

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
A CASE FOR BROADER SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

AZAR MUSAYEV

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

2010

THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
A CASE FOR BROADER SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts
in
Political Science and International Relations

by
Azar Musayev

Boğaziçi University

2010

Thesis Abstract

Azar Musayev, “The National Security Policy of the Russian Federation: A Case for Broader Security Perspective”

This study aims at analyzing the national security policy of the Russian Federation from the securitization perspective proposed by the Copenhagen School. Analysis is made in order to investigate whether there is a pattern in different securitizing moves made within a single state. For that aim, the securitization of demographic decline and information has been analyzed. The major argument of this study is that particular securitizing moves and general dominant discourse of danger show congruence. Namely, dominant discourse of danger that prioritizes certain security sectors may predict that particular cases will be securitized from the perspective of these sectors, as well. The first chapter aims to set the theoretical framework of this study. Therefore, the different definitions of the term of “security” are being analyzed focusing on the different schools of thought with special emphasis to the approach of the Copenhagen School. The second chapter describes the contours of the dominant discourse of danger with the help of analyzing relevant policy documents and official speeches. Having identified the dominant discourse of danger, the remaining two chapters aim at analyzing particular securitizing moves made with regard to demographic decline and information, respectively. After analysis of particular securitization moves, the study comes to a conclusion that there is congruence between the dominant discourse of danger and specific securitizing moves. Namely, as the dominant discourse of danger prioritized political and societal sectors, particular cases have also been securitized mainly from these sectors, along with traditional military one.

Tez Özeti

Azar Musayev, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Ulusal Güvenlik Politikası: Geniş Güvenlik Perspektifi İçin Bir Örnek”

Bu yüksek lisans çalışmasının amacı Rusya Federasyonu ulusal güvenlik politikasını Kopenhag Ekolü’nün “güvenlikleştirme” perspektifinden incelemektir. İnceleme, aynı devlette oluşan farklı güvenlikleştirme eylemleri arasında benzerlik olup olmadığını ortaya koymak amacıyla yürütülmüştür. Bu amaçla, nüfus sayının azalması ve enformasyonun güvenlikleştirilmesi araştırılmıştır. Çalışmanın ana argümanı, hususi güvenlikleştirme adımları ile baskın tehdit söylemi arasında uygunluk olmasıdır. Yani, baskın tehdit söylemi bazı güvenlik sektörlerini öncelikli hale getirmekle hususi konuların da bu sektörler perspektifinden güvenlikleştirileceğini ön görme olanağı sağlıyor. Birinci bölüm tezin teorik çerçevesini çizmektedir. Farklı ekollerin güvenlik kavramına getirdikleri farklı tanımlar Kopenhag Ekolü vurgulanarak incelenmiştir. İkinci bölüm, ilgili politika belgeleri ve resmi konuşmaların yardımıyla Rusya’da baskın olan tehdit söylemini tarif ediyor. Baskın tehdit söyleminin ana hatlarını belirledikten sonra kalan bölümler, sırasıyla, nüfusun azalması ve enformasyona yönelik güvenlikleştirme adımlarını inceliyor. Hususi güvenlikleştirme adımlarını inceledikten sonra çalışmamız bir devlette baskın olan tehdit söylemi ile farklı konuların güvenlikleştirilmesi arasında uygunluk olduğu sonucuna varıyor. Yani baskın tehdit söylemi politik ve kimlik sektörlerini baskın şekilde öne çıkardığı gibi incelenen konular da, geleneksel askeri sektörle beraber, öncelikli olarak politik ve kimlik sektörleri açısından güvenlikleştirilmiştir.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First, I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor Assist. Prof. Zühre Aksoy, for her guidance. She has been a great advisor for my thesis with her infinite energy, support and critical comments during this period. I would like to thank Prof. Gun Kut and Assoc. Prof. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, for taking part in my jury, encouraging me with their manners and making crucial comments on my thesis.

I am also grateful to all my professors in the Department of Political Science and International Relations for the great working environment and inspiration they created in the magnificent building of the faculty and transferring their academic knowledge to us through our long talks. I would like especially thank Prof. Kemal Kirişçi, Prof. Binnaz Toprak and Assoc. Prof. Zeynep Çağlayan-Gambetti. I cannot refrain myself from expressing my sincere gratitude to Prof. Kemal Kirişçi who inspired and supported me during my studies at the Boğaziçi University.

I want to thank my family for their support and patience during my entire education. I am deeply indebted to my father Samiddin Musayev and my mother Reise Guluzade for believing in me and making me feel their presence though being far away. Without their priceless inspiration I could not overcome myriad obstacles that I met during this period.

I cannot forget my friends who helped me in tackling with any problem. Shahmar, Elnur, Tural are few of those who accompanied me at the dormitory and shared my difficulties. They have been an inseparable part of my life with their jokes and support. Erdem Kaya deserves special thanks for his valuable aid in my studies, as well as, in dealing with countless procedures related to thesis writing.

ABBREVIATIONS

ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EU	European Union
FSB	Federal Service of Security (in Russian initials)
ICT	Information Communication Technologies
ISP	Internet Service Provider
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Association
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC-2000	National Security Concept adopted in 2000
NSC-97	National Security Concept adopted in 1997
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SORM	System for Operational-Investigative Activities
UN	United Nations
US	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
Research Questions.....	3
Case Selection.....	5
Methodology.....	8
Limitations.....	12
Thesis Structure.....	14
CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE DEBATE OVER SECURITY: NARROW VS. BROADER DEFINITION OF SECURITY.....	16
The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Definition of Security.....	16
Attempts to Broaden Security Agenda.....	19
National Security as a National Problem	25
Security Policy as a Process of Securitization/Desecuritization.....	31
CHAPTER 3: EVOLUTION OF SECURITY POLICY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA.....	53
Major Foreign-Security Policy Paradigms in Post-Soviet Russia.....	53
Practice of Securitization in the Russian Federation.....	64
Political Security (Sovereignty) in Post-Soviet Russia: Center-Subject Relations.....	76

Identity Crisis: Lack of National Idea as a Security Concern in Post-Communist Russia.....	81
Dominant Discourse of Danger: Identity and State Authority as Main Referent Objects.....	88
CHAPTER 4: SECURITIZATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN RUSSIA.....	90
Demographic-Security Relationship and Societal Security.....	90
Demographics in Russia.....	96
Societal Security Implications of Demographic Decline.....	98
Securitizing Move.....	107
CHAPTER 5: SECURITIZATION OF INFORMATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.....	121
Information Revolution and Security	122
Modern Information-Communication Technologies and State Sovereignty.....	125
Securitization of Information.....	133
An Assessment of Securitizing Move.....	142
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION.....	145
APPENDICES.....	151
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	155

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Security” is one of the most central notions in the international relations. There are few notions in the field that attracted so much debate as the term of “security” did. In the light of the fall of bipolar international relations and growing trans-nationalism in world politics, the debates over the definition and essence of security gained new impetus. Taking into account these developments, the purpose of this study is to elaborate Russia’s national security policy from the securitization perspective formulated by the “Copenhagen School”.

It is well known for all international relations students that, for a long time International Relations as a field of study has been under domination of realism, which conceives the international relations in terms of territorially bounded nation-states interacting with each other under anarchy, namely under the absence of any centrally law-enforcing establishment. Within this theorizing, security of the states means survival in the face threats emanating from other states.

More importantly, mainstream International Relations theory maintains that the only way to survive under anarchy is power. Though realists disagree over the issue that whether states seek power or security, the common assumption is that states ensure their survival only through power. Power is the only mean that ensures state’s survival. More importantly, realist thinking of international relations conceives power predominantly in terms of military capabilities, namely, in terms of capacity to do physical harm to others. Other capabilities are important only in so far as they contribute to the ability to

successfully deter others from physical attack. In these formulation what is meant by security, is a capacity to protect territorial integrity and sovereign ability to act. In sum as Walt (1991, p. 212), who is a defensive realist, summarizes, *security is about threat, use, and control of military force* (original emphasis).

Neorealist theorizing of security is not only excessively military based, and restrictive so that it does not allow thinking of those issues other than military affairs that can threaten the survival of the state and well-being of its citizens. It is also objectivist and universalistic, in the sense that, mainstream scholars tend to think that there is objective threat to national security independently from the context. And in this way, it does not allow one to see the differences in security thinking from one state to another.

In response to these drawbacks the Copenhagen school, led by Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and others, has proposed an alternative conception of security. First of all, they argued that military is not the sole referent object of national security; rather it is only one of them along with political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. They argue that neither security nor threats to national security is objective phenomena. Rather security is a socially constructed concept that can be different form one context to another.

Thus, Copenhagen school argues that threats to national security are constructed thorough the process which is called securitization. Namely, securitization is a process through which the relevant actors present an issue as an existential threat, which demands extraordinary measures to apply. In other words there is no predetermined list of threats to national security, on the contrary any issue can be conceived and presented

as a threat. But threat is not truly subjective but inter-subjective phenomena. This means that a discourse that takes the form of presenting something as existential threat does not by itself create securitization the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such (Buzan et al.,1998, p. 25). So an issue became a security issue the actor, central decision- making authorities present it as such advocating extraordinary measures to be applied and the audience accept the issue as such.

Research Questions

Though the framework outlined above is useful in challenging traditional thinking on security, it has been criticized for being rather silent on the problem that why authorities choose a specific issue to securitize and not others. And subsequently, why do they attempt at securitizing a specific issue in terms of one referent object and not others. In the light of these criticisms this study aims at answering following questions:

- Is there relationship between the context and respective securitizing move?
- Whether there is any pattern in authorities' attempt at securitizing certain issues in terms of certain referent objects?

If there is any relationship between the context and particular securitizing move, then there should be some pattern between the general security priorities of the given state and particular securitization moves.

Accordingly, the aim of this study is to find a pattern, if any, in making particular securitizing moves. Finding such a pattern would enrich our understanding of

securitization framework formulated by the Copenhagen School. In other words, the study attempts at generating new hypothesis with regard to relatively new and untested theory of securitization. Using Odell's (2001, p. 165) classification, it can be said that this study is a "hypothesis-generating" case study.

It is also important in the sense that, thus far research on securitization framework largely focused in single-case studies and applied the securitization framework to a single case, such as migration (Wishnick, 2006), drug trafficking (Asplund, 2004), education (Collins, 2005), invasion of Iraq (Roe, 2008), etc. Research on more than one securitizing moves, made within the same state, is rather absent. Under these circumstances, this study can be interesting to look for patterns of securitizing moves that occur within the same political setting.

This study starts from the assumption that security policy of each state is being formulated in accordance with the priorities determined by the relevant securitizing actors of the nation. This means that, in a specific time period under the influence of historical, social factors, each state determines certain security priorities, which in turn guides security policy of the state, including, securitization of specific cases. As a rule, these priorities are enlisted in respective state documents and "speech acts" of the state. In other words, in a specific context the state defines its own priorities in its respective documents due to which respective security policy is being formulated and realized. These priorities are guidelines for further securitization of specific issues. These priorities form the "discourse of danger" which declares certain issues as threatening to the survival of the referent object.

In other words, the hypothesis of the study is that discourse of danger that is predominant within a particular state makes some issues, and sectors more amenable to be securitized. If this hypothesis is true, then we should expect that particular securitization moves and broader discourse of danger show congruence. This study will look for such a pattern in the Russian setting. For that aim the context of the security policy of the Russian security policy will be analyzed in detail.

Case Selection

The research questions posed above will be evaluated in the Russian context. It is widely shared by the students of international relations that Russia experience dramatic transformation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the collapse of the Union significantly affected Russia's sense of itself, its place in the world, its friend and enemies. From security policy point of view, this means that the context of the security policy and discourse of danger have changed significantly. Due to these reasons, the post-Soviet Russian Federation presents itself as a "fruitful" field of discussions over security imperatives of the nation, i.e. determining the discourse of danger. It presents good material for analyzing the formation of discourse of danger, which is the independent variable of this study.

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation did not only lose its super-power status but also the organizing ideology. With the collapse of communism, which for decades has bound citizens of different ethnic and religious identities to the state the Russian state found itself in a "vacuum" of any idea that is able

to put its divergent population together. In other words, the breakdown of communist ideology that had kept together the population drove the society into a situation which one observer has described as “a society in crisis because of the breakdown of moral codes which cement it together” (quot. in Weaver et al., 1993: p. 119). Subsequently, the collapse of communism as an ideology that for decades had cemented multiethnic peoples together posed significant challenges to Russia’s new leadership.

As it will be shown in the following chapters, since 1990s the dominant discourse of danger mainly has not been built on military but political and societal dimensions. So, if my hypothesis is true, in this context issues are more likely to be securitized in political and societal security perspective, rather than or along with in military one.

The securitization of two issues will be examined in this study. These issues are demographic decline (which is one of the most important problems in the Russian Federation) and information (information technologies). As it will be clear in the subsequent chapters, these issues have been very critical for the Russian Federation in post-communist period.

The reason behind the selection of these cases is that both of them have been found as relevant to national security in traditional theorizing. The number of the population is traditionally thought as an element of national power in realist thinking. Similarly, information, especially as a mean of propaganda has been thought as tool of warfare. In short, these cases are “most-likely” cases to be securitized from military security perspective. Thus, finding that these issues have been securitized in terms of

political or societal security perspective along with military one would strengthen my hypothesis.

As far as demographics is concerned, it should be noted that the Russian Federation suffers from dramatic demographic decline in last decades. The figures released by Russian Statistic Committee (Goskomstat) revealed a total population numbering 142 million in January 2008 (Goskomstat, 2010). This means that in the territory of the Russian Federation, the decline has been over 5 million between 1989 and 2008. According to official calculations Russia's population will be 137 million in 2025 (Goskomstat, 2009a). But the United Nations medium population projection for Russia foresees a decline to 112 million by 2050 (Population Council, 2005, p. 401).

In addition to above mentioned features of Russian demographics, Russia also shows sharp regional disparities. Namely, Russia is not a state that experience uniform patterns of demographic trends.

National demographic trends in Russia disguise significant regional variance. Russia is comprised of 89 federal subjects, which exhibit hugely divergent demographic patterns in both population composition and dynamics. In 27 regions of the country mortality rate has been 2-3 times more than birth rates (Demographic Policy Concept). These regions are Central and Far Eastern parts of the country that have traditionally populated by ethnic Russians.

Accordingly, 2002 national level census results indicate that certain ethnic groups have increased in both absolute and proportional terms while others have declined. In 1989 ethnic Russians represented 81.5 % of the population of Russian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic (the predecessor of modern Russian Federation):

by 2002 this share had fallen to 79.8 % (Prendergrast, 2004: p. 21). The security implications of these developments have been one of the most important concerns of the Russian political leadership.

In a similar vein, rapid-revolutionary development of modern information-communication technologies posed new challenges for the Russian political elite. As it will be shown in more detail in the respective chapter, one of the basic dilemmas that Russian authorities faced after the demise of the Soviet Union is to find effective ways to rehabilitate national economy, while preserving political unity and national coherence. The dramatic demise of the USSR is still fresh, which shows that unfettered, loosely controlled information flows from abroad can destabilize the unity of the state significantly. It is widely shared belief in Russia that the Soviet Union collapsed mainly due to its inability to effectively tackle with information competition vis-à-vis western bloc (Torkunov et al., 2000, p. 61). This in turn, makes information-communication technologies amenable for securitization.

Methodology

Since the ultimate aim of the study is to look for congruence between dominant discourse of danger and specific securitizing moves made with regard to particular issues, the congruence method will be applied in this study. The essential characteristic of the congruence method is that the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its ability to explain or predict the outcome in a particular case (George and Bennett, 2005, p. 181).

In a similar vein, this study begins with a hypothesis, which predicts congruence between dominant discourse of danger and particular securitizing move. For that aim, an independent variable, which is the dominant danger of discourse in the Russian Federation, will be established. Analyzing respective policy documents and official speeches relevant to the issue the main contours of the discourse of danger will be made clear. Having identified the independent variable, the study will continue to assess its ability to predict the outcome of the dependent variables. The dependent variables of our study are particular securitization of demographic decline and information.

It should be underscored on that point that this study does not claim that there is causal link between dominant discourse of danger on one hand and individual securitizing move on the other. It is of paramount importance to make it clear that this study does not seek an answer to the question that why does the authorities move to securitize certain issues. Indeed, such a claim would require distinct research design so that congruence method would be sufficient. Namely, for the purpose of unveiling casual mechanisms through which independent variable (discourse of danger) produced the outcome of the dependent variable (securitizing move) would require to use process tracing simultaneously with the congruence method. But as this is a preliminary attempt to look for the existence of a relationship between discourse of danger and particular securitizing move, the study will suffice if it finds such a pattern in the Russian context.

It is worthy to remind that the securitization framework has been rather silent in analyzing the relationship between the context of the broader national security policy and particular securitizing move. Under these circumstances, finding that dominant

discourse of danger and the respective securitizing move show certain congruence will be significant puzzle for the Copenhagen School's further research agenda.

As mentioned above, mainstream theorizing of international relations takes objectivist, positivist epistemology, according to which the social world is possible to be studied with the methods of natural sciences. As far as security is concerned, this means that there is pre-determined list of threats and the researcher's duty is to investigate their impact of the given state's national security. In this sense, the mainstream's view of security is rather universalistic.

However, this study takes different view of security, according to which security is an "inter-subjective" phenomenon. Saying that security is an inter-subjective phenomenon means that its content and scope is not predetermined; rather it is being formulated within the public discourse. Any issue is securitized, i.e., gains legitimacy to be counted as security issue, and subsequently requires necessary measures to be taken only through public discourse.

For the sake of differentiation it should be noted that unlike positivist epistemology that treats social world as independent facts out there, discourse analysis claims that the facts acquire meaning only through discourses. Namely, whether the given issue is threat or not can only be solved through analyzing the respective discourse that presents the issue to the public.

So, for the sake of fully understand the security policy of a given nation, one should not judge this policy with predetermined, taken for granted concepts: instead, the aim requires analyzing the official discourse of the community within which the contours of the security policy is shaped. In other words, whether the issue is a security

matter or not, from which perspective does it perceived as security matter can be adequately analyzed through discursive analysis.

Official documents of the state, speeches of leaders, and parliamentary debates over the issue are the sources for detecting securitized issues. As mentioned above, security issue is a development that poses threat to the survival of the referent object. So, anything that is being presented in this manner is security issue for a given community. That means that only through analyzing official discourse, one can test whether demographic decline is a perceived security issue or not for the given state, i.e. the Russian Federation. In order to be counted as security issue, one should find the signs that Russian officials present the issue (demographic decline) as a development that threatens the stability of the state, the proper functioning of the state structures or societal unity. The facts that official documents, as well as leading officials present the issue in this manner and advocated for extraordinary measures to tackle with it will justify the assumption.

In this regard, this study will use contextual analysis to examine respective securitization of the issue mentioned above. As Jorgensen (2002, p. 78) puts it texts can be understood in relation to other texts and in relation to the social context. This means that the meaning of a particular discourse can be understood only in relation to a context. For instance, securitization discourse in the Russian Federation can only be analyzed in relation to the historical context that Russia found itself after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In order to unveil respective securitizing moves, relevant texts will be analyzed through “intertextual chains”¹ in security policy of the Russian Federation. For the signs of securitization, official documents that adopted with regard to national security such as, “Security Strategy of Russia”, “Information Security Strategy of Russia”, “The conception of Single Information Space in Russia”, “Demographic Policy Concept of the Russian Federation till 2015” has been examined.

In addition, annual “State of Nation” addresses that have been delivered by the president of the Russian Federation have also been analyzed. Since these addresses predominantly focus on the most urgent problems that the nation faces examination of them can be useful in finding the contours of the predominant security thinking of the nation, as well as, the characteristics of the securitization of the given issue.

Limitations

This study is a moderate attempt to apply Copenhagen School’s framework to a specific case. In so doing, it does not elaborate the process of securitization in its entirety.

Whether an issue has been successfully securitized, i.e., whether the relevant audience accepted the issue as such or not is out of my focus. Namely, it does not look at audience side of the process deliberately. The study exclusively focused on securitizing move, namely the authorities’ attempt at depicting an issue as a security threat.

First of all, this thesis does not aim at studying the results of respective securitizing moves. Recall that our aim is to investigate the existence of any pattern

¹ Jorgensen (2002, p. 74) defines Intertextual chain as a series of texts in which each text incorporates elements from another text or other texts.

between the dominant discourse of danger and the respective securitizing move. In this regard, whether the audience approved the move or not, will not contribute to our aim. My focus is on the making of securitizing move. Regardless of the public's approval, respective securitizing move can show congruence with the dominant discourse of danger. Due to above-mentioned reason, the approval stage of securitization will be deliberately kept out of concern.

But it should be added on this point that, this study does not negate the role of audience at all. On the contrary, this study does envisage the view that the security policy of the nation reflects certain consensus emerged among the political-security elite. On that point, this study takes respective policy documents, such as security doctrines as consensus papers. It is doubtless that before being public, these documents come across intense debates behind the doors and in the end result reflect the consensus of the relevant political elite of the given state.

Another limitation of the study is about the time period of the analysis. Namely, taking into account the fact that securitization is a dynamic process; any attempt to analyze it should limit itself within a certain time period. In this regard, this study examines only those securitization moves that occurred under the presidency of Vladimir Putin (2000-2008). Certain facts and developments outside this time period have been used to form a background and to show the continuity of the respective securitization move made by the Russian political leadership. Nevertheless, the exact focus of the study is the presidency of V. Putin who had been in the office from 2000 till 2008.

Thesis Structure

The thesis contains six chapters including introduction and conclusion. The second chapter aims at forming the theoretical framework for the study. For that aim, debate on security is being scrutinized in detail. Since the main concern of the study is to show the drawbacks of the mainstream thinking of national security the chapter began to outline the main tenets of realist notion of security. Following that alternative definitions of security are being examined. The exclusive focus is on the framework of analysis proposed by the “Copenhagen School”. The framework of analysis is located within the debate around the basic notion of “securitization”. Having identified the drawbacks of the securitization framework, the chapter concludes with the criticism of the CS framework, which paves the way for formulating the research question of the study.

The third chapter scrutinizes the evolution of security policy in the post-communist Russia. The aim of the chapter is to form background for specific securitization moves. For that aim, the major foreign-security trends are being examined. Having identified the main directions of national security policy of the Russian Federation, the chapter continues to unveil the basic contours of the dominant discourse of danger in the Russian Federation. In this regard, respective national security doctrines and official speeches delivered by the Russian political leadership are being analyzed.

Following it, the fourth chapter mainly deals with the securitization of demographic decline in the Russian Federation. The chapter began outlining the relationships between demographic factors and national security focusing mainly on

societal security notion introduced by the Copenhagen School. In this regard, migrational and inter-ethnic factors analyzed. The chapter examines respective documents and speeches that presented the demographic decline as a threat to the Russian national security.

In a similar vein, the fifth chapter focuses on the securitization of information-communication technologies. The chapter initially outlines information-security relationships making clear the political security notion and information security phenomena. The chapter concludes with the examination of the respective securitization move with regard to information. For that aim official documents and speeches are being scrutinized. In addition, emergency measures that have been applied to tackle with the issue have been examined, as well. The study ends with a conclusion where basic findings are being numerated.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE DEBATE OVER SECURITY: NARROW VS. BROADER DEFINITION OF SECURITY

As security is one of the most important concepts in International Relations studies, there have been serious debates around it. For a long period of time, international relations have been under the dominance of realism, which has also dominated security thinking. But as contending views of international relations unfolded, alternative views on security have emerged, as well. In this regard Bicchi (2001, p. 2) observes that security studies has been attempted to be broaden in two directions: vertically, in terms of referent objects of security; and horizontally, in terms of threats to security. In this context, the aim of this chapter is provide a review of competing approaches to security.

The Realist Theory of International Relations and its Definition of Security

As realism conceives the nation-states as main actors of international relations, it claims that the only referent point of international security is territorially bounded nation-states. In this regard, Waltz (1979, p. 94) argues that in international politics “states set the scene in which they along with non-state actors” pursue politics vis-à-vis each other. Moreover, despite the fact that from time to time non-state actors may deepen their role in international politics, Waltz continues, states nevertheless “set the rules of the intercourse” and by that way are able to change the rules according to their needs. This means that international relations, as a type of activity, are about the relationships

among territorially bounded states. Accordingly, security, as well as other concepts should be defined in relation to major units of international relations, i.e. states.

In state-centered traditional security thinking, security has been conceived mainly in terms of military security. According to tenets of realism the states interact in international system under constraints imposed by anarchical nature of the system, which requires them to rely on themselves for survival. States want as much as freedom as possible to avoid from being drawn into circumstances that could cause them great harm (Terriff et al. 1999, p. 37). Survival is the most important aim that the states pursue in international arena. As Waltz (1979, p. 126) put it, only if survival is assured can states safely seek other goals as tranquility, wealth and power.

Power is of vital importance in ensuring security, i.e. survival. Despite the fact that power has been conceived as an important notion in realist security thinking, there is no consensus on meaning that power has in inter-state relations, and especially in security thinking. According to some, who are traditionally called as defensive realists, power is not the aim but the mean through which, states ensure the security in anarchic international system. In this regard, Waltz (1979, p. 126) argues that, the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.

From defensive realist point of view, power maximization may not increase the security but threaten it. More precisely, it is argued that one state's quest for more power decreases the other's security, which in turn becomes more cautious about the intentions of the first one. So, the existence of "security dilemma", as Herz (1950) defines it as such, in fact makes those states more insecure that try to get more and more power. The unilateral quest for more power creates "vicious cycle of security and power

accumulation” (Herz, 1950, p. 157, quoted here from Grieco, p. 189), which in turn diminishes rather than increases the security of the states.

On the other hand, offensive realists, such as Schweller (1996) contend that it is not logical to assume that all states are satisfied with their positions in the system. On the contrary, he argues that without the possibility that at least some states are power maximizers rather than security seekers, neorealist notion of “security dilemma” loses its logic (Schweller, 1996, p. 119). As some of them may be eager to improve their positions through power accumulation and expansion, all states should cherish power over security. Simply, only more power can ensure state’s survival in the face of expansionist intentions of other states.

