite life in order to make morality possible, since morality realizes itself by adapting nature to itself rather than adapting itself to nature. In order for the subject to make moral progress, and transform its sensuous nature, the demand for an indefinite life is inescapable.

After the second postulate the contradiction that lies at the bottom of the moral world view becomes more visible. Where does this infinite life lead us to? This is a progress which can never end; it always remains as an aim to be reached, as a task

to be fulfilled, because if it ends, it will be the end of all effort, and, therefore, a negation of morality.[69]

The last postulate aims at resolving the contradiction between duty and nature, but what it does in fact is to shift the contradiction from the moral consciousness to a divine legislator. We have stated repeatedly that the contradiction arises whenever moral consciousness wants to act concretely, since duty and nature exist independently. Concrete action appears always as a single, particular case, but the particularity of content coming from nature is in contrast with pure duty, which is universal. Then, on one side, there is knowledge of particular cases of action, and on the other side, there is pure knowledge, which knows only duty to be its essence. How is it possible for moral consciousness to act?

Here intervenes the divine legislator - almost like the "deus ex machina" in Greek tragedy. Moral consciousness projects the unity of content and form into another consciousness. The divine legislator unites in himself what is separate in us; the universal and the particular. But the contradiction is still

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[69]ibid., p.620

there. Our consciousness contains pure duty, which is indifferent to every determinate content. But God's consciousness also contains the same relation to action, and the necessity for a determinate content. With the abstract notion of pure duty, for the divine legislator also, it is impossible to act in the actual world.

"The first maintains pure duty indifferent towards all specific content, and duty consists merely in being thus indifferent towards it. The other, however, contains the equally essential relation to the process of action, and the necessity, therefore, of determinate content: since duties for this other mean determinate duties, the content is thus, for it, just as essential as the form in virtue of which the content is a duty at all." [70]

The necessity for content is outside of our consciousness, in that of the divine legislator who thus mediates or connects determinate and pure duty, and is the reason why that specific duty also has validity. In Kant's system, consciousness grasps its object as will and knowledge of the self, viz. God, but this self-knowledge remains as an "other" for itself, since it posits this knowledge outside itself. And by contraposing knowledge and will to the actuality of the self, Kant makes the

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[70] ibid., pp.621-622

object of knowledge alien to the self, as pure knowledge and pure will in the form of a non-actual universal.

Hegel's God is nothing but the Spirit which has manifested itself as Absolute Self-consciousness. So, it is not surprising to read him saying that God is not purely positive. God as the Idea[71] is the unity of the good and the evil in the form of freedom realized. Therefore, the solution of the problem is already contained in the Idea, since the Idea in its very nature, has the potentiality of differentiating itself as positive and negative. If we stick to the concept of an unmixed, purely positive good, it means nothing but we are stuck in the narrow field of Understanding failing to grasp the dynamic principle in the Idea. Both good and evil remain as abstract categories of Understanding, and a transition to a higher level becomes impossible. The good, as the actual universal should be apprehended as activity and self-distinction. From the point of view of Reason, both good and evil are found in the concept of the will.

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[71] The Idea *(Idee)* is the concept that gives reality and existence to itself. To do this, the concept must determine itself, and determination is nothing external, but is the concept itself, i.e., it is self-determination. The Idea is the concept become concrete, the unity of subject and object, form and content.

This is a very significant point in understanding Hegel's dialectic of freedom. He bases his dialectic on the subject's recognition of good and evil, and claims that man is responsible for his deeds since they are the outcome of not only the natural will, but also the subject's knowledge of good and evil. Therefore, the subject, very much like God, has an active relation to both good and evil in the sense that "he" has the capacity of knowing and willing each freely.

In Kant, however, the unity of actuality and pure duty falls outside self-consciousness. The self of the "Moral World View" is no longer any actually existing moral self-consciousness. In so far as it exists in actuality, it is no longer moral. If there is no moral actuality, then there is only pure duty, which is only an abstraction. So, Kant started by claiming that there is an actual moral consciousness, and ended up saying that there is no actual moral consciousness.

The only way to avoid this contradiction is to admit that there is a continuous movement from one opposite to the other, from pure duty to actuality, and from actuality to pure duty.

"Hence, as regards content, they become, as such, object, each of them holds good for the other; and, as regards form, they become object in suchwise that this reciprocal interchange is, at the same time, merely pictured - a mere idea. Or, again, the actually non-moral, because, it is, at the same time, pure thought and elevated above its actual reality, is in idea still moral, and is taken to be entirely valid. In this way the first proposition, that there is a moral self-consciousness, is reinstated, but bound up with the second that there is none; that is to say, there is one, but merely in idea. In other words, there is indeed none, but it is all the same allowed by some other consciousness to pass for one."[72]

Kant, in his Critique of Practical Reason aims at developing a philosophical perspective where ontology is possible only with objective action. In denying the possibility of making an ontology on theoretical grounds, and giving practical philosophy the status it deserves, he is the one, who signifies a turning-point in the history of philosophy. According to Kant, man has a dignity only as a 'doer', as an active agent. In this respect, Hegel and his followers owe much to Kant's second critique.

The main problem in Kant's moral philosophy arises from the rigidity of his dualism. According to Hegel, what Kant failed to see was that knowledge of nature is knowledge of self, and knowledge of self is knowledge of nature. Kant did not admit

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[72]Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomenology of Mind, pp.626-627

the dialectical character of truth, and, therefore, excluded truth from knowledge. Hegel shares Kant's views that to be moral is to be rational, that rationality is at the heart of one's nature, and that to be moral is thus to be free. However, he objects to Kant's position of holding a sharp opposition between duty and inclination, and taking morality as a matter of what one ought to do. Hegel, unlike Kant, locates good and evil primarily in actual conduct rather than in the will and intentions, and regards evil as a necessary move in the development of consciousness towards the Absolute, as we shall discuss indetail in the following two chapters.

V. THE MORAL DOCTRINE IN THE BROTHERS KARAMASOV

"My worthy friend, gray are all theories
And green alone Life's golden tree."
from Goethe's FAUST
(First Part, Scene IV)

The Brothers Karamasov is not a Bildungsroman, though it certainly involves a pattern of moral Bildung as we shall see in the following chapter. The Brothers Karamasov, like many other Dostoyevsky novels, is much more than a Bildungsroman, since it provides a wider scope and understanding, an all-embracing view of life, rather than presenting the development of a single character going through stages of an educational process leading towards the final goal of attaining a compromise with social reality. Dostoyevsky's novel has a symphonic structure presenting a tremendous complexity of events and a rich variety of characters. Some fifty women, men and children run across its pages involved in numerous subplots which add to the richness of the novel.

Dostoyevsky, like many other nineteenth century realists, depicted themes of crime, punishment and repentance which were the dominating themes of the Bildungsromane of the time. However, Dostoyevsky remains unique in the way he elaborates

these themes around his fully developed and problematic characters. From all of his novels the Brothers Karamasov stands out as a novel of synthesis summing up almost the whole of the life and work of its writer. The novel's essentially philosophical nature tends to be obscured by the extraordinary intensity of characters and actions performed by them, by the multiplicity of places and of images. However, the intensely tragic quality of the passions, vices and inspirations it invokes, the polished dialectics of its conversations and arguments, and finally the brilliant criticism in the poem the Grand Inquisitor reveal the novel's philosophical depth.

The major difference between Bildungsroman and Dostoyevsky's novels consists in the use of dialogue in the latter, which creates a great shift in perspective, and results in a continuous dynamism felt at every single page of the novel. The secondary characters in Bildungsroman are static. They do not change in the course of the process that the main character goes through. They do not reveal themselves in their different responses to different situations. The most important reason for this is their function as accessories or diversions. They

are usually there, only because the narrator wants us to see the development of the main character, while the minor characters act as a foil to his development. Thus, the dynamic progress of the protagonist is contrasted to the static position of its "other". Dickens, for example, deals with types rather than characters. In most of his works - including Great Expectations - the first person narration is an extension of a monologue which presents a single world view. The dialogues between his characters serve for the assertion of the very same point of view.

