

TURKISH-BALKAN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

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TURKISH-BALKAN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR

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Title: Turkish-Balkan Policy After the Cold War

This thesis examines the Turkish-Balkan policy since the establishment of the Republic until now. Special emphasis is given to the period after the end of the Cold War as Turkish foreign policy gained several new aspects and experienced significant changes during this era. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and collapse of the communist regimes in the Balkans, the Iron Curtain which divided Turkey and Balkan states disappeared and these developments brought out a renewed Turkish interest and involvement in the region. However this early optimism gave way to stability and security concerns with the bloody disintegration of Yugoslavia and the emergence of new conflicts and wars in the Balkans. Turkey had to bring forth new approaches and policies in order to face the difficulties in this volatile geo-political environment. In this context, diplomatic initiatives towards the solution of the Bosnian and Kosovo crises and Turkish attempts to improve bilateral relations with the Balkan states were explored in details in this thesis. After the end of the Kosovo War the EU and the US accelerated their efforts to integrate the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. This thesis also attempts to find out the role of Turkey in this new economic, political and security structures in the Balkans.

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Başlık: Soğuk Savaş Sonrasında Türkiye'nin Balkan Politikası

Bu tez, Cumhuriyet'in kuruluşundan günümüze Türkiye'nin Balkan politikasını inceler. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Türk dış politikası önemli değişiklikler geçirdiği ve birçok yeni veçheler kazandığı için bu döneme özel önem verilmiştir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılışı ve Balkanlar'da komünist rejimlerin çökmesiyle Türkiye'yle Balkan devletlerini ayıran demir perde ortadan kalktı ve bu gelişmeler Türkiye'nin bölgeye dair merak ve ilgisini arttırdı. Bununla beraber, Yugoslavya'nın kanlı biçimde parçalanması ve Balkanlar'da yeni çatışmaların ve savaşların çıkması bu erken iyimserliğin yerini istikrar ve güvenlik endişelerine bırakmasına neden oldu. Türkiye, bu değişken jeo-politik ortamda güçlükleri aşabilmek için yeni yaklaşımlar ve politikalar ortaya koymak zorunda kaldı. Bu bağlamda, bu tezde Bosna ve Kosova krizlerinin çözümüne yönelik diplomatik girişimler ve Balkan devletleriyle ikili ilişkileri geliştirmek için Türkiye'nin yaptığı çalışmalar ayrıntılı bir şekilde incelendi. Kosova Savaşı bittikten sonra Avrupa Birliği ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Balkanları Avrupa ve Atlantik kurumlarına entegre etme çabalarını arttırdılar. Bu tez aynı zamanda Balkanlar'da oluşan bu yeni siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri yapılarda Türkiye'nin rolünü anlamaya çalışmaktadır.

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To the memory of my grandfather, İzzet Kongur

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PREFACE

This thesis examines the Turkish-Balkan policy since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 until now. Special emphasis is given to the period after the end of the Cold War as Turkish foreign policy gained several new aspects and experienced drastic changes during this era. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and collapse of the communist regimes in the Balkans, the Iron Curtain which divided the Turkey and the Balkan states disappeared and these developments brought out a renewed Turkish interest and involvement in the peninsula. Moreover with the emergence of new conflicts and wars in the Balkans, Turkey had to bring forth new approaches and policies in order to face the difficulties in this hot region.

This thesis is aimed to give a comprehensive evaluation of Turkish-Balkan policy during the Republican era and fill a certain gap in this field. I used mostly secondary resources such as books, periodicals, government documents and reports, theses, online sources and newspapers in this research. Although there is a rich academic literature about Turkish foreign policy in general, Turkey's Balkan policy in particular has rarely been studied. Turkish and foreign scholars generally have paid attention to the bilateral relations between Turkey and the Balkan states, mostly with Bulgaria and Greece. One exception is Oral Sander's Ph.D. thesis, in which he examines Turkish-Balkan policy between 1945 and 1965. I hope that this study will go one step further by exploring the similarities and differences between the Interwar, Cold War and Post-Cold War periods and analyzing Turkey's new role in the Balkans, in economic, security and political dimensions.

This thesis is composed of eight chapters. The first chapter gives a brief and general introduction of the thesis. The second chapter reviews the concept of regional middle power and discusses whether Turkey emerged as a regional actor in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s or not. The third chapter gives the historical background of the Turkish presence and influence in the region. The implications of the legacy of the Ottoman Empire on modern Turkey's Balkan policy are also analyzed.

Chapter Four focuses on Turkish attempts to establish peace and security in the Balkans through closer relations and conferences during the interwar years. In this part, population transfers with Greece, bilateral relations with the other Balkan states, and the Balkan Entente which came into being as a regional cooperation initiative that originated from the region will be examined.

Chapter Five concentrates on the Turkish Balkan policy during the Cold War years in the light of developments such as the eruption of the Cyprus Crisis, the Johnson Letter, Turkish-Russian rapprochement and the U.S. arms embargo.

Special emphasis is given to the disintegration of Yugoslavia in Chapter Six as this event played a decisive role in shaping Turkish-Balkan policy at the beginning of the 1990s. This chapter starts with a brief summary of the break-up of Yugoslavia and also presents the positions taken by different international actors such as the EU, the USA and Russia during the conflict. It then moves on to the Turkish response to the unfolding crisis. Turkish diplomatic efforts towards the solution of the Bosnia and Kosovo issues were evaluated in details.

Chapter Seven examines the EU and U.S. efforts to integrate the Balkans into the Euro-Atlantic structures which were accelerated after the end of the Kosovo war. In this

context, the European Union's new concept of regional approach was discussed by giving reference to regional cooperation initiatives and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). This chapter also attempts to ascertain Turkey's position in the new economic, political and security establishments in the region. The chapter finishes with the impact of the European Union integration process on Turkey's bilateral relations with its two Balkan neighbors, Bulgaria and Greece. Finally, in the conclusion part, I analyze the major findings of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Balkans have always played a significant role in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey has always been an important political actor in the region. The Ottoman Empire ruled the peninsula for more than five centuries. While receding from the Balkans, it left behind substantial Muslim communities and minorities of Turkish origin. A strong sense of affinity exists between the peoples of Turkey and the Balkan countries, which in effect mirrors Turkey's close interest in the region. Geographically, the Balkans are located in the area that connects Turkey to Europe. Approximately two and a half million Turkish citizens live in Western Europe, which also accounts for more than half of Turkey's foreign trade. Moreover, with Turkey's bid for European Union membership, the Balkans have gained a particular meaning. The Turkish state will continue to be sensitive to any major changes in the region as they will have immediate effects on Turkey's long term interests in Europe.

The Balkans have been a fertile ground for conflicts and wars that have characterized the fundamental change in the political and security environment in the peninsula during the post-Cold War era. The collapse of communist regimes and the dissolution of the Yugoslav and Soviet federations brought sudden, drastic implications in the region. At the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey found itself in a totally altered, and volatile geo-political environment. Ensuring regional peace and maintaining stability in

the Balkans became essential for Turkey's security and gave rise to active and high profile Turkish diplomacy.

The Yugoslav crisis constituted the greatest challenge for European security since World War II. It influenced the restructuring of post-Cold War security relations and complicated the European Union's development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and search for a new role in international affairs. The EU had fairly a bad image in terms of its management of the Yugoslav conflict. Divisions within the Union made it difficult to develop an effective and coherent CFSP.

The Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts revealed the weaknesses in the CFSP and urged the member states to develop more common positions and joint actions. The EU assumed more responsibility in the Balkans after the Kosovo crisis, by establishing closer institutional links with countries in the region and by strengthening regional cooperation between the Balkan states. The European Union's growing influence and role in the Balkans coincided with the gradual disengagement of the U.S. from the region mostly because of Afghanistan and the Iraq Wars.

In the Balkans, Greece is an EU member, while Bulgaria and Romania are set to become members in the near future. All the remaining Balkan states, including Turkey, aim at EU membership. Turkey has both strategic interests in the Balkans and the political and military means to back them. Turkish governments have taken active part in most of the regional cooperation schemes and Turkish peacekeeping forces have served in EU, NATO and UN military operations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Possible Turkish membership in the European Union will help the Union

to restrict the ethnic tensions in the Balkans and to enhance both the intra-regional cooperation and the region's integration with the EU.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The End of the Cold War and the Creation of the New World Order

The international system underwent a radical transformation in the late 1980s. The reunification Germany, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War and the breakdown of the post - 1945 power structure. The demise of the Cold War brought an end to the bipolar competition. Although the United States remained predominant in the military and security domains and continued to play a key role in world politics, new concentrations of power such as the EU, Japan, China, and India emerged.¹ Furthermore, with the removal of the constraining effects of super power bloc leadership, regional powers had greater room to maneuver and advanced their own interests and regional aspirations.²

Between 1986 and 1992, the European Economic Community made remarkable progress. The Single European Act was signed in February 1986 and came into force in July 1987.³ The member countries agreed to open their borders to the free movement of capital, goods, services and labor. This was an important step towards furthering the

¹ Anthony G. McGrew, "Conceptualizing Global Politics", in *Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation State*, (eds.) Anthony G. McGrew and Paul G. Lewis (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1992), p.24.

² Ian Clark, *Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.172.

³ Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, *The Commanding Heights: The Battle between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World* (New York, NY: Touchstone, 1999), p.314.

interdependence in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty which was concluded in February 1992 and became operational in November 1993, created a European Union that was composed of three pillars: an economic and monetary union, a common foreign and security policy, and a justice and home affairs policy.⁴ There were mainly two factors behind these developments: The disintegration of the Soviet Union had reduced Europe's dependence on the United States and the unification of Germany had made the establishment of a full-fledged economic and political union possible.

It can be said that today, power is increasingly diffused and redistributed downward into regions.⁵ International politics are increasingly shaped, not by a single, globalized process, but rather by several regional ones. With the waning of the bipolar era, regional powers had the opportunity to develop initiatives and wield influence in their respective regions.

The Emergence of Regional Middle Powers

Although the concept of middle power is not new and has been applied to countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Scandinavian states for a long time, the term itself is subjective and problematic. There is little agreement on what makes up a middle power in international politics.

Cantori and Spiegel define the middle powers as “those states whose level of power permits them to play only decidedly limited and selected roles in subordinate systems other than their own and included Australia, Brazil, Canada, East Germany,

⁴ Felipe Gonzalez and Stanley Hoffman, “European Union and Globalization”, *Foreign Policy* 115 (Summer 1999), p.28.

⁵ Graham E. Fuller and John Arquilla, “The Intractable Problem of Regional Powers”, *ORBIS*, (Fall 1996), p.1.

India, Italy, Spain and Portugal to this group.”⁶ Wight argued that, “a middle power is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in peace time the great powers bid for its support, and in war time, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict costs on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it.”⁷ The middle powers for Wight were Britain, France, Germany and Japan.

Both Cantori and Spiegel and Wight made a distinction between middle powers and regional powers and stated that the latter had geographically more restricted range. Cantori and Spiegel defined the regional states as “countries which are generally weaker than minor powers in material, military, and motivational power but which have a small degree of influence on the foreign scene because they are able on occasion to play a limited role in their own subordinate system.”⁸ According to them regional states which exerted some influence in their own region were Colombia, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela.⁹

Wight stated that “regional powers are the states with general interests relative to the limited region and a capacity to act alone, which gives them the appearance of local great powers.”¹⁰ In this context, Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia were regional great powers in the Arab world; South Africa in Africa, and Argentina and Brazil played a similar role in South America.¹¹

⁶ Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1970), p.14.

⁷ Martin Wight, *Power Politics* (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p.65.

⁸ Cantori and Spiegel, p.15.

⁹ Ibid., p.16.

¹⁰ Wight, p.63.

¹¹ Ibid.

It can be said that there are at least three criteria used while identifying a middle power. The first criterion is the position of the country in the international hierarchy. According to this view, middle powers are states which occupy the middle point in a range of bigness to smallness usually measured by reference to quantifiable attributes such as size, population, strength of economy and military capability.¹²

The second criterion is geography. It is asserted that states which are powerful within their geographic regions might usefully be thought of as middle powers.¹³ The last approach is the behavioral definition. According to this approach, middle powers are defined primarily by their behavior, “by demonstrating leadership in functional domains that is in issue areas or institutions where they have strong interests or responsibilities, by using their own weight to stabilize conflict or potential conflict in the international system and pursuing a generalized strengthening of multilateral decision making.”¹⁴

Middle powers stress conflict resolution, diplomatic initiatives, international institution building, and mediation. The diplomatic initiatives adopted by middle powers are composed of “generating a plan of action, often based on technical expertise, gathering support for their ideas from as many like-minded states as possible and then presenting the great powers with a suggested set of solutions, or with a process that might lead to a political solution.”¹⁵

¹² Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order* (Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 1993), p.17.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Bernard Wood, *Middle Powers in the International System: The Middle Powers and the General Interest* (Ottawa, Canada: The North-South Institute, 1988), p.20.

¹⁵ Kim Richard Nossal and Richard Stubbs, “Mahathir’s Malaysia: An Emerging Middle Power”, in *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War*, (ed.) Andrew F. Cooper (London, Macmillan Press, 1997), p.150.

The end of the Cold War and the eruption of various conflicts and wars in the zones of influence of the former Soviet Union wrought a change in the definition, role and functions of the middle powers. This change has been captured in the term “emerging regional middle power”. While traditional middle powers play their roles on a world scale, a regional middle power is usually determined within a regional division of the globe. Neumann defines the regional middle power as a state that “has the potential to balance other forces, maintain codes of conduct, stabilize sphere of influences and police unruly states.”¹⁶ So the emerging regional middle powers seem to play or are expected to play the role of regional peacemakers. These powers, at the regional level, seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable norms and rules in terms of which international politics and relations are conducted. Moreover, although they may be sufficiently developed economically or enjoy sufficient natural resources, these powers are still economically and technologically dependent on the core and need the support of big powers.¹⁷

Turkish Foreign Policy in the New Order

The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union had profound implications on Turkey, which had served as the southern bastion of the NATO alliance and acted as a strong barrier to Soviet expansionism toward the south. The changes in the international system opened up new opportunities and brought new challenges to Turkish foreign policy. Although the decline of the Soviet threat eased the

¹⁶ Iver B. Neumann, *Regional Great Powers in International Politics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992), p.7.

¹⁷ Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p.7.

tension on the Turkish state, the power vacuum created by the removal of the Soviet Union from the Balkans and the Caucasus gave rise to new regional conflicts and wars in these regions and increased the uncertainty and volatility in Turkey's geo-political environment.

Turkey's geo-strategic importance appeared to have declined somewhat in the immediate post-Cold War era.¹⁸ In the absence of a common enemy, the economic, political, and social incompatibilities between Ankara and the Western powers became much more apparent. The European Community rejected Turkey's bid for full membership in December 1989 by sending a message that Turkey's future did not rest with Europe.¹⁹ Moreover, at the beginning of the 1990s, Turkey was facing major crises in the economic and political realms such as the separatist and terrorist PKK movement, religious tensions, foreign debt and high inflation. Both internal and external developments within the country led the Turkish authorities to search for a new position in the new international context.

The decisive shift in Turkish foreign policy began with the Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991. Turkey took an active role in the US-led coalition against Iraq, following the latter's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Although Turkey had flourishing economic relations with Iraq based on bilateral trade, transit trade, and the construction of two oil pipelines from the northern Iraqi oil fields to Turkey's Mediterranean coast, the Turkish

¹⁸ Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and the Middle East After September 11", in *History in Dispute: The Middle East Since 1945*, (ed.) David Lesch (Columbia, SC: Manly, 2003), p.1.

¹⁹ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1999), p.23.

government did not hesitate to take part in the blockade of Iraq.²⁰ This new activism and assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy was further consolidated with the rise of new Turkic republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia after the decay of the Soviet Union. Turkey was the first state to recognize the independence of these states in 1991 and this act was followed by intense diplomatic efforts to forge close links and expand Turkey's influence in the region.²¹

The Gulf War reaffirmed Turkey's strategic importance in the eyes of the U.S. authorities and the U.S. encouraged and supported a more activist Turkish involvement in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. Turkey was regarded as "a key country whose future may not only determine the success or failure of its region but also significantly affect international stability."²² Furthermore, Turkey as a democratic, secular and Western-oriented country could become a genuine model for the Middle Eastern and Central Asian states. Buzan positioned Turkey as "the natural insulator between Europe and the Middle East, not only geographically but also culturally (non-Arab) and ideologically (Islamic, but with a strong secular state tradition)."²³ Huntington stated that, "the end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of

²⁰ Philip Robins, "The Foreign Policy of Turkey", in *The Foreign Policies of Middle East States*, (eds.) Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), p.326.

²¹ Ziya Öniş, "Turkey and Post-Soviet States: Potential and Limits of Regional Power Influence", *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 5, no. 2 (June 2001), p.2.

²² Robert Chase, Emily Hill and Paul M. Kennedy, *The Pivotal States: A New Framework for US Policy in the Developing World* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1999), p.9.

²³ Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs* 67, no.3 (July 1991), p.449.

Greece to those of China. Encouraged by the West, Turkey is making strenuous efforts to carve out this new identity for itself.”²⁴

A greater Turkish role in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East was favored by the West as a counter-weight against Iran. The fear that the vacuum left by the collapse of Soviet communism could lead to an emergence of Islamic fundamentalism in these regions led to the West’s promotion of Turkey as a Muslim, yet secular and democratic model.²⁵ Turkey, as a country which proved that Islam, democracy, human rights and market economy could go together, hand in hand, could help the West to reduce Christian-Muslim polarity.²⁶

Some of the scholars also stressed that Turkey was a regional role model and performed a regional stabilizing role. Larrabee and Lesser defined Turkey as a pivot state due to its population, geographical location, and economic and military potential and stressed that a prosperous and stable Turkey would be a factor of stability in a number of different areas: the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and Europe.²⁷ Andrew Mango stated that, “By itself, Turkey cannot bring order to the Balkans, the neighboring republics of the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. But it can make a significant contribution to international, especially Western, efforts in this direction.”²⁸ Graham E. Fuller pointed out that, “in a period when chaos will predictably be a major feature of political events in the Balkans and among the republics of the former Soviet Union -not to mention in the Middle East – the international system benefits from a nation whose

²⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, *Foreign Affairs* 72, no.3 (1993), p.42.

²⁵ Mustafa Aydın, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis* (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 2004), p.102.

²⁶ Oral Sander, *Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası* (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1998), p.261.

²⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee and Ian O. Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p.2.

²⁸ Andrew Mango, *Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role* (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1994), p.111.

stability and track record for international prudence is by and large impressive.”²⁹ Ziya Öniş underlined that since mid-1990s, Turkey has actively pursued a strategy beyond its own borders, especially in Caucasus and Middle and has undertaken the role of a regional stabilizer as part of its own economic and security interests.³⁰ However, some academics, such as Mümtaz Soysal, did not see a benefit for Turkey in assuming the role of a regional power as “this might lead Turkey to international roles exceeding the capabilities of both the state and the nation.”³¹

The belief that Turkey had greater avenue to be considered as a regional power was held widely in Turkey, especially in political circles at the beginning of the 1990s. The then Turkish President Turgut Özal, in his opening speech of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on September 1, 1991, described the situation created by the end of Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union as an “historic opportunity for the Turks to become a regional power,” and urged the Assembly not to “throw away this change which presented itself for the first time in 400 years.”³² Turkish State Minister Kamran İnan stated that “the international environment has changed. The bloc system is ended. Turkey has to accept, against its will, that it is a regional power.”³³ The leader of the Democratic Leftist Party (DLP), Bülent Ecevit emphasized the importance of the Balkans for Turkey where there were several newly established independent states and

²⁹ Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s New Eastern Orientation”, in *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, (eds.) Graham E. Fuller, Ian O. Lesser, Paul B. Henze, and J. F. Brown (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), pp.37-38.

³⁰ Ziya Öniş, “Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity”, *Middle East Journal* 49, no.1 (1995), pp.50-51.

³¹ Mümtaz Soysal, “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy”, in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p.38.

³² Cited in Aydın, p.100.

³³ Cited in Fuller, p.67.

added that Turkey had to develop its relations with the Balkan countries as it could find a historical occasion to be a regional power after the fall of communism.³⁴

So it can be said that after the end of the Cold War, Turkey actively sought to play a greater regional role, partly because opportunities have presented themselves and partly because circumstances have appeared to remove passivity as a viable option. Turkey's claim to be a regional middle power rested on its geographical position as much as its economic status and role in international organizations³⁵ and it was also hoped that an active leadership in these problematic regions would help to revitalize Turkey's strategic value to the West and enhance its own economic, political and security interests.

The Balkans in the New International Environment

The end of the Cold War was an important turning point for the Balkan region. The collapse of the communist system and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact resulted in the loosening of Soviet Union influence on the Balkan states and this paved the way for significant reforms such as the transition from the single party to the multi-party system and the adoption of a market economy.³⁶

However, the new era also brought serious challenges for the Balkans. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was cited as a successful multi-national state that had managed to establish good ethnic relations and held a balance between the communist and Western blocs in Europe during the Cold War years, disintegrated after

³⁴ Tanıl Bora, *Yugoslavya: Milliyetçiliğin Provokasyonu* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1991), p.225.

³⁵ Meltem Müftüler and Müberra Yüksel, "Turkey: A Middle Power in the New Order", in *Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers After the Cold War*, (ed.) Andrew F. Cooper (London, Macmillan Press, 1997), p.187-189.

³⁶ A. Hikmet Alp and Mustafa Türkeş, "The Balkans in Turkey's Security Environment", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6, (2001), p.128.

bloody and violent wars and a number of new states were established in post-Yugoslav space. This development affected the entire system of international relations in Europe and the Balkan region regained its former notoriety as a powder keg.³⁷

Yugoslavia was a European country in close proximity to the EC's borders and the Yugoslavian state had benefited from the EC's generalized system of trade preferences since 1974 and signed a trade and cooperation agreement with the EC in 1980.³⁸ In consequence, when the conflict first erupted in June 1991, the EC was expected to have great influence in resolving the crisis. Moreover, the Yugoslav crisis was perceived as an opportunity by the proponents of the EC security and defence dimension to demonstrate the Community's ability to manage crises in its near abroad.

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the EU's second pillar on all EU security issues, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy. After the conclusion of the Maastricht Treaty, more progress was made towards the realization of this agreement. In June 1992, the Foreign Ministers of the EU submitted a report to the Lisbon European Council on potential areas for CFSP joint action vis-a-vis particular countries or groups of countries and this gave a detailed list of foreign policy objectives such as:

- “strengthening democratic principles and institutions and respect for human and minority rights;

³⁷ Georgi Parvanov, “Bulgaria in Changing World”, *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13, no.4 (Fall 2002), p.6.

³⁸ Christian Pippan, “The Rocky Road to Europe: The EU's Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality”, *European Foreign Affairs Review* 9, no.2 (Summer 2004), p.221.

- promoting regional political stability and contributing to the creation of political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves towards regional or sub-regional integration;
- contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts;
- contributing to a more effective international coordination in dealing with emergency situations;
- strengthening international cooperation in issues of international interests such as the fight against arms proliferation, terrorism and traffic in illicit drugs; and
- promoting and supporting good government.”³⁹

As stated above, conflict prevention and conflict management would be one of the major policy objectives of the EU in the future. The conflict prevention and management tasks would cover, “humanitarian aid, election monitoring, police deployment and training, border controls, institution-building, mine clearance, arms control and destruction, combating illicit trafficking, embargo enforcement and counter-terrorism initiatives.”⁴⁰

However despite these ambitious aims, the EU failed to establish a coherent policy towards the Balkan region and could not deal effectively with the Yugoslav crisis. There were two main reasons behind Europe’s mismanagement of the Yugoslav conflict. First, the crisis broke out before effective institutions were in place. It was a crisis that

³⁹ Karen E. Smith, *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003), p.13.

⁴⁰ Hüseyin Bağcı, “Turkey and Europe: Security Issues”, in *Contemporary Issues in Turkey’s Foreign Relations: Dangerous Neighbourhood*, (ed.) Michael S. Radu (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003), p.56.

came too early in the history of the European Union.⁴¹ Second and more importantly, the EU was unable to develop sufficient consensus among its member states in matters of foreign and security policy. Germany insisted upon the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia while Greece blocked recognition of Macedonia under its constitutional name. It became evident that national priorities continued to constrain any progress towards common policies and that the member states had different interests in the region. So the CFSP joint actions in the former Yugoslavia were limited and modest, such as the support for the transportation of humanitarian aid to Bosnia and Herzegovina, support for the electoral process and local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the administration of the Muslim-Croat town of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴²

The Yugoslav crisis had two significant policy implications for the European Union. First, the Union took steps towards the establishment of a coherent, harmonized and effective foreign policy. The Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed in October 1997 and came into force in May 1999, provided the use of qualified majority voting rather than unanimity once a basic policy direction had been directed.⁴³ The treaty also created the post of the High Representative to help formulate, prepare and implement policy decisions. The Kosovo conflict was another test case for the CFSP's credibility and effectiveness. In Kosovo, Europe relied on U.S. military capacity in order to handle the crisis. The war over Kosovo confirmed the major shortfalls already identified in

⁴¹ Jean-Marie Guehenno, "A Foreign Policy in Search of a Polity", in *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy*, (ed.) Jan Zielonka (The Hague: The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International, 2003), p.25.

⁴² G. Wyn Rees, "Common Foreign and Security Policy and Defence: A Lost Opportunity?", in *Reforming the European Union: From Maastricht to Amsterdam*, (eds.) Philip Lynch, Nanette Neuwahl and G. Wyn Rees (Essex, England: Longman, 2000), p.169.

⁴³ Elizabeth Pond, *The Rebirth of Europe* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p.192.

European defense capabilities and led to important decisions on strengthening the EU's Common European Security and Defense Policy and the development of an EU rapid-reaction capability by 2003.⁴⁴ Furthermore, with the Nice Treaty of 2000, constructive abstention in the CFSP was replaced with enhanced cooperation mechanism and in terms of the security policy of the EU, a distinction was made between non-crisis vs. crisis arrangements and using NATO capabilities vs. non-using NATO capabilities.⁴⁵

Second, taking into consideration that the Balkans posed the immediate security risks to Europe, the European Union took steps toward promoting economic and political stability as well as regional cooperation in the peninsula. In December 1995, following the Dayton agreement, the EU launched the Royaumont Process that included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia with the aim of normalization of relations between these countries.⁴⁶ In April 1997, the EU devised a regional approach which set political and economic conditions for trade relations, the provision of assistance, and contractual relations with these five countries.⁴⁷ The EU revised its strategy after the Kosovo war. The Royaumont Process was replaced by the Stability Pact in 1999, which intended to help prepare the region for future EU membership through cooperation in the development of economic infrastructure, along with progress on regional security and democracy.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the Union began to sign Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) with the Balkan countries which

⁴⁴ Bağcı, p.58.

⁴⁵ Özkaragöz, Elif. 07 March 2005. *Turkey's Role in the Foreign and Security Policy of the EU*. Available [online]: < <http://www.turksam.org/en/yazilar.asp?kat1=1&yazi=148> > [11 April 2005].

⁴⁶ Smith, p.82.

⁴⁷ Smith, p.83.

⁴⁸ Dan Smith, "Europe's Peacebuilding Hour? Past Failures, Future Challenges", *Journal of International Affairs* 55, no.2 (Spring 2002), p.446.

encouraged reforms, strengthened bilateral links between the EU and each country and also gave Balkan states the prospect of full EU membership.

The gradual disengagement of the U.S. from the direct management of the Balkans also accelerated the European involvement in the region. After 11 September and succeeding Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the U.S. scaled down most of its ground forces in the Balkans. Europe mostly provides most of the NATO peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. However it should be noted that U.S. played an important as well as an unique role during the crises in the Balkans and will maintain its influence in the region in the following years. After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. moved most of its forces from Germany. These forces will be based in Southeastern Europe probably in Bulgaria and Romania as these two Balkan countries have access to an area long denied to the US: the Black Sea. Moreover, consideration has been given to Serbia and Montenegro as well, because Belgrade remains a critical and strategic crossroad of trade in the region and its influence on the Danube artery is vital.⁴⁹ Albania is also considered by some US authorities because of its access to the Mediterranean.⁵⁰

It seems that the European Union finally has started to carry out a coherent approach to the Balkans. The centerpiece of the EU's Balkan strategy is to move the region states toward membership, as economic integration combined with firm political structures will alleviate national tensions that would otherwise persist.⁵¹ The inclusion of Balkan countries as candidate members will require them to meet the EU's political

⁴⁹ Gregory R. Copley, "US Interests in the Balkans: Balancing Perceptions, Realities, and Strategic Need", *Defense and Foreign Affairs* 31, no.6 (June 2003), p.10.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans", *Foreign Affairs* 80, no.1 (Jan-February 2001), p.160.

conditions for accession that include high standards of democracy and respect for minority rights.⁵² However, there remain serious political problems, that need to be resolved. The Kosovo issue still has a destabilizing impact on the whole peninsula. Yugoslav authority in Kosovo has been suspended since 1999 due to the UN Security Council Resolutions 1244 and the territory is being administered by the UN Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK).

It is unthinkable that Kosovar Albanians would consent to return to Belgrade's rule and many of them seem to believe that the international community can grant them independence. On the other hand, Serbia will no doubt resist independence for Kosovo. If Serbia gives up Kosovo, the Serbs probably will demand compensation in Bosnia for the loss of Kosovo through annexation of all or part of Republika Srpska into Serbia proper.⁵³ Under those circumstances, Bosnian Muslims may demand territory for having been driven out of Serb-dominated areas during the war and Bosnian Croats may want to separate from the Bosniak-Croat Federation and unify with Croatia. Moreover, the possible independence of Kosovo also will affect the stability of Macedonia and will strain the fragile ethnic balance in this country.

Another uncertainty in the Balkans is the future of the Serbia Montenegro Federation. Montenegrins are divided deeply on the question of independence. While some of the groups state that Montenegro should reach a compromise with Serbia and

⁵² Mitja Zagar, "Ethnic Relations, Nationalism, and Minority Nationalism in South-Eastern Europe", in *Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order*, (eds.) Michael Keating and John McGarry (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2001), p.336.

⁵³ Edward P. Joseph, "Back to the Balkans", *Foreign Affairs* 84, no.1 (January-February 2005), p.121.

retain the common international personality for the two⁵⁴ there exists also a strong pro-independence faction which advocates the secession of Montenegro from the federation unless it brings immediate demonstrable benefits to the country.⁵⁵ Furthermore, if two independent states are established, the Sandzak of Novi Pazar, which has a Bosniak majority, will be divided between Serbia and Montenegro and this may create an additional problem in the Balkans.

Most of the authorities claim that if the Balkan states develop their economies and political and justice systems and move toward the EU, the drive for ethnic separation and aggressive nationalist tendencies will decrease.⁵⁶ In this context, the EU invests time and energy in keeping Serbia and Montenegro together to halt further fragmentation of the Balkans, including the drift towards independence in Kosovo.⁵⁷ However, small but potentially dangerous crises can flare up unexpectedly at any time as they did in Mitrovica and Presevo.

It will be very difficult and will take long time for many of the Balkan countries to meet the required economic and political criteria for accession to the EU. EU Foreign Ministers announced on March 16, 2005 that accession talks with Croatia would be postponed due to the country's failure to extradite Hague tribunal indictee, retired General Ante Gotovina.⁵⁸ This is the first time that the Union has delayed opening talks with a candidate country because of a human rights issue. Taking into consideration that

⁵⁴ See Türbedar, Erhan. 12 February 2005. *Karadağ'ın Bağımsızlığı'na Yeni Bir Engel*. Available [online]: <<http://www.turksam.org/tr/yazilar.asp?kat=53&yazi=169>> [11 April 2005].

⁵⁵ Marta Dassu and Nicholas Whyte, America's Balkan Disengagement ? , *Survival* 43, no.4 (Winter 2001-2002), pp.125-126.

⁵⁶ Joseph, p.123.

⁵⁷ Gabriel Partos, "Serbia: Apathy Rules", *The World Today* 60, no.1 (January 2004), p.22.

⁵⁸ *Southeast European Times*, 17 March 2005. Available [online]: <http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2005/03/17/feature-01> [11 April 2005].

Croatia is generally thought to be better prepared economically and politically for EU membership than the existing candidates, Bulgaria and Romania, it is likely that there exists a long way ahead the other Balkan countries' accession to EU. The idea of EU membership may start to seem less attractive if the process lasts too long and its tangible benefits are not materialized. The Balkans may risk falling into another cycle of political instability, disintegration and profound problems.

Turkey As a Regional Middle Power in the Balkans

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia increased the Turkish interest and involvement in the Balkans. Turkey has pursued an active, assertive and constructive foreign policy in the region by establishing close relations with Balkan states and by promoting regional security and stability.

Schoeman sets three conditions for an emerging middle regional power to fulfill its role. These are: "the internal dynamics of the state should allow it to fulfill a stabilizing and leading role in its region; the emerging power should indicate and demonstrate its willingness and capacity to assume the role of regional leader, stabilizer and, if not peacekeeper, at least peacemaker; and the emerging power should be acceptable to its neighbours as leader responsible for regional security."⁵⁹

If Schoeman's definition is taken into consideration regarding the definition of middle regional power, it can be said that Turkey emerged as a middle regional power in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s. From Turkey's point of view there exist several reasons why the Balkans are perceived as a very important region. First of all,

⁵⁹ Maxi Schoeman, "South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power", *African Security Review* 9, no.3 (2000), p.3.

Turkey is a Balkan country with its land in Eastern Thrace. The Ottoman Empire dominated the peninsula for more than five centuries and its successor state Turkey, has close cultural, religious and historical ties with the region. Turkish minorities are present in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia and there are large numbers of Turks living in Turkey who have migrated from the Balkans over the years. The Balkans are a strategic link between Western Europe and Eurasia and the shortest trade route that connects Europe to Turkey passes through the region.⁶⁰ This also enhances the value of the peninsula for Turkey. Last, and most importantly, maintaining the security and stability in the Balkans is a vital interest for Turkey because of the severe spillover from any Balkan unrest.

Turkish governments have advocated many diplomatic initiatives in many multilateral forums such as the CSCE, NATO, OSCE, OIC, and UN regarding the resolution of the Bosnian conflict. Turkey has worked actively for the creation of a joint Muslim-Croat resistance against Serbia. Turkish military forces have participated in peacekeeping operations in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. Turkey also has launched regional initiatives such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Trans-Balkan East-West Motorway in the Balkans and has taken part in most of the regional cooperation schemes that has been established since the Dayton Peace Agreement such as the Royaumont Process, Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI), Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECF), and the Stability Pact (SP).

⁶⁰ İhsan Gürkan, “Jeopolitik ve Stratejik Yönleriyle Balkanlar ve Türkiye: Geçmişin Işığında Geleceğe Bakış”, in *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1993), p.261.

Almost all the countries in the region attach remarkable importance to Turkey and try to gain the latter's support. For example, when Yugoslav officials visited Ankara to convince the Turkish government not to recognize the secessionist republics, officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo were trying to persuade Ankara to recognize the independence of these entities.⁶¹ Furthermore, those negotiating to resolve the Bosnian crisis found it necessary to seek Turkey's endorsement. David Owen and Cyrus Vance, before launching their Owen-Vance Plan, travelled to Turkey and met with Turkish officials, and US President Bill Clinton made many telephone calls to Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and felt the need to ask his opinion.⁶² Diplomatic exchanges continued after the end of the Yugoslav conflict and many Balkan diplomats and statesmen paid visits to Turkey.⁶³

The existence of a strong bond with a super power is important for a middle power to play a regional role. An emerging regional power is encouraged actively and supported by a major power.⁶⁴ Turkey's close relations with the United States and the existence of overlapping interests between the two countries regarding Balkan affairs has played an important role in Turkey's active involvement in the region.

The Balkans also became a new ground for Greek-Turkish rivalry. Greece, backed up by Serbia, accused Turkey of renewing its Islamic and imperial past and exploiting the presence of the Turkish and Muslim communities in the Balkans in order

⁶¹ İlhan Uzgel, "The Balkans: Turkey's Stabilizing Role", in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (eds.) Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), p.87.

⁶² İlhan Uzgel, "Balkanlarla İlişkiler", in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, (ed.) Baskın Oran (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p.501.

⁶³ See Kamil Mehmet Büyükçolak, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Yeni Bir Boyut: Balkanlar", in *Türkiye-Yunanistan: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, (ed.) Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2002), pp.142-144.

⁶⁴ Schoeman, p.5.

to increase its influence in the areas which were part of the Ottoman Empire. Turkey replied to the arguments such as neo-Ottomanism and Muslim axis by developing its relations with the Orthodox Balkan countries such as Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania. Moreover, Greece's policy of confrontation in the Balkans helped Turkey to enhance its role in the region. The pro-Serbian attitude of the Greek government on the Bosnian issue, the episodic tension between Greece and Macedonia, and the difficulties in Greek-Albanian relations facilitated Turkey's return to the area.⁶⁵ Greece changed its policy toward Albania and Macedonia in mid-1995 and adopted a more conciliatory approach. Simultaneously, Greece increased its economic expansion by using the advantage of its EU membership and succeeded in balancing political and military weight of Turkey in the peninsula.

So, during the 1990s, Turkey demonstrated constructive and prudent policies in the Balkans which had positive effects to the solution of crises and which enhanced Turkey's international reputation and alliances. As Şule Kut stated, "in a chaotic region at a difficult time, Turkey has proved itself to be a mature and reasonable regional actor."⁶⁶

The EU's December 17, 2004 decision to start accession negotiations with Turkey opened up a new chapter for Turkey and the Balkans. In the case of a possible membership to the EU, it is likely that Turkey will make a significant contribution to the region in terms of conflict prevention and peace maintenance. Turkey does not have any border or territory disputes with any Balkan country. Moreover, Balkan countries such as

⁶⁵ Stephanos Constantinides, "The Emergence of a New Ottoman Model: A New Foreign Policy in Turkey", in *The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction*, (eds.) George A. Kourvetaris, Victor Roudometof, Kleomenis Koutsoukis, and Andrew G. Kourvetaris (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p.386.

⁶⁶ Şule Kut, "Turkey in the Post-Communist Balkans: Between Activism and Self-Restraint", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 3, (1996/1997), p.45.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, which are at the centre of the conflicts, have close relations with Turkey and approach to Turkish security personnel that are sent to their countries positively.⁶⁷

Turkey's admission to the EU also will transform the Greek-Turkish relationship. For the Balkans, a situation in which Greece and Turkey are working together and with other Balkan states for common regional goals will speed up regional integration and will empower the Balkans within the EU.⁶⁸

Last, with the gradual economic development of Turkey within the EU and integration of the region with Europe, bilateral trade between Turkey and the Balkan states will accelerate. The Turkish state and businessmen will be able to pour more resources into the region and the realization of the long-term projects will be possible. The presence of a strong Turkish economy in the region will help Turkey to balance the Greek economic penetration, especially in Albania and Macedonia.

