

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY TRANSMISSION WITH  
PHENOMENOLOGICAL CHANGE OVER TIME

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY TRANSMISSION WITH  
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## Thesis Abstract

Gönenç Kara, “Autobiographical Memory Transmission with Phenomenological Change over Time”

Previous studies have revealed some differences for phenomenology between imagined and perceived events. In the present study, phenomenology for autobiographical memory of someone else was explored in parallel with own autobiographical memories. University students ( $N = 68$ ) were invited to a laboratory for two interview sessions one week apart from each other in order to also discover the effect of retelling over time. To-be-transmitted memory with either positive or negative emotions was presented to each participant either through video or transcript. Participants were asked to report phenomenological ratings to one of their most important memories as well as to the presented transmitted memory after they were asked to narrate these memories. Results showed that the time factor was important for both own and transmitted memories especially with regard to some measures of belief in accuracy which were found to be lower in the second session. Some sensory components were also found to lose their strengths over time for transmitted memories. Transmitted memory with negative emotions had higher ratings for feelings of living than transmitted memory with positive emotions while the latter had higher ratings for belief in accuracy. There was also some evidence for the impact of presentation type on belief in accuracy in that memory transmission through video returned higher ratings than memory transmission through transcript. The results show that phenomenology for autobiographical memory of someone else could depend on emotional valence as well as on how it is presented and when that phenomenology is measured over time.

## Tez Özeti

Gönenç Kara, “Zaman İçindeki Fenomenolojik Değişimi ile Otobiyografik Anı Aktarımı”

Önceki çalışmalar hayal edilmiş ve algılanmış olayların fenomenolojileri arasında bazı farklar bulunduğunu ortaya çıkarmıştır. Bu çalışmada, bir başkasının otobiyografik anısı için oluşan fenomenoloji, kişinin kendi otobiyografik anısı ile paralel bir şekilde keşfedilmiştir. Üniversite öğrencileri ( $N = 68$ ) zaman içinde yeniden anlatmanın etkisini de keşfetmek amacıyla, birbiriyle bir hafta aralıklı iki mülakat seansı için laboratuara davet edilmiştir. Pozitif veya negatif duygulu bir aktarılacak-anı her bir katılımcıya video kaydı ya da transkript aracılığıyla sunulmuştur. Katılımcılardan, kendilerinin en önemli anılarından biri ve onlara sunulmuş aktarılan-anıyı anlattıktan sonra, bu anılar için fenomenolojik değerlendirmeler rapor etmeleri istenmiştir. Sonuçlar, özellikle anının doğru hatırlandığına dair inancın ikinci seansta daha düşük bulunan bazı ölçümleri açısından, zaman faktörünün hem kendi anıları hem de aktarılan-anıları için önemli olduğunu göstermiştir. Aktarılan-anılar için bazı duygusal bileşenlerin de zaman içinde gücünü kaybettiği bulunmuştur. Negatif duygulu aktarılan-anı, pozitif duygulu aktarılan-anıdan daha yüksek yaşanma hissi değerlendirmeleri almışken; pozitif-duygulu aktarılan-anı, anının doğru hatırlandığına dair inanç açısından daha yüksek değerlendirmeler almıştır. Anının doğru hatırlandığına dair inanç açısından video kaydı aracılığıyla anı aktarımının transkript aracılığıyla aktarımdan daha yüksek değerlendirmeler almış olması, sunum türünün de etkisine dair kanıt olmuştur. Sonuçlar göstermektedir ki bir başkasının anısı için oluşan fenomenoloji, anının duygusal değerine, nasıl sunulduğuna ve fenomenolojinin ne zaman ölçüldüğüne bağlı olabilir.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

For the definition of what an autobiographical memory is, the existence of some phenomenological qualities attached to the episode that we remember is generally regarded as essential. This sense of reliving is seen as a major part of the process of remembering our past (Brewer, 1999). When human beings operate on their memory for communicative purposes, they do not only mentally represent the past to themselves but also to the others. This is apparent in our everyday conversations; we transmit memories to each other. In fact, human beings' ability to get information about non-observed physical environments and other people is argued to be one of the important factors in the evolution of language (Dunbar, 1998). The main interest of this study is to reveal how phenomenological properties are shaped in the receivers when people transmit their autobiographical memories to them. More specifically, the study aims to explore whether the phenomenological qualities experienced by the receivers are dependent on the medium of transmission and affect contained in the to-be-transmitted memories as well as what happens to these phenomenological qualities over time in parallel to phenomenology for their own memories. Therefore the related literature about the phenomenology of autobiographical memories (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003) and the research tradition interested in retelling of stories (Bergman & Roediger, 1999) served as the basis to construct the current study.

Although later disregarded by behaviorists, phenomenology had been a focus in psychology starting with the early psychologists such as Wilhelm Wundt and Freud. Today as more researchers aim to study conscious parts of the experience,

phenomenology has again started to be a focus in some domains of psychology. The research about autobiographical memory is no exception to that and especially the relation between memory phenomenology and individual differences might reveal valuable information about how people guide themselves according to these conscious aspects of the process of remembering. An immediate example would be the revealed relation between self-esteem and vividness of some kind of autobiographical memories. People whose self-esteems were higher reported higher vividness ratings for their self-defining memories as well as their earliest memories (Sutin & Robins, 2007). Besides, there have been attempts in the literature to relate individual differences also to the metacognitive parts (e.g. belief in accuracy) of memory phenomenology (Rubin & Siegler, 2004). Considering this effort, the present study aimed to discover the general patterns about how the phenomenology of memory receivers was formed despite the possible existence of a vast array of the personalities of these participants. The aim was to reveal some basics of the autobiographical memory transmission so that thereafter individual differences might also be taken into account.

The other research area used in combination with the first one for the present study starts with Bartlett's (1932) original studies about retelling of stories (Bergman & Roediger, 1999). In the method of repeated reproduction, Bartlett (1932) used a folktale which is offered to the participants in order to be studied and then the participants were asked to recall the story later a few times. The main interest of these studies was how schemas guided subsequent recall of the material, the schemas being especially the cultural ones. He found that some parts of the story which seemed supernatural to the subjects from a more industrialized society were ignored or distorted by them in subsequent recalls. In a similar vein, in the contemporary

autobiographical memory literature, researchers are interested in how memories are constructed from a social constructionist point of view and how consistently these memories are (re)told over time (Pasupathi, 2001). In addition to this line of research in the literature, the present study aimed to contribute by putting phenomenology into this framework of retelling over time in a parallel manner with the memories which people originally own and the memories which are transmitted to them.

Emotionality of an event seems to have an impact on the phenomenology of memories (Christianson & Safer, 1999). By the same token, recognizing emotions in the autobiographical memory of someone else and its relationship with the phenomenology of memory might be important. Therefore, the present study also aimed to consider the emotional valence of autobiographical memory as an important aspect of the memory transmission in order to capture some essence of how it might be important with regard to the memory phenomenology.

One of the functions of autobiographical memory sharing is argued to be emotional regulation which was found to occur more when listener responsiveness and agreement were high (Pasupathi, 2003). As summarized in Alea and Bluck (2003), responsiveness of the listener might be one of the underlying factors in developing intimacy which is a social function of autobiographical memory sharing. Responsiveness could increase the amount of emotions and details that are included in retelling. The phenomenological qualities of an autobiographical memory might well be one of the important factors for responsiveness, therefore revealing the transmission of autobiographical memories and their attached phenomenological characteristics in basic laboratory conditions was the aim of the present study which might have future implications. For instance, capacities of individuals for some phenomenological characteristics (e.g. imagery) might be trained through meditation

techniques which are already known to cause changes in brain structures that are supposed to be the underlying mechanisms of emotional regulation (Luders, Toga, Lepore, & Gaser, 2009). This might in turn be effective in encoding new experiences of the self and of the others thus in increasing responsiveness as well.

Another extension to be considered might be about how narratives can carry phenomenology and thus might change habitual phenomenological tendencies of memory receivers. For instance, point of view in memories (field vs. observer) has previously been suggested to be related to depression. Recalling memories with a field perspective has been found to be a protective factor against depression. Therefore, intervention through asking depressed people to recall memories with a field perspective has been suggested. In this regard, transmission of memories of other people with a field point of view to depressed people might be studied to see whether it might change their tendency to recall their own memories with an observer perspective which has been found to be associated with negative self-evaluation (Kuyken & Moulds, 2009). Thus, the present study aimed to reveal some basics of phenomenology for transmitted memories in a parallel manner to phenomenology for own memories.

