ON THE IDENTITY OF EMOTIONS:

CONCEPTS, FEELINGS, AND INTENTIONALITY

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Thesis Abstract

Botan Dolun, "On the Identity of Emotions: Concepts, Feelings, and Intentionality"

Historically, the philosophy of emotion deals with the question of what emotions are and how they relate to other types of mental states. This thesis gives an answer to this question in two consecutive steps. First, we circumvent the problem of intentionality by making a clear distinction between emotions and emotional feelings. Secondly, an understanding of the fundamental relationship between emotions and value judgements is sought, so that we can come up with a system of classification which applies to all emotion types.

Tez Özeti

Botan Dolun, “Duyguların Özdeşliği Üzerine: Kavramlar, Hisler ve Yönelmişlik”

Tarihsel olarak, duygu felsefesi duyguların ne olduğu ve diğer türden zihinsel durumlarla ilişkisi nedir sorusu ile ilgilenir. Bu tez bu soruya iki aşamalı bir cevap vermektedir. İlk olarak, duygular ve duygusal hisler arasındaki farktan yola çıkarak yönelmişlik problemi aşılmış; ikinci olarak, duygular ve değer yargıları arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamaya yönelik bir çabayla, duygular için sistemli bir sınıflandırma ortaya çıkartılmıştır.

To my true family and true friends…

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of emotion most commonly concerns the place of concepts, feelings, and intentionality within the affective realm. Not many philosophers directly handle the relationship between concepts and emotions, perhaps thinking that a thorough study of the nature of the intentionality of emotions would help reveal this relationship. However, since the emergence of a specific philosophical literature on emotions, the discussion over the nature of emotional intentionality is entangled by the debate between the feeling theorists, who tend to emphasize the role of non-intentional feelings in emotions, and the propositional attitude theorists, who tend to spare a significant role to beliefs and desires (Griffiths, 1998). Recently, there emerged philosophers who set themselves between the traditionally opposing poles by construing feelings as intentional phenomena. In respect to this background, the first chapter of this thesis will be a thorough discussion of the conceptual relationship between the emotional intentionality and the emotional feelings. This will be central to the discussions in the subsequent chapters concerning the place of concepts in the affective realm on the one hand and the relationship between emotions and value judgements on the other, particularly, to my overall purpose of providing a taxonomy (system of classification) for emotions.

CHAPTER 2

FEELINGS AND INTENTIONALITY

Let us begin then, more or less following the tradition, with a critique of the James-Lange theory of emotions. William James and Karl Lange (1922) proposed that our emotions are not the direct result of the perceptual input which gives rise to them, nor can we construe emotions as the cause of the bodily changes which are typically associated with them. Our commonsense misconstrues the experience of emotion by changing the place of causes and effects. According to them, directly caused by the perceptual input, the bodily changes always come before the emotion which is nothing but 'the feelings of the same changes as they occur' (p. 13). In other words, it is not the emotional experience which causes the changes in the bodily states which are usually thought to follow them; it is, on the contrary, the changes in the bodily states which cause our emotional experience. Hence, as James puts it famously, 'the more rational statement [of various emotional experiences] is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, fearful as the case may be' (bracket added).

James and Lange claim that 'if we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains' (p. 17). Let us suppose that this statement is true. What follows from it is that the feelings of the bodily sensations and the 'neutral state of intellectual

perception' are the only constituents of an emotional experience.[1] Insofar as the *'neutral state of intellectual perception'* is concerned, it seems that James and Lange presuppose that the sort of intellectual perception left when we abstract feelings from an emotional experience, such as when we experience laughter--"the perception that the [intentional] object belongs to the class 'funny'", is (1) in fact a part of the emotional experience and (2) such that if it were present by itself with no accompanying feeling, it would not constitute an emotional experience. (Bracket added) A strong feeling theory which proclaims that emotional experiences are non-intentional would readily oppose the first claim, and a strong propositional attitude theory which allows that no feeling is found in some emotional experiences would go against the second one. As a third possibility, it may be false to think that the feeling and the intellectual perception are two distinct phenomena. This might indeed be the case if the emotional feelings are intentional toward the object of the emotion, which Peter Goldie (2002) refers to as 'feeling-towards.'

Insofar as *the feelings of the bodily sensations* are concerned, it is one thing to say that we feel the kind of bodily changes which give rise to them as James and Lange put it earlier and another thing to say that we feel their sensations. We must distinguish sensations from what they are sensations of, and the question whether the emotional feelings are of these sensations (or of the bodily changes directly) only then follows. Furthermore, we want to know what the statement that feelings are of

[1] It is the emotional experience and not the emotion itself which consists of the emotional feelings and the intellectual perception. However, it is easy to misinterpret this last statement. Historically, the literature on emotion takes the earlier statement that 'our feeling of the [bodily] changes as they occur is the emotion' as paradigmatic of what the James-Lange theory stands for. Ellsworth (1994) argued that this leads to an oversimplification and James takes the cognitive appraisal of emotions as much into account as their bodily symptoms. Later, however, Reisenzein, Meyer, and Schützwohl (1995) successfully defended the original interpretation, which still stands as the most common reading of the theory.

something, whether sensations or bodily changes, really means. What kind of ontological or logical relationship does the word 'of' present in these statements refer to? Does it signify an identity condition or a kind of intentionality? If it signifies intentionality, what sort of intentionality do the feelings in question have (for instance, what sort of direction of fit or direction of cause)?

Let us begin with the first set of questions, focusing on the claim that all feelings are the feelings of the bodily changes. Unless we take this as a statement of identity, one thing that we can be sure of is that it concerns giving unmediated perceptual basis to emotions. Does this mean that to whatever extent there may be qualitative richness in an emotional experience, it would be grounded in the physiology of the person experiencing the emotion? If the qualitative aspect of emotion is exhausted by feelings, yes. However, a physicalist about emotion might argue that all qualitative experiences are at the end grounded, one way or another, in the bodily changes of the organism and some of these qualitative experiences may very well be due to higher cognitive processes rather than feelings. At this stage, we must be careful to distinguish qualia and feelings. "Qualia" refers to what is common to all types of mental state in terms of what it is like to experience them; whereas in the context of emotion, "feeling" sometimes refers to what is unique to emotion—the emotional qualia, or as it has just been used, to a component of the emotional experience which can itself have a quale. (Unless otherwise indicated, I will refer to feeling in the first sense as "emotional qualia") It may or may not be the case that emotional qualia depend for their existence on the feelings. There might also be other sources of emotional qualia.

Cannon's Objections to James-Lange Theory

Two historically famous objections to James-Lange theory, which turn on the above distinction, come from Walter Cannon (1929) who suggested (through some acutely designed but not so humane experiments) that the existence of emotional feelings is not dependent on the visceral changes (e.g., acceleration of the heart, increase of blood sugar, sweating, etc.) and even if it is dependent, emotional qualia are too rich to be reduced to the differences of the sensations which are produced by visceral processes alone. In his arguments, Cannon does not distinguish feelings and emotional qualia; however, I believe that his objections are better understood in the way I present them here. In his critical examination of the James-Lange theory of emotions, Cannon summarizes the first argument as follows:

> James attributed the chief part of the felt emotion to sensations from the viscera; Lange attributed it wholly to sensations from the circulatory system. Both affirmed that if these organic sensations are removed *imaginatively* from an emotional experience nothing is left... [Some scientists] varied this procedure by removing the sensations *surgically*. In their animals, all visceral disturbances through sympathetic channels—the channels, and in Sherrington's animals by vagus channels as well, were likewise abolished. According to James's statement of the theory the felt emotion should have very largely disappeared, and according to Lange's statement it should have wholly disappeared (without stimulation of our vasomotor system, it will be recalled, impressions of the outer world 'would arouse neither joy nor anger, would give us neither care nor fear'). The animals *acted*, however, insofar as nervous connections permitted, with no lessening of the intensity of emotional display. In other words, operations which, in terms of the theory, largely or completely destroy emotional feeling, nevertheless leave the animals behaving as angrily, as joyfully, as fearfully as ever (Bracket added, p. 350).

