

HOMOGENIZING A NATION:  
TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY AND  
MIGRATION-SETTLEMENT POLICIES OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC  
(1923 – 1939)

Thesis submitted to the  
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences  
in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts  
in  
Political Science and International Relations

by  
Erol Ülker

Bogazici University Library



39001101959917

14

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

2003

## ABSTRACT

This study basically aims to analyse the processes of nationalisation and the construction of national identity in Turkey from a historical perspective. One of the main components of the formation of nation-states is homogenization of population, in other words, homogenization of ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences that are outside the imagined boundaries of nation. In this sense, migration and settlement policies are fundamental instruments resorted in the course of construction of nation-state. The present study aims to investigate the migration and settlement policies of the interwar period which are highly neglected in the studies concerning the processes of the construction of national identity and nationalization in Turkey.

One of the most basic assertions this study relies on is that analysis of migration policies makes a significant contribution to the the analysis of the definition of national identity. States take their decisions, regarding who can be admitted as immigrant, within the framework of the imagined boundaries of nation. For this reason, that the cultural, ethnic and linguistic characteristics of the immigrants should not contradict with the current definition of nation, or the immigrants should be homogenized by assimilatory policies is one of the main aspects of the migration policies.

On the basis of this assertion, the present study investigates who were admitted as immigrant and how they were settled within the boundaries of the country during the interwar period. By investigating the migration and settlement policies, the main consequence this study arrives at is that, in contrast to the notion of constitutional citizenship in which Turkishness is defined on the basis of citizenship-territoriality, an es-

essentialist definition of Turkishness was developed in the course of national identity construction and it was the determinant definition in the political processes. According to this definition, being Muslim, speaking Turkish and possessing Turkish culture are the basic characteristics of Turkish nation which is conceived to be the legitimate owner of the country. Those who are not identified with Turkish nationality are included into the definition of Turkishness only when they possess these properties. The study analyses, how it was attempted to Turkify the population, within the framework of this definition, by means of migration and settlement policies. In this sense, one of the most important themes the research emphasizes is the Turkification of the Muslim linguistic minorities, especially of the immigrants, through demographic policies, which is not paid sufficient attention by the existing studies.

## KISA ÖZET

Bu çalışma, temel olarak, Türkiye’de uluslaşma ve milli kimliğin inşa edilmesi süreçlerini tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ulus–devlet oluşumunun en önemli bileşenlerinden birisi nüfusun yeknesaklaştırılması, bir başka deęişle ulusun tahayyül edilmiş sınırlarının dışında kalan etnik, kültürel ve dilsel farklılıkların tek tipleştirilmesidir. Bu anlamda, göç ve iskan politikaları ulus–devlet inşası sürecinde başvurulan temel araçlardır. Mevcut çalışma, Türkiye de milli kimliğin inşası ve uluslaşma süreçlerine ilişkin çalışmaların büyük oranda ihmal ettiği göç ve iskan politikalarını iki savaş arası dönemde incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Çalışmanın dayandığı en temel savlardan biri, göç politikalarının incelenmesinin, milli kimliğin süregiden tanımının analiz edilmesine önemli bir katkısının olduğudur. Devletler kimin göçmen olarak kabul edilebileceğine ilişkin kararlarını, ulusun tahhayyül edilmiş sınırları çerçevesinde almaktadır. Bu nedenle göçmelerin kültürel, etnik ve dilsel özelliklerinin, ulusun mevcut tanımıyla çelişmemesi ya da göçmenlerin asimilasyon politikalarına tabii tutularak yeknesaklaştırılması göç politikalarının en önemli veçhelerinden biridir.

Bu savı temel alarak, mevcut çalışma iki savaş arası dönemde Türkiye’ye kimlerin göçmen olarak kabul edildiğini ve kabul edilenlerin ülke sınırları içinde nasıl iskan edildiğini incelemektedir. Türklüğün yurttaşlık–ülkesellik temelinde tanımlandığı anayasal vatandaşlık kavramının aksine, Türk milli kimliğinin inşa sürecinde özcü bir tanımının geliştirildiği ve siyasal pratiklerde belirleyici olan tanımın bu olduğu göç ve iskan süreçlerinin incelenmesi yoluyla çalışmanın vardığı temel sonuçtur. Bu tanıma

göre, müslüman olmak, Türkçe konuşmak ve Türk kültürüne sahip olmak ülkenin meşru sahibi olarak görülen Türk ulusunun temel özellikleridir. Türk milliyetiyle özdeşleştirilmeyenler ancak bu özelliklere sahip olduklarında Türklüğün tanımına içersenmektedir. Çalışma iskan ve göç politikaları yoluyla, nüfusun bu tanım çerçevesinde nasıl Türkleştirilmeye çalışıldığını incelemektedir. Bu anlamda, mevcut çalışmaların gerekli önemi vermediği, başta göçmenler olmak üzere Müslüman dilsel azınlıkların nüfusa ilişkin politikalarla Türkleştirilmesi, araştırmanın öne çıkardığı en önemli konulardan biridir.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first like to express my deepest gratitude to Prof. Dr. Kemal KIRIŐI for his patience, guidance and supervision from which I have benefited and, needless to say, I will benefit much. Very special thanks should go to my dear friend Yusuf Dođan ETINKAYA for his invaluable aids in archive studies without which this study would have never end. Also Nurcan ZGÜR BAKLACIOĐLU, who translated an Albanian text and contributed to my archive study, should be mentioned in this sense.

I appreciate the patience of Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet ALKAN and Dr. Gn SOY-SAL in teaching Ottoman to such a "hard-working student", like me. Harun ZKAN, Fulya APAYDIN, Ayőegl KOMSUOĐLU, Umud Karaca DALGI and Foti BENLISOY supplied invaluable help in hard times. I want to thank them all on this occasion. The thank list would be incomplete without Prof. Dr. Faruk SNME-ZOĐLU, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Glden AYMAN, Asst. Prof. Dr. İnci KERESTECİOĐLU, Ahmet BEKMEN, Sevgi YNEY, Nazan MAKSUDYAN, Erhan KELEŐOĐLU and friends whose names are sacrificed to my forgetfulness.

Of course, it would be improper to skip Kemal Aydın AKAGNDZ who has significant imprints in my intellectual curiosities and whose memories are still alive. Finally, exceptional thanks go to Banu YILANKAYA for everything, even just for her presence. Naturally, the usual reminder applies: all errors and omissions belong to the author.

EROL LKER

İSTANBUL, 2003

*To my family...*

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| ABSTRACT .....   | iii |
| KISA ÖZET .....  | v   |
| ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.....  | vii |
| TABLE OF CONTENTS.....   | ix  |
| INTRODUCTION.....  | 1   |
| I. Research Question and the Aim of Study.....   | 1   |
| II. The Concepts of Nationalism and Nation Shaping .....   | 4   |
| II. i. Interwar Period Turkey as a Nationalizing State and the Migration-Settlement<br>Policies as Nation-Shaping Instruments..... | 14  |
| III. Literature Review on Turkish National Identity.....   | 20  |
| IV. Organization and the Argument of the Study.....  | 32  |
| 1. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT: THE<br>OTTOMAN PERIOD .....  | 38  |
| 1.1. Migrations to the Ottoman Empire before the Balkan Wars .....   | 39  |
| 1.2. Migration and Settlement during and after the Balkan Wars.....  | 42  |
| 1.2.1. Deportation of non-Muslims .....  | 46  |
| 1.2.2. Settlement of Muslim Immigrants.....  | 49  |
| 1.2.3. Exchange of Populations .....   | 52  |
| 1.2.4. Early Attempts of Nation-Building .....   | 54  |
| 2. TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE IMMIGRATION<br>PRACTICES IN THE POST-LAUSANNE TURKEY .....                                    | 56  |
| 2.1. Immigration Figures .....   | 58  |
| 2.2. Promotion of Immigrations .....   | 60  |

|             |  |            |
|-------------|--|------------|
| <b>2.3.</b> | <b>Official Legislations With Respect to the Immigrations.....</b>   | <b>63</b>  |
| 2.3.1.      | The Law on Settlement adopted in 1926 and the Relevant Memorandum<br>66  |            |
| 2.3.2.      | The Law on Settlement adopted in 1934 and the Relevant Circular.....   | 67         |
| <b>2.4.</b> | <b>Migration Hierarchy and the Comparison of Laws on Settlement .....</b>  | <b>72</b>  |
| <b>3.</b>   | <b>MIGRATION HIERARCHY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES OF<br/>TURKEY BETWEEN 1923-1939 .....</b>                   | <b>80</b>  |
| <b>3.1.</b> | <b>The Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey</b>  | <b>82</b>  |
| 3.1.1.      | The Way to Treaty.....   | 83         |
| 3.1.2.      | Definition of Exchangee (Mübadil) .....  | 84         |
| 3.1.3.      | Analysis of the Population Exchange in relation to the Construction of<br>National Identity.....                 | 86         |
| <b>3.2.</b> | <b>Other Agreements Concerning Migrations and Nationality.....</b>   | <b>102</b> |
| 3.2.1.      | The Agreement with Albania .....   | 103        |
| 3.2.2.      | The Agreement with Bulgaria .....  | 104        |
| 3.2.3.      | The Agreement with Romania .....   | 106        |
| 3.2.4.      | The Agreement with Yugoslavia.....   | 110        |
| <b>3.3.</b> | <b>Immigration Treaties and Turkish National Identity.....</b>   | <b>111</b> |
| <b>4.</b>   | <b>HOMOGENIZATION THROUGH SETTLEMENT POLICIES .....</b>  | <b>116</b> |
| <b>4.1.</b> | <b>Settlement Policies in the Period from 1923 to 1934.....</b>  | <b>119</b> |
| 4.1.1.      | Ministry of Exchange Reconstruction and Settlement.....  | 119        |
| 4.1.2.      | The Abrogation of Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement<br>127                                     |            |
| 4.1.3.      | The Law on Settlement adopted in 1926.....   | 132        |
| 4.1.4.      | Measures regarding the Turkification of Eastern Provinces .....  | 136        |
| <b>4.2.</b> | <b>Settlement Policies in the Period from 1934 to 1939.....</b>  | <b>141</b> |
| 4.2.1.      | The Law on Settlement adopted in 1934.....   | 141        |
| 4.2.2.      | Turkification of the Eastern Region .....  | 148        |
| 4.2.3.      | Expulsion of non-Muslims from Thrace .....   | 151        |
| 4.2.4.      | Settlement of Immigrants .....   | 155        |
| <b>5.</b>   | <b>ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY'S IMMIGRATION-SETTLEMENT<br/>POLICIES IN RELATION TO TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY .....</b> | <b>160</b> |
| <b>5.1.</b> | <b>Religion and Turkish National Identity .....</b>  | <b>167</b> |
| <b>5.2.</b> | <b>Assimilation and Dissimilation.....</b>   | <b>176</b> |
| 5.2.1.      | Dissimilationist Attitudes towards non-Muslim Minorities.....  | 177        |
| 5.2.2.      | Assimilationist Homogenization of Muslims.....   | 179        |

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>5.3. Conceptualizing Turkish Nationalism.....</b> | <b>187</b> |
| <b>6. CONCLUSION.....</b>                            | <b>196</b> |
| <b>RESOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY .....</b>              | <b>203</b> |

# INTRODUCTION

## I. Research Question and the Aim of Study

Nationalism and national identity have become intensely debated academic issues in the last two decades along with the growing theoretical interests upon multiculturalism, minority rights, and the dynamics of ethno-nationalism and nation-state formation. The resurgence of ethnic nationalisms that has gone hand in hand with the political disorder and instability and the eroding effects of globalization upon nation-state formation are among the most important factors instigating these academic concerns. Besides, the massive immigration from “Third World” to the industrialized countries, which has blurred the traditional boundary of “inside/outside” and which has been associated with a crisis of national identity, can be seen as one of such kind of factors.

Since 1990s, Turkey’s academia has followed a similar path in putting nationalism and national identity into a critical scrutiny. While there are many historical works dealing with the development of Turkish nationalist movement with special emphasis to the role of nationalist intelligentsia within its evolution, the debate regarding the ethnic and religious boundaries of Turkish national identity is one of the main agendas of these scholarly investigations.

The present study aims to contribute to this literature through theoretical and empirical analysis of Turkey’s “nation-building” policies. In one of his outstanding studies, Anthony Smith holds that the road to nation-states could take two variants: the “state-to-nation” model or that of “nation-to-state”<sup>1</sup>. The main problematique I ad-

---

<sup>1</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 136-142.

dress in this research is the nation-state formation in Turkey, which can be categorized on the basis of “state-to-nation” model. My primary endeavor is to provide a historical analysis of the nation-building policies of the Turkish Republic that aimed to equate the state with homogeneous nation identified with religious, linguistic and cultural unity of the population living within the territorial boundaries. In so doing, I concentrate upon the 1920s and 1930s, which were crucial years in the making of the new Turkish Republic and for the constitution of Turkish national identity. The underlying motivation of such an historical inquiry is that only by analyzing the historical construction of “Turkishness” can the essentialist face of Turkish national identity be appreciated. Because, the particular circumstances of a nation-state’s creation have a dramatic impact on its subsequent evolution, closing off various potential paths of development for nationalist movement and creating a field for the crystallization of national identities<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, revealing the historical construction of Turkish national identity at the period of the formation of the new Republic provides us with an improved understanding of its current meaning.

The main question of this study can be formulated as follows: What were the ethnic, religious and linguistic boundaries of “Turkishness” that was constructed by Turkey’s “nationalizing state” as the core of the homogeneous sense of Turkish nation? To answer this question, I will focus on the analyses of Turkey’s immigration and settlement policies that will be investigated within the framework of “nation-shaping”. These two issues have decisive importance for grasping the transformation of Turkey, emerging out of the debris of the Ottoman Empire, from multinational and multirelig-

---

<sup>2</sup> Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923*, (London and New York, 2001), p. 3.

ious social structure to the more uniform and more homogeneous nation-state. This is because, as will be examined throughout this work, governmental policy of the inter-war – period Turkey employed migration and settlement policies as the instruments for the homogenization of subject population based on Turkish religious, cultural and linguistic coordinates.

In fact, these two topics have not been subjected to sufficient scholarly interests. More importantly, this negligence has been resulted with some misinterpretations concerning the analysis of Turkish national identity. Thus, thanks to the investigation of these two topics, this study will endeavor to offer a more improved understanding in terms of the ethnic, religious and linguistic boundaries of Turkish national identity on the basis of which the homogenization policies were shaped.

In the following pages of the introduction part, I will take a look at the primary assumptions of the existing literature on Turkish national identity to situate the present work into the ongoing academic debate over this topic. Subsequently, the primary hypothesis of this research will be revealed clearly along with the organization of the study. For the sake of lucidity, however, I will define the significant terms that are used throughout this study before outlining my specific answers to the research question of the present work. Besides the goal of clarifying some significant terms in the senses used in this study, I also aim to reveal the theoretical framework of this research in the following part. After revealing my theoretical approach, I will turn to the question of why the analysis of immigration and settlement policies together is important to analyze the constructed boundaries of Turkish national identity.

## II. The Concepts of Nationalism and Nation Shaping

Nationalism and the idea of nation-state are among the most pervasive phenomena of our age but among the least well understood. So embedded in and so interwoven with social, cultural, economic and political aspects of modern life, it is almost impossible to isolate nationalism as an analytical area of study<sup>3</sup>. It remains so puzzling that neither widely accepted definition nor any analytic consensus over its dynamics and nature exist. Needless to say, I do not intend here to provide an exhaustive literature review upon such a controversial subject. However, revealing the meanings of some key terms that are used throughout this study has crucial importance for not falling into a theoretical quagmire stemming from the abundant amount of definitions and concepts over nationalism and national identity.

The term “nationalism” is used in this study in its political and modern sense. In this respect, I follow John Breuilly in viewing nationalism as something peculiarly modern and in giving emphasis to its political character<sup>4</sup>. Gellner’s well-known definition is, therefore, an appropriate starting point. He defines it primarily as a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent<sup>5</sup>. However, Gellner’s conceptualization of nationalism has limits for the aim of this study. As emphasized by Breuilly, nationalism, in Gellner’s point of view, is functional to the necessi-

---

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*, (London, New York: Verso, 1996).

<sup>5</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.

ties of modernity<sup>6</sup>. The transformation from static agro-literate society to advanced industrial one involved, according to Gellner, the standardized “high cultures” institutionalized through vast state-arranged and state-financed educational systems to prepare people to survive under conditions in which division of labor and social mobility became rule<sup>7</sup>. This formulation presupposes, within each political unit, a standardized high (national) culture that strives to attain its own state<sup>8</sup>.

Hobsbawm, on the other hand, defines nationalism as a political program without which, realized or not, it is a meaningless term. This political program holds that groups defined as “nations” have the right to, and therefore ought to, form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the French Revolution<sup>9</sup>. Anthony Smith shares a similar understanding with Hobsbawm in viewing nationalism as a movement for the coincidence of nation with polity. He considers it as “an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, cohesion and individuality for a social group deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential nation”<sup>10</sup>. By stating, “the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity”, Hobsbawm stresses the modern nature of

---

<sup>6</sup> John Breuilly, “Approaches to Nationalism” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*, p. 155.

<sup>7</sup> Benedict Anderson. “Introduction” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*, p. 10.

<sup>8</sup> Ernest Gellner, “The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*, p. 111.

<sup>9</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, “Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*, p. 256.

<sup>10</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalist Movements*, (London and Macmillan/New York: St. Martin Press, 1976), p. 1.

nationalism in line with Gellner<sup>11</sup>. Smith admits, more or less, this perspective positioning nationalism phenomenon (only as a political movement) into modern age<sup>12</sup>. Nevertheless, these formulations' specific emphasis to the political character of nationalism distinguishes them from Gellner's functional approach.

An important question arises from these definitions: what is a nation? To answer this question, this study follows a theoretical framework suggested by Benedict Anderson and others, such as Hobsbawm and Gellner, who insist on the modern character of nationalism. The primary argument propounded by Anderson is that not only "nationalism" but also the idea of "nationhood" is a modern phenomenon<sup>13</sup>. This means for Anderson that nationalism is not the revival of nations' self-consciousness, as advocated by the ideology of nationalism, rather, it invents nations where they do not exist<sup>14</sup>. In other words, nation is an imagined community and this particular imagining is modern. Hence, this imagination is a political kind that attributes sovereignty for a bounded and exclusive national community. And nation is imagined not as society but as community worthy of sacrifice, ultimately the sacrifice of one's life<sup>15</sup>. Hobsbawm, in the same way, does not regard the "nation" as a primary nor as an unchanging social entity. In his point of view, nations are social artifacts appeared in

---

<sup>11</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 14.

<sup>12</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 71.

<sup>13</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995). p. 18.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

connection with the creation of modern nation-state. In short, he claims, “nations do not make the states and nationalisms but the other way round”<sup>16</sup>.

This understanding of nation contradicts to an important extent with those propounding the continuity in between the pre-modern ethnies and the modern nations. Anthony Smith is, undoubtedly, the prominent representative of this approach. Although he, to some extent, concedes Anderson’s argument regarding the imagined and constructed characters of modern nations, this explanation is valid, according to Smith, only for limited number of cases. For Smith, nevertheless, “those nations with the most durable solidarity and most distinctive cultural heritage have emerged on the basis of strong pre-existing ties”<sup>17</sup>. In other words, the emergence of modern nations incorporated strong “ethno-history” at their core, with resonant myths, memories, values and symbols without which modern nationalism would be rootless and arbitrary.

In fact, the theoretical framework supported by those who view nation as modern-imagined artifact does not directly reject the ties between the construction of modern nation and pre-modern culture. Gellner, for example, observes, “...nationalism uses the pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures and cultural wealth...”. However, he adds, “though it uses them very selectively and it most often transforms them radically”<sup>18</sup>. For Gellner, therefore, the appropriation and the uses of the pre-modern culture is intrinsic to the process of invention or social engineering while

---

<sup>16</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 10.

<sup>17</sup> Anthony D. Smith, “Ethnic Nationalism and The Plight for Minorities”, *Journal of Refugee Studies* vol: 7, no: 2/3, 1994, p. 189.

<sup>18</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalisms*, p. 55.

Smith considers continuity between what he calls “myth-symbol complexes” of pre-modern ethnies and modern nations<sup>19</sup>.

The creation of “nation-state” in terms of the coincidence of territorial state with nation is the leading agenda of the programs carried by modern nationalist movements. The components of nation-state refer to the convergent but different historical processes. That is, the formation of modern states and the building of modern nations<sup>20</sup>.

The process of state formation is the product of multidimensional developments. Among the most important ones of these developments are: the consolidation of territorial units by bureaucratic-absolutist states that for the first time able to hold the monopoly of the means of violence inside their territory; the transformation of frontiers delimiting different states in clearly fixed boundaries; the emergence of bourgeoisie as a new class especially receptive to the ideas of Enlightenment; and the new roles of monarchs and rulers which was characterized by a legitimizing principle coming from the ruled rather than God’s will or royal blood<sup>21</sup>. This process involved the emergence of territorially defined populations each recognizing a common paramount organ of government subserved by specialized personnel to carry out the military and civil services. The emergent state was recognized by other similarly constituted ones as “sovereign”, that is, independent in its actions upon the territorially de-

---

<sup>19</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, pp. 19-42.

<sup>20</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-state-Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.) *Mapping The Nation*, p. 282.

<sup>21</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), pp. 51-52.

fined population<sup>22</sup>. Modern states had emerged long before nations, in the modern sense, and it was not until the late eighteenth century that both elements, the modern state and modern nation, melted into the shape of a “nation-state”<sup>23</sup>.

The building of modern nations constitutes the second dimension in the emergence of nation-state that became the recognized unit of political power par excellence not only for Western Europe but also in the rest of the world. The deliberate attempts of state-makers aimed to homogenize the culture of their subject population through linguistic, religious and educational standardization<sup>24</sup>. Giving to citizens a common national identity associated with common language and culture is the main target of nation-building measures<sup>25</sup>. The creation of symbols of national identity like flags and anthems, the socialization through educational system, and the establishment of political institutions seen to represent all sections of society are among the important measures taken by states to promote nation building<sup>26</sup>. And the result was that state, nation and society converged in the process of an effort to represent an entire society or people<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>22</sup> Samuel E. Finer, “State – and Nation – Building in Europe: The Role of the Military” in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 85-86.

<sup>23</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-state-Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.) *Mapping The Nation*, p. 282.

<sup>24</sup> Charles Tilly. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making” in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, p. 78.

<sup>25</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 222.

<sup>26</sup> Anthony H. Birch, *Nationalism and National Integration*, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), pp. 40-42.

<sup>27</sup> E. J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 265.

Many of the examples of present coextensivity between nation and state including the Western European nation states are the result of homogenization policies<sup>28</sup>. Rogers Brubaker conceptualizes this experience as “nationalizing nationalism” of “advanced” states considered by the existing literature upon nation building in a territorial rather than an ethno-cultural mode<sup>29</sup>. Arguing that various benefits arise when people share a sense of nationhood relying not on the ethnic-exclusivist but on the civic-territorial criteria, this literature perceives the measures of nation building in Western states, aiming to give citizens a common national language, identity and culture, as legitimate<sup>30</sup>. On the other hand, apart from Western and post-colonial states that are claimed to be based upon territorial-civic formulation of nationhood, the homogenization policies of other states are viewed as based upon the ethnic formulation of nation.

An opposition cited in almost all discussions of nation and nationalism is implicit within this perspective. Such opposition relies on the belief that Western nation-states were based on the contractual-civic idea of nation while Eastern nationalisms developed an ethnic-geographic sense of nation. Whereas the former is defined with political and rational criteria and seen to take political citizenship as the basis of national

---

<sup>28</sup> Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, p. 70.

<sup>29</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 82.

<sup>30</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, p. 222.

belonging, the latter is identified with essentialist and historical-cultural principles such as language, religion and ethnicity<sup>31</sup>.

Hans Kohn's distinction between Western (or civic) and Eastern (or organic) nationalisms is a well-known manifestation of this view. According to him, the former emerged in England, the United States, France, Switzerland and Holland as an expression of rising middle classes with rationalist, optimistic and pluralist vision of national community. The latter emerged in Eastern Europe and Asia as movements of lower aristocracy and the masses endowing the idea of nation with emotional and irrational senses<sup>32</sup>.

Though not in such a crude form, the dichotomy between Western and Eastern nationalisms (which goes with different names such as France versus German, territorial versus contractual, civic versus ethnic and so on) is granted as an axiom in most of the works with respect to the nationalism and nation building. Anthony Smith, for example, offers a twofold definition. That is, territorial and ethnic nationalisms. The first one regards the nation as a form of rational association. According to this form, the individual can choose which nation to join. The features of territorial nation are: compact territorial homeland, common legal codes and equality of all members before the law, the social and political rights of citizenship and a shared civic religion and mass culture. The second one perceives the nation as a community of culture and history. Genealogy rather than territory and the myth of common ancestry are the cri-

---

<sup>31</sup> Brian C. J. Singer, "Cultural versus Contractual Nations: Rethinking Their Opposition", *History and Theory*, vol: 35, no: 3, October 1996, pp. 309-312.

<sup>32</sup> Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalisms*, (New York: Mcmillan, 1945), pp. 18-20.

teria of national belonging. Additionally, instead of civic-mass culture, ethnic nationalism extols native history and an ethnic culture<sup>33</sup>.

In this study, I do intend to approach to the phenomenon of ethnic nationalism from the perspective of politics. In this respect, I conceptualize the ethno-cultural idea of nation, which jells around a common descent, language and history, as mainly an imagined artifact<sup>34</sup>, the perspective of which is consistent with the above-mentioned concept of nation. Thus, the present study's theoretical argument regarding the ethnic nationalism is fundamentally different from the one offered by Anthony Smith who searches for the ties in between pre-modern ethnies and ethno-nations.

To this aim, I employ a political point of view, in line with Rogers Brubaker, to analyze the nationalism phenomenon in the specific case of Turkey's nation-shaping policies. According to Brubaker, "two types of nationalism can be distinguished: polity-seeking or polity-upgrading nationalisms that aim to establish or upgrade an autonomous national polity; and polity-base, nation-shaping (or nation-promoting) nationalisms that aim to nationalize an existing polity"<sup>35</sup>. Brubaker uses the term "polity-seeking" nationalism for those that seek to establish polity or to broaden the boundaries of polity with irredentist aims<sup>36</sup>. On the other hand, the "nationalizing states" are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for

---

<sup>33</sup> Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Nationalism and The Plight for Minorities", pp. 187-189.

<sup>34</sup> Jürgen Habermas, "The European Nation-state-Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.), *Mapping The Nation*, p. 288.

<sup>35</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, p. 79.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79.

particular nations, yet as incomplete or unrealized nation-states<sup>37</sup>. Brubaker characterizes these states with the existence (the conceived or imagined existence) of a core nation defined in ethno-cultural terms, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry or permanent population as a whole. Despite the idea that the core nation legitimately owns the polity, the full realization of this ownership needs a specific action to promote the language, cultural flourishing, demographic predominance, economic welfare, in brief, political hegemony of the core nation. Brubaker conceptualizes these policies as the nation-shaping instruments of the nationalizing states in the course of full realization of the idea of nation-state<sup>38</sup>.

In fact, this perspective provides us with an opportunity of reconsidering the opposition between ethnic and civic nationalisms situating the former into the framework of political field. As emphasized by Oommen, the idea of nation-state in the sense of coincidence of state with homogeneous nation is not but an aspiration even in the Western Europe pursuing nationalizing measures that have been imbued with cultural and linguistic motivations. The assimilatory attitude in France, which is generally cited as a case of civic nationalism, towards Alsatians, Bretons, Occitens and so on afterwards the Revolution (1789) is only an example<sup>39</sup>. Thus, within the framework of politics, the line demarcating civic and ethnic nationalisms seems to blur. Indeed, in contrast to the generally accepted view, all nationalisms, including Western

---

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 83-84.

<sup>39</sup> T. K. Oommen, *Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), pp. 135-145.

European nationalisms, have a cultural and historical component<sup>40</sup>. The tension, indicated by Habermas, in European nation-states between the nation as the voluntary community of citizens and the inherited or ascribed nation of those born to it ought to be considered within this context<sup>41</sup>.

To sum up, the theoretical framework of the present research conceives the nationalism as a modern and political project aiming to create a nation-state. In other words, nationalist programs strive to equate the boundaries of state with a homogeneous nation, which is a constructed or imagined artifact. Such a project takes the shape of “polity-seeking” nationalism for those that seek to establish polity or to broaden the boundaries of polity and of “nation-shaping” nationalism that aim to nationalize (homogenize) an existing polity by endowing the population with the sense of national identity defined with ethno-cultural terms.

### *II. i. Interwar Period Turkey as a Nationalizing State and the Migration-Settlement Policies as Nation-Shaping Instruments*

The implications of what Brubaker offers to conceptualize nationalisms are very significant for the aim of the present study. It provides us with the opportunity of situating the national identity construction process of Turkey into a broader context of nation-state formation. The ambitious project of Kemalism in terms of the modernization and westernization embarked upon the creation of western style nation-state that necessitated, in the eyes of Kemalist elite, overlapping of the state with homogeneous

---

<sup>40</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, p. 246.

<sup>41</sup> Jürgen Habermas, “The European Nation-state-Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship” In Gopal Balakrishian (ed.), *Mapping The Nation*, p. 287.

nation. Renouncing any irredentist or revisionist political project<sup>42</sup>, Kemalist nationalism engaged in the process of homogenization in terms of the composition of its population after the ratification of Lausanne Treaty in 1923<sup>43</sup>. This process was accompanied with the “Turkification” of the key spheres from economy, which had been controlled traditionally by non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, to the state bureaucracy<sup>44</sup>. Thus, it is possible to conceive post-Lausanne Turkish Republic as a nationalizing state, and the constitution of the boundaries of “Turkishness” is central to the politics of nation shaping. In this respect, migration and settlement policies turned out to be prominent instruments in the hands of nationalist elites to the aim of “Turkification” (homogenization) of population.

The relation between nation building and migration is very debated topic. According to Aristide Zolberg, for example, the formation of nation-states often leads to the expulsion of groups who fail to conform to prevailing national characteristics including language, religion and ethnicity<sup>45</sup>. In a similar fashion, Anthony Smith illuminates the expatriation of minorities as one of the political consequences of ethno-nationalism<sup>46</sup>. The drive for the national purification singles out the minorities within as “alien” to the historic culture-community rendering them entirely unassimilable

---

<sup>42</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları* (1919-1938), (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 211.

<sup>43</sup> Ayhan Aktar, “Homogenizing the Nation; Turkifying the Economy: Turkish Experience of Populations Exchange Reconsidered”, paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations*, The Refugee Studies Program, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September 1998, p. 2.

<sup>44</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 1995), pp. 105-114.

