

IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF FASCISM
AMONG THE MAINSTREAM KEMALIST ELITE IN TURKEY, 1931 – 1943.

by
Cennet Ünver

Submitted to
the Institute for Graduate Studies in
the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts.

Boğaziçi University

2001

ABSTRACT

An Abstract of the Thesis of Cennet Ünver for the degree of Master of Arts at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History to be taken June 2001.

Title: IMAGES AND PERCEPTIONS OF FASCISM AMONG
THE MAINSTREAM KEMALIST ELITE IN TURKEY, 1931 - 1943.

The image and perception of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, as it comes to an expression mainly in the official organs of the Republican People's Party, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü*, and partly in the influential journal *Kadro* constitutes the subject of this study. The thirteen year period between 1931 and 1943, in which the authoritarian character of the single-party regime in Turkey was most evident, is the time frame. The approach to fascist ideology, the topics attracting most attention, and the way some of the core elements in Fascism and National Socialism are described in these sources, is identified in the work, which with a disclaim of undertaking a comparative analysis, still claims to include a comparative aspect. The particular interest in Italian Fascism in the first half of the 1930s, the positive perception of notions such as discipline, organization of the youth, ideological and physical education, the role of leaders, and finally, seen in general, the absence of any critical stance toward the two fascist regimes, are some of the findings which stand out in the examination of the sources. With this different approach to the experience of single-party rule in Turkey, this study brings to attention a new aspect and contributes to the wider debate over the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist regime in the inter-war period.

ÖZET

İtalyan Faşizmi ve Alman Nasyonal Sosyalizmi'nin, özellikle Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin resmi organları olan *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* gazetesi ve *Ülkü* dergisinde ve kısmen de, entelektüel dergi diye nitelendirilebilecek *Kadro* dergisinde, nasıl algılandığı ve ne tür bir imajda ifade bulduğu bu tezin konusunu oluşturmakta. Türkiye'de tek-parti rejiminin otoriter özelliğinin en belirgin sayılabileceği 1931-1943 yılları arasındaki on üç yıldan oluşan dönem, ele alınan zaman dilimi. Faşist ideolojilere sergilenen yaklaşımı, ideolojiler ile ilgili en çok ele alınan konuları, ve Faşizm'in ve Nasyonal Sosyalizm'in bazı temel öğelerinin ne şekilde anlatıldığını ortaya koyan çalışma, karşılaştırmalı bir analiz sunmamakla beraber, karşılaştırmalı bir yönü ihtiva ediyor. 1930'ların ilk yarısında İtalyan Faşizmi'ne karşı olan yoğun ilgi, disiplin, gençlik teşkilatı, ideolojik ve beden terbiyesi, şeflerin rolü, gibi öğelerin olumlu bir şekilde algılanması, ve iki faşist rejime karşı genel anlamda tepkili bir yaklaşımın söz konusu olmaması, birincil kaynakların incelenmesi sonucu göze çarpan bazı bulgular arasında. Türkiye'de tek-parti yönetimi deneyimini farklı bir yaklaşım ile ele alan çalışma, iki savaş arası döneminin Kemalist rejiminin otoriter mahiyetine yeni bir yön katarak, bu deneyim üzerinde yürütülen tartışmaya katkıda bulunuyor.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to my advisor, Asst. Professor M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, for his patient and thorough guidance throughout the thesis process. His generous offering of time, continuous interest in the work, and critical advice have made it all a true process of learning. Further, I thank Professor Taha Parla for his suggestions, which were essential in the forming of the structure of the thesis. I also thank Professor Şevket Pamuk for his propositions and participation in the jury. I owe thanks to all of the people at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History for having provided the relaxed atmosphere filled with the inspiration to undertake academic studies. I thank Ms. Kathryn Kranzler, whose inexhaustible patience and thorough editing brought the work to its present form.

I want to express my gratitude to the Beyazıt State Library (*Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi*), in particular to Mrs. Mihriban Bilir, for her at times inexplicable helpfulness to enable the fulfilling of the essential research of this work.

I am sincerely grateful to my dearest friend, Shahid H. Gazi, for his invaluable support and sincere encouragement, especially in the last and most tense phase of this work; without these, I doubt that the thesis would have seen the light of day. Finally, I thank my family, who, despite their reluctance to understand why a Masters Degree had to be obtained this far from home, did not hold back their support and encouragement. I thank in particular Nurhayat Ünver-Dolaysu for her unconditional support and caring and, acknowledging its modesty, as an expression of my gratitude and respect, to her I dedicate this work.

CONTENTS

PREFACE.....	vii
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. REVOLT AGAINST THE LIBERAL ORDER: THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF FASCIST IDEOLOGY	17
Georges Sorel, Revolutionary Syndicalism, and Futurism.....	24
German Reactionary Modernism.....	32
Characteristics of Fascist Ideology	41
III. THE IMAGE AND PERCEPTION OF FASCISM AMONG MAINSTREAM KEMALISTS AS EXPRESSED IN <i>HAKİMİYET-İ MİLLİYE (ULUS) AND ÜLKÜ</i>	49
The Perception of Italian Fascism and Fascist Italy	52
The Approach to National Socialism and Hitler's Germany	77
The Limited Democracy Rhetoric	111
IV. INTELLECTUALS' SEARCH FOR IDEOLOGY IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD: THE <i>KADRO</i> EXPERIENCE	117
The Emergence of <i>Kadro</i>	117
Authoritarian Traces	133
The Image of Fascism.....	147
Concluding Remarks.....	151
V. CONCLUSION	154
BIBLIOGRAPHY	164

PREFACE

The experience of single-party rule in Turkey's Republican period continues to attract attention of academic circles. The authoritarian nature of the Kemalist regime and its distinguishing features when compared to other similar cases in the inter-war period are discussed by a wide range of scholars who offer very different approaches and views to this question. The explanation of authoritarianism and the rejection of democracy solely by reference to the "conditions of the period," seems to be a reductionist perspective, which, admittedly crucial to keep in mind, when used as the only factor of explanation tends to reflect an attitude of "white-washing" or excusing the period. Furthermore, the conservative elements inherent in Kemalism leave a question mark as to whether to term it a kind of leftist political orientation and perhaps even requires a revision of its "progressive" character. A further step in this discussion making the questions even more relevant for the present is the implication of the single-party experience for the political culture and mentality prevailing in today's Turkey.

The extensive discussion of topics related to these subjects in my graduate classes, and in particular in Professor Karaömerlioğlu's course on the single-party era, ATA 604.01, provided the inspiration which ultimately led to the formulation of the question of this study. Approaching the controversy over the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist single-party experience from a different perspective, the image and perception of fascist ideology among mainstream Kemalists was found an essential subject to investigate, in order to reach a better understanding of the Kemalist rule in the inter-war years. Such an object necessarily requires a brief study of the Fascist rule in Italy and the Nazi rule in

Germany. Far from any claim of undertaking a comparative study, the present work includes a comparative aspect which will create a better foundation for discussing the single-party regime's characteristics and understanding its nature.

The thirteen year period between 1931 and 1943 is chosen for this objective. These years can be seen as the "golden" years of the single-party rule, or the decade in which the authoritarian character of the regime in Turkey was most evident. After the abolition of the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) in 1930, the country had to go through a fifteen year period before the transition to a multi-party system could be realized. Related to this, it was during these years that a discussion on the meaning of Kemalism emerged and efforts were put into defining its content. This latter was also motivated by developments in Europe, which was, so to speak, in a state of ideological battle, with authoritarian regimes in a camp against a group of liberal democratic countries. In other words, the efforts to define Kemalism were reinforced by these external developments, and while underlining the uniqueness of Kemalism and the Kemalist Revolution for Turkey, the Kemalist leadership still took into consideration the developments in the European context and regarded some countries as constituting a source of inspiration.

The exclusion of the important case of the Soviet Russia, despite the regime's totalitarian like character, can be put forth as a relevant point of criticism here. The requirement of limitation is one argument against this potential criticism. In addition, although similarities can be identified in the totalitarian character of the three regimes, ideologically, Italy and Germany were in the same camp, whereas the Soviet Russia and Socialism (despite its totalitarian feature) came to be perceived as the main enemy.

Furthermore, another distinguishing point for Mussolini and Hitler was that their “road to total power” was more “indirect” when compared to those of Lenin and Stalin.¹ These two latter points constitute the more substantial arguments for choosing to focus on Germany and Italy. Fascist ideology defined as Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, and not the broader term totalitarianism, thus constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. The domination of Italy and Germany on the European scene from the latter part of the 1930s, and the radical character of the rules are factors giving credit to the claim that these two countries in particular constituted models for other cases of authoritarian rule.

The Kemalist political-ideological leadership’s approach towards fascist ideology and rule is identified in this work mainly through a study of primary sources. The work is thus reminiscent of a discourse analysis. The newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, and the journals *Ülkü* and *Kadro* are the sources on which the analysis and discussion in large part, is based. With the assumption that the Kemalist single-party rule in Turkey in the inter-war years, especially during the 1930s, grew authoritarian as the point of departure, the aim is thus to investigate the approach presented towards the most evident cases of authoritarian rule in Europe, Italy and Germany, in this period, by prominent political and intellectual figures in the Kemalist establishment.

¹ “One major feature that unites the two regimes is nevertheless clear. Both rested on compromises between revolutionary movements aiming at total power (not bourgeois restoration) and Establishments shaken in their commanding positions by the impact of mass politics and the storms of the First World War...Unlike Lenin and Stalin, who could write upon a political and social *tabula rasa*...Mussolini and Hitler could not at first simply decree the liquidation of entire groups. Their road to total power was, and had to be, indirect... The wars of Fascism and Nazism, far from aiming to avert revolution, were designed to make it.” MacGregor Knox, “Expansionist Zeal, Fighting Power and Staying Power in the Italian and German Dictatorships” in Richard Bessel (ed.), *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Comparisons and Contrasts*, 2nd printing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.114.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The various authoritarian regimes that came into existence in the inter-war period in Europe make it possible to claim that it was an era dominated by authoritarianism.¹ This influence or domination meant that the political, economic, and cultural conditions of the era were defined by authoritarian ideology and politics for many countries, and that the democratic discourse as we know it was in retreat. As expressed by Eric Hobsbawm, Europe witnessed “the fall of liberalism.”² In the European framework, Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany constituted the main examples and models for other authoritarian countries. Furthermore, although the values of liberal democracy continued to be advocated in countries like Britain and France, in Michela Nacci’s words, “the fact remains that liberal democratic governments were generally held in low esteem.” Strikingly, according to the author, in the writings of the period, one finds a noteworthy

¹ As an indication of the dominance of authoritarianism in Europe: In Italy the Fascists came to power with their infamous March on Rome in October 1922; the Nazis triumphed in Germany in 1933 when Hitler was declared Chancellor; Spain had been under the military dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera from 1923 to 1930, and at the end of the three-year long Spanish Civil War in 1939, General Franco established an authoritarian rule; Oliveira Salazar became Prime Minister in Portugal in 1932 and established a Catholic authoritarian state (which was to last all the way up to 1974); and finally, in Greece, General Metaxas became head of a dictatorship in 1936. For a general overview of important developments in Europe, see Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Europe of the Dictators, 1919-1945* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

expression of “disaffection for democracy, violent invective against liberalism, criticisms of the philistine spirit that had supposedly infected every area of traditional politics, and expressions of sympathy for the Fascist and Nazi regimes. Authoritarian, conservative and reactionary tendencies prevailed, even among eminent intellectuals.”³

Turkey was not exempt from this general trend and belonged from the early 1930s to the range of countries experiencing authoritarian single-party rules. The ruling Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası*) (RPP) declared the regime a one-party state at the Third Party Congress in 1931 and room for any kind of opposition to the ruling Party was restricted. According to one view, which acknowledges the authoritarian nature of the Turkish single-party regime, the Kemalist rule was not founded on an ideology as opposed to the totalitarian regimes of the period. It was a distinguishing feature of authoritarian regimes, the argument goes, that they were based on “mentalities” which were less rigid and less coherently defined than political ideologies. The latter were essential for totalitarian rule. The Kemalist single-party regime in Turkey was consequently seen as belonging to the authoritarian category.⁴ In the same vein, the path to democracy is seen as constantly been kept open in Kemalist Turkey, as the political leadership was not interested in anything like the total transformation of society, which again was a point differentiating the Turkish case from totalitarian rules. The Kemalists had no objective of creating a “new man” and the single-party rule was only meant to be temporary.⁵

² Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes – The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991*, second edition (London: Abacus, 1995).

³ Michela Nacci, “The Present as Nightmare: Cultural Pessimism among European Intellectuals in the Period between the Two World Wars,” in Zeev Sternhell (ed.), *The Intellectual Revolt against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945*. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996, pp.105-128.

⁴ Ergun Özbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime” in A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun (eds.) *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State* (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981), pp.79-102.

⁵ Ibid., p. 91. This view is also held by Feroz Ahmad, who states that the Kemalists opted to abandon the single-party regime when the “conditions” had been prepared: “*Kemalizmin tarihsel görevi, burjuvazinin gelişmesi ve aynı zamanda da çoğulcu politika açısından gerekli koşulları yaratmak ve böylece tek-parti*

An approach contradicting some of these views held by Ergun Özbudun, argues that the Kemalist rule, especially from the early 1930s, began making its ideological stance and character more explicit. Hence, the Six Arrows (*Altı Ok*), which were the fundamental principles of the RPP, constituted the core of Kemalism as an ideology. These Arrows were officially incorporated into the RPP's programme at the Third Party Congress in 1931, a decision which has been interpreted as a step towards making the undefined and vague nature of the RPP ideology more clear. For the first time in the Republic's history, theoretical propositions were officially declared to be part of the guiding programme of the regime, and at the Fourth Party Congress in 1935, the term Kemalism was used as an expression to denote the regime ideology. Some of these ideological propositions had naturally existed prior to the official declaration in 1931 and any other claim would be an ignorance of the prevailing continuities in Turkey's history.⁶ With the further incorporation of the Arrows into the Constitution in 1937, their fundamentality for the Kemalist regime was put beyond any dispute. With this step, the principles and the ideology of the regime had legally been made synonymous with the state and the nation; any doubt towards the ideology or the party meant questioning of the constitution which would mean (counter-) revolutionary action.

Whether the efforts to present a theoretical definition of Kemalism deserve the label of being an ideology, or whether they should simply be regarded as some fundamental points and principles indicating a general idea of the orientation of the Kemalist rule, has been a point of controversy. The presentation of the Six Arrows as the constitutive elements of Kemalism as an ideology has been opposed by an approach which chooses to

rejimini geçersiz kılmaktı." Feroz Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, translated by Fatmagül Berktaş (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985), p.222.

⁶ "1931'de açıklığa kavuşturulmuş olsa bile Kemalizm, bir önceki on yılda da, aslında 1919'da milli mücadelenin başlamasından itibaren duruma ve koşullara uyarlanmak suretiyle egemenliğini sürdürmekteydi." Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p.237.

focus on the pragmatic nature of Kemalism. In this latter view Kemalism was never intended to be an ideology in the doctrinaire sense of the term. The fact that very differing and even opposing political orientations, from religious conservatives to leftists, have made claims on the Kemalist ideology, and call themselves “the” true Kemalists, seems to be a case in point. Nevertheless, the pragmatic nature of Kemalism does not necessarily constitute an obstacle in approaching it as a political ideology.⁷

When studied in the historical context within which the discussions on Kemalism initially emerged, it becomes evident that it was presented in terms of and thus perceived of as an ideology by many prominent intellectuals and politicians, particularly in the early 1930s. Although the term “ideology” was not used extensively to denote Kemalism in sources of the period, it was clear however that the Third Party Congress was an event starting the efforts to giving the single-party regime a name. In sources of the early 1930s, comparisons are made with other regime ideologies to underline the uniqueness of Kemalism for Turkey. This is a point which gives credit to the view that the Six Arrows should be treated as more than simple principles and that Kemalism was meant, or at least perceived of, as an ideology in the period in which it came into existence.

Mahmut Esat Bozkurt’s work, *The Atatürk Revolution (Atatürk İhtilali)* is a collection of lectures given by Bozkurt at the Institute for Atatürk’s Principles and History of the Republican Renovation (*Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü*). This Institute was established in 1934 with the aim of expanding the ideology and the principles of the Kemalist Revolution to the youth undertaking higher education.

⁷ “Kemalizm (Atatürkçülük), Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi’nin programlarında ilan edildiği üzere, bir siyasi ideolojidir. Bütünlüğü ve sürekliliği olduğu, uzun ömürlü ve kalıcı olacağı, özel adı bulunduğu, partinin programında hep açıkça ifade ve iddia edilmiştir. Kemalizm’in bir ideoloji olmadığı yolundaki yorumlar ve savlar temelsizdir.” Taha Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Kemalist Tek-Parti ideolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u*, Cilt 3, 2nd printing (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995), p.21. “Modern anlamda, toplumsal-siyasal bir programı ifade etmesi ölçüsünde bir “ideoloji” olan Kemalizm, elbette, devletin yeni bir meşruluk formülü üzerinde, yani ulus ile devletin birliği esasında, yeniden kurmayı amaçlayan bir projedir.” Levent Köker, “Kimlik Krizi, Meşruluk Krizi, Kemalizm ve Sonrası” in *Toplum ve Bilim*, 71 (Winter 1996), p.157.

Bozkurt's work, which can be described as an extensive narration of the Kemalist Revolution, includes comparisons of the Kemalist Revolution with other revolutions. In the preface of the work, Cahit Tanyol writes that Bozkurt's lectures are of significant importance due to the fact that these essays were the "first attempt to systematize Kemalism," and that, furthermore, Bozkurt's views had been approved of by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In addition, Tanyol says, the Institute for Atatürk's Principles had been established because of Kemal Atatürk's feeling of "the need for such a doctrine," and that "Mahmut Esat Bozkurt was one of these doctrinaires" or ideologues who had been approved by Atatürk to carry out the mission of enhancing the knowledge about the Kemalist Revolution and its ideology.⁸

Lectures given by Recep Peker at Ankara and Istanbul Universities constitute another example of the emphasis on ideological mobilisation in the first half of the 1930s. In Peker's own words, "the aim of giving these lectures on the Revolution (*İnkılab*) to the youth undertaking higher education at the university, was to inculcate the main belief in the Turkish direction and place it in your (their) heads."⁹ Recep Peker uses the term *İnkılab* to express the Kemalist Revolution and underlines that this latter "is not solely a movement which only changes the political or the economic regime. It is a Revolution which simultaneously has had an influence on the profound spheres (*derinlikleri*) of national, political, economic, and cultural life."¹⁰

⁸ "Atatürk, kendi sağlığında böyle bir doktrin ihtiyacını duymuş ve bunun için bir inkılap enstitüsü kurdurmuştur. Bu enstitü kemalizmin bir doktrin haline getirilmesiyle görevliydi. İşte merhum Mahmut Esat Bozkurt bu kemalizm doktrincilerinden biridir." Cahit Tanyol in the Preface of Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali* (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar/Kaynak Yayınları, 1967/1995), pp.3-4.

⁹ "İşte üniversite ve yüksek tahsil gençleri için inkılab dersleriyle amac edinilen şey, türk ana inanış istikametini, sizlere aşılama, sizlerin kafalarınıza yerleştirmektir." Recep Peker, *İnkılap Dersleri Notları* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936), p.2.

¹⁰ "İnkılabları yapmak için çok kere zor kullanmak lazımdır...Türk inkılabı yalnız, yalnız siyasal veya ekonomik bir rejim değiştiren bir hareket değildir. O, ulusal, sosyal, siyasal, ekonomik ve kültürel yaşayışın bütün derinliklerinde aynı zamanda tesirler yapmış olan inkılabdır." Ibid., pp.8-9.

The establishment of the Institute for Atatürk's Principles constitutes one expression of the ideological concerns of the political elite in this period and was preceded by the establishment of the People's Houses in February 1932, which was a step borne out of a similar concern with the aim of carrying the Kemalist Revolution to the people. The ideological mobilisation in line with Kemalism, of the youth as well as the people in general, was thus an important subject for the Kemalist rule in the period under consideration.

Another ideological perception of Kemalism was illustrated in Tekin Alp's work, "Kemalism," which was published in 1936. Tekin Alp saw the Fourth RPP Congress, held in 1935, as the event which in a definite way gave the regime its name. In his view, Kemalism was not just "a term, but maybe even the ideology which was going to decide the destiny of the State and the Turkish nation."¹¹ The official endorsement of this work was expressed in a review article in *Ulus*.¹²

This short presentation should have illustrated the ideological concern prevalent among prominent figures of the Kemalist establishment in the period under discussion. The perception of Kemalism to be the regime ideology gained momentum in the early 1930s and reached its apogee in the mid-1930s with the official declaration at the Fourth Party Congress in 1935. The question of how to spread this ideology to the youth and to the general people was seen as vital for the Kemalist political leadership in order to be

¹¹ "Kemalizm, artık, sadece hakikati, yani temel inkılabları, Yüksek bir Önderin tahakkuk ettirdiği teceddüt hareketlerini ifade eden mübhem bir tabirden ibaret değil, belki, devletin ve Türk milletinin mukadderatına hakim olan ideoloji haline gelmiştir." Tekin Alp, *Kemalizm* (İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1936), p.19.

¹² "Kemalizmin artık bir doktrin karakterini iktisab etmiş olduğunu tebarüz ettiren müellif, sonra Kemalist prensiplerin, tecrübe ve realitelerin icabları karşısında tamamiyle kalıplaşmış olmadığını ve elastikiyetini muhafaza ettiğini söylerken nasıl tezada düşmemesini bilmişse, türk inkılabında da, geçirdiğimiz istihalehin strüktürüne dışardan sathi bir gözle bakan bazı yabancıların mesela devleşilik ile demokrasi prensiplerimiz arasında görmeleri mümkün olan zıdlıkların neden hakikatte asla varid olmadığını da o derece meharetle anlatıyor ve bunu yaparken, delillerini muayyen doktrinlerin kıyaslanmasından değil, türk inkılabının hususiyetlerinden ve kelimelere verdiği hususi tariflerden alıyor... 'Kemalizm' kitabı, her türk münevverinin okuması ve daima müracaat etmesi lazım gelen bir kıymettedir." (Bibliografya) "Kemalizm," *Ulus*, 24 August 1936, p.4.

able to create legitimacy for its rule. Acknowledging its pragmatic nature, it is an assumption of this study then that Kemalism was an ideology, it was meant to be an ideology and it was perceived to be an ideology, albeit a unique one for Turkey, by the leading political ideological figures of the period.

The authoritarian features of the Kemalist single-party rule, especially in the latter part of its existence, are usually not questioned. The closure of the Free Party in 1930 is often taken as the event signifying the beginning of the last and most authoritarian phase of the Kemalist rule. The official declaration of the single-party rule in 1931, the abolition of the Turkish Hearths Movement the same year and the establishment of the People's Houses instead in 1932, the closure of the *Kadro* in 1934 only two years after the publishing of the journal, the dissolution of the Turkish Women's Movement (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*) in 1935 are important incidents giving credit to the argument that the Kemalist regime in Turkey grew more authoritarian from the beginning of the 1930s. The decision at the Fourth Party Congress in 1935 to fully merge the party and the state was another step underlining the authoritarian character.¹³ One example of the implication of this merge in practice was that the provincial governors (*Vali*) became heads of the local RPP branches. In Tekin Alp's presentation, this decision meant that the government and party were made into a "single whole which would not accept any fragmentation (*tecezzi*).¹⁴"

¹³ In Feroz Ahmad's view, this decision appears as a "decisive step in the establishment of a party dictatorship in Turkey." In his own words, "1935 yılında, Almanya'daki Nazilerin örneğini izleyen CHF kongresi parti ile devleti birleştiren bir kararı kabul etti; bu karar, Türkiye'de bir parti diktatörlüğü kurmada atılmış nihai adım gibi gözükmektedir." Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p.229.

¹⁴ "Parti, devletin mütemmim bir cüzü haline gelmektedir. Bundan böyle Parti ve hükümet, tek ve tecezzi kabul etmez bir vücut olacaktır. Hükümet, Partiden alacağı direktifler ve Partinin prensipleri dairesinde yürüyecek ve Parti teşekkülleri, malik olduğu bütün vesaitle, hükümete, vazifesini muvaffakiyetle ifa hususunda yardımcı vazife edinecektir." Tekin Alp, *Kemalizm*, p.196 and further, "O tarihtenberi, Halk Partisi, devletle tamamen birleştirilmiş, Parti ve Devlet bir tek vücut haline gelmiştir. Devletin ve Partinin vazifeleri ve salâhiyetleri, birbirini itmam eder. Geminin dümeni Devletin, fakat puslası Partinin elindedir." Ibid., p.265.

The authoritarian nature of the Kemalist rule is even seen, at moments, as having leaned towards being totalitarian.¹⁵ Leaving aside the discussion over totalitarianism, it can cogently be claimed that the single-party rule in the 1930s, with its denial of any kind of diversity, difference, and opposition to the ruling RPP, the absolutist manner in which the political rule presented the only version of the truth, the indisputability of the ruling elite and in particular its leader, were all expressions of the authoritarian character of the Kemalist rule. In the era of ideological polarization and strife on the international stage, the Kemalist single-party regime in Turkey had, in other words, taken its position in the authoritarian camp.¹⁶

As an aspect of the authoritarian nature of the Kemalist rule, the aim of this work is to explore the images and perceptions of fascism prevailing among the mainstream Kemalist leadership; in other words, the question of how fascism, as executed in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, was perceived and described by the Kemalists in the “golden” days of authoritarian single-party rule in Turkey. This subject has at most been a point of reference in secondary sources and has yet not constituted the main focus of any study.¹⁷

In a similar vein, references are often made to the authoritarian character of the Kemalist

¹⁵ “Tek doğru olmak, yalnız kendine benzemek, başkasını adi ve zararlı bulmak, ebediyen geçerli olmak vb. iddiasındadır...Bu katı siyasal ideoloji, şefçi, paternalist, elitist ve vesayetçidir. Çoğulcu, hoşgörülü, uzlaşmacı değildir; tek-particidir, muhalefete izin vermez; özde çok-partililiğe karşıdır. Siyasal tartışmaya ve katılıma açık değildir. Otoriter, yer yer de totaliterdir. Para-militer, yer yer de doğrudan militaristtir. Bir kelimeyle: anti-demokratiktir. Kemalist ideoloji, toplum felsefesi, ekonomik görüşü, siyaset teorisi itibarile anti-liberal ve anti-sosyalisttir. Bunları aşan bir “üçüncü yol” olmak, açık iddiasıdır.” Parla, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültür*, pp.322-323.

¹⁶ “1930’lara gelindiğinde birçok Kemalistin gözünde liberalizmin ve demokrasinin eski itibarı kalmamış durumdaydı. Tek Partili rejimler, özellikle de İtalya’daki faşistler, çekici bir seçenek sunuyordu...faşizm hem milliyetçi, hem de yurtseverdi ve bu yüzden Ankara rejimine daha uygun görünüyordu. Kemalizm gibi, faşizm de, sınıf çatışmasının millete yalnızca zarar vereceğine ve bu yüzden önlenmesi gerektiğine inanıyordu. Faşizm İtalya’da, zor ve tehlikeli bir mücadeleden sonra son derece kritik bir dönemde zafer kazanmıştı ve dolayısıyla buhran içindeki Türkiye için bir örnek olabilirdi.” Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p.227.

¹⁷ The subject of the present study has been dealt with peripherally, for example in Feroz Ahmad’s work, where Ahmad declares that the Kemalists “were admirers of the discipline prevailing in the fascist youth organizations and of the understanding of opposition against the anarchy of the capitalist world.” Ahmad, *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*, p.228.

rule in secondary sources and some comparative notes are even presented on the similar points between Turkey and the authoritarian cases of Italy and Germany.¹⁸

To make the picture more complete, it seems essential to investigate the question of how Kemalist political-ideological figures approached and perceived the authoritarian “models” of the period. The present study aims to give an answer to this important question and in this way to contribute to the general controversy over the nature of the Kemalist single-party rule. It is hence another assumption of this work that in discussions over differences and similarities between different rules and political practices, the notion of culture, and perceptions and images, are equally important to take into consideration to create the basis for understanding the nature of the rule under discussion. Since political practices are in general based on ideological stance, to obtain a fuller understanding of the latter, instead of just focusing on the level of political practice, attention should therefore be given to ideological images and perceptions as well. These images might give actual clues as to why certain political practices are exercised. Herein lies both the importance and relevance, as well as the object, of this study.

It should be emphasized that the present work is not meant as anything like a regime comparison between Kemalist Turkey, Fascist Italy, and National Socialist Germany. Such an objective far exceeds the scope of this study. The more modest aim is to paint the picture of the way Italian Fascism and German National Socialism were perceived of in the long decade of the 1930s. With which words were the two regimes in concern described, what issues in relation with these rules gained the most attention, how

¹⁸ Although Erich J. Zürcher ends by concluding that “the differences between the two regimes are greater than the similarities,” he still states that “Fascist Italy, was certainly important to the Turkish leadership. The way in which Mussolini seemed to forge national unity and to energize Italian society impressed many in Turkey (as, indeed, it did many other European countries), and a number of new laws promulgated under the republic were straight copies of Italian legislation.” Erich J. Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, third edition (London: I. B. Tauris, 1997), p.194.

was the Kemalist image of these two fascist rules and their ideologies presented? These are the main questions which will be asked throughout this work.

One pre-condition should be stated at this moment: the fact that various and at times opposing political-ideological figures belonged to the Kemalist ruling establishment and were defined as Kemalists requires a clarification of the different factions existing within the Kemalist tradition. To give an example, whereas Falih Rıfkı Atay and Mahmut Esat Bozkurt can be said to have belonged to the “mainstream political-ideological” grouping in the Kemalist establishment, Ahmed Ağaoğlu (who had been a founding member of the Free Party in 1930) is generally referred to as representing the “liberal minority” in this ruling establishment. Furthermore, the *Kadro* movement can be described as an intellectual minority, strongly advocating “State-ism” and thus rejecting any form of liberal thought. Finally, Recep Peker and Peyami Safa can be seen as representative figures of the “radical-conservative” group within the Kemalist establishment.

The purpose of this brief “categorization” of the different groupings under the broad term Kemalism is to exemplify and stress the necessity of differentiating between them when discussing the ideology. Very different and at times contradicting views were held, all defining themselves as representatives of Kemalism. Again it should be underlined that the groupings presented above are not prone to any questioning; in fact, the borders drawn between these factions are flexible. To take an example, Burhan Asaf, who was one of the founding members of the journal *Kadro*, contributed in addition with articles to the daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, which deserves to be described as representing mainstream Kemalism. These overlaps exist in other cases as well and should serve as an illustration of the flexibility and pragmatism existing within Kemalist groupings and orientations.¹⁹

¹⁹ Cemil Koçak, for example, claims that Falih Rıfkı Atay was known for siding with Recep Peker and that he resigned from his post as editor of *Ulus* after Recep Peker met too much opposition in the RPP and finally

In this study, the main focus will be on the mainstream faction of the Kemalist establishment. The sources that will constitute the bulk of the discussion and analyses in this work will primarily be the official newspaper of the ruling RPP, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (named *Ulus* from November 1934 onwards), and the journal *Ülkü*, which was the central organ of the Ankara People's House and which can therefore be regarded as being representative of official political-ideological Kemalism.²⁰ The ideologically less rigid and theoretically vague character of *Ülkü* will lead to a more arbitrary and less systematic use of the journal. Finally, the journal *Kadro* will be examined. *Kadro* is included more due to its character of being an exception or minority within the Kemalist elite establishment than to its (lack of) being representative of mainstream Kemalism. The reason for discussing *Kadro* is due to the continuing importance of the journal in the controversy over Kemalism. An understanding of the latter seems to require a serious study of *Kadro* as well, since this movement can be seen as one of the first serious attempts to give a strict and coherent definition based on theoretical discussions of Kemalism as an ideology.

The sources mentioned above constitute the primary sources of this study. In the daily *Hakimiyet-i Milliye /Ulus*, the main attention will be given to the editorials as these can be taken as clear representations of the political-ideological stance of the newspaper. The importance of this daily lies in the fact that it was the official organ of the ruling

decided to resign from his position as Prime Minister in September 1947. Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih 1923-1950" in Sina Akşin (ed.) *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi*, Vol. 4, 5th printing (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997), p.148.

²⁰ The journal was first of all oriented towards the political and intellectual elite establishment and this was explicitly stated by Nusret Kemal in an issue: "ÜLKÜ okuyup yazma bilmiyen veya az bilenlerin faydalanacağı bir mecmua değil, memleket ve dünya meseleleri üzerinde kafası işliyen Türk münevverleri arasında bir fikir teşkilatlanması vücade getirmek istiyen, milli fikir ve kültür alanında önderlik edecekler için çıkan bir fikir ve kültür mecmuasıdır." Nusret Köymen, "Ülkü Üçüncü Yılına Girerken," *Ülkü*, 5, no. 25, March 1935), p.80.

RPP.²¹ The particular focus on editorials and article series will lead to a natural concentration around the main contributors, such as Falih Rıfki, who was the editor (*başmuharrir*) of the newspaper throughout the period under study. Further, Neşet Halil (Atay) and Zeki Mesut (Aslan) contributed with editorials that also make up an important part of the material which will be used in this study. Finally, attention is given to Burhan Asaf (Belge)'s contributions under one of the permanent columns titled "Half Political" (*Yarı Siyasi*) and A. Esmer's writings, published in the "Foreign Policy" (*Dış Politika*) section, a large part of which discuss the developments in Europe of the period.

When examining the articles concerning Italy and Germany, an attempt to identify what can be termed the "political factor" will be made. Articles concerning official state visits, greeting telegraphs between the political leaders of the countries, etc., will deliberately be left out because of their strictly official character. The "political factor" is deemed too strong in such articles, and they are therefore regarded as in-appropriate for being used as material for investigating the mainstream Kemalist leadership's (ideological) approach to and perception of fascist ideology. Writings of particular importance for this study are articles with an ideological character. To give an example, theoretical discussions of Fascism and National Socialism, or approaches to the political developments in Germany, as Adolf Hitler's seizure of power, are writings of utmost importance for this work. Acknowledging the inter-relatedness of politics and ideology, I still think it is possible, and further essential, that the ideological level is identified in order to make a separate discussion of ideological writings. It is assumed that it is

²¹ "Büyük Şef Hakimiyeti Milliye gazetesini, yeni Türk devleti ile birlikte kurdu. İlk günden bugüne kadar bu gazetede çalışmış olanların hepsi, ellerinde bulunan müessesenin şerefini, vazifesini ve mesuliyetini gözönünde tuttular, ve daima, Gazi'ye hizmet şuur ve ahlakından başka bir kaygıya kapılmadılar. Hakimiyeti Milliye, yeni Türk Devletinin hissi ve fikri tarihidir." Falih Rıfki, "15 Yıl," Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 10 January 1934 (editorial); Further, "Ulus gazetesi, onu kurmuş olanın büyük ülküsünün sancaklarından biridir. Bizim arkamız da bu ülkeye sarsılmaz inancımızdır. Ulus sancağının altında döğüşen eski yeni yüzlerce yazıcının, kendilerinde, ayrı ayrı, birer dev gücü duymaları yalnız bundandır." Falih Rıfki Atay, "Taktik," Ulus, 18 December 1934 (editorial).

possible to make such an identification and separation on a viable scale. The present work aims at understanding the ideological perception and image of fascism and is thus not intended as a study of the official political relations between the countries concerned.

In the case of overlap between different Kemalist factions, like the case of the *Kadro* writer Burhan Asaf's contributions to *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the article will be used according to the source in which it was published. Burhan Asaf's articles in the daily will thus be used as representing mainstream or official Kemalism, whereas his articles in the *Kadro* journal will be seen as ultimately representing the ideology of the movement.

The examination of a variety of primary sources belonging to a certain historical period makes it possible to expect that a sense of the ideas and values prevailing in this period will be gained. The core words and views dominant among the people writing in these sources will be identified in order to formulate an idea about the "atmosphere" of the period. In other words, the ideas and thoughts at the centre of the political-ideological discourse of the 1930s will be traced. The study cannot, however, be claimed to be a discourse analysis as such an objective was not considered in the beginning and the methodology used was primarily motivated by the main question put forth. The long duration of the period under study and the examination of several sources of this period can nevertheless be seen as important factors which will give a strong clue about the general, political-ideological discourse prevailing in these inter-war years.

As indicated above, (Italian) Fascism and (German) National Socialism are the two ideologies which are included under the general concept of fascism, as used in the title of the work. The reason for "only" including these two cases of fascist ideology is that they were the most dominant ones in Europe in the period under study. Admitting that various other authoritarian rules were also in existence in the Europe of the inter-war years, and underlining that common elements can be found in the totalitarian character of Soviet

Russia with the regimes of Germany and Italy, the necessity of making a limitation, was one reason for making a selection. The political-ideological regimes in Italy and Germany were given considerable attention by the political rule in Kemalist Turkey and this has been an argument for the choice of ~~including~~ these two countries. Until the mid-1930s Italy was given particular attention by the Kemalist rule and with the emergence of the Rome-Berlin Axis, officially declared in 1936, the political-ideological dominance of Italy and Germany in Europe seemed to have been put beyond any doubt.

In several of the sources from the period discussing the Kemalist Revolution, references are made to the Fascist and the Bolshevik Revolution and in another study, the approach to Italy and Russia could viably be investigated. The purpose of including Germany and Italy in this study, however, is further motivated by the important fact that the ideologies of these two regimes, stressing their points of differences, came to bear common characteristics, one of which was a hostility towards Bolshevism and Russia. Further than that, the “class-antagonistic terms” used by the Marxists and the “class-integrative perspective” of the fascists, in Carl J. Friedrich’s view, constitutes “perhaps the most important real difference between communism and fascism, seen as totalitarian movements.”²² The strengthening of political relations from the mid-1930s onwards meant that the two regimes were in the same ideological camp.

The period under study, the long decade of the 1930s, embraces the thirteen years from 1931 to 1943. 1931 is taken as the starting point based on the factors presented above: the convening of the Third Party Congress and the start of a serious ideological concern of the Kemalist rule. The ending point, 1943, is based mainly on the developments in the Second World War. Italy was invaded by the Allied powers in this year and the era

²² Carl J. Friedrich, “The Failure of a One-Party System: Hitler Germany,” in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York, London: Basic Books, 1970), p.248.

of Italian Fascism was almost put to an end, only to be “rescued” by the German invasion. Mussolini gave his resignation however in July 1943. Further, the defeat of the Germans at the battle in Stalingrad (summer 1942 – March 1943) signified the turning-point of the war, and gave a strong indication of its outcome.²³ These developments on the European scene were to direct the ideological stance of Turkey to such an extent that when the final victory of the Allied powers had become obvious, Turkey took a u-turn, and finally even managed to declare war on Germany, only two months before the war was officially over in May 1945. The first years of the Second World War marked the culmination of the ideological battle between the conflicting parts in the War. In Turkey, 1941-1942 are seen as the years in which a group in the Kemalist single-party leadership were most strongly advocating a pro-German, and pro-Nazi, attitude. These two factors are the main reason for including the first half of the Second World War period in this study.

The image of fascism as practiced in Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany, among the mainstream faction of the Kemalist political-ideological elite in Turkey as expressed in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Ülkü* and *Kadro*, in the period between 1931 and 1943, is thus in sum the substantial title of this study. The second chapter will be a theoretical presentation of the ideological roots of fascist ideology. This chapter is thought of – and claimed to be – no more than an introduction on the emergence of Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany, through a focus on the cultural and intellectual aspect of the subject. The aim is to make the reader familiar with some widely neglected aspects of fascist ideology. In this discussion, a minimum degree of conceptual clarification will be obtained as well. After this presentation based on secondary sources, the following chapter will be on the image of fascism among the mainstream faction of the Kemalist political-

²³ “After that the Russians in turn began the advance which only brought them into Berlin, Prague and Vienna by the end of the war. From Stalingrad on everyone knew that the defeat of Germany was only a question of time.” Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes*, p.40.

ideological establishment. The ideological perception of Fascism and National Socialism, and the approach presented to the political regimes of Italy and Germany, in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü*, will be discussed.

The fourth chapter, on the journal *Kadro*, will have a more separate or independent character, although it will certainly be of relevance both to grasp the approach to fascism as well as to make some initial comparative statements on the ideological propositions of the movement's version of Kemalism, and the defining features of fascist ideologies (the latter will be presented in Chapter Two). The importance of this journal in the controversy over Kemalism despite the fact that the movement and its version of Kemalism, did not gain much ground among the mainstream Kemalist group, is a factor giving reason for such an independent treatment. Finally, the concluding chapter will include a brief summary and discussion of the results of the study undertaken.

CHAPTER II

REVOLT AGAINST THE LIBERAL ORDER: THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF ITALIAN FASCISM AND GERMAN NATIONAL SOCIALISM

The object of this chapter is to highlight the intellectual background of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Through a theoretical discussion of some of the propositions and thoughts of intellectuals who laid the foundation for and hence contributed to the evolution of fascist ideology, besides putting light on an aspect of fascist ideology which is too often neglected, a minimum degree of conceptual clarity will be achieved. An understanding of the emergence of both Fascism and National Socialism requires an elaboration of the cultural context in the period before the First World War, in which the discontent of the intellectuals was a factor leading them to present critical ideas and search for alternatives to the established order. This widespread intellectual trend has been seen as the starting point of the emergence of fascism.²⁴ In this view, the ideological

²⁴ "What was emerging in the period before the First World War was a complex ideological synthesis of old and new, of left and right. Fascism was embryonic rather than fully formed, and its name was yet to be coined. The emerging core of fascist ideology was clear, nevertheless." Roger Eatwell, *Fascism: a History* (London: Vintage, 1996), p.11; "A phenomenon of civilization, fascism represents a rejection of the political culture prevailing at the beginning of the century. In the fascism of the interwar period, in Mussolini's regime as in all other western European Fascist movements, there was not a single major idea that had not gradually come to fruition in the quarter of a century preceding August 1914." Zeev Sternhell, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology, from Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*, translated by David Maisel (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.6; "The phenomena of mass man were accompanied by a feeling that the bourgeois age had culminated in conformity while those personal relationships upon which bourgeois

foundation of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism was laid years before their political leaders, Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, attained political power.²⁵ In the exploration of this intellectual heritage, a brief discussion of some of the defining characteristics and propositions of the two fascist ideologies under examination, will also be presented. The theoretical framework will especially be used in Chapter Four in the comparative discussion on the *Kadro* movement's ideological propositions with the fascist ideologies under consideration.

In the immense literature on fascism it is possible to find different interpretations of the phenomenon, and explanations on how or why it came into being. The academic dispute over how fascism could be a reality in the twentieth century continues and it should be emphasized that the present theoretical discussion is not an answer or contribution to this controversy in the theoretical field. The object is, as explained above, much more modest, that is to make an introductory presentation on fascist ideology and in particular its intellectual background, and in this way acquire a minimum degree of conceptual clarification for the study.

Acknowledging the importance of socio-economic and political conditions which are relevant in a discussion on the course of history, the cultural sphere is often not given the attention that it deserves. Although the socio-economic and political circumstances in a given historical context are highly influential in the course of events, factors of explanation

morality and security were built had dissolved into nothingness. The tone among many intellectuals and among the young was one of revolt, of a desire to break out of the fetters of a system which had led to such an impasse." Walter Lacquer and George L. Mosse (eds.), "International Fascism 1920-1945," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p.15; and Robert O. Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism," in *The Journal of Modern History*, 70 (March 1998), p.11.

²⁵ A view regarding the two ideologies as, in the last analysis, being the products of their political leaders states that "Despite Rosenbergs and Gentiles, Feders and Himmlers and Bottais, the two dictators were the sole unimpeachable creators and interpreters of the doctrines of their movements. The dictators were the doctrine, the word made flesh, and understanding the success of their ideologies requires both appreciation of the role of the charismatic leadership in hammering doctrine home, and analysis of the context in which they flourished." MacGregor Knox, *Common Destiny – Dictatorship, Foreign Policy and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.57.

cannot be reduced to these conditions. The importance of the cultural sphere and the influence of intellectuals and their philosophical and ideological thinking are assumed as equally essential, for this reason highlighting this aspect of fascism for the purpose of this thesis requires special attention.

Nevertheless, at the outset some of the social and political conditions prevalent prior to the foundation of the two fascist movements in Italy and Germany should be recalled. It should first of all be mentioned that the First World War had led to destruction and damage on a scale hitherto unseen, and that this war experience reinforced the disillusion and discontent prevailing among the general people, and here among the intellectuals. The consequences of the Great War strengthened the rejection of the belief in Enlightenment reason and the idea of progress that had already begun to form at the beginning of the twentieth century. Expressionist philosophical thinkers and artists made their entrance to the scene, making the destructive consequences of the war, the doubts towards rationality, and the disillusion felt among the people their core subjects. In addition, working class unrest and strikes were a regular phenomenon in various European countries in the first two decades of the century. The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia was an important example of the search for social transformation.

Among the variety of interpretations offered on fascism, the approach presenting the emergence of this phenomenon from a cultural perspective, which is the subject of this chapter, has interestingly seen the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia as an event which gave further impetus to the forming of fascism. According to Sternhell, the Russian Revolution was “a revolution that not only endangered the national interests, but also represented a model that the theoreticians of revolutionary syndicalism had always described as fundamentally erroneous,” and this event accelerated the making of the “national-socialist

synthesis.²⁶” During the 1919-20, a period characterized by crisis and convulsions in Italy, “syndicalism – arguing the need for a national solidarity to save Italian society from disintegration and from a chaotic, sterile Soviet-type revolution – showed itself finally to be less and less socialist and more and more nationalistic.²⁷” A similar view is stated in Ernst Nolte’s account, where the author says that “the scepticism Lenin felt toward the “workers’ aristocracy” of the West was soon confirmed. It turned out that the victory of Bolshevism in Russia did not prevent its defeat on all the social battlefields of Europe, if it did not in fact actually cause it.” The “Communist parties,” were after 1923 in Nolte’s words “operating everywhere more to the advantage of their enemies’ cause than to their own.²⁸” In Nolte’s approach then, fascism, which he saw as having given the name to the era of the inter-war period, “in the overall relationships of the age, fascism for its part will have to be regarded as being primarily a reaction.²⁹” After presenting his definition of fascism, Nolte says that “this definition implies that without Marxism there is no fascism.³⁰”

The emergence of authoritarian rule and fascism has in another approach been explained through the process of modernization. The absence of the Western form of feudalism in the history of a country has been seen as the decisive factor which led to the emergence of authoritarianism and fascism. Smooth transitions to modern democratic regimes, in contrast, have occurred through bourgeois revolutions in countries where the landed aristocracy has enjoyed a certain degree of independence under the feudal order.

²⁶ Sternhell, p.140.

²⁷ Ibid., p.178.

²⁸ Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism: Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, translated by Leila Vennewitz (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), p.5.

²⁹ Ibid., p.9.

³⁰ Nolte, p.21.

Britain and France are presented as the obvious examples to this bourgeois-democratic path towards modernization. Viewing Western feudalism as a prerequisite to the establishment of liberal democratic regimes, the English Civil War, the French Revolution and the American Civil War, are seen as “stages in the development of *the* bourgeois-democratic revolution.”³¹

In this view, countries which have been delayed in their achievement of national unification have, due to this backwardness, experienced “revolutions from above.” In other words, these authoritarian revolutions have occurred due to the lack of the bourgeois-democratic form of revolution, and this model constitutes an alternative path to modernization. The authoritarian developments in Germany (and Japan) are interpreted as such revolutions from above which emerged due to the latecomer status of both of these countries in terms of national unification.³² This approach, presented by Barrington-Moore Jr., is rejected in Blackbourn and Eley’s account, which argues that the era of fascism cannot be explained by reference to any nation’s peculiarity. Questioning the notion of a model form of bourgeois democratic revolution, as put forth by Barrington-Moore Jr., Eley says that “rather than asking why the German bourgeoisie failed to act in an approved liberal way, we should ask ourselves why we should ever expect it to be liberal in the first place.”³³ Instead, Eley argues that the absence of liberal democratic development in

³¹ Moore-Barrington, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy – Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*, seventh printing (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), p.427.

³² *Ibid.*, p.438.

³³ David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 90. A similar point of criticism concerning the dilemma in explaining the “modern” aspect of National Socialism is presented by Mark Roseman who says that, “But where they [two versions of modernization theory which approaches National Socialism differently] agree, namely in the view that the concepts ‘modernity’ and ‘modernisation’ represent clearly defined social phenomena which can be used to evaluate or explain National Socialism, we may be more sceptical...it is not clear that ‘modernisation’ and ‘modernity’ really exist, except as glosses on a number of disparate and only loosely interrelated phenomena. The very fact that an advanced society could descend to National Socialism has reinforced our suspicion that ‘modernity’ is simply an illusion.” Mark

Germany “had very specific origins in the balance of social and political forces produced by the particular forms of Germany’s capitalist development.”³⁴

The orthodox Marxist interpretation of fascism, widespread in the inter-war period, states that fascism cannot be understood solely in terms of socio-economic factors or explained with reference to the historic specificities of a country.³⁵ Acknowledging that such factors may have an important role, it is held that in the last analysis fascism is part of the imperialist stage of capitalism and represents “the transition, in the imperialist countries, towards the dominance of monopoly capitalism.”³⁶ As presented in Nicos Poulantzas’ account, in the “Comintern’s theoretical and political understanding of fascism,” fascism was only a passing stage, and in fact “a *positive* moment in the bad side of history, as on the side of the masses in the revolutionary process.”³⁷

Leon Trotsky, one of the leading figures in the Russian Bolshevik party and the Communist International at the time when Italian Fascism emerged, did not see any crucial difference between Fascism and Nazism. In his view, “both Mussolini and Hitler utilized the masses of the petty bourgeoisie to win power and then strangled these forces in the vice of the bourgeois state apparatus.”³⁸ Trotsky’s view of fascism differed from that of the mainstream Comintern theoreticians on many important points. He did not view fascism as

Roseman, “National Socialism and Modernisation” in Richard Bessel (ed.), *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Comparisons and Contrast*, 2nd printing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.198.

