

THE SYRIAN “OTHER” IN EVERYDAY LIFE:
PERSPECTIVES ON SYRIAN REFUGEES IN ÜSKÜDAR

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THE SYRIAN “OTHER” IN EVERYDAY LIFE:
PERSPECTIVES ON SYRIAN REFUGEES IN ÜSKÜDAR

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Nurbanu Dursun, certify that

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ABSTRACT

The Syrian "Other" in Everyday Life:

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This thesis explores mobilization of conservative people for the refugee issue in the everyday life of Üsküdar and how they perceive the Syrian refugees arriving Turkey since the early days of the Syrian Civil War that started in 2011. In order to explore how people mobilize for the refugee issue, this thesis relies on a field study composed of in-depth interviews with and participant observation of people mobilized for the refugee issue in Üsküdar as an exemplary case. It relies on a merging of two theoretical outlooks, discourse analysis and sensory ethnography in order, to analyze the data. The study argues that the refugee issue is a privatized area in Turkey and that the neoliberal state in Turkey is getting less accountable for the refugee issue. This shifts the responsibility for addressing refugee issues to local communities, who then have to mobilize. This mobilization relies on neo-Ottomanist discourses and nostalgia. Therefore, the study argues that there is a contingent and collaborative relationship between neoliberalism and neo-Ottomanism on the refugee issue in Turkey. Although neo-Ottomanism is not a recent phenomenon, the thesis explores how the political discourse of neo-Ottomanism acquires hegemony over and gets internalized by the society. In that sense, there are reevaluations of three important key areas: the recent past through the Bosnian War, the imaginary on the West and Kemalism. These areas produce and reproduce new subjectivities and collectivities in a neoliberal state and society in accordance with neo-Ottomanism. This thesis emphasizes the transformative character of migrations in everyday life by presenting the local perspectives.

ÖZET

Gündelik Hayatta Suriyeli “Öteki”:

Üsküdar’da Suriyeli Mülteciler Üzerine Perspektifler

Bu çalışma Üsküdar’ın gündelik hayatında muhafazakâr insanların mülteci meselesinde seferber olma hallerini ve onların 2011 yılında başlayan Suriye İç Savaşı’nın ilk dönemlerinden itibaren Türkiye’ye gelen Suriyeli mülteciler üzerine görüşlerini araştırmaktadır. Mülteci meselesinde seferber olma halini araştırmak için bu çalışma, derinlemesine mülakat ve katılımcı gözlem tekniklerinden oluşan, örnek olarak Üsküdar’ı veren bir alan araştırmasına dayanır. Çalışma veriyi analiz etmek için iki teorik bakışı bir araya getirir. Bunlar söylem analizi ve duyusal etnografyadır. Çalışma, Türkiye’de mülteci meselesinin özelleştirilmiş bir alan olduğunu ve bu meselede neoliberal devletin gittikçe daha az sorumlu olduğunu iddia eder. Bu durum da yerel toplulukların mülteci meselesinde seferber olmasına ve mültecilerden sorumlu olmasına yol açar. Bu seferberlik yeni-Osmanlıcı söylemlere ve nostaljiye dayanır. Bu yüzden çalışma Türkiye’de neoliberalizm ve yeni-Osmanlıcılık arasında olumsal ve işbirlikçi bir ilişki olduğunu iddia eder. Yeni-Osmanlıcılık yeni bir fenomen olmamasına rağmen bu çalışma siyasi bir söylem olan yeni-Osmanlıcılığın nasıl hegemonya kazandığını ve toplum tarafından nasıl içselleştirildiğini keşfetmeyi amaçlar. Bu açıdan üç önemli alanın yeniden değerlendirilmesi söz konusudur. Bunlar, Bosna Savaşı üzerinden yakın tarih, Batı üzerine tahayyüller ve Kemalizm’dir. Bu alanlar neoliberal bir devlet ve toplumda yeni-Osmanlıcılıkla uyumlu yeni öznellikler ve kolektiviteler üretir. Çalışma, yerel perspektifleri sunarak göçlerin gündelik hayattaki dönüştürücü özelliğini vurgular.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

This thesis studies the local perspectives on Syrian refugees coming to Turkey since the start of Syrian civil war in 2011 and mobilization of the conservative people for the refugee issue. The Syrian civil war led to displacement of millions of people to outside countries. Turkey, having the geographic proximity to Syria, is the country that host the highest number of Syrian refugees inside its borders¹. Although the Syrians' arrival is discussed in terms of foreign policy, military security and economic burdens, the focus is not on how it affects everyday life. This thesis focuses the Syrians in Turkey as an ethno-political problem in everyday life of cities. It also aims to investigate common aspects of Turkish perspective on Syrian refugees in Istanbul and how people are mobilized in matters related to the refugees in Üsküdar.

Relying on the argument that ethnicization process in everyday life of cities is the central producer of discourses (Brubaker, 2004), I investigate affects and discourses around the Syrian refugees produced and reproduced in everyday life of Üsküdar. Therefore, my object of study is the production of discourses and affects around the Syrian other, its legitimation by the locals; and how migration acts as a factor that transform subjectivities and collectivities. I hold that the perspectives on the Syrian refugees can be studied through tropes of neoliberalism and neo-

¹ According to latest the UN Refugee Agency's report, there are 2.9 million registered Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Ottomanism. I argue that the historical and religious imaginaries surface up in the host-society's mind when the other arrives and people share the everyday life.

The Syrian refugees constitute an important issue that revolves around the questions of nationalism, religious identity and ethnicity. I argue that perspectives on Syrian refugees are placed on a neo-Ottoman discourse of pro-migration and a neoliberal discourse of state; and people are mobilized in order to welcome and sustain the refugees in this framework. On the one hand, recognition of Syrian refugees in Turkey is an example of Ottoman-Islamic tolerance the state wants to establish as a non-assimilationist nation-building process; and civil society acts in accordance with the political discourses. Reliance on the Ottoman past ensures the multicultural character of society and works to foster acceptance of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. The religion becomes the most important element that acts as a "glue" between nations. On the other hand, there is ongoing neoliberalization of the state that started in early 1980s that also manifests itself in the refugee issue. The state gets less accountable in the refugee issue through processes of privatization. The state's withdrawal is accompanied by mobilization and activation of the civil society in the refugee issue. Therefore, I argue that mobilization of the conservative people, as residents of cities, for the refugee issue act as a mechanism that aims to establish a neo-Ottoman social harmony in cities in the age of neoliberal states.

1.2 On the research method

In this thesis, I contend that a combination of both sensual and discursive understandings of the relation between the self and the other is necessary in order to reach an adequate interpretation of the phenomenon I aim to study. Studying senses and discourses together may seem incompatible as they refer to two distinct

theoretical traditions of experiences versus structures, phenomenology versus structuralism. However, our experiences are deeply related to discourses, categories; as our discourses and categories are deeply affected by our experiences. Fuchs (2015) writes how “it is only through our affectivity that we find ourselves in a meaningful environment in which persons and things matter for us, and in which we care for them as well as for ourselves” (p. 2). Wenger (1998) articulates this relationality in his study on learning as follows:

What we dare consider knowledge is not just a matter of our own experiences of meaning or even our own regimes of competence. It is also a matter of the positions of our practices with respect to the broader historical, social, and institutional discourses and styles (scientific, religious, political, artistic) to which we orient our practices in various ways and to which we can thus be more or less accountable. (Wenger, 1998, p. 141).

Wenger (1998) argues that “learning involves an interplay between the local and the global” (p. 228). Although our everyday actions are in practice, they take place in accordance with larger contexts where our localities are made sense of (Wenger, 1998, p. 228). There is constant engagement between the local and the global; and the relationality between the two is productive of knowledge. In other words, orientation of our daily practices within broader, larger discourses is what we always do in order to make sense of everyday happenings. In fact, Edensor (2002) defines culture as the very processes that connect the local and the national; and the national and the global (p. VII). Furthermore, Edensor’s analyses on national identity in everyday life holds that “the small everyday orderings” can be made sense of through “larger national orderings”, in which there is a combination of the local with the national (Edensor, 2002, p. 19). He studies embodied expressions and experiences of national identity through this perspective. This relationality between senses, experiences and discourses is an important part of the study that I want to highlight.

1.2.1 Sensory ethnography and discourse analysis

A study of everyday life experiences of Turkish encounters with Syrian refugees necessitates putting “questions of perceptions, place, knowing, memory and imagination” into the agenda (Pink, 2015, p. 25). Local Turkish perspectives on the Syrian refugees could be analyzed more easily relying on some of the defining principles of sensory ethnography which studies these themes in question. Sensory ethnography is an approach that makes use of social, sensory and material experiences in research environment. Social, sensory and material experiences are considered to be part of research material due to their importance in how people view the world. In this scheme, researchers rely on senses and perceptions, because they tell us about certain social and political power dynamics in the environment. Paul Stoller’s ethnographic account on Nigeria is noteworthy for its use of taste, smell and hearing in combination with sight, “the privileged sense of the West” (Stoller, 1989, p. 5).

However, the use of sensory and embodied experiences is problematized by classical philosophy. The body and mind dichotomy is an old philosophical discussion that contemporary thinkers also think and produce on. However, sensory ethnography relies on the body as “a site of knowing” (Pink, 2015, p. 27). Similarly, social relations are not only relations between minds but between bodies, social relations necessarily involve bodily encounters (Pink, 2015, p. 27). The relations among the society are also embodied. The “other” in these social relations, then, becomes the one that is proximate; and “a body out of place” (Ahmed, 2000, p. 15).

Embodied experiences include and rely on an analysis of senses and sensory experiences. Perception becomes a key term in discussions on embodied experiences.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ideas on the eye and sight can give us ideas on how human perceptions revolve around sensations (Merleau-Ponty, 1994, p. 32-33). Although Merleau-Ponty wrote on sight, there is an emphasis on multisensorial character of relations among the subject and the object (Merleau-Ponty, 1994, p. 30). Other than sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching are other senses that human perception uses; and these senses are not separate but interconnected. Drawing his theory from phenomenology, Merleau-Ponty wrote on how the sight can be a concept showing relations among various consciousness. This understanding attributes certain capabilities of perception to the human body. The emphasis on multisensoriality also means that something could be experienced through one sense but not the other in one context, while in the other context we observe experiences of multiple senses.

However, perception of sensory experiences does not mean that it is an individual only process. Rather, there is a social dimension to sensory experiences (Howes and Classen, 2014, p.1 [quoted in Pink, 2015, p. 31]). Social values are attached to sensory experiences. We process things and events through our senses in social, sensory and material environments we are in. In order to say more on environments, an analysis of place is necessary. The concept of place is developed in its relations to the senses and embodiment. Places becomes areas where bodies live, memories are attached and senses are dispersed. Certain places have certain histories, "even languages and thoughts" (Casey, 1996, p. 24 [quoted in Pink, 2015, p. 34]). Places involve social and non-social, material elements; yet, it is not fixed and is in constant re-making. Certain thinkers have theorized the place as open and fluid. Pink refers to place "as a coming together and 'entanglement' of persons, things, trajectories, sensations, discourses, and more" (Pink, 2015, p. 48). The experience of the entangled character of place makes an analysis on discourses possible.

Although I have emphasized the sensory and spatial dimensions of social encounters and how experiences are articulated from these encounters, the wider discourses and power dynamics are also meaningful, according to Wenger. He argues how local is connected to the global in the broad picture; and how social, sensory and material environment is associated with larger discourses of power and the social (Pink, 2015, pp. 39-41). The example of nationalism as a larger discourse of society and politics comes to mind. Theories of nationalism study national belonging and identification which go beyond the sensory and material environment and connect to the larger discourses. For instance, Hobsbawm (1992) writes how nationalism can be understood by studying the view from below “in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of people” (pp. 10-11). He continues by emphasizing the necessity of studying “the ordinary persons who are the objects of their action and propaganda” (Hobsbawm, 1992, pp. 10-11); although it proves hard to research. Similar to how larger discourses need to approach the everyday level of ordinary people, the sensory and material environment can be supplemented by larger discourses in order to get more meaningful analyses.

In that sense, memory and imagination appear to be other phenomena that are important for sensory ethnography. The relation between senses and memory take both individual and collective forms (Pink, 2015, p. 43). Social character of senses, and certain encounters could invite historical memories; and experiences of places are not separate from memories and imaginations. Memory and imagination are both practices in everyday life in which constant multisensorial place-making takes place (Pink, 2015, p. 45). Memory and imagination, as larger spheres of discourses, can become tools to make more local analyses on sensory experiences meaningful. Memory and imagination are concepts that make references to the imaginary past, as

well as the future and its possibilities. How people imagine their past and future become an important part of sensory ethnography. Pink's understanding of "ethnographic-place-as-event" is a method that involves categories of senses, place and memory and "where representations are known in practice" (Pink, 2015, p. 49). This is especially important for an analysis on perspectives on Syrian refugees in Turkey, where Turkey is the host country to which the embodied stranger in the figure of Syrian refugees enter.

Secondly, I will be using Foucauldian discourse analysis in this study. Michel Foucault's one of the biggest contributions to social theory is his theorization of discourse in the context of power, where power and knowledge are interrelated; and where power becomes discursive. The wide-spread, micro, everyday understanding of power argues that there are "innumerable individual exercises of power which are consolidated and coordinated" by various agents; such as individuals, institutions, the state and the society (Philp, 1985, p. 76). Discursive power takes places inherently in social relations of all kinds, in all levels. Foucault's discourse analysis keeps the interrelation between this understanding of power and knowledge at its core and holds a critical outlook on the naturalization of language. Language becomes political and is not considered to be "transparent or value-free" in Foucault's oeuvre (Cheek, 2008, p. 356). This is also related to Foucault's genealogical approach where language is the ultimate agent producing and reproducing power and knowledge. This is in conjunction with refuting "the idea that knowledge is objective and value-free, inevitably progressive, and universal" (Cheek, 2008, p. 356). Therefore, power and knowledge are interrelated and not neutral. They are governed by linguistic criteria where power becomes discursive.

Similarly, Foucault's (1981) understanding of discourse is not power-neutral but power-laden, and it is productive and reproductive of power and truth. Foucault writes "discourses themselves exercise their own control" (p. 56). Foucault (1972) holds that studying discourses' "conditions of existence" and "the practical field in which" they are deployed in are the crucial steps of discourse analysis (p. 235). New forms of localization and circulation of the discourse can be traced (Foucault, 1972, p. 231). He writes that discourse analysis "does not reveal the universality of a meaning, but brings to light the action of imposed scarcity, with a fundamental power of affirmation" (Foucault, 1981, p. 73). Likewise, Philp (1985) argues that discourse analysis does not aim to provide us with definitive analyses and interpretations (p. 69). Rather, texts remain elusive. Texts are both products and productive of discursive power as forms of narratives in this scheme (Cheek, 2008, p. 357). Furthermore, the text becomes the unit of analysis in Foucauldian discourse analysis, and the interview transcripts constitute my text in this thesis.

Discourse analysis is very popular in qualitative research since it helps the exploration of the power effects in a variety of perspectives. In that sense, by appropriating a critical perspective, the Foucauldian method "can enable us to explore how things have come to be the way they are, how it is that they remain that way, and how else they might have been or could be" (Cheek, 2008, p. 355). In this thesis, sensory ethnography is coupled with Foucauldian discursive analysis in order to provide a more in-depth interpretation of the data at hand after my experiences in the field.

1.3 My research

Although my research questions were originally “What are the discursive effects of Syrian migration to Turkey? What are the local perspectives on the incoming Syrian refugees? How does the local host-population view, represent, welcome and differentiate the Syrian refugees? What are the discursive frameworks that the local uses in order to characterize the incoming Syrian people? What are the reflections of these representations of the Syrian people in terms of the Turkish national and religious identity in the context of nationalism and conservatism?”, I had to re-think my research questions after conducting several interviews in Üsküdar. I wanted to understand why people are active when the Syrian refugees arrive and how the Syrian refugees are represented as others in society. Therefore, my new research questions are: Why are there many active individuals and groups that tackle the issue of Syrian refugees in Üsküdar? What motivates people actively involved in helping Syrian refugees in civil society and how are they motivated? What kind of discourses do people have when encountered with the Syrian refugees in everyday life, and how do these discourses operate? Are the incoming others differentiated when the host and refugee populations share the same religion? Does sharing a religion act as an integrating discourse in interaction between the host and guest societies and if so, to what extent? Do people explain their pro-refugee stance by resting on religion only or are other cultural criteria important for people’s accepting behaviors towards Syrian refugees? How do emotions operate in encounters with refugees? How are pro-refugee stances constructed in conservative perspectives, through religion or through shared history and culture?

I studied perspectives on Syrian refugees in Üsküdar, a district on the Anatolian side of Istanbul largely known for its conservative, yet also cosmopolitan

base. As opposed to the secular and economic hub of the Anatolian side, Kadıköy; Üsküdar remains an economically rather quiet district. Studying Üsküdar uncovers the basic dynamics of religious and nationalist perspectives, and I am interested in these perspectives on the arrival of Syrian refugees and encounters between the local and the “other”. I argue that Üsküdar is informative because it is telling of conservative, nationalist and religious perspectives on and encounters with the other in everyday life; and people are mobilized in the refugee issue in Üsküdar. In that sense, I attribute a representative role to the place of Üsküdar. However, this is not to argue that all perspectives on Syrian refugees in Turkey is represented in Üsküdar. Rather, Üsküdar is noteworthy for its active, mobilized, conservative, religious base in which I argue that the emphasis on shared religion with the Syrian refugees does not appear to be a differentiating feature; but rather a means to integrate. Recalling the research questions that I pose, the conservative, religious characteristics are in relation to people’s acceptance of the incoming other.

I was born and raised in Üsküdar, and spent almost all my life as a resident in different neighborhoods inside the borders of Üsküdar municipality. The Üsküdar municipality was ruled by conservative or right political parties since the 1960s, and I argue that this is representative of the conservative, religious residents of Üsküdar that I want to highlight in my thesis. In recent decades, the municipality was won by the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) for the last 3 local elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014 (Arslan et al, 2014, pp. 461-525). Before AKP, the RP (Refah Partisi, Welfare Party) won the 1994 elections before the party was shut down by the post-modern coup in 28 February 1997².

² The RP’s offspring, the FP (Fazilet Partisi, Felicity Party), won the next elections in 1999. Therefore, for more than 20 years, Üsküdar votes for conservative political parties in the Turkish political party scene. However, before that, the leftist parties of SHP (in 1989) and CHP (in 1977), and were able to hold the municipality, while the centrist ANAP (Homeland Party) had the control in

I have conducted seventeen semi-structured, in-depth interviews; and these interviews constitute the core of the research. In-depth interviews do not require having an extensive list of predetermined questions (Cook, 2008, pp. 422-423). Rather the researcher asks open-ended questions and can prepare an interview guide as a list composed of several topics to be discussed (Ayres, 2008, pp. 810-811). Although the transcripts of audio-records of these in-depth interviews constitute the core of my research, I have also treated the method of interview as a “multisensory event” that interviewees “represent and categorize their experiences, values, moralities, other people” (Pink, 2009, p. 81). Treating interviews as a multisensory event necessitates taking non-verbal elements into account. Apart from verbal expressions, I have noted images, sounds, scents, gestures, and touching. It is because audio-records are not considered to be isolated from the sensory experiences of researcher and research participants in everyday life (Desjarlais, 2003, pp. 18-19). Apart from words, verbal narratives, other sensory experiences were studied. Similar to how I want to study the encounters between the locals and the incoming refugees, the interviews can be seen as “social, sensorial and emotive encounters” (Pink, 2009, p. 83). The narrative of the “interview as place-event” tells us the research

1984. The AP (Adalet Partisi, Justice Party) won the 1963 and 1968 local elections, the first two local elections held after the implementation of 1961 constitution which led the way for establishment of local elections (Arslan et al, 2014).

A similar trend could be observed in general elections. In 2002, 2007, 2011 and 2015 general elections, the Üsküdar residents voted majorly for the AKP. The RP was also the leading party in the polls in 1995 elections. However, the 1999 elections display a peculiarity in which the leftist DSP won the majority, while FP won only the second majority in the district.

While the CHP won 1961 elections after the 60 coup d’etat, the Üsküdar district displayed an overwhelming AP victory in 1965 and 1969 elections. The CHP won the successive 1973 and 1977 elections, while in 1983, 1987 and 1991 elections, we observe that majority of votes were won by the centrist ANAP. As a recap, it is fair to say that the Üsküdar has remained a district that largely voted for right and conservative political parties since the 1960s. The period after the 1971 coup displays a rise in interest in leftist political parties; however, these attitudes do not stick for long and since the mid-1990s, Üsküdar’s political scene is dominated by conservative political parties. The conservative side social and political scenes is something that drew me to a study on perspectives on Syrian refugees in Üsküdar.

participants' embodied and sensory experiences and their ways of knowing (Pink, 2009, p. 95). Through these interviews, I aimed to understand what people think of Syrian refugees, what happens when the host and the guest populations encounter in the broader sense; and what they experience regarding the Syrians in their everyday lives. I have a list of topics ready to be discussed in each interview but my questions were open-ended. The interviews were by shaped by the interviewees' accounts as opposed to the researcher's interfering questions.

I also focused on participant observation to supplement my study. In participant observation, the researcher takes part in activities related to the area of interest in order to observe phenomena in their natural, everyday settings (McKechnie, 2008, p. 598-599). In this method, personal characteristics of the researcher can interfere with access; access meaning obtaining permission and establishing credibility (McKechnie, 2008, p. 598-599). I think the problem of access takes place in in-depth interviews as well. Therefore, as a headscarf wearing devout Muslim woman, I have chosen interviewees and settings that I have familiarity with. Therefore, I have not experienced any of my interviewees questioning my religious identity. The participants were approached through personal contacts and previous interviewees. Interviews lasted between 20 minutes to 60 minutes and were audio-recorded. Apart from the time I have audio-recorded the interviews, I was able to observe their offices as well as residencies. I conducted interviews in places that were the most convenient for the interviewees which included their houses, café places and restaurants. I have walked with the interviewees to other places, to other people, in some cases to other interviewees. I have had meals with them in coffee houses, sit in their kitchen and accepted their tea offers. They showed me visual images, which can be considered to be "material objects with sensory qualities"

(Pink, 2009, p. 93). They draw diagrams to explain what they mean in detail. They gave me their business cards so that I also have physical reminders.

The people I have interviewed are either Üsküdar residents, or they work in Üsküdar, or even if they do not work in the district they are active in the district in some capacity (whether observing the district because it is on their commute routes or go to the district to socialize). Therefore, all interviewees were able to give me details on everyday life in Üsküdar. All my interviewees describe themselves as conservative people, although their range of conservatism differ. The age range of my interviewees changes between mid-20s to the late 50s. Almost half of them are females (8 people), and the other half is males (9 people). I have aimed at having a diverse selection of interviewees in terms of their occupations. Therefore, my selection includes people working at a think-tank and charity organizations, people running coffee and tea houses and boutique restaurants, housewives, businessmen, medical doctors, an academic scholar, a writer, a graduate student in the area of education, a banker, and a shop assistant. Almost all of the interviewees are members of the middle class; yet, some of them would belong to lower middle class, while others are members of the upper middle class. Their education levels differ in conjunction with their middle-class status. All interviewees are graduates of high school but not everyone are university graduates. This is especially the case for headscarf wearing women who have not attended university due to the headscarf ban that was implemented for years. People with post-graduate degrees are in minority. All my interviewees have wanted to use their real names in the research although I told them they did not have to in order to protect their privacy.

I describe all my interviewees as active and mobilized people in matters regarding the wellbeing of Syrian refugees in Istanbul. Their activeness is in

different capacities and these positions were most of the time voluntary. For instance, a couple (Ayşe and Mahmut) was running a charity organization that mostly helps the Syrian refugees, helping them with basic needs and shelter, finding opportunities of employment if they can. Their organization locates the Syrians in need, and they fill certain forms to assess the situation. For instance, the form asks how many people live in the specific household, the income of the household, monthly bills and their prices, if they receive any help and what they need in the immediate sense. Ayşe is a housewife but has been working in various charity organizations or independently for years. Her husband, Mahmut is a professor of sociology and the founder of the organization, an organization that brings hot soup to homeless people during nights in the city. Additionally, Songül works independently with her sister-in-law and they visit Syrian families in need. Another couple, Melike and Halid, runs a small restaurant together and they welcome any Syrian wishing to have a meal for free. Also, they know some of the Syrian children in the neighborhood and they engage them in small activities of education, such as painting and drawing, or learning Turkish. Betül is a graduate student of developmental psychology with a major in guidance and psychological counseling. She is part of an organization that helps Syrian students with their education. They hold additional courses on the weekends and engage with the students personally. Courses include Turkish, mathematics, and crafts. Musa is part of a charity organization that aims at building a secured community for the widowed Syrian women and their orphan children in the border region between Turkey and Syria. His organization also helps with shelter and finding employment opportunities for the Syrian people in need. Providing certain household appliances and furniture, as well as having Turkish classes for Syrian adults are some of the organization's activities. Özge, a writer, visits many Syrian

families in their homes and writes on their situations and things she encounters online. Lastly, Osman works in an established humanitarian relief foundation as one of the top members.

The remaining interviewees are not active as the previous groups; however, they are still in contact with many charity organizations and they have encountered the Syrian people and even helped those among them who are in need. Leyla and Fadime as medical doctors treat Syrian patients for free in public hospitals and community health centers. Muhlis the businessman, who runs a child clothing shop, gifted many clothes for Syrian babies and children in Istanbul. Erkan the tea house owner, lets Syrian people have tea and coffee for free and went to the border towns in Turkish borders to and observed the Syrian migrants' conditions himself. Other participants; Mustafa the Banker, Mustafa the businessman, Ahmet the coffee shop owner, and Sena the shop assistant have shared their perspectives on the Syrian refugees from a philanthropic perspective.

I choose 4 interviews as my main interviews and data. These are Özge, Ayhan, Osman and Erkan's interviews. I choose these interviews as the core of my research because they present key perspectives on the issue and provide a summary of perspectives I look for. The way they relate to the other larger themes of history, belonging and culture that will be discussed throughout the thesis. Özge's account provides a mesh between religious and Ottoman culturalist perspective where Kemalist ideology is heavily criticized and Üsküdar's efforts hosting the refugees are not considered to be lacking. It includes a certain neo-Ottoman national imaginary with analyses on senses, emotions and experiences encountering the Syrian refugees. Özge now devotes most of her life to the refugees' well-being, both in economic and psychological manners; and she supplements her in-the-field activism with her

professional writing career. Her activism is telling of the official agents' absence in the refugee issue in civil society.

Ayhan's account, on the other hand, focuses on how there is a degeneration of Turkish values regarding hospitality. He focuses on how the essential characteristic of Turkish people must be hospitality in times of arrival of refugee people. In that sense, his analysis includes "our" culture, civilization and traditions that are distinct from "the West". Although the differences between the host and guest Syrian societies are highlighted, Ayhan takes these differences as reasons for empathy rather than discrimination. His account is reminiscent of official ideology with references to the shared Ottoman past and imperial history.

Osman's position also gives me insights on how political discourses can get hegemonic in civil society. Osman gave me details on the Bosnian War and how mobilization during the Bosnian War has led to foundation of his organization. Throughout the interview, I was able to get a sense of the geography he imagines that extends from the Balkans to the Caucasus while embracing the Middle East. He highlights the experiences in Anatolia and articulates Anatolia as a meeting place for immigrants for hundreds of years. In that sense, he treats the Syrian refugees from the perspective of historical experiences and imaginaries.

Erkan's account, on the other hand, provides how the Syrian War is compared and contrasted with the Bosnian War and its aftermath. There is a certain resemblance between the Syrian and Bosnian wars. Erkan's understanding offers a certain reevaluation of the recent past through the Bosnian War. The association's activities, which Erkan is part of, are in line with charity principle where the civil society takes responsibility settling and taking care of the refugees. These four interviews constitute the core of the research making references to everyday sensory

experiences that differentiate the Syrian other, neo-Ottoman discourses that rely on imaginary and symbolic historical and religious criteria and the whole concept taking place in a neoliberal state in which the issue of the refugees are left to the responsibility of the civil society.

My research is a study of civil society, not the state, in everyday life and it relies on the argument that there is neoliberalization of the refugee issue in Turkey by privatization of migration, withdraw of the state from areas of provision and the society getting responsible and accountable for social problems. My study could have included the perspectives and roles of the state, or more clearly, of the official agents tackling the refugee issue in Üsküdar. Interviews with employees of these official agents and institutions could have contributed to the research by expanding and supporting the argument that there is neoliberalization of the refugee issue in Turkey in which the state has an essential part. In that sense, my research remains limited to the civil society by excluding the accounts from the state, the official institutions dealing with the refugee issue. Although studying the official agents would exceed the scope of this thesis, it provides opportunities for upcoming research on migration studies in Turkey.

1.4 Overview of the thesis

Throughout the thesis, I emphasize the relation between the self and the other.

Thinking migration as a meeting, an encounter and an interaction brings questions of the subject and the other (Miles, 2003, p. 19). The relation between the subject and the other can take a reflexive form in which “our representations of the Other are important ingredients of our own identities” (Miles, 2003, p. 19). I am interested in this reflexive turn in encounters with the other; and how representations take place

and change. However, it is important to note the difference between an experienced other and an imagined other. The experienced other is in some sense direct contact and interaction with the subject, whereas the imagined other does not have any empirical reality (Miles, 2003, p. 24). It is fair to say that the Syrian refugee other is both an imagined other and an experienced other in Üsküdar. This is in reference to the Syrian other in everyday life and I study mobilization of civil society around the Syrian refugee issue in Üsküdar. I also relate perspectives in everyday life to context that they are made possible in.

To that end, I present a literature review on migration and how it gets privatized in Turkey through discussing neoliberalization in the second chapter. Turkey has a history of migration, both as emigration and immigration. Yet, its asylum system is rather out-dated and limited. By employing the 1951 Geneva Convention, Turkey does not legally recognize the Syrian migrants as refugees. They are accepted to Turkey and registered as people under temporary protection. In this scheme, the state's roles concerning the refugees stay rather limited. The withdrawal of the state as well as its incompetence when it comes to taking care of the refugees make the refugee issue stay in a gray zone, a limbo. This, however, opens areas for the civil society to intervene in the refugee issue. I argue that the neoliberal state no longer appears to be covering the issue of refugees, therefore the stage is set for the civil society to take responsibility in the issue of Syrian refugees. The activation of charities and associations in order to cover the Syrian refugees' problems are demonstrative, in that sense. Furthermore, the efforts of the civil society display how through mass mobilization and organization of the society, there is a new production of political and neoliberal embodied subjectivity, where the design of neo-Ottoman national building and neoliberalization of the state and society go hand in hand.

In the next chapter, I present the notions of subjectivity, hegemony and nostalgia as necessary tools for a study on neo-Ottomanism. I hold that the neoliberal state in the refugee issue goes hand in hand with neo-Ottomanist discourses. Neo-Ottomanism provides a design for mobilization of the civil society by instrumentalizing the past in order to address the current problems. In neo-Ottoman discourses, shared or imagined history and religion appear to be the bonding criteria when the Turkish host encounters the Syrian refugee other. In that sense, people rely on a neo-Ottoman articulation of the world view in order to locate, make sense of and operate the Syrian refugees' arrival. Neo-Ottomanism acts as restorative nostalgia, conceptualized by Boym, that aims at revoking the past by reinstating it. I also rely on the Gramscian concept of hegemony in order to articulate the workings of the neo-Ottoman discourses in civil society.

In that respect, three major outcomes emerge when studying mobilization of civil society, perspectives on and representations of the Syrian people in Üsküdar. In the fourth chapter, I explore how the Bosnian War is constituted as a founding moment of reevaluation of the recent past when the Syrian refugees arrive. The Bosnian War is recalled when the Syrian refugees are in Turkey. The experiences of the Bosnian War are recalled since the Bosnian and Syrian wars are compared and contrasted in terms of violence, pain, displacement and migration of thousands of people. In the fifth chapter, I tackle the concept of "the West" and how it remains at an ambivalent place in order for the Turkish identity to construct itself. By rearticulating and reevaluating the West, people are able to mobilize for the refugee issue. In the sixth chapter, I focus on the Kemalist ideology, as it is deemed problematic since it promotes modernization through Westernization. In the

concluding chapter, I go through a survey of the thesis and emphasize how migrations are productive of new subjectivities and collectivities.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW:

REFUGEES AND NEOLIBERALISM

2.1 On migration, the migrant and the refugee

What does people's migration to another country mean? The movement of people across vast geographies is nothing new. History provides us with accounts of how people moved across lands, fought, settled and produced. These accounts present us how migration is a central, and profound phenomenon in history. Migration is the broader term that is used for these movements and displacements; and migration is an exciting subject for the researchers in social sciences.

Classical studies on migration tend to focus on two important theoretical approaches to migration. These are voluntarist and structuralist perspectives (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 30). The voluntarist perspective relies on pushing and pulling factors that make people move. This model is individualistic, argues that the individual calculates costs and benefits of staying and moving; and then, arrives at the decision of migration (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 31). For instance, in terms of refuge, the repressive political regimes are considered to be a push factor (Papastergiadis, 2000, pp. 30-31). However, Mezzadra (2015) argues that it is commonsensical to say that migration is only very rarely voluntary or free (p. 122). Therefore, studying migration in terms of push and pull factors is not very meaningful. This is especially the case in forced migrations in which "a well-founded fear of violence" is the distinguishing factor of forced migration (Zolberg et al., 1989, p. 33). Although oppressive regimes are considered to be a push factor, it is

inadequate to analyze forced migrations from this perspective where violence and life-threatening conditions make the subject lack the authority to decide on push and pull factors in the first place.

The structuralist perspective, on the other hand, relies on the differentiation of center and periphery countries in the world economy. Class appears to be the decisive factor for migration from periphery to center countries of industrialization and developed economies. These models are very limited in themselves and they both regard the influence of external factors as the sole reason for migration (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 35).