In short, Schweller argues that, “not security but fear of relative losses is the prime movers of neorealist theory” (1996, p. 119). Accordingly, Mearsheimer (1990, p. 12) maintains that, for the sake of surviving, states seek opportunities to weaken potential adversaries and improve their relative power position. In other words, security of the state is maintained not only by crude material capabilities, but also by relative material capabilities, namely, for states’ security relative gains and losses in inter-state activities play much more important role.

Regardless of being defensive or offensive, realist theorizing of international relations asserts that the only referent object of security is states. Furthermore, it maintains that under anarchic system the states do ensure their security by relying on military capabilities. In other words, realist thinking conceives power in terms of military capabilities, namely, in terms of capacity to do physical harm to others. Other capabilities are important only in so far as they contribute to the ability to successfully

deter others from physical attack. In these formulation what is meant by security, is a capacity to protect territorial integrity and sovereign ability to act. Anything is a threat to national security in so far as it diminishes state's ability to retain enough power to deter others from harming it. Accordingly, security is about *threat, use, and control of military force* (Walt, 1991, p. 212, original emphasis).

More importantly, as realism, especially its structural version takes the states as "like units", mainstream theorizing of international relations envisages universalistic view on security. Namely, realism assumes that the like units of international politics face with the same kind of threats. In other words, realism tends to assume that there is predetermined list of threats that challenges state's survival. Grounded in a series of assumptions, such as anarchy and the centrality of the state, neorealist theory envisages objectivist epistemology. Due to which, neorealist security studies claim that it can confidently declare what is and is not "security issue", or what threats are, and to whom they refer (Krause and Williams, 1996, p. 233).

Attempts to Broaden Security Agenda

Vertical Broadening of Security Studies

Realist conceptualization of security, have been challenged by alternative theorizing of international relations. First of all, scholars from different theoretical background challenged realism's state-centric approach to security. World system, society, and individual have been proposed as a referent object for security in this regard.

According to Kolodziej (1992) there are four units of analysis of Post-Cold War security studies. The first of these units of analysis is the nation state as it had been in previous historical periods. Kolodziej analyses this unit of analysis in terms of organized violence and contends that it was especially significant in Cold War era. The second unit of analysis is civil-economic society, which includes groups, individuals and corporate bodies that pursue wealth and linked to the global economic system outside state ownership.

The third kind of unit of analysis for Kolodziej is civil political society. In this respect, personal and group liberties are closely related to security. In this regard mass abuses of human rights and fundamental freedoms are thought as security threat. The last unit of analysis is the international security system. According to Kolodziej international security system is composed of provisional security structures reached at the interstate level and between the state and civil society, bifurcated into economic and political elements.

As Kolodziej's conceptualization of civil political society as a unit of analysis implies, in many instances the state can be treated as threat rather than referent object for security. Similarly, Buzan (1991) argued that in some societies that are divided across ethnic, religious lines, the nation state can be a threat to the community rather being a referent object for security. So, instead of the states, societies should be regarded as object of security (Buzan 1991).

In a similar vein, Brown (1998, p. 3) contends that in the light of deepening globalization territorially defined nation-states are no longer legitimate actor to guarantee security to their fellow citizens. On the contrary, just incongruities inherited

legal/political structure of the nation state creates dangerous instabilities for the world society. In other words, the referent object for security is not nation states, but the world society as a whole.

Others argue that the legitimate referent object for security should be the individual. In this regard Booth (1991, p.319) argues that only emancipation of individual from physical and human constraints can produce true security (quot, in Terriff et al.1999, p. 20).

Feminist theorizing of International Relations envisages quite different approach towards security analysis, as it starts from different ontology. Feminists take the gender as a unit of analysis, and in that way, challenge the state's traditional role of security provider. Feminist scholars argue that due to inequalities embedded in modern state structures, the security of the women has been threatened by the states of which they are citizens. As Tickner (1997, p. 625) puts it, rather than seeing military capability as an assurance against outside threats to the state, militaries are seen by the feminists as antithetical to individuals' particularly, women's security.

In this context, Bilgin (2002) accuses mainstream approaches to security of not only being state-centric in the sense that taking state's security as a sole referent object. At the same time she contends (2002, p. 101) that the role that had been traditionally attached to the state in ensuring security of other referent objects should be rethought. In this regard, Bilgin argues that adequate attention should be paid to human agency, namely social movements and intellectuals who are also agents of security. Thus according to her, students of peace and security can re-configure security relations

through their academic works, since theory and practice are not separate but mutually constitutive.

So there is no consensus over referent points in security studies. In such circumstances, it is hard to discharge any of these claims mentioned above. With this regard, it should be noted that the meaning of security is not the same for referent objects that cited above. Moreover, in most instances the security of one referent object may be achieved at the expense of other's insecurity. Individual security mentioned above is a good illustrative case in this regard. This means that assessing security of one referent object requires unique set of conceptions and research design.

As this study's main concern is national security of a state, namely Russia, we will use those theories that take the state as a referent object. This does not mean that the alternatives provided above are illegitimate. But the point is that defining the "proper referent object" of security is out of concern of this study.

The choice made here is a tactical one. In other words, given the fact that one of the most important aims of this study is to challenge mainstream IR theory's inability in reflecting the reality, it is more rationale to take the state as a referent object as realism does and shows its own incompleteness with regard to its own object of study. In other words, taking the same phenomena as an object of study, this thesis aims at showing the obsolescence of mainstream's definition of security. So, the choice in favor of state as a referent object is a tactical one aimed at challenging mainstream while taking the same phenomenon as a referent object. While acknowledging the importance of other referent objects, we will focus on state security below.

Horizontal Broadening of Security Agenda

In the face of narrow, military dominated definition of security, there have been proposed alternative, “wider” concepts of security. In the face of profound changes that have been unfolded since early 1980s, scholars from different theoretical camps attempted to broaden security agenda. According to Buzan (1997) the interest in widening security thinking is the consequence of the end of the Cold War. As the military rivalry between the two super powers began to lose its intensity, the non-military aspects of security acquired importance once again (Buzan, 1997, p. 6).

Huysmans (1998) contends in this regard that the end of the Cold War caused uncertainty and indeterminacy, which in turn made it inevitable to find new kind of threats, enemies and dangers. Huysmans makes distinction between daily security and ontological security. While daily security relates to “the mediation of friend and enemies”, ontological security is about ambiguity and uncertainty, namely “the mediation of chaos and order (Huysmans, 1998, p. 241-243). So, he argues that the uncertainty caused by the end of Cold War goes beyond the lack of enemy or the question of world order. It also seems to involve a deeper, wider, more general problem of ontological (in)security (1998, p. 244).

Even before the end of Cold War, with the rise of trans-nationalism the attempts at redefining gained new impetus. Especially, the growing concerns about environmental problems urged academia to challenge realist notion of security, national security as well. In this regard, Mathews (1989) argued that the developments that characterize modern state of international politics demand redefinition of what

constitutes national security. She proposed to include resource, environmental and demographic issues into the domain of security studies (1989, p. 162).

Accordingly Ulmann (1983, p. 133) proposes alternative definition of security. According to his conceptualization a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that 1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private nongovernmental entities within the state. Similarly, Levy (1995, p. 40) defines national security threat as “a situation in which some of the nation’s most important values are drastically degraded by external action”.

Despite the fact that these formulations do pave the way for broadening security agenda significantly, realists argue that, it does so undermining the analytical usefulness of the term of security. More precisely, security defined in terms of any development that threatens the life of inhabitants is rather vague concept. In this regard, Walt (1991, p. 213) contends that, defining the term in this way would destroy its intellectual coherence.

More importantly, as mentioned with regard to realist conception of security, these alternative views of security do take universalistic position. In other words, in all these alternative conceptualizations the authors tend to think of security as an objective phenomenon that threatened by some kind of predetermined list of threats. The scholars who advocate for broadening security agenda usually draw attention to some specific issue while not challenging the nature of the concept of security that traditionally used by realist scholars.

Namely, the alternatives cited in this section do share the assumption with realism that states are alike and subsequently face the same kind of threats. As Krause and Williams (1996, p. 233) also put it, the above-mentioned attempts accept neorealist claim that “security” is reducible to an objective referent and *set of threats* (emphasis added). Namely, all these views do not take into account that the term of national security is context dependent and can vary from one nation to another. This, in turn, makes all these alternatives the target of criticism, which is common to realist epistemology. In short, without challenging realism’s objectivist epistemology, any attempt at authoritatively broadening security agenda falls short in capturing the difference of importance that security gains in different social, cultural, and historical circumstances.

National Security as a National Problem

As mentioned in previous section, realist security thinking assumes that the term of security means the same thing in all states, and subsequently all states should formulate almost same policies in ensuring their security. In most instances, the best way to security is power politics, namely, the power defined in terms of material capabilities is the only asset available to the states in ensuring their survival under anarchic international system.

Contrary to these assumptions Wolfers (1952) contends that security is not purely objective phenomenon and subsequently it is not logical to assert uniformity in security policies of different nations. Wolfers defines security both as an objective and

subjective phenomenon: in an objective sense it measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked (Wolfers, 1952, p. 485). In this regard, it is argued that, security is not the actual or desired situation; rather it is a value that nations cherish more or less. Moreover, as different states face different kind of threats, or even different level of the same threat, one should pay adequate attention to differences in security policies of two different nations.

More importantly, security, for Wolfers, is the situation or the feeling of such kind of situation in which the nation's core values are successfully protected from the threats. So, specific nations naturally have different views about their core values, which mean that specific nations should have specific views on the security as well. Moreover, as his analysis implies (pp. 481-482), even the same nation can have divergent view about its national interests, the protection of which is the aim of security policy. In this regard, Wolfers (1952, p. 489) maintains that, "the efforts for security by a particular nation will tend to vary, other things being equal, with the range of values for which protection is being sought".

According to Wolfers (1952, p. 489), there are certain values that are worthy to be protected for all states. For example, he continues, national independence and territorial integrity is those kinds of values that all states try to protect. But even in these circumstances, Wolfers, argues that different states adopts different means in protecting those values, due to both material capabilities and historical, cultural peculiarities (1952, p. 488-489). In sum, due to the fact that the existence and nature of core values is determined largely by domestic factors, such as "national character, tradition,

preferences and prejudices” (Wolfers, 1952, p. 488), adequate attention should be paid to these differences in assessing the security policy of a given state.

One of the most important qualifications pointed by Wolfers is that, survival, is not the only value that the states try to protect (1952, p. 488). Many states do consider other values, such as individual liberties, the propagation of specific ideologies and etc. as core values to be protected. For instance, for decades it had been conceived that any impediment that hinders the spread of communist values is a threat the Soviet Union. In this sense, the meaning of “survival” is not the same for different nations.

Buzan (1991) conceives similar view with regard to the differences that security acquires in different states. According to him, neorealism’s focus on systemic factors does not take into account that the security issues within international anarchy are highly conditioned by the domestic characteristics of states, along with the systemic factors (1991, p. 60). The domestic characteristics of the state are combination of three elements that defines the state: the idea of the state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state (1991, p. 65).

Accordingly, Buzan (1991) argues that the relative power capabilities are not the only element that determines the states’ relations with other states. On the contrary, domestic characteristics, such as the idea of the state and the institutions have significant effect on state’s position within the international system. And, as these factors are different nearly in all states, the universalistic view of security cannot be useful in assessing the security problems of different states. More precisely, because of the importance of what is different among states, one cannot expect the concept of

national security to exhibit much unity of meaning in any general sense (Buzan, 1991, p. 69).

Accordingly, each of the three elements is equally important in assessing the security of the state. In other words, the security of state is threatened not only when the physical base of it (territory, population and) is under the attack; rather the institutions that govern the physical base and the idea that establishes legitimacy in the minds of its citizens are equally important for the security of the state as a whole.

The idea of the state is especially important dimension of national security in Russian context. On one hand, after the collapse of communism as a state ideology Russia obliged to find its alternative. On the other hand, Russia's historical-demographical peculiarities, its multi-national character makes it more urgent to find an ideological bound. Due to these factors the idea of the state and its national security implications deserves thorough examination.

It is commonly held idea that modern-nation states, as a social organization, owe their existence to the existence of a nation, which is constituted by the individuals who share sense of common unity and destiny. A commonly held national idea, from this point of view, is a pre-requisite for the survival of a state. The common history is not sufficient in this regard. Along with common history, "present-day consent and the desire to live together" are also necessary for nation's, i.e., state's survival (Renan, 1990, p. 11).

In a similar vein Buzan (1991, p. 82) points out that a *strong idea of some sort* is a necessary component of a secure state (emphasis added). The idea is strong so long as it is being widely shared by the nation and can compete successfully with the

alternatives. This kind of idea gives purpose to the state institutions and subsequently ensures its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. For Buzan (1991, p. 70) nation and organizing ideologies consist the idea of the state. In other words, generally shared answer to the question “who are we” is of vital importance in keeping the population together. Similarly, an organizing idea that legitimizes the state authorities in the eyes of the public is of same importance. This kind of ideology should stem from population’s view of itself and its “mission”. Only by forging such kind of ideology, the state apparatus can rely on public’s “willing” loyalty and subsequently hopes for sacrifices for state needs.

As far as nation is concerned, it should be noted that the character of relationships between the state on one hand and the nation that populates its territory on the other hand is extremely important phenomenon in terms of national security. Namely, different states can experience very different kinds of insecurity with regard to nationality issues: for some states the tensions between the state and the nation creates security problems (Buzan 1991, p. 78). This issue is especially relevant for those states that constituted of more than one nation. Any tension among these nations naturally threatens the state’s survival. As mentioned above, Russia provides good example in this regard.

With regard to these states the second component of the idea of the state, namely, organizing ideologies gains greater importance. Widely held organized idea may mitigate the tensions among competitive nations within the state, and by providing legitimacy to the state can ensure secure environment. As Buzan (1991, p. 76) puts it, organizing ideas that transcends nationality issues may ensure citizens adherence to the

state institutions while keeping them together. As it will be put in following chapters, just the search of this kind of organizing ideology that able to function as communism did for decades is one of the most urgent security problem that Russian political leadership tries to solve.

Overall, besides its importance in challenging realism's universalistic view of security, Buzan's conceptualization of state opens the way to broaden the security agenda as well. In this regard his conceptualization of security is related to the Copenhagen School's framework that will be briefed below. As mentioned with regard to Wolfers' analysis, the states do not solely try to protect their territories from military invasions they also try to protect their governing institutions and the ideologies from being threatened. This means that the threats to national security is not solely military in essence, on the contrary, many kinds of threat as diverse as political, ideological, ecological, economical and so on, can threaten national security along with the military ones. This view will be used in assessing Russia's security policy in subsequent chapters.

In sum, contrary to realist claims of universality in security problems, it becomes obvious that wide range factors affect the state's security thinking, along with systemic factors. The national security is a national problem. In other words, the security policy of a given state is not solely the rational response to external factors that are universal in their effect; rather domestic peculiarities of the states do have influence over security calculations, which makes it inevitable to abandon realism's universalistic notion of security. The meaning of security, as well as the threats to national security cannot be determined exogenously; rather the specific threats do have respective meaning only so

long as they have been conceived as such by the state. The securitization approach tries to explain the process that specific issues are labeled as security threat.

Security Policy as a Process of Securitization/ Desecuritization

The Concept of Securitization

A framework formulated by Copenhagen School can be regarded as remedy to the above-mentioned drawback that shared by both traditional security strategists and those who advocate to widen security agenda. The aim of this section is to elaborate the framework proposed by Buzan et al. (1998).

Though Copenhagen School shares with other “wideners” the aspiration for broader security thinking, they differ at least on one important point. Namely, unlike their counterparts who argue for broadening security agenda, the scholars assembled under the label of Copenhagen School do it while redefining the essence of security. More precisely, they do agree that threats to national security should not be solely conceived in military terms, the but in order to be counted as security threat it must meet strictly defined criteria, namely, an issue should be securitized by the relevant actor before it can be regarded as security issue (Buzan et al.1998, p. 5, 23). More precisely, to be securitized means that the issue is “presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (pp. 23-24). In other words, contrary to traditional claims that security threats are objective in nature and universal across time and space, Buzan et al.

contend that security is an “inter-subjective” phenomenon that can be differed across time and from community to community.

Security as an inter-subjective phenomena means that security is neither something waiting to be founded and defined objectively. Rather, security is a self-referential practice, namely, it is the practice that renders something to a security issue. More importantly, the issue becomes a security issue not necessarily because a real existential threat exists; rather it becomes a security issue because it is presented as such a threat (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 24). In this regard, Weaver (1995, p. 55) argues that security is a speech act: namely, by uttering “security”, a state representative moves a particular development into specific area and thereby claims special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it. In other words, the utterance of the word of “security” is in itself an act of security.

On this point, the authors from the Copenhagen School solely rely on the language in depicting an issue as a security threat. But as McDonald (2008, p. 568-569) puts it, the language is not the only mean through which the meaning is communicated. Wilkinson (2007) argues that, especially in undemocratic settings, physical action should also be paid attention in analyzing securitization move. In this regard, McDonald argues that along with the language, the analysts that use securitization framework should also pay adequate attention to other tools, such as visual representations as well. In addition he finds the exclusive focus on the language problematic in the sense that it excludes forms of bureaucratic practices and physical action that are parts of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed (p. 569).

As the term of “inter-subjective” implies, the securitization is not a process driven solely by the actor, namely, the representative who defines something as security issue and advocating for special measure to tackle with it. On the contrary, according to the authors, for the fulfillment of securitization as process, the relevant audience should accept the issue as an existential threat and bear the burdens of special measures that deemed necessary to deal with it. A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such (Buzan et al.1998, p. 25). Without such an acceptance, one can only speak about a “securitizing move”, i.e. an attempt by the actor at framing an issue as an existential threat to a referent object.

The last point should not be used to exaggerate the role of the audience in the process of securitization. Saying that the actor should relate its arguments on the issue to the audience’s preferences is not the same thing to say that the latter has equal possibilities with the actor in shaping the security policy. The relationship between the power and the audience is always structured in favor of the former, and this is much more apparent in such a realm as security. Nevertheless, even in this realm, especially in democratic settings, the actor should convince the audience to the saliency if the alleged threat. As Buzan et al. (1998, p. 25) themselves put it, acceptance does not necessarily mean in civilized, dominance free discussion: it only means that an order always rest on coercion as well as consent. Since security can never only be imposed, there is some need to argue one’s case.

So, according to Buzan et al. securitization is the move that takes politics beyond established rules by labeling the issue a “security threat”. Securitization begins with “securitizing move” which is an actor’s attempt to presenting an issue as a security threat and advocating for extraordinary tools to tackle with it. In doing so, an issue is dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme priority: thus by labeling it as *security*, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 26). Having gotten the audience’s “approval”, the securitizing move is followed by emergency action, which can be in many forms, such as, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on civil-political rights and so on. In other words, emergency measures are an integral part of successful securitization.

The last point with regard to the emergency measures caused criticism by the researchers in the field. Thus, Collins (2005) and Roe (2008) contend that Copenhagen School’s focus on emergency measures is excessive. Namely, they argue that an issue can be successfully “securitized”, i.e., the actors and the audience can come to the agreement that any given issue is a threat while they can still have differences in the ways of tackling with the issue. Analyzing the securitization of education in Malaysia (Collins, 2005) and the Iraq’s WMD in the United Kingdom (Roe, 2008) comes to the conclusion that the absence of emergency measures does not mean that the issue has not been securitized. Namely, the point is that due to myriad reasons the elite can or has to deal with the issue without using emergency measures. According to Collins (2005, p. 573), the decision by the elite to resolve the existential threat through the political means does not mean the issue is less threatening, it just means that the actor prefers to pursue a political solution, for instance, because they recognize that the adoption of

emergency measures can be counterproductive. As it will be shown below, in case of demographics policy the Russian political leadership took similar stand, as well.

In a similar vein, Roe (2008, p. 617) points out that the actor (the Blair government) had been able to convince the British audience that the Iraqi WMD is a security threat. But as far as the adoption of emergency measures, namely military actions are concerned, the actor failed to succeed. But it should not mean that in this context the Iraqi weapons have not been securitized at all.

As a solution to the above-mentioned drawback, Roe suggests that the securitization should be conceived as a distinct two-stage process: the stage of “identification”, where an issue is defined as “security”; and the stage of “mobilization”, where the responses to that issue are thereafter established. As it makes one to question the “stageness” of the securitization, obviously, the two-stage approach outlined above empowers the researcher to analyze the respective securitization in more detail.

In short, scholars from the Copenhagen School point out that, a successful securitizing act is a combination of both the language and the society (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). In this formulation, there is no claim that the actor is free in choosing the issues to be securitized and subsequently imposing extraordinary measures to deal with them. In other words, in order to be successful in securitizing an issue the act should meet certain conditions. According to Buzan et al. (1998, p. 33) there are two types of conditions in this regard: internal and external.

Among the internal conditions of a speech act, the most important is to follow the security form, the grammar of security, and construct a plot that includes existential threat, point of no return, and a possible way out. The external aspect of securitizing act

has two conditions. First of all, the securitizing actor must hold such a position within the society that legitimizes him/her to speak of security of the referent object.

The other external condition is about the threats. Buzan et al. (1998, p. 33) maintains that it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if certain objects can be referred to that are generally held to be threatening. In themselves, these objects never make for necessary securitization, but they are definitely facilitating conditions (1998, p. 33).

From the review provided thus far it became evident that in the securitization framework the focus is mainly on the designation of threat. But as McDonald (2008, p. 578) suggests, such an exclusive focus on the designation of threat misses much about the construction of security through privileging the “content” of security over its meaning in particular contexts. As mentioned above, the meaning of security is not the same across time and the context. As this is the case in the post- Soviet Russian context, the meaning of security differs dramatically from that of the Soviet era. This means that articulations of the values in need of being protected are more prominent than articulations of “from what or whom we need protection” (McDonald, 2008, p. 579). This caveat in mind, special focus will be put on the meaning of national security in the post-Communist Russia, below.

Copenhagen School and the Security Sectors

Along with challenging mainstream’s objectivist view on security, Buzan et al. also argue that threats to national security should not be solely conceived in terms of military

threats. As Weaver (1995, p. 54) puts it, the struggle that underlines the logic of security, namely survival, can take place in spheres other than military one the priority of military means is a contingent, technical feature. On the contrary, they argue that national security is a multidimensional phenomenon, which consisted of more than one interrelated sectors. According to their formulation, the notion of national security encompasses following dimensions: 1) military (territorial integrity of the state), 2) political (legitimacy of political authority), 3) societal (group identity), 4) environmental (global ecosystem), and 5) economic (access to resources, finances, and markets to sustain livelihood) (Buzan et al., 1998: pp. 7-8). Taking into account of their significance for this study military, societal and political security deserves special attention.

Military Sector

Military security is about the defense of state's territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of both internal and external threats that are military in essence. This dimension of security has been traditionally thought as the only element of national security in mainstream approaches to security. Though Copenhagen School's conceptualization of military security resembles traditional security thinking in this regard, it differs significantly as well. Namely, unlike traditional security thinking, Copenhagen School's framework does not perceive military security relations as function of crude calculation of military capabilities of states. As Buzan et al. (1998, p. 57) explicitly put it, different societies may respond to the same "objective" security situation in different ways. More

importantly, it is argued that the meaning of one state's military capabilities is not same for different states. In other words, crude military capabilities need to be securitized in order to be counted as threat. Due to historical, geographical and cultural factors a state can securitize or de-securitize other's military capabilities.

Military sector is one of the most important sectors that is susceptible to further securitization. For Buzan et al. (1998, p. 57) military threats and vulnerabilities traditionally have been accorded primacy in security thinking. As one's military capabilities are the cornerstone of this state's security, i.e. military security, any issue that thought to be directed at diminishing one's military power is a military security issue. As the definition cited above indicates, not all threats to territorial integrity and sovereignty are military security matter; rather in order to be counted as such the threat should be military in essence, or should be directed towards minimizing the country's military potential.

In this regard, one may object, saying that any issue can be dangerous to military capability of the state. This is especially true about classical relationship between economic wealth and military power. But it should be kept in mind that the sectors cited above are not absolutely free form another, but retain their distinct features. For the military sector, military capabilities of the state are one of these features.

Political Sector

As far as political security is concerned, Buzan et al. defines it in terms of organizational stability of social order. In this regard, it is pointed out that, "[T]he heart

of the political sector is made up of *threats to state sovereignty* (emphasis is added) (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 141). As all kind of threats to national security aimed at undermining state sovereignty, political security constitutes that subgroup of threats that do not use massive military, identification, economic or environmental means (ibid., p. 142). In this regard, it should be said that, the distinctness of political threats is that they are directed to undermining not territorial integrity, economic self-sufficiency, but to undermining the very legitimacy of political authority. As Buzan (1991, p.118) put it “political threats are aimed at the organizational stability of the state...[The] very idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology and the institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats”. So sovereignty is the main object of political security.

In this regard, one can argue that, traditionally, all threats to national security have been defined through sovereignty discourse. But the difference that political security concept makes is that, threats to national sovereignty have not necessarily to be military threats; rather political ideological threats can undermine stability of state structures as terribly as military invasion does. From these considerations political security can be defined as a absence of existential threats to political entity’s organizational-political stability, that are not military, identificational, economic and environmental in essence. As it will be shown below, adverse information flows can be such kind of threats to the political sovereignty of organizational units.

Societal Sector

Societal security deals with identity problems. The organizing concept in the societal security is identity. Societal insecurity exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community. Identity is a set of common beliefs, worldviews shared by a given community. In other words, identity is a set of values that defines “we” and differs “we” from the “others”. In this case societal security can also be understood as “identity security” (Buzan et al., 1998: p. 120).