As summarized above, the phenomenology of autobiographical memories might have important implications in this framework of memory transmission therefore next comes a section of some findings about phenomenology in the literature in order to analyze its importance more thoroughly.

## Phenomenology of Autobiographical Memories

Autobiographical memory and self have recently been conceptualized as constituents of an interactive system, called Self-Memory System (SMS) (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). In this mutual relationship, autobiographical memory serves self as a database while self is engaged in the construction of the past according to its current goals (Conway, 2005). Therefore personal past is only temporarily constructed and represented in consciousness (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). Regarding this argument, Horton, Moulin, and Conway (2009) have recruited participants who started university education and looked at the effects of change in self as it was reflected in the content of their dreams sampled at three different times in a period. They found that students' self-concepts were more related to the themes in their dreams in the analysis when they utilized pairs of self and dream samples from the same points over time. The basic idea behind the present study was relying on this theoretical background; if the changes in a person's self is found to be effective in that person's retrieval of events, then it would be interesting to see what happens to a memory if the self (hence the person) to whom the memory originally belongs is totally changed.

Some other researchers move away from this intraindividual level towards a more interindividual level emphasizing the social functions of autobiographical memory (Pasupathi, 2001, for a review). Since the aimed change in memory ownership in the present study would take place at an interindividual level, it is worth looking at some of what those researchers presented. Included in this emphasis of social functions is the fact that listeners also have their own goals and autobiographical memory which are in interaction with the speaker's self-memory

system. This interaction is apparent in the finding that younger and older children might differ in their preference with regard to the gender of the person whom they would like to talk with and also that children might have a tendency to talk specifically with either boys or girls for different communicative objectives (Clark, 1994). Speakers also have been known to accommodate what they speak to the knowledge base they assume that is owned by their listeners (Krauss, 1987). Moreover, memory construction is believed to be affected by social aspects of the retrieval context, particularly by one's conversational partner (Hyman, 1994). One remarkable study showed that social effects were in operation even on the retrospective judgments of phenomenology. Skagerberg and Wright (2009) employed an eyewitness paradigm in which they exposed participants to a crime video and subsequently asked them to identify the person from a line-up. After identification, they told participants that they had chosen the same answer with either the majority or the minority of either high credibility (police officers) or low credibility (children) assumed other participants. They found out that when the source of feedback was presented as coming from the high credibility assumed group and when the feedback was confirming, participants believed much more in their own memory strength. They also believed much more in the memory strength of high credibility assumed source. Basically, participants did not even need the actual presence of the others for social construction of the phenomenology of their memories which was important for the design of the present study since there was no actual interaction between the original memory owner and memory receivers who were not in the same place during sessions of memory transmission. Instead, the effect of using different mediums for memory transmission (video vs. transcript) on phenomenology was investigated in the present study.

Still other researchers move further away from the level of individual and look at the effects of culture on the organization of autobiographical memory retrieval. For instance, some early studies examined the delay of reminiscence bump in the distribution of life-span autobiographical memories in immigrant groups who presumably went through an acculturation process (carrying relative stability after rapid change) that might have an effect on their cognition (Schrauf & Rubin, 1998; Schrauf & Rubin, 2001). In a more recent study, Berntsen and Rubin (2004) in their life script account argued that socially shared knowledge structures guide recalling of autobiographical memories. They showed some evidence that the reminiscence bump seen for positive events via especially strategic search (e.g. when participants are asked for their most important memories) rather than associative retrieval (e.g. when participants are asked to use words as cues for their memories) might be based on the existence of life scripts. For instance, when they asked participants to write according to them what would be expected to occur as the seven most important events in the life of a newborn, positive events were more likely to be reported to occur in the bump period than negative events were. Moreover, the standard deviations of age estimates for the occurrence of events were higher for the negative events than for the positive events. Berntsen and Rubin argue that the findings indicate the existence of an idealized understanding of life supported by a script (generally marking positive events) shared by the members of a culture.

It seems like culture to some extent is a critical contributor to label which of our experiences worth mentioning. In the present study, two to-be-transmitted memories to be used have been chosen among some most important memories collected at a pilot study phase. One of them was positive and the other was negative so that the effect of emotional valence on retrieval of memories of other people could

be investigated. Perceptions by the receivers about importance of the memory and retrieval difficulty were of special concern.

There are some related studies to the point stated above which confirm that culture is probably effective at not only guiding memory search but also shaping the relationships among the underlying processes that construct the phenomenology of autobiographical memories. Testing this hypothesis, Rubin, Schrauf, Gulgoz, and Naka (2007) found some differences among participants from three different cultures, Japan, Turkey and USA. One particular finding was that Turkish participants showed a stronger relation between their sound and language-related component processes and their metacognitive judgments of belief and recollection phenomenology. Rubin et al. discussed their findings with regard to probable differences in cultural orientation and personality differences across these cultures. It would be interesting to see how those component processes would shape the metacognitive judgments for the to-be-transmitted memories in the present study so that the effect of cultural orientation on autobiographical memory transmission could be investigated in future studies.

On the other hand, when it comes to discussing the impact of personality on memory, one study should not stand out of sight. Cox and Barnier (2009b) reported that participants were capable of selective processing of information about some characters in a story under hypnotic conditions even though the suggestion directed them to an opposite personality than their own which might implicate that there is room in one's mind for different selves and different memories related to them. Therefore the present study might reveal interesting results with regard to autobiographical memory representation for someone else and its phenomenology. Of particular interest here were any differences to be discovered between the

phenomenological ratings given for memories of oneself and of someone else. In fact in addition to the mentioned study about memory for characters in a story, Cox and Barnier (2009a) also reported that under hypnotic conditions participants recalled autobiographical memories from the perspective of their deluded identity. As we have some evidence in the literature that autobiographical memory mistakes of this kind can also be found without necessarily employing hypnotic induction, for instance as in the case of twins (Ikier, Tekcan, Gulgoz, & Kuntay, 2003), and it is not possible to take pure reports especially of metacognitive phenomenology (e.g. belief in accuracy) under hypnosis, the present study might fill the gap in the literature about autobiographical memory for someone else. To that end, some items in the questionnaire regarding the typicality (Kuntay, Gulgoz, Tekcan, 2004) of the transmitted memory were directed to the receivers. In addition to these items of plausibility, items of likeability were also directed to participants to check if there is any version of the mere-exposure effect (Zajonc, 2001) in operation which might have revealed interesting results with regard to their evaluation of the same memories in a retelling.

Additional evidence about humans' ability to have phenomenology for autobiographical events of non-experienced environments of possible selves which is the idea behind this study comes from a different line of research that was done by Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988). These authors have compared perceived autobiographical events with imagined ones and found that perceived events had higher ratings with regard to perceptual and contextual phenomenology than imagined events had. Destun and Kuiper (1999) introduced the event valence (pleasant vs. stressful) as a variable to this framework and their results revealed that pleasant events had higher scores in some sensory details and contextual information

than stressful events. Arbuthnott, Geelen, and Kealy (2002) also replicated earlier results and argued that guided imagery, which is a concept that might be considered closer to a transmitted memory with regard to its process of creation, stands between natural imagery and perceived events, sharing some similar qualities with each of them. Other researchers included time as a factor related to imagination and examine phenomenology in the framework of mental time travel (Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). One related study by D'Argembeau and Van der Linden (2004) found that there were much more sensorial details in positive than in negative events.

In summary, under various research paradigms before, humans have been found to have phenomenology for non-experienced events, and to some extent this phenomenology seems to be affected by the self and the emotionality of an event. As an addition to the literature mentioned above, the present study aimed to put autobiographical memory into this framework through exploring the possibility of memory transmission. For comparative purposes, participants were also requested to tell their most important own memory and report their phenomenology for it.

### Retellings of Autobiographical Memories

In Bartlett's (1932) studies mentioned before, the results showed the reconstructive nature and fallibility of memory against repeated testing. More recently, Wheeler and Roediger (1992) tried to replicate his results by considering the opposite results found by Ballard (1913) in which repeated testing resulted in remembering of the material which had not been remembered before. In consequence, they commented on the issue after taking the interval between tests into account and argued that when the intervals are short, it can create a kind of hypermnesia, while if the intervals are

longer, testing can reveal forgetting. Later Bergman and Roediger (1999) reported experimental results that confirmed this argument.