<sup>45</sup> Aristide Zolberg, “The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process”, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no: 467, May 1983, pp. 24-38.

<sup>46</sup> Anthony D. Smith, “Ethnic Nationalism and The Plight for Minorities”, pp. 194-196.

and thus their ejection (forced migration) appears as one of the important means, among others, of ethnic homogenization.

In the above sense of the word, forced migration used to be an important device for the nationalist elite in the formation of nation state. It is well known that Turkish population became far more homogeneous, especially regarding the religious criterion, after the compulsory exchange of minority populations with Greece<sup>47</sup>. Indeed, this was only a station in the road to Turkey's religious homogeneity. The forced migration of Armenian population in 1915 under the rule of Committee of Union and Progress<sup>48</sup> (İttihat ve Terraki Cemiyeti) and the mass exodus of Greek population to Greece during the War of Independence<sup>49</sup> (Kurtuluş Savaşı) had already been dramatic stages to the goal of religious homogeneity. Besides, the policy of expulsion concerning Christian population was carried further in the republican era, the pinnacle of which was the forced migration of approximately 40,000 Greeks in 1964<sup>50</sup>.

This research, on the other hand, deals mainly with the other side of the migration phenomenon for the analysis of Turkey's nation shaping policies, which has been almost overlooked by the existing literature. That is, policy of migration as not a refugee producing process but as a refugee incorporation device<sup>51</sup>. In other words, the

---

<sup>47</sup> Zafer Toprak, "The Demographic Consequences of Lausanne Treaty in Turkey" paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September, 1998, pp. 1-2.

<sup>48</sup> Taner Akçam, "Hızla Türkleşiyoruz" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997), pp. 154-155.

<sup>49</sup> Justin McCharty, *Ölüm ve Sürgün: Osmanlı Müslümanlarına Karşı Yürütülen Ulus Olarak Temizleme İşlemi*, (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi Yayın San ve Tic. A. Ş, 1998), pp. 335-345.

<sup>50</sup> Hülya Demir and Rıdvan Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1999).

<sup>51</sup> For the existing studies over similar theme, see Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol: 36, no: 3, July 2000; Soner Çağaptay, "Ke-

present study aims to analyze the migration policies of Turkey in terms of the incorporation of immigrants within the context of nation shaping and national identity construction.

As emphasized by Kemal Kirişçi, the decisions of who is to be admitted as immigrant and who is not are closely linked with prevailing definitions of national identity and citizenship. States prefer admitting persons who are likely to strengthen a country's national identity and cohesion<sup>52</sup>. Likewise, Rogers Brubaker persuasively argues that formed under particular – historical circumstances, bearing even today the stamp of these distinctive historical origins, the immigration policies of particular nation-states are highly connected to how the idea of nationhood has been historically constructed<sup>53</sup>. In other words, the general policy pattern of the immigration policies of a state is very revealing with respect to its particular conception of nationhood<sup>54</sup>.

Seen from this angle, the examination of Turkey's migration policies between 1923-1939 in terms of the admission of immigrants provides us with the opportunity

---

malist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma”, *Toplum-Bilim*, no: 93, Summer 2002.

<sup>52</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, p. 3.

<sup>53</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in France and Germany” in Gerschon Shafir (ed.), *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*, (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 138-169.

<sup>54</sup> In French case, for example, the nation has overwhelmingly been conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state that has centrally been expressed in the striving for cultural unity. Such understanding paved the way to a relatively generous immigration policy. On the other hand, bearing historically constructed, ethno-cultural idea of nationhood, Germany followed more rigid immigration policy in comparison to French case. Hence, citizenship has historically been more accessible to immigrants in France than in Germany. *Ibid.*, p. 130. One can also see the validity of the close connection in between the conception of nationhood and the immigration policies in the cases of Great Britain, Ireland and the United States. Suzanna Shanahan, “Scripted Debates: Twentieth – Century Immigration and Citizenship Policy in Great Britain, Ireland and the United States” in Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly (eds.), *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States*, (New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999), pp. 67-92.

of dealing with the historically constructed ideas of Turkish nationhood and national identity.

The period of 1923-1939 was marked by the state-generated flows of immigrants especially from the Balkan countries. In addition to the huge number of Muslim immigrants of Greece origin, who repatriated to Turkey due to the compulsory exchange of minority populations with Greece, Turkey's nationalist elite also promoted the immigration of Muslims from other Balkan Countries, especially from Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia, aiming to rise the number of populations due to the demographic and economic reasons<sup>55</sup>. As a result, 700,258 immigrants from Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were settled into the various regions of Turkey between 1923-1933<sup>56</sup> while the number of non-Muslim population decreased dramatically due to the forced and voluntary migrations. Keeping in mind the linkage in between the migration policies and the definition of national identity, a significant question arises from this situation: to what ethnic, religious and linguistic peculiarities did Turkey give priority for the admission of immigrants?

In fact, as will be investigated in detail in the following chapters, besides the ethnically and linguistically Turkish population who inhabited outside of the country, Turkey admitted even promoted the immigration of some Muslim groups of peoples. Alongside the Muslim-Turks, for example, Bosnians and Pomaks, who had no ties with Turkish ethnicity and vernacular, were admitted to the country without hesitation

---

<sup>55</sup> Soner Çağaptay, "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma", pp. 224-225; Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", *Birikim*, no: 71-2, March-April 1995, p. 35.

<sup>56</sup> Ahmet Akgündüz, "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers and Ethno-Religious Dimensions", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol: 24, no: 1, January 1998, p. 124.

and provided with Turkish citizenship. This, in fact, clearly reveals that Muslim affiliation was the crucial component of the constructed boundaries of Turkish national identity in the period under consideration.

In interpreting such priority of Turkey's immigration policies given to the religious affiliation, as will be argued in detail below, the existing literature perceives this as the indication of that Muslim religious background was the dominant component of Turkish national identity. However, this argument is only partially true. Besides relying upon the vague interpretation of Turkey's immigration policies, such argument fails to grasp the crucial aspect of the issue of the incorporation of immigrants.

The goal of the "Turkification" of the Muslim immigrants was the crucial aspect of the nation-shaping policies of the Turkish Republic. By means of settlement policy, governmental practices of homogenization aimed at assimilating the non-Turkish immigrants on the basis of Turkish language and culture. In this respect, the policy of settlement was the primary weapon of the governmental policy to achieve this goal. It was aimed at settling the immigrants, who were considered as not possessing the necessary requirement of being Turk, in a way that promote their Turkification process.

This, in fact, constituted only one aspect of settlement policies. As Will Kymlicka argues, national governments have often employed the policy of settlement to nationalize their homelands. This policy is to settle the new immigrants (and native dwellers) into the places of the historical homelands of the minority populations to disempower them and to increase the number of population considered as the members of

core nation<sup>57</sup>. Such a strategy was employed in the interwar period Turkey to nationalize the eastern region of the country, where Kurdish population constituted the majority, and the Thrace region, which were considered as a strategic area due to the national security concerns. Accordingly, the settlement policies of the interwar – period Turkey aimed at assimilating those immigrants whose Turkishness, in the eyes of nationalist elites, were to be promoted on the one hand, and nationalizing strategic regions by settling there ethnically and linguistically Turkish immigrants on the other.

Turning to our main research question, it becomes clearer why the examination of Turkey's nation building practices in the specific cases of the migration and settlement policies is important to analyze the constructed boundaries of Turkishness. The inspiration of this research emerged out of a dissatisfaction with the literature over Turkish national identity that does not give sufficient scholarly interest to these important themes. Without investigating the assimilative design of settlement and migration policies, the admission of non-Turk Muslims is generally interpreted with the argument viewing Muslim affiliation as the dominant category of Turkishness. And this view subordinates the roles of language and ethnicity in the formulation of Turkish national identity to the religious criterion. In the following part, I will reveal this tendency more clearly.

### **III. Literature Review on Turkish National Identity.**

In assessing the character of Kemalist nationalism in the 1920s and 1930s, two primary positions have been supported in the existing literature. The first one is based

---

<sup>57</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, p. 73.

on the argument that Kemalist nationalism was developed in these years around territorial-civic virtues<sup>58</sup>. The basis of national identity, according to this view, was defined in terms of citizenship, which was kept immune to the religious and ethnic ties, and the loyalty to the political values of the Republic. The official documents defining the content of Turkishness are illuminated as the primary clues of this formulation, the well-known example of which is the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution. This articles states that “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are, in terms of citizenship, to be Turkish”<sup>59</sup>. According to Bülent Tanör, for example, this document is the best proof of the fact that Turkishness was referred not to religious or ethnic peculiarities but to territorial and political ties<sup>60</sup>. On the other hand, the ethno-cist tendencies that flourished especially in the 1930s and crystallized with the well-known Sun-Language Theory and National History Thesis are viewed as minor deviations from the general trend. Or these tendencies are seen as the measures with the purpose of stirring emotion, bolstering national pride and self-confidence rather than deviations from a civic-territorially based approach of Kemalist nationalism<sup>61</sup>.

The second point of view puts out emphasis to the other face of Kemalist nationalism that resorted to the criteria like ethnicity, religious background, language and

---

<sup>58</sup> For a general exposition defending this view, see Bülent Tanör, *Kuruluş (Türkiye: 1920 Sonraları)*, (İstanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 1997); Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 251-262; Bozkurt Güvenç, *Türk Kimliği*, (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998); Frank Tachau, “The Search for National Identity among the Turks”, *Die Welt des Islams*, vol: 8, 1963; Suna Kili, *Atatürk Devrimi: Bir Çağdaşlama Modeli*, (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası, 1981); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

<sup>59</sup> Translation was quoted from Kemal Kirişçi, “Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices”, p. 1.

<sup>60</sup> Bülent Tanör, *Kuruluş, (Türkiye: 1920 Sonraları)*, p. 78.

<sup>61</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, p. 263.

culture for defining national identity<sup>62</sup>. Having in mind the major focus of the present work, this body of studies deserves a detailed scrutiny.

The major point that has been given specific interest by this perspective is the tension that is inherent in Kemalist nationalism between territorial and essentialist formulations of nation<sup>63</sup>. Taha Parla, for example, points out the deviation of Turkish nationalism from its territorial-civic foundations in his outstanding study inquiring the official sources of Turkey's political culture<sup>64</sup>. According to Parla, Turkish nationalism's exclusive and ethnicity-oriented face is latent from the very beginning of the Republic behind its pluralist, civic-territorial formulation<sup>65</sup>. He makes it clear how this second face became visible in Mustafa Kemal's speeches and official sources from the 1920s on<sup>66</sup>. Therefore, Parla seems to suggest that the strong ethnicist tendencies of the 1930s are not to be seen as the contingent or newly appeared developments but as the extension or manifestation of this second face.

---

<sup>62</sup> For a general exposition defending this view, see, for example, Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), vol: 3; Tanıl Bora, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 71, Winter 1996; Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001); Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2001).

<sup>63</sup> See, for example, Ayşe Kadıoğlu, "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları", *Türkiye Günlüğü* no: 33, March-April 1995; Sevan Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşünce'de "Türk Milleti" Kavramı", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no: 33, March-April 1995; Mesut Yeğen, "Yurttaşlık ve Türklük", *Toplum Bilim* no: 93, Summer 2002.

<sup>64</sup> Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 208-209.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 176-211.

Mesut Yeğen, from a different perspective, discloses this second face by indicating the tension between the definition of citizenship and the perception of nation<sup>67</sup>. To this aim, he resorts to the debate in Turkish Parliament concerning the definition of Turkishness appeared in the Article 88 of 1924 Constitution. He gives specific emphasis to the phrase, “in terms of citizenship”, in defining Turkishness. According to Yeğen, the addition of such words to the Article 88 indicates the difference of Turkish nation in the eyes of nationalist intelligentsia from the constitutional citizenship and reveals the contradiction between the civic-political and particularistic-ethnic formulation of national identity<sup>68</sup>. Yeğen is not alone in indicating this contradiction. Turkishness as diverse sociological and constitutional categories is highlighted also by Ergun Özbudun<sup>69</sup>, Sevan Nişanyan<sup>70</sup> and Ahmet Yıldız<sup>71</sup>. Ayhan Aktar, in the same way, displays the preferences favoring the category of “Turk” instead of “Turkish Citizen” for the employment of civil servants to indicate the reflection of this difference in the Republic’s practices<sup>72</sup>.

The above-mentioned opposition (common to almost all discussions of nation and nationalism that goes by different names such as ethnic-geographical versus civic-territorial, romantic versus rationalist, Eastern versus Western, German versus French

---

<sup>67</sup> Mesut Yeğen, “Yurttaşlık ve Türklük”.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 207-215.

<sup>69</sup> Ergun Özbudun, “Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu” in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997.

<sup>70</sup> Sevan Nişanyan, “Kemalist Düşüncede “Türk Milleti” Kavramı”.

<sup>71</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, p. 141.

<sup>72</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, p. 119.

nationalisms<sup>73</sup>) is often applied classification to conceptualize the existence of ethnic-particularistic face of Turkish nationalism along with the civic-territorial one. The disposition of Turkish nationalism is explained with the tension and problematic collaboration of civic nationalism with ethnic one or French model with German one, while the former term in these dichotomies refers to a benign, political or, better, contractual definition, the latter to a cultural, essentialist definition of national community<sup>74</sup>. Following the conceptual framework of Anthony Smith, who argues that the dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalisms is analytical and all nationalisms consist in itself the features of both<sup>75</sup>, Tanıl Bora, for instance, contends that Turkish nationalism includes the elements of both Western and Eastern nationalisms<sup>76</sup>. Likewise, for Ayşe Kadioğlu, the most fundamental feature of Turkish nationalism is its inclusion of German and French nationalisms' distinctive characteristics simultaneously<sup>77</sup>.

The list of those arguments stressing the ethnicity-oriented aspect of Turkish nationalism can be extended further. In fact, there is a growing consensus around Turkish nationalism's "Janus-faced" character. However, despite the strong emphasis

---

<sup>73</sup> Brian C. J. Singer, "Cultural versus Contractual Nations: Rethinking Their Opposition", pp. 309-310.

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, (New York: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 97; Cengiz Aktar, "Osmanlı Kozmopolitizminden Avrupa Kozmopolitizmine Giden Yolda Ulus Parantezi" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol: 4, pp. 100-101.

<sup>75</sup> Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, p. 13.

<sup>76</sup> Tanıl Bora, "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997), pp. 185-186.

<sup>77</sup> Ayşe Kadioğlu, "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları", p. 92.

upon the contradiction between territorial and ethnicist formulation of nation in Kemalist nationalism, this literature seems to reach to an agreement in viewing the dominance of the latter formulation over the former for the 1930s. The clear manifestation of this view could be found in a recent work written by Ahmet Yıldız<sup>78</sup>, which, for that reason, deserves specific attention.

For Yıldız, the evolution of Turkish national identity ought to be judged within three periods<sup>79</sup>. From 1919 to 1923, the religious criterion imprinted its dominance. Briefly stated, the necessities of reel-politic required the admission of ethnic-pluralism and the Muslims of the geographical area determined by the National Act (Misaki Milli) were accepted as belonging to Turkish nation without any qualification on the basis of ethnic linkage. The Lazs, Circassians, Kurds and other Muslims were therefore viewed as Turks while non-Muslims were excluded from Turkishness<sup>80</sup>.

Throughout the second phase (1924-1929), a secular-republicanist definition was ascribed to the dominant principle with the elimination of Islam from public philosophy relying on modernist and Westernist project. It consisted of juridical and political dimensions<sup>81</sup>. With the former, a constitutional citizenship was viewed as the basis of national belonging while the political dimension signified the loyalty to the ideals of the Republic along with the Turkish culture and language. According to Yıldız, citizenship was in no way adequate for Kemalist intelligentsia. Political dimension was

---

<sup>78</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 126-132.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 141-154.

always seen above the juridical citizenship, which to an important extent was the result of necessities imposed by the Lausanne Treaty's decrees concerning minority rights<sup>82</sup>. Turkish language was perceived as crucial component of the political dimension of national identity. Hence, this perception led to the efforts aiming to promote the speaking of Turkish in both public and private spheres like "Citizen Speak Turkish" campaigns<sup>83</sup>.

For Yıldız, the separation of Turkishness in the sense of nationality from the constitutional citizenship throughout the second period prepared the background for the ethnic formulation of national identity appeared in the third period (1929-1938)<sup>84</sup>. During this period, the sense of "self" was based on the understanding that all Turks constitute a "super-family" that was referred to the ethnic and genealogical peculiarities<sup>85</sup>. Sun-Language Theory and National History Thesis<sup>86</sup> were the major attempts to prepare the "scientific" basis of this ethnic-racial formulation that was accompanied with the development of the idea of "National Character" (Milli Seciye), which endowed Turkish nation with superior capabilities<sup>87</sup>.

Such categorization is not limited with Yıldız's work but, implicitly or explicitly, shared by most of others, who work on Turkish nationalism and national identity.

---

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 139-140.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 180-192.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 171-179.

Sevan Nişanyan, for example, develops the same categorization<sup>88</sup>. Baskın Oran, in the same way, deems the nationalism in the 1930s as imbued with racist themes and in that sense different from the disposition of the 1920s<sup>89</sup>. Likewise, Emre Arslan contends that Kemalist nationalism in the 1930s gave priority to the racist criteria over the juridical ones for the definition of national identity<sup>90</sup>. In a similar fashion, Hugh Poulton indicates the 1930s to point out Kemalist nationalism's incorporation of racist-ethnicist inclinations<sup>91</sup>.

Considering these arguments together with Kemalist nationalism's above-mentioned second face raises a significant question for the formulation of national identity in the 1920s. If Turkishness was defined on the basis of ethnic-racial peculiarities in the 1930s then what was the dominant criterion for its definition throughout the 1920s? In other words, in what forms did the second-face of Turkish national identity appeared in these years? As I have mentioned above, Yıldız puts loyalty to the ideas of the Republic, Turkish language and culture as the major criteria for the definition of national identity between 1924-1929. However, he also claims that behind the official discourses, "Turkishness relying on religion and race" preserved its existence that made it possible to speak about Bulgarian citizens of Turkey and, at the same time, to see the immigrants of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as

---

<sup>88</sup> Sevan Nişanyan, "Kemalist Düşüncede "Türk Milleti" Kavramı".

<sup>89</sup> Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990), pp. 200-207.

<sup>90</sup> Emre Arslan, "Türkiye'de Irkçılık" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol: 4, p. 411.

<sup>91</sup> Hugh Poulton, *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, p. 114.

same time, to see the immigrants of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria as Turks because of their religion and, sometimes, descent<sup>92</sup>.

In fact, this last point says much about the generally accepted content of Turkish national identity of which sunni-Muslim religious background, as not political but sociological criterion, is conceptualized as the actual basis. This understanding takes its inspiration from the investigation of the religious minorities' position in the Republic on the one hand, and the pattern of Turkey's migration policies on the other.

The common starting point for those who consider the religious background as the basis of Turkishness is the Compulsory Exchange of Minority Populations Treaty between Turkey and Greece (1923). This treaty's terms put religious criterion as the major determinant of one's nationality resulted with the coerced migration of Orthodox-Christian Greek population and the massive flows of Greece's Muslims to Turkey<sup>93</sup>. The exchange of Turkish speaking Christians, especially Karamanli population, with that of Greek speaking Muslims, especially Cretens, is explained as the indicator of dominance of religious criterion over the linguistic or ethnic ones in the constitution of Turkishness<sup>94</sup>.

---

<sup>92</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, p. 152.

<sup>93</sup> Kallipoli K. Koufa and Constantinos Svolopoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey: The Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, and its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations" in P. Smith, K. Koufa-A. Suppan (eds.) *Comparative Studies on Governments and non-Governments Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940: Ethnic Groups in International Relations*, (Dartmouth: European Science Foundation, New York University Press, 1991), p. 276.

<sup>94</sup> For an exposition defending this argument, see, for example, Rıfat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 542; Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, pp. 132-139; Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", p. 35; Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve*

On the other hand, the Turkification policies of the Republic are viewed as inclusive vis-à-vis non-Turk Muslims while non-Muslim minorities including Jews, Greeks and Armenians were seen as inassimilable within Turkish culture and thus treated with exclusive attitudes<sup>95</sup>. Therefore, the constitutional Turkishness was referred to these non-Muslims who were not perceived as belonging to Turkish nation, while Bosnians, Albanians, Lazs, Circassians, Kurds and other non-Turk Muslims were accepted as its potential members<sup>96</sup>.

The immigration policies of Turkey are interpreted as the other proof of the argument conceiving religious background as the basis of Turkishness. The preference in immigration practices given to the non-Turkish ethnicities with Sunni-Muslim religion over that of ethnic Turks belonging to other religious beliefs is seen as the manifestation of this argument. Kemal Kirişçi, for example, reveals how the immigration of Christian Gagauz Turks and Shi'a Azeris were refused, despite their explicit reference to Turkish descent while Bosnians, Albanians and Pomaks, non-Turkish ethnic groups from the Balkans, were able to migrate and settle in Turkey<sup>97</sup>. Kirişçi adds that this pattern in the migration policies was implicated despite the strong reference to Turkish descent/ethnicity and culture in the official legislation governing immigration into Turkey, that is, the Law on Settlement adopted in 1934<sup>98</sup>. Soner Ça-

---

*Kimlik*, (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 81; Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, pp. 173-188.

<sup>95</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, p. 102.

<sup>96</sup> Rıfat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, p. 542.

<sup>97</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 6.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

ğaptay, in the same way, gives emphasis to the importance of religious criterion for the immigration policies of Turkey throughout the period of 1920s and 1930s what he calls the Kemalist era<sup>99</sup>. According to Çağaptay, this indicates the decisive role of religion in Turkey for the construction of nation<sup>100</sup>.

What Kirişçi and Çağaptay explicitly argue with respect to the linkage between the immigration policies and the role of religion in the construction of Turkish national identity is, in fact, implied by most of other works. Tanıl Bora, for example, points out the migration policies to argue how religion appeared as the essential component of national identity especially throughout the first ten years of the Republic<sup>101</sup>. Likewise, the admission of non-Turk Muslims of the Balkans as immigrants in spite of the Christian Gagauz Turks is indicated by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduyu as the evidence of the perception that viewed Islam as important constituent of Turkishness as the ethnic background<sup>102</sup>.

The significant point that needs to be emphasized here is that the dominance of the religious criterion in the perception of Turkishness is not viewed as limited with the 1920s. Rather, it was implicitly or explicitly extended to the 1930s, the years that are considered, at the same time, together with the dominance of ethnic nationalism. In fact, the references to the aforementioned pattern of immigration policies are the implicit acceptance of this argument since the preference in favor of non-Turk Mus-

---

<sup>99</sup> Soner Çağaptay, "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma".

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224.

<sup>101</sup> Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", p. 36.

<sup>102</sup> Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduyu, "Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunu" in Artun Ünsal (ed.), *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınlar, 1998), p. 177.

lms over the Turkish speaking non-Muslims was carried in the 1930s. For example, the migration of Christian Gagauz population, whose immigration was refused, came into the agenda in the 1930s. However, apart from the implicit admission, this argument is already stated explicitly by Ahmet Yıldız<sup>103</sup>, Rıfat Bali<sup>104</sup>, Baskın Oran<sup>105</sup>, Ayhan Aktar<sup>106</sup> and so on.

Put in such a manner, the analytical differentiation between the 1920s and 1930s gets blurred. So does the classification of Turkish national identity in three periods I have summarized above. Even though the latter period is categorized on the basis of ethnic nationalism, the line demarcating “self” from “other” is viewed still on religious background. In other words, despite the suggested classifications generally appeared in threefold form we have seen above, religious background is admitted as the determinant category of Turkish national identity in all of these periods. As far as the argument conceptualizing the 1930s with the dominance of ethnic nationalism concerns, religion still remains as the main category. The religious minorities are considered as the main groups addressed by the exclusivist attitudes of the homogenization measures<sup>107</sup>, the situation which is not fundamentally different from the 1920s.

---

<sup>103</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, pp. 137-138.

<sup>104</sup> Rıfat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, pp. 545-546.

<sup>105</sup> Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, pp. 175-176.

<sup>106</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, p. 97.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.

#### **IV. Organization and the Argument of the Study**

What appears from the review of literature regarding the formulation of Turkishness can be summarized with two primary points. First is the subordination of cultural, ethnic and linguistic criteria to the religious one. Second is the unconvincing differentiation between the 1920s and 1930s. Having in mind the focus of the present work, the most important point is that the migration and the homogenization policies of the Turkish Republic in these years have crucial roles for the existing literature in coming up to the conclusion that sunni-Muslim heritage was the actual basis of Turkishness.

In fact, such understanding suffers from a vague interpretation of immigration policies on the one hand, and from the lack of adequate emphasis on the Turkification of Muslims on the other. Since the assimilationist attitude of the Republic towards the Muslim immigrants and ethnic-linguistic minorities is overlooked, Turkishness is perceived as if it was based primarily on the dichotomy of Muslims and non-Muslims. This study will endeavor to fill this gap.

The first chapter will deal with the issue of immigration and settlement in the Ottoman Period, the special attention being on the years after the Balkan Wars when the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) seized the direct control of the government. Besides the aim of providing a historical review, this part will focus on how the nationalist outlook of the CUP government was reflected in its immigration policies. It will reveal that demographic regulations such as forced migration and settlement were employed by the CUP rule for the purification of the population. The search for ethnic-national unity affected not only non-Muslims but also Muslims of different

ethnicities. While the former elements became the target of forced migration and relocation, the CUP rule attempted to Turkify the latter elements through the assimilative design of settlement. In fact, the Turkish Republic employed similar instruments to fulfill similar aims.

The second and third chapters will deal with the immigration policies of the Turkish Republic. In so doing, these parts will question the aforementioned explanations, which indicate the immigration policies as the proof of the dominant role of Muslim affiliation in the formulation of Turkishness. In a quite different manner from these explanations, it will be revealed that the preferences of the Republic in terms of who could be admitted as immigrant reveals the assimilative design of immigration policies. Instead of admitting all non-Turk or non-Turkish speaker Muslims alongside Muslim-Turks, the governmental policy gave priority only to those who could be assimilated into Turkish national identity by adopting Turkish language and culture. Nevertheless, this attitude was limited with those groups that were conceived as bounded to the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and that were perceived as the loyal subjects of the Ottoman rule. Thus, persons who were considered in relation to the ethnicities that had strong national movement or independent national state were not perceived in the same way and thus were not admitted as immigrant.

This is what the existing literature fails to grasp. If the Muslim affiliation was the primary category of Turkishness, this should have been resulted with the admission of all Muslims regardless of the expectation of assimilation. However, this was not the case. In the second chapter, through the investigation of official texts governing immigrations, I will try to reveal the immigration hierarchy of the state in which ethnic Turks or Turkish-speaker Muslims were put as the first group to be admitted.

Then came the Muslim peoples who were seen as appropriate to assimilation, such as Pomaks and Bosnians. However, alongside the non-Muslims, the immigration of Albanians, Kurds and Arabs was refused. In the third chapter, I will deal with the same topic by investigating the immigration agreements signed during the period under consideration. In this respect, I will point out that the assimilative design was at stake even in the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece.

After revealing the assimilative mentality of the immigration policies, I will tackle with the issue of settlement in the chapter four. This part will point out that not only non-Muslims but also Muslims who were considered as not possessing the necessary requirements of Turkishness, such as Turkish culture, language and (especially for Kurds) the political loyalty to the Republic, were the targets of the Turkification policies. It will be revealed that the settlement policies implemented to homogenize them had two aspects. First, those immigrants who were perceived as belonging to Turkish descent were located to regions where the government had the purpose of changing the population composition for national security matters. Second, different ethnic and linguistic groups of Muslims, especially immigrants, were to be settled dispersedly to promote their Turkification.

The primary concern of the chapter five is to evaluate the implications of these issues for the analysis of Turkish nationalism and national identity. In this part, I will engage in an attempt of reconsidering the religious, linguistic and ethnic boundaries of Turkishness from a theoretical point of view.

The present study does not reject the importance of religious background in the constitution of Turkish national identity. However, the following chapters will point out that it constituted only one among other criteria. From the very beginning of the

constitution of the Republic on, Turkish language and culture were the other significant criteria of Turkishness, in the perceptions of nationalist elites. Through the empirical investigation of the migration and settlement policies, the argument of this study appears as follows.

The nation-shaping project of the Turkish Republic was based upon the layered perception of “Turkishness”. In this respect, sunni-Muslim religious background was perceived as the significant criterion to be included into the imagined boundaries of the homogenous sense of Turkish nation. On the other hand, the perceived core of Turkish national identity necessitated language and culture as the other criteria. In order to be included into the core of Turkishness one should be sunni-Muslim speaking Turkish language and possessing Turkish culture. It was this core of “Turkishness” that “others” should be assimilated in. In other words, being Muslim was significant but not sufficient criterion of Turkishness. Those Muslims, including immigrants, who could not speak Turkish should have learnt it to get assimilated into the core of Turkishness.

In this sense, the interwar-period Turkey is the classical case of what Brubaker conceptualizes as nationalizing-state. The governmental policy aimed at promoting the hegemony of Turkish language and culture, which were considered as the historical peculiarities of ethno-cultural Turkish nation. In the chapter five, I will suggest that the question of whether the interwar – period Turkey can be regarded as ethno-nationalist or not is to be considered from this angle. Regardless of how to define it, the nation-building project of Turkey necessitated Turkish language, culture and Muslim affiliation as the primary criteria of being or becoming Turk. At the same time, they were the peculiarities of constructed core of Turkish nationality, defined

with ethno-religious terms, according to which the whole citizenry should have been Turkified.

Seen from this angle, the classification of the 1920s and the 1930s as different periods in terms of the construction of Turkish national identity becomes unnecessary. In both of these periods, in the eyes of nationalist elites, the religious affiliation undertook supportive role to cement the unity of Turkish nationhood. Nevertheless, behind this consideration, in both of these periods, laid a political project that envisioned the homogeneity in religious, cultural and linguistic peculiarities of nation. This is of course not to reject the growing emphasis in the 1930s upon the Turkish ethnicity in the formulation of Turkishness. However, looking at how this tendency reflected in the political practices of the state, one can see that there was not a break but a continuum in between the 1920s and the 1930s. I will emphasize this continuum throughout my empirical investigation of settlement and immigration policies.

The apparent conclusion following from this argument is that nationalism in Turkey between 1923 and 1939 shared the similar characteristics with its Balkan counterparts. As observed by Maria Todorova, nationalism in the Balkans was constructed primarily around linguistic and religious identities<sup>108</sup>. Language, according to Todorova, was perceived by all nationalist leaders of the Balkan Peninsula as the mightiest agent of unification. This, she adds, resulted with the rigidity of the ethnic boundaries it delineated. More importantly, religion could never be a sufficient component of national self-identity in the Balkans though it was very important. Its importance, as observed by Kitromilides, derived from the nationalist states' aspirations

---

<sup>108</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 177-178.

to homogenize their societies administratively and linguistically<sup>109</sup>. They found in religion a powerful additional support to cement the unity of the new nations which the states had created. The following chapters of this study will seek to prove how similar are the characteristics of Turkish nationalism to the phenomenon of the Balkan nationalism.