Both Turkey and the European Union consider the Balkans as a priority area and their objectives are quite close. So, this can be a suitable field for Turkey to carry out a progressive Europeanization of its foreign policy, working together with the EU's officials and creating for itself an image of being a power multiplier for the EU's foreign policy.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Sedat Laçiner, Mehmet Özcan, İhsan Bal, *Türkiyeli Avrupa: Türkiye'nin Üyeliğinin AB'ye Olası Etkileri* (İstanbul: Hayat Yayınları, 2004), pp.48-49.

⁶⁸ Matthew Nimetz, "Southeastern Europe in the Age of Globalism", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 16, no.1 (Winter 2005), p.18.

⁶⁹ Lecha, Eduard Soleri. Turkey and the EU: Bringing Together a Regional Power and a Global Actor. Available [online]: < http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=win2003_Eduard_Soler_i_Lecha > [12 April 2005].

CHAPTER 3

THE OTTOMAN LEGACY IN THE BALKANS

Historical Background

The Ottoman Empire was established by Osman Bey in northwestern Anatolia in 1299. He made Yenışehir the capital of the state and started out his career of conquest. The small principality turned into a vast empire that sprawled over three continents and sheltered peoples coming from different ethnic and religious backgrounds.

The main reason for the Ottoman rise was not only the strength of its armies and its superiority in warfare, but also the political vacuum created by the decline of Byzantine and Seljuk Empires. Mongol forces, led by Ghengiz Khan, defeated the Seljuk armies at the battle of Köseadağ in 1243 and gained the control of Anatolia. Ghengiz Khan levied tribute instead of establishing his personal rule. New bands of Turkish immigrants came to Anatolian lands in order to escape from the pressure of the Mongols and set out many Turkish principalities in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. The Ottomans could not strike back into Anatolia because it was occupied by powerful Turkish principalities such as the Karamanoğulları and the Germiyanogulları. So they moved westwards and confronted the weak Byzantine Empire. Byzantium had not totally recovered from the deteriorating effects of the Fourth Crusade, its territory was diminished, and the Empire was suffering from financial exhaustion, military weakness, social and religious strife. It proved unable to make a stand against the growing Turkish influence.

Western Europe was disorganized and divided in the fourteenth century. The terrible plague and the peasant revolts had caused major damage in European countries. England and France were fighting against each other in the Hundred Years' War. The two significant commercial powers, Genoa and Venice, were immersed in a deadly rivalry. The Christian kingdoms in the Balkans were not in a promising state either. The collapse of the Serbian Empire created a political vacuum on the peninsula and the Balkan peoples were too dispersed and feeble to resist the Ottomans.

Another factor that contributed to the Ottoman success was religion. The lure of conquest of infidel lands enabled the Ottoman sultans to attract into their service the unsettled nomadic Turcoman tribes⁷⁰ and this significant striking force aided them in their further march to the West. The dervishes and sheikhs of the Bektashi order also played a great role in the Ottoman expansion. The Bektashi order did not appeal to the strict rules of Islam. It included many pre-Islamic religious and shamanic elements. Dervishes travelled throughout the region in advance of the Ottoman armies and established lodges that served as bases for the diffusion of Islam among the local people.

Orhan Bey, Osman Bey's son and successor, captured Bursa in 1326 and made it the new capital of the state. He then conquered other two Byzantine cities, İznik (Nicae) and İzmit (Nicomedia) in 1331 and 1337, respectively.⁷¹ The Ottomans first crossed into the Europe in 1345 to help Orhan Bey's Byzantine father-in-law Cantacuzenus to gain the throne. The Castle of Çimpi was passed to the Turks in 1353. Süleyman Pasha, the

⁷⁰ Stanford Shaw, "The Ottoman View of the Balkans", in *The Balkans in Transition: Essays on the Development of Balkan Life and Politics since the Eighteenth Century*, (eds.) Charles and Barbara Jelavich (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1963), p.54.

⁷¹ Georges Castellan, *History of the Balkans: From Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1992, p.42.

son of Orhan Bey, crossed the Dardanelles and secured the control of Gallipoli in 1354. It became a strong base for further Ottoman expansion into the Balkans.⁷² During the reign of next ruler, Murad I, the Ottomans acquired first Edirne (Adrianople) in 1361 and made it the new capital in place of Bursa, then conquered the important places of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Macedonia, including Sofia, Salonica, Nish, Manastir and Ohri. Ottoman armies defeated a coalition of Serb, Bulgar, Croat and Albanian forces on the Kosova Plain in 1389 and established Ottoman control in Serbia. Murad I was assassinated on the battlefield and his son Bayezid I replaced him. Turkish raids to Macedonia, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia continued under his rule. The Ottomans seized Turnova in 1393 and acquired Wallachia in 1395 and started to make raids on Hungary.⁷³ This threatened the European powers and a new crusading army, headed by the Hungarians, met Ottoman troops in Niğbolu (Nicopolis) in 1396. The outcome was an outstanding victory for the Turks. Bulgaria, up to the Danube, was captured and this triumph also opened the way into Central Europe.

The Ottomans' march into the Balkans and Central Europe halted after the defeat of Bayezid I against Tamerlane at the battle of Ankara in 1402. Bayezid died in captivity in 1403 and his sons fought for the succession until 1413.⁷⁴ Mehmed I came out as victorious and become the new ruler. He succeeded in restoring Ottoman control in Anatolia and in the Balkans. Under the reign of Murad II, Ottoman troops crushed a

⁷² Mehmet İnbaşı, "Tarihsel Perspektif: Türklerin Balkanlar'a Yerleşmesi" in *Balkan Türkleri Balkanlar'da Türk Varlığı*, (ed.) Erhan Türbedar. Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2003, p.2.

⁷³ Edgar Hösch, *The Balkans: A Short History from Greek Times to the Present Day* (London, England: Faber and Faber, 1972), p.90.

⁷⁴ Castellon, p.60.

coalition of crusading armies at Varna and Kosova in 1444 and 1448, respectively, and confirmed the Turkish grip on the Balkans.

The Ottoman advance in the Balkans culminated in the conquest of Constantinople, the capital of the decaying Byzantine Empire in 1453 by Mehmed II, known as “The Conqueror in Europe”. Constantinople would become the permanent capital of the Ottoman state until its demise. Further expansion in the Balkans and Eastern Europe followed. Serbia, except for Belgrade, Morea, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldavia and Wallachia, were added to the empire and the Ottomans established undisputed control over the Balkan Peninsula. When Mehmed II died in 1481, he was the master of the Balkans from the Black Sea to the Adriatic and from the Carpathians to the southern tip of Greece.⁷⁵

Süleyman I completed the work of his grandfather, Mehmed II, by capturing Belgrade in 1521 and the island of Rhodes in 1522, and went one step further by conquering Hungary after an overwhelming victory against the Hungarians at Mohacs in 1526.⁷⁶ In 1541, Hungary was completely annexed and proclaimed as an Ottoman province.

The Ottoman Empire could not sustain its power in the succeeding generations and started to retrogress at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Administrative, economic and military decline were coupled with the inability to extend further conquests. Moreover, the Empire had reached its natural borders. Iran in the east, Russia in the north and Austria in the west were powerful barriers that the Ottomans could not

⁷⁵ L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans since 1453* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 2000), p.65.

⁷⁶ Ferdinand Schevill, *A History of the Balkans: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (New York, NY: Dorset Press, 1991), pp.217-219.

come up against easily. The turning point was the Treaty of Carlowitz, which was signed in 1699 after a long series of wars fought against a combination of European powers in the Balkans. With this treaty, Poland received Podolia, Venice captured Morea and Austria acquired Transylvania and all of Hungary except the Banat of Temesvar.⁷⁷ After the Karlowitz settlement, Austria became the dominant power in Central Europe.

By the turn of the eighteenth century, Russia joined Austria in her campaign against the Turks. This also marked the beginning of a long period during which the Orthodox peoples of the empire would look to Russia for protection. With the Treaty of Küçük Kainardji, which was concluded in 1774, following a war with Russia, the Ottomans lost some territory along the Black Sea, recognized the independence of the Khanate of the Crimea, and most important, this agreement formed the basis for future Russian intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire by giving Russia the right to protect Ottoman Orthodox subject peoples.⁷⁸

The decline of the Ottoman Empire, coupled with the national awakening of the subject peoples in the Balkan peninsula, continued throughout the nineteenth century. Ideas such as liberty, equality and nationalism generated with the French Revolution of 1789 changed the thinking style of the Balkan peoples entirely. It gave the Balkan peoples an ideology for revolt and a clear concept of nation.⁷⁹ Another significant factor that should be taken into consideration during this process was the growing great power rivalry and intervention in Balkan affairs. While the Ottomans were retreating, countries,

⁷⁷ Ibid, p.264

⁷⁸ Charles and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p.35.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.47.

such as Austria, Britain, France, and Russia were expanding their zones of influence in the region.

First, an uprising took place in Serbia in 1804 and Serbia gained an autonomous status in 1830.⁸⁰ It was followed by the Greek revolt that first broke out in the Danubian principalities, then in Peloponnesus in 1821. Greece became an independent state with the London Protocol of 1830, under the guarantee of Britain, France and Russia.⁸¹

During the years following Greek independence, significant reform movements took place in the Ottoman Empire. Sultan Abdülmecit signed and issued the Gülhane Charter in 1839 and proclaimed the principles of a reform movement called the *Tanzimat* (reorganization). This was a period of sustained legislation and reform that modernized the Ottoman state and society and contributed to the further centralization of administration.⁸² The political impact and diplomatic intervention of the West became much more evident during the Tanzimat era. Britain, Russia and France pursued their policies on the basis of claims to the right of protection over the Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic communities of the Empire.⁸³ However, most of the time religion was used at the backdrop as a cover for power politics. In 1856, following the Crimean War, the Reform Edict was issued by the Ottoman authorities and the legal and religious equality of the Christian subjects in the empire were guaranteed.⁸⁴ Ottoman reform efforts culminated in the promulgation of the constitution by Abdulhamid II in December 1876.

⁸⁰ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.229.

⁸¹ Stavrianos, p.291.

⁸² Stanford and Ezel Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, Volume II (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p.55.

⁸³ Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. London: Hurst & Company, 1998, p.143.

⁸⁴ L. S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans 1815-1914* (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), p.43.

The 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War marked the breaking point in the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Major changes took place in frontiers and the disintegration process began. In spite of the resistance at Plevna, Turkish forces were defeated at the end of the struggle and signed the Treaty of San Stefano in 1878. An autonomous, big Bulgaria was created which had borders stretching from the Danube to the Aegean and from the Vardar and Morava valleys in Macedonia to the Black Sea.⁸⁵ Moreover, Russia captured Bessarabia and Serbia and Montenegro gained further territory at Ottoman expense.

The realization of the San Stefano Treaty would make Russia the dominant power in the Balkans. Britain and Austria were uncomfortable about expanding Russian penetration in the peninsula and convened the Berlin Congress in June 1878 in order to make some modifications to the San Stefano Treaty. With the Treaty of Berlin, signed on July 13, 1878, Bulgaria was divided into three parts. Macedonia was returned to the Ottomans, southern Bulgaria, which was also called Eastern Rumelia, was given a separate status under Ottoman rule and the remaining territories made up the Bulgarian principality.⁸⁶ Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent. Austria acquired the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia gained Kars, Ardahan, Batum and southern Bessarabia. The war and the succeeding peace treaty were a complete disaster for the country. The Ottoman Empire had not only admitted substantial territory losses, but also large numbers of Turks and Muslims had to emigrate from Bulgaria to escape from the atrocities of Bulgarian and Russian troops. By 1879, seventeen percent

⁸⁵ Martin A. Roessingh, *Ethnonationalism and Political Systems in Europe: A State of Tension* (Amsterdam, Holland: Amsterdam University Press, 1996), p.59.

⁸⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p.29.

of the Muslims of Bulgaria had died and thirty-four percent became permanent refugees.⁸⁷

The uprisings of Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek guerillas in Macedonia and disorder in the eastern provinces raised the level of discontent against the authoritarian Hamidian regime. A series of opposition movements were formed with the aim of restoring the constitutional rule and saving the country from foreign attacks. The most important of these organizations, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), led by Talat Pasha, the chief clerk of the correspondence division of the Salonica Directorate of Posts, and comprised of a group of officers in the Second and Third Ottoman Army, stationed in Edirne and Salonica carried out a revolt in June 1908 and compelled Abdulhamid II to restore constitutional government.⁸⁸ After successfully resisting a conservative counter-revolution in 1909, the CUP took over the government, forced Abdulhamid II to abdicate and replaced him with Mehmed V Reşat. By making use of the political turmoil, stemming from the outbreak of the revolution, Bulgaria declared its independence on October 5, 1908; Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 6; and Crete announced its intention of uniting with Greece on October 7.⁸⁹

The Ottoman Empire had to face continuous territorial disintegration in the Balkans under the administration of the Committee of Union and Progress. After the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, which were fought against four Balkan states, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, the Ottoman Empire lost eighty-three percent of its land

⁸⁷ Justin McCarthy, *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922* (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, 1995), p.91.

⁸⁸ Hösch, p.140.

⁸⁹ A. L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire 1908-1923* (New York, NY: Longman, 1998), p.52.

and sixty-nine percent of its population in Europe.⁹⁰ After the end of the Balkan Wars five hundred years of Turkish rule in the peninsula came to an end.

The Ottoman Legacy in Turkey's Balkan Policy

The Ottoman Empire followed a systematic settlement policy in the Balkans. The Turcoman tribes migrating from Central Asia to Anatolia were transferred to the Balkans. The Turkish people were mostly located in Bulgaria, Dobrudja, Macedonia and Thrace.⁹¹ Today, Turkish minorities are present in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Protection and the well being of these Turkish communities constitute one of the basic tenets of Turkish-Balkan policy. Moreover, the Ottoman retreat from the Balkans was accompanied by several waves of migration to Turkey from the late nineteenth century and today about one fifth of Turkey's population is of Balkan origin.⁹² These people are sensitive to the developments in the Balkans and urge the government to take action.

Balkan Christians enjoyed a substantial degree of religious freedom under the auspices of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire did not embark on forced proselytism and Balkan peoples maintained their identities. The goal of the Ottoman settlement policy (*istimalet*) was to win over the local populations. Turks, who were also ardent followers of Islam, saw their Christian and Jewish communities as "People of the Book" and respected their faiths. Conversions came into being over centuries. Cities played a major role during the process. The first converts were people who resided in the

⁹⁰ Shaw and Shaw, p.298.

⁹¹ Wayne S. Vucinich, *The Ottoman Empire: Its Record and Legacy* (Princeton, NJ: Van Nastrand, 1965), p.116.

⁹² Kut, p.42.

towns and were in touch with the Ottoman administration. Some of the local churches, such as the Bogomil church in Bosnia and Herzegovina also found Islam closer to their creeds. There was also the economic aspect. Acceptance of the Islamic faith was directly connected with extensive rights and privileges, such as complete exemption from taxes.⁹³

Mass conversions to Islam took place in Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The inhabitants of certain regions in Bulgaria, along with half of the population in Crete, also turned to Islam.⁹⁴ The Muslim population in the Balkans, mostly located in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia, is another ramification of the Ottoman legacy. Since the establishment of the Republic until the end of the Cold War, being geographically cut off from these Muslim communities, Turkish governments and people did not pay much attention to them.⁹⁵ However, the persecutions that the Muslims suffered in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, and the indifferent attitude of the West motivated a strong reaction both from the press and public opinion and increased the affinity and solidarity towards these people. Although Turkey has not based its foreign policy on religious criteria, the Turkish government under the circumstances could not turn a blind eye to the developments in former Yugoslavia and voiced the Bosnian case in all international forums.

The current borders of Turkey became established with the signing of the Lausanne Peace Treaty on July 24, 1923, after the Turkish National War of Independence. Many of the leaders of the National Liberation Movement, including Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, had been born in the

⁹³ Hösch, p.104.

⁹⁴ Andre Gerolymatos, *The Balkan Wars: Conquest, Revolution, and Retribution from the Ottoman Era to the Twentieth Century and Beyond* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2002), p.72.

⁹⁵ Sylvie Gangloff, "The Weight of Islam in the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 5, (2000/2001), p.91.

Balkans and served as officers in the Ottoman Army. In view of the historical experiences, the national leadership decided that receding from the Balkans came to an end with the conclusion of the peace treaty and Turkey would withdraw no further.⁹⁶ The major concern of the Turkish authorities became the preservation of borders in the Balkans. The emphasis placed on unchanging borders continues to be a major tenet of Turkish foreign policy. In this context, Turkey eschewed from recognizing the secessionist republics of Yugoslavia until they were formally recognized by the EU and the US. Moreover, during the Kosovo conflict, although it openly criticized the violation of human rights of the Kosovar Albanians, the Turkish government stated clearly that a solution within the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state should be sought.

⁹⁶ Dilek Barlas and İlter Turan, "Turkish-Greek Balance: A Key to Peace and Cooperation in the Balkans", *East European Quarterly* 32, no.4 (Winter 1998), p.472.

CHAPTER 4

THE INTERWAR PERIOD

The already tottering Ottoman Empire collapsed at the end of the World War I and the Turkish Republic was proclaimed in 1923 in the Anatolian territories of the shattered Empire under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. During the early years of the Republic, Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues focused on internal reconstruction, carried out far-reaching reforms and improved national consolidation in the country.

In foreign policy, Turkey appropriated a cautious and conservative approach with the aim of securing peace and national security and safeguarding the gains of the Lausanne Treaty. The outlines of the Turkish foreign policy were determined by President Mustafa Kemal and put into practice by Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüşdü Aras. The main contours of Turkish-Balkan policy during the interwar years were resolving the disputes with Greece, developing relations with other Balkan countries and forming a Balkan Pact in order to keep the Balkans out of the ambitious designs of great powers, specifically, Italy and Germany. The ambassadors that were sent to the Balkan countries during this period indicated the importance Turkey attached to the Balkans. All of the ambassadors were close friends of Atatürk and kept their offices for long years. Enis Akaygen worked as the Athens ambassador (1929-1934), Ali Haydar Aktay as Belgrade ambassador (1928-1939), Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver as Bucharest ambassador (1931-1944), Tevfik Kamil Koperler as Sofia ambassador (1931-1934) and Basri Danişment as Tiran ambassador

(1932-1934).⁹⁷ Close relations with the Soviet Union, which started in the era of the National Struggle were also going on. Turkey considered Russian views and concerns significant and sought to get the support of Soviet Union in its policies.

The Exchange of Populations

Greece and Turkey signed a separate convention on January 30, 1923 in the course of the Lausanne Conference and arranged for the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish populations. According to the first article of the Convention:

As from 1 May 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorisation of the Turkish government or of the Greek government respectively.⁹⁸

The Greek inhabitants of İstanbul who were settled before October 30, 1918 and the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace would be exempted from the exchange as it was stated in the second article:

All Greeks who were already established before 30 October 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. All Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of Western Thrace.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Oya Dağlar, *Turkish Balkan Relations 1930-1940* (Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1997), p.102.

⁹⁸ Kalliopi K. Koufa and Constantinos Svolopoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey: The Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, and its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations", in *Ethnic Groups in International Relations* (ed.) Paul Smith (Parnmouth: New York University Press, 1991), p.288.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p.290.

A Mixed Commission was set up for the supervision of the exchange and the liquidation of the movable and immovable property of the exchanged persons. In view of the fact that the Mixed Commission met for the first time on October 8, 1923, the two governments agreed that the exchange was to take place as from May 1, 1924.

The two countries were embroiled in complicated disputes over the interpretation of the term “established”. Greece wanted to leave as much of the Greek population in İstanbul as possible and claimed that it should include all the Greeks who had been living in İstanbul before October 1918. The Turkish government set forth that the interpretation of the term established would be determined according to Turkish laws. The dispute was referred to the Permanent Court at the Hague, but to no avail. The Greek government seized the homes of the Turks in Western Thrace and used them as shelter for Greek refugees. In response, Turkey confiscated the properties of the Greeks in İstanbul. This increased the strain between the two countries.

Another area of conflict between Greece and Turkey was the position of the Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul. At the Lausanne Conference, the Turkish delegation formally demanded the removal of the Patriarchate from İstanbul, but met with the opposition of both Greece and the Allies. So Turkey reluctantly had to accept the suggestion put forward by Lord Curzon. The Patriarchate would remain in İstanbul on the condition that it became a purely religious institution. The Patriarch Constantine was expelled by the Turkish authorities at the end of the 1924 on grounds that he had come to İstanbul after October 30, 1918. This further exacerbated the relations. The Patriarch problem was finally resolved on May 19, 1925, after Constantine’s withdrawal and the

selection of Vasil Georgiades as the new Patriarch.¹⁰⁰ After this event normal diplomatic relations began and Cevat Bey was sent to Athens as the first Turkish ambassador.¹⁰¹

The Greek and Turkish authorities signed the Ankara Accord on June 21, 1925. By this agreement, the Turkish government accepted the Greek interpretation of established and agreed to regard as not liable to exchange Greeks resident in İstanbul before October 30, 1918. Established Greeks who had left İstanbul would be permitted to return. The Greek government undertook to purchase Turkish properties in Greece that had been expropriated for the use of the refugees or abandoned by their owners before October 1912.¹⁰² Similar action was to be taken by the Turkish government in the case of Greek property in Turkey. A new agreement between the parties was concluded at Athens on December 1, 1926. This agreement provided for the purchase by the Greek government from their former Turkish owners of rural properties in Greece, the price being fixed where necessary by a mixed commission. Properties in Turkey belonging to Greeks who had left the country before 1912 and to Greek subjects generally (including those in İstanbul) were to be restored to the owners.¹⁰³

These two agreements never came into effect and the dispute over the disposal of properties left behind by immigrants from Greece and Turkey continued in the following

¹⁰⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, “1919-1939 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası”, in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1973)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1974), p.70.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.70.

¹⁰² Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1925* (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), p.265.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.266.

years and two countries came near to a war in 1929.¹⁰⁴ The tension was eased partly by the Italian diplomacy and partly by the efforts and policies of Atatürk and Venizelos.

Italy signed a Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, and Conciliation with Turkey on May 30, 1928¹⁰⁵ and concluded a Treaty of Friendship, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement of Disputes with Greece on September 23, 1928.¹⁰⁶ The Italian government was also aiming to establish a tripartite pact between Greece, Italy and Turkey, which would consolidate the Italian influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Eleftherios Venizelos returned to premiership in July 1928 and sought reconciliation with Turkey. He made a speech in the Greek parliament in February 1930 and said that Turkey was a peaceful-minded state that would not attack Greece. This initiative of Venizelos paved the way for the establishment of an agreement on June 10, 1930. First it was decided that the immovable and movable properties left by Muslim and Greek exchangeable persons in Greece and Turkey were transferred in complete ownership to the Greek and Turkish government, respectively.¹⁰⁷ Second, properties belonging to persons exempt from the exchange, but seized by the state during the early years of the transfer would not be returned to their owners as such an action was impossible.¹⁰⁸ Third Greece accepted to pay 425,000 pounds in settlement of the claims

¹⁰⁴ Turkey began to recondition the dreadnought *Yavuz* (ex-Goeben), which had played an important part in First World War. In turn Greek government took up the question of obtaining another pre-war German ship, the *Salamis*.

¹⁰⁵ According to this treaty, both parties agreed not to be engaged in any economic or political arrangement against each other. If one of the parties were attacked by a third party, the other would stay neutral. Any disagreement between the parties would be solved by reconciliation or judicial adjustment. See Dilek Barlas, *Etatism and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World 1929-1939* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 1998), p.137.

¹⁰⁶ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1928* (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), pp.158-160.

¹⁰⁷ Dimitri Pentzopoulos, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and Its Impact on Greece* (London: Hurst & Company, 2002), p.118.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

of the Turks who had left Greek territory. This convention resolved the controversy between two countries and diplomatic relations entered a new and more propitious phase. Venizelos visited Ankara and İstanbul in October 1930 at İsmet İnönü's invitation and was cordially greeted. In a press meeting that was held on October 27, 1930 Venizelos announced that:

I should declare that I am very glad of the sincere attentions we received from the Turkish government and especially from the Turkish people. I will try to pay my gratitude and indebtedness in time.¹⁰⁹

During this visit Turkey and Greece signed a Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Mediation and Arbitration, a protocol regarding the delimitation of naval forces, installation and commercial agreements.¹¹⁰ In return, İsmet İnönü and Tevfik Rüştü Aras went to Athens in October 1931 and were warmly welcomed.

After the signing of the exchange protocol, according to the official figures of the Mixed Commission, 189,916 Greeks were transferred to Greece and 355,635 Turks went to Turkey.¹¹¹ Although the figures are not very accurate, it can be said that after 1922, with the defeat of the Greek armies in Western Anatolia approximately 1.4 million Greeks left for Greece and four hundred thousand Turks went to Turkey.¹¹²

The refugees who settled in Greece made up approximately twenty percent of the whole population, as the population of Greece was about five million at that time. Contrastingly the proportion of the Turkish immigrants in Turkey's estimated population of thirteen million was about four percent. So the economic and social impacts of the

¹⁰⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 28 October 1930, cited in Dağlar, p.61.

¹¹⁰ Fahir H. Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih (1789-1960)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1973), p.645.

¹¹¹ Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p.438-439.

¹¹² Eddy stated that the exchange involved 192,356 Greeks from Turkey and 354,647 Turks from Greece by using the same source. See Charles B. Eddy, *Greece and the Greek Refugees* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1931), p.201.

refugee settlement were greater in Greece than in Turkey. A Refugee Settlement Commission was established under the supervision of the League of Nations and raised international loans in order to deal with the settlement of the immigrants. This increased the foreign interference in country's affairs. When the Commission turned over its responsibilities to the Greek government in 1930, the total cost of the settlement had reached \$388,800,000.¹¹³ The Greek refugees were mostly settled in Athens, Piraeus, Macedonia and Western Thrace.¹¹⁴ In many areas refugees were not welcomed. As a large ratio of them was artisans, industrialists and merchants, they naturally lived in the urban centers. The overcrowding of the cities coupled with the high birth rate of the refugees increased unemployment and generated a great deal of bitterness against the immigrants. Native Greeks called them with pejorative names such as *tourkosporoi* (Turkish seeds) and *yiaourtovaptismenoi* (baptized in yoghurt).¹¹⁵ However, the influx of refugees from Turkey had positive repercussions on the commercial and industrial life of Greece in the long term. They introduced the silk, ceramic and carpet industries and helped to expand the fishing and textile industries. They were also largely responsible for the increase in cereal, olive, grape, and tobacco production, producing two-thirds of the total tobacco crop.¹¹⁶ During the years following the exchange of populations, Greece experienced real prosperity and progress. Between 1921-1926, there were opened 221 manufactories of foodstuffs, 70 for dealing with wood, 45 for weaving, 38 for making

¹¹³ Parliament of Greece, *Journal of Debates of Parliament, 1930*, p.1317., cited in Ladas p.704.

¹¹⁴ Ladas, p.645.

¹¹⁵ Renee Hirschon, "The Consequences of the Lausanne Convention" in *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange Between Greece and Turkey* (ed.) Renee Hirschon (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p.19.

¹¹⁶ Harry John Psomiades, *Greek-Turkish Relations, 1923-1930: A Study in the Politics of Rapprochement* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: UNI, 1966), p.73.

machinery, 30 chemical manufactories, 19 paper-mills and printing establishments, 12 tanneries, 8 tobacco manufactories and 1 hat manufactory.¹¹⁷

The settlement of the immigrants did not give rise to as much social upheaval in Turkey as it did in Greece. The Turks were accustomed to the phenomenon of immigration. As a result of the contraction of the Ottoman Empire, more than four hundred thousand Turks had fled from the Balkans to Turkey in the years between 1912 and 1920.¹¹⁸ The Turkish refugees from Greece were mostly settled in Eastern Thrace and Western Anatolia. They were relocated in the homes vacated by the departing Greeks. Predominantly farmers, they lived mainly in villages, enjoying the same living standards as the native Turks and did not pose a major problem to the state. As commerce and industry had largely been in the hands of the Christian populations, namely, Armenians and Greeks, after the exchanges, the economic life of the country was severely hurt. However this situation created new opportunities for some Turkish entrepreneurs who took control of abandoned businesses.

During the interwar years, Turkey also attempted to build up close relations with other Balkan countries and signed many bilateral agreements. On October 18, 1925, a Treaty of Friendship was concluded with Bulgaria. This confirmed the autonomy of the Muslim minorities in Bulgaria and also settled for regulated, voluntary and unrestricted emigration to Turkey.¹¹⁹ Bulgaria and Turkey signed the first commercial agreement in 1928 and this was succeeded by a Treaty of Neutrality, Mediation and Arbitration in

¹¹⁷ William Miller, *Greece* (London: E. Benn, 1928), p.296.

¹¹⁸ Cem Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu 1500-1927* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1995), p.62.

¹¹⁹ Roessingh, p.77.

1929.¹²⁰ Tevfik Rüşti Aras visited Sofia in December 1930 and the Bulgarian Premier Musanov paid a return visit to Ankara and Istanbul in December 1931. After the visit an official declaration was issued which stated that there was no differences dividing Bulgaria and Turkey, whose interests were practically identical.¹²¹ After Musanov returned to Bulgaria, he announced that two joint commissions would be formed: one to settle questions regarding the property of the refugees and the other to promote trade. Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship with Albania on December 15, 1923 and a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Yugoslavia on October 28, 1925.¹²² The agreement concluded between Turkey and Yugoslavia formally ended the state of war between the two countries.

The Balkan Conferences

The rapprochement between Greece and Turkey paved the way for closer cooperation in the Balkans. The idea of a Balkan federation came from former Greek Premier Papanastassiou, in September 1929, at the Congress of the International Bureau of Peace in Athens.¹²³ The Balkan countries responded to this idea positively and the first Balkan Conference was convened in Athens on October 5, 1930 with the participation of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia.¹²⁴ At the first conference minority issues were shelved and topics such as cultural, economic and technical

¹²⁰ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi I* (Ankara: Yükseköğretim Kurulu Yayınları, 1989), p.104.

¹²¹ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1931* (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p.341.

¹²² Gönübol and Sar, p.107.

¹²³ İsmail Soysal, "1934 ve 1954 Balkan Paktları ", in *Berlin Antlaşmasından Günümüze Balkanlar*, (ed.) Mustafa Bereketli (Istanbul: Rumeli Vakfı Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p.91.

¹²⁴ A Balkan flag of six golden stars and six stripes that symbolized the Balkan Union was flown at Delphi and a military band played a Balkan Hymn of Peace

cooperation were discussed. A permanent organization with a Council, an Assembly, and a Secretariat was set up. The Association of the Balkan Press was founded in December 1930.

The second Balkan Conference was held in İstanbul between 20 and 26 October 1931 and political disputes came to the fore. The main reason for the conflict was the division between the Balkan countries that became manifest after the First World War. Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia took an anti-revisionist approach, while Bulgaria, which had ceded large territories, and Albania, which had been under the direct domination of Italy, opposed the preservation of the status quo. Bulgaria did not want to drop its territorial claims in Macedonia and Western Thrace and was also at odds with Romania over the treatment of the Bulgarian minority in Dobrudja. However, it was the Albanian delegation that took the lead in Istanbul in the matter of minorities. Mehmet Konitza said that:

It has often been stated that easy questions should be settled first. I am not of this opinion. When we want to build a house, we do not begin with the doors and windows, but with the foundations. The foundations of the house that we have been trying to build in common are the equitable settlements of the question of minorities.¹²⁵

So because of the dissension about the minority issues, the Conference failed to achieve its main objective, the realization of a draft of a Balkan Pact. The major accomplishments were in the economic and cultural fields. The draft of the Balkan Postal Union was adopted, the Balkan Tourist Federation, which had been established in April 1931, submitted resolutions, and the formation of a Balkan Chamber of Commerce and Industry

¹²⁵ Theodore I. Geshkoff, *Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), p.95.

was decided. Mustafa Kemal attended the closing session of the conference in İstanbul on October 26 and made an encouraging speech:

The present Balkan states, including Turkey, owe their birth to the historic event of the gradual displacement of the Ottoman Empire, finally interred in the tomb of history. That is why the Balkan nations, possessing a common history, were related for centuries. If this history presents painful and sorrowful aspects, all the Balkans share their responsibility for it, while that of Turkey has not been less heavy. That is why you are going to erect on the sentiments of the past the solid foundations of fraternity and open the vast horizons of union... Since the foundation and aim of the union are collaboration in the economic and cultural domains of civilization, always respecting scrupulously mutual independence, it is not to be doubted that such an accomplishment will be received favorably by all civilized humanity.¹²⁶

The Third Balkan Conference met in Bucharest between 23 and 26 October 1932. The Bulgarian delegation strongly emphasized the importance of the problem of minorities and wanted this issue to be discussed and concluded. When their request was rejected, the Bulgarian group withdrew from the conference. The remaining five countries considered the possibility of more economic cooperation and formation of a customs union. The Conference approved the establishment of a Balkan Chamber of Agriculture and also laid the foundations for a Balkan Medical Union, which would compose all physicians in the Peninsula.

The National Socialist Party's victory in Germany and Italy's actions and threats in the Mediterranean forced Greece and Turkey to a closer contact. Greek Premier, Tsaldaris and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Maximos visited Turkey in September 1933 and concluded the Entente Cordiale on September 14, 1933. With this convention, the

¹²⁶ Robert J. Kerner and Harry N. Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente 1930-1935: A Study in the Recent History of the Balkan and Near Eastern Peoples* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1936), pp.60-61.

two countries mutually guaranteed their common frontier in Thrace, agreed to consult with one another on all questions of common interest, and to pursue a policy of friendship, understanding, and collaboration.¹²⁷ According to Article 3 of the agreement:

In all international meetings the membership of which is restricted, Greece and Turkey are prepared to consider that it will be the duty of the representative of one of the two parties to defend the common interests of both parties; and they undertake to endeavour to secure such joint representation, either alternately or, in particular cases of special importance, by the country most closely concerned.¹²⁸

Greco-Turkish Pact provoked a sharp reaction in Bulgaria and Bulgarian government saw the agreement as an attempt to block Bulgarian access to the Aegean Sea. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras paid an official visit to Sofia on September 20, 1933 and tried to appease the Bulgarian authorities. Bulgaria refused Turkey's suggestion to join in the pact. The only success for Turkey was the extension of the Treaty of Neutrality, Mediation and Arbitration of 1929 for five years.¹²⁹

Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Titulescu came to Ankara on October 17, 1933 and signed a Treaty of Friendship, Nonaggression, Arbitration and Mediation. One of the reasons that impelled Romania to make this agreement with Turkey was the revisionist policies of Bulgaria, and the other was the fact that the trade activities of Romania was dependent on free transition from the Straits, therefore on Turkey.¹³⁰ In November Tevfik Rüştü Aras visited Belgrade and concluded a Treaty of Peace, Nonaggression, Arbitration and Mediation with Yugoslav authorities on November 27,

¹²⁷ Hale, p.61.

¹²⁸ Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1934* (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), p.518-519.

¹²⁹ Gönübol and Sar, p.109.

¹³⁰ Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1918-1948* (Ambilly-Annemasse: Impr. Franco-Suisse, 1950), p.95.

1933.¹³¹ The major motives that drove Yugoslavia to sign this treaty were its anxiety due to the Bulgarian policies and the fact that the control Italy had established over Albania was a threat for Yugoslavia as well. An agreement settling certain financial questions relating to Turkish property in Yugoslavia was concluded at the same time. Turkey's bilateral agreements with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia played an important role in the realization of the Balkan Convention.

The fourth Balkan Conference was held in Salonica between 5 and 11 November 1933. The Assembly approved the establishment of a Balkan Cooperative Office and a Balkan Labor Office.¹³² A declaration was passed at the end of the conference, which stated a hope that the forthcoming Balkan Pact would encompass all the Balkan countries.

The Balkan Entente

Greece, Romania, Turkey and Yugoslavia formed the Balkan Entente on February 9, 1934. They agreed to guarantee the security of the existing Balkan borders and to consult with one another in the event of any threat to these frontiers. They also pledged not to undertake any political action vis-a-vis another Balkan state without the consent of the other signatories. The Pact was declared open for accession by other Balkan countries, whose acceptance would be subject to approval by the contracting parties. An additional protocol declared that the treaty was not directed against any power.¹³³ Turkey tried hard to bring Bulgaria into the Entente but its attempts ended with failure. Coming

¹³¹ Gönübol and Sar, p.109.

¹³² Kerner and Howard, p.110.

¹³³ Branimir M. Jankovic, *The Balkans in International Relations* (London: Macmillan Press, 1988), p.155.

to an understanding with Bulgaria was significant for Turkey because the Pact was not able to protect Turkey against an attack by Bulgaria, supported by Italy.

The statutes of the Balkan Entente were adopted in Ankara in October 1934. The Permanent Council, consisting of the foreign ministers of the four member states, was to hold regular meetings, an Economic Council would be set up, a Legal Commission was established to study the unification of legislation, and the foundation of a Balkan Bank was accepted in principle.¹³⁴

The Balkan Entente was a restricted and weak treaty, which had been organized with the objective of maintaining status quo in the Balkans against revisionist states. One of the deficiencies of the Pact was the different policy considerations and views of the signatory states and the other was the fact that it could not establish a defense system to protect the borders of its members against the external dangers. Turkey remained as the chief adherent of the Pact until its end. The Turkish government had solved most of its political problems and did not have any territorial aspirations in the region. Turkey stressed peace and security in the Balkans and believed that this could only come into being by the way of a regional convention. The expectations of the Turkey from the Balkan Pact were clearly expressed in an article that was written by Necmettin Sadık. He stated that:

It should never be forgotten that the main issues are the conservation of peace in the Balkans, preventing the interests of the Balkans from suffering from the foreign influences and finally securing the Balkan borders from any assaults.¹³⁵

However Turkey's close relations with Soviet Union complicated the situation. The Soviet government wanted to prevent Turkey from backing up Romania in a possible

¹³⁴ Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs 1934*, p.529.

¹³⁵ *Akşam*, 31.02.1934, cited in Dağlar, p.89.

clash with the Soviet Union over its frontier in Bessarabia. A clause therefore added to the effect that the guarantees only applied to the frontiers of the Balkan states with one another, and that under no circumstances would Turkey consider itself obliged to participate in any activity directed against the Soviet Union.¹³⁶

Another objection came from the opposition in Greece, led by Venizelos. Greece demanded that its commitments regarding the protection of Yugoslavia's frontiers should not involve it in a war against Italy. This reservation was accepted, together with the general provision that none of the signatories were under an obligation to assist if one of them were attacked by Italy alone.¹³⁷ These reservations put forth by Greece and Turkey restricted the Entente's scope, effectiveness and future development.

The rapprochement between Germany and Italy and creation of the Rome-Berlin Axis was another major factor that undermined the Balkan Entente. Germany rapidly extended its economic and political penetration in Southeastern Europe. This worried Romania and caused a shift in its foreign policy. Romania gave precedence to a German threat rather than Bulgarian revisionism and weakened its attachment to Balkan Pact. Yugoslavia also tried to strengthen its security by concluding treaties with Bulgaria and Italy. It signed a Treaty of Friendship with Bulgaria on January 24, 1937 and a Nonaggression Pact with Italy on March 25, 1937.¹³⁸

The Balkan Entente held its last meeting in Belgrade in February 1940. However, it was far from demonstrating a resolute stance against the aggressive powers. Russia

¹³⁶ Mustafa Türkeş, "The Balkan Pact and its Immediate Implications for the Balkan States, 1930-34", *Middle Eastern Studies* 30, (1994), p.137.

