

EMBODIMENT OF RULES IN ACTION:  
PRIMACY OF ACTION IN LATE WITTGENSTEIN AND  
MARX

Thesis submitted to the  
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Philosophy

by

Onur Bakır

Boğaziçi University

2010

## Thesis Abstract

Onur Bakır, “Embodiment of Rules in Action: Primacy of Action in Late

Wittgenstein and Marx”

This thesis investigates how rules and actions can be related to each other in an immanent way. To do this, I first focus on a prominent thinker, Ferdinand de Saussure, who defends the inevitability of separating rules and actions from each other and of thinking them dichotomously related. We look how he legitimizes and justifies his claim. After showing that the justification process of separation can be explained with the Marxist concept of reification, we look for the possibility of non-reified rule, which does not work in the framework of dichotomy in the texts of Wittgenstein and Marx. I determine the conditions of this type of immanent relation between rules and actions as the primacy of action, the function of rules as embedded grounds in action and the social aspect of any rule governed act. In the next section, I argue that the intimate relation, which is explained as the embodiment of rules in actions, does not raze the differences between rules and actions, and does not misplace the normative character of rules. To do this, I explain how rules and actions, that are co-immanent to each other, influence each other reciprocally and condition each other. In the last chapter, I discuss how this new relationship affects the intellectual practice, and conclude the discussion by synthesizing Wittgenstein's and Marx's two different suggestions, i.e. “to change the world” and “leaving the world as it is.”

## Tez Özeti

### Onur Bakır, “Kuralların Eylemde Cisimleşmesi: Geç Dönem Wittgenstein ve Marks’ta Eylemin Önceliği”

Bu tez, kuralların eylemlerimize içkin bir şekilde nasıl ilişkilenebileceğini araştırıyor. Bunu yaparken öncelikle kural ve eylemlerimizin birbirinden ayrıksı ikililer olarak ilişkilenebileceği fikrini savunan önemli düşünürlerden biri Ferdinand de Saussure’ün, bu iddiasını nasıl gerekçelendirdiğine odaklanıyorum. Bu gerekçelendirme sürecinin Marksizm’deki şeyleştirme kavramı ile açıklanabileceğini gösterdikten sonra diğer bölümde şeyleştirilmemiş ve ikililik çerçevesinde işlemeyen bir kural kavramının imkânını Wittgenstein’in ve Marx’ın yazılarında nasıl ele aldığına bakıyorum. Araştırmamızın sonucunda bu türden içkin bir ilişkinin koşullarını eylemin önceliği, kuralın işlevinin eyleme gömülü bir zemin oluşturması ve kurallı eylemin sosyal bir edim olması, olarak sıralıyoruz. Bir sonraki bölümde ise kuralların eylemde cisimleşmesi olarak açıklanan iç içeliğin, kurallar ve eylemler arasındaki farkı yok etmeyeceğini, kuralların normatif karakterinin eylemde cisimleşmesinden dolayı kaybolmayacağını tartışıyorum. Bunu yaparken birbirine içkin kural ve eylemin karşılıklı nasıl etkileştiğinin ve birbirini koşulladığının mantığını açıklıyorum. Son bölümde, bu yeni ilişki biçiminin düşünsel etkinliği nasıl etkileyeceği ve dönüştüreceği üzerine Marks ve Wittgenstein’in önerdiği iki farklı teklifin – “dünyayı değiştirmek” ve “dünyayı olduğu gibi bırakmak”- bir sentezini oluşturmaya çalışarak tartışmayı sonlandırıyorum.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the support and contribution of my committee members. Not all the professors would have the patience and tolerance to the mental cramps of philosophy students. However, Assist. Prof. Chryssi Sidiropoulou is a therapist philosopher who constantly worked on the cramps of my thinking. I am thankful to her help and supervising through my graduate study. I am grateful to Assoc. Prof. Türker Armaner who is always ready to help every student who studies Marx as a philosopher, without preserving his labor and his knowledge. It is a chance for me to be a student of Prof. Stephen Voss who reminds me the wisdom of philosophy with his style of doing and teaching philosophy.

I would like to thank TÜBİTAK for their financial support during my graduate study.

I feel indebted to my parents, Reyhane and Davut, my brother Doğan, and my uncle Recep for their unconditional support and love throughout my life.

It is redundant to acknowledge friends. The words in this thesis are inspired by their thinking and, got mature within their dialogues. However still it is a joy to utter their names once again. Firstly, I would like to thank to my unofficial editors Irmak and Nil, who corrected my innumerable grammar mistakes, confusions of sense, and meaning. They have great contribution to the understandability of this thesis. Reading on French Materialism with İlke was always great fun which I benefit a lot in this work. Elif was the first person, who listened to the immature ideas of this thesis. She shared her bright views, her home and her chronically flat air mattress with me. Ozgur helped and supported me whenever I lose my concentration in the progress of my writing. Çetin's house was my natural coffee break stop, I am thankful to his strong coffees and to the "deep" conversations we had on "how awful, hard and important is to write a thesis". Fatih is one of the friends who witnessed A long period of my life and encouraged me to follow my dreams. I must acknowledge Çağıl who never fails to remind me the lightness of life. Without him I would be definitely a more aggressive and pessimistic person.

Lastly I want to thank to Nil, who makes life to shine with her fun, humor, love, and magic in every humble day I worked on this thesis.

## CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER 2: REIFICATION OF RULES: DICHOTOMY OF RULES AND ACTIONS .....	6
CHAPTER 3: DISSOLVING THE DICHOTOMY .....	20
Priority of Action .....	22
Rules as Embedded Grounds .....	30
Social Field as a Condition for Rules .....	36
Accusation of Anthropocentrism .....	41
CHAPTER 4: THE LOGIC OF RULES' EMBODIMENT IN ACTIONS: CONTINGENCY AND NECESSITY IN RULE-FOLLOWING .....	48
Necessity and Contingency of the Rules of Grammar .....	52
Reciprocity between Necessary and Contingent .....	56
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	61
REFERENCES.....	66

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

There is very well known tendency in western philosophy to invent dichotomous couplings, on which the method of thinking is constructed. Despite, their nuances and different interpretations, the examples of this type are various; the Platonic division of the world into of appearance and form, Descartes' division of human into mind and body, Kant's division of mind into sensibility and understanding. Not only peculiar to a philosophers, but the philosophical traditions emerged around dualities, e.g. empiricism vs. rationalism, idealism vs. materialism etc. In this thesis, we focus on a particular dichotomy which is no less famous than the others; the dichotomy between rules and actions<sup>1</sup>. Our concern will be neither to reassure the legitimacy of dichotomy nor to reduce one of the poles to the other; rather it is to leave the framework which dictates us to suppose this radical divide between them.

In order to achieve it, we will start our inquiry, in second chapter, by elaborating one proposal, defending the dichotomy between rules and actions, done by Ferdinand de Saussure. We describe the motivations for supposing a dichotomous relation between rules and actions in Saussure's major work, *Course on General Linguistics*. Then, we look at how rules are separated and reified to an autonomous level of thought and assigned autonomous existence independent from the

---

<sup>1</sup> I used the concept of "action" interchangeable with the concepts of "practice" and "use". It is because of the fact that the term action is used in similar contexts to the concept of practice in Continental philosophy. Moreover, Wittgenstein uses the concept of "use" in order to refer to the speech acts. I did not change the concepts in order to be faithful to the original texts. Also, sometimes I used the concept of "theory," "thought" and "language" in the same context with "rule" since the dichotomy is sometimes expressed by contrasting "theory vs. practice" or "language vs. life".

movements in the field of action. The autonomy of rules expands to the authority of rules over actions in Saussure's thinking. We explain the process of defining the general principles of general linguistics with the concept of reification in Marxist tradition. Following the critique of reification I project the problematic of the thesis; to render the transcendence of rules into their immanence to actions, unsocial rules to social and the divide between rule and action to their reciprocal embodiment. To do this, in the third chapter, we show how the dichotomous thinking leads us to intertwining absurdities. We raise Wittgenstein's and Marx's objections to the conditions of reified rules. Through the critique we give the conditions of the embodiment of rules. We define rules not as causal determinants of actions but as the conditions of possibility. Then, we make sense of their immanence in actions, and their embedded character to social field. In the last section of the chapter we explicate what we mean by social field in order to differentiate our position from an essentialist approach to human nature. In the fourth chapter, we try to sustain rules' normative character in their immanence in actions, by showing how a rule can have normative and contingent character in a reciprocal embodiment of rules in actions. In the last chapter, we discuss what the dissolution of dichotomy can offer to thinking by elaborating on two different offers; Marx's "to change the world" and Wittgenstein's "to leave everything as it is."

To develop the concept of embodied rule and also to investigate the connections between Marx and Wittgenstein, the primary sources, my focus on Marx will be his early writings in *1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, *German Ideology*, and the first volume of *Capital*. In these books I focused mostly on Marx's ideas on language, his analysis of labor, materialist method, his critique of idealism,

and human beings. Apart from Marx, I used Vološinov's book as an important source on the views concerning the relation between practice and language in Marxist tradition.

On Wittgenstein, on the other hand, my primary focus was the rule following part of *Philosophical Investigations*. I benefit also from his other books such as *Culture and Value*, *On Certainty*, *Philosophical Grammar*, and *Philosophical Remarks*, where he wrote on the concept of rule, life and practice.<sup>2</sup> Especially from *Culture and Value*, I used many epigraphs, which are very strong poetic expressions covering all line of thought I try to draw. In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein states that "face is the soul of the body" (CV, 23e). Similarly, this book expresses the spirit of Wittgenstein's works. The poetic aphorisms in the whole book traverse his thoughts with sharp gestures and infinite speed.

Another point to note on Wittgenstein thinking is that 1939 is an important date for Wittgenstein: Jose Medina in his book *The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy* states that after 1939 Wittgenstein's thoughts on rules have radically changed within his later period. The ideas I use from Wittgenstein are corresponding to 1939 and afterwards. His ideas on rules and meaning are radicalized and he leaves the idea that rules have separate calculi from actions. After 1939 he emphasizes their inseparable togetherness. He uses phrases, like "meshing them in life" or "embodying them in life" in order to describe this immanence. The arguments on

---

<sup>2</sup> When a reference is made to any of these works above, the abbreviation will be indicated after the quotation within parentheses followed by the appropriate page numbers (and sometimes by paragraph numbers, for convenience). Those works and their abbreviations are as follows; *The Blue and Brown Books*: BB, *Culture and Value*: CV, *On Certainty*: OC, *Philosophical Grammar*: PG, *Philosophical Investigations*: PI, *Philosophical Remarks*: PR, *Remarks on the philosophy of psychology*: RPP v.2

embodiment of rules are stronger in the *Philosophical Investigations*, which build one of the arches of this thesis. The perspective I want to develop, is looking to Wittgenstein from the materialist Marxist tradition, examples of which are Bourdieu, Virno, and Shaviro. I did not interpret Wittgenstein as a conformist philosopher of ordinary life, or a skeptic on how we follow rules, or a cultural relativist.

On secondary literature I had difficulties to specify my focus because of the enormous literature on Wittgenstein and on Marx individually. Beside this fact, the interpretations are also very diverse and controversial. However, works which focus on both philosophers together are relatively rare. The reason for this is that dominant interpretations of both philosophers are falling apart from each other but few of their interpretation bring them closer on similar issues. Hence, in my secondary sources I used mostly people who wrote both on Marx and Wittgenstein together.

Rubinstein's, Easton's, and Kitching's books were very helpful for me to see the many similarities as well as differences between Marx and Wittgenstein. On Wittgenstein as secondary literature I used Hacker's and Baker's four volume *Analytical Commentaries on Philosophical Investigations*, and Jose Medina's *Rule The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*. Their works were especially helpful for me to understand the evolution of Wittgenstein's thought and also to see the similarities in his works.

