

PRACTICES OF “SOFT POWER”:
A COMPARISON OF SOUTH KOREA AND TURKEY
FROM THE 1990s TO 2017

İREM CİHAN MUTER

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

2018

PRACTICES OF SOFT POWER:
A COMPARISON OF SOUTH KOREA AND TURKEY
FROM THE 1990s TO 2017

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Asian Studies

by

Irem Cihan Muter

Boğaziçi University

2018

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Irem Cihan Muter, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

Signature.....

Date13.07.2018

ABSTRACT

Practices of Soft Power:

A Comparison of South Korea and Turkey From the 1990s to 2017

Throughout the history, power has been conceived as the ability to get what you want through inducement or threats which is basically called hard power and states have been longly practicing hard power in order to get what they want from other nations. Distinctly from the conventional perception of power, many countries utilize soft power to gain what they want in the international arena in the 21st century. Foremost among them, Korea and Turkey the “brother nations” which have similar modern historical developments have been decidedly employing cultural diplomacy strategies and trying to gain a leverage in the international arena. In this thesis, soft power practices of the both countries were investigated and their global soft power rankings were compared based on Joseph Nye’s theory on three sources of soft power as cultural attractiveness, universal foreign policies and legitimate domestic politics.

ÖZET

Yumuşak Güç Uygulamaları:

1990'lardan 2017'ye Güney Kore ve Türkiye Karşılaştırması

Tarih boyunca, iktidar, temelde sert güç olarak adlandırılan ve devletlerin diğer milletlerden istediklerini elde etmek için uzun zamandır zorlu bir şekilde uyguladıkları teşvik veya tehditler yoluyla istediklerini elde etme yeteneği olarak düşünülmüştür. Geleneksel iktidar algısından açıkça farklı olarak, birçok ülke 21. yüzyılda uluslararası arenada istediklerini kazanmak için yumuşak güç kullanmaktadır. Bunlardan en önemlisi, Kore ve Türkiye, benzer tarihsel gelişmelere sahip olan “kardeş uluslar,” kültürel diplomasi stratejileri benimsemiş ve uluslararası alanda bir avantaj kazanmaya çalışmışlardır. Bu tez çalışmasında, her iki ülkenin yumuşak güç uygulamaları incelenmiş ve küresel yumuşak güç sıralamaları, Joseph Nye'in kültürel cazibesi, evrensel dış politikaları ve meşru iç politikaları gibi üç yumuşak güç kaynağı teorisine dayanarak karşılaştırılmıştır.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to extend my gratitude to a number of people whom without their support and advice this thesis cannot be completed. First and foremost, I would like to express my deep appreciation to Prof. Selçuk Esenbel for her constant guidance to my thesis along with her unfailing willingness to share her precious time whenever I needed and her faith in me and actualizing my dreams to go to the Columbia University in the city of New York. I would also like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Hyun Woong Hong for his fatherly support and guidance both in academia and life, and unfailing enthusiasm to help both academically and personally whenever I needed. It has been a wonderful coincidence to see him again in Boğaziçi University after a semester in Myongji University in 2012. I would also like to acknowledge Prof. Arzu Öztürkmen for her encouragement for my future studies on the subject matter through her constructive criticism and inspiring comments. I would also extend my sincere gratitude for Prof. Carol Gluck for her valuable guidance from Columbia University and Dr. Altay Atlı whose enlightening comments have allowed me to shape my thesis. The valuable assistance of Buket Köse, Secretary of our Asian Studies Program is not forgotten either.

I express my deep appreciation to my dear friends Hülya Görkem Demirbulak and Zeynepcan Akar for always being there for me and encouraging me to come through the stress. And of course to my dear friend İlayda Abdik, who made my New York life wonderful. Special thanks to my beloved İbrahim Muter for his

generous and loving heart and being my biggest supporter in this journey of life. Last but not least, my deepest appreciation is to my parents, and I would like to dedicate this study to them, who have given their all for my happiness and being always loving and encouraging but nothing whatever I choose to pursue in life. I will do my best to deserve your love and sacrifice.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER 2: POWER AND SOFT POWER.....	8
2.1 Introduction.....	8
2.2 Power.....	12
2.3 Soft power.....	14
CHAPTER 3: SOFT POWER IN SOUTH KOREA.....	27
3.1 Introduction.....	27
3.2 Development of the Korean cultural industries, <i>Hallyu</i> (Korean Wave) and the <i>Chaebol</i> involvement.....	31
3.3 The role of the government in the development of cultural industry in Korea.....	51
3.4 The Park Geun Hye era.....	70
CHAPTER 4: SOFT POWER IN TURKEY.....	97
4.1 Introduction.....	97
4.2 Endeavors of the Turkish governments on cultural policies.....	100
4.3 The Justice and Development Party and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan era.....	103
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION.....	160
APPENDIX A: THE SOFT POWER 30: A GLOBAL RANKING OF SOFT POWER 2017.....	167
APPENDIX B: METHODOLOGY.....	176

APPENDIX C: METRICS.....	178
APPENDIX D: TOPLINE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS.....	181
APPENDIX E: TOPLINE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS.....	183
REFERENCES.....	184

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Stages of the spread of Hallyu.....	44
Figure 2. Public opinion in South Korea and Japan.....	80
Figure 3. Public opinion in South Korea and Japan II	80
Figure 4. Japanese public opinion.....	81
Figure 5. Favorable opinion of Turkey country-by-country responses.....	130
Figure 6. Favorable opinion of Turkey, country-by-country responses.....	131
Figure 7. Turkey’s role in the Middle East.....	131
Figure 8. Why Turkey cannot be a model.....	132
Figure 9. Why Turkey is not a model.....	133
Figure 10. Opinions of Erdoğan is mixed	133
Figure 11. Responsible person from the downing of the Russian airplane during the military operation in Syria.....	142
Figure 12. Attitudes towards the Turks.....	143
Figure 13. EU citizens’ opinion of Turkey’s EU membership.....	150
Figure 14. Opposition to Turkish accession by country.....	151

LIST OF APPENDIX FIGURES

Figure A1. Soft power conversion process.....	167
Figure A2. The sub-indices.....	168
Figure A3. International polling sample size.....	171
Figure A4. Weighting of the objective sub-indices.....	173
Figure A5. Year on year comparison.....	175

ABBREVIATIONS

ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

AKP Justice and Development Party

ATV Asia Television

BMD Ballistic missile defense

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CBS Christian Broadcasting System

CCTV China Central Television

CHP Republican People's Party

CJ Cheil Jedang

CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists

DMZ Demilitarized Zone

DPRK Democratic People's Republic of Korea

EAI East Asia Institute

EU European Union

GIC Gaesong Industrial Complex

HSYK High Council of Judges and Prosecutors

ICT Information and Communication Technology

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ITF International Taekwondo Federation

JTBC Jusikhoesa Jeitibissi

KBC Korean Broadcasting System

KBL Korean Professional Baseball League

KCAF Korean Culture and Arts Foundation

KOFACE Korea Foundation for Asia Cultural Exchange

LG Lucky-GoldStar

LGBT Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Trans

MBC Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation

MBC Middle East Broadcasting Center

MCPI Ministry of Culture and Public Information

MERS Middle East respiratory syndrome

MHP Nationalist Movement Party

MSIP Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning

MPL Motion Picture Law

MUSIAD Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NFPC National Film Production Centre

NGOs Non-Governmental Organizations

NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation

NPAD New Politics Alliance for Democracy

OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

OHCHR United Nations Human Rights Committee

PJAK Kurdistan Free Life Party

PKK Kurdistan Workers' Party or Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan

PP Program Provider

PPEC Public Performance Ethics Committee

PYD Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party

ROK Republic of Korea

SBC Small Business Corporation

SEG Samsung Entertainment Group

TAF Turkish Armed Forces

TBC Ton-Yang Broadcasting Company

TC Turkish Republic

TESEV Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

THY Turkish Airlines

TIKA Turkish Collaboration and Development Agency

TRT Turkish Radio Television Institute

TURKSOY Common Administration of Turkic Culture and Arts

UN United Nations

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

YPG People's Protection Units

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“If a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive, others will more willingly follow.”¹

Majority of the nations are endeavoring to achieve desired foreign policy outcomes in the global affairs arena which is becoming more complex day by day. In order to achieve those outcomes, nations have been seeking to gain power in various ways. As a realist point of view, throughout history, power has been perceived as the ability to get what a nation wants through inducement or threats, in other words “carrots” and “sticks” and states have been pursuing hard power in order to get what they want from other nations. However, the character of power is evolving, becoming more intricate day by day and moving away from the conventional acknowledgement of power which involved armies and economic power. This change is due to today’s multi-dimensional world which makes us dependent on each other along with digital advancement which eliminated national borders and made it possible for the people from all over the world to engage in world affairs. As a consequence, the traditional recognition of power could not sustain its presence in the process of shaping the outcomes of the global events and foreign policy aims of countries. Therefore, soft power is paramount in our contemporary world for a nation to succeed in the global affairs arena.

¹ Nye, *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, 32.

The soft power terminology was first coined by Nye (1990). He separated power into two concepts as hard and soft power and he emphasized the significance of a nation's ability to make another nation act accordingly to its will without threatening them but through its attractiveness. In order to acquire soft power, a nation must have cultural attractiveness, legitimacy in its domestic and foreign policies along with universal political values and norms which embodies internationalism and their practice in the foreign policy.

Many scholars such as Ferguson (2009), who is a well-known figure with his pro-imperialistic perspective ironically objects to this view by advocating that soft power is troubled. In a similar vein, various scholars defend that the soft power of the superpowers such as United States or Japan does not depend on their legitimacy in its domestic policies and foreign relations and whether or not they use hard power extensively, people are going to wear Converse shoes, drink Coca-Cola, watch American TV series or read Manga, watch Anime or still visit Japan. Indeed, the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq or having a president as Donald Trump who has radical racist views had no slightest impact on people watching Hollywood movies, eating from McDonalds or using Apple phones. In a similar vein, Japan sells its culture's idealized aesthetics to the world despite its imperialistic past, colonialism and militarist activities beginning from 1931 until the end of World War II and regardless of that fact people consume Japanese cultural products by reading Manga and watching Anime, thus its soft power has an invincible side. Although people drinking Coca-Cola or wearing a Michael Jordan t-shirt does not mean that

the US has power over them, it bewilders soft power resources with behavior as well.² Can the same hypothesis be made for the middle powers as well?

South Korea which is a country surrounded by superpowers such as China, Russia and Japan, and often called as a “shrimp among the whales,” for example, left its traumatic history of Japanese colonialist invasion, division into two different countries and followed by poverty, their *han* identity as Koreans call themselves, has reinvented herself and acquired a new slogan as “Korean Cool” instead of “shrimp among the whales” through its dramas, K-pop which has been called Korean Wave along with technological brands such as Samsung and LG. Today, the singer Psy has become the most famous Korean in the world by 3.1 billion views of his “Gangnam Style” video on YouTube. Whereas Turkey, which was a superpower by the legacy of the imperial Ottoman Empire, stands as a middle power which has significant popularity in the Middle East, Central Asia, Balkans and the other parts of the world this very day by its intriguing TV series, foreign attitude focused on bringing Ottoman history and culture back along with peacekeeping operations. Turkey and South Korea, in other words “brother nations” that both have similar modern historical developments yet are vulnerable in terms of soft power compared to Japan and the US. What creates this vulnerability?

Furthermore, while there have been many debates towards superpowers and their soft powers, there is not much debate on the soft power of the middle powers. The main concern of this thesis is therefore, the dependency relationship between soft power and hard power of the middle power countries. Thus, the research question of this thesis is, how do the unpopular hard power decisions affect the soft

² Nye, “Think Again: Soft Power”

power of the middle power countries such as South Korea and Turkey? To be able to determine the causalities along with foreign policy decisions, I will investigate the legitimate domestic policies, the leadership in the two countries as Park Geun Hye and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The reason behind I am analyzing the Park Geun Hye and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan periods with scrutiny is the soft power index has become more accurate during the time of both leaderships.

To observe the changes in the soft powers of both countries, I will utilize the Soft Power 30 (McClory, 2015) which is an international ranking of soft power. Based on Nye's (as cited in Portland Communications, 2017) model of three sources of soft power such as culture, political values and foreign policy, the index measures the soft power resources of countries by amalgamating both objective and subjective data. The process of generation of soft power is given in Figure A1 in Appendix A. The comprehensive explanation of the measurement can be found in Appendix A, B and C. The objective data is gathered from range of various sources such as UN World Tourism Organization, World Bank, and OECD and divided into six categories which each category acts as a sub-index with an individual score. The six sub-indices are: Government, Culture, Global Engagement, Education, Digital, and Enterprise which can be seen in Figure A2 in Appendix A. These sub-indices aim to evaluate a state's political values, public institutions, significant public policy outcomes, the attractiveness of a nation's culture including measures as the annual number of visiting international tourists, the global success of a country's culture industry, a nation's contribution to the international community, and appeal of a nation's economic model.³ The metrics and the data sources of the objective data can be

³ McClory, "The Soft Power 30," 30.

found in Appendix C. The subjective data consist of international polling. The countries polled for 2017 can be seen in the Figure A3 in Appendix A. The objective data is normalized and weighted through regression analysis. The weights of each sub index can be seen in Figure A4 in Appendix A. The formula being used in data normalization process is given in Appendix B. The detailed version of the methodology along with the data metrics information is given at the Appendix A, B and C. The subjective nature of soft power makes the reliability of the measurement intricate and according to the various scholars, soft power is under-theorized as its conceptual state is not clear and thus there is not a general acceptance amongst the scholars. In addition, there are too many fluctuations in the measurement as it has been criticized about how to know what other countries will want what we want in the international area and the theory needed to be more elaborated. According to Vuving (2009), this confusion is created from confusion of the resources and behavior of power. Whereas Ferguson (2009) states that using products of a country will not create a soft power. For instance, all over the Islamic world, people use American products yet their hatred does not decrease. In addition, Britain was the first to utilize soft power, yet nationalist movements emerged in the regions where Britain tried to implement the strategy. I am aware of the limitations of the study while conducting my research. Perhaps in the future, there will be a more objective measurement. However, at the moment it is the only method to our knowledge. Yet, I still strongly believe that despite Nazi Germany had an intimidating military and strong economy, its discriminative behaviors and occupation of neighboring countries such as France and Poland soon turned the United States, Soviet Union and United Kingdom into the opposition camp.

According to the Soft Power 30 ranking (Portland Communications, 2017), Western powers such as United States, United Kingdom, Germany and France are in top ten, whereas towards down to the ranking, emerging countries such as BRICS appear. As an exception, Japan stands within the top ten distinctively from other Asia-Pacific countries. In addition, measurement proves the fluctuation of soft power of countries year by year. Yet, Western powers' soft power measurement do not change dramatically as emerging powers' measurement do. Especially South Korea and Turkey which are the main interest of this thesis show more fluctuation in relation to Western superpowers. The year on year comparison is given in the Figure A5 in Appendix A.

The chapters are designed as following in the thesis: The concept of power will be analyzed and the difference between the different types of powers will be analyzed in the second chapter. The investment of the Korean governments to the cultural industry and how government investment formed Korean soft power will be addressed in the third chapter. In addition, the evolution of Korean soft power during Park Geun Hye period will be investigated. Similar to the third chapter, history of Turkish government investments to the cultural industry will be explained in the fourth chapter along with the transformation of Turkish soft power during Justice and Development Party period will be analyzed. In Turkey's case, I investigated particularly at cultural forms as TV series, as Said (1993) specifically analyzed novels in his book named *Culture and Imperialism*, which carries a very important role in Turkey's soft power.

According to Nye (2004), leadership is inevitably meshed with power and leaders have to make vital decisions on the types of power that they use. For instance instead of the hard power of terrorism, if Yasser Arafat had chosen the soft power examples such as Gandhi or Martin Luther King, he could have allured moderate Israelis and would have a Palestinian state. In the light of recent developments in the world such as Syrian War and Trump administration, would there be less of wars, terror attacks and less wounded people if soft power was employed more by nations?

CHAPTER 2

POWER AND SOFT POWER

2.1 Introduction

With the expansion of networks through technology advancement and evolution of global occurrences, conventional state-to-state diplomacy has given its place to a multilateral diplomacy. Therefore, almost every country is trying to reach their foreign policy goals in our contemporary world which is becoming complicated and intertwined day by day. In addition, it is not sufficient to possess pure hard power for achieving their foreign policy desires. On the contrary, as a return of the zeitgeist, today's power mostly depends on the attraction of the other instead of just coercing them. Attaining power and achievement of the desired outcomes in terms of foreign policy targets highly relies upon the allurements of other countries. This kind of power gain has been called soft power.

Today, soft power is shaped by two worldwide “mega-trends” which makes it more crucial for a successful foreign policy. The first one of these trends is the rise of networks as an important tool of international relations. The second one is the dramatic digital advancement in the fields of economy, politics, information, and social communications by macro and micro means are exponentially having an online extent. The first aspect has to do with the fast spread of power among states. For instance, the center of global economic power is moving to the East from the West. In addition, it is moving away from the states to non-state actors as well such

as NGOs, multi-lateral organizations, multi-national companies, trade unions, civil society groups, and individuals which hold significant impact in international relations. This move of power from governments to non-state actors is related to the second factor supporting escalation of networks which means a much more packed global arena resulted in increased contest for attention and impact.⁴

Notwithstanding, throughout history power has been conceived as the ability to get what you want through inducement or threats which is basically called hard power and states have been practicing hard power for a very long time in order to get what they want from other nations. Particularly, it became clear that by the two world wars that took place in the 20th century, power became the major actor in the nations' quest of gaining what they want.⁵

The power concept by its own in international relations conjuncture has included a prejudice in the hard power direction conventionally. Power has been considered mainly as a realist idea in International Relations which inclines to be perceived in Dahl's (as cited in McClory, 2016) point of view: one actor which is usually the state in this case utilizing "material resources" to force another state to do something it would normally not have done. Thus, there have been deliberations on soft power concept between realists and liberals.

Indeed long before their countries evolved into global superpowers and began to conflict in terms of armed and economic areas, the President of the United States Woodrow Wilson and the leader of the Soviet Russia Vladimir Lenin had already

⁴ McClory, "The Soft Power 30," 21.

⁵ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut: Kamu Diplomasisi*, 51.

confronted each other by means of soft power during 1917-18. As Melissen (2005) states, “The battle of values and ideas that dominated international relations in the second half of the twentieth century evolved into competition in the sphere of hard power, and not vice versa.” (p. 5). Nonetheless, the world diplomatic society was late to the essential struggle of interaction with foreign publics due to the preminent realist point of view which is evaluating international relations only by economic and military power means.

Wilson (as cited in De Grazia, 2005) has started his practice of generation of soft power through inventing the “Fourteen Points” which is a set of principles generated for peace was a success in terms of soft power and public diplomacy. Fourteen Points have raised exhilaration and sympathy in many countries when it was first declared. But before the Fourteen Points were launched, he discovered something very fascinating. He went to Detroit to lecture salesmen in first World’s Salesmanship Congress on July, 10, 1916. It was the time of World War I and Wilson was thinking whether entering the War and benefiting from the demolishment of the Old World or not. According to him, America’s “democracy of business” had to command in the endeavor for the friendly invasion of the world. Therefore to begin with, he thought that setting standards for customer-friendly commerce is the best. And he combined modern statecraft with an astonishingly modern consumer insight by asserting that salesmanship and statesmanship are interconnected in perspective and extent. Furthermore, he defended the view that dispute appears not from ideology or politics but from the insensitiveness produced by divergence in ways of living. Thus, for Wilson (as cited in De Grazia, 2005) salesman could help

statesmanship, “By instructing in that common school of experience which is the only thing that brings us together and educates us in the same fashion.” (p. 8). In addition Wilson (as cited in De Grazia, 2005) concluded his speech with by stating that;

...let your thoughts and your imagination run abroad throughout the whole world, and with the inspiration of the thought that you are Americans and are meant to carry liberty and justice and the principles of humanity wherever you go, go out and sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and more happy, and convert them to the principles of America. (p. 8)

Although its name was not given yet back at that time, this convention and Fourteen Points was crucial for the generation of resources that are necessary to gain soft power and implementation of public diplomacy. The international system is dramatically evolving and everything is becoming more intricate and faster day by day due to the contemporary world system. And by this pace along with immensity, we are living both with favorable circumstances and risks.

Recognition of soft power is particularly crucial in today’s world, not because of a finer understanding of power activity in international relations for academic causes but because of the world’s current chaotic situation which seems to continue in the future as well.⁶ Within this framework, theories of power, soft power and hard power will be discussed and the necessity of those terminologies for a success in the global affairs arena will be explained in this chapter.

⁶ Gallarotti, “Soft Power: What it is, why it’s important, and the conditions for its effective use,” 3-4.

2.2 Power

The conventional perception of soft power has been a Realist point of view amongst international relations scholars.⁷ According to realist scholars and the realism theory, advantage can be only obtained through force. Liberals on the other hand defend that advantage can be secured through international collaboration. As a general point of view in the international arena, the relationship between nations is conducted through the pursuit of obtaining advantage. This type of relationship that appeared among the nations has been stated in the work which was written by Thucydides (as cited in Karadağ, 2016), assumed to be the oldest theoretician of realism.

According to Mearsheimer (2001), who is one of the pioneer scholars of the contemporary realism, power is dependent on the specific material abilities which a state can possess and these material abilities are crucial “tangible assets” which shows a state’s military strength. Similarly, Waltz (1979) states that power is given the meaning of capacity such as magnitude of population and land, finance of resources, economic ability, military robustness, political balance and competence. Likewise, Gilpin (1981) explains power as states’ ability in terms of military, economy and technology.

In a similar vein, Morgenthau (1948) states that the advantage of a nation is the most important fact of politics and can be evaluated independently from time and space. In addition, he defends Weber’s (as cited in Karadağ, 2016) idea that the material and psychological profits are the essential motives that determine human behavior. Whereas, Carr (1939), one of the most important scholars of Realist

⁷ Gallarotti, “Soft Power,” 6.

doctrine states that during peace periods, the political tendency of nations are more peaceful in general and an act from a nation which will demolish this peace will be accepted as mindless, unreasonable and vicious.

Notwithstanding, liberals are challenging realists with various strands of thoughts. Walt (1998), discusses international theories and explains liberal thoughts. He states that, some of them advocate that states would be deterred from utilizing military power against each other through economic interdependence since conflict would menace each side's welfare. Some liberals are usually linked with President Woodrow Wilson and believed that the expansion of democracy is the answer for world peace based on the assertion of the high level of peace in democratic states in contrast to authoritarian states. The third group upholds that egocentric state actions can be eliminated by international institutions such as the International Energy Agency and the International Monetary Fund through stimulation of states with instant earnings and benefits of cooperation.

Fuller (2014) states his ideas on realism in his book *Turkey and the Arab Spring: Leadership in the Middle East* as:

What does the term “realist” mean in foreign policy? This debate lies at the heart of the newly emerging global order. In many ways “realism” is a misleading term; it suggests that there is a clear objective “reality” out there which determines national interests and action. But the terms “reality” and “interests,” far from being objective terms, are in fact intensely subjective and elusive. What do we mean by “reality”? Whose reality? There are multiple ways to view a situation. What one observer sees as a “threat” may be perceived by another only as an issue requiring attention. Indeed, even a term such as “the national interest,” so regularly invoked by realist observers, is hardly a clear concept. Foreign policy debate is *precisely about what the national interest really is*. Is it maximum wealth accumulation for the nation? If so, by what means? With what trade-offs? Or is creation of

national power the major national interest? But power how defined: economic, military, or even in terms of national social cohesion and balance? Or is the national interest defined by the ability to dominate the international environment? And if domination, then is it through force of arms and war, or economic power, or leadership by mortal example, or attraction as a model? International power can be assessed in many different ways. The existence of the term “soft power” is just one indicator of this recognition. The way the national interest is defined is itself a direct expression of national ideology, providing a rough indicator of how an actor might act. (p. 129-130)

2.3 Soft power

Distinct from the conventional perception of power, Nye (as cited in Janelli and Yim, 2007) brought a new terminology to the international relations literature which is called soft power, dividing the theory of power along with making a distinction between soft and hard power. However, the idea that culture has an impact on power was not invented by Nye. Many western Marxists such as Gramsci (as cited in Janelli and Yim, 2007) and cultural studies theorists defended that culture helped class, gender, and ethnic supremacy through legitimization and rationalization of inequalities and systems where those inequalities were continuous or given birth again.

Nevertheless, in addition to the ideas of those scholars, Nye (as cited in Janelli & Yim, 2007) gave soft power and culture concepts an international dimension. He defends that, hard power depends on inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”) and through carrots and sticks one might not get what he wants directly. There is a “second face of power” which helps one to get what he wants indirectly. Moreover, according to Nye (2004), a nation might attain the results that it desires in the world politics arena if other countries appreciate its values, mimic its

case, strive to its kind of welfare and want to go after. Thus, soft power is the capability to alter the choices of others. In sum, by Nye's (2004) own words,

Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. When you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country's military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced. (p. 256)

Moreover, Nye (2004) states that,

Co-optive power-the ability to shape what others want-can rest on the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. (p. 7)

Soft power terminology, which is a cultural invention, stands for the assets invested in the power of allurement along with approaches to use those assets to assist actors' aims. In other words, the soft power of a country depends on three resources: culture, its political values and its foreign policies.⁸ Soft power is chiefly created from the character, morals or beliefs of an establishment or a country which are articulated in its culture and can be seen in its domestic applications and policies, and in its behavior in foreign relations.⁹ If one state is willing to alter a policy in another state through allurement, it should make the target state imagine itself as "embodying culture," "political values," and its "associated policies" which needs a harmony between the sender state's reflection of the causes of allurement and the

⁸ Chitty & Ji & Rawnsley & Hayden, *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, 1.

⁹ Nye, *Soft Power*, 8.

target state's estimation of those causes. Shortly, in order for soft power to pay off, identification should come before persuasion which means that soft power relies upon others' understanding of one's charming attributes.¹⁰

Furthermore, based on Nye's (as cited in Hayden, 2012) explanation, soft power engages with three types of practices: agenda-setting (framing), persuasion, and attraction. Those soft power practices stand for ways to attain outcomes which mirrors the truth of "competitive endurance over legitimacy" as recognized by international actors. And in conjunction with that, Nye (as cited in Hayden, 2012) defends the dependence of soft power to credibility. Nevertheless, credibility is intrigued in Nye's (as cited in Hayden, 2012) thesis.

In terms of a soft power deal, credibility can be both an outcome and a resource, which brings us to the resources of soft power: culture, political values and foreign policies of a nation. Soft power, which is acknowledged by states and individuals represents more than pure cultural power which incorporates political morals and concepts, educational and socioeconomic systems, and legitimate national policies. Soft power's significance and purpose strengthens if other countries are convinced that a nation's ideals or policies are lawful and appealing in reality. The importance of utilizing soft power has been understood by many nations in terms of involvement in comparative politics of allurements, lawfulness, and plausibility. This is due to the equality of significance of plausibility with other nations' morals and interests with application of hard power to reach a nation's aspirations.¹¹

¹⁰ Lee, "Soft Power as Productive Power in Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia," 34.

¹¹ Lee, "The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East Asia," 11.

According to Galarotti (2011), the main contrast between soft and hard power is hard power brings out obedience through dependence on tangible power resources which are more direct and coercive in general, while soft power brings it out through various policies, attributes and behaviors that make a nation attractive to the other nations (which are more indirect and non-coercive). Thus, soft power strategies are long-term strategies in comparison to hard power ones. Therefore, time constitutes another significant feature of “hard-soft-power continuum”. Whereas there is not much time needed to create hard power, soft power requires extended time period since its intangible assets flourish after a prolonged amount of time. Likewise, the strategies conducted to secure hard power and soft power varies from each other. Whilst military and economic force’s repercussion is instant but last for a short amount of time, allurements and persuasion have long-term effects because hard power makes one to act involuntarily which is different from one’s general behavior, au contraire, soft power alters one’s attitude voluntarily.¹²

Another important aspect of soft power which was studied by various scholars is legitimacy. Cooper (2004) mentions about the significance of legitimacy for the soft power terminology. In a similar vein, Nye (2000) states that the activities conducted by the state should be perceived as legitimate to amplify soft power. Within this framework, Heng (2010) focuses on resources of soft power as an aspect of soft power terminology and defends that a nation’s history and social system may decide the power and effectiveness of a country’s soft power. While explaining that, he uses Japan and China as examples. He states that Japan appears to have succeeded

¹² Smith-Windsor, “Hard Power, Soft Power reconsidered,” 52.

in creating a soft power foundation by utilizing its popular and traditional culture along with values and norms which are incorporated in its policies. Yet, its aggressive past undercuts this foundation. Whereas China, has not yet formed an ideal foundation of soft power resources in terms of achieving desired foreign policy outcomes. In the case of China, there is a disparity between the three pillars of soft power which are cultural attractiveness, alluring domestic policies and values and norms supported through foreign policies even though popular cultural industries are expanding through the Confucius Institutes and cultural attraction. The biggest stumbling block in China's case is its competitive state-led model and its authoritarian political system.

The reasons of the success of soft power can be highly related to the technology advancement of today. That is because the methods have been applied to gain soft power can be also seen as some sort of marketing methods. The activities in order to achieve soft power can be conducted in a sense of advertising agency and introject others. Through internet, media and other technological organs slightest inventions can become renowned throughout the world. And thus, those activities implemented in a country may gain attention and sympathy from other nations.¹³

It has been a contradiction to scholars that a country's soft power expectedly weakens if it is performing poorly regarding domestic means. The country presumably loses not only its hard power but soft power such as its capability to alter the international agenda and its charisma if its economy and military deteriorate. A few nations may be appealed to other countries with their hard power by the illusions

¹³ Karadağ, *Kamu Diplomasisi*, 54.

such as invincibility or firmness. Hitler and Stalin examples can be a proof for that by their struggle to create such illusions. Further, hard power can be utilized to build realms and organizations as well that set the agenda for the petite-nations as Soviet did once for the Eastern Europe. That is why President Kennedy of the United States was worried despite the winning public opinion polls of United States over the Soviet Union because the polls also displayed Soviet supremacy in its space program and the power of its nuclear weapon. Because of the occupation of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviet Union has lost much of its soft power. Despite the escalation of its economy and military ability, its soft power diminished due to its cruel policies.¹⁴ Today, Russia's soft power has been declining as it did in the history due to its actions in Syria, Ukraine and Crimea. On the other hand, South Korea's soft power has been increasing through its peacekeeping operations in problematic regions, government investments on TV dramas and music sector and worldwide renowned technological advancements.

Hence, neither of those two kinds of power can survive without each other. Pure soft power and hard power cannot help a nation to become a powerful state. In order to be powerful, one nation has to combine the two concepts. In this light, Nye (2009) concurs in developing a term called "smart power" which is basically the combination of smart strategies to be applied in the foreign policy field that are the combination of both hard and soft power strategies.

As a matter of fact, not much concept as soft power with its outcome smart power went beyond the secluded academic world. One can encounter these terms in

¹⁴ Nye, *Soft Power*, 9.

powerful newspapers, favored to magazines which cover articles on foreign affairs. Furthermore, the concepts have been adopted by many chief decision makers around the world, specifically in the US. Thus, interest by scholars has ascended. However, the concept did not developed theoretically as it should be and its historical implementations have been narrow and have not been conducted carefully. Therefore, the soft power term has grown very poorly and it has been mentioned as “soft theory” by critics. Moreover, there has not been enough interest on such an important question as how the developments in world politics have affected the significance of both soft and hard power. Similarly, there have not been sufficient studies about the conditions that are necessary in the process of decision making for leaders to adopt and effectively utilize soft power. Thus, soft power has had a controversial acknowledgement as many other cultural productions, particularly in the academia.¹⁵

Soft power terminology highlights the apparently unquestionable idea that whether power can be developed from unmeasurable assets and the necessity of acquiring soft power for international agents.¹⁶ Indeed, there are persisting discussions on the conceptualization and measurement of soft power along with the real-life engagement of it although the soft power notion has been integrated into policymaking and diplomatic efforts more and more. The connection between hard and soft power, the correlation between the sources of soft power and methods for real-life application, and the productive utilization of soft power by different countries have been questioned in international relations. Further, since each nation

¹⁵ Chitty, Ji and Rawnsley, *The Routledge Handbook of Soft Power*, 1.

¹⁶ Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplomacy in Global Contexts*, 28.

in general searches for attaining different outcomes by engaging soft power based on its international standing and impact, scholars and policymakers have found it hard to construct a theoretical model which describes how soft power instruments and resources are built up and employed. Moreover, the dominant focal point on soft power in scholarship has been the abilities of the strongest states in the world. In fact, the first scholar who methodologically conceptualized soft power term, Nye's (as cited in Lee, 2011) examination predominantly focuses on the improvement and utilization of soft power to sustain the United States' global leadership through the advancement of soft power resources.

Vuving (2009) states that, the bewilderment and misunderstanding of soft power terminology is due to the common belief which equates power with power resources, in other words, people's confusion of soft power resources with behavior along with the scholars' general consensus on the terminology being "under-theorized," "lack of academic refinement," and "analytical fuzziness". According to Lee (2011), soft power's complications associated with policymaking and policy application can be outlined as following: The correlation between soft and hard power should be more clarified, more proof should be found in order to be certain about if a nation can employ soft power without hard power, or if the advancement of soft power needs hard power, or if a state's soft power would be affected by its major hard power. In this respect, Nye (2004) stated that hard and soft power carries the possibility of both supplementing and come into antagonism with each other according to the existing conditions.

Moreover, Lee (2011) articulates that at least three important dimensions should be taken into account when assessing a nation's soft power resources: "cognitive," "affective," and "normative". The cognitive dimension indicates that the other nations' assess of a nation's image and position in global affairs. The affective dimension represents whether a nation is appreciated or not by other nations regardless of its political, economic and military strengths or weaknesses. The normative dimension points out if other countries consider a nation's policy and global role as legitimate and reasonable or not. As an example, even though spectators states that the US war on Iraq is unlawful which is normative, yet they can be fond of US culture and its political concepts which is affective. Furthermore, people who judge US foreign policy as one-sided (normative) and do not like the United States (affective) might desire to have their children obtain an education in the United States after all due to its worldwide renowned schools (cognitive). Since various dimensions are intricate to assess, it is hard to evaluate a nation's soft power capacity extensively.

According to Lee (2009), soft power can be categorized into five categories as; firstly, soft power to ameliorate external security environment by presenting peaceful and attractive images of a country as China emphasizes on a "harmonious world," and peaceful development and Japan's self-restraint of self defense forces after World War II. Secondly, soft power to gain other nations' support for one's foreign and security policies; criticism against the US' war on globalism and invasion of Iraq can be given as an example of its failure. Economic sanctions or intervention to the countries through UN is another example. Thirdly, soft power to

dominate other countries' way of thinking and choices; Japan's "flying geese model," "Toyotaism" and "Just-in-time system" are examples of this category. Fourthly, soft power to sustain the unity of a community or group of countries; EU can be shown as an instance for this category. Lastly, soft power to strengthen approval rankings of a leader or domestic support of a government. Examples for this category are generation of national heroes.