The significant difference from other sectors is that, in societal security the main point of concern is society, i.e., its identity. Accordingly, the referent objects in the societal sector are large societal groups that carry the loyalties and devotion of subjects (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 123). These large societal groups can be tribes, clans, ethnicities, religious groups, civilizations and so on. All of them are identity groups. The members of the identity groups share the common outlook. Anything that is conceived as “threatening” to the survival of the identity by them is, by definition, societal security threat. Since the above-mentioned identity groups may have different organizational structure, the securitizing actor may differ from one group to another. In anyway, facilitating conditions cited above “entitles” certain members of the group to speak and pursue about the threats.

As far as national security is concerned, it should be reminded that nation is an organizing part of the “idea”. Accordingly, almost each state advocates for a specific view of the nation that it claims to represent and preserve through its apparatus. If this

view is conceived as threatened by the specific developments, then the relevant state authorities can also securitize it through securitizing discourse. In other words, in terms of societal security, the state can also be a securitizing actor.

This is important in the sense that in those states that constructed by different ethnic-religious groups each of these groups may have their own concerns stemmed from societal security. As far as Russia is concerned, this point is extremely important in the sense that, as multi-ethnic, multi-religious state, Russia is a unique example in analyzing societal security. The point is that, as state and nation do not correspond in Russia, state-national security and societal security of different ethnic-religious groups shows themselves as antithetical phenomenon. This in turn, creates further problems in ensuring both national security and societal security of societal groups.

This caveat in mind, while assessing securitization of demographic decline we will take societal security as one of the dimensions of national security. In other words, for the aim of this study we will not focus on societal security of different groups; rather as the main object of study is national security policy of Russia as a state, we will focus on the dynamics by which Russian political establishment tries to securitize particular issue from societal security perspective. For the aim of this study, societal security means nothing but a dimension of national security.

Economic Sector

Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets to sustain acceptable level of welfare and state power (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 8). Though

“acceptable level” may indeed vary from state to state, it can be argued that each state needs certain level of resources to survive. In this regard, it should be noted that economic security used in securitization approach is different from classical security conception. More precisely, the mainstream security thinking does take into account economic factors. But it does so, for the sake of military capabilities of the state. On the contrary, securitization approach takes economic security as an independent sector, though it does not deny relationships between economy and military, either. From securitization perspective, economic security can be threatened if state’s ability to reach desired resources is limited significantly. As Buzan et al. (1998, p. 105) put it, if state’s need of access to outside supplies that are required to feed its population and industry is threatened, the national economy can be clearly securitized. In the subsequent chapters it will be clear whether specific cases were securitized from economic perspective or not.

But as it is the case in other sectors, economic security issues are also constructed phenomena. Simply, the states that pursue mercantilist economic policy tend to securitize almost any foreign economic involvement, while liberals tend to negate securitization in economics. This means that, whether an issue is a threat or not can only be solved within securitization process. In other words it cannot be determined without analyzing respective security discourse of the nation.

Environmental Sector

Environmental security is relatively new concept. Though other sectors did attract attention in previous research, the attempts to formulate links between security and environment is characteristic to modern security studies. Copenhagen school determines environmental security as the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 8). Perhaps, most striking difference that environmental security presents is that it does not take state as a referent object directly. Instead of it, the referent object in the environmental security is the environment as such or some strategic part of it (ibid., p. 75). In addition, human civilization can also be presented as a referent object in this regard. As the Copenhagen School representatives argue, securitizing actors can perceive the threats that stem from environment threatening either the environment itself or the life of human kind. Depending on this, the main point of concern may be either the environment or the survival of humankind. The state, as a socio-political institution, can either be a referent object of environmental security or it can act as an actor in securitizing or desecuritizing environmental issues. For example, in order to securitize an issue from environmental point of view, an actor may link the survival of the population to the environment and thus may advocate for extraordinary measures.

Nevertheless, it should noted that unlike other sectors, environment- state security relations is rather hard to establish, due to which state securitizing actors may opt for indirect ways in securitizing-desecuritizing environmental threats.

Rather than being independent unit of analysis, the sectors enumerated by Copenhagen School are interrelated and serve to “disaggregate a whole” for the sake of proper analysis (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 168). In other words, though the sectors mentioned above do have somehow specific vulnerabilities and specific kind of threats that stem from such kind of vulnerabilities, in the end result all these should be reassembled as a whole for evaluating national security phenomena of a given state. The desegregation is performed only to achieve simplification and clarity, but for understanding the parts should be reassembled by shoving their relation to each other (1998, p. 8).

Besides that, identifying distinct dynamics of each sector help us to more adequately assess the securitization of specific issue. Any issue, for example demographic decline, may be threatening in terms of almost all sectors enumerated by Copenhagen School (this will be further elaborated in specific chapter dedicated to this issue). But in specific setting securitizing actors may predominantly securitize it from this or that sector’s perspective. Hence, identifying the distinct features of each sector is extremely important for proper assessment of the securitization of any issue.

Copenhagen School and Traditional Security Thinking

From the above-mentioned comments, it can be deduced that the relationship between traditional security thinking and the new security framework put by the Copenhagen School is complex. On one hand, the securitization approach challenges mainstream’s rather objectivist and military-centered approach to the security. In other words,

securitization approach takes a constructivist thinking and argues that there is no predetermined set of security threats. On the contrary, the threats are socially constructed.

But on the other hand, securitization approach does not hold the same kind of constructivism with regard to the structure. Namely, unlike critical approaches to international relations, Copenhagen School assumes that the structures are durable and constant, but changeable. According to the authors of the securitization approach, the structures, as well as, the state are sedimented practices. And one can take them as likely frameworks for discussion (Buzan et al., p. 205). Just on that point, they are close to the mainstream, which takes the state as a given. In other words, securitization framework does not aim at finding the ways of changing the “reality”; rather, it tries “to help in managing relations among units” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 206).

Due to the last point, this study finds securitization approach to be more proper tool to criticize mainstream security thinking. The point is that, unlike critical approaches to the international relations, which try to change the status-quo, the securitization approach tries to show the drawbacks of the traditional approach while tactically accepting the referent object as given. Taking the state as both securitizing actor and the referent object for the security, the securitization approach challenges mainstream’s objectified view of security. Accordingly, it draws attention to the fact that the terms of “security” and “security threat” are indeed of political choice. This enables the researcher to question the actor’s attempt to securitize or de-securitize any issue. In traditional security thinking anything military was considered as the realm of security and subsequently dealt with according to “security logic”.

But while widening the security thinking to the sectors other than military one, the securitization approach reveals the constructivist essence of security. And by this way, it points to the responsibility involved in talking about security for policymakers, analysts, and lobbyists. Below, using securitization approach, it will be attempted to show that in particular Russian context how the securitizing actor tried to securitize the issues from trying to mobilize public support for the respective political preferences. Most notably, the actors did so in terms of sectors other than military one. In this regard, securitization approach is useful to challenge mainstream's view of security.

More precisely, the point is that, while taking the same thing as a referent object, securitization approach does show the inability of the mainstream in effectively analyzing the national security problems of any given state. It points to the fact that excessively focusing on the military-political dimensions, and envisaging universalistic view of security, the mainstream is rather blind to many problems that the states find threatening to their survival. Securitization framework does not say that something is about security others are not. Instead, through the officials' language it shows what is being considered as security by the states themselves. If the mainstream's pre-determined list of threats does not correspond to those that any given state declare as threat, then it obviously points to the inability of the former.

As mentioned above, securitizing concept argues that one cannot define a threat objectively. For them, it is not advisable to add our basic securitization perspective that there are also objective security problems (1998, p. 40). Accordingly, there is significant difference between the analyst who analyzes the security policy of a given state on one hand, and the securitizing actor who frames the issues as security issue on the other. In

this regard Buzan et al. (1998, p. 40) claims that securitization perspective does open the possibility of problematizing both actual securitization, and the absence of securitization, but it cannot do so by proving that something “is” a security problem.

The value of securitization approach in challenging the mainstream’s objectivist view of security has been widely acknowledged by the students of security studies. Despite that, it has also caused sharp criticism due to its “failure to address the normative implications” located within its theory of securitization (Charrett, 2009, p. 10). Reiterating from Huysmans (2002, p. 43; 47) that “speaking and writing about security is never innocent” (quoted in Charret, 2009, p. 16), it is argued that Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of securitization reinforces traditionalist view of how securitization processes take place.

In other words, the Copenhagen School is being criticized for focusing exclusively on the state actors and neglecting the powerless and marginalized circles. According to McDonald (2008, p. 574) “such a focus serves to marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics”.

In a similar vein, while criticizing Copenhagen School’s stand on the analyzer’s role, Charrett (2009, p. 28) contends that the security analyzer should deconstruct the power relations that are inherent in security discourses; and accordingly pay adequate attention to alternative views on the “threatness” of the issue.

The normative dilemma outlined above is indeed rooted in the securitization framework. It is impossible to deny its salience and the legitimacy of the said concerns. At the same time, it is worthy to note that the authors of the securitization framework

are not fully negligent to the mentioned concerns. Obviously, the securitization approach does not arm the analyst to effectively deal with the normative implications.

But on the other hand lays responsibility for policymakers in talking about security. As Buzan et al. (1998, p. 211) puts it, to phrase things in security terms is a *choice*, not an objective feature of the issue or the relationship itself (original emphasis). That choice has to be justified by the appropriateness and the consequences of successful securitization (or desecuritizing) of the issue at hand. It can be objected that power relations sedimented in the field prevent the audience from properly evaluating the securitizing move. Despite the salience of the objection, it also should be noted that especially in the democratic settings, the securitizing actor has to appeal for the approval of at least smaller audience, such as military-security bureaucracy, parliament. This kind of formal “ratification” may assuage the side effects of talking about the security.

In addition, it should be reminded that the aim of this study is to evaluate Russian national security policy with the aim of securitization framework. The aim is to show the inability of traditional security thinking in explaining the security concerns of a nation-state. In other words, normative consequences are out of concern of this study, though the author of these lines do share the concerns outlined above.

Critic of Securitization Approach: the Absence of Context

One of the most important problems in the securitization framework is that it is not able to answer the question that why certain issues are selected for securitization and other

not. Similarly, why are the issues securitized in reference to one sector but not others? The authors of securitization concept do acknowledge that in practice, the constraints of facilitating conditions make actors much more likely to be successful with some types of referent objects than with the others (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 36). The facilitating conditions, both internal and external ones, do not say anything with prior conditions that enabled the referent object amenable to securitization. From the logic conceived by the authors, if the relevant actor holds a legitimate position with regard to security problems, he or she can securitize any issue successfully so long as he or she uses proper words, namely he or she is adherent to the grammar of the speech act.

But as they also acknowledged it, in practice only some issues are succumbed successful securitization, and the formula in its original version is not able to explain this practice. In other words, the point is that the facilitating conditions themselves should be placed into a broader discursive context. The Copenhagen School seems to neglect the role of the context and to present facilitating conditions as purely independent variable.

The problem in this formulation is that it absolutely neglects the independent existence of the threats that are hazardous to the existence of the object, be it human, state, or world system. In the formulation outlined above there is no security problem except through the language game. The authors seem to claim that through the speech act everything regardless of its peculiarities can be securitized successfully. As Balzacq (2005, p. 181) put it, the securitization formula asserts that if the speech act is achieved under prescribed rules, i.e., in conformity with the grammar of security, it alters the context accordingly. In other words, a formerly secure place will become insecure

through successful speech act (Balzacq, 2005, p. 181). But, language does not construct reality; at best it shapes our perception of it (ibid.). This means that, regardless of the use of language some threats can ruin the referent object. Moreover, without perception of a threat, it is not credible to hope that the relevant audience will approve the securitizing move initiated by the actor, whoever he/she is.

The neglect of the threats that do exist independently from language game is not only theoretically flawed; it also has a possibility to pave the way for ill-defined security policy. The securitization concept sentences itself to failing to see threats that may destroy the self-determination or existence of a political unit but are not framed as threats by this unit (Gromes and Banacker, 2007, p. 6). This is not to claim that there are predetermined list of threats independently from the actor and the relevant audience. On the contrary, I do share the position that something is a security issue only when it is framed as such by the relevant actor. The point is that, something can be threatening to the survival of a given political community without being acknowledged. Similarly, the authorities, intentionally or unintentionally, may securitize an issue, when in fact it is not a threat to the referent object. In both cases, at least perception of “threatness” is needed for securitization to occur.

On the other hand, the formula proposed by Copenhagen School seems to neglect possible influence of the prior context on speech act itself. More precisely, the speech act does not only create some sort of reality, but at the same time it is also shaped by the context that had been created before. Neither the actors, nor the audience acts within a vacuum. Rather, the prior social, political, and linguistic context shapes their perception of the world so that only a limited range of issues can be perceived as

security issue, which in turn, paves the way for subsequent securitization. Grace (1987, p. 48-49, quoted in Balzacq 2005, p. 182) states on this point that, to win an audience, security statements must, usually, be related to an external reality.

With this regard, Stritzel (2007, p. 360) argues that security articulations need to be related to their broader discursive contexts from which both the securitizing actor and the performative force of the articulated speech act gain power. In this sense, the Copenhagen School ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors- such as dominant narratives of identity- that condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security (McDonalds, 2008, p. 571). Accordingly, it is argued that social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourse of security become possible must be paid adequate attention (ibid., p. 573).

In this regard, Wilkinson (2007) argues that securitization framework is rather blind to political-social peculiarities that rooted in non-western, non-democratic societies. Namely, she contends that Copenhagen School seems to think that western notion of society; state, identity, etc are universalistic and applicable globally. According to her, while applying the framework to non-western settings local peculiarities should be addressed, as well.

Thus, neither the abilities of the actor nor the issues can be adequately captured without reference to their prior contexts. More precisely, a specific speech act that introduces a specific issue as an existential threat to the referent object cannot independently create successful securitization. On the contrary the prior discursive context forms the boundaries within which only certain issues are amenable to be securitized. These claims should be tested within a single case.

As the hypothesis formulated in the introductory part predicts, we expect that particular securitization of specific issues show congruence with the dominant discourse of danger, which prioritizes certain dimensions of national security.

In other words, for proper understanding securitizing moves of a given state, it is important to locate them within the context that is dominant at the time of securitization. Individual securitization moves are parts of greater discourse of danger that is dominant within the community.

In light of these qualifications, the aim of the following chapter will be to sketch the dominant security discourse of the Russian Federation. Namely, main security priorities of the Russian Federation that found its reflection in relevant policy papers and official speeches will be examined in detail. Doing so, it will be formed a background to evaluate the securitizations of the specific issues identified in introductory part of this thesis.

CHAPTER 3

EVOLUTION OF SECURITY POLICY IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA

Major Foreign-Security Policy Paradigms in post-Soviet Russia

The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its dominant Marxist thinking on international relations, subsequently re-emergence of the Russian Federation as an independent state compelled Russia to redefine its national security imperatives. The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union produced fourteen formally independent states around Russia with which Russia should formulate foreign policy on equal terms. More importantly, the breakdown of communist ideology that had kept together the population drove the society into a situation which one observer has described as “a society in crisis because of the breakdown of moral codes which cement it together” (quot. in Weaver et al., 1993: p. 119). Subsequently the collapse of communism as an ideology that for decades had cemented multiethnic peoples together posed significant challenges to Russia’s new leadership.

For Sakwa (2004, p. 161) national identity involves defined and defensible space and also imbuing that space with the sense of common purpose and destiny. This means that without such kind of identity nation-state as a social organization can hardly survive as an independent entity. In this context, Russian politics experienced intensive debates on Russia’s post-soviet identity, on foreign policy imperatives, on the threats that the country is faced.

The intense debates over the country's foreign policy identity are extremely important in terms of the formation of security policy. As a rule, national security is defined as the phenomenon that comprises the measures to defend national interests, the formation of which is not possible without solid foreign policy identity. For that reason, any attempt at proposing proper foreign policy for the state should also express its view on the threats that the nation is faced and subsequently the proper ways to tackle with them. In this context, the debates over Russia's foreign policy identity can be useful background in formulating the state's national security policy.

Actually, post-independence debates over foreign policy are the continuation of the late Soviet attempts at revising the Union's foreign policy strategy. So-called "New Thinking" emerged under Gorbachev's leadership began to challenge orthodox Soviet foreign policy beginning in mid 80s. The adherents of New Thinking tend to explain the Union's crisis with its foreign policy doctrine. Namely, Gorbachev and his followers thought that Marxist-Leninist foreign policy ideology arbitrarily overruled the existence of common interests that regardless of their political and socio-economical systems all the states share (Sergounin, 2002).

The post-independence debate on foreign-security policy showed new features while retaining previous contours. Above all, with the collapse of the Union, Russia lost its previous super-power status. Subsequently, with the end of Cold War, Russia lost its enemy, its "hostile other" that for decades helped to forge a state identity for the Soviet Union. The lost of the enemy naturally urged political establishment to revise its foreign-policy imperatives.

In addition to these external dimensions, internally, the collapse of communism as a state ideology left Russia lacking of an ideology that is able to cement its multi-national citizens together. Deep economic and political crisis that followed the end of the Soviet Union created new challenges that Russia should encounter.

In light of these developments, Russia experienced intense debates on its foreign-security policy. In literature, there have been identified many strands, schools of thoughts that proposed alternative visions on Russia's foreign and security policy (Chafetz, 1996/97; Sergounin, 1996; Tsygankov, 1997,). As Sergounin (1996) puts it, despite the fact that many had attempted to classify these debates there is no consensus over the issue.

Tsygankov (1997, p. 250) points out that these groups represent three theoretical traditions that are dominant in international relations studies: realism, those who emphasize international anarchy; the rationalists, who concentrated on international interactions; and the revolutionists, who focused on international society. But close examination reveals the fact that it is not possible delineate these schools easily. For example, those who envisage international anarchy encompass diverse groups, such as neo-communists, radical right nationalists, and moderate Statists (Tsygankov, 1997, p. 251-252). Despite this lack of coherence, at least four groups dominated foreign-security policy debates: Atlantist-Westernizers, Eurosianists, Statists, and Neo-Communists. With the exception of communists, who had been in opposition since the collapse of the Union, the other three groups had dominated foreign policy-making in different periods of time.

Atlantist-Westernizers

This group holds the view that Russia is a cultural and historical part of the Western civilization. Accordingly, in foreign policy Russia should give priority to its relationships with the leading western powers and should try to incorporate western values of democracy and market economy (Tsygankov, 1997, p. 253). This group dominated foreign policy making in early years of independence.

As far as security is concerned, “Atlanticists” argue that the meaning of the concept of security changed in the Post-Cold War epoch. They noted that, along with military-political dimensions the new concept should include economic, environmental, demographic, ethnic, religious and other aspects (Sergounin, 1996). More specifically, as Westernizers held the view that both the west and Russia share common interests, they argued that the direct military threat from foreign states was no longer pertinent. On the contrary, they held the view that in an interdependent world, Russia, like any other country, cannot solve its security problems without cooperation with leading western powers. As Tsygankov (1997, p. 258) puts it, Westernizers believed that Russia must become actively involved in international institutions in order to reduce internal threats to security.

Following the collapse of the Union the Atlantist-Westernizers took dominant position in formulating Russian foreign security policy. Under minister of Foreign Affairs Kozyrev this group attempted to establish normal relations with the west. Besides Kozyrev, Prime Minister Gaidar, State Secretary Burbulis, Minister of

Communication Poltarinin, Deputies of foreign minister Churkin, Kunadze, Shelov-Kovedyaev were part of the grouping (Sergounin, 2002).

But due to internal, as well as, external factors the group began to lose its prevalent positions. First of all, as Torkunov et al., (1999, p. 72) put it, adverse economic trends, the failure of “shock therapy” policy deprived the Westernizers from public support. This became evident in the elections held in 1993. In addition to internal factors, external environment also affected the Westernizers’ failure. For instance, the West did not accept Russia as a reliable ally. The NATO plans to enlarge, especially the alliance’s manner of solving Bosnia crisis without consulting to Russia upset Russian democrats. Besides that Russian democrats were not able to get appropriate feedback from former Soviet States. Unlike their initial attempts to establish friendly relations with them almost all post-Soviet, ex-Socialist countries reveal their aspirations for NATO membership. Suffice it to say that just for that reason the nationalist and communist opposition began harshly criticize the Westernizers. In the end, under these and some others factors Russian foreign-security thinking began to change.

Euroasianists

One of the main alternatives for democrats is nationalist group that is called “Euroasianists”. Rather than being a solid group, Euroasianists includes diverse political forces form both the left and the right. The common feature for all these forces is that they view Russia as a special civilization on its own. In other words, unlike the

Westernizers who hold the unity of Russia and the West, the Eurosianists believe that Russia is neither the West nor the East.

Accordingly, Eurosianists' philosophy departed from a thesis on Russia's special mission in history. This includes the mission to maintain peace and stability in the entire Eurasian continent (Sergounin, 1996). In this regard Kortunov (2003, p. 20) writes that, "world history has proved more than one times that regional and global stability can be maintained only if Russia is strong power (*derjava*) in Europe and Asia, as well as in a world". In the light of the Atlanticists' failure in building equal relations with the west, the "eurasianist" concept became popular among Russian intellectuals during the mid-1990s (Sergounin, 2002).

The "Eurasianists" believed that the government had paid too much attention to the Western direction of its foreign policy. It is not coincidence that, following the resignation of Kozyrev, Russia renovated its attempts to establish relations with Asian powers, such as Iran, China, and India. More importantly, according to them Westernizers had not been able to appreciate the prevalence that national interests hold over so-called common interests of humanity. For Kortunov (2003, p. 18), five years of realization Kozyrev's foreign policy showed the fact that any state should give priority to its national interest in foreign policy, otherwise, sooner or later she will be surrendered to the interests of stronger states. These ideas influenced Russia's foreign policy especially in mid-90s. As Sergounin (2002) puts it, Russia's drifts towards China and India in large part were influenced by Eurasianist trend.

Contrary to Westernizers' claims, the Eurosianists argue that Russia's most compelling need were in the South and in the East. According to them, Moscow should

deal with its newly independent neighbors, and with the problems that had arisen with its own sizable Muslim population (Sergounin 1996). In this regard Karaganov, who was a leading intellectual within this trend argued that “Russia should play an active post-imperial role in former soviet republics, if it refuse to play it, it will be imposed on us by history: by waves of refugees, by explosions at chemical plants, etc” (cited in Tsygankov, 1997, p. 259).

Despite these differences from the Westernizers, the Eurosianists also perceive security as an interaction of internal and external factors. Security is not regarded simply as phenomenon related to the outside environment (Sergounin, 1996). Stankevich, the then advisor to the President, emphasized that: “What is at stake is our internal stability. Unless we resolve this problem, it will remain a constant source of tension that could explode at any time” (Stankevich, 1994, p. 28, cited in Sergounin, 1996).

Pragmatic-Statists

Another important group struggling for influence in foreign policy debates is pragmatic-statists. Those, who have been identified to be a member of this group, do share with other school of thoughts the notion that Russia is a special case for the world politics; it is neither the west nor the east. As Chafetz (1996/97, p. 676) puts it, the Statists believe that Russia must not too closely imitate the Western model and endorses less cooperative view of international politics than that embraced by the Westernizers. That means that, Russia should pursue profoundly different way in tackling with the

problems that she faced. Having acknowledged Russia's weakness, the pragmatic-Statists opted for balanced foreign policy course. This kind of foreign security philosophy had been adopted by such kind of political forces as "Our home- Russia" and "Apple" (Yabloko) groups. These forces began to dominate Russian political establishment in 1993-1995. Especially under Primakov, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to carry balanced foreign policy. In 1996, following the re-election of Eltsin to the post of the Russian president, pragmatist-Statist foreign-security policy thinking finally strengthens its place (Torkunov et al., 1999, p. 75).

Unlike the "Eurosianists" pragmatists do not think that Russia's specialty comes from its unique geopolitical location. On the contrary, pragmatists do admit Russia's relative weakness in claiming for world power. The immediate task for Russia is not to look for foreign policy ambitious but to concentrate on internal problems. Moreover, for pragmatists Russia cannot imitate any other country not only for its geopolitical peculiarities, but also for its historical, cultural distinctness. Putin, who is a leading figure within this trend, points out that, "... our country's [Russia's] genuine renewal without excessive costs cannot be achieved by merely experimenting with abstract models or schemes taken from foreign textbooks" (Putin 1999).

This group is also statist, in the sense that they advocated for a strong role of the state. As Putin puts it explicitly, Russia's peculiarity obliges the state to be strong enough to deal with its diverse population and large area:

Our state and its institutions and structures have always played an exceptionally important role in the life of the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not anomaly to be discarded. Quite contrary, they see it as the source and guarantee of order, and the initiator and the main driving force of change (Putin 1999).

On foreign policy, pragmatists argue that Russia as any normal state should try to realize its national interests that stem from the country's real needs. Ideologies or abstract geopolitical models cannot be useful guide in foreign policy activities. As Sergounin (1996) puts it, for pragmatists (whom he labeled as "realists") Russian foreign policy should be defined in terms of real interests rather than *messianistic ideas* (emphasis added).

In spite of these differences from other groups, the pragmatist-Statists also think that national security policy of Russia should concentrate on internal threats rather than external military ones. The most preeminent internal threats are:

- The potential disintegration of the Russian Federation as a result of inter-ethnic and centre/regions conflicts;
- Socio-economic tensions stemming from economic decline, the rupture of economic ties. Inflation, rising unemployment, deep-going social differentiation, the degradation of science, educational system, medical services, etc.;
- Organized crime and corruption;
- Cultural and spiritual degradation;
- The degradation of environment;
- The lack of information security (Shaposhnikov, 1993, pp. 15-18).

