

THE UNITED STATES' EFFORTS AT BEING A GREAT POWER
AND ITS EFFECTS ON OTTOMAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS
AT THE END OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

by

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Title: The United States' Efforts at Being a Great Power and Its Effects on Ottoman-United States Relations at the End of the Nineteenth Century

The history of the relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States has roots in the beginning of the nineteenth century. This relationship which was officially recognized in 1830, become problematic after the 1870s. Missionary activities and educative studies of American citizens in the Ottoman lands were carried out from the beginning of the relations. But, the break out of nationalist problems and Americans' relative support to the favor of Bulgarian and Armenian uprisings carried Ottoman-American relations to a different dimension.

This thesis discusses those changes and transformations in Ottoman-American relations. Revision parameters in the relations are investigated without ignoring Ottoman foreign policy, the balance of power of the nineteenth century and Empire's relations with the other Great Powers.

The most important result achieved in the research is that Ottoman-American relations were directly connected to American foreign policy preferences. Until the Civil War in America, they adopted a relatively isolationist policy and relations with the Ottomans mainly were executed free of problems. However, after the 1880s, especially after the changing conjuncture with the Berlin Treaty of 1878, interventionist inclinations in Washington gained power. It affected Ottoman-American relations in the case of the nationalistic uprisings and missionary activities.

Furthermore, American policies for the sake of being a great power are also evaluated in the thesis by drawing attention to the embassy debates. The United States' desire to upgrade the rank of its diplomatic representative in Istanbul from the ministry to embassy and the Ottoman's resistance to this promotion was an explanative and typical example of Ottoman-American relations at the end of the nineteenth century.

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Başlık: On dokuzuncu yüzyıl sonu Amerikan'ın Büyük Güç Olma Çabaları ve Bunun Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkilerine Etkisi

Osmanlı-Amerikan ilişkilerinin tarihi on dokuzuncu yüzyıl başlarına uzanır. 1830'da resmi hüviyete bürünen bu ilişki, inişli çıkışlı boyutuyla 1870'lerden sonra problemleri bir hale gelmeye başladı. Misyonerlik faaliyetleri ve Amerikalıların Osmanlı topraklarındaki eğitim çalışmaları ilişkilerin başından beri yürütülüyordu. Fakat Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda milliyetçilik sorununun baş göstermesi ve Bulgar ve Ermeni kalkışmalarının Amerikalılardan bulduğu destek Osmanlı-Amerikan ilişkilerini farklı bir boyuta taşıdı.

Bu tez Amerikan-Osmanlı ilişkilerindeki bu değişimi ele almaktadır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Avrupa denge politikasını ve diğer büyük güçlerle olan ilişkisini göz ardı etmeksizin, Osmanlı-Amerikan ilişkilerindeki değişim parametreleri araştırılmıştır.

Araştırmada ulaşılan sonuç Osmanlı-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Amerika'nın dış politika tercihleri ile doğrudan bağlantılı olduğudur. Amerikalılar iç savaşa kadar görece izolasyonist bir politika benimsemiş ve Osmanlı ile ilişkileri temelde sorunsuz gitmiştir. Fakat 1880'lerden sonra, özellikle Avrupa'da 1878 Berlin Anlaşması ile de değişen konjonktür sonrası, Washington'da daha müdahaleci eğilimlerin güç kazanması, Amerikan-Osmanlı ilişkilerini milliyetçi isyanlar ve misyonerlik bağlamında etkilemiştir.

Dahası tezde elçilik tartışmalarına da dikkat çekilerek, Amerika'nın büyük güç olma yolunda uyguladığı politikalar değerlendirilmiştir. Amerika'nın İstanbul'daki orta elçilik seviyesindeki diplomatik temsilciğini büyük elçiliğe çevirmeye çalışması ve Babıali'nin buna yaklaşık on yıl direnmesi, on dokuzuncu yüzyıl sonu Osmanlı-Amerikan ilişkilerini açıklar mahiyettedir.

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PREFACE

This study mainly examines the history of the Ottoman-American relations within the framework of changing dynamics of the relations in the nineteenth century caused by the United States' efforts to become a great power and its affects on the relations with the Ottoman Empire.

The first chapter is introductory, drawing the main routes of the thesis and discussing sources with regard to the subject.

The second chapter is about the main characteristic features of American foreign policy and the changes the policy making underwent in time. It will focus on the process inclining from isolationism to interventionism which unquestionably, effected relations with the Ottoman Empire. The second chapter will give some clues about American foreign policy at the end of nineteenth century, which is expected to be explicative for the efforts to become a Great Power and to increasing problems with the Ottoman Empire.

The third chapter examines the main features of Ottoman foreign policy. Since American-Ottoman relations could not be evaluated by ignoring Ottoman foreign policy with regard to European politics, i.e. the balance of power, this chapter also focuses on the political changes inside Europe and the Ottomans' reactions to those developments.

The fourth chapter deals with Ottoman-United States relations. It covers the beginning of relations, treaties which draw maps for the future of the relations,

effects of transformations within the United States on mutual ties and problematic areas emerged after the American interventionist policy.

The fifth chapter examines the embassy debate. The symbolic meaning of the ranks of diplomatic representatives will be investigated since it implies the show of might and respect of the time. Therefore, in this chapter, the embassy debate between the Ottoman Empire and the United States are examined in order to show the American efforts at participating in the Great Powers. The Ottomans had sensed this secret agenda. That why they resisted for ten years and refused to upgrade the ranks of the US diplomatic representatives.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The nineteenth century was a period of dramatic change. The emergence and development of science and technology, communication tools, the increasing world population and modernization, all implicating a drastic change which urged states and societies to adapt themselves to this wave.

On the other hand, the nineteenth century also gave birth to ideologies, including nationalism, and saw emerging powers such as America, Germany and Italy, the globalization of markets and struggles of the Great Powers. This struggle was not limited to Europe, or the “Middle East.” It encompassed China, the Ottoman Empire, all of Eurasia and other parts of world subjected to the European conflicts.

The Ottoman Empire was unable to protect itself from the disastrous effects of this radical alteration. On the one hand it had anticipated the technological changes in the world since the army had begun to retreat on all fronts. The Ottoman Empire was faced with the necessity to reshape its approach toward the European states. On the other hand, it sensed the threat of emerging nationalism which jeopardized its multi-ethnic and cultural structure.

In this “longest century” the Ottoman Empire engaged in military reforms first of all in order to prevent regression and create a balance with the emerging Great Powers. Furthermore, it sought to become a member of European Concert after the announcement of the reform verdict of 1856. Under the protective umbrella of the European Concert, against the Russian threat, it sought to gain the support of the

Great Britain from the 1830s up until the last quarter of the century which was called the Eastern Question. Great Britain replaced Germany after the 1880s since the European balance of power did not suited Ottoman vital interests.

This brief history of the Ottoman foreign policy has been particularly investigated by historians.¹ However, in this “longest century” some parts of Ottoman foreign policy history, voluntarily or not, have been neglected. The relations between newly emerged state, America, and the Ottoman Empire, in the case of history of diplomacy, is one of the most neglected spheres of foreign policy history.

This thesis tries to focus on those neglected spheres. It paid attention to the characteristic features of the American foreign policy and its affects on the relations with the Ottoman Empire. Since internal developments within the European politics had great impact on the formation of the bilateral relations, the Eastern Question and the political atmosphere after the Berlin Treaty of 1878 must be mentioned. Therefore thesis spent quite effort to understand international environment which enable the United States to transform its foreign policy from the perception of isolation into more interventionist one.

¹ Some of those important works are as follows: Carl Brown, *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*. (New York: I.B. Taurus, 2001); Roderick Davison, *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1999); F. A. Yasamee, *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1996); Selim Deringil, *İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamit Dönemi (1876-1909)*, trans. Gül Çağalı Güven, (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2002); Maria N. Todorova, *Aspects of the Eastern Question* (Sofia: CIBAL, 1986); Orhan Koloğlu, *Avrupa'nın Kıskaçında Abdülhamid* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998); Ercüment Kuran, “II Abdülhamit’in Büyük Devletlere Karşı Uyguladığı Siyasetin Esasları,” in *Sultan II Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri, Bildiriler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1994); Nuri Yurdusev (ed). *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional*. (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004); İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Alkım, 2006); Murat Özyüksel, “Abdülhamit Dönemi Dış İlişkileri.” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu, pp.5-31 (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994).

American-Ottoman relations embraced various parts including arms trade, missionary activities, schools, American support to nationalistic uprisings i.e. Armenian and Bulgarian problems, fairs, railways, developing economic ties, extraterritorial rights for American citizens etc. Each subject mentioned above could be selected as a research area. There are huge numbers of documents in the archives with regard to each case. That's why thesis has to mention on those areas particularly problematic one, Armenian and missionary cases which unquestionably jeopardized bilateral relations in the long term.

On the other hand, thesis does not engage in the detailed investigation of each problematic area. It gives more importance to the affects of those problematic areas to the bilateral relations rather than how Armenian problem occurred in the Ottoman Empire or how missionary activities flourished within the borders. Lastly, thesis aimed to understand how Ottoman-American relations developed within the framework of the international relations.

Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the United States go back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It initiated under the flag of Great Britain by American traders' arrival to Izmir and other port cities. This premature type of relationship, mainly based on commerce, was acknowledged by the treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1830.

After that time, Ottoman-American relations made rapid development not only in the economic sphere, but also pullulated into various types including missionary activities, education, arms trade and diplomatic relations. Ottoman-American relations have not been investigated in full. Rather, those areas such as

missionary activities or American support of national movements, mostly to Armenian uprisings,² have been given the attention since they refer today's problematics.³

It is of course unquestionable that those spheres are not ignorable parts of American-Ottoman relations. However, the history of the relations can not be limited to those parts. This thesis will focus on Ottoman-American relations from a different perspective since it cannot be comprehended without understanding on the one hand the main changes within America and the Ottoman Empire, and on the other, inside Europe. Therefore the thesis will spent effort to examine the main basis of the American foreign policy toward Europe and the Empire.

Furthermore, the aim of this thesis is to understand how Ottoman-American relations developed within the framework of the international relations. It is important to ask how drastic changes in the Americans' understanding of foreign policy making affected relations and how the United States' efforts for being a great power shaped the character of the relations.

² There are many works related to missionary activities, American education and its support of the nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire. Some of them are as follows: Erdal Açıkşes, *Amerikalıların Harput'taki Misyonerlik Faaliyetleri* (Ankara: TTK, 2003); Süleyman Kocabaş, *Misyonerlik ve Misyonerler* (İstanbul: Vatan yay, 2002); Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Anadolu'da Amerika* (İstanbul: Arba, 1989); İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, *Ermeni Komitelerinin İhtilal Hareketleri ve Besledikleri Emeller* (Ankara, 1981); Şamil Mutlu, *Osmanlı Devletinde Misyoner Okulları* (İstanbul: Gökkuşbu, 2005); Samiha Ayverdi, *Misyonerlik Karşısında Türkiye* (İstanbul: Turan Neşriyat Yurdu, 1969).

³ In his work with regard to the historiography on Abdulhamid, Gökhan Çetinsaya writes that history is sphere of belief which prevents historians' rethinking matters, especially with regard to Abdulhamid II. See Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Abdülhamid'i Anlamak: 19. Yüzyıl Tarihçiliğine Bir Bakış," in *Sosyal Bilimleri Yeniden Düşünmek* (İstanbul: Metis, 1998), pp.137-146, p.145; and see Gökhan Çetinsaya, "Çıban Başı Koparmamak: II. Abdülhamid Rejimine Yeniden Bakış," *Türkiye Günlüğü*, 1999, p.58.

In assessing the main features of American foreign policy, two contradictory points will be mentioned in the thesis. The Monroe Doctrine, which was the main impulse behind the isolationist policy, and the concept of Manifest Destiny, which led Americans later into a more interventionist policy. The Monroe Doctrine was the basis of isolationist policies. Under the shadow of this doctrine, the United States would never interfere into the domestic affairs of the European state system, while at the same time it alerted the Europeans to keep themselves away from America's political problems.

On the other hand, Manifest Destiny constituted the basis for interventionist policies. The concept was about the American continent, which referred to the right to become the owner of the whole continent because of the destiny planned by God in accordance with their experience with self-determination and freedom. The continent would become the whole world in a short time.

So how did Americans go from isolation to intervention? In order to answer this question, a general look at the indicators of American economic boom, growth in population and developing industry is needed. The Civil War of 1861-65 was the turning point in the United States' economic and political dynamics. With the Civil War over, as Kennedy writes, the US was able to exploit the many advantages such as acquired agricultural land, raw materials of the west and the convenient evolution of modern technology; the absence of significant foreign dangers; the flow of foreign

and, increasingly, domestic investment capital to transform itself at a dramatic rate.⁴ Between the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the outbreak of the Spanish American War in 1898, American wheat production increased by 256%, corn by 222%, refined sugar by 460%, coal by 870%, steel rails by 523%, and miles of railway track in operation by over 567%.

The result of this transformation was chiefly economic, but of course, they began to affect directly the basis of international politics. As Lefebvre points out Republican presidents McKinley (1897-1901) and Roosevelt (1901-1908) led their country in a more imperialistic direction.⁵

But, before the indicators of the interventionist policies, Ottoman-American relations began to enter under those tensions. For example, after Civil War, the United States sought to have a base on Crete which shook the trust of Ottoman officials to Washington. This was not abnormal. On the contrary, the United States wanted to enter the Mediterranean Sea in order to come close to the market struggles among Europeans. Another example was their support of the Bulgarian nationalist uprisings. But the most interventionist policy was the American ties with the Armenians. America came face to face with the Ottoman government with the emergence of the Armenian national movement in many cases.

⁴ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Vintage Books, 1988), p.195.

⁵ Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası (La Politique étrangère américaine)*, trans. İsmail Yerguz (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), p. 20.

That the conflicts were the results of American ambitions is true. But of course it depended on some real social background. More than economic boom and the necessity to open into the world market, Americas' changing and growing population was another reason. Why were Americans interested in the Armenian question? Did they really want to divide the "Old Empire"? Perhaps, but American citizens of Armenian origin have to be remembered. In the late nineteenth century, increasing numbers of Armenians immigrated to the United States. They constituted a society in America. They were its citizens. That's why when they turned to Turkey after being American citizen, they become a problem between the two countries. America tried to protect its citizens, while the Ottoman Empire wanted to protect its sovereign rights and integrity.

Americans tried to persuade Ottoman officials to do what their interests required with their navy, which was the third most powerful in the world. A powerful navy meant the desire to become a great power. Furthermore, Americans organized several world fairs which were, at that time, places to show the might of the host country to the rest of the world. The Ottoman Empire was an important participant at those fairs.

The Embassy debate also has to be evaluated within this perspective. As is known, the image of a state was very important in nineteenth century foreign relations. Abdulhamid's efforts were basic examples of this fact.⁶ But it was not

⁶ Selim Deringil, "II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde 'İmaj' Saplantısı," in *Sultan II Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri, Bildiriler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırma Merkezi, 1994), pp. 149-162.

peculiar to Abdulhamd II. America also paid great attention to the image of its country which identified with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

Equality, especially among the Great Powers, was very important. The Ottoman Empire was not accepted as an equal member to the Concert of Europe politically in the treaty of Paris. But of course, formally the Ottoman Empire was equal with others diplomatically. At least, diplomatically, the Ottoman Empire sent its ambassadors to the capitals of the Great Powers, while they in turn sent their ambassadors also to Istanbul. However, America until 1893, never had such an “equality and reciprocity” even though they in some cases applied to upgrade its ministry (*Orta elçilik*) to Embassy (*Büyük Elçilik*). Even Germany, had emerged in the last quarter of the century, had an embassy in Istanbul.⁷ But America did not have one in Istanbul, including all other capitals until 1893. That is why the Americans’ pressure on the Ottoman Empire which lasted ten years could be evaluated as the American efforts to be accepted among the Great powers, as Abdulhamid II said in official documents.

This is the main body of the thesis. In the case of documents and works with regard to the American-Ottoman relations, we face a change in the historical writing. The historical writing deals with the subject rooted back to the 1930s and increases until today. Those works on Ottoman-American relations are few which mainly emphasize diplomatic relations.

⁷ Ulrich Trumpener, “Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Sonu” in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Sonu ve Büyük Güçler*, ed: by Marian Kent (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), pp.129-153, p.131.

There has to be a separation among the books with regard to America. On the one hand, as mentioned above, there are many books which reserve place for the Armenian problem and missionary activities. However, there are few which focus on the diplomatic relations or which examine the relations in the international sphere.⁸

In Abdulhamid II's historiography, there is an important development in the history writing that has abrogated polarizations among the historians in the last twenty-five years.⁹ The literature about American-Ottoman relations or the American presence in Anatolia has been pursued in a parallel way. Even though the former works mainly mention the American missionary activities or American mandate debates in Turkey, some new works have mentioned American-Ottoman relations from a different and broader perspective.¹⁰ Similarly, there are also some new works that deal with the other parts of the relations such as fairs, diaries or modernity.¹¹

With regard to archival documents, American-Ottoman foreign policy history can be investigated from two archives, in the case of official documents,

⁸ Mine Erol, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Yaptığı Ticaret Anlaşmaları* (Konya: Damla Matbaacılık); Leland James Gordon, *American Relations with Turkey, 1830-1930: An Economic Interpretation* (London: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932); Akdes Nimet Kurat, *Türk-Amerikan Münasebetlerine Kısa Bir Bakış (1800-1959)*, (Ankara, 1959); Oral Sander and Fişek Kurthan, *ABD Dışişleri Belgeleriyle Türk-ABD Silah Ticaretinin İlk yüzyılı, 1829-1929* (İstanbul: Çağdaş yay, 1977).

⁹ Nadir Özbek, "Modernite, Tarih ve İdeoloji: İkinci Abdülhamid Dönemi Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme," *Literatür*, no. 3 (2004), pp.71-90.

¹⁰ Especially those two, Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* (İstanbul: İmge, 2001); Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri*. (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003).

¹¹ Cafer Sarıkaya. "1983 Şikago Sergisi'nde Osmanlı Tiyatrosu" *Toplumsal Tarih*, 147/ March 2006, pp.66-71; Ahmet Turan Alkan, *Sıradışı Bir Jöntürk: Ubeydullah Efendi'nin Amerika Hatıraları*. (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997); and Tahsin Fendoğlu, *Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri (1786-1929)* (İstanbul: Beyan, 2002).

dispatches, the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives (BOA) and the AIRC at the American Embassy at Ankara. The BOA offers important official documents to the researchers even though they represent only a glance at the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, in order to get an idea of the American government, it is necessary to have a balanced approach; researchers have to investigate in the NARA, in Maryland, in America. In Turkey, some official documents can be reached at the AIRC, at the American Embassy, Ankara, but those microfilms, which include diplomatic dispatches among consulates, were “selected” from the NARA in 1945 and sent to Turkey.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF US FOREIGN POLICY

Americans entered into contact with the Ottomans in the early nineteenth century. It is an eligible question, how this transcontinental relationship developed and which events shaped the fate of this contact. Undoubtedly, Ottoman-US contact flourished under the shadow of the political and economic developments and conflicts inside Europe and the Ottomans' efforts to secure the existence of the Empire's integrity. In other words, the history of the relations could not be understood without referring to the effects of conditions that emerged in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. But, drastic changes inside America and its search to penetrate into the "Eastern" issues at the end of the nineteenth century also determined the future of the relations.

