

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BC

ÜMIT ÖZTÜRK

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

2018

SOCIAL MOBILITY IN ATHENS IN THE FOURTH CENTURY BC

Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

History

by

Ümit Öztürk

Boğaziçi University

2018

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

Social Mobility in Athens in the Fourth Century BC

The purpose of this study is to investigate the dynamics of social mobility in the context of Athenian society during the fourth century BC. In contrast to the contemporary studies' emphasis on occupation, class or wealth as the main venues for mobility, this thesis argues for a multiplicity of contexts in which individuals could experience mobility, and it adopts a qualitative approach and a conceptual framework that are sensitive to individual experiences. The thesis focuses on three cases drawn from the corpus of the fourth-century Athenian court speeches: Timarchos of Sphettos, Midas the perfumer and his family, and Pasion of Acharnai. Each case study unravels the multidimensionality of social mobility as it was experienced at the personal level; as exceptional as these cases might seem to be, their personal nature demonstrates a set of factors, whether individual or institutional, for mobility, and the potential replications of these elements check our interpretations of the Athenian social reality.

ÖZET

MÖ Dördüncü Yüzyılda Atina’da Sosyal Hareketlilik

Bu tezin amacı, MÖ dördüncü yüzyıl Atina toplumu özelinde toplumsal hareketliliği tartışmaktır. Güncel akademik çalışmaların meslek, sınıf ve maddi zenginlik gibi faktörler üzerine yoğunlaşmasına karşı, bu tez bireylerin mobilitayı deneyimledikleri bağlamların çoğulluğunu savunmakta ve niteliksel bir bakış açısı ile bireylerin deneyimlerini göz ardı etmeyecek bir kavramsal çerçeveyi benimsemektedir. Tez, dördüncü yüzyıl Atina hatiplerinin eserlerinden seçilen üç hayat hikayesine odaklanmaktadır: Sphettos’lu Timarchos, parfümcü Midas ile ailesi ve Acharnai’lı Pasion. Her bir örnek, toplumsal hareketliliğin çok yönlülüğünü bireylerin deneyimleri ışığında irdelemektedir. Hayat hikayeleri her ne kadar istisnai gözükseler de, kişisel deneyimler toplumsal hareketlilik çalışmaları için çeşitli bireysel ve kurumsal etmenleri işaret etmekte ve bu faktörlerin olası tekrarları ise Atina toplumsal tarihine dair yaklaşımlarımızı gözden geçirmemizi gerekli kılmaktadır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis owes a very large debt of *charis* that cannot be reciprocated in a few lines of acknowledgment. My thesis co-advisor, Julia L. Shear, has long been unfailingly supportive of my development, and I cannot sufficiently acknowledge her endless care for me. My advisor, Koray Durak, kindly received me and supervised my thesis after my former advisor, Noémi Lévy, was taken away from her students. I would like to thank Robin Osborne, Elif Ünlü and Antonis Hadjikyriacou for accepting to take part in my jury. Beyond the wine-dark sea, Kyriaki Konstantinidou has remained, as always, a great source of support and inspiration. I would like to thank Kostas Vlassopoulos for supervising my semester at Rethymno, and also for replying my very first inquiry about this project; Elton Barker for the beautiful seminars on Homer and Thucydides; Peter van Alfen for introducing me to Greek numismatics.

My family and friends kept this sinking boat floating throughout the writing process, and I would like to thank all of them for tolerating my grumpy face. The year in which this project was completed has been exceptionally tough, and I must acknowledge Naziş and an unnamed friend for the constant babysitting sessions.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Throughout this thesis, I followed the abbreviations of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (4th edition) for the names of the ancient authors and their works. Apart from these, the following abbreviations were utilized.

<i>AO</i>	Develin, R. (1989). <i>Athenian Officials: 684-321 BC</i> . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
<i>APF</i>	Davies, J. K. (1971). <i>Athenian propertied families, 600-300 B.C.</i> Oxford: Clarendon Press.
<i>GPM</i>	Dover, K. J. (1974). <i>Greek popular morality: In the time of Plato and Aristotle</i> . Basil Blackwell.
<i>ID</i>	<i>Inscriptions de Délos (1926-72)</i> . Paris.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae (1890-)</i> . Berlin.
<i>P. Oxy.</i>	<i>The Oxyrhynchus Papyri (1898-)</i> . London.
<i>R&O</i>	Rhodes, P. J. & Osborne, R. (2003). <i>Greek historical inscriptions 404-323</i> . Oxford University Press.
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum, (1923-)</i> . Leiden and Amsterdam.
<i>SIG³</i>	Dittenberger, W. (1915-24). <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecorum³</i> . Leipzig.

CHAPTER 1

SOCIAL MOBILITY AND ATHENIAN SOCIAL HISTORY

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Mr. Nilaiev was a promising engineer and one of the directors of a large factory in Moscow.¹ He was not from an aristocratic family, but his occupation provided him more than enough income; he married Vera, a girl from a noble family, who was trained at the famous Smolny Institute for young women of similar background. They had four children, three sons and a daughter. The family occupied a very large villa north of Moscow, and, for their Sundays, they also bought a dacha in a village. They had enough means to provide their children with a decent education; while the sons were at the high school, Alexandra, the oldest of the four and the only daughter, was at a medical school. In 1917, the revolution broke out. All of a sudden, the world that they knew so far crumbled, and a new one unfolded. What they had previously held in high regard was now worthless, their occupation and training became dysfunctional; workers occupied the factory, and their families moved in Nilaievs' villa. Among all the turmoil and trauma, Mr. Nilaiev could not make any sense of this new world; his mental health deteriorated and he died after a while. Although she was deprived of all the economic and social resources, Vera adapted herself to the new order, she put their sons in factories as workers and they built new lives for themselves. In a generation, all the fortunes of the family disappeared and successive two generations became factory workers, but their fall certainly paralleled others' rise.

¹ For the narrative of Vera, see Bertaux, "Transmission in Extreme Situations".

The second story comes from ancient Athens, the focus of our study. During the late fifth century BC, a man named Kephalos came to Athens, possibly from Syracuse, and brought with him his sons, Polemarchos, Euthydemos and Lysias. The family was among the richest of the city: they owned property worth either 30 or 70 talents,² and their possessions certainly included three houses, various furniture, a shield factory with a labor force of 120 slaves, the largest manufacturing business known from classical Athens.³ The family also developed close relations with contemporary elites in the city; his son, Lysias, when he recalls his father's immigration to Athens, claims that it was Pericles, the Athenian leader of great renown, who invited his father to dwell in the city.⁴ Plato's *Republic* is set in Polemarchos' house, where Euthydemos, Lysias and Kephalos, now in his old age, are present and Kephalos immediately engages in a conversation with Socrates.⁵ Lysias also tells us about their orderly way of life: "neither he (Kephalos) nor the rest of the family was ever involved in any litigation, either as prosecutor or as defendant. We lived our lives under the democracy in such a way as to do no wrong to others and to suffer no harm from other".⁶ In 404 BC, the revolution broke out, and the so-called the Thirty established its oligarchic rule in Athens.⁷ The new regime utilized coercive means if necessary, and they almost indiscriminately issued orders for arresting, exiling or executing citizens and, metics, resident foreigners, alike and also

² Lys. *Against Hippotherses*, fr. 165 (Carey) = P. Oxy.1606, fr. 2; see Todd, *Lysias*, 366-9; cf. Todd, *Commentary*, 13. n.45.

³ Lys. 12.18-9.

⁴ Lys. 12.4.

⁵ Plat. *Rep.* 1.328b-c.

⁶ Lys. 12.4 (trans. Todd).

⁷ The Thirty was an oligarchy established after Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War of 431-404, and it functioned from 404 to restoration of the democracy. It was overthrown in 403 by the combined efforts of the exiled democrats and the Spartans under king Pausanias, and the democracy was then restored. For a detailed discussion of the period; see Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens*; Wolpert, *Remembering Defeat*, 3-71; for specific aspects of the period, see Shear, *Polis and Revolution*, 166-322.

for the subsequent confiscation of their property.⁸ In eight months, 1500 or more citizens died as well, presumably, as even more metics.⁹ To enlarge the ruling body, the Thirty then enrolled three thousand citizens and practically disenfranchised the rest of the citizen body.¹⁰ In this turmoil, Polemarchos was arrested and executed in prison;¹¹ Lysias was able to escape, but the family property was confiscated.¹² In a sense, Lysias was luckier than Mr. Nilaiev's family: the democracy was restored in 403 BC and Lysias actively supported the democratic counter-revolution with his resources, a contribution which returned him only the status of *isotelēs*, a tax privilege given to resident foreigners.¹³

These two stories are of extreme circumstances, where one group radically dismantles and replaces a political regime, and the social order and power relations of the society are restructured accordingly. Large numbers of individuals radically move up and down in social space until a form of stability prevails. Even so, a revolution is not the only leveling mechanism; mass mobilization warfare, state failure and lethal pandemic can also be added to the list.¹⁴ But what about the individual level of social mobility? In the absence of such societal metamorphoses, how could an individual be mobile through social layers? In addition, what does the concept of social mobility entail, and how can we understand that individuals were mobile in a given social space? In order to address these questions, this study investigates the dynamics of social mobility in the context of fourth-century Athenian society. Unlike other ancient Greek cities, the relative abundance of

⁸ Lys. 12. 6-7.

⁹ Wolpert, *Remembering Defeat*, 152 n.67 with references.

¹⁰ [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 36.1-2.

¹¹ Lys. 12.17.

¹² Lys. 12.18-9.

¹³ Krentz, *The Thirty at Athens*, 73; Todd, *Commentary*, 16-17.

¹⁴ Scheidel, *The Great Leveler*, 5-9.

evidence for fourth-century Athens makes such an inquiry possible, but the nature of our sources requires a qualitative approach distinct from contemporary mainstream mobility research. In order to analyze individual mobilities within the multilayered social space with a qualitative approach, I shall focus on three cases drawn from the corpus of the fourth-century Athenian court speeches: Timarchos of Sphettos,¹⁵ Midas the perfumer and his family,¹⁶ and Pasion of Acharnai.¹⁷ Each case study will help us to understand different dimensions of social mobility, which, in return, will enable us to revisit our mental image of social mobility both at macro and micro levels. Before outlining the structure of the work, however, it is necessary to make a literature survey and then to clarify the perspective that lies behind this study.

1.1 Social mobility: A condensed history of the concept

What does the concept of social mobility entail? Unlike much disputed notions such as status, class or order, there is more or less a consensus on the fundamental aspects of the concept, which was first elucidated by Pitirim Sorokin, the founder figure of sociology of social stratification and mobility as a distinct topic of inquiry: “by social mobility is understood any transition of an individual or social object or value – anything that has been created or modified by human activity – from one social position to another”.¹⁸ Sorokin’s definition encapsulates both horizontal and vertical mobility: the former denotes movement between similar social positions within a social layer or mobility from one physical location to another, while the latter

¹⁵ Aesch. 1; Dem. 19.241-4.

¹⁶ Hyp. 3.

¹⁷ Isoc. 17; Dem. 36; [Dem]. 45, 46, 50, 52.

¹⁸ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 133; Müller and Pollak, “Mobility, Social,” 640 provides a more recent definition: “social mobility is the movement in time of social units between different positions in the system of social stratification of a society”.

explains shifts across different social strata. Individuals are usually the moving units, but social groups defined in terms of kinship, class or status may also be studied. For such an inquiry, however, certain assumptions must be made. Fundamentally, a society is ideally seen as a stratified social structure in which there is an ordered system of fixed positions that individuals can hold and between which they can move.¹⁹ These positions, moreover, provide their holders with unequal distribution of social rewards such as power, material means and privileges; the opportunities of individuals and groups to secure these rewards and to move between positions are also unequal, an assumption that constitutes the principal concern of mainstream mobility studies.²⁰

Despite fundamental agreement on the definition, the real challenge of the field derives from the divergent ways in which scholars have approached mobility. In 1927, when Sorokin published his classic work, *Social Mobility*, the perspective that he employed for this study was essentially different from today's mainstream mobility research in both qualitative and quantitative respects.²¹ According to Sorokin, since stratification takes different forms, three main contexts for mobility can be distinguished: economic, political and occupational, but they must be seen in close interaction with each other and one may overlap with another in certain aspects.²² Wealth and income are the main tenets of economic stratification; these two elements fluctuate from one society to another, and within the same society, from one group to another without any perpetual trend being observed.²³ Similarly, with political stratification, Sorokin investigates the uneven distribution of authority

¹⁹ Müller and Pollak, "Mobility, Social," 640.

²⁰ Müller and Pollak, "Mobility, Social," 640; Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 11-19; Grusky, "Social Stratification," 709-10.

²¹ For contemporary scholarship, see the discussion below.

²² Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 11-12.

²³ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 23-67.

and prestige, and honors and titles between and within member and non-member groups, including slaves, of various societies.²⁴ Finally, occupational hierarchies hold a prominent role in determining one's position in a given society: occupations are stratified in relation to each other (interoccupational stratification), and further hierarchies can also be discerned within an occupational group (intraoccupational stratification).²⁵ As the breadth of these three contexts is quite comprehensive, various mechanisms and institutions for social fluctuation can be proposed: army, church, schools, diverse forms of economic, political, and occupational organizations, and family.²⁶ These institutions, however, are not levelers *per se*; instead, "in their totality [they] compose an enormously complex and inevitable machinery which controls the whole process of social testing, selection and distribution of individuals within the social body".²⁷ Institutions are not fixed; each society creates its distinct set of institutions, develops them, and, if necessary, replaces the existing ones with alternatives.²⁸

To analyze the social position of an individual in this multi-layered, context-dependent and constantly evolving system, firstly, "his family status, the state of which he is a citizen, his nationality, his religious group, his occupational group, his political party, his economic status, his race, and so on must be known".²⁹ Secondly, the positions which individuals hold and the functions that they perform need to be analyzed, a process which, finally, has to be complemented with study of social groups' overall location "in the whole human universe".³⁰ Qualitatively, such an

²⁴ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 68-98.

²⁵ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 99-130.

²⁶ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 164-211.

²⁷ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 207.

²⁸ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 207.

²⁹ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 5.

³⁰ Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Mobility*, 5-6.

approach is insightful and capable of pointing out various aspects of social mobility; thus it enables historians to fashion more nuanced historical accounts, but as successive generations of scholars have changed their research interests, they used and developed the survey method as their almost exclusive tool, which, in return, restricted the sort of questions that can be investigated with the survey method, an issue that requires further explanation.³¹

Since 1945, new research traditions have emerged, which rely heavily on occupational stratification to define social hierarchies; thus social mobility has been reframed as occupational mobility since occupations are regarded as the crucial and most accessible indicator of individuals' social positions in a capitalist economic system.³² The survey method has become the norm: randomly selected interviewees are asked to answer the same set of closed questions about their occupations, as well as those of their fathers. Scholars then process the collected datasets with statistical tools to apply their findings to the whole population. In this process, mobility is seen as the dependent variable of the study, while the research questions and scholarly approaches determine what sort of independent variables will be employed and the ways in which statistical results will be evaluated. The survey method with quantitative applications is indeed a useful tool especially thanks to its descriptive capacity to analyze social phenomena in terms of numbers, but, as we will see, the method becomes trickiest when it is used as the exclusive way of studying social mobility.

³¹ Payne, "Social Mobility"; Bertaux and Thompson, "Introduction," 1-11; Savage, "Social Mobility"; van Leeuwen and Maas, "Historical Studies"; Kaelble, "Social Mobility, History of".

³² Kaelble, "Social Mobility, History of," 426.

Two main research paradigms need further discussion.³³ Status attainment model, our first quantitative research paradigm, was developed by Duncan and his colleagues.³⁴ They conceptualized mobility as the movement of individuals within a hierarchy of occupations that are stratified according to their respective socioeconomic status. Duncan's model comprises seventeen occupational status groups from self-employed professionals at the top to farm laborers at the bottom.³⁵ By describing social space in such precise terms, researchers can adopt statistical tools, especially linear regression models, to understand what kind of independent variables exert influence on individuals' movement within the given structure. The father's occupation, the father's educational level, the education, the earlier jobs, the sex and the race of the respondent can be analyzed numerically and described in mobility tables to the extent that they had a direct or indirect impact on individuals' social movements.³⁶ Studying mobility through variables, however, has led to a positivist dilemma that is not unique to mobility research, namely, taking correlation as a causal explanation.³⁷ The status attainment model assumes at its very core that the social world can be expressed in numerical terms: numbers are not the starting point for a causal explanation, but they are rather used as an explanation of complex mobility processes, a misuse which, in return, simplifies and even twists social phenomena. Occupations are stratified and transformed into a narrow numerical hierarchy based on income and years of schooling. All the multidimensional aspects of social inequalities are missing: use of variables as sole determinants consequently

³³ Müller and Pollak, "Mobility, Social"; Bertaux and Thompson, "Introduction"; Savage, "Social Mobility"; van Leeuwen and Maas, "Historical Studies".

³⁴ For their classic work, see Blau and Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*.

³⁵ Blau and Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, 27 table 2.1.

³⁶ Blau and Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure*, *passim*; Savage, "Social Mobility," 301-2.

³⁷ Savage, "Social Mobility," 302-3; Müller and Pollak, "Mobility, Social," 642; Bertaux and Thompson, "Introduction".

ignores the demand side of the equation, where structural and contextual obstacles prevent or facilitate mobility.

When Goldthorpe and his colleagues were developing their alternative class mobility approach, these problems were already well-known.³⁸ Their class paradigm is built on an alternative understanding of society as stratified in the form of a class structure “as one formed by the social relations of economic life or, more specifically, by relations in labor markets and production units”.³⁹ Unlike the occupational hierarchies of Duncan, Goldthorpe’s seven distinct class groups are not ranked, and thus specific classes cannot occupy allegedly higher or lower locations in social space; they rather serve as a conceptual framework in order to distinguish individual relations qualitatively and group them, a process which, in turn, can be used to observe how people are mobile between these categories. The use of statistical analysis also contrasts with Duncan’s paradigm; numbers are not taken as a causal explanation of mobility, and so become the end point of research, but they constitute the starting point that demonstrates the existence of certain mobilities or immobilities requiring further causal and qualitative explanation.⁴⁰ In studying social mobility, Goldthorpe utilizes mobility tables that express the ratios of sons’ movement from class origins to destinations in comparison to their fathers’. All movements discerned in their totality then account for absolute rates of mobility, while relative mobility rates express the chances of individuals from a certain origin class ending up in another class destination and compare them to the likelihood of

³⁸ There are various class mobility approaches that will not be discussed here for the sake of brevity; for a detailed survey, see Payne, “Social Mobility”; Müller and Pollak, “Mobility, Social,” 642-4; van Leeuwen and Maas, “Historical Studies”.

³⁹ Chan and Goldthorpe, “Class and Status,” 513; see the essential work, Goldthorpe et al, *Social Mobility and the Class Structure*. Recently, Goldthorpe and his colleagues returned to Weberian interpretation of class and status, and both concepts are now used in investigating different aspects of social mobility; Chan and Goldthorpe, “Is there a Status Order”.

⁴⁰ Savage, “Social Mobility,” 303-8.

other classes' movements. This distinction between absolute and relative rates allows researchers to distinguish structural obstacles that prevent or facilitate mobility of certain classes, but not others, and also to analyze class inequalities. As this brief explanation makes clear, the class paradigm provides a more operational and socially attentive approach, as long as we think of social mobility as movement of individuals between different classes. It is, however, this interpretation that has led to serious criticisms.⁴¹ conceptualization of mobility in the form of a class structure, as well as in an occupational status framework, ignores women, about whom occupational data tends to be very scanty; even if it exists, the long-term unemployed women and men remain uninvestigated since the principal focus is persistently on economic relations. Constraining the research questions to such macro scale explanations via occupations conceptualizes mobility as a series of punctually demonstrable occupational movements, a perspective which is built upon a language insensitive to individual experience at the micro level; as Bertaux and Thompson put it, statistical approaches to social mobility resemble "the observation of a carnival through a keyhole".⁴²

In their critique of the statistical studies of social mobility, Bertaux and Thompson, both oral historians and sociologists, ask for an alternative and qualitative method to social mobility, hence their life-story approach.⁴³ Instead of randomly selecting individuals from whom to collect survey data, Bertaux and Thompson adopted oral history methods: they chose a core sample of 100 families in France and Britain and made detailed interviews with three generations by using their semi-structured question set, a method which allowed interviewees to convey

⁴¹ Payne, "Social Mobility," 478-82; Pakulsky, "Foundations of a Post-Class Analysis"; Grusky and Kanbur, "Introduction," 13-29.

⁴² Bertaux and Thompson, "Introduction," 6.

⁴³ Bertaux and Thompson, "Introduction"; see also Bertaux, "From Methodological Monopoly to Pluralism".

their own experiences and views more freely.⁴⁴ The interviews were used “as sources to reveal what happened to the interviewee, how and why it happened, what he/she felt about it, and how he/she reacted to it or proacted to realize his/her projects”.⁴⁵ The benefit of this method, therefore, is in its capacity to demonstrate subjective and immediate contexts in which social mobility is in the making: Mr. Nilaiev’s family, for example, would have had a totally different life chances if a social earthquake, the revolution, had not broken out. The interview method also enables researchers to investigate certain questions which cannot be otherwise posed by survey data: the roles that a family plays in affecting its members’ occupational career,⁴⁶ the importance and meaning of housing in social mobility,⁴⁷ the ways in which individuals’ occupational desires conflict or accord with their current jobs,⁴⁸ the role of social and cultural capital when an immigrant settles in a new world,⁴⁹ how a political regime and its transformation affect the social mobility,⁵⁰ and the ways in which all these issues are interpreted by individuals. Women and the unemployed can now have a place in these studies, as can families, kinship or migrant groups. Although Bertaux and Thompson are mainly concerned with occupational mobility, the individual interpretations of interviewees, in this regard, pose a serious challenge for the overall conceptualization of social mobility: a certain Mrs. Lindsay, for instance, saw her family’s migration from Glasgow to Canada as a great achievement, a social mobility on its own because there, in Canada, they would have more social, cultural and material opportunities in building their new lives without

⁴⁴ For a detailed overview of the project, see Thompson, “Family Influences in Social Mobility,” 56-9 n.7; for the method, Bertaux and Thompson, “Introduction,” 11-8.

⁴⁵ Bertaux and Thompson, “Introduction,” 13.

⁴⁶ Thompson, “Women, Men and Transgenerational Family Influences”.

⁴⁷ Bertaux-Wiame and Thompson, “The Familial Meaning of Housing”.

⁴⁸ Vincent, “Shadow and Reality in Occupational History”.

⁴⁹ Elliott, “Migration, Mobility and Social Process”.

⁵⁰ Bertaux, “Transmission in Extreme Situations”; Andorka, “Social Mobility in Hungary”.

the class constraints of their Glasgow neighborhood.⁵¹ Social mobility, therefore, becomes more of an ongoing process that has resulted from an interrelation between human agency and contextual and structural limits and rewards; a focus on life stories and individual experience, therefore, facilitates a more nuanced understanding of social mobility processes, a perspective that is consonant with Sorokin's forgotten comprehensive conceptualization that incorporated mobility in different realms of life.

1.2 Social mobility and ancient Greek history

While social scientists have been occupied with social mobility since Sorokin's publication, Roman historians also engaged in investigations of social mobility in the early 1960s;⁵² social mobility, in the strict sense of the term, however, is a belated topic of inquiry for ancient Greek history. Instead, taxonomic discussions were dominating the field, often outlined as an opposition between Marxist and Weberian poles represented respectively by Ste Croix and Finley.⁵³ The issue of which concepts, namely class, order or status, furnish a more contextually appropriate conceptual framework in analyzing socioeconomic relations of Greek societies and their stratification systems led to a series of prolonged discussions.⁵⁴ Finleyan tradition and the concept of status, nevertheless, prevailed and its influence spread beyond scholarly circles in Britain.⁵⁵ Since the Finleyan interpretation of Weberian

⁵¹ Elliott, "Migration, Mobility and Social Process," 218.

⁵² Deene, "Let's Work Together," 153-4 with notes.

⁵³ Finley, *History and Society*, 116-32, 133-49; Finley, *Ancient Economy*, esp. 35-61; Ste. Croix, *Class Struggle*, esp. 31-111; for a critical evaluation of these discussions, see Nafissi, *Ancient Athens*, 235-56.

⁵⁴ Nafissi, *Ancient Athens*, 247-56.

⁵⁵ Vidal-Naquet, *Black Hunter*, esp. 159-165; Ismard, "Classes, Ordres, Statuts"; Zurbach, "La Formation des Cités Grecques".

status ruled out the concept of class⁵⁶ and Finley's followers have not paid attention to the history, hence the transformation, of the term class as a conceptual tool since the 1960s, class analysis could then be easily dismissed on the grounds that it "inevitably carries with it the baggage of exploitation".⁵⁷ Finley's status paradigm, especially prominent in his idea of the so-called spectrum of statuses, however, is useful in that it sheds light on the complex nature of social stratification.⁵⁸ For Finley, as Pollux observed,⁵⁹ there were various statuses between free men and slaves, and one has to borrow a jurisprudential approach and terminology of property to analyze this complexity: "all men, unless they are Robinson Crusoes, are bundles of claims, privileges, immunities, liabilities and obligations with respect to others. A man's status is defined by the total of these elements which he possesses or which he has (or has not) the potential of acquiring".⁶⁰ Then, Finley suggested the following categories of analysis for further investigation:

(1) claims to property, or power over things – a complex of elements requiring further differentiation both in its range (from *peculium* to full ownership) and in its application to different categories of things (e.g. cattle or land or agricultural produce or money); (2) power over a man's labour and movements; (3) power to punish; (4) privileges and liabilities in legal action, such as immunity from arbitrary seizure or the capacity to sue and be sued; (5) privileges in the area of the family: marriage, succession, and so on; (6) privileges of social mobility, such as manumission or enfranchisement (and their inverse); and (7) privileges and duties in the sacral, political, and military spheres.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Weberian conceptualization of class and status are not mutually exclusive, but they refer to different aspects of life; Weber, *Economy and Society*, 302-7, 926-940.

⁵⁷ Kamen, *Status*, 3; for a multiplicity of approaches to class analysis, see the articles in Wright, *Approaches to Class Analysis*.

⁵⁸ Recent trends on multidimensionality of inequality, see below.

⁵⁹ Poll. *Onom.* 3.83.

⁶⁰ Finley, *Economy and Society*, 131.

⁶¹ Finley, *Economy and Society*, 149.

Although the primary emphasis is given to the diversity of individual coordinates in a social space, Finley's insights could easily have initiated a research program on social mobility, as Kamen, who fulfilled Finley's call for a more nuanced study of statuses for Athens fifty years later, rightly observes: "the greatest advantage of this kind of approach is that it entails investigation into all areas of life, encompassing privileges and liabilities not only in the juridical sphere but also in the spheres of politics, religion, and the economy, among others".⁶² The drawback, however, is that questions of how individuals move between these statuses, and how social mobility, therefore, is experienced, remains unanswered.

Another but highly fragmented branch of the scholarship steered their investigations to explore the opposition between legal status and real life experience.⁶³ In contrast to the overemphasized polarities between free and slave, citizen and outsider, and rich and poor, these scholars have looked for alternative contexts in which legal status is irrelevant or less effective in shaping individual behavior.⁶⁴ The agora, for instance, as a place for economic transactions provides what Vlassopoulos calls "free spaces" where opportunities for social interaction between distinct status groups remain fundamental for the functioning of the economy.⁶⁵ Slave and female residents of the banking world, as Cohen demonstrated, enjoyed exceptional chances for gaining social and economic capital, trade knowledge, as well as manumission, so much so that, once a banker died, one of his manumitted slaves could marry the banker's wife in order to maintain banking operations.⁶⁶ The economic participation of women, indeed, was not confined to

⁶² Kamen, *Status*, 6.

⁶³ For a recent survey of the literature, see Vlassopoulos, "Que savons-nous vraiment".

⁶⁴ See, Vlassopoulos and Taylor, "An Agenda"; Taylor, "Social Networks"; Deene, "Let's Work Together".

⁶⁵ Vlassopoulos, "Free Spaces"; Gottesman, *Politics*, 44-63.

⁶⁶ Cohen, *Economy and Society*; Cohen, *Athenian Nation*.

household production aiming at self-sufficiency, and so the agora was a “free space” for them as well: they could sell various goods such as wares, ribbons, cloaks, perfume, sesame and bread, but they could also be wet-nurses and care for others’ children, as well as become grape-pickers and take part in agricultural production cycles.⁶⁷ Davies has diligently demonstrated the unstable nature of wealth and its transmission across generations, hence the impoverishment of some wealthy Athenian families and rise of others.⁶⁸

Beyond economic relations, metics and slaves, either Greek or non-Greek, could create communities and develop networks that might cut across status boundaries.⁶⁹ While religion was one context for sharing the same space and experience,⁷⁰ sports provided another.⁷¹ Rich “citizen club” activities such as those in gymnasium and symposium became more accessible to the less wealthy with the fourth-century.⁷² Even though slaves were strictly forbidden from participating in gymnastic activities,⁷³ the symposium was still a possible venue for pleasure, even more so for not well-to-do citizens and metics.⁷⁴ Fourth-century Athens witnessed “a new political world”; prosopographical evidence indicates that a wider cross-section of citizenry took a more active part in politics in comparison to the fifth-century, and their participation actively affected decision-making processes, and thus affected Athenian policies.⁷⁵ Representations of individuals in material culture, finally, present a similar picture in which citizen cannot be visually distinguished from non-

⁶⁷ Harris, “Wife, Household, and Marketplace”; Brock, “The Labor of Women in Classical Athens”; Scheidel, “The Most Silent Women (I)”; Scheidel, “The Most Silent Women (II)”; for occupational categories, see Harris, “Workshop, Marketplace and Household”.

⁶⁸ Davies, *APF*; Davies, *Wealth*.

⁶⁹ Gottesman, *Politics*, 44-63.

⁷⁰ Wijma, *Embracing*; Taylor, “Social Networks”; Parker, *Athenian Religion*, 337-42.

⁷¹ Golden, *Greek Sport*, 40-67.

⁷² Fisher, “Gymnasia”; Fisher, “Symposiasts”.

⁷³ Aesch. 1.138-9.

⁷⁴ Fisher, “Symposiasts”.

⁷⁵ Taylor, “A New Political World”.

citizen; whereas artists could occasionally differentiate slaves from their masters or mistresses, such distinctions were not always salient and were mostly related to making sense of the scene and figures.⁷⁶ Although these issues affect our understanding of social mobility, the scholars investigating these matters have not focused on mobility as a topic of inquiry on its own, nor did they provide a theoretical approach for social mobility.

Two recent works, however, stand out from this literature because of their theoretical contributions for further mobility research on Athenian society. Deene's article "Let's Work Together", develops Vlassopoulos' arguments about the agora as a "free space"; since the legal status of individuals was mostly irrelevant for daily transactions, Deene argues that economic cooperation could be used in order to create social networks and to accumulate social capital, a concept which Deene adopts to examine the possibilities for social mobility in Athenian society.⁷⁷ Behind this perspective lies Granovetter's oft-cited network theory which identifies two types of ties between individuals as strong and weak depending on a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie.⁷⁸ As individuals in close circles generally share the same information and opportunities, the importance of weak ties is not only in the subject's direct use of the networks, but also "in that they are the channels through which ideas, influences, or information socially distant from ego may reach him. The fewer indirect contacts one has the more encapsulated he will be in terms of knowledge of the world beyond his own friendship circle".⁷⁹ For Deene, social capital accumulated through constructing weak-tie bridges particularly benefited

⁷⁶ Osborne, *History Written*, 85-157.

⁷⁷ Deene, "Let's Work Together"; Vlassopoulos, "Free Spaces"; Millett, "Encounters in the Agora".

⁷⁸ Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1360-1378; Deene, "Let's Work Together," 155-6.

⁷⁹ Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," 1370-71; see also Granovetter, "Revisited," 201-233.

non-citizen residents of Athens, and this asset paved the way to social mobility either in its pure state, as networks give more social recognition, or in its transformed state with converting social capital into economic and cultural ones.⁸⁰ While capital analysis is indeed an insightful perspective for studying social mobility from a qualitative perspective,⁸¹ social capital is just one aspect of mobility and not the only element responsible for mobility in social, economic or cultural contexts; instead, stratification takes different forms and our perspective needs to be large enough to accommodate this complexity.

Social networks are also the starting point for Taylor, especially in the context of dedicatory practice where the epigraphic evidence testifies to individuals of different legal statuses coming together, and sharing the same environment and experience, processes which in turn lead them to develop social ties and construct group identities.⁸² In analyzing social networks for their real-life consequences, Taylor opts for the capability approach developed by Amartya Sen.⁸³ Sen's framework is evaluative, not causal, in assessing social arrangements such as inequality, well-being and poverty; therefore, it does not tell us why certain individuals are poor while others are not, but it does provide a framework with which to conceptualize and evaluate these phenomena.⁸⁴ Sen argues that capabilities, rather than commodities or utility, should be the space for the evaluation of well-being and social justice; this approach centers on what people are able to do and to be, thus their capabilities and substantive freedoms, an emphasis which has shaped

⁸⁰ Deene, "Let's Work Together," 169-72.

⁸¹ For a critical analysis of the literature on social capital, see Fine, *Theories of Social Capital*.

⁸² Taylor, "Social Networks".

⁸³ Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*; Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities*; Sen and Nussbaum, *The Quality of Life*; for a literature survey, see Robeyns, "The Capability Approach"; Clark, "The Capability Approach".

⁸⁴ Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," 94.

contemporary social policies and inequality and poverty measurement methods.⁸⁵

Individual capability sets hinge on various elements such as personal characteristics, people surrounding, social norms, the goods and services available at a given point in time, environmental factors and many more elements depending on the institutions, structures and legal frameworks of society. For Taylor, social networks are one of these factors, and they can enlarge individuals' access to social and economic resources, and thus expand their capabilities. To reassess social mobility, she then calls for an alternative view, one which focuses on what individuals' capabilities allow them to do, instead of emphasizing changes in legal status or taking economic mobility as the main tenet of social mobility. Taylor's insights can lead to a more nuanced historical account, and the capability approach is flexible enough for the contextual refinements of a historian,⁸⁶ but using it for social mobility requires us to go beyond Taylor's work and to integrate two intellectual streams, the capability approach and the study of social mobility and stratification.

1.3 How to study ancient social mobility?

For a student of modern societies, it is a methodological choice with its relevant strengths and weaknesses; one can either adopt an aggregative methodology and aim at generalizations, or one can look at individual narratives and utilize a language and conceptual framework, which is more sensitive to individual experiences and to their contradictions, to investigate various aspects of mobility processes. In the case of

⁸⁵ Sen's approach also has led human development reports of United Nations to be based on advancing human well-being; see <http://hdr.undp.org/en/humandev>, accessed on 22 December 2017.