¹³⁷ Hale, p.62.

¹³⁸ Armaoğlu, pp. 658-59.

captured Bessarabia and Bukovina from Romania, Italy attacked Greece and Germany annexed Yugoslavia. These developments marked the end of the Balkan League.

Despite its failure, the Balkan Entente provided some considerable benefits for Turkey. The Pact deterred Bulgaria and defended Turkey against the encroachments of Italy. Moreover, the members of the Entente supported Turkey's efforts to change the decision taken about the Straits by the Lausanne Treaty and acted in unity in the Montreux Conference.

CHAPTER 5

THE EMERGENCE OF THE COLD WAR AND ITS REFLECTIONS ON TURKISH-BALKAN POLICY

The Second World War Years (1939-1945)

An entirely new set of factors began to crop up in the Balkans and Central Europe when Hitler came to power in Germany in February 1933. However, for Turkey, the immediate danger was Mussolini's Italy, which began to fortify the Dodecanese Islands just off the Turkish coast in 1934. Furthermore Mussolini declared in March 1934:

There must be no misunderstanding upon this centuries-old task which I assign to this and the future generations of Italy. There is no question of territorial conquest... The matter is one of natural expansion which will lead to a close cooperation between Italy and the peoples of Africa, between Italy and the nations of the Near and Middle East.¹³⁹

This speech caused some consideration in the minds of the Turkish statesmen as one of Italy's historic objectives, Antalya, was located in Turkey. Their suspicions against Italy were confirmed when Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1935. Turkey sent a diplomatic representative to Addis Ababa and the Turkish Red Crescent undertook some measure of relief work in the country.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, Turkey, as a member of the League of Nations, voted in favor of applying sanctions against Italy. These sanctions included "an arms embargo, prohibition of financial transactions, an embargo on the importation of goods coming from Italy, an embargo on a restricted list of key materials for war and

¹³⁹ Cited in Shah M. R. Rehman, *Turkish Foreign Policy: Up to Date* (Allahabad: Allahabad Publishing House, 1945), p.164.

¹⁴⁰ Vere-Hodge, p.109.

the provision for the mutual support in the application of the economic and financial restrictions”.¹⁴¹ Sanctions were a real economic sacrifice on Turkey’s part as it sold cereals and coal to Italy.¹⁴²

Germany occupied Austria in March 1938 and invaded Czechoslovakia in March 1939. With the occupation of Austria, Germany acquired a dominant position over the Danubian states. The policy of sanctions against Italy had been advantageous for Germany as it had increased its exports to the Balkan states and become their major credit supplier. By 1939, economic and military control over all the means of communications in the Balkans came under German control. The growing German threat and the invasion of Albania by Italy in April 1939 transformed the Turkish foreign policy in the spring of 1939 and the Turkish government decided to cooperate with Britain in order to contain the Axis.

Turkey and England issued a joint declaration on May 12, 1939 which announced that the countries would “conclude a definite long-term agreement of a reciprocal character and in the event of an act of aggression leading to war in the Mediterranean area they would give each other all aid and assistance.”¹⁴³ Turkey reached a similar agreement with the French government on June 20, 1939 after France agreed to cede Hatay to Turkey.

The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact that was signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939 caused great amazement and disturbance in Turkey. The pact increased suspicions in

¹⁴¹ M. H. Macartney and P. Cremona, *Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy* (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1938), pp.135-136.

¹⁴² Feroz Ahmad, “The Historical Background of Turkey’s Foreign Policy”, in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p.20.

¹⁴³ Frank Marzari, “Western-Soviet Rivalry in Turkey, 1939-41”, *Middle Eastern Studies* 7, (1971), p.72., cited in Hale, p.66.

Turkish political circles about German and Russian designs in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Turkish government sent Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu to Moscow on September 26, 1939 to reach a compromise with the Soviet government. Although a breakdown in the negotiations was not recognized officially, Saraçoğlu failed to come to an agreement with the Soviet authorities.

Britain, France and Turkey concluded a Mutual Assistance Treaty on October 19, 1939. According to the agreement Britain and France would give Turkey all aid and assistance in the event of Turkey becoming involved in hostilities with a European power, in return Turkey pledged to help Britain and France first in case of aggression by a European power, leading to war in the Mediterranean and second, in case those two countries became engaged in hostilities on account of the guarantee that was given to Greece and Romania on April 13, 1939.¹⁴⁴ An additional protocol was added to the treaty that released Turkey from taking any action that would lead to war with the Soviet Union. Moreover, Britain and France granted credit to Turkey to buy war materials. By 1939, the Turkish army had also redeployed more than half of its forces, the bulk of its equipment, all of its modern weaponry and its best commanders to the Bulgarian frontier.¹⁴⁵

Italy declared war on the Allies on June 10, 1940 and attacked Greece on October 28. Italy's entry into the war increased the tension in Turkey. A blackout was imposed on the principal towns and a temporary state of siege was declared in Thrace.¹⁴⁶ France signed an Armistice with Germany on June 22, 1940 and German troops began to enter Romania on October 7. Italy's entry into the war and its attack on Greece brought into

¹⁴⁴ Rehman, pp.180-181.

¹⁴⁵ Brock Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42", *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no.3 (July 1995), p.498.

¹⁴⁶ Vere-Hodge, pp.137-138.

force Articles 2 and 3 of the Mutual Assistance Pact, but Turkey refused to go to war on the side of the Allies on the grounds that this would bring it in armed conflict with the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁷ Furthermore, the Turkish government argued that as France, one of the contracting parties of the treaty, had dropped out of the war, the whole basis of the provisions of the pact had disappeared.

The German army entered Bulgaria in March 1941. This alarmed Turkey and the Turkish authorities blew up the bridges over the Meriç River as a defensive measure.¹⁴⁸ The German offensive in Greece and Yugoslavia that started on April 6, 1941 ended with the surrender of Yugoslav and Greek forces on April 17 and on April 23, respectively. After these developments the Turkish government decided to reach some understanding with Germany. Turkey and Germany signed a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression on June 18, 1941. With this treaty the two countries undertook “to respect each other’s territorial inviolability and integrity and to abstain from any kind of direct or indirect action against each other.”¹⁴⁹ It can be said that this agreement helped Germany to neutralize Turkey before its offensive against the Soviet Union. In fact, on June 22, 1941, four days after the treaty was signed, German troops invaded the Soviet Union.

From mid 1941- until mid- 1943, all the warring parties felt that the neutrality of Turkey was in their interest. Only after Mussolini’s fall from power on July 25, 1943 and the Italian armistice on September 8, 1943, did the Allied position against Turkey begin to change. The Allies wanted Turkey to take an active part in the war until early 1944. The Turkish government turned down the suggestions on the grounds that it had not been

¹⁴⁷ Türkaya Ataöv, *Turkish Foreign Policy: 1939-1945* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1965), p.75.

¹⁴⁸ Cevat Açıkalın, “Turkey’s International Relations”, *International Relations* 23, no.4 (October 1947), p.484.

¹⁴⁹ Cited in Ataöv, p.93.

adequately armed to repulse a German offensive. However, with the deterioration of Germany's military posture, Turkey's neutrality assumed a more biased nature in favor of the Allies. On April 20, 1944, the Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioğlu announced that all chrome exports to Germany would cease.¹⁵⁰ In May 1944, the Turkish government suppressed those who were working to propagate Pan-Turkic and Pan-Turanian ideas with the aim of improving relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁵¹ Turkey broke off economic and diplomatic relations with Germany on August 2, 1944 and interned the German citizens in the country. Finally, the Turkish government declared war on Germany and Japan on February 23, 1945 and became a founding member of the United Nations.

Turkey stayed out of hostilities and maintained its neutrality throughout World War II. The major aim of the Turkish decision makers was to save the country from the destruction of the war and protect its independence and territorial integrity. In order to realize this goal, Turkish leaders skillfully made use of the country's strategic geographical position and played the Axis and the Allies against each other.

The Entry of Turkey into the Western Alliance

After the end of World War II, Britain and the Soviet Union clashed in the Balkans. Churchill and Stalin held a conference in October 1944 in order to settle Balkan affairs. They decided on a division of spheres of interest in the peninsula. According to the agreement, Bulgaria and Romania would be under control of the Soviet Union

¹⁵⁰ Selim Deringil, *Turkish Foreign Policy During the Second World War: An Active Neutrality* (Cambridge: NY, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.168-169.

¹⁵¹ Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943-1945: Small State Diplomacy and Great Power Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.237.

whereas Britain was to determine policy in Greece. Yugoslavia was divided into zones of influence between the two. With the establishment of communist governments in Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, Soviet dominance in the region became more evident. Britain renewed her opposition to Russian emergence in the Mediterranean and clung to the last footholds in Greece and at the Straits.¹⁵² However, England, which was suffering from internal tremors, did not have the power to carry on such a struggle. So, with the Truman Doctrine of 1947, the US succeeded Britain in Balkan diplomacy and military action.

Turkey's neutrality and its cautious policy during World War II could not save it from being an objective of expansionist Soviet designs. The Soviet government formally denounced the Treaty of Neutrality and Friendship of 1925 on March 19, 1945 on the grounds that this treaty was no longer in accord with the new situation. According to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov: "Great changes have taken place particularly during the Second World War which required a new understanding."¹⁵³ In return for the renewal of the treaty, the Soviet Union set two conditions: The revision of the Turkish-Soviet frontier fixed by the Kars Treaty of 1921, which meant the return of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan in Eastern Turkey to Russia and the establishment of Soviet bases at the straits. According to former Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, Lavrentii Beria, head of Stalin's police network and a Georgian like him, played an important role in Russia's

¹⁵² Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974), p.22.

¹⁵³ Cited in Altemur Kılıç, *Turkey and the World* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1959), p.116.

demands on Turkey. Beria argued that Turkey had been weakened by World War II and would be unable to resist Soviet demands.¹⁵⁴

The Soviet pressure and threats alarmed Turkey. Moreover, the situation in Greece did not bode well. Civil war had started in Greece. Communist and leftist elements that had played a very significant part in the resistance movement were fighting against the government in order to take over control of the country. If Greece also became communist, then Turkey would be encircled by the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Turkey tried to activate the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1939, but Britain had neither the power nor resources to back up Turkey against the Soviet aggression. So Turkey sought the political and military support of the United States. The US administration, which was initially reluctant to enter into commitments stretching into the Middle East, adopted a more forceful policy in the region after Soviet actions in Iran, supplemented by information about Nazi-Soviet negotiations over the Near East in the 1940s.¹⁵⁵ In fact, US president Truman had expressed his concerns about Soviet designs in a letter to US Secretary of State James Byrnes on January 3, 1946:

There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language do they understand – "how many divisions have you?"¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, (ed.) Strobe Talbott (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1974), pp.295-296.

¹⁵⁵ Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.301.

¹⁵⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1972), p.281.

The decisive turn of American policy came in 1947. In February, Britain had announced that it would no longer be able to provide economic support to Greece and Turkey. The new US policy was articulated publicly by President Truman in Congress. He asked for the approval of \$400 million assistance for Greece and Turkey on the basis of the so-called Truman Doctrine. Truman declared:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way... Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.¹⁵⁷

The launch of the Truman Doctrine was the harbinger of the US “containment” policy, which would become the basis of American foreign policy during the Cold War years. This policy was first outlined by George Kennan in a series of articles in *Foreign Affairs*. In the articles he claimed that there could not be any reconciliation between the United States and Soviet Union, the two countries were rivals and it was necessary for the United States to contain its rival. Kennan stated that:

It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies... It is clear that the United States cannot expect in the foreseeable future to enjoy political intimacy with the Soviet regime. It must continue to regard the Soviet Union as a rival, not a partner, in the political arena.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Statement of Truman to Congress, March 12, 1947, in *Documents on International Affairs, 1947-1948* (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1952), pp.5-6.

¹⁵⁸ George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (July, 1947), p.581.

This containment policy was to be implemented by economic aid, military readiness, and atomic retaliation capability.¹⁵⁹ The Truman Doctrine comforted the Turkish government and ended its isolation. Turkey became a member of the OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation) in 1948 and began to receive Marshall Aid. It was accepted to the Council of Europe in August 1949 and became a full member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in February 1952. As a result, Turkey took its place within the Western security system and managed to deter the Soviet threat.

During the 1950s and early 1960s, Turkey perceived regional problems through the prism of the Cold War and disregarded their distinctive features. The world was divided into two rival ideological blocs and Turkey chose to be a member of the Western world. Turkish Balkan policy during this period was an extension of this understanding. Although communist governments in the Balkans began to distance from Moscow and pursue more independent policies by the second half of the 1950s, Turkey approached Balkan issues with complete indifference and abstained from developing bilateral relations with the Balkan states. Furthermore, the idea of “peaceful coexistence” that was brought out by the Soviet authorities after the death of Stalin was regarded as a tactical step by Turkey, which aimed to distort the firm stance of the West against Russia.

During the 1950s Turkey signed on, with US encouragement, to a Balkan alignment with the aim of extending the Western defense system to the Balkans. Turkey and Greece signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on February 28, 1953 with Yugoslavia, which had been expelled from the Soviet bloc after Tito’s rift with Stalin. In

¹⁵⁹ Kılıç, p.137.

this agreement, consultation, collaboration, and nonaggression were promised by the signatories. The Balkan Defense Pact was concluded on August 9, 1954 in Bled, Yugoslavia, by Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The pact declared that:

The contracting parties have agreed that any armed aggression against one, or several of them, on any part of their territories, shall be considered as an aggression against all the contracting parties, which in consequence, exercising the right of legitimate individual or collective self-defense, recognized by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, shall individually or collectively render assistance to the party or parties attacked, undertaking in common accord and immediately all measures, including the use of armed force, which they shall deem necessary for efficacious defense...¹⁶⁰

With the help of this Balkan alliance, Yugoslavia would be covered by the NATO commitments. If it were attacked, Greece and Turkey would come to its assistance. The Balkan Pact provided for the establishment of a permanent council composed of the foreign ministers of the parties, or of other members of the governments concerned, and for joint work by the general staffs of the three countries.

The Balkan Defense Treaty proved to be short-lived. After the death of Stalin, his successors, Khrushchev and Bulganin paid a visit to Belgrade and made peace with Tito. Immediately thereafter, Yugoslavia, which did not want to enrage the Soviet Union, began to relegate the military aspects of the alliance to the background. Later, Tito became one of the leaders of the Non-Alignment Movement with Nasser of Egypt and Nehru of India and attempted to follow a policy of neutrality in foreign affairs. So Yugoslavia steadily grew distant from the Balkan Pact. Another cause of the breakdown of the Balkan alliance was the emergence of the Cyprus problem between Greece and Turkey. Although the treaty was concluded for a period of twenty years, it fell into

¹⁶⁰ Kılıç, p.161.

desuetude in June 1960. After the failure of the Balkan Pact, Turkey shifted its attention from the Balkan region to the Middle East and entered into some settlements with the Middle Eastern countries with the encouragement of Britain and the US.

From the Outbreak of the Cyprus Conflict to the Johnson Letter (1955-1964)

The Cyprus conflict, which would become one of the thorny issues between Greece and Turkey and cause a deterioration in their relations in the following years, came onto the international stage for the first time in August 1954, when Greece submitted the Cyprus question to the United Nations and claimed it under the principle of self-determination.

The Ottomans captured Cyprus from the Venetians in 1571 and ruled it for over three hundred years. The island's population was composed of Muslim Turks and Orthodox Greeks. After the Ottoman-Russian war of 1877-1878, the Ottoman Empire signed a convention with Britain that allowed Britain to occupy and administer the island in the name of the Sultan.¹⁶¹ In return, the British government would help the Sultan to defend the Empire against Russian encroachments in the east. England annexed the island in 1914 and by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 Turkey accepted that Cyprus had become a British colony.

Both Turkey and Britain were against the unification of the island with Greece under the guise of self-determination. England had withdrawn from Palestine in 1948 and Suez in 1954. After pulling out of Suez, the British established their Middle East

¹⁶¹ Ayhan Evrensel, *British Policy Towards Cyprus 1954-1960* (Master's Thesis, University of Birmingham, 1994), p.5.

headquarters in Cyprus and this increased the value of Cyprus to Britain.¹⁶² The Turkish government was also opposed to the Greek annexation of the island, as it would alter the bilateral strategic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean at Turkey's expense.¹⁶³ Another Turkish consideration was the security and well being of the Turkish Cypriot community on Cyprus.

The United Nations Political Committee turned down the Greek appeal and recommended that Cyprus dispute should be negotiated by the parties directly involved. After the failure of the Greek initiative in the United Nations, Archbishop Makarios III, the ethnarch of the island, and George Grivas, a Cypriot officer in the Greek army formed the underground Greek terrorist organization EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) and commenced a campaign of violence in the island on April 1, 1955 with the aim of forcing Britain out of Cyprus and realizing *Enosis* (union with Greece).¹⁶⁴

The outbreak of violence in the island led Britain to convene a Tripartite Conference in August 1955. The British government invited Greek and Turkish representatives to London in order to discuss the Cyprus problem. Turkish officials demanded the return of Cyprus to Turkey if Britain intended to leave it. The Greeks pressed for self-determination, and the British proposed a form of constitutional self-government under continued British sovereignty, with separate representation for the

¹⁶² Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968), pp.138-139.

¹⁶³ Tözün Bahçeli, *Greek-Turkish Relations Since 1955* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p.31.

¹⁶⁴ Robert Stephens, *Cyprus: A Place of Arms, Power Politics and Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean* (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), pp.140-141.

Greek and Turkish Cypriots.¹⁶⁵ The London Conference was suspended in September 1955 without reaching any compromise.

By 1956, EOKA began to direct its terrorist acts against the Turkish Cypriots. These terrorist activities gradually intensified and escalated into a kind of civil war between the two communities. In 1957 Turkey brought forth the argument that the island should be partitioned between Greece and Turkey. The turning point came at the beginning of 1959, when the British government came to the view that sovereignty over a few bases rather than the whole of Cyprus would be sufficient for its strategic needs.¹⁶⁶ In February 1959, the Greek and Turkish Premiers, Karamanlis and Menderes, met in Zurich and started negotiations. The discussions then were moved to London, where the prime ministers were joined by their foreign ministers, Averoff and Zorlu, the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus, Makarios and Fazıl Küçük, and the representatives of England.

Cyprus became an independent and sovereign state with the London-Zurich Agreements of 1960, except for two areas around the British air base at Akrotiri and the army base at Dhekelia on the south of the island.¹⁶⁷ These would remain under British sovereignty. The Cypriot Constitution, based on the London-Zurich agreements, was issued in April 1960. This paved the way for the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus on August 16, 1960. The new state was a bi-communal federation. The president would be a Greek Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish Cypriot and both of them would be

¹⁶⁵ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (Ankara: ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayınları, 2001), p.112.

¹⁶⁶ Deniz Erden, *Turkish Foreign Policy Through the United Nations: 1960-1970* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1976), pp.70-71.

¹⁶⁷ Stephens, p.160.

elected by their own communities. They would have executive authority and would be assisted by a council of ministers comprising seven Greeks and three Turks. A Turkish Cypriot would hold one of the key ministries such as defense, foreign affairs, finance or security. Either of the president and the vice-president could veto the decision of the council individually.¹⁶⁸ There would be a 50-seat House of Representatives, of which seventy percent was of Greek Cypriot origin and thirty percent of Turkish Cypriot origin. The civil service would be divided on the same ratio. The army would consist of sixty percent Greeks and forty percent Turks. One of the chiefs of the army, the police or the gendarmerie would be a Turk.¹⁶⁹

With the Treaty of Guarantee that was signed as part of the 1960 package between Britain, Greece and Turkey, three signatories, on their part, guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus. Any activity aimed at promoting *Enosis* or partition of the island was prohibited. Moreover, in the case of a violation of the provisions of the agreement, Britain, Greece and Turkey had the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the Treaty.¹⁷⁰

The Cyprus dispute strained Greek-Turkish relations and had negative repercussions on the Greek minority living in Turkey and the Turkish minority living in Western Thrace. On September 6-7, 1955, grave incidents took place in İstanbul and İzmir. On the evening of September 6, news spread in İstanbul that a bomb had been exploded at the Turkish Consulate in Salonica and destroyed the house in which Mustafa

¹⁶⁸ Cihat Göktepe, *British Foreign Policy Towards Turkey 1959-1965* (London, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp.111-112.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., p.112.

¹⁷⁰ Kyriakides, p.55.

Kemal had been born. Protest demonstrations against Greece turned into riots against the Greek Orthodox minority and led to the destruction of their shops and houses. After these events, Greece immediately withdrew from joint NATO exercises and demanded compensation. Moreover, the Greek state, probably in answer to the September 1955 events in Turkey, voted in favor of the Article 19 in 1955, which secured the removal of Greek citizenship from all people of non-Greek origin that had left Greece with no intention of returning.¹⁷¹

Diplomatic activity in the Balkans was frozen when Greece and Turkey joined NATO and accepted US help under the Truman Doctrine. However, after the death of Stalin in 1953, a number of proposals were made first for détente and then for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans by Bulgaria and Romania.

Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica circulated notes to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia in September 1957 calling for a summit meeting of these states to discuss their differences and pave the way for a general détente in the Balkans.¹⁷² He also offered to create a nuclear-free zone in the region with a second proposal, voiced in June 1959. This offer was repeated by Bulgarian Premier Todor Zhivkov in September 1960 at the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Turkey simply ignored the first Stoica Plan and rejected the second one by handing a note to the Soviet Union on July 13, 1959.¹⁷³ Zhivkov's proposal also did not receive positive response from Turkey. There were mainly two reasons behind Turkey's

¹⁷¹ Maria Demesticha, *Minorities in the Balkans in the Era of Globalisation: The Case of Turks in Western Thrace* (Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2004), p.105.

¹⁷² J. F. Brown, *Bulgaria Under Communist Rule* (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p.269.

¹⁷³ Oral Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-1965* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), p.156.

unwillingness. First, the Turkish government saw the peace offensive spearheaded by Bulgaria and Romania as a Soviet design to weaken the Western alliance. Second, the Turkish government was approaching with reservation any Bulgarian proposal because of latter's treatment of its Turkish minority. With a note dated on March 10, 1951, the Bulgarian government accused Turkey of instigating the Turkish minority to emigrate, but at the same time not issuing enough visas. The note stated that Bulgaria was ready to give to 250,000 people passports and asked Turkey not to obstruct their immigration.¹⁷⁴ Turkey rejected the proposal, but increased the number of visas issued, which made the wave immigration in 1950-51 possible. When emigration was ended by the Bulgarian government on November 30, 1951, a total of about 150,000 Turks had left for Turkey. The Bulgarian government was probably acting on behalf of the Soviets, who wished to punish Turkey for its participation in the Korean War.¹⁷⁵

Greece, like Turkey, rejected the Bulgarian and Romanian proposals. However, unlike the Turkish government, Greece sent its reply directly to Romania and adopted a cautious tone, stating that it was inappropriate for the time being. This clearly showed the policy difference between the two NATO members. While Turkey eschewed improving its relations with communist Balkan states on the grounds that it meant the distortion of Western solidarity, Greece preferred to pursue a more active policy in the Balkans and gave precedence to its regional interests.

Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia formed the Committee of Balkan Cooperation and Mutual Understanding in 1961. This committee held its first meeting in

¹⁷⁴ Ömer E. Lütem, "The Past and Present State of the Turkish-Bulgarian Relations", *Foreign Policy Quarterly* 23, (1999), p.68.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

Athens in April 1961 and the second conference in Sofia in March 1962. Although Turkey was invited, it did not attend any of these meetings. Greece both hosted the first meeting and sent one of its prominent leftist figures, Stamatios Mercouris, to the second one.¹⁷⁶ In addition to this, Greek Cypriots sent an observer and expressed their thesis on Cyprus and sought the support of the Balkan states. The Greek government also normalized its relations with Bulgaria. Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev visited Athens in July 1964 and a number of agreements involving cultural cooperation, tourism, trade, and the improvement of communications between the two countries were signed.¹⁷⁷ Turkey as a result of its passive policy in the Balkans, lost the initiative in the region to Greece.

Inter-communal relations in Cyprus worsened toward the end of 1963. President Makarios proposed a thirteen-point plan in November 1963 for amending the constitution. The veto power of the vice-president and the separate majorities required in the key areas of taxes, municipalities, and the electoral laws were to be abolished. The army, the courts and the municipalities were to be reorganized on a unitary basis. The proportion of Greek and Turkish civil servants was to be accepted according to the numerical strength of Greeks and Turks on the island.¹⁷⁸ The adoption of these proposals would have reduced the status of the Turkish community on Cyprus from one of a community with equal rights to one of a minority subject to the majority rule of the Greeks. They were rejected by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkish government on December 6, 1963.

¹⁷⁶ Sander, p.161.

¹⁷⁷ Brown, p.275.

¹⁷⁸ Erden, p.85.

Fighting started in December 1963 and continued over the next two years. Many Cypriots, most of them Turkish Cypriots, lost their lives. Turkish Cypriots were expelled from all the organs of the government. Thousands of them were forced to emigrate from the island during this period. The remainder were impoverished, as a complete blockade was imposed on them by the Greeks.¹⁷⁹

The British government convened the London Conference in January 1964 to find a solution to the conflict, but it failed to solve the problem. In March 1964, an UN-peacekeeping force was established and sent to Cyprus. Although this force led to a reduction of tension, it could not stop the communal strife. Greek attacks on the Turks continued throughout the island and the Turkish Cypriots were squeezed into enclaves. Under these circumstances the Turkish government decided to physically intervene in June 1964 in order to protect the rights of the Turkish community and informed US of its intentions. However, Turkey had to step down and abstain from intervention because of President Johnson's letter to Prime Minister İnönü. In his letter, the US president stated that NATO might not be able to help Turkey if it was attacked by the Soviet Union because of its involvement in Cyprus and added that the US would not allow Turkey to use any American-supplied military equipment in the intervention.¹⁸⁰

The Cuban Missile Crisis, the Cyprus problem, and the Johnson letter paved the way for a more diversified and independent Turkish foreign policy in the 1960s. The Cuban crisis made Turkey realize that the United States might jeopardize the safety of its ally and even sacrifice it for its own national interests. The indifference of the West and

¹⁷⁹ Richard A. Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971* (Waterloo, ON: University of Waterloo Publications, 1976), pp.101-104.

¹⁸⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol, "NATO, USA and Turkey", in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (ed.) Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975), pp.17-18.

particularly the US to the Greek terrorist activities on Cyprus and the Johnson letter of June 5, 1964 induced the Turkish authorities to re-evaluate their relationship with the US and their position in NATO. Internal developments in the country also had an impact on policy change. The military government, which ended the ten-year long Democrat Party administration in 1960, produced a new and more liberal constitution before yielding its powers to an elected civilian government in 1961. The new constitution brought new liberties to the Turkish people and led to the growth of political debate in Turkey. With the introduction of a new electoral system that was based on proportional representation, the range of views represented in parliament increased. Furthermore, the long-suppressed leftist movement came onto the political scene with the establishment of Turkish Worker's Party in February 1961. Left-wing intellectuals openly criticized the foreign policy decisions of the government and questioned the value of NATO and the Western alliance to Turkish national interests. So, by taking into consideration the relaxation of Cold War tensions and being disillusioned with US actions in the Cuban Missile and Cyprus crises, Turkey decided to follow a more balanced and independent foreign policy and intensified its efforts to improve relations with the Soviet Union.

From the Turkish-Russian Rapprochement to the Turkish Intervention in Cyprus
(1965-1974)

The Turkish-Russian rapport started with the visit of Turkish Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin to Moscow in October 1964.¹⁸¹ The two sides agreed to expand commercial and cultural contacts. In January 1965, a delegation of the Supreme Soviet,

¹⁸¹ Kemal H. Karpat, "Turkish-Soviet Relations", in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (ed.) Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975), p.90.

headed by Soviet President Nikolai Podgornyi, visited Ankara.¹⁸² This was followed by the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in May 1965. Three months later, in August 1965, Turkish Prime Minister Suat Hayri Ürgüplü and Foreign Minister Hasan Işık returned the visit. During these visits, declarations of friendship were made and agreements of economic assistance and cooperation were concluded. In December 1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin paid a visit to Ankara. He was the first head of the Soviet government to visit Turkey. In March 1967, an economic aid agreement was signed between the two countries which initiated several major industrial projects in Turkey.¹⁸³ Kosygin's visit was returned by Turkish Premier Süleyman Demirel's visit in September 1967. Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil returned Gromyko's visit in July 1968, and a year later Turkish President Cevdet Sunay paid a visit to the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁴

Establishing more friendly relations with the Soviet Union brought two positive outcomes to Turkey. First, the Soviet Union changed partially its attitude on Cyprus. While in the initial phase of the conflict Soviet government had supported the position of Makarios and provided military aid to the island, after the rapprochement with Turkey, the Soviets expressed support for a federal solution on Cyprus. Second, Turkey gained the opportunity to improve its bilateral relations with the communist Balkan states.

In August 1965, Ivan Budinov, Bulgarian Minister of Trade visited Turkey with the purpose of expanding commercial and cultural ties.¹⁸⁵ He was the first Bulgarian

¹⁸² Bruce R. Kuniholm, "Turkey and the West Since World War II, in *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, (eds.) Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p.54.

¹⁸³ Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1965-1973 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası" , in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1973)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi ve Basın Yayın Yüksekokulu Basımevi, 1987), p.526.

¹⁸⁴ Erden, p.117.

¹⁸⁵ Karpat, p.95.

minister to visit Turkey since World War II. Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivan Bashev came to Turkey in August 1966. During his visit, most of the outstanding issues between the two countries such as the regulation of boundaries, consulates, fisheries, improvement of transportation and communication and the construction of direct rail lines and a new highway were brought up.¹⁸⁶ In May 1967, Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil returned the visit of Bashev, and in February 1968, an agreement was signed between the two governments which allowed the emigration of the close relatives of the persons who had immigrated to Turkey up to 1952.¹⁸⁷ The conclusion of the emigration agreement paved the way for better relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. Bulgarian Premier Todor Zhivkov paid a visit to Turkey in March 1968 and a number of agreements on culture, economic development, transportation, trade, tourism and visas were signed.¹⁸⁸

Turkey's relations with Yugoslavia have developed in a friendly atmosphere since Yugoslavia's split with the Soviet Union and its expulsion from Cominform. Moreover, the condition of the Turkish minority in Yugoslavia did not present reasons for particular complaint. Exchanges between Turkish and Yugoslav leaders continued in the late 1960s. Yugoslav Prime Minister Spiljak visited Ankara in March 1968, and in return, Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel journeyed to Belgrade in September 1970.¹⁸⁹ Turkey showed satisfaction when Tito advocated the independence of Cyprus, while the plan for

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p.96.

¹⁸⁷ Ömer E. Lütem, "Tarihsel Süreç İçinde Bulgaristan Türklerinin Hakları", in *Balkan Türkleri: Balkanlar'da Türk Varlığı*, (ed.) Erhan Türbedar (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), p.53.

¹⁸⁸ Brown, pp.296-297.

¹⁸⁹ Gönübol and Kürçüoğlu, p.531.

securing the status of the Turkish community on the island by a federative system appeared to have received the reserved approval of Yugoslavia.¹⁹⁰

The normalization of Turkish-Romanian relations began with the visit of Romanian Premier Gheorghe Maurer to Turkey in July 1966. The result of the visit was the settlement of outstanding problems and an improvement of general relations. In April 1967 Turkish Foreign Minister Çağlayangil travelled to Romania and in September 1967, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel returned Maurer's visit.¹⁹¹ The visit of Romanian President Nicolai Ceausescu took place in March 1969 and it was followed by Turkish President Sunay's visit to Bucharest in April 1970.¹⁹² After these exchanges agreements on consulate and judicial assistance were signed. The independent path on which Romania had embarked since the mid-1960s, together with its good treatment of the small Turkish minority in the country accelerated the rapprochement with Turkey and Romania.

Relations between Albania and Turkey were without problems although the two countries were in opposing ideological blocs. Moreover, Albania's support for Turkey during a UN General Assembly resolution on Cyprus question in 1965 created a positive atmosphere towards this country in Turkey. In January 1966, ambassadors were exchanged and on July 25, 1966 a cultural exchange protocol were concluded between the two countries.¹⁹³ A trade agreement was reached in April 1967 and exchange of

¹⁹⁰ Ferenc A. Vali, *Bridge Across the Bosphorus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p.207.

¹⁹¹ Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu, p.532.

¹⁹² Vali, p.205.

¹⁹³ Bilal N. Şimşir, *Türkiye-Arnavutluk İlişkileri: Büyükelçilik Anıları (1985-1988)* (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2001), p.49.

Albanian and Turkish parliamentary delegations took place in September 1968 and in May 1969.¹⁹⁴

A military junta took over the government in Greece in April 1967 and on November 15, a renewed crisis exploded in Cyprus. General Grivas who had been appointed supreme commander of the Greek Cypriot armed forces by Makarios launched an attack on the Turkish villages of Köfünye (Kophinou) and Aytodro (Ayios Theodoros).¹⁹⁵ After warning flights by the Turkish Air Force, the Greek Cypriots withdrew from the two villages the following day. A further threat of military action by Turkey urged the US to intervene for mediation. On November 30, 1967 the Greek government agreed to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, disband the National Guard and recall Grivas.¹⁹⁶

Inter-communal talks started in June 1968, but the two parties could not reach an agreement. On July 15, 1974, the Greek junta under Brigadier Ioannides carried out a coup against Makarios, overthrew his government, replaced him with ex-EOKA journalist Nicos Sampson and declared *Enosis*.¹⁹⁷ On July 20, Turkey intervened with its troops under the authority of the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960 and extended its control to some thirty-seven percent of the island.¹⁹⁸ Turkish intervention on Cyprus ended the military rule in Greece. A civilian government under the premiership of Constantine

¹⁹⁴ Recai Karagöl, *Türkiye Arnavutluk İlişkileri'nin Dünü Bugünü Yarını* (Istanbul: Harp Akademileri Basımevi, 1995), p.35.

¹⁹⁵ Salahi R. Sonyel, "New Light on the Genesis of the Conflict: British Documents 1960-1967", in *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, (ed.) Clement H. Dodd (Cambridgeshire, England: Eothen Press, 1999), p.43.

¹⁹⁶ George S. Harris, "Turkey and the United States", in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (ed.) Kemal H. Karpaz (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975), p.71.

¹⁹⁷ Michael Stephen, *The Cyprus Question: A Concise Guide to the History, Politics, and Law of the Cyprus Question* (London, UK: Northgate Publications, 2001), p.44.

¹⁹⁸ Clement H. Dodd, "A Historical Overview", in *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, (ed.) Clement H. Dodd (Cambridgeshire, England: Eothen Press, 1999), p.10.

Karamanlis was established on July 23. Samson also resigned and was replaced by Glafcos Klerides, the head of the Greek Cypriot community.

An international conference was held at Geneva between Turkey, Greece and Britain on July 25, 1974. A cease-fire was agreed and it was also stated that in a declaration made by the three foreign ministers that there were two autonomous administrations in Cyprus, that of the Greek Cypriot and that of the Turkish Cypriot community.¹⁹⁹ At the second Geneva conference that began on August 9, Turkey urged the acceptance of a federal solution based on two autonomous units while Greece agreed to recognize a degree of autonomy for various Turkish enclaves spread on the island but rejected the formation of a geographical federation.²⁰⁰ The two sides could not come to an understanding and fighting resumed on Cyprus. Turkish troops began another offensive on August 14, and brought about thirty-five percent of the island under Turkish control. Greece, while openly declaring that it was unprepared for a war with Turkey, pulled its troops out of NATO. During the events of 1974, and following a formal exchange of population agreement made between Denktaş and Klerides, Turkish Cypriots moved to the north and Greek Cypriots moved to the south. This completed the partition of the island between Greek and Turkish communities.

From the U.S. Arms Embargo to the End of the Cold War (1975-1989)

The Cyprus crisis of 1974 had important effects on Turkey's relations with the US. The US congress, under the pressure of a pro-Greek lobby, decided to cut off

¹⁹⁹ Clement H. Dodd, *The Cyprus Imbroglia* (Cambridgeshire, England: Eothen Press, 1998), p.31.

²⁰⁰ Kemal H. Karpat, "War on Cyprus: The Tragedy of Enosis", in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition 1950-1974*, (ed.) Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975), p.201.

military aid to Turkey after December 10, 1974.²⁰¹ The arms embargo came into effect on February 5, 1975 and remained in place until August 1978. In return, the Turkish government suspended the Defence Cooperation Agreement of 1969 on July 25, 1975 and ended all operations at US military installations in Turkey.²⁰² Furthermore, in February 1995, Rauf Denktaş proclaimed the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in the northern part of the island.

In the late 1970s, the problems with the US, together with the perceived decline in the Soviet threat, and the growing security threats posed by Greece, led the Turkish authorities to adopt a new national security concept and new defense and foreign policies. Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit argued that Turkey was taking on a large burden within NATO and was dependent militarily on the US. It should reduce its forces and establish its own national defense industry. Ecevit explained that:

We first have to realize the fact that the Cold War period has ended and that détente started quite a few years ago, but Turkey's defense structure still largely dates back to the Cold War years and places a heavy burden on its economy. Because of its commitments to NATO, Turkey finds itself increasingly in a position where both its economy and its defense system must become more self-sustained...

While formulating a new national security concept and new defense and foreign policies we feel bound to keep in mind certain principles and factors. One of them is that we should make our national security primarily dependent on good relations and on establishing an atmosphere of mutual confidence with all our neighbours, with all the countries of the region.²⁰³

²⁰¹ Çelik, p.51.

²⁰² Faruk Sönmezoglu, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler: Kıbrıs, Ege ve Diğer Sorunlar* (Istanbul: DER Yayınları, 2000), pp.223-224.

²⁰³ Bülent Ecevit, "Turkey's Security Policies", in *Greece and Turkey: Adversity and Alliance*, (ed.) Jonathon Alford (New York, NY: Published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies by St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp.136-138.

According to this new policy, the Turkish government gave particular attention to the improvement of bilateral relations with Bulgaria and Romania in the Balkans. Turan Güneş, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, paid his first visit to Romania in July 1974.²⁰⁴ The fact that Bulgaria never took sides openly with Greece on the Cyprus conflict was appreciated in Turkey and many high level visits took place between the two countries. Prime Minister Demirel went to Sofia in December 1975 and signed the Declaration on Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation and in return Bulgarian President Zhivkov paid a visit to Turkey in June 1976.²⁰⁵ By getting closer to these two Balkan countries, Turkey was striving to balance Greece in the Balkans. Moreover, Turkey signed a political document on the Principles of Good Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation with the Soviet Union in June 1978 and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gündüz Ökçün, attended the non-alignment ministers meeting in Belgrade in July 1978.