Moreover, it is arduous to assess a nation's capability to conduct and advance soft power due to soft power's nature. There have been academic studies through cultivating international relations theories such as constructivism and postmodernism (effect of norms, identity and various cognitive and emotional factors on policies and security strategies) or conducting multinational public opinion surveys to measure the impact of countries in international relations and their national brand images. Nevertheless, the power of allurements in global affairs is still ambiguous. Soft power is more indirect and less ubiquitous power in terms of a nation's impact relative to hard power.¹⁷

Although it is difficult to analytically evaluate the soft power of a nation, there are various public opinion surveys and several studies dedicated to the measurement of soft power. The first attempt to measure soft power through assessing the particular resources that create it was made by the Institute for Government and Monocle magazine with the generation of IfG-Monocle Soft Power Index (as cited in McClory, 2015), it tried to measure the soft power of countries based on amalgamating objective data and subjective data collected from the public

¹⁷ Lee, "Theory and reality of soft power," 15.

opinion polls along with international organizations' data such as FIFA and Coca Cola rankings. Jhee and Lee (2011) have developed an alternative method to measure soft power has developed. According to them, in order to develop trustworthy and accurate measurements of soft power, data about how different facets of a given nation are recognized by other countries is required. Due to the restricted number of current cross-national surveys, earlier works could not go beyond aggregate level data in order to measure soft power's magnitude and could not collect individual-level data which tell the public's or elite's assessment of other nations. Even though by aggregate-level data one can expand spatial analysis capacity and advance the credibility of soft power measures through including its fundamental parts, soft power does not have consistent resources that operates as a currency. Therefore, it becomes harder to improve strong measures with aggregate-level data. A soft power resource may differ from country to country.

Nevertheless, the growing amount of international surveys have encouraged academic endeavors to measure soft power through adopting public opinions toward different nations, mainly the United States. Those survey-based researches benefit from responses which are linked to soft power survey items in political, economic and cultural realms. For instance, Nye (2004) had measured US soft power with public assessment of the country's technical and scientific developments, culture (music, films, television, and the expansion of American opinions and traditions), politics (American opinion of democracy), and economy (the American strategies of handling business) through using Pew 2002 Global Attitude (Pew Reseach Center,

2002) surveys which is a functional way of making cross-country comparisons of particular superior/inferior soft power resources in each realm.

On the other hand, Jhee and Lee (2011) elucidate that soft power could be measured by two different measurable dimensions as affective and normative which correspond to two origins of soft power: “attraction” and “legitimacy”. National possessions such as cultural wealth, economic ambitiousness, political advancement, educational allurements from other countries can correspond to the affective dimension of soft power. Whereas international peacekeeping operations for humanitarian crises, economic assistance, and the protection of international norms which consulates a country’s legitimacy can be correspond to the normative dimension of soft power. Although Nye (as cited in Jhee and Lee, 2011) does not make a certain distinction between such dimensions when measuring soft power, he mentions about the constitution of a country’s soft power depends on both attraction and legitimacy.

The soft power concept on its own contains instinctive sense which enables international agents achieve targets without the need of costly persuasion.

Nonetheless, questions have been asked such as what creates soft power? How to realize it when one sees it? How is soft power utilized by international actors? The rudimentary nature of soft power counts on certain facile acceptance about what is impact, seduction, and cultural characteristics related to the idea of power. As soft power depends on an idea of power which does not openly distinguish between the resources, policies, and outcomes along with the assumption of its function in external conditions of conventional international relations related disciplinary

studies, clarifying the soft power idea requires a hand from multidisciplinary point of views on communication, persuasion, and culture from outside the community of international relations scholars.¹⁸

¹⁸ Hayden, *The Rhetoric of Soft Power*, 28-29.

CHAPTER 3

SOFT POWER IN SOUTH KOREA

3.1 Introduction

South Korea has been concentrated on assuring its independence and security since the country is located in Northeast Asia and surrounded by big powers such as China, Japan, and Russia. The Korean War (1950-1953) and the country's division afterwards compelled South Korea to be active in terms of its public diplomacy in the international community as oppose to North Korea. Because of the anti-communist basis of South Korea's diplomacy, the most solid ally of Korea is United States since the Korean War. The US has been highly supportive of South Korea's diplomacy activities. Through South Korea's democratization and prosperous economic development in the late 1980s, it had the chance to engage economic and cultural resources to its activities to gain soft power and by that, its post-Cold War diplomacy has become firmer.¹⁹

Nonetheless, South Korea has started to conduct its activities to gain soft power in a more methodical way only from mid-2000s since it has started to give importance to soft power due to foreign policy benefits along with economical pay offs and sought for a more solid role in international relations. Before, South Korea's diplomacy activities were based on seeking to create a fine image over North Korea in the United Nations and with the countries which have diplomatic relations with

¹⁹ Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 107.

both of the Koreas. Notwithstanding, contemporary South Korea is a dynamic democracy with compact horizontal local networks which embraces conventional Confucian ethics. Koreans have become aware of the international publics' view of them through the decades of an export-oriented economy and emigration diaspora which meant that governmental and citizen endeavor for gaining soft power are functioning in an encouraging environment. By the assistance of solid information technology infrastructure, South Korea's popular culture products such as dramas, songs and food has been captivating among the people all over the world. South Korea's popular culture has been deliberately executed as a soft power "weapon".²⁰

With its worldwide renowned multinationals as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, and its trend-setter dramas which have been very well-received in all around Asia, the Middle East and South America as well as its innovative cosmetic industry that attracts many tourists to the country, South Korea has become one of the countries which have a significant soft power in recent years. South Korea's cultural exports such as "Gangnam Style" song, competitive electronic sports and kimchi-flavored pot noodles are used enthusiastically around the world. While the Korean dramas are admired by the Philippines, French adore Korean pop music and films.²¹ Home to 51 million people, South Korea has evolved to become the Hollywood of the East by producing entertainment which attracted millions of fans in Asia from Japan to Indonesia during the past decade.²² It can be said that South Korea conquered the world softly through *Hallyu* which is a Korean expression meaning Korean Wave that is used for the spread of Korean popular cultural products. In the 20th century,

²⁰ Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 108.

²¹ "South Korea's soft power: Soap, sparkle and pop"

²² Farrar, "'Korean Wave' of pop culture sweeps across Asia"

the world has seen the invasion of the United States' soft power through the assistance of Levi's, Coca Cola, Marlboro Man and Hollywood. Today, it appears to be South Korea has following the United States' footprints.

The government's exertion is paramount in this success story. The Korean Cultural Trade Commission's (as cited in Yatim, 2017) launch of a booklet called *Hallyu* Forever which is a directory about the various ways to access world markets through considering socio-economic, political and cultural characteristics of each territory can be given as a proof to Korean government's endeavor. For instance, a part in the book mentions about the Arab world and states the significance of not airing drama programs during Muslim praying times. In order to watch the renowned drama *The Jewel in the Palace*, Iranians were arranging their mealtime.

As told above, the recognition of Korean pop as a global spectacle was not contingent and the expansion of Korean cultural exports are the products of a systematic effort by the government. Korean cultural products' idolization was meticulously cultivated by the Korean government which esteemed it for its western aesthetic archetype. The Korean government has invested a significant amount of money to the Ministry of Culture which contains a department entirely for Korean pop established in the 1990s and the Korean Wave; *Hallyu* became prominent in Japan, China, and even North Korea.²³ Furthermore, it expanded to the countries in Europe, Middle East and South America such as Turkey, France, Egypt and Brazil. For instance, an emotional Korean drama called *Autumn in My Heart* became very popular in south east Asia in 2000. The following year, *My Sassy Girl* which is a

²³ You, "K-Pop: A Political Weapon"

comedy film became a big hit in the region. In 2003, *Winter Sonata* became so popular in Japan that the main character has become the subject of comparison with David Beckham. In the following year, a historical drama named *Daejanggeum* (The Jewel in the Palace) became the number one in Taiwan and the most watched drama ever in Hong Kong.²⁴

In addition, *Goblin* and *The Legend of the Blue Sea* was watched all around the world. Based on the subscription channel Sony One's data (as cited in Ng, 2016), in Malaysia and in Singapore, *The Legend of the Blue Sea* has become the most watched drama in its time slot compared to other Korean dramas. Furthermore, Korean music bands, fashion and online games were gaining admirers while hosting the 2002 World Cup with Japan.²⁵ For example, music bands such as Super Junior and Big Bang have become the head of the international charts and many people attended to the Super Junior concerts held abroad in France and Los Angeles.²⁶ This prodigy provided an extreme enhancement of South Korea's national brand overseas.

Notwithstanding, South Korea was not as trendy as today before. Musicians suffered because of censorship which was seen as a kind of demonstration that would be prohibited by the authorities. There were not any people with different style such as mods, rockers or hippies in the country. Furthermore, dramas were local and did not have topics as intrigued as today. Korea's over dependency on *chaebols* was acknowledged through the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the president Kim Dae-Jung tried to promote the improvement of the IT along with content industries such

²⁴ "South Korea: Riding the Korean Wave"

²⁵ "South Korea: Riding the Korean Wave"

²⁶ Ng, "The Legend of the Blue Sea' Continues to Be Top Dog in Viewership Ratings"

as film, pop music and video-games. Consequently, firms restructured: Samsung shifted into digital TV and mobile phones. On this situation Hong (2014) states that, if the crisis did not happen, *Hallyu*, the Korean cultural wave which expanded all around the Asia in the past decade would not have happened.

Eventually, the government funded and gave tax incentives for start-ups in the video-game industry which currently holds twelve times the national revenue of Korean pop. Similar to the video game industry, music has also enjoyed the government support. The government initiated a \$1 billion investment fund in order to assist to the pop industry. In sum, even though Korean cultural products have become renown to the Western world through Psy's "Gangnam Style" which has been viewed by 3.1 billion viewers on YouTube, as mentioned above, there is a more intricate story behind the success of Korean wave which involves the marriage of the Korean government, the *chaebol* and devoted individuals.

3.2 Development of the Korean cultural industries, *Hallyu* (Korean Wave) and the *Chaebol* involvement

Through globalization, Korea had been under bilateral and multilateral stress especially from the U.S. to open its markets in sectors involving cinema and television since 1980s. Consequently, production and commodification of media and cultural content containing film, television programming, animation, etc., have been promoted by the Korean economy as opposed to the backdrop of the global spread of "information society" discussion. Media liberalization actions which is also forced

by residents that were satiated by elongated state control of the media led to a significantly ambitious domestic media environment that produced commercially delicate productions in the end. The global media market openings furthered the export of Korean popular culture in the 1990s.²⁷

Due to the market opening to foreign distributors, the late 1980s and early 1990s was a paramount crossroad for the Korean cinema industry. In 1988, with U.S. pressure, the Korean government gave consent to foreign film companies for distributing their films without the control of local distributors in Korea by upsetting the domestic film industry and making them furious.²⁸ Therefore, foreign film imports escalated in contrast to local film productions. The Uruguay Round (UR) trade agreement which began in 1986 was converted into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Through this transformation, all affiliated countries including Korea were compelled to open their markets in media communications and culture areas. In the beginning of GATT in 1947, media communications and culture market were accepted as “exceptional categories” in terms of free trade principle. In this regard, the Korean press wrote while culture was appearing as a new sector in global economic competition, Korean indigenous culture was jeopardized by foreign media and dollar drain along with indicating the cultural industry’s contribution to national economies.²⁹ On this issue, Shim (2008) states that,

For Koreans, there was nothing that illustrated the importance of the cultural industry to the national economy better than what I would call the “*Jurassic*

²⁷ Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 15.

²⁸ Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 16.

²⁹ Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 15.

Park factor". In 1994, the Presidential Advisory Board on Science and Technology proposed to President Kim Young-Sam that Korea should develop cinema and other media content production as a national strategic industry. What the proposal highlighted was the fact that Hollywood movie *Jurassic Park*'s total revenue came up to the foreign sales of 1.5 million Hyundai cars, and this "unlikely" anecdote made the headlines the next morning in Korea. It was a "paradigm shift" for the Koreans who long had strongly believed that the heavy and chemical industries, including automobile, chemical, construction and electronic industries, would lead their country through to a more prosperous future. (p. 17)

Through the Motion Picture Law (MPL), the chief US studios could be able to export films directly into the Korean market and distribution companies such as Twentieth Century Fox, Warner Brothers; Columbia along with Disney opened their own distribution office in Korea. In addition, the US kept pressuring the Korean government to remove the screen quota system.³⁰ These developments caused fluctuation in domestic film production and led the modernization of production techniques in the Korean film industry as new generation of directors and producers accustomed rapidly to the new mediascape and looked for alternative ways to finance their films.³¹ In 1995, the National Assembly replaced old Motion Picture Promotion Law with the new Motion Picture Law with an aim of improving the industry's economic prospect in the audio-visual industry.³² Through this law, the government would give tax incentives for film production and appeal corporate capital into the cinema industry. As a matter of fact, chief *chaebols* such as Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai which were fond of home electronics had been preparing for cultural content production and learning hints from Japanese Sony Electronics' purchase of Columbia Pictures and CBS Records in the end of 1980s. Shortly, The President of

³⁰ Choi, "Faces of Globalization," 16.

³¹ Choi, "Faces of Globalization," 17.

³² Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 99.

South Korea Kim Young Sam's government aimed to encourage investment in the film industry, providing tax incentives for film production.³³ In addition, the government itself supported the film industry through the investments in film projects by establishing Small Business Corporation (SBC) which also undertook heavier part of the losses when funds failed. SBC invested \$121 million to film industry from 1998 to 2005.³⁴ Moreover, the government aimed to bring corporate capital into the cinema industry through the alteration of the Motion Picture Law.³⁵

In a similar vein to the compatibility between hardware-software, *chaebols* conducted the electronic device production and entertainment production simultaneously. Subsequently, Samsung and Daewoo began to finance film and video production at the end of 1980s.³⁶ Daewoo initiated its entertainment division before its competitors Samsung and Hyundai and its investments diversified involving construction of cinemas, production of Korean films, procurement and release of US films and it became the first *chaebol* to launch such division in order to secure its home-video market and cable channel.³⁷ In 1995, Samsung initiated Samsung Entertainment Group (SEG) to operate its media and entertainment division.³⁸ Samsung, Daewoo and Hyundai also ensured their investments in cable television series as program providers (PPs) in 1995. Consequently, more and more Korean *chaebols* became a part of the cultural industry from video production, film import, financing and production, the theatre operation to music production.³⁹ Korea's

³³ Shim, "The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave," 17.

³⁴ Choi, "Faces of Globalization," 19.

³⁵ Shim, "The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave," 17.

³⁶ Shim, "The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave," 17.

³⁷ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 100.

³⁸ Choi, "Faces of Globalization," 17.

³⁹ Shim, "The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave," 17.

biggest food producer and distributor Cheil Chedang Corporation also initiated CJ Entertainment in 1996. CJ appeared as a global competitor in the end of 1990s with its 11 percent share in DreamWorks and 20 percent interest in the US digital magazine publisher *2 Way Media*.⁴⁰ According to Shim (2008), “The *youngsang san-eop* (visual industry or image industry) is rising to the surface as a new field for *chaebol* competition” (p. 17). The Table 1 indicates the five major *chaebol*’s cultural industry activities in 1995.

Table 1. Five major *chaebol*’s cultural industry activities in 1995

<i>Chaebol</i>	Subsidiary	Activity
Samsung	Catch One	Pay cable channel (PP)
	Dream Box	Film importer / home video producer
	Hoam Art Hall	Theater
	Myungbo Movies	Cinema house (Samsung leased two screens under contract)
	Nices	Film importer / producer of CDs, LDs, CD-ROMs, and films
	Starmax	Film importer / film producer
	Cheil Youngsang	Film importer / television program producer
	Audiosoft	Music producer and distributor
	Q Channel	Cable channel (PP)
Daewoo	Daewoo Electronics Video Business Division	Film importer for home video production / film producer

⁴⁰ Choi, “Faces of Globalization,” 18.

	Wooil Video	Film importer for video production / distribution
	Dong-woo Video	Home video producer
	Seshin Video	Home video producer
	Daewoo Cinema Network	Cable channel (PP)
	Se-um Media	Music producer and distributor
Hyundai	Seoul Production	Film producer
	HBS	Cable channel (PP)
LG	LG Media	Film importer / producer of CDs, LDs, CD-ROMs, and films
	Mediart	Film importer / film producer
	Korea Home Shopping	Cable channel (PP)
SK	SKC Video Business Division	Film importer for home video production
	Pan Production	Film producer and distributor
	Mido Film	Film importer / film producer
	Seoryung Production	Film importer for home video production

Source: Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave

Couple of years later, the investments experienced losses along with the signals of economic decline in the mid-1990s. Consequently, *chaebols* tried to withdraw from the cultural industry. The 1997 financial crisis opened the way for *chaebols* to shut down their businesses. SK severely diminished its video and film businesses in January 1998 and Daewoo left behind its cinema investments in the following year. Specifically, the split of the Samsung Entertainment Group which was a combined organization established in 1995, brought all cultural industry

relevant ventures within Samsung in 1999 pointed the ending of “the *chaebol* age of Korean cinema industry” in the 1990s.⁴¹

Nonetheless, the *chaebol* era produced the foundation for the revival of the cinema industry. *Chaebol* film companies employed raw talents, who brought new energy into the Korean cinema through organizing independent film festivals and film scenario competitions with significant money awards. Especially, young directors who were graduated from renowned film schools all over the world that would wait for a long time to shoot their first films without financial backing were supported by the *chaebol*.⁴²

Meanwhile, plenty of talented staff members from different business departments within the *chaebols* were transferred to the cinema business. Thus, the *chaebols* brought their advanced business know-how such as audience research with efficient planning, marketing and transparent accounting to the Korean cinema industry which was sustaining with outdated business practices. Those people continued to work in the cinema industry even after the *chaebols* left.⁴³In addition, through the business improvement of the local film industry by *chaebols*, new players entered into the sector such as people with MBAs and graduates from prestigious universities in order to benefit from the ‘life-time’ employment under the *chaebol* possession in the middle of 1990s.⁴⁴ Later on, venture capitalists and investment firms came in and sought for quick profits while the *chaebol* were leaving the cinema industry.⁴⁵ Thus, a new generation of investors appeared in the

⁴¹ Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 19.

⁴² Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 19.

⁴³ Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 19.

⁴⁴ Shim, “Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia,” 33.

⁴⁵ Shim, “The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave,” 19.

Korean film industry after the *chaebols* downsized their entertainment divisions. Between the years 1998 and 2005, the number of venture capitalists who invested in the film industry became fifty and the total investment rises to \$535 million dollars. That money came into the film industry through the new investors such as Ilshin Investment Co., Bookman Venture Capital, and Mirae Asset Investment Co. which were backed by wealthy venture capitalists.⁴⁶

On venture capitalist investments, Shim (2008) further mentions about the thriller movie called *Shiri*;

Right after the Samsung Entertainment Group officially announced its breakup, an action thriller, *Shiri* which Samsung had planned and funded as its final project, ironically was a big hit. By attracting 5.8 million theatergoers nationwide, it set a new-box office record in Korea. That *Shiri* was also partly funded by a venture capitalist gave many prospective investors cues to finance film productions. (p. 20)

As it can be seen above, the improvement in the Motion Picture Promotion Law in 1999 opened the way for individuals to fund film productions which is called *netizen fund*. Consequently, a lot of films were funded by netizen funds not only in terms of investment but also for marketing. In 2001, US \$7.8 million amounted “Hana Cinema Trust Fund No.1” was initiated by Hana Bank. In such circumstances, the Korean cinema industry produced more blockbusters. Furthermore, Shim (2008) states that;

In 2001, *Shiri*'s box-office record was broken by *Joint Security Area*, whose record was again smashed by *Friends* a few months later with 8.2 million admission tickets sold in Korea. 2004 saw two movies that set new box-office records by hitting 11.08 million and 11.74 million in viewership,

⁴⁶ Choi, “Faces of Globalization,” 18.

respectively. *Silmido* revisited North-South Korean relations in the 1970s and *TaeGukGi: The Brotherhood of War* was a movie about two brothers' experiences during the Korean War. In March 2006, *King and the Clown*, a fiction film depicting a king during the Joseon (or, Chosen) Period (1392-1910) falling in love with a pretty male clown, set a new Korean record by drawing in more than 12 million audiences. Upheld by these and other well-performing local flicks, the Korean cinema's domestic market share has continuously increased from 15.9 percent in 1993 to 35.5 percent in 2000, and even recorded over 50 percent in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005. (p. 20)

The reason behind the film industry's attractiveness despite the 1997 economic crisis was the Motion Picture Law mentioned above and rapid financial return in comparison to other manufacturing businesses. Eventually, the "conglomeration" and investments of the venture capital to the film industry led Korean blockbuster films emerge.⁴⁷ The alliance between the conventional movie producers in Korean film production district *Chungmuro* and the conglomerates led the production of high quality movies.

Similar progress was made in the Korean drama sector as well. As in the cinema sector, government and lawmakers act quickly and strongly to produce high-quality K-drama. Through the Investment Broadcasting Law which obliged Korean non satellite networks to procure some of their programs from independent production companies, original Korean dramas that were the creation of self-employed writers and producers of have been broadcasted.⁴⁸ Moreover, due to the Asian economic crisis in the 1997, Asian buyers preferred to buy low cost Korean

⁴⁷ Choi, "Faces of Globalization," 18.

⁴⁸ Hong, *The Birth of Korean Cool*, 164.

TV programs as they were a quarter of the price of Japanese TV programs and a tenth of the price of Hong Kong television dramas in 2000.⁴⁹

When it came to 2005, \$43 million worth of content was exported by the Korean Broadcasting System.⁵⁰ Korean dramas have become so popular that in 2012, Taiwan's National Communications Commission asked Taiwanese network to decrease the number of Korean programs and increase the number of hours given to non-Korean shows. In 2013, a Korean drama called *Queens of Housewives* were airing four times a week in state channel Canal Habana in Cuba.⁵¹ Sung Tae-Ho (as cited in Lee, 2015), who is a senior manager in KBS stated that export of the network increased to \$65 million and reached to 38 countries in 2015. According to an article in *MK Daily* (as cited in Lee, 2015), from 2002 to 2009, the country has doubled its exports by exporting almost \$3 billion in entertainment and today, 400 independent studios create content for domestic and international markets.

In a similar vein, the Korean music industry has become one of the major contributors to Korean wave. Lee Soo Man, who is the founder of SM Entertainment in 1989, is the first person that industrialized the music industry and star generation process in K-pop. He has challenged the monotony of the Korean music and produced clone pop stars. One of the most successful instances of his products is H.O.T. which is a boy band that sold more than 10 million CDs between 1996 and 2001. Before generating H.O.T., Lee Soo Man conducted a survey amongst teenage girls to figure out the attributes of their dream idols. Based on the results of the

⁴⁹ Shim, "Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia," 28.

⁵⁰ Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 107.

⁵¹ Hong, *The Birth of Korean Cool*, 168.

analysis along with the singing and dancing talents, Lee selected the idols from thousands of audition videos. After two years of meticulous training in singing, dancing and other necessary skills that will help them to become successful in the music market, SM Entertainment released H.O.T.'s first album which was sold 1.5 million copies at the beginning.⁵²

3.2.1 Korean Wave

Hallyu (Korean wave) stands for the Korean popular culture boom, which became intensely popular in Hong Kong, China and Southeast Asia at the end of 1990s.⁵³

Hong (2014) states that *Hallyu* was born in a diplomatic purse carrying a Betamax tape of a Korean television drama named *What Is Love* which was transported between Seoul and Hong Kong in 1992,

The sender of the Betamax was Chung Injoon, a career civil servant and cultural attaché who now serves as visiting fellow at the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (KCTI is a government organization); the recipient was the Korean consulate in Hong Kong. Their mission: to get this show on Hong Kong television by any means necessary. In so doing, Chung told me, "I witnessed it, but set it in motion. At the time, he was the director called the Korean Overseas Information Service. Chung had to use a diplomatic pouch because of protocols that made it a logistical nightmare to ship broadcast-quality videos between borders. "We thought, maybe it will be opened, maybe it won't," he recalled. If the parcel had been intercepted, it would have been confiscated. And that might have changed the course of Hallyu history. (p. 165)

⁵² Shim, "Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia," 38.

⁵³ Kim, "Past, Present and Future of Hallyu," 154.

Chung Injoon and his colleagues realized that if they aired *What Is Love* on Hong Kong's Asia Television (ATV), it could reach beyond Hong Kong to China through Guangdong Province which is Hong Kong's neighbor in mainland along with possibility of 50 million audiences. Chung Injoon and his colleagues persuaded Korean companies in Hong Kong to purchase ad time during the shows and utilized Korean government funds to translate into Cantonese, because there was no demand for Korean television shows neither in Asia nor another region of the world before. Eventually, ATV aired the show and it became so favored that, Chung states (as cited in Hong, 2014) "there were no people or cars on the street during the time period that the drama was on air." (p. 165) More importantly, the series led to a cultural shift in Hong Kong. As Chung states (as cited in Hong, 2014), "In those days in Hong Kong, the husband cooked dinner after work. But the show sabotaged this, displaying the father as a superpower. When they watched the show, they saw the wife cooking, which caused kind of a syndrome." (p. 165). This was the very first beginning of the Korean drama current. Subsequently, the show was exported to China's China Central Television (CCTV), Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines along with export of other Korean dramas.⁵⁴

In addition, Korean dramas have become favored in Japan through the broadcast of the Korean dramas such as *Winter Sonata* and *Dae Jang Geum* (A Jewel in the Palace) on Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), the Japanese national TV channel in 2003.⁵⁵ Simultaneous popularity of Korean pop music (K-Pop) along with generation of international celebrities such as H.O.T., BoA, Rain ("Bi") and Super

⁵⁴ Hong, *The Birth of Korean Cool*, 167.

⁵⁵ Kim, "Past, Present and Future of Hallyu," 154.

Junior led to a new cultural phenomenon in the Asia called the Korean Wave (*Hallyu*).⁵⁶ Initially, *Hallyu* terminology's popularity increased through the Chinese media as *Hanryu*. The expression was first encountered in a Chinese magazine which was warning the readers to be careful about Korean popular culture.

Notwithstanding, the *Hallyu* expression started to be identified as a symbol of cultural influence on Asia.⁵⁷ Korean cultural products create soft power through the delicate propaganda of Korean values, images and tastes to global public. Korean cultural products also made Korean people look popular, which consists of pale, powdery skin including foundation using males around the world. Thus, the Korean cosmetics industry has boosted in Asia opening chains in the region. For instance, a Korean cosmetics brand Face Shop has thousand stores all over the Asia.⁵⁸ In addition, Korean stars had an immense influence on consumer products such as food, fashion, make-up trends and plastic surgery. Moreover, the number of students who are learning Korean escalated by 60 percent in 2003 from 2001 due to the interests which was created through the Korean dramas. Given the expanding enthusiasm, travel agencies have started to sell television drama-themed group tours to Korea with titles such as 'Best of Korean drama trailer deluxe tour'.⁵⁹ According to the research of Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI, 2005), the expansion of *Hallyu* has occurred in four stages which can be seen in the Figure 1. Firstly, Korean popular culture has been diffused through the production of TV programs, films, and K-pop (Korean pop). Secondly, people who were attracted by Korean TV programs, films, and K-pop, started to buy products that were created through the Korean

⁵⁶ Shim, "The Growth of Korean Cultural Industries and the Korean Wave," 16.

⁵⁷ Kim, "Past, Present and Future of Hallyu," 154.

⁵⁸ Hong, *The Birth of Korean Cool*, 168.

⁵⁹ Shim, "Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia," 29.

popular culture such as soundtrack of a renowned drama, a necklace which an actress used in a drama, or tickets for a Korean popular culture activity prepared for tourists.⁶⁰ Thirdly, people started to buy Korean products not only those are directly related to Korean mass culture but also products such as electronics and cosmetics. Lastly, when people started to buy products related to Korean popular culture and other Korean products they started to adopt a new point of view of Korea. Those four stages constitute the *Hallyu's* developmental cycle. Through the development of Korean wave, the export of specific products grew. In addition, the number of tourists who came to visit the popular Korean dramas' locations has escalated. Therefore, new opportunities have appeared for various Korean industries with the impact of the Korean cultural industry in foreign countries.⁶¹




Figure 1. Stages of the spread of *Hallyu*

Source: GO (2005)

⁶⁰ Kim, "Past, Present and Future of Hallyu," 154.

⁶¹ Kim, "Past, Present and Future of Hallyu," 154.

In the development phase of contemporary Korean soft power, The Cultural Ministry and its institutional arms have played paramount role. Generally, the MCST deals with the domestic cultural relations. In January 2014, the ministry opened 27 Korean Cultural Centers in 23 countries. There are 10 centers in Europe which are located in United Kingdom, Turkey, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Hungary, Poland, Kazakhstan and Russia; 9 centers in Asia including India, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and China with two centers. Furthermore, three centers exists in Latin America including Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and also three centers in the US located in Los Angeles, Washington DC and New York City. In order to support these cultural centers, the MCST spent 27.8 billion in 2012. In 1979, it initiated the very first Korean Cultural Centers in New York City and Tokyo.⁶² In 2012, the MCST spent 27.8 billion to support the cultural centers. These overseas Korean Cultural Centers run Korean language teaching programs and cultural events. In order to teach and promote Korean language, the MCST established King Sejong Institutes (*Sejong Hakdang*) through its overseas cultural centers. Their number has increased from 22 in 2010 to 60 in 2011 and to 90 in 2012 to 113 in July 2013.⁶³

In addition, the MCST started to broadcast a 24-hour network which was initially started as a domestic English language network in 1996 and has been airing in overseas programming since 1999. It operates as Arirang TV in English, whose mission is “to burnish Korea’s image in international communities and to improve relationships with foreign countries through close cooperation with broadcasting companies overseas.” In addition to the MCST, other ministries also engage in

⁶² Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy,” 123.

⁶³ Lee, “South Korea’s Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy,” 124.

miscellaneous public diplomacy activities when carrying out international programs to the leadership provided by these two ministries in soft power, For instance, South Korea's Ministry of Food, Agriculture, Forest, and Fisheries founded the Korean Food foundation in 2010 to promote the excellence of Korean food and its globalization.⁶⁴

The Ministry of Strategy and Finance has adopted public diplomacy components in its overseas consulting services by promoting Korean development experiences. Using loan components of ODA, the Korea Development Institute runs a knowledge-sharing program promoting a locally adapted Korean development model. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy is more oriented to commercial purposes when it promotes the “Korean Brand” in such areas as fashion and design. Its affiliated public organizations such as the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency and the Korea institute for Design Promotion, are mixing national images in their commercial branding.⁶⁵ As it can be seen above, the Korean government's role is crucial in creating Korean soft power. Further on the governmental support, Pease (2009) states that,

...during my fieldwork they unanimously praised the investment of the Korean government and large corporations such as Samsung that were willing to maintain the profile of Korean music through mounting concerts and album giveaways... The Samsung Economic Research Institute in 2005 drew up a report on Hanliu, entitled “The Korean wave sweeps the globe” to see how best to sustain and benefit from the wave and economists credited Korea's healthy export figures to the country's cultural diplomacy. The Korean government was likewise keen to capitalize on the economic benefits of Hanliu. In 2001, the Korean Ministry of Culture set up the Korean Culture and Contents Agency (KOCCA)— “in recognition of the value of cultural content and its importance as the nation's economic growth factor” — to

⁶⁴ Lee, “South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy,” 125.

⁶⁵ Lee, “South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy,” 125.

support cultural industries at home and to facilitate cultural exports and exchange. Besides KOCCA, a major investor in Hanliu was the Korean National Tourism Office, which noted the increase of tourism generated by overseas drama fans, and employed hankie stars, such as Rain, as “goodwill ambassadors.” In 2003, the KNTTO conducted a Hanliu tourism survey in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong exploring attitudes to Korean culture, publishing the results online. While TV dramas and film were found to have the greatest impact on visitor figures to Korea, the survey revealed that 27.5 percent of Chinese respondents listed “attend concerts of popular singer” as their “desired purpose of visiting Korea,” and fifteen percent cited the “influence of Korean music” in choosing that country for future tourism. (p. 155)

In order to become successful not only in Asia but also in the other parts of the world, a book named *Hallyu Forever* was published by Korean Cultural Trade Commission (as cited in Hong, 2014) which is a government agency. The book was about strategies on how to advance in world markets including descriptions of the socioeconomic, political, and cultural circumstances which might generate a feasible market for Hallyu along with recommendations on what kind of attribute of K-culture such as film, television, and food would be successful in a specific country. For instance, the chapter about the Arabian region underscores the significance of avoiding airing Korean TV programs during Muslim prayer times and being careful about the sexual norms which might make some of the Korean dramas immoral on the eye of Arabic viewers.

Yet, *Hallyu*'s greatest impact is in China. The wave has become so popular that Chinese authorities were infuriated and warned the public on the social ills of immoderate viewing of Korean dramas. However, the warnings did not succeed as the *Hallyu* surpassed dramas and become visible in the sectors including fashion,

food and cosmetics.⁶⁶ Chinese authorities who have seen the success of Korean cultural product exports along with Korea's increased influence, have stated to bring producers from Korea and begin to use soft power as a propaganda tool. In other words, the success of *Hallyu* caused both collaboration and competition in China. In addition, through *Hallyu*, Chinese people's perception of Korea has improved and they have started to sense cultural affinity towards Korea.⁶⁷

In a similar vein to government efforts, Korean conglomerates are endeavoring to turn Korean wave fans into consumers of Korean products and services. Samsung Electronics in China used renowned actor Ahn Jaewook as a model for its computer monitor commercial. Whereas in Vietnam, LG Household and Health Care observed that its sales 'skyrocket' after it used Korean actress Kim Nam-ju in its commercials. Public relations manager of LG Household and Health Care states that after that LG has 'notched the first place in brand recognition among foreign cosmetic brands in Vietnam'. Furthermore, LG Electronics have given numerous Korean dramas without demanding any money to Vietnamese television stations along with covering the cost of translating the dramas in order to maintain the Korean culture thunder in Vietnam. Korea is aware of that culture can bring money as much as semi-conductors or cars.⁶⁸

In addition to the marriage of the Korean government and *chaebol*, Korean culture was one of the most essential elements in creating a national brand image and the Korean Wave as well. Improvement of national image through culture

⁶⁶ Song, "China awash with Korean Wave fever"

⁶⁷ Jang, "The Korean Wave and Its Implications for the Korea-China Relationship," 110.

⁶⁸ Shim, Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia," 30.

ultimately has a positive influence on other factors that make up national image as a whole, such as political, social and economic factors. The Korean wave fundamentally improved the nation's cultural image that had a halo effect that changed people's perception of Korea's political, economic and social images. The Asian news frame explicitly stressed the situated sense of nation branding of the Korean wave. This frame not only reformed the Korean national image but also allowed Seoul to become known as the capital of commodities across Asia.⁶⁹

Then the question we should be asking is how Korean culture did draw attention of people all around the world? In her book *The Birth of Korean Cool*, Hong (2014) interviewed the founder of an Asian American magazine, *A Magazine*, Jeff Yang. According to him, whilst other Asian countries such as China and Japan imposed pan-Asian influence by being imperial powers which had been perceived as colonialist, Korea, on the other hand has conquered the world through its consumer products. He also articulates the significance of the role played by *chaebols* such as Samsung and LG.

Unlike Apple, both Samsung and LG released cheaper versions of their latest smart phones along with producing refrigerators and dishwashers which would make people to enter into the middle class. Shortly, Korean consumer products have become a representation of hope and a gate towards upper classes. Yang (as cited in Hong, 2014) further elaborates that Korean culture's especially K-pop's lack of eccentricity such as Mick Jagger or David Bowie is part of its captivation:

⁶⁹ Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 107.