Virno and Bourdieu are really influential on both the issues I elaborate and also the way I approach those issues. Their books are not scholarly concerned with both Marx and Wittgenstein but both Bourdieu and Virno focus on the rules and practical activity with a background influenced by Wittgenstein and Marx. Especially Virno's two books on multitude - *Multitude between Innovation and*

*Negation*, and *Grammar of the Multitude* – helped me to develop most of the ideas on the relationship between rules and actions in this thesis. In Bourdieu's book, *Theory of Practice*, I focused on mostly his critique of intellectualism. Those works are also one of the reasons I chose Saussure to represent the dichotomous ideas on rules. Virno, Bourdieu, and Vološinov refer to Saussure, the founder of general linguistics, who is a very influential figure of the twentieth century especially in structuralist movement. Neither Marx could refer to Saussure, nor does Wittgenstein ever mention him. Marx offers his critique by discussing Hegel. Wittgenstein does it by criticizing Augustinian picture of language or Descartes' mind-body dualism. However, the idealizations they criticize are justified and consistently defended in Saussure's thought very strongly. That is why I focused most of the parts of second chapter to Saussure's ideas on the dichotomy between rules of language and the speech acts (utterances).

Now, let us move to the second chapter where we interpret the main lines of Saussure's thought.

## CHAPTER 2

### REIFICATION OF RULES: DICHOTOMY OF RULES AND ACTIONS

*Sometimes an expression has to be withdrawn from language and sent for cleaning, - then it can be put into circulation. (CV, 39e)*

In this chapter, we first describe the reasons which force us to define the abstract rules in doing a study. Then, it is claimed that the concern for the abstract objectivity leads us to posit as presupposition a dichotomy between rules and actions. Ferdinand de Saussure explains in a refined way this motivation for objective rules in his *Course in General Linguistics*. We will illustrate how he hypothesizes the soundness of dichotomous structure between rules and actions, when he abstracts the rules from the field of action. We will see that the objectification of the rules of a study is done by satisfying some conditions, such as elimination of the social or empirical field from the rule, purifying the rules, and assigning autonomy to rules. Moreover we will see how sovereign power is dispensed to rules as unilateral conditioners of actions in defining the interaction between the rules and practices. This process, which is the necessary condition of doing an objective study for Saussure, is labeled as reification by Marx. What is fallacious for reification will be discussed. The problems of reified rules can be listed as: the transcendence of the rules to actions, the mystic divide and interaction between them, and lastly their non temporal, asocial nature. We will anticipate our project with the demystification of the intellectualism on the practices of life. In this way, the importance of Marx and Wittgenstein is noticed once again. Wittgenstein, in the rule following argument

section of *Philosophical Investigations* criticizes reified understanding of rule and dissolves this dichotomous structure (PI, §§185-242). Marx, in his *Early Writings* and in *Capital* gives the conditions of thinking rules as necessarily social and historical practical regularities. Their arguments on the absurdity of abstract objectivism are elaborated in the third chapter.

When a philosopher starts an inquiry, there seems to be that there are at least two options to approach her thoughts. One option is to question the answers she gives to her inquiry and the second one is to examine the legitimacy of the question; what it implies, how loaded its baggage is or what kind of presuppositions and hidden assumptions it carries. The question carries our desires, our wills and inclinations that move us to the answer, which most of the time is entailed not at the end of our inquiry, but at the very beginning, in the way we ask the question. Wittgenstein states similarly; “Tell me how you are searching, and I will tell you what you are searching for” (PR, pp.66-67).

One of the dominant tendencies in the history of western thought is the separation of the theoretical from the practical in different fields of scientific or philosophical discourse. The domain of theory and practice are both very broadly defined and it is very hard to cover the specific conditions, which legitimize this radical assumption of their infusible divide. This dichotomy appears in different forms, with different names in different fields of study or in the texts of different philosophers. The scientist or philosopher looks for the rules of phenomena, extract the rules from the field of practice, test them, and generalize them. “Looking for the stable in what is moving” becomes a condition for the thinker who tries to find its object to study. The objectivism, due to its neglect for different perspectives, power

relations, wills and desires, looks for the possibility of having “the same” vision when it is focused on its object. Once the object of study is objectified, the theoretician declares the divide between the objective rules and their practical execution as necessary condition of doing an objective study. The theory, which philosopher or scientist produces, disengages itself from the field of practice as a necessary condition because of the concerns of stability. The disengagement of thought from the field of practice, that is the empirical field, dictates itself for the possibility of an objective study. A very good example of the motivations of doing objective study is elaborated in Saussure’s *Course on General Linguistics*, where he finds his reasons to build a science called “General Linguistics.”

Saussure does start to his courses with the aim of fixing the errors in the method of linguistics. He endeavors to determine the satisfactory and necessary conditions for constructing general linguistics as a proper science. According to Saussure, the first condition of differentiating a field of study from other sciences as a separate proper science is to find its object of study and its subject matter (1966, pp. 1-3). The subject matter of linguistics is “determining the forces that are permanently and universally at work in all languages, and to deduce the general laws to which all specific historical phenomena can be reduced” (Saussure, 1966, p. 6). Universal and permanent are the key words here, because the “proper object” of linguistics cannot change depending on the differences it carries in speech. Obviously, the object of general linguistics will be speech. However, Saussure thinks that speech is a complex phenomenon which by itself cannot be the object of linguistics. “Taken as a whole, speech is many-sided and heterogeneous; straddling several areas simultaneously-physical, physiological, and psychological-it belongs

both to the individual and to society; we cannot put it into any category of human facts, for we cannot discover its unity” (1966, p. 8). Speech can be studied from different points of view since it cannot have any fixed rules because of its individual uses. Saussure contrasts the individual uses with the generality of rules. Individual uses are up to the speaker who uses the words. Thus, if we study speech, those several viewpoints will be laid simultaneously in front of us, and then the object of linguistics appears to us as a confused mass of heterogeneous and unrelated things. It is because human speech has both subjective and objective side. Moreover, speech always implies both an established system and an evolution. Hence, for the sake of objective stable general rules, Saussure extracts what is changing with time from what is systematic and stable. He distinguishes between the system and its history, the subjective and the objective. To delimit, within the range of linguistic phenomenon, the 'terrain of the language', Saussure sets aside 'the physical part of communication', that is, speech as a preconstructed object (1966, p. 12). Then, he isolates what he calls 'the executive side', since execution is always individual, and the individual is always its master. He calls the executive side, utterance [parole] (Saussure, 1966, p. 13). The remaining part he names as the language [langue], which is the universal and permanent.

Within the total phenomenon of language, represented by speech, we first singled out two parts: language [langue] and utterance. Language [langue] is speech [langage] less utterance (Saussure, 1966, p. 77). It is the whole set of linguistic habits which allows an individual to understand and to be understood. Contrary to utterance, language [langue] is not to be confused with human speech [langage], of which it is only a definite part, though certainly an essential one. The difference

between them is the executive side, for execution is never-carried out by the collectivity. Language [*langue*] is a self-contained whole and a principle of classification (Saussure, 1966, p. 8). Saussure gives language [*langue*] the first place among the facts of speech; we introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other classification (1966, p. 9). Whereas speech is heterogeneous, language [*langue*], as defined, is homogeneous. In the decomposed picture of language, the proper object of linguistics is *langue*, which is the system of the rules in language-speech. Later in the book, Saussure asserts that the sacrifice of differential relations in speech is simplification of data, which according to him is the only possibility for reasoning (1966, p. 102). Linguistics' proper sole object is language [*langue*]. He names this science as synchronic linguistics (Saussure, 1966, p. 20). Laws of synchronic linguistics are not affected by the uses, desires of the users. There is only one perspective in synchronic linguistics, and it has no common element with diachronic relations of utterance. When Saussure puts the utterance as apart from the investigation of language [*langue*] he does not only isolate different uses, dialects, enunciations, but also he thinks that the many fields of utterance do not have any relation to synchronic laws of linguistics, such as politics, ethnography, anthropology, even literary development. Even though he posits another science, diachronic linguistics, which looks for the uses in language he thinks that the internal linguistic organism can be understood without studying external phenomena (Saussure, 1966, pp. 20-22).

Actually, Saussure was aware that language owes its condition of existence to its social and empirical character. For example he acknowledges the fact that the synchronic rules cannot exist without the speech, which is their precondition

(Saussure, 1966, p. 14). The place of the social is settled at a primary position over the rule. Moreover at the very beginning, he announces his gratitude to the revolutions in linguistics that “language is no longer looked upon as an organism that develops independently but as a product of the collective mind of linguistic groups” (Saussure, 1966, p. 4). A particular language state is always the product of historical forces, but he never abandons the idea that a language state can be the object for synchronic linguistics after its historical and individual side is extracted. Although he accepts the interdependence of *langue* and *parole*, according to him their study must be absolutely distinct. “Language and speaking are then interdependent; the former is both the instrument and the product of the latter. But their interdependence does not prevent their being two absolutely distinct things”<sup>3</sup> (Saussure, 1966, p. 19). Moreover, as Bourdieu rightly observes, the priority of speech over language (*langue*) is a chronological priority. Once we learn a language, the order is reversed and logical conditions for decoding become primary to human speech and utterance [*parole*] (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 26).

Freeing rules from social relations is one of the important moves of the modernist thought whereby the rules are not affected by the changes in the field of practice. This tendency for searching the synchronic relations between rules is not peculiar to Saussure, but it is also a common concern for logic, mathematics, natural sciences and philosophy. For example, it is not hard to see the similarity between him and Descartes. Although he does not like the analogy between his two-sided approach to language and mind-body dualism (Saussure, 1966, p. 103). Descartes, the founder of modern dichotomies, has the motivation of “razing everything to the

---

<sup>3</sup> Italics are mine

ground,” a ground where negation of an action is not possible. He separates self-evident, clear, and distinct rules from the corporeal, sensible, and social. (Descartes, 1993, pp. 18-19). His understanding of thought was independent from any corporeal, material, sensual experiences. The thought, “Cogito ergo sum”, does not owe its conditions to any social discourse. Self-evident rules of thought are located in the soul, which is not material and temporal (Descartes, 1993, p. 35). Descartes’ self-evident rules of thought entail that there is a definite body of autonomous rules behind the practical life. Similar to Saussure, the rules of thought and their execution in practices are separated from each other in Descartes. Although he uses the mental terminology, a similar unity of linguistic phenomena is constructed by *langue* and *parole*, just as the human being is the constitution of two radically different things; I and the body (Descartes, 1993, p. 81). The dichotomous framework, in which intellectual inquiry works, divides itself from the practices/actions in life and moves the place of its theory to another field where it can easily split and differentiate itself from the empirical field of action. It breaks the flow of time and moving to an a-temporal reality (synchronicity), unchanging stability, and autonomous authority. Saussure, who knows more than anyone how language differentiates through time, and in space and society, believed that independent from all of the social differentiations, there is a deep unity of laws, which govern all these differentiations. Bourdieu genuinely observes that this unity causes a discontinuity between our practices and reasoning.

The desire to objectivity, which sets out to establish objective regularities (structures, laws, systems of relationships, etc.) independent of individual consciousnesses and wills, introduces a radical discontinuity between theoretical knowledge and practical knowledge, rejecting the more or less explicit representations with which the latter arms itself as 'rationalizations', 'prenotions' or 'ideologies' (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 26).

In this picture, practice, action or life is reduced to a manifold of movements, which has no meaning or rule immanent to them, but they become merely the effects of abstract rules. For the sake of these motivations, abstract objectivism sacrifices the differential, changing, temporal relations and deals with the stable relations between the unchanging principles, rules, and laws.

The move of Saussure, his method to find his objective method and subject of his study, is illusory. The sanctification of rules and the sacrifice of practice should be critically dissolved and deciphered. Saussure sanctifies the synchronic laws when he assigns to them a regulatory role. However, in the case of language the regular acts of speech form regularity and create rules, which we obey in the course of verbal interaction. However, Saussure lifts those rules from the regularities in speech and gives responsibility to linguists to look primarily at the non-temporal relations of the synchronic linguistics. Saussure's favorite example to describe the difference between the essential rules of synchronics and accidental rules of diachronic is the rules in chess. The rules of chess are not affected by time, locations, the shape of the stones, the talent of the players etc. However to change the number of chessman has an internal effect in the game (Saussure, 1966, pp. 22-23). Saussure states that rules of chess like language [*langue*], unlike utterance, are something that we can study separately. His justification is our ability to assimilate the organisms of dead languages, which are no longer spoken (Saussure, 1966, p. 22). The peripheral elements must be dispensed with the other elements of speech; "indeed, the science of language is possible only if the other elements are excluded" (Saussure, 1966, p. 15).

