

SCHOOL RELOCATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF
URBAN TRANSFORMATION AND EDUCATION POLICY CHANGE
IN TURKEY

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IN TURKEY

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Sezen Bayhan Gür, certify that

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ABSTRACT

School Relocations in the Context of Urban Transformation and Education Policy Change in Turkey

This research examines the school relocation process in Istanbul, with a particular focus on two schools. The aim is to understand the interaction between the school relocation policy and the urban and education policy processes. Much of the data was collected through participatory inquiry where the researcher was a participant observer. Two high schools in Istanbul were explored with respect to their relocation processes, with a much more emphasis on one of the schools as its relocation was imminent. The findings show that school relocations induced by urban transformation are inextricably linked to the material and symbolic reorganisation of neighbourhoods and contribute to the destabilization of secular middle class neighbourhoods and their schools. Also, by showing how neoliberalisation interacts with inherited regulatory systems, this research brings a novel contribution to the existing international literature on the interaction between education policy and urban space. While a large body of international literature has demonstrated that school relocations or closings contribute to the perpetuation of the inequalities rooted in the racialised structures and institutions, this research brings a novel dimension with its argument that the relocation policy in Istanbul interacts with the desecularisation of the city and the education system.

ÖZET

Türkiye’de Kentsel Dönüşüm ve Eğitim Politikası Değişimi Bağlamında Okul Taşınmaları

Bu araştırma İstanbul’daki okul taşıma süreçlerini iki okula odaklanarak incelemektedir. Çalışmanın amacı okul taşıma politikasının kent ve eğitim politikası süreçleri ile etkileşimini anlamaktır. Çalışmanın datasının çoğunluğu araştırmacının katılımcı gözlemci olduğu katılımsal yöntem ile toplanmıştır. İstanbul ilindeki iki lise taşınma süreçleri açısından, liselerden bir tanesine çok daha fazla odaklanılarak toplanmıştır. Bunun nedeni söz konusu lisenin taşınma sürecinin çok daha kısa bir zaman içinde gerçekleşmiş olmasıdır. Araştırmanın bulguları göstermektedir ki kentsel dönüşümün tetiklediği okul taşınmaları, mahallelerin material ve sembolik dönüşümü ile ayrılmaz olarak bağlantılıdır ve seküler orta sınıf mahallelerin ve mahalle okullarının istikrarsızlaşmasına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Neoliberalizmin dolaştığı mekanlardaki devralınan düzenleyici yapılar ile ne şekilde etkileşimde bulunduğunu gösterdiği için bu çalışma, eğitim politikası ve kentsel mekan etkileşimi üzerinde üretilmiş olan uluslararası literature özgün bir katkıda bulunmaktadır. Şimdiye kadar yapılmış olan bir çok uluslararası çalışma okul taşınmalarının veya kapatmalarının ırka dayalı eşitsizlikleri yeniden ürettiğini göstermektedir. Bu çalışma, İstanbul’daki okul taşıma politikasının kentin ve eğitim sisteminin gayrisekülerleşmesi ile etkileşim içinde olduğunu göstermesi açısından farklı bir boyut getirmektedir.

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*Dedicated to those
who devoted their lives to
right to the city
and
spaces of hope*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCPEE	Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education
DP	Democrat Party
HS	High school
IH	Imam Hatip
JDP	Justice and Democracy Party
MHA	Mass Housing Administration
MoNE	Ministry of Education
RPP	Republican People's Party
TEOG	Transition from Basic to Secondary Education

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

School spaces in Istanbul have undergone substantial changes in the past few years, and recent proposals suggest that further changes are imminent (see Law No. 1739; Law No. 6287). While the recent urban processes have been held responsible for some of the changes, some have come about as a result of administrative changes in school systems. Although many other forces might be said to interact with the spatial reorganisation of schools, at a first glance two major forces that have been held accountable are state-led urban transformation in Istanbul and school reforms that were implemented between 2012-2014.

In 2006, the issue of selling school buildings made the headlines of newspapers (see “1 Yerine 10 Okul”, 2006; Kireççi, 2006). Print media reported that initially eight schools in Istanbul, in neighbourhoods with high real estate prices, were put up for sale to generate millions and the revenue from the sales would be used to build new schools in areas lacking them (Kireççi, 2006). In 2009, the press leaked the news from the traditional annual meeting of the ruling party that there was consensus around the plan of selling 45 schools in upscale neighborhoods of Istanbul (Uçar, 2009). At the time, the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) stated that the news in some media did not reflect the reality, that they had no ongoing projects on selling schools which were actively providing education services or those that were under the status of historical building (MoNE Press Release 2009). Also, the MoNE stated that only the schools situated in areas that lost the residential district character would be included in such a plan (MoNE Press Release, 2009). To counter the reactions and allegations that this was unlawful, the then Mayor of Istanbul explained

in 2009 that with the amendment in 2008 to the National Education Basic Act No. 1739, school buildings which were deemed to be not “needed” could be sold with the approval of the Ministry of Education (“İstanbul’un tarihi okulları,” 2009). In 2010, 22 schools in central locations of Istanbul were claimed to have been put for sale (“Okul satışlarına protesto,” 2010). Although the MoNE did not explicitly mention any schools, Istanbul MoNE (Istanbul Milli Eğitim Müdürlüğü) Director stated that they had a plan to barter schools in central locations in return for many more schools in other parts of the city (Öğünç, 2010). The Director also stated that this process would be realised via the Mass Housing Administration (Öğünç, 2010), which has been restructured by the current government as a powerful real estate developer and is now one of the most influential actors in establishing a neoliberal regime (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008). In 2011, three schools in one of the most exclusive districts of Istanbul – one vocational school, one girl’s school, and one lycee (catchment-based enrollment high school)- were sold to the Mass Housing Administration (“TOKİ’nin Etiler harekati,” 2011). Although the number of schools in for-sale list appeared to be twenty-two as of 2011, the then leader of a school initiative called Don’t Touch My School (DTMS), Nebat Bükrek, announced in a protest that, according to their investigation, the number of schools planned to be sold was 180. Public reaction was initiated by Don’t Touch My School (DTMS) Initiative between 2009-2011, the period that was the initial stages of school relocations. Students, parents, and teachers in various parts of Istanbul organized around several school initiatives. Some of these initiatives have dispersed, giving up their activism, while some others are still struggling. New initiatives have been formed since the new policy changes caused the reactions of parents and residents interested in what is happening to neighbourhood schools. Although many school

communities believe that their schools will soon be sold and see it as inevitable, no solid plans regarding sales have been proposed yet. The plan for mass sellings is not yet politically palatable, but many schools have relocated since then due to earthquake restrengthening schemes, some of which did not start years after evacuations, and the new administrative changes in the schooling system.

In 2012, the policy of school relocations took on a different form with the Law No. 6287 that introduced the new compulsory schooling system. The system known as 4+4+4 system involved extensive spatial reorganization of school spaces and infrastructure. As primary schooling was divided into two four-year periods (4+4), middle school sections that were closed in 1998 with the transition to 8-year uninterrupted primary schooling were re-established. This meant conversion of hundreds of schools in Istanbul to either a primary school or a middle school because the new law stipulated that primary schools and middle schools had to be autonomous schools in separate buildings unless the conditions require otherwise (Law No 6287). Furthermore, some of the existing primary schools were converted into Imam Hatip¹ middle schools as these schools, which were closed with 8-year uninterrupted schooling, were re-established with the 4+4+4 reform.

Changes in high school system also necessitated a massive spatial reorganisation. Between 2012 and 2014, all catchment-based enrollment schools (*düz lise*) were closed and converted into exam-based enrollment high schools. Then, a new high school placement exam (Transition from Basic to Secondary Schooling [TEOG]) was introduced in 2014, which meant the decoupling of the previously-tight link between the neighborhood and its catchment school. In the first year it was

¹ Imam means “prayer leader” in Turkish while hatip means “preacher”. This type of schools were established in the early Republican era as vocational schools to train the religious clergy but gained mainstream school status first in practice and then on paper in the ensuing decades, which will be discussed in the following sections.

introduced, students were allowed to specify fifteen schools they wanted to be placed irrespective of the school type. Also, they had to fill in a second preference form in case they failed to get into one of these fifteen schools. In this form, high school candidates had to specify school types² rather than specific schools and three subprovinces³ where they wanted to study. Considering these parameters, the MoNE was to assign the candidates to the closest school to their home address. As can be seen, the exam linked the preference options to spatial conditions by enrolling the students who failed to get into their preferred schools to attend the closest available school.

Spaces of education are not immune to the urban transformation Istanbul has been undergoing. Today, many inner-city schools face the danger of being evacuated, relocated, or closed down for various reasons and in various ways. Some of the schools have been transferred; some schools await evacuation due to the changes in their land status, and some have been the victims of the new enrolment system.

Both types of changes, induced by urban transformation and school reforms, have been introduced hurriedly and without attempts for public negotiation or consensus building. That Turkey lacks an effective public accountability system in the sphere of educational policy making has complicated the issue. Officials do not share information with school communities even when pressurized to do so, give vague answers or incorrect information to them, or do not provide clear guidelines as to what exactly the students will have to do when their schools are closed down, or

² There were six school types: Anatolian High Schools, Anatolian Imam High Hatip Schools, Anatolian Vocational High Schools, Multiple-program High Schools, Science High Schools, Social Science High Schools, and Vocational Technical Educational Centers. However, only the first three of them were common while the others were rare. For example, as of 2014, there were only 6 Science High Schools and three Social Science Schools in Istanbul.

³ There were thirty nine subprovinces in Istanbul as of 2014 (Istanbul MoNE Directorate, 2014)

where exactly the new schools will be located. By the time of this research, three high schools in an upscale district of the city were transferred to the Mass Housing Administration, purportedly in exchange for 125 schools (“TOKİ Etiler’de 3 Okul,” 2011; Ögünç, 2010), although it was neither officially documented nor denied; some were merged with other schools, and tens of them were in the process of evacuation or relocation.

This spatial change has curiously coincided with the increasing drive towards neoliberalisation of education in Turkey. The ascendancy of neoliberal paradigm in education, which came in the 1980s (Ercan, 1999; Gök, 1997; 2002, 2004a, 2005b; Okçabol, 2005), continued in the 2000s with its becoming not only the dominant ideology informed by economic calculations but also a dominant cultural paradigm regulating the entire education system (Toprak, 2015). Neoliberal logic has been entrenched in multiple realms of the education, including, *inter alia*, the curriculum (Akkaymak, 2015; İnal, Akkaymak, & Yıldırım, 2014), schooling system (Aratemur-Cimen, 2015), vocational education (Aksoy, 2012; Bulut, 2012), and school-parent relationships (Apak-Kaya, 2014).

Relocation issue first brings up the question of privatisation of public space. According to Smith and Low (2006), privatisation of public space can only be understood when situated in its interconnection in the global, national, urban, and neighborhood scales. Linked to this, it is important to remember that the scale of public space is socially constructed, is an outcome of power relationships, and an object of historical change (Smith, 1993).

As “schools are so often defined by their immediate social environment, the social geography of cities and their larger metropolitan regions exerts a telling effect on education” (Rury & Mirel, 1997, p.50). Hence, relocation process cannot be seen

only as a process of transferring public buildings of enormous land value to private bodies merely for profit seeking. As described above, it may signify the emergence of new relationships and a new historical conjecture in education. For instance, studies on school relocations in the Western context have explored this issue and found out that relocations and/or closings serve to the perpetuation of power relationships rooted in the history of the locations scrutinised (see Buras, 2013; Grant, Archello, Konrad, & Swenson, 2014; Lipman, 2007, 2011a, 2011b; Gulson, 2007; Pedroni, 2011) and new types of educational identities (Gulson, 2007).

To grasp the complex dynamics involved in the project of school relocations, it would be useful to look at the interactions between the city and the education system, which have the potential to feed into one another. Changing the educational landscape of the city through school sales has the potential to result in significant changes in the lives of students, teachers, parents, and other citizens. However, the process may not always follow a unilinear path, with urban transformation impacting on education. The emerging forms of educational provision, instructional patterns, educational landscape, and social relations should be treated as formations that have the potential to shape the city as well as being shaped by what happens to it.

1. 1 Aim of the study

In the light of the above mentioned developments, through analysing the relocation⁴ or closure of schools, this research aims to explore the interaction

⁴ Closing, relocation, and conversion are intertwined practices that cannot be reduced to but are co-constitutive of one another. For example, closing a neighborhood school entails the relocation of the students attending the school while relocation or conversion of a neighborhood school means the closure of that school for the neighborhood. Similarly, even if a school is converted into a different school type in its same location, it is much less likely that neighborhood children will prefer/be able to attend that particular school. This research uses the terms closure and relocation interchangeably while the term conversion is used for conversion cases described in the study.

between education policy and urban space and document the implications of a particular policy for various actors.

. The central questions of the study are:

1. What is the nature of the displacement involved in school relocations?
2. How does school relocation policy interact with urban dynamics of Istanbul?
3. How can school relocation policy be situated in education policy-making agenda?

1. 2 Significance of the study

Because the immediate social environment plays a pivotal role in defining the characteristics of schools, the social geography of cities and their larger metropolitan regions exerts a major influence on education (Rury & Mirel, 1997). Hence, it is important to document the process of urban transformation and its interaction with education at a time when urban transformation has become a pressing issue throughout the country, in Istanbul in particular. Although there is a large body of scholarship on the process of urban transformation in Istanbul, analysing the process in terms of globalisation, political-economy, changing social relationships and power dynamics and resistance, there is a lack of engagement with the educational dimension of this process. The paucity of research dealing with the urban dimension of education and education policy research, therefore, makes this piece of research significant. For these reasons, I believe this study will address the lack of engagement in the field of education with the ongoing urban processes and urban education policy. In addition, this study will be an important contribution in that it documents from a political-geographical perspective a historical period in which a

number of significant changes to erode the public education system have been introduced in a relatively short period of time.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

School relocation issue found its place in the policy agenda at a time when neoliberal urban transformation in Istanbul was a pressing issue throughout the city and neoliberal educational reforms were being rapidly introduced. For this reason, this chapter includes an extensive discussion on neoliberalism as a theory and its repercussions in the urban and educational realms. Also, the chapter discusses neoconservatism as a dominant ideology in education and one that has long been in alliance with neoliberalism.

This section first summarizes the results of the studies conducted on school relocations in the UK, US, and Australia. Then, it provides an account of theories of neoliberalism and conceptualisation of neoliberalism from a critical geography perspective, which this study has tapped into to a great extent. Next, it theorizes the notion of hegemony with respect to education. Then, it discusses urban transformation with a particular focus on Istanbul. The section ends with a discussion of particular developments in the history of Turkish education that have significant relevance to the present discussions of urban education.

2.1 School relocations in international context

Studies on the interaction between urban education and urban policies extensively examine the ways in which educational practices are not immune to the changes occurring in the city. Among the dominant themes are school choice in the inner city (Cucchiara, 2013; Lucey & Reay, 2002; Reay & Lucey, 2003; Whitty, 2000, 2002), school segregation stemming from the pathologisation of certain inner city schools

(Carr & Lund, 2007; Gulson, 2007; Seller & Weiss, 1997; Sofer, 2007), and identity in inner city education (Archer, Halsall, & Hollingworth, 2007; Archer, Hollingworth & Halsall, 2007; Hollingworth & Archer, 2010).

Studies on urban transformation and school spaces, albeit mostly limited to the experiences in the US, UK and Australia, document various aspects of the issue. Most of these studies emphasize the nexus of race and class, arguing that school relocations have racial implications and the most affected populations are lower class non-white groups. In her voluminous work on Chicago urban schools, Lipman (2007, 2008, 2011a, 2011b) argues that education policy is closely linked to racialised reorganisation of urban space and managerial governance of the public sphere. To understand school closings in Chicago within the scope of *Renaissance 2010* Project, Lipman (2011a) explores the forces that interacted with the reform. In her analysis, she points to the interrelationship between housing and education policy by emphasizing how the HOPE IV urban project and the Ren2010 education project worked in a co-constitutive manner. Lack of investment in African American and Latino/a working class communities precipitated the gentrification and displacement of community residents and dispossession of their schools (p.13). Also in the context of New Orleans and Chicago, Lipman discusses how “the neoliberal education policy complex converges with, extends, even leads neoliberal urban restructuring in a nexus of privatization of public goods, constriction of democracy, corporate domination, public-private partnerships, gentrification, and governance by unselected semipublic bodies” (2011a, p.48). Lipman (2011a, 2015) also argues that involvement of venture philanthropy in urban education pushes public education into a new direction. This understanding is constitutive of the neoliberal shift from

government to governance, which means running public schools like private institutions (2011a, p.103).

Gulson (2005, 2006, 2011) analyzes the interplay between urban renewal practices, neoliberal education policies, and race in London and Sydney, arguing that neoliberalising education policies seek to attract middle classes to inner city government schools. He explores how inner city school reform influenced the Aboriginal population and changed the demographic characteristics of the region by closing down, on the pretext of low enrolment, the inner city schools predominantly attended by Aboriginal students while keeping those with primarily white student population despite their having lower enrolment (Gulson, 2011). Also gentrification leads to different aspirations, expectations and discourses on education (Gulson, 2007). For instance, Aboriginal spaces, including their schools, come to be marginalized and increasingly associated with failure as gentrification unfolds in Sydney (Gulson, 2011). In order to build legitimacy for gentrifying an area, educational problems can be reframed and located in 'deficient' cultures and community structures of people inhabiting the area. With gentrification, cities are reimagined as places where students can be displaced, reinserted, renewed, and renovated (Gulson, 2011).

Grant, Archello, Konrad, and Swenson (2014) analyse the Chicago 2013 decision to close 50 schools and relocate 30,000 students, locating it in the history of the city. Although the rationale for closings was to move pupils to better-performing schools, research on similar practices previously implemented in Chicago showed that a significant percentage of students whose schools were closed (42%) ended up in low-performing schools (de la Torre & Gwynne 2009, cited in Grant et. al., 2014). Moreover, when the relocated students reached high school, their on-track rates to

graduate were the same with those of the students who attended schools whose performance were similar to the shuttered ones (de la Torre & Gwynne 2009, cited in Grant et. al., 2014). Grant et. al. (2014) argue that public school closings in Chicago perpetuate colonial ideologies with regard to urban space and disadvantage low-income African American communities in terms of their control over their educational and urban practices. Besides, gentrification, in combination with mass school closings, both implemented on the pretext of ‘urban revitalization’ and of school reform, allow politicians to promote neoliberal educational agendas and maintain class based urban spaces where resources are unequally distributed among citizens. Such practices translate into worsening educational outcomes for the inhabitants of the affected areas (p.682).

Cucchiara (2008) shows how in the context of regenerating the city, public schools are re-branded and marketed in Philadelphia to market particular districts to upper-middle classes and knowledge workers. This is a process whereby education becomes a vehicle for urban renewal and cities such as Boston and Chicago underwent similar experiences. Such a policy, Cucchiara maintains, results in the marginalisation of low income and minority parents.

Buras (2013) discusses how entrepreneurs sought to take advantage of Hurricane Katrina and how “targeted state disinvestment in black communities prepared the ground for white entrepreneurs to capitalize on public schools and create an urban space economy that serves their accumulative interests through dispossession of working-class communities of color” (p. 19). While there were plans prior to the Katrina, a bill was passed right after the disaster in 2005, giving the control of an overwhelming majority of city’s schools to the state and charter schools became the chief strategy for building public education (Jabbar, 2016). In this way,

market-based reforms were implemented with much less resistance and public schools in the city were privatised.

Pedroni (2011) documents how neoliberal education policy in Detroit, as in Chicago, reinforces neoliberal urbanism, “participating in a highly racialized creative destruction and reconstruction of urban space” (p. 206). Although Detroit, in contrast to Chicago, does not have a claim to become a global city, it seeks to reposition itself in relation to world cities and respond to the perceived global challenges (p. 206). The neoliberal urban education restructuring in Detroit helps spatially reorganise the city by rupturing black spaces through disruption of neighbourhood schools. The shrinking population provided the policy makers to offer school closing programs in the name of increasing academic performance. According to Pedroni, “The schools slated for closure have, like other neighbourhood schools across the city, functioned as anchors of the local community; as one of the only remaining public spaces in the community” (p. 2010).

2.2 Approaches to neoliberalisation

A pure theoretical definition of neoliberalism is not possible for various reasons as neoliberalism is not a mode of production (Saad-Filho & Johnston, 2005, p.1).

Various terms have been coined to define neoliberalism: a class project (Harvey, 2007), an economic programme (Steger&Roy, 2010), a hegemonic project (Clarke, 2004a), a theory of particular political economic practices (Harvey, 2005, p.2; 2007, p.22), a “planetary vulgate” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001), a paradigm in economics (Palley, 2005, p. 20), and “specific styles of the general mentality of rule” (Dean, 1999, p.149, 155).

As the term *neo-liberalism* suggests, a large body of scholarship treats neoliberalism as a dominant economic paradigm that has an intellectual lineage with

liberalism (Jessop, 2002; Palley, 2005; Olssen, 1996). The term neoliberalism was first used by a small group of economists and legal scholars of Freiburg School to describe their economic programme through which they sought to revive classical liberalism (Steger & Roy, 2005, p.10). However, Austrian economist Friedrich von Hayek is usually given the credit for the intellectual origins of neoliberalism although his direct influence on mainstream economics during the neoliberal era has not been substantial (Lapavitsas, 2005, p.30).

Between 1945 and 1980, Keynesianism was the dominant economic paradigm in much of the world. Keynes opposed the fundamental theories of orthodox economy by challenging several of its premises. First, Keynes challenged the claim that “effective demand and supply in a capitalist economy tend to be equal” (Lapavitsas, 2005, p.31) by arguing that aggregate demand decreases during capitalist crises due to increased unemployment while aggregate supply tends to be greater than the former. This, Keynes (1936, pp.18-21 as cited in Lapavitsas 2005) argued, was a weakness of free markets and the solution was increasing aggregate demand and reducing unemployment through government intervention.

In the period following the Second World War, principles of Keynesianism were adopted in much of the developed capitalist economies. Crucial to this mode of economic thought were full employment, economic planning, social wage as a precondition of social cohesion, and corporatist economic arrangements that relied on the alliance of the business, organised labour, and the state (Jessop, 2002, pp.459-460). However, with the 1970s, Keynesianism was blamed for economic, political, and social problems of the time (Clarke, 2004a) and it started to lose its ground in the ensuing decades. Under the influence of neoliberal ideas, reducing government

expenditure and allowing more freedom to the markets became the dominant mode of thinking (MacGregor, 2005).

Having lived under World War II conditions, Hayek linked the idea of free market to a free society (Wapshott, 2011) and opposed the egalitarian-liberal idea that freedoms cannot be guaranteed without state regulation (Hackworth&Moriah, 2006). Along with Milton Friedman, another intellectual father of neoliberalism, Hayek believed that such egalitarian views were reminiscent of socialism (Hackworth & Moriah, 2006). He even went further to argue that Socialism and Nazism were similar in that they both aimed to remove the free market (Wapshott, 2011). For Hayek, market was neither a natural domain of exchange nor an artificial sphere bound by legal limits; it was a spontaneous social structure guided by customary rules that came into being as a result of a complicated cultural learning process (Dean, 1999, p. 157). Opposing Keynes and his colleagues who argued that aggregate demand needs to be increased in order to ensure full employment, Hayek argued that governments should cut down public expenditures and remove the barriers before trade and free circulation of capital. However, this does not mean that Hayek opposed all types of regulation. He supported the idea that legal and political conditions for the market must be made clear but these conditions must include drawing the limits of governmental power by a conception of the rule of law derived from the rules of conduct acquired in the course of cultural evolution (Dean, 1999, p. 158).

Although the writings of Hayek and Friedman provide a relatively coherent conceptualization of neoliberalism and its implications for economic, social, and political realms, monolithic and singular definitions of neoliberalism have been challenged by a growing body of literature and neoliberalism has become a greatly

contested term. In various theoretical discussions of the concept, a distinction is drawn between neoliberalism as a theory or ideology and neoliberalism as policy or practice because of the evident contradictions and divergences between the theory and the practice. While the concept is used in the technical sense to denote a set of regulatory economic principles, it has been revisited by scholars to refer to the application of these principles to the “organizational, political, and ideological reorganization of capitalism” under specific historical and geographical conditions (Brenner & Theodore, 2005; 2002). While the technical concept is usually referred to as neoliberalism, the other is termed as “neoliberalisation” (see David Harvey 2005; England&Ward 2007; Brenner&Theodore, 2005)⁵.

According to Harvey (2003, 2005, 2006) neoliberalisation is a political project of redistribution, a class project whereby assets are transferred or capital is redirected from the poor or less powerful towards the powerful elites or upper classes. By seeing neoliberalisation as redistribution, Harvey (2006, 2007) emphasizes that rather than wealth generation or economic growth, this political project is preoccupied with transferring wealth from subordinate actors to more powerful or dominant ones. In his voluminous writings on neoliberalisation, Harvey discusses the multiple realms of life transformed by neoliberal actors in order to ensure the success and maintenance of the project. Some of these domains are the culture (1990), urban life (2012), social division of labour (2010), property relations, land (2010), and technology.

A large body of scholarship defines neoliberalism as the reconfiguration or weakening of the welfare state. Bourdieu (1998) defines neoliberalism as a doctrine that seeks to entrench a set of beliefs as ineluctable and ever-existing, which would,

⁵ The two terms will sometimes be used interchangeably in this dissertation to refer to “neoliberalisation”. Brenner and Theodore also use the term ‘neoliberalism’ in many of their works instead of “neoliberalisation” or actually “existing neoliberalism”.

in the end, serve to destroy collective structures and solidarities built during the welfare era and replace them with market individualism. He comes up with the terms “the left hand” and “the right hand” of the state (p.2). While the former is made up of the groups such as social workers, teachers, and youth leaders, members of the spending ministries that are reminiscent of the social struggles of the past, the latter includes the banks, technocrats, and ministerial cabinets (Bourdieu, 1998). There is an opposition, Bourdieu argues, between these two hands of the state since the state tends to withdraw from certain domains of social service for which it was previously responsible. Hence, Bourdieu adds, the “*involution of the state*” (p.34) can be resisted when the social movement seeks support from the left hand of the state. Another point of Bourdieu is that neoliberalism is a conservative ideology but it also deploys reason and science, economics in particular, in order to justify itself:

It is by arming itself with mathematics (and power over media) that neo-liberalism has become the supreme form of the conservative sociodicy which started to appear some thirty years ago as ‘the end of ideology’, or more recently as “the end of history”. (p.35)

Clarke (2004a) has a claim to provide a more complex understanding of neoliberalism by defining it as a hegemonic project that is interested in redrawing the boundaries between the state and the market (p.91). He maintains that many attempts to define neoliberalism remain too coherent with their emphasis on the increasing supremacy of market forces vis-à-vis the state and the increasing ability of the market to evade the control of the government and unions. With his account of neoliberalism, Clarke (2004a) not only suggests that seeing neoliberalism simply as the weakening of the welfare state is an overly coherent approach, but also emphasizes that governmentality theories fail to offer a non-uniform and non-coherent account of neoliberalism as they attribute a fatalistic role to the neoliberal forms of control. State in Clarke’s theorization here is not “one partner among

many”, but remains as the “organizing force for meta-governance” (p.115).

According to this approach, neoliberalism is a non-linear and non-unified hegemonic project operating in a culturally and spatially uneven terrain and aiming to remove the barriers to the expansion of capital accumulation.

Kingfisher and Maskovsky (2008) approach the issue of neoliberalism vis-à-vis welfare state by emphasizing the cultural labour involved in the neoliberal system. The authors treat neoliberalism as an unfinished and fragmented process that articulates with other cultural formations. Kingfisher (2002) argues that neoliberalism is not only an economic system, but it is a comprehensive approach to life and aims to organise the realms of culture, home, and personhoods. She describes neoliberalism as a cultural system with highly gendered implications and a system in which male personhood is taken as the norm against which the world is understood and its concepts are constructed. For example, the division between public and private realms is drawn in a way to include jobs associated with women in the private realm while those of men are counted as belonging to the public. Such a division results in the devaluation of women’s labour since their labour largely remains within the private realm, although this labour is of paramount importance to men’s functioning in the public realm. This situation existed prior to neoliberalism. However, that neoliberal reforms invite women to participate in the market as independent persons just like men turns them into welfare dependents. As one of the marked characteristics of neoliberal thinking is that welfare dependency is seen as a pathology that needs to be addressed, women’s inferior role in the society is perpetuated by neoliberal reforms (Kingfisher, 2002). Another way women are disadvantaged by neoliberal reforms takes place is that retrenchment of welfare state

and imposition of charity mindedness leads to the expansion of the realm of private welfare for which women are held accountable (Kingfisher, 2002, p.30).

Governmentality theories of neoliberalism avoid an analysis of neoliberalism from a state-centric perspective, emphasizing the processes through which various forms of control are at work. Governmentality theories in general are concerned with how specific 'regimes of truth' emerged, "the ways in which various modalities of speaking the truth are formed, authorised truth speaking persons designated, and areas in which, about whom and from where, statements, discourses and practices rooted in truth are generated" (Cotoi, 2011, p.111). These theories highlight the role of nongovernmental organisations, citizenship regimes, and forms of expert knowledge. For example, periodising government, Rose (1996) builds on Foucault's analysis of neoliberalism as governmentality, and comes up with different periods of government where the relationship between the citizenry and the sovereign take on different forms. He defines neoliberalism as "a relatively coherent mentality of government" that emerged as a result of not elaborate and fully informed calculations but conflicts around how to cope with the problems of welfare (p.53). Rose (1996) argues that, the conflicts over problem of welfare and public costs have come to be rationalized within the mindset of government which is now called neo-liberalism. What is paradoxical about neo-liberalism is that although it purports to criticize the political government, it keeps "the programmatic a priori, the presupposition that the real is programmable by authorities: the objects of government are rendered thinkable in such a way that their difficulties appear amenable to diagnosis, prescription, and cure" (Rose&Miller 1992:183 in Rose 1996:53). Therefore, key points to take into consideration when analyzing neoliberal governmentality are: first rather than the decision of the sovereign, liberal government rationalities rely on the

subject who acts upon oneself; and second, the state is not a cause of a relations of authority as a coherent actor (Miller&Rose 2008 in Gulson& Fatah 2011). Rose's analysis suggests that in contrast to the liberal state that seeks to expand its reach into the lives of citizenry by socializing "both individual citizenship and economic life" (p.48) through welfarism, advanced liberal state desocializes the realms of welfare and the state by promoting self-enterprising subjects. Similarly, Dean (1999) argues that welfarist social policy is revisited by promoting a new form of relationship between the citizen and the society in which "society is regarded less as a source of needs that are individually distributed and collectively borne and more as a source of energies contained within individuals' exercise of freedom and self-responsibility" (p. 152). This notion of freedom, is different in many ways from its previous forms as it has undergone cultural renewal. Central to the new notion of freedom is the notion of choice, which brings about the conception of consumer sovereignty (p.154). This new notion of freedom also comprises "technologies of agency" through which the responsibility for publicly provided services is entrusted to private and civil organisations (p.167) as well as the individuals who are infused with a sense of agency that engages them as free citizens and consumers responsible for their own actions and risks they take (p.168). Hence, it is no longer the responsibility of the welfare state to cater for its citizens. The role of the state is to provide the conditions in which citizens can become active citizens, take their risks, increase their labor market skills, ad optimize their chances. One body of literature in neoliberalism emphasizes the role of expertise as an area of government (see Rose, 1993). According to these views, the emphasis on expertise in the neoliberal age is a result of the difficulties liberalism had in governing human conduct and the introduction of expert system has been a method of overcoming this crisis. Expertise

as a system claims to provide positive knowledge to individuals pertaining to various aspects of life from a neutral perspective, thereby governing the conduct of individuals (Rose, 1993). Education is also seen to play a key role in this process of capacity development or empowerment. According to Ball (forthcoming), Foucault's theorization is critical to analyses of schooling and learners. The organization of pedagogy within a field of knowledge can serve as an area of political intervention that regulate forms of relations to oneself and others (Ibid). It is possible to see the attempts to implement technologies of agencies or, to use Cruikshank's (1993 in Dean 1999, p. 168) terms, "technologies of citizenship" in community development projects, health campaigns, citizenship education projects, and teaching at all levels (Dean, 1999). Through these, neoliberal governmentality envisions a radical cultural renewal (Dean, 2010).

Despite its intellectual lineage with classical liberalism, neoliberalism differs from classical liberalism in significant ways. Olssen (1996) delineates these differences from a governmental perspective as follows:

Whereas classical liberalism represents a negative conception of power in that the individual was to be taken as an object to be freed from the interventions of the state, neo-liberalism has come to represent a positive conception of the state's role in creating the appropriate market by providing the conditions, laws and institutions necessary for its operation. In classical liberalism, the individual is characterized as having an autonomous human nature and can practice freedom. In neo-liberalism, the state seeks to create an individual who is an enterprising and competitive entrepreneur. In the classical mode, the theoretical aim of the state was to limit and minimize its roles based on postulates which included universal egoism (the self-interested individual); invisible hand theory which dictated that the interests of the individual were also the interests of the society as a whole; and the political maxim of laissez-faire. In the shift from classical liberalism to neoliberalism, then there is a further element added, for such a shift involves a change in subject position from "homo economicus," who naturally behaves out of self-interest and is relatively detached from the state, to "manipulatable man," who is created by the state and who is continually encouraged to be "perpetually responsive." It is not that the conception of the self-interested subject is replaced or done away with the new ideals of "neoliberalism," but that in an age of universal welfare, the perceived possibilities of slothful

indolence create necessities for new forms of vigilance, surveillance, “performance appraisal” and of forms of control generally. In this model the state has taken it upon itself to keep us all up to the mark. The state will see to it that each one makes a “continual enterprise of ourselves”. (p. 340)

Theorising neoliberalism with respect to citizenship, Ong (2006) argues that neoliberalism is a “new mode of political optimization” which regulates the “relationships between governing and the governed, power and knowledge, and sovereignty and territoriality” (p.3). She comes up with the term “neoliberalism with a small n” (p.3) as opposed to “Neoliberalism writ large” (p.14), which she considers too uniform and too generalising to explain the complex and multiple ways neoliberalism travels in various sites and interacts with “various assemblages” (ibid). *Exception to neoliberalism* is central to her analysis as is neoliberalism itself (Kingfisher & Maskovsky, 2008), and she mainly looks at the intersection of neoliberal practices with other assemblages. Ong is influenced by Giorgio Agamben, who sees the notion of *exception* central to understand modern sovereignty. Agamben, according to Ong (2006), argues that “exception is a fundamental principle of sovereign rule” that is predicated upon the distinction between citizens in a juridical order and outsiders who are denied these juridical protections (p. 5). However, Ong argues that Agamben’s conceptualisation of exception does not adequately account for the complex terrain of sovereign practices in a neoliberal world order vis-a-vis citizenship, and she comes up with a broader conceptualisation of exception, pointing to the articulations of “neoliberalism as exception” and “exception to neoliberalism” (p. 3). While the first one is deployed in transformation zones to manage populations according to a set of market calculations, “exception to neoliberalism” might be invoked at the same time as a way of excluding populations from these calculations.

Feminist scholars have contributed new insights into the discussions of neoliberalism by pointing out to the shortfalls of the distributive paradigm and drawing attention to the socio-cultural dimension of neoliberalism. Although the merits of the distributive model are acknowledged, by a large body of feminist literature, distributive justice paradigm is found to be limited as it does not adequately address inequality issues such as the unjust education system, the relationship between work-family, institutional racism, different gender roles, and colonialism (Smith, 2008). Moreover, although welfare state is seen as a mechanism that has the potential to alleviate the poverty experienced by low-income women, it is regarded as a paternalistic institution that invades women's privacy and seeks to control women through a set of bureaucratic and hierarchical provisions (Fraser, 1991; Smith, 2008; Young, 1990). In other words, benevolent state aids can act as a tool of domination, which is called "welfare paternalism" (Fraser, 1991). That the feminist literature criticizes welfare attitude towards women does not mean that they do not bring neoliberal policies under scrutiny. A large body of feminist scholarship has draw attention to how neoliberalism articulates with existing gender hierarchies. For instance, Nancy Fraser (1997) argues that justice should include both recognition and redistribution, and redistribution should not be compromised for cultural recognition. Despite being critical of welfare paternalism, Fraser (1991) emphasized the fact that welfare cuts primarily affected women as they are the prime subjects of the state as welfare receivers, unpaid caregivers, and paid workers. Cuts in the 1990s, in the US welfare program called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), for example, had the most destructive effects on women as welfare aid was received by the poorest in the society, most of whom were single-mother households (Fraser & Gordon, 2013). Also, Bedford (2008) argues that such cuts decreased the exit

options of women and made them more susceptible to involve in abusive marriages and oppressive jobs. She sees such policies as an indication of neoliberalism's marriage with cultural conservatism because while women's dependency on state is seen as demeaning, their dependency on their husband in a heterosexual marriage is promoted. With the lack of publicly provided childcare service, the privilege to act like a white, middle class male can only be enjoyed by only wealthy white women who can afford paid childcare, which is often provided by low-waged immigrant or ethnic minority women (Smith, 2008). Another issue of consideration by feminist theories of neoliberalism is associated with the NGOisation of feminist interventions, which is related to neoliberal social adjustment policies. One body of inquiry has contended that the drive towards NGO-based feminist work has depoliticized the feminist movement (Lang, 1997; Petras, 1997). According to Alvarez (1999), the recent tendency of treating feminist NGOs as "gender experts" rather than citizen groups defending women's rights reduced feminist NGOs cultural-political work regarding gender equity into a technical effort. Another stream of feminist thinking is interested in looking into how the new conception of the self introduced by neoliberalism transforms womanhoods (see Mihic 2008).

A large body of literature theorizes neoliberalism from an anthropological perspective. Anthropological studies on neoliberalism aim to explore how neoliberalism is socially produced in particular historical and geographic contexts in interaction with other socio-cultural formations and political projects. In doing so, they aim to discuss neoliberalism as a process that has its own contingencies, contradictions, and limits. Relying on their fieldwork in South Africa, Comaroff and Comaroff (2000), define neoliberalism as a global cultural formation that signifies a new epoch of "millennial capitalism" (p. 292), a kind of meta-culture that is

interested in transforming selfhoods and the relationships among individuals . It “attributes to the free market an ineluctably salvific, redemptive, even messianic quality” (Comarof & Comaroff, 2003, p. 150). The messianic aspect of neoliberalism, according to Comarof and Comaroff (2000) is linked to the rise of occult economies, which have a material and ethical dimension. The material dimension pertains to the creation of wealth using techniques that defy rational explanation while the ethical dimension is founded on changing moral approaches to value creation without much effort (p. 310). New forms of wealth creation made possible by new and arcane forms of technological and informational developments have been paralleled by the increase in faith in magical practice and spread of new religious movements (pp.310-315). Another critical face of neoliberalism, add Comaroff and Comaroff (2000), is the changing modes of relationship between capitalism and the nation-state. In other words, prior forms of engagements with the nation state do not exist because production of wealth depends on new ways of means. The third face of neoliberal capitalism, is the proliferation of neoliberal discourses on civil society and assertion of civil society against the nation state (pp.330-331). Civil society is regarded by many as a panacea for the postmodern pessimism and re-animates the modernist optimism by providing them with a common language to speak for democracy and justice and “to breathe life back into ‘society’ declared dead almost twenty years ago by the powerful magi of the Second Coming, especially Maggie Thatcher” (p. 331). Another strong argument of the authors is that neoliberalism seeks to, “in its ideology and practice, intensify the abstractions inherent in capitalism itself: to separate labor power from its human context, to replace society with the market, to build a universe out of aggregated transactions” (p. 305). Avoiding an explicit theorization of neoliberalism, Ferguson

(2006) also provides an anthropological account of the concept, by looking at the process of globalization from the vantage point of Africa. Seeing Africa as a category in which the world is structured rather than a region or culture, Ferguson seeks to understand how Africa came to be associated with “failure and poverty” and wants to ask “both how that place-in-the world functions in a wider categorical system and what this means for the way we understand an increasingly transnational, political, economic, and social *global order*” (p.5). He argues that contrary to the mainstream discourses that multiple locations across the globe are included by the global flows of capital, what also is the case is “a matter of highly selective and encapsulated forms of global connection combined with widespread disconnection and exclusion” (p.14) as exemplified in the case of Africa. Sometimes, “capital is globe hopping, not globe-covering” (p.38).

Similar to anthropologists, geographers, critically analyzing the theoretical popularity of the term neoliberalism, call into question the merit of conceptualizing neoliberalism as a monolithic force that spreads from the West to the rest of the world. Locating their discussion in the intersection of political economy and geography, Brenner and Theodore (2002) conceptualise neoliberalism as a multiscalar (vii) and “path-dependent” (p.2) project to which urban spaces are crucial. They use the term “actually existing neoliberalism” to refer to the practical and context-dependent character of neoliberalism, which deviates from neoliberalism as an ideology in which markets function according to the dictates of certain unchanging and fixed principles (Brenner&Theodore, 2002). In other words, neoliberal projects interact with inherited regulatory systems and institutions, and therefore the way they are implemented display differences in different contexts.

Sites (2000) argues that while the term neoliberalism was formerly associated with Hayekian economics and the policies of the hegemonic powers of the 1980s who were inspired by his ideas, it has recently become a shorthand for a particular form of capitalism that is a hegemonic system in most of the globe (119).

What most of these approaches, despite their different foci and sometimes, if rarely, conflicting claims, have in common is that they caution against treating neoliberalism as a uniform, all encompassing, uncontested, and fait-accompli process. Rather, they draw attention to its context-dependent, contradictory, and unfinished nature.

2.3 Neoliberalisation from the perspective of critical geographers

In analysing the case of inner-city school relocations and evacuations, this study mainly draws on the literature on neoliberal urbanism and neoliberal transformation of space. In this respect, the work produced by critical urban theorists and political geographers such as Neil Brenner, Nick Theodore, Jamie Peck, Adam Tickell, Neil Smith and David Harvey will be crucial to the analysis in this research. The author finds this literature relevant to the case under scrutiny because, as Brenner (2009) indicates, critical geography rejects the mainstream urban arguments which treat cities as spaces governed by “transhistorical” rules of social arrangements (p. 198), and instead it emphasizes the “evolving political economic geographies” of the urban condition and the diverse conflicts it harbours (p. 204). Also, work produced in this tradition stresses the closely intertwined relationship between neoliberalism and the urban condition. The issue of commodification of school buildings in Istanbul has coincided with a rapid neoliberal urban transformation throughout the city, and therefore an analysis of the process needs a sustained engagement with this specific

historical period and this evolving geography. Moreover, this literature engages in a constant critique of power and inequalities and argues that more socially just urban formations are possible. What is evident in the case analyzed in this study is also asymmetrical power relations, but the power does not go uncontested. Hence, insights of critical urban theory and political geographers could be relevant in terms of problematising these relations.

Brenner and Theodore's (2002) analysis of neoliberalism locates it in political economy and geography, showing the contradictions between neoliberalism as a doctrine that represent states and markets as opposite powers and neoliberalism as a path-dependent practice that is in interaction with state-governed institutions and embedded in various scales such as national, local, and global. Therefore, they call what they are discussing as "actually existing neoliberalism" (p.2). Rather than a reading of neoliberalism as a linear project that aims to start from a blank state to operate effectively, Brenner and Theodore (2002) argue that (actually existing) neoliberalism has interacted with the inherited institutions and practices of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state which shape and limit the "scope and trajectory" (p.14) of neoliberal policies. To bolster this argument, they look at two moments of neoliberalism, which they call "moments of destruction" and "moments of creation" (pp.15-19). In their use of the term "moments" they draw on the Marxist conception of history that we see in late Marx, in the *1857 and 1859 Critiques*, and they stress that they do not see it as a teleological process:

Our use of the term 'moments to describe the interconnections is therefore intended in the Hegelian-Marxian sense of conflictual yet mutually related elements within a dynamic, dialectical process, rather than as a description of temporal units within a linear transition. (p.16)

This statement rejects a totalistic approach to history that Althusser (1970) claims Marx had in his early years influenced by Hegel's *Phenomenology*. This wholeness of history characterised by the demarcations between different stages and the logic of their succession presents an evolutionary picture, a progressive line of succession of modes of production (Balibar, 2007). Brenner and Theodore state that neoliberalisation does not take place through a linear process whereby Keynesian-Fordist Welfare State institutions are destroyed and ways of living replaced by neoliberal and Postfordist institutions. Instead, according to the authors, neoliberal policies are mobilised both to counter and destroy Keynesian Welfare State forms as well as institutions and to address the crises caused by this neoliberal destruction. As Peck and Tickell (2002) argue, neoliberalism represents a form of regulation of sorts but not commensurate with the Keynesian welfarism (40).

Brenner and Theodore (2002) argue that cities in the neoliberalisation process “have become strategically crucial arenas in which neoliberal forms of creative destruction have been unfolding”, and they can be considered as “key politico-institutional arenas within the broader geographies of actually existing neoliberalism” (20). Harvey (2010) argues that such destruction is a matter of general capitalist tendency towards destroying the geographical landscape that is no longer relevant to mobile capital and then establishing a different configuration that serves its interests (p.192). It is also more than manipulation of land itself; in addition, a transformation of hitherto existing institutional structures and practices are involved. On the one hand, actually existing neoliberalism involves (partial) destruction of existing institutional structures and political arrangements through market-based reforms; while on the other it involves “(tendential) creation of a new infrastructure for market-oriented economic growth, commodification, and capital centric rule”

(Peck, Theodore, & Brenner, 2009, p.55). These two moments of neoliberalism, “moment of destruction” and “moment of creation” (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, pp. 362-366) are worthy of scrutiny in order not to miss the intricacies and active dynamics of any neoliberal process under analysis and not to see it as a finished and uncontested project.

Stating that their analysis is mainly concerned with the broader features of neoliberalisation, Peck and Tickell (2002) refer to the above mentioned two moments of neoliberalism as “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism (p.37), which represent the deregulatory and destructive (to the Keynesian Welfarist institutions) aspects of the neoliberal project and the regulatory and state-building character of it respectively. They focus on historical shifts of neoliberalism in transnational space rather than microdynamics of it although they believe that an adequate conceptualisation of neoliberalisation should be attentive to both the local dynamics and generic features of it (p.41). To provide evidence for their “roll-back” and “roll-out” neoliberalism thesis, they refer to the political developments that took place during the late 1970s and early 1990s. Aggressive state-led projects of the Thatcher and Regan eras are seen as signs that indicate neoliberalism did not stay as an abstract project, but was put into practice in the form of roll-back neoliberalism that aimed to deregulate the welfare state settlements. The ensuing political works of Clinton and Blair governments indicate the roll-out moments of neoliberalism as they were concerned with containing the perverse economic consequences of neoliberal reforms. With this discussion, authors both indicate the path-dependent character of the neoliberal project and stress that neoliberalism is not a unitary project merely aiming to establish the hegemony of market logic; it also encompasses a wide range of “extramarket forms of governance and regulation” (p. 43).

Brenner and Theodore (2002) set out a conceptualisation of the political economy of neoliberalism built on five central premises in order to avoid a uniform model that is immune to historical and geographical differences. According to this conceptualisation, neoliberalism is based on (a) a problem of capitalist regulation, (b) the unstable historical geographies of capitalism, (c) uneven geographical development, (d) the regulation of uneven geographical development, and (e) evolving geographies of state-regulation (pp. 353-357). All these premises are relevant, albeit in differing extents, to the issue scrutinised in this research.

According to Harvey (2006), although its existence in public policy dates back to pre 70s, neoliberalism came to the fore during the 1970s when the leading proponents of the neoliberal theory, von Hayek and Milton Friedman, were awarded the Nobel prize in economics in 1974 and 1976 respectively (Harvey, 2006). Not until 1979, however, did it become the dominant mode of thought governing public policy in western capitalist centers such as the US and Britain (Ibid). Harvey (2003, 2005, 2006) argues that the main achievement of “neo-liberalism” (2006, p.43) or “neoliberalisation” (2005:159) has been redistributing wealth rather than wealth generation. The main mechanism whereby this was achieved is explained under the rubric of “accumulation by dispossession” (Harvey, 2006, p. 43; 2003. pp.137-182, 2005, p.159). According to Harvey (2006), accumulation by dispossession is a continuation of accumulation practices which Marx described as “primitive accumulation” during the rise of capitalism (p.43). Accumulation by dispossession can include “the commodification and privatization of land” and “conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive property rights” (Ibid; 2003, p. 145; 2005, p. 159). Four main elements of accumulation by dispossession are privatization and commodification,

financialisation, the management and manipulation of crises, and state redistributions (Harvey, 2006, pp.44-49; 2005, pp.160-165).

In addition, John Clarke's analyses are relevant as they will be useful to conceptualise the role of the state in shaping public policy. Clarke (2004a, 2004b) argues that neoliberalism is a complex project through which the boundaries between the public and private are redrawn, and central to this project is the construction of social imaginaries related to the nation, the people, the public, and social collectivities. His argument is not one that signifies a diminishing role of the state in the process of neoliberalisation, but one that mentions state as a significant actor in opening the public to private development and redrawing the boundaries between the public and private.

One important concept that is critical to the discussion of neoliberalising cities of today is gentrification. Smith (2002) states that the process of gentrification, once considered a local phenomenon limited to particular world cities, has become a global urban strategy. This shift from a liberal urban policy to a neoliberal revanchist one has come with heightening social control (Smith, 2002). There are various definitions of gentrification such as those which see it as a process whereby working class households are replaced by the middle class populations (Smith, 1982) or as the "transformation of a working class or vacant area into middle-class residential and/or commercial use" (Slater, 2009, p.294). The most relevant definition to the case analyzed in this research is Hackworth's (2002), who defines gentrification as "the production of space for progressively more affluent users" (p.815), - be it a residential district or not -, a long term process whereby the working-class communities are replaced by more affluent settlers.

2.4 Education, neoconservatism, hegemony

Education tends to be thought of as simply the provision of neutral knowledge to students (Apple, 2001a). However, literacy can serve different purposes depending on the vision of knowledge and culture (Apple, 2014). It can be seen as a means of upward mobility, access to the job market, and creating a shared system of beliefs and values (Apple, 2014). Conservative approaches to literacy see it as a “moral technology” and a means of nurturing “economically driven skills” (Apple, 2014, p.45). Apple (2014) challenges this vision of literacy, arguing that literacy can function as a tool of empowerment when approached as a means of gaining control over one’s life. Coming up with alternative visions of literacy involves creating “critical literacy, powerful literacy, and political literacy, or powerful literacy” (p. 45).

