LIBERAL CULTURALISM AND THE INDIVIDUAL

An Alternative Account of Cultural Identities

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ABSTRACT

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In my thesis I aim to provide a philosophical basis to argue for a version of Pluralism which gives theoretical support for a form of Political Liberalism that is oriented towards enhancing communication among a diversity of cultures at the utmost level. I argue that the basic commitments of Political Liberalism to egalitarianism and to the autonomy of the individuals presuppose that the state be a pluralist one in which a diversity of cultures function to be the context of choice for the individuals.

In order to argue for the philosophical position of Pluralism that I adopt at the end of my thesis I introduced an alternative account of autonomy. In this new account, an individual's autonomy no longer amounts to a rather obscure activity of "willing to will", but to one's capacity to choose instead. In this respect I have been able to show that an individual's autonomy diminishes if his scope of choices is diminished. That enabled me to argue that the widest scope of choices can only be maintained in line with Pluralism. The alternative account of autonomy and the anti-essentialist understanding of cultural identities that I have provided so far has enabled me to conclude that diversity of cultures is the context of choice for an individual. In this respect Pluralism is the most appropriate philosophical position that is compatible with the alternative account of the autonomous individual.

KISA ÖZET

LİBERAL KÜLTÜRALİZM VE BİREY

Kültürel Kimliğe Yeni Bir Bakış

Fulya Özlem Daşhan

Tezimde, farklı kültürler arasında iletişimi güçlendirmeye odaklanan bir Siyasal Liberalizm biçimine teorik destek sağlayacak bir Çoğulculuk türü için felsefi bir temel oluşturmayı amaçlıyorum. Kültürlerin çeşitliliğinin, bireylerin özgür seçimlerinin bağlamını oluşturduğunu öne sürerek, Siyasal Liberalizmin, temel unsurları olan "eşitlik" ve "birey özerkliği" doğrultusunda, çoğulculuğu benimsemesinin gerekli olduğunu ortaya koyuyorum. Tezimin sonunda ortaya attığım Çoğulculuk'un benimsenebilmesi için "özerklik" kavramına yeni bir bakış açısı getiriyorum. Bu yeni bakış açısında, bireyin özerkliğini, seçme kapasitesi olarak tanımlıyorum. Böylelikle, bireyin seçeneklerinin azalmasının, özerkliğinin azalmasına sebebiyet verdiğini ortaya koymam mümkün oluyor. Bu durumda, seçeneklerin bolluğunun ancak Çoğulculuk sayesinde mümkün kılınabileceğini savunuyorum. Özerkliğe getirdiğim yeni bakış açısı ve kültürel kimliklere getirdiğim özcülük karşıtı yeni yaklaşım sayesinde kültürel çeşitliliğin, bireyin seçeneklerinin bağlamını oluşturduğu sonucuna varıyorum. Bu bağlamda Çoğulculuk, özerklik ve kültürel kimliğe dair bu iki yeni bakış açısıyla örtüşen en uygun felsefi yaklaşım olarak öne çıkıyor.

To My Mother.

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PREFACE

Whenever I look at a philosophical work, I tend to see in it reflections of what gives meaning to its author's life. As for me, the question of meaning in life has always been one that is firstly aimed at understanding what makes a person uniquely him/herself rather than somebody else; in other words, I have always wondered what a person's capability of being him/herself consists in, in spite of all the deterministic powers that shape one's very existence as a person. Secondly, the question of meaningfulness in my case has always had a lot to do with my biggest wish, which is to live in a society where communication and pluralism are among the most important values that everybody strives for in their relationships towards each other. So when I had the opportunity to write this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Master's degree in Philosophy, I felt the urge to combine these two topics which render my life meaningful.

At this point I must say that I have followed a rather slow pace throughout the whole proceeding of the work which involved a lot of shaping and reshaping. At the back of my mind, what eased my tension was Wittgenstein's phrase in "Culture and Value" that: "In philosophy the winner of the race is the one who can run most slowly. Or: the one who gets there last". In this respect, my adventure in writing this thesis has been a winning adventure of sorts in the afore-mentioned sense, during which I have been the last to philosophically reach everywhere. I am grateful to the professors in my committee for their patience in clearing away my philosophical misunderstandings and for bearing with the rather slow pace of the build-up of my argument.

Now that I managed to finish my work, I feel privileged for having talked about the issues that matter to me most in a philosophical way and having tried to personally provide a philosophical justification as to how pluralism is presupposed by autonomy.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The increasing awareness of the phenomenon of ethno-cultural heterogeneity emerging within the borders of Liberal nation states,[1] can be said to have brought forth a challenge to the foundational principles of Political Liberalism, such that an egalitarian and hence just state, nowadays, has to face the difficulty of finding a way between accommodating ethno-cultural differences and at the same time maintaining its difference-blind neutrality toward its citizens concerning their constitutive ends and the conceptions of the good life. The controversy of this attempt to do both, namely, adopting multiculturalist policies while being liberal about the constitutive ends of the individuals, is mainly due to the difficulty of practically demarcating the line between being difference-sensitive and being partial, since these two seemingly opposed modes of treatment most often overlap in the given context. However, achieving a balance between the, two through an egalitarian approach to ethno-cultural differences, is exactly the position that the various forms of Liberal Culturalism seek to maintain. In order for us to evaluate whether this position will fail to comply with the foundational principle of Liberalism, i.e., respecting the autonomy of the individual or whether it will provide a helpful solution for enabling the political co-existence of ethno-cultural diversities while maintaining an egalitarian basis, we need to take a look at the controversy of Liberalism versus Communitarianism and then this will shed light on

[1] I am aware of the difficulty of treating 'ethno-cultural heterogeneity' as if it is a phenomenon that only has to do with Liberal nation-states. For neither is there one definition and one type of Liberalism that describes all Liberal States, nor are all states facing multi-ethnicity and multiplicity of cultures 'nation states'. However, we should bear in mind that the problem concerning how to deal politically, i.e., institutionally, at the government level, with ethno-cultural diversities, is one that arose as a political debate in North American Liberal States first which then became a concern world-wide in those territories where ethno-cultural heterogeneity has been the case for centuries as in the multi-nation states of Europe and the former Ottoman Empire.

Liberal Culturalism, which nowadays seems to be the theoretical position overriding the former two.

Before that, let me illustrate my position with regard to these, so that my argument will be easier to follow. My claim is that unless the existing paradigm of language underlying the concept of "autonomy" and hence "the autonomous individual" at hand is complemented and replaced with a more adequate paradigm of language and human thought that (a) clarifies the nature of the relationship between the individual and the community and (b) situates the individual's identity in its full-blown alterity and fragmentation, neither of the above-mentioned political theories can manage to adopt difference-sensitive policies that would accommodate the essential interests of each individual. That is because a theoretical answer to the question "Why should we be multiculturalists?" can not be given if the *necessity* of the relationship between culture and the individual as well as between autonomy and context is not put forward in concrete terms. The term "Liberal Culturalism" seems to connote a certain paradox; it is as if the word "liberal" and the word "culturalism" can not come side by side without conflicting with each other. Because the implicit "neutrality" we ascribe to Liberalism seems to conflict with the inherent demand for Group-Specific rights for which Culturalism is in search. This paradox is something that challenges any political theoretician of cultural heterogeneity at face value in that certain forms of multiculturalism decrease the freedom of the individual in the name of securing this very freedom and certain forms of Liberalism become (or historically have been) majoritarian or authoritarian in the name of becoming egalitarian. The reason for this paradox is the confusion concerning the concept of the "autonomy of the individual" or the overall inadequate picture of the individual underlying all these political systems.

This picture of the autonomous individual, although providing a helpful vision of the Individual for contractual, mono-culture state-nations, proves to be inadequate lately and conditions of applying this rather monolithic concept of the individual in a context of freedom, i.e., in a real life situation where there *are* decisions to make and act *freely* on, remain rather unspecified whenever the identity or autonomy of the individual is at stake.

I will try to put forward the relationship between this picture of the autonomous individual about whom we do not know much, apart from his freedom and individuality, and the Picture Theory of Language with its implications concerning the nature of human thought and mind. At this point, when we get to see the inadequacy of the Picture Theory of Language, according to which language is seen as a set of descriptive propositions about how things are, in explaining the individual in his embeddedness, we will resort to Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the nature of language, human thought, essence and existence; and thus his contribution will be to prompt us to formulate an alternative concept and understanding of the autonomous individual which will suffice to explore the individual in his embeddedness.

I will argue that it is only when these formerly unspecified features of human existence and autonomy are formulated that we can rescue a difference-sensitive Liberal Political Theory of ethno-cultural diversities from falling prey to paradoxes that are pushing the theory towards undermining its very foundations such as libertarianism and egalitarianism.

This new concept of Autonomy and of the individual which we formulate following the lines of Wittgenstein's later thought will guide us to speculate on the vices and virtues of multiculturalist policies such as, "institutional changes in education" and "legislation", and the like and help us to decide which ones are

compatible with the “essential interests" of Individuals and whether a further and more profound political change such as retreating towards Cosmopolitanism or a strengthened form of Transnational Institutional Control over states would be a better alternative to Liberal Culturalism, with respect to its capacity to accommodate the diversity and “essential interests” of the Individuals including those who are not citizens but *barely human*.

Now let us get back to the point where we were to provide an account of what Liberalism, Communitarianism and Liberal Culturalism amount to, in the ethno-cultural diversities debate. It will be observed that my first chapter will be inclined more towards supplying clarifications concerning the theoretical positions and I will proceed to argue the vices and virtues of these positions only after we discuss them with respect to the concept of Autonomy.

CHAPTER TWO

LIBERALISM VERSUS COMMUNITARIANISM AND *THE EMERGING CONSENSUS* [2]

Political Liberalism and Communitarianism

Political Liberalism is the political theory that aims to furnish each individual with equal civil and political rights to achieve his/her ends so long as their achievement does not in some way violate the rights of another individual or a group of individuals. Liberalism, thus, does not interfere with the goals of the individuals regardless of whether they are *good* or *evil*. Since individuals are seen as capable of free choice and freely discarding their goals for better ones, i.e., revising their ends, this very capability of evaluating their choices in the light of an identity, a person they want to attain by putting some of their desires in practice while subordinating some to the hierarchy of the ones worthy of realizing, is understood to be the very mark of the autonomy of the individuals. It is this idea of the "autonomy of the individual" for which Liberalism gets criticized for being an "individualistic" or "atomist" system that disregards the value of cultural membership. (We will come back to this topic later in Chapter Three in a lengthy discussion concerning the "autonomous individual".)

In *Liberalism, Community and Culture,* Will Kymlicka argues

[2] In *Politics in the Vernacular*, Will Kymlicka titles his second chapter "Liberal Culturalism: An Emerging Consensus?" where he argues that when the long tradition of Liberal Nationalism met the debates on multiculturalism and culturally heterogeneous states, Liberal Culturalism emerged as a consensus among Liberals such that no one was discussing whether to be or not to be multiculturalist at all but just discussing which multiculturalist policies to adopt. However, he concludes that the seeming consensus is far from being a genuine consensus of ideas concerning the debate of ethno-cultural heterogeneity but it is merely what currently presides in the political arena due to lack of alternatives. Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship.* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): a-b.

> So we have two preconditions for the fulfilment of our essential interest in leading a life that is good. One is that we lead our life from the inside, in accordance with our beliefs about what gives value to life (that *I rule me*[3]); the other is that we be free to question those beliefs, to examine them in the light of whatever information and examples and arguments our culture can provide (that *no one else rules I).* Individuals must therefore have the resources and liberties needed to live their lives in accordance with their beliefs about value, without being imprisoned or penalized…Hence the traditional liberal concern for civil and personal liberties. And individuals must have the cultural conditions conducive to acquiring an awareness of different views about the good life, and to acquiring an ability to intelligently examine and re-examine these views. Hence the equally traditional liberal concern for education, freedom of expression, freedom of the press, artistic freedom, etc…This account of our essential interest forms the basis of liberal political theory.[4]

Thus, "freedom to choose" and "ability to revise" one's own ends seem to be the foundational principles of the concept of autonomy underlying Political Liberalism. However, Communitarians object to Liberalism on the grounds that this concept of autonomy brings about a distorted and inadequate view of the Self. In *Politics in the Vernacular,* Kymlicka states that

> Communitarians dispute this conception of the "autonomous individual". They view people as 'embedded' in particular social roles and relationships. Such embedded selves do not form and revise their own conception of the good life; instead, they inherit a way of life that defines their good for them. Rather than viewing group practices as the product of individual choices, communitarians view individuals as the product of social practices.[5]

So the liberal view of the Self that "the self is prior to its ends" is such, that the Self is always in a position to change its idea about its deepest conviction about what constitutes a good life and revise it respectively. However, that is not the picture of the Self that communitarians entertain. Sandel, for example argues that

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[3] In his essay "The Idea of a Free Man" Joel Feinberg puts it like this: "I am autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I." Joel Feinberg. "The Idea of a Free Man" in *Educational Judgements*. Edited by J. F. Doyle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973): 161.

[4] Will Kymlicka, *Liberalism, Community, and Culture* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989): 13. Hereafter LCC.

[5] Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 19.

> the self is not prior to, but rather constituted by, its ends- we can't distinguish 'me' from 'my ends'. Our selves are at least partly constituted by ends that we do not choose, but rather *discover* by virtue of our being embedded in some shared social context. Since we have these constitutive ends, our lives go better not by having the conditions needed to select and revise our projects, but by having the conditions needed to come to an awareness of these shared constitutive ends.[6]

Such an extent of inclusion of Ideals to the depiction of Self is obviously unappealing to Liberalism because of its foundational value of "Neutrality" and hence its "neutral concern" for the constitutive ends and ideals of individuals. Neutrality, or the term "neutral concern", is used to refer to "exclusion of ideals" in the Liberal Context. Kymlicka writes in *Liberalism, Community and Culture* that: "The 'exclusion of ideals' principle says that governments can not use as their justification for any action the fact that one person's way of life is more or less worthy than another's." On page 76 of the same book, he expresses Taylor's communitarian discontent with this concept of "neutral concern" that

> one of the features of liberalism which Taylor feels is inadequate is its insistence on 'neutral political concern'. The idea is that people are entitled to 'neutral concern' from the government- that is, equal concern regardless of their conception of the good (so long as it does not violate the rights of others), whether it is approved or disapproved of by the majority in society, or by state officials. This entitlement includes the right to veto the collective pursuit of the ends shared by the majority, where that pursuit violates my claim to equal neutral concern.[7]

The same discontent on the part of the Liberals occurs when this "neutral concern" is challenged by the demand to accommodate ethno-cultural differences within the institutional and political framework of the state. For if accommodating the differences would mean to compromise "the neutral concern", i.e., the "principle of

[6] Kymlicka, *LCC*, 52.
[7] Ibid., 76.

exclusion of Ideals" underlying Liberalism, then being difference-sensitive towards Selves in the Communitarian sense would be self-defeating for Liberalism by rendering its very foundations of both neutral egalitarianism and priority of individual freedom negotiable.

In order to understand whether constitutive ends and the concept of the good life of the community do enter and predetermine the path of the individual as opposed to Liberalism's neutral concern where these do not enter the picture at all, we should gain some insight as to what is understood by Communitarianism, i.e., Communitarian Politics.

Communitarian Politics can be said to be the "politics of the common good". However, here "common good" is supposed to denote more than what it denotes in the rather weaker sense in which Liberalism can also be said to be a politics of the "common good".[8] We could say, in the context of Liberalism, the idea of a "common good" is of a more common sort such that it is to be understood as: "what is to the benefit of everybody in the society irrespective of their individual needs". However, we employ a different language game with the concept of "common good" when communitarian common good is the one in question, that is, a common shared value, a common conception of what a Good Life consists in, that the society is supposed to impart to each individual. Given the moral priority of Society to the individuals, individuals are not allowed to revise or abandon "the common good" for an individual conception of the Good Life they see fit since that presupposes an overthrow of the "common good".

> In a communitarian society, on the other hand, the common good is conceived of as a substantive conception of the good which defines the community's 'way of life'. This common good, rather than adjusting

[8] "After all, a liberal state can be said to promote the common good, since its policies aim at promoting the interests of the members of the community" (Ibid.)

> itself to the pattern of people's preferences, provides a standard by which those preferences are evaluated. The community's way of life forms the basis for a public ranking of conceptions of the good and the weight given to an individual's preferences depends on how much she conforms or contributes to that common good. The public pursuit of the shared ends which define the community's way of life is not, therefore, constrained by the requirement of neutral concern. It takes precedence over the claim of individuals to the liberties and resources needed to choose and pursue their own ends. Individuals are no longer able to veto the pursuit of these shared ends whenever it violates neutral concern.[9]

As can be seen from this account of Communitarianism which Kymlicka provides, the main difference between Communitarianism and Liberalism is the issue of neutrality, neutral concern with the values and ends of the individuals such that Communitarianism views the individual as someone of whom not only culture and conceptual scheme, but also constitutive ends and the concept of the good life, are and need to remain predetermined. In this case, the criticisms that Communitarians have towards Liberalism obviously involve opposing the very concept of autonomy, since being unable to revise a pre-given end for an individual is an unacceptable situation for Liberal Politics, which is not justifiable unless the concern for neutrality as a central concept is abandoned. It is this Neutrality tenet of Liberalism, which the Communitarians see as inappropriate and unable to deal with the demands of an ethno-culturally heterogeneous society in which each community has a right to survive in terms of justice.

However, neither is the pressure and the need for political recognition cried out for by minorities "easy to neglect" or "difficult to supply" within the border of Liberalism, nor are the *ties that bind* as strong as the Communitarians suggest, for providing a justification for the subordination of individual freedom to the common good of the community. After all, perhaps, it might be the case that there is no such

[9] Ibid., 77.

community, in which the interests of individuals are so strongly tied together and intertwined that putting restrictions on individual freedom within that society can be justified. Saying that ties that bind are not that strong does not mean that there are no ties at all which is like a seamless web of shared life forms.

Liberal Culturalism

When the question is what the possible scope for rights of Ethno-cultural minorities within the Liberal Theory is, the answer seems to be Liberal Culturalism.[10]

> We can define both *liberal nationalism* and *liberal multiculturalism* as forms of "liberal culturalism". Liberal Culturalism is the view that liberal democratic states should not only uphold the familiar set of common civil and political rights of citizenship which are produced in all liberal democracies, they must also adopt various group-specific rights or policies which are intended to recognize and accommodate the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups. Such policies range from multicultural education policies to language rights to guarantees of political representation to constitutional protections of treaties with indigenous peoples. For liberal culturalists, these various forms of group-specific measures are often required for ethnocultural justice….In particular, liberal culturalists support policies which make it possible for members of ethnic and national groups to express and promote their culture and identity, but reject any policies which impose a *duty* on people to do so.[11]

However Liberal Culturalism is not a *bed of roses*, either. It does come with problems and objections similar to those directed towards Liberalism and Communitarianism, plus one becomes puzzled as to how this position can possibly be maintained without conflicting with the basic tenets of Liberalism while supplying the

[10] "Each of us, in our own way, argues that there are compelling interests related to culture and identity which are fully consistent with liberal principles of freedom and equality, and which justify granting special rights to minorities. We can call this the 'liberal culturalist' position." (Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 22)
[11] Ibid., 42.

members of a multi-cultural society with the just distribution of rights even if it is group-specific rights in question, which are to be distributed.

So far I have put forward the general features of the three existing political positions in the political debate concerning ethno-cultural heterogeneity: Political Liberalism, Communitarianism and Liberal Culturalism.

Multiculturalist Policies

Now it will be to the benefit of understanding the arguments against these positions, to put forward what is generally understood by "Multiculturalist Policies" the application of which raises all the issues and worries about the overall happiness and well being of the individuals, no matter whether they are autonomous atoms, freely acting, independently of each other, or outcomes of the membership which *defines* them or persons acting within a life-form shaped by a cultural scheme under which no essences but a web of relationships of living and interacting human beings lie. So, Liberal Multiculturalism is

> the position that accepts that minority groups have a valid claim not only to tolerance and non-discrimination, but also to explicit accommodation, recognition and representation within the institutions of the larger society. Multiculturalism can take the form of revising the education curriculum to include the history and culture of minority groups; creating advisory boards to consult with the members of minority groups; recognizing the holy days of minority religious groups; teaching police officers, social workers, and health-care professionals to be sensitive to cultural differences in their work; developing regulations to ensure that minority groups are not ignored or stereotyped in the media; and so on. Here again, we can specify a number of constraints that must be respected on a distinctly liberal conception of multiculturalism: membership of these groups must not be imposed by the state, but rather be a matter of self identity; individual members must be free to question and reject any inherited or previously adopted identity, if they so choose, and have an effective right of exit from any identity group; these groups must not violate the basic civil or political rights of their members; and multicultural accommodations must seek to reduce inequalities in power between groups, rather than allowing one group to exercise dominance over other groups.

Objections Against Liberal Culturalism

The liberal culturalist position is criticized on several grounds: on its theoretical foundations, and the methodological and normative questions that surround its horizon by communitarians, liberals and cosmopolitanists alike.