Vološinov believes that the reason of thinking that the rules (*langue*) can be investigated separated from utterance [*parole*] results from Saussure's definition of linguistics' object of study. According to him, the language [*langage*] in Saussure's mind is the dead language, which is not spoken, not changing. Indeed Saussure justifies the independence of *langue* from *parole* by giving examples about the ability to learn languages which have no users (dead language) but rules which are still there. The fallacy in Saussure's thought is, for Vološinov, the transition from dead language to the living languages (Vološinov, 1986, p. 71). The generalization of the regulatory function to whole languages creates the problem of reification.

There is no better term than reification as it appears within Marxist terminology that is used to refer the process of rationalizing the invention of stable rules and moving them to an abstract objective level, which human practice cannot touch. In Marxist studies reification is used in different contexts and debates, such as alienation of worker and commodity fetishism.<sup>4</sup> We will not discuss reification in these contexts, but as a fallacy of thought in the context of rules. Some other names can be given to the dichotomous assumption between rules and actions. For example, Bourdieu calls it "intellectualism", Vološinov names it as abstract objectivism, and Backer and Hacker prefer to an older notion; Platonism in their critique of Saussure.<sup>5</sup> When thinkers move from practices to abstractions, reification is used for freeing the regularities from their concrete conditions, and the regularities are moved to a non temporal, non spatial abstract reality, and then, accepting those abstractions as natural and evident by neglecting the historical process of the production of the

---

<sup>4</sup> See George Lukacs (1971), and Axel Honneth (2008)

<sup>5</sup> Bourdieu (1990), Baker (1980), Voloshinov (1986), Marx (1990, 1974)

discourse, desires and motivations for objectivity. A particular practice as an event is taken to be a norm, then first it is seen as artificial and forced, in time it becomes so accepted that even its creators start to think of it as a natural law. The method of purifying, objectifying the rules from the social, and from the field of practice breaks with the practical reality, its process of production, and historicity. Marx, when describing the intellectualist move, gives the example of law. "Roman law and German law are both laws, it is something which goes by itself. But if, on the contrary, I say: The Law, this abstract thing, realizes itself in Roman law and in German law, i.e. in these concrete laws, the interconnection becomes mystical." (Marx, 1978) Also Bourdieu quotes from Ziff where he draws our attention to the difference between two expressions of regularity:

Consider the difference between saying "The train is *regularly* two minutes late" and "*As a rule*, the train is two minutes late" ... There is the suggestion in the latter case that the train be two minutes late is as it were in accordance with some policy or plan ... Rules connect with plans or policies in a way that regularities do not ... To argue that there must be rules in the natural language is like arguing that roads must be red if they correspond to red lines on a map (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 40).

In the second case, simply we reify the rule as if there is an entity behind the regular practice, which is regulated by this rule. When the rule is reified, it goes beyond the scope of its users. The lateness of the train, in the second case, has no relation with the machinist. Passing from a regular action, which is a practice showing ordinary patterns by its repetitions, to a regulatory relation by positing a regulatory principle unchained from the regular practice has no legitimate justification. The regular or the regulatory force exists because of the regularity of the practice, not because already existing law what makes it regular.

After the rule is reified, isolated from action, and social surroundings, the effort is put on satisfying the interaction of two isolated entities; rule and action. As in the story of regularly late coming train, the rules, when abstracted, “determine” how the action is performed. The effort to interact two isolated different domains of rules and actions (since they were already unified in regular action) produces the mystery of rule’s transformation. It is obvious that even the synchronic rules are changing within time. However, the practical logic of this change becomes mysterious, on the condition that we accept that the rules are determining what action to be taken, and this determination is unilateral from rules to actions. Then, how come will we give the account of the changes in grammar? For example, the concept of “citizen” in Ancient Greek is not the same thing as the one of “citizen” in 21<sup>st</sup> century. The sensible answer from the intellectualist point of view is to defend that the concept in the time of Ancient Greeks is not ontologically same concept with the concept of citizen in the constitution of modern states. The concept did not change in the time of Ancient Greek in this view; on the contrary it stayed same. The concept of citizen now is a different concept. The rules of being a citizen are outside of time. The emergence of new concept, if not by practical uses of it, is left to be a spontaneous act of thought. The emergence has no development process, no labor. According to an intellectualist, even he accepts the changes in the rules of language, it is not the change in the rule but it is simply another rule. Both ontologically and epistemologically they are different concepts and have nothing to do with each other. However we never come to know how the rules are evolving and how rules “determine” the actions.

It is easy to see the results of abstract objectivism. First, the rule is thought to be transcendent to the users, practices and its applications. Second, the rule is isolated from the social field. And third, the rule determines unilaterally, how the action will be performed. As a consequence of the third result, the change in rules is left to be a miracle. This picture of rules, according both to Wittgenstein and Marx, is fundamentally flawed. Demystification of the relation between rules and actions and a practical logic of how we follow rules are given in both thinkers, without reifying the rules and reducing the field of empirical to idiosyncratic anomalous chaos.

It might sound like an unlikely pairing between Marx and Wittgenstein. They are fallen sides apart in another modern dichotomy between two kinds of philosophy, i.e. analytic and continental. Wittgenstein is mostly labeled as an analytic philosopher who was trained in analytic schools and taught there. His ideas are generally thought and debated within analytic philosophy. On the other hand, Marx's influence was mostly on the terrain of continental philosophy, not limited with thinkers from different fields but also mobilized huge masses with the demand of revolution in the continent. Moreover, Wittgenstein's philosophy, contrary of being revolutionary, is charged with being conservative. Within this framework, this juxtaposition indicates a perfect disharmony between the two philosophers. However, interestingly, there are neglected parts of both Wittgenstein's character and philosophy. In 1929, when Wittgenstein was back in Cambridge, he had no positivist leftovers from his early work. Moreover, his friendship with Sraffa, a Marxist economist, influenced his ideas on language and meaning (Sen, 2003, p. 1242). More importantly, there are conceptual familiarities between them; thinking language as a

social product, refusing reificationist tendencies, and thinking of rules as embedded in use. In the following chapters, I use their interpretations of both philosophers – Marx and Wittgenstein – for attacking the dualist dispositions of abstract objectivism, which try to subordinate life to their reified rules.

The understanding of the concept of rule is not just one philosophical problem, but it is dominating various philosophical questions in different fields of philosophy, since rules, structures, patterns or principles are posited with the expectation to be the answers to our questions. That is why the ontological status of rules and their relation to our action becomes important. Hacker and Baker, when mentioning the importance of Wittgenstein's therapy on rules, state:

The concept of a rule, correctly apprehended, is a powerful elucidatory tool in the resolution of a multitude of philosophical questions. But, if unclarity about the rules persists, or if misconceptions abound, then this concept far from clearing away the mists of mythology about symbolism, will multiply confusion, generating phantasmagoria of innate rules, hidden rules of depth grammar, rules encoded in the brain, rules generating consequences which no human being can apprehend, and so on (Baker & Hacker, 1992).

In this chapter we presented the transcendent and totalitarian conception of rules, resulting from the confused understanding of them. In the next chapter, I follow Wittgenstein's steps on removing the confusions about the concept of rule. First, I criticize the unfillable divide between action and rules. Second, I talk about Wittgenstein's objections to how this divide works. In dichotomous mechanism, on the one hand, we posit an unfillable gap between rules and practices. On the other hand, in spite of this divide, abstract objectivism states that there is a continuous relation between them from the rules to uses both regular and regulatory interference, which determines how actions are performed. Wittgenstein's line of

thinking severely attacks this mystified concept of “determination.” He does not offer any new explanation to fill the gap between rules and actions but he refuses the assumption of dichotomy itself. He forces us to focus on the priority of their unity in regularities. Taking the unity of practice and rule prior to any investigation, instead of dividing rules and actions to non-relational objects and trying to build up the relation again, Wittgenstein looks to practices themselves and to the differential relations between them. Third, I argue that the unity of practice forces us to think the rules in the social field, which Marx thinks as a possibility of condition of the rules. This critique will give us the conditions of thinking a proper understanding of rules, i.e. proper in the sense of saving us from absurdities and mysteries of intellectualism.

## CHAPTER 3

### DISSOLVING THE DICHOTOMY

*"In the beginning was the deed."*<sup>6</sup> (Goethe, *Faust*)

"We ascend from earth to heaven" (Marx & Engels, 1974, p. 47). Marx sarcastically describes the break of thinking from the concrete constraints of life and ridicules the fantasy of thinking in free floating mind games. The split between "earth and heaven", rules and actions, our focus of previous chapter, is refilled by assigning the rules a regulatory force over the different uses of words, in order to understand how our actions "are" or "must be." The mono-directional regulatory force from rules to actions dictates to us that the rule precedes any application and that it determines the use of a word. The relation is represented unilaterally; rules, as an autonomous system, are orders of how to use a word. Rule commands, regulates, and changes our linguistic practice from outside the level of use (practice) by transcending it. The second chapter consists of essentially presenting the logic of this dichotomous view. On the contrary, this chapter raises Wittgenstein's and Marx's objections to the three conditions of rules; the first is the priority of rules over actions, the second one is using "determination" with a regulatory function and the last one is purifying rules by extracting them from their practical and social elements. In the last section of this chapter, we will discuss the critique against the social dimension of rules. The objection evaluates the social field as the synonym of anthropocentrism, which is an assignment of essential properties to human nature. To clarify the confusion, we

---

<sup>6</sup> Wittgenstein quotes from Goethe in *Culture and Value*, p.31e

differentiate our position from a humanist who finds his departure point from an ethno-center or a human nature. Putting rules back to social field does not mean that they are depending on a human nature, we claim.

By doing this, we also claim that it is possible to build a concept of rule, which can help us make a new sense of the world, which is emancipated from the “totalitarianism” of rules. The critique of these three conditions provides new conditions for a new understanding of rule. We give a conceptual account of how we can build an understanding of the rule, which is neither absolute nor transcendent to use/application. Rules become immanent to field of action in Wittgensteinian and Marxist sense. But at the same time we are not left in a chaotic irrational world, in which everything changes continuously. The rules determine the condition of possibilities of actions and are determined by them reciprocally without losing their co-immanence to each other.

The difficulty of making sense of such a concept of rule results from trying to bring two opposing concepts together, which might sound like a contradiction; a rule operating on the field of social immanence and the very same rule transcendental (in the sense of being its condition of possibility of practice) to the immanent realm where actions take place. A defender of abstract objectivism would claim that this view is relativist and inconsistent because any rule- being on the empirical plane- will be different from one another. As a consequence, there will be no normative ground for actions. Moreover, abstract objectivists would say it is inconsistent and contradictory to claim that a rule is immanent to an action and to claim the same rule conditions the actions by being transcendental to them. On the other hand, the relativists will charge the argument with reificationism since rules still exist in our

explanation. However contradictory it might sound, in this part, I claim that we can live without absolute rules, and suggest a new notion of rule, which dissolves the existing conceptual frameworks by making sense of the embodiment of rules in actions.

#### Priority of Action

*People who are constantly asking 'why' are like tourists who stand in front of a building reading Beadeker and are so busy reading the history of its construction, etc., that they are prevented from seeing the building. (CV, 40e)*

Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday, says Wittgenstein (PI, §38). It happens when we separate the explanation of life from our practices – ordinary life and the everyday language around us. As a consequence we act like a tourist, or like a philosopher (Kishik, 2007, p. 115). Actually, long before Wittgenstein, Marx also criticized the priority of abstract thought (rule) over concrete (action) in Hegelian dialectics. Marx accused German philosophy of inverting the relation between concrete and abstract as in a *camera obscura*, as the inversion of the objects on the retina (Marx and Engels, 1974: 47). Whereas Marx acknowledges the fact that Hegel grasps the important points in human practice, such as seeing labor as essential nature, he criticizes Hegel charging him with mystifying labor by locating it within the mind, a product independent of material experience. “Logic...is alienated thinking, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and the real man: abstract thinking...” (Marx, 1975, p. 383). Alienation here is used as a form of reification which should be brought back to its concrete conditions.