These perspectives treat migration as very mechanized and economized phenomena. Gender and culture are dismissed from the picture (Abu-Lughod, 1978, p. 226). Therefore, the migrant subject is reduced to processes of economy and positioning of social class. Also, internal factors that lead to migration are not taken into consideration, in which the subject appears to be fixed and already determined. However, critical migration studies highlight the necessity of having the migrant subjectivity at the center and see how migration is constitutive of experiences of interaction and movement (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 35).

Critical migration studies pose criticisms to these traditional perspectives that undermine the subjectivity of the migrant. These studies criticize the views that migration revolves around the “excess” and it is the movement and displacement of people that are already solitary. Rather, these studies focus on how migration is “integral to the radical transformations of modernity” (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 2) and how it goes hand in hand with globalization (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 3). Yet, migration is not necessarily modern. The movement of people has been the

consistent feature of history, but these critical studies aim at bringing the migrant subjectivity back to migration studies.

Another criticism posed is to the view that sees migration “as a transitional phase” (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 12). Linear understandings of modernization of societies tend to hold how migration is temporary and it will lead to a settlement. However, critical migration studies highlight the everlasting nature of movement and displacement of people. These movements not only mean the physical acts of moving from one place to another, but it includes the motives of “imagining an alternative” (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 11). However, this alternative should not be considered in terms of a fixed ideal that the movement aims to arrive at. Rather, the fluid nature of social relations is translated as fluid movements of people. The destination of migration may change in time, or there may never be a destination.

It is important to note that these criticisms are also against the binaries present in migration studies. The traditional accounts on migration rest on a binary to explain migration and the figure of the migrant. On the one hand, migrations from periphery to the center are good and further economic development and technological enhancement by providing labor power. Besides, movement is associated with liberation. Thus, the migrant, the refugee, the dweller is appreciated in social theory. For instance, Alcoff (2006), studying Deleuze and Guattari’s theories, writes that the nomad aims at overcoming the essentialized notions of identity (pp. 275-277). On the other hand, the impacts of migrants in the host-country are analyzed and the migrants are held responsible for social ills. Therefore, what is important is to analyze migration not only in positive (the liberating aspect of moving, the empowered displaced) or negative (trauma associated with movement and displacement) terms; but as a dynamic phenomenon that has both stabilizing and

destabilizing elements. For my analysis, I am interested in how migration is linked to development of new subjectivities and transformation of subjects. Therefore, I do not engage with the migrant as solely “the marginal man” (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 55), nor the host society as the possessor or power.

Although the migrant and the refugee were always figures known in history, asylum seeking, formally, has a rather short history. It especially became a phenomenon after the Second World War as a humanitarian and political solution to the problem of displaced people (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 143). The dramatic increase in forced migration has taken place in the post-Cold War period, since the 1980s (Castles, 2003). It is important to note that displaced people are now problematized in the context of nation-state system and nationalism where the migrants and refugees are politicized (Castles, 2003, p. 20). In the current nation-state system, migration connotes going across the national borders. Mezzadra (2015) holds that the notion of the border has long been associated with stability and occupied a central position in modern political thought, especially in nationalism (p. 130). Therefore, the relation between the nation-state and migration poses something else. The nation-state system aims to regulate the movement of people inside the territories; and sees migration as a possible tool in nationalizing the state (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 2). The movement of people across geographies tests the national borders and poses challenges to their effectiveness. It aims to stabilize destabilizing tendencies of movement and displacement of people within its territories. The modern nation-state system relies on drawing boundaries between our land and the others' lands. De Genova (2015) writes “*Borders make migrants*” (italic in the original) (p. 4). It relies on claiming the land as your own while any movement

against this land challenges this possession. Therefore, the incoming other becomes a figure bringing danger creating effects on the host society (Castles, 2003, p. 23).

Migration destabilizes social conditions and is visible in “the emergence of new subjects” (Papastergiadis, 2000, p. 10). Therefore, it is important to discuss the migrant subject in more detail. Migrants and asylum seekers are the figures of these challenges posed to the nation-state and borders, which immediately makes them figures of illegality (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 144). For instance, Çelikateş and others (2015) question the almost-always assumed illegality of migration in Europe. The administration of borders, then, becomes an issue of workings of power (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 168). These workings include restrictions over mobility of people and governing the people that are inside the borders (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013, p. 183).

In general, the figure of the migrant is studied as an anomaly, an exception to the rule. Seeing the migrant as an anomaly stems from reading history of the state; in which the figures outside the state are either non-existent or ahistorical. This leads to essentialization of the figure of the migrant (Nail, 2015, p. 236). Yet, recent studies focus on the constitutive character of the migrant and how it is *the* political figure of our age (Nail, 2015). Nail, for instance, focuses on non-essentialist explanation of the migrant in which “One is not born a migrant but becomes one” (Nail, 2015, p. 3) and argues that seeing the migrant as “a failed citizen” is not helpful. Rather, he chooses an analysis that revolves around the theme of mobility and movement of people. He investigates how the migrant is actually a social condition and spectrum that “people move into and out of” (Nail, 2015, p. 235).

Reading these pieces on the subject of migration; one should focus more on how migration could be analyzed in a greater detail when it is not treated as an issue

that only occurs among states; but its effects are very much associated with the nation-state system and nationalism. However, it is important to take nationalism not just as a political term but a cultural term meaning “national order of things” in everyday life (Malkki, 1995, p. 5). Limiting migration to the history of states makes us lose important details over the figure of the migrant and how it actually is a constitutive figure in modern social and political thought. Nail (2015) highlights the movement of societies and how this dynamism is constitutive of new social and political entities. After this brief literature review on migration and the figure of the migrant; it is time for a historical background on Turkey’s experience with migration the Syrian migration to Turkey.

2.2 On migration to Turkey

Turkey’s relation with current Syrian government and the civil war require brief historical information. Since its admission to NATO in 1952, Turkey has been a member of the Western political alliance, of the United States and the European Union; and Turkey’s foreign policy had revolved around getting into the European Union till the mid-2000s. Starting with the AKP’s majority government since 2003, however, diversification of the Turkish foreign policy started taking place and Turkey’s foreign policy agenda included the regions of the Middle East, the Caucuses and the Balkans (Küçükcan and Küçükkeleş, 2013, p. 129). This meant Turkey was developing a regional approach while staying in the Western alliance. The relations between governments of Syria and Turkey improved, until the start of anti-government protests and their brutal putdown by the Syrian government led by Bashar Assad in 2011. Turkish government demanded Assad to resign and hold elections; however, these demands were not answered. In fact, the government’s

atrocities grew even more, which made millions of people leave their homes and search for new homes abroad. Turkey is one of the countries that the escaping Syrian refugees arrived to since March 2011. The Turkish government has adopted an open-door policy for the Syrian refugees; and established temporary protection centers to provide basic needs.

Before the Syrian Civil War, Turkey was not considered to be a country that hosts refugees (İçduygu, 2014). However, it has been a country receiving immigration in the last decades (Suter, 2013, p. 3). The state of Turkey preferred Turkish descent and culture in its immigration policies (İçduygu, 2015, p. 1). Likewise, granting Turkish citizenship to non-Turkish migrants rests on ethnic and cultural criteria rather than legal and political criteria of citizenship (Kirişçi, 2000). However, Parla (2015) argues that by implementing the new Citizenship Law of 2010, Turkey “seems to be letting go of its policy of favoritism towards the Turkish speaking migrants from Bulgaria” (p. 109). Her article on labor migration from Bulgaria to Turkey following the collapse of the communist system focuses on how ethnic categories of citizenship are being abandoned for neoliberal principles of labor market (Parla, 2015). This neoliberal turn is in conjunction with the diverse immigration flows to Turkey during the decades of globalization. Although some of these flows were irregular migrants on their ways to Europe, the refugee flows to Turkey have also taken place. The refugee Turks from Bulgaria in 1989 and the Iraqi Kurds during the first Gulf War in 1991 are the main examples (İçduygu, 2015, p. 4). The Syrian refugees, however, has been the highest number of migrants that Turkey has ever experienced.

Throughout the thesis, I use the term “refugee” to describe the Syrian people migrating to Turkey, yet there has been indecisiveness on how to refer to the Syrian

subject. The government does not use the term “refugee” to refer to the Syrian people arriving, because being a refugee is described by international conventions and the states giving refuge are asked to complete necessary steps to host these refugees and give them certain rights and liberties (Miş, 2013). This is related to international agreements Turkey is bound by. Turkey still adheres to 1951 Convention of the Status of Refugees which puts geographical limitations on asylum-seekers coming to Turkey. The convention holds that Turkey can give the status of refugee to people from the EU (Özden, 2013, p. 5). The state does not grant refugee and asylum-seeker status to those from outside Europe. In other words, only those from European countries can demand refuge and asylum in Turkey; and the Syrian people do not fall into this category; thus, they are not granted the right to refuge and asylum. The term immigrant is also in use, which reinforces the temporary aspect of the Syrian people’s daily lives in Turkey. The more casual term “guest” was used in earlier stages of migration to Turkey. The term “guest” connoted the temporary nature of migration the state focuses on. However, the Turkish state now uses “under temporary protection” to describe the Syrians’ legal status in Turkey³. Temporary protection regime has three characterizing features; “an open border policy, no forcible returns (*non-refoulement*), registration with the Turkish authorities and support inside the borders of the camps” (Özden, 2013, p. 5). Although this status grants immediate protection to the Syrian refugees; it, nevertheless, leaves the refugee issue in the gray zone in which the state can interfere in the refugees’ lives as well as and leave them abandoned. I argue that this gray area

³ The variety of terms to refer to the Syrian refugee subject further complicates social and political discourses to make sense of the Syrian other, when the registration of Syrian people is taken into consideration. This is related to the Turkish state’s legal framework that it follows. However, in this study I use the term refugee to refer to the Syrian migrating subject. It is because in the everyday language, the Syrians are called refugees regardless of their legal status. The Syrians under temporary protection, a legal terminology adopted by the state, is not in use in everyday colloquial.

helps the state acquire an area of movement when it comes to the issue of Syrian refugees.

2.3 Literature on Syrian refugees in Turkey

The first waves of migration from Syrian to Turkey have started in March 2011. In time, the number of Syrian people leaving their countries due to political violence, insecurity, and economic deterioration has increased. Turkey adopted an “open-door policy” on the Syrian issue and became the country that hosted the highest number of Syrian refugees in the world in the following years. Encountering the Syrian refugees in the Turkish context attracted the scholarly interest in academia. Earlier studies on the refugees are usually reports that aim at identifying the refugee problem. These studies focus on giving a brief number of the refugees, explaining how they are looked after by the state, and what the conditions of facility centers that host the refugees are. These are more informative studies that aim to portray what the situation at hand is. The first category of informative studies on the Syrian refugees in Turkey provides historical and legal framework for the Syrian migration to Turkey. For instance, Özden’s research report for Migration Policy Center in 2013 was an important contribution in terms of identifying the Syrian refugees’ situation in Turkey (Özden, 2013). This report includes the reasons for Syrian migration across the world, the state of Turkey’s main tenets when it comes to accepting the refugees and the refugees’ legal positions in Turkey. İçduygu, a leading academic figure in studies on migration, has also contributed to the studies of the Syrians in Turkey. In his report for Migration Policy Institute, İçduygu (2015) also emphasizes the need for a legal regulation in the recognition of the Syrian refugees. Similarly,

Suter's (2013) working paper analyzes the migrants and refugees received by Turkey in the last decades noting the increasing number of Syrian refugees in the country.

The second category of reports focuses on social acceptance of the Syrians in Turkey and how the Turkish state and society encounter the Syrian other. The most relevant report is by Erdoğan, and he takes social acceptance of the Syrians in Turkey into center in his analysis. In this report, Erdoğan (2014) comes up with several findings and argues that although the general acceptance of the Syrian refugees is high, the Turkish society has several red flags when it comes to accepting the other; and two important red flags are granting citizenship, and financial aids given to the Syrians. Another study aiming to assess the reactions against the Syrian refugees in Bolu, a middle Anatolian town in Turkey, has found that the construction of the Syrian refugees as the other relies on nationalist articulations of masculine features and defending the homeland (Güney & Konak, 2016). The Syrian men are "deserters" in this analysis which holds that nationalist articulations are bundled with themes of masculinity in Bolu (Güney & Konak, 2016, p. 506). The study includes accounts of how the Syrian male is perceived by being "less of a man" by leaving their countries. Other reports include those that are conducted by non-governmental organizations and human rights associations. Ortadoğu Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi (2015), a respectable think-tank, has a report entitled "The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Turkey" that problematizes the inefficiency and inadequacy of the camps in Turkey in tackling the refugee issue. İnsan Hakları ve Mazlumlar için Dayanışma Derneği (MAZLUMDER) also issued several analyses on the Syrians in Turkey. For instance, the association has a report entitled "Report on Social Attacks and Social Hate against the Syrian in Gaziantep and their Analysis" (MAZLUMDER, 2014). Another report focuses on the Syrians in Istanbul

specifically (MAZLUMDER, 2013a). These are both field research that highlight the importance of looking outside the temporary-protection centers, or the camps, in migration studies. In fact, another report by MAZLUMDER is specifically on Syrian women refugees that live outside the camps (2013b). These MAZLUMDER reports are especially important for providing everyday cases of discrimination that the refugee populations face in Turkey. Yet, these studies are almost always informative and aim at policy recommendation. The focus is also at how the Turkish society tackles the issue of the arriving Syrian refugees. These urge the involved agents, both national and international actors, to come up with sustainable policies on the issue.

Apart from these studies that focus on counting and identifying the Syrian refugees in Turkey and explaining their problems and coming up with possible prospects for the future, the representation of the Syrian refugees in media has also attracted interest. I have come across a couple of published articles that study the discriminatory discourses around the issue of Syrian refugees. For instance, Yaylacı and Karakuş's (2015) article on newspaper coverage of Syrian refugees argues that newspaper's coverage of the Syrian issue is very much related to their political position in Turkey. While the supporters of the government have a pro-migration discourse, opponents of the government and its foreign policy are critical of the Syrian immigration and sometimes use anti-immigration discourses. However, this study fails to show whether all positions on this political spectrum have a common representation of the Syrian refugees. Therefore, it does not inquire if there is a common representation, and how this common representation can be explained. Efe, who penned a report for a think-tank, conducts a similar study and comes up with a similar conclusion. In this study, Efe delivers a detailed content and discourse analysis of various newspapers positions on the Syrians. Efe (2015) argues that all

newspapers adopt humanitarian perspectives to varying degrees but their political positions determine how they view the issue of Syrian refugees. Another article by Doğanay analyzes the representation of the refugees through discriminatory discourses. This article focuses on how the Syrian refugees are problematized in the Turkish context. Doğanay (2016) argues that the representations of the refugees are “exaggerated” (p. 178). Although I think it is important that she points out to this irrational exaggeration, she does not deliver a detail explained why this exaggeration takes place. Likewise, Kolukırık (2009) finds similar results in his study of migrants’ representation in the Turkish media. He analyzes the image of refugees in the media before the Syrian migration. He conceptualizes his method through media-politics and argues that news pieces on refugees rely on popular and superficial representations (p. 14). These studies usually point out the political parties’ perceptions of the issue and their approaches to it. The politicization of the issue is analyzed through political parties’ positions, not in civil society in everyday life. This is the reason why I want to analyze perspectives on the Syrian refugees through the concept of everyday life. This thesis regards the Syrians in Turkey as an ethno-political problem in everyday life of cities. It also aims to investigate common aspects of exemplary perspective on Syrian refugees in Istanbul in a conservative neighborhood.

2.4 Official agents tackling the refugee issue in Turkey

There are three important official agents the host state of Turkey uses in order to address the refugee issue. The Republic of Turkey Disaster and Emergency Directorate (*T.C. Başbakanlık Afet ve Acil Durum Yönetimi Başkanlığı*, AFAD) is the main public institution that is responsible for the supply of humanitarian needs of the

Syrian refugees in Turkey. The institution has temporary shelters and units that house the Syrians, and provide basic needs and services. Apart from accommodation, AFAD has healthcare and education facilities. The Syrian refugees have free healthcare and Syrian kids are enrolled in schools. On their website, AFAD (2015) has a rather short disaster report on Syria. After critically examining this piece, I argue that AFAD's overall discursive tone centers on humanitarianism. AFAD holds that Turkey's approach to the Syrian refugee crisis is very humane; and Turkey's efforts to house the Syrian refugees could only be explained through humanitarian causes and effects. However, this humanitarian discourse is supplemented with another discourse that focuses on temporariness and permanency. In fact, AFAD's overall emphasis is on "temporary" units and shelters; yet, by providing basic education facilities in the protection centers, there is an idea of a future for the refugees. In the document online, it is said that "Turkey does not only provide temporary protection for Syrians in Turkey, but also prepares them for the post-crisis period" (2015). Therefore, there is indecisiveness over whether the refugees are temporary or permanent in Turkey, which is another side of the gray area that the refugees are put in. Since being a refugee is always treated as a temporary position (Agamben, 1995), the discussions revolve around temporariness versus permanence. Temporary protection centers promote the idea that the government views the refugees as temporary populations, which need immediate aids and services, that it needs to care for; however, provision of education facilities both in Arabic and Turkish languages portray a future design for the refugees. What is referred to as "the post-crisis period" is not clear. Does the post-crisis period mean the Syrian refugees are expected to be back in Syria once the war is over, or does it imply that the Syrian people are perceived as part of the Turkish state and society? These

debates over the temporariness versus permanence of the Syrian refugees in Turkey constitute a great part of discursive framework over the refugees and their influences on Turkish state and society, as well as keep the status of refugees in limbo.

Another emphasis on AFAD's introductory disaster report on Syria is how they employ "systematic approach starting with biometric records of individuals and emergency aid" (AFAD, 2015). In fact, this systematic approach has won the UN Public Services Award. This approach is highlighted by AFAD and promoted as it "allows the needs of the victims of a disaster to be addressed in a more focused way, assisting in the administration of temporary refugee facilities, such as container or tent cities, established for the temporary housing of victims of disasters or extraordinary circumstances" (AFAD, 2015).

Kızılay (Turkish Red Crescent) is an accompanying institution to AFAD in temporary protection units. They provide migration and refugee services consisting of housing, nutrition and psychosocial support to those under temporary protection. Kızılay is a public aid agency; however, they also collect charities from people through online and mobile donations. Kızılay holds that apart from helping those inside the Turkish borders; they also send humanitarian aid to Syria, through intermediaries on the border. Kızılay also announces that they have come up with a Kızılay Kart (Red Crescent Card) in association with UN World Food Programme (WFP). Instead of serving food at the cafeterias inside the camps, this card is given to Syrian refugee families and families can buy their groceries from markets they choose. Therefore, the refugee families can prepare their meals at their camps, giving them a feeling of "being at home". The head of Kızılay holds that this system protects the honor of poor families. However, the card that has no cash allowance but works through a voucher system highlights one of the defining features of conditions

of life in the refugee camps, which is immobility of the refugees and refugees' absence in the economic sphere (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, p. 88). Kızılay Card is another example of this systemization and rationalization of institutions. According to the state discourse, these are demonstrative cases of how the state is visible and in control in the issue of refugees.

Yet, the centers supplied by AFAD are not enough. In fact, AFAD writes that they host about 250,000 refugees; where there are almost 3 million Syrian refugees coming from diverse backgrounds in Turkey at that time (AFAD, 2015). This could be interpreted as a non-ideal situation; showing that only less than 10% percent of the Syrian refugees in Turkey could be looked after in government-based protection centers. Instead, hosting the refugees in these centers would be the ideal scenario for the government. Gedalof (2007) calls governments' efforts to keep refugees in temporary centers as an aim to keep refugees "off the street" by marking them (p. 80). She continues, "It is clearly important for the government to know where they are at any moment, so that they cannot threaten or be a burden on 'the people' in places where they do not belong" (Gedalof, 2007, p. 80). This, once again, promotes the idea of the host state that should be in control; however, the Turkish experience does not totally fall into this category. The Turkish experience of accepting refugees differs from Western countries' experiences where there are highly controlled, securitized procedures of "sifting the refugees" to decide who gets accepted into the country due to Turkish open-door policy. There is not a securitized sifting mechanism at borders. Rather, what is focused on is not necessarily who gets into the country, or who does not; but the numbers of refugees coming and the necessary financial means to supply their demands through official agencies such as AFAD and Kızılay. There is an emphasis on the amount of effort spent on the refugee issue.

This is sometimes given through examples on the budget assigned to the refugee's conditions. For instance, AFAD (2017) mentions how Turkey has spent 25 billion dollars for the Syrian refugees, whereas international communities are contributed with 526 million dollars. Therefore, although only less than 10% of the refugees are settled in tent cities, the budget Turkey has spent for the refugee issue has a high number.

Another institution that tackles the refugee issue in Turkey is the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate of General of Migration Management (*T.C. İçişleri Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü, Göç İdaresi*). One of the crucial problems is that the Syrians are not given the legal status of refugees; therefore, their rights that could come from being a refugee are undermined. This is displayed in Göç İdaresi's reports. In their annual reports, the Syrians are classified as migrants and people under temporary protection (Göç İdaresi, 2017). In the report, it is held that the number of Syrian people acquiring residence permits in Turkey is around 48 thousand people, which is less than the 55 thousand Iraqi people who acquired residence permits (Göç İdaresi, 2017, p. 39). Furthermore, 33 thousand Syrian people acquired short residence permits (Göç İdaresi, 2017, p. 41). Those who get family residence permits are only around 4 thousand people (Göç İdaresi, 2017, p. 42). These numbers constitute only a small fraction of almost 3 million Syrian migrants in Turkey, which means the remaining population is in Turkey without any residence permits. Besides residence, Göç İdaresi (2007) cites 7 thousand Syrian people having employment permits (p. 51), which is again a very small percent of people that needs employment permits. Although residence and employment permits are very limited, Göç İdaresi cites free health care and education as important efforts on the Syrian people under temporary protection. It is said that 450 thousand students are enrolled

in schools that has either Arabic or Turkish education depending on the people's accommodation (Göç İdaresi, 2017, p. 81). Göç İdaresi's statistics are demonstrative of the gray zone the Syrian people are put in. On the one hand, the legal refugee status is denied and there is temporary protection regime. The Syrian people are classified with other migrants in the report. The Syrians' percentages of acquiring residence and employment permits is usually less than other categories of national migrants. For instance, I gave the example of the Iraqi migrants in the category of residence permits. On the other hand, the state has immense healthcare and education facilities and services for the Syrian people in the refugee issue. However, these organizations are not enough when it comes to addressing the needs of all refugees. Rather, the remaining population is left to the responsibility of the civil society. In other words, there is privatization of the refugee issue where the refugees are left to the responsibility of the civil society. Thus, there is an oscillation between the competent state that accepts refugees and builds tent cities, on the one hand; and a neoliberal minimal state that privatizes the refugee issue and leaves the responsibility to the civil society, on the other hand.

2.5. Neoliberalization of the refugee issue in Turkey

I argue that a study of neo-Ottoman nation-building is related to the neoliberalization of state and society in recent years. Although my study initially focused on the relation between the Turkish host-self and the Syrian refugee-other, my experiences in the field drew me to a discussion in which the civil society becomes responsible of the refugee issue and gets organized, rather than the state and the international institutions. In that sense, understanding the neoliberal state will be beneficial since it helps understanding and contextualizing the neoliberal subjectivity which revolves

around responsibility and apolitical volunteerism. Neoliberalism refers to a political economic system of free markets and free trade in which the state acts only as an intermediary. The social and political relations are treated as economic relations that relies on calculation of costs and benefits. There is economic rationalization of social and political relations. The neoliberal system was established after decades of welfare states that promoted the idea of a strong state in line with Keynesian political economy. The neoliberal minimal state, on the other hand, could be related to features of “deregulation, privatization, and withdrawal of the state from many areas of provision” that characterize neoliberalism (Wacquant, 2012, p. 69). For instance, privatization of state-held institutions has been the key element in Turkish economic liberalization since the 1980s.

Brown (2005) writes that what differentiates neoliberalism from liberalism is the extension of market rationality to all social spheres even where the market is not at the center (pp. 39-40). The main tenet of neoliberalism is that the market is more efficient at distributing public goods and resources than the state (Ong, 2006, p. 11). The new scheme is “a new relationship between government and knowledge through which governing bodies are recast as nonpolitical and nonideological problems that need technical solutions” (Ong, 2006, p. 3). The state is reduced to a technical position. However, literature on neoliberalism highlighted how neoliberalism takes different forms and appropriates various non-neoliberal elements in order to survive especially in non-Western settings (Ong, 2006; Tuğal, 2012). Ong, in fact, theorized “neoliberalism as exception” in order to articulate how seemingly incompatible tools are used in neoliberalization in non-Western settings (Ong, 2006, p. 3). Ong (2006) argued that “exceptions to neoliberalism can both preserve welfare benefits and exclude noncitizens from the benefits of capitalist development” (p. 4). Brown

(2005) also holds that subjectivity is an inevitable part of neoliberalism and neoliberalism paints itself in local colors wherever it goes. Similarly, Cihan Tuğal (2012) has a study on neoliberal subjectivity in Istanbul and argues that neoliberal subjectivity involves contradictory elements that also challenge neoliberal thinking since the early 2000s.

It is crucial to see that the neoliberal scheme is constructed not only by an economic reasoning but also an ethical reasoning (Ong, 2006, p. 11). In fact, Hayek holds that a free-market economy needs “the moral basis provided by traditional values and institutions” (Buğra, 2007, p. 47). This is especially discussed in studies pertaining to subjectivity in neoliberalism. For instance, Tuğal’s (2012) analysis demonstrates how “the responsible and self-esteeming citizen” is constructed within neoliberal subjectivity (p. 67). Responsibility and apolitical volunteerism are, in fact, two of the characterizing features of the neoliberal subject (Tuğal, 2012, p. 68). “The trope of individual responsibility as motivating discourse” is seen as a glue that binds “various components of state activity together” (Wacquant, 2012, p. 71). For instance, Alkan-Zeybek (2012) writes that public authorities in Kayseri feel responsible and “proud of the fact that their town does not need public funds to build schools or mosques, as their business community provides more than enough” (p. 147).

Apolitical responsibility is crucial in my study. Neoliberal subject is associated with apolitical volunteerism (Tuğal, 2012, p. 68). Yet, in my accounts I argue how neoliberal subjectivity can take political forms through neo-Ottoman discourses in Üsküdar. I hold that apolitical responsibility gets political through neo-Ottoman discourses. Therefore, neoliberalism provides areas in which activism and mobilization of groups around the refugee issue can go hand in hand with neo-

Ottoman discourses. There are non-neoliberal elements used in neoliberalization of refugee issue and these non-neoliberal elements further fosters neoliberalization of refugee issue. The refugees' conditions and welfare are made a "problem" worth mobilization and redistribution through volunteerism. This is in the context of how volunteerism can provide mechanisms to form a community imaginary. For instance, Bartkowski and Regis (2003) hold charity as a community-generating and social change-inducing mechanism (pp. 17-20) (Tuğal, 2013, p. 143). Responsibility is shared among the local. Responsibility is not only individualized but socialized in the context of depoliticization of refugee issue. Support from the state is demanded on certain accounts; yet, it does not constitute the central criticisms in the interviews. Both state and non-state methods are used in order to make the refugees survive. Relying on interviews, I ultimately argue that the civil society feels responsibility for the well-being of the Syrian refugees in the framework of neoliberalism and neo-Ottomanism in conservative thinking, and I take mobilization of civil society in the refugee issue as constitutive of a new national imaginary. Neo-Ottoman discourse does not promote a transformative design in that sense. The established neoliberal order is not deemed a problem. Neo-Ottomanism redistributes some of the elements of former regimes, such as ethnic and cultural recognition, and while doing that it does not deviate from a neoliberal framework.

Turkey's transformation in the post-1980s can be characterized by "de-industrialization, post-Fordism, globalization and, perhaps the most comprehensive rubric, the transition from national developmentalism to neoliberal capitalism" (Keyder, 2005). This turn from import substitution industrialization to market-orientation was supplemented by privatization and financialization policies. Privatization is a crucial part of neoliberal structuring of economy since the 1980s.

For instance, Privatization Administration is founded in 1986 as an instrument of neoliberalizing Turkish economy and bureaucracy (Öniş, 2011, p. 707). After 1980 coup, Prime Minister, then President, Turgut Özal issued several economic acts of neoliberalism. The rise of relatively Islamist parties after the 1980 military coup also coincides with this era. Privatization, means of education and publications helped people of Anatolian origin to acquire means of economic and political power (Poulton, 1997). The rise of Anatolian Tigers, and formation of MÜSİAD (Distinct Industrial and Business Men Association) challenged old national state's economic policies and pursued privatization of state institutions, together with export-oriented economy.

Privatization boomed in the post-2001 period of the AKP government (Öniş, 2011, p. 711). Öniş (2011) argues that the globalist vision of the AKP government treated privatization as a necessary step that must be tackled urgently in order to follow the global economy and politics (p. 722). Patton (2009) views this vision as a mixture of neoliberalism and communitarianism. She argues that the shift of certain areas from state to the society, such as the family, the local, the NGOs and the private sector, is an important characteristic of this “neoliberal communitarianism” of the AKP (Patton, 2009). This takes place in a framework of redefining rights and obligations in which the relations between the individual and the social, and the state are redefined (Patton, 2009, p. 448). The individual becomes responsible to contribute to the society and the AKP “aims to transfer social policy responsibilities from the state to the voluntary sector and individuals” (Patton, 2009, p. 441). Therefore, privatization and social responsibility have been important features of the AKP's neoliberal political economy understanding.

Privatization of international migration has been studied in literature on neoliberalism. For instance, migration control efforts involving more private actors, private security companies increasing their numbers in migration issue, private agencies getting more influence when it comes to migration design are some of the examples Menz (2009) gives (p. 315). The neoliberal state does not abandon security measures per se; rather, employs neoliberal tactics evaluating the migrants according to their use in economic system (Menz, 2009, p. 316). Therefore, private migration control can work in a way to ensure sustainment of economic competitiveness (Menz, 2009, p. 318). Menz's account holds that privatization leads to shifting the economic burden to third actors and involvement of business in the refugee issue, which means there is less ground for civil society (Menz, 2009, p. 329). Similarly, Uçarer (2006) argues that border control mechanisms are getting increasingly privatized giving airline carriers as an example (pp. 226-227). Athwal (2015) analyzes racism's effect on refugee populations in the UK where he holds that the government distances itself from responsibility (p. 53). He argues that deportation mechanisms work for a profit regime, not for a welfare regime (Athwal, 2015, p. 53). Darling (2016a) similarly argues that the state's accountability in the issue of refugees is shrinking. He holds "reception, accommodation and support of asylum seekers" have changed through privatization in Britain (Darling, 2016a, p. 484). In another article, he holds there is an "asylum market" that relies on neoliberal norms and rules (Darling, 2016b, p. 230). Darling (2016b) argues that marketization of refugee issue is in line with depoliticization of refuge and asylum. Hyndman et al. (2017), however, analyze Canadian private sponsorship of refugees as an additional system to the government-induced mechanisms of welfare of refugees. Although private sponsorship has the idea of the state and mobilized civil society working in

harmony in refugee issue (Hyndman et al., 2017, p. 59), they argue that private sponsorship may advocate privatization of asylum-seeking in the long run (Hyndman et al., 2017, p. 56).

Although these examples demonstrate the privatization tendencies of the states in asylum-seeking processes, the Spanish case is perhaps the most similar to Turkey. An analysis of Spanish asylum system provides a similar framework to the one in Turkey in which people seeking refuge are not granted legal refugee status but they are treated in “irregular situation” (Jubany-Baucells, 2002, p. 316). There is great emphasis on local organizations and NGOs as “the main providers of benefits to non-status asylum seekers” (Jubany-Baucells, 2002, p. 316). Therefore, Jubany-Baucells (2002) argues that NGOs and local administrations are granted increasing responsibility and accountability in welfare of immigrants and refugees in Spain where over 90 percent of people applying for asylum are not granted state welfare (Jubany-Baucells, 2002, p. 425). Those who acquire refugee status are well-off; yet, during the process of applying for asylum and in cases of rejection of asylum, people are dependent on “extra-institutional actors” as NGOs and local organizations (Jubany-Baucells, 2002, pp. 422-423).

These cases illustrate how the refugee issue is getting increasingly privatized and economized. I hold that Turkey’s experience with the Syrian refugees is also an example of privatization of the refugee issue, in which the Turkish state leaves its responsibility on the refugee issue to the civil society. However, what is important to note is that Turkey does not have a concrete refugee policy in the first place and this is an important difference that separates Turkey from the other examples I have given. In that sense, the Turkish refugee policy can be called a “non-policy” since Turkey is still bound by Geneva Convention of 1951 which states that Turkey only

accepts refugees from European Union as legal refugees. Rather, temporary measures, in the form of temporary protection regime, are taken in order to respond to the refugee issue as a non-policy. Turkey's implementation of the temporary protection regime itself is why I call the refugee issue a gray zone in Turkey. Instead of changing the old conventions on the status of refugees, Turkey implements a new program that would not limit its say on the refugee issue on the one hand, yet it bears its responsibility towards the refugees from the state through privatization and withdrawal from responsibility. I argue that this goes hand in hand with neo-Ottoman national imaginary in which a new national identity is under construction both in the state and in the civil society. Therefore, what distinguishes Turkey's neoliberalization of the refugee issue is that it allows an articulation of the national imaginary both in political and civil levels. Therefore, a neoliberal program provides founding moments for the state in which the national identity and belonging are challenged and rearticulated. A new nation is imagined in processes of construction through neo-Ottoman discourses and everyday life is a huge part of these processes through active NGOs and charities.