This is not true of Dostoyevsky, who with a great performance deals even with the minor characters to make them flesh-and-blood individuals invoking a sense of actuality in the reader. This he owes to a great extent to his use of the dialogue in the novel. The dialogue, for Dostoyevsky, is of primary importance - which I will discuss later on in detail in relation to Hegel's emphasis on language - ; it is a medium through which characters reveal themselves as subjects having different levels of subjectivity. Thus, the true form of intersubjectivity we find only after we come to Dostoyevsky's novels, where we observe realism in its most refined form. This

is why Dostoyevsky's novels are called "polyphonic" rather than "homophonic" according to Donald Fanger, a critic of Dostoyevsky:

"In such a novel (a polyphonic novel), the argument runs, dialogue predominates over exposition, reversing the more usual 'homophonic' practice by which a single point of view dominates all the presented material and dialogue appears only as illustration of what has already been established respecting character and situation. The 'polyphonic' novel is thus the most 'objective' possible." [73]

Despite the fact that The Brothers Karamasov is far from possessing a didactic tone - which is closely related to its aspect we stated above - there is a moral doctrine woven into the texture of the story concerning the self-discovery of the individual:

"The doctrine itself is simple. Man can not achieve salvation without unconditional and unconditioned faith in God and in immortality. On the basis of such faith man must pursue the practical moral policy of 'actively loving others'. By so doing a man will be able to refrain from judging his neighbours and thereby avoid asserting himself at their expense and causing their humiliation; in addition he will be able to understand them, fulfill himself, and achieve self-knowledge."[74]

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[73] Fanger, Donald., "Dostoyevsky and Romantic Realism", Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967, p.95-96

[74] Jones, Peter., "Philosophical Aspects of the Brothers Karamasov" from the book "Philosophy and the Novel", Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, p. 6

As it has been indicated here, the doctrine itself may be "simple", but Dostoyevsky's approach to the problem is highly sophisticated and complex in demonstrating how every single detail is bound to lead to the very same conclusion.

The moral doctrine, obviously, is the Christian doctrine that true freedom consists in "actively loving others", and that man's soul, which is the only source of such a love, should dominate his mind and body, or in Hegelian terms, mind and body should be regarded as the two moments of the soul which corresponds to spirit in the form of reason knowing itself as its substance. However, what makes Dostoyevsky subject to our interest rather than any other Christian novelist, is the emphasis he lays upon three concepts which will constitute the three axes of our analysis : a) conscience, b) freedom, and c) the dialectic of recognition.

Before going into the analyses of these concepts and supporting them with examples from the novel, we should note the resemblance of Dostoyevsky's view on morality to Hegel's criticism of the "Moral World View" in Phenomenology.

Dostoyevsky is not a moralist, in the sense that Tolstoy and Kant were. Both Tolstoy and Kant - the former in Anna Karenina, and the latter in his Critique of Practical Reason and Metaphysics of Morals - emphasize the universality of duty, and draw a strict line between man's empirical self and rational self.

At the heart of Kant's moral philosophy lay the twofold assumption of the existence of phenomenal and the noumenal worlds, and of reason being employed in both. Reason is, alternately, concerned with theory about things, and with practical behaviour, but there is ultimately one and the same reason which has to be distinguished in its application. The objectives of reason, therefore, are two in number: the first is theoretical, and the second is practical rational knowledge.

Kant provides a basis for moral and religious discourse by distinguishing two kinds of reality, the phenomenal and the noumenal, and by limiting the scope of science to the phenomenal and justifying the use of practical reason in

connection with the noumenal. According to Kant, if such a distinction were not made, morality simply would be impossible, only because man would be viewed merely as a part of a mechanical system, and since he would be bound by the laws of nature, it would be impossible for him to act freely. Kant avoided this problem by saying that the phenomenal self of man, or the self we can observe, is subject to natural necessity of causality, whereas his noumenal self as a thing-in-itself possesses freedom. As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, it is only because of this dualism, that duty comes as a categorical imperative, a universal law that man ought to obey despite its empirical self driven by inclinations and desires.

Tolstoy agrees with Kant on how the categorical imperative enables us to discover our moral duties. In his masterpiece Anna Karenina, he portrays a married woman in high society who had lapsed morally. The theme is that the sanctity of the family can be preserved only by the mutuality of pure love of husband and wife, which is achieved by sacrifice, tolerance and the desire to make each other happy.(Along with Anna's story we are presented another couple, Levin and Kitty, who fulfill

these requirements and serve as an element that contrasts with Anna's tragedy.) On the other hand, the family is destroyed when either husband or wife indulges in egoistic love (or self-interest, in Kantian terms), which only aims at personal happiness, as in Anna's case to the ruin of her life, as well as that of her lover Vronsky.

Kantian system of morality presupposes a constant conflict between universal duty and the particular action performed by the individual. According to Hegel, Kantian concept of duty is an empty abstraction -which Kant would not object to-, and, as I have discussed in the previous chapter, the postulas of freedom, God, and immortality turn out to be different formulations of the antinomy : there is an actual moral self-consciousness, there is no actual moral self-consciousness - which Kant would surely object to.

According to Hegel, actual reality in Kantian system is captured in the portrayal of another consciousness as pure duty. And this difficulty can only be overcome by a continuous passage from one term to another, i.e. from actuality to duty, and from duty to actuality. As Hegel puts it "the unity of the

two first propositions, the self-conscious actuality, as well as duty, is only affirmed as a transcended or superseded moment. For neither of them is alone, neither is isolated; on the contrary, these factors whose essential characteristic lies in being free from one another, are thus each in that unity no longer free from the other; each is transcended."[75]

The difficulty of Kant's moral world view lies in the rigidity of his dualism between "actuality" and "duty", between content and form, between individual and universal, and the necessity of going beyond it. In Kant's system, consciousness grasps its object as will and knowledge of the self, but this self-knowledge remains as an "other" for itself, since it posits the knowledge outside itself. And by contraposing knowledge and will to the actuality of the self, Kant makes the object of knowledge alien to the self, as pure knowledge and pure will in the form of a non-actual universal.

According to Hegel, self is the unity of these two moments, and if self posits its object beyond itself, it can never attain

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[75]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", p. 626

the truth and knowledge of itself, which indeed is itself. Instead of grasping the unity of actuality and duty, it constantly displaces its truth as an "other", without perceiving the dialectic which constitutes it. For Hegel, this dialectic is found in the self-certainty of spirit which wills itself as actuality and universality.

Dostoyevsky's approach, in this sense, bears various similarities to Hegel's view of morality in Phenomenology. Both Hegel and Dostoyevsky ground their theses on the assumption that the universal and the individual, or the divine and the human are two moments of the same reality, i.e. of spirit. By allowing the individual consciousness to become for-itself they make self-certainty a medium for individual consciousness through which it grasps its truth as "this other consciousness" that the moralist displaces beyond man.

In Hegel's system, as well as in Dostoyevsky's novel, self-knowledge, therefore, is the knowledge of being, of all existence, whereas in Kant and Tolstoy self-consciousness is consciousness of pure duty and pure knowledge, which as an imperative is detached from the actuality of the self. The

moral value laid upon the attainment of a goal as pure duty ends up with the projection of the self outside itself making this goal unattainable, and resulting in self-alienation. The individual when it acts, discovers the insignificance of its action with respect to the final goal. It finds out that its deed is contingent, and the final goal as pure duty goes beyond the content of "this" specific act.

However, for Hegel, individual consciousness should be granted the moment of self-certainty where it holds its subjective maxims to be the absolute universal, which it will attain at the end of the process. According to Hegel, when duty is detached from action, as in the case of Kantian system of morality, then "since the universal good ought to be carried out, nothing good is done"[76] (emphasis mine) Thus, Hegel strongly emphasizes the significance of action in relation to its object, i.e. pure duty:

" The moral act is not something contingent and restricted; its essential nature lies in pure duty. This pure duty constitutes the sole entire purpose; and the act, whatever may be the limitation of the content, being the actualization of that purpose, is the accomplishment of the entire absolute

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[76]ibid., p. 631

purpose...For by the very notion of moral action, pure duty is essentially an active consciousness. Action thus ought certainly to take place, absolute duty ought to be expressed in the whole of nature, and 'moral law' to become 'natural law'"[77]

Thus, for Hegel, God as absolute good will, or as "highest good" in Kantian terms, is not detached from the particular deeds of the individual as a moral agent striving towards that Absolute. God is not an "other" posited by the individual outside itself, as it is in the Kantian system. For Hegel, it is a universal particularizing itself in the individual, and at the same time it is an individual discovering itself as the universal. Hegel's God is on earth, in the individual, continuously acting and manifesting itself as history.

