

THE VISIBILITY OF LATE-OTTOMAN RULERS:
THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSITION OF URBAN REPRESENTATION
IN SOUTHERN ARAB PROVINCES

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The Visibility of Late-Ottoman Rulers:
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I, Onur Atay, certify that

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ABSTRACT

The Visibility of Late Ottoman Rulers: The Ideological Transition Of Urban Representation in Southern Arab Provinces

This study questions how the power shift in the Late Ottoman Period effected the representation of rulership in the cityscape, via architectural, urban and infrastructural interventions in the Southern Arab Provinces, namely Palestine and Syria in the case of this study.

The main focus will be the modernization processes of the Ottoman state observed in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century urban developments. These developments were aimed to improve the Ottoman State's connection with the periphery. This focus will be expanded in this study via the examination of the differences between the approaches of the Hamidian era and that of the Committee of Union and Progress. The methodology of spatial interventions structured on the representation of hegemony and the revanchism between shifting powers will be also inspected.

It is crucial to mention before and after conditions and status of the provinces, in order to reflect on the progressive urban politics during the turn of the century. Possible alterations will be questioned via significant structural examples such as clock towers, monuments which implied celebrations and major infrastructural projects of the time. A methodological examination will be applied on how those examples were treated by the former and challenged by the latter powers that occupied the Ottoman rulership and the Ottoman urban space. The questions through the study will be instrumentalized in order to enlighten how the power shift affected

the centralization politics and how it shaped southern provinces of the Ottoman Empire in late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

ÖZET

Geç Osmanlı İktidarlarında Görünürlük:

Güney Arap Vilayetlerinde Kentsel Temsilin İdeolojik Dönüşümü

Bu çalışma, Geç Osmanlı Döneminde otorite geçişlerinin kent içerisinde lider figür temsilini nasıl etkilediğini, Filistin ve Suriye üzerinden Güney Arap Vilayetleri'ndeki mimari, kentsel ve altyapısal müdahaleler üzerinden incelemektedir.

Çalışma, odağını geç on dokuzuncu yüzyıl ve erken yirminci yüzyıldaki kentsel müdahalelerin modernizasyonu üzerine kuracaktır. Bu müdahaleler Osmanlı Devleti'nin çeperle ilişkisini değiştirme ve geliştirmeye odaklanmıştır. Bahsedilen bu odak, Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in dönemindeki yaklaşımlar ve İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nin yönetimde yetkili olduğu dönemdeki yaklaşımlar üzerinden kıyaslanarak, iktidarın temsilini ön plana alan mekansal müdahalelerin farklılaşması ve farklı iktidar güçleri arasındaki olası rövanşizm üzerinden genişletilecektir.

Yüzyıl dönümünde gelişim halindeki kent politikalarını yansıtabilmek için yerleşimlerin sonraki durumlarının da çalışmada yer alması önemlidir. Olası farklılıklar belirli örnekler üzerinden sorgulanacak ve bu örneklerin önceki ve sonraki yönetimler sırasındaki durumlarına yönelik tespitlerle, Osmanlı kentsel alanında ve yönetiminde bulunan farklı iktidarların bu örnekler üzerinden nasıl ilerlediği metodolojik bir biçimde incelenecektir. Bu sorgulamalar, geç on dokuzuncu ve erken yirminci yüzyılda gerçekleşen güç kaymalarının ademi merkezîyetçi politikaları nasıl etkilediği ve Osmanlı'nın güney eyaletlerini nasıl biçimlendirdiğini aydınlatma amacıyla araştırılacaktır.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Memory, as an ambiguous term when one questions if it is physical or not, is a foundation stone in making of one's history. Memory consists of the former, the old but not the forgotten; and remembering is crucial while building up the memory, thus the history.

Alois Riegl expands the understanding of memory in a broader spectrum beyond spaces. Riegl also questions texts; photos and every potential agent that we can say are witnesses of time and claim those to be evaluated also as monuments. Moreover, creating objects that represent a historical notion, or witness events originate different modalities of monuments, according to Riegl's point on the differentiation of intentionality in remembrance.¹ Riegl categorizes the monuments into two, related to the historical and sociological background of the monument. The first is unintentional monuments, which are the objects becoming tools of remembrance within time. The time that the objects witness is described as the age value. The memories created by the objects, enhance the value of those objects. Therefore, any object can create or recreate sessions of remembrance for the observer's perception, only with the provided agglomeration of memories. On the other hand, intentional monuments are built to represent the glory or the sorrow of a future historical incident, to promote a name or a happening with an aspiration. The utilization of any architectural application or urban intervention thus gains the role of an apparatus with the discourse of intentional monuments. The case of representation

¹ Riegl, *The Modern Cult of Monuments: Its Essence and Its Development*, 81.

of state power, in this study, will be examined through the case of intentional monuments.

Before any word on the significance of monuments, it is essential to differentiate the notions of history and memory. While memory is directly dependent on social conditions, it recreates itself as a collective compound, rather than only as a limited group of individual recollections. According to Maurice Halbwachs, history is singular while collective memory "...dissolves and recuperates around it".² While different societies form different collective memories, history distinguishes itself from memories when traditions and rituals stop operating. Therefore, memory is prospective; the new memory forms itself by projecting a future. Societies can only remember what they place and embed in collective memory. Collective memory leads the masses to the core of remembrance: to forget is a physical activity and physical alterations accelerate forgetting.³ To keep something recollective in common memory, physicality, or spatiality, is essential and that is understandable from the people's perspective. The incident eventually denotes a memory.⁴ Halbwachs's understanding of memory relies on relativity; memory is able to be changed via physical intervention and true remembrance can only be sustained via the collectivity of memory.⁵ As Walter Benjamin stresses in his *On the Concept of the History*, "to articulate what is past does not mean to recognize 'how it really was.'"⁶ Benjamin's emphasis underlines that not only remembering but also forgetting were spatial and political.

² Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 68-69.

³ Ibid, 140.

⁴ Assmann, Kaplicky, *Collective Memory and Cultural Identity*, 166.

⁵ Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, 72.

⁶ Benjamin, "On the Concept of History", 4.

The aforementioned physical changes can be directly related with space. The physical indicators that shape daily routines are the results of remembrance via observation and experience; therefore changing those indicators can alter remembrance. The indicators appear to be the structures or constructions in this study that surround us and amplify our feeling of belonging to space. As a community, we tend to shape our collective memory based upon structures and cultural landscapes, as much as the rituals that Benedict Anderson highlights in his book *Imagined Communities*.⁷ Anderson's assertion is basically on the invention of tradition, or activities performed that render people as members of a cultural or a religious group.⁸ People can belong to designated groups through physical alterations that are directly linked with the physical space.

The modern period was a milestone in which the immediate emergence of the omnipotence and omnipresence of the ruling powers resulted in the practice of memory making in urban space with a forward-thinking agenda. The initial aim might be linked to the centralization ideologies that were embraced by many leaders in the late eighteenth century. The transformations brought by the modern age, created designated bonds between memory and ideology, which was reflected in the kinds of urban spaces inspected in this study. As a significant example, the overwhelming acceleration of nation building was in development while memory became a direct apparatus in this progress. The direct utilization of memory was owned by sovereign powers, embedded in the methodology of modernization with the start of the nineteenth century. Simultaneously with the rising magnitude of the modern studies on monumentality, which was firstly triggered with Alois Riegl's work 'The Modern Cult of Monuments', memory was interrogated and thus became

⁷ Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 82.

⁸ Ibid.

much understandable as a notion than before. After almost a century, Pierre Nora created a new expansion in memory research, investigating the physical conditions of remembering and how we approach and reappropriate collective memory through memory spaces in his work *Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire*.⁹

Subsequently, the monument as a construction, as an object intended as an intervention in urban space, that comprises connotations and meaning than a mere physical need for the people, became popular and was reapproached in its modernist context. We can summarize with a declaration that the monuments have an important function, as they are memories devoted to the spiritual existence of human beings. In addition to this claim, no nation can survive without a memory or can be counted as a nation if we accept collective memory as a foundation stone. This interpretation summarizes the understanding of memory reflected in this study and bonds it with nation building.

The core intention of this study is to analyze and to compare the struggles for being remembered as a way of legacy building in the Ottoman realm. The Ottoman sultans, as well as the late military leaders, who were the sole governors of the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, were progressive in legacy building through urban or rural interventions. Those interventions imposed constructions of glory, charity and visibility or mere infrastructural applications that introduced modern technologies of the nineteenth century to the Ottoman subjects. In terms of memory production, or utilization, the Ottoman rulers approached their subjects differently, depending on geographical and cultural factors. Especially with the eighteenth century, which is going to be mentioned in this study regarding the urbanization boom with a socialization concept, the Ottoman sultans started treating the public space in relation

⁹ Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire”, 17.

with the social needs of its people. The expanding social space led to more urbanized and eventually tamed territories in the Ottoman cities.

My dissertation journey started with inspecting the late-Ottoman period monuments that I initially perceive only as the intentional monuments that represent no practical function. However, through this journey, I had the chance to question what kind of a development process, rooted back in the late eighteenth century, enabled Ottomans to envision monuments, and how modernizing urban transformation or infrastructural interventions were parts of the same constructional campaign that also consists of the symbolical, obelisk-like monuments erected during the Hamidian era. As a sample to represent late Ottoman period's urban developments, discovering late urbanization in the territories of Syria and Palestine was fruitful for me to understand the Ottoman approach in the periphery. Since the efforts to keep the empire as a whole, the urban modernity was a concept to be applied in the periphery, especially before the Great War not to lose the support of the peripheral communities. Especially after the Greek Independence and during the pathway leading to the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman state was also aware of the fragile loyalty in distinctive communities, especially in Levant. My point here is to elaborate questions to interrogate how the Ottoman rulers utilized different mediums of visibility, to reinforce the ruler image from the perspective of *reaya* with a constructive context in the region. My main goal is to inspect if there were revanchist politics during and after the power shifts, especially in the pre-Great War period, which can be perceived from the constructional approaches that the Ottoman state applied in the region. Syria and Palestine were two specific regions that the Ottoman rulers later showed interest and tried to reinforce their bonds with the empire. Those regions still have the Ottoman remnants as buildings and infrastructure, as first

applications of the modern city planning in their history. As a tool for power representation before the subjects, the Ottoman state utilized the construction, applied it with a glorious approach and tries to keep the Ottoman subjects loyal to the empire. Additionally, the theories of memory studies play a role to analyze the monumentality notion here and help me to distinguish the actions applied in the region.

About the sources I inspected throughout this study, my approach was mostly about expanding my range of study through the past. I tried to follow and multiply Erkmen's questions which she projected in her book, *Geç Osmanlı Dünyasında Mimarlık ve Hafıza: Arşiv, Jübile, Abide*, that created the pedestal for this study.¹⁰ The search for 'the real Ottoman monument' in the book expanded my understanding about the context and how the power shift in 1909 might have affected the ruler representation in the Ottoman public space. However, I found myself in a position against Erkmen's stance; the Ottoman modernization should be questioned from an earlier period to understand how the representation was utilized within time. Selim Deringil's clear examples in *Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)* helped me to project the Hamidian approach in this study and how the sultan approached the issue of visibility with international comparisons. I tried to develop my understanding of the Hamidian era, with a modernist perspective via Deringil's detailed examples and elaborate the legitimacy issue of the sultan before the *reaya*.¹¹ On the other hand, Klaus Kreiser's article "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1860-1916" on how the first public Ottoman monuments with an intentional and Westernized approach were planned

¹⁰ Erkmen, A. (2010). *Geç Osmanlı Dünyasında Mimarlık ve Hafıza: Arşiv, Jübile, Abide*. İstanbul: BEK.

¹¹ Deringil, S. (1991). Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909). *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 23(3), 345-359.

and projected in the Ottoman public space. Kreiser's article is fruitful to find new paths about the monument culture in the late Ottoman Empire and the late Egyptian khedives' approach in leader visibility, which is not included in this study.¹² On the other hand, the gaps that I could not understand in Kreiser's work also motivated my study and my further questions.

Followingly, to understand the image modernization of the Ottoman sultan and how this image was utilized during the era of Sultan Mahmud II, Darin Stephanov's book and his related article were both helpful.¹³ Also to understand the motives behind the strategies that have been used against the Arab communities in the southern regions in late century, Mahmud II's (1808-1839) several trips to Balkans between 1830 and 1837 were significant. Stephanov clearly illustrates the efforts of the ruler ship through the modernizing ruler image and how to reinforce the bonds between the Ottoman throne and the periphery, via visibility of a leader as Mahmud II. Also to understand the historical pathway that led to Mahmud II, I followed Shirine Hamadeh's work to overview the abundant construction period in eighteenth century.¹⁴ The period also brought a flexing social environment and reinforced the visibility of the Ottoman ruler ship in public space. My previously conventional reading of Ottoman modernization was altered with Hamadeh's elaborations in the book and I was able to understand and distinguish the significant evolution of the Ottoman public space through public routines and constructional projections.

¹² Kreiser, K. (1997). Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1860-1916. *Muqarnas*, 14, 103-117.

¹³ Stephanov, D. (2014). Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire, 1(1-2), 129-148.

¹⁴ Hamadeh, Ş. (2010). *Şehr-i Sefa: 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

Stefan Weber's detailed analysis of the Ottoman heritage in Damascus and the its historical narrative behind was also enlightening, since it was not easy to monitor the Hamidian construction scheme in the cityscape with comparative readings. While Weber's approach was much technical and related to the architectural details, on the other hand, Leila Hudson's book, "Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City" helped me to understand the social structure of Damascus and how the community was affected from the power shift in 1909 and how the war resulted in the cityscape. Though I was not sure how to use the well-detailed statistics in the book, the informative narrative was beneficial for me and for this study. I was mostly inspired with her detailed approach against Arab nationalism and how the Western type of nationalism infiltrated in the Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire.

As an enlightening source, though I did not include in this study for a long while, Hasan Kayali's book, *Arabs and Young Turks Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918*, on the problematic relation between the Young Turks and the Arabs in the southeastern periphery was fruitful for this study.¹⁵ Kayali's points are crucial to understand the nuances between the Hamidian strategy and the Young Turk approach in the territory. Additionally, the issue of Arab nationalism which was also correlated with the growing Turko-Ottoman nationalism was thoroughly inspected in his study.

The Ottoman railway technology, which reached its peak during the time of the Great War, has a long, well-detailed history. Due to the technological details, many of the sources I inspect was not helpful since those sources hesitate to mention

¹⁵ Kayalı, H. (2018). *Jön Türkler ve Araplar: Osmanlıcılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık 1908-1918*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

political aspects. Peter H. Christensen's detailed work, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways* expanded my view and answered my questions about a possible German colonial affiliation against the Arab territory.¹⁶ Since the Ottoman state was already evaluated for its utilization of Ottoman orientalism against its Arab subjects as Ussama Makdisi stresses, I found answers to my questions about the German affiliation during the railway installments in Christensen's book. However, there was still absence on behalf of the non-German railway affiliations and Murat Özyüksel's book *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire* helped me to see the other side of the railway economy and concessions.¹⁷ While I was inspecting the railway infrastructure as a power representation tool, Michael Talbot's clear explanation for the Haifan railway branch and the story of the railway monument in Haifa completed my gap in the Ottoman railway scene.

My initial question while starting this study, was whether there was an urban revanchism between the late leaders of the Ottoman Empire, especially the members of the Committee of Union and Progress, and Sultan Abdülhamid II, whom they deposed in 1909. The basic premises of this study were informed by Alev Erkmen's detailed study, which enlightened me about the post-Tanzimat era Ottoman rulers and their desire for Western type monumentality. I also intended to discover the introduction of a form of 'strategic charity' by Sultan Mahmud II during the pre-Tanzimat Era, as Darin Stephanov particularly detailed in his book, *Ruler Visibility and Popular Belonging in the Ottoman Empire, 1808-1908*.¹⁸ My journey followed the linking of the following periods in the concept of state visibility through

¹⁶ Christensen, P. (2017). *Germany and the Ottoman Railways*. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press.

¹⁷ Özyüksel, M. (2014). *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline*. London: IB Tauris.

¹⁸ Stephanov, D. (2018). *Ruler Visibility and Popular Belonging in the Ottoman Empire, 1808-1908*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

constructions. While the main base for this study was becoming apparent, it was better for me to look at the early implications of the urban advancements in Constantinople, during the early modernization era of eighteenth century to understand the development of public space and the transformation of royal space. Those transformations paved the way for forms of intended urbanism, which sought for better-developed cities for a better functioning of hegemonic mechanisms. Shirine Hamadeh's detailed explanation of eighteenth-century developments in her book *The City's Pleasures* is beneficial for preventing any anachronism or mistaken analysis of modern interventions that occurred in the nineteenth century. However, the history of the sultans' visibility-oriented interference in the Ottoman physical space was not limited to simple constructions, there were strategic purposes embedded in infrastructural applications, transportation advancements, or technological interventions. And I assume that this variety can be better examined in a territory that was neglected, remote to the throne, and hosted a clear selection of urban interventions that shaped the cities in a modern concept, as in the case of the Arabic-speaking southern provinces.

Last but not the least to be mentioned here, Zeynep Çelik's works definitely effected the direction of my research. Since she mainly focuses in the late modernization of the Ottoman Empire with a westernization perspective in her field of study, it generates a westernized story of the late Ottoman developments.¹⁹ While this approach can be questionable due to the designation of an Ottoman modernization story without linking it with before nineteenth century, this approach probably helped me to limit my boundaries while continuing my research of urban

¹⁹ Çelik, Z. (1993). *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century*. CA: University of California Press.

developments in the southeastern periphery. Her summarization was also beneficial to understand a modernizing empire, and comparisons with the western examples enlightened the possibility of similar approaches used in the urban scene.²⁰

The case of visibility played a key role, during the late dissolution of the empire, to consolidate power and land control. Especially as the independence movements in the Balkans started with the nineteenth century, the utilization of the Sultan as the sole protector figure of the imperial realm was crucial. The period during the Tanzimat (1839-1876) was a milestone that differentiated and categorized the concept of the leader representation as before and after. The presence of Sultan Mahmud II was introduced to the Balkan territories in person during the pre-Tanzimat era, while Sultan Abdulhamid II updated the same method in his own terms. He utilized the construction and infrastructure boom that represented himself not in person but through urban interventions, before the Southern periphery, especially in front of his Arab subjects. Cemal Pasha, who became the major governor in Syria and Palestine during the Great War, later used a similar discourse to reshape and eventually reorganize the territory under his name. This mere narrative basically creates the backbone of this study, to evaluate the represented state power in comparison during the Late Ottoman period via sampling the urban interventions of the era, in Syria and Palestine.

My intention is not to create a chronological order to mention the related actions in this study. To make proper comparisons, I found it better to sample different cases of technologically-oriented advancement, such as the improved utilization of Western time, railways, telegraphy, modern city planning strategies,

²⁰ Çelik, Z. (2008). *Empire, Architecture, and the City: French-Ottoman Encounters, 1830-1914*. Washington: University of Washington Press.

and aviation. The increasing number of the technology imports in the empire eventually resulted in the utilization of those technologies by the rulers who were seeking to increase their visibility, thus governing power. Each of these had diverse social, political and cultural ramifications, and therefore involved different forms of historicity in their own right for the Ottoman State. Therefore, I try to exemplify each advancement and its consequences in its own historical context and in relation to its existing historical narratives. This may result in a back and forth chronology and a subtle disconnection between the chapters, but I presume that this introduction may help to fix this potential disconnection.

In Chapter 2, I aim to create a brief summary of the new visibility that was introduced by Sultan Mahmud II during the pre-Tanzimat era. The sultan became personally visible and approachable as a leader, while he was trying to use the ruler image to strengthen the empire's bonds with the periphery. This progress foreshadowed the latter actions of the leaders and how the public perceived the preliminary actions held during that time. As a Western peripheral territory, Thrace was considered as a prototype for inspecting the motives in the next chapters that focused in Syria and Palestine. Therefore, the sultan's visit mentioned in the chapter was significant and a milestone for the ruler's presence as a centralization tool. On the other hand, as a significant introduction of a proto-monument during the pre-Tanzimat period, the Black Rock on Beykoz, which was placed to depict the Russo-Ottoman friendship of the time, was significant and necessary to be mentioned.²¹ That monument had the same fate of destruction with the Ayastefanos Monument in Yeşilköy as well, but not frequently mentioned though it was a very early example of

²¹ Ünal, F . (2013). Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı."Moskof Taşı". *Journal Of Turkology*, 23(2), 187-206. Retrieved from <http://dergipark.org.tr/iuturkiyat/issue/18520/195422>

monumentality in the cityscape.²² The frequently mentioned but never built Tanzimat monuments that Klaus Kreiser examined in his article on *Muqarnas*, were also narrated in this chapter to reinforce the base on how the newly announced Tanzimat edict was considered to be glorified in the Ottoman public space.²³ It is crucial to mention Alev Erkmen's study here again, that her academic research for the first intentional Ottoman monument in Riegl's terms helped me to find my path and continue interrogating my intention for this study.