Foundational Objections. The objections against the theoretical foundations of Liberal Culturalism are:

(a) Some deny that we can intelligibly distinguish between or individuate “cultures” or “cultural groups”;

(b) Others deny that we can make sense of the claim that individuals are “members” of cultures;

(c)Yet others say that even if we can make sense of the claim that individuals are members of distinct cultures, we have no reason to assume that the well-being or freedom of the individual is tied in any way with the flourishing of the culture.

I believe these objections that aim at questioning the justification of theories seeking to accommodate minority rights and multicultural heterogeneity owe their existence to conceptual confusions concerning who the individual is and what the relationship between his thought and concepts consists in. I think we can provide important contributions to this debate by employing Wittgensteinian concepts and methods to clarify these concepts and clear away the clouds of confusion in the haze of which these questions are asked. I will get back to answering these three objections to Liberal Culturalism in detail in Chapter Three, after discussing the traditional account of autonomy and introducing the Wittgensteinian account of autonomy I wish to put forward.

Methodological Objections. For the time being, as for methodological objections to Liberal Culturalism, one is that "the basic categories of liberal culturalism (e.g., multiculturalism, immigrants, and minority rights) only make sense in some countries but not others. However, in fact the Liberal Culturalist position suggests intuitive ways to solve many issues such that ethno-culturally heterogeneous states can in one way or other adjust these solutions to their cases. Especially the category of minority rights applies to almost all culturally heterogeneous states even if they do not have immigrants or a polyethnic or multi-nation structure. No country is so isolated that it has nothing to do with the total debate of minority rights, for even in formerly-colonised, rather mono-cultural island states like Ireland, there is a growing number of asylum-seekers awaiting political recognition or at least improvements in housing and procedures of asylum conditions such as Roman Gypsies from Romania, Ganaeans; there are people demanding erasure of racist stereotypes at school, workplace and the media like Irish Gypsies who have been historically discriminated against, having been labelled as "travelling people"; and there are groups like feminists who plead for legalization of abortion as well as certain Catholic groups who fear and oppose a possible legalization of abortion. However, the issue of refugees, for example, is exactly one source of objection to be directed towards Liberal Theories of Culturalism. Because people with no citizenship have no place in the moral ontology of these theories. So far as I am concerned, these theories are exclusively debating the issue of minorities in terms of citizenship; rights of non-citizens are not mentioned at all in the scope of minority rights. This is one area where our solution regarding a politically strengthened network of Transnational Institutions can be of help to settle the issue of refugees.

Women's issues, even if women outnumber men due to natural reasons, no matter where the state is, so long as the society has been a patriarchal one, will fall

under the category of minority rights debate concerning the "historically disadvantaged" and "underrepresented". Plus a minority does not necessarily have to be ethnically or genderwise differentiable; the mere fact that this group has been historically disadvantaged or is currently—whether it has or has not historically been—being discriminated against, is enough reason to seek for solutions to compensate the inequality it is facing. For example, in the case of Irish Gypsies, there is no historical evidence that they are in any way ethnically or culturally (in the narrow sense of speaking a different language or having a different religion, etc.) different from the majority apart from the fact that they have been a bunch of people who chose to or were somehow accustomed to lead a different life of their community's choice, namely an unsettled, mobile life. There is no reason not to find an intuitive way of accommodating these groups within the political system by endowing them with certain group-specific rights or let them claim their rights from transnational institutions if their demands are in conflict with what their legal system allows.

The second methodological objection is that "liberal culturalism underestimates the strategic uses of identity and group membership; and overestimates the role of shared norms or beliefs in explaining the cohesion of cultural or political entities." In my point of view, it is better that multiculturalism is defended on the basis of this allusion to cohesion of cultural or political entities. For if the strategic uses of identity and group membership provide a basis for arguments in favour of multiculturalism, there are several hazards to doing so which are quite linked to each other. One is that one can fall into the trap of what the Critical Theorists charged the enlightenment thinkers with, namely deploying the methods of physical sciences on the so called human sciences. Relying too much on the "contingent results" of such researches may prompt the theoretician to come up with equally discriminatory results that favour the

multiculturalist position but do so by being discriminatory towards the very minority in question.[12]

Another objection is that existing theories lack the sort of institutional specificity such that who qualifies to be counted under the scope of a certain category remains unspecified due to lack of such institutions that will evaluate these conditions of appropriateness and applicability.

This objection also has a lot to do with who the basic units of the theory are, as well as with the difficulty of depicting when they qualify to become a minority in terms of number and differentiability. However, it is perhaps misleading to view this objection as a methodological difficulty that the theory has to deal with. Since, I believe, it is rather a metaphysical difficulty; I mean a difficulty concerning the definition and veridical demarcation of minorities which Kymlicka mentions as the problem of "individuating cultures". This is a question whether there *are* "cultural identities" and whether there *are* "members" of cultures and whether there *are* any empirical—or metaphysical—justifications to demarcate a zone or a group of people and endow them with "group-specific" rights.

Normative Objections. The next front that Liberal Culturalism, which is a multiculturalist theory in favour of Group-specific rights, gets criticized about is the

[12] One such case is the German Political Thinker Gerhard Shurz's argument against Samuel Huntington's thesis of the *Clash of Civilizations*. In order to show that Huntington was wrong, he uses the findings of the 'World Value Survey Project' as the basis of his argument and through operating on the rate of happiness of individuals scattered around the world, he formulates his argument that, Huntington was wrong, neither are people in well-off countries so happy, nor are people in poor countries unhappy, and it is not the case that people in illiberal societies value existential virtues such as "Self-expression", therefore, contrasting this with how Europe was 600 years ago, he concludes that "perhaps some people are not at the stage of appreciating freedom yet, therefore, "no intervention". "No intervention" obviously sounds like a fine tolerant position but if we come to the point of proposing it through a biased cultural study, then we would not have an answer to give to people who come up with equally biased cultural studies that show a need for intervention on the basis of the "inferiority" of these people with regard to their capacity to enjoy freedom.

normative questions concerning the theory. These are questions that have the very foundations of liberal culturalism as their starting point.

> But why is it so important to recognize and accommodate ethnocultural identities and practices? Why does it matter whether society is multiculturalist? Why should we view membership in ethnocultural groups, or the potential loss of diverse cultures, as a matter of political importance rather than simply private life style choices?[13]

So here is another claim that puts us back into questioning, who, after all, are these individuals, about the identity and thus the value of the cultural membership of whom we can never reach a consensus. To be in a position to consistently answer this question we should be clear about the nature of the relationship between an individual and his culture. Does he *have* a culture? Is he a *member* of an ethno-cultural group? Are there such groups after all? Or what *is* culture the existence of which we are taking for granted?

Defending Liberal Culturalism

Here are the three arguments Kymlicka gives as examples of what divergent adherents of the debate claim. Three justifications of liberal culturalism are

> (1) Some theorists emphasize the importance of respect for *identity*. On this view, there is a human need to have one's identity recognized and respected by others. To have one's identity ignored or misrecognized by society is a profound harm to one's sense of self-respect. Minority rights satisfy the need for recognition.
> (2) Some theorists provide a more instrumental argument for cultural rights, emphasizing the role that cultural membership plays in promoting individual *freedom* or autonomy. On this view, one's culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable, so that if the options available in one's culture diminish, so too does one's autonomy. Minority rights protect these cultural contexts of choice.
> (3) Finally, some people emphasize the intrinsic value of the *diverse cultures* present in a society. Different cultures are seen as the repository of unique forms of human creativity and accomplishment, and to let

[13] Kymlicka, *Vernacular,* 47.

> cultures die out is to lose something of intrinsic value. Minority rights preserve these intrinsically valuable cultures.[14]

It would be appropriate to do an immediate, on site analysis of the three justifications here, but I will discuss them in detail after I give a more engaged account of the individual and his culture in the following chapters.

When the relationship between the individual and his culture is clarified, it will be seen that, not only my own culture and language as my context of choice but other contexts of choice and cultures and language are also *necessary* for me to be autonomous. If other cultures are necessary for me to be autonomous then there needs be communication among cultures in order for there to be a range of *meaningful options* to choose from. So communication enhancing policies on the part of the state are essential for one to be free. So the argument from the instrumental need for the cultural context brings it about that, by the same token, in our reading, the others' cultural contexts are equally well important for one to become autonomous. So, in this respect, what goes in Kymlicka's argument for one's own cultural context of choice goes for one's exposure to others' context of choice too. However, from here, rather than a multiculturalist position that secure group-specific rights of access to one's own culture, a more cosmopolitanist position that opts for pluralism in elaborating Group-specific rights, seems to suggest itself.

Tenet (3) is hardly separable from (2) when we take context of choice in a broader sense as we proposed that cultures provide a context of choice and that they should flourish. But again what applies to (2) in terms of self-formation is also applicable to (3) that cultural diversity does not have an intrinsic value but is the context in which one *becomes* a self and *becomes* autonomous. In the same respect then all measures should be taken to promote a plurality of cultures, such that one can only

[14] Ibid.

become autonomous by choosing out of many options that the overlapping network of cultural contexts provides.

One last resort of criticism towards Liberal Culturalism has been made regarding that Justice is an issue that needs to get resolved in context and that generalizing attitudes in line with some Universalist theories or attitudes about what a just distribution consists in remain oversimplistic concerning Minority Rights on a case by case basis, which could be called context-specific arguments discussing multiculturalist policies. Questions raised within this context are such as: "What exactly is the disadvantage which a minority faces within a particular institutional structure? Will the proposed multiculturalism reform actually remedy this disadvantage? Are the costs of a particular multiculturalism policy distributed fairly, or are some individuals or subgroups inside or outside the group being asked to shoulder an unfair share of the costs? Are there alternative policies which would remedy the disadvantage in a more effective and less costly way?

> Once we jettison the idea that group-specific rights are wrong in principle, and instead…. examine particular institutions, then the question becomes which sort of multiculturalism is most fair and effective, and how best to combine group-specific multiculturalism policies with difference-blind common rights.[15]

I do not agree that positing that multiculturalism policies are not in principle wrong brings us to the point of narrowing ourselves down to discussing which form of multiculturalism to adopt in each case, i.e., on a case by case basis. For in some cases involving a historically disadvantaged minority group, the underrepresentation at stake may not be consoled or solved by retreating to one of the available multiculturalist policies such as "affirmative action". Furthermore, if Kymlicka is consistent in his position of defending minority rights partly on the basis of his claim that *there are no*

[15] Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 35.

neutral states and that neutrality in the long run proves to be *biased* towards the majority culture, then he should be in a position to admit that on a case by case basis, some cases of injustice towards the minority group, simply make the demand of the group one that goes beyond the acclaimed policies of multiculturalism and bend the situation towards a more Cosmopolitanist solution such as constructions of world-wide tribunals where the under-represented will have a chance to redefine conditions of representation and themselves be the rulers of the new body of transnational institution; designed by *them* to answer *their* needs on a world-wide basis.

In *Multicultural Citizenship* Kymlicka gives a categorial summary of these group-specific rights in question so that we can undertake such an examination of minority rights on a case by case basis as has been suggested. However, we will do this analysis, later in Chapter Four, once we get a clearer understanding of the nature of the relationship between the individual and *his culture.* The Group-Specific (Group Differentiated) Rights which are taken up at face value in the political agendas of many current states[16] with ethno-culturally heterogeneous societies are subsumed under three general categories by Kymlicka in his 1995 work

> (1) Self-Government Rights (the delegation of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism);
> (2) Polyethnic rights (financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups); and
> (3) Special Representation Rights (guaranteed seats for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the larger state).[17]

However, as for the Paradox that awaits Liberal Culturalism which I had mentioned initially in the introduction, the conceptual haze over the autonomous

[16] "Virtually all liberal democracies are either multinational or polyethic, or both. The 'challenge of multiculturalism' is to accomodate these national and ethnic differences in a stable and morally defensible way." (Amy Gutmann, **"**The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 22, no. 3: 171-206.)
[17] Kymlicka, *Multicultural*, 7.

individual is not cleared away yet. For, while the account of the role of cultural membership is securing freedom and self-respect according to Liberal Culturalists, since they do not show *what* the nature of relationship between culture and the Self consists in, they fail to "show that minority rights supplement, rather than diminish, individual freedom and equality and help to meet needs which would otherwise go unmet in a state that clung rigidly to ethnocultural neutrality" contrary to what Kymlicka argues.

Kymlicka's Defence of Liberal Culturalism

Let us first clarify once again the liberal culturalist position that Kymlicka endorses. His justifications for arguing in favour of culturalist policies that would involve giving group-specific rights are the following.

(1) Kymlicka argues that the idea that liberal democratic states (or "civic nations") are ethno-culturally neutral is manifestly false,[18] and therefore, the state, which, on this basis, has already been proven to be partial all along the history to the majority group, can be justified to give certain group-specific rights to minority groups. After all, it is possible, he states, to view the so-called ethnoculturally neutral attitude of the state as a form of nation building which involved forming and shaping a societal culture by the majority group, and to view the minority rights debate in this respect as an alternative response to the dominant nation-building policies of the majority group. In this case, claim for minority rights can be seen as a response to nation-building rather than a claim for justice in the name of ethno-cultural neutrality.

[18] Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 24.

(2) Cultural membership is an indispensable context of freedom for the individual, and failing to provide an individual of a minority group with this context would be harmful for the individual

> By emphasizing the importance of certain interests which have typically been ignored by liberal theories of justice,—e.g. interests in recognition, identity, language and cultural membership. If these interests are ignored or trivialized by the state, then people will feel harmed—even if their civil, political or welfare rights are respected. If state institutions fail to recognize and respect people's culture and identity, the results can be serious damage to people's self respect and sense of agency.[19]
>
> If we accept either or both of these points, then we can see minority rights not as unfair privileges or invidious forms of discrimination, but as compensation of unfair disadvantages, and so as consistent with, and even required by, justice.[20]

Kymlicka argues that in *the new debate over minority rights* the nature of the argument has now shifted from the just distribution of rights in an ethno-culturally neutral society to how to redistribute those rights by a state which is understood to be essentially not neutral but tilted towards culture and interests of the majority bearing in mind the fact that cultural membership is an indispensable context of choice.[21]

The analysis of the Liberal Culturalist position suggests that both Liberalism and Liberal Culturalism are bearing traces of the essentialist tradition in philosophy in which an autonomous individual is depicted as one who *has* essential interests, who strongly evaluates about who to be and what to do concerning the pursuit of his individually chosen ends in a pre-given context and so on and so forth. The big difference, however, between Liberal Culturalism and Liberalism concerning their accounts of the Self is that in the former, the cultural scheme is seen as a context of freedom in which to act meaningfully whereas the latter has been charged with the accusation that it remains blind to this context of freedom while trying to maintain its

[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid., 33.
[21] Ibid., 1.

impartiality to who, on the basis of what, is making those decisions that render him/her autonomous.

CHAPTER THREE

LIBERALISM, LIBERAL CULTURALISM AND THE AUTONOMOUS INDIVIDUAL

Confusions About the Autonomous Individual

There is significant confusion concerning the nature of one's *cultural membership,* and the state in which "culture *is the context of choice"* for an individual. For what does it mean for an individual to *have* a context of choice or to be a *member* of a culture? Wittgenstein's analysis of the relationship between thought and language and hence the relationship between concepts and the *will* in the *Philosophical Investigations* might provide us with an important insight to understand what it *means* for an individual to be a member of *a culture* or for culture to function as *a context of freedom.* If one needs to defend Liberal Culturalism on the basis of the arguments that (a) Culture is the context of freedom (of choice) for an individual, and (b) Cultural membership is an indispensable requirement for one's identity, then a Wittgensteinian insight into how culture can function as a context and how one can be a part of this context is necessary. Because, if these two tenets provide the basis of justification for defending a Liberal Culturalist position, then it will be of significant help to identify the nature of one's relationship to his culture and the demands and implications of this relationship to evaluate the groundedness of these justifications.

I think that the existing paradigm or rhetoric of the autonomous individual prevalent in the tradition is too abstract and thus inadequate to supply a basis for the demand for Group-Specific rights in the Liberal Culturalist debate. It needs to be complemented with an elaborate analysis of the relationship between thought and language which might prompt us to change what we understand from autonomy and then redefine the "essential interests" of an individual. That in the long run will change what we understand by an individual as well. The relevant part of this conceptual

change to our debate will be to enable us to philosophically analyze group-specific rights on a case by case basis which will enable us to reflect on the relationship between those and the redefined "essential interests" of the "redefined individual". Hence, we will get a chance to elaborate, in line with our resulting philosophical insight, as to which group-specific rights and which additional policies are justified considering the findings of this conceptual research. This conceptual change and shift that we hope to bring about, should not be understood as aimed at securing a descriptive stance with regard to the essential interests and identity of the individual, for that would be quite contrary to Wittgenstein's anti-essentialist impact on metaphysics which is opposed to giving a clear cut definition of what an "individual" essentially means and what the set of his interests essentially consist in. The conceptual shift we bring about is one that will lead us to show that attempts to individuate one culture among others with its edges, to define people as *members* of that culture like members of a football team and to describe one such member as an autonomous individual are rather futile activities if an adequate account of conceptual determinacy is not given in the first place. *Just* like the argument against neutrality that Kymlicka gives and hence shifts the grammar of the debate on minority rights, we need to shift the grammar of the Self which is so central to but equally unhelpful in solving the political problems concerning ethno-cultural heterogeneity.

Let us first consider who the autonomous individual underlying Political Liberalism is, by first analyzing the concept of autonomy throughout the lines of Coeckelbergh with regard to the modern ideal of the autonomous individual.

> By 'ideal person' I mean the sort of person we wish to be, we aspire to…Thus, the ideal of a person is a claim about *what* we are and ought to be…However, the ideal also appears in discussions of related issues and of freedom in particular. Whether it is expressed explicitly or not,

> discussions about freedom often illuminate the ideal of the autonomous person.[22]

I argue that, taking a closer look at what is taken for granted by the concept of autonomy, i.e., making decisions, judging so and so to be the case, thinking that a state of affairs is good or bad and revising one's ends respectively will require us to consider what one's relationship with the concepts accessible to him is like, in other words, to consider the relationship between "thought" and "language". Hence that will be our next stage in analyzing the concept of autonomy.

Reflections on "The Metaphysics of Autonomy"

In this section, my aim will be to put forward how the modern concept of autonomy has traditionally been understood through the discussion of the modern Ideal of the Autonomous person that Mark Coeckelbergh provides. In *The Metaphysics of Autonomy*, Coeckelbergh gives an outline of the concept of the autonomy as it has been understood in the modern discourse. The dominant way of defining the autonomous individual in this sense, can be viewed in the quote from Feinberg that "I *am autonomous if I rule me and no one else rules I"*. There are important presuppositions underlying this argument concerning the relation of *I* to me, concerning the conditions of this reflexivity towards oneself and the capacities autonomous persons entertain. The "core" meaning of autonomy is described by Feinberg as "the psychological ability to be self-governing".[23]

> Berlin's conception of 'positive' freedom presents us with an excellent picture of the ideal of a person as an autonomous;[24] and it is precisely

[22] Mark Coeckelbergh, *The Metaphysics of Autonomy: the Reconciliation of Ancient and Modern Ideals of the Person* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): 3 (Emphasis in italics is mine).
[23] Ibid., 5 referring to Christman 1989: 5.
[24] " The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty' derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I

> this ideal that is dominant in the literature...Discussions about autonomy focus on questions about the source of control and determination. The ideal of the autonomous individual suggests the following answer: the source should be *me*, and not something or somebody else…I exemplify this ideal of what a person should be when I am this autonomous individual, when the source of my action and my thought is me, when I determine myself as an individual.[25]

The problem here seems to be the emphasis Berlin makes on an individual's being the source of his thought. For what does it mean to say that the source of my action and my thought is *me?* Do *I* come prior to my thinking such that I can choose *to think* and consequently choose *what to think*? Do my thoughts *originate* from me? What would be the presuppositions of such a picture in which we can make sense of individuals *bringing about* their thoughts—not "ideas", I mean the very activity of thinking—as well as determining the content of these thoughts and being their source, originator? In order to be able to make sense of such a picture where one precedes one's thought, the individual needs to be somehow *detachable* from his thought. The possibility to make sense of the hitherto mentioned *detachment* comes from seeing language as a medium to convey thoughts. Once language is seen in such a mono-functional aspect, then it will make sense to think of the individual as operating outside language when an activity such as 'ruling a desire' is concerned. It will be as if one is deploying all his cognitive powers to not lose the desire out of his mind's sight and to get hold of it before it becomes kind of verbalized.

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wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men's acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conspicuous purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer-deciding , not being decided for , self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realising them. This is at least part of what I mean when I say that I am rational, and that it is my reason that distinguishes me as a human being from the rest of the world. I wish, above all, *to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being*, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and purposes. I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realise that it is not." (Ibid., 4.)

[25] Ibid., 6.