³⁴ Ibid., p.122.

³⁵ “The primary causes of fascism are not the factors often seen as its basic *sine qua non*, such as the particular economic crises Germany and Italy were caught in when fascism was establishing itself, the national peculiarities of the two countries, the consequences of the First World War, etc. These factors are important only in relation to the stage of imperialism, as elements of *one of the possible conjunctures of this stage*.” Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship* (London: Verso, 1979), p.17.

³⁶ Ibid., p.53.

³⁷ Ibid., p.49.

³⁸ Robert S. Wistrich, “Leon Trotsky’s Theory of Fascism,” in *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976), p.161.

“an inevitable stage in the development of capitalism, nor that it was determined by economic necessity in a dialectical sense.” Instead, he blamed the Communists for their inability to organize and win the proletariat and the middle classes to their own cause.³⁹ His Marxist approach, however, meant that Trotsky shared the view of Comintern theoreticians that “fascism ultimately expressed the interests of finance-capital and was inextricably linked to the crisis of monopoly capitalism.”⁴⁰ He explained Italian Fascism as being a

Spontaneous movement of large masses, with new leaders from the rank and file. It is a plebeian movement in origin, directed and financed by big capitalist powers. It issued forth from the petty bourgeoisie, the slum proletariat, and even to a certain extent from the proletarian masses.⁴¹

Recognizing the different views on fascism within the Marxist approach, it remained true in all “socialist interpretations” that fascism was seen as “a secondary phenomenon derived from one of the two fundamental social realities (the bourgeoisie as against the proletariat).”⁴²

After identifying these important approaches to fascist ideology and rule, the cultural side of the subject can now be taken up, putting forth some of the main ideas of the prominent intellectuals who were part of the so-called cultural revolt at the turn of the century and who prepared the ideological foundation for the fascist political movements of the 1920s and 1930s.

³⁹ Ibid., p.176.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.163.

⁴¹ Leon Trotsky, quoted in *ibid.*, p.161.

⁴² Nolte, p.17.

Georges Sorel, Revolutionary Syndicalism, and Futurism

One of the important intellectuals whose thoughts in general have been disregarded although they have been of utmost importance in the evolution of Italian Fascism, is Georges Sorel. Sorel was a French thinker and a well known figure in the “revolutionary syndicalist⁴³” current especially in Italy. The role of revolutionary syndicalism, which was part of the socialist movement at the turn of the century in general, and the thoughts of Georges Sorel in particular, needs to be underlined in the evolution of Italian Fascism.⁴⁴ Members of revolutionary syndicalism believed in the revolution which Marx had envisioned and which would ultimately terminate the liberal and capitalist order and establish a socialist one. Initially the proletariat was seen as the key actor or force in this revolutionary transformation. Regarding Marx’s propositions as incomplete, however, Sorel presented a “revision of Marxism,” in which he did not reject capitalism as Marx did. In Sorel’s view, this had been a mistake by Marx since the socialization of property, as anticipated in orthodox Marxism, would never lead to the high level of productivity which had been brought about by capitalism.⁴⁵ Therefore, the mechanisms of capitalism, such as the individual rights of property and market forces, should be maintained. While fully rejecting political liberalism and liberal values, Sorel in a striking way, thus advocated liberalism in the economic field.

⁴³ In Italy, the first group of revolutionary syndicalists emerged around Arturo Labriola in Milan in 1902. The weekly publication *Avanguardia Socialista* was founded by Labriola in December that year. “The group’s ideology was based on direct action by workers organized in syndicates, which at that period meant the idea of a general strike, perceived as both a mobilizing myth and a legitimate tool of combat.” Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.131.

⁴⁴ Domenico Settembrini, “Mussolini and the Legacy of Revolutionary Socialism,” *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976), pp.239-268.

⁴⁵ In Sternhell’s words, according to Sorel “nothing could replace the modernizing capacity of capitalism; no historical force could fashion the future or create a new society in place of capitalism. It is capitalism that

One of the most important ideological contributions of Sorel to both revolutionary syndicalism and, through this, to the evolution of Italian Fascism was his emphasis on the role of myths in appealing to the sentiments of the masses and urging them to action. "As long as there are no myths accepted by the masses," Sorel argued, "one may go on talking of revolts indefinitely, without ever provoking any revolutionary movement."⁴⁶ This proposition was, at the same time, a rejection of the belief in human reason, that was a constitutive element in the Enlightenment thought; it was to the sentiments of the masses (and not their reason) that the political leadership should appeal. The motivation and mobilization of the proletariat⁴⁷ would be achieved through such an appeal, and in Sorel's view, the idea of the general strike as advocated by revolutionary syndicalism should be regarded as a myth.⁴⁸

The initial belief among the revolutionary syndicalist thinkers that the proletariat would undertake the social revolution, which would be started off by a general strike, was to be abandoned towards the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. The proletariat proved to be pre-occupied with its own materialistic interest, and the idea that its "heroic" virtue made it "ready for every sacrifice" was only an idealistic picture that revolutionary syndicalists had been creating in their minds. Sorel "was sufficiently clear-sighted, however, to be aware of the other side of the picture: it was not the fate of

causes economic progress and can consequently lay the foundations of a future society." Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.44.

⁴⁶ Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (New York: The Free Press, MacMillan, 1972), p.49.

⁴⁷ "Here we come upon the great discovery Sorel made: the masses need myths in order to go forward. It is sentiments, images, and symbols that hurl individuals into action, not reasonings. It was likewise from Sorel in particular and the Sorelians in general that fascism borrowed something else: the idea that violence gave rise to the sublime. Fitted out in this way, revolutionary action could now overcome all the resistances of the material world." Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.28.

⁴⁸ "Men who are participating in a great social movement always picture their coming action as a battle in which their cause is certain to triumph. These constructions, knowledge of which is so important for historians, I propose to call myths...the syndicalist "general strike" and Marx's catastrophic revolution are such myths." Sorel, *Reflections*, p.42.

civilization that preoccupied the striking workers, but their living and working conditions. Their demands centered on the eight-hour working day and not the end of bourgeois culture.⁴⁹ This realization or disappointment was one factor which was to lead to the acceptance of the nation, instead of the proletariat, as the motive force to carry out the revolution.

Other than leading to a disappointment with the proletariat, the failure of general strikes to lead to revolution further led to a questioning of strike activity as the means through which revolution should be brought about. Sorel argued in his *Reflections on Violence* that violence should not be approached in negative terms, as it usually had been. This work of Sorel consisted of a collection of articles published as a book in 1908.⁵⁰ In fact, the “syndicalist general strike” was seen by Sorel as comprising “a very great number of analogies with the first conception of war.”⁵¹ In a similar vein, revolutionary syndicalist thinkers adopted the view that in war “one acquired the taste for risk, discipline, and hierarchy,” and that it was due to these values that “war was the school par excellence for those virtues which are necessary for greatness.”⁵² The view of violence as a creative force and the glorification of war was also emphasized in the artistic and literary movement, Futurism. In their search for alternatives to the present, the Futurists “tried to build a bridge, by means of political action, between the aesthetic concept of ‘modernism’ and the

⁴⁹ Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.53.

⁵⁰ Differentiating in terminology between “force” and “violence,” for Sorel, “*violence* should be employed only for acts of revolt.” Further, he stated that “the object of force is to impose a certain social order in which the minority governs, while violence tends to the destruction of that order.” Sorel, *Reflections*, p.171.

⁵¹ In this relation Sorel further says that “the proletariat organises itself for battle, separating itself distinctly from the other parts of the nation, and regarding itself as the great motive power of history, all other social considerations being subordinated to that of combat... This conception of the general strike manifests in the clearest manner its indifference to the material profits of conquest by affirming that it proposes to suppress the State.” Ibid., p.167.

⁵² Ibid., p.166. For Mussolini’s adoption of the view that war would be a solution, see in Settembrini, “Mussolini and the Legacy of Revolutionary Socialism,” pp. 252-253.

sociological concept of 'modernization,' or in other words, between myth and political reality.⁵³ Their aim was "not to renew but to express the new, to be a faithful channel of expression for their time." They "invented new forms of expression" which would be proper for the future.

The meeting ground of revolutionary syndicalism and Futurism thus first of all consisted of the revolt against the present order, which was seen as the product of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Further, war and violence were seen as means which would solve the problems in the present by bringing about social transformation and revolution. In addition, Sorel's account of myths as a way of stirring the sentiments of the masses and in this way making them take action was a point which fit well with Futurism's attribution of an important role for aesthetics.

Furthermore, pessimism was a core element in Sorel's thought.⁵⁴ Distinguishing between a warrior ethic and an intellectual ethic, the former was representative of "the heroic values of the ancient city" and "the intellectual for the decadence of the Enlightenment." The "cardinal sin" of the intellectuals was their optimism since "one cannot rouse the masses by singing the praises of order, harmony, and the rationality of existing things."⁵⁵ Ancient Greece had been powerful due to the prevalence of the "Homeric myths," because it was "brave and disciplined." The emergence of the intellectuals and the "moral and intellectual corruption" to which their rationalistic

⁵³ David Ohana, "The 'Anti-Intellectual' Intellectuals as Political Mythmakers," in Zeev Sternhell (ed.) *The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945* (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996), p.94.

⁵⁴ In the "Introduction" to *Reflections on Violence* entitled "Letter to Daniel Halevy," Sorel states that he is happy to know that the person in reference "despise(s) the deceptive hopes with which the weak solace themselves." Further he says that, "We can then talk pessimism freely to each other, and I am happy to have a correspondent who does not revolt against a doctrine without which nothing very great has been accomplished in this world." Sorel, p.30.

⁵⁵ Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, pp.69-70.

thoughts led only caused the weakening of Greek civilization.⁵⁶ This view reinforces Sorel's giving primacy to myths and sentiments and his rejection of materialism and rational thought. Further, taking the roots of intellectualism and rational thought as far back as Ancient Greece, for Sorel "Socrates, Descartes, Voltaire, Rousseau, the Jacobins, and the politicians of the end of the nineteenth century" all belonged to the same genre. It should be noted then, that anti-intellectualism, a distinguishing feature of the fascist ideologies under consideration, also lay at the heart of Sorel's thought.

Socrates and the Sophists destroyed Homeric morality; that of the modern world was undermined and then destroyed by the eighteenth century, Jacobinism, positivism, democracy, the money grubbers, and the intellectuals.⁵⁷

Sorel's links with the French nationalist movement influenced his ideological thinking, leading him to gradually advocate nationalism. The failure of the strikes to bring about the social revolution as mentioned above had led to disappointment with the proletariat as the undertaker of action. The nation emerged as a possible unity which could replace the proletariat, and this view also gained widespread acceptance in the revolutionary syndicalist current. Nationalism and the struggle of national states, motivated by their own national interests, were accepted at least as a preliminary stage. The expectation of social revolution was in this way postponed into the future. This significant change, which occurred in the period just before the outbreak of the First World War, was further illustrated by the Italian revolutionary syndicalist leaders' approval and even encouragement of Italian participation in the Great War. Theoretically, a glorified view of war had already gained ground among persons part of the revolutionary syndicalist current,

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.70.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.71.

and the outbreak of the Great War was therefore seen as the event which would bring about the transformation of the present order.

Sorel's links to the French nationalist movement *L'Action Francaise*⁵⁸ and its founder Charles Maurras, which intensified during 1909-1910, should be mentioned in this context. *L'Action Francaise* was the only movement which, at the outbreak of the War, seriously opposed the established order in France, and was, according to Sternhell, not only a natural ally, but also the only possible one for Sorel. *L'Action Francaise*'s "merciless criticism of the democratic political culture, its philosophical foundations, and its principles and practices" constituted the common ground that brought Sorel and the movement together. "Attracted by the craving for grandeur, power, and violence that he sensed among the young Maurrassians," Sorel was only welcoming the movement with which he shared the rejection of the "existing moral and political order."⁵⁹ The relationship between Sorel and *L'Action Francaise* also came to an expression in the review *L'indépendance*, which was published by Sorel from 1911 until 1913. The content of the review was very similar to that of the weekly journal *L'Action Francaise*, bearing the movement's name. The close ties between Maurras and Sorel made Sternhell go as far as to argue that Sorel "became a mere representative of the *Action francaise* and a tool of Maurras."⁶⁰ The anti-semitic orientation of the French nationalist movement also influenced Sorel, who maintained that "the French must defend their state, their customs, and their ideas against the Jewish invaders who want to dominate everything."⁶¹

⁵⁸ "The Action francaise proclaimed the absolute incompatibility of nationalism with the republican regime, seeking the total destruction of the latter, and made it its objective to gain control of the forces capable of defeating liberal and democratic ideas." Ibid., p.81.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p.83.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.85.

⁶¹ Ibid.

The outbreak of the First World War led to a dispute within the Italian Socialist Party over whether Italy should participate. Many revolutionary syndicalist leaders saw Italy's entrance into the War as the channel to undertake changes and achieve the social transformation so long envisioned. The majority within the Socialist Party opted for neutrality and the opposing faction decided to found the *Fascio rivoluzionario d'azione internazionalista* in October 1914. Benito Mussolini also supported interventionism. From his origins as a provincial Socialist leader he had advanced and proved himself as the undisputable leader of the revolutionary Left in Italy and was, in these years, the editor of *Avanti!*, the review of the Italian Socialist Party. Disagreeing with its neutral stance, he left the Socialist Party and joined the newly founded movement and began publishing *Il popolo d'Italia* in November 1914. The change in the ideological stance of this socialist leader was already being expressed prior to the outbreak of the War; terms such as the proletariat and the working class had gradually been replaced by concepts such as the (Italian) nation and people in Mussolini's articles in *Avanti!*.⁶²

The intellectuals of the revolutionary syndicalist current thus initially tried to create a third road between liberalism and orthodox Marxism. They regarded myths as essential in this creation as it was through these that the sentiments and feelings of the masses (or the proletariat) should be approached. The disappointment with the proletariat gradually led to the advocacy of the nation as the motive force to undertake the revolution. Nationalism and nations were accepted as a passing stage and as a consequence of the interaction between the different currents under consideration, nationalism and socialism were reconciled and found its expression in the "National-Socialist Synthesis."⁶³ The positive

⁶² "At the moment the war broke out, the ideological development of revolutionary syndicalism had reached the point of no return. The socialist-national synthesis had come to fruition in the years before August 1914, but it is clear that this terrible ordeal greatly accelerated its evolution." Ibid., p.140.

⁶³ "After the war, Mussolini and his associates – especially the revolutionary syndicalists and the futurists – were convinced that with national syndicalism they had found a "third way," the way so earnestly sought

an proof.” According to Sternhell, the synthesis between class and nation was sought made with the claim that a nation would be embracing all classes “whereas the class does not embrace the nation.” Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.220.

⁶⁴ “Sorel influenced the futurists, the nationalists and the syndicalists, the three groups which in 1919 founded the ‘fasci di combattimento’ in Italy...The futurists, like Sorel, began with the nihilistic dilemma; they emphasized activity and dynamism for their own sake, and directed the myth towards political experience. Their glorification of the myth of war was reflected not only in writing, but also in action.” Ohana, p.93.

⁶⁵ Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.90 and further, “It is, moreover, not fortuitous that revolutionary syndicalism, Mussolinianism (defined as “the political line of Mussolini as a socialist” in page 250) and nationalism in Italy – just those components whose fermentation was to produce the brother-enemies fascism and communism – became incorporated in the general idealistic-activistic revolt against the legacy of the Enlightenment represented (if in antiquated and pallid forms) by the positivist democratism pervading the culture of the official left.” Settembrini, p.247.

⁶⁶ Benito Mussolini quoted by Edward A. Shils in “Introduction to the American Edition” in Sorel, p.24. It should be noted however that Ernst Nolte claims that Mussolini’s “concept of violence,” has “mistakenly” been attributed to Sorel, and further that Mussolini’s “relations with Sorel were not nearly as close and cordial as was later claimed.” Nolte, p.153.

German Reactionary Modernism

Just as the thoughts of Georges Sorel had an influential say in the evolution of Italian Fascism, together with the group of intellectuals belonging to the Futurist current and in fact even the French nationalist movement, *L'Action Francaise*, the intellectual background of German National Socialism also has to be recognized. One author has gathered the group of intellectuals who contributed theoretically to the emergence of the Nazi ideology under "reactionary modernism."⁶⁷ Referring in particular to the thoughts of Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Oswald Spengler and Werner Sombart, Jeffrey Herf argues that the reactionary modernist current "prepared the ideological grounds for the success of the Nazis." This group of intellectuals saw it as a pre-condition that technology became part of German nationalism, if the state was to be strong.⁶⁸ Rejecting the longing for the past of the "Völkisch" thinkers of the nineteenth century, the reactionary modernists shared their preference for nationalism to realize the cultural-political revolution. While opposing the principles of the French Revolution, they "found in nationalism a third force 'beyond' capitalism and Marxism."⁶⁹

The idea of the "community of blood" (*Blutgemeinschaft*) as put forth by Friedrich Georg Jünger was adopted in reactionary modernism, since such a community did not need any "intellectual justification."⁷⁰ Intellectual abstraction was opposed and values such as

⁶⁷ Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism – Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*, seventh printing (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁶⁸ "In the country of romantic counterrevolution against the Enlightenment, they [reactionary modernists] succeeded in incorporating technology *into* the symbolism and language of *Kultur* – community, blood, will, self, form, productivity, and finally race – by taking it *out of* the realm of *Zivilisation* – reason, intellect, internationalism, materialism, and finance." Ibid., p.16.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp.11-12.

⁷⁰ Germany was identified with the "*Blutgemeinschaft*" while the "people, ideas and institutions" that were "despised – England, France, democracy, parliament, Weimar, economic and political liberalism, Marxian socialism, and often enough the Jews – to the *Geistgemeinschaft*" (community of mind). Ibid., p.28.

“intuition, the self, and immediacy” were celebrated instead. At the root of conservative revolutionary thought, which Herf seems to use as synonymous with reactionary modernism, the author identifies a variety of currents such as German “romanticism...social Darwinism...Wagnerian visions of apocalypse and transformation, Nietzsche’s amoral celebration of aesthetics, and a general antipathy to Enlightenment thought and morality.”⁷¹

To take up some of the more specific thoughts of the reactionary modernist intellectuals, Oswald Spengler’s look upon war as a creative force bringing about “all great things” was a view shared by Ernst Jünger, who made use of the experience in the trenches (*Fronterlebnis*) to present a perception of war “as an exciting and romantic contact with sudden danger, death, masculine energy, and exotic and elemental forces.”⁷² Rejecting that it was “a symptom of the Decline of the West,” Jünger claimed that war “presaged cultural renewal.”⁷³ For Spengler, this decline or the “cultural crisis” could be overcome by nationalist mobilization.⁷⁴ The present order, which was a result of the nineteenth century, was characterized by a “shift” from culture (*Kultur*) to civilisation (*Zivilisation*). This “stage” of civilisation was in Spengler’s view “characterized by the growth of big cities, the disunity of peoples and the rise of the rootless individual, the disappearance of tradition and religion, a decline in the birth rate, the triumph of the intellect, practicality and materialism...and lastly democracy.”⁷⁵ Looking at history in terms of cycles in which

⁷¹ Ibid., p.29.

⁷² Ibid., p.72.

⁷³ Ibid., p.73.

⁷⁴ “In France, power ‘belongs to no one,’ because of French instincts of anarchy and egalitarianism, whereas in England, power is dispersed among individuals on the competitive market. In Prussia, ‘power belongs to the whole. The individual serves this whole. The totality is sovereign.’ Socialist virtues are German virtues – loyalty, discipline, selfless denial, and sacrifice, placing the good of the national *Gemeinschaft* over that of the individual.” Ibid., p.51. [emphasis added]

⁷⁵ Michela Nacci, “The Present as Nightmare: Cultural Pessimism among European Intellectuals in the Period between the Two World Wars,” in Sternhell (ed.), *Intellectual Revolt*, p.112.

civilisations “are born, grow to maturity and die,” Spengler thus claimed that there were “numerous examples” in history “of the breakdown and extinction of a civilization.”⁷⁶

The opting for an authoritarian state was also prevalent in Spengler’s thought as a “dictatorship of organization” was to replace a “dictatorship of money.” Socialism “as a national political community” which eliminates all “class conflicts” would replace capitalism and the “self-seeking liberal individualism” which was seen as another expression of capitalism. The “urban merchant” was met by Spengler with hostility as it was seen as part of the “capitalist evil,” whereas the German peasantry in contrast was seen from an idealizing perspective.

The peasantry cultivating the German soil was ‘creative’ rather than exploitative. Its economic activity did not break the confines of religion and local custom. Urban economic activity, however, is a ‘mediating’ activity that amounts to a ‘refined parasitism [that is] completely unproductive and thus alien to the land...It is through the urban merchant, who lacks ‘an inner bond with the land’ that ‘goods turn into commodities...exchange becomes commerce’ and ‘money thinking’ replaces thinking in terms of goods and human needs. Hence it should come as no surprise that urban merchants do not often come from the ‘firmly self-contained life of the countryside,’ but rather are strangers such as the ‘Jews...Byzantians, Persians, Armenians in the Gothic West...It is this human type – the merchant and middleman – not social processes such as industrialization or capitalism that threatens to eliminate a particular German identity and particularity.’⁷⁷

This peasantist view of Spengler is worth noting as peasantism was an important aspect of National Socialist ideology.⁷⁸

The advocacy of a selected group of people, “a myth of a charismatic elite,” which had been “born out of the trenches” and the contempt for “the masses” constitute important

⁷⁶ Ibid., p.108.

⁷⁷ In Herf, p.59.

⁷⁸ “The peasant became the key figure in the ideology of the radical right as elaborated by the Nazis. The Nazis were fond of stressing the point that, for the peasant, land is more than a means with which to earn a living; it has all the sentimental overtones of *Heimat*, to which the peasant feels himself far more closely connected than the white collar worker with his office or the industrial worker with his shop.” Barrington-Moore Jr., p.450.

elements in the thought of Jünger. Jünger saw the *Fronterlebnis* as important and claimed that the experience of war “ought to take precedence over intellectualistic haggling over political programs and ideologies.”⁷⁹ Advocating the rule of a “charismatic elite,” Jünger did not neglect the importance of the masses as it was they who would “produce a decisive and unrestricted type of leader, one who will have far fewer restrictions on his actions than even the sovereign of the absolute monarchy did.”⁸⁰ This line of thought can certainly be seen as having contributed to pave the way for Hitler’s take-over of power. Nevertheless, Jünger’s elitism, according to Herf, prevented him from joining the Nazi Party because he did not approve of the fact that too many people, the masses, were advocating and holding his own ideas.⁸¹ Further, he did not approve of “Hitler’s adoption of party tactics.”⁸²

In addition, Jünger regarded technology and machines, together with the masses and the worker, as “the forces of our time” which could not be rejected and which were not in conflict with *Kultur*, as held by “a misguided romanticism.” Instead he regarded machines and technology as indispensable for the present culture, if it wanted to “expand or defend its living space (*Lebensraum*).” This orientation of Jünger has led Herf to label him a “technological determinist in the extreme.” The incorporation of technology into the realm of culture was an important common point for many of the reactionary modernist thinkers.⁸³

⁷⁹ Ibid., p.81.

⁸⁰ Further, “*Let us throw ourselves into this era, which possesses its hidden beauties and its characteristic and fascinating powers as every other age, and we will wholly become what we are. This is a better service to the nation than that offered by a romanticism of a distant place and a past time, one which is not equal to the tasks that stand before us.*” Jünger, quoted in Herf, pp.86-87.

⁸¹ “He was too much the elitist to accept an actual mass movement that received many of his own ideas, and too much implicated in those ideas ever to openly criticize the Hitler regime.” Ibid., p.107.

⁸² Ohana, p.102.

⁸³ “Jünger was a technological determinist in the extreme and believed that use of technology brings with it ‘a very particular style of life, which extends to the great and little things of life.’ Far from being a neutral force, technology was inherently in conflict with democracy. Authoritarian technology required an

Martin Heidegger differentiated himself on this point by not believing that modern technology could be reconciled with the “German soul.” A choice had to be made between the two. Heidegger initially supported the Nazi regime and even regarded the “National Socialist revolution” as the path which would bring about the “complete transformation of our German being (*Dasein*).” In his lectures and speeches, he stated that “the *Führer* himself and only the *Führer* is the contemporary and future of German reality and its law.”⁸⁴ Witnessing the strong incorporation of technology into National Socialist political practices, however, led Heidegger to view the Nazi regime as having “deviated from the path of true German being (*Dasein*).”⁸⁵ Partly as a consequence of this observation, he resigned from his post as rector of Freiburg University in 1934.

Carl Schmitt also contributed theoretically to the National Socialist ideology. In line with both Spengler and Jünger, Schmitt regarded technology as indispensable for “war and political domination.” Further, to establish the precedence of politics over economics, he “argued in favor of subordinating the economy to the demands of the nationalist, authoritarian state.”⁸⁶ Although he belonged to a different circle, he was influenced by Sorel’s ideas, seeing “the theory of myth” as “the most powerful symptom of the decline of the relative rationalism of parliamentary thought.”⁸⁷

As a final intellectual figure who has been seen as a theoretical architect in the foundation of the Nazi ideology, Werner Sombart needs to be mentioned. In terms of the

authoritarian state.” Herf, p.105. Further, in Herf’s account: “By linking technology to the romantic and irrationalist traditions, to will, struggle, *Gestalt*, soul, destiny, and blood” Spengler “helped to shift the technology from the realm of *Zivilisation* to that of *Kultur*.” Ibid., p.68.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p.111.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p.114.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.121.

⁸⁷ Schmitt quoted in Zeev Sternhell, “Modernity and Its Enemies: From the Revolt Against the Enlightenment to the Undermining of Democracy,” in Zeev Sternhell (ed.), *Intellectual Revolt*, p.23.

evolution of National Socialist ideology, Sombart's distinguishing importance lies in the fact that he transferred his "social and historical categories into racial archetypes."⁸⁸ This was most clearly illustrated in Sombart's dichotomous presentation of the "Jewish Geist" and "German technology." This Jewish spirit lay at the root of the illnesses prevailing in the present capitalist order, and Sombart was thus providing the theoretical basis for the anti-semitic claims of National Socialist ideology. According to Sombart, the transition from feudalism to capitalism "was basically a shift from a Christian *Gemeinschaft* to a Jewish *Gesellschaft*," and the Jews represented all that is "universal, rootless, international, and *abstract*."⁸⁹

In sum then, the group of intellectuals who were part of the reactionary modernist current were in particular occupied with how to reconcile modern technology with the rejection of the values of modernization. This concern or the view of modern technology as an inherent part of German ideology, was to become an important aspect of Nazi ideology.⁹⁰ The Nazi propaganda of the necessity of technology and the "paradoxical combination of irrationalism and technics" was an important part of the National Socialist ideology and practices, and can thus be seen as having made a contribution to reactionary modernist thought:

In learning to speak the language of *Kultur*, will, authenticity, and the soul, the reactionary modernists contributed to the victory of totalitarian ideology over traditional power politics. Nazi ideology was by no means an unambiguous rejection of modernity.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Ibid., p.130.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.137.

⁹⁰ "We live in an age that is both romantic and steellike, that has not lost its depth of feeling. On the contrary, it has discovered a new romanticism in the results of modern inventions and technology...National Socialism understood how to take the soulless framework of technology and fill it with the rhythm and hot impulses of our time." G ebbels quoted in Herf, p.196.

⁹¹ Ibid., p.235.

The hostility towards the Enlightenment and the values of the French Revolution constituted the general points making it credible to claim that reactionary modernists were part of the cultural revolt against the established order at the turn of the twentieth century and prepared the ideological ground for the National Socialist regime. In Jeffrey Herf's words:

Reactionary modernism was a specifically German response to a universal dilemma of societies facing the consequences of the industrial and French revolutions: How can national traditions be reconciled with modern culture, modern technology, and modern political and economic institutions?⁹²

The orientation towards German nationalism or even a national form of socialism constituted the common response of these thinkers in this dilemma brought about by modernisation. Rejecting liberalism and Marxism, the primacy given to culture (*Kultur*) and German nationality as opposed to civilisation (*Zivilisation*) were thus (the German form of) expressions in the cultural revolt against the established order, and the third road alternative offered.

The question of the reconciliation of technology with culture constituted a main subject discussed within the reactionary modernist tradition and the First World War intensified this debate. The War further made the intellectuals of the German Right opt for a nationalist ideology. Advocating the "conservative revolution" they "were vehement opponents of the Weimar Republic, identifying it with the lost war, Versailles, the inflation of 1923, the Jews, cosmopolitan mass culture, and political liberalism,⁹³" and the experience of war led the conservative revolutionaries to associate "irrationalism, protest against the Enlightenment, and a romantic cult of violence with a cult of technics...When the right-wing literati idealized the lost communities of the past, they looked back to the

⁹² Ibid., p.217.

⁹³ Ibid., p.21.

modern battlefield and the trenches, not the preindustrial landscape.⁹⁴ The justification of force and violence for the nationalist cause was thus an important feature of the conservative revolutionaries as these “right-wing intellectuals presented war, militarism, and nationalism as the breeding ground for a new, post-decadent, antibourgeois man.”⁹⁵

The rejection of the values brought about by modernization, understood as the ongoing process since the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, was then the reiterated subject creating the common ground for the different currents in the cultural revolt, which were questioning the belief in human reason, rationality, progress, and intellectualism. The search for an alternative order, in which nationalism was to be given an important role, was another common feature. As an illustration of how widespread the rejection of liberal notions, such as the ideal of equality (among the people) and the rule of the masses, in the inter-war period was, they were opposed even by intellectuals, who distanced themselves from fascist ideology. Seen as an “aristocratic liberal,” Ortega y Gasset for example saw the rule of the average, “mediocre” man as an expression of a “crisis” because the masses “by definition, neither should nor can direct their own personal existence, and still less rule society in general.”⁹⁶ The view of elites as necessary, either in the form of selected groups in revolutionary syndicates or in the form of strong political leaderships, consisting of a “minority” of individuals possessing qualities making them “superior” to the masses, as held by Gasset,⁹⁷ was thus widespread and shared by other intellectuals of the period.⁹⁸ According to Sternhell, this “was the cornerstone of the social

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.24.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.30.

⁹⁶ José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1957), p.11.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.13.

⁹⁸ “For Ortega explicitly, and for Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger implicitly, society is composed of mass and minority. They use different terms for this division, but the distinction is still within their works.

sciences at the turn of the century.⁹⁹” In a manner similar to Gasset, Martin Heidegger also offered a critical account of “averageness” which meant that “we are part of the ‘they,’ in which we avoid the possible through interpretations which are ready-made by the other.”¹⁰⁰ Further, “the modern mass for Heidegger is the human being which has understood itself as technological Being.” This mass man or “human being” (*Das Man*) is by Heidegger “conceived as all humanity subsumed under conformity to the techno-economic will to power,” and this “falling of the individual into the techno-economic *das Man* is, for Heidegger, the deepest crisis of modernism.”¹⁰¹”

The aim of mobilizing the masses and incorporate them into the political process was mainly motivated by the object of creating support and legitimacy for the rule of the elite. In accordance with the rejection of Enlightenment reason, sentiments and feelings were to be given precedence in order to provoke the masses to action. For this purpose, the importance of aesthetics and the role of myths were acknowledged. The cultural pessimism of the intellectuals at the turn of the century led to a search for alternative roads to the established order and they

paved the way for those who wished to flock toward strong, if unjust, regimes. Nostalgia for a leadership role the intellectuals felt they were losing contributed much to their pessimistic assessments of the present, and to their contempt for production, prosperity and the standardization wrought by mass civilization.¹⁰²

For all of them, this distinction is more than a quantitative one...There exist also a qualitative or normative relation between mass and minority.” Howard N. Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth – The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset* (New York: Peter Lang, 1996), pp.156-57.

⁹⁹ Sternhell, “Modernity and Its Enemies,” p.16.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.73.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.162.

¹⁰² Nacci, “The Present as Nightmare: Cultural Pessimism among European Intellectuals in the Period between the Two World Wars,” in Sternhell (ed.), *Intellectual Revolt* p.128. A similar view was held by Sternhell, who claimed that “by undermining the foundations of democracy and trying to destroy the spirit of the Enlightenment, the cultural revolt, though it did not identify itself with Fascism, undoubtedly paved the way for it.” Sternhell, “Modernity and Its Enemies,” p.29.

Characteristics of Fascist Ideology

In the presentation made above on the intellectual background of fascist ideology, some of the ideological propositions and defining characteristics of Fascism and National Socialism have already been identified. The following account on the distinguishing features of these two ideologies has the intention of extending the theoretical framework and making some of the important propositions and theoretical assumptions more explicit. The limitation of this presentation should be admitted from the beginning and the theoretical framework thus not be seen as claiming to be all-embracing as important aspects of fascist ideology, like the role of women, are not included in the discussion. In the following presentation, only elements of fascist ideology which are deemed the most relevant for this study, will be included.

Both Fascism and National Socialism can be characterized as movements of action. The disciplined education and organization of the youth, according to the fascist ideology, was given importance and youth organizations established for this purpose. The Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*) in Germany and the Free Leisure Organization (*Dopolavoro*), and as part of this the *Balilla* and the *Pishtar* groups in Italy, were founded with the aim of educating the youth according to fascist ideology and keeping them physically mobilised and prepared for war. The youth organizations were further expressions of the efforts of the fascist regimes to create the “new man.”¹⁰³ According to Michael Geyer, “the state

¹⁰³ “The ‘new man’ who would ultimately emerge from the PNF (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*, National Fascist Party) youth organizations would revel in a ‘virile warrior education,’ and display a ‘sense of virility, of power, of conquest’ – and a brutish xenophobia...He would know neither fear, nor guilt, nor pity, and would owe loyalty to the Duce, not king or Pope.” Benito Mussolini (partial quotation) reference in MacGregor Knox, *Common Destiny*, p.68.

appears in this scheme as a totalising machine that puts everyone into 'his' place according to what 'we' decree necessary in order to wage war.¹⁰⁴”

Opposition to political liberalism, seen as leading to fragmentation and anarchy in society, constitutes a crucial distinguishing feature of fascist ideology, the theoretical background and argumentation of which has already been given. Political liberalism was viewed as at odds with the achievement of national unity and further the root cause of the emergence of the masses onto the political scene. This notion of egalitarianism among the people was strictly opposed in fascist ideology and the French Revolution and the Enlightenment seen as the historical events which had led to values like individualism, rationalism and intellectualism. Related to this, materialism was seen as an “evil” created by liberalism and Marxism and the “rationalistic, individualistic, and utilitarian heritage of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”¹⁰⁵ Instead, sentiments, myths and aesthetics were advocated. It was by appealing to the masses’ sentiments, not their reason, by means of strong myths, for example, that they were to be mobilized and herein lies the direct link to the intellectual heritage of both Sorel, in terms of the myths, and the Futurist current, in terms of the importance of aesthetics. With the aim of “molding the masses,” fascism in Italy foresaw that “feeling not reason dominates among the masses, and that only an appeal to feeling, through myths that give a shape to their desires and incite them to action, will enable a political organization to utilize their energy to achieve its own aims.”¹⁰⁶ Rejecting the masses’ ability to govern themselves, and consequently seeing elites and leaders as necessary, both Italian Fascism and German Nazi ideology, still acknowledged the

¹⁰⁴ Michael Geyer, “Restorative Elites, German Society and the Nazi Pursuit of War” in Bessel (ed.), pp.151-52.

¹⁰⁵ Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, p.7.

¹⁰⁶ Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, translated by Keith Botsford (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1996), p.82.

essentiality of achieving the support and loyalty of the masses.¹⁰⁷ Concerning the total mobilisation of the people, the following words of the Minister of Propaganda in Nazi Germany, Joseph Göebbels, are worth noting:

We must register everyone and we must distribute everyone precisely in order to know – this one will go to the military, this one will go to the factory, this one will stay in the factory and this one will be called up and passes on his job to his wife.¹⁰⁸

The mobilisation of the masses was a distinguishing feature of both the fascist regimes under consideration. Together with the elitist character of the regimes,¹⁰⁹ the necessity of gaining the support of the masses for the legitimacy and power of the rule was realized as a main object in order to be able to sustain political power. Through disciplined ideological education and physical training, people were brought up to obey and support the principles of the ruling leadership. Participation in daily activities, and mass ceremonies celebrating the fascist regime made the people become an integral part of the ruling ideology and hence mobilized them in the cause of fascism.

Myths and cults around political leaders played an essential role in the evolution of the undisputable, even holy, position and status of both Mussolini and Hitler. According to Emilio Gentile, the cult around the Italian *Duce*, the different myths created around him, the Fascist celebrations, ceremonies and rituals held at different occasions, were all elements of Fascism as a secular religion which, according to Gentile, made claim to presenting the ideology of the fatherland and in this way tried to create legitimacy.

¹⁰⁷ “Thus, the main claims of Fascists in Italy and Nazis in Germany had always been that they were able to mobilise people beyond the boundaries of class, gender, and region.” Geyer, p.137.

¹⁰⁸ Göring quoted in Geyer, pp.151-152.

¹⁰⁹ “The Duce proposed to spawn the new man ‘in the laboratory:’ “to create...the class of warriors, who are always ready to die; the class of the inventors, who pursue the secrets of the mysteries [of nature]; the class of judges; the class of the great captains of industry; of the great governors. It is through this sort of methodical selection that one creates the great elites that in turn establish empires.” Benito Mussolini quoted in Knox, pp.67-68.

Everything signifying or part of this religion was presented as sacred and undisputable whereas everything in opposition was viewed as heretical.¹¹⁰ This approach gave the State a holy status. In Mussolini's words:

The State is all, and nothing human or spiritual exists, or has any value, without the State. In that sense, Fascism is totalitarian, and the Fascist State, as synthesis and unity underlying every value, interprets, develops, and potentializes people's lives...the State is an absolute, and compared to the State, all individuals and groups are relative.¹¹¹

The conception of the state as an absolute end, seeing it as having a spiritual character, was a distinguishing feature of particularly Italian Fascism, and although the place of the state in Nazi Germany without doubt also had a strong and indisputable position, it has been argued that in the National Socialist rule, the Party preceded the State.¹¹² Gentile's interpretation of Italian fascism as a modern secular religion is worth elaborating. According to this author, secular religions began emerging after the French Revolution with the autonomy of politics which eventually led to politics gaining a sacred character. In addition, it was not only in Fascist (or totalitarian as Bolshevism is included in the group) regimes that the state ideology took on a religious character but this phenomenon was present in liberal democracies as well. However, Gentile admits that it was with the developments in the first half of the twentieth century and with Fascism, National Socialism (and Bolshevism) that the "autonomy of political power" reached a climax and the sacralization of politics reached "its apogee."¹¹³ The absolutist character of

¹¹⁰ For the Fascist religion, the Revolution was to lead to "a reconsecration of the cult of the nation and a regeneration of the Italian people." Soon Fascism was oriented towards the masses, "determined to impose its religion on all Italians, and to deal with opponents unwilling to convert as reprobates, as the damned, as enemies who should be persecuted, punished, and exiled from the national community." Ibid., p.21.

¹¹¹ Benito Mussolini quoted in *ibid.*, p.60.

¹¹² "B. Göbels diyor ki, *Almanya'da parti devletten üstündür*," *Ulus*, 1 July, 1935, p.1.

¹¹³ "Movements such as Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism have affirmed themselves as *political* religions and intensified the aura of the sacred that always surrounds power. They have attributed to themselves those functions, proper to religions, of defining the meaning of life and the purpose of being." Ibid., p.158.

both Fascism and National Socialism, making claim on the absolute truth and the definition of the meaning of life, was a feature of these ideologies which needs to be emphasized. Leadership, authority and hierarchical organization were thus important elements in fascist ideology. Furthermore, in line with the national unity rhetoric and the subjection of society and individuals to the state, opposition of any kind was strictly rejected and eliminated. Obedience to and faith in the leader were the qualities that the people needed to possess, “for if all members of the *Volk* and nation shared a common myth, a common soul, then their participation in government need only be symbolized by the leader who has activated their shared human natures through his own activism, his heroic will.”¹¹⁴”

Although Fascist ideology presented a hostile attitude to the process of modernisation, seen as brought about by the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, Sorel’s advocacy of liberalism in the economic field, capitalism in other words, was also adopted in Italian Fascism. As stated by Mussolini “in economic affairs we are liberals.”¹¹⁵ Furthermore, the question of how to overcome the dilemma of incorporating modern technology with German nationality and culture (*Kultur*) and the question of how to reconcile it with the claim of rejecting modernity and modernisation were as recalled a subject discussed extensively by the reactionary modernist intellectuals. In German National Socialism this dilemma seems to have been overcome as the opting for technology and technological advance became a defining characteristic of the Nazi regime.

The imperialist orientation of both Fascism and National Socialism is a final distinguishing feature and common point which should be mentioned in this discussion. Germany’s revisionist claims in particular regarding the Versailles Treaty’s prohibition of the country to establish colonies was one aspect of this orientation. The economic

¹¹⁴ Lacquer and Mosse, p.20.

¹¹⁵ Mussolini quoted in Settembrini, p.261.

incentives in this point were strong as colonies would provide raw materials to Germany and function as markets for industrialized products. Colonial ambitions motivated by similar economic arguments were shared by the Fascist regime in Italy. Further, the myth of the greatness of the Roman Empire and the longing for Italy's regional dominance was an additional factor leading to the Fascist regime's imperialist orientation and the occupation of Ethiopia in 1935-36 and Italy's continuous declared ambitions in the Mediterranean were examples of this orientation.

Irredentism and the aim of racial unification with Germans outside of Germany (*Anschluss*) was an additional aspect of German imperialism and a distinguishing feature of National Socialist ideology. The race-based and aggressive nationalism of National Socialism was a point differentiating this ideology from Italian Fascism.¹¹⁶ It should be mentioned that the Fascist regime in Italy did not opt for anti-semitic policies until 1938. Although the Italian Fascists did advocate a strong form of Italian nationalism, this did not contain the racist elements that were the motivating characteristics in the German *Blut und Boden* racism. Peasantism was, finally, an important and distinguishing aspect of German Nazi nationalism. As mentioned earlier, an idealizing perception of the peasants and the countryside, viewing the peasant as the holder of the purest form of German raciality, was a distinguishing ideological feature in Nazi ideology.¹¹⁷

The rejection of modernity, opposition to liberalism, hostility towards the French Revolution, criticism of the rule of the masses, the search for elites, the abandonment of

¹¹⁶ Sternhell argues that it is necessary to differentiate between Fascism and Nazism, since in his view, despite the existence of common points the latter was "biological determinism;" in other words, "the basis of Nazism was racism in its most extreme sense...Racism was thus not a necessary condition for the existence of fascism; on the contrary, it was a factor in Fascist eclecticism." Sternhell, *Fascist Ideology*, pp.4-5.

¹¹⁷ "By 1930 the Nazis had a new agrarian programme and a specific organisation designed to court the peasants. Headed by Walther Darré, it eulogised the peasants as the guardians of morality and tradition, as islands of decency in a sea of urban corruption which was overwhelming the true Germany." Eatwell, *Fascism*, p.104.

the belief in human reason and progress, the essentiality of sentiments and instincts constitute in sum the main thoughts of the intellectuals in the cultural revolt which were adopted in fascist ideology. Furthermore, the search for a revolution, either a socialist or a national (socialist) one, which would lead to social transformation and terminate the existing order was another point creating the meeting ground for these intellectuals. The emergence of the Fascist movement in Italy and that of the Nazis in Germany, when seen in this cultural context, appeared as the realization of the revolution which had been envisioned for a long time and which would make reality the theoretical assumptions discussed and promises put forth by a variety of intellectual thinkers.

The strong intellectual heritage of both Fascism and National Socialism make it difficult to describe the "era of fascism," to use Nolte's words, in inter-war Europe as an accident or a deviation from the main historical development of (particularly the Western) world. Leaving aside the reluctance to accept fascism as an inherent part of the twentieth century, the question of whether this phenomenon which appeared ^{as} in opposition to modernity, was brought about by the process of modernisation itself, is worth examining. The extensiveness of the cultural revolt against the consequences of modernity at the turn of the century is a point giving credit to this argument. In addition, mass politics and mobilisation, which was a distinguishing feature of fascist ideology, was brought about by modernisation itself and in one author's view "fascism is inconceivable without democracy or what is sometimes more turgidly called the entrance of the masses onto the historical stage."¹¹⁸

In the period prior to the establishment of both the Fascist and the Nazi movements, intellectuals, philosophical thinkers and ideologues shared a pessimism felt towards modern culture and expressed their disillusionment with the established, liberal order. The

¹¹⁸ Barrington-Moore, Jr., p.447.

ideas they were advocating came to be the constitutive elements and theoretical propositions of Fascism and National Socialism and the cultural revolt of these intellectuals, in this sense, prepared the ideological foundation for the two political movements. The intellectual heritage of both Italian Fascism and German National Socialism made them sufficient as political ideologies, and, according to some authors, even comparable to liberalism and Marxism.¹¹⁹

The theoretical discussion above should have made the conceptual framework clear by now. The focus of this work is fascist ideology defined, for this study, as Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. The concept of totalitarianism is, as mentioned earlier, deliberately excluded. The defining features of fascist ideology, or more correctly, features seen as important in this work, have been presented in a summarizing way, with the purpose of obtaining a clear discussion in the subsequent chapters. After this theoretical presentation, the main question under investigation, the approach of the mainstream Kemalist elite towards Fascism and National Socialism, can now be taken up.

¹¹⁹ According to Eatwell "fascism was an ideology just like the others." Eatwell, p.3. For an approach challenging this view, see Paxton, pp.1-23.

CHAPTER III

THE IMAGE AND PERCEPTION OF FASCISM AMONG THE MAINSTREAM KEMALIST ELITE AS EXPRESSED IN *HAKİMİYET-İ MİLLİYE (ULUS)* AND *ÜLKÜ*

During the investigation of the question put forth in the Introduction, the authoritarian atmosphere of the period under study was clearly discernible in the two primary sources, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü*, on which the present analysis will be based. In the terminology used in these sources there is an obvious ideological categorisation which puts authoritarian and democratic rules up against each other.¹²⁰ An understanding of the two ideological camps as being in opposition to each other and the recognition that the authoritarian camp was the dominating one, was prevalent.¹²¹ This

¹²⁰ “Demokrasi, 1914 te bütün milletlerin ilah gibi tapındığı bir prensipti. 1914 tenberi ne geçti ki hemen her millette, en demokrat milletlerde bile yeni bir nizam aramağa kalkışanlar günden güne artıyor...İnsanlar, rahat etmek, hür olmak, zengin ve emniyette olmak için ideallere sarılırlar. Her zamanın şartlarına göre bu ideallere vücut verecek sistemler başka başkadır. Demokrasi, fırkalar anarşisi, sınıf kavgaları, liberal ve fertçi iktisadın doğurduğu büyük buhranlarla hastalandıktan sonra, genç nesiller yeni bir nizam idealini aramağa koyuldular. Bu yeni nizamın her tarafta tecrübeleri yapılmaktadır. Fakat şekli ne olacak? Kimbilir. Bunu belki çocuklarımız görecekler ve biz yalnız doğum acılarını çekeceğiz.” “Demokrasi Buhranı,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliyet*, 6 June 1931, p.4.

¹²¹ “Vahdet politikası kuvvet politikasıdır. Memleketler var ki tek fırka ile idare ediliyor. Sınıf mücadelelerine meydan verilmiyor, vatandaşlar arasındaki vahdet ve tesanüdü bozanlar ağır cezalara çarpılıyor. Bu idare sistemi bazılarının iddiası gibi diktatörlük değil, muayyen ve malum bir politikanın iycabıdır: Memleketin vahdetini her mülhaza ve prensipten üstün tutmak. Avrupa’nın bazı memleketlerinde doğan diktatör temayülleri demokrasiye karşı bir hareket olarak telakki etmek haklıdır. Muhakkak ki diktatörlüğün her şekli fenadır. Fakat bazı şerait altında vahdete ve dolayısıyla kuvvete götüren en kısa bir yol olduğu, için bile bu sisteme bağlanan medeni milletler de çıkıyor. En koyu düşmanları bile inkar edemez ki Mussolini’nin idaresi İtalya için büyük bir niyemet, bir şeref ve menfaat olmuştur.” Siirt Mebusu Mahmut, “Vahdet Politikası,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8 August, 1931, p.1 (editorial).

recognition was, for example, clearly expressed in Recep Peker's lectures at the Faculty of Law in December 1934, during one of which he stated that "we are in an era of the single-party, which is based on the nation, which carries the wishes of the nation (on its shoulders), and which defends the nation from any dangers." Trying to differentiate the Kemalist regime in Turkey by defining it as having a peculiar state system consisting of "the national state," Recep Peker further claimed that the Turkish state was "more progressive in every respect" than the authoritarian state systems, referring to the Fascist and the National Socialist regimes, which in his view had emerged as a reaction to the failure of the liberal state system. It is evident in this article that the Kemalist regime's opting for the path of single-party rule was regarded as a requirement of the era, and furthermore that this was an opposing position to the idea of liberal democracy.¹²²

A main concern prevailing in many of the articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* was to place the Kemalist regime in Turkey, and its ideology Kemalism, within the ideological strife going on in contemporary Europe.¹²³ As part of this consideration, comparisons of

¹²² "Liberal devlet tipinin sınıf ve zümre menfaatleri güden dağınık fırkaları yerine ulusa dayanan, ulus isteklerini omuzlayan, ulusa gelecek tehlikeleri göğüsliyen tek fırkalar devrindeyiz...Liberal devletin zaman ve hadiselerin icab ve zaruretlerine göre istihalesi neticesinde, parlamentarizmin karışıklığı ve iktisadi liberalizmin istismarcılığı yüzünden, sınıf kavgalarının da baş göstermesiyle ya sınıf diktatörlüğü devleti, yahut da reaksiyonları olan otorite devletleri (faşist ve nasyonal sosyalist devletler) meydana çıkarken bir taraftan da, Türkiyede bunlardan her bakımdan, ileri ve yeni yaşayışa, kendi hayat şartlarına tamamiyle uygun bir başka devlet şekli: Ulusal devlet şekli doğdu...Liberal devlet tipinin dağınık fırkaları yerine ulusun bütün isteklerine omuz vermiş, bütün tehlikelerini göğüslemiş tek fırkalı idarelerin muvaffak olacağı devirdeyiz. En uygun devlet şekli, nasıl monarşi değilse ötekiler de değildir, tek fırka şeklidir ki: Ayakta duracaktır, muzaffer olmuştur ve muzaffer olacaktır." "Hukuk Fakültesinde inkılab dersleri, Bay R. Peker dün siyasal fırkaların doğuşunu anlattı." *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 31 December 1934, pp.1-2.