Main external threats to the Russian national security do not stem from directly foreign countries' military ambitions. Instead, these threats are either non-military, such as:

- Political: attempts to challenge Russia's territorial integrity by exploiting inter-ethnic or inter-religious conflicts; blocking integrational processes

in the CIS; efforts to weaken Russia's role and position in the international organizations;

- Economic; the diminished economic independence of Russia; a decline of its economic and scientific-technical potentials; Russia's non-admittance to the international financial, trade and economic organizations;
- Environmental: ecological disasters in neighboring countries; long term negative effects resulting from global economic shifts;
- Social: the internationalization of organized crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism, mass epidemics (Shaposhnikov, 1993, pp. 14-15).

As far as military threats are concerned pragmatists consider that these kinds of threats are not direct, i.e., there is no country that threatens Russia's territorial integrity with direct attack. Traditional military threats have been substituted by new kind of threats. These include: existing and potential armed conflicts in the vicinity of Russia, the unsettled problem of nuclear weaponry in the former Soviet republics, the lack of a proper border regime in the south and the west of Russia, and so on (Shaposhnikov, 1993, pp. 14-15).

Neo-Communists

Though communism lost its superiority as a state ideology, communists did take an active part in post-Soviet political debates. For instance, in parliamentary debates the

communist influence over foreign-security issue was quite evident. This was especially the case till 1993 when the parliament had larger leverage over foreign policy of Russia. But the reforms implemented in 1993 marginalized the Duma in formulating foreign-security policy.

As far as foreign-security policy is concerned, neo-communists share with the “Eurosianists” the view that international system is rather anarchic. As Tsygankov (1997, p. 256) puts it, neo-communists² argue along with other groups that there is no such thing as a world civilization or common human values. The more Russia tries to become a European country, the more it is doomed to lose its independence and uniqueness.

But the uniqueness that communists envisage is of different sort from the Statists’ one. The main difference lies in communists’ insistence that Russia should be a “super power”, i.e., the balance holder against the United States that represents very different values and is the most threatening to Russia’s interest (Tsygankov, 1997, p. 256).

On security policy, communists argue that Russia should give priority to its national-state interests rather than so-called common human values. They believe that the main Russian national interest inherited from its history consists of preserving the country’s territorial and spiritual integrity. An idea of a powerful state based on multi-ethnicity is equivalent to the Russian national idea (Sergounin, 1996).

Though the communists do consider some external developments, such as the enlargement of the NATO, the rise of regionalism (EU, NAFTA, ASEAN etc. which

² Actually, Tsygankov does not take neo-communists as an independent school of thought but as a subgroup within so-called “aggressive realists”.

may potentially increase Russia's isolation) as a challenge to the security of Russia, at the same time they think that the main threat lies within the country. In other words, for neo-communists, the breakdown of the Soviet Union and weakening of the Russian state have undermined Russian security and worsened its geo-strategic position (Sergounin, 1996).

This means once again that, the main threat to Russia's survival is not military in essence. Rather, from communist point of view, the lack of ideological bound threatens the very foundation of the state. Blaming Gorbachev and Eltsin for their "unwise" attitude towards communism, communists claim that only communist ideology can fill the ideological vacuum and in this way maintain internal stability and order, as well as repair Russia's external position. Moreover, only restoration of the Soviet Union can help Russia to restore its "historical borders" and survive in dignity, as it deserves (Zyuganov 1995, p. 58). In short, neo-communist claims that the ideological vacuum in the face of the collapse of the Union poses the most urgent threat to Russia's wellbeing and survival.

Practice of Securitization in the Russian Federation

Emerging Security Consensus: the Prevalence of Non-Military Threats

From the review provided above it can deduced that despite their diverging even contradictory view on international relations, Russia's place within the international system, all prevalent groups in foreign policy discourse agree at least one important

point, namely in post-Cold War period the main threats to Russian national security are internal developments and after the demise of East-West ideological confrontation direct military threat is no longer feasible. The faculty of the Moscow State University of International relations, led by Torkunov, came to the conclusion that in the circumstances when global military threat loses its significance many non-military threats gains new impetus. These are environmental degradation, organized crime and international terrorism (Torkunov et al., 2000, p. 58).

On this point it should be noted that the salience of internal dynamics in terms of a given state's security is not a new phenomenon. For Buzan (1991, p. 112) security of the state combines two factors: threats and vulnerabilities. While the first one refers to external adverse acts towards the state, the second one, vulnerabilities are internal peculiarities of the state, such as territory, the nature of geographical boundaries (i.e. whether the country is bounded with mountains or not and etc.) that encourage threats against the state. In other words, according to this classification, vulnerabilities are those factors that foreign states may take advantage of these while threatening the state's security.

But it should be noted that, in line with securitization approach any development should not be arbitrarily classified as either threat or vulnerability. In other words, it depends on securitizing actor that presents any development as threat. More clearly, if the securitizing actor presents any internal factor as threat but not as vulnerability, then the researcher can point out this fact and asses the respective securitization of the said factor. As analysis provided below shows illustratively, in Russian context some internal factors are presented as threats and securitizing actors used just this term.

Besides that in many instances the term of “internal threat” (*vnutrenniy vizov*) is used in both reviewed documents and speeches.

In this sense, President Eltsin’s annual address made in 1996 to the parliament was a proclamation of the “security consensus” outlined above. Thus, Eltsin in his address to the nation explicitly declared: “In current stage the situation in military affairs is characterized with diminished potential of direct wide-range aggression against Russia. The Russian Federation itself, dose not consider any state as a military rival...”(Eltsin, 1996).

Instead of focusing on traditional threats to national security, Eltsin declared that Russia’s survival, as well as its citizens’ well being is threatened from within. According to him, main internal threat to the security of the state is related to the incompleteness of state-building, namely, “unstable structure of democratic institutions of and governance” (Eltsin, 1996). In Copenhagen School’s terms, Russian president realized a securitizing move and labeled the above-mentioned developments as threatening Russia’s security.

National Security Concept-1997³

In the context of above-mentioned security consensus, the drafters of the first National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1997 (NSC-97) declared the aim of the document as “to formulate state strategy in ensuring the security of person, society and the state from internal and external *political, economic, social, military,*

³ Note that the following is a review of “The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted on 17 December 1997”;

ecological, information threats”(p. 561, emphasis added). Before moving to analyze the document in detail, it should be recalled from the previous chapter that, securitization is a process that comprises securitizing move, audiences approval and subsequent implementation emergency measures that have been deemed necessary to deal with the issue. In this regard, the security concept adopted by the high-level state structures comprises these steps. Namely, it presents certain view of national security while presenting certain issues as threatening Russia’s national security. Audience’s approval and implementation of emergency measures are out of scope of such kind of documents.

The concept does not simply acknowledge the fact that Russia’s security may be challenged by that kind of threats other than military attacks, more than that, it explicitly declares that currently and in foreseeable future the main threat to national security of the Russian Federation is not military in essence. Instead, as it is noted in the concept “in current state of affairs the main threat to national security is mainly internal in scope and related to internal-political, economical social, ecological, informational and spiritual spheres of national life “ (p. 566).

Acknowledging the lack of social agreement based on unifying national idea, the drafters of the concept note that in future, the priority should be given to ensuring national agreement, public safety, and stability of state institutions. Moreover, the management of inter-ethnic relations has been identified as a priority in ensuring national security (p. 563).

In political sphere, it is noted that incompleteness of the formation single legal space is in the focus of the document. Let’s recall from the Copenhagen School conceptualization of political security, which endorses that sovereignty is the heart of

political security concept. Note that that sovereignty, namely, internal sovereignty stipulates that the laws and norms adopted by the government should have superiority within the state boundaries.

In this regard, NSC-97 declared that, contradictions between the laws and decisions adopted by the subjects and the Constitution and the federal laws are threatening to the survival of Russia as a federal state. Moreover, it is declared that the collapse of single spiritual space of Russia, economical disintegration creates tensions in center-region, which in its turn threatens federal structure of the Russian Federation.

According to the concept, the preservation of Russian federalism is a pre-requisite for national security. Namely, existence and good functioning of federalism in Russian is being taken as equal to its survival as an independent state entity. In terms of securitization perspective, the Russian political elite consider that threat to federalism is of existential character, as it threatens the very survival of the state as such. This is a securitizing move with regard to federalism.

According to the document, the followings should be done to preserve federal structure of the state:

- To ensure the priority of federal laws, formation single legal space;
- To formulate mechanisms that prevents the rise of political parties and social unions that pursue anti-constitutional, separatist goals;
- To reinforce commonness among the nations historically inhabited in Russia;

In a similar vein, the main security blueprint of Russia reflects the view that, the formulation and reinforcement of national idea is a pre-condition for the survival of the

Russian Federation as an independent entity. The concept declares that the formulation of national idea should be based on traditional national values. In other words, ensuring national security of the Russian Federation also includes “preservation cultural, spiritual, historical heritage of the Russian people” (p. 567). In this context the Russian language is a special medium that holds together the citizens of the Federation. And subsequently, any attempt “to diminish the role of the Russian language is a threat to national security” (p. 565). From securitization perspective, this is a move to securitize the Russian language, which does not have anything in common with the military security.

While prioritizing internal non-military threats, the concept does not overrule the salience of threats emanated from alien countries. But the point should be noted in this regard that, none of these threats is purely military in essence. On the contrary, these are political in nature aimed at diminishing Russia’s role in world affairs.

With regard to the last point, Buzan et al. (1998, p. 145) points out that inadequate recognition by others is a serious threat to the political identity assumed by oneself. In other words, any attempt by foreign powers to not recognize Russia as such that it claims is a political security threat from Russian point of view. This means that, from securitization perspective, Russian political leadership moved to securitize its intended place in the world affairs and consequently, defined certain developments as threatening. Several external threats, which are of military character, have also been identified in this regard:

- Attempts to challenge Russia’s territorial integrity by exploiting inter-ethnic, inter-religious and other internal disagreements;

- Claims against Russia's territorial integrity by exploiting ill-defined juridical base of national boundaries;
- Attempts to diminish Russia's role in resolving key issues in international affairs;

The document also recalls economic and environmental dimensions of security. But it should be noted that the document does not include "economic security" expression. Instead numerates several policy directions to ensure economic prosperity of the country. Unlike it, the authors of the document do use ecological security term and numerates priorities with regard to the issue.

As far as military threats are concerned, the concept declares that while direct aggression against Russia is no longer feasible, local conflicts in near abroad can threaten Russia's security.

National Security Concept-2000: The Revision of External Threats

Significant developments, both internal and external, are responsible for revision the national security concept of the Russian Federation. Torkunov et al. (2000, p. 66) points out that external developments, such as NATO's military campaign in Kosovo and new concept of the alliance that challenge the traditionally defined sovereignty principle is one of the most important event that obliges Russian political establishment to revise national security policy.

Additionally, the severe financial crisis occurred in 1998 and subsequent deterioration of national economy weakened the position of those who envisaged rather

benevolent view about international system. The crisis showed illustrative that the hopes for easy integration towards world economy are misleading (Troitskiy, 2006, p. 4). Together with the first development this negatively affected political establishment's view about the image of the international environment.

Besides that, deterioration of the situation around Northern Caucasus, as well as intensifying terrorist bombings in Moscow made it inevitable to revise the main official document on national security.

The new version of National Security Concept, adopted on January 2000 depicts rather different picture of the international environment⁴. The new version of the national security concept notes that two mutually exclusive trends shape modern international relations. The first one is "strengthening of number of states and integrative associations in economic and political spheres". The second one is the attempts to create an international relations structure based on domination by developed Western countries under US leadership. At the same time it is emphasized that attempts to ignore Russia's interests when solving major issues of international relations, including conflict situations are capable of undermining international security, stability, and the positive changes achieved in international relations. From securitization perspective, these are attempts to securitize US-NATO hegemony and ignorance to the Russia's equal participation in solving main world issues.

Unlike NSC-97, the revised version starts from the point that "the level and scope of the military threat are growing". Especially, the concept express Russia's concern that "NATO's transition to the practice of using military force outside its zone

⁴ Note that the following is the review of the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted on 10 January 2000.

of responsibility and without UN Security Council sanction could destabilize the entire global strategic situation". Moreover it is emphasized that the growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms and methods of warfare.

So, the new security doctrine revised its predecessor's rather benign description of world politics. Put it bluntly, unlike previous document NSC-2000 express Russian political establishment's doubts on international cooperation and common human interests. The document acknowledges the salience of military related threats. In this regard it numerates certain developments, such as, delays in reforms of military forces of the Russian Federation, low level of equipment of the armed forces with modern military technologies as threatening the national interests of the Russian Federation. But, interestingly enough, like its predecessor, the NSC-2000 does not include any sentence about the direct military threats against the federation. In other words, even with regard to military issues, the main concern is not the possibility of direct military invasion against Russian territory per se. Nevertheless, the document significantly revised Russia's perception of military security.

Despite these revisions, the new version of the security resembles the previous one in securitizing political and social developments. Political security is the dominant concern. First of all, as mentioned above, according to Copenhagen School's theoretical approach the problem of proper recognition by international players is a political security issue. With this regard the document enumerates several external developments

as threatening Russia's security by diminishing its international status and its role in international affairs. Some of them are totally political in essence. These include:

- the desire of some states and international associations to diminish the role of existing mechanisms for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and the OSCE;
- the danger of a weakening of Russia's political, economic and military influence in the world;
- the weakening of integrational processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States;

Along with external trends internal developments retains their significance in terms of overall security of the Russian Federation. The Concept explicitly declares that, "the country's single legal domain is being eroded by nonobservance of the principle that the Constitution of the Russian Federation should prevail over other legal standards and that federal law should prevail over laws of constituent parts of the Russian Federation, and also by poor coordination of state management at various levels".

Societal security is another important concern of the revised version of national security concept. From societal security perspective, preservation national distinctness in the face of "overriding cultural and linguistic influence from neighboring culture" is one of the main security concerns (Buzan et. 1998, p. 121). In line with this argument, the document acknowledges that spiritual safety, i.e. "the preservation and strengthening of society's moral values, traditions of patriotism and humanism, and the country's cultural and scientific potential" is an integral part of state's security policy, advocating for a state policy to "maintain the population's spiritual and moral welfare,

prohibit the use of airtime to promote violence or base instincts, and *counter the adverse impact of foreign religious organizations and missionaries*” (emphasis added). In addition, for the drafters of the document the preservation of the Russian language is a pre-condition for ensuring of “spiritual unity of the people of a multinational Russia”.

Societal security concerns are also evident in the Concept’s view of border policy. It is interesting to note in this regard that Russia’s main national security document declares that “*demographic and cultural-religious* expansion by neighboring states into Russian territory” poses threat to national security (emphasis added). In other words, despite its salience for being securitized in military terms, the document envisages societal security perspective in securitizing border issues. This further strengthens the above-mentioned point that political and societal threats are more salient in Russian national security thinking.

In addition to political and societal security, the document also deals with economic security. Thus it says that, “In the economy, these threats are of a comprehensive nature” and enlists that distortion in banking system, growth in the state’s internal and external debt, domination of exports by fuel, raw materials and energy components of imports by food and consumer items are among most threatening economic challenges.

Besides that, the document recalls the threats that emanate from the environment. But interestingly enough it treats environmental threats from economic point of view. Namely, it says that the threat of a deteriorating environmental situation in the country and depletion of natural resources is great because of the domination

position in industry of the fuel and energy sector. In other words, the environmental developments are threatening so long as they challenge country's economical security.

As far as economic dimension of national security is concerned, it should be underlined that the document tends to present them mainly in terms of Russia's global prestige and internal stability. In other words, the document takes current economic situations challenging because it affects Russia's international position and paves the way for internal disintegration. In this regard, it became evident that the main concern of the Russian political establishment is the country's political unity and Russia's international prestige and recognition.

In sum, the analysis of official documents related to national security of the Russian Federation reveals the fact that political and societal security concerns retains their priority in security policy formulation. To ensure single legal domain, to maintain the sovereignty of federal authorities over the subjects and to maintain public unity based on Russian national idea are dominant security concerns in contemporary Russian politics. It should be underlined that all these are mainly internal developments. It is not coincidence in this regard that, the main security documents reviewed above explicitly prioritized internal developments in tackling with national security problems.

These issues are about the political sovereignty and societal unity of the Russian Federation. None of them is directly military issues, despite the fact that Russian political establishment treats them as a security threat. Contrary to claims put forward by mainstream security approaches, non-military issues have also been considered as threat in Russian context. These concerns along with traditional-military and economic

issues formulate the boundaries of the discourse of threats to national security. This in mind, the next sections of the chapter will elaborate these issues in more detail.

Political Security (Sovereignty) in post-Soviet Russia: Center-Subject Relations

Evolution of Federalism in 1990s

In early years of independence, one of the most urgent problems faced Russia was to formulate solid base of center-subject relations. This task includes to find a formula that binds ethnically, economically diverse regions together, as well as, to regulate their relationships with the center in an appropriate way.

With the declaration of *perestroika* (reconstruction) and subsequent political reforms in late 80s gave a new impetus to centrifugal attempts within the Soviet Union. The largest part of the Union, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) was not an exception in this regard. The RSFSR was a multinational (multiethnic) entity comprised of forty-five nationalities Thirty-three of the smaller nationalities had their own national territory-either an autonomous republic or a district. The autonomous republics had been created around the concentration of national minorities (McAuley, 1997, p. 29).

As Hunter (2004, p. 213) puts it, the rekindling of ethnic nationalism across the USSR affected many of the nationalities lived within Russia. As ethnic nationalism arose in many areas of the Soviet Union various ethnic groups of the RSFSR began asserting claims of national and cultural self-determination. By the end of 1990,

encouraged by the Russian Republic's own declaration of sovereignty, fourteen autonomous republics and three autonomous oblasts within the RSFSR had declared themselves sovereign republics (Hunter, 2004, p. 213).

In early periods, the Russian president Eltsin tried to solve the problem on a bilateral basis. Namely, beginning from 1992 treaties had been signed between the federal center and the subjects on rights and duties. In March 1992 the Kremlin reached an agreement with eighty-six subjects (except Tatarstan and Chechnya) on the issue. The Federation treaty did not recognize the right of ethnic republics to secede and stated that republican laws and constitutions could not violate those of federal government (Hunter, 2004, p. 222).

The important point in this regard is that, the above-mentioned document did not treat the subjects as equal. Namely, unlike the other subjects (such as oblasts and districts which were not created on nationality base), ethnic republics were taken as sovereign entities and granted significant powers, including the authority to conduct independent foreign and international trade policies and to determine their own governmental structures (Hunter, 2004, p. 222, Smith, 1998, p. 1395). Later, in February 1994, Tatarstan and the Russian Federation also signed the power-sharing treaty, which recognized Tatarstan as "a state united with the Russian Federation" (Hunter, 2004, p. 224).

Having consolidated its position as a president, Eltsin sought to undermine the rights of the republics enlisted in bilateral treaties. It is for this reason that the federal constitution adopted in December 1993 envisaged rather limited notion of sovereignty with regard to the ethnic republics. For many of the ethno-republics, the constitution

was therefore judged as an abrogation of the autonomous rights previously embodied in the Federal Treaty. In the referendum held on 12 December 1993 it received support from only nine of the 21 republics. Seven republics rejected the constitution, the plebiscite was declared invalid in Tatarstan where less than 14 % of the electorate voted, and Chechnya did not participate at all (Smith, 1998, p. 1396). Overall the constitution had received endorsement by 58,4% of those who voted (ibid.), which means near half of the citizens of the Federation either did not participate or voted negatively in constitutional referendum.

Erosion of Common Legal Space

Despite the fact that in theory the competition between the center and the regions had been solved in favor of central government, in reality different legal, contradictory notions of citizenships continued their struggle throughout the 1990s. As Smith (1998, p.1396) labeled it, “war of sovereignties” was characteristic for the period following the adoption of the Constitution. From political security perspective, this situation is extremely dangerous. For Buzan et al. (1998, p. 150), even minor violations of sovereignty are threats; thus it becomes endangered if *it becomes partial* in any sense (emphasis added).

Some regions sought to become international actors in their own right. In 1991-1995 alone Russian regions signed over 300 agreements on trade, economic and humanitarian co-operation with foreign countries, undermining Moscow’s monopoly on foreign relations (Sakwa, 2004, p. 134). In his annual address to the parliament Putin

declared that “more than 3500 laws passed in the regions contradicted the Russian Constitution and federal laws” (Putin, 2001).

Due to these features, Sakwa labels Russian federalism as “segmented regionalism” (Sakwa, 2004, p. 130), arguing that it fragmented the country economically and legally, cutting across all the processes of state building. Ill-defined center-subject relationships undermined the emergence of a unified national market, legal space and Russia’s coherence as an international actor. As he concludes, by the end of Eltsin’s presidency Russia was not only multinational state, but was also becoming a *multi-state state*, numerous proto-state formations making sovereignty claims vis-à-vis Moscow (Sakwa, 2004, p. 135-136, emphasis added).

Recentralization and Securitization of Center-Region Relations under Putin

As it is noted in Sakwa’s analysis, the ill-defined center-region relations had had detrimental effect on Russia’s post-Soviet domestic and foreign policies. In this context, it is not surprising that center-region relations took one of the most central themes in Putin’s presidential activity. Even before electing as a president, Putin identified center-region relationships as a key issue for Russia’s independence. In his address to the nation on the eve of the turn of the millennium Putin declares: “The key to Russia’s recovery and growth today lies in the state-political sphere. Russia needs strong state power and must have it” (Putin. 1999). The strong state that Russia needs should be democratic, law-based, *workable federal state* (ibid., emphasis added). In this address, that later has been called as Putin’s presidential manifesto, the prime minister coined the

term of “constitutional security”. Constitutional security denotes to the situation in which all laws are in concert with the federal constitution. Putin argued that the lack of constitutional security put Russia’s integrity and country’s manageability into jeopardy (ibid.).

In his 8 July state-of-the-nation address Putin identifies three issues that threaten Russia most: demographic decline, economic weakness and a state that does not function effectively (Putin 2000). As far as the last one is concerned, the president stressed that competition for power between the centre and the regional powers has been *destructive* (ibid., emphasis added).

In order to fix the problem, Putin initiated wide-range reforms in center-region relations. With his decree issued on May 13, 2000 Russia’s regions divided into seven larger administrative districts headed by the representatives appointed by the president. The representatives are responsible for overseeing the performance of federal agencies and monitoring the implementation of federal policy (Hunter, 2004, p. 229)⁵.

Additionally, in June 2001 Putin signed a decree creating a presidential commission responsible for redefining the distribution of powers between the federal center and the regions, especially bringing the power-sharing compliance into compliance with the federal constitution (Hunter, 2004, p. 231). On power-sharing treaties Putin emphasized the importance of equality among the subjects, which in the end result must ensure the equality of the citizens who live in different territories of Russia (Putin 2002).

⁵ For detailed information on Putin’s federal reforms see: Richard Sakwa, *Putin: Russia’s Choice*, Routledge, 2004, pp. 130-161; M. Steven Fish, Ten Years After the Soviet Breakup. Putin’s Path, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No.4, pp. 71-78;

Overall, Putin's different public speeches and its presidential activity reveals the fact that recentralization of federal authority is conceived as a pre-requisite for state's prosperity and sovereignty, i.e., political security. Strong state, defined as highly centralized federal authority, is equal to Russia's survival as an independent entity. Putin has put it as following:

Our entire historical experience shows that a country like Russia can live and develop within its borders only if it is a strong nation. All of the periods during which Russia has been weakened, whether politically or economically, have always and inexorably brought to the fore the threat of the country's collapse (Putin 2003).

As the above-mentioned quotation implies, the preservation strong federal center is one of the most important cornerstones of security thinking in contemporary Russia. The erosion of federal center has been the important dimension of security discourse in post-Soviet Russia, which in turn, reveals the priority that political security concerns hold in national security policy of the Russian Federation.

Identity Crisis: Lack of National Idea as a Security Concern in Post-Communist
Russia

The Identity Dimension of the Collapse of the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union is not solely political event that profoundly changed the directions of world politics. It also includes deep-going identity problems for the citizens of independent Russia, as well as its new political leadership. Surely, the nation

building processes have been launched all over the former Socialist space but in Russian context it has specific dimensions.

First of all, as Smith (1998, p. 1401) put it, the collapse of the Union left the ethnic Russians without identity. Namely, unlike other nationalities that live within Russia who had their own autonomous republics, i.e., the place with which they identified themselves, the ethnic Russians had been accustomed to identify themselves predominantly with the Soviet Union. In this regard, Kortunov argues that sovietization was an active anti-Russian (*antiruskii*) policy, a policy of de-rusification of the Russian nation. At the same time, he continues, many ethnicities of the Russian Empire (Tsarist Russia) have been formed as political, cultural and social subjects just under the aegis of the USSR and are the products of Soviet epoch (Kortunov, 2003, p. 419).

The point is that, the Soviet state did not furnish the RSFSR with the institutional trappings of nationhood. Rather, Russians were encouraged to think of the Soviet Union as their homeland (Smith, 1998, p. 1401) while the ethnic minorities within the RSFSR had their ethnically defined republics that provide them the locus of identity. And with the end of Soviet State the feeling of “homelessness” occurred among the ethnic Russians who hold the majority of the Russian Federation. The words written by a leading Russian intellectual Gannushkina illustrates that kind of feeling:

For many centuries the Russian individual has been accustomed [to thinking] that he [lives] within borders of his huge state [and that] he is the master of this empire. Today, we willy-nilly have ceased to feel ourselves to be masters everywhere, but it seems that we are unable to feel like masters even here at home [in Russia] (quot. in Urban, 1994, p. 740).

In a similar vein, Tishkov has noted that after the collapse of the Union “what ethnic Russians require more than anything else is a sense that they feel at home in their

homeland and that neither their identities nor cultures are perceived as threatened or imperiled by a federation protecting the rights and identities of national minorities” (cited in Smith, 1998, p. 1401). In other words, what the political establishment needs is an idea that gives legitimacy to the state in the eyes of both ethnic minorities as well as the ethnic Russian majority.