Korea has done a great job of standardization. It's provided a package of entertainment and entertainers who are sexy but safe. Adult yet not out of reach. When people buy into K-pop, they buy into a lifestyle. K-pop is pop culture as lifestyle brand. (p. 198)

One of the biggest Korean culture booms has happened in France. In 2011, tickets for a K-Pop concert in Paris have been sold less than fifteen minutes. For the concert including Girls Generation, TVXQ!, Shine, f(x), and Super Junior, all belong to SM Entertainment, there was one date scheduled for the concert. Soon after Parisian K-pop fans conducted a flash mob demonstration demanding additional concert dates. Same flash mobs came into sight in eleven other different cities in France. Choe Junho, who was the director of the Korean Culture Centre in Paris from 2007 to 2011, which is an agency supported by the Korean administration that is responsible for expansion of Korean culture abroad, made *Hallyu* well-known in France.

Before his return to Korea, he wanted to throw a concert that would be unforgettable in France. He proposed his plan to Korean Ministry of Culture and requested funds for a K-pop concert in Paris in June 2011. He convinced the ministry and received 250,000 euros for the concert which was not sufficient enough. Subsequently, Choe accessed to SM Entertainment. However, the company did not want to be involved with the government and Choe assured the company that nobody would meddle into their production or creative part of the concert. Consequently, SM Entertainment accepted to conduct a concert and generated one of the Korean culture's largest enthusiasts in Europe.⁷⁰ Through the collaboration, systematic

⁷⁰ Hong, *The Birth of Korean Cool*, 206.

planning and investments of the Korean government and the Korean conglomerates, *Hallyu* has become outstanding and generated Korea's soft power all around the world.

3.3 The role of the government in the development of cultural industry in Korea

The Korean government supported cultural industries extensively from the advancement of production technology to qualified personnel with an aim of international enlargement of distribution systems, since the late 1990s. This eager promotion of the cultural industry depends on the evolution of the government's approach on cultural industries due to the industry's potential for the national economic growth.⁷¹

State-led development strategy was applied by the government during the early phases of the industrialization from the 1960s to 1980s. Thus, specific industries were deliberately chosen and improved for high-speed national economic advancement. As a matter of fact, consecutive Korean governments pursued a combined advancement of the cultural industries rather than selecting specific industries such as electronics, mobile communications and multimedia industries with aiming the nation's economic development.⁷² South Korea had three goals in its history of cultural policy. First one is the declaration of national identity began with Rhee Syngman period. The second one is adopting culture as a tool to consolidate the

⁷¹ Kwon and Kim, "The cultural industry policies of the Korean government and the Korean Wave," 423.

⁷² Kwon and Kim, "The cultural industry policies of the Korean government and the Korean Wave," 424.

authoritarian regime of Park Chung Hee to Roh Tae Woo (1963-1993). And the third one is adopting culture as a national economic tool with the Kim Youngsam administration in 1993.⁷³

3.3.1 The Rhee Syngman era (1948-1960)

The Republic of Korea's first government had tried to utilize 'culture' as an instrument to recuperate the nation's identity after the destruction of the country as a result of Japanese colonization and Korean War that took place between 1950 and 1953. Thus, the state was active in terms of construction a national cultural movement for the regeneration of the country.⁷⁴ Although the government budget was inadequate due to the perishing of Korean economy after the Korean War, President Rhee Syngman endeavored to settle the national identity problem and defeat the Japanese domination for over 35 years and the destruction came along with the Korean War.⁷⁵

3.3.2 The military government of Park Chung Hee (1961-1979)

With the successful *coup d'etat* of General Park Chung Hee and his military's takeover of South Korea in 1961, the government initiated an institutional structure by adopting cultural policies which were led by the state.⁷⁶ Moreover, in 1962, the

⁷³ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 72.

⁷⁴ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 72.

⁷⁵ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 73.

⁷⁶ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 80.

Ministry of Culture and Public Information was initiated. The government of Park Chung Hee which ruled the country from 1961 to 1979, gave high importance to economic growth and pursued cultural policy actively by setting up laws, institutions, organizations and public fund devoted to the cultural sector. Especially, Park Chung Hee government issued “the first five-year master plan for cultural development” to be applied from 1974 to 1979.

The First Five-Year Plan for the promotion of culture and arts (*Munye Chinhung 5-gaeyon kyeheok*) was significant because it was the first long-term plan in Korea’s cultural policy history. The main motivation in this was to form a new national culture which is based on Korea’s native values and identity inside the Culture and Arts Promotion Law framework that was initiated in 1972 which covered maturing programs such as the endorsement of national studies, dispersion of culture within the society, and the launching of Korean culture overseas. The complete budget was provided by the government during this period. Table 2 indicates the investment plan between 1974 and 1978 and Table 3 provides the cultural budget from 1974 to 1978.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 83.

Table 2. Investment plan between 1974 and 1978 (in million won-won per U.S. Dollar is 404.4 in 1974 and 484.0 in 1975-1978)

	Total	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Traditional culture	14,957	2,467	3,082	2,820	3,066	3,522
History	1,569	403	290	292	292	292
Traditional Arts	670	88	142	145	147	148
Cultural properties	12,718	1,976	2,650	2,383	2,627	3,082
Contemporary arts	6,017	1,435	1,096	1,128	1,162	1,196
Literature	744	123	123	159	163	176
Fine Arts	650	106	116	116	146	146
Music	2,818	563	566	563	563	563
Drama	907	467	110	110	110	110
Dance	898	176	181	180	180	181
Popular Culture	3,985	660	1,344	676	662	643
Cinema	3,235	510	1,194	526	512	493
Publishing	750	150	150	150	150	150
Total	24,959	4,562	5,522	4,624	4,890	5,361

Source: The first five-year plan for promotion of culture and arts 1974-1978, the Ministry of Culture and Information, October 1973.

Table 3. The cultural budget from 1974 to 1978 (in million won-won per U.S. Dollar is 404.4 in 1974 and 484.0 in 1975-1978)

Year	Government Total Budget	The ministry Total Budget	Budget on Culture			Public Information Budget
			Sub-total	Culture and Arts	Heritage	
1974	880,533	4,330	1,431	1,431	-	2,899
1975	1,586,931	6,263	1,754	1,754	-	4,509
1976	2,258,512	6,508	2,012	2,012	-	4,496
1977	2,896,956	15,866	56,810	2,920	2,761	10,185
1978	3,517,037	23,351	12,838	5,005	7,833	10,513

Source: Thirty years of culture and public information 1979.

Cultural outputs such as conventional music, dramas and broadcasts were used to encourage Korean people to welcome the military government's stress on self-sacrifice, extensive working hours and low wages for the sake of nation.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the regime improved the Office of Public Information which was built in 1948 during Rhee Syngman administration and changed it to the Department of Public Information in 1961 and to Ministry of Culture and Public Information (*Munhwa Gongbobo*) in 1968. The governmental organization MCPI was utilized as a political device for coercion by various cultural schemes. Especially, it was

⁷⁸ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea's cultural industries," 519.

planned to construct a national culture which will generate faith to the government and infuse a feel of belonging to the country.⁷⁹

From the beginning to the end, the cultural plan was paramount for Park for the validation of his totalitarian administration and construction of Korea's national identity. In order to do that, the government focused on national historical locations and figures such as *Gyeongju* where three nations unified in the Seventh Century. In addition, national symbols were created such as *King Sejong* who invented the Korean alphabet in the mid Fifteenth Century and Admiral *Yi Soon-shin* of the Sixteenth Century who triumphed over the Japanese army. Therefore, it can be inferred that through cultural actions led by Park Chung Hee administration, South Korea's nationalism of today was built.⁸⁰

Park Chung Hee used "*Mun-hwa Han 'guk* (Cultural Korea)" slogan during his inauguration speech in 1971 and aimed to utilize Korea's cultural legacy in order for assisting the nation's modernization. Regarding this, the government declared October as the "Month of Culture" in 1972, and 20th of October 1973 as the "Day of Culture".⁸¹ Consequently, Korean Culture and Arts Foundation (*Han 'guk Munhwa Yes Chinhungwon*, KCAF) were initiated in 1973. In terms of cultural movements led by state, KCAF was a significant agency. Various facilities were established which were open-access to the public by KCAF with an aim of inserting state ideology to the general public and used cultural events to implement the state's propaganda. Therefore, it planned events such as dance, theatre, music, film and literature. With

⁷⁹ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 80.

⁸⁰ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 84.

⁸¹ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 82

The *Saemaul-Undong* (New Community Movement) it became the key component of the nation's cultural movement. The *Saemaul-Undong* was an important event for the Park Chung Hee administration because it was the symbol of the government's achievement in terms of rapid economic growth and industrialization. Moreover, the National Film Production Centre (NFPC) which was established in 1948 under the Rhee Syngman administration was improved and the first film policy named the Motion Picture Law (MPL) was publicized in 1962. The National Film Production Centre was utilized as propaganda means that exploited films.⁸²

The political power of President Park Chung Hee was strengthened after he established the Yushin Constitution in 1972. With this constitution, he demolished Korea's National Assembly and forbade the formation of political parties, restrained the freedom of expression. Simultaneously, censorship was pressed on the media and broadcasting industries. The Ministry Public Welfare became in charge of the cultural industries and audited films, theatre, dance, music and cultural establishment as the National Theatre, National Traditional Arts Centre and National Film Production along with applying censorship over their content. At the same time, Ministries of Culture and Public Welfare were carefully monitoring broadcasting and music publishing. With an aim of using television broadcasting for Korea's economic growth, major amount of dramas were dedicated to contemporary history as the Korean War which include anti-communist points. Dramas such as *Real Stories* and *Goodbye Abai* can be given as instances to these productions.⁸³

⁸² Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 81.

⁸³ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 519.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the majority of small private media industries and regional broadcasting operators were joined to Korean Broadcasting System (KBS) and the Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) which led government to increase its level of monitoring the broadcasting of news, entertainment, documentary, and educational programs. Eventually, the monitoring stretched out to the assignment of senior managers, annual financial plans and daily operations.⁸⁴ Notwithstanding, state-led international cultural promotion was first initiated in Park's government. The government not only promoted Korean legacy within the country borders but also globally. *Taekwondo*, can be given as an example to this as International Taekwondo Federation (ITF) was established in 1966. In addition, the government initiated its first overseas Korean Cultural Centre in Tokyo in 1979.⁸⁵

By the 1970s, extensive demonstrations started against the Park Chung Hee military government. The political unease between the military government and demonstrating Korean civil society gave birth to *Minjung* which means 'the people'. In late 1970s and early 1980s, Korea's youth integrated with *Minjung* culture and it led to the emergence of vast number of informal social groups in factories, universities and communities. Young Koreans were dancing, singing, producing dramas and films which manifest the despotic Korean government and motivate the young Korean people to engage in anti-government demonstrations in the 1980s. Eventually, Park Chung Hee was assassinated by the Korean central intelligence agency's chief on the 26th of December, 1979.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 520.

⁸⁵ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 85.

⁸⁶ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 520.

3.3.3 The Chun Doo Hwan era (1980-1988)

With the Chun Doo Hwan government in 1980s, the strict governmental monitor over culture evolved to a developmental policy which supported the growth of the cultural industry. However, this growth was not exactly a cultural liberalization. The Chun government sustained the monitoring over the mass media through the initiation of the Basic Press Act of 1980.⁸⁷

Same as in the Park Chung Hee government, the construction of national cultural identity was underscored in Chun's government. Yet, differently from Park's government, the cultural policy was not solely restricted on constructing a cultural identity with a focus on cultural heritage and traditional arts, but rather prolonged to contemporary arts. In this light, the Chun Doo Hwan government initiated two detailed plans for cultural policy as "the new plan for the cultural development" initiated in 1981 and "the cultural plan in the sixth five-year plan for economic and social development" initiated in 1986.⁸⁸

In this period the administration adopted entertainment and sports with an aim of diverting the society's attention from the bitter reality of low wages, continuing authoritarian political regime and restricted democracy. Moreover, limitations of the previous Park Chung Hee government were diminished and '3S Policy', a policy which was related to the promotion of sex, screen and sports was enforced.⁸⁹ Furthermore, professional sports leagues as football, baseball and wrestling were introduced.⁹⁰ In 1982, the Korean Professional Baseball League

⁸⁷ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 87.

⁸⁸ Yim, "Cultural Identity and cultural policy in South Korea," 40.

⁸⁹ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 520.

⁹⁰ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 520-521.

(KBL) and *Ssi-Reum* (traditional wrestling) were founded.⁹¹ Extensive investment in leisure and cultural provision as theaters, exhibition halls, ski centers, stadiums and amusement parks was made.⁹²

In 1980, the Basic Press Act, group of laws which were prohibitive and extensive in terms of the rights of the press was legislated. Through these laws, some capitalist groups in Korea were consolidated.⁹³ The government began to sponsor vigorously the media industry as Film and Television and owned all television networks.⁹⁴

For instance, the private broadcasting systems such as Ton-Yang Broadcasting Company (TBC) and Dong-A to join the state-led Korean Broadcasting System. In addition, it made *Mun-Hwa* Broadcasting Corp (MBC) which is another private broadcasting company to sell more than 60 percent of its shares to KBS. Thus, KBS received both advertising and licensing costs. Moreover, the Korean Christian Broadcasting System (CBS) had restricted its broadcasts due to its religious content. Therefore, KBS and MBC became the most powerful broadcasting companies which were led by the junta regime.⁹⁵ Despite being a dictator and his role in Kwangju massacre, the most significant development during Chun Doo Hwan regime was the creation of a market for the entertainment industries.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 87.

⁹² Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 520.

⁹³ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 89.

⁹⁴ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 87.

⁹⁵ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 89.

⁹⁶ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 90.

3.3.4 The Roh Tae Woo era (1988-1993)

Although Roh Tae Woo was originally from the military as an army general, his administration carried South Korea to democracy. From 1988, freedom of expression began to increase and the government started to detach its monitoring over the media slowly and eventually, censorship and strict legal mechanisms was abolished through the Basic Press Act in 1987.⁹⁷ The Roh Tae Woo administration initiated a “ten-year master plan for cultural development” in 1990 with the slogan of “culture for all the people.” The motivations behind this plan was again to form a cultural identity, promote the beauty in arts, enhance cultural welfare, develop regional culture, initiate international cultural exchange, form a cultural media and to accomplish an ethnic unification.⁹⁸

In terms of global exchange, the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games had taken place in Korea along with the permission of the direct distribution of foreign films in the country as part of the liberalization plans of the government and for the institutions the Roh government reformed the institutions that were left from the Park government and established local cultural institutions such as the National Institution of the Korean Language.⁹⁹

The highlight of the Roh’s government in terms of cultural policies was the liberalization of the media industry and the television market.¹⁰⁰ Liberalization measurements applied in cable television service initiation in 1993 and opening of the Korean film market to the US. Through media liberalization, Korea enjoyed

⁹⁷ Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 90.

⁹⁸ Yim, “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea,” 41.

⁹⁹ Park, “South Korea cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 91.

¹⁰⁰ Park, “South Korea cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 92.

exponential economic growth. The first ‘Cultural Industry Bureau’ was established within the Ministry of Culture and Sports in 1994 as a result of the internal ‘drama war’ among the three major Korean TV stations which are KBS, MBC, and SBS. The aim of the bureau was to conduct cultural strategies in order to expand the Korean popular culture products at the international stage.¹⁰¹

During this time, liberal newspapers were established such as *Hankyoreh*, *Kukmin-Ilbo* (1988), *Segye-Ilbo* (1989) and *Munwha-Ilbo* (1991) along with a creation of the media market. Nonetheless, the film industry of Korea was still monitored through Public Performance Ethics Committee (PPEC) which was established during Park government in 1978. In addition, film industry began to shrink due to the import liberalization of foreign films.¹⁰²

3.3.5 The Kim Young Sam era (1993-1998)

Through Kim Young-Sam administration which is the first civilian government after 30 years of junta, globalization has become the primary concern of the nation. In 1994, globalization (*segzehwa*) policy was officially launched by the government. *Segzehwa* slogan under Kim Young-sam’s government was the extension of the market opening and “catching up” to the level of international society. Upgrading the scope of international contributions to the global agenda, South Korea’s new government endeavored to find a diplomatic position looking out of the conventionally focused diplomatic space of Northeast Asia. For example, hosting the

¹⁰¹ Kim and Marinescu, “Mapping South Korea’s Soft Power,” 2.

¹⁰² Park, “South Korea cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 92.

G20 meeting in 2010 has given South Korea confidence in “going global”. The main motivation behind the globalization move was to carry Korea to the same level with other powerful countries in terms of political, economic, social and cultural development.¹⁰³ For instance, the government during this period promoted political campaign under the “Creation of the New Korea” slogan to raise Korea’s status in global society.¹⁰⁴

In addition, popular culture was recognized as an industry in this period. The Kim Young Sam’s government holds on the idea of post-industrial society and dazzled by the potential market values of popular culture which is reflected in US’ international success in its cultural industries. For example, a movie called Jurassic Park’s international profit was equal to that of the Korean car company Hyundai’s profit from exporting 1.5 million cars.¹⁰⁵ In 1994, the government set up the Cultural Industries Directorate to create and spread a strong economic foundation for cultural industries. The Cultural Industries Directorate’s policies include “the industrialization of culture” and “the internationalization of Korean culture.”¹⁰⁶

Moreover, the Ministry of Culture and Sport (MCS) was created with the Cultural Industry Bureau in 1994 (it became Ministry of Culture and Tourism in 1995). The Bureau was formed of six departments which were in charge of the cultural industry: Publication and Newspaper, Broadcasting and Advertising, Film and Video, Interactive Media and Cultural Content Promotion. As well as MCS was

¹⁰³ Ryoo, “The political economy of the global mediascape: the case of the South Korean film industry,” 878.

¹⁰⁴ Park, *South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012*, 93.

¹⁰⁵ Lee, “Cultural Policy and the Korean Wave: From National Culture to Transnational Consumerism,” 331.

¹⁰⁶ Lee, “Cultural Policy and the Korean Wave,” 331.

in charge of cultural administration, it also was responsible from the enhancement of value-added sectors within the cultural industry such as audio-visual industry (*Youngsang-sanup*). *Munwha Sanup* and *Youngsang-sanup* became the focal point of the press and the public through the establishment of the new administrative organization.¹⁰⁷In terms of cultural policy, three detailed cultural policy plans were introduced during the Kim Young Sam government. These were “New Five Year Plan for Promoting Cultural Development” in 1993, “The Master Plan for Cultural Welfare” in 1996, and “The Cultural Vision 2000” in 1997 respectively. Moreover, the first cable television system began to broadcast on 21 channels in eight local television stations in 1995 during the Kim Young Sam government and it rose to 77 cable stations in 1998.¹⁰⁸

Nonetheless, *Segyehwa* policy of the Kim Young Sam government was the defying point for the domestic film industry. Evolving cultural policies of the government during this time have caused huge investment in the domestic film sector and thus through market competition and foreign investment, domestic motion pictures boosted.¹⁰⁹ Furthermore, Kim Young Sam’s most important policy was to let *chaebol* to invest in the cultural industries.¹¹⁰

Through the Kim Young Sam administration, for the first time culture was converted into an industry. The film industry was changed from a service industry to a semi-manufacturing industry and financially supported by him in 1994. He was

¹⁰⁷ Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 96.

¹⁰⁸ Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 97.

¹⁰⁹ Ryoo, “The political economy of the global mediascape,” 878.

¹¹⁰ Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012,” 93.

thinking that the new cultural policy will draw new capital mostly from *chaebol* and during this period, *chaebol* investments in the media has boosted.¹¹¹

3.3.6 The Kim Dae Jung era (1998-2003)

The Asian financial crisis of 1997 may be considered a defying point for the cultural policy of South Korea. After the financial crisis, the market-driven cultural policy was sustained and the Kim Dae Jung government conducted a comprehensive economic restoration.¹¹² Deregulation was intensified and the privatization of Korea's cultural industries was increased. The Korean economy's focal point became technology and knowledge-intensive industries to boost the economic growth in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis. Therefore, Kim Dae Jung administration adopted phrases such as "knowledge economy", "new intellectuals", "globalization through informationalization", and focused on developing sophisticated networks and infrastructure in order to connect all the components of the nation.¹¹³ In addition, the government executed industry policies which reinforced the enhancement of Korea's modern technology and high value-added production in the industries such as information, communications, cultural and biotechnology.¹¹⁴

Moreover, during the Kim administration wide range of cultural industries were funded and policies were initiated to increase the core competency of these industries in international markets through underscoring the integrated growth

¹¹¹ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 99.

¹¹² Lee, "Cultural Policy and the Korean Wave," 331.

¹¹³ Ryoo, "The political economy of the global mediascape," 881.

¹¹⁴ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support," 524.

among the ICT and electronics industries. Thus, a mutually advantageous cycle of development was created among those industry sectors.¹¹⁵ President Kim Dae Jung, who called himself the ‘President of Culture’ initiated the Basic Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion along with giving \$148.5 million from the budget to the project in 1999.¹¹⁶ Moreover, the cultural industries went to a digitalization phase in 1990s. Thus, Korean products have become easier to advertise in international markets through ease of access to the internet and advancement in information technologies. Korean cultural industries tried to apply digital technologies in the production process of cultural products such as films, music, computer games and animation through the inventions in information and communication technologies.¹¹⁷ In 1994, the Korean government’s budget for cultural industries promotion which was around KRW 5 billion (approximately 4,6 billion USD) in the early days of Kim Young Sam administration have been increased to nearly KRW 640 million with the Kim Dae Jung government. Cultural industries’ budget became roughly KRW 200 billion which corresponds to 12.3 percent of the total budget of the ministry of Culture and Tourism.¹¹⁸

3.3.7 The Roh Moo Hyun era (2003-2008)

The Roh Moo Hyun government followed Kim Dae Jung administration’s legacy and policies. In November 2005, Roh Moo Hyun government announced that it will develop Korea as a brand and will promote Korea’s image, culture and national

¹¹⁵ Kwon and Kim, “From censorship to active support,” 525.

¹¹⁶ Shim, “Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia,” 34.

¹¹⁷ Ryoo, “The political economy of the global mediascape,” 881.

¹¹⁸ Kwon and Kim, “From censorship to active support,” 525.

identity abroad.¹¹⁹ The government was highly interested on exporting Korean dramas and films overseas and the increased popularity of those dramas and films were improving the nation's image. Through the success of the cultural industry, the demand for Korean commodities was boosted along with the increased consumers in entertainment and tourism industries. Shortly, in terms of marketing Korea as a brand and promoting Korea's appealing image abroad, his administration became successful.¹²⁰

Roh Moo Hyun government's first cultural industry plan was meant to connect the culture with Internet infrastructure. The administration was fancying developing digital content as a new generation national business in 2003. During this time, the government sustained the existing cultural industry plan left by Kim Dae Jung government but improved the plan and included "Creative Korea" (*Chang-ui Hankook*) in 2004. In 2003, the administration changed the Korea Foundation for Asia Cultural Exchange (KOFACE) which was established by the Kim Dae Jung administration into The Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange (KOFICE) and supported by the ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT).¹²¹

3.3.8 The Lee Myung Bak era (2008-2013)

"Middle Power" or *jung-gyun-guk* diplomacy has been particularly mentioned both by the government and policy experts in South Korea's foreign policy discourse. This course has begun to grow extensively after the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak

¹¹⁹ Ryoo, "The political economy of the global mediascape," 880-881.

¹²⁰ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 109.

¹²¹ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 112.

administration in 2008.¹²² Soft power, and public diplomacy has been substantially employed in South Korea's middle power diplomacy. Thus, it is fair to say that the contemporary endeavor to expand beyond East Asia and looking for an international role are significant reversal in South Korea's foreign policy history.¹²³

Since the Lee Myung Bak government, public diplomacy has been conducted in a more methodical and strategical way. When Lee's government introduced multilateral diplomacy more persuasively under the "Global Korea" slogan, public diplomacy became the backbone of Korean foreign policy. Thus, public diplomacy was adopted as an essential strategy of foreign policy in order to gain soft power. In 2009, the National Branding Committee was built as an important inter-ministerial presidential committee, though it was terminated with the Park Geun Hye's government in 2013. In addition, during Lee's government, G20 Seoul meeting, the second Nuclear Summit, and the fourth High-Level Aid Effectiveness Forum was hosted and it was reasonable for public officials to pursue more productive and systemized methods to apply public diplomacy.¹²⁴

The Lee Myung Bak government continued to invest in digitalization and integration of Korea's cultural industries, information, communication and other technological industry sectors.¹²⁵ The administration continued the promotion of the creative technology as well as the sectors such as ICT, biotechnology, nanotechnology, cultural technology, environmental technology and space technology. After the financial crisis of 2008, export was encouraged by the

¹²² Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 116.

¹²³ Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 117.

¹²⁴ Lee, "South Korea's Middle Power Activism and the Retooling of its Public Diplomacy," 109.

¹²⁵ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 112.

government in order to create a foreign trade surplus for these sectors to operate internationally.¹²⁶ In 2009, a further step has been taken and the ‘Presidential Council of National Branding’ has been established with a purpose of amplifying Korea’s national status and reputation in the international community through applying systematic and inclusive strategies of nation branding.¹²⁷ Moreover, Global Contents Fund was established by the government in 2011 for the qualitative and quantitative growth of Korean cultural products in global markets’.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the Lee Myung Bak government encouraged the integration between the film industry and flourishing media technologies as Digital Media Broadcasting (DMB) and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), smart phones and smart televisions.¹²⁹

The cultural policy of Lee Myung Bak administration’s main target was to sustain the ‘Korean Wave’ sponsoring the attendance of Korean films in international events. During this period, the administration also hosted cultural industry conferences such as the *Hallyu* (Korean Wave) Forum, G-Star Conference which is an international computer gaming convention and International Digital Content Forum (DICON). Furthermore, cultural offices in metropolises around the world were initiated in order promote Korean cultural products as the Korean Night, or road shows which include business forums and K-pop concerts similar to the South American Road Show were presented in Mexico, Peru, Brazil and the Indian Road Show.¹³⁰ Through the Lee Myung Bak government, Korean culture, its cultural

¹²⁶ Kwon and Kim, “The cultural industry policies the Korean government and the Korean Wave,” 428.

¹²⁷ Kim and Marinescu, “Mapping South Korea’s Soft Power,” 2.

¹²⁸ Kwon and Kim, “The cultural industry policies the Korean government and the Korean Wave,” 431.

¹²⁹ Kwon and Kim, “The cultural industry policies the Korean government and the Korean Wave,” 432.

¹³⁰ Kwon and Kim, “From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea’s cultural industries,” 526.

products and the Korean Wave became globally renowned products. They gained popularity in countries such as Japan, Southeast Asia and the Middle East.

3.4 The Park Geun Hye era

3.4.1 Culture in the Park Geun Hye era

In her inauguration speech called “Opening a New Era of Hope” the Korean President Park Geun Hye (as cited in Yonhap News, 2013) declares that;

In the 21st century, culture is power. This is an era when an individual’s imagination becomes creative content. As the “Korean Wave” is captivating people around the world, it is becoming a source of joy and happiness as well as abiding pride for all Koreans. This has been built on the foundation of Korea's splendid cultural heritage of tangible and intangible assets dating back thousands of years as well as our ethos. The new Administration will uphold our ethos and spread the value of our culture throughout society for the cultural enrichment of all citizens. We will harness the innate value of culture in order to heal social conflicts and bridge cultural divides separating different regions, generations and social strata. We will build a nation that becomes happier through culture, where culture is woven into the fabric of daily life and where the welfare system embodies cultural values. Creative activities across a wide range of genres will be supported, while a content industry that merges culture with advanced technology will be nurtured. In so doing, we will ignite the engine of a creative economy and create new jobs. Together with the Korean people, my Administration will foster a new cultural enrichment ?a time for culture to flourish, transcending ethnicity and languages, overcoming ideologies and customs, contributing to the peaceful development of humanity and spreading happiness.

Furthermore, Hye (as cited in The Korea Herald, 2015) explained creative economy as,

A creative economy is defined by the convergence of science and technology with industry, the fusion of culture with industry, and the blossoming

creativity in the very borders that were once permeated by barriers. It is about going beyond the rudimentary expansion of existing markets, and creating new markets and new jobs by building on the bedrock of convergence. At the very heart of a creative economy lie science technology and the IT industry, areas that have earmarked as key priorities.

In addition, Hye (as cited in The Korea Herald, 2015) expressed the cultural content industry as “alchemy of the 21st industry” and stated that the industry creates added value while positively affecting other industries such as tourism, health and education. In addition, Hye stated that (as cited in The Korea Herald, 2015) “The fusion of culture and industry will create a new growth engine for the future and help make South Korea a cultural powerhouse” in an event planned to construct an ecosystem for the cultural content industry. The Park Geun Hye administration conducted “Culture and Creativity Fusion Belt” project which is a development center for mass media and popular culture since 2013. The project suggests a Culture and Creative Venture Complex where broad span of cultural content is generated and seen as one of Park Geun Hye’s essential projects to advance the creative industries. In addition to the complex, there is the Culture and Creativity Academy which is planned to strengthen and educate talented people and the K-Culture Valley, a convention hall which will host concerts and a theme park consist of popular Korean content.¹³¹ South Korea’s entertainment *chaebol* CJ Group and *Gyeonggi* Province announced to invest 1 trillion won (US \$911 million) to establish the K-Culture Valley in *Goyang* which is located at the north of Seoul to utilize it as a center of cultural content.¹³²

¹³¹ Sohn, “Park administration promotes cultural industries, welfare”

¹³² “Park to build ecosystem of cultural content industry”

Furthermore, the Park Geun Hye administration has increased government investment on culture and increased the budget of the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism up to 2 percent along with the legislation of a framework act about culture. In addition, the Presidential Committee for Cultural Enrichment was initiated with an aim of seeking advice from artists within the cultural industry about Park Geun Hye's cultural policies.¹³³ During her speech at the 2014 World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Hye (as cited in Jin & Kim, 2016) said,

We use the expression Korean Wave to describe the widespread enthusiasm for Korean culture. Today, that wave is spreading rapidly across the globe. When Korean music recently paired up with YouTube, it became a global sensation. *K-pop*, Korean dramas and films are being greeted here and there and creating new added value. When the cultural values of each country are brought together with IT technology, this is another key attribute of the creative economy. The companies that are welcomed around the world are those that have successfully combined various cultural contents with new technology. (p. 5527)

After underscoring the importance of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) in the development of *Hallyu*, the Park Geun Hye government advertised the convergence between the Korean cultural contents with ICTs. Park Geun Hye realized the importance of *Hallyu* as a way to increase the national image while she was emphasizing *Hallyu* for bringing the national economy back to life together with the Creative Economy concept. In this regard, in her speech at the Fifth Asian Leadership Conference in 2014, Hye (as cited in Jin & Kim, 2016) said,

Looking back on our past seven decades of division, the Republic of Korea accepted liberal democracy and market economy, overcame the Korean War and following security threats, and became the country which has the 8th

¹³³ Jin and Kim, "Cultural Policy in the Korean Wave: An Analysis of Cultural Diplomacy Embedded in Presidential Speeches," 5526.

largest trade volume in the world. Beyond economic logics, *Hallyu* has become an international cultural trend sharing hearts and friendships. (p. 5527)

By combining *Hallyu* with cultural diplomacy, Park Geun Hye has improved cultural diplomatic strategies while sustaining existing cultural policies such as the protection of intellectual property rights and copyrights of Korean cultural contents.¹³⁴

Through the Culture and Creativity Fusion Belt project, content exports of South Korea became USD 5.7 billion in 2015. In addition, it is predicted that over 53,000 jobs will be created for the next five years. The endeavor for the advancement of creative industries also paid off for the tourism sector: In 2014, 14.2 million non-Korean tourists visited Korea, which is the highest number of tourists in Korea's tourism history. Moreover, the last Wednesday of every month has become "Culture Day" which is a day that people can see free or discounted performances, films and sports games. The increased chance for people to enjoy cultural activities was aimed by the administration through the campaign. Overall consumption of cultural activities of Korea has escalated by 23.8 percent since the initiation of Culture Day.¹³⁵ Based on the analysis of the Bank of Korea (as cited in The Korea Herald, 2015) in the first 10 months of 2014, after a year and a half of Park's inauguration, revenue from cultural content and leisure services raised to US \$767.2 million which is more than 2013's figure \$730.9 million, that was the all-time highest number for Korea.

¹³⁴ "Jin and Kim, Cultural Policy in the Korean Wave," 5527.

¹³⁵ Sohn, "Park administration promotes cultural industries, welfare"

3.4.2 Foreign policy in the Park Geun Hye era

3.4.2.1 South Korea - North Korea relations

Before Park Geun Hye's initiation as the new president, North Korea has already tested its third nuclear test along with the Unha rocket which was part of the country's missile advancement plan. Thus, the unease between North and South Korea climbed rapidly.¹³⁶ Within the few weeks, North Korea announced that the Armistice Agreement "completely nullified" on 11 March 2013, which cut off the last military hotline between the two Koreas and declared a "state of war" with South Korea, while nuclear-competent US bombers flew over South Korea in a show of strength. The hostility between two countries reached to the highest point in March and April 2013, during the joint military operation and North Korea cut off telecommunication lines with South Korea.¹³⁷

In addition, North Korea pulled back its 53,000 workers from the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). In return, South Korea also took back its staff from the KIC.¹³⁸ In March 2013, South Korean computer systems at banks and broadcasters were shut down temporarily and South Korea blamed North Korea for the incident.¹³⁹ Later in August, the KIC started to operate, however the relations between North and South remained tense.¹⁴⁰ Eventually, the two Koreas communicated again, willing to reopen the KIC and Mt. Geungang resort, finding resolution to matters such as family reunions. In August 2013, the two countries

¹³⁶ Mishra, "One year of 'Trust Politik'"

¹³⁷ Mishra, "One year of 'Trust Politik'"

¹³⁸ Wertz, "Inter-Korean Relations"

¹³⁹ "South Korea-Timeline"

¹⁴⁰ Mishra, "One year of 'Trust Politik'"

settled on a certain measures to avoid further disturbance of the KIC in future critical situations and to further advancement of the complex.¹⁴¹

With the unexpected imprisonment and subsequent assassination of Kim Jong-un's uncle, the second-in-command, Jang Sung-taek, the inter-Korean relations ended to the zero level.¹⁴²In February 2014, the reunion of the families occurred but, the talks on reopening the tourism activities in Mt. Geumgang were failed. In addition, at the beginning of 2014, Park Geun Hye changed the direction of her Trustpolitik policy and underscores the unification as the core of her inter-Korean policy. State media of North Korea condemned Park's stress on unification, stating that it is a hypothesis on the demolition of North Korea and South Korean-led unification by assimilation.¹⁴³

Two ROK soldiers were severely wounded by land mines located outside their patrol position while guarding in the DMZ. According to UN Commission of Enquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (CoIDPRK, 2004) North Korean soldiers intentionally placed the mines which North Korea refused. In return, South Korea did propaganda with loudspeaker along the border which was decided to end by both countries in 2004. In response, North Korea fired four shells to the South and the South fired a barrage of artillery. Eventually, both countries conducted high-level talks and agreed. Whilst DPRK indicated its "regret" for the wounded ones, South Korea settled to stop the loudspeaker propaganda

¹⁴¹ Wertz, "Inter-Korean Relations"

¹⁴² Lee, "Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies," 222.