In Turkey, charities have been part of the civil society organizations mobilized for the refugee issue. Charities, the increase in number of charities, how they construct the poor as well as how the givers construct themselves reflectively have been objects of scholarly interest for the academia. Charities can be classified under work for service as its characterizing features have "truly beneficial way of improving the world, or one's country, community, or family" (Budd, 2011, p. 163). For instance, Göçmen (2014) studies charities, or religiously motivated associations as she calls them, through neoliberalization and the rise of political Islam. She argues that increase in the number of these organizations are not just related to

neoliberalization of the state but also the rise of political Islam in the political sphere (Göçmen, 2014). Göçmen (2014) claims that the rise of political parties that rest on political Islam “opened a space for religion in the welfare arena” (p. 79). Therefore, charity work can be seen as a religious and spiritual work instead of a secular activity (Budd, 2011, p. 164); as well as can acquire “profound religious significance” (Budd, 2011, p. 166). This is in a context where humanitarian concerns are motivated by religious, spiritual and ethical principles (Budd, 2011, p. 174). What is worth mentioning is that poverty has always been treated as an issue that needs to be covered by the benevolent citizens (Buğra, 2007). In that sense, charities have always been around and active; and usually informed by religious sentiments and practices (Buğra, 2007, p. 37). Religions share a common interest in addressing the problems against the integrity of human dignity (Budd, 2011, p. 60). However, I argue that private benevolent and voluntary alleviation have been important for tackling the issue of hosting the Syrian refugees. There is a new mobilization of the private benevolence after the arrival of the Syrian refugees. This is not to argue that the state is not active in issues pertaining to the Syrian refugees. In fact, the Turkish state is congratulated for its pro-refugees and pro-migration approach since the early days of the Syrian escape from the region. The state’s open-door policy as well as mobilizing AFAD and Kızılay in order to accommodate the Syrian refugees are noteworthy. Rather, what I mean is the Turkish neoliberal state is no longer able to accommodate this issue. Therefore, it transfers various aspects of the issue to the private, civil society institutions as my analyses through interviews demonstrates. Although local governing bodies and municipalities are more effective in taking care of the refugees, the local society feels responsible of the refugees and it organizes itself to tackle the issue. The Turkish host-society experiences are demonstrative of

how the issue of refuge is left to the civil society. Furthermore, the efforts of the civil society display how through mass mobilization and organization of the society, there is a new production of political and neoliberal embodied subjectivity. Through privatization of the refugee issue, there is production of a new national imaginary in line with neo-Ottoman discourses.

Nevertheless, I want to emphasize how contingent these neoliberal processes are. There is not a deliberate choice in order to leave the refugee issue to the responsibility of the civil society but events *evolve* in that way. In other words, this is very much related to capacity of the state to accommodate and meet the needs of the refugees. When the state is not capable, the civil society organizations enter the area through local networks. The civil society does not wait for the state to declare that the civil society is responsible of the refugees. I hold that contingent processes regarding the refugee issue are effects of neoliberalism. Even if it is not intended, neoliberal processes make the state draw away from the refugee issue and make the mobilization of the civil society possible. Ultimately, Turkey experiences a hybridization of neoliberalism through arrival of refugees.

I have argued that neoliberalism is an important part of the framework regarding the refugee issue in Turkey. Although privatization of the refugee issue and mobilization of the civil society in order to accommodate the refugee issue take place in other countries, what distinguishes Turkey is that it relies on neo-Ottoman discourses and nostalgia; and there is production and reproduction of a new national imaginary that is different from before. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter on neo-Ottomanism.

CHAPTER 3

NEO-OTTOMANISM:

SUBJECTIVITY, HEGEMONY AND NOSTALGIA

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argue that the refugee issue in Turkey is in a gray zone, reminiscent of neoliberalization where the state appears to be the central agent in some matters while it leaves the issue to the civil society in other areas. In this chapter, I argue how neoliberal processes of refugee issue go hand in hand with discourses in neo-Ottomanism, where the state appears to be the central agent promoting these discourses, yet these discourses acquire hegemony over the civil society and the civil society embraces the neo-Ottoman discourse, a discourse that actually rose as a state, political and intellectual discourse. Therefore, apolitical character of work relating to the refugees in Üsküdar gets political through neo-Ottoman discourses. It is because the conservative aim is challenging of the established designs and it covers a wide range of topics relating to the incoming others as Syrian refugees. I further argue that there is making of a new conservative subject that is mobilized in the refugee issue and the practices in Üsküdar are ultimately “practices of subjectivation” (Mahmood, 2005, p. 194). By taking care of the refugees, there is a larger ideal of creating a national imaginary and a national subject that is challenging the established foundations. The practices of my interviewees from Üsküdar challenge secular and Kemalist vision of society and nation and literature on neo-Ottomanism provide clues how and why these challenges take place.

3.2 Affect and subjectivity

In this thesis, I explore affect through its relation with discourse. Although affect is usually associated with subjectivity and the inner sphere, I emphasize its relation with the exterior. In this study, affect is not studied as a theme of the inner world of humans but in the context of its relation with the discursive.

In literature, the affective sphere is associated with subjectivity and subjectivity is an area of interest in psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalytic theory focuses on how subjectivity is constructed through relations with other subjects in general. Basic Lacanian theory holds that subjectivity is not essential, nor given but constructed through relations (Navaro-Yashin, 2012, p. 22). Subjectivity is made through practices and relations in this approach and emotions are treated as units of analysis.

Similarly, Foucault's writings on subjectivation holds that subjectivation is a process in which the interior is effected by the exterior; therefore, it is a process in which "human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1982, p. 777) and subjects are constituted (Foucault, 1984, p. 121). There is a production of a particular kind of subject through disciplinary practices (Mahmood, 2005, p. 33). Subjectivation becomes an ongoing process that involves contradictions and this process takes place in a way that the subject becomes more disciplined by a discourse (Tuğal, 2012, p. 65). Foucault's understanding of subjectivity has "an effect of a modality of power operationalized through a set of moral codes that summon a subject to constitute herself" (Mahmood, 2005, p. 28). In that sense, Butler (1997) argues that subjectivation entails a paradox because it refers to both the process of becoming a subject and an object of subjection (p. 83). In other words, although discursive,

disciplinary and governmentalizing power makes the subject, the subject also constitutes himself/herself (Foucault, 1984, p. 122). The processes of subject constituting himself/herself are also influenced by the exterior. For instance, Foucault (1982) gives example of the state as “both an individualizing and a totalizing form of power” (p. 782). In fact, Foucault (1982) argues that the state must not be viewed as above individuals but an entity that can integrate individuals (p. 783). I think Foucault’s emphasis on state power are reminiscent of Gramscian hegemony and I discuss it in the next section.

However, critics argue that how subjectivity is studied as either an interior phenomenon or something that is materially determined (Navaro-Yashin, 2012, pp. 22-27). Navaro-Yashin (2012) uses a framework in which subjectivity is “formed within a fraught and conflicted field in distinct cultural contexts” (p. 25) and becomes “conflicted” (p. 147). Rather, an alternative approach is needed in which I propose a merge of these outlooks. Therefore, I make use of theoretical discussions of both subjectivity and hegemony in order to make sense of the data at hand. My data from interviews and sensory ethnography make me question the differences between sense and discourse, subjectivity and hegemony, affect and discourse (Navaro-Yashin, 2012, p. 24); because the borders among these categories get blurred in my material. I do not propose a new theory on study of social phenomena but I want to develop a new perspective to study discourse and how it gets unseparated from affect through the notion of nostalgia, which I discuss in the end of this chapter.

3.3 Gramscian hegemony

I argue that production and reproduction of new social and political subjectivities take place in accordance with the concept of neo-Ottomanism and its hegemony. To that end, I rely on a Gramscian understanding of hegemony. Although neo-Ottomanism is taken as a state-centric concept; a more society-centered analysis would be more meaningful in order to explain the processes of neo-Ottomanism in civil society and everyday life (Yalvaç, 2012). In this respect, it is important to recall Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony as a consent generating tool of the ruling classes in order to diffuse the lines between the civil society and the state (Yalvaç, 2012, p. 171). Following this critique and Gramscian concept of hegemony, I also take neo-Ottomanism as a hegemonic concept that delineates the lines between the state and civil society. I argue that neo-Ottomanism constitutes political, cultural and intellectual spheres that are productive of thoughts and practices around the concept. Neo-Ottomanism ultimately indicates a new identity politics over the space that is marked by religious, Islamic bonds.

One of the infamous sayings of Gramsci is "in concrete reality, civil society and State are one and the same" (Gramsci, 1971, p. 208). In a quest to figure out why the socialist ideology was not able to mobilize the worker class and how did the fascist ideology acquired power, Gramsci writes on the concept of consent in conjunction with coercion. In this respect, the state not only rules, dominates but is in constant effort to find means to gather consent of the society in order to keep its domination intact (Gramsci, 1971, p. 244). Therefore, civil society is distinct from state power and yet state power's influence on it is inevitable. This is a rather novel idea for his age and it emphasizes the consensual nature of power. Intellectual or moral leadership, which Gramsci calls hegemony, is necessary for the supremacy for

the ruling group (Feima, 1981, p. 24). Hegemony does not refer to coercive means of acquiring power but internal mechanisms producing power through consent. A great role is given to civil society with its “educational, religious and associational institutions” (Feima, 1981, p. 24). Coercion is not dismissed from the political sphere. A state having both coercion and hegemony is considered to be an integral state (Mouffe, 1979, p. 10). However, a greater emphasis is put on hegemony and consensual nature of power and its workings in civil society institutions. In fact, Gramsci asks this question in one of his texts: “But how will each single individual succeed in incorporating himself into the collective man, and how will educative pressure be applied to single individuals so as to obtain their consent and their collaboration, turning necessity and coercion into "freedom"?” (Gramsci, 1971, p. 242), which highlights the necessity of turning coercion into freedom while getting consents. Gramscian civil society is characterized by this hegemonic consent. Although consent is a highly ambiguous term, there is a certain connotation of conforming to an idea because it is found legitimate or legitimated (Feima, 1981, p. 38). In that respect, there is a certain reformative side to Gramscian conception of hegemony where the ruling group aims to be hegemonic to carry out certain “intellectual and moral reforms” (Mouffe, 1979, p. 8). Not only a Gramscian framework makes the relation between foreign policy and domestic policy more meaningful, it also makes references to civil society and people’s perceptions in everyday life which is crucial for my analysis in this thesis. For instance, Tuğal argues that the AKP was able to integrate its conservative civil society base with its political society (Walton, 2013, p. 186). Neo-Ottomanism accepts the condition that foreign policy discourse could be a transformative agent in domestic politics as well.

Emphasis on the relation between the foreign policy and domestic policy discourses is noteworthy, which is one of the characterizing features of neo-Ottomanism.

3.4 On neo-Ottomanism

The period after the AKP came to power winning a majority in the 2002 elections refers to a great political transformation in Turkey. This transformation involves both the domestic arena and the international arena in which the AKP reorganized the foreign policy discourse of the Turkish state. These two areas, although seemingly separated, go hand in hand. Foreign policy is related to domestic politics, and foreign policy becomes vital for nation-building and growing nationalism.

This section deals with the transformation of the foreign policy discourse under the AKP government through the concept of neo-Ottomanism, and makes references to the arrival of Syrian refugees while analyzing foreign policy discourse. Political parties' refugee policies have been in conjunction with their foreign policy understandings (Tuğsuz & Yılmaz, 2015). For instance, while the AKP's diversified and active foreign policy in the Middle East is welcoming of the Syrian refugees, the CHP's traditional foreign policy approach had an anti-immigration position since the early days of the Syrian Civil War. The AKP period of foreign policy discourse is usually characterized by a break with the Kemalist foreign policy making. Kemalism is based on the ideas of M. Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the secular Turkish Republic. Atatürk was able to found the new secular Turkish nation-state after organizing and leading local groups in the War of Independence against the occupier imperial forces. After the foundation of the nation-state, the main features of Kemalist foreign policy have become modesty, caution and non-involvement (Taşpınar, 2012). After the trauma of a world war and occupation of colonizing

forces, the Turkish state wanted to contain and protect its borders and lands against the outside threats. To that end, the Turkish foreign policy had a very securitized view, its world outlook was nation-state centric, and it promoted national interests above all. In practice, this meant that Turkey was not a main, central and powerful global agency in the world, but rather a dependent and modest country in political and economic spheres.

The Kemalist foreign policy discourse was largely intact, apart from a couple of instances, during the history of the Turkish state. When the AKP came to power in 2002, its first and foremost aim was to start the EU accession talks with Europe. The AKP's proposed democratization reforms were implemented relying on a pro-Western discourse (Dağı, 2005). The AKP was founded by the politicians leaving the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), a successor of the closed Welfare Party who had the ideology of Islamist "National Outlook". The National Outlook refers to the Islamist political stance in Turkey, a non-violent perspective that aims at having more representation at the parliament. The movement was characterized by its anti-capitalism as well as its anti-Western world-view that emphasizes relations with other Muslim-populated states. The AKP's foundation as a separate political party from the Virtue Party, symbolized the new party's divergence from the ideas of the National Outlook. However, the nature of this divergence was not clear, yet. And this was a concern for the secular elite of the country. Therefore, the AKP's goal of entering the EU, a very long dream for the Turkish state, during the early years of their government was a strategic move to eliminate the secularist criticisms of its rule by ensuring the national interests of the secular republic (Dağı, 2005, p. 32).

In later terms of the AKP government, however, the AKP's foreign policy is usually described by the notion of neo-Ottomanism, and Ahmet Davutoğlu is seen as

the figure developing this new foreign policy discourse. Ahmet Davutoğlu is an academic studying political science and international relations. He has been an advisor to the prime minister on issues of foreign policy, then the minister of foreign affairs, and ultimately the prime minister until he resigned in 2016. His famous work *Strategic Depth* (Davutoğlu, 2001), is considered to be the main text driving the foreign policy discourse during the AKP government. Neo-Ottomanism, however, is not something he coined. Many described the diversification in the foreign policy as neo-Ottomanism for two main reasons: the reference to Ottoman history and territories including celebration of multiculturalism, and an active involvement in foreign policy that aims at being a central actor, not a dependent agency.

The traditional Kemalist understanding of history portrays the Ottoman Empire as an era of decay, darkness, and ignorance. However, the AKP emphasizes the necessity of celebrating the Ottoman past as glorious and powerful. In that sense, the AKP aims at coming to terms with the Ottoman past. Davutoğlu (2001) studies Ottoman history and argues that it was the only political set-up established in the non-European world that challenged the European domination (p. 66). Having and keeping the relations among the former Ottoman territories is one of the main goals in foreign policy. Davutoğlu (2001) argues that historical experiences could be used by political will strategically (p 65). To accentuate the Ottoman heritage, soft power in international arena is emphasized. In fact, Davutoğlu (2001) distinguishes the Ottoman-Turkish foreign policy tradition from its European and Western counterparts by its non-imperial and non-colonialist approach (p. 52). He specifically explains Abdulhamid II's efforts to reach other Muslim states outside the Ottoman territories using his title of the Caliph as a non-colonialist approach; in fact, an

approach to that is characterized by its opposition to colonialism (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 67). Instead of military securitization of the foreign policy, the AKP proposes social, political, cultural and economic influences on former Ottoman territories, which are also territories neglected and ignored by the traditional Kemalist foreign policy. Davutoğlu actually calls this process “alienation” of Turkey from neighboring countries and argues for putting an end to it (Aras, 2009, p. 128). These territories cover the Middle East, North Africa, the Balkans as well as the Caucasus; and these territories are usually defined as neighbor states. In the larger scheme, improvement of relations with Russia and Iran as actors geographically close to Turkey is also considered to be a manifestation of neo-Ottomanism. Küçükcan and Küçükkeleş (2013) actually call this process “diversification in foreign policy”. Instead of having a monolithic outlook in foreign policy, the new perspective entails problem-free relations with geographically close neighbor states. This is popularly called “zero-problems diplomacy” and it entails being a powerful state in the region. Having strong ties with the neighbor states necessitates a strong, politically and economically stable country in the first place. The ultimate aim of being an effective, central regional power is viewed going hand in hand with domestic developments.

Geographical location of the Turkish state is greatly discussed in *Strategic Depth*. Davutoğlu makes specific references to the geographical placement of Turkey, having links to the Middle East, where major civilizations are born, and the Balkans and Europe. However, he does not agree with views that Turkey is a “bridge” between Europe and the East. The “bridge” is a famous metaphor generally used to describe Turkey’s geographical location in the world. However, Davutoğlu argues that describing Turkey as a bridge undermines its regional potential and it devalues its central position in the region. Additionally, he characterizes Turkish

foreign policy on the Middle East as a policy of abandonment. This necessitated abolishing political, cultural and strategic “bridges” (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 56). Five hundred years of Ottoman rule over the Middle East region was not strategically used after the First World War. The republican regime after the collapse of the Ottoman empire rejected the Ottoman political ideals and institutions in order to construct a new political culture in the contemporary era (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 69). Therefore, he argues that the bridge metaphor is not helpful for a country that aims at being a central actor in its region.

Instead of bridge, the metaphor of “compass” is used to emphasize the close links with the neighbor states (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2015, pp. 312-313). The compass metaphor comes from the idea that imagining drawing a circle with a compass centering Turkey. The neighboring countries also take place inside the circle, and these countries are those who Turkey shares historical experiences with, which are mostly former Ottoman territories. The compass metaphor is important because it holds the idea that Turkey cannot ignore what is happening in other neighboring countries; the reason being, it shares certain historical and cultural links with these countries. In fact, Davutoğlu calls other states Turkey’s “*tarihdaş*” which could be translated as those who have and share history with Turkey. A responsibility towards neighboring states is legitimated on the basis of history (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2015, p. 311).

Hakan Yavuz, on the other hand, does not take neo-Ottomanism as an AKP phenomenon. Rather, he has written on the concept in 1998, before the AKP was founded; and in that piece, he explains the neo-Ottomanist tendencies through Özal, Çiller and Erbakan governments since these governments have brought Ottoman-Islamic perspective from the periphery to the center (Yavuz, 1998, p. 20). In fact,

neo-Ottomanism's first advocates were liberal, secular intellectuals in contact with Özal (Fisher Onar, 2009). Yavuz (1998) highlights how this new political identity is in formation, but not yet completed (p.23). Yavuz (1998) holds the main characterizing feature of neo-Ottomanism to be "pluralizing and populist Islamic ideology" (p. 21). However, the theoretical framework of neo-Ottomanism is quite incoherent (Yavuz, 1998, p. 32). Similarly, Yavuz treats neo-Ottomanism in an international framework in which global events lead to re-evaluation of national identity. He gives the examples of Muslim deportation from Bulgaria, the collapse of the communist regimes in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and the political chaos afterwards as constitutive events that challenge the traditional national identity in Turkey (Yavuz, 1998, p. 33).

Davutoğlu (2001) also explains neo-Ottomanist movement through Özal governments between 1987 and 1993 (p. 85). One of the reasons he cites Özal government as neo-Ottoman is a conscious effort to build a new eclectic political identity and culture (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 85). However, Davutoğlu (2001) relates neo-Ottomanism to the Tanzimat ideology of Ottomanism which relies on a certain pragmatism and promotes compatible strategic alliances with the global powers (pp. 85-86).

Similarly, Duran (2013) does not refer to the AKP policy as neo-Ottomanist but civilizational. He argues that a new discourse of civilization is employed by the AKP which has "an ambiguous yet functional nature" (p. 94). The ambiguity gives the discourse a practicality combining different ideologies in Turkish political history. Kemalism is one of the ideologies that the AKP both restores and reconstructs (Duran, 2013, p. 100). However, Duran argues that the civilizational discourse is fostered after the Arab Spring in the region. The need for a new and

clear identity arose after the Arab Spring because the region demanded to know the legitimacy of the Turkish case. Therefore, Duran (2013) holds that the civilizational discourse is ultimately the invention of “a new political language and common overarching identity in Turkey and the Middle East” (p. 106). In this respect, what is called neo-Ottomanism is ultimately a higher discourse that goes across borders as the civilizational discourse could be given as an example. There is an emphasis on how the nation-state borders are not “legitimate” and highlighting the civilization and imperial heritage over the nation-state rule is indicative of the problematization of the national borders.

At this point, it is important to emphasize how foreign policy discourse affect the domestic policy discourse; and one should not differentiate the two from each other. In fact, Davutoğlu (2001) argues that there must be a harmony between domestic policy and foreign policy making and this relation needs to be reorganized in Turkey (p. 58). Neo-Ottomanism proves itself as a useful foreign policy discourse for the AKP in international relations, but it also refers to a certain national imagination inside the borders. Therefore, it is important to view neo-Ottomanism in domestic politics. Saraçoğlu and Demirkol (2015) argue that neo-Ottomanist foreign policy discourse is “a constitutive component of a new nationalist project” (p. 301). I view neo-Ottomanism not as a state discourse but as a discourse that is also “embraced and reproduced in social relations” (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2015, p. 305). The Syrian War being a “domestic issue” to the Turkish government could be understood through the terminology of neo-Ottomanism. It is important to note how this new nation-building project is different from its Kemalist counterpart. White (2013) argues that this Kemalist design was challenged by “powerful and self-confident Muslim networks” who aimed to foster “Muslim identity and culture” over

the Kemalist nation design relying on laicism (p. 3). White (2013) articulates the new nation-building project as aiming to promote “a distinctly Muslim brand of national community” (p. 4) I argue that the Syrian refugee can fit into this picture of neo-Ottoman nation-building.

Neo-Ottomanism has various facets. In fact, Walton (2010) studies neo-Ottomanism through articulation of space and place in Istanbul. He argues that civil society actors have gotten more prevalent and diverse since the 1980s and Islamic sphere had its share of foundations that tackles the urban issues. Walton (2010) holds that Islamic civil society organizations have worked to produce and reproduce the city of Istanbul as a neo-Ottoman place, a place of nostalgia in which the Ottoman past represents an ideal and the Kemalist understanding of urban space is criticized (pp. 94-98). Istanbul is deemed an Ottoman city and capital. Walton (2016) holds that the Ottoman Empire becomes an object of restorative nostalgia in his study on urban design of cities and sites of memory (p. 514). Yet, there is “a basic geographic fact” which is the former Ottoman territories belong to various states outside Turkey (Walton, 2016, p. 514). Therefore, the lands outside Turkey are parts of the neo-Ottoman discourse, yet they are not actively under Turkish control. A relation must have been formed between these former territories with the center, which is Turkey. Turkey is the country that has the heritage of the Ottoman state.

I argue that the ambiguous nature of the concept of neo-Ottomanism makes it a prioritized discourse in civil society and everyday life. On the one hand, it has a certain imagination of the nation that is on Islamic and multicultural grounds. On the other hand, it is not certain who is or what groups are included, or recognized in the new multicultural or Islamic imagination. Therefore, the elasticity of the concept makes it adapt to changing conditions. For instance, the neo-Ottomanist imaginary

relies on the inclusion and acceptance the Bosnian refugees in early 1990s, and the Kurdish people in Turkey in the 2000s. Similar to the refugee issue being left to a gray zone in Turkey, neo-Ottomanism portrays a gray zone in which there is a no black and white answer to who is in the neo-Ottomanist imaginary of the nation. The nation is under transformation and the Syrian refugees' arrival poses new alternatives to the neo-Ottomanist discourse. I hold that the period before the Syrian Civil War demonstrates the neo-Ottomanist discourse at work.

Therefore, neo-Ottomanism does not refer to a full-fledged concept that has distinctly articulated elements. In this thesis, I want to demonstrate how there are diverse discourses critical to neo-Ottomanism. What brings these diverse discourses together is the centrality of the Ottoman past, its social and cultural institutions. The Ottoman past is the ultimate reference point in neo-Ottoman discourse. The Ottoman past becomes the unit the present, and the future gets compared and contrasted to. Also, I want to make a remark on how it can be read as a fragile concept that is in crisis. For instance, if Davutoğlu is the central figure of neo-Ottomanism, then could the period after his administration be called neo-Ottoman? Critiques point out how neo-Ottomanism is going through a crisis and Davutoğlu's resignation demonstrates that crisis. One of my arguments in this thesis is how although Davutoğlu resigned from his position, a certain neo-Ottoman policy making is still intact. However, there are some differences. Prime Minister Binalı Yıldırım's administration after Davutoğlu can be taken as a new page in foreign policy discourse. I hold that although foreign policy and domestic discourses still have traces of neo-Ottomanism, they are more centered on pragmatism and realism in order to accommodate the challenges against the AKP government today. Yıldırım calls the process under his administration after Davutoğlu "decreasing the number of enemies and increasing the

number of friends” period. This is a criticism directed to Davutoğlu’s foreign policy in Syria in particular where Turkish calculations on the end of the war were not accurate. The failure associated with foreign policy in the Middle East (not being able to be a regional power although it is desired, the Syrian Civil War not ending but extending to other territories and effecting Turkey’s lands, severance of relations between Turkey and Israel, Russia) make us treat neo-Ottomanism as a fragile concept that is in crisis. Furthermore, its extension policy is no longer viable. There is a certain degree of isolation from the foreign affairs that goes with further nationalization. The effect of the failed coup attempt on July 15th 2016 is also a part of this isolation in which foreign powers are deemed responsible for cooperating with the coup makers and protecting them in their countries. In that sense, viewing neo-Ottomanism through its ambiguities on imaginaries on nation, friends and enemies is necessary.

3.5 Neo-Ottomanism as restorative nostalgia

After explaining neo-Ottomanism, I think it is crucial that I discuss Boym’s concept of restorative nostalgia. I think the concept of nostalgia provides a great ground combining subjectivity and hegemony in which state and political discourses get personalized, individualized and privatized in everyday life of civil society and has neoliberal thinking attached to it.

Boym (2001) discusses nostalgia in *The Future of Nostalgia*. She defines nostalgia as a longing for something that does not exist anymore. It is not clear whether the object of nostalgia was actual or is imaginary (Boym, 2001, p. xvi). Rather, this ambiguity is shared by people. Nostalgia is deemed actual and its imaginary nature is forgotten. In fact, Boym (2001) asks “How can one be homesick

for a home that one never had?” (p. xiii). In that sense, it is not an individual experience but rather becomes a social, historical and political emotion that makes imagination of the past possible (Boym, 2001, p. xvi). Nostalgia as a social emotion especially takes place in the globalized era (Boym, 2001, p.xiv). Globalization makes local attachments more meaningful and nostalgia becomes a “defense mechanism” against high-paced globalization (Boym, 2001, p. xiv). In that sense, a certain protectionist tendency comes with nostalgia. Even if longing for something can be universal, nostalgia has a “divisive” feature (Boym, 2001, p.xiii). Longing for something brings belonging to something with itself and belonging becomes divisive, differentiating the subject from others. The past gets remade and personal by forming relationship between the individual, personal and collective past and memory (Boym, 2001, p. xvi). The past’s designs are articulated as “personal aspirations” (Boym, 2001, p. 354).

Boym (2001) writes on two different types of nostalgia. One is “restorative nostalgia” which “does not think of itself as nostalgia, but rather as truth and tradition”, while the other is “reflective nostalgia” which is casting doubts to the truth the restorative nostalgia aims to establish (p. xviii). The past is made the truth that is not open to discussion. It becomes the source of truth. There is also an emphasis on “rebuilding the lost home and patch up memory gaps” (Boym, 2001, p. 41). It aims to achieve “a transhistorical reconstruction of the lost home” (Boym, 2001, p. xviii) The past as the truth needs to be reconstructed since the present is problematized and it needs to be transformed (Özyürek, 2006, p. 177). The reconstruction of the past refers to a certain “loss”. The lost lands, homes and values become important markers of nostalgia. There is an emphasis on how the present is different due to that loss. Although people rely on the past, it is in order to have a say

in the present rather than completely embracing and founding the past. Nostalgia has a certain aim of having power and domination in the present and what differs various nostalgias from each other is their relation to the present, how they articulate the present and how they transform it. This also means that nostalgia has the future in its design as well. By relying on the past, an ideal future is constructed which will be brought through transformation of the present. In that sense, restorative nostalgia is “at the core of recent national and religious revivals” with its emphasis on “the return to origins and conspiracy” (Boym, 2001, p. xviii). However, although restorative nostalgia has a desired future design in its vision, that design is an ideal that will not be achieved. Boym (2001) writes:

The dreams of imagined homelands cannot and should not come to life. They can have a more important impact on improving social and political conditions in the present as ideals, not as fairy tales come true. (Boym, 2001, pp. 354-355)

The role of nostalgia is to alter and work on the today, not the past, nor the future. The past is remembered because the present necessitates it. Although there is an idea of reconstruction of the lost home, the reconstruction does not have to get actualized in practice. Rather, restorative nostalgia provides a vision in the present according to the past that is yearned for and the future that is attempted. That vision makes people take responsibility in the attempts to achieve the desired future. Yet, this is not individual, independent responsibility but a social responsibility coming with the longing for the past (Boym, 2001, p. xiv).

Özyürek’s (2006) study on articulations of Kemalism holds that nostalgia has a strong relation with neoliberal thinking because through various means the national past becomes “personalized commodities” that the individual has to embrace and protect (p. 9). Özyürek (2006) explains nostalgia for the early republican era to flourish in a time where its basic features are threatened (p. 16). What is curious is

how although Kemalist past is criticized, neo-Ottomanism relies on similar methods to found itself as a social and national discourse. To give an example, in the new scheme, the Kemalist past becomes an era of darkness, while the Ottoman past is deemed illuminating. Although there are similarities between Kemalist nostalgia and neo-Ottoman nostalgia in terms of longing for the past (Özyürek, 2006, p. 174), I do not hold that a nostalgia for the Ottoman Empire stems from such a threat. On the contrary, the arrival of the Syrian refugees makes the flourish of such a nostalgia easier. The existence of the Syrians perpetuates a neo-Ottoman vision. The neo-Ottoman projects since the 1980s can be characterized under restorative nostalgia that aims at establishing a new truth as history and tradition. Recently, admitting the Syrian refugees inside the country are reminiscent of a nostalgia of the Ottoman society and history in which instead of clinging to the ruins of the empire, there is a conscious effort to rebuild the said traditions in place both socially and politically. The Syrians' arrival to the country can be considered to be new means of establishing a nostalgic social cohesion and sense of security that is aligned with the authority (Boym, 2001).

In that sense, I argue that the emphasis on the Ottoman past could be analyzed through Boym's conceptualization of nostalgia. Boym (2001) writes that nostalgia "is a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed". The imaginary Ottoman past is an example of nostalgia in which when huge numbers of the others arrive, it promises a utopian vision as a defense mechanism. As Boym (2001) suggests, although it has empathetic qualities regarding the other and highlights sense of belonging, it also includes its opposition in which the loss of identity is threatening and mutual understanding is not possible. When creating a utopian vision, the one at hand becomes unnecessary and irrelevant (Boym, 2001).

Nostalgia makes references to both individual and social memory. However, it is extremely crucial to view the perspectives on the historical imaginaries as today's necessities but it also has an ideal future in plans. The future is not dismissed but considered bundled with the past. There is a certain politics of the past in restorative nostalgia in which the politics is instrumentalized in order to respond to the happenings today which are arrival of the Syrian refugees and their effects on the Turkish host society.

3.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have discussed neo-Ottomanism through three important theoretical terms; subjectivity, hegemony and nostalgia. Drawing on my argument that there is neoliberalization of the refugee issue in Turkey and mobilization of conservative civil society takes place in the gray zone of neoliberal state, I explain how these occur through neo-Ottoman affect and discourses. I argue how neoliberalization of the refugee issue is bundled with hegemony of neo-Ottomanism. Although neo-Ottomanism is treated as a foreign policy discourse, it also has reflections on domestic discourses especially on matters relating to national imaginary. However, these discourses do not constitute a strictly defined sphere but have ambiguous elements that are sometimes in contradiction. Furthermore, there are transformations of the discourse according to the events taking place. In that sense, construction of a new subjectivity, its mobilization and neo-Ottoman nostalgia getting hegemonic in civil society are parts of the phenomena that need explanations. The arrival of Syrian refugees does not threaten the neo-Ottoman design but foster it. Restorative nostalgia in the form of yearning for the glorious Ottoman empire conceptualizes the Syrian refugees as the truth of the nation and state and evokes the past in order to

reconstruct it. The following chapters are on how the neo-Ottoman nostalgia is reconstructed when the Syrian refugees are in question in everyday life of members of civil society.

CHAPTER 4

THE BOSNIAN WAR AS A FOUNDING ACT OF NEO-OTTOMANISM

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss the Syrian War through its relation to the Bosnian War in early 1990s. The war refers to a violent period after the dissolution of the Soviet and Yugoslavian states. After the collapse of the Yugoslavian state, tensions among the various ethnic nationalist groups led to armed conflict among the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosnians in the region starting in 1992. The violent conflict was called the Bosnian War, and it took three years and ended in 1995. The war remains the bloodiest period in Europe after the Holocaust. There was genocide against the Bosnians, thousands of casualties and use of rape as a war crime. Turkish audience followed the Bosnian War very closely and Turkish foreign policy, to a certain extent, reflected that interest by implementing active foreign policy. I add several accounts from conservative intelligentsia of the period covering the Bosnian War in their columns. These accounts are exemplary pieces treating the Bosnian problem of the era aiming to demonstrate how the Bosnian War was followed by the religious circles and articulated among the communities. The Bosnian War was re-acknowledged when the Syrian War started and Syrian refugees came to Turkey. Throughout the interviews, the interviewees shared their views associating the Bosnian War with the Syrian War, forming relations between the two in terms of violence and pain endured during the wars; and, their aftermath leading to displacement and migration of hundreds of thousands of people. The Bosnian War is of central importance framing the perspectives on the Syrian refugees. Therefore, I

argue that the Bosnian War is a founding act determining the perspectives on the Syrian refugees arriving Turkey. When the Syrians arrive, the memory of the Bosnian War and its aftermath are recalled. These experiences are mobilized in order to make sense of the incoming Syrians, as well as organizing civil society in order to accommodate the Syrian refugees. Furthermore, I rely on the concept of neo-Ottomanism in order to explain the relation between the two wars. A neo-Ottomanist approach helps forming a relation between the two wars and their aftermaths possible. I use neo-Ottomanism as an umbrella term encompassing the mobilization of civil society with references to history and memory, which I argue to be a form of hegemony. I discuss the founding Bosnian War in conjunction with neo-Ottomanism, in order to show how there is a change in state and society in relation to the Balkans and countries outside the national borders. The reactions to and against the Bosnian and Syrian Wars, and refugees as the wars' aftermaths are contemplated together.