Chapter 3 focuses on the Hamidian project for building clock towers in the late nineteenth century, since the towers became a visible, obelisk-like representation of centralizing hegemony. Both the propagation of modern time through the image of the Sultan that was represented by the clocktowers, and the instant boom in their construction were direct clues of the increasing structural representation strategized by the sultan. My inspection of the clock towers was reinforced by Avner Wishnitzer's book on the development and management of time in the Ottoman Empire throughout the ages to understand the background for the Hamidian rise of the clocktower.²⁴ Moreover, Bengü Uluengin's detailed work on the constructional aspect of the clocktowers enlightened me about how the administration treated time management and how the public reacted to the later developments.²⁵ I also intended to place the post-war era of Jerusalem within the context of the clocktower in Jaffa Gate, to also include the post-Ottoman spatial revanchism realized by the British forces in Jerusalem in this chapter. The diary of Conde de Ballobar, who was the Spanish Consul of Jerusalem at the time, was helpful to understand the power shifts

²² Denkaş, E. (2011). *Ayastefanos Rus Anıtı(1898-1914)* (Unpublished MSc. Thesis). İstanbul Technical University, İstanbul, Turkey.

²³ Kreiser, K. (1997). Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916. *Muqarnas*, 14, 104-117.

²⁴ Wishnitzer, A. (2015). *Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

²⁵ Uluengin, Mehmet B. (2010). Secularizing Anatolia Tick by Tick. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42, 17-36.

and visible transformation of the city during the beginning of the new century.²⁶ His short daily notes are more than beneficial to understand the zeitgeist and the shifting symbolism of hegemonic changes. Additionally for this chapter, though it may seem to be out of this chapter's context, insights into the experimental urbanism in Beersheba was crucial to justify how urbanism was institutionalized to "tame" the Bedouins in the Palestine desert; here my analysis is developed on the basis of Yasemin Avci's work on the modern development of Beersheba as an Ottoman city.²⁷

Chapter 4 is reserved to the urban development of Damascus, which was one of the largest and oldest cities of the empire that later faced drastic infrastructural changes throughout the end of the nineteenth century. The city was almost an urban playground for Ottoman decision makers, because the Ottoman bureaucracy was reestablishing itself in Damascus under Sultan Abdulhamid's authoritarian rule, competing with the expanding port city of Beirut and the religious center of Jerusalem, especially during the silver jubilee events. The city hosted many constructions to project Ottoman glory in front of its populous and long-established urban community. A significant infrastructural application was the telegraphy system in Damascus that was symbolized by several constructions and a monument that shaped a modern square for the city. The Hamidian constructions were followed by Cemal Pasha's autonomous and instant decisions afterwards. This chapter consists of the most visible outputs compared to the other examples in this study in terms of urban revanchism. Thanks to Hans Theunissen's work *War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus*

²⁶ Ballobar, A., Manzano Moreno, E., & Mazza, R. (2015). *Jerusalem in World War I*. London: I.B. Tauris.

²⁷ Avci, Y. (2009). The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine (1860-1914). *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45(6), 969-983.

during World War I, I could draw upon a whole array of drastic changes applied during Cemal Pasha's governorate in Damascus.²⁸ I first had the chance to learn about the chief architect of Cemal Pasha, Mehmed Nihad (Nigisberk) and his journals written during his work for the Pasha.²⁹ Additionally, Talha Çiçek's elaborate account on state formation in Syria, in a book based on his dissertation, was enriching for this chapter as well.³⁰

The development of railways was another infrastructural but also strategic installation for Syria and Palestine. Michael Talbot's approach to the workings of 'imperial legitimation' in Ottoman cities via railways formed the basis of this chapter, as I conducted research on the railway monument placed next to the railway station in Haifa as another silver jubilee construction during the turn of the century.³¹ Moreover, Peter H. Christensen's study on German-Ottoman relations in the context of the railways answered and also multiplied my questions on the issue of Ottoman railway investments. The construction of the railway system between the cities in Syria, Palestine and religious cities of Hejaz was an institutionalized project for a Pan-Islamist approach aimed by Sultan Abdülhamid II. As a visible transportation project planned to ease the Haj route to Mecca, the Hijaz Railway was also a clear project to establish direct and sustainable connection with Palestine, Syria and the Hijaz territory. The project was made possible by donations from the Muslim community throughout the world and even this first step of the funding process also

²⁸ Theunissen, H. (2016). War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I. In E. J. Zürcher (Eds.), *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje's "Holy War Made in Germany"* (pp. 223-273). Leiden: Leiden University Press.

²⁹ Cengizkan, A. (2009). Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk'in Katkıları: Evkaf İdaresi ve Mimar Kemalettin. *Mimar Kemalettin ve Çağı: Mimarlık / Toplumsal Yaşam / Politika, Sempozyum Bildirileri*, 177-208.

³⁰ Çiçek, M. T. (2014). *War and State Formation In Syria, Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*. New York: Routledge.

³¹ Talbot, M. (2014). The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa. *Urban History*, 42(2), 246-272.

implied the Pan-Islamist tendencies behind the project. I intended to reflect on the Haifa connection of the Hijaz Railway in this chapter, and to see how a railway system was developed in order to reconnect an autonomously expanding, thus decentralizing city back to the Empire. On the other hand, a comparison is made between the Hijaz Railway and the Baghdad Railway, which was another project that was also launched during the Hamidian era, but then halted due to economic struggle. The Baghdad Railway project was later reconceptualized by the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress, in partnership with the Germans, who subtly intended for a military projection of the railway system instead of conceiving it as the Orient Express expansion. Therefore, these two grandiose projects were utilized with respect to two different political projects that intersect in their centralization agendas.

While I was trying to exemplify that transportation infrastructure was also an urbanization tool for the rulership to represent and embed itself in Ottoman public space, I also intended to cover another topic about the development another transportation and military technology: Ottoman aviation. Atilla Aydın's study on the vanity flight from Istanbul to Cairo in 1914 was fruitful to understand the Ottoman aviation in its first steps.³² The flight was personally forced by Enver Pasha to demonstrate the developed flight power of the Ottoman army just after a couple of months the Ottoman Empire joined the Great War. Though the pilots crashed through the route and were deceased in Damascus, the flight was planned to be from Istanbul to Cairo, as a demonstration against the Allied forces in Egypt. Additionally, the flight constituted a singular, temporary ceremony rather than being an established urban intervention (though there is a monument designed by Vedat Tek in memory

³² Aydın, A. (2009). The Ottoman Air Force Flight From Istanbul to Cairo in 1914. *Oriens* 37, 123-154.

of the pilots in Bayezid Square, in 1916); therefore I decided to exclude my abstract research on the topic from this study.

To conclude this part, it is crucial for me to mention and repeat that my aim is to create a comparative perspective to the constructional approach of the late Ottoman leaders that strategized institutional interventions to reinforce the Ottoman presence in the southern periphery. There were many construction projects applied in order to improve the bonds between the region and the throne, mainly started with the restorations of the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem by sultan Süleyman (1520-1566) in 1537.³³ On the other hand, modern urban strategies started to be developed with modernized technology, and the tools I wanted to classify in that context mostly belong to the nineteenth century developments. From telegraphy to modern urban planning, the late technology enhanced the visible connection of the Constantinople with the region while invisibly promoted Ottomanism in the field.

³³ Riedlmayer, St Laurent (1993). "Restorations of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock and Their Political Significance, 1537-1928". 76-84.

CHAPTER 2

SULTAN MAHMUD II AND THE UTILIZATION OF MODERN TOOLS FOR THE SAKE OF VISIBILITY

2.1 The empire and proto-instruments of modern representation

The Ottoman Empire, as a sovereign state inspired of the footsteps of a Western-oriented modernization, maintained an agenda that kept its bonds with its diverse population. The empire suffered contradictions within those footsteps; especially during the emergence of modernizing instruments that became visible starting with the early eighteenth century. The modernizing politics might not have seen similar to the methods that the Western countries embraced, however, the Ottoman approach was distinguishable: the sultan was everywhere, yet he was invisible. Fundamentally originated by the Fatih's code of laws, or the Fatih Kanunnamesi declared in the fifteenth century, the visual representation of the throne and the sultan was kept behind the walls, as Shirine Hamadeh once underlined this as a retreat or *inziva*, which is the original word that better represented the nuance in the situation.³⁴ In Hamadeh's book, *The City's Pleasures: Istanbul in the Eighteenth Century*, the sultan's public visibility was mentioned that the sultan's name and hegemony was endorsed through festivals and celebrations though the sultan was never present.³⁵ The sultan's image gradually diffused into the public space in time. The further development of public space was simultaneously built up with the sultan's visibility; the expansion of royal palaces and gardens in the cityscape established an early transparency for the ruling elite³⁶ The visibility of the sultan started to be developed as a metaphorical public construction and this construction became visible via his

³⁴ Hamadeh, *Şehr-i Sefa: 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul*, 86.

³⁵ Ibid, 92.

³⁶ Ibid, 87.

royalty reflected in architecture and urban space. The royal gardens became visible without large walls and the buildings were developed with more transparency, and the leader figure's diffusion in the public space was improved. Hamadeh also elaborates this change as a reflection of the visions of expanding Ottoman middle-classes on the Ottoman ruling elite.³⁷ Two significant types of construction were going to be continuous, fountains and clock towers, while the former was mentioned in detail also in Shirine Hamadeh's another detailed work and the clock towers, which are going to be analyzed in this study in further chapters.³⁸ The sultan's invisibility was thus halted but was still merely reflected with urban representation. The changing cityscape brought the progressive social classes in a cohesion, while the royal palaces through the Bosphorus were multiplied and the whole coastline became a ceremonial stage for the ruling power in early eighteenth century.³⁹ The progress was going to reach its peak with the moving of Sultan Abdülmecid's permanent departure from the Topkapi Palace to the Besiktas Palace, later in 1855.

Especially during the mid-nineteenth century, due to continuous municipal reforms, especially in 1855 and 1877, major urban interventions were made, and royal representation in architecture and state-programmed opening ceremonies simultaneously started to evolve into a form resembling its Western equivalents. Modern constructional and infrastructural approaches were in progress and they were kept sustainable in order to shape cities with the newly introduced modern aspects during the Tanzimat Period (1839-1876). After mid-nineteenth century, print media became another tool that brought the urban glorification forward and made the construction-based propaganda meet with the masses via texts, drawings and

³⁷ Hamadeh, *Şehr-i Sefa 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul*, 122.

³⁸ Hamadeh, "Splash and Spectacle: The Obsession with Fountains in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul", 128.

³⁹ Hamadeh, *Şehr-i Sefa 18. Yüzyılda İstanbul*, 88.

photography specifically respectively, significantly in Takvim-i Vekayi and Ceride-i Havadis. The festivals, celebrations and ceremonies were being mentioned in media; their visibility, or magnitude in other words, gained public importance both in social life and the urban space. The governmental interventions in city and the advancements of the empire became much more visible by the general public since the media helped the society to perceive anything with the perspectives that the state imposed. Additionally, the constructions or the related rituals that caused people to be exposed to the representation of the leader publicly were also perceived as important and acknowledged by Ottoman historiographers.

After the declaration of the Tanzimat Edict in 1839 in Gülhane, Ahmed Lutfi, who was an Ottoman court official and a historiographer, suggested for a man-sized stone scripture that would resemble the edict in the palace gardens of Gülhane with another obelisk-shaped monument to be erected in Bayezid Square. The suggested proposal also included a public practice resembling a *kandil* that would commemorate the reform package, which has been announced a year ago. The Ottoman notable's suggestion was also extraordinary since the anniversary celebration practice or commemoration rituals were peculiar to the sultan as well as to war and peace agreements. Lutfi's position here was directly linked with a civil and also revolutionary incident. Ahmed Lutfi summarized and defended his position as:

It is obvious that the erection of triumphal arches and other such symbols serves to perpetuate glory. In the unfounded opinion of the people, however, these practices are seen as European customs and give rise to idle talk. Nevertheless, even among us these practices are familiar.⁴⁰

As implied in that last part of his statement, Lutfi wanted to remind the *nişan taşları*, which were the ornamental obelisks with scriptures, started to be erected as

⁴⁰ Kreiser, "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916", 103.

signifiers of the archery sessions of the Ottoman sultans.⁴¹ His point was to underline the existing recognition of the society for the commemoration practice about individuals, especially for a sports event. Sultan Mahmud II, who demanded an Ottoman archery book to be prepared by Mustafa Kani, reignited the archery as a royal and thus popular sport during his reign.⁴² Also famous with his proficiency in this traditional but revived sport, Sultan Mahmud II let the stones erected in several locations through the imperial archery field, the Okmeydanı. The *nişan taşları* were an interpretation of the military and state power bonded with the Ottoman military tradition and royal representation since the archers who are responsible of the stones were mostly from the Ottoman dynasty or notable people close to the throne. The stones, which are diffused from the former archery fields in the periphery to the urban sections of the city, still occupy the urban scenery today, especially in Istanbul.⁴³

Besides the *nişan taşları*, Ottoman cities hosted a variety of different constructions representing royal hegemony with the nineteenth century, especially in the second half. At this point, it is better to remember Riegl's position once again about the intentionality in the creation of a monument. The visibility of the Ottoman throne in cities was improved not only with the growing representation of royalty in public offices but also with various urban components during the second half of the century.⁴⁴ However, starting with the era of Sultan Mahmud II, a new understanding of monumentality was embraced by the throne.⁴⁵ This new understanding was visibly affiliated with a newly introduced symbolism instead of a certain public function or a

⁴¹ For an elaborate study on *nişan taşları* M. Şinasi Acar, *Nişan Taşları: Osmanlı'da Sportif Atıcılık* (İstanbul: Yapı Endüstri Merkezi Yayınları, 2003).

⁴² Hattatoğlu, "İstanbul Okmeydanı ve Fatih Sultan Mehmet'in Okçuluğu", 104.

⁴³ Ibid, 107.

⁴⁴ Stephanov, D. "Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire", 129.

⁴⁵ Akyürek, *Bilgiyi Yeniden İnşaat Etmek: Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlık, Bilgi ve İktidar*, 95.

charity work embedded in urban scenery. Sultan Abdülmecid (1839-1861) was also keen on the same subject and ordered for monumental pieces that would have been placed in Bayezid Square, instead of Gülhane Park, where the Tanzimat reforms were publicly announced under the title of the Gülhane Edict. Both Gaspare Fossati and Artin Bilezikçi, as reputed architects of the era, worked on different proposals for a Tanzimat monument after invitations. They seemed to have exported concepts from the West and designed monuments for the imperial throne that looked similar to the French examples of the time.⁴⁶ Göksun Akyürek stresses the case and explains that the construction was also mentioned in *Takvim-i Vekayi*, the official newsletter, as a public event to be celebrated.⁴⁷ Since the word monument was not recognized, or not even invented in the Ottoman realm at this time, this monument was preliminarily called and mentioned in the newspapers as *Nişan-ı Adalet*, which can be boldly translated to “the sign of justice”.⁴⁸ Fossati’s monument was designed to project an engraved version of the Tanzimat edict, an *alem* representing Islam on its top and a fountain that was planned to project *ab-ı hayat*, the adam’s ale, resembling the holistic importance of justice. Bilezikçi’s proposal was a bit more humble compared to Fossati’s design and it was similar to a short victory memorial. The drawings of Bilezikçi’s monument were exhibited in Paris’s *Exposition Universelle* in 1855 and helped Bilezikçi to win a mention award, yet it was not built and also misunderstood as a monument for the Crimean War.⁴⁹ The problem with these monuments were not their intentionality or basic figurative approach; the repetitively mentioning of Western allies were not embraced by the Ottoman officials, according

⁴⁶ Kreiser, “Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916”, 104.

⁴⁷ Akyürek, *Bilgiyi Yeniden İnşaat Etmek: Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlık, Bilgi ve İktidar*, 110.

⁴⁸ The word, abide was to describe a monument, was to be invented in the early twentieth-century, during the CUP government. The word was actually derived to describe the eternal, or *ebedi*. See Alev Erkmen, *Geç Osmanlı Dünyasında Mimarlık ve Hafıza: Arşiv, Jübile, Abide*, (pp. 89-90).

⁴⁹ Akyürek, *Bilgiyi Yeniden İnşaat Etmek: Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlık, Bilgi ve İktidar*, 116.

to Klaus Kreiser.⁵⁰ Furthermore, the design proposals for these monuments were criticized that there was a visible use of the highly secular symbolism to glorify the Tanzimat Edict.⁵¹ However, Göksun Akyürek supports the former argument, that the bureaucratic conflict prevented the monument to be built.⁵²

2.2 The monument of surrender: the black rock on Beykoz

However, a much earlier monument strikingly comes forward with an emphasis on representational power and needs to be mentioned here. Though this study intends to focus on the representational politics of the Ottoman authority and its changing methods in public visibility through the Arab provinces of the late century, this early example has a multilayered story on monuments and territorial representation through a construction which had completed its lifetime as an alienated monument in Ottoman territory. Mentioning the reforms that led to the changing image of sultan Mahmud II and linking those reforms to the successors in time are crucial to form a basis for the upcoming modern representational methods of the Ottoman throne.

The same monument, known today as the Moskof Taşı, also resembled a memorability of a foreign power exhibited by a public construction in the Ottoman lands. Before the Tanzimat, in 1833, the Russians came through the Black Sea and settled their ships on the Bosphorus, placing their camps on the Cape Selvi in Beykoz, Istanbul. Their reason of arrival was the Ottoman throne's call for help after the ongoing feud between sultan Mahmud II and the Egyptian governor Mehmet Ali Pasha (1805-1848), who already was a leading figure and recently became the absolute ruler of his own territory around the Egyptian coast and declared autonomy

⁵⁰ Kreiser, "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916", 104.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Akyürek, *Bilgiyi Yeniden İnşaat Etmek: Tanzimat Döneminde Mimarlık, Bilgi ve İktidar*, 113.

against the Ottoman throne.⁵³ Mehmet Ali Pasha was a leader who also believed in the power of visual representation via tools of public visibility and public constructions (so did his son Ibrahim Pasha), similar to sultan Mahmud's attempts in public visibility. Mehmet Ali Pasha was a powerful ally that provided the sultan his service many times but his aggression against the Ottoman throne grew in time since his intention of expanding his territory through Syria was not welcomed by the sultan despite the support he provided so far. After heading to Syria with his army consisting of his loyal Albanian troops, he then moved his army to Anatolia and won the Battle of Konya (1832) against the newly established Ottoman army. There was not any obstacle left that might prevent the Egyptian Army from moving to North and invading the Sublime Porte in 1832. The peace attempts by the foreign powers, British and French, did not help to solve the problem between and later the Russians decided to offer their fleet to be close to the Gallipoli as an ally, which the Egyptian fleet came alongside. This military aid resulted with an agreement, the Treaty of Kütahya (1833) between the Egyptian and the Ottoman authorities, which caused the Egyptian governor to renounce his attempts on Anatolia and Syria afterwards. The Russians also signed another treaty with the Ottomans known as the Treaty of Hünkâr Iskelesi. The agreement gave an improbably advantageous position to the Russians, making them the only country in Europe with a fleet that had access to the Dardanelles.⁵⁴

The Russians also installed a huge military camp in Beykoz, which hosted a series of events based on the celebration of the good fellowship between the

⁵³ After the Navarino Sea Battle, despite the Egyptian fleet's huge loss, Sultan Mahmud II did not allow Mehmet Ali Pasha to expand his territory through Syria. The situation led to the first Egyptian-Ottoman war in 1831. See Guang Pan, "Revelations of Muhammad Ali's Reform for Egyptian National Governance", *Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia)* 7(4), (2018), 17-35.

⁵⁴ Ünal, "Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı "Moskof Taşı" (Камень Московитов)", 189.