¹⁴³ Wertz, "Inter-Korean Relations"

“unless an unusual incident occurs”. Further, the two countries decided to organise family reunions again which was carried in October 2015.¹⁴⁴

In 2016, DPRK conducted its fourth nuclear test and Park declared an instant shutdown of the KIC in response. Park Geun Hye asserted that capitals from the KIC had transferred to the leadership of North Korea’s Workers’ Party and that the safety of South Korean workers who work in the KIC was under threat in her speech to the National Assembly. Furthermore, the administration declared it will increase the level of sanctions on the North. The DPRK Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea (as cited in Wertz, 2017) stated that they would put the KIC under military control, suspend South Korean assets and cease the inter-military communication. The ROK National Assembly preceded the North Korea Human Rights Act which had been debated for 11 years in relation to its content and fears about possible harm of inter-Korean relations. In July 2016, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD Missile defense system was declared to adapt to South Korea by ROK and the US. Later that year, ROK and Japan signed a military intelligence sharing agreement.

Towards the end of the 2016, a corruption scandal centered on Park Geun Hye and her close confidante Choi Soon-sil appeared. Choi Soon-sil was alleged of admittance to secret government documents, intervention in state affairs and abuse of power.¹⁴⁵ In March 2017, after her impeachment, Park Geun Hye was removed by the South Korean constitutional court.

¹⁴⁴ Wertz, “Inter-Korean Relations”

¹⁴⁵ Griffiths, “South Korea presidential scandal: What you need to know”

3.4.2.2 South Korea - Japan relations

When Shinzo Abe became the Prime Minister of Japan, he has stepped some diplomatic moves that made South Korea furious. The landmark agreement between South Korea and Japan over the comfort women dispute was one of the highlights of Korea-Japan relations during the Park Geun Hye administration. On the comfort women issue, Korea has been expecting a “sincere apology” and admits the legal obligations from the Japanese government. Comfort women and their supporters defend that they did not profit from the grant that was given to South Korea by Japan during the 1965 normalization between the two countries and they were not represented by the Park Chung Hee administration when he recognized Japanese “réparations”. The debate has heated when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into office in February 2013 and defended that there was no proof of compel of comfort women to prostitution.¹⁴⁶

After becoming president in the early 2013, Park Geun Hye continuously declined to meet with Shinzo Abe. When they eventually met at the South Korea-Japan-China summit in 2015, Park Geun Hye excluded Abe from a state fest with Chinese leaders.¹⁴⁷ Moreover, Korea approached suspiciously to Shinzo Abe’s contended interpretation of post-war pacifist constitution of Japan which aims to authorize the deployment of Japanese military abroad.

Seven years later, he was the first Japanese leader to visit the *Yasukuni* Shrine, a shrine which pays tribute to soldiers who died during their duty for

¹⁴⁶ Terry, “Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations,” 9.

¹⁴⁷ Tisdall, “Korean comfort women agreement is a triumph for Japan and the US”

Japanese Empire since the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and fourteen sentenced “Class A” war criminals in World War II.¹⁴⁸ According to South Korea, visiting *Yasukuni Shrine* represents the absence of Japanese regret for its imperial-era actions and a proof that Japan still did not get rid of its militarist dreams. Moreover, to South Koreans, *Yasukuni Shrine* is not just a memorial but it is also a symbol of Japan’s nationalistic and xenophobic behavior in 20th century. It is a museum which worships kamikaze pilots while dismisses the fact that Japan began the war with China and the United States. Moreover, it does not pay the enough attention to the brutality devoted by Japan which involves Rape of Nanking. Therefore, for South Korea, visits to *Yasukuni* means that Japan did not fully accepted its atrocities and failing to inform Japanese young people about those violations.¹⁴⁹

Furthermore, the territorial dispute in the East Sea over the *Dokdo* in Korea (*Takeshima* in Japan) continued. In 2012, President Lee Myung Bak visited the islands and became the first president who ever visited the islands from both countries. Consequently, relations between Seoul and Tokyo soured. In 2014, the revision of existing middle and high school curriculum as the change of the name of disputed islets with South Korea (and China) as “integral territories of Japan” declared by the Abe administration created anger in South Korean front.¹⁵⁰

Since the Prime Minister Abe came into power, constitutional change has been one of the primary agendas of the parliament (*Diet*). Abe defends the increasing security risks in Asia and absence of the right for collective see defense restrains

¹⁴⁸ Lee, “The Stubborn South Why Seoul Needs to Mend Ties with Japan,” 82.

¹⁴⁹ Terry, “Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations,” 10.

¹⁵⁰ Terry, “Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations,” 11.

Japan from becoming a “normal country” so the constitution should be revised. Particularly, he wants to revise Article 9, which is a war clause that is dictated to Japan after the World War II, inhibits Japan’s military actions by stating: “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”¹⁵¹

Korea is tense about this constitutional alteration. It is cautious of Japanese desire and fears that the constitutional revision might represent the return to militarism and atrocity.¹⁵² According to a joint survey conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Hankook Ilbo (2015), 73 percent of the Japanese stated that Korea is unreliable. In terms of making amends for its belligerent past, 76 percent of Japanese defend that their government has done sufficient.¹⁵³

Figure 2 provides the results of public opinion in South Korea and Japan conducted by The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (EAI) (2017). When Koreans and Japanese were asked about their impression on each other’s countries, even though there was an improvement in the results, both nation’s negative percentage was higher than their positive percentage.

¹⁵¹ Terry, “Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations,” 11.

¹⁵² Terry, “Japan-South Korea-U.S. Relations,” 12.

¹⁵³ “Distrust between South Korea, Japan sky high: poll”




Figure 2. Public opinion in South Korea and Japan

Source: The Genron NPO, East Asia Institute, 2017.

As it can be seen in Figure 3, when Japanese were asked as “the reasons behind each other’s impressions,” it appeared that historical issues and territorial conflict maintained to being a negative influence on the impressions of both countries.¹⁵⁴




Figure 3. Public opinion in South Korea and Japan II

Source: The Genron NPO, East Asia Institute, 2017.

¹⁵⁴ The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, “The 5th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll,” 3.

In addition, when both countries were asked as “What should be done to improve Japan-South Korea Relations?” South Koreans answered as “comfort women,” “historical issues” and “territorial disputes,” whereas Japanese also touched upon the same issues along with viewing “state-level communication and building trust” as a significant matter to be engaged. Figure 4 provides the Japanese public opinion.¹⁵⁵




Figure 4. Japanese public opinion

Source: The Genron NPO, East Asia Institute, 2017.

3.4.2.3 Korea - China relations

After Park Geun Hye’s inauguration, in 2013, she visited China under the “trip of heart and trust” slogan (*sim shin ji ryoe*). Both countries declared that they would

¹⁵⁵ The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, “The 5th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll,” 3.

strengthen a bilateral strategic cooperative partnership. Consequently, communication channels were built to increase and put strategic dialogue in a routine between Seoul and Beijing. After the first Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue, the two countries decided to sign a military cooperation and set up a direct military hotline between the countries' defense ministers. It should be considered that South Korea only had such a hotline with United States. Therefore, this hotline symbolizes China's eagerness to collaborate with South Korea.¹⁵⁶

Park Geun Hye government's China policy can be classified into three categories. The first one is securing China's advocating for the Korean Peninsula Trust Building Process. The second phase is the development of the ROK-China Trust Building Process and the last one is the setting up of a new model of the Korea-China Relationship.¹⁵⁷ In 2013, when China decided to create an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, South Korea called for a minister from the Chinese Embassy in Korea to condemn the unilateral ADIZ and alerted Beijing that it will not agree to these rules. The boundaries of ADIZ extend to South Korean airspace. Particularly, there is a rock under the water in the East China Sea which names Ieodo and parts of airspace enclosing Jeju Island. Although, under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, Ieodo is not authorized to be declared as territory by either country due to its standing as a rock under the water, both countries assert that the rock falls under their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Five months later, the both countries' relations came back to normal.¹⁵⁸ In 2014, with the

¹⁵⁶ Kim, "Common Misconceptions about the China-South Korea Relationship," 135.

¹⁵⁷ Hwang, "The Rok's China Policy under Park Geun Hye: A New Model of ROK-PRC Relations," 6.

¹⁵⁸ Miller, "Is the China-South Korea Honeymoon Over?"

China's President Xi Jinping's state visit to Seoul, China and South Korea agreed to broad economic links and acknowledged their obligation to the nonproliferation of North Korea. The significance of Xi Jinping's visit to South Korea is for the first time a Chinese president has visited South Korea before visiting North Korea and for the fifth time since Park and Xi both became president.¹⁵⁹ In 2015, South Korea was one of the founding members of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) which suggested by China and Japan has not joined due to the US objections.¹⁶⁰

Before the impeachment of Park Geun Hye in 2017, the United States declared that it will establish Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in South Korea. The declaration of THAAD being installed created severe oppositions from China and responded as "take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests, and the consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea".

Even though certain counteractive measures were not issued, Chinese consumers were emboldened by Chinese state media to spurn Korean companies and tourism officials told that they would stop booking trips to South Korea of Chinese travelers. In addition, operations at Korean retail stores in China such as Lotte have hold over by Chinese officials with the excuse of violation of safety codes.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ "Korea-China Relations"

¹⁶⁰ Sakai and Wacker, "China-Japan-South Korea, a Tense Menage a Trois," 12.

¹⁶¹ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2017," 6-7.

Fifty five discount stores that belong to Lotte Group were temporarily closed by China.¹⁶² Until it was given to Korean government in early 2017, Lotte had owned the land which will be used for THAAD battery.¹⁶³

3.4.2.4 Korea - the US relations

While the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea is deeply intrigued and have many sides, there are five factors that determine the scope and situation of relations between the two countries. Firstly, the threat created by North Korea especially its nuclear program and missile tests and Washington and Seoul understands of if Kim Jong-Un regime constitutes a threat through the country's hostility or the probability of its downfall. Secondly, increase of China's domination in Northeast Asia concerns both United States and South Korea in many facets of both countries' strategic and economic policymaking. Thirdly, South Korea's recent rapid economic development and emerge as one of the world's leading economies that has a powerful export-oriented industrial infrastructure led to an increase in the number and sorts of trade debates and aided two countries to agree to sign the South Korea- U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA), approved by the Congress in 2011. Fourthly, South Korea's democratization enhanced the significance of public opinion in South Korea's foreign policy. Lastly, South Korean leaders' raising will of using the nation's middle-power situation to act a greater regional and global role.¹⁶⁴ Shortly, North Korea threat, China's expansion in Northeast Asia, Korea's advance

¹⁶² Lee, "The China-South Korea trade war must end"

¹⁶³ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2017," 6-7.

¹⁶⁴ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2017," 9-10.

economic development, democratization and Korean leaders' desire to benefit from the middle power status of the country constitute the basis of U.S.-South Korea relations.

With President Park Geun Hye who took office in 2013, Seoul and Washington sustained tense collaboration over North Korea policy forming a joint attitude which includes elements of compression and commitment.¹⁶⁵ Seoul and Washington sustained firm partnership over North Korea policy and pursued a joint attitude called “strategic patience” which underscored giving the regime hard time through comprehensive multilateral embargo and strong demonstrations of military collaboration.¹⁶⁶ In 2013, Obama and Park administrations decided to extend two year of the bilateral civilian nuclear agreement which expired in 2016. With this extension, it was aimed to avoid possible disturbance to nuclear energy trade and gain more time to sustain the negotiation. In 2015, cooperation between China and South Korea appeared as a significant part of the US - ROK collaboration. Park Geun Hye's attendance to China's military parade surprised some U.S. officials as South Korea was the only democracy or U.S. partner who showed up at the event. Although, it did not caused trouble between the two countries, Park Geun Hye's attendance in the Beijing parade drew contradicting image for the country's alliance with the U.S. as U.S. views South Korea's foreign policy not in zero-sum terms but an opportunity to handle China with its twenty-eight-thousand troop presence in the country and dedication to the defense of South Korea.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, “U.S.-South Korea Relations 2017,” 2.

¹⁶⁶ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, “U.S.-South Korea Relations 2017,” 3-4.

¹⁶⁷ Snyder, “A Pivotal U.S.-Korea Summit?”

In 2016, Seoul and Washington strengthened their collaboration in terms of dealing with Pyongyang as the country tested its fourth and fifth nuclear weapons in January and September 2016. After the tests, proliferation debates escalated within the political community in Seoul. The members of National Assemble from Saenuri Party of Park Geun Hye demanded ROK government to think through building nuclear weapons. Back then presidential candidate Donald Trump (as cited in Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, 2016) stated that he was supporting South Korea advancing its own nuclear weapon to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat in spring 2016. Notwithstanding, analyst stated that improvement of its own nuclear weapons might bring adverse outcomes to South Korea such as high costs, downgrade of international standing in terms of the country's campaign to nonproliferation of North Korea, possibility of economic sanctions due to its departure from international non-proliferation regime, and possibility to encourage Japan to develop its own nuclear weapons.¹⁶⁸ Because a weak relationship between South Korea and Tokyo endangers U.S. interests in Asia-Pacific such as capability to reach China efficient and trilateral collaboration over North Korea policy, the absence of collaboration between South Korea and Japan was a problem that have been thwarted U.S. The Obama Administration tried to improve the relations between Seoul and Tokyo through passing various bills and resolutions that encourage trilateral collaboration. Following North Korean provocations, the three countries cooperated in their strategies to North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches in 2016 and conducted a trilateral summit.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2016," 1.

¹⁶⁹ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2016," 7.

Subsequent to the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. strengthened by North Korea's provocations, both countries declared that they will deploy THAAD ballistic missile defense system in South Korea which caused objections from China and Russia asserting that the THAAD system's range stretched out beyond the Korean peninsula and could damage the security of the region. The grating reaction of China caused South Korea to fulfill United States' wishes and join its missile defense system. Thus, a new stratum of trust emerged between the US and South Korea.¹⁷⁰ Lastly, a bilateral North Korean Human Rights Consultation mechanism was established by the two countries.¹⁷¹ It can be concluded that the U.S.-South Korea relations were at their best between 2009 and until the end of 2016.¹⁷²

3.4.3 Domestic politics and values in the Park Geun Hye Government

According to Kelly (2014), Park Geun Hye as, "The wealthy, well-connected daughter of a former 'president' (dictator), Park is very much a product of the elitist, Seoul-based, corporatist, oligarchic Korean establishment." Park Geun Hye, who was the ROK's first female president, was criticized as much as she was supported. Her leadership started questioning with the set of events including stagnating economy and improvement of the national pension system. Firstly, her image deteriorated with her administration's answer to the ferry *Sewol* accident which caused the death of 304 people, mainly high school students. As the prosecutors

¹⁷⁰ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2016," 4.

¹⁷¹ Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2016," 1.

¹⁷² Manyin, Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin, "U.S.-South Korea Relations 2017," 1.

narrowed down their investigation on the family of Yoo Byung-eun who once commanded the operator of the broken ship, parents of the children who died in the South Korean ferry disaster marched to the President Park Geun Hye's office in Seoul demanding enquiry for the claims that Park administration's delayed and blundering rescue operation caused the increase in the number of deaths in nation's worst incident in years.¹⁷³

In 2015, Park Geun Hye's image collided once again with her government's grapple in their endeavor to contain the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS). Her leadership examined as the eruption proved the country's defected public health system such as overfull emergency rooms. Based on the survey of Gallup Korea, (as cited in Choe, 2015) her 40 percent approval rating before the eruption decreased to 33 percent. According to critical views of Park Geun Hye, she failed to identify a national crisis in advance and let people now, behaving only when public opinion had revolved opposed to her. In addition, they stated that she did not summon a meeting of cabinet ministers and civilian specialists on MERS until two weeks later the eruption began. When five colliding resolutions from different government agencies emerged to handle the MERS, critics stated it represents the same absence of effective leadership exhibited in the time of ferry *Sewol* accident. According to the Choi Jin (as cited in Choe, 2015), who is the director of the Institute of the Presidential Leadership in Seoul, Park Geun Hye's "mind-set remains stuck in her father's days, steeped in a hierarchical and close leadership."

¹⁷³ Choe, "MERS Tarnishes Korean President's Image as Leader"

In the same year, the textbook controversy emerged as the Park Geun Hye administration passed a highly disputed bill of launching history textbooks in schools that are only issued by the government. The policy evolved into a sharp ideological battlefield and divided South Korea into two as left and right with the assertion of the government that the change is obligatory to amend the “pro-North Korean” prejudice.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, it is essentially a grapple between two sorts of Korean nationalism and conflicting views of political legitimacy and modern identity. The progressive or leftist vision acknowledges ethnic Korean nationalism as its foundation which dates back more than hundred years and views modern history as an ascending course toward achieving an independent and unified society. Whereas, according to the conservative view, democratization escalated the national divide, however the nation should be proud instead of regretting this reality.¹⁷⁵

Moreover, according to the right-wing nationalists, Korean division is an obstacle to defeat. Therefore, public education should be giving praise to the South Korean accomplishments as a modern nation state. Of course, there have been sorrowful sacrifices and difficulties in the endeavor for flourishing liberal democracy, but the greatest aim has been reached, thus it is worthwhile. This view has been applauded by the Park Geun Hye government because of its convenience for the ones who have the power and economic privilege as it makes their position legitimate. Yet, it is blatant because it is idealizing dictatorships, and particularly rewriting the Park Chung Hee dictatorship as a legitimate rulership story in today’s administration leading by Park Chung Hee’s daughter, Park Geun Hye.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁴ Agence France Presse “South Korea accused of rewriting history in new school textbooks”

¹⁷⁵ Hwang, “Textbook controversy is over competing forms of nationalist history”

¹⁷⁶ Hwang, “Textbook controversy is over competing forms of nationalist history”

Consequently, the Park Geun Hye administration was accused of trying to manipulate and twist the tale of how the South Korean nation was established. In regard to the text book controversy Moon Jae In (as cited in AFP, 2015), who was a civil rights lawyer and New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) chief and the current president of South Korea stated “This is no less than outright dictatorship, no free democracy in the world has state-issued history textbooks.” Based on the public opinion poll conducted by Gallup Korea (as cited in AFP, 2015), 49 percent of Korean adults opposed to the policy whereas 36 percent of the adults supported it.

In November 2015, 80,000 people marched in Seoul demanding the resignation of President Park Geun Hye due to increasing bitterness over her government’s labor policies and escalating youth unemployment. Labor, civic and farmers’ groups who have varied feelings of injustice against the conservative Park Geun Hye government gathered together through organizing the marches including demonstrations as business-friendly labor policies and the usage of only state issued history textbook in middle and high schools.¹⁷⁷

Notwithstanding, Park Geun Hye’s popularity increased domestically at the end of 2015. Based on an opinion poll to measure presidential approval conducted by Gallup Korea (as cited in AFP, 2015), 43 percent of Koreans thought that Park Geun Hye is successful as a president while 46 percent thought that she is failing. Although the disapproval rating is higher than approval, her approval rating increased comparing to the end of 2014, when her approval rating was 40 percent. In terms of freedom of expression, the nation has been struggling as well. Freedom House (as

¹⁷⁷ Al Jazeera, “Dozens injured at South Korea anti-government protest”

cited in Haggard and John, 2016) degraded South Korea's "political rights" ranking from one to two on a scale of one to seven because of the high-profile scandals along with the National Intelligence Service (NIS)'s corruption of power regarding social media in 2013. Furthermore, the right wing group (as cited in Choe, 2016) stated "the increased intimidation of political opponents" since Park Geun Hye took office in 2013. In freedom of expression and belief measure of Freedom House (as cited in Haggard and John, 2016) which is created to measure the freedom, autonomy of the media, and cultural utterance, religious freedom, academic freedom, and freedom of open and private debate, the country positioned behind 69 other democratic country equal to one third of all countries with a score 14 out of 16. In addition, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (OHCHR) (as cited in Haggard and Jong, 2015) stated in its report on South Korea that, "the increasing use of criminal defamation laws to prosecute persons who criticize government action and obstruct business interests, and of the harsh sentences, including lengthy prison sentences, attached to such legal provisions." Similar to the United Nations, in Reporters Without Borders' World Press Freedom Index ranking (as cited in Cho, 2016), South Korea fell ten spots to 70th place out of 180 countries in 2016, which is the lowest point in its history. The country's ranking was 50th in 2013 (as cited in Cho, 2016) and degraded to 57th in 2014 (as cited in Cho, 2016), and 60th in 2015 (as cited in Cho, 2016).

Furthermore, during the Park Geun Hye presidency, media that criticized the government was suppressed. One of the charged members of the media was Seoul based Japanese correspondent Tatsuya Kato.¹⁷⁸ He was charged for defaming the

¹⁷⁸ Draudt, "The Future of South Korean Democracy"

president in an article published in 2014 which Kato (as cited in Choe, 2015) stated that Park Geun Hye might have been having a romantic meeting with a former aide during the Sewol ferry sinking with hundreds of passengers. Furthermore, just before Park Geun Hye's overthrow from the office, the administration charged with blacklisting about 10,000 artists who stated their oppositions to the Park government. Subsequently, Culture Minister Cho Yoon-sun was put into jail due to his exploitation of power by composing the list of "left-leaning artists" along with revoking government funding and private subsidies reportedly the previous chief of staff of Park Geun Hye Kim Ki-choon's command.¹⁷⁹

Based on The Global Corruption Barometer (as cited in Wright, 2016) public opinion survey, South Korea became the most corrupted country among developed countries in Asia. Seventy percent of Koreans stated that political parties were extremely corrupt, sixty four percent of Koreans thought that parliament and legislature was corrupt, thirty one percent thought the military was corrupted, thirty six percent thought that media was corrupt, forty three percent thought that religious bodies were corrupt, thirty three percent thought business was corrupt, thirty percent thought education system was corrupt, thirty eight percent thought judiciary system was corrupt, twenty one percent thought medical and health services were corrupt, thirty five percent thought police were corrupt, thirty six percent thought public officials and civil servants were corrupt. Increasing wealth and income imbalance, scarce employment chances for a distinctly educated society caused escalating

¹⁷⁹ Draudt, "The Future of South Korean Democracy"

populist dissatisfaction within the society directed to nation's social and political system which does not have transparency, justice and administrative incompetency.

In the end of 2016, a political corruption scandal about Park Geun Hye involving her close "shaman" friend Choi Soon-sil who was likened to Rasputin in Russia, acted as Park Geun Hye's puppet master broke out. The news of Park Geun Hye sharing classified government documents with Choi Soon-sil did not have security clearance and Choi's utilization of her network and domination to form the state policy, pocketing money in corporate donations and manipulating her daughter's acceptance to Ewha Women's University, one of the Seoul's most prestigious schools carried Park Geun Hye to impeachment.¹⁸⁰ The allegation began with the report on TV station JTBC on 24 October 2016 (as cited in Hahm and Heo, 2017) stating the probability of Choi Soon-sil's influence on policy making and recruitment of employee based on the evidence found on a personal computer believed to belong Choi Soon-sil. Consequently, National Assembly passed the law to perform a special investigation.

It was said that Choi family began to influence Park Geun Hye when she was a young woman, after her parents' assassination in the 1970s. Reportedly, Park Geun Hye first met with Choi Tae-min who is a religious entrepreneur and a trusted man in 1974 when she was 23 through Choi Tae-min's claim that he could contact with her mother's spirit. Subsequently, the father Choi became a devoted personal companion to Park until his death in 1994 and replaced by his daughter Choi Soon-sil. Choi Tae-min established a fusion cult that combines the elements of Buddhism, Christianity,

¹⁸⁰ Moon and Kim, "Park Geun-hye's Bad Chois"

Taoism, and indigenous Korean religion along with his claims of ability to see the future and heal the sick. In addition, he was the leader of the so called Church of Eternal Life and claiming that he could hear God's voice and translate his will. Choi Soon-sil's shamanism allegations derived from those facts and believed that she held shamanistic rituals in the presidential residence and ask for advice from fortunetellers.¹⁸¹

Park Geun Hye, Choi Soon-sil, some of Park Geun Hye's assistants and cabinet members were found guilty by the inspection of the special prosecutor team.¹⁸² Choi Soon-sil was charged on November 2 for accessing state secrets, effecting policymaking without having security clearance or official position while her entire accreditation was being a close friend to the president, routinely giving guidance on each subject from clothing to writing the speeches and policymaking. She was also charged for establishing two foundations for Korean culture and sports promotion and utilizing the foundations as a fundraising instrument for her and Park Geun Hye. Following demonstrations were held by thousands of South Koreans regarding the allegations and Park Geun Hye's approval rating dropped to four percent.¹⁸³ Moreover, nine business leaders including the vice chairman of Samsung, Jay Y. Lee and the chairman of Hyundai, Chung Mong-koo interrogated in parliamentary trial about millions of dollars they donated to two foundations which Choi Soon-sil managed.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸¹ Moon, "South Korea's Shamanic Panic"

¹⁸² Hahm and Heo, "The First Female President in South Korea: Park Geun-hye's Leadership and South Korean Democracy," 2.

¹⁸³ Moon, "South Korea's Shamanic Panic"

¹⁸⁴ Choe, "South Korea Enters Period of Uncertainty With President's Impeachment"

The necessary two-thirds threshold to pass a bill in the 300 seat National Assembly which is the only house of Parliament in South Korea passed and 234 lawmakers voted for impeachment. Although the vote was done by secret ballot, 128 lawmakers in *Saenuri* Party voted to expel Park Geun Hye.¹⁸⁵ After her impeachment, Park Geun Hye removed from office in March 2017 and replaced by the Democratic Party's candidate human rights lawyer Moon Jae In.¹⁸⁶ Park Geun Hye's downfall shows how corruption sustains ingrained at the highest stratum of political and corporate community of South Korea, at a time when the economy is stagnating.¹⁸⁷

3.4.4 Soft power ranking of South Korea

Based on the British think tank Institute for Government's soft power ranking (Institute for Government [IfG], 2010), Korea was ranked 19th in 2010 and 14th in 2011 (IfG, 2011). According to Monocle Soft Power Survey (Monocle, 2012), South Korea ranked 11th in 2012. In its 2014/15 survey (Monocle, 2014), Korea ranked as 15th. In 2015/16 survey (Monocle, 2015), Korea ranked 15th again and the magazine stated the reason behind it was the restrictions on the freedom of speech in the country. According to the Soft Power 30 (McClory, 2015), Korea ranked 20th in 2015. In 2016 ranking of Soft Power 30 (McClory, 2016), Korea ranked 22th. In Monocle's 2016/17 survey (Monocle, 2016), Korea dropped 2 places and ranked 17th. In Monocle 2017/18 survey (Monocle, 2017), Korea maintained its place as

¹⁸⁵ Choe, "South Korea Enters Period of Uncertainty With President's Impeachment"

¹⁸⁶ McCurry, "Who is Moon Jae-in, South Korea's new president?"

¹⁸⁷ Choe, "South Korea Enters Period of Uncertainty With President's Impeachment"

17th despite the impeachment of Park Geun Hye. According to 2017 Soft Power 30 ranking (Portland, 2017), Korea ranked 21st in 2017. According to the sub-indices of the measurement, South Korea's international polls and government indices are low. Thus, as the measurement of soft power proves, South Korea's soft power declined due to its domestic politics and foreign politics.

CHAPTER 4

SOFT POWER IN TURKEY

4.1 Introduction

Not much country exists in a vulnerable geopolitical area such as Turkey, or had a role in such crucial and intertwining international occurrences.¹⁸⁸ Conventionally, due to the facts such as Turkey's geography, the role of the military officers in the foundation of the Republic, security issues, Turkey was a hard power country and its foreign policy was focused on its security concerns. From the beginning of the Republic in 1923, Turkey's focus was securing the existence of the State. Thus, Westernization was significant for its security strategy. The country's main security concern evolved to protect its territorial integrity against Soviet expansionism. Turkey's hard and soft power competence shaped based on its relations with West. Thus, the country's credibility was low according to the Middle Eastern nations. Turkey was seen as a continuation of NATO, instead of having an international/security stance in the region.¹⁸⁹

Globalization along with escalating security threats in Turkey's boarder exposed that contemporary disputes cannot be solved through only states but requires international collaboration. Energy interdependence, terrorism along with ethnic and religious disputes in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East have revealed the necessity for Turkey to become more aware in its security issues and act more

¹⁸⁸ "Alone in the world"

¹⁸⁹ Oğuzlu, "Soft power in Turkish foreign policy," 84-85.

proactive and give lithe decisions in its foreign policy agenda.¹⁹⁰ In this vein, Turkey's diplomacy endeavors to gain soft power have begun through both governmental but mostly non-governmental organs after the 2000s due to its increasing significance in the region despite of early instances of public diplomacy in the 1990s.¹⁹¹

When Justice and Development Party (AKP) came into power, through the EU-related reforms, Turkey had a chance to improve its economic, political and security problems inside which made the Turkey as a secular and democratic nation with a large Muslim population became more attractive and a “model nation” to the Middle East countries. Moreover, the party's top governmental officials were utilizing soft power terminology in their speeches in international gatherings during the pragmatic period of AKP government's foreign policy. For instance, the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu (as cited in Benhaïm and Öktem, 2015) said that “We are cognizant of the fact that our democracy is our biggest soft power” (p. 14). In addition, Davutoğlu (as cited in Benhaïm and Öktem, 2015) stated that “Though there is ample room for improvement, our democracy inspires many in our neighborhood and constitutes the backbone of our growing soft power.” (p. 14)

Moreover, Prime Minister of then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used soft power terminology in his speech. In a conference of trade attachés Erdoğan (as cited in Benhaïm and Öktem, 2015) said that,

¹⁹⁰ Fotiou and Triantaphyllou, “Assessing Turkey's “Soft Power” Role: Rhetoric versus Practice,” 102.

¹⁹¹ Sancar, “Turkey's Public Diplomacy,” 13.

In the last eight and a half years, we have emphasized this soft power dimension in foreign policy. Inspired by the unique resources of our history, our culture, and our civilization, we are engaged in a hard struggle to have an impact on processes, to contribute to solutions for all questions on the regional and global scale. ... In addition, we disseminate Turkey's soft power, Turkey's message of peace to the whole world through TIKA, the Yunus Emre Institutes, the TRT, the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities. (p. 15)

Improved relations enabled Turkey to handle “all parties” in several conflicts. In addition to that, democratic reforms, a more robust economy and closer ties with EU have increased Turkey's soft power discourse and it was being referred as a model for countries that search for an answer to the question of “whether Islam could ever be reconciled with democratic principles and a liberal economy.” However, as Turkey began to have issues with its neighbors and other countries, the period of optimism and aspirations have faded away.¹⁹²

Through the re-election of AKP in 2007, the simultaneous abandon of democratic principles in domestic politics and the deterioration of the Turkish soft power have become ubiquitous. In conjunction, cynicism about Turkey's being role model for the Arab Spring has sparked off. The inconsistency between the image of Turkey as a model country and the actuality of the escalating number of journalists imprisoned along with the increasing authoritarianism following the Gezi Park protests in 2013 caused severe condemnation from the West as well as an assumption that the Turkish model was deceased. Together with these events, Turkish foreign policy evolved from pragmatism to an ideologically driven one.¹⁹³

¹⁹² Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 151-152.

¹⁹³ Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 151-152.

4.2 Endeavors of the Turkish governments on cultural policies

When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk first established the Republic of Turkey, he believed that the ‘permanence of the nation’ along with a solid state centralism was the most important thing for the Turkish republic’s cultural policy making between 1923 and 1950. Thus, nationalism and modernization became the two pillars of national culture.¹⁹⁴ Along with the Turkey’s endeavor to create an image and constructing an identity in the eyes of Westerners, Turkey had begun its communication efforts. The reason behind that was, after the perished Ottoman Empire, newly established Republic of Turkey needed to form a new identity before the international community in order to deliver its messages. For this purpose, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk brought reforms to the existing political system, education, women’s rights to vote, legal and economic system which were the key constituents of Turkey’s fresh identity and inspiration of official public diplomacy activities. In addition, various techniques of communication were adopted in order to position Turkey next to the modern Western countries and form an ally with them during the Cold War in the early times of the republic.¹⁹⁵

Moreover, education was centralized through the Unification of Education Act (1924), the new Turkish alphabet was invented (1928), the Turkish Education Association was established in order to support unprivileged children. To sustain these policies’ prosperity, two institutions as the Turkish Historical Society (1931) and the Turkish Language Institute (1932) were established.¹⁹⁶ Consequently,

¹⁹⁴ İnce, “The ‘Mehter March’ of Cultural Policy in Turkey,” 76.

¹⁹⁵ Sancar, “Turkey’s Public Diplomacy,” 13.

¹⁹⁶ İnce, “The ‘Mehter March’ of Cultural Policy in Turkey,” 77.

modernization has been added to nationalism, and in 1925 clothing law was enacted along with introduction of legal equality between sexes in 1926. Furthermore, in order to educate the citizens, People's Houses and Village Institutes were established in 1932 and 1940 respectively.

One of the significant influencers of Turkey's soft power in the Caucasus and African continent in the 90s and 2000s, was the religious and social organization called the Fetullah Gülen movement, or *hizmet* ("service") or *cemaat* ("community"). The religious clerk and his cult have created a sphere of influence through building schools from Kenya to Kazakhstan, business alliances, and cultural institutions in different parts of the world. Gülen movement resulted as an international symbol of both conservative Islamic values and "Turkishness" that felt itself responsible from spreading the Turkish language and culture overseas.¹⁹⁷ Furthermore, the movements regularly sponsored a Turkish language Olympiads in Turkey that host students from Gülen schools from all over the world to compete in their Turkish speaking abilities which gained attention of the international media and had a positive influence of Turkey's image in Central Asia and Africa¹⁹⁸ until the animosity between the AKP government and the so called *hizmet* movement that resulted with hundreds of thousands imprisonment of social workers following the failed *coup d'état*.

From the beginning of the 1990s, new governmental organizations have started to become influential in foreign politics in addition to Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the independence of Turkic republics and the developments in the

¹⁹⁷ Balci, "The Gülen Movement and Turkish Soft Power"

¹⁹⁸ Balci, "The Gülen Movement and Turkish Soft Power"

Balkans and Black Sea, an independent unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called TIKA (Turkish Collaboration and Development Agency) has been established in 1992. Between 1992 and 2002, 12 coordination offices of TIKA was opened in overseas and 2241 projects has been conducted. Later, TIKA was restructured and connected to Presidency.¹⁹⁹

With the beginning of great student project, Ministry of Education of Turkey became a cultural diplomacy tool in 1992. From the beginning of the 1990s, cultural diplomacy which is exclusive on Turkic republics has been conducted. Through the agreement signed by the cultural ministers of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, TURKSOY (Common Administration of Turkic Culture and Arts) was established in 1993 that its foundation based on mutual language, history and culture.²⁰⁰

Since the 1980s, Turkish Airlines (THY), has been ubiquitously utilized as a foreign policy strategy which advocates Turkey's expansion to far geographies. Another instrument of Turkey's soft power is Red Crescent or Kızılay, which is a Turkish Red Cross that deals with disaster response. It is one of Turkey's oldest and biggest civil soccer organizations which were established in 19th century during Ottoman era that is a significant contributor to Turkey's international stance and soft power. Lastly, through the Ministry of Tourism and Culture's sponsorship, annual London Turkish Film Festival has been conducting since 1993. Began as a three-day event, the festival has evolved into a two week festival.²⁰¹

¹⁹⁹ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri: Kültürel Diplomasi," 7.

²⁰⁰ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri," 12.

²⁰¹ Huijgh and Warlick, "The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers," 26.