> When I think in language, there aren't meanings going though my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought.[26]
> Now if it were asked: "Do you have the thought before finding the expression?" what would one have to reply? And what, to the question: "What did the thought consist in, as it existed before its expression?[27]
> But didn't I already intend the whole construction of the sentence (for example) at its beginning? So surely it already existed in my mind before I said it out loud!—If it was in my mind, still it would not normally be there in some different word order. *But here we are constructing a misleading picture of 'intending', that is of the use of this word. An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I could not intend to play a game of chess. In so far as I do intend the construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible by the fact that I can speak the language in question.*[28]

If thought is inseparable from language, as Wittgenstein suggests, *I* surely *am not* the source of my thought. The source of my thought, on the contrary, is exactly something or a totality of things else than me, i.e., the world, the forms of life I am born into which shape my very thinking and which give my thoughts their content . Furthermore, if there is no thinking outside concepts, those concepts are not originating from me, but from the society I live in, who, in their different applications of these concepts, determine their scope of meaning, in other words determine the boundaries of what can be done with these concepts. When I think, I think against the background of a certain grammar, of which the source is not *me*, but the life forms I share with others. When I think, apart from forming sentences of sorts and understanding them, my thinking is not analyzable into anything not conceptual, that I privately own and which, in this respect, originates from me. None of this is the case, when the source of my

[26] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 329.
[33] Ibid.,§ 335.
[34] Ibid., § 337 (italics mine).

thought is called into question. For my thinking is analyzable only in terms of the language games I play, which presuppose a whole lot of stage-setting, a whole lot of contexts, forms of life in which those games make sense and were created in the first place. What is presupposed by my thinking *are* the contexts of life in which dialogical processes of communication throughout human interaction gradually formed the language in which I think, in which the language games I play make sense.

Does this picture of language being the condition of possibility of thought pose itself as an impediment to individual freedom? In other words, if I am not the source of my thought, but it is the others and the life I share with them that is the source of my thought, does that mean my actions and my thought are so determined that I can not be thought to *rule myself* and be *autonomous?* To be able to elaborate these questions better, let us proceed with the account of Autonomy that Coeckelbergh provides.

> If we say that we want to be self-determining, part of what we mean is that we (want to) see ourselves as different from 'the world' with its deterministic character; if we understand the world as fully determined by the laws of science, we want to say that we are different from that world since we have a free will.[29]

It is here that he introduces Frankfurt's distinction of "second-order desires" and "second-order volitions"

> Frankfurt identifies one essential difference between persons and other creatures in the structure of the person's will: persons are able to form second-order desires. 'Besides wanting… *to do* this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are'. Frankfurt then makes a distinction between two different kinds of agents: persons and wantons.[30]

[29] Coeckelbergh, *Metaphysics*, 6.
[30] Ibid., 6. Referring to: Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in: *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68, no. 1: 5-22.

A person and a wanton are distinguishable by the former's ability to form second-order volitions in addition to second-order desires. For, while a wanton is also able to form a second-order desire, he lacks the unified, hierarchical order within which to evaluate the very nature of this subordination and meaningfully reflect on his choice to fulfil 'this' rather than 'that' desire, though he does not lack the ability to make the very choice. However

> the key difference between persons and wantons is that although wantons may have second-order desires (to want to have a certain desire), only persons are able to form what Frankfurt calls second-order volitions: the person "wants a certain desire to be his will"…A person is able to do this only in virtue of his rational capacities. For it is only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person's will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a rational being.[31]

The Grammar of the Will

In this section, I will try to provide a more detailed discussion on the problem of the conception of autonomy as linked with the *act* of "willing to will" and argue that this, besides being a misconstrued description of the nature of autonomous behaviour, falls short of explaining the autonomy of the individual in his situatedness. As we have seen in the last section, the structure of a person's own will is depicted to be self-reflective, i.e., one is thought to be in a reflexive stance, in the first person, towards his own thinking and that is what enables him to form second-order volitions. Thus, he not only needs to be conscious of something which takes the form of desiring it, he also needs to be conscious of his consciousness towards that thing such that he can identify himself with this consciousness and *make it his own will.* Wittgenstein, in PI 613, formulates the quest to "will to will" as follows:

[31] Ibid.

> In the sense in which I can ever bring anything about (such as stomach-ache through over eating), I can also bring about an act of willing. In this sense I bring about the act of willing to swim by jumping into the water. Doubtless I was trying to say: I can't will willing; that is it makes no sense to speak of willing. 'Willing' is not the name of any behaviour; and so not the name of any voluntary action either. And my use of a wrong expression came from our wanting to think of willing as an immediate non-causal bringing-about.[32]

Wittgenstein is here directing our attention to the misleading use of the word "willing". Willing, in the sense of a first order desire, is conceived to be something that we bring about voluntarily, in the tradition. However, this is a misconception according to Wittgenstein, because when we desire things, the part in which we act out of volition, is not the desire, for it is inconceivable to think of ourselves as bringing about a desire. Neither can we fail to desire a thing. In this sense, desiring is performed neither voluntarily, nor involuntarily. The part in which we *are* voluntary is when we *act* out of desires in *this* rather than *that* way. Hacker comments on how Wittgenstein takes the nature of intending to be and states

> A person's authority on his own intentions does not stem from epistemic privilege, but from, as it were, executive authority—*his* plans and projects are the plans and projects *he* comes up with—To ask someone what his intentions are, rather than telling him what to do, is to acknowledge his autonomy. To express, avow, or report one's intentions is to manifest one's autonomy in regard to one's action. One is not in a privileged position to *discern* one's intention, but one is in a position to *resolve* what to do.[33]

However, when the possibility of separating thought from language is not thought to be inconsistent, as in the context I have just outlined, then "willing" is seen, by people such as Frankfurt, as a non-verbal content, implicit in the action of the

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[32] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 613.
[33] Hacker, P.M.S, *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will, Volume 4 of an Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000): 259.

individual acting autonomously, simultaneously as he carries out the act that his desires prompt him to. It is such that, when the salient action is carved, this intentionality will be found at the roots of each act as a power to control, a power, the exercise of which does not involve any context outside of the sphere of one's volition wherever that is supposed to be. What is at stake here is reminiscent of the notion of Radical Reflexivity that Charles Taylor introduces referring to what can be described as the act of "ostending inwardly to one's thought while thinking" throughout the chapter on "Inwardness" in *Sources of the Self.*[34] Taylor makes a distinction between *a reflexive* and *a radical reflexive* stance regarding one's approach toward his experiences. Reflexivity is such that you make *your experience* the object of knowledge. However, Radical Reflexivity is a stance in which you seek to know, what it is for *you* in the first person, to have that experience. For instance, in remembering a friend you once had, you take a reflexive stance if you call to mind what you went through with that friend and you'll be taking a radically reflexive stance if you are trying to present for yourself what it is for you to be remembering that friend of yours, i.e., if you try to reflect on the activity of remembering which is happening *within you* at that particular moment.

Radical Reflexivity occurs when one is not only conscious of a thought like "It is raining today" but, is, at the same time conscious of the "thinking activity" involved in his own formulating of "It is raining today". It is as if there is an invisible shadow, a mind's eye located within the mind, or turned inward toward the content of the mind that is awaiting a thought to pass by and spots it when it occurs: "I am thinking that it is raining today". In PI 316, Wittgenstein remarks

> In order to get clear about the word "think" we watch ourselves while we think; what we observe will be what the word means!—But this concept is not used like that (It would be as if without knowing how to play

[34] Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

> chess, I were to try and make out what the word "mate" meant by close observation of the last move of some game of chess.)[35]

It can be argued that, implicit in this analysis of thought as something inner is the quest for self-determination that Coeckelbergh points out. If having free will partly amounts to being different from "the world" with its deterministic character, determined by the laws of natural science, then the retreat to the inner sphere as the source of one's thought is quite conceivable in line with this quest to escape from determinism as determinacy. The laws of natural science that determine the world themselves are *in language* as well, so a determinism-free intentionality will require that one is freed from language as well when one is considered to be the *source* of one's thought. But this paradigm, which allows for the separability of language and thought, simply does not function to help us understand the nature of autonomy. What we need to analyze—or to 'look' at in Wittgensteinian terms—in order to get a glimpse of what one's autonomy is all about is what actually happens when one is said to be acting voluntarily; when one is making strong evaluations. This analysis will prompt us to appreciate that one's autonomy is restored in the moves he makes in a language game, in, say, the utterances he makes, the words and the ideas he combines in a way unique to him, that, each time he makes one of these moves, he *is* choosing which pre-determined possibilities to combine and make his *own* out of a finite set of meaningful moves one could make in a language game by following its pre-determined rules. In this picture of one's autonomy, neither the possibilities of moves in a language game, nor the rules of the language game originate from the individual but, the very way in which he combines the possibilities, in which he chooses to follow *this* rather than *that* rule suffices to make the individual the source of his action. Since, after all, it is he who combines them in that

[35] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 316.

way, it is he who chooses the path he will follow among the multiplicity of paths that he could have chosen.

Now, as for the understanding of autonomy in terms of the utterance “I rule me”, the question is, *what* does one *rule*, each time, when *acting autonomously* or *being autonomous* is to be the case? What is the margin of autonomy, so to speak? Does one *rule* what to rule about, i.e., the context? Does one choose the context? No, it is the other way round, one *finds* himself in a context of choice in which, if there is only one option to choose, intention and hence autonomy is simply *not* the case. This context of choice is the language game one is situated in, that no form of life that people share is left out of the sphere of language games. The individual is the player of a multiplicity of language games overlapping, and his identity consists in being fragmented into the many “I”s and “its” and “hers”, many subjects and many objects and many seats of adverbials within sentences belonging to those language games the only intersection of which is the individual’s body. It is by being a mortal, bodily creature that one is able to play those language games he does, since being a creature of a different sort would utterly change his form of life and change his conceptual repertory so that most of what makes sense to him embedded in those language games, would not make sense if he were a different creature of sorts. Once the individual is understood to be embedded in those language games—that one can not even be *thought of* outside of a language game—, then all there is to an individual’s autonomy will be seen to consist in whether he is choosing the path he wants, or being coerced to choose it, externally. This is a sketch of my alternative account of autonomy through Wittgensteinian lines. I will get back to this point repeatedly, throughout the present chapter on autonomy. What is distinctively Wittgensteinian in this account is the situatedness of the individual in language games which prompts him to meaningfully decide which desire to act upon

without viewing the desires themselves as having a volitional content. ""At all costs I will get to that house."—But if there is no difficulty about it—*can* I try at all costs to get to the house?"[36]

This is a remark that emphasizes the context-dependence of will, of choices. It simply mentions the inapplicability of the concept of choice in the absence of a context in which the choice in question makes sense as a rule followed at the expense of other rules that could have been followed, on the face of a challenge that makes the choice in question a desirable one for the individual. My claim is that this remark justifies us in concluding that having a context—being embedded in, part of, a language game—and having more than one choice—at least the choice of having done otherwise or not having done at all as an option to avoid the costs— are presupposed by one's autonomy.

In this respect, if there is only one way to go, if there is only one option to choose for the individual, when he 'chooses' it, we can not talk about his acting voluntarily or involuntarily, he just did it, but he can not be said to have 'willed'—or 'chosen' in the terminology I attempt to employ—to do it. Doing something 'at all costs' presupposes that one at least could have chosen not to do it and hence could have avoided the 'costs' involved in choosing to do it.

Furthermore, when trying to do something, "trying" only makes sense if it makes sense to fail to do it. In more concrete terms, in the sense that one can not fail to desire a thing, one can not choose to desire either. Therefore, desire is completely deprived of its link in the causal chain of one's decisional pattern and hence action. What Wittgenstein opposes is the idea that one's intentionality is the force behind one's desires. This is to depict oneself as only the mover of but not being moved by his desires. However, in the case of desires, since one can not bring about a desire at will, it simply is what moves

[36] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 623.

one to take a decision, not what one moves in terms of a decision. Hence, what is wrong in the picture of first and second order desires and volitions is the same confusion of thinking of desiring, i.e., willing as a 'non-causal bringing about'. However, as has been said, there is no such thing as bringing about a desire just as there is no such thing as failing to bring it about. "And one might say: "I can always will only inasmuch as I can never try to will."[37]

What is overlooked in the picture of second and first order desires *competing* to be *one's own will* is that, it definitely is not the first order desire, namely, wanting to *V* that prompts one to have a second order desire that overrides the first, namely, not wanting to want to *V*. It is rather what *happens in between.* Put more precisely, "it is not because I want to *V* that I want to not want to *V*." What happens is I want to *V*, and then I think about the act of *V-ing* with its consequences and the difficulties and collateral damages that *V-ing* involves, which are all parts of the language game in which *V-ing* is involved, and thus having thought about *V-ing* in context, *I change my mind about V-ing*, that is, I now have the first order desire of not wanting to *V*. Therefore, I argue that it is not the case that I ever have second-order desires or second-order volitions. Whenever "having a desire not to want to *V*"—not wanting to want to *V*—is the case, I believe the second order desire is in fact a misconstrued first-order desire that is about the unwanted consequences of the "desire to *V*". So, what is happening is not one's ruling his first order desire by a second order volition in his inner sphere as a result of a somewhat disengaged and solitary deliberation; on the contrary what is happening is one deliberating about two first order desires that pull one from contrary directions, that is now there are two opposing rules to follow for the individual who is embedded in the language game that accommodates opposing patterns of rule-following among the ways

[37] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 619.

it can be played. My claim is that the autonomous individual is not one that is marked by his rational capacity to form second-order volitions but rather, one that is marked by his capacity to choose what to do when pulled by opposing first order desires from different directions. That renders the picture of reflexivity and "the *hierarchy within* that tames the first order desires by second order ones" a distorted one which owes its existence to a confusion that no longer functions when the confusion is clarified.

> That is I had a particular feeling, an inner experience; and I remember it—And now remember quite precisely! Then the "inner experience" of intending seems to vanish again. Instead one remembers thoughts, feelings, movements and also connexions with earlier situations. It is as if one had altered the adjustment of a microscope. One did not see before what is now in focus.[38]

The radically reflective, "critical" free will evaluating his very act of desiring as if spotting it in his inner sphere, draws us towards seeing a Cartesian paradigm of human thought and an essentialist view of language: a language comprised of descriptive sentences about the essence of trees, of persons desiring to *V*, as well as the essence of the act of *V-ing* at the very foundations of this concept of autonomy.

> The paradox disappears only if we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts—which may be about houses, pains, good and evil, or anything else you please.[39]

The paradox implies more than merely a discussion on the nature of intentionality. The paradox will disappear only if the paradigm of language, which separates thought from language, and by doing so separates at the same time the thinker from the thought and *creates* the locus of the inner mind, is abandoned. It is in this sphere that one becomes a Subject, and his desires become objects to him, and his *will* is of an objectifying character epitomizing control. It is in the inner sphere where one's

[38] Ibid., § 645.
[39] Ibid., § 304.

concern for autonomy is linked with self-control. Here, the subject, the thinker, arranges the thoughts in this sphere, parses for example his desires into certain categories being that of first or second order.

However, the very sphere within which the Subject, the "thinker of thoughts" is to reign and make evaluations, is a mere illusion created by a certain paradigm of language, namely the mono-functional language serving to convey thoughts, to describe how "things" are, i.e., their essences. In this sphere, the individual is alone with his desires and values and not even residing within a desire but at a meta-level over it. It is crucial to understand that here lies the paradox: If the individual's autonomy consists in a sophisticated act of deliberation in a sphere where he faces his desires one after the other, this presupposes a 'will' willing, that is a 'will' distinct and distinguishable from the content of the desire. I argue that it is impossible for one to evaluate or form a second-order desire without disengaging from the first order desire, the passion, i.e., the body for a momentary lapse of time, and rising above life to a timeless sphere to calculate the value of the first-order desire. Where does the transition from id to superego happen, so to speak? If it happens out there, in the world, then it will happen in time, bearing the constraints of our understanding of temporality that contradicting experiences can not overlap but succeed each other in time. However, wanting to not want to do something and wanting to do that same thing, can not be easily thought to happen at the same time since what we understand from time and from responding to desires in the normal way that humans usually do prompts us to think that these contrary desires succeed each other temporally. The difficulty is due to our inability to tell the difference between say for example "wanting not to want to smoke" and "not wanting to smoke". Wanting not to want to smoke, places an invisible man in control of his desires, like a driver, and then discussing whether one wants to be the driver or not. But what is

the driver driving? If it is the action that he is able or unable to decide between, i.e., to smoke or not to smoke, then autonomy simply involves deciding between first order desires. But if it is his desire and his reflexive attitude towards that desire he is unable to choose between, the second order desire suggests an escape from one's body, being freed from the power of passion for a minute, my point is: in "wanting not to want to smoke", "wanting to smoke" is absent, deprived of content and the power to manipulate one, as if one is not "moved by" but just the "mover of" his desires. In the second-order desire, first-order desire is simply not depicted as an act with a certain pleasure or pain sentiment, but as the mediation between an indeterminate *I* and the act of smoking with the pleasure, pain and bodily gestures it involves.

> One imagines the willing subject here as something without any mass (without any inertia); as a motor which has no inertia in itself to overcome. And so it is only mover, not moved. That is: One can say "I will, but my body does not obey me"—but not "My will does not obey me." (Augustine). But in the sense in which I can not fail to will, I can not try to will either.[40]

Only if the picture theory of language which is an essentialist paradigm of language, according to which my thought can be separated from my language, is at work as the underlying paradigm, can we continue to make sense of the first part in Feinberg's formulation which goes "I rule me" as a condition of autonomy. Otherwise, in our alternative picture, "I rule me" will dissolve into "I rule my decisions". What will be the relevant consequence of that with regard to our conception of autonomy? If what are taken to be desires about one and the same thing in a hierarchical order are shown to be desires about different things, then this hierarchy and order restored by the will *in* the person might be undermined and profound doubts might be raised about the conception of inner autonomy as a hierarchical order which in the long run might

[40] Ibid., § 618.

prompt us to believing that we are wantons after all but there is nothing wrong with that so long as we are capable of deciding which wanton desire to fulfil in worldly situations.

Let us now continue our debate concerning autonomy by looking at Charles Taylor's position. Charles Taylor goes further than Frankfurt in arguing that persons not only have the capacity to question their (first-order) desires, but also the capacity to question themselves.

> Beyond the *de facto* characterisation of the subject by his goals, desires and purposes, a person is a subject who can pose the *de jure* question: is this the kind of being I ought to be , or really want to be?"(Taylor 1976: 111)…Taylor claims that "we have the notion that human subjects are capable of evaluating what they are" and that "many" believe this kind of evaluation to be "essential to our notion of the self"…According to Taylor, we as a matter of fact make judgements and "strong" evaluations. We do not just evaluate what to do in the sense that we desire to do this rather than that, but we also evaluate whether it's good or not to have this desire. Taylor distinguishes between "someone who evaluates non-qualitatively" and someone who "deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires". Taylor refers to the latter type of a person as a "strong evaluator". He argues that the capacity for strong evaluation is "an essential characteristic of a person" since beings other than persons are either incapable of evaluating desires or are only able to evaluate as "a simple weigher". Taylor's idea of strong evaluation is compatible with Frankfurt's idea of higher-order desires. In particular, the capacity to question whether I am now the person I really want to be can manifest itself in the formation of higher-order desires, such as the desire to be a different person. In Frankfurt's volitional account this amounts to the desire to have a different volitional structure…To exercise my capacity to determine my life means that I make "strong" evaluations. Strong, because I do not just classify a certain (first-order) desire as good or bad, but I question myself as a certain kind of person. Taylor calls this questioning of the self "radical evaluation", a "reflection about the self" which "engages the self most wholly and deeply"; at stake here is my identity.[41]

The question is, can one really, meaningfully ask the question "Is *this* the kind of being I want to be or ought to be?" at any stage in one's life? That presupposes that

[41] Coeckelbergh, 8. (Taylor 1976: 126).

one's identity is transparent to himself such that he is able to describe his essence when he poses the "Who am I?" question to himself in a perfectly inclusive way that covers all there is to know about him. I claim that one's description of himself will always fall short of explaining all the fragments that make him up which are dissolved into the many contexts he is situated in where he is making decisions, evaluating desires or just doing what the context implies. It might be the case that "the notion of human subjects evaluating what they are" is a disengaged notion of human existence which presupposes that one rises to a meta-level and observes from that elevated point "what he is"—an idea which one can not make sense of when one is thought to be embedded in countless language games within which his use as an *I*, namely his role as an *I*, changes, or is loaded with a different content and in which that aspect of his identity—which would not have otherwise been predicated of him—is shaped. It may be the case that this very attempt to describe "what we are" is the fundamental misconception that we engage in, in terms of our notion of the self.

Furthermore, what does it mean "to evaluate whether it is good or not to have this desire"? As has been argued before "having a desire" is not something one can evaluate; one is moved by, but not the mover of one's desires. Having a desire, as we said, is not something we bring about voluntarily or deliberate about. What we deliberate about is what we will resolve to do upon having that desire. It is not having a desire that we evaluate, but rather the consequences of having that desire. Hence, if it is the consequence that is being evaluated, then it presupposes that it be acted on in contexts and that it produced certain results that are unwanted or strived for. If this is what amounts to the content of evaluation, then we can say evaluating a desire means evaluating what "acting upon that desire" amounts to.