Marx states his famous process of inversion in Hegelian dialectics, between the concrete and the abstract. If Hegelian dialectics is inverted then, we will find a fruitful method for thinking on logos. “With *Hegel* it [the dialectic] is standing on its head. It must be inverted, in order to discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (Marx, 1990, p. 103). However, we should see that a mere inversion without transforming the entities of the relation is to work in the same (but inverted) framework that we criticize. It is because we don’t abandon a dichotomy. Althusser criticizes precisely this point and states it is wrong to evaluate Marx as an inverted Hegelian. He says that this assumption makes the materialist method mysterious (Althusser, 2005, p. 91). Althusser declares his project as cleaning the Hegelian parts of Marxist philosophy. For Marx, the concept of rule, which is thought to be a reified a-historical entity, obviously carries illusions in it. Although Marx criticizes the authority of rule over use in his various works, and he tries to inverse this relation on the side of uses, he does not offer an explicit logic on the possibility of worldly historical rules. Althusser also notes that the concept of inversion is not the inherited method from Marx, since there is no book on method written by Marx (2005, p. 174). As Althusser formulates it, the Marxist method is not a given tool already in hand, but it is a violent attack on any dualist, rationalist, idealist ideas which try to subordinate practice to their idealizations (2005, pp. 180-182). Method makes itself visible in practical matters and emerges in the problem on which it builds its critique.

What is important here for us is to state that inverting the relation between rules and actions in the framework of abstract objectivism is no less reification of rules. On the question of priority of concrete to abstract (or action to rule), the point is not only which precedes the other but asking the possibility of leaving the

dichotomous structure altogether, and think of a new relation between acting and ruling, moreover new notions of rules and actions. Taking the relation prior to any investigation, instead of dividing relation to non-relational objects and trying to build up the relation again, we should focus on the relation (engagement) of actions and rules.

Wittgenstein appears as an important figure here, since similar illusions are remarkably treated in Wittgenstein's later works. Moreover, he doesn't only invert the structure but also dissolves it. His resistance against the temptation to posit a supposedly explanatory transcendent notion pushes him to attack the dualism between rules and actions, and also to explain their relation in a non-dichotomous way. In his words, he "meshes" rules in practices (PG, p.66). In this sense, he offers a new way of thinking to the Marxist literature as well. In his later texts Wittgenstein, after *Tractatus*, presents a new concept of rule and explication of how rules operate in language without losing their immanent connection to human experience. Therefore, I think, Marxist critique can benefit from Wittgenstein's ideas on "rule following." Steven Shaviro takes our attention to this connection by emphasizing Wittgenstein's rejection of theorizing. "Althusser has tried to link questions of practice to theoretical and epistemology questions, Wittgenstein restores the primacy of practice by dissolving epistemology and theory altogether" (1986, p. 230). Wittgenstein continuously attacks the theorization of human practices, by claiming that our practices are meaningful and rule-governed without any need of imprisoning them in the human brain, in a heavenly realm or inside a special science. Opposing the theorization (which meant nothing more than the reduction and the reification of human activities to fixed entities) affects also Wittgenstein's writing

style that is usually fragmental and composed of distinct paragraphs which are not connected to each other under a fixed heading. In Wittgenstein's texts there is usually a nameless interlocutor who responds to Wittgenstein's ideas. The interlocutor Wittgenstein talks to uses the arguments of various philosophers as diverse as Augustine's picture of language or Descartes' method of doubt, and theories like behaviorism or positivism. Our focus in the previous chapter was abstract objectivism which is tending to ignore the differences in experiences and subsumes them under an abstract law. Wittgenstein shows these arguments to be absurd, and highlights the understandability of the rule-governed practices in the absence of an abstract rule, and to the social contexts of actions.

The debate takes place around the status of rules over actions; where should we locate the rules: *above* or *in* their use? Do rules transcend the practice? Are they immanent or transcendental to actions? In the second chapter we saw how Saussure thinks that the language [langue] is prior to the speech acts. The question is not only a matter of whether one precedes the other, but also of how rules and practice are related to each other. It is not the only matter of deciding which has the omni-power of determination, i.e. whether use is prior to action or action is prior to uses. Any explanation must also contain how the actions and rules are related, unless we are comfortable leaving the relation unexplained and mysterious. In dichotomous view, we have seen that the relation between rules and actions are regulatory or determinative.

Wittgenstein, in the *Philosophical Investigations*, starts his rule following argument by criticizing the attempt to build up a determinative relation in order to explain the connection between rules and actions. The "determinative" relation,

containing a fixed formula – generative of the practice, is the first endeavor he is elaborating. The determinant relation suggests the idea that “Once we understand what is meant by the rules, then the practice follows.” The rules are thought as having internal systematic relations independent from uses, as a result, thinking and understanding are cut off from practice since it is thought that the meanings are inherent to the rules. In such a picture Wittgenstein thinks that we neglect something – “the experience or whatever you might call it; almost the world behind the mere words” (PI, §255). He challenges this illusory connection which is put forward by reificationists by a single question: “What if I do not obey the rule?” In various parts of his texts, he raises many endless examples of understanding the rule and at the same time not following it. Providing such examples obviously undermines the regulatory connection between rules and actions since in spite of its presence, the rule which is supposed to determine the practice is not followed. For example, there is a stranger in the city and he asks about the way to the city council. We say “follow the arrows!” the person says “ok!” and goes to the opposite direction. The arrows which show the way of the town may not mean anything to a stranger or we point out the city council building, and the stranger does not look where you point but exactly to our finger (PG, p.94). Or the teacher asks the pupil to count by adding “+2”s and even asks the pupil to write the formula on the board, he writes “ $An = n+2$ ” and starts to count “2, 4, 6, 8...1000” but after 1000 he starts going “1004, 1008, 1012...” The teacher warns him: “you stopped going adding 2’s.” But the pupil answers: “No I went on in the same way.” The teacher might challenge with this unexpected attitude by giving reasons, generating different formulations or giving other examples, but it would be still possible to have unanticipated reactions

from the pupil. It is always reasonably possible to misunderstand or to interpret a rule differently. Besides, it is also possible to refuse to follow the rule. Both cases undermine the sovereignty of the reified rule since “to understand” the rule does not “determine” in advance the actions to be taken. Understanding the systematic relations between rules determines nothing about the meaning of the practice. The effort to fill the gap between rules and uses with a determinative relation might fail in any event. The connection of the rule and use can be broken off. The *possibility of negating* the rule (failure, misunderstanding, and breaking) means precisely that the attempt to bridge this gap is open to the realities of life. The maneuver of the reificationist would be to dismiss any failure as a state of exception, an act of the lunatic, or a perversion. Wittgenstein states: "if a child does not respond to the suggestive gesture which is a part of our method of teaching it is separated from the others and treated as a lunatic" (BB, §93). But no higher court social practice can justify the norm further; it can only exclude and stigmatize the abnormal. In any training process, social practice defines "a normal and an abnormal learner's reaction" (PI, §143). Not following the rule does not mean acting irrationally. The way the pupil counts is a rule-governed act and the reaction of the stranger is not senseless.<sup>7</sup>

We face an attempt to strengthen the weakness of the determinative power of rules with a move of “correct interpretation.” In the defense of reification, one might claim that we need to present other rules to make someone understand or obey the

---

<sup>7</sup> Shaviro takes our attention at this point to Foucault’s work *Madness and Civilization*. Similar to Foucault, Wittgenstein also shows us how the different forms of life (who do not obey the sovereign rule) are excluded from the domain of meaningfulness (being in a rule governed act) (Shaviro, p. 233)

rule “correctly.” The possibility of misunderstanding is thought to be eliminated by the “correct” interpretation of the rule. The reificationist can claim that disobedience to the rule will be regulated by another rule. If the correct interpretation is not satisfied, then new rules will be posited until one interprets the rule correctly. Hence, at the end, the right interpretation will fill the gap between the rule and its application. However, if understanding the rule “correctly” is necessary to act, then in order to understand a rule, another rule is needed. The process of recovering the sovereignty of the rule is a continuous effort to eliminate the possibility of negation. As it can be easily seen, the insistence that something must mediate the two remains inconclusive once we see that the interpretation is nothing but positing another rule. To interpret the interpretation of the rule we need another interpretation and this process will go to infinity. According to this picture, there will be no bridge between rules and actions. Such a divide was made by Descartes, the absurd result was the denial of life, i.e. the paranoia which doubts everything. He had to posit a radical trust in God in order to give a foundation to life since the reasons for explaining the connections between actions and reasons are not able to touch the actions at all. The rules are hanging in the air without touching the human actions. As a result, the attempts to make sense of the dichotomy end up concluding with the absurd point that “there is neither accord nor contradiction with the rule” since it is possible to act without any accord with the rule and still not contradicting it (PI, §198).

The result is absurd. Even if we accept that there is a gap between rules and actions and try to build interaction between them with a determinative relation, then we can follow or not follow rules without any determinative force. The rules, which are supposed to be separated from practice and which govern practice, neither

govern practice nor are separated from practice. We follow rules, act in accord with them, obey them, break them etc. This absurd outcome, according to Wittgenstein, results from the confusion of what we comprehend by “determine.” It is because we treat rules *as if* there was a gap between them and actions. The confusion arises from what is understood by “rules determine the uses.” It sounds like it is the rule which makes the practice correct or meaningful, *as if* the rule was taking the steps in advance for us (Baker & Hacker, 1992, p. 108). However, any practice transcends the given rules; the general formula of a rule cannot contain in advance the steps to be taken. A sure way of determining what steps someone is to make, is to make them first (Baker & Hacker, 1992, p. 109). Acting itself is the only possibility to test the presuppositions made by the rules. A single movement in the act is never deducible from the rules only. The law is not sovereign because nothing can guarantee its application. A long quotation from Wittgenstein well summarizes the priority of action over rules very nicely;

A man reacts like this: he says “No, I won’t tolerate that!” – and resists it. Perhaps it brings about an equally intolerable situation and perhaps by then strength for any further revolt is exhausted. People say: “If he hadn’t done that, the evil would have been avoided.” But what justifies this? Who knows the laws according to which the society develops? I am quite sure they are closed book even to the cleverest men. If you fight, you fight. If you hope, you hope. You can fight, hope and even believe without believing scientifically (CV, 60e).<sup>8</sup>

If the rules and actions are disconnected, or in other words if I do not need any theoretical supposition in order to follow a rule, then how come a rule can be related to my actions? Wittgenstein makes a radical shift in the way we think about how the

---

<sup>8</sup> Science is used for the system of rules which do not get in touch with practice. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze whether science constructs itself beyond the human practices, but the quotation is useful for us to follow Wittgenstein’s argument if we take science to mean the rules which transcend the human practice.

rules operate. He states that the rules, which tell us how to act, must be exhausted at some point. The actor would give up giving interpretations or other rules and say “this is simply what I do” (PI, §217). All justifications for the application of the rule have to come to an end. Then, the actor will act without reasons. The end point is not a rule that will stop the discussion. What saves us from the infinite regress of rules is the rejection of two separate realms: rules and actions.

The action supersedes to a non-justificatory plane and it precedes the rules given to determine the actions. For Shaviro, the question of determination does not even arise in Wittgenstein’s thinking. The rules are situated in the context of practice, but not determined by it. Relations and contexts are matters, not of determination (Shaviro, 1986, p. 225). There is no justificatory rule beneath every rule that tells us how to act. Instead, there is a rule-governed regular practice. We are acting not because there are rules, but there are rules since we are acting. The rules become visible in practice. What we call “following a rule” is a practice, and there is no connection to any transcendent element in the activity of rule following. The rule is immanent in practice.

### Rules as Embedded Grounds

The effort to bring the defined rules back to life brings us down from a transcendent realm to the immanent realm of regularities. This result forces us to situate the place of rules in practices. If they are immanent to practice, what function will they serve in practices? In the previous section, we explained why rules can be neither a foundation nor a causal determination to our actions. In this section, we will claim that rules are laying the ground for our actions. We will explain the difference of serving as ground from determination or foundation.

Wittgenstein says: "We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm" (PI, §108). Priority of action over the defined rules inverses the framework that is imposed on us in *Course on General Linguistics*. *Parole* becomes important in the rule constructions and rule following. If we compare it with Saussure's *langue* we shift to a new way of thinking. According to Wittgenstein, rules in language are like the signposts which instruct how to do something (PI, §85). The rule has no determination for the meaning of my actions. The signposts (rules) can be interpreted in different ways or could not be followed. What they provide us is that the rules lay the ground to be able to follow a rule. The game of tennis, for example, is first of all a rule-governed practice. Someone, who knows tennis game, can say whether the actions are in accord with the rules of the game or not. The rules of tennis are not the justifications of the acts of the player but they are the grounds for the practice of playing tennis. The rules guide us but do not bind us completely. The rules of tennis, for example, tell us in which conditions the point is won but do not tell us how height to throw the ball or how hard to hit the ball (PI, §68).