Culture and knowledge are not pre-given concepts that are decoupled from relations of power and domination (Apple, 1999; 2014). They are constructed through complex processes through which meanings are attached to social constructs and a consensus is ensured around the constructed meanings. Just like culture, knowledge is a constructed entity and what counts as legitimate knowledge and what does not count is determined by complex web of power relations (Apple, 2014). As Fiske (1989) states,

Knowledge is never neutral, it never exists in an empiricist, objective relationship to the real. Knowledge is power, and the circulation of knowledge is part of the social distribution of power. The discursive power to construct a common sense reality that can be inserted into cultural and political life is central in the social relationship of power. The power of knowledge has to struggle to exert itself in two dimensions. The first is to control the “real,” to reduce reality to knowable, which entails producing it as a discursive construct whose arbitrariness and inadequacy are disguised as far as possible. The second struggle is to have this discursively (and therefore sociopolitically) constructed reality accepted as truth by those whose interests may not necessarily be served by accepting it. Discursive power involves a struggle both to construct (a sense of) reality and to circulate that reality as

widely and smoothly as possible throughout society. (cited in Appple, 2014, pp. 149-150)

The sphere of education has been under the influence of various emergent social movements (Apple, 2014). While some of these movements have emphasized a democratic turn in education, some have promoted a retrogressive social and cultural turn (Apple, 2014). According to Apple (2014) the second group has been the most influential and powerful.

The resurgence of conservatism has been the result of years of ideological endeavors of a rightist coalition including, inter alia, generously funded conservative think tanks, neoconservative political groups, evangelical and fundamental Protestants (Katz, 1990). The alliance of these groups has been successful in creating a new common sense, which means it has managed to hold together different social leanings and commitments and to organize them under its leadership in the realms of welfare, economy and education (Apple, 2014). This togetherness is called as “conservative modernization”, which is “a set of policies and programmes” implemented in an attempt to “‘free’ individuals for economic purposes but to control them for social purposes” (Dale, 1989, p. 4). In the context of the United States, Apple (2001a) gives an example of how conservative modernisation is in play in education:

We are told to ‘free’ our schools by placing them into the competitive market, restore ‘our’ traditional common culture and stress discipline and character, return God to our classrooms as a guide to all our consuct inside and outside the school, ad tighten central control through more rigourous and tough-minded standards and tests. (p.5)

The role of the policy of ‘conservative modernisation’ is crucial in resolving the contradictions between rightist movement’s feelings of nostalgia and the uncertainties of the market, which is paradoxically much cherished by the rightist

movement (Dale 1989 in Apple, 1996, p. 29). The rightist movement described here is not a unitary movement; it has contradictions and conflicts within itself, which it manages to solve in order to ensure that the society changes in particular directions (Apple, 2001a).

One focus of the conservative movement has been “freedom”. According to Apple (2001a), the operationalisation of the discourse of freedom by the rightist movement is rooted in the writings of Hayek, one of the celebrated theorists of neoliberalism, who believed that the framing of the concept of freedom was left to the monopoly of the left. Libertarian conservatives such as Hayek associated the notion of freedom with decentralisation of political power, non-intervention in the market, and limited government (Apple, 2001a, p.15), which in practice did not happen because neoliberal economies have been characterised by a great deal of state regulation (Harvey, 2005). As the concept of freedom framed Hayek and then Friedman, who proposed voucher plans as a panacea for educational problems, was found too libertarian by some conservatives, the discourse of individual choice came as the arbiter of freedom and consumer choice was advocated as the guarantor of freedom (Apple, 2001a). In addition, to entrench their own understanding of freedom, conservatives promoted an understanding of freedom rooted in tradition and religious virtue (Apple, 2001a).

A common sense built purely around market freedom and equality based on choice is not able to overcome the contradictions created by economic and social grievances (2001). The proliferation of such grievances is highly likely to create a crisis of authority, which can also be called according to Hall et. Al. (1987), “a crisis of hegemony” (p.viii, 177). Apart from promoting their economic interests, the dominant groups need to ensure social control for the perpetuation of their

hegemony. To address such contradictions and ensure social unity, a form of consensus or a common culture needs to be created. The concept of hegemony is crucial to the creation of this common culture.

2.4.1 Gramsci's concept of hegemony

Hegemony, in the Gramscian concept is quite different from the idea of domination. Antonio Gramsci, analysing how power operated in modern era in which he lived, came up with the notion of hegemony, bringing a new dimension to how class rule was ensured. Gramsci's novelty lied in the way he analyzed the successive defeats of the left, in that he centered his analysis on the question of why and how the left lost rather than how the fascist regime thrived (Vali, 2011). While doing this, he reinterpreted the role of agents in the sphere of power and came up with a different conceptualization than the Marxist conception of domination (Vali, 2011). Gramsci (2008) rejected the Marxist view of ideological domination as false consciousness, making a distinction between the "historically organic ideologies which are necessary to a given structure and organize human masses" and the ideologies that are arbitrary and can only create individual movements (p.377). As a result of his analysis of the political situation in Italy, Gramsci replaced the idea of ideology as domination with that of hegemony.

Gramsci (2008) argues that "ideology itself must be analyzed historically, in terms of the philosophy of praxis, as a superstructure" (p. 376). The structure/base and superstructure is not clearly demarcated in Gramsci's theorization unlike the traditional Marxist theory; it is an inessential (Kolakowski, 2005) and multifaceted relationship between the two (Hall, Lumley, & McLennan, 1978). The basis of Gramsci's approach to structure/superstructure complex is constituted by the

concepts of “hegemony, civil society, the State, the party, and the intellectuals” (Hall, Lumley, & McLennan, 1978). His introduction of these concepts made Gramsci to be considered as a theoretician of superstructure. While doing this, Gramsci does not abandon the notion of structure, but he incorporates it into his theorization of the superstructure. The structure is inherent or ever-present in Gramsci’s theory, but it is not explicitly discussed. While he acknowledges the Marxist economic principles through his analysis of the political situation in Italy, Gramsci is not satisfied with the Marxist approach to the state. While analyzing the defeats of the communists and their exclusion from the political sphere, Gramsci comes up with the notion of hegemony including consent as a tool of domination rather than ideology as false consciousness that results in the domination of the proletariat. Reformulating the base and superstructure thesis in Marxism, Gramsci argues that the dominant class is able to maintain its dominance over the subordinate classes by gaining their cultural and political support (Martin, 1998). The economy here is not the only determinant. Consent sometimes can be gained through economic concessions, but those which do not pose a threat to the essence of the structure (Hall, Lumley, & McLennan, 1978). Gramsci acknowledges the role of ideology in shaping the economic structure; however, he argues ideology should not be seen as “an appearance in contrast to the reality of economic structures” (Martin, 1998, p. 79). Hence, “ideologies have their ground in material realities and are themselves material forces” (Hall, Lumley, & McLennan, 1978, p.53). In this sense, hegemony has a central role in enabling the bourgeoisie to unify the masses under its leadership towards its multiple interests which can be other than economic ones. Gramsci argues that it is the terrain of civil society that hegemony has to be fought for since the hegemony of the ruling block operates

not only at the political terrain but permeates all aspects of social sphere (Hall, Lumley, & McLennan, 1978).

The interplay between the state and civil society, the two levels of the superstructure, is of crucial importance in Gramsci's theory of hegemony. Gramsci argues that hegemony belongs to the domain of civil society while coercion relates to the State; and with this argument two major superstructural levels emerge: the civil society and the political society or the State (Anderson, 1977). In the West, according to Gramsci, there exists a proper relationship between the State and civil society while in the East the State is everything and the civil society is weak (2008, p.238). Therefore, in the East, the State functions predominantly through coercion while in the West it mainly functions through consent. It is because of this difference these two geographies necessitate different revolutionary strategies. Because reference to consensus is low in the East, it is permissible to have frontal attack/ "war of manoeuvre". However, in the West, there is a need to use the institutions of civil society, which Gramsci calls "war of position" (2008, p. 238). These institutions could be the press, the education system, and other organizations that are not directly within the reach of the centralized state. These institutions are important to utilize since it is through them that "intellectual and moral leadership" (p. 57) can be achieved. It is through these institutions that ruling class maintains its hegemony. If the ruling class loses the consensus, it will no longer be the "leading" but only "dominating" and this means they have to exercise coercive force alone, which means that the great masses will become "detached from their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously" (2008, pp. 275-276). By this statement Gramsci makes it clear that it is through the repressive apparatuses the ruling group can exert power when it cannot keep civil society under its hegemony.

Hence the war of manoeuvre is an important corollary to the war of position (Hall, et. al., 1978). One thing which must be stressed is that, for Gramsci, although consensus is very important, it is never detached from coercion. The assumption that democratic governments do not use force does not fit with Gramsci's theory.

The role of the intellectuals in creating hegemony through consent is fundamental. Intellectuals are not the ones who create hegemony itself but they create the political conditions on which hegemony is constructed. The intellectuals organize the hegemony of the dominant class and create a "historic bloc" in which there is satisfactory, mutually supportive relation between the base and superstructure (Jessop, 1982). Gramsci calls the intellectuals as the "functionaries" of the superstructure; they "are the dominant group's deputies exercising the subaltern forms of hegemony" (p.12). They also provide the "connecting fibers within and between areas of social reality" (Sassoon, 1987, p.134). Class-consciousness, according to Gramsci, is impossible without organization and intellectuals (Kolakowski, 2005). "Political action and awareness of that action" are the facets of a single phenomenon, which can neither be reduced nor subordinated into one another (p.973). Gramsci politicizes the intellectual by this kind of theorization and puts forward the politician as a theoretician. This conceptualization is in accord with Gramsci's view of the unity of theory and practice (Kolakowski, 2005). Gramsci (2008) makes a distinction between the organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals. This division is political-economic because it goes back to historical development and its economic characterization and definition. Every social group in the world of economic production creates its own intellectuals who are organically related to their group and who "give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economical but also in the social and political fields" (p.5).

The organic intellectual occupies an important place in generating social change since they act as educators. Here, Gramsci does not take education in the strictly scholastic sense. For him, the relationship between the intellectual and the non-intellectual section of the society, between the “rulers and the ruled”, the leaders and the ones who are led (p. 350) can be an educational relationship. “Every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, between the various complexes of national and continental civilizations” (p.350). The organic intellectual plays a role in influencing the shared values of a class, defining its identity, and creating a unity and commonality between the members of it. The organic intellectual also generates consent in civil society by preparing the ground for the implementation of the legal and coercive functions of the state. Organic intellectuals have a direct role in the economic activity of a group. For instance, the Moderates of the Action Party with transformism as its parliamentary expression led “intellectual, moral, and political hegemony” after 1848, and they were the organic intellectuals of the upper classes (p.60). They were the company bosses, rich farmers, and so on, but they managed to exert their influence on the intellectuals of other classes and created a system of solidarity between all intellectuals. The traditional intellectual is one whose activities are in line with the descending process of history and mode of production. They constitute the pre-existing social categories as representatives of historical continuity. Thus, they present themselves as “autonomous and independent of the dominant social group” (2008, p. 7). What is fundamental for Gramsci is forging the organic intellectuals of the working class. The working class needs to create intellectuals who could use the language of the proletariat and who could express the feelings which the working class masses could not express for themselves (Kolakowski, 2005). The

role of language is critical, according to Gramsci, in creating hegemony (Friedman, 2009) and the intellectuals as the possessors of the linguistic instruments of expression have a critical role in creating collective identity and a collective cultural climate.

As part of the terrain of civil society, Gramsci focuses on the role of education as a tool of hegemony. He contradicts the idealist educationalists' argument that instruction and education are wholly distinct. For this to be the case, the pupil must be purely passive, just like mechanical receivers of abstract notions. However, Gramsci believes, this is not the case at all. Pupil's consciousness reflects the civil society and the social relations in which s/he participates. Gramsci criticizes the school curricula for ignoring these social relations of children. The notions of an advanced culture are imposed on children, which results in the "certain" of an advanced culture becoming "true" in the framework of a fossilized and anachronistic culture. Children are trained to conform to the values of the dominant culture while conflicting with that of their own. Also, through such school curricula, there is no concern for unity between school and life, which adds up to their alienation from their culture. In his discussion of education too, the idea of economy as a crucial factor is present, but not discussed elaborately.

2.4.2 Education and the concept of hegemony

Gramsci found concrete expression of the hegemonic educational relationships in the multiple institutions of civil society, particularly in the school (Entwistle, 1979). In this sense, hegemony involves bringing people to the point where they think as they do and where their consciousness is situated.

In the context of education, Williams (1976) summarizes hegemony as follows:

[Hegemony] is a whole body of practices and expectations; our assignments of energy, our ordinary understanding of man and his world. It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced [as a] reality beyond which it is very difficult for members of a society to move in most areas of their lives. But this is not, except in the operation of a moment of abstract analysis, a static system. On the contrary we can only understand an effective and dominant culture if we understand the real social process on which it depends: I mean the process of incorporation. The modes of incorporation are of great significance, and incidentally in our kind of society have considerable economic significance. The educational institutions are usually the main agencies of transmission of an effective dominant culture, and this is now a major economic as well as cultural activity; indeed it is both in the same moment. Moreover, at a philosophical level, at the true level of theory and at the level of the history of various practices, there is a process which I call the *selective tradition*: that which, within the terms of an effective dominant culture, is always passed off as “the tradition”, the significant past. But always the selectivity is the point; the way in which from a whole possible area of past and present, certain meanings and practices are chosen for emphasis, certain other meanings and practices are neglected and excluded. Even more crucially, some of these meanings are reinterpreted, diluted, or put into forms which support or at least do not contradict other elements within the effective dominant culture.

The process of education; the process of a much wider social training within institutions like the family; the practical definitions and organization of work; the selective tradition at an intellectual and theoretical level: all these forces are involved in a continual making and remaking of an effective dominant culture, and on them, as experienced, as built into our living, reality depends. If what we learn were merely an imposed ideology, or if it were only the isolable meanings and practices of the ruling class, or of a section of the ruling class, which gets imposed on others, occupying merely the top of our minds, it would be – and one would be glad – a very much easier thing to throw. (cited in Apple 2013, pp.22-23)

Apple (2001a) argues that in the context of the United States, conservative attempts to shape education should be interpreted as attempts to maintain cultural and ideological leadership. Recent reforms and attempts to reconstruct education are thus inextricably linked to this role of education. Apple points out to the cruciality of

text and gives examples as to how conservative groups in the US were interested in imposing their vision of what counts as important and legitimate knowledge by mounting campaigns against progressive textbooks (Apple, 2013). Also, increasing emphasis in many world education systems on school choice (Whitty & Edwards, 1998) devolution of centralized educational bodies (Whitty, 2001, 2002), the voucher system, and standardized testing (Apple, 2005), and venture philanthropy (Lipman 2011a; Pedroni, 2011) is a result of the broad-based conservative alliance.

A large body of inquiry examined the ways in which the policy emphasis on choice and institutional autonomy further disenfranchises the already disadvantaged communities by opening the way for further marketisation of education (Ball, Bowe & Gewirtz, 1996; Reay & Lucey, 2003; Whitty, 2001, 2002; Whitty & Edwards, 1998). The emergent policy preference for school choice in Western education systems came with the conservative governments of the time, such as the Thatcherite government in England (see Dale, 1989; Whitty, 2000; Whitty & Edwards, 1998) and Bush administration in the US. These governments did not create some sort of illusions or false consciousness; instead they spoke to the immediate problems and discomfort of people from a populist perspective (Apple, 2014). By pointing out to problems in public education, school choice was advocated in many contexts of education as a solution. Neoliberals, who are the most powerful group within the power bloc supporting conservative modernization (Apple, 2001a) successfully advocated the notion of parental school choice, framing choice in a consumer-oriented manner and promoting the extension of publicly-funded choice into the private sector (Whitty & Edwards, 1998). With choice policies, it was only the parents who could exercise choice, which created competition between schools (Whitty, 1997). Therefore cream-skimming effect became a major issue (Smith &

Meier, in Whitty, 1997) and a large fraction of students, those from low-demand families tended to be worse off (Reay & Lucey, 2003; Whitty, 1997) while middle class parents were “more likely to have the knowledge, skills and contacts to decode and manipulate what are increasingly complex and deregulated systems of choice and recruitment” (Apple, 2001b, p. 415). Deregulation provides some space for informal procedures being employed. The middle class, also, on the whole were “better at moving their children around the system” (Ball et. al. quoted in Apple 2001, p. 73). Also, research suggests that unrestricted choice gives rise to further stratification (Ball, Bowe, & Gewirtz, 1995), of which charter schools are an example (Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2011).

One outcome of limiting the notion of democracy to choice, usually conceptualized as consumer choice, is the heavy emphasis on the consumer while neglecting the producer, which can be seen as part of the aggressive neoliberal policies towards education workers and their unions (Apple, 2001a).

Essential to the advancement of choice policy and practices is the availability of comparative base of information (Apple, 2001a, 2005), which would allow consumers to make comparisons in the “market”. National standards, national curriculum, and national tests can therefore serve as facilitators of the structuring of the comparative ground and further the neoliberal direction in education (Apple, 2001a).

2.5 Urban transformation

This section briefly discusses the general characteristics of urban transformation drawing mainly on critical geographers and then discusses urban transformation trends and specific characteristics of Istanbul’s urban transformation.

2.5.1 A brief overview

Analysing today's urban transformation involves a discussion of the complex relationship between neo-liberalism and urban transformation. Cities have become important geographical locations for the neoliberal regime that aims value excavation and creation as well as political experimentation (Weber, 2002; Keil, 2009; Brenner & Theodore, 2002). It suggests a new mode of governance whereby policy is redirected from welfare toward competition and many functions carried out by the state are delegated to private and quasi-state institutions (Purcell, 2002). This mode of governance and political experimentation operates through various practices, as Brenner and Theodore (2002) put it,

from place-marketing, enterprise and empowerment zones, local tax abatements, urban development corporations, public private partnerships, and new forms of local boosterism to workfare policies, property-redevelopment schemes, business-incubator projects, new strategies of social control, policing, and surveillance, and a host of other institutional modifications within the local and regional state apparatus. (p. 368)

From this perspective, public ownership is seen as an impediment to more accelerated circulation and accumulation of capital, as a result of which, public spaces become subject to disciplinary force of neoliberal spatial relations. When public services are in short supply, cities are pushed to entrepreneurialism and inter-urban competition (Peck & Tickell, 2002; Öz & Eder 2012), as a result of which public spaces become tradable and consumerized. Such an approach to urbanisation promotes “elite partnerships, mega-events, and corporate seduction” that constitute “the only games in town and the basis of urban subjugation” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 393).

It is not only through the privatisation of public space and delegation of state functions to private or quasi state institutions that neoliberal urban governance

operates. It also functions through retaining the public character of certain spaces in formal sense but by transforming “the concept of the public itself” (Madden, 2010, p. 200), increasing the surveillance on public spaces (Cybriwsky, 1999, p. 223), re-engineering the notion of citizenship (Graham, 2009a), and through the militarisation of urban everydayness (Graham, 2009a, 2009b). Through these processes it aims not only to institutionalise a new scalar or economic order. Just as crucially, it seeks to design and roll out new technologies of government, produces new discourses of “reform”, promotes new subjectivities, and fashions new institutions and modes of delivery (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 389). Within this perspective of the urban a highly “punitive” (McFarlane, 2011, p. 210), interventionist, and militaristic agenda is pursued in dealing with multiple issues of social life such as crime-control, immigration, welfare policies, urban control and surveillance, and community change or development (Graham, 2009a; Peck & Tickell 2002). It is no surprise that this urban policy generates increased social control, exclusion and discrimination as well as resistance and social discontent.

Much scholarship has raised concern that new urban technologies have disenfranchised the urban population and weakened the relative autonomy people have over the decisions that transform their city (Purcell, 2002; Peck, 1998; Madden, 2010) When competitiveness is the main concern of the urban authorities and the politicians, policy is shifted away from “demand-oriented redistribution” to “supply-oriented competitiveness”, it means exclusion and marginalisation of citizens who are not capable of competing (Purchell 2002). This explains an important part of the process. However, exclusion should not merely be taken as being denied to certain public spaces (Madden, 2010; Iveson, 2003). It might have to do with the question of who decides the new ways public space is used, new technologies it is governed

through, and new meanings coined to it. It is for this reason that Iveson (2003) argues that “struggles over the terms on which people are able to access public space can be understood as struggles between a variety of publics over the meaning of publicness, rather than struggles over inclusion in the public” (p.217). Nor, should exclusion/inclusion necessarily be the major concern of public space analysis while looking into the disenfranchisement of the public as there are many ways it can take place, without spatially – in the material sense- excluding people (Madden, 2010). In his analysis of the renovation of New York City’s Bryant Park, Madden (2010) shows it is possible to bind certain spaces to dominant relations of power, thereby rendering “publicity without democracy” (p.191), through the transformation of urban space in certain ways such as by transforming it into consumption spaces or spaces under constant surveillance.

It is also within such a wider restructuring of the city space that the process of gentrification takes place (Marcuse, 1999) as every inch of landscape is regarded as value creation site. There are different accounts on the definition of gentrification. Drawing a distinction between urban restructuring and gentrification, Smith (1982) refers to gentrification as a process whereby working class households are replaced by the middle class populations while what he refers to as urban renewal is the construction of new structures on the already inhabited land. Slater’s (2009) definition of gentrification differs from Smith’s in that Slater does not limit it to residential neighbourhoods, but considers as gentrification the “transformation of a working class or vacant area into middle-class residential and/or commercial use” (p.294). Also, Berry (1985 in Marcuse 1999) considers the office growth in the central business district as an important aspect of gentrification. Hackworth (2002) argues that the conventional definitions of gentrification do not describe the recent

urban condition as it has become a more extensive phenomenon which is prompted by “global restructuring” (p.816) and large scale economic processes involving large-scale corporations and the state while previously it tended to be of smaller scale, involving individual or small-scale investors. Therefore, he defines gentrification as “the production of space for progressively more affluent users” (p.815), - be it a residential district or not - , a long term process whereby the working-class communities are replaced by more affluent settlers. As it spans a long period of time it may not be an immediately observable process whereby the subordinate groups leave their space to the more powerful ones (Ibid). Marcuse (in Slater 2009) defines four different types of displacement which extends from *direct displacement* whereby settlers are physically forced to leave their dwellings as a result of rent increases or suspension of basic facilities (such as electricity) by the landlord to *displacement by pressure*, which takes place when inhabitants in a gentrified area feel that their friends are leaving the neighbourhood and when the area becomes less liveable for them as a result of the changes in the environment and services they received (p.303-304).

One important aspect to gentrification is race in that it can also mean the displacement of non-white communities by the affluent whites (Boyd, 2005; Hoffman, 2003; Smith, 1996; Patillo, 2003). However, as there are various sides to whiteness or non-whiteness, depending on the spatial organisation of the neighbourhood, many factors may come into play. Much scholarship on gentrification and racial cleansing show that class might become something experienced through race and intra-racial diversity among the non-whites might result in different blocs and different ways they experience racial displacement

through gentrification as illustrated by the studies of Boyd (2005) and Patillo (2003) among the gentrified areas where black communities lived.

2.5.2 Urban transformation in the context of Istanbul

Kurtulus and Turkun (2005) argue that urban transformation process of Istanbul dates back to 19th century, which witnessed birth pangs of the nation state and modernisation. The second phase, which had a spontaneous nature, followed in the aftermath of the Second World War (Çalışkan, Çılgın, Dünder, & Yalçın, 2012). The neoliberal phase, which Çalışkan et. al. (2012) call the *third phase* was a result of the socioeconomic developments occurring in the 80s. In Istanbul the neoliberal urban regime started following the 1980 military coup d'état, which also initiated economic liberalisation in Turkey (Öniş 1991 in Kuyucu & Ünsal 2010). Istanbul's becoming a world metropolis is a result of the aspirations and imaginations of the central government of the 1980s, which set the parameters through legal measures to allow new channels of funding to be created so as to enable urban renewal projects and real estate investments. Also, Mayor Dalan's (1984-1989) vision and imagination of an Istanbul as an international city played an important role (Aksoy, 2012; Keyder & Öncü, 1993; Rutz & Balkan, 2009). This was a vision which linked economic prosperity to cultural industry, an image of Istanbul in which the Byzantine and Ottoman heritage was revived in order to invoke an image of a city as the centre of power, commerce, and culture (Rutz & Balkan, 2009). "Urban growth coalitions" in the city have had sustained interest in transforming Istanbul into a global city through policies seeking to turn it into a gentrified city appealing to the "tourist gaze" (Keyder 2005a, p. 128) and into a space of consumption and "tourist commodification" (Aksoy, 2012, p. 93). Çalışkan et. al. (2012) state that the 4th

phase was initiated in the late 90s and became more evident in 2002, with the ascent of the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) to power. Urban transformation process of this era effected deep-rooted changes in the urban texture of the city and urban capital accumulation processes were articulated to capitalism in an unprecedented way (Caliskan et. al., 2012).

The fourth phase of urban transformation also includes a gentrification strategy that has caused sweeping changes in the social and material architecture of the city. This is a project of “constructing the city anew”, as the conservative weekly magazine *Aksiyon* put it while exalting one of the urban regeneration projects in one of the peripheral districts of Istanbul (Aksoy, 2012, p. 95).

Urbanisation process, nevertheless, has not followed a similar trajectory in Turkey to the one in the first world (Keyder, 2005a) as the Turkish state never had a comprehensive formal housing policy for low income populations (Buğra, 1998) or an institutionalised welfare system. Between 1950 and the 1960 urban population in Turkey increased by about 80% (Şenyapılı, 1981). Low-income workers who migrated to cities lived in illegal squatter settlements they built in empty lands within the inhabited city (Keyder, 2005a). The city expanded in a chaotic way, for which not only the new settlers but also the public authorities who colluded with the perpetrators were also responsible (Keyder, 2005a). The latter also contributed to the legal-illegal division in the home ownership regime (Keyder, 2005a). Despite being illegal at that time, some of these settlements were legalised through amnesties issued by political parties seeking electoral support, (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010), and therefore squatter settlements gained different status of legality depending on several factors such as their location, the date they were built, and their tenure structure. This populism came to a halt in 2001 economic crisis (Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010) and

various neighbourhoods in Istanbul have undergone transformation through state-led urban transformation projects. These neighbourhoods were mostly illegal squatter settlement areas or central districts experiencing urban decay due to the low-income status of their residents (Caliskan et. al. 2012). The state and municipalities extensively used urban decay and unorganised settlement structure to justify urban transformation projects and displace the residents in these areas. Also, earthquake risk was a frequently used discourse while explaining the rationale for urban transformation projects in certain areas of the city.

Bartu-Candan&Kolluoğlu (2008) express their feelings about the recent changes in the city as follows: “we are witnessing with awe, horror or indifferent familiarity an Istanbul changing rapidly in terms of its spaces, the relations it comprises and its imaginary, as the city has undergone a neoliberal restructuring over the past two decades” (p.5). This neoliberal structuring has brought about a radical shift in urban land governance since 2001, which can be said to signify a shift from a ‘populist’ mode to a ‘neoliberal’ one (Kuyucu & Unsal, 2010, p.1). It is mainly through urban transformation projects that this shift has occurred, causing sweeping changes not only in the way the material space is organised, but in the ways various actors experienced and conceptualised the city. These projects as neoliberal tools have also been the means whereby the construction and real estate industry has achieved state-led profitable investment, but they have also generated new forms of segregation and inequalities (Aksoy, 2012; Keyder, 2005a, 2011; Öz & Eder, 2012).

A large body of inquiry on urban transformation in Istanbul extensively discussed the clearing off the low-income residents from the inner city (Foggo, 2007; Gökçen, 2009; Karaman & İslam, 2012; Karaman, 2014; Kuyucu & Ünsal, 2010; Onal & Akdemir, 2015; Önder, 2012; Sakızlıoğlu, 2007; Somersan & Kirca-

Schröder, 2007; Turanalp-Uysal & Korostoff, 2015; Ünlü, 2010; Uysal, 2012) and urban areas whose value has increased (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008; Ergun & Gül, 2010; Lovering & Türkmen, 2011; Uzuncarşılıoğlu-Baysal, 2010; Uzuncarşılı-Baysal, 2013), focusing on different aspects of the displacement. Kuyucu (2014) argues that it has largely been “the use of legal ambiguities and arbitrariness by numerous state and private actors” that has enabled the state to easily put into practice, despite resistance, its urban renewal plans involving displacement (p. 612) and explains in detail the central role of legal ambiguity (p. 625):

Without the extraordinary powers that legal ambiguity granted them, the municipal authorities, MHA officials and private developers would have had a much more difficult task in appropriating the informal properties of *gecekondu* dwellers. Furthermore, because the actual implementation of the projects relied on the strategic (ab)use of the flexible and ambiguous property structure prevalent in the informal markets, the new formal market ended up intensifying the inequalities and hierarchies of the former regime as well as generating new ones. In this sense, we can argue that legal ambiguity played a direct role in determining distributional dynamics in the new market that was created. That the projects depended on and deepened the ambiguous property relations of the informal order also shaped the social relations formed among the inhabitants, as they tried to form collective movements against the projects but found it almost impossible to sustain them. The tactics of project implementers stifled the formation of collective movements to protect housing rights and fed individualistic struggles for personal gain instead.

In the process of rapid urban transformation, land belonging to public institutions was one of the first assets to be turned into profit (A. Aksoy, 2012). Vast areas of state urban lands taken over by the MHA at little or no cost have been filled with gated towns, business towers and shopping malls, and the remaining public land such as those belonging to public schools are now new the targets for investment (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008). A considerable amount of public land in Istanbul officially belongs to a foundation or public institutions such as a school or a hospital (Keyder 2005b). In the city it is not uncommon to encounter plain, old, and

low-rise school buildings trapped among business towers, shopping malls, and exclusive leisure and consumption spaces.

A crucial actor in urban transformation in Istanbul and throughout the country has been the Mass Housing Administration (MHA). The state-led transfer of public land to private bodies mainly took and is still taking place through the MHA, which has become a prime agent in institutionalizing a neoliberal urban regime (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008; Gurcan & Peker, 2014; Kuyucu & Unsal, 2011; Moudouros, 2014) whereas it was intended to provide affordable housing when built in 1984 (Kuyucu & Unsal, 2011). MHA was invested with enormous power after 2000s, with the amendments to the Mass Housing Law No 298 and a set of other related laws. After these changes, MHA was able to build partnerships with private companies, take over state public land at no cost, and expropriate urban land (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008). The MHA increased dramatically its share in housing construction from 0,6 percent between 1984 and 2002 to 24,7 in 2004, which fell down to 12,1 per cent in 2005 (Bartu-Candan & Kolluoğlu, 2008, p. 17).

Scholarship on Istanbul's urban renewal also focused on the cultural character of the renewal, pointing to the fact that urban renewal process has largely been carried out by the same political group, also called as political Islamists, who have been running the Metropolitan Municipality for more than two decades (Batuman, 2013; Gürcan & Peker, 2014; Karaman, 2013a; Lovering & Türkmen, 2011). According to this point of view, neoliberalisation and Islamisation can be seen as intertwined processes in the way Istanbul has been transformed. Material and cultural factors manifest themselves in an intertwined and articulated manner. Karaman (2013a), who focuses on the coupling of Islamism and neoliberalism in the realm of urban governance, with a particular emphasis on Istanbul, defines the

process as “urban neoliberalism with Islamic characteristics” (p. 1). Tuğal (2008) calls it “market-oriented Islamisation of the city”, arguing that political Islamists reconstruct Istanbul in line with their imaginaries on the one hand while further integrating the city into capital accumulation processes on the other.

The success of political Islamists in 1994 Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality elections is attributed to their ability to appeal to the sentiments and interests of the urban poor living in the peripheries of the city. Most of the urban poor lived in shantytowns, called *gecekondu* (“built overnight” in Turkish) neighborhoods, which were comprised of illegal houses built on state land. Prior to the 1994 elections, it was the Islamic party (Welfare Party) who openly supported the legitimacy of squatter houses (*gecekondus*) and Recep Tayyip Erdogan- the mayoral candidate of the party- declared in a television program that he was not against such illegal settlements and that he also lived in a *gecekondu* (Turenc). Erdogan also argued that problems causing the rural migrants to move to the city should be solved before blaming them as undeserving occupiers of state land (Bora, 1999). These communities, the majority of whom were rural migrants and living in squatter settlements built on the state land, felt excluded by the globalizing city. Then under the name of Welfare Party, during their electoral campaign, political Islamists situated themselves against the discourse of “global city”, unlike their social democrat and centre-right rivals who declared that they wanted to make Istanbul a global city (Bartu). Adopting a populist discourse, the party severely criticized the inequalities in the city and the consumption culture of the urban elites, at times falling into a moralism that was hostile to any kind of entertainment (Bora, 1999).

Although political Islamists changed their policy regarding illegal settlements in their successive terms in the metropolitan mayoral office, they managed to keep

their relationship with the urban poor well in various ways, one of which was the aid or alms triggered economy. With the political Islamic parties coming to power, there has been a significant shift from the policy of social assistance provision by central government funds to a system whereby social assistance was provided by municipalities and NGOs (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). While much of the municipally-provided social assistance comes from private individuals, which reduces the function of the municipality in terms of social assistance provision to charity brokering (Buğra & Keyder, 2006; Eder, 2010), the process lacks transparency in many aspects such as who gets aid on what criteria and what kind of business relationships exist between the government and the aid-funding bodies. Moreover, there is no publicly available and comprehensive data on the scale of assistance (Gocmen, 2014). There was a large volume of media coverage, particularly prior to local government elections, concerning the aid provided by the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality (IMM) and other district municipalities of JDP as well as the motives behind them. Central government and local governments of JDP were and have still been accused of bribing the poor, making them dependent on alms, and threatening the aid-receiving poor that the aid would cease if the municipality was handed over to another party. On January 2 2009, the then PM responded to the criticisms that they were creating a culture of Islamic alms (*sadaka*) saying, “sadaka is part of our culture.” (NTV archives 2009, in Gocmen 2014, p.100). Another mechanism that provided aid to the urban poor was religiously motivated associations, the number of which soared after the rise of political Islamic parties to power in 2003 (Göçmen, 2014). Research carried out in three cities, one of which was Istanbul, shows that out of the 26 religiously motivated associations analyzed more than half were founded after 2002 (Göçmen, 2014). During the two-decade reign of JDP, conservative

economic elites have emerged (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012), which prepared the fertile ground for the proliferation of Islamic charity associations. Aid provided by JDP municipalities and Islamic associations filled the lacuna of social assistance in the country (Göçmen, 2014) at a time when the repercussions of the collapse of the three main “informal pillars” of Turkish welfare system - all of which “derived from the character of rural-urban migration” (Buğra & Keyder, 2006, p. 220)- became increasingly evident. These three informal pillars were the ties rural migrants had with their rural origins, state’s tolerance for settling on public land, and family and neighborhood solidarity practices (Buğra & Keyder, 2006). Karaman’s (2013a) research in a squatter neighborhood undergoing urban renewal documents that in-kind aid, inter alia, figured in as an element that undermined the struggle against renewal and helped the government elicit a high level of approval from squatter populations in the elections.

Although Islamists did not display uniformity in their approaches as to how urban space should be organised, city as a secular space started to be increasingly contested with political Islamists triumphing in municipal elections in Istanbul (Tuğal, 2009a, 2009b), starting with a modest victory in 1989 – when they took two peripheral municipalities- and culminating with taking over of Istanbul in 1994. Istanbul has been governed by political Islamists since then, and the urban policy they follow can be characterised as urban “neoliberalism Islamic with Islamic characteristics” (Karaman, 2013a). According to Karaman, Islamism is “a moral-political rationality that seeks to shape all aspects of social life (economic, legal, political, private) along Sunni Islamic principles” (p.3).

2000s in Turkey can be characterised by significant changes in social and political structure of the country, unprecedented transformation of its cities, and a

concomitant rise of new classes (Atac, 2013). Both the ongoing process of urbanisation and state-led urban transformation have created important business opportunities for the construction capital. The MHA has become a significant actor- *a state within a state* as some would call it- as a result of a set of changes in the legal framework. It played an important role in the emergence of a new group of business people, most of whom had close relations with the ruling political Islamists. In addition, municipal governments who have been empowered through legislative changes have become important actors in regulating government-business relations. Municipal governments and local businesspeople of enterprises of different sizes have been involved in public-private partnerships in the construction and maintenance of infrastructure and public buildings such as schools or hospitals (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012). Unsurprisingly, all these developments have given rise to the emergence of Islamic elites and middle classes, which translated into them having more power to reshape the city in line with their spatial aspirations.

In his ethnographic study on political Islamic movement in a peripheral municipality in Istanbul, Tuğal (2009a) describes Islamist movement's ambivalent approach to the city as follows:

Istanbul has been embraced as the symbol of Muslim glory and yet also condemned as the place where Westernization was initiated. (...) Nevertheless, the Islamist movement could not accept the city as it was. The metropolitan centers had become symbols of Westernization and of the removal of religion from public life. Islamists thought that the authoritarian secularists had taken the cities by force and divested them of their religious character. Therefore, they now talked about a conquest, especially of Istanbul, referring to the Ottoman seizure of the city 1453 as the first conquest. The secular inhabitants of the city centre were thus implicitly compared to the Christians residing in Istanbul in Byzantine times. (p. 430)

While it is not tenable to claim that central government and the municipal governments both belonging to the ruling JDP (Justice and Development Party)

solely rely on this outlook in the way they transform the city, it is obvious that there has been growing unhappiness among the secular urban populace with the conservative laws and practices aiming to reconfigure the urban space, which culminated in the Gezi demonstrations in 2013 (Gürcan & Peker, 2014). Also, increasing practice of sex segregation (Karaman, 2013a), laws limiting sale and consumption of alcohol, statements of ministers on women's mobility in urban space can be given as repercussions of a conservative attempt to re-organise the city (Gürcan & Peker, 2014).

2.6 Neoconservatism in education system in Turkey

This section discusses how education system in Turkey has been neoliberalised over time and locates the role of religion in education policy within the nexus of social class, social capital, and nation-building. After discussing the neoliberalisation of education system with a particular focus on schooling system, the section expounds the institutionalised religious education in relation to social class structure.

2.6.1 Neoliberalisation of education system in Turkey

It was during the Ottoman era, following the Tanzimat Decree in 1839 (also known as Edict of Gulhane) that the discussions started regarding the public provision of education by the state, and with the Ordinance of General Education (Maarifi Umumiye Nizamnamesi) in 1869 education was recognised as a free public service provided by the state although this principle was not fully implemented (Gök, 2003).

With the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, radical reforms towards modernisation were introduced and the role of education was seen as crucial in the institutionalisation of the reforms. As education was seen as crucial to the

creation of a modern subject who was loyal to the nation state, education of the time prioritised political socialisation (Gök, 2003, 2004, 2005) rather than reproducing social stratification patterns (Sayılan & Yıldız, 2009). In the 1924 Constitution primary education was defined as a right to be provided and financed by the state and as compulsory for both girls and boys. Until the 1950s an understanding of education as a free public service dominated, and most of the schools during this era were public schools (Gök, 2004a). The number of private education institutions were few and most of the private schools were minority schools and foreign schools whose existence was guaranteed by Lausanne Treaty. However, in the 1950s, the number of private schools started to increase, and Maarif Kolejleri (Colleges of Education) that were opened by the state 1955 can be considered as the early forms of private schools in Turkey since they enrolled students based on exam scores (Gök, 2004a). During this era, these schools were limited in number, but their number would increase after a couple of decades and they would become known as Anatolian high schools.

Although the 1960s were relatively promising years for the public character of education, the increase in privatization of education did not stop during these years. The reach of public services expanded and financial structure of the education system was strengthened in the 1960s (Soydan & Abali, 2014), which can be attributed to the developmentalist paradigm of the time (Soydan & Abali, 2014; Ercan, 1999) and the relative liberal character of the 1961 Constitution (Soydan & Abali, 2014). The developmentalist model assumed that an improvement in the capacities of citizens would translate into national development (Ercan, 1999) and therefore the public character of education was not played down. In line with the developmentalist model, the first five-year development program highlighted that a

significant number of students be encouraged to study in vocational schools, so that the labor force required for the nation's development could be trained (Okçabol, 2005). The developmentalist ideal, however, was not incompatible with the idea of private schooling. With the introduction of the Law on Private Education Institutions (Özel Öğretim Kurumları Kanunu) in 1965, new regulations were introduced regarding private schools (Gök, 2003). All private schools were bound by this law and according to the Law, they are to be supervised by the Ministry of National Education. The most important characteristic of the law is that it defined private schools as paid schools (Gök, 2004a). The law stipulated that "these institutions are not entitled to provide their services solely with a view to making profit" but they could make profit only on condition their investments were carried out with a view to contributing to the development of Turkish Education System and an increase in its quality (MEB 1966, cited in Gök 2004a; p.100). These statements are included in the new Law on Private Education Institutions, Law no 5580, which was issued in 2007 (see Law No 5580). Despite these statements, the increase in the number of private schools following the 1980s and the practices suggest that many private schools exist with the central aim of profit-making (Gök, 2004a).

The 1970s witnessed the emergence of market-based understanding in education, which was individualistic and valued the knowledge that had a market value (Ercan, 1999). During this period, significant steps were taken in order to improve the links between schools and the workplace (Caner, 1999). With the introduction of carpentership system into the industry in 1977, industrial sector became part of the education system along with schools (Caner, 1999). The number of private schools that prepared students for high school placement exams (hereafter dershane) increased during this period (Okçabol, 2005).

Transition to neoliberalism in Turkey started in 1980 with structural adjustment policies that aimed to decrease the scale of public sector activity and state intervention in the market (Öniş, 1991). The global shift to neoliberalism in education also came in the 1980s with the structural adjustment policies that were implemented under the supervision of the International Money Fund and the World Bank (Kurul, 2012; Sayılan, 2006). According to Gök (2002), repercussions of the structural adjustment policies followed by the government were visible in the education system in multiple ways. Education as a public service and human right was no longer considered as the responsibility of the state and public spending per student decreased gradually (Gök, 2002). The MoNE's share of gross domestic product (GDP), which was 2 percent in 1960, dropped to "1.3 percent in 1975, 1.6 percent in 1980, and and 1,3 percent in 1985" (Kurul, 2012, p.89). Also, the MoNe's share in the general budget decreased over the years, from 12.9 in 1960 to 11,7 in 1980, and 8.6 in 1985 (Yolcu, 2007, p. 100).

During this period, the state played an active role in the operationalisation of market principles and opening of private schools. Also, it should be noted that the introduction and retrenchment of neoliberal education policies went hand in hand with the promotion of religious components in the education system (Ercan, 1999). Despite its emphasizing that state resources were limited and contribution of private bodies should be encouraged, the state itself actively supported and funded private education (Ercan, 1999). For example, in 1983-1984 academic year, the state provided generous incentives to private education through credits and loans (Ercan, 1999). Moreover, stratification within the middle school sections (grades 6-8) and high schools in public schooling increased as the state created some sort of public-private schools (Gök, 1997) by opening many more schools that accepted students

depending on their nationwide placement exam scores and grade point averages (GPA). Increase in the number of Anatolian Schools and the introduction of *Super Lises*, which accepted students based on GPA, continued during this period.

Although such schools were free, it was predominantly the middle class students whose parents could mobilize their resources and secure a place for their children in these schools.

Late 1990s witnessed heated debates regarding the structure of compulsory education system in Turkey. A major change in education system came in 1997-1998 academic year, when compulsory schooling was extended to eight years (5+3). With the transition to 8-year uninterrupted education, middle school sections of all types of schools were closed. Although the extension of compulsory schooling was welcome by large segments of the society, it being interrupted caused reaction among those who wanted to send their children to Imam Hatip middle schools (see Çakır, Bozan, & Talu, 2004).

Another contentious policy was the change in the scoring of nationwide university placement exam. With new regulations in 1999, vocational school students were subject to lower coefficient in the university placement examination, which put them in a highly disadvantaged situation (Kosar-Altinyelken, Cayir, & Agirdag, 2015; Çakır, Bozan, & Talu, 2004). Because Imam Hatip schools were in the category of vocational schools during this period, the policy was interpreted as an attempt to prevent Imam Hatip graduates from entering university programs. Related to this, vocational education debate has remained limited to secularism-religion dichotomy although vocational education occupied an important place in the agenda of business groups who demanded reorganisation of vocational schools in line with the requirements of the business markets (Bulut, 2012).

Vocational education occupied a crucial agenda in late 1990s and early 2000s. Upon Turkey's accession to Customs Union in 1996, the share of medium and high-technology manufacturing businesses in aggregate exports increased (Bulut, 2012). Powerful business organizations such as Turkish Industrialists' and Business Association (TÜSIAD) published detailed reports to bridge the gap between vocational education and business market (see TÜSIAD, 1999). In 2006, one of the biggest business groups started a vocational education development project in cooperation with The Ministry of National Education, using the motto "vocational school, national issue" (see "Meslek Lisesi Memleket Meselesi", 2011). The project states that there has been an increase in vocational school application rates since the inception of the project, with a 30% increase in 2007-2008 academic year ("Meslek Lisesi Memleket Meselesi", 2016). In 2007 the Ministry of Education started a project called Strengthening the Vocational Education and Training System, the chief aim of which was to develop a modular, flexible, and quality vocational education (see SVET, 2006). The report emphasized lifelong perspective, in which lifelong learning was conceptualized in a way to respond to the demands of global knowledge economy and knowledge society in a Europe-centered context; and the economy-based concerns such as acquiring new skills, responding to the demands of the business market, employability, social cohesion for economic sustainability were articulated (Şimşek, 2008). Given the increasing rate of enrollments despite the fluctuations, the policies that were pursued seem to have translated into increasing student numbers in vocational high schools (see Table 1).

Table 1. Student Ratio in Secondary Education Institutions by School Type (%)

Academic Year	Science High Schools	Social Science High Schools	Anatolian High Schools	Anatolian Teacher Training High Schools	Arts and Sports Schools	General High Schools	Vocational And Technical High Schools	Imam Hatip High Schools	Total
1990-1991	0.20	0.00	1.69	0.27	0.03	48.63	42.41	6.78	100
1991-1992	0.21	0.00	1.72	0.45	0.04	48.66	41.77	7.14	100
1992-1993	Lise	0.00	1.77	0.66	0.06	48.50	41.26	7.54	100
1993-1994	0.24	0.00	1.94	0.74	0.07	48.34	40.60	8.07	100
1994-1995	0.26	0.00	1.96	0.88	0.07	47.73	41.21	7.90	100
1995-1996	0.27	0.00	1.95	0.86	0.08	46.78	41.84	8.22	100
1996-1997	0.29	0.00	2.16	0.94	0.09	44.99	43.09	8.44	100
1997-1998	0.34	0.00	2.60	1.08	0.11	42.86	44.55	8.46	100
1998-1999	0.40	0.00	4.94	1.19	0.13	39.82	44.87	8.66	100
1999-2000	0.46	0.00	7.36	1.42	0.16	41.94	42.47	6.20	100
2000-2001	0.46	0.00	9.31	1.51	0.19	45.35	38.91	4.27	100
2001-2002	0.45	0.00	9.98	1.35	0.22	46.99	37.72	3.29	100
2002-2003	0.47	0.00	8.45	1.22	0.25	48.95	38.16	2.50	100
2003-2004	0.47	0.00	7.41	1.13	0.26	49.85	37.82	3.06	100
2004-2005	0.53	0.02	6.79	1.13	0.28	48.42	39.40	3.43	100
2005-2006	0.57	0.02	8.84	1.35	0.28	46.38	39.00	3.56	100
2006-2007	0.56	0.04	10.01	1.49	0.29	44.14	39.63	3.84	100
2007-2008	0.60	0.06	11.67	1.74	0.32	39.67	41.67	4.26	100
2008-2009	0.61	0.08	11.46	1.71	0.32	37.11	44.62	4.09	100
2009-2010	0.59	0.08	10.53	1.67	0.35	35.04	46.65	5.09	100
2010-2011	0.67	0.13	16.77	1.76	0.40	26.71	48.08	5.47	100
Average	0.42	0.02	6.63	1.17	0.19	44.14	41.70	5.73	100.00

Source: MoNE Report entitled *İlköğretimden ortaöğretime, ortaöğretimden yükseköğretime geçiş analizi* (MoNE, 2012b).

The 2000s were marked by further marketisation of education, which was accompanied by conservative reforms. The JDP government that ruled the country as a single party took advantage of this, particularly in the aftermath of 2011 elections, since the legislative, judiciary, and executive powers of the state were gathered in the hands of a single party (Altıntaş, 2012). The party could pass various laws and

statutory decrees (*kanun hukmunde kararname*) in an attempt to implement the desired policies. One of the most contentious reforms came with the Law No 6287, which stipulated the transition in 2012-2013 academic year from eight-year uninterrupted compulsory schooling to a twelve-year 4+4+4 system. With this law, primary schooling has been divided into two 4-year periods. The first four years are to be studied in primary schools while the second four-year period is to take place in middle schools. Also, the starting age for primary schools, which was formerly age seven, was changed as follows: “Compulsory primary education encompasses ages 6-13. Compulsory schooling period starts in the September of the year when the child has completed age 5.” (Law No 6287). Although earlier school starting age was problematized initially, the change that would lead to fierce debates took place in the structuring of the primary school system. The change is summarised in the Law No 6287 as follows:

Primary schools consist of four-year compulsory primary schools and four-year middle schools and Imam Hatip middle schools, which provide opportunities for choosing among different programs. Middle schools and Imam Hatip middle schools provide elective courses that address the skills, development, and preferences of the students. The courses Kuran’i Kerim [Koran] and The Life of Hz. Peygamberimiz [Prophet Mohammed] are taught as voluntary elective [*istege bagli secmeli*] courses in middle schools and high schools. Other elective courses to be taught in these schools and program options in Imam Hatip middle schools and other middle schools are determined by the Ministry [of National Education].

The above passage suggests a return to a dual system of secondary education in which secular middle schools and Imam Hatip middle schools exist. This change is different from pre-1997 period since only middle school sections of Imam Hatip schools have been opened whereas prior to 1997 middle school sections of Anatolian schools existed. A very important implication is that the notion of choice, which was not included in the preceding version, entered the Basic Law on National Education.

Although much emphasis was placed by oppositional groups on the religious underpinnings of the new law, it has various pedagogical and class based implications which are summarised below by the then-PM in the following passage, in which the discourse of choice is manifest:

Pedagogical implications of the new law are as significant as its implications for democracy. (...) Thanks to you, today, national education has been structured in a way that values both education and training. National education has gained a character that can support the expanding Turkish economy. The era in which children were schooled at age 7 and then formatted without a break for eight years has ended. Now, after kindergarten, children will receive primary education for four years and then they will be able to continue their education in schools they want and they prefer. Vocational schools will be open for every child. Parents will be able to send their kids to vocational schools without any concern for future. Our children will now learn better their national values, spiritual values, and religious values in line with their preferences and their parents' preferences. (Erdoğan, quoted in "Erdoğan: 28 Şubat'ın", 2012)

While the law was criticised for having a "revanchist" (see Altıntaş, 2012) character and its conservative implications have been extensively stressed (see İnal, 2012; Okçabol, 2012), right after the bill was passed, the 4+4+4 reform was also severely criticized for furthering the marketisation agenda in education, thereby widening the already existing educational inequalities between the privileged and the already disadvantaged (see H. Aksoy, 2012; İnal, 2012, Müftüoğlu, 2012). In the initial draft, the law proposal granted permit to continue the second 4-period of primary schooling via open education. This proposal, coupled with change in the age of primary school enrolment, was seen as promoting earlier entry of students into vocational schools (H. Aksoy, 2012; Müftüoğlu, 2012) and the emphasis of the bill on vocational education was seen as an attempt to restructure the labour force with the dictates of global economic competition (Müftüoğlu, 2012). Upon public reaction, open education track proposal for the second phase of primary schooling was withdrawn.