In assessing the main features of the United States' foreign policy, this chapter will emphasize turning points and transformation periods which had impact on the relations with the Ottoman Empire. Within this regard, two diversity or contradictory bases of character of the American foreign policy will be mentioned: The Monroe Doctrine, which was the main impulse behind the isolationist policy, and the concept of Manifest Destiny, which constituted a perception not contradictory to the isolation in the beginning, but was transformed into a sort of belief parallel with the interventionist policies.

In doing so, it is aimed to apprehend the transformation of the United States' foreign policy. In the beginning, i.e. as independence was declared, the United States choose an isolation policy which targeted the provision of adequate conditions inside

to consolidate the newly established system and to become superior along with the continental powers by ignoring the European struggles that were spreading throughout the world.

The framework for this policy was drawn by the Monroe Doctrine. However, while the United States had almost completed its unification, especially after the Civil War of 1861-65, it experienced a huge economic and social explosion, which urged its people to expand throughout the world, not only economically, but also politically. Manifest Destiny, the belief that sanctifying the right to become the owner of the whole continent because of “the destiny planned by God,” then merged with Social Darwinism, and embarked upon the “survival of the fittest.”

The United States’ growing economic and social power, which started to reach its climax in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, would affect the world, significantly its “eastern” parts, and would reach as far as the Ottoman Empire. Building a strong navy, gaining extraterritorial rights, supporting missionaries, participating in world fairs were all indicators of its rising power. In this chapter, those transformations will be described in order to constitute a base for US relations with the Ottoman Empire.

Isolationism

As a new democracy in the world, the United States was aware of the deep need for the consolidation of its newly established status. George Washington, one of the founding fathers and first President, in his farewell message, glorified the policy

of isolationism by declaring that Americans had to develop commercial ties with foreign states while keeping themselves out of their political struggles.¹² While not ignoring, he sought to prevent the freedom and sovereignty of his country in the international system. The reason behind this decision was to protect and consolidate the newly established United States, which he believed to be threatened by Europe's domestic struggles.

The Monroe Doctrine

The perception that the US was in danger was common among all of the founding fathers and leading figures in the United States. This was the basis for the Monroe Doctrine, dedicated to President James Monroe, formulated in December 1823.¹³ The doctrine declared that

a. the Americans consistent by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain henceforth not to be considered as the subjects for the future colonization of the European powers, b. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so, c. with existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere, d. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness.¹⁴

¹² Maxime Lefebvre, *Amerikan Dış Politikası (La Politique étrangère américaine)*, trans. İsmail Yerguz (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004), p.14.

¹³ Armin Rappaport, *The Monroe Doctrine* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964).

¹⁴ David Larson, "Objectivity, Propaganda and the Puritan Ethic" in *The Puritan Ethic in United States Foreign Policy*, ed. David Larson (New Jersey, 1966), p. 10.

In interpretation, this doctrine proves that the United States declared that the Americas and Europe (the New and Old Worlds) were separate and different sorts of systems, which had different bases from each other. Under the shadow of this doctrine, the United States would never interfere in the domestic affairs of the European state system, while at the same time it alerted the Europeans to keep themselves away from Americas' political problems.

However, it has to be asserted that the Monroe Doctrine did not enclose the whole world; it was limited to European domestic affairs and issues related to the European nations. They did not isolate themselves from the rest of the world. For instance, the declaration of the Monroe Doctrine corresponded with the American missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ And the United States began to ask "Eastern" states in order to obtain extraterritorial rights.¹⁶

For example, while the United States implemented an isolationist policy with regard to the European issues, the existence of the U.S. naval forces in the Pacific persuaded the Qing Empire to sign an amity and commercial treaty with the United States on 3 July 1844, called the Treaty of Wanghia. Under its terms, "China was obligated to allow Americans to trade freely in Canton as well as in four other previously closed ports. Moreover, Americans obtained the right of extraterritorial

¹⁵ Nurdan Şafak. *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), p. 15.

¹⁶ An explicit description of the extraterritorial rights is as follows: "Exclusive territorial jurisdiction is one of the defining features of the sovereignty of the modern nation-state. With limited exceptions, it is *where* a person is that determines *what law* applies to him or her. However, when a state asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction, it claims the right to apply its laws beyond the borders of its territory" in Teemu Ruskola. "Canton is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial Sovereignty" *American Quarterly* 57. no 3 (2005), p. 860.

jurisdiction in China. From 1844 until 1943, U.S. citizens in China formally were subject only to the laws of the United States.”¹⁷

Ruskola draws a picture with regard to extraterritorial rights. According to him, the United States’ attempts to obtain extraterritorial rights were not limited to China. “The United States had, in fact, already entered into a series of extraterritoriality treaties with the Barbary states, the Porte, and the Imam of Muscat.” i.e. to “Mohammedan” states.¹⁸ Another “pagan” instance was that 1853-1854, Japan was obliged to open its doors to American goods after the US Navy knocked on its door.¹⁹

Interventionism and Manifest Destiny

Isolationist policy would continue for decades from time to time. Especially under the conditions of some international crisis or dangers, American political elite had often discussed whether the United States must perform isolation or not. Interwar period in the first half of the nineteenth century is an appropriate example. But as time passed, American foreign policy had predominantly become interventionist.

It is generally believed that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were jeopardized when the United States entered World War I. However, it had already

¹⁷ Teemu Ruskola, “Canton is Not Boston: The Invention of American Imperial Sovereignty” *American Quarterly* 57, no 3 (2005), p. 860.

¹⁸ Ibid., p.874.

¹⁹ Lefebvre, p. 17.

fallen into disuse by Americans, especially after the end of the American-Spanish War of 1898. Before the war, the United States, as in its relations with the Ottoman Empire, began to turn toward a more interventionist policy.

The roots of interventionist policy can be observed theoretically in the premises of Manifest Destiny, which was based on Puritan tradition. This concept was used first in articles by John O’Sullivan published in the *New York Times* in 1845. The concept, as O’Sullivan mentioned, was about the American continent which referred to the right to become the owner of the whole continent because of the destiny planned by God in accordance with their experience with self-determination and freedom.²⁰ “The whole continent” shows that in the beginning Manifest Destiny was limited to the Americas.²¹

However, as time passed and as the conditions in the international system changed, Manifest Destiny was transformed into more internationalist view and become the theological base for a new interventionist policy.²² This was the time when “the Great Power struggles were no longer merely over European issues but over markets and territories that ranges across globe.”²³

²⁰ See Frederick Merk. *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: Reinterpretation*. (New York: Vintage Books, 1963).

²¹ David Larson writes that “Manifest Destiny is a rationalization on the part of the United States for expanding across the continent and eventually across the Pacific Ocean.” See Larson, p. 10.

²² Ibid., p. 8.

²³ Paul Kennedy. *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Vintage Books, 1988), p.195.

For instance, since transformation in American foreign policy emerged in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Manifest Destiny reached its climax in 1900 in the debate over whether to annex the Philippines. Senator Albert Beveridge was the leading figure of the thought of annexation. His speech on Manifest destiny proved the “rationalization of the imperialism.”²⁴ He said, “the Philippines are ours forever... and just beyond the Philippines are China’s illimitable markets.”²⁵ This was the turning point in the minds of the Americans responsible for the making of foreign policy.²⁶

Rupture in the Policy: Transformation into Political Involvement

The United State’s foreign policy was transformed into a more active and interventionist one especially at the end of the nineteenth century. Pletcher calls it “economic expansion becoming political involvement.”²⁷ According to Symonds, the nineteenth century was a period also in which the United States “physically changed from a cluster of states along the eastern seaboard into a continental power, in which its naval vessels changed from sailing frigates to steam-powered armored cruisers, in

²⁴ Larson, p. 10.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁶ According to Ruskola, scholars in American studies increasingly are analyzing America’s territorial expansion in North America, the Caribbean, and the Pacific as an imperial project. In Ruskola, p. 860.

²⁷ David M. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Involvement: American Economic Expansion across the Pacific, 1784–1900* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001), pp.203–238.

which American policy changed from ‘leave us alone’ to ‘get out of our way,’ in which the iconic-policy maker changed from Thomas Jefferson to Theodore Roosevelt.”²⁸ He continues by emphasizing that “in the nineteenth century the range of US policy options expanded dramatically as the nation grew into power and capability and this had an impact not only on what we did as a nation but also on who become.”²⁹

Its indicators, however, can be traced back in many cases. Even though academics believed that the United States started to ignore the Monroe Doctrine especially after Roosevelt and World War I, other leading figures in the country already had taken steps to change the foreign policy. Republican presidents McKinley (1897-1901) and Roosevelt (1901-1908) led their country in a more imperialistic direction.³⁰ But there were also indicators of the transformation before their presidency. Kennedy puts forward the dilemma between the Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny. He says that:

The growth of US industrial power and overseas trade was accompanied, perhaps inevitably, by a more assertive diplomacy and by American style rhetoric of *weltpolitic*. ... with Social Darwinistic and racial arguments, ... The traditional, if always exaggerated, alarm about threats to the Monroe doctrine was accompanied by calls for US to fulfill its manifest destiny across the pacific. ... US was now being urged by many groups at home into a much more activist diplomacy –which, under the administrations of McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt, was exactly what to place the 1895 quarrel with Britain over the Venezuelan border dispute- justified in terms of the Monroe doctrine- was followed

²⁸ Craig L Symonds. “Milestones along the Path to World Power” in *Naval History*, 19, no 6, December 2005, p. 42.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.45.

³⁰ Lefebvre, p. 20.

three years later by the much more dramatic war with Spain over the Cuban issue³¹.

The Civil War was a turning point.³² The architecture behind the interventionist policy was Secretary of State Seward, who held this post throughout the War and who believed in the necessity of creating a protective barrier around the borders of the United States and the continent in order to protect the political and economic interests of the country. According to him, the United States could be secure only if the state pursued an expansionist policy.³³

This policy of course was supported by industrialists and businessmen especially after the Civil War when the United States became one of the leading figures in the world's economic struggle. Seward implemented his interventionist policies in spite of growing opposition. The Caribbean, Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Guam islands were occupied by the United States' navy, and later the Philippines and Puerto Rico come under the domain of the United States.

On the other hand, the theoretical background of this expansionism, of course, had been structured. Social Darwinism, a current of thought emerged from Darwin's ideas which associated the survival of living creatures to their conditions, found many supporters among Americans.³⁴ The main pillar of this current of thought was the belief that nations, as other creatures, had to struggle in order to survive with

³¹ Kennedy, p.317.

³² For details with regard to the rupture and transformation in the foreign policy, see Kissenger, pp. 162-194.

³³ Çağrı Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* (İstanbul: İmge, 2001), p. 260.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

other nations, and the most powerful one would survive. Kennedy also supported this, mentioning that “many observers in the late nineteenth century talked in terms of a vulgar Darwinist world of struggle, of success and failure of growth and decline.”³⁵ This belief was conceptualized with the slogan “survival of the fittest.”

Beyond the Civil War, the war with Spain, as mentioned above, marked a turning point in the history of the United State’s foreign policy. As an important indicator of interrupting the Monroe Doctrine, the United States began to change its policy toward Europe. It began to abandon its “ignorance policy” with regard to European “domestic” issues, framed by the Doctrine, and began to become interested in the “Eastern Question.”

This change in the policy making undoubtedly affected relations with the Ottoman Empire. Americans tried to exert pressure on the Ottoman Empire under the pretext of protecting its citizens and economic and political interests. On the one hand diplomatic crises began to be frequent because of the missionary activities; on the other hand, separatist movements in the Ottoman Empire, such as those of the Bulgarians, Cretans or Armenians, were supported directly or indirectly by Americans. Especially during the 1890s, the United States, in many cases, began to use its naval power as a diplomatic vehicle, which it believed to be a right choice in order to persuade the Ottoman diplomatic elite.

This transformation, of course was reflected on the ranks of the diplomatic representatives in Europe and the Ottoman Empire. According to Paul Kennedy, “it

³⁵ Kennedy, p.195.

was not until 1892 that the European great powers upgraded the ranks of their diplomatic representatives to Washington from ministers to ambassadors.”³⁶

The Changing United States in Economic and Social Indicators

The United States, especially after its Civil War, experienced an economic and demographic boom which positively affected its military and political power. This boom unquestionably had a deep impact on the global power balances, since it constituted the main impulse behind the American decision makers.

With the Civil War over, in Kennedy’s words, the US was able to exploit the many advantages such as “reached agricultural land, west raw materials and the convenient evolution of modern technology (railways, the steam engine, mining equipment) to develop such resources; the lack of social and geographical constraints; the absence of significant foreign dangers; the flow of foreign and, increasingly, domestic investment capital to transform itself at a stunning pace.”³⁷ Between the end of the Civil War in 1865 and the outbreak of the Spanish American War in 1898, “American wheat production increased by 256%, corn by 222%, refined sugar by 460%, coal by 870%, steel rails by 523%, and the miles of railway track in operation by over 567%.”³⁸

³⁶ Kennedy, p.195.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 312.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 312.

The result of this transformation was chiefly economic, but of course, they began to affect directly the basis of international politics. Because “industrial productivity with science and technology became an ever more vital component of national strength” at that period. Kennedy asserts that the “alterations in the international shares of manufacturing production were reflected in the changing international shares of military power and diplomatic influence.”³⁹

Especially after the Civil War, the production of American industry caused a widespread fear that even its enormous domestic market might soon be unable to absorb these goods, and urged industrialists and bourgeoisies to led the government to give all sorts of aid, including military, of course, to opening up markets throughout the world. The open door policy in China and the United States’ dominant economic involvement in Latin America were two examples of the results of these kinds of concerns. Another example was the beginning of the arms trade between American arms producers and the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁰

The drastic change emerged in the United States’ economic and social conditions forced the United States to intervene or expand throughout the Pacific. And this also led to the construction of a strong naval force which became the third most powerful sea power in the world by the beginning of the nineteenth century. It was an exemplary naval power.

³⁹ Kennedy., p.197.

⁴⁰ Oral Sander and Fişek Kurthan. *ABD Dışişleri Belgeleriyle Türk-ABD Silah Ticaretinin İlk Yüzyılı, 1829–1929* (İstanbul: Çağdaş yay, 1977). pp. 12–13.

According to Bönker, “U.S. leaders had recognized that they needed to turn their country into a premier imperial military power to secure its needs as an "export industrial state (*Exportindustriestaat*).”⁴¹ The navy was powerful enough to control and have a say in world politics (*Weltpolitik*), according to what Admiral Otto von Diederichs, the chief of the German Admiralty Staff, wrote in 1900.⁴² Another testimony for the rising of the United States’ navy was the German Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, who noted two years later that America would "move forward in enormous strides (namely: politically);" it would manage to keep abreast of the overall “development towards a few global empires (*Riesenreiche*).”⁴³

As the United States had emerged as one of the world's leading naval powers, this great navy did not keep itself away from the seas of the Ottoman Empire. Istanbul would in many cases have to face the United States’ navies, which had been dispatched to the Bosphorus in order to persuade the Sultan to sign an agreement or to accept the Americans’ requests in the case of the interests of American citizens, including missionaries.⁴⁴

Another sign of the “might” could be seen at the world fairs. Since the technology and industry of the United States boomed, they had begun to give

⁴¹ Dirk Bönker, “Admiration, Enmity, and Cooperation: U.S. Navalism and the British and German Empires before the Great War” *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History*, 2, no. 1, 2001.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ There is a doctoral dissertation with regard to the American navy in the Bosphorus. See William James Hourihan, *Roosevelt and the Sultan: the United States’ Navy in the Mediterranean, 1904*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, February 1975.

attention to world exhibits where they could perform and show their “might” to the other nations of the world. Those exhibits constituted an opportunity to compare American and European technology and “provided a mirror for the changing attitudes of the rest of the world toward American civilization.”⁴⁵

According to Curti, the desire to publicize the nation’s resources, industries and social and economic institutions were among the motives and arguments for American participation in overseas exhibitions. “Sensitive to European prejudices and attitudes of superiority, American at first haltingly took with increasing seriousness the opportunity to proclaim at the world fairs the national achievements and potentialities”⁴⁶ and they participated in world fairs in America in 1867, in Paris 1889, in Adelaide 1887 and in Barcelona 1888. Davis writes that “they presented a myriad of exhibits that juxtaposed the United States’ expanding technological prowess to the technological advances of its main competitors in the global political economy, Great Britain, France and an emerging Germany.”⁴⁷

Last, it has to be asserted that economic, social and political developments shaped the characteristic features of the United States’ foreign policy, which undoubtedly impacted the form of relations with the Ottomans. Furthermore, the basis of these relations could not be apprehended without understanding the main premises

⁴⁵ Merle Curti, “America at the World Fairs, 1851-1893,” *The American Historical Review*, 55, no 4 (July, 1950), pp.833.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.833.

⁴⁷ Eric Davis, “Representations of the Middle East at American World's Fairs, 1876-1904,” in *The United States and the Middle East: Cultural Encounters*, ed. Abbas Amanat, (2002), pp.344.

of Ottoman's foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century. The next chapter will serve to fill this vacuum.

CHAPTER III

OTTOMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND EUROPE

The nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new power, the USA. It was also the longest period of the Ottoman history, as Ortyalı said.⁴⁸ Immediate regression in the clash with the Great Powers, the internationalization of politics, and the quick spread of nationalism which would devastate the Ottoman lands created a drastic change in Ottoman foreign policy making, which tended then to become protectionist. Before, until the late 1700s, it mainly had been unilateral “that is other countries had resident ambassadors at the Ottoman capital from the fifteenth century onwards while the Sultan sent envoys abroad only for temporary missions on an ad hoc basis.”⁴⁹

As the international conditions had changed, the Ottoman Empire adopted itself to the international system and reformed its structure in accordance with the other powers in order to save itself from the dissolution.⁵⁰ This was the first principle, according to Roderick Davison, that guided the actions of the Ottoman statesman and

⁴⁸ See İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* (Istanbul: Alkım, 2006).

⁴⁹ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “The Adoption and Use of Permanent Diplomacy” *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional*. Ed by Nuri Yurdusev, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.131-150, p.132.