Furthermore, I analyze the link between the Syrian and Bosnian wars through the trauma of the loss of the Balkans in history. After the nationalist uprisings against the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan Wars in late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Ottoman Empire lost its territories in the Balkans. It had a major effect on the center in Istanbul, meaning the end to Ottomanist ideology. Its outcomes also influenced the later republican thought that prioritized the Turkish nationalist agenda. Therefore, the Balkans represent “the lost lands” that the Turkish agencies aim to reclaim and thus reintroduce a new Ottomanist, neo-Ottomanist agenda.

4.2 Turkish response to the Bosnian War and the period afterwards

Before the interviews, I argue that the Turkish neo-Ottomanist perspective on the Bosnian War is a founding act of the Turkish response to the Syrian refugees that is

also influenced by neo-Ottomanist discourses. The Bosnian example is remembered when the Syrians arrive to the country and become experienced others. I study the Bosnian War from the viewpoint in which foreign policy is in conjunction with internal politics at home. The relation between identity and foreign policy is especially studied in post-structuralist research (Hansen, 2006, p. 1). Therefore, I take foreign policy as intrinsically related to production and reproduction of national identity at home. From this perspective, I ask “How did the Turkish state respond to the Bosnian War and what did it mean for identity transformation at home?” Social and state responses to the Bosnian War in 1992 are rearticulating the early 20th century loss of the Balkans during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish state employed an active foreign policy during the Bosnian War, although it was going through internal problems at home, these problems being the rise of PKK and political Islam. Demirtaş Coşkun (2011) argues that the active foreign policy in the time should be analyzed from searches for a new state identity in conjunction with the foreign policy. The Bosnian War enabled the Turkish policy makers reaffirm their ties to the Western-oriented foreign policy making while attempting to have a regional power image in the Balkans after the collapse of both the Soviet and Yugoslavian states. The active foreign policy does not mean employment of hard power. Rather, the Turkish government employed soft power tactics in the region. The mobilization of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation), which Turkey had the chair position at that time, sending humanitarian aid to the region, providing health care, accepting the Bosnian refugees' arrival to the country are important steps of the Turkish soft power in the country (Robins, 2003, p. 361). Turkey did not impose vast obstacles to the Bosnians seeking refuge, unlike other European countries (Robins, 2003, p.363). In fact, it is estimated that more than

two hundred thousand Bosnian refugees arrived Turkey during the war (Robins, 2003, p. 345). Robins (2003) holds that Turkey was able to cope with these arrivals without getting too affected (p. 345).

However, soft power was supplemented by sending weapons to the Bosnian army (Robins, 2003, p. 348), a deviation from cautious Turkish foreign policy making (Demirtaş Coşkun, 2011, p. 9). Turkey become part of the actors that have a say in the Balkan problem, it was an attempt to become a regional power, which is in conjunction with neo-Ottoman policy making.

The support given to the Balkan populations is another dimension of neo-Ottomanism in the region after the collapse of the Yugoslavian state. In fact, Rucker-Chang (2014) argues that support from Turkey has been more influential for the Bosnian state, than other states' help having Muslim majority such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, due to shared history and identity between Bosnia and Turkey. The Ottoman past is focused on by both Bosnian and Turkish societies in the country, in order to draw a common future together. Rucker-Chang (2014) holds cultural production as an important part of neo-Ottomanism in Bosnia creating a Bosnia imaginary through the glorious Ottoman Empire. In fact, Turkey is constructed as the “kin state” connoting shared history and identity between two countries (Rucker-Chang, 2014, p. 152).

The oscillation between the East and the West is characterizing of the Balkan identity as well. In that sense, Rucker-Chang (2014) argues that Turkey “in many ways is the epitome of ‘Balkan’” (p. 153). This oscillation is especially heightened by “the fall of the Soviet Union” and “disillusionment with the EU” (Rucker-Chang, 2014, p. 154). Rucker-Chang also counts the AKP government in Turkey as a factor that draws Bosnia away from Europe. The Turkish influence is exercised by various

actors, both official agents and NGOs, from Yunus Emre Turkish cultural centers aiming to teach Turkish to religious communities building dormitories and offering Quran courses. The activities focus on both cultural, historical and religious similarities. Similarly, Solberg (2007) analyzes Turkish charity organizations in the Balkans and argues that these organizations activities aim at having stronger relations among the Muslim communities in the region and Turkey. She holds that the increase of mobilization in civil society made Islamist actors enter the civil society, and these actors became active in the Balkans after the collapse of the Yugoslavian state. Solberg studies both official and civil society actors in the region. She gives TİKA as an institution of soft power in the region, an agency that aims at developing relations especially in culture and education. She holds Diyanet as another actor that fosters teaching Islam and Turkish Islam in the region.

Apart from these official actors, there are civil society organization which Solberg categorizes under “neo-sufi” organizations that are active in areas of education as well as facilities pertaining to education. The young people are the target group and their relation with Islam is aimed at developing. These organizations are usually funded by wealthy businesspeople. Although she cites many organizations, she holds that İHH “was the first and only Turkish charity organization” to enter Bosnia during the war (Solberg, 2007). Therefore, she emphasizes İHH’s presence in the region. Somun (2011), former ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Turkey, analyzes Turkish activism in the Balkans that rely on the Ottoman past; yet does not call the process neo-Ottomanism because this foreign policy does not connote an imperial design based on Ottoman nostalgia. Rather, he focuses on pragmatist and realist nature of the foreign policy (Somun, 2011, p. 37). Similarly, he points to how the active Turkish foreign policy is not

specific to the AKP era; yet it differs from former eras because those foreign policies were “carried out in harmony with the Western alliances” (Somun, 2011, p. 33). However, he holds that later drives in Turkish foreign policy have an independent tone. Apart from the Ottoman past, Somun (2011) argues that Bosnian and Turkish states and societies have “their attachment to Europe” in common (p. 34). Bosnia, in that sense, represents “a physical bridge” (Somun, 2011, p. 34) that would connect Turkey to Europe and Atlantics. Furthermore, Somun (2011) gives an anecdote from Davutoğlu’s speech in Sarajevo, in which he says “Sarajevo is ours” and “Istanbul is yours”, showing the anti-imperial nature of the neo-Ottomanist policies in the Balkans (p. 38). There is an image of Turkey as “the mother of Muslims in the Balkans” in which the Muslims in Balkans are constructed as orphans (Rucker-Chang, 2014, p. 157). The influence of Turkey is articulated as forming a stronger transnational identity (Rucker-Chang, 2014, p. 158).

The neo-Ottoman imaginary of the glorious Ottoman past was rearticulated in the Balkans. Discourses on shared history, culture and religion are used in order to create a sense of similarity and familiarity between the region and Turkey. Therefore, response to the Bosnian War and its aftermath are characterized by soft-power workings of neo-Ottomanism through charities, education and cultural activities.

4.3 The Bosnian War through the eyes of the conservative intelligentsia

In order to give a sense of what the Bosnian Wars meant for the conservative intelligentsia during the early 1990s, I have gone over the periodical *Yeni Zemin*, a short-lived journal that I take to be one of the founding journals of the AKP ideology due to its emphasis on conservative democracy, which is articulated by Yalçın Akdoğan, one of the prominent figures of the AKP, who was also the founding

members of the journal. Other figures include Mehmet Metiner, Altan Tan and Davut Dursun. The criticism of Kemalism and laicism, a multicultural citizenship regime inclusive of the Kurdish and focus on the international politics from a non-Kemalist perspective are all reasons I take *Yeni Zemin* as founding of the AKP ideology. The journal had a collection of social, political and intellectual pieces that relied on a vast selection of intellectuals from different ideologies as guest-writers and interviewees including Nilüfer Göle, Nur Vergin, Toktamış Ateş and Murat Belge just to name a few. I have analyzed the journal's articles on the Bosnian Wars in order to give a sense of how Bosnia became an issue in social memory.

The Bosnian tragedy is characterized by Bosnia being the only Islam state in Europe. Therefore, other than being the lost lands, it represents Islam's last remaining existence in Europe. Bosnia is referred to take place "in the middle of Europe", and it represents the farthest point Islam had advanced into Europe (Yıldız, 1993, p. 54). However, authors argue that the West does not want a Muslim country on the continent and even a slightest potential of a Muslim country is deemed frightening (Yıldız, 1993, p. 55).

These are in conjunction with the Western image in which "the civilized European" image is challenged, whereas Bosnia is referred as pure. The West is accused of perpetrating the massacres of the Bosnians in the region. The West is accused of knowing of tortures in the region, yet staying inactive. For instance, the Western subject is accused of not tolerating the Andalusian Muslim population in Spain and "the Ottoman Islam state" in the past (Işık, 1993a, p. 52) and the Bosnian War is analyzed from this perspective where there is an intolerant, hatemonger West image. The Crusader thought in the Western mentality is not dead, Işık (1993b) argues (p. 45). The Bosnian commander focusses on how torture and rape are used in

the war. Furthermore, the real aim of the operations in Bosnia is deemed to be not innocent people but Islamic history, culture and civilization (Yıldız, 1993, p. 55).

The 500 years of Ottoman rule in the region is considered to be an Islamizing force.

Yıldız (1993) argues how it is the Ottoman heritage itself that is the aim:

Yes, it is the Ottomans that are the Bosnians the Serbs want to massacre. There is a historical, cultural and humane heritage that needs embracing and whoever the Ottoman heir is, they are the owner of the heritage. The real reason for fight is the Ottoman existence that is not overcome in any way and the Ottoman heritage that they cannot capture and seize no matter what they do.⁴ (Yıldız, 1993, p. 55)

Yıldız (1993) then holds that “Turkey should stop resisting and start embracing the heritage that is refused by the foundation of the republic”⁵ (p. 55). The Ottoman heritage, shared history with Bosnia are characterizing features of both these pieces and interviews I have conducted.

The other accused party are the countries having Muslim populations. The Islamic World remaining silent is a widely-used phrase. There is anger towards the leaders of Muslim societies. For instance, there is an article by a Bosnian military commander who says: “We know that Muslim societies are with us but their leaders have provided themselves useless” (Adilović, 1993, p. 51).

In that sense, charity is emphasized. However, the charity work of the period is categorized into two. On the one hand, basic aids were sent to the region, and on the other hand, there was an intellectual component where the massacres in Bosnia were articulated in media. Işık (1993a) argues that these aids helped the construction and perpetration of the ummah⁶ consciousness in Turkey although it was not the foremost aim (p. 53). In that sense, the Bosnian War is expected to revive and

⁴ For the original passage of this translated text, see Appendix A, 1.

⁵ For the original passage of this translated text, see Appendix A, 2.

⁶ The ummah literally means community in Arabic. It is used as a term that refers to the supranational community that is composed of all Muslims on the world.

develop the Islamist movements. Işık (1993a) uses the muhacir metaphor⁷ when referring to the Bosnians migrating to Macedonia and being accepted there by the Muslim population (p. 52). The military deployment to Bosnia is viewed rather cautiously, although the Welfare Party at the time advocated strongly for urgent military deployment (Robins, 2003). For example, Küçük (1994) writes that “Turkey’s deployment to Bosnia may seem beneficial at some points and Turkish people may get excited from this deployment”⁸, yet he stresses the decision to be taken cautiously (pp. 46-47). He deems Bosnia as a labyrinth involving multiple actors and deadlocks. Similarly, Vergin (1994), as a guest-writer, considers Welfare Party’s foreign policy to be “emotional” and writes:

In Welfare Party’s discourse, there is a desire and longing to be the Ottoman’s heir, continuation. It is not possible to reject this. We can call this yearning to a lost glory, or redefining our identity. But let’s not forget: The Ottomans built their sovereignty system by building links with the West, not turning their back on them.⁹ (Vergin, 1994, pp. 34-35)

The Ottoman rule over the Balkans have been a point that needs clarification. There is an emphasis of shared history in these accounts. Yet, the loss of the Balkan lands was traumatic in the Turkish imaginary which is the subject of the next section.

4.4 The trauma of the loss of the Balkans

The relation between the Bosnian and Turkish societies go back to Ottoman times, and the societies focused on the shared history, as well as religion to bond. In fact,

⁷ Muhacir connotes the people migrating from Mecca to Medina in history of early Islam. The migration was led by Prophet Muhammad. He and his people could no longer bear the atrocities committed by the regime in Mecca to the believers of Islam; therefore, decided to leave Mecca and head to the welcoming city of Medina. Seeing the Syrians as muhacir has two important connotations. First, it highlights the violent side of the forced migration, the Syrians are leaving their home country because of the atrocities, violence committed by their government. The migration is not economically motivated but it is forced. Secondly, if the Syrian refugees are muhacir, then it means that the Turkish host-society must be ensar, the people of Medina who invited and welcomed the Prophet and his people and helped them get by. There is a great responsibility associated with being the host.

⁸ For the original passage of this translated text, see Appendix A, 3.

⁹ For the original passage of this translated text, see Appendix A, 4.

according to the national Serbs perpetrating violence against the Bosnians, being Muslim meant to be a Turk, and an Ottoman. The terms of Muslim, Turk and Ottoman were all used interchangeably. In other words, the Ottoman past is constructed as the Balkan states' other as well (Çalış, 2001, p. 129).

The Bosnian lands as the Balkans represents the trauma of the lost lands in Ottoman imaginary and neo-Ottoman restorative nostalgia. The Balkan Wars, the nationalist independence movements in the region and subsequent migrations to Turkey after the Ottoman loss of land in late 19th and early 20th centuries have significantly changed the population dynamic in the region. For instance, before the Balkan Wars started, the Muslim population was in majority in the Balkan region in 1911 (McCarthy, 2006, p. 174). Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina took place in 1908 after years of occupation by their forces since 1878. The Ottoman authority was greatly decreasing and the Habsburg Empire saw the Bosnian territory as a gain. The Austria-Hungarian occupation is considered to be a colonial-style campaign in Europe (Schindler, 2004, p. 528), a case of quasi-colonialism in Europe that involves military policy (Schindler, 2004, p. 539). The quasi-colonial quality of the Austrian annexation fosters the traumatic side of the loss of the Balkans.

The Balkans represents the core of the empire and its loss led to significant effects on Turkish nationalist thought (Kurt & Gürpınar, 2015, p. 348). In fact, Boyar (2007) calls the Ottoman loss of territories a "trauma" representing a psychological shock leading to both internal and international changes in the image of the nation and country (p. 1). This is especially the case in the writings of the intellectuals of the era. An in-depth analysis of these texts is not the subject of this thesis. However, in order to give an example, it is a good idea to return to Yahya Kemal, a poet born

in Skopje, Macedonia who wrote: “When at one time it was ours, part of our true vatan/ why is Üsküp not ours today? I felt this deeply.” (Quoted in Boyar, 2007, p. 145). Similarly, Halide Edip’s writings had the trauma of the Balkan Wars at the center (Kurt & Gürpınar, 2015, p. 353). Boyar (2007) holds that the intellectuals were in search of an identity in the changing social dynamics of the Ottoman Empire that some of them were feeling personally (p. 7). However, the actors were distinguished in terms of their ethnicities and religions. For instance, the nationalizing Bulgarians were the enemies, whereas the Muslim Bosnians were the victims of other Balkan states’ independence movements (Kurt & Gürpınar, 2015, p. 353). The Ottoman Muslim identity was rearticulated after the loss of Balkan lands (Çetinkaya, 2014, pp. 763-764).

The Balkans represents the encounter between the Oriental and the European, Islam with Christianity. The Christian populations of the Empire were considered to be fueled by the European imperial powers against the Ottoman state and were accused of being ungrateful (Boyar, 2007, p. 141). In other words, the West was “the real mastermind” of the human tragedy born in the region, including the migration of thousands of people from the Balkans to Anatolia (Kurt & Gürpınar, 2015, p. 357). The Ottomans constructed their identity as the real victim against the Western bloc. The Balkans represents an important part of imagining “*vatan*”, the heart-felt, patriotic feeling of homeland, and the region’s loss, the loss of territory was constructive of a national ideology. After the loss of the Balkans, the Anatolian lands acquired new meaning for the subsequent Turkish Kemalist republic as it was the land that was left (Boyar, 2007, p. 146). Therefore, the Balkan Wars represent the Ottoman retreat from the region and the outcome of the Balkan Wars are considered to be important for strengthening the Turkish nationalism and pan-Turkish ideology

(Roshwald, 2001, p. 63). Berkes (1998) argues that the loss of Balkan territories led to a nationalistic reaction, not a religious outcry (p. 358). However, the religious reaction against the loss is part of the neo-Ottoman Balkan imaginary where the Balkan territories are claimed as “our own”. Kurt and Gürpınar (2015) argue that “the glory of the yesterday and the misery of today” were used in nationalistic imaginary in which the future is bright (p. 359).

The Balkan Wars represent the end of Ottomanist ideology. If and when you want to implement Ottomanism again, as in the case of neo-Ottomanism, the loss of Balkans is something that one should face. Neo-Ottoman nostalgia aims at overcoming that loss and restore the past as the truth, as something that needs to be evoked again. Therefore, the Bosnian War in 1992 and its aftermath signified that the Ottomanist ideal does not necessarily have to die, it could be revived. Furthermore, Ottomanism also refers to the loss of the Arab territories through policies of Turkification. It is because Ottomanism is considered to produce the early moments of Arab nationalism. Therefore, the Syrian refugees’ arrival signify Ottomanism could be revived against the Arab nationalism as well. The relation with the West and Kemalism are other dimensions of the issue that will be discussed in following chapters.

4.5 Rethinking violence and refugees: the Bosnian and Syrian Wars

I hold that the Syrian War is taken into account with memories of the Bosnian War in 1992. This was especially the case in my interview with Musa and Erkan. I have met Musa and Erkan in a charity organization in Uncular Street, Üsküdar. I have heard that the organization especially helps the Syrians with in-kind transfers, finding and acquiring furniture and other appliances for their homes. I have contacted Musa, an

employee at the organization, through phone and he invited me over the association's place for the interview. The place was right across the café that its owners, Melike and Halid, I have met and interviewed. In fact, during that interview, the Syrian kids were handed over several school supplies such as a small board and pens by the association Musa works at. Therefore, I can say that I established familiarity with the street and its habitants.

When I was there, Musa introduced me to Erkan, a tea-shop owner in Üsküdar's square, who was also there. They both agreed to have the interview. In fact, Erkan was more eager to share his experiences since he had recently been to the Turkish-Syrian border with other members of the association in order to assess the situation there. This included seeing the immediate necessities of the Syrian people arriving to Turkey and coming up with plans in order to decide what could be done for the Syrians. Erkan, firstly, underlines the feeling he had that he needed to do something about the incoming Syrians whether it is material help or non-material support. He says this feeling comes to people who are believers. Erkan tells me he was particularly moved after the bombings in Aleppo, which was covered and followed by the Turkish people and the media. The Aleppo bombings reminded people the harsh conditions that the Syrians endure or that make them leave their homes, country and arrive Turkey. In Erkan's case, it reminded people of the Syrian refugees in Turkey. Erkan tells me that he thought crossing the border and fighting against the oppressor regime in Syria. He felt like he needed to do something when he was at the border.

I told the others that I want to cross to the other side [across the border], get a gun and thought maybe we could do something. In that moment, spirit, I asked if we could do something like that. There are, of course, humiliation

and disappointment of not being able to go to the Bosnian War.¹⁰ (Erkan, 40s, male)

Erkan starts his interview in a high note and his tone remains excited throughout the interview. He is particularly excited when he tells me his experiences at the Turkish-Syrian border. He first starts telling me about his experiences there and how the decision to go to the border came about. His decision to go is particularly related to observe the life conditions of the Syrian refugees there. This decision came about with his contact with a small community of people that are actively engaged in charity work in FIKSAD targeting the Syrian refugees. He decided to go to the border in order to constitute his own perspective on the issue of Syrian refugees. His own observations, rather than somebody else's, is an important part of his perspectives on the Syrian refugees. In addition to his social and political ideology, his experiences, emotions he feels around the Syrians and observing their living conditions are all parts of his perspectives on the Syrian refugees.

Before going there, he had certain anticipations of the border, and how the life around the border would look like. When he was there, his anticipations were not met. The desertedness of the border made him think of fighting. He had the idea that he could just go across the border and fight against the oppressor forces there. This is where his tone particularly gets heightened. That moment is very indescribable for him and living those moments have particularly affected how he viewed the Syrian refugees from then on. Fighting is something that he feels like he can do in order to protect the Syrian refugees. Then, he remembers the Bosnian War where fighting for the ummah once again came about in his life.

¹⁰ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 1.

The reference to the Bosnian War is quite noteworthy. This reference takes place in comparison to the Syrian War. The comparison between the two wars is really striking and it has come up in several interviews in addition to Erkan's accounts. The interviewees tell their previous experiences of how they witnessed migration of people after enduring violence in their countries going through war. The violence in the Balkans in the early 1990s are felt deeply by the Turkish audience and the memory of the Bosnian War is used when the Syrians arrive escaping the violent war in their countries. The first and foremost effect of this comparison is a relation that is constructed between the Bosnian people enduring or escaping violence and genocide, and the Syrian people going through the almost same kind of violence. The experiences of previous examples of people fleeing violence helps make sense of the new refugees and how to treat the new-comers. Also, it emphasizes how the Syrian migration does not depend on economic concerns but it is a forced migration due to threats and execution of violence. The Bosnian and Syrian examples both display the destroying aspects of the war and people's spread into other countries in the status of refugees.

In Erkan's case, he recalls the Bosnian War in relation with the Syrian War; but he also remembers how he felt humiliated and disappointed because he was not able to go to Bosnia. In that sense, going to the border and observing the Syrian refugees' conditions is something he was able to do as opposed to the Bosnian case, in which he could not form his own experiences of the war and refugees. He was not able to experience and perceive how the Bosnian War was like, whereas he felt and experienced the Syrians' lives. He lived through their lives both at the border and in his everyday life where he sees the Syrians. Still, he remembers the Bosnian War with his heartfelt humiliation. Erkan thinks his first duty was to fight against the

oppressor forces, whether it was against the nationalist Serbians in the Bosnian War, or the Assad regime in the Syrian War.

When I ask if the Syrians are any different from other refugees that Turkey had hosted in its history, for example the Bosnians. Erkan feels a bit agitated because he does not call them refugees but his brothers and sisters:

How are they different? No one is different for us. We don't consider them refugees, that's why. The thing is, they are our brothers and sisters. They are our people, my mother, sister, brother, son, nieces and nephews... You have to view things in this perspective. When you have this perspective, there's been no problems. In fact, that's how things have been viewed. Other governments, except the Erbakan government during the Bosnian War, and the nationalist wing had created difficulties at borders for those who go there to fight. In spite of these, this country had this reflex: it is ours out there, Bosnia is ours. So is Chechnya, and so is Syria.¹¹ (Erkan, 40s, male)

Erkan felt that the question whether the Syrian refugees are any different from other refugees and migrants Turkey has hosted was challenging. He could not understand what I meant, and he used a questioning and slightly angry tone as a response. After I have ended the audio-recording, he asked me what I meant by this particular question. I told him that I have encountered various accounts in which people compare and contrast the Syrian refugees with other migrants Turkey has received. I also hold that the media representation of the Syrians includes these comparisons. Then, he repeated what he said, that this is not a perspective he takes. Rather, his perspective is emphasizing of the unity among various Muslim communities. In that sense, citing Bosnia and Chechnya together with Syria are important elements of his perspectives on the Syrian refugees.

This quotation is important on multiple grounds. Firstly, it shows how legal status of Syrian refugees is not problematized. According to Erkan, it does not matter whether the Syrians are refugees or not, rather he emphasizes familial discourses in

¹¹ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 2.

order to integrate the Syrian identity. He does not cite the legal status of refugees as a problem. Even if their legal status would be refugees, Erkan would say it is a problem because he emphasizes more intimate approaches. The legal status is, in a way, unnatural and unneeded. Therefore, instead of categorizing the Syrians as refugees, he refers to them through discourses on family. Ultimately, there is a conflict between the legal, political and the local, private and everyday life. The legal is, in a way, outside the everyday life. What matters ultimately is the workings of the everyday life. Erkan's dismissal of the refugee terminology is demonstrative of dichotomy between the legal and the private.

Secondly, there is a certain essentialization of identities cited. Erkan says "we don't consider them as refugees", but who is this "we"? Taking the rest of the interview into consideration, Erkan's understanding of "we" and "us" suggests a particular Islamic outlook that rests on Turkishness. It is not just that he is part of a Muslim community; this community is also Turkish and it heavily relies on the Ottoman past. Therefore, this Muslim community does not refer to the Muslim ummah per se, rather it refers to a certain part of the Muslim world that the conservative Turkish subject could form relations with through a neo-Ottomanist discourse. This means that not every Muslim identity is part of this imaginary, but an ummah imaginary is still voiced. In a way, there is a discourse that aims at covering a larger ground than it actually covers. Furthermore, although the neo-Ottomanist vision has the geography of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East in imagination, they are on the level of imaginary, not referring to the actual political, legal settings on ground. In that sense, Bosnian, Chechen and Syrian identities are identities that have gone through violence and pain and it is claimed that they could be integrated, whereas other Muslim identities are not cited. All three of them are

seen part of the imaginary. Yet, the difference among these identities are not taken into account. It is as if the Bosnian and Syrian experiences are very similar; these identities are essentialized as the victims. Yet, they refer to different time, geographical, social and political contexts. The Muslim identity goes hand in hand with discourses on the family where the legal statuses of refugee and migrant are undermined. In the new scheme, the refugee becomes part of the national family that no longer relies on Turkish nationalism. The refugees become “brothers and sisters” that parents or older siblings should take care of. The relation between the host and the refugee refers to an asymmetric power relations in the family. However, through familial discourses a new national community is constructed in the neo-Ottoman vision.

Thirdly, there are also imperial reflexes where the lands outside the current national borders are still “ours”. This has come up in most of my interviews. Although the Syrian subject could not argue that the Turkish lands are theirs, the Turkish host mentality can argue that the Syrian lands belong to them. It is important to ask what “it is ours” means. It is possible to take lands as “ours” in the context of ownership. There is a claim of ownership of lands outside the national borders. Although these lands are not theirs, there is such motivation that Erkan is able to call these lands “ours”. Erkan construct the non-owned lands as owned in his neo-Ottoman imaginary making his position the center. When Bosnian and Syrian lands are constructed as “ours”; then, Turkey becomes the center these lands are connected to.

In a similar context, although Erkan does not refer to the Kurds in any part of his interview, “our brothers and sisters” is a rather familiar phrase for Turkish audience because the phrase is used to refer to the Kurdish people. The AKP’s

citizenship program since its early years of governing aimed at including the Kurdish people into its multiethnic nation design. In that sense, the AKP years refer to “a shift towards multicultural nationhood” (Aktürk, 2017, p. 12). The party’s votes from the Kurdish region gradually increased in years with efforts to ease the bans on Kurdish language and media. The state broadcasting company opened a Kurdish television channel and Kurdish can be chosen as minority languages in elective courses. Through employing multiethnic programs, the AKP was able to gather the victims of Kemalist nationalism and modernity; who can be classified into two as the religious and the Kurds.

Yet, these were not enough. Küçük and Özselçuk (2015) argue that taking nation-state as a “neutral” entity leads to partial, not equal, recognition of the Kurdish entity. Turkish experience takes multiculturalism through taking the higher Turkish citizenship as the ground; yet, it is disregarded that Turkish identity is the dominant identity. Therefore, despite many efforts, the Kurdish issue, their rights and recognition to begin with, maintains its crucial place in political scene in Turkey.

Therefore, I can say that there is a similarity between referring to the Syrian refugees and the Kurdish people in Turkey. This takes place in a discursive platform in which there is a hierarchy of power among actors, in which the Turkish identity becomes the patrimonial leader that could help its brothers and sisters. Our brothers and sisters do not refer to an equal recognition but it refers to reflex of care over the victim. The subject as the victim is not monolithic but refers to a variety of identities across a vast geography. The phrase is rather curious. On the one hand, it is transnational, it poses a discursive platform that goes beyond national boundaries. As the Kurds are “our brothers and sisters”, so are the Syrians, who are not necessarily in national lands. The Syrians that are “our brothers and sisters” are not only those

that are under Turkish protection in Turkish lands. Rather, the Syrian people that are not in Turkey but enduring violence and hardships elsewhere are also “our brothers and sisters”. This is also in conjunction with the Bosnian identity, who are also referred to as “our brothers and sisters”.

On the other hand, the Syrian refugees are closer to being “our brothers and sisters” since they are actually on Turkish lands. Following the familial discourse, the national homeland is imagined to be the home to many identities in which the dominant Turkish identity looks after the younger, “brothers and sisters”, be it the Kurds, the Syrians or the Bosnians. Various identities exist under the same roof but the relations among them are not equal but asymmetric. The asymmetrical nature of the relations is in a way hidden but also obvious. Furthermore, there is an ambivalence over the position, or location, of the other. It is not clear whether the other is interior or exterior in these discourses. Home and national family are larger discourses that make “our brothers and sisters” meaningful yet ambivalent.

It is important to note that although the Bosnian war has generated memory in conservative society, the Kurdish question in Turkey fails to be a part of social memory. Although both the Kurds and the Bosnians are referred to as “our brothers and sisters”, their relation to the national family is very different. The Kurdish geography is not acknowledged, it is considered to be a part of Turkey; and the Kurds are recognized as long as they abide to the rules established by the Turkish state, the Turkish state in the form of a paternal family leader. The Kurds remain “brothers and sisters” with no history; and they do not take place in social memory regarding the communities going through violence in the imaginary geography.

This also shows that there is a certain nationalization of the familial discourse. Although the neo-Ottoman discourse does not articulate a strict Turkish

nationalism, it favors certain national identities and ethnicities over others. In that case, the Bosnian tragedies are integrated and embraced as “our own” whereas the Kurdish tragedies remain part of the unthinkable, invisible and the unsayable. Although the Bosnian War is constructed as a tragedy that is founding of the perspectives on the Syrian War, the Kurdish community’s history, for whom the same familial discourses are in use, does not connote any tragedy that make it a founding element for the nationalizing conservative approach.

In these examples, the Bosnian war is a founding act when it comes to perspectives on the Syrians in religious, conservative neighborhoods. Another interviewee, Osman, puts emphasis on Bosnia as a founding moment. Osman, a member of the board of trustees of İnsani Yardım Vakfı (İHH), tells me İHH, one of the most active humanitarian aid organizations in Turkey, was founded after the Bosnian War. On their website, it says that the organization was established by “the humanitarian aid work that were started by the hearts that could not remain indifferent to the Bosnian War in 1992”¹² (İHH, 2017). Osman, also starts his interview on the perspectives on the Syrians in Turkey with mentioning how their organization was founded during the Bosnian War in order to gather and send humanitarian aid to the region. The comparison between the Syrian War and the Bosnian War becomes apparent. He later follows the example of the Bosnian War by Kosovo and Chechnya wars, as other founding elements of the perspective on the Syrian people. Osman compares the process and aftermath of the Bosnian War with the Syrian War:

In 1992 Bosnian War, all political parties of Turkey, from right to left, embraced the Bosnians. There was a great mobilization to help Bosnia. People coming from there [Bosnia] were cherished and embraced. It was the same in the Chechnya War in 1994-1997. The Turkish left, the Turkish right,

¹² For the original passage of this translated text, see Appendix A, 5.

the Islamists, the conservative, the nationalists embraced the Chechen people. It was not a source of conflict. No one said “Why are the Chechen are here? What are they doing in there? What are the Bosnians looking for?” It was not a source of political conflict and polemics. But, unfortunately I have to say that we haven’t given a good account of ourselves in the Syria issue . . . Can you imagine, the shared emotions and sensibility shown towards people in Bosnia and Chechnya were not displayed in Syria. Why? The left and the right. “Was it necessary? Why did they revolt against the regime? If Syria is divided, Iran will be, too. Then, Turkey will be divided.” etc. The massacres in Syria were used for politics. We didn’t discuss the limits of human tragedy there. The tragedy was not prioritized. I was astonished. Around 10 to 15 thousand people arrived from Bosnia, and 30 to 40 thousand people from Chechnya. 50 or 100 thousand people didn’t come to Turkey from these countries. Chechnya had a population of 900 thousand and Bosnia had a population of 2,5 million. Now, there are 3 and a half million people arrived. It is as much as a country.¹³ (Osman, 40s, male)

Osman’s discursive style includes references to Bosnia. Bosnia, together with Chechnya are examples of discourses on pain endured by the Muslims in recent decades. Whether conscious or unconscious, he refers to Bosnia multiple times. In fact, when articulating the number of Syrian refugees coming to Turkey, he gives examples from Bosnia. The Syrian population in Turkey is about 3 million and Osman tells me this number is close to the population of the Bosnian state as a country. It is as if the whole Bosnian society has arrived Turkey. He gives other examples from the Balkan and the Caucasus states’ populations in order to make sense of the number of Syrians, and the great volume of it, in Turkey. In this account, the reference to the Bosnian War takes place in a comparison between the effects of migration on the host society of Turkey. Similarly, İHH’s activism in the Balkans, and designating the Balkans as opposed to other geographies is noteworthy.