Three major changes occurred in high school system during the 2010s. First, between years 2012-2014, catchment enrolment system was abolished in a piecemeal way through the conversion of catchment-based enrollment schools into Anatolian Schools, Vocational schools, and Imam Hatip schools. Also, almost all vocational and Imam Hatip schools acquired Anatolian school status with the addition of the word “Anatolian” and became Anatolian Vocational schools and Anatolian Imam Hatip schools (See Mesleki ve Teknik Egitim Genel Mudurlugu, 2014). Second, after conversion of all catchment-based enrollment schools was completed in 2014, a nationwide high school placement exam, Transition from Primary to Secondary Education (hereafter TEOG) was introduced, and all schools throughout the country became exam-based. Third, private teaching centers where students attended after school hours (dershane) were closed or converted into private high schools.

One theme that came into prominence in the 2010s has been technology. The project called Movement of Enhancing Opportunities and Improving Technology [Fırsatları Artırma ve Teknolojiyi İyileştirme Hareketi], also known as FATİH Project, was “perhaps one of the biggest educational investment of Turkey” and one which significantly deepened the neoliberal culture in the Turkish Education System. (Toprak, 2014, p.141). The project involved providing 570.000 classrooms with LCD panel interactive board and Internet infrastructure (Fatih, 2016). Although 570.000 classrooms in 42.000 schools were stated to be involved in the project as of 2012 and 10.6 million of tablet PCs were expected to be delivered (see Toprak, 2014), current claim of the project is to equip all schools at the primary and secondary levels with interactive boards while the number of classrooms has remained constant (see Fatih, 2016). The stated objective of the project is “to equip classrooms with information technologies aids (...) in line with the objectives stated in the Information Society

Stratetegies Act (...), which defines the actions to be taken in order for Turkey to become a knowledge society” (Fatih, 2016, para.4). The Prime Minister of the time emphasized the importance of the project by emphasizing transition to knowledge society and referring to the commander Fatih Sultan Mehmet, who conquered Istanbul:

Fatih Sultan Mehmet, by conquering Istanbul, ended the Medieval Age, a dark age, and initiated the Modern Age. Today, with Fatih Project, we are clearing up an age not only in the education system, but also in all realms affected by education, and we are all together initiating a new age here, the information age, the age of information technologies all together. (“Erdoğan: Fatih projesi,” 2012)

Although studies show that teachers’ use of interactive boards remained limited to presenting lectures (Akbaşlı, Taşkaya, Meydan, & Şahin, 2012; Pamuk, Çakır, Ergun, Yılmaz, & Ayas, 2013; Toprak, 2014), Fatih project is important in terms of its pedagogical and public implications. That millions of dollars have been spent on the computerisation of education within the project means transfer of public funds to private companies (Toprak, 2014). For instance, according to a recent auction won by General Mobile (GM, an affiliation of General Electric), the Turkish government will spend \$230 USD⁶ for one tablet (Zaman cited in Toprak, 2014). A rough estimation shows that the total amount that will be paid to companies such as GM is well over two billion dollars (Toprak, 2014).

In addition to the pecuniary implications of FATIH project, its pedagogical implications are worthy of being discussed. The emphasis of the project on the skills associated with neoliberal discourse, such as “being innovative” or “flexibility”, suggests that it is not only the technology, but also neoliberal rhetoric is articulated into the realm of education through such projects (Toprak, 2014). The skills are

⁶ Values have been converted from Canadian Dollar into USD.

defined as vital to the construction of the proper self who is compatible with dominant practices and beliefs and attributed “messianic, salvific, even magical manifestations”, which is a neoliberal strategy of the formation of a metaculture (see Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000, p. 293).

2.6.2 Education, social class and religious education in Turkey

Education was central to the nation-building process of the modern Turkish Republic that was established in 1923 following the demise of the multiethnic and theocratic Ottoman Empire. While Islam constituted the main pillar of education in the Ottoman Empire (Pak, 2004) modern educational institutions were launched in the 19th century as part of the Empire’s modernization reforms. “[The] struggle for modernisation in the Ottoman Empire was partly based on the different socialisations of the modernisers, who were graduates of Western-type military schools, and traditionalists” (Agai, 2007, p. 150) who were graduates of the traditional Islamic establishments of education. When the modernisers established the new nation-state of Turkey in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, they sought to reorganise the inherited political institutions in line with the principles that they regarded as the sine-qua-non of a modern nation state. A series of reforms dedicated to the principles of nationalism, secularism, and scientific positivism were wholeheartedly embraced by the urban, westernised, and educated stratum of the society (Gök, 2007).

The founders of the Republic aimed to replace the legacy of the Ottoman Empire with a new Republican ideal that was modelled after the west, which necessitated redesigning the education system accordingly (Gök 2007; Pak 2004; Bayar 2009; Kaplan 2006). In order to centralize the education system and terminate

the dual system of Ottoman education in which two different education philosophies - Islamic and Western – were followed, the Law of Unification of Instruction was passed in 1924 together with laws that abolished the Caliphate and the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Foundations. The Law of Unification of Instruction brought all the educational institutions under the authority of the Ministry of Education, terminating the dual system of Ottoman education and decreasing diversity in terms of school types. Since then, the Ministry of Education has been the sole authority to supervise all personnel, policies, and curricula. Also, with the Law, public religious education and religious education provided by religious orders were abolished. Educational programmes were designed towards institutionalising urban and western modes of living (Gök, 2007). Another change was that religion courses at primary and secondary schools were taken out of the curricula in 1927, except for primary schools in villages (Kaplan, 1998). As traditional institutions were closed down, the modern school was charged with “defining the moral discourse of Turkey” (Bilgi, 2014, p. 358). The Ottoman education system, in which a key concern was to “raise good Muslims” or bearers of morals that defined “a good Muslim” (Aksit & Coskun, 2004, p.5) was replaced by a modern education system which aimed to educate citizens who would be committed to the principles of nationalism, secularism, and scientific positivism.

The role of religion in the structuring of Turkish education system has been the most controversial issue throughout the history of the Republic. The aspirations of the rulers to raise loyal citizens to the westernizing Turkish Republic meant a radical transformation of the education system inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Seeing laicism as a prerequisite for Westernization, the founders of the new Republic, Mustafa Kemal and his friends, introduced a secular– albeit in a limited

sense- education system in which religious education was delegitimized while positivism was promoted. The Republican elite's commitment to secular positivism, which is premised upon the idea that reality is experienced only through rational observation rather than transcendental cosmology, clearly distinguished them from the Muslim clerics who had run most of the schools in the Ottoman Empire (Kaplan, 2006). Davison (2003) argues that although they can be used interchangeably in some limited senses, secularism and laicism as concepts have different etymologies, institutional backgrounds, and theoretical implications (see also Parla and Davison 2008). The term *secular* implies "the early Christian requirement of distance, non-coincidence between matters of religiosity and matters of the world" while the term *laicite* has a religious connotation by underlining the difference between the lay members of a church and the clerical strata (Davison, 2003, p. 334). The founders of the Turkish Republic named the relationship between the state and Islam as "laiklik" borrowing the French term "laicisme", which was a correct choice (Parla & Davison, 2008)⁷.

Most literature on the early Republican era, or the Kemalist era (1920-38), treat the education system of the period making sweeping generalizations (Bayar, 2009). According to such perspectives, the aspirations of the Kemalist elites to secularize the nation, which caused them to distance themselves from Islam, were sharply at odds with those of the Islamists who resisted the ruling ideologies. However, a large body of literature on the formation of the education policy of the early Turkish Republic suggest that the role of Islam is deemphasized in much of the analyses on the education policy of the modern republic (Kaplan, 1998; Davison, 2003; Bayar, 2009; Türkmen, 2009). Although "the policies of the Republican

⁷ In this thesis, the two are used interchangeably for practical purposes.

establishment vacillated dramatically” (Yavuz 2003, p. 124), depending on the political conjecture, the synthesis of nationalism, Islamism and capitalism was central to education policy of the new state (Kaplan, 1998). Religion was not excluded but instrumentalized by the state, hence controlled and reinterpreted, to promote a holistic spirit of Turkish nationalism (Türkmen, 2009).

Secular education had a crucial role in the formation of a new class of professionals (Göle, 1997), professional the middle class in particular (Gulalp, 2001; Göle, 1997). Republican establishment promoted a corporatist conception of society (Heper, 1976; Parla & Davison, 2004), and the new middle class derived their prestige from having the type of cultural capital esteemed in the new modern Republic (Göle, 1997; Gülalp, 2011). In addition, as the official power of the clergy was transferred to state institutions (Ayata, 1996) civil servants and bureaucratic elite emerged as a prestigious group. Stating that her conceptualisation of elite refers to the Bouerdian notion of cultural capital rather than material one, Göle (1997) argues that this new class was loyal to the nation state (also see Heper, 1981), to its values such as secularism and positivism and “became natural transmitters of the Kemalist ideology of progress” (p. 50). Despite their deteriorating prestige starting with the 1950s, education was a dimension of stratification in which the bureaucratic elite remained strong (Heper, 1976).

State control over religion was seen as only being possible if religious instruction was provided and supervised by the state. Immediately after the closure of traditional schools for advanced religious instruction, in 1924 twenty-nine Pastor and Preacher Schools (hereafter referred to as Imam Hatip schools) were opened to train the religious clergy (Kaplan, 1998). However, these schools were closed in 1933 due to a lack of demand (MEB[MoNE] Din Öğretimi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2010). Until

1948, the only state-sanctioned institutions to receive religious instruction were the Courses for *Hafizs* (memorisers of Koran) and Koran (Reed, 1955). According to Reed (1955), this policy led to a significant shortage of trained personnel in mosques and schools.

The transition from single party rule to a multi-party democracy in 1946 brought about significant changes in politics. The right-wing opposition, Democrat Party (DP), was able to mobilise diverse groups against the corporatist ideology of the state by embracing the principles of economic liberalism on the one hand, while on the other, the party was able to instrumentalise religion, aware of its potential to mobilise the masses (Keyder, 1989). Unlike its rival Republican Party, whose mainstay was the urban population, DP was a right wing party whose politics primarily targeted the countryside. In addition, the DP severely criticised the centralism of the republican leadership, arguing that it promoted metropolitanism, which in turn distanced people with education and sources from the outlying regions of the country (Birtek, 1985).

The education system was also criticised by DP. The DP argued that its French-inspired qualities prioritised the education of a bureaucracy and prevented the growth of a middle class with self-initiative and applied training (Birtek, 1985). Also, the DP blamed the ruling Republican People's Party (RPP) for abolishing religious education. The populist approach of the DP forced the RPP to halt its antireligious bias in education (Kaplan, 2006; Ahmad, 1982) and adopt a more populist approach to Imam Hatip Schools as the RPP felt the need to compete for votes. In 1949, Imam Hatip programs lasting ten months were launched in ten cities and optional religion courses were put back onto 4th and 5th grade curricula of primary schools (Reed,

1955). The students who wanted to take religion courses were required to document the authorization of their parents (Reed, 1955).

With the ascent of the DP to power in 1950, the liberal economic policies targeted the weakening of the conventional ties between the state and the Republican bourgeoisie and instead promoting the commercial farmers and the industrial bourgeoisie (Yavuz, 2003).

During DP rule, the role of religion in education changed remarkably. The 10-month Imam Hatip programs were changed to seven-year Imam Hatip schools in 1951 (4+3 middle and high school periods of study, respectively) and their number increased sharply. Also, in 1951, the policy regarding religion courses in primary schools changed. This time, students who wanted to be exempt from religion classes were required to bring a form documenting the parent's consent to exemption (Reed, 1955). Moreover, under the DP the official discourses on religion changed. While the Republican approach had reduced pressure on citizens as regards traditions that fettered them to the cultural modes inherited from the Ottoman Empire (Türkmen, 2009), the DP provided more space to Islamic modes of lifestyle and expression that had been marginalized by the secular establishment. Both of these perspectives, however, were informed by a strong state tradition (Rutz, 1999; Kaplan, 2002).

The DP started to lose its popularity in the late 1950s due to economic hardships (Zürcher, 1993). During this period, the party's platform was defined to a significant extent by concessions made to Islamic stakes (Özgür, 2012). Controlling the rising political Islamic revival was one among many rationales for the military intervention in 1960 (Hale, cited in Özgür, 2012). However, despite the military's claim for acting in the name of defending secularism and Kemalist principles

(Ahmad, 1982), religious Imam Hatip schools continued to increase (Kaplan, 1999; Özgür, 2012).

The religious shift gained momentum in national politics of the 1970s. Working class mobilization and radicalization of youth in the 1960s encouraged the military, which sought to promote a holistic spirit among citizens, to turn to religion (Kaplan, 2002). The RPP, who was in power for ten months in 1974, did not keep a distance to dogmatic education in schools and the idea of morality courses in the curriculum was proposed during this era, which can be interpreted as a compromise to the pro-islamic National Salvation Party (Kaplan, 1999). The Islamic party and the ultranationalist party of the 1970s successfully placed their cadres in the Ministry of Education (MoNE), “all the while promoting a more positive assessment of the Ottoman Islamic Heritage in the curriculum” (Kaplan, 2002, p. 118). According to Kaplan (1999), the National Front Government (1975-1977) heralded the soon-coming Turkish Islamic Synthesis in its government programme:

Our aim in national education is to raise all the members of our nation [millet] as citizens who assimilate, protect, and advance the national, moral, human, spiritual, and cultural values of the Turkish nation; who love and try to honor their family, country, and folks; who are committed to Atatürk revolutions and Turkish nationalism; who are aware of human rights and their responsibilities and duties towards the Turkish Republic, which is a national, democratic, secular, social and constitutional state; who are proud of our magnificent and glorious past; who look to the future full of hope; who avoid emulating [the West]; who are aware of their national characters. (Dağlı & Aktürk, cited in Kaplan, 1999)

Successive governments of the 1970s in which Islamic parties were coalition partners played a key role in the proliferation of Imam Hatip schools (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2014). For example, out of 452 Imam Hatip schools in 2004, 230 were those opened in the period 1977-1981 (see MEB Din Öğretimi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2010). A turning point came in 1977, when Imam Hatip graduates were given the right to pursue

college degrees in non-religious social science faculties (Kaplan, 1999; Çakır, Bozan, & Talu, 2004).

The repercussions of the military regime established after the 1980 were remarkable in terms of the role of religion in the education system. The military regime redefined the role of Islam in society and education in accordance with the principles of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TIS), a cultural program espoused by conservative intellectuals and generals (Kurt, 2010; Yavuz, 2003), and introduced mandatory religion and morality courses in the curricula of primary (grades 1-5) and secondary/middle (grades 6-8) school. Moreover, with the approval of the National Security Council, many more Imam Hatip high schools and middle schools were opened (Kaplan, 2002, p. 120). In 1983, the first civil government that came to office after the coup gave Imam Hatip graduates the right to pursue a university degree in all non-religious fields, which meant that Imam Hatip high schools were no longer vocational schools that only trained the religious functionaries.

1980s also witnessed transition to neoliberalism facilitated by the structural adjustment policies which aimed to decrease the scale of public sector activity and replace import substitution with export oriented growth (Onis, 1991; Toprak, 2005). Liberalization of economy in the 1980s allowed the provincial elites and small businessmen to augment their wealth because, without state intervention, they had more chance to compete with the established capital created by the republican bureaucracy (Tuğal, 2002; Yavuz, 1997). With the new economic policies, the Anatolian petty bourgeoisie who had been marginalised by the import substitution policy had more opportunities for social mobility and a provincial petty bourgeoisie started to emerge (Yavuz, 2003; Narlı, 1999). These groups who benefited from the liberal economic policies of the 1980s are “the first generation of an urbanising

economic elite” (Yavuz, 2009, p. 52) and retain their ties with their provincial origins (Narlı, 1999; Yavuz, 2009). The new province-based Islamic bourgeoisie counterposed themselves against the secularist coalition between the Republican establishment and Istanbul bourgeoisie (Yavuz, 2009), which would have a strong influence in the politics of the 1990s.

Although a large body of scholarship argues that the urban professional elites constituted the mainstay of Kemalist ideology in Turkey (see Toprak 1995, Gulalp 1995, 2001; Gole, 1997; Kandiyoti, 2003) and the legacy of Kemalist economic policies benefited the metropolitan business elites (see Nasr, 2010; Gulalp, 2001), anti-secular alternative classes began to emerge in the 1980s (Gulalp 1995; Gole 1997) and, concomitant to the rise of political Islam, they became more powerful in the next couple of decades. The emergence of anti-secular classes can be explained by various factors such as the postmodern weakening of Kemalist modernisation project, just like its Western counterpart (Gulalp 1995; 2001), urbanization (Gole 1997; Yavuz 1997), and transition from state protectionist economic policies to free market economy (Nasr 2010; Insel 2003). In addition, Turkish-Islamist-Synthesis (TIS), which was promoted by the coup government of the time as the official ideology of the state, created a fertile ground for Islamist views of self-expression and dissemination. The new Islamic middle class was significantly different from its traditional-secular counterpart for whom modernization was synonymous with westernization and commitment to secular positivism. There was also an urban-rural divide between the two groups since the secular middle classes tended heavily to be associated with urban centres while the Islamic or conservative ones were identified with provincial towns or having their roots in the periphery (Narlı, 1999) even if they were educated and intellectual urban residents.

Various concerns with regard to education policy have been brought up by myriads of interest groups so far, but compulsory religion courses introduced after the 1980 c'oup d'etat and religious public schools (Imam Hatip Schools) have been the most contested issues. Successive DP governments (1951-60) increased the number of Imam Hatip schools and right wing governments following a similar ideological path promoted them (Kaplan, 1998). By the 1990s, Imam Hatip High Schools (grades 6-8) were no longer vocational schools in practice, unlike their initial r'aison d'etre, because they had been recognized as regular, non-vocational high schools since the 1970s. By the mid-1990s, about 10 percent of all students in Turkey attended Imam Hatip Schools (Agai, 2007). In 1995-96 academic year, there were 434 Imam Hatip High Schools with around 189,000 students (MEB Din Öğretimi Genel Müdürlüğü, 2010). The military, who strengthened the role of Islam at all spheres of policy by imposing the ideology of Turkish-Islamist –Synthesis (TIS) after the 1980 coup, “felt overwhelmed by the effects of its policy” (Agai 2007, p. 153). Disquieted that these schools were powerful alternatives to laicist state schools, the military intervened with a memorandum in 1997, criticizing Islamic tendencies in the education system and revising its policy on the role of Islam in education (Agai, 2007). Following the memorandum, 5-year compulsory schooling was extended to eight years, which caused the junior sections of all school types, including Imam Hatip Schools, to close. The military intervention of the day was also related to the economic processes of the time. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rising Anatolian capital that supported the Islamist movement was disquieted by the anti-capitalist overtones of its discourse and by some of the party's municipal and national policies (Tuğal, 2011). After the 1997 intervention, this wing of the movement became dominant and, by separating from the (Islamist) Virtue Party,

established the conservative JDP. Due to the military defeat of Islamism, this pragmatic move did not encounter any mass resistance (Tuğal, 2011).

Rutz (1999) would describe the rapid implementation of the 8-year education system, with a particular concern for the conservative segments of the society, system as follows:

But the timing of the July announcement, without prior public debate or warning, was extraordinary, taking the public by surprise. The late announcement gave no indication of how the Ministry would solve in one month the logistical problems of the nation's schools, classrooms, and teachers before the opening of schools in September. More to the point, the announcement was a shock to millions of families whose well-laid education plans were suddenly disrupted by state intervention. Those who had intended that their children not continue past sixth grade would have to be accommodated. So, also, would those whose children had been preparing for several years to take the national fifth grade examinations that offered an opportunity to enter elite schools. Among those most affected, however, were devout Muslim families who planned to place their children in religious schools called Imam-hatip. These schools existed in the interstices of the state system, using the years of middle school to give religious education to children prior to their entering public high schools, religious high schools, or the workplace. In the summer of 1997, meetings were held in many neighborhoods in protest over not only the proposed education reform but also the recent political attacks on the Islamic-leaning Welfare Party. Several large rallies that attracted thousands of the faithful were staged in various parts of the country. (p. 94)

Another major policy change came in 1999, when grading system for the nationwide university entrance exam was changed to disadvantage Imam Hatip high schools and Vocational high schools. The change led to a sharp decrease in the number of students who preferred Imam Hatip High Schools. For example, student enrolment in 1999-2000 academic year was 43262 while it dropped to 18391 in 2000-2001 (MoNE Directorate for Religious Teaching, 2010). Çakır, Bozan, and Talu (2004), who carried out research on Imam Hatip schools, explain the lack of demand for these schools in the aftermath of 1999 policy change as follows:

Since the prospects of entering a university is rather low, enrollment levels are low. Parents send their lower performing children to these schools,

believing that they are unlikely to enter a university. In order to prevent the schools from closing due to under-enrollment, school principals, alumni, and conservative circles go to far-flung corners and villages and collect students who would normally not consider a high school education by providing them with incentives such as accommodation and scholarship. During our fieldwork, we ourselves observed that İmam Hatips had great problems with attracting students. These schools, which required students to take exams before 1997 due to high number of applicants, are today having severe difficulties with finding students. All the six İmam Hatip schools we visited were under-enrolled. The schools consisting of three or four buildings were using only one of the buildings. The other buildings were empty and some were dilapidated. We listened to various stories of how they collected students in order to prevent the schools from being closed. (p. 121)

This state of affairs would end soon after the 2002 elections, with the rise of JDP to power, giving rise to the present conflicts as to the rightful place of religious schools in the education system. Between 2002 and 2013 the number of İmam Hatip high schools increased from 450 to 2,000 (an increase of 344%), while the number of students increased more than ten-fold (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2014). In 2011, the grading system which placed graduates of İmam Hatip schools at a disadvantage was abandoned. By 2012-2013, the ratio of college preparation high schools (Anatolian High Schools) was in decline whereas that of İmam Hatip high schools was increasing, and the ratio of vocational high schools remained unchanged (see MEB Ortaöğretim İzleme ve Değerlendirme Raporu, 2013). Also, the repercussions of re-Islamization were observable in the new religion textbooks of 2007-2008, in which the Sunni sect became the prime focus (Türkmen, 2009). The objections of religious minorities who demanded exemption from mandatory religion courses and the European Court of Human Rights decisions in support of them were abortive, and the government refused to make mandatory religion courses elective (Türkmen, 2009).

With the 4+4+4 reform bill, which changed the 8 years of uninterrupted basic education system to a 4+4+4 model, İmam Hatip middle schools were re-opened.

Additionally, the bill introduced two more elective religion courses: the ‘Koran’ and ‘The Life of Prophet Mohammed’. A few months before the bill was passed, the then-PM had given the signs of the further de-secularisation of the education system when he said at a meeting, “We want to raise a religious youth” (Erdoğan, quoted in “Dindar bir gençlik”, 2012). After the bill was passed, in his address to the MPs of his party, the then Prime Minister expressed that the bill was a response to 8-year uninterrupted education by saying:

You have proven who owns national sovereignty. (...) After fifteen years, you have erased the last trace of 28 February [1997 military memorandum], a black day in our history, which was once claimed to continue for one thousand years, never to experience such days again. (Erdoğan, quoted in “Erdoğan: 28 Şubat’ın,” 2012)

An MP from the ruling party expressed his admiration for the policy at an alumni gathering of an İmam Hatip high school:

Now we have gotten a chance. We will surely increase the enrolment at these [İmam Hatip] schools. But [what is more important is that] we have gotten the chance to turn all schools into İmam Hatip schools. We have gotten this chance thanks to the elective courses on the Koran and the Life of Our Prophet introduced by the 4+4+4 system. (“Okulları İmam Hatip”, 2012, para.3)

Islamic elites and political Islamist leadership have long been interested in strengthening Islamic veins in the education system (Narlı, 1999, p.40).

Promoting İmam Hatip schools and all these developments and the positions of contending groups in religious schools debate have been informed by conflicting interests and are strictly related to the formation of hegemony and different social classes in Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Broadly defined, through analysing the relocation of school buildings, this research aims to explore the interaction between education policy and urban space and document the implications of a particular policy for various actors. For this purpose, a qualitative study that has employed the tenets of participant observation and multiple-case study methods has been carried out. This chapter is organized to provide detailed information about research design, data collection procedure and instruments, research sites, research participants, and data analysis approach.

3.1. Research design

This section discusses and explains the approaches that guided the design of this research. It begins with explaining its approach to the the four key elements that were defined by Crotty (2003) as crucial to a research design process. Then, the section discusses the key methodological challenges encountered during the research process.

According to Crotty (2003), there are four elements that inform one another in designing a research proposal. As shown in Figure 1 and Table 2, these elements are epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology, and methods (p. 4):




Figure 1. Four key elements of designing a research proposal (Crotty, 2003, p.4)

This section will discuss the three of these elements as the overall chapter itself is already dedicated to the element of methodology.

Table 2. Four key elements in research design

Epistemology	Theoretical Perspective	Methodology	Methods
Objectivism Constructionism Subjectivism (and their variants)	Positivism (and post-positivism) Interpretivism Critical inquiry Feminism Postmodernism Etc.	Experimental research Survey research Ethnography Phenomenological research Grounded theory Heuristic inquiry Action research Discourse Analysis Feminist standpoint research	Sampling measurement and scaling Questionnaire Observation - Participant - Non-participant Interview Focus group Case study Life history Narrative Visual ethnographic methods Statistical analysis Data reduction Theme identification Comparative analysis Cognitive mapping Interpretive methods Document analysis Content analysis Conversation analysis

3.1.1 Epistemological approach of the study

Epistemology relates to the theory of knowledge, which is constitutive of the theoretical perspective and therefore of the methodology (Creswell, 2003). It is concerned with the nature of knowledge (Crotty, 2013) and “providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are legitimate” (Maynard, 1994, pp.10-26). Crotty (2003) describes three main epistemological standpoints: objectivism, constructionism, and subjectivism. This research adopts a constructionist stance, which was the epistemology used in most qualitative studies during the 1990s (Crotty, 2003) and is still a widely used approach despite the surging popularity of subjectivism. This research adopts a constructionist approach in that it treats the meaning as constructed by human beings. It does not adopt an objectivist approach since it does not see meaning as already-positated; objectivity and subjectivity inextricably intertwined (Crotty, 2003) as human beings experience the world and construct their meanings in relation to their material experiences of the world (Cresswell, 2003). However, this view of meaning differs from interpretive claims to knowledge that emphasize the need for deploying research methodologies that do not develop a natural science of the social. As Crotty (2003) explains, although constructionism is different than objectivism, it “takes the object very seriously” and requires the researcher to pay constant attention to the object of research. Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the context in which research participants construct their meanings by visiting the research site and collecting data personally (Cresswell, 2003). According to this perspective, meaning is not created, but it is constructed. Human have an object to work with, which is the world and objects in it (Crotty, 2003, pp.44, 48). To give an example from the object of this research, school, school buildings, and

school policy were attributed different meanings by different people as a result of their material experiences in and with those elements.

3.1.2 Theoretical perspective

This section discusses the theoretical perspective that was used in designing the study and describes the multiple ways in which a contentious educational policy issue can be approached. The theoretical perspective that guided this study was critical inquiry. Critical inquiry takes power relations into the centre of its analysis and argues that the way humans come to know what they know occurs within the nexus of power relations. Moreover, as the case this research looks into involves a conflict, dealing with the issue of power and power relationships became an inevitable concern, and critical inquiry was selected.

3.1.2.1 Policy analysis

There are multiple ways of approaching policy. This research is shaped by a broad commitment to the Critical Cultural Political Economy of Education (CCPEE). Dale and Robertson (2014), who proposed the CCPEE as a research framework, argue that focusing on a particular aspect of an education ensemble, such as the cultural to the exclusion of political and economic provides a limited understanding of it (p. 150). Although focusing simultaneously on the political, cultural, and economic may not provide a full-fledged understanding, as the meanings of each may depend on the ontological and epistemological standpoints defining them, recognising this diversity and not reducing them to particular forms may offer “a realistic hope for reimagining and remaking education ensembles” (p. 151).

Ontologically, CCPEE draws on critical realism and critical theory. Critical realism makes a distinction between the “experiential”, the “actual” and the “real”, and asserts that “just because we cannot observe something does not mean to say it does not exist” (p. 152). The example given by Robertson and Dale (2014, p. 152) as to how this principle can be applied in the analysis of a particular educational phenomenon is worthy of quoting:

Take, for example, a roomful of 15-year-old students in Finland, sitting at individual desks, filling in responses to a test entitled Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). The students’ experiences of this activity does not exhaust all there is to say and understand regarding the causal powers of the test and their effects in and on the education ensemble. We need to understand how this event (examination, OECD, PISA, individualised responses, etc.) came about by asking questions such as: what are the outcomes of the results for the students, for Finland, the OECD, and other 73 countries involved? What causes the test to have the power to reshape education ensembles in countries like Germany? These questions require us to think about more abstract concepts, like power, learning competencies, comparison, and so on. Critical realists refer to this as the ‘actual’; that is, what happens if and when those powers (in this case the global PISA test) are activated to do what they do, and what eventuates when they do. (Sayer, 2000, p. 11–12)

As explained above, Critical Realism necessitates thoroughly inquiring about how things came to be or mean as they are.

Two central tenets of critical theory is that it is “concerned with the conditions for knowing and knowledge” (p. 153) and the notion of critique. A sustained engagement with the conditions for knowledge entails an analysis of how the knowledge of social reality is constituted, in other words, how a person comes to know things as they know (p.152). The notion of critique means putting a distance between the data and oneself as the researcher (Dale, 2009). A critique does not simply mean saying if things are not right, but it is a means of challenging self evident statements, taken-for-granted assumptions and the regimes of truth that

endow certain knowledge systems with a universal status. Also, the notion of critique for critical theory constitutes a basis for a social change (Robertson & Dale, 2014).

The strength of critique articulated through theory in countering the violence of predominant knowledge systems is clear through the following excerpt from Ball (1995, p. 266):

Theory is a vehicle for “thinking otherwise”; it is a platform for “outrageous hypotheses” and for “unleashing criticism”. Theory is destructive, disruptive, and violent. It offers a language for challenge, and modes of thought, other than those articulated for us by dominant others. It provides a language of rigor and irony other than contingency. The purpose of such theory is to de-familiarise present practices and categories, to make them seem less self-evident and necessary, and to open up spaces for the invention of new forms of experience.

The role of theory in policy analysis is crucial. Theories provide the researcher “with another language, language of distance, irony, and imagination” (Ball 1995, p. 267) that have the potential to shake our deeply entrenched beliefs in prevailing knowledge systems. Thus, they offer tools to work against “prevailing practices of ideological subjection” (Ball, 1995, p. 267). Having no theory leaves the researcher susceptible to unexamined and unreflexive assumptions and unsafe naïve ontological and epistemological a prioris (Ball, 1995).

Having emphasized the crucial role of theory, one problem that needs to be mentioned in education policy analysis is a “cavalier, uncritical and eclectic attitude to theory” that is applied insecurely into the phenomenon in question (Ozga 1987, p. 139). Another issue that Ball (1995) warns against is that in educational studies theory often serves as a tool that reaffirms the belief rather than a tool for analysis and for thinking otherwise. His question deserves attention: “do we reiterate our tired, anterior, mantric theories; do we do what ever we have to do to make ourselves useful as technicians of social management, or do we re-invent ourselves as

intellectuals and cultural critics?” (p.269). Dale’s (1992) approach can address these issues. Dale (1992), drawing on Cox, stresses that theory is always “for someone and for some purpose” and draws a distinction between “problem solving theory and critical theory” (p.206). While critical theory is interested in explaining how the prevailing power relations came to exist as they are, problem-solving theory takes the social systems taken for granted and develop concepts on this given ground. Here, the idea of critical should not be equated with being hostile or simply naming spaces, but the idea is to create a distance between the self and the phenomena analysed and question how it came about (Dale, 1992). In addition to attending how it came about, it is important to attend to the ways it is being remade so that we do not fix what we are endeavouring to understand.

A crucial task for critical approach is to take into account the changing nature of the social so that it does not become closed or certain. Therefore, it is important to attend to the unstable nature of policy while theorising about it. This attentiveness requires a kind of theorising that is built on complexity and doubt and on a reflexivity about its claims to knowledge about the social (Ball, 1995).

One example that can be given to the unstable nature of policy from fieldwork data is status of the land on which the field school of this study and another school adjacent to it were located. During my fieldwork, I was shown a copy of the document that explained the land status of the school I was working on, a mystery that parents had been trying to uncover for months by applying to official bodies for being informed. According to the document, the entire land that could be used for building a school or schools was 11534 m². However, a new school was to be built on a land of 7700 m² while there was another deal on the rest of the land between the MoNE and the association that was donating the land. The association,

as the donating party, allowed 7700 m² to be used by the Ministry of Education for 99 years on condition that the rest be not expropriated by the state but given back to the association. Another provision in the document was that the MoNE applied to the Ministry of Urban Planning to obtain construction permit for the land given to the association. Despite applying to official authorities several times requesting that the school's land status be clarified and what would be done with the 3800 m² of the land be explained, parents were not able to receive answers. Also, their claims that there was a commercial deal on the land was denied and harshly criticised by official authorities. It was about two years later that the official status of the land would become clear, when a newspaper announced that the 3800 m² of the land was given construction permit. By paying attention to the local policy context and complexities such as described above, I was able to come up with the concept of “uncertainty” that I defined as playing a constitutive role in school relocation policy.

3.1.2.2 Faces of power

Lukes' (1981) framework delineates three different views of power analysis while exploring policy processes: one-dimensional view of power, two-dimensional view of power, and three-dimensional view of power. In one-dimensional view of power, the locus of power is determined by seeing who prevails over decision-making processes and power is constituted and fully reflected in concrete decisions or in activity bearing directly upon their making. This view of power places decision-making in the core of analysis and deals with analyses of power in cases where there is observable conflict. However, the exercise of power does not solely involve overt decision-making. On the contrary, Bachrach and Baratz (as cited in Lukes, 1981) argue that power is also exercised when A puts an effort into promoting social and

political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are relatively harmless to A. In the end, all forms of political organisation are mobilisation of bias. Lukes (1981) argues that a satisfactory analysis of two-dimensional power involves examining both decision-making and non-decision making. A decision is a choice among alternative modes of action while a non-decision is a decision that results in suppression or prevention of a latent or overt challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker (Lukes, 1981). However, this view has its shortcomings. It conceives of bias and control too narrowly and lacks a sociological perspective within which to examine not only decision making and non-decision making power, but also the various ways of suppressing latent conflicts within society (Lukes, 1981). Also, the two-dimensional view of power confines itself to studying situations where the mobilization of bias can be attributed to individuals' decisions that have the effect of preventing currently observable grievances (overt or covert) from becoming issues within political process (Lukes, 1981).

The three-dimensional view involves a critique of the behavioral focus of the one-dimensional and two-dimensional views as too individualistic and allows for consideration of the many ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics, whether through the operation of social forces and institutional practices or through individuals' decisions. According to this view of power, in cases where there is no overt conflict, latent conflicts may exist, which is, as Lukes (1981) put it, "a contradiction between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those they exclude" (pp. 24-25). In this way, the three-dimensional view offers the prospect of a serious sociological and not merely personalized explanation of how

political systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or even from being made.

This study attempts to deal with the three dimensions of power in its discussion of school relocations. While the section on the presentation of the findings is more behaviour focused, the conclusion section employs a three-dimensional view in that it explains the latent conflicts and how particular aspects of education policy are prevented from becoming important issues worthy of public attention.

3.1.3 Research method

Selecting research method or methods is an issue of which techniques to use for collecting research material while methodology involves both theory and analysis that inform the research process. Two central methods used in this study was participant observation and multiple case study. Observational study requires the researcher to gather data by watching social interactions and behaviors (Eberst-Dorsten & Hotchkiss, 2014) while case studies involve in depth exploration of a process (Cresswell, 2003). Researchers gather detailed information through a variety of data collection instruments over an extended period of time (Cresswell, 2003).

Observation involves the systematic noting of events, conversations, behaviors, and objects in the research setting. The observational record is often called as field notes. As Marshall and Rossman (2006) explain, participant observation is both an approach to inquiry and data-collection method. It requires the researcher to spend an extended period of time in the field and immerse herself in the research setting, which enables her to learn directly from first-hand experience (p. 100). Researcher's reflections are constitutive of the analysis of a particular group as they provide the researcher with new vantage points (Glesme cited in Marshall &

Rossman, 2016). This method for data collection is basic to all qualitative studies and requires a consideration of the role of the researcher in the research (Marshall & Rossman, 2016), which is explored in the context of this research as well in the following sections.

3.2 Key methodological challenges

Since research questions had to do with thinking of a local situation as part of a broader policy, there were challenges as to how to manage the link between the local and the larger forces. Although case study as a method was helpful, it had risks and limitations. This section firstly aims to explain the researcher's conceptualisation of the field and strategies for dealing with the tension between the data and theory and the so-called macro and the micro dimensions in a research. Secondly, this section describes how to theorise the middle class, as it emerged as a key term during the fieldwork.

3.2.1 Tension between the whole and particularities

An inherent tension in policy analysis is how to simultaneously attend to the local situations and culture-specific meanings attached to them and the general patterns across localities (Ball, 1998; Gulson, 2007, Whitty & Edwards, 1998). Through attentiveness to location in the field (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997), it might be possible to move beyond 'the field' conceptualized merely as a spatial site towards the field as a political location, which allows the researcher to build connections between different knowledges produced by multiple locations. In other words, being attentive to the interlocking of multiple social-political sites and locations minimizes the risks and limitations of close engagement with the field. While this study seeks to

avoid holism, it makes concerted efforts to build connections between the empirical case and multiple phenomena elsewhere by discussing the interconnectedness between the research context and various sites that are in interaction with it. One way of doing this is exploring how history comes into interaction with everydayness and how social forces of larger scale lurk in the particularity of the local without parochializing the field (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2003). For instance, the research discusses how neighbourhood residents experience neoliberal urbanisation, a global phenomenon, through their interaction with the neighbourhood school and respond to it by reclaiming their school. Also, the research builds links between the crucial role of schools as sites for modern nation building and the discomfort of the citizens with the closing of their neighbourhood school.

3.2.2 Theorising the middle class

Since the preliminary findings revealed a dimension of school relocation policy that differed from its international counterparts, it was thought in the earlier phases of the research that it would be useful have an understanding of the theorisation of the middle class. While much of the international scholarship point to the displacement of black and aboriginal populations concomitant with reorganisation of school spaces, the findings of this research have shown that relocation threat in Turkey is also faced by middle class schools. Therefore, this section briefly explains what kind of theories inform the understanding of the notion of middle class pervading the inquiry described in this dissertation while a more concrete account with reference to the research sites will be provided in the subsequent sections.

Using the term ‘middle class’ takes one to a precarious ground as what makes middle class is still an ongoing sociological debate. According to the classical

Marxist position, it is one's ownership status in the social relations of production that determines their class position. In this perspective, capitalism as a historical mode of production consists of two main classes: the "proletariat" who sell their labour power for their survival and the "bourgeoisie" who have the ownership of the means of production, hence the power to exploit the labour power of the working class (Marx, 1977 [1954-1959]). However, in his later works, Marx (cited in Giddens, 1973) mentions middle classes; such as when he criticizes Ricardo for forgetting to emphasize "the constantly growing number of the middle classes, those who stand between the workman on the one hand and the capitalist and landlord on the other" (p.176). Marx's perspective on class has been open to myriads of alternate positions and reinterpretations of thinkers of different fields. According to Giddens (1973), recent perspectives can be categorised into three. The first category puts forth an economic perspective of class as determined solely by relations of production, seeing the middle class as becoming proletarianised due to the advance of monopoly capitalism, while the second one places the concept of class along the axes of exploitation and treats the middle class both as the exploited - in terms of property ownership -and the exploiter, in terms of organisational authority. The third viewpoint, which resonates with Weberian perspective, sees the middle classes as different from the proletarians and come up with the term "Professional-Managerial Class" (p. 46).

Wacquant (1991) argues that, rather than relying on abstract theorizations and drawing "objective" boundaries of class, the issue of what makes class should be dealt with through historical analysis of the social space in which class practices come into play. "In this perspective, the nature, composition, and dispositions of the middle classes cannot be directly 'deduced' from an objectivist map of class

structure; their boundaries cannot be ‘read off’ objective (i.e., theoretical) criteria of classification” (p.52). This research adopts an operational and relational approach to class. Hence, by middle class the research does not refer to a fixed category defined by a single factor such as income but takes it as constituted by research subjects’ sociospatial and material experiences in Istanbul.

3.3 Site selection

Consistent with the aim and the research questions, this section explains how the decisions regarding site selection were taken prior to the research. When I decided to study school relocations in Istanbul, the reactions of school communities and public outcry waned or were not covered by the press media as much as they used to be. Therefore, to have a clearer understanding of the issue, I first conducted brief interviews with people who took explicit position against school relocations and analyzed the existing documents on the issue, mostly limited to the news covered by the press media and press statements of school communities. The policy was not officially documented, albeit having been verbally confirmed by chief education and local authorities, which was covered by the press media.

In the light of the information I obtained from my informants, in early 2013, I decided to carry out fieldwork study in a public high school that was to be relocated due to high land price of the school. School teachers and students made it possible to collect preliminary information regarding the school. I visited the school one day each week for three months. I collected demographic data from the school and interviewed some of the teachers and parents in order to understand the relationship between the school and its surrounding. Although I was not able to become an integral part of the school community, my observations in the school and the data I

collected through the school's alumni provided rich insights as to how the policy of school relocations proceeded.

In late 2013, I was able to find a school community that was actively working to prevent the relocation of their neighborhood school and that was willing to accept me as a participant observer. For eight months, I became an integral part of the school community and initiative which worked against the demolition and relocation of their school. It was in this initiative that I was able to carry out participatory inquiry.

Meanwhile, in the summer of 2014 education became a central agenda of urban forums and some parent associations with the completion of high school transformations and introduction of the new exam system entitled Transition from Basic to Secondary Education (Temel Egitimden Ortaöğretime Geçiş [TEOG]). Increasing public attention on the issue resulted in various demonstrations, school meetings, and urban forums. These sites yielded relevant insights for my research topic. Also my informants from the school communities that I became a part of, regularly attending the forums in order to build solidarity and seek advice, significantly contributed to a deepening understanding of the research topic.

3.4 Research sites

This section aims to provide some brief information regarding the sites where the data for the research were collected.

3.4.1 Field schools

Since this research is interested in exploring the issue of school relocations in Istanbul in the context of education policy making, many school sites were capable

of providing data for the research. Although I observed the situation of various schools in the process of being relocated, I focused on two main sites to be able to obtain more in-depth understanding and a more nuanced view of school relocation policy. Two public high schools were scrutinised with respect to their relationship with their environment, the way they were affected by recent policy changes, and the reactions of school communities to the relocation of their schools.

3.4.1.1 Field school one: Kayabaşı High School

Field School 1, Kayabaşı High School⁸, was located on the European side of Istanbul. The reason this school was initially selected was because the school was to be transferred to the Mass Housing Administration. Kayabaşı High School is in an upscale district of Istanbul, with one of the highest land price per square meter in the country. The school serves nearly 900 students aged from fourteen to nineteen. The area is known for its luxurious restaurants. A large shopping mall, business tower, and residences loom above the school. When my fieldwork started, it was one of the few non-selective enrollment public high schools in the area, but the next year the school was turned into an exam based one (Anadolu Lisesi). By the time of the research, the school community claimed that the school had been transferred to the MHA, but it was not yet relocated. Official authorities did not deny the claims regarding the status of the school either. The principal, students and teachers were told that they would be evacuating the school within a year or so due to earthquake re-strengthening of the building. At the time of the research, the school was sharing its building with another high school, Serintepe High School, whose building was being rebuilt. Kayabasi teachers and staff believed that they would be relocated to

⁸ All the names of the schools and school communities in this research are pseudonyms.

that newly built school as it was too big to accommodate Serintepe high school students. However, Kayabaşı is still in its building although the school community keeps believing that they will soon evacuate the school.

As explained in the Kayabaşı High School's web site, the school was founded in a nearby district in Beşiktaş town by another name. The first building of the school was donated by a philanthropist whose grandfather served as the education minister during the Ottoman Empire and whose father served as the director of education. The philanthropist was particularly interested in girls' education and today in Istanbul there are many girls' dormitories named after him. Also, there are schools that carry his surname. Kayabaşı High School started education in 1961, in the building donated by this eminent philanthropist, as a girls' middle school. Due to the need for a high school in the area, a high school building was constructed in 1968, and Kayabasi became a high school moving to its current location. The name of the school was changed to Kayabaşı in 1981.

3.4.1.2 Field school two: Seyit Efendi High School

Seyit Efendi High School was located in a middle class residential district called Arguvan neighborhood located in the town of Kadıköy, and had around 1300 students. The school building consisted of four floors. Next to Seyit Efendi High School (HS), Kalimni Imam Hatip Girls' High School was situated. The two schools were separated by a wall. The land on which both Seyit Efendi HS and Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip High School stood was donated to the Ministry of National Education (MoNE) by a wealthy construction contractor (*muteahhit*) in 1985. The contractor, according to the residents of the neighborhood, used to live in a house that was situated on the land that he donated for school construction. Also, according

to the residents and website of the Seyit Efendi HS, the contractor donated the land on condition that it was used for a school and wanted an Imam Hatip school to be built on it. An Imam Hatip school was built on the land and Kalimni Imam Hatip High school students, who used to study in Uskudar Adult Education Center building, started to use the newly-built Imam Hatip building in 1976. Kalimni Imam Hatip High School was opened in 1975, one year before the construction of their permanent building, and it was a co-educational school at the time. According to the neighborhood residents, Seyit Efendi HS building was formerly a small building of two storeys (a basement and a ground floor) and firstly used as an annex building (*mustemilat*) to Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip HS. Later, according to one resident, second floor of the building was used as an Imam Hatip Middle school. When middle school sections of all schools were closed in 1995 with transition to 8-year uninterrupted education, the middle school was closed and with the addition of two more storeys, the school was converted into a mainstream high school in 2002-2003 academic year. According to the information on the school's website, conversion was made possible by a protocol between the Ministry of Education and the contractor since the contractor had donated the land on condition that it was to be used as an Imam Hatip School. With the transition to 4+4+4 education system, in 2013, Seyit Efendi HS was converted into a Girls' Technical and Vocational School. It was a surprise to the neighborhood residents that the school was converted into a girls' school when there were already two girls' schools in the vicinity: Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip HS next to it and a historical girls' school on other side of the boulevard, 450 meters from Seyit Efendi HS. During the semester break, parents were sent a text message by the school administration that their children would start the second term in another building located in an urban transformation zone five kilometers

from where Seyit Efendi HS was located. While the text message was a surprise, relocation was not since some of the students had learned that the school would be relocated when a service bus driver accidentally let it slip that they would be moving to another building soon. The school was not relocated as indicated in the text message because its construction was not completed. Also, as a result of the efforts of parents and neighborhood residents, the school was not relocated during the academic year. Parents reported that there was no electricity, heating or water running when they were sent the text message and the municipality of Kadıköy helped them to stop the relocation in the middle of the semester. Upon the news, parents and neighborhood residents established Seyit Efendi High School Solidarity and started to organize to stop the relocation. Despite their resistance, the building would be demolished and the school would be relocated in the next academic year (2014-2015). Figure 2 illustrates the relationship of the relocation of Seyit Efenfi HS with other schools in Kadıköy.




Figure 2. Relationship of Seyit Efendi High School's relocation with schools in Kadıköy municipality

3.4.2 Arguvan Neighborhood

Since much of the data presented in this research were collected in Arguvan neighborhood and one of the research questions is about the relationship between the relocation of the neighborhood school and neighborhood dynamics, it would be useful to provide detailed information about the history and demographics of Arguvan neighborhood. Moreover, Seyit Efendi High School was identified with the neighborhood and neighborhood residents had an active role in resisting the relocation of the neighborhood school. To understand the attachment of the residents to the school, providing extensive information about the area would be helpful. The information given in this section was collected from a wide variety of sources including history books, works of literature, informal learning activities carried out in the neighborhood, and personal accounts of neighborhood residents.

Arguvan Neighborhood was divided between Kadikoy and Uskudar municipalities but Seyit Efendi HS was situated on the Kadıköy side of Arguvan, on the border. About 100 m ahead of Seyit Efendi, Uskudar started. Eminent Turkish novelist and writer Selim İleri (1999, p.68) describes Arguvan, where he used to visit during his childhood, as follows:

For me, Arguvan was an alcove where I could find tranquility, serenity, and peace. Maybe I was not aware of that when I was a child, but every time I visited Arguvan, I carried with myself its gentle breeze and verdant solitude. This was the Kadikoy of forty years ago. When you start walking from Ayrılık Çesmesi you would find yourself in Arguvan. Here, spring the huge, flabellum-like leaves of centenarian trees. Behind these huge, verdant leaves a blue sky appears in the form of constantly-moving blue dots. (...) With its groves, gardens, meadows, and mansions, Arguvan was one of the most beautiful neighborhoods of Istanbul. It was said that during the [Ottoman] Empire sultans and princes dwelt here. Some of our elderly would remember those days. They used to show us some of the houses saying, “this mansion belonged to this and that Sultan”. (p.68)

Historical books on Kadikoy also show that Arguvan formerly hosted the mansions of the Ottoman Dynasty members (Teoman, 1974). In the fifteenth century, the districts of Kadikoy that had more than 100,000 akche (Ottoman currency unit) were given to the eunuchs (harem agasi) of the Ottoman Imperial harem (Küçüksezer, 2013). Although the land registration system, called *Dirlik* system, changed in time, the presence of eunuchs was evident in Arguvan; for example, many of the fountains in the district were donated by them (Küçüksezer, 2013). Some historical records and the accounts of historian Zeki Teoman (Küçüksezer, 2013) suggest that land ownership in Arguvan changed hands in the 17th century. “In the early 17th century, the area stretching from Rasimpaşa Neighborhood to Kucukcamlica, presently known as Arguvan, was owned by Misirli Osmanaga but expropriated in 1630 by the Sultan Murad IVth (Tarih Vakfı, 1993). Later in 1800s it became the property of III. Selim. Sultans used to distribute pieces of land from this neighborhood to people

whom they would like to reward and frequented the district themselves for hunting and entertainment” (Tarih Vakfi, 1993, p.16). It was the first settlements on the skirts of Camlica Hill by the Ottoman sultans that would trigger the transformation in property relations in Arguvan (Küçüksezer, 2013). Arguvan became home to the mansions of the Ottoman sultans, princes, and imperial family members which spread among the large meadows, gardens, and groves covering the neighborhood (Tarih Vakfi, 1993). The area was popular as a summerhouse destination because of its clear air that was believed to heal lung diseases (Yılmaztürk, 2015). It was therefore no accident that during the Republican era, a military sanatorium and a private sanatorium were opened in Arguvan neighborhood (Küçüksezer, 2013). Even in the 1960s, people with respiratory problems would be advised to settle in Arguvan (Küçüksezer, 2013).