⁸⁶ The flexibility of Sen's approach has led to series of criticisms, but it is the awareness that each society has different social norms and internal structures to value certain capabilities more than others which makes this approach especially suitable for a historical account; see Clark, "The Capability Approach," 5.

fourth-century Athens, however, a quantitative methodology lacks evidence and a qualitative one is imperative.⁸⁷ For this, as discussed above, a class model or a focus on wealth prevents us from investigating the intricacies of the mobility processes. What we need, therefore, is a qualitative approach that (a) does not focus on wealth and occupation as the only contexts of social inequality and mobility, and so can incorporate social, economic, legal, political and cultural structures; that (b) is sensitive to individual, as well as group, experience and interpretations of mobility; and that (c) conceptualizes mobility as a complex process, not as an end in itself, but rather as a dynamic process in which each action that results in social repositioning affects opportunities for prospective social mobility of the self, and possibly of surrounding individuals.

If mobility is understood as a process, then we need to revisit our methodology. In this study, I shall utilize an adaptation of the capability approach as my conceptual framework. With its fundamental emphasis on individual capabilities, what people are able to do and to be, and on functionings, performed capabilities, and its flexibility for different evaluative purposes, this approach can be distinguished as the most operational and nuanced framework for studying various aspects of social inequality and of mobility of the Athenian society.⁸⁸

In thinking about individuals' capabilities, at the first glance, there are countless options that people can do and be: one can eat food and be nourished, ride a bicycle and be physically mobile, or participate in a social meeting and get to know others. But what one can *effectively* do and be – capabilities or potential functionings – is limited on various grounds, by the so-called conversion factors.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ For a discussion of the sources, see below.

⁸⁸ Taylor, "Social Networks," 52 n. 51.

⁸⁹ Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," 100.

Firstly, at a personal level, one can refer to health, age, sex, mental and physical skills, income, and occupation as conversion factors restraining capabilities; at a social level, public policies, social norms, gender roles, social hierarchies, power relations derived from class, gender, race or caste can influence capabilities of an individual, as can climate, geographical location, topography, and proneness to earthquakes at environmental scale.⁹⁰ As usual with Sen's approach, he does not provide a concise list of elements; instead one has to accommodate factors and their relative significance in determining the capabilities in relation to the topic of inquiry and its context.⁹¹ Potential functionings emerging out of these constraints then constitute capability sets, from which individuals make choices based on their needs, preferences and existing circumstances, and thereby transform their capabilities, or potential functionings, into achieved functionings, doings and beings. Developed in such a broad fashion, the research agenda is to shape our evaluation of capabilities and functionings; focusing on predetermined doings and beings, one can study, for instance, poverty, individual wellbeing, and thus quality of life, or by taking a broad approach, as in our case, we can examine social repositioning. But when theory is put into practice, the pitfalls of broad conceptualization and individual focus have led scholars to pay less attention to groups, social contexts, structures and their connections with individuals' doings and beings.⁹² Social inequalities that are embedded in social, economic, political and various other structures, however, limit or facilitate social mobility, and their absence consequently draws an individual, but

⁹⁰ Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, 12-30; Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," 98-100.

⁹¹ *Contra* Sen, Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities*, 17-45 adopts a list of, what she called, central capabilities, which comprises minimum capabilities required for a dignified life; for a discussion, see Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," 105-7.

⁹² Robeyns, "The Capability Approach," 107-11; Stewart, "Groups and Capabilities".

an unreliable picture, of mobility, as if it were conducted under laboratory conditions.

One of the targets of stratification and mobility studies is to analyze the reasons why and the ways in which resources, endowments and life chances are unequally distributed in relation to social processes and social relationships, an emphasis that complements the missing social and causal mechanisms of the capability approach.⁹³ Concepts of class and status, often employed in mobility research, can initially appear to be useful, but they only allow investigation into those social structures, often occupational, that their conceptualizations inherently allow.⁹⁴ Due to similar criticisms, Jan Pakulski, for example, has highlighted the historicity of class as a concept; consequently he has challenged its use and called for a post-class analysis with a focus on the distribution of chances in a very broad sense.⁹⁵ Stratification studies also now opt for the more comprehensive idea that a multiplicity of social categories and relations including ethnicity, gender, age, religion, group affiliations, cultural practices and as well as many others, determines individuals' social positions, and, consequently, limits or expands what people can do and be.⁹⁶ These elements, however, are not static but dynamic and context-dependent: categories and practices do historically change, their importance varies depending on the circumstances, and individual agency may overcome structural constraints. In evaluating an individual's capabilities, these categories help us to understand what sort of options one may or may not have, but, especially in the form of social, cultural and legal norms, they also affect individual decision making. While a woman may not, for example, be prohibited from specific religious or social

⁹³ Roche, "Capability and Group Inequalities," 1-5.

⁹⁴ Sen, *Inequality Reexamined*, 117-21; Grusky and Kanbur, "Introduction," 13-29.

⁹⁵ Pakulsky, "Foundations of a Post-Class Analysis".

⁹⁶ Grusky and Kanbur, "Introduction," 13-29.

activities, the influence of social and cultural norms in her decision making can deter her from participating, and inequality in distinct forms may limit her life chances in these and many other related contexts.⁹⁷

Since our focus is on social mobility, stratification studies also provide the context for an application of the capability approach. In contrast to the overemphasis in mainstream studies on occupations, at the very outset of mobility research, Sorokin distinguished three main contexts for mobility, namely economic, political and occupational, but he also asserted that each one has to be seen in a close interaction and one may overlap with another in certain aspects.⁹⁸ With Sen's contributions,⁹⁹ the multidimensionality of inequality has been more emphasized recently; Grusky, for example, identified eight asset groups as contexts for study, as can be seen in Table 1. The list is not exhaustive, nor do we need a concise catalogue of assets in order to study mobility. The point, however, is clear: class, occupation and income should not be taken as the only aspects of social mobility. Inequality is multidimensional, as is social mobility.

Reframed in this way, the capability approach provides us with a qualitative perspective, one that is consonant with Bertaux and Thompson's historical approach. Accordingly, our questions can be put in a comprehensive manner: What could people do and be? What was the result of their doings and beings in terms of their social positions, and how could the outcomes of their actions affect their prospective life chances, or capabilities? In a contextual manner, what happened to the individuals, and how and why did it happen? How could they react to it?

⁹⁷ This limitation is indeed twofold. Social and cultural norms fundamentally restrict individual capabilities and substantive freedoms; therefore, a woman may not have access to particular activities in the first place. Even in the absence of such structural barriers, social and cultural norms can also have an impact, in varying degrees, on individual decision making.

⁹⁸ See pp. 4-7 above.

⁹⁹ See especially Sen, "From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality".

Table 1. Types of Assets¹⁰⁰

Asset group	Example of types
Economic	Wealth, Income, Ownership
Power	Political power, Workplace authority, Household authority
Cultural	Knowledge, Digital culture, ‘Good’ manners
Social	Social clubs, Workplace associations, Informal networks
Honorific	Occupational, Religious, Merit-based
Civil	Right to work, Due process, Franchise
Human	On-the-job training, General schooling, Vocational training
Physical	Mortality, Physical disease, Mental health

Did they submit or did they overcome structural and contextual barriers to do something which they valued? How did these actions and results make them feel about their place in social space? If given the chance, could they highlight one event rather than another as “a turning point”? If so, could their answers contradict our assumptions about their lives and life chances? Depending on the evidence, we could make these and many more queries; such a qualitative conceptualization ultimately contrasts with the contemporary liberal assumptions that are embedded into mobility research and its questions. Experience and individual actions, most importantly, does not succumb to legality; access to resources, possession of certain rights and privileges fundamentally affect chances of social mobility, but not in a deterministic

¹⁰⁰ Grusky, “Social Stratification,” Table 1.

way; instead, they provide the contexts to evaluate individual and social praxis, and their consequences.

If we return to Athenian society, stratification is an inseparable theme of Athenian social history. The author of Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* tells us that, at the beginning of the sixth century, Solon divided the Athenian society into four large classes based on property ownership, namely, in a descending order, five-hundred-medimnoi-men (*pentakosiomedimnoi*), horsemen (*hippeis*), yoke-men (*zeugitai*) and hired-men (*thêtai*).¹⁰¹ Solon's distribution of political rights and privileges promoted the first three classes: "[Solon] distributed the other offices to be held from among the five-hundred-medimnoi-men, horsemen and yoke-men - the nine archons, the treasurers, the vendors of contracts (*pōlētas*), the eleven and the paymasters (*kōlekretas*), assigning each office to the several classes in proportion to the amount of their assessment; while those who were rated in the hired-men class he admitted to the membership of the assembly and law-courts alone".¹⁰² Debt bondage, enslavement for debt and chattel slavery constituted different levels of dependence relations, and they resulted in a more fundamental form of inequality. Solon seems to have abolished enslavement for debt, but the presence of debt-bondage maintained unequal power relations,¹⁰³ and the following rise in chattel slavery transformed Athens into a slave society.¹⁰⁴ Although the relevance of and changes in Solonian categories is a contested topic for later periods,¹⁰⁵ diverse legal categories following the Cleisthenic reforms and the Periclean citizenship law contributed to an even more

¹⁰¹ [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 7.3; Ste Croix, *Athenian Democratic Origins*, 5-72; van Wees, "Mass and Elite"; for a narrative history, see Osborne, *Greece in the Making*, 202-213.

¹⁰² [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 7.3. (trans. Rackham, slightly adapted)

¹⁰³ Harris, *Law and Society*, 249-269.

¹⁰⁴ Rihl, "Classical Athens," 48-51.

¹⁰⁵ Ste Croix, *Athenian Democratic Origins*, 51-6.

complex stratification system.¹⁰⁶ Kamen recently demonstrated that, within the main tripartite division, there are various legal statuses with unevenly allocated rights and privileges;¹⁰⁷ if we look at individual experiences at a micro level, these coexistences are even more complicated by the multidimensionality of the inequalities observed in social, economic, political, religious and various other contexts.

1.4 Evidence

In order to analyze individual mobilities qualitatively within this multilayered social space, I shall utilize three case studies drawn from fourth-century Athenian court speeches. Before presenting an outline of the thesis, a brief discussion will clarify my use of different sources and the ways in which they are employed in this study. Since each chapter commences with an individual introduction to the relevant speeches, I confined my discussion here to the larger problems of this particular kind of evidence, and the ways in which we can, or sometimes cannot, overcome them.

Although a short discussion cannot do justice to the issues at hand, I will then proceed to a brief evaluation of other forms of literary sources and material evidence, and, in order to avoid a superficially descriptive account, I will focus on their relevance and problems for studying social mobility.

¹⁰⁶ Bakewell, “Μετοικία in the Supplices”; Watson, “The Origin of Metic Status”; Osborne, “Law, the Democratic Citizen”.

¹⁰⁷ Kamen, *Status*; cf. Todd, *The Shape*, 171-4.

1.4.1 Forensic oratory

The writing of court speeches was the craft of logographers,¹⁰⁸ speechwriters, a process which required the collaboration of the speechwriter and his clients. How exactly they worked together, and to what extent we can trace a client's agency in a speech is a major and unresolved issue in the scholarship.¹⁰⁹ The problems are even more complicated once we imagine a speaker delivering a speech in a courtroom with occasional extemporization, as well as the logographer revising his speech before its publication for circulation.¹¹⁰ Further issues can be derived from textual reproduction processes like possible forgeries and canonical reorganizations, of which the most well-known case is perhaps the association of some speeches in Demosthenic corpus with Apollodoros, the son of Pasion.¹¹¹ Besides these textual dilemmas, the speeches and the ways in which they are presented in court pose a serious risk for a historical account if they are taken at face value. Court speeches were written for a purpose, namely to persuade listeners, as Aristotle notes:

For in the assembly the judges decide upon their own affairs, so that the only thing necessary is to prove the truth of the statement of one who recommends a measure, but in the law courts this is not sufficient; there it is useful to win over the hearers, for the decision concerns other interests than those of the judges, who, having only themselves to consider and listening merely for their own pleasure, surrender to the pleaders but do not give a real decision. That is why, as I have said before, in many places the law prohibits speaking outside the subject in the law courts, whereas in the assembly the judges themselves take adequate precautions against this.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ For an introduction to techniques and problems of forensic oratory, see Cooper, "Forensic Oratory".

¹⁰⁹ For the collaboration of the client and the orator, Dover, *Lysias and Corpus Lysiacum*, 148-174; in contrast, Usher gives the full agency to orators; Usher, "Lysias and His Clients"; cf. Worthington, "Once More".

¹¹⁰ Todd, "The Use and Abuse," 166-7.

¹¹¹ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 50-76.

¹¹² Aristot. *Rh.* 1.1 (trans. Freese).

What Aristotle contemptuously described later in the same chapter as the trickery of forensic oratory encapsulates a set of refined rhetorical techniques such as characterization, personification, emotional appeal, and performative features like intonations, mimics and gesticulations, which were employed in order to sustain jurors' attention and to influence their judgments.¹¹³ Witnesses could support their friends for the sake of friendship and such a backup could be a cause of inaccurate information,¹¹⁴ but the problems became even more formidable when the Athenians shifted from oral testimony to written depositions around 370s, a transition that enabled litigants to write down, and thus manipulate, the texts, which were then simply approved or rejected by witnesses.¹¹⁵ Audience mattered; exhortations to their values, concerns and ideas were the keys to success,¹¹⁶ so much so that a certain Euxitheos, who was accused of illegally infiltrating into the citizenry, had to justify his mother's occupation as a wet-nurse with an apology:

You know, if the wet-nurse is a humble thing, I do not run away from the truth. We did nothing wrong, after all, if we were poor, but only if we were not citizens: and the present trial now is not about our luck or our money but about our descent. Poverty forces free men to do many servile, humble things: and it would be more in keeping with justice if they will be pitied for that, men of Athens, than if they are pushed further into ruin. I have heard that owing to the city's misfortunes at the time, many Athenian women (*astai*) became wet-nurses, servants, and grape harvesters, and many Athenian women (*astai*) rose from poverty to riches.¹¹⁷

There is neither a magical spell nor one comprehensive single approach to resolve all these problems; we cannot simply say: "disregard anything the orator says

¹¹³ Hall, "Lawcourt Dramas"; Cooper, "Forensic Oratory," 206-215.

¹¹⁴ For example, see Lys. 5.1.

¹¹⁵ Carey, "Artless Proofs".

¹¹⁶ Todd, "Lady Chatterley's Lover".

¹¹⁷ Dem. 57.45 (trans. Bers).

which might benefit his case; only believe the *obiter dicta* which he happens to mention in passing”.¹¹⁸ Literary and philological immersion together with a critical perspective built on comparative historical evidence will help us to find contextual solutions. If we are to test the reliability of Euxitheos’ words, for example, he is right that some Athenians did indeed despise venal activities and wage labor, and privileged those working for themselves,¹¹⁹ but how representative could such ideas be, especially when we focus on daily life? Are we also to believe Euxitheos’ insistence that only under extreme circumstances Athenian women went out of their houses to make a living? Taking Euxitheos’ picture of the Athenian society at face value would be misleading; we know of numerous laboring female citizens from the classical period, and Euxitheos’ apology seems to have appealed to the jurors’ mental image of the ideal woman.¹²⁰ Is his description of a social earthquake, which all of a sudden diminished many and prospered others, to be taken as credible? That Euxitheos did not feel a need to name the events or the years means that the audience already shared the contextual reference that we lack. Lacey plausibly dates the events to ca. 405-3,¹²¹ to the very same years when Lysias and many other residents of Athens suffered from siege, starvation and civil war, and, therefore, his reference to social ups and downs can be proven as reliable thanks to comparative evidence.¹²² Examined in such a critical manner, we can contextually distinguish what is plausible from what is not, and the court speeches can provide us with significant insights through their narratives of individuals and their experiences which, in turn, allow us to analyze various aspects of social mobility in the fourth-century Athens.

¹¹⁸ Todd, “The Use and Abuse,” 174.

¹¹⁹ Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 70-3; Cohen, *Athenian Prostitution*, 25-7, 40-44.

¹²⁰ Vlassopoulos, “Que savons-nous vraiment,” 670-1.

¹²¹ Lacey, “The Family of Euxitheus,” 59; Lape, *Race and Citizen*, 207-8; cf. Davies, *APF*, 94.

¹²² See Lysias’ narrative above.

1.4.2 Other literary sources and material evidence

In addition to forensic oratory, our knowledge on Athenian society depends on various other forms of literary sources, both fictional (comedy and tragedy) and non-fictional (history, political and philosophical treatises), and on material evidence. Incidental references to daily life and life stories, and contextual comparative evidence make the large spectrum of literary sources particularly significant in studying social history.¹²³ Thanks to such occasional allusions, we learn from Plato's *Republic* that Lysias and his family were socially well-integrated within Athenian elites, and that they shared the same friendly circles with Socrates.¹²⁴ Similarly, a short dialogue in Menander's *Hero* demonstrated that debt bondage was still a possibility for free men as late as the end of the fourth or early third century, and thus one more status for Finleyan spectrum of statuses.¹²⁵ Literary sources present the background to evaluate our case studies. The Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* informs us about the constitution of Athens and its legal procedures, while Xenophon's *Poroi* discusses the economic problems of 350s and possible solutions to overcome them.¹²⁶ Later sources can often be complementary when we lack contemporary evidence: Plutarch's *Life of Pericles* provides the context of Euxitheos' trial,¹²⁷ and Pseudo-Plutarch's *Lives of Ten Orators* collects biographical testimonia about the logographers. Later sources can occasionally be our only sources in solving certain conundrums. Our definition for the status of Athenian *metoikia* comes from

¹²³ For a recent discussion on sources for Athenian social history, Vlassopoulos, "Que savons-nous vraiment".

¹²⁴ Plat. *Rep.* 1.328b-c.

¹²⁵ Men. *Her.* 18-38; Harris, *Law and Society*, 256-8.

¹²⁶ Oliver, "Before 'Lykourgan Athens'".

¹²⁷ Plut. *Per.* 37.4; Bers, *Demosthenes*, 107-8.

Aristophanes of Byzantium,¹²⁸ and the mysterious status of the *khôris oikountes*, literally those living apart, has been contested once more by using the philosophers' wills preserved in Diogenes Laertius' writings.¹²⁹ As important as these sources may have been, each brings with it a particular set of issues, which will be addressed on a case by case basis.

Material culture is now an inseparable part of social history. Epigraphic evidence enables us to excavate various aspects of Athenian society. The *phialai* inscriptions, a set of inscriptions traditionally interpreted as inventories of *phialai*, silver offering bowls, dedicated by freedmen who escaped from remaining duties to their masters as a result of a legal process called *dikē apostasiou*, list a large group of individuals with their occupations; the status of these individuals, whether they were actually manumitted slaves or metics,¹³⁰ as well as their occupations have generated a series of discussions.¹³¹ Such debates seemingly will not come to an end in the near future;¹³² nevertheless, if one follows the traditional explanation in relation to manumission, *phialai* inscriptions illuminate the financial capacity of a group of slaves, who could accumulate enough capital to buy their freedom. Grave stelae constitute another group of evidence that can help us to make queries about wealth, identity and remembrance.¹³³ For example, a certain Atotas' epitaph reads:

¹²⁸ Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 7.

¹²⁹ Canavero and Lewis, "Khoris Oikountes". The status of the *khôris oikountes* has been the cause of a vigorous debate; see also Kamen, "Reconsidering the Status of *khôris oikountes*"; Kazakévich, "Were the *khôris oikountes* Slaves?".

¹³⁰ For a critical account of the literature and a reinterpretation of the inscriptions, see Meyer, *Metic*, 9-80; *contra* Meyer, Vlassopoulos relates the inscriptions to freedmen; see Vlassopoulos, "Review of Elizabeth Meyer".

¹³¹ Wrenhaven unconvincingly argues that *talasiourgoi*, wool-workers, were actually prostitutes, who were doing some wool-working in their spare time, and they were categorized in this particular way to avoid stigma associated with their "original" trade; Wrenhaven, "The Identity of the 'Wool-Workers'"; for a critical approach, see Kennedy, *Immigrant Women*, 130-3.

¹³² Lewis seems quite optimistic about a possible conclusion with Edward Harris' forthcoming article on the topic; Lewis, "Slavery and Manumission".

¹³³ Oliver, "An Introduction"; for a discussion on the relatively affordable cost of gravestones, see Oliver, "Athenian Funerary Monuments"; for changes in Athenian funerary monuments, see Sterns, "The Times They are A'Changing".

Atotas, miner.
Great-hearted Atotas, a Paphlagonian from the hospitable [Black] Sea,
far from his land has rested his body from toil.
Nobody rivalled [me] in skill. I am from the race of Pylaimenes,
who died, conquered by the hand of Achilles.¹³⁴

As a miner, we do not know whether Atotas was a slave or a free, and this makes our questions about agency even more intricate: was the person who erected the stele his master or rather one of his friends or family members, if he had any? The issue of agency for this epitaph raises further difficulties depending on the way in which Atotas lost his life.¹³⁵ the language may reflect his explicit wishes about the epitaph, but it may also mirror the ways in which he was remembered. As a person who was, or was remembered as being, proud of his ethnic background and of his occupation, Atotas was not alone;¹³⁶ Kosmopoulou has collected various stelae commemorating nurses, priestesses, midwives and woolworkers, who shared a similar pride of occupation.¹³⁷ When we look at painted and sculpted images, like those on grave stelae, the identification of the individuals with their legal status is often an insurmountable task in the absence of an additional information such as an inscription. Distinguishing citizens from non-citizens, metics from *xenoi* is not possible; without contextual salience of status, the same holds true for slaves, who were not systematically differentiated by artisans.¹³⁸ Therefore, taking certain individual depictions as evidence to support the traditional claim that banausic

¹³⁴ *IG* ii² 10051 (trans. Hunt); Hunt, "Trojan Slaves," 136-9.

¹³⁵ On the question of agency, see Osborne, *History Written*, 82-3.

¹³⁶ See Mannes Orumaïos' epitaph, "who was the best of the Phrygians in the spacious Athens", *IG* i³ 1361; Hunt, "Trojan Slaves," 139-40.

¹³⁷ Kosmopoulou, "Working Women".

¹³⁸ Osborne, *History Written*, 85-157, esp. 152-3; for exceptions see 153 n. 82.

activities belonged only to metics and slaves is fundamentally misleading, and using material evidence for social history requires supreme caution.

1.5 Outline

In order to assess social mobility in fourth-century Athens, each chapter examines a case study centered on two different dimensions of social mobility. Chapter 2 focuses on Timarchos of Sphettos. It takes his trial as a turning point in his life, and it begins by investigating Timarchos' political rise prior to the trial (Chapter 2.2). In contrast to Aeschines' explanation based on money and bribery as the causal factors of Timarchos' political mobility, it will become clear that Timarchos benefited from a multiplicity of factors such as social ties, military prowess and political offices and alliances in extending his capabilities on the political level. Chapter 2.3 argues that, in the absence of evidence, the functioning of *atimia* as a legal and social institution restricted his capabilities not only in political contexts, but also in different realms of life at varying degrees. Chapter 3 focuses on Midas the perfumer and his family. I will firstly emphasize the importance of power relations derived from *technē*, craft, and knowledge in shaping the family's overall capabilities (Chapter 3.2). Chapter 3.3 then focuses on the relationship between Midas' son and Epikrates, and argues that potent power of beauty, attractiveness, and sociability in the context of emotional and sexual relationships can pave the way to exceptional life chances for individuals. Pasion of Acharnai is the subject of Chapter 4, in which I will firstly (Chapter 4.2) discuss his mobility in social and economic contexts, and the ways in which these upward movements promoted his mobility in cultural and honorific contexts. Instead of evaluating his various contributions to the city for the mere purpose of

naturalization, I will opt for a broad perspective and I will argue that mobility in these distinct contexts was so intricately connected that Pasion could deploy these assets to facilitate further social cohesion and to gain counter-gifts beyond citizenship. In Chapter 4.3, Pasion's case will help us to gauge the relative importance of naturalization for social mobility. By taking his naturalization as another turning point of his life, I shall examine the contexts in which his naturalization did or did not affect his capabilities and functionings, as well as those of his relatives. From these chapters, it will become clear that individual cases, as exceptional as they may have been, can indicate larger institutions and mechanisms that can limit or facilitate social mobility. In addition, they give us substantial clues about the individual agency necessary to overcome those limits and they help us to understand how individuals experienced mobility processes. In line with this insight, and in order to move from a micro-scaled discussion to a macro analysis, in my concluding chapter, I shall develop my discussion presented in Chapter 1 and briefly outline a perspective that can incorporate a multiplicity of sources which do not yield enough material for making case studies.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICS, ATIMIA AND SOCIAL MOBILITY:

AESCHINES, *AGAINST TIMARCHOS*

2.1 Introduction

In 346,¹³⁹ the Athenians selected ten envoys to negotiate peace with Philip II of Macedon.¹⁴⁰ Although it was a distressing fact for the city that Macedon's political rise was an imminent threat, Athenian power was insufficient on its own to halt Philip nor was there any consensus in Greece for making a united stand against Macedon. When Philip demonstrated his willingness to make peace in 346, the Athenians welcomed this development. Philip's ambitious intentions, however, made it even more difficult for the Athenians to reach to a consensus over the city's foreign policies; upon their return, some of the Athenian envoys, such as Aeschines and Philokrates, were more optimistic that Macedonian policies would match Athenian interests, while others, especially Demosthenes, remained skeptical. The embassy's return also transformed their internal suspicions and enmities into political attacks at a public level. Firstly, Demosthenes and one of his associates, Timarchos of Sphettos, accused Aeschines at his *euthyna*, the public accounting of officials at the end of their terms for their conducts, of having accepted bribes from Philip and having betrayed Athenian interests.¹⁴¹ In addition to certain gifts, Aeschines

¹³⁹ Henceforth, all dates are BC.

¹⁴⁰ For the political background of the speech, see Harris, *Aeschines*, 41-106; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 2-24; Lape, "Psychology of Prostitution".

¹⁴¹ Harris, *Aeschines*, 95-6.

allegedly gained a plot of land at Pydna, which brought him an annual income of 3000 drachmas.¹⁴²

The accusations were serious and needed to come to court for further investigation, but Aeschines' ingenious counter attack prevented Demosthenes for three years from bringing the case to court. Aeschines' defense was an unexpected attack. Instead of targeting his prime enemy, Demosthenes, he chose Timarchos, who was not as politically and economically prominent as his associate was, and seems to have had a notoriously well-known youth that could be exploited in a judiciary context. The orator utilized the legal action of *dokimasia*, scrutiny, of public speakers, a legal process which checked the credentials of orators addressing public audience. According to the law, those who beat their parents or did not provide for them, those who had not performed the required military duties or had thrown away their shields in battle, those who had prostituted themselves, and those who had squandered their paternal estates or any form of inherited wealth did not have the right to address the assembly; thus they could not have a political career.¹⁴³ If they transgressed the law and committed themselves to active politics, then they could be prosecuted by *dokimasia*, could lose some of their citizenship rights and would be entitled as *atimoi*, disfranchised.¹⁴⁴ Aeschines delivered his speech either at the end of 346 or early 345.¹⁴⁵ Except for military cowardice, the orator accuses Timarchos of the other three categories in the law, but the main emphasis in his rhetoric remains on Timarchos' allegedly well-known sexual scandals. Although almost no proof of the accusations is provided and Aeschines' insistence on the validity of *phēmē*, true

¹⁴² Dem. 19.145, 166-8.

¹⁴³ Aesch. 1.28-32.

¹⁴⁴ For *atimia*, see below; for the problems of translating *atimia* as disfranchisement, see Hansen, *Apagoge*, 55-61.

¹⁴⁵ Fisher, *Aeschines*, 6-8; Harris, *Aeschines*, 102; Carey, *Aeschines*, 19.

report or rumor, about individuals' character and conduct makes his modern readers rightly skeptical about the factual reliability on Timarchos' life story, it was Aeschines who won the trial at the end.¹⁴⁶

The unusual contents of the case have influenced its reception in the scholarship. Scholars, especially after Dover's groundbreaking *Greek Homosexuality*, have tended to focus on the speech for its relevance for our understanding of the general social and cultural norms of homosexuality, the practice of pederasty, prostitution and the moral concerns of contemporary Athenians;¹⁴⁷ these inquiries have also been accompanied by political or legalistic readings.¹⁴⁸ If, however, we are to move beyond the literature and to concentrate on social mobility, behind Aeschines' allegations lies Timarchos' life story. The orator tells us how beautiful Timarchos was, and how his sexual attraction shaped his life chances. He then mentions Timarchos' family members and gives us clues about their life stories. Aeschines constructs a story, although in a highly distorted way, in which we learn about Timarchos' alleged lovers and political allies, his financial resources and the ways in which he utilized them, his political conducts and rise in power, his (ill-) reputation and how people had already made or should make use of it. Even more can be learnt from the speech if we ask why certain elements, like his military performance, went missing in the narrative, or if we contextualize his life story and try to comprehend the possible motivations and rationales behind his actions. *Against Timarchos* is full of insights about how an Athenian citizen could be politically mobile, and what kind of potential rewards and hazards await a politician; the speech

¹⁴⁶ Harris, *Aeschines*, 105-6; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 53-67.

¹⁴⁷ Dover, *Greek Homosexuality*, esp. 19-109; Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* II, 204-225; Davidson, *Courtesans and Fishcakes*, esp. 250-277; Sissa, "Sexual Bodybuilding"; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 25-52; Lape, "Psychology of Prostitution".

¹⁴⁸ Wallace, "Unconvicted or Potential"; MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure"; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 53-68; Lape, "Psychology of Prostitution".

also marked a turning point in his life as the verdict irrecoverably terminated Timarchos' career because he lost some of his significant civic rights such as addressing the people, a vital capability of a politician, prosecuting others and defending himself and his family members in the court, and entering agora and sanctuaries, among others.

In the following pages, I will take Timarchos' trial as a turning point of his life, and investigate his political mobility prior to the trial. Although Aeschines explained Timarchos' political rise as the result of money and bribery, I shall argue that Timarchos made use of a multiple factors such as social ties, military prowess, political offices and alliances in extending his capabilities at the political level. In the second half of the chapter, his life after the trial will be my focus. I shall demonstrate the ways in which his new legal status affected Timarchos' life. In the absence of evidence, as I will argue, the functioning of *atimia* as a legal and social institution inflicted a dramatic downward mobility on Timarchos not only in politics but also in different contexts at varying degrees.

2.2 Political rise

2.2.1 Early life, education and life chances

Timarchos of Sphettos must have been born at least by 391/0, if not earlier.¹⁴⁹ His father was Arizelos, about whom our knowledge is very limited. Aeschines tells us that Arizelos had two brothers, Eupolemos the gymnastic trainer, *paidotribēs*, and Arignotos, who was still alive at the time of the trial, but an elderly blind man.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁹ Timarchos was a member of the *boulē*, council, in 361/0; since the minimum age required for this duty was 30, he must have been born before 391/0; Develin, *AO*, 270; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 10-11.

¹⁵⁰ Aesch. 1.102.

Among the brothers, Eupolemos died first, and then Arizelos, while Timarchos was still a boy, presumably before 371/0.¹⁵¹ Eupolemos' death and Arignotos' disability put Arizelos in control of a decent wealth, almost at the levels of the liturgical class.¹⁵² This economic base accompanied by leisure from menial labor, access to a better education and to more expensive tastes in life should have contributed to Timarchos' mobility as part of his early life chances.

Money determines the quality and the duration of education, as Platonic Protagoras tells us: "people send their sons to a trainer, that having improved their bodies they may perform the orders of their minds, which are now in fit condition, and that they may not be forced by bodily faults to play the coward in wars and other duties. This is what people do, who are most able; and the most able are the wealthiest. Their sons begin school at the earliest age, and are freed from it at the latest".¹⁵³ Timarchos' uncle, Eupolemos was a gymnastic trainer, and, as well as a part of overall training at a school, he could personally have provided the necessary training for his young nephew, while he was still alive. In addition to gymnastics, we can expect Timarchos to have had an education in music, *mousikē*, and letters, *grammata*. These three elements of education – gymnastics, music and letters – constituted the fundamental tenets of the traditional education in Athens and furnished students with unequal life chances in comparison to those who lacked the means to afford such a training.¹⁵⁴ When Timarchos embarked on his political career, it was his education and training accompanied with other resources and experiences on which he could build his career.

¹⁵¹ Aesch. 1.102; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 238.

¹⁵² For discussion of the family's wealth, see below.

¹⁵³ Plat. *Prot.* 326b-c (trans. Lamb).

¹⁵⁴ For a survey on educational opportunities and traditions in Athens, see Pritchard, "Athens".

Another dimension of early life chances is related to the socialization in the form of friendship with contemporaries or of homosexual relationships developed in gymnastic contexts; it is the latter aspect on which the orator builds his story. To Aeschines, there was nothing wrong with a free man being a boy's lover, as long as some self-constraint remained between the lovers, and they did not exchange money for sexual favors: "According to my definition, desire for those who are noble and decent is characteristic of the generous and discerning spirit, but debauchery based on hiring someone for money I consider characteristic of a wanton and uncultivated man. And to be loved without corruption I count as noble, while to have been induced by money to prostitute oneself is shameful".¹⁵⁵ Aeschines' description of ideal love without material gain should not be taken at face value; Aristophanes' *Wealth* mentions boys receiving animals as gifts instead of cash,¹⁵⁶ and the indirect support of lovers in different contexts is an expected outcome of the relationship.¹⁵⁷ Then, we need to ask if we should we expect young Timarchos to be a catch for individuals like Aeschines and to benefit from such relationships. Both Aeschines and Demosthenes admit that Timarchos had an exceptional beauty; as he was the nephew of a trainer and from a quite well-to-do family, one would also expect him to have a sexually attractive body.¹⁵⁸ The orator, moreover, compares Timarchos with some boys of the most renowned beauty, such as Kriton, the son of Astyochos, and Perikleides of Perithoidai, who attracted the largest numbers of lovers but still were decent in their relationships.¹⁵⁹ While it seems likely from the narrative that

¹⁵⁵ Aesch. 1.137 (trans. Carey); Aesch. 1.9-16 considers the laws that regulated the relationship between pupils and teachers, trainers and any older male who could potentially have an undesired, i.e. sexual, contact with the boys. The ultimate purpose of these laws, for him, was to evade the moral corruption of younger generations.

¹⁵⁶ Aristoph. *Wealth*, 153-9.

¹⁵⁷ Fisher, "Gymnasia," esp. 98-100.

¹⁵⁸ Aesch. 1. 42, 75, 126; Dem. 19.233.

¹⁵⁹ Aesch. 1.155-7.