Besides that, the collapse of the Union questioned the very boundaries of Russianness. Tolz (1998, p. 996) identifies five definitions that had been in a dominant position in intellectual-political debates regarding the boundaries of the Russian nation:

1. Union Identity, which considers all the people that once lived within the borders of the Soviet Union as Russian nation. The proponents of this definition envisages the view that existence within one state (common history) is the basis of the nationhood;
2. Slavic Identity: the proponents of this definition take more limited view on nationhood and include only the Belarusians and the Ukrainians to the Russian nation;
3. Linguistic identity: this group takes the Russian language as the main measure to define Russianness and considers all the people that speaks Russian as a member of Russian nation;
4. Racists; this group defines the Russians racially, and argues that blood ties constitute the basis of common identity;
5. Civic nationalism: this definition takes all the citizens of the Russian Federation as a single nation. Regardless of their ethnic, cultural

background, these citizens united by loyalty to newly emerging institutions and to the constitution.

The views cited above, illustratively shows the effect of the collapse of the Union in one more respect, namely, these groups by and large envisages the feeling of “divided nation”. In other words, it becomes clear that the demise of the Union, threatened Russian’s sense of security as it divided their co-nationals into formally independent states.

Russian Civic Nationalism?

From this classification it becomes clear that, all the definitions of the Russian nationhood cannot be a unifying factor in such a multiethnic state as Russia, with only exclusion of the last option. As Hunter (2004, p. 176) puts it, despite their diverging views on Russianness all dominant groups other than the proponents of the last position are nationalists, in the sense that they take ethnic Russians as the base for a new state.

Due to this problem, from the very beginning Russian officials opted for civic nationalism as a unifying factor. The Russian citizenship law adopted in 1991 calls a citizen of the Russian Federation not *ruskii* (ethnic Russian), but *rossiyanin*, i.e. person that lives in the territory of the Russian Federation (Tolz, 1998, p. 1008). But despite official de-ethnicization, surveys conducted throughout 1990s reveals the fact that the majority of the minority nationalities continue to identify themselves more with ethnic dimensions than citizenship (Tolz, 1998, p. 1015).

According to Stern (1994), the problems in forging civic identity among ethnic minorities lie in policies that pursued by Soviet leadership, especially under Lenin and

Stalin. Namely, it is argued that in the Soviet Union ethnic consciousness was intensified by deliberate policies such as conflation of ethnic and political divisions in the federal structure of the state; intermittent promotion of national cultures and languages; preferential treatment of ethnic minorities within their own republics; including ethnic quotas in regional administration and in higher education; deportation of ethnic groups; and practicing of identifying citizens by ethnic group on internal passports (Stern, 1994, p. 51).

At the same time, in the official discourse, the Russian speakers residing outside the Russian Federation is being treated as a part of the Russian nation. In his 1994 New Year Address to the nation, Eltsin specifically appealed to the Diaspora saying: “Dear compatriots! You are inseparable from us and we are inseparable from you. We were and will be together” (cited in Tolz, 1998, p. 1009).

In a similar vein, NSC-2000 treats the Russian language as a factor without which “spiritual unity of the people of multinational Russia” is impossible (NSC-2000). In a similar vein, Putin (2001), called the Russians living abroad as “compatriots” saying that, “Russia will not abandon them”.

In sum, the official discourse reveals the fact that Russian officials take complicated stand on definition of Russianness. On one hand, documents related to citizenship envisage civic nationalism. On the other hand, the officials take the Russian language as a main indicator of Russianness and subsequently treat the Russian speakers resided in other states as members of the Russian nation. Putin’s 2005 annual address shoved this fact illustratively:

Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the *Russian*

nation, it became genuine drama. Tens of millions of our *co-citizens and compatriots* found themselves outside Russian territory” (Putin, 2005, emphasis added).

In these circumstances, Russia faces with the task to find the balance between ethnic-linguistic based nationalism and civic-citizenship based one. As Hunter (2004, p. 204) puts it, the reassertion of Russianness and the affirmation of the Russian culture and identity should not be at the expense of other ethnic and cultural groups. Failure to encompass all competing claims for self-determination within civic Russian identity can endanger Russia’s stability by instigating interethnic, interreligious conflicts.

The Quest for National Idea

The collapse of the Soviet Union, i.e., communism created ideological vacuum in all post-Soviet space. The severity of this is much more acute in such a multiethnic, multireligious state as Russia. In this regard, Stern (1994, p. 50) argues that the lack of “a common ideological bond” is partly responsible for the rise of ethnic separatism in post-communist Russia. That is why forging a common national idea that is able to hold the citizens together and give legitimacy to the state institutions had been an integral element of post-Soviet Russian politics.

Initially it appeared that the post-Soviet ideological and cultural void could be filled with the wholesale importation of the West’s liberal democratic political model, its market economy, and its culture (Hunter, 2004, p. 133). Indeed, in his 1996 annual address to the parliament Eltsin expressed that “democracy, formation of rule of law, civil society, market economy and other fundamental values ” can ensure Russia’s

development as a self-identified independent entity (Eltsin, 1996, p. 558). Having acknowledged the significance of a national idea, in the same year Eltsin created a special presidential commission for formulating a “Russian national idea” (Sakwa, 2004, p. 163).

But growing economic difficulties, especially the 1998 financial crisis, accompanied by West’s unilateral attempts in solving international problems (Kosovo is an illustrative case in this regard) diminished the support to those who advocate for western values. Eltsin’s unsuccessful attempts at forging a widely held national idea find its expression in Putin’s *Manifesto*:

The fruitful and creative work, which our country [Russia] needs so badly, is impossible in a divided and internally atomized society, *a society where the main social groups and political forces do not share basic values and fundamental ideological orientation* (Putin, 1999, p. 225, emphasis added).

Though Putin does not endorse feasibility of “an official state ideology” (Putin, 1999, p. 256), at the same he explicitly expresses his conviction that “without consolidation at least around basic national values and objectives” (Putin, 2003) Russia will not be able to withstand the threats that she faces.

Statism- a strong, effective central power is one of the most important principles that Putinite ideology propagates. As mentioned in previous sections, Putin equate the existence of strong-effective state with the survival of the Russian Federation as such. As Fish (2001, p. 73) puts it, along with power, administration and the state capacity, recentralization also serves the aim to separate ethnicity from identity.

Patriotism, i.e., “the feeling of pride in one’s country, its history and accomplishments” (Putin, 1999, p. 256) is another basic values that Russian national

idea envisages. Besides that, Putin argues that unlike western notion of individualism, social solidarity is more akin to Russian culture and history: the majority of Russians are used to depending more on the state and society for improvements in their conditions than on their own efforts (ibid., p. 257).

In short, membership in national community, social solidarity, and unwavering loyalty to the state and regime should, in Putin's view, form the core of citizens' public conciseness and identity (Fish, 2001, p. 74). Besides these "secular" values Putin gives significant importance to religion. Especially the Russian Christianity, i.e., Orthodoxy is conceived as a vital factor in uniting the nation. On one occasion Putin stated that, "without orthodoxy there would be no Russia" (cited in Sakwa, 2004, p. 170).

Dominant Discourse of Danger: Identity and State Authority as Main Referent Objects

With regard to security Baldwin (1997, p. 19) argues that the value of an increment of national security to a country will vary from one country to another and from one historical context to another, depending not only on how much security is needed but also on how much security the country has. Namely, the value that policy-makers attach to security is dependent on degree of security deficit. In light of this point, it can be argued that in a given historical context certain referent objects gain priority over others as the feeling of need for these objects is high in the community.

This expectation in mind, the next two chapters will explore the specific cases of securitization. In the chapter that follows, the securitization of demographic decline will

be elaborated. If our hypothesis put forward in the first chapter is sound, we should find that the demographic decline has been securitized from those perspectives that have been prioritized in the dominant discourse of danger. In other words, the chapter will look for congruence, if any, between the dominant discourse of danger outlined above and particular securitizing move made with regard to demographic decline. For that aim, the respective chapter will aim at unveiling the contours of securitization of demographic decline.

Subsequently, last chapter will elaborate information communication technologies' securitization. In a similar vein, the hypothesis of this study claims that securitization of the issue should show resemblance with the dominant discourse of danger. Though analysis of relevant data, the chapter will examine whether there is congruence between the dominant discourse of danger and securitization of information in the Russian Federation. The referent points of respective securitizing move, major points of concerns used to securitize the particular issue at hand will be unveiled accordingly.

CHAPTER 4
SECURITIZATION OF DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN RUSSIA

Demographic-Security Relationship and Societal Security

As mentioned above, the aim of this chapter is to elaborate securitization of demographic decline in the Russian Federation. In the light of the hypothesis formulated in the introductory part, the chapter aims at finding whether there is congruence between the dominant discourse of danger and the securitization of demographic decline in Russia. For that aim, the chapter begins with outlining the basic demographic trends and their security implications. Having formulated background, the chapter moves to examine securitization of demographic decline.

From securitization perspective, the link between security and any specific issue is not universal and objective; rather it can show differences from one setting to another. The relationship between demographics and security is not an exception in this regard. Demographic factors can be securitized in more than one way. The important thing in this regard is to find the ways that any issue, as well as demographic decline has been securitized. In other word, in order to judge on the demographic-security relationship, one should look at the discourse that presents demographic developments threatening. Furthermore, as sectoral analysis put forward by the Copenhagen School implies, a specific issue, i.e., demographic decline can be securitized from different sectors' perspectives. Thus any comprehensive analysis of the security policy should adequately address these issues.

Societal security that put forward by the authors of securitization approach opens new possibilities of analyzing demographics-security relationships. As societal security deals with identity, it is about the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom (Weaver et al, p. 23). From this perspective, the threats to the societal security are whatever put “we” identity into jeopardy.

The definition cited above does not allow to objectively identifying threats to societal security, simply because of the fact that each society may have its own imagination about its boundaries, about the “acceptable conditions for evolution” and so on. Nevertheless, Weaver et al. (1993, p. 43) identifies two issues that can threaten societal security: competing identities and migration, which are, at least, in Russian case strongly related to demographic decline.

As far as migration is concerned, it should be noted that many states take migration as a remedy for their declining labor forces. As population declines, the economy begins suffering from dearth of labor force. The states tend to compensate it with “importing” labor force.

In this regard, it should be noted that security implications of migrational flows have attracted intensive scholarly attention in the post-Cold War security studies. For instance, in spite of her traditional approach to security, Adamson (2006, p. 13) also observes in this regard that “migration may influence state’s capacity to formulate a coherent national identity which is necessary precondition for the maintenance of state security”.

From societal security perspective, Alexseev and Hofstetter (2006) enumerate several challenges that migration flows may pose to societal security. First, by raising uncertainty about the future of ethnic make up of states, regardless of actual migration scale, migration would make incumbent ethnic groups more likely to view competition for power as a key to their security. Second, ethnic incumbents could be rarely certain that temporary migrants would return home and would not settle down, bring in their relatives and friends, and claim jobs, resources, or territory. Histories of territorial claims and records of violent conflict between the migrants and the host populations would also decrease credibility of migrant's intent.

Third, migration often brings together ethnic populations who have a sense of distinct "groupness" and entrenched negative stereotypes (ibid.). As Buzan et al. point out "this threat on societal level when incoming population is of different cultural or ethnic stock from those that already resident. It is amplified when migrants seek to maintain their identity rather than adapting to that prevailing in their adopted country" (Buzan et al., 1998: p. 45).

Fourth, migration may engender economic rivalries and competition, activating the sense of economic vulnerability in host societies. The more intense this perception, the more would we expect migration to engender fear and hostility. Alexseev (2003: p. 91) points out that, actual or anticipated shifts in ethnic balance do not automatically harden into security dilemma situations and that perceptions of economic loss from such changes serve as mechanism to enhance or mitigate hostility against immigrants.

The arguments cited above should not be conceived as a claim for an objective cause-effect relationship between demographic decline and societal security. On the

contrary, such kind of argumentation would be in contradiction with the theoretical framework proposed by the Copenhagen School. Rather than being objective, the relationship between societal security and demographic decline is inter-subjective. In other words, the ways of securitization of any issue is not predetermined; rather wide-range social, historical, material factors define the direction of the respective securitization move. More than that, as Copenhagen School authors put it, any securitization-de-securitization is a political choice, which means that political preferences of the securitizing actor should also be adequately addressed.

In short, Copenhagen School's framework implies that while analyzing demographic decline and its impact on societal security, one should look at migration and its relevant securitization as well. In order to establish the link between demographic decline and societal security, the securitization of migration flows in Russia will be also elaborated in more detail in subsequent sections.

In sum, from securitization perspective as security is a multidimensional phenomenon, so are the links between demographics and security. Depending on the historical and material context, demographic factors can be securitized from different perspectives. Societal security is one of them, which can be threatened by demographic related factors, such as migration and competing identities. As mentioned above, this chapter aims at showing that securitization of demographic decline is not independent from the context. Rather, as it will be clear below, in the historical context, which prioritized societal and political concerns, demographic decline has been mainly securitized in line with the dominant discourse of danger.

Since the term of “security” acquires different meaning in different national contexts, so does the notion of “societal security”. At least, because of the fact that there are more than one identity group even within a nation each of which may have its own societal security outlook. This means that, before moving to analyze specific case of securitization, we should clarify the notion of Russian societal security.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the quest for an identity is one of the most important peculiarities of the post-Soviet Russian society and state. Given that societal security deal with the identity, the latter may hint the essence of the former.

Thus, on one hand, as it became evident from the previous chapter, the identity formation process in the Russian Federation is predominantly state-driven phenomenon. Which means that societal security that deal with the identity is strongly entrenched with the state policies. Additionally, despite the fact that the term of “we” has numerous explanations, more or less, all of them take ethnic Russian (*russkie*) peculiarities, such as the Russian language and Orthodox Christianity, as important factors that makes Russians distinct from “others”. It is not coincidence, in this regard that, the representatives of the Russian-speakers in near abroad are conceived as a part of Russian societal identity. On the other hand, the official security documents take the Russian language as a referent object and moves to securitize it. In addition orthodox Christianity consistently presented as a cornerstone of the national unity.

These arguments make one to conclude that the referent object of dominant societal security in the Russian federation is the “Russian national identity” defined in terms of Russian ethnicity, language and religion. As far as the securitizing actors are concerned, it should be reiterated that in the Russian settings, the process of

securitization is top-down one. This means that, the state political leadership plays much more important role in this regard. In addition to state officials, the Russian church, which has traditionally played central role in the Russian politics, “legitimately” speak for societal security. Or in Copenhagen School’s terms, historical, political facilitating conditions gives the Russian political leadership and the Church respective “social power” to speak on societal security, i.e., make securitizing move with regard to it.

This argument in mind, the remaining part of this chapter is dedicated to analyze the process of securitization of demographic decline. Specific focus will be on societal security, which is of the most “securitized” sectors in post-Soviet Russia. The aim of this chapter is twofold: on one hand, finding that demographic decline has been securitized from societal security perspective will challenge mainstream’s military-based security thinking.

On the other hand, finding evidences of societal securitization of demographic decline will further enrich the securitization approach. We hypothesize that specific cases are susceptible to be securitized in terms of those sectors that have been predominantly conceived as threatened in the dominant security discourse. So if it is true, then it should be expected that adverse demographic trends to be securitized from societal security perspective, since societal security is one of the most urgent national security concerns of the Russian Federation.

Demographics in Russia

Basic Demographic Trends in Russia

Russia is experiencing unparalleled decline in population for the last two decades. The figures released by Russian Statistic Committee (Goskomstat) revealed a total population numbering 142 million in January 2008 in the Russian Federation (Goskomstat, 2010)⁶. This means that the decline has been over 5 million between 1989 and 2008 in Russia. According to official calculations Russia's population will be 137 million in 2025 (Goskomstat, 2009). But the United Nations medium population projection for Russia foresees a decline to 112 million by 2050 (Population Council, 2005, p. 401).

Russia is experiencing natural population decline since 1992 and shows little sign of abating. Since then Russia has experienced annual population decline, resulting from greater number of deaths over births, accompanied by net inward migration insufficient to counter the overall population decline. Yet Russia's uniqueness in demographic terms lies not only in a sharp decline in births versus deaths for reasons other than war, famine or disease. Sure these trends are also evident in almost all developed countries. Along with these usual trends, Russia is also experiencing dramatically increase in mortality rates, causing life expectancy to decline.

⁶ See Annex 1 for detailed information;

Regionalization of Demographic Decline

In addition to above mentioned features of Russian demographics, Russia also shows sharp regional disparities. Namely, Russia is not a state that experience uniform patterns of demographic trends.

National demographic trends in Russia disguise significant regional variance. Russia is comprised of 89 federal subjects, which exhibit hugely divergent demographic patterns in both population composition and dynamics. In 27 regions of the country mortality rate has been 2-3 times more than birth rates (Demographic Policy Concept). These regions are Central and Far Eastern parts of the country that have traditionally populated by ethnic Russians.

On the contrary, as the above-mentioned document stated it explicitly, natural increase has been occurred only in 15 regions, including North Caucasian and Volgo republics, such as Chechnya, Dagestan, Tatarstan which are heavily populated by Muslim nationalities. As Herd and Sargsyan (2007, p. 57) points out it, the 2002 census revealed that the ethnic Russian population has declined from 81.3 to 79.8 percent of the population of Russia.

Regional disparities are evident in all demographic variables: in migration patterns, in fertility trends, in family and household dynamics, in mortality patterns and causes of death, etc. These disparities are more dramatic between ethnic groups.

Regional divergences in total fertility rates are significant, fertility rates presently range from an average of one child per woman in much of central and north-west Russia to 2.1-2.3 in Dagestan and Ingushetia, which are populated by Muslim

nationalities. Furthermore, certain regions suffer sharper fertility declines than others. For example, between 1990 and 1995 the total fertility rate fell by 29-34% in all regions except the North Caucasus where the decline was 26% (Prendergrast, 2004: p. 15).

As mentioned above, Russia suffers from long term trend of declining life expectancy and rising mortality rates. Mortality is higher in the European North, Siberia, Far East. Unlike these regions, southern parts of the country- North Caucasus, Volga and Central Black Earth have lower mortality rates. In this light, Bogoyavlenski suggests that regional differences in mortality rates may be a proxy for ethnic differences (Bogoyavlenski, 2001: p. 92).

Societal Security Implications of Demographic Decline

The aim of this section is to clarify in more detail the link between demographic decline and societal security in the Russian Federation. It should be noted in this regard that, the analysis provided below should not be interpreted so that there is some kind of “objective” threat to Russia’s societal security stemmed from adverse demographic decline. Indeed, such kind of claim would be contrary to the theoretical approach that this study envisages. In other words, as mentioned in previous chapters as well, it is not the function of the researcher to say that whether a definite issue is a threat or not. On the contrary, as securitization approach implies, this is a task of securitizing actors. The analysis provided in this section aimed at formulating background for the securitizing move which will be analyzed below. In so doing, it is attempted to show that individual securitizing move is not totally independent from the outer world. As Balzacq (2005, p.

181) noted it, speech acts do not construct reality; at best it constructs our perception of it. This means that securitization of any issue, including demographic decline, is not totally independent from the facts.

At the same time, the existence of facts does not make it sure that respective securitization will take place. Myriad intervening factors may increase or decrease the perception of “threatness” of the given issue. In addition, Copenhagen School argues that the move to securitize or de-securitize of any issue is a political choice. This means that, despite the existence of “facts”, the respective securitizing actor may opt to de-securitize of the issue. This study does not claim for existence of causal relations between the facts on one hand and the respective securitizing move on the other. Rather, it is being argued that, once the actor opted to securitize the issue, the securitization will be made in congruence with the dominant discourse of danger, which have had prioritized certain dimensions of the national security. This caveat in mind, the following sections attempt to outline possible societal security risks of the demographic decline.

Uneven Demographic Decline between Russia’s Ethnic Groups and Its Security

Implications

As mentioned above, along with migration, competing identities is one of the main threats to societal security (Weaver et al., 1993, p. 43). In this light, the study attempts to introduce basic traits of the Russian and Muslim identities showing that in most instances these two identity outlooks are contradictory.

The examination of debates about the new Russian identity throughout 1990s revealed that dominant political thought in Post-Soviet Russia is ethnocentric (Urban, 1994; Chafetz, 1996/1997; Hunter 2004). Be communist, reformist or religious, each of the major groupings envisioned ethnocentric rather than civic nationalism as dominant ideology. Due to these facts, Hunter (2004, p. 176) argues that all the major thought centers are nationalists. She goes on dividing these centers into five categories:

1. Christian nationalist;
2. Communist nationalists;
3. Geopolitical nationalists;
4. Fringe nationalists (ultra-nationalists or Neo-Nazis);
5. Reform nationalists.

All of these believe that Orthodox Christianity should be an integral part of new identity of new Russia. In this regard, Hunter summarizes basic traits of this type of self-identity:

This perception (i.e. Orthodox Christianity) imbued Russia with a sense of uniqueness as a *sui generis* civilization, different both from the Catholic and Protestant West and from the Islamic East, a sense of mission and spirit of messianism. In practical terms, this leads to belief that (1) in every aspect of life Russia must find its own special way and that foreign models flounder on Russian cultural soil (2) Russia has a duty to protect Christianity from encroachment by others, meaning principally Muslims, but potentially other non- Orthodox Christians (3) Russian lands are coterminous with the true realm of Christianity. Thus Orthodox Christianity and its history became inextricably linked to Russia's cultural heritage and its national identity: to be Russian meant to be Orthodox Christian (Hunter, 2004: p. 142).

In a similar vein Tolz (1998, pp. 995-996) observes that in early 1990s, most definitions of the Russian nation envisaged rather nationalist view. According to her, unlike those

who advocated for citizen based approach, remaining trends more or less envisaged racial, ethnic based view of Russian nation.

The role of others is as important in identity formation as the values that shared by given collectivity. The process of identity building includes the setting up of boundaries between “us” and “them”. In this case it is useful to mention the place of Muslims in Russian Orthodox self-identity. Hunter (2004: p. 146) points out that Islam and Muslims have been perceived as an inferior and have been seen as a threat to Russian interests and a hindrance to Russia’s territorial and cultural expansion.

So, theoretically we have strong reasons to anticipate societal insecurity under demographic situation, the basic trends of which outlined above with. On the other hand, contemporary Russian political arena is rich with events of inter-ethnic disagreements, such as the Chechen War, centrifugal tendencies in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan and the rise ultranationalist, Russo-centric movements. In the wave of decentralization during the tenure of Yeltsin, almost every autonomous republic with ethnic population adopted constitutional acts that declare superiority of titular ethnic groups within the autonomous republic.

For example, it is reported that the Republic of Adygei adopted a constitution, stipulating that the republic’s president must speak Adygei language and that 50 per cent of the posts in the republic’s governing bodies must be reserved for ethnic Adygei, although the titular nationality constituted only 22 per cent of republic’s population (Hunter, 2004: p. 216).

In sum, as far as the competing identities are concerned it should be noted that in Russia the overall population declines mostly at the expense of ethnic Russians. In other

words, though Russia experience demographic decline as a state, some federal republics of Northern Caucasus which are populated generally by non-Slavic Muslim nationalities experience natural increase. Muslim ethnic groups tend to have higher birth rates and larger families than Slavic counterparts. Moreover, though Russia suffers from both a long term general trend of declining of life expectancy and rising mortality rates, these factors are not so dramatic in the above mentioned Muslim republics due to specific social peculiarities.

So, in theory current demographic trends in Russia anticipate deep disparity among ethnic Slavic and Muslims, which in turn, reveals dangerous societal and political insecurity. In this regard, Prendergrast (2004, p. 51) argues that, the growth of relatively disenfranchised non-Russian, particularly Muslim ethnic groups in some republics may encourage radicalization of this part of the Russian society. This is especially relevant in the case that, when this minority groups is deprived or has a perception of being deprived of equal rights to participate in political life of the country.

The Consequence of Demographic Decline: Migration and its Security Implications

On one hand, population decline and ageing make the countries to seek the ways to compensate declining labor force. The experience of European states shows that immigration is one of the main options to manage this problem. On the other hand, migration flows are of great importance in bringing different cultures and nationalities face to face. Accordingly, the existence of large amount of migrants may forge the

feeling of “being exploited” among the titular population and may be proxy for subsequent securitization.

These arguments in mind, this section aims at illustrating the ways that migration may have impact on societal security. For this aim, the migration of the Chinese to Russia will be examined.

Since the Russian borders re-opened to foreigners in 1991, Chinese migration has been one of the most controversial topics in Russian political discourse⁷. For example, on one hand, Zaionchkovskaia, Head of the Department of Migration at the Institute of National Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, argues that in the face of dramatic depopulation of far Eastern parts of the Russian Federation, Chinese migration to these lands can mitigate the adverse effects of demographic decline (Lomanov, 2004: p. 18). Zaionchkovskaia is sure that it is necessary to invite Chinese to come to Russia. Her projection is that by the middle of this century, there will be at least 10 million Chinese in Russia, or maybe 20 million, equal to 20% of the immigrant labor force that should come to Russia. And, she argues, enemies of immigration must understand that only immigration could build up the Russian service sector, transportation, communication, construction industry, etc. (ibid., p. 18).

But, there are many who think differently. Throughout 1990s there have been countless alarmist claims about “yellow peril”, “Sinification” (*kitaizatsiya*) from national and local elites, as well as from the public. Above all, the president of the Russian Federation Putin put these concerns even more clearly. Thus, during his speech before the public the president declared: “If you do not take practical steps to advance

⁷ See Annex 2 for detailed information on migration in Russia;

the Far East soon, after a few decades, the Russian population will be speaking Japanese, Chinese, and Korean” (Putin, 2000a).

The migration from China is especially dramatized with regard to Russian Far East regions. As a result of adverse demographic trends, the Russian Far East population declined by almost 9 per cent in the 1990s (Prendergrast, 2004: p. 32). By 2004, this part of the Russian Federation had a population of 6.68 million inhabiting a territory of more than 6.2 million square kilometers, compared to 107 million Chinese living in the three Northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning) with a territory of 1.9 million square kilometers (Wishnick, 2006: p. 3). Implying the threatening nature of these population disparities, Russian academics and policy analysts see them as resulting in China's "demographic pressure" on Russia. By one estimate, this pressure amounts to 63,000 Chinese nationals per one Russian, per one kilometer of the Russian-Chinese border. Population density pressure was estimated at 380,000 Chinese per one Russian per one kilometer inside a one-kilometer band of the same border (Alexseev et al. 2006: p. 7).