Both Hegel and Dostoyevsky base the method and meaning of their work on a similar perspective. While reading The Brothers Karamazov one can feel the presence of such a God throughout the novel. This God is the product of the religious doctrines of Orthodoxy, and is very close to what Russian philosopher Fyodorov calls "brotherhood". According to Fyodorov, knowledge without action (the characteristic sin of philosophers and

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[77]ibid., p. 631-632

scientists) is "the gift of Satan", and the brotherhood of man, i.e. the Kingdom of God, is within the reach of man when this tragic isolation of man from its object, i.e. God as an "other", comes to an end. He criticizes Kant severely for basing his philosophy on this isolation:

" In the Critique of Pure Reason everything good, i.e. God, constitutes an ideal; in the Critique of Practical Reason it is an extra-worldly reality, while reality consists of a) the soulless world, an irrational and insentient power for which 'chaos' is a more appropriate term than 'cosmos' ... ; and b) an impotent soul ... apart from God and the world... Herein lies the separation of the soul from power and the world, from reason and feeling; their unification can only be a project - something which is not to be found in Kant."[78]

Fyodorov, unlike Kant, believes that perfection is not an ideal, but a reality attainable on this earth through moral action, which will result in the brotherhood of all man, i.e. the unification of man with God. Solovyov, on the other hand, who was familiar not only with Kant's, but also with Hegel's work, bases his religious philosophy on the notion of "Godmanhood" by which he expresses almost a Hegelian union of the individual with the universal, i.e. the Absolute, as the object of knowledge, through which reason receives content and

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[78] "Russian Philosophy", Vol III, ed. by J. M. Edie, J.P. Scanlan, and M.B. Zeldin., Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1965, p. 32

experience receives form. And the Absolute is only attainable through reason and experience. This trilogy is based on the concept of Holy Trinity, and Solovyov's "Godmanhood" derives its essence from Incarnation; the second Person of the Trinity, i.e. Christ is the Absolute embodied in an individual. Once the divine union is achieved in one God-man, the road for salvation, or reunification with God, is open to all man through "actively loving others", and actualizing the consciousness of the Absolute in history.

"The divine appears here (in the cosmic process) as the active energy of an absolute idea striving to realize or embody itself in a chaos of discordant elements. The divine principle, thus has the same aim as the world-soul, namely, the incarnation of the divine idea, or the deification (theosis) of all that exists, by giving all that exists the form of an absolute organism. The difference is that the world-soul, as a passive force, a pure tendency, does not primordially, know what to strive for, i.e. lacks the idea of total unity, whereas the divine Logos, as a positive principle, an active and formative energy, has the idea of total unity within itself, gives this idea to the world-soul as a determining form..." [79]

This "positive principle" is the major theme that lies at the heart of Dostoyevsky's novel; every conversation, every action and every character in The Brothers Karamasov serves as a tool to emphasize this underlying motive, and everything in the

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[79] ibid, p. 81

novel falls within its scope. The narrator's evaluation of the principal characters provide various examples supporting this thesis. We are told, at the beginning of the novel, that Alyosha was entirely convinced of the existence of God, and that he sought truth, and immediate action. (I, 5)[80] The author also informs us that Alyosha's choice of an elder tutor is because of his urge of attaining truth and self-discovery. In the same chapter, we are shown elder Zosima in action, advising Fyodor, peasant women, and finally Ivan. The motive of "actively loving others" is dominant here. Madame Hohlakova, and later Ivan (II, 4; V, 4) claim to love people, but in neither of the cases is it the love that Zosima advises, and practices.

According to Zosima -and Dostoyevsky himself - what is needed is "active love", a love of humanity in general which derives its essence from the brotherhood of all men.

This positive doctrine is reinforced in Book VI, where Zosima urges other monks to accept personal responsibility for all

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[80]All my references to *The Brothers Karamazov* are taken from Penguin Books edition of the work, translated by David Magarshack, Middlesex, England, 1958. The first numerals refer to the book, the second refer to the chapters in the book.

things and for all men (VI, 1,2) Zosima's confessions about his experiences in his youth and the regeneration he passed through are the early signs of the regeneration that Dmitry will go through starting with his dream of the 'babe'.

Zosima asserts that "actively loving everything" is the only way to apprehend God on earth as the all reality. Heaven is on earth waiting to be discovered, and "loving humility" is the strongest of all things, and the only means to salvation is to make oneself responsible for everything, "for everything like the ocean, flows and comes into contact with everything else: touch it in one place, and it reverberates at the other end of the world." (VI, 3) Jean Kellogg, in his book Dark Prophets of Hope, strongly emphasizes the connection between such a view of human existence and the teachings of the Byzantine church:

"If one thing Dostoyevsky was doing in portraying the human sea was to illustrate what he believed was to illustrate the only viable relationship between human beings, the other was to illustrate what he believed the relationship between man and the Life Force behind the universe. It is lack of recognition that Dostoyevsky's Russian and Byzantine background rather than hostility to the metaphysical per se that now keeps so much of this part of his vision unseen. The Eastern Fathers of the Byzantine Church, from the time of Iranaeus and Cyril, had regarded Christ as Pantocrator, reigning forever in the golden light of that holy mission expressed by the Byzantine mosaics and carried into Russian sacred painting. Under Christ Pantocrator all the human race was divinized. The very ground

was sacred. Dostoyevsky has Alyosha reverently kiss the earth to mark his reconciliation with his faith after Zosima's death."[81]

According to Zosima, this feeling of oneness with all reality on earth is essential for man to discover himself, if this feeling becomes weak, the individual is detached from its object, from its truth. And this is nothing but hell on earth. "What is hell?" asks Zosima, and he gives the answer right away: "The suffering that comes from the consciousness that one is no longer able to love".(VI, 3) The "active love" derives its essence from the individual's knowing itself as itself, as being identical with its "other", all reality; i.e. God in the form of Spirit.

Hegel in his Phenomenology gives a full-fledged account of how individual consciousness acquires knowledge of itself as itself climbing up the stages of a process of self-realization. The primary task of the next chapter will be to demonstrate how Dostoyevsky finds possible the acquisition of the individual's knowledge and truth of himself. As mentioned before, the

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[81]Kellogg, Jean., "Dark Prophets of Hope - Dostoyevsky / Sartre/ Camus/ Faulkner"", Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1975, p.48

analysis will involve three axes, which are interconnected, but will be studied separately, concerning a)conscience, b) freedom, and c) the dialectic of recognition.

VI. THE SPIRITUAL *BILDUNG* TOWARDS THE ABSOLUTE IN "*THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV*"

The enormous quantity of material in the family affairs of the Karamasovs is presented in a simple plan divided into three main parts: (i) rivalry between the father Karamasov and his elder son Dmitry in love with the same woman, making them mortal enemies, (ii) the mysterious murder of father Karamasov which leaves Dmitry as the primary suspect of the act, and (iii) the miscarriage of justice that dooms Dmitry to long years of prison on a charge of parricide.

The flow of events draw into their climax all the members of the Karamasov family including the two young women connected with them: Grushenka a wanton lady, whose sensual beauty is the cause of the mortal hatred between the father and his eldest son, and Katya, the daughter of a colonel. Katya -or Katerina Ivanovna as she is usually referred to- is very grateful to Dmitry for an act of chivalrous generosity to her, and she dreams of reforming him, of saving him from moral destruction so that the two together may begin a new life.

Though he takes similar themes to those of Bildungsroman, Dostoyevsky, in the Brothers Karamasov, pictures the climax, the moment of crisis in the process of Bildung, rather than presenting a full account of the individual's development from childhood to maturity. The novel is organized at extreme high tension and with maximum expression, and is built upon sharp contrasts of persons and events. As Fanger, points out, the structure of the novel's plot is largely dependent upon this crisis in the character's Bildung, and this is what makes Dostoyevsky unique in European realism:

"The strategic side of his predilection for extremities raised him above the level of his Western confreres, who made the same arguments but could not produce the same vindications of them. It is aptly summarized in Merezhkovsky's epigram that 'a novel of Dostoyevsky's is not a tranquil, smooth development of epos, but a collection of the fifth acts of many tragedies'"[82] (emphasis mine)

The central characters in Dostoyevsky's novel the Brothers Karamazov can be regarded as constituting a "chain of being" consisting of moments of self-consciousness. Progress up the chain depends upon recognition by an individual, i.e., by the "other". At the lower end of the chain, are the moral degenerates - Fyodor Karamasov and Smerdyakov, his illegitimate

[82]Fanger, Donald, "Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism", p. 219

son. At the other extreme, there are the "angels" - Alyosha, Fyodor Karamazov's youngest son and his spiritual mentor Zosima. The opposites are dominating the novel until the very end: the tranquillity in the monastery is contrasted to the neurotic atmosphere in father Karamazov's house, the Russian Father is contrasted to the "father", Zosima's teaching is contrasted to the conversation over brandy: until the very end of the novel Dostoyevsky, very much like Hegel, makes perfect use of antitheses as his main structural principle.