Ottomans and the Russians, welcoming various notable people, including the sultan himself.⁵⁵ Besides the Russian army's contemporary celebrative practices being performed in the Ottoman territory, the Ottomans also accepted the Russian General Muraviev's proposal for a sign or a monument he already designed personally to be mounted on Beykoz Hill. The Ottoman authority was not comfortable at first and hesitant about a Russian monument that would always remind them of their neediness during a time of distress. Therefore, General Muraviev later suggested the Ottomans to place a rock without any inscription, on the hill, which hosted their military camp as a remnant of their agreement and diplomatic victory. The rock, which was brought directly from the Bosphorus was huge, 3 meters high and weighing approximately 25 tons. It was an ambiguous, yet impressive monument. Muraviev cited his thoughts about the monument as:

Such an enormous rock was selected that it should represent the size of our power. The future generations may not be amazed by the artistic part yet the size of it will show them the intentions of the executors.⁵⁶

Though Muraviev intended to have an inscription of a heroic epitaph carved on the rock, he confined himself to have only the date of the construction carved in Cyrillic.⁵⁷ After the departure of the Russian fleet, Sultan Mahmud wanted Pertev Paşa's words to be carved on the rock as:

The Russian army came here and left as a guest
This piece of rock will remain as a reminder
May the peace between the two stay stable like today's
May our friendly chat be kept longer.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Ibid, 190.

⁵⁶ "O kadar büyük bir kaya seçilmeliydi ki, gücümüzün derecesi ortaya konabilsin. Gelecek nesiller sanat bakımından olmasa da, cesâmeti bakımından onu koyanların asıl niyetlerine şahit olsunlar" Ünal, "Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı "Moskof Taşı" (Камень Московитов)", 196.

⁵⁷ Ünal, "Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı "Moskof Taşı" (Камень Московитов)", 199.

⁵⁸ "Bu sahrâya misâfir geldi gitdi asker-i Rusî; Bu seng-i kûh-peyker yâdigâr olsun nişân kalsın; Vifâkı devleteynin böyle dursun sâbit ü muhkem; Lisân-ı dostânda dâstânı çok zamân kalsın." Ibid, 200.

It is arguable yet possible that the sultan had these words carved on their common monument without the Russians' consent. Excluding the less important and sort of not visible carved part in Cyrillic, which only resembled the date in Russian, the rock was considered as a royal Ottoman structure and opened with a ceremony in 1834. Starting with this ceremony, many Russian notables visited the monument in the following years, from diplomats to Russian artists, who pictured the monument in their works.⁵⁹ In 1875, Ahmed Lutfi mentions the monument as a still standing rock on the steep hills of Beykoz in the fourth volume of his Ottoman chronicle.⁶⁰ It was also mentioned in Reşad Ekrem Koçu's Istanbul Encyclopedia.⁶¹ On the other hand, the monument was pictured in the magazines, such as *Kievskaya Starina*, published in the Russian Empire, by the artists working for those magazines.⁶²

The monument eventually became a piece of dishonor and defeat from various perspectives in Ottoman society and was described as a symbol of the Sultan's invitation of enemies to the well protected domains of the Ottoman land. On the other hand, Reşad Ekrem Koçu stated that even Mehmet Ali Pasha was regretful because of the incidents he caused.⁶³ Started in 1855 and finished in 1866, the Beykoz Pavilion, which was to be constructed with the order of the Egyptian Governor as an apologetic gift to the Ottoman throne, was thus built on its significant place to overshadow the monument in Beykoz, which became known as the Moskof Taşı.⁶⁴ According to Osman Nuri Ergin, the monument already lost its Cyrillic inscription, which was scraped off, and the Ottoman inscription was also in bad

⁵⁹ Ünal, "Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı "Moskof Taşı" (Камень Московитов)", 201.

⁶⁰ Lutfi, *Vak'anüvis Ahmed Lutfi Efendi Tarihi IV*, 97.

⁶¹ Koçu, *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi V*, 2658.

⁶² Ünal, "Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı "Moskof Taşı" (Камень Московитов)", 204.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

condition, during his personal visit to the monument in 1914.⁶⁵ Both the neglect and the infamy caused the ambiguous monument to be alienated. Especially with the rising nationalism of the twentieth century and the unstable foreign affair policy of the Ottoman State, the rock became officially forgotten yet gained hatred by the locals against the Russian remnant. Eventually during the first days of the Great War, the students of the Rehber-i İttihadi Military School in Vanikoy attacked and tore down the monument into pieces in 1915 without any contrary uproar.⁶⁶

The Moskof Taşı was a significant example of a state erected monument, which later became a shameful remnant for the same authority. In contrast with the Ayastefanos Monument in Galataria, which was also a Russian placement, the Moskof Taşı was comparably unknown and unpretentious.⁶⁷ Osman Nuri Ergin's evaluation is not only considerable but also questionable for the monument that if the monument should have been demolished, the Beykoz Pavilion should have had the same destiny since the flamboyant summer palace was built by Mehmet Ali Pasha as a compensation gift for the incident that caused the Ottoman-Russo compromise. In his words, Ergin elaborates that there is a correlation between the pavilion and the erected stone, therefore even if the stone was removed, the pavilion may also remind the Ottoman public of being betrayed by an Ottoman khedive and the situation that eventually let the enemies step on the Ottoman territory, more importantly on Istanbul.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Ünal, "Ruslar Tarafından 1833'de Beykoz/Selvi Burnu'na Dikilen Kaya Anıtı "Moskof Taşı" (Камень Московитов)", 204.

⁶⁶ Kreiser, "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916", 106.

⁶⁷ The Ayastefanos Monument was erected in Yesilkoy, Istanbul due to the incidents during '93 Harbi; the Ottoman-Russo War in 1877-1878 See "Rus Kaynaklarında Ayastefanos Anıtı'yla İlgili Yeni Bulgular", *TÜBA-KED 14* (2016): 179-191.

⁶⁸ Ergin, *Türk Maarif Tarihi*, 537.

2.3 Sultan Mahmud II and his Balkan voyage

The visibility of the Ottoman throne, as a governmental association and personally the sultan's apparatus, were tied to direct and indirect components. As Karateke elaborates, direct ones were the public ceremonies where the sultan stands personally visible, while the indirect ones were the symbols: his tughra, monuments, buildings that were constructed or restored by his decrees.⁶⁹ The sultan's "good works" personified him and spoke for him due to the lack of institutionalized utilization of mass media. While Cengiz Kırılı expands the character of Sultan Mahmud II in his study, he expresses that the Ottoman state achieved to understand the public opinion and recognized it while the Sultan was not going to be a suppressive leader but his image was going to be the agent of representing power in the public.⁷⁰ Sultan Mahmud II was the first Sultan who was officially visible in public since Mehmed II's code of laws, except regular appearances in Friday prayers, accession to the throne ceremonies and celebrations or military campaigns, as Kırılı underlines.⁷¹ His image was institutionalized and was even placed in public offices as the symbolized gaze of the monarch. The sultan was the first Ottoman leader that objectified his image as a state symbol. As a pioneer leader in ruler visibility, sultan Mahmud II was consistent in sustaining his presence both directly and indirectly. His visibility was simultaneously evolving into being pompous as the savior of his people; Mahmud II was the first Ottoman Sultan that had public walks, especially around the bazaars, while he and his clique were visibly heading to the prayers. His evolving character as a king, can also be questioned since his approach in the reforms thus brought a similar image of a Western leader, both in theory and practice.

⁶⁹ Karateke, "Interpreting Monuments: Charitable Buildings, Monuments, and the Construction of Collective Memory in the Ottoman Empire", 187.

⁷⁰ Kırılı, *Sultan ve Kamuoyu*, 104.

⁷¹ *Ibid*, 105.

To demonstrate, it is better to have a look at on the representational evolution of the sultan through the years starting from his early days. As John Hobhouse quotes, when he visited the British ambassador in Istanbul with Lord Byron in 1810, Sultan Mahmud II, who accessed the Ottoman throne almost two years ago, seems to be aloof⁷² and discouraged even for having an eye contact with the other foreign guests.⁷³ He was not present though his look was glamorous as an Ottoman Sultan can be, with an “air of indescribable majesty”.⁷⁴ After almost two decades, in 1829, a British military officer called Adolphus Slade, describes another royal visit with the British ambassador again and describes the Sultan’s look as “divested of sultanic pomp” with “great simplicity”.⁷⁵ The evolution of the Sultan’s outlook was not a surprise, it was a whole package of reforms which caused the drastic changes in the Ottoman politics, methods of governance and the image of the Ottoman Sultan that would continue with the next generations of the Ottoman dynasty. The overall clothing reform of 1829, changed the image of Ottoman nobility and also established a mutual and visual base for both Muslim and non-Muslim subject. Donald Quataert expands the intention as: “At this crucial moment, he [Mahmud II] renegotiated Ottoman identity, stripping it of its religious component.”⁷⁶ One can easily mention of an analogy between the progressive Sultan and the changing empire as progressive bodies in simultaneousness.

Stephanov elaborates the visibility and representation of the Sultan into a broader context and categories, consisting of the royal signature as tughra, public constructional works held which are called “good works”, the mentions of the Sultan

⁷² Stephanov, “Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire”, 129.

⁷³ Ibid, 130.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid, 131.

⁷⁶ Quataert, “Clothing Laws, State, and Society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720-1829”, 413.

by the press and the Sultan's presence in public. Stephanov underlines that the reforms of the Ottoman throne, which were especially on behalf of the representational skills of the Sultan, were planned for a centralization policy that would help the Sublime Porte to gain respect and trust of the periphery by institutionalizing the leader's image in a modern way.

The first aspect of the "good works" of the sultan was about the charitable buildings that represented the deliberate effort for exhibiting the omnipresence of the throne through the Ottoman lands. The idea of Ottomanness was linked with the image of the Sultan and his visibility; if the Sultan had the power to be visible in the territory, this would have meant that the Sultan was capable of protecting that region. The charitable buildings and such constructions were considered as tools of constructing a leader figure. As stated by Karateke, in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire, it was advised to the Ottoman state officials who did not belong to the royal family that they should not build more than one mosque, or a similar charity building.⁷⁷ The constructions or the reparations started to be mentioned and praised in the official newspaper *Takvim-i Vekayi* while the tughras started to be placed on the building façades a century ago.⁷⁸ The tughra was a significant symbol since it was not an image that would have received harsh critics from the Muslim clerics but it was recognizable even by the illiterate sections of the society though it was not even easily readable.⁷⁹ During the Tanzimat era, especially after sultan Mahmud II's efforts, the tughra became the face of the throne, as an imperial stamp signing the built environment as the sultan's property. The sultan was thus embodied as a capable leader that owned the power to construct for his people.

⁷⁷ Karateke, "Interpreting Monuments: Charitable Buildings, Monuments, and the Construction of Collective Memory in the Ottoman Empire", 190.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

On the other hand, Sultan Mahmud II was not a leader known with victories or his success in the battlefield, however, his presence and image were glorified in different ways. He was the first Sultan that utilized public visibility, especially during his trip to the Friday prayers. He used routes through the Grand Bazaar to show that he is present while his pictures started to be hung in public buildings, or schools.⁸⁰ The accessibility of the Sultan made him gain an advantage to be reachable and present (for a limited public though), changing the Ottoman Sultan's ruling paradigm in representation and updating the mysterious eastern sultan as a visible and powerful western king. One can question that the Sultan's visibility also reinforced trust in the reforms by the public, since the Sultan's image was also changing in the perspective of the general public. The grandiose reforms of the Tanzimat era, which were officially declared right after Mahmud's death with the Gülhane Edict in 1839, are able to be considered as personified in the sultan's own body.

Another igniter for the sultan's position and his presence evolving into a king was the reimplementation and reinterpretation of the title of Caliph. After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774, which the Russians had major advantages against the Ottomans, the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire became the protégés of the Russian Tsar. In return, the Ottoman non-Muslims were recognized as the symbolic protégé of the Ottoman Sultan.⁸¹ After almost five decades, sultan Mahmud II was inspired by the realization that he was the protector of not only the Ottoman Muslims but also the non-Muslim Ottoman people. Also the latest incidents he experienced proved him that to be visible in the Western territories in the Balkans, which suffered

⁸⁰ Karateke, "Interpreting Monuments: Charitable Buildings, Monuments, and the Construction of Collective Memory in the Ottoman Empire", 189.

⁸¹ Stephanov, "Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire", 139.

sieges and riots, was also important to keep his people and borders safe and united. During the seven years between 1830 and 1837, Sultan Mahmud II travelled five times through the Western territories. Kırılı elaborates the Sultan's intention for those trips as "to be seen rather than to see his subjects".⁸² During those trips, he granted various funds for the non-Muslim population's needs for churches, synagogues or religious sites which were recognized as sacred by the non-Muslim population. The Sultan's effort was to keep himself being remembered, with his works, his aid and his presence in person, though becoming a godlike king figure from the non-Muslim perspective. His last trip to the Western territories took thirty-nine days with visiting more than a dozen towns close to the Danube River. During this last trip, according to Helmuth von Moltke, the Sultan once gave a speech, read by Vassaf Efendi, in Shumen:

I distinguish the Muslims among my subjects only in the mosque, the Christians- in the church, the Jews- in the synagogue; there is no other difference among them. My love and justice are strong for all, and all are my true sons.⁸³

The father figure wasn't firstly utilized against the non-Muslim Ottoman subjects though this statement represented the Sultan's timely contemporary intention to reach the proper and effective level of understanding on the equality of their subjects, which are being distinguished as potential separatists due to the *zeitgeist*. Sultan Mahmud later gave a speech in the same trip to the leaders of the non-Muslim population:

It is our wish to ensure the peace and security of all inhabitants of our God-protected great state, both Muslim and re'aya. In spite of all difficulties we are determined to secure the flourishing of the state and the population under

⁸² Stephanov, "Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire", 140.

⁸³ Ibid, 142.

our protection. You, bearing in mind our wish, ought to believe us in this deed.⁸⁴

The sultan was aware of the lack of a leader image in the territory also in the perspective of the non-Muslim communities throughout the Empire. These small steps later paved the way to the Gülhane Edict though the centralization politics of the Ottoman throne already started. Sultan Mahmud II's treat for the communities of lesser status in his empire was striking and was going to be embraced by the next generations in the throne, in different ways and methods. As mentioned before, this study primarily focuses on ruler visibility and revanchist politics in urban space during the turn of the century. However, the political methods firstly utilized or institutionalized during Sultan Mahmud II's era were remarkable and soon to be multiplied later by the next generations. After half a decade, the imperial case of centralization and visibility was going to appear in the southern Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The modernization of the leader image by sultan Mahmud II was going to be enhanced and reinforced with different approaches, especially with the reinforcing impact of technology.

⁸⁴ Stephanov, "Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839) and the First Shift in Modern Ruler Visibility in the Ottoman Empire", 140.

CHAPTER 3

CONSTRUCTIONAL REVANCHISM: SULTAN ABDULHAMID II AND CEMAL PASHA IN THE PERIPHERY

3.1 Sultan Abdulhamid II and the ticking hegemony

The rise of the development projects for the southeastern Ottoman provinces in the nineteenth century, which became visibly glorified by monumental approaches, then resulted in a construction program, is going to be interrogated in this topic. While Cengiz Kırılı elaborates the expansion and the evolution of social life in Ottoman public space, he exemplifies the notion of coffeehouses, which started growing in numbers in the eighteenth century.⁸⁵ On the other hand, Shirine Hamadeh questions the continuous production of fountains that were also mentioned in previous chapters of this study.⁸⁶ The improvement of Ottoman social space, in the developing public realm, was a signifier of the urban development in eighteenth century. As Hamadeh expresses, the Ottoman public space encountered an instant constructional boost with the beginning of the eighteenth century, which was comparable to the drastic interventions when the Ottomans took over Constantinople in fifteenth century. Hamadeh names this period in seventeenth century as a “construction frenzy”, the Ottoman ruler ship approached the city comparably to sultan Mehmet II (1451-1481) as a reestablishment of the Ottoman visibility in the cityscape.⁸⁷ While the social space was changing, another aspect was the public diffusion of the sultan, or the Ottoman royalty.

⁸⁵ Kırılı, *The Struggle Over Space: Coffeehouses Of Ottoman Istanbul, 1780-1845*, 121.

⁸⁶ Hamadeh, “*Splash and Spectacle: The Obsession with Fountains in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul*”, 130.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 123.

Ahmed III's arrival in Constantinople during his accession to the throne created a foundation for the new transformation of the city in 1703. The visibility of the Ottoman elite was on front and they achieved this visibility with architecture and urban development. As Hamadeh stresses, the modernization period of the Ottoman public space was launched in the eighteenth century; the architectural development let the royal image to be much visible than before and comparably not secluded.⁸⁸ The architectural interventions were again consistently growing in number in the eighteenth century and this situation resulted in the expansion of the royal space. The royal space was much visible thus accessible by the *reaya*. On the other hand, the drastic changes in the Ottoman monarch due to the political instability created a wider and ever-growing elite class and an expanding middle class in the Ottoman publicity. The changing architecture of the city might have been defined as Westernized or "influenced", however, the actors of the change were not only the leading ruling elite but also the royal families and the middling class. The modernizing urban development in Constantinople was not a centralized policy of the Ottoman throne, it was an outcome of the interactions between classes which are becoming visible and evaluable every passing day. Eventually, the early modern space gave greater opportunities for a diversifying Ottoman public to be visible to each other, more than before. However, this advancement inspired another aspect: the case of monuments in new forms, which represented the throne, directly or indirectly before the *reaya*. Though the Ottoman royalty had many instruments to represent its glory in public space, varying from selatin mosques to charity works, the eighteenth century brought different perspectives that were going to be embraced by the later sultans and authorities. Fountains were regarded as symbolical structures

⁸⁸ Hamadeh, "Splash and Spectacle: The Obsession with Fountains in Eighteenth-Century Istanbul", 27.

that represented Ottoman charity, as “good works” as mentioned above, while the clock towers served a new perspective on the perception of time by the *reaya*.⁸⁹

Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876-1909), was a pioneer in this construction boom in late nineteenth century and during his silver jubilee, the 25th anniversary of his accession to the throne, he celebrated with the inauguration of several constructions in different territories, all over the empire through a few years. The sultan’s interventions resulted in urban applications such as hospitals, schools, fountains and clock towers. Even infrastructure projects, as waste water management, were perceived as gifts from the sultan while those interventions were practically necessary. Similar to his predecessor Mahmud II, the sultan probably considered to link his omnipotent leadership to the empire’s lands through those structures and symbols, thus becoming omnipresent. Eldem emphasizes this attempt with citing the situation as “His *tughra* roamed through the Empire”, though his visibility was limited in person, except the Friday prayers held in the Yıldız Mosque.⁹⁰ The sultan’s symbolical signature, his *tughra* was always engraved on the newly built fountains and clock towers placed in the new public projects that created a new understanding of urban creation. The sultan’s *tughra* became a signifier of a connection between the urban space and the throne; sultan Abdulhamid II advanced the constructional representation, thus the visibility and utilization of the *tughra* became much more exposed. The opening of each piece became another brick put on his great wall of legacy; the structures metaphorically resembled his throne, like portraits of the sultan.

⁸⁹ Clock towers were the pioneer figures of the modern time in the Ottoman proto-public space. See Uğur Tanyeli, “The Emergence of Modern Time-Consciousness in the Islamic World and the Problematics of Spatial Perception”, *Anytime*, C. Davidson, ed. (MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. And London, 1999), 158-167.

⁹⁰ Deringil, “The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908”, 11-12.

On the contrary, the Ottoman economy was visibly fragile during the first years of sultan Abdülhamid II, around when the empire had been recently but severely troubled by the great bankruptcy of 1875. The Ottoman government did not still recover and was unable to invest in large-scale projects at that time. The inadequacy in the economy also led to welcome foreign investors that later paved the way for the establishment of the infamous institution, Düyün-i Umumiye (Public Debts Administration). The institution was a public debt administration formed after the Ottoman-Russo War of 1877-1878. The eventually ballooned Ottoman debt after the war was discussed and to be controlled by a special administration in the Berlin Congress of 1878.⁹¹ Furthermore, the changes in the municipal laws in 1871 and 1877 accordingly were noteworthy and brought the implications of modernization to the cityscape as much as the modernization of local governance, diffusing through the Ottoman cities' built environment.⁹² The efforts for the development of modern cities in a reformed control system was growing and those efforts were to be exported to the southeastern provinces in order to support centralization politics. Urbanization was thus becoming a tool of centralization and the most visible part of it. The expansion of the planned constructional and infrastructural reforms eventually led to the rise of the notion of "legitimacy structures".⁹³ Deringil explains that the political systems need to depend on different strategical pillars instead of mere brute force to rule different communities. The Ottoman Empire utilized different mediums

⁹¹ Also in favor of Russian war indemnities. See Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton University Press: 2008).

⁹² Lafi, "The Ottoman Municipal Reforms between Old Regime and Modernity: Towards a New Interpretative Paradigm", 354.

⁹³ Deringil names the intentionally Hamidian presence of any medium in urban space as "Legitimacy Structures" See Selim Deringil "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Aug., 1991), 345-359.

in different periods; such as Ottomanization or Islamization. However, I want to reapproach to those structures as physical constructions in this study.