First Response to Cannon

The methodological difference between the James-Lange approach and Cannon's study is emphasized by the author with the italic characters, but it is up to us to discern what this difference implies. If the James-Lange theory identifies emotional feelings with their corresponding neural state or activity, this would be a metaphysical claim. The authority of the empirical study would already be hampered by the conceptual relationship between the neural changes and the feelings since destroying one would have amounted to destroying the other. Besides this point, the experiments are decisive in regards to the general claim that the neural changes cause emotional feelings only insofar as the persistence of the emotional display/behaviour after the surgical removal of certain neural structures implies that while there is some feeling, there is no corresponding neural state or activity. This neural state or activity must be ruled out of what goes on after the surgery while there should remain some 'nervous connections,' such as to allow for the emotional display. The neural connections which 'permit' the emotional display must have nothing to do with the type of neural state or activity which according to James-Lange theory leads to emotional feelings. For, otherwise, such neural state or activity would not be completely eliminated.

Secondly, what Cannon calls 'the intensity of emotional display' and the intensity of feelings are two different phenomena. There seems to be left an open door by Cannon as to what the precise relation between the emotional behaviour and the emotional feeling is. One possibility is that feelings are identical with the emotional display in question; but are they really identifiable? Only a thoroughgoing

behaviourist would endorse this idea. Then, if Cannon's metaphysical claim is the weaker one in that emotional display only causally follows emotional feelings, would the persistence of the emotional display necessarily tell us the persistence of the emotional feeling? I do not see why emotional display may not have causes other than the feelings. Why should we presuppose that they imply for certain that there are feelings unless we already have the metaphysical conviction that they exist if and only if the feelings exist. Emotion, on the other hand, may be accompanied neither by feelings nor the so called emotional display. Later developments in the scientific research on emotion suggested that without the interference of higher cognition, such feelings and reactions may not be outright emotional. I will come back to this point soon.

Second Response to Cannon

How about the objection that even if feelings were dependent on visceral changes, emotional qualia are too rich to be reduced to the differences of the sensations which are produced by visceral processes alone? Cannon suggests that if the James-Lange theory were true, many of the sensations which supposedly constitute affective qualia must be produced by few basic visceral processes, such as a faster heart rate and erection of the hairs found in the experience of fear. However, the same processes function during other types of emotional experiences as well, such as rage, and even during non-emotional experiences such as exposure to cold (pp. 351-3). I think that this argument is strong for as long as we do not confuse feelings with emotional qualia. It works against the claim that emotional qualia are

determined only by visceral changes since the same set of visceral changes, it seems, may accompany different sorts of emotional experience, for which we would expect to have different qualia, but it is a weaker counterargument against the claim that feelings themselves are determined by visceral changes, for we do not know to what extent they are identifiable with emotional qualia. We cannot decide on what determines their nature solely on the basis of the differences at the level of emotional qualia since the qualitative aspect of emotion may have more than one kind of determinant.

This point is supported by another well known study of emotions by Schachter and Singer (1962), which showed that feelings are subject to cognitive interpretation and while the nature of different feelings may be determined by the neural conditions, as the James-Lange theory claims, the contextual differences of the subject experiencing the emotion determine the nature of the cognitive interpretation, hence, the overall experience of the emotion. Some philosophers seem to oppose this view on the basis of the idea that feelings are always conscious: According to Ben-Ze'ev (1997), for example, the feeling dimension of emotions is 'a primitive mode of consciousness,' which 'expresses the subject's own state of mind.' Feelings are devoid of any 'meaningful cognitive content,' and although they express the subject's own state of mind, they are not 'directed at this state or at any other object.' However, the identification of feeling with a form of consciousness and exclusion of any meaningful cognitive content from it, if true, would not entail an identification of feelings with emotional qualia. On the contrary, as I want to make clearer, it would make this identification questionable.

We have said earlier in respect to Cannon's first objection that his experimental method may work only if the relationship between the visceral changes and the feelings, as put forward by James and Lange, is not a condition of identity. It seems that, for them, this relationship cannot be merely causation since their theory relates to a metaphysical claim about the identity of emotional feelings, and the fact about the causal order does not give us the fact about their identity. However, causal interaction is a plausible candidate if we appeal, in addition to the James-Lange theory, to a functionalist account of emotion, in which a case of emotional feeling is identified with a particular functional role within the causal network of the mind. Then, the kind of visceral changes which cause emotional feelings may be understood as the kind of states which determines the role in question.[2] This is not to say that functionalism can answer all of the metaphysical questions concerning the relationship between emotional feelings and corresponding neural states. Indeed functionalism can only give us the ontological story of a mental state, and there would remain the relationship of the subject having that mental state and the world as the intentional object of that mental state. Therefore, it is possible to interpret that, for James and Lange, an instance of feeling is directed towards, or about, a certain visceral state or event. When I feel a pinch or prick on my arm, my feeling of pain is about the physical alteration on my skin. Isn't this after all what the nerves inform us about, that something is wrong with our physical structure, according to the modern

[2] I am not referring to what realizes the emotional feeling here. Visceral changes cause, hence, determine the feeling at least in part; there may be other determiners.

science of perception? Aside from the question whether such somatic perceptions involve an evaluative attitude (we will consider this possibility later in the second chapter), this widely accepted account is quite straightforward, and if we accept it as true, we would be providing a representational theory of emotional feelings. That the feelings represent things, figures in their identity condition, and not only that, we would be free to talk in terms of their causal relationship if we like, at least insofar as there is 'intentional causation' between the thing that represents and the thing being represented under the rubric of functionalism. This feature of emotional feelings turns on the question about what determines their intentional content, but we won't be dealing with it until later when we have to face the same question in respect to emotions themselves and the parallel questions regarding what determines an attitude to be an emotion and the kind of emotion it is. Let us, for now, focus on intentionality.

Intentional Causation

The concept *intentional causation* is an important element in John Searle's theory of intentionality (1983, 2001). Certain cognitive and conative states possess a *direction of causation* in the opposite direction of their *direction of fit*. I want to dwell on these concepts, for this approach fits well with my purpose of focusing on the logical properties of affective states—how they relate us, subjects, to the world and how they relate to one another, without hanging too much weight on the mind-body problem. Searle (1983) states that "the question concerning the logical nature of Intentionality is not an ontological problem at all" (p. 14). Accordingly, there may be

two types of answer to a question like "what is a belief?" One concerns the ontological category of beliefs and the other concerns their logical properties. Searle believes that "the traditional answers to this [question] assume that [it] asks about the ontological category into which beliefs fit, but what is important as far as the intentionality of belief is concerned is not its ontological categories but its logical properties." (Brackets added) We may not be in agreement with Searle as to which approach is the most important one in respect to beliefs; however, I believe that his approach is suitable to an analysis of emotions since the major disputes about their nature emerge at the level of their logical properties, which are, in any case, as important as what figures in the ontological story of emotion, such as their functional properties if we prefer to give a functionalist account for them.[3]

One way to capture the difference between beliefs and desires is to appeal to the notion of *direction of fit*. According to Searle (2001), 'the way [intentional states] are supposed to match reality is determined by [their] psychological mode' (p. 36). Insofar as this is true, we may say that the relationship between each type of mental state and its conditions of satisfaction is different in a certain way. A belief is satisfied when its content matches the reality. This is captured by the notion that beliefs have a mind-to-world direction of fit. As Searle puts it, it is the responsibility of the belief to correspond to a state of affairs in the world, not the other way around. Desires, in contrast, have a world-to-mind direction of fit; such that, to aim at representing the things in the world is not one of the necessary conditions for a mental state to qualify as a desire. If someone wants that it rain, it is, so to speak, the responsibility of the

[3] A deeper question follows that whether the logical properties are determined by the ontological properties, and if so, how. We will dwell on this problem when we ask the same question concerning how the conceptual content of emotion is determined in the second chapter.

world to match the content of that desire if that desire is to be satisfied. This fact is captured by the notion that desires have a world-to-mind direction of fit.