¹²³ "İtalya'da herkes Duçe'yi konuşuyor...Kemalist Türkiye'de herkes onu kuran gibi, Gazi gibi, Gazi'nin diliyle konuşacak...Türk münevverinin önündeki sararmış kitabı bir kenara atarak Kemalizmin yukarıda saymış olduğumuz ana direklerinden Türk İnkılabının kendi öz 'ideolojisini' yapmasıdır...Moskova-Ankara-Roma. Bunlar gittikçe camitleşen cihanın yegane fikir canlılığı gösteren noktalarıdır. Moskova ve Roma'nın münevverleri vaziyelerini yapmışlardır. Onun için bolşevikliğin ne, ve faşistliğin ne olduğunu biliyoruz. Türk münevverleri! Vaziyfenin başına gelmekliğin artık ihtiyari değildir: Kemalizmin de ne olduğunu bütün cihanın bilmesi, senin için, artık mecburidir. Ya vaziyfeni gör. Yahut ondan istiyfa et." Burhan Asaf (Yarı siyasi), "Moskova, Ankara, Roma" *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12 May 1932, p.2. For further references, see Falih Rıfkı, "İnkılabımızın Kökleri," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5 October 1933, (editorial); Burhan Asaf, "İstedığımız Hürriyet," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 September 1931, p.2; "Türk inkılabının Kendine Göreliliği," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5 August 1933, p.3; and Şevket Süreyya, "İnkılabın İdeolojisi, Sosyal Nasyonalizm ve Cemiyetçi Milliyetçilik," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22 November 1931.

Kemalism to other ideologies and in particular to Fascism and Bolshevism, were made. As underlined in the Introduction of this work, Kemalism was perceived of as an ideology by the political-ideological leadership of the era in Turkey.

An important point stressed throughout the period under examination was the peculiarity and uniqueness of the Kemalist regime and Kemalism for Turkey. This claim was defended by reference to historical events such as the period of National Struggle (*Milli Mücadele*) or the Independence Movement (*Kurtuluş Hareketi*) in the aftermath of the First World War, that had led to the achievement of independence for Turkey. The present regime was seen as a continuity of these events, which were regarded as the fundamentals of the Turkish regime and peculiar to Turkey's history. As part of this argument, any claim of resemblance between the Kemalist rule and other contemporary regimes was strictly rejected.

From the very beginning, it should be pointed out that in the primary sources under study, Italy and Russia were given particular attention, while Germany, when compared to these two regimes, a more marginal one. It seems that the Kemalist leadership in Turkey saw more common points with these countries and viewed them as examples to be learned from. Falih Rıfkı's work *Ankara-Moskova-Roma*, was published as a series of articles under the same heading in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (August 1932), and dealt with the common elements between the ongoing Revolutions in the three countries which were bound by historical friendship and had the same objective.¹²⁴ Nevertheless, interest in Nazi Germany

¹²⁴ "Bolşevizm propagandasına sebep olabilir, diye dünyanın altıda biri olan Rusya'yı, Faşist propagandasına yol açar, diye Akdeniz'in ikinci büyük devleti olan İtalya'yı görmemezlikten ve tanımamazlıktan gelmek bizim şeflerimizin mizaçlarına, karakterlerine, kafa ve ruhlarına yabancılaşmak demektir...Türk yığınlarının terbiyesi için Moskova'nın yığın terbiyesi metotları, yepyeni kafa ve ruhta bir cumhuriyet genci yetiştirmek için her iki inkılabın çocuk ve genç yetiştiren metotları adım adım tetkik edeceğimiz şeylerdir...Kemalizm durulmuş, kitaplaşmış, idareleşmiş bir dava değildir. Yürüyen, kımıldıyan, arıyan, canlı ve oynak bir ihtilaldir. Bu ihtilalin gözü her tarafa açık olmak lazım gelir. Yalnız bir esasta taassup düderiz (güderiz); Kemalizm'in Türk ve Türkiyeci, müstakil ve istiklalci karakterine candan bağlı

was intensified, and the number of writings about this country increased with the Nazi seizure of power in 1933. With the outbreak of the Second World War, articles related to Germany increased even further, although the majority of these were concerned with the developments in the war. Turkey's policy during the war years can be described as one of balance with the sole objective of keeping Turkey out of the conflagration. The Kemalist political leadership's efforts to maintain and keep the political relations intact with both of the conflicting parts in the war led to diplomatic and political relations with all the implicated countries, in a subtle manner. As a consequence of this position, the political considerations and calculations were strongly present throughout these war years which also came to be reflected in the articles of the official newspaper.

The Perception of Italian Fascism and Fascist Italy

In line with the ideological search of the official Kemalist elite and the efforts of defining the ideology of the regime, in the early 1930s the Kemalists showed a particular interest in Italian Fascist ideology. A large number of articles in the newspaper under examination, especially during 1931-1934, were concerned with Italian Fascism. Theoretical definitions of Fascism, descriptions of its historical background, explanations of how the Fascists came to power, their accomplishments, Mussolini's strong leadership, his personal qualities, detailed information about the Fascist *Dopulavoro* organization constitute many of the headings of these articles, a large part of which were published in series under different titles. To mention an example, "Fascism and Its State System"¹²⁵ is

kalmak; *Bu küçük kitabımla Yeni Rusya ve Faşist Roma kitaplarını tamamlamış oluyorum.*" Falih Rıfkı, "Moskova Roma," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1 August 1932, p.1 (editorial).

¹²⁵ The article series "Faşizm ve Onun Devlet Sistemi," in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, lasts from mid-August 1932 till the end of November 1932. The tenth year anniversary of the Fascists' seizure of power in Italy (with the March on Rome in 28 October 1922) is greeted in articles and the profound attention given on Italy and Fascism might be due to the celebration of the fascist rule in "friend Italy" (*Dost İtalya*), see especially Falih Rıfkı, "İtalya'da," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28 October 1932, (editorial), p.1.

one such heading. A look at these articles silences all doubt concerning whether Fascism attracted the attention of the official Kemalist elite in this period or not. In general, this interest was expressed in positive terms.¹²⁶ Although a large part of the articles were descriptive and explanatory, in the passages where the authors expressed their subjective views, one finds no critical approach to or discussion of the Fascist ideology. In general, it is the accomplishments, not any possible negative aspects, of Fascism that are discussed. The particular interest in Italian Fascism in the first half of the 1930s, which was a conclusion reached after the undertaking of research for this study, is also held by Ahmet Makal, who with specific reference to the article series mentioned above, states that these “examples are interesting in terms of showing the ideological (*düşünsel*) setting of the period and the orientation towards the totalitarian European countries, and in particular Italy.”¹²⁷

In addition to this interest, there was at the same time an emphasis on Fascism as a peculiarly Italian phenomenon. It was presented as a successful ideology, with its establishment of national unity and securing of discipline and order in Italy, but it was not an ideology which could be followed by others. Just as Kemalism was unique to Turkey, Fascism was peculiar to Italy. The imperialist orientation of Fascism, as discussed in Chapter Two, was one of the concrete features which the Kemalists put forth as a differentiating point between the Italian ideology and Kemalism. Although this was only expressed arbitrarily in a few articles, it is an important point to keep in mind since this

¹²⁶ “faşistlerin başardıkları işler, meydana getirdikleri eserler çok beğenilmeğe layıktır. Bu büyük işin mükemmel olmasının asıl sebebini vatan sevgisi ve milli duyguların birliğinde aramak lazımdır...Faşizm idaresinin memurları ve muallimleri maaş almazlar. Yaptıkları işi bir vatan borcu bilirler. Büyüğünden küçüğüne kadar orada herkes hasbi çalışır.” Selim Sırrı, “İtalya’da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı,” *Ülkü*, 1, no. 3 (March 1933), p.241.

¹²⁷ “Bu örnekler, dönemin düşünsel ortamını ve totaliter nitelikli Avrupa ülkelerine, özellikle İtalya’ya yönelişi gösterme açısından ilginçtir.” Ahmet Makal, *Türkiye’de tek partili dönemde çalışma ilişkileri: 1920-1946* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), p.175.

imperialism made the Kemalists distance themselves from Italian Fascism. The Kemalist regime in contrast, it was argued, was a national project with no extra-territorial aims. Second, together with defining Fascism as a revolution made on behalf of all of the Italian people; it was at the same time claimed that it was an ideology which ultimately served the interests of the industrial class. The Kemalist movement and the RPP embraced the people as a classless whole. Populism (*Halkçılık*), one of the Six Principles of Kemalism, was strongly advocated and was part of the national unity (*milli birlik*) rhetoric of the period.¹²⁸

These are the fundamental points which made the Kemalists to claim that their regime and ideology were unique and different from any other regime or ideology. Any potential accusation of the Kemalist ideology's similarity to Fascism,¹²⁹ for example, was pre-empted with this peculiarity argument. The distancing did not, however, prevent the Kemalists from stating that there were many things which could be learned and taken as an example from Italy.¹³⁰ The Italian case was peculiar just as the Turkish one was, but just as examples could be taken from Bolshevik Russia, Fascism's peculiarity to Italy was not an obstacle for the Kemalists to look at Benito Mussolini's ideology and learn from his state system.

¹²⁸ For a brief discussion of Populism and the Kemalist populist rhetoric, see Makal, pp.50-54.

¹²⁹ Falih Rıfki rejects such an accusation directed in *Son Posta*; "Bilir misiniz, ben ne diyormuşum: 'Asrın çürümüş mefhumlarını bırakalım; realite ile karşılaşalım ve bir faşist idare tesis edelim.'... 'Yüzde yüz demokrasi, yüzde yüz terbiye demektir. Yalnız herkesin okuyup yazma bilmesi değil, münakaşa olunan fikirler için hüküm verecek kadar seviye sahibi olması lazımdır...Gitmek istediğimiz hedefin münakaşasını bir tarafa bırakalım, çünkü bu hedef nede olsa, ancak yüksek bir seviye, düşünüş, duyuş, ve anlayış seviyesi olmadıkça varılabilmesi imkansızdır; her şeyin başında ve her şeyden evel, umumi bir terbiye seferberliği, ve mantiki bir organizasyon, garplı ve genç türkleri saflandırmak lazımdır.'" Falih Rıfki, "Bir Cevap," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16 June 1931, p.2. This discussion resembles the controversy that was going to emerge only a year later, between Ahmed Ağaoğlu and Yakup Kadri from the *Kadro* movement. Ahmed Ağaoğlu accused *Kadro* of presenting a version of Kemalism that leaned to Fascism – at least in methods – and the *Kadro* argued against any such notion.

¹³⁰ Falih Rıfki, "Moskova-Roma," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1 August 1932 (editorial), p.1.

The Dopulavoro Organisation

As mentioned in Chapter Two, one of the main constitutive elements of fascist ideology was the organization and disciplined education of the youth. In Italy, the National After-Work Leisure Organization (*Dopulavoro*), in which the people and the youth were supposed to spend their free hours in “useful” and effective ways, was founded in 1926. The Italian youth were educated according to Fascist ideology and learned about the Fascist Revolution in this organization.¹³¹ Further, the Balilla National Organization was a youth organization boys entered at the age of eight. They were called *Balillas* up until they were fourteen; from fourteen to eighteen, they were called *Pishtars* and in these years they were prepared for military service. With the establishment of the Young Struggle Fascios in 1930, the *Pishtars* became part of this Fascio group and underwent a strong ideological education prior to their military service.¹³² This Fascist organization thus had the function of educating the youth according to Fascist ideology, and making it part of the Fascist movement.¹³³

The girls were brought up and educated to be good Italian women who were to fulfill their main task in life as mothers. The role of the Fascist woman was not to become “a parliamentarian, a civil servant, in other words to become a man, but to become a

¹³¹ “B.M.T. (*Balilla Milli Tesisi*) yarının faşistleri, yarının idarecileri olacak olan gençlerde şuurun ve düşünüşün şekillenmesi ile de alakadardır. Onun bu vazifesi, kültür sahasında yardım vazifesidir. Kanun, organizasyonun, bu meramına ermesi için, ona, kendi bağrında mektepler, etüt ve propaganda merkezleri açmasına müsaade etmiştir. Buralarda, gençlere, faşist doktrinler öğretilmektedir. Böylece, İtalyan genci yarın hayata girince, türlü politika cereyanları, sosyal davanın türlü hal yolları arasında bunalmamış, kendi politika akidesi mevcut olgun bir adam halinde meydana çıkmış olacaktır.” “İtalyada Gençlik Organizasyonları, B.M.T. : Sosyal Yardım,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 July 1933.

¹³² “İtalya’da Gençlik Organizasyonları,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19 June 1933, p.4.

¹³³ “B.M.T. nin tatbik ettiği fizik terbiyeden beklenen başlıca fayda, Balillalarla *Pishtarların* askerliğe hazırlanmalarıdır. Bu fizik terbiyenin teknik-disiplinci nizamnamesinde, gençlerin disiplin duygularının kökleştirilmesi ve onlara askerlik terbiyesinin verilmesi temel maddeyi teşkil eder.” “İtalyada Gençlik Organizasyonları, B.M.T. Askerliğe Hazırlık,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 July 1933, p.4.

mother.¹³⁴” With this role, the Fascist women were given the duty of “bringing up the future generations to become valuable (*değerli*), powerful and fully Italian.¹³⁵” Since the Italian youth entered the youth organization as children, they were, so to speak, “born” into the Fascist Party. At every stage of their life, they were inside of the Party.¹³⁶ Italian Fascism was educating a “new generation” with “various and perfect” means of this Organization that made the Fascist “regime’s influence and penetration” (*tesir ve nüfuz*) on the youth indisputable.¹³⁷

Life is action; and fascism itself is the action. The hard state of action in its (Fascism’s) doctrines is due to this reality, its claim of always representing what is new in everything, is again due to this reality. And it is because of this that Fascism, which emerges in this way, which expands and takes root in this way, and finds itself in this way, is not giving value to the old and the aged, but to the young and the child. Thus, the ones who are at head of the machines which are operating national existence in Italy, are the youth. Since Fascism emerged as a movement of the youth, the subject about the youth’s education, came to be expressed as the main point under consideration for Fascism.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ “İtalya’da Gençlik Organizasyonları, Küçük Kızlarla Genç Kızlar,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 July 1933.

¹³⁵ “İtalya’da Gençlik Organizasyonları, Küçük Kızlarla Genç Kızlar,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 July 1933 and further, “faşizm, kadını, hayatta ve tabiatte erkeğin rolünü tamalıyan (tamamlıyan), fakat onun yerine geçmesi hiç bir zaman caiz olmıyan bir eleman telakki etmektedir. Faşist kadın, olgun ve düzgün yapılı, estetik duyguları açık, vatan sevgisi çocuk sevgisi gibi enstenkt halini almış, ev ve koca sevgisinin iyi çocuk, güzel çocuk yetiştirebilmenin biricik amili olduğuna inanmış bir kadın olmak gerektir.” “İtalya’da Gençlik Organizasyonları, Genç Faşist Kızlar,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 29 July 1933, p.3.

¹³⁶ “Şu tafsiyat isbat eder ki yeni yetişen İtalyan gençliği faşist fırkasına sonradan girmiyor; belki doğuşundan itibaren onu sinesinde yetiştirerek, bütün sevgisini ona vererek ve büyüdükten sonra da, hayatının her safhasında, yaşının her derecesinde, her zaman onunla beraber yaşayarak onun içinde yetişiyor.” “İtalya Faşist Gençliği Nasıl Yetiştiriyor,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 July 1931, p.5 and further, “Halk çocuğunun anasının karnından çıkar çıkmaz yattığı beşik, fırka kucığıdır. Bir yeni cemiyet başka türlü yuğrulamaz. Roma’nın yeni mahallelerinde liberalizm ve demokrasiye aykırı bir çok şeyler görse de 1921 anarşisinden, fakirliğinden, gevezeliğinden, başıboşluğundan hiç bir eser görmedim. Demokrasinin arkasından Ostiya’nın sivrisineği, Roma kırının batağı, İtalyan ahlakının inzibatsızlığı, İtalyan sokağının pisliği kalktı ve İtalyan milliyetperverliğinin eğilmiş başı yukarı kalktı.” Fali Rıfkı, *Moskova Roma, Seyahat* (Ankara: Muallim Ahmet Halil Kitabevi, 1932), pp.108-09.

¹³⁷ “Bütün aletler bol ve mükemmeldir. Faşist eserleri İtalyanın fakirliği ile bir tezat teşkil eden kuvvetli bir lüks ile müzeyyendir... Muhakkak olan ve bizi burada hulasatan alakadar eden bir şey varsa o da şudur ki hiç olmazsa şimdiki halde bütün bu muazzam makine azami mahsulü vermek üzere işlemektedir. Rejimin gençlik üzerindeki tesir ve nüfuzunun büyüklüğünden şüphe edilemez.” “İtalya Faşist Gençliği Nasıl Yetiştiriyor,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16 July 1931, p.5.

¹³⁸ “Hayat harekettir; faşizm de bu hareketin kendisidir. Onun doktrinlerindeki sert hareket hali bundandır; her şeyde, her zaman yepyeni olmak iddiası gene bundandır. Böyle doğan, böyle yayılıp kökleşen ve kendini böyle bulan faşizm, onun için eskiye ve ihtiyara değil, gence, çocuğa kıymet vermektedir. Nitekim bugün İtalya’da milli varlığı işleten bütün mekanizmaların başındakiler gençlerdir. Faşizm, gençlerin hareketi olarak doğduğu için, gençlik terbiyesi meselesi, faşizm için, daha doğuşunda başlıca mesele olarak kendini göstermişti.” Nüşet Haşim Sinanoğlu, “Gençlik Organizasyonları,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3 June 1933, p.5.

The Fascist organization and education of the Italian youth was seen as perhaps the most important factor which led to Fascism's success in Italy. Many of the articles in the newspaper go further than being mere descriptions of how this organization worked: the Italian youth were given as an example to be followed by any revolutionary movement that wanted to be successful. The Turkish youth was accordingly attributed an essential role and it was declared that it had to be organized, disciplined, and educated in a similar vein if they were to become conscious about Kemalism and give unconditional support to the Kemalist Revolution. The "serum" of the Kemalist "ideals" had to be "injected into the veins" of this youth, in the words of one writer.¹³⁹

Discipline appeared as one of the core concepts in the ideological discourse of the period, and in the sources in mention, the concept was used with solely positive connotations. Even in discussions about democracy, reference was made to "disciplined freedom" as a goal. In contrast, the unconditional liberalism of the French Revolution was presented as ultimately leading to anarchy.¹⁴⁰ Discipline was therefore seen both as an aim, something having a value in itself, referred to as being solely good, as well as a means, as it is through discipline that order, and even freedom and democracy would be achieved. It was with discipline that the youth should be educated and brought up and take part in

¹³⁹ "Türk ulusunun büyümesi ve ilerlemesi için yol tektir: Yeni baştan kuruculuk, yani devrimcilik. Bunun içindir ki yarınki büyük Türkiye'yi kuracak türk gençlerinin damarlarına, bu, isimde çift fakat hakikatte tek ülkünün seronumunu (serumunu) aşılacak en büyük ödevimizdir. Bu aşı yayıldığı, gövdede, bacaklara ileri doğru atılmak hızını, kollara yapıcılık ve yaratıcılık gücünü verecektir... Ülküsüne dört elle sarılacak ve içten inanacak kafası işliyen gençtir. Biz, yurd için başarılması gereken büyük işleri ancak böyle bir candan inanın hızından bekliyebiliriz." Yaşar Nabi Nayır, "Düşünüşler, Devrim gençliği," *Ulus*, 1 June 1935, p.2. [emphasis added].

¹⁴⁰ As an indication of the extensive use of "discipline" as a core concept in the ideological discourse, see following articles: Zeki Mesut, "İçtimai Disiplin," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 March 1931 (editorial); Aka Gündüz, "Tek Kanal Tek Disiplin," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 2 March 1932; Kütahya Mebusu Recep, "Disiplinli Hürriyet," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 April 1933 (editorial); Kazım Nami, "Disiplinli Gençlik," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 March 1934, pp.3-4; "Disiplinli sıhatli gençlik" *Ulus*, 4 May 1941, (editorial); and Prof. Dr. Fındıkoğlu, "Fikir Hareketleri, Milli disiplinin neveleri," *Ulus*, 3 September 1943, p.5.

political power.¹⁴¹ It can finally be said that this core concept and feature of Italian Fascism was approved of and regarded as an example to be followed by the official Kemalist rule as expressed in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*.

It is no exaggeration to claim that the Kemalists viewed the Fascist *Dopulavoro* organization as a model to be followed in their aim of incorporating the Turkish people and the youth into the Kemalist Revolution. In an article about the young Italian *Balillas*, Zeki Mesut stated that it was through such education and discipline that the “young generation” would make the ideals (*mefkure*) of the Revolution take root and survive:

The discipline and organization to which we want our youth to be subjected, should also inject the ideals of the Revolution to the new generation and protect her from the negative influences of the attractive and benumbing daydreams of management control; it is an organization of action and ideas which should awaken the feeling of Turkish honour and energy, and should make her taste the pleasure of enthusiasm of a high ideal.¹⁴²

Mussolini’s views on the importance of the education of the youth were reported in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and in the Fascist leader’s view, such an education was the “main cause which will make the Revolution and the regime continue to exist.” Thus, educating the youth and making them realize their role and duty in “national life” could not be left to “individual initiative,” (*teşebbüs*) but had to be taken care of by the regime itself “in an atmosphere of discipline.” As long as “fascism has not taken care of this task, it will not have finished its duty properly.”¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ “Faşizm, gençliği aradı. Yeni hareketler yalnız genç kuvvetlerle tutunabilir. Fakat kadro yalnız gençliğe iktidar veren bir fırsat değil, gençliği iktidar için yetiştiren, gençliğe yeni ahlak veren bir mektep olmalıdır.” Falih Rıfkı, (Roma, Tiran, Atina) “Kadro ve Şef,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3 June 1931, p.3.

¹⁴² “Bizim gençliğin tabi tutulmasını istediğimiz disiplin ve teşkilat da inkılap mefkurelerini yeni nesile aşılıyacak ve onu menfi tesirlerle sevki tabiinin cazip ve uyuşturucu hülyalarından koruyacak, ondaki Türk gurur ve enerjisini uyandıracak yüksek bir idealin heyecan zevkini tattıracak bir hareket ve fikir teşkilatıdır.” Zeki Mesut, “Gençlik Teşkilatı,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 March 1931 (editorial), p.1.

¹⁴³ “a) Gençliğin terbiyesi davası, inkılabın ve rejimin devamlılığını temin eden başlıca davadır; b) Rejim, bütün gençleri, milli hayatta üzerlerine alacakları işlerde gerçekten faydalı olmak için profesyonlarına ait tam bir bilgi ile cihazlandırmaya mecburdur; c) Faşizm, bu çok ehemmiyetli işi fertlerin teşebbüslerine bırakamaz; bunun zıttına, gençliği, bir disiplin havası içinde doğrudan doğruya kendisi yetiştirmelidir

Education (*terbiye*) constituted another core term in the ideological discourse of the period. In various articles, the question of how the people were to be educated was discussed extensively. Some articles paid special attention to the education of the peasantry.¹⁴⁴ The term *terbiye*, however, implied something additional to education (*maarif*).¹⁴⁵ When the latter is understood solely in terms of literacy, *terbiye* appears as a more controversial concept. Despite this controversy, it is clear however that ideological and cultural education was included in the *terbiye* concept, meaning that the Kemalist leadership was supposed to bring up the people according to the Kemalist Revolution.¹⁴⁶

With the launching of the "Everything within the State" principle in Italy in 1929, the Fascist state's power was further consolidated. The Balilla National Organization, which had been established in 1926, came under state control in this year. Three years later, in 1932, all other youth organizations were dissolved. The education of the youth became strictly a matter of the state. In Mussolini's words, "to teach things and educate the youth was not only a right of the state, it was also a duty."¹⁴⁷ The children belonged to the State, in other words. Although this radical idea was not advocated among the mainstream

d) *Faşizm bu işi görmedikçe, vazifesini tam olarak yapmış sayılamaz.*" Mussolini quoted in Sinanoğlu, "İtalyada gençlik organizasyonları," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17 June 1933, p.4.

¹⁴⁴ Hilmi A. Halik, "Kışla ve Köy Terbiyesi," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 3 (March 1933).

¹⁴⁵ "Maarif kelimesini terbiye ile değiştireceğimiz ve bir Türkiye terbiyesi planı yapacağımız sıra çoktan gelmiştir...Yeni Türkiye ancak planlı bir terbiyenin ve bunun için de gerek iktisadi, gerek içtimai ve idari cihazların planlaştırılmasının, ve hiç bir enerji ve zaman israf olunmıyarak, bütün şahsi ve milli kudretlerin Yeni Türkiye idealine doğru hücum ve teksif edilmesinin eseri olacaktır." Falih Rıfkı, "Bir Terbiye Planı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11 November 1931 (editorial).

¹⁴⁶ For the extensive use of the term, see the following articles: Neşet Halil, "Halk Terbiyesi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17 January 1931, p.2; Neşet Halil, "Halk Terbiyesi ve Vasıtalari," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12 April 1931, p.4; Falih Rıfkı, "Terbiye Kadrosu," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28 May 1931 (editorial); Dr. Reşit Galip, "Maarif Vekili ve Köy Terbiyesi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 May 1933, p.3; Falih Rıfkı, "İlk Terbiye," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11 March 1934 (editorial), "İlk tahsil ve köy terbiyesi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10 August 1934; Atay, "İnkılab Terbiyesi," *Ulus*, 21 February 1937 (editorial), Nasuhi Baydar, "1 Gün için, Demokrasi terbiyemiz," *Ulus*, 14 March 1939, p.5; Atay, "Bir terbiye meselesine dair," *Ulus*, 6 August 1940 (editorial), Prof. Dr. Sadi İrmak, "Sosyal Biyoloji görüşleri, Veraset ve terbiye," *Ulus*, 14 June 1941, p.2; Sadi İrmak, "Terbiye meseleleri, Anormal çocukların yetiştirilmesi," *Ulus*, 22 November 1942, p.2; and further, R. Ş., "Garp Memleketlerinde Halk Terbiyesi," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 4 (May 1933).

Kemalist group in a widespread manner, in one article, reasons for why the child belonged to the State were discussed.¹⁴⁸ Constituting an exceptional view, the radical character of this idea, and the fact that it was a basic view advocated by Italian Fascism, makes the statement worthy of note.

The Fascist youth organization had the aim of giving the youth a disciplined education. Further, the people in general were also the object of the *Dopulavoro*, which aimed at providing them with cultural education. Activities such as theater, cinema, libraries, field trips, visits to villages, and sports were organized for this purpose. "Heightening the cultural level" of the people was sought by these means and further, as part of the organization's social aid aspect, health care was offered in villages:

The social activity of the B.N.O. (Balilla National Organization) is in a state which has brought it to the most distant village. Doctors who are officials in the *Balilla* and the *Pishtar* legions, are assigned in these activities. These doctors are bound to the public health administrations in the provinces. A welfare center for treatment of out-patients exist at every *Balilla* House. Children bound to the Organization are constantly kept under observation in these centres so that any illness can be identified in the very beginning and its medical treatment immediately begun.¹⁴⁹

The cultural education aspect in the *Dopulavoro* organization is reminiscent of the People's Houses, which were established by the Kemalist rule in Turkey in (February) 1932 and which also had the aim of raising the cultural level of the youth and the people

¹⁴⁷ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 19 June 1933.

¹⁴⁸ "Öyle ise en doğru bakıma göre, çocuk devletindir. Devlet, mektep dediğimiz pota da çocuğu eritir, kendine yarıyacak bir biçime sokar. Ana babanın işi, çocuğu bu biçimden uzaklaştırmak değil, belki ona hazırlamak, bu işte devlete yardım etmektir." Kazım Nami, "Çocuk Devletindir," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23 April 1932, p.2.

¹⁴⁹ "B.M.T. nis sosyal yardım faaliyeti, merkezden ta en uzak köye kadar yapılmış bir haldedir. Bu işte, Balilla ve Piştar lejyonlarında kadrolanmış hekimler çalışırlar. Bu hekimler vilayetlerdeki devlet sıhhiye idarelerine bağlıdırlar. Her Balilla Evinde dispanserler vardır. Organizasyona bağlı çocuklar, bu dispanserlerde daimi bir müşahede altında bulundurulurlar. Öyle ki, herhangi bir hastalık daha başlarken teşhis olunabilir ve hemen tedavisine girilir." "İtalyada Gençlik Organizasyonları, B.M.T.: Sosyal Yardım," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 July 1933 and further, "Ayrıca, ucuz seyahat ücretleri sayesinde amelenin köylere dağılması ve tabiatı sevmesi temin edilmektedir...Teşkilat, tiyatro piyesleri, kütüphaneler ve filimler sayesinde, mensuplarının kültür seviyesini yükseltmeğe çalışmaktadır...Seyyar tiyatrolar sayesinde memleketin en ücra köşelerine kadar en kıymetli sanat mevzularını yaymaktadır." "İtalya, Dopulavoro," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6 July 1933, p.7 (Article from Börsen Courier).

through education according to the principles of Kemalism.¹⁵⁰ Although the People's Houses never came to be as dominant or far-reaching as their Italian counterpart, the fact remains that they were the institutions of the regime and of the ruling Party, that they were established with the purpose of creating support and legitimacy for the Revolution, and finally that they bore the aim of spreading the ideology of the regime to the people.¹⁵¹ These characteristics arguably are similar to the function of *Dopolavoro*. The following statements concerning the purpose of the People's Houses are important expressions of this parallelism, presented by political-ideological figures within the Kemalist establishment:

By taking all means into their hands, National Revolutions are becoming oriented towards the masses (*yığınlaşmaktadırlar*). A national revolution can grow apace only when it has crushed the class vase and found the free and fertile soil and mixed its substance into itself (*nüsgün*). There is no organization which can be compared to a crowd that has been fermented with inculcation and education. We are going to go towards the single child through the single school and the single book; and we are going to go towards the single people, through the single inculcation and the single education.¹⁵²

The People's House is the best means which in fact makes the people acquainted with the causes of the Republican People's Party. It is the strongest tie existing between the youth and the peasant and our party. Because our party is convinced that it is only by relying on such fresh and creative sources of power, and by arising its level of culture,

¹⁵⁰ "Bir milletin yetişip istikbale hazırlanması için klasik vasıtalar ve müesseseler mekteplerdir. Fakat muasır milletler, milli bir mevcudiyet olarak yetişip teşkilatlanmak için mekteplerin yalnız usuller, nizamlar altında çalışmasını kağı görmüyorlar. Gerçi tam şuurlu ve kuvvetli vatandaşlar yalnız mektep sıralarında iyi ve ciddi programlarla ve ameli tatbik usulleriyle yetişmiş olabilir. Fakat bu asırda militleşmek için milletçe kütleleşmek için mektep tahsilinin yanında ve ondan sonra mutlaka bir halk terbiyesi yapmak ve halkı bir arada ve birlikte çalıştırmak esasının kurulması lazımdır...gençlik istikbalin ışığıdır. Gençlik mütemadiyen yetişen ve yetiştiren bir çalışmanın içinde yaşatılmalıdır...Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkasının Halkevleriyle takip ettiği gaye; milleti şuurlu, birbirini anlıyan, birbirini seven, ideale bağlı bir halk kütlesi halinde teşkilatlandırmaktır." [emphasis added] Recep Peker, "Halkevleri Açılma Nutku," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 1 (February 1933), p.6.

¹⁵¹ "Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkasının prensiplerini her gün söylemek, nasıl tatbik edildiğinden her gün malumat vermek lazımdır. Cümhuriyetçi, milliyetçi, inkılapçı ve devletçi politikasının, bu memleketin halinde inkişafı, emniyeti temin eden, geleceğine en büyük kudreti ve en yüksek itibarı temin edecek olan bir program olduğuna samimi olarak inanmış olan bizler bu prensipleri ve manalarını yalnız samimi bir hisle bizi dinliyecek olanların hepsine anlatabileceğimiz iddiasındayız." "İsmet Paşanın Nutku," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 2 (March 1933), p.100.

¹⁵² "Milli inkılaplar bütün vasıtaları emirlerine alarak, yığınlaşmaktadırlar. Milli inkılap zümre saksısını kırıp o serbest ve özlü toprağı bulduğu ve kendi nüsguna onun cevherini karıştırdığı zaman serpilip boy atabilir...Telkin ve terbiye ile mayalanmış ve yoğrulmuş bir yığına kıyas edilebilecek hiç bir organizasyon yoktur. Tek mektep ve tek kitapla tek çocuğa, tek telkin ve tek terbiye ile tek halka doğru gideceğiz." Falih Rıfkı, "Halkevi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 24 June 1932, p.1 (editorial).

that it will be establishing the new times (future) of Turkey on a strong fundament. The RPP is not a simple political party: it is the front where the struggle and the construction of the cause of a new culture, a new society, a new age, in short, a new civilization is taking place.¹⁵³

The question of how the youth in Turkey were to be disciplined and educated according to the ideology of the Kemalist regime so that they would become the main followers of the Kemalist Revolution, was, as mentioned, a main concern of the period.¹⁵⁴ While trying to find answers to this question, Italian Fascism's organization and disciplining of the Italian youth appeared as a contemporary model to be followed. The establishment of the People's Houses can partly be seen in this light.

It is apparent from the articles mainly in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* that the Kemalists were attentive to the developments in Italy in the period when the Houses were established. Although it cannot be claimed that the People's Houses were solely inspired by the Italian *Dopulavoro* organization, it is beyond dispute that the Kemalists were aware of the developments in Italy and followed the Fascist practices, on this issue, closely. On the question of how to discipline and make the youth part of the ongoing Revolution, Fascism was taken as a positive example. The hypothesis that the establishment of the People's Houses in Turkey was inspired by the Italian Fascist youth organization is nevertheless given impetus by two statements referring to the *Dopulavoro* organisation in

¹⁵³ "Halkevi, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinin davalarını halka bilfiil tanıtan eneyi vasıtamızdır. Gençlik ve köylü ile partimiz arasında en sağlam bağıdır. Çünkü bizim partimiz, ancak bu taze, bu yaratıcı kaynak-kuvet'lere istinat ederek ve onların kültür seviyelerini yükselterektir ki Türkiye'nin yeni zamanlarını sağlam bir temel üstüne kurmakta olduğu kanaatindedir...C.H.P. basit bir siyasi parti değildir: bir yeni kültürün, bir yeni cemiyetin, bir yeni çağın, hulusa, başlı başına bir medeniyet davasının mücadelesi ve inşa cephesidir." F.R. Atay, "Yeni Halkevlerimiz," *Ulus*, 18 February 1939, p.1 (editorial).

¹⁵⁴ In addition to the articles concerning the Italian Youth, for the importance attributed to the youth in general, see the following articles: Zeki Mesut, "Gençlik Teşkilatı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 March 1931 (editorial); Zeki Mesut, "Gençlik ve Mefkure," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28 August 1931 (editorial); Kazım Nami, "Disiplinli Gençlik," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 March 1934, pp.3-4, Yaşar Nabi Nayır, "Düşünüşler, Devrim gençliği," *Ulus*, 1 June 1935, p.2; Falih Rıfkı Atay, "Gençlik," *Ulus*, 23 May 1936; (editorial), "Kahirede Burhan Belge güzel bir konferans verdi, Arkadaşımız gençlik meselesi ve gençlerin yetiştirilmesi hakkında Kemalist rejimin görüşünü anlattı," *Ulus*, 1 May 1937, p.5; Kadri Yaman, "Gençlik kulüpleri münasebetiyle, Gençlik hızla çalışıyor," *Ulus*, 26 August 1940, p.2; Atay, "Türk gençliği toplanırken," *Ulus*, 1 September 1940 (editorial).

relation to the People's Houses. In the Book of Regulations of the People's Houses (*Halkevleri Teşkiyatı, idare ve Mesai Talimatnamesi*) it was for example stated that, "the Fascists have a national culture organization named Dopolovoro which is comprehensive of all of Italy." Further, information is given on the activities of the *Dopolavoro*, such as the number of "cultural associations" and "people's libraries" which it had opened. Finally, the "bringing up of strong citizens" is declared as one of the aims with the programme of the People's Houses.¹⁵⁵ In another article in the newspaper, it was stated that "the youth who are working in the People's Houses...want to get to know and understand the youth organization of countries who are our neighbours and friends."¹⁵⁶ In this relation, reference is made to Nüzhet Haşim's newly published book on Italian Fascism, including the collection of articles published in the newspaper.¹⁵⁷ In his own words, Nüzhet Haşim is "admiring the beautiful, new and vigorous organization of the Italian youth, but this is not an endless and envious admiration," because the People's House is a "new, beautiful and unique organization" which is under construction in Turkey and which "is appropriate to the structure of the Turkish nation and at the level of the capabilities of the Turkish youth."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ "Faşist'lerin bütün İtalya'ya şamil Dopolovoro isimli bir milli kültür teşkilatı ve bu teşkilatın 1586 kültür derneği ile milli mevzularda piyesler temsil eden gençlerden mürekkep 1000 kadar amatör temsil gurupları vardır. Yalnız 1930 da açtıkları halk kütüphanelerinin sayısı (8000) dir...Almanların, sayılması sayfalar dolduracak kadar çok halk kültür teşkilatı vardır...Programımızı; bu ana ve temel prensiplerin hakimiyeti ve ebedileşmesi için bu vasıflarda kuvvetli vatandaşlar yetiştirilmesini; milli seciyenin türk tarihinin ilham ettiği derecelere çıkmasını, güzel sanatların yükseltilmesini, milli kültürün ve ilmi hareket ve faaliyetlerin kuvvetlendirilmesini ehemmiyetli vasıtalar olarak tespit ve işaret eder." "Halkevleri Teşkiyatı, idare ve Mesai Talimatnamesi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 December 1931.

¹⁵⁶ "Cümhuriyet Halk Fırkasının kültür ve gençlik kaynağı olmak üzere açtığı Halkevlerinde çalışan gençler, komşu ve dost memleketlerin gençlik teşkilatıyla tanışmak, onları anlamak isterler. İtalya gençliğinin nasıl yetiştirildiğini İtalya membalarından alınmış malumatla ve mahallinde vaki olmuş müşahedelerle tesbit ederek "Hakimiyeti Milliye"de bir seri makale neşreden Nüzhet Haşim Bey, bu değerli etütlerini bir kitap halinde topladı." Nüzhet Haşim, (Kitaplar) "Faşizm ve Gençlik Teşkilatı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 September 1933, p.4.

¹⁵⁷ Nüzhet Haşim Sinanoğlu, *Faşizm ve Onun Devlet Sistemi* (İstanbul: Ankara Matbaası, 1933).

¹⁵⁸ "Ben, bu kitapta italyan gençliğinin güzel, yeni ve diri teşkilatına hayran oluyorum fakat öyle sonsuz bir hayranlıkla gıpta ettiğim yok: Türk milletinin bünyesine uygun, Türk gencinin kabiliyetlerine denk bir yeni,

The People's Houses may never have achieved the profound penetration into the lives of people as the *Dopulavoro* organization did. The latter's influence was far-reaching as it was used as a means of mobilizing the Italian youth and the people. According to Nüşet Haşım, around seventy-five percent of the Italian youth were members of the organization.¹⁵⁹ In the case of the People's Houses the attendance had a more unregulated character, and the cultural education aim seems to have gained precedence over political-ideological mobilization. This is a fundamental difference which prevents any claim that the People's Houses were exact parallel institutions to the Italian *Dopulavoro* organization. Despite this very important difference in practice, it can, however, finally be said that on the question of the organization and disciplining of the youth, the inspiration from and influence of Italian Fascism was strongly present among the official Kemalist elite.

Acknowledging the particular importance attributed to the youth, the principle of Populism (*Halkçılık*) meant an orientation of the ruling leadership, at least theoretically, towards the people. This defining principle of Kemalism was strongly linked with the question of education. The education of the people in line with the Kemalist Revolution and ideology, with the aim of establishing national unity and the gathering (of the people) around one unified ideal, was the purpose of the establishment of the People's Houses. As indicated in the name as well, these institutions' orientation towards the people was expressed through the rhetoric of populism.¹⁶⁰

güzel ve eşsiz teşkilatın bizde yapılmakta olduğunu duyuyor ve biliyorum. Benim bu kitabı okuduktan sonra duyduğum takdirin büyük bir kısmı, bu teşkilatın gözlerimizin önünde tam manasiyle canlandırılmış olması muvaffakiyetine aittir." Nüşet Haşım, (Kitaplar) "Faşizm ve Gençlik Teşkilatı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 September 1933, p.4.

¹⁵⁹ Nüşet Haşım Sinanoğlu, "Gençlik Organizasyonları," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3 June 1933, p.5.

¹⁶⁰ For some examples on expressions of populism (*Halkçılık*) see Neşet Halil, "Halkçılık ve Demokrasi I," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5 September 1931, p.2; Neşet Halil, "Halkçılık ve Demokrasi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11 September 1931, p.2; Şevket Süreyya, "Halka Rağmen Fakat Halk İçin," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 17 October 1931, p.2; Burhan Belge, (Yarı siyasal) "Ulus-Halk," *Ulus*, 4 December 1934, p.3; Zeki Mesud Aslan, "Halk için," *Ulus*, 12 June 1935 (editorial); Atay, "Halka gidenler yerine halktan gelenler," *Ulus*, 4 April 1943 (editorial).

On the question of the education of the people, in addition to Italy, references were made to Russia and the Russian “methods” of educating the masses. *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (*Ulus*) editor, Falih Rıfıkı’s book “Moskova-Roma¹⁶¹” (1932) was published as a series of articles in the newspaper. Writing about his impressions and experiences during a journey to Italy and Russia, Falih Rıfıkı’s words on the education and disciplining of the youth and the people in these countries are noteworthy:

We will examine closely Moscow’s methods for mass education (*terbiye*) for the education of the Turkish crowds, and to bring up the Republican youth with a brand-new mind and spirit, (we will scrutinize) every step in both of the Revolutions’ methods to educate the child and the youth.¹⁶²

The Party’s control of and authority over all these organizations is absolute and complete. In the Soviet style, the authority and influence are not the people’s, but are supposed to become the people’s. It is a truth that just as fish can’t exist without the sea, so can’t revolutionaries live without masses. A dictatorship is only useful, in so far as it achieves everyday to bring the crowds closer to its ideal and making them more and more conscious about this ideal. A dictatorship which does not bring up the people and the youth, continues to weaken every passing day, whereas a dictatorship which does not educate its people and its youth becomes less and less indispensable.¹⁶³

After having identified the Kemalist interest in and occupation with Italian Fascism’s emphasis on the youth, it is possible to claim that the establishment of the People’s Houses was partly inspired by the *Dopulavoro* organization in Italy. The function of these Houses as being ideological organs of the ruling RPP and the state (acknowledging their cultural functions as well) and their declared goal of educating the people in line with the Kemalist

¹⁶¹ Falih Rıfıkı (Atay), *Moskova ve Roma, Seyahat*, and further, “*Rusya’nın her komiserliğinde, her dairesinde, resmi hususi müessesesinde bir ‘yığın terbiyesi’ vaziyfesi ve teşkilatı vardır. Ordu, donanma, sivil müesseseler, hepsi terbiye kadrosu içindedir. Hepsi halka şuur, teknik ve bilgi vermektedirler.*” Falih Rıfıkı, “Terbiye Kadrosu,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28 May 1931 (editorial).

¹⁶² “*Türk yığınlarının terbiyesi için Moskova’nın yığın terbiyesi metotları, yepyeni kafa ve ruhta bir cumhuriyet genci yetiştirmek için her iki inkılabın çocuk ve genç yetiştiren metotları adım adım tetkik edeceğimiz şeylerdir.*” Falih Rıfıkı, “Moskova-Roma,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1 August 1932 (editorial).

¹⁶³ “*Bütün bu teşkilatlar üzerinde fırkanın kontrolü ve hükmü kat’i ve tamdır. Soviyetler şekli, hüküm ve nüfuz halkın demek değil, halkın olacak, demektir. Şurası doğrudur ki, balık denizsiz yaşayamadığı gibi, inkılapçılar yığınsız yaşayamazlar. Diktatorya, büyük yığınları her gün şuurlaştıra şuurlaştıra kendi idealine yaklaştırabildiği kadar faydalıdır. Halkı ve gençliği yetiştirmeyen diktatorya, her gün zayıflar; halkını ve gençliğini yetiştiren diktatorya ise her gün biraz daha lüzumsuzlaşır.*” Falih Rıfıkı (Atay), *Moskova ve Roma, Seyahat*, p.57.

Revolution and creating the unified and unconditional support of the people for the regime were the essential conditions presented and viewed as giving validity to the claim of the similarity with the People's Houses in Turkey to their Italian Fascist counterpart. Acknowledging their differences, not least in how they came to function in practice, it was finally said that the Kemalists were ideologically inspired by Italian Fascism on the issue of education, which was understood more broadly, and encompassed ideological, general cultural as well as physical education (the latter will be discussed in depth in the section below on Germany).

The Appearance of Benito Mussolini – *Il Duçe*

The leader of Italian Fascism, Benito Mussolini, referred to as *Il Duçe*, also attracted much attention, and even admiration, from the mainstream Kemalist elite. A noteworthy amount of space was given to articles concerning Mussolini, either as articles about him or as citations of his speeches (some of which were taken from foreign newspapers). Mussolini and Italian Fascism were regarded as equivalents, since the Fascist movement had come to power and ruled in Italy mainly under the leadership of Mussolini. Thus, Mussolini's strong leadership was an important factor enabling Fascism's success and leading to its successful achievements in Italy. In certain writings in the newspaper, Mussolini was at some points referred to as a dictator, but this was, in general, not approached in a critical way. It is possible to find writings that differentiate between a dictator and a real leader (*Şef*) emphasizing the latter's closeness to the people as a distinguishing feature and claiming that this was a characteristic of the Kemalist

leadership.¹⁶⁴ The effort to differentiate the Kemalist regime from a dictatorship did not however lead to a general critical stance towards the dictatorial feature of Mussolini's rule. Although this approach changed with the developments in the Second World War,¹⁶⁵ throughout the 1930s the dictatorial character of the Italian regime was at most mentioned without any critical perspective. The following statement of Falih Rıfkı is illustrative of this approach:

When Mussolini entered Rome and put himself on the armpit of state leadership, he had a programme consisting of a single word: Italy! What was in the advantage of Italy in science, technique, and in law, all of this was Fascism. All that was at its harm, was the opposite of Fascism. As it would take too much time to gather and write these things down, and because it would require too many disks and too many files, Mussolini gave an end to bureaucracy. Thus Mussolini, who has been the leader of Fascism's dictatorship in the last decade, is exactly this...A despot can exist in the East, but in Europe that is impossible. In Europe, a dictator means the man who kneads of a new society and administration according to principles, to which he himself obeys just like everybody else. The dictator does not mean an individual, it means the symbol of the principles of a cause which has emerged due to any need or necessity. Nations sometimes need dictators.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ "Mustafa Kemal Şeftir; diktatör değildir. Büyük krizler de, ruhlar ve müesseseler bozguna uğradığı zaman içlerinden bir şef çıkan milletler bahtiyardırlar...Büyük adam bu kargaşalık sırasında herkesin aklından üstün bir akıl, herkesin enerjisinden üstün bir enerji ile teşhis olunur; herkes onda kendi istediğini, kendi düşündüğünü, kendi aradığını bulur; şefin başlıca hassası, inandırmaktır. Bir diktatör her zaman uyurabilir ve korkunç, tethiş silahların üstünde bir baş olarak oturtulabilir...Halk diktatörden uzaktır; diktatör halk yığınlarını, ayak basar basmaz insanı boğazına kadar çekip yutan kara bir bataklık gibi görür. Bir şefin en büyük korkusu ise, serbest sevgilerden, serbest inanışlardan mahrum kalmaktır; bir şef, kuvvet aradığı zaman, sokağa çıkar, halka gider. Diktatör saray ve surlara kapanır." Falih Rıfkı, "Şef ve Diktatör," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4 January 1931 (editorial), and further, "Bizdeki Şef telakkisi başka yerdekilerden ayrılır. Biz Şef'imizi tamamiyle bizden tanırız, o hepimizden biri, hepimizin başı ve hepimizin kendisidir. Şef kuvvetini gönlüne doldurduğu aşkımızdan alır, biz inşirahımızı gönlümüzü alan sevgisi ile mayalarız. Türk Şefi tamamiyle halkındır, halktan olmalıdır ve halk iradesiyle meydan almıştır. Olayların kahramanıdır. Onda tanıdığımız en yüksek vasıf bir halk çocuğu olmasıdır." Hasan Reşit Tankut, "Büyük Kurultay Dolayısıyla: II, Tek Parti Fikri," *Ulus*, 9 May 1943, p.2.