The history of the two communities and the specific peculiarities of Chinese migrants increases negative public attitude. There is a Chinese community in Russia from the mid-nineteenth century. Of course, there is every day communication between people, but there is nothing one can call a Sino-Russian culture produced by migrants. Lomanov observes this fact claiming that Russian and Chinese cultures are not compatible (Lomanov, 2004: p. 22).

Moreover, unlike the migrants from former Soviet Union, the Chinese migrants tend to live in closed communities with few contacts with the local Russians: “In

Moscow, there are more than ten hostels that are completely Chinese. They are like small Chinese islands, not China towns but China-buildings scattered all around Moscow. Mostly, Chinese keep these places under their control. There are Chinese guards at the doors” (Lomanov, 2004: p. 22). Problems inherited from history, like the assessment of the legacy of the border delimitation (both communities consider the current state borders as unjust), influence the perception of the Chinese community. The perception of Chinese communities is linked with an idea of the future disintegration of Russia due to growth of the Chinese community.

Public perception of Chinese migration differs from region to region. According to Wishnick’s assessments (2006: p. 8), in Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, the majority of respondent expressing negative view of Chinese migrants above all complained that they lived better than local residents. The research shows that negative views in the Russian Far East stem from perceptions of the adverse of Chinese migrants on their economic security. At first sight, one can argue that there is no need to worry about the prospect of wide range hostilities between the locals and the migrants. But Alexseev (2003, p. 87) comes to the conclusion that just the perception of economic loss can result with hostility against the migrants from different ethnic origin. According to the author, interethnic hostility, defined as proclivity for aggressive responding to members of other ethnic group, is the link between threat perception and overt hostile acts directed against ethnic others. In other words shifts in ethnic balances, be it due to migration or disproportional natural increase, do not automatically harden into ethnic violence. Perception of threat resulting from such changes are enhanced or mitigated by economic factors while hostility is in formation.

In this sense, it can be expected that hostility may arise from perceptions that members of a different ethnic group are doing better than members of one's own group. Actually, this is the case in terms of Chinese migration to the Far East regions of the Russian Federation. The results of the Survey conducted by the Center for Public Opinion Research at the Vladivostok Institute of history, Archeology and ethnography of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences shows that 74 per cent of the respondents said Chinese migrants gain more from trans-border transactions. It is also evident from the survey data mentioned above that these perceptions of relative losses to Chinese migrants could augment prejudices and raise interethnic tensions. The majority of the respondents saw the Chinese as more hardworking, and greedy. Moreover, the majority disapproves of their relatives marrying Chinese citizens (for the figures see: Alexseev, 2003: p. 98).

So, demographic processes in Russia are influencing the societal security at both national and regional level. In a multi-national country such as Russia, migration flows and other demographic processes may have significant consequences for the very cohesion of the society and culture, for popular understanding of regional and national identity and so for the state's stability and sovereignty (Prendergrast, 2004, p. 51).

The flow of ethnically and culturally distinct populations to the Russian regions may engender inter-ethnic hostility and violence. This is especially true about the Far Eastern regions of the Russian Federation. Surveys conducted by different organizations show that, local citizens have negative perception of Chinese migration to the region. The Russian population and media in the Far East have reacted to the Chinese immigration in a xenophobic manner. The people tend to associate their economic

depravity to the existence of migrants. This in turn, may forge ethnic hostility between these communities. Moreover, this situation may inflict Russia's bilateral relation with China, with which it has controversial relationships, especially in terms of demarcation of state borders.

But as securitization approach requires, unless the respective securitizing move taken by securitizing actors, it cannot be concluded that uneven demographic patterns or migration flows are threat to Russia's security. As mentioned in the first chapter, without this kind of securitizing move, uneven demographic trends can only be labeled as "security issue". Whether they are threat or not to the Russia's security can only be revealed by analyzing the securitizing move, which is the aim of the following section.

Securitizing Move

In light of adverse demographic trends, 1990s and early 2000s have been a period of securitization of demographic decline in Russia. It should be recalled from the Copenhagen School that securitization move means to present an issue as an existential threat. In the light of argument this section will focus on securitizing move with regard to demographic decline. Using Collins' (2005) two-stage approach to securitizing move the "identification stage", namely the presentation of an issue as a threat will be elaborated first.

Identification Stage

The seriousness of adverse demographic processes had already been evident in early 90s. Thus, in 1996 address to the Federal Assembly, Eltsin declared that, “the solution to demographic crisis is within Russia’s vital national interests” (Eltsin, 1996, p. 560). But until 2000s, Russian officials refrained themselves from explicitly labeling the issue as a threat.

National security Strategy of the Russian Federation, adopted in 2000, explicitly states that “a threat to the nation's physical health can be seen in the crisis in the systems of public health and social protection of the population, in increasing consumption of alcohol and narcotics”. The document states that the consequences of this profound *social crisis are a sharp drop in the birth rate and average life expectancy, distortion of the demographic and social composition of society, an undermining of the workforce as the foundation for industrial development, a weakening of the fundamental nucleus of society - the family - and a decline in society's spiritual, moral and creative potential* (emphasis is added) (NSC-2000).

As the wording of the above-mentioned quote reveals, the basic security document of the Russian Federation takes the demographic decline, which in itself is the result of “the crisis in the systems of public health and social protection of the population, in increasing consumption of alcohol and narcotics”, as a threat.

More interestingly, the document does not say anything that is related directly to military security, i.e., the defense of state’s territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of both internal and external threats that are military in essence. For instance, it

does not say that sharp drop in the birth rate can threaten country's military potential to defend itself from aggression. From sectoral perspective put forth by the Copenhagen School, this means that the national security concept of the Russian Federation, which defines guiding principles for the policy in the respective field, envisages quite broader view on security threats of demographic decline and subsequently enumerates societal factors, such as "demographic composition of the society", "spiritual and moral potential", as well.

In this regard, Elkner (2005) observes that spiritual security mainly concerns religious life. But the NSC-2000 envisages quite broader view on this issue and defines that "Russia's national interests in the spiritual sphere lie in preservation and strengthening of society's moral values, traditions of patriotism and humanism, and the country's cultural and scientific potential" (NSC-2000). In a similar vein, according to the authors of the document, "the Russian language" is an integral factor of spiritual security, without which "it is impossible to ensure the spiritual unity of the people of a multinational Russia" (ibid.). Thus, one can deduce that the term of "spiritual security" mainly concerns preservation of uniqueness of the Russian society, i.e. societal security. In other words, the term of "spiritual" mainly refers to societal security in the Russian context.

Under Putin's presidency (2000-2008) the securitization of demographic decline continued. The importance of the issue as a priority, even amongst other pan-Federation projects, was evidenced by Putin's initiative in June 2006 to rename the *Council on National Projects* to the *Council on National Projects and Demographic Policy* (Herd and Sargsyan, 2007, p. 51).

The President touched upon the issue in his 2000 annual address to the Federal assembly. Labeling the sharp decline in population size as one of the most “*alarming*” issue that Russia faces, the president explicitly treated it as an existential threat:

We, the citizens of Russia, are becoming fewer and fewer with each passing year. For several years now, the population has dropped by an average 750,000 people every year. . . . [If] the current tendency continues, *the survival of the nation will be threatened*. We [Russia] really do face the threat of becoming an enfeebled nation (Putin, 2000, emphasis added).

Returning to the issue once again, in 2006 address the president acknowledged the fact that the works that had been done in previous years were “inadmissibly insufficient”, and demographic situation was still “critical” (Putin, 2006). Accordingly, in the meeting of Security Council held in June 20, 2006, the president of the Russian Federation spoke of the issue as “crisis situation”: “Over the last 13 years the number of Russian citizens that died exceeded the numbers that were born by 11.2 million people. If we do not do anything then by the end of the 21 century Russia’s population will have dropped by half” (Putin, 2006a)

In line with these arguments, Russia adopted a special Concept of Demographic Politics, which declares that, “overall population decline creates possibility of diminishing Russia’s political, economic and military influence in the world” (Demographic Policy Concept). In other words, the document acknowledges that demographic decline may have multifarious effect on national security.

Thus, it envisages the view that unprecedented decline of population in Far Eastern part of the country is of critical nature, which makes these regions vulnerable for “demographic expansion of neighboring states” and consequently threatens Russia’s “geopolitical interests and territorial integrity” (ibid.). From Copenhagen School’s

perspective, it means that demographic decline is a threat for Russia's military security, since the latter's main referent object is the territorial integrity of the given state. But it is also worthy to note in this regard that, even on this point the Russian political leadership does not envisages fully traditional view of military security. Namely, the concern is not purely military capability of Russia. Rather, the Russian securitizing actor present demographic decline as threatening, due to perception that in the result of demographic crisis the population of the Russian territories may be substituted for neighboring nations. For these reasons, the document declares that due to demographic crisis "the ethnic composition of these regions [Far Eastern] has been worsened"(ibid.). In other words, despite the fact that the said document deals with the territorial integrity, i.e., military security, even on this issue the ultimate concern is about the ethnic composition of the Russian Far Eastern regions.

Along with military ones, the document enumerates societal consequences, as well. For instance, the document explicitly warns that "*decrease in number of some ethnic groups*" may have deleterious effect on country's security.

It is worthy to note that, from the analysis of official documents and speeches it has not been found any sign of securitization of demographics trends from the lens of uneven demographic increase among different ethnic groups. As the wording of the Demographic Policy Concept points out, the official discourse tend not to enumerate the names of ethnic groups, whose decline in size threatens the country's security.

Due to that reason, the former advisor of the Russian President Illiarinov calls the authorities to be overt on the issue. For instance, while criticizing the government's policy to deal with the demographic decline through economic means, he states that, if

new government measures to stimulate birth rates economically and financially are realized this “will only complete the dissolution of the Russian Empire” because the vast majority of funding will benefit the ethnic regions where the birth rates are already higher than for ethnic Russians (Herd and Sargsyan, 2007, p. 57).

Accordingly, Russian officials are obliged to emphasize social factors other than economic ones, such as morality, respect to family and so on. President Medvedev expressed this view saying that: “the loss of a moral compass has led to a drop in the influence of family, which has also had a very negative effect on demographic growth in our country” (Medvedev, 2009).

In addition, it is being implicitly expressed that overall demographic decline is the problem of those citizens of Russia that belong to Orthodox Christianity. In this regard it is worthy to recall the comments made by the Patriarch Alexei II: “We are living in the days where the *death* of our people has begun” (quot. in Herd and Sargsyan, 2007, p. 51, emphasis added).

President Putin continuously referred to demographic problems during his contacts with the Church. In his address to the Russian Orthodox Church, Putin declared that the demographic situation “is one of the most pressing issues” that the state and religious organizations must address together (Putin 2007). Though, Putin does not exclusively impose this duty on Orthodox Church alone, it is worthwhile to note in this regard that the reference to demographic situation is absolutely absent in president’s addresses to the Muslim community.

As mentioned above, migration is strongly related to demographic decline. Accordingly, for the sake of proper understanding of the place that demographic takes

in respective security policy, one should also look for securitization of migration. With regard to migration, the NSC-2000 explicitly declares that, “uncontrolled migration promotes nationalism, political and religious extremism, and ethnoseparatism, and creates a breeding ground for conflicts”.

In a similar vein, the Demographic Policy Concept expresses the view that “the substitution of indigenous inhabitants of Russia’s regions with immigrants, *both internal and external*, does not meet country’s [Russia’s] economical and geopolitical interests”(Demographic Policy Concept, emphasis added).

Due to societal concerns, Russia’s migration policy adopts certain criteria in assessing desirability of non-Russian migrants. As Putin expressed it, in dealing with migration issues “we [Russia] must keep in mind all possible and very sensitive changes to the *social, ethnic and religious* makeup of Russian society” (Putin, 2005b). For that aim, Russia’s immigration policy is oriented towards attracting “qualified experts, law-abiding citizens, *who respect Russia’s traditions and culture*” (Russian Federation, 2006, emphasis added). As these criteria hint, non-Russian migrants can pose challenge to Russia’s societal security.

The concern for compensating declining population at the expense of Russian speaking compatriots resided in CIS countries was thought the most viable option in dealing with demographic decline. Speaking on “effective immigration policy” Putin declared that this policy should be advantageous to those residents of the CIS with whom “we [Russians] have a good understanding and with whom we share the same language” (Putin, 2003). In a similar vein, Demographic Policy Concept explicitly

declares that, “the priority for the state migration policy should be to attract citizens from the CIS countries in selective manner” (Demographic Policy Concept).

On that point, the president of Russia made it clear that “compatriots living abroad” have significant migratory potential: “These people have been brought up according to the traditions of Russian culture, speak Russian. As such, they have all possible opportunities to adapt well to Russian society” (Putin, 2006b). It is not hard to deduce from these sentences that, the Russian political leadership concerns over the possibility that the flow of immigrants can change ethnic composition of the population.

The analysis of relevant policy documents and respective speeches delivered by the Russian political leadership reveals that demographic decline has been largely conceived as threatening and presented as such. In terms of securitization perspective, it can be deduced that the securitizing actor moved to securitize the demographic decline.

Having identified that demographic decline was intended to be securitized, we can move to investigate whether the securitization of the specific case show congruence with our independent variable (dominant discourse of danger).

As the analysis provided above illustrated, the securitizing actor has mainly emphasized societal factors while identified the issue as “threatening”. In spite of being traditionally “eligible” for the military sector, in the Russian context, the securitization of demographic decline has not been limited to military security. For instance, it is worthwhile to note that contrary to the expectation of traditional security thinking, the analysis has not been able to find any sign that the securitizing actor tries to link demographic decline and the military capabilities. Put it differently, the securitizing

actor does not use military arguments, such as the deficit of military personnel, in presenting the issue as a security problem.

Moreover, it should also be noted that except the Demographic Policy Concept, military security concerns, such as references to territorial integrity are absent in respective public speeches. Namely, the analysis has not found any reference to territorial integrity as well as military capabilities in respective State of Nation addresses delivered by the Russian President. On the contrary, public speeches of the Russian Federation exclusively focused on societal concerns, such as ethnic-linguistic composition of the country and preservation of national distinctness.

Overall, the securitization of demographic decline has mainly been from societal security perspective. Thus, the relevant documents and respective speeches, while presenting demographic decline as a threat to national security, mainly dealt with migration and the change in demographic composition of society. As far as migration is concerned, the securitizing actor continuously voiced its concern about negative effects of the phenomena, mainly focusing on preservation of ethnic distinctness of the society. For these reasons, it has been made public, more than once, that migration flows should meet certain cultural, linguistic requirements. This, in turn, enables us to conclude that notwithstanding other sectors, demographic decline has been mainly securitized from societal security perspective, as well.

Explaining Partial Securitization-Mobilization Stage

Buzan et al. (1998, p. 27) argue that securitization means: first designation something as an existential threat; second, advocating emergency action and special measures; and finally the acceptance of that designation by the audience. The first two composes securitizing move. From above-mentioned analysis it became clear that the securitizing move in the field of demographics is partial, in the sense that though officials did label the situation as “a threat to the survival of the nation”, the emergency measures have not been advocated yet.

But reiterating from Collins (2005, p. 573), it should be reminded that, the decision by the elite to resolve the existential threat through the political means does not mean the issue is less threatening, it just means that the actor prefers to pursue a political solution, for instance, because they recognize that the adoption of emergency measures can be counterproductive. In other words, specific securitizing move may remain in the identification stage without moving to mobilization one.

With regard to societal security, the securitizing actor has refrained himself from explicitly expressing concerns about discrepancies in population increase among different ethnic-religious groups. This is especially interesting in the face of sheer amount of facts cited in previous sections about security implications of uneven demographic trends. Different factors are responsible for this situation.

First of all, it should be noted that, though differential growth in the population of ethnic communities may produce tension and conflict, this is not a rule. Simply because of the fact that, a particular identification, whether along ethnic, religious or

gender, is not constant. A citizen's propensity to identify himself with one of these measures is dependent on the historical and social conditions. Moreover, as Hunter (2004, p. 197) shows, the Muslims in Russia are not coherent in their identity. For example, the Tatars tend to build their identity not in terms of religion but on the ground of ethnicity. In other words, the differences among millions of Muslims are hardly to forge common Russian Muslim Identity. This means that, ongoing attempts at forging supra-ethnic identity among different nationalities of the Russian Federation may mitigate the adverse effects of demographic trends.

Moreover, as it has been put in previous chapter, in contemporary Russian politics "strong state" is conceived as remedy to the multifarious challenges that Russia faces. And demographics-related societal insecurity is one of these challenges. Historical experience shows that, the challenges to the societal security are more serious when there is a "weak state". So, if plausible futures are sufficiently threatening, and if the groups have pessimistic opinions about the future, then, the groups may begin acting to ensure their existence at the expense of other groups.

But, under Putin we observe quite contrary tendency in Russia, namely strengthening central authority and subsequently growing confidence to state authorities. The president's attempts to strengthen the central authority have weakened centrifugal tendencies. Under the authority of strong and effective state apparatus, there is higher possibility that the security dilemma among different ethnic or religious groups will diminish significantly. In other words, the differential growth of population of different ethnic groups is unlikely to have so detrimental effect under "strong state". In other words, partial securitization of disproportionate demographic increase partly stems

from the fact that these demographic trends have not yet shown themselves as threatening of forging “strong state”, the existence of which is equated with the survival of the Russian state.

The same is also true in terms of migration. As Alexseev (2003: p. 98) shows, people do not afraid of size of migration flows, rather they fear of the possibility that the state may not be in a position to ensure their rights, such as property rights and so on. The absence of central authority or the perception of such a situation forces the actors (ethnic host and migrant communities) to measure their security relative to the rise or decline of the perceived capabilities of the other actors. This means that, strengthening the state apparatus, as well as improving the procedures of migration regime can diminish the side effects of migration. The Russian leadership’s belief in this argument mitigates the fears of demographic decline, which in turn, partly explains the situation around the securitization of demographic decline.

This points to the argument made by the Copenhagen School authors that it is a choice to present an issue as a threat and subsequently advocate for emergency measures. The situation around the demographic decline shows it illustratively. On one hand, the Russian securitizing actors did conceive the adverse demographic trends as threatening the survival of the Russian nation. But on the other hand, they did not opt for emergency measures, such as birth limitations for those ethnic groups that experience natural growth. In a similar vein, despite myriad “objective” arguments that migration definitely threatens societal cohesion, the above provided analysis could not find any evidence of emergency measures to tackle with the issue. This means that the choice to deal with the issue though emergency measure is a choice. And many social

and political factors can have impact on making such kind of choices. Though the analysis of these factors is out of direct concern of this study, it may be claimed that “strong state” argument that have been prioritized by the Russian political elite played its role in this regard. It remains as a research question for further studies in the securitization field.

With regard to our specific case at hand, it became clear that contrary to the claim of Buzan et al., securitization move does not necessarily entail emergency measures. The analysis provided above showed that the relevant actor did conceive the demographic decline as security threat and explicitly present it as such. On the other hand, they did not advocate for emergency measures and opt for political-economic options. In terms of Collins (2005), the securitization of demographic decline occurred only in the identification stage.

Overall, the analysis of securitizing move made with regard to demographic decline made it evident that demographic decline has been presented as a threat, namely as an adverse development that could threaten the very survival of the Russian nation. More important finding of the chapter is that, in line with the hypothesis of this study, the particular move to securitize demographic decline shows congruence with independent variable, namely, dominant discourse of danger.

Namely, it has become evident from the second chapter that dominant discourse of danger mainly revolved around non-military, societal and political security concerns. In this line, the particular securitizing move made with regard to demographic decline mainly takes societal concerns as a referent object. From the analysis of official documents and relevant public speeches, this chapter showed that demographic decline

has been attempted to be securitized in terms of societal issues, such as, preservation of ethnic, cultural and religious peculiarities of the Russian society.

It is worthy to remind on this point that, just these issues have been one of the most prioritized issues in the dominant discourse of danger. It should be recalled from the second chapter that Russia's security policy significantly prioritized societal concerns, such as preservation of the leading role of the Russian language, protection of spiritual and cultural heritage of the Russian nation. Respective security documents deeply concerned themselves with this issue. Subsequently, particular securitizing move of demographic decline resembled these features of the dominant discourse of danger, which in turn, proves the hypothesis of this study.

CHAPTER 5

SECURITIZATION OF INFORMATION IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the ways through which the Russian political-security elite is conceiving information and modern ICT. In Copenhagen School's terms this chapter aims at assessing securitizing move with regard to information in the Russian context. As it will be shown below, despite the fact that modern ICT has predominantly conceived as military security matter by the mainstream security analysts, the Russian security thinking largely took it as a political security issue and consequently took respective measures to tackle with it.

As it was defined in Copenhagen School's security framework, securitization means the presentation of an issue as an existential threat to a referent object and accordingly advocating for emergency measures to struggle against it. From the political security perspective, the main referent object of security is the sovereignty of the given state. More broadly, organizational and ideological stability of the state is being conceived as a referent object for political security.

In the Russian context, as it was shown in previous chapters, political security is one of the main security concerns. This encompasses the restoration of the state's common judicial space, effectively ensure the organizational stability of the federative structures and their superiority over the local ones and ensure state's ideological preferences.

As it was the case in previous chapter, the main securitizing actor of information is the state-political leadership. Actually, it has widely been shared by the securitizing

students that security is a “structured” field that only small number of actors is deemed to be “legitimate” to speak of security. In a non-pluralistic setting, such as the Russian one, this is especially true given the statist historical and social peculiarities. In short, while analyzing respective securitizing move with regard to information, the Russian political leadership will be taken as a securitizing actor. Below, it will be attempted to show that in the Russian context, the respective political leadership made securitizing move with regard to modern information-communication technologies largely from political security perspective, since they securitized the information in terms of state prestige and its sovereignty over the local national-federative subjects.

Information Revolution and Security

Before moving to assess the securitizing move made with regard to information, in the respective sections, the literature on the links between security and information will be outlined. The aim here is to form background for the respective securitizing move.

Revolutionary development of information-communication technologies (ICT) is one of the most salient features in modern societies. ICT have been so important to our societies that, many scholars do not refrain themselves from calling current stage of development as “information society”. Already in the late 1980s Castells (1989) came to the conclusion that information had become the major primary resource of material productivity in the newly emerging “knowledge economy”(quot. in Eriksson et al. 2004, p. 3).

As information strengthens its place in society, our dependence on it increases significantly. Accordingly, our societies, as well as its main political organization-nation-states have been vulnerable to the threats emanating from modern ICT. In the light of these developments, it is not surprising that the term of “information” is one of the securitized issues in post-Cold War security studies. In this context, the aim of this section is to depict theoretical schema showing the relationship between security and information. For this aim, the main focus will be modern ICT’s impact on traditional notion of sovereignty.

In post-Cold War world politics, information security gained prominent place along with terrorism, energy, and environmental problems. In 1995, the United States Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense issued joint press release noting that, “The security of information systems and networks is the *major security challenge* of this decade and possibly the next century ” (original emphasis) (Diebert, 2002, p. 115). Though this believe is unanimously shared by both politicians and academics, they have different, even divergent positions on what the essence of information security. Due to this fact, Eriksson et al. argues that there is no consensus about the meaning of information security (Eriksson et al., 2004, p. 1).

Policy makers and mainstream IR theorists tend to think of information security in terms of information infrastructure. In this formulation, nothing is totally different from earlier periods, except growing role of technologies in warfare. In this regard Thomas reports that in the US military-political circles information security is conceived as a security of state-military infrastructure, absence of unauthorized access

to state secrets (Thomas, 2001). In other words, information security is composed of computer security and communication security (ibid.).

Similarly, Ehlers thinks of information security in terms of information warfare. According to his definition information warfare is “defensive and offensive operations, conducted by individuals or structured organizations with specific political and strategic goals, for the exploitation, disruption or destruction of data contained in computers or transmitted over the Internet and other networked information systems” (Ehlers, 1999). From this definition, information security means absence of threats to information and information technologies.

According to our theoretical framework these definitions are too narrow in the sense that, they think of security predominantly as military security and do not take into consideration other equally important dimensions of national security. In this regard Diebert argues that the information security encompasses four kinds of objects: collective identities, states as such (the state’s ability to tackle with information warfare), private corporations and individuals (privacy of personal communications) (Diebert, 2004, p. 118). Though Deibert’s definition is broader and more encompassing, it also falls the same trap with previous ones, in the sense that all these definitions tend to introduce information as a totally new threat that comes into being due to informatization of the society. All these definitions tend to deal with the notion of information security through the lines of new information communication technologies. But it should not be neglected that, traditionally information had been conceived as one of the most important element of national security.

More importantly, for classical realism, information is one of the most important mediums in sustaining the power of the nation, which is the building stone of national survival, i.e. national security. Thus Carr (p. 132) argues that power over opinion is the third form of power. Power over opinion, for Carr, encompasses propaganda that the states use for the aim of gaining advantages in inter-state competition. This is inalienable part of nation's power that determines its place in international arena. This means that, information, as a component of power, is a salient factor of nation's security.

So, the security of information flows is not a new phenomenon in terms of national-state security. From the very beginning, the states did feel the need to control the outgoing and ingoing information flows in order to maintain social cohesion, political stability within the their territories. The new thing is that new information communication technologies began significantly challenge states' ability to do it. That's why the impact of modern ICT on state sovereignty gains new importance in the age of Information.