My claim is that the distinction Taylor makes between “someone who evaluates non-qualitatively” and “someone who deploys a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires” involves the confusion about desires and evaluation about desires at its roots, and when this confusion is clarified, we will see that the former does not involve an evaluation at all and the latter is an evaluation on first order desires that cancels out his category of “strong” evaluation.

Someone who evaluates non-qualitatively is one who has a certain desire and who is not evaluating anything at all. In the sense that it was not his intention to have that desire, he can not be said to evaluate his desire when he merely has it. As for deploying a language of evaluative contrasts ranging over desires, this merely amounts to thinking of situations where one had this desire and acted on it in a multiplicity of contexts in multidimensional ways. Again, it is not having a desire, but the situation of having a certain desire in a certain context that is being evaluated and as a result, what happens is that the desire gets acted upon or not on the basis of this evaluation.

My aim is neither to demolish the ideal of the autonomous person nor to deny that there is a “Self” that decides, chooses and hence that acts autonomously in each case in which acting autonomously, out of one’s own volition, makes sense. However, as can be seen, I argue that Self is fragmentary, the autonomous individual may perhaps be seen as a sum of individuals that are playing a number of language games in each of which they decide between which desire to act upon or what constraint to overcome next or how to challenge a given role within the language game. Hence, the concern with autonomy involves being cognizant of a totality of real life situations where individuals do make choices and act out of them. A person’s autonomy involves his being situated in contexts, in language games and evaluating what the appropriate path (rule) to follow is in each case.

By the same token, if having a person as one's Ideal has anything to do with autonomy as Taylor suggests, then the Wittgensteinian clarification of the grammar of idealizing is helpful such that it will be understood that when idealizing a person it is the pattern through which he undertakes to carry out his desires that we are identifying him with, and thus idealizing. It seems to me, much of what idealizing is, amounts to thinking of the many contexts in which our Ideal person was in and praising him for what he has chosen to do in the given context. Furthermore, this convoluted path of choices he made only makes sense to us as achievements because he made that particular choice among all the other things that could have been chosen. He made his path his own by not taking the other paths. This presupposes that he always was embedded in situations which gave his choice the meaning he confers on them and that he always had more than one path to take, namely more than one choice to make in the absence of which he would not qualify as a *willing* person. So evaluation amounts to a person's ability to do what he chooses, but not his ability to choose to choose or want to want. The alternative picture of evaluation that we propose, does not involve Ideal persons *per se* but persons idealized for what they choose to do, the analysis of which requires the admirer to be familiar with his Ideal's context of choice, namely his Ideal's culture. For example, if I have Mordechai Vanunu as my ideal person, it is impossible for me to withdraw him from his context of choice and still continue to idealize him.

The necessary relationship between an evaluator and his context is conceivable when we think of the players of a chess game. A chess player can be said to be acting autonomously when he evaluates on which move to make, thinks of a few moves to make each in line with a different rule, however, applicable to the same move and acts out of this desire. His evaluation amounts to having at his disposal all the choices he can make and with a view to them choosing this one rather than the other ones. We can say

that this type of evaluation is one that presupposes moves of others and a multidimensional vision of the situation he is in and the choices he can make that lie at his disposal. In this case, it is not of much help to him when he is deciding about how to make his next move, to think about the description of each piece; however it is helpful to know their uses, so he can be qualified as a player, in other words, he should know the multiplicity of contexts in which they are applied. Furthermore, it is not of much help to him to hold, say, a knight in his hand and think in an abstract fashion what the best thing to do with a knight is. He simply will have to put it somewhere on the basis of his familiarity with what a chess game and consequently what moving a knight involves, and will simply see what happens. It will be of profound help to him to think of the many ways he was challenged by his opponent when they were in the same situation, or what pattern of movements had followed from this position by players during the chess olympics which will all help him to decide which move to make and which not when it is his turn. What is presupposed here is that it is his opponent's moves that prompt him to make decisions and that situations to make decisions unfold themselves as outcomes of this dialogical process of taking turns in making decisions which determine the context of but not the content of the other player's next move. So there is no check mate outside the game just as they are no longer identifiable as chess players outside the game. Thirdly, it is not of much help to him in deciding what to do next, to identify himself with what he has done so far and ask "Is this the kind of chess player I want to become or do I want to become like Mr. Karatay?" For in asking such questions, he does not possibly know what kind of a chess player he is; which former moves of his is he to identify himself with and in what context were they done or have all the movements he has done so far been enough to put forward what kind of a chess

player he is? Could it not be the case that had he known better options, had he more choices, he would have been a different chess player?

As for the ideal to become like Mr. Karatay, in deciding what to do next, if the question is "How can I become a Mr. Karatay?" then how can he consistently be an autonomous chess player rather than being a would-be auto-copy of Mr. Karatay who moves the pieces just like him? However, instead of asking the abstract question of how to become like a Mr. Karatay, if he asks "What would a person like Mr. Karatay do in this particular situation?" then, this can be of much more help to him since it will be through viewing *how others do things* and *how they do them well* that he will improve his playing.

Forms of Life and Language Games

In the last section, we have made use of the Wittgensteinian concepts of Language Games and Forms of Life extensively. Now, I feel the need to put forward what these two concepts central to Wittgenstein's thought consist in. Language games involve all the rule-governed ways in which one interacts with the other in language. The many ways within which a child learns his language, through repetition; through ostension in which the child *understands* that the ostension is to be associated with the ostended but not, say, the fingertip or the elbow of the ostender, are all among the multiplicity of language games. Wittgenstein introduces them in PI 7.

> We can also think of the whole process of using words in (2)—[which is a primitive language of two builders who call out: Block! Slab! Pillar! and the other brings *what is* called out. This is a language in which there are only names and the objects they *stand for.* Wittgenstein's point in evaluating this game is that, even in such a primitive language, there is no essential relationship between the name and object, no intrinsic essence that will reassure us like a chart of the Universal qualities of 'Blocks' so that we can run around and bring the Block that fits the criterion, it is rather the case that objects acquire their names through the

> many ways people use them] as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games "language games" and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language game. And the process of naming the stones and of repeating words after someone might also be called language-games. Think of much of the use of words in games like ring-a-ring-a-roses.
>
> I shall also call the whole, consisting of language games and the actions into which it is woven, a "language game".[42]

In this way, language games can be said to be the many ways within which one learns how to act like a human being and insert himself into the world. Language games, in this respect, are the content of one's consciousness and thus shape one's worldview (*Weltanschauung*); serving as "Introduction to living" classes since each language game entertains a form of life within which one's way of talking about that life form as well as his thought concerning that life form is shaped. Thus, the ground on which these language games are played is our forms of life in that what kind of beings we are, like whether we are mortals, whether we are giants, whether we inhabit a sub-tropical rain forest or North Pole, or a European City with homeless people, all suggest different forms of life which in turn shape the rock-bottom grammar of the worldview, culture in question. That is, different language games are played with life depending on where we end up on this planet, yet these are linked to each other with some similarity like a family resemblance that enables us to meaningfully utter that *they are playing a language game with life.*

> Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who have mastered the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life. (If a concept refers to a character of human handwriting, it has no application to beings that do not write.)[43]

[42] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 7.
[43] Ibid., 148.

Elsewhere, Wittgenstein states: “What has to be accepted, the given is,—so one could say— *forms of life*”.[44]

Thus, according to Wittgenstein one *learns to live* when one learns his native language, not merely to locate the constituents of a life that one is somehow cognizant with.

In this respect, all the intentional content of an individual is in fact nothing else than his rational capacity to make decisions between the rules of, the choices within the language games which the individual has learned through intricate patterns of rule-following. So, in order to make sense of a desire in an evaluative way, one should have the mastery of language in which the technique of evaluating desires makes sense. There is no willing, no autonomy, without the stage setting it requires: there is a life in which people need things and their cries for needs are replaced by communicable acts of desire in the form of “I want to *V*”. Hence in PI 205, Wittgenstein clarifies this context-dependence of willing and intention.

> “But it is just the queer thing about intention, about the mental process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it. That, for example, it is imaginable that two people should play chess in a world in which otherwise no games existed; and even that they should begin a game of chess—and then be interrupted.” But isn’t chess defined by its rules? And how are these rules present in the mind of the person who is intending to play chess?[45]

This is a very explicit way of putting forward the way culture functions as the context of freedom for an individual. As can be seen, only when one remains blind to the cultural determination, the stage setting of one’s actions and desires, can one formulate Autonomy as one’s ruling himself, alone in a sphere of “strong” evaluation and critical reflection. However the very content of that sphere as well as the shape of

[44] Ibid., § 192.
[45] Ibid., § 205.

that sphere, i.e., the grammar of the inner mental realm, is given by what is public, and this is where it totally loses its sense to think of thought and language as separate.[46] I claim that acting autonomously means choosing to follow the rule of a language game that one sees to be the most appropriate within that language game in the context of a form of life. [47]

As has been said, situations, in the form of language games, involve concrete others as persons and the indeterminacy of how they will respond is an important part of the autonomous act, as well as the perception of the individual to judge the situation as part of a language game. When thinking of autonomy, we should bear in mind then all that is suggested in each move in a chess game. Wittgenstein in formulating his concept of the language games is also inspired by the example of a chess game such that he is comparing *speaking* with playing *chess, words* with *chess pieces, explanations of words* with *rules of chess, meanings of words* with *different powers of chess pieces,* which Hacker observes[48] that this picture is built into his employment of the term: "language-game".

In PI 23, Wittgenstein writes

> But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command?- There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call 'symbols', 'words', 'sentences'. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once and for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a *rough picture* of this from the changes in mathematics.)
> Here the term 'language-*game*' is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the *speaking* of language is part of an activity, or of a life-form.
> Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:
> Giving orders, and obeying them-
> Describing the appearance of an object or giving its measurements-

[46] Ibid., § 337.
[47] "We remain unconscious of the prodigious diversity of all the everyday language-games because the clothing of our language makes everything alike. Something new (spontaneous, 'specific') is always a language game." (Wittgenstein, *Investigations,* § 191.)
[48] Hacker, *An Analytical Commentary,* Vol. 1, Exegesis § 23.

> Constructing an object from a description (a drawing)-
> Reporting an event-
> Speculating about the event-
> Forming and testing a hypothesis-
> Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams-
> Making up a story; and reading it-
> Play-acting-
> Singing-catches-
> Guessing riddles-
> Making a joke; telling it-
> Solving a problem in practical arithmetic-
> Translating from one language into another-
> Requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
> -It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. (Including the author of the *Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus.*)[49]

Through combining language with the concept of game, certain features of the concept of game are made explicit in determining the salient characteristics of his new approach to language and the use of expressions. There is, for instance, no essence that describes all games but nevertheless what binds all games together is a certain family resemblance such that they are all performed according to certain rules in that all games involve a certain 'rule following' no matter how the role of players and the ground on which it qualifies as a game differ. Accordingly, "meanings of expressions" vary each time they are used in a different language game following the set of rules that mastery of playing that game calls for.

So, this is the paradigm of language and thought that Wittgenstein is offering as opposed to the traditional view of language in which language is a set of propositions that describe states of affairs in the world.

In the traditional view, thought and language are separable in that one is depicted to acquire the linguistic ability to share and express his experiences, i.e., what he went

[49] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 23.

through until that time when he acquires his native language.[50] That of course, locates one's thoughts in an inner sphere, where he is separated from others and therefore it makes sense to talk of inner autonomy, or will as non-linguistic, volitional structures that describe a person's mode of being in the world. The underlying paradigm of the autonomous individual is this essentialist picture, where one's mastery over himself does not presuppose a dialogical approach that *creates* one as a person and his sense of himself (which most of the time takes the form of an inner monologue, but whose constituents by no means originate from him but from the sphere of communication where through the shared forms of life, decisions *within* language games are created and sort of baptised by the individual each time he desires one thing or judges its consequences to be more valuable than those of another desire) each time he is embedded in a language game and thus *situates* him in real life where decisions are taken. The relationship between this paradigm (essentialism) and the atomism that awaits such an individual can not be overlooked. If not situations, but his inner sphere of mental activity is *where* one evaluates his desires and orders them in a hierarchy, as of first and second order, then the entrapment of autonomy in inner spheres of individuals, as a property of their will—whatever that is—will set the individuals apart from each other and hence that is why the account of the autonomous individual in this sense faces charges of atomism and individualism.

However, this paradigm does not answer the theoretical needs that will sufficiently show, for the purposes of Liberal Culturalism, why it is the case that it is valuable for an individual to be a *member* of *a Culture,* or that for an individual, his

[50] "When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having , rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified, and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." ((Augustine, *Confessions,* I. 8) Quoted in: Wittgenstein, *Investigations,* p.2.)

culture functions as his context of choice, i.e., context of freedom. That is why I propose that the underlying paradigm of essentialism should be replaced by the Wittgensteinian paradigm of language and thought, in which there are no essential meanings ("meanings" like Platonic entities, which would make sense even in the absence of an effective sphere of communication where they get to be *actually used* by individuals) and where meaning is understood to be "use", the application of which involve a sphere of interacting individuals who follow rules and who agree on judgements as well as definitions as basic to their shared life form.[51]

Were the traditional paradigm to be changed with the Wittgensteinian paradigm of meaning, a word's meaning would not be fixed to the description of its essence; it would rather be its different powers in different language games which would be bound by a network of family resemblances. The alternative "identity" of the individual on the basis of the Wittgensteinian paradigm of language suggests that when we make a claim such as "At stake here is my identity", we should not expect to define the essence of the "I", since this is not the language game we play with "I". Instead of trying to find the essence of the "I", its use must be observed, that is, different powers of the "I" in different contexts. Hence the meaning of "one's identity" changes in each language game, in each life form in which the individual participates. With an intent to understand the meaning of "I", when one looks at its "uses" in different language

[51] "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so—It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement."

What Wittgenstein means here is that, in order to get a certain constancy in results of measurement, say, for example the measurement of the length of a wall, people who go to measure the wall's length should not apply the ruler vertically or horizontally, or should be cognizant of methods of measurement when lengths are considered and these all presupppose a certain life form shared by individuals who sometimes find themselves in a situation to do measurements. So, describing what the state of affairs 'X' involves and judging 'this' to be a case of 'X' are activities that go hand in hand . PI 242, thus, is a perfect example to understand Wittgenstein's concept of grammar, which we could formulate as 'forms of life' immanent in language games as an inner map of signposts about "how we use it" in "these cases". Nevertheless grammar is not arbitrary at all, no more arbitrary then "method" or "length" is arbitrary in a case of measurement. (Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 242)

games, one finds the meaning of the I in contexts, hence the picture one comes up with, is a fragmentary one concerning the identity of the "I" that is spread into the multiplicity of language games in which "I" forms a part.

This new paradigm of language and thought, on the basis of which a whole new understanding of the identity of the "I" can be constituted in the way I have proposed, will be of much bigger help to put forward the many ways in which "culture is the context of freedom" for an individual. It is such that the individual is always embedded in one language game or another or a couple of them at the same time, and the moves he can make in each of them is all there is to the context of choice of an individual. For after all, each language game *is* a context, and each move in a language game *can* be a choice so long as there *are* more than one possible move in a language game. If what the individual does in a language game is not a choice, it is not because one fails to choose due to weakness of his will but because there were no other choices to be made such that *autonomy* as an act of choosing was not a part of that language game. In many cases where one is coerced to choose a certain thing or where one is not aware of the other choices, other rules of the language game, we can talk about choice not being the case and autonomy not being applicable to one's behaviour in that context.

The Individual and His Culture

In this section we will see how the Wittgensteinian paradigm of language can help us to formulate the nature of the relationship between an individual and his culture, especially the claim that "Culture is the context of choice" for individuals. If we look at PI 31 and PI 32 we will see two of the many statements that Wittgenstein makes about how by learning a language one learns a life form, or acquires the "form of forms" so to

speak, that is: to *think* and to *live like a human being*, hence we can say one *becomes* a human being, a rational being, a *thinking being* (which are inseparable for Wittgenstein, if not redundant categories of misconstrued grammar) by learning language.

> Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to *guess* the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong. And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child comes into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself".[52]

Learning language happens through intricate patterns of rule-following each of which might involve taking the wrong path and being corrected by others about how to continue to follow the rule correctly. This pattern of falling into errors and then being corrected by others is not an impediment to one's autonomy, because it is through these corrections and guidances about rule-following that one acquires the mastery of the given language game. This acquisition of the ability to follow rules correctly and apply them accurately in the relevant context is one's initiation to an autonomous life. One must know what qualifies as remaining within the application of a rule to transgress that application, just as in the case of writing a poem. You should know how to meaningfully use a word in order to challenge this use by the alternative use you propose. Yet this presupposes that there are people out there, who, as well as being in a position to correct your mistaken application of a rule—of a word in the case of a poem—can acknowledge your unusual application of it and can come to admit that *this can be an alternative use, an alternative application of this rule,* and incorporate this among the language games one can play in the suggested context, suggested life form.

[52] Ibid., § 32.

Thus, to acquire the mastery of a technique called "living" for a human being, for Wittgenstein, presupposes that one adheres to a form of life with others, where rules are followed "blindly" and passed on from generation to generation by the sentence "this is how we do it!" serving as the "bedrock of explanations" when definitions are of no more help. For after all, *explanations come to an end somewhere.*[53] That is when living practice, *custom* leads one to find and follow where the *signpost is situated.* [54]

Nothing reflects his position better than what he says in PI 199, which perfectly serves our purpose of showing the theoretical aspect of how it happens that "Culture is the context of choice for an individual without which he would be deprived of his capacity to choose".[55]

> Is what we call "obeying a rule" something that it would be possible for only *one* man to do *once* in his life?—This is of course a note on the grammar of the expression "to obey a rule". It is not possible that there have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given or understood; and so on.—To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are *customs* (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique.[56]

It is clear from this passage that one's choices are made within language games and none of these choices can be made by only one man and once in his lifetime, for choosing, i.e., acting out of one's own volition is a part of a *custom* (use, institution). What does it mean for one to have a larger scope of choices in that respect? It might be supposed to mean two things: (a) that he knows *all* the rules that can be followed in the language game he is situated and that he is able to introduce new applications of these rules. Both of these activities presuppose a whole lot of communication. In

[53] Ibid., § 1.
[54] "I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it ...I have further indicated that a person goes by a sign-post only in so far as there exists a regular use of sign posts, a custom." (Ibid., § 198.)
[55] Ibid., § 199.
[56] Ibid.

Wittgensteinian terms, rendering the *suburb* of a language, the *downtown* of it, is a gradual process that one can only bring about through constant communication with others so that he renders his *visual room*—the content of one's imagination in Wittgensteinian terms—one that can be viewed by all. (b) Or it might be supposed to mean that he is situated in as many language games as he can be, gets cognizant of, or is a participant of, as many customs as he can. That will give him the opportunity to incorporate a relevant rule, or a relevant concept into the language game he is embedded in currently. Hence, if the language game an individual is embedded in is one that does not involve choice, hence autonomy, the only way autonomy can be introduced into that language game is by importing a choice, a rule from a similar language game which one knows by heart. This, as can be seen, is also a case in favour of our thesis that autonomy presupposes a great deal of communication. Since if communication is not the case, how will one know the choices that don't belong to the language game he is currently playing? Only through communication can one get cognizant of other language games, situating himself in which will give one the opportunity to become aware of new choices that could be made, new rules that could be followed.

However, having one's culture as his context of choice and having a lot of choices, many alternatives to choose from, are definitely not one and the same thing. For the former is not a kind of arbitrary context that one can choose to have or not to have. It is the very structure in which one *thinks*, so in that respect, the aspect of having a context of choice differs from having a scope of choices to choose between. What Wittgenstein proposes is that one's cultural context forms his horizon of meaning. To predicate of a human being that he thinks is to predicate of him that he speaks a language and has concepts to employ in language games.

The Context of Autonomy

In this section, I will try to put forward that what there is to one's autonomy does not presuppose that there be a self-contained "I" *beyond contexts*, and that thinking of the "I" as a *hopelessly fragmented battlefield of forces* does not necessarily need to lead us towards questioning his autonomy. Autonomy, I claim, is perfectly compatible with this idea of fragmentation, if we think of the autonomous individual as one who is embedded in many different language games in each of which, a particular aspect of his identity, his self, is in use, but nevertheless this fragmentation does not deprive him of his capacity to be one that chooses and decides in each context between what his desires prompt him to.

In the definition, "I am autonomous if I rule me and no one else rules I",[57] the part "I rule me" refers to the traditional conception of the inner autonomy and "no one else rules I" refers to the outer autonomy.

