

POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF SMALL HYDRAULIC POWER PLANT
CONSTRUCTIONS IN THE PROVINCE OF RIZE

by

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B.S in Pol. Sci. and Int. Rel., Boğaziçi University

Submitted to the Institute of Environmental Sciences in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Science

in

Environmental Sciences

Boğaziçi University

2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Ali Kerem Saysel for giving me the confidence to explore my research interests and the guidance to avoid getting lost in my exploration.

It is with immense gratitude that I acknowledge the support and help of my co-advisor Assist. Prof. Dr. Zeynep Kadirbeyođlu.

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Hundreds of small hydraulic power plants (SHPPs) in different regions of Turkey have been under construction. However, local people are opposing to these constructions in some regions, especially through judiciary means. The government aims to make legal amendments in order to change the legal basis enjoyed by the opposition until now. These events manifest that SHPPs refer to a case of politicized environment. Relying on a political ecologic perspective, the study defined the issue of SHPPs in Rize as an ecological distribution conflict between different social actors having distinct material interests.

To test this hypothesis, this study investigated the state's policy of SHPPs and the opposition against it, focusing on three valleys in Rize. The research helped to identify the related actors, their motives and strategies. Grassroots actors aimed to defend their livelihood interests that depend on the sustainability of stream ecosystems. Environmental non-governmental organizations supported the cause of grassroots actors from a moral and environmentalist position. The state was driven by a developmentalist and neo-liberal motivation to increase domestic electricity generation capacity by promoting business investments in SHPPs. Although the state is the pivotal actor in this conflict, each actor has its own strengths enabling it to exert power over its opponents.

RİZE İLİNDEKİ HİDROELEKTİRİK SANTRALİ İNŞAATLARININ POLİTİK EKOLOJİSİ

Türkiye'nin farklı bölgelerinde yüzlerce küçük hidroelektrik santral (HES) inşa aşamasındadır. Fakat bazı bölgelerde, yerel halk bu inşaatlara, özellikle hukuki yöntemlerle, muhalefet etmektedir. Hükümet, bu muhalefetin şu ana kadar yararlanabildiği hukuki zemini değiştirmeyi amaçlayan hukuki düzenlemeler yapmaya çalışmaktadır. Bu olaylar, HES'lerin siyasallaşmış bir çevre vakasına dönüştüğünü göstermektedir. Bu bağlamda, politik ekoloji perspektifine dayanarak, bu çalışma Rize'deki HES meselesini farklı maddi çıkarlara sahip, farklı sosyal aktörler arasında cereyan eden bir ekolojik dağıtım krizi olarak tanımlamaktadır.

Bu hipotezi test etmek amacıyla, devletin HES politikası ve buna karşı geliştirilen muhalefet Rize'de bulunan üç vadiye odaklanılarak araştırıldı. Çalışma, ilgili toplumsal aktörleri, bunların motivasyonlarını ve stratejilerini tespit etmeye yardımcı oldu. Taban aktörleri, dere ekosistemlerinin sürdürülebilirliğine dayanan yaşamsal çıkarlarını korumayı amaçlamaktadır. Çevre sivil toplum kuruluşları ise, taban aktörlerinin davasını ahlaki ve çevreci bir pozisyondan desteklemektedir. Diğer taraftan, kalkınmacı ve neoliberal motivasyonlarla hareket eden devlet, şirketleri HES'lere yatırım yapmaya teşvik ederek, yerli elektrik üretim kapasitesini artırmayı hedeflemektedir. Bu çatışmada, devlet her ne kadar asli aktör olsa da, her aktör, rakipleri üzerinde güç uygulamalarını mümkün kılan avantajlara sahiptirler.

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LIST OF SYMBOLS/ABBREVIATIONS

Symbol/Abbreviation	Explanation
CPR	Complex Common Property Regime
DSI	The State Hydraulic Works
EIA	Environment Impact Assessment
ENGO	Environmental Non-Governmental Organization
EPDK	Energy Market Regulatory Authority
MENR	Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources
MW	Megawatt
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
SHPP	Small Hydraulic Power Plant
kWh	Kilowatt hour
TEMA	Turkish acronym for: The Turkish Foundation for Combating Erosion, Reforestation and the Protection of Natural Habitats
TNC	Transnational Corporation
YEGM	The General Directorate of Renewable Energy

1. INTRODUCTION

This thesis studies the conflict on small hydraulic power plants (SHPPs) in Rize from a political ecology perspective. The state's policy on the development of SHPPs and the reaction emerged against it in the cases of three valleys in the district of Rize, namely Senoz, İkizdere and Çağlayan-Arılı, are investigated and analyzed by a critical approach based on the literature of political ecology. Previously, in addition to some articles studied SHPPs in terms of their economic and technical aspects, the short articles by Mine Islar are the only studies focused on the political aspect of the issue. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study shows that the issue of SHPPs in Rize is not only a matter of economics and technology, but also a political conflict between different actors. Secondly, the reaction emerged against the state's policy of SHPPs is not a result of aesthetic concerns or caring for other species or future generations, but livelihood concerns of grassroots actors translated into environmental, territorial and human rights. Thirdly, the opposition to SHPPs is also a resistance against political marginalization of the grassroots actors, and that these actors do not feel that the EIA mechanism provides a just platform for taking part in the decision-making processes.

The structure of the thesis is as follows. In the next section background information about SHPPs is given. Section 3 presents a literature review of political ecology which would draw a theoretical framework to analyze the politics of SHPPs. Section 4 investigates the state's policy of SHPPs and the reaction emerged against this policy in three valleys of Rize, namely İkizdere, Fındıklı and Çağlayan-Arılı. Section 5 is an evaluation of the politics of SHPPs in Rize from a political ecology perspective, and section 6 includes the conclusion of the study and suggestions for further investigations.

SHPPs have been constructed in Turkey since 1926. The municipalities and Directorates of Rural Services constructed most of them during the period of 1950-1960. Until 1972, they were constructed by the municipalities and Directorates of Rural Services for the electrification of the rural settlements. However, although they had been widely

used to generate electricity; large-scale dams substituted them after 1960s in Turkey and at the global level (DSI, 2011).

SHPPs were taken over by Turkish Electricity Administration in 1982; but, later, some of them were closed due to operational problems and problems at the municipal level. In 1984, with the introduction of law decree numbered 3096 - the Law on Delegation of Agencies other than Turkish Electricity Administration about Electricity Generation, Transmission, Distribution and Trade of Energy, twelve SHPPs with a capacity lower than 10MW were constructed to generate electricity and started to operate according to build-operate-transfer model and auto-producer model (DSI, 2011).

DSI makes some optimistic predictions about the development of hydropower in Turkey. Further hydropower plants could produce 10-15 billion kWh/year minimum, which have an installed capacity lower than 30 MW and have not been examined yet. Besides, an additional 3-5 billion kWh/year can be produced by integrating turbines to water channels and dams. DSI promises to implement these SHPP projects in accordance with EIA examinations to preserve natural landscapes, historical artifacts and the ecosystems of the valleys. DSI also claims that the local people and NGOs would be informed about the processes and the works would be done in line with their concerns (DSI, 2011).

Although DSI promises to take the opinion of local people and NGOs on SHPP projects, these actors have been protested SHPPs in some parts of Turkey. The opposition is starting court cases; trying to designate regions of SHPPs as natural protected areas or boycotting public information meetings which are a part of the EIA mechanism. Such protests are not new in Turkey that large-scale hydropower projects were often criticized mainly owing to flooding of the settlements, which forces local people to migrate, and historical artifacts. However, in the last decade, the name “hydropower” has started to refer to small and river-type hydraulic power plant projects that are concentrated especially in the Black Sea Region. Different than large-scale projects, the main critique on SHPPs is that they have a risk to disrupt local hydro-cycles, in which streams are playing vital roles,

and surrounding eco-systems including human beings. These critiques lead some local people and environmentalist groups to perceive SHPPs as a threat to the survival of the local people and sustainability of the ecosystems. This debate has turned into a political clash that the local people and environmentalist groups oppose to the state's policy of SHPPs and to the companies constructing them. Considering the wide media coverage of the issue, we can say that the SHPPs have come to the fore of Turkey's agenda and have become the mostly debated environmental issue in the country.

The conflict on SHPPs is a complex issue with several aspects and can be approached from many different perspectives and dimensions. In this study, based on the assumption that SHPPs represent a case of politicized environment, the following research questions are addressed: What are the different actors in the conflict on SHPP in Turkey? What are the relations of power between these actors? What are the strengths and constraints of these actors in this conflict?

These questions are addressed from a political ecology perspective, which questions the interactions between the nature and the society. Political ecology is a vast literature and deals with several environmental problems at distinct times and spaces. Firstly, this study does an overall review of the literature to see the conflict over SHPPs from a political ecology perspective. Second, the study considers the concept of "environmentalism of the poor", which has been applied to environmental movements of rural and poor actors in the Third World (Martinez Alier, 2002). Finally, the conflict is investigated by the concept of "Third World Political Ecology" which considers the distribution of political power among different social actors to understand environmental issues in the Third World (Bryant and Bailey, 1997).

From a political ecology perspective, the hypothesis of this study is that the conflict on SHPPs in Rize is an ecological distribution conflict between two political camps, emerged because of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of SHPPs. One of the camps consists of the grassroots actors that are organized and act against SHPPs to defend their livelihood interests, and ENGOs that support grassroots actors by raising awareness

and translate grassroots demands into human, territorial and environmental rights language. The latter camp, on the other hand, is the coalition of the developmentalist state and the profit-seeking business. These two actors have compromised their interests on the utilization of all hydropower potential of the country, especially through SHPPs. The state neglects or attacks to the opposition of the former camp, following its developmentalist goals through neo-liberal policies of privatization. The business, on the other hand, seeks to minimize production costs as much as possible and enjoys this new terrain of profitable investments thanks to the neoliberal policy of the state. The state obscures the underlying logics, relations of power and environmental consequences of SHPPs, by appealing to a discourse based on the increasing economic growth of Turkey that is in need of much more and renewable energy sources.

The above hypothesis are tested and analyzed in the findings, based on an analysis of the state's energy policy, the role of SHPP in it, and the reactions emerged against this policy by the grassroots actors and ENGOs. Firstly, the state's current energy policy is identified and it is found that the state in Turkey is highly motivated and is eager to increase its energy generation capacity especially through developing domestic resources. The state justifies this policy mainly by several discourses: increasing energy demand of Turkey, the global campaign to mitigate the climate change, energy supply security; increasing resource diversity and unused potentials of energy sources. In line with the global hegemony of neoliberalism advocating privatization, the state calls business to invest for its energy projects.

It is found in this study that one of the results of the state's energy policy is the development of hundreds of SHPP projects in the Eastern Black Sea Region sheltering many small streams with high flow rates. DSI plays the leading role in these SHPP projects, regulating the process with other public institutions like Energy Markets Regulation Authority (EPDK) and Electric Power Resources Survey Administration (EIEI, now General Directorate of Renewable Energy [YEGM]) through the regulation made in 2003, called "Regulations on the Signing of Water Use right Agreement in order to produce for the Electricity Market". The aim of the regulation, which is based on the Electricity Market Law, is to define procedures and principles regarding Water Use Rights

Agreements between DSI and legal entities for constructing and operating hydropower generation facilities. Concerning environmental protection, this regulation mandates an EIA only for SHPP projects with a capacity higher than 50 MW; but only after the costs and designing of the project are determined through a tender mechanism for private companies. However, the opposition against SHPPs manifest that the EIAs are perceived as for pro forma, which are claimed to be copies of each other and not to be based on a basin-based approach.

Following the analysis of energy policy and the role of SHPPs in it, then, the study investigates environmentalist movements against SHPPs, based on the examples of three valleys in the Province of Rize – İkizdere, Senoz, Çağlayan-Arılı. The political actions of the grassroots actors in these valleys indicate that the livelihood concerns are the main driving forces for them to act against SHPPs, since their economic activities - agriculture, animal husbandry, beekeeping, water mills, fishing and tourism - depend on stream water threatened by the SHPPs. Two key strategies that the grassroots movements follow are starting lawsuits against SHPPs and appealing to the Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection to assign the valley as a natural protected area. But as they fail to do so and lose their trust in the state's intermediary role, they confront directly with the companies and the state. However, these constraints put forward by the grassroots actors push the state and the business to appeal to other strategies. As a pivotal actor in the conflict, the state plans to amend the regulations enabling the anti-SHPP camp to use the above mentioned strategies, in favor of the state and the business interests, by a new law. On the other hand, having close and symbiotic ties with the state, the business can bypass court decisions against SHPPs by minor modifications in the projects or can even ignore court decisions thanks to the lack of monitoring by the government.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study is a qualitative case study analyzing the conflict over SHPPs in Rize from a political ecologic perspective. In that context, political actions and discourses of different actors in the conflict are investigated.

Information with respect to the political actions and discourses of the grassroots actors, the ENGOS, the state and the business in the selected cases are reached from internet newspapers and through the web-sites of these actors.