The first signs of change in Arguvan would appear with the establishment of Gazhane Factory in 1891 (Küçüksezer, 2013). Workers settling around the factory in small houses set up worker neighbourhoods that stretched to Arguvan and cover the south of the neighbourhood in 1930s. In 1940, Dortyol area, the west of Arguvan was opened for settlement and nondescript apartments of two to three storeys were built in the area (Küçüksezer, 2013). Meanwhile, the Ottoman Dynasty members were sent to exile; the bureaucrats of the Abdulhamit era died; and the discredited members of the Committee of Union and Progress would retire into their shelves (Küçüksezer, 2013). With new settlement regulations introduced after 1960s, settlement in Arguvan expanded towards the north and construction gained momentum (Tarih Vakfi, 1993). In the 1980s, the area significantly changed with Eymen Topbas, Istanbul Provincial Head of the Motherland Party, which was in the office of the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul (Field notes, 2015). Topbas

started construction on Çamlıca Hill, a conservation area, which would trigger further construction in the surrounding.

In addition, in the 1980s, Arguvan Boulevard that stretched across the neighbourhood, in the north-south direction, was expanded, and construction on both sides of the boulevard increased, thoroughly changing the face of the neighborhood (Tarih Vakfi, 1993). İleri (1999) describes the changes he observes as follows:

I did not go to Arguvan for many years. Then, once I visited Çamlıca Girls' High School [in Arguvan]; my close friend Semra Aktanç was a philosophy teacher at the school. I thought the neighborhood changed a lot. It was still green and the mansions survived; but its charm was gone. Arguvan was still Arguvan though. After this visit, I did not visit Arguvan for years. In one evening, we were driving to our friend's new house, and while passing through a boulevard [that seemed so unfamiliar to me], I couldn't stop asking my friends the name of the boulevard. "Arguvan Boulevard" they said; I could not believe my eyes. Arguvan of forty years ago, which was covered by mansions and trees, was now replete with apartments and gated communities. There was a busy traffic on the boulevard, which sometimes blocked the road. What had happened to its countless trees, glittering verdancy, and beautiful vegetation? "It's been a long time. Arguvan has been urbanised rapidly.", they replied. Urbanising means, then, piling up apartments and gated communities and eradicating the trees. (p.69)

An architect and author, Arif Atılğan (2015) who has extensively written about Kadıköy district and its various neighborhoods including Arguvan contrasts the current busy state of Arguvan Boulevard with the 1960s and 1970s, giving the following example:

I would like to give two examples to illustrate the old days of today's busy Arguvan Boulevard. In the 1960s the Boulevard was so empty and so solitary that we were able to slide down along the entire Boulevard (...) without pedalling at all on the wheeled-slides that we made ourselves. In the mid-70s, turning off the engine and then switching the gear into neutral, we were able to drive the car throughout the entire Boulevard down to Kadıköy.

Observations from the fieldwork indicated that construction further increased in the 1990s and resulted in changes in Arguvan.

3.4.3 Urban forums

Urban forums were actively working on preventing the relocations of the schools in their neighborhood by appealing to official bodies such as the local MoNE directorates to obtain information and legal bodies to stop relocations, building links with many nongovernmental and local government authorities including, inter alia, local municipalities, Istanbul Chambers of City Planners, The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB), and being in constant communication with their local school teachers, students and sometimes the management. The information they gathered and generously shared was valuable to me since as an individual, I was neither legally entitled to appeal to such bodies or obtain such information, nor materially capable of doing it by myself. They were generously willing to accept me in all phases of their work, which provided me with invaluable research data. Also, one reason I was involved in urban forums was that some of my informants in Seyit Efendi Solidarity usually frequented these forums in order to obtain advice and build solidarity and sometimes forum members would visit school solidarities.

3.5 Data collection procedure and instruments

This section summarizes how and in which ways the data for the research was collected.

3.5.1 Field notes and Diaries

Most of the data I collected consist of field notes and diaries (see Appendix E and Appendix F for an example of each). While attending organisation meetings of Seyit Efendi Solidarity and urban forums I generally took notes at the time of the speech.

The meetings were open to community, and sometimes I was asked by my research participants to take notes in order to help them remember the main issues raised in the meetings and send the minutes to the email group. Being a fast typer was of great help to me, and in organised meetings I usually took my notes by typing. Sometimes, I both recorded and typed. In unstructured meetings where the group was not seated, I used a field notebook to take notes. At times, thinking that taking notes would be intrusive, I wrote diaries afterwards. In some situations, even taking notes may interfere with the situation or inhibit the participants (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). I wrote diaries for my visits to Kayabasi High School since most of my interactions were random encounters with students, teachers, or parents.

3.5.2 Questionnaires

In order to collect demographic data from Kayabaşı High School, I carried out a questionnaire and obtained demographic data from 127 students. The questionnaire aimed to understand where the students lived, why they chose to attend this particular school, time spent on commuting to and from school, means of transportation, and occupation of the parents. The questionnaire was developed as a supplementary tool for the qualitative study rather than as a principal research instrument designed for a quantitative study. Most of the questions are open ended questions that do not require an item analysis (Appendix G).

3.5.3 Interviews

I conducted semi-structured interviews with parents, community leaders, neighborhood residents, and teachers from schools that are to be affected by school closings and relocations. One parent, two teachers, two neighborhood residents, and

two school activists, one of whom was an architect and another a teacher, were interviewed. The interviews took from half an hour to two hours. The interviews were semi-structured interviews and they included broad questions regarding the involvement of the interviewee in the school issue. As the interviewee spoke, I narrowed down the question. Sometimes, I skipped some questions if the conversation flowed in a direction that was different than I expected but still seemed to provide relevant data. The interviews with the participants, except the activists, were carried out in 2015 and 2016, after relevant permission was obtained from Bogazici University Ethics Committee. The interviews with neighborhood residents and parents were carried out after spending more than a year with them. As I was already familiar with them and their case, the questions I asked to them aimed to crosscheck my field observations rather than to obtain new findings. However, the interviews provided valuable insights as I was able to obtain unified data as opposed to the discontinuous and embedded field data. I believe that these two types of data complemented each other. Interviews with activists were carried out first, in 2012 and 2013, when the research in its earliest phases. As the activists are publicly known figures and community leaders, they are cited by their real names upon their request.

3.5.4 Broadcast and printed materials

Furthermore, I tried to trace multiple discourses on the issue of school relocations by utilising a wide variety of materials such as press media news, official documents, press statements and booklets of school communities. These documents were particularly helpful in terms of obtaining information on the inaccessible sites and people, particularly on the the perspectives of policy makers.

3.6 Research participants

The focus of this research was not the perceptions of particular groups on a particular issue, but it was understanding a particular policy. It was not the ideas, perceptions, and experiences of people per se that constituted the final findings; but it was the analysis of these against the background of educational policy developments, scholarly studies linked to these developments, and policy texts and discourses. Since the core data for this research comes from the observation of particular events for which people gathered on a voluntary and irregular basis, I was not able to select my research participants except for the interviews. It was only for the interviews that I was able to select my participants. I interviewed six people in total. The aim of the interviews were mostly to test the findings collected through observation and to see if discontinuous and fragmented observation data resonated with the unified interview data. By its nature, in the observation part of the research, it was not possible to select the participants, but by coincidence most research participants in Seyit Efendi High School were women.

3.7 Researcher's role

The role of the researcher in a qualitative studies and policy analysis has always been a contentious issue sparking various debates. The ways the researcher conceptualises the notion of field, the participants and the researcher herself are all crucial considerations that shape the direction of the study. In my conceptualisation of the field, the participants, and the researcher, I mainly draw on the notion of “shifting locations” (Gupta & Ferguson 1997, p.38), which works in harmony with CCPEE and participant observation method.

In this respect, a primary concern of the researcher was attentiveness to the context in which policy is developed, negotiated, and implemented rather than prescribing which policy option would be more effective (Ball, 1995; Gulson, 2011). Therefore, the concern of the researcher while carrying out the research was not to come up with policy suggestions but present her own perspective on an ongoing policy domain, of which the author feels herself to be a part.

In contrast, sticking to the conventional idea of “the field”, which presupposes a clear-cut distinction between a familiar home, with which the researcher associates herself, and an unfamiliar field inhabited by the Other, fixes and essentializes identities, suppressing diversified forms of knowledge and complex understanding of phenomena. This way of putting the idea of “the field” also disguises or rejects the existence of power relations by failing to realize shifting and political nature of “the field”. To avoid this, what is necessary is to focus on the idea of *shifting locations* rather than *bounded fields*, an agenda which rejects the existence of the so called objectivity or impartiality, but embraces one which sees research enterprise as a form of “situated intervention” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997, p. 38).

3.8 Data analysis and interpretation

Data analysis and interpretation in qualitative research is an ongoing process that involves using open-ended data and requires the researcher to constantly reflect on the data, ask analytical questions, and write memos (Cresswell, 2003). Analysis of the data collected through case study and participatory observation involve a detailed description of the setting, followed by analysis of the data for themes or issues.

In analyzing data, I used the procedures suggested by various scholars, some of whom are Cresswell (2003), Marshall and Rossman (2006), Tesch (1990), and

Comaroff and Comaroff (2003). I first organised and prepared the data for analysis. That I took most of my field notes and diaries on my computer was a great advantage. When the typed field notes were added to the transcriptions of the meetings and interviews, a voluminous body of typed data was generated. In addition to the transcribed and typed data, I had field notes manually taken and printed materials such as bulletins, press statements, pictures, and reports. I first read through all the data to obtain a general sense of the information and to reflect its overall meaning. Cresswell (2003) recommends that the researcher think about the following: “What general ideas are participants saying?”, “What is the tone of the ideas?”, “What is the general impression of the overall depth, credibility, and use of the information?” (p. 191). Cresswell (2003) states that one technique used by qualitative researchers is writing in margins or start recording general thoughts about data at this phase. Being a fast typer, I already had typed notes for the meetings and interviews. While taking notes, I had simultaneously written my reflections on the issues that were being discussed at the meetings, such as why a particular person was talking about a particular issue or making a particular comment, a concept or theme that seemed to be salient at that particular occasion. While reading through all the transcribed data, these notes helped me to clarify the context. I first read the transcribed data without the comments and try to come up with answers to the questions raised above. Then I looked at my notes with the comments and checked if my answers resonated with the reflections written at the moment of note-taking. Sometimes, the reflection notes taken at the time of the observation lacked rigor as I did not have a general sense of the issue, which was the case with the reflection notes taken at the very beginning of the research. However, sometimes the notes complemented the general sense of the information particularly when they included

minute details that were not visible in the typed data but relevant to make sense of the overall context. Then, I started coding process. This process involved assigning the data into particular categories and giving a name to these categories. While doing this, Tesch's detailed guidance was of significant help. After getting a general idea, I picked one document, such as a press release or a piece of fieldnotes, and I went through the document asking what it is about. Rather than the explicit meaning, I thought about the underlying meaning. After I did this for several documents, I made a list of all topics and clustered similar topics. Then, I went back to the data and wrote the codes next to the pieces of the data. The types of codes I used were process codes, in other words what types of processes the data were mainly about. Three processes that were salient were urban transformation, desecularisation, and privatisation of education. Most of the data fell into more than one code or different codes followed one another in a very short piece of text. This was not surprising to me as my theoretical framework and literature suggested that social phenomena are co-constitutive, albeit not irreducible to one another. However, for practical purposes I assigned the data to one of the codes and decided to reflect the co-constitutiveness in the way I narrate the findings. Then, I assembled the data belonging to each category and performed my preliminary analysis. The main themes were identified during the coding process, but additional layers were added as the data were interpreted against literature and theoretical framework. As "sophisticated qualitative studies go beyond description and theme identification and into complex connections" (Cresswell, 2003), I utilised the three methodological operations suggested by Comaroff and Comaroff (2003) for a more complex and nuanced analysis of the data. These operations require subjecting the data to continuous analysis throughout the research, from the very beginning of data collection until the

moment of writing ends. These methodological operations can be summarised as follows:

- To map the substance of the phenomenal landscape on which any discursive flow is grounded.
- to follow the traces of that discursive flow, of its various signs and images, tracking the migration of the latter from their densest intersections to wherever else they may lead.
- to trace the passage of a discursive flow over time; this to establish what, precisely, is new about it and what is not, what are the relative proportions of rupture and continuity to which it speaks, what is unique and what is merely a local instance of a wider phenomenon. (pp. 168-171)

CHAPTER 4

PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS

This study looks into school relocation processes in Istanbul. By doing this, the study aims to understand the implications of the relocation of a school for its surrounding and the interaction between school relocation and urban transformation . Finally, the study seeks to situate the relocation policy in broader education policy making agenda. The research questions of the study are as follows:

1. What is the nature of the displacement involved in school relocations?
2. How does school relocation policy interact with urban dynamics of Istanbul?
3. How can school relocation policy be situated in education policy-making agenda?

Consistent with the research questions, this section presents the findings under three main headings.

1. The nature of the displacement involved in school relocations.
2. The interaction of school relocation policy with urban dynamics of Istanbul.
3. School relocation policy situated in education policy-making processes.

4.1 The nature of the displacement involved in school relocations

This section predominantly addresses the Research Question One and scrutinizes the displacement process involved in school relocations.. Research Question One was formed in the light of the international literature on school relocations which argued that central to school relocations or closings was displacement of certain populations. Moreover, local literature on the removal of public commons, albeit lacking a discussion on school spaces, argued that displacement was a crucial concern for the

populations associated with those spaces. Preceded by a brief comparison of the surroundings of the field schools, the issue of displacement is analysed under three main categories:

1. Urban transformation and displacement
2. The relationship between the neighborhood school and residential displacement
3. Displacement of the middle class

4.1.1 Field schools

The data for this study was gathered from two schools, one of them having a much more weight than the other as an eight-month fieldwork was carried out with the community of this school. Kayabaşı High School (HS) is located in Kayabaşı, one of the most luxurious districts of Istanbul. It is surrounded by luxurious restaurants, old middle class and upper-middle class settlements (*site*), new luxurious housing complexes, and a couple of shopping malls. Although there was much less neighborhood activism against the relocation of the school, in comparison to Seyit Efendi High School (HS), Kayabaşı High School's relocation was problematised by the urban forum of Besiktas, where the school is situated. Also, different from Seyit Efendi HS, Kayabaşı had a strong Alumni as it was an old school that was established in 1961 in a nearby neighborhood in Beşiktaş. The Alumni Association has a room in the school building and organizes various activities every year to keep its links with the graduates. Every year, the graduates gather in the school garden on the homecoming day. I joined one of the homecoming days and had the chance to observe how the graduates were attached to their school.

In contrast to Kayabasi HS, Seyit Efendi HS was a new school that was established in 2004 in the building of a closed Imam Hatip middle school. The school

did not have an institutionalised alumni association that was concerned about its relocation. However, Arguvan neighborhood residents, where Seyit Efendi HS was located, were enthusiastically resisting the school's relocation. Whereas Kayabasi was both a residential and a consumption district, Arguvan was more of a residential district and had a more middle class character. This feature is one of the reasons why it had more neighborhood resident support. Seyit Efendi HS had a parent's association but the association had good relationships with the school management and was silent in the face of school's relocation.

4.1.2 Urban transformation and displacement

The data for this section was collected from research interviews, press statement meetings attended by the researcher, student questionnaires, and discussions in urban forums. Research data demonstrate that school relocation policy resonates with current urban policies that displace particular populations from locations they have long been residing.

In one of the urban forums dedicated to commercialisation of schools and public spaces in Beşiktaş, the dwellers of the town expressed that they were going through hard times due to the construction companies aiming to displace them from their houses. Although the agenda was public assets and schools, the narratives of neighborhood residents explaining how disquieted they were with the changes in their environment pointed to the link between the schools and neighborhood displacement. A retired doctor who lived one km southwest of Kayabasi High School explained:

“I was living in Belediye Sitesi. There were 36 villas, 100 m² each, 3600m² in total. In front of the *site*, there was a 1500m² of public land transferred to the Treasury (*hazineye terk*). A construction company said that they have a construction plan of 85000-90000 m² in the area. Four Seasons and Astay set

up a fictitious real estate company called Kayabasi Real Estate. All of us [the residents] had been living in our houses for 35-40 years. We were residing in two-storey villas. They collected samples for drilling. The yellow envelopes [official letters] sent to us say ‘according to earthquake law, your houses are risky’. The envelopes were sent to the villas only, not the other apartments in Belediye Sitesi. 16 of the owners out of 36 gathered. We learned that Astay Construction company belongs to Ahmet Cekicci [a famous mafia leader in Turkey]. The remaining twenty owners sold their houses for 1 million USD each. And eight out of the remaining sixteen were sold for 1.8 million USD. (...) One morning, we woke up to find electricity, gas, and water cut off (...). One resident refused to move out and a week after the New Year’s Eve, on the 6th, bulldozers demolished the buildings. We went to the Municipality to see the demolition document, but they did not show it to us. They demolished the houses on the weekend and the area now is encircled by bars. Because we were clever enough to put some statements on our land registers, they cannot solve the issue by going to the court. They have wasted 50 million dollars including the bribes, but haven’t been able to fix it yet.”

Woman: We have similar issues in Kadikoy. What do you mean by “being clever”?

“We are living across Akmerkez in 90m2 houses and we want to live there and in 90m2 houses.”

Woman: [to the attendees] Remember Ulus. You have green space there. You bought these houses from state cooperatives (Field notes, Appendix J:1).

Half an hour before the man spoke, an architect explained that the removal of the schools was closely linked to the urban displacement in their surrounding:

“I see myself as a white-collar [worker]. Currently, I am living in my 8th apartment. It will be demolished too because [as we have been told] it is risky in case of an earthquake. I am homeless again. Right after the earthquake, I visited houses in Besiktas and explained the earthquake risk. Why have the officials become aware of the earthquake risks now, 15 years after the earthquake? 683,000 m2 of Zorlu [shopping mall] has been constructed on 83000m2 public land belonging to National Highways. All the schools are vanishing. It’s not only Kayabasi and the Polen School. There is Macka Akif Tuncel Vocational School too. Egitim-sen tried to get itself heard [about the issue.]. Schools set on fire in Ortakoy, Kabatas High School.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 2)

The narratives of other citizens who lived around the school were similar in that they suffered from the uncertainty and precariousness brought about by urban transformation led by construction companies working in collaboration with

municipalities and state authorities. The architect and a lawyer who was active in urban transformation and school relocation cases warned the forum participants that displacement of the traditional settlers was imminent, which according to them, was similar in some ways to the displacement inflicted on squatter house residents not so long ago. The architect commented about what had happened in Tarlabası pointing out the public silence about it:

“...When it comes to [urban] transformation, people in Kadikoy, Besiktas, and similar districts, should I say educated [people] or middle-class, those [people] looked down on these districts [squatter neighborhoods]. They said, ‘those are decayed places, transexuals live there, we cannot walk in the streets of Tarlabasi in the night’. We have fed these [urban transformation coalition].” (Field notes, Appendix J: 3).

The reflections of a resident from Tozkopran regarding Kayabasi community resonates with those of the architect’s. Tozkopran was a low-income neighborhood in Gungoren, a low income town of Istanbul but one of the most populated ones. Compared to other areas of Gungoren, Tozkoparan was less densely populated and was one of the greenest neighborhoods of Istanbul (Ergun & Gul, 2010). Also, it was close to the E-5 highway and a railway cut across the neighborhood, which made the neighborhood an ideal transformation area for urban policy makes (Ergun and Gul, 2010). In 2009, the Municipality of Tozkoparan initiated an urban transformation project which was met by resistance, but eventually deprived many poor people of the right to housing. After hearing in the forum the Kayabasi residents, all of whom expressed how unhappy they were with the recent urban renewal attempts which they thought were carried out with little regard for their lives, the man from Tozkopran commented:

“Here, I have been listening to a community who has no idea about the realities of the country. We have been experiencing these things [displacement] for the last five years. People in Besiktas were not even aware of him, when Ismet Tezel attempted suicide by drinking pesticides. Aunt Huri

died in Tokludedede when she was left homeless. You are talking about millions here, but there [in Tozkoparan] people are receiving 100TL as rent aid.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 4)

A woman from the crowd responded to the man saying, “how do you know that we are not aware of these?”. The man replied, “Being aware is not adequate, you were not with those people when they were getting kicked out.” This encounter not only pointed to the different aspects of displacement experienced by different communities but also to the class character of Kayabasi neighborhood, where some of the data for this research were collected.

Urban transformation was in the core agenda of Arguvan neighborhood as well, and residents often linked the relocation of the school to the urban transformation the neighborhood was undergoing. One of the reasons why, Arguvan Neighborhood Solidarity stated, they were against the relocation of Seyit Efendi High School was because they believed the school relocation was part of the rent generating strategies in their neighborhood (See Figure 3 and Figure 4). Just as it happened around Kayabasi, urban transformation in Arguvan was spearheaded by construction companies working in collaboration with municipal and state authorities and therefore, an indirect displacement with some kind of agency, was the case. The main boulevard named after the area, Arguvan Boulevard, and the streets were replete with construction work. Contractors would make agreements with homeowners, build their houses anew, and receive some of the land in return. Although many home-owners were happy with getting their houses renewed for free, those who felt confused and unhappy about the rapid change in the neighborhood were not few. There were fierce conflicts between some of the residents of housing complexes because legal consent of a certain percentage of residents was necessary in order for the contractor to redevelop the whole area. Moreover, some construction

companies pressurized the residents or misinformed them about the laws and legal procedures in order to persuade them to sign the construction deals. As one of the residents described it, ‘residents were forced to put their homes into circulation in real-estate market’ (Field notes, 2014). Also, major construction projects were underway in the district. A huge building complex including residences and a shopping mall was opened soon after I started the fieldwork in the area. Opposite Seyit Efendi HS, the public land of 50 acres belonging to a state university, was to be transferred to the Mass Housing Administration (see Aydın, 2014). The number of expensive restaurants and shops in the boulevard was increasing day by day.



Figure 3. View outside Seyit Efendi High School garden



Figure 4. View outside Seyit Efendi HS on the day it was demolished

Seyit Efendi Solidarity believed that the school's relocation could not be thought of as distinct from the transformation described above, and Seyit Efendi HS parents often voiced their concerns that the school land might be opened for investment in the future. All they relied on was not the urban change they were observing. In their encounters with official authorities, they were reminded that the land prices in the neighborhood were high. During municipal election times, they managed to arrange an appointment with the ruling party candidate for Kadıköy, whose chance of getting elected was low as Kadıköy was notorious in the eyes of some for being one of the strongholds of the main oppositional RPP. However the JDP was leading a dedicated campaign. Edibe narrated what happened at the meeting with the mayoral candidate's man who was responsible for educational affairs:

“He is the guy who managed the earthquake strengthening of the school. He knows everything about the school. He told us that everything was under his control and they could delay the relocation if we wanted. But he wanted us to help him in the election campaign. And both this guy and the mayoral candidate said to us, ‘do you have any idea about the land prices in that neighborhood?’” (Interview, Appendix J: 5)

Seyit Efendi Solidarity components’ conviction that the school relocation had to do with rent generation was visible in their press releases and discussions in the meetings. Almost all press releases included statements on the new basic education system brought about by Law No. 6287, popularly known as 4+4+4 system, followed by statements on urban transformation in the neighborhood. The following excerpts have been taken from the press releases of April and June 2014 respectively:

“Is there a demand for an Imam Hatip School in Arguvan? If the neighborhood residents are demanding the Imam Hatip School, then why build a dormitory? Why is the Ministry of Education allocating so much of its budget to Imam Hatip Schools? Are Seyit Efendi High School students being displaced to make a dormitory for the Girls’ Imam Hatip School or to create rent for construction companies? Do not our children have the right to continue their education in the place where they started, thinking that they were enrolling in a mainstream high school (*lise*)?” (Press Release, Appendix J: 6).

“And we have the issue of urban transformation, in other words rent generation (*rantsal dönüşüm*). With lands in urban centers becoming priceless and no empty land left, construction companies have now turned their attention to public lands. And under the rubric of urban transformation, public lands are being expropriated first by the state and then transferred to private companies. In a similar vein, we have learned that the land on which Seyit Efendi School is located has been expropriated. When we ask to official bodies why they want to relocate our school, we get different responses. They can be summarised as follows: “A reconstruction need has arisen regarding the subject matter land. A new planning scheme has been developed in order to redevelop the area in accordance with the needs of the town, and the subject matter land will be used to build a Girls’ Imam Hatip High School and dormitory and other buildings for community use.” (...) They say, “redevelop the area in accordance with the needs of the town”. How and in which ways has this need been defined?” (Press Release, Appendix J: 7)

Seyit Efendi HS Solidariy was not able to receive comprehensive official responses to their petitions, but they were able to obtain information in unofficial ways through their personal networks. They managed to contact one of the devisees of the land and arranged a meeting with her. Edibe, from Seyit Efendi HS, narrated how they learned the complex web of relationships and arrangements involved in urban rent generation process as follows:

“When the Imam Hatip School became too small for them, they used one of the floors of the annex building [would-be Seyit Efendi HS building] for the Imam Hatip Middle School. I remember the building. It was in ruins. The Imam Hatip building [next to Seyit Efendi HS] was in a similar condition. It was not in a great condition. [When we learned that the school would be relocated] We started to investigate the history of the school. We learned that the land used to belong to an association and a philanthropist [who established the association] donated the land. We accidentally obtained some documents meanwhile and we managed to contact some of the members of the board of trustees of the association. They said to us, “MoNE contacted us and told us ‘we want to demolish this building and construct an Imam Hatip instead. We will construct a huge building. Let us do it.’ We told them that we did not want to accept their request because our father granted this land as a school land. We want the school to stay here.”

Researcher: So, you contacted the philanthropist’s daughter?

“Yes, I met with his daughter. Then, MoNE officials told them that they would expropriate the land if the association did not accept MoNE’s demand. Upon this, siblings gathered and decided to offer a deal to MoNE. They say to MoNE, “this is a land of 12000 meters but 4700 meters is empty. You can build the new school there if you get the official permissions for us to use the empty land for commercial purposes.” (Interview, Appendix J: 8)

That was a bit of information they obtained verbally and they were not able to prove it. However, in late June, they saw in a protocol document accidentally that not all the donated land would be used for school construction, but a shopping mall would be built on a certain piece of the land. They also included this information in one of their press releases in June, as they were so sure that rent generation was part of Seyit Efendi HS’s relocation, although the information contradicted one of the few responses they received from the Istanbul MoNE (*Valilik*):

“Despite the vague and evasive responses we get during our face to face interactions with the official authorities, we have insisted on giving written petitions. We have gotten the following answer: “Your petition numbered 179857 has been investigated. The buildings to be constructed on the subject matter land are Girls’ Anatolian Imam Hatip High School and buildings for community use”. However, what we have heard contrasts with this answer. We have heard that The Ministry of National Education and Hursit Efendi Association made a contract to build a shopping mall on the empty land, which is owned by Hursit Efendi Association and situated adjacent to Seyit Efendi High School and Kalimni Girls’ Imam Hatip High School. As you can see, they are trying to send to exile the students of Seyit Efendi High School and Kalimni Girls’ Imam Hatip High School. The right to education, guaranteed by the Constitution, is being violated for the sake of rent generation or on the pretext of the new education system called 4+4+4.” (Press Release, Appendix J: 9).

Although the school communities believed that they had a right to be where they were, the official attitude did not match with their perceptions. Both urban authorities and education officials displayed a contrasting view regarding the relocation of particular populations. Discourses of the decision makers in the urban and educational realms show parallels in that both types of decision makers emphasize the unsuitability of the constituents to be removed from the areas that they claim to have a right. The Prime Minister of the time made the following comments while he was seeking media support against civil society organisations criticizing and organizing against urban renewal projects (2010 in Aksoy 2012, p. 104):

There are elements making Istanbul ugly, elements that harm and even destroy our historic values, our cultural assets. These now need to be removed, and this requires serious media support. If there is sympathy with these [elements], if they are protected, then it would be difficult for us to carry on with our job.

The then General-Secretary of the Istanbul 2010 Agency vented his frustration over the consumption culture in the historic district, where people of lower classes go shopping, using the following expressions: “we still market our plastic wares and shoddy merchandise in the historic peninsula, and we can’t bring Gucci or Prada

there” (Altug 2008 in Ibid). Istanbul Director of the Ministry of Education made the following statements in an interview while trying to explain the rationality of the relocation of three schools located in an upmarket district of Istanbul (Öğünç, 2010):

“Etiler Tourism Vocational School is quite an ordinary building. Levent Girls’ Vocational School and Kayabasi High School are also like that. Levent Girls’ vocational School is trapped among skyscrapers; it is a building that doesn’t fit with the texture of the city”.

Öğünç: It seems that vocational schools will be affected the most. Children who attend these schools usually come from poor families and they prefer these schools to learn skills so that they can get a job because they know that they won’t be able to attend university. Distancing the vocational schools from the city... Doesn’t this mean depriving them of their right to education?

“Why do you think so? Is it possible to get to any high school without vehicles? What we will do is to empty/clean the main arteries of the city. This is a contribution to relieve the city traffic. Far beyond disadvantaging people, it will bring lots of advantages.” (Appendix J: 10)

According to A. Aksoy (2012), who comments on such discourses, the populations, practices, and cultures that fail to comply with “the culture of hyperconsumption” (p.102) are considered too unpleasant to suit the image of Istanbul as a glittering global city. The data set out above resonates with Aksoy’s argument in that the priorities of decision makers and citizens who are concerned about their schools and residential settlements contrast.

4.1.3 The relationship between the neighborhood school and residential displacement

“If neighborhood schools bind people to a neighborhood undergoing change, closing them is a powerful lever to nudge people out” (Lipman, 2011b, p. 223).

Research data show that a neighborhood school was a factor that connected some of the residents to the neighborhood. A common conviction held by school communities and residents interested in what would happen to the neighborhood school was that the relocation of the school would contribute the displacement of the hitherto dwelling residents. However, the initial claim of MoNE was that schools in residential areas were not to be relocated. The 2009 Press Release of MoNE stated:

Ministry of Education (MoNE) has decided that the estates of MoNE, which are allocated by the Treasury and are not needed as school land for they have remained among industrial, business, shopping, and such areas and which have lost their residential district character, can be sold according to the article 51 of Basic Education Law, and the revenues generated can be used to build or renovate school buildings. (MoNE Press Release, 2009; Appendix J: 11)

According to the data obtained from a survey conducted among 127 Kayabasi School students, the Kayabasi is a school that has most of its students living in areas that are associated with the district. At least 29.9% of the students live in areas known to be within walking distance of 5-25 minutes to the school, with 55% of these students having lived in these areas since they were born and around 16% of them for more than ten years. Moreover, when the students were asked the reasons why they chose to attend that school, proximity was cited as the chief reason (Table 3).

Table 3. Reasons for School Choice

	Responses		Percent of Cases
	Number	Percent	
Proximity	47	27.5%	40.2%
It's a not a vocational school	26	15.2%	22.2%
Because of my GPA	25	14.6%	21.4%
Education is Good	20	11.7%	17.1%
Upon Recommendation	9	5.3%	7.7%
I had to	9	5.3%	7.7%
Friends	7	4.1%	6.0%
I Like the Area	6	3.5%	5.1%
Siblings attending the school	4	2.3%	3.4%
Don't Know	4	2.3%	3.4%
Family Member or relative graduates	3	1.8%	2.6%
Don't like the Schools in my neighbourhood.	3	1.8%	2.6%
Other	8	4.7%	6.8%
Total	171	100.0%	146.2%

Note: Outputs rounded to one decimal place.

Furthermore, according to the survey data obtained from Kayabasi students, 15,9% of them walked to school in the mornings, and 30% stated that they returned home on foot (see Table 4). The data also as shows that the majority of the students used public transportation and the (Table 4) it took 42,5% of Kayabasi students between 5-15 minutes to get to school, and for 39,4% travelling time in the mornings was between 16-30 minutes (Table 5).

Table 4. Means of transportation to school

VEHICLE TO SCHOOL				VEHICLE TO HOME			
Vehicle		Gender			Gender		
		Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total
Bus	Number (N)	25	34	59	24	29	53
	% (of total)	19.8%	27.0%	46.8%	19.2%	23.2%	42.4%
Walking		8	12	20	15	23	38
		6.3%	9.5%	15.9%	12.0%	18.4%	30.4%
School Bus		13	5	18	13	3	16
		10.3%	4.0%	14.3%	10.4	2.4%	12.8%
Parent's or Neighbour's lift		8	3	11	1	1	2
		6.3%	2.4%	8.7%	0.8%	0.8%	1.6%
Walking or Bus		2	2	4	3	2	5
		1.6%	1.6%	3.2%	2.4%	1.6%	4.0%
Bus or Taxi		2	1	3	1	0	1
		1.6%	0.8%	2.4%	0.8%	0.0%	0.8%
Bus and Parent's Car		2	1	3	2	0	2
		1.6%	0.8%	2.4%	1.6%	0.0%	1.6%
Bus and Subway		1	2	3	0	0	0
		0.8%	1.6%	2.4%	0%	0%	0%
Subway		0	1	1	1	1	2
		0%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	0.8%	1.6%
Other		0	4	4	1	5	4.8%
		0.0%	%3.2	%3.2	0.8%	4%	
Total		61	65	126	61	64	125
		48.4%	51.6%	100.0%	48,8%	51,2%	100%

Note: Note: Outputs rounded to one decimal place. Data presented as number and percentage (of total). Missing cases for the first and second categories are 1 and 2 (number) respectively.

Table 5: Traveling Time to School.

	Time	Number of Students	Percent (%)
	5-15mins	54	42.5
	16-30mins	50	39.4
	31-45mins	8	6.3
	46-59	6	4.7
	1hour	6	4.7
	Total	124	97.6
	Missing	3	2.4
Total		127	100.0

The spatial distance created between the neighborhood and the catchment-based enrollment school can be indicative of the transformation within the neighborhood.

The narratives of Seyit Efendi Solidarity exemplify this bond (December, 2013):

“A significant number of Seyit Efendi Students dwell in our neighbourhood. The school might be relocated by those who take the advantage of the semester break. Will students and parents be able adapt to such a change? Are they taking into account the costs and burden such a hasty change will bring about for our parents? Seyit Efendi High School cannot be demolished! This intrusion into Seyit Efendi High School right after [the conversion of] Sipahioglu [primary school] arouses suspicion. Education is a priority issue for our neighborhood residents. Parents who will not be able to find schools in their own neighborhood might feel compelled to leave the neighborhood. Huge gated communities (siteler) built around our neighborhood and such interventions in the schools lead us to think that a social transformation is being imposed on Arguvan.” (Press Release; Appendix J: 12)

In Arguvan, some of the parents had bought their houses many years ago, thinking that they could send their kids to the high school in the area. For example, one of the mothers expressed her concerns regarding the relocation of the school when we were delivering pamphlets to invite people to the school demonstration:

“We bought our house eight years ago. I knew then that my son wouldn’t be able to get into an Anatolian High School [exam-based enrollment school]. It was obvious from his academic performance. I knew he could only get into a lycee [non-selective high school]. While buying the house, I thought my son could attend this school.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 13)

As exemplified by the parent’s concerns, catchment-based enrollment neighborhood schools were the most viable options for residents who could not afford to send their children to private schools or who preferred to save the money for university education in case their children failed to get the adequate score for a desired public university program. Distancing the neighborhood school, according to the, would impact the existing residents.

4.1.4 Displacing the middle class

Both the arguments of the experts interviewed and the narratives of the research participants pointed to the displacement in the middle class neighbourhoods.

Although their discourses were intertwined with cultural arguments, their narratives of middle-classness interlacing with them being secular citizens, this section will first explain why many of the research participants were characterised as belonging to the middle class and then provide an account of how research participants conceptualised the displacement through schools as middle class citizen displacement.

4.1.4.1 The middle classness of the research participants

This research adopts an operational and relational approach to class. Hence, by middle class the research does not refer to a fixed category defined by a single factor such as income but take it as constituted by research subjects’ sociospatial and material experiences in Istanbul. For example, in the field school Kayabasi, the majority of the students came to school by bus rather than more costly means such as

taxi or school bus, attended shadow schools (*dershane*) -after regular school hours- for which they had to pay but were not able to attend private schools, and could spend time in the food court of the nearby shopping mall or in nearby cafes that appealed to those looking for inexpensive food but eating in the restaurants on the main road was out of the question for many except few.

Moreover, the spatial evidence - the location of the students' houses and their schools- gives clues as to their socioeconomic status. According to the study of Atac (2012), which draws a map of Istanbul's segregation map based on socioeconomic status, "there is no spatial contiguity between the lower and upper classes in Istanbul and middle class spaces function as a protection or a transition zone between these two classes" (46). Also, the study shows that the coastal lines are occupied by the highest income groups, allowing no groups other than the elites of the city penetrating these areas, and socioeconomic status tends to drop as one moves from these areas to the inner lands. Kayabasi HS and Seyit Efendi HS where the fieldwork was carried out were located not far from the sea, within a walking distance of about 15-20 minutes, and can be characterised as the transition zones between the elite districts of the city and more modest middle class settlements. Most of the residents who live in close vicinity of the school send their children to private schools. However, as is the case with most upscale districts of Istanbul, Kayabaşı neighborhood is surrounded by illegal residential areas populated by people who can only afford state schools. Although these are illegal residential areas, they are relatively better off compared to the other residents who live in other parts of the city since the area was opened for habitation earlier and some have been able to gain land ownership, albeit not building permission, as a result of electoral compromises

during the 60s to 90s. Also, service workers who have to live in the area, such as the janitors of the flats or servants, are known to send their children to such schools.

Previous studies describing the socioeconomic composition of the neighborhoods dealt with in this research also informed the way this research conceptualised their class character. For instance, a study that linked electoral preferences to socioeconomic status and views on secularism described Arguvan neighborhood as a “high income” neighborhood that historically voted for secular parties (Guida & Tuna, 2010).

Most of the schools constituents were self-defined middle classes as this was the way they would define themselves and their community. The urban communities residing in the vicinity of the schools and the school constituents such as teachers also believed most of the students were of middle income status although what they were heavily relying on was income and occupations of the parents. The guidance and counselling teacher at Kayabasi High School defined the socioeconomic status of the school’s students as follows:

I can say that 60% of are of middle class. I can say that the parents of 10% are teachers and another 10% are military officers. And there’s also small business owners. There are many students whose fathers are janitors. Only few of them [the students] are of high socioeconomic status. I guess it’d be only around thirty of them [out of 900]. (Interview, Appendix J: 14)

The school teachers also agreed with the guidance and counseling teacher while defining the socioeconomic status of the students. As for the jobs of the parents, they mostly described traditional middle classes such as teachers and artisans such as furniture sellers or electricians. It was also mentioned that some students were the children of janitors who lived nearby, which makes me define the school population as mixed income predominated by middle classes.

Also, the way Kayabasi students were perceived by the students of Solo High School, who were sharing Kayabasi's school building due to the reconstruction of their school building, told me a lot regarding their class status. When I first visited Kayabasi High School, I found myself observing two schools due to the fact that eight hundred students from Solo High School, in a nearby district had been temporarily using the Kayabasi's building. They used the building after 12:30 p.m., when Kayabasi's class hours finished. When I broached an issue on Kayabasi HS, Serintepe students consistently pointed out to the differences between themselves and Kayabasi students. Some of the differences they recounted was that they found Kayabasi HS students spoilt, their interaction with the teachers too rude, and girls wearing too "comfortably" and fashionably. Parents I talked perceived the Kayabasi HS population to be financially better off and believed that the behaviour of their children changed after moving to the Kayabasi HS building and interacting with its students. Some examples they gave were that the kids wanted to buy more clothes, to go on excursions with the school during public holidays, and to spend more time in the nearby cafes that appealed to students and in the luxury shopping mall looming over the school.

A Seyit Efendi parent answered as follows the question as to why she selected to live in her current neighbourhood and how she would define the school's socioeconomic character:

"It is a school attended mostly by children whose parents are civil servants. And the teachers are good. We had heard good things about them. They care about the kids at least. That's one reason. And it is walking distance and there's transportation options. And of course a very important thing is that there are kids at the school who are not living in outliers. I mean there's an income balance. That's very important."

Researcher: Income? You mean they are of similar income backgrounds?

“Yes, similar. (...) There were kids from lower income groups but middle class was dominant.” (Interview, Appendix J: 15)

In the Seyit Efendi HS circle in Arguvan, neighborhood residents and school initiative members often drew the distinction between themselves, whom they described as “middle income” (“orta halli”) people and the emergent Islamic bourgeoisie becoming increasingly visible in the neighborhood. They regarded the new residents of Arguvan as belonging to upper classes and it was a common belief among them that this new class was leading luxurious lives due to their business connections with the government. The way Seyit Efendi HS parents and Arguvan residents expressed their thoughts regarding the new location of the school revealed much about their class status and this status was perceived by others. While refusing to relocate, Seyit Efendi Solidarity members often coined the term “exile” to refer to relocation. Fikirtepe area, where Seyit Efendi HS was to be relocated, was a squatter neighborhood that was to undergo urban renewal. However, renewal did not start for a long time. Upon the reduction in the number of legally-permitted storeys, construction contractors cancelled the contracts they signed with the home-owners and sought ways of signing new deals with them. Also, not even every home-owner had signed the construction deal, even according to the previous regulation, because the conditions had not been clearly explained to them and they had been asked to sign vague deals (Field notes, 2015). As some neighborhoods had already signed agreements according to previous regulations, they had already moved out of their houses thinking construction would start soon. Those who had refused to sign the vague deals were made to leave their houses due to the cuts in services such as electricity and water and insecure atmosphere in the abandoned neighborhood. Thus, Fikirtepe neighborhood was an isolated area full of evacuated or demolished houses. This situation made Seyit Efendi parents feel insecure about the area and they were

unwilling to send their children to the new school's neighborhood. In parent gatherings and demonstrations they showed the predicament of Fikirtepe neighborhood as one of the justifications for why Seyit Efendi HS had to stay in Arguvan. However, not all the parents or Seyit Efendi Solidarity activists were cautious about the language they were using while talking about Fikirtepe. Some women would speak in a condescending and even denigrating manner although this was not common to the majority. This disquieted some people in Fikirtepe. Where Seyit Efendi HS was to be relocated was formerly occupied by another school called Velipasa İlkogretim Okulu. Because the number of students decreased due to population decrease in Fikirtepe, Velipasa was closed down and the remaining students were told to enroll in another school in Kadıköy. The school was knocked down and a new building for Seyit Efendi HS was constructed. Seyif Efendi Solidarity members wanted to build links with former Velipasa parents and encourage them to reclaim their previous location and study in the new school built for Seyit Efendi HS students. In this way, they thought that anti-relocation solidarity would become stronger, pressure on official authorities would increase, and the building Seyit Efendi HS was to be relocated would be utilised by a community who was associated with the district. This issue often came up. Once, at one of the routine organization meetings, when one Seyif Efendi Solidarity activist broached the issue again, one of the parents said, "They are not so much willing to meet with us. They said to a friend of mine, 'they [Seyit Efendi community] are looking down on us. They do not say good things about our neighborhood'". Nobody looked surprised upon the information they got from the parent although they refused the claim that they were looking down on Fikirtepe community. Their silence was partly because of unacknowledged class differences between the two communities.

As a researcher who spent eight months with Seyit Efendi Solidarity, I was able to visit their houses and gain insights into their lifestyle and consumption patterns. Most of them lived in their own houses and could enjoy the consumption patterns associated with middle class citizens to varying extents. During the exchanges with Arguvan residents who visited the activists and joined the demonstrations, I tried to elicit clues regarding the class status of Seyit Efendi HS students. Most of them were vocal about it and would say that a considerable number of them could be classified as middle class.

4.1.4.2 Displacement of Istanbul's middle classes

A common conviction shared by urban and school activists is that one function school relocations serves is the displacement of the traditional middle classes who dwell in the centre of the city. For instance, Mücella Yapıcı, an architect, an urban activist, and a prominent figure in urban grassroots movements in Istanbul, who also has long been struggling against school sales and relocations, lucidly explained one of the prime dynamics of the process in the interview with the researcher:

Yapıcı: Urban transformation has started in districts particularly where *rant* [*rent* or *undeserved income*] is high. In towns such as Kayabasi, Besiktas, Kadıköy, Tesvikiye. And this happened very slyly, in an unnoticeable way. Working skillfully, they've caused people to leave their neighborhoods. They declared some areas earthquake-risk areas they offered money to homeowners, etc. A serious destruction and change of lands have taken place, and they've caused people in these districts who lived on their labour to abandon these areas. As the *rant* increased, the rents increased as well. Homeowners were not able to meet the construction or renewal cost of their new buildings. The middle class tenants [are affected] as well. Because all these towns, I mean, in fact, are places inhabited by the educated, to some extent – should I say the urban bourgeoisie?- by middle classes let's say. This is [transformation] is a bit different from [what is taking place] in illegal settlements.

Researcher: Urban?

Yapıcı: Not urban.. Let's say middle classes. I mean educated people, or the elderly.

Researcher: But urban transformation also affected lower and lower middle class districts and many others. Like Hisarustu [a district where Kayabasi takes some of its students due to proximity].

Yapıcı: That's another thing. I am talking about something different. what I mean is the districts that are planned, regular, and are known to be inhabited by those as urbanite Istanbulers who have long been living in these towns.

Researcher: You mean the transformation that is currently going on?

Yapıcı: Yes, the one currently going on. To realise that transformation, you have to displace these people. There are many Nisantasilers, Tesvikiyans, Kadikoyans, whatever, who live on their labour but who are not the emergent middle classes. Some of them live on their salaries; some have retirement pensions. They have a house and live in the area. That's all they have. Some have small shops around. There are various measures to displace them, but one way is to make the life in these areas expensive. How can you make it expensive? If you cannot find a state school to send your kids, if they relocate the state hospital to far away, life becomes expensive for you. In this way, you send these people to the towns where you sent the working class, to the estates built by the MHA. That's why the buildings of the historical, traditional schools are being sold. This is the most invisible, the most unnoticeable, the most critical and the most dangerous aspect of the urban transformation. Urban transformation is a total privatisation of the public spaces of the city. (Interview, Appendix J: 16)

These comments were expert comments since Yapıcı was also the general Secretariat at the Istanbul Branch of the Chamber of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB), but the ideas of mainstream residents did not great differ from hers.

Many school activists and neighbourhood residents acting with them echoed similar feelings about how they felt that one side to school relocations was to displace the traditional middle classes and open the space for those who have the resources to invest in the real estate market. When we were watching the documentary Ekumenopolis in front of the school, at one of our night school watches, after the school building was evacuated, Gamze, a member of Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity said (while watching the demolition scenes in Başbüyük):

“We should have been in these places when they were being demolished. We should have intervened. We failed to see them [when they were getting kicked out]”.

Researcher: Did you know about these places during those times?

“I did. But we thought differently then. We thought they were undeserving occupants of state lands. We didn’t consider it as right to shelter. But actually [I’ve realised that] those people built the houses there for shelter, not for profit.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 17)

Through her comments remorseful comments, Gamze was empathizing with previously dispossessed residents and alluding to the idea that it was their turn. Many neighborhood residents echoed similar feelings and some clearly expressed that urban transformation was proceeding into middle class neighborhoods. Eda, an Arguvan neighborhood resident and Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity activist, was clear about this while saying, “urban transformation started in the poorest neighborhoods, but now it has come to our districts.” During school activism days, she and her husband were also struggling against the deals that were being negotiated between the residential complex (*site*⁹) residents and construction companies. They inherited their small house from their grandparents. The *site* had a park inside and they believed that the park would vanish if they signed the deal since, they thought, the contractor would seek to get as much land as possible for buildings. In one of our conversations at a café in the neighborhood, she recounted how she felt traditional middle classes in the neighborhood were being pushed from the district by contractors:

“They wanted to buy our house too. Most of the residents say, ‘I will sell the house and move to Kurtkoy; or I can move to my summer house in Erdek’ (a town known for being inhabited by retired civil servants.) Because the houses will be expensive. They say it’s gonna be 650.000(TL). The montly maintenance payment will be 350 (TL). The contractor will earn from this too.”

⁹ Site means residential complex usually encircled by walls. Some are similar to gated communities while the earlier versions do not have such strict security.

Researcher: Who's buying these expensive houses then?

“JDP people. They have all become richer. While I was studying at the uni, there was a guy in our class. He was designing the traffic signs of the municipality. He earned like hell. When you look at his appearance, he was like you and me. (...). Urban transformation started in poor neighbourhoods. But you see! Now it has come to middle class neighbourhoods.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 18)

A similar observation was voiced by Edibe, who narrated the displacement attempts in the northern tip of Arguvan. However, while Eda was of the opinion that the imminent displacement was more of a matter of changing wealth dynamics underpinned by loyalty to a particular organisation, Edibe believed that in addition to financial differences, there was an unsurpassable lifestyle difference between the newcomers and traditional settlers:

“But Peony Mall has been erected there, and now they are trying to evacuate the neighbourhoods in the south of Peony. They are saying to fifty or sixty-year-old neighborhoods, “go away”. They are trying to take away their houses.

Researcher: (...) That area is inhabited presently, right?

“Yes. Our friend Elif lives there. But because people are a bit aware, they are not giving their houses.”

Researcher: So, contractors want their houses?

“It's more than wanting. They are craving. They don't want one house, they want the whole area.”

Researcher: Are they trying to persuade people one by one?

“No, people are not persuaded. Do you know why? Because people have large tracts, they do not accept one-to-one ratio. For example, a person who owns one flat wants three [from the contractor] in return.”

Researcher: Is it because of the garden area?

“Yes, because the garden area is big. They want three flats in exchange for one. Contractors do not accept this. For how long can people resist? If the state declares these areas as disaster zone, as it did in Fikirtepe [Seyit

Efendi's new location], saying to them, "these are 50-60 year-old buildings, if you do not come to a consensus with the contractors, then I will declare the area disaster zone", people will forcibly give their houses [to contractors]. This is the reason for the structural change here. Now luxurious buildings are erected in Arguvan. The cheapest of them is sold for one million Lira. You know, most Turkish people do not have that much money. How can they afford to buy these houses? An average civil servant, a doctor, an engineer, or an architect does not have that much money. Then who's buying these houses? Who is buying these houses? (...) And we see extremely luxurious cars. Cafes have been opened under these newly-built apartments. These cafes don't have parks and these cars are parked alongside the main boulevard and sidestreets. We have no peace left in the neighborhood."

Researcher: Who do you think is buying these houses? You have just raised the same question.

"One thing is certain that foreigners are buying them. And I believe those who make easy money and have good relationships with the government are buying them. Otherwise, it is not possible to afford such expensive houses. Is it that easy to pay one million for a simple house!