⁵⁰ According to Davison, “Survival meant warding off attacks by other powers and, if possible, preventing them from taking pieces of the Ottoman Empire for themselves. It meant, further, preventing other powers from interfering in domestic ottoman affairs. Above all, it meant trying to fend off the intervention of one power or another in support of a rebellious nationality within Empire.” See Roderic Davison. “The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century,” in *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: ISIS press, 1999), p. 320.

diplomats. A second principle was the diminution regarding in the usage of the Islamic character of the state which was less emphasized until the 1875-8 crises. Davison arranges its list of principles that describes the changes in Ottoman foreign policy:

A third principle was that the Ottoman Empire was a legitimate European power and from 1856 on a member of the concert of Europe ... In 1840 after the reform edict of Gülhane, the Porte become an active participant in the European state system of the day as co-signer of the London convention, which provided for action against Mehmed Ali. ... A fifth principle ... the Ottoman diplomats appealed to international law, as a kind of defensive insurance policy. ... The seventh principle was the providing of the non-intervention in Ottoman domestic affairs.⁵¹

One of the most important transformations in the Ottoman structure was the flourishing diplomatic body. As Kurkcuoglu writes, “Ottoman diplomacy was weak when the state was strong. As a further exception to the rule, Ottoman diplomacy became strong when the state was weak.”⁵² That is why the bureaucracy grew rapidly throughout the nineteenth century.⁵³

Embassies were also the part of this promoting ruling class. As Yurdusev writes, “although the Ottoman Empire came to terms with the necessity of developing a European style of diplomacy rather late, she was the first non-European country to participate in the European states system and the first to establish resident embassies

⁵¹ Davison, “The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century,” pp.321-325.

⁵² Kürkçüoğlu, p.131; and see Davison, “The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century,” p.319.

⁵³ See Carter Vaughn Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, January 1980).

in Europe's capitals."⁵⁴ The resident embassies in Europe were established which "was a more significant Ottoman step toward democracy."⁵⁵

Since the outbreak of the French revolution in 1789, Paris was under consideration at the beginning as the destination for the first Ottoman ambassador. But this approach quickly changed as the French revolution outbreak in the country which accepted as a danger for the integrity of the Empire. Other Great Powers had also excluded new French regime.

France wanted to send its ambassador to Istanbul, but the Ottoman Empire did not accept the recognition. Istanbul declared that it would recognize the new French regime only after any other European power did so. This was the first instance showing Ottoman tendencies to check up the balances among the European states. In the case of permanent embassies, London was the first capital welcomes an Ottoman diplomat, Yusuf Agah Efendi. London was chosen as the first because "Great Britain as the rising star of European diplomacy had an influential position in the Ottoman Empire where it had been represented by the resident ambassadors since 1583."⁵⁶

Ottoman ambassadors, later, were sent to other European capitals such as Berlin, Vienna and Paris. Even though Ottoman ambassadors were withdrawn from their post by Selim the III, they were sent back in 1834 as resident ambassadors. A

⁵⁴ See Davison, "The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century," p. 320; and Esin Yurdusev. "Studying Ottoman Diplomacy: A Review of the Sources." *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional*, ed. Nuri Yurdusev (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 167-193, p.167.

⁵⁵ K rk ođlu, p.132.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.133.

Tehran embassy was opened in 1849 and ministers and charge de affairs authorized through Athens 1840, Stockholm 1854, St. Petersburg 1857, Rome 1870, Brussels 1857, and Washington 1867.⁵⁷

The Crimean War the and Ottoman Empire as a European State

Europeanization of the Ottoman diplomacy was not surprising. It was the sequences of the events which first emerged in the Crimean War. War resulted with a clear military victory for the Ottoman Empire and its western allies. The gift of the victory was the Treaty of Paris of 1856, which obliged Russia to leave European and Asiatic territory to the Ottoman Empire and prevented it from maintaining a fleet in the Black Sea. In other words, Russia was “required to leave herself permanently vulnerable to attack by Ottoman and its western allies.”⁵⁸ The treaty was not only the recovery of the Ottoman mood, but also made it a member of the Concert of Europe. The Treaty of Paris⁵⁹ was a shelter that preserved its independence and territorial integrity under the guarantee of the European balances and the Great Powers.

⁵⁷ Kürkçüoğlu, p.137.

⁵⁸ F. A. K. Yaseme. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdulhamid II and the Great Powers* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1996), p.8.

⁵⁹ The principles accepted in the Treaty of Paris were as follows: “equality of ottoman subjects, ottoman membership in the concert of Europe, the preservation of legitimate sovereign regimes and opposition to nationalist rebellion, the upholding of the international law, respect for sanctity of treaties, and non-intervention in ottoman domestic affairs” see Davison, “The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century,” p. 321-325.

The reason behind the establishment of the balance of power was the awareness of the great Powers that “the decline and eventually demise of the Ottoman Empire inevitably had major consequences ... and also affected were the Empire’s neighbors ... and for Great Powers. Because it threatened the stability of the international system upon which the security of all depended. This was the essence of the celebrated eastern question.”⁶⁰ In other words, the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire had been established “as a European” principle “for which Britain and France had shown that they would fight in the future of a stable Ottoman Empire.”⁶¹ Because, the Ottoman Empire was beneficial against Russian influence through the south, which was unacceptable for the British Empire because of the way across to India.

Since it was the essence of the celebrated Eastern Question, Davison’s eligible description has to be mentioned here. According to Davison, “the Eastern Question of nineteenth century can perhaps be represented as a set of concentric circles. The most sensitive issue was at the center of all: Who would control Istanbul and the Straits? ... For the Ottoman government, the Eastern Question was a set of western question: How to strengthen the empire in the face of nationalities imbued with western-style nationalism, how to fend off intervention by the European powers and in the end how to survive in a world dominated by the west.”⁶²

⁶⁰ Yasemee, p.1.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.8.

⁶² Roderic H Davison, “Ottoman Diplomacy and its Legacy.” *Imperial Legacy*, Ed by Carl Brown (Columbia University Press, 1997); and see Zdenek R Dittrich, “The European Great Powers

The Ottomans' acceptance into the Concert of Europe, however, was quite problematic. The Europeans neither hoped nor accepted an equal membership for the Ottomans. "The most galling sign of inequality was the continuance of the capitulations, giving foreigners special rights on Ottoman soil," says Davison.⁶³ Furthermore, Yasemee describes this system as the future of the Ottoman Empire, as their independent power having gone but that they would survive on the terms laid down by others. According to him the Ottoman ruler's recognition brought a radical transform in the foreign policy making which "frankly acknowledged the Empire's dependence upon the European Great Powers."⁶⁴

Therefore, it could be said that one of the most important results of the Crimean War was the formation of the Ottoman foreign policy methods which would continue to be implemented until the end of the Empire. First of all, winning the support of whatever major powers would back them up was the most important method pursued by foreign policy makers. This could be described as the balance of power which would continue throughout the end of the Empire.

A second method of Ottoman diplomacy was to avoid partition in international conferences, except in circumstances that were closely controlled. According to Davison, the reason behind this method was that "the great powers of Europe when meeting in conference tended to make demands of the Ottoman Empire

and the Eastern Question" in *Aspects of the Eastern Question*, ed. Maria N. Todorova, (Sofia: CIBAL, 1986), pp.9-10.

⁶³ Davison, "The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 321-325.

⁶⁴ Yasemee, p. 7.

to interfere in its internal affairs with proposals of reform or to plan for its partial dismemberment.”⁶⁵

A third Ottoman method has been common to all governments in modern times, and Ottomans would use it until the end of the Empire, including the period of the Committee of Union and Progress. It was “to seek to influence public opinion in other countries, especially through the press.”⁶⁶ In order to support this diplomatic method the Porte created a publicity bureau to furnish regular news bulletins on current questions to all Ottoman representatives abroad in 1858. Davison writes:

The Ottoman diplomats also learned how to encourage European newspapers editors to publish stories favorable to their government, and how to place their own news stories with newspapers and press services. ...some of the Ottoman ministers and ambassadors excelled in using the best diplomatic French, and precise and polite phraseology. They became accustomed especially in posts abroad to the social amenities, quite non-Islamic in that both sexes were involved, that facilitate diplomatic intercourse: receptions, dinners, and balls.⁶⁷

Reciprocity and equality, however, other important pillars of Ottoman diplomacy⁶⁸ were constructed on the Imperial image, according to Deringil, who says that, even though there were deficits in the economic and social integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in order to be accepted as a Great Power, it wanted to announce itself as a Great Power and represented itself to the European states. Ottoman

⁶⁵ Davison, “The Westernization of Ottoman Diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century,” p. 325.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.325.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 325-328.

⁶⁸ See William Hale, *Türk Dış Politikası 1774-2000*, trans. Petek Demir (Istanbul: Mozaik, 2003), pp. 8-9.

governments always reminded European States that they were all equal on the basis of the international law after Paris treaty gave her the membership of the European state system.⁶⁹

The main reason behind the Ottomans' symbolism was the century's general demonstration. In this century, states entered into a competition in the areas of the international panorama and symbolism in which they tried to indicate their equality with other powers. The Japanese example proves this fact, as they often mentioned their equally acceptance by other powers.⁷⁰ Furthermore, as will be discussed later, America pressured on the Ottoman government in order to upgrade the rank of its diplomatic representative in Istanbul. That is why it could be evaluated as the ambition to be accepted as an equal and its efforts to be a Great Power.

Treaty of Berlin and Abdulhamid II's Foreign Policy

The Ottoman membership on the Concert of Europe did not last long. Rather the end of the international confidence and goodwill toward the Ottoman Empire begin to end especially with the outbreak of the rebellions among the Serbs in Herzegovina. And the Bulgarian crises emerged in the aftermath shaking the basis of the Crimean settlement. Austria-Hungary and Russia privately discussed the

⁶⁹ Hale, p. 150.

⁷⁰ Selim Deringil, "II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde 'İmaj' Saplantısı," in *Sultan II Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri, Bildiriler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1994), p. 161.

possibility of the Empire's early break-up and pressed the other powers to assume more interventionist stances.⁷¹

According to Davison, "diplomatically the Porte found its friends Britain and Austria on whom it depended for support at the coming meeting insistent that it make further territorial concessions. Austria asked the Porte to request the entry of Austro-Hungarian troops into Bosnia Herzegovina to save the Ottoman and Austrian empires from the Serbian and Montenegrin menace."⁷²

Britain, to the consternation of the Porte, supported the Austrian maneuver. British also pressed the Porte to yield territory to Greece order to avoid greater losses that might later be imposed."⁷³ Therefore, Savfet complained angrily that the Great Powers obviously planned to partition the Ottoman Empire as Poland had been partitioned. "Part of the partition was to benefit the great powers part to benefit the smaller nationalities."⁷⁴

The Balkan crises did not only affect the Ottomans' international position. First of all, it created an internal crisis in the government which led to the disposition of the Sultan. In the spring of 1876 the crisis created by the Balkan unrest led to the deposition of Abdulaziz. And Abdulhamid II became the Sultan of the Ottoman

⁷¹ Yasemee, p.14; and see M. S Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (Macmillan, 1966), p.221.

⁷² Roderick Davison, "The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin." in *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 1999), p.183.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 184.

⁷⁴ Davison, "The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin," p. 184.

Empire.⁷⁵ New Sultan became the head of the Empire when the image of the State was the worst in the eyes of the European Powers.⁷⁶

He was an inexperienced Sultan in the beginning. He sent Mithad Pasha into exile as he had been the reason behind the Ottoman entrance into the war with Russia and he closed down the Imperial Assembly for thirty years as it had approved the war decision.⁷⁷ Furthermore, in the case of international relations, he “apparently also felt unsure in taking personal responsibility for crucial decisions of foreign relations. Instead ... he sought a kind of collegial responsibility among ministers and leading statements.”⁷⁸

Yasamee describes the Sultan as a realist in foreign affairs. According to him, realism implied an acceptance of the Ottoman weakness. As in the case of Austria-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia, he “never entertained any serious hope of recouping them.” Because “the sultan was no revisionist.”⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Moore describes Americans’ perception of Abdulhamid II as follows: “American view of this energetic ruler who each evening could hear choruses of trained parrots cry ‘long live the sultan’ follow a distinct pattern. During the opening of years of his reign one got the impression that another ‘broken down debauchee, with nerves shattered and bullied by the women of his harem’ had succeeded to the Turkish throne. Slowly this picture changed somewhat aided no doubt by the 500,000 dollar with which the sultan is said to have annually subsidize the press of Europe. Nevertheless by 1890 most American realized that the man who ruled the Ottoman Empire was no indolent sensuality.” See John Hammond Moore. *America Looks at Turkey*. Ph.D. dissertation, (University of Virginia, 1961), pp.75-77.

⁷⁶ Deringil, “II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde ‘İmaj’ Saplantısı,” p. 151.

⁷⁷ Ercüment Kuran, “II Abdülhamit’in Büyük Devletlere Karşı Uyguladığı Siyasetin Esasları,” in *Sultan II Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri, Bildiriler* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1994), p. 142.

⁷⁸ Davison, “The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin,” p. 177.

⁷⁹ Yasamee, p.42; and see Aydın Babuna, *Bir Ulusun Doğuşu, Geçmişten Günümüze Boşnaklar* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2000).

He was not revisionist, but the international environment was changing seriously. In other words, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw a change and transformation in European politics. This period gave testimony to the emergence of new powers such as Germany and Italy, which consequently and naturally jeopardized the Concert of Europe. For the long-established powers, Britain, France and Austria-Hungary, according to Kennedy, “the issue was whether they could maintain themselves in the face of new challenges to the international status-quo.” For the new powers, such as Germany and Italy, however, “the problem was whether they could break through to what Berlin termed ‘a world political freedom’ before it was too late.”⁸⁰ In other words, the world of the last quarter of the century became a multi-polar one in which “the great power struggles were no longer merely over European issues but over markets and territories that ranges across globe.”⁸¹

By the early 1870s, the Empire faced a more pressing external problems. According to Yasemee, “the balance of power which had produced the Crimean settlement was undermined by the wars of Italian and German unification.”⁸² On the other hand France became more vulnerable after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, which jeopardized its position as a great power.

The Berlin Treaty was the indicator of those alterations in world politics. It has disastrous effects on the balances of powers established after the Treaty of Paris

⁸⁰ Kennedy, p. 196.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 195.

⁸² Yasemee, pp. 12-13.

of 1856⁸³. As Yasemee writes, “one consequence was the British isolation in the Near East and Russia was quick to take advantage securing the abrogation of the black sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris in 1871. Revolution had occurred in the European and Near Eastern balances of power and if the Ottoman Empire was not immediately threatened, it was undoubtedly left exposed.”⁸⁴

The Berlin Treaty was the result of the Otto-Russian War of 1877-78, which was a modified version of Istanbul Treaty made with Russia that forced Great Britain to urge Russia to sign the Berlin conditions. As mentioned, it was a concrete sign of drastic change in the European politics. For example, after the Berlin Treaty, Ottoman lands were no longer under the protection of the Great Powers.⁸⁵ Contrary, it left Ottoman Empire open to attack as its conditions did not include the Treaty of Paris’ provisions requiring respect for the integrity of the Ottoman lands and detaining the penetration into its domestic affairs.⁸⁶ Especially the transmission of the management of Cyprus Island in 1878 and the annexation of the Egypt in 1882 by the Great Britain might be a turning point in the mind of Abdulhamid II.⁸⁷ Even Austria-Hungary

⁸³ In the case of its affects on the European politics see Fahir Armaoğlu, *19. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (Ankara: TTK, 1997), pp. 523-532.

⁸⁴ Yasemee, pp.12-13; and for details about the German and Italian risings’ affects see Kuran, p. 141; and Davison “The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin” p. 176.

⁸⁵ “From the summer of 1875 to the summer of 1878 that were more traumatic than any other similar period of years between 1774 and 1914.” See Davison, “The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin,” pp.175-176; and see Murat Özyüksel “Abdülhamit Dönemi Dış İlişkileri” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), pp. 5-31.

⁸⁶ Murat Özyüksel, “Abdülhamit Dönemi Dış İlişkileri” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), p. 6; and see Orhan Koloğlu, *Avrupa’nın Kısacasında Abdülhamid* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998), pp. 30-42.

⁸⁷ Kürkçüoğlu, pp. 144-145.

which had not fought against the Ottoman Empire since 1791 had declared rights on Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁸

Of course, the European powers did not only show their imperialistic face with the occupation or annexation of the places. They also increased the numbers of their diplomatic posts within the Ottoman borders. According to Georgeon, the European powers used more peaceful tools as diplomatic posts, new schools, and religious foundations in order to penetrate into the Empire.⁸⁹ They opened many diplomatic consulates in almost all parts of the country, including the United States too with the numbers of 30 consulates.⁹⁰

Under those circumstances, the new Sultan could not be a “statusquoist.” Rather he had to provide new tools to use in foreign policy making.⁹¹ First of all, as both the Sultan and Caliph it is not surprising that Abdulhamid II embraced pan-Islamism.⁹² Furthermore as the image of the Empire exhausted, he used both secular and religious tools. On the one hand, he recognized the Vatican diplomatically,⁹³ on

⁸⁸ İlber Ortaylı, “Son Üniversal İmparatorluk ve II Abdülhamit,” *Osmanlı, Türkler*, pp. 895–96.

⁸⁹ François Georgeon, *Sultan Abdulhamid*, trans. Ali Berktaş (Istanbul: Homer, 2006), p. 271.

⁹⁰ Georgeon, p. 273.

⁹¹ Of course, as a realist, he never constrains the limits of its tools. Bosnia instance shows that even though Bosnians demanded protection from the Sultan after the occupation of Austria-Hungary, Sultan acted in accordance with the balances and abstained from the intervention into the ‘Austrian domestic affairs.’ See Aydın Babuna, *Bir Ulusun Doğuşu, Geçmişten Günümüze Boşnaklar* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2000).

⁹² Georgeon, p. 239-49.

⁹³ Deringil, “II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde ‘İmaj’ Saplantısı” p. 151.

the other hand, he saw religion as a key factor to bind together peoples scattered from Albania to Arabia.⁹⁴

As mentioned, the Berlin Treaty and its aftermath led Abdulhamid II to approach foreign policy with a realistic perception. Furthermore, with the outbreak of the Eastern crises, “Abdulhamid II was to find a means of re-defining his dependence upon the great power system, on terms which would restore his freedom of maneuver. The solution lay in the possibility of exploiting his remaining diplomatic assets. Chief among these assets was his empire’s geopolitical importance.”⁹⁵

As the conditions been changed, he could no longer trust on the immediate support of the Great Britain since it had occupied Cyprus by benefiting from the conditions of the post-war period. As a realistic statesman, he would begin to seek a balance between the powers and had to find a new “friend.” Competition between the powers, between Russia, France and Great Britain, begin to clash over Europe and the Middle East. Furthermore, the rise of Germany gave an opportunity to Abdulhamid II.