The relation of rules to actions changes; the rule is not the cause of our action but it is the ground of an action (Baker & Hacker, 1992, p. 109). The continuous misunderstandings of rules exemplified in previous section are not due to a disagreement on the interpretation of rules, rather they are due to the lack of a common ground. Rules are giving the background on which we can agree or disagree. Baker and Hacker explain the place of rules with an analogy to face: "in order for there to be a facial expression there has to be a face" (Baker & Hacker, 1992, p. 138).

The normativity of ground does not force us to a strict necessity as in the case of foundation or causality. Ground is also about the possibilities for different actions, different interpretations. However, it would be a misinterpretation to state that the ground is given or separated from actions. Rules, being the ground of action, are "not propositions which logically imply what is believed" (PI, §481). The rules emerge in practices and change with practices. There are no rules waiting for the actions to happen to facilitate the practice. Wittgenstein describes the rules separated from practice as dead. What gives them a life is the uses (PI, §432). Thus, ground is not separable from practice in any course of action. In next chapter we will argue more on the inseparability between rules and actions. The expression of rule is always a practice. A rule which is not interpreted does not make any sense. Practice gives the words their sense (CV, 85e). A philosophy of use will therefore not determine limits and contradictions, but rather discover and apply ways of operating in various contexts" (Shaviro, p.224).

In paragraph 432, after Wittgenstein asserts that in use the rules are alive, he then adds a question to this point: "is life breathed into it there? – Or is the use its life?" He answers this question by appealing to the concept of life in different part of his texts. He attaches rule following practices with his notorious concept "form of life." He states: "the speaking of language is a part of an activity, or of a form of life" (PI, §23). In the introduction, I used the concept of language and meaning in the sense that it is closely related to the concept of rule. Indeed, it was the case for Saussure's "langue". In Wittgenstein as well, the rules do not have an independent existence from language. To talk about language is also talking about rules. Thus, when Wittgenstein explains language with the forms of life, the rules are not

excluded from those forms of life. They have also intimate connection with life. He uses different expressions to assert his ideas on the relation between rules and actions. He says: "Well, language does connect up with my own life. And what is called 'language' is something made up of heterogonous elements and the way it meshes with life is infinitely various" (PG, §66). This quotation is important because, in a matter to express the connection between rules and uses stronger, Wittgenstein uses the term "meshing with my life." He uses similar expressions in different parts of his texts. "Concepts find their home in our life" (RPP, v.2, §186). The meaning of a word is "embedded in life" (RPP, v.2, §150). Words have meaning only in "the flux of life" (RPP, §81).

The answer to the question of whether life is breathed into rules or whether their lives are to be found in the uses, is given. Wittgenstein does not emphasize their separation but their intimate life, always in uses. With this answer, Wittgenstein differentiates himself from the intellectualist tradition which always separates the layer of rules from the layer of uses, as in the case of Saussure's *langue* and *parole*. Instead, Wittgenstein focuses on the "forms of life" or social practices within which language is actually being used in various ways. In order to look for the rules it is enough to look for the uses, for the forms of life.

The embodiment relation should not be interpreted as the mediation of all practices by the rules. However the opposite is true; any rule must be mediated by practice. We cannot experience any rule governed act outside the practice. Our claim should not be understood as the mediation of life through the rules, but as the opposite. "Put grandly, our thesis is that it is from labor and not from language or thought, that the category of meaning arises" (Doyal & Harris, p. 59).

Another point that Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes himself is that the ground of a practice is neither given nor natural, it is contextual. The context of a rule is understood in the way it is used. The different uses, as a part of the regularities, are interwoven among themselves, and they construct a path to follow the rules. However it will be a misunderstanding to formalize the context. The context is not inherited by a divine principle but by the similarities, what Wittgenstein calls family resemblances, in practices. The contexts are heterogeneous and multiple, since they evolve with the practices. As Vološinov asserts: “contexts do not stand side by side in a row, as if unaware of one another, but are in a state of constant tension or incessant interaction and conflict” (Vološinov, 1986, p. 80) We will talk in the 4th chapter about how the contexts are heterogeneous and differential and cannot be reducible to each other in a more detailed way. However, we can see that both Wittgenstein’s and Vološinov’s arguments deny the possibility of a complete analysis or explanation that would be attainable in the terms of atomistic reduction. For, Wittgenstein’s “radical contextualism precludes the ultimate unification of independent entities” (Shaviro, 1986, p. 218).

In this section, we discussed how Wittgenstein explains the immanence of rules to practices. In his discussion of language, he does this by giving the authority to uses of words in constructing the meaning (rule) of a word. Without positing a separate entity, Wittgenstein thinks that the rules are the grounds of our actions in practice but this ground is inseparable from actions. We will leave the discussion of how the rules as grounds and actions are reciprocally affect each other to the next chapter. When Wittgenstein talks about rules in language or uses (speech acts), he does not speak about a different layer of practices, he’d rather say that everything is

connected to life and the practices, the regularities, and the customs in life.

Regularities and customs emerge through uses. The uses are tightly connected to regularities and customs. That is why, in the next section, we try to understand the connection between our actions and regularities.

Indeed, to say that practice is regular carries it to a common plane. It is necessary there to be a custom. Regularity is necessary to be able to follow any rule, because the rules are never for one time or for one person (PI, §199). It does not make sense to say "it is only possible to follow a rule for once only." Rule following is a repeatable action. In the absence of an explicit reference to the regular common behavior of mankind, the following of a rule in a particular circumstance could not even begin to take place (PI, §199). Len Doyal and Roger Harris similarly point out that Wittgenstein's "forms of life" can be understood as intellectual rules, but as social activities or forms of labor in the same sense that the Marxist tradition speaks of social practice (1983, p. 76). As we talked acting being is prior to any rule formulation. Rules are embodied in the regularities of customs, social practices, and common behaviors of mankind. What makes the rules emerge is the repetition of regularities, i.e. following them. Wittgenstein usually explains the use of rules with the concept of game, e.g. dancing, playing tennis, and playing chess, which are interactive activities. In discussing speech acts, Vološinov claims that the act is always directed to someone (a listener or a reader); there is no such thing as language in a vacuum. Our actions are located necessarily in an interactive plane. The speech act (speaking by following the rules of grammar of a specific language) is always a relation. "I give myself verbal shape from another's point of view, ultimately from the point of view of the community to which I belong. A word is a

bridge thrown between myself and another. A word is a territory shared by both addresser and addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor (Vološinov, 1986, p. 86). This point, of course, does not deny the possibility of carrying out some acts alone. But the rules in these acts are a way of doing – a technique- and the rules in those acts are located in customs. Following a rule is a collective habit. Not to follow a rule is also a collective habit (PI, §199). Disobedience also presupposes social.

The fear of differentiation of uses in the social field, as we argued in the second chapter, is led by the abstract objectivism to reify rules and to free them from the plane of social. However, if Wittgenstein and Vološinov make sense, the social plane is the condition for the possibility of rule following. In the next section, we look at how social plane appears as a condition for rules.

#### Social Field as a Condition for Rules

Marx and Engels assert in the *German Ideology* that for philosophers, one of the most difficult tasks is to descend from the world of thought to the actual world of social practices. The problem of descending from the world of thoughts to the actual world turns into the problem of descending from heavenly language to life or from theory to practice (Marx & Engels, 1974, p. 118). In the previous section, we discussed the conceptual possibilities of embedding theory in practice. In addition to the conceptual analysis, Marx and Engels think that the historically shaped dispositions of man push him to think as if the rules must transcend human action. “Men became accustomed to explain their actions as arising out of their thoughts instead of their needs” (Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 72).

According to Marx and Engels, these customs, which are the dispositions for reifying the rules of an action, are emerged with the development of capitalist mode

of production in factories. Their claim is interesting because it shows us that reification is not natural but socially mediated and related with the social changes. Alongside an increased division of labor, between the immaterial labor and the material work, the distinction between 'material' and 'mental' labor appears. The tasks of the manual worker, foreman, and the manager are distinctly determined. Manual workers are excluded from the knowledge of the plan of the machines, of the products and of the know-how. The formation of 'pure' theory, theology, philosophy, ethics etc." becomes possible with those changes in society (Marx & Engels, 1974, p.52). Abstract thought, "consciousness emancipated from the world", capable of transforming material life, not just experiencing it, emerges alongside social production. It is interesting to note that the structure between mental and material labor is very similar to the Cartesian duality of mind and body. Just as philosophers have given thought an independent existence, so they had to make rules into an independent realm. This is the secret of philosophical language in which thoughts in the form of words have their own content. As Hollobrow asserts, "the transformation of language and consciousness are parallel to the development of human society itself" (Holborow, 2006, p. p.7). We should also note that the idea that rules are necessarily mediated by the social field emerges along the development in late capitalism. In the age of advanced capitalism, technical rationality is embodied. People are employed in the works where dominant labor is immaterial, such as IT, service, culture, and education industry. The embodiment of immaterial labor in worker (white collar) produces the condition to ask the relation of material (action) and immaterial labor (rule) again.

In short, the history of human being, according to Marx, created the conditions of reification. We crave for generality, simplicity and formal definitions, so we fail to recognize the variety of different relations between the uses. Consequently we begin to see practice as a unified product of heavenly, formal, symbolic, thought (Baker & Hacker, 1992, p. 19). We will not get into the details of the historical critique Marx gives. He obviously had the concern of explaining the social changes by reducing them to economic infrastructure. However, rather than a historical analysis, our concern is to give a conceptual non-reductive analysis by putting the social field as a condition to follow rules, i.e. to act. On the other hand, it is very interesting to see the historical connections between two domains, which are seen unrelated at first glance; Descartes' dualism and the division of labor in factory. That is why Marx's detection concerning the separation between rules and actions as a historical claim is interesting for us since it matches with our aim that "rules should come down to earth."

Marx insists that the rules of thought and practice are not essentially different. "*Language* as a human practice is the immediate actuality of thought" (Marx & Engels, 1974, p. 118). Marx's claim that "language is practice" is not a loose remarks on language pointed out by an economist, but they are a strong insight on the conditions of language, even if he does not embark on a materialist theory of rules in language. Indeed, many materialists suggested a new understanding of language inspired by Marx's ideas. Vološinov was one of the thinkers who had the project of materialist philosophy of language and his ideas were a critique of Saussure who was prominent among those who suggest the division between realm and study of rule and the use.

In *Marxism and Philosophy of Language*, Vološinov claims that the rules are necessarily working in a social field while he focuses on the rules of language and speech acts. He criticizes the reduction of speech acts to socially isolated persons and the reduction of verbal interaction to two socially isolated persons with the capability of intellect to interpret the reified rules. According to Vološinov, what is prior to verbal interaction is those two human beings, but between two who are ‘organized socially’ and part of a social group (Vološinov, 1986, p. 12). It is because there is a need for a background, shared forms of life, for any meaningful practice to take place. We explained the necessity of common background as the condition of understanding our practices in the previous section. Now, Vološinov thinks that those shared common grounds are the place where there is a possibility for the individual to act around her social environment. The Individual (independent of all the effects of her social milieu) “is not the architect of the ideological superstructure, but only a tenant lodging in the social edifice of ideological signs” (Vološinov, 1986, p. 13).

Reification of rules excludes this condition and gets blind in front of the practices of human beings. Rules, as the tools for our practices, are connected to the individual and the social milieu. Wittgenstein emphasizes the condition of life by asserting that “the eye-piece of even the hugest telescope cannot be bigger than our eye” (CV, 17e). Austin’s work *How to Do Things with Words* asserts this point staggeringly and in a very detailed way on the phenomenon of whole language. His famous thesis, “saying is doing,” is based on his discovery of some verbs called performatives such as “to promise” or “to swear”. Those verbs, when uttered, are not descriptions of practices but they are themselves practices. When “I promise,” I

perform an act. The rules of language become the practice itself. According to Virno, the invention of performatives makes the hidden performative of all sentences visible, i.e. "I speak." (Virno, 2004, p. 90). "I speak" is the condition of any linguistic act. It is because any descriptive sentence's condition becomes performative. Language becomes a practice. Thus, the expression of the rule is an act itself which carries the "I" who performs it inside.