Researcher: Do you know anybody who has bought one of these houses. I mean one of those people who make easy money?

"I have no business with them. What am I supposed to share with a person who makes easy money. I cannot become friends with them. I cannot talk much with them because the biggest difference between them and us is our socio-cultural characteristics. The way we look at the Republic, the way we dress, the way we live." (Interview, Appendix J: 19)

Due to urban transformation projects, since the 2000s, thousands of home owners and tenants have been forcefully displaced from their neighbourhoods (Yılmaz, 2013) where they had lived for decades. Most of these areas consisted of illegal settlements (see Bartu-Candan & Kolluoglu, 2008) that the state had until then tolerated as part of its informal public housing policy, decayed neighbourhoods with settlements of differing tenure statuses (Kuyucu & Unsal, 2010) or Romani neighbourhoods (Karaman & Islam, 2012). However, displacement takes a different form in areas where settlers have legal ownership although various laws have been

passed to grant the state with extensive expropriation powers, limiting home owners' legal recourse or appeals on the basis of right to private property.

Indirect nature of displacement was also expressed by experts who at times gathered with neighbourhood residents at meetings organised to discuss the situation of the neighbourhood school, which would after a certain time result in discussing the overall transformation in the neighbourhood. A lawyer who lived in Besiktas since he was born tried to convince the meeting participants that displacement was not far away as in the following:

“In the past earthquake risk zone ended in Maslak Sitesi. These areas were not inhabited by well off people. Or they declared public lands or graveyards as risk zones. (..) And then, first they declared some neighborhoods as crime centers. The neighborhoods predominantly populated by the Kurds, such as Ayazma. But there were neighborhoods that resisted, such as Alibeykoy. Now, middle class districts are faced with urban transformation in an indirect way.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 20)

People were unhappy not only due to the risk of being displaced but also due to the indecent living conditions that could possibly be induced by urban transformation projects involving schools. Following the lawyer's speech, Omer, who lived behind the Police Training School (around 1 km from Kayabasi HS) expressed how unhappy he was that the school was sold as he believed life would become harder for them:

“Difficult times will be awaiting us after the sale of the school. Behind the school is residential area. The projects they plan for this area are resident projects for about two-thousand or three thousand people. Population density will increase. They need to plan the transportation, education, and health services in the area accordingly. Once population density increases that much, there will be no solution.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 21)

Following, Ömer, a woman talked about how the smell coming from the sewage of the nearby luxurious restaurants disturbed her when she visited Kayabasi's main street to go to the bank office. Although the street has always been busy, a conspicuous change is that it has been lined with luxurious restaurants in the past

five years and traffic has increased dramatically. After residents spoke in turn how disquieted with the changes in the neighbourhood, a man said angrily: “Is money everything! We should coin money in the mint (*Darphane*) and give all of it to them. All we want from them is to let us some peace (*yeter ki rahat biraksinlar bizi*)” (Field notes, 2015).

4.2 The interaction of school relocation policy with urban dynamics of Istanbul

This section analyzes how school relocation policy interacts with the urban dynamics of Istanbul and mostly addresses Research Question Two. This research question was formed as a result of the preliminary data collection in the first stages of the research, where the main focus was to have a broader understanding of the school relocation process. During this phase, school constituents who were involved in raising awareness on the predicament of Istanbul schools expressed that the policy of relocation was closely related to urban processes in Istanbul. In addition, a large body of international scholarship on school relocations argues that relocations are intertwined with the urban dynamics of the geographies where they take place. For instance, Lipman (2011a, 2011b, 2014) argues that there is a close link between the HOPE IV Urban Regeneration Project and Renaissance 2010 Education Reform that stipulated mass closing of Chicago schools. The interaction between school relocations and the urban transformation in Istanbul is analyzed under three main categories:

1. Redefinition of city spaces through education.
2. Operationalisation of religion in transformation projects.
3. Schools as the symbols of the Republic.

4.2.1. Redefinition of the city through spaces of education

While urban transformation had a crucial role in determining the predicament of the schools, research data demonstrates that schools were also constitutive of the urban transformation. This transformation was expressed by the informants in an entangled manner, often making reference to the cultural and class characteristics of the neighborhood. Also, the narratives of the residents was infused with spatial defensiveness.

4.2.1.1 Interlacing of cultural and class discourses

Transformation of school spaces was interpreted by the school community involved in activism and many neighborhood residents as part of hegemonic strategies to reorganise the neighbourhood, and residents in Arguvan would at times react to this loss of spatial privilege and status with territorial defensiveness.

The discourses of Arguvan residents pointed to the intertwinedness of the dispossession and changing social composition in their neighborhood. In this regard, two observations repeatedly appeared during the fieldwork. School communities and neighbourhood residents involving in activism thought, first, school relocations or sales were part of a larger de-secularisation project aiming to restructure the secular districts of the city. They believed that both the neighbourhood schools and the neighbourhood itself were gradually being handed down to the new Islamic bourgeoisie in various ways. One way, according to them, was to sell the school land to investors who had good relationships with the central government and start luxurious consumption projects on the land. In Seyit Efendi HS initiative, various members claimed that the conversion of the school into an Imam Hatip school was an intermediary stage to open the school land for private investment. Also, at the

organisation meetings, many participants voiced the rumors that the IH school would later be relocated and the whole land would be used to build a hotel or a shopping centre. Their convictions were influenced to some extent by the replacement of every bit of a public space throughout Istanbul by shopping centers (see Figure 5).

However, seeing a couple of official documents confirmed to some extent the doubts of Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity. On a hot, sunny June afternoon, I was sitting with the parents and neighborhood residents in the school garden, under some shade.

Meanwhile, a young director known for his work on urban transformation and right to the city was filming interviews with parents. A man accosted us, seeing that there was video shooting, and told us that the director was not allowed to do the shooting. He had a blue folder in his hand, and upon our question he introduced himself as a member of the Parents' Association of Kalimni Girls' Imam-Hatip School. An argument started between Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity members and the man. While Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity members were arguing that it was unfair for them to be kicked out from the neighborhood when a huge campus had already been built for Kalimni Boys' Imam Hatip School, the man was arguing that the school land had already belonged to them and that it was stolen from them with the 8-year uninterrupted schooling law closing middle schools. In the end, to prove that the law was on his side, he showed us some documents including a signed protocol between Istanbul Directorate of the Ministry of National Education and Hursit Efendi Association, the association who had donated the land. According to the protocol, the new school was to be built on a land of 8400 m² while the entire land on which the school was located was 12866 m². The whole land, the protocol stated, was divided into three tracts, two of which (8400 m²) were occupied by Seyit Efendi HS and Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip HS. The association, as the donating party, allowed these

two tracts to be used by the Ministry of Education for 99 years on condition that the third tract was not expropriated by the state but given back to the association.

Another condition was that the MoNE applied to the Ministry of Urban Planning to obtain construction permit for the third tract given to the Association. The third tract the association wanted to obtain was the unused land covered with bushes and trees next to Kalimni Girl's Imam Hatip. Long before the protocol was signed, Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity had been claiming that the donating party was interested in getting some of the land in return for giving the rest to the state for building an IH.

Despite applying to official authorities several times requesting that the school's land status be clarified and what would be done with the 4466 m² of the land be explained, they were not able to receive answers until 20 January 2016, when they read the news on an online newspaper. The newspaper reported the change in the master plan for the land adjacent to Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip HS by referring to the official document that was in display in the Istanbul Directorate of the Ministry of Urban and Environment Planning, where I visited once again to see the official documents.

According to the document, the status of the land of 4466 m² was changed. The new land was divided into two, one of which was defined as "commercial and residential land" and the other of which was defined as "land for religious premises (Mosque)".




Figure 5. Cartoon by Erhan Candan

Another common observation was that the residents believed a long-term consequence of the school relocations would be the change in the demographics of the neighbourhoods, which would be possible by pushing out the traditional middle classes of the school's vicinity. According to the residents, this strategy involved, inter alia, reducing the number of secular schools where they could send their children and making the area less affordable for the traditional middle classes through increased rent and housing prices, as a result making them move to more affordable areas and thereby opening the neighbourhood to the new Islamic bourgeoisie. While opening school land for wealthy Islamists was possible through the friendly relationships between the official bodies such as the municipalities and the central government, the change in the demographics of the region was a consequence of the changing class structures in the society. There were multiple interpretations by residents and parents. While some of them emphasized the hostile relationships between political Islamists and themselves, implying that they were not desirable dwellers according to the government, others believed it was a matter of economic power relations. A lot of neighbourhood residents and parents who came to

talk with us on school watches would start with how unfair it was to relocate the school and then go on to express how they felt the neighbourhood was being transformed. A woman who visited one of the Seyit Efendi school watches commented, “they want to make this boulevard an Islamic Begonia Boulevard and they will stroll along the boulevard in their chadors”. The classed character of her analysis is indicated in her analogy between present’s Bağdat Boulevard and Arguvan Boulevard as its to-be Islamic version. Begonia Boulevard is a high consumption locality in Kadıköy appealing to upper middle classes in particular and it is also known as a staunchly secularist neighborhood.

That the secular public schools in their neighbourhoods were being sold and then pushed to less desirable areas of the city was interpreted as a clear indication of the way in which secular public schools were made to deteriorate by deliberate spatial neglect. Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity interpreted their relocation as “exile” since they were sent to an area that was under urban transformation. Most of the houses in the area were abandoned for years and their situation was unclear. The deals between the contractors and house owners were taking longer due to the changes in the regulations. Homeless people and Syrian refugees started to dwell in the abandoned houses, with which parents were not happy. Also, landslides and construction accidents in the area aggravated the worries of the parents (see Figure 6 and Figure 7).



Figure 6. View inside from new Seyit Efendi HS building in Fikirtepe



Figure 7. View from the garden of new Seyit Efendi HS building in Fikirtepe

The following excerpt from a press statement of Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity also reflects the interlacing of class and cultural arguments:

Arguvan is threatened by an understanding that regards our cities and neighbourhoods as some kind of wealth accumulation tools rather than our life spaces. In its 12-year rule, the government has created new wealth classes. Because of its geographical location and the characteristics of the

neighbourhoods surrounding it, Arguvan is situated on a decent spot for the expansion of these segments [the new wealthy]. There are rumours that MHA has agreed with GATA [Gulhane Military Academy of Medicine] to build housing complexes in its [GATA's] garden. Similarly, there are news that Marmara University of Fine Arts might move out from our neighbourhood. When you put all these together, it can be understood that we are faced with a plan that seeks to transform the identity and composition of the neighbourhood. We will not give Seyit Efendi High School, we will not let our neighbourhood be looted. (Seyit Efendi Solidarity Press Statement, 2014; Appendix J: 22)

It was claimed that the MHA was involved in the claimed commodification of the two public buildings mentioned above by Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity. The rector of Marmara University had confirmed that they were negotiating an agreement with the MHA (Aydin, 2014) although the Grand National Assembly would refuse the existence of such a negotiation in its response to a written petition of the MP who was also following Seyit Efendi case (Written Petition No. 30824082/610). The MHA's key role was often brought up during the school relocation discussions. In her interview with the Istanbul Director of the Minister of Education, columnist Pinar Ögünç (2010) had the following conversation that epitomised MHA's crucial role as a state actor:

Ögünç: Is it the change made in 2003 in the National Education Basic Act that has made it easier for schools to change hands?

Director: There are always legal means for bartering. In the end, we are not selling public buildings via auctions. We are doing this through the MHA.

Ögünç: But there are cases of sales before MHA....

Director: Yes, this might have happened. After the sale, the status of the land can be changed by the Greater Metropolitan Municipality. The Law of Mass Housing grants such authority. It is easy for us as we are just bartering. Normally, divesting the land off its school land status is not an easy thing; on the contrary, it is one of the most difficult things ever. (Appendix J: 23)

Two years after this interview, Ögünç (2012) wrote again on the critical role of the MHA in urban transformation and school relocations, asking the question: "Are we

going to wake up one morning to see Türkiye has turned into a country called TOKİye¹⁰?”

Seyit Efendi HS was not one of the schools that were included in the initial list that was claimed to be on MoNE’s for-sale list. However, of the twenty-two schools which were included the list, thirteen are located in four municipalities that have a reputation for being staunchly secular and opposed to many policies of the government. Two of the remaining nine – also located in secular middle class neighborhoods- are among the oldest girls’ schools and widely recognised as monumental schools of the secular Republic. Although unaware of this list and distribution, just like Arguvan residents, many of the residents and parents I interacted during my fieldwork were concerned with the school relocations and transformations in their neighbourhoods and felt penalised by the government for systematically voting for the secular main opposition party in municipal and general elections. Whether these neighbourhoods were really being punished for the political choices of their population or not, the hostile relations with the central government significantly figured in the school communities’ interpretation of their educational problems. In the eve of municipal elections, Seyit Efendi Solidarity was trying to make the best of the political atmosphere and talking with officials to prevent the school’s relocation. The way Saniye recounts her encounter with the ruling party Kadıköy candidate and his people is worthy of quoting:

“It was the [municipality] election time, so we decided to go and talk with all the political parties and ask for support [to prevent the relocation]. We wanted to explain to them how difficult it was for our children. We went to talk with the JDP candidate as well. I forgot his name. He introduced us to his man responsible for educational affairs. I think his name was Mehmet. He told us that we were being misled by some, the area belonged to the Association, and the Association granted the land conditionally and could do whatever they wanted. He said to us that we were being directed by other

¹⁰ TOKİ is the Turkish acronym for the Mass Housing Administration.

groups, especially by the MPs [from the RPP] who came to support us. And things like that. He said, ‘if you promote us in the desk [that parents set up in front of the school], we will help you.’

Researcher: “The [parent solidarity] desk in front of the school?”

“Yes, they gave us the brochures and stuff like that which they used in their Kadıköy election campaign. He said to us, ‘If you explain our projects to people – we will do good things – we will help you then.’ And I said, ‘First clarify our school’s situation, and we will see what happens. If you are doing right things, why not! We said ‘we’re not your opponents. We would not deny good practices; that’s not a good behaviour. Let us have a look at these [brochures]’ But right after the elections, it was on Sunday, on Tuesday a fax was sent to the school administration, telling them to immediately evacuate the school at the weekend.

Researcher: Was it a legal fax?

“It was from the Ministry of National Education.”

Researcher: “But you were trying to obtain a legal document at the time [to be able to go to court.]

“Yes, but I saw the document. We were at the desk those days with other parents. The Vice Director came to us, showed us the document, and said that we had to evacuate the school at the weekend. We saw it but we weren’t able to get a picture of it.” (Interview, Appendix J: 24)

Apart from being punished, Saniye believed that the school’s relocation was closely linked to the transformation of the neighborhood:

“We always said this, both [Seyit Efendi and Kalimni Girls’ IH] schools should be rebuilt, and people can go to whichever school they want. But there’s no [secular boys’] high school left in Arguvan. It seems that their intention is to transform the face of Arguvan. That’s it. They want to transform. As the mayoral candidate had told us, there are very expensive lands here, where they can build glamorous shopping residences. [They think that] the local community who is currently living there can be pushed out. How should I say? They can be exiled due to the circumstances. The same is the case for my house [where I’m a tenant]. If they decide to rebuild this apartment, the costs will be too much for me. Therefore, retired people who are living here can no way afford the new costs. They will have to get a house in the outskirts and move there. This is what they want to do in our case [in Arguvan]; to change the face to some extent. That is what it seems like.” (Interview, Appendix J: 25)

A participant in a Beşiktaş meeting for schools pointed both to the middle class character of the town and the political conflict between the town residents and the central government, believing that this might constitute one factor that makes them unwanted dwellers:

“You might be thinking that you have been local Istanbulites for generations, you are indigenous, and you have money. And therefore, [you might be thinking] ‘we will not get kicked out of Besiktas, we will not get deterritorialized if urban transformation is to take place in the town’. But I think one thing has been made clear about Besiktas residents. Besiktas might not be a political neighbourhood but the government understood after Gezi that the neighbourhood can be dangerous for itself. (...) We used to walk in the streets of Besiktas during those days and people would invite us to their houses, giving us food; they were trying to help us. Thus, the government finds Besiktas as a threat. For this reason, if they have an urban transformation plan for the town, they would seek to get rid of this threat meanwhile. They can displace you and send you away.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 26)

The socio-cultural change, for which school communities and neighbourhood residents held urban transformation largely responsible, was also emphasized in Besiktas. At one of the meetings for schools, a speaker who believed that material dispossession went hand in hand with socio-cultural change remarked:

“They will claim that the value of your house will increase and it will become a better house. Will they do it for free? No, the law says that they will only pay demolition compensation. You will have to pay the rest. In other words, you will give your house and you will own nothing. It equals to buying a new house. When you give your house, you have to pay in advance a certain amount of money and get loans for the rest. In other words, the new law offers you what you already can do; it offers nothing new; it promises nothing new. And there is not guarantee that you will get a new house, or your new house will be on the same spot, you have no priority. If you have money, you can buy it, if not you cannot. Just like what happened in Sulukule, you might have to live 45 km from the city. Maybe you will move out of Istanbul. Maybe you will not be able to afford it, you will say to yourselves ‘I cannot live here any longer’ and leave the [neighbourhood]. What is offered to you is desperation. There is no guarantee that you will continue to live here. Socio-cultural structure is also entirely changing. There will remain nothing of the socio-cultural environment in which you are living today.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 27)

4.2.1.2 Spatial defensiveness through spaces of education

While explaining why hitherto residing Arguvan residents preferred to live in Arguvan and how the settlement dynamics are changing, Edibe made the following comments in which she mentioned culture and class at the same time, in an entangled, territorial, and somewhat complicated manner:

“There’s one thing I would like to emphasize. These are my personal opinions of course. I am talking about what I have experienced. The way people chose where to live depends on their culture. I mean if you want to increase your quality of life, if you want to be into arts, sports, theatre, books, and education you want to stay in the centre of the city. You want to stay in old neighborhoods. But if you haven’t developed yourself, you go to Dudullu, Cekmekoy, or New Camlica. Isn’t it surprising? Because Umraniye has been filled up, they have to go to these places. They cannot come here because they cannot afford [to buy/rent a house] here and they cannot adapt to the culture here. Who can afford [to settle] here? The conservative new wealthy. The conservative new wealthy want to dwell in the centre of the city. They want to dwell in Begonia Boulevard. They want to dwell in Arguvan. They want to dwell in Nisantasi, Cihangir. The wealthier of them want to live by the Bosphorous. They do not want to live in Ikitelli. They come [to these places] because of what has been lived here [yasanmislik]. But this has to do with one’s culture, with developing oneself. Some people say to me, “If I were you, instead of having bought one flat in Arguvan, I would have bought three flats in Kurtkoy and enjoy my life with the rent I get from the two.” I feel like saying, “You cannot enjoy your life, you would buy another house”. How can he enjoy it? What is he going to do with all that money? The only place he would enjoy is *kahvehane* [traditional tea house.]” (Interview; Appendix J: 28).

On the one hand, Edibe implies that it is the modern lifestyle culture that makes Istanbul’s particular locations desirable and attract the new conservative and wealthy dwellers, while on the other, she implies that some people cannot live in these neighbourhoods due to cultural difference. Whom she considers as unable to live in Arguvan and similar neighbourhoods are those who cannot afford Arguvan, but she also thinks that there is a group who cannot adapt to the culture in such neighbourhoods. She refers to both taste and economic class although she would consider the new Islamic wealthy class considerably different from the established

middle class in terms of taste, which she expressed many times during our interactions.

Statements of Edibe as to why she preferred to live in Kadıköy rather than the bordering neighbourhood, Üsküdar, are as follows:

“I do not like the cultural atmosphere in Scutari. The social structure, the chaotic atmosphere (karmasiklik) there, That the area has not achieved any progress. The most distinctive characteristic of Kadıköy, what distinguishes it from Scutari is this: Because in the past Kadıköy was predominantly inhabited by [non-Muslim] minorities, a European culture has been formed here. And, the summerhouses of Ottoman pashas used to be here, from Suadiye to Tuzla. The culture here is different as it was inhabited by an elite stratum of the society. A modern life, a history of modern life attracts me. 15th-century-like life of Scutari does not attract me. Modern structure of Kadıköy, gender equality and freedom of ideas here, its cafes and being able to enjoy the cafes in peace attract me. These privileges do not exist in Scutari.” (Interview; Appendix J: 29)

Interestingly, Saniye also compared Kadıköy to Üsküdar, when I asked why she preferred to live in her current neighbourhood. Unlike Edibe, Saniye moved to Istanbul six years ago, but placed Scutari against Kalmni and explained the rationale for her preference:

“I moved here from Izmir. First, this spot is close to my husband’s workplace. Second, I wanted it to be a place where I have freedom. Because Istanbul is a bustling city. Izmir is more modern, there’s more freedom and comfort. Everywhere, in all its districts you can live freely. Even in the outskirts you are relatively free. We wanted it here too. ‘My son should be able to have a decent life, but I shouldn’t have to limit myself either’ I said. ‘I shouldn’t feel having to wear a jacket [on my top]. Because in Scutari you see a significant number of veiling population. We chose here because it is near his workplace, and it’s a more modern, a more convenient location; a place where people can talk and dress more freely. But now, things are changing. Both here and in Arguvan- I spend four-five days of a week there – there are many veiled people.” (Interview, Appendix J: 30)

4.2.2 Operationalisation of religion in transformation projects

A theme that emerged from the data is the insertion of religious discourses and symbols in the transformation projects. At a meeting where an urban planner

presented on the history of Arguvan and its surrounding, referring to the 1980s, the architect made the following comments:

“Eymen Topbas [Istanbul Provincial Head of the Motherland Party] erected the mosque in Kucuk Camlica, on a conservation area [sit alani] and construction began in the surrounding of the mosque. The surrounding was empty before. Then, Bilfen [a private school] was built. It was built illegally. And then, villas were built on the skirts of it. Then, to the left of Bilfen [Private High School], Doga Private High School was built.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 31)

In the beginning phases of their organising, Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity avoided foregrounding the issue of conversion to Imam Hatip school most of the time and emphasized the rent involved in Gordon HS’s relocation because some members wanted to attract conservative residents and parents, whom they thought were less likely to cooperate. The cautious attitude of Seyit Efendi constituents was informed by their experiences of previous urban conflicts in which urban resistance movements were often portrayed by the government as a reaction of a group of non-religious people defying religious conventions or disrespecting Islam. This strategy treated resistance movements regarding various urban issues along a dichotomy of the religious and secular, thereby alienating non-seculars or pro-government citizens from the movements. The attempts of Seyit Efendi Solidarity to avoid the issue of conversion to religious school failed many times and created a symbolic distance between parents. One Sunday, when there was a parents’ meeting at school, Seyit Efendi Solidarity decided to hold a forum on school’s relocation. Their intention was to involve more parents in the resistance, which they believed would help them to prevent the relocation that could take place any time, if not at the end of the term. Around fifty people most of whom were parents gathered in a nearby park because they were not allowed to gather in the school garden. When a parent, a university professor started to talk about the issue of conversion to religious school, two

headscarved women left the park. Another headscarved woman left the park, saying “it seems their intention is different. They seem to be totally against Imam-Hatip schools” after a man said,

“I do not mind the school being relocated, my house is in Fikirtepe [the area relocation area], it would be easier [to get to school] for us. But my my concern is that the school is being converted into an Imam Hatip school. (...) The number of girls with headscarves is increasing in public schools.” (April, 2014). (Field notes, Appendix J: 32)

The lawyer of the Solidarity was also disquieted by the man’s speech and, in an attempt to change the atmosphere, he expressed how he felt that exclusionary discourses created a divide between people who should be in solidarity in order to protect their rights. Then, when he started talking about the violation of the right to the city and looting of public land in various parts of Istanbul, a dispute broke out between two women. All the crowd seemed to be impressed by the lawyer’s speech and one of the parents, said to a parent with a headscarf, shaking her head, “you see what’s going on!”, The women responded, “why are you saying this to me? I don’t want these to happen”. All these conflicts took place in less than fifteen minutes of time and almost all of the veiled women except two who were active in the Solidarity had left by the end of the forum (March 2014).

Similar confrontations between the JDP local governments and environmental activists took place in urban resistance movements in the area. Most of the leading activists in Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity were simultaneously active in an environmental movement working against construction attempts in a nearby grove, in the bordering municipality that was governed by the JDP. The local JDP government started building a mosque in the grove, which would arouse public outcry at national level. The protestors claimed that there were many mosques in the area and mosque was just a subterfuge to open the grove for future construction

whereas the JDP mayor initiating the construction would say, as quoted in Daily Sabah on October 27, 2014, “the protests have nothing to do with nature or environmentalism, but it is politicizing the issue, intolerance against religion and mosques.”

When Seyit Efendi relocated to Fikirtepe, parents and some neighborhood residents protested the new condition and one of the points they raised was how they believed the relocation of the school to open space for a religious school served as a subterfuge. I joined them that day and had the chance to observe the first day of the school in its new neighborhood and new building. Related to how religion is both instrumentalised in and intrinsic to the relocation of their school, they stated in their press statement in September 2014:

“We are aware that they wanted to demolish Seyit Efendi High School building despite our well-grounded objections in order to create construction rent, although they sought to give the impression that the demolition is to construct an Imam Hatip High School. We know that this [demolishment] is the first step of a massive construction rent generation in our neighborhood. We are aware that with 4+4+4 policy, they aim to kill two birds with one stone.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 33)

When the legal land status of the empty plot next to Kalimni Girls’ School was announced, religious buildings as a recurrent theme came into the fore once more. As the parents had suspected long before and as stated in the protocol between the MoNE and Hurşit Efendi Association who donated the land, the empty tract of 4466 m2 adjacent to Kalimni Girls’ Imam Hatip HS was given back to the Association and the legal status of the land was changed in a way to allow commercial use. According to the plan, however, a seemingly small portion of the land was allocated for a mosque. Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity was no longer that active, but they gathered in a short time and tried to organise in order to object to the decision within the legal duration of one month. On one Saturday, they tried to collect

signed petitions from bypassers on Arguvan Boulevard, gathering in front of the empty land. This time, parents and neighborhood residents were more cautious than before in order not to make any mention of the construction of a mosque or involve in any discussion of Imam Hatip. They believed that the mosque was again an excuse to implement the project with less conflict and resistance. During my visit to them on that Saturday (February 2016) one of the parents told me:

“We don’t make any mention of the mosque or Imam Hatip. We say we are against [the construction of] a shopping mall. They might put a small mosque here but for what purpose? Girls cannot become imams, so they don’t have to rehearse in the mosque” (Field notes, Appendix J: 34)

Their flyer solely emphasized the issue of shopping mall and and loss of a public space, saying:

“A new construction plan has been issued by the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning in order to convert the land next to Hukukcular Sitesi. According to the plan, the status of the land allocated for education has been changed to allow the construction of shopping malls and residences. All the land was donated for educational use and a school (Kalimni Girls’ Imam Hatip Lisesi) is situated on two-thirds of it. What the Ministry is trying to do is to take away the one-third and commercialise it. We have time to object to the plan. (...) Why are we objecting? We do not need a shopping mall in our neighborhood. We need a school. Until 2013, on this land, stood both a mainstream high school and an Imam Hatip high school. A new school should be built on this land for hundreds of students whose school building was demolished and who were sent to Fikirtepe and are unable to return. If this change [in land status] is realised, it will precipitate the commercialisation of other public spaces in Arguvan.” (Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity Flyer, 2016; Appendix J: 35)

The government’s tapping into religious sentiments can be considered as a strategy similar to what Clarke (2010) describes in the context of Britain: “there has been a continuing search for the conditions that would enable a new hegemony – one which would rest on increasingly segmenting populations through dynamics of inclusion and exclusion” (p. 348).

4.2.3 Schools as symbols of the Republic

*Woman from Arguvan: Why are you doing this? We are all Turks!
(Ne anlamı var, hepimiz Türküz!)*

*Man from Kalimni İmam Hatip Association: But we are Muslim
Turks! Muslim Turks! (Müslüman Türküz
ama! Müslüman Türküz!*

As a secular state school, Seyit Efendi HS had symbolic significance for the neighbourhood residents, parents, and Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity. Most of them expressed resentment about the impact that the removal of the school would have on the neighbourhood and equated it with the transformation of the Republic. For them, modern schools as one of the main pillars of the modern Republic, which was called by an MP from JDP as “90-year advertising break” (Yılmaz, 2015), were subject to relocation in part because they did not carry the same historical significance for the nation’s new rulers as they did for themselves. At a parent meeting carried out after an official parent gathering at the school, one parent explained how the removal of Seyit Efendi HS from the area was linked to the transformation of the neighbourhood:

“What did you used to say to the bus driver to tell him which bus stop you wanted to get off at? You’d say Kastellorizo Bus stop. Now the name of that stop is [has been changed to] Imam Hatip stop. If you want to change society, you first change the words. They are preparing all of us [for this]... In fact, they are aiming for socio-demographic change. What they want to change is the status [of the area]. The [new] school has a modern building but unsuitable surroundings. This [relocation of Gordon HS] is an attempt to change the modern structure of the neighbourhood.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 36)

Other secular state schools in the neighbourhood were also symbolically important for some of the solidarity members and Arguvan residents’ resistance was not limited

to the struggle over the relocation of Seyit Efendi HS. In the previous year, the solidarity attempted to prevent the conversion of a secular middle school on Arguvan Boulevard, about 1.5 km from Seyit Efendi HS, into an Imam Hatip middle school but ultimately were unsuccessful. The school building is currently used by an Imam Hatip middle school, the students of which are bussed in from other districts. One of the activists, however, insisted that they could still do something about it as the school had symbolic significance. She explained:

“That school is almost a hundred years old, and it is a special school. To celebrate the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Republic, ten schools were built and this school was one of them. Many people still refer to it as the 10th Year School. Many elderly people in this neighbourhood graduated from that school. There are 80-year-old people who are graduates of it. The school is as old as the Republic. If the number of the students from this neighbourhood was not sufficient, as a historical school it should be converted into a cultural centre or informal education centre. Why are you bussing in students for free from other districts?” (Field notes, Appendix J: 37)

Attempts to build an Imam Hatip schools were interpreted by a considerable number of people as attempts to construct new symbols and transform the surrounding of the school. A commonly uttered term by both Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity members and Arguvan residents who reflected on the issue of the school’s relocation was “monument”, denoting the new Imam Hatip schools. When it was unclear what would happen to the land of the to-be-relocated Seyit Efendi HS, a retired teacher in the solidarity commented: “They are going to build an imposing Girls’ Imam Hatip high school. They are erecting glorious symbols. We didn’t believe it then, but they built one [Kalimni Boys’ imam hatip high school] alongside E5 [the main highway]”. Three weeks before Seyit Efendi HS was demolished, the then PM, who attended a Ramadan dinner held for Kalimni Imam Hatip Alumni, hinted at the imminent tearing down of the school in his lengthy address to the community:

Imam Hatips emerged as a form of resistance. Imam Hatips are in fact the embodiment of the rebellion of a particular view. [It is] the uprising of a particular thought; [it is] an outcry... God willing, the [schools in] Astoria will be demolished soon. In Arguvan, if God wills, a new Kalimni Imam Hatip School will be constructed. The architecture of the new school will be profoundly different. Our girls will study there next year. It will have superb architectural style. I am not an architect, but I have aesthetic taste. Architects draw up plans and I approve them after analysing them. (Erdogan, 2014) (Appendix J: 38)

The last day of the school, which happened to be graduation day for seniors, included several novelties that were symbolically significant. At the closing ceremony, a performance was made by a *Mehter* band, which were the musicians of the Ottoman Army, instead of a modern music band (See Figure 8). When the presenter announced the performance, saying, ‘Would you like to take a short trip back in history?’, the students responded with an audible, albeit not very loud, ‘Noooo!’ which the presenter ignored and went on to say: “Okay then, let me call out the City Band (*Mehter* Band)”.



Figure 8. Closing ceremony on the last day of the school

A Seyit Efendi Solidarity activist, Elif, was so disgruntled that she burst into tears when I sent her a picture of the ceremony with the Mehter band. Many of the school activists were convinced that the ceremony was planned that way deliberately. Elif was present when the furniture in Seyit Efendi HS was being moved out. She recounted: “they were throwing away the pictures of Ataturk into the waste bin. I was so infuriated that I lost my temper. I crazily yelled at a man. I later learned that he was the chief police officer”. Elif referred to the closing of the school as ‘the closure of an era’, in reference to the Republican Era (See Figure 9).



Figure 9. Demolishment began in Seyit Efendi High School

Opposing to Seyit Efendi’s removal from the neighbourhood had a symbolic and historical character for some Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity Activists. Edibe commented:

“When people said we won’t be able to win [the struggle], I told them that what we were doing was leaving a historical record. In the future, ten-twenty years later, fifty years later, after the demographic characteristics of Turkey has changed, people will ask. When they encounter educational and cultural ills, people will ask, “did the people of that era, the neighbourhood residents just watch when schools were being converted into Imam Hatip schools, when the quality of education was being lowered, when a thousand two hundred students were thrown away?”. Now, when you google Seyit Efendi, you will see our press statements. These are historical documents. That was what I wanted to achieve. It might be difficult to win during the rule of government, but should we give up just because of that? No, that’s not possible.” (Interview; Appendix J: 39)

Bilgi (2014) calls modern Turkish school as a “symbol of the new era” and states that the location of the modern school and its architectural features contrasted with those of Ottoman schools called *mahalle mektebi*. “The removal of the school physically from the precinct of the mosque and any other Islamic sites marked it as novel” (p.365). Although Seyit Efendi parents believe that mosque shown in the new master plan on the land given back to the Association is a subterfuge to construct the shopping mall with much less resistance, it is telling when interpreted in the light of Bilgi’s study.

4.3 School relocation policy situated in education policy-making processes

This section aims to situate the school relocation policy within the broader education policy agenda in Turkey. The section analyses how and in which ways school relocation policy fits into, complements, or contradicts the general tendencies in education policy making. These issues are analysed under four main categories:

1. Voluntary withdrawal from public education
2. Arbitrariness and legal ambiguities
3. Consent to school relocations
4. Efficiency and instrumental rationality.

4.3.1 Withdrawal from public education

One of the most frequently uttered sentence by parents was, “are there any schools left. They haven’t left any schools.” [Okul mu kaldi ki! Okul birakmadilar ki.]. This spatial neglect, according to them, would make the residents look for alternative ways of gaining access to secular and more quality education and in the end force them to send their children to private schools, which would in turn deteriorate their financial situation. At an address to the community in an urban forum, a Seyit Efendi HS parent expressed in a press statement on June 18 2014, how the uncertainty created by the school’s relocation made some of the students leave Seyit Efendi and enrol in other schools:

“After the relocation decision, the motivation of the students, teachers, and school management was severely damaged. Education activities at our school have been terminated in practice due to the different news regarding the fate of the school. They say, ‘you will relocate this week’ and then they delay it and say, ‘you will relocate next week’. They have uninstalled the smart boards in the school. Because of the uncertainties tens of students have transferred to other schools. Who is going to pay for the results of all these irresponsible deeds? Attempts to accelerate the relocation by saying, ‘construction companies are pressurising us’ have stolen one year from our children. The greed of the construction sector for profit keeps devastating our parks, schools, and the future of our children.” (Press Statement, 2014; Appendix J: 40)

The press statement says that tens of students already transferred to other schools and Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity were convinced that school’s removal from the neighbourhood would result in the long run an increased preference for private schools by parents, according to parents transfer rate to private schools was not high yet. In Seyit Efendi HS, a couple of parents transferred their kids to private schools in the middle of the academic year while some of them were visiting private schools nearby to hear about the conditions and prices. For parents, immediate transfer rate to private schools was not high when I asked about it. According to their observations,

the rate was less than 10%, around 5-6%. However, the transfer rate they estimated was directly related to the school's relocation. They believed that the school's relocation in the long run would encourage private schooling as there would be no mixed-sex schools left around. They expressed their concerns regarding the issue in one of the press statements:

“As all mainstream high schools (genel liseler) have been closed down, Seyit Efendi High School has been converted into a girls' technical school. In our neighbourhood, we no longer have a school that appeals to boys and no school that provides academic [college preparation] education. We know that Anatolian High Schools have now replaced the mainstream high schools that used to provide academic education in the past. We believe that in the near future, the Ministry of National Education will abolish high school entrance exams and revert to catchment-enrolment system. In such a case, where will the neighbourhood students who want to attend a school in the neighbourhood go? Nedret Hanim [Girls'] Anatolian High School [a girls' Anatolian school in the neighbourhood] does not enrol boys. Our kids have been left with no option but to attend Imam Hatip high schools that have besieged our neighbourhood or high schools. Are they doing this on purpose?” (Press Statement, December 2013; Appendix J: 41)

This press statement was made about six months before the introduction of the new high school placement exam (TEOG) that made all schools exam-based. Rather than converting Anatolian schools into catchment-based enrolment schools, all schools were converted into exam-based ones. However, the exam system introduced spatiality by linking low performance highly to geographical location and making Imam Hatip schools spatially more accessible. According to Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity and Arguvan neighbourhood residents who were unhappy with the recent education reforms, the new exam system encouraged parents to enrol their children in private schools. After the school was relocated to Fikirtepe, it was opened on September 15 accompanied by the protest of Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity. They were not allowed to enter the school garden, but they gathered in front of the school to point out that they were not happy with the new location of the school and the new education reforms that facilitated the relocation of their school. Transition to private

schooling was one of the issues Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity raised in their press statement on the opening day of the school. This time they linked it directly to the TEOG exam:

“With the 4+4+4 education system, they first closed all the mainstream high schools, and now they are converting middle schools into Imam Hatip middle schools one by one. In this way, while the children of poor families have no chance but to select Imam Hatip schools or vocational schools, children of middle class parents are being encouraged to enrol in private schools. Now, the grievances brought about by TEOG are not due to technical hardships (*teknik sikintilar*). These grievances are due to the the fact that the majority(85%) of our students have been forcefully placed in Imam Hatip or vocational high schools. Parents who do not want to send their children to Imam Hatip or vocational high schools and who are financially capable have been anxiously enrolling their children in private schools. We no longer have the mainstream high schools that are free and that prepare our children for higher education. We no longer have the mainstream high schools where our children can enrol without taking exams and access without school buses.”
(Press Statement, Appendix J: 42)

The above mentioned comments of Seyit Efenfi HS Solidarity were preceded by their unhappiness with the relocation of their school and how they believed that 4+4+4 education system was intertwined with urban rent generation. With transition to 4+4+4 schooling system and the abolishment of high schools that enrolled students based on catchment area system, the relationship between neighbourhoods and non-selective high schools in their vicinity was cut off to a significant extent since students were solely placed according to the scores they got in the annually-held nationwide high school entrance exam. The new policy had various repercussions, but three of them were particularly problematized. The neighbourhoods whose schools were turned into vocational schools were not happy since education in these schools meant less chance of entering a 4-year university program due to the vocation-centred curriculum. For the students of the neighbourhood who wanted to have university education, such a transformation meant they had to get into Anatolian High Schools whose instruction increased the

likelihood of entering a university. However, the unhappiness of these communities did not translate into a major mobilisation, partly because conversions were made in a piecemeal way and parents were not able to respond to the rapidly-changing policies. Saniye expressed how she felt about the conversion of Seyit Efendi into a vocational school first and then how her opinions changed later:

Researcher: “Your school was converted before it was relocated. Did you think nowadays why it was converted?”

“I never thought about it”

Researcher: “Why?”

“I don’t know. I never thought about it. It wasn’t my concern. I was working so hard; I was busy. I didn’t have much knowledge about these things and I didn’t read much about such issues. All I did was to follow the news. And people were inured to such things. The education system has been changed many times. The curriculum has continuously changed. We were fed up with these. (...) But I was like, maybe there’s a demand for a vocational school. I even considered this probability.

Researcher: What is your opinion about the conversion now?

“Now, I believe that they are wiping out the schools that provide education for free. You become aware of things when you become an insider. In the past there were schools where you could gain access based on your address; now this accessibility has disappeared. Now they give you the opportunity to study if you’re willing to travel to different locations; the conditions have become tougher. For that reason, those who have the money go to private schools, while those who do not can study only at Imam Hatip schools. On the other hand, some vocational schools require high scores. Also I’ve realised, when I examined what’s going on, that those converted into Anatolian high schools have changed in name only; inside the schools nothing has changed other than that. I mean education system is not changing. The number of teachers does not increase. They do not provide education at the level of Anatolian high schools.” (Interview, Appendix J: 43)

Anatolian Schools, which existed before the policy change but fewer in numbers, required higher exam scores due to high demand. In cases where the neighbourhood high school was converted into an Anatolian High School, neighbourhood students who failed to get adequate exam scores would not be able to

automatically enrol that school, which would formerly have been possible due to the catchment area enrolment system. Therefore, these students would either enrol in a nearby vocational school or an Anatolian School located elsewhere if their exam scores allowed. The new schooling system in both cases directly translated into weaker relationships between the school and its neighbourhood not only because the students had to enrol in schools further from their neighbourhood, but also because fewer of those coming to the neighbourhood's school tended to be from the area. Increased travel time and cost were among the biggest difficulties the parents and students had, which was a common field observation in Kayabasi High School. A teacher from Kayabasi high school answered my questions regarding what happened to neighbourhood students after the conversion of the school into an exam-based school:

“Now that it's exam based, some of them [neighborhood children] managed to get into [Kayabasi] but not all of them.”

Researcher: Which schools have they gone? Do you have any ideas regarding this?

“No, but mostly vocational schools. You know, the regular vocational schools.”

Researcher: Where are these vocational schools?

“Buyuktasli [a nearby] vocational school. It has both an Anatolian section and a normal section.”

Researcher: Were those who used to come to Kayabasi directed to Buyuktasli Vocational School?

“Definitely, they are going there [Buyuktasli]. Low income parents who live around Kayabasi now send their kids to Buyuktasli Vocational Trade School or Recel Girls' Vocational School.” (....)

Researcher: But in the past you [Kayabasi] took into account GPA while enrolling students?

“Yes, they used to say so, but I don’t think that it was that important. Children with very low GPA could enroll as well. They used to say there was a GPA limit, but it was not applied strictly.” (Interview, Appendix J: 44)

The third case, conversion of the neighbourhood school into an Imam Hatip high school, aroused public uproar in secular districts of Istanbul, as epitomised in the case of Seyit Efendi HS. A widespread belief among the residents and parents in urban transformation areas was that conversion was an excuse to open the school land for investment in the future. Residents in such districts believed it would cause less opposition among both the school constituents when a piece of land belonging to an Imam Hatip School was privatised due to the allegiance between the purportedly conservative school constituents and the government. Another common belief was that the school was transformed into a Imam Hatip school to penalise the neighbourhood and deprive them of free public education. Saniye believed that this penalisation was carried out in a revanchist manner. At the organisation desk she came across many hostile situations in which pro-relocation people would accost and tell them that they were happy seeing Saniye and her friends in such a situation as they were filled with anger stemming from the 28 February days. Saniye gave an account of her pre-relocation and after-relocation experiences as follows:

“When you look at the general profile of people living in Arguvan - of course there are headscarved people- but such a big Imam Hatip school. I don’t think there could be demand for such a thing. When I go there [Imam Hatip School campus built after Seyit Efendi’s demolishment], I see at least thirty school buses. I am sure that at most fifty of them live in Arguvan and walk to school. I haven’t counted one by one; I just rely on what I see. I see kids walking after classes finish. It is written on the school buses. A lot of them are coming from far away places. From Umraniye, Sarigazi, and other places. They are bussing the students. As far as I know, the school has seventy boarding students. Was such a grandiose building necessary? I don’t think it was. What we needed Anatolian schools. Actually, catchment schools, but we can no longer demand them as they’ve been abolished. We don’t have a high school other than Nedret Hanim Girls’ High School. I mean they could have built two schools on that land instead of erecting such a huge one. People would go wherever they wanted. This is freedom [not what they’re doing]. But their intention is different. Probably they want to take revenge. During our press

statements, when we opened solidarity desk as parents, we met with a lot of reaction. They were like, ‘They did the same to us during the 28 February process and now we are taking revenge from you.’”

Researcher: “Did they say this openly?”

“Of course. Girls who were studying at Kalimni Girls’ Imam Hatip High School were sixteen or seventeen year-old children. How do they know what happened during those days! My child does not remember such things. How do they know it in such great detail? We have no idea. They would come and tell us ‘we are taking revenge. You did the same to us.’ A revengeful generation is growing up. We heard this a lot both from the teachers and students of [Kalimni Girls] the Imam Hatip school during the period we opened a solidarity desk in front of the school for five days a week. We got many similar messages from the Internet, social media pages. ‘The revenge of those days is being taken, do not ask for mercy now. You did the same to us’, they would say. As if we are responsible for what was done during those days. We got tons of messages. We had many face-to-face encounters too.” (Interview, Appendix J: 45)

The year 2014 was a particularly difficult year for parents because the TEOG exam was first introduced and it gave only limited number of schools to choose. Next year, the MoNE would relax the conditions of TEOG. However, the data for this research were collected when the school choice criteria were much stricter than 2015. According to the exam system in 2014, students could make two school preference lists, which were called Group A and Group B. In Group A list, students were allowed to choose 15 schools, irrespective of their home address. Schools for which the demand was high, in other words non-vocational and non-religious schools, which were of only two types (Science High Schools and Anatolian High Schools), were unsurprisingly included the most in Group A list. If a student failed to enter any of their Group A preference, she/he would be placed in Group B list, which was comprised of school types rather than particular school names. In Group B list, students had to specify four school types out of six, two of which are few in numbers (6 Science High Schools and 1 Social Science Schools in Istanbul). Depending on their exam score, they would be placed in a school closest to their

home address if possible. Making students to choose school types meant for many in practice that they had to include the category of *religious schools* (Imam Hatip High School) since science high schools existed only in 6 towns of the city and enrolled students with very high scores. In cases where the student did not include a religious school in her/his list despite the low exam score, she/he would be placed in a school by the Ministry of Education, the closest school available. If their exam score did not allow that, they would be placed into one of the three alternative districts they specified in their selection forms. That the students were made to prefer school types promoted religious schools and vocational schools since out of six school types, the most widespread and available one was religious schools.

Although it is not possible to draw a direct causal relationship, MoNE statistics on Istanbul suggest that school conversions had a significant role in the increase in private school enrolments. According to the calculations the researcher made relying on the data from MoNE Istanbul Directorate (see MONE [2012, 2013, 2014, 2015]), there is a sharp increase of around 12,5% in private school enrolment in 2013-2014 academic year, when the number of converted high schools was higher and conversions were completed, as opposed to that of 5,56 in the previous year. This figure is much higher in 2014-2015, with an increase of 14,4%, the chief reasons for which are the introduction of TEOG exam and the private school financial aid system (See Table 6 and Table 7).

Table 6. Number of Public and Private High Schools in Istanbul

Academic Year	Total School No.	Rate of Increase (Compared to the Previous Year)	No Of Public High Schools	Rate of Incr.	No Of Private High Schools	Rate of Incr.
2014-2015	1185	-17	716	-27.2	469	5.6
2013-2014	1428 checd	8.4	984	4,2	444	-39.7
2012-2013	1317	11,7	944	12,5	737	124
2011-2012	1179		850		329	

Source: MoNE, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

Table 7: Number of High School Students

Academic Year	No Of Total High School Sts	Rate of Incr.	No of State High School Sts	Rate Of Incr.	No of Private High School Students	Rate Of Incr.	No. of Open High School Sts	Rate of Increase
2014-2015	1043937	1.75	650698	-1.33	76463	14.4	316766	5.7
2013-2014	1025926	8.45	659469	3.21	66839	12.4	299618	21
2012-2013	945972	4.4	638941	3.81	59420	5.5	247431	5.6
2011-2012	905967		615456		56290		234221	

Source: MoNE 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

Other than the insecure atmosphere brought about by relocation, in the case of Seyit Efendi HS, unpreparedness of the new school and the neighbourhood that was undergoing urban transformation made the parents feel insecure about sending their children to the school and consider private school options. They explained in their press statement how they felt the area and the school made them feel insecure as in the following:

“We, Seyit Efendi High School parents have struggled for nine months in order to prevent the demolition of our school. Unfortunately, despite our struggle, our school has been demolished and 1400 students have been sent to exile to Mustafa Pasa Primary School in Fikirtepe, where there is ongoing construction work due to urban transformation and the area is not ready yet for education. In front of the school, flows Kurbagalistream, which is unhealthy and insecure for our children. We are highly worried that no security measures have been taken in order to prevent accidents such as children falling into the stream. And that Fikirtepe carries a high risk of landslide aggravates our fears. What is more, there is no hospital or no pharmacist, which are critical in case of urgent situations. There is no stationery shop or no cafeteria where they can find healthy food. Under such

adverse circumstances, our children are prone to dangers. We are worried about their security [*can guvenligi*]. We demand that official authorities take the necessary measures. Otherwise, you [official authorities] will be held responsible in case of any trouble that our children might experience.” (Press Statement, 2015; Appendix J: 46)

Security was important criterion for Saniye to choose Seyit Efendi for her son as well, and the sense of insecurity urban transformation in the area evoked in her was the stated reason of her to join the Seyit Efendi Solidarity and oppose school’s relocation:

Researcher: “What is the reason for your being inside the Solidarity and oppose the school’s relocation?”

“First I chose this school because it was close to my house. It is located in a safe district, my son can walk to school. The school has been sent from a neighbour hood that I thought to be clean to a riverbank, an urban transformation zone full of empty buildings. That’s the first reason. Second, if they were planning to demolish the school, why did they strengthen the building and send our children to another building for an entire year. That shows that they did not plan it long before, it was spontaneous. But when I was young, there was right to education. I mean accessibility. I realised that this had vanished. Therefore, I didn’t want my son to go to this insecure and uncanny place, to the construction zone. The press had covered many crime incidents that took place in that construction zone; many women were murdered there. There were drug addicts. Later they settled Syrians [refugees] there. Why should my son go there! Why should he abandon his comfortable life in Arguvan and travel there?” (Interview, Appendix J: 47)

According to Saniye, after the relocation of Seyit Efendi HS multiple factors such as relocation and the new exam system came at the same moment to contribute to an increase in private schooling, relying on her observations:

Researcher: “Now that you have one school missing in the neighbourhood, where are parents sending their children?”