During the last decade of the Cold War, Turkey realigned with the West because of the Iranian Revolution of February 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. However, during the 1980s, Turkey mostly encountered problems with its two neighbours in the Balkans, namely Bulgaria and Greece.

Inter-communal negotiations between the Turkish and Greek sides continued without success until 1983 and on November 15, 1983, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In addition to the Cyprus dispute, issues such as the delimitation of the continental shelf, sovereignty over Aegean territorial waters, and control of air space gave rise to serious tensions between the two countries. Greece

²⁰⁴ Gencer Özcan, “Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans”, in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.289.

²⁰⁵ İsmail Soysal, *Türk Dış Politikası İncelemeleri İçin Kılavuz (1919-1993)* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1993), pp.88-89.

fortified the Aegean islands in spite of the demilitarization obligation required by the Lausanne Treaty, while Turkey established the Fourth Army in 1975 which had no connection to NATO.²⁰⁶ Another source of friction between Greece and Turkey was the treatment of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace and the Greek community in Istanbul. The Turkish government criticized Greece for repressing the rights of the Turkish community and neglecting their economic and educational needs whereas the Greek government denied applying a policy of discrimination against its Turkish minority and accused Turkey of having forced out most of the Greek minority in Istanbul.²⁰⁷

After the October 1981 elections in Greece, PASOK, under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, came to power. Papandreou followed an aggressive policy towards Turkey, aggrandized the bilateral problems and Greece's threat perceptions with the aim of drawing more support from the West and consolidating Greece's position.²⁰⁸ According to the revised Greek defense doctrine, "the threat from the East and not from the North" was the main security concern for the country.²⁰⁹ The simmering tension between the two countries almost spilled into hostilities in March 1987 when the Greek government gave oil exploration permission to a Greek oil company in waters outside

²⁰⁶ Sönmezoğlu, p.182.

²⁰⁷ Tözün Bahçeli, "Turkish Policy toward Greece", in *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.142.

²⁰⁸ Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Aegean Relationship", in *Turkey and Europe*, (eds.) Canan Balkır and Allan M. Williams (New York, NY: Pinter Publishers, 1993), p.167.

²⁰⁹ Panayotis J. Tsakonas and Thanos P. Dokos, "Greek-Turkish Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century: A View from Athens", in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p.103.

Greek territorial waters claimed by Turkey.²¹⁰ After this incident Prime Ministers Özal and Papandreou met during the economic conference in Davos, Switzerland, in January 1988 and decided to initiate a process of rapprochement in order to create a climate of confidence and prevent the repetition of the 1987 crisis.²¹¹ However, the so-called the “spirit of Davos” did not last long and failed to resolve any of the important questions between Greece and Turkey.

At the end of the 1980s, Turkey experienced another crisis, this time with its other neighbor Balkan state, Bulgaria. From December 1984 through March 1985, the Bulgarian government initiated country-wide campaign of forced assimilation, in which Bulgarian Turks were obliged to adopt Bulgarian names. The Bulgarian authorities declared that those claiming to be minority Turks were actually ethnic Bulgarians who had been forced to convert to Islam by the Ottoman authorities and not the descendants of Turks who had migrated to Bulgarian lands during Ottoman times.²¹² By changing the names of people and through other means, the authorities said they were helping to restore these people to their proper Bulgarian roots. The aim of this national revival or rebirth process was to assimilate the Turks within the larger Bulgarian population and form an ethnically monolithic Bulgarian nation.

Renaming was followed by additional harsh measures to promote assimilation. Fines were levied against anyone overheard speaking Turkish, wearing traditional

²¹⁰ Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, “Ankara-Atina İlişkilerinde Son Dönem: Değişenler ve Değişmeyenler”, in *Türkiye-Yunanistan: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, (ed.) Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2002), p.184.

²¹¹ Erol Kurubaş, “Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Neo-Detant Dönemi ve İlişkilerin Geleceği”, in *Türkiye-Yunanistan: Eski Sorunlar, Yeni Arayışlar*, (ed.) Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2002), p.8.

²¹² Rossen V. Vassilev, “Post-Communist Bulgaria’s Ethnopolitics”, *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1, no.2 (December 2001), p.39.

Turkish clothing, performing Muslim religious rituals, and Turkish music was banned.²¹³

Muslim graveyards were destroyed and the names of deceased relatives and ancestors were changed in the municipal registers. Male children in schools and day-care were subjected to regular inspections to make sure their parents had not had them circumcised.

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The Turkish government's reply to the assimilation campaign came very late. On February 22, 1985, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave a memorandum to the Bulgarian government and offered to solve this problem with negotiations and proposed a new migration agreement.²¹⁵ At that time, the name changing process was mostly finished. After the rejection of its memorandums by the Bulgarian government, Ankara decided to follow a more active and determined policy. There were some reasons for the Turkish government's late response. First of all, Turkey was not very sure about the validity of the news. The roads were blocked due to adverse weather conditions, and access to the regions where Turks predominated was not allowed to foreign observers or visitors.²¹⁶ In addition to this, Bulgarian-Turkish relations seemed to be very friendly. There were visits between the two countries at the president, prime minister, and foreign ministers levels. After the 1980 military coup, Turkey had been bitterly criticized by the Western world and was trying to improve its relations with the Eastern European countries. Last, Turkey had great security problems at that time. The Iraq-Iran War, problems with Syria and

²¹³ John. D. Bell, "The Revival Process: The Turkish and Pomak Minorities in Bulgarian Politics", in *Ethnicity and Nationalism in East Central Europe and the Balkans*, (eds.) Thanasis D. Sfikas and Christopher Williams (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999), p.249.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Hamza Eroğlu, "Milletlerarası Hukuk Açısından Bulgaristan'daki Türk Azınlığı Sorunu," in *Bulgaristan'da Türk Varlığı* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992), p.16.

²¹⁶ Hugh Poulton, *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict* (London, England: Minority Rights Group, 1993), p.130.

Greece, and the Armenian atrocities were hot topics on the agenda of Turkey.²¹⁷ For this reason it did not want to raise the tension with Bulgaria, but this passive policy was detrimental to the Turkish minority in Bulgaria because it stimulated Bulgarian authorities to harsher and more repressive measures against the Turks.

The Turkish government raised the issue at the international forums, but as Turkey did not have a bright record on human rights, the Bulgarian government was able to deflect criticism. However, various human rights groups repeatedly raised the issue both with the Bulgarian government and at the UN. Amnesty International twice, in June 1986 and May 1987, submitted its concerns about Bulgaria to the UN under the procedure for confidentially, reviewing communications about human rights abuses, and the organization visited Bulgaria and met with officials to discuss these concerns.²¹⁸ Various Islamic countries condemned Bulgaria and the OIC sent a delegation to Bulgaria which reported on religious restrictions for Muslims. Even the Soviet Union, the closest ally of Bulgaria, abstained from supporting Sofia openly.

During the spring of 1989, the Turks launched a series of hunger strikes and demonstrations in Bulgaria which soon escalated into violent clashes with the authorities. In a televised speech in 1989, Zhivkov urged Turkey to open its borders to all Turks wishing to emigrate.²¹⁹ Under these circumstances, Turkey declared that all Turks who wished to emigrate would be taken in. As a result, over 300,000 Turks left for Turkey

²¹⁷ Ömer E. Lütem, *Türk-Bulgar İlişkileri 1983-1989* Cilt 1, 1983-1985 (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi, 2000), p.193.

²¹⁸ Poulton, p.161.

²¹⁹ Nazif Mandacı and Birsen Erdoğan, *Balkanlar'da Azınlık Sorunu: Yunanistan, Arnavutluk, Makedonya ve Bulgaristan'daki Azınlıklara Bir Bakış* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 2001), p.109.

between June and mid August 1989.²²⁰ This was the greatest population movement to take place after World War II in the world.²²¹ The mass exodus focused worldwide attention on Bulgaria's human rights record and disrupted an already shaky economy. The crisis was ended in November 1989, after the fall of the communist regime in Bulgaria and the replacement of Zhivkov by Mladenov as party leader of the BKP and head of state. On 29 December 1989, the Politburo decided the end of the assimilation policy and announced that it had been a grave political error.

The exact motives of the assimilation campaign remain obscure, and the documents concerning the decision have been declared missing. It seems that one of the main reasons was the continuously high differential in birth rate between the Turks and Bulgarians. Since the 1970s, the birth-rate of the Bulgarians has been constantly decreasing. For example "In 1968 80,000 children were born in Bulgaria and only 25,000 of them were Bulgarian."²²² This fuelled the fears of the Bulgarians of being outnumbered. The Turkish population also had a more youthful profile and became important for the active work force and this made the expulsion of them less preferable. Another reason may be that the regime panicked under the deteriorating economic situation in the country and in this way tried to deflect attention from itself.²²³ The increasingly Turkish character of the south-eastern region also prompted strategic concerns. On its borders was the traditional enemy, Turkey, with a population of over 50 million and growing and within its own borders there was a large minority of Turks, who

²²⁰ Erik J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London, UK: I. B. Tauris, 1993), p.317.

²²¹ Darina Vasileva, "Bulgarian Turkish Emigration and Return", *International Migration Review* 26, (1992), p.342., cited in Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun, *Bulgaristan'la Yeni Dönem: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Ankara-Sofya İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001), p.33.

²²² Bilal N. Şimşir, *Bulgaristan Türkleri* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1986), p.344.

²²³ Roessingh p.90.

was also growing at a rapid rate. The Bulgarian authorities also claimed that the Turkish General Staff possessed a plan for the realization of a Cyprus variant in Bulgaria.²²⁴ The discontent of the Bulgarian government increased when Turkey refused to renew the treaty on repatriation in 1979 due to internal economic problems.

The campaign of forced assimilation and oppression that was launched by the Bulgarian authorities against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria shook the bilateral relations between the two countries. The crisis ended only after the deposition of Zhivkov in November 1989 and conditions of the Turkish minority were improved.

In conclusion, it can be said that Turkey ceased to pursue an active and independent Balkan policy during the Cold War years. The Balkans were under the direct penetration of the Soviet Union and Turkey did not attempt much to challenge the status quo. Only during the Cyprus Crisis of 1974, did Turkey stray from its regular parameters and act unilaterally by giving priority to its national interests rather than the concerns of NATO and the Western alliance.

²²⁴ Rossen Vassilev, "Bulgaria's Ethnic Problems", *East European Quarterly* 36, no.1 (Spring 2002), p.106.

CHAPTER 6

THE DISINTEGRATION OF YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKISH-BALKAN POLICY

The Cold War came to an end with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the unification of Germany in 1990. Communist administrations were replaced by democratic governments throughout Central and Eastern Europe and a rapid transition from command to market economy, and from single party to multi-party systems took place. However, in the Balkans, Yugoslavia, which had been a buffer state between East and West throughout the Cold War was far removed from these political trends. Nationalist politics complicated and even hindered the democratization process in the country. Between the summer of 1991 and the spring of 1992, the Yugoslav federation was completely dismembered and was replaced by five successor states. This regime breakdown gave rise to bloody wars, ethnic violence and great human suffering. As the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the following Bosnia and Kosovo crises played a particular role in Turkish engagement with the region at the beginning of the 1990s, I will first provide a brief history of the breakup of Yugoslavian state, then discuss the implications of the conflict for the international community. Finally I will move on to examine the Turkish position.

The Breakup of Yugoslavia (1989-1992)

Yugoslavia was established by partisan leader Josip Broz Tito after World War II on federal lines. Six equal and autonomous republics were set up with governments of

their own. These included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. In addition, Kosovo and Vojvodina were given the status of autonomous provinces attached to Serbia. Tito was the unquestioned leader of the Yugoslavia until his death in 1980. With his effective and pragmatic governance, Tito managed to contain the aspirations of competing ethnic groups and hold the country together.

Tito had promoted the principle of collective leadership before his death. According to this system, the country would be administered by a network of collective bodies in which the republics and autonomous provinces were represented and among whose representatives the chairmanship would rotate.²²⁵ However, conflicting economic and political interests of the republics and provinces could not be reconciled under the auspices of this loose federal system in which power was shared. Economic situation was not promising either. Production had fallen, national income had declined on the other hand foreign indebtedness and rates of unemployment and inflation were growing.²²⁶ Yugoslavia, which was able to get massive external assistance during 1960s and 1970s with the efforts of Tito lost its credibility after his death. Widespread dissatisfaction with economic conditions resulted in the recurrent labor unrests in the late 1980s.

The first threat to the ethnic balances within Yugoslavia came from Kosova. In March and early April of 1981 Albanian students and workers carried out mass demonstrations in Pristina and many other parts of the Kosovo, demanded republic status

²²⁵ Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia From the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999), p.6.

²²⁶ Between 1981-1988, agricultural output declined by 600 percent, industrial output by 125 percent and national income decreased by 400 percent. See Sabrina Petra Ramet, *Social Currents in Eastern Europe: The Sources and Consequences of the Great Transformation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), pp.33-35.

for Kosovo, an improvement in economic conditions and the release of some political prisoners. Some of them also demanded union with Albania. Despite improvements, Kosova was still the economically most backward region of Yugoslavia. By being the seventh republic of the federation, Kosovar Albanians hoped to get a larger share from the federal budget. Serbian authorities interpreted the demonstrations as a counter-revolution, refused to grant Kosovo republican status and restored the order with the intervention of security forces. According to the official sources nine or eleven people died and several were wounded.²²⁷

The Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU), which was made up of eminent Serbian economists, political scientists, demographers, historians and writers, such as Kosta Mihailovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Radovan Samardzic, Vasilije Krestic, Dobrica Cosic, Antoije Isakovic and Mihailo Markovic, issued a Memorandum in March 1986 and claimed that Serbia had been discriminated against within Yugoslavia and accused the Croats and Albanians of alleged genocidal actions and policies against the Serbs.²²⁸ According to the Dobrica Cosic, the famous novelist and academic, “the Serbian people always lost in the peace what they gained in the war.”²²⁹ He concluded that, “after genocide (1941-45)... after the 1974 constitution,... it is difficult to understand why the Serbs today reasonably and persistently fail to aspire to a state without national questions, national hatreds, and Serbophobia. Serbs must learn to live without others within their

²²⁷ Poulton, p.61.

²²⁸ Memorandum was circulated privately but a draft was leaked to the press.

²²⁹ Cited in Muhamedin Kullashi, “The Kosovo Problem and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia”, in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.166.

own national state.”²³⁰ It was the first time that Serbia was openly challenging the policies of the Yugoslav state. This memorandum became the manifesto of the rising Serbian nationalism in the following years.

In May 1986, Slobodan Milosevic succeeded Ivan Stambolic as the chairman of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia (LCS). As soon as he came to power, Milosevic strove to establish full control in Serbia. His first step was to exploit the Kosovo question in order to gain domestic political advantage. On April 27, 1987, Milosevic gave a speech to the Kosovo Polje. He appealed to the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo with the slogan, “Nobody, either now or in the future, has the right to beat you!”²³¹ This was mostly a warning to the Albanian police, who had used force in the rally and beat Serbs and Montenegrins with clubs. In September 1987, Milosevic lodged corruption charges against Dragisa Pavlovic, chief of the Belgrade party organization and a key supporter of Stambolic and secured his dismissal from the party. In mid-December, Stambolic, whose position had been seriously weakened, was expelled from the Serbian presidency. Milosevic, who had overwhelmed his main opponents, accelerated the application of his political program. He succeeded in toppling of the governments of Vojvodina (October 1988), Montenegro, (January 1989) and Kosovo (February 1989) with the help of organized street demonstrations.²³² In February 1989, he pushed through a new Serbian constitution and abolished the former autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina.

²³⁰ *Borba*, 13 June 1989, cited in Raju G. C. Thomas, “Self-determination and International Recognition Policy: An Alternative Interpretation of Why Yugoslavia Disintegrated” *World Affairs*, (Summer 1997), p.13.

²³¹ *Chicago Tribune*, 17 October 1988, cited in “La Longue Duree: Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic’s Provocative Actions in Yugoslavia”, *ORBIS*, (Spring 1996), pp.1-2.

²³² Sabrina Petra Ramet, “War in the Balkans”, *Foreign Affairs* 71, (1992), p.4.

Milosevic was elected president of the Republic of Serbia in May 1989 and gave another speech in Kosovo on June 28, 1989 on the 600th year anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. He continued his anti-Albanian rhetoric and accused all the postwar Serbian leaders of humiliating Serbia. Milosevic stated that:

The concessions which many Serb leaders made at the expense of their people could be accepted by no people on earth, neither historically, nor ethically. Especially since the Serbs throughout their history never conquered or exploited anybody else. Their whole national and historical being throughout their history, through the two world wars, as well as today is liberating.²³³

After the consolidation of his power in Serbia, Milosevic started to play the Serbian nationalist card openly. His slogan was: “Serbia will either be powerful and unified or it will not exist.” His goal was to create a Great Serbia that would include Serbia, Montenegro, most of Bosnia and Herzegovina, significant portions of Croatia including Dalmatia, and parts of Macedonia.²³⁴ A map of Great Serbia was even published in *Ilustrovana Politika* magazine in 1990. Milosevic flattered the Serbian pride and nationalism. He legitimated the Chetnik movement as a honorable movement that had resisted against the historical enemies of the Serbian nation. He permitted Serbian Orthodox Church to build new churches and to restore old ones and graced many Serbian and Montenegrin dissidents such as Milovan Djilas and Gojko Djogo. Most of the Serbs were happy with Milosevic’s measures. Serbia had the largest territory and the largest population in Yugoslavia. The Serbian people had played a dominant role in the establishment of the Yugoslav state in 1918 and had worked actively during the wartime resistance movement. However, there was a widespread belief among the Serbs that their

²³³ *Politika*, 29 June 1989, cited in Ivo Banac, “Nationalism in Serbia”, in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.150.

²³⁴ Banac, p.151.

interests had not been recognized adequately, but in contrast had been sacrificed by Tito in order to strengthen Yugoslavia. According to this view, Tito had weakened Serbia by creating the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro and granting autonomous status to Kosovo and Vojvodina.²³⁵ So, by reintegrating Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia, Milosevic was applauded even by some of his political opponents and he became the undisputed leader of the Serbs.

Multi-party elections were held throughout Yugoslavia between April and December 1990. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia, anti-communist governments came to power. In Serbia and Montenegro communists retained their power whereas in Macedonia, a coalition government in which reformists communists were in the leading position was set up. The political scene was much more fragmented after the elections. The newly elected political authorities were committed to programs of regional and ethnic nationalism and seriously challenged the power of the federal system.²³⁶ Moreover, the 1974 Constitution, which gave the republics and provinces veto power over the most important state matters, further complicated the situation and led to a paralysis of the political system.

Slovenia was the first republic that took the steps which would disintegrate Yugoslavia. In July 1990, the Slovenian Assembly adopted a declaration on sovereignty which stipulated that the federal constitution would apply only if it did not conflict with Slovene laws, and announced that Slovenia would develop its own foreign and defence

²³⁵ Alex N. Dragnich, "The West's Mismanagement of the Yugoslav Crisis", *World Affairs*, (Fall 1993), p.1.

²³⁶ Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia", *Current History*, (November 1992), p.371.

policies.²³⁷ The overwhelming majority of the Slovenians voted for independence in the referendum that was held in December 1990 and Slovenia ceased to send conscripts to the federal army in March 1991. Slovenia had felt increasingly dissatisfied with the existing Yugoslav structure. The Serbian and Slovene authorities had conflicting views on matters such as constitutional change, the reorganization of the party and the resolution of the Kosovo problem. Slovenia was the richest and industrially the most advanced republic of the federation and the Slovenes did not want to bear the economic burden of the impoverished republics any longer.

Croatia was another wealthy state of Yugoslavia. Its geographical position as a transport route was a great asset. Most of the Yugoslav foreign trade went through Croatian ports and a large amount was earned by the tourist industry on the Dalmatian coast.²³⁸ Croatia also believed that its membership of an economically weak Yugoslavia had impeded its development. There was also an increasing wave of nationalism in the country. In April 1990, Dr Franjo Tudjman, the former General of the Yugoslav army and a nationalist historian, was elected president of Croatia and in December 1990, Croat Assembly adopted new constitutional provisions that referred to the republic as the sovereign state of the Croats and other nations living in Croatia, but no longer recognized the republic's Serbian community as a constituent nation.²³⁹ The discrimination of Serbs

²³⁷ John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict: An Analysis of the Causes of the Yugoslav War, the Policies of the Republics and the Regional and International Implications of the Conflict* (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p.14.

²³⁸ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century*, Volume 2 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.396.

²³⁹ Serbs made up 12.2 percent of the Croatia's population in 1991. See Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.178. Many of them lived in the Krajina region around the town of Knin. There were also Serbs in eastern Slavonia and Zagreb.

in Croatia further contributed to Milosevic's campaign of Serb nationalism and to his warning that unless measures were taken, the Serbs could never feel safe again.²⁴⁰

In October 1990, Croatia and Slovenia presented a Model of Confederation in Yugoslavia. The proposed confederation would be an alliance of sovereign states, functioning as an international organization, like the European Community. Member states would have their own currencies, armed forces and diplomatic representations in third states. Thus, each member would be an individual subject of international law. Serbia and Montenegro immediately rejected the proposal while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia stayed in between. Throughout the early months of 1991, the leaders of Yugoslavia's six republics conducted a series of meetings in order to reach a resolution but to no avail. Croatia and Slovenia insisted on the confederal solution, while Serbia and Montenegro stuck firmly to the federal position. When Serbia and Montenegro blocked the planned rotation of the collective presidency to Croatian representative Stipe Mesic, in May 1991 the situation reached a deadlock. The Croat and Slovene governments announced that they would secede from the federation by 26 June if no progress had been made.

Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed their independence on June 25, 1991. Two days later, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) sent troops to Slovene. The conflict lasted ten days and ended with the diplomatic intervention of the European Community. Slovenia and Yugoslavia signed the Brioni Accord on July 7, 1991. The agreement left the border posts and airport in Slovenian hands and called for the return of the JNA units to their barracks. At the same time, Slovenia agreed to a three-month suspension of its

²⁴⁰ Joyce P. Kaufman, "NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Conflict, Crisis and the Atlantic Alliance", *Journal of Conflict Studies* 19, no.2 (Fall 1999), p.7.

declaration of independence.²⁴¹ With the decision of the collective presidency in Belgrade to withdraw all the federal forces from Slovenia on 18 July, the Slovene-Yugoslav war came to an end. The conflict did not go on for a long time because there was no significant Serbian minority in Slovenia.²⁴² However in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia where the percentage of Serbs was much higher than in Slovenia, the military struggles triggered the outbreak of wide-scale violence within a short time.²⁴³ On June 28, 1991 the Serbian leaders of Krajina announced that the region would merge with the Municipal Community of Bosanska Krajina, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to form a greater Serbian community.²⁴⁴ Shortly thereafter, simmering ethnic tensions between Serbs and Croats exploded into open warfare. The Croat-Serb war lasted about six months and hostilities spread to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 1992 after the republic's declaration of independence. By the summer of 1992, thousands of people had been killed, historical cities such as Dubrovnik, Vukovar, Sarajevo had been destroyed and more than 2.5 million had become refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Response of the International Community

The European Community

For forty years, Yugoslavia played a significant role as a balance between the East and the West. Although it retained a communist system, Tito's break with Stalin in 1948

²⁴¹ Patrick Moore, "Breakthrough in Slovenian Crisis", *RFE/RL Daily Report*, no. 136, 19 July 1991.

²⁴² According to the 1991 census, Serbs made up about two percent of the Slovene population. See Raymond Tanter and John Psarouthakis, *Balancing in the Balkans* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp.172-173.

²⁴³ In 1991, Bosnia and Herzegovina's population was 43.7 percent Muslim, 31.3 percent Serb and 17.3 percent Croat. See Robert Anciaux, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Laboratory of the New International Order", in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.183.

²⁴⁴ Milan Andrejevich, "Hard Times Ahead for Croatia and Slovenia," *RFE/RL Report on Eastern Europe*, July 31, 1991.

had distanced Yugoslavia from Moscow's orbit. Yugoslav communism had preserved an independent character which was also reinforced by Tito's role in promoting the Non-Aligned Movement. However, with the end of the Cold War, the Soviet threat was removed in Europe, communist governments in Eastern and Central Europe had collapsed and Yugoslavia had lost its unique strategic position. Yugoslavia could not get much economic, military and political assistance from the West as it had enjoyed before. This change in Western attitude towards Yugoslavia was also expressed by Walter Zimmerman, the last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia:

As long as the Cold War continued, Yugoslavia was a protected and sometimes pampered child of American and Western diplomacy. Tito and his successors, after his death in 1980, grew accustomed to this special treatment.²⁴⁵

From the perspective of the United States, Yugoslavia's importance had diminished by 1989, but it remained still important to European interests. Conflict in Yugoslavia was a threat to economic and political stability of Europe. The breakup of the country could plunge the whole of southeastern Europe into a crisis by reopening a number of old territorial disputes centering on Kosovo and Macedonia and involving most of Yugoslavia's immediate neighbors, as well as Turkey.²⁴⁶ The escalation of conflict in Yugoslavia might cause an increase in refugees at a time when many of the European countries were suffering from economic recession and high levels of unemployment. There was also the economic aspect. Yugoslavia was the main trade route between Greece and the other parts of the EC. Moreover, proper solution of the Yugoslav conflict would demonstrate to the world that the EC was capable of conducting a

²⁴⁵ Warren Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Random House, 1996), p.7.

²⁴⁶ Christopher Cviic. "Who's to Blame for the War in Ex-Yugoslavia ?", *World Affairs*, (Fall 1993), p.5.

coherent foreign and security policy. Luxemburg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos had announced that:

This is the hour of Europe. If one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it is the Yugoslav problem. This is a European problem and it is not up to the Americans and not up to anybody else.²⁴⁷

At the beginning of the conflict, the EC favored the maintenance of the status quo in Yugoslavia. They supported the efforts of Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, who tried to bring down the hyperinflation and introduce free-market reforms in the country. The EC signed a five-year 807 million ECU loan agreement with the federal government on June 24, 1991.²⁴⁸ Prior to the summer of 1991, the EC had agreed that separatism could not solve the problem and Yugoslav state should continue its existence as an unified entity. French Prime Minister Edith Cresson even proclaimed that, “Yugoslavia cannot be part of Europe unless she remains united.”²⁴⁹

When the war spread to Croatia in July 1991, German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher invoked the CSCE crisis management, but it was unable to address the situation. The EC convened the Yugoslav Peace Conference at the Hague in September 1991 under the chairmanship of former UK Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington. Talks would be on the basis of three principles: no unilateral changes of borders, the protection of the rights of all minorities, and full respect for all legitimate interests and aspirations. Except for Serbia, all of the other five republics accepted the EC plan in principle.

²⁴⁷ Cited in C. J. Smith, “Conflict in the Balkans and the Possibility of a European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy”, *International Relations* 13, no.2 (1996), p.1.

²⁴⁸ Cviic, p.4.

²⁴⁹ Cited in Pia Christina Wood, “European Political Cooperation: Lessons from the Gulf War and Yugoslavia”, in *The State of the European Community: The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, Volume 2, (eds.) Alan W. Cafruny and Glenda G. Rosenthal (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p.233.

Milosevic's main objection was the proposed position of the Serb communities outside Serbia. While Serbs outside Serbia were classified as part of a nation in former Yugoslavia, now they would become national minorities. Serbia's position was that these minorities should be sovereign. The Serbs of Croatia also disapproved of the EC proposal. The Krajina leader, Milan Babic, declared: "What is contained in the offer is less than what we had before the arrival of democracy in Croatia."²⁵⁰ Serbia's rejection of the EC plan entailed the collapse of the Conference in November 1991.

Fundamental policy change in the EC regarding the Yugoslav crisis came from Germany. In July 1991, Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that:

We won our unity through the right to self-determination. If we Germans think everything else in Europe can stay just as it was, if we follow a status quo policy and do not recognize the right of self-determination in Slovenia and Croatia, then we have no moral or political credibility. We should start a movement in the EC to lead to such recognition.²⁵¹

After a few days, Foreign Minister Genscher, said "The Yugoslav federal army had gone mad and was running amok."²⁵² Germany formally proposed recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on July 4, 1991 at the European Community Council of Foreign Ministers meeting and was initially rejected by the Community. However, during July, Germany continued its efforts in the EC in order to persuade the member states for the recognition. Outside the EC it was only Austria who supported the German proposition.

²⁵⁰ *NIN*, 25 October 1991, cited in Zametica, p.62.

²⁵¹ *Guardian*, 2 July 1991, cited in Heinz-Jürgen Axt, "Did Genscher Disunite Yugoslavia? Myths and Facts About Foreign Policy of United Germany", in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.222.

²⁵² *The Times*, 4 July 1991, cited in Zametica, p.64.

Germany's push for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia was based on a number of motives. Germany and also Austria had strong historic, cultural and religious ties to these republics. Slovenia had fallen under German domination at the end of the eighth century and for many centuries had been subjected to a strong process of Germanization.²⁵³ The upper classes had used German as their language. The Slovenes had lived under the rule of the Hapsburg Empire until its breakup after World War I. German influence in the country had been decisive until the establishment of the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes in 1918. Croatia had become part of the Frankish Empire in the ninth century. In the nineteenth century it had passed to the rule of the Hapsburg Empire and German had become the official language. Germany had supported the Ante Pavelic's *Ustase* regime in Croatia between 1941-1945. Austria, Croatia and Slovenia were all Catholic countries. Germany, too, had a large Catholic population.

Domestic party politics also had some influence on the German policy. After Croatia and Slovenia proclaimed independence, all the major political parties in Germany, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), the Christian Socialist Union (CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Federal Democratic Party (FDP) adopted a policy that was supporting recognition and pressed the German government to act.²⁵⁴ Especially the CSU, which was a Bavarian party with a strong Catholic background and the ally of the ruling CDU of Helmut Kohl, exerted strong political pressure. The CSU

²⁵³ Stavrianos, p.231.

²⁵⁴ Alan Hanson, "Croatian Independence from Yugoslavia 1991-1992", in *War: Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict*, (eds.) Melanie C. Greenberg, John H. Barton and Margaret E. McGuinness (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), p.103.

representatives accused Kohl of “supporting the communists from Serbia” through the non-recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.²⁵⁵

Public opinion and the mass media put pressure on the government to recognize the independence of the secessionist republics. Many Germans took their holidays in Croatia and over 500,000 Croatian and Slovenian migrants were working as guest workers in Germany.²⁵⁶ Leading newspapers such as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* actively supported the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* regularly featured the writings of Johann Georg Reismüller. He said that:

Germany should be particularly sensitive to the fact that a nearby country (Serbia) is possessed with the same madness that the Nazis had, and is harassing weaker ones, Slovenia and Croatia.²⁵⁷

By the end of November, the shelling and siege of Dubrovnik and Vukovar, the occupation of almost a third of Croatia’s territory by Serb forces and the displacement of half a million Croats from their homes pushed German public opinion over the edge.²⁵⁸ The events in Yugoslavia also were attracting public attention in Austria mostly because of the Slovene minority in Klagenfurt and the Croats in Burgenland.

Another possible German motive was the re-emergence of the concept of *Mittleuropa*. This was mostly mentioned by Serbian authorities and continuously denied by the German government. According to this idea, Germany wanted to separate Croatia and Slovenia from the Yugoslav federation in order to gain a foothold on the Adriatic or

²⁵⁵ *Der Spiegel*, 5 July 1991, cited in Zametica, p.64.

²⁵⁶ Axt., p.227.

²⁵⁷ *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 February 1991, cited in Tanter and Psarouthakis, p.173.

²⁵⁸ Emel G. Osmançavuşoğlu, *The Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution and Britain’s Role in Shaping Western Policy 1991-1995* (Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 2000), p.54.

to guarantee access to its vacation land in Dalmatia.²⁵⁹ The disintegration of Yugoslavia would open the way for Germany's entry into southeastern Europe as a dominant force and protector of a bloc of states such as Austria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Slovenia.

According to the formal German view, Germany had insisted on the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia because it believed this was the strongest protection against Serb aggression. The recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC would stop the Yugoslav army from continuing with its destructive war operations in Croatia.

In early December, Tudjman visited Germany and met with Kohl and Genscher. On his way back, he told Croatian television that Germany "has no hesitation about its decision to recognize Croatian independence."²⁶⁰ Meanwhile the EC lifted economic sanctions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia.²⁶¹ After December 1991, Germany, which had also obtained the support of Italy, announced that it planned to recognize the independence of breakaway republics unilaterally. An Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting was convened on December 15-16 to settle the recognition issue. At that time, the EC was busy formulating the Maastricht Treaty, which would move the Community to an economic and political union. It would also set forth terms of a common foreign and defense policy among EC member states. So the EC foreign ministers were subdued to the German demand in order to preserve the Community's unity before the final signing of the treaty on February 6, 1992. A retired American diplomat described the meeting this way:

²⁵⁹ Thomas, p.3.

²⁶⁰ Cited in Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), p.198.

²⁶¹ *International Herald Tribune*, 3 December 1991, cited in Osmançavuşoğlu, p.55.

The vote in this gathering was eight to four against recognition, but the German Foreign Minister insisted that he would not leave the table until the EC foreign ministers would unanimously support him. It was 10 p.m. By 4 a.m., he had his way. Would it not have been wiser if the British and the French Foreign Ministers had declared that they would not leave the table until Germany and its three allies agreed with the majority not to accord recognition?²⁶²

At the end of the meeting, the EC decided to invite all Yugoslav republics that wanted to apply for recognition to submit their applications by 24 December. The EC established a five-member Arbitration Commission, under the chairmanship of the President of the French Constitutional Court, Robert Badinter.²⁶³ This Commission would decide whether the Yugoslav republics complied with the criteria that the EC required to grant recognition to independent states. The criteria included “ the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights, acceptance of existing boundaries and guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE.”²⁶⁴ The Commission was to report its findings on 15 January and the Council of Foreign Ministers would then act in light of the Commission’s suggestions.²⁶⁵

²⁶² See Walter R. Roberts, “The Tragedy in Yugoslavia Could Have Been Averted”, in *The South Slav Conflict: History, Religion, Nationalism and War*, (eds.) Raju G. C. Thomas and H. R. Friman (New York: Garland/Taylor and Francis, 1996), p.370.

²⁶³ The Arbitration Commission was supposed to be composed of European/Yugoslav personnel, but owing to lack of unanimity within the Yugoslav Federal Presidency regarding its two appointees, all five places on the Commission were filled by West European constitutional lawyers and jurists. See Eric Deamer, “The Recognition of Aspirant Statehood in the New Europe: The European Community’s Recognition of Croatia, 1990-92”, in *Ethnicity and Nationalism in East Central Europe and the Balkans*, (eds.) Thanasis D. Sfikas and Christopher Williams (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1999), p.354.

²⁶⁴ EC, “Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States”, *International Legal Materials* 31, (1992), p.1487.

²⁶⁵ Silber and Little, pp.198-201.

However, Germany could not wait until January 15, and the German government declared on December 19 that it would recognize Croatia and Slovenia. Recognition was executed on December 23, 1991. The Badinter Commission issued its opinion on January 11, 1992 and recommended that only Macedonia and Slovenia be recognized. Greece vetoed Macedonia's recognition by the EC on the grounds that the name of the country implied a territorial claim to its own northern province of the same name. Although Croatia fell short of the EC criteria, Germany prevailed. Genscher declared that the Commission did not legally have a binding effect for EC member states, because it was a device of arbitration not of international law.²⁶⁶ And on January 15, 1992 the EC recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia. The EC decided to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina from April 7 at the EC Foreign Ministers meeting that was held in Luxemburg on April 6, 1992.²⁶⁷

In the course of the Yugoslav conflict, the position of the two influential members of the EC, Britain and France, moved from the urge to hold Yugoslav together to adherence to German policy. France had historic ties with Serbia going back to World War I and during the summer and autumn of 1991 supported the Serbian side effectively. This also could be seen as an attempt to counter the intensive German backing of Croatia and Slovenia. However, with the spread of the crisis and the emergence of Belgrade's culpability in it, France shifted its position and no longer sustained support for a unified Yugoslavia.²⁶⁸ Britain, too, supported the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state and

²⁶⁶Hanson, p.104.

²⁶⁷ Johnston, Russell. 29 November 1993. *The Yugoslav Conflict-Chronology of Events from 30th May 1991-8th November 1993*. Available [online]: <
<http://www.cco.caltech.edu/~bosnia/doc/weudoc.html>> [25 February 2005].

²⁶⁸ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1997), pp.159-160.

vehemently opposed the recognition of secessionist republics. British Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd stated that:

Recognition will not stop the fighting. Nor will the West send troops to fight on Croatia's behalf. If we recognize the republics too soon, we risk detonating the fragile peace in Macedonia and Bosnia since they will come under great pressure to seek independence, too. Recognition of a series of small Balkan countries, without a framework allowing for protection of minorities, would not be a recipe for future stability.²⁶⁹

However, despite this opposition, Britain made a U-turn in its position and gave in to the German proposal. There were some allegations of a secret agreement between Britain and Germany. According to this view, Britain won the right to opt out of the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty on December 10, and in return accepted the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.²⁷⁰

As the tension in Yugoslavia was growing in September 1991, calls were made in Europe to deploy a West European Union (WEU) force to the country. France was the promoter of this idea and backed by Germany and Italy. Britain declined the plan on the grounds that intervention was not necessary. It argued that the conflicting parties should fight out their differences. Britain claimed that WEU intervention would require extensive manpower, was bound to lead to loss of life and would become open-ended and long lasting. At the meeting of the EC foreign ministers on September 19, Douglas Hurd finally rejected the plan.²⁷¹

The EC was unprepared for its role in Yugoslavia and was not able to cope with the crisis effectively. The EC presidency changed every six months and there was no

²⁶⁹ *The Times*, 3 December 1991, cited in Osmançavuşoğlu, p.55.

²⁷⁰ Jane M. O. Sharp, *Honest Broker or Perfidious Albion: British Policy in the Former Yugoslavia* (London, UK: Institute for Public Policy Research, 1997), p.13.

²⁷¹ *Daily Telegraph*, 20 September 1991, cited in Zametica, p.66.

permanent structure to deal with this kind of a conflict. The early recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the EC not only ended Yugoslavia as a federal state, but also helped to shift the fight from Croatia to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the recognition of the Croatian independence did not lead to any significant reduction or resolution of the conflict. In fact, it exacerbated the hostilities between the Croatian army and the Serbian irregulars and the JNA. Before the EC Summit of December 16, 1991, the UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar had written a letter to Genscher and warned the EC that “premature, selective, and discordant recognition of Slovenia and Croatia could intensify and widen the war.”²⁷² Furthermore, the Bosnian and Macedonian leaders opposed the recognition and wanted the European countries to withhold the recognition of the breakaway republics because they feared that such actions would provoke the Serbs and would lead to an escalation of aggression. However, the EC did not take these warnings seriously and did little or nothing to stop the inevitable war that would outbreak in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992.