¹⁶⁵ The following statement is important due to its "breaking-point" feature, as the "wrongness" of Mussolini is expressed for the first time in *Ulus* in such a striking way: "(Mussolini) Bir halk adamı olarak işe başladı. Fakat bir zümre adamı olarak iş başına geçti...Atatürk millet adamıydı. Mücadelesini hürriyet fikri için onun etrafında yaptı. Hakiki şef milletten doğar. Zümreden gelmez. Atatürk milletten gelmişti...(Mussolini) O, bütün bir millet yerine bir sınıf ve zümre ile iş görmek istediği için daima hesaplarının dışına çıkmağa mecbur kaldı. Zümre adamı hakiki şef olamaz. Bu zümre adamı oluşu Mussolini'yi kıymet hükümleri üzerinde oynamaya götürmüştü. 'İtalyan milleti benden ekmek istiyor, hürriyet istemiyor' sözü onundur. Hakikaten İtalyan milleti Mussolini'den, bu kendi kendine türiyen velinimetten hiç bir şey istemiyordu. Fakat bir şey isteseydi behemahal hürriyeti isterdi. Çünkü milletler hürriyete aşıktır ve insanlığın asıl şeref kapısı hürriyettir...Modern diktatörün hatası hürriyetle ekmek birbirene zıt şeyler olduğunu düşünmesindedir." Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, "Fikir Hareketleri, Mussolini'ye dair..." *Ulus*, 21 August 1943, p.5 and further, Esmer, (Dış politika) "Mussolini ve faşistlik," *Ulus*, 1 August 1943, p.3.

¹⁶⁶ "Mussolini Roma'ya girip hükümet reisliği koltuğuna oturduğu zaman bir tek kelimeli programı vardı: İtalya! İlimde, teknikte ve hukukta İtalya'nın faydasına ne varsa hep birden Faşizm idi. Zararına ne varsa

The incorporation of discipline and authority as values by different European countries is mentioned in an article by Falih Rıfki, stressing that “dictatorships have a place in history, in science and in reality.” They emerge when “the people agree to transfer some of its personal freedoms to a leader or to a group (*zümre*) for the sake of overcoming big crises.” A dictatorship was thus only temporary, supposed one day to leave power to an “ordinary system.”¹⁶⁷ An opposing view on dictatorships was presented by Nusret Kemal in *Ülkü* in which the author acknowledges that “both communism and fascism” through the means of “dictatorship” had achieved “great accomplishments.” Nevertheless, Nusret Kemal ended by noting that this had been “at the cost of the most sanctified ideal of mankind” which was “freedom, and in particular the freedom of thought.”¹⁶⁸

The Sacred Fascist State

As recalled from Chapter Two, the concept of the sacredness of the Fascist State was a defining feature of Italian Fascism. Personified in the leader, the state was seen as both

topu birden Faşizmin zıddı idi. Bütün bunlar toplanıp yazılmak uzun süreceği, bir çok masa ve dosya lazım olduğu için, Mussolini, kırtasiyeciliği sona bırakmıştır. İşte on senedenberi Faşizm diktatoryasının şefliğini yapan Mussolini budur...Despot Şark'ta olabilir; Avrupa'da imkansızdır. Avrupa'da diktatör demek, kendisinin de başkaları kadar itaat ettiği prensiplere göre yeni bir cemiyet ve idare hamuru yuğuran adam demektir. Diktatör şahıs değil, her hangi bir ihtiyaçtan ve zarureten doğan yeni bir davanın prensiplerinin timsali demektir. Milletler arasına diktatöre muhtaçtırlar.” Falih Rıfki (Atay), Moskova-Roma, Seyahat, pp.75-76.

¹⁶⁷ “Diktatür’ün tarihte, ilimde ve hakikatte yeri vardır. Diktatür, büyük buhranları atlatmak için halkın kendi hürriyetinden bir kısmını, bir reis veya bir zümreye devretmeğe razı olması demektir. Harpler hürriyetle, parlamento münakaşaları ile, sokak ve gazete kavgaları ile idare edilmez. Fakat diktatür, sürüp gidecek olan bir sistem değil, vazifesini bir gün normal bir sisteme bırakacak olan bir intikal vasıtasından ibarettir.” Falih Rıfki, “İki Tecrübe,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6 November 1934, p.1 (editorial).

¹⁶⁸ “Kapitalizmi kökünden yıkan komünizm, kapitalizmden komünizme geçerken hududu olmıyan ve müddeti kestirilemiyen bir diktatörlüğü zaruri görmektedir. Faşizmin ise henüz kapitalizmin fenalıklarına çare dahi bulmıyan bir diktatörlükten ileri gittiği isbata hayli muhtaçtır. Diktatörlük, muhakkak ki büyük bir kuvvet, ve tehlike anlarında lüzumlu bir metoddur; ve şüphe yok ki, komünizm de, faşizm de bu kuvvet sayesinde çok büyük işler yapmışlardır. – Fakat ne pahasına? Beşeriyetin en mukaddes ülküsü ve en büyük kudret membaı olan hürriyet ve bilhassa fikir hürriyeti pahasına.” Nusret Kemal, “Bir Cihanı Telakki Tarzı,” *Ülkü*, 2, no. 10 (October 1933), pp.285-86.

the means as well as the end and thus the “keystone” in “Fascist doctrine.”¹⁶⁹ This aspect of Italian Fascism was also noted in articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*.¹⁷⁰ In Falih Rıfki’s definition, Fascism was a “doctrine of the state and of authority” and in Fascism, “all forces prevailing in society have to be within the State. No power should be against the State. The State is not the flag of any class, any group (zümre) or even any system.”¹⁷¹ The Fascist State was presented as the only guarantor of the general interest of the society and it had the task of terminating the interest struggles between different sections in society and was to “eliminate” things that were in contradiction to the “national interest” or “damaging” to society.

The state is going to handle interest quarrels, the state is going to eliminate dangerous elements, the state is going to make things in accordance with national interest continue and remove ones which are contradicting (this interest). Now in Italy, both the individual, as well as the state, and foreign capital are working...Persons who have travelled in this country, four, eight, or twelve years ago, have now seen the different view of the street, of the field and of all of the people. Further, the world Depression and the conviction that the anarchy of production (and) the anarchy of liberal economy has been procuring this crisis, and the incapability of democracies to prevent these anarchies, has given justification to the regime.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ “The keystone of Fascist doctrine is the conception of the State, of its essence, of its tasks, of its ends. For Fascism the State is an absolute before which individuals and groups are relative...the Fascist State has a consciousness of its own, a will of its own, on this account it is called an ‘ethical’ State...The State...is a spiritual and moral fact because it makes concrete the political, juridical, economic organization of the nation and such an organization is, in its origin and in its development, a manifestation of the spirit.” Benito Mussolini, from *The Fascist Doctrine*, quoted in Carl Cohen, *Communism, Fascism and Democracy – The Theoretical Foundations*, 2nd edition (New York: Random House, 1972), pp.337-338.

¹⁷⁰ “Faşizmin ası eseri, işte bu devlet, meşru otoritesi ve manevi itibarı fırkalar ve hiziplere üstün tutulan devlettir. Devletin bayrağı ne fırkayı ne de bir sınıfı temsil eder. Onun zaferi italyanlık fikrinin doğuşu olacaktır...Demokrasi ve liberalizm realite tarafından bin kere mağlup edilmiştir. İleriye gitmek için ‘dolaşık’ iniş çıkışlar yerine, kestirme köprüler aranmalıdır.: ‘Politika milletleri idare etmek ve realiteleri kullanmak sanattır.’” Falih Rıfki, (Roma, Tiran, Atina) “Faşizm ve Sınıflar,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4 June 1931, p.4.

¹⁷¹ “Faşizm, bir devlet ve otorite doktrininidir. Memlekette ne kadar kuvvet varsa hepsi devletin içinde olmalıdır. Hiç bir kuvvet devlete karşı olmamalıdır. Devlet hiç bir sınıfın, hiç bir zümrenin, hatta hiç bir sistemin bayrağı değildir.” Falih Rıfki, “Faşist İtalya,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6 June 1932 (editorial).

¹⁷² “Menfaat kavgalarını devlet halledecek, zararlı unsurları devlet tasfiye edecek, milli menfaate uyanı devlet devam ettirecek ve artık uymıyanı devlet ortadan kaldıracaktır. Şimdi İtalya’da hem fert, hem devlet, hem de ecnebi sermaye çalışıyor...Bu memleketi, dört, sekiz, on iki sene evel gezmiş olanlar, şimdi sokağın, tarlanın ve bütün halkın başka bir manzara aldığını görmüşlerdir. Üstelik dünya buhranı ve bu buhrana istihsal anarşisinin liberal ekonomya anarşisinin sebep olduğu hakkındaki kanaat, demokrasilerin bu anarşileri menetmek hususundaki kudretsizliği, rejimde hak da kazandırmıştır.” Falih Rıfki, “Faşist İtalya,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6 June 1932 (editorial).

The notion of the state placed above everything in Italian Fascism is expressed in this passage. In this relation, however, the uniqueness of Fascism to Italy was once again underlined, but as is obvious from the quotation, this “uniquely Italian” feature was approved of and the state’s achievements acknowledged with normative words such as “all power which is not damaging to the country, and every system which has some usefulness to the country, can under the high judging (*hakemliđi, nazımlıđı*) of the state, work and be fruitful.” The important point here is that although the State-ism of the Kemalist ruling elite in Turkey did not get to have the far-reaching and totalitarian character of Italian Fascism in practice, at the theoretical level, the Kemalist elite offered a positive view of this aspect of Italian Fascist ideology. In the articles discussing this subject, it was explicitly acknowledged that it was through the Fascist State, its undisputed leader and the methods of education and disciplining of all ranks in the hierarchy that the view of Italy had been changed. This was a change for the better, with the establishment of order and national unity during a very short time span.

The Fascist State’s role as the creator and guarantor of national unity within society, the giving of precedence to the collective at the cost of the individual, and finally, the claim of the existence of harmony between the constitutive parts of a society, were expressions of the corporatist character of the Fascist regime. The look upon classes or groups in society as inseparable parts, constituting a whole, was an important distinguishing feature of Italian Fascism. The corporate system in Italy was settled in 1934. The Fascist rule did however take steps prior to this year, which gave the regime a corporatist character. The Italian Labour Condition (*Carto Del Lavoro*) was promulgated in 1927 and had such corporatist features for example. The importance of this Law in the context of the present discussion lies in the fact that it was discussed in articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü* shortly before the Turkish Labour Law (*İş Kanunu*)

was promulgated in 1936.¹⁷³ The Turkish Labour Law had features resembling the Italian Labour Condition and it has even been claimed that the Turkish Law had been prepared according to the Italian *Carto del Lavoro*.¹⁷⁴ An article in the newspaper declared that “disagreements in relation with work is going to be handled through compromise, and when this is not possible through the judging of the means for compromise established by the state.”¹⁷⁵ One of the most important implications of the Labour Law was the banning of strikes and lock-outs.¹⁷⁶

Describing the Law as a “regime law,” Recep Peker wrote that this Law meant that “we are building a wall against the (possible) fragmentation of the citizens through their evolving into classes.” This new Law was, according to Peker, going to “finish off the clouds which might enable the birth and living of class consciousness.”¹⁷⁷ In another article

¹⁷³ “İleri Hukuk Hareketleri, Profesör Mazhar Nedim B. İkinci Konferansını Verdi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8 March 1934, p.1 and Prof. Mazhar Nedim, “İleri Hukuk,” *Ülkü*, 3, no. 15 (May 1934).

¹⁷⁴ According to Karpas, “3008 sayılı İş Kanunu savaş öncesinin İtalya kanununa göre hazırlanmış olduğundan işçi meselelerini totaliter bir şekilde düzenliyordu.” Karpas quoted in Makal, *Çalışma İlişkileri*, p.382; Modifying this view, Ahmet Makal ends up concluding that “one observes a closeness (or resemblance) in the basic essences of the two arrangements.” And further he says that “the fundamental similarities” are outweighing the differences. Ibid., p.384.

¹⁷⁵ “İş anlaşmazlıkları, uzlaşma yoluyla ve buna imkan olmazsa devletin kuracağı uzlaştırma araçlarının yargıçlığı ile kotarılır. Grev lokavt yasak olacaktır. Ulusçu türk işçilerinin hayat ve hakları ile bu esaslar içinde ilgileniriz. Çıkarılacak iş kanunlarımız bu esaslara uygun olacaktır.” Kamal Ünal, (Gündelik) “İş Kanunu,” *Ulus*, 29 August 1935 (editorial). According to the Law, when the employees and the employers are not able to reach a compromise, a civil servant (*memur*) is supposed to try to settle the disagreement. In case the propositions of this civil servant do not lead to a solving, his proposal and the objections against it, are going to be conveyed in written form to the Governor (*Vali*). The next step in the legal procedure is the assembling of the “Board of Arbitrators for Working Disputes” (*İş İhtilafları Hakem Kurulu*) which mainly consists of official representatives from the Ministries of Economy, Justice, and the Interior, which after consulting with the conflicting parts, reaches a decision through voting. See articles 81-83, “İş Kanunu,” *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertip, Volume 17 (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası, 1936), pp.1180-1182.

¹⁷⁶ Article 72 in “İş Kanunu,” *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertip, Volume 17 (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası, 1936), p.1177.

¹⁷⁷ “Yeni iş kanunu bir rejim kanunu olacaktır. Gerçi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti kanunlarının kuvvet ve Devletçe ehemiyet bakımlarından birbirinden farkı yoktur. Fakat bir taraftan da içinde yaşadığımız devrin hayatı ihtiyaçlarını karşılayacak temel kaideleri koyan bir kanunun siyasal ve içtimai hayatımıza tesir bakımından ayrıca ehemiyet üzerinde durmak lazım gelir. İşte yeni yeni çıkarmakta olduğumuz iş kanunu Devletin esaslı kanunlarından bir rejim kanunudur...Biz bu iş kanunu ile, yurddaşların sınıflaşarak parçalara ayrılmasına karşı bir kale duvarı örüyorsa buna benzer başka kanunlarla tarifelere hakim olmak, kredileri tanzim etmek ve fiatların kontrolü kanunları gibi tedbirlerle de her gün müteakim safhalarda yürütüyoruz...Arkadaşlar, yeni iş kanunu sınıfcılık şuurunun doğmasına ve yaşamasına imkan verici hava bulutlarını ortadan silip

concerning the Working Law, it is stated that the Law has been made “to protect the material and the moral harmony existing between millions of citizens who are clamped together by economic and social work ties just as much as they are bound together by the ties of language and culture, and national feelings.¹⁷⁸” In these articles discussing the Law, the emphasis on the existence of national unity and harmony in the “Turkish nation,” characterized as constituting “a whole,” is worthy of note. The “life and the strengthening of the component parts which constitute this whole, depend on the life and the strengthening of the other parts.¹⁷⁹”

In an article explaining the factors which had led to the promulgation of this Law, Falih Rıfkı goes back to the initial period of the founding of the Turkish Republic and tells about Mustafa Kemal’s argument for naming the newly founded Party, the People’s Party. Claiming that “the civil servant (*memur*), the peasant, the worker, the entrepreneur (*teşebbüs sahibi*), the teacher, the one undertaking independent business (*serbest meslekten olan*),” all belonged to the same “society.” Mustafa Kemal wanted to “enter the era of Revolution” not by “dividing the nation,” but “on the contrary, by constructing the nation’s unity (*millet bütünlüğünü*).” This statement was another expression of the national unity rhetoric prevailing in the period under study. More importantly, Falih Rıfkı underlined that at that moment in time “we had not yet read neither the programme of Fascism nor of

sümpürecektir. Bu kanunla milli hayatın iş alanında muvazene kurulacaktır.” “Kamutay İş Kanununu kabul etti,” Ulus, 9 June 1936.

¹⁷⁸ “*Hulasa iş kanunu dil ve kültür bağları ile, milli duyguları ile olduğu kadar iktisadi ve içtimai iş bağları ile de tam bir ahenk içinde birbirlerine kenetlenmiş milyonlarca yurddaşlar arasındaki maddi ve manevi ahengi muhafaza için yapılmıştır.*” “Basın İçmeli, İş Kanununu nasıl anlamak lazımdır?” *Ulus*, 26 August 1937, p.3.

¹⁷⁹ “*Türk ulusu bir bütündür. Bu bütünün içerisinde ise, her cüzün yaşaması ve kuvvetlenmesi diğer cüzülerin yaşamalarına ve kuvvetlenmelerine bağlıdır. Bu ideoloji karşısında beden ve fikir işçilerinin yaptıkları işlerin korunması ve onların kıymetlendirilmesi lazımdı ve bu zorağı endüstri hareketlerinin başladığı bu anlarda kendisini daha kuvvetle gösterdi.*” “Ulusal davalarımız, İş kanunu projesine genel bir bakış,” *Ulus*, 16 November 1935, p.3.

National Socialism.¹⁸⁰” These words are expressions of Falih Rıfkı’s awareness of the resemblance of this rhetoric to the two fascist regimes under consideration, but again the stress is on the Kemalist Revolution’s unique and independent character.

After this short analysis on the image of (Italian) Fascism as it was expressed mainly in the official newspaper *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, and partially in the journal of the Ankara People’s House, *Ülkü*, it can in conclusion be said that the Kemalist elite in concern showed a particular interest in and even admiration of Italian Fascism as an ideology. Fascism was seen as a justified revolutionary movement which, although unique to Italy, constituted an example for the Kemalist Revolution on various points. The achievements of Fascism as seen by the Kemalists, first of all consisted in the saving of Italy from the anarchy of liberalism.¹⁸¹ Falih Rıfkı wrote of the atmosphere of discipline and order prevailing in Italy, which had made every Italian conscious of his place, role and duty in the established hierarchy. Fascism had an organizational form which accomplished “fifty years of work in ten years” and made things work efficiently.¹⁸² “After they gained

¹⁸⁰ “Belki başında sosyal, ekonomik veya politik herhangi bir mesleği tasrih eder bir sıfat bulamadıkları için şaşırıldılar. Atatürk kısaca: - Memur, çiftçi, işçi, teşebbüs sahibi, muallim, serbest meslekten olanlar, hepimiz aynı cemiyetten değil miyiz? Dedi. Henüz ne faşizmin, ne de nasyonal-sosyalizmin programını okumamıştık. Fakat Atatürk inkılab devrine, eski mekteb derslerinin tesiri altında bulunanların tasavvur ettiği üzere, milleti parçalıyarak değil, bilakis millet bütünlüğünü kurarak girmek istiyordu.” Falih Rıfkı Atay, “İş Kanunu,” *Ulus*, 30 May 1936 (editorial).

¹⁸¹ “Faşizm İtalya’da milli birliği, iktisadi ve içtimai düzeni, siyasi varlığı tehlikeye düşüren demokrasi ve liberalizm anarşisine karşı reaksiyon olarak doğmuştur...Bütün sistemler muvaffak oldukları zaman ve muvaffak oldukları kadar doğrudurlar. Faşizmin demokrasi ve liberalizme karşı isyanı, mesela Rusya’da olduğu gibi, demokrasi ve liberalizmi reddeden herhangi siyasi, içtimai ve iktisadi bir sisteme bağlı olduğu için değil, demokrasi ve liberalizm harpsunu İtalyasına zarar verdiği, İtalya’yı zayıflattığı, İtalya’ya uymadığı için ölmüştür. Lenin dünyayı, Mussolini İtalya’yı kurtarmak için ayaklandı.” Falih Rıfkı, “Faşist İtalya,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6 June, 1932 (editorial).

¹⁸² “Faşizm on senede bütün bu manzarayı değiştirmiştir. Servisler, şimdi, bütün Avrupa’nın en iyi işliyenlerindendir; sağlam bir hiyerarşi kurulmuş, sokak süpürücüsünden büyük idare adamlarına kadar, herkes iş başında ve size yardım etmeğe hazırdır; gümrük ve polis, eskisinin zıttıdır; Brendizi’nin iki tarafı hem dükkân, hem yatak odası, hem mutfak hizmeti gören hücresellerle çevrilmiş dar sokakları bile tertemizdir...Faşistler çok inşa etmişlerdir...Köylüye toprak verilmiş, bataklıklar kurutulmuş, ‘Çiftçi İtalya’ya doğru büyük adımlar atılmıştır. Faşizm, on senede elli senelik iş görmüştür: Mussolini ve faşizm, yarın, başka birgün belki düşebilir. Fakat bu eserlerin kaybolmak ihtimali yoktur. Evet, İtalya’da fransız demokrasisi bulamıyacaksınız...İtalya’yı bitiren disiplinsizlik idi. Faşizm bir otorite doktrini. Her milleti, içinde bulunduğu şartlara en uygun sistemleri araştırmakta serbest bırakmak lazımgelir...Faşizm yalnız

power,” Falih Rıfkı wrote, “the fascists put up state authority and the idea of the common interest against class struggle.” They did not recognize “any other class than the people or any other privilege (*imtiyaz*) than the state.”¹⁸³ Ultimately, therefore national unity had been achieved in Italy.

Underlining the uniqueness of Fascism to Italy and Kemalism to Turkey, one common point between the two regimes as expressed in the newspaper, was the condition that they were “regimes of Revolution,” (*inkılap rejimleri*) meaning that in both countries, the revolutionary struggle was continuing.¹⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Kemalist regime’s struggle against (the emergence of) class struggle and the aim of national unity was seen as another common objective. One difference between the two regimes was that the Fascists in Italy were a reaction to an already emerged situation of class struggle and liberal anarchy. The Kemalist movement in contrast was trying to build a nation from the very beginning, hence trying to preempt the emergence of classes. According to Falih Rıfkı, the Kemalist “task was thus in one way more difficult,” and yet at the same time it had the advantage that the notion of class conflict was totally absent.¹⁸⁵

italyanlığa mahsus ve İtalya'nın şartlarına uygun bir sistemdir.” Falih Rıfkı, (Roma, Tiran, Atina) “Faşizm Havası,” Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 2 June 1931, p.3.

¹⁸³ “Eğer Faşizm imdada yetişmemiş olsaydı, İtalya ya dağılacak, ya dağılmış kadar nüfuz, inkişaf ve kuvvetini kaybedecekti. (Faşistler) iktidara geldikten sonra sınıf kavgası fikrine karşı devlet otoritesi ve umumi menfaat prensipini müdafaa etmişler, sermayedarlar kadar emek sahiplerini de kendi safları arasında görmüşlerdir. Faşistler İtalya’da milletten gayri sınıf ve devletten gayri imtiyaz tanımazlar.” Falih Rıfkı, “Faşist İtalya,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 May 1932 (editorial).

¹⁸⁴ “Sovyet Rusya, Faşist İtalya ve Kemalist Türkiye, her biri kendi şartları içinde ve kendi şartlarına uygun inkılap rejimleri içindedirler: Üçünü de birleştiren müşterek vasfı, işte bu inkılapçılıktır.” Falih Rıfkı, “Faşist İtalya,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 25 May 1932 (editorial).

¹⁸⁵ “Faşizm, mevcut sınıfların şiddetli ve müzmin kavgasını menetmeğe ve uzlaştırmağa çalışıyor: Kemalizm, henüz sınıf kavgası doğmamış bir yurtda, demokrasi salgınlarının yerleşmesini menedecektir. Bizde şimdilik iki sınıf vardır: Garplı ve şarklı sınıf. Biz bütün sınıfların garplılaşmasını, fakat garp memleketlerindeki sınıfların hastalıklarını almamasını istiyoruz. Faşizm kaybolacak İtalya’nın önüne geçti. Kemalizm kaybolmuş olanı kurtarmıştır...(last word missing) ve faşizm yetiştirmiş, olmuş, hazır müesseseler buldu. Faşizm, yapılmış olan bir cemiyetin, yapılış şartlarını düzeltmek fikrindedir. Biz bu cemiyeti henüz yeniden yapıyoruz. Bizim için zorluk daha fazla, fakat daha eyi imkanlar vardır.” Falih Rıfkı, (Roma, Tiran, Atina) “Toprak,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5 June 1931, pp.3-4.

In spite of this difference, the overall aim of achieving national unity and the struggle against the emergence of liberal anarchy, and the means chosen to achieve this goal, can be identified as similar points between the Fascist regime in Italy and the Kemalist regime in Turkey. More important for this study, these resembling points were acknowledged by political-ideological figures in articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*. The importance given to the state and the leadership, the education of the people and the youth, and the precedence of the collective over the individual, were features of Italian Fascism which were regarded as values to be strived for by the Kemalists and which would ultimately contribute to the achievement of national unity in Turkey.

Educating and disciplining the youth as well as the people according to the ideology of the Revolution, the essential role of the leader, the importance of the state to hinder the emergence of - or abolish an already arisen state of - class struggle, the establishment of national unity, and the features of discipline and authority as values to be strived for constituted the points in Italian Fascism which were given the majority of the attention by the representative figures of the mainstream Kemalist elite. In the ongoing ideological struggle of the period, Italian Fascism was conceived of as a legitimate attempt to resist the traps of liberalism and to obtain national unity and order. In Falih Rıfki's words, for the "young countries" the aim was to establish "a different order for the new times:"

It is a fact that despite all their differences due to the differing conditions and climates, all young countries are being directed towards an understanding due to a common idea and feeling (*ensten*). The aim is a different order for new times.¹⁸⁶

To put it more explicitly, according to this view, liberalism had failed in various countries since it had led to class struggle and anarchy. The new or the "different" order was an order in which the state was kept above all, there was a ruling elite leading the

¹⁸⁶ "Şurası var ki, bütün genç memleketleri, her türlü şartlarla ve iklimlere göre değişen farklara rağmen, müşterek bir fikir ve enstenden gelen bir anlayışa sevketmektedir. Hedef, yeni zamanlar için başka bir nizamdır." Falih Rıfki, (Roma, Tiran, Atina) "Toprak," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 5 June 1931, pp.3-4.

masses, and the youth and the people were being educated in line with the Revolution. These conditions were requirements of this new time, before freedom and democracy could be enjoyed without leading to anarchy and class struggle. The youth as well as the people had to become conscious about the ongoing Revolution, its ideology and give unconditional support to its aims and values; then freedom could be realized and a controlled version of democracy be established. This was the picture of the time in which authority and disciplined education were seen as the means through which national unity and order would be attained. This was the essence of Fascism, as seen by official Kemalism, which had worked in Italy; and this was, with some degree of variation, the essential objective of Kemalism.

The Fascists are saying: 'Fascism is peculiar to being Italian.' Everybody knows that today's order of Moscow is peculiar to Russia. And we can say this: 'Kemalism is peculiar to Turkey. There are a set of principles which makes these three regimes draw near to each other. They all have the aim of welfare of the general people; Moscow wants to take all of Russia towards a single class, under a class dictatorship, Rome, through establishing harmony between classes, and Ankara by the ideal of a classless society. *In all of the three regimes, the state is not going to exercise authority on other classes for the sake of the privileges of one national class and further, the emerging classes are not going to handle any matter between them at the street or in the parliaments through fighting, outside (the domain of) the state...* The desire of the Turkish planners is not to make Turkey Moscow, nor Rome.¹⁸⁷ [emphasis added].

Although a different ideology "due to the differences in conditions and climate," this was the "new order" which Kemalist Turkey as one of the "young" countries was trying to settle in the changing environment and the changing time.

¹⁸⁷ "Faşistler diyorlar ki: 'Faşizm, İtalyanlığa mahsustur.' Herkes biliyor ki: 'Bugünkü Moskova nizamı Rusya'ya mahsustur.' Ve şunu söyleyebiliriz: 'Kemalizm, Türkiye'ye mahsustur.' 'Bu üç rejimi yaklaştıran bir takım esaslar vardır. Moskova bir sınıf diktatoryası altında, bütün Rusya'yı o tek sınıfa götürerek, Roma, sınıflar arasında ahenk kurarak, Ankara ise sınıfsız bir cemiyet ideali içinde fakat hepsi umumi halk refahını hedef almıştır. Üç rejimin üçünde de Devlet, hiç bir millet zümresinin imtiyazları namına diğer zümreler üzerinde hükmetmeyecek, türeyen sınıflar, aralarındaki davayı Devlet dışında, sokak ve parlamentolarda boğuşarak halletmeyeceklerdir. 'Kemalizmle, Faşizm arasında hususi bir yakınlık, Devlet, fert ve ecnebi sermaye teşebbüslerinin üçüne de yer vermekte olmalarıdır. Kemalizm ile Leninizm arasında hususi bir yakınlık, her iki tarafın halk yığınları ve iktisadi inkişafı ile Garp arasındaki uzun ayrılığı en kısa zamanda telafi etmek zaruretidir.' Türk plancılarının istediği, Türkiye'nin Moskovalaştırılması, veya Romalaştırılması değildir." Falih Rıfkı, *Moskova-Roma, Seyahat*, pp.16-17. [emphasis added]

The Approach to National Socialism and Hitler's Germany

To start out with a few general comments, Germany and the Nazi ideology received, as mentioned, less attention compared to Italian Fascism, in the sources under examination. Especially until the mid-1930s, the Kemalists only gave marginal attention to Germany, and although the number of articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* increased with the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, they were mostly reporting the political developments which were taking place in Germany. Any sort of emphasis on the common elements between the Kemalist and the National Socialist ideology was completely absent. Except for being an expression of the Kemalists distancing of themselves from the Nazis, this was in addition an illustration of the Kemalists' differentiation between Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Although the commonality in these two fascist ideologies was to be recognized towards the end of the 1930s (related to the intensified political relations and the emergence of the Rome-Berlin Axis in 1936), in the early 1930s, Italian Fascism and German National Socialism were perceived as two different ideologies. The felt 'closeness' to the Italian regime and its ideology, and the parallels drawn between Italy and Turkey were distinguishing features of the Kemalist approach to Italy and Italian Fascism. As recalled from the discussion above, there was much to be learned from the Fascist rule in Italy, albeit not followed completely since Fascism was a uniquely Italian phenomenon. Despite this difference in approach, National Socialism was nevertheless still discussed in articles in both *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü*. Although in a less structured and less profound way, interest was shown in the political as well as the ideological developments in Germany.

The more pragmatic approach to National Socialism is seen first in the smaller amount of articles (it is, for example, possible to find only a few long-running article series

concerning Germany). Second, articles or passages in articles explicitly discussing any parallels between Kemalism and National Socialism were exceptions. When dealing with National Socialism, the radical character of Hitler's ideology and regime was most often referred to, and no real wish to 'learn' from National Socialism was expressed.

Thus, it is possible to claim that in the first half of the 1930s, the Kemalist political-ideological leadership in Turkey saw their regime as being *ideologically* closer to Fascist Italy than to National Socialist Germany. This is an argument which in fact does not go too well with the political picture of the time. Keeping in mind that Turkey's economic ties to Germany were very close throughout the 1930s and recalling the more strained political relations with Italy, particularly due to Italy's extra-territorial claims and ambitions in the Mediterranean region, this argument seems a bit surprising. Nevertheless, this is the picture which emerges when the political aspect is ~~sought~~ kept in the background and an attempt is made to identify the ideological approach of the mainstream Kemalist elite.

In various articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, National Socialism was presented as an ideology whose defining characteristic was the quest for the establishment of national unity in Germany. This was a common point with Italy, which, in the eyes of the Kemalist figures, gave legitimacy to the Hitler regime. The National Socialists had emerged as a result of the political anarchy of the many political parties in Germany, and the National Socialist Workers Party (NSDAP) was itself a symptom of this anarchy.

The course of the strengthening of the Hitler movement in Germany has run parallel with the increase in the anarchy of ideas in that country. The movement which is coming along as a torrent, is not Hitler-ism or anything alike, but anarchy. Thus, Hitler is the log, dragged by the flood, whose size appears bigger and bigger with the approaching of the torrent.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁸ "Almanya'da Hitler hareketinin kuvvetlenmesi seyri, o memleketteki fikir anarşisinin artması seyri ile, ilk gününden bugüne kadar, hep muvazi gitmiştir. Sel gibi gelen hareket, Hitler'cilik falan değil, sadece anarşidir. Hitler, sel yaklaştıkça hacmi büyük gözüken, selin sürüklediği kalastır." Burhan Asaf, (Yarı Siyasi), "Hitler'in Ehlileştirilmesi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11 May 1932, p.2.

Second, the NSDAP had revisionist aims for Germany, and Hitler's rejection of the Versailles Treaty and its implications were seen as being in accordance with the German national interest. This could, from a nationalist, Kemalist perspective, hardly be objected to. Hitler, also referred to as the *Führer* in the articles in the newspaper, was working for the national interest of Germany, and this sole fact was something which received approval. In the words of Burhan Asaf:

With the last event in Germany, something has been broken and a new thing been born. The thing which has undergone a break is the obligation for Germany to make every calculation and consideration according to international measures, and take every of its decision according to these measures. The new thing which has been born is the determination to subject international obligations in an absolute way to national measures. In the exuberant reaction of today, one has first of all to see this...A new course has started for Germany. What is the really important thing is the direction of this current. And this direction is heading towards the creation of the contrastless German nation...Henceforth, the characteristic of Germany is going to be national liberation through the heading towards the German nation free of contradictions. And Hitler is one of those who puts forth this characteristic. Either, Hitler is going to remain loyal to this trait and put it into existence, or, if he shows the weakness and deviates from it, the trait will trip him up, and choose itself other men.¹⁸⁹

Initially with the Nazi take-over of power, the immediate aims put forth by Germany did not meet any rejection or critique in the official Kemalist newspaper. The aims summarized as the establishment of national unity in Germany and the abandonment of the Versailles Treaty were recognized. At the same time, however, a certain degree of scepticism towards Hitler's increasing popularity (which had enabled the Nazi party to gain 37.3 percent of the votes in the elections of July 1932)¹⁹⁰ could be discerned. Hitler

¹⁸⁹ "Son hadise ile, Almanyada, bir şey kopmuş ve bir yeni şey doğmuştur. Kopan şey, Almanyanın her hesabı beynelmilel ölçülere göre yapması ve her hükmü böyle bir hesaptan çıkarmasıdır. Doğan şey ise, beynelmilel zaruretleri milli ölçülere sureti katiye ve mutlakada tabi kılmak kararıdır. Bugünkü taşkın aksülamelde, her şeyden evel bunu görmek lazımdır...Almanya için artık bir yeni akış başlamıştır. Bu akışın, asıl, istikameti mühimdir. Ve bu istikamet, Tezatsız Alman milleti'nin yaratılışına doğrudur...Almanyanın bundan sonraki şiarı, tezatsız millete doğru milli kurtuluş olacaktır. Bu şiarı Almanyada atanlardan biri de Hitler'dir. Hitler, ya bu şiarına sadık kalacak ve bunu tahakkuk ettirecektir, yahut, eğer inhıraflarda bulunmak zafını gösterirse, şiar kendisini çecek ve yeni adamlarını seçecektir." Burhan Asaf, (Yarı-Siyasi) "Aksülamel Almanyası." *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 4 February 1933, p.3.

¹⁹⁰ Eatwell, p.105.

was appointed Chancellor in January 1933 and in 1934, took the post as President (*Reichskanzler*) of the Third Reich after the death of President Hindenburg. In this same year, the Enablement Act was passed giving Hitler unrestricted powers for the coming four years. An expression of the Nazi consolidation of power in Germany, immediately after their take-over of power, these political developments led to some unease among the Kemalist leadership. This scepticism was to increase towards the end of the 1930s in parallel with the growth of the Nazi expansionist ambitions and aggressive politics.¹⁹¹

The reserved attitude of the Kemalists towards the National Socialist ideology is an important point of difference from their attitude towards Italy and can partly be explained in terms of historical circumstances. In the beginning of the 1930s, the Fascists had been in power for almost a decade in Italy. The Fascist rule had been consolidated in 1926 and the Kemalists had a clear picture of what the Fascist ambitions and aims were. The political relations between Italy and Turkey were defined and the concern with Italy and the approach to this country therefore had a different character. The Kemalists could more easily be occupied with the historical developments in Italy and focus on the changes the country had gone through under the Fascist rule. The situation in Germany was different, as the National Socialists came to power a decade later. The feeling of insecurity was caused by this factor as the ideological features as well as the political aims of the ‘new’ regime had yet not been explicitly stated and were not known. The Kemalist approach

¹⁹¹ “İç politikada en ehemiyetli inkılab, şüphesiz, alman milli birliğini tamamlamasındadır..Almanları yoğurup hamur yaptıktan sonra onu millet halinde onu kalıptan döken milli sosyalistliğin hararetidir...Almanlar dünyanın en çalışkan milletlerinden biridir. Galiblerin, harpten sonra kendilerin mahkum ettiği vaziyette kurtulmaları ve çalışkanlıklarıyla mütenasib refaha kavuşmaları noktasında dünyanın sempatisi kendileriyle beraberdir. Fakat onların da aynı hakkı başkaları için tanımaları lazımdır. Halbuki Nazi rejiminde bu hakkı başkalarından inkar etmek isteyen bir eda vardır. Bu espri değişmez de tazyik devam ederse, bu tazyikin ağırlığı altında rejimin kendisi bile sukut edebilir.” A.Ş.Esmer, (Dış İçmal) “Üçüncü Rayh’ın beşinci yıldönümü.” *Ulus*, 30 January 1938, p.3.

towards the Nazis thus had to be more *ad hoc* due to this basic historical condition which also is a partial explanation of the more pragmatic approach to National Socialism.

This should not, however, mislead the reader to think that National Socialism was not dealt with by the Kemalists. In the long decade of the 1930s, both the speeches of Hitler as well as other prominent Nazi leaders, like Propaganda Minister Goebbels,¹⁹² were published, just as discussions of the implications of National Socialist ideology were presented. It is possible to find articles with extracts from Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*¹⁹³ as well as translations of articles from *Völkischer Beobachter*, the official newspaper of the Nazis.¹⁹⁴ Further, legal developments, such as the Law on Sterilization and the Law on Rights of Land Property (*Erbhofrecht*), were presented and discussed at length in articles in the newspaper. The point is that when looked upon more generally and when compared to the writings concerning Italy and Italian Fascism, first of all, the number of articles was lower. This quantitatively gives impetus to the argument put forth above that Italian Fascism received more attention by the Kemalists. Second, the writings on Germany had a more pragmatic character. The absence of long-running article series, with only a few exceptions, is one illustration of this pragmatism. The writings deal more with the present-day developments in Germany rather than discuss at great length or give profound presentations of the National-Socialist ideology. With these general views and pre-conditions in mind, the concrete aspects of National Socialist ideology and politics, which

¹⁹² "Almanya Propaganda Nazırının bir Nutku," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 June 1933, p.1; "Faşizm ve Nasyonal Sosyalizm, Almanya Propaganda Nazırının Bir Yeni Nutku," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 July 1933; "B. Göbels diyor ki, Almanya'da parti devletten üstündür," *Ulus*, 1 July, 1935; p.1, "Kritik ve otokritik, Dr. Göbbels'in sözleri," *Ulus*, 16 October 1937, p.2.

¹⁹³ "Nasıl Yahudi Düşmanı Oldum?" *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22 April 1933, p.5; "Alman nasyonal sosyalistliğinin 63 maddeyle hulasası," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 April 1934, p.8 (both articles are from *Mein Kampf*).

¹⁹⁴ "Neşeden Kuvvete, Völkisher Beobachter Alman gazetesinden," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12 April 1934, p.4.

were given the most attention by Kemalist figures in the primary sources under study, can now be taken up.

The Image of *Der Führer*

The Kemalist view of the *Führer* was less spectacular and more vague than the admiration of the *Duçe*. Again in terms of amount of articles, the space given to Mussolini, translations of his speeches, articles about his personal qualities, a series of photographs showing him in different contexts, far exceeded the attention Hitler receives. Nevertheless, Hitler was described in terms of a strong leader who is trying to solve the socio-economic problems and the political unrest prevailing in contemporary Germany. Hitler's takeover of power in 1933 was seen as evidence of the German people's realization that "what is necessary in this era of depression is more than anything, the authority of the state."¹⁹⁵ The German "patriots" (*vatanperverleri*) in the words of Zeki Mesut, through establishing the majority in parliament and taking the lead in government, "want to give an end to class struggles." Further, what was important "in the sphere or life of the State is that there is a government authority which represents the rule of the leading actor in all spheres of life, the people, and the ideal about the life and ascendancy of the people." In Falih Rıfkı's account, Hitler's coming to power was seen as a realization of the essentiality of the state, and as the abandoning of liberal economy and a step towards state-ism.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Zeki Mesut, "Otorite Buhranı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10 February 1933 (editorial).

¹⁹⁶ "Hitler'in faşizmi, Alamnya (Almanya) daha organize bir memleket olduğundan Mussolini faşizminden daha kolay maksadına varabilir; fakat dahili ve harici düşmanları daha kuvvetli olduğundan Mussolini'nin faşizminden daha çetin imtihanlar geçirecektir. Hitler'in Alamanyası, bütün dünyada liberal ekonomiyi bir tarafa atarak devletçiliğe doğru giden geniş harekete ilim ve teknikte en ileri gitmiş bir milletin karışmış olması demektir." Falih Rıfkı, "Faşist Hitler," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 3 March 1933 (editorial).

In another article, Zeki Mesut discussed the importance given to the raising of leaders in Germany. That they had a “leaders’ school” (*Şefler Mektebi*), in his view, showed the importance the Germans gave to the leadership question. Further, the school was an expression of the view that leadership could be learned through schooling and education. Stating his own views on the “the great importance of leadership in the sphere (*hayatında*) of the state, the nation and the society,” Mesut claimed that it was “the valuable leaders who put forth the value of the numbers (*sayıların*), and of the masses. The leaders are (like) the powers who give life to (*canlandıran*) and who run a machine.” Especially in periods of socio-economic depression and crises, the role of leaders became evident and the German people “who are a disciplined and organized nation anyway, have realized the role of the leader, and have seen it as necessary to educate (*terbiye*) the leadership capability in a given (*muayyen*) direction, in other words, according to the principles of the National Socialist Revolution and the state.”¹⁹⁷

The emergence of National Socialism and Hitler was seen as a consequence of and reaction to the anarchic conditions, the socio-economic situation and the “chains” put on Germany internationally through the Versailles Treaty.¹⁹⁸ These were presented as the main factors leading to the emergence of National Socialism. Rejecting the dispute over the “rightist” aspect of Hitler, the regular writer in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, Burhan

¹⁹⁷ “Zaten disiplinli ve teşkilatlı bir millet olan almanlar şefin rolünü eyice anlamışlar ve şeflik kabiliyetinin, muayyen bir istikamette, yani nasyonal-sosyalizm inkılabının ve devletin prensipleri dairesinde terbiyesini lüzumlu görmüşlerdir.” Zeki Mesut, “Şefler Mektebi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 30 April 1934 (editorial).

¹⁹⁸ “İtalya’da faşistlik İtalya’nın anarşisi içinden doğduğu gibi, Almanyada da milli sosyalistlik alman milletinin ızdırabı içinden doğmuştur. Almanya harpta mağlub olmuş, Versailles’da imzaladığı sulh şartlarıyla, Avrupada’ki arazisinin yüzde on beşini kaybetmiş, sömürgeleri elinden alınmış silahsızlanmış, tamirat bedeli namı altında ağır bir harb tazminatı ödemeğe mahkum edilmiş...İç politikada en ehemiyetli inkılab, şüphesiz, alman milli birliğini tamamlamasındadır..Almanları yoğurup hamur yaptıktan sonra onu millet halinde onu kalıbtan döken milli sosyalistliğin hararetidir.” A.Ş.Esmer, (Dış İçmal) “Üçüncü Rayh’ın beşinci yıldönümü,” *Ulus*, 30 January 1938, p.3.

Asaf, said that “Hitler is just representing a nation’s anarchy of ideas and decisions.¹⁹⁹” As a reaction against the politically anarchic situation, Hitler represented the aim of establishing national unity. The term national unity constituted another of the core values and concepts in the political-ideological discourse of the period, and the aim of national unity was seen as constituting one of the defining characteristics of the authoritarian regimes, differentiating them from the liberal-democratic camp. The national unity rhetoric prevailed not only among the Kemalists as a concern for Turkey, but as a general preoccupation for regimes that perceived themselves as struggling against the traps of liberal anarchy. This goal of national unity, present in both Italy and Germany, was important to note, as from the Kemalist perspective, it gave legitimacy to the fascist ideologies and their leaders:

The strongest conception and the strongest action of the National Socialist Revolution is the conception and the action aiming at rendering secure national unity. The National Socialist Revolution is struggling for procuring German unity from two fronts. One of these is formed by the German-ness prevailing inside of Germany’s present political borders; the other front consists of the German-ness outside these borders, and in particular in Austria. Chancellor Hitler, who has managed to make his will and leadership accepted almost by everybody in Germany, is about to remove the last difficulties contradicting national unity in the first front. As it is said, with the help of history and occurrences, Hitler has been succesful in undertaking that which Bismarck has not been able to.²⁰⁰

In various editorials on Germany, Zeki Mesut focused on Hitler’s “sincere” closeness to the people. The importance given to the people by the German leader was,

¹⁹⁹ “Prusya ‘sağ’a kaydı diyenlerin maksatlarını anlamadığımız gibi, “Fransız intihabatı solların zaferi ile netiycelendi” sözü de, bizce bir muammadır. Hitler ne için “sağ”ı temsil ediyormuş? Hitler, sadece bir milletin fikir ve karar anarşisini temsil ediyor. Bunun “sağ” yahut “sol” ile ne alakası var?” Burhan Asaf, (Yarı Siyasi) “Fransız İntihabatı,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10 May 1932.

²⁰⁰ “Nasyonal-sosyalizm inkılabının en kuvvetli görüşü, en kuvvetli hareketi, milli birliğin teminine matuf olan görüş ve hareketidir. Nasyonal-sosyalizm inkılabı Alman birliğini iki cepheden de temin edebilmek için uğraşmaktadır. Bu cephelerden birini Almanya’nın bugünkü siyasi hudutları içindeki almanlık, diğerini de onların dışındaki almanlık ve bilhassa Avusturya teşkil etmektedir. Almanya içinde iradesini ve şefliğini hemen bütün Almanlara kabul ettirmiş olan Şanseliye Hitler birinci cephede milli birliğe uygun düşmeyen son maniaları da ortadan kaldırmak üzeredir... Denildiği gibi, Bismarck’ın yapamadığını tarih ve hadiselerin yardımı ile Hitler yapmağa muvaffak olmuştur.” Zeki Mesut, “Alman Birliği,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 13 February 1934 (editorial).

according to Zeki Mesut, even illustrated in the latest political event where the position of the “leadership of the State” (Presidency) and the “leadership of the Government” (Premier) was unified into one position. This decision was sent to referendum by Hitler, showing that he “felt the need to apply to the vote of the people.” According to Hitler’s own explanation, the reason for consulting with the people was based on his belief that “all power is solely arising from the people and that it is necessary to get the approval through the people’s free and secret vote.”²⁰¹ The importance attributed to the people by Hitler was seen as striking by Zeki Mesut, as Hitler’s “dictatorial powers supersede those of the most powerful dictators” and since he thus did not need to make such a consultation.

In line with these views, the author further declared that “although it is possible to argue various things about the Hitler regime, one thing is obvious: Hitler is first of all a leader who is consolidating the racial and blood ties of the German nation, putting the German idea above all other ideas and in this way strengthening German unity with the most strong feelings.”²⁰² In Mesut’s view, this had led to the fact that in contemporary Germany the individual had been replaced by the masses. There was no longer the “thought of the person” or the “feeling of the person.” Instead there was a “continuously moving mass politics which is embracing all persons...The mass is in a state of movement, the mass is thinking, the mass is laughing, the mass is crying, the mass is working.” And

²⁰¹ “Hitler en kudretli diktatörlerden daha fazla bir kudret sahibi olduğu halde gene bütün kuvvetin milletten geldiğini söylemektedir. Son defa hükümet reisliği ile devlet reisliğini de nefsinde cemederek bütün Almanya’ya mutlak surette hakim olan Hitler, ayrıca milletin reyi ile de bu hakimiyetini teyit etmek istemiştir. Hitler bir bakımdan, milletin hakimiyetine hürmet eden bir demokrat, diğer bir bakımdan da adaletin bile kendi hüküm ve takdirine bağlı olduğunu iddia eden en koyu bir diktatördür...Hitler milletin arzu ve iradesine dayanmakla gösteriş yapmış olmuyor, onun bu hareketinde samimi olduğunu kabul ederiz. Devlet reisliğini de hükümet reisliği ile birleştirmek isterken milletin reyine müracaat lüzumunu duymuş ve bu lüzumu yazdığı bir mektupta ‘her kuvvetin ancak milletten geldiğine ve milletin serbest ve gizli reyile tasdik olunması ıycağı ettiğine tamamen kani bulunduğunu’ söyleyerek izah etmesi bunun bir delilidir. Hitler bir kuvvet ise onu yaratan, onu bugünkü mevkie çıkaran alman millettir.” Zeki Mesut, “Almanya’da Devlet,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 11 August 1934 (editorial).