Direction of causation, on the other hand, concerns the causal order of the experience of intentional states and their objects. Searle finds out that, in cognitive and conative states, the direction of causation runs in the opposite direction of their direction of fit. Consider our visual experiences and intentions to act, which are cognitive and conative respectively. If someone goes through a perception, such as when a child hears the sound of her mother calling, the sound of her mother would be the cause of her sensory experience. The way the world is causes the way the things are mentally represented. All types of sensory experience share this property of having world to mind direction of causation. Intentions, on the other hand, have a mind to world direction of causation since they are the ones which cause the change in the world. If I intend to walk across the room, it is my intention which should cause the act of walking, and certainly not the other way around. Indeed, the intentional property of direction of causation figures in the conditions of satisfaction of both perception and intention, and because of this, Searle groups them together as *causally self-referential states*. In our last example, one aspect of the condition of satisfaction of my mental state is that I walk across the room, and unless this action is caused by my intention, I cannot be said to have actually satisfied it. In the previous example, the child would be hearing the sound of her mother calling if and only if there actually is a sound and the sound is in a causal relationship with the child's sensory experience. How about beliefs and desires? They are not, according to Searle's theory, causally self-referential, for they may be satisfied even when there is no intentional causation. Someone's true belief that a friend is visiting may not be caused by the fact that his friend is actually visiting but by his overwhelming

expectations to see him. Then, it would *not* be right to say that there is any causal connection between the fact of the matter and the belief that represents it. The case is similar for desires: If I desire that it rains today, and it actually rains today, my desire would be satisfied because of a certain change in the world, but it would obviously not be the case that my desire caused this change. We may differentiate, following Searle, between the volitional states--desires and intentions, and the cognitive states which are beliefs and perceptions. At this point, we may also differentiate, by virtue of the property of causal self-referentiality, between desires and beliefs on the one hand, and intentions and perceptions on the other.

If feelings are of certain visceral changes in the sense that they are intentional states, this means that they may not only be caused by the visceral changes but are also intentionally directed towards them, in which case, they would have a certain direction of causation and a direction of fit running in the opposite direction. The James-Lange theory takes perception as a model for emotional feelings. Accordingly, we would expect them to be causally self-referential and to have a mind-to-world direction of fit and a world-to-mind direction of cause. If this model is appropriate, it follows that just as a perception of red is directed toward and caused by that which is red, the feeling of fear is directed toward and caused by that which is... well, which is what? If we want to follow the theory consistently, to include affective states like fear, we should not hesitate and say that fear is directed toward the corresponding visceral changes, but then it is not clear whether the model is true for most feelings. For most feelings, including fear, seem to be directed toward real objects in the world—objects other than the one's own bodily states. Moreover, it seems that the cause and the object of a feeling need not be identical; in other words, feelings do not seem to be causally self-referential.

Goldie's Account of Intentional Feelings

The idea that emotional feelings are intentional is defended by Peter Goldie (2002), who classifies them in three groups. The bodily feelings—the feelings of bodily changes--have intentionality toward the bodily states. James and Lange would endorse this as the only kind of feeling possible. For Goldie, however, this group of feelings are not necessary for emotional experience at all and they generally constitute only a small part of it. During the bodily feelings, caused by, for example, the change in muscular reactions and autonomic nervous system, one feels these changes themselves (p. 52). Therefore, the phenomenology of this type of feeling is not rich enough to constitute the overall emotional experience. On the other hand, it is possible for these feelings to borrow a more complex intentionality from the emotions of which they constitute a part. Although this second type of feeling is in some sense bodily too; in another sense, they concern whatever is the content of the first person experience of emotion. What makes a certain trembling of the limbs a trembling of fear, according to this account, goes beyond the intentionality towards the bodily states. Having said this, an even more commonly experienced type of feeling, according to Goldie, is called 'feeling towards', which completely leaves behind the primitive kind of intentionality found in the earlier types. Goldie claims that the feeling towards has a world directed intentionality, which maybe conceptualized as 'thinking with feeling' (p. 58). However, he adds that it is not an attitude like believing and desiring (p. 72). There are certain ways in which thinking with feeling differs from just thinking, the most important of which has to do with the role of the will and the role of the imagination in their formation. In feeling towards, the

imagination tends to be less subject to the will. Another important difference is in the way of grasping the saliences in the world. In that sense, both thinking of and feeling toward have a mind-to-world direction of fit; however, the latter gives way to a qualitatively distinct experience by virtue of the kind of intentionality it possesses. Therefore, we may say that, for Goldie, feelings in general have a unique intentionality, and partly because of this fact, emotions are distinct from other types of mental states.

Goldie formulates his arguments against what he calls the *add-on theory* of emotion. Here is how he describes this theory and his motivation to argue against it:

> It is not true that precisely the same sort of action can be done, sometimes with emotion and sometimes without, where the emotion is taken as comprising feelingless belief and desire, plus something which is not directed towards the object of the emotion—a psychological add-on (a visceral feeling perhaps), or a purely physiological add-on (a visceral change perhaps), or both. The person who thinks that additions like these are sufficient to distinguish emotional thought and action from unemotional thought and action is the *add-on theorist*. Against this view stands the phenomenology. Consider doing these things unemotionally: striking a blow; making love; seeking safety. Now consider, and contrast, acting when you act out of emotion: *angrily* striking the blow; making love *passionately*; *fearfully* running away. The phenomenology of such actions—what it is like for the agent—is fundamentally different in character. And an action done with feeling can be distinct in its phenomenology not just for the agent, but also for others involved directly or peripherally in the action; one just has to think what it is like to be made love to with feeling for this to be obvious: it is not like being made love to without feeling, plus feeling. Acting out of emotion is not acting without emotion (explained by feelingless beliefs and desires) plus some added-on ingredient or ingredients. Rather, when an action is done out of an emotion, the whole action, and the whole experience of the action, is fundamentally different (pp. 39-40).

A Critique of Goldie's Account

According to Goldie's account, feelings, perhaps along with beliefs and desires, are types of thinking, and they come together to constitute emotions; though, only the feelings are necessary. Hence, we can have emotions just in the form of intentional feelings, but we cannot have emotions just made up of beliefs and desires. I have two objections at this point: First, it is not clear that if we construe some feelings with a kind of intentionality or say that they are intentional by their very own nature, we would no longer need to construe them as a mere component of emotion. I admit that they are not the sort of component we would find in material objects, adjacent to its counterpart. Yet, this is true for other kinds of mental states as well, and we do not hesitate to call them separate elements of experience despite the singular or unified appearance of our experiences of their conjunction. A man running toward the market, we may say, has both the desire to go to the market and the belief that the market is located in the direction he is running. His running toward the market is not a sign either exclusively of his belief or exclusively of his desire. Except when we deal with the content of people's verbal expressions, it may not be easy to discern from any action, what sorts of mental state are embedded in the mind of the agent which motivate them to act. This is precisely because actions (including verbal acts) are hardly ever a result of a single mental state; but rather, they emerge from reasoning and deliberation which involves more than one type of mental state. Since we do not thereby conclude that beliefs and desires are not components of mental experiences, why should we in the case of feelings?