As it was mentioned before, some researchers have taken a more ecological framework underlining the importance of whom we tell our memories and for what purposes (Marsh, 2007). The necessity of focusing on this point is supported by the empirical finding which revealed that many of the retellings of personal events were regarded as inaccurate by the participants themselves. They also reported that they retell personal events for purposes other than merely informing, such as in order to entertain or to elicit sympathy (Marsh & Tversky, 2004). Regarding this point of purpose of retelling, Dudukovic, Marsh, and Tversky (2004) designed experiments which involved different purposes for participants, namely with entertainment and accuracy emphases and they found that for the former there was much more mentioning of affect while for the latter sensory information took more place in the retelling. Since the present study just aims to lay some basics about the possibility of autobiographical memory and its phenomenology transmission, it employed no variation in the purpose of retelling when the participants were asked to report the memories. The only emphasis present about retelling was that it should include as much detail as possible.

There also exists another group of studies which can be considered closer to the aim of the present study about combining phenomenology and retelling. Suengas and Johnson (1988) made a comparison between the effect of rehearsal on events which are perceived and which are only imagined. During rehearsal, some of the participants were asked to focus on sensory characteristics while some others focused on apperceptive characteristics such as thoughts and feelings. They reported that sensory characteristics lost their power faster for imagined events than for perceived

events. In a similar vein, Lampinen, Odegard, and Bullington (2003) examined participants' memories for actions that are performed or imagined. Among all the others, the most relevant finding from this study was the positive relation between the number of imaginings and the possibility of confusion which simply meant that rehearsal of imagination might cause those events to be remembered as performed. This implication of rehearsal is also seen in another study by Arbutnott (2005) who reported similar findings with regard to autobiographical memory and imagination. In her study, imagery ratings of imagined events had arisen up to the level of those of autobiographical memories after three repetitions. This finding stands somewhat contrary to Suengas and Johnson's finding that imagined events lost their sensory characteristics after repetition so considering both of these findings together, the present study might give a better understanding by comparing ratings of imagery for to-be-transmitted memories reported at the end of second session with those reported at the end of first session. As for participants' belief in the accuracy of what they remember, it was expected to follow whichever way ratings of imagery moves between the two sessions which were held one-week apart from each other.

## CHAPTER II

### METHOD

#### Participants

There were two groups of participants, one of which participating for the pilot phase of the study and the other participating for the main study. Seven participants volunteered for the pilot phase the aim of which was to choose the to-be-transmitted memories to be used in the main study. For the main study, 74 students from introductory psychology courses in Bogazici University participated in the first session in return for course credit. Sixty-eight students (49 women, 19 men) among those who participated in the first session continued participating for the second session thence constituting the final number of participants the data of whom are used for the statistical analyses. The age of these participants ranged from 19 to 27 ( $M = 20.68$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ).

#### Materials

##### To-Be-Transmitted Memories

To-be-transmitted memories to be used in the study were chosen after collecting candidate autobiographical memories from seven volunteers in the pilot study. Volunteers were invited in their free times to a small quiet room where video recording took place. After the scope of the study was explained by the experimenter, they all agreed to participate. Thereupon they were asked to tell one positive and one negative autobiographical memory which are most significant to them from any

period of their life. They are given as much time as required to choose the autobiographical memories. Then video recording began during which they told the selected memories in front of a camera in a monologue fashion while the experimenter only attentively listened without any intervention. When they finished telling both of the memories, they were asked to rate those memories for some properties with an adapted version of Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) which was also used in the main study (Appendix A). Then they were fully debriefed and thanked.

Among these memories collected in the pilot phase, memories of four participants have been found more appropriate for transmission in general with regard to their contents. Both the positive and the negative memory should have been coming from the same person in order to match the to-be-transmitted positive and negative memory as much as possible. So memories of these four participants have been transcribed and then put into analysis by a computer programme called Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker, Chung, Ireland, Gonzales, & Booth, 2007) to give an idea to the researchers about the similarity of various aspects of these positive/negative memory couples. LIWC is a computer programme for text analysis which can calculate the amount of words for different categories of cognition, emotion or linguistics. For the purpose of this study, the dimension of affect was the most important one for selection therefore these four couples of candidate memories have been compared with regard to the relative amount of positive and negative as well as total affect words included in each of them. The result of the comparison is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Comparison for Dimension of Affect in Candidate Memories

	Affect	Positive Affect	Negative Affect
Memory couples			
1.a	1.14	0.76	0.38
1.b	3.61	0	3.09
2.a	1.71	0.57	1.14
2.b	3.89	1.6	2.52
3.a	2.47	0.77	1.7
3.b	4.53	1.6	2.93
4.a	3.03	2.31	0.72
4.b	3.1	0.44	2.65

Note. “a” denotes the values for positive memory and “b” denotes the values for negative memory of a memory couple narrated by each participant.

Since the amounts of total affect words were more similar and positive and negative affect words were well-balanced for the positive and negative memory, the fourth couple of the memories were chosen as to-be-transmitted memories for the main study. A screenshot from the corresponding recorded video depicting the person telling the memory has been put on top of the transcripts to be used in the main study in order to make them as realistic as the video recordings themselves. The length of the positive memory was 692 words while it was 452 words for the negative memory.

#### Own Memories

Participants of the main phase of the study were asked to tell an autobiographical memory of their own specified by the instruction and report phenomenological experiences for it.

#### Questionnaires

A Turkish adapted version of The Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (AMQ) was used (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003; Rubin & Siegler, 2004) (Appendix A). In the adapted version, some items from the original questionnaire have been

excluded since what they measure would be ambiguous if they were applied for the phenomenological experience for the memory of someone else (e.g., “As I remember what I have been told, it comes to me in words”). In general, this questionnaire aims to measure phenomenological experiences that accompany the act of remembering autobiographical memories. Items measure metacognitive judgments (e.g. about recollection and belief), as well as component processes (e.g. sensory information) and reported properties (e.g. importance, rehearsal). Moreover in order to be replied for the to-be-transmitted memories, participants were given an adaptation from AMQ which might be called Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire - Transmitted Memory (AMQ-TM) for the sake of clarity in the text. AMQ-TM aimed to measure the phenomenological experiences related to a transmitted autobiographical memory and has items exactly corresponding to the ones in AMQ (only differing in some extra items). The wording in AMQ-TM instead has an emphasis on the receiver’s own memory about the event that they learnt from another participant’s autobiographical memory account. AMQ-TM was worded accordingly to whichever condition participants belonged to with regard to the medium of transmission. AMQ-TM used for video and transcript conditions can be found in Appendix B. Also items of likeability and plausibility aiming to test some specific hypotheses were added to the questionnaires mentioned above. Same questionnaires were used for the second session except the extra questions added about the rehearsal of the to-be-transmitted memory.

### Procedure

Participants signed up for the experiment in time slots of one-hour chosen by themselves according to their available times. At the scheduled time, they came to

the laboratory where the interviews took place. First the scope of the study was explained to them without revealing the experimental condition they have been randomly assigned to. Participants who agreed to join filled an informed consent form. Then they were requested to tell their most significant memory from any period of their life. The full instruction read to participants requesting them to tell their own memories can be found in Appendix C. They were given as much time as required until they chose their memory to be told. After they decided, voice-recorder was turned on and they told their chosen memory in a monologue fashion while the experimenter only attentively listened. When their narrative was over, they were asked to reply the AMQ for the memory they just told.

After they finished replying the questionnaire, they were told that next an autobiographical memory of someone else would be presented to them to which they should pay attention because later they would be asked to retell that memory as well as answer some questions regarding it. According to random assignment, they were given either the positive or the negative to-be-transmitted memory. Along with this variable of emotional valence, they were also randomly assigned to either video or transcript conditions as the presentation type of the to-be-transmitted memory. The full instructions read to participants according to each condition can be found in Appendix D. After the to-be-transmitted memory was presented to them, they were asked to retell it as detailed as possible in a monologue fashion while the voice-recorder was turned on and the experimenter was attentively listening. When their narrative was over, they were asked to reply the AMQ-TM for the memory they just told. After they finished replying the questionnaire, participants were thanked and told that the study was over for the first week and they were expected to come for the second phase on the same day of the following week.