After Bismarck's fall in 1890, Abdulhamid II established a strong relationship with his predecessor, Wilhelm II.⁹⁶ On the other hand, with the inauguration of the Wilhelm II, German foreign policy making changed drastically. The reason behind the transformation could have been the explosion in

⁹⁴ John Hammond Moore, *America Looks at Turkey*, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Virginia, 1961), pp. 75-77.

⁹⁵ Yasamee, pp. 45-46.

⁹⁶ Kuran, p. 146.

industrialization and its impulse for founding new markets around the globe, which had been already shared by the Great Powers.

The industrial explosion which put Germany on the top of the world behind the US in the cases of the production of steel, exportation and other indicators of the economic dynamism forced it to clash in interests with other Great powers.⁹⁷ As the US began to transform its foreign policy at the turn of century, because of the economic development, Wilhelm II, too began to seek a more interventionist policy in accordance with the same reasons.⁹⁸

The German search for new markets coincided with the Ottoman looking for new ally within the European powers. In 1897, the Ottoman- Greek war ended with victory on the side of the Empire, but in response, the Ottomans could not benefit it as Europeans pressured on the government. This one-sided approach to the Ottoman state pushed it to the German block. German influence and penetration into the Ottoman Empire could be seen clearly in that period as the Baghdad railway project donated to the German companies in 1902.⁹⁹ Wilhelm's inauguration urged a new type of relationship consisting of not only military but also economic components.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ Özyüksel, p.13.

⁹⁸ Ulrich Trumpener, "Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu ve Büyük Güçler*, ed. Marian Kent, (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), p.129.

⁹⁹ Kuran, p. 146.

¹⁰⁰ Özyüksel, p. 15. Yasemee express the situation with similar words as "Central to Abdulhamid's approach to foreign affairs was a deep sense of the Ottoman Empire's vulnerability to the European great powers. His Tanzimat predecessors had assumed that all powers but Russia were broadly in favor of the empire's preservation, and that Britain in particular could be relied upon to defend the empire against Russian attack. By contrast Abdulhamid believed that all powers but Germany was hostile and that the British particular were bent upon the Ottoman Empire's destruction.

Indeed, Hale writes that German-Ottoman relations can not be investigated just from the lens of economic perceptions, since the Bagdad railway system could not be completed till the end of 1930s.¹⁰¹ Last it has to be said that it is generally believed that Abdulhamid II pursued a pro-German foreign policy understanding that is criticized by Ortaylı. He argues that Abdulhamid II used Germany as a show component against the other Great Powers.¹⁰²

So, what was the American position in this complex condition? As the European politics underwent changes, the United States also transformed its foreign policy toward the Ottoman Empire and Europe. The Americans changed their approach from “leave us alone” to “get out of our way.” The next chapter will evaluate this transformation and its effects on the American-Ottoman relations.

His pessimism was rooted in his experience of the eastern question of 1875-78 when as he believed the empire had been deliberately abandoned by its erstwhile allies.” See Yasamee, p. 44.

¹⁰¹ Hale, p. 21.

¹⁰² Ortaylı, “Son Üniversal İmparatorluk ve II Abdülhamid,” pp. 895-96. For details with regard to the German influence in the Ottoman Empire see Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Alman Nüfuzu*; and Trumpener, “Almanya ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Sonu” pp. 129-153.

CHAPTER IV

OTTOMAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

United States-Ottoman Treaty Relations

Contrary to what has been known up to now, Ottoman knowledge with regard to the “new” continent went back to the 1580s, when an unknown Turkish author wrote the oldest book on America, *Tarih-i Hindi Garbi*.¹⁰³ However, the roots of Ottoman-United States relations date back to the beginning of the nineteenth century under the commercial initiative of American citizens throughout the Mediterranean. Izmir, as a port city, constituted the most important focal point for American traders, whose diplomatic protection was provided by the British Consulate up to 1830s, i.e. they were accepted officially as British citizens.

Shopkeepers in Boston sold nuts, figs and coffee from Turkey and though until 1811 Americans were engaged in trade under the guidance of the English Levant company. In that year two Yankee merchants established their own company in Izmir.¹⁰⁴ Even though, according to Moore, “Memories of crusades and blood-

¹⁰³ Ibrahim Muteferrika published its five hundred copies in the beginning of the spring of 1730. See Thomas D. Goodrich, “Tarih-I Hind-I Garbi: An Ottoman Book on the New World” *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 107, no. 2, (April-June, 1987), pp. 317-319; and see his book *The Ottoman Turks and the New World: A Study of Tarih-i Hindi Garbi and Sixteenth Century Ottoman Amerikano* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1990).

¹⁰⁴ John Hammond Moore, *America Looks at Turkey*, Ph.D. dissertation (University of Virginia, 1961), p. 5.

curdling tales of the non-Christian world were very much a part of the heritage brought to Jamestown and Plymouth”¹⁰⁵ Americans wanted to come into the lands that belonged to the Ottoman Empire.

Improvement in economic interrelations between the two states and Americans’ persistence for the sake of the establishment of diplomatic ties resulted in some treaties which shaped basically the character of relations. From the beginning up to 1914, relations were based on a number of treaties such as the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1830, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1862, Treaty of Extradition of 1874, and a protocol of 1874, which “accepting the Turkish law of 1867 as granting foreigners the right to hold real estates.”¹⁰⁶

The Friendship and Free Trade Agreement of 1830

Inauguration was made with the signing of the Friendship and Free Trade Agreement of 1830.¹⁰⁷ Charles Rhind, a trader, and Reis-ul Kuttab, Mehmed Hamid Efendi, as representatives of two states came to an agreement on 7 May 1830 for the

¹⁰⁵ Moore, p. 2.

¹⁰⁶ Lenand James Gordon, “Turkish-American Treaty Relations,” *The American Political Science Review*, 22, no. 3, (August 1928), p. 718.

¹⁰⁷ Mine Erol, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile Yaptığı Ticaret Anlaşmaları* (Konya: Damla Matbaacılık), p. 14.

completion of negotiations.¹⁰⁸ The achievement behind the signing of this treaty was not only the improving economic ties, but also both sides' search to widen the dimension of the bilateral relations.

As Moore stresses:

During the early times of the relations, there was few isolated exchange of technical information. The sultan expressed great interest in Yankee ships. In fact a clause providing for the construction of all Ottoman warships was rejected by the United States senate in 1830, but in 1831 a dozen workmen arrived in Turkey. ... In 1846 the Sultan asked President Polk to send several scientific agriculturalists to his dominions.¹⁰⁹

Therefore, another reason behind the achievement of this agreement seemed to be the 1827 British, French and Russian assault on the Ottoman Navy at Navarin, which destroyed the Ottoman fleet. American's newly established sea power attracted the Ottoman statesman and they hoped to engage in relations which would provide the Ottoman state as a new and powerful navy.

One the other hand, one of the most important results of this treaty was diplomatic. This Agreement initiated diplomatic relations by the opening of a new United States diplomatic representative office in Istanbul.¹¹⁰ While diplomatic

¹⁰⁸ Erdal Açıkses, *Amerikalıların Harput'taki Misyonerlik Faaliyetleri* (Ankara: TTK, 2003), p. 32; and Lenand James Gordon, "Turkish-American Treaty Relations," *The American Political Science Review*, 22, no. 3 (August 1928), pp. 711-721.

¹⁰⁹ Moore, p. 11.

¹¹⁰ Gordon, "Turkish-American Treaty Relations," pp. 711-72. For more details see Çağrı Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes Toward American Missionaries," Research Paper, Yale University, p. 315 at <http://research.yale.edu/ycias/database/files/MESV5-11.pdf> and see Yavuz Güler, "Osmanlı Devleti Dönemi Türk Amerikan İlişkileri (1795-1914)" *Gazi Üniversitesi Kırşehir Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 6, no. 1, (2005), pp. 227-240.

relations would be executed in Istanbul, Izmir never lost its economic importance. The American Consul of Istanbul, Heap, in a report to Secretary of State Adee, wrote that “the consulate at Smyrna is the most important in Turkey. There are few missionaries and mission schools in the distinct. But the principal duties of the consuls are connected with our commerce.”¹¹¹

David Porter was appointed as charge dé affairs, and consequently it changed the status of Americans within the country by emancipating them from their dependence on the British consulate –whereby they lost the right to benefit from the protection of the British consulate. After this agreement, United States-Ottoman relations pullulated into many problematic areas, from trade to missionary activities, from diplomatic relations to arms trade.

Important problems which occupied the relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire were the result of some terms belonging to this agreement. This agreement contained ten articles, overwhelmingly economic in content, in which the third and fourth articles carried important conditions for the future of relations.¹¹² That article had an impact on the facilitation of the United States’ commercial activities within Ottoman boundaries as it required, “American merchants established in the well-defended States of the Sublime Porte, for the purpose of commerce, shall have liberty to employ Semsars (*umûr-u ticaretlerinde istihdam edecekleri simsarlar*)

¹¹¹ AIRC, from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893.

¹¹² Turkish and English translations of the agreement are available at Tahsin Fendođlu, *Modernleşme Bağlamında Osmanlı-Amerika İlişkileri, 1786-1929* (İstanbul: Beyan, 2002), pp. 313-322 and see Fahir Armaođlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Mûnasebetleri* (İstanbul: TTK, 1991), pp. 1-6.

of any nation or religion (*her ne millet ve mezhebden olur ise*), in like manner as merchants of other friendly Powers.”¹¹³

Furthermore the fourth article carried capitulatory conditions which gave the United States’ diplomatic representatives the right of jurisdiction or “extraterritorial rights”¹¹⁴ within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire in some criminal cases related to their citizens. The article stated the condition that, “if litigations and disputes should arise between subjects (*tebaa*) of Sublime Porte and the United States, the parties shall not be heard, nor shall judgment be pronounced unless the American dragoman be present (*tercümanı hazır olmadığı halde istima ve fasl olunmayub*).” The condition ended with the provision of juridical right to United States diplomatic representatives by requiring that “they shall be tried by their Minister of Consul and punished according their offence (*elçi ve konsolosları ma’rifetile iktizayı te’dibleri icra oluna.*)”¹¹⁵

This clause created some problems between the two states that lasted until the end of the nineteenth century. Even though the clause granted citizens of the United States extraterritorial rights, the Ottoman Empire, in practice, denied the implementation of this clause by asserting translation mistakes. The United States’ Minister in Istanbul, Oscar Straus, described the situation as follows:

On these later European capitulations was based our own first treaty with the Sublime Porte in 1830. Practically speaking consular

¹¹³ Fendoğlu, p. 319 and 315.

¹¹⁴ Gordon, “Turkish-American Treaty Relations,” pp. 711-721.

¹¹⁵ Fendoğlu, p. 316-319.

jurisdiction in Turkey was then not very different from what it was in the fifteenth century. When I took office one of the questions to be settled was the interpretation of Clause 4 of the Treaty of 1830. ...French version of the treaty was not exactly in agreement with the Turkish. ... Indeed the treaty rested in peace until 1868, when the American minister, acting according to the English version clashed, with the Turkish authorities in the interpretation of clause 4, regarding jurisdiction over American citizens - in the case two who had been arrested and imprisoned for alleged offenses against the Turkish government.¹¹⁶

Therefore, the problem this clause created continued to constitute an obstacle in the development of relations until the Young Turks government abrogated all capitulations in 1914.¹¹⁷

This agreement, furthermore, gave the United States of being recipient of most favored state status (*en ziyade müsamahaya mazhar*), which facilitated its diplomatic and economic initiatives within the Ottoman Empire. The inauguration of missionary activities at the same time was an indicator of the agreement's impact on the prospect of the Ottoman Empire.

Another unmentioned part of this agreement included some secret terms with regard to expected American aid for the restoration of the Ottoman navy, which had been destroyed at Navarin. According to a separate and secret article, "whenever the Sublime Government shall order the building and the construction in the dominion of America of whatever quantity of war vessels, such as two deckers, frigates, corvettes and brigs, this shall be communicated and notified by the office of

¹¹⁶ Oscar S. Straus, *Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft* (Cambridge: Riberside Press, 1922), pp. 87-88.

¹¹⁷ Erol, p. 18; and Gordon, "Turkish-American Treaty Relations" p. 714.

the Chief (of the Secretaries).”¹¹⁸ This secret clause also demonstrates background of the agreement. Interestingly it was denied by the United States congress. However, as Moore writes, “in 1831 a dozen workmen arrived in Turkey.”¹¹⁹

Treaty of Naturalization and Extradition of 1874

Ottoman-American relations can be separated into two phase. The first phase contained relations up to the 1870s. This phase could be accepted as more balanced relations in whom problematic issues had not emerged yet as missionary activities. Or the Ottoman Empire had not been faced yet with the nationalistic uprisings. That is why this first phase was relatively free of problems. It could be understood from the perception of the Ottomans in the eyes of the Americans. For example, a refugee case gives us some clues with regard to the American perception of the Ottomans.

Numerous Hungarian revolutionaries found refuge in Istanbul after the debacle of 1848. This created in America an unprecedented surge of warm friendship for the Turks. When Russia subsequently asked Turkey to hand over these rebels, the American media supported the Ottomans as follows: whatever happened, the Turks would always be the friends of those in distress.

¹¹⁸ Fendoğlu, p. 321.

¹¹⁹ Moore, p. 11.

Therefore after the treaty of 1830, another treaty of commerce and navigation was signed in 1862¹²⁰, during American Civil War, which extended the privileges of the US especially in the case of the economic sphere.¹²¹ This treaty reduced the proportion of the custom taxes in the advance of the United States' merchants. On the other hand, it was the sign of Ottoman support for the integrity of the America during the Civil War.

However, the character of the relations began to change after 1870s, which corresponded with the aftermath of the American Civil War. In this second phase, relations became more problematic one. Another treaty, signed in 1874, constituted a crucial point for the future of relations.

The Treaty of Naturalization and Extradition sought a solution for the most problematic areas within the relations: the status of the naturalized citizens of the United States that meant dealing mostly on the conditions of Ottoman Armenians who become citizen of the United States.

A part of the naturalized citizens of the United States had been Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire. They included some Greeks and Syrians, but mostly

¹²⁰ For transcription of the Treaty's articles, see Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri*, pp. 7-13.

¹²¹ See original text, "Devlet-i Aliyye ile Amerika Devlet-i Fehimesi Arasında İmzalanan Muahednamelerdir" in *Mecmua-i Muahedat* (İstanbul: Hakikat Matbaası, 1297), 2, no. 1, pp. 2-24. For details see Oscar S. Straus, *Under Four Administrations: From Cleveland to Taft* (Cambridge: Riberside Press, 1922), p. 88; and Nurdan Şafak, *Osmanlı-Amerikan İlişkileri* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı, 2003), p. 12. For the transcription of the treaty text, see: Ibid, pp. 122-133 and Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri*, pp. 14-18.

were Armenians¹²² who had returned to Turkey after they had gained the right to be American citizen.¹²³ According to Ottoman authorities, those immigrations were mostly the result of not political, but economic reasons.¹²⁴ On the other hand the Ottoman authorities believed that those immigrations were harmful to the economic development of the country.¹²⁵ Furthermore, those who wanted to immigrate to the new continent were transported by agencies, some of whom were corrupted.¹²⁶

Armenians in America usually resided there and became the American citizens. But some Muslims who were Ottoman subjects clashed with the Armenians in America. In March 1896, Muslims complained by the Ottoman minister in Washington about Armenians' using insulting language against them to the American government. According to the petition, the Muslims said that, "we are Ottoman subjects who have come to America for the purpose of engaging in commercial business. There are fifteen of us residing at Providence. The Armenians use insulting language to us and maltreat us. Day and night we have no rest, either in the streets or at our houses. They have slandered us."¹²⁷

¹²² Kemal H Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 1985, pp. 175-209.

¹²³ For detail of a case of application of Armenians to United States' Consulate: AIRC, *from William B. Hess to William F. Wharton (?)* Roll 20, vol. 20, November 21, 1892.

¹²⁴ BOA, DH. MUI, D 8, G 12, 21 N 1327.

¹²⁵ BOA, DH. MB. HPS. M., 17/13, 9 Z 1332.

¹²⁶ BOA, MUI. 18/37, 16 Ca 1328; and BOA, DH. EUM.THR, 9/58, 15 L 1327.

¹²⁷ From Mavroyeni, Ottoman Envoy to Washington, to Mr. Olney. No 8396/16, March 31, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, III (1895-1896) (Ankara Imprimerie de la Société torque D'Historie: 1999), pp. 326-327. According to petition, they were also arrested because of the Armenians. They defended that "they have demanded two hundred dollars from

Armenians' return to the Ottoman Empire often resulted in political tensions with America since they become the citizens of America, because "they were charged with being involved in alleged conspiracies against the Turkish government."¹²⁸ In many cases, Ottoman officials arrested them.¹²⁹

Americans always protested these arrests because they accepted the Armenians as American citizens, and the Ottomans arrested the Americans by doing so. The Ottomans, on the other hand, accused the Armenians who had engaged in some criminal activities before becoming American citizens. In order to solve this problem, the Americans appealed to Ottoman authorities. In 1874, a treaty was signed between Ottoman officials and American minister George H Boker.¹³⁰

According to the treaty, if an Ottoman subject became naturalized, i.e. became an American citizen, he/she would be accepted as an American citizen officially. On the other hand, those who became naturalized American citizens, but continued to remain within the borders of the Ottoman Empire were accepted as

one of us, and fifty dollars from another. They induced the authorities to interfere and these Muslims were imprisoned." Petition was signed by those Cafer Hüseyin, Halil ferhad, İsmail Osman, Ali Mustafa, Süleyman Mustafa, Muhammed Mustafa. Muhammed Mustafa gave his residing address as "American Screw co. Providence, R.I."

¹²⁸ Straus, p. 91.

¹²⁹ Ottomans prohibited the entrance of Armenians who had gone to United States and Russia. See BOA. MV. 102/30, 30 M 1319. Furthermore see AIRC, *from Consulate General of the United States, Constantinople to Assistant Secretary of state*, no 11, January 4, 1894, a dispatch with regard to arrest and imprisonment of naturalized citizens of the United States in Turkey and see *from consulate general at Istanbul to Edwin F. Uhl*. Roll 20, vol. 20, no 11, January 4, 1894. Another case for naturalized citizen of the United States was that "MR. A. Melriq, landed at Salonica and arrested at his hotel and put in prison by Turkish officials who sent him out of the country one or two days afterwards. The consular agent at Salonica saw the governor of the place but he replied that he was obeying order from the Istanbul concerning Armenians who had become U.S. naturalized citizens." See AIRC *from William B. Hess to Josiah Quincy*, November 14, 1893, roll 20.

¹³⁰ Straus, p. 90.