²⁰² Zeki Mesud Alsan (Aslan), “Büyük Bağ,” *Ulus*, 23 January 1935 (editorial).

the most crucial or “distinguishing feature” of National Socialism expressed itself in this mass-orientation. Zeki Mesut went a bit further than just presenting this feature of National Socialism; he claimed that the individual person’s area or zone was “static (*durgun*), with a low degree of warmth and the lack of astonishing (*büyüleyici*) waves that would push the feelings far away.” In contrast, the mass area was “filled with the highest energy of desire (*istek*) arising out of thousands of heads, thousands of hearts.” In this energy and in this mass area, even persons who perceived themselves as weak and not useful understand their value and “feel honour by seeing themselves under the command (*buyruğu altında*) of the crowd of people (*kalabalık*) who walk behind the high ideal.”²⁰³

To summarize the Kemalist perception of *Der Führer*, especially in the early years of the 1930s when the National Socialists were establishing their power, the fact that Hitler came to power by gaining the majority vote cast in the elections was, according to Zeki Mesut, proof that Hitler’s dictatorship was based on “one of the fundamental cornerstones of democracy which is elections (*reyiam*).” Zeki Mesut took note of the fact that although many people called Hitler a dictator, “the Germans call him *Führer*, a guide (*kılavuz*).” Far from taking a critical approach to the emergence of yet another dictator in Europe, the Kemalists, especially in the immediate aftermath of Nazi seizure of power, perceived Hitler as the strong leader who, having been needed for a long time, had finally emerged and who had the legitimate aims of establishing national unity and finding solutions to the economic as well as political problems of Germany.

The *Führer* (*kılavuz*) aspect of Hitler, rather than his dictatorial feature, was put forth in the early 1930s. The democratic character of the National Socialist take-over of power,

²⁰³ “Kişinin kendi alanı durgundur, sıcaklığı düşüktür, ve orada duyguları uzaklara iletecek büyümlü dalgalar yoktur. Yığın alanı ise bin bir kafanın, bin bir yüreğin içinden kopup gelen bir isteğin en yüksek enerjileri ile doludur. Onun içinde önceden kendilerini cılız ve bir şeye yaramaz görenler bile varlıklarının değerini anlarlar, ve kendilerini yüksek ülkü ardından giden kalabalığın buyruğu altında görmekten büyük kıvanc duyarlar. Ulus ve ülkü birliğinin gücü de böylelikle en yüksek kertesine çıkmış olur.” Zeki Mesud Alsan (Aslan), “Büyük Bağ,” *Ulus*, 23 January 1935 (editorial).

through elections, was presented as a fact which made Hitler the choice of the German people. In short, in the official Kemalist view, Hitler was seen as a symptom of and a reaction to the political anarchy prevailing in Germany. The revisionist aims of Germany regarding the Versailles Treaty, as well as the goals of uniting the German nation (including Germans abroad, which meant the *Anschluss* project with Austria), was in large part approved by the Kemalists.²⁰⁴ At a later stage, however, with the more radical National Socialist claims and politics such as the German territorial expansion and aggressive politics, the Kemalist approval began to decline. This change in attitude never really turned into an open criticism of or hostility towards Hitler and his ideology.

Organization of the Youth

The Nazi organization of the German youth was another subject that attracted the interest of the writers at *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and the subject was discussed in one of the article series on Germany. The youth were claimed to be an internal part of the National Socialist movement. The latter term, “movement” was seen as an indication of the fact that “National Socialism was a youth party: both in terms of spirits as well as in terms of supporters (*azası*), it was really the party of the new generation.²⁰⁵” The disciplined physical and ideological education of the German youth was handled through the Nazi youth organization, the “Hitler Youth” (*Hitlerjugend*). Persons between fourteen and

²⁰⁴ “Versailles sulhunun zincirlerini kırmak yolundaki alman teşebbüsü türk milleti tarafından daima sempati ile karşılanmıştır. Almanya’nın silahlanması Türkiye’de sevinç uyandırdı. Avusturya’nın ilhakı, alman milli birliğinin tahakkukuna doğru bir adım telakki edildi. Südet mıntakasının milli hudutlar içine alınması da aynı manaya alındı. Fakat Almanya burada durmadı. Nazi ırk nazariyesine aykırı olduğu halde bir gün ansızın Çekya’yı ilhak ederek orta Avrupa’da bir müstemleke kurdu. Ertesi gün balkanlı bir müttefikimizi tazyik etmeğe başladı...Bu şartlar altında Türkiye’nin emniyetini başka kombinezonlarda araması pek tabii idi.” A.Ş. Esmer, (Dış politika) “Türkiye ve Almanya,” *Ulus*, 20 May 1939, p.3.

²⁰⁵ “Nasyonaldosyalizm – bir gençlik fırkasıdır: gerek ruhi ve gerek azası bakımından böyledir, hakikaten yeni neslin fırkasıdır.” (Yabancı Gençlikler: 3) “Alman Gençliği,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 July 1933.

twenty years were members of this organization, which was further divided into four sub-groups according to sex and age.²⁰⁶

Although parallels can be drawn between the *Hitlerjugend* and its Italian Fascist counterpart, the *Balillas*, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. It should suffice to note that just as the mainstream Kemalists showed a particular interest in the organization of the youth in Fascist Italy, this subject also attracted their interest as far as Nazi Germany was concerned. Although the writings on the German youth in the daily were fewer in number and lesser in detail, the Kemalist elite showed a particular interest in the youth question which was given primary importance in both of the fascist regimes. According to one writer, by penetrating into every possible sphere, National Socialism was expanding the borders to get the youth under its control through the means of “homework, games and fun (*eğlence*).” This was seen as a way of “putting the ideas of people into shapes” (*kalıp*) just as was the case with the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages:

The new state doctrines, both adherence to fascism and adherence to national socialism, are in many aspects resembling the Catholic Church of the Middle Ages. Intolerance, restrictions, the claim on penetrating into every sphere of individual and collective life, and the urge to mold the ideas of people, are examples of this.²⁰⁷

The critical tone in these sentences is, however, more an exception to the general line of the mainstream Kemalist leadership. As was emphasized throughout the discussion on Italian Fascism, the necessity to incorporate the youth into any revolutionary movement was acknowledged and approved of by mainstream Kemalist figures.²⁰⁸ Making the youth

²⁰⁶ (Yabancı Gençlikler: 4) “Alman Gençliği,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 8 August 1933.

²⁰⁷ “Birçok cihetleriyle yeni devlet mezhepleri, gerek faşistlik ve gerek nasyonal sosyalistlik, orta çağ katoliklik kilisesine benzemektedir: Müsamahasızlıkları, inhisarcılıkları, ferdi ve cemi hayatın her sahasına

physical education, in contrast, the matter appears to be different as the physical education aspect of National Socialist ideology garnered more profound attention by the Kemalist leadership. The Law on the Requirement of Physical Education (*Beden Terbiyesi Mükellefiyeti*) was promulgated in Turkey in June 1938 and made it a legal requirement for the youth to become members of (sports) clubs and do physical exercise in their free hours.²¹¹ Articles discussing the necessity of making sports a matter of the state and views approving the making of physical education a legal requirement were published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* as well as *Ülkü*. The ideas prevailing behind the promulgation of the Law were discussed extensively.²¹² An article in *Ülkü*, by Rahmi Apak emphasized that “nowhere in the world, not even in countries like Germany, Italy, or Soviet Russia, that have dealt with the question of the youth since the last decade and which have tried to make the new regime take root in the country by putting the burden on the shoulders of the youth, has the organizing of the youth been bound to a legal decree.”²¹³

In August 1937, the governors, who were at the same time the People’s Party chiefs in cities, became the heads of the regional branches of the Turkish Sports Association (*Türk Spor Kurumu*).²¹⁴ The party representatives were to play a role and take decisions to secure “the progress of Turkish sports,” as it was expressed in one article in the newspaper.

²¹¹ “Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu,” in *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertib, Volume 19 (Ankara Başvekalet Matbaası, 1938), p.1656.

²¹² Dr. Hayri Kaleli, Sağlık Bakımından Spor,” *Ülkü*, 9, no. 49, (March 1937); Nüzhet Abbas, “Halkevleri ve Memleket Sporu,” *Ülkü*, 13, no. 73 (March 1939), Nüzhet Baba, “Bize en Uygun Sistem Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor,” *Ülkü*, 15, no. 88 (June 1940), “Mühim bir kararname, Yurttaşlar Beden faaliyetine mecbur tutulacaklar,” *Ulus*, 18 April, 1940, p.2.

²¹³ “Dünyanın hiçbir yerinde, hatta Almanya, İtalya ve Sovyet Rusya gibi on yıldanberi gençliğe el koymuş ve yeni rejimi memlekette yerleştirmeyi ve kökleştirmeyi yeni neslin omuzlarına yüklemiş olan ülkelerde dahi işbu gençlik teşkilatının yapılması kanuni bir hükme bağlanmış değildir. Bütün bu memleketlerde gençlik, rejimin dayandığı Parti ile ve hususi yardımlarla sevk ve idare edilmektedir. Halbuki, inkılap yapan, rejim değiştiren her memleket derhal gençliği ele almıştır. Hitler’in şu sözünü buraya yazacağım: ‘Bir inkılabın muvaffakiyet sırrı, o inkılaba uygun yeni adamı yaratmaktadır, hem de en çabuk zamanda yaratmaktadır. Bunsuz inkılaptan bahsetmek bir hayalden bahsetmek olur.’” Rahmi Apak, “Yeni Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu,” *Ülkü*, 12, no. 72, (September 1938), pp.42-43.

²¹⁴ “Spor işleri için mühim bir karar, Parti reisleri spor işlerini devralıyorlar,” *Ulus*, 19 August 1937, p.2.

More than anything, this decision was an expression of the state's (and the ruling Party's) penetration into another area of the private sphere. Expressed differently, the question of the physical functioning of man became the concern of the State.²¹⁵ In a speech made in relation to a meeting on the Project on Sports Organization (*Spor Teşkiylat Projesi*), the minister of the interior, Şükrü Kaya, declared that "physical education is a true part of national education." And just like all other education, "the aim of physical education is to bring up the individuals as valuable (*hayırlı*) persons for the nations, and together with the nations for all mankind." According to Şükrü Kaya, "the man of the Kemalist Revolution is a youth with a beautiful body, an intelligent mind (*düşünceli*), is courageous, (*cesur*) and dignified (*vakur*).²¹⁶"

Sports or physical education is thus seen as a matter of the state and a means through which the "man" of the Revolution will be created. For the sake of the nation, and, in the final analysis for the sake of all mankind, sports should belong to the domain of the state. A decree on the Law on Physical Education was further promulgated in 1940,²¹⁷ and the view of physical education as constituting an integral part of the broader aim of education was expressed in the Regulations of the Law (*Beden Terbiyesi Mükellefiyeti Nizamnamesi*). In this text it is stated that "the principal task of the General Directorate for Physical Education (*Beden Terbiyesi Genel Direktörlüğü*) is to increase the physical and spiritual capabilities of the citizen according to national and revolutionary aims." Thus, "every club

²¹⁵ "Bizim bu Türkiye'de bedeni terbiye, bütün manası ile milli, binaenaleyh devletin müdahale, mürakabe ve tanzim hizmetlerine kati lüzum gösteren bir iş, türk nesillerinin sıhat, kuvvet ve ahlaki üstünde tesiri yakından ve büyük olan bir iştir." F.R. Atay, "Bedeni terbiyeyi teşkilatlandırma!" *Ulus*, 5 January 1939, p.3 (editorial) and "Devlet, beden terbiyesinin başına geçti, Artık beden terbiyesi ve spor bir zümre ve oyun değil, bir memleket ve milli hizmet davası olmuştur," *Ulus*, 5 January 1939, p.2.

²¹⁶ "Kemalist inkılabının adamı, Güzel vücudlu, sağlam düşünceli, cesur ve vakur gençlerdir!" *Ulus*, 30 June 1938, p.1 (From the speech of Şükrü Kaya).

²¹⁷ "Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor Mükellefiyeti hakkında kararname," in *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertib, Volume 21 (Ankara Devlet Matbaası, 1940).

is at the same time an institution of upbringing which is supposed to heighten the level of social manners (*içtimai terbiye*), (increase) the activity of society (*cemiyet hayatı*) and patriotism (*yurt sevgisi*).²¹⁸”

In articles discussing the Law, statements underline the need to “increase the beauty and the proportion (*tenasüb*)” of the body and the requirement to “keep our bodies stronger for the defense of the country.” This military objective was further emphasized by the claim that this was not an era “where we can expect to find something useful in doing sports for the sake of sports.” Rather, physical activity was an “obligation²¹⁹” (*mecburiyet*) that had already been realized by various countries. The legal step making physical education a matter of the state, was thus seen as a necessity of the period. A young generation of potential candidates for the military would be kept “physically mobilised” and prepared to go into the army. As it is explained in one article, the last war “has once more demonstrated how important a factor (*amil*) a youth brought up with discipline can be in the service of national defense.” Further, a strong army was one where the individuals had been unified, through discipline and training, “into one unit, one whole.”²²⁰

If the youth of a country, with both its girls and its boys, are brought up under the same discipline, then the established unity between the youth and the army will be complete and proved inside all the borders of the country. Now, the obligation to undertake physical education (in our country) has to be observed and seen from this angle...These clubs constitute a step toward the military service and they are undertaking the task of a bridgehead tying the same discipline upwards. Thus, the requirement of physical education is, through adding to each other the at times very weak muscles of the youth which are revolving in the various turmoils of life in cities, towns, and villages, is creating a muscle of youth which is powerful and healthy and which succeeds in every attempt.²²¹

²¹⁸ Paragraph 1 and 2, “Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor Mükellefiyeti hakkında kararname,” in *Düstur*, Üçüncü Tertib, Volume 21 (Ankara Devlet Matbaası, 1940), p.645.

²¹⁹ “Sporumuzda yeni durum: 5, Spor ve sistem meselesi,” *Ulus*, 21 July 1938, p.4.

²²⁰ “Disiplinli sıhatli gençlik,” *Ulus*, 4. May 1941 (editorial).

²²¹ “Eğer bir memleket gençliği, kızıyla, erkeğiyle, aynı disiplin altında yetiştirilmiş olursa, o zaman gençlikle ordu arasında bu birlik, bütün memleket hudutları dahilinde tam ve müspet olur. İşte bizde, beden terbiyesi mükellefiyetini bu bakımdan mütalea etmek ve bu zaviyeden görmek lazımdır. Bundan dolayıdır ki,

In a series of articles on the subject, Dr. Osman Şevki Uludağ discussed different aspects of the Physical Education Law. One striking point referred to by Uludağ was that the “hygiene movements that have begun in the last years in Germany with the aim of saving the race from possible dangers in the future, have emerged through medical thoughts.” According to Uludağ, “Turkish doctors have started their efforts with the belief that this is a national matter, and that the doctor has an absolutely essential role in this matter of making the race more beautiful and strong (*gürbüzleştirmek*).²²²” The race issue will be discussed shortly, but due to its relevance, it should be noted that a relation was established between physical education and the “improvement” of the race in terms of beauty and strength. Although this was not a major concern in the writings on the Law on Physical Education, it is still worth noting that such a link was established and presented in the newspaper and in the following statement the broader approach to Physical Education comes to an expression in an interesting way:

Our new Sports Institute (*Spor Enstitümüz*) is at the same time going to be the laboratory of physical education and sports in the country. The training of staff in these institutes is first going to be possible after the conditions of hygiene under which the people are living, the sanitary situation, and the racial level have been examined and the kind of physical education or sports which people according to their physical condition are supposed to exercise (is decided), and the way to increase the power and energy of the people, which is necessary in the defense of the country, has been identified. The institutes are going to be places where (the) hygiene, anthropology, physiology, anatomy, and even diseases are going to be taught according to this purpose.²²³

gençlik kulüplerinin ordu ile, gençlik arasında bir geçiş iskelesi vazifesi gören, birbirini tamamlayan unsurlar olduğunu görmekle sevinmekteyiz. Bu kulüpler, askerliğin bir basamağı olmakta, ve aynı disiplini daha yukarıya bağlayan bir köprü başı hizmetini görmektedir...İşte beden terbiyesi mükellefiyeti, şehirlerde, kasabalarda ve köylerde, hayatın binbir dağdağası içinde yuvarlanan gençlerin bazan çok nahif olan pazılarını birbirine ekliyerek, ondan kuvvetli, sağlam, tuttuğunu koparır bir gençlik adalesi imal eylemektedir.” “Disiplinli sıhatli gençlik,” Ulus, 4 May 1941 (editorial).

²²² Doktor Osman Şevki Uludağ, “Sporumuzda yeni durum: 3, Spor ve Hekimlik,” *Ulus*, 19 July 1938, p.4.

²²³ “Yeni spor enstitümüz memleketteki beden terbiyesinin ve sporun aynı zamanda laboratuvarı olacaktır. Halkın içinde yaşadığı ihyen şartları, sıhhi durumu, soysal seviyesi, bünyeye göre hangi neviden beden terbiyesi veya sporla uğraşması lazımgeldiği, halkın memleket müdafaası için lüzumlu olan kuvvetini, enerjisini artırmak için hangi yoldan gidileceği ancak bu enstitüde tetkik edildikten sonra işleri başarmak üzere elemanlar yetiştirilebileceği için, orası ihyenin, antropoloji, fizyoloji, teşrih, hatta emrazın da maksada göre tedris edileceği mahal olacaktır. Bunların hepsi tabiat ve tıp işidir. Türk spor sistemi ancak burada ve

The reason for including the Law on Physical Education in this section on the Kemalist approach to Germany and National Socialism is due to the frequent references made in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* to the National Socialist organization of physical education. These references do not make it possible to link the Law on Physical Education as well as the incorporation of sports under the State's domain to the National Socialist experience in Germany. It can however be claimed that the Kemalists were inspired by various countries on the question of the education of the youth, and Germany seems to have been given particular attention on the physical education aspect of this matter. When the fact that the *Hitlerjugend* became famous for its strict ideological and physical organization and mobilization of the German youth is kept in mind, then the Kemalist interest in Germany appears less noteworthy. In the context of this analysis, however, it should be noted that it is possible to trace this distinguishing interest in the German undertakings, which makes it possible to make the above claim that Germany constituted a source of inspiration for the Kemalist leadership on the question of physical education of the youth.²²⁴

böyle kurulur." Doktor Osman Şevki Uludağ, "Sporumuzda yeni durum: 3, Spor ve Hekimlik," *Ulus*, 19 July 1938, p.4.

²²⁴ For references made to Germany on this subject see: "İşin aldığı şumül dolayısıyla Rusya'da, Yugoslavya'da, Fransa'da spor işi müstakil nezaretler kurulmasını icabettirmiştir. Almanya'da bu vazife nazırlarından üstün salahiyetlere malik bir spor Führer'ine verilmiştir. İnsan nesli kudret ve güzellik bakımından eski Yunan devrine en çok asrımızda yaklaşmıştır. Bu da sürekli bir beden terbiyesi sayesinde gerçekleşmiştir." Sadi Irmak, "Günün mevzuları, Beden terbiyesi teşkilatı Maarif Vekillğine geçerken," *Ulus*, 9 June 1942, p.2 and "Bugün Avrupa'da beden terbiyesi alanında bu terbiyenin rejime uygun olarak tadilinde bize en yeni ve güzel misali Almanya'nın verdiğinde şüphe yoktur...Bu arada unutmamalıdır ki muayyen hedefi insan yetiştirmek için icadolan sistemlerin çoğu Almanya'da birkaçı da İsveç ve Felemenkt'te türemiştir. Diğerleri hariç asıl mevzuumuz Almanya'da, bu sistemlerin yerlerini çoktan daha geniş ve bugünkü çağın kültürüne uygun programlara terketmiş olduklarıdır. O kadar ki birinci cihan harbinden evvelki haliyle Almanya'yı bugünkü haliyle ne fikir ne de bunun tamalayıcısı olan beden terbiyesi sahasında kıyaslamak çok hatalı neticeler verir." Nüzhet Baba, (Spor meseleleri) "Dünkü ve bugünkü Almanya'da beden terbiyesi, Yeni Sisteme Nasıl Geçildi?" *Ulus*, 5 July 1942, p.2 and in addition, Atay, "Beden terbiyesi ve modern harpler," *Ulus*, 11 October 1940 (editorial).

Eugenics

A certain rhetoric of race was present in both of the primary sources used for this analysis. Articles concerning socio-biology and eugenics (*ırk hıfzısıhhası*) were published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü* with subjects ranging from the appropriate age of marriage for women (from a eugenics perspective), to the question of the burden persons suffering from mental and physical diseases, were inflicting on the nation.²²⁵ In the newspaper, the Sterilization Law promulgated in Germany in 1933 is discussed extensively. According to this Law, persons with a genetic disease were required to undergo sterilization. To give an example, people suffering from epileptics or mental illnesses, were to be sterilized and the aim was to remove the risk that these diseases were transferred to future generations. The Sterilization Law was a step taken by the Nazis with the overall aim of achieving a pure and healthy German race. The decision to sterilize persons was left to the courts and, according to one article in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, eighty courts and thirteen Supreme courts were allotted to deal with these cases. In addition to the Judge in the court, two doctors, one of whom supposedly a specialist in physiological and sterilization laws, were to be present.²²⁶

The Sterilization Law was featured in one article with the heading “A New Population Law in Germany,” which is very indicative of the approach displayed. The Law was seen

²²⁵ “bir memlekette aklen özürlülerin, hastaların çoğalması, sağlamların yaşama yükünü ağırlaştırıyor...Umumun ve cemiyetin menfaati noktasından şahısların hürriyetini tahdit ederek ruhan hasta olanların evlenmelerine ve evlenmişlerse çocuk yapmalarına mani oluyoruz.” Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Kerim, “Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti,” *Ülkü*, 3, no. 15, (May 1934), p.207.

²²⁶ “Vahim ırsi hastalıklarla malul bulunanları kısırılığa tabi tutan kanun mucibince” kısırılık ameliyatına tabi tutulacakların sayısının, erkek ve kadın olmak üzere, 400.000 olduğu. “Prusya Adliye Nazırı, muhtelif kısırılık vakalarıyla meşgul olmak üzere 80 hususi mahkemenin ihdasını emretmiştir. Bu mahkemeler bir hakim, yeminli bir doktor ve fizyolojik ve ırsi kanunlar mütehassısı diğer bir doktordan teşekkül etmektedir. Bundan başka Prusya’da 13 yüksek mahkeme tesis edilmektedir. Bu mahkemeler istinaf takdirinde yukarıki mahkemelerin bidayet hükümlerini tetkik edileceklerdir.” “Almanya’da Sağlam Nesil Mücadelesi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23 December 1933.

as a step taken by Germany “to secure that its present population will be raised in a stronger manner, both physically as well as mentally (*dimağ*).²²⁷” Further, the step to put into action the Sterilization Law was regarded as a “brave step which is putting it beyond doubt that Germany wants to be a role model to (the) other countries.” As explained in the article, the new fashion among families “who in terms of body and brain are high and strong” to bear only one child, and the fact that families that were of lesser qualities, and who might carry the genes for different illnesses, had “five or ten children,” created a problematic situation in terms of population. With this view as an explanation, the Sterilisation Law was seen as a most “appropriate” solution:

To ensure that its prospective population both in terms of its physics as well as in terms of its mind, is brought up in a stronger way, Germany has imposed (*vazetmek*) a new Law...The poor who are suffering from these genetic diseases and illnesses should willingly accept such a surgery which will protect future generations from these diseases but not have any damaging effect (*iras*) on their own lives and their enjoyment of life. This should be seen as *a blessed duty for the fatherland (vatan)*. The obligatory Law of Sterilization which the new German government has promulgated, which without expecting too much sacrifice from the individual, will protect the interest of society, can therefore be considered as being *extremely just*. With these new Laws, Germany has shown *the courage to take the most severe and decisive step*. Provided that these Laws made by the Germans are scutinized in a proper way, it is going to be seen that the government has on this case acted in a very strict and yet at the same time *compassionate and just way*.²²⁸ [emphasis added]

²²⁷ (Berlin Mektubu) “Almanya’da Yeni Bir Nüfus Kanunu,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 July 1933, p.2. A similar attitude is presented in *Cumhuriyet* where turkishs doctors are asked for their opinions on the Law. Although one doctor presents a more reserved attitude, Dr. Fahrettin Kerim approves the Law and says that it is only showing that “scientific truth, although it might at times be very hurting, in the end will come forth.” See “Deliler, aptallar, hastalar kısır edilmeli mi? Doktorlarımız Almanyada kabul edilen kısırılaştırma kanunu hakkında ne diyorlar?” *Cumhuriyet*, 28 July 1933.

²²⁸ “Almanya; müstakbel nüfusunun gerek beden ve gerekse dimağ itibariyle daha sağlam yetişmesini temin maksadiyle yepyeni bir kanun vazetmiştir...Bugibi irsi illet ve hastalıklara müptela olan zavallıların; kendi hayatlarına ve hayat zevklerine hiç bir zarar iras etmeden müstakbel nesilleri bu illetlerden korumağa yarıyacak bir ameliyata, seve seve riza göstermeleri mukaddes bir vazifei vataniye olsa gerektir. Yeni Alman hükümetinin, fertten büyük bir fedakarlık beklemeden cemaatin faydasını korumak maksadiyle koyduğu mecburi (Sterilisation) kanunu bu itibarla gayet adilane addedilebilir...Almanya, koyduğu yeni kanunlara bu sahada en sert ve kati adımı atmak cesaretini göstermiştir. Almanların bu gaye uğrunda yaptıkları kanunlar eyice tetkik edilirse görülür ki hükümet bu işe çok sert fakat aynı zamanda şefkat ve adaletle hareket etmiştir.” (Berlin Mektubu) “Almanya’da Yeni Bir Nüfus Kanunu,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 July 1933, p.2. [emphasis added]

As part of the general race-rhetoric of both the newspaper and the journal, discussions were presented on the meaning of eugenics (*ırk hıfzısıhhası*) and emphasis put on the importance of eugenics as a scientific discipline. A number of articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, primarily written by Mahmut Şemsi and Sadi Irmak, were concerned with this subject.²²⁹ Mahmut Şemsi gives the following definition on eugenics:

By making use of various means (education, training, and physical exercise), persons who in a race are physically and especially intellectually the most potent, the most intelligent, the most favourable, and who possess the best character, should be discovered and selected, and to ensure the powerful upbringing physically as well as intellectually of future generations, these distinguished persons should be protected in an effective way and their descendants reproduced as much as possible.²³⁰

In the same article, Şemsi presented arguments advocating the sterilization of persons who were seen as not belonging to the “valuable” (*kıymetli*) group of people. In a similar vein, Sadi Irmak dealt with “the necessity” of sterilization. Irmak claimed that even other types of illness, like persons who were “thieves, murderers and prostitutes”, should be included in the category of people with a lower value. Irmak’s claim was that it was

²²⁹ As an indication of the attention given to the question see: Dr. M.Şemsi, “Terbiyenin Biyolojik Temelleri Beden Terbiyesini Takdirde ifrat ve Kızlarımızın Tahsil Meselesi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 August 1933, p.3; Dr. Mahmut Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı, İnsan İrklarının Sıhhati İçin Alınan Yeni Tedbirler,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 October 1933, p.5; Dr. M. Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı, İrk Sağlığı İçin Bulunan Çareler,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 October 1933, p.3; Dr. M. Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı, İrsi İstidatların Muhafaza ve Tekemmülü,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 10 October 1933, p.5; Dr. M. Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 15 October 1933, p.5; Dr. Mahmut Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16 October 1933, p.5; Dr. Mahmut Şemsi, “Sağlık Bahisleri, İrk Sağlığında Mesleklerin Rolü,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 February 1934, p.5; Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Sıhhileşen Türkiye,” *Ulus*, 6 November 1936, (Editorial); G.A., “Hayat ve Sıhat, Saf ırk,” *Ulus*, 11 January 1939, p.5; “Türkiye’nin aile hekimi olan Hıfzısıhha Enstitüsü, Samih Tiryakioğlu, Sıhatımızın bozulmaması için sessiz sedasız çalışan bir koruyucu melektir,” *Ulus*, 26 December 1940, p.5; Prof. Dr. Sadi Irmak, “Sosyal Biyoloji Görüşleri, Nüfus siyaseti bakımından evlenme yaşı,” *Ulus*, 27 May 1941, p.2; Prof. Dr. Sadi Irmak, “Sosyal biyoloji bahisleri, Millet hayatında verasetin rolü: İrsi hastalıklar,” *Ulus*, 9 June 1941, p.4; Prof. Dr. Sadi Irmak, “Sosyal Biyoloji görüşleri, Veraset ve terbiye,” *Ulus*, 14 June 1941, p.2; Sadi Irmak, “İçtimai biyoloji görüşleri, Yüksek kabiliyet ve dehanın irsiliğine dair,” *Ulus*, 18 August 1941, p.4; Sadi Irmak, “Sosyal biyoloji görüşleri, Milli istifa bakımından mecburi kısırlaştırma,” *Ulus*, 1 September, 1941, p.5.

²³⁰ “Bir ırk içindeki bedenlen ve bilhassa dimağan en iktidarlı, en zeki en müsait, en sağlam seciyeli fertleri (*tahsil, terbiye ve idman gibi*) muhtelif vasıtalarla istifade ederek meydana çıkarıp seçmek ve gelecek nesillerin dahi *bedenen ve dimağan* iktidarlı olarak yetişmelerini temin etmek için ırkın böyle güzide şahıslarını müessir bir şekilde himaye ederek bunların nesillerini ırk içinde mümkün olduğu kadar üretmektir.” Dr. M. Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı, İrk Sağlığı İçin Bulunan Çareler,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 October 1933, p.3.

common knowledge that those who committed these kinds of crimes had family members who either earlier had committed crime, or who were suffering from some kind of mental illness. This led Irmak to assume that there was a genetic explanation for crime as well.²³¹ Complementing Sadi Irmak's view, Mahmut Şemsi elaborated further on the question of what should happen to persons of lower capabilities. In his argumentation, Şemsi stated that they should naturally not be killed; a life should be created for them but they should not be able to reproduce as their reproduction would not only lead to poverty but might even end up being a threat to the race and the nation:

What should happen to people who are impotent, stupid, vicious in short, people who are worthless for the health of the race? Should they be condemned to death? No, on the contrary, even they are going to be taken care of to the end of their lives, in a most excessive way, worthy to mankind, and a human life, in the exact sense of the term, be provided for. However, the increase of these persons' number in a race and in a nation (since statistics show that these people reproduce the most and with the highest frequency) does not only increase the misery in that nation, the unlimited (*namahdut*) abundance (*tekessür*) of these individuals, threatens the future of the race, and even the nation. So much so that it puts it in danger.²³²

In the science called eugenics (*ırk sağlığı*), theory and surgery, is closely scrutinized. If there is one thing certain, it is the fact that in all civilized countries large sums of money are spent on the maintenance of the lives of people who are disabled due to genetic defects (*mayubat*) (in other words acholism, tuberculosis, syphilis, neuropathic (illness due to the nerves), epilepsy...psychopathic...the insane, and murderers. These numbers are increasing in an excessive way. These kinds of persons are incapable of fulfilling their familial and social duties, and they are only reproducing the race in the nation.²³³

²³¹ Sadi Irmak, "İçtimai biyoloji görüşleri, Suç işlemede irsin rolü," *Ulus*, 25 August 1941, p.2.

²³² "İktidarsızlar, aptallar, istidatsızlar, seciyesizler ve hastalıklılar velhasıl ırkın sağlığı için kıymetsiz olan şahıslar ne olacaktır? Bunlar ölüme mi mahkum edileceklerdir. Hayır, bilakis, onlar dahi, ferdi hayatlarının sonuna kadar, insanlığına en ziyade layık olan bir şekilde bakılacaklardır, kendilerine tam manası ile insani hayat temin edilecektir. Ancak böyle kıymetsiz şahısların bir ırk, bir millet içinde çoğalmaları (ki böyleleri istatistiklerin gösterdiği veçhile bir ırk içinde en çok ve en çabuk ürüyorlar) o milletin içinde yalnız sefaleti arttırmakla kalmıyor, böyle şahısların ırk dahilinde namahdut bir şekilde tekessürü, ırkın, milletin istikbalini dahi tehdit ediyor. Hatta tehlikeye koyuyor." Dr. M. Şemsi (İrk Sağlığı) "İrk Sağlığı İçin Bulunan Çareler," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 October 1933, p.3.

²³³ "İrk sağlığı denilen ilimde nazariyet ve ameliyat tetkik edilir; muhakkak olan bir şey varsa, bütün medeni memleketlerde irsi mayubat ile malul olanların (yani alkolik, tüberkülos, firengili, nevropathe (yani sinirleri hasta, epileptique, (yani saralı), psychopathe (yani irsi istidatlara mebni dimağın anormal) olanların, deliler ve canilerin) ziyadesiyle artmakta bulunmaları ve bunların hayatlarının idameleri için, milletlerin pek yüksek mikyasta paralar sarfetmekte olduklarıdır. Böyle şahıslar ailevi ve içtimai vazifelerini iyfadan acizdirler ve ırk milletin içinde ziyadesiyle üremektedir." Dr. M. Şemsi (İrk Sağlığı) "İrk Sağlığı İçin Bulunan Çareler," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 October 1933, p.3.

Finally, note should be taken of the fact that the issue of sterilization was discussed in the newspaper independent from the discussion on the Sterilization Law in Germany, as well. Put more clearly, the writings in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* do not solely deal with this subject as a taking of a stance towards the step taken in Germany. Sterilization was presented, by Sadi Irmak and Mahmut Şemsi, as a most necessary and appropriate tool in the field of eugenics for the realization of a healthy race, which was to be achieved through racial (health) measures. Noteworthy however, is the fact that the subject of eugenics and race was given increased attention towards the end of the 1930s which coincides with the racial developments in Germany. The Nuremberg Laws were promulgated in 1935 (banning any relationship and marriage between purely Aryan Germans and non-Aryan races for example), and with the “Night of Krystal” (*Kristallnacht*) on 9 November 1938 the aggressive attacks, as the forerunner of the racist policies against the Jews, took place.

Another topic discussed under the eugenics subject was the role of women, and in particular their appropriate level of education and their appropriate age of marriage from the perspective of attaining a healthy race. In this discussion, it was argued that educated women should get married at a younger age than what had recently become the norm, as their late marriage meant that they would not be able to bear a “sufficient” number of children. Since these women were educated, it was assumed that they must have some sort of “higher” qualities or capabilities. Thus, it was preferred that they have more children compared to uneducated women, again, from society’s point of view and when the aim of a healthy race was kept in mind. After all, “among all the professions (*meslek*), the most beautiful, the most healthy, the one with the highest virtue, the most intelligent and the most talented, in short: there is one duty on which the woman cannot be replaced and which is *the most valuable* duty awaiting the woman: this duty is to become the mother of

children with high merits.²³⁴” In the arguments presented in these articles, the aim of a “healthy race” was continuously emphasized. In a similar way, succesful sports-people were also seen as worthy of having more children “because if the strong and beautiful ones are not going to have children, then there will not remain any beautiful and strong persons in the nation.”²³⁵ It should suffice to note that the line of argumentation in this passage resembles the one seen in the explanation given on the German Sterilization Law: categorization of people according to their capabilities and the preference that those with the “higher” qualities should outnumber those with the “lower” ones, be it with a legal step such as the Sterilization Law or through different means of encouragement:

Especially if the *valuable women* decide not to have children, then the dependence (*istiklalsizlik*) prevailing among women will have increased excessively. Because then reproduction will have been left to worthless women. Our girls who are continuing their education at the university or other institutions for higher education are, from a eugenics perspective, constituting a completely infavourable case of natural selection. Although educated women constitute the most valuable part of a race and are the chosen (*müntehap*) ones in terms of physical power, character, determination, will, and intellectual capability, still, the notion of motherhood is for these girls in a state of total disuse and empty. *Women who are physically and intellectually less valuable are, however, getting married and forming families with lots of children.* [emphasis added] *We deem it appropriate to note that regarding the scientific value of this article as certain, we do not agree with its sociological analyses. We have however included the article which is covering an idea debated in the whole world, to show that these kinds*

²³⁴ “Çünkü bütün meslekler içinde: en güzel, en sıhhatli, en yüksek haslette, en zeki ve en kabiliyetli velhasıl bir kelime ile: En kıymetli kadını bekliyen ve onun yerini hiç bir kimsenin tutamıyacağı tek bir meslek vardır; bu meslek yüksek kıymetteki çocukların anası olmaktır. Halbuki ahvali hazıra bilhassa böyle kıymetli kadınları başka meslekler için analıktan uzaklaştırmaktadır.” Dr. M.Şemsi, “Terbiyenin Biyolojik Temelleri Beden Terbiyesini Takdirde ifrat ve Kızlarımızın Tahsil Meselesi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 August 1933, p.3 and further, “Yüksek bir nesil yaratmak ve bu yüksek neslin anaları olmak, bundan daha şerefli ve bundan daha güzel bir meslek olabilir mi? Analık, bugün dahi her şeyden üstündür.” Dr. M. Şemsi, “Terbiyenin Biyolojik Temelleri, Kadın Meselesi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16 August 1933, and finally, “Çocuk olacağı zaman bir aile ruhan ve beden zinde olmalı, keyif verici zehirlerden temiz bulunmalıdır. Bir tarafta cinsi iktidarsızlık varsa aileyi devam ettirmemeli, ayrılmalıdır...Kadınlarda irsi sanat ev hanımlığı ve valideliktir. Bundan dolayı mümkün olduğu kadar kadın umumi hayata atılmamalıdır. Ev işiyle ve çocuğunun terbiyesiyle meşgul olmalıdır...Kadınlar mümkün olduğu kadar erken evlenip eyi ana olmalıdırlar.” Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Kerim, “Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti,” *Ülkü*, 3, no. 15 (May 1934), p.211.

²³⁵ “En iyi sporcuların ya hiç çocukları yoktur ve yahut da pek az çocukları vardır. Bu, malum bir keyfiyettir. Bu hale bilhassa sportmen hanımlarda tesadüf ediliyor...İrk için ise, bilhassa milletin böyle kudretli şahıslarının çocuk yapmalarının büyük ehemmiyeti vardır. Kuvvet ve güzellik ideali çok iyi bir şeydir. Fakat bizi buna götürecektir yol ırk sağlığıdır. Zira kuvvetliler ve güzeller çocuk yapmıyacak olursa, milletin içinde güzel ve kuvvetli insan kalmıyacaktır.” Dr. M.Şemsi, “Terbiyenin Biyolojik Temelleri Beden Terbiyesini Takdirde ifrat ve Kızlarımızın Tahsil Meselesi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 14 August 1933, p.3.

of analyses are also being made among our readers (*karilerimizde*). [latter statement the view of the newspaper]²³⁶

It can certainly be questioned whether these radical views of Sadi Irmak and Mahmut Şemsi can be taken as representative of mainstream Kemalism, and to what degree they were endorsed and approved by the newspaper. Especially since the majority of their articles were not editorials, it is difficult to make the claim that the above mentioned contributors represented the official view of the daily. The note put in the end of Mahmut Şemsi's article quoted just above stating that "although the scientific value of this article is considered as absolute, we deem it appropriate to note that we do not agree with the sociological conclusions reached in it"²³⁷ gives credit to this questioning.

With this pre-condition in mind, it still remains true that the writings of both Sadi Irmak and Mahmut Şemsi were given space in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, and in fact, these two writers' articles outnumbered those of other writers on the race subject. Therefore, although Irmak and Şemsi were not part of the mainstream Kemalist group under consideration, which makes it impossible to take their views as representative of mainstream Kemalism, it should still be taken into consideration that no opposing views were challenging or questioning the ideas of these two figures. Maybe belonging to the radical minority within the official political-ideological group, their long-running articles

²³⁶ "...bilhassa kıymetli kadınlar çocuk istemeyecek olurlarsa, kadın cinsindeki istiklalsizlik daha büyümüş, daha ziyade artmış olacaktır. Çünkü bu defa çocuk yapma kıymetsiz kadınlara terkedilmiş demektir... Darülfünuna ve yüksek mekteplere devam eden kızlarımız ise, ırk sağlığı bakımından tamamen gayri müsait bir ıstıfa teşkil ederler... Yüksek tahsil görmüş olan kadınlar, bir ırkın müntehap, bedeni iktidar, seciye, azim ve irade ve dimağı kabiliyet itibariyle en kıymetli unsurlarını teşkil ettikleri halde kendilerinde, içtimai kuvvetin en yüksek ve en kıymetlisi olan validelik tamamen muattal, bomboş bir haldedir. Bedenen ve dimağan az kıymetli olan kadınlar ise evleniyor ve çok çocuklu aileler teşkil ediyorlar." [İlmi değeri muhakkak olan bu yazının sosyolojik tahlillerinde isabet görmediğimizi buraya kaydetmeyi faydalı gördük: Yalnız yazı bütün dünyada konuşulan bir fikri ihtiva ettiği için karilerimize bu tarzda tahliller de yapılabildiğini göstermiş olmak için koyuyoruz.] This latter statement made by the newspaper Dr. M. Şemsi, "Terbiyenin Biyolojik Temelleri, Kadın Meselesi" *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 15 August 1933, p.5.

²³⁷ "İlmi değeri muhakkak olan bu yazının sosyolojik tahlillerinde isabet görmediğimizi buraya kaydetmeyi faydalı gördük: Yalnız yazı bütün dünyada konuşulan bir fikri ihtiva ettiği için karilerimize bu tarzda tahliller de yapılabildiğini göstermiş olmak için koyuyoruz." Dr. M. Şemsi, "Terbiyenin Biyolojik Temelleri, Kadın Meselesi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 15 August 1933, p.5.

published in the newspaper give credit to the argument that they were covered or embraced by official Kemalism.

This brief discussion should by now demonstrate the character of the interest of the Kemalists in the race issue. With the pre-condition mentioned above kept in mind about the degree of representativeness, particularly because the writings used in this discussion were not editorials, it should be clear that there was a concern about the “scientific” developments concerning race. The notion of a “healthy race” was openly advocated and discussed in the newspaper, and references were made to different research experiments and results accomplished in countries like the United States of America, Britain, and Germany. These references were partly made to show that the health of the race was a general concern in the world. The race-rhetoric was present in sources of official Kemalism, even if only in a limited way and some of the views had an extreme character at times leading to associations with the ideas and arguments of the National Socialist ideology. In an article in which he defined eugenics and further, discussed the necessity of sterilization for a healthy race, Mahmut Şemsi for example ended with the following striking words:

ON ONE HAND, TO MULTIPLY, AND PERFECT THE PHYSICALLY AND INTELLECTUALLY STRONG PARTS OF THE RACE, and on the other, to hinder the growth of worthless persons in the nation.²³⁸

In general, the race aspect of National Socialist ideology does not gain much attention in the sources. The policies against the Jews, to take an important example, are not discussed extensively nor is news on this subject given much space. In the few articles

²³⁸ “BİR TARAFTAN İRKİN BEDENEN VE DİMAĞAN KUVVETLİ OLAN UNSURLARINI MUHAFAZA, TEKESSÜR VE TEKEMMÜL ETTİRMEK diğer taraftan da milletin içindeki kıymetsiz şahıslarının çoğalmalarına mani olmaktır.” Dr. M. Şemsi, “İrk Sağlığı İçin Bulunan Çareler,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 9 October 1933, p.3.

dealing with National Socialist racism, it is nevertheless obvious that the official Kemalists did not approve of the Nazi racist ideas. In Burhan Asaf's words, "it leads to a great amount of sadness felt against the German people, to see this race hysteria, as those who know this nation closely, know how valuable (are the) things which they have brought about."²³⁹,

The National Socialist efforts to unite the German nation and create a consciousness among the nation about the German past were stated as something understandable in one article. Further, efforts, meaning the exclusion or "denial" of people "who have become mixed into the national being, but who are still staying outside of Germanness and who are gathering around a different kind of tie (*bağ*)," were stated as being legitimate. This group of people would only have a negative effect on the nation, damaging the nation from inside. This argument illustrates how in the Kemalist approach to National Socialist Germany, a large part of Nazi aims and efforts were understood and approved. The efforts to bring up the German people according to the National Socialist ideology and its aims, and in this way create the German nation and gather it around the single high ideal of Germany, were approved of in the article just mentioned. The exclusion and denial of people living inside the nation, but who tended not to be part of the nation by their commitment to something other than the high national ideal, was seen as a legitimate cause. Aggressive racism as practised by the Nazi rule was not discussed explicitly and it seems that this was the point where the mainstream Kemalist leadership drew the line. As an expression of this "dual" attitude, on the one hand distancing itself to race-based

²³⁹ "Avrupalıların ırk etrafındaki bu masalları ötedenberi malumdur. Fakat ırkçılığın bir nevi içtimai histerya haline getirilmesi Hitlerci rejime müyesser olmuştur. Kendilerinden başka bütün insanları kitaplar, konferanslar, radyolar hulasa neşriyatın her neviyle tahkir etmek kafi gelmiyormuş gibi, bir de beşkalarına sataşıyorlar...bu ırk histeryası insanda, Alman milletine karşı derin bir üzüntü uyandırıyor. Çünkü bu milleti yakından tanıyanlar, ne kıymetler doğurmuş olduğunu bilirler." Burhan Asaf, (Yarı Siyasi) "İrk Demagojisi," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 August 1933, p.3.

nationalism and on the other hand seeing measures taken against people who were not part of the national ideal as legitimate, the following statement is striking:

To say the truth it is difficult to understand Hitler's repudiation of the notion of the nation and replace it with the notion of the race...Hitler has declared that the task of bringing up the nation is the goal of his party, to stamp the race and its heroism to the spirit of the German nation. If, with his cause of racism, Hitler is intending to reject those people who have been mixed up with the national being but who still express an inclination towards any tie outside of Germanness, and if his purpose is to bound the German people to the history of German race and educate it, then he is very much entitled to this...the manifestations of foreign soul which has been mixed up with the nation and brought up by others, or this or that international doctrine, in a national society will only open a road as that of a worm in a fruit. Is it possible for such a fruit not to rot? Germany had turned into a rotting fruit. Hitler is mercilessly peeling off this rottenness with the sharp point of a knife.²⁴⁰

Peasantism

Peasantism was an important aspect of National Socialism which was also acknowledged by the political-ideological Kemalist leadership. The aim of creating legitimacy and support to the Nazi regime constitutes one explanation for the peasantist orientation. Further than that however, as was shortly mentioned in the theoretical discussion in Chapter Two, the idealized perception of the German peasants as being pure (in terms of nationality and race) due to their exemption from the damaging consequences of urbanisation and industrialization, is also an important factor in the Nazi rule's

²⁴⁰ "Hitler'in millet anlayışını inkar ederek bunun yerine ırk anlayışını koyması, doğrusu güç anlaşılır. İstila yapmış bir ırkla istila görmüş bir memlekette kan farikasını cemiyetin damgası diye kullanabilmek imkansızdır...Hitler, fırkasının, milleti yetiştirmek içinde vazifesi, alman milletinin, ruhuna, ırk ve onun kahramanlığının damgasını vurmak olduğunu söylemiştir...eğer Hitler, ırkçılık davası ile, milli varlığın içine karışmış, fakat hala, almanlığın dışında şu veya bu bağın etrafında bir topluluk temayülü gösterenleri inkar ederek alman milletini, cermen ırkının tarihine bağlayış [bağlayıp] terbiye etmeyi kastediyorsa, bunda yerden göğe kadar hakkı vardır...Milletin içine karışmış başkalarının getirdikleri yabancı ruh tezahürleri de, şu veya bu enternasyonal doktrin de, milli bir cemiyette, kendisine, ancak bir kurdun bir yemişin içinde kendine yol açtığı gibi yol açar. Böyle bir yemişin çürümemesi mümkün müdür? Almanya çürüyen bir yemişe dönmüştü. Hitler bu çürüğü, bir sivri bıçak ucu ile acımadan soyup atıyor." Nüzhet Haşim, "Hitler'in ırkçılığı," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1 October 1933, p.3.

peasantist orientation and rhetoric.²⁴¹ This aspect of National Socialism attracted the interest of the mainstream Kemalist elite and the subject was discussed in a number of articles in the daily.²⁴² The amount of references and the generally positive character of the approach presented in these statements give the impression that German peasantism constituted a source of inspiration for official Kemalism. In various articles, it was stated that the importance given to the peasantry in Germany should constitute an example to be followed for Turkey.²⁴³ The peasantist rhetoric prevailed, both in specific articles concerning Germany and in writings with a general character, with references made to the importance of the peasants for the Kemalist Revolution. It should be recalled that peasantism was adopted and strongly advocated among the Kemalist elite in the period under study. In articles in *Ülkü*, for example, the peasantist rhetoric was evident and questions related to the villages and the peasants were discussed extensively.²⁴⁴ The

²⁴¹ "Köylülük, örneğin Hitler'in tabiriyle, "başımızı ağrıtan toplumsal hastalıklara karşı en iyi sigortayı" sağlıyordu... Benzer şekilde, Nazi resmi belgelerinde köylüler "Alman devletinin köşetaşları," ve Alman halkının en sağlıklı fiziksel ve ruhani özelliklerinin en kuvvetli taşıyıcıları olarak karakterize ediliyordu... Köycülükleri anti-şehir ve anti-sanayi bir söylem ihtiva ediyordu." M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, "Bir Tepeden Reform Denemesi, 'Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu'nun Hikayesi," in *Birlikim*, March 1998, p.41.