In the quotation above, Osman criticizes how the Bosnian and Syrian War produce different results, yet puts emphasis on the vast difference between the number of people arriving after both wars. Although he takes the number as an

¹³ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 3.

important source of negative reactions against the Syrians, he finds it puzzling to see the difference in attitudes against the Bosnians and the Syrians. In that sense, he deems the processes during the Bosnian War in Turkey positive; yet, argues that Turkish state and society was not able to deliver a similar response when the case was the Syrians. Rather, he argues that the Syrians' arrival was politicized, although it was a matter of humanitarianism. Politicization of the matter refers to how the issue becomes a matter of conflict between various political parties from left to right. Non-politicization would mean all political parties agreeing on a single solution. Osman's general accounts do not give any specific affect. He is a corporate man, and his account is demonstrative of that corporate structure. Relying on numbers and figures in order to make his point, as well as having a political tone that is reminiscent of political parties is important. However, his emphasis on the Bosnian War as a founding moment for İHH is worth mentioning. It shows that the emergence of civil society and the Islamist's appearance at the civil society with active organizations and associations, at least İHH's emergence, is very much related to the pains endured by the Muslim communities outside the national borders. In that sense, the Bosnian case is reflective of how the civil society is organized in accordance with the Muslim communities' facilities.

Osman offers the reason that the Syrian refugees were criminalized and problematized due to their ethnicities. They are Arabs, not Europeans. While the Bosnian identity connotes being European, the Syrian population is characterized by being Middle Eastern. He holds that there is a hierarchy in perspectives on the Syrian refugees. Still, Bosnia and Syria refer to very different moments in Turkish social and political history. The Turkish government was not actively on the Bosnian lands during the Bosnian War, whereas geographical proximity with Syria shapes the

Turkish relations with Syria. There was no Turkish involvement and it is a different context. Similarly, the aftermath of the Bosnian War did not lead to migration of millions of Bosnian refugees to Turkey.

Victimization connotes a retreat from taking responsibility. Both Bosnian and Syrian refugees are constructed as victims of Western perpetrated wars and violence. However, the Syrian War and the Turkish involvement in the war refers to a different context in which the foreign policy also had neo-Ottoman discourse. Turkey, in a way, had a say in the Syrian question. Therefore, the reactions against the Syrian refugees come because the Syrian War was politicized by the Turkish state in the first place. Therefore, the question was not viewed from a non-political lens but it referred to admitting the government's foreign and domestic policies regarding the Syrians. The Bosnian War, however, was not politicized nor problematized in everyday life. It was a geography far away and it did not affect the everyday life enough to produce discourses on the Bosnians. The Bosnians, therefore, were constructed as victims of violence.

4.6 The geographical imagination and the metaphor of *ecdad*

Bosnia through humanitarianism and institutional help are subjects of conversation in Leyla and Fadime's accounts. Leyla is a health officer, whereas Fadime is a gynecologist. They are both in health industry and their experiences with the Syrians have a more professional tone in which it is a relation between the health officer and the patient. This puts matters in a different context but it is not devoid of any reference to history and memory. When I ask what they think of the Syrian refugees' conditions in Turkey, Leyla recalls her experiences in Bosnia. Leyla holds that the official agents' activities were observable. She argues that the official actors "are still

there” and active. She tells it in the context of responsibility where the Turkish host state and society feel responsible. These accounts mention Bosnia in terms of how Turkish institutions are still active there, although it has been many years since the war. Leyla and Fadime discuss what the Syrian lands represent. Leyla says,

An Arab does not feel responsible; an Indonesian does not feel responsible or a Moroccan does not feel responsible. It has been years, more than 20 years that TİKA¹⁴ brings aid to Bosnia. The same with the Yunus Emre Institute. I have seen them in Jerusalem. There are Yunus Emre cultural centers and TİKA branches in Bosnia and Jerusalem. The walls from Abdülhamid era are destroyed by Israel and the collapsed walls are still restored by TİKA. You still feel yourself responsible. It is because you have ethics, morals that are heritages of *ecdad*, grandparents. It is helping others in the cause of Allah.¹⁵ (Leyla, 30s, female)

Leyla’s referral to Indonesia demonstrates the oscillation between the ummah imaginary and a nationalist neo-Ottoman imaginary. While Bosnia and Syria are parts of a geography that one can intervene in, Indonesia remains a geography that is far away that it cannot intervene in neither Bosnia nor Syria. Yet, because Indonesia is seen still a part of the ummah, it is blamed for not helping. It is important to note that helping those from these geographies is not devoid of power relations. Helping and intervening also mean governing. It has power relations attached to it.

Therefore, although Leyla says Indonesia does not help, it can be articulated that Indonesia does not help but Turkey helps. Turkey becomes the one that takes initiative and responsibility. Therefore, Turkey’s governing of the Syrian refugees is legitimated and depoliticized. The Syrian tragedy is made sense of in conjunction with the Bosnian and Palestinian experiences. Then, Fadime intervenes,

¹⁴ TİKA (T.C. Başbakanlık Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı Başkanlığı – Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency) is an official institution under the Turkish Prime Ministry that operates soft power in countries that Turkey has historical and ethnical relations with. Their projects and activities cover a large range of fields from tourism, restoration and development to education and health.

¹⁵ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 4.

Looking after your legacy... I mean, those are lands remainder of the Ottomans. It is our legacy, heritage and we cannot let them go. You cannot let them go anyway.¹⁶ (Fadime, 30s, female)

Syria and Bosnia is mentioned with Palestine here. This is another point that needs attention since the Bosnian tragedy is remembered in conjunction with Palestinian tragedy. Apart from Chechnya, Palestine refers to the great pain endured by the Muslim populations. Therefore, there is an imagination of a geography that encompasses various states around Turkey, whom the past is shared with. The geography is no longer limited to the national boundaries but it refers to a larger area where the Muslim communities are going through pain and violence. Besides, Leyla a young married woman of early 30s, visited both Bosnia and Palestine, as opposed to other states. Her choice of visit reflects the geographical imagination. This geography is made sense of through shared culture and past. The larger geography is deemed experienced, although this generation is not necessarily the generation to be in the geography. Rather, having that sense of closeness and sharing with a larger geography makes people link Syria with other communities going through similar experiences. For instance, Songül is another interviewee that tells me traces of the Ottoman past is on Syrian lands:

When you observe the [Syrian] lands, when you look at *ecdad*, you see that there are our Ottomans' traces in almost half of Syria.¹⁷ (Songül, 40s, female)

The shared history is emphasized in these accounts. Shared history almost has a binding quality that glues two estranged societies together and metaphors of family and *ecdad*, which literally means grandparents and ancestors, reinforce this binding. The cultural heritage in the form of historical remains are deemed important. In this aspect, the interviewees' use of the phrase "our lands (*bizim topraklar*)" is

¹⁶ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 5.

¹⁷ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 6.

noteworthy. “Our lands” are used with “our ancestors” in order to form a familial relationship between Syria and Turkey. However, this relation usually takes an imperial form where the Ottoman center of Istanbul is elevated. The quotation also has a celebratory tone, in which there is celebration of the self over help given to the others. The Turkish help to the area is deemed important and it is explained through the shared past and ancestry. Therefore, the metaphor of family is accompanied by shared past and ancestry here. The metaphor of *eccdad* is quite significant and it refers to a process of forming familial relations between communities. In that sense, Bosnia is taken to be the founding act of the perspectives on the Syrian refugees through the metaphors of family and *eccdad*, which means the relations between the communities are closer and more binding than imagined.

Eccdad also refers to the hierarchical structure of the family. When the Syrian refugees are constructed as “our brothers and sisters”, the ancestors, *eccdad*, become the heads of the imagined family. *Eccdad* become the authority figures that has power over both the Turkish and Syrian communities. Yet, the Turkish communities feel more pride because there is celebration over who their ancestors are. In that sense, the metaphor of *eccdad* provides an opportunity of historicizing the imagined family. It is as if the familial discourses are used because the past is imagined in a way that it is made a genealogy of family history. When the Syrian refugees arrive, the past gets more personal and familial through metaphors of shared past and ancestry. The past is given meaning through close relations with the earlier generations and ancestors.

4.7 Conclusion

To conclude, the interviewees aim to conceptualize the Syrian refugees by comparing and contrasting them with their experiences and memories during the

Bosnian War and its aftermath since they both refer to violent processes leading to forced migration and displacement of people. These comparisons become important elements of mobilization of the Turkish society in refugee issue and works as reevaluation of the recent past. Yet, the Turkish involvement in the Syrian War is rather disguised in these accounts. Rather, the Bosnian War acts as a founding moment in order to reevaluate the recent past when the Syrian refugees arrive. The Bosnian and Syrian refugees are resembled and metaphors of family, brothers and sisters, shared past and ancestry. This imagined family is constructed against an “enemy”, which is “the West” that the conservative subject feels disillusionment with. The West imaginary is subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

THE DISILLUSIONMENT WITH “THE WEST”

5.1 Introduction

In the last chapter, I argued that the Bosnian War was of founding value in perspectives on the Syrian refugees in conservative circles. In this chapter, following the arguments in the last chapter, I argue that the Bosnian War mattered and it was rearticulated because it created a widespread disillusionment with “the West”.

During the Bosnian War, the Welfare Party at the time proposed an alliance with other majorly Muslim states in order to “resist and respond to the West” (Dağı, 2005, p. 25). The aim was not to have a more powerful organization that would stop the Western acts, but rather have an organ that would stand against the West. They argued that the West was employing double standards, and it was not fair. The Bosnian genocide in Europe was taken as the ultimate double standard against the Muslim identity in Europe and the West was re-articulated as the other of the Muslim religious identity. The moral authority of the West was challenged during the Bosnian War (Dağı, 2005, p. 26). The AKP’s early years were making peace with the West in order to implement democratization reforms. Similar to other experiences in Turkish history, the AKP turned pro-Western in order to implement democratization reforms that would also protect it from the Kemalist tutelage (Dağı, 2005, p. 32). The westernizer identity was, in a way, reclaimed from the Kemalists (Dağı, 2005, p. 33). However, it was not for long since the launch of a more neo-Ottomanist vision.

The Bosnian War demonstrates the failure of the West in the eyes of the conservative people. The Bosnian War affected the West’s discursive centrality and

authority in non-Western settings. Similarly, I hold that the ongoing Syrian Civil War fostered the anti-Western perspectives in society. Therefore, I discuss the conceptualization of the West in interviews on perspectives of the conservative people. In these interviews, the West refers to a rather ambivalent position. On the one hand, the West's moral authority is challenged, on the other hand, it still becomes the other of the Turkish subject. The West becomes a necessary evil that the Turkish subject constructs its identity against; yet there are also elements of discourses denouncing the West's position. Therefore, the West is both constructive and destructive.

The Western role in the Syrian War can be classified into two: during the war and its aftermath, especially in terms of migration. During the war, the West is articulated as the perpetrator of wars and violence whereas in its aftermath the West becomes the irresponsible agent, whereas Turkey becomes the one taking initiative by hosting the refugees. In these accounts, the West is not dismissed but repositioned in conjunction with the neo-Ottoman imaginary of the West that is a new articulation and criticism of the Kemalist understanding of the West. The friend-enemy discourse is articulated as well as the metaphors of disease and drugs in the context of westoxication.

5.2 Turkey and the West: An ambivalent relationship

Turkey's position against the West needs articulation. The adjective that would characterize the Turkish understanding of the West would probably be "ambivalent". For instance, Küçük (2009) argues that the position of Turkey against the West is always a question. Turkey is a bridge between the East and the West, but never one of them. It is because Turkey is not that Eastern, but also it is not European yet. Similarly, Duran (2013) holds that the Turkish government's relations with the West

could be explained through “critical integration” (p. 95). Turkey is not necessarily opposed to the West per se but rather critical of areas of collaboration with the West. It is not Eurocentric but it is not dismissive of the West altogether. The problem is having the West at the center in international area. Various social and political groups had their ambivalent positions regarding the West, from the Islamists to the leftists and the republicans (Aydın, 2004, p. 95). Aydın (2006) actually calls that almost all ideologies share degrees of anti-Westernism (p. 448). This made the West the ultimate other in Turkish social and political scene in modernization for decades, going back to the Tanzimat era.

The earlier criticisms of the West were regarding the imperial and colonial nature of the Western agenda in the Ottoman Empire. The reformation process under the Ottoman Empire symbolized the first symptoms of “alienation” (Aydın, 2006, p. 455). The Ottoman thinkers wrote on how these agendas were against the civilizing mission and Enlightenment ideas of the West claiming universality (Aydın, 2006, p. 448). The West was labeled as “the Crusader”. However, there was an attempt to reconcile the West with Islam (Aydın, 2006, p. 450). The Turkish modernization started with modernization of the army, then bureaucracy and ultimately everyday life (Dağı, 2005, p. 22). The support for or the opposition to Westernization made Westernization an identity-building phenomenon (Dağı, 2005, p. 22).

Therefore, the westernization efforts had not started with the early republic. Rather, earlier Ottoman attempts go back to the Tanzimat period. The aim was to modernize in a way to preserve the old Ottoman institutions and glory (Adıvar, 1935, p. 60). Adıvar (1935) analyzes the Westernization process from a perspective in which in the conflict between the East and the West, the West had “a greater chance of victory” (p. 69). Similarly, the disillusionment with the West was a feature of the

Balkan Wars. Adıvar (1935) holds that the European press at the time used medieval Crusader discourses, the cross was against the crescent (p. 78).

The relations with the West during the early republican history have been studied in detail, as the Kemalist regime was implementing a vast Westernization program. Although the Kemalist reforms took the Western model as an ideal, their relation with the West was not positive because the West was perceived “sinister, untrustworthy, and imperialistic” (Aydın, 2004, p. 95). The West was almost a necessarily evil that needs to be followed. It was “both inevitable and desirable” (Aydın, 2006, p. 449). The Kemalist ideology differentiated between two different understandings of the West: the universal West and the imperial, colonial West. The universal west was a role-model while the imperial west was sinister. Similar to the late Ottoman understanding, the West becomes a non-Western creation of universality and rationalism (Aydın & Hammer, 2006, p. 352). Positivism and secularism were products of European history; yet, in non-Western contexts in acquired a universal character (Göle, 1997a, p. 48). These concepts were not necessarily Western, but rational that could be applied to all societies. In fact, Aydın (2006) writes how various authors would call the West “arrogant, barbaric, old and cunning” during the early republican period although the government was following a westernization agenda (p. 451). The foreign policy of the time seems opposed to the West (Adıvar, 1930, p. 192). The West’s superiority was accepted because it referred to a universal superiority, not necessarily superiority of a specific social and cultural entity. This is also in conjunction with Turkish independence from European colonization which was an important marker of the Turkish society against the West. The Turkish independence from the West had an anti-colonial message.

The Kemalist agenda was “reforming, modernizing and secularizing” Turkish society (Göle, 1997a, p. 47), whereas democratization was a rather unpopular world. Secularization was the way to Westernization, not necessarily democratization (Göle, 1997a, p. 49). This was not unique to Turkey but other authoritarian democrat states of the region, including Iran and Egypt. Westernization connoted “an abandonment of Islam” (Dağı, 2005, p. 23). Westernization of the lifestyle was also one of the aims. Therefore, visibility of Westernization was important; symbols rather than substance was emphasized (Cizre & Çınar, 2002, p. 310). The question was whether it was possible to reform a Muslim society without changing their religion (Adivar, 1930, p. 77). The Kemalist response was rather ambivalent. The Kemalist wished to change the religious attachments, yet it was not easy; therefore, the regime focused on controlling the religious sphere. Therefore, Halide Edib takes the adoption of the civil law, instead of revision of the Ottoman family law based on shariat, as one of the crucial demonstrators of Westernization efforts of the Kemalist reforms (Adivar, 1930, p. 227). The fixed feature of Muslim societies was the Islamic rules they followed, shariat; therefore, changing it would provide mechanisms to change the Muslim society. This is why Adivar emphasizes the adoption of Swiss civil law as one of the crucial Kemalist reforms. Civil law which deals with daily life and family was no longer a venture of the shariat, an important step towards Westernization (Adivar, 1935, p. 123).

For instance, Halide Edib Adivar is one of the famous authors that produced on the subject of conflicts between the East and the West. Halide Edib asks “quovadis, Turkey” and holds that Turkey should head towards wherever the West heads; yet, highlights the importance of the East, calling it a part of our [biological, physical] structure (Adivar, 1928, p. 248). So, she advises following the trends in the

East from an objective point of view. She argues that the East also effects the West; yet, she does not observe any strong movements in the East to take as an example.

Adıvar (1928) calls the Westernization efforts a necessity:

As a Turk I know that we are destined to become Western, whether we like it or not. We are too advanced on the Western road to turn back, but as an individual and Asiatic I do very much hope that the East will keep her individuality and her soul. (Adıvar, 1928)

Adıvar (1928) later adds: “If the Western civilization collapsed in the world, still the Turks would be its champions for a few centuries at least”. In that sense, occidentalism was used in order to foster the Kemalist reforms (Aydın, 2006, p. 451 & Ahıska, 2010). Occidentalism is a rather curious concept to explain. It has a certain essentialization of the West in accordance with certain positive images (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 480). Halide Edib also writes on Turkey as “the very best laboratory in which a student of history can make his researches on the conflict of East and West” (Adıvar, 1935, p. 1). This conflict characterizes the Turkish identity.

5.3 The conservative criticisms of the West

Anti-Westernism was articulated as a founding idea in various anti-Kemalist groups (Aydın, 2006, p. 448), and the conservative circles’ opposition to the West characterized their position in Turkey (Dağı, 2005, p. 21). However, both Kemalist and conservative accounts agree on that “the West exists” and “it created modernity” (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 499). Turkey, or Islam, versus the West has been an important part of the conservative rhetoric; and this is followed by “neither East nor West” (Moghadam, 1993, p. 245). Yet, the conservative criticism differentiated the West from modernity; thus, it refuted that the Islamic culture is not capable of modern change (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 483). Modernization symbolized a certain possibility of emancipation; whereas, Westernization was deemed as alienation and

enslavement (Dağı, 2005, p. 23). These were problematic because the social space of Islam was being limited (Dağı, 2005, p. 23). The conservative characterization of modernization was not equal to Westernization. In fact, they did not have a problem with modernization per se but rather with Westernization in the hands of the Westernizer, in other words, Kemalist elites (Dağı, 2005, p. 34). The conservative intelligentsia was not against the West per se but the Kemalist use of westernization (Aydın, 2006, p. 453). Westernization came with secularism, *laiklik* that limited the religion's role in society aiming to limit its role to the private life. The criticism against the West is also directed to the Westernized elite of the republic (Göle, 1997a, p. 57). The concept of the elite per se disregarded the religious intelligentsia.

The Turkish conservative circles have a few names that produced on the concept with the West. Cemil Meriç and Nurettin Topçu are two of these names. These authors' works circulate vastly in these groups. Cemil Meriç, for instance, does not call modernization process Westernization but associates alienation and displacement of identities with modernization (Poyraz, 2006, p. 434). He regards the republican project of "hasty" reforms destroy the cultural harmony in the society (Poyraz, 2006, p. 434). The West, however, is associated with freethinking. But, the West does not connote a geography per se but rather an understanding, a vision possessing freethinking. Therefore, the West cannot be Western at all times. In fact, he classifies "a cannibal Europe" and "a thinking Europe" (Poyraz, 2006, p. 442). That is why, according to Meriç, the Turkish intelligentsia and politicians are at fault when they imitate the West without knowing what the West stands for (Poyraz, 2006, p. 440). He gives the example of sartorial reforms as shallow imitations of the West, whereas he thinks European thought and philosophy must be studied (Poyraz, 2006, p. 444). Therefore, Meriç does not take the West as a problem per se, but

rather cites shallow imitations of the West as a problem. He criticizes the republican elite from this perspective. The republican reforms are problematic because they do not take the West as freethinking but in its superficiality; therefore, they create alienation of the higher classes from society (Poyraz, 2006, p. 444).

Topçu is another thinker that relied on criticisms of the West in his thought. However, his thought is characterized by the Anatolian Islam (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 492). His thoughts are marked by a certain Anatolian nationalism. He advocated a revival of the Anatolian Islam through giving examples from Western renaissance and reformation periods (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 494). However, Topçu finds the Kemalist reforms from above still problematic and argues that they connote a certain Crusader mentality (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 498).

There is a distinction between the material side of the West and its spiritual side. The materialistic side of the West both connoted technological advancements, and its violent aftermath in terms of colonization, exploitation and violence (Dağı, 2005, p. 23). On the spiritual side, the West was deemed degenerate and flawed. Adivar (1935) also holds the Westerner as having a lack of proportion between materialism and spiritualism (p. 8). The West represents moral decadence although it is technologically advanced (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 484). The family relations are the most important markers of decadence, as well as the religious practices. Kısakürek calls this situation the Western crisis, the crisis of the West that stems from “the shortage of spiritual order, faith and morality” (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 487). However, what he proposed was rather a synthesis of Muslim spirituality with the Western rationality (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 487). The essentialist representations of the West rely on the ideas circulating in Europe (Aydın & Duran, 2013, p. 499), such as ideas taking Europe as a Christian civilization (Shakman

Hurd, 2006, p. 401). However, both religion and secularism are characteristics of the European identity (Shakman Hurd, 2006, p. 417).

5.4 The West in a friend-enemy discourse

In my interview with Musa and Erkan, in addition to familial discourses regarding the Bosnian War, there is longing for the past and its re-articulation and a wish for its restoration as in Boym's explanation of restorative nostalgia. When Turkey becomes the center, not a part of the periphery, the centralization of the West gets problematized. Therefore, the enemy of this scheme becomes "the West" that threatens the familial relations between Turkish and Bosnian, Syrian identities in which the past acquires central importance. The West becomes the ultimate perpetrator of violence and war in the geography.

Towards the end of that interview, Erkan got frustrated over the question on international agents' role in current Syrian crisis. I have asked the role of international actors to all my interviewees including Erkan. I was particularly interested what their thoughts on the international actors' handling of the refugee crisis are; since Turkey accepts a huge percent of the Syrian refugees, whereas Europe's share is rather small. This point has been a subject of Turkish political discourse as well. Therefore, I expected this to create affects on my interviewees as well as to influence their discursive framework. My expectations were realized. The questions on other international actors' positions created affective economies in which almost all of the interviewees took the international sphere as "the West". Therefore, the discourse of the West constitutes a large ground in which the West increasingly becomes the other of the Turkish identity when the Syrian refugees arrive and it gets reevaluated.

When answering my question, Erkan picks an accusative tone and addresses the international actors by calling them out. He means the European, American and Israel as “the West” in his discourses. He uses the pronoun “you” as if he speaks to a person in order to refer to the West:

The international actors do nothing. They don't do anything. They build obstacles so that they [the refugees] wouldn't come. Scoundrels! You [the West] started it. The Arab Spring? Whose spring is it? Am I the one that have done all these things? Am I the one who armed all these groups? Am I the one who have sold rockets to ISIS? When they come here, what is the first thing they do? They have occupied the oil wells. What do the oil wells mean? An oil barrel is sold for 50 dollars in international markets. How much do you get from these barrels? Who buys these? Is it Turkey? No, you are the buyer. But, it is the West they say. See the contrast? You are the burglar! You are shameless and the murderer. You are the one arming that group [the ISIS] there. You buy those guys' oil for a lira, if it is 5 liras, and you don't give them any money. What do they do instead? They give them weapons. You financed this group. You created terror. What else would you do? People have become refugees and they get drowned in seas. This is not your problem. You are not interested in rehabilitating people and doing them good. You are a selfish murderer. I mean the West. I mean Israel. This is not because I speak out of anger and partiality. You have to view things through justice. How come do they know what justice is? Am I the one who buys oil? You buy it. If you but it, then you are the burglar. You are the murderer. You are the founder of that group.¹⁸ (Erkan, 40s, male)

Referring to the West as if it is a person is a rather important aspect. It makes the West the audience of discourses. He talks to the West in order to be heard. He wants the West to hear him and respond to him, although he believes that the West will not be able to refute his criticisms. I chose to have this quotation because it demonstrates a rather clear perspective on the West. Erkan's accounts treat the West as a monolithic entity that is characterized by negative features such as being greedy, promoting terrorism and violence. There is not much ambivalence in his accounts. The West is associated with terror, darkness and greed. The West is characterized by a certain utilitarianism that only considers its well-being and does not care of the

¹⁸For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 7.

others. The others of the West are non-Westerners, and the non-Westerners are not of value. The value itself is very rationalized in the Western sense. It is not a spiritual value. The Western value refers to a utilitarian value system, it needs to be profitable. In that sense, the reason the West is associated with negative qualities is ultimately related to utilitarianism. Although the West is not inherently bad, it adopts such utilitarian means that it makes it greedy and inhuman. These utilitarianism leads to a process in which the West ultimately becomes the reason why all wars take place.

Ayhan, another interviewee, relies on a discourse in which the West is opportunistic and always thinking of its economic interests. Ayhan runs a think tank that researches abuses of human rights. The think tank especially focuses on abuses of rights in Europe studying Islamophobia. He actively follows the current affairs and proposes his commentary on these affairs. During the interviews, he gives the example of London local elections. Ayhan tells me why Sadiq Khan, London's first Muslim major, was elected:

They [the London residents] have elected a Muslim-origin major in London. It is a totally political move. Having a Muslim major will bring Arab investors and the Arabs will feel safe. According to the English, the Arabs mean money. When you visit England, there are all these vacant buildings and apartments. Perhaps, they have been vacant for years. These belong to princes and the rich. They keep it just to have an image but keep it empty. They maybe stay there for 3-10 days keeps it empty otherwise. It is just to have the image [of owning an apartment in England].¹⁹ (Ayhan, 50s, male)

The London major's being Muslim-origin and his election are all commercial and economic. This is not political. It totally depends on economic, commercial reasons because there is a need for hot money . . . We don't think that way. We don't think the Syrian rich may invest in Turkey. This is naïve. Maybe it is humane but it is not realistic.²⁰ (Ayhan, 50s, male)

¹⁹ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 8.

²⁰ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 9.

Before telling me about Sadiq Khan, Ayhan told me how in previous decades the Turkish people kicked out the Arab investors from Istanbul. He told me how the Turkish treat the Arabs as if they were inferior. However, Ayhan says “the West accepted them [the Arab people] with open heart because they had economic expectations from them²¹” (Ayhan, 50s, male). Although there is associating the West with calculating economic interests, in a way, Ayhan finds it smart, because not calculating the interests implies naivety. Economic interests and calculative approach implies having a utilitarian attitude, and he associates the West with this understanding of utilitarianism. A contrast between the humane and the economic is constructed. However, there is a rather ambivalent tone. On the one hand, the West is deemed smart for having an economic mind. Having a utilitarian discourse and seeking economic interest is presented as the way people behave or should behave. For instance, in Ayhan’s account, if the Arabs were encouraged to invest in Turkey in prior terms, the Turkish economy would flourish more. Therefore, the European decision to let the Arab investors in their countries is a smart move that Turkey should have followed. On the other hand, seeking economic and material interests is deemed inhuman from the start. In that sense, perspectives on the refugees could not take a utilitarian tone, because it is inhuman to do so. The West’s utilitarian attitude is criticized and presented as an incorrect example that Turkey should not follow.

When I ask Osman what he thinks of the other international actors and agencies approaches to the Syrian issue, he gives me a perspective regarding the West.

When we compare other countries with Turkey, except for Germany and Switzerland, I would say that the West hasn’t given a good account of itself. The Western world was scared and frightened of the Syrian refugees saying “How are we going to look after them? How to host them? They are from a

²¹. For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 10.

different culture. If the Muslims come here, Christianity will be in danger.” I think it was Hungary who said to only get Christian refugees. Unfortunately, the West didn’t give a good account of itself. People drowning in the Mediterranean... We all watched it, it was in front of the whole world. Europe put barriers up both in political and cultural senses. There were ethnical, religious, political and cultural barriers. You have to accept that. It was not a good test for them. It considered “What happens if they come? Would our order get halt? What would happen to our socio-cultural and sociological [order]?” It is because Europe lives according to order. But Turkey did not do it. Turkey’s approach was totally conscientious. It acted in accordance with religion, traditions, culture, customs and manners.²² (Osman, 40s, male)

In this account, the West has failed the test of accepting and hosting the Syrian refugees. Once again, the West is used interchangeably with Europe. It showed how there are barriers against the non-Europeans in their countries. Being non-European is also associated with being non-Christian. Osman thinks Christianity is one of the defining elements of the European identity and gives the Hungary’s declaration that they would only accept Christian Syrian refugees as an example. This is related to how Europeans live according to rules and order, whereas the Turkish response has a conscientious side where it accepts the refugees no matter what conditions it is in. This resembles Ayhan’s account in which he deems the Western perspective utilitarian. In that sense, being utilitarian is linked to being orderly. Yet, being orderly and relying on non-conscientious principles is deemed inhuman when there is a human tragedy in the form of displacement and migration of millions of people. Therefore, the Turkish response is articulated to be more humane and it draws from religion, culture, customs and traditions. When the West is imagined to be utilitarian, the non-Western is claimed to be the opposite of the rational, interest calculating image. In that sense, Osman holds that there are some essential qualities of being Turkish and living in Anatolia, a land mixed with various identities, the migrants’

²² For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 11.

land in a way: “Hospitality is extended to the other in our historical experiences, religion, belief systems, traditions and customs²³”. Then, the Turkish and Islamic becomes conscientious, humane, compassionate as opposed to the West:

Europe erects political, religious and status barriers. It does not say “humans are first.” It prioritizes its security, not human security. The West has this egoist approach. In Turkey, there is this belief in predestination that comes from traditions in Eastern societies. We say Allah is the guarantor. We say the guests come with their fortunes. This comes from beliefs. It does not mean anything in the West. There is no translation of *nasip* [foreordination] in the West²⁴. (Osman, 40s, male)

The idea of interest, seeing the refugees from the viewpoint of economic interest are characterizing feature of the West, according to the interviewees. When accepting refugees, there is this idea that they should be of use in the Western setting.

Therefore, there is a selection among the refugees. However, they argue that Turkey does not have this perspective since it has an open-door policy in order to host people escaping the oppression in their country. Osman historicizes the Turkish attitude towards refugees. His understanding of the Ottoman past relies on the empire’s tolerant attitude towards the incoming immigrants. Going to the past and studying it are important parts of seeing where countries stand at the refugee issue; and in this scheme, the West represents how to act realistically and economically, in utilitarian terms including the situations of war and violence. Even if the West is not actively in war, it is hold to be the reason why wars erupt in the first place.

Therefore, the West is, in a sense, the mastermind behind all violence. These negative features make the West “the enemy” in Erkan’s discourse:

But this state could fix these problems. This state could rehabilitate things. It can achieve these by acknowledging the obligation that comes from the history. It is not about running projects following Western examples. It is not how it goes. The West is our enemy till the end. It has never been our friend.

²³ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 12.

²⁴ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 13.

It will never be humane. They are cruel. We haven't distinguished the people from Bosnia with the Syrians.²⁵ (Erkan, 40s, male)

A similar pattern is in Ayhan's discourses. He relies on a friend-enemy distinction in order to explain the relations with the West:

When we started our Islamophobia project, some people called it an operation against Europe saying Europe is not Islamophobic and there is tolerance for Muslims. On the contrary, it is the opposite. Europe is the Muslims' enemy.²⁶ (Ayhan, 50s, male)

Relying on a discourse of friend and enemy is very crucial. I take it as demonstrative of how the relations with the West are constructed in a dichotomy. In this framework, the West is either the friend or the enemy; and it cannot be anything in between. Similarly, the friend-enemy discourse articulates two actors, the West and the non-Western, whether it is Turkish, Middle Eastern, Islamic, or Eastern. When the West is taken as a monolithic concept, the relations with the West are constructed in a dichotomous manner. The West is not a recent "enemy" but its position against the Turkish identity is historicized. Erkan argues that the West has never been a "friend" in history and the relations with the West always had conflicts. Therefore, he does not take the West as a role model. Erkan's account provides the Ottoman imperial, but not colonial, history as a legacy that must be followed rather than the Western examples. Giving examples from the Iraq invasion and oil prices, Erkan calls the West "burglar" and "murderer", and he later holds that the West disguises itself. This seems to be the other major problem with the West. The West not only perpetuates wars; the West perpetuates wars in disguise, not openly. Erkan follows his narrative by relying on a verse from Quran. He says those who raise unrest in the region disguise themselves being ameliorators. These are in the context of how

²⁵ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 14.

²⁶ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 15.

people have started leaving their countries in the first place. Erkan treats “the West” as the ultimate enactors of unrest in the region. Erkan holds that the Western models, including democracy, should be criticized. He treats democracy as a Western concept that the Muslims should not use:

Unfortunately, the Muslims use the notion of democracy, too. Democracy is a Western lie and a toy. People think it means what human rights in Islam is. Even the fact that it comes from Latin means we shouldn’t use it. Especially the notion of democracy... We are Muslim. Islam means justice and compassion. It means fraternity and sharing. It means taking an upright stand against oppression with your property, life and everything. But the West tackles unrests. They are the ones who start the wars.²⁷ (Erkan, 40s, male)

Therefore, there is an understanding of a “two-faced” West that imposes double standards. On the one hand, human rights and liberties are taken as the core European values and these European values are deemed universal. On the other hand, these values are criticized for not being applied to everyone. The Syrian refugees and the Western opposition to the Syrian refugees’ arrival to the West is given as a concrete example that the Western values are in denial. This is conjunction with perpetuating conflicts and violence in disguise.

Furthermore, this account creates an opposition between the West and Islam, although categorically they refer to different levels. The West is associated both with a different religion, or lack of *the* religion, Islam. The West is not only a political, social and cultural product but it also refers to a religious entity, and religion also connotes a major difference between two civilizations. The West’s cultural aspects will be analyzed in more detail in the next section.

²⁷ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 16.