“You don’t have much choice. No choice. The conversion of our school and all other things have caused an increase in the number of private schools. Arguvan has a potential for that. Bilfen Private school has been opened, and Dogus Private School has been opened. A few schools have immediately opened. To my knowledge, those who have money - or some get bank credits - send their children to private schools. Some say their children’s exam scores do not allow them to get into the schools they want, and so on. Because the

aren't any schools left. Because the other alternative is Imam Hatip schools. Vocational schools require exam scores too. Therefore, they will either pay for the private school or choose Imam Hatip schools.” (Interview, Appendix J: 48)

In another case, a case of a middle school relocation in Kadıköy, in which Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity cooperated in order to prevent school's conversion into an Imam Hatip middle school, transfer to private schools was more manifest. Before the school's possible conversion was known by all parents, a private school made phone calls to most of the parents and invited them to their office to talk about enrolment in the school and said they offered discount to high-achieving students. A teacher from the school reported that many parents visited the school and took an exam to be able to get a discount. The conversion of the school did not take place that year as a result of parents' reaction and resistance. However, the school was left without sources in the next year and then converted into a public education centre in the following year. During the three-month period when parents actively worked to stop the conversion, transition to private schools was frequently uttered. Parents and residents of Kadıköy often marched to the Directorate of Kadıköy Branch of Ministry of National Education (İlçe Milli Eğitim Müdürü) in order to stop the conversion. They would often demand that the Director accept them into his office for a meeting. After every meeting, parents would recount their encounters with the Director. After one of the meetings, one parent tried to explain how important his child's education was and he would not mind transferring his child to a private school:

“He [director] said to me that I am not a resident in the school's catchment area [He threatened me]. I said ‘does it matter where I reside. I would move out for my child's education, or I can send him to a private school.’” (Field notes, Appendix J: 49)

As can be seen in the above examples, in case of a crisis, parents thought of private schools as an exit.

4.3.2 Arbitrariness and legal ambiguities

It was largely the use of arbitrariness and legal ambiguities by numerous state actors that made it possible to implement the relocation policy of Seyit Efendi HS with much less obstacles and difficulties. In one of the Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity meetings attended by many parents and neighborhood residents, in March 2014, the following conversation between parents and the lawyer that the Solidarity was consulting explains the arbitrary and uncertain nature of the process.

Lawyer: “I would like to emphasize two; pardon, three things. Whatever they might be thinking of doing with the school land, they must have made a change in the master plan and they must have changed the actors who have a say in the existing master plan. I mean, in order to change the function of the land, which is educational land at the moment, and to use the empty land next to the school, they need to change the master plan or the area that the plan encompasses. This is the first thing I would like to attract your attention to. Secondly, if they are thinking of changing the educational institution that currently exists on that plot, there must be an administrative act or acts. As far as I can see, they have provided no official explanation or information on the issue so far. This is against the law of course. But aside from that, this is unacceptable. I would like to emphasize one thing regarding this. This is important. I know Arguvan a little bit. My uncle and his family live here, just near the [Seyit Efendi High] School. I have just visited them. More important than [it being illegal], it is unacceptable that they are removing a public school, a public secular school, in a particular spot in Istanbul, in one of its neighborhoods. And it is unacceptable that they are doing this by using various tricks.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 50)

As expressed in the following conversation between a parent and the lawyer arbitrariness and legal ambiguities regarding the school’s land status made it difficult for parents to take legal action:

Parent A: Can I ask a question? [Says her name]. We heard the demolition and relocation decision in late September, early October, from rumors. And as soon as we heard the news, we started to think of what to do. But first we had to understand if it was a rumor or truth, and to learn this we gave official petitions, parents did this. They told us that the school would be relocated, to this and that school, and a conference hall will be built in its place. Now, my question is, we get legal counseling support from different people, but we are proceeding in a rule-of-thumb method. I mean our biggest problem is that we are confused as to what to do, how to plan things ahead because we rely on the information that we get in bits and pieces, but our opponent is proceeding

fast. They are more organised than us, they lie; a lot of people offered legal consulting, like Egitim-sen. But we haven't been able to take solid steps yet. Can we set a workplan with you? So, is it the Metropolitan Municipality who is responsible for this; should we go to them first? Everything is so confusing. (...) How can we work more systematically? When can we open a lawsuit? We really need to be informed about these.

Lawyer: "I explained this in the petition I penned last week. The Metropolitan Municipality, Kadıköy Municipality, and The Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning should assume responsibility [for answering the petitions]. They have to answer if there is a [new] master plan, if any changes have been made to the existing plan, if the usage purpose of the area has been changed, if so, what is the cost of this change. And they have to show you the plans. We penned some petitions, it would be good if you could submit them. Secondly, we talked about appealing to Kadıköy and Istanbul directorates of the Ministry of Education about the administrative act that explains the relocation decision of a public school to Fikirtepe, most probably never to return. That is all that can be done for the time being. There's nothing much that can be done apart from this. And maybe members of parliament can give petitions in the Grand National Assembly and ask the politicians what they are doing about the school."

Parent B: "That has already been done."

Lawyer: "Then, in the legal realm, there's nothing left to do."

Parent C: "Can't we open a lawsuit?"

Lawyer: "You cannot do that without knowing what the administrative act is. You can only do this; if you want, we can write 'Seyit Efendi High School is being relocated to Fikirtepe for reasons we do not know yet and for a period of time we do not know yet. And we want this plan to be stopped and administrative and land plans to be made clear to us.' And writing that, you can go to the court. But they might refuse your appeal."

Parent B: "We lack the legal documents. All we do now is to state that our children will not be safe there. Can we go to the attorney on the basis of this?"

Lawyer: "It is possible"

Parent B: "The only evidence we have is the text message that was sent to all of us by the school. (...) We still keep them." Can we use it to start a lawsuit?

Lawyer: "But you are assuming that the attorneys will be brave enough to start a lawsuit." (...)

Parent: "No, we just don't know anything, where to start. We are asking it to you."

Lawyer: “I do not think that attorneys will take this seriously and take legal actions. (...) How can it be possible! There’s one administrative paper that will directly affect all your lives, the lives of your children, and you are toiling to see the document. This is unacceptable. (...) We were taught at the faculty of law that if a procedure is against the law, all you [attorney] do is to sign it and send it to the court. Such courts used to exist. Even me, myself, witnessed that. But under such circumstances, what would really work is your struggle.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 51)

Under such circumstances, parents were late for opening a lawsuit but they did their best. Saniye explains how they proceeded and what happened as a result:

“We went to the governorship of Istanbul. There, we were only informed orally that the school would be relocated and then rebuilt. I don’t remember the written document that they sent later. At the meeting that I made with [Istanbul] Ministry of National Education [Directorate] I gave them six thousand signatures. I gave them by hand, myself. They told us at the meeting that the order has come from Ankara and there are confidential issues that we cannot know. And because the land belongs to the Association, they said they had no say. All the written explanations were like this, particularly the ones from The Center for Information [BIMER]. As we were late we didn’t have the right to open a lawsuit. We weren’t able to take any other legal action either. We tried to open one lawsuit in which we asked to them the legal basis of the relocation of the school and the legal documents. They [the legal authorities] wanted from us the documents about which enquired. (...) We investigated and found out something like, according to the legislation if two schools are demolished, both of them should be rebuilt. Relying on this, we went to the court stating that they [the Governorship of Istanbul] should explain the legal basis for the school’s demolition. But the court didn’t respond. We opened the case against the Governorship [of Istanbul] but the Governorship sent us a paper asking on the basis of what documents we are making these claims. They wanted the documents that we were wanting from them.” (Interview, Appendix J: 52)

4.3.3 Consent to school relocations

For any policy to be implemented consent needs to be obtained, which can be achieved through various mechanisms. Drawing on field data, this section describes two main consent generation mechanisms. While the first mechanism involves deliberate neglect, the second one entails uncertainty as well as penal measures.

4.3.3.1 Consent through neglect

Although this research heavily focuses on opposition to school relocations, there was considerable consent as well. Consent to school relocations was generated through a variety of mechanisms. The chief mechanism was desourcing the public schools. Many public schools lacked basic amenities and services, which made the lives of students and parents more difficult. In June 2014, a major education forum was organized in Kadıköy to discuss the educational problems and Seyit Efendi Solidarity members attended the event and shared their experiences of relocation with the public and sought solidarity. TEOG exam system had just been introduced and there was a chaotic atmosphere due to it. Despite the various new things people were trying to make sense of and explain to one another, one of the main issues raised was familiar: the lack of resources in public schools. At the session on what could be done about school relocations and conversions, a parent from the district of Fatih drew attention to the predicament of underfunded secular public schools comparing them with newly opened Imam Hatip Schools:

“To stop the conversion of our school, we tried to talk with the Istanbul Director of the Ministry of National Education, but he refused our meeting requests all the time. We have two schools in our town which have been converted into hotels. What has been gone through in the health sector is now being experienced in education. [With the new high school placement exam system] one million two hundred thousand and fifty students were enrolled in open schools. Now they work in agriculture or in industry, or they are made to get married. The Ministry of Education that can arrange school buses for Imam Hatip schools does not provide cleaning materials for schools. It [the MoNE] purchases smart boards but not cleaning materials. They gave the [smart board] business to Vestel without any bidding process. Schools have smart boards that cannot be used properly. They allocated two billion [Turkish Lira] for private schools. The state that cannot find the money for a janitor, for a bar of soap, or for coal can find the money for private schools.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 53)

By “finding the money for private schools”, the parent meant the newly introduced incentive system that involved providing financial aid to parents who wanted to enrol

their children in private schools or whose children were already attending private schools. The financial aid system was introduced in March 2014 with the additional articles to the Law No. 5580, the Law on Private Education Institutions, which was passed in 2007. On 7 August 2014, it was announced in the Official Gazette No. 29081, that starting with the 2014-2015 academic year, in line with the protocol signed between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education, the state was to grant financial support to 250,000 students who were already attending or who wanted to enroll in a private school. That the subject matter law came at a time when many parents were disgruntled with rapid reforms for which they were unprepared made the parents think that financial aid to private schools was paradoxical when thought against the neglected situation of public schools.

Saniye, a Seyit Efendi HS parent explained how school principals tried to involve parents in the school's funding and maintenance in the face of lack of public funds:

Researcher: "were you in the catchment area of Seyit Efendi when you enrolled?"

"No, we were not. We were in the catchment of X School. But I found an acquaintance who helped me fix things. I sent four guys to clean the school and had the school cleaned. When the principal learned my job, he said to me, 'you can do a lot of work for the school.' But I witnessed one thing. A woman was begging the principal to enroll her kid into the school. But the principal was refusing. He said, 'I don't care. If you donate five hundred liras, it will be okay. And I am making a five hundred discount for you.'" The poor woman was a cleaner somewhere.

Researcher: "Was she living in the catchment area of the school?"

"She wasn't. She missed it by one street only. I felt so sorry. She was an impoverished woman.

Researcher: "Is that the current principal?"

"That doesn't have much to do with the principal. That's how the system worked at schools previously [during catchment area system]. Because the

state does not financially support the schools or provides little support, principals used to create funding for schools in this way.”

Researcher: I see

“Five hundred from some, one-thousand from another. Whatever they could get.” (Interview, Appendix J: 54)

In order to obtain the consent of families and students, MoNE authorities and policy makers often emphasized the positive aspects of studying in new school buildings. Seyit Efendi High School had been recently renovated, one year before its demolition decision. However, it did not have a sports hall. The new school’s having a sports hall was often stated by the director of the school as an advantage of relocation. Parents and students who did not want to relocate frequently complained about the director’s praising the sports hall. One parent expressed her disinterestedness in it saying, “What is my child going to do with the sports hall if he cannot walk to his school any more, and if he has to travel half an hour and then walk along insecure streets”. However, according to some parents who joined organization meetings, their children were allured by the idea of having a sports hall. However, the report of the Chamber of Turkish Architects and Engineers (TMMOB) inspected the area and prepared a report on the area where Seyit Efendi was to be relocated, indicating that the area was not yet suitable for education. The long report briefly said:

“As a result of the fact that the road [where the school yard opens to] has been opened to the use of high school students whose attention level may not be constant; it is busy with construction vehicles moving around to get to the construction sites around, and the school is located in the middle of construction sites creates an insecure environment. (...) Because of the demolishments, the district has turned into a crime center. Moreover, not all the buildings around the school have been demolished yet, and with the onset of the demolishments it is inevitable that physical conditions will aggravate and there will be increasing pollution associated with demolition, construction, and noise. There exists a transportation network via E5 Highway whereby access to subway, buses and minibuses is possible and

students can walk to school from the stop. However, as it is obvious in the attached pictures, the road from the stop to the [Veli Efendi] School is desolate and poorly-lit, which creates an atmosphere congenial to crime coupled with the lack of adequate security measures in the area.” (TMMOB expert report, 15 September 2014) (Appendix J: 55)

Kayabasi High School had been using the same school building for years with other schools whose buildings were being renovated or strengthened against earthquake risk. Therefore, almost all the rooms were used as classrooms. School staff, students, and parents from Kayabasi High School narrated the inadequacies of the school building that made the lives of the students and teachers difficult. Also, my field notes are replete with the stories of students saying how they are affected by the lack of basic necessities at their schools and strategies they deploy to survive under these conditions. A lack of labs, a cafeteria, a gym, a hall for curricular and extracurricular school activities; lack of a library or study hall to study before or after school; neglected and insufficient number of toilets, and neglected classrooms with little up-to-date technology or teaching tools were among the many building related difficulties which the students and teachers suffered from. Not surprisingly, some parents and students were pleased by the idea of having better-equipped and better-designed school buildings.

Lack of basic educational facilities in Kayabasi frequently came out as an issue during my encounters with the students. For instance, one day, Semra, a student whom I met in the school yard and often talked wanted me to help her with the English exam. When we decided to meet to study, we were unable to find a decent space to study. First, we decided to study on one of the benches in the garden, but it was too windy and the wind was scattering the pages of Semra’s notebook. Then, we decided to study in the school’s cafeteria, which was actually the entrance of the school. Although we started studying and tried hard to continue, we realised that it

was too loud to study in peace, which we were not aware of during our daily conversations that did not require such a great deal of concentration. Oguz, another student whom I often had conversations, used to travel after school to a university campus in Maslak in order to use the study hall in the campus. However, recently he was having a hard time entering the campus since the security was no longer willing to let him in as security measures on the campus were tightened. Similar issues were often voiced by students of Kayabasi during our interactions, and when I asked to them if they would prefer to relocate to a better-equipped but further school, a considerable number of them would welcome the idea when they thought it in isolation from other factors such as increased travel time and distance from the city center.

Nebat Bukrek, one of the leaders of the Don't Touch My School Initiative, pointed in my interview with her to the strength of the promise of a well-equipped school in obtaining parents' concern, particularly parents with lower socioeconomic status:

“The government has a strong power of persuasion. They visit the houses that are around the schools to be sold and praise the relocation project. They already have connection with them through in-kind aids they provide. They say “we are going to build modern campuses for your children, just like universities, they will study in these excellent schools from kindergarden until finishing high schools”. When we visit the parents to talk to them, some might even say “dear teacher, these are valuable areas, they are being wasted, they promised us new schools”. I think the best school is the school where your kid can get on foot. And some schools should be inside the city centre, in interaction with the city. (...) But to convince parents, they are lying to them or deceiving them. They tell them that the new schools will provide high quality education in modern buildings with libraries, sports halls, theatres, and everything [students will need]. They say that the schools will be equipped with the latest technology.” (Appendix J: 56)

Ms. Bukrek believed that it was highly unlikely and there was no guarantee that the promise for better equipped schools would be fulfilled. In contrast, she stated that the relocation would work to the detriment of lower classes and women and

contribute to increased dropout rate for girls in lower income families for the following reason:

“Because of increased transportation costs, children of many poor families who live around those schools will be deprived of education. Especially, parents with more than one child might have to choose between the children. It is likely that boys will be preferred. There are many girls’ schools among those that will be sold. The students of these girls’ schools are generally coming from poor and conservative families. I mean who will be affected by this transformation are actually those who are poor and living around the schools, and their daughters in particular. When they stopped enrolling students in Taksim Trade Vocational School, they didn’t think of the future of the students. 700 students applied to enroll [but couldn’t as the school didn’t accept them]. We tried to trace them. It seems that 300 of them attended the nearby schools... I mean we guess this when we look at the increase in student numbers in nearby schools. But the rest 400 is not known. Most of these are girls.” (Interview; April, 2012) (Appendix J: 57)

Although the data collected for this study do not suggest a similar consequence, for the fieldwork schools were middle class schools, studies on girls’ education in Turkey resonate with Bukrek’s ideas. Studies show that parental income has a larger effect on girls’ schooling than boys’ (see Tansel, 2002; Duman, 2009) in all three schooling levels (Tansel, 2002) since there is preference for the son when household income is limited (Duman, 2009). This means that girls are more prone to be affected by fluctuations in the household income and increased education expenses such as transportation costs. Also, Tansel (2002) argues that unfavorable urban conditions such as squatter settlements mean lower level of attainments with a larger effect for girls and probability of middle schooling for both boys and girls is negatively affected by living in undeveloped settlement areas, which might be due to the lack of availability of schools or increased distance to schools, which raises security concerns for parents. Prevailing social norms also contribute to the gender inequality in education in Turkey (Tansel, 2002) and families prefer to keep more at home than boys in case of lack of schools within easy reach (Duman, 2009).

Lack of attention to public schools was not only a reason for some parents' consenting to school relocations, but it also constituted a consent mechanism for the conversions to Imam Hatip schools and a justification for it. Edibe, narrated the answer they got from the administration in response to their reaction against the conversion of the middle school about 900 m away from Seyif Efendi HS:

“We collected about ten thousand signatures to prevent the conversion of the school into an Imam Hatip middle school. We had conflicts and arguments with the school principal and everybody [at the school]? They said to us, “you’re the residents of this neighborhood, but weren’t you aware of the rundown condition of the school. When it has been converted into an Imam Hatip middle school, the conditions have improved.” (Interview, Appendix J: 58)

State’s deliberate neglect, according to people who were trying to prevent conversions of their neighborhood schools, was accompanied by increasing role of philanthropy organisations in public education activities. A parent who attended an information exchange meeting said regarding the opening of Imam Hatip classrooms in their schools by evacuating the library and other rooms of the school used for extracurricular purposes:

It might be out of necessity that there are forty or fifty students packed in a classroom [in secular public schools]. But why are Imam Hatip schools privileged? Why are they evacuating even the principal’s room in order to use it as an Imam Hatip class. This is what we are against, not Imam Hatips or those who send their schools to there. Every parent can prefer whichever school they want; they should be free to educate their children the way they want. But we are against privileging Imam Hatip schools. Not everyone might be aware of this but various philanthropy associations donate large sums of money to bus Imam Hatip school students. I mean they arrange the buses and pay for the expenses, or they provide free lunch. We are against providing prerogatives [to particular groups]. We went to the MoNE district director and told him that the state should be neutral and independent. It should be everyone’s state. Sadly, the director openly said, “I have a side. I side with Imam Hatip schools.”. He said things like, “Naturally, I will improve their conditions. Nobody can stand on my way.” (Field notes, Appendix J: 59)

Research data from Seyit Efendi case demonstrate that increasing role of philanthropy in education has been reframing how access to resources is accomplished, particularly in urban schools. Various foundations were involved in the demolition and rebuilding of Seyit Efendi HS. When the demolition was drawing closer, various foundations and philanthropists were mentioned by the school activists who were exploring the hidden official procedures. Parents were able to obtain a copy of the protocol signed between the Istanbul Directorate of Education and the company that funded construction work of the new school. The company was a construction company which was awarded major national and international contracts including, inter alia, a metro project in Qatar, a high speed railway project Saudi Arabia, and a railway project in Ethiopia. Also, a journalist was working on the complex web of relationships involved in the school's rebuilding and informing the parents at times. The demolition work of the school was contracted to another company named *Okul Yapar*, some shareholders of which were known for their political career. Moreover, in December 2013, when a major corruption investigation started, one of the allegations, as reported reported in *Daily Yurt* (Şahin, 2014) was that *Okul Yapar* bribed a well-known religiously motivated education association. This issue was often brought up by Seyit Efendi Solidarity because they believed that a trade between construction companies and the political power was involved in the demolition of their school and building of the new Imam Hatip School. Their convictions were neither proven nor refuted. Making contractors donate to faith-based charity associations or fund charitable activities in support of the ruling party had become a widely extensive practice (Eder, 2010). "A typical arrangement then would be generous donations to the municipality charity fund in return for a lucrative infrastructure and a real-estate bid" (Eder, 2010, 178). Just as

welfare liabilities were delegated to religiously motivated charity organizations, responsibilities pertaining to education were handled in a similar way. However, this was done in a selective manner.

The following fieldnote also lucidly points to the nexus of urban transformation, neglect of state schools, and selective support for particular educational groups. When Seyit Efendi HS and Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip HS buildings were being restrengthened in 2012-2013 academic year, they used the buildings of other schools for a year. Seyit Efendi HS relocated to Meryem Hanım middle school in a nearby neighborhood in Kadıköy, and Kalimni Girls' Imam Hatip HS used the evacuated Seyit Efendi building. Kalimni Imam Hatip Middle School was opened in this year, with 4+4+4 law but as it did not have its own building and the school consisted of only the 1st graders, it also shared the building of Meryem Hanım middle school. The neighborhood, however, was of lower socioeconomic status compared to Arguvan. When Seyit Efendi HS was demolished and sent to Fikirtepe, construction work for Kalimni Imam Hatip HS began. It was believed that both Kalimni Imam Hatip HS and the Kalimni Imam Hatip Middle School would study in the newly built campus in Arguvan. During construction period, in 2014-2015 school year, the Middle School kept sharing Meryem Hanım primary school building. However, the students of Meryem Hanım Primary School were moved to another school named Inonu. This aroused some reaction among the parents of Meryem Hanım as they had to travel longer distances and there were problems with transportation. Also a small group among the parents suspected that the school would be converted into an Imam Hatip middle school and they would never be able to return to their schools. However, the MoNE denied the claims of conversion and said that they would return the following year, which left opposing parents and

neighborhood activists in an uncertainty as to how to react and organise. The school was close to the new location of Seyit Efendi HS and therefore got many of its students from the area. However, as people moved out of the area due to urban transformation, the number of students attending Meryem Hanim had significantly dropped. The following conversation points to the way public schools were left to create their own resources and solutions in the face of urban transformation and dispossession and how selective support mechanism for certain schools operates:

Parent1 from Meryem Hanim: I talked to the Kadıköy MoNE Director. He said, “The school [Meryem Hanim] has a capacity of 1500 students. Current number of your school is 345. I cannot allocate the whole school for such a small number. If you find the number to fill up the school, you can get your school back. Because of urban transformation, there is a drop in the number of students”. We don’t even know what’s gonna happen in Inonu [where Meryem Hanim students have been sent].

Parent2: Nobody knows what’s going to happen to Inonu either. There’s uncertainty due to urban transformation. Maybe Inonu will be closed in a couple of years too.

Teacher from Meryem Hanim: I talked with the muhtar. He says that there isn’t much demand for an Imam Hatip high school in Arguvan [referring to Kalimni Girls’ Imam Hatip HS]. And the owner of the land does not give the land to Imam Hatip. They may use this [Meryem Hanim] building for [Kalimni Girls’] Imam Hatip High School.

Kadıköy resident: The moctar told me that they have converted the school [Meryem Hanim] into an Imam Hatip middle school. They were enrolling students in July. (...)

Teacher: They changed the catchment area for the school. Ikbaliye students can no longer enrol in Meryem Hanim. We should try to change the catchment area back to its previous form.

Parent 3: But ninety percent of the current residents [of this neighborhood] are happy with the school having been converted into an Imam Hatip middle school.

Parent 2: Do you know why? Because they provide transportation, food, and clothes. Everything they need. (...)

Parent 1: We should find a way of increasing the student numbers of our school. But there's urban transformation. Only old people have remained where I live now.

Union activist: Should we want Sipahioglu [the school in Astoria, whose conversion to an Imam Hatip school Edibe and her friends tried to prevent.]? They can merge two schools here, and we can get Sipahioglu in return for Meryem Hanim.

Parent: But not all parents can easily get to Sipahioglu. Some are living far from there.

Teacher: But Ikbaliye is packed. Would it be possible to open Meryem Hanim in Ikbaliye? We need to find a way of not losing our schools.

Parent: We don't have a primary school in our neighborhood [there's no rationale for closing or relocating it].

(...)

Activist: They don't care whether you have a primary school in the neighborhood or not. But they are carrying out urban transformation in a way to encourage the new comers to attend Imam Hatip schools.

Kadıköy resident: But those who come after the transformation will be of much higher income status.

Activist: But *yesil sermaye* [conservative capital] will come. They might be willing to attend Imam Hatip schools.

(...)

Parent: I said to the MoNE Kadıköy Director that I preferred this school because my house is in the area. I am a working woman. I don't want to send my child to school with a school bus. (...) He said to me, you have 320 students there, the school has a capacity of 1500. We cannot allocate it to you.

Kadıköy resident: We should visit houses one by one and explain to them that we do not need an Imam Hatip school. (...)

Activist: People send their kids due to poverty. Last year, they used to send lunch to the teachers of Imam Hatip but not to the teachers of Meryem Hanim.

Researcher: Who's providing the food?

Parent: The municipality. (Appendix J: 60)

As can be clearly seen in the above conversation, parents, teachers, activists, and neighborhood residents were trying to develop their own solutions to the problem of relocation of and dispossession in state schools, and nearly all schools in Kadıköy district suffered from the repercussions of urban transformation and it further aggravating the predicament of public schools. Moreover, it is apparent in the above conversation that the public schools in Kadıköy were all linked to one another in that destabilisation of one had implications for others in the vicinity.

4.3.3.2 Indirect consent

Two central mechanisms that generated indirect consent were uncertainty stemming from lack of communication with official authorities regarding the status of schools and penal measures.

A central problem in the encounter of the citizens with the state was uncertainty. None of the school relocation and conversion cases were communicated to parents or neighborhood residents beforehand. Most of the time, they were able to learn the news accidentally and at the last moment. For example, the relocation news of Seyit Efendi HS was first revealed when a service bus driver accidentally let it slip that they would be moving to another building soon. News would spread as rumors first, which made it painful for those wishing to organize others to take action against an imminent policy. Even when the intentions of policy became clear, ambiguities and uncertainties made it hard to take legal action. For instance, although Seyit Efendi HS parents sent numerous petitions to official authorities, requesting that they be informed about the official land status and demolition documents of their school, their petitions were either given irrelevant answers that did not reveal the information they needed or the petitions were rejected on the pretext of having

missing documents. Parents would spend hours in Istanbul Ministry of Education offices to give their petitions or to see certain documents regarding their schools. In the end, the whole process would turn into a chaotic and arduous experience, which would weaken the energy of school constituents. One of the Seyit Efendi HS activists and neighborhood residents expressed her feelings: ‘last week they said they would evacuate the school on the 14th. Now, they say it might be the end of the term. This [uncertainty] has turned into a torture’. The word *torture* was one of the most frequently uttered words by parents and neighborhood activists during meetings. Just as it happened in state-led urban transformation projects in Istanbul, uncertainty served as a policy making tool that precluded resistance or weakened the oppositional groups. It also made it impossible for oppositional groups to accurately inform the public, which prevented them from creating space for public negotiation, decision-making, and consensus building. As of the writing of this research, the MoNE officials kept their reticent attitude regarding the school. During a recent visit of Seyit Efendi parents, accompanied by me, to MoNE Istanbul Directorate in order to submit petitions against the change of land status, a branch directorate told us the MoNE would object to the plan as well. That confused all of us because MoNE was one of the signees of the previous documents that showed the agreement on the empty plot to be used for commercial purposes.

Penal measures served as effective deterrent mechanisms. For school communities, the government was represented by police forces and in addition to uncertainty, another key term that I documented was ‘profiling’. Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity members believed that they were being profiled by the police and the fact that a significant number of the members were single women aggravated their

worries. Saniye's encounter with a ruling party member turned into an experience in which she felt that she was closely followed by authorities. She explained:

The appointment was not on my name. Another parent got the appointment [from the mayoral candidate of JDP]. It was on her name. She met them at a lunch organised for women. I gave her name when I went to the office. But when I introduced myself to him, he knew my surname and that my son was a 4th grader, and other details."

Researcher: "Your son's class?"

"Yes, he did. And he told me word by word what I talked with the PM who came to one of our demonstrations.

Researcher: "How can he know that?" (...)

"Mmm. Maybe there was a plainclothes police among us. There were only other parents with us. (...) Someone who listened to us must have reported our conversation to him [the mayoral candidate]." (Appendix J: 61)

Parents were more concerned about their children. A couple of months after the demonstrations, students withdrew from minor protests as they got warnings from the school management. According to the parents, the school management was pressured by the police and the MoNE authorities to control their children. Some parents were made to sign documents saying that their children left the school (tasdikname), which the director would put into effect if the children were involved in any protests. If the parents had not signed the documents, their children would have been expelled from the school. Saniye explained this process as follows:

"Children were more active in the past, before parents got involved. (...) But after [a major protest throughout the country took place in March 2014], they got warnings and some sent to disciplinary committee. As far as I know six of them were in this situation. (...) We told the children to be calm. Otherwise, their entire educational life would be terminated. That was our sole concern. I mean, I wouldn't be that concerned if they belonged to any political groups or something like that. (...) But they did not. They were just normal kids who had never been to any demonstrations before. We talked to them and warned them." (Interview, Appendix J: 62)

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS

This study has analysed school relocation policy in Istanbul, which has become a controversial issue in the past few years, with particular reference to two urban schools, with more weight on one of them. The central concern of the study was to examine the implications of the relocation of a school from the inner city for its surrounding and where the policy of school relocation is situated in today's education policy making. The main questions addressed within the scope of this study were:

1. What is the nature of the displacement involved in school relocations?
2. How does school relocation policy interact with urban dynamics of Istanbul?
3. How can school relocation policy be situated in education policy-making agenda?

On the basis of the aim of the study and research questions, the final chapter of the study is organised under twelve main headings.

In order to gain insights into the relocation project I spent eight months with a school community that worked to demolish the relocation of their school, from February to October 2014. Throughout this period, I attended almost all organisation meetings, press statements, and other activities that school activists joined. After the school was demolished, I kept in contact with the community, spending time with them particularly for school related activities. Also, for two years, I followed urban forums, whose one of key agenda was preventing the removal of public schools from their neighborhoods. First from late 2012 to June 2013, I regularly attended one

forum. Then, I found two more forums and chose which forum to attend mainly considering the agenda that was announced via email. I attended the forums whose agenda of the week was the neighborhood school. Although I haven't cited the data from the forums much, unless it was one of those I attended with Seyit Efendi constituents to build solidarity, following the forums provided me with the opportunity to locate the issue on a broader scale. Forums were more diverse and dynamic than anti-relocation school communities as they were less bound by official limitations unlike the parents who were more cautious and taking pains to maintain a balance in order not to endanger their children's future. I also conducted interviews with three parents, three neighborhood school activists, two teachers, and one architect who is at the same time a leading urban activist. Interviews with Seyit Efendi people were conducted after the demolition of Seyit Efendi HS. Also, I visited another school two hours per week, for one semester, in order to understand the relationships the students built with their environment.

Before starting my fieldwork with Seyit Efendi High School Solidarity, where in time I became a semi-constituent since I would reciprocate with my support when they needed and asked for it, I was already familiar with school relocation issue since I had already followed one of the forums as a dissertation researcher and various education gatherings as an Istanbul resident. However, what was unique with Seyit Efendi was that it was an active school solidarity and their relocation course was running rapid and more overt compared to other schools. From the very first day, I told them that I was a researcher working on school relocations and I found their case worthy of following. Their intense anti-relocation work that was able to mobilise the neighbourhood allowed me to be able to carry out an embedded fieldwork. Although this study does not involve the official authorities directly, the

connections I built with school constituents allowed me to obtain many official documents and narratives regarding the behaviour of officials. I also had the chance to have informal conversations with them during our numerous visits to the MoNE to give petitions, to protest, or to demand that the Director concerned talk to us.

5.1. The co-constitutive relationship between school relocations and urban transformation

Various studies have pointed to state-led commodification of public spaces in Istanbul in various contexts (Aksoy, 2012; Erder, 2014; Gurcan & Peker, 2014; Kuymulu, 2013; Oz & Eder, 2012; Turgut, 2006;). This study has dealt with an unexplored aspect of this commodification by analyzing the relocation process of Istanbul schools with particular reference to two neighborhood schools.

Data collected throughout the fieldwork point to the co-constitutive nature of school relocation policy. Findings indicate that urban transformation process in Istanbul has had a significant influence on school spaces, which resonates with the existing international scholarship. This can be considered as a predictable outcome in the light of both studies exploring the predicament of urban commons in the local context and international research focusing on school relocations. Land prices in Istanbul have skyrocketed and therefore lands belonging to schools have become invaluable as, with the expansion of the city, most schools have remained in the centre of the city. However, an analysis remaining at this level will assume neoliberalism as a linear process whereby it operates smoothly and replaces the old Keynesian systems with new modes of production and values. An account of neoliberalism from a critical geography perspective takes neoliberalism as a non-linear project which is in interaction with previous structures (see Brenner &

Theodore, 2002). Therefore, the research described in this dissertation was carried out this definition of neoliberalisation in mind, and the data collected from a bottom-up perspective did not refute this view of neoliberalisation. The reaction of school communities showed that while schools were affected by urban transformation, they were constitutive of the urban transformation and power struggles implicated in the transformation process. School communities believed that the removal of a neighborhood school was related to the commodification of the urban sphere on the one hand; while on the other, they saw the school as a constitutive element of their surrounding and believed its removal had implications beyond the removal of a building. The long term repercussion of school relocations were seen as the transformation of the neighborhood and displacement of the traditional middle class residents. While this was seen as a deliberate attempt by some research participants, for others it was a natural consequence of changing property relations. Although the former view is essentialist and fails to see the complex web of power relations lying in the nexus of capital, hegemony, and identity, as Gillborn (2005, 2008) indicates, policy is far from being neutral and its consequences are not accidental as long as a set of policies known to harm a particular population are retained.

5.2. The involvement of the middle class in school relocation policy

Voluminous international scholarship on school relocations point to the intertwinedness of the commodification of public schools with racial displacement, arguing that they contribute to the displacement of black, aboriginal, or ethnic communities and perpetuate the existing hegemonic relationships in education (Buras, 2013; Gulson, Lipman, 2011a, 2011b; Gulson, 2011; Grant et. al. 2014).

A novel contribution of this study to the existing body of inquiry has been to suggest that a geographically situated tendency exists in Turkey, where school relocations entail destabilisation of middle class schools as well. This is not to suggest that the situation in Turkey contrasts with the international trajectory or lower class schools are not displaced. On the contrary, during the fieldwork, it was documented that lower income groups suffered significantly from the commodification of their school spaces and neoliberalisation of the education system. However, because of the fieldwork schools and the local conjuncture, the focus of the study was the middle class displacement. This was an unforeseen finding in the initial phases of the research, but it became apparent as the fieldwork progressed. The involvement of the middle class as the distressed population can be explained by the changing character of the Turkish middle class. The composition and political orientation of the middle class appears to be changing as new fractions become dominant. This finding resonates with the studies that point to the changing class characteristics in Turkey where the Islamic capital and Islamic middle class have become a major force (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2012; Balkan & Öncü, 2015; Öncü & Balkan, 2016; Tuğal, 2002; 2011; Yavuz, 2003; 2009).

5.2.1 The salience of the middle class in school relocation crisis

Although lower income schools were also subject to displacement and deterioration, the salience of middle class in reacting to relocations can be understood from a conjunctural approach. Bayhan and Gök (2016) identify the particular conjunctures of forces involved in the policy of school relocations in order to provide a nuanced picture of how school spaces became an expression of a conjunctural crisis driven by different contradictions. They argue that rather than

schools simply being inadvertent victims of the wider struggles underlying building changes, school relocation policy and that policy becoming a conjunctural crisis have their roots in the history of Turkish education, current economic policies and in the politics of nation-building to which education was paramount. Deepening of urban reproduction crisis, deepening of ideological tensions that manifest themselves in the urban and educational spheres, and the perceived educational grievances of the middle class can be said to constitute the dominant moments in school relocation crisis (Bayhan & Gök, 2016).

Urban displacement described in this research can be said to create an urban reproduction crisis. The displacement of the middle class from the inner city and their schools can be identified as part of “accumulation by dispossession” defined by Harvey (2006) as involving:

- Commodification and privatization of land and the forceful eviction of populations.
 - Conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive property rights
 - Suppression of rights to the commons
 - Commodification of labor power and the suppression of indigenous forms of production and consumption
 - Colonial, neocolonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets
- (p. 43).

The first three characteristics of accumulation by dispossession are particularly relevant to school relocation cases in Istanbul.

Although the middle class faced displacement, their reaction to school relocations in the context of urban renewal cannot be explained with reference to a

single factor. Ideological reproduction of the urban space can be said to be another moment. Growing unhappiness among the middle classes with the ideological reproduction of the urban space contributed significantly to the way they conceptualised and reacted to school relocations. Political situation in the 2013 summer also is also attributed to a crisis of a similar kind. In their conjunctural analysis, Gürcan and Peker (2014) argue:

class-structural and hegemonic aspects of the state and other external actors can be decisive in the emergence and impact of political opportunities that lead to social mobilization in the long term. It is thus important to keep in mind that social movements deal not only with “impartial” state actors, but also with the representatives of dominant class fractions that have different political projects. In this sense, one should pay special attention to the ways in which capitalist projects (“neoliberalism with Turkish/Islamic characteristics” in the case of Turkey) are linked to the course of social mobilization. In Turkey, the systemic accumulation of popular grievances can be analyzed based on what we call the “political-cultural fix” of neoliberalism (in addition to the “political-economic” spatio-temporal fix as described by Harvey), i.e. the geographically/historically specific ways in which neoliberalism is legitimized and reproduced. Hence the strategic importance of the expansion of shopping malls, neoliberal urban projects, and mosques in the AKP government’s drive to transform the urban fabric within an anti-Republican and neo-Ottomanist framework.” (p. 86)

Theorisation of Gurcan and Peker (2014) takes the analysis described in this research to the third point. Educational problems of the middle class, related to both the further commodification of education and the increasing dominance of the conservative agenda in education can be said to have constituted a major force in the middle class unhappiness with the relocation policy. Education is central to the reproduction and social mobilisation of the middle class. Although MoNE statistics imply that the major impact of the high school placement reform has been to direct low performing students to attend vocational schools, middle class parents and residents were more concerned about the implications of the policy for their schools and the education system which used to prioritise their needs. Abolishment of

catchment area schools instigated public resentment particularly among those known for having secular sentiments because the policy was seen as a means of increasing the number of Imam Hatip high schools and destabilising secular state high schools.

5.2.2 Mobilising the resources

The middle class had access to a wider range of network and was able to mobilise their resources much better than lower income groups, which also explains why they were able to get themselves heard and turn school relocations into a contentious political issue. Some of Seyit Efendi HS parents worked in media sector or had close connections to them. They were able to ensure that some TV channels or newspapers covered the issue, thereby making it heard by a larger number of people. Also, they were able to garner the support of MPs who could carry the issue to the Parliament. Moreover, they used their own expertise and social capital in publicising the issue.

Saniye commented regarding this:

“I was criticised by Gökhan for acting like an advertiser because I often tried to apply my professional knowledge to Seyit Efendi struggle. My job involved reaching particular groups of people to announce the events that we organised. So, I would often think about how to get to more people and engage them in Seyit Efendi issue. I would often try to apply the advertising strategies that I knew at work. I don’t think this is a bad thing. You have to reach people, so the strategies are the same no matter what the issue is.”
(Appendix J: 63)

Also, advantageous financial situation of the middle class allows them to be more active while organising meetings, events, or demonstrations. Busy schedule of Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity destabilised the usual course of their daily lives and they had to place less weight on their household duties and destabilised their mundane lives to the extent that some women would make jokes saying “it seems that my husband will divorce me”. Despite the sacrifices they had to make, they were able to enjoy some priorities such as buying service for the tasks they were no longer able to fulfil.

That the school relocation issue came at a time when different forces convened at the same time and the middle class were able to mobilise their resources for their school struggle made them visible actors. Thus, this research does not argue that low-income groups were not subjected to injustices regarding school relocations or did not consider the issue trivial. Instead it argues that particular conditions made the salience of the middle class possible.

5.3 Formation of hegemony: Religious school debate

The foregrounding of religious schools in both school relocations and education system in general are related to the critical role of education in building hegemony. All the developments described in this research and the positions of contending groups in religious schools debate have been informed by conflicting interests and are strictly related to the formation of hegemony and different social classes in Turkey. As described earlier in the article, Islamic elites and political Islamist leadership have long been interested in strengthening Islamic veins in the education system (Narlı, 1999) and promoting Imam Hatip schools. Rather than an end in itself, from a Gramscian perspective, this research treats this policy tendency both as means and ends. As Gramsci (2012) argues, power in economic sphere does not necessarily imply fixed relations of domination of subordination. In other words, ruling classes are not solely interested in ruling: it is crucial for the ruling class that its power in one domain be translated into political, social, and cultural authority or leadership (also see Clarke, 2010). Just as Apple (2001a) discusses in the context of the United States, conservative attempts to shape education in Turkey too should be interpreted as attempts to maintain cultural and ideological leadership. These arguments accord with the existing literature which suggest that provincial elites (Tuğal, 2002) and the

newly emerging business elites in Turkey often invoked Islamic sentiments while promoting their business interests and called for the solidarity of the believers against the established secular bourgeoisie (Tuğal, 2002; Buğra, 2014). Rather than being a new phenomenon, “marriage of the market and religion, where religion became the new lubricant facilitating the working of market institutions” can be traced to the 1980s (Yavuz, 2009, p.59) and even earlier.

Reflections of Özgür (2012) on Imam Hatip schools with respect to hegemony are worthy of quoting:

In exchange for the funds that they receive, Imam-Hatip schools provide Islamist politicians with venues to garner support, inform the public, and canvass voters. General high schools are not known to let secularist politicians use their grounds in the manner that Imam-Hatip schools do for Islamist politicians. For instance, mayors of municipalities whom I talked said that the occasionally spoke at Imam-Hatip schools to inform the public about their activities. (p. 144)

Also, drawing on a survey they carried out with Imam Hatip students, Coskun and Senturk (2012) state that Imam Hatip schools have already become crucial tools to create a community loyal to the political Islamic parties and the students tend to take the agenda of the ruling political Islamist party as the agenda of Turkey (Coskun & Senturk, 2012). This study has found out that this hegemonic agenda was accelerated in the past few years and has become a force contributing to the disgruntlement of the secular middle class populations in the urban context.

Although it has been discussed that apart from promoting their economic interests, the dominant groups need to ensure social control for the perpetuation of their hegemony, the research does not claim that the religiosity intended to evoke with respect to education is an archaic Ottoman religiosity. It is beyond the scope of this research to discuss it in detail; however, this religiosity is not at sharply odds

with the dictates of modern life. It is an understanding where modernity and religiosity fuse.

5.4 A new assessment system

One of the findings of the research has the convergence of the new high school placement exam with school conversion and relocation policy. Urban education policy change in many international contexts have been accompanied by an increasing emphasis on assessment.

One thing that has not been discussed in relation to the TEOG exam system is how it will contribute to the privatization of education in multiple ways. This research has explained how instability brought about by TEOG and its decoupling the relationship between the neighborhood and its catchment school might contribute to privatization of education. Another point that needs to be taken into account is the standardization brought about by the exam. Indeed, standardized data based on standardized tests can serve as crucial elements of the drive toward marketization because they provide the consumers with relevant data to make comparisons and make choices accordingly (Apple, 2005).

5.5 School choice debate and geographically situated tendencies in Turkish education

Findings suggest that lack of emphasis on choice and school autonomy in Turkish education policy is a geographically situated tendency. International scholarship on urban education point to the increasing policy emphasis on school choice and devolution of educational bureaucracies, which translates into an emphasis school autonomy, and have examined the ways in which the policy focus on choice and

institutional autonomy further disenfranchises the already disadvantaged communities by opening the way for further marketisation of education (Ball, Bowe & Gewirtz, 1996; Reay & Lucey, 2003; Whitty, 1997, 2001, 2002; Whitty&Edwards, 1998). While these studies argue that it is the middle class who can take advantage of choice based policies, lack of choice was a concern for the middle class informants who participated in this research. “There is no choice” was a frequently voiced sentence.

Although the middle class might not be saying that they have been left without choice in comparison to the urban poor or low income populations, the way choice has been framed in recent policy documents does not contradict their perceptions. The notion of choice entered the National Law of Education with 4+4+4 education system, but it has not yet been at the forefront of education policy discourse. The concept of choice was framed from a conservative perspective and referred to being able to choose a religious middle school. Discourses of the most powerful politicians who were proud of the new schooling system also refer to choice in this context.

Lack of school choice discourse in Turkey is related to the issue of institutional autonomy and devolution. In Turkey, unlike in the international context, there has been limited enthusiasm for a pronounced choice and devolution policy. The centralized character of education system, which has been problematised by various agencies including, inter alia, international organisations such as the World Bank, non-governmental organisations, and human rights groups, is due to the political climate peculiar to Turkey. The World Bank (2005), describes Turkish education system as the most centralized system in Europe and its schools as having little autonomy, which it attributes to “legitimate historical reasons, including issues

of culture, nation building, and social unity” (p. 27). One of the chief reasons for this significant difference, in other words firm commitment to central bureaucratic control, is because education in mother tongue has long been one of the central demands of the Kurdish political movement. Although Turkey has signed international treaties pertaining to minority and cultural rights, it has put reservations on provisions that are relevant to minorities’ right to education in mother tongue (Kaya, 2009). In addition to this historical reason, the argument of this study is that bureaucratic control will continue to be a dominant trend due to the crucial role of education in reorganizing the hegemonic relations.

Despite this striking divergence from different geographies in the working of urban education policies, MoNE statistics suggest that the major impact of the high school placement reform has been to direct low performing students to attend vocational schools. Considering the current situation of vocational schools, it can be suggested that the implications of policy serves the perpetuation of existing hierarchies and power relations, which reflects the broader tendencies that are occurring worldwide. Moreover, retaining bureaucratic control is not an impediment to the advancement of the neoliberal agenda. This study suggests that the state is interested in retaining its monopolistic power in centrally regulating and supervising educational affairs on the one hand; while on the other, it seeks to delegate the responsibility for funding by promoting parental participation, private school enrolments, and educational philanthropy. These divergences and convergences can be explained by an understanding of neoliberalism as a project which is, according to Brenner and Theodore (2005), ‘*articulated through contextually specific strategies*’ (p. 102). “Neoliberalism does not exist in a single, ‘pure’ form, but is always

articulated through historically and geographically specific strategies of institutional transformation and ideological rearticulation” (p. 102).

5.6 New schools, new symbols

The removal of a public school to replace it with a religious school campus is accorded a symbolic significance in both the everyday life and the future of the neighborhood. As the ‘monuments to the Republic’ (Bilgi 2014, 356), schools do not carry the same significance for the existing rulers who felt they have long been neglected and suppressed. During the establishment phase of the modern Turkish Republic, schools assumed a critical role in terms of both ideological and architectural reconstruction of the nation’s neighbourhoods. Modern schools were constructed discursively and materially with a view to delegitimizing and constructing as ‘other’ the Ottoman schools named *mahalle mektebi*, which literally means ‘neighbourhood schools’ (Bilgi, 2014).

The grandeur of the new school campus that was built one year after the demolition of Seyit Efendi High School attested to a new symbolism on Arguvan Boulevard. This symbolism resonates with Batuman’s (2013) argument that “the urban strategy of neo-liberal Islamism rests, on the one hand, on the production of space through maximization of rent and, on the other, on the framing of the social spaces with Islamic representations” (p. 1110).

5.7 Public schools situated in urban education policy

This research contributes some insights into educational policy change in a neoliberal state, notably that physical locations are significant enabling and disabling factors within neo-liberal policy-making. Relocation policy was equated with physical

neglect both generally and in the particular case of Seyit Efendi HS where the school was sent to an urban transformation zone full of insecurities that were documented by impartial urban authorities such as the Chamber of Engineers and Architects.

The idea of relocating inner city schools to certain designated zones or peripheries were perceived to stand in sharp contrast to the newly established religious schools in relatively desirable parts of the city. Although further research needs to be carried out to see to what extent this judgment is indicative of a general trend, Özgür's (2012) study on Imam Hatip schools resonates with it in that the study explains in detail how Imam Hatip schools are generously funded in terms of equipment and buildings. With respect to the location, for example, in the opening ceremony of a newly built Imam Hatip School in Istanbul, the district governor of Uskudar boasted that they allocated the most expensive land in the area for the school ("Ünalan Anadolu," September 2012).

This preference for disadvantaging secular public schools reflects a clear choice about the priorities in the allocation of resources for education, where problems of underresourced secular public schools do not rank very high. This is not because these problems are regarded as marginal. The choice reflects, rather, a particular perspective where parental efforts as well as mechanisms of charity mobilized by NGOs are seen as the proper means of dealing with educational problems, a concern considered to be beyond the scope of the state's responsibilities.

5.8 Voluntary exclusion of the middle class from public education

Increasing drive towards marketisation and commodification of education in Turkish education system has long been an issue (Gök, 2007; Kurul, 2012), and school relocation policy intertwined with other educational dynamics can be said to

further contribute to this trend among the middle class. In the light of the studies that argue parent's views regarding public schools is a key factor in shaping their school choice (Aratemur-Cimen) and the claims of school communities that public schools are destabilised through various mechanisms, one of which is relocation, it is possible to suggest that middle classes will further withdraw from public education. Also, that these developments have been complemented with the recently introduced private school incentive system signal a departure the corporatist mode of educational politics which had been implemented in the policy of publicly funded comprehensive schooling.

Traditional middle class' finding itself in a disadvantageous situation with the school relocations and related reforms might have implications for the education of the working class. Failure of the working class in education is a "relational outcome of middle class power to define what counts as knowledge and achievement" (Whitty, 2001; p. 287). However, destabilising the existing relationship of the middle class to their schools would not reverse this trend. The shift from a relatively secular public education system to a more-religion oriented one will further promote the voluntary exclusion of the middle class from public education, an agenda advanced by the neoliberal state through several measures ranging from desourcing public schools to providing financial incentives for those sending their children to private schools. Therefore, from a class hierarchy perspective, destabilising middle class public schools cannot be seen as opening space for the disadvantaged groups. Moreover, various studies have pointed that education reforms presented in the rhetoric of difference and diversity often turn out to be sophisticated mechanisms of perpetuating existing racial and class-based hierarchies (Gewirtz, Ball, & Bowe, 1995; Whitty, 1998; 2001). In this vein, seeing the recent cultural turn in Turkish

education system as a reversal of existing power relationships provides one with a limited understanding such as seeing recent reforms simply as the dismantling of the previous Republican mode of totalising education and as empowerment of the previously-excluded religious populations, including the conservative poor. Just as Whitty (2002) describes in the context of urban education in England and the US, where school choice policies initially obtained the support of Black communities, radicals, and liberals. This perspective fails to show how macro-societal pressures or expectations are translated into particular reform agendas.

5.9 Market-oriented islamisation of Istanbul

Aside from the threat of displacement, the way Arguvan residents interpreted the relocation of the neighbourhood school cannot be decoupled from what Tuğal (2008) calls the “market-oriented Islamisation of the city” (p. 76). “Cultural institutions are often collocated with commercial ones and a precondition for project realization is that new forms of co-operation between public authorities and private investors are developed” (Nylund, 2001). Some Arguvan residents who owned more than one house were not likely to be displaced by the urban transformation; on the contrary, the value of their houses had increased. However, they were unhappy with these developments due to the cultural character of the renewal, and their reaction to the relocation of Veli Efendi was informed by the market oriented islamisation of the city, the effects of which they were able to observe in their neighborhood.