²⁴² "Almanya Mektupları, Köy Pedagojisi ve Türkiye İçin Ne Manası Vardır," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22 June 1932; "Almanya Neşriyatı, Yeni Almanya'da Köycülük, (Almanya'daki Hitlercilerin uyandırdığı köycülük cereyanı etrafındaki çalışmaların izahını ve bu mevzuu temas eden kamunların bir tahlilini yapan bu yazıyı bir siyasi bültenden alıyoruz:)" *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28 September 1933, p.4; Neşet Halil Atay, "Almanya mektupları, Üçüncü Rayhta köy," *Ulus*, 13 April 1935, p.3; Neşet Halil Atay, "Köy İçin Tetkikler," *Ulus*, 30 April 1936, p.2; Neşet Halil Atay, "Köy için tetkikler, Almanyanın zirai yapısı," *Ulus*, 30 May 1936, p.2; İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, "İktisadi meseleler, Alman hububat siyaseti ve tatbikatı," *Ulus*, 29 October 1942, p.2; İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, "İktisadi meseleler, Alman hububat siyaseti ve tatbikatı," *Ulus*, 30 October 1942, p.2; İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, "Ekonomik Meseleler, Almanya'da 'Devlet İaşe Korporasyonu,'" 3 December 1942, p.2.

²⁴³ "Köylüsü bizim köylümüze nazaran çok daha münevver olan ve zirai olmaktan ziyade sınai bir memleket bulunan Almanyanın bu meseleye verdiği ehemmiyet, bizim için bir nümune olmalıdır. Köy mekteplerimizin bugünkü vaziyeti, bize bu reformatik mesaide, avrupalılardan çok daha müsait bir saha arz etmek kabiliyetindedir." "Almanya Mektupları, Köy Pedagojisi ve Türkiye İçin Ne Manası Vardır?" *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 22 June 1932, pp.2-3.

²⁴⁴ Nusret Kemal, "Köy Seferberliğine Doğru," *Ülkü*, 1, no.5 (June 1933); Mehmet Saffet, "Köycülük Nedir?" *Ülkü*, 1, no. 6 (July 1933); Dr. Zeki Nasır, "Köylerimizin Sağlık İşleri," *Ülkü*, 2, no. 7 (August 1933); Nusret Kemal, "Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi," *Ülkü*, 2, no. 8, (September 1933); Bahadır R. Dülger, "Köyün Gücü," *Ülkü*, 7, no. 37, (March 1936).

peasantist orientation and rhetoric among the Kemalist elite continued throughout the 1930s and reached a peak towards the end of this decade with the establishment of the Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri*) in 1940.²⁴⁵ In the extensive discussion about the peasantist subjects, it was possible to find articles in which an ideal view of the peasants was given, describing them as “conciliatory, compliant, and dignified.” In addition to such qualities, it was further claimed that “if a nation is seeking the fundamental lines (*ana çizgilerini*) of its history, it will find them in its clearest form in the peasant.”²⁴⁶ This idea, that the pure form of the nation could be found in the villages, resembles the peasantism advocated by the Nazi ideology.

German peasantism was seen as part of the project of nationalization of the National Socialist regime in articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*. As explained in one article, by protecting the German peasant, the regime aimed at “just as in the political and cultural sphere, to be self-sufficient in the economic one as well.”²⁴⁷ The state controlled the peasantry and had a decisive say in the agricultural production as “the peasant cannot grow whichever product wherever he wants.” This was decided by the state, leading Neşet Halil

²⁴⁵ On the establishment of the Village Institutes in Turkey, see M. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, “The Village Institute Experience in Turkey,” in *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 25, 1 (May 1998).

²⁴⁶ “Köylü gayri şahsidir. Onun için kendinden bile önce soy ve ocak vardır. Köylü, barışçıdır; uysaldır; oturaklı, törücü ve saygılıdır. Köylü, saftır. Köylü olduğu gibi görünür...Köylünün duygusu; normalin üstünde, arık, keskin ve sandığımızdan çok incedir. Köylü, yapılarında ölçülüdür. İhtiyaçlarında yorganına göre ayağını uzatır ve düşünüşünde aşırılık (ifrat) tan kaçınır...Köylü, susaktır. Her aklına geleni söylemez, zevzeklikten hoşlanmaz...Eğer bir ulus, tarihinin ana çizgilerini ararsa onu en belli olarak köylüde bulur. Orada yaşanmış tarihin ana çizgileri arık ve saf olarak yaşar, durur.” Said Aydoslu, “Köylü ve Köylü Ekonomisi,” *Ülkü*, 5, no. 27 (May 1935), p.174.

²⁴⁷ “Nasyonal sosyalistler, Almanyanın yüzünü tekrar toprağa çevirmişlerdir. Hitler bu yeni Almanyayı: ‘İstikbalin Almanyası ya yalnız bir köylü rayhı olacak, yahut tıpkı Hohenstanfen, Hohenzollern Almanyaları gibi batıp gidecektir. Onlar ırki ve iktisadi merkezlerini kendi içlerinde aramayı unuttukları için battılar...Alman köylüsünün henüz tıkanmamış olan kuvvet kaynakları ihya edilmedikçe nasyonal sosyalist devriminin kafadan işe çıkmasına imkan yoktur’ diye anlatır. Nasyonal sosyalistler alman ulusunu kendi toprağının mahsulleriyle doyurumuna, üçüncü rayhı sıyasada, kültürde olduğu kadar ekonomide de ulusallaştırmağa çalışıyorlar. Nasyonal sosyalistlerin alman köyünü yeniden kuran ve koruyan üç kanunları vardır: Bunlardan biri (köylüler korporasyonu) kanunu, ikincisi (irsi çiftlik kanunu) üçüncüsü de (iaşe) kanunudur.” Neşet Halil Atay, (Almanya mektupları) “Üçüncü Rayhta köy,” *Ulus*, 13 April 1935, p.3.

to claim that in Germany “the village is not for the peasant, but the village and the peasant are for Germany.”²⁴⁸

In line with the positive perception of Nazi peasantism, the important legal-political steps taken in Germany concerning the peasants were followed and presented in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*. Immediately after coming to power, the National Socialist party “first of all declared the peasantry to be the blood source of the German race.” As a legal step ‘executing’ this idea, the Law on Rights of Property (*Erbhofrecht*), which was launched in September 1933, meant a new order of land. This Law, which was discussed by İsmail Hüsrev Tökin in articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, defined small agricultural producers (*işletmeler*) as *Erbhof* or “farms based on race” according to certain criteria. If a farm had been the property of a person belonging to the German nation (excluding Jews and races with ‘tainted blood’) since the year 1800, if the size of the land was 125 hectares at maximum and finally, if the farm was able to provide the living of a small family, then it was an *Erbhof* and certain legal rules had to be followed in its running. An *Erbhof* farm could neither be shared nor sold, it had to remain in the same size and some specific rules were regulating the heritage.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ “Üçüncü rayh da, köylü hür fakat istihsal dirijedir. Köylü dilediği yere dilediği mahsulü ekemez. Ona, ekeceği yer ve o yere ekilecek mahsul söylenir. Köy, köylü için değil köy ve köylü, Almanya içindir. Üçüncü Rayhda köylü alman kanından veya ırkı buna benzer bir kandan gelen volkgenossedir. Hodbin liberalizm ve komünizm ve köylülük taban tabana zıd şeylerdir. Nasyonal sosyalizmin, irsi çiftlik kanunu, köylüyü bundan sonra eski alman hukukuna göre, toprağında sağlam olarak kökleştirecek, ve toprağına sahip olmak hakkını her türlü ekonomik buhranlara rağmen satılmaz ve borç ödemez bir mülk haline getirecektir.” Neşet Halil Atay, (Almanya mektubları) “Üçüncü Rayhta köy,” *Ulus*, 13 April 1935, p.3.

²⁴⁹ “1933 te iktidar mevkiine gelen Nasyonal-Sosyalist parti evvela köylüyü Alman ırkının kan kaynağı olarak ilan etti. Binaenaleyh bu kaynak her türlü içtimai, iktisadi ve moral sarsıntılardan masun kalmalıydı. 1933 eylül 29 da neşredilen *Erbhof* kanunu ile yeni bir toprak nizamı tesis edildi. Alman ırkına mensup çiftçilerin (yani 1800 haziranının birinde yaşamış olup yahudi veya renkli bir ırka mensup olmıyanların) şahsi mülkiyetinde bulunup cesameti azami 125 hektar olan ve küçük bir aileyi geçindirmeye kifayet edecek kudrette olan zirai işletmeler *Erbhof*, irsi çiftliktir. *Erbhof* taksim edilemez. Nesilden nesile aynı hacimde kalır. Bir varise ancak toplu olarak intikal eder. *Erbhof* satılamaz. Variz, ancak Almanya'nın bazı yerlerinde en büyük oğul, bazı yerlerde en küçük oğuldur. Bazı ahvalde toprak sahibi mirasçıyı evvelden tayin eder. Toprağı alan varis, diğer aile efradına tazminat vermiğe mecbur değildir. Yalnız onlara çiftlikte bakmak ve küçükleri okutmakla mükelleftir. Babanın bırakmış olduğu menkuller için umumi veraset kaideleri caridir.” İsmail Hüsrev “Tökin, (İktisadi meseleler) “Alman hububat siyaseti ve tatbikatı,” *Ulus*, 29 October 1942, p.2.

In a second article on the Erbhof Law, in addition to giving further information, Tökin says that the National Socialist regime “realized the principle of the ‘Leader’s (Şef) State” by putting an end to the “division of powers” principle. This meant that the economy of the country was to be organized according to the general interests of the nation. The latter meant that Etatism, or the state’s control of the economic sphere, was to be preferred and, according to Tökin, the agricultural sector was to be “the first area in which the State-ist policies were executed.”

In National Socialism, political action comprehends total consignment (*sevk*) and direction. This consignment and direction is crystallized in the might of the state. The state serves the realization of the racial aim. Thus, National Socialism has put into existence the principle of the “Leadership State.” In the “Leadership State” the “division of powers” principle has been put to an end. As an indispensable result of this, *the economy, with the purpose of serving the single aim of ensuring the collective interest of the nation*, has been subjected to total consignment and direction, and to the order and commandment of the state...Because the National Socialist party programme today has accepted the principle of re-organizing the order of professional classes in the economy, in Germany, the field in which this (professional class) order (Staendische Aufbau) was first and most preferably to be applied, was agriculture.²⁵⁰ [emphasis added]

In spite of the lack of any subjective views in the article by Tökin, the above quotation still gives an indication of the author’s look upon the Erbhof Law, presented as one of the steps taken by the regime in Germany to fulfill the aim of putting “the general interest” of the nation (also in the economic field) above everything.

²⁵⁰ “Nasyonal-Sosyalizmde siyasi aksiyon, topyekun sevk ve idareyi tazammun eder. Total sevk ve idare ise, devlet kudretinde billurlaşır. Devlet, ırki gayenin gerçekleşmesine hizmet eder. Nasyonal-Sosyalizm böylece ‘Şef Devleti’ prensipini gerçekleştirmiştir. Şef Devletinde ‘kuvvetlerin taksimi’ prensipine son verilmiştir. Bunun zaruri bir neticesi olarak ekonomi de milletin müşterek menfaatini teminden ibaret olan tek bir gayeye hizmet etmesi için total bir sevk ve idareye, devletin emir ve kumandasına tabi kılınmıştır. Bu topyekun sevk ve idare, idari muhtariyeti bozacak mahiyette değildir. Aksine olarak idarede muhtariyet ve mesuliyet, ancak bu sayede mümkün olabilmektedir. Bu esaslardan hareket edilerek devlet ile ekonomi arasında mutavassıt organlar halinde muhtar teşekküller vücuda getirilmiştir. Devlet kendi bünyesine yabancı fonksiyonları bu teşekküllere devrederek iktisadi mesuliyetini azaltmaktadır. Fakat diğer taraftan da bu teşekküller vasıtasıyla ekonomi, devlet kadrosu içine alınmış olmaktadır...Bugün Nasyonal-Sosyalist parti programı, ekonomide mesleki sınıf nizamını yeniden kurulmasını prensip olarak kabul etmiş bulunduğundan Almanya’da mesleki sınıf nizamının (Staendische Aufbau) en önce ve tercihan tatbik edildiği saha, ziraat olmuştur.” İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, (Ekonomik Meseleler) “Almanya’da ‘Devlet İşe Korporasyonu,’” *Ulus*, 3 December 1942, p.2. [emphasis added]

It has interestingly been claimed that the Nazi Erbhof Law constituted the model for the Kemalist political leadership when it promulgated the Land Law (*Toprak Kanunu*) in Turkey in 1945.²⁵¹ The aim of the Land Law was in general “to supply landless peasants with land, provide loans and some important means required for production,” and further, “to inhibit the decrease or increase of the size of lands” to secure a certain largeness, and finally, “to secure a continuity in the usage of the land.”²⁵² In his explanation of the Nazi Erbhof Law, Ömer Celal Sarç states that “there is a socio-political (*siyasi-içtimai*) aim with the National Socialist Land Reform: to create a rooted class of peasants, and to protect and reinforce the peasant’s qualities such as his attachment to the land, patriotic and nationalist feelings, and conservatism.” “According to the National Socialist doctrine,” the peasants thus constituted the “strongest fundament of the State and the element of stability of society.”²⁵³

Noting the parallels which have been drawn between the Erbhof Law and the Turkish Land Law, what can be said in a certain manner based on the present study is that the peasantist aspect of National Socialist ideology constituted one of the points which was given particular attention by mainstream Kemalists throughout the period under study. In

²⁵¹ The Land Law was met with opposition from large landowners, including Adnan Menderes who was to be among the founders of the Democrat Party. In a discussion of the draft of the Law, Menderes claimed: “‘çiftçi ocağı’ ile ilgili hükümlerin, Hitler’in nasyonal sosyalist rejiminin toprak iskan kanunu olan Erbhof kanunundan hemen aynen iktibas olunmuş.” Quoted in Karaömerlioğlu, “Tepeden Reform,” p.34; and further see, *ibid.*, p.40. In addition, Niyazi Berkes, in his memoirs, refers to Prof. Ömer Celal Sarç’s resembling argument and says that “Onun gösterdiği gibi, bu kanun, aslında bir Nazi kanunundan alınmıştı...Tasarının bütün ruhu Türkiye’nin tarım ekonomisini ‘köylü ocağı’ ekonomisi yapmaktı. Bu ‘köylü ocağı’ denen şey, Hitler zamanında ‘Erbhoff’ denen şeyin ta kendisi.” Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 2nd printing (Istanbul: İletişim, 1997), p.246.

²⁵² “‘Çiftçi Ocakları’ çıkarılarak kanunlaşan ÇTK (Çiftçiyi Topraklandırma Kanunu)’nın en genelde hedefi topraksız ve az topraklı köylülere toprak vermek, kredi ve tarımsal araçlar gibi köylünün üretim için gereksindiği bazı önemli vasıtaları sağlamak...toprakların belli bir büyüklüğün üstüne çıkmasını ve altına inmesini engellemek, ve son olarak toprağın sürekli kullanımını garanti altına almak.” Karaömerlioğlu, p.33.

²⁵³ “Nasyonal sosyalist toprak inkılabının siyasi-içtimai bir gayesi vardır: kökleşmiş bir çiftçi sınıfı meydana getirmek, köylünün toprağa bağlılık, vatan sevgisi, milliyetçilik, muhafazakarlık gibi vasıflarını muhafaza etmek ve kuvvetlendirmek. Nasyonal sosyalist doktrinine göre böyle bir sınıf ideolojisi itibariyle devletin en sağlam temelini ve cemiyetin istikrar unsurunu teşkil etmektedir.” Ömer Celal Sarç, quoted in Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, p.247.

general, a positive approach was presented and Nazi peasantism appeared as a source of inspiration for the Kemalist rule.

To summarize the analysis on the Kemalist approach to National Socialism and Germany, on the question of Hitler's leadership, more than putting forth the dictatorial and absolutist features of his rule, Hitler's importance for the German people as the "strong leader" trying to establish national unity in Germany by putting an end to the ills of anarchy and his struggle for establishing the political independence of Germany internationally, was stressed. On the question of the education of the youth, a particular stress on the necessity to give physical education to the youth, was identified. The National Socialist regime, seen as a movement of the youth, and its practices, were seen as examples to be learnt from. Regarding the Law on Physical Education promulgated in 1938, references were made, among other countries, to Germany as a case illustrating the importance and essentiality of such a requirement.

Finally, the peasantist feature of National Socialism was a point given special attention in the sources. In addition to the articles directly concerning German peasantism, in writings on peasantism in Turkey, references were made to the German experience. It was seen that İsmail Hüsrev Tökin presented the content and implications of the Erbhof Law in two long and detailed articles in the newspaper in December 1942, almost ten years after the Law had been promulgated in Germany, in a period when peasantism was advocated strongly among the Kemalist elite in Turkey. Although Tökin did not present any subjective views on the Erbhof Law, these articles did exemplify the interest in the agricultural developments in Germany, giving credibility to the claim that National Socialist peasantism constituted a source of inspiration for mainstream Kemalist figures in Turkey.

The Limited Democracy Rhetoric

In this section the democracy rhetoric expressed in the sources under discussion will be examined in brief. A look upon the Kemalist perception and image of democracy will be contributive to the understanding of the image and perception of fascist ideology, as discussed extensively in the analysis above. In the primary sources examined so far, only a very limited use of a democracy rhetoric was identified, making it possible to argue that democracy was far from any prioritized concern of the political leadership in the 1930s, which falls well in line with the dominance of authoritarianism in the political-ideological discourse of the period.

The approach presented towards democracy, mainly in the articles in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)*, is mostly one of rejection of democracy, particularly when it is regarded as synonymous with liberalism. Nevertheless, while the negative aspects of contemporary liberal democracies are stressed and an ideological-political distance put to liberal regimes, it is at the same time possible to identify a limited number of statements which treat democracy as an ideal and acknowledge its inherently positive qualities.

As an example of the perception of democracy presented in the newspaper, in a disagreement between Neşet Halil (Atay), a main contributor of articles and editorials, and Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), the democratic character of the Kemalist revolution was discussed. Şevket Süreyya claimed that the present stage of the Kemalist Revolution could not be termed as being a democracy. Further he stated that “the Turkish Revolution is a revolution which aims at establishing a democratic regime but the present “political order” (*siyasi nizam*) in which it finds itself, is not democracy in itself.” Şevket Süreyya claimed that this present “political order” is in contradiction with the points of action (*hareket noktaları*) and the political mechanisms (liberalism and parliamentarism) of classical,

political democracy.²⁵⁴” This view was rejected by Neşet Halil, who accused his colleague of not approving democracy and claimed that this was the actual cause for his view of the Kemalist Revolution as not being democratic. According to Neşet Halil, it was “tragic” (*hazin*) to speak about the “ideology of our Revolution without believing in democracy.”²⁵⁵ In addition, “to claim that the Turkish revolutionary system is not democratic means that one has not understood the points of action of the Turkish Revolution.” And Şevket Süreyya’s reason for making these claims was “as he himself admits, because he is an enemy of democracy.”²⁵⁶

Seeking a compromise between these harshly opposing views, Zeki Mesut wrote that “if democracy is seen as an aim rather than as a means, then it might be easier to reach a common understanding about its conception (*mefhumu*):”

If democracy is taken into consideration more as an aim, rather than as a means, then it might be easier to reach an agreement on its notion. The known means of democracy are sometimes not free from leading to results in opposition to democracy. Considering that class (based) governments give opportunity to class oppression, they are being incompatible (*münafi*) towards the social spirit of justice, hence towards the real aim of democracy.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴ “Bu nizam ‘demokrasi’ diyenler vardır. Yanlıştır. Türk inkılabı, demokratik bir rejimi istihdaf eden bir inkılapdır, denilebilir. Fakat, onun, şimdi içinde yaşadığı ‘siyasi nizam’ bizatihi demokrasi değildir. Bu nizam, klasik siyasi demokrasinin hem hareket noktaları ve hem de siyasi mekanizması ile (liberalizm, parlamantarizm) tezat halindedir... Harp sonu Avrupasında meydana alan Anti-Demokratik cereyanların vüsat ve ehemmiyeti tetkik olununca görülür ki, bu cereyanlar, şu veya bu milletin Demokrasi rejimine intibaktaki kabiliyetsizliğinin birer eseri olmaktan ziyade, cihanın gidişinde ve milletlerin bünyelerinde meydana alan derin stürüktürel tehavvüllerin içtinabedilmez birer aksi tesiridir.” Şevket Süreyya, “Fikir Münakaşaları, İnkılabın İdeolojisi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 23 January 1931, p.5 (answer to Neşet Halil bey).

²⁵⁵ “Demokrasi milletlere ihtiyaçlarını düşündüren, tedbirlerini bizzat aldırın bir rejimdir. Milletler ancak demokrasi yolunda ilerledikçe içinde yaşadıkları müşkülata bir çare buluş refaha erebileceklerdir... Demokrasiye inanmadan inkılabımızın ideolojisinden bahsetmek biraz hazindir.” Neşet Halil, “Demokrasi Rejimi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 18 January 1931, p.2.

²⁵⁶ “Türk inkılap nizamına demokrasi değildir demek için Türk inkılabının hareket noktalarını anlamamış olmak lazımdır. Fakat Şevket Süreyya B. bunu anlamadığı için değil kendi iytiraf ettiği veçhile demokrasi düşmanı olduğu için söylüyor.” Neşet Halil, “Demokrasi Rejimi ve İdeoloji Bahsi,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 28 January 1931, p.2 (response to Aydemir)

²⁵⁷ “Demokrasi bir vasıta olmaktan ziyade bir gaye olarak nazarı iytibara alınır, mefhumu etrafında belki daha kolaylıkla birleşilebilir... Demokrasinin malum vasıtaları bazı kereler demokrasi aleyhine netiyeceler vermekten bile hali kalmamaktadır. Sınıf hükümetleri sınıf tahakkümüne meydan vermek iytibarıyla içtimai adalet ruhuna ve bu sebepten asıl demokrasi gayesine münafi hükümetlerdir.” Zeki Mesut, “Demokraside Gaye ve Vasıta,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 31 March 1931 (editorial).

In a similar way, Nusret Kemal termed democracy “not the result of the Revolution, but the end.” And the purpose with undertaking this Revolution, “is to pull down the obstacles existing in front of this end, to pave the way for it, and to build the consciousness which will enable society to reach this goal.”²⁵⁸

In *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, the controversy over democracy was mainly presented in the editorials of Zeki Mesut, Falih Rıfkı and Neşet Halil. In their articles, liberal democracy was used as synonymous with the political systems established in France and Britain. “Anarchy” constituted a core concept used extensively to define these liberal democracies and the notion of liberal democracy was generally used with negative connotations. “In Europe, the democracy of the French Revolution has become ill” in Falih Rıfkı’s words. Everywhere the symptoms of this illness had become obvious: “political anarchy, class conflict, prostitution on a large scale, strikes, demonstrations, all these are conditions of the democratic countries.” According to the author, “Western democracy” had been “punished” because “society (*cemiyet*) had not been kept above everything else and the selfishness of classes had been disregarded.”²⁵⁹ In Falih Rıfkı’s view, authority as a value had to be given precedence at the cost of freedom because “democracy and freedom that is so wanted today” only led to the limiting of the room for action and maneuvering of the

²⁵⁸ “Demokrasi bir inkılabın mahsulü değil, gayesidir. İnkılap bu gayenin önünü setliyen engelleri yıkmak, bu gayeye giden yolu açmak ve cemiyeti bu gayeye vardırıarak şuuru kurmak için yapılır. Bu itibarla demokrasi inkılapçıları bu işin peygamberleri, havarileridir. Bu sıfatlarıyla demokrasi inkılapçıları, en liberal dinleri kuran peygamberlerin bile olduğu gibi, diktatördürler, başlangıçta işi lüzumsuz ve vuzuhsuz münakaşanın çıkmazına sokmamak için fikirleri biraz klişeleştirirler ve arkalarından gelenlerden mutlak bir itaat isterler. Fakat açık olarak ortaya koydukları idealde o kadar özgeci (gayrendiş), o kadar kendini vermiş, o kadar feragatlidirler ki onların emirleri kanun emrinden, hapis korkusundan, darağacı dehşetinden daha tesirlidir, onlara korkulduğu için değil, sevgi ve inanla bağlanıldığı için itaat olunur...Halkçı bir devletin en büyük vazifesi halkı mümkün olduğu kadar süratle kendi kendini idare edecek kültür ve şuur seviyesine vardiyecek tedbirler almak ve halk arasından bu seviyeye varanları otomatik bir surette memleket idaresine ortak edecek şekiller koymaktır. Şüphesiz ki bir yarım akıllı, veya şuurunu aykırı tesirler altında aksıyan bir adamla şuuru mükemmel ve hür bir adama memleket idaresinde aynı hakkı vermek doğru olmaz.” Nusret Kemal, “Halkçılık,” *Ülkü*, 1, no. 3 (April 1933), pp.186-187.

²⁵⁹ Falih Rıfkı, “Sınıf Kavgası,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1 April 1931 (editorial).

state and thus could be equated with the word “anarchy.”²⁶⁰ The “demagogy of democracy” was a “track” with the aim of “making the people fight in forum arenas and divide it into hundred classes, into thousand pieces and break all of the Six Arrows at once.”²⁶¹

Whereas liberal democracy was in general viewed in negative terms, democracy as such, was at some points presented as an ideal for which to strive. To obtain this ideal, some preconditions had to be met. First of all, “the borders” of democratic freedoms had to be strictly drawn. Second, there had to be an “ideological unity and common interpretation among the citizens” in society regarding the most essential principles of life and development (*inkışaf*) because in countries where no such unity around the ideal existed, “the freedoms supplied by democracy, become the most dangerous weapons for society.”²⁶² The level of “culture,” was presented as another pre-condition, in an article in *Ülkü*, and it was said that “culture” was to be attained through education (*terbiye*).²⁶³

The presentation of pre-conditions for the achievement of democracy was stressed in a number of articles in both of the sources, which leads to the conclusion that the liberal version of democracy was strictly rejected by the mainstream Kemalist leadership, while at

²⁶⁰ “Bugün demokrasi ve hürriyet diye istenilen şey, hükümetin elini kolunu bağlamak ve hükümet kadrosu dışındaki bütün vatandaş ve müesseselerle hiç bir kayıt konmamak demektir. Fakat bu türlü hürriyet de bir başka alafrağa kelimenin, anarşinin tercümesidir...Bazan bir memlekette bir işten anlıyan bir tek adam varsa, onun hükmü on beş milyonun hükmüne bedel olur: Bunun ismine salâhiyet denir...Dünyayı salâhiyetlerin idare etmekte olduğunu bilmek lazımdır.” Falih Rıfkı, “Otorite,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 21 July 1931.

²⁶¹ Atay, (Kronik) “Aykırıları,” *Ulus*, 30 May 1935.

²⁶² “Demokrasinin güzel tatbik edilebilmesi ve eyi netiyeler verebilmesi için ilk şart vatandaşlar arasında hiç olmazsa en esaslı hayat ve inkışaf umdeleri hakkında bir fikir ve telakki birliği mevcut olmasıdır. Daha kısa tabiriyle mefkure birliği olmanın memleketlerde demokrasinin temin ettiği hürriyetler cemiyet için en tehlikeli silahlar haline, inkılap eder.” Zeki Mesut, “Hürriyetlerin Hududu,” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 6 April 1931 (editorial).

²⁶³ “Dünya bugün iktisadi ve içtimai buhran içinde bir de terbiye buhranı geçiriyor...Demokrasi rejiminde yaşadığımız ve yaşamak azminde olduğumuz için diyebiliriz ki terbiyenin birinci maksadı en geniş manasında kültür vermektir...Kültür, bir insanın mensup olduğu tabiat ve cemiyet nizamı içine faal bir surette uyabilmesi ve bu uyma için muayyen ideallere malik olması, demektir. O halde terbiyenin birinci maksadı idealler vermektir.” Nusret Kemal, “Terbiye Meselesi?” *Ülkü*, 1, no. 6 (July 1933), p.436.

some points, and in particular by some figures, democracy was viewed as an ideal, an end, for which the Kemalist Revolution was striving. The establishment of national unity, the achievement of the people's support for the Kemalist Revolution and its ideals, the success of ideological education to heighten the cultural level of the people in general, and the youth in particular, were seen as the pre-requisites even for the establishment of democracy, all of which the ongoing Kemalist Revolution was struggling for. Without the fulfilling of these pre-conditions, the experience of democracy would mean "suicide."²⁶⁴

One hundred percent democracy means one hundred percent education (*terbiye*). Not only that everybody is literate, but in addition that they possess a certain degree (or ability) to present their thoughts on the ideas that are being debated. Let us leave the discussion over the aim that we want to go towards because it is after all going to be impossible to reach it without a high level of reflection, listening, and understanding; first of all and before anything else, through a general mobilisation of education, and a reasonable organization, the western and young Turks, should be put into ranks (*saflandırmak*).²⁶⁵

The ambivalent approach towards the concept of democracy is illustrated in an article by Recep Peker, who uses the term "disciplined freedom" to denote a similar pre-conditionality.²⁶⁶ The approach was ambivalent because on the one hand, the liberal

²⁶⁴ "Genç yaşında bir inkılap, ideali bugünkü Fransız demokrasisi olsa da, halkı ve müesseselerini ona göre yetiştirmeden, demokrasi normalini araması, intihar demektir; çünkü iytiyatları bozulan, müesseseleri yıkılan, öldürülmüş menfaatlerin cesedi henüz soğumamış olan, ve büyük bir kısmı yeni prensiplerin kıymetini ölçecek seviyede bulunmayan ekseriyet, ona rey verme." (Roma, Tiran, Atina) "Normal," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 June 1931, p.4.

²⁶⁵ "Yüzde yüz demokrasi, yüzde yüz terbiye demektir. Yalnız herkesin okuyup yazma bilmesi değil, münakaşa olunan fikirler için hüküm verecek kadar seviye sahibi olması lazımdır...Gitmek istediğimiz hedefin münakaşasını bir tarafa bırakalım, çünkü bu hedef nede olsa, ancak yüksek bir seviye, düşünüş, duyuş, ve anlayış seviyesi olmadıkça varılabilmesi imkansızdır; her şeyin başında ve her şeyden evel, umumi bir terbiye seferberliği, ve mantiki bir organizasyon, garpli ve genç türkleri saflandırmak lazımdır." Faliş Rıfkı, "Bir Cevap," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 16 June 1931, pp.1-2.

²⁶⁶ "Ferdin hürriyeti fikrinin yanında bir taraftan da milli disiplin fikrini yaşatacak alışkanlık ve uysallık itiyatları kuvvetlendirilmelidir. Biz, düşünen, yazan, söyleyen, çalışan ve kazanan 'Hürriyetli' ve aynı zamanda cemiyeti korumak ve yaşatmak için lazım olan bütün kayıtları tanıyan, devlet otoritelerinin, milli şeflerin hükümlerine candan uyan ve inanan 'Disiplinli' bir cemiyet kurmak davasındayız." Kütahya Mebusu Recep, "Disiplinli Hürriyet," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 26 April 1933 (editorial) and further, "'Hukuku Beşer' hürriyeti nasıl bir zulüm devrinin aksülameli ise bugün doğan ve bazı memleketlerde yer alan karşı fikirler, sıkı idare tipleri de ölçsüz hürriyetin aksülamelidir...Biz, düşünen, yazan, söyleyen, çalışan ve kazanan 'hürriyetli' ve aynı zamanda cemiyeti korumak ve yaşatmak için lazım olan bütün kayıtları tanıyan, devlet

version of democracy was rejected as it was seen as the cause of anarchy in the society. On the other hand, it is claimed that through education of the people ideological unity could be attained and democracy then established.

It should finally be stressed that although democracy was not a main concern and therefore not given much place in the rhetoric of the period, in some articles, the concept was taken into use, mostly in the ambivalent manner, presented above. While rejecting liberal democracy, expressions regarding democracy in positive terms, as an ideal to be strived for, could be found, admittedly in a highly limited number.

otoritelerinin, milli şeflerin hükümlerine candan uyan ve inanan 'disiplinli' bir cemiyet kurmak davasındayız. Recep Peker, "Disiplinli Hürriyet," *Ülkü*, no. 3 (April 1933), p.179.

CHAPTER IV

INTELLECTUALS' SEARCH FOR IDEOLOGY IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD: THE *KADRO* EXPERIENCE

The Emergence of *Kadro*

Kadro was a journal published between 1932 and 1934 by a small group of intellectuals in Turkey.²⁶⁷ The group, which can be characterized as belonging to the Kemalist elite establishment, evolved into an ideological movement. *Kadro*'s evolution gradually led to the group's differentiation in ideological position from the mainstream or ruling political-ideological elite within the Kemalist apparatus. The *Kadro* movement is thus one example of the existence of different versions and interpretations of ideology within the Kemalist tradition which is a point also underlined in the Introduction of this thesis. Further, the movement exemplifies the search for ideology by intellectuals in a period when external developments were putting pressure on existing political institutions and ideological orientations. The extensiveness of authoritarianism in the inter-war period

²⁶⁷ Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) was the owner of the journal, Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir) the main ideologue, Vedat Nedim (Tör), Burhan Asaf (Belge) and İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin) regular writers. For a biographical summary, see Mustafa Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi – Ulusçu Sol bir Akım* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999), pp. 229-236.

was, as discussed in the previous chapter, acknowledged by the Kemalist political-ideological leadership as well, and the case of *Kadro* is interesting in terms of comparing some of the propositions put forth by this movement in its version of presenting the ideology of Kemalism, with some of the core assumptions and distinguishing features of the fascist ideologies under consideration.

To make the relevance of the journal *Kadro* for this thesis more explicit, the fact that it was an intellectual movement in search of and making claim on presenting the ideology of the Kemalist regime is one important factor. Furthermore, the semi-independent (from the mainstream Kemalist political rule) position of the journal in the early 1930s is a unique feature and this chapter on *Kadro*, in addition to being informative about the movement and presenting its definition of Kemalism, will further be contributive to the understanding of the mainstream Kemalist leadership's ideological stance. Points which differentiate the *Kadro* minority from the mainstream leadership will be put forth in the subsequent analysis, and this work on *Kadro* thus enables the reader to get a better understanding of the mainstream Kemalist faction's ideological standpoint.

When the prohibitive character of the legal-political context, in which the *Kadro* movement came into being, towards any kind of grouping or current that did not explicitly advocate the official political-ideological line of the state is kept in mind, the uniqueness of the movement becomes more apparent. The first Press Law of the Turkish Republic, strictly regulating the press according to the official Kemalist leadership's line of thought, was promulgated in 1931, and the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) as recalled had been closed in November 1930 after only a three months period of existence, and these were steps signifying the single-party rule's evolution into a more rigidly authoritarian character. Giving *Kadro* additional importance, this restricted legal-political context is however also

an expression of the movement's necessary closeness to the Kemalist political leadership as the movement's existence would not have been allowed if the matter had been different.

The intellectual superiority of all the *Kadro* members is another point of uniqueness for the movement. The educational backgrounds of all its contributors were noteworthy, and their former political activities in leftist circles²⁶⁸ was one expression of this intellectual feature which was also reflected in their articles. The advocacy of Marxist historical materialism and dialectical thinking was, at the theoretical level, the methodological approach which the movement's members had in common,²⁶⁹ together with their different, specific areas of specialization.

Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), often seen as the main "ideologue" of the movement, stands out with his contributions on the 'Ideology of the Revolution' (*İnkılabın İdeolojisi*). His main thinking had already been published in a book bearing the same title in 1932.²⁷⁰ Vedat Nedim (Tör), the second main writer at the journal, was generally concerned with the issue of national economic liberation from "the exploitative international system" and other economic matters. Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, the official owner of the journal, primarily contributed with writings on literature and the arts. A large part of İsmail Hüsrev (Tökin)'s articles discussed the peasantry and the rural structure, with an emphasis on the necessity of winning the support of the peasantry for the Kemalist Revolution, and as part

²⁶⁸ Şevket Süreyya and İsmail Hüsrev both went to Moscow for higher education. Vedat Nedim participated in the fourth Comintern congress in Moscow as representative of the Turkish Worker's Peasant's Socialist Party (*Türkiye İşçi Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası, TİÇSF*). Both Vedat Nedim and Burhan Asaf wrote articles in the leftist journal *Aydınlık*. Further, (Şevket Süreyya, İsmail Hüsrev, Vedat Nedim and Burhan Asaf were related to the *TİÇSF* in the mid 1920s. See Türkeş, pp.229-335.

²⁶⁹ The dialectical approach of the movement is emphasized in an interesting study on the *Kadro* undertaken with use of quantitative methods. See İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Bir Aydın Hareketi: Kadro" in *Toplum ve Bilim*, 24 (Winter 1984), p. 45; and further "Cemiyetin seyri üzerinde başlıca müessir, iktisadi olan yani *infrastructure* (alt-yapıya ait) sebeplerdir...Tarihi maddiyetçi görüşünü harpsonrasında olduğu kadar doğruluğu hiç bir zaman, harci alem bir hakikat olmamıştır." Burhan Asaf, "Rejimler, Nasıl Niçin Değişiyor?" *Kadro*, 1, no. 12, p.29.

²⁷⁰ Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İnkılap ve Kadro*, fourth printing (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1990).

of this, the essentiality of a land reform. Finally, Burhan Asaf dealt with theoretical questions, discussing the content of different ideological currents such as socialism, fascism, and national socialism, and through these discussions, further elaborated upon the characteristics of Kemalism. It should be mentioned that the high level of intellectualism of all the *Kadro* members was a new experience within the intellectual and political circle in the Kemalist regime and made some factions within the Kemalist political elite uncomfortable.²⁷¹

The 'Third World'ist approach of the *Kadro* movement is another feature making it unique. It has been noted that many of the propositions presented by Şevket Süreyya and Vedat Nedim bear striking similarities with those of the *Dependencia* school which emerged in the 1960s in Latin America. Andre Gunder Frank, a prominent figure of this school, presented critical propositions about the exploitative division of labour between the industrialized and the developing countries in the international system.²⁷² Noteworthy in the context of this study is the fact that Şevket Süreyya had presented similar sophisticated arguments already at the beginning of the 1930s. In spite of the differences in terminology and some theoretical assumptions, the resemblances are so striking that *Kadro* has even been interpreted as a forerunner to the *Dependencia* by Eyüp Özveren.²⁷³

For all these reasons *Kadro* maintains an important place in Turkish historiography. The controversy over the emergence as well as the closure of the journal continues to make

²⁷¹ For the dialogue on *Kadro* between Necip Ali Küçüka (President of the People's Houses) and Niyazi Berkes, see in Berkes, pp. 80 - 87. Necip Ali Küçüka expresses the unease felt against the *Kadro* movement in the Republican People's Party, among other things due to their intellectual capabilities. Küçüka further proposes Berkes to assist them in understanding the movement's propositions which he himself is unable to do, since it is a question of "knowledge and culture." Further see Şevket Süreyya, "Yarı münevverler kulübü," *Kadro*, 1, no. 8 (August 1932).

²⁷² Andre Gunder Frank, "The Underdevelopment of Development" in Sing C. Chew and Robert Denemark (eds.) *The Underdevelopment of Development* (California, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996), pp.17-55.

²⁷³ Eyüp Özveren, "The Intellectual Legacy of the *Kadro* Movement in Retrospect" in *METU Studies in Development*, 23 (4), (1996), pp.565-576.

the movement an interesting subject of study. The movement's contribution to the discussions on the nature of Kemalism and the controversy it raised over whether Kemalism can be characterized as an ideology gives the movement and the journal a particular significance. *Kadro* was one of the first attempts to give a profound and strict definition of Kemalism and a first experience in creating the theoretical foundation for the ongoing Kemalist Revolution. Any understanding of Kemalism, thus, requires a study of the *Kadro* and the well-formulated ideological propositions presented by the movement.

Studies on *Kadro* have so far been carried out from different perspectives and a large number of works have focused on the economic developmentalist aspect of the movement.²⁷⁴ As an example of a movement struggling for national liberation, *Kadro* has further been studied from the 'Third World'ist approach already mentioned.²⁷⁵ The aim of this study is to place the *Kadro* ideology within a broader European intellectual context. At first glance, *Kadro*'s attempt to give the Kemalist Revolution a theoretical foundation led the group to make doctrinaire statements. Further, when the view of the inter-war period as an era of pessimism and intellectuals' revolt against modernity and the liberal order is recalled, the importance of *Kadro* becomes more apparent.²⁷⁶ The possibility that *Kadro* found inspiration and was influenced by the ideological and intellectual currents and atmosphere of inter-war Europe as the point of departure, *Kadro*'s similarities and differences with the ideological propositions of Fascism and National Socialism, have been

²⁷⁴ Ayşe Trak, "Development Literature and Writers from Underdeveloped Countries: The Case of Turkey" in *Current Anthropology*, 26, (1) (February 1985), pp.89-102.

²⁷⁵ Özveren, pp.572-573.

²⁷⁶ "(However – and this is a very important point) – everywhere in Europe, the political revolt was preceded by the cultural one...The desire to purify the world of the defilements of the eighteenth century and to introduce various forms of discipline such as classicism, together with the rejection of liberal and bourgeois decadence, united in a single momentum the inner core of Fascist intellectuals and the extensive external circle of fellow-travellers...by undermining the foundations of democracy and trying to destroy the spirit of the Enlightenment, the cultural revolt, though it did not identify itself with Fascism, undoubtedly paved the way for it." Sternhell, "Modernity and Its Enemies," pp.28-29.

found worth examination.²⁷⁷ The aim of this chapter is hence to explore this hypothesis and to compare the main ideas advocated by the *Kadro* members with those of the anti-liberal and authoritarian currents prevailing in Europe of the period. To trace the ‘spirit’ of the inter-war period in the *Kadro* movement’s ideological thinking is the aim of this work before going into the discussion on the image and perception of fascism as expressed in the journal.²⁷⁸

In addition to their Marxist methodological approach, Werner Sombart, some of whose main ideas were presented briefly in the discussion of the German reactionary modernist current in Chapter Two, constituted another important intellectual source of inspiration for the staff of *Kadro*. Sombart was working in the field of political economy and his works focused on the “dynamics of capitalism,” which in his own words, was meant to be a “continuation” or “completion” of Marx.²⁷⁹ A fundamental thought advocated by Sombart was his “opposition to unilinear theories of historical evolution born of the Enlightenment’s belief in the inevitability of human progress.²⁸⁰” Whereas Marx “sees capitalism as a necessary economic mode which will generate its antithesis,” Sombart regarded capitalism as “morally exhausted” thus “containing no guarantee of higher forms waiting to spring with telic certainty from the womb of the dying social order.²⁸¹”

²⁷⁷ “Artık liberal iktisat tenceresinin içinde hangi aş pişer ve nasıl pişer, bütün milletler anlamıştır. Bütün milletlerin kararı, sanayi ve ileri tekniği benimsiyerek birer iktisadi cüzütam olmaktır. Ve bunu yapmakla, hukuk bakımından müsavi milletlerin hakiki kurtuluş ve hakiki medeniyet nizamına geçmektir...şimdi harp Avrupasını dolaşan parola: disiplindir. Emperyalist milletler, bu parolaya doğru, kendi bünyelerine göre değişik yollardan yürüyorlar. Fakat mutlaka bu parolaya doğru yürüyorlar. Kimi milli kabine sahanlığından, kimi faşizm patekasından, kimi de ırkçılık katakomblarından.” *Kadro*, 2, no. 16 (April 1933), p.3. [emphasis added]

²⁷⁸ Türkeş, pp.148- .

²⁷⁹ Philip Siegelman, Introduction in Werner Sombart, *Luxury and Capitalism*, third edition (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), p.viii.

²⁸⁰ Siegelman, *ibid.*

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.ix.

Sombart emphasized the “uniqueness” and “self-actualizing” feature of each culture which had its own “spirit” or “ethos” and which was not involved in any “preparations for realizing higher unities,” as the overthrow of capitalism.²⁸² Presenting “an uncompromising critique of the economy and culture of capitalism,” especially in his early works, and regarding capitalism as a “destroyer of the German *Gemeinschaft* and harbinger of spiritless mechanization,” Sombart gradually turned towards “Nietzschean values.”²⁸³ As recalled from Chapter Two, Sombart was seen as the main ideological figure within the reactionary modernist current who translated “the language of social theory into the language of race” and who made “the transfer of a highly emotional protest against rationalization into a set of metaphors that contributed to a forward-looking nationalism.”²⁸⁴

According to Mustafa Türkeş, the *Kadro* members were inspired mainly by the early works of Sombart, and thus cannot be held responsible for the racist views which this German thinker came to advocate.²⁸⁵ References to Sombart are especially made by Vedat Nedim (Sombart was his professor at the University in Berlin) and in sum, the necessity of planning in economy, the analysis of capitalism based on three phases, and the search for an alternative, third road to capitalism and communism, were the general ideas associated with Werner Sombart which can be detected in *Kadro*’s ideological thinking.²⁸⁶

²⁸² Ibid.

²⁸³ Herf, pp.134-35.

²⁸⁴ Ibid., pp.150-151

²⁸⁵ Türkeş, p.121. After Adolf Hitler’s take-over of power, Sombart took a different path in his writings, defining the Jews as the enemy. This has, according to Türkeş, been interpreted as an unsuccessful effort by Sombart to become an ideologue of the Nazi regime.

²⁸⁶ “Sombart’a göre planlı iktisat, vahşi, kaotik, nizamsız ve manasız iktisadın zıddıdır. Bugünkü iktisat hayatı bir “kül” halinde tanzim edilmemiştir. Parçaları arasında bir manalı ve gayeli rabıta bulunan ve birbirine nazım bir prensibin bağlarile bir uzviyet halinde kaynamış olan bir iktisat hayatından mahrumuz...Sombart’ın bu kronikte bahse mevzu olan eseri, *Kadro*’nun milli kurtuluş hareketi tezinin ve ideolojisinin kısmi bir teyididir.” Vedat Nedim, “(Kadro) yu teyit eden bir eser: *Die Zukunft des*

As stated earlier, one of the main concerns of the *Kadro* movement was the achievement of economic development for Turkey, with the aim of gaining independence in the capitalist world system and abandoning the country's 'semi-colony' (*yarı-sömürge*) position. This was seen as the most crucial matter for the Turkish Revolution.²⁸⁷ The ongoing struggle for national liberation had the most urgent aim of freeing the country from economic exploitation in the international capitalist system. Furthermore, Turkey could be seen as the first case of a national liberation movement (*Milli Kurtuluş Hareketi*) which all third world countries should follow.

The ideology presented by the *Kadro* was first and foremost oriented towards the political and ideological elites of the regime.²⁸⁸ The movement was in search of ideology on behalf of the political leadership, not of the masses. The fact that the writings in the journal had a relatively complex level of argumentation and abstraction is an illustration of this elite orientation. Further, the *Kadro* writers were concerned with the avant-garde's taking the lead in the revolutionary process.

Kadro came into being with official approval through Mustafa Kemal's personal acknowledgements of Yakup Kadri, the owner of the journal.²⁸⁹ Furthermore, both an article congratulating *Kadro* by Mustafa Kemal and a speech by İsmet İnönü, in relation

Kapitalismus- Werner Sombart," *Kadro*, 1, no. 5 (May 1932), pp.37-38; for a summary of the intellectual roots of the *Kadro* members, see Mustafa Türkeş, "The Ideology of the Kadro [Cadre] Movement: A Patriotic Leftist Movement in Turkey" in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.) *Turkey Before and After Atatürk, Internal and External Affairs* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).

²⁸⁷ "İleri teknikli bir iktisat gövdesine en çabuk yoldan varmak ve aynı zamanda sınıfsız ve tezdadsız millet olmak hedefine götürecek iktisat siyasetini çizmek veya çizmemek...Bu, Türk inkılabının varlık veya yokluk davasıdır." Vedat Nedim, "Sınıflaşmamak ve İktisat Siyaseti," *Kadro*, 1, no. 11, p.20.

²⁸⁸ Yakup Kadri's following statement illustrates the orientation of the journal towards the political elite: "Ben bu Kadro'yu çıkarırken Halk Partisinin anlaşılmayan bazı ilkelerinin izahı ile meşguldüm. Mesela mebuslara soruyorlardı "Efendim Devletçilik diye bir şey çıkarıyorlar, bu ne demektir? Eğer Devlet taraftarı olmaksız, biz zaten tek partiyiz, binaenaleyh bunu ayrıca bir hareket halinde kurmanın lüzumu yok" diye. Baktım bütün meclis Halk Partili, fakat Halk Partisinin ilkeleri hakkında hiçbir bilgileri yok. Bunu izah etmek için çare arıyorduk." Quoted in Hakkı Uyar, "Resmi İdeolojinin İki Yüzü: Ülkü ve Kadro" in *Toplum ve Bilim*, 74 (Fall 1997), p.182, footnote 2.

²⁸⁹ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat*, third printing (İstanbul: İletişim, 1984), p.25.

with the tenth anniversary of the Republic, were published in the journal. This official endorsement was further expressed in the welcoming of the journal in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (*Ulus*)²⁹⁰ and the announcement of the appearance of every new issue in the daily.²⁹¹ Despite this official approval, *Kadro* was nevertheless still met with suspicion from other segments of the political establishment. In one article, Aka Gündüz expresses his disappointments with *Kadro*'s approach and criticizes the movement for not showing respect to the political leadership and accuses the *Kadro* members of having called the political leadership "good for nothings" (*kahve mahsulü*) and the people "idle" (*avare*).²⁹²

The Secretary General of the People's Party, Recep Peker, was another figure criticizing the *Kadro* group, first of all for making claim on the right to "write the ideology of the Revolution." If anyone was supposed to write such an ideology, according to Peker, it would be the people who had actually carried it out.²⁹³ Interestingly, the official journal of the People's Houses, *Ülkü*, was begun being published in February 1933, a year after the establishment of the Houses, and thirteen months after the appearance of the first issue of *Kadro*. Recep Peker was initially responsible for the publication of *Ülkü* (Fuat Köprülü took over his post in July 1936)²⁹⁴ and this has been viewed both as an expression of

²⁹⁰ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 24 January 1932, p.2.