On the other hand, this "I" should not be understood as individual who is prior to its existence in society. Both Marx and Wittgenstein refer to the novel of Daniel Defoe, *Robinson Crusoe*, who is an image of those thinkers who reduce the ability of abstract thought to individual. Marx ridicules the character of Robinson Crusoe as he is showed as a man really independent from society, because of the fact that he lives alone. In the first chapter of *Capital*, Marx rightly points out that the techniques and know-how that Crusoe has, such as fishing, hunting or making furniture, are the techniques he carries from the society he was formerly living in (1990, p.170). Similarly Wittgenstein points out that Crusoe is not a man who developed his techniques without any interaction to society. He is an English speaker and his ability to use language is not caused by the power of natural tendencies or a divine creation, but the society he was formerly living in. Training is the simplest and most neglected part of our engagement to society. We learn how to eat, speak, and walk etc. by training. Those functions are what individuates us as human beings and which are only possible by training and social cooperation. Marx emphasizes in *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* that "It is above all necessary to avoid once more establishing 'society' as abstraction over and against the individual. The individual is the social being" (Marx, 1975, p. 350).

It would be a misinterpretation to think that positing the social field as a condition conflicts with the possibility of performing some acts alone. The important thing here is, even in the acts which are performed alone, the fact that the rules we use are socially mediated. This fact is of course more obvious in interactive practices. In his article to *Follow a Rule*, Charles Taylor (1999) emphasizes the interactive notion of speech act by giving examples from interactive practices. According to Taylor, actions can not be explained from the perspective of a first person singular self. The agent is engaged to the co-agent in the common actions. The interactive practices do not happen with the participation of two first person individual selves. Interactive practices, like dancing or conversation, carry their rules embodied in actions. For example, the tempo in a dance or in a conversation affects the performance of the action directly. The tempo, on the other hand, is not external to action but it precisely appears in action (Taylor, 1999, pp. 49-52). In conversation, Vološinov states,

I give myself verbal shape from another's point of view, ultimately from the point of view of the community to which I belong. A word is a bridge thrown between myself and another. If one end of the bridge depends on me, then the other depends on my addressee. A word is a territory shared by both addresser and addressee, by the speaker and his interlocutor" (Vološinov, 1986, p. 86).

The dialogic actions strictly underline the necessity of thinking them in their social setting.

#### Accusation of Anthropocentrism

*"Let us be human!" (CV, p.30e)*

By appealing to "the common behavior of mankind," Wittgenstein places natural life at the very heart of historically determined institutions (Virno, 2008, p. 34). He

posits action as an essential element of life. Marx also puts labor as the essential relation, which shapes human nature. With the process of labor, humans can change the conditions of their existence and make their own history; in this process, furthermore, they also change themselves (Marx, 1990, p. 283). Labor is related to the dynamics of the relations in the social field. The process is manifestations of actual life. This emphasis on culture, human-being, customs and social field leads to the criticism of Wittgenstein on the fact that his analysis is human-centered (anthropocentric), in the same way that Marx had been criticized of being a humanist in his early writings. In this section, we interpret that neither Marx nor Wittgenstein as anthropocentric. On the contrary, their critiques argue against both attaching a nature to human beings and also thinking human being as unconditioned by the history of humankind.

Balibar, in his book *Philosophy of Marx*, reminds us that Marx was not the first thinker who defined labor as essential to man. Hegel says the same sentence and is criticized by Marx rigorously (Balibar, 2007, p. 26). We cannot therefore engage ourselves to this proposition without questioning it. To say that “the human is practice” does not guarantee us to be in a non essentialist position.

To start with, we did not think labor or practice as a universal from which everything is derived in the universe. Labor (action) is totally concrete and is a material process which is a relation between man and nature. And this relation is prior to the construction of the essences of its object. Acting has an ontological primacy over the rules which define its essence. Moreover, we stated that action is possible with the social relations. Consequently, Balibar asserts that a human being is the ensemble of social relations (Balibar, 2007, p. 29). There is no essence prior to

practice, nor is there any activity that is unbounded by its conditions. Labor or practice is neither the essence nor foundation of human being.

The condition of social field does not entail any engagement to the human nature. The social field is not a fixed sum of individuals. It is not a structural complex which has atomic essences inside, but it is contextual and heterogeneous. We already talked about how Marx criticizes the image of independent individual in the case of Robinson Crusoe, who is the atomic unit of social field with a specific essence. Instead of a structural reading of the social field, there are some other interpretations which are more useful to understand what we mean by social. Virno, for example, uses the concept of "multitude," which is also the title of his book, to refer to the social body. He states: "in order to name with a unifying term the forms of life and the linguistic games which characterize our era, I have used the notion of "multitude." This notion, the polar opposite of "people," is defined by a complex of breaks, landslides, and innovations which I have tried to point out" (Virno, 2004, p. 97).

Multitude is never reducible to individuals. The ensemble of social relations produces the conditions for individuals to emerge. It is not the individual has the autonomy over the rules. But as Lyotard puts it; it is not that "people make use of language" but that language makes use of people (Lyotard, 1993, p. 21).

Wittgenstein also clearly stresses this point: "when I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly" (PI, 219). It is not the human being who is endowed with essential natural capacities but the human being is the individual who is emerged with regularities of multitude.

According to Virno, the concept of social should be translated as pre-individual, not as something essential to individual human existence (Virno, 2004, p. 80). "Pre-individual" refers to the conditions which satisfy us to be an individual in the milieu we live in. Virno proposes three pre-individual notions in *Multitude*. The first one is the biological basis of the human species, which are the sensory organs, motor skills apparatus, perception abilities. Secondly, language is pre-individual; he does not mean the artificial languages but the historical-natural language which is shared by all speakers of a certain community (Virno, 2004, p. 76). The first pre-individual condition for human beings is their biological conditions and the second one, which is important for our thesis, is the historical rules, which they develop through history by the use of language. Thirdly, the prevailing relation of production is pre-individual. Labor can take place in the context of the productive forces immanent in the social. Thus the rules, which we follow in perception, language, and production are also pre-individual. The validity of rules is not up to the individuals in multitude, nor are they human centered. Only within the collective, certainly not within the isolated subject, can perception, language, and productive forces take on the shape of an individuated experience. "Language belongs to everybody and to nobody" (Virno, 2004, p. 77).

Last point could be to notice that the process of reification is not just working by eliminating the socially determined products of thought, but reification can work on the other way around; that human properties might be attached to the reified objects. This method is used in public relations of corporations, such as "X is a warm-hearted company." It is also common in ethical or religious discourse, such as "good and evil are forces ruling the universe," or "god is benevolent." There are also

examples even in science when one depicts nature with a will and preferences; “Nature chooses the fittest to survive.” Choosing, ruling, benevolence, and being warm-hearted are humanly activities or states. Therefore a critique of reification does not reduce everything to human nature, but reificationist motivations in this sense have a human centered view upon life.

At the end, what we can say is that the species’ specific conditions are not essential but can change within time. The rules arise from social demands and needs of the material world and also, through human cooperation and activity, consequently contribute to the transformation of that world. They are then themselves transformed as the human society changes. Human practice is not something with an essential nature. The anthropocenter emerges and changes with the regularities of practice. Language, thought and rules are the genetic tools of this biological creature which is the product of its biological evolution. Just like our hands and eyes, they emerge alone with our needs. In addition to this biological existence, following the rules is a social practice. The rule following animal is a social animal. That is why the cry of Wittgenstein should be read in this context, and not as an essentialist craving; “let us be human!” (CV, 30e)

The conditions we gave in this chapter raise some questions about the common understanding of actions and rules. First, when we think on acting, we want to keep the possibility of freedom that is the ability not to obey, to change, to break, to differentiate, to transform our practices. On the other hand, we connected possibility of acting closely with the rule following. Rule following, contrary to differentiation, implies the sameness of our practices, such as being necessary, bounded, and normative. Especially, giving the social character of rule following as

a condition raises objections and confusions on both concerns; differentiation of practices, and unification of practices. How can my experiences differentiate, if they are independent from my will that is socially conditioned? The second question, how can my experiences have a norm if they are relative to culture?

Insofar as my claim from the very beginning has been the insufficiency of reification, both concerns about differentiation and unification are to be accounted for. As we have seen in this chapter, reification can account neither for the normative character of rules nor for the multiplicity and differentiation of the practices. We have to be able to show that the repetition of a rule in practice, its regular character, does not violate its differentiation. It is because the problem we posed is not how a reified rule is not possible, but it is how a non-reified rule is possible. Hence, in the next chapter, I will talk about the relation between the necessary definitive rules and the contingent practice since our account of embodiment of rules can not be explained properly without understanding the relation between contingent and necessary elements in regularities.

We will argue that following the same rule cannot mean to perform the same act. As Deleuze and Guattari put it, “the relation between the statement and the act is internal, immanent, but it is not one of identity” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004). The practice can be similar to another act and still be differentiated. Since the rules are not unshakeable entities, they differentiate in the practices of the empirical plane according to the conditions of the actions such as time, space, person, and observer. The concept of following a rule and of doing the same thing are interwoven, since the former determines what counts as the same (PI, §225). In the next chapter, we will give the practical logic of differentiation and uniformity of practices by looking

particularly at the linguistic practice which explains the contingent and necessary relations between the meaning of rules and the speech acts.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE LOGIC OF RULES' EMBODIMENT IN ACTIONS: CONTINGENCY AND NECESSITY IN RULE-FOLLOWING

In the previous chapter, when we talked about the priority of action and the function of rules in practices we mentioned the conditions of possibility for differentiation of practices. Those conditions were the impossibility of reducing an action to its rules, possibility of misunderstanding, break, disobedience, and the open-ended character of practice in general. Moreover we said that the rules are laying the ground for our actions, but we added that the ground is not totally separable from the practice. The unity of action is prior to the differentiation from the ground. Moreover placing the rules in the social field implies the relativity or differentiation of many necessary rules that of mathematics or natural science. The main concern of this chapter is to provide a satisfactory explanation in Wittgenstein to the uniformity of actions and differentiation of them within the embodiment framework between rules and actions. For this purpose, the chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, we will discuss in what sense the rules are contingent and in what sense they are necessary. In second section, we will discuss the reciprocal interaction between necessary and contingent elements in action. Doing this explains to us how rules change or endure in the flow of life.

An objection from the abstract objectivist perspective can be this double nature Wittgenstein attaches to the rules. On the one hand, rules are changing in practice by being embedded in action, and on the other hand they are normative to their uses by conditioning the possibilities of such use. This status sounds simply

inconsistent with in the dichotomous framework. Wittgenstein thinks it is caused by the confusion which considers the rules and uses essentially as different entities. The confusion results from the idea that the possibilities given in rules are the necessary conditions which do not change in time and precede the actual practices.

The logic of the stability and the change of our practices can be investigated by looking at the oscillation of action between the definitive rules and the regularities. According to Virno “rule following faithfully reflects both the impossibility of escaping historicogenetic conditions and, precisely for this reason, gives evidence for comings and goings between species specific regularities and definitive rules” (Virno, 2008, p. 44). Wittgenstein explains this logic in different linguistic contexts. His explanations are very useful for understanding the possibility of non-reified rules in language. In different parts of his texts he emphasizes the heterogeneity, multiple uses in language. In *Philosophical Investigations* he says that “language is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten” (PI, §23). In *On Certainty* he speaks similarly: “a language/game does change with time” (OC, p. 34e). However, we should note that change or innovation happens rarely; we mostly act regularly. Thus, the logic between contingent and necessary elements should be given in order to understand both innovative and regular action. To grasp the tension between necessity and contingency, Wittgenstein suggests that there is a reciprocal dynamic relation between the definitive rules and rule following practice. The possibility of negation and the open ended character of practice are the sources of change in the regularities of language games. These possibilities are embedded in actions and create a tension

between rule and its use, but the tension works in a different framework, not within dichotomy. In this chapter we try to make sense of this relation by giving the logic of oscillation. However, this logic of action has a logic which is not that of the logician. Bourdieu states that “this has to be acknowledged in order to avoid asking of it more logic than it can give, thereby condemning oneself either to wring incoherences out of it or to thrust a forced coherence upon it” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 86). It is a different logic because there are no principles of this practical logic, from which everything is derived. Wittgenstein also says similarly that “there is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies.” (PI, §133) Our therapy, or method of rule following is not a general method for all philosophical problems but an explanation against the intellectualist inclinations.