In order to see the effect of retelling, the participants who showed up for the second session one week later were asked to retell the memories that they had told the previous week. The order was the same so first they were asked to retell their own memory (Appendix E). This was followed by the request of retelling the to-be-transmitted memory (Appendix F). Their narration was again voice-recorded in a monologue fashion while the experimenter only attentively listened. Each of their memory narration was again followed by replying the respective questionnaires. When it was all over, participants were thanked and fully debriefed.

In summary, the factorial design was 2 (presentation type) X 2 (emotional valence) X 2 (memory source) X 2 (time) mixed. While presentation type (video vs. transcript) and emotional valence (positive vs. negative) were between-subjects factors with random assignment of participants to each condition, memory source (own memory vs. transmitted memory) and time (session 1 vs. session 2) were within-subjects factors regarding the ratings given to the questionnaires.

## CHAPTER III

### RESULTS

First, the recorded sessions were transcribed in order to make them available for any analyses aiming to see the effects of the independent variables on narrated memory lengths. Series of univariate ANOVAs were run for all the dependent variables separately. For all the analyses, questionnaire ratings were entered into a 2 (emotional valence) X 2 (presentation type) X 2 (time) mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) by taking emotional valence (positive or negative) and presentation type (video or transcript) of the to-be-transmitted memory as between subjects variables and time (session 1 or session 2) as a within subjects variable. Results for participants' ratings given in response to the questionnaires are presented separately for the transmitted memories (TM) and for their own memories (OM) in the following sections. Items in the questionnaires are grouped according to three broad categories of recollection and belief, component processes, and reported properties of events or memories (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). Also, analyses for word counts are included.

#### Analyses on TM Ratings

##### Recollection and Belief

Dependent variables entered into the analyses under this recollection and belief category, their definitions from the corresponding questions and related descriptive information could be seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Descriptive Information for Dependent Variables of Recollection and Belief in Transmitted Memories

Variable	Session 1		Session 2	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Living (yaşıyormuş gibi hissetmek)	3.56	1.51	3.34	1.22
Back in Time (olayın zamanına dönmek)	4.10	1.28	3.99	1.33
Remember/Know (bilmekten öte hatırlayabilmek)	4.40	1.26	4.09	1.08
Real/Imagine (hayal edilmiş öğeler katmamak)	5.74	1.04	5.35	1.06
Accurate (hangi ölçüde çarpıtılmıştır)	5.32	1.25	5.21	1.17
Testify (mahkemede ifade güveni)	4.60	1.47	4.29	1.45
Persuade (yanlışlığına ikna olma)	3.28	1.31	3.65	1.22

Note. Short definitions from the corresponding questions are given in parenthesis.

For the dependent variable Living, there was a main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 13.24, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 2.23, \eta_p^2 = .17$ ). When the question whether the participants felt as if they were living the original event while they were remembering the to-be-transmitted autobiographical memory was asked, the participants who were given a memory with negative emotions ( $M = 3.93, SD = 1.40$ ) stated that they felt like living the original event more than the participants who were given a memory with positive emotions ( $M = 3.00, SD = 1.19$ ).

For the dependent variable Remember/Know, participants tended to state that they remembered the event rather than just knowing it more so in the first session ( $M = 4.40, SD = 1.26$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 4.09, SD = 1.08$ ),  $F(1, 64) = 3.84, p = .054$  ( $MSE = .86, \eta_p^2 = .06$ ).

For the dependent variable Real/Imagine, there appeared a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 10.01, p < .01$  ( $MSE = .50, \eta_p^2 = .14$ ). The amount of reported belief in the reality of what is remembered against the possibility that it was all imagined was found to be higher in the first session ( $M = 5.73, SD = 1.04$ ) than in the second one ( $M = 5.35, SD = 1.06$ ). Another main effect that appeared significant was that of

presentation type,  $F(1, 64) = 11.43, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 1.32, \eta_p^2 = .15$ ), in that participants to whom the to-be-transmitted memories were presented via video ( $M = 5.87, SD = 0.96$ ) reported a higher amount of the mentioned belief in the reality than the participants to whom the to-be-transmitted memories were presented via transcript ( $M = 5.21, SD = 1.07$ ). There was also the main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 7.40, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 1.32, \eta_p^2 = .10$ ), indicated by the finding that the mentioned belief was higher for participants who were given the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions ( $M = 5.81, SD = 0.95$ ) than for participants who were given the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions ( $M = 5.27, SD = 1.11$ ).

For the dependent variable Accurate, the analysis revealed a Time X Presentation Type interaction effect,  $F(1, 64) = 7.84, p < .01$  ( $MSE = .44, \eta_p^2 = .11$ ). While there was not any difference in the reported accuracy between the first session ( $M = 5.35, SD = 1.23$ ) and the second session ( $M = 5.56, SD = 1.05$ ) for participants in the video condition,  $t(33) = -1.42, p > .05$ ; reported accuracy was significantly higher in the first session ( $M = 5.29, SD = 1.29$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 4.85, SD = 1.18$ ) for participants in the transcript condition,  $t(33) = 2.52, p < .05$  (see Figure 1).

For the dependent variable Testify, there was a main effect of presentation type. Participants in the video condition ( $M = 4.85, SD = 1.38$ ) were more confident in what they remembered than the participants in the transcript condition ( $M = 4.06, SD = 1.44$ ),  $F(1, 64) = 7.25, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 2.94, \eta_p^2 = .10$ ).

For the dependent variable Persuade, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 6.34, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 0.73, \eta_p^2 = .09$ ). Participants reported that they could be much

more persuaded about what they remembered to be wrong in the second session ( $M = 3.64, SD = 1.22$ ) than in the first session ( $M = 3.27, SD = 1.31$ ).




Fig. 1 Accuracy ratings for transmitted memories as a function of presentation type and time. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

For the dependent variable Back in Time, there was no significant effect.

### Component Processes

Dependent variables entered into the analyses under this component processes category, their definitions from the corresponding questions and related descriptive information could be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Descriptive Information for Dependent Variables of Component Processes in Transmitted Memories

Variable	Session 1		Session 2	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
See (olayı zihinde görebilmek)	4.65	1.09	4.34	1.02
Setting (mekanı hatırlayabilmek)	4.72	1.67	4.46	1.62
Spatial (kimin/neyin nerde durduğu)	3.65	1.55	3.47	1.40
Hear (olayı zihinde duyabilmek)	3.74	1.29	3.46	1.22
Coherent Story (bütünlüklü hikaye)	4.53	1.20	4.03	1.17
Emotions (anı sahibinin duyguları)	3.74	1.30	3.53	1.41

Note. Short definitions from the corresponding questions are given in parenthesis.

For the dependent variable See, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 6.19, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 0.54, \eta_p^2 = .09$ ). Participants reported that they could see the event in their own minds more clearly in the first session ( $M = 4.66, SD = 1.09$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 4.34, SD = 1.02$ ).

For the dependent variable Setting, there was a main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 6.12, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 4.38, \eta_p^2 = .09$ ). Participants reported that they could remember the setting more clearly if they were given the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions ( $M = 5.04, SD = 1.71$ ) compared to the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions ( $M = 4.15, SD = 1.46$ ).

For the dependent variable Hear, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 4.45, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 0.60, \eta_p^2 = .06$ ). Participants reported that they could hear the event in their own minds more clearly in the first session ( $M = 3.74, SD = 1.29$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 3.46, SD = 1.22$ ).

For the dependent variable Coherent Story, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 11.50, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 0.75, \eta_p^2 = .15$ ). Participants reported that it seemed more like a coherent story to them when they remembered the to-be-transmitted memories in the first session ( $M = 4.54, SD = 1.20$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 4.03, SD = 1.17$ ).

For the dependent variable Emotions, there was a main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 4.60, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 2.73, \eta_p^2 = .07$ ). Participants reported that they could feel the emotions of the original memory owner more clearly if they were in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions condition ( $M = 3.94, SD = 1.35$ ) than in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions condition ( $M = 3.33, SD = 1.31$ ).

For the dependent variable Spatial, there was no significant effect.