One of the most visible and prominent constructions that represented the glory of sultan Abdulhamid II was the clock tower. Initially seen in a wooden form with the sixteenth-century and embedded in the *muvaqqithanes* in the Ottoman territory in the Balkans, the first one in the empire's heart was erected next to the Nusretiye Mosque in Istanbul in 1839.⁹⁴ Avner Wishnitzer defines the *muvaqqithane* as a philanthropic and pious component in urban space while the time management was a work of astronomy and was acknowledged as a holistic duty for the *muvaqqits*.⁹⁵ In the eighteenth century, establishing *muvaqqithanes* was a charity work for the Ottoman notables, similar to the funding and construction of fountains.⁹⁶ On the other hand, the Ottoman clock tower might be perceived as a pioneer urban utility that had various effects on the already modernizing society of the Ottoman Empire. The clock tower was an outcome of the evolution of function and representation. Ron Fuchs and Herbert Gilbert elaborate the clock towers as a peak level of change depicted by the constructional approach in urban space:

Clocktowers were conceived as symbols of Ottoman loyalty, but they also symbolized the new spirit of change that had spread through the empire since the mid-nineteenth century.⁹⁷

Sultan Abdulhamid II's constructional approach of his representation brought various architectural interventions, from hospitals to infrastructural developments throughout the empire; the debt administration was in accordance with this constructional approach, it attracted foreign investors and eased the way to fund the

⁹⁴ Gelmez, Altıntaş, "Clock Towers as the Focus of City Square: The Changing Scale of Nusretiye Clock Tower", 83.

⁹⁵ Wishnitzer, *A. Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 29.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 26.

⁹⁷ Fuchs, Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem", 90.

construction boom.⁹⁸ The significance of the clock towers was also related to the recent models of Ottoman governance, centralization policies were being embraced, especially from the perspective of sultan Abdulhamid II. The sultan's approach in building clock towers might be perceived as individual constructions. On the contrary, the sultan's intervention in time management as a centralized policy to be spread throughout the empire was significant in terms of centralization. This policy also led a boost in constructional interventions, as clock towers. As Deringil also mentions, the understanding of the periphery eventually became colonial yet essential from the sultan's perception, and one can argue that the same understanding is also relevant for the whole Ottoman territory.⁹⁹ The sultan's approach to visibility thus needed a way of representation that would have introduced the ruler's image to his people, especially for the illiterate crowds that constituted the majority of his *reaya*. The utilization of the clock towers was thus important because the sultan achieved to show his state power through monuments that were accompanied with the introduction of modern time. Furthermore, the introduction of modern time was crucial since industrial and infrastructural developments necessitated the use of standard official time. Avner Wishnitzer stresses that sultan Abdulhamid II was a confident pragmatist and he also had intentions to adopt the Gregorian calendar to prevent the dichotomy about time management within Ottoman borders.¹⁰⁰ A joint presentation of power and modernism was eventually successful for the sultan to have his people understand modernism as a gift from the ruler himself.

The Ottomans arguably recognized the Western understanding of daily life and perception of time in the sixteenth century and Tanyeli approaches this struggle

⁹⁸ Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1808 to 1908", 21.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Wishnitzer, *A. Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 181.

between the “new time” and the “old time” as “the essential punctuation of everyday life in a traditional Islamic society was by definition not secular but strictly religious.”¹⁰¹ From Tanyeli’s perspective, daily routines were still organic and tied to the cultural aspects, which were also tied to the religious background of the society, and those routines are able to be perceived as the “Islamic time” which is formed according to the Ottoman subject’s daily practices.¹⁰² However, the Western time and Islamic time, or *alafranga* time and *alla turca* time as Wishnitzer distinguishes, had already been institutionalized in the Ottoman realm, especially in public offices that belong to ministries of Financial Affairs, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs.¹⁰³ The *alafranga* time was even used in Dolmabahçe Clock Tower that was completed in 1895. The mechanical double clock system in the tower was utilized to simultaneously correct the *alla turca* time, and was invented by a clockmaker, Johann Meyer, who was awarded by the sultan himself.¹⁰⁴

Despite the Sultan’s strong references to the Islamic way of governance to for the sake of the Pan-Islamic union under the Ottoman throne he planned and his efforts on rebuilding the charm of the Caliphate with the help of those legitimacy structures, the clock towers (even many of them were placed in public squares hosting mosques) were set to the standard time instead of the Islamic time, which the sultan insisted for.¹⁰⁵ As one of the foremost intellectuals of the era, Fani Efendi summarizes the relation between the clock towers and the sultan with his comments

¹⁰¹ Tanyeli, “The Emergence of Modern Time-Consciousness in the Islamic World and the Problematics of Spatial Perception”, 162.

¹⁰² Ibid, 163.

¹⁰³ Birol, “Managing the time of the bureaucrat in the late nineteenth century Ottoman central administration”, 81.

¹⁰⁴ Wishnitzer, *A. Reading Clocks, Alla Turca: Time and Society in the Late Ottoman Empire*, 181.

¹⁰⁵ Tanyeli, “The Emergence of Modern Time-Consciousness in the Islamic World and the Problematics of Spatial Perception”, 164.

on the erection ceremony of Adana clock tower: "...Outwardly, a clock chimes in essence, the government is calling..."¹⁰⁶

The aforementioned attempt for updating the perception of time in a Muslim state can be regarded as revolutionary in late Ottoman social politics, especially as an attempt utilized by state power, which aimed for absolute centralization. In the context of Ottoman clock towers, Alois Riegl's conceptualization of the monumentalization principles evolves into a mixture of common rituals with physical structures: a ritual of perceiving time results in a daily routine through clock towers' utilization, which were also erected as symbolical structures representing state power. The number of the clock towers constructed until 1909 was over hundred and the towers spread through the Ottoman Empire looking like a crucial urban-imperial component.¹⁰⁷ Though Western time was utilized to be used by the Ottomans before, a public ritual of understanding time was utilized for a remembrance apparatus for the sultan's good.¹⁰⁸ In both ways the remembrance of the ruler infiltrated through the daily lives of the subjects through a daily practice, which was practiced in the same way in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman State.

3.2 The changing clock tower in Jerusalem

Notwithstanding the amalgamation of time and space, in the case of the Jerusalem Clock Tower as a significant example, the structure was built embedded to the monumental Jaffa Gate of the Walled City in order to dominate the cityscape. The emphasis was not on the clock due to its small scale compared to the whole structure attached to the walls of the Jerusalem's Old City. One can say that the structure was

¹⁰⁶ Uluengin, "Secularizing Anatolia Tick by Tick", 20.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 31.

mainly built to project the power of the sultan with its flamboyant presence embedded in the city walls. According to Abu-Manneh, Jerusalem was one of the first remote municipalities established in Palestine, and the second stage in the history of Jerusalem started with the foundation of modern Jerusalem.¹⁰⁹ Though the city was settled and continuously recognized as a sacred space by the long-established religious groups because of its rich and diverse history, Jerusalem was sort of neglected as a town before, compared to the old city of Damascus or the newly expanding Beirut as other remote Ottoman territories. Jerusalem population was around twelve thousand in 1838, and the non-Muslims constituted half of this population.¹¹⁰ After the impact of the Tanzimat reforms and the establishment of sustainable working bureaucratic governance linked to the Sublime Porte, the city grew immediately. There was still a question of modernization in the city and this ambiguity created a fragility in the local governmental body for a while.¹¹¹ After a comparably fair municipal progress and new policymaking efforts, in 1877, sultan Abdulhamid II allowed private land ownership in Jerusalem, which was also available for the foreigners. Many German Templars and several other religious groups accordingly started to buy land in Jerusalem and the economical cultivation eventually became visible in the town with growing transportation links and urban facilities.¹¹²

As one of the numerous clock towers built by Abdülhamid, the clock tower next to the Jaffa Gate of Jerusalem was one of the most remarkable designs during the construction spree of the time. The Jaffa Gate was already refurbished for the

¹⁰⁹ Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman Administration and the Notables", 9.

¹¹⁰ Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 17.

¹¹¹ *Ibid*, 19.

¹¹² Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period: The New Ottoman Administration and the Notables", 10.

visit of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II in 1898 and there was also a plaque mounted on the same wall as a remembrance piece for the two leaders.¹¹³ The marketplace and the square next to the gate were popular at that time and it was considered as the main center of the Old City of Jerusalem. Later on, in 1901, simultaneously with the silver jubilee events throughout the Ottoman Empire, a clock tower was planned to be built next to the Western gate of the Jerusalem's walled city.¹¹⁴ Raymond Charles Péré, who was also the designer of another clock tower in Izmir, Konak Square, allegedly designed the tower.¹¹⁵ Péré was a French émigré living in Izmir who was one of the important architects of the Hamidian era. He was also known as the architect of the St. Helen Levantine Church in Izmir, which was built in 1906, and several public or private Levantine buildings constructed mostly in Izmir.

Péré's design was well detailed which is sort of reminiscent to the clock tower in Izmir. Both of the designs were partly orientalist, accommodating Moorish patterns on the façade and exhibited pointed arches carved out of stone. Compared to the other clock towers in the same region, around Nablus, Jaffa or Acre, the clock tower planned for the Jaffa Gate was remarkably ornamental and colossal, with its bulky figure that overshadowed its clock.¹¹⁶ Another interesting fact was that the construction's stones were collected and brought from the sacred Zedekiah Caves under the Muslim section of the walled city.¹¹⁷ It is arguable yet possible that the intention behind the excessive design and the significant location of the clock tower was tied to the need for a constant representation of the Ottoman sultan for the

¹¹³ After his visit Kaiser Wilhelm was then called as Hadji Wilhelm in the territory and the rumor circulated in the territory as the German Kaiser converted to Islam to fight against infidels. See Erol Köroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I*, (Tauris Academic Studies, London-New York, 2007), 87-88.

¹¹⁴ Kushner, "Ali Ekrem Bey, Governor of Jerusalem, 1906-1908", 355.

¹¹⁵ Ben-Arieh, *The Old City*, 32-33.

¹¹⁶ St Laurent, Riedlmayer, "Restorations of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock and Their Political Significance, 1537-1928" 82-83.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 84.

people of Jerusalem and the crowded passers-by such as Christian pilgrims and the Templars.

The clock tower was planned to be completed in a short period of time like the other ceremonial structures built at the time, in order not to miss the silver jubilee events that celebrated the twenty-fifth anniversary of Sultan Abdulhamid's accession to the throne. Many of the clock towers were finished or about to be finished at that time. However, in the end, due to the lack of financial support and constructional challenges in the old city, the tower was able to be finished in 1909, at a date when the hegemonic clock towers and the imperial intention of Hamidian visibility had become almost obsolete. Though it was the direct representation of the throne in the form of a legitimacy structure, the general public embraced the tower, as much as the other clock towers and silver jubilee constructions throughout Palestinian territory.¹¹⁸

Ronald Storrs, as the first British governor of Jerusalem, who started his duty after 1918, described the clock tower as “a style midway between that of Eddyson lighthouse and a jubilee memorial”.¹¹⁹ After the arrival of the British armies in Jerusalem, the British authority accessed the city and the first information of this epic arrival was published with the photos that included the Jaffa clock tower. The tower was an obelisk of remembrance for the British officials, which reminded them that the Ottomans were in charge of the holy city of Jerusalem for four hundred years.¹²⁰ Eventually there was a decision made for the deconstruction of the clock tower by the British governorate though the city notables wanted Storrs to spare the structure since the recent Ottoman efforts to build the tower were still current and vocalized. The governorate came up with a solution to deconstruct the tower and re-erect it in

¹¹⁸ Fuchs, Herbert, “A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem: British Architecture in Mandate-Era Palestine”, 85-92.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 88.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

some other place. The proposed site is not far, but the overall new design and the magnitude of the construction were to be altered in order to erase the glory of the former clock tower associated with the Ottomans. Furthermore, the petition of the Pro-Jerusalem Society collected around 500 pounds to dismantle the clock tower in order to prevent the structure from total destruction while being demolished. Storrs cites the public reaction as "...a certain degree of sentiment attaches to the clock..."¹²¹ Though the governor promised the public that the tower was going to be reconstructed somewhere else, with the same materials they collected from dismantling, they could not manage to properly dismantle the masonry built tower and came up with another design proposal for a new clock tower.¹²²

The British Governorate of Jerusalem finally demolished the clock tower after the Great War, in compliance with the McLean's 1918 plan, which sought to wipe out the buildings attached to the old wall and erase the recently built Ottoman remnants and the shantytown basically. The Mandate's governorate re-erected another clock tower in a nearby site as part of the modernizing Jerusalem plan prepared by the reputed town planner Sir Patrick Geddes.¹²³ Charles Holliday created the significant design for the new clock tower and he placed the Hamidian clock's mechanism and the face itself, with a completely different architectural approach compared to the former structure, which was blamed for representing a subjugating Ottoman-baroque style.¹²⁴ The new clock tower included none of the former ornamental approaches and the tower was a comparably short and dull structure alongside its compound. It is not wrong to say that the need for a clock tower was

¹²¹ Fuchs, Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem: British Architecture in Mandate-Era Palestine", 88.

¹²² Gitler, "Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity" 41.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid, 42.

crucial in the cityscape since the collective memory had already embraced the presence of a clock tower in the central city of Jerusalem. Therefore, the new proposed style was intentionally altered, and represented the new ruler of Jerusalem as the British Mandate. Holliday's proposal for the new clock tower and the adjoining compound that worked as an *arasta* (shopping alley), in the first days of 1924, was finalized with the construction of the design by the end of the year.¹²⁵ The new design was dull compared to the old tower and the whole compound mimicked the layout of a vernacular Palestinian house, evoking a highly appropriated local, or orientalist approach. Fuchs and Herbert elaborate the situation that the Ottoman subjugation was replaced by a simple British orientalism melted in a modernist style in the Palestinian land.¹²⁶ The compound was then demolished in 1934 to expand the existing vehicle roads and to establish new connections to get rid of the growing vehicle traffic that connected the Old Town with the expanding western part of Jerusalem.

The clock towers became revolutionary components of modern urban expansion controlled by the Ottoman state, however, they could not sustain their practical role due to the territorial, or central power shifts in the Ottoman Empire during the first years of the twentieth century. To conclude, it is better to mention that before the British occupancy, the approach to clock towers had already changed after the removal of sultan Abdülhamid II from the throne. The new perspective on the cities created by the officials of the Committee of Union and Progress, did not prioritize the production or maintenance of the clock towers. Instead of the former celebrative constructions, the new Ottoman governorate decided to forward the

¹²⁵ Fuchs, Herbert, "A Colonial Portrait of Jerusalem: British Architecture in Mandate-Era Palestine", 93.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 92.

budgets for local constructions to sanitary developments instead of erecting clock towers and thus halted their ongoing constructions.¹²⁷ Though the new state power decided on the cancellation of those constructions for economic reasons, other projects to be built afterwards do not confirm their reasoning for the cancellation. The latter expenses spent for other constructions, such as new artesian wells, railway development toward Beersheba and new avenues and roads for vehicle transportation.¹²⁸ It is arguable yet possible that the construction of the clock towers may have been cancelled because those symbolical structures were related or thought to be connected to the ruler ship imagery of sultan Abdülhamid as agents of the throne's representation.

3.3 The arrival of Cemal Pasha in Palestine and his “good works”

The construction of clock towers and their opening ceremonies were performed over a significant length of time; they were objects for the inauguration or commemoration of the important dates. A drastic switch that ended the golden days of the symbolical structures was in the first years of the period that the Committee of Union and Progress came into power. In 1915, Cemal Pasha, as the Minister of the Navy was appointed as the governor of the Greater Syria, including the Palestinian lands. Also being approached as a military and bureaucratic base against the British forces in Egypt, the city of Jerusalem became more autonomous after the disposal of Sultan Abdülhamid II from the throne. This situation can be counted as a signifier of political change. This especially effected the representation of the throne, which was

¹²⁷ St Laurent, Riedlmayer, “Restorations of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock and Their Political Significance, 1537-1928” 85.

¹²⁸ Ballobar, 78, 81, 107.

personified and institutionalized under the name of Sultan Abdülhamid II during the previous decades.

The diary of Antonio de la Cierva y Lewita, who was the Spanish consul in Jerusalem between 1913 and 1919 and also the Count of Ballobar, is an informative source to enlighten Cemal Pasha's period of governance in Jerusalem.¹²⁹ The consul was also a reputed character well recognized and welcomed by the Pasha himself. Also as a consul from Spain, which was a neutral country and did not interfere in any of the political and military rivalry in Middle East at that time, one might as well say that the Count of Ballobar was objective in his observations on the changing political and cultural geography, excluding his missionary duty in the Holy Land. As Count Antonio cites, on 19 December 1914, after stopping by Damascus, the Ottoman troops directly arrived in Jerusalem and had significant preparations for Cemal Pasha's arrival, described in the Count's words as "artistic preparations as arches". As a striking spectacle, Cemal Pasha arrived in Jerusalem on 9 January 1915 with an automobile.¹³⁰ Since the first automobile seen in Jerusalem was in 1912 and the vehicle was not popular at that time, the Pasha's entrance was intriguing as an Ottoman notable, who is both a military general and one of the prominent names of the ruling elite in Constantinople.¹³¹ While the Pasha was already aware of and interfering in the local assets, Count Antonio endorsed him for gifting the St. Anne Sanctuary complex at the northeastern part of the walled city, to the Greek Catholic Church of Jerusalem.¹³² This was one of his first actions in Jerusalem to show himself that he is in control.

¹²⁹ See Conde de Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, Manzano Moreno, E., & Mazza, R. eds. (I.B. Tauris, New York, 2015).

¹³⁰ Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, 115.

¹³¹ Nassar, "Representing Palestine in the Work of the First Local Photographers", 139.

¹³² Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, 46.

Cemal Pasha was known as an ambitious leader who was eager to show authoritarian tendencies, especially after his governance period in Adana.¹³³ He had a strong enthusiasm in his personal visibility to be depicted as a state official to the Palestinian people, a Pasha, who relied on his zealous military potency. He once told Count Antonio that the sultan himself promised Cemal Pasha a *gazi* title if he can overpower the British forces in Egypt.¹³⁴ Since then, his main aim was to traverse the Sinai and attack the British Troops nearby the Suez Canal. His first attempt unsuccessfully ended by the end of January and he once mentioned the Count that he wanted to write a war memoir based on the failed raid and the reasons behind it. It is possible to assume that the Pasha was trying to exhibit his excuses through that book, which was never published.¹³⁵ This intention behind publishing a book and for narrating the recent history of the territory under his rule was also another signifier for Cemal Pasha's egocentric approach. He was trying to make a permanent impact, with his name remembered by the people, or at least via a history book edited by himself. The Pasha sought for a potential and intentional historical remnant, which would have been monumentalized before the local community to depict his "good works".

On the other hand, the Pasha was ambitious for taking part in public gatherings despite the generic tyrant approach, which is to lay low against public attention and visibility. The utilization of the crescent and star flag, which was brought with the Tanzimat, was largely utilized during Cemal Pasha's reign in the region. It was always arranged that he was welcomed by local crowds who were waving these flags. It was not questionable whether the locals embraced the Turkish

¹³³ Güçlü, Y. *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909: Cemal Paşa and Beyond*, 220-246.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, 64.

¹³⁵ Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Suriye Hatıraları*, 90.

flag as a sign of respect, or whether flag-bearing was a compulsory method which was enforced by the Ottoman officials during the ceremonial events. Sheikh Asad al-Shukairi, a notable Naqshbendi leader in the region once stated “The flag should better be waved instead of my severed head”, which indicates the enforcement of the new Ottoman flag as an indoctrinating agent.¹³⁶ The flag as icon was a powerful tool for the masses to unite under a shared symbol, or a national component that unified all and created the proper connections with central authority, as conceived within a hegemonical perspective.

Furthermore, the Pasha always received the demands of the public in Friday ceremonies held in the Aqsa Mosque.¹³⁷ His utilization of the Friday prayers was similar to sultan Abdülhamid’s Friday appearances, though Cemal Pasha was more open to dialogue with the people, receiving their demands after the prayers. The Pasha was approachable and open to public demands, though there was a slight moderation between the public and the Pasha. Ali Fuad (Erden), who was the secondary commander of the 4th Ottoman Army in Greater Syria, mentioned about the Friday gatherings in his memoirs. As he underlines, Cemal Pasha’s admission of the locals in front of himself and listening to them after the Friday prayers was a well-known practice of the second Caliph Omar, who was recognized almost as a holy figure by the local crowds as a prominent companion of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Ali Fuad insists that the Pasha was aware of what he was doing and how to project himself as a godlike figure in the perception of the Muslim crowds of Jerusalem.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Sheikh Esad was a well known Abdulhamid critic of the time. See Ali Fuad Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Suriye Hatıraları*, (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003).