In the previous chapter, Wittgenstein’s examples on possibility of misunderstanding were about the most basic agreements between human beings, such as ostensive definition, or a basic mathematic formula. The second possibility which undermines the sovereignty of rules was the open-ended character of practice. Wittgenstein refers to the rules of tennis to illustrate the open end of actions. There are certain rules which tell us how to play tennis, but the rules of tennis do not say everything, such as how high or how hard the ball should be thrown (PI, §68). The bounds of a rule-governed act cannot be strictly marked with the rules. It is not possible to totally frame an action with rules. Markell Patchen, in his article on Arendt’s understanding of the rule, points to a similar aspect of rule following: “Rule governed practice action is never a closed system but is permanently exposed to the possibilities of critique, contestation, expansion, transformation, and reinvention” (2006, p. 4). The incompleteness of definitive rules is not a shortcoming, but rather a

power which opens the novelty and change in practices. According to Vološinov, reification of rules ignores this possibility and absorbs a speaker's potential to supersede the definitive rules, and select a new form over a recognized one, that makes language what it is (Vološinov, 1986, p. 56). Indeed, a decision is necessary at every step of rule following. The speaker's or player's role is not merely passive in practice, on the contrary it is active in the sense that one must decide to follow or not to follow the rule.

Immanence of rules in the regularities of life makes two things possible. First, it guarantees that we can follow a rule, i.e. logos is part of the world, and secondly it gives the possibility of not following it, i.e. possibility of differentiation. Contingency is possibility that also marks the boundaries, and necessities. So regularity, the field of practice, is the possibility of both sensibility and the historicity of rules. Virno gives emphasis to this paradoxical situation; "as paradoxical it may seem, the contingency (possibility of change) has its original place of residence in an activity that is only seemingly obvious, in "following a rule", in an activity the possibilities are confined, which implies a necessary connection. This implies, inversely, that every humble application of a norm always contains within itself a fragment of state of exception" (Virno, 2008, p. 74). Both the accord and the mistake are embedded in practice because of the "open ended" character of practice. The problematic existence of rule following provides the possibility of undermining the necessary conditions of actions we are confronting, because of the incommensurability of rules and the excess of practice from the open ends.

The incommensurability between the definitive rule and acting attaches to every act a miraculous perspective; and this perspective stays as possibility in every act. However, the miracle is not a mystery but caused by the unexpected existence of action. Shaviro locates the possibility of unexpected transformations in actions “to the impossibility to draw a firm boundary between contingencies and structural instances (*definitive rules*), between moves which are made within a given language-game and moves which alter the very nature of the game”<sup>9</sup> (Shaviro, p. 228). In this miraculous oscillation between definitive rules and regularities Wittgenstein does not offer a relativist understanding of rules but a different type of necessity by definitive rules, which cannot bound the practice totally and which are not bounded conclusively. He offers a logic in which both the practice and the definitive rules might change.

#### Necessity and Contingency of the Rules of Grammar

The definitive rules for Wittgenstein are the explanations or instructions of how we use a word in a practice. In language games for example, he names those rules as “grammatical propositions.” The grammar lays the ground for the possibility of empirical propositions to be meaningful. Rules of grammar are not the meaning of the words but the explanations of how the words are going to be used. For example, in order for the proposition “tables are dancing” to make sense, there needs to be grammar in which the proposition makes sense. “If equals are added to equals then the wholes are equal” or “p or not p is always the case” are in the grammar of our life. Accordingly, all principles of formal logic and pure mathematics belong to the grammar of our life. The grammatical propositions are not testable because they are

---

<sup>9</sup> Italics are mine.

the instruments of testing. They are the possibilities of having meaningful or meaningless sentences.

Testable sentences, on the other hand, are empirical ones. Those sentences are constituted with the possibilities of grammar, e.g. “it is raining today”, “I feel tired”, or “he is waiting.” This demarcation might sound like the analytic/synthetic distinction, but it is not. Some definitive rules, which are not usually classified as analytic, such as “There must be a cause” and “There is no such thing as reddish green” can serve as grammatical propositions. (Foster, 2004, p. 11) The propositions, e.g. “I have two hands”, “The world existed long before the human beings” can serve as grammatical propositions. Or a formally tautological sentence such as “War is war” is an empirical sentence in a different language game (not in formal logic).

The demarcation between empirical and grammatical is contingent. “The rules of games may in some cases be definite but in others vague or fluctuating, so the rules of grammar may in some cases be definite but in others vague or fluctuating” (Foster, 2004, p. 9). Wittgenstein attaches the conditions of being a priori to the users of the statement. He says: “a priori or analytic proposition means that it is a form of account which is very convincing to us” (PI, §158).

The contingent character of definitive rules and also the rules’ inconclusiveness to bind an action raise the idea that the rules of grammar do not have any force on users. One reason of defending reification is the claim that immanence of norm would leave us without norms in our actions. From the intellectualist perspective, when the absolute force of norm disappears in our actions, one can think that we are fallen in the chasm of relativism. Thus, we need to posit idealizations which reassure the necessity of norm. However, as Medina puts it: “the

normative force of rules will be misunderstood if it is considered in abstraction from our actual practices of use (Medina, p. 75). Wittgenstein develops an important explanation on the normativity of rules without falling into the position of a relativist. Appealing to persuasion or agreement should not be misunderstood that the rules are a mere convention or a decision of will, which can be easily dispensed with. Wittgenstein distinguishes that “to use a word without justification, does not mean to use the word without right” (PI, §289). The fact that rules are based neither on logical nor empirical necessity, i.e. their arbitrariness or contingency, does not entail that the rules are up to free consent.

A social agreement is necessary in order for the rules to make sense. However, the agreement is neither a social contract nor an abstract principle, it is rather a practical one. To differentiate his position from the theories which depend on abstract notion of agreement Wittgenstein says: “agreeing on grammar means to share a form of life” (PI, §241). Of course, the agreement on artificial rules without sharing forms of life is possible. However according to Wittgenstein such practices, following the artificial rules, are dull. He express his aversion to Esperanto in *Culture and Value*; “Esperanto. Our feeling of disgust, when we utter an *invented* word with invented derivative syllables. The word is cold, has no associations yet plays at 'language'. A system of purely written signs would not disgust us like this” (CV, 52e). A convention or agreement is not on the rules of grammar like in the rules of Esperanto, but it is on the regularities. Shaviro formulates the relation by stating that “the concrete social practices produce agreement-not the other way around” (Shaviro, 1986, p. 225). Agreement is not an abstract social contract that is signed by consensus but it means that we share the rules, we know how to use the

rules but we do not completely agree on how to use a word. Nor does agreement mean to agree by contemplation. Hollobrow points out that while people can share and use a language and participate in the different language games with different interests and viewpoints, they do not fail to communicate. Sharing a language does not mean agreeing on its uses completely. (Holborow, 2006, p. 16) The meaning of a word contains a plurality of interrelated uses. Vološinov grasped nature of agreement not as a consensus by individuals but agreement is more about the power relations in the shared forms of life in society. He says: "in the vicissitudes of the word are the vicissitudes of the society of word-users" (Vološinov, p. 157) Thus, Wittgenstein says "when I obey a rule, I do not choose. I obey the rule blindly" (PI, 219).

The absence of absolute necessity or absolute agreement in grammar does not mean that the grammar is unimportant or easily dispensable. Vološinov complains about the perspective of rationalist with the demand of absolute necessity: "what interests the mathematically minded rationalist is not the relationship of the sign to the actual reality it reflects, nor to the individual who is its originator, but the relationship of sign to sign within a closed system already accepted and authorized." (Vološinov, 1986, p. 58) Mathematically minded rationalist, whom we referred to as intellectualist or abstract objectivist, confuses the necessity within a closed system and the necessity of the system itself. Necessity of the system becomes contingent in the open-ended character of life and practice. Obviously, in some practices the force of the norm is very strong. In the way it is not possible to see with hands instead of eyes, someone who talks within certain possibilities of the language game- delineated by the grammatical propositions- cannot reject the meanings of the words inside a particular language game. A pupil, when she wants to make an addition can

write on the board “ $2+2=5$ ”, this is simply a violation of the rule. Of course this mistake does not change the fact that “ $2+2=4$ ” is true. However, the inhabitants of a fluid world would have different mathematics or not at all (Baker & Hacker, p. 336). In the same way, of course the rules of nature do not change, but the ways in which they constrain us do. Len Doyal and Roger Harris exemplify some changes in rules of nature “through the bounds of both our theoretical and practical understanding” (Doyal & Harris, p. 66). For example, “the mechanism of human reproduction remains unchanged and does present what are regarded as absolute limitations on what can be done (e.g. no immaculate conceptions) as well as an important link with our evolutionary past. Yet even in reproduction, modern technology (contraception, artificial insemination and amniocentesis) has altered the material constraints that we experience” (Doyal & Harris, p. 66). What makes a proposition grammatical is not a heavenly criterion but it is how it is used in the regular actions of human beings. Generality of a rule lies in its use, not (or not necessarily) in its form. Coming back to language games, Vološinov rightly says that *parole* (in Saussure) “returns as an essential factor in the history of language” since it is the use of language that changes the rules (Vološinov, 1986, p. 61).

#### Reciprocity between Necessary and Contingent

To understand the intense togetherness of empirical and grammar (contingency and necessity), Wittgenstein offers the metaphoric relation between river and its bedrock. Grammatical sentences, which are the bedrock of the river, are what makes the empirical propositions to flow. They are the condition of the possibility of the flow. However, the bedrock, as we emphasize from the beginning, is not given. What makes the bedrock to emerge is the flow of the water on it. Bedrock is both the result

of river and the condition of production of river. The dynamism of the flow can change the depth and direction of the bedrock.

Or it might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became fluid” (OC, 15e).

We might treat a sentence as testable in one game and grammatical in another. Or, a proposition of grammar might change into an empirical proposition. Every practice carries and determines new possibilities in it. When a practice accords with the rule, which is fitting to a projection, the riverbed deepens, when it does not accord with it, then it forces a change in grammar.

The idealization that separates grammar from actual use is implausible because it cancels out the possibility of change between two states. This kind of idealization would not be different from the reification of rules. One side of the regularity is bed and the other side of it is the flow. The rule (bedrock) cannot be fully separated from the medium because it is only expressed in it. One of the most important conclusions of the previous chapter is the idea that the rule is visible in practice. There is no rule outside of practice. Expression of a grammar rule is a redundant and dull expression. It does not inform us, such as “I have two hands.” It is a repetition of which is already known. However, it is still a practice. They are expressed and expressible only in practice. As once Foucault says for the transcendental elements in experience; “the grammatical elements are immanently caught up in the very things they connect” (Robinson, 2007, p. 14).

When we accord with the grammar, there is obvious separation between empirical and grammatical. However, in order to understand the possibility of

change, the demarcation should be understood as a blurry region where the difference of empirical from the grammatical is not easily discernible. The distinction is spurious. Virno locates the possibilities of change in this indiscernible grey zone between rule and action, in the tension between solid and fluid, grammatical and empirical. Both the open-ended character of action over the borders of definitive rules and the possibility of negation are in this grey zone of practice. In acting the grey zone is always present as a possibility. Virno states:

the independence (or limitation) of the moment in which the rule is applied emerges in full in the presence of the corresponding rule, and not where the rule is missing. Between norm and its effective realization there exists a lasting hiatus, indeed a real and true incommensurability (Virno, 2008, p. 102).

Acting always distorts the definite rule, escapes from its measure. The possibilities of change, break, resistance to the rule happen in the presence of the rule, in the activity of rule following. It is not an anomalous activity which does not make sense. On the contrary, it makes fully sense that we comprehend it as a break, a novelty or a mistake. All those possibilities are carried in the practice of rule following. Thus, Wittgenstein says "to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule" (PI, 202). This point is interpreted as a skeptic position by Kripke (1982)<sup>10</sup>, implying that we do not know which rule we follow. However, the accusation of skepticism is caused because of a demand of higher court of understanding which differentiates the rule from acting. However, we continuously tried to show the insufficiency of such a demand on both understanding of our actions and acting itself. We need neither a higher status of rules nor an ability to know the rule disengaged from acting, in order to act or to know how we act.