The central problem of the novel is an alienation[83] deriving mainly from the assertion of self, and recognition, as we mentioned above, is the only medium for regeneration. At the centre of the novel, and at the centre of this thesis, there is Dmitry, the man of action. He is one of the lower members of the chain, and we witness his progress and regeneration through the novel. Dmitry is associated with the negative doctrine at the beginning of the novel, but in the process of his spiritual

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83 In Hegel's philosophy, alienation (Entfremdung) is closely connected to Bildung. After the decline of the unalienated Ancient Greece, the period of modernity is referred to as the "world of the self-estranged (sich entfremdete) spirit" . This world is marked by separation: between actual world and a world beyond, which is represented by Faith (Glaube), as the essence of the actual world, between the self-conscious individual and the social substance, and between state power and wealth. (A Hegel Dictionary, p. 37) Here, when we talk of alienation we mean the individual's alienation from the universal spirit, and since the individual fails to discover the truth about itself, i.e., that it is identical with the universal, it is not only isolated from the society but also self-alienated.

Bildung, he discovers the conflict in his being and gradually rises up the chain. At the beginning of the novel, he is associated not only with moral blindness, but also with falsehood, cruelty and self-interest. However, when he recognizes himself as a morally inadequate individual, he seeks forgiveness and love. The same is true, in a sense, for both Ivan and Katya, as we shall see in our analysis.

In this chapter while discussing the dialectical movement of Spirit from moral consciousness to universal self-consciousness, we shall also analyze the antithetical nature of the characters in the novel, and demonstrate the parallelism between the rise of Spirit in the Phenomenology and the progress and regeneration of the characters in the Brothers Karamasov.

A. Gewissen as Acting Spirit

Before analyzing the development of Spirit from Gewissen (conscience)[84] to universal consciousness, the significance of

[84]Wissen (to know) is related to gewiss (certain), and Gewissheit (certainty) in both an objective ('That is certain') and subjective ('I am certain of it') sense. Certainty, in Hegel, is immediate rather than derived, and this is why it is fallible. It is only a step towards the final goal of attaining the Absolute. Gewissen (conscience) also derives from wissen. Throughout his treatment of Gewissen (conscience), Hegel makes use of its verbal similarity with Gewissheit (certainty), and thereby stresses the connection of conscience with self-certainty (Selbstgewissheit), and its consequent fallability.

this chapter in the entire Phenomenology (and for this thesis) should be noted.

In order to make clear what Gewissen signifies in Hegel's Phenomenology, we must go back to the notion of thing itself (die Sache selbst) which Hegel introduced when he moved from Reason to Spirit. At the very beginning of the development of Spirit, "thing itself", the authentic human deed, appears as a notion without content, an abstract predicate. It acquires its objectiveness in ethical spirit, in the family and the people, where it expresses itself as individuality. In the world of culture, it becomes externalized, where the self-alienated spirit places its object outside itself, and tries to attain it in the form of wealth, power or heaven.

However, at the level of Gewissen, the thing itself is no more an abstract predicate; it is the subject that acts. It is concrete in the senses that it is the subject that knows within itself all its moments. Spirit, at this point, has the universal no more outside itself; he is no longer opposed to the universal, whereas the universal is contained in its very being. Spirit is the free subject creating its history. Free

spirit is creative in the sense that it is not crippled by the contradiction between the abstract universal and the actuality. It acts, and by acting it discovers the certainty of the validity of its action.

In short, the universal instead of being an abstract in-itself as in Kantian morality, has now become a moment of human action, a being that is for-an-other. Thus it took the form of an individual self that demands recognition for his actions by other individuals. The action must be recognized to be authentic, because only through the mediation of other selves it can lead to a universal self-consciousness.

Hegel, at this level of consciousness, presents a dialectic in which the particular and the universal are contraposed in a concrete form: the particular as the acting consciousness; and the universal as the judging consciousness. These two types of consciousnesses exchange their respective roles in the course of the dialectic, and the Spirit grasps itself as absolute in the consciousness of pardon for sins, when the two are united with the help of recognition acting as a middle term between the two.

The best way to define Gewissen is to note its main difference from moral consciousness, the consciousness of Kantian moralism. Duty, the object of moral consciousness, could not be other than the self, but at the same time, it was beyond the self, which is actual in concrete action. Since it is separated from actuality, moral consciousness did not act at all, although duty, its very essence, demanded action.

"According to this latter state of mind (moral consciousness), I act morally when I am conscious of performing merely pure duty and nothing else but that: i.e., in fact, when I do not act. When, however, I really act, I am conscious of an "other", of a reality which is there before me, and one which I want to bring about; I have a definite end, and fulfill a definite duty. There is something else therein than the pure duty, which alone was supposed to be kept in view." [85]

However, at the moment of action, these contradictions disappear, since we must act one way or the other, when we find ourselves placed in a certain situation. Therefore, concrete self, which Kantian morality placed beyond our reach, is now actualizing itself.

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[85]Hegel, G.F.W, "The Phenomenology of Mind", p. 648

Action in the Brothers Karamasov is the product of Gewissen. The characters are aware of their Dasein[86]; finding themselves in a given situation at a given time, they make quick decisions without hesitation, they can not do anything but act. They do not have time to contemplate or to make plans, and even if they make plans they rarely act in accordance with their plans. Dmitry is completely conscious of his hatred for his father and his love for Grushenka. In every action he performs - when he challenges his father to a duel, or when he rushes after Grushenka who flies of to a new life with her first and rightful lover - he is absolutely convinced that he must do so. Katerina Ivanovna, who desperately tries to reform Dmitry to her own standards, firmly believes that she can restore Dmitry from moral destruction. Father Karamasov sticks to his own view of the world - mere charlatanism - which is the only way of existence he can assume. Ivan, even the most introspective of all the characters in the novel, confesses in the court that he was the one who taught Smerdyakov to kill. In all the cases stated above, it is the active agent's actuality produced by its own consciousness.

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[86]Dasein (being there, presence, existence), for Hegel, is Being (Sein) with an 'immediate determinacy', hence, in this context, Dasein is usually translated as a 'determinate being'. It may be useful to note that the Heideggerian association of Dasein with human being in time has little significance for Hegel. (A Hegel Dictionary, p.94)

The essence of Gewissen, therefore, is absolute conviction (Überzeugung), to determine itself by itself. Here we must note that there is a close connection between conviction and arbitrariness. But arbitrariness is essential for Gewissen, and it is the element that will lead Gewissen to universal consciousness, as we shall see later. At this point, however, Gewissen (good conscience) is unaware of its essence of arbitrariness, that is to say, it is unaware of itself as bad conscience.

Knowledge is contingent if it is other than the object, but at this level, this distinction is transcended. At the level of Gewissen, my decision at the moment of action in a given situation is my certainty that I take to be absolute. Thus the concrete situation exists only as it is for me. I convert the given situation into a situation that I take upon myself, and by doing this I transform the concrete situation which is objective into my actuality produced by my consciousness. The acting self does not and can not view all the situations from an impersonal position. It is stuck in its own truth, because its view of the world is its sole truth. This truth is its own

and absolute. It is absolute by the sincerity of its conviction.

"Now it is the law which exists for the sake of the self, not the law for the sake of which the self exists"[87]

But the dialectic movement can not rest here. The acting consciousness, which maintains itself as a unity of being-in-itself and being-for-itself moves to another level, since this momentary unity breaks down by its demand for recognition of its conviction by other selves, as we shall discuss in detail.

Acting consciousness which was considered as universal, now becomes a beautiful soul (die schöne Seele). The beautiful soul is the natural good, which easily reconciles duty with freedom. It naturally acts in accordance with duty; it is the pure good will in Kantian terms.

In Gewissen we saw that Spirit immediately certain of itself reconciled within itself nature and duty, at the moment of decision involving a specific action. But in the case of the beautiful soul, moral consciousness loses its concreteness, and tends to be contemplative rather than active.

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[87] op.cit., p. 649

"Contemplation of itself is its solitary existence, and this objective element is the utterance of its knowledge and will as a universal."[88]

This contemplation is a religious one. The beautiful soul discovers within itself a divine voice, and while contemplating itself, it enjoys the divine within itself. However, the beautiful soul, by withdrawing from action can do nothing but "vanish like a formless vapor" into the air. This results from its contemplative character. Its subjectivity is raised to the level of universality- a result that we have been looking for all through the Phenomenology- but incapable of acting, the beautiful soul fails to transform its thought into being, and pays the price for mere contemplation with its very existence. It is not an active soul engaged in the life-and-death struggle, the play of forces. It refuses everything that is "earthly", and, therefore, is doomed to be detached from reality, separated from the world. Isolation from society, i.e., the refusal of action, for Hegel, either results in the loss of self, as in the case of the beautiful soul, or gives rise to evil, as in the case of judging consciousness which we will soon discuss.