²⁹¹ "Kadronun bu üçüncü nüshası, bu mecmuada en iyi inkılapçı fikirlerin vekar, itina ve ciddiyetle neşirliği vasfını tanıyanlara daha ziyade itminan verecek yüksek bir eser halindedir." (Mecmualar) "Kadro'nun üçüncü nüshası," *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 1 April 1932, p.4.

²⁹² "Biz, Türk inkılabı için kan dökmüşler ve can vermişler, biz Türk inkılabı için her işaretle kan dökmeğe ve canvermeğe hazır olanlar (kadro) adındaki mecmuaya – bu mevzu vesilesiyle – şunu söyleriz: Bize hemen tarziye ver. Sen bize (kahve mahsulü) ve halka (avare) dedin arkadaş! On temmuzu yapanlar, otuz bir martı bastıranlar, hareketordusundan sağ kalabilenler, Sakarya'da vuruşanlar, ve binnetice Çankaya'yı çevreleyenler kahve mahsulü, ve onlara sevinen halk avare değillerdir. Şimdilik dostçasına istediğimiz tarzıyeyi vermeyinceye kadar dostluğumuzdan istinkaf etmiyeceğiz. Yalnız bu iş acele olsun azizim kadro." Aka Gündüz, "Biraz Değil, Tam Saygı İsteriz." *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 7 March 1932, p.2.

²⁹³ Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat*, pp.45-46.

²⁹⁴ *Ülkü*, 7, no. 41 (July 1936).

another attempt to fill out the content of Kemalism and as an indication of the dispute over to whom the mission or right to define Kemalism belonged.²⁹⁵

Another critical voice was heard in the semi-official newspaper *Cumhuriyet*, where articles by different writers questioned the object of this new “ideological movement” (*fikir hareketi*).²⁹⁶ The main question or concern in these articles was whether this new movement was a symptom of segmentation in the RPP. In *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* any such claim was rejected. Responding to an article presented in *Son Posta* with such a claim of fragmentation, Falih Rıfkı declared that *Kadro* was presenting the Party ideology, based on the fundamental principles as presented in the Peoples Party’s programme.²⁹⁷ With a similar argument, the *Kadro* movement also rejected this claim of fragmentation.²⁹⁸

Peyami Safa took a harsher stance in his criticism of *Kadro*, mainly for the doctrinaire form in which the movement presented Kemalism. Safa went so far as to accuse *Kadro* of adhering to “Turkish fascism.” Safa’s writings were responded to by Burhan Asaf, who denied any possible parallellism between *Kadro* and (Italian) Fascism. In the evolving discussion, Safa accepted that *Kadro* could not be termed fascists *per se*, but “so can’t Mussolini,” Safa claimed, since all theoretical doctrines were expressed

²⁹⁵ “*Kadro*’cular bu *kadro* tanımıyla tek parti yönetimi için bir düşünsel temel oluşturmaya çalışmaktadırlar. Ama önemli pratik bir sorunla da karşı karşıya bulunmaktadır. İktidarı denetliyen CHP ve bunun da bir siyasal eliti vardır.” İlkin and Tekeli, pp.39-40.

²⁹⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 11 September 1931; *Cumhuriyet*, 12 September 1931; *Cumhuriyet*, 17 September 1931; *Cumhuriyet*, 11 March 1932; and *Cumhuriyet* 12 March 1932.

²⁹⁷ “Bu yazıları ‘Halk Fırkasında yeni bir cereyan’ başlığı değil, ‘Halk Fırkası programındaki ana esaslara göre yapılan fırka ideolojisi’ serlevhası konulmalı idi. İstanbul’da bir takım gazetelerin yabancı kalmakta oldukları böyle bir fikir hareketinin ‘Hakimiyeti Milliye’de devam etmekte olması gerçi türk gazeteciliğinde yeni bir cereyandır; fakat Halk Fırkasında yeni bir cereyan değildir.” Falih Rıfkı, “Yeni Bir Cereyan Varmış?” *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, 12 September 1931, p.1.

²⁹⁸ This claim of segmentation is rejected by the *Kadro* as well. Burhan Asaf claims: “Ankara’da yeni bir cereyan yoktur. Ankara’da Ankara’nın hiç bir zaman durmamış olan fikir hareketi vardır...Tasnif meraklıları buna devlet sosyalizmi, devlet sermayedarlığı diyebilirler ama bu o değildir. Bu harice yutulmamak için devlete sığınan Türk milletinin kendi iktisadiyatını devletin himayesinde bir cephe olarak toptan müşahede etmesi ve toptan bir programa raptetmesidir.” *Cumhuriyet*, 11 September 1931.

differently from the way they were executed in practice.²⁹⁹ Safa maintained, however, that one could trace parallels between *Kadro*'s ideological thinking and Italian fascism.³⁰⁰ He stated that *Kadro* obviously took Fascist Italy as an example to be followed and that this pro-Italian attitude of *Kadro*'s was enough to illustrate the movement's similarities with Fascism.³⁰¹

In an interesting way, this parallelism was also put forth by a contemporary Italian Turkologist, Ettore Rossi. Comparing the national liberation movement in Turkey with the Fascist Revolution in Italy, Rossi claimed that the RPP's party programme had similarities to its Italian Fascist counterpart.³⁰² Moreover, Rossi asserted that the *Kadro* movement and its version of Kemalism contained characteristics similar to Fascism.³⁰³ Ettore Rossi's striking claims and arguments were immediately responded by Burhan Asaf, who strictly

²⁹⁹ "Gene itiraf et ki İtalyanın emperyalist emelleri istisna edilirse bu emperyalizmle mücadeleyi hedef yapan ve - yalnız bu noktada tamamen size iştirak ettiğim - sisteminizin usulü, faşist veya nasyonal - sosyalist iddiaları andırmıyor değildir...Dostum demek istiyorum ki sizi faşist olmadığınızı kabul ederim; hatta bu manada Sinyor Mussolininin de faşist olmadığını kabul ederim. Çünkü, herhangi bir doktrine nisbet mevzuu bahsolunca, hayat önünde karikatürü sırtan her türlü nazariyeye zeki bir adam beynini kaptırmaz...Mazur görünüz, pek can sıkıcı bir terminoloji tekrarları içinde kalıyorsunuz: "Metotlu düşünüş, sistemli görüş, yarı müstemleke olmaktan kurtuluş, ileri teknik, devlet cihazının iktidarı, tezat, nizam" gibi tabirlerinizin binlerce defa tekrerrü...Mecmuanızın bir sayısını okumuş olan için ikincisini okumak ihtiyacı doğmuyor. Tek plak çalan bir gramofona benziyorsunuz: Hoş, bütün doctrinaire mecmualar gibi." Peyami Safa, "Bir Kadrocu Dostuma" *Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1933.

³⁰⁰ "Bununla beraber, son yıllarda, bazı gruplar ve bazı meslektaşlar, Türk inkılabının izahına teşebbüs etmemiş değillerdir; hatta mecmua ve kitap bile çıkarmışlardır. Bunlar Karl Marx iktisadiyatını milli bir kadro içine sokmağa çalışan telifçilerdi. Nihayet, sosyalist veya kollektivist fikirlerin milliyetçilikle telifi gayretler, ister "nasyonal-sosyalizm", isterseniz "sosyal-nasyonalizm" diyiniz, başka iki kelime ile daha iyi hulasa edilebilir: Türk faşizmi. İşte bu Türk faşistleri, tezlerine isim koymaktan çekinerek, herkesi önünde iğilmeğe mecbur edecek bir tabir buldular: Kemalizm. Ben de bu güzel ve büyük isim karşısında hürmet ve minnetle şapkamı çıkardıktan sonra derhal ilave edeceğim ki onların tezleriyle hakiki Kemalizm arasındaki mesafe, buradan Sovyet Rusya veya faşist İtalya kadar uzaktır." Peyami Safa, *Cumhuriyet*, 29 July 1933.

³⁰¹ "Anlaşıyor ki sağda solda komşu milletler bizim kendilerinden ilham aldığımızı öne sürmekle rejimlerine dışarıdan gıda arıyorlar. Onların bu iddiaları elbette ki sizin faşist veya komünist olmanızı icap etmez...Gene itiraf et ki İtalyanın emperyalist emelleri istisna edilirse bu emperyalizmle mücadeleyi hedef yapan ve - yalnız bu noktada tamamen size iştirak ettiğim - sisteminizin usulü, faşist veya nasyonal - sosyalist iddiaları andırmıyor değildir. Karşı tarafın silahını kullanmak ister gibi görünüyorsunuz ve zaten ben de "Türk faşizmi" tabirile aradaki bu farkı biraz ortaya koymuş bulunuyorum." Peyami Safa, *Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1933.

³⁰² Mahmut Şakiroğlu, "Giacomo Caretto ile Söyleşi" in *Tarih ve Toplum*, 17 (May 1985), p.346.

³⁰³ Giacomo Caretto, "1930'larda Kemalizm-Faşizm-Komünizm Üzerine Polemikler II" in *Tarih ve Toplum*, 18 (June 1985), p.422.

rejected any comparison between Kemalism and Fascism. According to Burhan Asaf, Rossi had reached these wrong conclusions due to a wrong assumption: he saw the Turkish national movement for liberation and the Kemalist Revolution as a simple project of Westernization. Furthermore, Rossi was only taking some paragraphs of the RPP programme, and based on these, he was claiming that the Kemalist Revolution was an early copy of the Fascist Revolution in Italy.³⁰⁴ Burhan Asaf emphasized in his arguments against Rossi's claims that the Kemalist Revolution for national liberation could not be taken out of its historical context but had to be viewed in the (historical) process where it had taken place. First of all, the "Turkish revolutionaries," according to Asaf, had realized that "the phase of imitation (*taklitçilik*) is over." They had become aware that only "a form of economic, social and political regime which is peculiar to the Turkish land" could be established and that "an originality for creation according to the realities (*şeniyetleri*) of those lands"³⁰⁵ was being demanded. What was emphasized by Asaf was the argument of the uniqueness of the Kemalist Revolution, which was a point underlined by the mainstream Kemalist leadership as recalled from Chapter Three. In Asaf's words, the people carrying out the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey, "to make the nation a nation and to make the country a country, have never taken the simple road of following a model."³⁰⁶

In addition to these arguments, Burhan Asaf gave some further examples of features that differentiated Italian Fascism and Kemalism. One important point was their different

³⁰⁴ "Halk Fırkası programından bazı maddeler alarak, milli inkılabımızı faşist inkılabının şimdilik henüz pek genç bir kopyesi telakki etmek te, ancak 'garplılaşıma' esas ile kabili izah bir sakat hükümdür. Türk inkılabının gayesi, garplılaşmak olsaydı, Dr. Rossi'nin kısa süren bir muhakeme silsilesinden sonra, Türk milletinin en yeni garp rejimlerinden biri olan faşizmi almağa kalkıştığını söylemesinde bir beis olmazdı... Fakat Türk İnkılapçıları, milleti millet ve memleketi memleket yapmak işini hiç bir zaman, model üzerinde kanaviçe işlemek gibi, basit bir ameliye telakki etmemişlerdir." Burhan Asaf, "Faşizm ile Türk milli kurtuluş hareketi," *Kadro*, 1, no. 8 (August 1932), p.37.

³⁰⁵ "Türk İnkılapçıları, taklit devresinin kapandığını ve Türk topraklarına has olan iktisadi, içtimai ve siyasi rejim şeklinin ancak o toprakların şeniyetlerine uygun orijinal bir yaratıcılıkla meydana getirtilebileceğini, ifadeleşen milli şuurun hareket ve vakı olmuş bir şiarı olarak peşinen ilan etmişlerdir." Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

historical backgrounds. Fascism had emerged to “save the partly capitalist Italy from the class contradiction of capitalism, and the internal anarchy that is caused by this contradiction,” whereas in Turkey, the Revolution, which had been started by the movement for national liberation, had had the aim of “replacing the semi-colony, the Ottoman Empire, with the independent Turkish patriotic nation (*vatan*) according to the historical conditions of the present.”³⁰⁷ Another differentiating point stated by Burhan Asaf was that in the aftermath of the First World War, “fascism has been obliged to declare colonialism as one of its principal characteristics (*şiarları*) which led to the adoption of liberalism in the international economic sphere. In contrast, “Kemalism is a rebellion against colonialism,” and therefore advocated Etatism at both the domestic and the international level.³⁰⁸

Burhan Asaf concluded by saying that even if one could identify some similarities between Fascism and Kemalism mainly in their approach to capitalism and “to its political expression democracy,” this should not be seen as an expression of the Kemalist application of Fascism as had been put forth by Rossi. If Rossi instead had been referring to the possibility that “this is maybe a historical necessity common for all nations in the aftermath of the war,” his explanation would have been more “learned (*bilgili*) and contributive to friendship.”³⁰⁹

These arguments presented by Burhan Asaf are important first of all because they illustrate the strict rejection of any parallellism between Kemalism and Fascism. Second,

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p.38.

³⁰⁸ Ibid., pp.38-39.

³⁰⁹ “Eğer kurtuluş inkılabımızla faşizm arasında, kapitalizmi ve onun siyasi bir ifadesi olan demokrasi'yi telakki hususunda bir benzerlik varsa, bunu, bizim faşizmi taklide yeltenmemiz gibi, hem inkılabımızın orijinal vasıfları aleyhine ifade edilmiş bir hüküm hem de zatı meseleye uygun olmıyan bir hatalı görüşe istinat ettireceğine, harpsonrasının belki de bütün milletler için müşterek bir tarihi zaruretine raptetmiş olsaydı, hiç şüphesiz, hem daha bilgili, hem de dostluğa daha fazla uygun bir mütaleada bulunmuş olurdu.” Ibid. p.39.

they prove that *Kadro* was seen as an illustration of the search of ideology in Turkey in the inter-war period, both by the movement itself, as well as by prominent figures in the mainstream ruling elite. Finally, the last statement referring to the “historical necessity common to all nations” is an expression of the view that the anti-liberal and authoritarian line of thinking and practices was seen as a necessity of the period.

Another reaction to *Kadro* came from Ahmed (Ağaoğlu), one of the most prominent advocates of liberalism in Turkey during the period under discussion.³¹⁰ In a rather polemical debate between him and the staff of *Kadro*, the question of the importance of the state vis-a-vis the individual was discussed. Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) strongly defended individual liberty both in the economic as well as in the political sphere since he considered liberty essential for development and progress of any kind.³¹¹ He further criticized *Kadro* for presenting its version of the Kemalist ideology in an absolutist manner. Making an ironical comparison between *Kadro* and “other religions,” Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) accused the former of presenting a “worse religion than these other religions,” since *Kadro* showed no degree of tolerance towards other opinions or “non-believers.” *Kadro*’s intolerance made the movement even worse than religions which at least acknowledged the right to have doubts and forgave non-believers for their sins.

You will remember the verses of the Psalms of David, the Bible, the Torah, and the Koran! A set of rules without any explanation, any evidence, any proof. This mode of expression is very good for believers: But what about non-believers?... Back in time, the motto of the Catholic Church was “Hord de moi point de salut,” the principle that there exist no emancipation outside of me. The motto of Islam consists of “believers on one side, and the infidels (are all) one.” But at least Islam is accepting the principle of “non-compulsive conviction” (*ic̣tihat bilakasır*). That is, it forgives those people who work and strive to find the truth but who due to comprehensive deficiency are not

³¹⁰ For a short and summarizing article on the liberal thought of Ahmed Ağaoğlu, see Ayşe Kadioğlu, “Laiklik ve Türkiye’de Liberalizmin Kökenleri” in Ayşe Kadioğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi* (İstanbul: Metis, 1999), pp.73-99.

³¹¹ “Göreceklendi ki garbın yükselmesinde başlıca sebebi ferdi hürriyetlerin gittikçe genişlemesi ve bu sayede ferdin tedricen açılması olmuştur.” Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Devlet ve Fert* (İstanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933) p.27.

able to find it, and it promises them that they are going to be given a place in the grave, in the inter-mediate state of the soul after death and before the final judgement (*berzeh*) and that a second proposition is going to be offered them. The “Kadro” religion of the twentieth century does not even show this much patience and tolerance. In fact, this religion permits tactical and strategic zigzags.³¹²

The critical reactions to *Kadro* which emerged immediately after the movement came into existence had one characteristic in common. They all accused *Kadro* of taking the role of writing the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution. Recep (Peker) saw this right as his own while the writings in *Cumhuriyet*, from Peyami (Safa) to Ahmed (Ağaoğlu), criticized both the content of the *Kadro* ideology as well as *Kadro*’s claim of writing the ideology of Kemalism. According to Safa, there was nothing wrong in writing ideology in a doctrinaire form or in being influenced by different ‘isms; what he objected to was labelling the ideology presented as Kemalism.³¹³ In his criticism, Safa³¹⁴ and Ağaoğlu both indicated that their own version of Kemalism was the correct one.³¹⁵

³¹² “Zeburun, İncilin, Tevratın ve Kur’anın ayetlerini hatırlarsınız! İzahsız, delilsiz, sübutsuz bir takım düsturlar! Bu tarzı ifade müminler için pek iyi: Fakat mümin olmayanların hali ne olacak? ... Vaktile katolik kilisesinin şiarı ‘Hors de moi point de salut’ ‘benim haricimde nicat (ricat) yok’ düsturu idi. İslamiyetin şiarı ise ‘müminler bir tarafa, kafirler bir’ düsturundan ibarettir. Fakat islamiyet hiç olmazsa ‘içtihat bilakası’ esasını kabul ediyor. Yani hakikatı bulmak için çalışıp, çabalayıp nihayet idraklerinin noksanı dolayısıyla bulamayanları affediyor ve onlara berzehte yer verileceğini ve kendilerine ikinci bir teklif yapılacağını vadediyor. Yirminci asrın ‘Kadro’ dini bu kadarlık olsun tahammül ve müsamaha göstermiyor. Filhakika bu din taktik ve istratejik zikzaklara müsaade ediyor.” Ağaoğlu, pp.8-11.

³¹³ “Ben, Türkiyede faşist, komünist ve daha bilmem ne ist bin türlü doktrin sahibinin yaşamasına ve yazı yazmasına muarız değilim; fakat bunların tezlerine Kemalizm ismi vermeleri, sonra da mektep müdürü, muallim ve mektep kitabı müellifi olarak şahsi tezlerini inkılap nesillerine telkin etmeleri, açıkçası, rejime ihanettir. İşte Türk inkılabının ideolojisini resmen bir kere daha tesbit ve ilana bizi mecbur eden vaziyet. 29 teşrin-evvel hazırlıklarının basında bilhassa bulunması lazım gelen şey budur. Yoksa, inkılabımızın onuncu yıldönümünde, her ağızdan başka bir ses çıkacak ve inkılap ideolojisi diye bir tifoldunun rüyası gibi hümma ve hezryan dolu bir anarşi manzarası karşısında kalacağız.” Peyyami Safa, *Cumhuriyet* 29 July 1933, p.3.

³¹⁴ “Bu tarihten birkaç yıl önce Kemalizmin dogmatik, nasçı ve akideci bazı izahları yapılmak istendi. Bunlar “iptidada vücut vardı, madde vardı” prensipile Avrupanın yıllanmış materyalist akidelerine, yahud “ferd yok, cemiyet var” gibi Gökalp artığı, fakat gene Avrupa milliyetçiliği temellerine, yahut da istihsal vasıtalarının devletleştirilmesi ilah... gibi sosyalist iktisad nazariyelerine bağlı fikir hareketleriydi. O zaman 1932-1933 Kemalizmi Avrupa ideolojilerinden mülhem kapalı sistemler içine hapsedmenin imkansızlığına dair yüzlerce yazı yazdım ve bu tehlikeli dogmatizmle mücadele ettim. Burada iftiharla söyleyebilirim ki bütün o yazılarımda Halk Partisinden hiç de farklı düşünmemiş olduğumu, sonradan, Genel Sekreter Şükrü Kayanın ve o zaman İktisad Vekili Celal Bayarın muhtelif beyanatlarında gördüm.” Peyami Safa, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Kanaat Kitabevi, 1948), p.200.

³¹⁵ Ahmed (Ağaoğlu)’s objection to *Kadro*’s definition of themselves as “Kemalist, Revolutionary (inkılapçı) and State-ist (devletçi)” is expressed in the following section: “Kemalist! Ala! Fakat ben de hiç

The controversy over the ideas proposed by *Kadro* thus ended up being a dispute over the content of the Kemalist ideology, the definition of which all of the critics had a differing version. The debate was therefore far from any question of whether Kemalism, but rather whose or which Kemalism. This point should be noted first because it illustrates the closeness between the *Kadro* movement and the surrounding political elite of the regime. In other words, it is an expression of *Kadro*'s incorporated position in this elite establishment which was mentioned at the outset. Second, the debate clearly demonstrates the eagerness of both the 'liberal' (in the figure of Ahmed Ağaoğlu) as well as of the 'radical-conservative' (in the figure of Recep Peker) wings of the political-ideological establishment to roll itself in the banner of Kemalism. Finally, the fact that this to a large extent was possible is an illustration of the pragmatic nature of Kemalism, a theme discussed in the Introduction of the thesis.³¹⁶

The *Kadro* movement attempted to expunge this pragmatism and replace it with a rigid and coherent definition. The latter constitutes one of the crucial points of differentiation between the *Kadro* and the mainstream Kemalist elite. In contrast to the doctrinaire and rigid theorization of Kemalism by the movement, the ruling political elite was more pragmatically oriented, giving priority to the extensiveness of the room for political action over any preference of an intellectually complex and theoretically well-founded ideology. Political practice and action, not intellectualism, was the concern of the

olmazsa aynı derecede Kemalist olmak iddiasındayım!. Fakat yukarıda görüldüğü veçhile ben Kemalizmi tamamen başka tarzda düşünüyorum ve bu düşüncelerimi de dimağımdan, indi telakkilerimden, kelime ispekülasyonlarından değil, Kemalizmin meydana koyduğu müsbet vak'alar ile müsbet eserler üzerine istinat ediyorum...Halbuki Kemalist inkılabının birinci hedefi her nevi mistisizmi ve mutlakiyeti yıkmak ve vatandaşlara tefekkür ve söz serbestilerini vererek başkasının hakkına tecavüz etmemek şartile herkese istediği gibi düşünmek, anlamak ve söylemek hakkını teminden ibarettir. Kadrocular Kemalist olduklarını iddia ettikleri halde Kemalizmin esası olan bu hakkı tanımak istemiyorlar." Ağaoğlu, pp.56-57.

³¹⁶ "Herkes Atatürk'ün kendi safında olduğunu iddia ediyor. Faşist ona dayanıyor, komünist ona sığınıyor, yobaz onu savunuyor; sağda o, solda o, ortada o, doğuda o, batıda o...Sömürgeci onu kendi safında görüyor. Nerdeyse nurlular da, şeriatçılar da, bu Atatürk furyasından kendilerine hisse çıkaracaklar." Tanyol, Preface, pp.3-4.

ruling elite, which, for example, also came to an expression in the form and content of the journal *Ülkü*.

Authoritarian Traces

After having identified some of the important reactions which the founding of the *Kadro* journal led to, including the accusation of adhering to “Turkish fascism,” the object in this section is to compare the main ideas proposed by *Kadro* with the defining features of fascist ideology, by using the theoretical framework presented in Chapter Two. As stressed earlier, although Italian Fascism and German National Socialism can be gathered under the general term fascism and both be regarded as fascist ideology, the existence of differences and distinguishing characteristics between the two ideologies should once again be emphasized. In the following analysis, *Kadro*’s ideological propositions will be held up against the two fascist ideologies and a differentiation between Fascism and National Socialism sought to be made when required. The following discussion does not claim to be all-embracing since, as recalled from Chapter Two, the theoretical framework was constructed selectively, and incorporated only the points which were deemed most important for this study.

The claim of *Kadro* to offer a “Third Road” alternative between capitalism and communism constituted a common rhetorical proposition. In Roger Eatwell’s words, “intellectual fascists were often to term themselves supporters of a ‘Third Way’, neither left nor right, neither capitalist nor communist.”³¹⁷ More than being a matter of rhetoric and words, the search of *Kadro* for an alternative to these political ideologies which could be seen as a legacy of the nineteenth century was an important common starting point. The radical rejection of capitalism, regarded as the economic expression of liberalism and a

³¹⁷ Eatwell, p.11.

disguise for political liberalism, was a resembling characteristic with fascist ideology. Although capitalism as an economic mode of expression was not rejected in Italian Fascism, the damaging consequences of the capitalist spirit, which was seen as synonymous with the "Jewish Geist" in Werner Sombart's thinking, were mentioned as distinguishing thoughts which motivated the presentation of the third road alternative. Acknowledging the peculiar line of argumentation and the different ideological explanation in Sombart's rejection of capitalism, compared to *Kadro*, whose main argument lay in the exploitative character of the capitalist international system and Turkey's semi-colony position, it remains true, that the radical rejection of capitalism was a common point between the movement and Werner Sombart. The hostility towards liberalism, for which capitalism was only a disguise in *Kadro*'s view, and the search for a third road alternative to both liberalism (capitalism) and communism, was thus an important point which the movement had in common with both of the fascist ideologies.

The rejection of communism by the *Kadro* was mainly explained by reference to the communist aim of establishing the rule of the proletariat. This was seen as contradicting the nature of the Revolution in Turkey whose ultimate aim was the establishment of national unity and a classless society. The populist rhetoric of mainstream political-ideological Kemalists was thus supported by *Kadro*, but in contrast to the mainstream leadership, *Kadro* recognized the prevalence of classes in society. The classless society and the aim of national unity were the ideals for which the Kemalist Revolution was struggling. The view of Bolshevism and Socialism as the main enemy in both Italian Fascism, which as recalled ironically sprang from the Italian Socialist circle, and German National Socialism thus appears to be a common point, but *Kadro*'s rejection was mainly based on the communist ideal of a proletarian, hence class-based, society. For fascist ideology, the international claims of communism and the socialist ideal of uniting all the proletariats in

the world, were strictly contradicting the nationalist claims and ambitions of both Italian Fascism and German Nazi ideology.

On the question of the perception of the state, the economic developmentalist concern of *Kadro* and the movement's pre-occupation with Etatism stand out.³¹⁸ As recalled from the theoretical discussion, the "sacred" character of the state, particularly in Italian Fascism, and partly in German National Socialism (in the latter, the Party was seen as having superseded the State), was a distinguishing feature of fascist ideology. Although the state-ist approach of the *Kadro* movement did not embrace this ideological feature, seeing the state as an end in itself and giving it a holy or sacred character, the state was still seen as being capable and responsible of the achievement of the development of all aspects of society. The view that the State was supposed to be the directing institution and power in society with the aim of making the revolution succeed were expressions of the movement's advocacy of Etatism.³¹⁹ Although Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) accused *Kadro* of presenting their version of Kemalism in a doctrinaire form resembling a religion, it is still difficult to claim that the ideology presented by the movement had the character of a secular religion on the scale that was the case in Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany. The advocacy of a strong state with an attribution of an essential role for it in the economic, political and social spheres of life, at a first glance, puts the *Kadro* movement close to the authoritarian ideologies. However, the view of the state as sacred and having a spiritual power based on

³¹⁸ "Klasik yollar bizi istediğimiz hedeflere götürmezler. Türkiye, kendi yolunu kendi bulacaktır. Bu yeni yolu açacak bir tek kuvvet tanıyoruz: Devlet Türkiye'nin iktisadi talihinin mimarı, gerek Türkiye, gerek cihan iktisadiyatının her gün değişen şartlarını, adım adım kollayan bir 'İKTİSAT DEVLETİ' olacaktır. Fert, bu muazzam inkılap işinde Malzemedir...Nasıl Devlet memleketin müdafaa, hukuk ve maarif (eğitim) işlerinde kontrolü elinde bulunduruyorsa (ve vatandaşlar buna karşı gelmiyorsa), iktisadi alanda da Devletin hakim ve nazım rolü kabul edilmeli." Vedat Nedim, "Müstemleke iktisadiyatından millet iktisadiyatına" *Kadro*, 1, no. 2 (February 1932), p.10.

³¹⁹ "İleri teknikli bir Türk iktisadiyatı ve sınıfsız ve tezsiz bir Türk milleti ancak devletçi bir iktisat siyasetinin eseri olacaktır. Bu itibarla Türk milletinin sınıflaşmasına meydan vermeden, ileri teknikli bir iktisada kavuşması demek, aynı zamanda içtimai endişeleri de göz önünde bulunduran bir iktisadi devletçilik demektir." Vedat Nedim, "Sınıflaşmamak ve İktisat Siyaseti," *Kadro*, 1, no. 11 (November 1932), p.21.

the fact that it represented the national religion, is an important differentiating characteristic of fascist, and in particular Italian Fascist, ideology. A strong state was advocated by the *Kadro* movement because it was seen as the guarantor of development especially in the economic but also in the socio-political fields, but as stated, the state was not presented as an absolute end in itself, having a spirit of its own, and this is a point of difference which needs to be emphasized.

The important role given to the avant-garde, the cadre, in the revolutionary process by *Kadro* appears due to its elitist implications as a point of similarity. An important difference, however, is the fact that the intellectuals were given a vital place in this cadre, together with the political leadership, and this elite had the responsibility of making the revolution and its ideology take root among the people. The anti-intellectual feature of fascist ideology, and the hostility towards intellectuals due to their rationalistic and positivistic approach, should be recalled in this context. The intellectualism of *Kadro* was thus an important differentiating point both from the fascist ideologies, as well as from the mainstream Kemalist leadership.

On the question of the role of the political leadership and the importance attributed to cults and myths around the leader, as recalled from Chapter Two and Emilio Gentile's account, both the myth as well as the cult around Mussolini played a crucial role in carrying the Fascist ideology to the people and mobilizing the Italian population. Just as Fascism was viewed in terms of a secular religion, making claim on representing the truth, Mussolini was consequently seen as a holy figure, whose position was indisputable and whose words constituted the absolute truth.

Withholding that an important role was given to the cadre and as part of this to the political leadership in the undertaking of the Revolution, as proposed in *Kadro's* Kemalism, it has to be recognized that any notion of a leadership cult or myths created

around Mustafa Kemal seems to be lacking when the cults of both Mussolini and Hitler are kept in mind. The undisputable position of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and his leadership were recognized and he was without doubt seen as the leader (*Şef*) of the Kemalist Revolution and the Kemalist regime,³²⁰ but both Mussolini and Hitler's positions seem to have embraced something additional, a spiritual character and a religious form, making the word of the leader the absolute truth.³²¹ Related with this, the recognition of the position of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) as the *Şef*, was never propagated to the people on the scale seen in Italy and Germany. This argument can be supported with reference to the primary sources, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Ulus)* and *Ülkü*, in which the number of Mustafa Kemal's speeches are limited, making it difficult to speak of any notion of an extensive propaganda. The myth-making around Mustafa Kemal, non-existent during his life time, can be claimed to have been made after his death and the cult around him, thus, did not play the kind of role as in the Italian and German cases, in the period under study. The fact that the attribution of the title of "Eternal leader" (*Ebedi Şef*) to him was declared after his death at the Extraordinary Congress (*Olağanüstü Kurultay*) held in December 1938,³²² gives credit to this argument which is a crucial point of difference from both Italian Fascism and German National Socialism.

The belief in a strong leadership to make the Revolution successful in Turkey nevertheless prevailed in the inter-war years. Just as national unity was seen as the ideal to

³²⁰ The following sentences by Yakup Kadri written in retrospect, in relation with his taking office in diplomacy, are both entertaining as well as illustrative of the importance attributed Mustafa Kemal: "*Lakin ben politikanın satranç tahtası üstünde sadece bir 'piyade' idim. Ne mat edilmeğe değerdim, ne de başlıca bir rolüm olabilirdi. Onun içindir ki, hünerli satranç ustası beni bir ileri sürdü, bir geri çekti ve sonunda karşımdaki fil'e esir vermekte hiç bir zarar görmedi. Aziz Atatürk; politikanın santranç tahtası üstünde senin elinle kımıldayan bir 'piyade' olmak bile benim için büyük şerefli.*" Karaosmanoğlu, *Zoraki Diplomat*, p.48.

³²¹ "The state does not hold political authority as an impersonal unit but receives it from the Führer as the executor of the national will. The authority of the Führer is complete and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the means of political direction; it extends into all fields of national life; it embraces the entire people, which is bound to the Führer in loyalty and obedience." Cohen, *Communism, Fascism*, p.372.

³²² Hikmet Bilağ, *CHP 1919-1999* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999), p.84.

be strived for, and discipline and organization the means necessary for its establishment, authority and leadership were the other core tools through which this ideal was to be attained. This was a fundamental idea proposed by *Kadro* which illustrated the influence of the “spirit of the age” on this intellectual movement.³²³ To obtain the ideal of national unity, the single-party rule was seen as yet another legitimate requirement in the *Kadro* group³²⁴, and political opposition an illness hindering the achievement of this ideal. A unified people, giving unconditional support to the same ideal and the principles of the regime, was necessary for the Revolution to succeed. Although the existence of opposing views was recognized to be a possibility, according to Şevket Süreyya, in such a case, one part had to triumph and if necessary “with violence and force” make the other, opposing part surrender.

A revolution does certainly not mean that everything is deadly calm. Of the two clashing parts in a Revolution, one of them is going to subject the other to its own will by force and compulsion (*cebrüzor*), one regime is going to transform (*istihale*) into another regime, and one matter into another matter, in short some things are going to be dispersed in the structure of society and new things be created.³²⁵

³²³ “The idea that only a cultivated elite is capable of rising above the herd and creating new values was the cornerstone of the social sciences at the turn of the century.” Zeev Sternhell, “Modernity and Its Enemies,” p.16; and further, “the cultural pessimists paved the intellectual way for those who wished to flock towards strong, if unjust, regimes. Nostalgia for a leadership role the intellectuals felt they were losing contributed much to their pessimistic assessments of the present...mankind could find itself again only by abandoning its formal freedoms, and that civilization could be saved only by the energy and the warrior spirit of radically antimodern men.” Nacci, p.128.

³²⁴ “*Türk inkılabının sesini dışarıya duyurtacak olan cihazımız, aynı vazifeyi içlerimizde başaran cihaz, yani Fırka’dır. – Devlet ve hükümet, resmi müesseselerdir. Dışarıya karşı bağıdırlar. Sözlerini ve hareketlerini tartmağa mecburdurlar. Fırka için bu gibi bağlantılar yoktur. Fırka, sadece millete, daha doğrusu, milletin ileri menfaatlerine karşı mes’uldür. Dışarı doğru resmi sıfatları yoktur...Matbuat ve radyo ile beraber bütün neşir vasıtaları, Fırka’nın elindedir; yahut elinde olması lazımdır. İnkılabın bütün prensiplerini, bu vasıtalarla Fırka, hem içeri hem dışarı doğru kiskançlık ve karar – sertliği ile müdafaa eder.*” Burhan Asaf, “İnkılabımızın Sesi,” *Kadro*, 1, no.11 (November 1932), p.35.

³²⁵ “*İnkılap demek, hiç şüphesiz bir süt limanlık demek değildir. İnkılapta çarpışan iki taraftan biri, diğerini kendi iradesine ve cebrüzor ile mahkum kılacak, bir rejim diğer rejime, bir keyfiyet diğer keyfiyete istihale edecek, hülâsa cemiyetin bütün bünyesinde birşeyler dağılacak ve birşeyler yeniden yapılacaktır.*” Şevket Süreyya, “İnkılabın psikolojisi,” *Kadro*, 1, no. 1 (January 1932), p.4.

Furthermore, “deepening” the Revolution and making it take root among the people, was seen as essential for any revolution to succeed. Unification around the Revolutionary ideal required that everybody accept and support this ideal and behave according to its principles. Since a “revolution is not a neutral order,” it was necessary that “everyone who is living under it, regardless of whether they are supporting it or not, accept it and adopt to it.” In other words, a revolution meant that “the will of those who are not supporting it is bound (*bağlanmak*) unconditionally to the will of those who are in support of it.” This was the only way that unification could be achieved and the Revolution achieve success.³²⁶

The rejection of political opposition of any kind against the political leadership leads one to better understand Ahmed (Ağaoğlu)’s accusation of *Kadro* for presenting their ideology in a theocratic way, as a religion, whose version of the truth was presented in an absolute way and thus made all people, so to speak, subjects:

Since a Revolution, in terms of occurrence, means that the will and interest of a group of people in the nation is bound with force and compulsion to the will and interest of another group of people, discipline, prestige, and authority are unavoidable and inseparable elements of this occurrence...From this perspective, the state organization in terms of its form, is very similar in all countries undergoing revolution. But the fact remains that the state in both fascism and in revolutionary socialism, has not lost its class character.³²⁷

³²⁶ “İhtilal inkılabın gayesi değil, vasıtasıdır...İnkılab bitaraf bir nizam değildir. Onun içinde yaşayanların, taraftar olsunlar veya olmasınlar, ona intibak etmeleri lazımdır. İnkılap, ona taraftar olanların iradelerine, taraftar olmayanların iradelerinin, kayıtsız ve şartsız, bağlanması demektir...İnkılabın derinleşmesi demek, her şeyden evvel, bu prensiplerin ve onların ifadesi olan inkılap ahlak ve disiplininin, ileri kadronun dimağından genç neslin, şehir halkının ve köylünün dimağına inmesi ve yerleşmesi demektir.” “Kadro’nun gayesi açıklanıyor” *Kadro*, 1, no. 1 (January 1932), p.1.

³²⁷ “İnkılap, hadise bakımından manası itibarile, millet içinde bir takım insanların irade ve menfaatlerinin, diğer bir takım insanların irade ve menfaatlerine cebir ve zor ile bağlanması demek olduğundan bu hadisede disiplin, prestic ve otorite zaruri ve ayrılmaz unsurlardır...Bu bakımdan devlet teşkilatı, şekil itibarile bütün inkılap memleketlerinde birbirinin aynı gibidir. Fakat şu var ki, gerek faşizm, gerek ihtilalci sosyalizmde devlet, Sınıf mahiyetini kaybetmemiştir.” Şevket Süreyya, “Türk Nasyonalizmi,” *Kadro*, 2, no.21 (September 1933), p.10.

In a polemical debate in *Cumhuriyet*³²⁸ between Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) and Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), the latter referred to Ağaoğlu's preceding membership of the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*) and used this as an argument to show Ağaoğlu's distance from the RPP and true Kemalism.³²⁹ The aim of the ongoing Revolution was the establishment of national unity, which meant a classless society. As recalled, *Kadro*'s rejection of socialism was based on the argument that it led to a system of class rule. The Turkish national liberation movement in contrast aimed at avoiding contradictions and classes in society.³³⁰ (Italian) Fascism was rejected with a similar argument. Even if Fascism claimed to eliminate class contradictions in society through organizing people according to the corporatist model, which was based on individuals' representation by their professional corporations and consequently the worker and the employer were put in the same corporation, İsmail Hüsrev rejected that Fascism obtained the goal of unity in society. He stated that, "in reality, the corporate state has not abolished class contradictions and reconciled opposing interests. The collective labour agreement is only a matter of "showing-off" that the employer and the employee have come to an agreement." According to İsmail Hüsrev, "the old relations of property remain," and "Fascism has not been able to realize (*tahakkuk ettirmek*) the unity of the nation." In contrast, it remained as an "order of jendarme that

³²⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 1 February 1933; *Cumhuriyet*, 2 February 1933; and *Cumhuriyet*, 5 February 1933.

³²⁹ "Kadro sahibi en son makalesinin en son kısmında, benim serbest fırkaya mensup olduğumu hatırlatıyor...serbest fırkayı hatırlamakla demek istiyor ki ben inkılapçı, devletçi ve Kemalist olsaydım serbes fırkaya gitmezdim. Ahlak bakımından pek kötü olan bu fıkraya cevabım şudur: 'Ben serbest fırkaya inkılapçı, demokrat, liberal devletçi ve Kemalist olarak geçtim. Çünkü inkılabın ta ilk günlerinden inkılap reislerinin maiyetlerinde çalışmış, inkılap matbuatını senelerce idare etmiş, inkılabın resmi organinin başında senelerce bulunmuş.'" Ağaoğlu, p.101.

³³⁰ "Binaenaleyh biz, tezatsız millet şiarını ortaya atmakla hiç bir suretle şe'niyetle tezada düşmüyoruz. Millet bünyesinin bugünkü sınıflı kuruluşunun tabi olduğu kanunları ve bu bünye içinde liberal ve ferdîyetçi bir inkişafın verebileceği neticeleri evvelden gördüğümüz ve idrak ettiğimiz içindir ki, millet bütünlüğünün organik surette tahakkukunu gaye ediniyoruz. Davamızda ne faşizmin demagojisine, ne de sosyalizmin dar sınıfcılık zihniyetine yer veriyoruz." İsmail Hüsrev, "Millet içinde sınıf meselesi," *Kadro*, 3, no. 26 (February 1934), p.26.

persistently preserves the old.³³¹” In the same issue of the journal, Burhan Asaf acknowledges that “although Fascism has not been able to fully eliminate a single class or group’s fearless exploitation of all the other masses of the nation, it has at least been able to curb it.³³²”

On the question of the political mobilisation of the masses, *Kadro*’s stance strongly differed from the mass mobilisation feature of both of the fascist ideologies. Although it is possible to find statements about the necessity of the people to be active for the success of the Revolution³³³, the implications or meaning put into these statements seems to be different from the political mobilisation which was adhered to by the Fascist and the National Socialist rules. For the latter, as it was also noted in the theoretical chapter, the mobilisation of the masses from below was one of the most distinguishing characteristics. In the case of *Kadro*, the reference to the activity of the people seems to have been purely rhetorical and the people’s participation in the revolutionary process understood as the necessity of people to become conscious of, and give unconditional support to, the ideology of the revolution. The ideals and principles of the revolution were to be expounded to the people and these would ultimately become an integral part of the people’s consciousness. It was only when such an ‘unconscious consciousness’ of the

³³¹ “Korporatif devlet hakikatte sınıf tezatlarını kaldırmış, zıt menfaatleri telif etmiş değildir. Kollektif iş mukavelesi tarkile iş verenle iş alanın anlaşması, işin gösteriş tarafıdır. Eski mülkiyet münasebetleri gene bakidir...Hulasa, faşizm, millet bütünlüğünü tahakkuk ettirememiştir. Eskiye ısrarla muhafaza eden bir jandarma nizamı olarak yerinde kalmıştır.” Hüsrev, Ibid., pp.23-24.

³³² “Faşizm, sınıfların siyasi mücadele haklarını ortadan kaldırmak ve istihsalde maliyet fiyatı’nı bütün sahalara şamil olarak kontrol etmekle, artık bir tek sınıf, yahut zümrenin milletin bütün diğer yığınlarını pervasızca istismar etmesini, gerçi tamamen kaldıramamış ise de, hiç olmazsa, frene almıştır.” Burhan Asaf, “Faşizm niçin beynelmileleşmek istiyor, *Kadro*, 3, no. 26 (February 1934), p.31.

³³³ “İnkılap yapan bir cemiyet durgun değildir. İnkılap içindeki bir cemiyetin ferdi de sürekli aktiftir; ‘Bu hareket içinde ise fert, ya yıkılan cemiyetin bir bakiyesi olarak menfi, ya kurulan nizamın bir unsuru olarak müspet, fakat, her zaman aktif ve her zaman müteaddidir.’ Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), “İnkılab heyecanı,” *Kadro*, 1, no. 2 (February 1932), p.5.

Revolution existed in the minds of people that the Revolution could be claimed to have reached its goal.³³⁴

In both Italy and Germany the active participation of the people, mass mobilisation, in the political process was witnessed through the strong propaganda apparatus of the political leadership, and through the various channels for people to participate and become part of the political sphere. The people were incorporated and made part of the political process through various means, such as institutions in which people were educated ideologically as well as physically. Extensive propaganda was undertaken through technological means, and through daily ceremonies and rituals, as presented by Gentile, celebrating (Italian) Fascism as a religion. Through the various forms of institutions belonging to the state, both the Fascist regime in Italy and the Nazi regime in Germany successfully opted for the people's active participation in political life to make them an integral part of the regime. The ruling elite opted for the support of the masses and tried to create legitimacy for its rule, directly through the means of mass mobilisation and this distinguishing feature of fascist ideology was crucial in the consolidation of the power of the Fascist and Nazi rules.

The absence of any concern for mobilising the masses and making them participate in the political processes can partly be explained by *Kadro's* intellectualist bias. As mentioned earlier, *Kadro* was presenting an ideology for the political leadership of the regime and was mainly concerned with giving an explanation of the Kemalist ideology and revolution to this elite. This ideology was not written for the masses and when this fact is kept in mind, it appears less noteworthy that mass mobilisation was not a consideration of

³³⁴ "Bir İnkılap biter mi? Bitebilir. Müdafaa ettiği bütün gayeler artık tabii kaideler haline gelen; ahlakını, hukukunu, sanatını yapan; tezatlarını ve reaksiyonlarını yenen, hulasa getirdiği cemiyet şekilleri artık tabiileşen İnkılaplar görülmüştür...Cihanda İnkılap devam ediyor ve Türkiyede İnkılap bitmemiştir." Şevket Süreyya, "İnkılap bitti mi?" *Kadro*, 1, no. 3 (March 1932), pp.5-6.

the movement. The *Kadro* members were intellectuals, not political leaders, which partly explains their disregard to the question of political mobilisation. It should however be noted that the mainstream political leadership also did not give any primacy to this issue of mass mobilisation, and this was a point of overlap between the *Kadro* and the mainstream Kemalist group which distinguished them from both the Fascist and the National Socialist rules.

Since *Kadro*'s Kemalism was not adopted by the mainstream political-ideological leadership, it remained an ideology restricted to the theoretical level. *Kadro*'s propositions were in other words not put into political practice and this was a crucial point of difference from the two fascist ideologies under consideration. Both Fascist and Nazi ideology took their shape, also, during and due to the exercise of political power by their leaders. To take an example, the leadership cult around Mussolini emerged gradually during the Fascist rule, as in the early 1920s the question of who was the *Duce* of Fascism was still a matter of dispute (Gabriele D'Annunzio was regarded as the leader of Fascism by some groups in the movement).³³⁵ Towards the end of the 1920s however, the question had been solved and the leadership of Mussolini become indisputable. This aspect of Italian Fascism, the cult of Mussolini, emerged gradually and through the political practices of the Fascist rule.

Related to the orientation towards the masses in both Fascism and National Socialism, and as part of its anti-intellectual character, complex theoretical assumptions and explanations were rejected by these ideologies. As discussed in Chapter Two, both Fascism and National Socialism were ideologies that were "founded" on theoretical propositions that had been held by groups of intellectuals at the turn of the century. Thus, the intellectual roots of these ideologies has already been acknowledged. The political movements made use of these theoretical propositions in the definition and creation of the

³³⁵ Gentile, p.134.

political ideology, but what the political leaders needed was an ideology which would appeal to the people rather than a complex set of theoretical explanations and arguments.

The purpose of the *Kadro* movement was to fill in the ideological gap and for this purpose strict and coherent theoretical assumptions were presented at times, as rightly claimed by Ahmed (Ağaoğlu) and Peyami (Safa), in a rather doctrinaire form. This fact has been seen as a possible cause for the decision to close *Kadro*. According to this argument, the ruling political elite in Turkey became uneasy and dissatisfied with *Kadro* because the movement was presenting Kemalism in a too strictly defined and rigid way, which was in contradiction to the pragmatism favoured by the political rule.

Kadro's rejection of political liberalism, which was regarded as ultimately leading to fragmentation and prohibiting the development of national unity,³³⁶ constitutes a common point between the movement and fascist ideology. Further, the view of the French Revolution as the root cause of this state of liberalism is equally criticized by both fascist ideology and the *Kadro* group.³³⁷ The First World War was seen as an event which signified that the French Revolution had been doomed to failure and Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) for example claimed that "the nations who have survived the painful and bloody trials of the years 1914-1918, have ceased believing in the words "brotherhood,

³³⁶ "Bugünkü Almanyanın Versailles muahedesinde ziyade Fransız demokrasisinin kurbanı olduğuna şüphem kalmadı. Bir millet, demokrasi hesabına ancak bu kadar istismar edilebilir. Otuz fırka – belki de daha fazladır – her Almanın kafasında cirit oynatıyor!...Bir Almanya, bir Alman milleti yok. Otuz fırka var. Otuz fırkaya bölünmüş bir millet, otuz fırkaya ayrılmış bir memleket var. Hitler, demokrasiinin aleyhinde. Fakat kendi mevcudiyetini bizzat demokrasiye borçlu. Demokrasinin o herşeyi hazmeden geniş işkembesi olmasaydı, Hitler olmazdı!" Vedat Nedim, "Kreuger, Hitler, Göthe," *Kadro*, 1, no. 4 (April 1932), pp.27-28.