---

<sup>10</sup> See *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (1982)

There is a true incommensurability which builds a hybrid region in a regular practice; grammatical but also empirical, empirical but also grammatical. This grey zone locates the immanent possibility of accord and resonance at the same territory of action, where empirical and grammatical are very closely intertwined and Virno asserts, it is where they cling to each other (Virno, 2008, p. 118). However nothing is possible until it is actual. Possibilities do not take the steps in advance. At the point of indiscernibility, the common behaviors of mankind precede the determined rules (the bedrock) and thus, function as the final criterion for acting. The change does not happen with the illegitimate application of the rule but it happens in the hybrid zone of the action. The action is always a problematic process when the question of legitimacy is suspended because at the zone of indiscernibility the action does not itself allow to be measured, the instrument of measure is broken, and true incommensurability appears until a new grammar appears. Wittgenstein depicts this incommensurability with the pain of birth: “the labour pains at the birth of new concepts” (CV, 62e). This alteration in rules and in the way we live (forms of life) is not a merely conceptual difference, “but also it is what one does” (RPP, §910).

To summarize, “rule following practice moves in between the territory of well-defined rules to regularities, then from regularities to well-defined rules” (Virno, 2008, p. 37). The rules give the condition of possibilities of regularities, and then the regularities give the condition of possibility of forming the rules. The borderline between them are fluid because of “the very mode of existence of language, in which, simultaneously, some forms are undergoing grammaticization while others are undergoing degrammaticization.” (Vološinov, 1986, p. 126) While the rules of grammar make projections possible, those possibilities (projections,

anticipations) emerge from the multiple differentiation and continuous resemblances of practices. Neither grammar is reducible to the practices it generates, nor is the practice reducible to rules. The immanent conception of the rules is laying the ground (bedrock) for our practices, but the crucial point is that beneath every bedrock there is an abyss which is nothing but life that makes it contingent. The meaningful human practice metabolizes ambivalence and oscillation, between grammar (redundant non-informational rules) and continuous differentiation of regularities. Wittgenstein's and Marx's methods offer us a logic of pragmatics of experimentation. Without any idealization of rules, Rule following itself is an effort to unfold a space in which it is once more possible to think.

At the end of this chapter, we can say that what makes a rule normative is neither its logical form nor its putative empirical necessity, but its practical embodiment in practice which is always contingent. This move brings to two opposing concepts together, that of contingency and necessity. The normative behavior emerges from the repetition of regularities and rituals. Obviously, those regularities in life change. The problem is about the so called a priori or analytic rules which are supposed not to change. What we tried to do is to dissolve these reified necessary conditions of practice back into the human practice. This is not a dictation to thought but we do by appealing to the regularities in human practice, especially to language. Dissolving the rules in action showed us how "human practice sets up camp within the environment of the contingent" (Virno, 2008, p. 97). The conditions which make the reification inevitable are deciphered and new conditions which make embodiment of rules inevitable are determined. In last part, we will end up our discussion with some conclusive remarks.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

*Philosophers should leave everything as it is.*

*(Wittgenstein, PI, 124)*

The philosophers have only interpreted the world,  
in various ways; the point is to change it. *(Marx, 11<sup>th</sup> thesis)*

The main aim of this thesis has been to provide the ontological possibilities of constructing the place of rules immanent to our lives in an embedded way, in opposition to a transcendent reified relation between rules and actions. The place of rules in actions has not been ignored but on the contrary, it is taking the attention of many thinkers, not only because the thinker looks for logos (rule) in the object he looks at, but also because the rules are everywhere in our lives. The problem is not their existence but their insistence. The insistence or endurance of rules legitimizes itself in the discourse of reification. Meanwhile, we tried to make the presuppositions of reification and desires for reification visible in *Saussure's Course on General Linguistics*. Then, we explicate how Wittgenstein and Marx render them from necessary to contingent, from natural to artificial, and from subjectless propositions to the collective intentions. We followed their critique of a heavenly sanctified order, an a-social, non-produced rule which conditions of production are mystified.

Wittgenstein, in *Philosophical Investigations*, challenged these mystifications by having an immanent critique which leads us to see the social, practical, and

dynamic character of the rules that we tried to support with Marx's and Vološinov's arguments. They gave the possibility of the embodiment of rules in actions, which produce the conditions both of normativity and transformative action without falling either to a skeptic or relativist position. Normative character of rules is superseded from being a cause, a reason or a foundation of our practices, to the function of laying the ground for practices. Illuminating this made us understand the reciprocal interaction between rules and actions. And this interaction between empirical and grammatical provides the possibility of making new sense of the world, i.e. changing the way we live in it.

At the end, it is important to ask how the embodiment of rules in actions can affect the intellectual practice. It is important because if this critique is right on its claim then the motivations and presuppositions of abstract objectivism are illegitimate to carry out a theory. What should change in our way of carrying out a study after the elucidation on how rules operate? Two answers; as I quote in the epigraph, one from Wittgenstein saying that theory or philosophizing should be abandoned and the world should be left as it is, the other from Marx in his famous 11<sup>th</sup> thesis suggests, in the very opposite of Wittgenstein, that we should change the world. At a first glance, these famous quotations are very different suggestions. However, when we analyze the contexts they are written in, both of the suggestions make similar sense.

Wittgenstein rigorously attacks the way of philosophizing, which nullifies the effects of practices to the rules (logos). He is doing that without placing himself to a skeptic or reductionist position. Rather, Wittgenstein's rule following argument dissolves philosophy into practice, hence the philosophy which ignores the practice,

which does not position itself as a practice, is “bad” philosophizing. With the embodiment of rule into practice, we are left at the point of trying not to interpret the world from outside, but to change it from inside. The intellectual practice carries the conditions of being a concrete practice which evolves by its activity. Hence, as Shaviro rightly observes, Wittgenstein's attack on traditional philosophy stands entirely in accord with the demand of the 11<sup>th</sup> Thesis on Feuerbach: that we change the world, rather than merely interpret it (Shaviro, 1986, p. 217).

I use the term “suggestion” in order to talk about Wittgenstein’s and Marx’s propositions on intellectual practice since they are necessarily in the modality of “ought.” It is obvious that there are theoreticians, law makers, linguists and others who build up their study still on a reified notion of rule, although the Marxist and Wittgensteinian analysis of rules are old and popular enough to be well known. Not only in academia but also in our everyday life there are people who produce victims and are victimized under the sovereign rule. For example, Vološinov is an interesting figure in that sense. One might think that philosophy of language has nothing to do with politics or ethics, but it is very interesting to notice that Vološinov is exiled to Siberia because of the book he wrote on language. It was not only a geographical exile but also an intellectual one. He disappeared from the scene after his exile. He is left to oblivion by those who sanctify their own rules and defend the rules in spite of those who use them. Vološinov, as a philosopher of language, whose work studies the possibility of linguistic rules’ evolution, obviously alarms the ones who sanctify “the principles of Marxism.” For Vološinov, the sacred was represented by Stalinism. For us, it is neo-liberal economy, nation state, logic, natural sciences, etc. Most of the times, the legitimization of dictatorships’ authority is constructed on the

reification of rules and on the sacrifice of our practices, beliefs and our lives in the name of those rules. The sovereign can ignore the meaningfulness, objectivity, or normativity of everyday practices, because he already holds the justifications for this ignorance in the discourse of abstract objectivism. What an intellectual practitioner can do is deciphering the problems of this sanctification. In that sense, Wittgenstein matches up his works with the sign hanging on the walls of English train stations just after the World War II where “is this journey really necessary?” is written (CV, 62e). Now, these three philosophers (Marx, Wittgenstein and Vološinov) give us the possibility of thinking against the sovereign rule again by asking; “Is our journey really necessary?” To think about it is always political, since the rules that are laying the ground for our actions, which entail the decision, i.e. to do and not to do? What Wittgenstein and Marx provide us is making the possibility visible of thinking of our rules as political and ethical. Doing this is also giving the possibility to think on non-hierarchical politics.

On the other hand, this possibility cannot make anyone little more comfortable, because the possibility is not an actual state; it also contains the possibility of failure, evil and danger. The care for rules blatantly opens up new possibilities for thought, such as thinking the conditions of possibilities of human beings’ historic natural institutions, or possibility of asking to make science, art, philosophy, and politics in a different way, without losing connection with the immanent level. This is why it is not relieving to say that the rules are embodied in practices, because it does not prevent them to be treated as separated entities. Hence, some bothersome questions arise to ask further; how come reification is adequate to life today if it is realized because of confusion, and how come it keeps dominating

our form of thinking? Why does reification become a dominant form of thinking, at the end of the day? Of course, the possibility to change the grammatical propositions does not make them change like natural event, nor the effort to change takes one day, but it loads the responsibility on the agents, since the practice (use) becomes the essential element of change. As Wittgenstein emphasizes in different places, the change in rules will be possible only if we change our forms of life. To achieve this, the experiments in different areas of human practice, aiming at changing the grammar of the world today, i.e. aiming at a new ontology, are exigently needed as it was no less exigent yesterday.

## REFERENCES

- Althusser, L. (2005). Contradiction and Overdetermination. In *For Marx* (pp. 89-128). London: Verso.
- Althusser, L. (2005). On the Materialist Dialectic. In *For Marx* (pp. 161-218). London: Verso.
- Baker, G. P., & Hacker, P. M. (1992). *Wittgenstein Rules, Grammar and Necessity*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Balibar, É. (2007). *Philosophy of Marx*. London: Verso.
- Bourdieu, P. (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. (R. Nice, Trans.) Cambridge, Oxford, UK: Polity Press, B. Blackwell.
- Deleuze, G., & Guattari, F. (2004). Postulates of Linguistics. In *A Thousand Plateaus* (pp. 83-123.). New York: Continuum.
- Descartes, R. (1993). *Meditations on first philosophy*. (D. A. Cress, Trans.) Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co.
- Doyal, L., & Harris, R. (1983, May-June). The Practical Foundations of Human Understanding. *New Left Review*, 139, pp. 59-78.
- Foster, M. N. (2004). *Wittgenstein on the Arbitrariness of Grammar*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Holborow, M. (2006). Putting The Social Back Into Language: Marx, Vološinov and Vygotsky reexamined. *Studies in Language and Capitalism*, 1-28.
- Honneth, A. (2008). *Reification : a new look at an old idea*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kishik, D. (2007, August 23). Wittgenstein on Meaning and Life.
- Lukács, G. (1971). *History and class consciousness : studies in Marxist dialectics*. (R. Livingstone, Trans.) Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Lyotard, J.-F. (1993). "Wittgenstein 'After'". In J.-F. Lyotard, *Jean-François Lyotard: Political Writings*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

- Marx, K. (1990). *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy* (Vol. 1). (B. Fowkes, Trans.) Penguin.
- Marx, K. (1975). Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. In L. Colletti (Ed.), *Early Writings*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.
- Marx, K. (1978, Spring). The Value-Form. *Capital and Class*, 4, pp. 130-150.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1974). *German Ideology*. London: Lawrence.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1970). *Selected Works* (Vol. Three). Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- Medina, J. (2002). *Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Patchen, M. (2006, February). The Rule of the People: Arendt, Arche, and Democracy. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 100 (No. 1), pp. 1-14.
- Robinson, K. (2007). An Immanent Transcendental: Foucault, Kant and Critical Philosophy. *Radical Philosophy* (141), 12-23.
- Rubinstein, D. (1981). *Marx and Wittgenstein Social Praxis and Social Explanation*. London, Boston and Hanley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Saussure, F. d. (1966). *Course in general linguistics*. (A. S. Charles Bally, Ed., & W. Baskin, Trans.) New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Sen, A. (2003). Sraffa, Wittgenstein, and Gramsci. *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 41, pp. 1240-1255.
- Shaviro, S. (1986). From Language to "Forms of Life": Theory and Practice in Wittgenstein. *Social Text*, 13-14 (Winter - Spring), 216-236.
- Taylor, C. (1999). To Follow A Rule. In R. Shusterman (Ed.), *Bourdieu A Critical Reader*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Virno, P. (2008). *Multitude: Between Innovation and Negation*. LA: Semiotext(e).
- Virno, P. (2004). *The Grammar of multitude*. NY: Semiotext(e).
- Vološinov, V. N. (1986). *Marxist Philosophy of Language*. (L. Matejka, & I. R. Tutunik, Trans.) MA: Harvard.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1980). *Culture and Value*. (P. Winch, Trans.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1972). *On Certainty*. (G. E. Anscombe, Ed.) New York: Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1974.). *Philosophical Grammar*. (A. Kenny, Trans.) Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Wittgenstein, L. (1980b). *Philosophical Remarks*. (R. Rhees, Ed.) Chicago: The University of Chicago.