5.5 The discourse on “westoxication”

Ayhan is the head of a publishing house and a think tank in Üsküdar. I argue that Ayhan’s accounts are particularly demonstrative of the discourse on “westoxication”. My interview with him on perspectives on the Syrian refugees in Turkey and hospitality shown or withdrawn to the refugees has focused on how there is a cultural and moral change in Turkish society. Ayhan holds that the West is ruining the essence of the Turkish, which is also Anatolian, values.

Actually, we are not a natural society, either. We have been deformed and degenerated. The way we view neighbor relations... In old times, actually not that long but fifteen years ago, the guests were considered when houses were designed. Perhaps our houses are twice as large as before but we don’t have a tendency to have guests over. We don’t practice it anymore. You think it is a burden. This changes your opinions on having guests over. We have become a society that doesn’t even host its own kind.²⁸ (Ayhan, 50s, male)

Ayhan analyzes the relations between host and guest societies through the transformation of Turkish society. Anatolia represents a clean slate. For instance, the Anatolian people were “asked to shoulder the responsibilities of the crisis” and they successfully did during the War of Independence (Adivar, 1928). Being Anatolian was associated with a certain practical wisdom, having a human element that knows the value of the country and freedom (Adivar, 1928). Degeneration of the society is a key term he makes sense of social change. In this scheme, the perspectives on the Syrians are used for reflecting over social change in Turkish society. He tells me his relations with the neighbors in Kadıköy, where he lives for fifteen years. Although he is the building manager, he says he has not been invited to any of the buildings. People say hello to each other and make small talk, but having somebody over at home is not practiced. He invites people over for tenants’ meeting, though. However, even though he invited people for a meeting, people proposed to meet outside the

²⁸ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 17.

building, at a café house. Following that, he connects this change to Westernization and its detrimental effects on the society. He says:

We have become a wild society. We are not normal. It is as if only the other side [the Syrians] is like that. If we think having our own people over is a burden, naturally we will remain at bay to the other. This is not a reaction against the Syrians specifically. We have social degeneration. Essentially, this is not how this society is. When we produce thought... We have opposite thoughts on things with the West, even if we share same practices. The West does not have a notion like that [helping others]. "I don't have to help them." But we feel obliged to help them [the Syrians] but our practices are close to the West, or even the same. Our thoughts are complete opposite, though.²⁹ (Ayhan, 50s, male)

But what is indigenous about Anatolia and the Turkish people?

The thing is, a Turkish person going to Europe does not think they will settle in Europe. We have analyzed this subject [in our reports]. When you go to Europe, you see that the Arabs have founded NGOs to research Islamophobia and they are more experienced when it comes to social demands. However, the Turkish-founded organizations almost have no education on these issues. This is not related lack of knowledge. The Arabs feel that they belong to Europe. They say "I will live here from now on." The Turk does not feel belonging. The Turks want to be able to return to their country anytime.³⁰

When I ask why he thinks this is the case:

It is the way it is. This is the case. The Westernized, even those who feel mentally close to Europe suffer from homesickness. They say they will return. Even the second and third generations there have and feel this idea or return. It is how we view the refugees. We said they came but they will return. We cannot imagine that they will stay here. We think they will act like us. Maybe after some time, we have understood how they are not like us and how they will stay and settle here.³¹ (Ayhan, 50s, male)

Although there is this patriotic essence, Ayhan also mentions social degeneration.

Westernization seems to not eliminate the patriotic essence, rather patriotism is taken for granted. It is referred as the ordinary, normal way of things. No matter how Westernized people are, they still possess love for their country. This rotting is connected with the Kemalist understanding of modernization as Westernization,

²⁹ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 18.

³⁰ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 19.

³¹ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 20.

which will be discussed in the next section. The West is seen as a perpetrator that damages the essential Turkish identity. He gives the example that Kadıköy is the only district in Islam that does not host refugees. Ayhan calls this process becoming wild, which is not normal, which keeps society away from its core, its essence. There is an Anatolian essence, he holds:

I have seen a statistic lately. According to police records, Kadıköy is the only district [in Istanbul] where there are no refugees. Probably the highest number of refugees is in Sultanbeyli. This gives us the picture. The refugees live more in Anatolia, in undegenerated societies. Üsküdar hosts as much refugees as Anatolian it is. How close are Kadıköy, Bakırköy, Beşiktaş, Şişli to Anatolia? This is not about a specific municipality or a politician . . . If that space preserves its Anatolianness, then spaces having similar characteristics would host refugees as much as they can. It is not because Kadıköy is very modern that they don't host refugees. It has lost its Anatolianness, its indigeneness. It has started thinking like a Westerner, to be more precise. A society that has finished its integration with the Western values. I think it is a society that has become primitive. It strays from its values. Naturally, there are no refugees in Kadıköy. It is not because it is evil. They would look after dogs but say "we don't have to host refugees." It is not because it is anti-humane. There is a shift in values. It is not good, nor bad. It needs cure.³²

Throughout the interview, Ayhan gives Kadıköy as a counter-example what Üsküdar represents.

If a German refugee comes, what would the Kadıköy residents think? They might accept them. Probably, they would. It is about perceptions that are created. My kids were told they would have new foreign friends. They were thrilled expecting English, German, Dutch friends. It turned out that they were Arab kids. They were displeased. This is the sign of a society and social structures that go through social manipulation. Islamic society, African society are societies that have gone through social manipulation. They were manipulated. The white race, the higher race is prioritized. A refugee from Europe would be embraced by those who do not even have a sense of help but they would not embrace refugees from Africa or the Middle East.³³

³² For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 21.

³³ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 22.

When I ask what he means by manipulation and if there are degrees of getting manipulated, Ayhan actually explains what he means through the metaphor of using drugs:

If a society embraces the refugees, it means that they haven't gone through high dosages of manipulation that would affect their humanity. There are still traces of drugs, though. When they evaluate Islam, they may say "We cannot keep up with these demands". It means that they are on small doses, maybe around 20 percent. Here, they [the Kadıköy residents] are addicted to drugs, they have been manipulated. They say "Islam is primitive. One should be like the Westerns, contemporary and modern". It means they are addicted to drugs. The other society [the society accepting refugees] is on a habit basis. They smoke it, they get high but they can return to normal. They still have it, though. If they didn't have it, they wouldn't behave that way and we would become a more religious society. The Middle Eastern society has low esteem now. The African society has even higher dosages. They have come to a point where they hate themselves. The superiority of white men... Being European, contemporary and modern... There is this reflex to espouse the societies and thoughts that are not yours. We have that, too. It is because we don't have a solid system of thought.³⁴

Ayhan uses the drug metaphor in order to explain the effects of Westernization, to be more clear excess Westernization, at society. I find the drug metaphor rather curious. The drug metaphor refers to a state of mind that is not authentic, that changes the subject and makes it numb. Numbness is inner to the subject and has vast effects on society. The drug metaphor is used in conjunction with the discourse of manipulation. The choice of the word manipulation is crucial. Manipulation refers to a change that destroys your inner form. Manipulation is managing and influencing in a skillful manner in order to affect the other's way of thinking. If you are manipulated, you are no longer your true self but you are broken, you are under influence of another force. Therefore, both manipulation and the drug metaphor demonstrate a change of the self in a negative manner. Drugs refer to a disease, something that change your biological constitution. Ultimately, drugs kill you from

³⁴ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 23.

within. It refers to a temporary period of highness and relaxation; yet, addiction to the drug is a problem, and that addiction is found unhealthy. The state of being addicted to something that is exterior, outside to you is deemed problematic. It makes the subject drift away from its “true” self and values. The local values are no longer prioritized. There is a certain alienation from the society one is in. You are no longer a part of the society anymore. The problem is, however, one is no longer part of any society. There is alienation from feelings of belonging and it is made sense of by attaching yourself to another sphere, sphere of the West. The West becomes the object of addiction, something that makes the subject forget its nature and values.

The drug metaphor exists in the Turkish context. The conservative, religious critiques included references to the West through diseases. Although the West was materially superior, it was morally inferior and by following the western doctrines, the Turkish moral life was getting inferior. The West symbolized the moral decay. The West was individualistic, materialist and decadent; and similar metaphors are used in the Iranian discourses through the term “westoxication”. Westoxication, Weststruckness, Occidentosis, while it is originally *gharbzadegi* in Farsi, refers to the disease that you get from the West (Moghadam, 1993, p. 245). The term is coined by Iranian author Jalal Al-i Ahmad in order to criticize the excess Westernization in Iranian society. Al-i Ahmad gives the example of a disease that rots the plant from within in order to explain westoxication (Hanson, 1983, p. 9). Westernization is taken to be political, economic and cultural imperialism and its effects are deemed destructive of the biological make-up of the body. It breaks the body and makes it sick. This is a rather strong criticism of Westernization. Westernization and its effects are too strong that it affects the body itself. His other criticisms include dependence on the West and cultural imperialism. He classifies the

world into two, as the East and the West but holds that his classification is not geographical but economic (Al-i Ahmad, 1984, p. 28). The West refers to sated states and societies, whereas the East is hungry. This is a great dichotomous conceptualization. The West is “the wealthy, the powerful, the makers and exporters of manufactures”, while the East is “the poor, the impotent, the importers and consumers” (Al-i Ahmad, 1984, p. 28). One refers to progress, while the other is associated with stagnation. An important criticism of the West is directed to its colonial past and its ongoing effects. Al-i Ahmad not only takes the economic aspect, but includes spheres of education and culture into his analysis on colonialism.

Since it is a disease, it needs diagnosis and then, cure (Al-i Ahmad, 1984, p. 27). The solution to westoxication is rather ambivalent but it involves going back to a pure Islamic and local culture; and there is reassertion of the pure culture (Moghadam, 1993, p. 245). The pure culture connotes a certain autonomy that the locals should embrace (Algar, 1984, p. 13). Ayhan does not pose any cure per se, but he means that the reasons for the disease is the lack of authentic system of thought.

The West becomes the other through various dichotomies created in order to explain it, including the friend-enemy antagonism. The West and the rest dichotomy is highlighted and reproduced (Moghadam, 1993, p. 249). The Western identity remains fixed and monolithic (Moghadam, 1993, p. 258). Differentiating among different Western states and societies is rare. The relation between the East and the West is not the problem per se but rather the problem stems from the West’s colonial approach and how the East is pushed to a status of inferiority in front of the West (Hanson, 1983, p. 9). Therefore, Al-i Ahmad’s westoxication thesis is not on Iran per se but rather it covers a wide range of states and societies in the East; yet the conflict between Islam and the West is prioritized (Algar, 1984, p. 15). This is especially the

case when Al-i Ahmad proposes a revival of Islam in order to overcome westoxication.

Algar mentions Mehmet Doğan's (1997) *Batılulaşma İhaneti* (The treachery that is Westernization) as a similar book giving the message of westoxication in a non-Iranian setting, in Turkey. Doğan is an author that writes on the Turkish language, society and problems surrounding these areas. *Batılulaşma İhaneti* was first published in 1975 and it acquired fame in conservative circles, including Cemil Meriç's praise of the book calling it a piece of accusation. Doğan challenges taken-for-granted aspects of Westernization in Turkey. His main argument is that Westernization refers to a certain alienation, metamorphosis from the self (Doğan, 1997, p. 193). He takes Westernization as a process of differentiation from one's true self. It refers to a process in which the subject is no more the subject that was in the beginning. Secondly, he holds that this transformation takes place through suppression from the others; these suppressions are both open and disguised (Doğan, 1997, p. 11). In other words, Westernization takes place because it is imposed on state and society. Yet, there are reactions against this imposition. Westernization refers to some groups' alienation from the society. In fact, Doğan (1997) describes these groups as "ape-like" (p. 12).

Similarly, he uses the disease metaphor to explain Westernization. He quotes Said Halim Pasha:

The West enthusiasts' features resemble people who read medicine books in order to prevent diseases and achieve perfect health. In the end, these people think they have caught all the diseases and they make life a burden that they compulsorily tolerate, and they view life as a helpless, long misery.³⁵ (Doğan, 1997)

³⁵ For the original passage of this translated text, see Appendix A, 6.

The criticism is this: Westernization takes place incorrectly, “the real essence” of the West is missed and Westernization is carried out through outward and formal measures (Al-i Ahmad, 1984, p. 31). The copyist technique is criticized (Doğan, 1997, p. 112). Doğan twists the use of the word contemporary. In the official discourse, Westernization is associated with being contemporary. Yet, Doğan (1997) argues that Westernization is an outdated practice for Turkey, and he holds that Turkish modernization of more than 200 years was a process of further decay and colonization by the outside forces (p. 113).

5.6 Conclusion

To conclude, the arrival of Syrian refugees make the interviewees reevaluate the concept of the West. There is a production and reproduction of disillusionment with the West in the interviews. The West becomes the enemy of the imaginary family of the Turkish and Syrian communities. The West becomes a necessary evil that the local identity needs in order to construct its subjectivity; yet there is an aim of overcoming the West’s discursive centrality. Therefore, there is an ambivalent position attached to the West; while the West is deemed destructive of the true essence of the Turkish identity, the Turkish subject also needs it in order to construct themselves. This ambivalence of the West becomes important when mobilizing around the refugee issue. This is achieved through metaphors of friend-enemy and drugs, diseases. The disillusionment with the West is also related to Kemalist projects of modernization as Westernization, which is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

KEMALISM AS THE ULTIMATE OTHER

6.1 Introduction

In previous chapters, I have argued that the Bosnian war becomes a founding moment for neo-Ottoman affect and discourse. The Bosnian War's founding moment is related to criticisms of the West. In this chapter, I hold that although people were criticizing the West, the real target seems to be the Kemalist ideology. I discuss Kemalism in conjunction with the new nation imaginary with the arrival of Syrian refugees, and argue that the Kemalist ideology becomes the ultimate other, not the Syrian others. In other words, the Syrian refugees are not otherized as much as the Kemalist ideology. The Kemalist ideology, once again, is deemed the ultimate challenger against the conservative, religious identity. Anti-Kemalist criticisms have been influential forming a conservative, religious subjectivity. The Syrian identity does not become a problem but the Kemalist ideology is reproduced as a problem, an issue again. This problematization takes criticisms of the early republican Kemalist reforms at the center. There is perpetuation of criticisms of Kemalist reforms with the arrival of Syrian refugees, which makes society question the foundations of Kemalist nation. Kemalism is deemed problematic because it promotes laiklik, it has a strict Turkish nationalism, it abolished the caliphate and it takes modernization as Westernization. Metaphors of vandalism and values in the larger theme of forced forgetting are used in order to discuss and criticize the Kemalist ideology. I argue that nostalgia and privatization of the refugee issue are driving forces behind neo-Ottoman hegemony. Nostalgia for the Ottoman past and reproducing that past

become meaningful when the Kemalist principles of national identity on religion could be relaxed.

6.2 The setting and features of Kemalism

I have contacted Özge after getting her name from Melike and Halid, one of the first interviewees who run a small restaurant in Üsküdar. During our interview, they referred to Özge from time to time and recommended her for my thesis saying her insights could be what I was looking for. They told me Özge was very devoted to visiting Syrian families on a regular basis and keeping dialogue as the basis of her solidarity with the Syrian refugees for almost four years. What she aims is not to bring extravagant gifts to children and families, but rather keeping things regular and consistent. Following their advice, I have contacted Özge, she agreed to do the interview and invited me to her office close to the Üsküdar square.

Her office was a small, cold room but stuffed with all kinds of books, assignments, and bundles of paper. Some of the things that have caught my attention were pieces of Arabic calligraphy and books of Said Nursi. There were also some boxes that were waiting to be brought to the refugees. In fact, before our interview had started, a man brought 5-6 pairs of pants and delivered them to Özge. After she accepted the pants and the man left, she told me that he was one of the conscious tradesman around and was willing to help with whatever he has on hand. Then, she poured me a glass of tea with some cinnamon while I found myself a space on the edge of the couch. The noon prayer was called during the earlier moments of our interview and Özge stopped talking in order to listen to the call to prayer carefully. Later, she made a prayer and told me to include it in my thesis. The prayer was not necessarily about the refugees but demanding good wishes for all.

Özge is very articulate and relies on mostly Arabic vocabulary. She tells me she is a writer but she keeps writing to a minimum now that she spends most of her time with the Syrian refugees, mostly in Fatih county, though. I thought she was mostly active in Üsküdar considering the tradesman that just walked in was one of the people from her network, but that was not the case. Her main geography of work was Fatih.

I take Özge's interview as the central interview that posits the Kemalist ideology as the ultimate other. In this case, the Syrian refugees are not described as the others, but they are included in the newly forming society; but the Kemalist ideology becomes the other that differentiated the Arab, Syrian identities in the first place. My interview with her gives me the basic tenets of neo-Ottoman criticism of Kemalism and yearning for the Ottoman past. The conservative perspectives on the Syrian refugees do not have an independent place of their own. Rather, the Kemalist ideology becomes "the other" of the conservative sensibilities. In that sense, it is important to view conservative and religious perspectives with their relations to the Kemalist perspective. Apart from being political ideologies, different "lifestyle, behavioral practices, and ideological positions" (White, 2002, p. 30) are associated with Kemalism and conservatism and these connote their social side making them social constructs. For instance, White (2002) writes that "self-defined Kemalists imagine themselves to be "modern," liberal, secular, and individualistic", they treat non-Kemalists to be "traditional," authoritarian, patriarchal, religiously fanatic, and collectivist" (p. 31). The relationality between the two is worth mentioning and these concepts and as well as their relation to each other are prone to change and transform (White, 2002, p. 8). While "the Kemalists' cultural Other" becomes the religious and conservative (White, 2002, p. 32); the religious people's other becomes the

Kemalists and the differentiation had not just political but “emotional, personal and symbolic levels” (Göle, 1997b).

But, what is Kemalism? The Kemalist secularist worldview derives from Kemal Atatürk’s founding principles of the republic. Although Atatürk was a politician and a military leader, not necessarily a theoretician; his conceptualization of the founding principles of the new nation-state as the Turkish republic has been vital and referred to Kemalism, or Kemalist ideology. Kemalism’s greatest aim was to modernize the society according to Western principles with reforms from above in order to achieve quick social and political change. Official Kemalist principles were written in RPP’s party program in 1931. Kemalism was composed of six principles. These were republicanism, secularism (*laiklik*), nationalism, populism, statism and revolutionism (or reformism); these principles explained the vision of the Kemalist government in early republican era. Four features of Kemalism has been influential in forming criticisms in my interviews. These are Kemalism being a laik ideology, a nationalist ideology, its abolition of the caliphate as well as its promotion of modernization through Westernization. Neo-Ottomanism used some of these criticisms against Kemalism as founding elements of its own.

6.2.1 Laiklik

The biggest act of the Kemalist reforms was to implement laiklik, secularization, separating the state and religion; therefore, replacing imperial and religious authorities with secular institutions. The republican, Kemalist aim was to limit religion to the private sphere; which meant removing religion from the public sphere. However, Kemalist treatment of laiklik did not let the religion be. Rather, religion was too important of an issue to be left alone. Mardin calls religion’s situation in the

private sphere rather ambiguous. He argues that although religion was tolerated, it was not secure; and Atatürk hoped laiklik would inevitably solve the tension between toleration and insecurity (Mardin, 1971, p. 209). Therefore, Atatürk “sought to reinscribe it within his own discourse” (Sayyid, 1997, p. 63). Religious institutions were not separated from the state, rather they were made “subordinated” to the state (White, 2013, p. 191). It meant “the establishment of complete state control over remaining religious institutions” (Zürcher, 2004, p. 181). Since, the ultimate aim was to modernize, laiklik was seen as a step of modernization and social change (Sayyid, 1997, p. 64). Because laiklik has been the founding element of the republic, any criticism against laiklik was taken to be a criticism against the nation-state.

Laiklik was thought to be in opposition against the Muslim culture (Kasaba, 1997). The religious circles viewed Kemalist reforms as cutting religion from people’s lives by force, not limiting religion to the private sphere (Kasaba, 1997). Similarly, religion was not just an individual matter but relied on social mechanisms and institutions to live; and the Kemalist ideology disregarded that. The Kemalist reforms meant restriction and limits according to the anti-Kemalists.

The laiklik reforms could be classified into two as those pertaining to state and bureaucracy and those pertaining to everyday life and its workings. In the first category, the state religion was written as Islam in 1924 constitution; but, the expression was lifted in 1928 making Turkey a secular state. Furthermore, the ministry of Islamic law and pious Ottoman organizations, vakıfs, were abolished. Similarly, religious Sufi lodges were closed. Therefore, Islam was not backed by the state anymore (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 13).

Apart from reforms regulating state and ruling, secularizing reforms that would regulate the everyday life were implemented. For instance, the weekends were

arranged to be Saturday and Sunday, instead of including Friday, the holy day in Islam (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 13). Similarly, lunar calendar appointing Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina as the starting point and lunar clock was replaced with Gregorian Calendar and clock as symbolic move away from the Ottoman and Islamic past. Islamic law was abolished and replaced with civil codes adopted from Switzerland. The family law was secularized. The state abolished religious marriages and polygamy. The hat reform is another reform that tackled sartorial sphere. Its relation with laiklik is as follows. The hat reform denounced any kind of religious headwear. Therefore, headpieces of the shaikhs were banned in order to eliminate any prerogative given to the religious class. Religious attire was limited to the religious facilities. The whole population was imposed to be made equal, in the sense of being the same, through sartorial and authoritarian reforms that aims at modernization as Westernization. These were the reforms that tackled the everyday life (Zürcher, 2004, p. 173). Tackling everyday life through visibility demonstrated "expression of authority as a monopoly of the state" (Zürcher, 2004, p. 187).

Laiklik reforms included keeping religion out of not just state and bureaucracy, but also education (White, 2002, p. 35). Laiklik reforms were accompanied by the abolition of medreses. Medreses were basic units teaching Islamic courses. The abolition of medreses attempted to have all education under state control through one association, the Ministry of Education (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 13). Laiklik was transformed into a discriminating act by undermining "the place of Islam as a discourse", which created "the distance between the educated and the uneducated" (Mardin, 1997).

Apart from these two categories, there is another category that draws on the boundary between the social and the political. For instance, the conversion to a Latin alphabet in 1928, which had devastating effects on the religious elite making the whole literate illiterate. The change of alphabet from Arabic to Latin is indicative of forced forgetting. It refers to one of the most traumatic Kemalist reforms for the religious intelligentsia because it meant breaking the links between the present and the Ottoman and Islamic past. Arabic alphabet, apart from being any alphabet, was the alphabet that the words of the Quran are in (Çağaptay, 2006, p. 14). There is a certain emphasis put on Arabic. Arabic remains a sacred language for Muslims that is different than everyday language in Turkey (Connerton, 1999, p. 66).

The alphabet reform was followed by purification movements in language. Ottoman Turkish was composed of Turkish, Arabic and Farsi words and Atatürk initiated purification of the Turkish language from Arabic and Farsi words that were “alien” to the Turkish language. Turkish Language Association was formed in order to research Turkish words from the rural Anatolia as well as communities in Central Asia. Although not that successful as the alphabet reform, purification movements worked in some manners. For instance, an average person in Turkey does not even understand Atatürk’s speeches from the early republican era. However, because religion was disregarded, it made it politicized in the long run. For instance, White (2002) argues that religion was the only channel for protest during the republican era (p. 104). The civil society lacked multiple voices for a long time. The birth of political Islam in Turkey could be viewed from this perspective in which religion got politicized and reactivated and entered the political arena through hardships (Sayyid, 1997, p. 63).

6.2.2 Nationalism

After the collapse of the empire, a nation-state was founded and nationalism became the founding ideology of the new state. Following the discussion on laiklik, it can be argued that the weak religionism was accompanied by strong nationalism in Kemalist imaginary (White, 2013, p. 191). Nationalism was used to take the place of religion. Secular system in nationalism was considered to be a “civic religion” that citizens could abide to (White, 2013, p. 191). The Kemalist ideology therefore has a rather ambivalent relationship with Islam. While being Muslim is not necessarily dismissed, being Turk is prioritized as opposed to being Muslim (White, 2013, p. 48). Furthermore, White (2013) argues that “countries outside the comfort zone of previous Kemalist governments” were viewed through suspicion and a sense of threat (p. 11). States having high Muslim populations were considered to threaten the secular regime in Turkey (White, 2013, p. 11).

Social memory is constitutive of legitimation of the new regime. For instance, Connerton (1999) writes that “to pass judgement on the practices of the old regime is the constitutive act of the new order” (p. 7). This was also the case in Kemalist accounts of nation-building. As Connerton (1999) argues the higher the aspirations of the new regime, the more it will introduce forced forgetting (p. 12). It meant alienating the society from its Ottoman and Islamic past. In order to modernize, nationalize and secularize the state and society, the regime saw a break with the Ottoman and Islamic past necessary. For instance, Bozdoğan (2001) gives the example of comparisons between Ottoman capital of Istanbul and republic’s capital of Ankara in which the cosmopolitan nature of Istanbul is criticized (p. 67). The

Ottoman Istanbul had a multicultural, multiethnic and multireligious character which was problematized by the new regime which aimed to promote a homogeneous base for the newly founded nation state (Bozdoğan, 2001). Bozdoğan (2001) actually makes remarks on how cosmopolitanism was associated with “contamination and decadence” in Kemalist nationalism (p. 67). However, Ankara was articulated as a “tabula rasa” (Bozdoğan, 2001, p. 68). The city was associated with homogenous, “pure” society that the new nationalist regime wants to highlight. Discourses on hygiene was made use of in order to promote homogenous nationalist ideologies.

The creating of historical myths as well as changing the language by eliminating Arabic and Farsi words were part of nationalization program. In order to make sense of the remaining land of Anatolia and feel proud of the land, ancient civilizations located in Anatolia were studied. The Hittites and Sumerians were taken to be the new roots for the Turkish nation, as opposed to Muslim states of the Ottomans and the Seljuks. For instance, Bozdoğan (2001) studies the role of Hittite and Sumerian influence in modern architecture during the early republican period.

The most important criticism against the Kemalist nationalism is its emphasis on homogeneity. White (2013) writes the Kemalist ideology fears mixing of different traditions, languages, customs and manners, ethnicities (p. 182). This Kemalist perspective is challenged by neo-Ottomanist perspective on the nation that relies on multiculturalism, multi-ethnicities, and multi-religions. White (2013) calls these “heterodox notions of Turkish national identity” that is critical of the Kemalist vision; however, the challenges against the Kemalist national identity give the impression that they are “more stable and rooted than secular nationalism” (p. 100). This is especially the case regarding the Kurdish issue. Because the Sunni Muslim identity is prioritized, the Kurds are considered to be parts of the Turkish realm as

fellow Muslims; whereas the Kemalist nationalism only accepts the Kurds if they are stripped of their Kurdish identity, as “fictive Turks” (White, 2013, p. 53).

Neo-Ottoman criticism of Kemalist ideology does not take ethnically homogeneous society as an ideal, and Kemalism is made “the other” of neo-Ottomanism. Neo-Ottomanism imagines the nation through religious identity as in the case of Ottoman millet system. In fact, Turkish Islamists after the 1980s produced radical critiques of the Kemalist nation-state and Kemalist nationalism, which do not take religion as a factor that constructs the nation (Bora, 2003, p. 449). An understanding of the nation through religious affiliations, criticism of colonially-drawn borders and including the outside Muslim nations in the imaginary nation are coupled with the Ottoman past as an imperial fantasy (Bora, 2003, p. 449). Furthermore, Bora (2003) argues that anti-Westernism is essential for Turkish Islamists’ conceptualization of nationalism (p. 449). Although he does not necessarily call it neo-Ottomanism, Bora’s account involves the main tenets of the phenomenon that I call neo-Ottomanism in this study.

6.2.3 Abolition of the caliphate

The abolition of the caliphate in 1924 came after the abolition of the sultanate, and it was a complex affair. Atatürk used the political significance of the caliphate during the War of Independence against the occupying forces (Sayyid, 1997, p. 57). The argument was that they were rescuing the Muslim population from the Christian control, of Greek as well as colonial forces. After the success of the War of Independence against the Greek and other occupying forces in 1922, the sultanate was abolished with arguments that they were collaborating with European occupying powers. Therefore, the abolition of the sultanate was not a surprise but it was

expected. However, the abolition of the caliphate took place after the foundation of the republic in 1923. After founding the new state, the caliphate was deemed unnecessary in the world of nation-state system (Sayyid, 1997, p. 59).

The abolition of the caliphate is noteworthy because it meant that other political ideologies apart from Turkish nationalism were suppressed, including Ottomanism and pan-Ottomanism (Sayyid, 1997, p. 60). Similarly, it meant a retreat of religion from the public sphere in which religion must be kept in the private sphere (Sayyid, 1997, p. 60). Furthermore, the abolition of the caliphate meant a break with Islam, the past as well as Muslim societies.

Sayyid analyzes Kemalism more than a national phenomenon, a program that other majorly Muslim populated countries of the region followed. Therefore, Turkey was not the only country going through authoritarian secularization, as Gelvin (2011) calls it. For instance, Iran also established nationalizing reforms where religious character of the earlier regimes is dismissed and a secular, national identity focused on Iran is favored (Connerton, 1999, p. 52). Therefore, the abolition of the caliphate also demonstrates how Kemalism is not a local, national phenomenon peculiar to Turkey (Sayyid, 1997, p. 70). Rather, it had its effects going beyond its national boundaries.

Although the institution of caliphate was rather forgotten, Islamic social and political organizations were read and advocated. For instance, The Welfare Party was able to organize anti-Kemalist opposition (Kasaba, 1997) and Erbakan proposed the system of “confederation of faiths” resembling the Ottoman millet system of multiple legal orders (White, 2002, p. 118). Each ethnic and religious community would have their autonomy according to their belief and legal systems; and the state would be the guarantor of these autonomies in a multicultural system (White, 2002,

p. 126). White (2002) actually takes the system of “confederation of faiths” as the early efforts of neo-Ottomanism (p. 126). The Kurds in Turkey were attracted to promises of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity of the Welfare Party (White, 2002, p. 126).

6.2.4 Modernization as Westernization

Another bigger challenge against the Kemalist ideology regards its modernization program. Modernization of state and society has been the ultimate question since the Tanzimat era in Turkey. The question was not on if modernization was necessary. Rather, it was accepted that there is a need for modernization but the real question was on how to modernize. The wide spread reforms aimed at modernizing the state and society, but modernization was equated with Westernization (Bozdoğan, 2001). Radical Kemalist idea was to foster modernization as Westernization. One could not be modern without becoming Western (Sayyid, 1997, p. 68).

The Kemalist ideology’s constitutive elements can be dated back to the late Ottoman period. For instance, Hanioglu (1997) writes on *İctihad* journal, and its head author Westernist, *Garbci*, Abdullah Cevdet to be leading figures advocating Westernization in society that influenced the republican elite. Cevdet aimed to eliminate Islam from Ottoman society, yet knew that could not be easy and it needs utmost attention. Therefore, instead of an atheist program, he held reforming religion through science and enlightenment ideals (Hanioglu, 1997, p. 140). But still, religion, or to be more specific Islam, was the biggest obstacle against social progress (Hanioglu, 1997, p. 144). Hanioglu (1997) then argues that the new regime adopted parts of Cevdet’s plans by nationalizing and Turkifying Islam in a “scientific” manner (p. 148).

Cevdet's argument that Islam could not be reconciled with modern life and having societal degrees to implement Westernization are his other thoughts that may have influenced the Kemalist programs (Hanioglu, 1997, p. 141). Cevdet expressed adopting European-style clothing and hats, as opposed to fezes as parts of his program of Westernization. He even mentioned the conversion of the alphabet from Arabic to Latin (Hanioglu, 1997, p. 143). Similarly, Cevdet wanted to promote European good manners dismissing the Ottoman manners as "outdated" (Hanioglu, 1997, p. 142).

In later years, the Kemalist route to modernization was Westernization in which culture and institutions of the Ottoman Empire were viewed ultimately alien to the Western world; thus, they needed to be changed (White, 2002, pp. 117-118). There was an antagonism between the West and Islam and it was not surmountable (Sayyid, 1997, p. 60). Islamic institutions could not be reformed but they needed to be abolished (Sayyid, 1997, p. 59). Modernization was imagined in a monolithic, uniform manner in which state and society would move progressively into the future (Kasaba, 1997). Homogeneity and progress were characterizing features of modernization as Westernization. Everyday life became important markers of modernization, including appearance and clothing of people, hygiene and cleanliness of cities (Kasaba, 1997), as well as manners, daily customs, behavior and lifestyles (Göle, 1997b).

Westernization included enlightenment and positivism; since it was thought that the West was able to develop by going through these phases (Kasaba, 1997). However, these experiences were not necessarily taken to be local experiences pertaining to the West, but deemed universal. In fact, positivism was considered to hold "universalistic claims for the Western model" disregarding the Christian

cultural sphere (Göle, 1997b). The infamous phrase “reaching the level of contemporary civilization”³⁶ was the level of the Western model, and nothing else but it was advocated because it was considered to be universal (Gülalp, 1997).

Anti-Kemalist criticism of Westernization may take forms of essentialism and Orientalism in which the West and the Islamic are essentially different and unable to reconcile (Gülalp, 1997). While the West is associated with materialism, greed for economic profit and interests, the Islamic is associated with spiritualism and values (Gülalp, 1997). The West was still an enemy that needed to be defeated in Kemalism. However, the methods of the West were necessary in order to defeat the West (Gülalp, 1997).