### Reported Properties of Events or Memories

Dependent variables entered into the analyses under this reported properties category, their definitions from the corresponding questions and related descriptive information could be seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Descriptive Information for Dependent Variables of Reported Properties in Transmitted Memories

Variable	Session 1		Session 2	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Importance (anı sahibi için anlamlılık)	5.40	1.42	5.38	1.15
Positive Emotions (pozitif duygular içirme)	4.04	2.31	4.00	2.16
Negative Emotions (negatif duygular içirme)	3.35	2.26	3.31	2.24
Point of View (birinci/üçüncü şahıs)	1.88	0.32	1.93	0.26
Difficulty of Recall (hatırlama zorluğu)	2.16	0.91	2.84	0.97
Representativeness (olayın anı sahibini temsili)	4.96	1.01	4.91	0.85
Likeability of Memory (anının hoş gitmesi)	3.85	1.83	3.69	1.69
Plausibility for You (baş gelme ihtimali)	3.32	1.53	3.63	1.62
Plausibility for Another (başkasının başına gelmesi)	4.94	1.28	4.90	1.30
Similar experience (benzerinin başa gelmesi)	2.72	2.91	2.69	2.58
Likeability of Owner (anı sahibinin sevilmesi)	4.40	1.02	4.25	1.06
Rehearsal/Thought (olay hakkında düşünme)	-	-	2.19	1.08
Rehearsal/Talked (olay hakkında konuşma)	-	-	1.09	0.29

Note. Short definitions from the corresponding questions are given in parenthesis. The rehearsal variables were only measured at the second session.

For the dependent variable Positive Emotions, there was a main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 327.44, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 1.57, \eta_p^2 = .84$ ). Participants reported that the event included more positive emotions if they were in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions condition ( $M = 5.90, SD = 1.09$ ) than in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions condition ( $M = 2.01, SD = 1.06$ ).

For the dependent variable Difficulty of Recall, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 26.57, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 0.58, \eta_p^2 = .29$ ). Participants reported that it

was more difficult to remember the to-be-transmitted memory in the second session ( $M = 2.84, SD = 0.97$ ) than in the first session ( $M = 2.17, SD = 0.91$ ).

For the dependent variable Likeability of Memory, there was a main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 28.96, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 3.84, \eta_p^2 = .31$ ). Participants reported that they liked the memory more if they were in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions condition ( $M = 4.64, SD = 1.53$ ) than in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions condition ( $M = 2.83, SD = 1.47$ ).

For the dependent variable Plausibility for You, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 6.09, p < .05$  ( $MSE = .52, \eta_p^2 = .09$ ). Participants reported that the probability of the event in the to-be-transmitted memory happening to them was higher in the second session ( $M = 3.65, SD = 1.62$ ) than in the first session ( $M = 3.34, SD = 1.53$ ). There was also a main effect of emotional valence ( $F(1, 64) = 15.91, p < .01$ ) but Levene's tests for the first session ( $F(1, 64) = 15.91, p = .05$ ) and the second session ( $F(1, 64) = 15.91, p < .05$ ) indicated that the homogeneity of variance assumption was broken. Some cases were omitted through calculating Cook's distances and in the new data set the main effect of emotional valence was preserved without violating the homogeneity of variance assumption. Participants reported that the probability of the event in the to-be-transmitted memory happening to them was higher if they were in the negative memory condition ( $M = 4.14, SD = 1.14$ ) than in the positive memory condition ( $M = 2.55, SD = 1.38$ ),  $F(1, 61) = 30.41, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 2.69, \eta_p^2 = .33$ ).

For the dependent variable Likeability of Owner, the analysis revealed a Time X Presentation Type interaction effect,  $F(1, 64) = 4.10, p < .05$  ( $MSE = .25, \eta_p^2 = .06$ ). While there was not any difference in the ratings between first session ( $M = 4.41, SD = 1.10$ ) and second session ( $M = 4.44, SD = 1.19$ ) for participants in the

video condition,  $t(33) = -0.26, p > .05$ ; likeability of owner ratings were significantly higher in the first session ( $M = 4.38, SD = 0.95$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 4.06, SD = 0.89$ ) for participants in the transcript condition,  $t(33) = 2.60, p < .05$  (see Figure 2).




Fig. 2 Likeability of owner ratings for transmitted memories as a function of presentation type and time. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

There were not any significant effects for the dependent variables Importance, Negative Emotions, Point of View, Representativeness, Plausibility for Another, Similar Experience, Rehearsal/Thought, and Rehearsal/Talked.

#### Analyses on OM Ratings

##### Recollection and Belief

Dependent variables entered into the analyses under this recollection and belief category, their definitions from the corresponding questions and related descriptive information could be seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Descriptive Information for Dependent Variables of Recollection and Belief in Own Memories

Variable	Session 1		Session 2	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Reliving (yaşıyormuş gibi hissetmek)	5.29	1.15	5.35	1.14
Back in Time (olayın zamanına dönmek)	5.35	1.44	5.32	1.40
Remember/Know (bilmekten öte hatırlayabilmek)	5.88	1.00	5.71	0.99
Real/Imagine (hayal edilmiş öğeler katmamak)	6.46	0.78	6.16	0.78
Accurate (hangi ölçüde çarpıtılmıştır)	5.72	1.23	5.82	1.01
Testify (mahkemede ifade güveni)	6.32	0.90	6.03	0.98
Persuade (yanlışlığına ikna olma)	2.53	1.34	2.79	1.15

Note. Short definitions from the corresponding questions are given in parenthesis.

For the dependent variable Real/Imagine, there appeared a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 10.30, p < .01$  ( $MSE = .50, \eta_p^2 = .14$ ). The amount of reported belief in the reality of what is remembered against the possibility that it was all imagined was found to be higher in the first session ( $M = 6.46, SD = 0.78$ ) than in the second one ( $M = 6.17, SD = 0.78$ ).

For the dependent variable Testify, there was a main effect of time. Participants were more confident in what they remembered in the first session ( $M = 6.33, SD = .90$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 6.03, SD = .98$ ),  $F(1, 64) = 10.38, p < .01$  ( $MSE = .29, \eta_p^2 = .14$ )

For the dependent variable Persuade, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 4.06, p < .05$  ( $MSE = .60, \eta_p^2 = .06$ ). Participants reported that they could be much more persuaded about what they remembered to be wrong in the second session ( $M = 2.78, SD = 1.15$ ) than in the first session ( $M = 2.52, SD = 1.34$ ).

There were not any significant effects for the dependent variables Reliving, Back in Time, Remember/Know, and Accurate.

### Component processes

Dependent variables entered into the analyses under this component processes category, their definitions from the corresponding questions and related descriptive information could be seen in Table 6.

Table 6. Descriptive Information for Dependent Variables of Component Processes in Own Memories

Variable	Session 1		Session 2	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
See (olayı zihinde görebilmek)	5.66	1.07	5.51	1.04
Setting (mekanı hatırlayabilmek)	6.32	1.07	6.24	1.08
Spatial (kimin/neyin nerde durduğu)	5.32	1.36	5.40	1.28
Hear (olayı zihinde duyabilmek)	4.84	1.39	4.66	1.45
Coherent Story (bütünlüklü hikaye)	5.04	1.41	5.06	1.23
Emotions (o zamanki duyguları hissedebilmek)	5.16	1.64	5.04	1.42

Note. Short definitions from the corresponding questions are given in parenthesis.

For the dependent variable Coherent Story, the analysis revealed a Presentation Type X Emotional Valence interaction effect,  $F(1, 64) = 5.55, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 2.65, \eta_p^2 = .08$ ). While there was not any difference in the ratings of how much participants' own memory seemed like a coherent story to them between the conditions of to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions ( $M = 5.25, SD = 1.16$ ) and to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions ( $M = 4.88, SD = 1.66$ ) in the video condition,  $t(54.49) = 1.07, p > .05$ ; participants gave significantly higher coherency ratings in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions condition ( $M = 5.50, SD = 1.02$ ) than in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions condition ( $M = 4.56, SD = 1.24$ ) in the transcript condition,  $t(66) = -3.42, p < .01$  (see Figure 3).




Fig. 3 Coherent story ratings for own memories as a function of presentation type and emotional valence of the transmitted memory. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

There were not any significant effects for the dependent variables See, Setting, Spatial, Hear, and Emotions

#### Reported Properties of Events or Memories

Dependent variables entered into the analyses under this reported properties category, their definitions from the corresponding questions and related descriptive information could be seen in Table 7.