The cases are chosen from the province of Rize as it is one of the hot spots of the conflict on SHPPs. The valleys of İkizdere, Senoz and Çağlayan-Arılı in Rize were focused as there are influential grassroots movements in these valleys and there is a wide media coverage on the conflict of SHPPs in these valleys.

After identifying the concerns in the discourses of the actors, they are evaluated from a political ecologic perspective. Main assumptions in the literature are considered as a good starting point in identifying the conflict. However, the identification of poor and rural aspects of the grassroots actors against SHPPs has lead the study to look into the concept of “environmentalism of the poor” developed in John Martinez Alier’s 2002 study. This concept led the study to go further and focus on the concept of the Third World Political Ecology described in Bryant and Bailey’s 1997 book. The development of ENGOS in Turkey and their relationships with the state are also reviewed. In addition, Mine Islar’s 2012 articles on SHPPs in Turkey are also evaluated. Thus, other actors in the conflict and the relations of power between them are analyzed. All these sources were reached from the library of Boğaziçi University and Harvard University’s online databases, and with the help of thesis advisors. Appropriate theories are selected to create an understanding of the cases investigated in this study.

With respect to the ethical aspect of the methodology, the study aimed to prioritize environmental conservation to economic development and critically analyzed the state's policy of SHPPs, with the assumption that SHPPs have serious risks for the ecosystems. The literature of political ecology has an influence on such a preference as it has strong normative implications in favor of grassroots movements against environmental degradation.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1. Political Ecology Literature

Political ecology emerged in the 1970s as an effort to “address some of the notable weaknesses of social sciences in addressing questions of how human society and the environment shape each other over time” (Walker, 1995). It looked into environmental problems as social problems; rather than as results of inappropriate technology, or overpopulation, or poor management addressed by cultural or human ecology. At its starting point, political ecology focused on land degradation and emphasized the impact of larger political-economic forces in shaping environmentally degrading activities and actors, especially the “land manager”; but in 1990s, a bulk of studies on political ecology started to emerge (Peet and Watts 2004).

There are several definitions of political ecology because of its multidisciplinary character. In their foundational text, Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) defined political ecology as a “broadly defined political economy” which seeks to address “pressure of production on resources” than “pressure of population on resources”, with a “plural approach” to environmental issues and a focus on social “marginality” or poverty as not only the cause of environmental degradation but also an outcome of it (Peet and Watts, 2004). For Muldavin (1996), political ecology is “a historically informed attempt to understand the role of the state, the social relations within which land users are entwined, and resulting environmental changes. Martinez Alier (2002), on the other hand, defined the term as the “study of ecological distribution conflicts”. And for Robbins (2004), political ecology is a set of “empirical, research-based explorations to explain linkages in the condition and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit considerations of relations of power.”

Contributions to political ecology by disciplines such as political economy, behavioralism, cultural ecology, natural ecology, social movements theory, cultural

anthropology, cultural and economic geography, environmental history, feminist theory and narrative theory have made it to be observed by many scholars as a theoretically incoherent field of study (Walker, 1995). However, this deficiency cleared the pave for incorporating several concepts and ideas into political ecology. From a Marxian perspective, concepts like capitalist accumulation and self-exploitation were integrated to the studies of political ecology. Political actions and environmental movements were taken into consideration seriously. Discourse and knowledge in environmental problems were addressed in several political ecology studies. Long-term ecosystemic changes with an environmental history perspective and new ecological concepts like chaotic fluctuations or disequilibria were researched by political ecologists (Peet and Watts, 2004).

What themes can be studied with political ecology approaches? According to Walker (1995), “political economy, gender analyses of resource use and studies of the household, environmental and livelihood movements, struggles over social identity and symbolic meaning, discourse and development (in particular, sustainable development), social analyses of environmental conservation, and environmental history” are the characterizing themes in the field. These themes can be addressed through various approaches and concerns in political ecology like “(1) the role of the local resource user and the capabilities and “decision-making environment” that affect the ways that resources are used; (2) the ways that local resource use is shaped by social and economic relations at multiple scales (the household, the community, the market, the state, transnational capital); (3) the ways that historical processes have shaped and continue to shape these relations; (4) the ways that society and the “natural” or human-modified physical mutually shape each other over time” (Walker 1995).

Considering political ecology studies on water, we see that the literature is focused on privatization and commercialization of water. David Harvey (1998), for instance, argues that privatization of water service provision and ensuring full cost recovery lead to a new wave of accumulation by dispossession, which is a response to capitalism’s crisis of over-accumulation; thus water becomes a new terrain for profitable investment. Swyngedouw (2003), on the other hand, writes that privatization of water “involves centrally the transfer of ownership of water, infrastructure, and the like from the public sector, from local

ownership or control, from forms of collective or socialized ownership to often globally organized private water companies.” For him, privatization of water goes hand in hand with the discourse on “scarcity” for the acceptance of market mechanism although there is no evidence of global shortages of water. States and multilateral institutions play a critical role in promoting privatization by regulating it through legal and institutional frameworks; thus a regime of “re-regulation” than deregulation emerges on the contrary of neo-liberal ideology (Swyngedouw, 2003).

Molle (2005) criticizes “classical and technicist vision of river basin development... describ[ing] the growing anthropogenization of waterscapes without addressing – or even obscuring – the underlying logics, interests, power relationships as well as ecological transformations. Changes are always presented as an improvement – even if some dysfunctions are identified and must be mitigated – and the spatial and social distribution of benefits and costs are overlooked.” For Molle (2005), the state and urban interest groups struggle to control the use of water resource not only through projects but also through constructing and controlling a mainstream discourse defining the causes of water scarcity and pave the way for further projects and agendas.

Islar (2012a) adapts the points made in the political ecology of water to hydropower development in Turkey, by addressing the issue in terms of neoliberal policies. She argues that the state excludes rural communities by limiting their use and control to rivers, through legal frameworks in line with neoliberalism. EIA processes and renewable energy laws works in such a way that favors private interest; that this legality creates a hegemonic understanding of rights to access and control over water. Islar (2012b) also argues that the struggle between certain groups is not only on their conflicting interest, but also on different representations of rivers. While the state and the private actors perceive a river as a source for national and economic benefit; for villagers and the Turkish Water Assembly, a river represents heritage, life and rights.

What about the debates going on political ecology? Vayda and Walters (1999) argue against political ecology with the claim that it puts the emphasis on political factors in the

explanation of environmental change through “a priori judgments, theories or biases” and thus neglects the importance of biophysical aspects of environmental change. Furthermore, Vayda and Walters (1999) criticize some political ecologists of following a “populist political agenda” in favor of “local communities” against “political-economic system” for “sustainable use of resources.” However, Peet and Watts, (2004) argues that Vayda and Walters (1999) ignore to see the studies of political ecology addressing social variations inside local communities in relation to the environment, without adopting a romantic perspective of naïve peasants in a “theatre of governance”.

Based on the main assumptions of political ecology described above, this study argues that the conflict on SHPPs in Rize is not because of using inappropriate technologies or methods, but it is a social problem shaped by larger political and economic forces. In this sense, social relations between different actors are to be addressed in order to investigate the conflict over SHPPs. Marginalization of poor actors by stronger actors in complex web of social relations is an influential factor in the transformation of the issue into a social conflict or ecological distribution conflict. The state which is traditionally a powerful actor plays a leading role in this conflict and its prominent role attracts our attention to relations of power in shaping the conflict. Therefore, we should take into account political actions, environmental movements, discourse and knowledge on the environment in order to investigate the problem better.

We can argue that the conflict on SHPPs refers to a new wave of accumulation by dispossession which refers to capital accumulation for companies constructing and operating SHPPs, while grassroots actors are dispossessed of water resources of the streams. Thus, ownership rights of the public and control of local people on the stream water are transferred to companies. This change is legitimized by a discourse of scarcity, calling for market mechanism and privatization for “effective” use of water sources. Such a discourse stems from classical and technicist vision of river basin development neglecting or obscuring the underlying logics, interests, power relations and ecological transformations. Thus, unequal distribution of costs and benefits produced by SHPPs are overlooked. However, this process does not refer to deregulation but a “re-regulation”, in which the state, which represents urban interests, plays a vital role in promoting

privatization and market mechanism through legal frameworks like water use right agreements and institutions like Energy Market Regulatory Authority and the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works.

Based on the above points, this study focused on the theories of “environmentalism of the poor” and “Third World political ecology” in order to create focus into the environmental movements and political actions related to the conflict on SHPPs in Rize. Therefore, a theoretical framework to investigate the actors in the conflict, relations of power among them, and their strengths and restrictions are studied.

3.2. Environmentalism of the Poor

John Martinez Alier’s 2002 study explains the term “environmentalism of the poor” which refers to a different and new current of environmentalism which is mostly evident in the Third World and emerged as a reaction to destruction of the livelihoods of poor people by profit-seeking companies and developmentalist states. According to him, what makes this current of environmentalism different than others is that its main motivation to preserve the environment is not the result of aesthetic concerns but of livelihood concerns of poor and rural actors. This thesis adopts the view of this current of environmentalism as it addresses social movements against environmental degradation, which is very similar to the SHPPs in Rize. In this study, it is found that the poor people living in rural areas close to SHPPs form the main block of social movements against SHPPs, who act against companies and the state, with livelihood concerns rather than aesthetic concerns.

Martinez Alier (2002) defines environmentalism of the poor by comparing it with other types of environmentalisms, which are the “cult of wilderness” and the “gospel of eco-efficiency”. Martinez Alier (2002) argues that the ‘cult of wilderness’ and the ‘gospel of eco-efficiency’ dominate the environmentalism in the world and they are alive and sometimes crosscutting. Let’s first take a look at these types of environmentalism as environmentalism of the poor has emerged as a reaction to these currents.

Martinez Alier (2002) argues that the “cult of wilderness” does not attack economic growth but fights in order to preserve the remnants of pristine natural spaces outside the market. The “cult of wilderness” has other motives like aesthetic, religious or even utilitarian (future edible species, future medicines) to preserve Nature than scientific reasons. He argues that some followers of this current believe that humans have no right to annihilate other species that have a right to exist. He claims that the main proposal of this current is “keeping nature reserves, called “national parks” or something similar, free from human interference.” It is interesting to note that some aspects of the movements against SHPPs seem like originated from the cult of wilderness. We do not observe a serious critique of economic growth by these movements, but observe that they demand for preservation of unique and beautiful natural spaces sheltering endemic species. In line with such an approach, they appeal to the state in order to assign their surroundings as natural protected areas to keep SHPPs away or to stop the ongoing constructions.

Martinez Alier (2002) defines another current of environmentalism named as the “gospel of eco-efficiency” as a challenge to the “cult of wilderness”, which is “worried about the effects of economic growth not only on pristine areas but also on the industrial, agricultural and urban economy.” According to Martinez Alier (2002), this current often supports economic growth but not at all costs. This current supports concepts like “sustainable development”, “ecological modernization”, or “wise use of resources”, without attributing any intrinsic value to natural beings. Considering the calls by the movements against SHPPs for sustainable use of water resources and the arguments against SHPPs saying that economic activities like tourism or agriculture would be affected negatively, we may argue that they have similarities with the gospel of eco-efficiency. However, this current of environmentalism stays silent about the social and political aspects of environmental degradation and focuses on finding quick-fix technical policy solutions. In this sense, this current of environmentalism portrays a technocratic approach to environmental degradation, lacking a popular support.

Martinez Alier (2002) argues that a third current challenging the cult of wilderness and the gospel of eco-efficiency is “environmentalism of the poor”, which fits well in analyzing the social movements in Rize against SHPPs. He argues that this current of

environmentalism “points out that economic growth unfortunately means increased environmental impacts, and it emphasizes geographical displacement of sources and sinks.” These impacts, he writes,

“... have been felt disproportionately by some social groups that often complain and resist (even though such groups do not necessarily describe themselves as environmentalists). Some threatened groups appeal to indigenous territorial rights, and also to the sacredness of Nature in order to defend and secure their livelihood... However, the main thrust of this third current is not a sacred reverence for Nature but a material interest in the environment as a source and a requirement for livelihood; not so much a concern with the rights of other species and of future generations of humans as a concern for today’s poor humans.”

According to Martinez Alier (2002), environmentalism of the poor is a Third World-based environmental movement type, which mobilizes mainly rural and poor people motivated by livelihood concerns against unequal distribution of environmental damages and risks. He argues that “only in the South have large masses of people engaged in environmental conflicts, while fending for themselves.” In that sense, environmentalism of the poor is often puts an emphasis on geographical displacement of sources that are felt disproportionately by different social groups. It is different from environmentalist movements in the North that only in the South we observe large masses of people fending for themselves in environmental conflicts. It is also different from the Northern movements in the sense that Southern movements often call the state as an intermediary actor at the beginnings of the conflicts, but start to confront more directly with the states in case the state ignores the demands and interests of the movements.