This vision necessitated some actors taking leading roles in order to civilize, modernize and Westernize the society. These reforms were carried via the state. “The government, judiciary, educational system and military” were instruments of Kemalist reforms and their sustainment (White, 2013, p. 39). A special emphasis was put on the military as the guarantor of unitary, secular Kemalist regime (White, 2013, p. 3). The actors were all political elites; and women, different ethnic and religious groups were objects of Kemalist reform (Göle, 1997b). Therefore, modernists had a statist and authoritarian stance (Keyder, 1997). This was another criticism that modernization was being implemented from above via radical reforms (Keyder, 1997), not taken through social negotiations and experiences in history. Evolutionary rather than revolutionary change was supported by anti-Kemalists. In that sense, the Kemalist modernization does not connote a success story but a violent process of radical reformation that disregarded the societal and historical elements coming from

³⁶ White holds that the use of the term “contemporary” as opposed to “modern” has been associated with Kemalism as well (2013, p. 48). While the critiques use the term modern which makes references to civilizations, as opposed to nation-state system possible (White, 2013, p. 48).

the Ottoman society (Bozdoğan & Kasaba, 1997). The frustrations of modernization as Westernization, both in terms of its methods and ideals, have been influential forming anti-Kemalist thoughts. It is important to note that neo-Ottoman criticism of Kemalist ideology opened areas of public action by relying on Ottoman tradition and imaginaries (White, 2013, p. 48).

6.3 The Kemalist reforms according to the neo-Ottoman Imaginary: Metaphors of violence and forced forgetting

Özge's account starts by telling her family's story. She shares how her ancestors are migrants, making references to the Syrians' migration. She internalizes and personalizes the Syrians' migration in that way. The migration stories of the elders are very common cases in Turkey where most of the people have close or far ancestors that have migrated from the Balkans, the Caucasus, or the Middle East.

Three quarters of my grandparents are Yugoslovian migrants. They have arrived these lands after the Balkan Wars going through the same distresses, sorrows, pains. They carried the migrants' burdens on their shoulders, hearts and souls. They arrived at Istanbul then head to Bursa, then decided on settling in Izmir.³⁷ (Özge, 30s, female)

This has come up in my many interviews, people starting explaining their grandparents' stories of migration. Almost everybody has these stories. These personal histories are used for empathy when there is an encounter with the Syrian people. The words "cedd" or "ecdad", which mean grandfathers, are specifically used in the context where the past is contextualized through familial discourses. I have argued how familial discourses are used in order to cover the issues pertaining to the Syrian refugees in previous chapters. The past is personalized through male

³⁷ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 24.

experiences and histories. After Özge complains how the Syrian refugees are treated badly in Turkey, I ask whether we have forgotten our own histories of migration:

People don't know who they are. When we ask any people where they come from, they would either say they are coming from a mall, from an entertainment center or from consuming something. When we ask what they remember, they would tell us the series, films they have watched or things they want to buy. I mean, there is a small portion who thinks of their ancestors, grandparents, values, past. This is why the migrants are being mistreated. It is because we are ignorant. If they would learn their past, but I'm repeating again that the reforms have closed the doors of learning about your past. Don't learn your history, past. Don't know who your ancestors are, who your grandparents are and remain detached from their values. Look, there is a historical fountain here. We cannot read what is written on it. We cannot even guess which historical period it is from.³⁸ (Özge, 30s, female)

Throughout the interview, Özge problematizes the past and actually differentiates between the two pasts, one is the traumatic past associated with Kemalist reforms; and the other is the Ottoman past that is yearned for, that is distant but missed by her. This is where her tone gets political. On the Kemalist past, Özge has serious criticisms regarding the Kemalist regime, one being the alphabet reform. When counting the positive effects of hosting the refugees, she says that:

Look, with the arrival of our Syrian refugee friends, our letters that were taken away from us, that were vandalized, have come back . . . Our letters, veiling, madrasas, life styles, everything has been slaughtered.³⁹ (Özge, 30s, female)

She argues that the aim of the Kemalist reforms was to detach the people from their past and from their geography. However, she holds that the current arrival of the Syrian people actually provides an opportunity of evaluation the Kemalist design. Then, the arrival of the Syrians is actually in opposition with the Kemalist ideology which detached the Turkish from the Middle East. Now, she holds, the Syrians, their geographies, their language and letters can be known in everyday life. Özge explains

³⁸ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 25.

³⁹ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 26.

the reform period during the early republican period without referring to Kemalism; however, the Kemalist criticism is taken for granted between us, as she sees me I am a head-scarf wearing woman. This was the case in many interviews I have conducted. The Kemalist critique is something that the interviewees felt like they have shared with me, the researcher. Although Özge's sometimes covert metaphors surrounding Kemalism may be difficult to decipher for some, she was certain that I understood what she meant. However, people appeal to different forms of criticism and sometimes feel uneasy criticizing Kemalism, or more specifically Kemal Atatürk himself. It is because the Kemalist ideology is not just any ideology but the state ideology.

Her view is a perfect example of an overtly anti-Kemalist discourse and she uses metaphors referring to violence in order to advocate her thoughts. In Özge's interview, Kemalism is associated with certain enforcement and imposition. She holds that it was something imposed from the above to society. In that sense, she uses the words vandalism and slaughter; words both connoting violence. There is an association of the reforms with danger, violence and threat. It does not necessarily refer to a physical violence, but the meaning of violence is extended to a degree that the everyday life is also included. Therefore, there is violence in everyday life and she associates the reforms with violence. There is a forced implementation of reforms and that she holds that forced implementation is a violent process. Ultimately, this could be linked to discussions on freedom. By associating the reforms with violence, she takes freedom to be lost or limited. The reforms are not freeing reforms, in her mind. On the contrary, their forced imposition is against freeing the society. It further connotes enforcement and imposition.

Also, reforms are deemed destructive of the way of things. Violence stems from these destructive processes. In a way, there is something unnatural about the reforms. They destruct the natural way of things, and it makes them non-indigenous, something exterior, something that is alien. They are alienating of one from his and her essence. For instance, the Kemalist reforms are accused of leading to forced forgetting. Yet, this forced forgetting is in the form of suppression in which with the new events could challenge the forgetting induced. Therefore, new events, such as her example of Syrian refugees arriving Turkey, could take the effects of the Kemalist reforms back, and their effects could be erased in time. Özge's first example is on the alphabet reform. She thinks this is the most critical reform. She holds that the Syrian refugees bring the Arabic alphabet with them, an alphabet that she yearns for. During the interview, I could see that Özge was studying calligraphy and she had Arabic study notes. After the interview, I have friended Özge on social media and could see that she posts photographs of her handwriting in Arabic. Studying the Arabic language and appreciating the alphabet through the art of calligraphy are important anecdotes that demonstrate the relation she forms with the Arabic alphabet. She values the visibility of the Arabic alphabet. She uses visibility as a method of promotion of her thoughts. The Arabic alphabet does not connote any alphabet. She takes the Arabic alphabet as *the* alphabet, and she embraces it as calling it "our alphabet", whereas she disowns the Latin Alphabet Turkish uses. However, reforms' ulterior motive is to disengage and alienate people from their ummah:

We didn't know the existence of the Syrian lands and our brothers and sisters on that geography. It is because the curriculums and reforms [Kemalist reforms] have done whatever it takes for us not to know them. So, that

wouldn't know them, we wouldn't know the values there.⁴⁰ (Özge, 30s, female)

There is the theme of enforcement in these accounts as well. The Kemalist reforms are problematized in terms of making people forget their histories, thus who they are, and alienating them in their geography. Geography connotes certain values; the cultural is also the valuable. I take “value” as a discourse demonstrating a certain vision that is not materialistic. The region, the geography is not articulated with its material goods but rather its cultural, spiritual and moral goods that are not deemed materialistic. Therefore, an interest in the region is dismissed from any criticism that this interest is material, or more specifically colonial. Özge holds that the retreat of the Kemalist ideology from former Ottoman lands is problematic not because it was economically unwise, but because it refers to a certain disengagement with the spiritual and cultural atmosphere of the region. It is as if the Kemalist retreat happened because the Kemalist ideology did not deem the region economically profitable and dismissed its cultural and spiritual value. This retreat is analyzed in the context of losing one's identity and alienation in conjunction with Kemalism. This especially resembles neo-Ottoman criticism of the Kemalist regime which takes Turkey's foreign policy after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as alienation from its geography. There is an alienated subject from his and her surroundings, environment and this is problematized. This alienated subject is not aware, woke nor sober. Rather, the subject is numb to his and her environment, and environment, geography becomes meaningless. The people in that geography become blurred. Özge thinks that the migration of Syrian refugees is challenging that alienation and

⁴⁰ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 27.

making people encounter the people that they share their environments with. There is a challenge against forced forgetting via institutional designs.

In Leyla's account, this forced forgetting is also mentioned; yet, it is in a more disguised tone. When I ask what being a Syrian means in Turkey, Leyla answers:

Those are your lands and they are your people. They have been assimilated in time. They have always spoken in that language. When you go to Hatay or Antep, they speak the same language. Just because you are located northern than them you have forgotten your language. If you would be located more southern, we would have spoken the same language. Syria is just a name of a city.⁴¹ (Leyla, 30s, female)

In this account, there are also referrals to forgetting and the republican regime is associated with a certain forgetting in a covert form. Leyla holds the people of the southern regions of Turkey are made forgotten of the language they speak, which is Arabic. Leyla relates this to placement of borders, one of the features of Kemalist nationalism. There is a disguised criticism of national borders and their arbitrary placement. In that sense, borders foster forced forgetting and therefore, separate people that actually share many features. The republican placement of borders is problematized and is held as a part of forced forgetting in everyday life that is associated with Kemalism.

Ahmet, the owner of a trendy coffee house in Üsküdar who employs Syrian employees, says they have established a solid relationship with the Syrian employees. He refers to the borders when he shares his perspectives on the Syrian refugees:

Syria had been a part of these lands 100 years ago. The drawn borders were not real nor realistic. These were drawn by forces outside. Syria was what Diyarbakır is to us now. It feels very different just because there is this 100-

⁴¹ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 28.

year-gap. Yet, we share the same culture, outlook on life and many other features.⁴² (Ahmet, 30s, male)

The borders are deemed arbitrary and Ahmet held them as influences of imperial powers of the time. Yet, his criticism also gives clues on how borders act as a mechanism in order to draw two communities away from each other. “100-year-gap” is crucial in that sense and it could be related to metaphors of forced forgetting in which the 100-year period after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is characterized by a certain void that needs to be filled. Today’s neo-Ottoman agenda could actually be read as a means to close that gap and people’s mobilization around the refugees can be articulated as a move against the forced forgetting associated with Kemalism.

Özge takes the neo-Ottoman approach to the former Ottoman territories in order to overcome alienation and forced forgetting as devoid of any material interest. However, neo-Ottomanist approach to the Middle East takes material dimension into account and promotes a certain collaboration among neighboring countries.

Therefore, there is room for economic and material interests in neo-Ottomanist discourses. Furthermore, the Kemalist ideology was not devoid of values. Rather, it had different values than Islam and the Ottomans. Its values center in secularism and positivism (Göle, 1997b). Therefore, I hold that “values” become another metaphor in discussions of Kemalism. Actually, what Özge means is that Kemalism has values that are different than what she advocates. The problem is not having “no values” but having different values than one. The metaphor of values became especially clear to me when Özge mentions me a church located in Üsküdar and experiences regarding that church. She visited the church and then wrote an article about her insights for a newspaper.

⁴² For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 29.

I visited their church aiming to understand what they are doing here. I stayed for their sermons and meetings. They despise Islam there. They shun and exclude the religious sacrificing [in Islam]. They promise to help the incoming Syrian women and children in order to Christianize them. But they do these during their religious ceremonies. For example, if a Syrian woman goes there to get a super market card, they invite her to the Eucharist. They call wine Jesus' blood and call bread Jesus' bread. They dip the bread in wine and eat it . . . This demonstrates how Üsküdar hands the Syrians over to the oppressors, to the enemy instead of looking after them. I have taken this issue to the municipality, even to the mayor. What have they done? A couple of warnings, maybe. Nothing else. That church association is an imposter whose purpose is to Christianize the young people and dis sever them from their own core identity.⁴³ (Özge, 30s, female)

The church becomes the enemy when they try to help the Syrian people because they promote Christian values, values that are different than what Özge holds. What angers Özge becomes the helping hand from a different religious association. She is particularly agitated by the church's activities with Syrian children where they make the kids draw crosses and write "love" in English. Özge says while they are insulting the Islamic values, they smile to the others at all times and disguise their intentions.

I think the church example and how their help is problematized by the interviewee are very crucial. Although the improvement of the conditions of the refugees would be something Özge wishes to take place, she wants that to be triggered and officiated by the Muslims, not non-Muslims. This is an important context where the religion is considered to be the bonding element between the societies, as well as how religion could be mobilized in order to help the Syrian people in need. In this scheme, the non-Muslims organizations' efforts to help are questioned, because the hidden, or sometimes not so hidden, motive is thought to be converting the Syrians into their religion, which is not Islam. However, although the church is made an enemy here, the real blame is put on the Turkish organizations who remain inefficient helping the Syrians. The self-blame is the characterizing

⁴³ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 30.

theme here. This is also evident in her discussions of the Ottoman past. Özge has a different approach in which her discussions of the past, the Ottoman state and society are differentiated from imperialist tones. She still relies on the Ottoman history but not in a patronizing perspective.

I don't want to call it hospitality. These lands belong to them as well. It is our shared lands in real terms. It is the Ottoman lands. It is theirs as much as it is ours. In reality the lands belong to no one. Allah revives whomever he wishes to revive wherever he wishes.⁴⁴ (Özge, 30s, female)

This is not something that has come up many times in my interviews. Usually, people have imperial imaginaries where the Syrian lands belong to the Turkish, not vice versa where the Syrians can demand a say on the Turkish lands. This is a complete alternative to the hierarchical system that elevates the Turkish society while patronizing the Syrian refugees. This is not the context where the Turkish state and society, as the older brother, protects the younger sibling; which is the case in almost all other interviews. The Syrian culture and religion is considered to be our own culture and religion. This is a total criticism of Kemalist nationalist design. Not only Özge disregards the national boundaries, but discursively reclaims the Ottoman lands; but this is not in any imperial motive. In fact, she tells me how lands belong to no one but Allah. The Ottoman rule is idealized, but this idealization is established through religious criteria. In that sense, I take Özge's neo-Ottoman account as an example showing internal diversification of neo-Ottomanism. While other discourses have focused on the rule and domination of the Ottoman power, or the Ottoman referred to tropes of power, domination and authority, Özge takes the Ottoman state and society as a harmonious whole. The asymmetry of power that is reflected in metaphors of family is no longer used. Similarly, the celebration of values over

⁴⁴ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 31.

utilitarianism in discussions against the West does not fit here. Rather, this version of neo-Ottomanism does not have a self-celebratory tone of the Turkish identity over the Syrian identity. The Syrians are not new comers but they arrive to what is already theirs. What still makes Özge's accounts neo-Ottoman is her reliance on the Ottoman past as the center. The Ottoman example provides the main body her vision is based on. In fact, the Ottoman state and society as the ideal come up again when I ask her what should be done. She suggests having the Ottoman *imarethanes*, guilds where the poor and the students would get food in the Ottoman period, as examples to provide settlement and basic needs to the Syrian refugees⁴⁵. She suggests returning to that system. She says:

Yes, we need to go back to the our imarethanes. Ottoman imarethanes need to be opened as soon as possible before these people go through any harm and abuse. They need to be treated as humans as they are. İmarethanes are the only solution. We need to return to that system.⁴⁶ (Özge, 30s, female)

This quotation above makes me recall her independent attitude in the refugee issue. Özge treats help to the Syrians not in an institutionalized form. She is not part of any charity or association. She is not actively engaged with her local community when it comes to the Syrians. Rather, her method is spontaneous and I think her perspective on helping reflects that. Helping others is a blessing that is not shared by all but you have that blessing if it is in your foreordination. I think this is a novel perspective since almost all my interviewees have corporate, institutional identities although they do not necessarily problematize non-institutionalization. This helps Özge have independence in her activities regarding the Syrians; however, her efforts remain

⁴⁵ İmarethanes or imarets were institutions established in order to help the poor in the Ottoman state and society. These were institutions that run through charities given from the local population. A complex of facilities were constructed in order to settle the poor and needy. Cafeterias were important parts of the imarets in order to feed people. The complexes could also involve mosques and hospitals. İmarethanes are given as an example of institutional care of the poor and the needy in the Ottoman state and society by Özge.

⁴⁶ For the original passage of this translated quotation, see Appendix B, 32.

rather humble in comparison to other charities and associations' acts. I think Özge does not undermine the value of individual connections between the Turkish and Syrian peoples. This is especially the case regarding her sensory experiences with the Syrian children. She also does not believe in forcing people to help the Syrians. She definitely sees the importance of increasing the number of people helping the Syrians and she wants that to happen. However, she wants that motivation to come to people rather than forcing people to show affective emotions.

Although she values her independent approach, she idealizes the Ottoman institutionalization. The Ottoman example provides an element of nostalgia. The past that is alienated by the reforms are aimed to be brought to life. Considering the importance of memory and its relation with the present, we can argue that “the more radical the rejection of anything that came before, the greater the dependence on the past” (Connerton, 1999, p. 61). The dismissal of Kemalist regime necessitated relying on what have come before Kemalism, which is the Ottoman rule.

6.4 Conclusion

To conclude, the arrival of the Syrian refugees becomes a challenge against the Kemalist understanding of religion and nationalism, and the interviewees reevaluate the features of Kemalism. The disillusionment with the West that is discussed in the previous chapter is recalled and it is held Kemalism was problematic because it articulated modernization as Westernization. The Syrian refugees' arrival challenges alienation of the Turkish state and society from its past, which is held as the central feature of Kemalism. This is accompanied by criticisms of borders that are deemed arbitrary and unreal. Therefore, Kemalism is discussed through metaphors on violence, alienation and forgetting; and it becomes the ultimate other that is criticized

when the Syrian refugees arrive Turkey. Furthermore, a criticism of Kemalism makes restorative nostalgia of the Ottoman past possible.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Migration has been one of the central phenomena in human history. Movement of people across geographies, settlement of migrants in new environments, migrants' making of new social, economic, political and cultural relations in their new environments have taken place since the earlier days of human history. There have been various reasons that contribute to the decision of migrating. The traditional literature on migration tells us how "pull factors" in developed countries are the most important reason people migrate from economically less developed countries to more developed countries. For instance, the expectation to get employed and get a better education can be reasons for domestic as well as international migration that draw on pull factors. However, asylum seeking as forced migration is another context that needs serious attention. Although it is a form of migration; it is characterized by the existence of life-threatening, violent conditions that make people leave their homes in the first place. Migration is deemed forced and involuntary in these cases.

Although asylum seeking also has a history as long as human history, its legal recognition is rather recent going back to the aftermath of the Second World War. Following the two wars, displacement of people from their countries for political reasons and their involuntary migration to other lands have been subject of international law that the refugee as a mobile subject is recognized by the international law. Both the figure of the migrant and the refugee have been central figures in history. Yet, somehow their central position in history is often disregarded in the age of nation-state systems relying on strictly defined borders.

Turkey's history regarding migration and asylum seeking is rather peculiar. The recent waves of Syrian migration to Turkey challenged Turkey's experiences of migration and furthered discussions on the Turkish policies on migration and asylum. Although Turkey is a country that both accepts migrants and sends migrants; its conditions of asylum and refuge are rather outdated and isolationist. The 1951 Geneva Convention which Turkey stills abides to recognizes only asylum seeking requests from the European Union into account. In that sense, the Syrian refugees escaping the Syrian Civil War and arriving Turkey are not recognized as refugees in the legal sense. They are unrecognized refugees (Zolberg et al., 1989, p. 30), guests (Miş, 2013), or people under temporary protection (Özden, 2013). The emphasis on the term "temporary" is rather crucial. Although the Syrian displacement from Syria and migration to Turkey have been ongoing since the early days of 2011, the legal status of the Syrian migrants has not been recognized as refugees.

One of the reasons researchers study migrations in social sciences is related to how migration has a transformative nature. For instance, migrations have been central in producing and reproducing nation-building project by states in areas of both domestic politics and foreign policy. Migrants are also studied as subjects of economic reforms and military security. The migration of people is articulated as an economic problem that needs state reforms, or the migration is taken as a problem of border security that needs military control. However, in the sociological sense, migration is transformative of the social and the political. Through migration, new social, economic, political and cultural relations are formed. The movement of people generates new entities, subjectivities and collectivities. Having this context at the background, this thesis has focused on perspectives on the Syrian refugees in everyday life of cities in particular. It has argued that the migration of Syrian

refugees to Turkey is transformative of the local subjectivities and collective identities. It has taken the encounter between the host and the guest identities as moments of articulation of the local, national identity. I have studied the mobilized, active community of conservative Üsküdar residents in Istanbul as subjects and objects of transformative role of migration. In that sense, my study is not a refugee study per se, but rather it is on how the host society is affected by the migration and how the host society's ideas of their national identities are opened to discussion with the arrival of refugee communities. The effect of refugee communities in everyday life not only contributes to articulation of national identity in the local, host society but it also mobilizes communities around the goal of providing welfare and other means in order to cover the refugee issue.

I have studied the mobilization of Üsküdar residents on the refugee issue in the context of neoliberalization of the refugee issue. In the traditional sense, neoliberalization refers to processes of privatization, deregulation and withdrawal of the state from economy (Wacquant, 2012, p. 69). The market is deemed as the most efficient institution distributing public goods and resources, not the state (Ong, 2006, p. 11). The state is reduced to a minimal state that remains technical (Ong, 2006, p. 3). However, there are studies on how neoliberalism in the non-Western contexts can get accompanied by non-neoliberal elements in order to survive (Ong, 2006; Tuğal, 2012). In that sense, neoliberalism can get blended in the local values rather than remaining technical through processes of privatization, deregulation and withdrawal of the state from economy. I take this feature of getting blended into the local as an important part of neoliberalization in Turkey. Neoliberalism takes various forms in order to sustain itself in Turkey and neo-Ottomanism provides another means for

neoliberalism to keep itself going, and this sustainment includes the refugee issue as an area of neoliberalization, privatization and withdrawal of the state.

I have argued that further neoliberalization of the state in Turkey can be witnessed in areas related to refugees, and there are privatization and withdrawal of the state from welfare of the refugees. This is not a phenomenon peculiar to Turkey. Rather, there are instances of privatization of the refugee issue in the world, and there is a general trend that states are getting less accountable in issues of migration and asylum seeking. The United Kingdom, Canada and Spain are some of the examples. In the United Kingdom, the state is further detached from the immigration policies. The state leaves its responsibilities to the private sphere while it distances itself from the migration area (Athwal, 2015). In Canada, however, the neoliberalization of the state in areas regarding migration and refuge is accompanied by introduction of new systems. For instance, there is a private sponsorship system in Canada in which private individuals can get involved in processes of welfare of the migrants and refugees (Hyndman et al., 2017). Similarly, the legal refugee status is not granted to certain groups in Spain; and, the unrecognized refugees are mostly covered by local administrations and NGOs (Jubany-Baucells, 2002). These are important examples demonstrating how states withdraw from issues related to migrants and refugees. Moreover, through privatization, civil society organizations rise as agents having responsibility in the refugee issue. Mobilization of civil society on the refugee issue does not necessarily mean that the state and civil society organization are two distinct agents in the refugee issue. Rather, in the sponsorship system in Canada, there is a harmonious collaboration between the state and civil society in the refugee issue (Hyndman et al., 2017). Likewise, I argue that my study demonstrates how mobilization of civil society organizations on the refugee issue is

not separate from the state discourse and agenda. Therefore, there are neoliberalization, privatization of the refugee issue and withdrawal of the state from responsibility against the refugees; and fostering of civil society organizations cannot be considered separate from the neoliberal state discourse and its agenda.

Ultimately I argue that what differs Turkish experience of privatization of the refugee issue from others is its use of a new political discourse, that is turned into a social discourse, while treating the refugees. For instance, Spain and Turkey have similar frameworks when it comes to granting the legal status of refugee to limited groups and leaving the position of asylum seekers in a gray zone. However, Turkey advocates a neo-Ottoman discourse of restorative nostalgia, while Spain does not employ similar methods of nostalgia. In that sense, there is a merging of neoliberal state and neo-Ottoman state in Turkey.

What is neo-Ottomanism, then? As the name of the term suggests, there is an emphasis on Ottomanism, a key strategy aimed at producing a new, loyal and national Ottoman citizen base during the late periods of Ottoman state and society. It was advocated in order to sustain the ethnically, religiously and culturally heterogeneous imperial population from the negative effects of the nationalist thoughts following the French Revolution. Neo-Ottomanism draws from this theoretical heritage and holds the ethnically, religiously and culturally heterogeneous population as its core. Instead of assimilationist policies of the Kemalist discourse, there is an emphasis on Islamic and multicultural character of society. The neo-Ottoman understanding of the nation does not rely on a secular, ethnic understanding. Rather, shared past and religion as well as multiculturalism appear to be the key factors that make the neo-Ottoman nation.

Neo-Ottomanism's other main feature is regarding the foreign policy understanding. There is a great link between foreign policy discourse and domestic policy discourse and foreign policy is used in order to shape and rebuild the domestic policy. In that sense, I do not treat neo-Ottomanism as a specifically foreign policy discourse but rather I focus on how it is transformative of the society as well. Neo-Ottomanism focuses on interventionism as opposed to isolationism in the geography Turkey is located in. This is a new outlook on foreign policy. Instead of having a cautious and isolationist foreign policy that constructs Turkey as a bridge between the East and the West, the new framework rejects being a bridge because it does not connote a central position. Rather, there is an aim to become a prominent actor that is in harmony with its geography in which Turkey is viewed as a "compass" (Saraçoğlu & Demirkol, 2015, pp. 312-313). Geography is emphasized to a great extent and Turkey's advantages of being located in this geography is deemed important. There is the central argument that there must be a harmony between the state and its surrounding, neighboring environment. Geography is not considered indifferent to its history. In fact, historical experiences and shared past are focused on as sources of forming bonds. Interventionism should not be considered as hard power. Rather, soft power is emphasized as it is deemed effective influence of the hegemonic power over the designated area.

Neo-Ottomanism has been used since the Özal administration in the early 1990s. The liberal and secular thinkers close to Özal, have written on neo-Ottomanism arguing how the Ottoman heritage in the geography is something that Turkey cannot separate itself from and it was first advocated as a foreign policy discourse. Although neo-Ottomanism is not a phenomenon specific to the AKP, it is further discussed through the AKP years and its transformative effect is state and

society. However, Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister of Turkey, is the key figure associated with neo-Ottomanism. Davutoğlu's famous book, *Strategic Depth*, is considered to be one of the key texts of neo-Ottomanism. In this book, coming to terms with the Ottoman past as recognizing and reinstating it are emphasized. For instance, Davutoğlu gives examples from the late Ottoman period in which soft power of the empire is highlighted. Intervention of the Ottomans is described as non-colonialist and non-imperialist (Davutoğlu, 2001, p. 52). That is why the intervention of the Ottoman state was not considered to be problematic. Rather, the Ottoman system is advocated as an ideal form. Instead of employing a cautious attitude that is isolationist, there is the idea of state being active in foreign policy. This activeness is not considered to be aggressive, assertive but rather powerful in the sense that state having a say in matters related to the region. The region refers to the geographical area that is composed of Turkey's neighbor countries, with whom Turkey shares historical, ethnic, religious and cultural bonds with. One of the most influential arguments is that Turkey, by abandoning the heritage of the Ottoman state and society, got alienated from its history and geography (Aras, 2009, p. 128).

This alienation could make more sense by explaining nostalgia. The concept of nostalgia, to be more clear, restorative nostalgia (Boym, 2001), makes the neo-Ottoman discourse more meaningful. Neo-Ottomanism constructs a past, that is imaginary and advocates it as the truth, as an ideal that needs to be embraced and revived. In that sense, the emphasis on the past is not only a feeling of longing, yearning for the past. On the contrary, it has a practical side. The feeling of longing for the past is fostering action and practice. Then, the past is aimed to be revived, re-evoked and re-embraced. I argue that in order to restore the past and attain a certain restorative nostalgia linked with neo-Ottomanism, there is mobilization of the society

and transformation of the state. That is why I think there is a making of a new subjectivity in conjunction with a certain state hegemony in the civil society. Neo-Ottomanism provides frameworks in which people can get mobilized in civil society through instrumentalizing the past. The past acts as a shared imaginary that helps mobilization of people in civil society that is in the context of the neoliberal Turkish state.

How are the conservative people get mobilized for the issue of Syrian refugees? I have argued that the Bosnian War in the early 1990s has produced a founding framework for perspectives on the Syrian refugees in conservative Turkish circles. The Bosnian War took place in the early 1990s after the collapse of Soviet and Yugoslavian regimes and it was a stage for genocide, the most violent period in the European history after the Holocaust in the 20th century. The link between the Bosnian and Syrian Wars are formed through violence and pain that both wars share. Both wars are considered to be two of the most violent cases in recent history and their aftermath in terms of forcing thousands of people to leave their countries, migrate and seek refuge elsewhere. Through these experiences and victimization of Bosnian and Syrian refugees, links are formed between cases. I also argue that the context of neo-Ottomanism help linking the two wars. The intervention into the Bosnian War through active foreign policy mobilizing the international actors is actually earlier phases and examples of neo-Ottoman thinking in the 1990s. In the Syrian case, the Turkish government's close relations with Syria before the war, and its close following of the war through siding with the opposition against the Assad regime are demonstrative of the active Syrian policy. Furthermore, the operation of Euphrates Shield was a military operation against the radical terrorist groups

launching attacks on the Turkish lands. Therefore, Syria is somewhere that Turkey has actively intervened.

The link between the two wars are formed through metaphors of family, a paternal family to be more clear. In that context, refugees are labeled as “brothers and sisters”. This metaphor fosters victimization of the refugees, making them objects of attention and care. This care should be carried out by older siblings or parents. By labeling the refugees as brothers and sisters, an asymmetric power relation is formed between the host and the guest; in which the host is dominant over the guest. When the refugees are younger siblings, the role of older siblings or parents is taken by the host society. This is in the context of a certain hegemony. However, the familial discourse is important. The Syrian refugees are not outsiders to this design. They are treated within the family, yet the asymmetric relations among the household are disguised.

The familial discourses are further highlighted by the metaphor of “eccdad”, which literally means grandparents and ancestors. The metaphor of eccdad refers to the shared past through ancestors. There could be a relation formed with the metaphor of family, and it could be argued that ancestors become the rulers of the larger family that is discursively imagined. This is indicative of how the past is also treated in a framework of familial discourses. The past gets familial. It acquires a close and deep meaning that the subject can get attached to through familial relations. The past is not any past, but the past of grandparents and ancestors whom the subject feels close connections with. The past gets personal and familial.

I have also studied the Bosnian War through the discourses on the Balkans as the lost home. The loss of the Balkan lands is deemed a trauma for the late Ottoman thinking, while the early republican discourse was interested in forming a national

identity out of the lands remained after the First World War and the Independence War. The loss of the Balkans was also significant because it actually meant that Ottomanism could no longer be advocated in the late Ottoman period. In today's conditions, there are conscious efforts in order to revive the Balkans as an Ottoman land and construct the Balkans as the object of restorative nostalgia. Therefore, the interest and intervention in the Balkans can actually be considered as an attempt to undo the experiences of Kemalist republicanism and revive the Ottomanism agenda that was cut short in the late Ottoman period due to imperial and nationalist threats from inside and outside. Neo-Ottomanism fits to the framework of embracing the Ottomanist agenda of the late nineteenth century in the current era. The trauma associated with losing the Balkan lands are attempted to overcome in the current period. Overcoming that trauma is possible through restoring the past, and that is how neo-Ottoman nostalgia works. In this scheme, nostalgia is not only a longing for the past. Rather, it is also in practice. It aims at reconstructing the past because the past is not only nostalgic, but it also refers to "the truth" the discourse as restorative nostalgia wants to attain. The Bosnian War provided founding means that the past could get restored. This is why through the arrival of the Syrian refugees to Turkey and Turkey acquiring the status of a host state and society for the victimized refugees, there is articulation of the necessity of restoring the past. The experiences of the Bosnian War are recalled in order to restore the past in the current period.

The Bosnian War was a matter that is followed closely by the Turkish state and society. This close following is important because when the Syrian refugees arrive, the local imaginary remembers the experiences of the Bosnian War. These experiences are both experiences of the victimized Bosnian refugees and Turkish articulation of the Bosnian War. The Bosnian War is used as a framework for

comparing and contrasting the conditions of refugees. The Syrian refugees are reminders of the recent history of other experiences of displacement, forced migration and seeking refuge and the Bosnian War and its aftermath are given as lived experiences of how people fled war and sought refuge in other countries. The Bosnian War is also taken as a framework in which Turkish people were not able to contribute much. In a way, by helping the Syrian refugees and mobilizing around their problems, the experiences and disappointments regarding the past are aimed at overcoming and reversed. The Syrian refugees now provide means that the subject and the collectivity around the burdens of the past could get relief. The Syrian War provides means to reverse the Bosnian War.

The Bosnian War's most influential outcome for the Turkish audience was production and reproduction of the disillusionment with the West. The West and the relations with the West were reevaluated and rearticulated in the context of the Bosnian War. The West was accused of employing double standards against the Muslim identity in Europe and the moral authority of the West was seriously challenged (Dağı, 2005, p. 26). Apart from its moral authority, the discursive centrality of the West was questioned. Similarly, the Syrian refugees has made the Turkish audience reevaluate and rearticulate the notion of the West and the relations with the West. "The West" becomes an ambivalent concept that both constructs the non-Western identity and also destroys the non-Western identity. Perspectives usually acquire an anti-Western tone in the interviews. However, there is no straightforward outlook on the West. Although the West is challenged and questioned, it is still deemed as "the other" that the Turkish conservative subject needs, needs to face in order to construct and keep its identity. While the West's position is denounced, there is a conscious effort to declare how it is denounced

because it needs explanation. It still holds a discursive centrality in the accounts although they may sound and feel anti-Western. In order to get mobilized for the refugee issue, ambivalent imaginaries on the West becomes something necessary. The West becomes a necessary unit that the conservative subject has to take into account when acting on the Syrian refugees and their issues. Therefore, mobilization of the subjects cannot be considered separately from their imaginaries regarding the West. Discourses on the West become a framework in which the West is constructed as an identity that is “the other” of the Turkish, that is in line with neo-Ottoman, subject.