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[88]ibid., p. 663

In the Brothers Karamasov, Dostoyevsky becomes extremely ironical where he talks of Father Ferapont, one of Zosima's opponents. The aged monk is an ascetic; he strictly observes fasts and having taken the vow of silence, scarcely utters a word to anybody. In his complete isolation, he takes himself to be a great saint, a beautiful soul, "and he was so dangerous chiefly because a great many monks shared his opinion and because many of the people who came to visit the monastery looked upon him as a great saint and ascetic, just because he behaved like a saintly fool" (IV, 1) (emphasis mine) Dostoyevsky shares Hegel's view that isolation from society not only results in the loss of self, but also gives rise to evil, if it, in turn, takes the form of a judging consciousness. Father Ferapont is detached from the actuality in the sense that he completely refrains from action, and believes to have found harmony and unity in contemplation about the divine in himself. The irony is the more he isolates himself from actuality, the more is he detached from the universal. While he takes himself to be the identity of the universal and the individual, what he really does is reducing both to an empty abstraction. The dialogue between Father

Ferapont and one of the monks that came to visit him provides us with a good example of this ironical situation:

"'Great Father,... is it true that you are in constant communication with the Holy Ghost?'
'Aye, he does fly down. It happens sometimes.'
'How does he fly down? In what shape?'
'As a bird.'
'The Holy Ghost in the shape of a dove?'
'Aye, there is the Holy Ghost and there is the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is different. He can appear in the shape of some other bird; sometimes as a swallow, sometimes a goldfinch, sometimes as a tom-tit.'" (IV, 1)

The beautiful soul, as universal subjectivity, and Gewissen, as acting consciousness must be reconciled. This reconciliation of finite spirit with infinite spirit -not truly infinite because it is cut off from the finite- is the dialectic of Spirit.

B. Evil and Freedom

The two figures of the dialectic of recognition, namely the acting consciousness and the judging consciousness develop from the inner self-certainty of Spirit. Acting consciousness is nothing but Gewissen that discovered itself not as "good conscience", but as "bad conscience", as a sinful consciousness. It is finite, and its finitude implies a limitation. Sin is inescapable when there is action.

Thus the problem with conscience is that though it was meant to be the identity of subjective knowing and willing with the good, it takes the form of pure subjectivity while still claiming to be that identity. And if subjectivity becomes purely formal and detached from its universal content, then it is doomed to be evil.

"To have a conscience, if conscience is only formal subjectivity, is simply to be on the verge of slipping into evil , in independent self-certainty , with its independence of knowledge and decision, both morality and evil have their common root."[89]

This common root, Hegel claims that both morality and evil share, is nothing but Freedom. According to him, it is the particularity of the will which later turns out to be evil. Particularity always involves a duality. Here it is the duality of the natural will (the undeveloped character) and the inwardness of the will (knowledge).

The will is opposed, at this point to the universal as inner objectivity, i.e. to the good. Moreover, when the will is reflected into itself, it becomes a knowing consciousness, and this is opposed to the natural will. In this opposition the

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[89]Hegel, G.W.F, "Philosophy of Right", p.92

inwardness of the will, i.e., knowing consciousness which derives its content from desires, impulses etc., becomes evil[90]. In other words, consciousness which becomes purely formal, and, therefore, abstract, derives its content from its desires, and impulses, and claims itself to be the Absolute. The agent is able to pass off his action as "good" in the eyes of both himself and the others, although he is inwardly aware of the contrast between this aspect and the essentially negative content of his action. When subjectivity claims to be the Absolute, this is the worst form of evil, whereby evil is perverted to good and good to evil, and consciousness in being aware of its power to affect this perversion, firmly believes itself to be the Absolute. Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right emphasizes the role of knowledge in the emergence of evil:

"Man is therefore evil by a conjunction between his natural or undeveloped character and his reflection into himself, and therefore, evil belongs neither to nature as such by itself - unless nature were supposed to be the natural character of the will which rests in its particular content , nor to introverted

[90]The difference between error and evil is based on recognition or knowledge. Evil is not nature alone, nor is it reflection alone; it is the willing of the natural through reflection. Therefore, if these two were not united, there would be no evil. Since desires or impulses are neither good nor evil in themselves, it is my knowledge and choice of them what makes them evil. Furthermore, in the absence of the natural will, a mere reflection would be meaningless and would not give rise to the emergence of evil.

reflection by itself, i.e. cognition in general unless this were to maintain itself in that opposition to the universal."[91]

Conscience as pure particular subjectivity can choose freely the good or the evil. And it is this arbitrariness of choice, this possibility of the will to choose the evil that contradicts the good, its own essence, and what makes the will free and evil at the same time.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel uses the term "Geworfenheit"[92] when he talks of the painful existence of man in the world. When he says "only a stone can be innocent", he probably means that finitude is necessarily sinful, since an acting consciousness must necessarily engage itself in the world, be something particular, and still must strive to overcome this particularity.

The problem that lies at the heart of Hegel's thesis here is the problem of a fundamental freedom that we can neither bear nor refuse. In Hegel's view of the moral agent, the acting spirit is purely subjective, i.e. it determines itself by

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[91] op. cit., p.93

[92] "Geworfenheit" which means simply "being thrown", probably is a reference to the original sin and man's fall from paradise.

itself, but at the same time it demands its own truth to overlap with the universal truth, the good. Therefore, it demands recognition. The contradiction here is between the universality it states in its words and the particular content of its action.

"Its pure self, as it is empty knowledge, is without content and without definiteness. The content which it supplies to that knowledge is drawn from its own self, qua this determinate self, is drawn from itself as a natural individuality. In affirming the conscientiousness of its action, it is doubtless aware of its pure self, but in the purpose of its action -a purpose which brings in a concrete content- it is conscious of itself as this particular individual, and is conscious of the opposition between what it is for itself and what it is for others, of the opposition of universality or duty and its state of being reflected into self away from the universal." [93]

Not only do I await recognition from the others, but I also know that the particular content of my action is not adequate to this universality I demand to be recognized in my deed. When this opposition becomes fully conscious, it is what is called hypocrisy, and this hypocrisy must be unmasked, as evil must be annulled.

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[93]Hegel, G.W.F., "The Phenomenology of Mind", p. 668

However, there is even something worse than hypocrisy, as we shall discuss in relation to the poem of the Grand Inquisitor in the Brothers Karamasov :this is the point where the individual subject imposes not only on others but also on himself. This is a state where subjectivity claims to be absolute. As a single will this evil consciousness is aware of itself as absolute, and of its powers to effect the perversion of evil into good.

Before we talk about the meaning and significance of the poem the Grand Inquisitor, we had better recall the story in the poem. Ivan's story begins with the appearance of Christ in Seville, some time in the sixteenth century. People recognize Him by the miracles He performs, and gather around him. When the cardinal sees this, he sends his guards to catch Him, and imprisons Christ, because he takes Him to be a danger to the peace of society. He tells Christ that he will burn Him the following day, and that "the same people who today kissed your feet, will at the first sign from me rush to rake up the coals at your stake tomorrow."(V,5)The rest of the poem is the Inquisitor's rejection of Christ for refusing the three temptations - of miracle, mystery and authority - which he

believes to be the three necessary powers to fight rebellion and bring happiness on earth. According to the Inquisitor, Christ, because of his pride of love and freedom, chose what was beyond the power of man, and the church, therefore, was compelled to correct his work.(ibid.) Freedom of choice, in the eyes of the Inquisitor, is a burden that man can never bear "... a tranquil mind and even death is dearer to man than the free choice in the knowledge of good and evil. There is nothing more alluring to man than this freedom of conscience, but there is nothing more tormenting either."(ibid.) What man seeks on earth, however, is only someone to worship, someone to keep his conscience, an authority that he can obey, a God that is, and remains as an "other". The only answer Christ gives to these assertions is a kiss that he gives the Inquisitor as the sign of his great faith in love and forgiveness. Dostoyevsky uses this silent answer also with Alyosha, who kisses Ivan believing that he has cut himself off from the universality that has been offered to him. This is an alienation of the worst kind since he denies the free choice of actively loving others.

Ivan's poem of the Grand Inquisitor is central to Dostoyevsky's novel, and to our discussion of freedom and evil. Freedom, for

the Grand Inquisitor, is the greatest of evils. It is a burden from which all men desire to be saved. What he does not see is freedom is not a burden, but a gift for humanity, a view which Hegel and Dostoyevsky share. It is, of course, true, at least for Hegel, that to be free means to be evil, but it is only through the mediation of evil that man can achieve the Absolute, in the form of a concrete universal.

The Inquisitor says that they have accepted the terrible burden that the people want to get rid of. They alone know the fearful secret that man is free. The ordinary people, "the believers", relieved of the heavy burden of freedom, live in happy innocence. The Grand Inquisitor and the elite of church, by taking the freedom from the hands of ordinary people, commit the worst of all crimes. For both Hegel and Dostoyevsky, they deny the people their chance of discovering the universal in themselves, since the only way for salvation is freedom of choice. By imposing its conviction upon the masses, and taking from them the freedom they deserve, the church turns people into "antheaps", unconscious masses alienated from the universal, which is the worst of all evils.