We can make several points regarding to the politics of SHPPs in Rize, with reference to the environmentalism of the poor. Firstly, the conflict on SHPPs has emerged in the last decade when Turkey has a high economic growth rate and intends to utilize all its hydropower potential for electricity production to meet its highly increasing energy demand. This point is in line with the idea that economic growth – not wrong policies – is the main reason increasing environmental impacts. Secondly, we can argue that what Martinez Alier refers to by geographical displacement of sources and sinks between the

First World and the Third World occurs between the urban and the rural areas, in the case of SHPPs. The water source of the streams in the rural areas is transformed into energy source by SHPPs mainly for the use of industries, residences and commerce highly concentrated in the urban areas. In that sense, the case of SHPPs refers to an instance of ecological distribution conflict in which benefits are mostly enjoyed by the state and companies representing urban interests, while the rural and poor actors suffer from the costs. Thirdly, we can argue that the victims of SHPPs act to defend their material interests vested in the environment as a requirement of the livelihood, but not a concern with other species, future generations or aesthetics. It is evident in the discourses of the peasants against SHPPs that the streams are perceived as a source of survival and requirement for economic activities like agriculture, fishing, mills, tourism or beekeeping. This is why large masses of rural and poor people are acting for their material interests against SHPPs. Fourthly, we see that the movements against SHPPs have a tendency of calling the state as an intermediary actor in the conflict mainly through court cases and prefer to see the companies as their prior rivals, but not the state. However, when the state neglects its intermediary role and acts for the benefit of the companies, these movements begin to criticize and protest the state as well.

3.3. Third World Political Ecology

Another approach that can contribute to investigating the political aspect of SHPPs in Rize is Third World political ecology. Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that the environmental crisis of the Third World is not the crisis of all related actors; but the poor is mostly adversely affected by political and economic forces causing environmental change and unequal distribution of costs and benefits associated with environmental change. Bryant and Bailey (2002) add that “Those unequal relations to be related, in turn, to the power that each actor possesses in greater or lesser amounts, and which influences the outcome of environmental conflicts in the Third World.” Bryant and Bailey write that there is a large literature on the political, economic and cultural dimensions of power; however, political ecologists define power as ‘the control of a party has over the environment of another party’. Thus, we can take one more step further from environmentalism of the poor and argue that the unequal distribution of costs and benefits produced by the SHPPs is the

outcome of unequal distribution of power among different actors of the issue. Moreover, we can say that the state and companies exert power over poor and rural people living close to the areas of SHPPs by controlling their environment. But this point seems ambiguous; then how may an actor seek to exert control over the environment of other actors?

There are three ways defined by Bryant and Bailey (1997) that can answer the above question. First one is that an actor may control the access of other actors to a diversity of environmental resources such as land, forests, water or minerals. Such an actor excludes other actors in benefiting of the valued resource and establishes a monopoly on it. They argue that exclusion of other actors may be total or partially (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Secondly, according to Bryant and Bailey (1997), an actor may give priority to selected environmental problems and projects while excluding others. Thirdly, Bryant and Bailey (1997) maintain that an actor trying to control over the environment of other actors may also do it through regulating ideas. They write that “power is partly a matter of ‘winning the battle of ideas’ over human use of the environment, since actors typically seek to legitimate the triumph of their individual interests over the interests of others through an attempt to assimilate them to ‘the common good’”. They argue that states have not been content merely to impose their move at the expense of other actors, but have sought to justify it.

We see that all the ways of exerting power described above are used in the politics of SHPPs. The state and companies limit the access of local peasants to water sources of the streams by transferring a large amount of water through pipes for a few kilometers to turbines of SHPPs. While doing so, the state prioritizes mitigation of climate change through developing hydropower; but neglects the costs of SHPPs on the environments of local peasants. And, to legitimize its policy, the state develops pro-SHPP knowledge while trying to falsify counter arguments against SHPPs; and assimilates individual interests of the state and companies to the common good of the society. Then, why do the state and private companies follow a hydropower policy ignoring the environmental and social costs of SHPPs?

3.3.1. The State

Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that the states have a tendency to favor economic development over environmental conservation. Focusing on the Third World states, they maintain that the states neglected environmental conservation in their official development plans and mostly focused on rapid industrialization policy to catch up the First World by importing expensive capital goods, such as equipment, required to initiate industrial development. Another reason, according to Bryant and Bailey (1997) is that business, especially transnational corporations, discourages states to enforce environmental regulations strictly, by threatening them to withdraw their operations in the country. Besides, states do not insist on environmental regulations as their interest of development is compatible with business quest for profit making. Considering the state's pro-SHPP policy in Turkey, we see that the rapidly increasing energy demand parallel to the economic growth rate, lead the state to seek for new energy sources like hydropower in order to continue its economic growth. The state aims to utilize all its hydropower potential in a short time because of the rate of increase in energy demand. Moreover, the state needs funding from the private sector for these investments. Therefore, it has to make SHPPs attractive investment opportunities for the private sector which seeks for low costs for their investments. In such circumstances, environmental conservation has low priority for the state and the private sector, as it would increase construction and operation costs. When we look into the court decisions against SHPPs, we see that many of those projects neglected environmental conservation. The protests of local people are also the indicators of the same phenomenon. Thus, we can make an inductive point in line with Bryant and Bailey (1997) by saying that the stream ecosystems are being threatened by SHPPs, for the sake of creating domestic energy sources in a rapid and cheap way.

3.3.2. Business

According to Bryant and Bailey (1997), the role of business in the global capitalist system is to maximize its profit by minimizing production costs through acquiring natural resources and labor as cheaply as possible. Therefore, business activities tend to eliminate

traditional local environmental management practices by grassroots actors throughout the Third World and, thus foster social and environmental conflicts. Armed with the ability to transfer their operations from one region to another, transnational corporations act like the “antithesis” of the grassroots actors, while local business does not have such an advantage. On the other hand, bad publicity injurious, because of the growing concerns about environment promoted especially by ENGOs, is a serious risk for transnational corporations more than for local business. Local business has often close relationships with state leaders and officials as a result of their local embeddedness; therefore, they have much more ability to bypass environmental regulations and standards. In that sense, local business has the ability to present its activities and interests as “for the national interest” and blame ENGOs and grassroots actors as “disruptive influence” in the society. Therefore, Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that local business can be more destructive environmentally than transnational corporations. Nevertheless, both types of business enjoy being in alliance with the First and Third World states; since their strategy is to accumulate capital requires the support of the state which can provide ‘public goods’ like legal-coercive abilities, while business contribute to the quest for development by the Third World states.

There is not any concrete information on the types of companies granted with a water use rights agreement required to start an SHPP project, but most of them seems to be domestic companies when the names of these companies are investigated. However, some argue that there are subcontractor domestic companies representing transnational companies which prefer to hide their identities. It may be argued that such a method enables transnational companies to bypass some regulations for foreign companies or to block bad publicity injurious.

The evidences show that companies do not actively participate in the discussions on SHPPs, but the state takes part solely in the discussions from a pro-SHPP perspective presenting SHPPs as “for the national interest”. Beyond the discursive level, the state simplifies environmental procedures to be followed by the companies to promote market mechanism. The state also has a leading role in labeling the opposition against SHPPs as a “disruptive influence”. Moreover, we observe that the state is eager to amend the

regulations in favor of the companies, enabling the opposition to use legal means against SHPPs. Thus, we come to the conclusion that there is a strong alliance between the state and the companies to develop SHPPs and limit the activities of opposition.

3.3.3. Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations

According to Bryant and Bailey (1997), the size and number of NGOs has started to increase world-wide until 1970s, mainly as a result of declining capacity of the state in the management of various aspects of social and environmental well-being. Environmental NGOs (ENGOS) differ from other NGOs in the sense that they emphasize the need for environmental conservation when promoting social justice and equity for poor marginalized grassroots actors. In playing their roles, ENGOS do not possess the political advantage of the state and the economic power of the business; however, they have a ‘moral’ character that other actors lack. They do not sacrifice environmental quality for the benefits of economic growth as states and businesses do. Thus, they are supported by the public goodwill which they are able to use politically in raising public awareness on environmental issues to influence the environmental policies and practices of states, businesses and multilateral institutions.

ENGOS active in the conflict on SHPPs have a variety of types like associations, platforms, activist groups or assemblies. These organizations bring together local people whose livelihood are threatened by SHPPs; middle-class people living in big cities, who are worried about their hometowns determined as an area for SHPPs; and anti-capitalist groups. It may be argued that their power has a moral character and is limited with raising public awareness against SHPP in order to illegitimate the state’s policy of SHPPs and business activities. By doing so, ENGOS translate livelihood concerns of the grassroots actors into environmental, human and territorial rights language. Moreover, ENGOS are capable of using legal means like starting court cases against SHPPs or assigning valleys as natural protected sites. All in all, their source of power is public goodwill taking notice of grassroots demands and environmental well-being.

3.3.4. Grassroots Actors

According to Bryant and Bailey (1997), political implications of environmental crisis in the Third World are significantly related to the livelihood concerns of grassroots actors like shifting cultivators, small-scale farmers, nomadic pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, poor urban dwellers or fisheries. These actors develop institutional arrangements in order to regulate use of certain environmental resources like land, water, trees or animals. That creates complex common property regimes (CPRs) with the aim to manage those resources on a communal long-term basis. However, Bryant and Bailey (1997) argue that CPRs “are taken over by the state for large-scale commercial exploitation either by its own agencies or by allied business interests using the legal-political powers of the state”. The result is a series of large-scale logging, mining, cattle ranching, cash-crop production and dam construction which have been traditionally promoted by and benefited from powerful actors. Nevertheless, for Bryant and Bailey (1997), it is often impossible for poor grassroots actors to protest about environment degradation that is disrupting their livelihoods, even under the conditions of democratic rule. They are generally marginalized politically and economically. However, they argue, “Many grassroots actors nonetheless adopt strategies that aim to minimize any adverse effects to them while at the same time avoiding confrontation with powerful actors.” They develop alternative strategies to survive or confront with powerful actors directly to protect the interests of local poor people.

When we look at the conflict on SHPPs in Rize, it is evident that poor and local actors have a critical role. Demonstrations against SHPPs at the local level are mainly formed by local peasants who perceive streams essential for their survival, as their economic activities like agriculture, animal husbandry; fishing, mills, beekeeping and tourism are depended on streams. As the streams cannot be owned privately, the state has the ownership rights in the name of the country; however, local people have used the rights to use these streams through complex common property regimes. We can argue that the rights to use of the streams by grassroots actors are abolished by SHPPs as the state transferred these rights to companies through water use rights agreements for a time of 49 years. This change refers

not only to a transfer of rights but environmental degradation and disrupting the livelihoods of grassroots actors. However, these grassroots actors are economically and politically marginalized groups; therefore, they hesitate to confront directly with a powerful actor like the state, but they prefer more indirect protests like starting court cases or other legal measures. When they prefer to make direct protests, they prefer to target companies rather than the state. In this sense, we can argue that environmental movement against SHPPs seems to be a typical Third World environmental movement.

3.3.5. The Relationship between the State and the Environmentalist Movement in Turkey

A national policy for environment in Turkey was added to the agenda first in 1970s. Its progress was in line with the developments in the international realm. Thus, the concept of “sustainable development” became the key concept of Turkey’s policies of environment in 1990s. In 1991, the Ministry of Environment was founded and then united with the Ministry of Forestry in 2002. However, due to the legal and institutional progress for over 30 years, Turkey still lacks a good level of governance in environmental affairs (Bölgesel Çevre Merkezi, 2006).

There are two main elements behind the state’s policies of environment in Turkey: requirements of the EU accession process and demands of the free market economy. Proposals for law were often aiming to filling the gaps in the EU progress reports, without starting any public debate and neglecting opinions of civil society organizations and related experts. Concerning the economic factors, the government tends to make laws in line with the pressures by party alignments or domestic and foreign business groups. For instance, “motions for stay of execution” and “cancelling” decisions of the courts with regard to cases such as the coastal road project in the Black Sea Region, Cargill’s corn facility and gold mining in Bergama were not obeyed (Duru, 2006).

Environmental movements in Turkey, on the other hand, were at their embryonic stage of environmental activism, focused on problem identification and consciousness raising, in the pre-1980 period. They were usually forestry and beautification organizations with members specialized in related professions. However, the 1980s indicates a gradual increase in the number of environmental organizations which adapted issue-based activism avoiding over-politicization and polarization. There were two major themes that the environmental movements in this period were concerned with. The first concern was on land-use conflicts and general urban planning disputes. The second major concern was about energy related issues, like thermic power plants in Gökova, nuclear energy in Akkuyu and hydropower project in Fırtına Valley. This second concern politicized environmental movements and changed their nature from conservationist approach which was convenient during the 1970s and early 1980s to a radical attitude. During the second half of the 1990s, a process of institutionalization and professionalization took place and that resulted in professional organizations which employed professional staff and focused mainly on information gathering, storage, and dissemination. Despite its institutionalization and professionalization, environmental movement in Turkey still lacks mass participation; in that sense, the development of environmental movement in Turkey follows the same path with the rest of the Turkish civil society (Adem, 2005).