¹³⁷ Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Suriye Hatıraları*, 102.

¹³⁸ *Ibid*,102.

Moreover, the Pasha was a ‘builder’. He frankly believed in the power of the representation of a leader’s good works, which would convince the locals to believe in him, as an omnipotent leader who was actually a total foreigner to the region. Cemal Pasha was also dreaming of a sovereign state, of which he would have been the leader after the war.¹³⁹ He had similar intentions with the other CUP leaders of the period; he was looking for a nationalized, modernized but still Ottoman-linked territory to rule over. Regardless of the political engagement of the Sublime Porte, Cemal Pasha approached different regions in the southern periphery of the empire with only one goal: to show himself as the preferable leader with a power to be negotiated in person.

Cemal Pasha was sent to Adana in 1909 by the state to re-establish state control, just after the massacres against the Armenian population, and he launched a reconstruction campaign in the region.¹⁴⁰ He reported his actions to Constantinople periodically and ran his building campaign with prison labor; his fast urban and constructional interventions such as debris removal or reconstruction of the burned properties were engaged with the utilization of prisoners.¹⁴¹ His fast interventions made possible with the utilization of prison labor, reflected his self-esteem and ambition for establishing a one-man authority. During his time in Adana, Cemal Pasha was known as an Ottoman general while he was also pro-British, contrary to the central government’s position in the Porte.¹⁴² In 1911, the Pasha was sent to Baghdad this time. He eventually intervened in the local government and replaced the Christian mayor of the town with a Muslim. According to Ali Fuad (Erden), it had been two years since the Pasha’s Adana period, he now became a vocal Islamist

¹³⁹ Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Suriye Hatıraları*, 87.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 72.

¹⁴¹ Güçlü, *The Armenian Events of Adana in 1909*, 391.

¹⁴² Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Suriye Hatıraları*, 73.

and an anti-imperialist in Baghdad.¹⁴³ Being stationed in a significant strategic front for the Ottomans, Cemal Pasha initially launched a construction campaign in Baghdad that resulted with the establishment of larger streets and an electric tramway, similarly to his installments in Adana.¹⁴⁴ Another significant detail is that the Pasha was able to criticize the recently deposed sultan Abdülhamid II at that time. During one of the public meetings he regularly held with the local people, he mentioned the ongoing railway construction, which connected Baghdad with Syria and Palestine.¹⁴⁵ His accusation was based on the recent contract initiated for the Germans and assigning German companies to build the largest infrastructural project of the era. He cited, “The contract given to the Germans would ruin us” and he was accusing the deposed sultan for this affiliation, while the current Ottoman government was comfortable with the situation.¹⁴⁶ The pan-Islamist discourse was thus useful for Cemal Pasha to gain popularity and to receive trust as a Muslim commander against the infidels.

Pasha left a remarkable trace of his short-term governance in Palestine. His administrative skills were performed in different regions of the peripheral South. More particularly, he had the chance to impress the people of Jerusalem with the mega projects that he imposed. Cemal Pasha was personally proud of the new boulevard in Jaffa with a size of 800 meters length and 35 meters width, which he mentioned about in one of his reports to the Porte.¹⁴⁷ He renewed the public parks in the city and ordered the building of fountains. On one of the inscriptions of a fountain that was placed on a pilgrimage route to Jerusalem, his own words were

¹⁴³ The Pasha was going to be vocally anti-French in Damascus later. See Ali Fuad Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Suriye Hatıraları*, (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003), 90.

¹⁴⁴ Weber, *Damascus: Ottoman modernity and urban transformation* (1808-1918), 38.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Suriye Hatıraları*, 75.

¹⁴⁷ See M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation In Syria, Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, (Routledge, New York, 2014), 191.

engraved, which summarize his perspective about his current and future vision for the region: “Voyager! It is Cemal Pasha the Great and Pious who built this fountain with the help of Allah to quench your thirst.”¹⁴⁸

It is arguable to say that the Pasha was mimicking the previous interventions, though he was repeating the same narrative about the charity works of the eighteenth-century Ottoman public realm. Cemal Pasha was not hesitant about representing himself as a leader, since, as mentioned above, he was willing to be the permanent governor of a region conceived as a sovereign state in the near future. The Pasha’s interventions that strengthened his visibility and representability were not limited to the urban projects he launched. His gaze expanded through the territory and he even interfered in the transportation of grain from Northern territories to the South. He ordered the grain to be transported via the maritime line, through the Dead Sea. Moreover, as a signature, he placed his name on the biggest vessel in work during the process, as *Büyük Cemal*, meaning “Cemal the Great”.¹⁴⁹

On the other hand, while Cemal Pasha’s intentions may have been understood as efforts for changing only the cityscape, his ambition was similar to the Hamidian plan to modernize the entire region in accordance with the project of modernizing society and enhancing its surveillance.¹⁵⁰ Talha Çiçek illustrates this method as a late Ottomanization tool that would have connected the periphery to the center, both socially and physically, which was ethnically, religiously and geographically remote

¹⁴⁸ See M. Talha Çiçek, *War and State Formation In Syria, Cemal Pasha’s Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, (Routledge, New York, 2014), 191.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 193.

¹⁵⁰ The Pasha had an elaborate plan for the whole Levant territory he was responsible of. See Hans Theunissen, “War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha’s Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I” *Jihad and Islam in World War I: Studies on the Ottoman Jihad on the Centenary of Snouck Hurgronje’s “Holy War Made in Germany”* Erik Jan Zürcher ed. (Leiden University Press, Leiden, 2016), 223-273.

from the throne.¹⁵¹ Still, the Pasha's motive behind the modernization plan was not based on centralization or strengthening the ties with the central authority. As mentioned above, his enthusiasm about the modernization projects was basically driven by his own ruler image, instead of representing a remote authority. The similarities and the differences between those two close approaches were much visible in the Beersheba interventions during the Hamidian period and later, during Cemal Pasha's office.

3.4 Bedouins of the southern Palestine: modernizing a nomad settlement

Another modernizing aspect, that simultaneously sought to tame the masses and project authority in the city through urbanization, was visible in Beersheba in the deserts of Southern Palestine (Birüssebi as mentioned in the Ottoman records). The intentions to modernize the Bedouin settlements during the era of Sultan Abdulhamid II could be interpreted as 'modernizing the desert'. His large infrastructural projects focusing on the in-between land of the Negev desert (which hosted the nomadic Bedouin tribes for centuries), involved communications technology, physical facilities as military barracks, housing units and mosques which are unfamiliar for the tribes, transportation, and amounted to a major urban and infrastructural intervention. According to Avcı, it is possible to elaborate the reasons behind these interventions as a provincial administrative agenda that was crucial to set up a centralization policy for the region.¹⁵² Also as Avcı stresses, the potential problems with the Bedouins can be categorized into three, as military, political, and economic. Firstly, the Bedouins would have posed a constant threat, since they were nomads

¹⁵¹ Çiçek, *War and State Formation In Syria, Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, 43.

¹⁵² Avcı, "The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine" (1860-1914)", 973.

and it was hard to categorize and contain them as the *reaya*. Secondly, they were influential to each other as tribes and consolidation of a state power in the territory was not possible without “taming” the nomads. Especially during the British presence in Egypt, it was crucial for the Ottomans to establish a regulated system in the territory. Thirdly, taxation was crucial to set up a local economy, and without a modern settlement for the tribes, it would have been hard to apply the taxation system in the region.

According to Alouis Musil’s memories, who was a Czech explorer who travelled through Palestine and the Arab lands during the end of the nineteenth century, there was barely any construction around the land of Beersheba in 1902.¹⁵³ His memories relay only the image of bedouin tents and remnants of old masonry structures. However, in 1907, there was already a city square including a mosque, a couple of public and military buildings, settled in a grid plan, which represented the strong possibility of an external urban intervention at that time.¹⁵⁴ Between 1902 and 1907, the Hamidian urban interventions were fast due to the establishment of the local government in 1900.¹⁵⁵ There was also a public market planned in order to gather the visiting bedouin tribes, thus establishing an economical basis for the new city. There were seven new wells excavated for providing fresh water for the occupants, which was already abundant for the inhabiting tribes in the region.¹⁵⁶ The aptly created city structure was beneficial for the nomadic people, while the bedouin

¹⁵³ Avcı, “The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine” (1860-1914)”, 973.

¹⁵⁴ The modernist approach in city planning during the early century was recognizable from the clean, geometrical intersections and block articulation. See Stanley Waterman, “Pre-Israeli Planning in Palestine: The Example of Acre”, *The Town Planning Review*, vol. 42:1 (Liverpool University Press, 1971), 85-99.

¹⁵⁵ Avcı, “The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine (1860-1914)”, 975.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 976.

sheikhs were still trying to keep their presence and representation due to their deteriorating presence in local authority.

The modernization of Beersheba was a grandiose project that projected the imperialist approach of the Ottomans in a remote territory, ruled mostly by families under the influence of several notables as sheikhs. The Ottoman officials purchased a sizeable amount of land from the sheikhs in 1901, to be planned by the recently established local government. The local government in Beersheba directed the subdivision of the lands, and the improvement of basic housing was in advance. Though the land was purchased, it was given free to the individuals who promised to build a house and live in the city.¹⁵⁷ Avcı elaborates the situation as: “Thus the city became more than a small thriving town having a high potential for being the administrative and economic center of a large area.”¹⁵⁸ The Hamidian interventions were planned to be continuous, and the initial idea was to create the first project to modernize and settle the nomadic populations in the desert, however, the intervention was halted due to the power shift in 1909.

However, during the post Hamidian period, the city was treated as a mere military outpost, especially with the beginning of Cemal Pasha’s reign in the region. Beersheba was the last outpost that connected Jerusalem with the Negev desert, placed in the middle of the route between the Sinai Peninsula and central Palestine. After his arrival in the region in 1915, the Pasha periodically informed the de-facto head of the government, Enver Pasha, about the ongoing situation in Beersheba and the recent changes his local government implemented in the city. The perspective for cultivating a desert town against British-occupied Egypt became much more visible

¹⁵⁷ Avcı, “The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine (1860-1914)”, 977.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

during the initial stages of the war. The situation evolved into the creation of a remote outpost for the Ottoman army and the city was swiftly connected to the northern centers via railways.¹⁵⁹ The railway development was expanded through Beersheba and was linked to Hijaz accordingly. Additionally, Count Antonio of Jerusalem mentions Beersheba in his diary as a military outpost, a place to be reached instead of a place to be visited or a focal point for the local government's urban expansion politics, mainly administered by Cemal Pasha.¹⁶⁰ The consul underlines the distance of the region and expresses the seemingly unnecessary importance of the city for the rest of Palestine. The majority of the infrastructural and urban funding was directed to the construction of the railways in the Syrian-Palestinian territories, especially after the breakout of the Great War.¹⁶¹ The railway connection between Beersheba, Jaffa and Jerusalem was finished in 1915, and was utilized for the prospective transportation needs of the Ottoman army. The same railway connection was to be invaded and demolished by the Anzac troops of the British Army afterwards during the first offensive movement of the British army against the Ottomans.¹⁶² A significant construction, concluding the era of urban development, was the Beersheba Central Train Station, which was the last building that the Ottoman authority completed in the Palestinian lands.¹⁶³

The intention behind the founding of a modern city has different implications and the Ottoman imperial approach in the peripheral Arab lands between the

¹⁵⁹ Provence, *The Last Ottoman Generation and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, 40.

¹⁶⁰ There were anti-aircraft guns placed, most probably, by the Germans. Count Antoino displeasingly mentions them. See Conde de Ballobar, *Jerusalem in World War I: The Palestine Diary of a European Diplomat*, Manzano Moreno, E., & Mazza, R. eds. (I.B. Tauris, New York, 2015), 100-101.

¹⁶¹ Berelovich, Kark, "The missing element in Palestine: infrastructure and logistics during the First World War", 11.

¹⁶² Sheffy, "The origins of the British breakthrough into South Palestine: The Anzac Raid on the Ottoman Railway, 1917", 144.

¹⁶³ Avci, "The Application of Tanzimat in the Desert: The Bedouins and the Creation of a New Town in Southern Palestine (1860-1914)", 983.

Hamidian era and that of the CUP presented the two different sides of this situation. As a target for centralization politics, the modernization of a city was crucial to modernize the regional populations. Moreover, Beersheba was the first example for the Ottomans, which was an “artificial city” for serving modern purposes, both urban and military. On the other hand, Cemal Pasha and his clique did not disregard the city’s geopolitical position. Similar to the Hamidian era, they treated Beersheba as a modernizing agent, but with a greater intention to implement the first military front against British Army in Egypt.¹⁶⁴ The expansion of logistical opportunities and making those connections sustainable were thus the results of the first centralizing, and then localized intentions behind the Beersheba development project. The Hamidian urban approach aimed to “tame” the sheikhs and the other notables that ruled the land, while the projection shift during CUP’s intervention was about re-utilizing the location as a buffer zone between the Egyptian front and the Holy Land. Therefore, one can conjecture that the Hamidian urban projection was derived from the will to glorify the power represented by the Ottoman throne while establishing a modern city system that would connect the Bedouin settlement with the empire. The Hamidian methodology was thus multi-layered and visible in Beersheba context that the sultan’s approach was about to utilize the constructional approach, thus modern tools to establish order in public life. On the contrary the CUP’s urban projection was geared to create a new and designated peripheral city during the time of war, as a new front to be reinforced in the periphery.

¹⁶⁴ Sheffy, “The origins of the British breakthrough into South Palestine: The Anzac Raid on the Ottoman Railway, 1917”, 133.

CHAPTER 4

THE INVENTION OF MODERN SYRIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE OTTOMAN IMAGE

4.1 The figurative antenna and shaping the new city center(s) of Damascus

Similar to the idea behind the sultan's mobile and wandering glory conceived through the clock towers, or the founding of a new city in the middle of a desert, a new political approach in urban representation emerged through the popularization of new technologies, as in the case of telegraphy in informative technologies, and the railway in the logistics of transportation. As a matter of fact, railways and telegraphy were the two foremost technologies in development, as popular tools for the diffusion of a modern, westernized understanding of logistics and communication in the nineteenth century. Those tools eventually affected imperial infrastructure, and thus the cityscapes. These sibling tools implied the importance of communication and transportation, which were crucial for the Ottoman state during the Hamidian period of centralization politics, since the Ottoman throne sought to establish stronger links with the periphery, especially with the Arab regions of Syria and the Palestine. Pan-Islamism, the recent ideology to unite all the Muslims under the same flag, which was planned to gain support from the Arab tribes, then evolved into a method of centralization politics and was being welcomed by the Ottoman state, particularly through the end of the nineteenth century. Due to the receding borders on the Western front, the Ottoman state believed in the possibility of utilizing pan-Islamism to create a unified empire, consisting of Anatolia and Levant. Endorsing pan-Islamism brought the reinforcement of healthy communication and sustainable transportation, thus new technologies and developments introduced by the West were

easily welcomed by the Sublime Porte, especially after the economic deprivation during the last decades of the nineteenth century. Yakup Bektaş expounds the reinforcement of railways and telegraphy in the Ottoman Empire as an approach destined to attain unification with the peripheral communities. Especially the telegraphy line between Damascus and Mecca would be the main link that would sustain the connection of the periphery with the central governmental body.¹⁶⁵ To honor the establishment of the telegraph line between Damascus and the Hejaz, in Damascus's Marjah Square. The square was known as a former trader market intersection, hosted the construction of an obelisk between 1900 and 1907— a structure that was new and distinctive in terms of the recently adopted Western architectural styles that was represented in the Ottoman public space.¹⁶⁶ The square was well known as the new city center, created and built by the Ottoman authority in the late nineteenth century. As Leila Hudson expands, “Marjah became the fulcrum between the old city on the east and a strip of new European-style public buildings that stretched westward along the course of the river.”¹⁶⁷ In 1908, the square was surrounded by modern Ottoman public buildings, which were designated for the use of Ottoman officials; while there was also a tramway centered in Marjah Square, which rendered the square as a center of Hamidian modernity.¹⁶⁸

The heavy majority of the Ottoman structures, buildings which were erected as symbols glorifying the sultan and emphasizing his all-embracing power, were built for practical purposes, at least for daily needs, such as the fountains or clock towers with respect to the silver jubilee constructions of the Hamidian era during the

¹⁶⁵ Bektaş, “The Sultan's Messenger: Cultural Constructions of Ottoman Telegraphy, 1847-1880”, 695.

¹⁶⁶ Weber, *Damascus: Ottoman modernity and urban transformation (1808-1918)*, 55.

¹⁶⁷ Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City*, 109.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 110.

turn of the century. The obelisk to celebrate the recent telegraph connection between Damascus and Medina was designed in 1900 by Raimondo d'Aronco; the Italian architect who was personally invited by the sultan at the time. The architect was welcomed for designing a national Ottoman exhibition in Istanbul but he could not realize the proposal because of the infamous earthquake of 1894. However, the architect achieved to design a selection of Hamidian buildings that brought a newly introduced Art Nouveau style embedded with the late Ottoman Baroque in Constantinople and the Orient.¹⁶⁹ Between 1893 and 1909, d'Aronco designed several buildings in Constantinople, which vary from religious buildings as the tomb of Sheikh Zafir in Beşiktaş to state buildings, such as the Italian Embassy building in Tarabya. Raimondo d'Aronco was recognized as the official architect of the sultan, since his architectural approach and choices shaped the royal Yıldız landscape during the Hamidian era. On the other hand, the telegraphy monument in Damascus was one of the few constructions outside of Constantinople that the architect handled under the Ottoman supervision.

The Telegraph Monument was erected in 1904, four years after the completion of its design process; in the Marjah Square, as part of the celebratory constructions for the sultan's twenty-fifth anniversary of ascension to the throne. Marjah became a modern piazza surrounded by newly constructed state buildings planned through Hamidian urban interventions.¹⁷⁰ The monument was symbolically meaningful and divergent compared to the diverse and rooted signs of Ottoman architectural presence in the city. It was figurative yet represented technological features in an ornamental style. Its figurative approach in the bronze material depicts wires circulating the main column extending to the top of the structure, which was

¹⁶⁹ Kreiser, "Public Monuments in Turkey and Egypt, 1840-1916", 112.

¹⁷⁰ Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City*, 109-110.

crowned with a bronze model of the Yıldız (Hamidiye) Mosque in 1 to 20 scale. The mosque was placed in the image of the monument with a concrete intention, because the Yıldız Mosque, built in 1886 by Sarkis Balyan, was more than a building, it represented the sultan, who was almost invisible in person but visible through his buildings or services. The sultan was known and remembered through his constructions though the mosque conveyed a significant message. During the time, the Sultan's only public visibility was remembered through his appearances during the ceremonial Friday prayers in the Yıldız Mosque.¹⁷¹ The Friday Prayers held a particularly symbolic role for the sultan because he was known for his abstinence from public view. As a tool for overcoming the pseudo-ban on the representation of the Sultan's own image, the utilized model worked perfectly. Regarding the tughra's mentioned representational power from the subjects' point of view, this significant structure became a powerful urban agent in public space. The visibility and the representation of the throne was much more poignant and utilized, especially in a territory that needed a reinforcement to be connected to the central authority. The symbolic connection of the capital to Damascus was thus glorified through the telegraph line that was established to connect Damascus to the Hijaz. The monument represented the already established connection between Damascus and Constantinople, while the real connection was between Damascus and Hejaz. The obelisk and the square were both recognized as symbols of Ottoman governmental presence, especially within the landscape provided by the surrounding state buildings. It is possible to argue that the sultan also eventually had the chance to introduce the modern urban notion of a public square with the final touch of the telegraphy monument by d'Aronco.

¹⁷¹ Deringil, *Well Protected Domains*, 23.

Regular practices of daily life were performed around the square. For instance, the ceremonies for the Sultan as *veladet-i hümayun* events, royal birthdays, were carried out in the Square, around the newly erected obelisk, summarizing the definition of a modern public gathering space recognized by the subjects.¹⁷² The square was an early example of an urban component utilized to house the official rituals of a remote controlling authority. A new approach in space making was introduced by the Ottoman sultan, which encouraged the recognition of the sultan as the founder of the new city center with the recent establishment of the Marjah Square. The newly introduced transportation opportunities and modernizing public institutions brought around the Marjah Square visualized a Hamidian image with the help of the telegraphy monument. However, the situation tended to change with political transformations in the next decade.