My second objection revolves around the idea that if the emotional feelings were intentional by nature, instead of having borrowed intentionality, they would have a specific direction of fit and direction of cause. However, individual affective states, except the bodily feelings, seem to differ in respect to these logical properties depending on under which circumstances they are being experienced. A certain case of love may involve mind-to-world direction of fit; whereas, another case of love may have world-to-mind direction of fit. It may be that the two cases are about the same intentional object and have the same level of intensity but still differ in respect to their directions of fit. Consider a tennis player's passion for the game when she is practicing tirelessly, a child fond of ice-cream overrunning his friends in the line to buy an ice-cream, or a hateful remark of someone's enemy. Examples like these generally provide the biased framework for the emotion theories which consider emotions as a form of desire. In examples like these, desires are definitive of the affective state; however, we could think of other cases in which beliefs are more definitive. Take, for example, a student's happiness that he has been a successful student throughout the year, or consider a woman's fear that she may not be paid a full salary that month because of a financial crisis. In these examples, the subjects have particular beliefs about the world--the student's belief that he has been successful and the woman's belief that there is a chance she may not be paid a full salary, and these beliefs, rather than any desires, are what is definitive of the subjects' emotional state. I do not suggest that these subjects cannot have any desires in association with their emotional state. However, insofar as the information presented by these last examples goes, what is definitive of the emotional states in question is the corresponding belief state.

The Implication for the Propositional Attitude Theory

Can we say that the mental states which play a definitive role in the emotional experience enter into the ontological structure of the emotion as the propositional attitude theories suggest? I believe that there is a difference between playing that role and being a component. This perspective would be completely supported by a functionalist approach to the ontology of affective states, according to which, a particular emotion would play a certain functional role among certain beliefs and desires (as well as other emotions and other states of various kinds), but although all of these states (let's call them 'determiners') are necessary for individuating the particular emotional state, none of them are considered to be a component of it. I believe that this point is crucial in solving the dispute between the feeling theorists and the propositional attitude theorists. It is quite clear that emotion is not a second order state which supervenes on beliefs, desires and feelings. Emotion's proper ontological place is with all of the mental states which are determined by their particular roles within the causal framework of the mind. Moreover, I want to argue that feeling is not a component of emotion. Then, the question is what the proper place for emotional feelings is and how we can identify them.

Emotions and Emotional Feelings

I believe that we can give a functionalist definition of feelings as well. What differentiates feelings from emotions is the kind of states which functionally

determines them—their determiners. My claim will be that while emotions are essentially determined by beliefs and desires, feelings are essentially determined by perception and intention. In other words, some affective states are determined by causally self-referential states only, and we call them feelings; on the other hand, some affective states are determined just by causally non-self-referential states, and we call them emotions. A token of fear as a feeling may be determined by the perception of what we believe is dangerous, of a rise in heart rate, of blood pressure, of dizziness and so on, as well as the intention to run away, yell out for help and so on. A token of fear as an emotion, on the other hand, is normally determined by the belief that there is something dangerous and the desire to avoid it; however, to call this a state of emotion, there is no need to have a perception of any sort, nor must the subject of fear intend any action. But the point is not a mere fact about what is needed in order to have emotions; it is a logical point, certain descriptions cannot possibly be allowed in the description of emotions. Let us be critical of these ideas and try to discern what the real difference between emotions and feelings might be. I have argued earlier that it is not the presence or absence of any qualia since each state may have a quale of its own. I argue now that it is not a part-to-whole relationship either, i.e., feeling should not be construed as a component of emotion, and that they are distinct kinds of mental states under the larger category of affective states.

We have conceded earlier that some feelings only seem like they have intrinsic intentionality. The situation is not any different for emotions; hence, neither of them has any logical properties, with which they function as to connect the subject and the world with one another. In that sense they are very dissimilar to beliefs and desires. However, emotions can only be functionally determined by states like beliefs and desires. And in so far as this is true, it is normal that we often see an emotion occur in

coordination with certain beliefs and desires. On the other hand, this coordination is never present with perceptions or intentions. Does this mean that, for example, a token of fear as an emotion can never be caused by a certain perception? Do we not become fearful when we perceive a dangerous situation? I think we do, however, we should be careful in distinguishing the folk way of describing certain events versus how a serious ontological framework is constructed in respect to analyzing a state like the one in question. This fear state, insofar as it is directly caused by something perceived, should be called an emotional feeling rather than an emotion. What we would normally find in the same situation, however, is another causal event—the belief that what is perceived is dangerous is caused by the perception of what is dangerous. It is this belief which causes the emotion of fear, not the perception. This point would become clearer by another example: We do not love the people we do when we perceive them. We love them because we have beliefs about them (and normally desires as well). "Love" here is an emotion term. If any token of love as an emotion state is determined in one's mind, the proper functional description cannot have any statement of one's perceptions, for this would make the description a description of love as a feeling rather than emotion. The emotion of love is too complex to be caused by a perception. It always requires certain beliefs and desires to figure in its functional description. If someone's love is directly caused by a perception of a certain lovable property, that state of love is not an emotion but an emotional feeling. We might have a tendency to call this a "feeling of emotion." Don't let this fool us; the term "feeling" in this phrase does not refer to feeling as an affective state but rather to the qualitative experience of the emotion (refer to page three for the two ways we define the term "feeling"). Hence, although we may sometimes use the phrase "feeling of emotion" what we mean by it in those times is

emotional qualia, and it is wrong to use this phrase in the case of the last example since the love experience of the person in question is directly caused by a certain perception, and a mere perception cannot cause the emotion, love.

Are Emotions and Feelings Intentional?

If emotions and emotional feelings are not intrinsically intentional states, our attribution to them of any aboutness is either *subjective*, in which case it would be similar to how we attribute an aboutness to written or spoken words, signposts, and to any other truly non-intentional state or being, or *objective*, in which case, we would have to admit that our attempt to view them as intentional states is simply illusory, or at best, mistaken.[4] I have claimed so far that we normally attribute intentionality to emotions and feelings partly because they are causally determined by intentional states, i.e., their intentionality is *derived* from the intentionality of other types of mental states. In that sense, affective states and signposts have something in common. Both affective states and signposts are functionally realized if and only if they are causally determined by certain cognitive and conative states. Then, the question is whether or not the fact that a functionally realized state has the property of intentionality may depend only on this causal determination; and if so, what is the nature of this determination? I believe that it is quite plausible to conjecture, as a consequence of the similarity of the way in which the two kinds of states in question

[4] Here the subjective attribution is the projection of the property of intentionality onto some entity which is not in itself intentional.

are functionally realized, that we attribute to them the property of intentionality in the same fashion. Since it seems that we attribute intentionality to entities like signposts subjectively, it is quite possible that to the extent that the nature of the aboutness of both types of states depends on their determiners, they are only subjectively held to be directed to the world.

One support for this claim comes from how we refer to mental states. Consider the following statements:

a) I believe that it is raining.

b) I desire that it rains. (i.e., I want it to rain)

c) I enjoy that it is raining.

At least in some cases, the statement of enjoyment can be paraphrased as "I am happy because it is raining," which would entail that the object and the cause of my enjoyment are the same. On the other hand, arguably it makes no sense to say that "I believe because it is raining" or "I desire because it rains." Since for all three type of states, the intentional object and the cause may sometimes be identical, I suggest that the reason for this linguistic difference lies in some other source. Notice that if the reason had anything to do with the fact about object-cause identity, we would have to be able to paraphrase statements of perception as a consequence; but arguably, it makes no sense to utter a sentence of the form, "I perceive (e.g., see, hear) because it is raining."