Timarchos could have had such affairs, the orator does not want his audience to imagine Timarchos in such a socially acceptable relationship; instead, Aeschines contextualizes Timarchos' alleged love affairs in domestic spaces, which are publicly invisible and suspicious, and he imagines him licentiously gambling, feasting and having sexual intercourse for profit without any moral concern.¹⁶⁰

2.2.2: Timarchos' networks and political rise

Did Timarchos' alleged lovers and friends prove to be useful for his political mobility? Answering this question is difficult because Aeschines' narrative aimed at depicting Timarchos as the ultimate degenerate male prostitute who followed pleasure and material gains without any moral concern and career pursuits; consequently, his relationships were narrated through a highly distorted lens which projected Aeschines' allegations onto Timarchos' overall social networks. Some of Aeschines' arguments about Timarchos' alleged lovers crumble, however, if we look more closely at the nature of these relationships. There were ways and means, as we will see, for Timarchos to benefit from his associates in his political mobility, especially since some of his contacts were politically prominent figures of the city.

As Aeschines narrates, after some time at the house of a doctor named Euthydikos,¹⁶¹ Timarchos caught the attention of Misgolas, the son of Naukrates, of Kollytos, who allegedly paid a sum of money and set Timarchos up in his own house.¹⁶² Misgolas seems to have been so well-known figure for his predilections for handsome young men that Athenaeus quotes passages from comic poets Alexis,

¹⁶⁰ Aesch. 1.39-70.

¹⁶¹ Aesch. 1.40.

¹⁶² Aesch. 1.41-2.

Antiphanes and Timokles which ridicule his notorious passion.¹⁶³ Apart from these references, we are not well informed about him. An inscription from the mid-fourth century recorded his name in a list of ten names with a secretary and an undersecretary, presumably a college for a votive dedication.¹⁶⁴ Another reference to Misgolas can be found in the *phialai* inscriptions in an entry that documents Misgolas and his brother Naukles manumitting two slaves.¹⁶⁵ His tastes point to a man of leisure, but the lack of evidence does not give us any indication of his possible wealth, hence his absence from Davies' *Athenian Propertied Families*. Aeschines is highly cautious in describing Misgolas; the orator refers to him as a man *kalos k'agathos*, good and noble, whose only defect was his obsession with young men.¹⁶⁶ We also learn from the speech that Misgolas was a friend of Phaidros, the son of Kallias, of Sphettos, a member of a wealthy family that had exerted an increasing influence on the city's politics during the fourth and third centuries.¹⁶⁷ Misgolas and Phaidros together participated in a procession for the City Dionysia in a role that remains unknown to us; when Timarchos did not appear as he promised, they had to leave their place and to look for him.¹⁶⁸ One of the purposes of this narrative for Aeschines' strategy is to show that Phaidros was genuinely aware of the couple's relationship and he had to testify to this fact. Before concluding the section, however, Aeschines makes a critical statement and argues that Misgolas was his own age, forty-five years old; his youthful appearance should not confuse the audience.¹⁶⁹ Since, as I discussed above, Timarchos was born before 391/0, he should have been

¹⁶³ Ath. 8.339a-c.

¹⁶⁴ IG ii² 2825; Develin, *AO*, 352; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 170.

¹⁶⁵ IG ii² 1554 = SEG 18.36b ll. 335-342; Meyer, *Metics*, 101; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 170.

¹⁶⁶ Aesch. 1.41.

¹⁶⁷ Aesch. 1.43; Davies, *APF*, 524-8.

¹⁶⁸ Aesch. 1.43.

¹⁶⁹ Aesch. 1.49.

at least forty-five or six at the time of the trial, and thus a contemporary of both Aeschines and Misgolas.¹⁷⁰ Phaidros, who was also Timarchos' fellow demesman, should have been born at least by 390, as his son, Thymochares was politically active in 329/8.¹⁷¹ As they were of the same age group and pursued political ambitions at public level, it seems less likely that Timarchos and Misgolas had a relationship as Aeschines tries to imply; instead, the orator seems to build his narrative on Misgolas' notorious desires and the gossip about Timarchos' youth, which were together exploited to convince the audience with the insistence that they were of distinct age groups.

Another prominent name among Timarchos' alleged lovers is Hegesandros, the son of Hegesias, of Sounion.¹⁷² Hegesandros and his brother, Hegias, once served as *tamiai*, treasurers, of Athena, positions traditionally elected from the *pentekosiomedimnoi*, the highest of the Solonian property classes.¹⁷³ Hegesandros was also the treasurer of Timomachos of Acharnai, who was general in 361/0,¹⁷⁴ and Aeschines accuses Hegesandros of expropriating 80 minae during his service.¹⁷⁵ He was indeed well-off: Aeschines characterizes him a regular visitor of a gambling house,¹⁷⁶ and his brother, Hegesippos, performed a liturgical service in 341/0, an action that signals the family's wealth above the liturgical threshold.¹⁷⁷ Aeschines'

¹⁷⁰ Similarly, see Harris, "When was Aeschines Born?"; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 11-2.

¹⁷¹ Davies, *APF*, 525.

¹⁷² Aesch. 1.54-71, 110-112; Davies, *APF*, 209-10; Develin, *AO*, 269.

¹⁷³ Hegesias served in 349/8, Develin, *AO*, 314; Hegesandros served in 361/0, Develin, *AO*, 269; although the law seems to have still been in effect, in the fourth century, some treasurers were elected from the other property classes, a fact that challenges the validity of the Solonian regulations for the functioning of the fourth-century Athenian democracy; Taylor, "A New Political World," 79.

¹⁷⁴ Develin, *AO*, 267-8; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 193-5; Davies, *APF*, 280.

¹⁷⁵ Aesch. 1.56; Dating Hegesandros' duties is quite problematic. Aeschines refers to him as treasurer both of Athena and so based in Athens, and of Timomachos and so based in Thrace, in the same year, 361/0. Unless an overlap of both duties is responsible for such an exceptional case, holding both positions simultaneously seems unlikely; therefore, Davies dates his post with Timomachos before 361/0; Davies, *APF*, 209; cf. Fisher, *Aeschines*, 194-5.

¹⁷⁶ Aesch. 1.57.

¹⁷⁷ *IG ii*² 1629 l. 543; Davies, *APF*, 209.

reference to Hegesippos with his nickname, *krōbulos*, top-knot, should have reminded his audience of a particular way of life, a luxurious one with oligarchic sympathies.¹⁷⁸ When Hegesandros returned from his service to Timomachos in 361/0, as Aeschines narrates, he first met Timarchos in a gambling house run by a public slave named Pittalachos, who was Timarchos' alleged lover at the time. Hegesandros then lusted after Timarchos, persuaded him and set him up in his house.¹⁷⁹ In the following sections, the plot unfolds and Aeschines relates the scandals of this relationship.

Once we ask about the potential ages of Hegesandros and Timarchos, however, the plausibility of Aeschines' account can be contested. Although we do not know Hegesandros' exact age, Aeschines dates his encounter with Timarchos to 361/0, when Timarchos was a member of the *boulē*, and therefore at least thirty years old. Aeschines seems to have built this narrative in line with his overall strategy of portraying Timarchos as a much younger figure and hoping that the jurors would not remember his age and the events of fifteen years earlier. Instead of their alleged liaison, Aeschines afterward refers to their close collaboration in a public embezzlement. When they were both in public service in 361/0, Hegesandros and Timarchos reportedly benefitted from Hegesandros' position as a treasurer of Athena, and stole 1000 drachmas from the treasury.¹⁸⁰ A certain Pamphilos of Acherdos accused them in a Council meeting of embezzlement; although they were found guilty in the preliminary vote, the formal ballots exonerated them.¹⁸¹ In narrating their joint scandals and diverting the audience from pondering over their ages in 361/0, Aeschines' strategy seems to transform a friendship or a form of

¹⁷⁸ Fisher, *Aeschines*, 203-4.

¹⁷⁹ Aesch. 1.54-7.

¹⁸⁰ Aesch. 1.110-2.

¹⁸¹ Aesch. 1.110-2; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 248-50.

cooperation into a homosexual love affair, and, as the verdict demonstrates, he was successful enough to convince his audience.

In addition to these putative love affairs, Aeschines also alludes to Timarchos' allies at the trial. Using a common strategy in court speeches, the orator predicts his opponents' arguments and attempts to discredit their validity in advance. In the case of Timarchos, Aeschines argues that Demosthenes and an unnamed general will appear in the court and will speak on his behalf.¹⁸² The relationship between Demosthenes and Timarchos is not attested until this trial, but, by 347/6 at least, we can expect them to have a common cause to develop a form of collaboration. As Demosthenes recounted in his later prosecution of Aeschines, when he was on the Council for the second time in 347/6, Timarchos proposed a decree that inflicted capital punishment on those who were caught transporting arms or naval equipment to Philip.¹⁸³ In the course of his duty on the *boulē*, Timarchos apparently cooperated with Demosthenes because of their shared anti-Macedonian sympathies which became public at Aeschines' *euthyna* when they accused Aeschines of having accepted bribes on his embassy to Philip and betrayed Athenian interests.¹⁸⁴

Timarchos, moreover, could have introduced Hegesippos, who had already developed an intense hostility against Philip and proposed that the Athenians should ally with Phocis, to Demosthenes.¹⁸⁵ If we follow the *opinio communis* and attribute the authorship of the speech *On Halonnesos* to Hegesippos, the scornful language of the orator against the letter from Philip and his overall portrayal of Philip as a

¹⁸² Aesch. 1.117-131; Aeschines does not give any clue about the identity of the general; see Fisher, *Aeschines*, 274.

¹⁸³ Dem. 19.286; Develin, *AO*, 347; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 21.

¹⁸⁴ See pp. 34-5 above.

¹⁸⁵ Aesch. 3.118; Harris, *Aeschines*, 96.

complete hypocrite mark the extent of his opposition.¹⁸⁶ Apart from Hegesippos' and Demosthenes' expected speeches in support of Timarchos during the trial,¹⁸⁷ Demosthenes in a later speech proudly reminds his audience of the honesty of Hegesippos during an embassy to Philip and the latter's irritation.¹⁸⁸ Hegesippos afterward accompanied Demosthenes in his embassies to the Peloponnese to promote anti-Macedonian sentiments.¹⁸⁹ Since there is no sign of their earlier cooperation and all the events postdate the trial, it seems quite possible that Timarchos could have introduced his two important political collaborators who subsequently became close associates during his absence in politics.

The appearance of Timarchos' friends in court on his behalf is the most obvious example of how Timarchos could benefit from his friends and political allies, but it is not the only one. In a judiciary context, friends can refrain from testifying for the opponent, as Timarchos' associates seem to have done, or they can prosecute a common enemy or his supporters.¹⁹⁰ Young politicians could attach themselves to more experienced colleagues or act in concert with some associates in the expectation of future benefits.¹⁹¹ Phokion and Euboulos, for instance, promoted Aeschines' political rise; Aeschines kept supporting Euboulos' policies, and, when it became necessary, Euboulos appeared in the court on his behalf.¹⁹² For Timarchos' earlier career, we do not have any evidence of his connections with senior figures, but his earlier close cooperation with Hegesandros and Hegesippos in particular, and his association with Misgolas and Phaidros could have provided him certain

¹⁸⁶ For authorship, see Trevett, *Demosthenes*, 113-6; [Dem]. 7.

¹⁸⁷ Aesch. 1.71.

¹⁸⁸ As a member of an embassy, Hegesippos went to Philip's court in order to revise the terms of the Peace of Philokrates, but the mission failed; Dem. 19.331.

¹⁸⁹ Dem. 9.72; [Dem]. 7.2.

¹⁹⁰ Sinclair, *Democracy*, 143-4 with references.

¹⁹¹ Rhodes, "Political Activity," 142; Harris, *Aeschines*, 35-6.

¹⁹² Both Phokion and Euboulos spoke at the court; Aesch. 2.170, 184; for Aeschines' political career and friends, see Harris, *Aeschines*, 33-40.

opportunities and could have enhanced his capabilities at the beginning of his career. In becoming ambassadors, friends would be fundamental as these posts required election. Nausikles, Aeschines' friend from the *ephebeia*, proposed him for election to an embassy in 346;¹⁹³ we can expect similar networks of support for Timarchos' embassies.¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless, lack of evidence prevents us from identifying the individuals who proposed Timarchos for his embassies.

In proposing, passing or blocking decrees at the assembly, friends could undertake different roles; Demosthenes recounts an assembly meeting in which Aeschines and Philokrates prevented him from speaking:

I stood up, denied that I knew anything about these matters, and made an effort to repeat the information that I had presented to the Council. At that point Aeschines and Philokrates stood up to face me, one on this side, one on the other: they screamed, they booed, finally they jeered at me. You citizens laughed and would neither listen nor believe anything except what Aeschines reported.¹⁹⁵

We know of at least two decrees that Timarchos proposed. Although one of them concerned the houses on the Pnyx,¹⁹⁶ the other decree, that inflicted capital punishment on those who were caught carrying arms and equipment to Philip, was highly political in its nature and it should have required a significant political backup from politicians and friends with similar anti-Macedonian sentiments.¹⁹⁷ Apart from actions at public level, Timarchos and his associates could have deliberated on possible decrees, shared knowledge on various subjects and cooperated in non-political aspects of life, but this kind of a coordination should not be confused with

¹⁹³ Aesch. 2.18; Harris, *Aeschines*, 38.

¹⁹⁴ Aesch. 1.120; Develin, *AO*, 351; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 259.

¹⁹⁵ Dem. 19.23 (trans. Yunis); for similar roles that friends undertook, see Sinclair, *Democracy*, 142-3.

¹⁹⁶ Aesch. 1.81-2. The Pnyx was the hill on which the assembly met.

¹⁹⁷ Dem. 19.286; Develin, *AO*, 347.

modern political parties and their more institutionalized support mechanisms: political alliances were contextual and dynamically changing, and the politicians, when they addressed the assembly or the court, stood alone and did not represent a political group.¹⁹⁸ In this sense, Timarchos' networks should not be overemphasized. Timarchos seems to have actively built social networks, invested time and arduous labor in politics and, as a result of these toils, he became one of the prominent political figures of his period.

2.2.3 Wealth and the power of wealth

In considering Timarchos' political mobility, his economic capital requires special attention. Studies of fourth-century politics have demonstrated that the significance of wealth for obtaining direct political influence was supplanted with an alternative one that privileged oratorical skills and administrative expertise, a development which encouraged less well-to-do and poor to engage in politics.¹⁹⁹ Prosopographical evidence for Athenian politicians presents a very similar picture: non-wealthy citizens seem to have had a more prominent role in the city's politics.²⁰⁰ A division, both in roles and in terminology, between generals and rhetores also crystallized in this period;²⁰¹ wealthier figures continued to hold generalships, and some leading families could even maintain their predominance in military positions.²⁰² Aeschines was a man of this new world. He was neither of an elite

¹⁹⁸ For the discussion on political parties' non-existence in the ancient Greece, see Hansen, "Political Parties"; Harris, *Aeschines*, 39-40; Sinclair, *Democracy*, 139.

¹⁹⁹ Davies, *Wealth*, esp. 115-131; Connor, *New Politicians*, esp. 117-8; Rhodes, "Political Activity"; for various aspects of the fourth century politics and politicians, see Ober, *Mass and Elite*.

²⁰⁰ Taylor, "A New Political World".

²⁰¹ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 119-21.

²⁰² See the discussion in Davies, *Wealth*, 122-5.

and/or from a wealthy family, but he worked, firstly, as an undersecretary with an income of 2 or 3 drachmas a day,²⁰³ then as an actor with less important roles, elements which explain his late entry into politics.²⁰⁴ Still, wealth could extend one's capabilities; ambitious politicians could spend large sums of money on the liturgies and claim a higher social status and credibility in both political and judiciary contexts.²⁰⁵ In contrast, the wealthy could also hold back from making financial contributions by disguising their wealth; in this way, they could deliberately avoid supporting the city's policies.²⁰⁶ Politicians were not paid. Active participation in politics required financial means to maintain one's expenses and this made the exchange of gifts and money a possibility to be exploited for political ambitions.²⁰⁷

Timarchos' family, however, contrasts Aeschines' background. In *Against Timarchos*, Aeschines reports the following holdings of the family: a plot of land in Kephisia, another in Amphitrope, two workshops in silver mining areas, one in Auron and another in Thrasymos, all of which were sold when Arizelos was alive in order to evade liturgies by making his visible property invisible in the form of money.²⁰⁸ Other than these properties, which could have been partially passed to Timarchos in cash, Timarchos inherited a house behind the Acropolis, a piece of marginal land at Sphetos, a farm at Alopeke, and a workshop of shoemakers with nine or ten slaves who paid the owner two or three obols a day; there were also two slaves, a woman skilled in linen and a male embroider, as well as some debtors owing him money and furniture.²⁰⁹ In the absence of further details, it is not possible

²⁰³ Dem. 19.199-200 with Loomis, *Wages*, 22-3.

²⁰⁴ For Aeschines' life prior to his entry into politics, see Harris, *Aeschines*, 17-33.

²⁰⁵ See, for example, Demosthenes' comparison of his liturgical contributions with those of Meidias; Dem. 21.151-174; cf. Lys. 21; Rhodes, "Political Activity," 137-8, 141-2.

²⁰⁶ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 215-7.

²⁰⁷ Sinclair, *Democracy*, 179-86; Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 236-8.

²⁰⁸ Aesch. 1.101; Isae. 8.35; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 238-9; for liturgy avoidance, see Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, esp. 190-204; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 191-8.

²⁰⁹ Aesch. 1.97; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 231-235.

to estimate actual worth of the family; while Arizelos seems to have had enough capital to be at the edge of qualification for liturgical class, he deliberately sold some part of his investments and kept a mixed holding in a such a way as to remain below the liturgical threshold and to avoid fulfilling his responsibilities to the city.²¹⁰

If Aeschines' account is valid on the family's wealth,²¹¹ we must then ask if Timarchos could have profited from his economic power in his political rise. As I discussed above, money determines the quality and the duration of education, and, thanks to freedom from menial labor, the opportunity to spend time in gymnasia and symposia would return invaluable social contacts. Having the chance to work on rhetoric with distinguished sophists might plausibly promote one's political success. Aeschines, for instance, lacked the necessary means and skills, hence, presumably, his delayed entry into politics, but Timarchos seems to have been one of the early starters, as the orator accuses him: "for at the young age (*tautēn tēn hēlikian echōn*) that you see, there is no office he has not held".²¹² Aeschines' explanation for such a political success is, however, denunciatory, and he accuses Timarchos of buying his way into the offices.²¹³ There are at least two problems with this claim. Firstly, as I demonstrated, Timarchos was at least forty-five or forty-six years old, a middle-aged politician who had served twice on the council, and was thus not a junior politician.²¹⁴ Secondly, while Aeschines was asserting that Timarchos had already squandered all of his property and was without any means, he also justified

²¹⁰ Mixed holdings based on real and industrial property and liquid investments were common during the fourth century; see Davies, *Wealth*, 38-72; Osborne, "Pride and Prejudice"; Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 163-71.

²¹¹ Unlike most of his arguments, Aeschines provides various witnesses for the family wealth, and this makes his arguments more plausible for our purposes; Aesch. 1.100.

²¹² Aesch. 1.106 (trans. Carey).

²¹³ "He acquired none of them by selection by lot or election but bought every one illegally"; Aesch. 1.106 (trans. Carey).

²¹⁴ Demosthenes later reminds his audience, "how long has it been since Timarchos began speaking before the Assembly? A long time"; Dem. 19.286 (trans. Yunis).

Timarchos' reach to all the public positions merely by bribing, an argument that seems to be a rhetorical exaggeration.

First of all, Aeschines claims that Timarchos squandered all of his property before the trial: "but he has nothing left, no house, no apartment, no farm, no slaves, no money out on loan, none of the other sources of income for men who are not felons".²¹⁵ Such an extreme dissipation of property could have prevented Timarchos from participating in politics, but until the present trial he was still very active: he served twice in the council, participated as an envoy and held offices in foreign lands, in addition to posts that Aeschines possibly omitted. While the orator uses witness testimonies for his claim that Timarchos sold the paternal properties and collected the debts that owed to his father,²¹⁶ none of them provides evidence about how he managed the economic capital derived from these transactions, and the audience was asked to blame Timarchos' immoral life style with extravagant expenses for the loss of his fortune.²¹⁷ A plausible solution to our conundrum would be that Timarchos adopted an alternative strategy and heavily invested his money in loans with or without interest while keeping some cash at hand for the demands of public or personal life. Athenian banks provided the necessary mechanism, and Timarchos was not the only one to hide his wealth as there were many "artful tax dodgers".²¹⁸ Banking transactions were not made public and this confidential feature of the banks made it even more appealing to tax evaders;²¹⁹ in order to meet the cash

²¹⁵ Aesch. 1.105 (trans. Carey).

²¹⁶ Aesch. 1.100.

²¹⁷ Aesch. 1.105.

²¹⁸ Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, esp. 190-204; Apollodoros, for instance, accuses Stephanos because "Stephanos deliberately chose to engage in disgraceful activities, turning his back on the city and concealing his wealth in order to make invisible profits through the bank and to avoid serving as chorus producer or trierarch or carrying out any other civic duty. He's a great success"; Dem. 45.66 (trans. Scafuro); see Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 191-207.

²¹⁹ Under the exceptional circumstances of [Dem]. 49, the death of the client resulted in a trial, and Apollodoros, the son of Pasion the banker, had to produce the record book, *grammata*, of the bank,

demands of a political career, therefore, Timarchos could very well have adopted a similar strategy and retained his financial resources for different ends.

The second problem is related to buying out all the offices that he held. Bribery is one of the most common *topoi* of the Athenian oratory; the poverty of the orator, his sudden economic mobility and election as a member of an embassy or as an auditor in the council could be exploited by his opponent.²²⁰ With money, one could even provide witness testimonies.²²¹ Since both parties, the briber and the bribed, were liable to punishment, to prove that someone engaged in bribery was an insurmountable task;²²² therefore, the corpus of Athenian oratory is full of references to any form of bribery and embezzlement.²²³ As for Aeschines' allegations about Timarchos' involvement in bribery, the orator details one specific case. For an official post in Andros, which was to be elected by lot, Timarchos paid 30 minae with the money that he borrowed with an interest rate of eighteen percent per year.²²⁴ As the orator did not provide any further details or witnesses, the ways in which the money was used pose a further problem: whether he allegedly paid the officials responsible for the allotment process or bought off the potential candidates remains unknown.²²⁵ The implication of Aeschines' argument in this particular case of bribery is clear: the financial returns from this post should have provided Timarchos with enough capital to repay his debt with interest and to accumulate a personal profit. As Millett warns, however, the prestige of the office should not be neglected;

[Dem]. 49.43; for the ways in which bankers helped tax evaders, see Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 201-7.

²²⁰ For different aspects of wealth and its use in politics, Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 192-247.

²²¹ "I know you would all agree that men who give false testimony would be willing to do that sort of thing either for payment because of poverty or because of friendship or because of hostility to the opposing litigants"; Dem. 29.22 (trans. MacDowell).

²²² Aesch. 1.86-8.

²²³ Sinclair, *Democracy*, 179-86; Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 233-8; for a collection of references, see Taylor, "Bribery I," 58-61.

²²⁴ Aesch. 1.107.

²²⁵ Fisher, *Aeschines*, 245.

by having such a post Timarchos could benefit from potential networks and he could use the post as an important step in his political mobility.²²⁶ Apart from this office, Timarchos served twice in the council, once as an auditor, *logistēs*, to examine the accounts of magistrates who were responsible for handling the public money, a position that was also chosen by lot, and once as an inspector, *exetastēs*, to the mercenaries at Eretria, a post elected by vote.²²⁷ For none of these duties, however, did Aeschines support his claims with witnesses or explained how Timarchos could have bought the offices; instead, the orator dwells only on how Timarchos allegedly profited from his duties.

In addition to his lucrative post in Andros, Aeschines claims that Timarchos received bribes when he was an auditor, *logistēs*.²²⁸ The auditors undertaking *euthynai* were in an advantageous position to extort money; despite the collegiality of the post, they could blackmail the officials and their unequal power could make even innocent individuals compromise with blackmailers in order to minimize the risk of a potential trial.²²⁹ By helping to sweep an official's misconduct under the carpet, an auditor could also develop reciprocal relationship to be used in future. In addition, when Timarchos and Hegesandros were counselors in 361/0, as discussed above, they allegedly stole 1000 drachmas from the treasury; a certain Pamphilos accused them during an assembly meeting, but they were acquitted before the case turned into a formal trial.²³⁰ For his elected post as an inspector, *exetastēs*, to the mercenaries at Eretria, Timarchos and his fellows inspectors, either by manipulating the numbers of the soldiers or in another ingenious way, illegally misappropriated

²²⁶ Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 278 n. 52.

²²⁷ Aesch. 1.106-116.

²²⁸ Aesch. 1.107.

²²⁹ Christ, *The Litigious Athenian*, 135 with notes.

²³⁰ See p. 43 above.

money.²³¹ While Aeschines claims that Timarchos admitted his guilt, the orator cannot provide any witnesses for either Timarchos or any other inspector.

The final, yet rather ambiguous, bribing episode belongs to the very recent period. In 346/5, the decree of Demophilos ordered revision of all the deme registers to expel those who were illegally registered as citizens.²³² Under these extraordinary circumstances, internal enmities led to the expulsion of citizens, but other men reportedly made it their business to naturalize foreigners illegally or to help exclude citizens in exchange for money from their enemies.²³³ In the case of Timarchos, he was held responsible for receiving bribes totaling 2000 drachmas and causing a certain Philotades of Kydathenaion to lose his citizenship.²³⁴ Timarchos was a member of Sphettos, and therefore he could not have an official role in this legal process at the deme of Kydathenaion;²³⁵ instead, as Fisher argues, he must have had an external position either as a witness for one of parties and was paid for his credibility for putting forward arguments, or as one of the conspirators who were paid to drop the case.²³⁶ Aeschines, this time, supplies two witnesses and presents the agreement between the two parties on the case, which gives somewhat more authority to this charge.

Since whether or not Timarchos really bribed officials, benefitted materially from his posts or acted as a paid witness during the deme ballots cannot be conclusively determined due to the lack of further evidence, the predominance of similar arguments in the corpus of Athenian court speeches highlights the plausibility of at least some claims on the charges of embezzlement and bribery. Athenian

²³¹ Aesch. 1.113.

²³² Aesch. 1.77, 86; Plut. *Per.*, 37.4; Dem. 57.

²³³ Dem. 57.2-6, 57-61.

²³⁴ Aesch. 1.114-5.

²³⁵ [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1; Dem. 57.

²³⁶ Fisher, *Aeschines*, 253-4.

attitudes to bribery, unlike modern values, were more tolerant despite the laws; as Hyperides explains in connection with Demosthenes' trial for bribery in 323: "As I said in the assembly, gentlemen of the jury, you readily allow the generals and politicians to make large profits, not because the laws grant them this right but because your indulgence and generosity allow it".²³⁷ Then the orator specifies the limits of tolerance, the cases of bribery could somehow be endured as long as "what they take is for your benefit and not to your detriment".²³⁸ As an active politician, Timarchos could, indeed, have exploited some of these opportunities in the partially tolerated "shadow economy" of the Athenian politics, which, in return, promoted his political mobility by extending his capabilities with an economic and social backup. The distorted lens of Aeschines' narrative prevents us from observing with precision the other contexts in which Timarchos made use of his economic power in his political rise and the ways in which his mobility brought him further material gains; nevertheless, economic capital seems to have evidently provided him better early life chances and the most needed financial independency for his later career, thus the leisure to take a more active part in the city's politics.

2.2.4 The conduct of a politician

Early life chances and social and economic capital could be held responsible for Timarchos' mobility, and he had unequal chances in these areas in comparison to an ordinary Athenian citizen. As influential as these factors might have been in his social mobility, taking these resources on their own as causal elements would bring with it the risk of reductionism. Without understanding a citizen's personal story,

²³⁷ Hyp. 5.25 (trans. Cooper); Christ, *The Limits of Altruism*, 80-2.

²³⁸ Hyp. 5.25 (trans. Cooper).

particularly his willingness, performance and experience in participating in politics and undertaking political and military roles, and therefore without giving due credit to the factors of individual agency and capacity and of luck, we cannot comprehend how Timarchos came to be one of the politically prominent figures of the time. As a citizen of means, Timarchos deliberately chose to be a politically active citizen, unlike his father Arizelos, and purposefully transformed his capabilities into achieved functionings in order to occupy a more influential role in politics. Therefore, the ways in which he performed these duties and responsibilities should complement our analysis of Timarchos' political mobility.

As a middle-aged politician, Timarchos had previously taken on various public roles. As a rhetor, he seems to have occupied the bema so often that, in an assembly meeting, Autolykos, a member of the council of the Areopagos,²³⁹ could claim that “on the matter of this deserted locality and the area of the Pnyx,²⁴⁰ do not be surprised, men of Athens, if Timarchos is more familiar with it than the council of the Areopagus”.²⁴¹ In order to address the assembly frequently and to have enough authority to hold citizens' attention, an orator had to be eloquent in his speech, knowledgeable in the different aspects of the city's maintenance, and intelligent and cultivated in critically analyzing policies and proposing alternatives.²⁴² The Xenophontic Sokrates recommends that the young but politically ambitious, Glaukon familiarize himself with the city's revenues and expenses, her enemies, defense and grain supply; he then adds: “You will find, I take it, that the men who are famous and admired always come from those who have the widest knowledge, and the infamous

²³⁹ The Areopagos, made up of ex-archons, was a council whose responsibilities at the time were mainly related to religious affairs and the judgment of homicide cases.

²⁴⁰ Pnyx was the hill on which the assembly met.

²⁴¹ Aesch. 1.82 (trans. Carey).

²⁴² Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 324-8.

and despised from the most ignorant. Therefore, if you want to win fame and admiration in public life, try to get a thorough knowledge of what you propose to do. If you enter on a public career with this advantage over others, I should not be surprised if you gained the object of your ambition quite easily”.²⁴³

Politicians were expected to offer the assembly their best possible advice with respect to their knowledge and expertise; their unofficial status as private individuals speaking on their own behalf at the assembly did not give politicians immunity from legal controls. A political opponent could utilize the process of *graphē paranomon*, a public indictment against those who proposed a decree against the law, and so challenge the credibility, knowledge and political intentions of his enemy. While Timarchos proposed at least two decrees, Aeschines does not allude to any *graphē paranomon* that targeted Timarchos’ proposals. For magistrates, the *dokimasia*, on entering an office, and the *euthyna*, when leaving the post, could check the conducts, attitudes and character of a politician.²⁴⁴ Timarchos’ story seems to be free of such difficulties in these contexts as well. Despite the allegations of bribery, he had completed his service on the *boulē* just a few months before the trial took place, and Aeschines was not able to come up with an accusation in this respect either. Timarchos’ embassies present a very similar picture. Despite the fact that accusing a politician of bribery during his embassy is one of the most obvious strategies of slander and that Timarchos had participated in at least two embassies, Aeschines cannot dwell on this aspect of Timarchos’ career, a fact which indicates that Timarchos performed well enough in politics and better than the way in which Aeschines would like to portray him.

²⁴³ Xen. *Mem.* 3.6.17-8 (trans. Marchant).

²⁴⁴ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 329-330.

Apart from political conduct, a public speaker's military career was of paramount importance. In his quarrel with Demosthenes, Meidias allegedly hired a sycophant named Euktemon in order to prosecute Demosthenes for desertion.²⁴⁵ After Meidias struck Demosthenes in the face when he was a *chorēgos*, someone who funded choruses and plays, the case was brought to court. This time it was Demosthenes who accused his opponent, Meidias, of having left the ranks three times.²⁴⁶ Similarly, in his speech *On the Dishonest Embassy*, Demosthenes mocked Aeschines' military performance.²⁴⁷ Aeschines took the charges very seriously; in his response, he detailed his service that returned him praise of the commanders and a crown of the city, and he then summoned as witnesses Phokion the general, Temenides and his other fellow soldiers from the campaigns.²⁴⁸ Although some of these charges can be taken as rhetorical topoi, the scrutiny of public speakers could be utilized against those politicians who had not performed the required military duties or had thrown away their shield in battle, and the law deprived them of their rights.²⁴⁹ The rationale behind such a concern seems rather obvious to Aeschines: "Mister, when you do not take up arms for the city or because of cowardice cannot protect it, do not presume to give it advice".²⁵⁰ In risking his life and protecting the city, however, a politician could ask for the gratitude, *charis*, from the demos;²⁵¹ Lysias' client, Mantitheos, makes the point explicit in his defense:

If any of you are angry at those who claim the right to manage the affairs of the city but who run away from its dangers, you could not justly hold that

²⁴⁵ Dem. 21.103; for a discussion on importance of a politician's military record, see Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, 128-42; Christ, *The Limits of Altruism*, 70-2; Sinclair, *Democracy*, 54-61; Rhodes, "Political Participation," 143-4.

²⁴⁶ Dem. 21.100, 162-4.

²⁴⁷ Dem. 19.113.

²⁴⁸ Dem. 2.167-70.

²⁴⁹ Aesch. 1.29.

²⁵⁰ Aesch. 1.29 (trans. Carey).

²⁵¹ Christ, *The Limits of Altruism*, 70-2.

opinion about me. I not only fulfilled my duties enthusiastically, but also had the courage to face danger. I did this not because I treated lightly the prospect of facing the Spartans, but so that if ever I were unjustly forced into litigation, I would be better (*beltiōn*) received by you because of this and would receive full justice.²⁵²

In this environment, we must ask how well Timarchos performed in this area of his career, and whether he could claim such a positive treatment from the jurors by pointing out what he had done for the safety of the city. Aeschines does not give us any clue.²⁵³ The most relevant reference may be found in Timarchos' duty as an inspector of the mercenaries, but this appointment cannot be associated with his general service as a hoplite in defending the city. What remains unmentioned is especially significant for our purposes. Notwithstanding Aeschines' mostly unsupported arguments about sexual misbehavior, mismanagement of property, and his deliberate stretching of the law to accuse Timarchos of not providing for his own uncle, the orator did not even attempt to blacken Timarchos' military record. This particular absence would imply that, in the recent memory of the demos, Timarchos should have had an untainted positive image as a public speaker who, like his opponent Aeschines, could remind his audience of his toils and of achievements gained through arduous labor on the battleground. Nevertheless, in emphasizing the military aspect of his career, we should not go so far as to imagine Timarchos as a person in pursuit of the martial leadership. As discussed above, in the fourth-century, the bifurcation of leadership in political and military realms often led to different career paths, and Timarchos seems to have been heavily engaged in the former rather than the latter.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Lys. 16.17 (trans. Todd).

²⁵³ "It is perhaps surprising that nothing is made of Timarchos' cowardice, nor of the apparent absence of a military career"; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 270.

²⁵⁴ Rhodes, "Political Activity," 143.