Ottoman subjects.¹³¹ Those who were accepted as Armenians could not benefit from the rights of American citizens. It means they could not benefit from the right of jurisdiction or “extraterritorial rights” of American diplomats according to the treaty of 1830. At least, American diplomats could not assert such a right and could not participate into the court trial.

Even though the treaty was signed, problems continued to constitute an obstacle on the development of relations. For example, Mavroyeni, in 1896, wrote that “The Sublime Porte, desiring to give fresh evidence of its friendship for the United States Government, has decided to accept the enclosed text of a naturalization convention, and has instructed me to request Your Excellency to take measures to the end of the convention may take effect as possible.”¹³² Ambassador Straus, on the other hand, noted that, “When it was concluded, the senate refused to confirm it because under it American citizenship to his native land and his remaining there two years, but the senate amended this treaty by changing the phraseology of the clause containing the two year reference.”¹³³ Therefore, this problem would never been solved as Straus said that, “ten years later when I was again minister to Turkey I was instructed to renew negotiations but the Ottoman government was now unwilling to

¹³¹ See BOA IH, 15815, 1291, in Şafak, p. 88; and see details with regard to the Ottoman approach *From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State*, no. 8690/43, August 30th, 1896. in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 66.

¹³² From Mavroyeni, Ottoman Envoy to Washington, to Mr. Olney. No 8778/49, October 2, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900). (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), pp. 147-148.

¹³³ Straus, p. 90.

negotiate at all on this subject and we were left without any treaty of naturalization.”¹³⁴

Those treaties mentioned above shaped the character of the relations between the two states. Former treaties were not problematic. But the Treaty of Naturalization and Extradition of 1874 was the result of some problems which occurred after the American Civil War of 1861-64. The reason behind this development was the beginning of the transformation in American foreign policy and the Civil War constituted a shift in American foreign policy.

The Civil War: A Transformation in Relations

The Civil War in North America constituted not only a rupture in the United States’ foreign policy, but also an important impact on the transformation of Ottoman-United States relations. It was a critical watershed for the United States whether it was separated or not.

Under those circumstances, the United States’ foreign policy makers had to contact other states carefully because the south could benefit from aid that come from Europe which unquestionably jeopardize the integrity of the United States. As Foster

¹³⁴ Straus., pp. 91-92.

says, “at no time since the foundation of our government have our diplomatic relations been of such an intense and critical nature as during the civil war.”¹³⁵

As the war began, the United States’ Secretary of State Seward notified the Ottoman State. In his note, he said that Abraham Lincoln had been inaugurated as the President of the United States, but that the southern states had announced their independence. In this note, he concluded that the United States would provide unification of the country.¹³⁶

As time went on, Istanbul was informed by three different resources with regard to the war. The first source was the Ottoman ambassadors in France and Britain, who collected and dispatched news with regard to the beginning of the war to Istanbul. The French and British ambassadors were the second source. They gave information about their governments’ position with regard to the war in order to shape the decision of the Sultan and direct him parallel to the position of the Great Powers. Last, the third source was the diplomats of the United States in Istanbul.¹³⁷

As the dissolution of the United States came to the surface, two of the Great Powers, Britain and France, determined their positions in favor of the separation.¹³⁸ However, in spite of the Ottoman Empire’s strong relations with those powers, Istanbul was the only capital which supported the unification of the United States.

¹³⁵ John W. Foster, *A Century of American Diplomacy: Being a Brief Review of the Foreign Relations of the United States 1776-1876* (Boston and New York: Kissinger Publisher, 1900), p. 357.

¹³⁶ Çağrı Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri* (İstanbul: İmge 2001), p. 250.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¹³⁸ Şafak, p. 25.

As Moore put forward, the Sultan's government was unusually friendly toward America during the Civil War. Moore writes that, "Turkey is the only country upon the face of the earth which officially has supported the American government in this our trials."¹³⁹ The Ottoman Empire announced its position in the war in the favor of the unification by forbidding the access throughout the Mediterranean Sea of the navies belonged to the Southern Confederation forces and labeled them pirates.¹⁴⁰

The general reason behind the Ottoman decision to support the United States' unification was the opposition of the Ottoman elites to the perception of the separation.¹⁴¹ Since the Ottoman Empire faced nationalist movements that increasingly shook the unity of the country, they could not overlook the emergence of a leading case of separation.

The Effects of the Civil War on Relations

The US Civil War effected Ottoman-United States relations in both positive and negative ways. The first affect emerged in the diplomatic post. When the war began the United States' diplomat Minister James Williams, who was a southern advocate, left his post in order to participate into the war in the favor of the southern

¹³⁹ Moore, p. 14.

¹⁴⁰ Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 254.

¹⁴¹ Ibid, p.252

troops. A short period of vacuum emerged in diplomatic representative in Istanbul. But Edward Jay Morris replaced him in 1861.¹⁴²

Moreover, the Civil War affected relations in positive and negative directions. Positively, the emerging reciprocal trust between the two states constituted an impulse to develop the diplomatic relations which had begun in the 1830s, but could not find correspondence on the Ottoman side. Even though the United States has opened its diplomatic legation in Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire could not find any chance to give a response. However, immediately after the war, the first Ottoman diplomatic legation in Washington opened at the rank of ministry.¹⁴³

As a second positive effect, the United States began to seek new areas for marketing its weapons with the aim of disposing its arms stocks.¹⁴⁴ According to 1830 Treaty, the United States was forbidden to sell arms to the Ottomans. However, this condition would be abrogated with the 15th condition of the treaty of 1862.¹⁴⁵

A last directly positive affect could be observed in Ottoman agricultural production after the Civil War began. Cotton production was damaged seriously in the Southern states, which allowed the Ottomans to fill the vacuum at the agricultural market. The Empire gained from this vacuum by encouraging producers in the lands

¹⁴² Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 251.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 256.

¹⁴⁴ Oral Sander and Fişek Kurthan, *ABD Dışişleri Belgeleriyle Türk-ABD Silah Ticaretinin İlk Yüzyılı, 1829-1929*, (İstanbul: Çağdaş yay, 1977); see Moore, p. 15; and Şafak, pp. 135-136.

¹⁴⁵ Şafak, p. 137.

suitable to production. In October 1861, a circular dispatched to all provinces ordered focus on the further production of cotton.¹⁴⁶

On the negative side, while the end of the Civil War initiated a discussion on slavery, another dimension came with the consolidation of United States domestic security and peace: the transformation of United States foreign policy into a more interventionist approach. Especially after the 1870s, the United States began to have more problematic relations with the Ottoman Empire that were complicated not only with the Armenian problems, but also with the missionary activities and the struggle for economic and political advantage.

Problematic Areas

Crete Islands: Distasteful Inauguration

As mentioned above, the United States began to transform its foreign policy into a more interventionist direction after the Civil War which affected negatively relations between the two countries negatively. The first problem in this regard emerged on Crete, where the United States sought to have a base in the Mediterranean Sea. Secretary of State Seward, who was the initiator of the interventionist policy, wanted this base in order to protect the economic and commercial interest of American citizens.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁶ Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, pp. 251-252.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 269.

Seward opened the discussion of dispatching a huge navy throughout the Mediterranean. This interventionist attempt was sensed by other states diplomats and created unrest. According to a dispatch sent to London in May 1866 by the British Ambassador in Istanbul, Sir Henry Eliot, the Americans might accept calls of the annexation of the Cretans under the shadow of their interests which meant the involvement of a new power in the problem. This would immediately have a negative impact on the British interests in the region.¹⁴⁸

The Crete question, which resulted in a confrontation between the two states, forced the Ottoman elites to reshape their position with regard to America. They began to think after the crises that the United States sought a base in the Mediterranean Sea as a part of its interventionist policy. Furthermore, they recognized that the United States was moving to purchase Alaska and the Caribbean islands, but if they would find a chance, they might also seek to penetrate Ottoman affairs directly or indirectly.

The Ottoman Empire responded to this maneuver with “sociological engineering.” In order to prevent American intervention into the Ottoman sphere of influence, the Ottoman elite decided to publish articles in American magazines which opposed US actions in the region.¹⁴⁹ The Cretan question was instructive for Ottoman political elite to overview the relations with the United States. However, the

¹⁴⁸ Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 270.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 280.

Bulgarian uprising and missionary activities inside the Empire dramatically changed Ottoman policy toward Washington.

Missionary Activities: Gordian Knot of the Relations

Missionary activities within the Ottoman territories constituted the main problematic area between the two states. Those activities were directed by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM). The Board had been founded in 1810 by members of the Congregational, Presbyterian and Reformed churches, the main objective of which was to convert or evangelize the Native Americans and Catholics on the continent.¹⁵⁰

However, as Manifest Destiny was announced, the Board acknowledged a new object, “the evangelization of the whole World,” and started to expand the range of its activities. The Ottoman Empire was a part of this world and they had taken into account this “old Bible land.” In 1818, two American missionaries, Pliny Fisk and Levi Parsons, were appointed to implement preparatory work in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁵¹ But surprisingly, the first attempts at missionary work in the Ottoman lands were not directed particularly at Muslims, nor at the Oriental Churches, but at the Jews.

¹⁵⁰ Erhan. “Ottoman Official Attitudes toward American Missionaries,” p. 316.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 316.

The history and proceeding of the missionary activities in the Ottoman Empire flourished within its boundaries in the 1840s and reached their climax during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.¹⁵² According to numbers given by Erhan, “forty-one missionaries in 1836 were sent to the Ottoman Empire.” However, between 1836 and 1844, 54 new missionaries were assigned to the country. In 1890, this number reached 177, and in 1913, 209. The increasing numbers of missionaries corresponded with the growth in religious and educational activities.¹⁵³ The seven churches and schools under the control of American missionaries in 1850 grew to the numbers of 97 churches and 331 schools by 1880.¹⁵⁴

An interesting report,¹⁵⁵ prepared by Zühtü Pasha, Ministry of Education, to submit Sultan, gives important clues about the numbers of those schools. In 1893, Zühtü Pasha writes that there are 392 Protestant schools, 108 of them established after the inauguration of the Abdulhamid II. The Report indicates that the main reason behind the flourishing American schools in the Empire was official tolerance and unconcern. Furthermore, 1913 was the climax of the activities, with 163 churches and 450 schools. Under the shadow of this increasing number, Uygur Kocabaşoğlu

¹⁵² Süleyman Kocabaş, *Misyonerlik ve Misyonerler* (İstanbul: Vatan yay, 2002), pp. 105–106.

¹⁵³ Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes toward American Missionaries,” p. 316.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 317.

¹⁵⁵ BOA, Y.EE. 102/232, 18 Muharrem 1311, in Yahya Akyüz, “Abdülhamit Devrinde Protestan Okulları ile İlgili Orijinal İki Belge” *Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, 3, no 1–4, 1970, pp. 122–124.

classifies missionary activities into three phases as a preparatory period (1820-1838), an accommodation period (1840-1870) and a harvest period (1871-1900).¹⁵⁶

The relations between the Ottoman Empire and the missionaries began peacefully because of the small numbers of the missionaries and Ottoman relations with Great Britain. Since the inaugural treaty of 1830 between the Empire and the United States was signed, the missionaries were under the protection of the British Embassy and consulates throughout the country. Moreover, at that time, the Ottomans did not think to take legal measures against the missionaries in order to limit their activities.

For instance, the missionaries in Beirut received travel permits (*seyahat tezkeresi*) from the officials through the British Consulate in that city.¹⁵⁷ Furthermore, with this treaty, missionaries found the chance to come to Istanbul with Charge d'Affaires David Porter. They began to work in the capital and formed a plan to pursue. They engaged to learn such local languages as Turkish, Armenian, and Greek in order to establish contact with the local communities. Furthermore, they sought to publish religious books which addressed each different ethnic community. And they planned to have contact with the public in both formal and informal ways.¹⁵⁸

They had become citizens of the United States and came to Istanbul as the treaty of 1830 indicated. Parallel to this development, it is generally believed that

¹⁵⁶ Uygur Kocabaşođlu, *Anadolu'daki Amerika* (İstanbul: ARBA, 1989).

¹⁵⁷ Erhan, "Ottoman Official Attitudes toward American Missionaries," p. 318.

¹⁵⁸ Kocabaşođlu, p. 50.

when the Ottoman Empire and the United States finally signed a treaty in 1830, the missionaries lost their British protection.

Documents shows, however, that through the end of the nineteenth century, in some provinces where American consulates did not operate, missionaries continued to apply to British consulates. According to the documents, American diplomats forced Washington to open new consulates in those provinces in order to prevent any misunderstandings with regard to the might and political esteem of their own state.¹⁵⁹ As Erhan writes “since the American legation in Istanbul was not as powerful as the British and the American consulates were not spread around the Empire, the American missionaries continued to seek close relations with the British diplomats in order to secure their presence in Ottoman lands.”¹⁶⁰

Parallel to the increase in the missionary activities in the 1830s and 1840s, more and more problems arose. That is why the Ottoman government regulated the opening of schools with the Regulation of the General Education of 1869. The government required a license for the continuance of the educative activities for missionaries.¹⁶¹

Oscar Straus, the United States Minister in Istanbul, described how problematic areas emerged because of the missionary activities after that time. One of his main duties at the legation was the protection of the interests of the American

¹⁵⁹ AIRC, *from Consulate General of United states, Constantinople to Assistant Secretary of state*, no 11, January 4, 1894.

¹⁶⁰ Erhan, “Ottoman Official Attitudes toward American Missionaries,” p. 316.

¹⁶¹ İlknur Polat, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Açılan Amerikan Okulları Üzerine Bir İnceleme,” *Bellekten*, 52, no. 203, August 1988, p. 635.

missionaries with regard to their schools and their printed matter. He emphasized that those problems “formed the major portion of the affairs requiring his immediate attention.”¹⁶²

He said that about 400 schools had been established in Turkey by Presbyterian and congregational missionary boards and criticized the Ottoman government saying “beginning with the winter of 1885, upon one pretext or another, 30 of those schools in Syria were closed; many of the teachers were arrested and forbidden ever to teach in the country again, while the parents threatened with fines and imprisonment if they continued to send their children to American schools.”¹⁶³

Straus continued with the assertion that the missionaries had to submit the textbooks and other documentary equipment to the local authorities. As we know from his memoirs, he protested to the Grand Vizier, Kamil Pasha, against the closing of the schools and after some weeks they reached a deal. According to their understanding, Kamil Pasha accepted to telegraph the Vali of Syria to order that the schools be allowed to reopen upon their compliance with the law.”¹⁶⁴

In the case of the arrest of missionaries and other American citizens, Straus gave another instance which again forced him to enter into discussion with Ottoman officials. He called the official measures the “expression of the government’s enmity

¹⁶² Straus, p. 70.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 70.

toward the activities of our missionaries” for the arrest of persons who went about selling Bible tracts.

He described the officials’ treatments as unlawful and conscious enmities toward US citizens, by saying “the agents of the American as well as the British Bible society were constantly and arbitrarily being arrested. They were charged with playing their trade without license yet when they made application they were never able to get license. From time to time I protested against these arrests and secured the release of one after another of the agents.”¹⁶⁵ Even though he portrayed the arrest of American citizens as the cautious and general act of the government, he said in a different chapter of his book that, “the Porte was not always able to control the governor generals of the provinces.”¹⁶⁶

Minister Straus was right in his condemnation because the number of official documents both in American and Turkish archives prove this fact. But why the Ottomans changed their approach toward missionaries and why they began to observe closely what missionaries did in the country? Some of the developments inside the Empire as nationalistic uprisings and missionaries’ direct or indirect, but visible support to Bulgarians and then Armenians urged Ottoman officials to detect closely missionaries.

¹⁶⁵ Straus, p. 74.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 77.

Bulgarian Crisis and Losing Reciprocal Trust

The Bulgarian Question was an important reason for the crisis between the United States and the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman political elite already had begun to lose its trust in the United States' government when they sought to have a base on Crete. Moreover, they began to think that the American government had ambitions on Trablusgarb (Libya).¹⁶⁷ Furthermore, growing Bulgarian nationalism made those suspicions worse.

The growth of Bulgarian nationalism was indebted to the publications of books and newspapers, which were strongly supported by American missionaries. Bulgarian nationalist, in their fight against Ottoman authority, benefited from the support of Robert College, which was the most advanced educational institute in the Ottoman Empire at the time. The College, in Istanbul, accommodated a number of Bulgarian students who then became the leaders of the nationalist movement.¹⁶⁸

Robert College was also important to the diplomatic legation in Istanbul. Straus wrote about his efforts for the improvement of the college and for its protection from the governments' control. He benefited in many cases from his close relations with Ottoman officials. For example, he reported that, in 1888, he secured for Robert College permission for the erection of two new buildings, one a house for the president and the other an addition to the college itself. He said that because of the

¹⁶⁷ Sadık Pasha's letter: BOA, Y.EE. 44/46, 1 Şaban 1293.

¹⁶⁸ Zafer Toprak, "Robert Kolej," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, 6, 1994, pp. 335.

good relationship between Kamil Pasha and himself, the Pasha had “acknowledged this bit of chicanery and duly rectified it.”¹⁶⁹

According to Minister Straus, “Dr. Washburn, president of the Robert College, was recognized as an authority on Turkish and Balkan issues, and the influence of the college was by no means limited to the Turkish Empire, it was felt quite as much as throughout Balkan states.”¹⁷⁰ Straus confessed the fact that Bulgaria was governed largely by officials graduated from Robert College, and “they looked to Dr. Washburn as their chief adviser.”¹⁷¹

Most of the graduates of Robert College of Bulgarian origin worked in important and strategic occupations and became judges, military officials and teachers, which gave them the power to shape the society and politics of the country. For example, one of the leading figures of Bulgarian nationalism, Stefan Stanbolov, was among the graduates of the College. The missionaries who worked at the College did not lose contact with the graduated Bulgarians.¹⁷²

Rather, they supported the spread of nationalistic ideas among the society through publications. Especially Hamilton, Long and Washburn’s attempts for the sake of the improvement of nationalistic ideas were important behind the emergence of Bulgarian intellectual elite who were increasingly under the affect of American

¹⁶⁹ Straus, p. 77.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., p. 76.

¹⁷² Toprak, p. 336.

liberal thought.¹⁷³ This proved Straus' comment with regard to the Washburn's acceptance among the revolutionaries: "they looked to Dr Washburn as their chief adviser."

In April 1876, Bulgarian uprising began which was suppressed by the Ottoman army quickly that led Bulgarian nationalist to announce their movement to the world. The Bulgarians aimed to announce Ottomans' "cruelty" and they preferred to use missionary channel which enabled them to reach great newspapers in America and Great Britain. The Americans not only engaged in the problem with the missionaries. Furthermore, the ministry in Istanbul also began to get interested in the question. Social pressure, which emerged thanks to the newspapers, urged the American government to participate into the question.