The West is discussed in the context of its actions in different time frames. On the one hand, there is an active West that perpetrates wars and violence in non-Western areas, and Syria is given as the ultimate example of how the West gets violent by not stopping the war, or even furthering the war. On the other hand, the West is considered to be constructing itself as an actor that runs away from responsibility in the aftermath of the war, especially in the context of displacement and migration of people. The West is constructed as an irresponsible actor and this is articulated in comparison to Turkey, which is deemed a responsible country hosting millions of Syrian refugees. The West’s irresponsibility is explained through utilitarian and materialist methods it relies on. Instead of having value-based and idea-based approaches of the non-Western, the West is deemed greedy with material and economic interests. The unwelcoming attitude towards the Syrian refugees in the Western countries are problematized while making comparisons to the Turkish case. In that sense, selecting the refugees according to their professional identities in the Western countries is criticized because it is deemed inhuman and opportunistic. This is further discussed through the metaphors of friends and enemies. Relying on

utilitarian, materialist and economic discourses is given as the ultimate reason that makes the West “the enemy”. Through this metaphor, the relations with the West are personalized and fit in a framework of everyday life. The West being the enemy is explained through how it is not a “friend” of the local subject in the first place. Because the West has failed to become a friend, it paved its way to become the enemy. The friend and enemy discourse provides means of easier mobilization in everyday life by forming basic relations that draw on personal relations.

There is further evaluation of the West through bodily discourses. The metaphors of disease and drugs are instrumentalized in order to define the West and make it meaningful. Relying on the literature on westoxication, the West is found alienating and destroying the non-Western’s organic unity. Westoxication is a term coined by Iranian author and thinker Jalal Al-i Ahmad (1984). Al-i Ahmad (1984) explains the influence of the West on the non-Western societies through the metaphor of rotting of a plant from inside to outside. The West is deemed destructive through metaphors that connote destroying the bodily unity and organic well-being of the body. This constitutes the framework in which the West is deemed a problem that threatens the very essence of the individual and the social; therefore, an action is held necessary. The necessity of acting against westoxication is discussed in a number of areas, and the refugee issue constitutes one of them. By mobilizing around the refugee issue, westoxication is problematized, criticized and aimed at overcome. Mobilization of people around the refugee issue relies on ambivalent discourses on the West that challenges and question the West’s authority but also taking it at the center by making it the other.

The West is further discussed in the context of Kemalism, and Kemalism’s characterizing feature is taking modernization as Westernization. Kemalism is

problematic because it promoted modernization as Westernization. The problem was not to decide whether to modernize or not, because there was no question on its necessity. There was a need for modernization in order to get ahead as a state and society. Rather the actual question was on how to modernize. Kemalism chose to modernize through Westernization, but this was a problem for the conservative ideology. In other words, although the West was the object of criticisms in the interviews; an analysis on the Kemalist ideology is demonstrative that Kemalism is the central ideology that faces the criticisms. Following these discussions, the Syrian refugees are not considered to be the others in the neo-Ottoman context. Rather, Kemalism is constructed as the ultimate other again. The Syrian refugees are taken as identities and communities that could be integrated in the society that is transforming; yet, the Kemalist ideology remains an ultimate other that needs to be overcome. The Syrian refugees are not problematized but the Kemalist discourse becomes a problem that needs solutions. What has come up in interviews is that the arrival of Syrian refugees provides grounds for challenging and reevaluating the Kemalist discourse and experiences. Criticisms on Kemalism makes new imaginaries on the nation possible. Similar to discourses on the West, mobilization of people around the refugee issue makes Kemalism an object of discourses. When the strict Kemalist principles on national identity are relaxed, restorative nostalgia on the Ottoman past can get revoked. Therefore, a neo-Ottoman national imaginary necessitates taking what has come after the Ottomans as a problem. What has come after the Ottoman state is the Kemalist republic. Therefore, the Kemalist ideology becomes the object of criticism and it needs to be reevaluated and rearticulated in order to restore the Ottoman past through the mobilization of people.

Apart from advocating modernization as Westernization, Kemalism's other features are laiklik, its strict understanding of nationalism and the abolition of the caliphate. I argue that these constitute the areas in Kemalism that face the conservative criticisms. In the literature, laiklik, as a distinct mode of Turkish secularism, made religion and the state separate. Yet, this does not connote secularism in the ideational sense, since Turkish laiklik aimed to dominate the religious sphere by limiting it to the private sphere while controlling its public appearance. Laiklik's effects on the conservative thinking is very influential. Secondly, the Kemalist nationalism is characterized by a homogeneous design of the nation-state system in contrast to the heterogeneous system of empires. Multiethnic, multireligious and multicultural nation was not promoted; rather, the nation should acquire homogeneous characteristics in order to strive as a nation after the multicultural system of the empires. Thirdly, the abolition of the caliphate remains an event that broke the relations with the ummah, the Islamic community and the Islamic past. Therefore, Kemalism actually had consequences that went beyond the Ottoman borders. The abolition of the caliphate also meant the erasure of religion's political side. However, by attempting to erase the religion's political side, it ultimately made Islam a political force in the form of Islamism.

Features of Kemalism are criticized through the metaphor of vandalism in the interviews. These metaphors are used as means to hold the Kemalist ideology as a violent force. This does not connote a physical violence per se but rather an everyday violence that challenges the essences of subjectivity and collectivity. The violence associated with Kemalism draws on from enforcement and imposition. One of the reasons that the Kemalist reforms in the early republican era was problematic is that the reforms did not originate from below but instituted from above by force. Because

the reforms take place in everyday life, violence is generalized and extended to micro settings of daily happenings. For instance, one of the interviewees gives the example of the alphabet change reform as vandalism in how she experiences that enforcement in the everyday life. Connecting to the metaphors of westoxication, enforcement of reforms is considered in the context of changing one's identity, an unnatural process that draws one's identity from its essence. There is a process of alienation associated with reforms.

Imposition of reforms are also discussed through the metaphor of forced forgetting and alienation. The other important reason the reforms are criticized is that the reforms aimed at forced forgetting and alienation by dissociating the subject from its past and geography, which is one of the central criticisms of neo-Ottomanism. The Kemalist ideology is problematic because it makes subjectivity and collectivity dissociate from their surroundings. The geography and the past associated with the Ottoman state and society get meaningless, whereas the neo-Ottoman discourse aims to restore these elements in an agenda of restorative nostalgia.

These metaphors are used to criticize the Kemalist ideology; yet what is significant is how the Syrian refugees are held as the means to remember the past, and undo the Kemalist reforms. That is why through criticisms of the Kemalist discourse, conservative people are able to mobilize for the refugee issue. Kemalism provides a ground that mobilization can take place against. Therefore, in order to mobilize effectively for the refugee issue, the Kemalist discourse is criticized and a neo-Ottoman alternative is fostered. The Syrian refugees provide a moment of opportunity to further processes of undoing the Kemalist ideology.

The arrival of Syrian refugees provide means of reevaluation of the past through the Bosnian War, the West and the Kemalist ideology. The neo-Ottoman

affects and discourses are of help when these evaluations take place. Neo-Ottomanism is not new; yet, it is getting increasingly hegemonic in civil society and the perspectives on the Syrian refugees in the conservative circles in Üsküdar use the neo-Ottoman discourses in everyday life. What is important is that these reevaluations are fostered in order to mobilize for the refugee issue in Üsküdar in the framework of neoliberal state that is increasingly getting less accountable for the refugee issue. In that sense, there is a contingent and collaborative relation between neoliberalism and neo-Ottomanism on the refugee issue and these go hand in hand. Mobilization of people on the refugee issue and production of new subjectivities and collectivities point out to transformative role of migration. It seems that these processes will continue as the Syrian War is still ongoing and the Turkish state and society keep their active roles.

APPENDIX A

ORIGINAL PASSAGES OF TRANSLATED TEXTS

1. Evet orada Sırların katletmek istediği Boşnaklar Osmanlıdır. Demek ki tarihiyle, kültürüyle ve insanıyla ortada sahip çıkılacak bir miras vardır ve Osmanlı'nın varisi her kimse bu mirasın da sahibi odur. Kavganın gerçek sebebi de, bir türlü hakkından gelinemeyen Osmanlı varlığı ve bir türlü ele geçirip emniyetle üzerine oturamadıkları Osmanlı mirasıdır. (Yıldız, 1993, p. 55)
2. Türkiye, cumhuriyetin ilanıyla birlikte reddettiği bu mirasa karşı direnişini artık kırmak zorundadır. (Yıldız, 1993, p. 55)
3. Türkiye'nin Bosna'ya asker çıkarması bazı noktalardan yararlı gibi görünebilir ve Türkiye halkı bundan heyecan duyabilir. (Küçük, 1994, pp. 46-47).
4. RP'nin söyleminde, diğer yandan, bir de Osmanlı'nın devamı olmak arzusu veya hasreti var ki, buna katılmamak mümkün değil. Yitirilmiş bir haşmetin özlemi, kimliğimizi yeniden tanımlama idaresi de diyebiliriz buna. Ama unutmayalım: Osmanlı, Batıyla hemhal olarak kurmuştu egemenlik sistemini, ona sırtını çevirerek değil (Vergin, 1994, pp. 34-35).
5. İHH İnsani Yardım Vakfı, 1992 yılında ortaya çıkan Bosna Savaşı'na kayıtsız kalamayan gönüllülerin başlatmış olduğu insani yardım çalışmalarının, 1995 yılında vakıf olarak yapılanması ile İstanbul'da hayat bulmuştur. Retrieved from <https://www.ihh.org.tr/tarihce>
6. Batı hayranlarının hali, hastalıklardan korunmak ve tam bir sıhhate sahip olmak arzusu ile tıp kitapları okuyan bazı kimselere benzer. Bunlar sonunda, kendilerinin bütün hastalıklara tutulmuş oldukları vehmine düşerek, hayatı

mecburen katlandıkları tahammül edilmez bir yük, çaresiz ve uzun bir ızdırıp olarak görmeye başlarlar. (Dođan, 1997)

APPENDIX B

ORIGINAL PASSAGES OF TRANSLATED QUOTATIONS

1. Bizim niyetimiz karşı tarafa geçip bir silah edinin silahla bir şeyler yapabilir miyiz? O ruh haliyle, Bosna savaşına gidememenin verdiği bir eziklik ve hayal kırıklığının da nedeniyle acaba böyle bir şey yapabilir miyiz? (Erkan, 40s, male)
2. Neyi farklıymış? Hiçbirini farklı kılmadı. Mülteci olarak bakmadığımız için. Asıl olan bunlar bizim kardeşlerimiz. Bizim insanımız. Benim anam, bacım, kardeşim, oğlum, yeğenim... böyle bakmak gerekiyor. Böyle bakınca sorun olmamış. Hatta böyle de bakılmış. Bosna savaşı sırasındaki Erbakan hükümetini tenzih ederek söylüyorum diğer hükümetler bile, bu ülkenin ulusalcı diye tabir ettiğimiz kanat bile ister istemez zorunlu olarak tabi oraya savaşa gidenlere kapılarda sorunlar inşa ettiler. O sorunları yaşayan arkadaşlarımız çokça var. Ama buna rağmen bu ülkenin reflekslerinde şu vardı: orası bizim, Bosna bizim. Çeçenistan da bizim, Suriye de bizim. (Erkan, 40s, male)
3. İyi taraflarını da gördüm, sıkıntılı taraflarını da. Eksi ve artı taraflarını şöyle gördüm. 1992 yılında Bosna Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin bütün siyasi partileri MHPlisi, CHPlisi, Refah Partisi, Anavatan Partisi, Doğruyol Partisi'ne varıncaya kadar bütün sağ ve sol siyasi görüşlerin hepsi Boşnakları bağrına bastı. Bosna'ya müthiş bir yardım seferberliği oldu. Oradan gelenler bağrılarına basıldı vs. Çeçenistan Savaşı yine 94-97li yıllarda, o da öyle. Türk solu, Türk sağ, İslamcısı, muhafazakârı, milliyetçisi Çeçenleri bağrına bastı gerçekten. Hiçbir eleştiri konusu olmadı. "Çeçenler neden burada, ne arıyor bu insanlar burada? Boşnaklar ne arıyor kardeşim?" gibi siyasi çatışma

polemik konusu olmadı. Ama Suriye meselesinde maalesef, üzümlere söyleyeyim ki, iyi bir imtihan verilmedi . . . Düşünebiliyor musunuz bir Bosna ve Çeçenistan’da gösterilen ortak duygu ve duyarlılık maalesef Suriye’de gösterilmedi. Neden? Sol-sağ. “Gerek var mıydı? Bunlar neden ayaklandı? Bölünürse İran bölünür. Sonra Türkiye bölünür” vs. vs. Hep siyasete malzeme edildi Suriye’deki katliam. Oradaki insani trajedinin boyutlarını konuşmadık. Trajedi öncelenmedi. Bu noktada ben şaşkınlık yaşadım. Bosna’dan buraya 10-15 bin civarında insan geldi. Çeçenistan’dan da öyle, en fazla 30-40 bin. Öyle 50 binler, 100 binler gelmedi ne Bosna’dan ne Çeçenistan’dan. Zaten Çeçenistan’ın nüfusu 900 bindi, Bosna’nın nüfusu iki buçuk milyonu. Ama burada 3 buçuk milyon insan geldi. Bir devlet kadar. (Osman, 40s, male)

4. Bir Arap kendini mesul hissetmiyor. Bir Endonezyalı kendini mesul hissetmiyor. Bir Faslı kendini mesul hissetmiyor. Hala Türkiye’de yıllar olmuş, 20 küsur yıl olmuş Bosna’ya hala TİKA yardım götürüyor. Yunus Emre enstitüsü. Kudüs’te gördüm. Bosna’da, Kudüs’te hala Yunus Emre kültür merkezleri ve hala TİKA’nın eli var oralarda. Kudüs’te İsraililerin yıktığı sette, Abdülhamid döneminden kalma yıkılan duvarı hala TİKA onarıyor. Hala mesul hissediyorsun kendini. Çünkü ecdaddan kalma, Osmanlı’dan kalma bir ahlakın var. Fisebilillah herkese yardım etmek. (Leyla, 30s, female)
5. Mirasına sahip çıkmak. Sonuçta Osmanlı bakiyesi o topraklar. Bizim hani mirasımız, bırakamayız. Bırakamıyorsun da. (Fadime, 30s, female)
6. Topraklarına baktığımız zaman ecdada baktığımız zaman Suriye’nin yarısında bizi Osmanlı’nın izleri var. (Songül, 40s, female)

7. Uluslararası camianın yaptığı bir şey yok. Onlar bir şey yapmazlar. Onlar sadece set kurmaya çalışırlar gelmesinler diye. Alçak herifler, bunu siz başlattınız. Arap baharı diye bahsettiğiniz bahar kimin baharı? Bunu ben mi yaptım? Bu grupları ben mi silahlandırdım? Bu kadar Amerikan, IŞİD diye tabir edilen o isme de yakışmayan DEAŞ'a ben mi bu kadar roket sattım? Bunlar buraya gelip de ilk yaptıkları ne? Petrol kuyularını işgal ettiler. Petrol kuyuları ne anlama geliyor? Uluslararasıda petrolün varili 50 dolara satılıyor, brand petrol 55 dolar, bilmem ne petrol 50 dolara satılıyor. Sen kaç para alıyorsun bundan? Alan kim bunları? Türkiye mi alıyor? Alan yine sensin. Ne oldu batı? Hani bu ne perhiz bu ne lahana turşusu. E hırsız sensin. Arsız, katil sensin. Orada bunları silahlandıran sensin. Çünkü hem adamın petrolünü alıyorsun, beş liralık petrolü bir liraya alıyorsun, hem karşısında para da vermiyorsun. Ne yapıyorsun? Silah veriyorsun. Sen finanse ettin bu işi. Terörü sen oluşturdu. Ne yapacaksın başka? Oradaki insanlar mülteci olmuş, insanlar denizlerde boğulmuş. Senin derdin bu değil ki. İnsanları rehabilite etmek, insanlara faydan dokunması değil ki. Sen bencil bir katilsin. Batı olarak söylüyorum. İsrail olarak söylüyorum. Bunu öfkeyle, tarafgirlikle konuştuğumdan değil. İnsan adalet merkezli bakmalı. Önce adil olmalı. Öncelik adalet, ondan sonra merhamet. Senin adaletten anladığın nedir? Bu petrolü ben mi alıyorum? Sen alıyorsun. Sen aldığına göre hırsız sensin. Katil sensin. Örgütü kuran sensin. (Erkan, 40s, male)
8. Londra'da adam Müslüman kökenli bir belediye başkanı seçiyor. Tamamen siyasi bir yönlendirmedir. Çünkü Müslüman bir belediye başkanı olması Arap yatırımcıların oraya gelmesini sağlayacaktı, Arapları kendini güvende hissettirecekti. Çünkü Arap, İngiliz'in gözünde paradır. İngiltere'ye

gittiğinizde en önemli yerlerde belki yıllarca boş kalan binalar ve daireler vardır, Prenslere veya zenginlere ait. Sırf imaj için adam almıştır ama boş tutar. Yılda 3-5-10 gün kalır ama boş tutar. Sırf imaj için. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

9. İşte Londra'nın belediye başkanının Müslüman kökenli olması, seçilmesi gibi tamamen ticari, ekonomik bir şey bu. Siyasi bir duruş değil. Tamamen ekonomik gerekçelerle oluşmuş bir şeydir çünkü sıcak paraya ihtiyaç var . . . Biz mesela hiç böyle düşünmemişizdir. Suriyelinin zenginlerinin Türkiye'ye gelip yatırım yapmasını hiç düşünmemişizdir. Bu da çok safça bir şey. Belki çok insani ama bir anlamda da çok gerçekçi değil. (Ayhan, 50s, male)
10. Batı da bunları gönül rızasıyla kabul etti çünkü bundan ekonomik bir beklentileri oluştu. (Ayhan, 50s, male)
11. Türkiye'yi kıyasladığımızda Almanya'yı belki şey tutarsak. Tabi burada İsviçre de önemli. Sığınmacı alan ülkelere baktığımızda Batı politika olarak Suriye meselesinde iyi sınav veremedi. Burada bir istatistik vardı da ona bakacaktım. Batı dünyası Suriyeli sığınmacılar noktasında ürktü, korktu. “Bunlara nasıl bakacağız, nasıl edeceğiz? Bunlar farklı kültürden geliyor. Bunlar işte Müslüman buraya gelirse Hristiyanlık tehlikeye girer” algısı oldu. Macaristan yanılmıyorsam. Hani “Hristiyan olanları alalım” filan. Batı iyi bir sınav veremedi açıkçası. Akdeniz'de boğulan insanlar, malum hepimiz izledik dünyanın gözleri önünde. Avrupa gerek siyasi, gerekse kültürel anlamda bunlara bir set koydu. Hem etnik yapı hem dini hem siyasi hem kültürel olarak bir bariyer koydu. Bunu kabul etmek lazım. Burada iyi bir imtihan veremedi. “Acaba ne olur, bunlar gelirse düzenimiz bozulur mu? Sosyal kültürel, sosyolojik şeyimiz ne olur?” Bunun şeyindeydi. Çünkü düzene göre yaşayan bir ülke sonuçta Avrupa. Fakat Türkiye böyle yapmadı.

Türkiye'nin yaklaşımı tamamen vicdani bir yaklaşımdı. Yani din, gelenek, kültür, örf, ananeyle birlikte hareket etti. (Osman, 40s, male)

12. Bizim tarihsel, hem din, inanç kodlarımızda var bu, hem törelerimizde, geleneklerimizde böyle bir misafirperverlik var. (Osman, 40s, male)

13. Çünkü Avrupa hem siyasi, dini ve statü bariyerleri koyuyor. Önce insan demiyor. Önce benim güvenliğim diyor. Önce insanın güvenliği demiyor. Batının böyle egoist bir yaklaşımı var. Türkiye, doğu ülkelerinde tabi bu inançtan kaynaklanan kader, inanç, töre kültüründen kaynaklanan bir şey var. Onun kefilisi Allah'tır deriz. Misafir kismetiyile gelir deriz. Bu inancın getirdiği bir şey. Ama Batı'da bunun bir karşılığı yok. Nasibin karşılığı yok batıda. (Osman, 40s, male)

14. Ama bunu bu devlet düzeltebilir. Bunu bu devlet rehabilite edebilir. Çünkü tarihinin vermiş olduğu bir yükümlülükle bunu yapabilir. Yoksa hani şöyle proje yapacağım, batıların örneklemeleriyle falan. Böyle bir şey yok. Batı bizim düşmanımız. Baştan sona kadar. Kâinatın sonuna kadar. Hiçbir zaman da dostumuz olmadı. İnsani de olmayacaktır. Zalimler. Bosna'dan gelenleri biz hiç Suriyelilerden ayırmadık. (Erkan, 40s, male)

15. İslamofobi çalışmasını başlattığımızda bunu Avrupa'ya yönelik bir operasyonu olduğunu söyleyen insanlar olmuştur. Avrupa aslında İslamofobik değil, işte Müslümanlar olanlara hoşgörü. Tam tersi, Avrupa Müslüman düşmanıdır. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

16. Özgürleştirirken onların tabiriyle demokrasi, Müslümanlar da bunu kullanıyor maalesef. Demokrasi batının bir yalanı ve oyuncağıdır. Her ne kadar insan haklarına İslam'daki karşılığı olarak yerleşse bile o kelimenin Latin kökenli, Roma kökenli, Yunan kökenli, özür dilerim, bir kelime olması

bile Müslümanların ağızına yakışmıyor. Demokrasi ifadeleri kesinlikle... Biz Müslümanız. İslam demek adalet demek, merhamet demek. İslam demek kardeşlik demek, paylaşmak demek. İslam demek zulmün karşısında dimdik durmak demek. Malıyla, canıyla her şeyiyle dimdik durmak demek. Ama bunların işleri fitnedir. Burada bu savaşı çıkaran da onlar. (Erkan, 40s, male)

17. Aslında biz de çok doğal yaşayan bir toplum değiliz. Biz de deforme olduk, dejenere olduk. Komşuluk ilişkilerimiz bir başkasına yönelik bakışımız... Eskiden, aslında eskiden dediğim de çok eski değil 15 sene önce, evler dizayn edilirken yatıya gelecek misafirler dikkate alınarak evler dizayn edilirdi.

Şimdi o dönemin belki iki misli büyüklükte evler var ama bir yatılı misafiri ağırlayacak refleksimiz yok. Uygulamamız da yok. Zorluk çekersiniz. Bu misafir ağırlama kültürünüzü bile değiştiriyor. Kendinizden olanı bile ağırlayamayacak hale gelen bir toplum haline geldik. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

18. Bu kadar yabanileşmiş bir toplumuz. Biz de normal değiliz. Sanki sadece karşı taraf öyleymiş gibi. Biz kendi insanımızı ağırlamaktan bile şeysek doğal olarak oraya karşı mesafe koyacağız. O zaman bu sadece Suriyeli mültecilere gösterilen bir refleks değil. Toplumsal bir bozulmamız var. Özü itibariyle bu toplum böyle değil. Düşünce üretirken... Batı insanı düşünce üretirken pratiklerimiz yakın olsak bile düşüncelerimiz zıttır. Yani onda öyle bir kavram yok. Ben yardım etmek zorunda değilim. Ama biz yardım etmek zorunda olduğumuzu hissediyoruz ama pratiklerimiz batıyla aynı veya yakın. Ama düşüncemiz tam zıt. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

19. Şöyle ki Avrupa'ya giden bir Türk kendini hiçbir zaman Avrupa'da sabit kalabileceğini düşünmez. Biz bununla ilgili bir çalışma yapmıştık.

Gittiğimizde Arapların kurduğu sivil toplum kuruluşları İslamofobiyle ilgili

ya da yaşadıkları coğrafyadaki toplumsal taleplerle ilgili daha birikimli olduğunu görüyorsunuz. Ama Türklerin kurmuş olduğu yapıların tam tersi hiçbir eğitimi yok. Bu bilgisizlikten kaynaklanan bir şey değil. Arap oraya kendini ait hissediyor, “artık ben burada yaşayacağım” diyor. Türk ise ait hissetmiyor. Her an ülkesine dönebilmek istiyor. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

20. Böyle. Bu başka bir sorun. Ama durum bu. Batılı olanın, Avrupa’ya düşünsel anlamda yakın olan bile memleket hasreti çekiyor. Ama adam geri döneceğim diyor. Orada ikinci, üçüncü kuşak olanlar bile dönme şeyini hissediyor. Bize gelen yabancı misafirleri, mültecileri de aslında böyle gördük. Bunlar geldi ama gidecekler. Burada kalabileceklerini biz hayal edemiyoruz. Bizim gibi davranacaklarını düşünüyoruz. Bunlar aslında belki bir şeyden sonra anlaşıldı gibi. Yani bizim gibi olmadıkları, burada yerleşik olarak kalabilecekleri... (Ayhan, 50s, male)

21. Geçenlerde bir istatistik gördüm. Emniyet’in raporlarında hiç mültecinin olmadığı tek ilçe Kadıköy. Buradan yola çıkarak muhtemelen en çok mültecinin olduğu yer de Sultanbeyli’dir. Bu aslında bize resmi verir. Anadolu’nun, bozulmamış toplumlarda daha çok, Üsküdar ne kadar Anadolu’ysa o kadar mülteci alıyor. Kadıköy, Bakırköy, Beşiktaş, Şişli ne kadar Anadolu’ya o kadar. Bu bu belediye, şu belediye, siyasetçi falan değil . . . Ama oradaki eğer Anadoluluğu koruyorsa aynı özelliğe sahip mekanlar ağırlar. Kadıköy çok modern insanların yaşadığı bir yer olduğu için ağırlamıyor değil. Anadoluluğunu, yerliliğini kaybetmiş. Daha doğrusu Batılı gibi düşünmeye başlamış. Batı değerleriyle entegrasyonunu sağlamış bir toplum. İlkelleşmiş bir toplum bana göre. Kendi değerlerinden uzaklaşmış. Doğal olarak Kadıköy’de mülteci yok. Kötülüğünden değil. Köpek bakar ama

Suriyeli mülteciye bakmak zorunda değilim der. Gayrı-insani olduğu için değil. Değer kayması olmuş. İyi ya da kötü değil. Tedavi edilmesi gereken bir şeydir. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

22. Kadıköylüye bir Alman mülteci gelse nasıl bakar? Onu belki kabul edebilir. Hatta muhtemelen eder. Oluşturulan bir algıyla da alakalı. Bizim çocuklara demişler ki “yabancı arkadaşlarınız olacak”. Çocuklar sevinmişler. İngiliz, Alman, Hollandalı arkadaşlar. Gitmişler Arap çocuklar. Çocuklar burunlarını bükmüş. Toplumsal manipülasyona uğramış ya da manipülasyona uğramış toplumsal yapıların... İslam toplumu, Afrika toplumu manipülasyona uğramış bir toplum. Manipüle edilmiş. Beyaz ırkın, asil ırkın varlığı ön planda tutulmuş. Avrupa’dan gelen bir mülteci belki hiç o yardım duygusu olmayan insanda sahiplenmeye sebep olacaktır ama Afrika’dan gelen veya Ortadoğu’dan geleni sahiplenmeyecektir. (Ayhan, 50s, male)
23. Diğeri sahiplenirken o manipülasyonu aslında insanlığı kaybedecek şekilde dozunu, dozaj almamış. Onda da uyuşturucu var. O da Müslümanlığı değerlendirirken “ya kardeşim biz de bu işlere bir türlü sahip çıkamıyoruz” böyle okumamız yazmamızda da aslında doz olarak uyuşturucu var ama yüzde yirmi oranında. Buradaki çok daha yüksek oranda uyuşturucuyu almış, manipüle edilmiş. “Müslümanlık ilkel bir şey zaten, Batılı olmak lazım, çağdaş olmak, modern olmak lazım” diyor. O artık uyuşturucu müptelası olmuş. Bu diğeri alışkanlık düzeyinde. Arada bir içiyor, kafayı buluyor ama normalleşebiliyor. Orada da yok değil, orada da var. Orada olmasa böyle davranmaz. Daha dini bir toplum oluruz. Şimdi Ortadoğu toplumu bu ezikliği yaşıyor. Afrika toplumu dozu daha yüksek orada. Orada da kendinden nefret eder hale gelmiş. Beyaz insanın üstünlüğü, diğer tarafta Avrupalı, çağdaş,

modern olma. Kendi dışındaki toplumlari, kendi dışındaki düşünceleri kabullenme refleksi var. Bizde de o var. Biz de çünkü çok sağlam bir düşüncemiz yok. (Ayhan, 50s, male)

24. Benim de dörtte üç oranında dedelerim, ceddim Yugoslavya muhaciridir. Balkan harbinden bu topraklara gelmiştir. Aynı dertlerle, kederlerle, elemelerle. Muhacirliğin yüklerini omuzlarında, kalplerinden, ruhlarında taşıyarak. Önce İstanbul'a, sonra Bursa'ya, olmadı İzmir'de karar kılmışlardır. (Özge, 30s, female)

25. İnsanlar kendilerini bilmiyorlar. İnsanlara sorsak nereden geldiniz, alışveriş merkezinden gelmiştir ya da eğlenmekten gelmiştir ya da bir şeyi tüketmekten gelmiştir. Nereden geldiğini bilmiyor. Neyi hatırlıyorsun desek, izlediği dizileri, filmleri söyleyecektir ya da almak istediği bir şeyleri söyleyecektir. Yani ceddini, dedesini, atasını, değerlerini, mazisini düşünen çok az kişi var. Bundan dolayı muhacirler yadırganıyor. Cahilliklerinden dolayı yadırganıyorlar. Gerçek anlamda mazisini araştırırsa, ama tekrar söylüyorum, inkılaplar bunun kapılarını kapattılar. Mazinizi bilmeyin. Ceddinizi, ecdadınızı, dedelerinizi tanımayın, onun değerlerine yabancı kalın. Bakınız, burada bir tarihi çeşmemiz var. Yazılarımızı okuyamıyoruz. Bu tarihi çeşmenin vaktini daha tahayyül edemiyoruz. (Özge, 30s, female)

26. Bakınız, Suriyeli muhacir dostlarımızın gelmesiyle bizim vasıtasıyla elimizden alınan, yıkıp yakılan harflerimiz geri gelmiştir . . . Bizim harflerimizden, tesettürümüzden, medresemizden, yaşam biçimimizden, her şeyimiz katledilmiştir. (Özge, 30s, female)

27. Suriye denilen haritadaki bir kardeşimizin varlığını maalesef bilmiyorduk, tanımiyorduk. Çünkü bize tanımamız için elinden geleni yaptı bu

müfredatlar, inkılaplar. Zaten tanımayalım diye, oradaki değerleri bilmeyelim diye. (Özge, 30s, female)

28. Senin memleketin, senin insanın. Zaman içinde asimile olmuş. Dili hep öyleymiş. Bizim Hatay'a, Antep'e indiğinde aynı dil. Sadece sen aşağıdan biraz yukarıdasın diye dilini unutmuşsun. Biraz daha yukarı çıksaydı ya da sen aşağı inseydin aynı dili konuşacaktık. Suriye aslında bir ilin adı sadece. (Leyla, 30s, female)
29. Şöyle aslında 100 yıl öncesine gittiğimizde Suriye aslında bu toprakların bir parçasıydı. O çizilen sınırlar aslında gerçekçi reel sınırlar değildi. Bizim dışımızdaki güçlerin çizdiği sınırlardı. Diyarbakır bugün bizim için ne ise Suriye de oydu. Dolayısıyla 100 yıllık bir şey olunca sanki aslında çok farklı. Aslında kültürümüz, hayata bakışımız, aslında birçok şey aynı. (Ahmet, 30s, male)
30. Onları ziyaret ettiğim zaman burada neler yapıyorsunuz? Vaazlarına katıldım, toplantılarına. Orada Müslümanlığı tahkir ediyorlar. Kurbanı öteliyorlar, dışlıyorlar. Gelen Suriyeli hanımlara ve çocuklara "size yardım edeceğiz" diye onları Hristiyanlaştırmak adına yardımlar yapıyorlar. Fakat bunu kendi ayinleri üzerinden gerçekleştiriyorlar. Mesela oraya BİM kartı için gitmiştir Suriyeli hanım ama onu rahatlıkla şarap sırasına davet edebiliyor. İsa'nın kanı diyorlar şaraba. İsa'nın ekmeği diyorlar ekmeğe. Bandırıp yiyorlar . . . Bu noktada Üsküdar'ın sahip çıkmak yerine kardeşlerini zalimlere ve düşmana teslim ettiğinin de bir göstergesidir. Biz bunu belediyeye, belediye başkanına kadar taşıdık. Ne yapılabildi, 1-2 ikaz belki. Başka hiçbir şey yapılamadı. O kilise derneği aynı zamanda buradaki gençlere de

Hristiyanlaşma, öz kimliğinden koparma gayesi içerisinde olan sahtekâr bir dernek. (Özge, 30s, female)

31. Mesela şimdi bizim burada ciddi bir misafirperverlik, misafirperverlik de demek istemiyorum. Bu topraklar onların da toprağı. Gerçek anlamda müşterek toprağımız. Osmanlı toprağıdır. Bizim olduğu kadar onların da. Hakikatine baktığımız zaman kimsenin değildir toprak. Allah dilediğini dilediği yerde ihya eder. (Özge, 30s, female)

32. Evet, artık imarethanelerimize geri dönmeliyiz. Osmanlı imarethanelerinin açılması gerekiyor. Bir an önce. Bu insanlar daha fazla zarar görmeden, hor, hakir görülmeden insan olmaktan uzaklaştırılmadan yani insan yerine konulmamaları söz konusu. Tek çözüm imarethaneler. Onlara geri dönmemiz gerekiyor. (Özge, 30s, female)

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