The relationship between the state and ENGOs in Turkey shows a tension between these actors since 1990s which signifies the waves of democratization and suitable conditions for the flourishing of civil society, following neoliberal policies of the state. However, this is a “critical engagement” that “the state becomes responsive to the demands of environmental civil society organizations as long as they correspond to the priorities of economic growth.” Since 1980s, the state has tolerated and even supported ENGOs that concentrated on endangered wildlife and habitats; but it ignored or used legal and physical force to prevent them when they linked environmental issues with overall development policies. It is evident when environmental policies of the state are analyzed. The Ministry of Environment and Forestry, which is now the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning, has lacked the necessary organizational and financial ability to enforce environmental rules and regulations against environmentally harmful activities of the business, especially the small and medium enterprises which work as subcontractors of the

TNCs. This situation indicates political unwillingness of the state in responding the demands from community level environmental movements and civil society organizations challenging development priorities of the state. In that sense, environmental issues become a part of the state agenda often to please international agencies and not to be perceived as an uncaring state (Aydın, 2005).

The nature of ENGOs against SHPPs in Rize seems not to fit with the current situation of environmental movement in Turkey. First, there are some influential ENGOs against SHPPs which have radical tendencies criticizing the economic growth policy of the state neglecting grassroots concerns and environmental wellbeing. These ENGOs are not institutionalized and professionalized in the way that Adem (2005) identifies. In that sense, these ENGOs are similar to the ENGOs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, although it is not possible to argue that there is a strong mass support for these ENGOs, we can talk about a substantial mass support by grassroots actors if we consider that population in the valleys of SHPPs have decreased significantly due to rapid urbanization in the last decades in Turkey.

Concerning the relationship between the state and the ENGOs against SHPPs, it is found that the state ignores or uses legal and physical force to prevent the ENGOs since they have a critical look to the development policy of the state. The generosity of the MENR in providing “EIA positive” or “EIA not required” reports for the companies shows political unwillingness of the state in imposing environmental rules and regulations for the business. It can be argued that this attitude of the state is not unique to the sphere of environment, but is valid for all areas in which the interests of the state and the civil society are conflicting.

4. FINDINGS

In this section, firstly the results of the investigation on the current energy policy of Turkey and the role of hydropower, especially SHPPs, are presented based on official sources. Then, the movement emerged against the SHPP policy of the state is analyzed by looking at three case studies from the province of Rize.

4.1. Current Energy Policy of Turkey

In order to understand the SHPPs policy of the state, first, we investigate its general energy policy and the role of hydropower in it. As the state conducts its energy policy mainly through the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, it is a good starting point to analyze this agency's role. The ministry intends to increase the energy production capacity rapidly and justifies this intention with the assumption that the demand for energy in Turkey rapidly increasing although its energy sector is heavily depended on imports. The ministry supports this increase in the energy demand as a result of several factors like increasing population, industrialization and urbanization, commercial opportunities of globalization (MENR, 2010).

In line with the above aim, the ministry proposes a policy until 2023 which foresees the utilization of all domestic coal and hydropower potentials and increase installed capacity of wind power up to 20.000 MW and of geothermal energy up to 600 MW. Moreover, it also proposes the introduction of nuclear power in order to generate 5% of Turkey's electricity generation. Hydropower has also a critical role in the state's energy policy. The ministry intends to increase its renewable energy capacity up to 30% until 2023 and most of this part is planned to be developed through hydropower. In this direction, the state plans to complete the ongoing constructions of hydropower plants until 2013 and thus increase total energy capacity by 5.000 MW. Another critical aspect of Turkey's energy policy is to take advantage of its geostrategic position – “energy corridor”

– between energy producing countries in the Middle East and the Central Asia on the one side, and the US and European countries on the other side (MENR, 2010).

To reach the above targets, the ministry plans to institutionalize a competitive and efficient energy market, together with privatization of electricity distribution and production activities. Thus the state aims to provide the necessary investments for the energy sector in Turkey, which is more than 120 billion dollars until 2020 (MENR, 2010).

Considering environmental conservation, the ministry only addresses the climate change as an environmental problem. It targets to reduce the rate of increase in greenhouse emissions by the energy sector after 2014. The strategy to achieve this objective is the promotion of nuclear energy, energy efficiency, clean coal technologies and renewable energies. The ministry has nothing in its strategic plan about the mitigation of adverse effects of hydropower on the environment (MENR, 2010).

How can we analyze the above strategies of the MENR? Kaygusuz and Arsel (2005) defines the approach behind this discourse as “energy interdependence” which refers to “creating new and secure lines of energy transportation and investing in new domestic energy creation methods.” The assumption of the MENR is true in the sense that electricity is a growth area in Turkey as domestic sources of oil, gas, and sufficiently high quality coals and lignite are limited; while growing industrial and commercial interests are demanding for more and cheap electricity. These facts, however, are not sufficient by itself to justify a specific energy policy, as there are alternative policy proposal stems from the same assumption. Therefore, we may argue that this policy proposal is based on specific preferences and values of the state (Kaygusuz and Arsel, 2005).

What are the preferences and values that the official strategies of energy policy are based upon? The regulatory framework of the MENR is an economic growth oriented market-based regulation, which refers to a belief in minimum state involvement in the economy that it regulates the economy only through market-based mechanisms. Technological framework is based on a belief in risk-prone technologies like nuclear

power, and a preference for conventional mega projects symbolizing the state power. Finally, the political outlook behind these preferences is a nationalist approach prioritizing state sovereignty over the rights of subnational groups (Kaygusuz and Arsel, 2005).

Keeping in mind the above explained approach of the developmentalist state in terms of its technological framework, we can argue that SHPPs policy of the state refers to a series of conventional and mega projects concentrated in specific regions. Concerning its regulatory aspect, market-based mechanisms are preferred to attract investments from the private sector; thus the business becomes a critical actor in the conflict on SHPPs. On the other hand, nationalist outlook of the state leads to the exclusion of local people whose livelihood is depended on the streams, which can be considered as prioritizing “national interests” to the interests of subnational groups.

4.2. The Hydropower Policy of Turkey

In this section, the hydropower policy of Turkey is analyzed in details. First, the main actors within the state conducting the official policy on hydropower are examined. Second, the legal procedures to start an SHPP project are explored to have a clear understanding of the roles of different actors. Third, numerical information about the current situation of hydropower in Turkey is presented. Forth, the situation of small and river-type hydraulic power plants is taken into consideration to focus on the topic of this study. And finally, the arguments advocated by the General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works in order to rationalize the official policy on small and river-type hydraulic power projects are listed and explained.

4.2.1. The Main Actors within the State

There are three main state institutions implementing the hydropower policy of Turkey: General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI), General Directorate of

Renewable Energy (YEGM, old acronym EIEI) and Energy Market Regulatory Authority (Turkish acronym: EPDK).

DSI is known to be a dam-builder institution as its main duties like hydropower production; irrigation and flood control require dam constructions. It is under the authority of the Ministry of Forestry and Hydraulic Works and it can be considered to be the main actor carrying out the current hydropower policy of Turkey. It has two main functions in the hydropower policy. It implements the SHPP projects by itself and it signs water use right treaties with private companies for the implementation of the projects (DSI, 2011).

The role of YEGM related to hydropower is to provide engineering service for SHPP projects. It makes surveys about energy potential of water streams and leads projects at different steps such as final project, feasibility, master plan and preliminary survey. In 2007, YEGM claimed that it had contributed to the engineering services for more than 80% of all operating SHPPs. More than half of all the SHPPs under construction and 44% of the planned SHPPs have been projected by the YEGM (DSI, 2011).

EPDK's role in the hydropower policy is limited with licensing companies which sign a water use right agreement with DSI to generate, transfer, distribute or sell electricity produced by an SHPP. In order to start an SHPP project, the last step for a private company is to take the necessary licenses from EPDK (DSI, 2011).

The hydropower policy of the state is implemented mainly through these institutions. YEGM estimates hydropower potential of streams and prepare SHPP projects according to these estimations. DSI is responsible of implementation of the SHPP projects by itself or with private companies via water use right agreements. EPDK licenses the private companies that sign agreements with DSI, thus allows companies to start the implementation of the project. The roles of these actors are not as distinct as explained but it gives and overall picture.

4.2.2. Knowledge and Justifications about SHPPs

Developing a policy for SHPPs, calling other actors to support this policy for mutual benefit or setting up institutions to conduct this policy are not enough for the state to reach its targets; it has to justify its policy about SHPPs. As the pivotal state institution, DSI takes the role of producing and disseminating knowledge that presents SHPPs as “for the national interest.”

For DSI, Turkey, with its growing economy and varying consumption trends, is the second country that has the highest increasing energy demand rate. In the last decade, Turkey has the highest energy demand increase rate among OECD countries. However, Turkey’s rate of energy consumption per person (2.685 kW/h) is still far from the rates of advanced countries which are higher than 10.000 kW/h. Moreover, DSI compares energy prices used by the industry in Europe and Turkey and argues that Turkey has relatively high prices compared to the European countries. According to DSI, if the total energy demand of Turkey is assumed to increase 200 billion kWh for each year, then Turkey has to double its total installed capacity in 10 to 12 years to meet its energy demand. Turkey is required to add an installed capacity of 3.000 MW each year until 2020 in order to meet its energy demand which is an increase of almost 8% each year. This requires an investment of 4 billion US dollar each year (DSI, 2011).

In this context, Turkey should reach the level of advanced countries by increasing its total installed capacity up to 40.000 MW for hydropower until 2020. Turkey’s altitude above sea level which is around 1300 meters and its mean annual precipitation of 501 billion m³, of which 186 billion m³ of that is transformed into river water, increase Turkey’s hydropower potential up to the level of 20% of the whole hydropower potential of Europe. According to DSI this potential should be turned into electricity through hydropower plants (DSI, 2011). This fact refers to a common paradigm of Third World states that is catching up the First World takes place through commercializing domestic natural resources. In addition, DSI claims that decreasing energy prices for industrial use is very critical, by making a comparison between industrial energy prices in Turkey and

Europe. Such a point may support the idea that the current energy policy of the state is for the benefit of urban interests, rather than of rural interests.

Another argument which DSI put forward is that the main cause of Turkey's foreign trade deficit is due to the cost of energy imports. DSI informs that Turkey's energy need in 2009, which was 194 billion kWh, was met at a ratio of 80% by fossil fuels like petroleum, natural gas and coal; however, 92% of the consumed petroleum and 99% of the consumed natural gas were all imported. The cost of natural gas imported from Russia and Iran was more than 20 billion dollars in 2010. This foreign dependency is told to be threatening the energy supply security of the country. This is equal to 22% of total import costs of the country and is a burden of approximately 284 TL on each family. According to DSI, considering the minimum wage of 729 TL, this is a great burden for the society (DSI, 2011). The last remarks remind us that the state is required to justify its SHPP policy as "for the national interest". The benefits which would be created by hydropower projects are presented as if they would be shared equally by all in the country (DSI, 2011).

DSI (2011) attributes a special importance to river-type SHPPs in local development. They would provide electricity to industrial facilities and thus increase job opportunities for the local people. Moreover, the contractor companies would build social facilities like health centers, schools, village residences or provide drinking water. SHPPs are also helpful in protection of local settlements from floods and erosion, and promote forestation; therefore, they have a positive impact on the conservation of biodiversity. As we will see in the following sections, the critiques on SHPPs totally reject these claims. They argue that SHPPs do not create job opportunities for local people as they require skilled and trained personnel. Many of the SHPPs are constructed not for the purpose of providing drinking water, but only for electricity generation. Concerning the conservation of biodiversity, the critiques say that the regulators of SHPPs lack passage for fish species and SHPPs endanger living beings depended on the streams as they do not release enough water to the river beds.

Considering environmental impacts of hydropower, DSI neglects all critiques and argues that it is one of the most environmental friendly energy sources compared to other alternatives. DSI rejects the claims that hydropower plants damage the natural equilibrium, moisture equilibrium and precipitation regime of the river basins. DSI argues that hydropower plants are not the factors of precipitation and moisture in a basin. The knowledge put forward by DSI ignores the critiques that some endemic fish species are endangered and some parts of the streams are dried by SHPPs. EIA is presented by DSI as an effective tool in preventing environmentally degrading risks of SHPPs. However, EIA is not an independent decision-making process but a process supporting the decision making. Basic function of EIA is to show the decision-makers environmental impacts of the projects in order to help them in decision making. We may argue that the right to decide on whether an SHPP is environmentally harmful or not, belongs to the state expressing its intention to develop SHPPs as quickly as possible. Therefore, the state's role of development and stewardship seem to be conflicting and that the evidence shows that the state prefers to play its former role (DSI, 2011).