The predominance of women in Seyit Efendi HS struggle is also linked to the conservative character of the urban transformation in Arguvan. Parenting in education is a gendered job and it is predominantly mothers who deal with the children’s schoolwork, communicate with the teachers and network in order to find

out the relevant information which will provide their children with a competitive advantage (David, Davies, Edwards, Reay, & Standing, 1996; Reay & Ball, 1998). However, women's involvement in their children's education and school environment is more than accumulating cultural capital for their children; in fact they also engage in this labour for their self-interest (Apak-Kaya, 2014). Women in Arguvan neighborhood were concerned about not only their children's schooling but also their own freedoms. The way they defended their freedoms was rooted in the historical construction of female identity and the discourse of women's rights in Turkey. Kandiyoti (1991) argues that emancipation of women in Turkey can be fully understood by analyzing "the process of her emergence from an empire based on the multi-ethnic millet (national and religious communities) system to Anatolia-based secular nation state" (p.23). The issue of women's rights was a strong instrument to dissolve the theocratic remnants of the Ottoman state and establish a secular nation state (Acar & Ayata, 2002; Kandiyoti, 1987; 1998, p.43). The discussions over women's rights in the First National Assembly were subject to fierce debates between the deputies. The then Minister of Education, Hamdullah Suphi, had to resign in 1921 because of the reactions against him for carrying out a mixed-sex teachers' congress (Taşkiran, in Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 38). Although it was a process where the emancipators were males whereas women were passive onlookers, the Republican area opened space for "state-sponsored feminism" (Kandiyoti, 1991, p. 42). On the other hand, it was mostly the urban middle class women who were able to directly benefit from Republican reforms (Kandiyoti, 1987). Due to the peculiar conditions of the country, Turkish education system and professional world provided some advantages to urban middle class for upward mobility and status (Öncü, 1982). Relatively high ratio of women with respected occupations such as lawyer and doctor

compared to many developed Western countries is a commonly voiced fact in Turkey. According to Öncü (1982), this is to some extent a result of the urban women being able to take care of the cheap labour of rural migrant women in the house and the late development of professional occupations, which urban women were encouraged to enter rather than rural men who were seen as of more threat to professional urban men (Öncü, 1982). No matter what the reason is, these factors have generated loyalty among the urban women to the modern state.

Seyit Efendi women were no doubt also acting with spatial defensiveness and territoriality, which was similar to the territoriality described by Turam (2013) in reference to Nişantası dwellers, which Edibe has also mentioned as a desirable spot for the emergent bourgeoisie whom she sees as characterised by conservatism. Turam (2013) argues that “certain places, such as Teşvikiye, practice, attract, hold and (re)generate political power”, referring to “these places that are highly agentic and highly contested as ‘zones of and for freedom’”. According to Turam,

Now that devout Muslims are integrated into these contested urban sites, and share bourgeois lifestyles, ordinary people from all walks of life act in defense of their ‘sphere’ of freedom and privacy. This new territoriality is largely symptomatic of rising fears of losing freedom, privacy and social status. This defensiveness, expressed mainly through ‘neighbourhood territoriality’, is reinforced by people’s decreasing trust in, and increasing demands from, the state for the protection and security of their rights and liberties. (p.411)

Turam’s observations are in line with Edibe’s accounts explaining why she would not prefer to live in Scutari. Edibe believed that the neighborhood failed to adopt a modern and accultured life, which she associated with more freedom.

5.10 Consent building

In today’s Istanbul, like many other public assets, school buildings have also become crucial instruments for current government’s strategy of creating new infrastructure,

which is an integral part of its neoliberal value accumulation project. While some school buildings are sold and the schools are to be relocated into new premises in the peripheries of the city, some of them are either rebuilt or renovated with no change in their location. According to the figures of the European Investment Bank (EIB), in 2008 Turkey signed an EIB loan of EUR 300 million, which was used for the reconstruction of 60 schools and 1 hospital, as well as the retro-strengthening of the building structure of 54 schools and 20 healthcare facilities (EU Delegation, 2014). If selective withdrawal of state support for public schools or not attending to the increasing infrastructural needs of them is the moment of destruction, renovating the existing schools or replacing them with new ones in the peripheries of the city is the moment of creation that is rendered through deployment of neoliberal political programs at various spatial scales. Although the processes of construction bidding of the schools have been subject to corruption allegations (see Birgun, 2013), newly built schools have been important tools to generate consent among people who expect better service provision and associate better architecture with more quality education.

5.11 A new policy experimentation

A common practice in public schools was to share one building, which was exemplified in the case of Kayabaşı High school. This practice points to two interrelated policy directions: a shift to a more efficient utilisation of public resources and a neoliberal political experimentation with educational spaces. As cities become important geographical locations for the neoliberal regime that aims at value creation as well as political experimentation (Weber, 2002; Keil, 2009; Brenner & Theodore, 2002), spaces of education in the city become subject to this new mode of

governance. If transferring the school land to private bodies and reconstructing the existing schools are ways of commodification, both the act of selling them and making other schools share the same building constitute the political experimentation side of the new policy direction in education. The practice that I witnessed during fieldwork work was indeed a micro-experimentation for the yet inchoate school campuses project of MoNE, through which it aims to gather tens of city schools in a single campus. The legal framework was vaguely drawn in 2009 with the code of MoNE Education Campuses No.2618. School relocation/selling policy as well as the practices of sharing school buildings work in agreement towards the larger project.

The act of commodification of schools need not be seen merely as an economic project; it is also a political project. Wacquant (2012) argues that “Commodification as the extension of market or market-like mechanisms, based on the notion that such mechanisms are universally optimal means for efficiently allocating resources and rewards” is one of the institutional rationalities of the neoliberal reengineering. It suggests a new mode of governance that not only dictates privatisation and retrenchment of welfare, but also new regulatory measures that shape the way public resources are used. The Public Financial Management and Control Law No. 5018 issued in 2010 constitutes an example of how public institutions are made to act in a particular direction while using their resources. The principle of efficiency and effectiveness constitute both the *r’aison d’etre* of the Law and are central concepts to the definition of *public finance management*. The principle of accountability, the mechanism of internal control, internal auditing, and the responsibilities of all the managers are linked to successful realisation of the principles of effectiveness and efficiency.

5.12 Third face of power

According to Lukes (1981), a complex analysis of power needs to avoid behavioural focus and realise that non-events make more significant policy than do policy-making events. For any event that occurs, there must be an infinity of alternatives. Then, an important question is which non-events are to be considered as significant. One answer is those outcomes desired by a significant number of actors in the community but not achieved. For example, a non-event in Seyit Efendi HS Solidarity was what kind of education system they desired. One reason for this was the dominant political orientation in the Solidarity, which was more diverse in the initial phases of their organising. The agenda of the Solidarity was busy and chaotic, and deeper problems between individuals lay unresolved for a long time. The alliance between different individuals and groups within the solidarity was based on the existence of a common hostility towards particular government policies rather than on a common ideology. However, some of the issues were more urgent and significant for the solidarity.

Although their disgruntlements gave vague clues as to what kind of education they wanted, there was no explicit discussion of this. That issue was more of a concern in Don't Touch My School Initiative that also worked against school conversions and it was brought up in some neighborhood forums but went lost amidst the immediate needs of parents to organise and obtain advice. Seyit Efendi Solidarity shrank as some members left the organisation due to the split between the members who wanted to carry the Turkish flag in demonstrations and those who said that it was a political symbol and therefore should be avoided. Another non-event was the lack of support from lower income groups. Although Seyif Efendi members were aware of it and made a couple of attempts, they did not discuss this issue

openly. They got active support of urban rights' groups and education rights' groups but this was not enough for them to spread their resistance to a larger population.

The issue of school relocations shows us that education and its spaces are both materially and symbolically central to power struggles and domination in the city. Viewed from the vantage point of educational sciences, what is most conspicuous in today's urbanism is that today's Istanbul inner-city schools have become crucial sites for neoliberal experimentations that aim to extract value from the city. However, taking into account the crucial role of schools in social reproduction, it is possible to say that this experimentation might be aiming to make use of the potential of educational sites to transform, shape, or recreate people's selfhood and skills, which come into being in part through interaction with the social and material environment. The school initiatives, as well as those not actively involved but who are against selling school buildings and the Turkish government represent competing interests and directions in education and community development in Istanbul. They have strikingly different approaches to the way they conceptualise education, space, and place. These differences seem to have unfolded in relation to global and national economic and social processes that have transformed Istanbul from the "city of seven hills", a famous expression coined to describe the historical city, to a "seven star" city.

5.13 Limitations of the study

Certain limitations were involved in the research, which can be specified as follows:

1. This study sought to conceptualise school relocation practice in Istanbul at a policy level, from both the perspectives of parents and policy makers. However, due limited access to the policy documents and uncertain and

untansparent nature of the policy under consideration, the study of perspectives has been dominated by a bottom-up account. Therefore, the study described how the policy was perceived by school constituents and the repercussions of the policy for them. Policy makers' perspective of school relocations was analysed in an embedded way, with reference to media accounts, limited written responses to parent petitions, limited interaction with bureaucrats at the MoNE Istanbul National Directorate, parents' reporting of their own encounters with policy makers, and documents that were accidentally disclosed.

2. Fieldwork was carried out with only two school communities and a deep engagement was possible with one. Although various other school communities were interacted with as field school communities had links to them and would often come together, the situations of these schools were not scrutinised.
3. This study was carried out in two middle class districts. In depth engagement with working class districts or affluent neighborhoods has not been possible.
4. The focus of the study has been on the perspectives of adults, parents, neighborhood residents, and school activists in particular. Perspectives of students are limited as they were not actively engaged due to their educational commitments and their parents' reservations about their participation.
5. Perspectives of communities who defend school relocation policy is absent due to the spatial and time limitations.

5.14 Suggestions for further research

Both based on the limitations and the need for a deeper understanding of school relocation policy, the following suggestions can be made for further research.

1. Fieldwork with relocated school communities in districts of Istanbul that have characteristics which differ from the schools described in this study would provide a deeper understanding into the process. For instance, studies on how closings, relocation, or conversion affect working class or low-income schools would contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of the relocation process. Given that middle class is much more capable of mobilising its social and economic resources in case of an educational crisis, analyzing the predicament of lower income groups in the face of lack of resources would provide a deeper understanding into the ways in which education policy affects different populations.
2. An analysis focusing mainly on pro-relocation parents or neighborhood residents would yield a more nuanced understanding of consent mechanisms in education and how they are related to particular power dynamics.
3. A particular research focus on the effect of the new high school placement exam on school choice vis-à-vis spatial location would yield further insights into the role of spatiality in politics.
4. A longitudinal study on a particular relocated school or closed school would illuminate the long term effects of school relocation or closing policy.

APPENDIX A

BOGAZICI UNIVERSITY HUMAN RESEARCH INSTITUTIONAL COMMITTEE APPROVAL FORM

BOĞAZIÇI ÜNİVERSİTESİ
İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) Toplantı Tutanağı
2014/5

20.10.2014

Sezen Bayhan
Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Eğitim Bilimleri Bölümü, Bebek/ İstanbul
sezen.bayhan@gmail.com – bayhans@boun.edu.tr

Sayın Araştırmacı,

“Kentsel dönüşüm ve eğitim: İstanbuldaki okul dönüşümleri ve yer değıstirmeleri” başlıklı projeniz ile yaptığınız Boğaziçi Üniversitesi İnsan Araştırmaları Kurumsal Değerlendirme Kurulu (İNAREK) 2014/71 kayıt numaralı başvuru 20.10.2014 tarihli ve 2014/5 sayılı kurul toplantısında incelenerek etik onay verilmesi uygun bulunmuştur.

Saygılarımızla,

Prof. Dr. Hande Çağlayan (Başkan)
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Hukuk Fakültesi
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Çapa/İstanbul

Yrd. Doç. Dr. Ekin Eremsoy
Psikoloji Bölümü, Doğu Üniversitesi,
İstanbul

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM (TURKISH)

Bu çalışma Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'nde yürütülmekte olan "Kentsel Dönüşüm ve Eğitim: İstanbul'daki Okul Yer Değiştirmeleri ve Dönüşümleri" konulu bir doktora tezi kapsamında İstanbul'un eğitim mekanlarının dönüşümünü araştırmayı hedeflemektedir. Çalışma kapsamında İstanbul'da dönüşüm geçiren bazı okullar seçilmiştir ve araştırma amaçlı olarak okul bileşenleri ile mülakat ve anket çalışmaları yapılacaktır. Birçok yerel veli dayanışma grubu ve mahalle organizasyonları bu konu ile yakından ilgilenmektedir. Bu araştırmada bize yardımcı olmanız için sizi de projemize davet ediyoruz.

Araştırmayı kabul ettiğiniz takdirde size yarı yapılandırılmış mülakat metodu kullanılarak belirli sorular yöneltilecektir. Ayrıca ekteki formda istenen bilgileri de sağlamanızı rica ediyoruz. İsminiz ve verdiğiniz bu bilgiler tamamen gizli tutulacaktır.

Çalışmaya katılmanız tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Sizden ücret talep etmiyoruz ve size herhangi bir ödeme yapmayacağız.

Sizden alacağımız soruların cevapları başka çalışmalar için de kullanılabilir. İstedığınız zaman çalışmaya katılmaktan vazgeçebilirsiniz. Bu durumda sizden alınmış veriler imha edilecektir.

Bu formu imzalamadan önce, çalışmayla ilgili sorularınız varsa lütfen bu soruları iletiniz. Daha sonra sorunuz olursa, Sezen Bayhan'a (Telefon: 0 505 674 95 82) sorabilirsiniz. Araştırmayla ilgili haklarınız konusunda yerel etik kurullarına da danışabilirsiniz.

Adres ve telefon numaranız değişirse, bize haber vermenizi rica ederiz.

Bana anlatılanları ve yukarıda yazılanları anladım. Bu formun bir kopyasını aldım.

Çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

Katılımcı Adı-Soyadı:.....

İmzası:.....

Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

Varsa Katılımcının Vasisinin Adı-

Soyadı:.....

İmzası:.....

Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

APPENDIX C

RESEARCH PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM (ENGLISH)

This study aims to explore the transformation of educational spaces in Istanbul as part of a PhD study conducted at Boğaziçi University. The name of the dissertation is “Urban Transformation and Education: School Relocations and Conversions in Istanbul”. Within the context of the study, certain schools that are undergoing transformation have been selected as research sites and school communities will be interviewed and given surveys. We cordially invite you to contribute to our study.

If you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked semi-structured interview questions. Also, we would like you to answer the questions in the attached form. Your identity and the information you provide to us will be confidential. It is completely up to you to decide to participate in the study. We do not charge you or offer money for the study. The answers we get from you can be used for further studies. You can quit the study at any phase of it. In that case, we will exterminate all the data we obtain from you.

Before signing this form please do not hesitate to ask questions to us if you have any. If you decide to ask questions later, you can call Sezen Bayhan at 0 505 674 95 82. You can also consult local ethic groups regarding your rights in the study.

Should your address and phone number change, please inform us.

I have read and understood the above written information and I have obtained one copy of the form.

I agree to participate in this study.

Name and surname of the participant:.....

Signature.....

Date (day/month/year):...../...../.....

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (TURKISH)

1. Grup sorular (*Okul hakkında*)

1. Çocuğunuzun lise öğrenim hikayesinden kısaca bahseder misiniz? (mesela kaçınıcı sınıf, ne zamandır bu okulda okuyor, akademik durumu, derslere olan tavrı, en sevdiği ders gibi.)
2. Coçuğunuzu bu okula göndermenizin öncelikli nedeni nedir? Biraz açıklar mısınız?
3. Bu okulu seçmenizde etkili olan diğeri faktörler nelerdir?
4. Çocuğunuzun okulunu tercih edenleri genel olarak nasıl tanımlardınız? (nerden geliyorlar, sosyo-ekonomik durumları gibi.)
5. Okulun diğeri veliler ve öğrenciler tarafından tercih edilmesinde başlıca etkenler sizce nelerdir?
6. Gelir durumunuzu veya sosyoekonomik durumunuzu nasıl tanımlarsınız?
7. Aylık ortalama ne kadar civarı eğitim harcaması yapıyorsunuz çocuğunuz için? Bütçenizi zorluyor mu bu harcamalar?
8. Eskisi ile karşılaştıracak olursanız eğitim harcaması davranışlarınızda meydana gelen değişiklikler oldu mu?
9. Üniversite ve meslek olarak ne düşünüyorsunuz? Bu tercihinizin nedenleri nelerdir?
10. Okulun geçen sene, yani 4+4+4 ile, kız meslek lisesi yapılması hakkında ne düşünmüştünüz?
11. Tam karşısında kız lisesi varken sizin okulunuzun meslek lisesine dönüştürülmesi hakkında ne düşünmüştünüz?
12. Sizce neden okul kız meslek lisesine dönüştürdüler?
13. Yan binada bulunan Kalimni IHL ile herhangi bir etkileşimi oluyor mu öğrencilerin?

2. Grup (*Taşınma ve Eylemlilik*)

14. Okulun dönüştürülme haberini öğrenmeniz nasıl oldu. Ve bunu takip eden süreçten biraz bahseder misiniz? (ilk tepkiniz neydi, cocuğunuzun tepkisi, mahallelinin, ve diğerlerinin)
15. Sizce okulunuzun yerini neden değiştiriyorlar?
16. İlk dönem taşınacak denmişti. O dönem okul değiştirenler oldu mu? (evet ise: nereye gittiler)
17. Okul konusunda herhangi bir eylemlilik, dava süreci, toplantı, vb bir aktivitede bulundunuz mu?
18. Okul eylemlerine velilerin katılım oranı nasıldı? (az diyorsa nedeni sorulacak.)
19. Nasıl gelişti örgütlenme ve okulun dönüşmesine karşı çıkma süreci?
20. Öğrencilerin eylemlere katılımı nasıldı süreç içerisinde?

21. İstanbul genelindeki benzer okul hikayeleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
3. Grup (*Yeni Okul*)
22. Yeni okula taşınmanın sizin için ne gibi eksileri veya artıları olacak?
23. Çocuğunuz ulaşımını nasıl sağlayacak?
24. Öğretmenleri, sınıfı, arkadaşları aynı kalacak mı, yoksa değişecek mi?
25. Okulun yeni çevresi hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nelerdir?
4. Grup (*Arguvan*)
26. Arguvan bölgesini sosyoekonomik ve kültürel açıdan nasıl tanımlarsınız?
27. Bölgede son yıllarda gözlemlediğiniz değişimler var mı? (Biraz bahseder misiniz? -“evet” diyorsa bu soruya.)
28. Arguvan Dayanışması bazı sorunlar yaşadı ve bölündü. Bununla ilgili görüşleriniz neler?

APPENDIX E

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS (ENGLISH)

1. Group Questins (*About the school*)

1. Could you briefly inform us about your child's education history. Çocuğunuzun lise öğrenim hikayesinden kısaca bahseder misiniz? (Her/His grade, how long she/he has been attending this school, academic performace, favourite subject, etc.)
2. What is the main reason for you to prefer this school for your child? Could you please explain.
3. What are the other factors that made you select this school?
4. How would you broadly define the population who choose to study at this school? (Socioeconomic status, neighborhood, etc.)
5. What do you think are the main factors that make other parents and students prefer this school?
6. How would you define your income and socioeconomic status?
7. How much on average do you spend on education? Does this cost cause a significant burden on your budget?
8. Have there been any chanes in your educational spendings compared to the past?
9. Which program would you consider for you child's university life. Why?
10. What was your opinion last year when the school was converted into a Girls' Technical Vocational School?
11. What did you think it being converted into a girls' school when there was another girls' school across the street?
12. Why do you think has the school been converted into a girls' vocational school?
13. Do the students of Seyit Efendi have any interaction with the student sin the next building, in Kalimni IHL?

2. Group (Relocation and mobility)

14. How did you learn about the conversion news of the school? And can you please tell us about what happened afterwards? (What was your first reaction, your son's reaction, the reaction of the community, etc?)
15. Why do you think is the school being relocated?
16. It was said that the school would be relocated in the first term? Where there any students who transferred to other schools during that time?
17. Have you ever participated in any organisation, meetings, judiciary processes during this time?
18. What was the participation level of parents in school protests? (The reasons will be asked if the answer is 'little')
19. How did the organising and resisting process evolve?

20. What was the participation level of the students like?
21. What is your opinion on the similar conversion processes throughout Istanbul?
3. Group (New School)
 22. What do you think will be the pluses and minuses of moving to your new school?
 23. How will your child transport to and from the school?
 24. Will the teachers and classmates stay or will they change?
 25. What do you think about the new surrounding of the school?
4. Group (Arguvan)
 26. How would you define Arguvan neighborhood in terms of socioeconomic status and culturally?
 27. Have you observed any changes in the past few years? (If the answer is yes, the question “Could you please explain” will be asked).
 28. Arguvan neighborhood experienced some problems and was fragmented. What do you think about that?

APPENDIX F

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE (TURKISH)

Bu anket İstanbul eğitim coğrafyası üzerine Boğaziçi Üniversitesi'nde yapılan akademik bir çalışma için düzenlenmiştir. İsminizi belirtmeniz istenmemektedir. Cevapları sadece bu anketi düzenleyen kişi görecektir. Desteğiniz için teşekkür ederiz.

1. Cinsiyet: K E 2. Yaş _____

3. İstanbul'da ikamet ettiğiniz semtin/mahallenin tam olarak adı? (Örnek: Şişli-Çağlayan, Kağıthane-Telsizler Mahallesi, Beşiktaş-Etiler)

4. Ne kadar zamandır bu semtte/mahallede oturuyorsunuz?

5. (Var ise) Daha önce oturduğunuz semt? Buradan taşınma nedeniniz nedir?

6. Okumakta olduğunuz okulu tercih etme neden(ler)iniz?

7. Evinizden okulunuza ulaşmanız ne kadar zaman alıyor?

- _____
- 5 -15 dk 16-25 dk 26-35 dk 36-45 dk 46-59 dk
 1saat 61-75 dk 76-89dk 1.5 saat 91-120dk
(1.5-2saat) 2saatten fazla

8. Evinizden okulunuza kaç ulaşım aracı ile gelmektesiniz? (gününe göre değişiyorsa durumu aşağıda açıklayınız)

- 1 2 3 4

9. Evden okula gelirken en sık hangi aracı/araçları kullanıyorsunuz (lütfen açıklayınız)

Yaya olarak _____ (ise işaretleyiniz)

10. Okuldan eve ulaşmanız ne kadar sürüyor? [lütfen hem yazınız (örnek:15-20dk civarı), hem de kutucuklardan en yakın olanını işaretleyiniz

- 5 -15 dk 16-25 dk 26-35 dk 36-45 dk 46-59 dk
 1saat
 61-75 dk 76-89dk 1.5 saat 91-120dk (1.5-2saat)
 2saatten fazla

11. Okuldan evinize kaç ulaşım aracı ile gitmektesiniz? (gününe göre değişiyorsa en sık olan durumu belirtiniz veya durumu açıklayınız.

- 1 2 3 4

12. Eve giderken en sık hangi araç(lar)ı kullanıyorsunuz? (Lütfen açıklayınız.)

Yaya olarak _____ (ise lütfen işaretleyiniz).

13. Kaç kardeşiniz var? _____

14. Yaşları? 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____

15. Annenizin ve babanızın mesleği?

Anne _____

Baba _____

16. Okul dışında en çok vakit geçirdiğiniz mekanlar ve yaptığınız ders dışı aktiviteler nelerdir?

17. Bu mekanları tercih etme nedenleriniz?

18. Eklemek istedikleriniz veya paylaşmak istediğiniz düşünceleriz varsa buraya yazabilirsiniz.

APPENDIX G

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE (ENGLISH)

This questionnaire has been designed for a study conducted on Istanbul school geography. We do not ask you to write your name. The answers will be seen only by the person who is conducting the survey. Thank you for your contribution.

1. Gender: F M

2. Age

3. In which neighborhood of Istanbul do you live?

4. How long have you been living in this neighborhood?

5. Your previous neighborhood. Why did you move out from this neighborhood?

6. What is the main reason(s) for you to choose to study at this school?

7. How long does it take you to get from your house to the school?

- 5 -15 min 16-25 min 26-35 min 36-45 min 46-59 min 1hour
 61-75 min 76-89 min 1.5 hour 91-120 min More than 2 hours

8. How many vehicles do you use while getting from home to school?

1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____

9. Which vehicles do you use the most while getting from home to school?

Please tick if _____ on foot.

10. How long does it take you to get from school to your home?

- 5 -15 min 16-25 min 26-35 min 36-45 min 46-59 min 1hour
 61-75 min 76-89 min 1.5 hour 91-120 min More than 2 hours

11. How many vehicles do you use while getting from school to home?

1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____

12. Which vehicles do you use the most while getting from school to home?

Please tick if _____ on foot

13. How many brothers and sisters do you have? _____

14. Their ages? 1. _____ 2. _____ 3. _____ 4. _____

15. Occupation of the mother and father?

Mother _____

Father _____

16. What are the places that you spend your after-school time. And what activities do you mostly do after school?

17. What are your reasons for preferring these places?

18. If you would like to express any additional ideas, you can write them here.

APPENDIX H

SAMPLE DIARY ENTRY

This is an original-size screenshot of the diary entry that was penned on MS Word by the researcher a day after the event in which the researcher participated. Typos and grammar mistakes are kept intact for authenticity purposes. Only the name of the high school has been changed.

11 Nisan 2014

Dun Sevit Efendi Lisesi'nin okul onu eylemine gittim. 10dk gecikmeli olarak 8:10'da oradaydim. Okulun tasinmasinin Hazirana ertelendigi dusuncesi ile bir cok veli gelmemisti. Ogrenciler zaten disiplin korkusundan dolayi yoklardi. Berkin Elvan eyleminde 30-40 tanesine disiplin sorusturmasi acilmis, tasdiknameleri anneleri tarafından imzalanmis. Bu ne demek cok iyi bilmiyorum ama zannedersem sicillerine kotu bir sey yazilmasin diye anneleri kendileri almaya razı olmuslar. Bunun tehdidi altindalar.

40-50 kisi kadardik eylemde. Karsimizda Kazan adli luks kebapci vardi. Kebapciya gelenlerin onemli bir kısmi yeni islami burjuvazi mensuplari idi. Cikinca luks jiplerine ve arabalarini okul bahcesinden alip gidiyorlardı. BMW jeep, Mercedes, vs. idi.

Okulun onunde ise eylem yapanlarin cogu geleneksel orta sinif dedigimiz gruptandi. Diger eylemlerde oldugu gibi kadinlar agrlikta idi. O civarda oturan bir kadin soyle dedi:


“Ortalikta okul birakmadilar ki. benim torunum var, daha 5 yasinda. Dusunuyoruz ne yapsak. Bey diyorum benim emekli maasimi koyariz, seninkini de koyariz, ozel okula gondeririz. E biz ne yiycez. Kizin getirdigini yeriz artik”. Anne single mother idi anladigim kadariyla.

Kazan’a giden iyi giyimli biri cikisti gruba: “burasi imam hatipti eskiden” diye. Yuhaladilar. Erkeklerden sinirlenenler oldu ama kimse abartmadi. Egemen olmak boyle bir sey olsa gerek dedim.

APPENDIX I

SAMPLE ON-SITE FIELD NOTES

This is a picture of one-page field notes taken during a community discussion on schools. Name of the participant is covered for confidentiality purposes.



APPENDIX J

NARRATIVES IN TURKISH

4.1.2 Urban transformation and displacement

1. Belediye Sitesi'nde oturmakta idim. 36 villa, 100er metrekareden toplam 3600 metrekare. Önünde Hazine'ye terkedilmiş 1500 metrekarelik alan vardı. 85000-90000 metrekare yer inşa edeceğim dedi inşaat şirketi. Four Seasons ve Astay, ve kurdukları fiktif Şirket Etiler Gayrimenkul. Herbirimizin oturduğu evlerin 35-40 yıllık geçmişi vardır. İki katlı villalarda oturuyorduk. Karot numunesi aldılar. Gelen sarı zarfta deprem yasası gereğince eviniz tehlike arz etmektedir diyordu. Belediye Sitesi'ndeki diğer binalara değil, villalara gelmiş zarflar. 36 kat malikinden onaltısı bir araya geldik. Astay İnşaat Ahmet Çekiççi'nin şirketiymiş. 1 milyon amerikan dolarına 20 satmış daireyi. Kalan onaltısının altısı bir milyon sekiz yüz bin dolara sattı. (...) ELEktrik su kesikti bir sabah kalktığımızda. (...). Bir kişi kalmıştı taşınmayan. Ayın altısı, yılbaşından hemen sonraki hafta iş makinası girdi. Belediye [Beşiktaş Belediyesi]'ye gittik, yıkım kararını vermiyorlar. Cumartesi pazar evleri yıktılar. Şimdi Akmerkez'in karşısındaki o arazi, parmaklıklar arkasında. Biz akıllılık ettik. Tapulara şerh düştük, mahkemede halledemiyorlar. Rüşvet de dahil 50 milyon dolar harcadılar ama hala halledemediler.

Kadın: Biz bunu Kadıköy'de de yaşıyoruz. Akıllı davranmaktan kastınız nedir?

- Biz Akmerkez'in karşısında oturuyorduk. 90 metrekarelik evlerde oturuyorduk. 90 metrekarelik ev istiyoruz yine. Akmerkez'in karşısında oturmak istiyoruz.

2. Kendimi kentin beyaz yakalı olarak görüyorum. Sekizinci evimdeyim. En son oturduğum ev riskli diye yeniden yıkılıp yapılacak. Ben yine kapıda kaldım. Depremden sonra Beşiktaş'ı kapı kapı dolaştım riskleri anlatmak için. Akılları 15 senedir nerdeydi? Yeni mi hatırladılar depremi? 83bin metrekare üzerine altı yüz seksen üç bin metrekarelik Zorlu'da Karayolları arazisine yapıldı Zorlu. Okulların hepsi gidiyor. Sadece Etiler Polis Koleji değil, Maçka Akif Tuncel Lisesi de var. Eğitim-sen ciyak ciyak bağırırken okullar satılıyor diye, Ortaköy'de yakılan okullar, Kabataş Lisesi, Beşiktaş Kız Lisesi.
3. Dönüşüme meselesinde, Kadıköy'deki, Beşiktaş'taki, vb gibi, aydın mı desem orta sınıf bölgeler mi desem, bunlar gecekondü bölgelerindeki yıkımlara kayıtsız kaldılar, hor gördüler. 'E bunlar çökmüş, buralarda translar var, Tarlabası'ndan gece yürüyerek geçemeyiz buralardan'' dediler. Biz besledik bunları.
4. Ben Tozkoparan'dan geliyorum. Burada ülke gerçeklerinden kopuk bir kitle gördüm. Beş senedir biz bunları yaşıyoruz. İsmet Tezel tarım ilacı içerken

Beşiktaş'takilerin haberi olmadı bunlardan. Tokludedede'de Huri Teyze öldü kapı dışarı edilince. Bir taraftan trilyonlardan bahsederken bir tarafta yüz TL kira yardımları alan insanlar.

5. Okulun güçlendirmesini de yapan o, ne kadar para harcadığını da bilen o. Yani ben.. bütün bunlar benim kontrolümde oluyor, dedi. Dolayısıyla erteleyebiliriz dedi isterseniz. Ama bizim için siz de bi şeyler yapın.. Ayrıca şey dediler, sizin ordaki arsa fiyatlarından haberiniz var mıdır [dediler]. Hem o hem de belediye başkan adayı söyledi. Buraları şey, değerli yerler, sizin bundan haberiniz var mıdır, fiyatlardan.
6. Arguvan'da İmam Hatip'e tale mi var? Mahalleli İmam Hatip talep ediyor ise neden yurt binası yapılıyor? Milli Eğitim bütçesinin büyük bir kısmını neden İmam Hatiplere ayırıyor? Seyit Efendi Lisesi öğrencileri Kız İmam Hatip Lisesi'ne yurt yapmak için mi, yoksa inşaat şirketlerine rant yaratmak için mi yerlerinden ediliyor? Çocuklarımızın düz lise okuyacağız diye okula başladıkları yerde devam etme hakları yok mu?
7. Bir de işin kentsel dönüşüm yani. Rantsal dönüşüm kısmı var. Özellikle şehir merkezlerindeki arazilerin çok değerlendirilmesi ve boş arazilerin kalmaması nedeniyle inşaat şirketleri gözlerini kamu arazilerine dikti ve devlet eliyle kamu arazileri kentsel dönüşüm adı altında önce kamulaştırılıp daha sonra da özel şirketlere peşkeş çekiliyor. Bu bağlamda Seyit Efendi Lisesi ile Kalimni Anadolu İmam Hatip Lisesinin bulunduğu arazinin kamulaştırıldığını öğrenmiş bulunmaktayız. Resmi makamlara okulumuzun neden taşınmak istendiğini sorduğumuzda aldığımız farklı, farklı yanıtların özeti şöyledir; “Meskûr arsa üzerinde yeni bir imar durumu oluşmuş, ilçenin ve bölgenin ihtiyaçlarına uygun yeni yapılaşma düşüncesiyle planlama yapılmıştır ve bahsi geçen arsa üzerinde Kız Anadolu İmam Hatip Lisesi Eğitim-Öğretim binası ve yurt binası ile diğer sosyal donatılar yapılacaktır.” Bu iki lisenin de tadilatı yeni tamamlanmış ve depreme dayanıklı hale getirilmişlerdi. Peki hangi zihniyetle bunları yıkacağım, yerine yeniden eğitim kampüsü yapacağım deniliyor? Bir de “ilçenin ve bölgenin ihtiyaçlarına uygun yeni yapılaşma düşüncesiyle” deniliyor, bu ihtiyaç tespiti nasıl ve ne şekilde yapılmıştır?
8. Okul yetmeyince oranın bir katını imam hatipe dönüştürdüler. Ben hatırlıyorum onu harabe halindeydi. İmam hatip binası da öyleydi kötüydü, ahım şahım bir şey değildi. Şimdi biz bu sefer geçmişini araştırdık okulun. Seyit Efendi'yi araştırırken buranın bir vakıf olduğunu, adamın burayı vakfettiğini okul için vakfettiğini öğrendik. O arada bir tesadüf eseri elimize belgeler geçti. Biz vakıf yöneticilerine ulaştık. Vakıf yöneticileri bize dedi ki Milli Eğitim'den bize geldiler, biz bu binayı yıkıp yeni bir imam hatip yapmak istiyoruz. Büyükçe bir

şey yapacağız siz buna izin verin. Bunlar da biz buna izin vermek istemiyoruz, burası bize babamızdan vakfedildi okul olacak.

Sezen: Siz kızıyla görüşmüştünüz değil mi?

- Evet kızıyla görüştüm. Ondan sonra Milli Eğitim'den gelenler demiş ki o zaman biz burayı kamulaştırırız sizin elinizden alırız. Bunun üzerine bunlar da kardeşler toplaşıyorlar aralarında. Bunlara bir teklif götürelim diyorlar. Madem öyleyse, burası 12 bin metrekare bir arazi, 4700 metrekare yeri boş duruyordu arsa olarak. Vakıf yöneticileri diyorlar ki siz oraya yeni okul yaparsanız bu taraftaki boş arsayı da bize ticari şekilde kullanmamıza izin çıkarın.

9. Yetkililerle yüz yüze yaptığımız görüşmelerde bulanık ve kaçamak cevaplar almamıza rağmen ısrarla yazılı dilekçe vermeye devam ederek aşağıdaki gibi bir cevap almış bulunmaktayız: “179857 numaralı dilekçeniz incelenmiş olup mezkur arsa üzerine Kız Anadolu İmam Hatip Lisesi ve donatı alanları yapılacaktır.” Fakat duyduklarımız bu cevap ile çelişmektedir. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ve Hurşit Efendi Vakfı'nın Seyit Efendi ve Kız İmam Hatip Lisesi yanındaki arazi üzerine alışveriş merkezi yapmak üzere anlaşmalarını duymuş bulunmaktayız. Gördüğümüz gibi Seyit Efendi ve Kız İmam Hatip Lisesi öğrencilerini sürgüne gönderecekler. Anayasa ile garanti altına alınmış olan eğitim hakkı, rant uğruna ve 4+4 denilen eğitim sistemi bahanesiyle ihlal edilmektedir.

10. Mesela Etiler Otelcilik Turizm Okulumuz bina olarak çok sıradandır. Levent Kız Meslek Lisemiz var, Etiler Lisesi aynı şekilde. Mesela Kız Meslek Lisesi'nin iki yanı gökdelen, o iki katlı yere yapılmış; şehrin dokusuna da uymayan bir yapı.

Ogunc: Galiba daha çok etkilenecek olanlar meslek liseleri. Bunlara da daha ziyade yoksul ailelerden gelen, üniversiteye devam edemeyecekleri için bu okullar sayesinde meslek edinen çocuklar gidiyor. Meslek liselerinin şehir merkezlerinden uzaklaştırılması, bu çocukların eğitim haklarını ellerinden almıyor mu?

“Neden öyle düşündünüz ki? Hangi liseye servissiz gidiliyor ki artık? Bizim yapacağımız şehrin ana arterlerini boşaltmak... Şehrin trafiğine de katkıdır. Kişilerin aleyhine bir durum olmayacağı gibi birçok avantajı da getirecektir.”

4.1.3 The relationship between the neighborhood school and residential displacement

11. Söz konusu genelge Millî Eğitim Temel Kanunu'nun 51. Maddesi'ne dayanak olarak hazırlanmıştır ve genelgede özellikle yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi (yerleşim alanı özelliğini kaybeden, çarşı, sanayi işyeri vb. alanlar arasında kalan ve bu nedenle veya başka sebeplerle okul alanı olarak kullanılmasına ihtiyaç

duyulmayan) çeşitli sebeplerle okul alanı olarak kullanılmasına ihtiyaç kalmayan taşınmazların belirlenmesi istenmiştir.

12. Seyit Efendi Lisesi öğrencilerinin önemli bir kısmı mahallemizde ikamet etmektedir. Okulun ise sömestr tatilinden yararlanarak taşınması gündemdedir. Öğrenciler ve aileleri böylesi bir dönüşüme uyum sağlayabilecek midir? Apar topar yapılacak bir dönüşümün ailelerimize getireceği ek yük ve maliyetler hesaba katılmakta mıdır? Seyit Efendi Lisesi Yıkılmaz! Sipahioğlu sonrasında Seyit Efendi Lisesi'ne yapılan bu müdahale bizde ciddi kuşkular yaratmaktadır. Mahalle halkımız için eğitim öncelikli bir konudur. Kendi mahallesinde çocuğunu gönderecek okul bulamayacak olan veliler bir tür mahalleden ayrılma baskısı altında kalabilirler. Mahallemiz çevresinde kurulan koca siteler ve okullara yapılan bu müdahaleler kimi çevrelerin Arguvan'a bir tür sosyal dönüşümü dayattıklarını düşündürmektedir.
13. Biz evi sekiz sene önce aldık. O zamanlardan çocuğumun anadolu lisesine giremeyeceğini biliyordum. Belliydi o zamanki halinden, derslerden. Anca düz liseye gider biliyordum. Evi alırken oğlan buraya gider diye düşünerek aldım.

4.1.4 Displacing the middle class

14. Yüzde otuzu orta sınıf diyebilirim. Yüzde onun ailesi öğretmen falan. Yüzde on da asker çocuğu. Küçük esnaf da var bir de. Babası apartman görevlisi olan da çok. Sadece çok azının ekonomik seviyesi yüksek. Sadece 30 tanesi falandır sanırım.
15. Memur öğrencilerinin, memur ailelerinin çocuklarının gittiği bi okul. Bi de öğretmenlerle ilgili çok iyi yak... şeyler duyduk. İlgililer en azından. O yüzden bi de; yürüme mesafesi, kolay ulaşım olduğu için.. Br de tabi şey çok önemli. Bizim gibi çok uç noktalarda yaşamayan insanların çocuklarının var olması. Yani gelir dengesi de var. İı.. O çok önemli bi şey çünkü.

Sezen: Gelir.. Genellikle benzer?

“Benzer, evet.”

Sezen: Orta sınıf?

“Daha alt gelir grubundan da vardı ama orta sınıf dediğimiz ağırlıktaydı.”

16. Özellikle rantın yüksek olduğu yerlerde Etiler, Beşiktaş, Kadıköy, Teşvikiye gibi bölgelerde ciddi bir dönüşüm başladı ve bu çok gizli kapaklı, çok hissedilmeyen bir şekilde gerçekleşti.

Mücella Yapıcı: şimdi bu mahallelerde çok ustalıklı ve usturuplu bir şekilde riskli yapı, riskli alan, kensel donsum, denerek ordaki mülk sahiplerine size bir kat fazla vereceğiz, iki kat fazla vereceğiz, sunu-bunu vereceğiz diyerek ciddi bir yıkım, el değistirme, orada emeğiyle yaşayan insanların orayı terketmesine neden oldular. Çünkü rant yükseldikçe, binalar yenilendikçe kiralar yükseldi ve bu konuda hem inşaat maliyetini üstlenemeyecek, farkı ödeyemeyecek mülk sahipleri mülklerini müteahhitlere kaptırarak gidiyorlar, hem de ordaki orta halli kiracılar da – çünkü bütün bu semtler aslında aydınların, aşağı yukarı - kent burjuvazisinin mi diyelim- orta sınıfın oturduğu yerler, gecekondu alanlarından farklı olarak.

Sezen: Kentli?

MY: Kentli değil ama orta sınıf diyelim. İşte okumusunun, yazmısının, ya da yaslı insanların...

Sezen: Hisarustu, vs. diğer tüm bölgelere de geldi ama...

Mücella Yapıcı: Hepsi öyle... O başka bir durum. Gecekondu bölgelerinden farklı bir şeyden bahsediyorum. Ben sana planlı, regüler, bugüne kadar İstanbul'un kentli olarak oturmuş, yaşayan bölgelerinden bahsediyorum.

Sezen: Su anki donusum mu?

Mücella Yapıcı: Evet. Şu anki dönüşüm. Bu dönüşümü yapabilmek için buralarda oturan, yıllardır oturan ama. Artık Nişantaşılı, Teşvikiyeli, Kadıköylü, bilmemneli, ama emeğiyle geçinen, yeni sermayedar olmayan insanlar var. Bunların kimi maaşla geçiniyor, kimi emekli maaşıyla geçiniyor. Bir evi var, barkı var oturuyor. Kiminin buralarda işyerleri var. Bu insanları buradan uzaklaştırmak için bir takım tedbirler alınıyorsa da, buralarda yaşam pahalı hale getiriliyor. Yani buralarda yaşamak nasıl pahalı hale gelir? Çocuğunuzu yollayacak devlet okulu bulamayarak, oradaki gidecek devlet hastanesini yok ederek, onları alıp bütün kentin emekçilerini surdugun, halkali malkali gibi TOKİ konutlarının orada yaşamaya mahkum ederek ancak çözebilirsin. O nedenle bütün bu eski tarihi okulların özelleştirilerek fonksiyonlarının değiştirilmesi. (...)Bütün bunlar aslında bu dönüşümün en görünmeyen, en farkedilmeyen, ama en kritik, en tehlikeli yanları.

17. Buralar yıkılırken orda olmalıydık. Müdahale etmeliydik. Bu insanları göremedik.

Sezen: O zamanlar buraları biliyor muydun?

Biliyordum. AMA o zamanlar daha başka düşünüyorduk. Devlet arazisine konmuş tipler olarak görüyorduk. Barınma hakkı olarak görmüyorduk. Ama sonra aslında kar için değil, barınmak için o evleri yaptıklarını gördüm.

18. Bizim evimizi de almak istediler. Çoğu insan “Satıp Kurtköy’e taşınırım, ya da Erdek’teki yazlığa giderim” diyor. E, yeni yapılan evler pahalı olacak. Altıyüz elli bin diyorlar bir daire için. Aylık aidatı bile üç yüz elli bin. Müteahhit ordan da kar edecek bir de.

Sezen: Peki kim alıyor bu evleri?

“AKPliler. Hepsi zengin oldu. Üniversitedeyken bizim bölümde bir çocuk vardı. Belediyenin trafik işaretleri işini yapıyordu. Deli gibi para kazandı. Tipine baksan sen ben gibi. (...) Kentsel dönüşüm yoksul mahallelerde başladı. Ama bak, şimdi orta sınıf mahallelere geldi.

19. Oraya Peony AVM yapıldı. Peony’nin yukarısındaki binalar, mahalleler, 50 yıllık, 60 yıllık mahallelere de siz bunlar gidin diyip onların ellerinden ellerinden almaya çalışıyorlar.

Sezen: Şimdi oralarda yerleşim var değil mi?

“Bizim Elif mesela Valievleri’nde oturuyor. Ama oranın insanları biraz bilinçli olduğu için bir türlü müteahhitlere vermiyorlar evlerini.”

Sezen: Müteahhitler istiyor değil mi oraları?

“Ne demek istiyor. Çok istiyor. Vermiyorlar. Ama müteahhitler bir evi istemiyor. O adayı olduğu gibi istiyorlar.

Sezen: Tek tek mi ikna etmeye çalışıyorlar?

“Hayır, insanlar ikna olmuyor. Neden olmuyor biliyor musun? İnsanların kendi arsaları büyük olduğu için bire bir değişimi değil, bir tane dairesi olan 3 tane istiyor yıkıldığı zaman.”

Sezen: Bahçe alanından kaynaklı mı?

“Evet, arsanın büyüklüğünden, bahçeden. Bir daireye karşılık 3 daire istiyor. Bunu da müteahhit vermiyor. Ne zamana kadar vermeyecek. Yarın öbür gün devlet orasını Fikirtepe’de olduğu gibi afet bölgesi ilan ederse, bu binalar 50 yıllık, 60 yıllık, siz müteahhitlerle anlaşmıyorsunuz, ben de burayı afet bölgesi ilan ediyorum derse, ne olacak, o zaman ne yapacak o insanlar, mecburen verecekler. Şimdi yapısal değişikliğin kaynağı bu. Burdaki yapısal değişiklik şu. Bu binalar Şimdi bu lüks binalar yapılıyor mu Acıbadem’e ve by binaların en ucuzu milyon dolarla satılıyor. Bakıyorsun Türk insanına para yok ki Türk insanına. Bu insanlar nerden bükür parayı. Sıradan bir memurda, doktorda, mühendiste, mimarda bu para yok. O zaman kim alıyor bu daireleri Bu daireleri kim alıyor.? Trafik inanılmaz derecede keşmekeş. Arguvan köprüsünü, şu bizim köprüyü geç, Çamlıca, Bilfen’in oraya kadar inanılmaz derecede trafik var. Son derece lüks arabalar. Bunun yanı sıra na oldu, Yeni yapılan binaların altına kafeler yapılmaya başlandı, kafelerin otoparkı yok. O araçları yolların kenarlarına park ediyorlar.

Yolların kenarları yetmeyince sokak aralarına park ediyorlar. Mahallede huzur sükut kalmadı.”

Sezen: Kim alıyor o binaları sizce? Dediniz ya o zaman kim alıyor diye.

“Şimdi bu binaları alanların bir kere yabancılar olduğu kesin. Bir de kolay para kazanan insanlar alıyor, hükümete yakın insanlar diye düşünüyorum. Kolay para kazanan insanlar alıyor. Yani Bu kadar büyük paraya alamazın yani. ev alamazsın, bir milyona ev almak kolay mı, kolay mı o kadar. kolay bir şey değil yani. Çok zor.”

Sezen: Siz hiç biliyor musunuz öyle ev alan, kolay para kazananlar dediniz ya?

“Benim öyleleriyle işim olmuyor ki. Benim kolay para kazanan insanlarla ne işim olacak ki. Ben Onlarla ahabap olamam ki, dost olamam ki, konuşamam ki. Çünkü Zaten onlarla aramızdaki en büyük fark bizim sosyo kültürel yapımız. Bizim cumhuriyete bakışımız, kılığımızla kıyafetimizle yaşam biçimimizle. Kul hakkına sadakatimizle biz zaten onlardan ayrılıyoruz.”

20. Eskiden riskli alan Maslak Sitesi’nde diye sınır çizilmişti. Zenginlerin yaşadıkları yer değildi. Kamu alanları, mezarlıklar var, riskli alan ilan ettikleri yerler arasında. (...) Suç merkezleri ilan ettiler önce. Kürtlerin olduğu yerleri. Ayazma falan. Ama kentsel dönüşüm kararlarına itiraz eden mahalleler oldu. Alibeyköy mesela. (...) Artık orta sınıf mahalleler dolaylı yollardan kentsel dönüşüm ile karşı karşıya.

21. Biz neler çekicez Polis Okulu’na bunlar olduktan sonra. Arkası oturma alanı. Bütün çevresi araçlarla dolu. Buraya getirdikleri projeler iki bin, üç bin kişilik konut projesi. Yani oradaki nüfus yoğunluğu artacak. Ona göre ulaşım, eğitim, sağlık imkanları belirlemek gerek. Bu nüfus yoğunluğu katlanınca orada olacıklara dair çözüm yok.

4.2.1.1 Interlacing of cultural and class discourses

22. Arguvan, kentlerimizi, mahallelerimizi yaşam alanları olarak değil de bir tür servet biriktirme aracı olarak gören bir anlayışın tehdidi altındadır. AKP iktidarının 12 yıllık iktidarı yeni bir zenginler sınıfı yarattı. Acıbadem hem coğrafi konumu hem de çevresindeki mahallelerin yapısı itibariyle bu kesimlerin doğal yayılma alanı olarak değerlendirilebilecek bir noktadadır. GATA Hastanesi’nin bahçesine siteler inşa etmek üzere TOKİ ile anlaşma yapıldığı haberleri ortalıkta geziyor. Yine benzer biçimde Marmara Güzel Sanatlar Fakültesi’nin mahallemizden taşınması gündemde. Bütün bunlar alt alta konuldukça aslında mahallenin kimliğini ve yapısını dönüştürmeye dönük bir plan ile karşı karşıya olduğumuz anlaşılabilir. Seyit Efendi’yi vermeyeceğiz, mahallemizin talan edilmesine mücadele etmeyeceğiz.

23. Ögünç: Okulların el değiştirmesini kolaylaştıran 2003'te Milli Eğitim Temel Kanunu'nda yapılan değişiklik mi oldu?

“Takasa her zaman yasal olarak imkân var. Nihayetinde biz kamu binalarını ihaleye çıkararak satışı yapmıyoruz. TOKİ'yle yapıyoruz.”

Ögünç: TOKİ'den önce satış örnekleri de oldu ama (...)

“Evet, olmuştur. Satıldıktan sonra Büyükşehir Belediyesi'nde arsanın dönüşümü yapılabilir. TOKİ'nin kanununda böyle bir yetki var. Biz takas yaptığımız için kolay oluyor. Normalde okul alanından çıkarmak kolay değildir, hatta en zor işlerden birisidir.”