I suggest that we look at the following source for an explanation: Although emotions and feelings are functionally realized if and only if they are causally determined by certain non-affective states, the rules of grammar are not as strict as the

rules of ontology; and as a consequence, it is not a problem to form a sentence for anyone, even like, “I am happy”--without any mentioning of what the subject is happy about. Nevertheless, the rules of language are obedient to our intuitions of the ontological structure of things just enough so that we cannot so sensibly—but not completely insensibly—form a sentence of the form, “I perceive,” “I desire,” and “I believe” as well as sentences like “I am perceiving,” “I am desiring,” and “I am believing.” Although these sentences may syntactically be okay, it seems semantically preferable that one states what she perceives, desires, or believes also. On the other hand, sentences of the form, “I am happy,” and “I am sad” seem semantically self-sufficient in a way that the previous statements are not. It seems that an analysis of language is pregnant with more evidence to support the claim that emotions and feelings are not objectively intentional.

Another support comes directly from conceptual analysis: Notice that although the intentionality of affection is causally determined by certain cognitive and conative states, affective states are directed toward whatever the intentional object of these non-affective states is. In so far as this is the case, the intentional content of emotions and feelings is not constrained by the number of intentional objects. I believe that this corresponds to the fact that the qualitative richness of emotions and feelings differs, both from one another and from other types of mental states. If so, we might have given an answer to the question, what explains the qualitative richness found in the affective realm. Notice that if we pursue the debate in this direction, it is not logically obligatory, that we take sides on the more prevalent and the quite different philosophical issue, namely the ontological question over the existence of qualia--the phenomenological properties of some mental states. For it is not necessary, when we locate these properties as a part of what the emotional experience

is, that we suppose the mind is an entity over and above the material world. We could be a thoroughgoing functionalist, an identity theorist, or a qualia freak, and it doesn't matter. When we pursue the debate in this direction, we want to know, given that there is something it is like to experience emotions, what makes a token of that experience as simple or complex as it may be. It follows that it is better to formulate this as a question over the nature of the conceptual content in emotions and feelings—whether or not there is such content and how this content is determined.

Finally, we may support the claim that emotions and feelings are not objectively intentional on the basis of intuitions which derive from phenomenology: Although there is something it is like to experience emotions and feelings, the subject of an affective state need not be always aware of the intentional content of her affection. Indeed, this is quite a common experience, and it seems that it can be explained by the fact that affection is a distinctly identifiable functional state—the intentional content of which is causally determined by those states which have intrinsic intentionality. For example, one can be aware of her fear without having any conscious notion of what she fears. This may be the case in so far as one need not be aware of the cognitive and conative states which provide the intentional content for the fear in question.

If we choose to take phenomenology seriously, however, we should also consider the following distinction between a signpost and an affective state: In order to treat some object as a signpost, we must take notice of whatever it is that functionally realizes it, such as a patch of colour on the wall. On the other hand, taking notice of an affective state has no such requirement. One does not need to notice the very neural activity which realizes her fear in order to notice her fear.

Similarly, one may take notice of her emotions and feelings without taking notice of their intentional content, and this seems to be impossible in the case of signposts.

This point leads to the following question: If both an affective state and a signpost are subjectively held to be intentional, does that mean that their intentionality is similar in every aspect? I believe that the main difference is teleological: A signpost—such as a stop sign—seems to differ from an affective state by virtue of carrying over the information passed onto it by its determining intentional states—such as the desire to stop pedestrians—from one subject to another. We might think that some emotions and feelings do just the same thing; for instance, an infant's cry may be interpreted as calling for attention to the fact that she is hungry, and the scream of someone in danger may be interpreted as calling for help. Hence, in those affective states too, it seems, the intentionality serves to convey certain information, and this much of their intentionality is explainable in terms of their causal determination by certain intentional states. However, this perspective seems to be open to an objection for not making a distinction between the effects of emotion (commonly referred to as the emotional response or expression) and the emotion itself. After all, it is not the sadness of the infant or the fear of the person in danger which aims to call for other people's attention and convey certain information to them. It seems quite absurd to claim that any creature that experiences sadness does so for the sake of attracting other people's attention, which would seem, on the contrary, a negation of the genuineness of that affective state.

I take this difference between affection and a signpost seriously. Hence, I conclude that the intentionality of affection is neither objectively real like the intentionality of cognitive and conative states nor quite like the intentionality of

entities like signposts. Might this be an indication of the peculiarity of the ontological space in which we allocate emotions and feelings—a sign of the very confusion and controversy which eluded the philosophy of emotion since day one? This point requires further attention.

The above arguments have two implications: First, emotions and feelings differ from cognitive and conative states because their intentionality is causally determined by that of other states. They do not have intrinsic intentionality. Second, emotions and feelings differ from signposts despite the fact that the intentionality of both types of states is causally determined. Nonetheless, we should formulate their difference in terms of their intentionality. It seems that, to do so requires us to summon a broader understanding of intentionality—one that relates to teleology. In other words, to have a better understanding of affective states requires us to go beyond the questions we have dealt with so far—the questions which essentially relate to how the intentionality of affection is determined—and we must look for the causes of this determination itself. At this point, we may follow different strategies, such as the ones offered by the biological and the social sciences. Another strategy—the one which I will follow—is conceptual analysis.

CHAPTER III:

CONCEPTS OF EMOTION

In this chapter, I will refer to two basic types of concepts. The first group comprises concepts that we use to name emotions, such as fear, anger, and love.[5] The second group comprises concepts like danger, harm, wrong, and commitment. As with Goldie, we may call these 'concepts of emotions' and 'concepts of emotion invoking features' respectively. We may also observe that there is a certain correspondence between these two types of concepts; such that, for instance, "...fear has a paradigmatic narrative structure—a paradigmatic structure of recognition of the dangerous... and the dangerous is what merits fear—what merits this recognition..." (p. 101). Then, my question becomes whether the entire taxonomy of emotions is possible on the basis of this and similar correspondences.

In most texts, the concept of fear and the concept of danger are given as paradigmatic of the case in hand. I believe that this is not a coincidence given the simple structure of fear. When someone sees a fast approaching car which one believes to be posing a danger, one feels fear... simple enough. The concepts of love, excitement, regret, shame, grief, joy or happiness, and so on, however, may not be so easily explicable in terms of their relationship with the concepts of emotion evoking features. Perhaps, *devotion* or *dedication* corresponds to *love*, but we cannot be so

[5] Let us put the distinction between feelings and emotions aside for now. Assume that everything said in this chapter applies to feelings as well as emotions—unless of course an inconsistency results due to how they are explained differently in the first chapter.

sure.[6] After all, this relationship may not always be found in experience. Perhaps, *progress, anticipation*, or even *chance* corresponds to *excitement*, but I am not sure that the last two can even properly be identified as concepts of emotion invoking features. The states like regret, shame, jealousy, gratitude, and pride present us with a totally different story by seeming more like value judgements (or attitudes) than emotional states alone. Finally, joy and sadness seem to be more central to this entire conceptual framework than any other state, as if more in the line of pleasure and pain—only further removed from the bodily sensations, but who can tell the relevant concepts? Accordingly, I suggest that in order to give a comprehensive taxonomy of emotions, we need to develop a method which we can use to analyse complex emotions. Historically, the most popular approach has been to determine the fundamental types of emotion first; and then, to work from top to bottom in explaining the complex ones. This approach is based on the assumption that emotions form a natural class, i.e., they share something in common. I will be holding onto this assumption here as well.