The United States

The initial position of the United States regarding the Yugoslav conflict was to maintain the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. The United States Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Belgrade in June 1991 and met with the leaders of the republics. He said that:

The United States will not recognize any unilateral declarations of independence by Croatia and Slovenia. Change can take place only

²⁷² *UNDOC S/23280*, 11 December 1991, cited in Osmançavuşoğlu, p.56.

through dialogue among all parties and a final agreement. American policy supports a democratic, united Yugoslavia.²⁷³

By spring of 1992, after the EC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, American position began to change. The United States recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 6, 1992 along with that of Croatia and Slovenia. However, it seemed that the US chose a low profile in Yugoslavia during the Bush administration. Domestic politics had an effect on Bush's hands-off policy. The economy was fragile and he was carrying out a presidential campaign. Moreover, the US government was mostly interested in the impending disintegration of the Soviet Union at that time. So the United States perceived the Yugoslav crisis as a European problem that should be handled by Europe. European leaders were also against any US intervention. Jacques Delors, President of the EC declared that: "We do not interfere in American affairs; we hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours."²⁷⁴

After the November 1992 elections, Clinton became the new US president. Although he had criticized the Bush policy in Yugoslavia during the campaign, he too focused on the domestic situation and did not take any initiative. The American public was also strongly against the deployment of US military forces in Bosnia. The combination of events, growing Serbian aggression, the Krajina and Sarajevo attacks, attacks on safe havens, massacres in Srebrenica broke the reluctance of the US and it decided to take the lead in Bosnia. Clinton stated that, "if the United States does not act in situations like this, nothing will happen...A failure to do so would be to give up

²⁷³ *Borba*, 22-23 June 1991, cited in Cviic, p.4.

²⁷⁴ Bolton, John R. 1 January 2000. *European Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies*. Available [online]: <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.17123,filter.all/pub_detail.asp> [25 February 2005].

American leadership.”²⁷⁵ The apparent American willingness helped NATO take the military action necessary to bring the conflict to an end. NATO operation, Deliberate Force started on August 30, 1995 and lasted until September 14, 1995. NATO air forces launched attacks on Serbian targets. These air strikes were followed by a combined Bosnian-Croatian offensive against the Krajina Serbs and Bosniak and Croat forces took back large areas of Croatia previously captured by the Serbs.²⁷⁶ After these two events, the Belgrade government came to terms. The Dayton Peace Agreement was signed at Dayton, Ohio, on November 21, 1995 between the republics of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and this agreement put an end to the war.

Russia

When the Yugoslav crisis broke out in 1991, the Soviet Federation was also on the verge of disintegration. Moscow was preoccupied primarily with domestic issues. There had been considerable problems with the evolving independence movements in the Baltic Republics, Moldova and Ukraine, and Russia was trying to redefine its role in the world. Throughout the Yugoslav conflict, the political chaos and fragile economic situation in the country had overshadowed Russia’s policy on Yugoslavia.

Russia and Serbia had close ethnic, historic and religious ties. Russia also had concerns about the spreading American influence through NATO into southeastern Europe when NATO was intending to expand into east central Europe.²⁷⁷ Furthermore,

²⁷⁵ Elizabeth Drew, *On the Edge: The Clinton Presidency* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp.138-146.

²⁷⁶ Joyce P. Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), p.120.

²⁷⁷ *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p.66.

both of the countries were in similar positions. The Serbs and Russians constituted the largest single population group in the former federations and had a large diaspora in the newly independent countries.

In October 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev brought Milosevic and Tudjman for a meeting in Moscow and strove to mediate between them. The meeting resulted in a statement, but did not provide any progress towards the resolution of the conflict.²⁷⁸ From 1991 until 1994, Russia did not try to carve a distinct role in the Yugoslav problem and supported the Western approaches. Russia did not even object to the imposition of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in May 1992. However, this pro-Western attitude shaped by the policies of Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was sharply criticized. Yevgenii Ambartsumov, the chairman of the Parliamentary International Affairs Committee, declared that, “Moscow should pursue its own interests rather than allow its foreign policy to be dictated by American electoral politics.”²⁷⁹ Misha Glenny brought forth a different explanation to this passive Russian Balkan policy. According to him, Milosevic supported the failed Moscow coup attempt of 18-19 August 1991 and Boris Yeltsin never forgave this.²⁸⁰

Russian policy regarding the Yugoslavia began to change in 1994. Russia followed a more determined line and condemned the UN threat to launch air strikes to the Serbian targets in Sarajevo.²⁸¹ The shift in the policy was related mainly to the domestic

²⁷⁸ Gow, p.193.

²⁷⁹ Quoted in Gow, p.194.

²⁸⁰ See Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers, 1804-1999* (London: Viking Penguin, 1999), p.637.

²⁸¹ C. Cem Oğuz, “Rusya’nın Balkan Politikası ve Balkanlar’daki Gelişmelerin Rus Siyasetine Etkileri (1991-2000), in *Balkan Diplomasisi*, (eds.) Ömer E. Lütem and Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001), p.270.

political situation in the country. After the December 1993 elections, an anti-reformist majority that was composed of communists and nationalists elected in parliament and an assertive and more independent line was established in foreign policy.²⁸² Moreover, the disunity, indecision and incapability shown by the West during the Yugoslav crisis disappointed the liberal Atlanticists and they also believed that Russia had to alter its path.

The change in Moscow's policy was not a radical break. Russia voiced the Serbian demands more loudly, tried to block the imposition of harsher sanctions on Serbia and used more public policy in the Contact Group. However, Russia did not give a strong reaction when NATO confronted the Bosnian Serbs in 1995 and its position in the Balkans was remarkably restrained after the peace settlement at Dayton.

Turkish-Balkan Policy during the Yugoslav Crisis

The Early Phase (1991-1992)

When the Yugoslav crisis erupted in 1991, the situation in the Balkans was far from being Turkey's top priority issues. Ankara was preoccupied with the possible disintegration of the Soviet Union and the mounting conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, within its own borders Turkey was fighting against the separatist PKK guerilla forces. At the initial stage, Turkey supported the position of Europe and United States and defended the continuation and territorial integrity of the Yugoslav federation. Ankara even criticized Germany's decision to recognize the independence of

²⁸² Renee de Nevers, *Russia's Strategic Renovation: Russian Security Strategies and Foreign Policy in the Post-Imperial Era*, (London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994), p.38.

Croatia and Slovenia on the grounds that such a move would only hasten Yugoslavia's disintegration and increase internal strife.

Turkey's relations with Yugoslavia had been friendly in the earlier years. Yugoslavia had treated its small Turkish minority benignly and it was one of the few countries in the world that had condemned Bulgaria for carrying out a harsh assimilation policy against its large Turkish minority in the 1980s. Furthermore, Turkish trade with Western Europe was run mainly by highways and railways that passed through Yugoslavia. Moreover, an instability in Yugoslavia might have spillover effects in the whole Balkan region and could bring a flood of Albanian and Bosnian refugees to Turkey.²⁸³

When the war began in June 1991, Turkey declared that what was happening in Yugoslavia was an effort towards the preservation of the federal structure of the state and that the JNA was the legal force that was trying to hold the country together which otherwise was disintegrating.²⁸⁴ When the war spread to Croatia and mass destruction was taking place in Knin and Vukovar, the Turkish press concluded that "although there were high casualties and a large amount of destruction in Croatia, the Serbs were, after all, taking their revenge upon the Croats, who had butchered the Serbian population during the Second World War in collaboration with the Axis forces."²⁸⁵ There was also news about Turkish workers who were coming to Turkey for the summer vacation, but

²⁸³ Şaban Çalıř, "Turkey's Balkan Policy in the Early 1990s", *Turkish Studies* 2, no.1 (Spring 2001), p.137.

²⁸⁴ *Newspot*, 11 July 1991.

²⁸⁵ Hasan Ünal, "Bosnia II: A Turkish Critique", *The World Today* 51, no.7 (July 1995), p.128.

were held up at the Yugoslavia-Austria border because of the war and Turkish truck drivers who had been killed during the fighting in Yugoslavia.²⁸⁶

Some Turkish politicians also saw the actions of the Serbs as an attempt to defend the rights of their country. For example, Ali Dinçer, a member of the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP), called the Serbs the bravest and most dynamic people of Yugoslavia and claimed they greatly resembled the Turks.²⁸⁷ Vehbi Dinçerler, a member of the Motherland Party (MP) declared that Turkey should take sides with the Serbs, because “they were abandoned by the West due to their sect and Ottoman past.”²⁸⁸

During this period, Turkey was seen as an important player by the various parties of Yugoslavia. Top officials from some of the constituent republics travelled to Turkey in order to lobby their own interests. Yugoslavia’s İstanbul ambassador, Lazar Jarkovic, stated that, “if Yugoslavia disintegrates, it will affect the whole world and Turkey will not be out of this.”²⁸⁹ The President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Aliya Izzetbegovic and the President of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, visited Turkey in July 1991 and sought to obtain the support of Turkish authorities. Izzetbegovic declared that, “if Bosnia is divided then there will be a civil war in Yugoslavia and this will jeopardize the peace in Europe. The peace in Europe is tied to the peace in Bosnia.”²⁹⁰ In return, Turkish Foreign Minister Safa Giray paid an official visit to Yugoslavia on 29-30 August 1991 and met with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Luncan. He also visited Bosnia and Herzegovina and

²⁸⁶ See *Ayın Tarihi*, 28 June 1991 and 2 July 1991.

²⁸⁷ TBMM, *Tutanak Dergisi* (Ankara: TBMM Matbaası, 1991), pp.618-619.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.577.

²⁸⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1991.

²⁹⁰ *Ayın Tarihi*, 16 July 1991.

Macedonia. When he returned to Turkey, Giray said that: “The Yugoslavian republics should resolve their problems without resorting to force.”²⁹¹

Macedonia declared its independence on September 17, 1991 and the parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared the republic’s sovereignty on October 15, 1991.²⁹² These developments increased the pressure on the Turkish government. Macedonian Foreign Minister Denko Malevski travelled to Turkey on October 7 and asserted that the two countries held identical stands on how to deal with the crisis in Yugoslavia.²⁹³ Vice Premier of Bosnia and Herzegovina Muhammed Cengic visited Turkey on November 14 and discussed the possibility of oil and humanitarian deliveries from Turkey. The Bosnian government also asked that Turkey defend its case within NATO.²⁹⁴

After the general elections of October 20, the True Path Party (TPP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) formed a coalition government and the new Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, expressed Turkey’s concern about the Yugoslav conflict in his first international press conference:

We follow the internal developments in Yugoslavia with great concern. It is our desire to see that a solution be found to the conflict among the Yugoslav republics, preventing the use of force, and meeting the expectations of all sides. Bearing this in mind, Turkey will pursue its contacts and efforts to create an atmosphere of dialogue within the framework of principles outlined by the CSCE process.²⁹⁵

²⁹¹ Cited in İsmail Soysal, “Günümüzde Balkanlar ve Türkiye’nin Tutumu”, in *Balkanlar* (Istanbul: Eren, 1993), p.226.

²⁹² The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared itself independent on March 3, 1992.

²⁹³ *BBC/SWB/EE*, 18 October 1991.

²⁹⁴ See *BBC/SWB/EE*, 18 November 1991 and 20 November 1991.

²⁹⁵ “Turkey and the New World Order”, Press Conference by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 11 December 1991), p.12., cited in Şule Kut, “Turkish Diplomatic Initiatives for Bosnia-Herzegovina”, in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.297.

However, Turkey started to change its policy in January 1992 and began to consider recognizing the independence of the secessionist Yugoslav republics. This view was consolidated after the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia by the EC on January 15, 1992. Turkey understood that the Yugoslav federation was on the eve of dismantlement and that the Turkish government could not stay indifferent to the growing Serbian aggression against the Muslims.

Bosnian Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic visited Ankara on January 2, 1992 and asked Turkey to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.²⁹⁶ These developments alarmed the Belgrade authorities. The President of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and Serbian Foreign Minister Jovanic visited Ankara on January 22, 1992. Milosevic met with the President Turgut Özal, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Hikmet Çetin. Milosevic stated that since the beginning of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Turkey and Yugoslavia had enjoyed perfect relations and Turkey had followed a responsible policy by eschewing support of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.²⁹⁷

Meanwhile Macedonian Foreign Minister Malevski expressed that Turkey's recognition of Macedonia as an independent state would bring stability to the region.²⁹⁸ Macedonian President, Kiro Gligorov, also made a statement in Washington and declared that the Macedonian peoples were bound to Turkey with ties of great friendship and that

²⁹⁶ *BBC/SWB/EE*, 3 January 1992.

²⁹⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, 23 January 1992.

²⁹⁸ *Milliyet*, 25 January 1992.

he believed that Turkey would recognize the independence of the Macedonian state within a few days.²⁹⁹

Turkey decided to recognize the independence of all four of the republics of Yugoslavia (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia) on February 6, 1992.³⁰⁰ With this decision, Turkey became the second country, after Bulgaria, to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.

Escalation of the War in Bosnia (1992-1995)

Turkish Diplomatic Efforts towards the Solution of the Problem

The Bosnian Serbs, who had set up autonomous regions in October 1991 and formed a separate and unconstitutional parliament in January 1992, declared the Bosnian Serb Republic on March 27, 1992.³⁰¹ This dramatically increased the tension in the country and fighting between the Muslims and Serb militias broke out in April 1992. There were serious clashes along the Neretva River and in the towns of Bosanski Brod and Kupres between Serbian irregulars backed by the JNA and Muslims and Croats. On April 6, 1992, when the EC decided to recognize the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serbs bombarded Sarajevo, opened a military front in the eastern part of the republic and started to push westward. Within five weeks the Serbian militia forces controlled more than sixty percent of Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁰²

After the spread of the war to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey dropped its passive wait and see approach and followed an active and assertive policy. Turkey

²⁹⁹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 30 January 1992.

³⁰⁰ Statement by Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Office: Ankara, 3 April 1993., cited in Kut, 297.

³⁰¹ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.232.

³⁰² *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 15 May 1992, cited in Ramet, p.207.

stressed the need to sustain the independence and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state and advocated multilateral intervention in various forums such as the CSCE, NATO, the OIC, and the UN in order to put pressure on Serbia to stop the war.

On May 5, 1992, Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin sent a letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council and demanded that the UN take the necessary measures for the protection of the independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After he took over the chairmanship of the Council of Europe on May 7, Çetin in his first speech again emphasized the importance of the preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign state.³⁰³ Turkey welcomed the imposition of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro on May 30 with the Resolution 757 of the United Nations Security Council but also made it explicit that as the embargo came too late, it would not produce the desired effect. In line with the resolution, Turkey recalled its Ambassador Berhan Ekinci from Belgrade on May 31, 1992.³⁰⁴

Turkish representatives carried out intensive diplomacy for Bosnia at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and as a result of this successful diplomacy Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted to membership in May 1992. Although CSCE failed to solve the conflict, it was the first international organization that proposed the use of military force to stop the war. On June 10, 1992, the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) of the CSCE called on the UN to consider military intervention in order to stop the bloodshed in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁰⁵

³⁰³ *Ayın Tarihi*, 7 January 1992.

³⁰⁴ *Newspot*, 31 May 1992.

³⁰⁵ See Kut, pp.301-302.

Turkey also applied to the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) for the Bosnian cause. On May 14, 1992, with the initiative of the Permanent Representative of Turkey at the UN, the permanent representatives of the OIC member states brought the Bosnian issue to the Security Council. Later in June, they formed a contact-group headed by Ambassador Akşin of Turkey with the aim of acting as a pressure group at the UN.³⁰⁶ Turkey also convened the extraordinary meeting of OIC foreign ministers in Istanbul on June 17-18, 1992.³⁰⁷ The final communique that was accepted at the end of the meeting demanded the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia and the disbanding of Serbian irregular forces, no recognition of the new Yugoslavia until UN resolutions had been implemented and coordinated military intervention under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter if the existing sanctions proved to be ineffective.³⁰⁸ July 17 was declared the “Day of Solidarity with the People of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and a fund was established for Bosnia.

At the Helsinki Summit of the CSCE in July 1992, the Turkish delegation, headed by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, formed a pressure group including Azerbaijan and the Central Asian Turkish republics to mobilize support for the Bosnian government.³⁰⁹ At the meeting, Demirel met with US President Bush and argued that a Kuwait-like military intervention was needed in Bosnia. He also expressed that Turkey would contribute to any international peace keeping force. After the meeting, Turkey provided a

³⁰⁶ Ibid., p.300.

³⁰⁷ Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin was also the term president of the OIC at that time.

³⁰⁸ “Final Communique of the Fifth Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers”, Istanbul, 18 June 1992, See Kut, p.302.

³⁰⁹ *Hürriyet*, 10 July 1992, cited in Kemal Kirişçi, “New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior”, in *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, (eds.) Çiğdem Balım, Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, Cevat Karataş, Gareth Winrow and Feroz Yasamee (Leiden: Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1995), p.8.

warship to NATO's fleet in the Adriatic the task of which was to enforce the naval embargo on Yugoslavia.³¹⁰

Turkey's major diplomatic initiative regarding the Bosnian issue came in August 1992. Turkey submitted the "Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina" on August 7, to the UN Security Council. According to the Action Plan: The assaults against the people of Bosnia should be considered as crimes against humanity and those responsible should be brought to justice, Serbian prison and concentration camps should be handed over to the Red Cross, the Belgrade government should stop supporting the Bosnian Serbs, and UN forces should take control of the region. If these measures did not succeed in three weeks, then air raids under UN command should be started to immobilize Serbian militia positions surrounding Muslim-populated so-called safe havens.³¹¹

Contrary to most of the Western countries, Turkey did not see the Bosnian conflict as a civil war or a humanitarian crisis. Bosnia-Herzegovina, an independent and sovereign country which was a member of the UN was about to fall because of a neighbouring country, Serbia that was trying to impose its will. For this reason, the main aim of the Action Plan was to deter Serbian aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the Turkish authorities, if preventive measures were not taken against the Bosnian Serbs, who were backed up by the Yugoslav Federal Army, then they would never agree to any negotiation. Hikmet Çetin circulated the Action Plan at the London Conference, which was held on August, 26-27, 1992, and asked for a solution that protected the independence and territorial integrity of the Bosnian state. Furthermore, he also demanded that the UN take military intervention into consideration. He stated that:

³¹⁰ *Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1992.

³¹¹ *Hürriyet* 8 August 1992, cited in Çalış, p.139.

We will work for a solution that preserves and respects the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the other republics. We will under no circumstances recognize territorial gains obtained by the use of force, or any changes in borders except through peaceful negotiations.

... Serbian aggression, sustained by Belgrade and carried out by Serbian proxies in Bosnia must be halted. The guns must be silenced and removed. In attaining these objectives, we will not rule out the use of force, whether against Serbian elements in Bosnia and elsewhere or against Serbia itself.³¹²

At the London Conference it was decided that the conflict should be solved by diplomatic means. The Conference called for the restoration of territory taken by force and the condemnation of Serb aggression. Sanctions against Belgrade were strengthened and monitors along Serbia's international frontiers were stationed. In addition, it was decided that apart from the UN, no political authority had a right to intervene militarily in the conflict area.³¹³ This decision closed all gates to the Bosnian Muslims who were hoping for military support from the outside. Another disappointment on the Muslim side was the acceptance of Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, as a separate party to the Conference. Although the Bosnian Serbian Republic was not recognized legally, it was not neglected completely. This was a victory for the Serbian side, because any decision on Bosnia and Herzegovina could be now taken only after Karadzic's

³¹² "The Address of Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin at the London Conference, 26 August 1992", in *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 6, no.29 (Autumn 1992), pp.79-80.

³¹³ Mustafa Türkeş, "Bosna Hersek Problemi: 26-28 Ağustos 1992 Londra Konferansı ve Siyasi Sonuçları", Prof. Dr. Abdurrahman Çaycı'ya Armağan (Ankara: Hacettepe Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1995), p.477., cited in Ali Askeroğlu, "The Bosnia-Herzegovina Question in the Turkish Foreign Policy: 1992-1995. Has It Been Successful ?", *Journal of Qafqaz University* 2, no.2 (1999), p.104.

approval.³¹⁴ The London Conference ended without any positive development for the settlement of the conflict.

David Owen, former British Foreign Secretary, and Cyrus Vance, former US Secretary of State, presented the Vance-Owen Plan at a meeting in Geneva on October 28, 1992. The Plan called for the division of Bosnia into ten ethnically based provinces and a special status for Sarajevo. Turkey opposed the Vance-Owen Plan on the grounds that it rewarded the acquisition of territory by force, and created ethnically cleansed areas

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Another Turkish diplomatic initiative came in November 1992. Turkey convened a Balkan Conference in Istanbul on November 25, 1992. The neighbouring countries of former Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, Italy and all the Balkan states except Greece and Serbia and Montenegro attended the meeting. In the joint declaration of the Conference, the participants called for the UN to deploy peacekeeping forces in Kosovo, Macedonia, Sancak and Vojvodina to prevent the spread of ethnic clashes, proposed the establishment of safe havens in Bosnia, and urged the international community to recognize Macedonia.³¹⁶

In December 1992, Turkey intensified its efforts in the UN for the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia. Bosnian Muslims had been deprived of the right of self-defence while Bosnian Serbs had the JNA's heavy weaponry and supplies. According to Turkey, the international community, which was turning a blind eye to the ethnic cleansing, daily

³¹⁴ Askeroğlu, p.105.

³¹⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 6 November 1992.

³¹⁶ "Joint Declaration of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Balkan and Regional Countries", Istanbul, 25 November 1992, cited in Kut, p.307.

massacres and violations of human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should at least give its permission to the legitimate self-defence of the Bosnians and lift the arms embargo.³¹⁷

On December 18, 1992, the UN accepted the joint proposal submitted by Turkey and Bosnia. The General Assembly would ask the Security Council to decide for military intervention in case the Serbian attacks did not stop by January 15 and lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina.³¹⁸ But the General Assembly did not have any binding force and effective sanctioning power and some of the permanent members of the Security Council, such as Britain, France and Russia, were against the lifting of the arms embargo so, despite intense diplomacy, Turkey was unable to realize its goal.

On January 10, 1993, Bosnian Deputy Premier Hakija Turajlic was killed by Serbian militias on his way back to city escorted by United Nations Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) after a meeting with Turkish Minister of State Orhan Kilercioğlu. This incident increased the Turkish frustration with the UN and raised serious doubts about the capability and effectiveness of the UNPROFOR to meet the challenges in Bosnia. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin stated that, “the UN is not even able to protect the road from the airport to the city.”³¹⁹

Between February 15-22, 1992, Turkish President Turgut Özal undertook a Balkan tour and visited Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia and Macedonia. Özal conveyed Turkish views on the Bosnian problem and underlined the significance of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially with his meeting with Croatian officials.

³¹⁷ See “Address of the Turkish Deputy Permanent Representative in the UN Ambassador Tahsin Burcuoğlu to the UN Human Rights Commission, New York, 3 December 1992”, in *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 6, no.29 (Autumn 1992), pp.93-96.

³¹⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 20 December 1992.

³¹⁹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 10 January 1993.

On March 31, 1993, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 816 which allowed the member countries to implement a no-fly zone by force.³²⁰ Turkey contributed to the NATO operation by sending eighteen Turkish F-16s to Italy.³²¹ In an April 1993 meeting, the OIC adopted a resolution that demanded the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina. At a subsequent OIC meeting, which was held in Islamabad in July 1993, the OIC members proposed to send troops to defend the safe havens around a number of Bosnian Muslim cities which had been declared by the UN in April-May 1993.³²²

The January 1993 Vance-Owen Plan and the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan of June 1993 were criticized equally by Turkey on the grounds that they both rewarded the aggressor by accepting the territory captured by force and negated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

By the end of 1993, it was clearly understood that the UN would not lift the arms embargo in favor of the Bosnian Muslims or intervene actively in the crisis. So Turkey changed its position and started to focus on the reforging of the Croat-Muslim alliance against the Serbs in Bosnia. Ankara drew attention to the futility of the Croat-Muslim fighting and pointed out that it served only to the advantage of the Serbs, who wanted to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina and realize their Greater Serbia ideal.

In the meantime, Turkey-Croatia relations, which had suffered when the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina were fighting against the Bosnian Muslims, began to improve.

³²⁰ *Milliyet*, 2 April 1993.

³²¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 18 April 1993.

³²² See "Speech by Turkish Permanent Representative at the UN, Ambassador İnal Batu at a meeting of the OIC member countries arranged in New York on July 22, 1993 to discuss Bosnia and Herzegovina", in *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 7, no.32 (Summer 1993), pp.127-128.

President of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman visited Turkey on 30 April and 1 May 1993. During the visit, an agreement on diplomatic and political cooperation between the two foreign ministries was signed and a loan of \$100 million was given as a credit by Turkish Eximbank to the Croatian Zagrebacka Bank.³²³

Turkey emerged as an important mediator between the Croats and Muslims in Bosnia and tried to carry out a compromise between the two parties. Political consultations between Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Turkey took place on a tripartite basis. The first tripartite meeting was convened in Zagreb on September 24, 1993 at the invitation of the Bosnian and Croatian governments.³²⁴ Another tripartite summit took place in Sarajevo on November 12, 1993 and included Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hikmet Çetin, Croatian Prime Minister Mate Granic and the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Slajdzic.³²⁵

The Washington Agreement that was signed in March 1994 ended the conflict between the Croats and the Bosnian government. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin was also invited to Washington to witness the signing of the accord because of Turkey's contribution to the peace process.³²⁶ The end of the conflict between the Croats and Bosnian Muslims opened the way to further improvement in bilateral relations between Croatia and Turkey. An Air Transport Agreement between Turkey and Croatia was signed on January 13, 1994. Croatia Airlines flights between Zagreb and Istanbul started on April 17, 1994. Finally, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in Zagreb on July 17, 1994 between Demirel and Tudjman, covering all aspects and areas of

³²³ *Ayın Tarihi*, 30 April 1993.

³²⁴ Turkish Daily News, 27 September 1993.

³²⁵ *Ayın Tarihi*, 12 November 1993.

³²⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, 17 March 1994.

cooperation. The Croatian and Turkish private and public sectors were encouraged to promote trade and pay visits to each other and participate in trade fairs.³²⁷

In March 1994, the UN Secretary-General agreed that the Turkish detachment as a part of UNPROFOR would be accepted.³²⁸ When the UN set up a protection force for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey wanted to be one of the participants, but was rejected on the grounds that it had strong cultural, historical and religious ties with the region. In February 1994, Russia who had traditionally close relations with Serbia, was allowed to send troops to Bosnia. Turkey appraised this decision as the double standard of the Security Council. The Bosnian Muslim leaders supported the Turkish argument. The UN Ambassador of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Muhammed Sacirbey had stated that:

Butros Gali, who sent Russian troops to Bosnia, continually turns down the deployment of Turkish troops. We want partial Muslim contingents instead of Serbian sympathizer Russian soldiers.³²⁹

Turkey sent 1,457 troops to Bosnia between 18-27 June, 1994 and they were stationed in Zenica and Kakanj areas, with the task of monitoring the ceasefire between the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.³³⁰ After the signing of the Dayton agreement in 1995, Turkey continued to support Bosnia and tried to strengthen the Bosniak-Croat alliance. According to Turkey the Bosniak-Croat cooperation was the only viable means of preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, Turkey actively participated to the US initiated “train and equip” program for the Bosnian

³²⁷ See Yüksel Söylemez, “An Overview of Turkish-Croatian Relations”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 3, (1996/1997), pp.105-106.

³²⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, 22 March 1994.

³²⁹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 25 May 1993.

³³⁰ Söylemez, p.111.

Federation army. The United States provided about \$100 million in equipment and Turkey trained 150-200 Bosnian officers.³³¹

Evaluation of the Turkish Foreign Policy in the Bosnian Conflict

The Turkish diplomatic initiatives carried out during the Bosnian crisis were in line with the new Turkish foreign policy principles adopted after the end of the Cold War. Turkey refrained from a direct unilateral approach and tried to mobilize the international community in support of the multilateral actions that were compatible with its objectives.

Turkey followed similar policies during the Bosnian and Armenian-Azerbaijan conflicts. Turkey waited until the dissolution of the Soviet and Yugoslav federations were ineluctable and then adhered to a new principle of collective recognition. Turkey recognized the independence of all Yugoslav republics which declared independence at the same time on February 6, 1992 and all former Soviet republics except Azerbaijan were recognized on December 19, 1991.³³²

When full-scale fighting began in February 1992 between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey tried to maintain its impartiality although there were calls for military intervention in support of the Azeris, whom most of the Turks regard as brothers. Prime Minister Demirel stressed that Turkey would not realize unilateral use of force. He stated that, "Turkey will not act alone militarily, foreign policy decisions cannot go along with street level excitement."³³³ A similar statement was made by the Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin regarding the Bosnian crisis: "Even if

³³¹ *Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1996.

³³² Turkey recognized Azerbaijan as an independent state on November 9, 1991

³³³ *Ayın Tarihi*, 24 August 1993.

hundreds of Bosniaks come to Turkey as refugees, we will not take any unilateral action.”³³⁴

Turkey provided active diplomatic support for the Azerbaijani and Bosnian governments and underlined the importance of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Armenia and Serbia were both perceived by Ankara as states which were trying to realize their expansionist designs by the use of military force. The Turkish government focused on the activation of the CSCE and the UN in respect of each crisis. Turkish Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin stated at the UN General Assembly:

The sinister success of Serbian expansionism in Bosnia has emboldened aggressors elsewhere. A tragedy of similar proportions transpires in the Caucasus. The Armenians have occupied a fifth of Azerbaijani territory. Peace and stability in a sensitive region neighbouring Turkey has been seriously undermined. Security Council resolutions 822 and 853, calling for the immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal of the occupying forces, are being ignored.

It should be borne in mind that short-term military opportunism is not compatible with long-term interests. Moreover, it is fraught with unpredictable dangers. Neither in the Balkans or the Caucasus, nor anywhere else for that matter, will Turkey ever accept the acquisition of territory by force.³³⁵

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was of much greater importance to Turkey than that of Bosnia and Herzegovina because of the proximity of the conflict to Turkey and the importance of Azerbaijan as a Turkic ally.³³⁶ However, there was also the possibility

³³⁴ *Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1992.

³³⁵ “Statement by Hikmet Çetin at the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 30 September 1993”, in *Turkish Review Quarterly Digest* 7, no.33 (Autumn 1993), p.81.

³³⁶ Philip Robins, *Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2003), p.353.

that the situation in Bosnia had set as a precedent for the Armenians, who were using military means to succeed in their expansionist plans. So when the war in Bosnia escalated and news of atrocities and ethnic cleansing against Bosnian Muslims reached Turkey, Ankara felt the need to formulate a more active and assertive policy.

During the Yugoslav conflict, the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy was to maintain security and stability in the region. The possibility of the spread of the strife to Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia and Sandzak alarmed the Turkish authorities because there were sizeable Turkish communities living in Bulgaria, Kosovo, Greece and Macedonia. Anxieties regarding the Yugoslav issue were voiced by many top Turkish officials at various times. Chief of General Staff, Doğan Güreş stated that, “if the necessary precautions are not taken in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the conflict could spread to Kosovo and Macedonia and a new Balkan war could break out.”³³⁷ President Turgut Özal also said that, “if the war in Bosnia cannot be stopped, it can spill over into a whole region and affect also Turkey.”³³⁸

There were also millions of people of Bosnian origin living in Turkey.³³⁹ Most of them had migrated to Turkey in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, after the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although most of them were Turkicised and fully integrated into Turkish society, they were sensitive to the developments in the region and put pressure on the governments to take a more resolute stand. One of the organizations of the Balkan immigrants, the Rumelian Turks Association, met with

³³⁷ *Ayın Tarihi*, 21 November 1992.

³³⁸ *Ayın Tarihi*, 28 January 1993.

³³⁹ Figures are not clear. They vary from 2 million to 4 million.

Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin and Vice Prime Minister, Erdal İnönü and demanded the government to take stronger measures to support the Bosnian Muslims.³⁴⁰

Humanitarian aid campaigns and the acceptance of refugees were other policies of solidarity toward the Bosnian Muslims. When the American operation of dropping humanitarian aid by air started in March 1992, Turkey contributed to this operation by providing nine tons of materials, including food and medicine. By March 1993, Turkey had disbursed \$23 million worth of aid in Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁴¹ Bosnian Muslim refugees began to arrive in Turkey in April 1992. Some of them stayed with their relatives and some of them took shelter in refugee camps. The refugee camps were opened in Ankara, İstanbul, İzmit, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ. By March 1993, the estimated number of Bosnian refugees had reached 20,000.³⁴² The Turkish authorities made it possible for Bosnian Muslims to use Turkish hospitals. In August 1993, a 75-bed hospital was opened in Istanbul to treat wounded Bosnians. Furthermore, the Turkish government allowed Bosnian children to continue their educations in Turkish schools in November 1992, and in January 1994, an “extraterritorial” school was opened at the Kırklareli refugee camp to provide education to nearly 400 Bosnian children in their own language.³⁴³

There was also the economic aspect. The transit routes in Yugoslavia which provided the contact with Western Europe and Turkey were blocked because of the war. This interrupted the largest portion of the foreign trade which was carried out with

³⁴⁰ *Turkish Daily News*, 27 April 1992.

³⁴¹ *BBC/SWB/ME*, 29 March 1993, cited in Robins, p.363.

³⁴² *BBC/SWB/ME*, 29 March 1993, cited in Robins, p.363.

³⁴³ Kemal Kirişçi, “Post Second World War Immigration From Balkan Countries to Turkey”, *New Perspectives on Turkey* 7, (Spring 1995), pp.71-72.

Western Europe by trucks via highways.³⁴⁴ Alternative routes were available through Italy and Romania, but the costs of transportation increased.

Another reason for the active Turkish policy was the lack of a firm Western response in Bosnia. This increased the doubts about the double standard of the West. Muslim Iraq had been crushed forcefully, but Christian Serbia was carrying on its policies without facing any real obstacle. Most of the Turks were convinced that the Europeans regarded the Bosnian Muslims as expendable, simply because they were Muslims.³⁴⁵ This view was also accepted by some pro-Western figures such as Mehmet Ali Birand. He said that:

“The events in Bosnia and Herzegovina show that the West does not want a Muslim country in Europe. Their non-intervention shows this. They are letting the Serbs do their dirty work.”³⁴⁶

Major diplomatic initiatives in the Yugoslav crisis were taken during the administration of the TPP-SDPP coalition government under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel. There was a deep division between the government and the presidency regarding the Bosnian conflict. While President Turgut Özal supported a hawkish line and declared Turkey’s intentions to intervene in the conflict by military means and to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia unilaterally, the coalition government followed a cautious policy and made it clear that Turkey would not act alone and would comply with the decisions of the UN. Özal’s visit to Balkan countries in February 1992 and his participation at a Bosnian

³⁴⁴ Yaşar Selami Eralp, *The Yugoslav Imbroglia and Turkish Policy in the Balkans in Early 1990s* (Master’s Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 1994), p.120.

³⁴⁵ Kenneth Mackenzie, “Turkey’s Circumspect Activism”, *The World Today* 49, no.2 (February 1993), p.26.

³⁴⁶ *Tageszeitung*, 11 August 1992, cited in J. F. Brown, “Turkey Back to the Balkans”, in *Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China*, (eds.) Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p.153.

rally held in Taksim Square in İstanbul on February 1993 was criticized by the government. Vice Prime Minister Erdal İnönü said that, “foreign policy should not be used as a means of achieving domestic political ends.”³⁴⁷

However, Turkey’s inability to move the international community into firm action in Bosnia raised the intensity of domestic criticisms directed at the government’s foreign policy. The first political actions in the opposition began with the leader of the Democratic Leftist Party (DLP), Bülent Ecevit. He emphasized the importance of the Balkans in Turkish foreign policy and urged the government to develop its relations with the newly established independent states, especially with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.³⁴⁸ The leader of the Motherland Party (MP), Mesut Yılmaz accused the government of being passive and incapable in the conflict and defended taking more active initiatives in the Yugoslav crisis.³⁴⁹ The leader of the Welfare Party (WP), Necmettin Erbakan, advocated the use of Turkish troops in the Bosnian conflict. Erbakan claimed that his party could form a deployment force of ten thousand troops to be sent to Bosnia.³⁵⁰ However these arguments proved to be pointless. In December 1992, the Turkish military submitted a report to Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stated that unilateral military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina was impossible on the grounds that Turkish aircraft could only remain over the territory of Bosnia for about five minutes because of no refueling capability.³⁵¹

³⁴⁷ *Milliyet*, 17 February 1993.

³⁴⁸ Bora, p.225.

³⁴⁹ See *Ayın Tarihi*, 10 May 1992 and 27 July 1992.

³⁵⁰ *Turkish Daily News*, 18 February 1993.

³⁵¹ *Ayın Tarihi*, 12 December 1992.

Turkish public opinion did not pay much attention to the Yugoslav crisis in the beginning. However, when the conflict spilled over to Bosnia, and Serbian forces began to attack Muslim communities, the situation changed. Furthermore, associations such as the Solidarity Group of Bosnia, Sanjak and Kosovo informed the Turkish public opinion about the course of the Bosnian conflict.

The activities of the media also should be mentioned. Most of the prominent figures of the Turkish media called for a more energetic and assertive foreign policy in the Balkans albeit they approached the Bosnian crisis from different perspectives. Islamist-conservative and nationalist-conservative circles appraised the Bosnian conflict as a new crusade against the Muslim world and warned the government that if preventive measures were not taken immediately the developments in the region could pose a direct threat against the security of Turkey. Ahmet Kabaklı, an influential figure of the nationalist-conservative intelligentsia wrote: "If we cannot stop the Serbs in Bosnia, we cannot stop the crusades in Edirne."³⁵² Fehmi Kuru from the Islamist-conservative group said that:

Either Turkey will firmly establish her position in the Balkans, or the accounts that were not settled concerning the Eastern Question will become a current issue and the Turks will be forced to migrate first into Anatolia and then towards Central Asia.³⁵³

The Westernist-liberal intelligentsia saw the Bosnian crisis as a chance for Turkey to become a major power. According to this perspective, the Balkans stood as an area of influence that Turkey could not afford to ignore. The crisis in Bosnia was perceived as a

³⁵² *Türkiye*, 14 July 1992, cited in Tanıl Bora, "Turkish National Identity, Turkish Nationalism and the Balkan Problem", in *Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order*, (eds.) Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemal Saybaşılı (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1995), p.118.

³⁵³ *Zaman*, 18 December 1991, cited in Bora, p.118.

testing ground upon which Turkey would develop its ability to carry out its new mission.