24. Seçimler vardı, seçimlerden dolayı bütün partilere gidelim dedik hani, elimizden geldiğince destek isteyelim, çünkü hani çocuklarımız mağdur oluyor. AKP'ye de gittik. AKP belediye başkan adayı -onun adını da unuttum şimdi- o eğitimden sorumlu bi... yanılmıyorsam Osman'dı... bi beyefendiyle bizi karşıladı. Ondan sonra... Onunla yaptığımız görüşmede bizim yanlış yönlendirildiğimizi, burasının vakfın olduğunu, ondan sonra vakfın şerhle orayı verdiğini, dolayısıyla şimdi vakfın istediği şekilde yapabileceğini. (...) Bizi de başka grupların yanlış yönlendirdiğini, özellikle gelen milletvekillerinin yanlış yönlendirdiğini vesaire söyledi. ‘Bizim için bizi o masalarda tanıtın, size yardımcı olacak’ dediler.

Sezen: Aa, okul masasında?

“Evet, yaptığımız.. Onların Kadıköy için seçim çalışmalarında kullandıkları broşürler vesaireleri de vererek ‘bunları anlatın, bakın biz iyi şeyler yapıcız burda, siz bunları anlatın, biz de size yardımcı olucuz’ dediler. Hatta ben de şey dedim: Siz önce bizim işimizi netleştirin, bunlara da biz bi bakalım, yaptığımız doğru şeylerse niye olmasın ki?”

Sezen: Hı hı..

“Hani biz size tamamen karşı değiliz. Yapılan iyi şeyleri de görmemezlikten gelmek olmaz, bize yakışmaz zaten. Bunları inceleyelim, tabi ki, niye olmasın dedik. Ama onlar seçim sonrası -pazar seçim yapıldı- salı günü sabah, seçimler açıklandıktan sonra ‘okulu acil boşaltın, hafta sonu boşaltın’ faksı geldi.”

Sezen: Pekala, legal bir faks mıydı?

“Milli Eğitim'den gelmiş bir fakstı.

Sezen: Ama henüz sizin elinizde belge yoktu?

“Bizde yok ama ben gördüm belgeyi. Şöyle gördüm. Müdür yardımcılarında biri o faksı geldi ve gösterdi bize. Bahçede biz kapıda nöbet tuttuğumuz için. Faks geldi, bu hafta sonu boşaltıyoruz, eyvah dedi...ler. Biz onu gördük. Gördük ama elimizde bi belge yok, onun resmini ya da başka bi şeyini alamadık.”

25. Ama biz hep şey dedik: Yani iki okul da yapılsın, isteyen istediğine gitsin ama şu anda Acıbadem’de bir lise yok. Mevcut durumda da görünen o ki aslında yapılmak istenen Acıbadem’in çehresini değiştirmek. Mesele bu. Dönüştürülmek isteniyo orası da yani, görünen o, yani burda.. AKP’li belediye başkan adayının dediği gibi çok pahalı araziler var, iyi, güzel, rezidanslar yapılabilir, orda oturan yerli halk artık öteye.. öteye gidilebilir, yani nasıl denir.. nasıl... Başka bir yere sürgün edilmek, şartlar nedeniyle, yani yapılabilecek bi şey yok. Aynı şey benim bina için de geçerli. Bugün burası yeniden yapılmaya kalkılırsa bu site maliyeti de artacak. Dolayısıyla burda oturan emekli insanın onu karşılayabilmesi mümkün değil. Ne yapacak? Kenar kıyıda bi ev alıp oraya geçecek. Burda da yapılmak istenen aslında bu. Biraz çehreyi değiştirmek. Görünen o.
26. ‘Bize bir şey olmaz, paramız var, yerlisiyiz, kaç nesildir İstanbulluyuz’ diyor olabilirsiniz ama. Kentsel dönüşüm olursa yerimizden yurdumuzdan edilmeyiz düye düşünüyor olabilirsiniz. Ama, politik bir mahalle değil belki ama Gezi sürecinde hükümet için ne kadar tehlikeli olduğunu hükümet anladı. Yukarıdan yemek veriyorlardı teyzeler bize, evlerine çağırıyorlardı. Hükümet için tehlike arz ediyor Beşiktaş. Burada kentsel dönüşüm uygulanırsa o tehlikeyi de ortadan kaldırmak isteyecektir bu arada. Sizi yerinizden yurdunuzdan edip gönderebilirler.
27. Evinizin değeri artacak, eviniz güzelleşecek diyecekler. Bedavaya mı yapacaklar peki? Yeni yasaya göre yıkım bedeli ödenir diyor sadece. Gerisini siz ödemek zorundasınız. Yani evinizi verip hiç bir şey alacaksınız karşılığında. Yeni bir ev almakla eşdeğer. Yeni ev alırken de bir kısmını ödersiniz ve gerisine borçlanırsınız. Yani yasa size zaten şu anda yapabileceğiniz bir şeyi sunuyor, yeni bir şey sunmuyor. Ve yeni bir ev sahibi olacağınızın hiç bir garantisi yok, aynı yerden alacağınızın garantisi yok, hiç bir önceliğiniz yok. Paranız varsa alırsınız, yoksa alamazsınız. Sulukule’dekilerin başına geldiği gibi, şehirden 45 kilometre uzakta yaşamak zorunda kalabilirsiniz. Belki de İstanbul’dan taşınıacaksınız. Belki gücünüz daha fazla yetmeyecek, diyeceksiniz ki “artık burada daha yaşayamam” diyeceksiniz ve terkedeceksiniz. Size sunulan çözümsüzlük. Burada yaşayacağınızın hiç bir garantisi yok. Sosyokültürel yapı da tamamen değişiyor. Bugün yaşadığınız sosyokültürel çevreden eser kalmayacak.

4.2.1.2 Spatial defensiveness through the spaces of education

28. Şurası çok önemli. Tabi bunlar kendi görüşlerim. Ben yaşamışlıklarımı anlatıyorum. kültürüne göre yere gidiyorsun. Yani sen yaşam kaliteni yükseltmek istiyorsan, sanatla sporla, tiyatroyla, efendim kitaplar, eğitimle haşır neşir olmak istiyorsan şehrin çeperinden geldiğin zaman şehrin merkezinde kalmak istiyorsun. Eski yerlerde kalmak istiyorsun. Ama bu gelişimi sağlamadıysan sen, nereye gidiyorsun biliyor musun, Dudullu tarafına

gidiyorsun, Çekmeköy tarafına gidiyorsun. Yeni Çamlıca tarafına gidiyorsun. Hayret değil mi! Ümraniye dolduğu için oralara gitmek zorunda kalıyorlar. Buralara da gelemiyorlar hem ekonomik olarak buralar yüksek hem de kültürel olarak uyum sağlayamıyorlar. Buraya kim geliyor! Muhafazakar yeni zenginler geliyor. Muhafazakar yeni zenginler şehrin merkezinde oturmak istiyor. Bağdat Caddesinde oturmak istiyor, Acıbademde, Cihangirde oturmak istiyor Nişantaşında oturmak istiyor, Cihangir’de oturmak istiyorlar. daha daha zenginleri de Boğazda oturmak istiyor. İkitellide oturmak istemiyorlar. Bu yaşanmışlığa geliyor insanlar. Ama kültürle alakalı bu. Bu kendini geliştirmekle alakalı. Şimdi diyor adam 900.000 tl verip burada oturacağıma Kurtköy’den üç tane daire alırım ikisini kiraya verip oradan gelen parayı yerim. Sen oradan gelen parayı yiyemezsin ki yeni bir ev alırsın sen. Yeni bir ev alırsın sen. Nasıl yiyecek ? Nereye gidecek o? Hiç bir yere gidemez ki. Ancak kahveye gider gelir eve.

29. Kültür yapısını sevmiyorum. Sosyal yapısını, karmaşıklığını. Orada rahat edemiyor insan. sosyo kültürel olarak düşük olması. Şeyin, (err) Yerleşim alanının son derece kısık olup da karmaşık olması, gelişme göstermiyor olması. Kadıköy’ü Üsküdar’dan ayıran en önemli özellik şu: Kadıköy’de daha çok azınlıklar da yaşadığı için Kadıköy’de belirli bir Avrupalı kültür yapısı oluşmuş. Bir yandan Osmanlı paşalarının yazlıkları; Suadiye, [Bostancı, Erenköy,] Tuzla’ya kadar. Belirli bir elit tabakanın yerleştiği yer olduğu için buradaki kültür farklı. Bir yerde çağdaş bir yaşamın yaşanmışlığı çekiyor beni. Üsküdar’ın 15.yy gibi yaşantısı çekmiyor beni. Kadıköy’ün modern, kadın erkek eşitliği, fikir özgürlüğü, kafeleri, rahat oturmaları sohbetleri bunlar insan cezbediyor. Üsküdar’da bunlar yok.
30. Ben İzmir’den geldim. Geldiğimde burası.. burayı seçmemdeki sebep oturma olarak; bir, eşim için yakın oluşu. İki, rahatça yaşayabileceğim... çünkü İstanbul çok kalabalık ve çok karışık bir şehir. İzmir daha modern, daha rahat, daha özgür. Her yerinde, yani bütün semtlerinde.. ee.. özgürce yaşayabiliyorsun. Yani kenar kıyı dediğin semtlerde bile daha rahatsın. Burda da şey istedik, yani çocuğum rahat rahat girsin çıksın ama ben de kendimi kısıtlamayayım. İşte yani gerekiyorsa.. İşte, ceket giymek zorunda kalmayayım. Çünkü Üsküdar’a indiğinizde gerçekten kapalı bir kesim görüyorsunuz. Ama işe de yakın olsun istediğimiz için bu bölgeyi seçtik yaşamak için. Daha modern, daha rahat, insanların daha rahatlıkla giyinebildiği ve konuşabildiği bi yer diye düşündük. Ama şimdi giderek hem kendi oturduğum yerden hem de işte son iki yıldır yaptığımız eylemler.. Arguvan’da haftanın dört gününü beş gününü geçiriyorum – Çok fazla artık kapalı dediğimiz insan var.

4.2.2 Operationalisation of religion in transformation projects

31. Küçük Çamlıca, Eymen Topbaş sit alanına camiyi dikti ve caminin etrafına yapılaşma gerçekleştirildi. Etraf boştu. Bilfen yapıldı. Burası ruhsata aykırı olarak yapıldı. Sonra altına villalar yapıldı. Sola Doğa koleji yapıldı. Bilfen'in soluna, oraya da.
32. Benim derdim o değil. Ben [yeni] okula yakın oturuyorum, daha kolay gitmesi. Benim derdim imam hatipleşmesi. Türbanlılar git gide artıyor devlet okullarında.
33. Bizler, Seyit Efendi Lisesi'nin bütün haklı itirazlarımıza rağmen ısrarla yıkılmak istenmesinin nedeni olarak yerine İmam Hatip Lisesi yaptırılmıyormuş izlenimiyle Acıbadem'de başlatılacak büyük ölçekli imar rantı elde etme hamlesinin ilk adımı olduğunu biliyoruz. 4+4+4 eğitim sistemiyle, kentsel dönüşüm politikalarının paralel bir şekilde yürütülerek bir taşla iki kuş vurulmak istendiğinin de farkındayız.
34. Camiden hiç bahsetmiyoruz. AVM'ye karşıyız diyoruz. Buraya küçük bir cami koyacaklar da ne işe yarayacak. İmam hatiplerin yanında uygulama için oluyormuş ama kızla imam olamıyor ki uygulama yapsınlar burda.
35. Hukukçular Sitesi'nin bitişiğindeki eğitim alanının, ticaret ve konut alanına dönüştürülmesi için Çevre ve Şehircilik bakanlığı tarafından yeni bir plan askıya çıkarılmıştır. Arazinin tamamı eğitim amaçlı vakfedilmiş olup 2/3'lük kısmında okul yer alıyor (Kalimni Girls' Anatolian İmam Hatip High School). Bakanlık şimdi 1/3'lük kısmını eğitimden kopararak, ticareileştirmek istiyor. Henüz askıda plana itiraz süremiz var. (...) Neden itiraz ediyoruz? AVM eksigi değil, fazlamız var. Okula ihtitacımız var. Bu arazi üzerinde, 2013'e kadar hem imam hatip lisesi hem de düz lise yer alıyordu. 2014'te okul binaları yıkılıp, Fikirtepe'ye gönderilen ve geri dönemeyen yüzlerce öğrencimiz için burada yeni okul yapılmalıdır. Bu değişiklik gerçekleşirse, Arguvan'daki diğer kamusal alanların da ticaret alanına dönüştürülmesinin önü açılacak. Çünkü plan emsal teşkil edici.

4.2.3 Schools as the symbols of the Republic

36. Eskiden şoföre ineceğiniz zaman ne diyordunuz? Karakol durağında ineceğim. Şimdi o durağın ismi İmam Hatip durağı oldu. Toplumu değiştirmek istiyorsanız önce kelimeleri değiştirirsiniz. Hepimizi hazırlıyorlar. Aslında sosyo-demografik bir değişiklik amaçlıyorlar. Değiştirmek istedikleri şey statü. Yeni okulun modern bir görüntüsü var ama çevresi uygun değil. (...) Bu, mahallenin modern yapısını değiştirmek için yapılmış bir girişimdir.
37. Bu okul yüzyıllık, ve bu okul şöyle bir, bu okulun soyle bir özelliği varmış. Cumhuriyetin 10 yılında 10 tane okul yapılıyor. Bu okulun adı daha önce 10. Yıl İlkokulu diye anılmış. Hala bir çok insan hala öyle der. Burada bir çok yaşlı

insan ordan mezun olmuş. 80 yaşında insanlar var. O okuldan mezun olmuşlar. Madem oyle bu okul Cumhuriyetle yaşıt 90 yıllık bir okul mu kardesim? Bu okulda öğrenci yok mu? Bu okul tarihi bir okul. O zaman bu okulun binasını siz kültür merkezine dönüştürün, halk eğitim merkezine dönüştürün. Niye sen Caddbostan'dan, efendim Yeni Sahra'dan, efendim şeyden, İçerenköy'den servislerle öğrenci getiriyorsun.

38. İmam hatip okulları bir direniş, bir direnç olarak ortaya çıktı. İmam hatip okulları aslında bir düşüncenin isyanıdır, bir fikrin adeta isyanıdır, bir itirazıdır, bunun için ortaya çıktı. (...)inşallah şu anda Arguvan yıkılıyor, Arguvan'ın yerinde çok çok farklı bir mimariyle inşallah Kadıköy Kız İmam Hatip orada inşa edilecek. Kızlarımız, bir sonraki eğitim öğretim yılında, orada okuyacaklar. Onun da mimarisi gerçekten çok çok güzel. Mimar değilim ama biraz estetik zevkim vardır, mimarlar çiziyor ben de inceliyorum, ondan sonra 'tamam' diyoruz ve yola öyle devam ediyoruz.
39. İnsanlar bir şey çıkmaz burdan diyince, ben de o zaman şunu söyledim: bizim yaptığımız bu çalışma tarihe not düşmek. Yarın öbür gün 10-20 sene sonra veya 50 sene sonra Türkiye'nin demokratik yapısı değişip eğitim kültür yönünden aksaklıklarla karşılaşıldığında insanlar demeyecekler mi ya 'o çağdaki insanlar, o zamanki insanlar bu okullar imam hatipe dönüştürülürken, eğitim kalitesi düşerken, 1200 tane çocuk sokağa atılırken hiç mi o mahallelinin aklına gelmemiş' demesinler diye. Şimdi Google'da aratınca Seyit Efendi diye yaptığımız basın açıklamaları çıkıyor, bu tarihe bir belge. Benim amacım da buydu. Evet bu iktidarla bizim sonuç almamız zordur. Ama zor diye yapmayalım mı? Yok böyle bir şey.

4.3.1 Privatisation of education

40. Hatta okulla ilgili alınan taşınma kararları sonrasında öğrencilerin, öğretmenlerin ve okul idaresinin eğitim ile ilgili motivasyonları ciddi zarar görmüştür. "Bu hafta, olmadı, sonraki hafta" türünden yapılan ciddiyetsiz, hazırlıksız, ne yaptığını bilemeyen açıklamalar 1300 kişilik okulumuzda eğitimi fiilen bitirmiştir. O kadar ki okuldaki akıllı tahtalar bile taşınma gerekçesi ile sökülüştür. Yaşanan belirsizlikten dolayı onlarca öğrenci kaydını başka okullara almak zorunda kalmışlardır. Yapılan bu sorumsuzca davranışların, çocuklarımızın omuzlarına yüklediği bedelin hesabını kimler verecektir? "İnşaat şirketleri bizi sıkıştırıyor" gerekçesi ile taşınmayı hızlandırmak için yapılan hamleler 1300 öğrencinin bir senesini çalmıştır. İnşaat sektörünün kar hırsı ormanlarımıza, parklarımıza, okullarımıza ve çocuklarımızın geleceğine zarar vermeye devam ediyor.
41. Genel liselerin kapatılması sonrasında Seyit Efendi Lisesi, Kız meslek lisesine dönüştürüldü. Şimdi mahallemizde erkeklere de hitap eden ve akademik eğitim

sunabilen hiçbir okul yok. Bizler biliyoruz ki Anadolu liseleri aslında geçmişin akademik eğitim veren genel liselerinin isim değiştirmiş halidir. Hatta Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın çok yakın bir gelecekte Anadolu liselerine giriş sınavını kaldırarak adrese dayalı öğrenci yerleştirme sistemine geçeceğini biliyoruz. Böylesi bir durumda mahallemizde akademik eğitim almak isteyen öğrencilerimiz hangi okula gidecektir? Nedret Hanım Kız Anadolu Lisesi'ne erkek öğrenciler kaydedilmemektedir. Böylesi bir durumda çocuklarımıza mahallemizi kuşatan imam hatip liseleri ve özel okullardan birisine gitmekten başka seçenek bırakılmamaktadır. İstenen bu mudur?.

42. 4+4+4 eğitim sistemiyle önce düz liseleri kapattılar, şimdi de kademeli olarak düz ortaokulları kapatıp, yerlerine imam hatip ortaokulları açmaya başladılar. Böylelikle yoksul aile çocukları İmam hatip'e ya da meslek liselerine gitmek zorunda kalırken ,orta sınıf ailenin çocuklarını da özel okullara göndermeye teşvik ediliyor. Şu anda TEOG ile yaşanan sıkıntılar teknik nedenlerden dolayı değil, liseye gidecek olan öğrencilerimizin %85'nin zorla İmam Hatip ya da meslek liselerine yerleştirilmelerinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Artık çocuklarımızın gidebileceği sınavsız, parasız, taşınmaz, yüksek öğrenime hazırlayan genel liseler yoktur.

43. Sezen: Pekala, okulun.. Sizin okulunuzken çevrildi, siz neden meslek lisesine çevrildiğini düşünmüştünüz o zaman?

“Bunu düşünmemiştim hiç yani..”

Sezen: Niye hiç düşünmediniz...

“Hiç, hiç yani düşünmedim. Diyorum ya ilgi alanım değil. Yani çalışıyorum, bi işim var. Çok fazla böyle şeylerle de vakit geçirmedik. Yani özel olarak oturup bakmadım. Haberlerden takip ettiğim kadarıyla. Bi de çok kanıksanmış bir durum var. Hani eğitim sistemini o kadar çok değiştirdiler ki. Müfredat habire değişti. Artık bize de bi yılgınlık oldu. (...) Belki şey bile olabilir diye düşündüm, belki böyle bir talep var orda, o yüzden... Bu bile aklıma geldi, hani olabilir mi, olabilir.

Sezen: Şimdi pekala ne düşünüyorsunuz çevrilmesiyle ilgili?

“Şimdi şey düşünüyorum; parasız eğitim yapılabilecek okulların tümüyle yok edildiğini düşünüyorum, işin içine girince. Yani şunu fark ediyorsunuz işin içine girince: Eskiden ikametgaha dayalı kolay erişilebilir okullar varken, eğitim varken şimdi bu erişilebilirlik yok oldu. Çocukları daha zorlu şartlarda bambaşka yerlere taşıma sistemiyle okuma imkanı sunuyorlar. Dolayısıyla parası olan özel okullara veriyor, olmayan(ın) da gidebileceği tek okul şu anda imam hatip. Kaldı ki meslek liselerinde de artık çok yüksek puanlar var. Ha şeyi de fark ettik bu arada. Mesela bu işler olurken oturup incelediğimde düz liseye ayrılmış okulların, daha doğrusu düz lise olan okulların adının sadece anadolu lisesi

olarak deđiřtiđini g6rd6m, iindeki hibir Őey deđiřmedi. Yani eđitim sistemi deđiřmiyor, ekstra 6đretmen gelmiyor, gerekten adı anadolu lisesi konumunda eđitim vermiyorlar’.

44. Dođru, tabii ki yani puanla geldiđi iin puanla gelebilen oldu ama hepsi deđil.

Sezen: Bilmezsiniz belki ama nereye gidiyorlar, hibir fikriniz..?

“Yok, ama meslek lisesi en ok. En ok d6z meslek. Var ya...”

Sezen: Nerde o meslek lisesi?

“B6y6ktařlı, ticaret meslek; anadolu b6l6m6 de var d6z b6l6m6 de var ve ođunlukla ocuklar oraya gidiyor.”

Sezen: Eskiden Kayabařı’na geleceklerden de oraya y6nlendirmeler oldu mu?

“Kesinlikle oraya gidiyorlar. Kayabařı civarında oturan hani gelir d6zeyi d6ř6k ailelerin g6nderdiđi okul B6y6ktařlı Ticaret Meslek ya da Reel Kız Meslek.”

(...)

Sezen: Eskiden tabii siz not ortalamasına g6re alıyodunuz, deđil mi?

“6yle s6yleniyodu da yani hi 6yle bi Őey olduđunu d6ř6nm6yorum. Yani ok d6ř6k notları olan ocuklar da gelip kayıt yaptırabiliyodu. Kontenjan, hani sınır deniyodu, o da sınır da sınırsızlařıyordu.”

45. Valla Őimdi Ő6yle bir Őey var: Arguvan’da oturan insanların profiline baktıđında tabii ki kapalı insan ok vardır, vardır ama bu kadar dev bir imam hatipin olması... Őey diye d6ř6n6yorum yani, b6yle bir talebin olabileceđini d6ř6nemiyorum. Kaldı ki gidip baktıđımda orda en az otuz tane servis aracı g6r6yorum. Acıbadem’de oturan, y6r6yerek giden gelen 6đrenci sayısı eminim elliyi gemiyordur. Yani birebir saymadım ama g6rd6đ6m kadarıyla, y6r6yen ocukları g6r6yoruz falan Őimdi gidip baktıđımızda da. Dıřardan ok gelen var, 6mraniye’den, Sarıgazi’den, ordan burdan - o servislerin 6st6nde yazıyor. Tařıma... Zaten bildiđimiz kadarıyla yetmiř tane de yatılı 6đrencisi var. Hani bu kadar devasa bir okul yapılabilir miydi, ihtiya mıydı? Bence deđildi. İhtiya olan aslında, burda gerekten iřte anadolu lisesi eđer, iřte d6z lise olmadıđı iin isteyemiyoruz ama gerekten bir lisenin olması gerek, 6nk6 yok. Nedret Hanım Kız Lisesi’nin dıřında bir lisemiz yok. Dolayısıyla hani bu kadar b6y6k bi bina yapmak yerine yine o alana iki tane bina yapılabilirirdi; isteyen istediđine giderdi yani, 6zg6rl6kse bu.. Ama temelde d6ř6nce bu deđil. Heralde bi Őeylerin.. yani g6rd6đ6m6zde de, o basın aıklaması, o masaları atıđımızda da bize ok tepki geldi. 28 Őubat’ta da bize yaptılar gibi bir s6ylenti vardı, biz de onun 6c6n6 alıyoruz sizden dediler.

Sezen: Dediler yani?

“Tabi tabi. İmam hatipten ıkan kız 6đrenciler ki bunlar on altı on yedi yařında ocuklar, o s6rete ne olduđunu nerden biliyorlar yani? Hani benim ocuđum hatırlamaz, onlar nasıl bu kadar hakimler, onu da bilmiyoruz. ‘6c6m6z6

alıyoruz, siz de bize yapmıştınız' gibi kindar bi nesil geliyor, biz onu çok net hem imam hatibin öğretmenleriyle hem de öğrencileriyle birebir haftanın beş günü açtığımız masalarda duyduk zaten. İnternette, yani sosyal ağlarda da bu anlamda çok mesaj aldık. 'O günlerin öcü alınıyor şimdi, ağlamayın, siz de bize yapmıştınız.' Sanki biz o dönemlerde bunu yapmışız da bunun sorumlusu bizmişiz gibi. Çok mesajlar aldık, birebir de çok tartışmalar oldu bu anlamda.

46. Bizler, Arguvan Seyif Efendi Lisesi velileri, öğrencileri ve Acıbadem sakinleri olarak okulumuzun yıkılmasını önlemek için 9 ay boyunca mücadele verdik. Tüm bu haklı mücadelemiz sonucunda okulumuz maalesef yıktırıldı, 1.400 öğrencisi şu anda kentsel dönüşüm çalışmaları olan ve eğitim için henüz hazır olmayan Fikirtepe'deki Muratpaşa İlköğretim okuluna sürgün edildiler. Okulun önünden Her türlü olumsuz koşullar içeren Kurbağalı dere geçmektedir ve çocukların bu dereye düşmemesi için hiçbir güvenlik önlemi alınmadığı gibi Fikirtepe'de toprak kayması riskinin yüksek olması da endişelerimizi daha çok arttırmaktadır. Üstelik, okulun çevresinde acil durumlar için ne bir hastane, ne bir eczane, ne bir kırtasiye ne de çocukların yemek ihtiyaçlarının karşılanması için sağlıklı beslenecekleri bir yer yoktur. Bu sağlıksız koşullarda çocuklarımızın başına her hangi bir şey gelme olasılığı oldukça yüksektir. Çocuklarımızın can güvenliğinden endişeliyiz. Yetkilileri önlem almaya çağırıyoruz. Aksi takdirde çocuklarımızın başına gelebilecek her hangi bir olaydan dolayı sizler sorumlu olacaksınız.

47. Sezen: Pekala.. bu karşı çıkmanın, bu okul.. hani mücadele içinde olmanın en önemli nedeni ne senin?

"Bir, yakın olduğu için verdiğim bir okul. Güvenilir bir semt bi kere her şeyden önce. Semt olarak güvenilir bir semt, yürüme mesafesinde. Temiz bir çevrenin olduğunu düşündüğüm bir bölgeden dere yatağına ve kentsel dönüşümün uygulandığı, boş binaların olduğu bi yere çocukların gönderilmesi. Bu bir, birinci temel. İkinci temel, madem yıkacaktınız.. ikinci sebep, madem yıkacaktınız, niye güçlendirme yaptınız ve niye çocuklarımızı bir yıl başka bir yerde okuttunuz? Demek ki hani bir plan dahilinde olmamış bu, yani sonradan gelişmiş. Ama bizim yetiştiğimiz zamanlarda eğitim hakkı vardı, hani ulaşılabilirlik, erişilebilirlik. Onun gittiğini fark ettim yani, o yüzden ve hiç tekin olmayan, güven vermeyen bir bölgeye, inşaat alanına kaldı ki o inşaat alanında, o dönemlerde basında çok yer almıştı, o tarihlere dönün bakın, bir sürü kadın cinayeti var orda. Tinerciler var. Sonradan oraya Suriyelileri yerleştirdiler.. Vesaire. Hani o bölgeye niye gitsin ki Acıbadem'de bu konforu, bu rahatlığı terk edip niye oraya gitsin ki çocuk?"

48. Ordaki bu okul eksildi, nereye gönderiyorlar çocuklarını sence?

"Seçeneğin yok. Seçeneğin yok. Bu arada tabi bizim bu okulun dönüşmesi, sonrasında böyle olması şey gibi de, deli gibi de özel okulun açılmasına sebep oldu. Yani Arguvan'da bi potansiyel var. Söyle.. BİLFEM açıldı, Doğuş'un var..

Yani birkaç tane bi anda özel okul oluştu. Parası olan ya da en azından bildiğim krediyle vesaireyle çocuklarını özel okula gönderen gönderebiliyor. Şey.. puanı tutmamış, vesairesi olmamış. Gidecek okul yok çünkü. Dolayısıyla, ya alterbatifin şu çünkü. Puansız alabiken tek olul sadece imam hatipler. Onun dışında meslek liselerine dahi puanla girebiliyosan şi,mdi,. Dolayısıyla ya paralı okuyacaklar ya da imam hatip. Başka seçenek yok.”

49. Çıkmış bana diyor ki senin adresin okula tutmuyor. Ben de dedim ki farketmez nerde oturduğum. Çocuğumun okulu için evimi taşırım, ya da özel okula veririm.

4.3.2 Arbitrariness and legal ambiguities

50. İki şeye dikkat... üç şeye dikkat çekmek isterim. Birincisi burada arazinin kullanımıyla ilgili nasıl bir işlem yapacaklarsa yapsınlar, yapmayı düşünüyorlarsa, bunla ilgili bir imar planı değişikliği yapmış olmaları gerekir ve de imar planının, mevcut imar planının muhatabında değişiklik yapmış olmaları gerekir. Kastım şu şu: Yani ordaki eğitim alanı fonksiyonunu değiştirmeleri için arka taraftaki büyücek arazide başka fonksiyonlar öngörebilmeleri için imar planı değişikliği ya da imar planındaki plan boyutlarına ilişkin değişiklik öngörmeleri gerekiyor. Birinci dikkatinizi çekmek istediğim nokta budur. İkincisi de orada mevcut eğitim kurumunun değiştirilmesi öngörülüyorsa bunla ilgili bir ya da birden çok idari işlem ya da işlemler olması gerekir. Anladığım kadarıyla şu ana kadar buna ilişkin herhangi bir açıklama ya da resmi bilgi verilmemiş durumda. Bunun hukuka ayrılığı bir yana, hukuka aykırı ama, kabul edilemez olduğu çok açık. Bir şeye dikkat çekmek isterim öncelikle. Bunların önemi şu: Yani ben Acıbadem’i biraz biliyorum, amcamlar burada oturuyorlar, okulun yan tarafında hemen biraz önce daha gittim. Ama onun ötesinde İstanbul’un belli bir yerinde, belli bir mahallede kamusal... kamusal, seküler bir tek okul kalmaması, bir tek devlet okulu kalmaması, bunun envai çeşit numarayla yapılmaya çalışılması kabul edilemez.

51. Veli A: Ben bir soru sorabilir miyim? [kendinin tanıttı. İsim silindi] Şimdi biz bu yıkım ve taşınma kararını kısıtlı hal gazetesi şeklinde eylül sonu ekim başı duyduk ve hemen ne yapabiliriz diye şey yaptık, fakat duyum mu işte gerçek bir bilgi mi, ilk önce bu bilgiyi almak için bazı dilekçeler verdik, velilerden işte örgütledik bunu, ne olacak bu hal diye. Evet, taşınacak ve şu şu şu okula gidilecek gibi cevaplar verildi ve yerine de konferans salonu bilmem ne yapılacak. Şimdi bizim en büyük sorunumuz şu: Biz şimdi farklı kişilerden hukuki destek alıyoruz fakat gerçekten biraz kafa göz yarararak gidiyoruz. Yani önümüzde, bir; bu işi hangi sırayla yapacağımız konusunda kafamız biraz karışık ve parça parça bilgilerle gidiyoruz ve karşımızdaki güç çok hızlı gidiyor. Hani daha organize, daha yalancı bize göre ve biz sadece hani şu halimizle hani bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyoruz ama hukuki destek konusunda gerçekten şu ana

kadar yardımcı olmak isteyen çok insan oldu, Eğitim-Sen vesaire.. Ama gerçekten hani somut bazı adımlar atamadık. Hani biz sizinle böyle bir iş sırası koyabilir miyiz yani? Hani bu mesela, Büyükşehir mesela şimdi çıktı, Büyükşehir'den, değil mi, sorulması? (...) Evet, yani biz bunu nasıl daha sistemli götürebiliriz, yani bunu hani bir sıraya mı dökürebiliriz, hangi aşamada hemen biz davayı araya sokabiliriz... Hani bu konuda gerçekten bilgilendirilmeye ihtiyacımız var.

Avukat: Dilekçe metninde ifade ettim. Yani burada da söyleyeyim: İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi, Kadıköy İlçe Belediyesi, Çevre ve Şehircilik Bakanlığı İstanbul Bölge Müdürlüğü bu dilekçelerin muhatabıdır. Bir imar planı var mı, imar planında bir değişiklik yapıldı mı, fonksiyon değişikliği yapıldı mı, fonksiyon değişikliği yapıldıysa fonksiyon değişikliğinin maliyeti nedir, bunların paftalarını verin. Bu dilekçeler zaten vardı, bunların verilmiş olması iyi olurdu. İkincisi ilçe milli eğitim müdürlüğüne ve il milli eğitim müdürlüğüne burada yapılmak istenen bu işlemin, yani kamusal bir meslek lisesinin Fikirtepe'ye taşınması ve sonra pek muhtemel geri gelmemesine ilişkin dayanak idari işlemler nedir, bu sorulacaktı. Şu an yapılabilecek olanlar bunlar. Bunun dışında, bunun dışında başka bir şey yok özetle. Yani Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'ne soru önermeleri verilebilir, ne yapıyorsunuz diye..

Veli B: Verildi zaten.

Avukat: Tamam. Hukuken, hukuken bunlar yapıldığı an itibariyle yapılacak başka bir şey yok.

Veli C: Peki dava açamaz mıyız?

Avukat: Şu anda idari işlem ne, o öğrenilmeden dava açılmaz. Şu yapılabilir, şu yapılabilir.. İsterseniz bu da yapılabilir: Seyit Efendi Lisesi'nin tarafımızca bilinmeyen bir nedenle ve tarafımızca bilinmeyen bir süreyle Fikirtepe'deki... tamam yazarım onda bir sıkıntı yok... Fikirtepe'deki işte filanca okula taşınması ve/veya kapatılmasına ilişkin dayanak, imar planlarının ve ilgili idari işlemlerin idareden) sorulmak üzere iptalini talep ediyoruz diye dava açabilirsiniz. Bu dava reddedilebilir ama denenebilir yani.

Veli B: Bizim velilere gönderilen mesaj, okulunuz taşınıyordur diye duruyor. Resmi evraklar olarak gerekli tespit... Sadece onun üzerinden giderek bizim orda can güvenliğimiz yok diye savcılığa suç duyurusu ya da bunun gibi bir şeylerle gidebilir miyiz?

Avukat: Olabilir.

Veli C: Ya bizde sadece okuldan gelen bir mesaj var, yani bu ayrıntıları ya da sizin hukuki açıdan bize gerekli olan bilgileri görmesek bile bizim sadece veliler olarak, bize okul döneminde işte taşınacak diye gelmiş mesajlarımız var. Biz onları hala saklıyoruz.

Avukat: Bakın... Onun üzerinden gidip de.... Şu fikirde anlaşalım... Fikirtepe'ye... Siz diyorsunuz ki bunu soruşturacak savcılar var...

Veli: Biz onu, nereden başlayacağımızı bilmiyoruz, size danışıyoruz.

Avukat: Hayır hayır, şunu söylüyorum. Bunların hepsi olabilir, ben bunların hiçbirisine itiraz etmem; suç duyurusunda bulunun, falan filan. Siz diyorsunuz ki bunu soruşturacak savcılar var, ben diyorum ki yok. Varsa bile cesaret alması gerekir dışarıdan. Gazete okuyunca diyecek ki ya buna sahip çıkan veliler var, ben de bir adım atayım. Yani o da başka bir yere tayin olmak istemez en azından, çoluk çocuk okumaktadır, başka bir yere tayin olmak istemez. Siz diyorsunuz ki.. Bakın, şuna gerek yok, sizin... şöyle bir rezillik olur mu arkadaşlar? Bir tane idari işlem vardır; hayatınızı, çocuklarınızın hayatını doğrudan etkileyen bir ya da birden çok idari işlem var, imar planı olabilir ve onun dışında taşınmaya ilişkin milli eğitim teşkilatının tesis ettiği idari işlem vardır. Bunu öğrenmeye çalışıyorsunuz, binbir cambazlık ediyor idare. Olur mu böyle rezillik? Olmaz. Bu olmaz. Şu mümkün müdür yahu? Bu işlem, bu taşınma işleminin dayanağı her neyse bilmiyorum, bana da vermiyor, her neyse, idareye sor, ben onun iptalini istiyorum diye dava açabilir misiniz, açabilirsiniz. Bize böyle anlattılar. Yani hukuk fakültesinde İlhan Özel şöyle anlatır, yani bir tane hocamız... Filanca işlem, adını da bilmiyorum, yani hukuka aykırıdır, nokta imzala ver. Bu kadardır idari dava dilekçesi. Mahkeme her şeyi kendisi araştırmak zorundadır ama var mı böyle bir mahkeme? Yok. Yani söke söke almak gerekir bu mahkemeleri. Vardı böyle mahkemeler, ben bile gördüm yani. Bu mahkemeleri söke söke almak gerekir mi, gerekir. Bunu konuşalım biz avukatlar olarak. Bunu konuşalım. Hani bu da, bu da denenebilir. Ama tekrar söylüyorum: Burda esas olan mesele sizin mücadeleniz.

52. Valiliğe gittiğimizde de valilik de yıkılıp yeniden yapılacağını sözlü olarak söylediler, yazılı dönüşü de şu anda hatırlamıyorum, aslında hepsi duuru yo bi yerde ama. Milli Eğitim Bakan... İl Milli Eğitim'le birebir yaptığımız görüşmede ki altı bin tane imza verdim ona. Ben verdim yani. Yaptığımız görüşmede Ankara'dan emir geldiğini söylediler. Bizim bildiğimizin dışında geliştiğini söylediler ve vakıf arazisi olduğu için çok da söz haklarının olmadığını söylediler. Gelen yazılı açıklamalar hep bu yöndeydi. Özellikle BİMER. E geç kaldığımız için de dava açma hakkımız ne yazık ki yoktu. Yasal yollardan da bi şey yapamadık. Yine de biz bir dava açtık ve şey istedik; yani

bunları niçin yapıyorsunuz, hangi belgelerle, neye dayanarak yapıyorsunuz diye bir dava açtık. Bizim istediğimiz belgeleri onlar bizden istediler.

4.3.3.1 Consent through neglect

53. Engel olmak için İl Milli eğitim müdürü ile görüşmek istedik ama konuşmayı Kabul etmedi bizimle. İki tane otele dönüştürülen okulumuz var Fatih bölgesinde. Sağlık sektöründe ne yaşıyorsa aynısı eğitim sektöründe. 1milyon 250 bin öğrenci açıköğretime kaydedildi. Şu anda sanayide çalışıyorlar, tarımda çalışıyorlar ya da evlendiriyorlar. Gerekirse Imam Hatip'e servis bulan MEB okullara temizlik malzemesi almıyor. Çoğu akıllı tahta alıyor ama temizlik malzemesi almıyor. Vestel'e ihalesiz Verdi. Okullarda var ama kullanılmıyor digru durus. 2 milyar dolari özel okullar icin ayirdi. Hizmetli, sabun, komur bulamayan devlet özel okullar icin verecek parayı bulabiliyor.

54. Sezen: Siz adres olarak okulun bölgesine giriyor musunuz?

“Girmiyoruz biz, mesela X'e tutuyordu... Ama hani ben bi tanıdığım soktum oraya. Fakat okulu temizlettim dört tane personel gönderip. İşimi öğrenince adam, bana şunu yaparsın, bana bunu yaparsın.. Ama gözümle gördüm, bi tane mesela temizlikçi bi kadın vardı, ağlıyordu. Nolar çocuğumu al diyo, eve yakın.. hani suydu buydu. Ama almıyor onu. Adam beni ilgilendirmiyor (diyor), beş yüz lira vereceksin, sana indirim yaptım bi de beş yüz lira diye..

Sezen: O pekala kayıt bölgesinde miydi okulun?

“Dışında işte. Bi sokakla kaybediyodu. Kadına öyle dedi ki kadın gariban, yazık yani..”

Sezen: Hıı, anladım. Bu bi önceki, bundan bi önceki müdür di mi?

“Evet, eskiden... yo, bu, bu müdür. Aynı müdür ama eskiden zaten genel olarak okullarda sistem buydu. Devlet yardım yapmadığı veya kısıtlı yardım yaptığı için onlar da bu şekilde alıyorlardı.”

Sezen: Öyle.

“Bazısından 500, bazısından 1000, ne verirse...”

55. Sokağın özellikle dikkat düzeyleri her an değişebilecek öğrenim çağındaki bireylerin kullanımına açılmış olması ve yolu kullanmakta olan araçların çoğunluğunun çevredeki şantiye alanlarına hizmet vermesi, okulun şantiyeleirn orta yerinde bulunması sonucunda güvenliksiz bir çevre oluşmaktadır. (...)
Bölgedeki yıkımlardan dolayı okulun bulunduğu alan, adli adi suç odaklı bir merkez durumundadır. Ayrıca okulun çevresinde henüz tam bir yıkım yaşanmamıştır ve önümüzdeki günlerde bu yıkımların başlamasıyla birlikte fiziki olumsuzluklar da (ses/gürültü, yıkım ve inşaat odaklı kirli hava vb.)

artışlar olacağı kaçınılmazdır. Kent içi çevrelerden eğitim yerine kadar ki ulaşım sistemleri için söylenmesi gereken ilk saptamalar, toplu ulaşım marifetiyle bölgeye gelmek isteyenler için kullanıma açık E-5 Karayolu sistemi üzerinden var olan bir ulaşım ağı mevcut olup, kullanılacak araçlar metro, otobüs, ve minibüs özelliğindeki toplu ulaşım araçlarıdır ve durak yeri olarak okula olan mesafeleri makul yürüme sınırları içinde olmakla birlikte, durak yerinden okula kadarki yürüme güzergahı üzerindeki olumsuzlukları sıralamak istersek; ıssızlık, suç unsurlarının barınması için hayli ideal bir fiziksel çevre, yeterli aydınlatma ve güvenlik önlemlerinin istenilen düzeyde oluşturulmadığı fotoğraf üzerinden de okunabilmektedir.

56. Hükümetin muazzam bir ikna gücü var. Evlere okulların taşınmasını övmek için ziyaretler düzenliyorlar sırf. Zaten bu yardımlar dolayısıyla bağları var velilerle. Bunlara diyorlar ki, ‘sizin çocuklarınıza üniversite gibi modern kampüsler kuracağız, anaokulundan üniversiteye kadar burada okuyacaklar mis gibi’ diyorlar. Velilere konuşmaya gittiğimiz zaman kimisi, ‘Hocam buralar değerli yerler, harcanıyorlar, hem bize yeni okul sözü verdiler’ diyorlar. Bence en iyi okul yürünerek gidilen okuldur. Ve bazı okullar şehrin içinde olmalı, şehirle etkileşim içinde olmalı. Yani ne bileyim. (...) Ama aileleri ikna etmek için yalan söylüyorlar, kandırıyorlar. Yeni okulların, modern binalarda, böyle kütüphaneli, spor salonu, tiyatrosu, herşeyiyle, çok iyi eğitim vereceğini söylüyorlar. En son teknolojiyle donatılacak diyorlar.
57. Ulaşım masrafları artınca yokul civarında yaşayan bir çok ailenin çocuğu eğitim hakkından mahrum olacak. Özellikle birden fazla çocuğu olan aileler seçim yapmak zorunda kalacaklar. Büyük ihtimalle erkek çocuklara öncelik tanınacak. Satılacaklar arasında pek çok kız okulu var. Buralardaki öğrencilerin çoğu yoksul ve muhafazakar ailelerden geliyor. Yani bu dönüşümden en çok etkilenecek olanlar yoksul ve okulun civarında yaşayanlar, kızlar özellikle. Taksim Ticaret Meslek Lisesi’ne yeni öğrenci kaydını durdurdukları zaman bu öğrencilerin geleceğini hiç düşünmediler.
58. Hemen 5000 mi, 10 000 imza topladık biz Sipahioğlu’nun İmam Hatip’e dönüşmemesi için. Okulla çatışmaya başladık, müdürüyle, amiriyle, hepsiyle. Onlar bize dediler ki ‘madem mahallelisiniz bu mahallede bu okulun perişan halinden haberiniz yok mu sizin? Ne zaman İmam Hatip geldi okulun hali düzelmeye başladı.’
59. Mecburiyetten kırk elli öğrenciyi hadi bir sınıfa tıkıyorsun anladık. Ama İmam Hatip’e neden ayrıcalık var? Müdür odası bile boşaltıldı İmam Hatip sınıfı yapacağız diye. Biz buna karşıyız, İmam Hatip’e değil. İsteyen çocuğunu isediği yere göndersin, istediği gibi eğitsin. Ama İmam Hatiplere ayrıcalık tanınmasına karşıyız. Herkes bilmiyor ama vakıflar bir sürü para bağışlıyorlar buralara. Yani servis sağlıyorlar, masraflarını ödüyorlar bunun, bedava yemek veriyorlar. Biz ayrımcılık yapılmasına karşıyız. İlçe Milli Eğitim Müdürü’ne gittik görüşmek

için, dedik ki tarafsız olmalı, bağımsız olmalı devlet. Devletse herkesin devleti olmalı. Malesef bize ne dedi. Bize dedi ki, ‘Ben tarafım’ dedi. ‘Ben İmam Hatiplerin tarafındayım, tabi ki şartlarının geliştirilmesi için uğraşcam, kimse bana engel olamaz’ minvalinde şeyler söyledi.

60. Meryem Hanım’dan Veli: Ben Kalimni Milli Eğitim Müdürü’yle konuştuğumda “Orası 1500 kapasiteli bir öğrenci, sizin mevcut 345. O mevcutla orayı size tahsis edemem. Orayı dolduracak kadar öğrenciyi bulun, okulunuzu geri alırsınız. Kentsel dönüşüm nedeniyle öğrenci kaybı var, ne olacağı belli değil İnönü’de de” diyor.

Veli 2: İnönü’nün de ne olacağı belli değil. Kentsel dönüşüm nedeniyle belirsizlik var. Belki İnönü de olmayacak bir kaç sene sonra.

Meryem Hanım’dan öğretmen: Muhtar ile konuştum: “lise için talep yok İH’ye diyor. Seyit Efendi’nin yanındaydı ya. Yıkılan okul şahsa ait. İmam Hatip’e vermiyor. O yüzden orayı buraya alacaklar.

Kalimni sakini: “Temmuzda imam hatip oldu, imam hatip kaydı alıyoruz dedi Muhtar bana. Temmuz ayında kayıtlar alınıyordu.

Öğretmen: Kayıt bölgesini değiştirdiler. Kısalttılar. İkbaliye’yi çıkarttılar. İkbaliye’den geri istememiz lazım kıstıkları kayıt alanını.

Veli 3: Yalnız ister şu ankilerin yüzde 90’ı [okulun imam hatipe dönüşmesini].

Veli2: Neden olduğunu biliyor musun? Servis, kıyafet,yemek, hepsini veriyorlar.

Veli 1: Okulun kapasitesini arttırmalıyız ama. Kentsel dönüşüm bölgesi orası. Benim bulduğum yerde yaşlılar var.

Kent aktivisti: Sipahioğlu’nu geri istesek? İki birleşse.

Veli: Ama velilerden bazıları uzak oraya. Gidemez herkes.

Öğretmen: İkbaliye tıkkış tıkkış. Meryem Hanım İkbaliye’ye gitse. Yeter ki okullar gitmesin elden.

Veli: Neticede bizim mahallede ilkokul yok.

Aktivist: Kimsenin umrunda değil ki. Kentsel dönüşümü ona göre yapıyorlar. Gelenleri imam hatipe gönderecek.”

Kalimni sakini: Gelenlerin ekonomik seviyesi daha yüksek olacak ama.

Aktivist: Yeşil Sermaye geliyor ama. Gidebilir onlar.

(...)

Veli: Evime en yakın olduğu için verdim çocuğumu dedim ben Milli Eğitim Müdürü'ne. Ben işe gidiyorum. Çocuğumu servisle göndermek istemiyorum. Müdür kendi kendin çelişiyor kendisiyle. 320 öğrencin var, 1500 kapasiteli okul. Orayı sana veremem dedi.

Kalimni sakini: Kapı kapı dolaşalım. Mahallelinin talebi olsun. Imam hatipe ihtiyaç yok diyelim.

(....)

Aktivist: İnsanlar yoksulluktan gönderiyorlar oraya. Geçen yıl oranın öğretmenlerine yemek geliyorken buraninkine (Meryem Hanım) gelmiyordu..

Sezen: Kim getiriyormuş yemekleri?

Veli: Yemek Üsküdar'dan geliyormuş. Belediye AKPnin ya.

4.3.3.2 Indirect consent

61. Yani ben kendi adıma değil, velilerden biri almıştı randevuyu, onun adıyla gittik biz. O tanışmıştı zaten bir öğlen yemeği, kadınlarla yapılan bir yemekte tanışmıştı. Randevuyu o arkadaş almıştı, X. X adına gittik. Ama ben gittiğimde Saniye dediğim anda zaten soyadımın Develi olduğunu, çocuğumun son sınıfta olduğunu vesaire biliyorlardı.

Sezen: Çocuğun sınıfını bile biliyodu?

“Tabi tabi.. Benim birebir, milletvekiliyle birebir yaptığım konuşmanın içeriğini söyledi.”

Sezen: Ona nasıl ulaşabiliyor?

“Yani belki alandan, bizim içimizde onlardan sivil polis... (....)Demek ki o konuşmayı dinleyen birileri ulaştırdı, heralde diye düşünüyorum. Başka bi açıklaması yok ki.

62. Çocuklar çok aktifti eskiden. Velilerden önce. (....) Ama bu Berkin Elvan eylemleri falan olunca. O yüzden çocuklar daha önce fişlendiler, öyle söyleyeyim. Uyarılar alındı, disipline gönderildi, ailelerle görüşüldü. Benim bildiğim altı öğrenci var öyle. Bikaçına şey dedik, zaten hani... Ee... Şey, işte diğer çocuklara bu gaza gelmemeleri gerektiğini... Çünkü öteki taraftan eğitim hayatları son bulacak, yani tek endişemiz o. Gerçekten bi gruba mensup olsalar, bi ideolojileri olsa vesaire hadi diyeceksin, zaten yatkınlar... (....) Biz o gaza gelmemeleri, her şeye atlamamaları, her denileni yapmamaları gerektiğini sıradan anne gibi... (gülerek) buna düştük yani..

CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS

5.2.2 Mobilising the sources

63. Gökhan eleştirip duruyordu ama. Reklamcı gibi davrandığım için. Yani ben işten öğrendiklerimi Seyit Efendi’de kullanmaya çalışıyordum. İşim gereği hep birilerine, belli bir insan kitlesine etkinlikleri duyurmak için ulaşmanın yollarını arardık. O yüzden Seyit Efendi’de de hep nasıl ulaşabiliriz insanlara diye yollarını arardım. İşe yaradığını düşündüğüm reklamcılık stratejilerini uygulamaya çalışırdım. Bence bunda kötü bir şey yok. İnsanlara ulaşmak zorundasın sonuçta, ha orası ha burası, ne farkeder.

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