Modern Information-Communication Technologies and State Sovereignty

State sovereignty, defined as monopoly of power over defined territory and people, is under the threat posed by innovative communication technologies, especially the Internet. As Eriksson et al. point out, in previous times, monopoly over means of communication allowed national governments to reach the entire citizenry with their own messages (Eriksson et al., 2004, p. 5). Making use of such a monopoly, the

governments successfully maintained social cohesion among their subjects, through propagating their view about national identity, state policy. With the development of the Internet, citizens from all over the world can communicate information without the mediation of their respective governments. It is worthwhile to note in this regard that, this kind of information may not always be conducive for the ideologies that are being used to legitimize the activities of state institutions, as well as, the political regime. Consequently, it becomes clear that the control of the Internet is not a simple technical matter, but political security issue, which concerns the security of the political regime. On this point, it is worthy to recall from previous chapters that political security includes the legitimacy of the regime, as well (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 146).

In this regard, it is not surprising that the control of the content of the Internet communication has been defined as sovereignty matter by the participants of *World Summit on Information Society* held in Tunis in 2005. The final declaration of the summit reads as follows: “Policy authority for the Internet-related public policy issues is the *sovereign rights* of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues” (emphasis is added) (WSIS, 2005, art. 35.a.).

In conformity with this formulation, almost all states try to control information flows in the Internet environment. Governments seek to build borders in cyberspace that are analogous the geographical borders of their territory (Marlin-Bennet, 2004, p. 15). But due to very essence of the Internet, which is extra-territorial in nature, makes it difficult for governments to retain their traditional monopoly over controlling information within their territories.

The passage of information through cyberspace adds a twist to the analysis of controls of information flows because of their non-territorial, non-physical reality of computer-mediated communication. Unlike the real one, in the virtual world, the hiving off national territories is difficult to accomplish because of inherently borderless nature of Internet transmissions. Consequently, military (which traditionally had been used for that purpose) might not be called in to protect borders and the power of the state is at least partially diminished by the Internet (Marlin-Bennet, 2004, p. 21).

In this borderless world, state's territorially defined jurisdiction loses its effectiveness significantly. As Saco points out, "the state traditionally defined in relation to the geographical territory it governs, is re-imagining itself so as to warrant the application of laws that extend its jurisdiction into non-territorial, extra sovereign space of the Internet" (Saco, 1999, p. 286).

With regard to effectiveness of state control of the Internet, Cogburn contends that though the Internet communication challenges state sovereignty in this field, it would be premature to claim that state control is by no means effective. He points out that, states do control the Internet through administrative and economic means (Cogburn, 2005, p. 20). But these claims fail to take into consideration the fact that the states are not so free to control the activities of new mass media as they once did with regard to traditional communication-information mediums. The problem is that, usually dissident Internet sites are located in foreign countries rather than home country. In these circumstances the state's ability to effectively trace the threat and to "silence" it is extremely limited. For example, many Chinese opposition Internet sites are located in the US and though China had been able significantly to block these sites' entrance to

China, it is not sufficient to say that the government (in this case Chinese one) has effectively been able to retain monopoly over the information regarding its policies.

With this regard, it should be emphasized that, the mere fact of state authorities' inability to successfully control the Internet is not enough to fully understand the Internet's impact on the notion of sovereignty, i.e. state authority. As far as internet-enabled communication is concerned it can be said that the Internet is not so conducive to freedom and emancipation. Especially, from Foucauldian vantage point, which conceives the power as a phenomena existed everywhere, and argues for abandoning traditional "judicial sovereignty model" that overwhelmingly concentrated on direct ways that the state ensures its authority, the direct involvement of state organs are not necessary for tackling with the Internet.

In other words, private companies may successfully perform the controlling role on behalf of the state. The point is that for controlling the Internet users the mere feeling of being controlled is enough. As Altheide (2004, p. 224) put it, "control narrative", namely, the user's expectation that he/she may be monitored has considerable effect in "disciplining him/her". This means that, regardless of the identity of the observer, be it the state institutions or private organizations, the simple possibility of surveillance is quite enough for "disciplinary power" to be effective. Additionally, the Internet's peculiarities, such as "the visibility of those who use it, the unverifiability of observation, and uncertainty" (Brignall, 2002) make it useful medium for those who intend to control the citizens.

Nevertheless, these arguments do not exclude the challenges that the Internet and modern ICT pose to "information security" of state. On the contrary, as modern ICT

empower the state with new means in its relationships with its subjects, they also create new opportunities for wide range actors, regardless of being foreign countries, transnational interest groups (terrorist organizations, resistance groups, liberation movements, etc.) and even individuals (hackers), in their relations vis-à-vis the respective state institutions.

Accordingly, the measures, taken by different states, such as extraordinary taxes on Internet services, explicit ban on Internet using show the fact that the Internet has been securitized extensively all over the world. Moreover, despite the claims that Internet censorship is unique to authoritarian regimes (Milner 2003), Diebert et al's findings show that even the most democratic nation on the Earth, i.e., the US, attempts to restrict Internet contents due to security concerns (Diebert et al., 2007, p. 26). In a similar manner, Halperin reports that Germany attempted to restrict the sites that endorse pro-Nazi content (Halperin, 2000, p. 171).

The Internet and National Identity

The Internet poses challenges to political authorities not only in terms criminal activities, but also with regard to their national identity projects. Traditionally, every territorially determined nation-state maintained its legitimacy within its population by forging national identities that differentiate the given community from the others. Mass media and traditional communication mediums had played critical role in creating "imagined communities". As Anderson argued, just the invention of print media accelerated nation-building projects in Europe (Anderson, 1991, p. 46).

With regard to modern information-communication technologies, Kitchin (1998, p. 74) points out that, unlike traditional communication mediums “cyberspace is not a broadcast medium with few producers and many consumers, rather a decentralized communication system where the individuals are both the consumers and the producers, cyberspace is interactive; the users can choose what information they receive and send (quot. in Sounders, 2004, p. 3).

The Internet and cyberspace represent powerful tools for simultaneous and anonymous communication as well as an alternative universe where marginalized groups have the ability to craft discursive imaginaries which challenge the pre-existing structures imposed on them by their states and dominant elites (Sounders, 2006, p. 46). In this regard, Diebert reports that, in relation to Quebec problem, Canadian officials had raised their concern that the use of the Internet could undermine national coherence. Similarly, in France there were concerns that the domination of the English language in the Internet poses threat to French language, subsequently, France’s national identity (Diebert, 2002, p. 119, 120).

The Internet’s impact on national cohesion in such a multi-ethnic state, as Russia is also worthy to be examined. Russia’s identity crisis is a well-documented phenomenon. Though, national identity matters are dealt as a separate security issue under the head of societal security by Buzan et al., they themselves imply that the drawbacks in forging national identity could have political security implications, as well (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 155).

In this regard, Zamyatin (2002) maintains that the growing use of the Internet in Russian regions helps forging regional rather than national conscience. He claims that,

regional subjects of the Federation become more alienated as a result of developments of modern ICT.

As mentioned above, some scholars share the view that the Internet enables the minorities to break the state's traditional monopoly over identity-making processes. In this light, Sounders points out that unlike traditional tools used in these processes, such as print media and the education system, the Internet is inherently more encompassing and free in this sense.

It is worthwhile to note in this regard that the Muslims began to make use of the Internet in implementing their religiosity. As Goble (2008) notes on this point, the Russian Muslims do not only turn to the Internet for information they may not be able to get locally, but they also actually use it for religious practices. For example, in Voronezh, Muslims have begun to create their own "virtual mosques" online, where they assemble online for regular prayers.

Goble observes that the Muslims' use of the Internet challenges the authorities' ability to control the practices and make them to practice "benign Islam". The problem is that, via the Internet, the individual Muslim can connect with the religious communities located far away from Russia, and in this way get access to alternative visions of the Islam that is propagated by state-controlled Muslim organizations. It is worthy to note on this point, even the official leader of Russian Muslims, Tajud din tried to dissuade his followers from using the Internet for religious practices (Goble, 2008).

So, from political security point of view, uncontrolled flows of information are potential threats. Though the states differ from one another in their tactics to deal with

the Internet content, the common pattern is that in all these cases the content censorship is carried through security discourse. More importantly, in most instances the states authorities justify their attempts using sovereignty arguments.

In short, from political security perspective, information security may be defined as a state policy aimed at dealing with information flows that can affect political legitimacy adversely. On this point, it should be noted that, explicit restrictions and bans are not necessarily the only tools to deal with information security issues. Rather, states try to maintain domination in information space in order to balance adverse information flows. This definition does not deny the fact that thanks to unprecedented development of ICT, information has been one of the core values of modern societies, and in the same manner, the information infrastructures themselves have been an integral part of national defense, i.e. national security. Moreover, information is equally important to all dimensions of security proposed by the Copenhagen School.

This caveat in mind, the remaining part of the chapter aims at finding answers to the following questions: whether information has been securitized in the Russian Federation?; if the securitization did occur, then does it show congruence with the dominant discourse of danger?

Securitization of Information

Presenting Information as a Security Issue-Identification Stage

In this section the main focus will be on the presentation of information as a security threat. Using Collins' (2005) two-stage approach to securitizing move, this section will elaborate the ways, through which, information, as well as, information-communication technologies have been presented as threat. For that aim, official discourse of the Russian political leadership, as well as, official documents relevant to the matter will be scrutinized.

As world economy entered into new stage, which is characterized by domination of knowledge based, technology oriented market relations, it becomes necessity to acquire modern technologies and use them for economic development. But doing so, the states should not neglect the impact of modern ICT, especially over informatization of the society at large on other fields of state activity. As mentioned above, national security is one of the most important issues that authorities should pay attention in dealing with modern information based economic competition and development. This issue plays more important role in such societies that have traditionally been closed in terms of information flows. Russia is one of those kinds of societies.

One of the basic dilemmas that Russian authorities faced after the demise of the Soviet Union is to find effective ways to rehabilitate national economy, while preserving political unity and national coherence. Torkunov et al. (2000, p. 61) observes

in this regard that, the dramatic demise of the USSR is still fresh, which shows that unfettered, loosely controlled information flows from abroad can destabilize the unity of the state significantly.

The early state documents adopted in the field of information and technologies envisages economic and security thinking simultaneously in their content. For example, Conception on Single Information Space of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1995, envisages the logic that the plurality in information space could adversely affect national security (Machulskaya, 2005, p. 82).

Continuing these efforts, National Security Concept of the Russian Federation deals with the information security separately saying that Russia's expulsion from the external and internal information market poses serious danger to the national security of the Russian Federation (NSC-2000.). From this logic, there had been adopted separate doctrine on Information Security in Russia.

The Information Security Doctrine

The Information Security Doctrine of Russia adopted in 2000, started from the conviction that current conditions of political and social-economic development of the country “requires sustaining certain restrictions on free information flows while not threatening society's demand for information” (ISD, 2000). The document puts the aim to find *Russian* ways of passing into information society (emphasis is added).

Moreover, the conception declares that transition into information society, as a precondition of economic development, should also contribute to *social, political and*

spiritual coherence of the Russian society, as well as strengthening the institutions of the Federation, as well as its regions. In other words, informatization of the society should not impede the state to deal with entire range of security problems.

As Thomas points out it, Russia is unique country in the sense that it conceives information security not only in terms of information infrastructure, but also through the lines of security of society and individual (Thomas, 2001). Moreover, unlike the US, Russia perceives information as security threat, not only due to the fear that adversaries can get access to information infrastructure or paralyzed it. On the contrary, the main state document that regulates information security of the Russian Federation explicitly declares that, “information sphere actively challenges *political, economical, defensive and other dimensions of the security of the Russian Federation*” (ISD, emphasis added).

On one hand the above-cited quote proves that, Russia envisages quite broader view of national security, which has “political, economic, defensive and other” dimensions. On the other hand, it denotes to the fact that military security is not the only sector that information can be securitized. Rather, Russian leadership perceive information as a security matter due to the fear that “in modern times information can be used as tool to exert pressure on country’s leadership, or to challenge its political, cultural unity” (ibid.). It would be worthy to remind that, according to Copenhagen School’s approach, political security deals with organizational stability of the given state. And the Information Security Doctrine warns that information flows can be threat to political unity, i.e., smooth functioning of state institutions, as well.

One of the authors of the doctrine, First Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Sherstyuk explains the reasons behind the adoption

of the doctrine saying that “rapid development of ICT market makes the information sphere an increasingly attractive arena for struggle to exert economic, political, military or cultural pressure” (Russian Federation, 2001.).

Information security defined as “a state of protection of the national interests of the Russian Federation in information sphere” (Russian Federation, 2000b) requires the state institutions to maintain state monopoly in information space of the Russian Federation. In this regard, the Doctrine declares that ensuring Russia’s policy with sustainable information support is a vital interest of the Russian Federation.

According to the authors of the Doctrine, the greatest dangers in the sphere of home polices are “dissemination of false information on the policies of the Russian Federation, the activities of the Federal Authorities, on the events at home and abroad (ISD, 2000). In this regard, the doctrines declares that, monopolization of information sphere of Russia by internal, as well as, foreign information structures, blocking state mass media to inform Russian society about the events at home and abroad is threat to national information security of Russia (ibid.). In face of these threats, it is put as aim to strengthen state mass media structures.

In the field of foreign policy, the Doctrine enumerates that “information and propaganda activities of political forces, public associations, and mass media and of individuals, which distort the strategy and tactics of Russian foreign policy; insufficient information awareness of the public of the Russian foreign activities issues” (quot. in Panfilov, 2005, p. 10).

Touching upon the issue, president Putin explicitly declared that, “reliable information on the events in our country is a question of its reputation and *national security*” (Putin, 2000, emphasis added).

The following quote from Putin explicitly reveals Russia’s political-security concerns over the information:

It is far from everyone in the world that wants to have to deal with an independent, strong and self-reliant Russia. Political, economic and information pressure have become weapons in the global competitive battle today. Our efforts to strengthen our state are sometimes deliberately interpreted as authoritarianism (Putin, 2000).

One of the novel sides of the doctrine is that it deals with society’s information security as separate matter. In this regard the Doctrine’s main concern is about the national identity issues and possible impact of information flows on this kind of matters. In this field, the authors of the Doctrine enumerate those threats, such as: domination of foreign mass media in internal information market; dependence of spiritual, economic and political spheres on foreign information structures, devaluation of spiritual values of Russian Society and propaganda in favor of values that contradict with values accepted in Russian society (ISD, 2000).

Just this point is extremely vocal in Russian academic circles, as well. On this point, Sopochnikova (2008, p. 12) explicitly draws attention to the fact that “ensuring information security is extremely important in such a stage of Russian society, which can be characterized deep polarization along interethnic cleavages”. She emphasizes that rapid development of communication technologies can be hurtful to social stability, under weak state regulations in this sphere.

Accordingly, Kuznetsov et al argues that information security of Russia should include: 1) ensure the place of the Russian idea within Global historical process; 2) Ensure the development of Russian idea within Russian people and; 3) ensure defense of Russian nation and those nations that accept the idea of the Russian nation from external inversions.⁸

The Mass Media Regulations-Mobilization Stage and Implementation of “Emergency Measures”

As it became evident from the previous section that information has been consistently presented through security prism, the turn is now to analyze the respective emergency measures taken with regard to the matter. It will be shown below that unlike the demographic decline, in the case of information the respective securitizing move has passed both “identification” and “mobilization” stages.

Since the adoption of the doctrine mass media regulation had become central issue in Russian public debates. As Information Security doctrine declares as aim “to strengthen state mass media, to extend its modern means of providing reliable information to the Russian citizens and foreign nationals” for the sake of information security (ISD, 2000), mass media structures had been continually securitized in political discourse.

In this regard, the Russian president on numerous occasions calls the mass media outlets to act “responsibly”, since their activity negatively affects “federal

⁸ See: Kuznetsov Y., Nikolskiy V., Vvedenie v teoriyu nacionalnoy bezopasnosti (Introduction to theory of national security),

institutions' struggle against the threats that country faces today" (Putin, 2000).

According to the president of Russia, some media outlets have been succumbed to political interests of their owners, in the result of which the media is being turned into "*a means of fighting the state*" (ibid., emphasis added).

It is interesting to note on this point that, former staff members of security services had been appointed to state-owned mass media outlets. Thus, former Security Service General Zdanovich had been appointed deputy of the head of the State TV and Radio Company (VGTRK in Russian initials), and other former State Security Committee officers had been appointed as managers in other mass media (Panfilov, 2005, p. 8). This again shows that, mass media, in particular, and information in general are treated as security matter in contemporary Russian politics.

In parallel with these developments, increasing attempts to censor traditional mass media had drawn academic attention (Lipman et al., 2007, Belin, 2001, Simons et al., 2006). The authorities under Putin did not rely on censorship to ensure favorable information environment, but also continually tried to control financial sources of mass media outlets. As Panfilov reports, in January 2000 Putin approved the amendments to the Law on Economic Support of Regional (City) Newspapers. Since then, all the publications were to be financed centrally by the Federal Authorities through the Ministry of Press and no longer through the constituent entities of the Russian Federation (Panfilov, 2005, p. 15). This should be seen as an attempt to maintain coherence of national information space.

Within the state policy towards information, the Internet deserves special attention. As mentioned above, the difficulties in controlling the Internet content in

traditional ways is a prominent side of securitization of information in a global scale. From the very beginning, the control of the Internet is also conceived, and introduced as a security matter. Much as is the case in western states, in Russia the laws concerning commerce regulation and laws concerning media regulation are governing the Internet. From the beginning of the 1990s, the Russian government showed concern for two areas regarding Internet use: security of new technology (grounded in the cold war- motivated rivalry in the industrial-military complex) and national identity (protection of any communication medium from overwhelming foreign influence) (Marcus, 2004).

Shortly after he was appointed Acting President, Putin approved a secret rule permitting the tax police, the Interior Ministry, and the Kremlin and parliamentary security services to intercept electronic communications, such as data and e-mail (Peterson, 2005, p. 90). In July 2000, the government promulgated additional regulations making information about the eavesdropping equipment used to monitor e-mail and Internet activity a state secret and enabling governmental agencies to monitor communications for up to two days before getting court approval for such eavesdropping, as required by the Russian Constitution (ibid.).

Due to security risks, in early 2000, Putin issued decree according to which all Internet Service Providers (ISPs) should locate special installations in their infrastructure so that federal security services to surveil communications going through the Internet (Niklaus et al., 2000). System for Operational- Investigative Activities (SORM) had been designed for that purpose. The Federal Security Service (FSB in Russian initials) forced ISPs to install hardware that allowed FSB to monitor Internet usage and e-mail messages of the providers' customers (Alexander, 2003, p.10).

In conformity with these efforts, Russian State Duma began to consider the amendments to the law “On Mass Media” in early February 2008. If passed, the amendment would give any electronic source, which has more than 1,000 hits per day the status of mass media, and in this way making them subject to laws on mass media as the law on extremism (Open Source Center, 2008). With regard to the bill, Gryzlov, speaker of the Duma and leader of pro-government United Russia Party said that Internet freedoms would not be threatened. However, he continued that security must take precedence saying that, “the Internet is all too often used as an instrument for destabilization and for terrorism” (ibid.). It is interesting on this point that, in Gryzlov’s phrase security does not mean military attack, but the dissemination of adverse information. This again shows that information is securitized not solely in military terms but also political security concerns.

Along with attempting to control information communication flows in the Internet, Russian authorities try to restrict foreign involvement into this sector, as well. So, the amendment to the law “On the Order of foreign Investment in Companies and Organizations Having Strategic Importance for National Security” would have expanded the number of sectors of the Russian economy that are considered “strategically important to national security” to include the Internet and publishing (Open Source Center, 2008). Though the second reading of the bill postponed, the very fact that the Internet is considered as strategically important issue to national security is worthy to be underscored.

An Assessment of Securitizing Move

From the analysis provided in this chapter, it can be concluded that current developments in information sphere are predominantly conceived from security perspective. Moreover, the Russian political elite seems to be convinced that uncontrolled information flows can adversely affect political stability of the state, undermining its policies' legitimacy and social coherence. In other words, the securitization of information largely conducted from political security perspective.

Official documents adopted in the Russian Federation, reveals the fact that along with mainstream notions of “information security”, namely, “the security of information infrastructure”, Russian political leadership conceived the term from political security perspective, as well. Information security is understood in terms of state's monopoly over the information space, especially, to control the adverse effects of information flows on state policies' legitimacy. Moreover, officials' public speeches, as well as, laws on mass media envisage security arguments.

Especially, the Russian political leadership presented uncontrolled information flows as threat to national security and tried to adopt special measures to tackle with the issue. For that aim, the freedom of speech has been restricted and relevant measures have been applied to the Internet. All these acts denotes to securitization of information in the Russian Federation. Making use of theoretical approach put forward by Copenhagen School one can conclude that information-communication technologies, the possibility of uncontrolled information flows are threat to the Russian national security.

More importantly, the analysis provided in this chapter points out that securitization of information has been mainly conducted from political security perspective. It has been evident that the Russian political leadership moved to securitize information and information-communication technologies using sovereignty discourse. In other words, in line with the dominant discourse of danger outlined in the second chapter of this study, the modern information-communication technologies has been securitized in terms of organizational stability of the federal structures and preservation of the state unity. In public speeches and official documents, the Russian securitizing actor tried to present information-communication technologies as security threat arguing that uncontrolled informational flows may threaten Russia's unity and survival as a state.

The data analyzed above reveals that securitization move with regard to information show congruence with the dominant discourse of danger, which is the independent variable of this study. In other words, it became evident that like the dominant discourse of danger outlined in the second chapter, the particular securitization move made with regard to information-communication technologies mainly revolved around political security concerns. More importantly, above-provided analysis proves the hypothesis of this study that within a given state particular securitizing moves mainly revolves around those sectors that have been prioritized by the dominant discourse of danger.

The analysis provided in this chapter also shows that unlike mainstream IR theory's arguments in reality Russian leadership takes quite broad view on information

security that encompasses political and societal dimensions along with traditional military one.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis has attempted to analyze the national security policy of the Russian Federation from the securitization perspective proposed by the Copenhagen School. The overall aim was to investigate the existence of any pattern of securitizations within the single settings.

Having outlined the major contours of the debate around the definition of security, the study has mainly focused on the framework worked out by Buzan et al., which envisages “wider” view of security. Under this framework, respective securitizing moves have been examined.

The central claim of the study was that discourse of danger that is predominant in a certain national setting depicts the contours of specific securitizing moves. For that aim, the specific chapter outlined main directions of national security policy of the post-communist Russian Federation. Referring to respective official documents and speeches it made clear that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian political leadership has mainly focused on internal developments that threatens the country’s political unity and national identity. Proper functioning of federal institutions, Russia’s political prestige in the world affairs, the preservation of unity of multi-ethnic, multi-religious population, as well as, the strengthening the bonds that cement the population to the state has been prioritized in the dominant discourse of danger. In other words, dominant discourse of danger mainly prioritized political and societal security.

With this background, demographic decline and its securitization have been examined. First of all, it became evident that demographic decline has been presented as security issue, i.e., as an existential threat to the survival of the Russian nation. There were adopted special state documents with regard to the issue, which outlines security implications of sharp decline in population size. Moreover, speeches delivered by the President of Russia have presented the issue as threatening to the survival of the nation.

More importantly, it has been found that despite its salience for being securitized from military security perspective, the Russian political-security elite did mainly present the issue from societal security perspective. Thus, the data made it clear that Russian political leadership finds the demographic decline as threatening, because it poses challenges for preserving national identity and cultural unity. This poses a significant challenge for mainstream security studies, which envisages excessive military oriented view of security. In other words, unlike mainstream's claim, Russian political leadership has taken wider approach to demographic-security relationship and subsequently made a respective securitizing move.

In sum, as the respective chapter pointed out, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian political-security leadership largely prioritized preservation of national unity and national identity. Subsequently, societal security concerns have one of the priorities of the post-Soviet Russian national security policy. Having identified that societal security is one of the main parts of the dominant discourse of danger, the respective chapter made it evident that demographic decline has been securitized from the societal security perspective, as well.

At the same time, it has been found that the securitizing move in this regard is partial, in the sense that it did not move to the “mobilization stage”. More precisely, despite the fact that demographic decline had been presented as a security threat, subsequent “emergency measures” did not accompany it. The unveiling of the exact reasons of the partial securitization remains as a task for future research.

As far as information is concerned, it became clear that information and information-communication technologies, including the Internet had undergone extensive securitization in the Russian Federation, as well. It is an important factor to be noted that there had been adopted specific doctrine on information security.

Though the doctrine does acknowledge military aspects of the issue, it also takes it from political security perspective, as well. This is also evident in Russian political leadership’s attempts to present the issue using sovereignty discourse. In other words, rather than affecting Russia’s military capabilities, and its ability to successfully wage a war, uncontrolled information flows is being thought as threatening the country’s sovereignty at large, which is the “heart” of political security defined by the Copenhagen School.

As it was the case with regard to demographic decline, it became clear that securitization of information largely recalls the priorities of the respective discourse of danger. Namely, preservation of the political legitimacy and to ensure constitutional unity of the state was one of the most important tasks of the post-Soviet Russian political leadership. Especially, under Putin’s presidency this issue was one of the most prioritized ones. It suffices to recall that, specific term of “constitutional security” has been coined by the President to describe the state of affairs. As political security

concerns have been prioritized, the securitization of information has been done from this perspective.

Thus, the data showed that, the securitizing actor approaches the information phenomena and information-communication technologies from political point of view. The securitizing move made with regard to the issue, revealed that the securitizing actor securitized the issue claiming that it undermines state's ability to act properly, and challenges the legitimacy the regime both at home and abroad.

Unlike the demographic decline, the securitization move with regard to information is full in the sense that it passed both identification and mobilization stages. Thus, the political leadership of the Russian Federation did not only present the issue as threatening Russian political security, it has also advocated and applied certain restrictive measures to tackle with the issue. In this regard, the securitization move of the information has been analyzed in two stages.

Overall, the study finds that within a single case, particular securitizing moves show congruence with the discourse of danger that is predominant at that time. In the Russian context, dominant discourse of danger revolved largely around the political and societal issues, and these are the ways that securitization of demographic decline and information had been conducted.