For the dependent variable Importance, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 7.80, p < .01$  ( $MSE = .59, \eta_p^2 = .11$ ). Participants reported that their memory was more significant for them in the first session ( $M = 5.26, SD = 1.49$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 4.89, SD = 1.48$ ).

For the dependent variable Point of View, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 4.00, p = .05$  ( $MSE = .03, \eta_p^2 = .06$ ). Memories were reported from a third person rather than a first person point of view more in the first session ( $M = 1.23, SD = .43$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 1.17, SD = .38$ ).

Table 7. Descriptive Information for Dependent Variables of Reported Properties in Own Memories

Variable	Session 1		Session 2	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Importance (anının anlamlı olması)	5.26	1.49	4.90	1.48
Positive Emotions (pozitif duygular içermesi)	3.18	2.32	3.07	2.25
Negative Emotions (negatif duygular içermesi)	4.37	2.28	4.38	2.19
Point of View (birinci/üçüncü şahıs)	1.24	0.43	1.18	0.38
Difficulty of Recall (hatırlama zorluğu)	2.04	1.19	1.94	0.96
Representativeness (anının temsil etmesi)	4.66	1.49	4.57	1.40
Age of memory (kaç yıl önce)	6.22	4.41	6.18	4.47
Age at event (kaç yaşında)	14.47	4.29	14.51	4.33
Likeability of Memory (anının hoşça gitmesi)	2.97	1.54	2.81	1.62
Plausibility of Memory (başkasının başına gelmesi)	4.68	1.43	4.54	1.46
Rehearsal/Thought (olay hakkında düşünme)	4.54	1.46	4.49	1.34
Rehearsal/Talked (olay hakkında konuşma)	4.16	1.56	4.04	1.38

Note. Short definitions from the corresponding questions are given in parenthesis.

For the dependent variable Rehearsal/Thought, the analysis revealed a Presentation Type X Emotional Valence interaction effect,  $F(1, 64) = 6.60, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 3.27, \eta_p^2 = .09$ ). While participants in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions group ( $M = 4.78, SD = 1.44$ ) gave higher ratings to their own memories than the participants in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions group ( $M = 4.09, SD = 1.38$ ) did in the video condition,  $t(66) = 2.00, p = .05$ ; participants in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions group ( $M = 4.12, SD = 1.47$ ) gave lower ratings to their own memories than the participants in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions group ( $M = 5.03, SD = 1.09$ ) did in the transcript condition,  $t(66) = -2.90, p < .01$  (see Figure 4).

There were not any significant effects for the dependent variables Positive Emotions, Negative Emotions, Difficulty of Recall, Representativeness, Age of Memory, Age at Event, Likeability of Memory, Plausibility of Memory, and Rehearsal/Talked.




Fig. 4 Rehearsal/thought ratings for own memories as a function of presentation type and emotional valence of the transmitted memory. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.

#### Analyses on Word Counts

As for the length of own memories, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 6.80, p < .05$  ( $MSE = 17847.75, \eta_p^2 = .10$ ). Participants told their own memories longer in terms of word count in the first session ( $M = 413.45, SD = 301.56$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 353.67, SD = 252.49$ ).

As for the length of transmitted memories, there was a main effect of time,  $F(1, 64) = 22.42, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 3393.88, \eta_p^2 = .26$ ). Participants told the transmitted memories longer in terms of word count in the first session ( $M = 298.20, SD = 130.86$ ) than in the second session ( $M = 251.22, SD = 116.84$ ). There was also the main effect of emotional valence,  $F(1, 64) = 16.72, p < .01$  ( $MSE = 22609.21, \eta_p^2 = .21$ ). Participants told the transmitted memory longer in terms of word count in the to-be-transmitted memory with positive emotions condition ( $M = 327.48, SD = 122.36$ ) than in the to-be-transmitted memory with negative emotions condition ( $M = 221.23, SD = 105.18$ ).

## CHAPTER IV

### DISCUSSION

The present study investigated autobiographical memory phenomenology for individuals' own memory and transmitted memory to them. Transmitted memories were presented to the participants via either video or transcript and emotional valence of the transmitted memory was either positive or negative. The effect of time was also examined by designing a second retelling session one week apart from the first one. Memory phenomenology was assessed through questionnaires with regard to three categories, component processes, recollection and belief, and reported properties of events or memories (Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). The results will be discussed separately for these three categories as well as for word counts.

#### Component Processes

According to participants' reports of the phenomenology for transmitted memories, time was apparently an important factor. These memories were reported to be more clearly seen and heard at the first session compared to the second session as well as their stories being perceived as more coherent. Suengas and Johnson (1988) found that sensory and clarity ratings had decreased for imagined events over time. This is somewhat in contrast with the results of Arbuthnott (2005) in which repetition was found to increase the imagery ratings. If the phenomenology for imagined events could be considered similar to phenomenology for transmitted memories, the present study supported the finding of Suengas and Johnson rather than that of Arbuthnott.

As another variable of component processes, the setting was found to be

affected by the emotional valence of the transmitted memory. The setting of the transmitted memory with negative emotions was remembered better than that of the transmitted memory with positive emotions. This was an interesting finding when compared to what Destun and Kuiper (1999) had earlier found. In their study, pleasant events had higher ratings for contextual characteristics such as time, location and setting which is in contrast to the present findings. One possibility is that perhaps the distinctive contents of the two memories might be responsible for the discrepancy in that the event in the transmitted memory with negative emotions was taking place in a common location of the city which might have assured participants of their memory strength with regard to it.

There was also an effect of emotional valence on another variable of component processes which is Emotions. Ratings for how clearly the emotions in the transmitted memory were felt were higher for the transmitted memory with negative emotions than for the one with positive emotions. Since the amount of affect words were found somewhat similar in these two memories as analyzed by LIWC, it could be suggested that negative emotions might have been easier to be recognized. Nevertheless certain generalizations would require further research since only one memory for either kind was used in the present study hence the finding might well be due to differences in the idiosyncratic contents of these two memories. Further research would also be necessary in order to explain the lack of finding an effect of emotional valence on the sensory component See, since Destun and Kuiper (1999) had found otherwise, namely a higher rating for visual details in the pleasant events compared to stressful events. Yet it should be kept in mind that imagining an event for oneself and encoding a memory of someone else could be employing different cognitive processes.

The present study failed to find any effect of presentation type on component processes of the transmitted memories. Even though it could be thought that presenting the transmitted memory via video should create an advantage for participants, this possible advantage might be equalized by the fact that participants had the opportunity to read the transmitted memory in a self-paced manner when it was presented via transcript.

As for the component processes of the own memories, the only effect found was that of an interaction between presentation type and emotional valence for which it is difficult to come up with a plausible explanation since these factors originally belonged to transmitted memories rather than own memories. On the other hand, the lack of finding an effect of retelling over time on any variables of component processes for own memories is compatible with Arbuthnott's (2005) similar finding which showed that repetition did not change ratings for autobiographical experiences.

### Recollection and Belief

Participants' reports of how much they felt like living the original event were found to depend on the emotional valence of the transmitted memory. Higher ratings of living the event were given in the case of transmitted memory with negative emotions compared to the transmitted memory with positive emotions. This finding could somehow be expected since the participants also reported that emotions were more clearly felt in the former than in the latter case and feeling the emotions had been earlier found to have a predictive value for feeling of reliving an event (Rubin, Schrauf, Gulgoz, & Naka, 2007) . However, a somewhat puzzling situation arises

when one considers the finding in the opposite direction with the variable Real/Imagine in the present study. Interestingly, participants in the positive memory condition believed more strongly in the reality of what they remembered than the participants in the negative memory condition did although the latter group reported higher ratings for feelings of living the event and the emotions included in it. If one feels like they live the original event more strongly, why would they then feel less certain about the accuracy of what they recalled? One possibility could be defended when the study by Rubin, Schrauf, and Greenberg (2003) is considered. They found that the variable Real/Imagine is related to mood. More specifically, they found that negative mood decreases the belief in the recalled content. For the present study, if it could be assumed that transmitted memory with negative emotions might have created a negative mood in the participants in that condition, than it would not be as surprising to expect low Real/Imagine ratings as opposed to high Reliving ratings.