Before beginning our inquiry, one more point should be emphasized. As all nationalisms, the development of Turkish nationalism involves various historical-structural tendencies that undoubtedly have imprinted their remarks on the construction of identity with which it aims to endow the population. Focusing mainly on the homogenization and immigration policies of the Turkish Republic in the interwar period, this study excludes some very important aspects of Turkish nationalism, such as westernization-modernization project, secularism, anti-communism and so on. Besides religion, language and culture on which this study focuses through the investigation of immigration and settlement policies, unquestionably, the above aspects constituted significant dimensions of the practices and identity discourse of Turkish nationalism in the era under consideration. Without taking into account such historical-particular specificities of Turkish nationalism, its disposition could never be understood and analysed sufficiently. Underlying only few aspects of nationalization in Turkey, therefore, any generalization this research suggests is inadequate. Hence, the main effort of this research is nothing but to emphasise one of the significant aspects of nation building rather than analyzing all aspects of nation-state formation in Turkey.

---

<sup>109</sup> P. Kitromilides, "Imagined Communities and the Origins of National Question in the Balkans", *European History Quarterly*, vol: 19, no: 2, 1989, pp. 184-185.

## **1. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT: THE OTTOMAN PERIOD**

Before beginning the inquiry with respect to the migration policies of the Turkish Republic and their relevance to the construction of Turkish national identity, it is inevitable to sketch out the population flows occurred throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Ottoman Empire. There are two important points that make it necessary to provide such a historical review.

First, the post-Lausanne Turkish Republic relied to an important extent on the population structure that was shaped by the migrations occurred during these two periods. When the Republic was constituted, the composition of its population was overwhelmingly Muslim. This means that hundreds of years old Anatolian Christianity had almost come to an end before the constitution of the Republic. In this respect, the pouring of Muslim immigrants from Caucasus and Balkans throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century was one of the most important reasons that determined the demographic structure of Anatolia.

The second point is that the Turkification measures implemented by the Turkish Republic was shaped around the demographic heritage of the Ottoman Empire on the one hand and the early experiences of nation building implemented by the rule of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) on the other. While the Muslim composition of the population prepared a significant but not sufficient ground to equate the state with homogenous nation, the nation-shaping policies of the Turkish Republic re-

sorted to similar instruments used by the CUP rule. Throughout the period the CUP took the direct control of the government, demographic measures including forced migration and settlement became the primary instruments for the homogenization of the population. As it will be investigated in the following chapters, the Turkish Republic employed similar instruments for the fulfillment of similar aims.

In this part, therefore, the primary purpose is to present a historical review of the migrations in the Ottoman era with special emphasis to the period after the Balkan Wars when the CUP had taken the direct control of the government.

### **1.1. Migrations to the Ottoman Empire before the Balkan Wars**

The initial massive refugee flows were the outcomes of the shrinkage of Ottoman political space that was accompanied by the centripetal migration of Muslims from the lost territories to the remaining Ottoman lands<sup>110</sup>. The first time the Ottoman Empire faced the migration problems was after the failure of Vienna Besieging in 1683. Austria-Ottoman War, between 1683-1699, caused the withdrawal of the Muslims from the borders of Austria to the inner territories of the Empire<sup>111</sup>. Subsequently, the 1774 Ottoman-Russian War that was seized with Küçük Kaynarca Treaty resulted in a massive immigration movement. Between 1789-1800, almost half a million Tatars migrated from Crimea to the remaining parts of the Empire. Some of them were settled in Beserabya and Dobruca and some of them in Anatolia. The second

---

<sup>110</sup> Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples" in Karen Barkey – Mark von Hagen (eds.), *After Empire, Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, (Boulder: Westview Press: 1997), p. 157.

<sup>111</sup> H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Balkanlar'ın Makus Talihi: Göç*, (İstanbul: Kumsaati Yayınları, 2001), p. 31.

wave of Tatar migration occurred after the Edirne Treaty that put an end to the 1828-1829 Ottoman-Russian War. That was followed by a third wave of Tatar migration with which approximately 400,000 Tatar entered into the Ottoman territories. Accordingly, it is estimated that about 1,800,000 Tatars migrated to the Ottoman Empire between 1783-1922<sup>112</sup>.

Besides these huge number of Tatar immigrants, from 1859 to 1865, the Ottoman territories witnessed another massive migration flow from the Caucasus<sup>113</sup>. The collapse of the resistance against Russian occupation in this region resulted with a wave of migration to the Ottoman territories. Triggered by Russia's pressures on the one hand, and the fled of Muslims to escape its sedentarization and Christianization programs on the other, according to Karpat, as many as 2,000,000 Circassians, Abkhazians and Chechens left Russia for the Ottoman lands in the period from 1859 to 1879. According to Karpat, only 1,500,000 of them actually survived and settled in the Ottoman domains<sup>114</sup>.

As to the migration flows from the Balkan Peninsula, the formation of national states and the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in this geography produced mass displacements<sup>115</sup>. As correctly observed by Todorova, the substantial population shifts during the nineteenth century were due mainly to political events, most prominently the emergence of the Balkan nation-states at the expense of the Ottoman Em-

---

<sup>112</sup> İlhan Tekeli, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 50, Summer 1990, pp. 55-56.

<sup>113</sup> Kemal Karpat, *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi: Toplum, Kuramsal Değişim ve Nüfus*, (Ankara: İmge Yayınları: 2002), p. 129.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>115</sup> Rogers Brubaker, "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples", p. 157.

pire<sup>116</sup>. Formulating their territorial claims during the nineteenth century, various national movements urged independent nation-states for the Balkans that would unite subject peoples whose national identities imperial domination had denied<sup>117</sup>. However, the Balkan Peninsula was the home of many different linguistic, ethnic and religious communities. Inheriting such demographic and social legacy, the emerging nation-states faced similar obstacles in equating the state with a nation and followed similar paths in creating ethnic and religious homogeneity, such as ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation and forced migration. This situation produced refugees of two sorts, moving towards opposite directions. Muslim groups moved towards the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire and Christian populations moved towards the territories they considered as the fatherland of their own nations in order of escaping Ottoman control<sup>118</sup>.

The constitution of autonomous Bulgaria and the recognition of independent status for Romania, Montenegro and Serbia after the Russian invasion of the Balkans and 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War resulted with the fleeing or expulsion of Muslims from the region<sup>119</sup>. Justin McCharty estimates that 1,253,000 Muslims were uprooted from their homes and became refugee between 1877-1880. Although the majority of them were Muslims with Turkish vernacular, there were also Bulgarian

---

<sup>116</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 175.

<sup>117</sup> Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, New York and (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 40.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>119</sup> Ahmet Akgündüz, "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers and Ethno-Religious Dimensions", p. 100.

speaking Muslim Pomaks and Circassians among these refugees<sup>120</sup>. Additionally, the Berlin Treaty that ended Ottoman-Russian War gave the control of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria. Due to the pressures exposed upon the Muslims in this region, approximately 120,000 Muslim Bosnians migrated to the Ottoman territories in the period from 1882 to 1900. 1900 was the year that the migration flow of Bosnians reached to its peak. At that time, about 150,000 Muslims took refuge in the Ottoman lands<sup>121</sup>. The last migration flow before the Balkan Wars originated from Crete Island. It is estimated that around 60,000 Muslims migrated to the Ottoman lands from 1898 onward<sup>122</sup>.

## 1.2. Migration and Settlement during and after the Balkan Wars

The year 1912 indicated for the Ottoman Empire beginning of ten years long period remarked by devastating wars that started with the Balkan Wars, carried on with First World War and closed with the War of Independence. The era of wars from 1912 to 1922 caused substantial changes in the demographic composition of Anatolia which the new Republic inherited. This was a period of chaos with extreme mortality rate and the massive population flows that resulted with a dramatic decrease in the total population of Anatolia from 17.5 million to 12 million<sup>123</sup>. It has been estimated

---

<sup>120</sup> Justin McCharty, *Ölüm ve Sürgün: Osmanlı Müslümanlarına Karşı Yürütülen Ulus Olarak Temizleme İşlemi*, p. 105.

<sup>121</sup> H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Balkanlar'ın Makus Talihi: Göç*, (İstanbul: Kumsaati Yayınları, 2001), p. 37.

<sup>122</sup> Ahmet Akgündüz, "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers and Ethno-Religious Dimensions", pp. 100-101.

<sup>123</sup> İlhan Tekeli, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu", p. 59.

that 18 per cent of the Muslim population were killed<sup>124</sup>. Besides 2.5 million Muslims, between 600,000 and 800,000 Armenians, as well as up to 300,000 Greeks lost their lives<sup>125</sup>.

By the time the constitution of the Republic was announced, Anatolia was fundamentally different from what it had been before the beginning of the Balkan Wars. The striking fact is that the developments occurred throughout this period were responsible for the end of hundreds of years old Ottoman Christianity and bestowed the emerging republic a population consisting overwhelmingly of Muslims. According to the census of 1906, the Ottoman population within the boundaries of the present-day Turkey was around 15,000,000 of which 10 % was Greek, 7 % was Armenian and 1 % was Jewish. In the census of 1927, however, non-Muslims accounted only for 2.6 %<sup>126</sup>. Of course, high rates of mortality because of the war conditions were one of the major factors that led to this dramatic decrease in non-Muslim population. But the deliberate attempts of the late Ottoman government to homogenize the population were as significant as the wartime conditions for proportional dwindling of the non-Muslim population.

Especially after the seizure of the government by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) following the Balkan Wars, migration became an important instrument resorted for the purpose of nation building. In this sense, besides coping with

---

<sup>124</sup> Zafer Toprak, "The Demographic Consequences of Lausanne Treaty in Turkey" paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September, 1998, p. 3.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3. For a more detailed investigation of censuses in the republican era, see also Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999).

the troubles posed by the massive immigrants influx to the public order, the CUP government resorted to the migration policies as a means for the constitution of homogenous nation. Thus, migration and settlement policies implemented by the CUP rule after the Balkan Wars had a fundamentally different pattern in comparison to the previous practices. Social engineering imbued with nationalist point of view was the major concern of these policies.

On the one hand, demographic regulations were used to consolidate the Muslim composition of Anatolian population. Non-Muslims came to be the targets of the compulsory deportation policies. Hundreds of thousands of non-Muslims were deported and relocated especially throughout the World War I. Besides, the first examples of the compulsory exchanges of minorities were practiced at the same period. Muslim emigrants were also exposed to the demographic regulations. Alongside the technical measures for handling the immigrant flows, a long-term perspective in terms of consolidating the sense of Turkishness among the immigrants, as well as the native dwellers of Anatolia, was developed during the implementation of settlement policies. In fact, this was part of a broader political context that was characterized by the rising of nationalism that paved the way for the measures of nation building.

During the rule of the CUP, Turkism became a dominant ideology that replaced the Islamist political discourse of Abdulhamid's rule. In fact, however, this does not mean that Turkism appeared as the sole ideological orientation within the CUP elites. Rather, as emphasized by Feroz Ahmad, the ideological symbiosis that consisted of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism was still in effect throughout the rule of the CUP. Nevertheless, the contribution of Turkism to this symbiosis rose crucially when the

CUP seized direct control of government in 1913 and faced an empire in which ethnic Turks became the dominant population group<sup>127</sup>.

Turanist-Turkist tendency had already been strong within the CUP circles but its ascendance to the dominant ideology occurred after the Balkan Wars when the Ottoman Empire lost significant parts of its territories in the wars. Most of the regions lost in the Balkan Wars were populated by non-Turks whose own nationalist impulses had undermined the basis of Ottomanist grip over those territories. Even the Muslim Albanians had launched a revolt in 1910 in the face of the Young Turk's centralizing measures. It was therefore not a coincidence that after the Balkan Wars nationalist-Turkist feelings were reinforced on the basis of the understanding that the future of the Ottoman Empire depended largely on the CUP's ability to awaken nationalist passions among the Turkish populace<sup>128</sup>

On the basis of this ideological outlook, the CUP rule enjoyed the domestic policy initiative that can be described as the nation-building effort, especially after the beginning of the World War I<sup>129</sup>. This consisted of various measures from the abolition of Capitulations to the legislation introduced in 1916 for limiting the juridical sphere of Muslim religious courts, and to the language reform in 1915. One of the primary purposes of these measures was the Turkification of the economy by the means of nationalist *etatism* designed to foster the development of a Turkish-dominated economic system. The national economy was to be led by Turkish bour-

---

<sup>127</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908 – 1914*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları), 1995, p. 187.

<sup>128</sup> Aviel Roshwald, *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923*, pp. 106-107.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

geoisie that would supplant Armenian and Greek commercial classes that had long dominated the trade and financial sectors<sup>130</sup>. Through the Language Reform, for example, the use of the foreign languages for the economic transactions was prohibited to ease for Muslim-Turks to take part in economic activities.<sup>131</sup>

Demographic regulations, therefore, should be assessed as the other significant aspect of the CUP's nationalist policies aimed to create religiously and ethnically homogenous population structure. These can be investigated under three categories.

### *1.2.1. Deportation of non-Muslims*

Although there had already been small-scale migrations of Greeks and Armenians from Anatolia to Russia in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the serious mass exoduses of the Christian population started with the World War I<sup>132</sup>. In May 1915, approximately one year later the breaking out of the World War I, the CUP government passed a law to regulate the relocations of the groups that were considered as the potential betrayers. The primary purpose in deporting and resettling the non-Muslim populations was explained to expel the non-reliable groups from the strategic places. Although its actual content did not target Armenians directly, they were the first group exposed to the relocation because of the decision of the CUP government<sup>133</sup>. Accordingly, more than 810.800 Armenians fled to the Soviet Union, Greece, France, the United States

---

<sup>130</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>131</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 1995), p. 90.

<sup>132</sup> Ahmet Akgündüz, "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers and Ethno-Religious Dimensions", p. 112.

<sup>133</sup> Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 64.

and neighboring Arab lands during the implementation of the decision<sup>134</sup>. Because of the migrations and the high rate of mortality, in 1923, only about 70,000 Armenians remained within boundaries of the Turkish Republic out of one and a half million who had lived in Anatolia before World War I<sup>135</sup>.

Greeks were the other group to be relocated. The government did not issue any special instruction for their relocation. However, viewed as a threat in the face of potential relations with Greek armies, some of them were transferred to the inner regions of Anatolia and some of them were driven to Greece. According to Ladas, in 1914, 115,000 Greeks were expelled from Turkish Eastern Thrace and sought refuge in Greece. 85,000 Greeks from the same region were deported to the interior of Anatolia. And 150,000 of them were driven from coast region of Western Anatolia and came to the shores of Greece<sup>136</sup>. However, important number of Greek refugees turned back to their home regions between 1918-1919 due to the developments discussed below<sup>137</sup>. The main period of Greek emigration started in 1922 when Greco-Turkish War resulted with the victory of the latter. At that time, around 1,350,000 Greeks left the Aegean region for Greece alongside the Greek troops<sup>138</sup>. The emigra-

---

<sup>134</sup> Justin McCharty, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, (New York and London: New York University Press, 1983), pp. 124-130.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>136</sup> Stephen Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, (New York: MacMillan, 1932), p. 16.

<sup>137</sup> Justin McCharty, *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, pp. 13-131.

<sup>138</sup> İlhan Tekeli, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu", p. 61.

tion process of Greeks was ended with the compulsory exchange of populations that will be investigated in the chapter three.

Apart from Armenians and Greeks, there were other non-Muslim groups who were exposed to the relocations during the World War I. Jews who were living in the Palestine territories forced to migrate to Damascus and Beirut<sup>139</sup>. Besides, some other non-Muslim groups including Nasturis, Süryanis and Keldanis were also relocated<sup>140</sup>.

By early 1918, long before the end of war, however, the CUP government decided to cease the resettling policy. Ongoing deportations were stopped and those who had been sent to exile were allowed to return to their homes<sup>141</sup>. More importantly, the government attempted to facilitate the returning of non-Muslims to avoid the deaths and sufferings of the kind that had taken place during the Armenian relocation. To this aim, the Department of Tribes and Refuges (Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) was put in charge of the refugees' return to their homes<sup>142</sup>. Economic problems caused by the expulsion of the communities were very important in forcing the Ottoman Government to stop deportation and resettling policy. The deportation of non-Muslims who were the few able-bodied men left after the massive conscription begun at the start of war had disrupted both agriculture and trade, adding additional trouble to the economy that had already suffered from the war condi-

---

<sup>139</sup> Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, pp. 64-65.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 65.

<sup>141</sup> Stanford J. Shaw, "Resettlement of Refugees in Anatolia, 1918-1923", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, no: 22, Spring 1998, pp. 58-59.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

tions<sup>143</sup>. Of course, British pressure for the return of non-Muslims was the major reason after the armistice and following occupation<sup>144</sup>.

### 1.2.2. *Settlement of Muslim Immigrants*

Of course, this is only one aspect of the story. From the beginning of the Balkan Wars to 1922, 435,094 Muslims from different parts of the Balkan Peninsula entered into the Ottoman domains<sup>145</sup>. The first wave of Muslim refugees arrived at Anatolia after the beginning of the Balkan Wars. Although significant number of Muslims remained on their lands or returned after the first Balkan War, they were driven out during the second war. Most of them fled the advancing armies of Balkan States. As emphasized by McCharty, they had reasonable ground for their fears that ignited the massive refugee flows<sup>146</sup>. Each of the Balkan States adopted a policy of “demographic welfare”, like the CUP government of the Ottoman Empire, in the areas they conquered. They aimed by this policy to make their “own” people an absolute majority in their lands by excluding or exterminating the groups other than their own. Muslims were the important targets of this policy.

In addition to the emigration of Balkan Muslims, there was also another refugee pouring from the Russian Caucasus. This stemmed from both the Ottoman Eastern Front in World War I and the subsequent Turco-Armenian War that resulted with a

---

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 58.

<sup>144</sup> H. Yıldırım Ağanoğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Balkanlar'ın Makus Talihi: Göç*, p. 137.

<sup>145</sup> Cem Behar (ed.), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu*, Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi, vol: 2, p. 62.

<sup>146</sup> Justin McCharty, “Muslim Refugees in Turkey: The Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence” in Heath W. Lowry – Donald Quataert (eds.), *Humanist and Scholar: Essays In Honor of Andreas Tietze*, (İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 1993), p. 89.

tragedy not only for Muslims but also for Armenians. According to the statistics provided by McCharty, approximately 272.704 Muslims immigrated to Anatolia, mainly to Kars region, at this period<sup>147</sup>.

The settlement of Muslim immigrants was deemed as an important dimension of social engineering. They were settled in the various regions of Anatolia according to the principle that aimed to increase the number of Muslims in the areas where non-Muslim groups constituted the majority. Therefore, the government paid specific attention to locate the Muslim immigrants to the areas from which non-Muslims were deported<sup>148</sup>. For this purpose, the CUP government also applied to the “celp” policy. That is, in order to increase the number of Muslim population in strategic regions, it attempted to bring the Muslims living outside the boundaries to settle in those regions besides the immigrants who migrated to Anatolia under the obligations of war conditions. In November 1917, for example, the government decided to bring Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria to settle in Çatalca region. Moreover, in December 1917, the government decided to bring the Muslims from Niş so as to settle them in the same region<sup>149</sup>.

At the same time, the CUP government did not view the incomers as a homogeneous group of people. Rising nationalist tendencies during its rule went hand in hand with the increasing sensitivity to the ethnic, religious and linguistic peculiarities of the subject population. Therefore, different linguistic and ethnic groups were subjected to different settlement policies. The major aim of this strategy was to ease their

---

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 95-97.

<sup>148</sup> Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, p. 65.

assimilation in Turkish culture on the one hand, and not to allow the clustering of the same ethnic group in the same region on the other.

In locating Albanian emigrants, for example, the government gave attention to settle them in the areas far away from the Balkans. Some regions, such as Çatalca, Edirne, İstanbul, İzmir and Karesi, were closed to the settlement of Albanian migrants<sup>150</sup>. Furthermore, they were scattered to different geographies to make their assimilation more possible. The government undertook specific measures in order to prevent their escape from the areas they were inhabited<sup>151</sup>. Though not in such a strict manner, similar measures were taken for the settlement of Bosnian emigrants. There was no regional restriction for Bosnians' settlement but facilitating their assimilation in Turkish culture was the major concern of the government in locating them<sup>152</sup>. For both the settlement of Albanian and Bosnian immigrants, the government applied to a condition according to which, in a region, the total number of the immigrants should be below ten per cent of the total Turkish inhabitants<sup>153</sup>. Besides, the government put certain restrictions to the migration of Gypsies from the Balkans to the Ottoman territories. In some cases, their entrance to the Ottoman domains was prevented<sup>154</sup>.

---

<sup>149</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

<sup>150</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 114.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 114-116.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 124.

<sup>153</sup> H. Yıldırım Ağanoglu, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Balkanlar'ın Makus Talihi: Göç*, p. 117.

<sup>154</sup> Fuat Dündar, *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, pp. 127-128.

### 1.2.3. *Exchange of Populations*

Another policy resorted to by the CUP rule for the purpose of the homogenization of population was the exchange of minority populations. This was so important a measure in effect that paved the way and prepared the ground for the later minority policy of the Turkish Republic. There is no doubt that the early experiences of the exchange of minority populations implemented during the rule of the CUP appeared to a nationalist elite to be a rational solution to Turkey's minority problem.

This policy was first carried out at the end of 1913 and involved the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. Being the first interstate treaty in modern history providing for an exchange of populations, it was formulated by the Treaty of Peace signed after the second Balkan War, on September 29, 1913, by these two states<sup>155</sup>. According to the terms of this treaty, a mixed commission charged with carrying out the exchange of populations and their properties was set up. A Mixed Commission consisting of six Ottoman and nine Bulgarian delegates met at Edirne during November 2-15 and signed a "Protocol concerning the Exchange of Populations"<sup>156</sup>. In effect, the protocol provided for the voluntary exchange of Bulgarians and Muslims within a fifteen-kilometer-wide zone along the Ottoman-Bulgarian frontier<sup>157</sup>. This protocol, indeed, recognized a *de facto* situation since the population concerned had almost already mi-

---

<sup>155</sup> Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase- A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968), p. 60.

<sup>156</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 19.

<sup>157</sup> Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase- A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, p. 60.

grated during the Balkan Wars<sup>158</sup>. It only completed and regulated this situation by giving it a legal basis and by exchanging the remaining minority populations. As a result, 9714 Muslim families or 48.570 persons from the Bulgarian territory were exchanged against 9472 Bulgarian families or 46.764 persons from Ottoman's Thrace region<sup>159</sup>.

Having succeeded in exchanging its Bulgarian minorities of Thrace, the CUP government sought to reach a similar agreement with Greece. The primary goal it hoped to achieve was to expel the Greek population living in the Aegean coast of Anatolia, who turned out to be intolerable in the face of the expansion of Greece to the Aegean Islands during the Balkan Wars. These islands were ominously close to the Aegean coasts of Asia Minor and made the linkage between around one million Greeks and Greece possible, the situation that posed serious threat, in the eyes of the CUP leaders, to the security of the Ottoman territory. Thus, they believed that Greeks must be deported and their place must be filled by Muslims<sup>160</sup>. On the basis of this consideration, the CUP government proposed an exchange of population, in May 1914, similar to the agreement reached with Bulgaria<sup>161</sup>. By the time, in order to force the consent of Greek Government to this proposal, the government had already engaged in systematic persecution against Greeks living in the Aegean coasts and

---

<sup>158</sup> Y. G. Mourellos, "The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey", *Balkan Studies*, vol: 26, no: 2, 1985, p. 391.

<sup>159</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 20.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>161</sup> Y. G. Mourellos, "The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey", pp. 393-394.

Thrace<sup>162</sup>. The main line of persecution resorted was to forcefully expel them to Greece and interior Anatolia, as mentioned above. After four days of the suggestion, the Greek government announced its consent to the exchange of population notwithstanding on voluntary and simultaneous basis<sup>163</sup>. A mixed Commission for the exchange was established in June 1914 and it held a number of meetings in İzmir. But shortly thereafter, the Ottoman Empire entered to the World War I on the side of Central Powers and the work of commission was suspended before implementing the exchange.

#### 1.2.4. *Early Attempts of Nation-Building*

What I have summarized up to here has a crucial importance to understand the dynamics of nation-building policies of the Turkish Republic. One of important points to be stressed is that the new Republic was established mainly on the demographic structure of the Ottoman Empire. Due mainly to Muslim immigrations from the Balkans and Caucasus and forced or voluntary immigrations of the non-Muslims from the country, the composition of the population the Republic inherited was overwhelmingly Muslim. One should add the high rates of mortality stemming from the massacres, wartime casualties and so on as the other important reason in the appearance of such a demographic structure.

Most importantly, the early experience of nation-building policies implemented in the period of the CUP government was seen by the founders of the Republic as a logical way of creating a homogenous nation-state. Even though the proportion of the

---

<sup>162</sup> Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase- A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, pp. 61.

non-Muslim population had decreased dramatically before the constitution of the Republic, there was still important number of non-Muslims inhabited in the boundaries of the country. Besides, the Muslim population was hardly homogenous. Kurds, Circassians, Albanians, Bosnians and so on were living alongside the Muslim-Turks in Anatolia<sup>164</sup>. The new Republic aimed to create homogenous nation-state out of this population structure. As will be investigated in the following pages of this study, the founders of the Republic employed the similar methods to this purpose. The population exchange with Greece, which had been cancelled in the period of the CUP government, was put into effect by the leaders of the Republic. Besides, like the CUP government, the new Republic resorted to the settlement policies to the aim of Turkification. In a similar way with the “celp” policy of the CUP rule, Muslim-Turk immigrants were settled to Turkify the population of some strategic places. Non-Turk immigrants, on the other hand, were settled in a scattered way in line with the assimilationist policies of the CUP rule. Accordingly, in a sense, it is not an exaggeration to state that the founders of the new Republic attempted to complete what had remained unfinished in the period of the CUP rule, in terms of the constitution of a homogenous nation, by employing almost the same instruments. In the following pages, I will examine this issue in detail.

---

<sup>163</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, pp. 21-22.

<sup>164</sup> Soner Çağaptay, “Kemalist Dönem’de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma”, p. 219.

## 2. TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY AND THE IMMIGRATION PRACTICES IN THE POST-LAUSANNE TURKEY

The basic theme with which this chapter is concerned is the immigration policies of the Turkish Republic and their relevance to the construction of Turkish national identity in the period of 1923-1939. What is given specific interest throughout this chapter is the linkage between the definition of Turkish national identity and the official texts regulating the entrance of immigrants since, as I have already noted in the introduction part, in controlling immigrant's entry, significant issues concerning the definition of national identity raises. Considering the fact that once admitted an immigrant or a refugee becomes a potential citizen, states prefer incorporating those who are likely to strengthen a prevailing national identity and cohesion<sup>165</sup>. Hence, the analysis of immigration policy of a state says much about how national identity is defined within it. Based on this argument, the question this chapter attempts to answer is as follows: to what ethnic, religious and linguistic peculiarities did Turkey give priority for the admission of immigrants?

To answer this question, two kinds of regulations employed by Turkey to control and govern immigrants' entry will be investigated. One of them comprises the official legislations adopted for governing the entry of immigrants. These are the Law on Settlement issued in 1926 (Law 885, May 31, 1926) and the Law on Settlement adopted in 1934 (Law 2510, June 14, 1934). In fact, these instructions do not solely address the issue of immigration. Rather, they were designed to construct a homoge-

---

<sup>165</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 3.

nous sense of national identity by employing the policy of settlement. Nevertheless, for analytical purposes, this subject is investigated in the chapter five. What concern us in the present part are the principles employed by these legislations for the admission of immigrants. After providing the numbers of incomers with special emphasis to their country of origin, this chapter investigates this topic in detail.

Besides the official legislations, another significant theme concerning Turkey's immigration policies is the international agreements signed with Balkan countries to regulate and control prospective immigrations. Undoubtedly, the convention concerning the compulsory exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece is the most important one of those agreements. In addition to this convention, Turkey also signed bilateral migration treaties with Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. The following chapter explores these agreements with special emphasis to the conditions and principles formulated for the prospective immigrations.

Briefly stated, these two chapters aim to reveal that the striking aspect of the immigration policies of the Turkish Republic during the 1920s and 1930s was the admission of some non-Turk ethnic communities especially of the Balkan countries alongside the Muslim-Turks. Viewing them as appropriate groups for assimilation into the cultural and linguistic coordinates of Turkish national identity, Turkey's nationalist elite provided these groups with the status of immigrant and thus Turkish citizenship. Nevertheless, this attitude was limited to those groups that were conceived as bounded to the cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire and that were perceived as the loyal subjects of the Ottoman rule. Thus, people who were considered in relation to the ethnicities that had strong national movement or independent national state were not perceived in the same way and thus were not admitted as immigrant.

They were deemed as people who could not be assimilated into Turkish national identity.

## 2.1. Immigration Figures

The period from 1923 to 1939 witnessed state-generated immigrant flows especially from Balkan countries. According to the figures provided by Cevat Geray, 823,006 persons entered Turkey as immigrants between these years<sup>166</sup>. Kemal Kirişçi estimates the same figure as 825,022<sup>167</sup> and Gülten Kazgan as 801,808<sup>168</sup>. Looking at their country of origin, we can see that the overwhelming majority of the immigrants came from Balkan countries. The most significant flow of immigrants originated from Greece under the framework of population exchange implemented after 1923. According to Geray, the number of Muslim immigrants of Greece origin was 384,000, which constituted 61.1 per cent of the total number of the immigrants between 1923 and 1933<sup>169</sup>. During the years under consideration, 198,688 migrants moved to Turkey from Bulgaria according to figure provided by both Kemal Kirişçi<sup>170</sup> and Halit

---

<sup>166</sup> Cevat Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanı*, (Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi-Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962), pp. 7.

<sup>167</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 8.

<sup>168</sup> Gülten Kazgan, "Milli Türk Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Göçler" *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol: 6, Nüfus, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), p. 1556.

<sup>169</sup> Cevat Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanı*, pp. 11. Both Kirişçi and Geray estimate the immigrants of Greece origin who migrated to Turkey because of compulsory exchange of population as 384,000. However, another important resource concerning the immigrations puts the same number as 499,239: *İskan Tarihiçesi*, (İstanbul: Hamit Matbaası, 1932), p. 137. Therefore, we can estimate that the total number of immigrants between 1923-1939 can be higher than what Kirişçi and Geray estimate.

<sup>170</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 8.