4.2 Ottoman potency in Damascus at the brink of the Great War

Cemal Pasha, was one of the three high commanders of the CUP who had influenced the governmental bodies and military authority in the ruling government. He was also the Minister of the Ottoman Navy, and was appointed as the governor of Greater Syria and Palestine in 1915. He was considered a prominent military figure who would deal with the rising territorial paranoia of the central Ottoman administration for the Arab peripheries. After the deposition of sultan Abdulhamid II, the Committee of Union and Progress was trying to strengthen their bonds with the periphery, as much as the former sultan did, but in a different mode of administration and political discourse. The empire was still trying to strengthen the bonds between the southern provinces via the centralization policies that previously benefited from

¹⁷² Avcı, Avcı, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Siyasi Meşruiyet ve Propaganda Aracı Olarak Anıtın İcadı (1840-1917)”, 43.

pan-Islamist discourse during the Hamidian era. However, Cemal Pasha had different plans. Though the intention was to place Cemal Pasha as the temporary head of the governorate in Damascus, his aspirations were different. His ambition was to become the founder of Modern Greater Syria, which would cover Beirut, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Aleppo and Damascus, and connect these territories to central Ottoman authority. This was practically analogous to the Greater Egypt idea once Kavalalı Mehmet Ali Pasha brought in front of the Ottoman State in the nineteenth century.¹⁷³ Kavalalı was appointed as the governor of Egypt by Bâbüâli in 1806, just a decade after Napoleon's invasion to establish a French campaign in the Ottoman territories for trade and military based purposes. It is arguable yet possible that Kavalalı inherited the idea of the Greater Egypt, including Syria and Palestine, from the former occupation, since he fought against the Ottoman army between 1838-1839 because of the same purpose. Additionally, one of the main reasons behind Cemal Pasha's appointment in the region was to defend the Levant against the British forces in Egypt and possibly take the region back under the Ottoman rule. Egypt was already occupied by the British troops in 1882, though they let the locals to operate as a mandate.¹⁷⁴

Cemal Pasha's passion was aimed to change the urban space with modernist approaches in advance with enormous public investments from Istanbul. Different from his former construction experiences involving the prisoner labor gangs in Baghdad or Adana, the Pasha was comparably advantageous in Damascus since the city had already experienced major construction projects during the Hamidian period. He was already experienced in urban projects and in getting in touch with the local communities. Due to his former experiences, he was already skilled in establishing

¹⁷³ Erden, *Birinci Dünya Harbi'nde Suriye Hatıraları*, 92.

¹⁷⁴ Hirszowicz, "The Sultan and the Khedive, 1892-1908", 287.

local connections with diverse communities of the territory to get proper insight before his interventions.

To establish a rational city projection that was proper and suitable for the zeitgeist, the director of the German Fine Arts Academy in Rome, Maximilian Zürcher, was sent to Syria by Enver Pasha in the beginning of the year 1916.¹⁷⁵ In order to provide the necessary professional vision, Zürcher was personally chosen by Enver Pasha.¹⁷⁶ Though the implementations were planned to modernize the territory, the restoration plans were basically considered in order to rebuild the imagery and glory of the Islamic Caliphate under the domain of the Ottoman Empire. This would entail urban interventions, which had slowed down with the deposition of the sultan Abdulhamid II. In other words, the Pan-Islamist approach that was formerly planned to be a tool for unification with the Arab territories was improved and rerouted by the new projects of Cemal Pasha and his governorate. However, the image of the Caliphate became ambiguous, embodied in the power of Cemal Pasha and became invisible while the Pasha was treating the territory as a sovereign state under his rule.

Secondly, Cemal Pasha's personal perspective on the pan-Islamist approach was based on clearing the remnants of pre-Islamic heritage in Damascus center.¹⁷⁷ There were two prominent buildings to be primarily restored, the Takiyya al-Sulaymaniyya, a mosque-hospice complex built on the orders of Suleyman I (1520-1566) and the Madrasa al-Salimiyya, a religious school which was completed during

¹⁷⁵ Çiçek, *War and State Formation In Syria, Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, 193. Hans Theunissen claims that Zürcher was personally chosen by Cemal Pasha due to his experience of restoration projects in Rome. See Theunissen, "War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I", 256.

¹⁷⁶ Theunissen, "War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I", 256.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 256-257.

the era of Selim II (1566-1574).¹⁷⁸ The restoration intention was a direct and visible propaganda aimed at the Muslim masses in the territory, which were already charged with wartime anger directed against the West. According to the memoirs of Ali Fuad Erden, who was one of the chief commanders of Cemal Pasha's 4th Army, the public was praising the pasha as "the Second Salahaddin" with reference to Salahaddin Ayyubi who was a mythical hero from the Crusades Era in the public perspective.¹⁷⁹ Accordingly, Cemal Pasha ordered the founding of a new educational facility, which would be named the Salahaddin University in Jerusalem. He also asked the architect Kemaleddin Bey to design a new tomb for Salahaddin Ayyubi in Damascus. Mehmed Nihad Bey (Nigisberk), who was one of the responsible officials of the newly projected constructions in the city, elaborates those plans in his journal.¹⁸⁰ Consecutively, after the Great War, the Ottoman judiciary would then interrogate Mehmed Nihad Bey about the constructions and accuse him of the high costs spent for those constructions in Damascus and its periphery.¹⁸¹

The interventions executed in Damascus endorsed the city's connection with the central government, representing the Ottoman desire for hegemony over the city. State power was represented through Cemal Pasha's authoritarian projection of a new city assembled with restoration, demolition and rebuilding. However, his understanding of urban symbolism was a few steps forward compared to the Hamidian modes of intervention. According to the narration of J. R. Hanauer, the Canon of the Church of Jerusalem, a landscape project was applied during Cemal Pasha's reign in front of the Military Headquarters. The flower garden was

¹⁷⁸ Theunissen, "War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I", 227.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, 245.

¹⁸⁰ Cengizkan, Mehmet Nihat Nigisberk'in Katkıları: Evkaf İdaresi ve Mimar Kemalettin. "Mimar Kemalettin ve Çağı: Mimarlık / Toplumsal Yaşam / Politika, Sempozyum Bildirileri", 187.

¹⁸¹ Theunissen, "War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha's Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I", 258.

ornamented with symbolical structures made of concrete and rock, and structures represented the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Sea of Marmara and the Dardanelles, visually summarizing the narrative of the Gallipoli War, even with model vessels made in wood (in miscalculated scales) that represented the Ottoman Naval Forces.¹⁸² The realization of the Gallipoli War in the landscape project might have been Cemal Pasha's idea since he had been the Minister of the Ottoman Navy. It is a direct reminder of Pierre Nora's lieux de memoire that is represented by a monument, which also aims to recreate a de-facto, a transferred and manipulated version of a milieu de memoire (that is, actual Gallipoli) in a city like Damascus, geographically far away from the Dardanelles.¹⁸³ The monument-garden also brought one of the earliest glorified representations of the Gallipoli War, which was then popularly used as a nation-building apparatus in the following decades, as well as being a historical moment that unified the Empire.¹⁸⁴

Though the governorate in Damascus was pursuing to reshape the city in the image of the new Ottoman order represented by the CUP regime, Cemal Pasha's grandiose interventions can also be described as a form of urban revanchism that was destined to change the projected city center of the Hamidian era. The Hamidian city center was oriented around the Marjah Square and the surrounding public institutional buildings.¹⁸⁵ On the contrary, Cemal Pasha intended to recreate the 'Ottoman' center of the city and reapproached to the city center as a boulevard which would host ceremonial marches and be surrounded with new public buildings.

Mehmet Nihat (Nigisberk) and a Russian-Jewish engineer Gedaliah Wilbuschewitz

¹⁸² Hanauer, "Notes on Changes", 68-69.

¹⁸³ Nora categorizes the memory spaces as real and unreal, under the names of milieu de memoire and lieux de memoire, accordingly. See Pierre Nora, *Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire, Representations*, 26, (University of California Press, Spring, 1989), 7-24.

¹⁸⁴ Hanauer, "Notes on Changes", 68-69.

¹⁸⁵ Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City*, 258.

who migrated to Palestine in 1892, were responsible of the new boulevard that would also be surrounded by “a bank, a hotel and a bathhouse” as Theunissen expresses.¹⁸⁶ This axis would work as a connection between the old Damascus center and the railway station, that would also connect the pilgrims walking route to their railway connection.¹⁸⁷ The act of creating a ceremonial axis, as a new boulevard for the city of Damascus, and utilizing this axis as a connection between the old city center and the new city center, were what Pasha wanted to create with his officials in the governorate in 1916. Similar to the simultaneous urban interventions happening in the West, the Pasha was acting unhesitant during the demolishment and did not tolerate his decisions to be questioned. His order for the demolition of some of the former Ottoman military and administrative buildings built around the Marjah Square, which were representing the ‘old Hamidian regime’, was based on his intention to rebuild them around the boulevard to make the new boulevard ‘official’.¹⁸⁸ The construction work started in 1915 and a Russian-Jewish engineer that migrated to Palestine in 1892, whose name was Gedaliah Wilbuschewitz, was commissioned for the design of the boulevard.¹⁸⁹ Moreover, according to Cemal Pasha’s memoires, the Pasha had grandiose goals about the project: “The boulevard I had constructed in Damascus is I think not surpassed in beauty in any city of the east”.¹⁹⁰ The boulevard was oriented in East-West; that starts from the Old Citadel in East and ends with the Hejaz Central Train Station in the West. The former Hamidian approach was based on to establish a ceremonial center with a monument and surrounded by public buildings while Cemal Pasha’s plans were utilized to

¹⁸⁶ Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City*, 259.

¹⁸⁷ Theunissen, “War, Propaganda and Architecture: Cemal Pasha’s Restoration of Islamic Architecture in Damascus during World War I”, 260.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 254.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, 255.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 256.

create routes for marches and expand the city center through the railway station. The Pasha also commissioned Karl Wülzinger to build a ceremonial fountain, similar to the Ahmed III Fountain in front of the Topkapi Palace, across the Hejaz Central Train Station.¹⁹¹ The fountain was also a projection of a CUP monument, a structural signature of the CUP in the city. Cemal Pasha wanted the design to be figurative, with lion figures and such ornaments that would also include crescent and star figures. However, the fountain was not realized. Yet a floral design representing the Turkish banner, in plan view, was applied in the same road intersection, at the West end of the newly opened boulevard.¹⁹²

Aside from the restoration plans, demolished structures or the new roads that made Cemal Pasha known as the ruler-builder of the territory, he then also left an infamous mark in the city of Damascus. His further decisions were also recognized and are still remembered today in the collective memory of the Syrian society, through some disruptive events that transformed the cityscape. Especially through the end of the Great War, rising Arab nationalism was the main target that the Ottoman State aimed to get rid of. The sheikhs and notable families were de-facto decision makers of the region, and they were the prominent social actors of the communities of the geography due to the entrenched feudal system. Starting with the Hamidian era, a great effort was made by the Sublime Porte to establish a properly working connection with the peripheral region and the establishment of the municipal body was thus utilized. With the help of new technologies, telegraphy and the railways, both communication and transportation were improved and the integration of the region to the Ottoman mainland was in progress. From Palestine to

¹⁹¹ Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City*, 260.

¹⁹² Çiçek, *War and State Formation In Syria, Cemal Pasha's Governorate during World War I, 1914-1917*, 192.

Syria, the recent technologies, alongside practices of centralizing politics, disseminated the idea of being part of the greater Ottoman polity.

However, the rival powers were also aware of the situation and the tendencies behind the recent Ottoman presence focusing in the region. While the British forces were settled in Egypt, starting with April 1915, British aircraft started to drop leaflets in the Ottoman controlled territories of Palestine and Syria, in Turkish and Arabic languages, claiming that the Gallipoli had been recently captured by the Entente and the winner was also advancing towards Constantinople.¹⁹³ The unreal propaganda was effective and started rumors within the territorial Arab communities; since the same news were being circulated in the Egyptian media and the naval transportation network. The military government in Constantinople was severely challenged in terms of pursuing the policy of the Ottomanization of the region.

4.3 Cemal Pasha and his restoration of the Ottoman image in Damascus

Cemal Pasha's counter action was to fight against the spreading rumors about the Ottomans' decline in the Great War, especially after his unsuccessful strike against the British forces in Suez, Egypt.¹⁹⁴ During the summer of 1915, under the Pasha's patronage, many prominent feudal actors, as well as governmental officials from the region and other prominent names coming from other major urban centers, were invited to "see the seat of the Caliphate" in Constantinople and also visit Gallipoli.¹⁹⁵ The intent was a counter-propaganda activity embedded in an expedition as Salim Tamari notes:

¹⁹³ Aktar, "A propaganda tour organized by Djemal Pasha The Arab literati's visit to the Gallipoli front, 18–23 October 1915", 62.

¹⁹⁴ Sheffy, "The origins of the British breakthrough into South Palestine: The Anzac Raid on the Ottoman Railway, 1917", 133.

¹⁹⁵ Aktar, "A propaganda tour organized by Djemal Pasha The Arab literati's visit to the Gallipoli front, 18–23 October 1915", 64.

The purpose of the expedition, according to the authors of the mission's report, was to examine at first hand the course of the military operations in Çanakkale [Gallipoli], mobilize support for the Ottoman war effort in the Arab provinces of the sultanate, and strengthen Arab–Turkish solidarity. The last objective was an obvious reference to the rising tide of Arab separatist movements.¹⁹⁶

In a telegraph informing Enver Pasha that he intended to program this tour for the dignitaries to effect their broader communities, Cemal Pasha demanded a warm welcome and elegant hospitality for the visiting group. He strongly emphasized that “This is very important for the future of the Ottoman government in Syria and Mount Lebanon”.¹⁹⁷

Accompanied by officials from the CUP government, the Syrian-Palestinian elites visited Constantinople and met Sultan Mehmed Reşad and the crown prince Yusuf İzzeddin, and then moved to Gallipoli to visit the actual sites that hosted the battles so far. After a two-month trip, as Aktar stresses, the emphasis on Islamic Holy War and the discourse of defeating the infidels was thus established by the Ottoman authority and was reinforced in front of the visiting group; the strategy that Cemal Pasha was sought for was thus realized.¹⁹⁸ The main intent was to create an awareness about the growing assault of the British forces against the Ottoman Empire with the implication that Arab communities in the southern periphery were going to face the same challenge soon.

While Cemal Pasha's oppressive mode of governance received praises from the visitor elites in Gallipoli, the other Arab leaders in the territory were vocally critical of the Pasha's actions. The Syrian-Palestinian elite group influenced the soldiers in Gallipoli with Islamic rhetoric and with the appeal to Holy War, while, in

¹⁹⁶ Aktar, “A propaganda tour organized by Djemal Pasha The Arab literati's visit to the Gallipoli front, 18–23 October 1915”, 65.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 67.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid, 70.

his own administrative enclave, Cemal Pasha was trying to get rid of all critics against his rule. When there were two weeks left to the end of the expedition in Gallipoli, Cemal Pasha ordered the martial court to investigate many Arab nationalists in Lebanon, and eventually eleven Arab notables were executed.¹⁹⁹ The decision and the execution did not affect the ongoing visit in Gallipoli, though it reinforced the growing criticism against the Pasha in the Arab lands. The group then returned to their peripheral territory and made a presentation in Cinema Gallipoli in Damascus, which hosted a large amount of Arab notables in the region, including the soon-to-be revolting leaders.²⁰⁰

The Ottoman rulers actually wanted to replace a newly popular Arab nationalism with a unionist Turko-Ottomanist approach embedded in Pan-Islamism. However, both the military results of the Great War and the Arab notables' developing interest in Pan-Arabism (which grew similar to global nationalism in early twentieth century, against the Turko-Ottomanist approach) caused several outbreaks and revolts in the last Arab territories of the Ottoman Empire during the first year of the Great War. Cemal Pasha rigorously intercepted and ordered the prominent actors of the nationalist movement to be arrested and executed. Simultaneous executions were put through in Beirut again and in Damascus. Twenty-one Arab men, who were mostly journalists and former politicians, were executed accordingly in 6 May 1917. The actions in Damascus were performed open to the public, interestingly, in the Marjah Square, which had once hosted festivals, celebrations and official state ceremonies. Contrary to its former heritage, as a trade intersection and a public center, the Marjah Square was named thereafter as the

¹⁹⁹ Hudson, *Transforming Damascus: Space and Modernity in an Islamic City*, 122. Koroğlu, *Ottoman Propaganda and Turkish Identity: Literature in Turkey during World War I*, 194.

²⁰⁰ Aktar, "A propaganda tour organized by Djemal Pasha The Arab literati's visit to the Gallipoli front, 18–23 October 1915", 65.

Martyrs Square. The day of May 6 was declared and to be remembered as the Martyrs Day. To this day, it is observed as a day of mourning and silent ceremonies to commemorate the lost ones.²⁰¹ This incident also created a trace in the urban cityscape that the Hamidian glorification of the square was altered with a disastrous memory, through an atrocity committed by the Pasha.

Due to the fact that Cemal Pasha used some obvious ways of modern propaganda in politics, the Arab regions were introduced to different types of memorial practices in a short time. The previous attempts in the Hamidian era were channeled to several other new mediums during the Pasha's reign. Cemal Pasha invented routines and rituals in the community as a regional leader, similar to sultan Abdülhamid's salute after Friday prayers, while his permanence in the region was questionable. On the other hand, Hulusi Bey, who was the governor of Syrian territory between 1914 and 1915, frequently sent mails and telegraphs to Talat Pasha in Constantinople, which were severely critical of the Pasha.²⁰² He believed that Cemal Pasha must have had a psychological diagnosis based on his addiction to propaganda and self-promotion. He stated his position in one of those mails as: "Nobody can doubt Cemal Pasha's patriotism. However, he is a megalomaniac. He is addicted to the illness of propaganda and the urge to be celebrated all the time!"²⁰³ Hulusi Bey also warned Talat Pasha about the Arab notables before the expedition; he believed that Cemal Pasha was thinking that he was utilizing the feudal leaders to gain their support during the territorial battles, although their sentiment was the exact opposite. He claimed that the Arab notables were trying to get leverage from Cemal Pasha and use the opportunities to reinforce their own positions against the other

²⁰¹ Aktar, "A propaganda tour organized by Djemal Pasha The Arab literati's visit to the Gallipoli front, 18–23 October 1915", 65.

²⁰² Ibid, 67.

²⁰³ Ibid.

leaders in the Syria-Palestine territory.²⁰⁴ Additionally, the other Ottoman notables in the territory were also critical against a possible Pan-Ottomanist merger since there were many nationalist commanders as Mersinli Cemal or Mustafa Kemal, such as Hulusi Bey, who did not want any Arab affiliation in their battalions.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁴ Aktar, “A propaganda tour organized by Djemal Pasha The Arab literati’s visit to the Gallipoli front, 18–23 October 1915”, 65.

²⁰⁵ Ibid, 67.

CHAPTER 5

THE REPRESENTATION OF POWER THROUGH MODERN TRANSPORTATION: THE CASE OF OTTOMAN RAILWAYS AND AVIATION IN SYRIA AND PALESTINE

5.1 Sütun-ı Âlî, the column that bore the Ottoman hegemony in Haifa

The early industrial activities and logistics played a role in the shaping and/or reshaping of the cities in the east, as much as it did in the West. This section follows Yuval Ben Bassat and Yossi Ben-Artzi's detailed joint study on late Ottoman Palestine. The core intention here, however, is to follow how the city of Haifa was enhanced with a centralization approach despite its low population, neglected logistics and overshadowed functionality in comparison to the ancient city of Acre which is 15 kilometers away from the city.²⁰⁶ The narrative also follows the dynamics of the nationalization politics conducted through railways, which created a considerable impact on Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism within the borders of the Empire. In that context, the nationalization campaign for the railways led by sultan Abdülhamid or the railway expansion to Mecca and Medina which was projected to benefit of the Muslim pilgrims will be inspected. The studies of Murat Özyüksel and Hans Christensen are crucial and comparable sources for this chapter to understand the motives behind the railways expansion and further related projects in the territory. On the other hand, Michael Talbot's work on the significant monument placed in memory of the railway construction in Haifa is expanded to understand the

²⁰⁶ Ben-Bassat, Ben-Artzi, "Cartographical evidence of efforts to develop Acre during the last decades of Ottoman rule: did the Ottomans neglect the city?", 69.

power of symbolism and how the monument worked as a metaphorical flagpole for Hamidian presence in the territory.²⁰⁷

Haifa was comparably different than the previously mentioned urban centers in this study; the town was not a real urban entity the beginning of the nineteenth century; the Ottoman authority neglected it and the settlement was barely developed after the mid-eighteenth-century.²⁰⁸ The Port of Acre, on the other hand, was the popular urban and transportation center, especially during the early nineteenth century, and thus Ottoman authorities invested in the development of the city. However, the increasing transportation demands in the Levantine geography and its coastal line, simultaneously appeared with the construction of the new railway lines in mid-nineteenth century which were later planned to be integrated to the Hijaz railway sponsored by the Ottoman authority.²⁰⁹ Though the Hamidian authorities carried through the initial plans, German, French and British companies were in advance during the construction of the railways starting from the Taurus Mountains through the Hijaz territory.²¹⁰

Haifa's expansion was also simultaneous with the growing global migration to the area; the Ottoman Muslim and foreign Christian communities were becoming a part of a bigger population also consisting of Ottoman Jewish and later Zionist groups in the mid-century. As Talbot stresses, the decrease of the Muslim community's percentage compared to the total population of Haifa was also an issue for Ottoman authorities. Additionally, the Ottoman authorities tried to stop the growing flow of the non-Muslim migrants through Haifa, though the foreign agents

²⁰⁷ See Michael Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", *Urban History* 42, 2 (2015), 265.