Another factor in the present study on which belief in accuracy measures for transmitted memories seem to be depending is presentation type. Both for the variables Real/Imagine and Testify, participants in the video condition reported higher ratings of belief than participants in the transcript condition. Although there was no advantage of video over transcript revealed for variables of component processes, it seems like this is not the case for these metacognitive judgments. This is also supported by an interaction between presentation type and time for the variable Accurate. While participants' belief in the accuracy remained the same between sessions in the video condition, it decreased from session 1 to session 2 in the transcript condition. The effect of time decreasing the strength of belief in accuracy was also revealed by the variables Remember/Know, Real/Imagine and Persuade for all of which the belief was lower at the second session than at the first session.

There was also the effect of time for some measures of belief for own memories. For the variables Real/Imagine, Testify and Persuade, the belief in the accuracy ratings decreased from session 1 to session 2.

### Reported Properties of Events or Memories

One of the reported properties that turned a significant effect was Positive Emotions. Participants gave higher ratings of positive emotions for the transmitted memory with positive emotions which could be considered a kind of partial support for manipulation check. Apart from that, there was partial support for an asymmetrical relation of plausibility and likeability of the memory with the emotional valence of it. While likeability of the memory was found to be higher for the transmitted memory with positive emotions, plausibility for the memory receiver was found to be higher for the transmitted memory with negative emotions. But before drawing conclusions, it should be considered that this might again be only due to idiosyncratic contents of these two memories.

Also another interesting result was found for plausibility. Participants reported that the event was more plausible for them at the second session compared to the first session. This result was interesting because the very same participants reported that it was more difficult to recall the memory content at the second session than at the first session. Although they recalled the content more difficultly, they thought the event was more plausible for them at the second session.

As for the reported properties of own memories, one effect was that of time on Importance. Participants regard their own memory as more important at the first session than at the second session.

## Word Counts

Memory lengths were found to be shorter at the second session for both own and transmitted memories. Transmitted memory with positive emotions was told longer than the transmitted memory with negative emotions which is an expected result since the original versions of the transmitted memories were different from each other in the same way.

## CHAPTER V

### CONCLUSION

The present study explored the phenomenology for autobiographical memory of someone else. Phenomenology for transmitted memory was found to be affected by the emotional valence as well as presentation type. Some ratings of phenomenology also differed between two sessions over time.

One important limitation of the present study is that delay and retelling were not manipulated independently from each other so it is difficult to conclude to which one of them the effects of time that were found significant are due. The transmitted memory might have been also given to another group that would not tell or report phenomenology for it.

Another limitation is that there was only one interval which was set as one week to discover the effect of time. Different lengths might have been employed to better understand the effect of time. Also more than one memory could have been used for each condition in order to rule out the possibility of specific content being responsible for the effects.

The measures of personality, mood or cultural orientation could be used in future studies in order to explore whether they could also have some effect on memory transmission. Also the present study employed no variation in purpose or accuracy emphasis for retelling the memories so in future studies the present paradigm could be combined with eyewitness (e.g. Marsh, Tversky, & Hutson, 2005) and earwitness (e.g. Campos & Alonso-Quecuty, 2006) testimony literatures.

Further studies are required in order to better understand the determinants of this kind of phenomenology.

## APPENDICES

## Appendix A

### Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire

1. Olayı hatırladığımda, olayın kendisini yeniden yaşıyormuş gibi hissediyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hissetmiyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

2. Olayı hatırladığımda, onu zihnimde görebiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç göremiyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

3. Olayı hatırladığımda, onu zihnimde duyabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç duyamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

4. Olayı hatırladığımda, o zaman hissettiğim duyguları şimdi de hissedebiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hissedemiyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

5. Olayı hatırladığımda, olayın geçtiği mekanın neresi olduğunu hatırlayabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hatırlayamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

6. Olayı hatırladığımda, olayın geçtiği mekanda kimin/neyin nerde durduğunu hatırlayabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hatırlayamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

7. Bu olay sizin için ne ölçüde pozitif duygular içeriyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç pozitif değil		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla pozitif

8. Bu olay sizin için ne ölçüde negatif duygular içeriyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç negatif değil		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla pozitif

9. Sizce olaya dair anınız, tarafsız bir gözlemcinin doğru bir aktarımına kıyasla hangi ölçüde inançlarınız, niyetleriniz ve beklentileriniz doğrultusunda çarpıtılmıştır?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
% 100 çarpıtılmış						% 100 doğru

10. İnsanlar bazen bir olayın bütün ayrıntılarını hatırlamasalar dahi başlarından ne geçtiğini bilirler. Bu olay hakkında düşünürken sadece ne olduğunu bilmekten öte olayı gerçekten hatırlayabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hatırlayamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

11. Bu anınızın doğruluğuna bir mahkemede ifade verebilecek kadar güveniyor musunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç güvenmiyorum		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla güveniyorum

12. Olayı hatırladığımda, şimdiye bağlanmış dışarıdan bir gözlemci gibi olmak yerine, olayın gerçekleştiği zamana geri döndüğümü, olayın içinde yine bir katılımcı olduğumu hissediyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hissetmiyorum		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla hissediyorum

13. Bazı anılarımızı hatırladığımızda olayı doğrudan kendi gözümüzden görürken bazı anılarımızı kendimizi de dışarıdan görebilecek şekilde gözlemci perspektifinden görürüz. Bu olaya dair anınız hangi perspektiften oluşmuştur?

1	2
Birinci şahıs	Üçüncü şahıs/gözlemci

14. Olayı hatırladığımda, bana yalnız bir gerçeklik, gözlem ya da sahne olarak değil de, kelimeler veya resimler halinde akan bütünlüklü bir hikaye veya olay şeklinde görünüyor.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç görünmüyor		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Son derece belirgin bir biçimde

15. Eğer olay sırasında yanınızda genelde güvendiğiniz başka bir kişi bulunsaydı ve size olayın çok farklı bir şekilde gerçekleştiğini anlatsaydı hangi ölçüde anınızın yanlış olduğuna ikna olurdunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç ikna olmazdım		Bazı ayrıntılarda ikna olurdum		Bazı esas noktalarda ikna olurdum		Tamamen ikna olurdum

16. Bu anı önemli bir mesaj içermesinden, hayatımda kritik bir kavşağı veya bir dönüm noktasını temsil etmesinden dolayı benim için anlamlıdır.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç değil		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Tamamen

17. Bu olay gerçekleştiğinden beri, olay hakkında düşündüm .

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç						Hayatımdaki olaylar
değil						arasında en sık
						düşündüğüm oldu

18. Bu olay gerçekleştiğinden beri, olay hakkında konuştum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç						Hayatımdaki olaylar
değil						arasında en sık
						konuştuğum oldu

19. Hafızamdaki olayın onu hatırladığım şekilde gerçekleştiğine ve ona hayal edilmiş veya uydurulmuş öğeler katmadığıma inanıyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
% 100 hayal						% 100 gerçek
edilmiş						

20. Anınız, belli bir yer ve zamanda bir defa gerçekleşmiş bir olaya mı, çok defa yaşanmış benzer veya alakalı olayların bir özeti veya birleşmiş haline mi, yoksa bir günden daha fazla bir süreye yayılmış kabaca aralarında süreklilik bulunan olaylara mı tekabül ediyor?

1	2	3
Bir defa	Birleşmiş	Yayılmış

21. Bu anıyı hatırlamak sizin için ne kadar zor oldu?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç zor		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Çok zor
değildi						oldu

22. Bu anı sizi ne ölçüde temsil ediyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç temsil		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla
etmiyor						temsil ediyor

23. Lütfen olayın tarihini (gün/ay/yıl) mümkün olduğu kadar doğru bir biçimde hatırlamaya çalışınız.

Lütfen tahmin etmeniz gerekse bile bir ay, gün ve yıl bildiriniz. Eğer anı belli bir süreye yayılmışsa, bu sürenin ortasındaki yaklaşık bir tarihi veriniz.