Eren<sup>171</sup>. Besides, 117,095 people coming from Romania entered Turkey during the same period. An interesting fact is that the vast proportion of migrant movement from Romania to Turkey occurred after 1933. Between 1923 and 1933, only 33,852 people left Romania for Turkey<sup>172</sup>. Finally, 115,210 people from Yugoslavia moved to Turkey during the years from 1923 to 1939<sup>173</sup>. In contrast to the Romania case, the vast majority of immigrants from Yugoslavia, which accounts for 108,709, came between 1923-1933<sup>174</sup>.

Although the overwhelming majority of officially reported immigrants came from the Balkan Peninsula, there were some other immigration movements from the Caucasus, Cyprus, Syria and so on. In December 1925, for example, a governmental decree concerning the settlement of approximately 20,000 Muslim immigrants from Cyprus was published<sup>175</sup>. In June 27, 1927, the Turkish Press revealed that some 15,000 immigrants from Syria, 10,000 from Cyprus and 50,000 from Caucasus were going to enter Turkey<sup>176</sup>. It was revealed that about 50,000 immigrants were going to leave Soviet Union for Turkey in accordance with the Moscow and Kars Treaties<sup>177</sup>. An assistant director of settlement was charged with finding out the exact number of

---

<sup>171</sup> Halit Eren. "Balkanlarda Türk ve Diğer Müslüman Toplulukları ve Göç Olgusu", *Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV) Yayınları*, 1993, p. 294.

<sup>172</sup> Cevat Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanı*, p. 11.

<sup>173</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 8.

<sup>174</sup> Cevat Geray, *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanı*, p. 11.

<sup>175</sup> "Kıbrıstan Gelecek Muhacirlerin İskanlarına Tahsis Olunan Arazi Hakkında Kannunname", no: 1118, 7/12/1341-7/12/1925, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 7, p. 130.

<sup>176</sup> "Muhacir Celbi", *Milliyet*, 27 June 1927, p. 3.

<sup>177</sup> *Milliyet*, 10 June 1927, p. 2.

them and sent to Tiflis<sup>178</sup>. There were also migrations from Georgia. Some of the Muslim immigrants of Georgian origin came to Samsun<sup>179</sup>, and some others were settled in Malatya region<sup>180</sup>. Besides, according to an official report, there were some Turks residing in Yemen who wanted to migrate to Turkey<sup>181</sup>. There were migration movements even from Finland and Jordan<sup>182</sup>. Migrations from the geographies other than Balkan countries carried on during the 1930s. In November 1934, for example, Şükrü Kaya Bey, Minister of the Interior, informed the Grand National Assembly about the number of repatriates of Turkish origin. According to information provided by Şükrü Kaya, 15.319 Muslim Turks came to Turkey during the period from June 1, 1933 to June 1, 1934. This number consisted of 4,284 persons from Russia, 325 from Syria, 1,112 from Persia and 252 from Dodocenase Islands in addition to the total of 9,476 persons from Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania and the Western Thrace<sup>183</sup>.

## 2.2. Promotion of Immigrations

An important fact is that Turkey promoted the immigrant influx to the country during these years. In 1928, for example, a special report from USA's Turkish Embassy was informing USA's Secretary of State about the Turkish propaganda in Ro-

---

<sup>178</sup> "Yeni Muhacirler", *Milliyet*, 15 June 1927, p. 3.

<sup>179</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 55.139..20, 13/11/1927.

<sup>180</sup> BCA Fon No: 272.0.0..12, Yer No: 45.75..22, 20/7/1925.

<sup>181</sup> BCA Fon No: 272.0.0..12, Yer No: 55.139..27, 19/11/1927.

<sup>182</sup> Soner Çağaptay, "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma", p. 223.

<sup>183</sup> *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 25, İçtima: 3, 12/11/1934, p. 15.

mania. This report claimed that large numbers of Turks in the Romanian Dobrudja were responding to Turkish propaganda and were migrating to new homes in Anatolia. The same report points out to existence of similar propaganda in Bulgaria. It was claimed that considerable number of Turks from Bulgaria were moving to Turkey and that much propaganda to increase such emigration was being carried on<sup>184</sup>.

Two significant themes imprinted their remarks to the Turkey's immigration policy and laid beneath the policy of promotion of the immigration flows to the country. First, as I have already noted in the preceding part, Anatolia was dramatically depopulated due to the war conditions before the construction of the new Republic. Hence, nationalist elites viewed the influx of immigrants to the country as one of the ways to increase the number of population. Hamdullah Suphi Bey, a prominent figure of Turkish nationalist movement, expressed this consideration clearly in the discussions held in Turkish Parliament.

*I wonder if those who saw the blanks in Anatolia do not agree with the necessity to bring two-two and a half million more Turks to Anatolia<sup>185</sup>.*

According to Hamdullah Suphi, in solving the demographic problems of Turkey, it was an urgent necessity to bring the Turk-Muslim communities inhabited in various corners of the Balkans and to settle them in Anatolia.

On the other hand, the promotion of immigration especially from the Balkan countries was directly connected with the nationalist discourse of the Turkish Republic. As correctly observed by Tanil Bora, the consideration of bringing the remaining

---

<sup>184</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929 (M 353), from Charles C. Wilson to the Secretary of State, 8/02/1928, 867.5574/1.

<sup>185</sup> TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt: 11, İçtima: 19, 10/12/1340-10/12/1924, p. 15.

Turk-Muslim communities of the Balkans to Turkey became the motto of imagination as to the ethnically homogenous Turkish nation and this was repeated by nationalist intelligentsia up to the end of 1930s<sup>186</sup>. In other words, the influx of immigrants to Anatolia was conceived as a factor strengthening the cohesion and homogeneity of Turkish nation. They were regarded as loyal members of Turkish nation who were sharing the historical and cultural heritage of Ottoman Empire and who were belonging to Turkish descent. Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Internal Affairs, was stating this consideration with respect to the population exchange as follows;

*The primary debt of a nation, the highest duty of a government is to assure the unity of a nation within its country. The basis of the convention of population exchange implemented in Lausanne is related with this object and formed for this object<sup>187</sup>.*

He added in the same speech that

*Thanks to Lozan Treaty, we added 500,000 people out of the strongest elements of our race to our country<sup>188</sup>.*

What is apparent in Şükrü Kaya's speech is that he conceived the immigration of Greece's Muslims to Turkey as a development strengthening the cohesion of Turkish nation. This way of thinking, in fact, was not limited with the population exchange. It was supported that, apart from those who were not aware of their Turkishness, there were millions of Turks residing in Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania and Crimea.

---

<sup>186</sup> Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", pp. 35-36.

<sup>187</sup> "Bir milletin en birinci borcu, bir hükümetin en yüksek vazifesi memleketi dahilinde milliyet birliğini temin etmektir. Lozanda aktedilen mubadele-i ahali mukavelesinin esası bu gayeye matuftur ve bu gayede istihsal edilmistir". *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: III, Cilt: 26, İçtima: 36, 19/03/1931, p. 60.

<sup>188</sup> "Biz Lozan Muahadesi sayesinde ırkımızın en kuvvetli unsurlarından 500.000 nüfusu memleketimize ilhak ettik". *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: III, Cilt: 26, İçtima: 36, 19/03/1931, p. 62.

Bringing and settling those Muslim-Turks who remained outside the boundaries of Turkey was thought as a national “ideal” as early as 1923<sup>189</sup>.

### 2.3. Official Legislations With Respect to the Immigrations

Notwithstanding the strong emphasis given to the necessity of bringing outside Muslim-Turk communities to the country, the immigrants settled in Turkey consisted of various non-Turk ethnic and linguistic groups though a significant proportion of them were Turkish-speakers. For example, the number of people whose native or secondary language was Albanian increased from 21.774 to 40.647 between the years of 1927 and 1935 according to the demographic censuses implemented in these years<sup>190</sup>. Similarly, according to the census of 1935 there were 38.141 people speaking Bosnian language<sup>191</sup> and 41,041 people speaking Pomak language as mother tongue or as secondary dialect<sup>192</sup>. We can estimate that the actual numbers must have been higher than what was provided by the official censuses and important proportion of these people came to Turkey mainly from the Balkan countries during the early years of the Republic<sup>193</sup>.

In fact, what lied beneath this matter was the immigration policies of the Turkish Republic which conceived some non-Turk Muslim communities, especially of the

---

<sup>189</sup> *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 2, İçtima: 35, 13/10/1339-13/10/1923, pp. 628.

<sup>190</sup> Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, (İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999), p. 81.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 121.

<sup>193</sup> Because of the lack of sufficient and reliable data regarding the ethnic, linguistic and national backgrounds of the incomers, I cannot give precise information about this matter.

Balkans, as part of the common Ottoman heritage and as belonging to “Turkish culture”. They were regarded as the people who could be easily assimilated into the cultural and linguistic margins of Turkish national identity that was set out to construct. In this sense, Turkey’s immigration policies had two aspects. Some non-Turks and non-Turkish speakers were accepted as immigrants and naturalized into Turkish citizenship alongside the Muslim-Turk communities of the Balkan countries. However, once admitted as immigrant and thus adopted Turkish citizenship, they were exposed, at least theoretically, to settlement policies that had been designed for assimilating them into the boundaries of Turkish culture and national identity. And these policies were substantially different from the ones directed to Turkish-speakers. In other words, once admitted, they became one of the targets of the homogenization efforts of the Turkish State. On the other hand, the settlement of Turkish-speaker immigrants especially of Balkan origin constituted the other aspect of social engineering. They were located to the districts which were thought to be delicate regions according to the national security concerns. Strengthening the Turkish composition of Thrace region, which was conceived as a vulnerable area in the face of the conflicting interests appeared in the Balkans, and Eastern regions of Anatolia, where high Kurdish density in the population put threats to Turkey’s security concerns, by settling those Turkish-speaking immigrants was one of the primary objects of Turkification measures.

This policy design imprinted its remarks to the official texts adopted for governing the immigrations into the country during the period under investigation. Having been designed mainly for the purification of the population by employing settlement policies as a tool of social engineering, the laws on settlement, adopted first in 1926 and then in 1934, included also some significant provisions over the conditions on the

basis of which immigrations into Turkey ought to be governed. For analytical purposes, I only investigate these latter provisions concerning the conditions of immigrations in the present part and focus on the other aspects of these legislations regarding the purification measures resorted by them in the chapter five. In fact, these two themes are highly interrelated. While these laws were employed as the means of constructing a homogenous sense of national identity and of purification of the population inhabited within the borders of Turkish Republic, the conditions of which immigrants had to have according to these laws reveals an important indication in terms of the imagined boundaries of Turkish national identity aimed to be created.

While investigating these legislations, one of my primary intentions is to point out the continuum existed in between the laws on settlement adopted in 1926 and 1934 with respect to the similar patterns of the formulation of migration hierarchy. This matter is very important for our topic. In analyzing the immigration policies of Turkish Republic and its connection to the construction of Turkish national identity, the existing literature deals largely with the Law on Settlement issued in 1934 and, generally speaking, ignores the other significant legislation adopted in 1926. Nevertheless, a closer analysis of both of these legislations together indicates that the former law issued in 1926 had employed similar pattern with respect to the definition of prospective immigrants. What was at stake at both of them was the differentiation of the prospective immigrants on the basis of Turkishness. In other words, they categorized immigrants as Turks on the one hand, and as individuals bounded to Turkish culture on the other. Whereas this categorization was clearly put in the law of 1934, it had been implied in the preceding law adopted in 1926 and in the relevant text issued for the implementation of it.

### 2.3.1. *The Law on Settlement adopted in 1926 and the Relevant Memorandum*

The first significant official text governing voluntary immigrations was the Law on Settlement adopted in May 31, 1926 (Law 885)<sup>194</sup>. The first article of this law charged Ministry of Internal Affairs with the tasks of admitting the immigrants and refugees to the country, and of determining their regions of settlement. The Article 2 of the Law on Settlement revealed who cannot be admitted as immigrant or refugee. According to it,

*People who do not belong to Turkish culture, who are infected with syphilis, who are subject to leprosy and their families, who are imprisoned because of committing murder except political and military reasons, anarchists, spies, gypsies, and who are exiled outside of the country cannot be admitted*<sup>195</sup>.

Apparently, this law linked the admission of immigrants and refugees to the condition of belonging to Turkish culture. However, who was to be considered as belonging to Turkish culture was not specified in this law. Indeed, aside from outside Muslim-Turk population, this category was referring to the non-Turk ethnic and linguistic peoples especially of Balkan region. Although this point was not cited in the original text of the Law on Settlement, another significant official text adopted in relation to this law makes the matter quite clear. This is “Memorandum of Settlement” published in August 1, 1926<sup>196</sup>. The last paragraph of the first article of this memorandum stated that

---

<sup>194</sup> “İskan Kanunu”, no: 885, 31/06/1926, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 7, , pp. 1441-1443.

<sup>195</sup> “Türk harsına dahil olmayanlarla sirayet devrindeki frengililer, cüzzama müptela eşhas ve aileleri, ceraiye siyasiye ve askeriye müstesna olmak üzere cinayetle mahkum olanlar, anarşistler, casuslar, çingeneler ve memleket haricine çıkarılmış olanlar kabul edilemezler”. *Ibid.*, p. 1441.

<sup>196</sup> “İskana Ait Muhtıra”, Tertip: 63, 01/08/1926 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, Naci Kökdemir (ed.), (Ankara: 1952), pp. 192-208.

*Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars are deemed as bounded to Turkish culture and the applications of Albanians, who came to Turkey before and were registered, with respect to the admission of their families are being granted*<sup>197</sup>.

Taken together, the Law on Settlement adopted in 1926 and Memorandum of Settlement issued in relation to this law reveal the ethnic and linguistic preference of Turkey in admitting someone as immigrant. Alongside the Muslim-Turk communities, Pomaks, Bosnians and Tatars were also admitted; even their migration to the country was promoted. Another significant fact is that Turkey did not promote the coming of further Albanians since they were not counted among the ethnic groups perceived as the elements of Turkish culture. Albanian immigration was restricted with the families of those who had already migrated. The immigration claims of Gypsies were also rejected.

### 2.3.2. *The Law on Settlement adopted in 1934 and the Relevant Circular*

While the Law 885 was still in effect, a bill concerning the adoption of a new settlement law was forwarded to Turkish Grand National Assembly in May 5, 1932<sup>198</sup>. As a result, a new "Law on Settlement" (Law 2510) was adopted in June 14, 1934, which replaced the Law 885<sup>199</sup>. Looking at the content and wording of this new law, one can easily recognize the fact that it was highly affected from the political context of the 1930s. During these years, ethnic considerations were emphasized in the definition of Turkish national identity at the discursive level, which was crystal-

---

<sup>197</sup> "Pomaklar, Boşnaklar, Tatarlar, Türk harsına dahil addedilmekte ve evvelce Türkiye'ye gelerek tescil edilmiş olan Arnavutların hariçte kalan ailelerinin kabulleri hakkındaki muraacatları daisaf olunmaktadır". *Ibid.*, p. 193.

<sup>198</sup> "Meclise Verilen 22 Kanun Layihası", *Milliyet*, 5 May 1932, p. 4.

<sup>199</sup> "İskan Kanunu", no: 2510, 14/06/1934, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 15, , pp. 1156-1175.

lized by the officially supported National History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory<sup>200</sup>. This was based upon the understanding that all Turks constitute a “super-family” that can be distinguished from others with its ethnic and genealogical traits<sup>201</sup>. In line with this tendency, the wording of the Law on Settlement employed frequently the terms such as Turkish race and Turkish descent, which echoed the prevailing identity discourse of the period.

This can be viewed in the special provisions specifying conditions for the prospective immigrations that were provided under the section two of Law 2510, which included four articles. According to the Article 3, Ministry of Interior was charged with accepting those people who want to be settled in Turkey. The status granted for them were defined as immigrant. On the other hand, the same article provided the definition of a refugee. This status was referred to the people who want to take shelter due to some necessities without the intention of settlement in Turkey. This article also includes a detailed stipulation upon who can be admitted as immigrant.

*The settled or nomad individuals or tribes of Turkish descent and the inhabited individuals of Turkish culture, who wish to come from outside separately or collectively with the intention of settling in Turkey, can be admitted with the order of Ministry of Interior according to the decrees of the present law*<sup>202</sup>.

There is an obvious difference between the Law 885 and the Law 2510. The term “Turkish descent” which was added to the latter law had not been cited in the

---

<sup>200</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, p. 158.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 161.

<sup>202</sup> “Türkiye’de yerleşmek maksadile dışarıdan, münferiden veya müctemian gelmek isteyen Türk soyundan meskun veya göçebe fertler veya aşiretler ve Türk kültürüne bağlı meskun kimseler, işbu kanunun hükümlerine göre Dahiliye Vekaleti’nin emrile kabul olunur”. “İskan Kanunu”, no: 2510, 14/06/1934, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 15, p. 1156.

former. However, a closer analysis of the Law 2510 reveals that it followed quite similar pattern with the preceding settlement law in putting conditions of immigrations. First, it employed almost the same exemptions on the basis of which immigrations ought to be denied. According to the Article 3, the following individuals cannot be admitted to the country.

- A) *Who are not tied to Turkish culture*
- B) *Anarchists*
- C) *Spies*
- D) *Nomad gypsies*
- E) *Who are exiled to the outside of the country*<sup>203</sup>

In fact, what was at stake in relation to the addition of the term "Turkish descent" to the Law 2510 was to make it clear what had been implied in the Law 885. Both of these laws granted immigrant status to the outside Muslim-Turk communities plus some non-Turk ethnic groups with non-Turk vernaculars though the provisions of the Law 885 did not specify any term for the outside Turkish-speaker Muslim communities. That the memorandum of settlement I have mentioned counted only Bosnians, Pomaks and Tatars as belonging to the Turkish culture means that Turkish-speaker Muslims' ties to Turkish culture was obviously taken for granted. The Law 2510 cited them in its provisions under the rubric of "individuals of Turkish descent".

Indicating which peoples were accepted as belonging to Turkish culture according to this law would make the matter clear. The original text of the Law 2510 leaves this subject to the discretion of Council of Ministers in the Article 3 and did not provide any other special expression about it. Nevertheless, another official text issued

by the General Directorate of Settlement (İskan Umum Müdürlüğü) in relation to the implementation of the Law on Settlement includes detailed description upon this matter. This is “Circular concerning the Completion of Settlement and Demographic Works Quickly” adopted in August 7, 1934<sup>204</sup>. The Article 4 of this circular reveals detailed information with respect to which groups of peoples could be provided with the status of immigrant. According to this article, the following individuals ought to be accepted as immigrant without investigation

*...the individuals of Turkish race or the individuals bounded to Turkish culture who speak Turkish and who do not know any other language...<sup>205</sup>.*

The following paragraph states that

*Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars, Karapapaks will be treated in the same way<sup>206</sup>*

These provisions made it clear who were conceived as bounded to Turkish culture. Like the Law 885 and related memorandum, Pomaks, Bosnians and Tatars were included into the boundaries of Turkish culture without hesitation. Unlike the Law 885, Karapapaks were also added to this category. Besides, the circular under investigation provides another category of peoples.

*Muslim Georgian, Lezgi, Chechen, Circassian, Abkhasian and other Muslims who are deemed as bounded to Turkish culture*

---

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1157.

<sup>204</sup> “İskan ve Nüfus İşlerinin Sür’atle İkmali Hakkında Tamim”, no: 15035/6599, 7/8/1934 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 234-239.

<sup>205</sup> “...Türk ırkından olanlara veya Türk kültürüne bağlı olupta türkçe konusup türkceden baska dil bilmeyenlere...”. *Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>206</sup> “Pomaklar, Boşnaklar, Tatarlar, Karapapaklar hakkında da aynı muamele yapılacaktır”. *Ibid.*, p. 236.

*will be signed nationality declaration according to the order of center issued for an individual*<sup>207</sup>.

Accordingly, some of the peoples especially of Caucasian origin were relegated below the aforementioned category, including Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars and Karapaks, within the hierarchy put forth by official regulations. Although the latter category were treated in the same way with individuals of Turkish descent and provided with the status of immigrant urgently, Georgians, Lezgis, Chechens, Circassians and Abkhasians were exposed to investigation of the official authorities before they were admitted to the country.

Another category of peoples was at the bottom of the hierarchy. The same circular put these peoples as follows

*Foreign Kurds, Arabs, Albanians; other Muslims who speak languages other than Turkish and all foreign Christians and Jews cannot be given nationality declaration. And they cannot be given immigrant paper. They all will be treated as foreigners*<sup>208</sup>.

Apparently, non-Muslims were in no way admitted to the country according to the circular under investigation. Besides non-Muslims, Albanians, Kurds and Arabs were not being admitted as bounded to Turkish culture and were not being provided with immigrant status and Turkish citizenship.

---

<sup>207</sup> "Müslüman Gürcü, Lezgi, Çeçen, Çerkes, Abaza, ve diğer Türk kültürüne bağlı sayılan Müslümanlar hakkında fert üzerine merkezden alınacak emirle tabiiyet beyannamesi imzalatılacaktır". *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>208</sup> "Yabancı Kürtlere, Araplara, Arnavutlara, türkçeden başka dil konuşan Müslümanlara ve alelittak ecnebi hristiyanlara ve Yahudilere tabiiyet beyannamesi imza ettirilemez. Ve bunlara muhacir kağıdı verilemez. Bunlara tamamen ecnebi muamelesi yapılacaktır". *Ibid.*, p. 237.

#### **2.4. Migration Hierarchy and the Comparison of Laws on Settlement**

What deserves specific attention here is that the Law 2510 and the relevant circular provided more detailed and extended immigration hierarchy comparing them with the Law 885 and the relevant memorandum. It not only made it known specifically the ethnic, religious and linguistic groups whose immigration ought to be denied but also added some other groups to the list of peoples who were able to be accepted as bounded to Turkish culture. These newly added groups consisted largely of Muslim peoples of Caucasian geography. At this point, it is important to pay specific attention to the hierarchy of migration by assessing together and comparing both of these legislations in order to reveal the continuities and differences between them.

First of all, it is important to note that there is a significant continuum in between the primary objects of the legislations I have investigated above. In providing the status of immigrant and thus citizenship, both Law 885 and Law 2510, and the relevant legislations, differentiated between the categories of the individuals of Turkish descent or Turkish-speakers and individuals bounded to Turkish culture, though these categories were to be treated in the same way. This was not specifically cited in the former. However, the Law 885 had implied what the Law 2510 apparently put forth by employing a negative expression of who could not be admitted as immigrant. By citing only Pomaks, Tatars and Bosnians as peoples of Turkish culture, the memorandum issued for the implementation of Law 885 implied a hierarchical view between Muslim-Turks and these non-Turk Muslims defined as belonging to Turkish culture.

This means that Turkish-speakers were at the top of the migration hierarchy according both to the laws on settlement adopted in 1926 and 1934. The circular of memorandum adopted in 1934 employed the expression of “the individuals of Turkish race or the individuals bounded to Turkish culture who speak Turkish and who do not know any other language” to specify who were at the top of the hierarchy. Accordingly, it perceived the individuals of Turkish race and Turkish-speakers under the same category. Nevertheless, the use of the term “Turkish race” indicates the impacts of the prevalent identity discourse of the 1930s upon the wording of the Law 2510. During the 1930s, this term – along with the terms of Turkish descent and ethnicity – was being repeated in other legislations issued in relation to the topics of residence and nationality. For example, the “Law concerning the Residence and Expedition of Foreigners in Turkey”<sup>209</sup> accepted in June 29, 1938 provided special facilities to the individuals of Turkish race. According to the Article 8 of this law, they were exempted from paying residence tribute, which should have been paid by all foreign individuals provided with the right of residence in Turkey<sup>210</sup>. In fact, as emphasized by Soner Çağaptay, the term of Turkish race, which can be seen in many official texts adopted in the 1930s, was referring to Turkish descent and ethnicity more than to biological, physical and so-called scientific approach of the racist ideology<sup>211</sup>. However, despite such kind of references to Turkish descent and race during the 1930s, Tur-

---

<sup>209</sup> “Ecnebilerin Türkiye de İkamet ve Seyahatleri Hakkında Kanun”, no: 3529, 29/06/1938, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 19, pp. 1649-1655.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1650.

<sup>211</sup> Soner Çağaptay, “Otuzlarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinde İrk, Dil ve Etnisite” In Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol: 4, pp. 260-261. For a general exposition of similar argument, see also Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne*

key's preference was in favor of Turkish vernacular rather than ethnic ties. One of the most important proofs of this argument was the relegation of Tatars who have explicit ties with Turkish descent below to the individuals of Turkish-speakers in the circular of memorandum of 1934. Tatars were cited as people belonging to Turkish culture alongside the Pomaks and Bosnians who have not any connection with Turkish descent.

Under the Muslim-Turks, aforementioned peoples of Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars and, in the circular of memorandum of 1934, Karapapaks constituted the second category in both legislations adopted in 1926 and 1934. In fact, we should understand the expression of "bounded to Turkish culture", employed for defining this category, as nothing but the manifestation of the belief of Turkish nationalist elites which regarded them as peoples who could be assimilated into the linguistic and cultural traits of Turkish national identity. Since these peoples had no ties with any nationalist movements or national-state, they were supposed to be the prospective members of Turkish nation<sup>212</sup>. This was the case even for the Balkan Muslims of Pomaks and Bosnians who had non-Turkish vernaculars and who had no ties with Turkish descent. Due to this consideration, the immigration of these peoples to Turkey was not only allowed but also promoted. In 1933, for example, Turkey brought 160 Tatars who had took refugee to Bulgarian city of Varna to the country with its own endeavors<sup>213</sup>. In a similar fashion, 30-40 Pomak families from Bulgaria who took refugee for Greece be-

---

*Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, pp. 155-226; Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, pp. 89-99

<sup>212</sup> Soner Çağaptay, "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma", p. 236.

<sup>213</sup> "Romanya'yı Terke Mecbur Edilen Türkler", *Milliyet*, 18 November 1933, p. 6.

cause of the pressures of Bulgarian state were brought and settled in Turkey. Turkish consul – general of Gümülcine dealt with these Pomaks and sent them to Turkey by providing even their train tickets<sup>214</sup>.

In opening the doors of Turkish citizenship to these peoples, the major reference point was the historical heritage of the Ottoman past. Galip Pekel Bey, a deputy of Tokat who was the delegate of temporary settlement committee, was referring this understanding by stating that

*...The Settlement Law divided the immigrants who will come to Turkey into two parts. The one is those who are racially Turk, other is those who have walked together with Turks throughout the history. These are, for example, Bosnians, Pomaks, Circasians and so on Muslims...<sup>215</sup>.*

It is obvious in this statement that Galip Pekel Bey implied nothing but the Ottoman past by the term of “history”. In a similar way, the official bill proposed for the admission of a new law on settlement was frequently referring Ottoman past especially in the Balkans. It supported the idea of bringing the Muslims remained there after the shrinkage and the fall of the Ottoman Empire<sup>216</sup>. Therefore, the citation of Pomaks, Bosnians and Tatars in both settlement laws as peoples belonging to the Turkish culture was not a coincidence. They were the Muslims of the regions perceived as identical with the Ottoman past. Pomaks and Bosnians were the Muslim inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula remained under Ottoman control for centuries. Similarly,

---

<sup>214</sup> “Bulgaristandan Kaçan Pomaklar”, *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1934, p. 5.

<sup>215</sup> “İskan ana kanunu hariçten gelecek olan muhacirleri ikiye bölmüştür. Birisi ırkan Türk olanlar, diğeri de tarih boyunca Türklerle beraber yürümüş olan kimselerdir. Bunlarda mesela, Boşnaklar, Pomaklar, Çerkesler, filan gibi sair müslümanlardır”. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: VI, Cilt: 3, İçtima: 22, 05/06/1939, p. 15.

<sup>216</sup> “1/335 Numaralı İskan Kanunu Layihası ve İskan Muvakkat Encümeni Mazbatası” In *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 3, Ek: 189, 02/05/1932, p. 15.

Tatars were the inhabitants overwhelmingly of Crimea that had been the other important center of the Ottoman rule. Besides, we know that there were also important numbers of Tatars residing in the Balkan Peninsula. As I have mentioned in the first chapter, they were uprooted from Crimea and settled in Beserabya, Dobruca and some other parts of the Balkan geography, especially between the years of 1789-1800. Karapapaks, who were cited only in the circular of 1934, were the only people who were not resided in the Balkans specified under this category. They were of Azeri origin who had Turkish vernacular with Azeri dialect<sup>217</sup>. Besides their Turkish vernacular, as correctly argued by Soner Çağaptay, Turkish nationalist elites welcomed them due also to their ties with Turkish descent<sup>218</sup>.

Some Muslim peoples of Caucasians, who were cited in the circular of settlement adopted in 1934, constituted another category. They were admitted as the people of Turkish culture but relegated in the migration hierarchy below the aforementioned category of people who were to be accepted to Turkey without investigation of the official authorities and to be treated in the same way with individuals of Turkish descent. In a different manner, Caucasian Muslims could be accepted with the order of authorities issued case by case. Soner Çağaptay argues that one of the factors that lied beneath the different treatment of the Caucasian Muslims from the aforementioned category was the fact that some of them were nomad peoples and Turkey was looking

---

<sup>217</sup> Peter Alford Andrews and Rüdiger Beninghaus (eds.). *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989), p. 75.

<sup>218</sup> Soner Çağaptay, "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma", p. 236.

at the nomads with suspicion<sup>219</sup>. The other factor, according to Çağaptay, was the alertness of Turkey against the communist propaganda that would be realized by immigrants of Caucasian origin<sup>220</sup>. In addition to these points, we can also add in line with Kemal Kirişçi that this was one of the indications of Turkey's preference in favor of the Ottoman past for the issue of immigration<sup>221</sup>. Since the Muslim peoples of the Caucasian geography had hardly experienced Ottoman rule, they would have been regarded in the eyes of Turkish elites as not critical as Pomaks and Bosnians.

Another important point needs to be emphasized here is that this category of peoples were not referred in the Law 885 and the relevant memorandum. Nevertheless, this difference ought not to be exaggerated. Even before the adoption of Law on Settlement in 1926, Turkey was accepting the Muslims of Caucasian under the conditions very similar to what was offered in 1934. In 1924, for example, a special notification was issued with respect to the admission of Georgian and Azeri Muslims to the country. The same notification, however, urged the restriction of places they were to be settled<sup>222</sup>. In addition, some Georgian Muslims were accepted to Turkey in 1927, when the Law 885 was in effect

The last category of peoples includes those who were viewed as having no ties with Turkish culture. While the memorandum of 1926 mentioned only Albanians and Gypsies in this category, Kurds, Arabs, other Muslims with non-Turk vernaculars and

---

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 236.

<sup>220</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 236-237.

<sup>221</sup> Kemal Kirişçi. "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", pp. 15-18.