Another argument put forward by DSI is about climate change. However, DSI considers the Voluntary Carbon Market which is one of the mechanisms established after the Kyoto Protocol, as an economic opportunity for Turkey; rather than a problem to be mitigated. For DSI (2011), Turkey should take part in carbon markets and the best way to do that is through hydropower projects. DSI (2011) informs that Turkey has developed 151 projects creating carbon credits, with a total installed capacity of 3.176 MW and causing an emission reduction at an amount of 10.811.600 tons CO₂; 84 of these 151 projects are hydropower projects. DSI's view about the climate change emphasizes the development role of the state even in a case of global environmental problem defined as one of the most critical environmental problems.

4.2.3. The Legal Procedure to Implement an SHPP Project

In order to implement an SHPP project, companies have to follow a legal procedure set by the institutions. DSI administers the projects of hydropower plants with the legal

basis of regulations named as “Regulations on the Signing of Water Use Right Agreement in order to produce for the Electricity Market” which was first entered into force in 2003. The regulations show how the system works for the implementation of hydropower plant projects. DSI announces and updates on their website about the projects. The application for the projects which are prepared by DSI and YEGM can be made on a regular basis and according to the projects’ stages (DSI, 2011).

When the first application is done for a project by a firm or group of firms, that application is also announced on the web-site and the project stays for 30 days available for other applications. With the end of application period, DSI asks for feasibility reports from the candidates. Among the candidates of whom feasibility reports are appropriate, a meeting called “Hydroelectricity Resource Contribution Share” is arranged in order to select the firm which wins the right to sign a water use right agreement (DSI, 2011).

Then, 90 days are granted to the selected firm in order to prepare a detailed and updated feasibility report. Other than DSI and the YEGM, firms can also prepare their own projects and apply with them to DSI. A similar procedure is followed if a project proposal is approved by DSI (DSI, 2011).

DSI evaluates the feasibility reports presented by firms according to some criteria such as interactions with DSI’s other existing, under construction and planned projects; hydrology, optimization, technique and economic feasibility. However, firms are responsible for all possible errors that are not foreseen in the feasibility reports. In case of the rejection of all project proposals by firms, DSI may repeat the call for proposals (DSI, 2011).

If the feasibility report of a firm is approved, it has the right to sign a water use right agreement with the condition of obtaining a license from Energy Market Regulatory Authority (Turkish acronym: EPDK). In case of more than one firm’s feasibility reports are approved, DSI requests a quote from those firms; the firm offering the best price signs the water use right agreement. The Water Use Right Agreement is valid as long as the license

of EPDK is in effect. In case of the renewal, expiration and revocation of the license, the agreement becomes void. The approved firm is also required to obtain an “EIA (Environmental Impact Assessment) Positive Decision” or “EIA Not Required Decision” related to all of the structures going to be constructed by the firm. If the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning decides for an “EIA Negative Decision”, water use right agreement becomes void (DSI, 2011).

Keeping the strategic plan of the ministry in mind, it can be argued that the regulation intends to serve the ministry’s objectives about empowering the private sector in the energy market, liberalization and promoting domestic energy resources. This regulation is worth noting as it provides an opportunity to discuss how the value of a water use right agreement is determined. The feasibility reports asked by DSI from the firms do not include a specific part on how the project will be conducted while also preserving the environment. Therefore, an EIA report is requested from the firms after the firm and the price it offered have already been approved by the authorities. It means the cost of an SHPP is not determined considering the possible effects of the project on the environment. The cost of an SHPP is completely left to the market mechanism, not free but regulated by state institutions.

4.2.4. Current Situation of Hydropower in Turkey

DSI reports that Turkey produced 18% of its energy by hydropower in 2009. That rate was higher in the previous decades; but it decreased with the introduction of natural gas for residential and industrial use (DSI, 2011).

Hydropower potential which is asymptotically calculated by the measurement of all water flows within the borders of a country is called theoretical hydropower potential. However, as it is not possible to utilize all that potential with the existing technology, the potential which can be utilized by the current technology is called technically feasible hydropower potential. However, that potential does not mean that it is also economically feasible. The part of technical potential, which can be developed with the existing and

expected economic conditions, is called economically feasible hydropower potential (DSI, 2011).

Turkey's theoretical potential of hydropower is 1% of the world's theoretical potential and its economic potential is 16% of Europe's. Turkey's theoretical hydropower potential is 433 billion kWh and technically feasible potential is 216 billion kWh. Economically feasible hydropower potential of Turkey is 140 billion kWh. If tax cuts for renewable energy sources, suggested by the EU, are implemented, this potential is expected to become larger. In 2010, 53 billion kWh of the economic potential is being operated, which amounts to 37.85% of the total economic potential. This rate is 86% in the USA, 78% in Japan, 68% in Norway and 56% in Canada (DSI, 2011).

There were 264 operating hydropower stations in Turkey at the end of 2010. There were also 236 stations under construction (12 of them were being constructed by DSI) and 1200 stations were planned to be constructed in the direction of the law decree number 4628 called Electricity Market Law. Thus, the total number of SHPP projects was 1700 according to the final data presented by DSI (DSI, 2011).

The number of small hydraulic power plants among the ones in operation and under-construction, which is 500 in total, is 225. The number of plants with dams is 100 while the number of river-type plants is 400 among all 500 SHPPs in operation and under-construction. The number of small hydraulic power plants among all the planned hydropower stations is 730. If all the planned projects are completed, 80 billion kWh/year is expected to be generated. Thus, 90% of the economic potential of hydropower will be in use (DSI, 2011).

Until now, the energy policy of Turkey and the role of hydropower in it are explained. There is cohesion between the state institutions and the government about the urgent necessity of finding new energy sources to utilize. The main reason behind this motive, argued by these actors, is that energy demand of Turkey is high while the energy need of the country depends heavily on energy imports. Furthermore, as Turkey lacks oil and

natural gas reserves, it has to find alternative ways than energy imports, not to risk its energy supply security. One of these alternatives is hydropower energy. As the most of the rivers and streams in Turkey are small, thus river-type and small hydraulic power plants are considered by the state institutions and the government as good opportunities to meet their goal. Considering the global-wide concerns on the climate change due to fossil fuel based energy consumption, the option of hydropower becomes more and more preferable by these actors. As a result, the government decided to develop hundreds of small and river-type hydraulic power projects on the rivers and streams of the country. And one of the hot spots of these projects is the Eastern Black Sea Region which hosts many small rivers and streams. However, local organizations established against these projects show that SHPPs are not welcomed by all in the region. In the following section, the hydropower projects in the province of Rize in the region and the opposition against them is investigated.

4.3. The conflict over SHPPs in the valleys of Senoz, Çağlayan-Arılı and İkizdere

The valleys of Senoz, Çağlayan-Arılı and İkizdere in the province of Rize are investigated in this study to analyze the nature of the conflict over SHPPs in Rize from a political ecologic perspective. For this purpose, the actors in the conflict, their relationships and political actions are identified and described in this part.

Even though, institutions like DSI, the YEGM and the EPDK conduct the state's policy of SHPPs; on the discursive level of the conflict, we observe the Prime Ministry, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection and the Administrative Court of Rize represent the state in the conflict. However, the state does not portray a homogenous and single unity of these institutions; but the latter two actor plays the state's role of stewardship while former actors, plays the state's role of development. This distinction is not of good cop/bad cop roles, as the government side takes steps in order to amend the regulations and neutralize the other side actors and create a single block of the state in line with the government's

policy. Thus, the government would be able to prevent the grassroots and ENGOs to use court cases and natural protected area status against SHPPs, through the mentioned institutions. Hence, we can argue that the issue has also aspect of intra-state conflict. Furthermore, all the companies identified during the research are domestic companies and the opposition usually targets these companies in their campaigns, rather than the state or government, in order to stay legitimate and influence some intermediary state institutions.

Grassroots actors identified in the regions are village mukhtars, peasants and their local organizations. We can define these actors as grassroots since they are directly influenced by the negative impacts of SHPPs and are mobilized to defend their livelihoods that depend on the streams. On the other hand, national or thematic organizations like TEMA and Sisterhood of the Streams Platform which represent also the people who are not directly affected by SHPPs and support the grassroots actors mainly for ethical reasons.

It should be noted that a distinct line cannot be drawn between the grassroots actors and these ENGOs as their members are sometimes crosscutting. In addition to that, there are also differences between ENGOs in terms of ideological background, radicalism and the extent of affinity with the grassroots actors. For instance, Sisterhood of the Streams Platform are considerably active in the region and has closer ties with the local people, when it is compared to TEMA.

The main strategy of the grassroots and ENGOs is to call some state institutions to intermediate between themselves and the companies. They start court cases against SHPPs and in many cases the courts decided to stop the constructions. They apply to the Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection in order to designate the valleys, on which SHPPs are planned to be constructed, as natural protected sites, in order to keep construction activities away from their regions. But when they fail to stop business activities through the intermediary state institutions, they confront with the companies directly. They protest public information meetings, a step in EIA mechanism, and try to EIAs illegitimate. Moreover, when the court decides that EIA is not legitimate and orders

an on-site expert examination, grassroots actors protest company representatives who attend the examinations and try to influence the judges.

In the following parts, we will see how the conflict over SHPPs in Senoz, Çağlayan-Arılı and İkizdere are shaped by these actors in a Third World type ecological distribution conflict. It is also analyzed how they interact with each other and which kind of political actions they make in order to exert power over the other actors.

4.3.1. SHPPs in the Province of Rize

Two tables are presented to show SHPP projects in the province of Rize. Table shows SHPP projects that were started and at different phases of construction or started to operate. Table II shows the SHPP projects that were not started yet and calling for applications from private companies. The tables show that there are two SHPPs, named as İkizdere I and Dilek-Güroluk, that are currently operating in Rize; while there are 23 SHPP projects in the province that are at different phases of construction. The number of the projects that are at the planning phase is 59. Thus, we conclude that the SHPP policy of the state has recently started in the province and what is expected is a series of construction works or examinations. For this reason, it can be argued that the opposition in the province is against constructions or plans of SHPPs, rather than the negative impacts of operating SHPPs. It can also be argued that SHPPs are concentrated in a few districts like İkizdere, Çamlıhemşin, Çayeli and Fındıklı; and we observe cases that there are more than one SHPP projects on one stream. For instance on Yeşildere, there are four SHPP projects and on Cimil there are five SHPP projects. Therefore, several grassroots actors living in separate settlements are influenced negatively by a series of SHPPs on the same stream, thus forcing them to come together and create grassroots organizations and develop stronger coalitions.

Table 4.1. The SHPPs in Rize that are under construction or operating

	Name of the SHPP	Project owner	Installed capacity (MW)	Average Production (kWh)	District	Start date	Project status
1	İkizdere-I	P.B ¹	15,12	110	İkizdere	1961	Operating
2	Dilek-Güroluk	B.O.T ²	180,00	593	Çamlıhemşin	2011	Operating
3	Ayder	DSI	35,00	185	Çamlıhemşin	-	Feasibility report
4	Cevizlik	DSI	90,00	395	Kalkandere	-	Feasibility report
5	Çamlıhemşin	B.O.T	42,00	195	Çamlıhemşin	-	Feasibility report
6	ÇAT	DSI	60,00	236	Çamlıhemşin	-	Feasibility report
7	Demirkapı-Dereköy	DSI	105,00	366	İkizdere	-	Feasibility report
8	Dikkaya	DSI	25,00	118	Çamlıhemşin	-	Feasibility report
9	Hisarcık	DSI	15,00	72	Çamlıhemşin	-	Feasibility report
10	Rüzgarlı Reg. and SHPP	Corporate	6,75	44	İkizdere	-	Feasibility report
11	Tozköy	DSI	120,00	347	İkizdere	-	Feasibility report
12	Tozköy II	Corporate	31,40	60	İkizdere	-	Feasibility report
13	Yokuşlu-Kalkandere	DSI	34,00	131	İkizdere	-	Feasibility report

¹Provincial Bank

²Build-operate-transfer model

14	Gürpınar	DSI	50,00	128	Çayeli	-	Master plan
15	Kayalar	DSI	85,00	176	Çayeli	-	Master plan
16	Adacami	DSI	20,00	101	Merkez	-	Preliminary study
17	Aşıklar	YEGM	1,24	7	-	-	Preliminary study
18	Doğanay	DSI	2,00	8	Ardeşen	-	Preliminary study
19	Dumankaya	YEGM	2,48	14	-	-	Preliminary study
20	Durak	DSI	132	411	Çamlıhemşin	-	Preliminary study
21	Fındıklı-Arhavi	DSI	120	435	Arhavi	-	Preliminary study
22	Hako	YEGM	0,73	5	-	-	Preliminary study
23	Kutulu	YEGM	6,22	38	-	-	Preliminary study
24	Paşalar	DSI	30,00	139	Fındıklı	-	Preliminary study
25	Turhan Reg. and SHPP	YEGM	4,72	28	-	-	Preliminary study

Table 4.2. SHPPs that are planned to be constructed in Rize

	Name of the SHPP	District	Name of the River
1	Kale Reg. and SHPP	-	Kale Deresi
2	Akbucak SHPP	-	GöreDere
3	Uzundere Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	Uzundere