> What I mean by the inner aspect of autonomy is captured in the phrase 'I rule me'. The ideal of autonomy here is that we are able, in Feinberg's words, to 'identify with the desire that is higher in our personal hierarchy, and consider ourselves to be the subject rather than the object of constraint.' This ideal can be refined by looking at what it would be for a person *not* to be autonomous. According to Feinberg, the non-autonomous person is a person who has 'no hierarchical structure of wants and aims and ideals and no clear conception of where it is within him, that he really resides'. Such a person would be a battlefield for all of his constituent elements, tugged this way and that, and fragmented hopelessly.[58]

It is essentially this hierarchical formulation of the inner aspect of autonomy that I intend to oppose in my account of the autonomous individual. Where actually is that hierarchical structure of desires and aims and ideals located *within* me? If there is such a

[57] Joel Feinberg, "The Idea of a Free Man" in *Educational Judgments*, edited by J. F. Doyle (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973): 161.
[58] Coeckelberg, *Metaphysics*, 14.

vertical line of hierarchy within me on which aims and ideals are attached as if to the higher and lower branches of a wish-tree, then half of my life should be spent looking for the whereabouts of it (in my soul? in my heart? in my brain? where is it?) and the other half should be spent trying to maintain it where it is (on condition that I spot it) and keep it from falling down. This is unrealistic. If autonomy means being able to evaluate the outcome of my desires according to what I find valuable in life, then the constraint which prompts me to be autonomous would be real life and human interactions where the content of my desires lies, as well as what makes them good or bad depending on the very situations. Hence, it must be the very mark of a person's autonomy to be a *battlefield for all of his constituent elements, tugged this way and that, fragmented hopelessly*. On this battlefield where all the desires have an equal claim to hierarchy, there is in fact no such hierarchy that each desire is an element of a different language game overlapping in the *fabric of daily life.* As for fragmentation, since one is not an object for himself either, he can only get to have a sense of himself in fragments, for there is no essential description he fits in and in which all the fragments form but one identifiable union. An autonomous individual is rather one that is embedded as a player in a multiplicity of language games with his divergent desires on a context-by-context basis. Therefore, it is out there in the realm of communication and interaction that he exercises and is able to exercise his autonomy. There is no context within which to be autonomous in the hierarchical inner, since there we seem to be exerting power on things which we can not grammatically exert power on or not fail to bring about. Hierarchical order in one's inner presupposes that we want to have certain desires but there is no such thing as wanting to have a desire; rather, what we want to have is the implications of the desire we happen to have. However, as I have argued before, when the prevalent understanding of language and thought remains that language is the

picture of the world where good, bad, beautiful, ugly, day, cat, etc. meet their descriptions and where thought is the activity one attends to and can inwardly ostend (as in the act of willing) when, say, a proposition passes his mind, then the prevalent inner aspect of autonomy which faces the charges of atomism and individualism will not fade away, because the presupposed essentialism is still dominant in the paradigm of language. As I have further indicated, only when we replace this existing paradigm of language with that of Wittgenstein can we do away with the aspect of autonomy as an inner hierarchy and start seeking for it where it actually happens, in the world where people interact and communicate with each other.

> Whereas the inner aspect of autonomy refers to the relations and state of affairs *within* the person, I shall say that outer autonomy concerns the relationship between the person and the rest of the world, in particular other people…It…contrasts 'forms of passive mindless adjustment (the pejorative term is "conformity") to the requirements of one's culture.[59]

The non-autonomous person with regard to his outer autonomy is exactly the Communitarian Self with his aims and ends, i.e., desires, subordinated to the requirements of his culture. "Autonomous persons, on the contrary, are capable of conforming if they choose…They will conform when and only when there are good reasons for doing so".[60]

In order to tell whether one is autonomous or under constraint in the inner or outer sense, "Is it really an *inner* constraint?" and "Is it really an *outer* constraint?" are the key questions. However, is there really such a clear cut demarcation between inner and outer constraints? That is, if there *are* inner constraints. If we are to take 'constraint' in a weak sense—like something that diminishes our power of choosing or distorts its conduct—when it is 'inner' and in a strong sense, as a coercion—like

[59] Coeckelbergh, *Metaphysics*, 15.
[60] Ibid.

something that coerces us to “choose” something (which is tractable and manifest only in our acting) and thus renders the very act of choice impossible—what is our justification for doing this categorization? My point is, what would be the basis of such an assumption that there is an imbalance between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ senses of “constraint”? Since if we take the weaker sense of constraint into account, language can also be regarded as a constraint that impedes us from being an “autonomous individual”. If we take most of our convictions to be of a conceptual character (“conviction” itself is a concept), we can see how our desires and strong evaluations over our desires and our ideals are determined by and supervene on how we take the state of affairs to be in our metaphysics. In other words, what we speculate about as being good or bad as well as the concepts of good and bad themselves are internal to language and the grammar of that language *is* the compass of the internal configuration of how things, relations and nonsense in the world are situated. Grammar thus draws the bounds of sense and senselessness of what we can imagine. In this sense, language may be said to shape who we are and what we want in an indispensable way. This is where we get confused about whether to think of language and hence culture as a “context of” or a “constraint on” freedom. We might argue that if language and thought are separable as the dualistic picture of essentialism suggests such that language functions to express what we think, then language can be seen as a constraint such that it in principle will always fall short of expressing what we think.

However, if language and thought are inseparable as Wittgenstein suggests, such that language is the stage-setting that is presupposed by our thinking’s being meaningful, then language and culture will be seen as the necessary context of freedom as that which makes desiring and evaluation of those desires and choices parts of a language game in which one is embedded. In this sense, language games (and hence

language) is both the context of freedom and the context of life of the individual in general.

Deconstructing Language as a Constraint

In this section my aim will be to put forward that it does not make sense to think of language and hence culture as "constraints". The embeddedness of the individual in them is to be seen as not something to transcend but as something in which one's sense of the world, one's sense of oneself and one's understanding are shaped. Language can be thought of in terms of this context-constraint opposition in two levels:

(a) One is that one can not make choices about things that do not exist in his ontology, about life forms that are completely alien to her. "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world".[61] But it does not make sense to think of this metaphysical condition as an impediment to one's individual freedom. It is true that we are claiming that one becomes freer if one learns about more choices. However, that might require the individual to look at everything in a profoundly different way than he is accustomed to.

That will be like adjusting the lenses of the microscope, or changing the glasses through which one looks at the world. At stake here is one's *Weltanschauung*, worldview, in which all the language games he is a player of make sense and give him the sense of leading his life throughout the decisions he makes in the situations of life that form the content of the language games he is cognizant of. It is not an arbitrary pair of glasses that one can put on and off as he likes. However, it will be necessary to one to have an access to at least one worldview as his native one to be inserted into life. It is impossible to think of an individual as not having a worldview, since it is congenial to one, namely,

[61] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by C.K. Ogden. Introduction by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955): 5.

one is born into a worldview which is reflected in the forms of life shared by the participants of this worldview. The point is one can not become an autonomous individual without becoming an individual first. In this sense, if one becomes an individual in a worldview, in a language, then that language is not a constraint on, but the very context of one's life, let alone his autonomy.

Hence, once one is initiated into life through a language, then it makes sense to speak of incorporating new meanings into his ontology or extending his worldview by introducing him to new life forms. In this case, the life form which an individual can not make choices about doesn't necessarily need to be a life form so remote from his own that he can never make sense of it with his given functional capacities. The point is, what does not exist in his ontology does not necessarily have to be something that can never exist in his ontology like sonar visions of a bat[62] or a lion's speech,[63] because that would require that he alters his—material—composition and becomes something else, some species of a different sort or an inhabitant of a possible world whose actual existence is not conceivable for us for the time being. What the individual lacks in his ontology can simply be some new way of looking at things, some language game of which the rules one has not learned but the acquisition of which might have changed one's life in a profound way. For example, if one does not have any concept of any reference to "Future" in her language, in the form of Future Tense or in the form of some hint that the time is somehow moving in a continual direction, that 'now' is the last minute's successor, can one have second-order desires? Can one have Ideals to fulfil if there is "No Future"? Or, for example, can one kill himself if he doesn't have "first-person authority"? However, as history shows, it is not impossible for one to extend his ontology. That amounts to a change in grammar in Wittgensteinian terms.

[62] Thomas Nagel, "What is it like to be a bat?" in *The Philosophical Review*, 133, no. 4, 1974: 435-450.
[63] Compare: "If a lion could talk, we could not understand him" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 190).

Since that counts as a very gradual and slow change in one's grammar, it requires that suburbs become downtown in the city of language—that is, a change in the Forms of Life on a communal, public scale that would make unusual or currently inconceivable practices a part of the daily life that form a part of the everyday discourse. If we look at Wittgenstein's "city metaphor", we can get a clearer insight as to how grammar can possibly be gradually changing as we have mentioned.

> Do not be troubled by the fact that languages (2) and (8) consist only of orders. If you want to say that this shows them to be incomplete, ask yourself whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of our language. (And how many houses or streets does it take before a town begins to be a town?) Our language may be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.[64]

This is to say that even "grammar", on the basis of which we play all these language games, is apt to change throughout history by coming across different life styles, i.e., life-forms, by interacting with different cultures, obviously through communication. Being able to be influenced by others, requires that one be in a position to understand, to make sense of how others do things and this amounts first to being embedded in a form of life and language games through which an individual *learns to communicate* and secondly to communication as that which will enable learning new language games for the individual. If there are two distinct cultures living side by side being utterly ignorant of how the other does things—everyday issues that the neighbour is involved with, like cooking a staple dish or recycling garbage or the frequency of an all-purpose proverb that applies to countless situations—then we can not talk about there being a communication. However, as we will see in our discussion concerning

[64] Ibid. , § 18.

cultural identities in terms of Family Resemblances, it conflicts with the grammar of the concept of human life and being human, to think of cultures as utterly distinct from each other especially if they are living side by side. Culture on that account is something of which borders can not be drawn owing to the fact that each time one ventures out to describe a cultural identity, one confesses seeing how all there is to an "authentic" culture is just a huge bundle of rootless fragments of common practice, *a complicated network of overlapping and crisscrossing family resemblances,* so to speak.

> Besides, trying to find some primordially authentic culture can be like peeling an onion. The textiles most people think of as traditional West African cloths are known as Java prints; they arrived in the 19th century with the Javanese batiks sold, and often milled, by the Dutch. The traditional garb of Herero women in Namibia derives from the attire of 19th-century German missionaries, though it is still unmistakably Herero, not least because the fabrics used have a distinctly un-Lutheran range of colours. And so with our kente cloth: the silk was always imported, traded by Europeans, produced in Asia. This tradition was once an innovation. Should we reject it for that reason as untraditional? How far back must one go? Should we condemn the young men and women of the University of Science and Technology, a few miles outside Kumasi, who wear European-style gowns for graduation, lined with kente strips (as they do now at Howard and Morehouse, too)? Cultures are made of continuities and changes, and the identity of a society can survive through these changes. Societies without change aren't authentic; they're just dead.[65]

(b) There is a background zone of value-contaminated convictions underlying every choice. This absence of neutrality and culture-dependence at the foundations of one's desires may be seen as a constraint on autonomy as well. This tenet differs from (a) in that not the ability to form judgements, but the value-ladenness of the judgements made by an individual as part of a language game is at stake here. If one comes to entertain the value-ladenness of what he takes to be neutral judgements about facts of nature, then this might form the very foundation of his looking for alternative stories to account for

[65] Kwame Antony Appiah, "*The Case for Contamination"* in: The New York Times, 1.1.2006. Online:<http://www.wehaitians.com/the%20case%20for%20contamination.html> (20. September 2006).

the world. Hence, the value-ladenness which might seem as a constraint on one's autonomy, if one forms an awareness of this, will form the very justification of his leaning towards other cultures to find out about their culture and language games.

> If the formation of concepts can be explained by facts of nature, should we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar?—Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general facts of nature. (Such facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science; nor yet natural history—since we can also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes. I am not saying: if such and such facts of nature were different, people would have different concepts (in the sense of a hypothesis). But: if anyone believes that certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize- then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him.
>
> Compare a concept with a style of painting. For is even our style of painting arbitrary? Can we choose one at pleasure? (The Egyptian, for instance.) Is it a mere question of pleasing and ugly?[66]

This is an anti-essentialist remark about the cultural determination of our concepts in which Wittgenstein claims that the discourse in which we talk about the world is not a set of necessary concepts that have a one-to-one correspondence with facts-of-the-matter, rather it is discourse that involves an infinite set of ways of dealing with the world through different uses of these very concepts. We are embedded in our concepts which shape good and bad for us in a kind of non-arbitrary and pre-determined way, but that means, concepts different from ours are possible in different life forms and contexts.

This is the road that leads to Pluralism in Wittgenstein's work. Seeing that there is no essential fact of the matter in our descriptions and that they are all value laden, we can appreciate the fact that there can be other descriptions, other pictures where everything fits in, albeit in different colours and under different shades. Once the road to

[66] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, 195.

Pluralism is open this way, then there is a possibility that the grammar of our decisions may change. Thus, as autonomous individuals, we become freer by becoming conscious of the cultural elements and the value-ladenness that shape our choices since we come to believe that were we to hear other stories and be raised by them, our choices could all have been different. In order to seek for the ways in which others do things, one must understand that his concepts are congenial to his thinking and by the same token, he has to admit their contingency and predetermination.

For example if one comes from a culture where "asking for help, or talking about one's problems" is considered immoral, then this will affect the way he shapes his ends as well as what he takes to be "good" or what a "good life" consists in, and in turn his essential interests to maintain that Good Life that he finds valuable. If one has a net of proverbs highlighting the value of "maintaining one's public image no matter what", then this could have been seen as an impediment to the individual's autonomy. The justification behind that worry would be that it is never possible for a decision to be neutral and freed from values, and this interwovenness of values in the form of proverbs or traditions at the background of each evaluated desire, each decision taken, might be seen to pose an impediment to one's autonomy. How is one to be free from the convictions that bind his decisions somewhat unconsciously? By seeing how others do it, not necessarily by argumentation, as Appiah states in his recent essay called "The Case for Contamination".

> When we make judgements, after all, it's rarely because we have applied well-thought-out principles to a set of facts and deduced an answer. Our efforts to justify what we have done—or what we plan to do—are typically made up after the event, rationalizations of what we have decided intuitively to do. And a good deal of what we intuitively take to be right, we take to be right just because it is what we are used to. That does not mean, however, that we cannot become accustomed to doing things differently.
>
> Consider the practice of foot-binding in China, which persisted for

> a thousand years—and was largely eradicated within a generation. The anti-foot-binding campaign, in the 1910's and 1920's, did circulate facts about the disadvantages of bound feet, but those couldn't have come as news to most people. Perhaps more effective was the campaign's emphasis that no other country went in for the practice; in the world at large, then, China was "losing face" because of it. (To China's cultural preservationists, of course, the fact that the practice was peculiar to the region was entirely a mark in its favour.) Natural-foot societies were formed, with members forswearing the practice and further pledging that their sons would not marry women with bound feet. As the movement took hold, scorn was heaped on older women with bound feet, and they were forced to endure the agonies of unbinding. What had been beautiful became ugly; ornamentation became disfigurement. The appeal to reason can explain neither the custom nor its abolition.[67]

People do not ordinarily come to believe things or change their habits through argumentation, so it is wrong to think that they can be corrected to believe the reverse or convert to the alternative habit only through argumentation.[68] It is most often the case that people change their practices by seeing how others do what they do. What makes this possible is that (i) one realizes the value-ladenness of his account of the world and his decisions accordingly, and (ii) allows other stories to influence him. However, the influence exerted on an individual does not necessarily have to be in the form of convincing him through an argument; communication that will allow the other to observe enough regularity in the other's behaviour to be able to learn something from it will suffice, which again renders communication a must for expanding the scope of choices of the individuals. An expansion in the scope of choices is what brings about freer individuals in the long run.

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[67] Ibid.

[68] In *Culture and Value*, Wittgenstein comments that: "A proof of God's existence ought really to be something by means of which one could convince oneself that God exists. But I think that what *believers* who have furnished such proofs have wanted to do is, give their 'belief' an intellectual analysis and foundation, although they themselves would never have come to believe as a result of such proofs. Perhaps one could 'convince someone that God exists' by means of a certain kind of upbringing, by shaping his life in such and such a way" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, ed. by G.H. von Wright and Heikky Nyman, trans. by Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) : 85e.)

Therefore, it is the understanding of language and culture not as "constraints on", but "conditions of", the possibility of freedom and hence autonomy that can provide any Culturalist theory with a justification of Culturalism arguing that culture is the context of choice for an individual. On the other hand, the temptation to escape to an inner world of no constraints *is* the underlying paradigm of autonomy even if the political liberal theories do not entertain this attitude of radical reflexivity involved in the traditional concept of autonomy. Autonomy as the inner hierarchical order, the idea that "I am autonomous when *I* rule *me*", is to be rejected firstly because it is simply talking about an illusory sphere of freedom, because there is no "I" or an act of "ruling" prior to language and culture: *language games* in Wittgensteinian terminology, let alone there being a *me* to be ruled over. The language of *ruling oneself* should be replaced by deciding what to do, which rule to follow in each language game one is embedded in. This is not a deterministic picture but an acknowledging of how the world is and situating oneself in this world as the doer of deeds, player of language games, someone who lives and can not help but make grammatical remarks when talking about states of affairs thinking that he is citing empirical facts. Secondly, the hierarchical vision of autonomy should be rejected because that is what makes autonomy a kind of atomism and individualism.

If what we propose here as the presuppositions of the autonomous individual are taken at face value, namely that (i) he needs to be embedded in a cultural context to be autonomous and (ii) he needs to have both other rules and ways of application of rules in his language game and rules and language games of other cultural contexts at his disposal to be able to enlarge his scope of choices, then it will be seen that this can only be done by enhancing the sphere of communication within the society. That is how individuals and societies have historically overcome their impediments to a full

appreciation of personal autonomy: their ignorance of choices as well as the ignorance of contexts in which choosing makes sense.

If we are going to make our demand for Group-Specific rights demand on the argument from culture being the context of choice by showing that a group-member is perfectly able to be autonomous without his context of choice—as the hierarchical conception of inner autonomy suggests—we need to stop and think there about the incompatibility of this conception of inner autonomy within the general context of the autonomous individual. What is in the 'inner' is merely the capacity to become autonomous, not autonomy itself. For ruling needs to be instantiated in an action, in a language game of sorts. The autonomous individual reigns in the context of the life forms getting articulated in many ways criss-crossed in language games.

Until now we have tried to put forward how it is the case that one's culture forms the context of his freedom. We have formulated autonomy to be the ability to choose the rules to follow in language games within which every individual is situated. These context-dependent choices and decisions of the autonomous individual presuppose the actions and reactions of the Others he is in conversation with. Hence the only constraint on the autonomy of the individual would be not having a culture but on the contrary being denied this very context or being denied the opportunity to learn new language games or maintain a sphere of communication where this is possible. The account of autonomy as the ability to choose which rule to follow or how to combine rules—yet by following the rule of the language game for introducing something new—in a new way in language games presupposes a sphere of communication of which doors are open to welcome new players as well as the games *they* know and *we* do not.

Another difficulty that arises with the idea of the autonomous individual as a strong evaluator with an inner hierarchy is that you need to have a picture with non-

fuzzy edges about who you are and what you want, etc. It is quite a first person picture of one leading his own life. However, if one is a totality of fragmentary “I”s embedded in a multiplicity of language games, then we may think of his identity as the non identifiable set of these particular situated “I”s instantiated in the multiplicity of language games he plays. Rather than being the strong evaluator of his desires and his second-order desires, he is a hopelessly fragmentary battlefield of forces overlapping each other in that he has no essence to be described as such but he is a network of “I”s autonomously deciding which rule to follow in each context within a language game.

It is here that we turn our attention towards the second tenet which is supposed to justify the claims for Group-Specific Rights and Culturalist Policies. The first tenet was that “Culture is the context of freedom for an individual”, that members of a Culture should be endowed with certain rights that make it possible for them to live and flourish within that Culture. Now, the question arises as to how members of Cultures are to be identified and this brings us to the issue of the second tenet: “The Value of Cultural Membership“. The blur concerning the identity of an individual or a culture brings us to discussing whether the argument from “The Value of Cultural Membership” is one that can provide justification for the demand for group-specific rights. The difficulty arises from there being no clear-cut demarcation between where one culture starts and another ends and the lack of sufficient criteria to identify a person with a Culture. How is the hopelessly fragmentary individual to fit within a cultural identity without leaving the majority of his constituent fragments outside the cultural identity? At this point, Marina Sbisá’s Radical Reading of Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance” metaphor will be of help to us, to understand who to identify as members of a culture and what the nature of this *membership* consists in.