<sup>222</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 55.139..20, 13/11/1927; *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 45.75..22, 20/07/1925.

non-Muslims were also cited in 1934 in addition to them. In truth, from the beginning of the Republic, Turkey did not give immigrant status to non-Muslims including Jews and Christians. In contrast, it tried to get rid of them whenever possible. For the Christians, the compulsory exchange of populations acted with Greece, which is investigated in the next chapter, is the clear proof of this fact. Besides, we know that there were some attempts for the settlement of Jews in Turkey. In 1933, for example, "Jewish Colonization Association" (Musevi Kolonizasyon Cemiyeti) demanded the settlement of 300,000 Jews into Turkey. If this number was found to be too high, they admitted to decrease it up to 100,000<sup>223</sup>. However, this never took place. Turkey in no way gave permission to the immigration of non-Muslims. As it is mentioned in the next chapter, even the immigration of Gagauz Christians, who had obvious ties with Turkish ethnicity, was rejected.

More important than the case of non-Muslims is the rejection of some Muslim groups, that is, Gypsies, Albanians, Kurds, Arabs and other non-Turkish-speakers. They were considered as people who had nothing common with Turkish culture. As to the Albanians and Arabs, the existence of strong national movements and independent national-states identified with these peoples was one of the most important reasons of this approach. Besides, the Arab and Albanian revolts against the Ottoman rule were still fresh in the memories of nationalist elite. For that reasons, Turkish elites assessed them as inappropriate for the assimilation into the Turkish national identity. Kurds were regarded in the same way and deemed as inappropriate for the assimilation due to their active resistance against the rule of the Republic.

---

<sup>223</sup> "Türkiye'ye Musevi Göndermek İstiyorlar", *Milliyet*, 18 November 1933, p. 6.

Accordingly, the migration hierarchy formulated by the official legislations reveals the ethnic, linguistic and religious preferences of Turkey in providing someone with immigrant status. Muslim religious affiliation and the reference to the Ottoman heritage opened the door of Turkish citizenship to some non-Turkish-speaker ethnic groups, who had no ties with an independent national-state or a nationalist movement, alongside the Muslim-Turks with Turkish vernacular. In the next chapter, I will reveal that the treaties signed for governing and regulating immigrations employed quite similar migration hierarchy, which relied upon the twofold categorization of immigrants as Muslim-Turks and Muslims of Turkish culture.

### **3. MIGRATION HIERARCHY IN THE INTERNATIONAL TREATIES OF TURKEY BETWEEN 1923-1939**

During the period under investigation, Turkey signed special agreements with Balkan countries in order to ease the influx of immigrants besides the object of regulating and controlling the migration movements to the country. This part is concerned with the analysis of these agreements through the examination of who were defined and accepted as potential immigrants and thus Turkish citizens. In particular, this part investigates three agreements signed with Balkan countries. These are compulsory exchange of population agreement signed with Greece (1923) and migration agreements signed with Bulgaria (1925) and Romania (1936). Besides these treaties ratified specifically for the regulation of immigrations, I also examine the treaty between Albania and Turkey (1923) with emphasis to the articles regarding the question of nationality and citizenship. Finally, a migration treaty signed with Yugoslavia (1938) is also examined although it was suspended and not carried out. The compulsory population exchange between Turkey and Greece is paid specific attention, due to its complexity, extent and importance in addition to its undeniable role for the analysis of Turkish national identity within the existing literature.

As it is revealed below in detail, two groups of people were at the center of these agreements. The first category included those who had already emigrated. For this category, Turkey accepted Muslim affiliation as the key of naturalization. In other words, those Muslims who had already entered the country before the ratification of agreements or before the cited date were accepted as Turkish citizens without

reference to their ethnic, national or linguistic origins. However, this was not the case for the second category. The people with whom these agreements were concerned as potential immigrants were defined as Turks. Hence, this category was less inclusive than the category of Muslim. Briefly stated, the term of "Turk" was referring to Turkish-speaker Muslims plus some non-Turkish speaker Muslim peoples who were considered as belonging to Turkish culture. The conditions put in the treaties and conventions for the prospective immigrations dealt not exclusively with Muslims but with the peoples inhabited within the various Balkan countries who were considered as appropriate for the assimilation into the linguistic and cultural boundaries of Turkish national identity. Hence, this perspective was consistent with the logic of official legislations I have investigated in the preceding part specifying who ought to be admitted as immigrant and acquired Turkish citizenship. Following this perspective, Turkey did attempt to exclude, for example, Albanians who were not counted among the groups defined as of Turkish culture in the aforementioned official legislations.

What is pointed out in this part, in fact, contradicts with widely shared wisdom over Turkey's immigration policy, the details of which were debated in the Introduction. It is generally assumed that the agreements signed throughout the early years of the Turkish Republic with respect to the immigrations were concerned with the criterion of Muslim religious background and this illuminated the decisive role of Islam in the construction of Turkish national identity. However, this argument is only partially true since it failed to grasp aforementioned different categories with which the agreements were concerned. Hence, the different classifications of the peoples with whom these agreements dealt as Muslims, who had been living in the country, and as Turks who would immigrate, into which Albanians and non-Turkish-speakers were

not included, points out the fact that Muslimness and Turkishness were different categories in the eyes of Turkish nationalist elites. The latter term was referred to Turkish-speaker Muslims and to the other Muslim ethnicities that were considered as appropriate to the assimilation. In other words, what was at stake at least theoretically for the forthcoming immigrations was not the opening of the doors of Turkish citizenship to the Muslim groups of the Balkan countries but to the peoples who could be assimilated into Turkishness.

### **3.1. The Compulsory Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey**

As it has been noted in the introduction chapter, the common starting point for the argument that conceptualizes the Muslim religious background as the basis of Turkish national identity is the compulsory exchange of minority populations between Greece and Turkey. This is based on the terms of the convention that regulates the implementation of the exchange. It is generally argued that the compulsory exchange was relied exclusively on the religious affiliation of the people to be exchanged, the fact of which, according to this prevailing argument, points out the dominance of religion in determining the definition of Turkish national identity. However, this argument fails to grasp the whole spirit of the exchange. This part, therefore, attempts to cast light upon the national aspect of the compulsory exchange agreement that is almost overlooked by the existing literature.

I do not intend here to investigate all the aspects of the population exchange. This theme has various dimensions from its important effects on the nature of Turco-Greek relations to the status of Phanar Patriarchate established in İstanbul and to the

exchange of immigrants' properties and so on. Investigating all the aspects of compulsory exchange is not only too broad agenda to tackle with here but also beyond this research's focus of analysis. What I will attempt to do is to give specific emphasis to the criteria employed by the population exchange to specify the people to be exchanged on the one hand, and to analyze their connection with the definition of Turkish national identity on the other.

### 3.1.1. *The Way to Treaty*

In the first chapter, the early attempts in regard to the exchange of minority populations between Greece and Turkey were investigated. This had been planned to be realized on voluntary and simultaneous basis in contrast to the compulsory character of the later exchange. While this early attempt was put on a shelve due to the entrance of the Ottoman Government into First World War, the second debate on the exchange of populations came into agenda during the negotiations of Lausanne Treaty that ended the catastrophic war took place in Anatolia between nationalist Ankara Government and Greece. In the meantime, the first proposal for a separate convention for the exchange of minorities was put forward by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who had been entrusted by the Assembly and Council of the League of Nation with the question of relief for the refugees from the Greco-Turkish war<sup>224</sup>. After the long and litigious discussions over the various issues with respect to the conditions of the exchange, "The Convention and Protocol concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations" and the annexed protocol was signed on January 30, 1923. This convention was signed together with an agreement concerning the restitution of interned

---

<sup>224</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 335.

civilians and the exchange of prisoners of war between Greece and Turkey<sup>225</sup>. Both were completed by a declaration in regard to the amnesty with the annexed protocol and a declaration of Muslim properties in Greece signed on July 24, 1923.

### 3.1.2. *Definition of Exchangee (Mübadil)*

Article 1 of the convention established the compulsory character of the exchange as well as defined the exchangeable persons.

*As from May 1, 1923, there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Muslim religion established in Greek territory. These persons shall not return to live in Turkey or Greece respectively without the authorization of the Turkish Government or of the Greek Government respectively<sup>226</sup>.*

In effect, the reciprocal migration was concerned with two distinct categories of people. According to the Article 3, those who had already migrated constituted the first category. This included Christians of the Ottoman Empire and Muslims of Greece who had left their home and migrated between October 18, 1912 (beginning of the First Balkan War) and January 30, 1923 (the date the convention was signed). In this category, there were around 847.931 Greeks, who had fled from Anatolia alongside the withdrawing Greek troops, and around 115,000 Muslims from Greek territory who had migrated in 1914 in response to an invitation of the CUP govern-

---

<sup>225</sup> "Türk ve Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi'ne İlişkin Sözleşme ve Protokol", for the whole text of the convention, annexed protocol and a declaration, see İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları: Tarihleri ve Açıklamaları ile Birlikte*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 1989), pp. 177-183.

<sup>226</sup> Quoted from Kallipoli K. Koufa and Constantinos Svolopoulos, "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations Between Greece and Turkey: The Settlement of Minority Questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, and its Impact on Greek-Turkish Relations", p. 288.

ment to be settled in the lands depopulated because of its deportation policy<sup>227</sup>. The second category consisted of the persons who had not left their homes hitherto and were to be transferred.

Nonetheless, the Article 2 of the convention defined certain exceptions in terms of the scope of the exchangeable persons. According to it, the exchange shall not include

- a) *the Greek inhabitants of İstanbul*
- b) *the Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace*<sup>228</sup>.

In order to prevent different interpretations, the same article defined also those who were to be considered as the inhabitants of the regions defined.

*All Greeks who were already established before October 30, 1918, within the areas under the Prefecture of the City of İstanbul, as defined by the law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of İstanbul. All Muslims established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Muslim inhabitants of Western Thrace*<sup>229</sup>.

The second category of exemption included the Greeks of the Aegean Islands İmroz (Imbros) and Bozca Ada (Tenedos), which were both granted to Turkey by the main Treaty of Lausanne<sup>230</sup>. Although the aforementioned exemption was put by the convention of population exchange, their exemption from the population exchange was provided by Article 14 of the Lausanne Treaty. This article stated that

---

<sup>227</sup> John A. Petropoulos, *The Compulsory Exchange of Populations: Greek-Turkish Peacemaking, 1922-1930*, *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, vol: 2, 1976, p. 137.

<sup>228</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 290.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 290.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 294.

*The stipulations entered into or to be entered into between Greece and Turkey concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations shall not be applicable to the inhabitants of the islands Imros and Tenedos*<sup>231</sup>.

### 3.1.3. *Analysis of the Population Exchange in relation to the Construction of National Identity*

What needs to be emphasized with respect to the convention is that the scope of the populations to be exchanged was defined at first glance on the basis of religious affiliation in spite of the nationalistic and patriotic expressions of both sides. However, a closer analysis of the convention and discussions took place in a sub-committee charged with determining the content of exchange indicates that the compulsory exchange was not free from ethno-religious considerations.

First of all, as correctly observed by Koufa and Svolopoulos, whereas the Article 1 employed the expressions of “Turkish nationals of the Greek Orthodox religion” and “Greek nationals of the Muslim religion” to define the persons to be exchanged, it is obvious from the title of the convention that the religious background was considered within the broader context of their ethnic and national consciousness<sup>232</sup>. In other words, the term “Greek and Turkish populations” of the title (Convention concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations) was referred to the persons to be exchanged and this reference reveals the fact that religious affiliation was not resorted for the sake of itself. Rather, it was conceived together with its relation to national background. Investigating the discussions took place in the sub-commission makes this argument clearer.

---

<sup>231</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 295.

<sup>232</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

The first important proof of this argument is the reciprocal use of the terms “Muslim” and “Turk” throughout the discussions took place in the sub-commission of the exchange of population. For example, while sub-commission’s report in regard to the content of its agenda was being presented to the Committee of Territorial and Military Problems, the people specified as the subject of the population exchange was defined as “Greek and Turkish minorities”<sup>233</sup>. The same report was informing the Committee as to the necessity for broadening the considered extent of the exchange regarding Turkish and Greek peoples<sup>234</sup>. On the other hand, one can encounter at the same time to the utilization of the terms “Muslim” and “Greek” for defining the exchangeable persons<sup>235</sup>. In fact, the terms “Turk” and “Muslim” was used reciprocally throughout the discussions conducted under sub-commission to determine the content of pre-draft and draft of the exchange convention.

More importantly, that religious affiliation of Muslim subjects of the exchange was perceived within the broader context of their ethnic and national origins became obvious with the proposal of Turkish delegation as to the utilization of the expression “Muslim Turks” to specify the subject of the persons who shall migrate to Turkey<sup>236</sup>. This expression was apparently considered equivalent to “Greek Orthodox” and proposed ethnical plus a religious criterion<sup>237</sup>. A similar suggestion came also from Mon-

---

<sup>233</sup> *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 1, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969), pp. 321, 333, 335.

<sup>234</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 323.

<sup>235</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 325, 336.

<sup>236</sup> *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 2, (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969), p. 368.

<sup>237</sup> Stephen P. Ladas. *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 380.

tagna who was the representative of Italy and who proposed the replacement of the words “Greek nationals of Muslim religion” with that of “Greek nationals of Turk-Muslim religion”<sup>238</sup>.

Equally important fact is that persons who had obvious ethnic affiliation other than Turkishness and who had ties with an independent state were aimed to be exempted even though they were Muslim. “The Governmental Decree Concerning the Transaction of an Instruction Arranged according to the Convention Acted with Greek Delegation in Lausanne in January 30, 1923”<sup>239</sup> affirmed this aspect of the population exchange. The Article 8 of this decree stated that

*The Government of the Turkish Grand National Assembly considering the protection of the Turks in Greece from pressure and the points regarding increasing the population in our country, if those who are citizens of another state want to be sent out of Greece based on the Lausanne Treaty, the principle about being transported to the territory of governments to which they belong, will be defended in the joint commission and they will not be sent to Turkey*<sup>240</sup>.

It is obvious in this article that with the implementation of population exchange, Turkey aimed to bring from Greece solely those who were perceived as Turk. Besides, this article reveals the determination of Turkey in denying the immigration of

---

<sup>238</sup> *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 2, p. 344.

<sup>239</sup> “30 Kanunısani 1923 Tarihinde Lozanda Yunan Murahhaslariyla Yapılan Mukavele Mucibince Tanzim Olunan Talimatnamenin Mer’iyete Vaz’ı Hakkında Kararname”, no: 2600, 17/7/1339-17/7/1923, *Düstur*, Tertip: 4, Cilt: 3, pp. 135-142.

<sup>240</sup> “Mübadele esasının kabulünde Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi Hükümeti ancak Yunanistan’daki Türkleri tazyikten kurtarmak ve memleketimizde nüfusu teksir eylemek nikat-ı nazarını istihdaf eylediği cihetle diğer bir devlet tebaası olmak şeraitini haiz bulunanlar Lozan mukavelesine istinaden Yunanistan’dan çıkarılmak istenildiği takdirde bunların irken mensup buldukları hükümet toprağına sevkleri hususu muhtelit komisyon nezdinde müdafaa olunacak ve Türkiye’ye gönderilmeyecektir”. *Ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

non-Turk elements to its territories. The same perspective was repeated in the Article 16 of the same decree.

*Those among the incoming refugees who belong to the totality of another state are not permitted to settle down in Turkey and will be returned to the country to which they are attached racially and emotionally*<sup>241</sup>.

In this respect, Albanian population of Greece was the major group to be excluded from the exchange. Indeed the aforementioned proposition of Montagna was developed to achieve this aim. The status of Albanians came into the agenda of the sub-commission due to Montagna's suggestion, which remarked the necessity to exclude "Albanians of Greece" from the scope of population exchange<sup>242</sup>. This was also supported by Greek delegate Demetrius Caclamano<sup>243</sup>. Their main argument in supporting this suggestion was based on that although the "Albanians" was sharing the same faith with Turks, they were obviously not their compatriots<sup>244</sup>.

Discussions concerning the status of Albanians with respect the population exchange was carried further during the implementation of the convention and in the Mixed Commission charged with the regulation of this process. The Albanians who became the center of these disputes were the Albanian-speaking Muslims of Chamuria, which is the area of Epirus extended between Butrinto and the mouth of Achéron and, eastward, till the foot of Mount Olystika. According to Michalopoulos, this

---

<sup>241</sup> "Muhacirin-i varide meyanında başka bir devlet mecmuasına mensup olduğu halde Türkiye'ye tavattun etmeleri tecviz edilemeyenler irkan ve hissene merbut oldukları memlekete iade edilecektir". *Ibid.*, p. 139.

<sup>242</sup> *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 2, pp. 344.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 344.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244.

was the only area of Epirus where Muslims resided<sup>245</sup>. He estimates that they numbered 20.319 people in 1923<sup>246</sup>.

The Albanian problem came into the agenda of the Mixed Commission at an early date of the implementation of exchange. Since there was no specific provision concerning the Albanian population of this area in the Convention and since their exemption was guaranteed only by the oral expression of Greek delegate, Greece had a free hand in determining in this area who is to be exchanged and who is not. In so doing, Greek authorities adopted the criterion of place of birth. Absolutely, Greece's primary aim through this policy was to get rid of as many Albanians as possible. Thus, only those who can prove to have been born in Albania were declared by the local authorities of Epirus as exempted from migration to Turkey<sup>247</sup>. Nevertheless, Albanian Government found this unsatisfactory. It claimed that Greek authorities were forcing the Greek-born Albanians of Chamuria who were equated with Turks to abandon their homes and Greek refugees from Turkey were settled in their places<sup>248</sup>. Due to this consideration, Albania initiated a diplomatic campaign against Greece. This question was discussed in December 1923 in the 27<sup>th</sup> session of the League of Nations, which decided to forward it to the Mixed Commission. In March 1924, the Mixed Commission confirmed the decision according to which Greek subjects who were Muslims and of Albanian origin ought to be excluded from the compulsory ex-

---

<sup>245</sup> Dimitris Michalopoulos, "The Muslims of Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey", *Balkan Studies*, vol: 27, no: 2, 1986, p. 304.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 304.

<sup>247</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 385.

<sup>248</sup> Dimitris Michalopoulos, "The Muslims of Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey", p. 305.

change<sup>249</sup>. Upon this decision, a special committee was organized and charged with to determine who can be considered as Albanian among the people of Chamuria. Throughout the discussions conducted in this committee, League of Nations and the Mixed Commission, two different theses over the principle of nationality struggled. While Greek side contented that country of origin should be main criterion, Albanian side espoused that speaking-language was better measure to determine the nationality of Albanians. As a result, Greek side agreed in March 1926 to the exclusion of all Chamuria Muslims by announcing that the exchange of populations had ended in Epirus and no more Muslims would leave Greece for Turkey<sup>250</sup>.

From the beginning, the position of Turkish side during these debates seemed negative as to the incorporation of Albanian Muslims, which was consistent with the decision put forth by aforementioned governmental decree. Another decree was issued exclusively upon this matter with the signature of Mustafa Kemal.

*It is decided that Çamlıkians too will not be exchanged on the basis that the Albanian Çamlık inhabitants are not subject to the exchange according to the Treaty<sup>251</sup>.*

In his reminiscence, Rıza Nur, the chief of Turkish delegation in the sub-commission of population exchange, stated that in proposing the use of “Muslim Turk” in the convention, his primary purpose was to prevent the entrance of the Albanians, who, he claims, were not Turk and evlad-ı fatihan, to Turkey<sup>252</sup>. Besides, in

---

<sup>249</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 305.

<sup>250</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 307-308.

<sup>251</sup> “Arnavud olan Çamlık ahalsinin mübadeleye tabii olmadığı muahade iktizasından bulunduğundan Çamlıklılarında mübadele edilmemesi karargir olmuştur”. *BCA*, Fon No: 30..18.1.1, Yer No: 8.39..3, 14/09/1924.

<sup>252</sup> Rıza Nur. *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları A.Ş, 1992), p. 150.

January 1927, Turkey rejected Greek Government's offers and did not allow for the emigration of Albanians of Chamuria by stating that it was impossible for them to be welcomed in Turkey<sup>253</sup>.

These debates, in fact, make the matter quite clear. As observed by Ladas, it was not with coreligionists that the Convention was dealing with but with compatriots of the contracting parties. If it was based exclusively on the religious criterion, one can expect that Albanian-speaking Muslims inhabiting in Greece, and the Armenians, Syrians, Russians and other peoples of Orthodox-Christian religion established in Turkey would be compelled to migrate. However, this was not the case. Just as Albanian Muslims were decided to be exempted, so the above-mentioned Orthodox persons who had not Greek national consciousness were excluded from the exchange, the development of which could not take place if the religious criterion was employed strictly without reference to ethnic and national principles.

However, this issue ought to be considered together with a contradictory situation appeared due to the implementation of the population exchange. Whereas the whole spirit of the exchange convention dealt with its subject people not as coreligionists but as compatriots, its execution led to ostensibly paradoxical results. On the one hand, the immigrant communities who were coerced to migrate to Turkey consisted of various peoples from different ethnic origins other than Turks and with different vernaculars other than Turkish. On the other hand, the Orthodox-Christian population coerced to migrate to Greece included those who were speaking in Turkish and using this language in their worships. Thus, reaching some generalizations in terms of the

---

<sup>253</sup> Dimitris Michalopoulos. "The Muslims of Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey", p. 310.

definition of Turkish national identity through the examination of the immigration practices signifies the analysis of this contradictory situation.

There is no specific data set with respect to the linguistic and ethnic peculiarities of the population migrated to Turkey due to the compulsory exchange. However, it is generally agreed that the significant number of incomers consisted of Greek and Albanian speakers<sup>254</sup>. Whatever the actual number of incomers who had foreign dialect, this led to negative reactions of Turkish nationalist elite. The details of this reaction and its connection with the construction of Turkish national identity will be discussed in the next chapter.

On the other hand, among the Orthodox-Christians who forced to migrate to Greece, there were an important number of Turkish speaking persons. In this respect, Karamanli population who resided around the Cappadocia region of Inner Anatolia was an important case. According to the data collected by Center for Asia Minor Studies, forty-nine Orthodox communities out of a total of eighty-nine were Turco-

---

<sup>254</sup> Some secondary sources about the Greece's Muslim communities inhabited in Greece before the population exchange would give us some clues in terms of the ethnic and linguistic composition of these immigrants. According to P. Konortas, for example, the Muslim community resided in Greece's Teselya region in the last years of Ottoman domination consisted of around 40,000 people. He urged that there were four ethnic groups among these Muslims: Turks, Albanians, Tatars and Circassians. Cited in Aleksandre Popovic, *Balkanlar'da İslam*, (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995), p. 304. Another resource written in 1858 claims that almost all Muslims of Teselya region knew Greek and they were speaking only this language. Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 305. The situation in Crete was not different. It is estimated that there were 27.852 Muslims in Crete in 1911 Cited in *Ibid.*, p. 310. N. Slousch provides information about the composition of Muslim Community of Crete for the year of 1906. According to him, it consisted of two different groups of peoples: those of Turkish origin and those of Greek origin who had converted to Islam and who had Greek vernacular at that time. Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 311-312. As to the Epir region, Popovic claims that there were approximately 155,000 Muslims in the year of 1907. According to him, this Muslim community included Albanian, Turk and Greek Muslims. *Ibid.*, p. 321. In the part of Macedonia ceded to Greece by the treaty of Bucharest in 1912, there were around 475,000 Muslims according to the statistics provided by League of Nations Refugee Settlement Commission. Due to the migrations resulting from Balkan Wars and First World War, this number decreased to 348,000 in 1920. George B. Zotiades, *The Macedonian Controversy*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1961), p. 39. Popovic urges that Muslim community residing in Macedonia was composed of following ethnic elements: Turks, Gypsies, Circassians, Albanians, Pomaks and some Valacophones. Aleksandre Popovic. *Balkanlar'da İslam*, p. 322.

phone in Cappadocia<sup>255</sup>. Psomiades claims that there were around 50,000 Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians left in Anatolia before the population exchange<sup>256</sup>. Besides speaking Turkish, their culture and way of life were not that different from the neighboring Muslim-Turk population. Furthermore, they were not only worshipping in Turkish but also writing in Turkish with Greek Alphabet, which is called as Karamanlıca<sup>257</sup>. Moreover, in 1922, “Turkish Orthodox Church” that claimed to represent Turkish Orthodox population of Anatolia was created under the leadership of a priest from Keskin region, Papa Eftim, and with the support of the Ankara government<sup>258</sup>. What is striking here, they were generally called as Christian Turks, the name of which put forth a strong reference to Turkish ethnicity. Şemseddin Sami, for example, claimed in his *Kamus-ül Alam* that the Christian population of Anatolia was racially Turk. In many articles published by Turkish newspapers between 1910 and 1922, Turcophone Orthodox population of Anatolia was declared as the individuals of Turkish race and ethnicity<sup>259</sup>.

---

<sup>255</sup> Foti Benlisoy, *Papa Eftim and the Foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church*, Unpublished M.A. Thesis submitted to Boğaziçi University-History Department, 2002, p. 1.

<sup>256</sup> Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase- A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, pp. 92. In fact, the number of Turcophone Orthodox Christians who migrated to Greece was more than 50,000. According to 1940 census in Greek Macedonia there were 80,310 Turkish-speaking people, who were mostly Orthodox immigrants from Turkey. George B. Zotiades, *The Macedonian Controversy*, (1961), p. 44.

<sup>257</sup> Mahmut H. Şakiroğlu, “Lozan Konferansı Sırasında Kabul Edilen Türk-Yunan Ahali Değişimine Ait Tarihi Notlar” in *Yusuf Hikmet Bayur’a Armağan*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985), p. 230.

<sup>258</sup> Elçin Macar. *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 84-94.

<sup>259</sup> Foti Benlisoy. “Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Katedilmemiş Bir Yol: Hristiyan Türkler” in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekinçil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 928-931.

Despite this prevailing consideration, which incorporated Turcophone Orthodox-Christians into Turkish ethnicity, however, they were not exempted from the compulsory exchange. Considering the fact that, as I have emphasized above, the whole spirit of the convention dealt to an important extent with compatriots rather than coreligionist, the decision of the Turkish Republic with respect to the immigration of these Turkish speaking Orthodox population raises important consequences for the definition of Turkishness.

One of the important themes needs to be emphasized here is that Turkey had a free hand in deciding their inclusion or exclusion to the compulsory exchange. The debates held in Turkish Parliament concerning the Lausanne Conference indicate this fact. Tunalı Hilmi Bey, the deputy of Bolu region, asked in the parliament that whether Turkish Orthodox people who had established their own church in Anatolia would be included in to the exchange. Rıza Nur, the chief of Turkish delegation in the sub-commission of population exchange, stated as a response to this question that it depends on the decision of parliament since there is no specific provision about this question<sup>260</sup>. Nevertheless, two points indicated the actual tendency of Turkish side in favor of including these people to the exchange.

In the first place, the status of “Turkish Orthodox” people vis-à-vis population exchange was not brought into the agenda of the Lausanne Conference. The sole exception was the expression of Lord Curzon supporting the exemption of them from the exchange. Venizelos also agreed with him<sup>261</sup>. As a response, İsmet İnönü ex-

---

<sup>260</sup> *TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtları, Devre: I, Cilt: 4, İnikat: 2, Celse: 3, 02/03/1339-02/03/1923*, p. 12.

<sup>261</sup> Harry J. Psomiades, *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase- A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, p. 92.

plained in the Minority Commission that Turkish Orthodox people had never desired to be treated in other way from the Muslim citizens and, he added, this could not be expected from them in the future<sup>262</sup>. However, there appeared no other expression of Turkish side during the Lausanne Conference stating or supporting the exclusion of Turkish Orthodox people from the population exchange.

More importantly, Turkey did not cite Turkish Orthodox Church among the independent churches whose members were exempted from the exchange. This issue came into the agenda of the Mixed Commission in relation to the status of Orthodox Arabs of Cilicia vis-à-vis population exchange. The Turkish delegation stated that the term "Turkish nationals of Greek Orthodox" of Article 1 of the convention should comprise all the Orthodox Christians residing in Turkey without reference to different churches. On the contrary, Greek side contended that the same article referred Orthodox Christians and Greeks at the same time. According to this interpretation, those who had not Greek national consciousness could not be exposed to the migration<sup>263</sup>. To solve this controversy, the Mixed Commission decided in December 1927 that the Article 1 indicates only those who were tied to the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Phanar and should not be applied to all the Eastern Orthodox Churches<sup>264</sup>. This decision made it clear that only those who were tied to Ecumenical Patriarchate were considered as having Greek national consciousness. What is striking in this decision is that although the Mixed Commission specified the names of the churches exempted from the exchange, "Turkish Orthodox Church", which was considered in Turkey as the

---

<sup>262</sup> *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 1, pp. 210-211.

<sup>263</sup> Foti Benlisoy, *Papa Eftim and the Foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church*, p. 112.

representative of Orthodox-Christian Turkish population, was not included. More importantly, Turkish delegation did not offer its inclusion to the list of independent churches<sup>265</sup>, the fact of which points out Turkey's intention of getting rid of its "Orthodox Turkish" population. Since "Turkish Orthodox Church" was not specified as independent church, Turkey regarded Turkish-speaking Orthodox-Christians as being tied to Ecumenical Patriarchate. Hence, Turkey implicitly accepted that Turkish-speaking Orthodox-Christians had Greek national consciousness stemming from their ties with Phanar. As a result, Karamanlı population was uprooted in accordance with the compulsory population exchange.

It is generally assumed that the decisive factor that eventually led to the decision of Turkey to include Turcophone Orthodox-Christians in the compulsory exchange was the decision held in Lausanne for the maintenance of Phanar Patriarchate in İstanbul<sup>266</sup>. Despite Turkish delegation's insistence upon the removal of Patriarchate from İstanbul, this was not accepted not only by Greek side but also by the Western representatives in Lausanne Conference<sup>267</sup>. Having been suspicious of the Greek propaganda promoted by Patriarchate and its prelates, according to this view, Turkey preferred the migration of Turcophone Orthodox-Christians. However, what was at stake was more complicated. This issue cannot be assessed properly without relating it to Turkey's minority question discussed in the Lausanne Conference.

---

<sup>264</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 382.

<sup>265</sup> Foti Benlisoy, *Papa Eftim and the Foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church*, p. 113.

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 115.

<sup>267</sup> *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 1, pp. 320-332.