Dostoyevsky's answer to the Inquisitor's thesis - actually to that of Ivan's - is given by Zosima in the following book (VI), where the elder says that no one is alienated from "others", since every person is responsible for every other person, and that our freedom coincides with the freedom of God only in actively loving others.

C. The Dialectic of Recognition and the Absolute

Conviction becomes universal if it presupposes a relation among self-consciousnesses. The individual by itself can not attain universal consciousness. Only an individual in a community which is in relation with this community can partake in the attainment of the universal. Thus, there has to be the mediation of an "other" for the abstract universal that the self of Gewissen assumes, to become concrete universal.

At this point, the universal is no longer an abstraction as it is in Kantian moralism; it becomes a moment, an object of concrete consciousness. Hegel proceeds from the abstract in-itself, from duty in the Kantian sense, to the concrete object of mutual recognition by self-consciousnesses. This move is extremely important, since it implies that the individual can

not exist if he is not recognized by the community. The struggle for recognition, therefore, is a life-and-death struggle, since self-consciousness needs the mediation of its "other" in order to exist.

"This conviction is just the inherent principle itself; it is inherently universal self-consciousness - in other words, is recognition and hence reality. The result achieved under conviction of duty is therefore directly one which has substantial solid existence." [94]

Duty, in Kantian morality, had no presence, or in Hegelian terms, "no solid existence". It was, thus, impossible for moral consciousness to be recognized by an other. But action is simply the expression of a particular content by moral self-consciousness, and it is this content which is recognized and which makes the action actual.

The struggle for recognition in the Brothers Karamasov is immense. Almost every single line in the novel expresses the individuals demand to be recognized by its other, the community. All through the novel, people feel themselves denied the recognition, which Dostoyevsky, like Hegel, believes, is essential for human existence.

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[94]Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomenology of Mind, p. 651

Dmitry's relationship with Katya, the daughter of his commanding officer, provides us with the best example of the struggle for recognition. As many critics of Dostoyevsky agree, there is a strong resemblance between the personalities of Dmitry and Katya. Jones claims that they were both fond of self-torture[95], Harper argues whether they are, or Dostoyevsky characters in general, "doubles", in the sense that they can contemplate love and hate both at once[96], Kellogg says that "each lived within a shell of glamorous personality enclosing an inner self bitterly insecure and feeling in danger of obliteration."[97] It is true that both Katya and Dmitry are proud, challenging, and self-assertive. In their relationship each seeks recognition from the other, and their relationship takes the form of a cruel fight, since they both want to exercise power upon each other, and to gain dominance over the other.

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[95] Jones, Peter., "Philosophical Aspects of the Brothers Karamasov" from the book "Philosophy and the Novel", p.131

[96] Harper, Ralph., "The Seventh Solitude : Man's Isolation in Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche", p.39

[97] Kellogg, Jean., "Dark Prophets of Hope - Dostoyevsky / Sartre/ Camus/ Faulkner", p.17

Katya, at the beginning of the novel, challenges Dmitry by taking no notice of him, and Dmitry pays her back by humiliating her in the most terrible way. To save his father from destruction, Katya finds herself at Dmitry's door ready to offer herself to him. However, Dmitry notices the pleasure she derives from playing the role of a noble, self-sacrificing daughter, and refuses to touch her. He just gives her the money she needs, and sends her away. In behaving this way he gains a total victory over Katya: he does not allow Katya to play the noble soul, but he himself plays the honorable gentleman; and overlooks her beauty and charm, and thereby denies her the recognition she desires.

When Katya inherits money, and gets engaged to Dmitry, she avenges herself on him. As Dmitry proves to be unfaithful to her stealing money from her which he spent on Grushenka, Katya pretends to love him, although she actually hates him. This time through her role of a self-sacrificing woman she, in a sense, confirms his low self-esteem, and gains mastery over Dmitry. Suffering, in the case of Katya, becomes violence exercised over the other, and leads her into alienation, rather than resulting in empathy and solidarity.

Only after she refrains from judging others, will she be able to judge herself. Katya, at the beginning of the novel, having completely devoted herself to self-concern says "I will be a god to whom he (Dmitry) can pray"(IV,5). However, in the end, as we shall see, she will be ashamed of her pride, and will ask forgiveness of both Dmitry and Grushenka.

The "court scene" (XII) is probably another good example presenting the struggle for recognition in the novel; it is a life-and-death struggle both metaphorically and literally. Towards the end of the novel the chief characters gather together before the final catastrophe. The three brothers, the two women rivals, and all the other main characters meet at the trial. All Russia is watching the trial. Dmitry's and Ivan's confessions, the measured debates, and the brilliant arguments of opposing sides provide the best setting for the individual's ultimate demand for recognition of his conviction by the other.

Self-assertion is doomed to fail, since consciousness discovers the arbitrariness of its action. When I act I know that I can not know all the circumstances related to my action; the

circumstances of my action go beyond the limits of my knowledge. While trying to avoid pure duty, which I know to be abstract, I stick to my conviction and take a particular "this" to be my duty. However, this conviction, though essential, is as empty as pure duty, since any content can be regarded as pure duty. Conviction, therefore, remains formal.

"Since morality lies in the consciousness of having fulfilled one's duty, this will not be lacking when the action is what is called cowardice any more than what is called courage. As the abstraction called "duty" is capable of any content, it is quite equal to that of cowardice. The agent knows what he does to be duty , and since he knows this , and conviction as to duty is just dutifulness, he is thus recognized and acknowledged by others."[98]

Then once an act has been performed, it must be recognized by other self-consciousnesses. The action is the expression of my conviction, which is in-itself universal, and I demand that all others should discover themselves in my action as I did. But recognition, at this point, is impossible, because there is a discrepancy between action and the universality of conviction.

"Both aspects, conscience, qua acting, and the general consciousness acknowledging this act to be duty, stand equally loose from the specific character belonging to this deed. On account of this freedom and detachment, the relation of the two within the common medium of their connexion is rather a

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[98]Hegel, G.W.F., "Phenomenology of Mind", p.655

relationship of complete disparity- as a result of which, the consciousness, which is aware of the act, finds itself in complete uncertainty regarding the spirit which does act and is 'certain of itself'"[99]

Although recognition does not necessarily follow from the conviction of Gewissen, the universal self-consciousness must exist and be actual. This universal self, which can be both objective, that is to say, perceived by the other consciousnesses, and subjective, in the sense that it originates from the subject, can only be language (logos); a language that expresses conviction and comments on action.

Moral consciousness, in the Kantian sense, is silent. There is no place for language in Kantian morality, since he bases his view of morality on the individual detached from its other. Recognition is overlooked, because pure duty is the sole essence of morality. In Hegel, however, it is only language which universalizes the self that is certain of itself in its own conviction. The subject's knowledge of the act is objectified in language.

"The universality lies in the form of the act. It is this form which is to be affirmed as real: the form is the self, which as such is actual in language, pronounces itself to be the truth,

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[99]ibid., p.659

and just by so doing acknowledges all other selves, and is recognized by them." [100]

Acting spirit, in Hegel's view, determines itself by itself, but at the same time it demands recognition from other consciousnesses. It demands its own truth to be accepted by its "other" as absolute truth. Therefore, when it states its conviction, or when it confesses its action, it opens itself to universal recognition and expects to be judged.

Judging consciousness appears in the form of universal consciousness, which at the end proves to be identical with the particular consciousness that it attempts to judge. When it utters the moral judgment, it bases its judgment on its own law, just like the sinful consciousness bases itself on its law.

The acting consciousness in its act discovers itself as evil and sinful, and by discovering the hypocrisy in itself, it confesses itself to its other, and, in turn, expects a confession from the other. The judging consciousness, on the other hand, by opposing evil comes with a non real judgment

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[100] ibid., p.663

instead of a real action. It thus falls in the hypocrisy it judges. By judging, or contemplating, it only contemplates evil, and fails to represent the universality it claims to bear within itself.

It is not until the "hard-hearted" judge forgives the man of action that reconciliation between the two is attained. The judge's pardon of the sins of the active agent is an admission, a recognition of the other self within its own self. With the final "yes" the judge opens itself to the world, and by "yessing" its other, it "yesses" the Absolute.