On the basis of this study, it can be said that the dominant discourse of danger predicts the contours of securitization of specific cases. The specific securitization of demographic decline and information largely resembled the discourse, which securitized political and societal sectors. In this regard this study can be taken as a case that shows

the shortcoming of securitization theory, which was rather ignorant to contextual factors.

This study did not aim at finding the ways through which, dominant discourse of danger and particular securitizing moves show parallels. More importantly, this study does not claim that there are causal relations between these two variables. Instead of that, we found that dominant discourse of danger predicted the contours of particular securitizing moves. This means that further research is needed to find whether the dominant discourse of danger causes or simply contributes to particular securitizing moves. Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis shows that there is need to adequately focus on general security priorities of the given state, while analyzing the particular securitizing moves.

Moreover, it should be noted that, despite the Copenhagen School's negligence to the independent existence of threats, the respective chapters showed that specific securitization occurred in such a context that certain developments, especially demographic decline, and its regionalization poses challenges to Russia's national security. As it was indicated in the introductory part, the mere non-existence of securitizing move should not be used for arguing that the issue is not threatening given state's national security. Rather, future research within the Copenhagen School's framework should investigate the role of facts in making respective securitizing moves.

Another point for future research may be the assessment of respective securitizing moves. Namely, the future research should answer the question that why in a certain cases the securitizing moves remain in the identification stage not passing through the mobilization one. This kind of research would require different research

design and methodology. Given that the securitizing move is a political choice, the future research on the issue should be focused on political agenda and preferences of the securitizing actors, as well. For that aim, future research should pay adequate attention the peculiarities of the political regime. Thus far, securitization research has predominantly focused on western political systems. Non-western, non-democratic settings should be examined adequately.

APPENDIX A: RESIDENT POPULATION ¹⁾

Years	Total population mln. persons	Of which		As percentage of total population	
		Urban	Rural	urban	rural
1989	147.0	108.0	39.0	73	27
1993 ²⁾	148.6	108.7	39.9	73	27
1996	148.3	108.3	40.0	73	27
2001	146.3	107.1	39.2	73	27
2002					
as of January 1	145.6	106.7	38.9	73	27
as of October 9 ³⁾	145.2	106.4	38.8	73	27
2003	145.0	106.3	38.7	73	27
2004	144.2	105.8	38.4	73	27
2005	143.5	104.7	38.8	73	27
2006	142.8	104.1	38.7	73	27
2007	142.2	103.8	38.4	73	27
2008	142.0	103.8	38.2	73	27
2009	141.9	103.7	38.2	73	27

¹⁾ Data are given: for 1989 - according to the population census as of January 12, for 1993, 1996, 2001-2009 - estimation as of January 1 of corresponding year.

²⁾ 1993, 1996, 2001, 2002 - population size is adjusted according to the results of the All-Russia population census 2002.

³⁾ In accordance with data of the All-Russia population census.

Source: State Statistics Committee of the Russian Federation. Retrieved July 12, 2010,

from http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/05-01.htm.

APPENDIX B: INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

(persons)

	1997	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Arrivals to the Russian Federation, total	597651	359330	177230	186380	286956	281614
of which from:						
CIS countries	571903	346774	168598	177657	273872	269976
Azerbaijan	29878	14906	4600	8900	20968	23331
Armenia	19123	15951	7581	12949	30751	35216
Belarus'	17575	10274	6797	5619	6030	5865
Georgia	24517	20213	5497	6806	10595	8806
Kazakhstan	235903	124903	51945	38606	40258	39964
Kyrgyzstan	13752	15536	15592	15669	24731	24014
Republic of Moldova	13750	11652	6569	8649	14090	15519
Tajikistan	23053	11043	4717	6523	17309	20717
Turkmenistan	16501	6738	4104	4089	4846	3962
Uzbekistan	39620	40810	30436	37126	52802	43518
Ukraine	138231	74748	30760	32721	51492	49064
far abroad countries	25748	12556	8632	8723	13084	11638
Australia	57	27	30	28	38	31
Afghanistan	208	288	60	86	212	278
Bulgaria	750	245	118	109	207	190
Germany	2379	1753	3025	2900	3164	3134
Greece	183	182	200	176	260	289
Israel	1626	1508	1004	1053	1094	1002
Canada	73	50	99	77	118	105
China	2861	1121	432	499	1687	1177
Cuba	110	37	17	12	44	36
Latvia	5658	1785	726	766	887	716
Lithuania	1785	945	360	371	537	455
Poland	247	61	55	48	96	100
Syrian Arab Republic	483	358	68	67	93	125

Continued

USA	668	439	396	411	578	551
Turkey	176	164	86	172	315	373
Finland	140	83	129	137	172	174
Sweden	32	14	23	32	39	30
Estonia	3483	786	432	347	508	476
other countries	4829	2710	1372	1432	3035	2396
Departures from the Russian Federation, total	232987	145720	69798	54061	47013	39508
of which from:						
CIS countries	146961	82312	36109	35262	31329	26114
Azerbaijan	4302	3187	1274	1366	1355	1258
Armenia	2578	1519	620	686	728	1032
Belarus'	18928	13276	6034	6318	5302	3954
Georgia	3286	1802	691	593	603	572
Kazakhstan	25364	17913	12437	11948	10211	7483
Kyrgyzstan	6296	1857	473	605	668	648
Republic of Moldova	5715	2237	786	636	629	551
Tajikistan	2474	1158	434	424	464	637
Turkmenistan	1532	676	125	112	111	90
Uzbekistan	7370	3086	595	648	722	948
Ukraine	69116	35601	12640	11926	10536	8941
far abroad countries	86026	63408	33689	18799	15684	13394
Australia	297	176	209	167	139	202
Afghanistan	146	25	11	11	12	16
Bulgaria	668	180	124	116	132	163
Germany	48363	40443	21458	8229	6486	4916
Greece	886	314	155	139	116	98
Israel	12873	9407	1745	1408	1202	1040
Canada	1333	841	628	552	571	516
China	1222	658	456	196	56	53
Cuba	89	27	2	3	5	6
Latvia	636	365	211	223	271	226
Lithuania	1162	376	213	228	276	215

Continued

Poland	376	135	76	84	77	101
Syrian Arab Republic	256	54	54	42	38	24
USA	9087	4793	4040	3109	2108	1722
Turkey	356	104	85	78	78	81
Finland	923	1142	737	695	692	620
Sweden	151	195	110	132	137	157
Estonia	702	385	225	270	280	301
other countries	6500	3788	3150	3117	3008	2937

Source: Russian Statistics Committee: International Migration. Retrieved July 12, 2010,

from http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_06/IssWWW.exe/Stg/1/01-05.htm.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamson, F.B. (2006), "Crossing Borders International Migration and National Security", *International Security*, Vol.31, No. 1(Summer 2006), pp. 165-199;
- Alexander, M. (2003), The Internet in Putin's Russia: Reinventing a technology of authoritarianism, *Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association*, University of Leicester, UK, Retrieved September 1, 2010, from www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2003/Marcus%20Alexander.pdf;
- Alexseev M.A., (2001). Decentralization versus State Collapse: Explaining Russia's Endurance, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 101-106;
- Alexseev M.A. (2003), Economic Valuations and Interethnic Fears: Perceptions of Chinese migration in the Russian Far East, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.40, No.1. (Jan., 2003), pp.85-102;
- Alexseev M.A., Hofsetter R.C. (2006), Russia, China, and the Immigration Security Dilemma, *Political Science Quarterly*, Spring 2006, 121.1.
- Altheide, D., L., (2004), The Control Narrative of the Internet, *Symbolic Interaction*, Vol. 27, No. 2, pp. 223-245;
- Anderson, B. (1991), *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, Verso;
- Asplund, E. (2004), A Two Level Approach to Securitization: An Analysis of Drug Trafficking in China and Russia, *Master's Thesis, Uppsala Programme of International Studies, Department of Peace and Conflict Research*;
- Baldwin, D. (1997), The Concept of Security, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.23, No.1, pp. 5-26;
- Balzacq, T. (2005), The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 171-201;
- Belin, L. (2001), Political Bias and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media. In Brown, A., (ed.), *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*, pp.323-345, New York, Oxford University Press;
- Bicchi, F. (2001), European Security Perceptions vis-à-vis the Mediterranean: Theoretical and empirical considerations from the 1990s, *Jean Monnet Working papers in comparative and International Politics*; Retrieved May 28, 2009, from <http://www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/jmwp39.htm>;

- Bilgin, P. (2002), Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East, *The Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 2., No., 1, pp. 100-118;
- Bogoyavlenski, D.D. (2001), Etnniceskie sostav naseleennia Rossii (Ethnic composition of Russia's population), *Sotsiologiceskie Issledovaniya*, No.10, pp. 88-93;
- Booth, K. (1991), Security and Emancipation, *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, pp. 313-326;
- Brignall, T., (2002), The New Panopticon: The Internet Viewed as a Structure of Social Control, *Theory and Science*, Retrieved April 26, 2009, from <http://theoryandscience.icaap.org/content/vol1003.001/brignall.htm>;
- Brown S., (1998). World Interests and the Changing Dimensions of Security. In Klare, M., T., and Chandrani, Y., (eds.), *World Security: challenges for a new century*, third edition, New York, ST. Martin's Press;
- Buzan, B. (1991), *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*. Boulder CO, Lynne Rienner;
- Buzan, B. (1997), Rethinking Security after the Cold War, *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol.32, No. 1, pp.5-28;
- Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lematre, P., Tromer, E., Weaver, O. (1990), *The European Security Order Recast: Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*. London, Printer Publishers;
- Buzan, B., Weaver O., and Wilde J. (1998), *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- Carr, E., H., (1939), *The Twenty Years Crisis: 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, Macmillan;
- Chafetz, G. (1996/1997), The struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 111, No.4, pp.661-688;
- Charrett, C. (2009), A critical application of securitization theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security, International Catalan Institute for Peace;
- Castels, M. (1989), *The informational city: information technology, economic restructuring, and the urban-regional process*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell;
- Cogburn, D. L., (2005, Sep), "Global Internet Governance: Who's Winning, Who's Losing, and Who Cares?", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the

American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC Online <APPLICATION/PDF> Retrieved April 21, 2009, from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41699_index.html;

Collins, A., (2005), Securitization, Frankenstein's Monster and Malaysian education, *The Pacific Review*, Vol., 18, No., 4, pp. 567-588;

Demographic Policy Concept, Konsepsiya demograficeskoy politiki Rossiiskoy Fedaracii na period do 2015 qoda (Demographic Policy Concept of the Russian Federation till 2015), Retrieved February 18, 2009, from <http://www.akdi.ru/econom/program/demogr.htm>;

Diebert, R. (2002), Circuits of Power: Security in the Internet Environment. In Rosenau, J.,N. and Singh, J. P. (eds.), *Information Technologies and Global Politics*, pp. 115-143, State University of New York Press;

Diebert, R., Rohozinski, R. (2007), "Good for Liberty, Bad for security? Global Civil Society and the Securitization of the Internet", Retrieved May 29, 2009, from www.wsir.pwias.ubc.ca/2007/articles/DeibertRohozinskiDraftChapter-Access%20Denied%20-%20MIT.pdf;

Ehlers, V., J. (1999), "Information Warfare and International Security", Retrieved May 29, 2009, from <http://www.naa.be/publications/comrep/1999/as285stc-e.html>;

Elkner, J. (2005) Spiritual security in the Russian Federation, Retrieved May 16, 2009, from <http://www.historyandpolicy.org/papers/policy-paper-26.html>;

Eltsin, B.,N., Poslaniya po nacionalnoy bezopasnosti Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federacii Federalnomu Sobarniyu; 13 iyunya 1996 qoda (Annual Address to the Federal Council of the Russian Federation; 13 June 1996) in Kortunov, S., V., (2003), *Stanovleniye Politiki Bezopasnosti: Formirovanie Politiki Bezopasnosti Rossii v Kontekste Problem Globalizacii (Evolution of Security Policy: the formation of security policy of Russia in the context of globalization)*. Nauka, Moscow Appendix, pp. 553-560;

Eriksson, J. and Giacomello, G. (2004, Feb), International Relations Theory and Security in the Digital Age, *Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association*, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada Online <.PDF> Retrieved April 22, 2009, from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72240_index.html;

Fish, M., S. (2001), Ten Years after the Soviet Breakup. Putin's Path, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.12, No., 4, pp.71-78;

- George, A. I., Bennett, A.(2005), *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England;
- Goble, P. (2008), Window on Eurasia: Russia's 'Cyber-Muslims' Challenge Moscow, Islamic Leaders, Retrieved May 26, 2009, from www.windowoneurasia.blogspot.com/2008/01/window-on-eurasia-russias-cyber-muslims.html;
- Goskomstat, (2009), Population Size (medium variant of projection); Retrieved July 12, 2010, from http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_06/IssWWW.exe/Stg/1/01-05.htm-;
- Goskomstat, (2010), Population Size as of January 1; Retrieved July 12, 2010, from http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_12/IssWWW.exe/stg/d01/05-01.htm-;
- Grace, G. W. (1987), *The Linguistic Construction of Reality*. London: Croom Helm;
- Grieco, J., Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics, in Doyle and Ikenberry (eds.), *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*;
- Gromes, T., Banacker, T. (2007), The Concept of Securitization as a Tool for Analyzing the Role of Human-Rights-Related Civil Society in Ethno-Political Conflict, *SHUR Working Paper Series*, Center for Conflict Studies, University of Marburg;
- Halperin, D. (2000), The Internet and National Security: Emerging Issues. In Alberts, D., Papp, D., (eds.), *Volume II of information Age Anthology: National Security Implications of the Information Age*, pp. 137-179;
- Herd, G., P., Sargsyan, G., (2007), Debating Russian Demographic Security: Current Trends and Future Trajectories, *Security Index*, Vol.13, No. 2 (82), pp. 50-67; Retrieved January 15, 2010, from <http://www.res.ethz.ch/kb/search/details.cfm?id=45812&lng=en>;
- Herz, J., H. (1950), Idealist Institutionalism and the Security Dilemma, *World Politics*, Vol.2, No.2, pp. 157-180;
- Hunter, S. (2004), *Islam in Russia; the politics of identity and security*, Center for Strategic and International Studies;
- Huysmans, J.(1998), Security! What do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol.4, No.2, pp. 226-255;
- ISD, (2000), Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation;
- Kitchin, R. (1998), *Cyberspace: The World in Wires*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons;

- Krause, K., Williams, M., C. (Oct., 1996), Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol.40, No. 2, pp. 229-254;
- Kolodziej, E., A., (1992), *What is Security and Security Studies?: Lessons from Cold War*;
- Kortunov, S., V. (2003), Stanovleniye Politiki Bezopasnosti: Formirovanie Politiki Bezopasnosti Rossii v Kontekste Problem Globalizatsii (Evolution of Security Policy: the formation of security policy of Russia in the context of globalization). Nauka, Moscow;
- Jorgensen, P. (2002), *Methods of Discourse Analysis*. London, Sage Publications;
- Levy, M., A. (1995), Is the Environment a National Security Issue?, *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp.35-62;
- Lipman, M., McFaul, M. (2007), Managed Democracy in Russia: Putin and the Press. In Graber, D., (ed.) *Media Power in Politics*, pp.412-422, A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington D.C.;
- Lomanov A.V. (2004), On the Periphery of the “Clash of Civilizations”: Discourse and Geopolitics in Russian- Chinese Relations;
- Machulskaya, I., Q. (2005), Legal Basis of Formulation Information Society in Russia in the Age of Globalization, in *Information Security of the Russian Federation*, Analytical Department of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Analytical Monthly No. 14, pp. 70-98;
- Marlin-Bennett, R., (2004, Sep), "Gates, Sluices, Dams, and Leaks: Power and the Control of Information Flows" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hilton Chicago and the Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL Online <.PDF> Retrieved April 21, 2009, from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p60898_index.html;
- Mathews, J., T., (1989), “Redefining Security”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No.2, pp.162-177;
- McAuley, M. (1997), *Russia’s Politics of Uncertainty*. Cambridge University Press, New York;
- Mearsheimer, J., J. (1990), Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War, *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 5-56;

- McDonald, M. (2008), Securitization and the Construction of Security, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol., 14, No., 4, pp. 563-587;
- Medvedev, D., A., (2009), Speech at the Joint Session of the State Council and the Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Organisations on Cooperation between State Authorities and Religious Organisations in Spiritual, Moral and Civic Education of Young People, March 11, 2009, Tula, Retrieved April 4, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/03/11/2257_type82913_213881.shtml
- Milner, H. (2003), The Digital Divide: The Role of Political institutions in Technology Diffusion, Retrieved April 18, 2009, from www.princeton.edu/~hmilner/working%20papers/internet_democ3.pdf;
- Niklaus, A., Schwarz, P. (2000), Russian President Putin introduces widespread state monitoring of the Internet, Retrieved January, 17, 2009, from <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2000/feb2000/put-f04.shtml>; accessed;
- NSC-97, Konsepsii nacionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federaciii ot 17 dekabrya 1997 goda (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, adopted on 17 December 1997); in Kortunov, S., V., (2003), Stanovleniye Politiki Bezopasnosti: Formirovaniye Politiki Bezopasnosti Rossii v Kontekste Problem Globalizatsii (Evolution of Security Policy: the formation of security policy of Russia in the context of globalization). Nauka, Moscow Appendix, pp.561-569;
- NSC-2000, Konsepsiya Nacionalnoy Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, v redaksii ukaza Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 10 yanvarya 2000 goda, no. 24 (National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, revised by the Decree no.24 of the President of the Russian Federation, 10 December 2000), Retrieved February 24, 2009, from <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1.html>;
- Odell, J., S. (2001), Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, *International Studies Perspectives*, Vol., 2, pp. 161-176;
- Open Source Center, (2008), Russia- Increased Attempts to Regulate Internet, Open Source Center Analysis, Retrieved May 18, 2009, from <http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2008/03/osc-russia.html>;
- Panfilov, O. (2005), Putin and the Press: The Revival of Soviet-Style Propaganda, translated by Maria Blake, The Foreign Policy Center;
- Peterson, D. J. (2005), *Russia and the Information Revolution*, Santa Monica. CA, USA: Rand Corporation;

- Population Council, (2005), The President of Russia on Population, *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 31, No. 2, pp. 401-402;
- Prendergrast, J., G. (2004), The Regional Consequences of Russia's Demographic Crisis, Department of Geography, University of Leicester, Working Paper No.3, Retrieved February 18, 2009, from www.geog.le.ac.uk/russianheartland/WP03_Demographics_July04.pdf;
- Putin, V., V. (1999), Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, 29 December 1999. In Sakwa, R. (2004), *Putin: Russia's Choice*, pp. 251-262, Appendix;
- Putin, V., V. (2000), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 8 July, 2000, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February, 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2000/07/08/0000_type70029type82912_70658.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2000a), Introductory Remarks at a Meeting on the Prospects of the Development of the Far East and the Trans- Baikal Region, Blagoveshchensk, July 21, 2000, Retrieved April, 5, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2000/07/21/0000_type82912type82913_127800.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2001), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 3 April, 2001, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/05/16/0000_type70029type82912_44692.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2002), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 18 April, 2002, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2002/04/18/0000_type70029type82912_70662.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2003), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 16 May, 2003, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/05/16/0000_type70029type82912_44692.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2004), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 26 May 2004, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2004/05/26/1309_type70029type82912_71650.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2005), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 25 April 2005, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from

http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml

- Putin, V., V. (2005b), Introductory Remarks at Security Council Meeting on Immigration Policy, Retrieved April 4, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/03/17/2132_type82912type82913_85311.shtml;
- Putin, V., V.(2006), Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation 10 May 2006, Moscow, Kremlin, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2006 a), “Transcript of the Security Council Meeting Devoted to Measures to Implement the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly”, Retrieved February 24, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/20/2149_type82913type82917107479.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2006b), “Answers to Questions Asked During the President of Russia’s Interactive Webcast held 6 July 2006”, Retrieved April 26, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/07/13/1732_type148989_108577.shtml;
- Putin, V., V. (2007), Speech at a meeting with Russian Orthodox Clergy to mark the Ninetieth Anniversary of the Patriarchate’s Restoration, November 19, 2007, The Kremlin, Moscow, Retrieved April 5, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/11/19/2325_type82912type84779_151562.shtml;
- Renan, E. (1990), What is a Nation?, In Bhabba, K., H., (ed), *Nation and Narration*, pp. 8-23, London, Routledge;
- Roe, P., (2008), “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol., 39, No., 6, pp. 615-635;
- Russian Federation, (2001), “Interview given by First Deputy Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation V.P. Sherstyuk to the Newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda publishes on January 24, 2001”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department;
- Russian Federation, (2006), Transcript of the Security Council Meeting Devoted to Measures to Implement the Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Retrieved April 4, 2009, from http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/06/20/2149_type82913type82917_107479.shtml;

- Saco, D., (1999), "Colonizing Cyberspace: "National Security" and the Internet", in Weldes, J., et al. (eds.), *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, University of Minnesota Press, Minnesota, London, pp.261-293;
- Sakwa, R. (2004), *Putin: Russia's Choice*. Routledge;
- Saunders, R., (2004), "A New Web of Identity: The Internet, Globalization, and Identity Politics in Post-Soviet Space", *Warsaw Special Convention of the ASN*;
- Saunders, R. A. (2006a), "Digital Imaginaries of Power: National Minorities, Cyberspace, and the New Politics of Reality", Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA Online <APPLICATION/PDF> Retrieved May 7, 2009, from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p152536_index.html;
- Saunders, R., (2006b), "Denationalized Digerati in the Virtual Near Abroad: The Internet's Paradoxical Impact on National Identity among Minority Russians", *Global Media and Communication, Vol.2, No.1, pp; 43-69*;
- Schweller, R., L. (1994), Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist States Back In, *International Security, Vol.19*;
- Schweller, R., L. (1996), Neorealism's Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?, *Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 90-121*;
- Sergounin, A., A., (1996), Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute; Retrieved March 29, 2009, from http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/sea01/index.html#txt*;
- Shaposhnikov, Y. (1993), A security Concept for Russia, *International Affairs (Moscow), Vol. 39, No.10, pp. 10-19*;
- Simons, G., Strovsky, D. (2006), Censorship in Contemporary Russian Journalism in the age of the War against Terrorism: A Historical Perspective, *European Journal of Communication, Vol.21, No. 189, pp. 189-211*;
- Smith, G. (1998), Multiculturalism and Federal Justice, *Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 50, No. 8, pp. 1393-1411*;
- Stern, J., E. (1994), Moscow Meltdown: Can Russia Survive?, *International Security, Vol. 18, No., 4, pp. 40-65*;

- Stritzel, H. (2007), Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond, *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 13, No.3, pp. 357-383;
- Terriff., T., Croft, S., James, L., and Morgan, P., M. (1999), *Security Studies Today*. Polity Press;
- Thomas, L., T. (2001), Information Security Thinking: A Comparisons of the U.S., Russian and Chinese Concepts, Retrieved February 19, 2008, from www.dodccrp.org/events/2004_CCRTS/CD/papers/064.pdf;
- Thomas, L., T. (2002), Information Warfare in the Second (1999-Present) Chechen War: Motivator for Military reform?, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS., Retrieved February 19, 2008, from <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/iwchechen.htm>;
- Tickner, J., A. (1997), You Just Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements between Feminists and IR theorists, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 41, No.4, pp.611-632;
- Tolz, V. (1998), Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist Russia, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, pp.993-1022;
- Tolz, V.(2001), Politicians' Conceptions of the Russian Nation. In Brown, A., (ed.), *Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader*, pp. 355-363, Oxford University Press, New York;
- Torkunov, A., V., Ilyin, M., V., et al. (2000), *Vnesnyaya Politika Rossiiskaya Federasiya 1992-1999: ucebnoe posobie* (Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 1992-1999: textbook), Moscow State University of International Relations, Moscow;
- Troitskiy, M. (2006), Globalization vs. National Security: External and Domestic Factors in Russian Foreign Policymaking, *Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Convention of International Studies Association*, San Diego, USA, March 22-25 2006;
- Tsygankov, A., P. (1997), From International Institutionalism to Revolutionary Expansionism: The Foreign Policy Discourse of Contemporary Russia, *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 247-268;
- Ulmann, R., H. (1983), Redefining Security, *International Security*, Vol.8, No.1, pp.129-153;
- United Nations, (2001), "Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?" doc. ST/ESA/SER.A/206, New York: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, population Division.

- Urban, M. (1994), The Politics of Identity in Russia's Postcommunist Transition: The Nation against Itself, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp.733-765;
- Walt, S., M. (1991), The Renaissance of Security Studies, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol.35 (2), pp. 211-239;
- Waltz, K., N. (1959), *Man, the State, and War*, New York, Columbia University Press;
- Waltz, K., N. (1979), *The Theory of International Politics*, Random House, New York;
- Weaver, O. (1995), Securitization and Desecuritization. In Lipschutz, D., (ed.), *On Security*, pp. 46-87, Columbia University Press, New York;
- Weaver, O., Buzan, B., Kelstrup, M., Lemaitre, P. (1993), *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, Pinter Publishers Ltd;
- Wilkinson, C. (2007), The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?, *Security Dialogue*, Vol., 38, No., 1, pp. 5-25;
- Wishnick E. (2006), The Securitization of Chinese Migration to the Russian Far East; Rhetoric and Reality, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu;
- Wolfers, A. (1952), National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol.67, No.4, pp.481-502;
- WSIS, (2005), "World Summit on the Information Society: Outcome Documents", *Tunis*, Retrieved May 26, 2009, from www.globalaffairs.ru/docs/saunders.doc;
- Zamyatin, D. The Role of the Internet in Formulating Regional Conscience in Contemporary Russia" (translation from Russian), Retrieved May 26, 2009, from <http://rocich.ru/article/268>;
- Zyuganov, G. (1995), *Rossii i Sovremenni Mir (Russia and Contemporary World)*, Moscow, Obezrevatel;