In the session of the Territorial and Military Problems Commission, held in December 1, 1922, İsmet İnönü put forth clearly the close connection between the population exchange and minority question. According to him, the question of population exchange was directly linked to the solution of Turkey's minority question<sup>268</sup>. What was on the agenda in this respect was the pressure upon Turkey for convincing it to accept the existence of linguistic and ethnical minorities in Turkey, in addition to religious minorities. In the face of such pressures, Turkish side insisted on the argument that there was a cultural and historical unity among the Muslim population of Turkey and its minority issue concerned only with those non-Muslim groups due to this cultural and historical heritage<sup>269</sup>. Rıza Nur made Turkey's argument clear by stating in the sub-committee of minority question that history shows that the question of the minorities in Turkey always had reference to the non-Muslims<sup>270</sup>. What was apparent in Turkey's insistence upon minority question was that if Turcophone Orthodox-Christians remained in Turkey, they would adopt the status of minority with special rights derived from it.

Accordingly, there seems a serious contradiction in the implementation of the population exchange. While Albanian Muslims of Greece were exempted due to their ethnic and linguistic differences from Turkish population, Turkish-speaking Karamanlı population was forced to leave and Turkey accepted an important number of Greek and Albanian speaking persons as immigrants. In fact, despite this ostensible

---

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

<sup>269</sup> see Rıza Nur's statement: *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 2, pp. 175-179.

<sup>270</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

contradiction, the implementation of population exchange reveals an important propensity in terms of the definition of Turkish national identity. While it provides us with a comprehension for the religious boundary of Turkishness, we can assess, at the same time, how pertinent this religious boundary with Turkishness in its national and ethnic sense.

On the one hand, the forced exodus of Turcophone Orthodox-Christians made it clear that Turkish national identity had exclusive religious basis within the political and cultural context appeared after the War of Independence. Aside from the decisive factors explained above, the decision with respect to the immigration of Turkish-speaking Christians points out the important role of Muslim religious affiliation for the construction of Turkish national identity.

However, the function of religious affiliation ought to be understood within a broader context. Rather than being an independent category, it was considered within the context of Turkish nationality. In other words, Muslim religious affiliation was deemed together with its relation to the so-called Turkish culture into which those Muslims who were conceived as not bounded to it were not included. The case of Chamuria's Albanian Muslims indicates this aspect of population exchange. In admitting them as immigrants, Turks and non-Turks were attempted to be separated. For example, while population exchange was carried on, it was learnt that some Muslims from Parga, the district of Chamuria region, were accepted to Turkey as exchangee. Upon this information, Ali Şuuri Bey, the deputy of Karesi, asked in Turkish Parliament that if their nationality was disclosed. He added that

*While we cannot provide better condition and settle the persons of our own race, is there any opportunity to deal with people from other nationalities?*<sup>271</sup>

İsmail Kemal Bey, the deputy of Çorum, followed Ali Şuuri and asked whether were they Turk or not. The response of Cemil Bey, the Minister of Internal Affairs, to these questions reveals the discrimination between Turks and non-Turks as to their admission as immigrant. He stated that

*Since it is proven that the people of Parga are Turk and that they went along with Fatihan and settled there as a whole, only those people from Parga shall come due to the population exchange*<sup>272</sup>.

What can be inferred from this debate held in Turkish Parliament is that Muslim religious affiliation was conceived in relation to the nationality of the persons to be admitted as immigrant. In other words, while the forced exodus of Turkish-speaking Orthodox-Christians revealed that to be included into the imagined boundary of Turkishness one should have been Muslim, the Albanians case made it clear that religious affiliation was not employed for the sake of itself; rather, this was only one of the criteria for the definition of Turkishness. The exclusion of Albanians from the population exchange put reference to Turkish descent since, as I have noted above, the main argument of Turkish side in so doing was their different race and nationality. In fact, this point was not limited with the population exchange and Albanian exchangees. While the population exchange was carried out, Süleyman Sırrı Bey was asking in

---

<sup>271</sup> "Biz kendi ırkdaşlarımızı terfih ve iskan edemezken, başka milletlerle uğraşmaya imkan var mıdır?". *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 16, İçtima: 87, 25/03/1341-25/03/1925, p. 205.

<sup>272</sup> "Beynelmilel olarak, Pargalıların Türk oldukları ve Fatihan ile oraya gidip yerleştikleri sabit olduğu için, mübaleye tabii olarak yalnız Pargalılar gelmektedir". *Ibid.*, p. 205.

Turkish Parliament the nationality of 30,000 immigrants of Serbian origin whose likely influx to Turkey Turkish newspapers announced<sup>273</sup>.

Of course, this is not to suggest that all the exchangees came to Turkey due to the population exchange were of Turkish descent. On the contrary, as I have noted above, there were an important number of immigrants with Greek and Albanian vernaculars, who probably converted to Islam and who probably belonged to non-Turkish ethnicities. Indeed, Turkish bureaucracy was aware of this fact and discriminated the incomers on the basis of Turkishness. The Article 18 of the aforementioned governmental decree stated this discrimination clearly.

*Non-Turks are obliged to accept to dwell in the districts pointed out by the government; those who do not obey will be deported from the border*<sup>274</sup>.

On the other hand, the Article 17 of the same decree allowed to those who were defined as Turks to settle to the places they preferred<sup>275</sup>. The next chapter will examine the attempts of Turkey for the Turkification of these “non-Turk” people and its relevancy to the construction of Turkish national identity. Nevertheless, what needs to be emphasized here is the validity of the migration hierarchy I have debated in the preceding part in the implementation of the population exchange. In other words, alongside the Turkish-speakers, Turkey admitted non-Turkish-speakers due to the compulsory exchange. However, once admitted they were exposed, at least theoretic-

---

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 205.

<sup>274</sup> “Gayr-i Türk olanlar hükümetin irae edeceği menatıkta iskanı kabule mecbur olup isga etmiyenler huduttan ihrac olunacaktır”. “30 Kanunisani 1923 Tarihinde Lozanda Yunan Murahhaslariyla Yapilan Mukavele Mucibince Tanzim Olunan Talimatnamenin Mer’iyete Vaz’ı Hakkında Kararname”, no: 2600, 17/7/1339-17/7/1923, *Düstur*, Tertip: 4, Cilt: 3, p. 138.

<sup>275</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

cally, to different settlement policies from Turkish-speakers, which aimed to assimilate them into Turkish national identity. At the same time, the immigrations of Chameria's Albanian Muslims were rejected since they were not regarded as people who could be assimilated because of their ties with an independent state and strong nationalist movement. Lastly, the population exchange proves that whatever their ethnic and linguistic peculiarities, non-Muslims were in no way considered as appropriate for the assimilation. The following part investigates the same problematique through the analysis of the other treaties signed with Balkan countries in order to regulate immigrations.

### **3.2. Other Agreements Concerning Migrations and Nationality**

Turkey signed two bilateral agreements with Bulgaria and Romania with the object of promoting and regulating immigrations. Although, in contrast to the population exchange convention, the terms of them provided an opportunity of voluntary migrations for the minority peoples of the contracting parties, the category of people with whom Turkish side dealt as prospective immigrants were Muslim-Turks and those Muslims who were considered as appropriate to the assimilation. In this respect, these agreements followed a similar logic with the case of population exchange. One more migration treaty was signed with Yugoslavia in 1938 but this was not implemented. On the other hand, one of the aims of these treaties was to naturalize those who had already migrated. In this sense, Muslim religious background was accepted as sufficient condition for acquiring Turkish nationality.

### 3.2.1. *The Agreement with Albania*

Though it did not include any special provision for immigration, the bilateral treaty signed with Albania was the first example implemented for this last object since it dealt with the question of citizenship of the contracting parties' nationals residing in the opposite sides. It was signed in December 15, 1923 and ratified in Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 6, 1925<sup>276</sup>. This treaty was composed of three parts. The first part was "Mutual Friendship Agreement Ratified between the Turkish Republic and the Albanian Government"<sup>277</sup>. In this part, contracting parties declared their determination for preserving and maintaining friendly relations. Besides, in Article 3, they declared their mutual agreement upon acting a residence contract and a nationality contract.

The Article 1 of the Residence Contract provided the reciprocal traveling and residence rights in the other party's territory for the contracting parties' citizens<sup>278</sup>. The Article 2 made it clear that these rights were not referred to the question of immigration and could not harm the contracting parties' rights of regulating migrations. What particularly important for our topic is the Nationality Contract<sup>279</sup>. It provided that both Albania and Turkey shall give citizenship to the other party's people residing in their own territory. Nevertheless, those who were over the age of 18 could choose to leave their present citizenship and could adopt other country's nationality.

---

<sup>276</sup> "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Arnavutluk Hükümeti Beyninde Mün'akit 15 Kanunuevvel 1339 "1923" Tarihli Muhadenet Muahedenamesi Hakkında Kanun", no: 602, 6/04/1341-6/04/1341, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 6, pp. 203-218.

<sup>277</sup> "Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile Arnavud Hükümeti arasında Munakif Muhadenet Muahedenamesi", *Ibid.*, pp. 204-206.

<sup>278</sup> "İkamet Mukavelenamesi", *Ibid.*, pp. 207-214.

In other words, according to the Articles 2 and 3 of this contract, Turkey undertook to give Turkish citizenship to the Albanians residing in its own country unless they chose Albanian nationality. The same was also obligation for Albanian side according to the conditions of the nationality contract.

In accordance with this agreement, Turkey found out the number of Albanian people residing in Turkey. It was revealed in July 1927 that there were approximately 30,000 Albanians in Turkey<sup>280</sup>. According to news published by *Milliyet*, 1400 of them preferred Albanian nationality, which, according to Article 3, resulted with the obligation of leaving Turkey within one year<sup>281</sup>. In another news, it was revealed that at least 9,000 Albanians chose Turkish citizenship<sup>282</sup>. An interesting fact about the nationality contract is that religious background was not specified as the condition of acquiring Turkish citizenship. In this sense, it was different from the treaty signed with Bulgaria in which Muslim affiliation was put as a primary condition of acquiring Turkish citizenship without the status of minority. However, the Albanian population residing in Turkey was overwhelmingly Muslim, which was not the case for Bulgarian population living in Turkey.

### 3.2.2. *The Agreement with Bulgaria*

The scope of the agreement signed with Bulgaria was broader than the one acted with Albania in the sense that besides the questions of nationality and minorities, it

---

<sup>279</sup> "Tabiyet İtilafnamesi", *Ibid.*, pp. 215-218.

<sup>280</sup> "Kaç Arnavud Var?", *Milliyet*, 15 July 1927, p. 3. The actual number may have been below than 30,000 since, according to 1927 census, there were 22.754 Albanian-speaking person in Turkey. Cited in Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, pp. 81-83.

<sup>281</sup> "Kaç Arnavud Var?", *Milliyet*, 15 July 1927, p. 3.

also included a provision for the prospective immigrations. This was acted in October 18, 1925 and ratified in Turkish Grand National Assembly in August 17, 1926<sup>283</sup>. It included three parts: "Friendship Agreement between the Turkish Republic and Bulgarian Kingdom"; "A Protocol added to the Friendship Agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria" and "A Residence Convention between Turkey and Bulgaria".

What specifically concern us are the added protocol and, more importantly, residence contract. With the Part A of the former, Bulgaria and Turkey undertook to recognize all the minority rights provided by Neuilly and Lausanne Agreements to each other. This means that Turkey granted to its Bulgarian minority the entire minority rights cited in Lausanne Treaty while Bulgaria granted to its Muslim minority the entire minority rights cited in Neuilly Treaty. According to a note added to Part A, Turkey recognized Christian Turkish citizens with Bulgarian mother tongue as Bulgarian minority. Part B of the added protocol provided citizenship to the people who had migrated to the opposite sides. Thus, Turkey recognized the Bulgarian nationality of the Christian population who had been born in its 1912 borders and who had migrated to Bulgaria up to the date of agreement. In a similar way, Bulgaria granted to recognize all the Muslims who had been born within its borders of the year of 1912 and who had immigrated to Turkey up to the day this agreement signed as Turkish citizens. It is apparent in this provision that Muslim religious background was accepted as the key of acquiring Turkish citizenship.

---

<sup>282</sup> "Dokuz Bin'den Fazla", *Milliyet*, 19 July 1927, p. 4.

<sup>283</sup> "Türkiye-Bulgaristan Umumi Protokol ile İkamet Mukavelenamesi", for the whole texts of agreement, protocol and convention, see İsmail Soysal. *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları: Tarihleri ve Açıklamaları ile Birlikte*, pp. 253-263.

However, this was true only for those Muslims who had already entered the country. For the prospective incomers, another condition was specified as the key of acquiring Turkish citizenship in the residence convention. According to its Article 2, contracting parties granted not to put obstacles to the voluntary immigration of Bulgarian Turks and Turkish Bulgarians. They were provided with the opportunity of bringing their animals and portable goods to the country they immigrated in addition to the rights of selling their fixed goods without restriction. What is important here is that Turkey employed different criteria in granting citizenship to those already migrated and in admitting prospective immigrants. While Muslim people of Bulgarian origin residing in Turkey were provided with Turkish citizenship without any reference to their national origins, Turkey cited Turkishness as a condition in admitting new immigrants. This points out the fact that Turkishness and Islam were different categories in the eyes of Turkish nationalist elites.

However, in line with the assimilationist perspective which perceived some Muslim groups as bounded to Turkish culture, Bulgarian-speaking Pomaks of Muslim religion residing in Bulgaria were also admitted to the country along with Turkish-speaker Muslims. Especially between the years of 1930 and 1935, an important number of Pomaks immigrated to Turkey in the face of assimilation campaigns targeting them<sup>284</sup>. Their immigration took place under the framework of residence contract.

### 3.2.3. *The Agreement with Romania*

Aside from the population exchange, having been the unique implemented agreement signed solely for regulating immigration in the period under consideration,

“The Contract Organizing the Immigration of Turkish Inhabitants of Dobruca” followed the same logic expressed above<sup>285</sup>. This contract was acted between Turkey and Romania in September 4, 1936 and ratified in Turkish Grand National Assembly in January 25, 1937<sup>286</sup>. Its main object was expressed with “the legitimate desire of the Dobruca population of tying again to their natural ethnic origins”<sup>287</sup>. According to its Article 1, “Muslim-Turk establishments of Durostor, Caliaacra, Köstence and Tulcea shall be benefited from this contract”. Article 2 of the contract provided that Romanian citizens who are originally Turk and Muslim inhabiting in the above mentioned provinces are allowed to leave Romania within five years according to the conditions described in this contract. It is apparent in these articles that this contract targeted Muslim-Turk communities of Dobruca region and put Turkishness as the condition of immigration.

It is important to note here that the migration treaties signed with Bulgaria and Romania employed different terms in defining the national condition for the prospective immigrants. Whereas the former used “Turk”, the latter put “Muslim-Turk” for this object. In fact, the primary aim of using this second definition was to prevent the immigration of Christian Turcophones, called “Gagauz Turks”, residing in Romania, especially in its Beserabya region. This issue deserves further attention because it

---

<sup>284</sup> Tsevetana Georgieva, “Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians”, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol: 12, no: 3, July 2001, p. 308.

<sup>285</sup> “Dobrucadaki Türk Ahalinin Muhaceretini Tanzimeden Mukavelename”, for the whole text of the contract see *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 18, pp. 253-270.

<sup>286</sup> “Türkiye ile Romanya Arasında Mün’akid ‘Dobrucadaki Türk Ahalinin Muhaceretini Tanzim eden Mukavelename’nin Tasdiki Hakkında Kanun”, no: 3102, 25/01/1937, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 18, p. 252.

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 52.

casts light upon the religious dimension of Turkish national identity like the forced immigration of Karamanli population I have mentioned in the preceding part.

The Gagauz population of Romania became widely known in Turkey throughout the 1930s. In this respect, the efforts of Hamdullah Suphi, who were attended as Turkish ambassador to the Bucharest in 1931, had undeniable role. Throughout the years he carried out this duty, Hamdullah Suphi attempted to spread Turkish national feelings among the Turkish-speaking Christians, namely, Gagauzs. Besides seeking to improve their relations with Romanian Muslim Turks, he also propagated the idea of how necessary their immigration to Turkey. In fact, he was not alone in this consideration. Yaşar Nabi, in his book “Balkanlar ve Türklük” published in 1936, also put emphasis to the necessity of bringing and settling Gagauz Turks to Turkey. According to him, the only way of preventing their assimilation to Romanian nation was to promote their immigration to Turkey, the idea of which was also shared by Hamdullah Suphi. In supporting this idea, both Yaşar Nabi and Hamdullah Suphi claimed that they were undeniably Turks who were using Turkish even clearly than Anatolian Turks who were exposed to the cultural and linguistic domination of Arab and Persian cultures. To prove their Turkishness, Yaşar Nabi investigated their culture, language and other aspects of way of life such as their songs, literature and traditions besides their clear Turkish consciousness<sup>288</sup>.

Their Turkishness was also supported in the Turkish Press. According to news published by Cumhuriyet, there were approximately 130,000 Gagauz Turks inhabited

---

<sup>288</sup> Yaşar Nabi, *Balkanlar ve Türklük*, (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936), pp, 75-100.

in Beserabya<sup>289</sup>. It was contended that since they saved their Turkish mother tongue, these Christian Turks did not lose their Turkish national consciousness. The name Gagauz was considered as the proof of their Turkish descent since it stemmed from “Kara Oğuz”, one of the historical Turkish tribes. The same news also revealed that there was a strong political tendency of forcing Romanian government to accept them as a national minority. Besides speaking Turkish among each other, they were also demanding Turkish teacher for their children who were studying in Romanian and Bulgarian schools. Another news appeared in *Cumhuriyet* provided a translation of an article published by Kadrovel, a Romanian newspaper. The name of this article was “Christian Turks in Romania”. Its author supported that it is not true to equate Turkishness with Islam. Indicating the efforts of Gagauz Turks for becoming a national minority recognized by Romanian state, this article claimed that the perspective of equating Turkishness with Islam could lead Turkey to lose millions of its brothers<sup>290</sup>.

Notwithstanding this prevailing consideration supporting Turkishness of Christian Gagauz population, they were not allowed to immigrate to Turkey. The incorporation of the term “Muslim-Turk” to the migration treaty acted between Turkey and Romania not only made their immigration to Turkey impossible but also affirmed one of the aspects of Turkey's immigration policies implemented in the period under in-

---

<sup>289</sup> “Romanya Türkleri Ne Halde”, *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1934, p. 4. Yaşar Nabi claimed that their number was as many as 300,000. Yaşar Nabi, *Balkanlar ve Türklük*, p. 61.

<sup>290</sup> “Romanya’da ki Hristiyan Türkler”, *Cumhuriyet*, 15 January 1934, p. 3.

vestigation, that is, preventing the immigration of non-Muslims to Turkey. Turkey accepted only some 70 Gagauz students in 1935, who in time converted to Islam<sup>291</sup>.

#### 3.2.4. *The Agreement with Yugoslavia*

Turkey signed another immigration agreement with Yugoslavia though it was not ratified in Turkish Grand National Assembly and thus not implemented<sup>292</sup>. Like the contract acted with Romania, this agreement designed solely for the regulation of immigration. "The Convention Concerning the Regulation of the Immigration of Turkish Population Residing in the South Serbia Region of Yugoslavia" signed in July 11, 1938<sup>293</sup>. With this convention, Turkey undertook to accept 40,000 families from Yugoslavia within six years from July 1, 1939 on. The second paragraph of this convention determined the regions from where immigrations would originate. According to it, the Muslim-Turks of the following regions were provided with the opportunity of voluntary immigration to Turkey.

1. *Vardar: Prizren, Dragashi, Suhareka, Ferizaj, Tetova, Gostivar, Rostuša, Dibra, Struga, Prištine, Kačanik, Gjilan, Preševa, Prespa, Ohri, Kırçova, Kruševa, Poreçi, Manastir, Morikova, Kavadar, Negotin, Üsküp, Kumanova, Veles, Sveti Nikola, İştip, Koçani, Radoviç, Strumiça, Valandova, Gevgeli, Kriva Palanka, Kratova, Carevo Selo ve Berova;*

2. *Züt: Peç, Istog, Mitrovitsa, Gjakova, Rahovets;*

---

<sup>291</sup> Mustafa Baydar, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları*, (İstanbul: Menteş Kitapevi), 1968, pp. 157-161.

<sup>292</sup> Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, "Albanian Migratons and the Problem of Security in the Balkans", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, 2001, no: 6, p. 85.

<sup>293</sup> "Yugoslavya'nın Güney Sırbistan Bölgesinde İkamet Eden Türk Nüfusunun Göçü ile İlgili Konvansiyon", for the whole text of this treaty, see Hakif Bajrami, "Konventa Jugosllavo – Turke e Vitit 1938 Për Shpërnguljen e Shqiptarëve" in *E Verteta Mbi Kosoven Dhe Shqiptaret ne Jugosllavi*, (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Të Shqipërisë Instituti I Historisë, 1990), pp. 334-340.

### 3. *Morava: Podujevo, Vuçitrin/Vushtria ve Dreniça*<sup>294</sup>

The Article 1 of this convention defines who would emigrate from these regions to Turkey. It is important to note here that this article put forth a national criterion that was quite similar to what was offered by the official legislations investigated in the preceding chapter. With this convention, the immigration of Yugoslav Muslims whose origin and language is Turk and who owned Turkish culture was to be regulated. Nevertheless, this did not come into effect since the convention was not ratified by the Turkish side. According to Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu, the major reason of this was mainly economic. This convention was compiled to include 40,000 families, covering around 200,000 immigrants. Alongside the huge number of immigrants received from Bulgaria and Romania, according to Baklacioğlu, the implementation of this convention was going to bring economically and socially heavy burden to Turkey, also struggling with the approaching World War II<sup>295</sup>.

### 3.3. Immigration Treaties and Turkish National Identity

What can be inferred from the analysis of the treaties signed with Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia with respect to the issues of immigration and nationality is that there was a religious and national hierarchy in admitting persons to Turkish citizenship. First, it was certain that non-Muslims were not accepted as Turk and they were excluded from Turkey whenever possible. The Karamanlı and Gagauz cases are the clear proofs of this argument. Although it was apparently accepted that

---

<sup>294</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 337.

<sup>295</sup> Nurcan Özgür Baklacioğlu. "Albanian Migratons and the Problem of Security in the Balkans", pp. 84-85.

they were from Turkish descent/ethnicity and were sharing Turkish culture, they were not incorporated into Turkish nationality. Whereas Karamanlı population was sent to Greece in accordance with the population exchange, the immigration of Turcophone Gagauz community of Romania were not admitted.

What needs to be emphasized here is that Gagauz community were not brought and settled in Turkey despite the growing critics with respect to the compulsory immigration of Karamanlı population to Greece. This criticism became prevalent during the 1930s, the years of which Turkish national identity started to be based on ethnic considerations at the discursive level, crystallized by the officially supported National History Thesis and Sun-Language Theory. Yaşar Nabi, for example, explained the forced immigration of Christian Turks following the War of Independence as a big historical mistake. According to him, their only mistake was to accept Christianity during Byzantium rule and, apart from this fact, they were undeniably Turks approved by historical, linguistic and ethnographic facts. Hence, he claimed, by forcing to leave them, Turkey deprived of one of its historical richness. The interesting point is that Nabi tied this issue to the necessity of bringing Gagauz Turks to Turkey. He stated that

*We probably lost now Anatolia's and Thrace's Christian Turks entirely, whom we gave with our own hands. But, they have also brothers who are living outside the country and who are not lost. Gagauzs, the number of which is 50,000 in Bulgaria that remained from the massive homogenizations and of which can be estimated as 300,000 in Romania, are maintaining their Turkishness strongly<sup>296</sup>.*

---

<sup>296</sup> “Kendi elimizle verdiğimiz Anadolu ve Trakya'nın Hristiyan Türklerini –aksini dileyelim- belki artık büsbütün kaybetmiş bulunuyoruz. Fakat onların, memleket dışında yaşayan ve henüz kaybedilmemiş kardeşleri de var. Sayıları, Bulgaristan'da kütlece temsilardan arta kalmış elli bin ve Roma-

In 1937, Ahmet Emin Yalman put forth a similar argument with respect to the forced immigration of Turkish-speaking Christians while supporting the necessity of the promotion of Turkishness propaganda among the outside Turks.

*If we had today's mind, there would be a broad Turkish Orthodox Church in our country and hundreds of thousands people, who are undoubtedly Christian Turks, would not flow outside to the motherland*<sup>297</sup>.

As early as 1928, Hamdullah Suphi underlined in an interview with British Ambassador that the expulsion of Karamanlı Christians from Turkey was a mistake. He stated that they were the purest blooded Turkish group in Anatolia who were uncontaminated with Greek propaganda. Thus, their inclusion into the compulsory exchange was “a mistake of first magnitude” to which he was “strongly opposed”<sup>298</sup>. According to Mustafa Baydar, in propagating and promoting the mass immigration of Gagauz Christian Turks to Turkey, Hamdullah Suphi's primary aim was to recover the mistake committed by sending Christian Turks away from Anatolia<sup>299</sup>.

Notwithstanding the strong arguments favoring the settlement of Gagauz Christians into Turkey, which was supported also as an excuse of the forced exodus of Turcophone Christians to Greece, they were not admitted. Taken together with the Karamanlı case, this proves that there was no ground for Christians, whatever their ethnic and linguistic backgrounds were, within the imagined boundary of Turkish na-

---

nya'da üçyüzbin olarak tahmin edilebilen Gagauzlar, Türklüklerini sapasağlam muhafaza ediyorlar”. Yaşar Nabi. *Balkanlar ve Türklük*, p. 61.

<sup>297</sup> “Eğer bugünkü aklımız olsaydı memleketimizde geniş bir Türk Ortodoks kilisesi mevcut olurdu ve hristiyan türk olduğuna şüphe olmayan yüz binlerce insan ana vatanın haricine akıp gitmezdi”. Ahmet Emin Yalman, “Hariçteki Türkler”, *Tan*, 4 August 1937, p. 1

<sup>298</sup> Cited in Foti Benlisoy, *Papa Eftim and the Foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church*, pp. 178-179.

<sup>299</sup> Mustafa Baydar, *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları*, pp. 157-161

tion. Moreover, this was the case not only at the early years of the young Turkish Republic but also during the 1930s, the years of which ethnicity-oriented face of Turkish nationalism became dominant with a strong reference to the secularist and modernist identity discourse.

The category of Muslim affiliation stood at the second level of the hierarchy. Turkey gave the right of citizenship to the Muslims residing in its own territories without paying attention to their ethnic, linguistic and national affiliations. The agreements signed with Albania and Bulgaria did not cite any national or ethnic terms in providing them with the opportunity of naturalizing into Turkish citizenship. By means of these agreements, Turkey implicitly accepted Muslim religious affiliation as a key of acquiring Turkish nationality, however, only for those who had already migrated to Turkey or who were inhabited within its territories by the time these agreements were acted. What lied beneath this practice was the recognition of Turkish nationalist elite with respect to the potential of assimilating and molding the diverse Muslim ethnic groups from the Balkans into the actual or preferred Turkish national identity they had set out to construct<sup>300</sup>.

Finally, Turkishness was at the top of the hierarchy. Muslim religious background was not viewed as sufficient condition for the incorporation of further immigrants. Whereas the residence convention signed with Bulgaria employed the term "Turk" and put national principle for the prospective immigrations, migration treaties signed with Romania and Yugoslavia employed "Muslim-Turk" for the same purpose. Similarly, as I have debated above in detail, the whole spirit of the compulsory exchange

---

<sup>300</sup> Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 18.

convention dealt not with Muslims but with the compatriots of Turkey, which was crystallized with the exemption of Chamuria Muslims of Greece from the exchange. It is certain that the category of Turkishness was not totally separated from the Muslim religious faith of the communities whose migration to Turkey was promoted. In contrast, this was perceived as the first condition to be cited as Turk and to be allowed to immigrate. Nevertheless, the category of Turk was more critical than what the category of Muslim implied. This included in the eyes of nationalist elites not all the Muslim inhabitants of the Balkan countries but Muslim-Turks and those who were viewed as appropriate to the assimilation into Turkish national identity. They were Bosnians, Pomaks and Tatars but not Albanians and Gypsies.

#### **4. HOMOGENIZATION THROUGH SETTLEMENT POLICIES**

The major concern of this chapter is to examine the settlement policies of the Turkish Republic which aimed to homogenize the population living within its borders. In fact, this issue is highly related with the pattern of immigration policies implemented during the 1920s and the 1930s since the policy design resorted for the settlement of immigrants constituted one of the major aspects of Turkey's nation-shaping policies. In other words, just as the Republic's immigration policies were based upon the ethnic and linguistic hierarchy, so were its settlement policies shaped around the perspective of constructing culturally and linguistically homogenous nation. As it will be demonstrated below in detail, two major strategies were developed in the settling of immigrants. First, those Turkish speaking immigrants, who were perceived as belonging to Turkish descent, were located to some regions whose composition of the population the government intended to Turkify, due especially to the security concerns. Second, different ethnic and linguistic groups of immigrants, who were designated as possessing Turkish culture, were to be settled in a scattered way - and not to strategic areas- to promote their assimilation. Most of the official regulations published in relation to the issues of settlement and immigration followed these principles and thus tied the settlement of immigrants to the ethnic and linguistic conditions.

Indeed, investigating the settlement policies of the Turkish Republic within the period of 1923-1939 has crucial importance for analyzing the constructed boundaries of Turkish national identity. As I have debated in detail in the introduction part, it is

generally assumed that what can be inferred from the admission of non-Turk Muslim ethnic groups to the country indicates the decisive role of religion in the construction of Turkish national identity. In truth, however, espousing the argument that Turkish national identity was based upon the Muslim religious affiliation through the investigation of immigration policies presupposes that Turkish nationalism was integrative vis-à-vis Albanians, Pomaks, Bosnians, Tatars and other immigrants from different ethnic and linguistic origins. In other words, such an argument presumes that they were incorporated within the boundaries of Turkishness with cultural and linguistic traits they had owned prior to immigration.

However, this argument fails to grasp important aspects not only of immigration policies but also of the settlement policies implemented in the era under consideration. In the last two chapters, I have demonstrated that rather than accepting the immigrants due solely to their Muslim religious background, Turkey admitted non-Turkish-speaker Muslims because of the belief that considered them as appropriate for the assimilation. From the very beginning of the Republic, this assimilationist perspective was at stake in the settlement policies. In that sense, Turkish nationalism was assimilative with respect to the non-Turkish or non-Turkish-speaker immigrants rather than being integrationist or dissimilationist. In other words, drawing upon the concepts of Rogers Brubaker we can argue that it involved creating a target population, namely immigrants, similar to the reference population, namely native Turks, whose putative characteristics are conceived as normative for the citizenry as a whole<sup>301</sup>. Hence, unless the Muslim immigrants fulfill the expectation of assimilation,

---

<sup>301</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, p. 88.

they were not included into the imagined boundaries of Turkishness. In other words, Turkishness was referred to these immigrant communities only if they could adapt themselves to Turkish language and culture.