Wittgenstein, through PI 65 to 76, argues that there is nothing that is common to all languages, apart from there being some overlapping and crisscrossing features like what holds between members of a family. In the case of a family, there is nothing common to all members of the family, but between the individual members of a family one can trace a path of resemblance that runs through all members of the family such that each resembles each in a certain aspect that diverges when the members involved in the relationship change but the relationship itself nevertheless persists as a vague form of binding. He gives the example of games and while showing that there is nothing that is common to all games, he claims that a concept of game holds them all together as if relatives on a chain of family resemblance

> Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all—but that they are *related* to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships, that we call them all "language".[69]
> Consider for example the proceedings that we call "games"…Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games'".-but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all.- For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that…And we can go through the many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear. And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.[70]
> I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, hair, temperament, etc., etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. –And I shall say: 'games' form a family.[71]

This looking and examining into the way things resemble and diverge from each other as a method of determining what binds them all (as *the fluid intersection that is*

[69] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 65.
[70] Ibid., § 66.
[71] Ibid., § 67.

the only constant in counting their common properties, namely the continuous overlapping of these fibres)[72] is not exclusive to the concern about the nature of language for Wittgenstein. Attending to the different uses of how we employ words, sentences and thus getting a better picture of what our relationship with them and our confusion concerning them consists in, is the therapy Wittgenstein attempts to provide for all such philosophical ailments. In a way, he can be said to be employing the same method of psychotherapy to our philosophical habits (such as the *idea of perfect delimitation as* Marina Sbisá puts it)[73] and unveils the background in which such cognitions occur. What is likely to happen then, is a change in those very cognitions that are the results of our confusion.

Against Cultural Identities

I will get back to this point of Wittgenstein's therapeutic activity in philosophy; however, for the time being, I would like to say that Marina Sbisá, in her 2006 paper "Against Cultural Identities"[74] is after such a therapy for the idea of perfectly delimited Cultural Identities, and her method is to use the "Family Resemblance" metaphor in putting forward her thesis that Cultural Identity is no more than "a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing".

> I am interested in exploring how family resemblance applies to cultural identity and, beyond it, intercultural relations….In the thematic progression of the *Investigations*, I am inclined to see the family resemblance sequence of paragraphs as continuing the initial attack on meaning as denotation, by transferring it to predicates: just as the

[72] "But if someone wished to say: "There is something common to all these constructions—namely the disjunction of all their common properties"—I should reply: Now you are only playing with words. One might as well say: "Something runs through the whole thread—namely the continuous overlapping of these fibres"." (Ibid.)
[73] Marina Sbisá, "Against Cultural Identity: a Family Resemblance Perspective on Intercultural Relations," (*Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog: Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenststein Gesellschaft,* edited Georg Gasser, Christian Kanzian and Edmund Runggaldier, (Kirchberg am Wechsel: Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, 2006): 296-298.)
[74] Ibid.

> meaning of a name is not the object it denotes, the meaning of a predicate is not the set of objects which the concept expressed by the predicate applies to…There is no essence of language, nor of a game, ultimately because it is search for essence which is senseless; this is so, because of how language works and what meanings or concepts do *not* consist in.
> There are various ways of using family resemblance to criticize socially accepted beliefs and expectations about cultural identities. A first kind of use comes in when we realize that individuals that are said to fall under a certain collective identitary denomination of a cultural kind never match exactly its alleged defining features…This approach, however, does not deny the reality of cultural identities: their nature becomes that of psycho-social models. People might still feel inadequate if they fail to perfectly match one such model.
>
> A second kind of use comes in when we realize that collective identitary denominations of the cultural kind do not correspond to perfectly defined models, but are themselves grounded in family resemblance relations. The use of family resemblance proposed above focused on the cultural identity of individuals, and therefore on instances or tokens of cultural identity as opposed to types. But types of cultural identity are themselves difficult to define and delimit…In this way, we start seeing that no cultural identity is completely isolated. But this approach can still allow for the idea that there are clear-cut distinctions, if not among peripheral cases, at least between prototypical cores.
>
> But a third step can still be taken, especially if we see family resemblance as deconstructing the very notion of a concept, thus depriving concepts of any kind of existence *qua* things. In this perspective, cultural identities (at the type level) are no more existent things than concepts. There is nothing more about 'being a C...' apart from collocating oneself, along each of a certain number of the relevant dimensions of cultural identity, in a position similar to that of other individuals accepted as 'C's by the relevant audience. Descriptions of types of cultural identity ("A C is...") are not descriptions, more or less accurate, of something existing, but either context-driven generalizations from individuals accepted as Cs or contributions to the construction of stereotypes or models, which in turn do not aim at reflecting reality, but have a more or less apparent normative function.[75]

The three tenets that Sbisá's Radical Reading of Family resemblance metaphor contains are:

(1) The individuals, namely, the tokens of cultural identity, do not quite fit in what the concept of cultural identity delimits, i.e., cultural identity as a type.

[75] Ibid., 296.

(2) The very concept of cultural identity itself was built upon those individuals with fragmentary characteristics some of which fit and some of which do not fit the given "description".

(3) From the second tenet, we come to understand that there has never been a sufficient condition to form a concept of cultural identity, i.e., types have themselves been built upon non-typical tokens later to fit the types, so a form of circularity is involved in the description of cultural identity as a type that undermines the very possibility of forming a concept of cultural identity. However as the very notion of family resemblance suggests, a cultural identity, e.g., "Turkishness" as a concept has no definite description, no essence but it is a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing.

Thus, if we take the example of Turkish Cultural Identity, we conclude from the first tenet that there are no Turks that fit the description, from the second tenet that Turkish Cultural Identity was built upon those Turks who did not quite fit the description but that the Turks were denoted under this identity anyway for practical purposes. Finally, an examination of the third tenet shows us that the very idea of family resemblance suggests that there never was a descriptive feature in the grammar of "Turkishness" anyway but rather, the concept was merely suggesting that, once we were committed to abandon our search for the elements in the extension of the concept of "Turkishness", what the concept of "Turkishness" at hand would prompt us to do would be, to look at all the crisscrossing patterns of similarity and to allude from then on to the richness of diversification suggested by the concept of "Turkishness". Hence, we could, through the third tenet, come to understand that the cultural identity at stake is

merely *an area with vague boundaries* in the same way that an indistinct photograph continues to be a picture of a person.[76]

The second tenet that cultural identities were themselves formed by gathering the partly fitting token identities together can be read as an argument from the contingency of cultural identities as well. As Kymlicka explains in his account of defining Cultures, creating a societal culture is one of the most basic forms of nation-building and as the name "building" suggests, these cultures are *created* for practical purposes such as maintaining the society as a whole, securing equality of opportunity through institutions such as public education or establishing a sense of solidarity among citizens

> A societal culture is a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared language. I have called these 'societal cultures' to emphasize that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices. Such 'societal cultures' did not always exist, and their creation is intimately linked with the process of modernization (Gellner 1983). Modernization involves the diffusion throughout a society of a common culture, including a standardized language, embodied in common economic, political and educational institutions. This occurs for a variety of reasons. It is a functional requirement of a modern economy, with its need for a mobile, educated and literate work-force. Second, it reflects the need for a high level of solidarity within modern democratic states. The sort of solidarity essential for a welfare state requires that citizens have a strong sense of common identity and common membership, so that they will make sacrifices for each other, and this common identity is assumed to require (or at least be facilitated by) a common language and history. Third, the diffusion of a common culture seems required by the modern commitment to equality of opportunity…The capacity and motivation to form and maintain such a distinct culture is characteristic of 'nations' or 'peoples' (i.e. culturally distinct, geographically concentrated and institutionally complete societies.) Societal cultures, then, tend to be national cultures.[77]

[76] Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 71.
[77] Kymlicka, *Multicultural*, 77.

What this suggests is that societal cultures are *created* for practical purposes; had there been different purposes, culture would have different features, which all the more justifies Sbisá in concluding that Cultural Identities were themselves formed from tokens (people) the common feature of which is just a complicated network of overlapping resemblances. There is nothing common to the members of the Societal Culture; furthermore, they *are* made *members* out of practical requirements. Hence, to summarise the whole idea of the network between the individual, his cultural context and cultural membership, we can make our point by saying: "While the cultural context that one is born into and lives in is his context of freedom, that context of freedom is an area with vague boundaries that denies any attempt at perfect delimitation."

The above mentioned contingency concerning cultures, namely defining cultures, has important bearings on the issue of individuating cultures that Kymlicka addresses in response to Waldron, who is against cultural identities as a repository of "cultural membership" but is in favour of culture as a context of freedom. On the problem of individuating cultures, Kymlicka writes

> So far I have been taking for granted that there are such things as "separate" and "distinct" cultures, and that it makes sense to ask whether there is one or two or more of them in a particular country. But is this realistic? Some people deny that it is meaningful to talk about individuating cultures in this way. According to Jeremy Waldron, the project of individuating societal cultures presupposes that cultures are somehow isolated and impervious to external influences. Yet cultures have influenced each other so much, he says, that there is no meaningful way to say where one culture ends and another begins. Indeed, there are no such things as cultures, just innumerable cultural sources, without any "structure" connecting them or underlying them. Waldron accepts that the meaningfulness of options depends on the fact that they have cultural meanings. But he rejects the assumption that the options available to a particular individual must come from a *particular* culture. As he puts it: '(The fact) that people need cultural materials does not show that what people need is a 'rich and secure' cultural structure'. It shows the importance of access to a variety of stories and roles, but it does

> not…show the importance of something called membership in a culture.[78]

Contrary to what Waldron thinks, Kymlicka is committed to the idea that cultural membership does matter on the basis of his belief that there *are* distinct cultures and denying group-specific rights to minorities on the basis of the untenability of the idea of cultural identity results in minorities' disintegration into the majority culture. The hitherto mentioned disintegration would only be the case if denying the existence of cultural identities would commit us to the neglect of cultural fragments, which we argue have dissolved into the overlapping thread of resemblances of the personal choices, habits and life styles, etc. people pursue. However, this does not necessarily have to be the result of denying cultural identities. If the borders of the context of freedom, i.e., culture, of each individual, can not be drawn, that ambiguity as to the lack of criteria to demarcate where a culture begins and another starts must be the foundation of Liberal Culturalism. The point is, if the meaningfulness of options for an individual *is* what is meant by context of freedom (of choice) and if this context captures cultural fragments from every person in that society, then the way to foster individual freedom should be to accommodate all the cultural fragments in the societal culture through institutions and policies which would involve non-isolationist Group-Specific rights such as polyethnic rights.

The argument against cultural identities loosens the ties of cultural membership while continuing to admit that there *are* cultures, but it is our very approach toward the concept of culture that is being challenged. Rather than seeing culture as a concept that denotes a group of people that identify themselves and want to be recognized as the extension of that concept, culture is to be seen as an area with vague boundaries that is under a constant process of making and remaking. This has important bearings on the

[78] Ibid, 102.

argument from "the value of cultural membership" which is supposed to justify the demand for group-specific rights on the part of the minorities. Culture as a context of freedom does not depend on any accomplishment from the individual, since what is given such as language and a certain worldview that this language and history has brought forth are such that an individual's relationship to them is one that a person can not transcend and one that he will always be embedded in.

However, the idea of cultural membership suggests a more active relationship than that of culture being the context of freedom when the question of how one deals with one's culture is at stake. It suggests a more active relationship, because cultural membership is basically about what one identifies oneself with. This is what theorists of Culturalism have in mind when they talk about the value of cultural membership. So, cultural membership is supposed to give one a secure sense of belonging since it is argued that it does not involve accomplishment, such that one does not need to do anything to become a member of the culture but one rather *finds* oneself in it

> Why are the bonds of language and culture so strong for most people...Margalit and Raz argue that membership in a societal culture…is crucial to people's well being for two reasons: The first reason is…that cultural membership provides meaningful options in the sense that "familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable". [My note: This is the tenet of culture being a context of choice]…but also because of the role of cultural membership in people's self-identity. Cultural membership has a "high social profile", in the sense that it affects how others perceive and respond to us, which in turn shapes our self-identity. Moreover, national identity is particularly suited to serving as the "primary foci of identification", because it is based on belonging, not accomplishment…Hence cultural identity provides an "anchor for [people's] self-identification and the safety of effortless secure belonging". But this in turn means that people's self-respect is bound up with the esteem in which their national group is held. If a culture is not generally respected, then the dignity and self-respect of its members will also be threatened.[79]

[79] Ibid., 89 (Kymlicka on *Margalit and Raz*).

I suspect that cultural membership involves accomplishment. I think that this argument is formulated due to a slight conflation as can be detected in the above quote of cultural membership with one's having his culture as a context of choice (and life). For at the level of one's finding oneself in a Culture or as a member of a culture automatically, this means his insertion into some already existent context. However, at the level of identifying oneself with a culture, if this self-identification is what is meant by cultural membership, it can turn into a pretty demanding task to accomplish as there would be norms about who counts and who does not count as a member and what a (typical) member of that Culture does and what he doesn't or is not supposed to do. So, if cultural membership amounts to identifying oneself with a culture, this self-identification will presuppose that the member is not a passive receiver of the context that he finds himself in and almost unconsciously shaped by, but that he is an active participant that shapes the very features and boundaries of membership to one's own culture as he himself constitutes an exemplar of it.

However, our account on the basis of Wittgenstein's family resemblance metaphor has shown us that while there *are* cultures, there are no cultural identities in the sense that one can be a member of them, but the role of culture is such that it delineates an unbounded area which is the background that gives meaning to the life and choices, in other words. Actions and freedom of the individuals, whose personal identities are shaped by the overlapping and criss-crossing resemblances which thread on thread form, i.e., constitute the background of meaning, so to speak.

Therefore, the family resemblance perspective on cultural identities, while deconstructing cultural identities, also deconstructs the "role of cultural membership" and its claim to provide justification for group-specific rights, since culture, by its very

nature, resists all sorts of delimitations that would thus denote and denominate members and non-members of a culture.

CHAPTER FOUR

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW ACCOUNT OF AUTONOMY AND FRAGMENTARY IDENTITIES

To understand why language and culture matter to people in conscious or unconscious ways, so to speak, would be of profound help and guidance to any political theory concerned with accommodating ethno-cultural heterogeneity within the societal culture through institutions, laws, organizations, specially designed rights, etc. which aims at furnishing the individuals within its scope of moral ontology with their essential needs. Nevertheless, it is not easy to understand the nature of attachment an individual has to his *own* culture, no matter on whichever side of the unbounded area called culture, the constituents of this attachment lie.

> I suspect that the causes of this attachment lie deep in the human condition, tied up with the way humans as cultural creatures need to make sense of their world, and that a full explanation would involve aspects of psychology, sociology, linguistics, the philosophy of mind, and even neurology.[80]

[80] Ibid., 90.

Wittgenstein's Method: From Theory to Therapy

What I have done so far has been carried out with an intent to provide a clarification on the nature of this attachment to "culture" arguing through Wittgensteinian lines, bearing in mind that in a Wittgensteinian fashion, clarification means redefining the concepts at hand and preparing for the conceptual change and the new philosophical vision this *investigation* will bring about. A Wittgensteinian reading of culture and what the relationship of an individual with culture consists in is possible and helpful especially when we equip ourselves with an understanding of Wittgenstein that reads his work simultaneously as a work on Philosophy of Mind as well as a work on Philosophy of Language. This will seem very obvious to the reader once we grasp his idea that thought and language are inseparable, for in this case any study that delves into the nature of language will necessarily have delved into the nature of thought as well. Before getting back to our arguments on the Wittgensteinian insight for an alternative concept of autonomy and an alternative approach to the concept of culture, I would like to draw the reader's attention to a more general aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy, namely his method and aim in doing philosophy, since I believe these will justify a general claim about his thought that inspired us to this project in the first place.

Wittgenstein can be viewed as *the philosopher* whose total aim and method was of showing the social and cultural context in which people live, become human beings, learn to think and live, namely he aims to show the background against which everything in one's life becomes meaningful and he does so through a therapeutic method of clarification.[81] He takes a concept about the essence of which there is much philosophical and theoretical confusion and by showing the many ways in which this

[81] "What is your aim in philosophy? To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle." (Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 309.)

concept is *used* in the everyday life of the society, namely by showing its *context*, clears away the confusion through dissolving the concept into its uses in situations. We have seen throughout this text, for example, how he applied this to the concept of intentionality which served as a way for us to deconstruct the modern Ideal of Autonomy.

However, this, no doubt, is another cause of confusion for those who seek to find the essence of concepts: What do they denote? What do they delimit? However, Wittgenstein's very method amounts to showing that there are no such essences but all there is to the meaning, the essence of the concept is its use, context. In PI 371, he writes: "Essence is expressed in Grammar".[82] This is where his method in philosophy is likened by some[83] to the method of Psychotherapy, albeit on a more social, and hence a much broader level, as if what is alluded to and illuminated in each therapy is cognitions and the implicit unconscious of the whole society (that uses the concept) as opposed to those of an individual undergoing psychotherapy. So his method can be called somewhat like a 'Sociotherapy' in this respect. That is why he proves to be the fittest for a study on the nature of how culture gets to be the context of choice for an individual as well as for the society as a whole who shapes and is shaped by that context constantly.

If we require penetrating better to the way his method functions as a therapy, we will need to remember his remarks on grammar. Because, it is in grammar that the implicit—collective—unconscious is situated and it is grammar that (when conflated with empirical facts) forms the origin of mistaken cognitions, which are to be redirected through *philosophical investigations* to their correct signposts in grammar by

[82] Ibid., § 371.
[83] I am indebted to Michael Maurer for drawing my attention to the similarity between the method of *psychotherapy* and Wittgenstein's style of philosophizing: *investigating* concepts, language and thought for the purpose of freeing the individual from the bewitchment of past language use.

remembering each time: "*This is* how we use it!" or "*This is* how it happens, emerges in life!". Thus he goes on to describe how "grammar" is to be understood as the background as well as the backbone of *meaning*, meaning being the combination of words which does not serve to receive a "stare and gape" from the one who hears this combination, but which functions in a definite way, while remaining within the bounds of sense, namely within the domain of the game that includes sense and excludes senselessness.[84] However, the boundary itself does not show what it is being drawn for, nor does it say until when this combination of words will be withdrawn from circulation. So there is room for change in the grammar, though a very slow one. Grammar, in a sense, can be said to be arbitrary, but it is as arbitrary as the imaginability of what forms part of, and what is excluded by, our form of life as living and interacting human beings.

> Even if a proposition is conceived as a picture of a possible state of affairs, still the most that the proposition can do is what a painting or relief or film does: and so it can at any rate not set up what is not the case. So does it depend wholly on our grammar what will be called (logically) possible and what not, i.e. what that grammar permits?"- But surely that is arbitrary!- Is it arbitrary?- It is not every sentence-like formation that we know how to do something with, not every technique has an application in our life; and when we are tempted in philosophy to count some quite useless thing as a proposition, that is often because we have not considered its application sufficiently.[85]

Hence, his saying that "essence is expressed in grammar".[86] In line with this, Wittgenstein draws two conclusions. One is that, what we take to be the essence of a thing so far, is nothing more than "how we use it" given the circumstances of this particular life that we are leading. So there are no essences; to requote him: "What is to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—*forms of life*."[87] So, when we think we

[84] Look up Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 498 and § 499.
[85] Ibid., § 520.
[86] Ibid., § 371.
[87] Ibid., § 192.

are describing the essence of a thing, hence when we think we are forming an empirical proposition about a state of affairs, if we are involved in explicating, say, what the descriptive properties of an X is, we are in fact involved in a grammatical activity. We are making a grammatical remark about X, about how we use it, not why we use it that way.[88] In this respect, since we can not conceive of non-X being the case or the state of affairs we ascribe to X not being the case, describing what X is, completely drops out of the conversation as nonsense, such that, to say 'if X was not so, we could not talk about it this way', presupposes we know what being able to talk about something amounts to.

> The rules of grammar may be called "arbitrary", if that is to mean that the *aim* of the grammar is nothing but that of the language. If someone says "If our language had not this grammar, it could not express these facts" —it should be asked what "*could*" means here.[89]

The many ways in which Wittgenstein shows his conception of grammar to be the bounds of sense that determine the rules of a language game, the transgression of which would require a change in forms of life, prompts him to conclude that on many occasions when we think we are forming an empirical remark, we in fact are making a grammatical remark, the negation of which would require us to transcend our forms of life and thus he is showing that it equally transcends our form of life to *think of* the grammatical remark we make; it should rather be taken as a remark which exemplifies the way we talk about the phenomenon in question.

So it can be said that Wittgenstein's therapy is his "Anti-essentialism" that renders the thought that "language functions in one way: to express thoughts" a futile and senseless one. So the therapy is active when a sentence like "Every Rod has a length" is no longer taken to be an empirical remark about "how rods are" but a

[88] "Grammar does not tell us how language must be constructed in order to fulfil its purpose, in order to have such-and –such an effect on human beings. It only describes and in no way explains the use of signs." (Ibid., § 496.)
[89] Ibid., § 497.

grammatical remark, in the sense that thinking of a Rod not having a length is merely senseless.