These absences in both political and military contexts, however, call for a different explanation than Aeschines' allegation that Timarchos bought his way into all the offices. In frequenting the bema, addressing the people, as well as in serving various offices, especially those chosen by election, Timarchos should have proved his success in eloquence and politics. We lack the evidence regarding the other posts that he had held because Aeschines assumed that the jurors had already known of, or at least had heard about, them. This view can be confirmed by Demosthenes' reminder that Timarchos had been in politics for a long time and undertook various civic responsibilities;²⁵⁵ it had been at least fifteen years since he served in the council for the first time. Since his entry into politics, despite all the legal checks of the democratic system on public speakers, Timarchos seems to have performed well until the trial. Aeschines cannot bring up a case of *graphē paranomon*, or of a failure in *dokimasia* or *euthyna* in which Timarchos became the target and could not defend himself, a situation which indicates that he knew the rules of the game and played it proficiently.

In return, honor, public recognition, experience and political power should have enhanced his capabilities.²⁵⁶ Timarchos could have demanded the gratitude of the people in considering his case, claimed more authority in advising the demos on foreign policies and the defense of the city, and eventually gained the support of the citizens in his political rise. After all, it was not only what a speaker proposed, but also the speaker himself, his character and the public knowledge about him that affected the citizens' decisions; each speech and proposal, in this regard, was

²⁵⁵ Dem. 19.286.

²⁵⁶ For the rewards of political and military career, Sinclair, *Democracy*, 163-188; Christ, *The Limits of Altruism*, 70-2.

followed by a form of informal public scrutiny on the part of citizens when they made up their minds whether or not to agree with the orator's ideas or proposals.²⁵⁷

Timarchos' political mobility should also have enabled him to accumulate a larger body of social and economic capital; his political alliance with Demosthenes seems to have been rather recent and purposeful in shaping the politics of the city against Macedon. Timarchos, therefore, reached at a level that any ordinary Athenian citizen could ideally achieve, but only a few actually did so. In the absence of evidence, however, we do not know which events or factors he regarded as more crucial for his political rise, how he felt about his position in the society, whether or not he was satisfied in realizing his ambitions, or what he personally made of his successes and failures, but the preceding discussion should have clarified that his life prior to the court case presented a case of political upward mobility.

2.3 After the trial: *Atimia*

Reconstructing Timarchos' life before the trial is a difficult task, because many questions remain unanswered and those that somehow find responses are often not conclusive, but the evidence is even more scanty when we investigate his life after the trial. Our only source is Demosthenes.²⁵⁸ Three years after Timarchos' case, Demosthenes finally prosecuted Aeschines;²⁵⁹ in his speech, Demosthenes reminded his audience of Timarchos and of the unjust treatment that he had received in the court,²⁶⁰ but he also added:

²⁵⁷ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 329-332.

²⁵⁸ Fisher, *Aeschines*, 22-3.

²⁵⁹ Dem. 19.

²⁶⁰ Dem. 19. 2, 120, 233, 241-57, 283-6.

Aeschines ruined (*apōlosen*) Timarchos not, by Zeus, out of concern for improving your children's character . . . but because Timarchos, while on the Council, moved a decree that ordered the death penalty for anyone caught shipping arms or naval equipment to Philip ²⁶¹

The author of the *Lives of the Ten Orators*, alluding to the use of the verb *apollumi*, to ruin, in this passage concludes that Timarchos hanged (*anērtēsen*) himself on leaving the court.²⁶² Pseudo-Plutarch's note seems to be a dramatic exaggeration of Demosthenes' language, as Fisher notes.²⁶³ Still, Demosthenes aims to narrate a pathos; he portrays Aeschines as inciting the jurors to put aside their feelings, to ignore Timarchos' appeal to his old mother and children, and to inflict the heaviest possible punishment:

Will you not recall what he said when he prosecuted Timarchos? – that a city that does not use muscle against criminals is of no use, nor is a state where clemency and influence outstrip the laws, and that you must not take pity on Timarchos' mother, who is an old woman, on his children, or on anyone else, but must understand that if you abandon the laws and the state, you will find no one to take pity on you.²⁶⁴

In the end, Timarchos was a miserable man, *talaipōros*, who lost his civic rights, as well as his political career.²⁶⁵ Nevertheless, we must ask how credible Demosthenes' narrative is, and whether Timarchos and his family were desperate and wretched in every single aspect of the live. Lack of evidence prevents us from developing a detailed account of exactly what happened after the trial; in the absence of concrete details, however, the verdict and the functioning of the Athenian law enforcement can give us valuable insights about how Timarchos' life, as well as those of his

²⁶¹ Dem. 19.285-6 (trans. Yunis).

²⁶² [Plut]. *X orat.*, 840f.

²⁶³ Fisher, *Aeschines*, 22 n.71.

²⁶⁴ Dem. 19.283 (trans. Yunis).

²⁶⁵ Dem. 19.284.

family, may have changed after the trial. In the following pages, I shall argue that the verdict and its legal and social enforcement by society and Athenian officials inflicted a radical downward mobility on the family.

2.3.1 *Atimia* as a legal status

If an orator failed to pass the scrutiny of orators, he was punished with the loss of some of his citizenship rights and was entitled as *atimos*, disfranchised.²⁶⁶ Our main source for the process is Aeschines' speech *Against Timarchos* in which the orator provides the four categories that make an orator ineligible for addressing the people.²⁶⁷ He refrains, however, from detailing which set of rights are to be forfeited and only makes a generic exclamation: "Which men, then, did he [the legislator] think should not speak?".²⁶⁸ There are at least two problems with this aspect of the punishment. Firstly, if a citizen did not qualify for the right to address the assembly by prostituting himself, for example, and if he spoke at an assembly meeting despite the restrictions, the punishment for not abiding by the law was execution, not losing the right to speak.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Timarchos was able to participate in politics and he defended himself in his trial, a fact that calls for explanation. This inconsistency in law and practice was recently explained by Wallace by the term potential or unconvicted *atimia*.²⁷⁰ If a citizen prostituted himself, but kept making speeches, he was a potential *atimos* who could de facto retain his rights until he was convicted in the court. With conviction, his status as an *atimos* was officially approved by the

²⁶⁶ For a detailed discussion of *dokimasia* of orators, see MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure"; for his critique, Gagliardi, "The Athenian Procedure"; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 157-9.

²⁶⁷ See pp. 35-6 above; Aesch. 1.27-30.

²⁶⁸ Aesch. 1.28 (trans. Carey).

²⁶⁹ Hansen, *Apagoge*, 66-7 with references.

²⁷⁰ Wallace, "Unconvicted or Potential"; cf. Hansen, *Apagoge*, 66-7.

court, and the result of infringing upon the terms of the *atimia* was either capital punishment or imprisonment until a court verdict. This view also explains how Timarchos was able to defend himself in the court. Since he was an unconvicted *atimos*, Timarchos could express himself at the trial and his punishment was not execution or imprisonment but loss of citizenship rights.²⁷¹

The set of rights that Timarchos forfeited poses the second problem. *Atimia* as a punishment took various forms so that it could be either total or partial.²⁷² In the case of the former, a citizen lost the right to move decrees, to speak in the assembly, to be a juror, a prosecutor and a witness, to hold a magistracy, and to enter the sanctuaries and the agora.²⁷³ An *atimos* could not be guardian of his family, since he could not appear in public to look after their interests.²⁷⁴ Partial *atimia*, however, could be related to the deprivation of any right mentioned above, but Andocides alludes also to cases in which citizens were not allowed to travel to Hellespont or Ionia.²⁷⁵ State debtors made up an exceptional group; since they lost their property rights unlike others, their all deprivations could be reversed once they repaid their debts.²⁷⁶ In certain cases, *atimia* could be hereditary: state-debtors, as long as they and their heirs abstained from paying back the debts, those guilty of treason or attempting to overthrow the democracy, those convicted of bribery or of theft, and those who had proposed the abolition of certain laws could transfer their legal deficiencies to their heirs.²⁷⁷

We must then ask whether Timarchos became a total *atimos* or if he lost

²⁷¹ Wallace, "Unconvicted or Potential," 75-6.

²⁷² Andoc. 1.73-6.

²⁷³ Hansen, *Apagoge*, 61-2 with references; for a more recent discussion, Kamen, *Status*, 71-78.

²⁷⁴ Dem. 24.200-3; Hansen, *Apagoge*, 63.

²⁷⁵ Andoc. 1.75; Hansen, *Apagoge*, 63-6.

²⁷⁶ Hansen, *Apagoge*, 67-70.

²⁷⁷ Andoc. 1.75; Hansen, *Apagoge*, 71-2.

specific right(s).²⁷⁸ Aeschines does not explicitly state if Timarchos was to become a total *atimos* or if he was only to lose his right to address the assembly; instead, the orator explains the law in terms of the criteria of eligibility and the procedural aspects, without detailing the possible verdict.²⁷⁹ The functioning of the scrutiny of orators makes an analysis even more formidable because of its exceptional responsive, not preventive, nature and its need for personal initiative; in this sense, the process resembles a trial rather than a usual *dokimasia*.²⁸⁰ In the case of the scrutiny of officials, if a citizen failed to pass the scrutiny, the process prevented him from undertaking a magistracy.²⁸¹ Orators were already proven to be eligible to speak because they had gained this right by having passed their first *dokimasia* when they registered in their deme at the age of eighteen, and they kept addressing the demos as long as they successfully defended themselves in any legal process that could officially deprive them of that right.²⁸² Reframed in this way, the scrutiny of orators seems to have been built on Wallace's distinction between convicted and unconvicted *atimos*.²⁸³ By having committed any of the four categories, Timarchos was an unconvicted *atimos* and he did not have the right to speak in the assembly. Once he did so, however, Timarchos became liable to the *dokimasia* of orators, and could be convicted not with partial, but with total *atimia*.²⁸⁴ The suggestion of total *atimia* is consonant with Andocides' list of total *atimia* cases in which he counts men

²⁷⁸ Timarchos was to lose only his right to speak in the assembly: Gagliardi, "The Athenian Procedure"; Wallace, "Unconvicted or Potential," 76; Todd, *The Shape*, 116 n.15; Carey, *Aeschines*, 20; the verdict was a total *atimia*: MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure"; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 6, 22-3, 157-62; Kamen, *Status*, 73.

²⁷⁹ Aesch. 1.28-32.

²⁸⁰ Each public official had to pass his *dokimasia* before undertaking offices, and the process is automatic in the sense that there was no need for personal initiation of a citizen. In the case of *dokimasia* of orators, however, a citizen had to take the initiative and to prosecute the opponent on the grounds that he had spoken in the assembly, even though he was ineligible; Todd, "Athenian Procedure," 77-8; Todd, *The Shape*, 168; MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure".

²⁸¹ [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 55; Rhodes, *Commentary*, 612-621.

²⁸² [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1-2; Rhodes, *Commentary*, 493-505.

²⁸³ Wallace, "Unconvicted or Potential"; MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure," 85.

²⁸⁴ MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure," 84-7.

guilty of desertion, of evasion of military service, of cowardice, of evasion of naval service or of throwing away their shields, as well as those who had maltreated their parents.²⁸⁵ Similarly, a citizen who prostituted himself was not allowed to speak in the council or assembly or in court, to hold a magistracy, or to enter the temples and the agora; if he did not obey the law, any fellow citizen could prosecute him with the heaviest punishments.²⁸⁶ By committing one of these acts, a citizen became an unconvicted *atimos*, and the scrutiny was to transform his potential status into an official one. This view also explains Demosthenes' dramatic portrayal of Timarchos as a miserable man and his appeal to his old mother and children. It seems rather unlikely that Demosthenes' insistence on Timarchos' misery was based merely on the loss of the right to speak in the assembly.

At the end of the trial, therefore, Timarchos lost his most essential citizenship rights and experienced a radical downward mobility. More importantly, however, *atimia* blocked his prospective chances of subsequent upward mobility in various contexts; except for amnesties proposed under the unusual circumstances,²⁸⁷ recovering his rights was only a slight probability.²⁸⁸ *Atimia* deprived Timarchos of his political career, as well as its privileges and material and honorific rewards. The loss of political participation might have been less detrimental to a politically less engaged citizen, but Timarchos' aspirations should have made him particularly vulnerable to this aspect of the verdict. Nor were the limitations confined to political contexts: he was also unable to speak in the judiciary realm. He had no right to

²⁸⁵ Andoc. 1.74.

²⁸⁶ MacDowell, "The Athenian Procedure," 86 with references; Aesch. 1.20.

²⁸⁷ For the cases, see Hansen, *Apagoge*, 68-9; Kamen, *Status*, 76-7.

²⁸⁸ The most plausible opportunity for Timarchos would have been the general amnesty proposed by Hyperides after the battle of Chaironea (338) as Hyperides' proposal also covered the *atimoi*, but Aristogeiton's *graphē paranomon* prevented its implementation; Hyp. fr. 33. Personal appeal to the assembly was a possibility, but the requirement of at least 6000 affirmative votes made such a reprieve less likely to happen; Dem. 24.45-6.

prosecute an opponent individually or defend himself; although he could appear in the court, Timarchos had to remain silent, like Straton in Demosthenes' speech *Against Meidias*.²⁸⁹

His silence would also not protect his family's interests. Timarchos had to find someone, most possibly a close relative, if he did not have a brother, to be the legal guardian of his family in order to safeguard them. This vulnerability would have caused a great risk; a certain Timokrates allegedly sold his own sister after he had become the guardian of his family because of his father's *atimia*.²⁹⁰ Timarchos' property was to remain intact, and his heirs could inherit the property without legal constraints.²⁹¹ Nevertheless, the limitations on physical mobility of an *atimos* within the city would have led to further problems. While prohibiting Timarchos from entering to the agora accords with his deprivation of civic rights, it also prevented him from socializing, an activity for which the agora was the center of the city. Public worship and the sanctuaries were no longer accessible to Timarchos.²⁹² At personal level, this restriction should have affected his reciprocal relationship with the divine; at the communal level, his claim to be a part of the city as a religious community and to share the city's bond with the gods was fundamentally challenged and restricted by his inability to take part in religious rites.²⁹³ In terms of military service, Timarchos was unlikely to be called upon to serve as a soldier and take part in missions abroad,²⁹⁴ nevertheless, Timarchos retained his right of physical mobility

²⁸⁹ "Yet although he was a citizen, had served on all the campaigns when he was eligible, and had never done anything terrible, this man stands now in silence, deprived not only of other common privileges but even of the right to speak or express his grief"; Dem. 21.95 (trans. Harris).

²⁹⁰ Dem. 24.200-3.

²⁹¹ For possible difficulties with inheritance, Hansen, *Apagoge*, 63.

²⁹² Aesch. 3.176; Lys. 6.9, 24.

²⁹³ Parker, "Pleasing Thighs"; Parker, *Miasma*, 94-7; Blok, *Citizenship*, 228.

²⁹⁴ Kamen, following MacDowell, interprets the absence of evidence as potentially allowing military participation, but, as she admits, it would have been practically inoperable, except under the unusual circumstances of major battles; Kamen, *Status*, 77-8; MacDowell, *The Law*, 74.

and could go anywhere without limitations. His life circumstances could even promote such a decision,²⁹⁵ but we simply do not have any evidence regarding his movements abroad. Although a legal perspective is very informative in comprehending how Timarchos' capabilities were limited after the trial, in order to understand better how Timarchos experienced his new legal status, we also need to investigate the ways in which enforcement of the verdict could influence his life.

2.3.2 *Atimia* as an experience

Focusing on the legally institutionalized conditions of *atimia* and dissociating it from its sociocultural connotations does not comply with the *atimia* terminology. *Atimos*, in colloquial use, means dishonored: it is composed of the prefix *a* which has a negative force to encapsulate deprivation of *timē*, honor; thus it delineates a degraded social status.²⁹⁶ In line with this non-technical sense of the term, a certain Manthitheos argued that having his step-brother as his namesake and the consequent public confusion in identifying the two men would bring him a great dishonor:

For assuredly I am not so stupid or inconsistent in my conduct as to agree to take a third of my father's estate (all of which at one time was to be mine) and to rest content with that since he had adopted the two men as sons – yet in the matter of the name to be contentious – except that for me to change my name would entail great dishonor (*megalēn atimian*) and cowardice, and for him to have the same name as I would be impossible for many reasons.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Kamen, *Status*, 74.

²⁹⁶ Hansen, *Apagoge*, 60-1; more recently, in a series of articles, van't Wout discussed this rather neglected aspect and demonstrated various coexistent usages in literary and epigraphic sources; van't Wout, "From Oath-Swearing"; van't Wout, "Neglected Evidence"; van't Wout, "Social Evaluation"; see also, Joyce, "*Atimia* and Outlawry"; Dmitriev, "Athenian *Atimia*"; Wallace, "Unconvicted or Potential," 77-8; Allen, *The World of Prometheus*, 61.

²⁹⁷ Dem. 39.6 (trans. Scafuro); van't Wout, "Social Evaluation," 188-94; in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, the Furies regarded the acquittal of Orestes as a dishonorable act: "Younger gods, you have ridden down the ancient laws and have taken them from my hands! And I – dishonored (*atimos*), unhappy, deeply angry – on this land, alas, I will release venom from my heart, venom in return for my grief,

A curse tablet with a judiciary curse illuminates another non-legal dimension of the term:

Let Pherenikos be bound before Hermes of the underworld and Hekate of the underworld. I bind Pherenikos' [girl] Galene before Hermes of the underworld and to Hekate of the underworld I bind her. And just as this lead is *atimos* and cold, so let that man and what belongs to him be *atima* and cold, and for those who are with him the things they have spoken and planned concerning me.²⁹⁸

Lead is a cheap material with a pale color, and its peculiar softness makes it impossible to transform it into tools of practical functionality. In the subsequent lines of the tablet, Pherenikos' soul, mind and tongue were explicitly cursed to be dysfunctional, as lead, and socially worthless in the court so as to make sure that he would not succeed in the trial.²⁹⁹ From a different point of view, we can also associate this aspect of *atimia*, socially dysfunctional and devalued, with its technical use when a litigant claims that he was not an *atimos*, thus he had no reason to oppose the political regime.³⁰⁰ While this set of various meanings could imply a semantic field in which an *atimos* made sense of his legal status as an individual, the social enforcement of the verdict would lead to even more diverse experiences in daily life.

The social projection of the legal conditions of *atimia* was not a mechanical process that could be realized in a single day with the declaration of the verdict; it was rather a process that developed out of continual daily-life experience in relation

drops that the land cannot endure"; Aesch. *Eum.* 778-81 (trans. Smyth); for a discussion of this passage, see van't Wout, "From Oath-Swearing," 152-5.

²⁹⁸ *DTA* 107 ll. 1-6 (trans. van't Wout) as cited by van't Wout, "Neglected Evidence," 130-3; see also Faraone, "The Agonistic Context," 15.

²⁹⁹ *DTA* 107 ll. 7-11.

³⁰⁰ Antiph. fr. 1a; Lys. 20.4, 25.11; van't Wout, "Neglected Evidence," 128-30; van't Wout, "From Oath-Swearing," 157-8.

to the overall society and the institutions of the city. In this sense, the Athenian judiciary system and its emphasis on private initiative help us understand Timarchos' experience. It was an Athenian citizen, not a formal prosecutor, who needed to be vigilant in observing transgressors of the law, in prosecuting and arresting them if necessary.³⁰¹ Aeschines, for instance, justifies his prosecution of Timarchos by highlighting his role in helping the city and safeguarding her laws:

Never before, men of Athens, have I brought an indictment (*graphē*) against any man or persecuted him at his final audit; no, I have in my opinion shown restraint in all such matters. But since I could see that the city was suffering serious damage from this man Timarchos, who addresses the Assembly illegally, and since I am personally the victim of his malicious prosecution (just how, I shall explain later in my speech), I concluded that it would be utterly disgraceful not to intervene in defense of the city as a whole, the laws, you, and myself.³⁰²

As a personal litigant, Aeschines had to collect evidence and summon witnesses. Then the jury, composed of non-professional jurors chosen from the citizenry by lot, had to listen to the both parties and to adjudicate on the case. Implementing and enforcing the law in the absence of an institutional police force in most public spaces necessitated a fundamental social backup; that Athens was not a face-to-face society in which everyone shared acquaintance with or knowledge of the rest of the community made the legal system rely heavily on the knowledge and initiatives of citizens.³⁰³ In such a context, we should expect the extent of Timarchos' public recognition, especially after the court verdict, to determine the number of people keeping an eye on him. As the speaker of Lysias' speech *Against Alcibiades* notes, Timarchos' prominence ought to have made him exceptionally vulnerable:

³⁰¹ Allen, *The World of Prometheus*, 200-2; Hunter, *Policing Athens*, 120-153; for a critical view, see Harris, "Who Enforced".

³⁰² Aesch. 1.1-2 (trans. Carey).

³⁰³ Gottesman, *Politics*, 63-76; Hunter, *Policing Athens*, 120-153.

If you punish those who are unknown, none of the others will behave better, because nobody will hear about the offenses you have condemned; but if you punish the most prominent among the criminals, everybody will know, and as a result, the citizens will heed this example and become better.³⁰⁴

Circulation of news, networks of knowledge and daily encounters should have exerted an influence on the restrictions that Timarchos would have experienced, and the verdict ought to have reconfigured the relationship between Timarchos and the society, but the extent and the rigidity of policing was highly context dependent. On the one hand, we have the example of Aristogeiton,³⁰⁵ who incurred debts and fines that he could not repay, and so became an *atimos* as a state debtor,³⁰⁶ but he kept parading in public and addressing the assembly until his imprisonment. On the other hand, despite the immunity formally voted by the assembly after his involvement in mutilation of the Herms, Andocides could not endure the social pressure and chose self-imposed exile as a way to escape from the public gaze.³⁰⁷ What seems to have distinguished Andocides from Aristogeiton is the former's crime, public prominence and the amount of disgrace he brought on himself as a "herm-cutter" and an oligarch, a stigma that stuck to him and affected his life in extra-legal contexts.³⁰⁸

The disgrace that the sobriquet "herm-cutter" brought on Andocides helps us to understand the impact of Timarchos' alleged nickname, "the whore". Aeschines claims that once the name Timarchos is uttered, the first reaction is always "which Timarchos? The whore?".³⁰⁹ This argument is part of Aeschines' overall strategy of

³⁰⁴ Lys. 14.12 (trans. Todd); cf. Lys 27.5; Din. 1.27.

³⁰⁵ Dem. 25; Din. 2.

³⁰⁶ Dem. 25.67; Din. 2.12.

³⁰⁷ Andoc. 2.10.

³⁰⁸ Gottesman, *Politics*, 69; for different treatments of public debtors, see Hunter, "Policing Public Debtors".

³⁰⁹ Aesch. 1.130.

highlighting the importance of common report and rumor as a reliable evidence for analyzing an individual's character and crimes,³¹⁰ and the predominance of this topos in speeches suggests a rhetorical strategy aiming to construct a fiction that the whole city shared the same knowledge about a person's conduct.³¹¹ The orator either fabricates gossip or tailors an existing rumor according to his needs with the expectation that the intended audience, the jurors, will take his words for granted in considering his arguments. Apart from its rhetorical use, gossip plays a crucial role in shaping social behavior: it reinforces shared sociocultural norms, ridicules deviants, and thus contextualizes individual conduct within larger social structures without necessary legal intervention.³¹² The court verdict, however, combines these two aspects. Once the jurors made up their minds and approved Timarchos' status, and thus the plausibility of Aeschines' slanders, whether or not Aeschines was right about the Timarchos' nickname was no longer relevant.³¹³ The audience should not be regarded as passive in this regard; they could help to circulate and regenerate the rumors at any time, and even enforce them in public.³¹⁴ Social pressure in the form of muttered or open mockery, sideways glances and finger-pointing would enforce *atimia* for Timarchos and shut him out of public places without a need for institutional police.

The influence of rumor and of verdict needs special attention in discussing shame and honor. For Hunter, gossip checked and continually constructed what it meant to be an Athenian "by the images it evoked, by the standards it proclaimed,

³¹⁰ "But where men's lives and actions are concerned, of its own accord a true report (*phēmē*) spreads through the city announcing an individual's conduct to the public at large, and often predicting future events, too. This statement is so patently true and uncontrived that you will find that both our city and our ancestors established an altar to Report (*phēmē*) as a goddess of very great power"; Aesch. 1.127-8 (trans. Carey).

³¹¹ Hunter, *Policing Athens*, 99-102; Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 148-51; Eidinow, *Envy*, 196-206.

³¹² For rumor as a social construct, see Eidinow, *Envy*, 191-211; Hunter, *Policing Athens*, 96-119.

³¹³ Eidinow, *Envy*, 195; Hunter, *Policing Athens*, 105.

³¹⁴ Eidinow, *Envy*, 177.

and by the morality it enforced”.³¹⁵ In failing to conform to the standards of behavior, at least at a discursive level, an individual had to expect his due challenge in terms of his reputation as a deviant. Gossip and its social map of reputations function in such a way as to shape and reshape identities by setting individuals in their current social positions with an ongoing (re)negotiation of social relations.³¹⁶ If, however, an individual evaded public visibility as a result of a legal verdict or of any stigma attached to him, further challenges awaited. In the Athenian *imaginaire*, a male citizen needed to spend much of his time in public spaces, unlike women who had to seclude themselves to private space away from public gaze;³¹⁷ for an *atimos*, such a standard was legally impossible and its social outcomes were inevitable: “in Athens, then, as in many modern Mediterranean communities, to be shut out of the public space where men gather, whether by force of law or of public opinion, eliminates the possibility of maintaining one’s standing in the eyes of the community, and marks one with dishonor”.³¹⁸ Moreover, *timē* denotes both an individual’s value in his own and others’ eyes and the esteem conferred by others.³¹⁹ In his reading of the Homeric poems, Cairns distinguishes various qualities that contributed to one’s value, such as prowess in warfare, rank, wealth, noble birth, age, special skills, kinship, being a good wife and friendship, as well as alternative ways of expressing esteem: material prizes, full cups of wine, gazing in admiration, verbal greetings, the best seat of the table and carrying out orders.³²⁰ These ways and means of estimating and presenting individual value could signal distinct senses in different

³¹⁵ Hunter, *Policing Athens*, 178.

³¹⁶ Eidinow, *Envy*, 179.

³¹⁷ See for example, Xen. *Oec.* 7.30-1.

³¹⁸ Cohen, *Law*, 73. For a comparative anthropological discussion of honor and shame in Mediterranean societies, see Horden and Purcell, *Corrupting Sea*, 489-523.

³¹⁹ Cairns, “Honour and Shame,” 29.

³²⁰ Cairns, “Honour and Shame,” 29-30 with references.

periods, but, behind the nuances of the particular, they were still relevant in fourth-century Athenian society as they still mattered in contemporary societies. In this regard, idiosyncratic ways and means of estimating one's value and bestowing honor in daily life could result in numerous possibilities for an *atimos*, and we must be equally concerned about what is missing in our sources as about what we are told.

We need to ask then how Timarchos experienced the outcomes of the verdict. Did he isolate himself to a country house and avoid public appearance in general, as the term that Allen coined "internal exile" entails,³²¹ or did he somehow benefit from demographical features of Athens like the cunning Aristogeiton and parade in public? Even though the absence of evidence prevents us from tracing his life afterward and finding concrete answers,³²² the nature and the extent of "social policing" of citizens suggest that Demosthenes' construction of a miserable Timarchos was not a mere rhetorical exaggeration, at least at the city level. The orator's appeal to the audience presumes that, depending either on their familiarity with the law or on the stories told about previous cases, they already knew or at least could imagine the almost catastrophic consequences of *atimia* for a citizen. The silence of our sources, therefore, could very well be derived from the success of social policing in implementing the conditions of *atimia*, as from the vigilance of political enemies. The notorious public recognition following the trial would have posed a serious threat to Timarchos, if he attempted to circumvent the conditions of his legal status. As discussed above, the effects of his *atimia* must have been comprehensive in reconfiguring Timarchos' relationship with the society, the institutions of the city and the divine; the social projection of the legal conditions of *atimia*, therefore, signals a dramatic downward mobility for a citizen, but even more

³²¹ Allen, *The World of Prometheus*, 230.

³²² Fisher, *Aeschines*, 21-3.

so for a prominent politician who had undertaken arduous labor and striven to climb the social and political ladders.

In considering his renegotiation of his status at micro level, however, we need to ask whether Timarchos changed his management of his economic sources, was deprived of his social networks, and experienced a loss of cultural capital. Or, in a diachronic perspective, with changes in political climate, could the restrictions be relaxed or ignored in such a way as to relieve the social pressure? At a deme level, where we would expect the features of a face-to-face society, did his fellow demesmen renegotiate their relations with Timarchos, or did they interpret the case, as modern readers do, as a political fight between the leading political figures of the time and so they support one of their own? Even though there is no way to find answers to these questions, the social nature of the Athenian judiciary system and law enforcement, demographic features and economic structures were capable of yielding opportunities that would easily contradict a legal perspective.

2.4 Conclusion

Timarchos' story is especially relevant for a study of social mobility because his life witnessed two directions of mobility at drastic levels, both upward and downward, and we have relatively abundant information about his life despite Aeschines' distorted narrative. Prior to the trial, Timarchos was one of the prominent politicians of the city who had proposed at least two decrees, undertaken various public roles including multiple embassies, and seems to have been very actively engaged in the city's internal and external policies. In explaining how Timarchos possibly achieved and experienced mobility, unequal early life chances deserve special attention as they

apparently gave him an unequal earlier start in comparison to the politicians who came from less advantageous backgrounds. The social networks of Timarchos, which included individuals such as Misgolas, Phaidros, Hegesandros, Hegesippos and Demosthenes, would have proved useful for his political career; their political support was much needed for Timarchos career, and their appearance on court is indicative of the firm backup of his social cycles and political allies. Timarchos' access to economic capital and, if we are to believe some of Aeschines' allegations, his involvement in the "shadow economy" of the Athenian politics were the means that could further be utilized in realizing political ambitions. The resources and social and political support, however, only partially account for Timarchos' political mobility; how Timarchos performed as a politician mattered. In passing the institutional checks of the political system and in fulfilling his military duties, Timarchos seems not to have experienced any difficulty and performed well enough that Aeschines' sarcastic picture of his career could not bring up any specific instance of failure.

The trial, however, marked a turning point in Timarchos' life. Three years after the trial, Demosthenes recalled the catastrophe that Timarchos had to endure, but he refrained from making incidental references to what exactly had happened afterward; this speech is the last instance when we hear about Timarchos. In the absence of evidence, I argued that the legal conditions and social projection of *atimia* would imply plausible ends. *Atimia*, as a legal status, deprived Timarchos of his political career along with most fundamental citizenship rights, of his claim to be part of the demos as a religious community, as well as of his right of physical mobility by restricting his access to the agora and the sanctuaries. The reliance of Athenian law enforcement and judiciary system on social actors to keep an eye on

the transgressors of the law, the influence of rumor and mockery in regulating social behavior, and the consequences of these factors in incurring shame and bestowing honor could result in numerous possibilities for an *atimos*' experience after the trial. The silence of our sources on Timarchos' life and Demosthenes' remark implies that, at least at the institutional level, the implementation of the verdict was successful, and Timarchos experienced a dramatic downward mobility and could not recover his career. From a diachronic perspective, however, we need to conclude that the very same nature of Athenian social policing could plausibly help Timarchos afterward to find a laxity in the enforcement of the conditions of his legal status at a micro level.

CHAPTER 3
CRAFT, BEAUTY AND SOCIAL MOBILITY:
HYPERIDES, *AGAINST ATHENOGENES*

3.1 Introduction

Sometime between the years 330 and 324, a certain Epikrates appealed to the Athenian courts and sued an Egyptian perfumer named Athenogenes.³²³ Epikrates seems to have lusted after one of Athenogenes' slaves, a boy who remains unnamed in the text, but his endeavors to persuade the boy to live with him ended up in vain. If we are to believe Epikrates' narrative, the boy insisted not only on his own manumission, but also that of his whole family, as a condition for their prospective relationship, and he was successful: Epikrates was convinced. As the family was Athenogenes' property,³²⁴ however, it was his decision that was going to be decisive, and the plot unfolds at this point. Athenogenes declined Epikrates' initial offer, but relied on the services of his cunning *hetaira*,³²⁵ Antigone, who successfully implemented Athenogenes' scheme in order to exploit Epikrates' alleged naiveté and to sell the slave family for an extraordinary price of 40 minae. Still, Athenogenes was to make the final touch: as a last minute favor, instead of just manumitting the slaves, he sold them outright with the perfume shop which Midas, the father of the boy, was operating. Athenogenes' claim that the shop's liabilities were not

³²³ Hyp. 3; Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 266-7.

³²⁴ In this study, I utilize Lewis' explanation of slavery as a property relationship which encapsulates also interpersonal domination and exploitation; Lewis, "The Definitional Problem".

³²⁵ Defining *hetaira* into English is a cumbersome task because the ancient Greek vocabulary is not as clear as we might expect. Kurke, "Inventing" envisions *hetairai* as more privileged sex workers, while *pornai* seem to have been easily accessible slave-prostitutes. Lape, "Gender," 69 noting the difficulty in distinguishing the nuances of these terms translates both terms as "sex workers". Cohen, *Athenian Prostitution*, 31-8 is the most recent discussion and it highlights the contextual use of the terms. Noting these difficulties, I leave these terms untranslated throughout the text.

exceedingly high turned out to be a serious deception. Midas incurred a huge debt of almost five talents, an amount that could not be matched by the stocks of the shop. The case is therefore a *dikē blabēs*, a private prosecution for damages,³²⁶ and Athenogenes would have been liable for the debts, had he lost the case; nevertheless, he possessed the written contract which was signed in the presence of witnesses, a fact that makes Epikrates' case rather vulnerable in court.

Midas' autonomy as a slave and his capacity to incur such large debts have influenced the speech's reception in the scholarship; scholars, most prominently Cohen, have contextualized Midas among "privileged" slaves of the fourth-century Athens, who benefitted from the investments of wealthy residents of the city, either citizen or metic, the loose personal supervision owing to the fact that some slaves were not cohabiting with masters, and from the overall economy of Athens that experienced high levels of horizontal specialization in production cycles.³²⁷ Instead of using Midas as a mere example of a privileged slave, however, I shall argue that the case study of Midas and his family illustrates the importance of interpersonal and individual power relations in our discussion of social mobility. I shall focus firstly on Midas and demonstrate the importance of power relations derived from *technē*, craft, and knowledge in shaping the family's overall capabilities. It will become clear that Midas' occupational skills as a perfumer not only kept him in control of a large business with power over his own labor, but they also furnished him with the opportunity to accumulate economic capital, to extend his social networks and to live in a family environment with various plausible capabilities in different realms of life. In the second half of this chapter, I will shift our focus to the relationship between

³²⁶ Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 267-9; MacDowell, *The Law*, 149-53; Osborne, "Law in Action," 57.