24. Sizce anınızı bir başkasıyla paylaştığımızda bu anı karşı tarafın ne kadar hoşuna gider?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hoşuna		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Kesinlikle
gitmez						çok

25. Sizce anınızdaki olayın bir başkasının başına gelme ihtimali ne kadardır?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç yok		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Kesinlikle
						çok

## Appendix B

### Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire – TM

1. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, olayın kendisini yaşıyormuş gibi hissediyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hissetmiyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

2. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, olayı zihnimde görebiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç göremiyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

3. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, olayı zihnimde duyabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç duyamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

4. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, anı sahibinin olayda hissettiği duyguları ben şimdi de hissedebiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hissedemiyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

5. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, olayın geçtiği mekanın neresi olduğunu hatırlayabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hatırlayamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

6. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, olayın geçtiği mekanda kimin/neyin nerde durduğunu gözümde canlandırabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç canlandıramıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

7. Anlatılan amdaki olay size göre ne ölçüde pozitif duygular içeriyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç pozitif değil		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla pozitif

8. Anlatılan anıdaki olay size göre ne ölçüde negatif duygular içeriyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç negatif değil		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla pozitif

9. Sizce anlatıya dair hatırladıklarınız, tarafsız bir izleyicinin/okuyucunun doğru bir aktarımına kıyasla hangi ölçüde inançlarınız, niyetleriniz ve beklentileriniz doğrultusunda çarpıtılmıştır? \*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
% 100 çarpıtılmış						% 100 doğru

10. İnsanlar bazen kendilerine aktarılan başkasının başına gelmiş bir olayın bütün ayrıntılarını hatırlamasalar dahi o kişinin başından ne geçtiğini bilirler. Anlatılan anıdaki olay hakkında düşünürken sadece anı sahibine ne olduğunu bilmekten öte olayı gerçekten hatırlayabiliyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hatırlayamıyorum		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Sanki şu anda gerçekleşiyormuş gibi net

11. Anlatılan anıya dair hatırladıklarınızın doğruluğuna bir mahkemede ifade verebilecek kadar güveniyor musunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç güvenmiyorum		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla güveniyorum

12. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, şimdiye bağlanmış dışarıdan bir gözlemci gibi olmak yerine, olayın gerçekleştiği zamana gittiğimi, olayın içinde bir gözlemci olduğumu hissediyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hissetmiyorum		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla hissediyorum

13. Bize aktarılan bazı anıları hatırladığımızda olayı doğrudan anı sahibinin gözünden görürken bazı anıları anı sahibini de dışarıdan görebilecek şekilde gözlemci perspektifinden görürüz. Anlatılan anıya dair hatırladıklarınız hangi perspektiften oluşmuştur?

1	2
Birinci şahıs	Üçüncü şahıs/gözlemci

14. Anlatılan anıyı hatırladığımda, bana yalnız bir gerçeklik, gözlem ya da sahne olarak değil de, kelimeler veya resimler halinde akan bütünlüklü bir hikaye veya olay şeklinde görünüyor.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç görünmüyor		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Son derece belirgin bir biçimde

15. Eğer anlatılan anı size sunulduğu haliyle genelde güvendiğiniz başka bir kişiye daha sunulsaydı ve bu kişi size olayın çok farklı bir şekilde gerçekleştiğini anlatsaydı hangi ölçüde olaya dair kendi hatırladıklarınızın yanlış olduğuna ikna olurdunuz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç ikna olmazdım		Bazı ayrıntılarda ikna olurdum		Bazı esas noktalarda ikna olurdum		Tamamen ikna olurdum

16. Bu anı, anı sahibine önemli bir mesaj içermesinden, kritik bir kavşak veya bir dönüm noktasını temsil etmesinden dolayı onun için anlamlıdır.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç değil		Belli belirsiz		Belirgin bir biçimde		Tamamen

17. Bu anlatılan anı bana sunulduğundan beri, anıdaki olay hakkında düşündüm.\*\*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç						Hayatımdaki olaylar
değil						arasında en sık
						düşündüğüm oldu

18. Bu anlatılan anı bana sunulduğundan beri, anıdaki olay hakkında konuştum.\*\*

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç						Hayatımdaki olaylar
değil						arasında en sık
						konuştuğum oldu

19. Hafızamdaki olayın onu hatırladığım şekilde bana sunulduğuna ve ona hayal edilmiş veya uydurulmuş öğeler katmadığıma inanıyorum.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
%100 hayal						%100 gerçek
edilmiş						

20. Hatırladığımız kadarıyla size anlatılan anı, belli bir yer ve zamanda bir defa gerçekleşmiş bir olaya mı, çok defa yaşanmış benzer veya alakalı olayların bir özeti veya birleşmiş haline mi, yoksa bir günden daha fazla bir süreye yayılmış kabaca aralarında süreklilik bulunan olaylara mı tekabül ediyor?

1	2	3
Bir defa	Birleşmiş	Yayılmış

21. Anlatılan anıyı hatırlamak sizin için ne kadar zor oldu?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç zor		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Çok zor
değildi						oldu

22. Tahmininize göre anlatılan anıdaki olay anı sahibini ne ölçüde temsil ediyor?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç temsil		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Tamamıyla
etmiyor						temsil ediyor

23. Tahmininize göre anı sahibi bu olayı kaç yıl önce, kaç yaşında yaşamıştır?

24. Size aktarılan anı hoşunuza gitti mi?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç hoşuma		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Kesinlikle
gitmedi						çok

25. Bu anda size aktarılan olayın sizin başınıza gelme ihtimali ne kadardır?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç yok		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Kesinlikle
						çok

26. Bu anıda size aktarılan olayın sizin yaşınızda, sizin cinsiyetinizde bir başkasının başına gelme ihtimali ne kadardır?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç yok		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Kesinlikle çok

27. Bu anının aynısı veya bir benzeri başınıza geldi mi? Cevabınız evet ise aradaki benzerliği aşağıdaki yüzdelerden en uygununu seçerek belirtiniz.

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100
hayır gelmedi										aynısı geldi

28. Sizce size aktarılan olaydaki anının sahibi ile tanışsaydınız onu ne kadar severdiniz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç sevmezdim		Biraz		Büyük ölçüde		Kesinlikle çok

\* The wording “izleyicinin” is used for the video condition and the wording “okuyucunun” is used for the transcript condition.

\*\* These two questions related to rehearsal were only applied in the second session.

## Appendix C

### Memory Instruction for Own Memory at the First Session

Hayatınızın herhangi bir döneminde başınıza gelmiş bir olayı anlatan en önemli anınızı mümkün olduğunca ayrıntılı anlatınız. Anınız sürekli yaşadığınız tekrar eden olayların bir özeti değil de, başı ve sonu bir gün içerisine sığan somut bir olay ya da durum hakkında olmalıdır. Lütfen anınızı anlattıktan sonra anınızın nitelikleri hakkında takip eden sorulara cevap veriniz.

## Appendix D

### Memory Instructions for Transmitted Memories at the First Session

#### For Transcript Condition:

Şimdi size bir anlatının transkripsiyonu gösterilecektir. Bu anlatıda bir kiři kendi başına gelen bir olayı anlatmaktadır. Lütfen bu anlatıyı dikkatlice okuyunuz.

Okuduktan sonra sizden bu anlatıyı mümkün olduğunca ayrıntılı bir biçimde ses kayıt cihazına kaydedilmek suretiyle anlatmanız istenecektir.

#### For Video Condition:

Şimdi size bir anlatının video kaydı gösterilecektir. Bu anlatıda bir kiři kendi başına gelen bir olayı anlatmaktadır. Lütfen bu anlatıyı dikkatlice izleyiniz. İzledikten sonra sizden bu anlatıyı mümkün olduğunca ayrıntılı bir biçimde ses kayıt cihazına kaydedilmek suretiyle anlatmanız istenecektir.

## Appendix E

### Memory Instruction for Own Memory at the Second Session

Geçen seansta anlattığınız kendi anınızı mümkün olduğunca ayrıntılı bir biçimde hatırlayarak ses kayıt cihazına kaydedilmek suretiyle anlatınız. Lütfen anınızı anlattıktan sonra anınızın nitelikleri hakkında takip eden sorulara cevap veriniz.

## Appendix F

### Memory Instructions for Transmitted Memories at the Second Session

#### For Transcript Condition:

Geçen seansta başka bir kişinin başına gelen bir olaya dair transkripsiyonunu okuduğunuz anlatıyı mümkün olduğunca ayrıntılı bir biçimde hatırlayarak ses kayıt cihazına kaydedilmek suretiyle anlatınız.

#### For Video Condition:

Geçen seansta başka bir kişinin başına gelen bir olaya dair video kaydını izlediğiniz anlatıyı mümkün olduğunca ayrıntılı bir biçimde hatırlayarak ses kayıt cihazına kaydedilmek suretiyle anlatınız.

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