²⁰⁸ Ben-Bassat, Ben-Artzi, "Cartographical evidence of efforts to develop Acre during the last decades of Ottoman rule: did the Ottomans neglect the city?", 72.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 23.

in Palestine used their rights to allow some of those migrants to be settled in the city.²¹¹ Sultan Abdülhamid II actually wanted to project the city's links with Islam and the Caliphate, therefore there were efforts to represent the Sultan's glory through urbanization efforts and monumental structures. One of those structures, the Jaffa Gate clock tower was remarkable and was mentioned briefly in the previous chapter on the construction spree of the period, which boomed through the end of the nineteenth century. The sultan's constructional interventions grew and multiplied in the southeastern periphery as much as they did in Constantinople in this period.

During the mid-eighteenth century, the original settlement of the city of Haifa moved to the eastern part of the territory by Zahir al-Umar, who was the Arab tribe leader of the territory. Despite the major urban centers around, Haifa's walled city was comparably new and questionably artificial.²¹² The formerly built mosque of Al-Jarinah in Haifa was erected behind the walled center of the city in 1774 to commemorate Zahir al-Umar after his demise. Despite the neighboring cities, like Acre, Haifa did not own any sacred memorial sites like Islamic shrines or mausolea. The Al-Jarinah Mosque was also not recognized as a sacred space by the Muslim communities since the building did not represent any notion of a religious site for those communities, in comparison with the locations in Acre or Nablus.²¹³ A clock tower was then attached to the mosque in 1900, contrary to the other examples constructed during the silver jubilee events of the sultan during the beginning of the new century.²¹⁴ The other clock towers, numbering around a hundred pieces erected throughout different regions of the empire, were not affiliated with any religious

²¹¹ Alliance Israelite Universelle played the main role during the late eighteenth-century Jewish mobility in Palestine. See Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", 268.

²¹² Kolodney, Kallus, "From colonial to national landscape: producing Haifa's cityscape", 325.

²¹³ Talbot, 254.

²¹⁴ Ibid, 255.

structure before; some of them were actually placed in place of the muvakkithanes which were religious institutions utilized for designating praying times.²¹⁵ The clock tower brought a mission of royal representation for the mosque after the completion of the construction; the religious space became a hybrid structure with its modern clock, its religious functionality and its representation of Ottoman centralized rule. The mixture of religious space with centralized Ottoman propaganda was a complete summary of the Hamidian approach in the region; an ostentatious structure was erected for the representation of the Ottoman throne and reminded the local community that they were also the part of the empire.

The clock tower was so dominant that it was visible from almost any point in the city's mountainous periphery as well as the coastal line. According to the newspapers, it was claimed that many Jewish people living in Jaffa at the time contributed to the construction of the tower. Talbot also questions that it was possible that the Jewish community in Haifa also joined the financial collaboration to build the clock tower. However, this allegation might sound controversial; since the construction in Haifa was a part of a mosque and it was not customary that the different religious groups in the reaya would have contributed in any religious construction instead of their own. Therefore, the clock tower built on this religious-monarchic combination might have been directly funded, and/or operated by the central authority, the Ottoman throne. The first aspect of the Ottomanization period of Haifa was thus projected through the clock tower which was a modern structure erected next to a religious center, representing the hegemonic Ottoman urban values

²¹⁵ Muvakkithanes were the first institutions publicly working on the time management. See Süheyl Ünver, "Osmanlı Türkleri İlim Tarihinde Muvakkithaneler", *Atatürk Konferansları-V, 1971-1972*, (Ankara, 1975), 234-254.

of the time, also with the mere inscription written on the clock tower, as: “Long live our Sultan Abdülhamid”.²¹⁶

Ben-Bassat and Ben-Artzi claim that the Ottoman authorities neglected Acre while they were focusing in the developments in Haifa.²¹⁷ The scholars also claim that the Islamic heritage and the Muslim majority caused the authorities to concentrate on Haifa, because the city was much diverse in terms of religion compared to Acre, and it was also becoming an alternative port city. Additionally, Acre had its own recognized Islamic religious centers such as Masjid al-Anwar and Maqam Nebi Saleh while Haifa was lacking in Islamic representation.²¹⁸ Moreover, the port in Acre was available for big scale maritime logistics with its wide natural shore while Haifa port was available for human transportation at the time and the growing migrant flow was active there. The former ruler of the territory, Zahir al-Umar, also endorsed the migration and the welcoming of the non-Muslim subjects within the Empire’s territory; the leader was an autonomous leader looking for new trade opportunities in both Acre and Haifa in mid-eighteenth century. The Tanzimat reforms were also effective. The reutilization of the waqfs and privatization of the properties reinforced urban growth, especially in the de-facto autonomous Palestinian territories.²¹⁹ The flow of the newcomers increased, and this inevitably changed the demographics in the port city. Even the British appointed a vice-consul to work in the city of Haifa in 1853, which had a population of around 8.000, a low

²¹⁶ The secularization through the clock tower realized on a clock tower with the Sultan’s message, thus altering the history of the mosque and making it a royal object.

²¹⁷ Ben-Bassat, Ben-Artzi, “Cartographical evidence of efforts to develop Acre during the last decades of Ottoman rule: did the Ottomans neglect the city?”, 73.

²¹⁸ Masjid al-Anwar is known as Al-Jazzar Mosque today built by Al Jazzar himself in 1781, while the Maqam Nebi Saleh, as the Prophet Saleh’s Tomb was renewed variously by the Bahais later. Prophet Saleh is also recognized by the Bahai community. See Bernhard Dichter, *Akko-Sites from the Turkish Period*. Haifa: University of Haifa, (pp. 108-117).

²¹⁹ Talbot, “The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa”, 252.

number compared to the other cities in mid-century.²²⁰ After his arrival, the consul, Edward Thomas Rogers, had an anticipation about the port of Haifa and informed his superiors that there is need for a better and modern port in Haifa with modernized docks and a functioning pier.²²¹ On the other hand, the German Templars developed a perception that the port of Haifa was their first step to the Holy Land. They thus glorified the arrival in Haifa as a sacred event. Their stance was reinforced with the incoming groups from Northern Palestine, and the new residents of Haifa eventually demanded the seat of the sancak to be replaced in Haifa, instead of Acre. The growing economic importance and the changing population expanded the city and its opportunities eventually. The completion of the port of Haifa in 1905 finalized the process of the power shift between the two cities.

Haifa was a growing city in terms of international trade and the colonialist agenda, a condition of which the sultan was also aware. The emerging new city was becoming widely well known. It was also the first step in the *Aliyah* process of the Jewish communities, which was an increasingly popular ritual of visiting the Holy Land. Since local waqfs were also powerful in the region, Ottoman presence was becoming more obscure; the social and charity works were also overshadowing the Empire's presence.²²² During Haifa's rise with the incoming migration and the city's growing economy, other logistical developments were immanent for the city. There were already new trade routes caused by the newcomers. However, the idea of the railway was still intact because of the main line planned by the Ottoman center to

²²⁰ The municipal reforms were applied in various times, especially in Palestine. See Nora Lafi, "The Ottoman Municipal Reforms between Old Regime and Modernity: Towards a New Interpretative Paradigm", *First Eminönü International Symposium*, (Istanbul, 2007), 448-455.

²²¹ Edward Thomas Rogers presented the project on expansion of Haifa Port, significantly during the Crimean War. See Ben-Bassat, Ben-Artzi, "Cartographical evidence of efforts to develop Acre during the last decades of Ottoman rule: Did the Ottomans Neglect the City?", 71.

²²² Abramovich, Epstein-Pliouchtch, Aravot, "Imported modernity and local design: the creation of resilient public spaces in late Ottoman Palestine", 1878-1918, 4.

start from Damascus to end in Hijaz, specifically Mecca, in order to establish a modernized pilgrim route and properly connect the Holy City with the empire. Since 1890, Ottoman authorities had let the British companies build the railways between Haifa and Daraa, as a concession. However, the progress was obscurely slow. Sultan Abdulhamid initially considered the British investment as an advantage, since the newly developing transportation technology would help him reach out to the periphery and have stronger connections with the Arab communities of the territory. However, the slow progress of the British company caused the Ottoman authority to buy back the concession in 1901 and the sultan decided to finish the railway between Daraa and Haifa with the Empire's own resources. At the time, the population was 9908 and the majority of the residents were non-Muslims.²²³

The connection between Daraa and Haifa was not part of the main railway line, it was a planned branch of the railways heading through the West, the Mediterranean coast. After taking back the concession from the British company Philling, Abdulhamid also requested the help of the German engineers for the new branch, which would be part of the Baghdad railway in the next decade.²²⁴ The slow process of this additional branch was vocally criticized by the locals and notables of the region. Esad Tevfik Efendi, the governor of Acre, which lost its status as the seat of the sancak and was already surpassed by Haifa, commented on the lingering work as:

The country has been waiting for your works, in expectation of the sign of your efforts; and news of you had varied on account of the length of time that passed, causing uneasiness in our minds, for the people prefer the completion

²²³ Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", 249.

²²⁴ Meissner Pasha was also responsible during the Baghdad Railway construction however Auler Pasha did not join the latter construction. See Murat Özyüksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline*, (New York, 2014), 78-80.

of the work, though some had become weak in hope; but I wish you good fortune, victory, and good progress.²²⁵

The governor's mild critique was a summary of the situation. However, a former concession given to the Sursock Family of Beirut in 1880 to establish a line between Acre, Haifa and Damascus might have ignited the governor of Acre to voice these comments. The local authorities and the growing Palestinian communities were waiting for a train line for almost 30 years, though their proposals were not welcomed by the central authority. In 1892, as a monumental gesture, the foundation stone of the proposed line was placed as a sign of the beginning of the construction by the head of the Philling Railway Company, Madam Philling. According to Carmel, the slow process was also due to the French companies' running a carrier service between Beirut and Damascus, which would have been badly effected by a new railway line that "...would cause the destruction of the economy of Beirut".²²⁶

In 1905, the Ottoman authorities managed to finish the railway line between Haifa and Daraa, connecting the new port city of the Levant with the Hejaz railway route that was launched by the order of the sultan in 1900. The construction work was carried out by soldiers and temporary workers around the region, since most of the infrastructural work was operated by the Ottoman military at the time. There were two temporary arch-gates placed in Daraa and Haifa, to glorify this unique branch that connected the city of Haifa with the Hejaz route, with the purpose of achieving a better and safer pilgrimage travel.²²⁷ A four pillar monument with a pedestal with inscriptions in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish, was designed by the sultan's architect, Raimondo d'Aronco, and then placed across the Haifa Train

²²⁵ Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", 257.

²²⁶ Carmel, *Ottoman Haifa, A History of Four Centuries under Turkish Rule*, 122.

²²⁷ Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", 261.

Station in 1903, which had also been recently built in 1900. Those buildings, including the train station, the clock tower attached to the Masjid Al-Anwar, and the monument were all parts of a compound that represented the Ottoman state. Sultan Abdulhamid II was aware of the expanding problem about ruler visibility in Haifa or its lack thereof. Since the Palestinian territories were de-facto autonomous but also neglected; the independent growth of Haifa was a problem, especially with the growing interest of the religious groups that diminished the Muslim majority.²²⁸

The monument, called Sütun-ı Âlî, did not have any specific function; similar to the Telegraph Monument in Damascus also designed by d'Aronco. According to Talbot the opening ceremony of the monument was arguably held in 1903, or 1905.²²⁹ In reference to the journals of the time, the monument was already completed prior to the train station; therefore the opening of the monument might have been in 1903.²³⁰ The column was not much high to be visible as much as the clock tower in Masjid al-Marwan. Neither did it represent the same approach as the Damascus monument which had been conceived as the signifier of a new city square. However, the monument projected an image of Ottoman authority, namely the omnipotence and the economical sufficiency of the sultan and the empire.

The urban expansion in Haifa continued, and economic links with the local territory were growing, therefore the bonds with the Ottoman center were in obvious decline. The sultan intended to show his power with the nationalized construction of the railways and the infrastructural power of his rulership. This image of power is also included within the figures of the Sütun-ı Âlî. The monument contains four columns in Corinthian order with a Roman slab on top with four cannon balls

²²⁸ Yazbak, "Comparing Ottoman Municipalities in Palestine: The Cases of Nablus, Haifa, and Nazareth", 241.

²²⁹ Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", 263.

²³⁰ Ibid.

(forming a pyramidal shape) and a topping crescent over the slab. As Talbot narrates, an engineering magazine in Germany depicted the monument as being of German origin; the Bavarian railway between Fürth and Nuremberg, which was recognized as the first modernized steam-powered railway line, also hosted a obelisk-like monument called the Eisenbahndenkmäl in Nuremberg.²³¹ The German monument was erected for the 50th anniversary of the railway line; as a German-made pioneer transportation unit. The sultan always kept his sight on international developments and he was fond of foreign magazines. It is apt to confirm that the monument was inspired from the Eisenbahndenkmäl, since his argument was similar to the intentions behind that specific German industrial development: nationalizing the public transportation and depending on national resources in industry. The amalgamation of religious and modern discourse was also available in the Sütun-i Âlî; on inscriptions placed on two different sides of the monument, the sultan addressed his subjects in both Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. Moreover, the Arabic inscription was written in a religious tone, with an emphasis on the Caliphate and the subject-sultan relationship that it entailed:

In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate: praise be to God alone and prayer and peace upon his final Prophet. Our lord and our master, the Commander of the Faithful and the Caliph of the Master of Prophets, Sultan of the two lands and Ruler of the two seas, the Sultan son of the Sultan, the conquering Sultan Abdulhamid Khan son of the conquering Sultan Abdulmecid Khan – may God extend his reign and prolong his life and his days – has ordered that a railway be established from Syrian Damascus to facilitate the pilgrimage of the nation of Muhammad (peace be upon him) to the House of God and to press their foreheads at the garden of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him). Then he gave his pious order – may God fully perpetuate his reign – that the railway be extended from the city of Haifa to join the Hejaz Railway for the pilgrimage of every Muslim to the House of God and to journey to the garden of the Messenger of God to pray to the

²³¹ Talbot, “The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa”, 263.

Almighty that he support his great Caliphate and that he raise up his worthy workers in his sublime hand. Inaugurated in the year 1319 AH [1901/02].²³²

The Haifan branch of the Hijaz railway was not principally constructed for the pilgrims, however. The inscription was prepared with a pious tone in order to impress the Arabic speaking communities in the region. On the other hand, the Ottoman Turkish inscription rationalizes the construction in a milder religious tone and carries more secular overtones in representing the authority of the new establishment:

In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate: praise be to God alone and prayer and peace upon his final Prophet. Our lord, His Majesty the Commander of the Faithful and Caliph on Earth, Sultan of the two lands and Ruler of the two seas, the Sultan son of the Sultan, the conquering Sultan Abdulhamid Khan son of the conquering Sultan Abdulmecid Khan, desiring to strengthen the prayers of the Muslim pilgrims fulfilling the obligation of hajj and visiting the sweet- smelling garden of the Prophet, the magnificent threshold of the caliphate has undertaken a benevolent work in issuing the order and imperial command for constructing [the railway] from the noble city of Damascus to honored Mecca. [This] memorial commemorates the magnificent imperial decree of the great order from the caliph stretching forth his hand that the Haifa railway become a branch line of the Hamidian Hejaz Railway. Year 1319 AH [1901/02].²³³

The additional use of the ‘Hamidian’ term basically draws the main line between the two inscriptions; the former inscription represents the Caliph as a holy figure, or even godlike, with pious messages, while the latter represents the Sultan connected to his predecessors, linking him to the Ottoman dynasty, and emphasizes the sultan’s sufficient skills and power to establish the railway branch. Apart from inscriptions, there were three relief works on the pedestal, an institutional railway icon derived from the German equivalent, the Ottoman coat of arms, and a locomotive figure. One can question the lack of the sultan’s tughra, though it was already included at the top of the monument underneath the cannonballs. The tughra

²³² Talbot, “The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa”, 263.

²³³ Ibid, 264.

was also placed on the clock tower and the train station within the railway compound.

The railway between Daraa and Haifa was metaphorical of a power struggle from the perspective of the sultan. It marked his achievement against foreign capital and political intervention. The lacking British progress was halted with the Ottoman take-over, especially in a territory with a decreasing Muslim minority. This was a propaganda victory for the Sultan Abdulhamid. Even the non-Muslim notables were impressed with the work, accepting and reinforcing, at least superficially, the links of the city with the sultan and his patronage. One of the Christian elites, called Ghattas Efendi, praised the sultan during the construction as such:

Too long the seeds of progress have been amongst us in a state of inertness, longing for a hand to raise them from this long apathy and bring them to light. Whenever we compared the past with the present, we asked ourselves if we were really the descendants of our ancestors. The past brought us but regrets; the present found us in the same inertness; and our future appeared as nothing but a series of vain illusions, when at last a shining star appeared on our horizon, which dissipated the darkness of this dark night, and revived the little life we still possessed, opening before us an era of moral and physical progress, to which our ancestors themselves have never attained.²³⁴

After the Sultan's deposition in 1909, the dream of the Hamidian Haifa and the power battle against the German Templars, British investors, and the incoming Jewish settlers were halted. The military commander of Greater Syria and Palestine, Cemal Pasha treated Haifa as a remote outpost for maritime transportation. The city was not one of his priorities since the population rise left Muslims as a minority and the German Templars were eligible to be left autonomous.²³⁵ The only struggle that the Pasha had was with the Bahai movement and their proselytizing agenda.

Nevertheless, the breakout of the Great War eventually took him back to Syria and

²³⁴ Talbot, "The Exalted Column, the Hejaz Railway and imperial legitimation in late Ottoman Haifa", 258.

²³⁵ The German alliance played a big role in Haifa's modern development before and during the Great War. See Abramovich, Epstein-Pliouchtch, Aravot, "Imported modernity and local design: the creation of resilient public spaces in late Ottoman Palestine", 1878–1918, 10.

Lebanon.²³⁶ Eventually, during the Great War, the British Army took control of Haifa in 1917 and established a new local government.

5.2 The expansion of railways in Palestine and transportation as a political leverage

During the turn of the century, the Ottoman sphere of influence was narrowing down in the Arab provinces, and the political interventions, mostly held by sultan Abdulhamid II's ruling mechanism, did not yield satisfactory results. The recent technological developments, such as telegraphy, the technological advancements in urbanization, and the railways (which never became expansive throughout the Empire) were utilized as tools for the representation of the royal entity against the masses. Especially telegraphy and railways were presented as auspicious gifts from the sultan during the Hamidian era, and were promoted to glorify the sultan as the holistic caretaker of the Arab territories. As observed in Ussama Makdisi's masterful analysis on the Ottoman approach to those territories, the sultan and the Ottoman authorities treated those provinces with a mindset that could be described as 'Ottoman orientalism'.²³⁷ As Makdisi stresses, after the Ottoman decline in the Balkans in late nineteenth century, the Ottoman state approached to its Arab provinces as Ottoman properties but not Ottomanized. There was a crucial need for spatial interventions to Ottomanize the Arab provinces.²³⁸ The Ottoman interventions were mostly welcomed in the region; however, it is arguable to say that the overall Ottoman strategy was welcomed. The buildings or the constructions were not inappropriate for or unwelcomed in the region although they were utilized to reinforce centralization and perceived as agents of the throne.

²³⁶ Ben-Bassat, Ginio, *Late Ottoman Palestine: The Period of Young Turk Rule*, 265-266.

²³⁷ Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism", 768-96.

²³⁸ *Ibid*, 770.