³²⁷ Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 93; Cohen, *Athenian Nation*, 135, 140; Cohen, "Slave Power," 165; Todd, *The Shape*, 188, 192-4; Hunter, "Introduction," 11; Kamen, *Status*, 23-4; see also, Fisher, "Independent Slaves"; for horizontal specialization, see Harris, "Workshop".

Midas' son and Epikrates, and argue that potent power of beauty, attractiveness, sociability in the context of interpersonal power relationships could pave the way to exceptionally enhanced life chances for individuals. Before embarking on our discussion, a word of caution is needed; unlike the case of Timarchos, the gaps in our knowledge are much larger as the speech is our only source about the family, and their lives are narrated in as much as the details are relevant to the speaker's arguments. Even though there is often no way to trace what exactly happened, comparative evidence suggests plausible ends and helps us understand how Midas and his family could have experienced social mobility in different areas of life.

3.2 Craft, knowledge and social mobility

3.2.1 Craft and knowledge

In an investigation of how Midas benefitted from his craft and craft knowledge for social mobility, it is imperative that we first ask who Midas was and how he ended up as a perfumer, what kind of a knowledge was necessary for maintaining the business operations, and how he could acquire and accumulate such a knowledge in the first place. Unlike most basic crafts which required relatively low levels of specialization, the elaborate tricks of a perfumer, as I argue, were critical in determining the success of the perfume shop, and it was this particular human capital that kept Midas in charge of a business worth almost five talents and provided him workshop authority accompanied with individual autonomy to make business arrangements.

Our knowledge about Midas' background is highly limited. In studying Athenian citizens, social historians are fortunate if they can find a demotic in order to

follow the traces of individuals, and to locate them in their demes, and then to search for possible familial ties and other forms of social networks; Midas, however, was a slave and he lacked any attribution to his background in the speech. In such a case, the onomastic practices of Athenians in naming their slaves is illuminating; Strabo summarizes the Athenians' practices in renaming their slaves:

Getai are those who incline towards the Black Sea and the east, and the Dacians are those who incline in the opposite direction towards Germany and the sources of the Danube. The Dacians, I think, were called Daoi in early times; whence the slave names "Getas" and "Daos" which prevailed among the Attic people; for this is more probable than that "Daos" is from those Scythians who are called "Daai," for they live far away in the neighborhood of Hyrcania, and it is not reasonable to suppose that slaves were brought into Attica from there; for the Attic people were wont either to call their slaves by the same names as those of the nations from which they were brought (as "Lydos" or "Syros"), or addressed them by names that were prevalent in their countries (as "Manes" or else "Midas" for the Phrygian, or "Tibios" for the Paphlagonian).³²⁸

The accuracy of Strabo's account has recently undergone systematic criticism in the onomastic studies of Vlassopoulos for Athens and Lewis for the larger Greek world.³²⁹ Both scholars' investigations of slave names demonstrated that ethnic and foreign names were not exclusively dominant, and slaves could gain, or potentially retain, particular type of names that could not be dissociated from those of citizens. Midas' name, however, apparently fits into the practice that Strabo outlines, and it points to his potential Phrygian origins.³³⁰ This choice would be related also to Athenian slave-owners' tendency to rename their slaves according to their occupations; although the number of cases is not very large, there seems to have been a trend toward calling more privileged slaves, like bankers and secretaries as

³²⁸ Strabo, *Geography*, 7.3.12 (trans. Jones, slightly adapted).

³²⁹ Vlassopoulos, "Athenian Slave Names"; Vlassopoulos, "Plotting Strategies"; Lewis, "Notes".

³³⁰ Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 289; Lewis, "Near Eastern Slaves".

well as public slaves, by names attested for citizens and reserving the names only used for slaves for those in more humble occupations.³³¹ In the case of Midas, his craft as a perfumer could have determined his master's choice. Although the tastes and fashions for perfumes seem to have perpetually changed with privileging certain production centers rather than others throughout the classical and Hellenistic periods, the demand for imported perfumes and aromatics had remained strong.³³² Such a market for "exotic" perfumes would, indeed, fit with Midas' name by associating the luxuriousness of his craft with his foreignness as a perfumer.

How Midas came to be a perfumer is also missing from Hyperides' narrative. That he could already have had the knowledge of his craft before enslavement should not be ruled out because a slave could be bought specifically for his expertise in a certain economic activity.³³³ A well-known example is Sosias, whose skills in managing mining operations made him so exceptional that Nikias bought him for one talent in order to control his one thousand slaves working in the silver mines.³³⁴ Training a slave as an apprentice under a craftsman other than the master was another possible career trajectory, but we lack direct evidence for this practice, except in the written contracts found in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt.³³⁵ Another, and most plausible, explanation is that the individual was trained by the master or one of his slaves who was familiar with the craft and instructed and supervised the

³³¹ Vlassopoulos, "Plotting Strategies," 114-6 with table 5.12.

³³² See esp. Reger, "Formation of Taste"; Salle, "Ingredients".

³³³ Rihl, "Classical Athens," 55.

³³⁴ For the price, see Xen. *Mem.* 2.5.2; for Nikias's slaves, Xen. *Ways.* 4.14; for Nikias and his family, see Davies, *APF*, 403-7. Buying slaves with expertise seems to have been a practice of wealthy individuals who had no knowledge of a craft and, therefore, they had to buy experienced slaves already laboring in various activities; see e.g. Timarchos and Demosthenes' slaves in various activities; Aesch. 1.97; Dem. 27.9-11.

³³⁵ See the discussion in Burford, *Craftsmen*, 87-91.

new slave until he became proficient enough in his profession.³³⁶ In doing so, a master could obtain slaves from the market at more acceptable prices, transmit his trade knowledge, secure his slaves' loyalty and motivate them further with prospective rewards, including potentially with manumission.³³⁷ In his prosecution of Stephanos, Apollodoros highlights the popularity of this aspect, especially for small-scale businesses and crafts:

All of you know, I imagine, that if a cook or some other artisan had chanced to buy this man [Phormion] when he was for sale, he would have learned the skill of his master and would have none of the wealth he now enjoys. But since my father who acquired him was a banker, and since he taught him to read and write and trained him in the business and put him in control of vast sums of money, Phormion has prospered, for the good luck of his arrival at our door was the source of all his present blessings.³³⁸

The arguments that Athenogenes was the third generation of his perfumer family and that he had run three shops cannot easily be taken at face value as the speaker's ultimate intention is to construct the image of a foreigner preoccupied with menial labor and financial profit.³³⁹ Notwithstanding these caveats, Athenogenes' personal engagement in the perfume business and his consequent craft knowledge still favor an explanation based on his involvement in Midas' training.

The particular type of activity determined Midas' training, and we have a variety of evidence for the nature of his business. First of all, Epikrates reports that

³³⁶ Xen. *Mem.* 2.5.2 posits a variety of prices from 50 drachmas to 1000 with the exception of the price of Sosias. In Hyp. 3.2, Epikrates pays Antigone 300 drachmas to buy a slave girl; Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 282; cf. Dem. 27.9-11.

³³⁷ See e.g. the dialogue in Xen. *Oec.* 12.3-14.10, where Ischomachos envisions buying a slave without any expertise and training him so that he could make the slave loyal to him with prospective rewards based on his performance; Cohen, *Athenian Nation*, 143; Cohen, "Slave Power," 164.

³³⁸ [Dem]. 45.71-2 (trans. Scafuro).

³³⁹ Hyp. 3.19. Whether he had the shops simultaneously or in succession seems unclear; Finley, *Studies*, 68; for potential rhetorical exaggeration, see Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 320-1.

the shop had some perfume (*muron*), perfume bottles (*alabastroi*),³⁴⁰ and myrrh (*smurna*)³⁴¹ as its assets, but he then omits the rest of the items by merging them as “some items” (*atta onomata*) that Athenogenes had mentioned to him.³⁴² Although some perfumes seem to have been provided by other producers – Midas still owed money to Pankalos and Prokles³⁴³ for perfumes –,³⁴⁴ retailing and producing were not mutually exclusive.³⁴⁵ Depending on the tastes of the clients and on contemporary fashion, a perfumer could supplement his own production with perfumes obtained from other local producers or with those imported from renowned workshops in distant locations.³⁴⁶ The precise location of the shop is also not given, and the interchangeable use of *muropōlion* (perfumery) and *ergastērion* (shop and/or workshop) in the speech does not help us to identify the exact nature of the shop.³⁴⁷

The debts of the perfumery, similarly, do not exclude either of the two possibilities. Epikrates divides the liabilities of the shop into two kinds. On the one

³⁴⁰ The *alabastron* is a round-bottomed, very small, long-bodied vessel with a flanged mouth, which was used particularly for perfumes. The form had its origins in Egypt, where the supplies of alabaster were abundant. Beside alabaster, they could be produced of glass, metal or ceramic. In Athens, *alabastra* of various materials, including imported alabaster from Egypt, are attested, but their financial value varied depending on the material used and the ways in which it was processed. For development and later spread of Attic *alabastra* across the Mediterranean, see Algrain, “L’alabastré Attique,” 123-9; van Alfen, *Pant’Agatha*, 257-9; for a discussion of illustrations on *alabastra*, see Badinou, *La Laine et le Parfum*, 51-125; *contra* Osborne, *History Written*, 134-6.

³⁴¹ For myrrh, see van Alfen, *Pant’Agatha*, 37-40.

³⁴² Hyp. 3.6.

³⁴³ Later in the speech, Prokles’ name is given as Polykles; Hyp. 3.10; see the discussion in Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 293.

³⁴⁴ Hyp. 3.6.

³⁴⁵ The technological requirements needed to transform a domestic space into a workshop were not so extensive, especially for a perfumery. A press, made of cloth, wood or metal, as well as of marble, such as those attested in Delos’ perfume workshops, and an oven, which could also be moveable, were enough to set up a perfumery. See the discussion, Brun, “The Production,” esp. 277-8 for the problems in identifying the remnants of a perfumery; Reger, “The Manufacture,” esp. 260-272 for the manufacturing process.

³⁴⁶ Reger, “Formation of Taste”; van Alfen, *Pant’Agatha*, 215-6.

³⁴⁷ Midas’ shop as a *muropōlion*, Hyp. 3.6, 11, 18; as an *ergastērion*, Hyp. 3.6, 10; Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 293-4; van Alfen, *Pant’Agatha*, 215-6 with notes; Massar and Verbanck-Piérard, “Follow,” 276-7 asserts a clear-cut division between a perfume-seller and a perfume producer based on the Greek vocabulary, *murepsos* (perfume maker) and *muropoles* (perfume seller), and they assume that Midas ran a retail shop. Since the speaker’s use of the term *ergastērion* (workshop) implies potential productive activities, the terminological distinction is not as clear in the speech as they wish to see it.

hand, there are loans from creditors (*chrestai*), among which only Pankalos and Prokles' names are given since the total amount of the loans owed to them are small, but the rest of the creditors are not registered in the agreement by their names.³⁴⁸ As for the second and the largest kind of liabilities, Epikrates details *eranos* loans raised by loan-depositors, among which only the one organized by Dikaiokrates is recorded, but Athenogenes identified these depositors broadly as the clients (*prosphoitōntos*) of the shop.³⁴⁹ *Eranos* is normally explained as a – friendly – type of a loan without interest raised by a group of individuals and with preset periodical repayments;³⁵⁰ in the case of Midas, one can doubt the interest free, hence gratuitous, nature of such a debt as Midas was the slave operator of the shop, who, according to Epikrates, acquired everything thanks to these debts.³⁵¹ Indeed, the overall liabilities of the shop turned out to be five talents, a sum which points to a shop rather than a mere stall at the agora, and one large enough to have been producing, importing and selling perfumes simultaneously.³⁵²

The price information for perfumes could also help us to understand Midas' debts. Although we have several recipes for various perfumes, reconstructing prices is mostly not possible due to lack of evidence. In Delos, however, we have some comparative evidence for the price for *rhodinon*, rose perfume. From 302 to 169, 13

³⁴⁸ Hyp. 3.10; Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 295-6.

³⁴⁹ Hyp. 3.6, 11.

³⁵⁰ See Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 153-9; *contra* Cohen, *Economy*, 207-15.

³⁵¹ Hyp. 3.11. Most recently, Thomsen reevaluated the evidence and demonstrated that there were two – coexistent – kinds of *eranos* loans: one that was personally collected by the debtor from multiple, and preferably friendly, contacts; and the other was provided by an individual representing a group of creditors or a private association, in which case the loans seem less likely to have been interest-free. Midas' debts fit into the latter category rather than the former; Thomsen, "The *Eranistai*"; Cohen, *Economy*, 207-15; for a discussion of the clients' deposits, see Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 295-6. A comparative example can be found in Lysias' speech *Against Aeschines the Socratic* in which Aeschines seems to have collected *eranos* loans, credits and personal debts in order to set up a perfumery, but his *eranos* depositors were, unlike Midas' case, not his clients; Lys. *Against Aeschines the Socratic*, fr.1-4 (Carey).

³⁵² Finley, *Studies*, 68-9 and Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 297 n.5 see the shop as a mere market stall, despite the excessive amounts of the sums owed; cf. Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 294; van Alfen, *Pant'Agatha*, 215-6.

entries for *rhodinon* prices are preserved in the accounts of the sanctuary of Apollo.³⁵³ Although only two entries keep the exact amounts of perfumes obtained, 1,5 *kotulai*,³⁵⁴ it seems rather unlikely that the sanctuary would change the amount through time, but there is no way to prove or to reject this argument.³⁵⁵ If we assume 1,5 *kotulai* as the standard amount, then the prices range from 2 drachmas 2 obols to 5 drachmas 2 obols.³⁵⁶ Further price information comes from an anecdote told by Teles about Diogenes the Cynic;³⁵⁷ Diogenes takes his guest to a perfume shop in Athens and asks for the price of *kupros*, or *kuprinon* (henna perfume), and the price is one mina per *kotule*.³⁵⁸ If perfume was locally produced, what determined the price was mainly the number and amount of exotic ingredients needed for the recipe; *rhodinon* could be produced with an addition of only one imported ingredient in order to reduce the costs and target less well-to-do clients.³⁵⁹ In this regard, the debt of Midas' shop can be explained either by the unique talent of Midas to bankrupt a large business or, more realistically, by the particular production and retail orientation of the perfume shop which produced and sold perfumes with more exotic ingredients than cheaper versions like *rhodinon*.

In order to run such a shop with large expenses, we should expect Midas to have accumulated high levels of craft knowledge for maintaining operations efficiently. Although we often lack the evidence for the “tricks” of most other crafts, Theophrastus' study *On Odors* is exceptionally important because the treatise presents valuable insights into the craft of perfumers, and thus of Midas. In

³⁵³ *IG* xi 2 145.29; 161A.92-3; 161A.102; 203A.39; 206.17; 287A.54; *ID* 316.84; 338Aa.27; 354.66-7; 372A.79; 396A.72; 442A.184; 461Ab.4; see Reger, “The Manufacture,” 279 with notes.

³⁵⁴ 1 *kotule* = 0, 27 liter.

³⁵⁵ Reger, “The Manufacture,” 277-80; Bresson, *The Making*, 352, 514 n. 40.

³⁵⁶ For the price list, see Reger, “The Manufacture,” 279.

³⁵⁷ O'Neill, *Teles*, 13h; Athen. 15.691c-d supports the view of substantial prices for perfumes, and it exemplifies a price range of 2 to 10 minae per *kotule*.

³⁵⁸ *Kupros* as an expensive perfume listed by Theophrastus; see Theoph. *On Odors*, 31.

³⁵⁹ For a discussion of *rhodinon* recipe, see Reger, “The Manufacture,” 260-3.

compiling his work, Theophrastus seems to have supplemented his individual observation of some of the production phases with perfumers' reports, as we know from his purposeful utilization of direct and indirect speech.³⁶⁰ In one of his reported testimonies, Theophrastus informs us, "a certain perfumer said that he had had Egyptian perfume in his shop for eight years, and iris-perfume for twenty, and that it was still in good case, in fact better than fresh perfume".³⁶¹ Depending on the kind, aged perfumes would have been worth more than fresh ones, but the preservation techniques and conditions posed a serious challenge, especially during hot seasons in Athens. Perfumers achieved quality by keeping their perfumes in lead, stone or alabaster vessels and depositing them in the upper rooms of the building that did not have direct contact with the sun.³⁶² Theophrastus also reports that perfumes made of flowers, like *rhodinon*, did not last long enough to age,³⁶³ and the perfumers had to organize their stocks in order to avoid any spoilage that would incur material loss.

Cunning tricks were not missing in retailing. Perfumers had to be aware of the specific effects of certain perfumes on human senses in order to be able to sell their products:

If one has regard to the virtues of the perfumes in question, one may well be surprised at what happens in the case of rose-perfume: though it is lighter and less powerful than any other, if one has first been scented with it, it destroys the odor of the others. And this is why perfumers, if a purchaser hesitates and is not inclined to buy this perfume, scent him with it so that he is not able to smell the others.³⁶⁴

³⁶⁰ See the detailed discussion in Reger, "The Manufacture," 257-9 with notes.

³⁶¹ Theoph. *On Odors*, 38 (trans. Hort).

³⁶² Theoph. *On Odors*, 40-1.

³⁶³ Theoph. *On Odors*, 39.

³⁶⁴ Theoph. *On Odors*, 45 (trans. Hort).

Scenting the wrists of clients was not without a reason. According to Theophrastus, since the skinny nature of the wrist makes it colder than other body parts, perfumers were deliberately scenting the wrists of the customers in order to make sure that body-heat could not diminish the character of the perfume.³⁶⁵ Depending on the tastes and sex of his customers, we should imagine Midas also proposing alternatives to them. Theophrastus gives us glimpses of contemporary tastes and reports that the lightest perfumes, like *rhodinon* and *kupros*, were the best suited to men, while perfumes with more substantial character and strength, such as myrrh-perfume and *megaleion*,³⁶⁶ were more appropriate for women.³⁶⁷ The medical virtues of perfumes should not be neglected; *megaleion* was believed to relieve inflammation from wounds and *rhodinon* was excellent for ears.³⁶⁸ A perfumer had to have at least a very basic knowledge of perfumes' properties in order to recommend certain products. Midas presumably also stayed informed about recent inventions, prominent perfumers and imitations of well-known perfumes.³⁶⁹ Athenaeus' discussion of perfumes identifies some of the famous production centers: Egyptian henna-perfume, *rhodinon* from Phaselis, the saffron-perfume of Cilician Soli and Rhodes, and the nard-perfume of Tarsos were once regarded as the best of their kinds.³⁷⁰ The accumulation of such craft knowledge, or human capital, and his proficiency in deploying it kept Midas in control of such an establishment.

³⁶⁵ Theoph. *On Odors*, 53.

³⁶⁶ *Megalleion* was a perfume which was named after his inventor, Megallos; see Athen. 15.690f-691a.

³⁶⁷ Theoph. *On Odors*, 42, 53-6.

³⁶⁸ Theoph. *On Odors*, 35-6.

³⁶⁹ See Reger, "Formation of Taste," esp. 31-4 for the example of *megaleion*.

³⁷⁰ Athen. 15.688e-689e; these centers were not constant, and they changed over time; see Plin. *Nat.* 13.5-6.

3.2.2 Craft and its consequences

This craft knowledge accompanied by relatively loose supervision by masters seems to have enabled slaves to maintain control over their labor, to avoid alienation and to obtain power in terms of interpersonal power relations. As a slave working away from his master's immediate control and maintaining his craft, Midas was not alone. As we noted in Chapter 2, Timarchos inherited a workshop of shoemakers with nine or ten slaves who paid him two, in the case of their foreman three, obols a day.³⁷¹ In such an arrangement, slaves worked, and often lived, apart from their masters; in return, they had to pay a regular amount of money (*apophora*) determined by the master and they could keep the remaining sum to cover their business and life expenses; over time they might even accumulate enough capital for their manumission.³⁷² Athenian economic and political life encouraged such arrangements, especially for craft-production. The Athenian popular imagination relied on an ideal image of citizens who were expected to shun working under the authority of others, in repetitive and menial, hence "slavish", jobs, and they had instead to opt for self-employment, most prominently for farming, as the ideal form of labor.³⁷³ The expected labor deficiencies in economic cycles were ideally supplemented with the extensive use of the labor of slaves and metics; the former were especially seen as the most appropriate in operating large estates due to the supreme legal authority that a master exerted over his slaves.³⁷⁴

³⁷¹ Aesch. 1.97.

³⁷² For Athenogenes receiving monthly accounts for the shop, see Hyp. 3.19; for the most recent survey of slaves living apart, see Kamen, *Status*, 20-31. Kazakévich, "Were the χωρίς οἰκοῦντες slaves," 377-80 collects all the *apophora* related cases.

³⁷³ See also pp. 14-5, 27-8 above with notes.

³⁷⁴ Cohen, *Athenian Nation*, 143; for political and economic rationales, see Osborne, "Economics".

The loose supervision of masters was especially the case in large establishments whose owners were not familiar with the craft knowledge. In such instances, a form of occupational pride, as we saw in the example of the miner Atotas,³⁷⁵ could motivate slaves to hone their skills and feel more commitment to their craft. In Midas' case, however, there is not enough evidence to conclude that Athenogenes was not involved at all. Athenogenes, as the speaker claims, was allegedly the third generation of a perfumer family and he seems to have operated two other perfumeries;³⁷⁶ even after he had disposed of Midas' shop, the speaker could still find him hanging around the perfumeries in the agora.³⁷⁷ What kind of collaboration he envisioned between his other shops and how closely he supervised Midas remain unknown; nevertheless, even the speaker had to admit that Athenogenes received monthly accounts and his knowledge about the shops should have been based on these regular reports.³⁷⁸ Therefore, we should expect Midas to benefit from the lack of direct supervision unless his master had a reason to step into the business.

Access to and accumulation of economic capital, as noted above, is another consequence of craft activities. The most exceptional slaves in this regard were those owned by bankers: Pasion and Phormion, both slave bankers, gained not only their freedom but also Athenian citizenship by making extraordinary monetary contributions to the city.³⁷⁹ If we follow the traditional interpretation of *phialai* inscriptions, we have even more evidence for different occupational groups of slaves

³⁷⁵ See pp. 30-1 above.

³⁷⁶ Hyp. 3.3, 19; see also Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 318-21.

³⁷⁷ Hyp. 3.11.

³⁷⁸ Hyp. 3.19-22.

³⁷⁹ For Pasion, see Ch. 4 below; for Phormion, Dem. 36. Apart from these two examples, Xenon, Euphron, Euphraios, and Kallistratos, the slaves of the same bank, also seem to have been manumitted; Dem. 36.13-4.

who had access to more than enough financial means to obtain their freedom.³⁸⁰

Among them, two perfumers with a child, clearly a family, are also attested.³⁸¹ The inscription preserves the names of the freedmen, Hermonas and Habrosyne, who are both identified with their occupation as perfume sellers (*muropōlēn* and *muropōlin* respectively). Hermonas and Habrosyne were living in Piraeus, which could indicate the location of their shop, since their ex-master, Hippokrates, was also living in Piraeus. From the terms of the entry, we can deduce that Hippokrates was a metic himself because the mason described him as living in Piraeus.³⁸² We should further expect that Midas' craft should have provided him and his family with a form of monetary autonomy. Depending on the amount of the net profit, Midas and his family could have raised their quality of life so that it was better and more dignified than the lives of most chattel slaves.

Maintaining business operations in the agora necessitated the extension of social networks, and this situation contributes to our discussion of interpersonal relations as a context for social mobility. Slaves working apart from their masters had to acquire contacts for receiving materials needed for production, retailing manufactured goods, sharing and accumulating craft knowledge, and also for economic capital. Even though we often lack the evidence to demonstrate how slaves ran their establishments, Hyperides' speech sheds some light on Midas' contacts. Midas was apparently using Pankalos and Prokles as perfume suppliers, presumably among other men whose names are not indicated.³⁸³ Their status, whether they were citizens, metics or slaves, is unclear,³⁸⁴ nor do their names provide any

³⁸⁰ See p. 30 above with notes.

³⁸¹ *SEG XXV* 180 ll. 29-37; Meyer, *Metics*, 137-9.

³⁸² For the discussion of the formula for metics, see Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 6-10.

³⁸³ Hyp. 3.10.

³⁸⁴ Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 293.

prosopographic clue; nevertheless, both Pankalos and Prokles were collaborating with Midas and had him as a reliable business contact who could pay his debts. The *eranos* loan, as most part of his five talent reliability was recorded under this title, required even more trust in Midas and his expertise in running the shop as there were multiple individuals simultaneously lending money to him; he was, in return, successful enough in guaranteeing the funding necessary for operating the shop. Such business relations would also be useful in extra-market contexts because business and social relations could coalesce, and this intermingling of contacts provided slaves with social support if necessary.³⁸⁵

Apart from clients, depositors and associates as potential friends, recent research has demonstrated the very capability of slaves to form and maintain social ties in various contexts. Hunt has highlighted a form of ethnic identity that slaves could construct. As the ongoing slave trade from Phrygia replenished the Athenian unfree labor force, preserving a sense of his birth culture, speaking his mother tongue, fashioning supporting mechanisms in the absence of relatives, and accumulating enough capital with the help of his ethnic community to buy freedom were not ephemeral possibilities for Midas once he had gained a certain amount of autonomy from his master.³⁸⁶ In a religious context, slaves seem to have made group dedications with metics and citizens;³⁸⁷ such shared experiences could have reinforced social ties regardless of the legal statuses of the individuals involved, and they could have contributed to enhanced life chances in different aspects of life. More fundamentally, Midas had the privilege of having a family, a chance that most

³⁸⁵ See e.g. Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 65, with 61-67 for the relationship between bankers and their clients.

³⁸⁶ Hunt, "Trojan Slaves"; for Near Eastern slaves in Athens, see Lewis, "Near Eastern".

³⁸⁷ See e.g. *IG* ii² 2354; *IG* ii² 2934; *SEG* XXIV 223; for a detailed discussion, see Taylor, "Social Networks"; Parker, *Athenian Religion*, 337-42; Kamen, *Status*, 17, 30.

slaves lacked.³⁸⁸ The speaker does not mention Midas' partner, but tells us only that he had two sons, which give us no information about the mother.³⁸⁹ Transmission of craft knowledge and their active involvement in business operations could have provided Midas' sons with the chance of further mobility, especially after their manumission.³⁹⁰ The privilege of living in a family setting could, in turn, be exploited by the master with the threat of dissolving the family in case of opposition and of selling its members to separate individuals, but the importance of familial support for individual wellbeing is particularly important in understanding the conditions of slaves' lives.

The fragile nature of Midas' familial unity is indicative of his unprivileged legal status as a slave. In maintaining business operations independently, even if he was registered as the debtor, Midas had no legal persona which was liable for the debts that he incurred, and his position was merely as an agent for his master; it was the owner, Athenogenes, who had the ultimate responsibility for Midas' actions and debts in court.³⁹¹ Such a legal nullity could, at least in theory, have easily ended up with the master taking possession of slave's capital, but the surviving speech indicates that Midas did not experience such a radical intervention by his master.³⁹² What happened to Midas and his family, in this regard, is unknown. They were sold to Epikrates so that he could keep his promise to manumit all members of the family, but the speech does not provide any indication whether or not he really manumitted them.

³⁸⁸ Golden, "Slavery and the Greek Family," 143-6.

³⁸⁹ Hyp. 3.4-5, 24.

³⁹⁰ For Midas' sons' potential contribution to the business operations, see below.

³⁹¹ "... Crimes committed by slaves, and expenses they incur, shall be the responsibility of the master for whom the slaves are working"; Hyp. 3.22 (trans. Whitehead); Todd, *The Shape*, 187-8.

³⁹² Todd, *The Shape*, 188; a radical intervention by master is at odds with the very idea pertaining to such arrangements, that is to make investment without personal involvement and to motivate slaves with prospective rewards of working apart from the master; see Cohen, *Athenian Nation*, 143.

3.3 Beauty, emotional appeal and slave power

Although craft and knowledge fundamentally enhanced the capabilities of Midas and his family, they were not the only causes of the family's social mobility; instead, the main plot of the narrative draws our attention to the potential outcomes of a relationship formed between a slave boy and a free man. Epikrates' narrative is quite explicit: he pursued Midas' son and was refused as the boy wanted his whole family's manumission; this rejection initiated the chain of events that resulted in the court case, hence our speech. The relationship between the leisured Epikrates and the slave boy reminds us, at first glance, of an instance of a world turned upside-down. Epikrates, as a citizen with more than enough financial means, was attracted to a slave boy who refused to stay with him, as if the boy had authority for the last word on this issue. Indeed, the boy was the property of Athenogenes, and it was he who was to give the ultimate decision; nevertheless, Epikrates first chose to convince the boy, instead of immediately appealing to his master. For Epikrates, at least, this implies that their relationship was not an immediate issue of property. Midas' son, in return, acted accordingly: he demanded his whole family's manumission as a condition for moving to Epikrates' house. How could the boy, as a slave who did not have the legal authority over his life, bargain his status with an individual other than his master, and persuade him to spend 4000 drachmas and to manumit his whole family? If we simply take this instance as an exceptional case of the "world turned upside-down", we then overlook an important factor of social mobility: the power derived from beauty, (sexual) attractiveness, sociability and emotional appeal.

Our knowledge about Midas' son and his first encounter with Epikrates is almost absent. The missing parts of the manuscript may be responsible for this situation as, at the very outset of the speech, we find Epikrates having reached the middle of his narrative when he had finished his report about the earlier events pertaining presumably to his encounter with the boy.³⁹³ Nevertheless, the boy seems to have cohabited with his family and probably was expected to contribute his father's operations. There were various ways that he could help: he could sit under a simple parasol and sell perfumes apart from their shop, especially near the places where perfumes were used, such as cemeteries, sanctuaries and gymnasia.³⁹⁴ He could also stay at the shop, assist his father, and learn the details of the craft. His active participation in business activities and his presence at the shop would explain his first encounter with Epikrates. Perfumeries, like other shops in the agora, acted as places for individuals to come together and chat; they seem to have been even more appealing than other shops because perfume was distinguished by being a part of conspicuous consumption habits, which differentiated the profile of clients from those of other shops that provided basic needs, like the shop of a butcher or a tanner.³⁹⁵ Aristophanes' *Knights*, for example, caricaturizes leisured young males sitting in the perfume shops and gossiping:

Demos

None shall ascend the rostrum, unless his chin is bearded.

Sausage-Seller

What then will become of Cleisthenes and of Strato?

Demos

I wish only to refer to those youths who loll about the perfume shops, babbling at random, "What a clever fellow is Phaeax! How cleverly he

³⁹³ Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 279.

³⁹⁴ Athen. 13.612a; Massar and Verbanck-Piérard, "Follow," 276-7.

³⁹⁵ Lewis, *News*, 17.

escaped death! How concise and convincing is his style! What phrases! How clear and to the point! How well he knows how to quell an interruption!”

Sausage-Seller

I thought you were the lover of those fairies.

Demos

The gods forefend it! and I will force all such fellows to go hunting instead of proposing decrees.³⁹⁶

Theophrastus’ obnoxious man could be an extreme caricature of a leisured male, a person without any respect for others, who does not bother to act in an orderly fashion and conspicuously displaying what he possesses. When he needs company, he knows the right address:

He goes shopping for himself, and hires flute-girls, and he shows his purchases to anyone he meets and invites them to share. He stands by the barbershop or perfume seller (*muropōlion*) and relates that he intends to get drunk.³⁹⁷

As far as socialization in the shops is concerned, however, our sources tend to focus merely on citizens, and this situation caused Lewis to conclude that slaves were not involved in all these discussions and were denied access to knowledge.³⁹⁸ The untenable nature of this argument has been demonstrated, especially by Vlassopoulos and Gottesman, and the salience of legal status in daily interactions can now be regarded as less significant depending on the circumstances, particularly in market contexts.³⁹⁹ Epikrates’ profile fits neatly into the type of leisured man:

³⁹⁶ Aritoph. *Knights*, 1373-84 (trans. O’Neill).

³⁹⁷ Theoph. *Characters*, 11 (trans. Rusten and Cunningham); cf. Athen. 13.612a.

³⁹⁸ Lewis argues, “slaves at the lowest rank, were not expected to take part in any exchange of information at all”; moreover, “they were both disenfranchised within the polis, and, uniquely, subject to the systematic withholding of information”. As for the presence of metics, Lewis admits that they were present, as shopkeepers and craftsmen; see Lewis, *News*, 19-23.

³⁹⁹ Vlassopoulos, “Free Spaces”; Gottesman, *Politics*, 44-63; Deene, “Let’s Work Together”.

although he appeals to the ideal citizen typology of the Athenian popular imagination and depicts himself as a humble farmer, his financial laxity, so much so that he was able to manumit three slaves for 4000 drachmas without any financial returns expected, contradicts his arguments.⁴⁰⁰ He was not alone in manumitting slaves for sexual and emotional pleasure and spending large sums for this purpose; Isocrates reacts to similar attitudes of contemporary figures:

The race of sycophants is so hostile to everyone that far from reproaching those who spend twenty or thirty minas to buy the freedom of (*lusomenoi*) women who will consume the rest of their household, instead they rejoice at their lavishness; but if someone spends anything on his own education, the sycophants say they are being corrupted.⁴⁰¹

Apart from manumission as an outcome, beauty and attractiveness played a crucial role in different contexts. As we noted in Chapters 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, Aeschines connects all of Timarchos' potential affairs with his exceptional beauty and attractiveness, and it was his evil ways of using these personal qualities that made Timarchos the villain of the narrative. In contrast, Aeschines also refers to various boys, like Kriton, the son of Astyochos, and Perikleides of Perithoidai, whose outstanding good looks attracted the largest number of lovers, but their decency and that of their lovers distinguished them as good lovers of a morally acceptable relationship.⁴⁰² Aspasia, the well-known *hetaira* of Pericles, was of great beauty and charm,⁴⁰³ but, at the same time, Plutarch alludes to her exceptional talents, knowledge and sociability in the sense of having cultivated conversations with her

⁴⁰⁰ Hyp. 3.26; Whitehead, *Hyperides*, 328-9; Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 116-21.

⁴⁰¹ Isoc. 15.288 (trans. Too, slightly adapted).

⁴⁰² Aesch. 1.155-7.