Absolute spirit is neither abstract infinite spirit detached from its actuality, nor finite spirit detached from universality; it is the actual universal, the unity of these two I's. As Hegel puts it :

"The reconciling affirmation, the "yes", with which both egos desist from their existence in opposition, is the existence of the ego expanded into a duality, an ego which remains therein one and identical with itself, and possesses the certainty of itself in its complete relinquishment and its opposite: it is God appearing in the midst of those who know themselves in the form of pure knowledge"[101]

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[101] ibid., p.679

Dmitry Karamasov, the novel's principal hero is a complicated and honorable character. At the beginning of the novel, he appears as the usual arrogant army brute, unrestrained and loose in morals, but beneath this rough appearance has a living, sensitive soul. Standing between deadly sin and life-giving beauty, he is a typical "double", a character of extreme complicity. His inescapable fall in the course of the novel also signifies his development as Spirit: his rise into the glittering summits of reconciliation. Dmitry's Bildung is central to the novel, not only from the point of view of this thesis, but for Dostoyevsky himself. He makes the prosecutor at the trial say, "he (Dmitry) seems to represent Russia as she is... he is spontaneous, he is a marvelous mingling of good and evil." (XII,6)

The fate of Dmitry is tragic, as the fate of man on earth. He has been unable to break the bondage of the sin, although he tried to escape. At the moment of disaster -when he is convicted and sentenced to twenty years of penal servitude-, however, his entire being is dominated by a feeling of radiance, such as he has never known before: a new man is being born who bases his existence on the hope of salvation. He says

that he had a dream in which he saw a burnt-out village, blackened timbers, emaciated peasant women with hungry children, crying in their arms. He asks, "Why are people poor? Why's the baby poor? Why's the steppe so bare? Why don't they embrace and kiss one another? Why don't they sing joyous songs? Why are they so black with black misfortune? Why don't they feed the baby?" (IX, 8) The answer is obvious for both Hegel and Dostoyevsky: salvation is only possible through suffering, and the unity of the universal with the particular can only be attained through struggle.

Dmitry's dream of the 'babe' signifies the beginning of his regeneration. Accepting responsibility not only for wanting to kill Fyodor, but also for all the suffering and pain on earth, he echoes Zosima: "all are responsible for all... I am going for all, because someone must go for all." (IX, 9) As Jones points out, one should note that whereas Ivan used the suffering of children for the purposes of accusing his hypothetical God (V,4), Dmitry used the dream of the 'babe' as a ground of accepting what his brother could not:

"... the 'active love' of others is the fundamental practical policy; from it will follow the conditions and states that men mistakenly search for as preconditions of their concern for

others. By loving his neighbour before all else, a man comes not only to understand him, but also to achieve self-fulfillment and self-knowledge."[102]

The 'active love' that derives its essence from accepting the responsibility for everything that is human - which Zosima calls 'ocean', and Hegel calls 'universal spirit'. The human ocean is composed of free individuals constituting a chain of solidarity. Love and forgiveness are the only means to establish this chain. When Dmitry accepts the conviction for a murder he did not commit, he thereby opens his heart to love and seeks forgiveness. When he wakes up from his dream, he suddenly discovers that someone put a pillow under his head.

" 'Who put the pillow under my head? Who was that kind man?' he cried with a sort of rapturous, grateful feeling and with tears in his voice, as though goodness only knows what great favour had been shown him.

It was never discovered who that kind man was. It might have been one of the witnesses, or the examining magistrate's clerk had, out of compassion, seen to it that a pillow was put under his head. But his whole soul was shaken with tears. He went up to the table and said that he would sign anything they liked.

'I've had a good dream gentlemen' he said in a strange voice, looking transformed and his face radiant with joy."(IX, 9)

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[102]Jones, Peter., "Philosophical Aspects of the Brothers Karamasov" from the book "Philosophy and the Novel", p. 145

It is not only Dmitry, who goes through a process of Bildung in the novel. Ivan, Katya, and to some extent, even Grushenka are involved in the dialectical progress towards self-recognition. Ivan's rise is marked by his visits to Smerdyakov, where his half-brother charges him of the murder of their father. The triadic structure of Bildung which in the Brothers Karamasov takes the form of pride, shame and resentment repeats itself also in Ivan's case, through which he, like Dmitry, accepts his responsibility in the murder. With his dream of the Devil (XI, 9), he comes to recognize his own alienation in denying responsibility for others. The source of Ivan's alienation is the gap between his actions and his awareness of their consequences. In taking no responsibility for his actions, he was completely isolated, in other words, when he claimed "everything to be permitted" he was unaware, that he was actually giving Smerdyakov a license to kill.

Smerdyakov, on the other hand, is too weak a character to go through a process of Bildung. In his case, action and self-assertion derive their source from another consciousness, i.e., that of Ivan's. When he discovers that Ivan, his spiritual leader, was unaware of the consequences of his teachings,

unable to bear the burden of his guilt he commits suicide. (XI,9)

Katya's regeneration is portrayed at the end of the novel, in the chapter named "For a Moment the Lie Becomes Truth". The name of the chapter is a reference to Ivan's claim that Katya's love for Dmitry was a lie (XI,6). Katya, who until the very end was only concerned about her pride, now confesses herself to Dmitry, and asks for forgiveness not only of Dmitry, but also of her bitterest enemy, Grushenka. The passionate confessions of Dmitry and Katya, at the end of the novel, refer to the moment where the dialectic of recognition comes to and end, where the judge and the doer are reconciled in love and forgiveness. Dostoyevsky, carefully reminds the reader that this can be a momentary reconciliation in the case of Dmitry and Katya, but again he assures us, since they both believe it to be true, then it is true.

" 'Have you forgiven me or haven't you?' Mitya murmured at last, and at the same time instant, turning to Alyosha with a face distorted with joy, he cried to him : 'Do you hear what I'm asking? Do you hear?'

'It is because you're generous at heart that I loved you' the words suddenly broke from Katerina. 'And you don't want my forgiveness - it is I who want yours. But whether you forgive

me or not - you'll always be a sore place in my heart and I in yours - that's how it should be'...

So they went on murmuring to one another almost meaningless, frantic, perhaps not even truthful, words, but at that moment it was all true, and they themselves believed implicitly what they said." (Epilogue, 2)

Hegelian dialectic of the forgiveness of sins is important both from the point of view of theology and of philosophy in general. In Phenomenology, this dialectic offers not only a solution to the problem of reconciling the two ends of the opposition between the infinite and the finite, the universal and the particular, but it also presents the concrete situation of human existence reflecting on the problems of relations among self-consciousnesses, and on the difficulties of communication and recognition.

By viewing spirit as infinite life particularizing itself in individual consciousnesses, Hegel reconciles the abstract universal as law with the action of the sinner. By his act, the sinner comes to face his fate in the form of law, and by facing his destiny he transcends it. When spirit discovers itself as love, it is reconciled with fate. Thus, God, as Hegel conceives it, can not be indifferent to the tragic fate of man on earth. He, actively participates in both human suffering, and in love

that reconciles it. Man, on the other hand, through suffering and pain, inevitably moves towards its own transcendence which is the only possible way for him to overcome his finitude.

The fact that Hegel contraposes 'the judge' to 'the doer' signifies the employment of one of the recurring themes in Phenomenology: relation among self-consciousnesses. For Hegel, it is impossible for the individual to isolate itself from universal consciousness. It can exist only through the mediation of an other, i.e., through recognition. In this dialectic, evil in its pure form is personified in judging consciousness, who claims itself to be the identity of the universal and the particular, but is, in fact, isolated from the rest of community. By withdrawing itself from action, and assuming the position of a judge, it refuses to be recognized by its other, and to discover in itself the true universality it seeks.

Since evil arises as independent self-will that isolates itself from community, it ought to be annulled. It must be annulled not because it is considered as a misfunction of the will, but because it must be considered as a moment in the emergence of

the universal, the good. Hegel emphasizes the importance of evil in the process of attaining the Idea of freedom, and goes even further and claims that to be rational is to be evil.

"With this facet of evil, its necessity, there is inevitably combined the fact that this same evil is condemned to be that which of necessity ought not to be, i.e. the fact that evil ought to be annulled. It is not that there ought never be a diremption of any sort in the will - on the contrary, it is just this level of diremption which distinguishes man from the unreasoning animal; the point is that ... it should overcome the diremption as a nullity."[103]

The subjective self-certainty which is independent and self-determinate can either will the universal, the good, or what opposes this universal, the evil. If he wills the good, which is an abstract universal at this level of the process, he becomes a good[104] man. But what makes him good is the possibility that he can also be evil. From the point of view of the will, good is only an abstraction, and it necessarily becomes evil when it is realized in action. Thus, for the

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[103] Hegel, G.W.F., "The Philosophy of Right", p. 93

[104] Neither in Phenomenology of Mind, nor in Philosophy of Right does Hegel give any credit to natural good, as we have already pointed out while discussing the beautiful soul. Man is neither evil nor good in its own nature. What makes him evil or good is the conjunction of his natural will and his knowledge of good and evil, the fact that he consciously chooses between them.

abstract good will, it is only possible to become a concrete universal through the emergence and transcendence of evil.