Culture in a Wittgensteinian Fashion

What now may be considered as a big jump from this lengthy discussion on Wittgenstein's understanding of Grammar is the conclusions that can be drawn from it on a larger and smaller scale concerning the remark that "Culture is the context of freedom" for an individual, that it is a grammatical remark, the negation of which transcends our understanding of an individual as a conscious human being, i.e., transcends our forms of life. Hence, what has to be accepted, the given, is the form of life where individuals become who they are, before they know it, embedded in the language and culture they were born into. Let us first discuss the implications of that on a larger scale as a justification of certain aspects of Liberal Culturalism. At the same time, when culture, as such, is taken as a pre-existing form of determination on one's human condition, i.e., on one's existence as a human being, a very important and puzzling question as to why it is one's *own* culture that Culturalism should seek to accommodate can be answered. Kymlicka asks this question in *Multicultural Citizenship.*

> But why do the members of a national minority need access to their *own* culture? Why not let minority cultures disintegrate, so long as we ensure the members have access to the majority culture (e.g. by teaching them the majority language and history)?[90]

By raising these questions, Liberal Culturalism gives a good basis to attend to the many ways in which the debate on minority rights becomes a debate about the

[90] Kymlicka, *Multicultural,* 84. A few lines below, he addresses the same question: "Is individual choice tied to membership in one's *own* culture, or is it sufficient for people to have access to some or other culture?"

human condition. If one's own culture is so inseparable from one, in such a way that being conscious of it or valuing it as such transcends him, the question whether one's individual choice is tied to his membership in his *own* culture is itself a senseless question. In the sense that he can not become a non-member of his culture, he is not a member of it either. Thus, it is important to remember, in the Wittgensteinian fashion, what makes the question of culture, a question that makes sense for us. It is our very circumspection towards culture, that in and through it we gain our meta-position toward it; culture is that which makes us possible to ask questions about the merits of culture. My point is that one must have a culture, a language first to have a sense of culture, i.e., to make the discourse on vices and virtues of one's own culture imaginable and available to one. Namely, one must first have climbed up the ladder to be able to kick it away.[91]

That brings us back to evaluating the two central claims made by defenders of minority rights, namely "that *mainstream institutions are biased in favour of the majority, and that the effect of this bias is to harm important interests related to personal agency and identity* concluding that *we might expect minorities to feel excluded from 'difference-blind' mainstream institutions and to feel alienated from, and distrustful of, the political process*".[92] The claim of Liberalism to neutrality is such that the state should be in a neutral position with regard to the ethno-cultural heritage of each individual, that this neutrality must be manifest in the *difference-blind institutions;* and the Liberal Culturalist position is that there is no such neutrality, that the state is always tilted towards the majority culture when its institutions are at stake. Thus, Liberal Culturalists are justified in demanding for Group-Specific rights to re-adjust the imbalance between majority and minorities within the state, since an egalitarian system

[91] Compare: Wittgenstein, *Tractatus*, 6.54.
[92] Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 36.

should endow its citizens with a just distribution of rights, and this equality in question is just what seems to be lacking in the case of so-called "neutral" states with their so-called "difference-blind" institutions.

However, what Liberal Culturalists take to be the solution, namely giving minorities the same rights to self-govern, seeing this as an alternative process of nation building by the minority who were absorbed in the societal culture of the majority before as a matter of the majority's own process of nation building, does not necessarily have to be the only option to settle the inequality in favour of the minority. I will discuss the cosmopolitanist solution that I think better fits the claim from neutrality at length with regard to under-representation and transnational institutions a little later.

First, let us discuss what harm is done if a minority is denied access to their *own* culture. This is to get back to the discussion on culture being the context of freedom for an individual. First, there is the instrumental argument for cultural rights, that persons become freer or more autonomous when they are endowed with the right to access their *own* culture.

> Some theorists provide a more instrumental argument for cultural rights, emphasizing the role that cultural membership plays in promoting individual *freedom* or autonomy. On this view, one's culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable, so that if the options available in one's culture diminish, so too does one's autonomy. Minority rights protect these cultural contexts of choice.[93]

We have discussed in Chapter Three concerning autonomy and the state that interfering with the content of the narratives on the basis of which one makes decisions and in terms of which one has a sense of himself, is interfering with one's autonomy. There are certain rights of the individual such as speaking her native language, learning one's native language and inheriting the relevant historical narratives of that culture, the

[93] Ibid, 46.

denial of which would require that the state interferes with the autonomy of the individual. Denying the group-specific rights that would make these possible, might transform the individual in such a way as to create *somebody else* from him than who he would have been if he were given the rights he is entitled to have, such as speaking and getting education in his own language and learning about the inherited customs and traditions. According to Liberal Culturalism, no egalitarian Political Liberal theory can continue to preserve its commitment to the equality of individuals in choosing and revising their ends without giving them the group-specific rights necessary in that respect. What are those certain rights so indispensable to one's personhood, then? Denying, for example, an individual the right to speak his own language, or initially denying the newborn infant of an immigrant family the right to get an education in his native language, does seem to be interfering with one's personal autonomy. Asking the baby to become a human being in another language than his mother's is downright interfering with his constitutive ends on the part of the state, in such a way that it amounts to exerting a metaphysical violence on the individual by saying: "*we* decide what the constituents of your ontology will be and the narratives underlying them" since language is the medium where thought and thus autonomous decisions occur.

On the smaller scale of the discussion of this predetermination, namely discussing what "Culture is the context of freedom for an individual" implies on the individual scale, required us to attend to what an individual's autonomy consists of as we did in Chapter Three and thus to draw conclusions concerning the pre-requisites of individual freedom. This is where our discussion leads us to concluding that once one's access to one's own culture is secured by the state through institutions and policies, then the next step on the agenda of the state to enable citizens to become free, equal and

autonomous should be to enhance communication and to support that there be a diversity of cultures within the state.

In Chapter Three, we have seen that what is involved in autonomy, namely in "ruling oneself", is not an activity one carries out in isolation from others in his "ruling part", but rather a dialogical process that manifests itself in a multiplicity of language games like making decisions, comparing values, learning about new narratives, replacing a mistaken cognition with a correct one, admiring an ideal, and so on. One might be alone and employing all these language games in his inner monologue, talking to himself, but one should not be misled into thinking that talking to oneself involves a doubling of consciousness, as if one is talking to an inner mirror. It is the "others" who he is in contact with, *in himself,* on the basis of whose thoughts he changes his mind; or it is exactly by seeing how "others" do things and learning what their narratives are that he acquires a new choice. An individual's rationality more than anything is manifest in his ability to learn and a mark of learning is being able to apply the newly acquired concepts in the appropriate contexts and to combine them with the existing concepts in due order. So one becomes freer by having more choices. That does not mean that one becomes freer by making more choices, one does not become freer by, say, marrying five times, just because he is able to do so. However, being able to divorce, as an option, makes one freer such that, the choices, instead of being between remaining married *willingly* and remaining married *unwillingly*, will be between remaining married *willingly* and divorcing. A closer look at the former situation will reveal that in the case of "remaining married unwillingly" there is no choice involved, it is simply a passive act of enduring an external coercion which does mean that having an inadequate scope of choices does deprive one of his autonomy or decrease one's freedom of choice

on certain occasions especially when there *are* no other choices to be made. Hence, the value of the diversity of cultures.

The Value of Cultural Diversity

In this section we will see whether the argument from the value of cultural diversity suffices as a basis for demanding Group-Specific rights and whether commitment to the value of cultural diversity could be explained as an instrumental concern that aims at securing the essential interests of the autonomous individual by expanding his range of choices. "The value of diversity within a culture is that it creates more options for each individual, and expands her range of choices."[94]

However, Kymlicka thinks that value of cultural diversity argument which supports enlarging the scope of choices within the society does not give enough ground to base minority rights debate on. It is supplementary according to him, but not sufficient, since it does not say why the access to the minority culture but not to, say, Ancient Greek Culture should be the concern of the state through its institutions and policies.

> There are many ways of promoting diversity, and it seems likely that protecting national minorities involves more cost to the majority than other possible ways. For example, a society could arguably gain more diversity at less cost by increasing immigration from a variety of countries than by protecting national minorities. The diversity argument can not explain why we have an obligation to sustain the particular sort of diversity created by the presence of a viable, self-governing national minority.[95]

There is another problem which Kymlicka associates with the argument from the value of cultural diversity, which is the point that, just because cultural diversity is

[94] Kymlicka, *Muticultural*, 121.
[95] Ibid, 122.

intrinsically valuable and increases the range of options of an individual, this can as well turn into an argument in favour of the preservation of "cultures" and become a justification for an external restriction on the minority that they should maintain their authenticity, i.e., their traditional culture, so that the society will continue to avail of the diversity of cultures. When we consider what Kymlicka cites as the third argument from the Liberal Culturalist Camp, in favour of minority rights, we come across the same argument from Value of Cultural Diversities in which cultures are viewed as distinct repositories which would make the argument from diversity vulnerable to the attacks stated above.

> Finally some people emphasize the intrinsic value of the *diverse cultures* present in a society. Different cultures are seen as the repository of unique forms of human creativity and accomplishment and to let cultures die out is to lose something of intrinsic value. Minority rights preserve these intrinsically valuable cultures.[96]

However, all these objections supervene on one particular reading of culture, namely of culture being a perfectly delimited area, hence the cultural identity of the minority nation will be one with certain descriptive features, the preservation *as such* of which requires and justifies claims to self-government of the minority nation. So the idea is that the borders of such a delimited area of *cultural structure* can be perfectly drawn such that it can suddenly be vulnerable to external restriction as if it is more or less a stable structure. We have shown throughout the "family resemblance" reading of cultures, (through the therapeutic argument style of Wittgenstein of directing the reader's attention to the "grammar" and to how culture is used in daily life) that neither do cultures have such descriptive borders in which they fall and exclude non-members, nor do their *members,* on the basis of which the cultural identity (in this case the

[96] Kymlicka, *Vernacular,* 48.

minority nation) was formed, show any signs of carrying a common set of properties which are common to all members of the minority nation more than a complicated network of overlapping family resemblances. That brings about the consequence that, whenever one ventures to draw a fence around the minority nation and argues that their culture is so authentic that, out of respect and concern for cultural diversity, it should not be left to die out, then the difficulty he encounters would be that he wouldn't know where to construct the fence, i.e., where the border between two cultures lies, so as to determine where one ends and the other starts.

As for the first objection, that the value of cultural diversity alone does not provide sufficient theoretical ground to demand minority rights but can be seen as a supplementary argument, I agree with Kymlicka that if a concern for cultural diversity was not complemented with a concern for equality, the question as to why it is access to one's *own* culture that matters, as well as access to, say, American Hip-hop culture, could not be answered. However, once the right of one's access to his *own* culture is secured by the instrumental argument from "culture being the context of choice" claiming that denying or interfering with this right would diminish that person's autonomy by diminishing his scope of choices, then the argument from the value of cultural diversity will be seen to complement the liberal concern for autonomy and individual freedom in a profound way while rendering communication between diverse cultures a must.

However, that is a new way of looking at cultural diversity. Instead of looking at cultures as intrinsically valuable repositories of which the borders can easily be drawn, if we look at the divergent cultures and a society of cultural diversities as *the* context of choice—which is a more realistic option regarding the unbounded and indescribable nature of culture—then cultural diversity will also be subsumed under what is valued

instrumentally. In this case, what applies to one's *own* culture as being the context of freedom—when this context is broadened to include other cultures as well—will also apply to *diversity of* cultures. Because in this case, the context of freedom includes both one's *own* culture and the cultures in his periphery, exposure to the fragments of which he neither can avoid nor should avoid since they are among the very conditions of his freedom. So Margalit and Raz's concern with the decaying and diminishing of one's own culture and the harm this does to a person's autonomy applies just as well to cultural diversity if divergent cultures are to be seen as constituents of one's context of freedom. In the same respect, it should also be considered that the web one denotes as his culture is so full of *foreign* fragments that depriving him of those is both an impossible task to accomplish given the empirical difficulty of deciding where one culture ends and where the other starts, and an activity that would decrease one's autonomy by depriving him of certain choices which might be very central to his range of choices. For example, rendering Turkish the only language of education and hence University education in Turkey, would deprive analytical philosophers in Turkey of the freedom to pursue the needs of their professional career as well as depriving students of the possibility to fully understand the writings of certain philosophers. Hence if the cultural diversity is *decaying or discriminated against, "the options and opportunities open to its members will shrink, become less attractive, and their pursuit less likely to be successful."*[97]

So what we are doing here is to broaden the scope of culture, in the instrumental argument, to reformulate it to include cultural diversities and argue that *culture* determines the boundaries of the imaginable, so that if the options available in *culture*

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[97] Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, "National Self-Determination" *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 87/No. 9 (New York: Columbia University Press 1990): 449.

diminish, so too does one's autonomy. Minority rights should be so organized as to protect these cultural contexts of choice.

In this respect, what is expected of the Liberal state, to secure the equality and autonomy of the individuals is to so organize and constitute its institutions as to provide individuals with the utmost opportunities to communicate with one another bearing in mind that such a pluralist sphere of communication will be presupposed by the autonomy of the individual, the communicative sphere functioning as the context of the range of choices, the range of *meaningful options* one can make.

Thus formulated, "the diversity argument really can not explain why we have an obligation to sustain the particular sort of diversity created by the presence of a viable, self-governing national minority". Indeed, it seems to be that way, but perhaps the reason is, because we have *no* such obligation. The point is, when we show the unboundedness of culture and deconstruct the essence of cultural identity as we have attempted through Wittgensteinian lines of argument, if all minorities get to be represented and the flourishing of their cultural elements somehow get secured by the communication-oriented Pluralist State, then self-government does not seem to be a necessary option as an "essential interest" of the minority nation or its members. If the aim is that of co-existence of equals in a communicative sphere, self-government functions to isolate cultures rather than enable cultural diversity. If a culturally diverse society is really a presupposition of autonomy for the individual, then the alternative nation-building policies which are accomplished through constituting an institutionalised societal culture on the part of the self-governed national minority will harm the autonomy of its members when, for example, education gets done in the minority language and a bilingual education is not aimed at. It can be seen that

secession is not necessary for isolation; rather, cultural partiality, in our account, is seen to be the very source of isolation.

The question is how then the ethno-cultural heterogeneity will be accommodated within the state when the claim to neutrality is shown to be utterly senseless and impossible and when the utmost interest of the individuals regarding their autonomy on an egalitarian basis is shown to be co-existence in a Pluralist state aimed at enhancing communication. Which group-specific rights are compatible and complying with this aim and which of them are not?

So now let us consider what these Group-Specific rights are, whose legitimacy, concerning egalitarianism and the autonomy of the individual is being questioned here. To requote Kymlicka's definition, they are

> (1) Self-Government Rights (the delegation of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism);
> (2) Poly-ethnic rights (financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups); and
> (3) Special Representation Rights (guaranteed seats for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the larger state).[98]

Let us take a look at the virtues and vices of each of these group-specific rights and their appropriateness and applicability with respect to our family resemblance perspective in favour of a pluralist and communication-oriented form of Culturalism.

Self-Government Rights

These are rights which could be explained by alluding to the United Nations Charter: "all peoples have the right to self-determination". So it is basically the idea that, if the majority nation had initially the right to self-govern and built a nation on the

[98] Kymlicka, *Multicultural*, 7.

basis of that right and in this respect created a societal culture through its institutions like education, language, public holidays, etc. to maintain that nation *as* a nation, then the same right should be given to the minority nation as well, if the state is concerned with being an egalitarian liberal one that is impartial in the distribution of rights towards its citizens.

The traditional way of accommodating a minority nation's quest for self-government has been through federalism, i.e., through creating regional federal governments. However, when the aim and function of federal governments is changed from that of decentralizing the state government and endorsing a regional, locally governed state bounded by the central government to that of accommodating an ethnical, national and cultural community in a segregated area of which borders are drawn with an intent to include the majority of the members of the minority and thus to render members of the majority, a minority within the segregated area subject to the local government's policies of alternative nation building, then philosophical problems arise concerning the who-ness (identity) and the autonomy of the Individuals inhabiting that piece of land.

The philosophical problem arising out of identity has to do with the deconstruction of cultural identities we have provided. Suppose a minority nation is granted the right to self-govern. What will be the criterion to determine who counts as a member and who does not? How will the borders of the minority nation be drawn without having to invent a contingent border just for the sake of drawing a border to confine the minority nation, to practically allow them to self-govern? To say we do not have to draw such borders will be to give up the idea of constructing a Federal Government in the segregated area and hence to practically abandon the claim to Self-Government.

The other philosophical problem with Self-government is that it looks almost like a communitarian solution to the problem of autonomy of individuals such that the flourishing of the minority as a nation is given priority and primacy over the flourishing of individuals residing in it.

> If we want to preserve a wide range of human conditions because it allows free people the best chance to make their own lives, we can't enforce diversity by trapping people within differences they long to escape.[99]

If autonomy consists in being able to rule oneself in a dialogical process of Self-creation within a context of freedom, the context being that which is shown to be a range of choices that involve cultural elements from both one's own and one's surrounding cultures, then diminishing this range of choices will diminish the freedom and hence the autonomy of the individual. This interference with one's autonomy can be to such an extent that the individual might be left with no choices at all when he is faced with ends pre-determined by his community to be valuable but which he is unwilling to pursue. If, from mere lack of choices, such as not being able to speak the language of the majority, one pursues the pre-determined end of continuing his father's business in agriculture, then how can we talk of such an individual's being autonomous even if he becomes a farmer on his father's land *willingly?* What is willing, if there is only one option for the individual to follow?

Polyethnic Rights

Polyethnic rights are the ones most compatible with our account of a Pluralist, Communication-oriented state concerning its duty toward its citizens to accommodate their ethno-cultural heterogeneity within its institutions and policies. These rights

[99] Appiah, *Contamination*.

suggest the utmost level of exposure to diversity of cultures, since they are aimed at getting financial and political support from government in terms of bringing their cultural elements to the public sphere and making them a part of the free circulation of concepts, tradition and horizon of consciousness. These polyethnic rights range from changing the educational curriculum to accommodate the differences of the minority group to readjusting the public holidays to secure an egalitarian government policy towards all the ethno-cultural groups within a society and a readjustment of government funding policies to accommodate the special needs as well as the art of the minority nation within the institutions of the state.

Kymlicka writes in his 1995 work that

> these group-specific measures—which I call "polyethnic rights"—are intended to help ethnic groups and religious minorities express their cultural particularity and pride without it hampering their success in the economic and political institutions of the dominant society…However, these policies are primarily directed at ensuring the effective exercise of the common rights of the citizenship and so do not really qualify as group-differentiated citizenship rights.[100]

I disagree with polyethnic rights' not qualifying as group-differentiated citizenship rights. I think what is primarily intended by demanding polyethnic rights for the historically or culturally disadvantaged (such as people of colour or religious minorities) is not the concern for doing away with the obstacles that impedes the minority 'member' from becoming a full citizen and hence from integrating him better into the Political Institutions. I think it is the other way round, such that it is the demand of the minority from the majority to attend to the implicit existence of the majority's prevalent ethnicity and culture in political institutions and hence tilt the political institutions a little bit towards more group-recognition and group differentiation so as to

[100] Kymlicka, *Multicultural*, 31.

accommodate that of the minority groups as well.[101] If we are to consider what we have in mind here under the name of polyethnic rights, we see that they range from changes to the education curriculum to recognize the history and contribution of minorities to the changes in dress-code at schools and asking for funding for ethnic studies and associations as a part of government's art and culture policies.

One could agree with Kymlicka in viewing the demand for polyethnic rights as an act of integration to common rights of citizenship only if there were such an objectively defined set of common rights of citizenship.

The demand for polyethnic rights

(a) is an act of retribution for the lack of neutrality of the government.

(b) could be considered as yet again involving a confusion concerning the who-ness, the identity of the individual which finds its expression in the blurry edges of the overlapping private and public spheres, in one of which one is recognized as a citizen and in the other as an individual. The age-old distinction of the private and public spheres makes it difficult to decide whether polyethnic rights are solely designed for the historically disadvantaged to better integrate themselves with the constitutional demands of citizenship in their country of residence.

Rights of Special Representation

These are inclined to endow the under-represented or historically disadvantaged groups with an increased level of representation with partial policies designed for them to have, for example a reserved number of seats in the Parliament, etc. "They are most

[101] It is as if the motto behind the demand for Polyethnic Rights is "institutions are initally not *neutral* but *majoritarian* anyway, so why not expand the scope of this partiality to include our goals, Ideals and values along with theirs"?

plausibly seen as a temporary measure on the way to a society where the need for special representation no longer exists—a form of political 'affirmative action'."[102]

However, I have doubts whether this can really be a temporary measure; I mean what do we mean by "temporary"? In order to retribute the historically disadvantaged the rights of representation that have escaped him throughout the history, we have to go back to the beginning of the Political life perhaps and annihilate the distinction of Public and Private Spheres, since it was then when the whole story of under-representation began such that women, slaves, aliens were expelled from the political sphere and were not there for centuries until they found themselves subject to abide by laws they have not created and part of a political system which they themselves have not shaped and which therefore could have been completely different in terms of its measures of representation or distribution of rights. However, this, for the time being, is not a form of life that we can make sense of, and it sounds counter-productive when a post-modernist "history is but the creation of white well-off males, therefore political 'affirmative action' makes sense only if it is carried out long enough to forget where we started from" kind of argument is formulated without offering a better solution. After all, the question is, are we for or against special rights of representation if there are no better alternatives to do justice to the under-represented?