⁴⁰³ Plut. *Per.*, 24.2-10; Athen. 13.589d; Cohen, *Athenian Prostitution*, 62; Kennedy, *Immigrant*, 68-96, 150-3.

lovers. Such an awareness in the power of social skills in interpersonal relations apparently affected Neaira's training:⁴⁰⁴ her ex-master, Nikarate, "was very shrewd at sizing up the physical attributes little girls would develop, an experienced expert at raising and educating them. That was the craft she had developed, and from it she made her living".⁴⁰⁵ Emotional appeal is another expected outcome of a relationship regardless of legal status. A master and his slave could foster an intimacy,⁴⁰⁶ especially when the slave gave birth to her master's child,⁴⁰⁷ or, as in the example of Epikrates, an outsider would step into the picture and buy or manumit the slave in order to set him/her up in his house.⁴⁰⁸

In discussing the ways in which personal qualities like beauty, attractiveness and sociability affected interpersonal power relations, recent studies in sociology acknowledge their potent power in social life,⁴⁰⁹ as well as their influence on subjective wellbeing.⁴¹⁰ The importance of these elements in appearances and attitudes becomes especially relevant as individuals tend to associate high levels of attractiveness with high levels of other characteristics, like status, knowledge or economic capital.⁴¹¹ In the case of Athenian society, we should not ignore such tendencies; as Pseudo-Xenophon's well-known remark indicates, as early as the late fifth century, there were some Athenian slaves who were not distinguishable by their outlooks and clothes:

⁴⁰⁴ Neaira's story, see [Dem]. 59.

⁴⁰⁵ [Dem]. 59.18 (trans. Bers).

⁴⁰⁶ For the intimacy between master and slave, Lys. 1.12; cf. Isae. 6.18-21; for comparative perspective, see Patterson, *Slavery*, 228-32.

⁴⁰⁷ See Golden, "Slavery and the Greek Family," esp. 146-52; see also Golden, "Slavery and Homosexuality".

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. [Dem]. 59.29.

⁴⁰⁹ See e.g. Hakim, "Erotic Capital"; see also, Hakim, "Honey Money".

⁴¹⁰ Requena, "Erotic Capital".

⁴¹¹ Requena, "Erotic Capital," 14.

Now among the slaves and metics at Athens there is the greatest uncontrolled wantonness; you can't hit them there, and a slave will not stand aside for you. I shall point out why this is their native practice: if it were customary for a slave (or metic or freedman) to be struck by one who is free, you would often hit an Athenian citizen by mistake on the assumption that he was a slave. For the people there are no better dressed than the slaves and metics, nor are they any more handsome.⁴¹²

Reframed in this way, beauty, attractiveness, sociability and emotional appeal would result in distinctly enhanced life chances; individuals could form social ties, exert influence and authority, negotiate their life circumstances and attempt to enhance their personal capabilities.⁴¹³ Our literary sources mirror various instances of such cases, particularly in relation to female *pornai* and *hetairai*. Access to economic capital is an immediate outcome. Neaira's accumulated wealth, with the contributions of her lovers, allowed her to buy her freedom for 2000 drachmas;⁴¹⁴ the other slaves at Nikarate's house – Anteia, Stratola, Aristokleia, Metaneira, Phila, Isthmias – were also all manumitted with the help of their lovers.⁴¹⁵ Nikarate herself is an ideal exemplar: once a slave, she gained her freedom and then exploited the sexual labor of girls in such a way as to enjoy an extravagant lifestyle.⁴¹⁶ When personal capital did not suffice to cover manumission costs, slaves could persuade their lovers to pay for their manumission. Although he already had a citizen wife, Apollodoros paid for his *hetaira*'s manumission and gave away another *hetaira* in

⁴¹² Ps-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.10 (trans. Marchant).

⁴¹³ Cohen, "Slave Power" articulates the ways in which slaves in Athens could obtain power, but he is mainly concerned with the accumulated wealth of slaves and its potential consequences in terms of power relationships between free and unfree individuals.

⁴¹⁴ [Dem]. 59.29-32. The procedure of manumission attested here is what Kamen described as a fictive sale. In these arrangements, a third party pays the master for the slave's freedom, whether with slave's money or with his own. It was fictive because the purchaser does not exercise any property right over the slave, but only proceeds the transaction necessary for slave to become free; see Kamen, "Sale". Slaves manumitted through this process do not seem to have had any remaining legal obligation to their manumitters or ex-masters; see especially Glazebrook, "The Erotics"; Kamen, "Sale," 297; Meyer, *Metics*, 25 n. 61; Kapparis, *Apollodoros*, 232-3.

⁴¹⁵ [Dem]. 59.19-20.

⁴¹⁶ [Dem]. 59.18-20, 29.

marriage.⁴¹⁷ Abundant references collected by Athenaeus in his *Deipnosophistai* support the exceptional outcomes of these relationships; prominent fourth-century figures, like Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes and Hyperides provided their *hetairai* with exceptional life chances.⁴¹⁸ For example:

Hyperides the orator, having driven his son Glaucippos out of his house, received into it that most extravagant courtesan (*hetairan*) Myrrhina, and kept her in the city; and he also kept Aristagora in the Peiraeus, and Phila at Eleusis, whom he bought for a very large sum, and then emancipated; and after that he made her his housekeeper, as Idomeneus relates. But, in his oration in defense of Phryne, Hyperides confesses that he is in love with the woman; and yet, before he had got cured of that love, he introduced the above-mentioned Myrrhina into his house.⁴¹⁹

Our sources often highlight the agency of dominant male lovers in undertaking such promises, but we need to be skeptical of the emphasis on the male voice and to consider the potential power of slaves in demanding and negotiating certain gifts from the lovers. Lysias, for instance, was known to be a lover of Metaneira, another slave of Nikarate's house; their relationship reached such a level that Lysias promised to initiate her in the Eleusinian Mysteries and paid all the expenses related to the festival and the cult at Eleusis.⁴²⁰ Simos the Thessalian, in a similar fashion, took Neaira to Athens in order to attend the Great Panathenaia.⁴²¹ Since Metaneira and Neaira were in the more advantageous position of having lovers rather than a constantly changing clientele, like that of much-maltreated sex workers, a perpetual relationship could very easily have resulted in emotional proximity. The case of Olympiodoros is particularly illuminating: he was accused of keeping a

⁴¹⁷ Dem. 36.45. The text does not clarify how Apollodoros could give away a *hetaira* in marriage. Presumably, as in the case of Neaira's ex-lovers, he could have paid the amount needed for her manumission and/or provided other expenses related to marriage; [Dem]. 59.29-30.

⁴¹⁸ Athen. 13.566-599; for Lysias, 13.592c; for Isocrates, 592b-d; for Demosthenes, 13.592e-f.

⁴¹⁹ Athen. 13.590c-d (trans. Yonge); Kamen, "Sale," 298.

⁴²⁰ [Dem]. 59.21.

⁴²¹ [Dem]. 59.24.

hetaira instead of marrying a citizen wife, but the speaker also argues that his *hetaira* is to be blamed for all the troubles:

Olympiodoros here, judges, has never wed an Athenian woman in accordance with your laws, and he has no children now and never has had any; instead, he keeps in his house a courtesan (*hetairan*) whose freedom he bought, and she is the one who is harming all of us and leading him further along the road to madness.⁴²²

The restrictions in the Athenian laws on marriage prevented citizens from marrying non-citizens, if they were to produce legitimate heirs, and, therefore, Olympiodoros could not marry his *hetaira*, even if he personally manumitted her.⁴²³ In the absence of legal arrangements, Olympiodoros' unnamed *hetaira* could still live in a form of union and exert influence over her lover. Similar arrangements are attested elsewhere in our sources. Neaira, for instance, was able to cohabit with Stephanos at least until the trial.⁴²⁴ A certain Alke, retired from the sex business because of her age, cultivated a relationship with the old, yet prosperous, Euktemon. He set Alke in control of his apartment block (*sunioikia*), then left his house and started living with her in spite of his whole family's opposition; Alke, in return, profited from Euktemon's monetary power, and she reportedly attempted to register her son born from another man as a citizen under Euktemon's name.⁴²⁵

Although a homosexual love affair would seem less advantageous because of its temporary nature without the potential of prospective reproduction, it could provide young lovers with exceptional gifts.⁴²⁶ As I discussed in Chapter 2.2.1,

⁴²² Dem. 48.53 (trans. Scafuro).

⁴²³ For the most recent evaluation, see Kennedy, *Immigrant*, 12-26; Bakewell, "Forbidding".

⁴²⁴ [Dem]. 59.

⁴²⁵ Isae. 6, esp. 19-22.

⁴²⁶ Kamen, "Sale," 298 n. 87.

Aeschines accuses certain boys of receiving money and gifts in exchange of their sexual favors to lovers, and the expectation of the dominant lover's support in different contexts is highly anticipated. In a more privileged case, Autolykos relied on the wealth and power of his lover Kallias for his athletic training, which led to his winning prizes, and later for his entry into the politics.⁴²⁷ Another example is Theodotos of Lysias' speech *Against Simon*; he enchanted two lovers who gave a fierce fight in order to win him over:

We were both attracted, members of the Council, to Theodotos, a young man from Plataea. I expected to win him over by treating him well, but Simon thought that by behaving arrogantly and lawlessly he would force him to do what he wanted.⁴²⁸

To protect Theodotos from Simon, the speaker had to take the boy away and leave the city for some time. His attempts ended up in vain as, once Simon heard that they were back, he immediately rushed into the house where Theodotos was staying and attempted to take him away.⁴²⁹ Even though Theodotos' status, whether he was a slave or metic, remains unclear, his case is indicative of his advantageous position in interpersonal power relations, and this enabled him to negotiate his expectations, to gain support and protection of his lover, and to demand a comfortable shelter that he might otherwise have lacked.

These examples of how an individual, often unfree, benefitted substantially from beauty, attractiveness and sociability implies various consequences for Midas' son. He was, first of all, able to exert enough influence to make negotiations over his life chances. Even though the boy did not have any legal authority over his body, the

⁴²⁷ Xen. *Sym.* 2.5-7, 3.12-3, 8.36-41; Fisher, "Gymnasia," 99.

⁴²⁸ Lys. 3.5 (trans. Todd).

⁴²⁹ Lys. 10-4.

power derived from attractiveness and emotional proximity put him in a privileged position when he was responding to Epikrates' demands. He could put forward conditions, demand their fulfillment and then renegotiate his liaison with Epikrates in such a way that the speaker at the time was not in a position to challenge the terms of Midas' son to bargain over Athenogenes' extraordinary monetary demands. He could, as a result, persuade Epikrates to spend 4000 drachmas and to manumit his whole family.

How he was, or was not, manumitted, however, would make a difference as it was going to affect his life afterward. When Epikrates tried to manumit the family by paying for their freedom, Athenogenes convinced him not to do so but, instead, to buy them outright because there was a very important nuance between the two procedures, as the speaker reports Athenogenes saying:

I shall sell them to you outright. That way, nobody can bother you or corrupt the boy, and they themselves will not try any tricks because of fear. Best of all, though, as things stand now they would think it was I who had brought about their liberation, whereas if you buy them outright and then grant them their freedom later, when it suits you, they will be grateful to you twice over (*diplasian exousin soi tēn charin*).⁴³⁰

What the word *charis*, gratitude, signifies here remains ambiguous: the intended meaning seems to be slaves' gratefulness in exchange of their freedom, but manumission could have real life consequences as manumitted slaves often had further obligations toward their ex-masters. In the case of not fulfilling their responsibilities, slaves could be prosecuted in court by their former owners.⁴³¹ Such

⁴³⁰ Hyp. 3.5-6 (trans. Whitehead).

⁴³¹ The procedure is *dikē apostasiou*, prosecution for deserting or leaving, and if slaves cannot prove their total freedom, they were to be re-enslaved; see Zelnick-Abramowitz, *Not Wholly Free*, 274-292; cf. Kamen, *Status*, 32-42.

an arrangement, that is the purchase of slaves instead of immediate manumission, would have limited Midas' son's capabilities, especially from a legal perspective. When Neaira was not treated well by Phrynion, her manumitter, she was able to take refuge to Megara;⁴³² Midas' son probably did not have this right as his manumitter was likely to be his new master, Epikrates, and this arrangement put him in control of the boy's right of physical mobility.⁴³³

In the absence of evidence, there is indeed no way to trace what exactly happened afterwards, but comparative evidence suggests plausible ends. Theodotos' case, as well as those of female *hetairai* discussed above, highlights the importance of the continuing relationship in their capacity to foster emotional ties, which would result in enhanced capabilities in different contexts. Like the speaker of Lysias 3, Epikrates does not make any reference to a wife or a child, a situation which implies that Midas' son could remain in constant physical proximity with his lover to such an extent that he could maintain, and even increase, his power and enjoy more personal autonomy. Economic capital could be the most anticipated result: he could draw money from Epikrates, demand a lavishly furnished life and even support his family by channeling some material favors from his lover to them. We should expect a better life quality in terms of nutrition, physical and mental security to influence his subjective wellbeing. Later life chances need to be considered as well. When Epikrates was expected to marry and Midas' son became too old (or less desirable?) for a relationship, they had to transform their unity, if not put an end to it. Such a breakup was the case, for instance, for Neaira's lovers, Timanoridas and Eukrates. They bought Neaira in order not pay Nikarate large sums, but, when they were about to marry, Timanoridas and Eukrates asked Neaira to find money to buy her freedom

⁴³² [Dem]. 59.35-6.

⁴³³ Kamen, *Status*, 36-40.

instead of selling her outright; afterwards, she could rely on her ex-lovers' support in order to gain her freedom.⁴³⁴ If Midas' son reached this stage, he could presumably secure his lover's support, as well as that of his friends and of his family, if they had had been manumitted altogether, in order to strive to maintain his obtained capabilities and achieved quality of life.

3.4 Conclusion

The case study of Midas and his family contributes to our overall discussion on social mobility in evaluating the importance of interpersonal and individual power relations. As a slave, Midas' access to and accumulation of craft knowledge enabled him to pursue a life that a modern reader with a legal focus on the institution of slavery would very easily fail to observe. His expertise privileged Midas in social relations as well as in dealing with his master Athenogenes, who entrusted him with a large business operation with the stipulation that Midas had obtained more than enough knowledge, experience and skills in running the business and the minimal supervision of the master would prevent any business failure. Such an individual autonomy in living and working apart had material consequences, as Midas paid his master a regular sum and accumulated the remaining money after covering his business expenses, and social returns, visible especially in his extension of social networks. Equally important was his ability to live in a family setting, an opportunity that most slaves lacked.

The significance of the family's unity becomes especially relevant for our discussion because the encounter of Midas' son with Epikrates paved the way to the

⁴³⁴ [Dem]. 59.29-30.

family's prospective manumission. Their relationship draws our attention to the potent power of beauty, attractiveness, sociability in the context of emotional and sexual relationships. As discussed with respect to the comparative evidence, in spite of his fragile legal status as a slave, Midas' son was in a privileged position so that he could demand his whole family's manumission as a condition for moving into Epikrates' house, he also asked for fulfillment of his conditions, discussed and renegotiated his current and prospective position in the relationship. Such a power exerted on lovers would return exceptionally enhanced life chances in the form of economic capital, social support, and higher standards of living.

CHAPTER 4

BANK, FORMS OF CAPITAL AND SOCIAL MOBILITY:

THE CASE OF PASION

4.1 Introduction

Sometime after 394, a young man from Bosporan elite circles, whom we know only by his patronymic as the son of Sopaïos, appealed to the Athenian courts and prosecuted a banker, namely Pasion, with the charge of misappropriating his money at the bank.⁴³⁵ This occasion is the very first instance in which we hear about Pasion, who then became one of the most well-known and richest bankers of Athens. At the time of the speech, Pasion seems to have been a well-connected and highly reputable banker; the speaker had relied on Pasion's standing and deposited so much money that Pasion, allegedly, could provide surety for seven talents on his behalf, with the stipulation that he had enough deposits to cover the perils of such a financial burden.⁴³⁶ Subsequently, thanks to his son Apollodoros' active involvement in Athenian politics with a highly litigious career,⁴³⁷ we learn even more about Pasion's personal and business life. He was originally a slave working under the bankers Antisthenes and Archestratos, who later manumitted Pasion on account of his honesty and industriousness.⁴³⁸ After the manumission, he took control of his masters' bank, developed it into an extremely profitable commercial establishment and accumulated a huge amount of economic capital.⁴³⁹ We also learn from

⁴³⁵ Isoc. 17. For a discussion on the son of Sopaïos, see below.

⁴³⁶ Isoc. 17.43-4; Shipton, "The Private Banks," 415 n. 124.

⁴³⁷ Trevett, *Apollodoros*; Davies, *APF*, 427-442.

⁴³⁸ Dem. 36.43-4, 48.

⁴³⁹ For a discussion of his material achievements, see below.

Apollodoros' speech *Against Stephanos* that Pasion gained Athenian citizenship in return for his exceptional services toward the city.⁴⁴⁰ Apollodoros' court speeches also give us a glimpse of the bank's clientele and Pasion's friends: apart from the young member of the Bosporan elite, we come across a renowned Athenian general, a *proxenos* of the Herakleians, foreign merchants, various citizens and resident foreigners.⁴⁴¹

The relatively abundant evidence about Pasion and his family has influenced the family's reception in the scholarship. Apollodoros' court cases in pursuit of collecting the unpaid debts after his father's death and the way in which he described the monetary transactions have been analyzed in relation to the overall nature of lending and borrowing in ancient Athens.⁴⁴² We have, on the one hand, Millett's *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens* that relies on the roles of friends in providing financial means through *eranoi* and other types of loans and marginalizes the role of the banks in economy: "common sense suggests the ways in which people with cash to spare would normally focus their lending on to fellow-citizens with whom they were directly acquainted. Such personal knowledge would typically depend on ties of kinship, locality and friendship – or a combination of all three".⁴⁴³ This position, which can be traced back to Finley's *The Ancient Economy*,⁴⁴⁴ has been contested by Cohen and Shipton, both of whom individually demonstrated the misleadingly trivializing portrayal of the banking's role in the overall economy.⁴⁴⁵ The assumptions derived from the economic arguments have resulted in divergent

⁴⁴⁰ [Dem]. 45.85 with Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 24-25 n. 10; see below for a discussion of his benefactions.

⁴⁴¹ For a discussion, see below.

⁴⁴² For a critical survey of the literature, see Shipton, "The Private Banks," 396-401.

⁴⁴³ Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 40; for a detailed discussion, see also 109-159.

⁴⁴⁴ Finley, *The Ancient Economy*, 48.

⁴⁴⁵ Cohen, *Economy and Society*; Shipton, "The Private Banks".

interpretations of the social reality. From Millett's perspective, a banker becomes nothing more than a "non-citizen substitute for the services usually performed by citizens and friends".⁴⁴⁶ Due to the marginalized role of banks in his account, Millett underestimates the potential relationships between bankers and their clients; his reading of the sources is heavily oriented towards the invention of bankers and their clients as desperate individuals without any friends to aid them.⁴⁴⁷ The more inclusive readings of Cohen and Shipton underline the *personal* nature of the banking business, and acknowledge the significance of social networks developed by bankers.⁴⁴⁸ In line with the latter tradition, in this chapter, I will first examine Pasion's mobility in economic and social contexts, and then the ways in which these upward movements promoted his mobility in cultural and honorific realms. As I shall demonstrate, mobility in these different contexts was intricately connected so that Pasion could deploy these assets to facilitate further social cohesion and gain grants beyond citizenship. In the second half of this chapter, the case of Pasion will allow us to focus on the relative importance of naturalization for social mobility. By taking his naturalization as another turning point of his life, I shall examine the contexts in which his naturalization did or did not affect his capabilities and functionings, as well as those of his relatives.

⁴⁴⁶ Then Millett continues: "over time a bond of *philia* might develop between banker and client", an explanation which leaves no possibility for bankers and their clients having earlier friendly contacts, and ignores the already existing networks of the bankers; Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 212.

⁴⁴⁷ Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 213-5.

⁴⁴⁸ See Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 61-67 for the relationship between bankers and their clients, and 171-183 for socially prominent clients of the bankers; Shipton, "The Private Banks," 420-2; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 155-60.

4.2 Mobility in multiple contexts

4.2.1 Economic mobility and the world of banks

According to Demosthenes, “the bank is an operation with a risky income based on other people’s money”.⁴⁴⁹ Indeed, the speaker of the speech *For Phormion* claims that a failure was not a distant possibility, and he recalls the examples of bankers, such as Sosinomos, Timodemos, as well as unnamed individuals, who had to deploy all their possessions to settle disputes with their depositors.⁴⁵⁰ Pasion, however, was much more successful. After his death, we learn the details of the family’s accumulated wealth from various court speeches connected with Apollodoros’ litigations. In Demosthenes’ speech *For Phormion*, we are told that Pasion’s properties were worth 20 talents,⁴⁵¹ and the amount of cash out on loan reached more than 50 talents, of which 11 talents amounted to the deposits of the clients and the remaining 39 talents belonged to Pasion’s personal capital.⁴⁵² As for his property, we know of two apartment blocks (*sunoiikia*), one of which he left to Apollodoros⁴⁵³ and the other to his wife Archippe,⁴⁵⁴ and a house in Piraeus.⁴⁵⁵ The rent for Pasion’s shield factory and bank as determined in Phormion’s lease gives us a sense of how

⁴⁴⁹ Dem. 36.11 (trans. MacDowell); cf. Isoc. 17.9.

⁴⁵⁰ Dem. 36.50. Phormion was once a slave of Pasion’s bank. With his manumission, however, he took charge of the bank by leasing it from Pasion, and he then gained such a fortune that he received Athenian citizenship as a result of his benefactions; see Davies, *APF*, 435-7.

⁴⁵¹ Dem. 36.5-6; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 27-31, 162-3 collected the earlier discussions on the topic. Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 129-36, 183-9 interprets the same chapters as part of his overall conceptualization of the formulaic opposition between “landed” and “maritime” loans and argues that 50 talents were in maritime loans and the remaining 20 talents were in landed loans, instead of translating the latter as property (*eggeios ousia*). Although Cohen’s overall argument about bankers’ involvement in the maritime loan market seems persuasive, the Demosthenic chapters under discussion are not as explicit as to fit into his overall position on the debate on maritime credits.

⁴⁵² Dem. 36.5.

⁴⁵³ Dem. 36.35. Apollodoros had properties in three demes, but we cannot ascertain whether or not he inherited all of these or if he purchased them on a later date; [Dem]. 50.8; cf. Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 162-3.

⁴⁵⁴ [Dem]. 45.28.

⁴⁵⁵ [Dem]. 52.13.

lucrative these operations could be: the bank brought 100 minae and the shield factory 60 minae per year.⁴⁵⁶ The total amounts that these operations yielded, however, must have been higher because the lessee had to profit from the agreement after having covered the maintenance costs; these included the slaves' living expenses, the rent of the establishments, and the material resources required in the case of the shield factory. In addition, the speaker of the speech *For Phormion* claims that the Apollodoros' share in the properties should also return him 30 minae per year. As the speaker could have maximized the numbers in such a way as to strengthen his position in the trial and to depict Apollodoros as the ultimate squanderer, a concise accounting is not plausible, but Trevett's conservative estimate of 70 talents as the minimum value for the family's overall fortune at this time seems reasonable.⁴⁵⁷

Structural and contextual explanations could, although partly, account for such exceptional enrichment in a single generation. The monetization of the economy and the use of coinage in daily transactions favored Athenian banks as the businesses not only for depositing and borrowing money, but also for coin exchange, which could provide a steady income, although the extent of its profitability remains unclear in Athenian banking operations.⁴⁵⁸ That the influx of foreign merchants into the city created a constant demand for money exchange, as well as continuous practical troubles, led the Athenians to enact a law to regulate the ways in which market officials were to resolve disputes concerning the authenticity of coins,⁴⁵⁹ the decree was to be put between the tables of bankers and money-exchangers whom the

⁴⁵⁶ Dem. 36.11.

⁴⁵⁷ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 31.

⁴⁵⁸ Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 216-7 highlights the lucrative aspects of coin exchange by bankers but his emphasis on this particular aspect is an inseparable part of his general position to trivialize the role of the banks in the overall economy; *contra* Shipton, "The Private Banks".

⁴⁵⁹ R&O 25.

regulations most concerned. Coin exchange could also attract foreign merchants as clients; we hear, for instance, that a Herakleian merchant deposited money in Pasion's bank, "like the other merchants".⁴⁶⁰ The general demand for depositing in and lending from the banks seems to have been the main source of income for bankers. The amount of profit that deposits yielded is missing in our evidence,⁴⁶¹ but, instead of returns, putting money under a banker's control could help Athenian liturgists in different ways. As we noted in Chapter 2.2.3, bankers could backup those "artful tax dodgers" in their efforts to evade liturgies by depositing their liquid wealth, since it was not made public nor counted among their visible properties.

Before leasing the bank to Phormion, Pasion's bank had 11 talents of the clients' deposits on loan, but more than 39 talents of loans derived from Pasion's own resources.⁴⁶² The yields of 50 talents would hinge on the kind of credits, whether they were landed or maritime, in which they were invested in. From a short-term perspective, the almost standard landed credit rate of one percent per month seems to have been relatively cheap, but, if the loan was not paid in a month or so, such a credit would give bankers less risky and profitable opportunities for enrichment.⁴⁶³ The arrangements of these credits varied depending on borrowers' profiles, their relationship with bankers and, of course, the context. Timotheos, the renowned fourth-century Athenian general, appealed to Pasion when he ran short of funds to pay the troops and provide supplies,⁴⁶⁴ as well as when he was in need of an immediate money supply to entertain his distinguished guests from abroad.⁴⁶⁵ We

⁴⁶⁰ [Dem]. 52.3.

⁴⁶¹ See the discussion in Shipton, "The Private Banks," 415-6 with notes; Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 238-41 rejects the idea that interest was paid on deposits.

⁴⁶² Dem. 36.5.

⁴⁶³ Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 104-5; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 58-60.

⁴⁶⁴ [Dem]. 49.6-8.

⁴⁶⁵ [Dem]. 49.22; for Timotheos' loans, see below.

also know that Pasion lent money to a merchant named Philondas to cover the freight charges of a cargo of wood, but the detailed arrangements of this particular loan remain obscure.⁴⁶⁶ A banker's profitability differed depending on the interest arrangements between lender and borrower and the duration of time until the debt was discharged. Maritime credits, however, due both to the risk involved in shipping and to the overall profitability of trade, were much more lucrative. Whether Athenian banks provided maritime credit or not has been contested, but Cohen's detailed study of the topic proved that bankers were also involved in maritime finance.⁴⁶⁷ This aspect of the banking business is especially important in explaining how profitable a bank could be. Unlike landed credit, interest, or "yields" as Cohen translated the word *tokos*, for maritime credit reached twelve to thirty percent, depending on the degree of risk and profit expectations.⁴⁶⁸ A fixed amount was determined in advance for the whole journey instead of relying on a time-based calculation of interest that would disadvantage the merchants in case of contingencies like unexpected weather conditions or pirate attacks which would delay their arrival at the promised port. As for such cases, the surviving contract in Demosthenes' speech *Against Lakritos* indicates that the exact amount of merchants' repayment would be recalculated if they had to jettison some of their goods or if enemies or pirates seized the ship and confiscated the cargo,⁴⁶⁹ a grave risk that bankers ought to have taken into consideration while negotiating the terms and the yields of the loan. Our evidence does not help us to ascertain to what extent Pasion deployed the deposits of more than 50 talents in maritime and landed credits; the personal, and thus highly negotiable, nature of the lending and borrowing prevent us from developing a

⁴⁶⁶ [Dem]. 49.35.

⁴⁶⁷ Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 111-183; Shipton, "The Private Banks," 419-20 with notes.

⁴⁶⁸ Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 34 n. 70, 131; cf. Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 104-5.

⁴⁶⁹ Dem. 35.11.

concise account of Pasion's capital accumulation. Nevertheless, this highly personalized aspect of banking operations allowed bankers to rely on their reputation, credibility, and the help of friends to develop their businesses, as well as to profit from these relations in various contexts, the consequences of which could manifest themselves outside banks.

4.2.2 Between Friends and Clients

The significance of Pasion's social networks, and of his consequent accumulation of social capital, needs special treatment. The banking business, as was recognized by Cohen, centered on the persona of the banker: "The banker's personal network of friends and his prestige as a professional were as significant as even the possession of vast monetary resources. Indeed, banking was so intensely personalized at Athens that business and social relations tended to coalesce".⁴⁷⁰ Shipton similarly argues that "the effect of the private banks is thus to link together different areas of the ancient economy: landed with non-landed, citizen with metic, Athenian with non-Athenian".⁴⁷¹ Reframed in this way, economic and social capital are inseparable: friends were able to deposit their money at the bank or to borrow with or without interest, or they could introduce new clients and extend the bankers' existing networks. The importance of social networks and social capital, however, cannot be reduced only to an economic context. Instead, social networks helped Pasion to develop his social and economic capital which not only extended his trade and helped him to profit materially, but also allowed him to enhance his capabilities by drawing on these networks in different contexts. The son of Sopaïos, whom we met

⁴⁷⁰ Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 65.

⁴⁷¹ Shipton, "The Private Banks," 421.

earlier, explicitly describes the place of banks and bankers in terms of networks. He specifically notes the difficulties of his case at the very outset, and, for him, the social ties of bankers pose a serious challenge; as he states:

The most difficult thing of all, men of the court, is the sort of opponents I am facing. Dealings with people at banks occur without witnesses, and those who have suffered injustice at their hands must run a risk against people who have many friends, who handle lots of money, and who appear credible (*pistoi*) because of their trade.⁴⁷²

Despite his prominence and his powerful connections in the Aegean and the Black Sea, the speaker wants us to believe that he is afraid of Pasion because Pasion could make use of his own networks and reputation in such a way as to defend himself during the prosecution. More specifically, however, what the speaker worries about is Pasion's social capital: the capacity of Pasion to use his friends who can support him and speak on behalf of him, and also his reputation, which has been built through the years as a result of his long-term investment in sociability. In order to comprehend better the anxiety of the son of Sopaïos, and his reference to Pasion's social capital, we should analyze the social networks of Pasion and the ways in which the banker benefitted from them.

Our sources do not inform us about the ethnic background of Pasion; scholars, however, have argued that he must have been of a Phoenician origin.⁴⁷³ Most recently, Peter Hunt has claimed that the name of Pasion's son, Apollodoros, could have been used as an Athenian adaptation of an originally Phoenician name.⁴⁷⁴ If we take into account the existence of a sizeable community of Phoenicians in Athens,⁴⁷⁵

⁴⁷² Isoc. 17.2 (trans. Mirhady).

⁴⁷³ See Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 1, 17 n. 1 for a summary of the discussion; recently, Peter Hunt supported the same idea; see Hunt, "Trojan Slaves," 140-142; for a discussion on Athenian slave names, see pp. 80-1 above.

⁴⁷⁴ Hunt, "Trojan Slaves," 142 n. 58.

⁴⁷⁵ Taylor and Vlassopoulos, "An Agenda," 5 n.28.

Pasion's rational for naming his son can be better understood; as Hunt puts it: "Pasion may have cleverly combined an allegiance to his homeland and an accommodation with Athenian culture in his choice of a name for his son".⁴⁷⁶ Even if some of those Phoenicians were clearly slaves, slaves in Athens could maintain their ties with people of the same ethnic origin.⁴⁷⁷ Therefore, if we return to Pasion's networks, it would not be surprising to find some Phoenicians in the speeches who act as intermediaries. The son of Sopaaios, for example, refers to a man named Pythodoros the Phoenician as the person who introduced him to Pasion. It appears from the speech that, on Pythodoros' recommendation, the speaker started using Pasion's bank for his personal finances and continued to do so until they ended up in court. We do not know the exact legal status of Pythodoros,⁴⁷⁸ but, whatever legal status he possessed, it is evident that he introduced a possible client to Pasion, and perhaps other clients of whom we are not aware. In this sense, the ethnic relationship between Pasion and Pythodoros contributed to the expansion of the bank's clientele and its financial resources. From our perspective, this introduction is a proof of Pasion's capability to transform his social capital, his pre-existing social networks including his relationship with Pythodoros, into economic capital by gaining new clients and increased opportunities for fresh deposits and loans for his bank.

Pythodoros the shopkeeper was regarded as a serious threat to the speaker of Isocrates 17 because he was held responsible for opening the sealed jars which kept names of the candidates to be judges for the *Dionysia*.⁴⁷⁹ For Davies, he must have

⁴⁷⁶ Hunt, "Trojan Slaves," 141.

⁴⁷⁷ Hunt, "Trojan Slaves," *passim*.

⁴⁷⁸ A convincing argument made by Davies and followed by Trevett that there are two different Pythodoros mentioned in the text. The first one is Pythodoros the Phoenician (*phoinikos*), who was described in 17.2 as the introducer. Later in the text, 17.33, Pythodoros the shopkeeper (*skēnitēs*) is mentioned, who is also attested in Dem. 54.7. The use of different sobriquets particularly suggests that these men were not the same individuals and they need to be treated separately. For a detailed discussion, see Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 20-24 n. 8-9, 156-157; Davies, *APF*, 481-4; for a discussion of Pythodoros the shopkeeper, see below.

⁴⁷⁹ Cf. Lys. 3.4. For the system of judging in the *Dionysia*, see Todd, *Lysias*, 54 n. 3 with references.

been of the liturgical class because only a competing *chorēgos* could have had a motive for such an action.⁴⁸⁰ As Trevett points out, however, it is equally possible that he could have acted as an agent or as friend since we are not informed otherwise by our sources.⁴⁸¹ Despite scholarly disagreements over the reasons for his actions, it is clear that Pythodoros was an Athenian citizen, and he had such a relationship with Pasion that he “says and does anything for Pasion” as he allegedly helped Pasion illegally to manipulate the wording of an agreement.⁴⁸² From the speaker’s perspective, the purpose of such a claim is to demonstrate the extent of the support that Pasion could enjoy if necessary; for our purposes, this episode is a proof of the extent of Pasion’s social networks and it shows that these networks included citizens as well as the expected non-citizens.

Another friend, who is mentioned in Isocrates’ *Trapezitikos* is Agyrrhios, the person who was sent by Pasion to the speaker in order to ask him “to cancel the written agreement” that had been made between Pasion and the speaker.⁴⁸³ Davies’ reading of this passage leads him to conclude that Agyrrhios was acting “in what looks very much like a professional capacity as confidential agent”;⁴⁸⁴ if Agyrrhios had such an affiliation with Pasion, the speakers would presumably not have left it unmentioned in a context where Pasion’s capacity for conspiracy is at issue.⁴⁸⁵ Therefore, it seems more likely that Agyrrhios acted simply as a common friend performing a service. Regarding the identification of Agyrrhios, Davies cannot find evidence, either liturgical or otherwise, to classify Agyrrhios and his descendants among the *plousioi*; however, Agyrrhios was an active figure in the political affairs of the late fifth and early fourth century. He served as the secretary of the council in

⁴⁸⁰ Davies, *APF*, 481-4.

⁴⁸¹ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 157.

⁴⁸² Isoc. 17.33.

⁴⁸³ Isoc. 17.31.

⁴⁸⁴ Davies, *APF*, 278.

⁴⁸⁵ See also Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 156.

403/2,⁴⁸⁶ and also as a general in 389.⁴⁸⁷ Furthermore, in Demosthenes' speech *Against Timokrates*, we are told that he was among the leaders of the Athenians who returned from Phyle and overthrew the Thirty, and thus "a good man, a liberal politician, and an ardent defender of popular rights".⁴⁸⁸ The friendship, in the nature of either strong or weak ties, of such an active citizen, could have had potential in public and market contexts, in which referrals by well-reputed individuals held a crucial role in expanding social networks and increasing economic chances in the market.