Of course, what I have argued about the immigrants from different ethnic and linguistic groups can be generalized and extended over to other Muslim elements whose cultural and linguistic traits were deemed as intolerable. Rather than addressing solely non-Turkish speaker immigrants, the Republic's settlement policies were concerned also with homogenizing these elements, including Kurds, gypsies, nomads and other non-Turkish speaker Muslims residing in the interior. Thus, alongside the immigrants of different ethnicities, Turkishness was open to these elements as long as they could be assimilated culturally, linguistically and, especially for Kurds, politically. By means of the settlement policies, the Republic endeavored to mix them with the Turkish-speaker native population -who were considered as the legitimate owner of the state- to achieve this aim.

In the next chapter, I will dwell upon the meaning of this argument for the analysis of Turkish nationalism and national identity more extensively. Here, I will concentrate merely upon the social engineering project implemented by means of settlement policies. This issue will be investigated within two periods, that is, before and after the Law on Settlement adopted in 1934. In so doing, my primary aim is to emphasize that the homogenization of the population was on the agenda of the settlement policies before the adoption of this law and that it followed the assimilative design of the preceding practices of settlement.

## 4.1. Settlement Policies in the Period from 1923 to 1934

### 4.1.1. Ministry of Exchange Reconstruction and Settlement

Throughout the years of the 1920s and the 1930s, a significant number of official legislations, decrees and regulations were issued concerning the settlement and re-settlement not only for the immigrants and the refugees but also for the nomadic tribes and the rebellious groups that inhabited in the Eastern Provinces. Undoubtedly, as I have noted before, the laws on settlement adopted in 1926 and 1934 were the most important ones of these official texts. Nevertheless, the new Republic should have handled in its early years the massive immigrant flows especially those from Greece came under the framework of population exchange, and the huge number of population remained homeless because of the devastating impacts of the period of wars. To cope with the troubles posed by the necessity of settling homeless people and immigrant groups, in October 13, 1923, a special ministry was established, that is, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement (Mübadele İmar ve İskan Vekaleti)<sup>302</sup>. This ministry was charged with the tasks of improving the construction of places distraught because of the war conditions besides the settlement of exchangees, other immigrants and refugees, and the homeless people<sup>303</sup>. It was provided with sweeping powers to take decisions on questions concerning these matters, and to

---

<sup>302</sup> Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925)*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), p. 28.

<sup>303</sup> "Mübadele İmar ve İskan Kanunu", no: 368, 8/11/1339-8/11/1923, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 5, p. 407.

use all state employees and the military and police authorities in line with the above-mentioned objective<sup>304</sup>.

Although the Republic was under the burden posed by the massive number of immigrant influx and of homeless people, from the early years on a long-term perspective of social engineering was developed in the official texts dealing with these matters. For the settlement of exchangees of Greece origin, one of the primary policies was the distinction of Turks and non-Turks. Before the establishment of Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement, a special decree including stipulations about this matter was published in July 17, 1923, that is, "The Governmental Decree Concerning the Transaction of an Instruction Arranged according to the Convention Acted with Greek Delegation in Lausanne in January 30, 1923"<sup>305</sup>. In the last chapter, I have provided the provisions of this decree about the rejection of the immigration of those who were found as inappropriate to live in Turkey. Besides, this decree includes very important provisions about the settlement of exchangees, which reflect the prevailing assimilative mentality of the Republic directed to non-Turkish-speaker Muslims.

In the first place, the Articles 17 and 18 of this decree tied the issue of the settlement to a national condition<sup>306</sup>. The former article leaves the decision of where to settle to the initiative of Turk exchangees as long as they could afford the required costs without any demand from the government. Nevertheless, according to the latter

---

<sup>304</sup> Stephen P. Ladas, *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, p. 707.

<sup>305</sup> "30 Kanunisani 1923 Tarihinde Lozanda Yunan Murahhaslariyla Yapilan Mukavele Mucibince Tanzim Olunan Talimatnamenin Mer'iyete Vaz'ı Hakkında Kararname", no: 2600, 17/7/1339-17/7/1923, *Düster*, Tertip: 4, Cilt: 3, pp. 135-142.

article, it was obligatory for non-Turks to settle in the regions provided by the government, whatever their material conditions were.

On the other hand, the Article 29 made it clear on what conditions the government aimed to organize the settlement of the non-Turk and non-Turkish-speaker immigrants.

*By taking into account that the most difficult obstacle to the civil and social improvement is the dissimilarity in the language and customs, the proportion of the immigrants, whatever race or nationality they belong, whose language and customs belong to another race shall never be over 20 percent in any Turkish town and village<sup>307</sup>.*

The following article approves this perspective by stating that in settling the immigrants their professional and racial traits will be taken into consideration, in addition to the geographical and economical features of the places they immigrated from.

It is apparent in these stipulations that the government aimed to settle the non-Turkish-speaker exchangees and immigrants on the basis of the conditions that made their adaptation to Turkish culture and language in the best way possible. By restricting their proportion to 20 percent in Turkish towns and villages, it was being hoped to make their assimilation possible without posing any threat to the social order especially of the rural areas.

This assimilatory perspective was connected in Turkish National Assembly with the prevailing idea of creating a homogenous nation-state in the discussions over the

---

<sup>306</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 138.

<sup>307</sup> "Hangi ırk ve milliyete mensup olursa olsun lisan ve adatin tehalufu medeni ve ictimai terrakkiyatın en çetin manii bulunduğu daima nazar-ı dikkatte bulundurularak herhangi bir türk kasaba ve köyünde

adoption of a law concerning the establishment of the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement. Besim Atalay Bey, one of the prominent figures of Turkish nationalism, pointed out the dangers of settling the individuals who own the language and customs of one different national group in an area. In a similar fashion, Abidin (Daver) urged that the new Ministry should settle the immigrants by taking into account the necessity of their mixing with the “original inhabitants” (sekene-i asliye)<sup>308</sup>.

In the early years of the Republic, the government attempted to follow this mentality in the settling of immigrants. In particular, it was careful against Albanian and Bosnian immigrants and endeavored to settle them in a programmatic way. As early as August 4, 1923, the Turkish Grand National Assembly sent a decree to most of the provinces of the country inquiring about the situation of Albanian and Bosnian immigrants<sup>309</sup>. This decree demanded information from the local authorities concerning the number of those immigrants inhabited within the boundaries of the provinces and the locations where they had settled. Besides, it also asked that how many further Albanian and Bosnians immigrants could be settled. The replies of the local authorities to this decree reflected the attention given to the settlement of these groups. For example, the government was informed that out of the 16 Albanian families from Kosova and Manastır, 10 families were settled in Bor region and 6 families were settled in the

---

lisan ve adeti başka bir ırka mensup muhacirinin miktarı yüzde yirmiye asla tecavüz etmeyecektir”.  
*Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>308</sup> *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 3, İçtima: 48, 04/11/1339-04/11/1923, p. 216.

<sup>309</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 16.66..1, 04/08/1923.

center of Niğde district. Another telegraph informed the government that there was no possibility of transferring the Albanians and Bosnians from Bursa to İzmit<sup>310</sup>.

In the last chapters, I have provided detailed information about the attitudes of the Republic against the immigration of Albanian people. On the basis of the consideration viewing them as inappropriate for assimilation, their immigration was seemed as unacceptable. Nevertheless, there were an important number of Albanians in the country. In 1927, 21,744 Albanians were residing in Turkey according to the census implemented in this year<sup>311</sup>. Not to mention the fact that, important number of them immigrated to Turkey before the constitution of the Republic. In addition, Turkey could prevent the Albanian immigration in the population exchange only from Greece's Chamuria region. Thus, we can estimate that important number of Albanians entered the country during the implementation of the population exchange. Because of this situation, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement paid specific attention to their settlement. An instruction issued by the Ministry is very informative about this attitude.

*It is decided to transfer the 500 Albanian people who dwell in İzmir-Bornova to interior regions. It is requested urgently to be made known that how many families could be settled in the province conditionally to the abandoned Armenian properties and in a scattered way<sup>312</sup>.*

---

<sup>310</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>311</sup> Fuat Dündar. *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, p. 81.

<sup>312</sup> “İzmir’de Bornova’da mukim 500 nüfus Arnavud’un dahile nakli mukarardır. Bunlardan ermeni emval-i metrukesinde olmak ve mütefferik surette yerleştirilmek şartıyla vilayet dahilinde kaç hanenin iskana kabil olabileceğinin biltahakkuk isari rica”. *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 19.90..10, 11/06/1924.

This decree, which was sent to the local authorities of Niğde and Burdur provinces, reveals important aspects of the Republic's settlement policies in its early years. On the one hand, the specific condition it provided reflects the assimilative perspective of the settlement policies. The Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement aimed to prevent their settlement together in one region, which would make their assimilation difficult. On the other hand, this decree reveals another policy design the Republic developed from its early years on. The settlement of non-Turk immigrants to some areas, which were conceived as delicate regions according to the national security concerns, was viewed as inappropriate. Thrace was one of such kind of regions due to its proximity to the borders. Aegean coastal region was the other delicate area in the face of the tensions with Greece and subsequently with Italy. Due to the overwhelming Kurdish composition of its population, Eastern region was conceived under the same category. In the following pages of this chapter, I will investigate the policies resorted for the Turkification of these regions and the critics directed to the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement for the settlement of non-Turkish-speaker immigrants to the Aegean region. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized here that in most cases the interior Anatolia was the preferred place where non-Turk immigrants were located. In March 16, 1923, for example, another group of Albanian immigrants were transferred from İzmit to the interior provinces of Konya and Eskisehir<sup>313</sup>.

In truth, Albanians and Bosnians were not the only group of people whose settlement in a delicate region was prevented. Pomaks, who were defined to be pos-

---

<sup>313</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 16.65..1, 16/03/1923.

sesing Turkish culture in the official texts regulating immigrations, were treated in the same way. In March 17, 1924, for example, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement issued a decree asking for information about the number and professions of the Pomaks whose settlement in Thrace was rejected<sup>314</sup>.

Besides the immigrants of the Balkans, similar measures were undertaken for the people of Caucasian origin in the early years of the Republic. For example, an instruction issued by the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement revealed that a group of Circassian immigrants was transferred to Malatya and Niğde due to political concerns<sup>315</sup>. Although the kind of political reasons that had led to their deportation was not overtly mentioned in this instruction, it reveals how the settlement practices was utilized by the Republic in line with the social-engineering measures. Another direction issued by the Ministry points out to the attention given to the settlement of Caucasian immigrants and reflects the suspicious attitude of Turkey's nationalist elite against them. This direction urged the restriction of the settlement districts of Georgian and Azeri immigrants besides the rejection of the immigration of the White Russians<sup>316</sup>.

Gypsies were one of the other targets. The primary aim of the government was to settle the Gypsies, who were living overwhelmingly as nomadic tribes, in a scattered way. In August 3, 1924, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement issued a decree for this purpose. This decree demanded the settlement of the ex-

---

<sup>314</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 17.79..6, 17/03/1924.

<sup>315</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 18.96..9, 11/06/1924.

<sup>316</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 30..18.1.1, Yer No: 9.27..8, 28/05/1924.

changee gypsies before the winter from the local authorities of the provinces<sup>317</sup>. In a similar way, another directive urged the settlement of immigrant gypsies who had been transferred from Adana to Malatya to the “appropriate” regions<sup>318</sup>.

An official legislation, “a Law concerning the Immigrants, Refugees and Nomads who Change Their Settlements without Permission”, published in November 30, 1925, proves the determination of the government for the application of the rules of settlement<sup>319</sup>. This law made it obligatory to inhabit for five years in the areas of settlement specified by the government. In fact, before the adoption of this law, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement dealt with this issue. For example, it was learnt that 44 exchangees from Drama who were settled in Samsun went to İstanbul without permission. Upon this information, the Ministry urged the transfer of these exchangees from İstanbul to their original settlement place of Samsun with the directive issued in January 29, 1924<sup>320</sup>. Furthermore, in March 6, 1924, it published a special instruction that urged the settlement of the exchangees of Greece to the pre-determined places assigned in the agreement<sup>321</sup>. Nevertheless, faced with the increasing number of escapes, the government saw it necessary to adopt a special law about this matter<sup>322</sup>. Thanks to this law, it attempted to fix the places of immigrants where

---

<sup>317</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 76.33..6, 03/08/1924.

<sup>318</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 47.88..20, 18/02/1926.

<sup>319</sup> “Mahalli İskanlarını Bila Mezuniyet Tebdil Eyleyen Muhacir ve Mültecilerle Aşair Hakkında Kanun”, no: 675, 30/11/1341-30/11/1925 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 18-19.

<sup>320</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 17.44..77, 29/01/1924.

<sup>321</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.11, Yer No: 17.81..6, 06/03/1924.

<sup>322</sup> *İskan Tarihçesi*, (İstanbul: Hamit Matbaası, 1932), p. 65.

they had been settled. In effect, these official regulations were concerned especially with the elements that were perceived as non-reliable. For example, an instruction issued in May 11, 1925 urged the transfer of a group of exchangees who had left the areas of Çanakkale and Bursa, to their original settlement places<sup>323</sup>. The important point here is that this group had emigrated from Greece's Crete Island whose Muslim population consisted of an important proportion of Greek-speakers<sup>324</sup>. Alongside the Albanians, Bosnians, Pomaks and Gypsies, the government attempted to be cautious in settling the exchangees from Crete. This policy design was carried on in the subsequent years. In 1933, for example, an official report was urging the application of the aforementioned Law 675 carefully for the exchangee Gypsies who had left their official settlement areas of Mersin and had gone to İzmir<sup>325</sup>.

Evidently, alongside the necessity of coping with the demographic chaos, an assimilatory perspective was also on the agenda of the settlement policies in the early years of the Republic. In practice, however, this could not be realized successfully and the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement became the target of harsh criticism in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

#### 4.1.2. *The Abrogation of Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement*

The problems appeared in the settlement of exchangees was the major theme of the critics that were brought into the agenda of Turkish National Assembly upon the

---

<sup>323</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 44.70..8, 11/05/1925.

<sup>324</sup> Aleksandre Popoviç, *Balkanlar'da İslam*, pp. 313-318.

<sup>325</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 63.190..5, 07/03/1933.

interpellation of Esat Bey, who was the deputy of Menteşe region<sup>326</sup>. This consisted of the following questions directed to the Ministry.

- 1) *How many immigrants and exchangees had come?*
- 2) *How many immigrants and exchangees had been settled?*
- 3) *Where and how much reconstruction had been made?*

The interpellation of Esat Bey ignited the discussions and the expression of the critics with respect to the implementation of the settlement policies. Some of the critics were related to the material difficulties, which resulted with the casualties and immigrants' material losses. Many examples of the administrative mistakes and improprieties leading to the sufferings not only of the exchangees but also of the other immigrants, and homeless people were criticized throughout this discussion<sup>327</sup>.

In fact, besides the problems derived from such reasons, as emphasized by Ayhan Aktar<sup>328</sup>, there were also significant structural obstacles to the settlement of the immigrants in a healthy way. The lack of reliable statistics in the hands of the government over population structure, economic situation and the housing conditions of the country was one of the important obstacles<sup>329</sup>. For this reason, the government could not be successful in settling the immigrants efficiently. Moreover, it is needless to say that the long period of wars combined with the catastrophic impacts of the Greek invasion gave way to the worsening of the housing conditions of the country.

---

<sup>326</sup> BCA, Fon No: 30..10.0.0, Yer No: 6.38..2, 19/10/1924.

<sup>327</sup> TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt: 9, İçtima: 49, 30/10/1340-30/10/1924, pp. 81-107.

<sup>328</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, pp. 32-41.

<sup>329</sup> Ayhan Aktar, "Homogenizing the Nation; Turkifying the Economy: Turkish Experience of Populations Exchange Reconsidered", p. 13.

In addition, although the number of population Turkey accommodated due to the population exchange was twice as many as the immigrant influx Greece had to handle, before the immigrants of Greece came to the country lots of housings were plundered by the local homeless people<sup>330</sup>. Aside from leading to the tightening relations between immigrants and local inhabitants, this caused serious troubles for the settlement of immigrants and refugees<sup>331</sup>. These themes constituted one of the primary subjects of deputies' critics indicating the growing discontent about the practices of the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement.

Nevertheless, another topic uttered repeatedly by most of the deputies in their critics about the settlement practices is more important for the focus of the present work. Looking at their statements in the National Assembly, one can see that the Ministry was found unsuccessful in settling non-Turkish-speaker immigrants according to the assimilative design. In this respect, one of the most important critics directed at the Ministry was the admission of Albanians as exchange and their settlement together in İstanbul and İzmir. Rıza Nur Bey for example, directed sharp critics to the Ministry about these matters<sup>332</sup>.

In fact, the settlement of the Albanians was brought into the agenda of the National Assembly before the interpellation of Esat Bey with another motion submitted by Mehmet Bey, the deputy of Çanakkale<sup>333</sup>. This motion demanded information over the settlement of Albanians to Erenköy district of İstanbul. As it becomes obvious

---

<sup>330</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 10.

<sup>331</sup> Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925)*, pp. 138-143.

<sup>332</sup> *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 9, İçtima: 49, 30/10/1340-30/10/1924, pp. 84-87.

with the speech of Mustafa Necati Bey, the former chief of the Ministry, the Albanian-speaking Muslims of Greece's Yanya region, who had emigrated to Turkey due to the population exchange were the center of this dispute<sup>334</sup>. Nevertheless, the critics were not limited to Albanian speakers. Hamdullah Suphi's speech makes it clear that what was perceived as problem was not only the settlement of Albanians in a wrong way but also the broader failure of the Ministry in applying the assimilatory principles of settlement provided by the aforementioned official regulations.

*They settled the Greek-speaking people around Istanbul. This is a gross error. They settled the incomers of Yanya from Gekbuze towards here. Some of them were settled to Çatalca and it's surrounding. However, if there is a language different from Turkish in the areas inhabited by the overwhelming Turkish majority, we must isolate it (Applauds). They settled the Greek speaking masses right across the sea from the islands. A grave mistake! Soon, when peace truly reigns and if relations between the islands and our shores pick up and the Greek islanders and Greek-speaking masses reestablish contact, then it will be impossible to eradicate this language<sup>335</sup>.*

Ali Şuuri Bey, the deputy of Karesi, directed similar critics to the implementation of settlement policies.

*The Zeytinler village of Edremit consists of 568 dwellings and out of these dwellings, 200 are native people (ahali-i kadime), 200 are Bulgarian-speaking Pomak Turks, and an undetermined number of people was speaking Albanian and Bosnian languages. Among the people inhabited on the coast, the domi-*

---

<sup>333</sup> BCA, Fon No: 30..10.0.0, Yer No: 6.33..18, 05/12/1923.

<sup>334</sup> TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt: 10, İçtima: 2, 05/11/1340-05/11/1924, pp. 62.

<sup>335</sup> "İstanbul etrafına rumca konuşan halkı yerleştirdiler. Bu hatayı fahiştir. Gekbuze'den bu yana Yanya'dan gelenleri iskan ettiler. Bunların bir kısmı da Çatalca ve havalisine yerleştirildi. Halbu ki biz, Türk ekseriyeti kahiresiyle meskun olan yerlerde Türk lisanından başka herhangi bir lisan varsa izale etmeye mecburuz (alkislar). Adalar sahiline rumca konuşan kitleleri getirip yerleştirdiler. Büyük bir hata oldu. Yarın, öbür gün, vaziyet daha sükuna gittikten sonra, adalar sahilleriyle temas başlar, rumca konuşanlarla Rum adaları arasındaki kitleler hali temasa gelirse bu yabancı lisanı boğmanın imkanı kalmaz". TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: II, Cilt: 9, İçtima: 49, 30/10/1340-30/10/1924, pp. 92.

*nant dance is Polka instead of our national dance; the dominant musical instruments are the mandolin and the bagpipe instead of our national instruments; the dominant language is Albanian and Bosnian instead of our national language. Is this, too, a question of appropriations?*<sup>336</sup>

Apparently, the settlement of the non-Turkish-speaking immigrants together in a region without separating them into different areas to ease their assimilation constituted one of the most important themes of the critics. Such critics did not only target the Albanian-speakers but also Bosnians, Gypsies, Pomaks, Circassians and the immigrants of Crete. Rıza Nur, for example, targeted the mistakes of the Ministry in settling the Circassians and the immigrants of Crete, alongside the Albanians and Bosnians, in his critic of the Ministry<sup>337</sup>.

In a way, these critics can be thought as the individual reactions of some deputies. However, having in mind the aforementioned governmental decree defining the principles of the settlement on the basis of national and linguistic criteria, we can infer from these critics that the Ministry was found unsuccessful in applying the assimilative mentality of the Republic's settlement policies despite its endeavors I have revealed above. It is therefore not a coincidence that approximately one month after this parliamentary debate, on December 11, 1924, the Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement was abrogated and its duties were delegated to the Department of Settlement created under the Ministry of Interior with the Law 529<sup>338</sup>.

---

<sup>336</sup> “Efendim, Edremit’in Zeytinler karyesi 568 hanedir ve hanelerden ikiyüzü ahali-i kadime ikiyüzü Bulgarca konuşan Pomak Türkü, tayin edemediği miktarda Arnavutça, Boşnakça konuşuyordu. Sahildeki kısımların ahalesinde milli raks yerine polka, milli çalgı yerine mandolin, gayda, milli lisan yerine Arnavudça, Bosnakça hakimdir. Bu da mı tahsisat meselesidir?”. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 10, İçtima: 2, 05/11/1340-05/11/1924, p. 28.

<sup>337</sup> *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 10, İçtima: 4, 05/11/1340-05/11/1924, p.152.

<sup>338</sup> “Mübadele İmar ve İskan Vekaletinin Lağvile Vazifesinin Dahiliye Vekaletine Devri Hakkında Kanun”, no: 529, 11/12/1340-11/12/1924, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 6, pp. 37-38.

On the other hand, considering the early practices targeted at the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants together with the conceptions of deputies, that are reflected in their statements, reveal the fact that linguistic and cultural homogeneity of the population was one of the top items on the agenda of the settlement policies from the beginning of the Republic. In that sense, the laws on settlement issued in 1926 and 1934 and other official legislations have followed the assimilative mentality regarding the non-Turkish-speaker Muslims formulated in these early years.

#### 4.1.3. *The Law on Settlement adopted in 1926*

After the closure of Ministry of Settlement, the Republic carried on its social-engineering measures in a more systematic way crystallized by the adoption of lots of official legislations in relation to the issues of settlement and re-settlement. The major purpose of these legislations were made clear by Besim Atalay's speech verbalized in the Turkish Grand National Assembly in which he called for the preparation of a regulation designed for the Turkification of non-Turkish-speaker elements.

*At what time will we make Turkish the language of the people we called as Turk? I wonder, why we do not compel, why we do not oppress. Why do the Albanians who had come here speak Albanian? Why does Bosnian speak Bosnian language and Circassian speaks Circassian language?*<sup>339</sup>

This statement, in fact, reflects clearly the political atmosphere of the period in which Turkification of the non-Turk Muslims constituted an important agenda. Shortly after Besim Atalay made his speech in the parliament, the law on settlement

---

<sup>339</sup> "Biz ne vakte kadar, hangi güne kadar Türk dediğimiz halkın dilini Türkçe yapacağız. Acaba neden cebretmiyoruz, neden sıkıştır mıyoruz? Buraya gelen Arnavud neden Arnavudça konuşacak? Boşnak Boşnakça, Çerkez Çerkezce konuşacak". *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 74, 20/03/1926, p.271.

(Law 885) was adopted on May 31, 1926 that was one of the most important pieces of legislations of the years of the 1920s designed for this purpose<sup>340</sup>.

In the chapter two of this study, I have provided the stipulations of the Law 885 with respect to the immigration criteria. However, the major aim of this law was to regulate the settlement policies in the face of the ongoing immigration influxes. Looking at its content, we can see that besides the immigrants, this law included significant stipulations for the settlement of nomad tribes, and the gypsies of Turkish nationality as well. In this sense, it provided an important instrument of social engineering to the government for the homogenization of the population. Hence, the Ministry of Interior, particularly Department of Settlement created under it, was provided with a sweeping power in terms of governing the settlement policies by means of the Law 885's stipulations. Its Article 1 leaves the decisions in terms of determining the settlement regions of the immigrants, who come to Turkey individually or collectively, and of their transfer to these places to the initiative of the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, according to the Article 3, the settlement of the nomad individuals and tribes is left to the decision of the Council of Ministers, which is to be implemented by the Ministry of Interior. There is also an important provision for the gypsies. According to the Article 5, whereas the gypsies of the Turkish nationality ought to be settled in an "appropriate" region, foreign gypsies are to be ejected outside of the country.

Up to the year of 1934, when a new and more extensive law on settlement was adopted, this law was used as one of the important instruments of the Republic's assimilation policies. During this period, the Ministry of Interior endeavored to be care-

---

<sup>340</sup> "İskan Kanunu", no: 885, 31/06/1926, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 7, , pp. 1441-1443.

ful in settling the immigrants in line with this assimilatory perspective. For this aim, the Ministry tried to learn the linguistic and ethnic composition of the provinces to designate the appropriate places of settlement for refugees. A special report from the Ayaş district, for example, informed the Ministry of Interior over the numbers of Turk, Gypsy and Bosnian immigrants besides the numbers of Muslims from Bulgaria and Romania<sup>341</sup>. This is a very detailed report including a table over the nationality of population structure and revealing information street by street. For instance, there were 48 Bosnians inhabited in İhsaniye Street, which constituted the 100 per-cent of the composition of the population there. In Hacı Recep Street, on the other hand, 422 Turks constituted the 99,2 per-cent of the population. There were also 6 Muslim Gypsies inhabited in another street of Ayaş. A similar report from Düzce province was informing the government about the names and the numbers of populations of the villages which were inhabited by the non-Turk elements<sup>342</sup>.

Aside from the immigrants, nomad individuals and tribes were also exposed to settlement thanks to the aforementioned stipulation put by the Article 3 of the Law 885. An interesting fact with respect to this issue is that the government distinguished the Turk and non-Turkish-speaker nomads and exposed these two categories to different manners of settlement. As to that of who were defined as Turk nomads, the government chose to settle them together. With a governmental decree and the approval of Council of Ministers, for example, a nomadic tribe consisting of 150, so-called, Turk people were transferred from the Aksaray region to the Amarat village

---

<sup>341</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.65, Yer No: 6.5..6, 10/05/1927.

<sup>342</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 59.161..6, 18/06/1928.

and settled there together<sup>343</sup>. In a similar way, 279 nomad individuals of so-called Turkish race from the various villages of Sorgun district were settled together in the Çat village<sup>344</sup>. However, another governmental decree dealt with a nomad tribe from Artvin province, whose individuals were called as “Hemşinli”, in a different way<sup>345</sup>. Indeed, the term of Hemşinli used in this decree was referring to a kind of Muslim group speaking Armenian language as mother tongue<sup>346</sup>. Similar to the general way of treating the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants, this decree ordered the transfer of the Hemşinli nomads to the interior regions. Furthermore, it did not specify any settlement place and rather demanded their transfer to the interior “provinces”. This means that the Hemşinli people were going to be scattered to the various regions of settlement according to the decree.

As to the Gypsies, an instruction sent to Mersin province by the Ministry of Interior makes the meaning of the term of “appropriate region” quite clear, which was used for the settlement of this group in the Article 5 of the Law 885<sup>347</sup>. This decree was about the 146 exchangee Gypsies who had fled from Mersin to İzmir without the permission of the authorities. They had been re-brought to Mersin in line with the aforementioned law 675 making obligatory for the settled people not to change the original settlement places. Upon the question of the local authority of Mersin

---

<sup>343</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 30..18.1.2, Yer No: 26.12..15, 02/03/1932.

<sup>344</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 30..18.1.2, Yer No: 40.78..8, 05/11/1933.

<sup>345</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 30..18.1.2, Yer No: 40.78..2, 05/11/1933.

<sup>346</sup> There are also Turkish-speaker Hemşinlis. But the Hemşinli groups inhabited in Artvin region were overwhelmingly Armenian-speakers. For general information on Hemşinli people, see Peter Alford Andrews and Rüdiger Benninghaus (eds.), *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, pp. 130, 358-359.

<sup>347</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 272..00.12, Yer No: 63.190..5, 07/03/1933.

about how to re-settle these Gypsies, the Ministry of Interior urged the location of each Gypsy dwellings to the different villages of the province in line with the general policy design of settling the non-reliable elements in a scattered way.

#### 4.1.4. *Measures regarding the Turkification of Eastern Provinces*

So far, I have focused on the assimilatory design of settlement targeting the Muslim immigrants, gypsies and nomads. However, another group of people became one of the most important targets of the assimilatory policies especially from the year of 1925 on. This was the Kurdish population who inhabited overwhelmingly in the Eastern Provinces and who revolted against the rule of the Republic repeatedly. By the time the establishment of the Turkish Republic was announced, Kurds constituted approximately the 20 per-cent of the population living within the boundaries of the country<sup>348</sup>. Disappointed by the official nationalist ideology of the Republic viewing the Turkish population to be the legitimate owner of the country, and by the lack of any reference in Laussane Conference and the constitution of the new state to their rights and identity, the opposition of Kurds, initiated to some extent by the nationalist intelligentsia, led to the Seyh Sait, 1925, Agri, 1927-30, and Dersim, 1936-38, revolts<sup>349</sup>. Facing such an active opposition, from the second half of the 1920s on, the Republic embarked upon the Turkification of the Eastern Provinces aside from the bloody suppression of these revolts.

---

<sup>348</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), p. 248.

<sup>349</sup> Hamid Bozarslan. "Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi, (1898-2000)" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol: 4, p. 848.

This had two aspects that were highly related with the settlement policies. While the rebellious Kurds were deported to the western parts of the country, the government attempted to colonize the Eastern Provinces by locating the Turkish immigrants of Caucasian and especially of Balkans origins there.

Upon the outbreak of Ağrı uprising, the first instance of deportation concerning the Kurds was regulated in June 1927 with a particular law, that is, “a Law concerning the Relocation of Some Individuals from the Eastern Zone to the Western Provinces”<sup>350</sup>. According to this law, up to 1400 peoples and 80 rebellious dwellings from the zone of martial law, which was announced by the time the Şeyh Sait revolt erupted in 1925, and from the Bayazıt Province to the Western Provinces were granted. In another incident, the government relocated 41 people with 10 dwellings from Bitlis to the western part of the country<sup>351</sup>.

There was even news with respect to a possibility of cooperation between Turkey and Persia for the relocation of recalcitrant Kurds. A special report from the USA Embassy in Turkey informed the USA State Department about this topic. According to this report dated March 6, 1929, agreement between Turkey and Persia was under way for the combined military action of both countries for dislodging the troublemaker Kurdish mountaineers inhabited around the frontier<sup>352</sup>.