Turkish music has also created Turkey's soft power beginning from the 90s. For instance, Tarkan has become very popular in countries such as Mexico, Russia, Azerbaijan, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia. He gained so much popularity in Latin community that his "Şımarık" (Spoiled) song became one of the top played songs on Latin pop radio stations in the cities as Los Angeles, New York, San Juan and San Diego in 2000. According to the Broadcast Data Systems (as cited in Rodriguez, 2000), in San Juan, Puerto Rico, the song was played averagely fifty-five times a week in WKAQ-FM radio and became the eight-most played song in the radio. Whereas in Los Angeles, it was played twenty-six times a week and became the 16th most played song on KLYY-FM. In Billboard's world music chart (as cited in Rodriguez, 2000), Tarkan's album ranked 4th. Eventually, Tarkan became first in the iTunes of four countries such as Azerbaijan, Bahrein Saudi Arabia and Uzbekistan and became 20th in the general ranking of iTunes.²⁰²

4.3 The Justice and Development Party and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan era

4.3.1 Culture in the Justice and Development Party era

Unlike South Korea, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) play a major role in the development of cultural industries in Turkey. In 2012, the number of the coordination offices of TİKA was raised to 33 and the agency conducted 1412 projects in 100 countries. While the budget of development aid was about 70-80 thousand dollars, the budget has become 1.3 billion dollars in 2011.²⁰³

²⁰² "Tarkan dünya listelerini de salladı"

²⁰³ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri," 7.

In addition to TIKA, Turkish Republic Presidential Public Diplomacy Coordinatorship was established in 2010 with an aim of conducting public diplomacy activities. Started by giving scholarship to 10,000 students for Turkic and neighbor societies, the great student project has been transferred to the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities in 2010.²⁰⁴ Turkey's need for public diplomacy has increased with the full accession negotiation process to EU and consequently, cultural activities in the EU countries were increased. In order to change public opinion in the EU which negatively perceives Turkey's full membership to EU, cultural heritage, art exhibitions, movie days along with various cultural events have been organized. In this light, 'Turkish Season' event in France has been organized along with participating to Frankfurt Book Convention as a guest country.²⁰⁵ In 2008, Yunus Emre Institute which resembles British Council and Goethe Institute was established and became an important cultural diplomacy tool in terms of expansion of Turkish culture and Turkish language education with its 30 branches in overseas.²⁰⁶ Furthermore, TURKSOY has conducted significant events in terms of spreading the Turkish culture such as celebration of Nevruz in UNESCO in 2010 and in UN General Assembly in 2011 along with Yunus Emre Oratorio concerts took place in New York and Washington in 2012.²⁰⁷

THY has continued to be one of the pillars of the Turkish soft power and aimed becoming a global airline company simultaneously with AKP government's ambition to become an international actor. Particularly, THY, as a soft power tool has

²⁰⁴ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri," 8.

²⁰⁵ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri," 12.

²⁰⁶ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri," 9.

²⁰⁷ Purtaş, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yükselen Değeri," 12.

become a complementary part of AKP's foreign policy aims as provider of the peace and stability through a liberal regime and free trade agreements in the Middle East.²⁰⁸ THY has become a worldwide renown airline company through sponsoring Barcelona Football Club and shooting advertisements which include globally famous stars such as Oscar winner Morgan Freeman, basketball player Kobe Bryant and football player Messi along with becoming the airline which has the most flights all over the world with 264 flight points. Along with THY, the Red Crescent Society has collaborated with Turkish government during the housing of Syrian refugees and located 65,000 Syrian refugees into win camps in Turkey along with decreasing the tension during the AKP period. ²⁰⁹

Expo World Fair can be given as an example for The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' cultural promotion endeavors. Held in every five years with attention of 157 countries gathered for ideas, innovation, and culture, Expo is a significant agenda for Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Further on government support for Turkish cultural diplomacy, "Spot On, Turkey Now" Turkish festival which featured Turkish and Austrian literature, music, and dance performance collaborations occurred through the joint effort of the Wiener Festwochen (Vienna Festival), one of the world's greatest cultural festivals, along with Istanbul Foundation for culture and Arts that took place in 2009 in Vienna can be given as another instance. The festival was sponsored by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Promotion Fund of the Turkish Prime Ministry.²¹⁰

²⁰⁸ Selçuk, "Turkish Airlines as a Soft Power Tool in the Context of Turkish Foreign Policy," 131-132..

²⁰⁹ Huijgh and Warlick, "The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers," 26

²¹⁰ Huijgh and Warlick, "The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers," 24.

4.3.1.1 Turkish dramas

In recent years, Turkish dramas have become a non-governmental public diplomacy strategy and for the Turkish government which is display Turkey internationally.²¹¹ Predomination of Turkish television by American series in the 70s and 80s continued with the Mexican and Brazilian *telenovelas* in the early 90s which were more attractive for Turkish cultural viewers since they were superior substitute to the shabby domestic productions. Notwithstanding, through the adoption of new technologies, improvements in film schools and media liberalization, television production has been dramatically progressed in the late 90s. Simultaneously with the improvements in the film industry, Turkish television production experienced a Renaissance during the end of the 90s and early 2000s. Therefore, Turkish dramas have become the building block of Turkey's non-governmental public diplomacy activities and become a soft power tool.²¹² The unexpected achievement of Turkish dramas astonished not only the TV production industry, but also the policy makers who were seeking to elevate Turkey's influence in the region by that time.²¹³

After the privatization of Turkish media in the 1980s, it has become transnational with a goal of stretching out Turkish diaspora in the world and Turkic populations living in the previous Soviet republics. Consequently, transnational broadcasting has begun with TRT, the state television, in 1990. Simultaneous evolution of the Arab media conceded with increasing demand for content which enabled Turkish TV programs to enter to a market which has approximately 700

²¹¹ Çevik, "Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy: A Western Projection by a Muslim Source," 78.

²¹² Çevik, "Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy," 82.

²¹³ Çevik, "Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy," 83.

satellite channels aside from its national broadcasters.²¹⁴ The opening of Turkish productions to the world market began with *Deli Yürek*, which was exported only to the Caucasus due to cultural connections in the early 2000s. This export generated aspiration for the Turkish film and television industry to turn into one of the global producers in international entertainment industry. Gradually, Turkey has exported more than 120 soap operas to the TV channels in 130 countries including Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Qatar, Greece, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Macedonia, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, Serbia, Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Madagascar, Mauritius, French Polynesia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Vietnam. Therefore, Turkish dramas have been far-reaching to the Middle East, Balkans, some countries in Europe, the Caucasus, Africa, Russia, Asia and newly South America.²¹⁵

The initiator of this sensation was the MBC, a Middle Eastern media giant that comprises of the integration of Saudi capital and Middle Eastern expertise which led the appearance of a successful private Arab media in the 1990s.²¹⁶ Ezgi Ural (as cited in Yanardağoğlu and Karam, 2013), sales executive of Kanal D which is one of the biggest private TV channels in Turkey and states that, Turkish drama exports to Arab states were not planned at the beginning and occurred by coincidence as one of the chairmen of MBC watched a Turkish drama in his hotel room in Antalya during his vacation in Turkey and observed some cultural resemblances that steered MBC to purchase several Turkish dramas. Eventually, the Turkish drama exports surpassed

²¹⁴ Kraidy and Ghazzi, "Neo-Ottoman Cool: Turkish Popular Culture in the Arab Public Sphere," 19.

²¹⁵ Çevik, "Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy," 83.

²¹⁶ Buccianti, Turkish soap operas in the Arab world: social liberation or cultural alienation?," 1.

100 million dollars. With *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (Magnificent Century)'s export to Italy as the first Western European country to buy the dramas along with China's CCTV and the airline company *Emirates* for its inflight entertainment system in 2013, the soap opera started to air in 70 countries.²¹⁷ According to the estimations of MBC television's marketing department (as cited in Yanardağoğlu and Karam, 2013), 85 million Arab viewers watched the final episode of *Gümüş*, (*Noor* or *Nour*).

In 2015, the drama called *Fatmagül'ün Suçu Ne?* or What is Fatmagul's Fault? Was seen by 12 million people in Argentina. In addition, Turkish drama called 1001 Nights have become the most viewed program in Chile in 2014. Tali (2016) interviews some of the Turkish drama watchers from South America and according to Marcela Mera who is a devoted viewer of Turkish dramas from Chile/Santiago, it is easier to attach to Turkish shows than US dramas because Turkish dramas tell nostalgic romance rather than too much sexuality that are being shown in Hollywood dramas. Moreover, she states, "Although Turkey is quite far away, I found our cultures to be quite similar, and the Turkish productions are very high quality and don't have the Hollywood clichés and stereotypes." Furthermore, Ivette Sanchez from Peru/Lima states, "I regularly get together with my friends and host Turkish drama nights, watch these dramas and chatting. The plots are clever and productions are excellent."

The success of Turkish dramas in the places that they were exported, especially in the Middle East, are due to several factors. Burhan Gun (as cited in Tali, 2016), the president of the Turkish TV and Cinema Producers Guild states that the

²¹⁷ Çevik, "Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy," 92.

success of Turkish dramas in South America is because of the series' coverage of migration from rural villages to cities and hardships of urbanization in their plot which is a significant issue in developing countries and have not being touched upon in Western TV series.

When it comes to Western societies such as Greece, Turkish cultural products, especially soap operas attracted Western and Middle Eastern viewer because they are the symbol of the forgotten conventions, the “externalized Orient,” and old-fashioned religious norms for Greek viewers. In addition, they illustrate an obtainable modernity, Westernization, and secularization for the middle classes in the Middle East.²¹⁸

Moreover on the impact of Turkish dramas, Aslı Tunç (as cited in Williams, 2013) states that “Turkish serials deal with many issues that Arab television is afraid of dealing with such as gender equality, treason and love affairs, and discussing the subject of illegitimate children born outside of marriage.” (p. 2379). Furthermore, the main characters in the series are usually women who are searching for power, challenging the social norms in terms of gender equality while seeking their significant other.²¹⁹ Thus, through the Turkish dramas, Arab women have begun communicating with their husbands.²²⁰

In this context Çevik (2014) states that;

Female characters in the soap operas acquire a dual identity symbolizing both strength and vulnerability at the same time. The storylines are centered on women where the female characters represent a synthesis of modernity

²¹⁸ Yörük and Vatikiotis, “Soft Power or Illusion of Hegemony,” 2379.

²¹⁹ Çevik, “Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy,” 89.

²²⁰ Williams, “The rise of Turkish soap power”

and traditionalism, a very impeccable reflection of the in-between sentiment of Turkish society. As a result, the characters appear to be in a lost space, trying to find the balance between the traditionalist society and modernist demands of the modern age... they also reflect shifts in defining and redefining gender roles. Therefore, the soap operas while being a source of entertainment are also a source of inspiration within the trajectory of shifting social norms in the Middle East. (p. 97)

As a result, Turkish dramas and actors turn into cultural ambassadors of the country at the same time being condemned as they are *neo-Ottoman cool* which is a term indicates the discourse on Turkey's proactive foreign policy in the Middle East and the disapproval of the new foreign policy because is trying to rejuvenate Ottoman Empire days while marketing products associated to the Ottoman Empire.²²¹ Indeed, the extraordinary reputation of Turkish dramas in a region which Ottoman Empire used to own has been elucidated as propaganda of Turkey's increasing domination within the region simultaneously with neo-Ottomanist return project. In his book, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu (as cited in Yörük & Vatikiotis, 2013) called this method "strategic depth" defending that Turkey is situated at the core of significant "geocultural basins" and should seize the opportunities in the region and take action for its benefit.

Through the *neo-Ottomanism*, a term coined during the Turgut Özal government, the country underscored the semantic, cultural and pious connections with countries in Caucasus and Central Asia which gained their independency newly and Arabian states.²²² Thus, the foundation of the *neo-Ottoman Cool* is Turkish modernity which has been alluring to Arabs because of its success in amalgamating

²²¹ Çevik, "Turkish Soap Opera Diplomacy," 93.

²²² Onar, "Neo Ottomanism, Historical Legacies and Turkish Foreign Policy"

previous conflicting political, economic and socio-cultural components into one attractive “package” which has been described as “[A] European, Islamic, Secular, Capitalist Turkey”. In this vein, the success of Turkish dramas in the Arabian Peninsula reflects the Arab public opinion. Arabs’ intertwined feelings on Turkey such as aspiration and worry is similar to Taiwanese, Koreans and other nations’ feelings on Japan and its television dramas.²²³ Shortly, in Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi’s (2013) sentences net-ottoman Cool is;

...Neo-Ottoman Cool is a productive, however ironic, notion to capture both underlying causes and outcomes of Turkey’s rising status in the Arab world, facilitated by the political bankruptcy of competing powers: Saudi Arabia’s clerk-religious system is a liability in the race for the hearts and minds of Arabs, and Iran’s anti-US and anti-Israel vitriol, compounded by the Sunni-Shi’i split, has failed to sway large segments of Arab public opinion. Turkey’s allure, with its glamorous stars and its popular politicians, has recently been complicated by Turkey’s growing involvement in the Arab uprisings, especially in Syria. Nonetheless, Turkey’s position in the Middle East may become more central as Muslim Brotherhood affiliated parties friendly to the AKP’s blend of religion, capitalism and electoral politics take over Arab governments. The most singular achievement of the AKP in this regard might be its success in uprooting anti-Turkish sentiment in the Arab world without affecting a deep geopolitical shift, relying instead on media, popular culture, diplomacy and skillful oratory to create the aura of Neo-Ottoman Cool. (p. 27-28)

All of those circumstances generated a Turkish area of political, economic and cultural impact that is “soft power” in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East along with evolution of Turkey into a regional power with significant international force. In addition, Turkey became the symbol of an attainable model of democracy for the Middle East which is “an alternative model of governance for Muslim societies,” a political system which integrates a balanced secularism and a

²²³ Kraidy and Al-Ghazzi, “Neo-Ottoman Cool,” 26.

balanced Islamism that contains both Western liberal democracy rules and the conventional norms of Islamic “conservatism”. With the Arab Spring, the “Turkish model” debate was increased.²²⁴

The revenue obtained from Turkish drama exports has increased 30 times within eight years. While drama export was 10 million dollars in 2008, the figure reached 300 million dollars in 2016.²²⁵ Based on the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s figures (as cited in Candemir, 2013) even though Turkish economic growth has declined to 2.2 percent in 2012 from 8.8 percent in 2011, Turkish drama exports have doubled in 2012 to 130,000 million dollars as 13,000 hours of program has been sold. Drama exports had positive effect on tourism as well.²²⁶

In 2013, Turkey has become the 6th most visited country through 37.8 million visits which was 5.9 percent higher than the visits in 2012.²²⁷ According to the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism’s (as cited in Candemir, 2013) data, the number of tourists who visited Turkey increased 26.06 percent, corresponding to 1.841 million in 2013 March. While Saudi tourists rose 88.74 percent, Qatar to 102 percent and Israel to 184 percent.

Along with the Turkish drama sector, we observe the rise of Turkish popular music as well as it did during the 90s. For example Selda Bağcan, who is a Turkish folk music artist, have been invited to the Burning Man 2018, which is a worldwide

²²⁴ Yörük and Vatikiotis, “Soft Power or Illusion of Hegemony,” 2366.

²²⁵ Bozkus, “Dizi ihracatımız çok hızlı yükseliyor”

²²⁶ Huijgh and Warlick, “The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers,” 21.

²²⁷ Huijgh and Warlick, “The Public Diplomacy of Emerging Powers,” 21.

renowned music festival.²²⁸ In addition, the leading actor of the Lord of the Rings, Elijah Wood, has stated his admiration to Selda Bağcan (as cited in CNN, 2015). Fazıl Say, who is a distinguished piano player have been known for his outstanding compositions by the world.

4.3.2 Foreign policy in the Justice and Development Party era

From the establishment of Turkish Republic until the AKP government, Turkey's foreign policy was Western oriented and had two focus as the United States and Europe. However, the AKP government and incumbent Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, tried to have a more versatile and proactive Turkish foreign policy beginning with the 2000s. At the beginning of its government, AK Party's foreign policy seemed harmonious with the European Union (EU) and the US. Until 2009, the party's zero problem policy and increased attention to the Middle East through its activities as a regional mediator welcomed by EU and the US.²²⁹

The AKP's foreign policy varied from conventional values of Turkish diplomacy which was pro-Western. With the new policy orientation, 'five pillars' was thought to be the government's focus. Firstly, Turkey should search 'democratization' while establishing security and stability; secondly, problems with neighbors should be downgraded to 'zero problems'; thirdly, Turkey should not forget it is the successor of a civilization which embraces European, Middle Eastern and Asian characters that is seen as 'Neo-Ottomanism' by observers; fourthly,

²²⁸ "Selda Bağcan to sing at Burning Man 2018"

²²⁹ Kaya, "Dış Politika Değişimi: AKP Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası," 77.

gaining ‘soft power’ in the region by integrating economic, cultural and demographic components along with security and political matters; and fifthly, to pursue a versatile foreign relations which leaves pro-Western foreign diplomacy behind.²³⁰ Turkey’s election as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council for the first time since the 1960s could be given as an instance for the increasing endorsement for the Turkish foreign policy.²³¹ In addition, Bosnia Herzegovina-Serbia in 2009, Israel-Syria (until the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza attack of Israel) peace meetings and the incumbent prime minister of Turkey Ahmet Davutoğlu’s efforts to start the conversation again when Hizbollah and his allies resigned from Saad Hariri coalition government could be shown to be Turkey’s new mediator diplomacy.²³² Even though during the early administration period of AKP, Turkey’s soft power in the Middle East indicated an increase through AKP’s proactive diplomacy and the success of Turkish dramas, Davutoğlu’s following quarrelsome foreign policy decisions along with sectarian tendencies undermined Turkey’s positive image from the 2009. This chapter will investigate the effect of Turkey’s foreign policy decisions to its soft power.

4.3.2.1 Turkey’s Middle East policy

For a long time Turkey’s relations with its neighbors in the Middle East were uneasy because of the historical occurrences. While Arabs grudge Turks for being an imperial power as Ottoman Empire, Turks recall how Arabs stabbed Turks in the

²³⁰ Yanardağoğlu and Karam, “The fever that hit Arab satellite television,” 566.

²³¹ Kirişçi, “The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state,” 32.

²³² Güder, “2000 Sonrası Türk Dış Politikasının Temel Parametreleri ve Orta Doğu Politikası,” 62.

back during the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, Turkey set apart itself from its Arab neighbors through the establishment of Turkish republic on secular foundations along with pursuing a foreign policy which faced to the West instead of the East.²³³ In 2010, the Arab Spring started in Tunisia and consequently transferred to Libya, Egypt and Syria. The elevated hopes and expectations that the Arab Spring would bring democracy to the region soon fade away and the crisis brought even more conflict and instability to the region.²³⁴ At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Turkey's foreign policy toward Middle East gained importance simultaneously. Ankara was given a spectator status in the Arab league and in the African Union.²³⁵ Furthermore, through the election of a Turkish national as the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, by behaving as a middleman during the peace talks between Israel and Syria, by the establishments for Syria, Iraq Iran and Palestine, and through the election as a non-Permanent Member in the United Nations Security Council along with the backing of the Arab countries, Turkey became a potential regional power at the beginning of Arab Spring.²³⁶ Nevertheless, Turkey could not benefit from this opportunity and its status as a model country did not last long.²³⁷ In the light of the developments in Libya, Egypt and Syria, its "zero problems" policy era has come to an end. The regional developments have both effected its socio-economic situation and its relations with the countries in the region.²³⁸

²³³ Yanardağoğlu and Karam, "The fever that hit Arab satellite television," 566.

²³⁴ Yaman, "AKP Dönemi Dış Politika Ekseninde Mezhep Meselesi," 185.

²³⁵ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "Turkey's Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East: Under the Shadow of the Arab Spring," 7.

²³⁶ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 7.

²³⁷ Yaman, "AKP Dönemi Dış Politika Ekseninde Mezhep Meselesi," 193.

²³⁸ Yaman, "AKP Dönemi Dış Politika Ekseninde Mezhep Meselesi," 193.

4.3.2.1.1 Turkey - Israel relations

The Israel-Turkey relations had already started to deteriorate before the Justice and Development Party government and the relations continued to be tense with the AKP administration. The AKP government continued to denounce Israel for its political actions and military operations as former Turkish governments did. In 2003, Turkey voted confirmative at the UN to castigate Israel's separation wall along with Prime Minister back then Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's criticized the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yasin (Palestinian imam and politician) as a "terrorist act" in 2004 and vigorously objected to Israeli military actions in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories in 2006.²³⁹

Despite the political unease, economic and commercial relations sustained until the "Operation Cast Lead in Gaza" on 27 December 2008 by Israel.²⁴⁰ This assault of Israel to Gaza formed Turkish-Israeli relations all over 2009. The first reaction to the assault was the adjournment of Israeli-Syrian peace talks by Syria, along with a bitter condemnation.²⁴¹

The climax of the tense relations was the "one minute" incident which caused Prime Minister back then Erdoğan to storm off the stage after expressing his feelings with sentences as "When it comes to killing, you know well how to kill" when the moderator did not provide enough time to answer President Shimon Peres' speech about Israeli military operations in the Davos World Economic Forum. (Benhold, 2009).²⁴² Furthermore, the relations were reduced to the *chargé d'affaires* level

²³⁹ Ulutaş, "Turkey-Israel: A Fluctuating Alliance," 5.

²⁴⁰ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 14.

²⁴¹ Ulutaş, "Turkey-Israel," 6.

²⁴² Bennhold, "Leaders of Turkey and Israel Clash at Davos Panel"

through the fatal Israeli commando raid on a Turkish flotilla on 31 May 2010 which caused ten Turkish national's death on the *Mavi Marmara* ship that was carrying activists against the naval blockade of Gaza in order to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza. The incumbent Minister of Defense of Israel, Ehud Barak visited Turkey in January 2010 with a purpose of lowering the rigidity between the two countries. Notwithstanding, it was not a successful visit due to the refusal to meet by President Gül and Prime Minister of the time Tayyip Erdoğan. Consequently, all the military activities with Israel were adjourned by Turkey.²⁴³

The motivation that Turkey to hold over the relations with Israel was to increase Turkey's impact on the Arab countries in the Middle East simultaneously. It was almost obliged for Ankara to secure the trust atmosphere by declining relations with Israel. Thus, Turkey would continue being the playmaker in the region and sustain its policy of solving problems by dialog as a soft power. With the incumbent US President Barrack Obama's visit to Israel on 22 March 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu called Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and made an apology on behalf of Israel for the *Mavi Marmara* attack. Due to the compression of the US, Erdoğan accepted the apology, thus the dialogues between the two states have begun again.²⁴⁴

In a public opinion survey conducted by Pew Research Center (Pew Research Center, 2013), when Israelis were asked whether if they have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of Turkey, 54 stated they are very unfavorable in the survey conducted in spring 2011, and 42 of them stated very unfavorable in the survey conducted in spring 2013 while 3 and 2 of

²⁴³ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 14.

²⁴⁴ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 14.

Israelis stated that they were very favorable in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Table 4 indicates the results of the survey.

Table 4. Public opinion in Israel

		Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of: p. Turkey					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2013	2	12	38	42	5	100
	Spring, 2011	3	10	29	54	4	100
Israel	Spring, 2013	Now I would like to ask your views about some additional political leaders. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of: c. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan					
Israel	Spring, 2013	3	11	31	53	2	100

Source: Pew Research Center, October 17, 2013.

After 2016, the Turkish government to have caught between pragmatism and populism in its relations with Israel and the consequent improvement of the relations resulted in anger from Islamist circles in Turkey.²⁴⁵

4.3.2.1.2 Turkey - Libyan relations

Libyan leader Gaddafi and Turkey's relations were very good between 2009 and 2010. Turkey chose not to intervene in the rebellion on 17 February 2011 to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. However, when it saw the US and NATO supporting the uprising opposed to Gaddafi and rebels were against Turkey, Ankara decided to recognize the resistance and terminated its support for Gaddafi. Turkey entered to the Operation "Unified Protector" with seven aircraft and six ships through the NATO take over after the UN Security Council resolution which called military intervention. Gaddafi regime officially terminated by the assistance of NATO in 20 October 2011.²⁴⁶

The relations started to worsen after three years due to Turkey's position in the restructuring in the country succeeding elections. Two rival governments with different centers one in Tobruk and one in Tripoli appeared to establish the new regime. The one in Tobruk represents the liberals and elites which are acknowledged by the international community particularly by the US and the EU, whereas the one is Tripoli represents the Islamic tented establishment called Fajr Libya which is constructed by the advocates of the Muslim Brotherhood. According to the

²⁴⁵ Kirişçi, *Turkey and the West*, 168.

²⁴⁶ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 15.

administration in Tobruk, Turkey and Qatar provided for the Tripoli government that is guided by Omar al Hassi and controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. But the Tobruk government asked the Turkish and Qatari to leave Libya within 24 hours based on their support of terror. Turkish Embassy in Tripoli was shut down since 25 June 2014.²⁴⁷

4.3.2.1.3 Turkey - Egypt relations

Ankara supported the manifest against President Hosni Mubarak due to the fear of experiencing same things as happened in Libya. When Morsi became the president, he imitated Turkey's foreign policy and followed a similar pattern towards Syria and Israel.²⁴⁸ The fine relations between Turkey and Egypt sustained until 3 June 2013, when Abdel Fattah el-Sisi commanded military coup that overthrew Morsi. Incumbent Prime Minister Erdoğan asserted that the military coup cannot be accepted. In response, el-Sisi, (as cited in Bağcı and Erdurmaz, 2017) stated that Turkey should put an end to meddling Egypt's internal affairs and started an endeavor against the Muslim Brotherhood and tried to decrease their religious impact in Egypt. To this day, Erdoğan asserts that Turkey still acknowledges Morsi as the President of Egypt and finds el-Sisi guilty in terms of overthrowing the elected President by a military coup and damaging Egyptian democracy. Even though the commercial relations are sustained, Turkish-Egyptian relations are at the lowest level.

²⁴⁷ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 16.

²⁴⁸ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 17.

4.3.2.1.4 Turkey - Iraqi relations

AKP's Iraq policy can be analyzed in parallel with the domestic power struggle between AKP and Turkish Armed Forces (TAF).²⁴⁹ With the AKP government, the Kemalist perception of border with Iraq evolved into a foreign policy which acknowledges the emerging Kurdish entity in the region. The TAF was backing a united Iraq to stop the constitution of an independent Kurdish entity in northern Iraq.²⁵⁰

Whereas AKP was advocating a united Iraq along with the recognition of the Kurdish entity, however, the formation of an entity as a state in northern Iraq was against the unitary nation-state idea for the Kemalist TAF. The dispute about the northern Iraq and the domestic power struggle resulted with the presidential elections and Ergenekon investigation.²⁵¹

After the US had taken back its army from Iraq in November 2011, politicians could not set a sustainable order in Iraq. Even though the al-Iraqiya Party which had a secular origin that was ruled by Ayad Allawi won 91 seats out of 325 in the parliamentary elections, al-Maliki with Shia origin won with 89 seats accordingly to the Iraqi constitution. When the President of Iraq, Tariq Hashimi was arrested at Baghdad Airport on 19 December 2011, Turkey and the Maliki government relations became tense. After the US withdrawal from the region, the occurrence became Sunni community's symbol in the Sunni-Shia conflict. Subsequently, Tariq Hashimi became a refugee in Turkey and Hashimi did not accept the death sentence which

²⁴⁹ Balci, "Foreign Policy as Domestic Power Struggle: The Northern Iraq as a Battlefield Between the AKP and TAF in 2007-8," 70.

²⁵⁰ ²⁵⁰ Balci, "Foreign Policy as Domestic Power Struggle," 79.

²⁵¹ Balci, "Foreign Policy as Domestic Power Struggle," 79.

was declared in Iraq. Ankara's hosting Hashimi was interpreted as intervention of Iraq's internal affairs by al-Malik. Whereas Turkey recognized the situation as conduction of an oppressive regime to Sunni Arabs.²⁵²

Despite the increased hopes for better bilateral relations that were created through Nuri El Maliki's decision to withdraw from his third presidential term and leave the seat to Haydar El-Abadi, the emergence of ISIS in Iraq ruptured the expectations. As a matter of fact, the relations have become tenser along with the risqué of military confrontation through the Başika crisis. Besides the Başika crisis, Turkey's placement of its troops to Iraq border perceived as a threat from Iraq before Iraq's Musul operation. Nevertheless, the tensions were reduced by the visit of a delegation under the leadership of Foreign Ministry counselor Ümit Yalçın as soon as the operation has begun.²⁵³ The evolving regional dynamics and the emergence of the Syrian War had an effect on the smoothed bilateral relations.

4.3.2.1.5 Turkey - Iran relations

Ankara needed to utilize Iranian oil and natural gas resources thus, it underscored improving a stable policy despite the pressure coming from the US and the West. Ankara acknowledged the fact that Iran could quickly build an alliance with Russia in a case of controversy of interests. When Iran increasingly supported Kurdish terrorism and sectarian discrimination, Turkey recognized that Iran could initiate problems in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy. Therefore, Turkey decided to

²⁵² Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 18.

²⁵³ Duman, "Türkiye-Irak ilişkileri nerden nereye?"

sustain decent relations and conduct them independently from the West.

Consequently, Ankara rejected the US forces inquiry to use Turkish territory to enter Iraq in 1 March 2003. Because of the energy demand Ankara saw the necessity to advance relations with Iran in return of the stiff relations with the US.²⁵⁴

In fact, Ankara compensates one-third of its energy need from Iran and in 2001, the Iran-Turkey pipeline was initiated. However, the pipeline became unstable due to Iran's usage of it as a political weapon and it adjourned the pipeline from time to time. In this regard, an agreement was signed between Turkey and Iran in 2004. Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, Ali Larijani (as cited in Bağcı and Erdurmaz, 2017) stated that Iran had proof of the US support to the PKK and PJAK when he visited Turkey in May 2006. Turkey was convinced that collaboration with Iran on terrorism was successful. Notwithstanding, the collaboration declined by the end of 2011 due to the contrasting views towards the Syrian war. The contradiction between the two states furthered in the time of elections in post-US Iraq. In order to make certain of the Shia-dominated coalition be shaped, Iran tried to intervene the internal affairs of Iraq during his visit to Turkey.

The tension between the two states escalated with the rebellion in Syria under the impact of the Arab Spring. Due to its strategic relations, Iran supported the Syrian regime against the anti-government protests. There were two reasons behind this behavior: First of all, to Iran, these demonstrations were a plot against itself by the superpowers in order to remove Iran's impact in the Syria-Iran axis. Second, Iran would lose its connection to Hizbollah which provides it an influence in the Middle

²⁵⁴ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, "The Middle East Seen from Ankara," 20.

East along with losing a major ally with the overthrow of the Assad regime.²⁵⁵ For Iran, Syria is a “resistance front against the Zionist regime” due to Syrian support to the Hizbollah in Lebanon. Iran supported the Assad regime since the beginning of the rebellions in Syria because of the fear of being weak against Israel and the West. The relations between two countries became tenser with the Erdoğan’s visit to Tehran on 28 March 2012. Despite the aim of this visit was to solve the Syria problem, it evolved into a meeting where both countries stated their attitude towards the Assad regime.²⁵⁶ In 2013, Ahmadinejad completed his time in presidency which meant a new period for both Turkey-Iran relations and Iran’s nuclear agenda. New president Hasan Ruhani acted accordingly to Iran’s nuclear agenda.²⁵⁷

4.3.2.1.6 Turkey - Syria relations

Turkey had two major problems with Syria as the water problem and the activities of Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) until the end of the 1990s.²⁵⁸ When AKP came to government in 2002, it sought to improve relations with the country’s neighbors under the ‘zero problem’ aim, particularly with Syria due to its borders with three principal areas of conflict in the Middle East that are Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon. Turkey’s rejection of US base establishment in Turkey to attack Iraq in 2003 was received positively by Syria. Following refusal of AKP of the US’ requests which

²⁵⁵ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, “The Middle East Seen from Ankara,” 22.

²⁵⁶ Bağcı and Erdurmaz, “The Middle East Seen from Ankara,” 22.

²⁵⁷ “Geçmişten günümüze Türkiye-İran ilişkileri”

²⁵⁸ Aras and Polat, “From Conflict to Cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran,” 509.

would isolate and undermine Syria led Turkey to become a key actor in the region along with brokering peace talks between Syria and Israel.²⁵⁹

The turning point of the relations between the two countries was the withdrawal of the US forces from Iraq at the end of 2011.²⁶⁰ The evacuation of the US from Iraq made Turkey anxious about Iran's increasing regional influence amongst the Arab Gulf countries stretching from western Afghanistan to the Mediterranean. If Iran increased its sphere of influence and connected the regions of so-called Shiite Crescent geographically which would add Iraq to already prevailing 'resistance', involving Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, that could alter the political prospects of the region fundamentally? The Arab Spring gave Turkey to claim its own sphere of influence as the major regional power and a role model with its political governance. Thus, Syria became even more paramount to lose to Iran's sphere of influence. Syria became one of Iran's 'resistance axis' with the spread of Arab Spring to the country which gave Turkey a chance to act against Tehran and an opportunity to change the regime in Damascus that caused the geopolitical rivalry for the leadership in the region between Ankara and Tehran.²⁶¹

Pro-democracy demonstrations in Deraa, Syria to protest the apprehension and torture of a group of adolescents who wrote revolutionary slogans on a school wall evolved into a nationwide uprising demanding President Bashar al-Assad's resignation after the harsh response from security forces in 2011. The country dragged into civil war as the brutality increased dramatically and caused the formation of

²⁵⁹ Kabalan, "Syrian-Turkish Relations," 30.

²⁶⁰ Kabalan, "Syrian-Turkish Relations," 35.

²⁶¹ Kabalan, "Syrian-Turkish Relations," 36.

rebel units to fight government forces in order to take the control of cities, towns and the rural areas. The battle stretched out to the capital Damascus and second city, Aleppo in 2012. The conflict got deeper than a rudimentary fight against Assad and gained sectarian connotations and turned the country's Sunni majority against the president's Shia Alewite sect that pinched the regional and world powers. With the emergence of the jihadist group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), the war acquired another dimension.²⁶² According to UN envoy for Syria (UN envoy for Syria, 2011), 400,000 Syrians have been killed since the beginning of the war in 2011.²⁶³

In August 2013, hundreds of people were slaughtered as the rockets filled with nerve agent sarin were fired at numerous suburbs of Damascus which made western powers believe the massacre was conducted out by the Syrian government. Confronting the anticipated US military intervention to Syria, President Assad gave consent to the ejection and demolition of Syria's chemical weapons arsenal entirely. Notwithstanding, it has been reported that toxic chemicals such as chlorine was being utilized "systematically and repeatedly" in the attacks. The humanitarian crisis caused flees of more than 4.5 million people to other countries, particularly to Turkey.²⁶⁴ From 2015 onwards, several ceasefires were attempted by parties which resulted with failure. In January 2018, Turkey launched an attack on northern Syria to expel Kurdish rebels who control the area around Afrin.²⁶⁵

²⁶² "Syria: The story of the conflict"

²⁶³ "Syrian Civil War Fast Facts"

²⁶⁴ "Syria: The story of the conflict"

²⁶⁵ "Syrian Civil War Fast Facts"

4.3.2.1.7 Turkey's image in the Middle East

The unflavored image of Turkey in the eyes of the Arab World throughout 20th century had evolved into a positive perception with AKP government.²⁶⁶ Turkish foreign policy created the majority of its attractiveness in the Middle East. For instance, Turkey's veto of welcoming US troops for the Iraq War in 2003 challenged the common view of Turkey's foreign policy decisions are dependent on US and has been beneficial for its soft power. In addition, Turkey's condemnation of Israel after the Gaza War has escalated its popularity in the region. Notwithstanding, Turkish-Israeli collaboration was one of the major disapproval reason of Turkey is the Arab world. Moreover, Turkey's political transformation had become a model for the Arab world in terms of credible governance since it claimed to defend the "moderate Islam" political view, thus Turkey was seen as a victorious symbol of the agreement between Islam and democracy. Furthermore, the country's economic recovery and becoming one of the G-20 countries escalated its appeal.