We have evidence, moreover, for how Agyrrhios may have helped Pasion to extend his social networks. We learn from the speech *Against Timotheos* that a man named Kallistratos, whom Davies identifies as Kallistratos of Aphidna, one of the well-known politicians of the period was a good friend of Pasion, although he was much younger than Pasion.⁴⁸⁹ Timotheos, the son of the well-known Athenian general Konon, borrowed four loans at different times from Pasion, but he did not repay them. Apollodoros, therefore, prosecuted Timotheos in the court either by a *dikē blabēs*, an action for damages, or by a *dikē chreōs*, an action for debt.⁴⁹⁰ The total amount of the debt was less than a talent, which does not seem to be an extremely large amount for Timotheos because he inherited 17 talents from his father.⁴⁹¹ Based on what he was told by Pasion and also by using the record book, *grammata*, of the bank and witnesses, Apollodoros narrates the details of how these

⁴⁸⁶ *IG* II² 1 l. 41; *IG* II² 2, ll. 1 and 6.

⁴⁸⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 4.8.31; Davies, *APF*, 278-80.

⁴⁸⁸ *Dem.* 24.134 (trans. Murray).

⁴⁸⁹ [*Dem.*] 49.47. The speech is dated to the late 360s, and traditionally to winter of 363/2, almost ten years after Pasion's death; Scafuro, *Demosthenes*, 354; Davies, *APF*, 278-80.

⁴⁹⁰ Scafuro, *Demosthenes*, 354.

⁴⁹¹ "The death of Konon, and his will (which he drew up in Cyprus), made it clear that his property was many times smaller than you had expected. He set apart five thousand staters for dedications to Athena and to Apollo at Delphi. To his sister's son, who acted as his guardian and steward for all his property in Cyprus, he gave about ten thousand drachmas, and three talents to his brother. He left the rest, seventeen talents, to his son. The total of these bequests comes to roughly forty talents"; *Lys.* 19.39-40 (trans. Todd).

loans were given to Timotheos.⁴⁹² The first loan dates back to the archonship of Sokratides (374/3),⁴⁹³ to the occasion when Timotheos borrowed 1,351 drachmas and 2 obols with his treasurer, Antimachos acting as an intermediary. Timotheos, however, claims that Antimachos took out the loan privately and he did not receive the money.⁴⁹⁴ To disprove this argument, Apollodoros contends that Kallistratos, the person who confiscated Antimachos' property, was Pasion's friend (*epitēdeiouontos*); if Antimachos had really borrowed the sum on his behalf, Kallistratos definitely would not oppose Pasion in case he had a desire to confiscate Antimachos' property.⁴⁹⁵ We also learn from the speech that Agyrrhios spent some years in prison and, since he was an honorable man and obedient to laws, Kallistratos did not help him, despite the fact that he was the person "who was in power, and who was his nephew".⁴⁹⁶ This strong tie, the kinship between Kallistratos and Agyrrhios, could potentially explain the acquaintance between Pasion and Kallistratos, despite the latter's very young age,⁴⁹⁷ and the existence of a contact in a distant group, therefore, could have helped Pasion to extend his social networks and his capabilities in different contexts.

The son of Sopaios is another tie in Pasion's networks, and we can observe how intricate the association between the banker and his client could be by examining the relationship between the two. The speaker was not an ordinary resident foreigner, but the son of a Bosporan political elite,⁴⁹⁸ thanks to his connections, Satyros, the king of the Bosphorus, provided him with a letter which was to be read in Athens during the case.⁴⁹⁹ If we are to believe the speaker, when he

⁴⁹² [Dem]. 49.6-33. For use of *grammata*, see [Dem]. 49.43.

⁴⁹³ Develin, *AO*, 243.

⁴⁹⁴ [Dem]. 49.44.

⁴⁹⁵ [Dem]. 49.47.

⁴⁹⁶ Dem. 24.135 (trans. Murray).

⁴⁹⁷ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 157.

⁴⁹⁸ Isoc. 17.3, 57.

⁴⁹⁹ Isoc. 17.52.

found himself in an insurmountable situation, he first appealed to Pasion to come up with a solution. For this, he told his secrets to a banker, just as if he was a friend:

In these difficulties, men of the court, I told Pasion my troubles. Indeed, he behaved so agreeably toward me that I would have trusted him completely, not only about money but about everything else . . . I was thinking that Pasion was giving me all this advice out of goodwill for me.⁵⁰⁰

The speaker wants us to believe that the nature of the relationship between the two men was not merely professional; instead they were actually friends. Without hesitation, he became a debtor to Pasion's bank in order to make his visible money invisible.⁵⁰¹ Afterwards, when the circumstances changed, he ended up pursuing Pasion in court for his money and aiming to ruin his reputation. Nevertheless, the trustworthiness of Pasion, which the speaker emphasizes at the very outset, and his close relationship which included concealing the secrets of an elite young man from abroad demonstrate for us the power of Pasion's social networks and their extent. Thanks to his service in the bank and his good reputation in his trade, Pasion could become a friend to a wealthy and politically powerful foreign man, and he could extend his social networks in such a way as to develop both his social capital, by extending his circle of friends with quite visible material sources, and his economic capital by using these networks in his trade. The transformation between the two capitals, and their uses in different contexts helped Pasion to enhance his capabilities in social and economic life.

Another example can be found in [Demosthenes] 52, the speech *Against Kallippos*.⁵⁰² Kallippos, as a *proxenos* of the Herakleians, used his legal status to get his hands on the money of Lykon, a Herakleian who died abroad. Apollodoros does

⁵⁰⁰ Isoc. 17.6-8 (trans. Mirhady).

⁵⁰¹ Isoc. 17.7.

⁵⁰² For a discussion of the speech, see Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 96-97.

not narrate the background of the relationship between Pasion and Kallippos before the court case; rather, from the way in which he reports the events, Kallippos seems not to have been either a client of the bank,⁵⁰³ or a friend of Pasion.⁵⁰⁴ In this sense, Kallippos' dealings with Pasion confirm Pasion's willingness to extend his social networks, but it also demonstrates the limits imposed by Pasion on his interactions with others. According to Apollodoros' narrative, after Kephisiades was paid the amount left by Lykon, Kallippos approached Pasion and "asked for a favor" in order to obtain the money which Lykon had left in the bank.⁵⁰⁵ Pasion's answer was very explicit in terms of the extent to which he could offer his help; and he, or at least Apollodoros imagining his father, says:

Kallippos, I want to do a favor – in fact I would be crazy if I didn't – but in a way that will not detract from my reputation or result in any loss.⁵⁰⁶

Since Kallippos has a large network, thanks to his position as the *proxenos* of the Herakleians, Pasion is naturally willing to do him a favor and to extend his social networks. Nonetheless, gaining the favor of Kallippos could pose a risk for his reputation, for his trade and, of course, for the other social networks that he had developed so far. Pasion, therefore, adopted the role of an intermediary by telling the

⁵⁰³ [Dem]. 52.5-6. When Kallippos learnt about the death of Lykon, he immediately visited Pasion's bank in Piraeus to figure out if there was any money deposited by Lykon. Only when he introduced himself to Phormion, who was then a slave of the bank, was he informed about the details of Lykon's money. It seems very unlikely that Phormion, who was in charge of the bank's operation, did not recognize a client of the bank.

⁵⁰⁴ [Dem]. 52.8-11. Regarding the potential of friendship, Apollodoros rules out this possibility by not providing a background for their relationship and by the way in which he describes the encounter between Kallippos and Pasion. Some time after from his first encounter with Phormion, Kallippos found Pasion in the agora and approached him to figure out if Lykon's money was still at the bank. To claim that they were already friends, one needs to explain why Kallippos waited so long to disclose his intentions to Pasion, and why he chose such a formal space as the agora to "approach" (*proselton*) Pasion.

⁵⁰⁵ [Dem]. 52.8-10.

⁵⁰⁶ [Dem]. 52.11 (trans. Bers).

other party about Kallippos' insistent claim on the money, and he refrained himself from taking an active part in the debate. Kallippos, in contrast, responded to Pasion with an awareness of his importance as a friend; for this reason, his belief in Pasion's capacity "to do a favor" for him is limitless, as we see by his reply to Pasion: "don't worry, Pasion. If you want, you'll make them do it".⁵⁰⁷ To achieve the friendship of Kallippos, Pasion must do some extraordinarily unclear, hence potentially inappropriate, things, which might include manipulation of the record books, using personal networks for persuasion, or the invention of novel ways of extracting money from the other party. If he were to succeed, Pasion would be able to incorporate Kallippos into his networks, and he would be granted "some favors" in different contexts in future.

Our final case is found in the speech *Against Timotheos*, which I discussed in part above. The way in which Timotheos borrowed money from the bank is useful for our discussion because it highlights the very individual nature of banking; Timotheos' relationship with Pasion was transformed into such a way that he could bypass some crucial steps of borrowing money from a banker. For example, when Alketas, the ruler of Molossi, and Jason, the tyrant of Pherai, came to Athens in order to help Timotheos in a trial after he was deposed from office,⁵⁰⁸ they arrived at nightfall and Timotheos did not have enough money to entertain them; he found the solution in asking Pasion for money. Although it was already night, Timotheos sent his attendant, Aeschrion, to Pasion's house, which was nearby, and he borrowed bedding, cloaks, two silver drinking bowls and a mina of silver.⁵⁰⁹ Firstly, the formal steps of taking out a loan are bypassed by not appearing in person, but by using his servant as an intermediary, and further by not offering any security, since almost the

⁵⁰⁷ [Dem]. 52.11 (trans. Bers).

⁵⁰⁸ [Dem]. 49.14-21; Scafuro, *Demosthenes*, 358.

⁵⁰⁹ [Dem]. 49.22.

whole of his property was already mortgaged and thus it was not available to be given as security.⁵¹⁰ Secondly, he not only asks for cash, but also for the things which one normally does not borrow from a banker. Finally, neither for this particular loan nor for the others, does Apollodoros mention that any interest was charged by Pasion. Millett is rightfully suspicious about the interest-free nature of these loans, and he claims that “Apollodoros wanted to mislead the jury into thinking that the loans were interest-free”.⁵¹¹ This suspicion could very well be correct, if we follow Millett’s insistence on bankers’ position in the society as “the last resort” for those in need of money; but his own emphasis on interest-free loans among *friends* provides a solution for this conundrum. If friends could borrow and lend money without interest, then Pasion could very well distinguish a friend from a client, and Apollodoros could be right on his insistence about the interest-free nature of the debts that Timotheos borrowed from his father.⁵¹²

From Pasion’s perspective, Timotheos’ relationship with Pasion was not built upon a banking business aiming merely at obtaining interest from the funds. Instead, Apollodoros explains his father’s motives in giving the loans to Timotheos:

Be that as it may, judges, my father still considered his supply of cash of less importance than assisting Timotheos to obtain what he had requested in his moment of need. In fact, judges, my father thought that if Timotheos survived those perils and arrived home from the King’s service, once he was more secure in his resources than he was at that time, not only would he recover his own money, he would also be able to obtain any other service he might ask of Timotheos.⁵¹³

Apollodoros explicitly states that, rather than an immediate return of the loans with

⁵¹⁰ “And yet, if the defendant had suffered loss, the loan, too, was lost for my father, for he gave it neither on security nor in the presence of witnesses”, [Dem]. 49.2 (trans. Bers). For Timotheos’ property given as security, see [Dem]. 49.10-12.

⁵¹¹ Millett, *Lending and Borrowing*, 286-287 n. 27; cf. Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 209-215.

⁵¹² See the introduction above. Millett in general depicts bankers just like today’s corporations which target profit maximization, and ignores the fact that they were individuals whose friends and clients could be intermingled, and, therefore, some of their monetary transactions could be interest-free; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 157-158; Shipton, “The Private Banks,” 411-412.

⁵¹³ [Dem]. 49.3 (trans. Bers).

interest, his father expected to get further benefits at a later date. His separation of financial returns from “other” benefits in sentence implies that these “other” benefits are not necessarily financial in their nature, and this peculiar uncertainty can help us to understand how Pasion developed and imagined his relationship with Timotheos and with some other clients as well. By giving loans, Pasion carried out the necessities of his banking business and he could benefit financially from those transactions. He could, at the same time, lend without an immediate financial profit, since, during the transactions, he was literally building social networks and consciously thinking of them as a social capital to be used in different contexts. As most of the cases discussed above show, those Pasion’s friends whom we know from the literary sources had a higher standing in the social and economic strata of the city; therefore, they could help Pasion to enlarge his body of clients with distinguished individuals and to extend his financial resources. Since economic capital is an inseparable part of status construction and the spread of status beliefs,⁵¹⁴ the amount of wealth enjoyed by Pasion helped him to elevate his social position within the city. Apollodoros, after the death of his father, could still rely on his father’s trustworthiness and reputation; when he was trierarch, Apollodoros could ask Pasion’s friends for individual support⁵¹⁵ and for money:⁵¹⁶ “since Pasion was my father and had many foreign friends and was trusted all around Greece, I had no lack of sources from whom to borrow money when I needed it”.⁵¹⁷

4.2.3 Capital transformation and mobility in cultural contexts

These assets, economic and social capital, are transformable, and cultural capital is

⁵¹⁴ Ridgeway and Erickson, “Creating”.

⁵¹⁵ [Dem]. 50.18.

⁵¹⁶ [Dem]. 50.56.

⁵¹⁷ [Dem]. 50.56 (trans. Bers).

no exception; by turning economic and social capital into cultural, or by “investment in public goodwill”,⁵¹⁸ individuals could extend their capabilities.⁵¹⁹ In the context of fourth-century Athens, the liturgical system based on non-voluntary services and voluntary benefactions were the tools that could be utilized for this conversion.⁵²⁰ In very conspicuous ways, well-to-do citizens undertook more than what was required from them because these gifts would return them the respect, honor, *timē*, and gratitude, *charis*, of the demos.⁵²¹ As a speaker stated to jurors: “the reason I spent more than was required by the city was to improve my reputation among you (*ina kai beltiōn eph’umōn nomizoimēn*) and to be able to defend myself better if I were to encounter any misfortune”.⁵²² The prestige derived from liturgies, however, varied depending on the particular kind of service performed. The *chorēgia*, particularly that of choruses, offered the sponsors, *chorēgoi*, an ostentatious display of wealth devoted to the demos in front of a large audience in the theatre, and a success could consequently be monumentalized with a choregic monument incorporating the tripod awarded to the successful performances. In this way, a *chorēgos*’ success would be permanently monumentalized in the city’s topography.⁵²³ The trierarchy provided less visibility, particularly after the establishment of taxation groups called *symmoria*.⁵²⁴ To erect a monument for commemorating the trierarchic service seems not to have been the standard practice.⁵²⁵ In the case of resident foreigners, although the limited nature of the evidence prevents a detailed account, metics were certainly

⁵¹⁸ Davies, *APF*, xvii.

⁵¹⁹ For conversion of capitals, see Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” 24-26.

⁵²⁰ Domingo Gygax, “Gift-Giving,” 48-50.

⁵²¹ Ober, *Mass and Elite*, 231-3; Sinclair, *Democracy*, 64-5; Christ, *The Limits of Altruism*, 72-7.

⁵²² Lys. 25.13 (trans. Todd); cf. Lys. 20.31; Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, 180.

⁵²³ For a discussion, see Wilson, *The Athenian Institution*, 198-262.

⁵²⁴ For *symmoria*, see below.

⁵²⁵ Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, 179-80; Wilson, *The Athenian Institution*, 48-9; Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 50 similarly argues that “despite the differences in amounts spent, in the eyes of the law these men were not really distinguished from one another inasmuch as they all had responded promptly to the state’s call to perform their duty (*ta prostattomena*)”.

expected to contribute,⁵²⁶ particularly to take part in the *chorēgia*⁵²⁷ and to pay *eisphora*, occasional war taxes.⁵²⁸

In practice, however, the functioning of the liturgical system was subject to various challenges, and Pasion's voluntary contributions need to be evaluated in this context. Scarcity of economic resources, political ebbs and flows, and the limits of Athenians' altruism resulted in chronic deficiencies in allotting annual liturgies during the fourth century.⁵²⁹ Although the practice of *syntrierarchy*, which started late in the Peloponnesian War, enabled sharing the costs of funding warships, the search for trierarchs or *syntrierachs* during the 370s, for instance, ended up with so many non-allotted ships that almost half of the fleet in 378/7 could not be funded by citizens.⁵³⁰ The Athenians' response to these difficulties was, firstly, through reforms: the creation of *symmoriai*, taxation groups, firstly for *eisphora* payments (378/7) and then for trierarchies under the reforms of Periander (358/7), the introduction of naval *epidosis*, voluntary monetary contributions (357), and later Demosthenes' reconfiguration of trierarchic *symmoria* system (340) tried to ameliorate the city's financial troubles.⁵³¹ Encouraging Athenian elites to make voluntary contributions through the means of offering counter-gifts was an alternative solution, and it became more frequently attested as the fourth century progressed.⁵³² As for resident foreigners, similar counter-gifts could be offered in

⁵²⁶ Dem. 20.18-21; see the discussion in Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 80-2; Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 7; Davies, "Demosthenes," 34.

⁵²⁷ Lys. 12.20. Whether or not metics could become trierarchs is highly disputed; Cohen, *Athenian Nation*, 74-5 n. 170 argues for metic trierarchs; *contra* Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 61, esp. 240-1 n. 25.

⁵²⁸ Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 78-80.

⁵²⁹ Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, 143-204; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 193-9.

⁵³⁰ IG ii² 1609; Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 180-1.

⁵³¹ For the transformation of the liturgical system, see Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 173-217; Christ, *The Bad Citizen*, 155-171; Domingo Gygax, "Gift-Giving"; Domingo Gygax, *Benefaction*, 192-217 is the most recent evaluation for the fourth-century changes.

⁵³² Domingo Gygax identifies this process as "euergetization" of the liturgical system; see Domingo Gygax, *Benefaction*, 206-7.

return for their benefactions; the most well-known cases were *proxenia*,⁵³³ *euergesia*, benefactor, *enktēsis*, the right to own property, *isoteleia*, equal taxation with citizens, and, although rare, naturalization.⁵³⁴ Such benefactions of metics and non-resident foreigners were, at least ideally, voluntary and their gifts initiated a reciprocal relationship with the city, which became even more significant in times of need.

Pasion made his voluntary contributions in this particular period when the city was in a continuous struggle to cover her financial burdens. In his speech *Against Stephanos*, Apollodoros sums up his father's services as follows:

My father gave you a thousand shields and often made himself useful to you: he voluntarily contributed (*ethelontēs epidous*) five triremes and manned them from his own resources and served as trierarch on these occasions.⁵³⁵

That the speaker does not detail the circumstances under which these donations were made prevents a precise evaluation of Pasion's gifts. Davies, highlighting the military nature of the gifts, favors a date prior to the end of the Corinthian War in 386, and argues that Pasion was naturalized as a direct result of these benefactions;⁵³⁶ Trevett, however, offers a *terminus post quem* of 394/3 and *ante quem* of 376 due to the lack of evidence to specify the dates.⁵³⁷ To ascertain precisely how many of these benefactions were performed while Pasion was still a metic is an insurmountable task, and we also do not know what other possible benefactions and liturgical services remained unmentioned in Apollodoros' speeches. Although the costs varied

⁵³³ There is no contemporary translation of *proxenos*, but it is traditionally translated as an ambassador or as an honorary consul whose duty was to look for Athenian interests in his own town; see e.g. Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 13-4; Kamen, *Status*, 58-9; contra Domingo Gygax, *Benefaction*, 51-3 highlights the honorary character of *proxenia* as a title awarded by the city in return for benefactions; see also 58-60, 107-14, 206-7.

⁵³⁴ For the most recent discussion of the counter-gifts, see Domingo Gygax, *Benefaction*, *passim*; Kamen, *Status*, 56-61; Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 11-6.

⁵³⁵ [Dem]. 45.85 (trans. Scafuro).

⁵³⁶ Davies, *APF*, 430, 434-5.

⁵³⁷ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 21-4 n. 9.

depending on the duration of duties, the ambitions of the trierarch to distinguish his ship and crew from other trierarchs, an expenditure of 4000 drachmas to 6000 drachmas seems reasonable for a single service as trierarch,⁵³⁸ and we can, therefore, expect at the very least a sum of 3.4 talents, if not more, to have been spent on equipping and manning the ships. Whether or not Pasion personally undertook the service is also contested.⁵³⁹ As more and more cases of hiring someone else instead of personally undertaking of trierarchy are attested, Gabrielsen's suggestion that Pasion did not undertake trierarchy in person, but only paid for it in the form of an *epidosis* seems highly plausible.⁵⁴⁰ This view also implies that at least some of his five trierarchic services funded through *epidoseis* could predate Pasion's naturalization and its consequent liturgical demands; if this assumption is correct, then, with some of these voluntary trierarchies, Pasion was making benevolent contributions and engaging in a reciprocal relationship with the city rather than only fulfilling the liturgical demands. As for his gift of one thousand shields, which was not a liturgical service either, the only comparative price information comes from the island of Keos in the third century, where the price was 20 drachmas per shield.⁵⁴¹ Nonetheless, the shields could have been provided directly from Pasion's own shield factory, and, if the Kean price was relevant to Athenian market, this benefaction could have cost Pasion less than 10.000 drachmas.

Illustrating Pasion's deployment of capital in cultural contexts is straightforward, but it is a more challenging task to analyze the causal elements that

⁵³⁸ Davies, *APF*, xxi-xxii; for the cost variations, see Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 50, 118-125; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 24-5 n. 10.

⁵³⁹ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 24-5 n. 10 assumes that Pasion paid also for the construction of the ships; therefore, his estimation is 9.5 talents; cf. Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 203.

⁵⁴⁰ Gabrielsen, *Financing*, 203; Davies, *APF*, 435 evaluates the same chapter as a case of voluntary trierarchy; the same argument also applies to Phormion's trierarchies; see *IG ii²* 1623.246-8 and *IG ii²* 1629.647-9; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 6 argues that the trierarchies must have postdated Pasion's naturalization, but he rules out the possibility of an *epidosis*.

⁵⁴¹ *SIG³* 958.31; Davies, *APF*, 435.

would account for his expenditure of such an enormous sum, at least five talents, on benefactions. Osborne links Pasion's benefactions to his desire to become a citizen : "it is clear enough from his [Apollodoros'] comments about his own status that the acquisition of citizenship was regarded as a competitive struggle, in which one's resources were brought to bear to achieve the desired end of Athenian citizenship".⁵⁴² The speaker of the speech *Against Neaira* explicitly relates Pasion's citizenship to his benefactions: "now then, when the Athenian assembly voted to make Pasion and his descendants Athenian citizens, in gratitude for the good things (*tas euergesias*) he had done for the city, my father agreed with the assembly's gift of citizenship".⁵⁴³ Trevett finds this explanation "scarcely an exaggeration" on the grounds that the grant of citizenship was a reward in return for services already rendered, and the donor was expected to continue in his generosity and kept giving gifts to the city.⁵⁴⁴ Pasion is seen then as a part of banker exceptionalism in terms of his financial capabilities: "successful bankers tended to be the only metics rich enough to be able to afford to make acts of civic benefaction on a sufficiently grand scale to gain citizenship in return".⁵⁴⁵ Naturalization seems, consequently, to have been Pasion's main target in making such outstanding benefactions multiple times, and the importance of naturalization with its consequently given rights and privileges for extending one's capabilities will be discussed in the next section; nevertheless, focusing on naturalization as the ultimate end of the benefactions misses two significant aspects of gift exchange: the extra-legal reasons and consequences of

⁵⁴² Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 195. Domingo Gygax follows Osborne's explanation: "the example of Pasion, however, is of a man who was not a citizen and was performing benefactions to gain citizenship"; Domingo Gygax, *Benefaction*, 207 n. 176.

⁵⁴³ [Dem]. 59.2 (trans. Bers).

⁵⁴⁴ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 160-1.

⁵⁴⁵ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 161. Davies, *Wealth*, 66 similarly argues that "it rather looks as if it was mainly bankers, rather than other metic entrepreneurs, who were able to amass a sufficient investment in public goodwill to carry them across the social gulf that separated them from the citizen body".

benefactions, and the rewards that Pasion could obtain prior to his naturalization.

Extra-legal factors ought to have played a crucial role in Pasion's contributions. Although the liturgical system reframed the gift exchange between the demos and the wealthy residents in terms of fulfilling the required duties, and, therefore, prevented their potential demand for the demos' subordination, voluntary benefactions and carrying out more civic duties than were expected would still give access to additional public recognition and honor. More importantly, however, we should expect a form of acculturation. Pasion spent many years, certainly more than ten, in Athens before his naturalization, and, the Chapter 4.2.2 demonstrated, he achieved social cohesion among various citizens, rather than being excluded from social circles. This social integration enabled Pasion to learn more than the tricks of his craft: the expectations of the Athenians, their norms and attitudes, especially toward socially and economically mobile persons, and how, in the past, such individuals responded or should better have reacted to the Athenians' demands. When, for instance, Apollodoros rebuked Stephanos for disguising his wealth, he could demonstrate that he had learnt Athenian cultural norms, which demanded that the rich not be hoarders, but if so, encounter the social outcomes of such behavior.⁵⁴⁶ Or, when he boasted about his liturgical services, it was a demonstration not only that he had accustomed himself to the city's norms, but also that he had embodied and actively implemented them.⁵⁴⁷ Even without legal recognition of social mobility with naturalization, learning the "good manners" of Athenian elite, responding to the demands of becoming one of them through benefactions and sharing the other culture-specific practices, which remain unmentioned in our sources, would return Pasion cultural capital and help him to integrate himself better into the society, to

⁵⁴⁶ [Dem]. 45.66.

⁵⁴⁷ [Dem]. 50.

enlarge his circles of friends, to gain reputation and to escape the servile stigma attached to his background by culturally legitimizing his relatively rapid enrichment.

The grant of citizenship was not guaranteed at the city-level gift exchange, and, depending on the historical context, there were variations in the nature of the counter-gifts with which the Athenians reciprocated. The case of Lysias is highly illuminating in this regard. In his speech *Against Eratosthenes*, the orator claims that his family sponsored choral performances and paid *eisphorai* more than once during the Peloponnesian War, as well as ransomed many Athenians from the enemy.⁵⁴⁸ During the turmoil of 404-3, Lysias very actively supported the democratic forces: he donated 2000 drachmas, 200 shields and also paid for the service of 300 mercenaries.⁵⁴⁹ As I discussed above,⁵⁵⁰ however, these gifts returned him only the status of *isotelēs*, a result that highlights the importance of political climate, economic circumstances and the Athenians' changing attitude in granting citizenship.⁵⁵¹ Despite the absence of evidence, the peculiar stinginess of Athenians⁵⁵² and the multiplicity of Pasion's benefactions make it more probable that Pasion was first granted other privileges such as *enktēsis* or *isoteleia* rather than immediate access to citizenship without his benefactions having been individually reciprocated.⁵⁵³ The case of Euenor is very revealing: he first became *proxenos* and *euergetēs* in exchange of his medical services, and then, with an amendment, he gained *enktēsis* and *epimeleia*; finally, at a later date, he obtained the grant of citizenship.⁵⁵⁴ Similarly, Osborne notes that of the honors whose nature is securely

⁵⁴⁸ Lys. 12.23.

⁵⁴⁹ [Plut]. *X orat.* 835f; Davies, *APF*, 589.

⁵⁵⁰ See pp. 2-3 above.

⁵⁵¹ Osborne, *Naturalization* III, 48-9; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 162.

⁵⁵² Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 204-9.

⁵⁵³ Mari, "Le Prestige," 88.

⁵⁵⁴ *IG ii*² 373; Osborne, *Naturalization*, D50 with idem, *Naturalization* IV, 197. We should note that Euenor was naturalized only after having contributed a talent of cash; see *IG ii*² 374 ll. 8-10.

preserved on the stone and dated prior to 321, the grants of *proxenia* alone amount to 23%, the grants of *proxenia* accompanied with other privileges 42%, the grants of other privileges (without *proxenia*) 18%, and the citizenship grants 17%.⁵⁵⁵ The overall picture of counter-gifts, therefore, necessitates rethinking Pasion's potential grants prior to his naturalization. Indeed, in financial terms, the right to own a property could have been Pasion's initial target in order to minimize the risks involved in credit markets, and the acquisition of a part of his properties could predate his naturalization.⁵⁵⁶ This suggestion also has significant repercussions in terms of banking business. The lack of property rights restrained metic bankers from lending against landed securities, and in such cases bankers had to rely on the services of citizen agents. When Phormion leased the bank from Pasion, as he was still a metic and could not recover the money that Pasion had already lent against security of land and buildings, he had to register Pasion, who was by then a citizen, as the debtor for these sums rather than the original debtors.⁵⁵⁷ A counter-gift, in the form of *enktēsis*, therefore, could have provided Pasion with more freedom in arranging his multiple businesses, security in terms of investments, the privilege, that most metics lacked, of bequeathing property to his family, as well as potential candidacy for the next set of privileges in return for his other gifts.⁵⁵⁸

⁵⁵⁵ Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 208 n. 146.

⁵⁵⁶ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 162-3, for example, interprets Pasion's acquisition of properties in relation to the need to balance the risks of banking business, but, as he rules out the possibility of *enktēsis* prior to naturalization, Trevett sees Pasion's property acquisition as part of his financial investments once he had secured the citizenship.

⁵⁵⁷ Dem. 36.6; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 98-9 argues for similar arrangements between Pasion and Pythodoros; Shipton, "The Private Banks," 418-9.

⁵⁵⁸ Whitehead, *Ideology*, 14; Kamen, *Status*, 55-61.

4.3 Naturalization and social mobility

All these factors – economic, social and cultural capital – in turn could have helped Pasion to receive citizenship. Firstly, and fundamentally, to make a distinctive contribution to the city, an individual needed to possess significant financial resources in order to be able to afford to make civic benefactions. Secondly, economic capital could be transformed into cultural capital in order to gain prestige and public recognition. Pasion's economic capital was not an efficient tool on its own to relocate him in the Athenian society nor to burnish his reputation. Thirdly, an individual's reputation could be an obstacle to receiving citizenship. Since the decree of citizenship had to be passed in the assembly, personal reputation might prevent an individual from gaining a grant of citizenship.⁵⁵⁹ Finally, willing friends were an inseparable part of gaining citizenship, since someone needed to take the legal initiative, to spread the reputation and to control the information circulated about Pasion. For this reason, Davies claims that Pythodoros the shopkeeper, who "says and does anything for Pasion",⁵⁶⁰ was the person who proposed his name for citizenship.⁵⁶¹ Even though this suggestion seems highly plausible, it is not possible to be certain about this connection, but whoever put forward Pasion's name, surely he was not one of his enemies. Thus, as a result of a change in his legal status, Pasion's social position in the city consequently rose and brought with it an expansion of his capabilities; how radical this change was, and in which contexts these new rights did or did not have an effect on his real-life chances need to be discussed for a better understanding of his mobility.

⁵⁵⁹ For naturalization in practice, see Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 171-209.

⁵⁶⁰ Isoc. 17.33.

⁵⁶¹ This suggestion also explains why Pasion was enrolled into the deme Acharnai, since Pythodoros was his *prostates* and he was an Acharnian; Davies, *APF*, 430; see also Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 196.

The economic outcomes of Pasion's citizenship seem the most visible aspect of the naturalization process for Trevett: "Pasion took opportunity provided by his grant of citizenship to move money *into* landed property".⁵⁶² The acquisition of a family house in Piraeus,⁵⁶³ two apartment blocks,⁵⁶⁴ and, if they were originally purchased by Pasion, some of Apollodoros' properties in three different demes reflect Pasion's eagerness to invest in landed estates.⁵⁶⁵ Nevertheless, the absence of evidence, as discussed above, does not rule out the possibility of an earlier grant of *enktēsis*, which would then have given Pasion access to landed properties prior to his citizenship decree. If this hypothesis is correct, then naturalization would not make any serious change in terms of property relations. The surviving will of Pasion, if authentic,⁵⁶⁶ demonstrates that he bequeathed his property to his wife and two sons without any hassle except that his son Apollodoros insistently craved more than his due.⁵⁶⁷ In terms of taxation, Pasion and his family no longer had to pay the *metoikion*, the metic tax; instead, they had to satisfy the even more costly requirements of the citizen liturgical class. If we follow Apollodoros' statement quoted above, the family members were expected to be lavish with their gifts and to surpass others in their liturgical generosity. In this sense, even if Gabrielsen's suggestion that Pasion paid for the trierarchy through *epidoseis* is correct, we can expect some of these services to postdate his citizenship decree, and the absence of any allusion to "tax dodging" behavior of Pasion and of his family proves that they satisfactorily performed their duties.⁵⁶⁸ Although this transformation from a foreign

⁵⁶² Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 163; Deene, "Naturalized Citizens," 173.

⁵⁶³ [Dem]. 52.13.

⁵⁶⁴ One in [Dem]. 36.15 and the other in [Dem]. 45.28.

⁵⁶⁵ [Dem]. 50.8.

⁵⁶⁶ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 183-4.

⁵⁶⁷ Dem. 36.

⁵⁶⁸ There is a possibility that Pasikles might have tried to avoid liturgical service; see n. 598 below.

benefactor of the city to a citizen liturgist prevented Pasion's involvement in further gift exchange with the city because citizenship was the most precious gift that a city could award in this period, he could demand the *charis* of the demos whenever necessary; this feeling of gratitude seems to have been hereditary and was deliberately exploited by Apollodoros. After detailing his father's contributions, Apollodoros could appeal to the jurors: "I mention these matters not in the belief that you owe me a favor (*charin*) (for it's we who are indebted to you) but that you may be aware that they are treating me undeservedly; for that would not be fair to you either".⁵⁶⁹ His statement here clearly requests, in an indirect way, the jurors' acknowledgement of his father's earlier gifts.

Whether naturalization led to some changes in the social cycles and life-style of Pasion needs to be addressed. Although his complete networks or life-style cannot be discerned from the surviving evidence, as a banker, Pasion was already well-connected, as we saw in Chapter 4.2.2. Citizenship seems not to have made a change in his way of life in general; he was still operating bank and living in Piraeus. The speech *Against Kallippos* narrates that since Pasion was now too old and had problems with his vision, he could not come up to the city from Piraeus, where he used to live.⁵⁷⁰ Similarly, a few years before this event, during the archonship of Socratides (374/3), when Timotheos was in need of money and was about to set sail from Piraeus, he could find Pasion in the port and ask for money.⁵⁷¹ Instead of a change, however, his new deme affiliation of Acharnai would have been helpful in extending his social networks because his sponsor in proposing the decree, Pythodoros of Acharnai according to Davies and Osborne,⁵⁷² would support his

⁵⁶⁹ [Dem]. 45.85 (trans. Scafuro).