Cengiz Çandar, a popular pro-Western journalist stated that:

The Balkans once again make Turkey into a European and world power. Just like the Ottomans started becoming a world power by expanding into the Rumelia... Therefore, Turkey has to become a Balkan power in the course of her journey into the 21st century. This is necessary for her to enlarge, not her territories, but influence, and to take her part in political alliances that may affect the world's destiny... Since we have started to talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia, we have stepped into the world scene...³⁵⁴

Greece and Serbia objected to growing Turkish involvement in the region and claimed that there existed an Islamic arc in the Balkans stretching from western Bosnia through Sanjak, northeast Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, northern Greece and southern Bulgaria to Turkey in Europe and Cyprus. Turkey was accused by these two countries of positioning itself as the protector of the Muslims in the peninsula and trying to revive the Ottoman Empire. Bosnian Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic claimed that Turkey was trying to establish a state that had borders stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Wall of China and was exploiting the Bosnian problem as a springboard for this policy.³⁵⁵ Serbian Foreign Minister Jovanovi declared that Turkey had stirred up religious sentiment among the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and accelerated their indoctrination.³⁵⁶

Many Greek intellectuals and politicians were also talking of neo-Ottomanism and a renewed Turkish role in the Balkans. For example, Greek Foreign Minister Antonis

³⁵⁴ *Sabah*, 14 February 1993, cited in Bora, p.119.

³⁵⁵ See *Ayın Tarihi*, 24 December 1992.

³⁵⁶ *Ayın Tarihi*, 9 December 1993.

Samaras declared that “theories about the Muslim arc in the Balkans are well founded”.³⁵⁷ And one of the well known academics, Thanos Veremis stated that:

Since 1989 Turkey has been making inroads into the Balkan Peninsula via Islamic outposts. More than 5.5 million Muslims reside in a geographic wedge that extends from the Black Sea to the Adriatic, separating Greece from its Slavic Christian neighbours. Turkey is trying to become the champion of the Balkan Muslims... This may prove dangerous in a region already torn by separatist movements.³⁵⁸

These Serbian and Greek views were largely inaccurate. Turkey did not play the Muslim card in the Balkans. Turkish officials did not portray the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina as one between Christianity and Islam. While Iran perceived the Bosnian war as an example of Western hatred of Islam, Turkey did not describe the conflict as a religious clash. Turkey, as a secular country with a mostly Muslim population, sought to reduce rather than accentuate the religious dimension.

Moreover, Turkey improved its relations with the predominantly Orthodox countries of the Balkans, such as Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania. Turkish Chief of General Staff, Doğan Güreş visited Bulgaria in December 1991 and signed the Sofia Document. This document included the exchange of information and cooperation in military training. With this agreement the two countries also promised not to hold military exercises within fifteen kilometers of their mutual border.³⁵⁹ In March 1992

³⁵⁷ *Eleftherotypia*, 21 January 1996, cited in Asteris Huliaras and Charalambos Tsardanis, *Imagining the Balkans: The Three Greek Discourses of the Post-communist Era*, p.244-245. Available [online]: < <http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/Papers/Huliaras%20Tsardanis%20-%20Imagining%20the%20Balkans.pdf>> [07 December 2004].

³⁵⁸ Thanos Veremis, “Greece: The Dilemmas of Change”, in *The Volatile Powder Keg: Balkan Security after the Cold War*, (ed.) F. S. Larrabee (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), p.132.

³⁵⁹ Gareth Winrow, *Where East Meets West: Turkey and the Balkans* (Exeter: Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 1993), p.14.

Bulgaria's Defense Minister, Dimitar Ludjev visited Turkey and in May 1992, the two states signed a friendship, good neighborliness, and security agreement during the visit of the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Philip Dimitrov.³⁶⁰

Turkey was the second country to recognize the Republic of Macedonia under its constitutional name and became the first country to open an embassy in Skopje in 1993. Turkey, which viewed the survival of Macedonia as an essential condition for stability in the region, attached special importance to its relations with Skopje. During the winter of 1991-1992, Turkey provided oil and humanitarian aid to Macedonia.³⁶¹ In May 1992 the two countries signed a security protocol. In March 1994 an agreement on economic cooperation was signed and Turkey committed to providing \$25 million of credits to Macedonia.³⁶² In March 1995, a military cooperation agreement was signed and Turkey agreed to train Macedonian officers in the Partnership for Peace training program.³⁶³

Turkey signed a friendship and cooperation agreement with Romania in September 1991 during President Özal's visit.³⁶⁴ Commercial relations between the two countries developed rapidly. Romania became Turkey's biggest trade partner in the Balkans. There were about two thousand Turkish companies in Romania by the fall of 1993, although the vast majority were small businesses.³⁶⁵

³⁶⁰ See *Aydın Tarihi*, 10 March 1992 and 6 May 1992.

³⁶¹ Şule Kut, "Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası 1990-1993", in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (ed.) Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2001), p.337.

³⁶² Sylvie Gangloff, "The Relations Between Turkey and Macedonia: The Incoherencies of a Political Partnership", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6, (2001), p.38.

³⁶³ Dilek Barlas, "Turkey and the Balkans: Cooperation in the Interwar and Post-Cold War Eras", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 4, (1998/1999), p.74.

³⁶⁴ *Aydın Tarihi*, 18 September 1991.

³⁶⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, 7 September 1993.

All these developments showed that there was not much of a case for viewing religion as the key to the foreign policy of Turkey. It can also be said that pro-Serbian policies of the Greek government during the Bosnian crisis had been based to a large extent on a reaction to growing political weight of Turkey in the region. Greece had problems with both of its neighbors Albania and Macedonia and with the normalization of the Turkish-Bulgarian relations felt itself encircled and forged closer ties with Serbia. Greek government became the most consistent and forceful backer of Belgrade's policies in the international arena. Both Greece and Serbia was uncomfortable with the idea of a Bosnian state which because of its Muslim plurality would be friendly to Turkey.

Turkish foreign policy towards the Bosnian crisis was energetic and constructive. Turkey promoted a myriad of diplomatic initiatives and played an active role in the declarations of the resolutions of the CSCE, the OIC and the UN. Turkish governments remained committed to multilateralism and eschewed from taking unilateral action. Concerning the fact that the West finally did in 1995 what Turkey had advocated in 1992 with the Action Plan further showed the accuracy of the Turkish views on the solution of the problem. However, with regard to the length of the war, Turkey failed to bring about its objectives, the Bosnian conflict lasted three years and international community could neither halt nor roll back the Serbian aggression. The events in Yugoslavia also showed that Turkey had considerable influence in the region. It was clearly seen that although by itself Turkey could not bring order to the Balkans, it could make a significant contribution to efforts in this direction.

The Last Phase: The Kosovo Imbroglio (1998-1999)

Although the Dayton agreement of 1995 put an end to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and brought relative stability to this country after three years, a crisis was starting to grow in Kosovo. The Dayton agreement had confirmed that Kosovo remained part of Yugoslavia. The only development in favor of the Kosovar Albanians was an agreement by the UN Security Council that the “outer wall” of sanctions against Serbia such as the denial of access to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank would remain until the human rights record in the remaining Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was improved.³⁶⁶ The attitude of the international community could be understood as Kosovo was relatively quiet at that time and they needed the cooperation of Milosevic to force the Bosnian Serbs to a compromise.

It can be said that the Dayton agreement undermined the position of Ibrahim Rugova in Kosovo and his Ghandian policies of passive resistance. Many Albanians began to think that they could only win international recognition through the use of force and violence. In the meantime, the guerilla organization of the Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), became prominent with shootings and bomb attacks against Serbian officials and institutions. The situation worsened when the KLA acquired the weapons and ammunition of the Albanian army during the internal turmoil in Albania in spring 1997. The KLA declared itself the armed force of the Kosovar Albanians in January 1998. On February 28, 1998 the KLA killed four Serbian policemen in Likosane in the Drenica and within few weeks they took most of the Drenica region under

³⁶⁶ Noel Malcolm, *Kosovo: A Short History* (London: Macmillan, 1998), p.353.

control.³⁶⁷ Serbia responded to the uprising by launching a major drive against the KLA forces and at the beginning of March 1998, eighty Albanians were killed in Drenica, among whom twenty-five were women and children.³⁶⁸

The intensification of the Albanian-Serbian clashes in Kosovo alarmed the Western governments not just because of the numerous Albanian refugees, but also the potential of the spread of the conflict to neighbouring countries, especially Macedonia, which had a large Albanian population. The international community imposed an embargo against Belgrade, and the Contact Group, that included France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US, held bilateral talks with Milosevic.

The situation deteriorated on January 15, 1999 when forty five-bodies of Albanians, including three women and one young boy were found in the southern village of Racak.³⁶⁹ In February, 1999, with the initiative of the Contact Group, the Kosovo peace talks were opened in Rambouillet, Paris. The first agreement text that requested the withdrawal of Yugoslav military forces from Kosovo and the settling of the NATO peace forces in the region was rejected by both parties. The second agreement which included, immediate cessation of violence, the withdrawal of Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo, the stationing of an international military force led by NATO in Kosovo and a referendum for independence after a three year transition period was accepted by the Kosovar Albanians, but refused by the Serbs.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁷ R. J. Crampton, *The Balkans Since the Second World War* (New York: Longman, 2002), p.272.

³⁶⁸ Enika Abazi, "Kosovo: War, Peace and Intervention in a Nutshell", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6, (2001), p.65.

³⁶⁹ Tanter and Psarouthakis, p.78.

³⁷⁰ Enika Abazi, "Kosovo/a Conflict and the Post-Cold War Order: Russia and Turkey Policies", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 7 (2002), p.223.

On March 24, 1999 NATO launched a series of air strikes on Serbian forces. The air strikes lasted seventy-eight days and Milosevic agreed to sign the peace plan proposed by G-8 countries on June 10, 1999. The G-8 Peace Plan had three main points: “the retreat of all military, police and paramilitary forces from the region, the settlement of international civil and security entities in the region under the patronage of the UN, the establishment of a transitory administration by the UN Security Council with the purpose of creating a temporary political framework that would guarantee peaceful and normal living conditions in the area and that would give significant autonomy to Kosovo.”³⁷¹

After Yugoslavia signed the G-8 Peace Plan, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244, which approved the establishment of United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo (UNMIK) and NATO led Kosovo Force (K-FOR). UNMIK would administer the communications, police, schools, public transport, and power plants while K-FOR would help to maintain the peace in the region.³⁷²

When compared to Bosnian issue, it seemed that Turkey chose a low profile in the Kosovo crisis. Although Turkish authorities condemned the violence and violation of human rights openly they did not launch any major diplomatic initiatives. The most important Turkish diplomatic initiative during the Kosovo conflict was the visit of İsmail Cem, the Turkish Foreign Minister, to Belgrade in March 1998. Cem advocated a peaceful solution to the problem, which included the restoration of the rights of the Albanians.³⁷³ There were several considerations behind Ankara’s cautious policy.

³⁷¹ Nuray Bozbora, “The Endurance of Uncertainty in Kosovo”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 7 (2002), p.206.

³⁷² Krampton, p.276.

³⁷³ Uzgel, pp.82-83.

Bosnia and Herzegovina was an independent and sovereign state that was recognized by the international community and accepted to the membership of the UN. However, Kosovo was part of the Yugoslavia although it had been granted political autonomy by the 1974 Constitution. The Turkish government was strongly committed to the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state. Turkey which had been fighting against a separatist movement in its own territory for nearly fifteen years could not provoke or support separatist tendencies in the region. As early as 1992, when Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Kosovar Albanians visited Ankara and requested from Turkey to recognize the independence of Kosovo, he was rejected by the Turkish officials. President Demirel also had declared many times that if Kosovo proclaimed its independence, this would not be approved by the international community.³⁷⁴

There is also a Turkish minority living in Kosovo.³⁷⁵ The relations between the Albanians and the Turks in Kosovo were far from ideal. Turks were disturbed about the claims of the radical Albanians that there was no Turkish minority in Kosovo. The Belgrade government, which sought to impede any kind of Albanian-Turkish unity in the province, had treated its Turkish minority fairly well. When most of the Kosovar Albanians lost their jobs after the incidents in 1991, the Turks had kept their positions. Furthermore, the Serbian authorities that had banned the Albanian broadcasting of Radio Television Pristina in July 1990 allowed Turkish language broadcasting.³⁷⁶ These

³⁷⁴ See *Aydın Tarihi*, 12 July 1998 and 3 April 1999.

³⁷⁵ According to the 1981 census 11,000 Turks were living in Kosovo. Today their number is estimated to be around 60,000. See Erhan Türbedar, "Tarihte Değişen Siyasi ve Sosyal Dengeler İçinde Kosovo Türkleri", in *Balkan Türkleri: Balkanlar'da Türk Varlığı*, (ed.) Erhan Türbedar (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), pp.76-77.

³⁷⁶ Şule Kut, "Turks of Kosovo: What to Expect? ", *Perceptions* 5, no.3 (September-November 2000), p.57.

developments deepened the division between the Albanians and Turks in Kosovo and the Albanians accused the Turks of being in collaboration with the Serbs.

The Turkish authorities were also worried about the possibility of the conflict extending to Macedonia, where there is a large Albanian community. Turkey had developed close ties with Macedonia and attached this country a special importance for the preservation of the regional balance in the Balkans. If Kosovo became an independent state this could provoke a separatist movement in Macedonia and give rise to political turmoil in the entire peninsula.

When a diplomatic solution to the Kosovo issue could not be reached and the harassment of the Albanians by the Serbs continued, NATO took the decision to intervene. Turkey participated in NATO's military action and provided eleven F-16 fighter jets. After the end of the NATO bombing and following the withdrawal of the Serbian forces from Kosovo, Turkey sent a detachment of 1,000 troops to join the KFOR in July 1999.³⁷⁷ They were deployed around the town of Prizren, in Mamusa, where a large majority of the Kosovar Turks lived.

Turkey accepted about 18,000 refugees from Kosovo.³⁷⁸ Some of them joined their relatives in Turkey and some of them stayed in the refugee camp in Kırklareli. The Turkish authorities also established refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia.

Kosovo crisis did not provoke much excitement in Turkish public opinion, as opposed to the case of Bosnia. The international community had responded to the conflict quickly and vigorously and the Turkish people were mostly interested in the capture of

³⁷⁷ Uzgel, p.82.

³⁷⁸ H. Bülent Olcay, "Kosova: Nereden Nereye? ", *Avrasya Etütleri* 17 (Spring-Summer 2000), p.19.

Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the terrorist PKK organization and the forthcoming general elections. It can be said that Turkish government's approach and policies during the Kosovo crisis had broad support within Turkey.

CHAPTER 7

TURKEY AND THE BALKANS AFTER THE KOSOVO WAR

Regional Cooperation Initiatives

The Western democracies had a poor record in dealing with the state disintegration in the former Yugoslavia. The military intervention came too late, the arms embargo caused terrible losses on the Bosniak side and the West declared safe havens, but failed to protect these areas later. The engagement of the EC was neither unified nor consistent. The EC could not adopt a common foreign and security policy regarding the Yugoslav crisis because of the different policy orientations of the member countries. The US perceived the conflict as a European problem and did not want to intervene actively in the initial phase and the UN was reluctant to use force. These hesitant policies of the international community caused humanitarian catastrophes and tragic developments in Yugoslavia. The entire Balkan Peninsula suffered considerably from the bloody dismemberment of the Yugoslav federation and these developments also delayed the establishment of a secure and stable environment in the region.

After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, the EC and the US started to pay closer attention and commitment to the region and launched many regional initiatives with the aim of bringing economic prosperity, security and stability to the Balkans. The EU, particularly, undertook more responsibility and long-term obligations towards the restoration of peace and stability in the peninsula. The Balkan states

responded to these regional approaches positively and saw the integration with the EU and NATO as key factors in their economic and political reconstruction.

Turkey, as a Balkan state, strongly supported the exercise of regional cooperation in the Balkans and actively took part in most of the initiatives. Although Turkey had considerable military and political weight in the region, Turkey's economic influence was limited because of its financial difficulties.

The Royaumont Process

The first of the post-Dayton regional initiatives was the Royaumont Process, the Process of Stability and Good Neighbourliness in Southeast Europe. The meeting which led to the Royaumont Process was held in the French town of Royaumont on December 13, 1995, one day before the Paris Peace Conference for Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁷⁹ The process involved nine Southeast European countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey and Yugoslavia), the EU member states, Hungary, Russia and the USA.³⁸⁰ At the meeting of the EU foreign ministers on February 27, 1996, the Royaumont Process was transformed into an EU initiative. The main objectives of the Process were: "the stabilization of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the surrounding region of Southeast Europe, confidence building and dialogue, promoting treaties of friendship and good neighbourliness, and bilateral cooperation projects."³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Levent Bilman, "The Regional Cooperation Initiatives in Southeast Europe and the Turkish Foreign Policy", *Perceptions* 3, no.4 (September-November 1998), p.71.

³⁸⁰ Snezhana Shtonova, "Regional Cooperation and Strengthening Stability in Southeast Europe", in *NATO Research Fellowships Reports* (Sofia: NATO Research Fellowships Reports, 1998), p.26.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.27.

The Royaumont Process concentrated on civil society projects and the establishment of a multilateral dialogue between academicians, journalists, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), parliamentarians and trade unionists. Dr. Panagiotis Roumeliotis was appointed coordinator of the Royaumont Process on November 28, 1997.³⁸² He would serve as an intermediary between EU Institutions, international financial institutions, the Royaumont Process member states, NGOs and other regional cooperation organizations. He would also supervise the implementation of projects and provide information on existing NGOs and their activities.

The Royaumont Process initiative came from France and reflected the desire of the EU to balance the growing US military and political impact in the Balkans as a result of the Dayton Agreement. Greece became a strong supporter of the initiative. The Greek government set up an office in Athens, pushed for the appointment of Dr. Roumeliotis and provided financial support to several projects.³⁸³

The Royaumont Process focused its regional approach on political and civil society confidence building. The main achievements were the strengthening of inter-parliamentary activities, the organization of conferences, NGO meetings and seminars. Bureaucratic problems and a lack of coordination on the part of international donors and NGOs led to an unsuccessful implementation of the Process.³⁸⁴ It was included in the

³⁸² European Stability Initiative. September 1999. *The Stability Pact and Lessons From a Decade of Regional Initiatives*. Available [online]: <<http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi-document-id-1.pdf> > [10 January 2005].

³⁸³ Ibid.

³⁸⁴ Bendiek, Annegret. 13 April 2004. *Europe's Conflict Resolution: The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe*. Available [online]: <<http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/uppsala/ws19/Bendiek.pdf> > [12 January 2005].

working area of the OSCE and later integrated into the framework of Stability Pact in 2000.

The Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI)

The second regional cooperation attempt, the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) that was initiated and supported by the USA came into being in December 1996 at a meeting held in Geneva. The participant countries were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey.³⁸⁵ The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was at first invited, but the invitation was later withdrawn because of the events in the country.³⁸⁶ Along with the EU and NATO, the SECI would work in close collaboration with many international organizations such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Bank. The bulk of the cost of SECI, through the contributions of both personnel and cash was borne by the participating states. Austria, the Czech Republic, Italy, Switzerland and the US also provided some help.³⁸⁷

The main aim of the SECI was to promote cooperation among the region states in the areas of energy, environment, transport infrastructure, private capital investment and trade. An Agenda Committee that consisted of high-ranking officials from the member states was set up in order to decide the common projects. The Business Advisory Council

³⁸⁵ Güner Öztekin, "Situation in the Balkans and Turkey's Balkan Policy", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 8 (2003), pp.10-11.

³⁸⁶ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became the member of the SECI in December 2000.

³⁸⁷ Richard Schifter, "South-east Europe in the Post Milosevic Era: The Need to Lower the Barriers", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13, no.2 (Spring 2002), p.6.

(BAC), comprised of leading businessmen from the region, was created to promote private sector investments in southeast Europe. Through the Business Advisory Council, the SECI established a network of Business Support Offices (Istanbul, Szeged, Thessaloniki, Udine and Vienna) as well as a Business Information and Clearing Center.³⁸⁸

Dr. Erhard Busek, former Vice-Chancellor of Austria was appointed coordinator of the SECI on December 19, 1996 and the Coordinator's Office was established in Vienna in March 1997 with the financial support of Austria, Germany, Italy and the US. The Agenda Committee convened its first meeting in Geneva on January 29, 1997 and at this meeting introduced six ECE-proposed projects. Responsibility for projects that were developed within the process was given to individual countries as a host country. The SECI projects that would be worked on were: "The Danube recovery program (host country Austria); an energy efficiency demonstration zones network in Southeast Europe (host country Hungary); financial policies to promote small and medium enterprises (SME's) through micro credit and credit guarantee schemes (host country Romania); the identification of bottlenecks along main international corridors in the SECI region and short-term measures to remove them (host country Bulgaria); the interconnection of natural gas networks, the diversification of natural gas networks, the diversification of gas supply and the improvement of security of supply in Southeast Europe (host country

³⁸⁸ Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Vienna. 23 April 2002. *Coordination Meeting of the Regional Initiatives*. Available [online]: <http://www.ceinet-download.org/download/200_VIE_Coord_Meet_RO.pdf> [08 January 2005].

Bosnia and Herzegovina); and trade facilitation: actions to overcome operational difficulties (host country Greece).”³⁸⁹

Furthermore, the SECI broadened its activities to include drug and gun trafficking, money laundering, prostitution and other forms of cross-border crime. In this context, a Regional Centre of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative for Combating Trans-border Crime was established in Bucharest in early Autumn 1999 and it became operational on January 1, 2001.³⁹⁰ The basic objective of the Centre was to curb the illegal trade across regional borders. It utilized the standard procedures and technical systems of OIPC-INTERPOL for the search, transmission, retrieval and analysis of across the border criminality data.³⁹¹

The main problem of the SECI was its perception by the EU as a US attempt that aimed to expand US economic interests in the region. Moreover, SECI was a self-assistance program that relied on funds from abroad and most of the time it suffered from limited financial backing. The SECI’s greatest strength was its emphasis on economic, environmental, and infrastructure cooperation. The SECI excluded sensitive high security issues and concentrated on technical and non-strategic policy areas where cooperation would likely to have greater chance for success.³⁹² It seems that the SECI is moving towards merging with the Stability Pact, which was *de facto* achieved by the appointment

³⁸⁹ Ünal Çeviköz, “European Integration and Regional Cooperation in Southeast Europe”, *Perceptions* 2, no.4 (December 1997-February 1998), p.147.

³⁹⁰ Marko Hajdinjak, *The Yugoslav Wars and the Development of Regional Criminal Networks in the Balkans* (Sofia: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2002), pp.64-65.

³⁹¹ Pop, Adrian. *Sub-Regional Groupings as Security Providers in Central and Southeastern Europe*. Available [online]: <<http://www.elis.sk/mot/full/mo101g.pdf>> [10 January 2005].

³⁹² Albrecht Schnabel, “Kosovo and the International Community: The Trigger for Peace in Southeastern Europe”, in *Southeast European Security: Threats, Responses and Challenges*, (ed.) Albrecht Schnabel (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), p.243.

of SECI coordinator, Dr. Erhard Busek as Stability Pact Special Coordinator in January 1, 2002.

The Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECP)

The Process of Good Neighbourliness, Stability, Security and Cooperation of the Countries of Southeastern Europe, later called the Southeast European Cooperation Process, was established at Bulgaria's initiative in Sofia in July 1996. It was the continuation of the ministerial conferences of the Balkan states that took place at the end of the 1980s. The first meeting had been held in Belgrade in 1988 and was followed by another one in Tirana in 1990.³⁹³ The third conference would be in Sofia in 1991, but it was cancelled because of the war in Yugoslavia.

SEECP included Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia attended with the status of observers.³⁹⁴ The goals of the SEECP was to strengthen security and political cooperation, expand economic relations, increase cooperation in democracy, human dimension and judiciary and struggle against illegal activities in the region.³⁹⁵ Regular meetings were convened among the ministers of defense and foreign affairs and also heads of state or government. Meetings of ministers of foreign affairs of southeastern

³⁹³ Bechev, Dimitar. *Building Southeastern Europe: The Politics of International Cooperation in the Region*. Available [online]:

<<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW4/BechevPAPER.PDF>> [10 January 2005].

³⁹⁴ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Southeast European Cooperation Process. Available [online]: <<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/REgions/Balkans/SEECP.htm>> [07 January 2005]. Bosnia and Herzegovina became an official member in February 2001. Serbia and Montenegro fully rejoined the SEECP in October 2000 and Moldova participates into the meetings as an observer.

³⁹⁵ See *The South East European Cooperation Process*. Available [online]: <<http://www.stabilitypact.org/seecp>> [10 January 2005].

European countries were held in Sofia (6/7 July 1996), Thessaloniki (9-10 June 1997), Istanbul (8-9 June 1998), Bucharest (December 1999), Skopje (June 2000), Tirana (May 2001) and Bucharest (October 2004).³⁹⁶ The summits of heads of state or government of southeast European countries were held on Crete (3-4 November 1997), in Antalya (12-13 October 1998), Bucharest (February 2000), Skopje (February 2001), Tirana (March 2002), Belgrade (April 2003) and Sarajevo (April 2004).³⁹⁷ At the Bucharest Summit, participating countries adopted the Charter on Good Neighbourliness, Stability, Security and Cooperation in Southeastern Europe and at the Skopje meeting, An Action Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation was launched. The aims of the Action Plan were: “directing the SEECP activities towards the main objectives in the economic field of the regional cooperation; focusing the cooperation on concrete programs, projects and activities that would be initiated, developed and implemented in the short and medium run; identifying concrete priority projects and programs of regional interest and examining the ways and means for their implementation; facilitating the coordination of the SEECP activities with the relevant programs of the European Union, International Financial Institutions and of other regional initiatives.”³⁹⁸

Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey formed the multinational peace force for Southeastern Europe (MPFSEE) in 1998.³⁹⁹ The idea of creating a peace force had been recommended by Turkey at the Session of NATO

³⁹⁶ Dusko Lopandic, “Regional Cooperation in South Eastern Europe Towards a New Institutional Framework”, in *Regional Cooperation in Southeastern Europe: The Effects of Regional Initiatives*, (ed.) Dusko Lopandic (Belgrade: Prometej, 2002), p.56. The eight summit of the SEECP was held in Bucharest on May 10-11 2005.

³⁹⁷ SEECP Main Documents. Available [online]: < http://www.mae.ro/seecp/main_doc.html > [15 January 2005].

³⁹⁸ Action Plan for Regional Economic Cooperation, Skopje, 22-23 February 2001. Available [online]: < <http://www.mae.ro/seecp/main3.html> > [15 January 2005].

³⁹⁹ Croatia, Slovenia and USA are the observer countries.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs in May 1997. MPFSEE is a joint military unit that was established at a brigade level and planned to be deployed in NATO, OSCE and UN-led peacekeeping operations. The MPFSEE Headquarters was located in Plovdiv in Bulgaria initially and moved to Constanta, Romania in June 2003. Hilmi Akın Zorlu, Turkish Brigadier General had been assigned as the first commander of MPFSEE in August 1999. Currently Brigadier General Giovanni Sulis from Italy serves as the commander of the MPFSEE forces.⁴⁰⁰ It may take some time for MPFSEE to become an effective military force. It has a symbolical more than a practical importance.

SEECF was the only regional initiative that was not imposed by external actors but generated within the region. It provides a forum for discussion where common positions and joint declarations can be taken. SCEEP has neither budget nor permanent institutions. Coordination of the group is assumed by the host country, which rotates annually and for this reason, the efficiency of SEECF mostly depends on the ability and will of the chairman-in-office to take initiatives.⁴⁰¹ Moreover, bilateral problems between some member countries (relations between Albania and Macedonia, Greece and Macedonia, Greece and Turkey)⁴⁰² and the suspension of the membership of Serbia and Montenegro until 2000 limited the successful progress of SEECF.

⁴⁰⁰ See SEEBRIG Commanders. Available [online]: <
<http://www.ce.aurer.army.mil/pages/seebrig/seebrig/seebrig%20comanders.htm>> [15 January 2005].

⁴⁰¹ Ali Hikmet Alp, "The South-East Europe Cooperation Process: An Unspectacular, Indigenous Regional Cooperation Scheme", *Perceptions* 5, no.3 (September-November 2000), p.46.

⁴⁰² For example Macedonia withdrew from the Sofia Conference at the last moment because of its dispute with Greece on its constitutional name.

The Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe

The last regional cooperation scheme which aimed to build up a more secure and stable order in the Balkans was the Stability Pact that was launched at the Cologne Summit of the EU on June 10, 1999, just before the end of the war in Kosovo⁴⁰³ It came into force with the Sarajevo Summit held in July 1999. The Participants in the Stability Pact were: “The countries of the region: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey; the EU member states and the European Commission; other countries: Japan, Norway, Russia, Switzerland, USA; international organizations: Council of Europe, NATO, OECD, OSCE, UN, UNHCR; international financial institutions: Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank; regional initiatives: Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), Central European Initiative (CEI), Southeast European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and Southeast European Cooperation Process (SEECp).”⁴⁰⁴

The main objectives of the Pact were to achieve lasting peace, prosperity, and stability for southeastern Europe, to establish effective regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations through strict observance of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, to create vibrant market economies based on sound macro policies, to foster economic cooperation in the region and between the region and the rest of Europe and the

⁴⁰³ Fuat Aksu, “Confidence, Security and Conflict Resolution Initiatives in the Balkans”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 8 (2003), p.68.

⁴⁰⁴ The Stability Pact Partners. Available [online]: <
<http://www.stabilitypact.org/about/default.asp>> [15 January 2005]. Serbia and Montenegro was accepted as a full and formal participant in October 2000.

world, to ensure the return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes, to create the conditions for the Southeastern European countries to fully integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures.⁴⁰⁵

The Stability Pact was divided into four working tables to carry out its agenda. They were: the Southeastern Europe Regional Table, the Working Table on Democratization and Human Rights, the Working Table on Economic Reconstruction, Cooperation and Development, and the Working Table on Security Issues (It has two sub-tables: Security and Defense, and Justice and Home Affairs).⁴⁰⁶

The Southeastern Europe Regional Table meets alternatively at Brussels and Thessaloniki. It is the decision-making organ of the process and is chaired by the Special Coordinator. Its main task is to coordinate the activities of the subordinate organs and to evaluate the progress accomplished by the process.⁴⁰⁷ The Working Tables are specialized working groups whose task is to examine a given set of problems and to identify the necessary means of response. The Permanent Secretariat is based in Brussels. Bodo Hombach from Germany was the first Special Coordinator. Currently, Dr. Erhard Busek assumes the post.⁴⁰⁸

It can be said that the Stability Pact is the synthesis of all the regional cooperation initiatives, which were launched after the Dayton Agreement. The agreements for trade liberalization and refugees and internally displaced persons were the major achievements

⁴⁰⁵ The Cologne Document of the Stability Pact. 10 June 1999. Available [online]: < <http://www.stabilitypact.org/constituent/990610-cologne.html> > [15 January 2005].

⁴⁰⁶ Bodo Hombach, "Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe: A New Perspective for the Region", *Perceptions* 5, no.3 (September-November 2000), pp. 9-10.

⁴⁰⁷ Victor-Yves Ghebali, "The OSCE and the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe", in *The Operational Role of the OSCE in South-Eastern Europe: Contributing to Regional Stability in the Balkans*, (eds.) Victor-Yves Ghebali and Daniel Warner (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p.58.

⁴⁰⁸ See Available [online]: < <http://www.stabilitypact.org> > [15 January 2005].

of the Pact. The European Commission and the Stability Pact jointly launched an initiative for electricity and gas called the Southeast Europe Regional Market with the aim of modernizing the energy infrastructure. Moreover, twenty-eight bilateral free trade agreements were signed and these are intended to stimulate intra-regional trade and attract foreign direct investment.⁴⁰⁹ There is also discussion on moving toward a South European Free Trade Agreement, SEEFTA, which will create an advanced multilateral free trade zone.

The European Union was the initiator and chief supporter of the process. The EU and its member states were the most important donors in the Balkans. The European Commission announced that it will raise more than Euro 10 billion up to the end of 2006.⁴¹⁰ It seems that the EU has fully committed itself to the economic, political and social reconstruction of the Balkans. In this context, it contributes to the projects and programs, which are necessary to implement structural changes and that will also ease the integration of the Balkan states into the EU. After it failed in both Bosnia and Kosovo, the Stability Pact, as Srdjan Vucetic pointed out, “was supposed to demonstrate to the US that Europe could handle its own problems.”⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁹ Busek, Erhard. 17 December 2004. *South Eastern Europe in 2005: Challenges for the EU and the UK Presidency*. Speech at the Chatham House. Available [online]: <
<http://www.riia.org/pdf/research/europe/Busek171204.pdf>> [15 January 2005].

⁴¹⁰ Vladimir Gligorov, “Notes on the Stability Pact”, in *Balkan Reconstruction*, (eds.) Thanos Veremis and Daniel Daianu (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p.16.

⁴¹¹ Srdjan Vucetic, “The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe as a Security Community-Building Institution”, *Southeast European Politics* 2, no.2 (October 2001), p.130.

Integration of the Balkans with Euro-Atlantic Structures

The European Union

EU Regional Approach

The first EU regional policy towards the Balkans was the “Regional Approach” that was established by the General Affairs Council on April 29, 1997.⁴¹² It would include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslav Federal Republic. The aim of the Regional Approach was the successful implementation of the Dayton and Paris Peace Agreements and consolidation of the economic and political stability in the region. The Regional Approach was based, in particular, on political and economic conditionality, compliance with which forms the basis for the development of bilateral relations with the EU in the field of trade, financial and economic assistance and contractual relations.⁴¹³ The financial arm of the Regional Approach was OBNOVA, which served the primary purpose of aiding reconstruction efforts in the region.

The level of the EU cooperation was made dependent on “the fulfillment of minimal requirements for the establishment of a functioning democracy, including respect of human rights and transition to a market economy and the establishment of cooperative relations with neighbouring countries, including the gradual development of free trade.”⁴¹⁴ The content of the Regional Approach was declared as: “Progressive

⁴¹² EU General Affairs Council is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of EU member states and deals with external relations and general policy questions. See Available [online] : < <http://www.seeurope.net/en/faq.php> > [15 January 2005].

⁴¹³ Othon Anastasakis, “Towards Regional Cooperation in the Balkans: An Assessment of the EU Approach”, in *Regional Cooperation in Southeastern Europe: The Effects of Regional Initiatives*, (ed.) Dusko Lopandic (Belgrade: Prometej, 2002), p.31.

⁴¹⁴ Heinz Kramer, “The European Union in the Balkans: Another Step Towards European Integration”, *Perceptions* 5, no.3 (September-November 2000), p.28.

restoration of the movement of people and ideas, in particular relating to information; organization of regional meetings, restoration of dialogue between different elements of society (intellectuals, journalists, religious figures); provisions to ban propaganda promoting aggression; re-launching regional, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation; initial identification of specific cross-border projects; and cooperation in re-establishing civil society, especially in areas of justice and administration (conjointly with the programs developed by the Council of Europe)⁴¹⁵

The Regional Approach did not produce any substantive results. It had been insufficient with respect to the magnitude of the economic, political and social problems in the region as had best been seen in the cases of Albania and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The approach had limited financial backing and it had set forth only trade and aid incentives without paying much attention to security domain. Progress in the fulfillment of the conditions had been slow and the Regional Approach could not prevent the renewed escalation of violence in Kosovo in early 1999.

The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)

After the outbreak of the Kosovo conflict there came the redefinition of the EU regional policy towards the Balkans and the EU launched the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) in May 1999. SAP officially came into force at Zagreb Summit in November 2000 and included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia.⁴¹⁶ SAP is a step-by-step approach

⁴¹⁵ The Regional Approach as defined in 1996. Available [online]: <
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/docs/reg_approach_96.htm> [15 January 2005].

⁴¹⁶ These Southeastern European countries are also called as Western Balkans in the EU vocabulary.

based on aid, trade preferences, dialogue, technical advice and, ultimately, contractual association relations. It provides a framework for the development of economic and political relations between the Western Balkan states and the EU and intends to open the perspective of EU integration. The principal elements of the SAP were: “Political conditionality; cooperation in justice and home affairs and security issues; assistance for democratization, civil society, education and institution building; development of political dialogue, including dialogue at a regional level; development of existing economic and financial assistance, budgetary assistance and balance of payment support; the development and promotion of existing economic and trade relations; humanitarian aid for refugees, returnees and other persons of concern; and signing bilateral Stabilization and Association Agreements.”⁴¹⁷

The Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) and Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability (CARDS) program form the cornerstones of the Stabilization and Association Process. SAAs are the main tools, which aim at the gradual implementation of a free trade area and reforms to sustain adoption the EU standards and, eventually, will bring the Western Balkan countries closer to the EU.⁴¹⁸ They set out rights and obligations, in areas such as competition and state aid rules, intellectual property and establishment.⁴¹⁹ SAAs are tailored to the economic, political and social circumstances of each country, but they have a common goal of achieving the formal association with the EU structures. It can be said that SAAs are similar to the

⁴¹⁷ See Road Map to Europe: Stabilization and Association Process. Available [online]: <<http://www.ictd.org.al/docs/sae.pdf>> [15 January 2005].

⁴¹⁸ Esra Hatipoğlu, “Meeting the Balkan Challenge: The EU Policies Toward South Eastern Europe”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6 (2001), p.232.

⁴¹⁹ From Regional Approach to the Stabilization and Association Process, The EU’ s Actions in Support to the Stabilization and Association Process. Available [online]: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/actions/sap.htm> [15 January 2005].

Europe Agreements, which were concluded between the EU and many Eastern and Central European countries at the beginning of the 1990s. The main innovation of the SAAs was that they envisage more regional cooperation than the Europe Agreements.⁴²⁰ The EU signed the first SAA with Macedonia on April 9, 2001 and with Croatia on October 29, 2001.⁴²¹ Negotiations with Albania started in January 2003, a feasibility study on opening negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina was adopted in November 2003 and feasibility study for Serbia and Montenegro is underway.⁴²²

The CARDS aid program of the EU that was introduced in 2000 brought a more strategic approach to assistance to the SAP countries. The CARDS program replaced the PHARE of 1989 and the OBNOVA of 1996 programs.⁴²³ It constitutes the single legal framework of the EU assistance. Euro 4.65 billion was allocated for the period between 2002-2006.⁴²⁴ The aid was conditioned by the respect for democracy and the rule of law, human and minority rights, the existence of a free market economy and structural reforms and management of public finances.⁴²⁵

The main objective of the SAP was to promote political stability and economic prosperity in the region and bring the participating states closer to the EU. In this context, the Thessaloniki EU-Western Balkans Summit, which was held in June 2003, should be mentioned. In this meeting it was stated that the map of the EU would be incomplete until

⁴²⁰ Anastasakis, p.33.

⁴²¹ David Phinnemore, "Stabilisation and Association Agreements: Europe Agreements for the Western Balkans?" , *European Foreign Affairs Review* 8, no.1 (Spring 2003), p.77.

⁴²² Third Stabilization and Association Process Annual Report. 30 March 2004.
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/sap/rep3/strat_pap.pdf> [15 January 2005].

⁴²³ Gordana Ilc, "EU Stabilization and Association Process and South Eastern Europe", in *Regional Cooperation in Southeastern Europe: The Effects of Regional Initiatives*, (ed.) Dusko Lopandic (Belgrade: Prometej, 2002), p.67.