According to the TESEV opinion poll (as cited in Altunışık, 2011), Arab citizens thought that Turkey was the most powerful economy in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia and it would be the strongest economy after 10 years. Lastly, Turkish cultural products contributed to its glamour within the region and Turkish dramas has been watched by 78 percent of the Arabian citizens along with an increased number of tourists to Turkey from Arab countries. Despite the bilaterally improved relations, a more solid and collaborative regional order has not been established yet and Turkey could not convert its regional popularity into a powerful diplomatic impact. Turkey's

²⁶⁶ Salem, "Turkey's Image in the Arab World"

eager endeavors to have a peace treaty between Israel and Syria failed when Israel launched the Gaza war in December 2008 without Ankara's knowledge. In addition, its efforts with Brazil to ease the Iranian-Western nuclear deadlock in May 2010 resulted with an agreement with Tehran, but the West and the Security Council revoked the agreement. Moreover, incumbent Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu failed to find a solution when he went to Beirut after the fall down of Lebanese government in January 2011. Turkey still could not leverage its fame to become the major player in the Middle East or in the creation of a middle east which resembles to Turkey's governance model.²⁶⁷

The country's public opinion polls were high before the Arab Spring, however Ankara's stance over the Libyan uprising and Qaddafi's release of his air and ground forces against civil people has a negative impact on Turkey's image in the Arab world. The printed media reports on Turkey's support of Qaddafi despite his apparent crimes because of Turkey's \$15 billion of contracts in Libya underscored the irony between Turkey's image as an advocate of human and democratic rights in the region and as a government which is interested in business deals regardless of the human costs.²⁶⁸

In sum, Salem (2011) states that Turkey could have strengthened its leadership position in the Middle East during the Arab Spring through advocating democracy rather than concerning about its business deals within the region.

²⁶⁷ Salem, "Turkey's Image in the Arab World"

²⁶⁸ Salem, "Turkey's Image in the Arab World"

Figure 5 provides the favorable opinion of Turkey country-by-country responses. When seven countries in the Middle East as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq were asked about their positive opinion of Turkey over the four years from 2009 until 2012, 75 percent in 2009 stated their favorable opinion. The number reached its highest point with 82 percent in 2010 and began to decline in 2011 as 80 percent and reduced to 71 percent in 2012. Although the recognition of Turkey is still positive, it has been declining.²⁶⁹

In The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East survey of Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) Foreign Policy Programme (TESEV, 2012), when respondents by country were asked their favorable opinion of Turkey, Libyan respondents have the most favorable perception of Turkey by 90 percent likewise in 2011. 84 percent of the respondents had positive view towards Turkey which is lower than 2011. Palestine had the third most positive view towards Turkey by 81 percent. Positive perception towards Turkey is higher than 70 percent in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and Yemen.

However, despite the fact that the perception of Turkey remains to be high, the positive view has indeed fallen compared to 2011. The positive perceptions from the countries as Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran have changed more remarkably. Positive perspective of Turkey has fallen from 78 percent to 63 percent in Lebanon whereas 74 percent to 55 percent in Iraq. Syrian favorable opinion has fallen even more dramatically. While in 2010, positive perception of Turkey was 93 percent, it has fallen to 44 percent in 2011 and 28 percent in 2012.

²⁶⁹ Akgün and Gündoğar, "The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012," 9.




Figure 5. Favorable opinion of Turkey country-by-country responses

Source: TESEV Foreign Policy Programme, The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012.

Figure 6 provides the three years of favorable opinion of Turkey. In The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2013 survey (TESEV, 2013), when respondents were asked their thoughts about Turkey’s role in Arab Spring while 67 percent of the participants from Egypt in 2011 stated their positive thoughts about Turkey’s role in Arab Spring, the rate decreased to 50 percent and to 37 percent in 2011 and 2012 respectively. Even though in some countries, Turkey’s perception is still high, 19 percent of drop was observed in overall assessment of Turkey by the Middle East countries in 2013.

The most remarkable change in opinion took place in respondents from Egypt. Results in 2012 (TESEV, 2012) reveal that 84 percent of the respondents had favorable opinion of Turkey. Whereas in 2013 (TESEV, 2013) the rate decreased by 46 points down to 38 percent. Along with Egypt, favorable opinion decreased in Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, the Gulf Countries and Yemen as well. The least favorable opinion belongs to Syria by 22 percent in 2013.




Figure 6. Favorable opinion of Turkey, country-by-country responses

Source: TESEV




Figure 7. Turkey's role in the Middle East

Source: TESEV

As it can be seen in Figure 7, the regional favorable opinion of Turkey playing a bigger role in the Middle East was 60 percent in 2013. The percentage was 71 in 2011, and 66 in 2012. The most shift of perception occurred in Egypt. While 74

respondents from Egypt stated that Turkey should play a more significant role in the region, the number dropped to 47 percent in 2013.²⁷⁰




Figure 8. Why Turkey cannot be a model

Source: TESEV

As Figure 8 shows, when participants asked why Turkey cannot be a model, respondents stated Turkey’s interventionism as the main reason. Respondents gave the country’s secular political system and close relations with the West as the second reason. In addition, Turkey’s not being Muslim enough is another influential reason.²⁷¹

Figure 9 provides the why Turkey is not a model opinions in the same survey conducted in 2012. Respondents stated Turkey’s being not Muslim enough reason as the primary reason to why Turkey cannot be a model question.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Akgün and Gündoğar, “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2013,” 21.

²⁷¹ Akgün and Gündoğar, “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2013,” 23.

²⁷² Akgün and Gündoğar, “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012,” 21.




Figure 9. Why Turkey is not a model

Source: TESEV




Figure 10. Opinions of Erdoğan is mixed

Source: 2017 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey

According to the Pew Global Attitudes Survey (Fetterolf and Poushter, 2017), the favorable opinion of Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan in 2017 was 66 percent in Jordan, 59 percent in Tunisia, 42 percent in Lebanon and 15 percent in Israel. It has been observed that the views of Erdoğan have improved in Tunisia by 10 percent since 2014, whereas in Lebanon, the favorable opinion has decreased since 2015 by 8 percent as shown in Figure 10. Moreover, the unfavorable view of Turkey was found to be 80 percent in Israel in 2017, 39 percent in Jordan, 53 percent in Lebanon and 23 percent in Tunisia.²⁷³ The comprehensive information can be found in Appendix D and Appendix E.

4.3.2.2 Turkey - the US relations

Turkey's relations with US had ups and downs since the Iraq War in 2003. Although the US had issues with its important European allies such as France and Germany over the war in Iraq, they did not last long as in Turkey case.²⁷⁴ Strained relations between the two countries got tenser with Turkey's resistance to new sanctions against Iran in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the declining of Israel. There were recurring reports about Turkey's increasing alienation from the West after the *Mavi Marmara* incident. It was contended that Turkey was seeking new alliances in the Middle East and Eurasia and moving away from the USA and Europe and was narrated as 'shifting axis of Turkish foreign policy' by several journalists.²⁷⁵

²⁷³ Fetterolf and Poushter "Key Middle East Publics See Russia, Turkey and U.S. All Playing Larger Roles in Region"

²⁷⁴ Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 129.

²⁷⁵ Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 131.

The Bush administration's resolution to overthrow Saddam Hussein in 2003 had paramount implications for the Turkey-US alliance. One of the most solemn contradictions in Turkish-American relations since the US Congress' application of an arms embargo on Turkey in 1975 is the Turkish parliament's rejection of letting the American military to use Turkey as an initiative platform at the beginning of the Iraq War. Indeed, the Kurdish problem sustained to be one of the most debated issues in the bilateral relationship all over the last decade. Turkish officials were thinking that the PKK was the major benefiter of the war in Iraq since it benefited the absence of a central government authority in northern Iraq to enhance its bases for striking against Turkey. Along with the American reluctance to diminish the PKK's bases was condemned by Turkey. Even though the US had officially (as cited in Sayarı, 2013) stated that PKK is a terrorist organization and aided Turkey to capture its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1991, it was unwilling to diminish PKK in northern Iraq due to its worry of alienation the northern Iraqi Kurds who had become America's major ally in Iraq as a consequent of the war.

The two countries came to crossroads again when US troops held members of the Turkish Special Forces troops for the allegations of planning to assassinate a local Kurdish leader where the Turkish military personnel were hooded and taken to Kirkuk for questioning and released after 60 hours which is known as the 'hood incident' in 2003.²⁷⁶ The two states had uneasy relationship all over the eight years of the Bush administration between 2001 and 2009 and it continued for the first two and a half years when President Obama took office.²⁷⁷ Turkey and the US relations were

²⁷⁶ Atmaca, "Turkey-US Relations (2009-2016): A troubled partnership in a troubled world?" in Turkish Foreign Policy," 64.

²⁷⁷ Sayarı, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 129.

also affected from another regional security issue which is the nuclear desire of Iran. According to Washington, Iran's nuclear development program is a paramount threat for the security of the West and Israel. Notwithstanding, Turkey seemed kind and giving credit toward Iran's scheme. The separation between Ankara and Washington on this contradiction evolved into a critical crisis in June 2010 due to Turkey's veto for further sanction against Iran in the UN Security Council which Turkey serves as a non-permanent member.²⁷⁸ As Çağaptay (2013) states, "Today, Turkey faces a range of stress tests over its competence as a global actor as well as its commitments to Western interests and values." (p. 4)

Ironically, the contradiction that created the crisis between Ankara and Washington since 2003 also became a tool for calming down the relations between the two states.²⁷⁹ The relations promptly developed when the Turkish government concurred to host the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) radar missile shield system in 2011 and Turkey's decision was welcomed by the Obama administration. Thus, the relations between Ankara and Washington were remarkably improved and the alliance reflected collaboration than contradiction since 2011 until the Trump Administration. It was apparent that Turkey changed its policy towards Iran's endeavor to advance its nuclear ability which meant the escalating rivalry between Iran and Turkey through both of their ambition of becoming the main power in the region.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁸ Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 133.

²⁷⁹ Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 133.

²⁸⁰ Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 129-130.

Furthermore, tense relations between Ankara and Washington cooled down through the Arab Spring as well which caused an evolution in the political landscape of the Middle East. Even though Turkey was against NATO's propaganda for overthrowing Muammar Qaddafi, in the end it supported and worked together with the other NATO members to change the regime in Libya. More significantly, Turkey abandoned its intimate diplomatic and economic relation policy with the Assad regime and became one of the chief supporters of the opposition groups in Syria. In conjunction, the US who was seeking to demolish Assad regime for a very long time aided diplomatically and logistically to the opposition groups.²⁸¹

Even though Ankara and Washington was at the same page on the necessity of a new regime in Syria at the beginning, their views began to separate as the civil war in Syria persisted. Turkey was defending taking forceful measurements to overthrow Assad regime, such as buffer zones on the ground and no-fly zones in the air, whereas the US were only providing logistical and intelligence for the opposition in their struggle against the government. While the Arab Spring helped positively the cooperation between Turkey and the USA, worsening relations between Israel and Turkey had adverse effect on bilateral relations.²⁸²

4.3.2.3 Turkey - Russia relations

During Russian President Vladimir Putin's administration first steps have been taken to improve Russia-Turkey relations in 2004 and Putin made his first state visit to

²⁸¹ Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 133.

²⁸² Sayari, "New Directions in Turkey-USA Relations," 134.

Turkey in 2005. Putin was the first political figure who saw the evolution of the Western oriented Turkish foreign policy.²⁸³ In 2008, this partnership was tested with the “Five Day War” when Georgia brought the Adjara region under central government control through overthrowing the pro-Russian leader Aslan Abashidze. In addition, it tried to bring South Ossetia which declared its one sided independence under its control. In response, the Russian military won against the Georgian army in South Ossetia and invaded some towns of Georgia. But, Georgia is one of the most crucial countries for Turkey’s strategy in the South Caucasus. Furthermore, it is the only state that exists between Russia and Turkey which is geographically similar to a “buffer state” balancing the possibility of contradiction between Turkey and Russia. Through its rise as an independent country in 1992 and the president who came to the power with the “Rose Revolution” of 2003, Georgia has become an important ally of the United States, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Its ardent search of a NATO membership brought the country closer to Turkey which is the country’s sole neighbor which is a NATO member.²⁸⁴ When Russia cut the electricity of Georgia by Putin’s order, Georgia asked electricity from Turkey. Turkey met the needs of Georgia the same day along with Turkish Red Crescent’s humanitarian aid to the border. However, it did not assist to the military aid request of Georgia. Turkey did not get involved to the war between Georgia and Russia which is a country that is very close to its border and has improving trade relations.²⁸⁵ In addition, Ankara detained the U.S. navy’s entry to Bosphorus to supply humanitarian relief in order to compromise to Russia.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ Göksedef, “Putin dönemi Türk-Rus ilişkileri”

²⁸⁴ Aktürk, “The Crisis in Russian-Turkish Relations, 2008-2015,” 2.

²⁸⁵ Göksedef, “Putin dönemi Türk-Rus ilişkileri”

²⁸⁶ Bechev, “Russian-Turkish Relations In Crisis,” 11.

When it came to 2010, High Level Cooperation Council in order to guarantee the trade relations and sign high level agreements that gathers many minister and business figures, was established.²⁸⁷ Even though the relations between the two countries strengthened with a nuclear power plant agreement, it started to deteriorate with the Arab Spring. While Turkey chose to stand with the revolutionary side in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya after a deep consideration during the escalating violations of the demonstrations, Russia supported the expelled Libyan dictator Muammer Gaddafi and the military dictator who overthrew the first democratically chosen President of Egypt Mohammad Mursi, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Turkey has been the strongest supporter of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government in the world whereas, Russia has been the most precise supporter of Sisi's military dictatorship. Therefore, Turkish and Russian stance on the Arab Spring became the two polar.²⁸⁸

Civil antagonism, change in the regime, military rule in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia did not affect Turkey and Russia in terms of national and territorial security. However, the events in Ukraine since November 2013 had effected the two states both individually and Russian-Turkish relations. The demonstrations begun at Independence Square in Kyiv, Ukraine because the President of the Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych and Prime Minister Mikola Azarov was about to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union in order to build closer relationship with Russia. The pro-Russian resolution immediately evoked people who tend to support pro-European course for Ukraine. Following severe demonstrations caused

²⁸⁷ Göksedef, "Putin dönemi Türk-Rus ilişkileri"

²⁸⁸ Aktürk, "The Crisis in Russian-Turkish Relations, 2008-2015," 2.

Yanukovych's resignation from the presidency by the Ukrainian parliament and escape to Kharkiv in the Eastern Ukraine and then to Russia. The new pro-Western government's rule was interpreted as a "coup" by Russian policy makers and became the plea for Russia's invasion to Crimea in February 2014. The peninsula was annexed by Russia with a referendum following the occupation in March 2014.²⁸⁹ The annexation of Crimea was a defying point for Russian-Turkish relations due to Crimea's central existence in the Black Sea, similar to the position of Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As told before, Russia has been supporting Assad regime and the Russian Air Force has been bombing the Syrian opposition forces with Turkmen fighters whom Turkey was backing up and Russia was utilizing the Turkish airspace on several situations.²⁹⁰ When Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber aircraft which contravened the Turkish airspace in November 24, 2015, it was an absolute shock for Russia and was acknowledged as the major reason of the greatest crisis of the Russian-Turkish relations in the 21st century. Notwithstanding, it was a symbol of the turnaround in the geopolitical dynamics existing collaboration between the two states. Consequently, Russian administration decided to economically sanction Turkey.²⁹¹

In December 2015, the meeting of the Russian-Turkish High-Level Council was cancelled and by January 1, 2016, visa-free travel to Russia was revoked for Turkey. In addition, the Russian government prohibited agents to sell vacations in

²⁸⁹ Aktürk, "The Crisis in Russian-Turkish Relations, 2008-2015," 3.

²⁹⁰ Aktürk, "The Crisis in Russian-Turkish Relations, 2008-2015," 4.

²⁹¹ Aktürk, "The Crisis in Russian-Turkish Relations, 2008-2015," 2.

Turkey which is a very popular holiday destination for Russian tourists and Charter flights has been called off. Turkish firms, especially the ones in the construction sector which is in the second place after the tourism in terms of Turkish exports to Russia have been refused access to public contracts. Moreover, the Russian food safety agency, *Rosset'khozadzor*, has cancelled many of the Turkish agricultural imports such as tomatoes, apricots, poultry and salt which hit economically hard the farmers in the Mediterranean region of the country. Possible loss was USD 9 billion, which is equal to 0.3 to 0.4 percent of Turkish GDP.²⁹² On June 2016, Erdogan apologized to Russia through a letter to President Vladimir Putin.²⁹³ As well as the economic reasons such as downfalls in tourism, agricultural and construction industries, security concerns also played a major role in Ankara's rapprochement to Moscow. In addition, United States's and the West's Syria policy was more and more upsetting Ankara. The United States' focal point on fighting ISIS and reluctance to straightly challenge Syrian regime forces along with western cooperation with the People's Protection Units (YPG) through the Syrian Defense Forces provoked Ankara and its perspective on YPG along with the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) factions of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The Turkish government became alarmed when the PYD extended its control through the Turkish-Syrian border and United States contemplated arming the YPG because it did not want an emergence of a sovereign Syrian Kurdish region on its border nor a bolstered YPG or PKK.²⁹⁴ In 19 December 2016, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey Andrey Karlov was shot dead at an art exhibit by Turkish gunman while crying out "God is great!"

²⁹² Bechev, "Russian-Turkish Relations In Crisis," 9.

²⁹³ Tavernise, "Seeking to Improve Ties With Russia, Turkey Apologizes for Downing Warplane"

²⁹⁴ Taylor, "Why Turkey Needs Russia"

and “don’t forget Aleppo, don’t forget Syria!”.²⁹⁵ The event happened right before the planned gathering of Turkey, Iran and Russia for the Syrian crisis and right after the UN Resolution on Aleppo in December 2016.²⁹⁶ The murder shocked the world and Russian-Turkish relations were strained, but the relationship did not deteriorate. A high-level Turkish-Russian-Iranian summit for the Syrian war was carried out in Moscow as planned.²⁹⁷ The relations sustained fairly normalized until today. Figure 11 provides the opinions on the responsible person from the downing of the Russian airplane during the military operation in Syria. When asked their opinion to Russian public as “Who is to blame for the downing by Turkish fighters of the Russian airplane which was taking part in the military operation in Syria?” 56 percent of Russian said the Turkish leadership, President Erdoğan was to blame.²⁹⁸




Figure 11. Responsible person from the downing of the Russian airplane during the military operation in Syria

Source: Russian Analytical Digest

²⁹⁵ Arango and Gladstone, “Russian Ambassador to Turkey Is Assassinated in Ankara”

²⁹⁶ Gardner, “Breaking the US-Russia Impasse: Keeping the Door Open to Dialogue,” 6.

²⁹⁷ Malsin, “Why the Assassination of a Russian Ambassador in Turkey Won’t Start a New War”

²⁹⁸ Bechev, “Russian-Turkish Relations In Crisis,” 12.

Figure 12 provides attitudes towards the Turks. When Russian public have been asked as, “Has your attitude towards the Turks lately become better, worse, or has it remained the same?” 28.6 percent of the total population answered that it has become worse. ²⁹⁹




Figure 12. Attitudes towards the Turks

Source: Russian Analytical Digest

4.3.2.4 Turkey - Armenia relations

The relations between two countries had sustained its tense situation due to the Armenian Genocide controversy. After Armenia gained independence in 1991, due to the dispute over the Armenian enclave Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993 and the assassination of Hrant Dink, who is a Turkish-Armenian journalist by a Turkish

²⁹⁹ Bechev, “Russian-Turkish Relations In Crisis,” 15.

nationalist in Istanbul in 2007, there was no formal diplomatic relations until 2009.³⁰⁰ However, as a result of both Turkey and Armenia's positive actions, the relations moved forward rapidly.³⁰¹ Following the Russian-Georgian war, Armenia's trading route through Georgia to Russia was collapsed. In order to improve the relations, incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan invited Abdullah Gül to a soccer game in Yerevan in 2008. The "soccer diplomacy" led normalization of the relations along with signing of significant bilateral protocols by means of genocide in Zurich in October 2009. Nonetheless, the Protocols left without any results due to Turkish side's former assurance to Baku on the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. In addition, nationalists on the Armenian side condemned the Protocols and stated that any further deal with Turkey which does not include genocide acknowledgment would be a capitulation.³⁰²

In 24 April 2014, a statement by Tayyip Erdoğan at the state level was made declaring the country's grievance and remorse related to the tragedy that Armenians gone through in 1915 and invited Armenian President to the commemoration of the World War I Battle of Gallipoli, *Çanakkale* which is generally conducted on 18th of March to commemorate the end of the Allies' 1915 naval campaign to seize Dardanelles. Notwithstanding, that specific year, the Turkish government pushed the observance forward to April 24-25 which was coinciding with the Armenian Genocide commemorations and the ANZAC arrivals on 25 April 1915. Both of the Presidents Erdoğan and Serzh Sargsyan have circulated invitations for their

³⁰⁰ Engert, "Turkey-Armenia: From Denial to Excuse?"

³⁰¹ Hill & Kirişçi & Moffatt, "Armenia and Turkey: From Normalization to Reconciliation," 129.

³⁰² Hill & Kirişçi & Moffatt, "Armenia and Turkey," 131-132.

particular events, however Erdoğan's letter arrived months later and was condemned as indecent disturbance.³⁰³ In 2018, Armenian side has abolished the Protocols.³⁰⁴

4.3.2.5 Turkey - the EU relations

When the AKP government first came to power, it invested significant amount of recently obtained political capital to fortify Turkey's relations with the West with the aim of EU membership.³⁰⁵ However, its foreign policy changed its axis in time.

4.3.2.5.1 Turkey - Germany relations

Until 2005, Turkish-German relations were at their best. The chancellor Schröder increased its support for Turkey's EU membership through the evolution in the security policies as a result of Kosovo War and September 11. Schröder's "symmetric membership policies" had a good effect on the bilateral relations between Germany and Turkey.³⁰⁶ In 2005, Angela Merkel took office.

Due to the escalating tensions, contentious issues emerged within the EU and the new member nations' economic inadequacy influenced Germany's view of Turkey's EU membership. Furthermore, the EU's unwillingness to expansion due to constitutional and financial crises, the appearance of Islamophobic and right-wing populist groups in Europe along with political facts caused Turkey-Germany

³⁰³ Hill & Kirişçi & Moffatt, "Armenia and," 129.

³⁰⁴ "Ermenistan Türkiye ile ilişkileri normalleştirme anlaşmasını bozdu"

³⁰⁵ Alessandri, "Turkey's New Foreign Policy and the Future of Turkey-EU Relations," 7.

³⁰⁶ Yeneroğlu, "Political Relations between Turkey and Germany," 14.

relations to give attention on Turkey's EU membership. The psychology of being kept out during Merkel's presidency along with the strengthening of the xenophobic political parties over the Europe, demonstrations against Muslims, attacks to mosques made Turkey skeptical towards Europe both in terms of public and political stratum.³⁰⁷

Subsequent regional politics of Germany after the Arab Spring and its view of Turkey within the same frame downgraded the relations between the two countries. The relations got bitter after the 2013 Taksim Gezi Park Protests. At the end of 2012, Turkey asked air defense support from NATO subsequent to death of Turkish citizens because of the missiles thrown from Syria. In addition to the US and Netherlands, Germany sent two patriot missiles and the duty was extended for two years until the end of the war.

Notwithstanding, the duty was terminated. Simultaneously, a German citizen's death was in the news. It was significant because the casualty was Kevin Joachim who was an intelligence staff. While Germany denied that it was training Kurdish troops in Iraq and Syria, two Turkish citizens were arrested due to spy allegations. Before the incident, the tensions between the two countries heightened with the allegations as Germany is listening Turkey since 1976 emerged. Based on the article by Focus magazine (Focus, 2014), German Intelligence Service have started to listen Turkey with the President Schmidt's order in 1976 and it continued with the information of Foreign and Defense Ministries.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Yeneroğlu, "Political Relations between Turkey and Germany," 15.

³⁰⁸ Göksedef, "Merkel döneminde gerilen Türk-Alman ilişkileri"

Germany's blurry stance on PKK was another problem between the two countries. Despite the fact that PKK is forbidden by the law in Germany, it has been *de facto* acknowledged as a legal organization. Close relationship of German Left Party to the PKK deteriorates the trust in bilateral relations.³⁰⁹ The relations became tenser during the failed coup attempt in 15 July 2016 when Turkey could not take the support that it wanted from Germany. In response to asylum given by Germany to certain soldiers, diplomats and judges who supported the failed coup attempt, Turkey inhibited the entrance of German ministers to Incirlik base. Consequently, Germany took its troops back and replaced them with Lebanon. In addition, Germany stated that there were some spies connected to Fettullah Gülen movement and found Turkey responsible. Moreover, Germany reacted harshly to dual citizen Die Welt journalist Deniz Yücel's arrest along with German human rights activist Peter Steudtner. Lastly, some states in Germany inhibited campaign meetings of Turkish ministers before the 16 April 2017 referendum. Turkey harshly reacted and Erdoğan resembled Merkel to Nazis.³¹⁰

4.3.2.5.2 Turkey - France relations

Tensions and threat of sanctions have enameled the bilateral relations for twelve years beginning in 2001 with the France's recognition of Armenian Genocide of 1915.³¹¹ In 2007, Turkey's relationship with France reached to the lowest point of all time both by political and economic means with the power change in France. The

³⁰⁹ Yeneroğlu, "Political Relations between Turkey and Germany," 18.

³¹⁰ BBC, "Türkiye-Almanya ilişkilerini krize sürükleyen 5 konu nedir?"

³¹¹ Perrier, "La relation franco-turque reste tendue"

right wing president Nicolas Sarkozy was severely against Turkey's EU membership and used it as part of his election campaign by asserting Turkey is a part of Asia Minor, not Europe. During Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency, the relationship between the both countries downgraded to minimum in its history due to Sarkozy's strangling five chapters of EU bill for political causes.³¹²

In 2012, tensions between Turkey and France escalated as French Senate passed a bill which acknowledged the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Empire in 1915 along with criminalizing anyone who denies the genocide through putting them into jail or charging €45,000 (\$58,000). In regards, Turkey cancelled the bilateral meeting stating France executed its own genocide amid the war in Algeria, a cruel war fought by Algerian guerrillas against French colonial rule between 1954 and 1962. Furthermore, Erdoğan (as cited in CNN, 2012) stated that,

Algerians were burnt en masse in ovens. They were martyred mercilessly. If French President Mr. (Nicolas) Sarkozy does not know about this genocide, he should ask his father Paul Sarkozy. His father Paul Sarkozy served as a soldier in the French legion in Algeria in 1940s.

Moreover, Turkey suspended the bilateral relations with France and called off the authorization for French military planes to land and warships to dock in Turkey along with declaring all joint military practices invalid, stating he would choose case by case whether to give permission for the French military utilization of Turkish airspace in phone with the Turkish ambassador to France.³¹³

³¹² Paul, "Turkey-EU Relations: Forever Engaged, Never to be Married?"

³¹³ Chrisafis and Hopkins, "Turkey freezes all political relations with France over genocide row"

In 2014, through the election of Francois Hollande, chapter 22 was unblocked to date solely 14 out of 35 negotiating chapters opened except research and development remained closed. In addition, he visited Turkey to correct the bilateral relations.³¹⁴ Notwithstanding, consecutive President Emmanuel Macron inaugurated in 2018, criticized Erdoğan's governance by stating he is remorseful and does not approve Turkey's new path along with declaring that it is time to end the hypocrisy and acting as if Turkey has any prospect to enter EU³¹⁵ which might be a preview of the future bilateral relations.

4.3.2.5.3 Turkey - Greece relations

There have been sustaining problems with Greece such as island dispute in the Aegean Sea, Cyprus and minority issues. Since 2002, two parties came together for sixty times with "exploratory" purposes. Notwithstanding, a decision has not been made yet.³¹⁶ Bilateral relations have increased through economic relations, trade deals, along with increased tourism revenues and the relations moved out from its state-centric sense and diffused into larger crowds.³¹⁷

From 2004, Greece began to settle down in the 18 islands along with arming them.³¹⁸ Regarding the takeover, former general secretary of the Ministry of Defense Ümit Yalım (as cited in Bechev, 2017) stated that the AKP government gave the 18 islands in order to take a negotiation date from the EU. Another issue which

³¹⁴ "Hollande tries to calm France's complicated relationship with Turkey"

³¹⁵ "Macron tells Erdogan: No chance of Turkey joining EU"

³¹⁶ Yılmaz, "Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının Neresindeyiz?"

³¹⁷ İnci, "Türk-Yunan Siyasi İlişkilerinde Azınlıkların Dini Kurumları Meselesi," 66.

³¹⁸ Yılmaz, "Türk-Yunan Sorunlarının Neresindeyiz?"

caused tensions between Greece and Turkey was the Greece's denial to return eight military officers who fled from Turkey following the failed coup in July 2016.

4.3.2.5.4 Turkey's image in the EU

EU citizens' opposition to the Turkish EU membership has surpassed 50 percent since 2005 as shown in Figure 13. When European citizens were asked that are they for or against to Turkish accession between 1992 and 2005, the opposition line has been steadily increased over the years. ³¹⁹




Figure 13. EU citizens' opinion of Turkey's EU membership 1992-2005

Source: Centre for European Reform

³¹⁹ Barysch, "What Europeans Think About Turkey and Why?," 1-2.

Figure 14 indicates that three quarters or more of the population in Germany, France and Austria are stated that they are against Turkey’s becoming a part to EU. In a similar vein, based on the FT/Harris poll results (as cited in Barysch, 2007), 84 percent of French citizens were opposed to Turkish accession to EU, while the percentage in Germany was 79 percent.³²⁰




Figure 14. Opposition to Turkish accession by country 2007

Source: Centre for European Reform

4.3.3 Domestic politics and values in the Justice and Development Party era

The AKP government introduced “conservative democracy” terminology to its voters.³²¹ The AKP government openly declared its political attitude during the election campaigns and governmental events which deeply have affected economic,

³²⁰ Barysch, “What Europeans Think About Turkey and Why?,” 2.

³²¹ Doğanay, “AKP’nin Demokrasi Söylemi ve Muhafazakarlık: Muhafazakar Demokrasiye Eleştirel Bir Bakış,” 65.

social and cultural structure of Turkey. In addition, it applied its perspective into constitutional changes including fundamental laws such as trade and criminal law along with European Union Accession reforms.³²²

During Presidential election in 2007, the incumbent Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's replacement of the old President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer caused a crisis and met by objections from military bureaucracy, representatives of jurisdiction, media and the main opposition party Republican People's Party (CHP).³²³ Abdullah Gül earned 357 from the Parliament, which was not sufficient for his presidency. In response, CHP applied to the Constitutional Court with the fact that 367 votes are not only enough for decision but at the same time it is the necessary number for the meeting.³²⁴ Regardless to the objections, AKP started the voting process in the parliament and shook the political agenda with an explanation posted on the website of Turkish Armed Forces General Staff that passed into history as "e-memorandum". As a reaction, the Constitutional Court accepted the rule which obliges 367 ministers to attend the session. Notwithstanding, AKP put forward the date of the elections. Consequently, the party won the elections with 47 percent.³²⁵ In the new Presidential voting, Abdullah Gül was selected as the 11th President of the Republic with 339 votes.³²⁶ After the elections, referendum was conducted on the election of the President of the Turkish Republic by public and the result was "yes" with 70 percent of votes on 21 October 2007.³²⁷

³²² Koç, "12 Eylül'den 12 Haziran'a Siyasi Partiler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi," 7.

³²³ Koç, "12 Eylül'den 12 Haziran'a Siyasi Partiler," 8.

³²⁴ Hamsici, "2010 referandumunu: 'Evet', 'Hayır' ve 'Boykot' Cepheleri Ne Demişti?"

³²⁵ Koç, "12 Eylül'den 12 Haziran'a Siyasi Partiler," 8.

³²⁶ Hamsici, "2010 referandumunu: 'Evet', 'Hayır' ve 'Boykot' Cepheleri Ne Demişti?"

³²⁷ Koç, "12 Eylül'den 12 Haziran'a Siyasi Partiler," 8.

AKP's steps for the elimination of headscarf ban caused new controversies. With the support of Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), constitutional change was actualized. However, the change which was supported by the eight out of eleven ministers in the parliament with an exception of CHP which only had 20 percent support was cancelled by the Constitutional Court. In March 2008, a closure lawsuit was filed for the AKP. The Constitutional Court gave a warning to AKP instead of closing it. Right after the lawsuit, Ergenekon investigation came into the agenda.³²⁸

The Ergenekon trial began with a trite counterterrorism operation in Umraniye, Istanbul, on 21 January 2008 that asserted the existence of a clandestine organization named Ergenekon which AKP claimed that it aimed overthrowing the government. Consequently, several waves of remarkable arrests occurred such as well-known figures, academics, journalists, politicians, retired senior military, representatives and leaders of NGOs. Members of the network was blamed of having established and directed a terrorist organization, of being members and supporters of this organization, of aiming to overthrow the government of the Turkish Republic and to motivate the people to revolt against the government. Thus according to accusations, their main target is to weaken the political power along with organizing a military coup and this Ergenekon organization would be in charge of preparing the ground to legitimize an intervention of the army, maintaining political instability, anarchy, terror and chaos. The opposition party CHP, called the operation a scenario by defending that the scenario designed by the government as part of a strategy of intimidation of the opposition and defenders of secularism.³²⁹

³²⁸ Koç, "12 Eylül'den 12 Haziran'a Siyasi Partiler," 8-9.

³²⁹ Bolat, "L'affaire Ergenekon: Quels Enjeux pour la Démocratie Turque?," 42.

In this tense atmosphere, a referendum for the Constitutional amendment was conducted on 12 September 2010. The suggested constitutional reform package covered paramount amendments in the Constitutional Court and the judging process of the military officials who took part in the foregoing coups.³³⁰ When AKP could not find the majority in the parliament, the party made the referendum package pass through a referendum and earned 57,88 percent of the votes. Still today, it is a major controversy as many see the package as the getaway for AKP for the ultimate control in governmental bureaucracy including judiciary and beginning of a Turkish kind of Presidential rule.³³¹

The tense atmosphere and polarization of society in Turkey escalated over the years and attained its climax in 2013. *Gezi* Protests, started in the center of Istanbul along with the severe suppression of the police damaged AKP's prestige as the advocator of pluralism, transparent and trustworthy government.³³² The protests began with the destruction attempt of the *Gezi Parkı* regardless of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Board's negative decision on construction of artillery barracks which would be utilized as a shopping mall, proposal of the government instead of *Gezi Park*.³³³ Protests soon after evolved into a nationwide series of anti-government protests which was projected to authoritarianism of AKP due to the severe police response entering to Taksim Square with water cannon vehicles, shooting civilians with pressurized water and tear gas in May 30, 2013. People, who felt that their lifestyles have been attacked by the government such as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and

³³⁰ Hakyemez, "2010 Anayasa Değişiklikleri ve Demokratik Hukuk Devleti," 1.

³³¹ Hamsici, "2010 referandumu: 'Evet', 'Hayır' ve 'Boykot' cepheleri ne demişti?"

³³² Bechev, "The Travails of Democracy in Turkey," 8.

³³³ İnce, "Kışlaya onay yok!"