³³⁷ "Son asır sınaat ve para medeniyetini vücuda getirmiş olan ekonomik sistemler doğrudan doğruya Fransız inkılabının ortaya attığı prensiplerin çocuğudur. Avrupanın şerefini ve kudretini teşkil eden o heybetli fabrikalar, o korkunç bankalar, o devağzı limanlar, kısaca garp medeniyeti dediğimiz muhteşem alem, serbes rekabetten doğmuş ve yaşaması ancak serbes rekabetin devamına bağlı bir nizamdır. Halbuki serbes rakabet sistemi başka bir bakımdan bugünkü iktisadi ve siyasi ıztırapların ..başı olmuştur...1914 muharebesi serbes rakabet sahasındaki bu ferdi boğuşmaların millet ve devlet halinde umumileşmesi demektir. Bu bakımdan Cihan harbini Liberal sistemin bir iflası gibi telakki edebiliriz ve dolayısıyla Fransız İhtilalini de." Yakup Kadri, "Ankara, Moskova, Roma," *Kadro*, 1, no. 6 (June 1932), p.39.

freedom, justice” and started regarding these as some metaphysical and abstract ideals.³³⁸ The *Kadro* group’s rejection of liberalism and individualism was a logical consequence of the advocacy of Etatism, which gave the state precedence over the individual. Individuals had duties, not rights, and should keep the goals and interests of society above everything, even themselves.³³⁹ As expressed clearly by Şevket Süreyya:

In the new Turkey, the individual first belongs to the country, and then to himself. *Half of our day is ours and the other half belongs to the state.* When I use all the hours on my own (*nef’ime*), and when I stay all day in my own corner, confining me into myself, I become like a man who has stolen half the right of the state!³⁴⁰

In articles discussing the importance of the youth for the Revolution, the “duty of the individual” was underlined. The youth constituted the group in society which was supposed to carry the Revolution into the future. Further, for any Revolution to become successful, it was essential to organize the youth and make sure that it became a “generation of the Revolution.”³⁴¹ Educating the youth according to the principles and the ideology of the Revolution, and ensuring that it utilized its time efficiently were seen as requirements to achieve this goal. A youth, unorganized, left to itself, and distanced to the notions of

³³⁸ “1914-1918 yıllarının acı ve kanlı imtahanlarından çıkmış olan milletler artık “uhuvvet, hürriyet ve adalet” kelimelerine inanmaz olmuşlar, bunlara bir takım metafizik ve abstrakt mefhumlar nazarıyla bakmaya başlamışlardır.” Ibid.

³³⁹ “Millet iktisadiyatı yaratma davasında her vatandaş disiplinli ve şuurlu bir ordunun fertleri gibi üstüne düşen vazifeleri bilmelidir.” Vedat Nedim, “Müstemleke iktisadiyatından millet iktisadiyatına,” *Kadro*, 1, no.2 (February 1932), p.9.

³⁴⁰ “Yeni Türkiyede fert, evvela memleketin, sonra kendinindir. Günümüzün yarısı bizim, yarısı devletindir. Bütün saatlerimi kendi nef’ime aldığım, bütün gün kendi köşemde kendim için kapanıp kaldığım zaman, devletin yarı hakkını çalmış bir adam gibi olurum!” Şevket Süreyya, “Halkevleri,” *Kadro*, 1, no.3 (March 1932), p.35.

³⁴¹ “harpsunu ihtilallerinde heyecan, kollektif bir ruh disiplinidir. Harpsunu ihtilallerinde sokağın ve endividüalizmin damgası yoktur. Şimdi, inkılap nesli sokağın kalabalığı içinden kendi kendine ve kendi başına doğmaz. Muayyen bir inkılap, terbiyesi içinde, muayyen bir cemiyet kuruluşu için yetiştirilir ve hazırlanır. Şimdi inkılabı benimseyen ve mukadderatını bu inkılabın mukadderatına vakfeden herkes; çocuk, kadın, genç, ihtiyar bu devamlı ve prensipli inkılap terbiyesinin bir mevzuudur. İnkılap nesli, böyle kollektif bir yetişiş, duyuş ve hareket ediş disiplinine mevzu olan nesildir. Ferdi bir ruh macerası değil, toplu arayış, ve hareket edip ahlakının, ruha verdiği ‘sonsuz tatmin’ yahut inkılap heyecanı, ancak böyle bir inkılap nesli içinde yaşar ve kökleşir.” Şevket Süreyya, “İnkılap heyecanı,” *Kadro*, 1, no. 2 (February 1932), p.7.

discipline and principles, would not be able to fulfill its task and responsibility, which was to ensure the success of the Revolution.³⁴²

To sum up, *Kadro*'s hostile attitude towards both economic and political liberalism and the historical root of this phenomenon, the French Revolution, is reminiscent of the fascist ideologies' standpoint. The precedence of the collectivity, the nation and the people, at the 'cost' of the individual, is another aspect of this feature. On the question of the importance of the state and leadership cult, the sacred character of the Fascist state, the cult around the *Duçe*, and the sacralization of politics were important distinguishing features of Italian Fascism which need to be emphasized. This sacredness made it possible to view Fascism in terms of a secular religion, which made claims on presenting the absolute truth by deciding right and wrong and defining the meaning of life. The State-ism presented by the *Kadro*, although certainly giving an indisputable role to the state, could not be claimed to be similar to the proposition of fascist ideology. The view of the state as having a spiritual existence on its own, was an important notion, absent in *Kadro*'s state-ism.

In a similar vein with the mainstream Kemalist leadership, *Kadro*'s affirmative look upon notions such as discipline and organization, especially in the education and training of the youth, was a point resembling the Fascist and National Socialist notions of these concepts. Although these 'tools' were used at a much more extreme level than what was even proposed theoretically by *Kadro*, it remains a fact that Italy and Germany (as well as Russia) constituted sources of inspiration on these points.

Finally, the doctrinaire form in which the *Kadro* movement presented its version of the Kemalist ideology was a point of resemblance which should be mentioned. The

³⁴² "Bizce teşkilatın içine alınacak olan gövdeler değil, kafalardır. Kumanda talimatları, kumanda basamakları, hep kafalar için ve kafalara göre olmalıdır...Kanlı cepheden kusursuz millet yapısına kadar sığın sahaya, bir ad olsun diye 'inkılap' diyoruz...İnkılabımızın bütün esaslarını, bütün gayelerini, teşkilatına kafası ile bağlanmış bir Türk gençliğine belletmek. Üzerine aldığı mesuliyeti Büyük Nutuktaki son cümle ile ve Başbuğun dediklerini tekrar ettirmek suretile anlatmak. Ve sonra, ona vazife vermek." No Author, "Editorial," *Kadro* 2, no. 17 (May 1933), pp.3-4.

intolerance towards any questioning or opposition against the ideology proposed by this leading avant-garde movement and its absolutist claims show that the group falls well in line with the “spirit of the age” and is just another example of the authoritarian traces that can be found in its ideological propositions.

The Image of Fascism

As discussed extensively in Chapter Three, the mainstream political-ideological Kemalist leadership attributed a distinguishing importance to the youth in writings concerning how the regime and the ongoing Revolution were to succeed. As recalled, Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany constituted strong sources of inspiration on this subject. The positive perception of the youth aspect of the two fascist ideologies led to the conclusion that Italy and Germany were regarded as examples to be learned from on the question of the education of the youth. Without going into any further discussion on the matter, it should suffice to note that this subject also attracted the attention of *Kadro* in a similar way with the mainstream Kemalist leadership, as expressed in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* and *Ülkü*. A positive perception of fascist ideology specifically due to this subject was present in this intellectual journal.

Furthermore, with reference to the section on the issue of race and health, which was also discussed in the previous chapter, no attention was given to this subject in the *Kadro* journal. It was a fundamental assumption of the movement that the Turkish nation consisted of the Turkish people, who were seen as constituting a whole and united around the same national ideal and Revolution.

This is the cause of a nation and a country, which to be accomplished in such a tight span of time, orders that the Turkish country, the Turkish nation, and the Turkish state

become a single body, with a unique understanding (*iz'an*), a unique perception (*duygu*), a unique consciousness and a unique volition (*irade*).³⁴³

The anti-semitic orientation of the National Socialist regime in Germany, which admittedly had only attained power a year after the beginning of publishing of the journal, or the question of race-based nationalism, was not given any attention in *Kadro*. As an exception to this general ignorance, in one article, Burhan Asaf shortly discussed Hitler's policies towards the Jews, and stated that "justified, or unjust, harsh or soft, the meaning of this action should be seen around the saying that 'the minority which does not conform to the majority will sooner or later regret it.'" Further than that, Asaf said that the anti-semitism against the Jews in Germany "will hopefully be a lesson" for the (national) minorities in Turkey who instead of keeping themselves out from the majority nation should try to integrate and become a whole with it.³⁴⁴ Hitler's policies were thus regarded as legitimate and even put forth as a warning to minorities in Turkey, but again, the subject was not discussed any further in other articles and it is difficult to reach any general conclusion based on this single article.

Related to the race aspect of German National Socialism, the irredentist and imperial aims of both the German ideology as well as Italian Fascism were points strictly rejected by the *Kadro* movement from the very beginning. First of all, the Kemalist Revolution was perceived as a struggle for national liberation, which meant a struggle on behalf of the nation. In addition, it was seen as a struggle against imperialism. It was asserted that the

³⁴³ "Bu bir millet ve memleket davasıdır ki, bu dar zamanda başarılabilmesi için, Türk memleketinin, Türk milletinin ve Türk devletinin bir tek gövdede bir tek iz'an, bir tek duygu, bir tek şuur ve bir tek irade haline gelmelerini, emreder." *Kadro*, 2, no. 15 (March 1933), p.4.

³⁴⁴ "Almanya'daki yahudi aleyhtarlığı, umarız ki, bizimkilere bir ders olur. Türk kadar misafirperver olmak için, Türk kadar tarih içinde efendi millet olmuş olmak lazımdır. Fakat, her misafirliğin sonu, ya evdekilere karışmak yahut misafirliği uzatmamak değil midir? Bizim azlıklar, evdekilere karışmasını, şimdiye kadar hiç bilmediler. Çünkü bilmek istemediler. Fakat bundan sonrası için bunun samimi yollarını, biz göstermeden kendilerinin arayıp bulmaları, şüphe yok ki, hem onların hem de bizim lehimize dir." Burhan Asaf, "Bizdeki Azlıklar," *Kadro* 2, no. 16 (April 1933), p.52.

national liberation movement in Turkey had been fighting a war against the imperialist aims of the European powers and that the independence constituted the culmination of this struggle, leading to the final victory of the national movement. As a logical consequence of being a movement struggling against imperialist powers and aims, Kemalism and Turkey thus did not have these objectives. In articles in the journal, imperialism was continuously stated as a key differentiating feature of Kemalism from both Fascism and National Socialism.³⁴⁵ The anti-colonialist aspect of the movement was evidenced through the movement's 'Third World'ist approach. It was stated in the journal that the struggle for national liberation going on in Turkey should be seen as an example and followed by other Third World countries.

In an article series with the title *Ankara, Moskova, Roma*, Yakup Kadri discusses the regimes in Turkey, Soviet Russia, and Italy and offers his views on the common characteristics between the three countries. In Yakup Kadri's view, all of the three rules can be seen as a "reaction to an established order."³⁴⁶ Furthermore, points of similarity between the communist and the Fascist regimes are discussed, and Yakup Kadri identifies the faith and trust of the people in the political leaderships as one such common point. This was seen as an expression that the control of the masses in these regimes was not based on force or fear. Duties and tasks in society were being undertaken in a disciplined way

³⁴⁵ "Faşizm, İtalya için gecikmiş bir emperyalizmin, Almanya için ise harpte mağlup olmuş ve binaenaleyh bütün hesaplarında aldanmış bir emperyalizmin ifadesidir. Bu şartlar karşısında kalmış, daha doğrusu tarih tarafından bunlar karşısında bırakılmış bir memleket için, en tabii yol emperyalizmde vaz geçmektir. Fakat bunu ne İtalya, ne de Almanya yapmak istemiştir. Bilakis, her iki memleketin de has niyeti, menfi olan bu şartlara rağmen emperyalizmde devam etmek ve muvaffak olmak yollarını, inzibat ve şiddet kanalından ele geçirmektir." Burhan Asaf, "Faşizm, niçin beynelmilelleşmek istiyor?" *Kadro*, 3, no. 26 (February 1934), p.30.

³⁴⁶ "Bu üç inkılap, menşe itibarile eştir. Yani, her üçü de müesses bir nizama karşı birer reaksiyondur. Fakat, gaye itibarile birbirinin tamamen zıttı olduğu kadar kullandıkları sistemlerce de birbirine pek o kadar benzemezler." *Kadro*, 1, no. 12 (December 1932), p.33.

without even being questioned by the masses.³⁴⁷ This ability of the political leaderships to educate and organize the masses and making them devoted to the regime and its ideology was seen as an example from which the liberation movement in Turkey could learn:

We can only find the example of a Revolution which subjects itself to a perpetual control, in Fascist Italy. The Fascist Organization works smoothly as a machine all of whose equipments are being oiled everyday, almost in an automatic way. When all of this organization or some part of it is wanted to be activated, it suffices for the leader (*Şef*) to touch a switch with the touch of his finger...And this is the reason that Mussolini, maybe despite his own wish and will, has more the attitude of a foreman, rather than a dictator.³⁴⁸

The importance of organizing the youth and incorporating it into the national liberation movement, deepening the Revolution and its ideology in *Kadro*'s terms, was again emphasized with reference to Italy and Russia.³⁴⁹ The case of a young "Italian Balilla," who succesfully answered the *Duce*'s question on what Italy's national corn (buğday) policy consisted of with a precise reply, was given as an example of the

³⁴⁷ "Rusya ile İtalya'da bu iki türlü mahrumiyete katılanmanın yegane saikını korkuya atfedenler yanılırlar. Gerçi, İtalya'da olsun Rusya'da olsun fabrika kapılarında silahlı nöbetçilere tesadüf etmek mümkündür ve amele muhitlerinin umumi manzarasında bir cebri çalışma emaresi vardır. Fakat, bu, her yerde, her zaman mevcudiyeti tabii bir tenbel veya asi azlığına karşı alınmış tedbirlerden başka bir manayı ifade etmez. Öbür taraf, asıl yığınlar, yeni bir dinin vecdi içinde kamaşmış kalmış gibidirler. Bunlarda çalışma bir ibadet halini almıştır ve dünyada hiç bir şey onlara kendi el işlerinin mahsulünden daha fazla bir zevk ve neş'e veremez." Yakup Kadri, *Kadro*, 1, no. 12 (December 1932), pp.33-34.

³⁴⁸ "Kendi kendini mütemadi bir kontrole tabi tutan bir tam İnkılap örneğini, biz ancak, Faşist İtalya'da bulabiliriz. Faşist teşkilat, bütün cihazları her gün yağlanıp parlatılan son sistem bir makine gibi, adeta otomatik bir tarzda işler. Bütün teşkilatın veya o teşkilattan bir kısmının istenildiği anda harekete gelmesi için, Şefin, parmağının ucuyla bir düğmeye basması kifayet eder...Onun içindir ki, Mussolini'de – belki de kendi arzu ve iradesine rağmen – bir diktatör tavrından ziyade bir ustabaşı hali vardır." Yakup Kadri, "Ankara Moskova Roma," *Kadro*, 1, no. 11, (November 1932), p.38.

³⁴⁹ "Yeni Türkiyede her vatandaşın bir de İÇTİMAİ İŞ sahibi olması ve bu işin onun ruhunu doyurması lazımdır. Harp sonunda bir inkılabı sahne olmuş her yerde, Rusyada, İtalyada hatta yeni Çinde, genç nesil kül halinde bu içtimai iş ve terbiye planının içine alınmıştır. Buralarda genç neslin her mensubu, kendi meslek veya tahsil saatleri haricinde bir gençlik ve kültür müessesesi içinde yaşar ve orada kendi ruhunun zevkini ve tatminini bulur. Mesela İtalyada bir gençlik kulübü, gencin siyaset, cemiyet, kültür ufkunu her gün biraz daha açan ve onu bir (Dağının insanlar cemiyeti)nin menfi enstenklerine göre değil, muayyen prensipler ve gayeler etrafında birleşmiş insanların müşterek ihtiyaçlarına ve zaruretlerine göre hazırlar. Yeni Türkiyenin bu cins müesseselerden şimdiye kadar mahrum olduğunu itiraf etmek lazımdır ki, bizde genç neslin her mensubu, tahsili veya mesleki için vakfettiği saatler haricinde, ya ne yapacağını bilmiyen bir aylak, ya kendi başına ve kendisi için bir meşguliyetler bulmaya çalışan bir TEK ADAM dır." Şevket Süreyya (Aydemir), "Halk evleri," *Kadro*, 1, no.3, p.35.

consciousness about the national (Italian) ideology, prevailing in the youth. This was stated in a manner indicating the admiration of the mechanisms of education and training in the Fascist regime.³⁵⁰ The question of the organization of the youth was a point which was discussed extensively in Chapter Three and it should thus suffice to note that this interest of the mainstream Kemalist leadership was shared by the *Kadro* members as well:

While the organized youth in Russia and Italy is guarding over the Revolution, in Germany, an organized youth has been successful in making a whole political movement. Britain and France might continue to have doubts about the necessity of such an organized youth for a while, but for Turkey this matter has reached its proper degree of maturity.³⁵¹

Concluding Remarks

Any official statement explaining why *Kadro* ceased to be published was not presented in the journal. The closure continues to be a point of dispute in discussions about *Kadro*. Was the journal closed because it had “fulfilled its aim” of giving the regime an ideological basis through its definition of Kemalism and thus become obsolete? Was *Kadro* giving a too strict definition of Kemalism and in this way contradicting the political elite’s adherence to a pragmatic form of ideology? Or had the uneasiness felt towards the group among different persons within the Kemalist elite establishment reached such a level that the dissolution of the movement had become a requirement to silence the opposition

³⁵⁰ “Fakat biz bir genç nesle muhtacız ki, onun Ararattan Akdeniz kıyılarına kadar Türkelinin her bucağında yaşayan her mensubu kendisine: - Devletin filan milli dava üzerinde siyaseti nedir? denildiği zaman, cevabını: hiç olmazsa üç satırda kristalleştirmiş bir düsturla ifade edebilsin ve bilinsin ki, Türk yurdunun her yerinde her genç, bu suale böyle cevap verir...Bu itibarla gençliği, İnkılap esasları dahilinde ve İnkılap avangardının hem yardımcı, hem istihlaf edici bir kuvveti olarak hazırlamak işi artık günün davasıdır.” Şevket Süreyya, “Gençnesil meselesi,” *Kadro*, 1, no. 4, (April 1932), pp.6-7.

³⁵¹ “...Rusya ile İtalya’da, teşkilat içine alınmış gençlik inkılap bekçiliği yaparken, Almanya’da teşkilatlı gençlik bütün bir siyasi hareketi başarmıştır. Böyle bir gençliğin lüzumundan, bir İngiltere, ve bir Fransa bir müddet daha şüphe edebilirler, ama Türkiye için bu dava kıvamına gelmiştir.” *Kadro*, 2, no. 17 (May 1933), p.3.

within the Kemalist leadership? It appears as a highly probable possibility that the Third World'ist orientation and claims of *Kadro* was disapproved of by the Kemalist political leadership, which was pre-occupied with making Turkey part of the West. Westernization and not Third World'ism was, in other words, the aim of the political rule. *Kadro's* Third World'ist orientation therefore, attributing Turkey a leading role among the developing countries, and related with this, the radical rejection of capitalism, appear as potential reasons for the eventual dissolution of the group.

Furthermore, the doctrinaire and absolutist form of *Kadro's* presentation of the Kemalist regime's ideology might also have been a reason for the political leadership's decision. The proposition above that the political rule advocated an inherent pragmatism in Kemalism is a suggestion worth keeping in mind. It was through this pragmatism that Kemalism could gather and keep very different, and at times even opposing, ideological factions under the same umbrella. A too-strict definition of Kemalism would naturally lead to the emergence of disagreement and opposition; a tendency of which the rule of the single-party leadership was not in favour.

The primary object of this study has been to place the *Kadro* movement, signifying intellectuals' search for ideology in Turkey, in the European (authoritarian) inter-war context. The identification of similarities and differences between the *Kadro's* ideological thinking and the propositions of Fascist and Nazi ideologies has been presented. Anti-liberalism, advocacy of Etatism, and the look upon the French Revolution as a "historical" case belonging to the past and the root cause of the illnesses prevailing in the present liberal order were views in common between the movement and the authoritarian ideological movements. The precedence of the State over the individual, the view of the elite as a pre-requisite in the Revolutionary process, the advocacy of discipline, education and organization of the youth, the rejection of political opposition and the aim of national

unity, the ideal of a classless society, and finally, the doctrinaire and absolutist form of presenting these propositions were identified as the features of the movement resembling the authoritarian ideologies in question. *Kadro's* Kemalism then did bear authoritarian traces. At the same time, the radical anti-capitalist approach of the movement and its opposition to any form of imperialism and colonialism, constituted important points which differentiated this group from the fascist political rules in Italy and Germany. It was further stressed, that the *Kadro* was an intellectual group whose propositions did not gain much ground among the mainstream leadership. Thus, the Kemalism proposed by *Kadro* remained a theory. This factor was a crucial point of difference, which also meant that the propositions of the *Kadro*, even when they resembled the propositions of Fascism and National Socialism, never came to be executed in practice or propagated on the scale or to the extent which was the case in the fascist regimes.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The objective of this work was to identify the image and perception of fascism among prominent mainstream Kemalists in Turkey of the 1930s. The second chapter of the thesis consisted of a theoretical presentation of some of the intellectual roots of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism with the aim of acquiring conceptual clarification in the subsequent analysis. Identification of some of the main ideas of the intellectuals who were part of the “cultural revolt” at the turn of the twentieth century was made to illuminate the intellectual background of fascist ideology, and through this, focus on the cultural aspect of fascism. It was argued that it was partly due to this intellectual heritage, which had provided the theoretical fundamentals, that fascism achieved its “success” in terms of widespread support, as was the case in the inter-war period, making it credible to speak of a, if not fascist, then authoritarian era, which witnessed the failure of liberalism.

Rebellion against the consequences of modernity and rejection of the values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution were the general lines of thought which created the meeting ground for the different intellectual currents in the cultural revolt of which revolutionary syndicalism and the thoughts of Georges Sorel in particular, and German Reactionary Modernism were discussed. In this revolt, the search for social transformation

and an alternative order to the established one was a common objective bringing these different intellectual groups together. The hostile opposition towards liberalism, and the efforts of revising Marxism, led to the search for a “third road” among the revolutionary syndicalists in Italy. The German reactionary thinkers’ hostility towards big business and liberalism, and their opting for a nationalist third road, giving precedence to German *Kultur* over *Zivilisation*, was through a different line of argumentation and motivation, another example of the search for a third road alternative. These were the general characteristics of the intellectuals’ revolt against the liberal order which had begun at the turn of the twentieth century, and which paved the way for Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, as many of the thoughts and ideas put forth by these intellectuals were adopted by the fascist movements under consideration.

The case of the *Kadro* movement constituted an example of an intellectual group’s offering of a third road alternative for Turkey through its definition of the ideology of the Kemalist Revolution, Kemalism. The radical rejection of both capitalism, which was seen as a disguise for liberalism, and communism, due to its ideal of a class-based, proletarian society, was identified as a common starting point of *Kadro* with fascist ideology. Although a common point, and despite the authoritarian features which were identified in the *Kadro* movement’s ideological propositions, it was noted that the group strictly rejected any accusation that it was adhering to (Italian) Fascism and argued that Fascism’s adoption of capitalism constituted one important point of difference. Another point, which was also underlined by mainstream Kemalists, was the imperialist orientation of the fascist ideology. For *Kadro*, Turkey constituted an example of a national liberation movement, that had the aim of freeing itself from its position as a semi-colony in the exploitative, international capitalist system and which therefore could be seen as a model to be followed by other Third World countries. Having said this, the movement’s negative approach to the

colonial and imperialist aims of fascist ideology in general, and of Italian Fascism in particular, appeared more evident.

Kadro's radical opposition to capitalism was a distinguishing feature differentiating the group from the mainstream political-ideological leadership. The latter was further aiming at making Turkey part of the world of the Western countries and did not have any ambition of becoming a role model for the Third World countries. In the concluding part of Chapter Four, this anti-capitalist approach and Third-World'ist orientation of the movement were presented as potential reasons for the decision of the political leadership to dissolve *Kadro* by closing the journal. Despite these differences, however, *Kadro*, to a large extent, fell well in line with mainstream Kemalism in its ideological propositions. The group's claim of uniqueness of the Kemalist Revolution and its ideology of Kemalism for Turkey was an important point shared by the mainstream leadership as was emphasized in the analysis in Chapter Three.

The study which constituted the main body of this thesis in terms of investigating the question of the images and perceptions of fascism prevailing among the mainstream Kemalist elite of the time led to the conclusion that there was a particular ideological interest in Italian Fascism in the first half of the 1930s. With an underlining of the peculiarity of both Fascism for Italy and Kemalism for Turkey, nevertheless, the Fascist case was seen as an example, although not followed completely, which could be learned from. Among the subjects which were given the most attention in the articles concerning Italy in the two primary sources on which the analysis was based, was first and foremost the Fascist organization and education of the youth. A positive perception of the function of the *Dopulavoro* organization as well as of the Balilla National Organization in the education of the Italian people and, in particular, of the youth, according to the Fascist ideology, was evident. In articles discussing the establishment of the People's Houses in

Turkey, references were made to these organizations and this was in the analysis seen as an indication that on the question of the ideological education of the people and the youth, Italian Fascism constituted a strong source of inspiration for the mainstream Kemalist leadership.

A second point on which mainly a positive approach was presented in these sources was the leadership and role of Benito Mussolini in the Fascist movement. Seen as the sole leader of Italian Fascism, he was given most of the honour for the successes achieved by Fascism in Italy. Mussolini's position, at times recognized as being a dictatorship, was in general and even when termed a dictatorship, seen from an affirmative perspective. His strong leadership, after all, signified the establishment of national unity in Italy, which was seen as the ultimate aim for the Kemalist Revolution as well, and was a core concept in the political-ideological discourse of the period.

Related to the leadership aspect, the conception of the state in Fascism was another point emphasized extensively and discussed mainly in the articles in the newspaper. The superiority of the state, superseding everything and given a spiritual existence of its own, was interpreted in positive terms. Any potential negative aspects in such a conception of the state, such as the restrictions on individual freedom, were not expressed (articles in *Ülkü* constituted an exception on this point), and it appeared in articles discussing the state in general, that it was given precedence over the individual, by prominent figures in the mainstream Kemalist elite as well. As mentioned in Chapter One, it should be recalled that at the Fourth Party Congress in 1935 the decision to fully merge the ruling RPP and the State was taken. The identification of the affirmative statements and recognition of Fascism's conception of the state as a sacred and spiritual entity makes this decision of the Kemalist rule appear less striking.

In conclusion, the image of Italian Fascism in general consisted of the view that it was a justified revolutionary movement which was struggling for the achievement of national unity in Italy. Furthermore, this objective was shared by the Kemalist rule, which – with an underlining of its uniqueness for Turkey - could learn from the Fascist experience and the developments in Italy. The publication of Falih Rıfkı (Atay)'s work *Moskova-Roma* and Nüşet Haşım (Sinanoğlu)'s *Faşizm ve Onun Devlet Sistemi* as books in 1932 and 1933 respectively, and the large extracts published in article series in the daily during these years, was put forth in the discussion as an example of the ideological interest shown particularly in Italian Fascism. The positive perception of Fascist ideology and rule was also prevalent in these works written by two prominent political-ideological figures of the mainstream Kemalist establishment, and reinforces the claim made above.

Keeping in mind the short analysis on the ambiguous approach to democracy, and especially the strict rejection of liberal democracy, which in large part is perceived in terms of its connotations to anarchy and dis-unity in society, and regarded as the contrary model to authoritarian rule, the Kemalist leadership's feeling of closeness to and interest in Italian Fascism, appears to be more "natural," or reinforces the claims put forth above.

A similar feeling of closeness was absent in the approach to the other case of fascist ideology studied in this work, National Socialism and Nazi Germany. The attention given to Nazi ideology was, as recalled, less in number of articles and had a more pragmatic character. In the newspaper, narration of the political developments in Germany, rather than profound discussions on National Socialism as an ideology, constituted a large part of the articles. After highlighting this difference in the scale of interest compared to the case of Fascist Italy in the analysis, the points given particular attention and discussed most extensively, in relation with Germany, were identified.

In the analysis of the approach to the emergence of the Nazi Party and Hitler's seizure of power in 1933, the recognition of these developments as legitimate and justified was a finding of the investigation which stood out. The revisionist aims of the Nazi rule regarding the Versailles Treaty and the efforts put into establishing national unity were met with approval by the mainstream Kemalist leadership. Acknowledging that a more reserved attitude could be traced regarding Hitler's gradual increase of power, initially, any critical approach was absent. Even the decision of the Enabling Act in 1934, which gave Hitler unrestricted powers for the coming four years, was seen as a legitimate step since, it was argued, the decision was reached only after consulting with the people through their vote.

The look upon Adolf Hitler as a leader was discussed in only a limited number of articles and the immediate reaction to his leadership was one of recognition. As claimed in one article, Hitler was an illustration of the German people's realization that a strong leader was necessary for ruling society and undertaking revolution. In general, the dictatorial character of Hitler's rule was not approached in a critical way, and the necessity of a strong leader was given emphasis. The aim of achieving national unity in Germany, and even the unification of the German people with Germans outside the borders of the country (in particular the *Anschluss* with Austria), gave the Nazi regime, and hence its undisputed leader, legitimacy.

A second subject which was discussed extensively in the primary sources under consideration was the organization of the youth in National Socialist Germany. The majority of references in the writings on this topic were mostly referring to the Nazi rule's physical education and mobilisation of the youth, which were seen as matters if not to be followed completely, that should be taken as an example and learned from. Identification of the profound interest in the physical education of the youth created the ground for better

understanding the legal steps putting physical education and sports under the domain of the state, the first one of which was taken in 1937 with the incorporation of the Turkish Sports Association (*Türk Spor Kurumu*) under the state's authority, and the second in 1938 with the promulgation of the Law for the Requirement of Physical Education (*Beden Terbiyesi Mükellefiyeti Kanunu*), the latter making it obligatory for the youth to undertake physical exercise. The radical character of this regulation and the fact that it can be seen as an attempt by the single-party rule to mobilise the people seems beyond dispute. Although the potential outbreak of the Second World War in this period and the concern of military mobilisation can be viewed as important factors leading to the promulgation of the Law, in the discussions in both of the primary sources under consideration, it becomes evident that the race aspect, in addition to military mobilisation, also constituted a consideration and motivating factor which led to the decision to make physical education a legal requirement for the youth in Turkey.

The race subject, and in particular the interest in eugenics in both of the primary sources under examination, was identified in the analysis. It was illustrated that the achievement of a healthy race was discussed extensively. Views approving the Sterilization Law promulgated in Germany in 1933 and articles discussing the appropriate age of marriage for women and in particular the role of educated women in society, from a eugenics perspective, constituted a large part of these articles on the race issue. In addition to identifying the eugenics concern, in this section it was further noted that the Nazi rule's aggressive racist policies particularly against the Jews was a matter which was not given much attention and in general, even neglected. Far from any critical stance to the undertakings of the Nazi regime, the amount of news related to the Jews was highly restricted. The tense diplomatic and political relations before the outbreak and especially during the Second World War years should be recalled as the disinterest and neglect

might have been an expression of political concern and caused by diplomatic considerations.

The final point which was noted in the discussion on Germany revolves around the statements on Nazi peasantism, which was presented in the sources examined, generally in positive terms. The recognition and approval of the Peasantist aspect of Nazi ideology by political-ideological figures in the mainstream Kemalist circle was discerned in the articles. The attention given to Nazi peasantism gained further importance with the recalling of the advocacy of peasantist ideology among the Kemalist leadership throughout the 1930s. İsmail Hüsrev's articles in 1942, discussing the Nazi Erbhof Law, almost ten years after it was promulgated in Germany, and the claim put forth by the prominent political and intellectual figures of the period that the intention with the Land Law (*Toprak Kanunu*), which was to be promulgated in 1945, was very similar to that of the Erbhof Law, was presented. Leaving the controversy open to discussion, it was finally noted that both in the general peasantist rhetoric of the period, as well as in articles concerning Germany, the National Socialist endorsement of peasantism was a subject given attention, and further perceived in a positive way, as a source of inspiration.

The final notes in this chapter were on the stance towards democracy in the articles examined. It was claimed that an ambiguous approach to democracy was discernible. In general, democracy as an idea was fully rejected when understood in terms of liberalism. At the same time however, the view of democracy as an ideal to be strived for could, on a limited scale, be identified. The controversy between some of the leading contributors to the official newspaper was presented to illustrate this ambivalent approach to and use of the democracy concept. The rejection of liberal democracy was nevertheless a widespread view due to the negative connotations of this term with the state of anarchy and disorder. Description of the Kemalist Revolution as being democratic, however, also was being

made, especially in articles in *Ülkü*, but this was not the case in the newspaper and this view appeared to be more an exception than representative for the general mainstream Kemalist elite.

The image and perception of fascism among the mainstream Kemalist leadership can then all in all be claimed, to a large extent, to have been affirmative, with a recognition and at times admiration of the achievements of particularly Italian Fascist ideology. Both Fascism and initially also National Socialism were regarded as justified and legitimate movements due to their aim of establishing national unity in societies which had been, or were, characterized by the anarchy and disorder of liberalism. With an emphasis on the peculiarity of Fascism for Italy, it remained a true picture that the Fascist ideology and rule were perceived in positive terms, as an example from which the Kemalist ruling elite could learn, because it was seen as a successful revolutionary movement, which in only a few years, had accomplished decades' worth of work. The strong and indisputable position of the Fascist state and its leader was seen as the main reason for the achievements of Fascism, and even in articles discussing the Fascist rule from an authoritarian perspective, the lack of a critical approach was notable.

The systematic following and examination of the sources in this study, gave strong clues about which concepts were at the core of the political-ideological discourse of the period, and furthermore, in what ways they were perceived. As an illustration, it became evident that notions such as national unity (*milli birlik*), discipline, order (*nizam*), organization (*teşkilat*), education (*terbiye*), and authority (*otorite*) were concepts used extensively with an inherently positive meaning, and presented in an affirmative manner. In a similar vein, democracy, and in particular liberal democracy, was a concept seen as equivalent to liberal anarchy, an obstacle to the achievement of national unity, and a model in which the concepts mentioned above were absent.

A linguistic study certainly far exceeds the scope as well as the “capability” of the present work. The purpose with this short presentation, however, was to show that during the undertaking of this research, these concepts and the perception of these concepts, appeared as another possible way of obtaining a better understanding of the nature of the single-party rule under examination. In a comprehensive discourse analysis then, through a systematic examination of a more extensive number of sources, a better ground could be created for the understanding of the perceptions and images prevailing in the discourse of the period.

The experience of single-party rule in Turkey seems to be one of those subjects which will continue to be controversial and discussed in academic circles. The period starting from the early 1930s onwards attracts even more interest due to the authoritarian character of the Kemalist rule. Although various interpretations and arguments can be put forth in the discussion over this authoritarian nature, it remains crucial to verify these claims by taking into consideration the political and ideological discourse of the period. The study in hand was an attempt, or more correctly, a first step in the undertaking of such a task. The potential trap of presenting a criticism of the single-party experience based on the normative and subjective values of today, or the opposite position for that matter with the ultimate aim of “white-washing” or legitimizing this experience, was deliberately sought avoided. Through a systematic analysis of the selected primary sources, the aim was to illuminate a subject with the purpose of putting forth another aspect in the controversy over the experience of single-party rule in Turkey, and contribute to the wider discussion over the authoritarian nature of this rule.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ağaoğlu, Ahmet. *Devlet ve Fert*. Istanbul: Sanayiinefise Matbaası, 1933.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme*. Translated by Fatmagül Berktaş. Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985.
- Alp, Tekin. *Kemalizm*. Istanbul: Cumhuriyet Matbaası, 1936.
- (Atay) Falih Rıfkı. *Moskova Roma, Seyahat*. Ankara: Muallim Ahmet Halil Kitabevi, 1932.
- Aydemir, Şevket Süreyya. *İnkılap ve Kadro*. Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1990.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *Unutulan Yıllar*. 2nd printing. Istanbul: İletişim, 1997.
- Bessel, Richard (ed.). *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Comparisons and Contrasts*. 2nd printing. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Bilâ, Hikmet. *CHP 1919-1999*. İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık, 1999.
- Blackbourn, David and Geoff Eley. *The Peculiarities of German History. Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat. *Atatürk İhtilali*. Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar/Kaynak Yayınları, 1967/1995.
- Caretto, Giacomo. "1930'larda Kemalizm-Faşizm-Komünizm Üzerine Polemikler II". *Tarih ve Toplum*, 18 (June 1985).
- Cohen, Carl. *Communism, Fascism and Democracy – The Theoretical Foundations*. Second edition. New York: Random House, 1972.
- Eatwell, Roger. *Fascism: A History*. London, Vintage, 1996.
- Frank, Andre Gunder. "The Underdevelopment of Development" in *The Underdevelopment of Development*. Edited by in Chew, Sing. C. and Robert Denemark (eds). California, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1996, pp.17-55.
- Friedrich, Carl J. "The Failure of a One-Party System: Hitler Germany," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (eds.). *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*. New York, London: Basic Books, 1970.
- Gasset, José Ortega y. *The Revolt of the Masses*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1957.

- Gentile, Emilio. *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*. Translated by Keith Botsford. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1996.
- Geyer, Michael. "Restorative Elites, German Society and the Nazi Pursuit of War" in Bessel, Richard (ed.). *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Comparisons and Contrasts*, 2nd printing. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Herf, Jeffrey. *Reactionary Modernism – Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*. Seventh printing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Hobsbawm, Eric. *Age of Extremes – The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*. Seventh edition. London: Abacus, 1998.
- Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. "Laiklik ve Türkiye’de Liberalizmin Kökenleri," in Ayşe Kadıoğlu, *Cumhuriyet İradesi Demokrasi Muhakemesi*. Istanbul: Metis, 1999.
- Karaosmanoğlu, Yakup Kadri. *Zoraki Diplomati*. 3. Baskı. Istanbul: İletişim, 1984.
- Karaömerlioğlu, M. Asım. "Bir Tepeden Reform Denemesi, ‘Çiftçiye Topraklandırma Kanunu’nun Hikayesi." *Birikim* (March 1998).
- Karaömerlioğlu, Asım. "The People’s Houses and the Cult of the Peasant in Turkey" in *Turkey Before and After Atatürk, Internal and External Affairs*. Edited by Sylvia Kedourie (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999).
- Karaömerlioğlu, M. Asım. "The Village Institute Experience in Turkey." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 25, no. 1 (May 1998): pp.47-73.
- Knox, MacGregor. *Common Destiny – Dictatorship, Foreign Policy and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Knox, MacGregor. "Expansionist Zeal, Fighting Power and Staying Power in the Italian and German Dictatorships" in *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Comparisons and Contrasts*. 2nd printing. Edited by Richard Bessel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Koçak, Cemil. "Siyasal Tarih 1923-1950" in *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi*, volume, 4. 5th printing. Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1997.
- Köker, Levent. "Kimlik Krizi, Meşruluk Krizi, Kemalizm ve Sonrası." *Toplum ve Bilim*, 71 (Winter 1996).
- Lacquer, Walter and George L. Mosse (eds.). "International Fascism 1920-1945." *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1. New York: Harper and Row, 1966.
- Makal, Ahmet. *Türkiye’de tek partili dönemde çalışma ilişkileri: 1920-1946*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999.
- Moore-Barrington, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy – Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Seventh printing. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.

- Nacci, Michela. "The Present as Nightmare: Cultural Pessimism among European Intellectuals in the Period between the Two World Wars," in *The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945*. Edited by Zeev Sternhell. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996.
- Nolte, Ernst. *Three Faces of Fascism, Action Francaise, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*. Translated by Leila Vennewitz. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965.
- Ohana, David. "The 'Anti-Intellectual' Intellectuals as Political Mythmakers," in *The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945*. Edited by Zeev Sternhell. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996.
- Özbudun, Ergun. "The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime" in *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. Edited by A. Kazancıgil and E. Özbudun. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1981. pp.79-102.
- Özveren, Eyüp. "The Intellectual Legacy of the Kadro Movement in Retrospect." *METU Studies in Development*, 23 (4): 565-576.
- Parla, Taha. *Türkiye 'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları, Kemalist Tek-Parti ideolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u*. Volume 3. Second printing. Istanbul: İletişim, 1995.
- Paxton, Robert O. "The Five Stages of Fascism," in *The Journal of Modern History*, 70 (March 1998):1-23.
- Peker, Recep. *İnkılap Dersleri Notları*. Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936.
- Poulantzas, Nicos. *Fascism and Dictatorship*. London: Verso, 1979.
- Republic of Turkey, "İş Kanunu." *Düstur*. Üçüncü Tertip. Volume 17. Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası, 1936:1146-1205.
- Republic of Turkey, "Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu." *Düstur*. Üçüncü Tertib. Volume 19. Ankara Başvekalet Matbaası, 1938:1656-1661.
- Republic of Turkey, "Beden Terbiyesi ve Spor Mükellefiyeti Hakkında Kararname." *Düstur*. Üçüncü Tertib. Volume 21. Ankara Devlet Matbaası, 1940:645-661.
- Roseman, Mark. "National Socialism and Modernisation" in *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, Comparisons and Contrast*. 2nd printing. Edited by Richard Bessel. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Safa, Peyami, *Türk İnkılabına Bakışlar* (Kanaat Kitabevi, 1948).
- Settembrini, Domenico. "Mussolini and the Legacy of Revolutionary Socialism." *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976): 239-268.
- Shils, Edward A., "Introduction to the American Edition" in Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 5th printing. Translated by T.E. Hulme. New York: The Free Press, MacMillan, 1972.

- Siegelman, Philip. "Introduction," in Werner Sombart. *Luxury and Capitalism*. Third Edition. The University of Michigan Press, 1967: pp.v-xxix.
- Sinanoglu, Nüşet Haşim. *Faşizm ve Onun Devlet Sistemi*. Istanbul: Ankara Matbaası, 1933.
- Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*. 5th printing. Translated by T.E. Hulme. New York: The Free Press; MacMillan, 1972.
- Sternhell, Zeev. *The Birth of Fascist Ideology, From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*. Translated by David Maisel. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.
- Sternhell, Zeev. "Modernity and Its Enemies: From the Revolt Against the Enlightenment to the Undermining of Democracy," in *The Intellectual Revolt Against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945*. Edited by Zeev Sternhell. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1996: pp.11-29.
- Şakiroğlu, Mahmut. "Giacomo Caretto ile Söyleşi." *Tarih ve Toplum*, 17 (May 1985).
- Tanyol, Cahit, "Preface" in Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, *Atatürk İhtilali*. Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar/Kaynak Yayınları, 1967/1995.
- Tekeli, İlhan ve Selim İlkin. "Türkiye'de bir Aydın Hareketi: Kadro." *Toplum ve Bilim*, 24 (Winter 1984): 35-67.
- Trak, Ayşe. "Development Literature and Writers from Underdeveloped Countries: The Case of Turkey." *Current Anthropology*, 26 (1) (February 1985): 89-102.
- Tuttle, Howard N. *The Crowd Is Untruth – The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega y Gasset*. New York: Peter Lang, 1996.
- Türkeş, Mustafa. *Kadro Hareketi – Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım*. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1999.
- Türkeş, Mustafa, "The Ideology of the Kadro: Cadre] Movement: A Patriotic Leftist and Movement in Turkey" in *Turkey Before and After Atatürk, Internal External Affairs*. Edited by Sylvia Kedourie. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999: 92-119.
- Uyar, Hakkı. "Resmi İdeolojinin İki Yüzü: Ülkü ve Kadro." *Toplum ve Bilim*, 74 (Fall 1997).
- Wiskemann, Elizabeth. *Europe of the Dictators, 1919-1945*. New York: Harper & Row, 1966.
- Wistrich, Robert S. "Leon Trotsky's Theory of Fascism." *Journal of Contemporary History*, 11 (1976):157-184.
- Zürcher, Erich J. *Turkey: A Modern History*. Third edition. London: I. B. Tauris, 1997.

NEWSPAPERS

HAKİMİYET-İ MİLLİYE, January 1931 – 27 November 1934 [Missing issues: 19 June 1931-13 July 1931]

ULUS, 28 November – December 1943 [Missing issues: 27 December 1937-31 December 1937, 1 March 1938 - 1 May 1938 and 1 April – 1 May 1942]

CUMHURİYET

Cumhuriyet, 11 September 1931.

Cumhuriyet, 12 September 1931.

Cumhuriyet, 17 September 1931.

Cumhuriyet, 11 March 1932.

Cumhuriyet, 12 March 1932.

Cumhuriyet, 29 July 1933.

Cumhuriyet, 1 August 1933.

Cumhuriyet, 1 February 1933.

Cumhuriyet, 2 February 1933.

Cumhuriyet, 5 February 1933.

Cumhuriyet, 28 July 1933.

Cumhuriyet, 29 July 1933.

JOURNALS

KADRO [January 1932-April 1934]

Asaf Burhan. "Rejimler, Nasıl Niçin Değişiyor?" *Kadro*, 1, no. 12 (December 1932).

Asaf Burhan. "Faşizm ile Türk milli kurtuluş hareketi," *Kadro*, 1, no. 8 (August 1932).

Asaf Burhan. "İnkılabımızın Sesi," *Kadro*, 1, no.11 (November 1932).

Asaf, Burhan. "Bizdeki Azlıklar," *Kadro*, 2, no. 16 (April 1933).

Asaf Burhan. "Faşizm, niçin beynelmilelleşmek istiyor?" *Kadro*, 3, no. 26 (February 1934).

Hüsrev İsmail. "Millet içinde sınıf meselesi," *Kadro*, 3, no. 26 (Şubat 1934).

Kadri Yakup. "Ankara, Moskova, Roma," *Kadro*, 1, no. 6 (June 1932).

Nedim Vedat. "(Kadro) yu teyit eden bir eser: *Die Zukunft des Kapitalismus- Werner Sombart*," *Kadro*, 1, no. 5 (May 1932).

Nedim Vedat. "Müstemleke iktisadiyatından millet iktisadiyatına" *Kadro*, 1, no. 2 (February 1932).

Nedim Vedat. "*Kreuger, Hitler, Göthe*" in *Kadro*, 1, no. 4 (April 1932).

Nedim, Vedat. "Sınıflaşmamak ve İktisat Siyaseti," *Kadro*, 1, no. 11 (November 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "*Yarı münevverler kulübü*," *Kadro*, 1, no. 8 (August 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "İnkılabın psikolojisi," *Kadro*, 1, no. 1 (January 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "İnkılab heyecanı," *Kadro*, 1, no. 2 (February 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "İnkılap bitti mi?" *Kadro*, 1, no. 3 (March 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "Halkevleri," *Kadro*, 1, no.3 (March 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "İnkılap heyecanı," *Kadro*, 1, no. 2 (February 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "Halk evleri ", *Kadro*, 1, no.3 (March 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "Gençnesil meselesi," *Kadro*, 1, no. 4 (April 1932).

Süreyya Şevket. "Türk Nasyonalizmi," *Kadro*, 2, no.21 (September 1933).

Editorial – no author, "Kadro'nun gayesi açıklanıyor," *Kadro*, 1, no. 1 (January 1932).

Editorial – no author, *Kadro*, 2, no. 15 (March 1933).

Editorial – no author, *Kadro*, 2, no. 16 (April 1933).

Editorial – no author, *Kadro*, 2, no. 17 (May 1933).

ÜLKÜ [February 1933-December 1943]

Abbas, Nüzhet. "Halkevleri ve Memleket Sporü," *Ülkü*, 13, no. 73 (March 1939).

Apak, Rahmi. "Yeni Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu," *Ülkü*, 12, no. 72 (September 1938).

Aydoslu, Said. "Köylü ve Köylü Ekonomisi," *Ülkü*, 5, no. 27 (May 1935).

Baba, Nüzhet. "Bize en Uygun Sistem Beden Terbiyesi ve Sporü," *Ülkü*, 15, no. 88 (June 1940).

Dülger, Bahadır R. "Köyün Gücü," *Ülkü*, 7, no. 37 (March 1936).

Halik, Hilmi A. "Kışla ve Köy Terbiyesi," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 3 (April 1933).

Kaleli, Dr. Hayri. "Sağlık Bakımından Sporü," *Ülkü*, 9, no. 49 (March 1937).

Kemal, Nusret. "Halkçılık," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 3 (April 1933).

Kemal, Nusret. "Köy Seferberliğine Doğru," *Ülkü*, 1, no.5 (June 1933).

Kemal, Nusret. "Terbiye Meselesi?" *Ülkü*, 1, no. 6 (July 1933).

Kemal, Nusret. "Bir Köycülük Projesi Tecrübesi," *Ülkü*, 2, no. 8 (September 1933).

Kemal, Nusret. "Bir Cihanı Telakki Tarzı," *Ülkü*, 2, no. 10 (October 1933).

Kerim, Prof. Dr. Fahrettin. "Milli Nüfus Siyasetinde (Eugenique) Meselesinin Mahiyeti," *Ülkü*, 3, no. 15 (May 1934).

Köymen, Nusret. "Ülkü Üçüncü Yılına Girerken," *Ülkü*, 5, no. 25 (March 1935).

Nasır, Dr. Zeki. "Köylerimizin Sağlık İşleri," *Ülkü*, 2, no. 7 (August 1933).

Nedim, Prof. Mazhar. "İleri Hukuk," *Ülkü*, 3, no. 15, (May 1934).

Peker, Recep. "Halkevleri Açılma Nutku," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 1 (February 1933).

Peker, Recep. "Disiplinli Hürriyet," *Ülkü*, no. 3 (April 1933).

Selim Sırrı, "İtalya'da Halk ve Gençlik Teşkilatı," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 3 (April 1933).

Ş. R. "Garp Memleketlerinde Halk Terbiyesi," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 4 (May 1933).

"İsmet Paşanın Nutku," *Ülkü*, 1, no. 2 (March 1933).

Ülkü, 7, no. 41 (July 1936).