4	Uzundere-II Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	Uzundere
5	Melikom Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	BüyükÇay
6	Karaağaç Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	Beyazsu
7	İncesu Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	İncesuDere
8	Başköy Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	BaşköyDere
9	Sesli Reg. and SHPP	Çayeli	SesliDere
10	Çatak Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	Yeşildere
11	Çatak SHPP	Fındıklı	ÇağlayanDere
12	Gül Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	ÇağlayanDere
13	Gürsu Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	YeşilDere
14	RizeYeşildere SHPP	Fındıklı	Yeşildere
15	Üstün I-II Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	Yeşildere
16	Çınarlı Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	PiskaleDeresi
17	Sırt Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	Kokasör
18	Taşdibi Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	Abuvıce-Dikilitaş-Abu streams
19	Meşedüzü Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	KüçükDere
20	Hayat SHPP	Fındıklı	Yeşildere and Büyükdere streams
21	Sarmaşık Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	KokasörDeresi
22	Yayla SHPP	Fındıklı	Abuvıce Deresi
23	Cevizli Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	YeşilDere-Magosti and CevizliDereleri
24	Kobanlı SHPP	Fındıklı	Çağlayan (Solares) Deresi
25	Fidanlık Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	ÇağlayanDeresi
26	Tepeköy Reg. and SHPP	Fındıklı	Papadhia (Çardağali) Deresi

27	AslanDere SHPP	Fındıklı	ÇağlayanDere
28	Şemşirli Reg. and SHPP	Güneyce	YaylaDere
29	Ayvasıl Reg. and SHPP	Güneysu	PilahozDere
30	Ambarlık SHPP	Güneysu	PaşacurDere
31	Tepe SHPP	Güneysu	Kale Dere
32	Yeşilköy SHPP	Güneysu	ÇatalDere
33	Aliçik I-II SHPP	Güneysu	Kale Dere
34	Hamzabey SHPP	Güneysu	TaşlıDere
35	Gürgen Reg. and SHPP	Güneysu	GüneysuDere – Kale Dere
36	Yeşildere Reg. and SHPP	Hemşin	BüyükDere
37	Hemşin II Reg and SHPP	Hemşin	HemşinDeresi
38	Hemşin I Reg. and SHPP	Hemşin	HemşinDeresi
39	Selin-I Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	CimilDere
40	Rüzgarlı Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	Çamlıdere
41	Selin-II Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	CimilDere
42	Arı Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	CimilDere
43	Sarmakol SHPP	İkizdere	ÇokcorDere
44	Gelintaşı SHPP	İkizdere	ÇamlıkDere
45	Başbuğ SHPP	İkizdere	İyidere (İkizdere)
46	Ceyhun SHPP	İkizdere	CaterliDeresi andUyranDere
47	Deligör Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	ÇamlıkDeresi
48	Nizam SHPP	İkizdere	Çokcor-TaşlıDere
49	Orsa-2 Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	Cimil-PanculDeresi
50	Ayyıldız SHPP	İkizdere	Melez-Kunda-ArzayanDereleri
51	Filiz Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	AnzerDeresi
52	İkiz Reg. and SHPP	İkizdere	Cimil, Faso, Bulanık and Ranos Streams
53	Saray SHPP	İyidere	İyidere

54	Çiğdemli Reg. and SHPP	Kaptanpaşa	ÇatalDere
55	Zeynep Reg. and SHPP	Kaptanpaşa	Uzundere – Canovit and Tülük
56	Dikmen Reg. and SHPP	Merkez	HemşinDere
57	Göl SHPP	Merkez	AskorozDeresi
58	İncirli Reg. and SHPP	Of	İyidere
59	Ortaköy Reg. and SHPP	Ortaköy	HemşinDere

4.3.2. Senoz Valley

In Senoz Valley in the district of Çayeli, two SHPPs called Uzundere I and Uzundere II, that are planned to be constructed on the stream of Uzundere, are the mostly debated SHPP projects. For Uzundere I and Uzundere II, DSI signed a water use rights agreement with the company Karadeniz Enerji , and with Atabey Enerji respectively. The only purpose of these projects is electricity generation, but not providing water for irrigation or drinking (DSI, 2011).The grassroots actors in the region are united under Senoz Association to defend their livelihood interests against these projects. There are also Senoz Valley Conservation Platform and the Sisterhood of Streams Platform which are ENGOS bringing several organizations and individuals together, and a national environment organization called TEMA supporting the struggle of grassroots actors. O, the state takes part in the conflict with three institutions: the Administrative Court of Rize, Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection and the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry. While the latter one supports these companies by granting “EIA Not Required” or “EIA Positive” reports; the court tends to provide support to the claims of the grassroots actors and ENGOS, and the council rejects to designate the valley as a natural protected area. The Mayor of Çayeli, on the other hand, who is a member of the ruling party of AKP, has a pro-SHPP discourse, parallel to the government’s policy, and accuses ENGOS for manipulating the public opinion (“Senoz Vadisi Modern Bir Yola Kavuşacak”, 2009).

The constructions of these SHPPs were started after the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (which is now converted to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning) granted “EIA not required” reports in 2006 for both of the projects, ignoring the opposition of local people and associations. Although, Rize Administrative Court cancelled “EIA not required” decisions after Senoz Association started a lawsuit, the construction continued based on a reason that the stopping of the construction would increase the risks of flooding and landslip (Yavuz, 2011).

The Administrative Court of Rize granted a motion for stay of execution against Uzundere I on December 2008, after Senoz Association started a lawsuit against the “EIA not required” report by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. However, Karadeniz Enerji Yatırım prepared a new project for the same site with the purpose of capacity enhancement and received another “EIA not required” report from the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry. However, gendarmes reported two times that the construction was in progress secretly (“Senoz Vadisi’ndeki HES Bugün Çalışmaya Başlıyor”, 2010). On May 2010, the company managed to complete the construction of Uzundere I and started to generate electricity, despite the ongoing court cases. The Sisterhood of Streams Platform protested the start of operation and claimed that action as a violation of law (“Senoz Vadisi’ndeki HES Bugün Çalışmaya Başlıyor”, 2010). Although the company started to operate Uzundere I, one month later, on June 2010, the court decided to grant a motion for stay of execution again and to stop the operation of the station (Yazıcı, 2010).

The Administrative Court of Rize cancelled the “EIA not required” decision of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, on November 2009, for Uzundere II Regulator and SHPP project, and stopped all construction activities. Nevertheless, the group proposed a new project on the same site in July 2009 and was granted with a new “EIA not required” report; therefore they bypassed the decision of the court and continued the construction (“Senoz Vadisi’nde Yine ÇED Toplantısı”, 2010). Administrative Court of Rize granted a motion for stay of execution, on February 2010, this was against the “EIA not required” report for Uzundere II (“Senoz Vadisi’nde Yine ÇED Toplantısı”, 2010). Following this decision, on June 2010, a call for public information meeting – one of the steps of EIA

procedure – was made for Uzundere II. The Sisterhood of Streams Platform protested the meeting and made a declaration saying that the EIA reports of the projects were illegitimate as they were prepared without a holistic approach to the valley. The platform also criticized the Ministry of Environment and Forestry in the sense that EIA reports were being granted pro forma just to bestow privilege upon specific energy companies (“Senoz Vadisi’nde Yine ÇED Toplantısı”, 2010). Later on, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry granted a new “EIA positive” decision on February 2011 for Uzundere II; but the court again decided to grant a motion for stay of execution on May 2011. Thus, the court had decided for a motion for stay of execution the third time for Uzundere II (Kaçar, 2011).

Together with the court cases, the opposition uses another weapon against SHPPs that is assigning the valleys natural protected areas which provide a legal basis to prevent SHPP constructions in the entire area. However, on December 2009, Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection declared that it had rejected the application made by 11 village mukhtars requesting to assign Senoz Valley a natural protected area. The council put forward the existence of stone mines and SHPP construction zones on the valley as the reason of its decision. A nation-wide environmentalist organization, TEMA, protested this decision by a declaration and maintained its support to the local people against SHPPs on the valley (“Senoz Vadisi’nde Yine ÇED Toplantısı”, 2010). However, in October 2010, Administrative Court of Rize cancelled the decision of Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection on the rejection of the application about assignment of Senoz Valley a natural protected area. The court based its decision on the Cultural and Natural Assets Protection Law, claiming that the research done by the council on-site lacked the contribution of experts and the cooperation of other associated agencies (“Senoz Vadisi’nin Sit Alanı Olma Umudu Doğdu, 2010). Thus, the possibility to make Senoz Valley a natural protected area emerged again.

As the tension increased in the valley when Uzundere I started to operate and court cases could not stop constructions, and the direct confrontations between the state and the grassroots actors emerged. For instance, on November 2010, peasants of Çataldere in Senoz Valley organized a demonstration against the Regulator and SHPP of Uzundere in

their village. The demonstration was controlled by the gendarmes without using any violence against the demonstrator peasants (“Senoz Vadisi’nde HES Eylemi”, 2010).

What do the events in Senoz Valley say about the conflict on SHPPs? We can say that a struggle between different actors mainly on the legal basis through court cases. Senoz Association, supported by the ENGOS, plays a pioneering role in these court cases against the companies, with the claim that EIAs are conducted perfunctory. It can be argued that the opposition calls the court, which represents the stewardship and intermediary role of the state in this conflict, to stop the activities of the companies threatening the livelihood of the grassroots actors. The court plays these roles by granting motions for stay of execution several times for the SHPPs. However, the companies work secretly or, thanks to the Provincial Directorate of Environment and Forestry, receive new EIA reports to continue constructions. Although appealing to Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection to designate the valley as a natural protected area and get rid of SHPPs in the region have been failed in the region; it is still the ultimate goal of the opposition thanks to the court reversed the judgment of the council. Therefore, we may argue that the conflict in Senoz Valley is going on between two groups: the government and companies at one hand, and the grassroots, the ENGOS and the Administrative Court of Rize at the other hand. The government tends to ignore the court decisions and insist on supporting the companies and overlook their activities violating court decisions.

4.3.3. Çağlayan-Arılı Valleys

Çağlayan and Arılı valleys are in Rize’s Fındıklı district. The projects of Başköy Regulator and SHPP on Arılı River, and Paşalar Regulator and SHPP and Akman Regulator on Çağlayan River are in operation in Çağlayan Valley. There are also other SHPP projects planned to be implemented in the region. Besides, there is also a project aiming to connect the Arılı River to another river in Arhavi through pipes, because the river does not have enough water to construct an SHPP on itself only. However, Fındıklı Streams Conservation Platform, including many political parties and other organizations,

are against these projects for several reasons (Fındıklı Derelerini Koruma Platformu, 2010a).

The platform argues that the valley has a unique ecosystem that protects the wildlife in itself, cultural and social structure and architecture. The valley has a great potential for eco-tourism, which has been examined by some state institutions like the Development Agency. The unique rural architecture in the valley has a world-wide fame. An endemic species of sea trout is being reproduced where Çağlayan River and the Black Sea are intersecting. However, Akman Regulator is planned to transfer Çağlayan's water flow to another SHPP in Arhavi. The platform claims that the water sets the basis for all ecological, social and cultural life on the valley and SHPP projects are threatening the ecology and society of the valley by changing its water regime (Fındıklı Derelerini Koruma Platformu, 2010a).

The platform is against SHPP projects on the valley for several reasons. One of them is that 4% as the minimum amount of water is not sufficient to clean fertilizer and sanitation wastes released to the streams, endangering human health living in the region. This minimum amount is also not sufficient for the survival of the sea trout in the Çağlayan river. Cutting the trees and explosions during the construction phase are increasing the risk for landslide and erosion; and historical houses in the region may also be harmed due to these explosions. The platform also claims that excavations produced during construction are dumped into the river beds, harnessing their natural characteristics and living beings. Moreover, touristic practices, one of the most crucial income sources of local people, in the valley will decrease as the scenery will be disrupted due to the SHPPs, tunnels, electricity distribution lines and constructions (Fındıklı Derelerini Koruma Platformu, 2010b).

We observe that court cases, natural protected area status and protests are the main weapons of the grassroots actors and ENGOS in Çağlayan-Arılı region. In Arılı Valley, for instance, Fındıklı Rivers Platform, which represents grassroots actors like village mukhtars, and Sisterhood of the Rivers Platform protested the public information meetings organized by the company of STY Energy Electricity Production and Rize Province

Environment and Forestry Directorate (Çağdaş Ses, 2011). This protest is an indicator of the two political camps of the conflict over SHPPs. A grassroots organization and an ENGO at the opposition side resist against the construction of SHPPs in the region, while the state and a company on the other side are trying to complete a procedural step to start the project. We can argue that slogans like “Our water is not for sale” or “The rivers are ours” by the protestors; represent livelihood concerns of the grassroots actors. Another important point of this protest is that one of the mukhtars in the meeting argued that although 19 mukhtars presented a petition against SHPP project in the region during a previous public information meeting, project was granted with an “EIA Positive” report. Therefore, the mukhtar claimed that public information meetings were simply pro-forma (Çağdaş Ses, 2011). The discourse of the mukhtars on the public information meetings of EIA procedure shows a reaction to political marginalization in the decision making processes related to SHPPs. In that context, this protest can be considered as a reaction to the political and economic marginalization of grassroots actors.