Trans (LGBT) and feminist activists participated to the *Gezi* Protests. During protests, 11 people were killed including children and 8000 people were injured.³³⁴

On the events, the incumbent President Erdoğan (as cited in DW, 2017) used a language which would divide the society even more and said,

Gezi provocateurs vandalized the streets. They pretended that terror reigned everywhere in Turkey. The opposition poured gasoline onto the fire. Ops took on an active role and distributed provisions and money. They insulted the police. Partisan media wrote lies to push people to protest. Employers, employers' organizations and unions made irresponsible declarations. For what? For 12 trees!

One of the most significant outcomes of *Gezi* protests was the abuse of government's privilege to use force and made it unattainable to conduct demonstrations against the government on the streets.³³⁵

The *Gezi* crisis was followed by the corruption scandal namely the "December 17, Corruption and Bribery Operation" which revealed numerous top governmental figures and children of cabinet ministers and caused resignation of four ministers. In 25 December 2013, another interrogation was conducted by prosecutor Muammer Akkaş including incumbent President Tayyip Erdoğan and his son Bilal Erdoğan.³³⁶ Subsequently, phone records between Tayyip Erdoğan and Bilal Erdoğan while Tayyip Erdoğan is commanding to get rid of the high amount of money to his son leaked to the internet.³³⁷ In response, the incumbent Prime Minister back then Tayyip Erdoğan blamed foreign powers for plotting a 'parallel structure' to parish the state pointing Fethullah Gülen, originally a part of the AKP constituency, a

³³⁴ Dw, "What's left of Turkey's *Gezi* protest movement?"

³³⁵ Dw, "What's left of Turkey's *Gezi* protest movement?"

³³⁶ Sözcü, "17 Aralık Büyük Yolsuzluk ve Rüşvet Operasyonu"

³³⁷ BBC, "4 soruda: Başbakan Erdoğan ve ses kayıtları"

persuasive cleric settled in the US which caused cleanse of alleged followers of the cult from the prosecution service and law enforcement.³³⁸ The December 17 had significant impact on Turkish democracy. Recordings that proved alleged corruptions, domination of the media, contentious government control over the police and the judiciary, suspension of the social media as twitter and YouTube, the restriction of the internet with new legislation, the new regulation for High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), all had adverse effects on Turkey's and the AKP government's democratic position both in the country and abroad.³³⁹ AKP won the local elections by 45 percent of the votes in the shadow of government-cult fight in 2014. In addition, incumbent general secretary of AKP Tayyip Erdoğan has become the first President of the Republic who is chosen by the public with 51.8 percent votes in August 2014.³⁴⁰

On 15 July 2016, a failed coup *d'état* attempt took place which dragged the country into a further chaos initiated by a number of eminent officers within the Turkish Armed Forces, who were believed to connected to the Islamist Fethullah Gülen cult. While F-16s and helicopters were flying across the Istanbul and Ankara, the so-called "Peace in the Country Council" declared that it has seized the power through the national television channel TRT, citing "an erosion of secularism, the elimination of democratic rule, a disregard for human rights, and Turkey's loss of credibility in the international arena." (Shaheen, 2016).³⁴¹ Found in a hotel room in Marmaris, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan conducted a FaceTime call with a CNN

³³⁸ Bechev, "The Travails of Democracy in Turkey," 8.

³³⁹ Toruk and Güran, "The 2014 Turkish Municipal Elections Under the Impact of the December 17 Process," 289.

³⁴⁰ "Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi"

³⁴¹ Shaheen, "After the failed coup in Turkey"

Türk correspondent and mobilized citizens to go out on the streets to prevent the coup.³⁴² Consequently, over 300 casualties along with over 2,100 wounded were recorded which was followed by a state of emergency declaration and massive wave of arrests are being conducted since then. Almost 7,400 police, soldiers, civil servants and academics have been discharged along with 150,000 public sector workers and 50,000 people from the military, police, judiciary, education and press are being kept in prison due to their alleged ties with terrorist *Gülenist* cult.³⁴³

In December 2016, AKP proposed constitutional amendment in order to fundamentally change the parliamentary system of Turkey with a presidential system which would make Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the only authority in the nation. Some of the articles in the proposed constitutional amendments were; the submitted proposal which caused controversies in the parliament, eliminates the office of the prime minister. Thus, there would no longer be a cabinet responsible to parliament and the president could employ and dismiss ministers. The president will be at the top of the executive branch and will be entitled with issuing orders. The parliament will lose its right to veto. The president will have the criminal responsibility. The president will have the control over the high council of judges and prosecutors. According to critics and opposition party CHP, suggested amendments would definitely weaken the democracy by generating a political system without ‘checks’ and ‘balances’ that drag Turkey under a one-man rule.³⁴⁴

³⁴² Gürçan and Gisclon, “From Autonomy to Full-Fledged Civilian Control,” 1.

³⁴³ Dearden, “Turkey dismisses 7400 more police, soldiers and public sector workers a year after failed coup”

³⁴⁴ Bora, “Turkey’s constitutional reform: All you need to know”

In the constitutional referendum which was held in 16 April 2016, public supported the proposed constitutional amendments and thus, approved the presidential system by 51.4 percent of the votes.³⁴⁵ The amendments will come into force first with election which will be held on 24 June 2018.

According to United Nation's Human Development Data (UNDP, 2016) Turkey's Gender Inequality Index (GII) has been steadily declining from 1995 until today. As reported by the Freedom House Freedom in the World report (Aghekyan et al., 2016), Turkey has been the country in which freedom is most depressed and became a "Partly Free" country due to the resumed violence between the government and Kurdish militants, terrorist attacks by the Islamic State group, the severe harassment of the opposition parties and media by the government in 2016. In 2018 Freedom in the World report (FH, 2018), the country's status has become "Not Free." According to the report of Committee to Protect Journalist (CPJ) (as cited in Al Jazeera, 2016), Turkey has become the worst country among the countries that arrest journalists in 2012.

Furthermore, in the World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index (WJP) (as cited in TM, 2018) which ranks countries' performances based on constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice; Turkey rated among worst and has downgraded to 101st place out of 113 countries.

³⁴⁵ Fox and McLaughlin, "Turkey referendum: Erdogan declares victory"

4.3.4 Soft power ranking of Turkey

Based on the Institute for Government's soft power ranking (IfG, 2010), Turkey ranked 25th in 2010 and 23rd in 2011 (IfG, 2011). According to Monocle's Soft Power Survey (Monocle 2012), Turkey was in 20th place in 2012. In Monocle's 2014 ranking (Monocle, 2014), Turkey downgraded to 26th place. In 2015/16 survey of Monocle (Monocle, 2015), Turkey ranked 25th. According to Soft Power 30 ranking (McClory, 2015), Turkey was ranked 28th in 2015. In the 2016 ranking of Soft Power 30 (McClory, 2016), Turkey did not ranked within the 30 countries. In the 2017 measurement of the Soft Power 30 (Portland, 2017), Turkey ranked 30th.

The measurements prove that Turkey's soft power is in a severe decay although it shows a slight increase in 2017. The tourists number have declined by 16.5 percent in the first quarter of 2016 due to the volatility and bloodshed in the country bringing a hard hit to economy along with Turkish Airline's declaration of its worst losses since 1999 and decrease in exports.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁶ Kirişçi, "Can Turkey salvage its soft power image ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit?"

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

It is apparent that Turkey has not gained a fully-fledged soft power in the world, particularly in the Middle East. In addition, its existing soft power has been declining due to its decisions in foreign policy and domestic politics. First of all, the country's popularity had increased in the Middle East when it harshly criticized Israel due to the Gaza War and had been a role model for the region in terms of its secular governance system. Yet, it could not benefit from the Arab Spring to transform its reputation into a solid diplomatic influence along with consolidating its stance and establishing the regional order in the Middle East. The 19 percent drop of in the Turkey's favorable view in 2013 is a proof of the decline of Turkey's soft power in the region. In a similar vein, downing the Russian plane had negative effect on Turkey's positive opinion and stopped tourist flow to Turkey from Russia. 56 percent of the Russian respondents thought Tayyip Erdoğan was the main responsible person from the unfortunate event.

Secondly, Turkey's domestic politics have a negative impact on Turkey's soft power. Recent issues in freedom of expression and human rights violation which are ironic to the country's peacekeeping operations abroad, influences global perspective on Turkey. Repression of the public by the police forces through shooting civilians with pressurized water and tear gas during Gezi Protests which resulted with 11 casualties and 8000 wounded people along with incumbent President Tayyip Erdoğan's trite speech, calling demonstrators to provocateurs, which polarized the

society even more and apparent abuse of power to oppress people had major adverse impact on Turkey's image. Furthermore, following arrests of 150,000 people from public sector, academy, judiciary and press after the failed coup in 2016 with an excuse of their alleged ties with *Gülenist* cult contributed to this unfavorable image. Turkey's exclusion from the ranking in the Soft Power 30 index proves the decline of the country's soft power. Ironically, once the creator of Turkey's soft power by opening schools in Africa and Central Asia continents, conducting Turkish Speaking Olympics, *Gülenist* cult has attempted coup in the country.

As told, Turkey's Gender Inequality Index (GII) has been steadily declining from 1995 until today based on United Nation's Human Development Data. According to the Freedom House report (Aghekyan et al., 2016), Turkey has been the country where freedom is most repressed and became "Partly Free" due to the continued violence between the government and Kurdish militants, terrorist attacks by the Islamic State group, and acute abuse of the opposition parties and media by the government. Consequently, in 2018 Freedom in the world report (FH, 2018), the country's status has become "Not Free". Moreover, based on the report of CPJ (as cited in Al Jazeera, 2016) Turkey has become the worst country among the countries that arrest journalists. In addition, according to Rule of Law Index (as cited in TM, 2018), which ranks countries performances based on constraints on government powers, absence of corruption, open government, fundamental rights, order and security, regulatory enforcement, civil justice and criminal justice; Turkey rated one of the worst countries and has been downgraded to 101st place out of 113 countries. All these measures are another proof of Turkey's soft power decline. Therefore, one

could conclude that Turkey's soft power is contingent on its legitimate decisions in foreign and domestic politics as well as its governmental investment to the cultural diplomacy. Nevertheless, Turkey has a comparative discrepancy in its political domain of soft power. It has a divided political image in some parts of the world, where the country's image has been applauded in some geographical areas and disfavored in others.

Korea's success in creating a global cultural industry was due to several factors. First of all, the government investments and the collaboration with *chaebol* along with the investments of venture capitalists generated a local cultural industry. Through the tax incentives given to the *chaebol*, equipped employees came into the cultural industry and along with the technology development, the quality of products have improved. Eventually, the quality of the cultural products has increased. Secondly, the increase of Korea's soft power is closely related to the Korean democratization and globalization. Through the Democratization of Korea, censorship on the cultural products has decreased and thus, quality content has been created. In a similar vein, through the globalization, Korean culture has expanded and its soft power increased. Nonetheless, during the Park Geun Hye government censorship and blacklisting of producers who criticized Park was increased. Nevertheless, Korea has taken strategic steps and created its cultural industry as if it was equal to the car or ship industry. The collaboration of the Cultural Ministry and the *chaebol* led the generation of Hallyu which has millions of fans all over the world and contributed to South Korea's soft power. Its soft power is not as high as

Japan's but it has been steadily moving forwards to improve her image and consolidate her place in the international arena.

Unlike the South Korean governments, the Turkish governments did not have a major role and investment in the development of Turkish cultural industries. Instead, the AKP government has faced itself to the Islamic world and the Middle East and invested into Islam oriented culture in the Ottoman geography. It was successful in reviving the Ottoman spirit and presenting the country as the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. However, the government did not have a role in the improvement of Turkish dramas and other cultural sectors. Tayyip Erdoğan even condemned the portrayal of Sultan Süleyman in the “Magnificent Century” drama along with its directors, broadcasters as Süleyman spends plenty of his time in harem, he drinks occasionally.³⁴⁷ As a matter of fact, the Turkish cultural industry's advancement has happened due to the Turkish media sector along with Turkish individual's energy that emerged through globalization. There are unnamed group of producers who were not unionized and have international networks doing their best. It has still a long way to catch South Korea which managed to create a multi-billion dollar industry with vast government investments.

At the same time, we see that AKP have been aiming to become the free rider in terms of expansion of Turkish culture internationally and it has been sending certain artists and producers to the global fairs. Yet, we cannot absolutely accept the idea that the government investments are an indicator of soft power. If the cultural contents were purely produced by the government, people might not want to watch

³⁴⁷ Batuman, “Ottomania: A hit TV show reimagines Turkey's imperial past”

them as they were a tool of government propaganda. Therefore, without directly involving, any government should be able to provide tax incentives and ambassadorial aid in order to diffuse its own culture abroad at the same time being more tolerant on dramas which carry different views than their own perspective.

In a similar vein to Turkey, Korea's soft power has been affected by the developments in its foreign relations. When Korea decided to employ THAAD, 55 discount stores that belong to Lotte Group was temporarily closed by China along with Chinese consumers were emboldened by Chinese state media to stop buying Korean products and tourism officials stated that they would stop trips to South Korea from China. Similarly, due to the comfort women issue, bad impressions between Japan and Korea do not fade away. When Japanese respondents were asked about their impressions of Korea, 48.6 percent Japanese respondents stated that they have bad impressions about Korea in 2017 which was 4 percent higher than 2016 results.³⁴⁸

Furthermore, Korean domestic policies had significant impact on the country's soft power during Park Geun Hye era. Issues as freedom of expression and human rights violations were problems for the country as well as Turkey, although not severe as in Turkey. Freedom House downgraded South Korea's "political rights" ranking from one to two on a scale of one to seven because of the high-profile scandals along with the National Intelligence Service (NIS)'s corruption of power regarding social media in 2013. Furthermore, they indicated intimidation of political opponents have increased since Park Geun Hye took office in 2013. In freedom of

³⁴⁸ The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, "The 5th Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll," 3.

expression and belief measure of the same organization which is created to measure the freedom, autonomy of the media, and cultural utterance, religious freedom, academic freedom, and freedom of open and private debate, the country positioned behind 69 other democratic country equal to one-third of all countries with a score 14 out of 16. Furthermore, the impeachment of Park Geun Hye regarding the Choi scandal has adversely affected the country's image.³⁴⁹

In addition, as the OHCHR stated in its report (as cited in Haggard and Jong, 2015) that “the increasing use of criminal defamation laws to prosecute persons who criticize government action and obstruct business interests, and of the harsh sentences, including lengthy prison sentences, attached to such legal provisions.” Similar to the United Nations, in World Press Freedom Index ranking (as cited in Cho, 2016), South Korea fell ten spots to 70th ranking out of 180 countries in 2016, which is the lowest point in its history. The country's ranking was 50th in 2013, ((as cited in Cho, 2016) and downgraded to 57th in 2014 (as cited in Cho, 2016), and 60th in 2015 (as cited in Cho, 2016). These measurements indicate the country's struggle in taking legitimate decisions in its domestic policies.

The statistics show that both Turkey's and Korea's soft powers are affected from their hard power decisions. The worldwide success of Korean Wave is a proof that the Korean government investments are very satisfactory in terms of the creation a global cultural industry from scratch. In light of the evidence, more scrupulous resolutions in issues related to the country's domestic politics such as freedom of speech records, legitimate domestic policies and administration will increase the

³⁴⁹ Haggard and Jong, “Freedom of Expression in South Korea,” 168.

country's soft power ranking. In a similar vein, a more independent and active foreign policy along with balance herself in the China-US-Japan triangle will improve the soft power stance of the country. It will be interesting to observe the successive President Moon Jae In's decisions who are a former human rights lawyer. He has been already endeavoring to repair the country's negative image along with balancing himself in the US-China-Japan triangle in order to solve the nuclear crisis of North Korea in the region.

Whereas, it seems to be Turkey has a very long way to fix its image in the world and salvage its declining soft power. From examining the findings, legitimate decisions both in its domestic and foreign policies might aid the AKP government to improve the country's image. Some scholars argue that contradicting with his dream of Ottoman Empire's revival and becoming a superpower, Tayyip Erdoğan's imperious decisions in its domestic policies and hard power diminishes Turkey's favorable perception in the world arena. The statistics show that repression of freedom of speech and recent human rights violations have a major negative impact on the country's soft power stance.

One of the biggest reasons of Turkey's soft power ranking being lower than Korea is also the fact of geography. The borders are more steady in the Asia-Pacific than in the Middle East along with the matter that there is a relative stability unlike in the Middle East where, the slightest event in the land causes radical shifts in the region dynamics. It could be argued that gaining leverage and soft power in the international arena will be through meticulous decisions in the both governments' improved foreign affairs and universal domestic values.

APPENDIX A

THE SOFT POWER 30: A GLOBAL RANKING OF SOFT POWER 2017³⁵⁰

Methodology of the index

Those countries most adept in using soft power to facilitate positive collaboration will be better placed to weather the current uncertainty and geopolitical instability, and ultimately shape global events. This leads to the question: how can soft power be deployed effectively? As we have referenced in our previous reports, Joseph Nye's own model for the conversion of soft power into a desired outcome comprises five steps. As shown in Figure A1, the first step in the process of converting soft power into a successful outcome is identifying the resources that will affect the target(s) in question.



Figure A1. Soft power conversion process

Source: Nye, "The Future of Power"

As illustrated by Nye's model for converting soft power, the process must start with a clear account of available resources and an understanding of where they will be effective. It is at this first hurdle-measurement-that most governments

³⁵⁰ The appendix A is the methodology of the Soft Power measurement from the Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2017, written by Jonathan McClory, Portland Communications. The pages are taken from the same study.

stumble. This, however, is understandable as the difficulty of measuring soft power is well documented.

Nye has previously pointed to three primary sources of soft power: culture, political values, and foreign policy. Based on a comprehensive review of academic literature on the subject. The Soft Power 30 framework builds on Nye's three pillars, capturing a broad range of factors that contribute to a nation's soft power. The Soft Power 30 index assesses the soft power resources of countries by combining both objective and subjective data. A more detailed discussion of the methodology used to build and calculate The Soft Power 30 rankings can be found in Appendix A.

Objective data

The objective data is drawn from a range of different sources and structured into six categories, with each category functioning as a sub-index with an individual score. The six sub-indices are: Government, Culture, Global Engagement, Education, Digital and Enterprise. The framework of categories was built on a survey of existing academic literature on soft power. Figure A2 below illustrates the six sub-indices that constitute The Soft Power 30 index.




Figure A2. The sub-indices

Source: McClory, "The Soft Power 30: 2017"

The government sub-index is designed to assess a state's political values, public institutions, and major public policy outcomes. By including measures like individual freedom, human development, violence in society, and government effectiveness, the Government sub-index gauges the extent to which a country has an attractive model of governance and whether it can deliver broadly positive outcomes

for its citizens. Potential partners for international collaboration are more likely to be drawn to states with well-functioning systems of government. When a country's culture promotes universal values that other nations can readily identify with, it makes them naturally attractive to others. The rich and volume of cultural output is important in building soft power, but mass production does not necessarily lead to mass influence. As a result, our index includes measures of culture that serve to capture both the quality and the international penetration of a country's cultural production. The Culture sub-index includes measures like the annual number of visiting international tourists, the global success of a country's music industry, and even a nation's international sport prowess.

The Global Engagement sub-index aims to measure a country's diplomatic resources, global footprint, and contribution to the international community. Essentially it captures the ability of states to engage with international audiences, drive collaboration, and ultimately shape global outcomes. The Global Engagement sub-index includes metrics such as the number of embassies/high commissions a country has abroad, membership in multilateral organizations, and overseas development aid.

The ability of a country to attract foreign students, or facilitate exchanges, is a powerful tool of public diplomacy, even between countries with a history of animosity. Prior research on educational exchanges gives empirical evidence for the reputational gains that accrue to a host country when foreign students return home. Foreign student exchanges have also been shown to have positive indirect 'ripple effects' when returning students advocate on behalf of their host country of study. The Education sub-index aims to capture this phenomenon as well as the contribution countries make to global scholarship and pedagogical excellence. Metrics in this sub-index include the number of international students in a country, the relative quality of its universities, and the academic output of higher education institutions.

Though elements relating to the economy may seem more of a hard than soft power concern, the Enterprise sub-index is not a measure of economic power or output. Rather, this sub-index aims to capture the relative attractiveness of a country's economic model in terms of its competitiveness, capacity for innovation, and ability to foster enterprise and commerce. Economic might is more associated with hard power, but economic factors can contribute to soft power as well.

The Digital sub-index brings an important new component to the measure of soft power. The ways that technology has transformed everyday life over the last two decades are hard to over-exaggerate. Media, commerce, government, and our daily social interaction have all changed with technology. The same can be said of foreign policy, the practice of public diplomacy, and soft power.

The inclusion of a Digital sub-index aims to capture the extent to which countries have embraced technology, how well they are connected to the digital world, and their use of digital diplomacy through social media platforms.

Subjective data

One of the biggest challenges to measuring soft power accurately is its inherently subjective nature. Rather than attempt to design against subjectivity, The Soft Power 30 index embraces it. The inaugural Soft Power 30 index published in 2015 was the first to measure soft power by combining objective data and international polling. As in 2016, Portland Communications followed the same framework this year, using specially commissioned polling across 25 countries as the subjective data for the index.

Based on an overview of existing academic literature on soft power, we developed a series of short questions. The polling provides data on international perceptions based on the most common ‘touch points’ through which people interface with foreign countries. Figure A3 on the following page gives a summary overview of the subject of the polling questions asked and shows what they were designed to measure.

International polling for the index ran across a range of the world’s major regions. In 2016 we expanded our polling to 25 countries, up from 20, and taking our sample size from 7,200 to 10,500. This year, we ran polling of the general public in the same 25 countries. However, the sample size was increased to 11,000. Countries polled for this year’s study are given in the table below.

Country	Region	Sample
Argentina	Latin America	500
Australia	Australasia	250
Brazil	Latin America	500
China	East Asia	500
Egypt	Middle East & North Africa	250
France	Europe	500
Germany	Europe	500
Greece	Europe	250
India	South Asia	500
Indonesia	Southeast Asia	500
Italy	Europe	500
Japan	East Asia	500
Malaysia	Southeast Asia	500
Mexico	Latin America	500
Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	250
Poland	Europe	500
Russia	Europe/Asia	500
South Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	500
South Korea	East Asia	500
Sweden	Europe	250
Turkey	Middle East & North Africa	500
UAE	Middle East & North Africa	250
UK	Europe	500
USA	North America	500
Vietnam	Southeast Asia	250
Total Sample:		11,000

Figure A3. International polling sample size

Note: Samples are people

Source: McClory, *The Soft Power 30*: 2017

The samples within each country were representative by age, gender, and region. The full sample was designed for broad coverage of a diverse range of cultures, rather than to be precisely representative of global opinion.

The survey consisted of a series of questions translated into the main language(s) of each country by native speakers, using an 11-point numeric answering scale (0 to 10) to avoid the risks associated with translating verbal answering scales. Different cultures have been found to have different approaches to answering numeric scales (e.g. tending towards central or extreme scores), but the normalization of the data mitigates against this.

The following factors were covered in the polling (each rated on a 0-10 scale, where 0 represented a very negative opinion, and 10 represented a very positive opinion):

- Favorability towards foreign countries;
- Perceptions of cuisine of foreign countries;
- Perceptions of how welcoming foreign countries are to tourists;
- Perceptions of technology products of foreign countries;
- Perceptions of luxury goods produced by foreign countries;
- Trust in foreign countries' approach to global affairs;
- Desire to visit foreign countries to live, work, or study;
- Perceptions of foreign countries' contributions to global culture.

These eight metrics were used to develop a regression model, where "favorability towards foreign countries" was the dependent variable, and the remaining questions were independent variables. This measured the extent to which the remaining perceptions predict favorability towards a country in the dataset.

The regression model allowed each metric to be appropriately weighted, to minimize the impact of any bias in the choice of questions.

Changes, limitations, and shortcomings

This third iteration of The Soft Power 30 was an opportunity to improve upon the 2016 study. While we broadly followed the same methodology and framework, we have made a few small improvements to the index in the hopes of providing a more accurate benchmark for global soft power. The first change was simply to update all of our data with the most recently available sources. The second change was the edition of a few new metrics. Starting with the objective data, the Engagement sub-index had one change to the metrics.

To assess global leadership on environmental issues, we dropped the metric on environmental treaties in force and replaced it with a more holistic measure of environmental policy performance: The Environmental Performance Index. The EPI was developed jointly between the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy and the Columbia University Earth Science Information Network, in collaboration with the World Economic Forum.

The Culture sub-index saw one new addition and one substitution. The addition is designed to give an objective metric for cuisine, which has only been previously captured in the subjective data. That metric is the number of Michelin-starred restaurants by country. The substitution was an updated version of a metric we had used in the two previous studies on the power and reach of language. We have replaced the previous metric derived from a language study in the late 1990s, with the Power Language Index study, produced in 2016.

The final two changes we made to the objective data represent technical improvements to the methodology. First, we tightened up the data normalization process, to mitigate distortions from a small number of metrics with extremely large variances in value. Second, as we have developed a system for weighting the subjective data using regression analysis based on the overall favorability question, we decided to run the same exercise on the objective data and developed a weighting for each sub-index of the objective. It is important to note, we did not weight individual metrics, but simply the total score of each sub-index. The variance in the weighting of the objective sub-indices is much smaller than that of the subjective polling categories. The top-weighted objective sub-index is Government at 14.6 percent, while the lowest is Culture at 9 percent. If the objective sub-indices were given equal weighting, they would be weighted at 11.7 percent of the total overall weighting. The remaining 30 percent is made up by the subjective polling data. The full weights for the objective sub-indices are given below:




Figure A4. Weighting of the objective sub-indices

Source: McClory, *The Soft Power 30: 2017*

Turning to the subjective data, only one small change has been made, and that is an increase in the sample size of polling for Australia and Indonesia. As with every composite index, ours is not without its limitations and shortcomings. The subjective nature of soft power makes comparison across all countries difficult. Moreover, the total complexity of the dynamics of inter-state relations – where soft power is brought to bear – cannot be fully rendered by a comparative global index.

However, the index marks a continuation of the mission we set out to achieve in 2015: to develop a better and more accurate measure of soft power resources. Likewise, it reflects the ever-growing role that digital plays in the generation and exercise of soft power. It is both our plan and our hope that future versions of this index will continue to improve incrementally in providing an accurate assessment of global soft power. Building a larger data set, establishing a stronger case for the weighting of indicators, and increasing the reach and scope of the international polling will all be priorities for future iterations. The growing importance of the digital components of soft power is something we also intend to address going forward. We recognise that reaching the ultimate goal of a definitive measure of soft power will be a long and iterative process. The work for this third iteration of The Soft Power 30 index was undertaken in the hopes of moving closer towards that goal.

Results

Changes to methodology

As mentioned in the methodology section, we have once again made a few small improvements to the index methodology. Two new metrics have been added and we have increased the polling sample size to 11,000. As noted last year, these changes mean that from a methodological purist's perspective, we cannot claim that the 2015, 2016, and 2017 indices are exactly the same, as each iteration has evolved with incremental improvements. However, these minor changes do not prevent us from making substantive comparisons and drawing out interesting trends and lessons across three years of results.




Figure A5. Year on year comparison

Source: McClory, The Soft Power 30, 2017

APPENDIX B

THE SOFT POWER 30: A GLOBAL RANKING OF SOFT POWER 2015³⁵¹

Methodology of the Ranking

The index compares the relative strength of countries' soft power resources; assessing the quality of a country's political institutions, the extent of their cultural appeal, the strength of their diplomatic network, the global reputation of their higher education system, the attractiveness of their economic model, and a country's digital engagement with the world. Only where absolutely necessary metrics are controlled for population or GDP. But this is not done often as there is ultimately no such thing as 'soft power per capita'.

For some composite indices, whether the measure is government effectiveness, quality of life, economic competitiveness or prosperity, there is usually a single, objective outcome measure, against which an index can be structured. This is usually done by using multiple regression to test the relative contribution of metrics towards the single outcome measure. Unfortunately, there is no single objective outcome measure for the successful leveraging of soft power. Without an objective outcome measure, using a regression analysis for variable selection is impossible for our index. As a result, the indicators across all the objective data had to be selected based on an analysis of existing literature on soft power.

In calculating the index, all data was normalized in order to ensure that each variable was on a single scale. This allows for the comparison of data across a diverse set of metrics that would otherwise be incomparable. Normalization was calculated according to the min-max method, which converts raw data to a figure between the ranges of 0 to 1. The formula for normalizing data according to this method is given in an OECD publication on constructing composite indicators and is as follows:

$$I_{qc}^t = (x_{qc}^t - \min_c(x_q^{t0})) / (\max_c(x_q^{t0}) - (\min_c(x_q^{t0})))$$

However, some variables we also binned into quartiles or deciles where the range of the scale was too large to warrant a standard approach to normalizing the data. When a variable was deciled, countries in the bottom 10 percent were given a score of 10 percent and countries in the top 10 percent were given a score of 100

³⁵¹ The appendix is the methodology from the Soft Power 30: A Global Ranking of Soft Power 2015, written by Jonathan McClory, Portland Communications. The pages are taken from the same study.

percent. There were only a few cases where a given metric was so skewed by outliers that a decile or quartile approach to normalization was deemed appropriate. Within each sub-index, metrics were given equal weighting in the calculation of the sub-index score. This was done as no justification could be found in the literature for weighting some variables more than others. The calculated score for each sub-index was then combined with the normalized scores of the seven polling categories to form a final score for each country. In calculating the final score, the objective sub indices were weighted 70 percent of the final score and the average polling scores 30 percent. The 70-to-30 objective-to-subjective weighting was done because the index prioritizes the soft power resources that exist in reality. Opinion is important, but The Soft Power 30 aims to measure objective, tangible assets that contribute to a country's soft power.

For the subjective data, ComRes designed and ran new international polling to give an accurate assessment of favorability towards specific aspects of countries that international audiences would find attractive. It was essentially designed to provide a subjective account of key soft power assets of countries. ComRes conducted the research online between the May 21 and June 8.

The following questions were asked (each rated on a 0-10 scale, where 0 represented a very negative opinion, and 10 represented a very positive opinion):

Favorability towards foreign countries; Perceptions of cuisine of foreign countries; Perceptions of how welcoming foreign countries are to tourists; Perceptions of technology products of foreign countries; Perceptions of luxury goods produced by foreign countries; Trust in foreign countries' conduct in global affairs; Desire to visit foreign countries for work or study; Perceptions of foreign countries' contributions to global culture.

These eight metrics were used to develop a regression model, where 'favorability towards foreign countries' was the dependent variable, and the remaining questions were independent variables. This measured the extent to which the remaining perceptions predict favorability towards a country in the dataset. The regression model allowed each metric to be appropriately weighted, to minimize the impact of any bias in the choice of questions.

Countries for the index were not selected according to a rigid formula or set criteria, but chosen to give a representative sample of the world's major powers, including countries from every geo-political region. The selection process included major OECD countries, the emerging BRIC nations and several smaller countries that have carved out a reputation exceeding their size. Data was collected for 50 countries in total, and we have published the top 30 ranking countries.

APPENDIX C

METRICS AND THE DATA SOURCE OF EACH SUB-INDICES

Sub-Index	Metric	Data Source
Culture		
	Total number of tourist arrivals	UN World Tourism Organisation
	Average spend per tourist (total tourism receipts divided by number of tourists)	UN World Tourism Organisation
	Number of films appearing in major film festivals	Various
	Number of foreign correspondents in the country	Gorkana Media Database / Foreign Correspondent Associations / Various
	Number of UNESCO World Heritage sites	UNESCO Statistics
	Annual museum attendance of global top 100	The Art Newspaper Review Number 289, April 2017
	Size of music market	IFPI Global Music Report 2017
	Number of top 10 albums in foreign countries	IFPI Global Music Report 2017
	Number of top 10 albums in foreign countries	IFPI Recording Industry in Numbers 2016
	Olympic medals (Summer 2016 / Winter 2014)	International Olympic Committee
	FIFA Ranking (Men's)	FIFA/Coca Cola World Rankings
	Quality of national air carrier	Skytrax Arline Equality Review
	Michelin starred restaurants	Michelin guide
	Power Language Index (PLI)	Chan, K., Power Language Index, 2016
Digital		
	Facebook followers for heads of state (outside of country)	Facebook
	Facebook engagement score for heads of state or government (outside of country)	Facebook
	Facebook followers for ministry of foreign affairs (outside of country)	Facebook
	Facebook engagement score for ministry of foreign affairs (outside of country)	Facebook
	Number of internet users per 100 inhabitants	World Bank
	Secure internet servers per 1 million people	World Bank
	Mobile phones per 100 people	International Telecommunication Union
	Internet bandwidth thousands Mpbs	International Telecommunication Union
	Government Online Services Index	United Nations E-Government Survey
	E-participation Index	Web Index
	Fixed broadband subscriptions per 100 people	World Bank

World Bank Ease of Doing Business Report	World Bank
Unemployment rate as a percentage of labour force	World Bank
Hi-tech exports as a percentage of manufactured exports	World Bank
Log of business start-up costs as a percentage of GNI per capita	World Bank

Government

Human Development Index score	UNDP Human Development Repo
Freedom House Index score	Freedom House
Number of think tanks in the country	McGann, J. (2017), 2016 Global Go to Think Tank Index Report
Gender Equality Index score	UNDP Human Development Report
Economist Democracy Index score	Economist Intelligence Unit
Size of shadow economy as a percentage of GDP	Hassan, M & Schneider, F (2016), Size and Development of the Shadow Economies of 157 Countries Worldwide: Updated and New Measures from 1999 to 2013
Homicides per capita	World Bank
World Bank Voice and Accountability Index score	World Bank
Capital punishment carried out in 2016	Amnesty International
Income inequality - gini coefficient	World Bank
World Economic Forum Trust in Government Index score	World Economic Forum
Press Freedom Index score	Reporters Without Borders
World Bank Government Effectiveness score	World Bank
World Bank Good Governance Regulation Quality score	World Bank
World Bank Good Governance Rule of Law score	World Bank

Polling

Cusine	International polling
Welcoming to tourists	International polling
Technology products	International polling
Luxury goods	International polling
Trust to do the right thing in global affairs	International polling
Appeal as a place to visit, work, or study	International polling
Contribution to global culture	International polling

Education

Average of OECD PISA science, maths and reading scores	OECD
Gross tertiary educational enrolment rate	World Bank
Number of top global universities	Times Higher Education (top 200)
Number of academic science journal articles published	World Bank
Number of international students in the country	UNESCO Institute for Statistics
Spending on education as percentage of GDP	World Bank

Engagement

Total overseas development aid	OECD
Overseas development aid / GNI	OECD
Number of embassies abroad	Lowy Institute / Embassypages / Various
Number of embassies in the country	Embassypages
Number of consulates general abroad	Lowy Institute / Embassypages / Various
Number of permanent missions to multilateral organisations	Lowy Institute / Various
Membership of international organisations	Various
Environmental treaty signatures	United Nations Treaty Collection
Asylum seekers per 1,000 people	World Bank / Asylum Seeker Resource Centre
Number of diplomatic cultural missions	Various
Number of countries a citizen can visit visa-free	Henley & Partners Visa Restrictions Index 2016
Size of Weekly Audience of State Broadcaster	Various
Environmental Performance Index (EPI)	Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy (YCELP)

Enterprise

Global patents filed (percentage of GDP)	World Intellectual Property Organization / World Bank
WEF Competitiveness Index	World Economic Forum
Foreign direct investment as percentage of GDP	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Statistics / World Bank / Various
Heritage Economic Freedom Index score	2017 Index of Economic Freedom
Corruption Perceptions Index score	Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2016
R&D spending as a percentage of GDP	World Bank
Global Innovation Index score	The Global Innovation Index 2016
Number of SMEs as a percentage of labour force working in SMEs	International Finance Corporation

APPENDIX D

TOPLINE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

		Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of _____ n. Turkey					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2017	5	15	40	40	1	100
	Spring, 2015	3	8	37	48	3	100
	Spring, 2013	2	12	38	42	5	100
	Spring, 2011	3	10	29	54	4	100
Jordan	Spring, 2017	20	39	23	16	2	100
	Spring, 2015	20	45	20	13	2	100
	Spring, 2013	32	40	21	5	3	100
	Spring, 2012	34	38	24	5	0	100
	Spring, 2011	31	38	24	6	2	100

	Summer, 2002	22	11	36	32	0	100
Lebanon	Spring, 2017	20	26	17	36	2	100
	Spring, 2015	24	30	15	30	1	100
	Spring, 2013	26	30	14	29	1	100
	Spring, 2012	25	34	15	22	3	100
	Spring, 2011	31	37	14	16	2	100
	Summer, 2002	4	26	25	22	23	100
Tunisia	Spring, 2017	40	29	9	14	9	100
	Spring, 2013	34	33	6	9	18	100
	Spring, 2012	49	29	8	5	10	100

Source: Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Survey December 11, 2017 Release

APPENDIX E

TOPLINE QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

		Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of _____? b. Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
Israel	Spring, 2017	4	11	33	50	100	
	Spring, 2015	3	7	21	65	100	
	Spring, 2014	3	13	34	49	100	
	Spring, 2013	3	11	31	53	100	
Jordan	Spring, 2017	21	45	20	10	100	
	Spring, 2015	12	47	22	16	100	
	Spring, 2014	24	36	22	15	100	
	Spring, 2013	36	39	17	6	100	
	Spring, 2012	37	39	17	3	100	

Lebanon	Spring, 2017	18	24	19	37	100
	Spring, 2015	22	28	19	30	100
	Spring, 2014	22	27	18	31	100
	Spring, 2013	25	29	20	25	100
	Spring, 2012	25	33	23	18	100
Tunisia	Spring, 2017	34	25	8	17	100
	Spring, 2014	19	30	11	15	100
	Spring, 2013	24	28	6	12	100
	Spring, 2012	44	30	7	5	100

Source: Pew Research Center Spring 2017 Survey December 11, 2017 Release

REFERENCES

- 4 soruda: Başbakan Erdoğan ve ses kayıtları. (2018, March 1). *BBC*. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler/2014/02/140226_soru_cevap_erdogan
- 17 Aralık büyük yolsuzluk ve rüşvet operasyonu. (2018, March 1). *Sözcü*. Retrieved from <http://www.sozcu.com.tr/2014/gundem/17-aralik-buyuk-yolsuzluk-ve-rusvet-operasyonu-680664/>
- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. (2018, March 9). *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/adalet-ve-kalkinma-partisi>
- Agence France Presse. (2017, September 6). Distrust between South Korea, Japan sky high: Poll. *Daily Mail*. Retrieved from <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3116412/Distrust-South-Korea-Japan-sky-high-poll.html>
- Agence France Presse. (2017, October 28). South Korea accused of rewriting history in new school textbooks. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/03/south-korea-accused-rewriting-history-schoolbook-policy>
- Aghekyan, E., Bhatia, R., Dunham, J., O'Toole, S., Puddington, A., Repucci, S.,... Tucker, V. (2018). *Freedom in the world 2018*. Washington DC: Freedom House.
- Aghekyan, E., Bhatia, R., Dunham, J., O'Toole, S., Puddington, A., Repucci, S.,... Tucker, V. (2016). *Freedom in the world 2016*. Washington DC: Freedom House
- Akçadağ Alagöz, E. (2018, January 21). Bir kamu diplomasisi örneği olarak Güney Kore. *Bilgesam*. Retrieved from <http://www.bilgesam.org/incele/124/-bir-kamu-diplomasisi-ornegi-olarak-guney-kore/>

Akgün, M. & Gündoğar, S. S. (2012). *The perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2012*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.