The technological advancements represented two major notions in the Ottoman political sphere: to strengthen bonds with the central administration through glorified constructions and to physically connect the underdeveloped Arab provinces to the center. The effort was undertaken to establish a system that would avert foreign influences which would end up in occupation, as in the case of the British intervention in Egypt in 1882.²³⁹ One of the prominent Hamidian political tools was the Pan-Islamist discourse, with the utilization of the Caliphal figure as an inclusive holistic leader for Muslim communities, and the projection of his royal strength via the ‘good works’ mentioned in the previous chapters. The utilization of the caliphal title was actually a dated political tool in the Ottoman state body, but the title was not in use, or effective, until the early nineteenth-century; except it was globally recognized during the preparation of the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.²⁴⁰ On the other hand, sultan Abdulhamid II had the chance to innovate image-making policies with the help of technological advancements, especially with the growing opportunities for establishing new transportation and communication lines. Information technologies eased the way to inform and respond to the provinces easily, while the transportation brought a reinforced connection of the territories with the state. The sultan, as the caretaker Caliph, brought the new technology to the neglected territories while these new establishments were planned in detail to strengthen the bonds between the monarch and the communities and tribes of the region.

As Minawi stresses, the two major technological inventions were crucial for state-intended modernization during the mid-eighteenth-century: telegraphy and

²³⁹ Minawi, “Beyond Rhetoric: Reassessing Bedouin-Ottoman Relations along the Route of the Hijaz Telegraph Line at the End of the Nineteenth Century”, 82.

²⁴⁰ Hamilton A. R. Gibb, 295.

railways. These technologies were simultaneously implemented in many locations throughout the world and shared a common infrastructural requirement; they both needed a permanent, continuous and systematically built technological infrastructure in order to operate. However, while the technology of telegraphy was already introduced in the Ottoman Empire during the Crimean War in 1853-1856, the railway technology was comparably lacking in the time.²⁴¹

Despite the ongoing pitches sultan Abdulhamid II received, he was still hesitant about the proposed Anatolian Railway, which was presented several times by the Germans.²⁴² Christensen questions that the German dominance on railway production and their representation of their own system as the monopoly of recent technology had reinforced the German affiliation in Ottoman politics, which already started with the modernization of the Ottoman army by German military officials in 1880.²⁴³ The German military officers, later to be called German pashas, played an important role in the establishment of the railway system in the Ottoman Empire, specifically in two prominent lines. The Hijaz Railway and the Baghdad Railway became the grandiose projects of their time during the two different eras, the Hamidian era and the times during the Great War. Therefore, many journals and sources of the time were quoting from these pashas about the investments in the Ottoman Empire; the cartographical studies of the sites prepared under their administration were published in German magazines.²⁴⁴ They assisted and operated many surveys, preliminary exercises on the site, constructional and military

²⁴¹ First railway network was between Izmir and Aydın, established in 1868. See Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 69.

²⁴² Özyüksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline*, 27.

²⁴³ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 14.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 49.

operations in order to complete the infrastructural work needed for the railway installment.²⁴⁵

However, the first introduction of the railways in the region was with the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, opened in 1892, a separately working line built by a collaboration consisting of Jewish, Catholic and Protestant communities of the territory.²⁴⁶ It was the first introduction of steam powered transportation technology in Palestinian territory, however, it is possible to claim that its impact was enormous since the railway line between Acre-Haifa-Damascus was either proposed during the aftermath by the same collaboration of Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, but also this time with the support of the British companies.²⁴⁷ On the other hand, the local Ottoman authorities were also discussing a functioning long railway route, similar to the telegraphy line, which connected Damascus to Mecca. The construction of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway was a product of collaboration consisting of Jewish, Catholic and Protestant communities, while both European and local Jewish media harshly criticized the Jerusalem based communities to be part of it.²⁴⁸ An investor from Jerusalem, Jozef Navon was the main initiator of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railroad and established the collaboration. Moreover, the investor later stated that Theodor Herzl even rejected to endorse the project.²⁴⁹

The Muslim pilgrims had several different routes to arrive in Mecca, the Iranians were using the routes through the Arabian peninsula while the majority preferred the maritime route by arriving in Jeddah.²⁵⁰ Many of the maritime travelers

²⁴⁵ Özyüksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline*, 28.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 31.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 32.

²⁴⁸ Travis, *On Chariots with Horses of Fire and Iron*, 95.

²⁴⁹ Cotterell, *The Railways of Palestine and Israel*, 10.

²⁵⁰ Auler, *Hicaz Demiryolu İnşa Edilirken-I: Şam-Maan Hattı*, 39.

used the Suez Canal after 1869, also under the British authority starting from 1882, while some pilgrims used the ground route, bypassing the canal and heading through the desert over Sinai.²⁵¹ The Syrian pilgrims or the ones from the neighboring territorial tribes usually followed the route starting from Damascus, going through Daraa, Amman and through Medina to end up in Mecca. The advantage of this route for the pilgrims was that they had the chance to see the other sacred locations on the way, through the desert. Many of the pilgrims were proud of this grueling trip, since the difficulties they came over brought sorrow and thus much holiness to their journey en route to the cities of Medina and Mecca.²⁵²

Sultan Abdülhamid II, as a leader seeking ways to unify the Arab communities and strengthen their connections with the center, had already welcomed the proposal of a new railway line by the Germans in 1883, after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russo War, which was the Baghdad Railway (or Baghdadbahn) that would connect the Orient Express to Baghdad, with an Anatolian line. The main intention behind this line was German expansion; the growing economy led the German Kaiser to decide on new trade routes, especially in Asia Minor. As Christensen elaborates, Ottoman-German relations were also an outcome of the late maturation of German self-confidence, while the rival European countries' colonial approaches already established their bonds with different cultures and geographies.²⁵³ As interpolated by Christensen, the military expansion of the Germans was developed in accordance with their economic investments.²⁵⁴ The German companies were eager to invest in the Ottoman railways, simultaneously with the African railway plans they were developing; while the international media inevitably considered their intentions

²⁵¹ Auler, *Hicaz Demiryolu İnşa Edilirken-I: Şam-Maan Hattı*, 39.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 136.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

‘colonial’.²⁵⁵ However, the sultan’s intention was much more focused on the Levant. His idea was to connect the major cities on the line, which starts from Damascus and ends in Mecca, through a railway system, as they already did with the telegraphy infrastructure.²⁵⁶ The sultan did not originally come up with the idea; Dr. Charles Zimpel firstly presented the idea to sultan Abdulaziz in 1862.²⁵⁷ Dr. Zimpel was an American educated German engineer with pan-Germanist tendencies, which were already suitable with the Ottoman-German relations of the time.²⁵⁸ Since the first proposal, there were many drafts that the investors tried to take the attention of the sultan for the project but there was no response. According to Christensen, the situation was partly because of the sultan Abdülhamid’s political critics, for instance Damat Ferid Pasha.²⁵⁹ After the arguable accusations about his plans against the sultan, he once said:

You indulge in unreasonable actions and wasteful expenditure, such as the creations of grades and decorations unseen in any other state. . . . Our country is rich, capable of prosperity and of supporting in comfort twenty times its present population. But, alas! a gang of robbers has seized it and has barred the road to wealth and treasure.²⁶⁰

Similar to the colonization arguments in international media, the sultan was criticized, similar to the way he was reviled by Damat Ferid Pasha did, because of the former railway concessions to foreign companies, especially the German business, for his own sake to create personal allies and reinforce his regime. As an outcome of this tangled situation, and also because of the depleted state budget, Abdulhamid’s decision was to build the railway between Damascus and Mecca with

²⁵⁵ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 17.

²⁵⁶ An Ottoman engineer, Hacı Muhtar Bey, undertook the mission to primarily inspect the route in use. See Auler Pasha, *Hicaz Demiryolu İnşa Edilirken-I: Şam-Maan Hattı*, (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, İstanbul, 2017), 43-44.

²⁵⁷ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 12.

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Ibid, 16.

²⁶⁰ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 16.

a different funding method. The idea was to have an open call for all Muslims who recognized the Caliph, and receive donations from them in order to modernize the route for the pilgrims with a railway system.²⁶¹ The donation ads were placed in the Ottoman daily newspapers and weeklies of the time, such as *Malumat* and *Sabah*.²⁶² Due to the slow process of receiving donations, the sultan had a second call for all the Muslims living in the Ottoman Empire, and converted the process into a religious mission. After some time, even the Druzes, Christians and Jewish people living around the railway route voluntarily joined in and contributed to the donations.²⁶³

To follow the steps of the Hijaz Railway Project, Auler Pasha's journal is a key resource since he was one of the responsible people in the technical team. Karl Lorenz Auler, also known as Auler Pasha, was one of the important actors during the Hijaz railway construction, since he recorded the progress in detail and published those notes later in 1906. He was one of the German officers who worked in the installment of the Hijaz Railway during the Hamidian era, then went back to Germany in 1908. As Auler Pasha quotes, the overall budget from the donations reached 46,7 million francs, while donations were still being received.²⁶⁴ The overall campaign worked and created a remarkable budget, while simultaneously reinforced the sultan's image as the Caliph. The budget was still not enough for the proposed railway line; however, the campaign reinforced the sultan's image from the pan-Islamist perspective and improved his stance before their partners, Germans and the construction teams as well. The majority of the labor groups was also Muslim. However, following their failing progress after a couple of months, the sultan assigned Meissner Pasha, who was also active during the construction of the

²⁶¹ Auler, *Hicaz Demiryolu İnşa Edilirken-I: Şam-Maan Hattı*, 38.

²⁶² Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 18.

²⁶³ Ibid.

²⁶⁴ Auler, *Hicaz Demiryolu İnşa Edilirken-I: Şam-Maan Hattı*, 38.

infrastructure and railways in the Balkans.²⁶⁵ According to Meissner, the project was realized by “the most honestly managed fund in the country”.²⁶⁶

The railway to Medina was opened in September 1908, a couple of months after the military intervention against sultan Abdulhamid II by the notable officers who were then members of the Committee of Union and Progress.²⁶⁷ The railway was ready for the first pilgrimage trip on January of 1909 but the connection from Medina to Mecca was not yet finished.²⁶⁸ Also there was a railway workers’ strike in Haydarpasa, Istanbul resulting from the discriminative policies of the Deutsche Bank, the major investor in the project. The workers also underlined that despite the zeitgeist their intention was not revolutionary, but was only because of the uneven treatment against them, compared to the non-Muslim workers. The situation froze the ongoing constructions, especially the Baghdad Railway, which remained, halted until 1910.²⁶⁹

Furthermore, the Hijaz railway was active, yet not totally embraced during its first years after its opening. The bedouins occupying the territories on the route, who also caused problems such as looting or attacking the workers during the construction, called the train “Hamid’s donkey”.²⁷⁰ Some Arab religious notables criticized the railway project because modernized transportation caused the

²⁶⁵ Auler, *Hicaz Demiryolu İnşa Edilirken-I: Şam-Maan Hattı*, 40.

²⁶⁶ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 18.

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 21.

²⁶⁸ Both economic and social factors played crucial role in the unfinished Medina-Mecca line. The common view was to prevent the railways expansion to Mecca, since the railways represented the West and the technology, which should have been kept away from the religious city. See Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 20.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda*, 16.

pilgrimage route to lose its soul, or essence.²⁷¹ However, the Hejaz railway gained popularity in time and worked effectively, until the breakout of the Great War.

On the other hand, the Baghdad railway was halted until February 1910 and construction continued with the engagement of Meissner Pasha. Especially the end of the Hijaz railway progress eased the situation since it was difficult for the Ottoman military to simultaneously conduct two constructional operations simultaneously in two harsh regions. Meissner Pasha was transferred to the project as he was already experienced from the Hejaz railway and knew how to conduct the process with the Arab workers and the Ottoman military in the region. On the contrary, the Baghdad railway had loose ends in four locations; especially there were separate lines divided by mountainous zones in the Taurus region, around Pozanti, and the Amanos region around Osmaniye.²⁷² The geographical obstacles were too difficult to proceed with construction, compared to working in the vast desert plains of the Hijaz railway.

The construction of the Baghdad railway became a huge burden, both for the Germans and the ambitious Ottoman authority. Since sultan Abdülhamid II was deposed, the ongoing projects in the Arab provinces were approached through military goals and conducted with the vision of the German officials. Especially with the forthcoming war, the numbers of people working in the railway construction were diminishing; in August 1914, the number of the labor force was around 11,796 while it tragically decreased to 1,651, one month later.²⁷³

After the Ottoman Empire entered the war, they eventually sided with the Germans. The call for jihad was directed against the French, British and the Russians, while the Germans and the Austro-Hungarians were excluded. The

²⁷¹ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 110.

²⁷² Özyüksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline*, 25.

²⁷³ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 22.

utilization of the fatwa was influenced by the Germans and eventually the role of the Baghdad railway changed; the religious propaganda was prioritized. Once planned to be the part of Asia Minor's main transportation line, the German authorities urged the Baghdad railway to be finished in order to be used for strategic military purposes in 1915.²⁷⁴ The category "workers" were changed to "soldiers" in official documents and the support behind the construction was boosted. The prisoners of war started to be included in the labor gangs, as Cemal Pasha did in Adana with the inmates.²⁷⁵ As a tragic end, the main connection between Nusaybin and Al-Mawsil could not be finished and the continuous railway was not realized especially after British powers captured Baghdad in 1917.²⁷⁶

Both of the railway projects, the Hejaz and Baghdad railways, were considered to be the sole technological connectors in advance, to reach out to the periphery of the Empire. Especially the Hejaz railway, as a collectively funded project, was a grand Ottoman ideal for sultan Abdulhamid as a means of transport to be used as a potent propaganda tool. His effort to impose royal presence on the southern provinces and to link them with a modernized transportation agent was the core idea. He successfully presented this idea with an Islamized package as a favor for the pilgrims, funded by the Muslim world. On the contrary, the Baghdad railway was intended to create another colonial route shared with the Germans. However, it turned into a military undertaking because of the unraveling events of the Great War. One can argue that the tragic end of the Baghdad railway occurred because of unsuccessful management, since the Sublime Porte behaved erratically due to

²⁷⁴ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 22.

²⁷⁵ Çiçek, *War and State Formation in Syria Cemal Pasha's governorate during World War I, 1914-17*, 173.

²⁷⁶ Christensen, *Germany and the Ottoman Railways Art, Empire, and Infrastructure*, 23.

political instabilities. While the Baghdad railway was not even finished by the end of the war, the Hejaz railway was already in use. Moreover, Talat Pasha, insisted that the Sharif of Mecca undertake the final connection between Medina and Mecca, although the Sharif postponed this request. Accordingly, through the end of the war, the Hijaz railway was sabotaged regularly by the local Arab tribes.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁷ The 'Lawrence from Arabia', Thomas Edward Lawrence was practically active while uniting the Arab tribes against the Ottoman-German alliance. The railways were a common target for the tribes, as much as they were for Lawrence. See Özyüksel, *The Hejaz Railway and the Ottoman Empire: Modernity, Industrialisation and Ottoman Decline*, 201-202.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The unstable urbanization politics in the southern periphery of the Ottoman Empire, especially during the end of the nineteenth century were tied to the dynamics of Ottoman centralization politics and the effort to create a modernized, all-encompassing Ottoman identity. Hamidian politics sought for possible ways to establish bonds, under the pan-Islamist umbrella, however the caliph's imagery and his royal works had a limited power. Especially the simultaneously growing British, French and German interests in the region also affected the general stance of the geography before the Great War. The Ottoman paranoia for losing the southern periphery matched with the Western interests and created the a battlefield in the region. The neglected Arab communities were open to Ottoman propaganda, however, the propaganda brought a modernized, yet incomplete identity for the residents of the region, who seemed to be recently recognized by central Ottoman authority. The half-Ottomanized perception for the region brought the issue of Ottoman orientalism and its related urban interventions in the territory.

It is better to draw a line between Syria and Palestine in this context of urban comparison, since the local dynamics were different in those two similar regions. Palestine was de-facto autonomous and recently developed with its growing non-Muslim population, also with its rural but populous part. The general population of Palestine was also drastically challenged by the citizenship law in 1869, which enabled the Ottoman subjects to be citizens and claim legal rights.²⁷⁸ Damascus, on

²⁷⁸ Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar: Osmanlılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık 1908-1918*, 17.

the other hand, was an organized province with a rich history and more settled in comparison to Palestine. The policies of the different power figures were different in terms of construction and representation. While the Hamidian approach was generous but was not enough for establishing an Ottoman identity for the region; the approach brought by the Young Turks, especially by Cemal Pasha in person, was also not only generous, but also disgraceful. Cemal Pasha's approach was harsh and destructive, even if he presented himself as a builder-governor in his first days in the region. His drastic decisions and leader obsession built the main opposition base against the Ottomans during the Great War. The modern idea of the ruling nation was being developed in Syria and carried on by the Pasha and one of the first modernized implications of the race-based discrimination was visible in Pasha's approach in Damascus. While the Hamidian approach was to complete the Ottomanization of the people in the region, Cemal Pasha's strategy was to develop and sustain his leader figure. His mass executions were also infamous that the modern Syrian history also has a narrative based on his brutal actions.

If we compare the shift in Ottoman rulership according to the actors' representational interventions in those provinces, pan-Islamism brought a powerful foundation stone for the future of a modernized Ottoman identity. However, the Ottoman identity was later challenged with Turko-Ottomanism. Also as Kayalı stresses, the development of the late Arab nationalism in the region, which will evolve into pan-Arabism in mid-nineteenth century, was originated with the popularizing Turko-Ottomanist behavior during the CUP era.²⁷⁹ The Hamidian pragmatism utilized in pan-Islamist politics was renounced and replaced with the nationalist Turko-Ottomanism thus the notion of Ottoman orientalism. Additionally,

²⁷⁹ Kayalı, *Jön Türkler ve Araplar: Osmanlılık, Erken Arap Milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık 1908-1918*, 20.

it is better to remember that the efforts made during Abdülhamid's era to strengthen the bonds with the territory was an outcome of Greek and then Balkan uprisings which eventually led to the Balkan Wars in 1912-13. The losses in the Western front led to imperial reconstruction, which was programmed to focus in the Arab provinces as well. The shrinking empire alarmed the Ottoman throne to focus in the periphery to protect its receding borders, not with the utilization of the brute force, but with strategies to develop a common identity. Hamidian politics sought for establishment and order in those peripheral provinces, however, the approach involved more than urbanization. It was a way of linking, or directly connecting the provinces to the center with the utilization of urbanization as an agent for the representation of the monarchy. The Ottomanization was an outcome of the Tanzimat and this approach introduced modernization to the people in territory, however, sultan Abdülhamid's simultaneously applied strong centralization policies were too strong to be achieved in short term.

The military intervention of the Committee of Union and Progress against the ruling leader was risky, especially for the future of the recently developed territories in Syria, Beirut and Palestine. The Hamidian visibility linked its own identity with the periphery via its own constructional representation. However, the persistence to keep those territories as valuable and urbanized parts of the empire was effective yet not sustainable for the Committee of Union and Progress. The operations were single-handedly controlled by Cemal Pasha and the pan-Islamist approach. Cemal Pasha's personal character played an important role here since he was the sole protector of the land as he imposed himself. His struggle with the central government in Istanbul and the Egyptian front increased the overall tension in the territory and Cemal Pasha was already a ruler figure with autocratic tendencies.

His revanchist attitude against Hamidian urbanization was visible in Damascus, however, his position shifted against the British forces. According to Cemal Pasha, military advancement was more important than pleasing the masses, especially after the first military charge against Suez in Egypt. His plans were based on establishing his own ruling legacy while it was necessary for him to prepare for the war against the British army, instead of polishing his omnipotent leader charm. The centralization of the territory was already questionable for Cemal Pasha since he saw himself as the future leader of the de-facto sovereign territory. His ambiguous intentions were updated and reshaped with the military plans during the war, the modernization politics evolved into tactical urbanism and the representational interventions quickly formed into military campaigns.

While the Hamidian interventions created modern Palestine and Syria and brought an aspect of being an Ottoman subject, Cemal Pasha's development period created another layer that consists of pan-Turkism and a reinforced Ottoman orientalism. The Great War and its consequences were damaging for the territory, though the physical changes that Ottoman hegemony created were fruitful for the region in terms of urban modernization and economic expansion of the cities. On the other hand, those physical changes as urban developments and infrastructural constructions shaped the future of those provinces and created their future urban agendas for the aftermath, as one can see from the British armies interventions in the Old City of Jerusalem. To conclude, besides the possibly revanchist urban interventions and their motives, it is appropriate to say that the social changes led by the Hamidian authority started the Ottomanization of the region. On the contrary, Cemal Pasha's later interventions created a continuous backlash and unconsciously

encouraged the Arabic nationalism and contributed in the development of the modern Arab identity in Syria and Palestine.

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