Other than protests like analyzed above, the opposition starts court cases against SHPPs in the region like in the case of Paşalar SHPP on Çağlayan Valley. After the Ministry of Environment and Forestry granted the company of Ayen Enerji with an “EIA Positive” report in April, 2008, Fındıklı Streams Conservation Platform started a court case in the Administrative Court of Rize. The court granted a motion for stay of execution and based its decision on the lack of a basin planning in EIA process of the project, and later cancelled the “EIA Positive” report of the ministry. Then the company appealed to the Council of State; but the council approved the decision of the court (Muhalefet, 2012).

As mentioned above, natural protected area status is one of the weapons that the opposition has against SHPPs in the region. Çağlayan Valley had been designated as a grade one natural protected area by Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection in November, 2008, and with the application made by the peasants. Ayen Company, which had a project of SHPP in the valley, started a court case in Rize Administrative Court to cancel the valley’s status. However, the court dismissed the case. So the company went for an appeal in the Council of State, but it also dismissed the case and approved the decision of Rize Administrative Court in April, 2011. Thus, Fındıklı

Streams Conservation Platform prevented the construction of all 16 SHPPs in Çağlayan and Arılı valleys (Yıldırım, 2011).

In Çağlayan and Arılı Valleys, we observe a victory of the grassroots and ENGOs against the companies, by designating the region as a natural protected area. Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection has a supportive role for the opposition in this case.. The struggle of the opposition is also on legal basis like in Senoz Valley, enjoying the stewardship and intermediary role of the courts.

4.3.4. İkizdere Valley

İkizdere is one of the most important 200 valleys in the world that have many endemic plant and animal species. The valley is said to have a great potential of touristic practices like rafting, ski, thermal spring and safari. A good quality of honey is also produced in the valley. However, there were 16 SHPP projects in the valley in 2008, against which local people are organized under the name of a grassroots organization called İkizdere Association. According to the association, SHPPs would not be a significant contribution to neither the economy of the region nor the economy of the country. The chairman of the association argued that around 0,7% of Turkey's electricity generation would be provided by SHPPs in İkizdere. Considering the unique natural circumstances of the valley and the fact that there were alternative energy sources, the costs of SHPPs would be more than their benefits. In addition, the association claimed that the rivers would dry up due to very low level of minimum amount of water release, thousands of trees would be cut off and the plantation would be damaged during constructions. The association suggests that the valley has a great tourism potential which can be considered as an alternative to SHPP projects. Based on the tourism potential of the region, the association claims that SHPPs are not for the benefit of local people, but only benefiting a few companies. However, İkizdere Association is not against SHPPs at all; it argues that it was possible to operate SHPP projects on the valley without putting the ecosystem at risk by reducing the electricity production rate of the stations but releasing more water to the river bed (Kaçar, 2009).

İkizdere Association organized a protest in August, 2008, against SHPPs in the region, with the support of ENGOs such as Nature Association and TEMA. With the participation of many people coming from big cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, the number of attendants reached to 7.000. Following this protest, the Prime Minister Erdoğan accused the people against SHPPs as “groups of vagabond people” but not “environmentalists” (Kaçar, 2009). Another demonstration was happened in January, 2010, during the public information meeting. In this demonstration,, the spokesperson maintained that “...organic farming, stockbreeding and tourism should have been promoted in the region. A money grubber company has come to our village to construct an SHPP and is misleading the state in the examinations. Our villages, have a thousand year heritage, are endangered. How can we ignore this beautiful nature while the company is trying to make easy money here? We don’t let this destruction happen at all costs but using our democratic rights and respecting the laws. Shame on your enterprise” (Kaçar, 2011a).

The Prime Minister Erdoğan participated in the discussion by attending the opening ceremony of the Cevizlik SHPP on August, 2010. He rejected the claims of the environmentalists that the rivers were being sold to companies and told that only the right of use was being granted to the companies. He also rejected that the rivers were drying up because of SHPPs; he argued that on summers SHPPs stopped and release all the water to the river bed. He added that only a small amount of trees were cut at the beginning and the end points of SHPPs. He told that the opposing groups were trying to prevent all investments in the region. Besides, he warned the investors about people who bought licenses for SHPP projects and sold them for higher prices to the investors (Kaçar, 2011b).

Other than protesting SHPPs, İkizdere Association appealed to the Administrative Court of Rize and the granted motions for stay of execution against SHPPs such as Cevizlik, Dereköy-Demirkapı and Selin-II; and ordered expert examinations for these projects. The justifications put forward by the court for these decisions are mainly on the claim that the EIAs of these projects were prepared perfunctorily and they had risks to make irreversible damage to the nature (Kaçar, 2010). Finally, İkizdere Association won a great victory against SHPPs when Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection designated İkizdere Valley as a natural protected area in October, 2010.

Thus, 22 SHPP projects, mining practices and stone quarries in İkizdere were considered to be “postponed”. The chairman of İkizdere Association, KademEkşi told that “Today is the day we are saved from SHPPs; is the fortunate day we have inherited the green, the nature to our children.” Thus, İkizdere became the second valley designated as a natural protected area after Fırtına Valley in Çamlıhemşin (Kaçar, 2010). The prime minister opposed the new status of İkizdere in a short time. He told that the investments for SHPPs were to end the mentality of “water flow for nothing”. According to him, that decision was a great mistake when Turkey was trying to have the 3rd largest installed capacity of electricity generation (Erdil, 2010). In response to Erdoğan’s opposition, İkizdere Association maintained that it was not against all SHPPs in the region but supported energy investments if the conservation of environment was assured through construction of a less number of SHPPs in the valley (Kaçar, 2010).

After İkizdere won its new status, in October, 2010, the government showed that it would insist on its SHPP policy by offering a new law draft called the Law of Protection of the Nature and the Biological Diversity, and abolishing the authority of Regional Councils of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection in designating a place as a natural protected area and transferring that right to the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. The draft also included an article authorized the Ministry to change the natural protected area status of a region. The draft proposal was considered by many as revenge against the decision of Trabzon Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection which designated İkizdere Valley a natural protected area (Babacan, 2010). The draft was approved by the Commission of Environment in the Parliament in June 2012 and then sent to the General Assembly to be committed. The draft could not be legalized (Nature Conservation Center, 2012). However, the government issued a decree (with the number 648) in August 2011, which extended the authority of the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning, transferring the right to assign an area as a natural protected site and changing the status of existing protected sites. In addition, a further step was also taken by the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs and law draft, namely “Water Law Draft”, was issued and shared with the public. The Chamber of Environmental Engineers criticizes the draft and claims that it would restrict the access to water (Yöney, 2012).

İkizdere can be regarded as the heart of the conflict on SHPPs in Turkey. The Prime Minister's intervention to the debate supports such a point. The opposition questions the state's development role in the case of İkizdere by claiming that the electricity generation by SHPPs in İkizdere would be very little. As a further step, the opposition argues that if the state intended to follow a developmentalist policy, the region had a potential for tourism. Such arguments provide legitimacy to the opposition against the government. But we can say that the goal of the opposition is the access to defend the grassroots actors' rights to access to water sources of the streams. In that sense, livelihood concern is the main motive of the opposition in İkizdere.

Concerning the strategies of the opposition in İkizdere, we observe the same methodology. Firstly, they start law suits against SHPPs often claiming that EIA reports are illegitimate. In the above case, we see that the movements successfully illegitimate SHPPs in their regions through this method. Secondly, they apply to the Regional Council of Cultural and Natural Assets Protection to assign the valleys as natural protected sites, thus keep companies away from their regions. Until this second goal is reached, the movements appeal to a third method which is direct confrontation with the state and the companies. They protest information meetings organized by the state and business representatives or organize mass demonstrations. However, this last method is often used as a last resort as the movements hesitate to confront directly with a powerful actor like state and if they have to, they target companies rather than the state. Although the opposition in İkizdere managed to designate the valley as a natural protected area, the government indicates that it intends to weaken all legal tools of the opposition movements and deepen their political marginalization.

5. EVALUATION

We can basically argue that the politics of SHPPs refers to a case of unequal distribution of costs and benefits among different actors. In line with the global trend promoting renewable energy resources to mitigate the climate change, the state basically aims to reach its goal of increasing its domestic and renewable electricity generation capacity by utilizing the country's all hydropower potential. Thus, the state would be able to meet the increasing energy demand in Turkey and cope with the problem of foreign dependency of its energy sector. In order to reach these goals, the state aims to transform streams into terrains for profitable investments through passing regulations for liberalization and "competitive" and "efficient" energy markets, to attract private investments. Profit-seeking business, looking for investment opportunities with low construction and operation costs; approached positively to that call of the state; thus the number of applications done by companies to start an SHPP project exceeded the state's expectations. At this point, the interests of the state and business have compromised, although they have distinctive political, economic and strategic interests and different sources of power.

But what are the benefits of SHPPs for local actors? The discourse on the benefits of SHPPs at the local level is shaped by the state itself. As claimed by the state, the main benefits for local actors are new employment opportunities and local development by electrification. We can observe that this discourse is adopted by some people at the local level. Some local shopkeepers, for instance, support SHPPs with the expectation of more income thanks to increasing economic activities generated by SHPPs. Moreover, lord mayor of Çayeli district, from the ruling political party, celebrates SHPPs for the development of his district. However, some grassroots organizations argue that SHPPs do not create new employment opportunities for local people, except employing a few security guards for each SHPP; but employ trained technicians from outside the locality. And local electrification cannot compensate for the disrupting of the existing economic activities like agriculture, stockbreeding, tourism, fishing or mills which provide income to local people. Other than disrupting existing economic activities by limiting access to water

resources, there are other aspects of SHPPs, attracting the protest of grassroots organizations. Deforestation, excavations, bad scenery, explosions during construction phases of SHPPs, and energy transmission lines are other costs causing some local people to suffer. This reminds us what Third World political ecology argues: rural poor is mostly adversely affected by environmental degradation, whose survival depended on the well-being of the ecosystems.

To sum up, we can argue that energy is not a rural but an urban demand, considering that the largest energy user sectors are industry, commerce and residence which are highly concentrated in urban spaces. Therefore, the benefits of SHPPs are to be enjoyed by the business and the state representing urban interests, while environmental and economic costs of SHPPs are externalized to rural actors, especially the ones whose material interests depend on the streams. In that sense, we can argue that this unequal relationship between rural and urban is very similar to the relationship between the First and the Third worlds in which sources are geographically displaced from the latter one and transferred to the former.

How can we explain this unequal distribution of costs and benefits? From the perspective of political ecology, we can argue that this unequal distribution of costs and benefits among different actors is not only an outcome of unequal distribution of power among them, but also the results of deepening this unequal political relationship. SHPPs can be seen as leading to marginalization of grassroots actors which were already marginalized. When we look into the rural parts of Eastern Black Sea Region, we observe that most of the young population had moved to big cities to gain employment or other benefits. Thus, the region has turned into a place occupied by a large population of old people; and agriculture, stockbreeding, beekeeping, mills and tourism generate income only for survival. For this reason, the region is considered to be one of the poorest regions in Turkey. In that context, SHPPs are perceived as a threat to these economic activities for livelihood of poor people and as indicators of more economic marginalization. But it would be mistake to see grassroots movements against SHPPs as only a form of resistance against economic marginalization; but it is also a resistance against political marginalization restricting or abolishing the control of grassroots actors on streams as they

are excluded from decision-making processes over streams. Information meeting in EIA mechanism is far from providing a satisfactory space for grassroots participation since it is perceived by grassroots organizations as a “pro-forma” step that companies complete to start constructing SHPPs.

What strengths and constraints do different actors have in the above explained unequal power relations? Very similar to the environmentalisms of the poor in the Third World, grassroots movements in the region hesitate to confront directly with the state mainly as it is traditionally a powerful actor; but focus more on targeting companies and appeal mostly to peaceful protests, boycotting, lawsuits or other legal measures. With reference to political ecology, we may argue that the above mentioned methodology of the anti-SHPP camp is also based on the perception in the Third World that the state has an intermediary role and can minimize the adverse effects of environmental degradation. However, also very similar to the Third World grassroots movements, they may prefer direct confrontations, for instance throwing stones at construction sites or attacking the car of the judge, when peaceful or legal actions fail to stop SHPPs. However, the state takes greater notice of grassroots organizations as they have legitimacy and accountability. Village mukhtars in grassroots movements and support of opposing political parties contribute to these two traits of grassroots organizations and reinforce their opposition to the state and to the business interests.