⁴²⁴ The European Commission and EU Policy Towards South East Europe. Available [online]: <<http://www.seerecon.org/gen/ecrole.htm>> [15 January 2005].

⁴²⁵ Ibid.

the Western Balkan countries became members of the EU and that EU membership would be possible on the condition that these states meet the Copenhagen Criteria.⁴²⁶ However, it seems that there is still a long way ahead. It will take the countries of Western Balkans decades to fulfill the economic conditions of the Copenhagen Criteria.

Table 1. Economic Indicators in the Balkans⁴²⁷

	GDP (current US \$) 2003	GDP Growth (annual %) 2003	GDP Per Capita (current \$US) 2003	Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) 2003	Foreign Direct Investment, net inflows (BoP, current US \$) 2002	Unemployment Rate (annual %) 2003
Albania	6.1 billion	6	4,500	4	135,000,000	15.8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7.0 billion	4	4,100	1	293,400,000	40.0
Bulgaria	19.9 billion	4	7,600	2	599,700,000	14.3
Croatia	28.3 billion	4	10,600	2	980,500,000	19.5
Greece	173.0 billion	5	20,000	4	52,860,670	9.4
Macedonia	4.7 billion	3	6,700	2	77,200,000	36.7
Romania	60.4 billion	8	7,000	23	1,144,000,000	7.2
Serbia and Montenegro	19.2 billion	3	2,200	6	475,000,000	34.5
Slovenia	26.3 billion	2	19,000	1	179,600,000	11.2
Turkey	238 billion	6	6,700	21	1,037,000,000	10.5

The GDP's of the Western Balkan countries is lower than those of the EU member Balkan states such as Greece and Slovenia. Croatia that was accepted as a

⁴²⁶ N. Aslı Şirin, "Balkans in the Post Cold War Era: Quest for Stability and the European Union", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 8 (2003), pp.103-104.

⁴²⁷ Source: World Development Indicators Database. August 2004. Available [online]: <<http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/>> [15 January 2005]. See also CIA World Fact Book. Available [online]: <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook>> [15 January 2005].

candidate country by the EU in June 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania, which will be members of the Union in 2007 have higher GDPs and GDP growth rates. Croatia also has a higher GDP per capita than the other Western Balkan countries. High unemployment rates in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro contrast sharply with Albania and Croatia. Moreover, among the Western Balkan states, only Croatia has attracted substantial foreign direct investment.

There are still significant unsolved political issues in the region. These are uncertainty on the final status of Kosovo, problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unclear relationship between Serbia and Montenegro and the fragile situation in Macedonia. Neither the Stabilization and Association Agreements nor the Stability Pact were able to prevent the crisis in Macedonia, which took place in March-August 2001. The EU signed the first SAA with Macedonia in April 2001, but that did not hinder internal conflicts in the country. This incident again raised suspicions about the efficiency and economic capability of the SAP in the maintenance of regional security and stability.

Turkey concluded an Association Agreement with the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1963 and it was transformed into a Customs Union in 1995. Turkey was declared a candidate country at the Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999. The Accession Partnership with Turkey was adopted by the General Affairs Council of the EU in March 2001.⁴²⁸ In December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission that Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey. Turkey's possible membership in the EU has aroused considerable controversy. Member states continue to

⁴²⁸ Sibel Turan, "Turkey's Integration Process to the EU and the Balkan Countries", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6 (2001), p.224.

be divided on the desirability of Turkish admission to the Union. Considering the fact that Turkey is a large and poor country which is located in one of the most problematic regions in the world, its accession to EU will be much more difficult and complicated than that of the other Balkan states.

The European Security and Defense Policy in the Balkans and Turkey

After the Cold War, the European Union increased its efforts to become an international player on the political and security field and therefore attempted to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy. With the Maastricht Treaty that was signed on February 7, 1992 and entered into force on November 1, 1993, the Western European Union (WEU) was declared as the organization responsible for implementing the defense aspects of the EU's decisions on foreign and security policy.⁴²⁹ At a meeting that was held in Petersberg, Bonn, in 1992, WEU members put forward the "Petersberg Tasks", which included the employment of WEU military forces for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.⁴³⁰ At the NATO Summit of January 11, 1994, NATO gave support to the development of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) through strengthening the WEU.⁴³¹

⁴²⁹ Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1954 in order to create a common defense system to protect Europe from the Soviet threat. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK are the member states. Turkey joined in 1992 as an associate member.

⁴³⁰ Western European Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn. 19 June 1992. Available [online]: < <http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf> > [17 January 2005].

⁴³¹ The Brussels Declaration of the North Atlantic Council. 11 January 1994. Available [online]: < <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/1994/9401e.htm> > [17 January 2005].

The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the successive wars that broke out in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina seriously put into question the capability of the European Union. The member states failed to produce a common foreign and security strategy and the Europeans failed to end the conflict that occurred on their own doorstep. In 1997, the member countries of the Union signed the Amsterdam Treaty and the agreement came into effect in 1999. With this treaty the EU incorporated the Petersberg Tasks adopted by the WEU in 1992 and created the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy.⁴³² In the spring of 1997, Albania came near a civil war because of the collapse of the pyramid schemes in the country. Greece and Italy, two EU member states, primarily concerned by the Albanian crisis because of the massive exodus of refugees to their borders, tried to prepare the political ground for an intervention through the EU. However, both Germany and also the UK opposed the request that a Special Session of the WEU Council be convened to grant the WEU the authority of the military operation. So instead of a WEU force, an Italian-led “coalition of the willing” unit, which was composed of 7,000 soldiers from Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Romania, Spain and Turkey, came into being and they intervened under the name of Operation Alba in order to reestablish order in Albania.⁴³³ Operation Alba showed that there was still a lack of consensus between the EU states about how to deal with the crises that took place at the borders of Europe.

⁴³² Trevor C. Salmon and Alistair J. K. Shepherd, *Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), pp.62-63. Former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana Madariaga took up the post on October 18, 1999 for a period of five years. In July 2004, he was appointed again for a second 5-year mandate as EU High Representative for the CFSP.

⁴³³ Tanner, Fred. 21-22 August 1998. *Conflict Management and European Security: The Problem of Collective Solidarity*. Paper prepared for the First Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP)-Yale (ISS) Seminar in Leukerbad, Switzerland. Available [online]: <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/3isf/Online_Publications/WS4/Tanner.htm> [17 January 2005].

The Kosovo Crisis of 1999 was another striking example of the European weakness in the security area. The United States conducted nearly eighty percent of the bombing, ninety percent of the air-to-air refueling, and met approximately ninety-five percent of the intelligence requirements.⁴³⁴ The experience in Kosovo made the Europeans realize to what extent they depended on the United States, both in terms of political decision making and in terms of military capabilities and the discussions on the need for a more developed European defense capability accelerated.

In December 1999, the EU convened the Helsinki Summit and the member states announced their determination “to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where, NATO as a whole was not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.”⁴³⁵ A possible future location of the EU military force might be Africa where France, Spain and UK had important economic and cultural interests. The members also pointed out that, “the process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army.”⁴³⁶ According to the Headline Goal adopted during the meeting, Europe by 2003 would deploy, within sixty days, fifteen brigades (up to sixty thousand troops) for the purpose of performing the Petersberg Tasks.⁴³⁷ This European Rapid Reaction Force, roughly equivalent to

⁴³⁴ David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities Gap and the European Union”, *Survival* 42, no.4 (Winter 2000-2001), pp.103-107, cited in Orhan Yıkılkan, *A Changing European Security and Defense Architecture and Its Impact on Turkey* (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), p.18.

⁴³⁵ Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions. 10-11 December 1999. Available [online]: < http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#security > [17 January 2005].

⁴³⁶ Ibid.

⁴³⁷ Robert Wilkie, “Fortress Europa: European Defense and the Future of the North Atlantic Alliance”, *Parameters* 32, no.4 (Winter 2002), p.40.

conventional corps, would be self-sustaining for up to one year and require an additional ten thousand soldiers for rotational purposes.

The following Feira and Nice Summits, which took place in 2000, made considerable steps towards the institutionalization of the European security system and took important decisions concerning the non-EU member states such as Turkey. According to the decisions taken, both NATO's non-EU members, and the non-NATO EU candidate states would be placed within the European security structure but non-EU member countries would be part of the decision-shaping stage instead of being an actor in the decision-making process.⁴³⁸ The EU stated that as Turkey was not a member of the EU, it could not be included in the decision-making process of the Union. However, this explanation did not satisfy Turkey, as it is located in close proximity to the existing and potential crisis areas where the EU would take action. The main Turkish concern was that Greece could use the European security system in conflict areas such as the Aegean Sea and Cyprus to the detriment of Turkish interests. In this context, a prominent Turkish scholar, Erol Manisalı stated that:

The EU will have the opportunity to pressure Turkey concerning its relations with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration by using the ESDP, as the Aegean and the island of Cyprus will be seen within the boundaries of the EU. Even today it is considered as such. The strategic balance between Turkey and Greece will be altered completely. While Greece is both in NATO and the ESDP, Turkey participates only in NATO. Greece will begin to use the EU militarily against Turkey.⁴³⁹

Turkey wanted participation in the EU's decision-making process when operations in its region were being considered, in return for the use of NATO's planning

⁴³⁸ A. Seda Serdar, "The New European Security Architecture and Turkey", in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, (eds.) Tareq Y. Ismael and Mustafa Aydın (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), p.70.

⁴³⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, 24 April 1999, cited in Yıkılkan, p.67.

capabilities. So in December 2000, Turkey blocked the Berlin Plus and Nice proposals within NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) that would guarantee the EU access to NATO's planning capabilities. Turkey's firm stance on its position led to the start of a round of negotiations in May 2001 in Istanbul between Turkey, the UK and the United States and resulted in the Ankara Document that was signed in December 2, 2001.⁴⁴⁰ With this agreement, Turkey received assurances that the ESDP would not affect its security interests in its region and if an envisaged autonomous EU operation was to be conducted in the geographic proximity of Turkey, it would be consulted and on the basis of this consultation, its participation in the operation would be considered.⁴⁴¹ Greece objected to the Ankara Document at the Laeken European Council and claimed that this agreement did not address the Greek security interests in the Aegean Sea and on Cyprus. At the Copenhagen European Council meeting, which was held in December 2002, a deal was accomplished. It was declared that: "Cyprus and Malta will not take part in EU military operations conducted using NATO assets once they become the members of the EU"⁴⁴² With this declaration the Greek Cypriot Administration and Malta were excluded from the Berlin Plus agreements and their implementation, but they would participate fully in all other aspects of the CFSP and ESDP.

The EU has made noticeable progress in the areas of conflict prevention and peacekeeping. The EU authorities contributed to the containment of the Albanian insurrection of 2000-2001, which broke out in the Presevo region of southern Serbia

⁴⁴⁰ Esra Doğan, "Turkey in the New European Security and Defence Architecture", *Perceptions* 8, no.1 (March-May 2003), p.176.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴⁴² Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions. 12-13 December 2002. Available [online]: < http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf > [17 January 2005].

bordering Kosovo.⁴⁴³ The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) took over UN police operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003 and had five thousand officers ready, with the ability to deploy one thousand within thirty days.⁴⁴⁴ In Kosovo some thirty-six thousand troops (eighty percent of the total force) and eight hundred civilian police force from EU member states serve to maintain civil order.⁴⁴⁵ The EU could not prevent the outbreak of conflict in Macedonia, but mediated between the Albanian and Macedonian communities alongside the US and arranged a cease-fire between the parties. The EU launched its first military mission Operation Concordia in March 31, 2003, sent three hundred-fifty soldiers to Macedonia and replaced the small NATO peacekeeping mission there.⁴⁴⁶ In December 2003, when Operation Concordia ended, the EU established a police force to help train Macedonia's police forces. Finally, as of December 2, 2004, the European Union's Operation Althea took over from the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁴⁷ The new force, to be known as European Union Force (EUFOR), was formed by countries acting through or in cooperation with the European Union and commanded by Major General A. David Leakey from the UK.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴³ Dassu and Whyte, p.129.

⁴⁴⁴ Fraser Cameron, "The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 9, no.2 (Winter-Spring 2003), p.116. There are 12 Turkish police officers in the EU police mission force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁴⁴⁵ See The EU's Relations with South Eastern Europe. Available [online]: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/see/index.htm> [17 January 2005].

⁴⁴⁶ Keohane, Daniel. 01 July 2003. *EU Defence Policy: Beyond the Balkans, Beyond Peacekeeping?* Available [online]: http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/keohane_weltpolitik_jul03.htm> [17 January 2005]. Turkey sent 8 soldiers to the EU force in Macedonia.

⁴⁴⁷ See Available [online]: <http://www.belgium.ion.int/index.asp?NewsID=314>> [17 January 2005].

⁴⁴⁸ Bulgaria, Canada, Norway, Romania and Turkey from NATO, Argentina, Chile, Morocco, New Zealand from other continents and Switzerland as a neutral non-European country

Although the efforts toward the establishment of a European force were transformed into a more tangible form, there is still a considerable gap between ESDP and NATO capabilities in terms of implementing strategies that call for force projection, as in the case of the Petersberg Tasks.⁴⁴⁹ The Europeans also lag behind the Americans in terms of intelligence and military units as they allocate less financial resources to military spending. However, it can be said that EU at least has shown the determination and political will to take more responsibility in its own neighbourhood, particularly in the Balkan region. Since the late 1990s, the EU has played a dominant role in the Balkans, not only through its economic assistance policies, but also with the growing presence of European police forces.

NATO

NATO emerged as the main mechanism for coping with the regional conflicts in the Balkans after the end of the Cold War. NATO's involvement in the Balkans marked also a turning point in the Alliance's history. NATO moved beyond its task of defending members' territories into crisis management outside its traditional borders. NATO's military support for UN peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia was the first combat operation and first out-of-area mission in the history of the Alliance.

The first NATO involvement in the Balkans took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1992. NATO, with the Operation Sharp Guard monitored and enforced an UN-imposed arms embargo against the whole of the former Yugoslavia as

contributed to the EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See Available [online]: <<http://europa.eu.int>> [17 January 2005].

⁴⁴⁹ Yıkılkan, p.32.

well as specific economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.⁴⁵⁰ Subsequently, NATO launched the Operation Maritime Monitor, which aimed to enforce the embargo and watch over naval vessels in the Adriatic. In March 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 816, which extended the no-fly zone and also authorized the member states to take measures to ensure the compliance with the ban on flights in the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁵¹ In April 1993, NATO commenced the Operation Deny Flight in order to monitor the flight ban.⁴⁵² The major NATO attack, Operation Deliberate Force, which ended the war in Bosnia, took place between August and September 1995. The main objectives of the air campaign was to get the Bosnian Serbs to lift the siege of Sarajevo, remove their heavy weapons and negotiate a peace agreement.⁴⁵³ After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, the UN gave NATO a mandate to implement the peace accord and NATO sent a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) of more than 60,000 troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina. IFOR deployed to Bosnia and Herzegovina in December 20, 1995 to oversee the implementation of the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement: “bringing about and maintaining an end to hostilities; separating the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska; transferring territory between the two entities according to the peace agreement; and moving the parties’ forces and heavy weapons into approved storage

⁴⁵⁰ Gülnur Aybet, “NATO’s NEW Missions”, *Perceptions* 4, no.1 (March-May 1999), p.70.

⁴⁵¹ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), Appendix, 412.

⁴⁵² NATO first used armed force in Bosnia and Herzegovina on February 28, 1994 when it shot down four Bosnian Serb warplanes that were violating the flight ban.

⁴⁵³ Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO’s Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p.127.

sites”.⁴⁵⁴ These goals were achieved by June 1996 and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) succeeded IFOR in December 1996. The primary task of the SFOR was to maintain the security environment to facilitate Bosnian efforts to reconstruct its economy and society.⁴⁵⁵ SFOR’s activities ranged from “patrolling and providing area security through supporting defense and supervising de-mining operations, to arresting individuals indicted for war crimes and assisting the return of refugees and displaced people to their homes.”⁴⁵⁶ SFOR’s mission lasted eight years and was replaced by the European Union Force (EUFOR) in December 2004.

NATO carried out its second intervention in the Balkan region in Kosovo. NATO members launched an air campaign, Operation Allied Force, in March 1999 against Serbian targets both in Kosovo and Serbia.⁴⁵⁷ The air strikes lasted for seventy-eight days and finished when the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic agreed to a peace plan based on NATO conditions on June 3, 1999. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1244 on June 10, 1999 and a mandate was given to NATO in the Kosovo province. NATO’s initial mandate was “to deter renewed hostility and threats against Kosovo by Yugoslav and Serb forces; to establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order; to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); to support the international humanitarian effort; and coordinate with and support the international

⁴⁵⁴ NATO Fact Sheets: NATO’s Role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available [online]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>> [20 January 2005].

⁴⁵⁵ S. Victor Papacosma, “The Balkans and a Transforming NATO”, in *The New Balkans: Disintegration and Reconstruction*, (eds.) George A. Kourvetaris, Victor Roudometof, Kleomenis Koutsoukis, and Andrew G. Kourvetaris (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), p.331.

⁴⁵⁶ The Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html>> [20 January 2005].

⁴⁵⁷ Martin A. Smith, “NATO: West is Best?”, in *Uncertain Europe: Building a New European Security Order?*, (eds.) Martin A. Smith and Graham Timmins (New York: Routledge, 2001), p.63.

presence, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). ⁴⁵⁸ NATO formed the core of the international peacekeeping mission to Kosovo, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and deployed some 46,000 troops in June 1999.⁴⁵⁹ Currently, NATO maintains a military presence with some 17,500 troops in KFOR.

With its military involvement in Kosovo, NATO not only prevented a humanitarian catastrophe, but also restored stability in a strategic region lying between its member states. During the air campaign, NATO air strikes targeted the Yugoslav army's air defenses and important military infrastructure and in this way halted the strategic and military power of Serbia that pursued aggressive policies. Moreover, there was a large Hungarian population living in the Vojvodina province of the Serbia and Montenegro, and a possible clash between this Hungarian community and the Serbian authorities in the future might drag NATO into the conflict because of Hungary's recent membership to NATO in 1999. NATO's Kosovo operation also hindered this and brought the Serbian military power under control.

In February 2001, armed ethnic conflict broke out in Macedonia between the government forces and the Albanian guerrillas. A major factor contributed to the unrest in the country was the instability in neighbouring Kosovo. Both the EU and NATO, with the help of the OSCE, intervened and a full-scale war was averted this time. Macedonian and Albanian politicians concluded the Ohrid Framework Agreement on August 13, 2001, which included a cease-fire, disarmament of the rebels and constitutional and political

⁴⁵⁸ NATO Fact Sheets: NATO's Role in Relation to Kosovo. Available [online]: <<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/kosovo.htm>> [20 January 2005].

⁴⁵⁹ NATO's Role in Kosovo. Available [online]: <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/kosovo.htm>> [20 January 2005].

reforms to secure Albanian rights in Macedonia.⁴⁶⁰ After the peace agreement, NATO deployed a force of 3,500 troops under Operation Essential Harvest to disarm the so-called Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) and destroy their weapons and ammunition.⁴⁶¹ After completing this task, NATO retained, at Skopje's request, a follow-up force of roughly 1,000 to protect civilian observers that monitored the re-entry of the state security forces into former crisis areas.⁴⁶² NATO handed responsibility for this operation to the EU on March 31, 2003.

NATO's interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia contributed to the formation of security and stability in the Balkans. NATO emerged as the most determining force in bringing an end to major conflicts in the region. In the future it seems that NATO will continue to play a crucial role in the Balkans with the participation of the Balkan states in the Alliance. Bulgaria, Romania and Slovenia became the members of the NATO on March 29, 2004. Albania, Croatia and Macedonia participate in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PfP)⁴⁶³ and contribute personnel to NATO operations. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro are candidates for the PfP.

Turkey as a key ally of the NATO's southeastern region contributed to NATO's all operations in the Balkans and provided troops for SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

⁴⁶⁰ Dana H. Allin, *NATO's Balkan Interventions* (New York: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), pp.78-79.

⁴⁶¹ Stanler R. Sloan, *NATO, the European Union, and The Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), p.112.

⁴⁶² NATO in the Balkans: Bringing Peace and Stability to the Balkans, NATO Briefing. Available [online]:< http://www.nato.int/docu/briefing/balkans_e.pdf> [20 January 2005].

⁴⁶³ Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) was initiated by the Clinton administration at the January 1994 NATO Summit. Each participating state follows a relationship with the Alliance at a pace and scope determined by its own capabilities and needs. Over the long term, the key objective is to accept some partners as the full members of the NATO.

KFOR in Kosovo and Operation Essential Harvest in Macedonia.⁴⁶⁴ Turkey supported Bulgaria and Romania's entry into NATO strongly on the grounds that it could help to consolidate security and stability in the Balkans. Furthermore, Turkey developed its bilateral military relations with the other Balkan states. Albania and Turkey signed a military cooperation agreement on July 29, 1992, which provided both parties to take part in maneuvers in the other's country.⁴⁶⁵ Turkey provided military assistance to Albania that included the training of officers for the Albanian army and the construction of a naval base on the Adriatic Sea coast.⁴⁶⁶ The Turkish government sent 700 soldiers for Operation Alba, and Turkey, at the invitation of the Albanian government, subsequently sent a military contingent of advisers, together with Greece and Italy, to help rebuild the Albanian forces.⁴⁶⁷

Turkey and Macedonia signed a security protocol in May 1992. In July 1995, the two countries concluded the Skopje Document, which provided for the exchange and military training of military experts and joint military exercises.⁴⁶⁸ An agreement on the training of Macedonian pilots was signed in March 1996. In March 1997, Turkey gave the Macedonian army several transport vehicles, two patrol boats and a communication system.⁴⁶⁹ Turkish government also donated equipment and ammunition worth \$1.9

⁴⁶⁴ Turkey sent about 1,000 troops to SFOR and KFOR and 150 troops to Macedonia.

⁴⁶⁵ Uzgel, p.74.

⁴⁶⁶ Sabri Sayari, "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism" *Journal of International Affairs* 54, no.1 (Fall 2000), p.179.

⁴⁶⁷ John Roper, "The West and Turkey: Varying Roles, Common Interests", *The International Spectator* 34, no.1 (January-March 1999), pp.89-102.

⁴⁶⁸ Zalmay Khalilzad, "A Strategic Plan for Western-Turkish Relations", in *The Future of Turkish-Western Relations: Towards a Strategic Plan*, (eds.) Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian Lesser, and F. Stephen Larrabee (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2000), p.37.

⁴⁶⁹ *MILS*, 17 March 1997, cited in Sylvie Gangloff, "The Relations Between Turkey and Macedonia: The Incoherencies of a Political Partnership", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6 (2001), p.40.

million to the Macedonia.⁴⁷⁰ Turkey supports both Albania and Macedonia's bid for membership in NATO.

Turkey's Economic Relations with the Balkan Countries

Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC)

The Black Sea Economic Organization (BSEC) was established on the initiative of Turkish President Turgut Özal on June 25, 1992 in İstanbul and consisted of Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.⁴⁷¹ The main aim of the BSEC was the promotion of economic cooperation in the Black Sea region. Specific areas of cooperation were: "transport and communications, including infrastructure; informatics; exchange of economic and commercial information, including statistics; standardization and certification of products; energy; mining and processing of mineral raw materials; tourism; agriculture and agro-industries; veterinary and sanitary protection; health care and pharmaceuticals and science and technology."⁴⁷²

The BSEC is an institutionalized organization. The Permanent International Secretariat is located in Istanbul. It is responsible for the practical coordination between the different levels of cooperation and it collects and compiles information, which is needed to develop particular cooperation projects. The leading body of the BSEC is the Assembly of Foreign Ministers and the Chairmanship-in-Office and is based on rotation (six months). There are permanent working groups such as the Working Group on Agriculture and Agro-Industry, Banking and Finance, Cooperation in Combating Crime,

⁴⁷⁰ *Turkish Daily News*, 14 June 1999.

⁴⁷¹ Brown, p.157. Serbia and Montenegro became a full-fledged member in April 16, 2004. Austria, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Tunisia held observer status.

⁴⁷² Summit Declaration on BSEC, Istanbul, 25 June 1992. Available [online]: <http://www.bsec.gov.tr/summit_h.htm> [24 January 2005].

Communications, Cooperation in Emergency Assistance, Energy, Environmental Protection, Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information, Health care and Pharmaceuticals, Cooperation in Science and Technology, Cooperation in Tourism, Trade and Economic Development and Transport.⁴⁷³ The other affiliated institutions include a Parliamentary Assembly, which enables national parliaments to adopt legislation needed to implement BSEC decisions; the BSEC Business Council; the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank that was opened in Thessaloniki which finance the implementation of joint regional projects and provide banking services to the public and private sectors of member states; the International Center for Black Sea Studies; and the BSEC Coordination Center for the Exchange of Statistical Data and Economic Information.⁴⁷⁴

The BSEC was transformed into a regional economic organization with an international legal identity when member states adopted a Charter in Yalta on June 5, 1998 that was ratified by the respective parliaments in May 1, 1999.⁴⁷⁵ The six Black Sea littoral states of the BSEC, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine also formed the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group (BLACKSEAFOR) in April 2, 2001 in İstanbul.⁴⁷⁶ The BLACKSEAFOR is composed of naval elements and its tasks are: “search and rescue operations, humanitarian assistance, mine counter measures,

⁴⁷³ See Subsidiary Organs. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec.gov.tr/subsidiary_hm> [24 January 2005].

⁴⁷⁴ See BSEC Related Bodies. Available [online]: < http://www.bsec.gov.tr/bsecrelated_hm> [24 January 2005].

⁴⁷⁵ Berdal Aral, “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation After Ten Years: What Went Wrong? ”, *Alternatives* 1, no.4 (Winter 2002), p.1.

⁴⁷⁶ Ali Başaran, “10’Uncu Yaşında Karadeniz Ekonomik İşbirliği Girişimi: Beklentiler, Gerçekleşenler, Sorunlar, Umutlar”, *Avrasya Etütleri* 23 (Summer-Fall 2002), p.101.

environmental protection, goodwill visits and any other tasks, like peace support operations agreed by all the parties.”⁴⁷⁷

The BSEC failed to realize most of its original goals. Most of the member states were in the early stages of their transition from central-planned economies to market-oriented economies and lacking the necessary financial resources. There were also significant political disputes between the BSEC member states: between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh, between Greece and Turkey in respect of Cyprus and the delimitation of the Aegean Sea, between Georgia and Russia over the Abkhazia issue, and between Moldova and Russia about the Transnistria region. Moreover, as Ahmet Davutoğlu stated, the BSEC member states saw the organization as a second rate partnership which was designed to satisfy certain conjectural needs and constantly underlined that the BSEC was not an alternative either to the EU or NATO.⁴⁷⁸ This attitude was mostly prevalent among the Balkan states Bulgaria and Romania that were part of the enlargement process in the EU and Turkey, which had signed a Customs Union Protocol with the EU in 1995. At the Bucharest Summit of the BSEC in June 1995, the Romanian President Ion Iliescu said that: “We conceive economic cooperation in the Black Sea as a bridge between our countries and the other areas of cooperation in Europe, in the European Union, as well as a component of the general progress of European integration.”⁴⁷⁹ Former BSEC Chair, Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Nadejda Mihailova indicated that: “the organization can only develop successfully in cooperation

⁴⁷⁷ Background of the BLACKSEAFOR. Available [online]: <http://www.blackseafor.org/backgr.htm> [24 January 2005].

⁴⁷⁸ Ahmet Davutoğlu, *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu* (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001), p.277.

⁴⁷⁹ Ion Iliescu, “Toast by the President of Romania, Ion Iliescu”, in *Romania: Black Sea Economic Cooperation Summit Conference* (Bucharest, Romania: Public Information Department, 1995), p.56.

with the EU.”⁴⁸⁰ Former Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Çiller stated that: “in the future the BSEC will be integrated into Europe.”⁴⁸¹

Bilateral Economic Relations

Albania

Turkey and Albania signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness, Cooperation and Security in 1992. This was followed by the President Turgut Özal’s official visit to Tirana in February 1993. In October 1995, Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Turkey signed a declaration in New York on the construction of a trans-Balkan highway linking İstanbul with the Albanian port of Durres.⁴⁸² In February 2005, during Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Tirana, the two countries signed an agreement on maritime transport.⁴⁸³ However, bilateral economic relations lagged behind the military and political cooperation. Turkey comes fourth (5.4 percent) in Albania’s imports after Italy (36.2 percent), Greece (27.6 percent) and Germany (5.5 percent) and in terms of Albania’s exports, Turkey is again the fourth partner after Italy (74.9 percent), Greece (12.8 percent) and Germany (3.4 percent).⁴⁸⁴ Greece shares a border with Albania and Albania is located just across the Adriatic from Italy. Turkey is

⁴⁸⁰ *RFE/RL Newslines*, 23 October 1998.

⁴⁸¹ *OMRI Daily Digest*, 11 February 1997, cited in Melanie H. Ram, *Sub-regional Cooperation and European Integration: Romania’s Delicate Balance*, Report presented to the International Studies Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL, 20-24 February 2001, p.12.

⁴⁸² Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2000), p.155.

⁴⁸³ SEE Security Monitor, 15 February 2005. Available [online]: < http://www.csees.net/?page=news&news_id=40902&country_id=> [01 June 2005].

⁴⁸⁴ İstanbul Ticaret Odası, Arnavutluk Ülke Raporu. Available [online]: < <http://www.ito.org.tr/ITOPortal/Dokuman/08.04.02.pdf>> [28 January 2005] and CIA World Fact Book, Albania. Available [online]: < <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/al.html>> [28 January 2005].

in a disadvantageous position compared to Greece and Italy because of the transportation costs.

Albania has a small economy, but a growing one, and this attracts the medium and small-size Turkish enterprises. There are forty-eight small and medium size Turkish enterprises operating in Albania, Turkish investments in Albania total nearly \$ 35 million. By June 30, 2003, there were ten Albanian companies in Turkey with a total capital of 872.7 million TL.⁴⁸⁵

Table 2. Turkey-Albania Foreign Trade (million \$)⁴⁸⁶

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2001	73.2	3.6	69.6	76.8
2002	78.7	3.8	74.9	82.5
2003	114.4	4.5	109.9	118.9
2004/1	9.9	0.4	9.5	10.3

The trade volume between Turkey and Albania reached to 119 million dollars in 2003. This is an increase of about forty-three percent when compared to preceding year. The trade balance shows a large surplus in favor of Turkey. Turkish investments in Albania vary from shoe factory, snail processing company, housing scheme, residential and business center to retail and health investments.⁴⁸⁷ The number of Albanian tourists

⁴⁸⁵ TC Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]: <

http://www.hazine.gov.tr/ybsrapor2003_1yari.pdf> [28 January 2005].

⁴⁸⁶ Source: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Available [online]: <www.die.gov.tr> [28 January 2005].

⁴⁸⁷ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Albania. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Albania/Albania_Economic.htm> [28 January 2005].

visiting Turkey was 32,424 in 2003. The share of Albanian tourists in total number of foreigners arriving in Turkey was 0.23 percent in 2003.⁴⁸⁸

Bosnia and Herzegovina

Turkey pledged eighty million dollars of Eximbank credits for the reconstruction program in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴⁸⁹ This was in addition to the provision of thirty-two million dollars of bilateral and humanitarian assistance. Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed a Free Trade Agreement in July 3, 2002, which covered all agricultural and industrial products without exceptions.⁴⁹⁰ The two countries also signed a bilateral investment protection agreement to protect and promote investments and Turkey granted preferential treatment to Bosnia and Herzegovina over a wide range of products.

The level of economic relations between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina remained low. One reason for this is the divided and multi-tiered government structure in Bosnia. There is not a single economic space in the country. Another reason was the growing EU domination of the country's economy. Italy (28.7 percent), Croatia (18.3 percent) and Germany (17.1 percent) are the major export partners of Bosnia while its leading import partners are Croatia (24.5 percent), Slovenia (14.7 percent) and Germany (13.7 percent).⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ Turan Aydın, "Bosna-Hersek'teki Yeniden Yapılanma Çabaları ve Türkiye", *Avrasya Etütleri* 3, no.2 (Summer 1996), p.66.

⁴⁹⁰ Central Eastern Europe Business Information Center, Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Commercial Guide 2004. Available [online]: <http://www.mac.doc.gov/ceebic/countryr/bosniah/CCG.htm> > [28 January 2005].

⁴⁹¹ CIA World Fact Book, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available [online]: < <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bk.html> > [28 January 2005].

Table 3. Turkey-Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Trade (million \$)⁴⁹²

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	42.90	6.30	36.60	49.20
2003	49	7	42	56
2004	79	9	70	88

The present trade volume between Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina is eighty-eight million dollars. It increased 57.14 percent compared to 2003. There are forty-eight medium and small-sized Turkish companies in Bosnia and there are seven Bosnian companies in Turkey.⁴⁹³ Moreover, a Turkish-Bosnian Businessmen Association was established on March 6, 1997 in order to improve the cooperation between two countries. The İstanbul Chamber of Commerce and the Chamber of Foreign Trade of Bosnia and Herzegovina also signed a cooperation protocol during Turkish State Minister Beşir Atalay's visit to Sarajevo on May 6, 2005.⁴⁹⁴ The number of Bosnian tourists visiting Turkey was 34,636 in 2003. The share of Bosnian tourists in total number of foreigners arriving in Turkey was 0.25 percent in 2003.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹² TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]: <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasim-04.xls> [28 January 2005].

⁴⁹³ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Bosnia and Herzegovina. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Bosnia+and+Herzegovina/BosniaandHerzegovina_Economic.htm> [28 January 2005].

⁴⁹⁴ *Southeast European Times*, 08 May 2005. Available [online]: <http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2005/05/08/nb-04> [09 May 2005].

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

Bulgaria

A free trade agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria was signed in July 1998 and took effect in January 1, 1999.⁴⁹⁶ Turkish companies undertook the construction of three dams on the Arda River and a 114-kilometer-long highway connecting the Kapikule to Orizova.⁴⁹⁷ Bulgaria currently has two border crossings with Turkey. Bulgarian authorities requested the re-opening of a third crossing, which is likely to be favorably considered by Turkey. Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey also are actively working to improve the border crossing conditions and to alleviate bottlenecks through the SECI.⁴⁹⁸

Turkey comes fourth (9.2 percent) in Bulgaria's exports after Italy (14.1 percent), Germany (10.9 percent) and Greece (10.5 percent) and in terms of imports Turkey is the fifth partner (6.2 percent) of Bulgaria after Germany (14.4 percent), Russia (12.6 percent), Italy (10.3 percent) and Greece (6.7 percent).⁴⁹⁹

Table 4. Turkey-Bulgaria Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵⁰⁰

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	377.5	506	-128.5	883.5
2003	491	655	-164	1,146
2004	685	748	-63	1,433

⁴⁹⁶ *Reuters*, 18 July 1998, cited in Coşkun, p.101.

⁴⁹⁷ *Reuters*, 2 April 1999, cited in Coşkun, p.102.

⁴⁹⁸ Central Eastern Europe Business Information Center, Bulgaria Commercial Guide 2004. Available [online]: <http://www.mac.doc.gov/ceeibic/countryr/bulgaria/CCG.htm> [29 January 2005].

⁴⁹⁹ CIA World Fact Book, Bulgaria. Available [online]: <<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/bu.html>> [28 January 2005].

⁵⁰⁰ TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]: <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasım-04.xls> [28 January 2005].

Mutual trade between Turkey and Bulgaria reached 1,433 million dollars in 2004. The trade balance shows a deficit on the Turkish side. Turkey mostly imports electrical energy and natural gas from Bulgaria and exports metals and textile products. Turkish investments in Bulgaria increased during the 1990s, and presently 2,609 Turkish companies are operating in Bulgaria and their investments stand at 250-300 million dollars.⁵⁰¹ Their activities are mostly focused on the construction of highways and power stations, textile and food, and wine and tobacco industries. There exist thirty-two Bulgarian firms in Turkey with a capital of 7.9 trillion TL.⁵⁰²

Croatia

Turkey's economic and commercial relations with Croatia remain limited. A Turkish-Croatian Joint Commission was established in 1995 and some meetings have taken place between the businessmen.⁵⁰³ There are three Croatian companies in Turkey, one of them is in manufacturing sector and the others are in service sector. There are two Turkish companies in Croatia. ENKA deals with highway construction and UZEL builds and operates hotels in Dubrovnik.⁵⁰⁴ Agreements to develop trade and economic

⁵⁰¹ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Bulgaria. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Bulgaria/Bulgaria_Economic.htm>
[28 January 2005]. In terms of FDI Turkey is at the 13th rank in Bulgaria with an investment of 125.3 million dollars.

⁵⁰² Ibid.

⁵⁰³ Pınar Yürür, "Tarihi Süreç İçerisinde Hırvatistan Dış Politikası", in *Balkan Diplomasisi*, (eds.) Ömer E. Lütem and Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001), p.224.

⁵⁰⁴ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Croatia. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Croatia/Croatia_Economic.htm>
[28 January 2005].

cooperation and also mutual encouragement, promotion and protection of investments between Turkey and Croatia were signed in 1996.⁵⁰⁵

Table 5. Turkey-Croatia Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵⁰⁶

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	42.42	9.38	33.04	51.80
2003	73	14	59	87
2004	96	29	67	125

The trade volume between the two countries was 125 million dollars in 2004. This shows an increase of about forty-four percent when compared to 2003. The two countries also concluded a Free Trade Agreement. It seems that Croatia carries out most of its foreign trade with the EU especially with Italy and Germany.⁵⁰⁷

Land and maritime transportation is a promising sphere of cooperation between the two countries. An Air Transport Agreement between Turkey and Croatia was signed in January 1994 and Croatia Airlines flights between Zagreb and Istanbul commenced in April 1994. Furthermore, a Road and Maritime Transport Agreement was concluded in Ankara in 1994.⁵⁰⁸ This will make possible a Ro-Ro line between Mersin and Rijeka, Split and Ploce.

⁵⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁶ TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]: <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasim-04.xls> [28 January 2005].

⁵⁰⁷ Export partners of Croatia are Italy (26.1 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (14.6 percent), Germany (12 percent) and import partners are Italy (17.9 percent), Germany (15.7 percent) and Slovenia (7.4 percent) See CIA World Fact Book, Croatia. Available [online]: < <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hr.html> > [28 January 2005].

⁵⁰⁸ Söylemez, p.105.

Greece

Turkey's bilateral trade with Greece experienced substantial growth after the signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1996 and the rapprochement between the two countries in 1999. A Turkish-Greek Joint Economic Commission was established in February 2000 and two meetings took place in Athens and Ankara. There are four Turkish companies in Greece, operating in transportation, information technology and service sectors whereas in Turkey, there exist seventy-six firms with Greek capital, which operate in the construction, cosmetic, fishery, information technology, packaging, pharmacy, plastic and tourism sectors.⁵⁰⁹

Table 6. Turkey-Greece Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵¹⁰

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	574	324	250	898
2003	728	349	379	1,077
2004	898	446	452	1,344

In 2004, Turkey's exports to Greece increased twenty-three percent when compared with 2003. As for imports from Greece, they increased twenty-eight percent. Greece has a share of 1.8 percent in Turkey's total exports and 0.57 percent in Turkey's total imports.