My claim is that there is a better alternative than the special right of representation to do justice to the under-represented. It might sound radical at first sight to say that just reserving a few seats in an already established Parliament, the shaping and functioning of which has solely been determined by the majority, will not make things a whole lot better for the under-represented, i.e., the historically disadvantaged within that community. Because allowing minorities to take a bigger part in the decision

[102] Kymlicka, *Multicultural*, 32.

processes of that *body-politic* will still leave a lot to be desired when the task, with an intent to maintain the equal distribution of rights, is to reshape the society and institutions as if such a disprivileging (disadvantaging) of the minority on the part of the majority has never happened.

The solution has to do with a more cosmopolitan attitude, in other words, by establishing a trans-national institution, of which members are the very disadvantaged in question, who not only will be the founders of the tribunal before which they will stand to claim rights from and be held responsible but also be represented at the fullest level. The full appreciation of this idea will yet again require us to review our concept of the individual, society, fragmentation and historical representation as well as the relationship between language, world and its constitutedness. That, yet again, has to do with the concept of the individual and his situatedness that is viewed to be under-represented and in whose name special rights of representation are asked for. If, contrary to the present picture of "citizens searching for rights", an alternative picture of "historically constituted 'citizenship' out of which people seek refuge now and thus construct a people's tribunal before which no one gets under-represented" is drawn, the practical consequence of that will be the strengthening of transnational institutions, especially NGOs and INGOs where the historically disadvantaged do get represented, for it is they themselves who form these very institutions to seek for their rights of representation which virtually escape them within the given system of representation inside the state of their origin.

Towards 'Open-Border' States and Strengthened Trans-national Institutions

What can be a solution to accommodate ethno-cultural heterogeneity within the state without there being any individual harmed by the disadvantages of under-representation, where individuals freely practice the demands of their cultural norms openly as if the political sphere has diffused into the private sphere and where individuals get to have a chance to revise their ends by fully exercising their rational capacity to choose what best fits them out of a wide range of meaningful options?

We have seen that self-government rights might decrease the range of meaningful options while enabling individuals an opportunity to freely practice the demands of their cultural norms. Likewise, we have seen that polyethnic rights enable individuals to freely practice what their cultural norms demand of them and these rights are also intended to give the individual access to his culture at the most basic level of inhabiting a world of meaningful options. However, when these rights are not complemented with self-government rights, their institutionalization in the societal culture is endangered, since members of the majority culture generally out-number members of diverse cultures and even a multiculturalist re-adjustment of laws to accommodate polyethnic rights might fail to supply the demand unless a re-adjustment in the representational status of minority members is made. Nevertheless, we have seen that equal representation before the laws and institutions is not such an easy task to accomplish even for the Liberal Culturalist Government with the best intentions. What is at stake here is the fact that the very task of re-shaping the institutions so as to accommodate the under-represented within the legislative system on an equal basis of representation, for the time being, transcends the bounds of the imaginable. Why can this inequality which has historically been in favour of the majority culture not be reconciled by a simple act of guaranteeing seats in the parliament? Does it have to do with the number of seats? Let us increase the minority nation’s seats then until it equals

that of the majority nation, or let's make it such that all seats belong to the minority nation in the parliament. But, first in the second case we would be talking about a revolution not of culturalism.

However, the point is, even if such a revolutionary change of power was the case, an inequality caused by failing to take part historically in the shaping of the institutions and the state is not an inequality that can be settled, retributed, in terms of slight changes in the already determined system of representation. The individuals who have historically been underrepresented may have discomfort in feeling responsible before the laws of a political structure in the shaping of which they were but excluded.

Kymlicka's claim was that the new debate over minority rights did not even seek to accommodate Minority Rights, or let's say Group-Specific rights in a neutral system of difference-blind institutions. His claim was that everyone involved in the debate is aware of the fraudulence of the Liberal State's claim to neutrality. So the conclusion he was drawing from this lack of neutrality which results in inequality was the justification for demanding group-specific rights for minorities within the nation. Group-specific rights by pulling the state towards an utmost level of sensitivity towards ethno-cultural differences would not by doing so neutralize the state for that is totally inconceivable but would secure a more egalitarian basis for co-existence on a legislative, representative and institutional level.

However we have argued that the same concern from lack of neutrality and a case for under-representation is most compatible with the idea of transnational institutions.

If cultural diversity purports to enhance the autonomy of individuals and if confusion strikes when individuating cultures happens to be the issue—say, for a practical purpose such as establishing a Federal Government—then the quest for a more

cosmopolitanist attitude towards the solution of problems arising out of ethno-cultural heterogeneity is unavoidable.

What do we have in mind when we mention "Cosmopolitanism"? A one-state, one-nation world with no borders? No, not really. Because that would make the task of finding local solutions to local problems almost impossible to accomplish. For what will the language of constitutions and institutions of that new state be? English? Why? Or should a language be constructed anew? But well and what of it, then? Weren't we initially looking for a solution to accommodate ethno-cultural diversity rather than try to erode it from the sphere of communication?[103]

However, strengthening the political power of transnational institutions, multiplying them in number and kind to include NGOs, INGOs, people's tribunals as well as Political Unions does seem to be a promising option to complement the Liberal Pluralist States we hitherto proposed as well as providing them with solutions they can not come up with, given the existing system of representation and conditions of citizenry at hand.

First, if a multiplicity of transnational institutions before which members can be represented at the individual, communal or government level get to be the dominant political structure at both the national and international level, then the under-represented will finally have found an egalitarian basis of representation before which they can feel responsible. They can feel bounded by the rules of these institutions and be held accountable for their deeds before the judges and the juries of these institutions since they themselves, the historically under-represented, will be among the very founders of these institutions. A more democratic form of representation should underlie the structure of Transnational Institutions, then. Since, otherwise, the least well-off still can

[103] "Esperanto. The feeling of disgust we get if we utter an *invented* word with invented derivative syllables.The word is cold, lacking in associations, and yet it plays at being 'language'. A system of purely written signs would not disgust us so much." (Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 52e.)

not find their feet within the system. In other words, the representational systems of such new transnational institutions and the already existing ones such as Greenpeace, Amnesty International, etc. should be so constituted and re-adjusted that the needs of the least well-off will be spoken out loud in them as opposed to being institutions where only the richest bourgeois of an under-developed nation get to be represented, i.e., transnational institutions should aim to reconcile all sorts of inequalities so long as the interest of one group or an individual does not violate the rights of another.

Another solution transnational institutions can offer is on the methodological objection directed towards Liberal Culturalism that it caters to only certain Liberal States that fit a certain definition of Political Liberalism with certain problems that are irrelevant to multinational and multicultural societies worldwide. Since everybody will be represented within the Transnational Institutions at least under the category of "world citizens", nobody's right to living or demands to political recognition will be excluded and expelled from the political sphere. That raises an important issue worldwide concerning the political situation and problems of those who do not qualify to be citizens of a state such as refugees, victims of illegal sex-trade and human smuggling, citizens of unrecognized states such as Northern Cyprus or Palestine who are theoretically non-existent on the political world-map as well as those whose rights are undecided due to legally undefined life-forms such as women of religious marriages lacking civil marriage. It will be under the vast representational scope of transnational institutions that the currently unrepresentable *barely human* will find legal and political support.

Whatever I state throughout these lines will remain somewhat abstract for the time being and will fall short of providing the reader with substantial theoretical arguments, since as Kymlicka states

> While we have an increasing number of transnational institutions, which exercise an increasing influence over our lives, we have no political theory of transnational institutions. We have well-developed theories about what sorts of principles of justice should be implemented by the institutions of the nation-state; well-developed theories about what sorts of political rights citizens should have vis-à-vis these national institutions; and well-developed theories about what sorts of loyalties and commitments citizens should have to these institutions. By contrast, few people have any clear idea what principles of justice or standards of democratization or norms of loyalty should apply to transnational institutions.[104]

If Liberal Pluralist States are complemented as we proposed, by such a strengthened and overlapping network of transnational institutions, then, borders which are political lines of demarcation drawn for practical purposes such as including citizens —who are to be endowed with rights and responsibilities of citizenship—and excluding non-citizens will lose their frenetic political significance and will shift towards becoming mere landmarks of practical demarcation of regions. That actually seems to be the case in the European Union which can be seen as a strengthened transnational institution within which borders lost their political significance and became mere signs of geographical demarcation within the borders of the institution. However, the no-borders policy is only applied within and among the states of the European Union since there is no transcontinental union before which the European Union as a member stands.

Why should it be of importance that there is a world-wide political system of co-existing Liberal Pluralist States with almost no borders, which are bounded by strengthened Transnational Institutions of all sorts? Because this is the political system that would best fit the fragmentary nature of cultures as well as individuals. The difficulty from individuating cultures arises out of the very nature of cultures as we have shown through the idea of Family Resemblance, such that it is impossible to

[104] Kymlicka, *Vernacular*, 235.

individuate a perfectly delimited area for a cultural identity. The fragmentary nature of cultures as well as individuals best fits a no-border area upon which they can have an access to both their *own* culture as well as cultural fragments from all the surroundings no matter if it is both empirically and theoretically impossible to tell which is which (which is one's *own* and which not, *originally*). The Pluralist Liberal State would guarantee individuals' right to access to and exercise the demands of their culture through polyethnic rights. Finally, trans-national institutions would answer the needs of and hold responsible the members of cultures such as nations, chosen identities, non-citizens and victims of under-representation where the state can not accommodate those needs or can not prosecute those who are culpable for crimes against certain members of certain groups, who, after all, all have fragmentary identities. For example, who is going to prosecute those who abuse refugees under war-like conditions if there are no transnational institutions in which refugees are represented and their rights are demanded for, even if there is a perfectly operational political system of Liberal Culturalist State Nations worldwide?

The three dimensional approach to world politics of Liberal Pluralist states co-existing in an open-border system bounded by Transnational Institutions though on a lesser degree is what we propose, the elaboration of which however exceeds the theoretical limits and background of this thesis. However, it remains as a provisional work that I would like to present, with an intent to provide theoretical ground for a position which I think best fits the individual in his fragmentary identity of overlapping contexts of choices and a passion to choose what his desires ultimately prompt him to, in each context.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

In an era of cultural fluidity between even the remotest cultures, ethno-cultural heterogeneity, which formerly was expelled as irrelevant from the Political Sphere, became an issue awaiting resolution on the agenda of almost all Liberal States. This is an era when the historical narratives about what defines a liberal state as well as what defines “culture”, “cultural identity” or “individual” are rapidly eroding and being replaced by a mist of confusion. In the mist of this confusion, we find ourselves asking: How can a liberal state continue to be neutral towards ethno-cultural differences while supplying the demand for Group-Specific rights, i.e., minority rights? The confusion is due to the dysfunction of the underlying paradigm of essentialism, namely the understanding of language and thought in which language only functions in one way, i.e. to convey thoughts, to describe the essences of things. This paradigm no longer functions, because every time we ask questions about the essences of things, we confess to being able to find none.

In order to individuate a culture and hence endow its members with the right to self-govern, we ask the defining features of a cultural identity and the defining features of its members as well as the conditions of describing an individual as a member. The only answer that awaits us is that culture is a context of choice with vague boundaries, and identity, which is formed within that context, is as fragmentary and unbounded as the context itself.

In order to secure the essential interests of the individual, we try to secure his autonomy but confusion sets in whenever we think of the individual on the one hand and his context of freedom on the other hand as if we can legitimately, meaningfully talk about these separately, as separable from each other.

The cure comes from Wittgenstein, through his arguments against there being such essences to describe what there is to being an X, and through the way he shows us that we are playing the wrong language game with culture, with individual, with autonomy, with neutrality, namely with the majority of the concepts that occupy our current political discourse. If we come to entertain the many ways in which these concepts are used, with different purposes, depending on the context, our quest to describe the essence of culture, individual, identity, and the like will dissolve into attending to the multiplicity of language games in which these concepts are used. That will in turn bring about changes in the way we look at, say, for example, culture, and the presuppositions of culture as well as the political demands we can justify on these presuppositions.

When the same technique is applied to the concept of “individual”, i.e., not looking for a description of it, but trying to understand the dimensions of the many situations, contexts it is embedded in, we will confess to finding the many different roles “individual” plays in the language games it is employed in, or is a part of. That will bring about changes again in the way we understand the Individual which will commit us to profoundly change our ideas about what his ‘essential interests’ consist in. Such an embedded view of the individual provides a better understanding of his predeterminations, predestinations and clears away his road to freedom, to autonomy, by showing what his boundaries consist in. These boundaries, the conceptual borders

which the individual can not transcend, are shown by us not to be “constraints on”, but “the context of” the autonomy of the individual, as well as being his very context of life.

When the same technique of “conceptual therapy” is applied to the concept of “autonomy”, our findings seem to be of quite a revolutionary sort. We see that what has been understood to be the mark of the autonomous individual, namely his capacity to rule himself, and not be ruled by others than himself, is one that presupposes that he be in a context and that there should be more than one choice to make in that context in the absence of which he does not qualify to be *willing* at all, but merely *doing* what the only choice he has dictates him to. When we make a close investigation of the traditional connotations of *willing*, of *ruling*, we come across a somewhat disengaged individual, not *choosing between* his desires but *ruling over* one desire in the form of a ‘will to will’. What Wittgenstein allows us to see is that this “willing to will” can not be the story behind one’s autonomy since in the same sense that we can not fail to will, we can not make sense of the idea of ‘trying to will’ or ‘managing to will’ either. There is something quite confusing in this picture of intention, that willing and strong evaluation which the individual engages in to exercise his autonomy seem to be activities that one can do on one’s own as if there is no constraint that the context imposes on him and as if it makes sense to will or be a strong evaluator even if there is only one choice to make.

What Wittgenstein manages to do is to situate the individual in language games and show that it is impossible to think of an individual not embedded in a language game of sorts, sharing a form of life with the *other players* of the same language game. Although he never specifies in his work what an individual’s autonomy might alternatively consist in, apart from deconstructing the traditional understanding of intention, voluntary behaviour and hence of *ruling oneself*, in this work I have taken up

this task of proposing an alternative account of autonomy, arguing through Wittgensteinian lines. I propose that one's autonomy consists in his capacity to choose between moves in a language game, hence in one's choosing to make *this* rather than *that* move, to utter *this* rather than *that* sentence, to opt for *this* rather than *that* combination of words in a language game. This fragments the "I" into its different uses in different language games, in other words, now the "I" is fragmented into a multiplicity of "I"s with different roles in different language games, nevertheless, this fragmentation does not decrease anything of his power to rule. For after all, in our account, one's power to rule is described as his power to choose, that is, between a multiplicity of options which are all accessible to him by being present in one's ontology, i.e., via remaining within the bounds of the imaginable as choices, for the individual.

The presuppositions of this new account of autonomy, especially for political discourse, can easily be detected. What does one's autonomy presuppose if autonomy amounts to the capacity to choose and to the exercise of this capacity in the form of decisions taken out of a range of choices accessible to one? First, this will presuppose one's access to one's culture such that a choice can be meaningful to one only if it is a part of a language game. Secondly, there must be more than one choice to make in each context in order for the individual to qualify as acting voluntarily. So access to a multiplicity of choices is the second presupposition of the autonomy of the individual.

This raises the question about the language games in which there is only a meagre amount of choices to make. How will the individual act autonomously, how will he qualify to be autonomous, if there is only one move to make, one decision to undertake in a language game he is embedded in? He will not qualify to be autonomous unless there are new rules that are incorporated, new choices introduced to the language

game one is currently embedded in. How will it be the case that such an introduction of new rules, new choices becomes part of the prevalent language game currently being played? The answer is that this can only be achieved through a sphere of communication. Only through communication and a pluralism of sorts can it be possible that language games which do not involve autonomy of the individuals due to lack of choices can acquire a shift in their grammar. However, what is at stake here is to acknowledge that, if language games are played on the basis of forms of life, an expansion in the scope of forms of life for an individual will multiply the language games he is embedded in. This multiplication will bring about an expansion in his range of choices. Our account of autonomy which amounts to viewing 'one's capacity to choose' as the mark of his autonomy, will presuppose that such an expansion in one's range of choices will enable the individual to become freer, and to exercise and appreciate his autonomy at the utmost level.

Hence, the "essential interests" of the autonomous individual, to fulfil his quest for autonomy, are (a) to access his own culture through which he will become an individual and learn to live as a human being and acquire an ontology—one's own culture, in this account is seen as what initiates him to life—and (b) to access other cultures and different forms of life in order to expand his scope of choices and become freer in due respect.

Thus our account of autonomy has brought us to posit Pluralism, arguing that a Liberal Pluralism is the only form of political theory that would entertain both the situatedness, i.e. embeddedness of one in his culture, and at the same time strive to fulfil one's need for extending his worldview to become cognizant of a multiplicity of choices through communication. I call this new position the Liberal Pluralist position with its

emphasis on communication and openness to other cultures as well as emphasizing one's situatedness in his own culture.

Emphasizing communication brings us to the question of wondering whether it is really possible for different Cultures leading different forms of life and playing a different set of language games on the basis of these forms of life to influence each other. This again will require us to reflect upon the way we are formulating our very question. For talking about cultures this way presupposes that there are cultural identities with essential qualities distinct from each other such that they do not share any form of life. However, if we take cultural identities as areas with vague boundaries, not as a set of members but as a context that merges into the contexts in its periphery, we will come to see that individuals are already sharing forms of life with even the remotest cultural relatives in the complicated network of family resemblances. Hence, enhancing communication, positing Pluralism, will be nothing more than acknowledging this feature of Culture being "a complicated network of family resemblances, constantly overlapping and criss-crossing".

From the beginning till the end our aim was to provide a theoretical solution for the problem of accommodating ethno-cultural heterogeneity within an egalitarian and difference-sensitive Political Liberal Theory, as well as providing a theoretical justification for minority rights and multiculturalist policies. As I have mentioned from the beginning, our study was open to finding certain of the demands for group-specific rights not justifiable on the basis of our account of the autonomous individual and what his essential interests consist in.

Thus, in Chapter One, I have tried to put forward the relevant political positions and their claims concerning minority rights. I have provided Kymlicka's account of Liberal Culturalism and tried to provide the reader with the reasons why he thinks

Liberal Culturalism is the best possible solution opposed to Liberalism and Communitarianism in the minority rights debate. I intended to draw attention to the conceptual confusions concerning the "autonomous individual" underlying those political positions and argued that the traces of essentialism and its implications were prevalent in the political tradition. My aim was to clear away misconceptions that made a theoretical work on Culturalism an utterly confused one. I took up the study to provide a philosophical ground on which claims such as 'Culture is the context of freedom' and 'It is valuable for an individual to be a member of a Culture' could be made sense of.

In the second Chapter, I have tried to put forward what the dominant ideal of the modern autonomous individual has been. Arguing through Wittgensteinian lines I have proposed an alternative account of the Autonomous Individual who has access to his culture as the presupposition of his very existence as a human being. When the essentialist understanding of language and thought is thus replaced with the Wittgensteinian understanding of language as comprised of language games and forms of life on the basis of which these games are played, "Culture is the context of freedom of choice for an individual" now became a substantial and meaningful claim on the basis of which claims to certain minority rights could be justified. However, the account of the autonomous individual I have proposed has shown that one's access to other cultures as well as one's *own* culture is an essential part of his autonomy and foundational among his interests. This was due to two reasons; firstly, considering what to count as one's *own* culture proved to be a futile activity since one's own culture as well as all cultures is a complicated network of family resemblances overlapping. So if what has formed the *culture as we know it today* has been a constant ongoing communication between cultures which are like areas with vague boundaries, then Pluralism is essential to make sure that cultures will continue to exist in the proposed

sense. Secondly, one's access to other cultures enlarges his scope of choices and if autonomy as we have defined it is the capacity to choose, then the more choices there are, the more autonomous an individual may become.

Hence, our account of Autonomy has brought us to posit Pluralism and enabled us to see where Cosmopolitanist options posed themselves as better solutions to deal with the problem of ethno-cultural heterogeneity.

In Chapter Four, I have tried to look for the practical implications, practical political consequences of our proposed account of Autonomy. With an intent to look for what is most appropriate for a Political Liberal Theory that aims at fulfilling the essential interests of the autonomous individual, namely his utmost exercise of his capacity to choose in a sphere of communication, we have come to analyse the policies that were aimed at accommodating these interests in ethno-culturally heterogeneous societies through endowing them with certain group-specific rights. An analysis of these multiculturalist policies, which take the form of group-specific rights, shows us that some of these policies fall short of giving the minorities what they strive for. So we have attempted to offer a somewhat practical solution to overcome this practical despair which has historical as well as philosophical reasons underlying it.

Having posited Pluralism as the Philosophical position to adopt, our practical solution in line with our philosophical findings has been to suggest a tri-partite system of strengthened Transnational institutions, of Liberal Pluralist States aiming at communication enhancing policies and of weakened or open borders. This practical solution remains as a provisional position to provide clarifications, although these exceed the theoretical basis that my thesis can provide.

As a last remark, I would propose that if Culture is the context of choice for an individual, and if this context is one which can not be confined within clear-cut borders,

then Pluralism will be the most appropriate philosophical position to adopt, in resolving the issue of endowing the fragmented individual with the widest scope of choices at his disposal each time he is embedded in a language game, in a real life situation with real players.

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