⁵⁷⁰ [Dem]. 52.13.

⁵⁷¹ [Dem]. 49.6; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 164-5.

⁵⁷² Davies, *APF*, 430; Osborne, *Naturalization IV*, 196.

reception and facilitate his further integration at deme and phratry levels.⁵⁷³ Equally absent is evidence about whether Pasion encountered any bias from other citizens. His son Apollodoros, for instance, reports a confrontation when Polykles, who was deliberately avoiding replacing him as the successor trierarch, was approached by Apollodoros' friends; in this instance, Polykles' reaction is very suggestive of the prejudice that a citizen-by-decree could face: "The mouse has just got a pitch: he wanted, you see, to be an Athenian".⁵⁷⁴ Similarly, Lycurgus, in his prosecution of Leocrates, adumbrates the relationship between the city and the citizen-by-decree, and argues that the latter's loyalty to the former could often be doubtful:

Just as all fathers do not feel the same degree of affection for their adopted sons as they do for their natural children, so too men feel less attachment to land that does not naturally belong to them but has been acquired later in their lives.⁵⁷⁵

Such reactionary sentiments exposing the inherent inequality between the citizen-by-birth and the naturalized citizens apparently influenced the public expectations from naturalized citizens and required the deployment of even more of their resources than was officially required. Apollodoros explicitly states:

Whatever services concern the city, however, and all those that concern you, I carry out, as you know, with as much splendor as I can. For I am not unaware that for you who are citizens by birth it is sufficient to carry out your public duties as the laws enjoin, but for those of us who are made citizens (*poiētous*) it is appropriate to be seen carrying out these duties as men who are returning a favor.⁵⁷⁶

Unlike Apollodoros, there is no evidence that Pasion was confronted with such

⁵⁷³ Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 172-3.

⁵⁷⁴ [Dem]. 50.26 (trans. Bers).

⁵⁷⁵ Lycurg. 1.48 (trans. Harris); for a discussion of anti-naturalization sentiments, see Lape, *Race*, 249-53.

⁵⁷⁶ [Dem]. 45.78 (trans. Scafuro, slightly adapted).

treatment. Moreover, taking the experience of Apollodoros as a representative example of the conditions of naturalized citizens, or particularly of Pasion, would be highly misleading; Apollodoros not only enthusiastically implemented most of his newly acquired rights, but he also conformed himself to “good manners” by leaving Piraeus for the countryside and tried to distinguish himself even from the citizens in terms of liturgical expenses.⁵⁷⁷ Nevertheless, Pasion did not get actively involved in politics and his naturalization does not mark any rupture in his way of life. We can at least suggest that differences in life styles, the utilization of the obtained rights and privileges, and the extent to which an individual attempted conspicuously to display his legal status should have led to alternative reactions. The case of Apollodoros, however, reveals how a psychological condition resulting from prejudice against naturalized citizens would affect and prevent citizens-by-decree from actively utilizing some of their recently obtained rights, either at personal level by affecting their individual decision making to avoid confrontation or at a social level by the society’s imposition of certain practical, yet non-legal, limitations.

The religious aspects of the naturalization offered further opportunities for social integration. If we follow Blok’s conceptualization of citizenship with membership and participation being its constituent parts,⁵⁷⁸ a change in legal status and becoming an Athenian opened up a further set of capabilities. To be a citizen in essence meant also to have a share in the *hiera*, the city’s relationship with the divine, and to be a part of the city’s religious community;⁵⁷⁹ in a very context-

⁵⁷⁷ [Dem]. 53.4 with Deene, “Naturalized Citizens”; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 160, 176-8; Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 197-8.

⁵⁷⁸ “Citizenship consists of membership of a political community, in which an individual holds claims to whatever prerogatives and is encumbered with whatever responsibilities are attached to this membership, with communitarian ideas of membership in and attachment to this particular community”; Blok, *Citizenship*, 43.

⁵⁷⁹ Blok, *Citizenship*, esp. 47-99.

dependent fashion, metics' participation in cults and festivals were, therefore, regulated and occasionally limited by the demos by assigning them roles distinct from those of citizens, and thus distinguishing, Athenian from non-Athenian, participant from spectator.⁵⁸⁰ Reframed in this way, naturalization was not only about obtaining a new set of rights that could extend what Pasion would effectively do, but also who he could be. Through the very acts of taking part in festivals with roles that were previously inaccessible, citizens-by-decree could construct their identities and claim their social position in accordance with their new legal status.⁵⁸¹ Nevertheless, as noted above, this integration was not without limitations: the demos prevented naturalized citizens from holding an Athenian priesthood, because only the descendants of an Athenian woman could obtain these special positions,⁵⁸² a fact that expounded the fictive nature of adoption because the status of a citizen-by-decree was still not the same as that of a citizen-by-birth.⁵⁸³ The absence of evidence, again, prevents us from balancing this descriptive picture with Pasion's personal engagement in cults and rituals, especially those in which he took part before the grant of citizenship, to investigate how he maintained, supplemented and/or restructured his personal relationship with the divine when he became a citizen; nonetheless, we should note that there was no obstacle that would keep him from maintaining the cultic activities he used to favor and Athens housed various private religious associations.⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸⁰ Most recently, Wijma demonstrated this by investigating the divergent ways in which metics participated in the Panathenaia, the Lenaia, the City Dionysia and the Hephaisteia; see Wijma, *Embracing*; Blok, *Citizenship*, 270-2; *contra* Shear, *Serving*, ch. 7 offers a more nuanced account of metics' historically changed participation in the Great Panathenaia with regard to its consequences for identity construction.

⁵⁸¹ For the divergent ways of constructing identities for male citizens and metics during the Great Panathenaia, see Shear, *Serving*, ch. 6-7.

⁵⁸² [Dem]. 59.92; Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 150-4, 173-6; Kamen, *Status*, 82-4.

⁵⁸³ Blok, *Citizenship*, 262-3; Osborne, *Naturalization* IV, 173-6.

⁵⁸⁴ Parker, *Athenian Religion*, 333-42; Taylor, "Social Networks".

Political and judicial rights before and after naturalization, that is the rights of a metic and a citizen, differed substantially. As a citizen, Pasion was granted almost all the rights that a citizen enjoyed except holding an Athenian priesthood or one of the nine archonships, but the descendants of a naturalized citizen were to become full-fledged citizens and gain access to these rights, if they were born from an Athenian mother.⁵⁸⁵ A citizen-by-decree, therefore, obtained the right to possess and bequeath property, access to politics, the capacity to appeal individually to judicial processes open to citizens without the help of a citizen representative, *prostatēs*.⁵⁸⁶ The vulnerable legal protection of metics was also reversed:⁵⁸⁷ cases concerning him were no longer taken to the polemarch, a requirement which signified the foreignness of a metic in Athenian judicial system;⁵⁸⁸ in the case of a premeditated murder, his killer would have been sentenced to death, unlike metics, non-resident foreigners and slaves, whose murderers would choose exile in order to save their skin.⁵⁸⁹ The extent to which Pasion implemented his acquired legal rights and privileges in political and judicial contexts, however, is missing in our evidence; Apollodoros never alludes to his father's engagement in politics nor is there any such reference in the corpus of Athenian oratory. We can surmise from this silence that Pasion did not take an active part in politics either because of his background and old age or due to his general unwillingness;⁵⁹⁰ we should not, however, rule out the possibility that Pasion could have taken part in assembly meetings as there was no obstacle for new citizens, and the participation in these meetings was one of the most basic responsibilities of a

⁵⁸⁵ [Dem]. 59.92.

⁵⁸⁶ Whether or not a male metic needed a *prostatēs* in order to present and defend his case is highly controversial; see Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 90-1; Kamen, *Status*, 47-8.

⁵⁸⁷ For the most recent evaluation of legal vulnerabilities of metics, see Meyer, *Metics*, 28-47.

⁵⁸⁸ [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 58; Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 92-3; Patterson, "A Metic in Court," 97-99.

⁵⁸⁹ Whitehead, *The Ideology*, 93-4; Patterson, "A Metic in Court," 100-1.

⁵⁹⁰ The surviving evidence demonstrates that the participation of naturalized citizens into active politics rarely occurred; see Osborne, *Naturalization IV*, 194-200.

citizen. In a judicial context, Apollodoros alludes to Pasion's involvement in litigation, in which Kallippos prosecuted Pasion with a *dikē blabēs*, but, although no decision was reached as a result of arbitration, Pasion died in the meantime and the case did not come to the court.⁵⁹¹ During the arbitration process, since Lysitheides, the arbitrator, was one of Pasion's acquaintances, he did not decide in Kallippos' favor as long as Pasion was alive, even though they were close friends (*hetairō*).⁵⁹² Apart from this case, Apollodoros does not mention any ill-treatment that Pasion encountered at the Athenian courts, and his naturalization at this level seems to have smoothly functioned.

Pasion's naturalization, finally, was fundamentally tied up with that of other members of his household.⁵⁹³ Although the naturalization of his sons Apollodoros and Pasikles is secure, his wife Archippe seems not to have obtained citizenship nor did she remain as an ordinary metic.⁵⁹⁴ following Pasion's death, Archippe married Phormion, who was not a citizen at that point; at the same time, by Pasion's will, she could inherit money and property as her dowry including two talents on loan, an apartment block worth 100 minae, slaves, jewelry and anything she kept in Pasion's house.⁵⁹⁵ If she obtained the apartment block under her name, we can deduce that Archippe had the right to own property, which metics without *enktēsis* could not do.⁵⁹⁶ She also kept being involved in the banking operation. Archippe had an

⁵⁹¹ [Dem]. 52.

⁵⁹² [Dem]. 52.14.

⁵⁹³ Similarly, the mobility of Timarchos, Midas and Midas' son was intricately connected with that of their own families; see above.

⁵⁹⁴ Carey, "Apollodoros' Mother" argues that Archippe was still a metic; Whitehead, "Women and Naturalization" claims that her status remained unregulated by the law, and therefore her status was somewhere between a citizen and a metic; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 102-110 similarly emphasizes this uncertainty; Kapparis, "The Athenian Decree," 372 n. 27 citing [Dem]. 59.92 argues that, even if she was not naturalized, by the virtue of Pasion's naturalization, Archippe and Pasion could still have legitimate children who could then have the same legal status, that of a citizen-by-decree rather than of a citizen-by-birth; cf. Blok, *Citizenship*, 260-5; Kapparis, *Apollodoros*, 371-4.

⁵⁹⁵ [Dem]. 45.28 with Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 41-2 n. 24.

⁵⁹⁶ Whitehead, "Women and Naturalization," 112-3; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 107-10.

accurate knowledge of the lease of the bank firstly to Phormion by Pasion, then to other men by Apollodoros, and the monetary arrangements made for all these transactions; she was even accused of having access to and doing away with the bank's record book. Only after Archippe's death, did Apollodoros prosecute Phormion in the court in pursuit of his monetary demands because then she could not intervene with the precise knowledge of the business.⁵⁹⁷ About Pasikles' life much less is known, but his inherited property kept him in the liturgical class as late as early 330s, and his son Pasion seems to have manumitted a slave.⁵⁹⁸ Apollodoros' case offers the most conspicuous, and best attested, influence of naturalization.⁵⁹⁹ Pasion's social and economic capital furnished Apollodoros with enough leisure to learn the laws of the city,⁶⁰⁰ access to books and probably a decent rhetorical education to hone his skills and prepare himself for public life,⁶⁰¹ and the much needed contacts to support his entry into the politics.⁶⁰² His later attempts to dissociate himself from the banking business, his decision to live in the countryside instead of Piraeus, and his lavish spending on the liturgical services demonstrate Apollodoros' internalization of the cultural norms of Athenian elites and construction of his identity in accordance with this particular set of notions that prevailed predominantly among the elites of the city. Their deployment against Phormion, accordingly, shows his exceeding desire not only to implement his acquired rights,

⁵⁹⁷ Dem. 36.14-18; Cohen, *Economy and Society*, 77.

⁵⁹⁸ Hyp. fr. 42-43 with Cooper, "Hyperides," 145-6; *IG ii²* 1570 ll. 42-3; Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 17, 49 n. 30, 151; Davies, *APF*, 442.

⁵⁹⁹ Deene, "Naturalized Citizens".

⁶⁰⁰ [Dem]. 59.15.

⁶⁰¹ Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 111-23.

⁶⁰² For a discussion of Apollodoros' political career, see Trevett, *Apollodoros*, 124-54; cf. Timarchos' political career discussed in Ch. 2.1 above. Both Arizelos and Pasion apparently did not engage in politics, but their politically ambitious sons Timarchos and Apollodoros skillfully utilized their family resources for political mobility.

but also to display his identity as an insider and thus to be received as an Athenian.⁶⁰³

4.4 Conclusion

The case of Pasion demonstrates how closely mobility in different contexts could interrelate and pave the way for the extension of capabilities. The banking business offered Pasion an exceptional opportunity for rapid economic capital accumulation, as is clear by his rise from almost nothing to the possession of more than 70 talents in a single generation. The highly personalized nature of banking operations enlarged Pasion's social networks and brought with it even more clients and friends, who then facilitated his social integration into various friendly cycles. These resources were subsequently deployed in cultural contexts in which liturgies and benefactions enabled Pasion to transmute his capitals into cultural one by engaging in a gift exchange with the city and, in so doing, by adapting himself to the prevailing cultural norms. Although dissociating mobility in one context from another for analytical purposes is necessary in order to understand better the dynamics of Pasion's upward movement, this separation may not be so easily discerned when we look at the real-life circumstances. We should also be skeptical of the perspective which relates the reasons behind Pasion's benefactions to the city merely for the purposes of the naturalization; acculturation and more immediate demands for counter-gifts, like the grant of *enktēsis*, could have played a crucial role in Pasion's personal decision making.

Naturalization, then, furnished Pasion with a new set of capabilities in

⁶⁰³ It is worth noting that even if Apollodoros did not become a banker himself, we still observe a transmission of business knowledge across generations. As Apollodoros' litigations after his father's death demonstrates, he was highly knowledgeable about the banking business and its management; see especially [Dem]. 49; see also pp. 117-8 above.

economic, social, religious, political and judiciary contexts; the real life consequences of these new rights and privileges, that is whether Pasion really transformed these capabilities into functionings, however, appear to be highly divergent. If he had not obtained an earlier *enktēsis*, his new economic rights opened up the landed estate market for further investment. His economic preoccupations and social life seems not to have changed remarkably, but he was now given the chance to engage more comprehensively in the city's relationship with the divine and to become an insider as an Athenian. After his naturalization, Pasion did not make an entrée into the world of politics, and the silence of Apollodoros makes it highly probable that if Pasion ever appealed to the Athenian courts, he did not experience any ill-treatment as a citizen-by-decree. Naturalization also had a significant impact on Pasion's family. The less documented experiences of Archippe and Pasikles contrast with Apollodoros' ambitious political career, litigious life-style, his desire to conform to the discourse of the ideal citizen by living in countryside, not being involved in the banking business and the life in Piraeus, and his lavish expenses for liturgies, all of which contributed to the renegotiation of his social position in the Athenian society.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The preceding case studies have unraveled the multidimensionality of social mobility as it was experienced at personal level. With Timarchos' story, we analyzed his political upward movement and, after the court verdict, his multifaceted downward mobility. Midas' and his family's narrative highlighted the significance of interpersonal and individual power relations derived from craft knowledge, workplace authority, and from beauty, attractiveness and sociability. The abundant evidence for Pasion's life enabled us to examine the ways in which Pasion experienced mobility in economic, social and cultural contexts; the discussion of his naturalization illustrated its divergent impacts on Pasion's subsequent life. These case studies illuminate the intricacies of mobility: following individual life stories, we can pursue how and why individuals historically extended or lost their capabilities – an aspect of mobility that would go unnoticed in a macro perspective – and the extent to which these mobilities would contradict any legalistic approach. As exceptional as these cases might seem to be, their personal nature demonstrates a set of factors, whether individual or institutional, for mobility, and the potential replications of these elements would check our interpretations of the Athenian social reality.

It is, however, often not possible to make case studies as the scanty and incidental allusions in our literary sources do not yield enough material for individual life stories. Material culture, similarly, provides a panorama of diverse snapshots into lives; its very nature focusing on instantaneous actions, such as the moment of gift exchange, manumission or death, provides glimpses of mobility, especially of those

subaltern groups whose mobility often tends to remain invisible in literary sources. In order to incorporate these multiple sources and to move from a micro-scaled and individual discussion of the social mobility to a macro analysis, in the following pages, I shall briefly outline a perspective for studying social mobility and develop my discussion in the first chapter. I shall argue that, to have a more nuanced account of mobility at the macro level, we need to reconcile the two poles of the research tradition, the one that takes the legal conditions of social life as the main tenet of social reality by focusing on the contrasting legal statuses of citizens, metics and slaves; and the other which criticizes this structural, hence extremely stagnant, version of social history and argues for high levels of social cohesion and fluidity, so much so that one would even search for an Athenian nation.⁶⁰⁴ The conceptual framework of the capability approach will be useful in this regard; contextualizing, on the one hand, legal rights and privileges, social norms and cultural values, or any form of institution, broadly construed,⁶⁰⁵ that affected personal capability sets, and balancing this stagnant picture, on the other hand, with the functionings of individuals who could obey, react, negotiate or silently circumvent these barriers by their actions even without the legal recognition and assurance of their current life conditions.

5.1 From general to particular

The focus on legal traditions finds one of its most explicit expositions in Hunter's introduction to the edited volume entitled *Law and Social Status in Classical Athens*. In setting up the framework of the book, Hunter elucidates the way in which the

⁶⁰⁴ See pp. 14-5 above.

⁶⁰⁵ North, *Institutions*, 3.

concept of status is utilized: “In this collection, status groups refer to these juridically defined orders, and status to the standing of each group within the resultant social hierarchy, together with its attendant privileges and disabilities, honour or lack thereof”.⁶⁰⁶ Such a perspective equating social status with legal status assumes that legal rights and privileges govern, in a deterministic fashion, the construction of individual and collective identities, that individuals uncritically embodied their social categories and acted in a completely consistent fashion within the legal boundaries, and that the social stratification system of the Athenian society was deliberately constructed within *only* the realm of the legal institutions with unequal allocation of rights and privileges. As the author herself briefly concedes, the legal system was not alone in structuring of social hierarchies, and one could consult to Finley’s broad categories of analysis discussed above to see how intricate the hierarchies could be.⁶⁰⁷

Still, as problematic as this approach seems to be, it provides a fruitful starting point. Legal status, as one of the conversion factors,⁶⁰⁸ instructs individuals in the sort of capabilities they legally possessed, and this aspect of the Athenian history has been diligently investigated.⁶⁰⁹ Citizens could start learning about their freedoms and responsibilities from early socialization in the household and then continue to do so by extending their interaction to the larger social cycles and to the different public venues. Metics, having settled in the city, had to learn as much about what they could do or be as about the actions and things that they were not allowed to perform and obtain; these restrictions on doings and beings must have had an

⁶⁰⁶ Hunter, “Introduction,” 1-2.

⁶⁰⁷ Hunter, “Introduction,” 2-3.

⁶⁰⁸ See pp. 19-20 above.

⁶⁰⁹ See e.g. Kamen, *Status, passim*; Todd, *The Shape*, 167-200; MacDowell, *The Law*, 67-83; Harrison, *The Law I, passim*.

impact on the interpretation of individual position in social space, particularly for newcomers without a fair image of the world into which they stepped. Depending on their life conditions, slaves were compelled to adapt their attitudes as soon as possible to evade potential punishment, especially bodily mistreatment. Kamen's account, as discussed above, challenges the model of tripartite status division and demonstrates the multiplicity of legal statuses with unequally allocated rights and privileges. A movement, therefore, between various statuses could ideally entail social mobility. Questions arise, however, when we start asking about the extent to which legal rights and privileges were actually practiced by their holders. Any legitimate citizen had the right to engage in politics, to surpass others and to obtain a prominent position, but only a few succeeded; the other forms of inequality together with the ways in which they empowered mobility in political contexts and within the very same status groups need to supplement this legal and stagnant picture. Similarly, from a legal perspective, a metic could be seen as occupying the lower echelons of the social hierarchies; once we consider the accumulation of different forms of capital, as in the case of Pasion or Midas, and the means of obtaining such resources for slaves and metics, we are compelled to reimagine the different facets of inequality and the other prevailing institutions that shaped, even bent, the practice of legal rights and privileges.

Economic contexts and institutions exposed further inequalities in restricting individual capabilities. Legal status restricted the access to the landed properties; this regulation carried both economic and non-economic overtones. Attica as a region belonged to the citizen community as their birthright and most citizens were, ideally, farmers who maintained their economic independence by cultivating their own plots of lands. Such a labor ideology was believed to be fundamentally influential in

individual decision making through the circulation of sociocultural norms, and the Athenians were accordingly known to have despised working for others.⁶¹⁰ In line with this structural explanation, one would expect citizens and metics with *enktēsis* to benefit from the property market and the agrarian economy, and slaves and metics to perform the residual banausic economic activities. The extent to which this model accounts for social reality is, however, hard to assess. As Vlassopoulos recently noted, our sources tend not to reveal cases of citizen wage laborers and small-scale traders; the scanty allusions to such examples were caused not due to the absence of such individuals who actually took part in those activities, but rather to the ideology that prevailed in our literary sources.⁶¹¹ In this sense, we know that Athens' thoroughly monetized economy with the relatively high level of horizontal specialization required a diversified labor input, and thus it offered numerous ways and means to accumulate economic capital. Slaves, metics and citizens could become wage laborers and work side by side, run businesses and maintain workshops which depending on the nature of the production might even be at home. From the shield factory of Pasion or of Lysias which brought enormous profits to its owners to the selling of basic commodities under a small parasol, like Euxitheos' ribbon-seller mother, to eke out a livelihood, the Athenian economy featured a very large spectrum of economic opportunities that further complicated social stratification. In considering capability sets, while reserving a position for the ideal of self-employment that would potentially deter individuals from undertaking wage labor, we should not rule out the possibility of alternative forms of labor for which individuals could, or were compelled to, opt. Occupations, or the lack of them in the case of wealthy residents of the city, with their relevant esteem in the society, the

⁶¹⁰ See p. 88 above.

⁶¹¹ Vlassopoulos, "Que savons-nous vraiment," 669-74.

control over one's own labor, the social networks obtained through economic activity and the economic capital derived from these practices were some of the contexts for mobility either in the form of mobility attested immediately in economic contexts, as they would enhance individuals' capabilities and effect social position, or through the deployment of resources in alternative mobility venues.

Regulations concerning social, cultural and religious life need to be mentioned in evaluating personal capabilities at macro scale. Athens, in this sense, encapsulated a peculiar topography of inequality. There were strictly "unfree spaces" such as the assembly and the council where ordinary non-citizens were not allowed to become active members and thus were prohibited from the benefits of these communities. Economic encounters and cooperation in the agora, on the other hand, resulted in the fashioning of networks, while the lack of any visual distinction between citizens, metics and slaves facilitated socialization between individuals. Religious festivals and the city's cults, as noted above, spatially and in a performative manner segregated, in a highly context-dependent way, citizens from metics and slaves, and envisioned the citizenry as a religious community. Private religious associations, at a micro level, put some of those individuals together and enabled construction of group identities. Slaves were forbidden from practicing at the *gymnasia*, but metics, with enough leisure, could do so;⁶¹² *symposia*, as a drinking party of the well-to-do, might not have been affordable for the majority regardless of legal status, but coming together and drinking at houses or taverns were still possible. Such multidimensional spatial and social segregation inevitably affected what individuals could do and be, and gaining access to any of those spaces and social groups entailed an extension of one's capabilities.

⁶¹² Aesch. 1.138 with Fisher, *Aeschines*, 283-4.

5.2 From particular to general

This brief and synchronic account illustrating the institutions that disproportionately allocated individual chances of social mobility could further be detailed with a study of the multidimensionality of inequality at macro level, but, although a detailed study of inequality is much needed, it is not the purpose of this thesis to engage in such a discussion. More importantly, such an account on its own cannot tell us how individuals experienced mobility within the structural boundaries, or if they somehow managed to overcome the institutionalized barriers to have a greater share in life, more than what was supposedly their due. This absence consequently leads to the missing of historicity of life chances, hence the factor of luck, the very existence of which challenges the nature of causality adopted in our studies. By chance, a slave could be bought by a caring owner and have a dignified life, or a metic could be invited by a friend and offered new chances, and a citizen could make new friends and obtain new ways and means to make his/her life better. We need, therefore, to incorporate achieved functionings into our accounts to historicize mobility processes, to analyze causal mechanisms behind them, to observe if they contradict or complement the static view of the society, and to articulate the implications of these micro events for the larger social questions, as in the case studies of the preceding chapters. I shall provide two examples that do not yield enough detail to make case studies in order to consider the implications of this approach.

The first story is that of a certain Pankleon. During the early fourth-century, a prosecutor, who remains unnamed in the text, summoned him to the court of the

polemarch with the assumption that Pankleon was a metic.⁶¹³ Pankleon, however, responded that he was originally a Plataean and, by the virtue of mass naturalization of Plataeans,⁶¹⁴ an Athenian citizen too. The prosecutor then took up his detective hat and commenced making inquiries here and there to ascertain Pankleon's status. He first appealed to some Dekeleians, as Pankleon claimed that Dekeleia was his deme, but no one seemed to have known him; instead, in the meantime, the speaker found out that there had already been some court cases either in progress or completed against Pankleon before the polemarch.⁶¹⁵ With certainty about Pankleon's status, the speaker initiated his case in the court of the polemarch; Pankleon immediately maneuvered and brought a counter-prosecution, *antigraphē*, with the claim that, as a citizen, he should have been prosecuted in the courts and the speaker's case before the polemarch was inadmissible. The prosecutor did not give in; he kept asking questions about Pankleon's status, but this time of Plataeans, who happened to meet at the cheese-market on the first day of each month. Although most of the Plataeans there had no prior knowledge of Pankleon, a certain Nikomedes claimed that he used to have a slave by that name, who was of the same age with Pankleon and, like Pankleon, he used to work as fuller, but subsequently fled away.⁶¹⁶ The speaker completes his narration by describing how Nikomedes afterwards attempted to reclaim Pankleon as his runaway slave and those with Pankleon, in return, claimed that he had a brother who could prove his status as a citizen; then a certain woman stepped into the scene out of the blue with the very same claim on Pankleon. Nevertheless, those with Pankleon took him away without making any effort to

⁶¹³ The speaker does not explain the events that led to the court case, except to assert that Pankleon did not stop wronging him for a long time; Lys. 23.2.

⁶¹⁴ See Osborne, *Naturalization*, D1 with idem, *Naturalization II*, 11-6; cf. Blok, *Citizenship*, 257-9; Kapparis, "The Athenian Decree".

⁶¹⁵ Lys. 23.2-4.

⁶¹⁶ Lys. 23.5-7.

prove his legal status through witnesses and the present court case was to resolve the status predicament.⁶¹⁷

It is not possible to determine from this narrative whether Pankleon was a citizen, a metic or a slave, nor is it my intention to find an answer. What concerns us here is the potential that the institutional difficulties which the Athenian legal system had in efficiently diagnosing legal status distinctions could be exploited by a slave or a metic with the support of some friends. Pankleon called on his friends to support his position in his conflict with the prosecutor and his alleged masters: his associates were guarding him, allegedly lying for him and pledging themselves as sureties for Pankleon's claims. Moreover, as the speaker's main intention was to portray Pankleon as a slave, by his own narrative he acknowledged that a slave could have an insightful knowledge of the Athenian laws and legal procedures, and utilize them self-confidently. Pankleon's case, therefore, highlights the significance of individual agency in challenging the legal system in pursuit of a better life. Were there other Pankleons? Even if the Athenians had remained highly concerned about those who somehow made it into the citizenry through various schemes, it seems very likely.⁶¹⁸ A phratry inscription from the deme of Dekeleia dated to 396/5, reflects this concern and prescribes a punishment of 100 drachmas to those members of a *thiasos*, a subdivision of the phratry, who voted for one of their members' entry into the phratry, even if the most of the other phratry members voted against him.⁶¹⁹ As a small group, *thiasos* members could more easily orchestrate a non-citizen's entry into the phratry, and the larger group was expected perpetually to check such plots. The fine of 100 drachmas and other institutional preventive processes seem to have

⁶¹⁷ Lys. 23.9-11.

⁶¹⁸ See e.g. Davies, "Athenian Citizenship"; Gottesman, *Politics*, 169-74.

⁶¹⁹ R&O 5, ll. 88-94.

failed; after decades, the number of the cases reached such a level that the Athenians finally reacted with a *diapsephisis*, or *diapsephismos*, the revision of the all deme registers, in 346 in order to expel “intruders”.⁶²⁰ Two speeches delivered in the process of the revision make it clear that with some money and social support, foreigners could find the right persons to speak on their behalf and facilitate their transition into the citizen-body.⁶²¹ If we are to speculate on daily life, it would not be unreasonable to expect that individuals employed ephemeral and occasional lies as means to make their lives a little better, and such cases would easily go unnoticed in our sources unless a wronged party initiated a legal action and paid a logographer to write a speech.

My second case concerns an incidental reference to an elderly nurse in the Demosthenic speech *Against Euergos and Mnesiboulos*.⁶²² The speaker, whose name was left unmentioned in the text, challenged Euergos and Mnesiboulos for false witnessing in his quarrel with Theophemos, but, in return, the speaker was convicted and had to pay a fine to Theophemos.⁶²³ Instead of waiting for the speaker to pay the sum due, Theophemos teamed up with Euergos and Mnesiboulos, and seized the speaker’s property with an unexpected assault on his house.⁶²⁴ In the middle of all the tumult, the old nurse of the speaker happened to be at home and tried to guard her little cup from the intruders; they, in return, went wild and fatally wounded the old woman, who died six days after the attack.⁶²⁵ We learn from the speech that the nurse was originally a slave in the speaker’s father’s household, who was

⁶²⁰ See p. 53 above.

⁶²¹ Dem. 57.52; Isae. 12.2-3 argues that some citizens helped foreigners to become citizens by registering them as their sons. According to the speaker, the rationale for such actions was either because they did not have any sons of their own or because they were too poor and the adoption of foreigners would return them some comfort.

⁶²² Dem. 47.

⁶²³ Dem. 47.64.

⁶²⁴ Dem. 47.52-61.

⁶²⁵ Dem. 47.58-9,

subsequently manumitted and then spent her life with her husband. With the loss of her husband, she was left without the support of any relative and friend. The speaker then welcomed his old nurse into his house and provided the necessary shelter for the old woman, because “it was my duty to ensure that neither the woman who had been my nurse nor the slave who had attended me in boyhood should live in want”.⁶²⁶

The case of the old nurse, in general, relates to the perils of the old age. With the loss of physical capacity or with potential health problems leading to disabilities in old age, the chances of individuals supporting themselves could substantially decrease, and a downward mobility became an imminent threat. For such a risk of downward movement, there were at least two preventive mechanisms, one was reciprocal, yet legally grounded in the case of citizens, and the other was strictly institutional. For the former, individuals were expected to sustain their parents for the sake of gratitude they felt toward their parents.⁶²⁷ Nevertheless, if the parents were not given the basic maintenance and shelter or were subjected to physical violence, anyone could initiate a *graphē* for their maltreatment and the punishment was total *atimia*.⁶²⁸ In the absence of networks of support, if disabilities of old age hindered the elderly from making a livelihood and if they had less than three minae, they could apply for a disability pension, which was originally one obol per day and was raised to two obols in the course of the fourth century.⁶²⁹ This mechanism was designed to provide the minimum food supply; therefore the amount did not come

⁶²⁶ Dem. 47.56 (trans. Scafuro).

⁶²⁷ Dover, *GPM*, 273-5 collects the literary testimonia on the topic.

⁶²⁸ [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 56.6; Harrison, *The Law I*, 77-8; Fisher, *Aeschines*, 137, 159-60. The scrutiny of orators similarly led to the same punishment; see pp. 64-5 above. If a father, however, maltreated his children, they were then freed from the remaining obligations to the father except for burying him and performing the necessary rites after his death; see Aesch. 1.28.

⁶²⁹ For one obol, see Lys. 24.13, 26; for two obols, see [Arist]. *Ath. Pol.* 49.4.

close to the typical daily wages of 1 to 2 drachmas per day, an amount which they could have earned had they been able to work.

We do not know for sure whether the nurse suffered from any health problem and was consequently compelled to call on the speaker's help or if the latter remained in touch with her and did not let his old nurse work at a bare subsistence level once her husband died. Her case more specifically illustrates the precarious conditions of old age, which was more likely to affect metics and freedmen as they lacked the necessary kinship groups or extended families which they had to leave behind when they arrived at Athens. In the absence of any institutional support mechanism for needy metics, the strong tie between the nurse and the speaker proved to be critical and prevented the potential downward mobility and poverty. The speaker's nurse does not seem to have been alone in receiving an aid. A grave stele commemorating a metic nurse, Melitta the daughter of the *isotelēs* Apollodoros, parallels a similar bond between a nurse and the attended child; her epigram reads as follows:

[[Melitta]] daughter of the *isotelēs* Apollodoros, Melitta the nurse. In this place the earth covers over the deserving nurse of Hippostratē, and even now she misses you. I held you dear while you lived, nurse, and still now honor you although you are beneath the earth, and will honor you as long as I live. I know that even in Hades, if there is any reward for the deserving, the foremost honors rest with you, nurse, in the house of Persephone and Pluto.⁶³⁰

Hippostrate and her family seem to have erected and paid for the stele, and the epigram reflects their gratitude, very similar to the one envisioned between parents and children. If Euxitheos was right that many Athenian women, as well as metics and slaves, labored as nurses,⁶³¹ then we need to reconsider the implications of such

⁶³⁰ IG ii² 7873= SEG XXX 235 (trans. Kennedy); for a discussion of metic nurses, see Kennedy, *Immigrant*, 133-40.

⁶³¹ Dem. 57.45.

an occupation not only in terms of access to economic capital, but also in its capacity to create strong ties that would help individuals, regardless of their legal status, to escape downward mobility and to find additional or sometimes the only possible comfort if necessary.

5.3 Conclusion

The cases of Pankleon and the unnamed nurse, as well as the cases discussed in the preceding chapters, reflect only a glimpse of the overall social mobility and point out some of the causal factors and mechanisms attested in fourth century Athens.

Examining mobility from different angles, at both the macro and micro levels, and considering not only legal status groups, but various age, gender, occupational, ethnic and religious groups would immensely enhance our knowledge about the multidimensionality of the inequality. This approach will also prove to be fruitful, if we are to go beyond the conceptual dichotomy between class and status in analyzing inequality. By looking at the alternative contexts and the ways in which distinct forms of inequalities reflected themselves and mobilities experienced by individuals, future research will be able to put forward the much needed study of inequality and mobility in the ancient Athens.

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