⁵⁰⁹ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Greece. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Greece/Greece_Economic.htm> [28 January 2005].

⁵¹⁰ TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]:
<http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasım-04.xls>> [28 January 2005].

Macedonia

Although Turkey and Macedonia had close relations on the military and political levels, Turkey remained behind other countries in investment and trade with Macedonia. The Prevention of Double Taxation and Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments were signed in 1995 and these agreements were ratified by the Turkish parliament in July 1996.⁵¹¹ A Joint Business Council was created in November 1995 and a Free Trade Agreement was concluded in September 1999.

The decline of Turkish-Macedonian economic relations coincided with the normalization of the relations of the Skopje with its neighbours. Greece recognized Macedonia as the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and lifted a sixteen-month embargo in September 1995.⁵¹² Serbia and Montenegro recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name in April 1996 and signed the Prevention of Double Taxation and Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments agreements in September 1996. Resumption of economic relations with Serbia and Montenegro was important for Macedonia as its external trade relies mainly on the route (the Morava-Vardar valley), which goes from Serbia.⁵¹³

Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz visited Macedonia in July 1998 and the two countries signed a Social Security Agreement.⁵¹⁴ Three months later President Süleyman Demirel paid another visit to Macedonia and projects such as the creation of a

⁵¹¹ *Hürriyet*, 26 July 1996, cited in Gangloff, p.47.

⁵¹² Şule Kut, "Turkish Policy Towards the Balkans", in *Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds.) Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayarı (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), p.86.

⁵¹³ Gangloff, p.49.

⁵¹⁴ *Hürriyet*, 07 July 1998, cited in Gangloff, p.48.

joint venture in Strumica for the management of a sunflower oil factory and the construction of dams and power stations in the Vardar Valley were decided. Macedonia and Turkey signed an agreement in Skopje on April 27, 2005 promoting bilateral economic and commercial cooperation. The protocol covered a wide scope of activities including banking, standardization, energy, tourism, health and environmental protection.⁵¹⁵

Table 7. Turkey-Macedonia Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵¹⁶

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	100	15	85	115
2003	99	25	74	124
2004	118	41	77	159

The trade volume shows an increase of twenty-eight percent in 2004 compared to preceding year. Turkey is the seventh import partner of Macedonia (6 percent).⁵¹⁷ There are approximately two hundred Turkish companies in Macedonia with a total of twenty million dollars of investment. Forty of these companies are small and medium sized

⁵¹⁵ *Southeast European Times*, 28 April 2005. Available [online]: <
http://www.balkantimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/newsbriefs/setimes/newsbriefs/2005/04/28/nb-04> [09 May 2005].

⁵¹⁶ TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]:
<http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasım-04.xls>> [28 January 2005].

⁵¹⁷ CIA World Fact Book, Macedonia. Available [online]: <
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/mk.html>> [29 January 2005].

enterprises. Twelve Macedonia firms are presently operating in Turkey with a total capital of 272 billion TL.⁵¹⁸

Romania

Romania emerged as the Turkey's biggest partner in the Balkans. The trade volume between two countries reached 2,320 million dollars in 2004. The Turkish-Romanian Business Council was formed in 1997 and the two countries concluded a Free Trade Agreement in April 1997 that became effective in February 1998.

Table 8. Turkey-Romania Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵¹⁹

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	552.3	648.9	-96.6	1,201.3
2003	696	784	-88	1,480
2004	966	1,354	-388	2,320

Turkey's trade balance with Romania is negative. Turkey is Romania's fifth export partner (5.1 percent).⁵²⁰ Turkey has an important economic presence in Romania. Currently there exist 8,666 Turkish firms in the country with investments over eight hundred million dollars. Turkish companies like Bayındır and Bayraktar have made large investments in the financial structures in Romania as the Turkish Romanian Bank and

⁵¹⁸ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Republic of Macedonia. Available [online]: <
<http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Republic+of+Macedonia/Macedonia+Economic.htm> [28 January 2005].

⁵¹⁹ TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]:
<http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasım-04.xls> [28 January 2005].

⁵²⁰ CIA World Fact Book, Romania. Available [online]: <
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ro.html>> [29 January 2005].

Robank.⁵²¹ In return there are fourteen Romanian companies in Turkey, two of them are in manufacturing sector and the rest are in the service sector.⁵²²

Turkish investments include beer and beverages, construction, electronics, textile and tourism. Turkish contracting firms have built a number of shopping centers in Romania and the Turkish government also encourages Turkish contracting firms to take part in infrastructure projects that will be realized in the framework of the Stability Pact. Moreover, Romania is also interested in the development of transportation, especially roll-on-roll off ferryboats between Turkish and Romanian ports. Romania is one of the countries in the world from whose citizens Turkey does not require an entry visa. The number of Romanian tourists visiting Turkey was 185, 036 in 2003.⁵²³

Serbia and Montenegro

The economic relations between Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey, which froze during the Bosnian and Kosovo crises, have started to improve steadily during the recent years. The Turkish-Yugoslav Business Council held its first meeting in Belgrade in June 2002. This council meeting was succeeded by subsequent meetings, which were gathered in Bursa and Istanbul. The last meeting took place in Istanbul in February 2004 and the President of Serbia and Montenegro, Svetozar Marovic also participated.

⁵²¹ Emil Constantinescu, "Romanian-Turkish Cooperation", *Foreign Policy Quarterly* 23, (1999), p.94.

⁵²² Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Romania. Available [online]: <
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Romania/Romania_Economic.htm>
[28 January 2005].

⁵²³ Ibid.

Table 9. Turkey-Serbia -Montenegro Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵²⁴

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2001	98.16	47.19	50.97	145.35
2002	120.92	11.14	109.78	132.06
2003	184	30	154	214

There are presently twenty-two Serbian and Montenegrin firms in Turkey.⁵²⁵ Car spare parts, construction materials, electrical appliances and equipments, foodstuff, ready-wear goods and textile products are areas of trade between the two countries.

Slovenia

Turkey established diplomatic relations with Slovenia in 1992 and opened an embassy in Ljubljana in 1993. However neither political nor economic relations between the two countries have developed much. Slovenia carries out most of its foreign trade with EU countries, especially with Austria, Germany and Italy. Slovenia is important for Turkey because it is a transit route for most of Turkey's exports to Europe. Turkey and Slovenia set up the Business Council in 1997 and a Joint Economic Commission in 1998. A Free Trade Agreement was signed in May 1998 and became effective in June 2000.

⁵²⁴ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Serbia And Montenegro. Available [online]: <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Serbia+and+Montenegro/SerbiaandMontenegro_Economic.htm>[28 January 2005].

⁵²⁵ TC Başbakanlık Hazine Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]: <http://www.hazine.gov.tr/ybsrapor2003_1yari.pdf> [29 January 2005].

Table 10. Turkey-Slovenia Foreign Trade (million \$)⁵²⁶

Years	Turkish Exports	Turkish Imports	Trade Balance	Trade Volume
2002	68.90	56.60	12.30	125.50
2003	79	66	13	145
2004	149	158	-9	307

Slovenia is a small market and is not attractive for Turkish businessmen. Currently two Turkish firms operate in Slovenia with a capital of 1.4 million dollars.⁵²⁷ In Turkey, one firm with Slovene capital operates in the telecommunications sector.

Turkey's economic involvement in the Balkans remains weak. Turkey can not provide much credit and incentive to the private enterprises because of its own financial difficulties. Moreover, Russia, and the newly independent republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia are more attractive than the Balkan region for Turkish businessmen in terms of market size, resources and profit opportunities.

Total trade volume between Turkey and nine Balkan countries does not even reach to the trade volume between Turkey and Germany. Bilateral economic relations with countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia with whom Turkey has close political and military ties are insufficient. Greece, by using the advantage of geographical proximity and its EU membership has increased its economic penetration in the Balkans. Major Greek companies such as Hellenic Petroleum SA, OTE

⁵²⁶ TC Başbakanlık Gümrük Müsteşarlığı. Available [online]: <http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/gumruk/dosyaupload/disticaret/bulten-Kasım-04.xls> [28 January 2005].

⁵²⁷ Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey's Commercial and Economic Relations With Slovenia. Available [online]: < http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Regions/Balkans/Slovenia/Slovenia_Economic.htm > [28 January 2005].

(Greek State Telecommunications Company), National Bank of Greece, Alpha Credit Bank, Delta SA (one of the largest dairy products manufacturing firms), 3E (the largest beverages bottling company in Greece) and Mihailidis (tobacco processing and merchandising company) have expanded their investments in Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia.⁵²⁸

The Role of the European Union Integration Process on Turkey's Relations with
Neighbour Balkan States

Greece: Relative Rapprochement

Turkey and Greece, although they were both members of the Western alliance during the Cold War confronted several times on issues such as Cyprus, the Aegean Sea, the Patriarchate and the question of minorities. The outbreak of the Yugoslav conflict in the 1990s added another dimension to this already strained relationship. While Turkey strongly supported Bosnia and Herzegovina and developed its relations with Albania and Macedonia, Greece was involved in severe disputes with its two neighbours and it provided keen diplomatic support to the Bosnian Serbs and Serbia in the international area. Although Greece and Serbia had deep historical ties and the common bond of Orthodoxy, it was also argued that pro-Serbian policies of Greece was in part based on its perception of how the evolving situation might or might not work to Turkey's advantage.⁵²⁹

⁵²⁸ Charalambos Tsardanidis and Evangelos Karafotakis, "Greece's Economic Diplomacy Towards the Balkan Countries", *Perceptions* 5, no.3 (September-November 2000), pp.85-86.

⁵²⁹ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkey in the New Security Environment in the Balkan and Black Sea Region", in *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, (eds.) Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp.83-84.

The first incident which brought Turkey and Greece to the brink of war after the end of the Cold War was the Kardak (Imia) Rocks crisis, which took place in January 1996. A Turkish ship ran aground on December 25, 1995 on the uninhabited Kardak Rocks, which lie 3.8 nautical miles off the Turkish coast in the Aegean Sea, and about 8.8 kilometers from the Greek island of Kalymnos. The Greek ships claimed that the region was within the territorial waters of Greece and offered to help to the ship crew. The Turkish captain refused their offer on the grounds that the area was in Turkish territorial waters.⁵³⁰ The Turkish insurance company attempted to rescue the ship. On December 26, 1995, Greece issued a note to Turkey, claiming that the ship was in the territorial waters of Greece and demanded that the rescue operations be stopped. On the same day Turkish government sent a reply and denied the Greek assertions.⁵³¹ The situation worsened when the mayor of Kalymnos, together with the priest of the island, placed a Greek flag on the Kardak Rocks. In return two journalists from the Turkish *Hürriyet* newspaper landed on the island and replaced the Greek flag with the Turkish flag. A possible military clash between the parties was prevented with the intervention of the US. Both sides agreed to remove their flags and returned to the status quo.

According to the Greek authorities, Turkey had challenged Greek sovereignty over the Kardak Rocks.⁵³² However, Turkey declared that there are hundred or thousands of small uninhabited islands and islets in the Aegean Sea which have never been the

⁵³⁰ Fuat Aksu, "Turkish Greek Relations: From Conflict to Détente, the Last Decade", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 6 (2001), p.172.

⁵³¹ Ali Kurumahmut, *Ege'de Temel Sorun: Egemenliği Tartışmalı Adalar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1998), Annexes 20-21.

⁵³² Fotios Moustakis, *The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p.50.

subject of international legal agreements. The ownership of these islands is unclear so they represent gray areas of uncertain sovereignty.

At the Madrid NATO Summit of July 1997, Greece and Turkey accepted the Madrid Declaration, which aimed to diminish the tension between the two countries. According to this declaration both countries accepted: “To continue the development of peace, security and good neighbourhood relations; to respect the other country’s sovereignty; to respect the international laws and agreements; to show respect for the vital benefits of the other country and its legitimacy in the Aegean Sea; the desire to avoid from misunderstandings that may give rise to military conflict and founding on mutual respect accepting to stay away from one-sided actions; to use peaceful methods based on mutual decisions, to sort out the conflicts without resorting to the threat of using power or actually using power.”⁵³³ The Madrid Declaration could not go further than a declaration of goodwill and could not hinder the emergence of new conflicts between Turkey and Greece.

Tension between the two countries rose again when the Greek Cypriot Administration of Cyprus announced in January 1997 that it would purchase S-300 missiles from Russia and would deploy them on Cyprus. Such a development would alter the balance between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean and Mediterranean Sea in favor of Greece. Moreover, these missiles had capability to hit targets in southern of Turkey. In December 1998, the Greek Cypriot government, under US pressure, agreed to deploy the missiles on Crete. This action further complicated the situation in the Aegean. Turkey

⁵³³ S. Gülden Ayman, “Ege’de Müzakere ve Caydırıcılık”, in *En Uzun Onyıl: Türkiye’nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, (eds.) Gencay Özcan and Şule Kut (İstanbul: Büke Yayıncılık, 2000), p.281.

had to improve the radar system and reconsider its defense priorities in the Aegean Sea.⁵³⁴

On February 16, 1999, Turkey announced the capture of the leader of the separatist PKK organization, Abdullah Öcalan, in Nairobi, Kenya.⁵³⁵ Greece had sheltered him in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi. This incident justified the Turkish claims that Athens was providing military and political support to the PKK. The Simitis government in Greece tried to show that the groups supporting Öcalan and PKK were not from the government and that those who were involved in the affair would be punished. As a result, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Theodoros Pangalos, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Alekos Papadopoulos and the Minister of Public Order, Filippos Petsalnikos had to resign.⁵³⁶

In July 1999, a process of diplomatic dialogue was commenced between Turkey and Greece spurred by the meeting of Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem and his Greek counterpart George Papandreou in New York. The two countries agreed to hold meetings on issues such as culture, commerce and trade, drug trafficking, environment protection, illegal immigration, organized crime, tourism and terrorism.⁵³⁷ The controversial issues such as Cyprus and Aegean Sea were postponed to a later date.

⁵³⁴ Aksu, p.179.

⁵³⁵ Amikam Nachmani, "What Says the Neighbor to the West ? : On Turkish-Greek Relations", in *Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power*, (eds.) Barry Rubin and Kemal Kirişçi (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 2002), pp.99-100.

⁵³⁶ M. Murat Hatipoğlu, "Yunanistan'ın Dış Politikası ve Balkanlar" (1990-2000), in *Balkan Diplomasisi*, (eds.) Ömer E. Lütem and Birgül Demirtaş Coşkun (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2001), pp.49-50.

⁵³⁷ Alexis Heraclides, "The Greek-Turkish Conflict: Towards Resolution and Reconciliation", in *Turkish-Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in the Aegean*, (eds.) Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis (London, UK: Routledge, 2004), p.78.

The Turkish and Greek earthquakes of August and September 1999 prepared the ground for the détente. After the Marmara earthquake which struck Turkey on August 17, 1999, the Greek government provided 200 tents with doctors and nurses, one thousand blankets and twelve tons of every sort of aid.⁵³⁸ Turkey sent the dispatch of an aid team to help with rescue operations after the earthquake in Athens on September 7, 1999. However, the following events showed that conflicting issues did not disappear easily. Although, the celebrations which were held in Turkey on September 9 to celebrate the liberation of İzmir from Greek occupation were not as pompous as they usually were and did not include the representation of the salvation of the city from the Greek armies, a governmental decree was concluded by the Greek President Stefanopoulos on September 14, in commemoration of the day when “Western Anatolian Greeks were subjected to genocide by Turkey”.⁵³⁹

At the December 1999 Helsinki Summit of the EU, Turkey was made a candidate for EU membership. Greece lifted its veto on the conditions that bilateral disputes in the Aegean Sea which could not be resolved by 2004 would be referred to the International Court of Justice in the Hague and a solution to the Cyprus problem would not be a pre-condition for the accession of the Cyprus to the EU.⁵⁴⁰ In January 2000, Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou formally visited Ankara and in February 2000, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs İsmail Cem paid an official visit to Athens. During these visits, a total of nine bilateral agreements, in areas of economic, cultural and scientific

⁵³⁸ *Hürriyet*, 21 August 1999, cited in Aksu, p.191.

⁵³⁹ Alaeddin Yalçinkaya, “From Disaster Solidarity to Interest Solidarity: Turkish-Greek Relations After the Marmara and Athens Earthquakes Within the Concept of Game Theory”, *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies* 8 (2003), p.189.

⁵⁴⁰ Robert McDonald, “Greek-Turkish Relations and the Cyprus Conflict”, in *Greek-Turkish Relations in the Era of Globalization*, (eds.) Dimitris Keridis and Charles M. Perry (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2001), pp.134-135.

cooperation, education, environment, tourism and combating organized crime, were signed.⁵⁴¹

Greek treatment of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace was another source of friction between the two countries. In recent years there had been some developments and positive changes in the living conditions of this Turkish community mostly prompted by the European Union pressure. The most important improvement was the abolition of Article 19 of the 1955 Citizenship Law of Greece in June 1998. According to this law, “a person of non-Greek ethnic origin who goes abroad without the intention of returning may be deprived of citizenship by administrative decree.”⁵⁴² As this article was applied only to Greek citizens of non-Greek origin, it was clearly based on racial discrimination. It is estimated that more than 60,000 Turks from Western Thrace lost their citizenship between 1955-1998 because of this article.⁵⁴³ Article 19 was revoked by the Greek parliament, but without retrospective effect, which means there are still thousands of people who have been deprived of their citizenship unjustly.

Minority education in Greece has been subject to excessive pressures and intervention of the government and also suffered from the lack of a systematic and well-planned state policy. There were some efforts of the Greek governments in the 1990s which aimed at upgrading the quality of the education afforded to the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. A 0.5 percent quota and special examinations for admission to universities had been fixed in 1996 in order to raise the educational level of the minority

⁵⁴¹ Thanos P. Dokos, “Greek Security Policy in the Twenty First Century”, in *Greece and Turkey After the End of the Cold War*, (eds.) Christodoulos K. Yiallourides and Panayotis J. Tsakonas (New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 2001), p.95.

⁵⁴² Baskin Oran, “The Sleeping Volcano in Turco-Greek Relations: The Western Thrace Minority”, *International Journal of Turkish Studies* 4 (Winter 1992-1994), p.128.

⁵⁴³ International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Greece Annual Report*, 1999.

and to facilitate its integration to the country.⁵⁴⁴ In 2000, the Greek and Turkish governments agreed on printing and distribution of new primary school textbooks for the minority schools throughout Western Thrace.⁵⁴⁵ However, the poor quality of education that the Turkish students receive in Western Thrace does not appear to have changed substantially. Moreover, government efforts to unilaterally upgrade the Greek curriculum of the minority schools with assistance from the EU had limited impact and faced resistance from the Turkish community, as the Greek government did not resume cooperation with Turkey in this field.⁵⁴⁶

After the 1990s, with the help of the EU funds, Greece took some measures to improve the economic conditions of the Western Thrace region. Between 1990-1994 more than 250 million dollars was directed by the government through EU projects for Western Thrace.⁵⁴⁷ However, in terms of infrastructure Western Thrace is still the least developed area in Greece. According to a US State Department report, “development of public services including electricity, telephones and paved roads in Moslem neighbourhoods and villages continues, in many cases, to lag far behind that of non-Muslim areas.”⁵⁴⁸

Greece does not allow its Turkish minority to elect its own *muftis*. Until 1991 the *muftis* were elected, but since then, the legal procedure for the election of the *muftis* was abolished in favor of a nomination procedure by the Greek government. Furthermore, the elected *muftis* of Komotini (Gümülcüne), and Xanthi (İskeçe), İbrahim Şerif and Mehmet

⁵⁴⁴ Greek Helsinki Monitor, *Religious Freedom in Greece*, 2002.

⁵⁴⁵ Greek Helsinki Monitor, *Problems of the Turkish Minority of Greece*, 2003.

⁵⁴⁶ Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association, *Outstanding Issues Affecting the Muslim Turkish Minority of Western Thrace*, 2003.

⁵⁴⁷ *Financial Times*, 10 December 1994, cited in Demesticha, p.160.

⁵⁴⁸ US State Department, *State Department's Annual Report for International Religious Freedom: Greece*, 2000

Emin Ağa, were sentenced to imprisonment by the Greek courts on the grounds that they were impersonating a religious authority. The issue was referred to the European Court of Human Rights. The Court decided that Greece had violated the freedom of religion and self-expression and concluded that compensation must be paid.⁵⁴⁹

Greece continues to object the establishment of civil societies and associations, which carry the denomination Turkish in their titles. Associations such as the Xanthi Turkish Union, the Komotini Turkish Youth Union and the Western Thrace Turkish Teachers Union remain banned because of the word Turkish on their titles. The Greek Supreme Court justified its verdict on the grounds that use of the adjective Turkish threatened public order and national security.

The earthquake diplomacy of 1999 contributed to a gradual improvement in Greek-Turkish relations. However, this new *détente* seems to be fragile as core issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean Sea have not been resolved yet. The accession of the Greek Cypriot Administration of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 without a final settlement in Cyprus and growing suspicions in Turkey about the European Union's seriousness for Turkish membership further complicate the situation.

Bulgaria: A New Beginning

Relations between Bulgaria and Turkey became strained in the mid-1980s because of the Bulgarian authorities' forced name changing campaign of 1984-85 and the exodus of more than 300,000 Bulgarian Turks in 1989. After the fall of the Zhivkov regime in November 1989, the restoration of full rights to the Turkish minority and the

⁵⁴⁹ Ayşe Özkan, "Yunanistan Türkleri: Batı Trakya'da Uygulanan Azınlık Hukuku", in *Balkan Türkleri: Balkanlar'da Türk Varlığı*, (ed.) Erhan Türbedar (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), p.184.

participation of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), the Turkish political party to the new political establishment opened the door for better Turkish-Bulgarian relations.

The MRF, which is composed mainly of ethnic Turks, plays a critical role in Bulgarian political life. It was founded in January 1990 under the leadership of Ahmed Doğan with the aim of representing the interests of the Turkish and other Muslim communities in Bulgaria. The first multi-party elections in Bulgaria took place in June 1990 and the MRF gathered about six percent of the popular vote and obtained twenty-three seats in the parliament.⁵⁵⁰ The second multi-party elections for parliament, along with the first regional and local elections were held in October 1991. The MRF got the 7.5 percent of the popular vote and won twenty-four seats in the parliament.⁵⁵¹ In November 1991, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) formed the first non-communist government in Bulgaria since 1944. For the first time since Bulgarian independence from Ottoman rule in 1878, a Turk was elected vice-president of parliament. The chairman of the Committee on Human Rights, the chairman of the Committee on Education and Science, the vice-chairmen of the Committee on Religious Denominations, the Committee on Culture, and the Committee on Economic Policy were also ethnic Turks.⁵⁵²

In 1994, the MRF won fifteen seats and became the fourth major political group in Bulgaria. The main reason of the decline of the MRF's representation in the parliament was the formation of two new parties, the Party for Democratic Change, which was

⁵⁵⁰ Vesselin Dimitrov, *Bulgaria: The Uneven Transition* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2001), p.44.

⁵⁵¹ R. Craig Nation, "The Turkic and Other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans", in *Turkey Between East and West: New Challenges for a Rising Regional Power*, (eds.) Vojtech Mastny and R. Craig Nation (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), p.117.

⁵⁵² Nurcan Özgür, *Etnik Sorunların Çözümünde Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1999), pp.105-109.

founded by Mehmed Hoca, a leading member of the MRF and Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Commission; and the Democratic Party of Justice, which was formed by the former Chief Mufti, Nedim Gencev.⁵⁵³ These two parties could not overcome the four percent threshold, but were able to take enough votes away from the MRF to reduce its representation in the parliament. In the April 1997 elections, the MDF formed a coalition, which was called the Alliance for National Salvation with former UDF members, the Green Party, the Agrarian Party and a cluster of monarchist parties and got nineteen seats.⁵⁵⁴ In June 2001 elections, the MRF received about 7.5 percent of the national vote and twenty-one seats in the parliament.⁵⁵⁵ It formed a coalition government with the National Movement of Simeon II (NMSS) of the former Tsar Simeon Saxe- Coburg Gotha and was represented by its own ministers and own parliamentary committees.

The most important points in the 1990 MRF platform were: “The restoration of property and jobs of Turks who emigrated to Turkey in 1989 and subsequently returned to Bulgaria; the optional teaching of Turkish, three or four hours a week in Bulgarian schools to pupils who are ethnic Turks; the optional teaching of Islamic theology in Bulgarian schools to pupils who are ethnic Turks; the restoration of regional cultural and ethnic institutions, such as Turkish theaters, folklore ensembles, cultural clubs, and regular radio and television broadcasts in Turkish; the restoration of mosques in Kyustendil, Plovdiv, and elsewhere; permission to construct Islamic prayer houses if

⁵⁵³ Ali Eminov, *Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria* (London, UK: Hurst and Company, 1997), p.170.

⁵⁵⁴ Emil, Giatzidis, *An Introduction to Post-Communist Bulgaria: Political, Economic and Social Transformations* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2002), p.59.

⁵⁵⁵ Ömer Turan, “Geçmişten Günümüze Bulgaristan Türkleri”, in *Balkan Türkleri: Balkanlar’da Türk Varlığı*, (ed.) Erhan Türbedar (Ankara: Avrasya Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi Yayınları, 2003), pp.36-37.

Moslem congregations wish to do so; the lifting of the ban on publishing Islamic literature, including the Koran; the introduction of Ramadan and Kurban as national holidays for Moslems, the lifting of bans on religious rites; for example, in connection with burials; and the return of property belonging to Islamic communities that was nationalized by the communist party”.⁵⁵⁶ Most of these issues have been addressed by the MRF and it was a major contributor to the marked improvement of Turkish minority’s situation.

The restoration of Turkish-language classes took place during the second half of the 1991-1992 school year. However, they were offered as optional classes before or after normal school hours and this was inconvenient for the students who lived in rural areas. Another problem was the lack of an adequate number of qualified Turkish teachers as most of them had left Bulgaria during the mass emigration of 1989. Positive steps were taken by the Bulgarian authorities to train new teachers. The Department of Turkish Philology was restored at the University of Sofia, a new department of Turkish Philology was established at Sumen University and some Turkish students were sent to universities in Turkey for training. Another obstacle was the lack of textbooks in Turkish. A Turkish Writers’ Collective that was made up of prominent native Turkish intellectuals in Bulgaria worked in cooperation with the Turkish Ministry of Education and recommended a set of Turkish textbooks to be used in Bulgaria from the first through the fifth grades.⁵⁵⁷ The Bulgarian Ministry of Education approved the textbooks that were recommended by the collective and by the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year the Turkish textbooks problem was solved. In the 2002-2003 school year, Turkish language

⁵⁵⁶ Kjell, Engelbrekt, “Nationalism Reviving”, *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no.48 (1991), p.7.

⁵⁵⁷ Eminov, p.141.

classes as compulsory became available in the schools of seventeen municipalities and in the normal school curriculum.⁵⁵⁸

Bulgarian National Television launched Turkish language newscasts for the first time on October 2, 2000.⁵⁵⁹ The local Bulgarian National Radio network also broadcasts Turkish language programs in regions with an ethnic Turkish population. The Bulgarian Minister of Culture announced in March 2003 that the state-run Turkish theater in Kardzhali would reopen⁵⁶⁰ and it would stage Turkish-Bulgarian-language plays.

After the end of the communist regime in Bulgaria in 1989, all restrictions on religious rights were removed. The right of Muslims to repair old mosques and to build new ones was restored, Islamic schools that had been closed during the communist era were reopened and new religious schools were established. The Islamic Theological Institute in Sofia was introduced in 1990, the Islamic secondary school in Sumen, Nüvvab, that had been turned into a secular high school during the school year of 1947-1948, reopened its doors to students of religion and finally another religious school was established in Momchilgrad.⁵⁶¹ The Quran had been translated into Bulgarian and Turkish and the restriction, importation and distribution of the Quran was lifted. However, the problem of *vakıfs* (pious organizations) whose properties were confiscated during the communist period has not been resolved yet. Bulgaria adopted restitution laws in the

⁵⁵⁸ Emrah Yaman, *The Turkish Minority in Changing Bulgaria* (Master's Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003), p.206.

⁵⁵⁹ Lilia Petkova, "The Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Social Integration and Impact on Bulgarian-Turkish Relations, 1947-2000, *The Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 1, no.4 (June 2002), p.52.

⁵⁶⁰ *RFE/RL Newslines*, 11 March 2003.

⁵⁶¹ Ali Eminov, "Turks and Tatars in Bulgaria and the Balkans", *Nationalities Papers* 1 (2000), p.145.

early 1990s, but has not yet fully returned the confiscated properties to some one million Muslims.⁵⁶²

In the spring of 2002, the Ministry of Education and the Chief Mufti's Office commenced a program to provide optional Islamic education classes in primary schools. In June 2002, Chief Mufti Selim Mehmet announced a two month course to train teachers to teach Islam, coordinated with the Ministry of Education and the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. As of June 2002, approximately 2002 children in grades one through four across the country attended these new optional Islamic religion classes.⁵⁶³

On December 20, 2002, the Bulgarian Parliament passed a new Religious Denominations Act, which came into force on January 2, 2003.⁵⁶⁴ The new law guarantees equal treatment of all religious denominations, but they have to register local branches with the municipal mayor and this allows greater state control over their religious activities.

Bulgaria signed in March 1993, an Association Agreement with the EU which came in effect in January 1995.⁵⁶⁵ Unlike the previous Association Agreements that was signed with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland in December 1990, the agreement signed with Bulgaria was made conditional on respect for human rights and democratic principles. Bulgaria applied for full EU membership in December 1995. Membership negotiations with the EU started at the beginning of 2000 and Bulgaria probably will be part of the EU in 2007. Bulgaria's bid for membership to the EU accelerated the reforms in the country. In 2002, Bulgaria signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention

⁵⁶² *RFE/RL Newslines*, 01 February 2002.

⁵⁶³ Yaman, pp.201-202.

⁵⁶⁴ International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Bulgaria Annual Report*, 2003.

⁵⁶⁵ Stephane Lefebvre, "Bulgaria's Foreign Relations in the Post-Communist Era: A General Overview and Assessment", *East European Quarterly* 28, no.4 (January 1995), p.463.

for the Protection of National Minorities. In September 2003, the Bulgarian Parliament adopted an Act for Protection from Discrimination and it became effective in January 2004.⁵⁶⁶ The act set up an administration body with effective powers to investigate and punish discrimination and changed the burden of proof of discrimination in accordance with European Commission Directive 2000/43 and Directive 2000/78, which included the shift of the burden of proof from the victim to the perpetrator.

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria supports the country's efforts for EU membership because they believe that only the full membership of the country in the EU may guarantee an irreversibly well functioning defense mechanism of minorities' rights and freedoms in Bulgaria. The remarkable improvement in the status and welfare of the Turkish minority stabilized Turkish-Bulgarian relations. Bulgarian President Peter Stoyanov visited Turkey in July 1997 and gave a speech at the Turkish National Assembly.⁵⁶⁷ In his speech, Stoyanov asked forgiveness for what had been done to the Turkish minority in his country. In December 1997, Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz visited Sofia. This was the first official visit by a Turkish Premier in eighteen years.⁵⁶⁸ Agreements concerning maritime borders and delimitation of the Black Sea continental shelf were concluded and the half century long border dispute in the delta of the river Rezovska (Rezve) was resolved.⁵⁶⁹ During a visit by Bulgarian Premier Ivan Kostov in Turkey in 1998, the two countries signed an agreement about the retirement benefits due from the Bulgarian government to the Bulgarian Turks who were now

⁵⁶⁶ International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *Bulgaria Annual Report*, 2004.

⁵⁶⁷ Lütem, p.76.

⁵⁶⁸ *RFE/RL*, Newline 09 December 1997.

⁵⁶⁹ Coşkun, *Bulgaristan'la Yeni Dönem: Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Ankara-Sofya İlişkileri*, p.89.

permanently residing in Turkey.⁵⁷⁰ The Heads of State of Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey carried out trilateral meetings in Varna (October 1997), in Antalya (April 1998) and in Bucharest (1999). In Antalya they signed a cooperation agreement on combating against terrorism, organized crime, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, money laundering, arms and human trafficking and the other major crimes.⁵⁷¹ In February 2001, Turkey and Bulgaria also signed a protocol to fight against terrorist organizations.⁵⁷²

Today, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, which is fully integrated and represented in political life, not only remains an important factor in Bulgarian politics, but also serves a positive link between Bulgaria and Turkey.

⁵⁷⁰ Ivanka Nedeva Atanassova, *The Impact of Ethnic Issues on the Security of South Eastern Europe*, Report Commissioned by the NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999, p.46.

⁵⁷¹ Shtonova, p.47.

⁵⁷² Michael B. Bishku, "Turkish-Bulgarian Relations: From Conflict and Distrust to Cooperation", *Mediterranean Quarterly* 14, no.2 (Spring 2003), p.93.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

This thesis examined Turkish-Balkan policy from 1923 until today. There are some basic tenets of Turkish-Balkan policy which remained immutable although foreign policy itself underwent major modifications and revisions throughout the years due to the changes in domestic and international environment.

The Ottoman Empire ruled the Balkan territories more than 500 years and its successor state, Turkey, is culturally and historically connected with the Balkan states. Furthermore, while withdrawing from its past possessions, the Empire left behind substantial Turkish communities. The protection and well being of these Turkish minorities has constituted one of the basic tenets of Turkish-Balkan policy. The Turkish Republic has insisted that these people should be good citizens of the countries in which they reside and should be treated fairly. When they were not, Turkey has appealed to the international community as it did in the case of the Bulgarian and West Thracian Turks.

Another characteristic of the Turkish-Balkan policy is the significance that is attached to maintaining security and stability. The Balkans has a strategic position for Turkey as a gateway to Europe. Any instability can affect Turkey directly in the form of a mass migration to the country or trade loss. Moreover, there is always the risk of being pulled into a new Balkan War. In this context, Turkey looked at first with reservation to the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the creation of new states. It recognized the break-away republics only after the dismemberment of the federation was clear. Ankara

demonstrated a similar attitude in the Kosovo and Macedonia crises. The preservation of the existing borders in the Balkans has been a major concern of the Turkish authorities as redrawing of the existing frontiers could destabilize the region and provoke conflict.

In the early years of the Turkish Republic, the main priority was given to the internal transformation of the country. Turkey renounced all territorial claims in the Balkans and this helped the new Turkish state to develop better relations with the newly independent Balkan states which were formerly under Ottoman sovereignty. In the 1920s Turkey normalized its relations with all the Balkan countries and secured its frontiers with bilateral treaties. Throughout the 1930s, priority was given to the creation of a regional cooperation organization in the Balkans with the aim of increasing security and stability and deterring great power intervention. In this context, Turkey participated in four Balkan conferences in the interwar period and contributed actively to the formation of a Balkan Entente. The Balkan Entente was the first regional cooperation scheme that originated from the peninsula itself. However, it failed to protect the member states against outside threats and became obsolete after the explosion of the World War II.

After World War II, Turkey's main foreign policy emphasis was on strengthening ties with the Western bloc, especially with NATO and the United States. The Balkans remained of secondary importance for Turkish decision makers until the mid-1960s as the region was under direct penetration of the Soviet Union and a move to challenge the status-quo might be seen as an attempt to distort the Western alliance.

The period of *détente*, the eruption of the Cyprus conflict and the emergence of bilateral problems with the United States led Turkey to revise and diversify its foreign policy and to improve relations with the Soviet Union. The rapprochement with the

Soviets helped Turkey to develop its bilateral relations with the communist Balkan states. Changes in domestic politics also contributed to the shift in Turkish foreign policy. After the military intervention of 1960, a new and more democratic constitution was introduced, combined with an electoral system that was based on proportional representation which increased the range of views represented in parliament. This created an environment in which the Turkish people openly criticized the actions of the governments and also their foreign policy decisions. Political party leaders felt it necessary to pay more attention to public opinion and the governments preferred pursuing a balanced and more independent foreign policy.

This tendency continued until the end of the Cold War with the exception of the early 1980s, which was regarded as a Second Cold War. Relations with Greece, which were strained after the emergence of the Cyprus problem in the mid-1950s, further deteriorated with a series of conflicts in the Aegean Sea. In the closing years of the Cold War Turkey also experienced another crisis with its other Balkan neighbor, Bulgaria, because of the latter's campaign of forced assimilation and oppression against its Turkish minority.

The end of the Cold War, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the violent break-up of Yugoslavia, opened a new chapter in Turkey's foreign relations. The Balkans have re-emerged as an important focal point for Turkey and ties with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania were strengthened. Turkey's active and energetic policy in the Balkans caused some concern in Athens and Belgrade. Turkey was accused of creating a Muslim arc in the Balkans and trying to revive the Ottoman Empire. However, Ankara did not play the Muslim card in the Balkans as claimed by Greece and

Serbia. On the contrary, Turkey's policy in the Balkans has been cautious and reasonable. Although Ankara supported and urged a military intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to stop the bloodshed and protect the territorial integrity of the country, it has not shown any inclination to take unilateral military action. Turkey's approach to Bosnia and succeeding Kosovo crises was mostly in line with Western policy.

Turkey's active Balkan policy entered into a cooling-off period between 1996 and 1997. Then Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan gave precedence to Asia and Africa. Furthermore, socialist governments that came to power in Albania and Bulgaria established close relations with Greece. During the Yılmaz-Ecevit (1997-1999) and Ecevit-Bahçeli-Yılmaz (1999-2002) coalition governments the Balkans regained its importance for Turkey. Turkey re-energized its bilateral relations with the Balkans states, participated in all of the multilateral regional cooperation initiatives, and sent security forces to EU and NATO operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia.

The need to "Europeanize" the Balkans by bringing the region into European structures became much more evident after the destructive wars in former Yugoslavia. It started with regional cooperation schemes that focused on the solution of regional problems, such as energy, ecological damage, Danube issues, infrastructure, transportation, and migration, and continued with the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which gave the Balkan states the perspective of EU membership. However, the Balkan countries still have a long task ahead of them in the building up and modernization of institutions, the rule of law, respect for minorities and the development of a market economy. Moreover, most of the Balkan states are small and underdeveloped. Lack of permanent economic and political stability discourages foreign direct investment.

Low purchasing power stimulates smuggling, illegal trade and development of underground activities. By encouraging economic, political and social reforms, the EU is also aimed to accelerate economic growth and development in the region.

In the past decade, Turkey has emerged as an increasingly significant regional actor in the Balkans, wielding substantial military as well as diplomatic weight. The Balkan region will remain in the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy in the next years. It now gains a particular meaning in view of Turkey's bid for membership in the European Union. Although the Balkans in general is faced with many challenges such as ethnical conflict, economic backwardness, and political instability, integration in Europe is not possible without stable and prosperous Balkans and without active role of Turkey in all spheres of common interest. Turkey has the will and capacity to promote many initiatives and to contribute greatly for the peace and stability of the Balkan region. Stability, development and reconstruction in the Balkans will be affected strongly by EU policies in the future even though the US still has remarkable influence in the region.

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