Minister Maynard, charged Schuyler, the first secretary of ministry, with the duty of focusing on the problem. While Great Powers pressured the Ottoman Empire to convene a Conference in Istanbul, in order to have a solution with regard to Bulgarian crisis, Schuyler spent efforts, including sending letters to American newspapers and preparing a constitution for Bulgaria, to maintain the case in the agenda of the American society.

According to Erhan, the Ottoman image in America had never been worse since the Cretan crisis and this led Ottoman officials to target him.¹⁷⁴ Ottoman officials tried to persuade Americans to remove Schuyler from office, but the

¹⁷³ Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p, 283-284.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 286.

outbreak of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877-78 interrupted this search when the Ottomans were deeply in need of foreign support.¹⁷⁵

At that point it has to be asserted that the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, which lasted some nine months, had little effect on US public opinion toward the Empire. Americans, especially during the Balkan hostilities, accepted the Ottoman Turks as a “cruel power” over their fellow Christians. However, “fearful of Russian might, most Americans in Turkey backed the Sultan and tried to suppress material unfavorable to his cause.”¹⁷⁶ That meant they preferred the lesser of two “evils.” Within this regard, New York ladies established the Society of the Cross and Crescent to aid wounded Turkish soldiers.

Washington, furthermore, observed closely the Russian-Ottoman War with the reports dispatched from Ministry in Istanbul. For example, Washington received a report with regard to the war and its dramatic effects on society. Schuyler wrote to W. Hunter that “By the coming of Russian forces towards near Constantinople, thousands of peoples of Muslim population in the Adrianapole arrived daily, even though it is impossible to estimate their numbers. ... They have been settled in the mosques, public buildings, and fed in great part by the contributions and efforts of committees and societies both native and foreign.”¹⁷⁷ But the United States had no political interests in this struggle. Therefore it was logical to keep them away from the clash.

¹⁷⁵ Erhan, *Türk Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 294.

¹⁷⁶ Moore, p. 50.

¹⁷⁷ AIRC, *from Schuyler to W. Hunter*. Roll 13, vol. 13, No. 111, January 28, 1878.

The Armenian Question: Cause of Divorce

The Armenians could not keep themselves away from the emerging nationalistic movement of the nineteenth century. The Armenian question emerged as a political issue with the sign of Berlin treaty of 1878. The Russian occupation of the eastern lands of the Ottoman Empire and voluntarily or not some Armenians' participation in the war carried the issue into the international dimension. And an article, numbered 61, which promised to make reform in the provinces on where Armenians lived, was put into the agreement.¹⁷⁸

The project for the Anatolian Reform must be mentioned here. Ilıcak writes “During the period 1878-1885, ‘Anatolian Reform’ can be defined as the process of British efforts to make the Ottoman government introduce administrative reforms in its eastern provinces for the benefit of its Armenian subjects in order to prevent a possible Russian intervention in the region, which could endanger the British imperial route to India.”¹⁷⁹

This development consequently encouraged Armenian nationalists and they began to establish secret organizations in order to announce their struggle for own state. Revolutionary Armenian committees emerged especially after the 1880s.

¹⁷⁸ Şafak, p. 302.

¹⁷⁹ H. Şükrü Ilıcak. *The Question of Reforms in Eastern Anatolia after the Congress of Berlin 1878-1885*, (Thesis, Bilkent University, 1996). For details with regard to the Anatolian Reforms see Ali Karaca. *Anadolu Islahatı ve Ahmet Şakir Paşa: 1838-1899*. (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1993); Ali Karaca. *Anadolu Islahatı Umumi Müfettişi Ahmet Şakir Paşa ve İcraatı (1838-1899)*. Thesis, (Marmara üniversitesi, 1992); Cevdet Küçük. *Anadolu Islahatı ve İngiltere 1878-1895*. Thesis, (İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1982).

Hincak, Tasnaksutyun were established and an increasing number of revolts around the eastern Anatolia began to be observed.¹⁸⁰ News of uprisings in Van, Zeytun, Erzurum, Sason and other cities and raid in Ottoman Bank reached American and European public by the newspapers and missionary letters.

Americans, at first tried to keep themselves out of the question.¹⁸¹ For example, Minister Straus not only criticized the missionaries because of their activities with regard to the Armenians, “out of their real responsibilities,” but also favored Abdulhamid II thanks to his policies on Jews. Straus wrote that “Foreign Jews in Jerusalem were being expelled simply because of their race, and American Jews were being discriminated against along with those of other nations.” Moreover, “Ottoman authorities, with rare exceptions, had been not only tolerant but also hospitable to Jewish immigrants. Romania and Russia expelled Jews. Most of these people went to America, but some to other countries, including Palestine.”¹⁸²

With regard to missionaries, Minister Strauss, in December 1888, warned them to keep themselves apart from those activities which did not suit their profession and their aim for staying in the Ottoman Empire. Because news of the increasing number of revolts among Armenian population against the Ottoman authority by the in the 1890s was spread throughout the world by their letters and articles.

¹⁸⁰ İsmet Parmaksızoğlu, *Ermeni Komitelerinin İhtilal hareketleri ve Besledikleri Emeller* (Ankara, 1981), p. 16.

¹⁸¹ Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 306.

¹⁸² Straus, pp. 80-81.

For instance, he dispatched a message to Secretary of State Bayard, conveying his concern about the involvement of the missionaries in political issues, especially in eastern Anatolia, that could be harmful for the security of their lives and property.¹⁸³ Ottoman documents correct Minister Straus' concern. Ottoman officials believed that missionaries did not only publicize Armenian problem. Furthermore, they engaged in close contact with the Armenians as the documents show. According to the document, some American missionaries residing in Bursa went to Erzurum and Trabzon in order to convert Armenians to Protestantism. Babiali ordered local officials to prevent their work and to remove them from the region.¹⁸⁴ On the other hand, since the American Minister condemned the Armenians, the Ottoman government was grateful to the United States because it did not get involved in the Armenian question and stayed neutral on European issues.¹⁸⁵

Before the American opinion of Abdulhamid II worsened, Americans approached him from a different perspective. In the beginning, the United States public was flattered by the Sultan's personal regard for their representatives at his court and appreciated his keen interest in American life. Reports such as those describing wedding ceremonies naturally reminded many Americans of the Arabian Nights and only increased the veil of mystery surrounding this illusive potentate. He was the first Sultan to sit at dinner with his ministers and he was also the first to dine

¹⁸³ Document could be found in NARA; M 46, Dec 22, 1888 in Çağrı Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 307.

¹⁸⁴ BOA. HR. MKT. 4/18, 08 Cemazeyilahir 1260.

¹⁸⁵ BOA, Y. EE. 63/31, 25 Muharrem 1311.

with European and American ladies. When the empress of Germany visited Constantinople, he shocked Muslims by kissing her hand.¹⁸⁶

However, letters and news of Armenians in the Empire changed the opinion of Americans dramatically. As Moore writes “during his reign the missionary found it very easy to stir up intense hatred against Abdulhamid II, particularly after the Armenian outrages in the mid-1890s.”¹⁸⁷ Furthermore, “it was thereafter impossible for any American to obtain an accurate appraisal of Abdulhamid II or of Turkey itself. Armenians and missionaries blamed the palace gate.”¹⁸⁸

American opinion began to change toward Ottomans especially after the events of 1895-96 which started in Istanbul with Babiali March of Armenians and spread quickly throughout Trabzon, Erzurum, Harput, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Antep and Maraş. Ottoman armies had suppressed those uprisings but news came from Eastern Anatolia which manipulated and exaggerated by Armenians and missionary letters changed American public opinion toward Ottoman Empire.¹⁸⁹ That is why the Ottomans tried to give answers to those accusations. Movroyeni, the Ottoman minister at Washington, tried to answer those condemnations and labels such as the “unspeakable Turk,” or “terrible Turk”¹⁹⁰ that emerged in the newspapers. According to a dispatch from Mavroyeni to Olney, the Ottomans believed that those campaigns

¹⁸⁶ Moore, pp. 78-79.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 60-61.

¹⁸⁸ Moore, p. 79.

¹⁸⁹ Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk Amerikan Münasebetleri*, p. 578.

¹⁹⁰ Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, pp. 285-304.

were produced by the missionaries. He wrote to Olney that “the daily communications to the newspapers of Boston and other cities which we read, and which represent the Turkish government as an inhuman government, killing and massacring innocent Armenians, are based upon the secret reports of the missionaries living in Turkey.”¹⁹¹

In spite of Mavroyeni’s efforts, after the people, the American government also began to get involve in the question because Americans Armenian origin became a problem in the development of relations. As mentioned above the treaty of Naturalization and Extradition of 1874 sought a solution.¹⁹² But Armenian Americans’ return continued to result political tensions since “they were charged with being involved in alleged conspiracies against the Turkish government.”¹⁹³ In many cases, Ottoman officials arrested those naturalized Armenians.

On the Ottoman side, at the same time, Armenians not only engaged in revolutionary or nationalistic activities inside the Ottoman land, but also they undertook some campaigns to gain support of Americans. The Ottomans also

¹⁹¹ From Mavroyeni to Mr. Olney. No 8176/1, January 2, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*. III (1895-1896) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société torque D’Histoire, 1999), pp. 214-215. Meanwhile, there are a lot of dispatches in this approach. In an another dispatch, Mavroyeni writes Mr. Olney that “these disturbances were the result of a plan of insurrection conceived by certain misguided Ottoman subjects, the most recent manifestation of which plan was the criminal attempt against the Imperial Ottoman Bank of Constantinople, together with the explosion of bombs thrown among the troops and the population of the capital.” In *From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State, October 8th, 1896*, no 8797/52, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*. IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société torque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 167.

¹⁹² Mavroyeni Bey, in his despatch summaries the process of the agreement. See *From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State*, no. 8778/49, October 2nd, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société torque D’Histoire, 1999), pp. 147-149.

¹⁹³ Straus, p. 91.

condemned some American foundations close to the Armenians in America. For example, Washington Minister Mavroyeni Bey wrote to Mr. Olney that, “As some American citizens are distributing in Turkey money collected in the United States for the benefit of Armenians, and as the Armenian Relief Association, of New York, ... is one of the committees charged with the collection of this money in the United States... this same association had a long circular distributed among the American public, in which it advocated the emigration of the Armenians of Turkey.”¹⁹⁴

Mavroyeni continued, emphasizing the rights of American citizens in the United States, “it is true that every American has the right, according to American law, to set forth any thought or any plan in writing. My purpose in writing this note is not to protest against a state of things which is lawful in America. My purpose is to show the plans of the enemies of the Empire.”¹⁹⁵

Furthermore, those Armenians were close to missionaries. If Armenians were prosecuted by the Ottoman officials or if they were targeted by the Muslim society, then missionaries also were affected by those conflicts. Therefore, since American citizens’ negatively were affected by the Ottoman government, America had already become one part of the Armenian problem by its citizen’s direct ties to the conflicts. For example, in January 1893, two teachers of Armenian origin at Merzifon American College were arrested after the Armenian uprisings in Merzifon

¹⁹⁴ *From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State*, no. 8690/43, August 30th, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 66.

¹⁹⁵ *From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State*, no. 8690/43, August 30th, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 66.

and Amasya. A school building was destroyed by claiming that rebellious Armenians were hiding there. This was the visible reason behind the transformation of Americans' policies toward the Ottomans with regard to the Armenian case. America reacted roughly since American property had been destroyed and began to ask Ottoman officials for compensation.¹⁹⁶

Sensitivity emerged with the missionary letters and Armenian Americans, as to be in the Bulgarian crises, affected American officials with regard to the Armenian atrocities. More importantly, during the events, property of some American citizens began to be damaged by Ottoman officials. Abdulhamid II tried to prevent any general uprising throughout the Ottoman Empire by taking tough measures and it led missionaries to react to those policies.

Moore continues with this determination: “although several United States ministers came to know and appreciate this unique personality (Abdulhamid II), most American diplomats in the Ottoman Empire tended to support the view of the missionary: This ruler seemed intent on thwarting every well-meaning effort by external forces to contribute to the welfare of his subjects.”¹⁹⁷

Americans even considered participating in the international investigative commission which convened to detect the Sason events, but President Grover Cleveland then renounced their decision¹⁹⁸ before their participation was refused by

¹⁹⁶ Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, p. 310.

¹⁹⁷ Moore, pp. 60-61.

¹⁹⁸ BOA, HR. SYS, 188/39, 10 Cemazeyilahir 1312.

the British officials.¹⁹⁹ In the meantime, the Ottoman government tried to get rid of image of itself with regard to the Sason event in order to affect Americans' view. Babiali sent an explanation to Washington through Mavroyeni. In the dispatch, sent in 1896, the Ottoman government described the Sason events as agitation: "The agitation against Turkey which began in November 1894, was based on, both in England and the United States, assertions that alleged massacres had taken place at Sason. ... (those news in newspapers) were invented by the Armenian revolutionary committees, and thrown out to a credulous public with a view to fomenting additional disturbances among the Armenians."²⁰⁰

Mavroyeni Bey again tried to answer complaints which reach to American government by writing Mr. Olney that "a sovereign government, which has done all in its power to defend foreigners residing in its territory, is not responsible to them or to their government for any injuring or loss that may be occasioned by an insurrection... both the local authorities and the Imperial troops made every effort to protect the lives and property of Americans."²⁰¹

A similar event occurred two years later in Harput. In January 1895, the Ottoman government received news from Harput that the private property of American missionaries in Harput had been seized by violence and some native

¹⁹⁹ BOA, HR. SYS, 29/54, 19 Cemazeyilahir 1312.

²⁰⁰ From Mavroyeni to Mr. Olney. No 8275/11, February 5, 1896, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, III (1895–1896) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D'Historie, 1999), pp. 293-294.

²⁰¹ From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State, October 8th, 1896. no 8797/52, in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D'Historie, 1999), p. 167.

Christians had being killed.²⁰² Another document implied Americans' desire for compensation and ordered the protection of American citizens from the devastations.²⁰³ Ottoman officials rejected the American request for compensation. A dispatch wrote that, "the local authorities and Imperial troops have displayed all their efforts for the protection of the lives of Americans, and that this has expressed to the authorities' acknowledgement for the measures adopted in order to insure the safety. The Imperial Government not being in any way bound to make good the loss suffered during the aforementioned disturbances, there cannot be any question of the payment of an indemnity for the wasting at stake."²⁰⁴ The missionaries, after those events, called the American government to send a navy into the Ottoman seas.

The US Navy in the Bosphorus

At that point the US navy in the relations with the Ottoman Empire had to be asserted. Ironically enough, the US Navy constituted an important part in the relations. As was mentioned before, the main intention behind the Ottomans' desire for the improvement of the relations was the Navarin event in which the Ottoman navy had been destroyed by the Great Powers and it was the might of American navy

²⁰² BOA, HR. SYS. 73/18, 25 Recep 1312; BOA, HR. SYS. 73/19, 26 Recep 1312; BOA, HR. SYS. 73/20, 30 Recep 1312.

²⁰³ BOA, HR. SYS. 73/21, 1 Şaban 1312.

²⁰⁴ From Tevfik Pasha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Terrel, American Minister in Istanbul, February 24, 1896. in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, III (1895-1896) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société torque D'Historie, 1999), p. 308-309.

that had attracted the Ottoman ruling elites. The Ottomans mentioned the importance of the naval power, in sending their official, Emin Efendi, to America with the intention of discussing technical and military negotiations. He was welcomed in America with a special ceremony.²⁰⁵

However, on the American side, the navy was a power which was beneficial to persuade the Ottomans to accept American requests. The Americans, in various cases, referred to their powerful navy in order to solve problems that emerged with the Ottomans. Sometimes it was because of the missionaries' problems sometimes political concerns led them to threaten the Ottoman authorities in order to come to an "agreement." Between 1850 and 1914, the US navy had come to Istanbul, waiting specifically in front of the Dolmabahçe Palace to show the might of the Americans.²⁰⁶

An instance is described by Minister Straus in his memoirs

Matters in Turkey at this time (1898s) were also not going very smoothly. At a conference with McKinley one day he showed me a communication from Dr James Angell, Minister at Porte, suggesting that the only way to bring Turkey to terms was to send warships up there and rattle the Sultan's windows. The President was much disturbed. He felt the sending of warships might result in another accident like the blowing up of the Maine. He said the situation had worried him so that it interfered with his sleep, and he begged me to accept again the appointment of Minister Turkey declaring with conviction that he regarded me as the only man who could adjust the situation.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ BA, HR. MKT. 38/9, 29

²⁰⁶ Şafak, pp. 91–92.

²⁰⁷ Straus, p.124.

Another instance was experienced during 1895. At that time, according to some allegations, the properties of missionaries in Hatput were usurped and some Christians were killed by the Muslim inhabitants.²⁰⁸ The Ottoman authority ordered immediately to control the situations and to secure the Americans' properties and lives.²⁰⁹ Mavroyeni, told Olney, Secretary of State, that "Tevfik Pasha points out the double fact, namely that the Imperial authorities of the aforesaid city did everything in their power to combat the fire which broke out in that city and that thanks to their efforts, the greater part of the property of the American missionaries was able to be saved."²¹⁰ But the Americans demanded indemnity for the charge of costs. And according to documents, Americans decided to send their Atlantic Navy to the Ottomans' territorial waters in order to persuade the Ottoman rulers to pay the costs.²¹¹

For example Mavroyeni dispatched Mr. Olney that "I do not know how the information published in the American newspaper is true, which states that the cruiser Bankroft has received orders to proceed to Constantinople. Your Excellency knows the weighty and conclusive reasons for which Sublime Porte was not able to accept, on the other occasion, the proposition of Mr. Terrel concerning the authorization for the passage through the Straits of the Bancroft. This reason ... still has the same

²⁰⁸ BOA, HR. SYS. 73/18, 25 Recep 1312; BOA, HR. SYS. 73/19, 26 Recep 1312.

²⁰⁹ BOA, HR. SYS. 73//21, 1 Şaban 1212.

²¹⁰ From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State, no. 8594/35, July 11, 1896. in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société torque D'Historie, 1999), p. 6.

²¹¹ BOA, HR. SYS. 73/51, 23 Recep 1313.

weight.”²¹² Terrel, American Minister in Istanbul, wrote to Babiali that “I have the honor to inform you that the United States ship Bancroft of 839 tons, carrying four guns, and with a crew of about seventy men, officers included, has been ordered by my government to come to Constantinople for the service of this Legation.”²¹³

Mavroyeni answered the dispatch by referring to the Paris Treaty of 1856, that “Your Excellency knows perfectly well the warmest and sincere desire of the imperial government to do all in its power to strengthen, if possible the ties of friendship which unite the two countries; but, in this case, a certain fact is involved, to wit, that the only Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Paris enjoy the rights to have vessels of war permanently at Constantinople at the orders of their respective Embassies.”²¹⁴

But this act would not be fulfilled in accordance with the American government’s refusal to send a navy to the Bosphorus,²¹⁵ even though the American

²¹² From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State, no. 8691/44, August 30, 1896. in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, IV (1896-1900) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 68.