Moreover, ENGOs against SHPPs, translate the livelihood concerns of grassroots actors into the language of human, territorial or environmental rights when the national audience or the court is addressed. Their non-profit and moral character provide legitimacy to ENGOs in raising a nation-wide public awareness against SHPPs. Declarations and slogans of ENGOs in the demonstrations or web-sites contain syncretism like between access to water and human rights, valleys and common ownership, or SHPPs and the right to live in a healthy environment. Lawyers of ENGOs are also providing a critical help to grassroots actors in opening lawsuits against SHPPs and overcoming the complexities and high costs of these lawsuits, which can also be seen as an effort to translate local concerns into the language of rights. In that context, we observe that the languages of “cult of wilderness” and “the gospel of eco-efficiency” are harnessed by ENGOs. It is possible to

see that demands from ENGOs, like assigning the valleys as natural protected sites to keep SHPPs away, or references to future generations and the rights of other species, which are intrinsic to the current of the cult of wilderness. In addition, some ENGOs support eco-tourism as an alternative to SHPPs, reminding us the gospel of eco-efficiency. But these discourses of ENGOs can be seen as pragmatic, aiming to counter the criticisms like “They are against development” made by the Prime Minister Erdoğan.

ENGOs against SHPPs are more sensitive to livelihood concerns of grassroots actors, than to the concerns for future generations, other species or eco-efficiency. As these ENGOs are formed and supported mostly by middle class people living in big cities, whose hometowns are in the rural regions threatened by SHPPs, and therefore they have direct access to information from grassroots actors whose opposition to SHPPs are shaped more by livelihood and material interests. Therefore, we may argue that ENGOs’ attitude towards SHPPs represent typical Third World ENGOs of middle class people’s sensitivity to livelihood interests of the rural poor.

Even if the grassroots-ENGOs target mostly companies, it is evident that the state is the pivotal actor in the politics of SHPPs. As a traditionally powerful actor, the state has several ways to exert its power over other actors. First, it creates knowledge over SHPPs, mainly based on a discourse of energy scarcity. According to the state, SHPPs are necessary to meet the increasing energy demand of Turkey and promote its economic growth through local and renewable energy sources, while decreasing foreign dependency of its energy sector. Thus, the state’s policy of SHPPs becomes a policy “for the common good”. According to the state, this policy is also to cope with the global climate change; therefore it is also a “green” policy. This discourse is produced by the state functions to obscure the underlying logics, power relations and ecological transformations about SHPPs.

However, disseminating a discourse on the pros of SHPPs for the common good is not enough; the state has to provide financing for SHPPs. At this point, neo-liberal paradigm which is promoted mainly by multinational institutions plays its role and pushes the state to

appeal to the regulations assuring privatization and liberalization of the energy sector, such as Electricity Market Law which promotes competitiveness for the energy market. By this way, the state calls business to invest in its policy of increasing energy generation capacity by SHPPs. Guaranteeing companies to purchase electricity at a certain price, the state creates a terrain for profitable investments which look attractive to business which seeks to make profit through minimized construction and operation costs. The state reinforces this liberalization process by neglecting its steward role and does not impose strict environmental regulations on the companies.

It would be misleading to argue that privatization of the energy sector, thus the transferring the use and control of streams to the business, means that the state relinquishes all its ownership and control rights. Technical studies of SHPPs are conducted by the YEGM while their projects are prepared by DSI which are public institutions. In order to construct and operate an SHPP, a company shall be granted with a water use right agreement from DSI, shall be licensed by the EPDK and shall issue an EIA report to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. These binding regulations allow a company to transfer water flow from one point of stream to another point through pipes and generate electricity, for at most 49 years according to the contract signed with DSI. Therefore, we can argue that the state still keeps its ownership and control rights on the streams of SHPP projects. Therefore, it is not possible to argue that privatization of water resources and transferring the rights of use and control to the business lead to environmental degradation, economic and political marginalization. Developing SHPPs on streams as quickly as possible is a state policy and privatization is a tool to attract investment required to realize this policy. Not dictating strict environmental regulations on companies does not seem to result from a wrong policy but a policy intentionally neglects the costs and risks of SHPPs and already marginalized grassroots actors are exposed to these costs and risks.

New dimensions emerge for the constraints and strengths for the state and the business, when the state's policy on SHP turns into a conflict. There is no information on whether the majority of companies building SHPPs are managed by foreign or national business; but it is evident that the national business has a larger share in the market for SHPPs. Unlike multinational companies, national companies are more open to publicity

injurious, as Bryant and Bailey (1997) claimed, as they cannot carry their operations out of the country. Therefore, they sometimes work through subcontractors to hide their names and protect their publicity against anti-SHPP propaganda. For instance, as a well-known company, Borusan was exposed to protests of anti-SHPP groups, when it started an SHPP project. Another strength that of companies is to ignore the court decisions against SHPPs. Thanks to their close and symbiotic relationship with the state leaders, companies can bypass court decisions to go on projects by revising projects, which is highly criticized by grassroots movements. Companies may also work secretly at nights in places where there is a risk of strong resistance against SHPPs. And another way is to bribe local people to convince them to build SHPP in their region.

While the business enjoys the above possibilities to protect its interests, the state has a wider range of possibilities. It misappropriates the fields required for SHPP constructions – owned by many different people – and integrates these fields to SHPP projects. Thus the companies are saved from the serious problem of reaching to the owners and making contract with each of them to buy the lands required for SHPP projects. It also tries to mold a public opinion for SHPPs through several ways like through DSI instructing the merits of SHPPs, or participation of the Prime Minister to the opening ceremony of an SHPP. Strength of the state is to provide security to companies against anti-SHPP groups at the local level through gendarmes. It also grants companies with a right to employ security guards in SHPP construction zones. But, what makes the state a powerful actor is its ability to overcome the constraints put forward by the anti-SHPPs camp.

Concerning the constraints faced by the state and the business, it is found that that court decisions against SHPPs are serious limits to the state and business interests. There are many court cases opened by anti-SHPP groups; and many of them granted for a motion for stay of execution against SHPPs. Another important issue against SHPPs is natural protected areas. If the regional council of cultural and natural assets protection assign a valley as a natural protected area, all SHPP projects in the valley has to stop. This limit is the ultimate goal of all anti-SHPP movements. So, the government decided to issue a new draft and transferred the authority to assign a place as natural protected area from the regional council to the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning. However this

ministry is a pro-SHPP institution, and we can conclude that the government intends to clean a serious obstacle against its SHPP policy and restricts the strengths of anti-SHPP camp.

To sum up the evaluation section, we find that when political ecology is applied to the politics of SHPPs, the political map of the issue, the actors in it and their constraints and strengths are identified. Unequal distribution of costs and benefits produced by SHPPs leads to a political conflict between two camps. On the one side, there is the state and the business, while the grassroots actors and the ENGOS form the other camp. In line with the global trend of developing renewable resources to mitigate the climate change, on the other hand, the state aims to utilize all the country's hydropower potential and to meet the increasing energy demand. While doing so, the state represents urban interests of industry, commerce and residences which are demanding for more and cheap energy supply. The business, on the other hand, perceived SHPPs as a terrain for profitable investment providing opportunities of minimized construction and operation costs. Rural and poor grassroots actors are the victims of the state's SHPPs policy, whose livelihood based on water supplies from the streams is under the threat of SHPPs. They defend their own material interests which are mainly agriculture, stockbreeding, beekeeping, mills or tourism. And the ENGOS have a supportive role for the livelihood interests of the grassroots actors, translating these interests into human, territorial and environment rights language to mold a public opinion against SHPPs and through legal means.

In this ecological distribution conflict, each actor exerts power over the other actors through several strengths and constraints. In parallel to the global neo-liberal paradigm, the state conducts its SHPPs policy with the financial support from the business by putting forward the regulations and institutions in order to promote privatization and liberalization. Appealing to a discourse about scarcity of local and renewable energy supply, the state obscures the underlying logics, power relations and ecological harms of SHPPs. The alliance of grassroots actors and ENGOS react to this policy mainly through court cases or demands for natural protected areas, which has succeeded to stop many SHPPs. However, the state plans to overcome this method of anti-SHPP camp by making amendments in regulations that are able to work against SHPPs. At this point, we may argue that the anti-

SHPP camp may prefer more direct confrontations against SHPPs in the future if its main method is abolished, and as the state loses its legitimate and intermediary role perceived by the grassroots actors.

6. CONCLUSION

This study analyzed the politics of SHPPs in Rize by identifying the main actors, the very relationships between them, and the strengths and constraints in these relationships. Although SHPPs represent a nation-wide issue, three cases – the valleys of İkizdere, Senoz, and Çağlayan-Arılı – are selected from the province of Rize in the Eastern Black Sea Region as one of the hot spots of the conflict.

SHPPs in Rize are presenting a case of politicized environment; therefore the issue is approached from a political ecology perspective. As the opposing movements against SHPPs in the Eastern Black Sea Region include rural and poor people, the concept of “environmentalism of the poor” developed by John Martinez Alier (2002) is investigated. This concept is fruitful in the sense that it identifies the driving forces behind the emergence and flourishing of environmental movements of rural and poor people in the Third World, against economic and political marginalization caused by environmental degradation. Since it is discovered that the environmental movements against SHPPs in Rize show great similarities with their counterparts in the Third World, the approach of “Third World political ecology” by Bryant and Bailey (1997) is focused to address the research questions. This approach makes it possible to identify the actors in environmental conflicts, and how they shape these conflicts within the strengths and constraints created through the interactions between themselves. Furthermore, the development of ENGOs in Turkey and their relationships with the state are analyzed to better understand the conflict on SHPPs.

The literature review on political ecology motivated the study to focus on the state as a traditionally powerful actor. Therefore, the SHPPs policy of the state with references to its general energy policy and active institutions in it are investigated. Thus the motives behind the state’s SHPPs policy, the discourses it produces, the mechanisms it uses and the role of the business in this policy are pointed out.

Then, the events related to SHPPs in the research cases are searched from several newspaper internet pages and the web pages of grassroots movements against SHPPs. Thus, the motives of the grassroots organizations against SHPPs, the clashes between different actors and their competing discourses are examined.

Based on the above analysis on the politics of SHPPs in Rize and application of political ecology to this analysis have made it possible to give answers to the research questions of this study. Actors of this political realm are identified to be the state, the business, the grassroots actors and the ENGOs. And this political realm is analyzed as a case of ecological distribution conflict, shaped by asymmetrical power relations in which the costs and benefits of SHPPs are distributed unequally among these actors.

The movements against SHPPs by grassroots actors are viewed as a reaction to becoming the victims of the costs made by SHPPs, while their benefits are transferred mostly to the state and the business. In other words, the grassroots actors act to defend their livelihood interests and resist against not only economic, but also political marginalization caused by the activities of the state and the business. ENGOs, on the other hand, have a supportive role for the grassroots movements and translating their livelihood demands and interests into the language of human, territorial and environmental rights to mold a nationwide public opinion. Thus, the political realm around the SHPPs portrays a conflict between two political camps. One camp presents the state and the business, while the other camp is formed by the grassroots actors and the ENGOs.

These actors exert power over each other, accordingly with the constraints and strengths determined in relation to other actors. Representing urban interests demanding for more and cheap energy, the state obscures the underlying logics, power relations and environmental harms related to the SHPPs. It does that through appealing to a discourse based on the increasing economic growth of Turkey; foreign dependency of its energy sector; and the global trend of developing renewable energies to mitigate the climate change. Furthermore, the state calls the business to invest for its policy through regulations for liberalization and privatization, and creates a terrain for profitable investment which

attracts the business which is seeking for minimized construction and operation costs. State makes such investments more attractive by not enforcing strict environmental regulations for the companies, and thus paves the way for economic and political marginalization of the local and rural actors whose livelihoods depend on the well-being of the hydro-cycle in which streams play a critical role.

The grassroots movements and the ENGOs supporting them constrain the state and the business in order to protect the livelihood interests of the grassroots actors. They start lawsuits against SHPPs, or appeal to regional councils to assign their surrounding as a natural protected area to keep SHPPs away from their livelihoods. We can argue that these methods were successful to a certain extent until now and managed to assign two of the valleys as natural protected areas in the three selected valleys and helped to win some court cases against the SHPPs. However, the state, as the pivotal actor in this political conflict, intends to change the regulations helping the anti-SHPP camp to utilize the above methods, to favor of the state and the business interests. It indicates that the resistance against SHPPs policy of the state is far from reaching to a policy solution taking notice of the grassroots demands and interests.

Academic studies on the political aspect of SHPPs are limited and most of these studies are on the economic and technical aspects of SHPPs. In that sense, this study contributes to the literature by applying concepts of political ecology like marginalization, ecological distribution conflict and environmentalism of the poor to the politics of SHPPs in Rize.

This study brings new questions into mind and calls for further studies. One possible study can be on the traditional, complex common property regimes formed by the grassroots actors in the valleys that SHPPs are planned to be constructed, and the effects of SHPPs on these regimes. Another study may be on the state and the business perceptions of grassroots actors to understand how the state gained its image as an intermediary actor and its image changed with the processes of SHPPs. The influence of older environmental movements in Turkey, like the movement of Bergama peasants, on the rising movement

against SHPPs is also an interesting research topic. Finally, the experiences of other countries on SHPPs and a comparison of these experiences with Turkey can also be an interesting contribution to the debate about the politics of SHPPs in Turkey.

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