Akgün, M. & Gündoğar, S. S. (2013). *The perception of Turkey in the Middle East 2013*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.

Aktürk, Ş., Alaranta, T. & Bechev, D. (2016). Russia-Turkey relations. *Russian Analytical Digest*, 179, 2-16. Retrieved from <https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-a-010818420>

Alessandri, E. (2010). Turkey's new foreign policy and the future of Turkey-EU relations. *The International Spectator*, 45(3), 85-100.

Alone in the world. (2018, March 1). *The Economist*. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21689872-consequences-not-talking-neighbours-alone-world>

Altunışık, M. B. (2011). *Challenges to Turkey's "soft power" in the Middle East*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.

Arango, T. & Gladstone, R. (2017, October 24). Russian ambassador to Turkey is assassinated in Ankara. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/world/europe/russia-ambassador-shot-ankara-turkey.html>

Aras, B. & Polat, R. K. (2008). From conflict to cooperation: Desecuritization of Turkey's relations with Syria and Iran. *Security Dialogue*, 39(5), 495-515. doi: 10.1177/0967010608096150

Bağcı, H. & Erdurmaz, A. S. (2017). The Middle East seen from Ankara. In Demir, I. (Ed.), *Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East: Under the shadow of*

the Arab Spring (pp. 7-47). Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Balci, A. (2015). Foreign policy as domestic power struggle: The Northern Iraq as a battlefield between the AKP and the TAF in 2007-8. *Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 2(1), 67-94. Retrieved from <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/159016>

Balci, B. (2018, April 20). The Gülen movement and Turkish soft power. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from <https://carnegieendowment.org/2014/02/04/g-len-movement-and-turkish-soft-power-pub-54430>

Bartsch, K. (2007, June 19). *What Europeans think about Turkey and why*. Paper presented at the Centre for European Reform Seminar: Europe's Public Opinion on Turkish EU Accession, Brussels.

Batuman, E. (2018, June 3). Ottomania: A hit TV show reimagines Turkey's imperial past. *The New Yorker*. Retrieved from <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/02/17/ottomania>

Bechev, D. (2015). The travails of democracy in Turkey. In V. Talbot (Ed.), *The uncertain path of the 'New Turkey'* (pp.7-22). Milan: Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale.

Bechev, D. (2018, March 19). Turkey and Greece: Old habits die hard. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/turkey-greece-habits-die-hard-171208095106144.html>

Benhaïm, Y. & Öktem, K. (2015). The rise and fall of Turkey's soft power discourse: Discourse in foreign policy under Davutoğlu and Erdoğan, *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 21, 1-24. Retrieved from <http://ejts.revues.org/5275>

- Bennhold, K. (2018, February 2018). Leaders of Turkey and Israel clash at Davos panel. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/world/europe/30clash.html>
- Pease, R. (2009). Korean pop music in China: Nationalism, authenticity, and gender. In Berry, C., Liscutin, N., & Mackintosh, J. D. (Eds.), *Cultural studies and cultural industries in Northeast Asia: What a difference a region makes* (pp. 151-169). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Bolat, N. (2010). L'affaire Ergenekon: Quels enjeux pour la démocratie Turquie? *cairn.info*, 1, 41-53. doi:10.3917/pe.101.0041
- Bora, B. (2018, March 1). Turkey's constitutional reform: All you need to know. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores>
- Bozos, F. (2018, January 17). Dizi ihracatımız çok hızlı yükseliyor. *Ekonomist*. Retrieved from <http://www.ekonomist.com.tr/medya/dizi-ihracatimiz-cok-hizli-yukseliyor.html>
- Buccianti, A. (2010). Turkish soap operas conquering the Arab world: Social liberation or cultural alienation? *Arab Media & Society*, 10, 1-7. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265525398_Dubbed_Turkish_soap_operas_conquering_the_Arab_world_social_liberation_or_cultural_alienation
- Carr, E. H. (1981). *The twenty years' crisis*. New York: Palgrave.
- Candemir, Y. (2018, January 17). Turkish soap operas: The unstoppable boom. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved from <https://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2013/04/29/turkish-soap-operas-the-unstoppable-boom/>

- Chitty, N., Ji, L., Rawnsley, G. D. & Hayden, C. (2017). *The Routledge handbook of soft power*. New York: Routledge.
- Cho, I. J. (2017, November 3). Reporters Without Borders cites South Korea's defamation and national security laws as impediments to free expression. *The Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/740709.html
- Choe, S. H. (2017, October 25). MERS tarnishes Korean president's image as leader. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/13/world/mers-tarnishes-korean-presidents-image-as-leader.html>
- Choe, S. H. (2017, November 2). South Korea enters period of uncertainty with president's impeachment. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/asia/south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-impeached.html>
- Choi, J. (2010). *The South Korean film renaissance: Local hitmakers global provocateurs*. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press.
- Chrisafis, A. & Hopkins, N. (2018, March 20). Turkey freezes all political relations with France over genocide row. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/dec/22/turkey-france-freeze-relations-over-genocide>
- Cooper, R. (2004). Hard power, soft power and the goals of diplomacy. In Held, D. & Koenig-Archibugi, M. (Eds.), *American power in the 21st century* (pp. 167-180). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Craig, H. (2012). *The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in global context*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.

- Çevik, S. (2014). Turkish soap opera diplomacy: A western projection by a Muslim source. *The Journal of Public Diplomacy*, 5(1), 78-103. Retrieved from <http://www.publomacy.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Turkish-Soap-Opera-Diplomacy.pdf>
- De Grazia, V. (2006). *Irresistible empire: America's advance through twentieth-century Europe*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dearden, L. (2018, March 4). Turkey dismisses 7,400 more police, soldiers and public sector workers a year after failed coup. *The Independent*. Retrieved from http://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/IPM_PolicyBrief15July_12.08.16_web.pdf
- Denney, S. (2017, October 31). 2015 ends on a higher point for South Korea's president Park. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/2015-ends-on-a-higher-point-for-south-koreas-president-park/>
- Dönmez, R. Ö. (2014). *Türkiye'de politik değişim ve Türk dış politikası: Neo-Osmanlıcılığın sosyo politikası*. Bursa: Dora.
- Doğanay, Ü. (2007). AKP'nin demokrasi söylemi ve muhafazakarlık: Muhafazakar demokrasi ve eleştirel bir bakış. *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 62(1), 65-88. Retrieved from <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/ausbf/article/view/5000053457>
- Draudt, D. (2017, November 3). The future of South Korean democracy. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/the-future-of-south-korean-democracy/>
- Duman, B. (2018, March 20). Türkiye-İrak ilişkileri nereden nereye? *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/gorus/turkiye-irak-iliskileri-nereden-nereye>

- Engert, S. (2016). Turkey-Armenia: From denial to excuse? In Daase, C., Engert, S., Horelt, M. A., Renner, J. & Strassner, R. (Eds). *Apology and reconciliation in international relations: The importance of being sorry* (pp. 218-237). New York: Routledge.
- Ercan, P. G. (2017). *Turkish foreign policy: International relations, legality and global reach*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ermenistan Türkiye ile ilişkileri normalleştirme anlaşmasını bozdu. (2018, March 19). *Euro News*. Retrieved from <http://tr.euronews.com/2018/03/01/ermenistan-turkiye-ile-iliskileri-normallestirme-anlasm-n-bozdu>
- Farrah, L. (2018, January 21). ‘Korean Wave’ of pop culture sweeps across Asia. *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/asiapcf/12/31/korea.entertainment/>
- Ferguson, N. (2018, July 1). Think again: Power. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/03/think-again-power/>
- Fetterolf, J. & Poushter, J. (2018). *Key Middle East publics see Russia, Turkey and U.S. all playing larger roles in region*. Washington DC: Pew Research Center.
- Fotiou, E. & Triantaphyllou, D. (2010). Assessing Turkey’s “soft power” role: Rhetoric versus practice, *The International Spectator*, 45(1), 99-113. doi: 10.1080/03932720903562593
- Fox, K. & McLaughlin, E. C. (2018, March 1). Turkey referendum: Erdoğan declares victory. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/16/europe/turkey-referendum-results-erdogan/index.html>
- Fuller, G. E. (2014). *Turkey and the Arab Spring: Leadership in the Middle East*, Squamish: Bozorg Press.

Full text of Park's inauguration speech. (2018, May 31). *Yonhap News Agency*. Retrieved from <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/02/25/95/0301000000AEN20130225001500315F.HTML>

Gallarotti, G. M. (2011). Soft Power: What it is, why it's important, and the conditions under which it can be effectively used. *Journal of Political Power*, 4(1), 25-47. Retrieved from https://wescholar.wesleyan.edu/div2facpubs/57/?utm_source=wescholar.wesleyan.edu%2Fdiv2facpubs%2F57&utm_medium=PDF&utm_campaign=PDFCoverPages

Gardner, H. (2017, October 25). Breaking the US-Russia impasse: Keeping the door open to dialogue. *The Russian International Affairs Council*. Retrieved from <http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/breaking-the-u-s-russia-impasse-keeping-the-door-open-to-dialogue/>

Geçmişten günümüze Türkiye-İran ilişkileri. (2017, September 30). *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/dosya/gecmisten-gunumuze-turkiye-iran-iliskileri>

Gilpin, R. (1981). *War and change in world politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Griffiths, J. (2017, August 26). South Korea presidential scandal: What you need to know. *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/02/asia/south-korea-president-scandal-explained/index.html>

Göksedef, E. (2017, October 13). Putin dönemi Türk-Rus ilişkileri. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/putin-donemi-turk-rus-iliskileri>

Göksedef, E. (2017, November 9). Merkel döneminde gerilen Türk-Alman ilişkileri. *Al Jazeera*. Retrieved from <http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/al-jazeera-ozel/merkel-doneminde-gerilen-turk-alman-iliskileri>

- Gürcan, M. & Gisclon, M. (2016). *From autonomy to full-fledged civilian control: The changing nature of Turkish civil-military relations after July 15*. İstanbul: İstanbul Policy Center
- Gürses, Ö. (2018, March 17). Yunanistan'ın Ege'de işgal ettiği 18'inci ada adımıza tescilli çıktı! *Sözcü*. Retrieved from <https://www.sozcu.com.tr/2016/gundem/yunanistanin-egede-iskal-ettigi-18inci-ada-adimiza-tescilli-cikti-1546450/>
- Haggard, S. & You, J. S. (2015). Freedom of expression in South Korea. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 45(1), 167-179. doi:10.1080/00472336.2014.947310
- Hahm, S. D. & Heo, U. (2017). The first female president in South Korea: Park Geun-hye's leadership and South Korean democracy. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 00(0), 1-17. doi:10.1177/0021909617722376
- Haksoon, Y. (2002). Cultural identity and cultural policy in South Korea. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 8(1), 37-48. doi:10.1080/10286630290032422
- Hakyemez, Y. Ş. (2010). 2010 anayasa değişiklikleri ve demokratik hukuk devleti. *Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 14(2), 387-406. Retrieved from http://webftp.gazi.edu.tr/hukuk/dergi/14_2_13.pdf
- Hamsici, M. (2018, February 27). 2010 referandumu: 'Evet', 'hayır' ve 'boykot' cepheleri ne demişti? *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39462061>
- Hayden, C. (2012). *The rhetoric of soft power: Public diplomacy in global contexts*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.
- Heng, Y. K. (2010). Mirror, mirror on the wall, who is the softest of them all? Evaluating Japanese and Chinese strategies in the soft power competition

era. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 10(2), 275-304. Retrieved from <https://academic.oup.com/irap/article-abstract/10/2/275/777729>

Herh, M. (2018, January 21). Video content battleground: Global media giants invading Korean market. *Business Korea*. Retrieved from <http://www.businesskorea.co.kr/english/news/ict/16771-video-content-battleground-global-media-giants-invading-korean-market>

Hill, F., Kirişçi, K. & Moffatt, A. (2015). Armenia and Turkey: From normalization to reconciliation. *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, 13(4), 127-138. Retrieved from http://turkishpolicy.com/pdf/Armenia-and-Turkey-From-Normalization-to-Reconciliation-Winter-2015_82b3.pdf

Hollande tries to calm France's complicated relationship with Turkey. (2018, March 20). *France 24*. Retrieved from <http://www.france24.com/en/20140128-hollande-france-complicated-relationship-turkey>

Hong, E. (2014). *The birth of Korean Cool*. London: Simon & Schuster.

How will Armenian genocide bill affect France-Turkey relations? (2017, November 14). *CNN*. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/europe/turkey-france-genocide-bill-q-and-a/index.html>

Huijgh, E. & Warlick, J. (2016). *The public diplomacy of emerging powers, part 1: The case of Turkey*. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.

Hwang, K. M. (2017, October 28). Textbook controversy is over competing forms of nationalist history. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved from the https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2015/11/633_190233.html

Hye, P. G. (2017, July 10). A new kind of Korea: Building trust between Seoul and Pyongyang. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northeast-asia/2011-09-01/new-kind-korea>

- İnce, A. (2013). The 'Mehter March' of cultural policy in Turkey. *Centre International de Formation Européenne*, 1, 75-92. doi:10.3917/eufor.367.0075
- İnce, E. (2018, February 28). Kışlaya onay yok! *Radikal*. Retrieved from <http://www.radikal.com.tr/hayat/kislaya-onay-yok-1117393/>
- İnci, S. (2010). Türk-Yunan siyasi ilişkilerinde azınlıkların dini kurumları meselesi. *Balkan Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 1(2), 63-96. Retrieved from <http://acikerisim.kirklareli.edu.tr:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/20.500.11857/381/Turk%20Yunan%20Iliskileri.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Jahan, S. (2016). *Human development report 2016*. Ottawa: Lowe-Martin Group.
- Janelli, R. L. & Yim, D. (2007, October 5-6). *Soft power, Korea, and the politics of culture*. Paper presented at the Catching the Wave: Connecting East Asia through Soft Power Conference, UC Berkeley.
- Jang, S. H. (2012). The Korean Wave and its implications for Korea-China relationship. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, 19(2), 97-113. Retrieved from http://s-space.snu.ac.kr/bitstream/10371/96546/1/7.The-Korean-Wave-and-Its-Implications-for-the-Korea-China-Relationship_Soo-Hyun-Jang.pdf
- Jhee, B. K. & Lee, N. Y. (2011). Measuring soft power in East Asia: An overview of soft power in East Asia on affective and normative dimensions. In Lee, S. J. & Melissen, J. (Eds), *Public diplomacy and soft power in East Asia* (pp. 51-65). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Kabalan, M. (2013). Syrian Turkish relations: Geopolitical explanations for the move from conflict to co-operation. In Hinnebusch, R. & Tür, Ö. (Eds.), *Turkey-Syria relations: Between enmity and amity* (pp. 27-39). New York: Routledge.

- Karadağ, H. (2016). *Uluslararası ilişkilerde yeni bir boyut kamu diplomasisi*. Ankara: Nobel Akademik Yayıncılık.
- Kaya, E. (2015). Dış politika değişimi: AKP dönemi Türk dış politikası. *Karadeniz Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 12(7), 71-91. Retrieved from <http://dergipark.gov.tr/ksbd/issue/16231/169979>
- Kelly, R. E. (2017, September 19). South Korea: One year in, assessing Park Geun-Hye's presidency. *Lowy Institute*. Retrieved from <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpretor/south-korea-one-year-assessing-park-geun-hyes-presidency>
- Kim, T. Y. & Jin, D. Y. (2016). Cultural policy in the Korean Wave: An analysis of cultural diplomacy embedded in presidential speeches. *International Journal of Communication*, 10, 5514-5534. Retrieved from <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/5128/1838>
- Kim, Y. & Marinescu, V. (2015). Mapping South Korea's soft power: Sources, actors, tools, and impacts. *Romanian Journal of Sociological Studies*, 1, 3-12. Retrieved from https://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/39098361/Mapping_South_Korea_Soft_Power.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAIWOWYYGZ2Y53UL3A&Expires=1530749764&Signature=OD1msMo7C9DMzT6jw8lAzs8%2F830%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DMapping_South_Korea_s_Soft_Power_Sources.pdf
- Kirişçi, K. (2009). The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state. *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 40, 29-57. Retrieved from <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d658/67de5df577a9e392d91cd4927e76f04e158c.pdf>
- Kirişçi, K. (2018). *Turkey and the West: Fault lines in a troubled alliance*. Washington DC: The Brookings Institution.

- Kirişçi, K. (2018, January 21). Can Turkey salvage its soft power image ahead of the World Humanitarian Summit? *Brookings*. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/05/16/can-turkey-salvage-its-soft-power-image-ahead-of-the-world-humanitarian-summit/>
- Koç, Y. T. (2011). 12 Eylül'den 12 Haziran'a siyasi partiler: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Ak Parti). *SETA Analiz*, 41, 1-23. Retrieved from <http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/12-eylulden-12-hazirana-siyasal-partiler-ak-parti.pdf>
- Korea-China relations. (2017, August 21). *Global Security*. Retrieved from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/forrel-prc.htm>
- Kraidy, A. M. & Al-Ghazzi, O. (2013). Neo-Ottoman Cool: Turkish popular culture in the Arab public sphere. *The International Journal of Media and Culture*, 11(1), 17-29. doi:10.1080/15405702.2013.747940
- Kwon, S. H. & Joseph, K. (2014). The cultural industry policies of the Korean government and the Korean Wave. *International Journal of Cultural Policy*, 20(4), 422-439. doi:10.1080/10286632.2013.829052
- Lee, G. (2009). A theory of soft power and Korea's soft power strategy. *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 21(2), 205-218. doi:10.1080/10163270902913962
- Lee, J. (2014), The stubborn south: Why Seoul needs to mend ties with Japan. *World Affairs*, 177(4), 80-86. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/43556674>
- Lee, J. W. (2017, August 21). The China-South Korea trade war must end. *The Japan Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/26/commentary/world-commentary/china-south-korea-trade-war-must-end/>

- Lee, S. J. (2016). South Korea's middle power activism and the retooling of its public diplomacy. In Melissen, J. & Sohn, Y. (Eds), *Understanding public diplomacy in East Asia* (pp.107-131). New York: Palgrave Macmillan,2015.
- Lee, S. W. (2011). The theory and reality of soft power: Practical approaches in East Asia. In Lee, S. J. & Melissen, J. (Eds). *Public diplomacy and soft power in East Asia* (pp. 11-33). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Lee, Y. W. (2011). Soft power as productive power. In Lee, S. J. & Melissen, J. (Eds). *Public diplomacy and soft power in East Asia* (pp. 33-51). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Letsch, C. (2018, March 1). A year after the protests, Gezi Park nurtures the seeds of a new Turkey. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/whats-left-of-turkeys-gezi-protest-movement/a-39049440>
- Macron tells Erdogan: No chance of Turkey joining EU. (2018, March 20). *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-42586108>
- Maiki, J. (2018, March 25). Soft power survey-2012. *Monocle*. Retrieved from <https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2012/>
- Malden, J. (2017, October 25). Why the assassination of a Russian ambassador in Turkey won't start a new war. *Time*. Retrieved from <http://time.com/4608523/turkey-russia-andrey-karlov-assassination/>
- Manyin, M. E., Chanlett-Avery, E., Nikitin, M. B. D., Williams, B. R. & Corrado, J. R. (2016). *U.S.-South Korea relations*. Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.
- Manyin, M. E., Chanlett-Avery, E., Nikitin, M. B. D., Williams, B. R. & Corrado, J. R. (2017). *U.S.-South Korea relations*. Washington DC: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001). *The tragedy of great power politics*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Melissen, J. (2005). *The new public diplomacy: Soft power in international relations*. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

McClory, J. (2010). *The new persuaders*. London: Institute for Government.

McClory, J. (2011). *The new persuaders II*. London: Institute for Government.

McClory, J. (2015). *The soft power 30*. London: Portland.

McClory, J. (2016). *The soft power 30*. London: Portland.

McClory, J. (2017). *The soft power 30*. London: Portland.

McCurry, J. (2017, November 2). Who is Moon Jae-in, South Korea's new president? *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/09/moon-jae-in-the-south-korean-pragmatist-who-would-be-presidentc>

Miller, J. B. (2017, August 21). Is the China-South Korea honeymoon over? *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/is-the-china-south-korea-honeymoon-over/>

Mishra, S. K. (2017, July 10). One year of 'Trust Politik'. *The Korea Times*. Retrieved from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinion/2014/02/197_151569.html

- Moon, K. H. S. & Kim, D. (2017, November 1). Park Geun-hye's bad chois. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2016-11-09/park-geun-hyes-bad-chois>
- Moon, K. H. S. (2017, November 1). South Korea's shamanic panic. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-korea/2016-12-01/south-koreas-shamanic-panic>
- Morgenthau, H. (1948). *Politics among nations: The struggle for power and peace*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Nye, J. S. (1990). *Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nye, J. S. (2004). *Soft power: The means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs Press.
- Nye, J. S. (2009). *Understanding international conflicts*. New York: Pearson.
- Nye, J. S. (2018, March 25). Think again: Soft power. *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from <http://foreignpolicy.com/2006/02/23/think-again-soft-power/>
- Nye, J. S. (2018, June 17). The benefits of soft power. *Harvard Business School*. Retrieved from <https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-benefits-of-soft-power>
- Oğuzlu, T. (2007). Soft power in Turkish foreign policy. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 61(1), 81-97. doi:10.1080/10357710601142518
- Onar, N. F. (2009). Neo Ottomanism, historical legacies and Turkish foreign policy. *Edam*, 3, 1-16. Retrieved from <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/neo-ottomanism-historical-legacies-and-turkish-foreign-policy>

- Park, J. H. (2018, January 21). Hallyu needs political skill, economic resilience. *Korea Times*. Retrieved from http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/11/398_218339.html
- Park to build ecosystem of cultural content industry. (2017, September 4). *The Korea Herald*. Retrieved from <http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20150211000757&mod=skb>
- Parker, G. (2018, January 21). US overtakes Britain as world's top 'soft power'. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/c20d03e2-2fa6-11e6-bda0-04585c31b153>
- Paul, A. (2017, November 17). Turkey-EU relations: Forever engaged, never to be married? *Heinrich Böll Stiftung*. Retrieved from <https://eu.boell.org/en/2015/07/08/turkey-eu-relations-forever-engaged-never-be-married>
- Perrier, G. (2018, March 20). La relation franco-turque reste tendue. *Le Monde*. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2013/05/04/la-relation-franco-turque-reste-tendue_3171022_3234.html
- Purtaş, F. (2013). Türk dış politikasının yükselen değeri: Kültürel diplomasi. *Akademik Bakış*, 7(13), 1-14. Retrieved from <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/gav/article/view/5000141857/5000129671>
- Ramirez, E. (2018, January 21). How is the presidential scandal impacting South Korea's diplomacy? *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/how-is-the-presidential-scandal-impacting-south-koreas-diplomacy/>
- Rodriguez, A. V. (2018, June 29). Turkish singer's Latin success sealed with a kiss, or two. *Los Angeles Times*. Retrieved from <http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jul/22/entertainment/ca-57108>

- Rozman, G. (2014). *Joint U.S.-Korea academic studies*. Washington DC: Korea Economic Institute of America.
- Said, E. W. (1994). *Culture and imperialism*. London: Vintage.
- Salem, P. (2011). *Turkey's image in the Arab world*. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları.
- Sam, M. Y., Song, J. H. & Dewey, M. (2012). Korea's public diplomacy: A new initiative for the future. *The Asian Institute for Policy Studies*, 39, 1-25. Retrieved from <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/issue-brief-no-39-koreas-public-diplomacy-a-new-initiative-for-the-future/>
- Sancar, G. A. (2015). Turkey's public diplomacy: Its actors, stakeholders, and tools. In Çevik, B. S. & Seib, P. (Eds), *Turkey's public diplomacy* (pp. 13-42). New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Sayarı, S. (2013). New directions in Turkey–USA relations. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 15(2), 129-142. doi:10.1080/19448953.2013.775022
- Shaheen, K. (2018, March 4). After the failed coup in Turkey: Refrain from vendetta, Mr. Erdoğan. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <http://www.voxeurop.eu/en/content/blog/5108036-refrain-vendetta-mr-erdogan>
- Selçuk, O. (2012). *Turkish airlines as a soft power tool in the context of Turkish foreign policy*. (Unpublished masters thesis). Boğaziçi University, İstanbul.
- Seib, P. (2018, January 21). Korea's public diplomacy opportunity. *Huffington Post*. Retrieved from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/philip-seib/koreas-public-diplomacy-o_b_4326708.html

- Selda Bağcan to sing at Burning Man 2018. (2018, June 29). *Hurriyet Daily News*. Retrieved from <http://www.hurriyetaailynews.com/selda-bagcan-to-sing-at-burning-man-2018-124451>
- Serventi, C. (2018, March 25). Soft power survey 2014/15. *Monocle*. Retrieved from <https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2014-15/>
- Serventi, C. (2018, March 25). Soft power survey 2015/16. *Monocle*. Retrieved from <https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2015-16/>
- Serventi, C. (2018, March 25). Soft power survey 2016/17. *Monocle*. Retrieved from <https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2016-17/>
- Seung, H. K. & Joseph, K. (2013). From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea's cultural industries. *The Economic and Labour Relations Review*, 24(4), 517-532. doi:10.1177/1035304613508873
- Shim, D. (2006). Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia. *Media, Culture & Society*, 28(1), 25-44. doi:10.1177/0163443706059278
- Shim, D. (2008). The growth of Korean cultural industries and the Korean Wave. In Chua, B. E. & Iwabuchi, K. (Eds). *East asian pop culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave* (pp. 15-33). Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press.
- Shoe, S. H. (2017, November 3). Court acquits journalist accused of defaming South Korean president. *The New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/18/world/asia/south-korea-park-geun-hye-defamation-verdict.html>
- Smith-Windsor, B. A. (2000). Hard power, soft power reconsidered. *Canadian Military Journal*, 1(3), 51-56. Retrieved from <http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo1/no3/doc/50-56-eng.pdf>

Snyder, S. A. (2017, November 8). A pivotal U.S.-Korea summit? *Council on Foreign Relations*. Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/pivotal-us-korea-summit>

Sohn, J. (2017, September 14). Park administration promotes cultural industries, welfare. *Korea Net*. Retrieved from <http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/policies/view?articleId=133205>

Song, J. A. (2018, June 30). China awash with Korean Wave fever. *Financial Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.ft.com/content/167338ec-fa0b-11e5-8e04-8600cef2ca75>

South Korea's soft power: Soap, sparkle and pop. (2017, February 21). *The Economist*. Retrieved from <https://www.economist.com/news/books-and-arts/21611039-how-really-uncool-country-became-tastemaker-asia-soap-sparkle-and-pop>

South Korea: Riding the Korean Wave. (2017, June 21). *Cosmetic Business*. Retrieved from https://www.cosmeticsbusiness.com/technical/article_page/South_Korea__Riding_the_Korean_wave/49786

South Korea-timeline. (2017, August 23). *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-15292674>

Syria: The story of the conflict. (2018, March 5). *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-26116868>

Syrian civil war fast facts. (2018, March 7). *CNN*. Retrieved from <https://edition.cnn.com/2013/08/27/world/meast/syria-civil-war-fast-facts/index.html>

- Tali, D. (2018, February 12). An unlikely story: Why do South Americans love Turkish TV? *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-37284938>
- Tavernise, S. (2017, October 22). Seeking to improve ties with Russia, Turkey apologizes for downing warplane. *New York Times*. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/28/world/europe/russia-turkey-erdogan-putin.html>
- Taylor, M. G. (2017). *Why Turkey needs Russia*. Washington DC: Wilson Center.
- The Davutoğlu effect. (2018, January 21). *The Economist*. Retrieved from <http://www.economist.com/node/17276420>
- “The legend of the blue sea” continues to be top dog in viewership ratings. (2017, July 20). *Soompi*. Retrieved from <https://www.soompi.com/2016/12/14/legend-blue-sea-continues-top-dog-viewership-ratings/>
- Tidal, S. (2017, July 10). Korean comfort women agreement is a triumph for Japan and the US. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/28/korean-comfort-women-agreement-triumph-japan-united-states-second-world-war>
- Toruk, İ. & Güran, M. S. (2014). The 2014 Turkish municipal elections under the impact of the December 17 process. *Selçuk Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 36, 281-297. Retrieved from <http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/165240>
- Turkey-Israel topline. (2017, September 25). *Pew Research Center*. Retrieved from <http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/10/17/turkey-israel-topline/>

Turkey rated among worst in world in WJP 2017-18 Rule of Law Index. (2018, March 4). *Turkish Minute*. Retrieved from <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-2018-table-country-scores>

Türkiye-Almanya ilişkilerini krize sürükleyen 5 konu nedir? (2017, November 10). *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-39937578>

Ulutaş, U. (2010). Turkey-Israel: A fluctuating alliance. *Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı*, 42, 1-12. Retrieved from <https://www.setav.org/en/turkey-israel-a-fluctuating-alliance/>

Vuving, A. L. (2009, September 3). *How soft power works*. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting: Soft Power and Smart Power, Toronto.

Walt, S. M. (1998). International relations: One world, many theories. *Foreign Policy*, 110, 29-46. Retrieved from <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0015-7228%28199821%290%3A110%3C29%3A1ROWMT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3>

Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.

Wertz, D. (2017, August 23). Inter-Korean relations. *The National Committee on North Korea*. Retrieved from <https://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/inter-korean-relations>

What's left of Turkey's Gezi protest movement? (2018, March 1). *DW*. Retrieved from <http://www.dw.com/en/whats-left-of-turkeys-gezi-protest-movement/a-39049440>

Whitehouse, B. (2018, March 25). Soft power survey 2017/18. *Monocle*. Retrieved from <https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2017-18/>

Williams, N. (2018, February 12). The rise of Turkish soap power. *BBC*. Retrieved from <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-22282563>

Wright, J. N. (2017, November 3). Populism comes to South Korea. *Chatham House*. Retrieved from <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/populism-comes-south-korea>

Yanardağoğlu, E. & Karam, I. N. (2013). The fever that hit Arab satellite television: Audience perceptions of Turkish TV series, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 20(5), 561-579. doi:10.1080/1070289X.2013.823089

Yatim, D. (2017, February 20). Hallyu, the Korean Wave. *The Jakarta Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.thejakartapost.com/life/2017/02/13/essay-hallyu-the-korean-wave.html>

Yeneroğlu, M. (2016). Political relations between Turkey and Germany. *Insight Turkey*, 18(1), 11-19. Retrieved from <http://www.mustafayeneroglu.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Insight-Turkey-Winter-2016.pdf>

Yılmaz, S. (2018, March 17). Türk-Yunan sorunlarının neresindeyiz? 21. *Yüzyıl Türkiye Enstitüsü*. Retrieved from <http://www.21yyte.org/tr/arastirma/yunanistan/2017/03/29/8598/turk-yunan-sorunlarinin-neresindeyiz>

You, K. (2017, February 20). K-pop: A political weapon. *Brown Political Review*. Retrieved from <http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2017/02/k-pop-political-weapon/>

Yörük, Z. & Vatikiotis, P. (2013). Soft power or illusion of hegemony: The case of the Turkish soap opera “colonialism”. *International Journal of Communication*, 7, 2361-2385. Retrieved from https://insidestory.gr/sites/default/files/1880-9797-1-pb_2.pdf

Yumuşak güç'te Türkiye dünya 20'ncisi oldu. (2018, January 21). *Milliyet*. Retrieved from <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-yumusak-guc-te-turkiye-dunya-20-ncisi-oldu-gundem-1634966/>