²¹³ From Terrel to Tevfik Pasha, no. 106, January 6, 1896. in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, III (1895-1896) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 227.

²¹⁴ From Mavroyeni Bey, Ottoman Envoy at Washington to Mr. Olney, American Secretary of State, no.225, January 16, 1896. in *Documents Diplomatiques Ottomans: Affaires Armeniennes*, III (1895-1896) (Ankara: Imprimerie de la Société turque D’Histoire, 1999), p. 234.

²¹⁵ BOA, HR. SYS. 73/62, 19 Şaban 1313. In a lot of cases Americans in the ottoman land called Americans to send their navies to Bosphorus in order to back themselves. See BOA, HR. SYS. 74/26, 13 Rebiulevvel 1314.

media continued to announce the news with regard to the United States Navy's "possible" operations in the Bosphorus.²¹⁶

Last, Armenian question affected Ottoman-American relations in negative direction. As mentioned, relations began to evolve into a more complex dimension especially after the Civil War of Americans since they sought to penetrate in European affairs. Americans search for a strategic base in the Mediterranean had led them to be a part of the Crete problem which signaled transformation in the American foreign policy into a more interventionist policy in the eyes of the Ottoman political elite. Neither Crete problem, nor missionary support for the Bulgarian nationalism resulted with an intense diplomatic tension. On the contrary, Armenian question would frequently result with many diplomatic tensions since naturalized American Armenians constituted main part of those questions. Since American citizens began to be damaged in the Ottoman lands, America get involved interventionist policy not only with its citizens but also diplomats.

Americans could not accept the condition that it could not protect its citizens in another country. In other words, Americans could not allow its citizens to benefit from the help of the British consuls. They accepted it as the violation of American sovereignty that could create negative image on the country which not suit with the ambitions of being a great power. It must be remembered that nineteenth century was the period of displaying "mighty." In American mind, displaying of "mighty" was corresponding with the security of its citizens.

²¹⁶ BOA, HR. SYS. 70/16, 23 Rebiulahir 1322.

Fairs

Another sphere of displaying “mighty” was fairs. In the second half of the nineteenth century, countries began to convene world fairs to show their improving technological and economic power to world. The United States was one of those countries that invited the Ottoman Empire to participate in those events. America held several world fairs, such as the 1876 Philadelphia Centennial Exhibition, the 1893 Chicago World Columbian Exposition, the 1901 Pan-American Exhibition in Buffalo, and the 1904 St. Louis Louisiana Purchase Exposition, all of which constituted the most important economic, political, and cultural events in the United States.

According to Davis, the fairs “presented a myriad of exhibits that juxtaposed the United States’ expanding technological prowess to the technological advances of its main competitors in the global political economy, Great Britain, France and an emerging Germany.”²¹⁷ In order to show the might, adequate to the period’s understanding, America showed “large steam driven turbines, such as the Philadelphia Exhibition’s Corliss engine, the Chicago Exposition’s Worthington pumps, and other newly developed machinery in the fairs’ ubiquitous Machinery Halls.” The United States aimed to prove the fact that “the United States was one of

²¹⁷ Eric Davis, “Representations of the Middle East at American World's Fairs, 1876-1904” in *The United States and the Middle East: Cultural Encounters*, ed. Abbas Amanat, 2002, p. 344.

the world's great industrial powers."²¹⁸ It meant that they wanted to exhibit their modernism.²¹⁹

Furthermore world fairs represented classifications in the world as discriminating participant cultures into various spheres. Davis makes an important analysis with regard to the case:

The spatial representation of foreign peoples at the four world's fairs demonstrates that foreigners were viewed not as a homogenous unit but as politically, socially and culturally differentiated. Countries like Great Britain, France and Germany were treated with great respect as indicated by the placement of their exhibits at privileged positions within the respective expositions and by the descriptions of their exhibits in promotional literature on the fairs.¹⁶ Semi-industrialized nations such as Spain, Italy and Greece were viewed with respect but as quaint given the emphasis on agricultural and artisan rather than industrial products in their exhibits. At the next level in the hierarchy of nations were the countries of the Middle East, Latin America and Asia. These countries such as the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Persia, Tunisia, China, Mexico and Brazil engendered a certain level of respect primarily because they were organized as nation-states. However, their cultures were viewed as strange, exotic and radically different from American culture. Below these states were so-called "primitive" or "savage" peoples, especially those from Africa who did not inhabit nation-states but who was organized along tribal lines.²²⁰

World fairs were about the "might" of the United States. But with regard to our subject, it has to be said that foreign exhibits, especially those from the Middle East, constituted a different type of political and social identity. According to Davis,

²¹⁸ Davis, p. 344.

²¹⁹ Selim Deringil, "II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde 'İmaj' Saplantısı," in *Sultan II Abdülhamid ve Devri Semineri, Bildiriler* (İstanbul Üniversitesi Tarih Araştırmaları Merkezi, 1994), pp. 149-162, p. 157.

²²⁰ Davis, pp. 349-50. Only Japan did not fit neatly into this hierarchy. While it was non-Western, it was also engaged in a process of rapid modernization. ... "Anglo-Saxons of the East," were prescient indicators of the sense that Japan was likewise an emerging global power.

“The world’s fairs would be ‘living’ museums which would provide first and foremost an educational experience that would teach the visitor how to properly understand American and foreign societies.”²²¹

The Ottomans were invited first of all to the trade fairs in New York in 1852. However, they did not accept the invitation for economic reasons. Even though Americans guaranteed to pay the expenses, Ottomans were late.²²² Then they participated in the Philadelphia fair in 1876, and then attended the Chicago World Fair of 1893.²²³ The Americans were happy to accommodate the Ottomans at the Chicago Fair. President James A. Garfield sent them a letter of thanks to accept the invitation.²²⁴ The Ottomans demanded that the American officials build a mosque for Muslims to perform their religious duties during the Colombian World Exhibition.²²⁵

Since world fairs were places to show the might or image of the countries to their counterparts, the reason behind the Ottomans’ participation was to gain prestige in the eyes of the world.²²⁶ Sultan Abdulhamid II gave importance to the Ottoman image in the world. In 1894, Abdulhamid II donated 300 liras to the victims of a

²²¹ Davis, pp.349-50

²²² Erhan, *Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin Tarihsel Kökenleri*, pp. 370–373.

²²³ See details in the case of Chicago fairs; Ahmet Turan Alkan, *Sıradışı Bir Jöntürk: Ubeydullah Efendi’nin Amerika Hatıraları* (Istanbul: İletişim, 1997); Selim Deringil, *İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji. II. Abdülhamit Dönemi (1876-1909)*, trans. Gül Çağalı Güven (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi, 2002), pp.162-169; Gültekin Yıldız, “Ottoman Participation in World’s Columbian Exposition” *Türklük Araştırmaları Dergisi*, no 9, 2001; Cafer Sarıkaya, “1983 Şikago Sergisi’nde Osmanlı Tiyatrosu” *Toplumsal Tarih*, 147/ March 2006, pp.66-71

²²⁴ BOA, HR. SYS. 71/19, 7 Zilhicce 1308.

²²⁵ BOA, HR. SYS, 71/60, 10 Cemazeyilevvel 1309.

²²⁶ Deringil, “II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde ‘İmaj’ Saplantısı,” p. 157.

forest fire in America.²²⁷ Another example was that Abdulhamid II sent photograph albums to London and Washington which depicted the Ottoman Empire as a powerful state with technological improvements.²²⁸

The Ottoman exhibit was approved as a “Turkish Coffee House and Bazaar.” In the center of the exhibit building was a café where coffee was served “in the peculiar Turkish style.”²²⁹ The head of the Commission was G. D’Aristarchi Bey who headed the Ottoman Legation to the United States.

²²⁷ Deringil, “II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde ‘İmaj’ Saplantısı,” p. 154.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 153.

²²⁹ Davis, pp. 356.

CHAPTER IV

DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION

The Diplomatic Ranks

For world diplomatic history, the nineteenth century can be accepted as the period of institutionalization for diplomacy making. The Vienna Congress of 1815 constituted a base for this institutionalization since it produced three levels of legation abroad, ambassadorship, ministry and *charge de affairs*.

Theoretically it was the seniority as an article written in 1905 indicate: “Since in theory of international law all nations are equal one to another, the Congress of Vienna further provided that diplomats in each class should take rank d’après la date de la notification officielle de leur arrive, in other words, by seniority in service at the seat of government to which they are accredited.”²³⁰ Assessing the practice of diplomacy has confirmed that those levels of the diplomatic legations were not only the signers of the credit of a state abroad, but also the indicators of positive or negative progress in mutually diplomatic relations between two or more countries.

Deringil confirms that whit the lack of concrete military power, diplomacy and symbolism gain importance. The nineteenth century saw the expansion of wars outside of the European continent, which urged European Powers to give great

²³⁰ Charles Noble Gregory, “The Privileges of Ambassadors and Foreign Ministers” *Michigan Law Review*, 3, no. 3 (January 1905), p.173.

appreciation to the symbolic indicators of their powers.²³¹ In the sphere of the international politics, for example, reciprocity became one of the main components of interstate relations. A small case in the protocol could be a problem in such a condition. And the Ottoman State, according to him, gave great attention to that sort of diplomacy making²³² because it was weak, compared to other European powers in many respects.²³³

There are many instances that illustrate this fact. For instance, a crisis between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain resulted in the Ottoman pronouncement that it would reduce the grade of the Ottoman Embassy in London to ministry in order to protest British policy. Furthermore, it was not the only method applied in the diplomacy of the nineteenth century.

Even today we can observe such gestures. For example, a diplomatic crisis between Israel and Turkey directly was reflected the degree of legations. In 1985, the Israeli legation in Turkey was reduced to the degree of *charge dé affaires* because the intensity of relations was the worst of all times between the two states.²³⁴

²³¹ Deringil, "II Abdülhamid Döneminde Osmanlı Dış İlişkilerinde 'İmaj' Saplantısı," pp. 155-156.

²³² Ibid., 156.

²³³ Roderic Davison, "The Ottoman Empire and the Congress of Berlin," in *Nineteenth Century Ottoman Diplomacy and Reforms* (İstanbul: ISIS press, 1999), p. 176.

²³⁴ It is narrated from Israeli diplomat of the period, Alon Liel, who gave a speech in the conference and confirmed by Özdem Sanberk, a retired Turkish diplomat: Present and Future of Turkish-Israeli relations at Park Otel, convened by the contributions of Konrad-Adanuer and Israeli general Consulate of Istanbul, in January 26, 2006, Istanbul.

As Paul Kennedy says, in the nineteenth century, the great power struggles were no longer merely over European issues, but over markets and territories that ranged across the globe.²³⁵ This was expansionist policy especially after the Congress of Berlin. The French occupation of Tunisia and the British occupation of Egypt made the Ottoman Empire the first victim of this military expansion.

However, real expansion or penetration by European states into the Ottoman Empire, as Georgeon says, was fulfilled by peaceful means such as establishing diplomatic networks, schools, investments and religious missionaries. In order to perform such a policy, the Great Powers opened many consulates within the Empire and around the globe, including in the United States, which had approximately 30 consulates during the period.²³⁶

As a newcomer to global politics, efforts began to launch a comprehensive United States' diplomatic network at the end of eighteenth century, and it was a period in which the Ottoman Sultan Selim III began to appoint permanent ambassadors to countries.²³⁷ President Washington appointed American citizens as diplomats first of all to France and Spain in 1779, to England in 1785, to Portugal in 1791, to Prussia in 1797, to Russia in 1809 and to the Ottoman Empire prior to

²³⁵ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and the Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (London: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 195.

²³⁶ François Georgeon, *Sultan Abdulhamid*, trans. Ali Berkay (Istanbul: Homer, 2006), p. 271-273.

²³⁷ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu "The Adoption and use of Permanent Diplomacy" *Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional*, ed. Nuri Yurdusev, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 131-150., p. 132.

1840.²³⁸ It has been affirmed that “they were lower ranking diplomats general ministers who lived and worked in buildings known as legations”²³⁹ which was strongly consistent with the diplomatic status of the United States abroad.

Here a differentiation must be made between diplomatic posts and consulates. “While diplomats concerned themselves with matters of representation, consuls handled passports visas and related business matters. Consular posts were established wherever Americans were involved in commerce. By 1840 there were 145 consular posts compared with 20 diplomatic posts. By 1860 the number of consular posts climbed to 279, with increase to 33 diplomatic posts.”²⁴⁰

Furthermore, there is some evidence which confirms that those consuls were not only engaged in commercial activities. An obvious debate on the United States’ desire to open a consulate in Erzurum was rejected by the Ottoman State by referring to the reality of the non-existence of the US citizens in the region.²⁴¹

Dealing with official degree United States’ diplomats abroad reveals that this degree was the indicator of the United States’ relations and its credit abroad. The premature character of the United States’ foreign policy could be symbolized with its level of diplomatic representations as charge dé affairs or ministry until the 1893. It was not until 1893 that the European Great Powers upgraded the rank of their

²³⁸ Jane C Loeffler, *The Architecture of Diplomacy: Building America’s Embassies* (Princeton: Architectural Press, 1998), p. 14.

²³⁹ Ibid. p.14

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

²⁴¹ Şafak, p. 48.

diplomatic representatives to Washington from ministers to ambassadors.²⁴²

According to an article written in 1905,

The United States receives diplomatic representatives from thirty-seven nations and accredits her representatives to them in return. Six of these on each side are of the highest rank, namely Ambassadors extraordinary and Plenipotentiary being those received from and accredited to the five great powers of Europe, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia and to our sister republic of Mexico. The rest are almost without exception “Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers plenipotentiary” standing in the second rank of “Les Employés Diplomatiques” to use the term adopted at the congress of Vienna (1815) where the relative rank was determined which attaches to these different offices.²⁴³

However, while US policy began to turn from economic into political involvement, the level of diplomatic representatives began to increase its degrees. The first United States ambassadorship, after all, was opened in London, as “Thomas Bayard became the first American to hold the rank of ambassador when the senate confirmed president Grover Cleveland’s appointment of Bayard as ambassador to Great Britain.”²⁴⁴ After this first opening, the United States similarly established embassies respectively in Paris, Berlin and Rome.²⁴⁵

²⁴² Kennedy, p. 195.

²⁴³ Gregory, p. 173.

²⁴⁴ Loeffler, p. 15.

²⁴⁵ Ibid. p.15

Diplomatic Representatives and Their Status

In assessing the social, occupational and economic background of the United States diplomats, it is obvious that they did not have officially diplomatic backgrounds. A search for the comparison between United States and British ambassadors shows that in the period 1893 to 1930 those ambassadors were 40 or more years of age when they were first appointed ambassador and the service was made up exclusively of men.²⁴⁶ Approximately 80 percent of the Americans indicated having attended college or university.²⁴⁷ Furthermore, a typical American ambassador, in Hartman's words, "was a man who having graduated from a preparatory school spent four years at and graduated from a college or university become a lawyer businessman or politician and finally received when in his middle fifties his first appointment as ambassador."²⁴⁸

Dealing with the United States ambassadors in Istanbul, we can confirm this assumption. According to Heap, United States Consulate General in Istanbul, "In Italy, France, Germany, Austria and English men are more educated for the consular service and some serve a time in the foreign office before their first appointment to consulates to the duty as clerks and afterwards promoted to the vice consulates."²⁴⁹

²⁴⁶ Dale Allen Hartman, "British and American Ambassadors: 1893-1930. A Study in Comparative Personnel." *Economica*, no. 33 (August 1931), p. 328.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 334.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p.340

²⁴⁹ AIRC, *from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893*

There were journalist, university professors, languages and geography experts, politicians and novelist who served as official ministers of the United States in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.

Ambassadors had some obligations and responsibilities abroad, on the one hand, and diplomatic and juridical immunities, on the other. At the beginning of the twentieth century the position and the status of the diplomatic representatives were perceived as follows: “Ambassadors were inviolate by the law of the ancient Greeks and Romans, being regarded as having a sacred character and under the protection of the Gods.”²⁵⁰

In the law of international relations and tradition states had some obligations to receive diplomats. In general it is said that a state was not at liberty to refuse to receive a diplomatic representative from another duly sent. However, refusal was allowed, according to Gregory, if special reason could be shown. It could be concluded that “such reason may arise first from the general situation as the fact that receipt of such representative would imply acquiescence when the receiving nation is unwilling to acquiesce; second, from the fact that the status, conduct or character of the person sent is unsatisfactory to the sovereign to whom he is accredited.”²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Gregory, p. 175. Gregory continues with the complaints that “The Turks only among the nations of Europe long disregarded this civilized usage and even in 1806 the British minister at Constantinople had to secretly withdraw to avoid torture and death, although it seems that Koran teaches the sacredness of embassies.” This sentence could be analyzed from the two dimensions. On the one hand, he approached to case with the orientalist viewpoint, widespread perception of the time, on the other hand, he implicitly accepted Ottoman Empire within the “states of Europe.”

²⁵¹ Ibid., p. 177.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, diplomatic traditions required states to exempt diplomats from the local laws. International rules seem settled that “a diplomatic representative, in the country to which he is accredited, is exempt from the local laws and jurisdiction both criminal and civil, he being considered as if all the time within the jurisdiction of his own country and subject to its laws.”²⁵²

There is a differentiation in diplomatic legation between Ministries and Consulates. According to a diplomatic dispatch of the United States General Consulate in Istanbul, United States Consulates were responsible for the protection of its citizens without any exception (missionaries, professors, medical practitioners, teachers) within Ottoman boundaries, and for commercial pursuits.²⁵³

According to a dispatch from Istanbul to Washington, each office of the consulates in the Ottoman Empire had its own duty. The consulate general at Constantinople corresponded with and made reports to the State Department; received communications from and gave instructions to the consuls at Smyrna, Beirut and Jerusalem and the agencies in its districts; received and dispatched from consuls to the department of state; held consular courts for the trial of cases between Americans; in where a foreigner plaintiff and an American defendant; tried Americans for crimes; received transmits and prosecuted claims and complaints of American citizens against Turkish authorities or subjects; wrote explanations to the United States minister.²⁵⁴

²⁵² Gregory, p. 178.

²⁵³ AIRC, from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893

²⁵⁴ AIRC, from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893

Consulates also took in responsibility for its citizens at times of death, birth and marriage. The marriage of a naturalized American citizen with a Turkish subject was dispatched to Washington in 1882.²⁵⁵ Whether naturalized or not, the protection of United States citizens in Turkey was the most important duty of the United States consulates. In a dispatch, United States Consul General William B. Hess narrated how they rescue a naturalized citizen from prison.²⁵⁶ With regard to the protection of United States citizens, consulates gave great attention to the safety of missionaries. Consul General Heap noted that “looking after our commercial interests, our consuls have another important duty on where missionaries held actions.” And he continues as follows:

“They require the interventions of consuls for their protection. Their duties oblige them to make long and frequent journeys among wild tribes expose themselves at every moment to aggression and outrage and this not only on the highway but from the authorities. ... Armenians in Syria and Palestine many travelers visit safety gives to consuls particularly the one at the Jerusalem much concern.”²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ AIRC, from Heap to Adee. Microfilm, Roll 15 vol 15, No 226, September 15, 1882.