Appraisal as the Cause of Emotions

It seems plausible to think that all emotions are, in one way or another, indicative of certain value judgements made in advance by the subject experiencing them. Under normal conditions, the higher the value one gives to a newly received present, the more he would feel joy. The circumstances, however, need not be

[6] Unless it is already indicated, I will italicize a word whenever it refers to a concept.

normal, and one may feel differently. If one has the belief that one has not done anything to deserve a present of such value, everything else being equal with the earlier case, one might feel embarrassment. This shows that in some cases, emotions and feelings result from reasoning. However, there is a default emotional concept, so to speak, in cases where the purpose of an action or the typical response patterns determines it. A present is meant to cause joy in the receiver and not embarrassment. A surprise is meant to excite pleasantly and not shock its target; though the latter may occur every now and then. A beautiful scenery causes admiration and not sorrow, but only under normal circumstances. If it is these circumstances which provide the basis for the emotions and feelings we experience, and these circumstances are determined by certain value judgements, than it makes sense to conjecture that the affective states are in various ways indicative of them. The joy of receiving a present indicates, among other things, how much the receiver values the present. The excitement of being surprised indicates, among other things, one's earlier (and subsequent if the excitement is pleasant) judgement that one is in the hands of safety. Finally, the admiration of a beautiful scenery speaks for itself, in which case it is an indication of an aesthetic judgement. One kind of theory which aims to capture this similarity between different types of emotion is called the appraisal theory of emotion.

Richard Lazarus (1991) offers a theory of emotions according to which the appraisal of certain relations between the subject and her environment generates the emotions.[7] According to Lazarus, each emotion has 'a distinctive core relational theme' (p. 89). He states that, "the fundamental idea of a relational theory of emotion

[7] I will use the terms "appraisal" and "value judgment" interchangeably.

is that we cannot understand the emotional life solely from the standpoint of the person or the environment as separate units." Accordingly, he claims:

> I can illustrate the relational meanings that underlie emotions with the concepts of threat, insult, and enhancement of ego-identity, each of which lead to a different emotion —namely , anxiety, anger, and pride, respectively. If we feel threatened, insulted, or benefited —these are, of course, appraisals — the relational meaning of each does not stem from either the person or the environment; there must be a conjunction of an environment with certain attributes and a person with certain attributes, which together produce the relational meaning. (p. 90)

The following schema shows the causal sequence of events that generates an emotion according to Lazarus' theory:[8]



The theory, of course, is more complicated than what this schema can possibly capture. It is enough for our purposes, however, to suggest one possible way in which emotions can be generated. We want to know whether it is possible to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of emotions on the basis of this account, given the assumption that emotions form a natural class. According to Jesse J. Prinz (2004) the hopes of providing a comprehensive taxonomy on the basis of an appraisal theory

[8] The schema is a slightly modified version of its original presented in Prinz (2004; p. 14).

looks dim. He gives two arguments for this claim. His first argument is based on an assumption which derives from a distinction made by Paul E. Griffiths (1998). According to Griffiths, what appears to be a single class of emotions essentially splits into two groups: The first group comprises affect programs—a notion borrowed from Paul Ekman. Prinz describes the affect programs as follows: "[They] are complex responses that involve appraisals, bodily changes, and action dispositions in response to perceived stimuli. [They] are culturally universal, are underwritten by specific neural circuits, and have homologues in non-human species. They are generally associated with specific facial expressions" (2004; pp. 81-2). Some examples of affect programs are given as anger, happiness, and sadness.

The second group of emotions, according to Griffiths, comprises the complex emotions, such as jealousy and shame. These are higher cognitive states which involve "advanced cognitive abilities" which we do not commonly find in non-human animals (p. 83). As Prinz puts it, they seem to involve a capacity to have "a degree of conceptual sophistication." For Griffiths, the main difference between the affect programs and the complex emotions lies in the fact that emotions in the first group are modular, and hence, 'informationally encapsulated.' What this means is that they are functionally isolated from the rest of the faculties of the mind. Many philosophers have thought that sensory experiences are isolated in the same way. When we have a visual experience of an illusion, for instance, our beliefs and desires which may be somewhat informed of the occurrence of the illusion seem to be helpless in fixing our perception. If modularity figures in their properties, we would expect the affect programs to be informationally encapsulated as well, and Griffiths thinks that this functional independence is what differentiates them from the complex emotions, which by definition seem to be 'intrinsically cognitive' (p. 83).

Prinz' Objections to Lazarus

Let us now come back to Prinz's first objection to Lazarus. He states it as follows:

> Griffiths' argument suggests that the mechanisms that set off affect programs differ considerably from the mechanisms that set off higher cognitive emotions. Affect programs respond to a restricted range of perceptual inputs, and higher cognitive emotions respond to complex thoughts. The suggestion that both are driven by a shared set of appraisal dimensions is not easy to reconcile with this apparent difference in their etiology (p. 86).

Prinz does not give us any details about the difficulties that he anticipates in reconciling Lazarus' theory with the distinction made by Griffiths. However, his suggestion seems to be that if Griffiths is right in his classification of emotions, Lazarus would either have to admit that his general story for how the emotions are generated—via a single mechanism of appraisal—is mistaken or he would have to find a way to reconcile his approach with the difference in mechanisms that play a role in their realization.

Here is Prinz's second objection to Lazarus before I go on to formulate my responses:

> If emotions such as anger and fear were generated from the same appraisal dimensions as guilt and pride, we should not find creatures that have the former but lack the latter. On dimensional accounts [such as the account of Lazarus], higher cognitive emotions are not generally presumed to differ in complexity from the emotions associated with affect programs. All derive from the same dimensions. But, in nature, there seem to be many creatures that have affect programs but lack higher cognitive emotions. Dimensional accounts have difficulty explaining that fact. (p. 86, bracket added)

A Response to Prinz

The first objection concerns the difficulty in offering a common mechanism that generates all emotions in terms of appraisal. I agree that not all emotions, especially the basic ones such as anger, need to be generated by a process of appraisal. To give an example, Lazarus claims that anger is always generated by the recognition of something offensive, but it is hard to see why we should qualify this sort of recognition necessarily as a judgement that something is offensive to one's well-being, i.e., as an appraisal which causally precedes the emotion *every time* that we are angry. It is generally agreed that our moral judgements can be cognitively represented, for example, in believing that something is good. What is disputable is that the making of a moral judgement depends solely on the faculty of cognition, in which case, someone's disapproval of a crime would be understood as entirely a matter of her reasoning and beliefs about the event which is, thereby, claimed to be a crime. Neither belief nor desire by itself can determine a subject's relationship with what is morally significant (what is good or bad). A subject, who recognizes that a particular case of crossing the street when the traffic light is red is morally wrong, need not be making a value judgement. For the subject might have the prior belief that crossing the street when the traffic light is red is wrong, and she could have simply reasoned, via a simple modus ponens, that this particular case is also wrong. Accordingly, there seems to be a difference in how a value judgement is generated (given that they are generated as opposed to being static relations between the subject and her environment) and how that value judgement is applied under certain circumstances. Just to give a name to this type of judgement and distinguish it from value

judgements—that is, genuine aesthetic and ethical judgements, I am going to call it an "evaluative judgement." For all that it takes to carry out these judgements is to make an evaluation. An evaluation of course is not necessarily simpler than making a value judgement since it generally requires the use of other faculties, such as for making an analysis of a real life situation. Nonetheless, any being who can read, understand, and reason on the basis of a set of rules which determine what is to be called "right" and what is to be called "wrong", can decide whether some action or situation is right or wrong in light of those rules.[9] Therefore, I suggest that if the appraisal theory is true, an appraisal need not always be present when the emotion is generated.