In the Brothers Karamasov Father Zosima is aware of the abstract universality of good will. At the beginning of the novel, when he first sees Dmitry, he falls to his knees before him, and touches his head to the ground as a mark of respect to one who will suffer a great deal in the future.(II, 6) The attainment of the identity of good with subjective willing and knowing involves a process of learning, i.e., a Bildung, where knowledge of the unity of oneself and the universe is obtained through suffering. This is the way that both Hegel and Dostoyevsky interpret the myth of the fall: Man has fallen only to rise again, and this time possessing the knowledge of good and evil, which is a necessary condition of goodness as the concrete universal, in contrast to the natural -but abstract - good in the form of innocence. Dmitry, as acting consciousness, represents a subject creating its own history; a subject which has absorbed in itself the universal as its pathos instead of having the universal beyond it in the form of an abstract universal.

This view leads us to the question of how God, the absolute good will, can permit evil on this world. The difficulty of this question lies in the fact that we tend to think that will is related to itself in a purely positive way. Hegel claims that this type of thinking is detached from actuality, and turns good into an empty abstraction. The problem of the origin of evil, therefore, is the outcome of representative thinking as Knox states:

> "'How does the negative come into the positive?' If we begin by presupposing that in the creation of the world God is the absolutely positive, then turn where we will, we shall never discover the negative within that positive , since the talk of God's 'permitting' evil is to ascribe him a passive relation to evil which is unsatisfactory and meaningless."[105]

As we have already stated in the previous two chapters, Hegel's God is Spirit which has manifested itself as Absolute Self-consciousness. If we stick to the concept of an unmixed, purely positive good, it means nothing but we are stuck in the narrow field of Understanding failing to grasp the dynamic principle in the Idea. Both good and evil remain as abstract categories of Understanding, and a transition to a higher level becomes impossible. The good, as the actual universal should be

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[105] op. cit., p.255

apprehended as activity and self-distinction. From the point of Reason, both good and evil are found in the concept of the will.

Then the question
"Why do the wicked live
reach old age and grow mighty in power?"

(Book of Job 7:1, 8:20-21)

can be answered easily. They are one moment in the absolute, i.e., the good, and this negative moment is necessary in the attainment of the absolute. The wicked, the evil are by no means guiltless, on the contrary, their act is freely chosen, and evil is fully their responsibility. However, in the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins, evil is negated, or as Hegel states it "the spirit absorbs them within itself". In his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, he writes as follows:

"The determination that everyone remains what he is lies in the realm of finitude. He has done evil, evil is in him as his quality. But in morality and still more in religion, spirit is known as free, as itself affirmative, so that this limit within man, which goes as far as evil, is a nothingness for the infinity of spirit. Spirit can manage things so that what has happened has not happened. Action does indeed remain in the

memory, but spirit rids itself of it - the finite, evil in general, is negated."[106]

In Dostoyevsky's novel, finally, in Alyosha's Bildung, evil as a moment of the Absolute is negated, and transcended into a higher reality. At the end of the book we see Alyosha, who throughout the novel questioned his belief in God - which was his share in the guilt -, kissing and blessing and loving the earth as a living God. Alyosha, passing through experience, and meeting evil in the form of both an empty-belief and disbelief, completed his development, and changed from a weak, innocent young boy to an individual possessing the knowledge of himself as himself, i.e., the knowledge of universal self-consciousness, as R.P. Blackmur points out,

"The earth, God's world, the Karamasov baseness had gained new meaning and in doing so had transposed the idea of universal guilt into universal forgiveness. ... 'Tragic phrases should be forgiven, they must be... Without them sorrow would be too heavy for men to bear'. In a sense, the action of this whole novel is a tragic phrase; and in another sense, this moment of conversion in Alyosha's life is such a phrase present and transcended."[107]

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[106]Hegel, G.W.F., "Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion" Part III., "Absolute Religion", translated by E.B. Speirs and J. Burdan Sanderson, ed. by E.B. Speirs, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1968, pp. 172-173

[107]Blackmur, R.P., "The Grand Inquisitor and the Wine of Gladness", from "Eleven Essays in the European Novel", Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., New York, 1964, p. 220

We can conclude saying that it is inevitable and also necessary to be evil to climb up the stages in the process in order to reach the Absolute, and only through the mediation of the worst forms of evil such as hypocrisy and self-righteousness, is it possible to actualize this transition. The whole history of spirit, or human development is a history of errors. But we must recognize that this history is part of the Absolute, a moment of the ultimate truth. In the course of its development, spirit transcends itself into the consciousness of the forgiveness of sins, i.e., universal self-consciousness, rather than locating the universal in the consciousness of a beyond which is always transcendent.

Kojeve, in his Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, strongly emphasizes the point that the Absolute Spirit as the "revealed-infinite-eternal Being" is 'Man' himself who is the end product of the process. He supports his claim with his remarks concerning Hegel's modifications on the quotation from Schiller; the last lines of Phenomenology[108].

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[108]Hegel's modification of the poem in the original text is as follows:
"aus dem Kelche dieses Geisterreiches
schaeumt ihm seine Unendlichkeit"
In the English translation, however, there is the word "God", like "Gott" in Schiller's text:

"I shall not dwell on the fact that Hegel says 'Geisterreich' (realm of spirits) in stead of 'Seelenreich' (realm of souls), although this substitution is extremely significant. What is especially important is Hegel says 'dieses Geisterreich' (this realm of spirits) instead of 'das ganze Seelenreich' (the whole realm of souls). By this change he means to exclude the "Angels" of which Schiller speaks, he means to underline that eternal or infinite Being - that is the Absolute Spirit (which, in Schiller, is God) arises solely from the totality of human or historical existence. Therefore, the temporal past of eternal Being is human, and only human. If one wants to talk about 'God', in Hegel, therefore, one must not forget that this 'God's past is Man: it is a Man who has become 'God', and not a 'God' who has become Man (and who moreover again becomes God). And the third modification of Schiller's text by Hegel has the same meaning. Schiller says: "die Unendlichkeit" (the infinity); Hegel writes "seine Unendlichkeit" (his infinity). Thus, Phenomenology ends with a radical denial of all transcendence."[109]

The whole Phenomenology is a demonstration of Being as Spirit, i.e., synthesis of knowledge and the real. It is not a process carried on by the subject within itself, but it is a process in which the subject discovers itself in the object, and the object reveals itself through the subject, as a result of their continuous interaction.

"The chalice of this realm of spirits
Foams forth to God His own Infinitude"

[109]Kojeve, Alexander, "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel", ed. by Allan Bloom, translated by James H. Nichols, Cornell University Press, New York, 1980, pp. 166-167

The transition from Gewissen (conscience) to religion in Hegel's Phenomenology is of vital importance in the attainment of a self-conscious Absolute. It also presents a key to understand Hegel's realism. Hegel bases his realism on the opposition of the object and the subject. The subject in question is, however, not a knowing subject; it is an acting subject, i.e., a moral agent. For Hegel, it is impossible to bridge the gap between subject and object, and establish their identity, unless philosophy gives an account of action. The problem with traditional philosophy is, that it constantly opposes object to the knowing subject, where subject is doomed to remain at the level of understanding capable only of possessing the "knowledge of the knowledge". True knowledge, however, requires that the subject coincides with the object, as Kojeve points out:

"It is meaningless to oppose the knowing Subject to the Object which is known, as 'Realism' ordinarily does. For, having opposed them, one no longer understands their union or coincidence in true knowledge. If one wants to take account of the 'real', one must not oppose the (natural) World to a 'Subject', situated who knows where, and whose sole function is to know this world, that is to reveal it by discourse or concept. One must not oppose Being to Thought, or to the knowing subject. One must oppose the natural Being to human Being... In other words, one must see something else in Man besides a knowing Subject, and one must oppose Man to the

(natural) World precisely to the extent that he is this other thing (Anderes)."[110]

This is exactly what Hegel does in his Phenomenology. The knowledge that knowing consciousness possesses is a false knowledge, since it does not coincide with the object. To establish the identity of this false knowledge (subjective self-certainty), and true knowledge (objective truth), action is necessary, since not thought but action, and action only negates a given being, and the Bildung towards the Absolute is possible only through this negativity.

Consciousness as self-related negativity in action discovers itself as erring consciousness, and the history he creates as a history of errors. And, when finally, error is transcended into the truth of the Absolute, history comes to an end, since history, by definition, is acting consciousness that is necessarily in error. The overcoming of error is, therefore, the overcoming of Time, i.e., of Man as a free, historical individual. According to Hegel, this is the goal of history, where Man finally overcomes his temporal existence, his finitude, as opposed to Nature, and he himself becomes eternal. Moreover, since he possesses the memory of his temporal

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110 ibid., p. 157

existence, his historical past, he also remains a self that has come to know itself as itself; i.e., Absolute Self-consciousness.

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