²⁵⁶ “On November 3, instant, Mr. Lagors Kavarkliyan a naturalized United States citizen of Turkish origin holding a passport no 4744, dated October 3 1893, duly signed by the secretary of state arrived at this post from Marseilles, but the Turkish officials refused to recognize his American citizenship disregarding his passport and refusing to allow him to land. When informed of this violation of the right of an American citizen and adhering to the laws, principles and traditions of our government which inhabit absolutely and discrimination whatever between nation base and naturalized citizens, of whatever nationality, in their right of protection ... I remonstrated to the proper officials. ... With the dragoman of the consulate I called on the on the Turkish officials of the post in Galata and demanded that said American citizen be allowed to land here which demand was granted. I took a boat and went on to bring him ashore.” In AIRC, *from William B. Hess to Josiah Quincy*, Microfilm, roll 20, November 14, 1893.

²⁵⁷ AIRC, from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893

As said before, the establishment and opening of new consulates constituted an indicator with regard to the increase and promotion of American credit and power among the Great Powers and within the Ottoman Empire. The United States General Consulate, at least, interpreted the importance of the multiplication of the consulates. Consul General Heap wrote in a report dated 1893 that “I should say that several (consulate) are required in Turkey.” As a new plot region, he advised Washington to select Sivas as a place where they should open a consulate, because, Sivas “is the town where many Armenians reside here.” The reason behind this assumption is that throughout the region the missionary society has established stations with schools and required much valuable property.

However, Heap continued with a complaint. According to him, this province was minimally within the distinct of this consulate general, but where application was made for assistance on protection he was been obliged to ask a British consul to assist the complaints. Since the United States wanted to be a great power and to have some tool which would increase its influence within the country, Heap asked for the multiplication of the numbers of consulates by referring to the dignity of the United States: “This has always been done promptly and as effectually as circumstances would admit, but it scarcely comports with the dignity on the power of the United States to be indebted for the protection of its citizens residing in a foreign country. This weakens our prestige and influence.”²⁵⁸

²⁵⁸ AIRC, from Heap to Alvey A. Adey, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893

Ottoman-United States Diplomatic Relations

on the Institutional Level

The History of the United States-Ottoman official relations goes to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The initial period of economic relations was under the diplomatic representation of the British consulate.²⁵⁹ Until the completion of the free trade and friendship agreement of 1830, Ottoman-United States relations continued in a non-official way. However, this agreement opened the way for the United States to open consulates in Turkey wherever it found them necessary. First of all, the United States government opened a consulate in Smyrna (İzmir), then Beirut and in Istanbul in 1831 under the conditions of this treaty.²⁶⁰ The charge dé affaires in Istanbul was converted into as the permanent legation. After 1831 the United States government started to send representatives to Istanbul.

As mentioned before, their real occupations differed from each other. As Moore puts forward, between 1831 and 1876 nine Americans presented their credentials to the Sublime Porte as official representatives of the United States: between 1831-1843, David Porter; 1843-1849, Dabneys Carr, a Baltimore newspaperman; 1849-1853, George Marsh, a self trained expert of languages and geography; 1853-1858, Carroll Spence, 1858-1861, James Williams; 1861-1870, Edward Jay Morris, a Harvard graduated and founder of the republican party; 1870-

²⁵⁹ Şafak, p. 37.

²⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 46-51.

1871, Isaac MacVeagh; 1871-1875, George Boker; and 1875-1880, Horace Maynard, a radical Republican served United States as diplomatic representatives in Istanbul.²⁶¹

Furthermore, Straus, between 1897 and 1898; and McKinley between 1898 and 1900 served as ministers in Istanbul. Straus held the membership responsible for trade in Roosevelt's cabinet from 1906 to 1909 and returned to Istanbul as an ambassador.²⁶²

Another minister in Istanbul was General Lew Wallace, an important commander during the Civil War in the United States. His main occupation after the war was as a solicitor. Before his official residence in Istanbul, he wrote a book about the East, titled *Ben Hur*.²⁶³

While Americans sent diplomatic representatives to Turkey in 1830s, the Ottoman Empire would wait to improve diplomatic relations by opening a *şehbenderlik*, a diplomatic post responsible to protect the trade interests of Ottoman citizens in America in 1845.²⁶⁴ Due to the increase in the numbers of Ottoman citizens living in the United States, United States economic and political relations with the country; the Ottoman government opened more diplomatic representatives in San Francisco, New Orleans, Chicago and Philadelphia after 1868. After 1860, ministers were sent to Washington with other diplomatic representatives. The first

²⁶¹ Moore, pp. 6-10.

²⁶² Naomi W Cohen, "Ambassador Straus in Turkey, 1909-1910: A Note on Dollar Diplomacy" *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 45, no. 4, March 1959, p. 632.

²⁶³ Sir Henry Woods, *Türkiye Anıları: Osmanlı Bahriyesinde Kırk Yıl 1869-1909*, trans. Amiral Fahri Çoker (İstanbul: Milliyet, 1976), p. 241.

²⁶⁴ Şafak, pp. 57-58.

Turkish minister in Washington was Edward Edme Blacque, who held the post for six years.²⁶⁵

However, it has to be asserted that the Ottoman Empire also gave importance to the selections of the rank of official representatives. The embassies and ministries of the Ottoman Empire abroad showed the importance to which the Ottoman Empire attributed to a country. For example, in 1888, Ottoman diplomatic representatives in Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Iran and France were at the rank of embassies. At the same time, countries such as Spain, United States, Belgium, and Portugal had ministries which demonstrated their ascendance and importance in the eyes of the Ottoman Empire.²⁶⁶

The Embassy Debate

The debate on the promotion of the rank of the diplomatic representative of the United States in the Istanbul dated back to 1881. A document dated December 04, 1881 shows that some United States' ministries would be transformed into an embassy.²⁶⁷ However, this transformation would be delayed to 1893 when the ranks of the United States' diplomatic representatives in all Great Powers would be

²⁶⁵ Şafak, p. 58.

²⁶⁶ Kemal Girgin, *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Tarihimiz* (Ankara: TTK Basımevi, 1994), p. 66.

²⁶⁷ BOA. HR. SYS. D 48, G 16, 12 Muharrem 1299

upgraded to embassy. Until that time the United States was involved in some initiatives which aimed to urge the European states to accept the promotion.

For example, the United States decided to appoint Kieley as ambassador to Vienna in hopes of Austria-Hungary's positive response. On the contrary, the United States was unable to win at diplomatic chess. A diplomatic crisis between two countries forced the United States to retreat from its maneuver and Kieley was called back to Washington.²⁶⁸ Even though the United States could not gain what it wanted with regard to the promotion of rank of diplomatic representatives abroad, the State Department continued to open new legations in the Middle and Far East. A project for the opening of a diplomatic legation in Iran was opened to discussion in 1882,²⁶⁹ and appointments as Minister, Charge *dé* Affairs and General Consulate to this country were made in 1883.²⁷⁰ Another diplomatic initiative took place in Japan where efforts were made to open a United States ministry.²⁷¹

The United States' diplomatic decisions either with regard to the promotion of ranks of legations or the opening of new consulates within the Empire, were always taken in accordance with the other great powers. For instance, in a debate on the question of whether United States should reduce the numbers of its consulates in the Ottoman Empire or not, the answer was given by General Consulate Heap as follows: "If the number of the American consulates in Turkey is compared with that

²⁶⁸ BOA. HR. SYS. D 59, G. 17, 7 Zilkade 1302

²⁶⁹ BOA. HR. SYS. D 48, G 39, 16 Şaban 1299

²⁷⁰ BOA. HR. SYS. D 48, G 42, 17 cemaziyelevvel 1300

²⁷¹ BOA. HR. SYS. D 49, G 14, 13 Camaziyelevvel 1302

of other nations, it will be evident that their number should not be reduced but that there is a necessity for the establishment of new ones.”²⁷²

In an another case about the establishment of a consulate in Philippopolis, Bulgaria, Consulate General Heap grounded his reasons as the necessity to open a consulate there as follows: “As we have no consular representation in this principality, our countryman have as usual under such circumstances been obliged to apply to the British diplomatic agency and consul general at Sophia for protections against the Bulgarian authorities. Austria, Belgium, France Great Britain, Greece, Italy and Russia are represented by the diplomatic agent and consular general; Germany and Holland by consul general.”²⁷³ That means the United States took into consideration the positions of the other Great Powers in planning the policies pursuing in the Ottoman state.

Eight years of waiting opened the door to promotion. This diplomatic development immediately was noticed in Istanbul.²⁷⁴ According to documents Great Britain, Italy, France and other European states, including Germany, promoted the ranks of their diplomatic representatives into the Embassy.²⁷⁵

This promotion consequently facilitated the United States’ efforts with regard to its ranks of diplomatic representatives. The United States began to ask the

²⁷² AIRC, *from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893*

²⁷³ AIRC, *from Heap to Alvey A. Adee, Microfilm, roll 15, no 281, June 20, 1893*

□ BOA. Y.PRK.EŞA, D 17, G 72, 30 Za 1310; and BOA. HR.SYS. D 50, G 12, 19 Recep 1310

²⁷⁵ BOA. HR.SYS. D 50, G 13, 24 Zilkade 1310

Ottoman Empire in order to promote its legation's rank in Istanbul from ministry to Embassy. The first application was made by the United States' Minister James Angell in Istanbul in March 1897. In his personal negotiation with the Sultan, he transmitted the State Department's request to promote the rank of legation into the Embassy. The Ottoman Empire did not refuse the request, but sought for any delay. Abdulhamid II, according to his personal order, told the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that in order to enable the United States to promote the rank of the legation in the Ottoman Empire, that first of all the Ottoman State had to appoint an ambassador to Washington. This part of Abdulhamid II's answer could be analyzed within the framework of the reciprocity which has been the bases of international relations until recent times. However, the second part of the answer put forward Abdulhamid II's diplomatic perception that he evaluated the desire of the United States as their ambitions to become a great power by opening an Embassy in the capital.

Therefore, it was decided that request should be delayed. Abdulhamid II advised Ministry of Foreign Affairs to use economic and financial problems as a pretext. The Ottoman Empire could not promote the rank of its legation for economic reasons.²⁷⁶

A second initiative was begun by United States Minister John Leishman in May 1904. The State Department, according to one document, sought to send an ambassador to Istanbul, as they had before in Vienna in 1885,²⁷⁷ but the Sultan again

²⁷⁶ BOA, İrade Hususi, n 43, 17 L 1314

²⁷⁷ BOA, İrade Hususi, n 88, 28 S 1322

refused this request by referring implicitly to the principle of reciprocity and by rejecting the promotion of the ranks in both capitals. The rejection of this request, in Abdulhamid II's eyes, depended on his belief and suspicion with regard to the United States' efforts at being a Great Power. Abdulhamid II thought that the United States' ambitions were not in the best interests of the Ottoman State.

Even though the Ottoman Empire frequently refused the United States' desire to send an ambassador to Istanbul, the State Department did not give up the pursuit of intention. Another debate took place in June 1906. Abdulhamid II again complained about the same subject, citing its possible implications on internal and external developments.²⁷⁸ The document says that the United States forcefully wanted to send an ambassador to Istanbul. But Abdulhamid II ordered that this problem had to be solved before the United States' candidate for ambassador departed from Washington in order to prevent any crises between the two states. This part of the answer and order was with regard to diplomacy. The document continues, however, with the possible internal implications of the appointment. The Sultan attracted attention to the possible power of the United States ambassadors within the country, especially with regard to the missionary activities and related problems.

As Ottoman-United States relations fell into crises resulting from the missionaries' activities or the Ottoman's rough policy toward the Armenians or Bulgarians, diplomatic representatives were the most impacted positions. Furthermore, as the economic and political involvement of the United States

²⁷⁸ BOA, İrade Hususi, n 84, 29 R 1324

increased in the region, it requested that the Ottoman Empire increase the rank of its diplomatic representation from ministry to embassy first in 1896 and this request lasted until 1906. As the first American ambassador was appointed to the Ottoman Empire in 1906 this crisis came to an end when Leisman, the United States' first ambassador on Istanbul, arrived and was accepted by the Ottoman State.²⁷⁹

Why did Ottoman government approve the appointment of an American ambassador to Istanbul in 1906? Ottoman foreign policy making could not be evaluated without referring developments within the Europe. America, after the turn of the century, began to be accepted as an important power since its diplomatic representatives upgraded to embassy in 1893, in various European capitals. While Americans welcomed in the European politics, Ottomans could not achieve to resist this development long. On the other hand, it is important to note that America already get involve militarily its first transcontinental operation by supporting British suppression in China in 1905. One year later, Ottoman Empire upgraded American diplomatic representative's status from ministry to embassy.

Relations between the United States and the Ottoman Empire would be interrupted with the outbreak of the First World War when the Ottoman Empire ended diplomatic ties with the United States.²⁸⁰ As an official document demonstrates, "the Imperial Government has today informed the embassy that as the government of the United States has declared itself to be in a state of war with

²⁷⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.EŞA. D 49, G 92, 21 Za 1324

²⁸⁰ Gordon, "Turkish-American Treaty Relations," p. 718.

Germany, the Ottoman government's ally it finds it necessary to rupture its diplomatic relations with the United States today. American interests have been confined to the Swedish minister."²⁸¹

²⁸¹ from Tarler to Secretary of state, no 2639, April 20, 1917 in *The American Journal of International Law*, 11, no. 4 (October 1917), p. 375.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In assessing the relations between America and the Ottoman Empire, the diplomatic dimension is too important to languish in the shadow of the missionary activities or the Armenian problem. It is unquestionable that those relations continued throughout the nineteenth century, were multidimensional with all parts interrelated each other and directly or indirectly, under the affect of economic, social and global developments.

Therefore, this thesis approaches Ottoman-American relations from a different perspective and seeks to comprehend how those bilateral relations were affected by the American efforts at becoming a great power. With regard to Ottoman-American relations some answers we reached which corresponded with the thesis approach.

It is unquestionable that Ottoman-American bilateral relations were established on the pillars of the economic ties before the mid-nineteenth century. For instance the Treaty of 1830 was based on economic concerns and whole articles were with regard to the regulations on American trade within Ottoman lands. Those efforts at opening a diplomatic legation in Istanbul also sought to control commercial activities between the two states. It was not problematic because there were no American citizens in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but only few merchants established contact with the Turks. Furthermore, missionary

activities just had begun flourished in the Ottoman Empire but these did not result in a diplomatic crisis until the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Furthermore the beginning of relations also proved that American-Ottoman relations flourished because of American persistence, while the Ottomans tried to delay all parts of the relations. In the beginning the Ottomans were not desirous for the improvement of the relation. On the contrary, the Americans urged the Ottomans to sign the treaty in 1830. This type of task distribution, i.e. the Ottomans' reluctance and the Americans' determination, would continue until the end of the Empire in all spheres of the relations.

On the contrary, the economic agenda replaced political one, as America began to change its political approach from isolation to intervention. We have to remember the improvement of missionary activities and the increasing American population in the Ottoman Empire. The number of naturalized American Armenians was growing, and the Ottoman Empire was faced with the emerging nationalist movements in the Balkans and Eastern regions. The spread of the diplomatic representatives throughout the country also proved the escalation of the political dimension. In the beginning, consulates and diplomatic representations were opened to deal with traders' problems, but then, America sought to open a consulate in Erzurum where an order to serve nearby American citizens.

This was the result of a political agenda, of course. America after the 1860s, i.e. after the Civil War, began to transform its foreign policy toward an interventionist approach. Because economic, demographic and social developments within America led it to intervene into European affairs in order to protect its interest, according to

Secretary of State William Seward. After that time, America can be seen in many problematic areas such as the Crete problem, the Bulgarian uprising and the Armenian Question which all led Ottoman-American relations into a more intense crisis.

Of course, American-Ottoman relations can not be evaluated without referring to European politics. It is the fact that America benefited from the international conditions that emerged after the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which indicated changes in the European Great Powers' approach toward the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain and France no longer supported the Ottomans' integrity after that time and ignored the articles of the Paris Treaty of 1856, which had given the Ottomans rights to become "equal" member of the European balances of power. As European conditions had changed, America could easily determine their politics vis-à-vis the Ottomans. It is an legitimate question to ask whether Europe determined to secure the Ottomans' integrity in the Treaty of Berlin, then America could get involved in a more interventionist policy toward Babiali. Perhaps, but even though America changed its policy toward Europe, i.e. abandoned isolationism and preferred interventionism, it always avoided clashing with the interests of the Great Powers. Rather, it sought to move parallel to them, and usually sought to gain from this cooperation.

This thesis, therefore, read American-Ottoman relations from a perspective that seeks to evaluate it within the developments of the international relations. It attributes importance, of course, to the missionary activities or American support of the Armenians. They constitute an important part of the last quarter of the nineteenth

century. But it gives more importance to comprehending why the Americans changed their policy toward the Ottoman Empire, or what the bases of those transformations were.

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APPENDIX

LIST OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES IN ISTANBUL

George W. Erving, Chargé dé Affaires; commissioned, although his nomination was confirmed by the Senate.

David Porter, Chargé dé 'Affaires, September 13, 1831, reappointed as Minister Resident in May 23, 1840.

Dabney S. Carr, Minister Resident, February 29, 1844.

George P. Marsh, Minister Resident, March 11, 1850.

Carroll Spence, Minister Resident, August 23, 1853.

James Williams, Minister Resident, January 14, 1858.

Edward Joy Morris, Minister Resident, Jun 8, 1861.

Wayne MacVeagh, Minister Resident, Jun 4, 1870.

George H. Boker, Minister Resident, November 3, 1871.

Horace Maynard, Minister Resident, March 9, 1875.

James Longstreet, Minister Resident, Jun 14, 1880.

Lewis Wallace, Minister Resident, May 19, 1881 and again Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Jul 13, 1882.

Samuel S. Cox, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, Mar 25, 1885.

Oscar S. Straus, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, March 24, 1887, and in Jun 3, 1898 again. Last, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in

May 17, 1909.

Solomon Hirsch, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, May 16, 1889.

David P. Thompson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, November 15, 1892.

Alexander W. Terrell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, April 15, 1893.

James B. Angell, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, April 15, 1897.

John G. A. Leishman, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, December 20, 1900, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Jun 18, 1906.

William Woodville Rockhill, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, April 24, 1911.

Henry Morgenthau, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, September 4, 1913.

Abram I. Elkus, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, July 21, 1916.