What follows from the above conclusion is that we cannot defend the idea that emotions form a natural class on the basis of a single appraisal mechanism which is supposed to generate emotions. However, this idea should not lead us to think that value judgements are irrelevant in respect to how we may group emotions together and classify them. On the contrary, I believe that a working taxonomy of emotions and feelings is not possible without the consideration that affective states help determine as well as indicate certain value judgements, i.e., they also serve as a necessary condition for making genuine aesthetic and moral valuations. In so far as this claim is true, one cannot be making any aesthetic judgement without engaging in any kind of affective state towards the object being liked or detested; and similarly, one cannot be making any moral judgement without engaging in any kind of affective state towards the object being approved or disapproved. Hence, the joy of receiving a present is not only indicative of the value of the present for the receiver; it determines to some extent her judgement of that value. The pleasant excitement of being

[9] This is of course not to say that in those cases we make the correct judgment.

surprised is not just an arbitrary sign that someone is happy for being with her close ones; it is necessary for that judgement to be made about them. Accordingly, I suggest that the very moral and aesthetic reasoning which lies beneath the moral and aesthetic attitudes of people partially depends on the role of their affective states. Therefore, affective states differ in respect to the ways in which they help determine our moral and aesthetic judgements.

How Do Emotions Determine Value Judgements?

The supporters of the propositional attitude theory of emotion often claim that emotions are identical with value judgements. Martha Nussbaum (2001), one of the well known defenders of this view, states that "the story of emotion... is the story of judgements about important things, judgements in which we acknowledge our neediness and incompleteness before those elements that we do not fully control," and that "there appear to be type-identities between emotions and judgements; emotions can be defined in terms of judgement alone" (p. 271; 283). So, if emotions are judgements alone, there might be as many different types of emotion as there are different types of judgement. This seems to pose an advantage of explanatory power over the feeling theory. We have seen an example of the cognitivist claim that non-cognitive means to give a typology of emotions is not possible when we mentioned Cannon's counterargument to James and Lange, which was based on the insufficiency of bodily states and events for the purpose of differentiating states like fear and anger. This complaint is justified considering the wide range of emotions, including ones that we may not have yet conceptualized. But it may be inadequate as well for being

too generous for demanding that each type of emotion should correspond to a kind of judgement. In any case, much of this claim depends on what we mean by 'a kind of judgement', and this does not have any more straight forward an answer.

I agree with Nussbaum that emotions are essentially related to value judgements; however, I disagree with her as to what this relationship really consists in. It appears that some emotion types, such as sadness, participate in various kinds of value judgement, such as regret and jealousy. This hypothesis seems to fit consistently with my earlier claim that the intentional content of emotions and feelings is determined by certain non-affective states. Hence, both the experience of regret and the experience of jealousy may result from sadness given the proper kind of causal determination. To give as simple an account as possible, a subject's regret may be a combination of her sadness and her belief that she has missed a significant opportunity in the past, and her jealousy may be a combination of her sadness and her belief that her lover receives too much attention from someone else.

Generalizing this point to some of the other candidates for value judgements, we may be able to explain—without appealing to any identity theory—why states like regret, shame, jealousy, gratitude, and pride present us with a different story by seeming more like value judgements than emotional states alone. I suggest that concepts like regret, jealousy, pride and so on are primarily used to name value judgements, and the affective states are named after the value judgements which they help to constitute. I know of no other way of pointing out this partly conceptual and partly linguistic occurrence than to give some examples: Consider how a subject's regret may be determined by a combination of her sadness and her belief that she has missed a significant opportunity in the past. It seems that the sentence “S feels regret”

would not lose significantly from its meaning if we paraphrase it into the following sentence: "S feels sadness because S believes that S has missed an opportunity in the past." It seems only natural that we name the sadness in question after the experience of regret, which it helps to constitute along with a certain belief.

Again, consider how a subject's feeling of shame may be determined by a combination of her sadness and her belief that others are feeling joy out of what caused her sadness—most plausibly, a failure or deficiency. It seems that the sentence "S feels shame" would not lose significantly from its meaning if we paraphrase it into the following sentence: "S feels sadness because S believes that others are feeling joy out of S's failure." In this case, it seems only natural that we name the sadness in question after the experience of shame, which it helps to constitute along with a certain belief.

In order to explain the centrality of sadness in these cases, let us try to answer the question why someone might be ashamed but not angered with the belief that others are feeling joy out of what caused one's sadness. We must keep in mind that in these and similar cases, we are only referring to a certain combination of affective and non-affective states. One would indeed be angered by finding out that others are taking joy out of her failure if one also believes that this event is, in some way, an indication that the same people may cause her to fail again in the future, which amounts to the possibility of harming her. *Harm* (*wrong* or *morally bad*) is the concept of emotion invoking feature for anger. Hence, in the absence of the belief that one might be exposed to the feature in question, one would not be angered. *Sadness*, on the other hand, corresponds to the concept of morally bad in a way which is different from *anger*. Let us try to discern this difference. If a child believes that

he has lost his favourite toy (notice that this is an evaluative judgement), he may either become sad or angry depending on the nature of his beliefs about what caused the toy's disappearance. If he believes there to be a responsible person, for instance, he may become angry at that person. If no responsibility can be attributed, he may just experience sadness. Hence, there emerge two senses of *morally bad:* The one concerning *anger* emerges from an interaction with another subject deemed to be the cause of one's sadness. The one concerning *sadness* emerges from an interaction directly with this cause.

In this peculiar sense, then, sadness is more central an emotion than anger. However, both *anger* and *sadness,* along with their contraries—*contentment* (*calmness* or *acceptance*) and *happiness* (*joy, cheerfulness, gladness, etc.)* are central to the conceptual framework of the mind in so far as these affective states help the formation of value judgements; hence, they all concern well-being in one way or another. We have seen how sadness is central to the formation of regret, jealousy, and certain forms of shame. One can continue the list by deciding whether one of the basic affective states is a necessary condition for the value judgement in question. Happiness is central to the formation of value judgements such as pride and love. Anger is central to the formation of guilt, contempt, and envy, and contentment is central to the formation of forgiveness. In each case, the value judgements require the combination of these basic affective states with the appropriate cognitive and conative states. In the case of pride, the fact that a subject is proud of her sibling implies that, to give as simple an account as possible, she feels enjoyment and this affection is caused by her belief that someone, with whom she can identify herself with, has been successful. Thus, in the case of pride, *enjoyment* is associated with *well-being* in a particular way. It can, however, be associated with *well-being* in a

different way in the case of love. So, each basic kind of affective state plays a different role as it participates in the formation of a different value judgement. In folk-psychology, we often give the name of the value judgement to the affection which goes in its formation. Hence, we normally use the name 'love' to refer to the particular enjoyment which goes in the formation of love. Since naming an emotion or feeling after the value judgement it constitutes is quite a common practice, we may not see it as a problem unless the value judgement and the corresponding affective state are confused.

We might think of the relationship between a value judgement and the corresponding affective and non-affective states as a kind of supervenience, which we may capture with the following schema:



Notice that this way of classifying emotions would circumvent the objections faced by Lazarus. First, we are not trying to classify emotions on the basis of a single mechanism of appraisal—which is supposed to generate them. Indeed, we are not trying to identify emotions on the basis of any of its causes; and instead, we are focusing on how an instance of emotion determines a certain value judgement. Second, we may account for the objection that most animals can experience the basic emotions, such as sadness and anger, but it seems that they cannot experience the

complex ones such as regret and jealousy. If these complex emotions are in fact certain forms of value judgement, which are partly determined by the basic emotions, we would expect any being to first have the competence for experiencing the basic emotions, and only after, to form states like regret and jealousy.

Identifying Different Species of Emotion

Following the given approach for naming some of the complex emotions, it is possible to account for different species of an emotion type as well. Consider again the example of shame, which seems to be a combination of one's sadness and the belief that others are happy for the cause of this sadness—most plausibly, a failure or deficiency (think of someone who trips over in front of others). However, we might call the sadness in question more specifically an "embarrassment" since shame may sometimes imply a combination of sadness and the belief that others are caused to be sad also because of the same cause (think of a soldier who takes it as a dishonour to have lost the war for his country). One might object that shame sometimes occurs in the absence of any failure or deficiency at all, such as when a subject feels shameful because he is aware that his advantages are exposed to someone who is disadvantaged. This case is not, however, a refutation of what we have said so far since it only shows that the failure or deficiency need not always belong to the same person who feels shame. Indeed, this type of shame is possible only if the subject empathises with another person's failure or deficiency. Nor is it necessary that this

other person is a different subject than the subject experiencing the affective state. We might regard in retrospection—let us say a childhood memory—as a shameful event, feeling shame even if we had not felt shame at the moment. This shows that we empathise with the person in our recollection—our childhood, and perceiving ourselves as 'the other', we can go through the same process which brings about the feeling of shame.

The task of providing a comprehensive taxonomy of affective states seems to be daunting, and perhaps the best we can do here is to point at the right direction for at least the most commonly experienced emotions and feelings. There seem to remain certain states which we haven't been able to classify yet, such as excitement, hatred, and boredom. Analysing these states might help us discover certain parameters for grouping them together. Nevertheless, the fundamental criterion remains to be how these states are related to the basic types of affection. To give an example, although excitement, hatred, and boredom seem to concern the duration and intensity of feelings, these are not the real distinguishing factors of one type of affective state from another—at least not in any non-contingent way. An emphasis over such features of affection is a mistake and results from an association of these states with feelings only, as well as a mistaken notion of what feelings really are.

Let us look closer to excitement: One may experience excitement as an emotion when he anticipates what he believes to be in the near future. The feeling of excitement, on the other hand, results from the perception of the same thing. If one is excited while sitting at home that he will bungee jump tomorrow, it is called an emotion. If one is excited seeing the height from the platform right before bungee jumping, it is called an emotional feeling. In each case, what makes that state an

excitement is either the desire or the intention to perform what one believes to be risky. In both cases, the performance is conceived to be in near future. This particular conception, along with the conception of the risk, cause the person to experience one of the basic types of affection—enjoyment or sadness, depending on the other cognitive and conative states which determine that affective state. If the resulting experience is enjoyment, it is generally called 'excitement'. If the resulting experience is sadness, it is generally called 'panic'. Accordingly, excitement is neither a special instance of feelings nor simply results from the intensity or duration of certain sensations.

Emotions and Value Judgements

Unless the basic types of affective states are combined with the appropriate cognitive and conative states, we may best describe their function as expressive rather than evaluative. What I mean by “expressive” is nothing over and above the absence of the kind of responsibility with respect to the world and the conditions of satisfaction found in the case of cognition and conation. On the other hand, we have seen that value judgements are at least in part a matter of having conditions of satisfaction. However, we should not expect this intentionality to be as clearly apparent as the intentionality possessed by our faculties of cognition and conation since it partly involves emotions and feelings which are non-intentional.

We have said earlier that the faculties of cognition and conation are insufficient by themselves to make a genuine value judgement. Affective states fall

short of that capacity as well. It seems that both types of mental states have the function of forming a value judgement if and only if they are combined properly. We also argued in the first chapter that the kind of intentionality possessed by emotions and feelings differ from the intentionality of entities like signposts because their intentionality lacks the function of conveying information to other subjects. We may now move on to explain the difference between the intentionality of affective states and value judgements. An important difference between affective states and value judgements seems to be that only the latter kind of state has the metaphysical property of being an end in itself. This property is most apparent in the case of aesthetic judgements, but we may extend the conclusions that we may draw from the following discussion to the kind of value judgements that we have considered thus far.

It is often falsely believed that the experience of pleasure in some aesthetic judgements is the real end to that experience. Anne Sheppard (1987) observes that there is an emotional element in positive aesthetic judgements, which is often named 'aesthetic pleasure'. Sheppard writes:

> Aesthetic pleasure is manifested in a desire to continue or repeat the experience. We want to stop at the viewpoint and look at the scenery, we want to revisit beautiful places or reread books we have enjoyed. Correspondingly the reverse of aesthetic pleasure is manifested in a desire to get away from the offending object. Not only do we want to continue or repeat a pleasurable aesthetic experience but we regard doing so as an end in itself. We say that we are looking at the scenery or reading the book just because it gives us pleasure to do so. The gourmet who has aesthetic experiences of taste enjoys the taste of smoked salmon for its own sake, not to satisfy his hunger (pp. 64-5).

My first objection is that if we try to follow the views presented so far consistently, the aesthetic pleasure must be recognized as a distinct element rather than as a manifestation of the volition involved in the aesthetic judgement—unless, of

course, we are ready to give some reasonable account of how this manifestation actually takes place. Second, we must make a difference between intentions and desire. In general, feelings—and accordingly, perception and intention—have a more significant role in determining the nature of aesthetic judgements than beliefs and desires. For example, when we hear a beautiful song, we *intend* to hear it more. When we visually perceive something that repels us, we *intend* to get away from it. On the other hand, having the *desire* to expose oneself to what is beautiful and to avoid what is repellent seem to contribute more to how much we value that thing in a quite different sense. By all means, this sense is more relevant to a moral or ethical stance than it is to an aesthetic judgement. Would you desire to view a beautiful portrait as often as possible exactly for the same reasons that you intend to keep looking at it when you are actually viewing it? I suggest that the intention and the aesthetic pleasure constitute an aesthetic judgement; whereas, the desire and the aesthetic pleasure constitute a moral judgement—one that indicates how much the subject values the portrait in a different sense.

In so far as an aesthetic judgement is partly determined by feelings, we must be careful to distinguish the feelings from the aesthetic experience. An aesthetic judgement—a judgement about what is beautiful or ugly—must always result from either a pleasant or unpleasant feeling. This statement may seem false if we associate these feelings only with certain bodily sensations. However, most aesthetic judgements require subtle feelings, and these feelings need not always be associated with bodily sensations. Finally, the fact that aesthetic judgements are formed in part by pleasant or unpleasant feelings does not imply that they are accompanied by those feelings, as though when we find something beautiful or ugly, there is first an aesthetic judgement and a separate feeling attached to it. As I have argued before, a

value judgement is a combination—or better—a product of affective and non-affective states and the resulting experience is a unity of these states in the mind. Consequently, the feeling found in the experience of what is beautiful is not an end in itself; it serves to form the aesthetic judgement; whereas, a genuine aesthetic judgement is that unity formed at the end. Because feelings have this essential function in the formation of aesthetic judgements, they are often misconstrued as the sole purpose of an aesthetic experience.

CHAPTER IV:

CONCLUSION

I have two expectations from this thesis: (1) to reveal the intrinsic nature of emotions by virtue of analyzing some of their major components, and (2) to make considerable progress in order to locate the proper conceptual space in which emotions rest among other types of mental states. In realizing the first objective, I have introduced one important distinction between feelings and emotions. Each type of state is functionally realized by going into causal interaction with different types of mental states which I call "determiners". In so far as their determiners are distinguished, emotions and emotional feelings should be conceived as two distinct type of affective states; and hence, the question of how feelings relate to the intentionality of emotions should not lead to the problems commonly found in the literature.

This led us to the chapter in which we discussed the causal role of emotions and feelings in realizing various types of value judgement. The main arguments centred on the claim that four basic types of affection—joy, sadness, anger, and contentedness—help causally determine value judgements, and we may conceptually analyze the corresponding value judgements in order to arrive at a taxonomy of emotions and feelings.

What is needed is to test this system of classification further. One way to do this is to look closer to how value judgements ought to be expressed in language, such that their formulation in language reveals a consistency with the theory presented

here—a topic that we have not considered in this thesis. For instance, one could ask how to formulate love as a value judgement in language; would the sentence "this is something/someone lovable" be alright? If so, what kind of property does the term "lovable" refer to? Is that property out there, so to speak, independent of our perception? And many more philosophical questions like these seem to carry the interest in the field of philosophy of emotion more into the field of ethics.

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