---

<sup>350</sup> “Bazi Eşhasın Şark Menatıkından Garp Vilayetlerine Nakillerine Dair Kanun”, no: 1097, 10/06/1927 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 28-30.

<sup>351</sup> Soner Çağaptay, “Kemalist Dönem’de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma”, pp. 228.

<sup>352</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929 (M 353), 6/03/1929, 767.91/19

The policy of deportation was carried further even after the repression of Ağrı revolt. In November 1931, for example, in accordance with the government's decision to remove some of the tribes on the Iraq frontier to the Western Provinces, the group consisting of 300 families arrived at İstanbul and it was revealed by Turkish Press that they were going to be settled in Tekirdağ<sup>353</sup>. Moreover, 122 people belonging to the Halikanlı tribe, which was one of the recalcitrant tribes, arrived at İzmir via Trabzon and İstanbul in the same month<sup>354</sup>. At the beginning of the 1932, the Turkish Press announced that the forced relocation of the Halikanlı tribe from eastern to western Turkey was completed. These tribesmen had been settled in Thrace and had already begun to cultivate the lands provided for them by the time this news item was published<sup>355</sup>. Another way of dealing with the disobedient Kurds was to change their settlement places without sending them to the western regions of the country. For this purpose, the Council of Ministers issued two important decrees in 1930 and in 1931<sup>356</sup>. These decrees regulated the relocation of the Kurds inhabited in the mountainous areas of Dersim to the Elazığ meadow. The reason that lies behind this was to transfer the unreliable elements from the places that were hard to control to the areas that were easier to exercise authority.

---

<sup>353</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), Review of the Turkish Press for the period 12 November-55 November 1931, 897.9111/337.

<sup>354</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), Review of the Turkish Press for the period 15 November-30 November 1931, 897.9111/340.

<sup>355</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), Review of the Turkish Press for the period January 24-February 6 1932, 897.9111/348.

<sup>356</sup> "Elazığ Ovasında Yerleştirilen Dersimliler Hakkında", no: 8734, 01/01/1930; "Dağlık Mıntıkalarda Yaşayan Halkın İskanı", no: 10822, 18/3/1931 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 165-166.

Besides the policy of deportation, Turkey used the settlement of immigrants to the Eastern Provinces as the other instrument for the Turkification of the region. This was seen as the way of strengthening the Turkish composition in the eastern parts of the country where Kurds constituted the majority. In June 1927, for example, the Turkish Press published news over this issue<sup>357</sup>. According to the information attributed to the Department of Settlement, the number of emigrants, including those from the Caucasus, who were going to be settled in the Eastern Provinces during that year was between 40,000-50,000.

Nevertheless, Ankara was preparing the ground for the settlement of immigrants in the eastern part of the country even before that date. A report, which was sent from the Muş Province to the Ministry of Interior after the repression of the Seyh Said uprising, makes the intention of the Ankara clear with respect to this matter. It was very detailed report providing information over the housing and settlement conditions of the Bolanik and Malazgirt fields where the expected immigrants would be placed. After revealing wide-ranging information from the number of the abandoned properties to the fields of grassland, this report stated the possibility of locating important number of immigrants to these fields<sup>358</sup>. In line with this policy design, for example, some of the immigrants, who came from Yugoslavia, were placed in Diyarbekir as early as 1925<sup>359</sup>.

---

<sup>357</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929 (M 353), Review of the Turkish Press for the period 1 June-18 June 1927, 897.9111/189.

<sup>358</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 45.77..5, 16/08/1925

<sup>359</sup> BCA, Fon No: 272..0.0.12, Yer No: 45.75..3, 06/07/1925

In the early years of the 1930s, the strategy of placing the immigrants to the eastern region still constituted an important dimension of the settlement policies. The newspaper of Cumhuriyet revealed in October 23, 1933 that about 100,000 immigrants would be settled in the eastern region and some of them arrived at Muş Province<sup>360</sup>. In the following days, there appeared several predicates in the Turkish Press proving the validity of this information. In November 22, for example, Milliyet published news over the immigrants from Romania who would be settled in the Eastern region<sup>361</sup>. Similar news made public that 511 immigrants from Romania were transferred to Elazığ<sup>362</sup>. Nevertheless, the government was careful in preventing the location of the non-Turkish-speakers immigrants to the Eastern region due to the assimilative strategy of settlement. For example, the settlement place provided to the 200 Pomak migrants, who came from Bulgaria, was Yozgat, the province of Interior Anatolia, instead of eastern part of the country<sup>363</sup>.

Furthermore, the government supported the strategy regarding the Turkification of the Eastern Provinces through the adoption of particular laws. "Law concerning Land Distribution within the Eastern Zone to the Needy Farmers", issued in May 2, 1929, was serving this purpose<sup>364</sup>. It gave the government the juridical right of distributing lands of public treasury existed in the Eastern Provinces to the immigrants

---

<sup>360</sup> "Altınova'ya 100 Bin Muhacir İskan Edilecek", *Cumhuriyet*, 23 October 1933, p. 3.

<sup>361</sup> "Romanya'lı Muhacirler Bugün Geliyor", *Milliyet*, 22 November 1933, p. 3.

<sup>362</sup> "Romanya'dan Gelen İrkdaşlarımız Elaziz'e Gönderildi: Muhaceretin Muntazam Kafiler Halinde Taakup Edeceği Söyleniyor", *Milliyet*, 24 November 1933, p. 1.

<sup>363</sup> "Bulgaristandan Kaçan Pomaklar", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1934, p. 5.

<sup>364</sup> "Şark Menatıkı Dahilinde Muhtaç Zürraa Tevzi Edilecek Araziye Dair Kanun", no: 1505, 02/06/1929 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 34-35.

alongside the poor farmers, nomads and tribesmen. More importantly, shortly before a new and more detailed law on settlement came into effect, the Turkish Grand National Assembly adopted another law in May 9, 1934 concerning the distribution of the lands and properties that belonged to the public treasury and that remained from the repatriated emigrants of the Russian nationality to the immigrants and refugees<sup>365</sup>. In particular, it was about Kars, Bayazıt, Erzurum and Çoruh provinces within which Ankara wanted to increase the number of Turkish population. Both of these laws, in fact, were designed to promote the migration of Turkish-speaking people to the eastern regions by providing the incomers with material benefits.

## 4.2. Settlement Policies in the Period from 1934 to 1939

### 4.2.1. *The Law on Settlement adopted in 1934*

As far as the relation in between Turkey's nation-shaping practices and the settlement policies concerns, the Law on Settlement (Law 2510) adopted in June 14, 1934 has decisive importance and thus requires specific attention<sup>366</sup>. Before proceeding with the examination of its assimilatory design, however, an important point is to be emphasized. I have focused hitherto upon the investigation of the Republic's settlement policies implemented between the years of 1923 and 1934 with specific emphasis to the social-engineering measures aiming to homogenize the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants, nomads and Kurds. I have also mentioned how the settlement of

---

<sup>365</sup> "Kars Vilayetiyle Bayazıt, Erzurum ve Çoruh Vilayetlerinin Bazı Parçalarında Muhacir ve Sığıntıların Yerleştirilmesi ve Yerli Çiftçilerin Topraklandırılması Hakkında Kanun", no: 2502, 09/06/1934 In *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 400-401.

<sup>366</sup> "İskan Kanunu", no: 2510, 14/06/1934, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 15, pp. 1156-1175.

immigrants was employed as an instrument for the colonization of the Eastern Provinces where the Kurdish people constituted the majority. In fact, such investigation proves that from the early years on, a long-term perspective was developed by the Turkish nationalist elite for the cultural and linguistic homogenization of the population living within the borders of National-Act (Misak-ı Milli). In this sense, rather than formulating the guiding principles of nation-building policies for the first time, the Law on Settlement adopted in June 14, 1934 followed to an important extent the mentality of these preceding practices, and combined the rules of settlement and immigration that had been provided by the various pieces of official regulations under the same legislation.

More than addressing solely the issue of immigration, therefore, it was concerned with assuring the unity of the nation in the interior by means of demographic regulations<sup>367</sup>. Within the discussions conducted in Turkish National Assembly, Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior at the time this law adopted, made it quite clear what purposes the government aimed to achieve through the implementation of the measures provided by the Law on Settlement.

*...This law will create a country speaking with one language,  
thinking in the same way and sharing the same sentiment...<sup>368</sup>.*

Şükrü Kaya, in fact, put forth apparently the rationale on the basis of which the stipulations of the new law were designed, that is, the purification of the population culturally and linguistically. This perspective had already been disclosed by the draft-

---

<sup>367</sup> *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 3, 14/06/1934, p.140.

<sup>368</sup> “Bu kanun tek dille konuşan, bir düşünen aynı hissi taşıyan bir memleket yapacaktır”. *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 3, 14/06/1934, p.141.

ers of the Law 2510 in providing the reasons leading to the preparation of such a detailed legislation. The bill proposed to Turkish National Assembly in 1932 in relation to the Law on Settlement had given specific emphasis to the requirement of the measures to flourish the usage of Turkish language among the people who remained far-off to Turkish culture despite the attempts of the Republic<sup>369</sup>. This new law had been legitimized as an official text which pointed out to the required strategy for compelling them to the internalization of Turkish culture and to the adoption of Turkish language<sup>370</sup>.

The sensitivity in regard to the usage and flourishing of Turkish language among non-Turkish-speakers was also the primary agenda in the parliamentary discussions preceding the adoption of the Law on Settlement. Sadri Maksudi Bey, for example, stated in relation to this issue that

*...Turkification of the language is among the greatest devices of assuring the future of Turkish race and the living of Turk as Turk. This is our end...*<sup>371</sup>

Following the preceding practices, therefore, the people with whom the measures of settlement were concerned included non-Muslim minorities who were not speaking Turkish, the Kurdish people inhabited especially in the Eastern Provinces and the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants as well. It is clear in the way of thinking appeared in the parliamentary discussions that, through the measures provided by this

---

<sup>369</sup> "1/335 Numaralı İskan Kanunu Layihası ve İskan Muvakkat Encümeni Mazbatası" in *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 3, Ek: 189, 02/05/1932, pp. 2-3.

<sup>370</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 2-3.

<sup>371</sup> "Türk ırkının istikbalini temin etmek, Türk'ün, Türk olarak yaşamasını temin etmek için en büyük çarelerden biri lisanın Türkçeleştirilmesidir. Gayemiz budur". *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 3, 14/06/1934, p.71.

law, the government aimed to homogenize the large pockets constituted by these peoples across the country where Turkish was not being used ten years after the establishment of the Republic. The mentality of social-engineering was so strong that most of the speeches verbalized in the parliamentary discussions put also stress to the settlement of nomad persons of Turkish ethnicity, which makes it clear that they were considered under this category. In this respect, Şükrü Kaya stated that settling approximately one million nomads wandering in the Eastern region, Adana, Antalya, Muğla, Burdur and so on was an urgent necessity to provide them with the values of the Republic<sup>372</sup>.

Looking at the content of the Law 2510, one can easily recognize how pertinent are its provisions to the policy of nation shaping, the design of which is very similar to the practices implemented up to its adoption. Its first article reveals that, through the program implemented by the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Interior will govern the inhabitation and the distribution of population across the country on the basis of adherence to Turkish culture. There is no doubt that the most striking stipulation concerning the settlement is provided with the second article under the rubric of "Settlement Regions". With the primary goal of creating a homogenous nation in mind, the drafters of the law divided the population and their settlement places into three parts according to the criterion of adherence to Turkish culture.

*Zones of Number 1: Places where the condensation of population of Turkish culture is desired.*

*Zones of Number 2: Places where are separated for the relocation and settlement of the population whose assimilation into the Turkish culture is desired.*

---

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 141.

*Zones of Number 3: Places that will be uninhabited, and where the settlement and residence will be prohibited due to spatial, sanitary, cultural, political, military and security reasons*<sup>373</sup>.

In fact, the aims of homogenization of the non-Turkish-speaker people and of the Turkification of the delicate regions of Thrace and Eastern Provinces lied behind the division of the country into three parts of settlement. This policy design had two different but highly related dimensions, which was followed and formulated in a systematic way the assimilatory design of the settlement that had been implemented after the establishment of the Republic.

First, it was aimed to locate the rebellious Kurds, Gypsies, nomads and non-Turkish-speaker immigrants, whose so-called “Turkishness” needed to be enhanced, to the areas of number two. These areas were opened to the settlement of non-Turkish-speaker immigrants and to those who would be relocated from the areas of number one, and from number three where residence was prohibited due especially to the security concerns.

Second, some areas, which were called as the zones of number one, would be exposed to the policy of settlement designed for strengthening the Turkish composition of the population. To this aim, while these areas were opened to the settlement of Turkish-speaker immigrants, the non-reliable elements residing there were going to be deported to the zones of number two.

The Law on Settlement consists of various significant stipulations governing this policy design. Whereas some of them deal with the demographic regulations con-

---

<sup>373</sup> “1 Numaralı Mıntıklar: Türk kültürlü nüfusun tekasüfü istenilen yerlerdir. 2 Numaralı Mıntıklar: Türk Kültürüne temsili istenilen nüfusun nakil ve iskanına ayrılan yerlerdir. 3 Numaralı mıntıklar: Yer, sıhhat, iktisat, kültür, siyaset, askerlik ve inzibat sebepleriyle boşaltılması istenilen ve ikamet yasak edilen yerlerdir”. “İskan Kanunu”, no: 2510, 14/06/1934, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 15, p. 1156.

cerning the interior population, some of them put important rules in terms of the settlement of immigrants.

The measures concerning the population inhabiting in the interior aimed at homogenizing the elements including non-Muslims, Kurds, Arabs, and the non-Turkish speaker immigrants who had already entered and settled into the country. In this sense, Article 11 comprises very important measures, which were developed, according to the drafters of the law, to assure “the unity in language, culture and blood”<sup>374</sup>. This article charges the Ministry of Interior with the tasks of preventing the establishment of the villages and districts by the non-Turkish-speakers, and of undertaking special measures for those persons who did not possess Turkish culture and for those who were not speaking in Turkish though bounded to the Turkish culture. These measures include transferring them to another places in a scattered way and dropping them off citizenship when it is required<sup>375</sup>. It is obvious that under the rubric of “individuals of Turkish culture speaking languages other than Turkish”, these measures were concerned also with past immigrants from Caucasus and the Balkans, who were not speaking in Turkish for a variety of reasons, alongside the non-Muslims and those Muslims who neither speak Turkish nor considered as possessing Turkish culture.

There are also some specific measures governing the relocation of these elements to the zones of number two. For that purpose, the paragraph four of the Article 10 gives the Ministry of Interior the authority of transferring the nomads or settled tribesmen who did not belong to Turkish culture to the zones of number two, and of

---

<sup>374</sup> “1/335 Numaralı İskan Kanunu Layihası ve İskan Muvakkat Encümeni Mazbatası” In *TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 3, Ek: 189, 02/05/1932, p. 11.

<sup>375</sup> İskan Kanunu”, no: 2510, 14/06/1934, *Düstur*, Tertip: 3, Cilt: 15, p. 1159.

their settlement there in a scattered way. The meaning of this provision is obvious. The terms of tribesman and nomad were referred especially to the Kurds who constituted the majority in the Eastern Provinces alongside the Gypsies and nomads of Turkish origin<sup>376</sup>. In the face of the revolts occurred during the 1920s and 1930s around the eastern borders, the government was willing to relocate the rebellious Kurds from this area through applying the policy of deportation. Besides, by means of the Article 12, those non-Turkish-speakers inhabited in the zones of number one and who were not transferred to the zones of number two ought to be settled into the centers of villages, districts and provinces whose population were bounded to Turkish culture. Moreover, in line with the goal of Turkification, the Article 12 of the legislation prohibits the settlement of new tribesmen, nomads and others who did not possess Turkish culture to the zones of number one.

As to the settlement of the immigrants, the provisions of Law 2510 aimed at colonizing the zones of number one by placing the Turkish-speaker immigrants into these regions on the one hand, and promoting the assimilation of the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants by locating them to the zones of number two on the other. The fourth paragraph of the Article 12 reveals the intention of the government in terms of the colonization of the areas of number one. This states that the immigrants of Turkish culture can be settled into these areas. In practice, however, this article implies only those Turkish-speaking incomers. In line with the following provision, others were to be settled into the zones of number two in a scattered way alongside those who would be deported from the areas of number one and number three.

---

<sup>376</sup> Soner Çağaptay. "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma", p. 230.

Evidently, this new Law on Settlement provided the government with an important tool for constructing a homogenous nation-state in its linguistic and cultural senses, and constituted the legal basis of a massive social engineering project. Although many articles of it, particularly those governing the relocation of the population and of dividing the country into different zones of settlement, were abrogated and amended in time<sup>377</sup>, it remained in effect during the years of 1934 to 1939, the era of which under consideration.

Unfortunately, the catalogs of the archives of Prime Ministry (Başbakanlık Arşivi) provide very limited number of documents with respect to the implementation of the Law of 2510. Thus, it is not possible to investigate sufficiently how the measures of it were carried out and to what extent they were accompanied by the policy of nation building in the actual practices. Nevertheless, thanks to these limited number of documents, and other first-hand resources including those provided by the Turkish press and the USA archives relating to the internal affairs of Turkey, it is possible to give a broad picture over this topic.

#### 4.2.2. *Turkification of the Eastern Region*

As far as the issue of strengthening the Turkish composition of some regions defined as the zones of number one concern, the existing resources points out that the efforts of the government centered over Eastern Provinces and Thrace Region. In this respect, I have mentioned above how the settlement of immigrants and the deportation of the rebellious Kurds had been employed as the measures for the homogenization of the eastern areas in the aftermath of the Şeyh Said revolt erupted in 1925. It

---

<sup>377</sup> Kemal Kirişçi. "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 6.

seems that this policy design was carried further after the adoption of the Law 2510. In line with this aim, the government attempted to create pockets constituted by the Turkish speakers in the east, in which the residence of non-Turkish-speakers was forbidden, and, at the same time, to expel the non-reliable elements from strategic areas by declaring them as the zones of number one or number three.

“The Decree Concerning the Acceptance of an Instruction about the Land Distribution in the Zones of Number One”<sup>378</sup>, which was published in November 24 1939, provides some insight on this matter. This points out the fact that the issues of land distribution and settlement were implemented on ethnic and linguistic bases. Its second article provides all persons of Turkish descent and language who reside in the zones of number one and who do not possess sufficient land with an opportunity of acquiring lands belonging to the public treasury. On the other hand, however, its third article put certain restrictions concerning land distribution to the non-Turkish-speaker tribesmen and their settlement places.

Such restrictions give in detail the list of the places where the settlement of non-Turkish-speakers was forbidden. An important fact is that, according to the Article 4, these places were defined as the zones of number one, where it was desirable to increase the number of population considered to be of Turkish culture.

Looking at the list, one can easily recognize that significant number of places, which were forbidden to the settlement of non-Turkish-speakers, were the surroundings of the railways. One of them, for example, was the area within a twentieth-

---

<sup>378</sup> “Birinci İskan Mıntıklarında Toprak Tevziyatına Dair Olan Talimatnamenin Kabulü Hakkında Kararname”, no: 2/12374, 24/11/1939 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 166-171.

kilometer-wide zone along the both sides of the railway starting in the Sallar station of Diyarbekir province and passing from Diyarbekir, Beşiri, Kurtalan, Baykan, Bitlis, Tatvan, Gevaş, Van and Özalp. This area was extending up to the Iraq frontier by passing from Dicle Valley<sup>379</sup>. Under similar conditions, the surroundings of the railways from Fırat bridge to Diyarbekir; Divriği to Sarıkamış; Malatya to Divriği; Diyarbekir to Mardin; Diyarbekir to Akçakale and so on were also forbidden to the settlement of non-Turkish-speakers.

Besides the railways, the vicinity of the mines and other centers of natural resources were declared as the zones of number one due to their strategic importance. Divriği, Ergani, Guleman, Vangölü and Malatya were considered under this category<sup>380</sup>. Another category was the surrounding areas of the frontiers. Twenty-five kilometer-wide zones along the borders of Syria, Iraq, Persia and Russia were also forbidden to the tribesmen speaking language other than Turkish<sup>381</sup>. Some parts of Maraş, Göksun, Pinarbaşı, Erzican, Erciş, Tatvan, Elazığ, Gümüşhane, and Ağrı Provinces were also counted among the zones of number one<sup>382</sup>.

Another important provision, which is very important for the focus of the present work, needs to be emphasized here. According to the fourth paragraph of the Article 3, the areas that were assigned to the settlement of Turkish immigrants were among the regions prohibited to the tribesmen<sup>383</sup>. This, in fact, reveals clearly the in-

---

<sup>379</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167.

<sup>380</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>381</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 168.

<sup>382</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 168-169.

<sup>383</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 167.

tention of the government in terms of the colonization of the Eastern Region by means of settling there the Turkish-speaking immigrants from the Balkans and to some extent Caucasus. Hence, it was aimed to create the pockets constituted by the Turkish-speaker and reliable elements, which was deemed as one of the ways for the Turkification of the region. While investigating the settlement of immigrants below, I will turn to this issue.

#### 4.2.3. *Expulsion of non-Muslims from Thrace*

The measures with respect to the homogenization of the Eastern Provinces were on the agenda of the settlement policies in the aftermath of the Şeyh Said revolt. Nevertheless, it seems that shortly after the adoption of the Law 2510 in June 1934, the government embarked upon the policy of Turkification with respect to another region, that is, Thrace.

Briefly stated, the process leading to the expulsion especially of Jews from the region started two weeks after the acceptance of the Law on Settlement in Turkish Grand National Assembly. Some people provoked by the anti-Semitic local press attacked the dwellings and stores of the Jews<sup>384</sup>. These instances took place simultaneously in different parts of Thrace including Edirne, Çanakkale, Uzunköprü, Kırklareli, Babaeski and so on<sup>385</sup>. As a result, the developments brought distress to Jews scat-

---

<sup>384</sup> Rifat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, pp. 246-247.

<sup>385</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 247.

tered throughout Thrace and especially in Edirne, where there was a Jewish population of about 8000, and resulted with the dislodging of important number of them<sup>386</sup>.

In fact, this was a very complicated development having a variety of dimensions. It seems at first glance that the government did not take part. In contrast, İsmet İnönü, the Prime Minister at that time, announced that persons who found responsible for the occurrences would be punished<sup>387</sup>. In this respect, Zafer Toprak argues that rather than the government, the local branches of the Republican People's Party initiated this development<sup>388</sup>. On the other hand, Haluk Karabatak and Avner Levi attribute the reason of the incidences to the impacts of the rising racist and anti-Semitic tendencies in the international context upon Turkey's political environment, which corresponded to the acceptance of the Law on Settlement imbued with terms echoing the racist ideology<sup>389</sup>.

The effect of the anti-Semitic outlook especially of the local agitators to the eruption of the Thrace Affair is beyond doubt. Nonetheless, it is hardly possible to deny the role of the government. Some significant documents relating to this matter make it quite clear the close connection in between the government's long-term policy concerning the homogenization of the strategic regions ethnically and linguistically, and the Thrace incident.

---

<sup>386</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), 06/06/1934, 867.4016 Jews/10.

<sup>387</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, pp. 73-74.

<sup>388</sup> Zafer Toprak, "1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHF'nin Sorumluluğu", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no: 34, October 1996, pp. 19-25.

<sup>389</sup> See Haluk Karabatak, "1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudiler", *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 146, February 1996, pp. 68-80; Avner Levi, "1934 Trakya Yahudileri Olayı: Alınamayan Ders", *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 151, July 1996, pp. 10-17.

Ayhan Aktar provides one of such documents, which gives important proof in terms of the responsibility of the government in the Thrace Affair<sup>390</sup>. This was a correspondence sent from Percy Loraine, the British Ambassador of İstanbul, to the British Foreign Ministry. Loraine holds in relation to the expulsion of Jews from Thrace that this took place due to the government's decision of clearing Thrace from the Jewish elements. At the beginning, according to the Ambassador, this strategy was going to be realized step by step through the initiation of some boycotts and small instances against the Jews. Nevertheless, since unofficial institutions learned its oral orders, the government lost the control of developments, which, therefore, transformed into an unintended outburst against the Jews.

Another document I encountered in the archives of the USA relating to the internal affairs of Turkey not only supports the aforementioned argument but also casts light upon a significant aspect of the matter.

*The interesting fact has come to light that the entire Jewish population of Thrace is in process of being expelled. Whether this affects three or five thousand persons cannot be ascertained, nor has any public announcement on the subject, whatever, been made. Apparently, the decision in high places to evacuate the Jews has not been reached in any spirit of anti-Semitism. Already the minority populations of Thrace, other than the Jews, have been moved out, and now it is the turn of the Jews, almost all of them small trade people, to submit the same thing. They will probably all, or at least the majority, come to İstanbul<sup>391</sup>.*

Sent by Robert Skinner to the USA Secretary of State, the important point this correspondence provides is that the underlying reason of the Thrace Affair was not

---

<sup>390</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, p, 92.

<sup>391</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), from Robert P. Skinner to the Secretary of State, 29/06/1934, 861.4016-Jews/9.

anti-Semitism but the well-known policy of expulsing the unreliable elements from the strategic regions. In that sense, Ayhan Aktar reveals the connection of Thrace Affair with a significant development appeared in the foreign policy concerns of Turkey. He correctly argues that Italy's ambitious interests concerning the Aegean and Mediterranean regions- crystallized by the motto of "mare nostrum" (our sea)- made Thrace a vulnerable region in the eyes of the administrator-elite<sup>392</sup>. Thus, in the face of the possible cooperation between the expansionist countries of Italy and Bulgaria targeting Turkey, Thrace seemed so critical that the inhabitation of Jews, who were traditionally considered as non-reliable element, in the region was assessed as a threat to Turkey's security concerns.

Seen from this angle, the correspondence of the Thrace Affair with the remarkable military activity in the same region was not a coincidence. In the meantime, there was much activity in and around Edirne, reparation of roads, construction of bridges, accompanied by a considerable movement of troops, which obviously indicate the measures undertaken to prepare this vulnerable area for defense against military threats<sup>393</sup>. Hence, strengthening the Turkish composition of the population inhabited in Thrace was seen as one of such measures against the expansionist inclinations of Italy and Bulgaria.

What can be inferred from information provided up to here is that rather than stemming from the anti-Semitic or racist inclinations, the Thrace Affair indicates that this region was considered under the category of zones of number one, where the

---

<sup>392</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, pp, 84-88.

<sup>393</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), from John Mc Ardle to the Secretary of State, 20/07/1934, 867.20/48.

condensation of Turkish population was desired, due to Turkey's security concerns. Although I have not found any official document announcing Thrace as the zone of number one and thus proving this argument, the developments speak for themselves. That Jews were not the only group affected from the developments can be seen as one of the proofs of this argument. In July 20, the Sofia Embassy of the USA informed the Secretary of State over the expulsion of four Bulgarian families from the region nearby Edirne. An interesting point is that this correspondence linked the issue to the operation of the Law on Settlement and viewed the division of the country into different zones of settlement as the reason of Bulgarians' expulsion. It also revealed the fear that several hundred Bulgarians residing in Edirne would be obliged to leave if the implementation of the law was carried on<sup>394</sup>. Similarly, another correspondence sent from the USA's Turkish Embassy to the Secretary of State attributes the developments to the acceptance of the Law on Settlement and, specifically, to the division of the country in to areas of settlement<sup>395</sup>. Finally, as it is debated below in detail, just as the policy design implemented in order to homogenize the eastern part of the country, the deportation of Jews went hand in hand with the settlement of large number of immigrants to Thrace.

#### 4.2.4. *Settlement of Immigrants*

On August 11, 1934, the Cumhuriyet discussed the question of the immigration of Turks from neighboring countries. According to this news, twenty thousand of Turks had entered Turkey through İstanbul in the past year, coming mainly from Ro-

---

<sup>394</sup> *Ibid.*

mania. An interesting point to be noted is that according to this report those entered thus far had been settled in Diyarbekir region, but in the future such immigrants were to be settled in Thrace, in expectation of an increase in those coming from Bulgaria<sup>396</sup>. This report, in fact, reveals an important aspect of Turkey's settlement policy, which was implemented in accordance with the stipulations of the Law 2510. That is, the settlement of the ethnically and linguistically Turkish immigrants to the regions whose population the government intended to Turkify. There is no doubt that Thrace and the Eastern Provinces were the most important of such kind of regions due to the reasons I have already mentioned. Hence, along with the strategies of relocating the unreliable elements and prohibiting some strategic areas to their settlement, the government employed this policy for the homogenization of these regions. In this sense, these two policy designs constituted the two different but highly related instruments of the Republic's social engineering project.

The operation of this strategy can be observed in most of cases concerning the immigrants' settlement. In 1935, for example, the General Inspectorship of Thrace (Trakya Umumi Müfettişliği) informed the Prime Ministry about the areas within which 100,000 immigrants would be settled. Out of the total of 100,000 immigrants, 10,000 were going to be settled in the east, 15,000 in Edirne, 30,000 in Kırklareli, 15,000 in Tekirdag and 30,000 in Çanakkale<sup>397</sup>. It is obvious that the distribution of the immigrants exclusively to the provinces of Eastern and Thrace regions was not a

---

<sup>395</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), 06/06/1934, 867.4016 Jews/10.

<sup>396</sup> NAUS, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), 19/9/1934, 867.4016 Bulgarians/2.

coincidence. Under the legal framework of the Law on Settlement, the government intended to homogenize these strategic areas, which were designated as the zones of number one, through the settlement of immigrants of Turkish ethnicity. Hence, another important document proves the validity of this long-term strategy by revealing that the admission of large number of immigrants to Thrace was the consequence of a deliberate policy. According to a governmental decree issued in April 25, 1935, five-years-long program was developed by central authority to settle massive number of immigrants to the zone of General Inspectorship of Thrace, which comprised the provinces of Edirne, Çanakkale, Kırklareli and Tekirdağ. The same decree reveals that as many as 350,000 immigrants could be placed into these provinces<sup>398</sup>. Therefore, the government endeavored to develop the housing conditions of the region to promote the residence of as many of immigrants as possible. Besides repairing abandoned properties remaining from the Armenians and Greeks, an important number of new houses were constructed for the incomers<sup>399</sup>. In 1937, for example, 10,000 new houses for the immigrants were constructed in the various parts of Thrace<sup>400</sup>. In the meantime, the government did not ignore the colonization of the Eastern Provinces. For the year of 1937, it was planned to settle the highest proportion of the expected immigrants to the east part of the country. While Bursa, for example, would receive only 35 immigrant dwellings, and İzmir, Aydın and Bilecik would receive even below

---

<sup>397</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 30..10.0.0, Yer No: 72.474..6, 04/02/1935.

<sup>398</sup> *BCA*, Fon No: 30..18.1.1, Yer No: 54.31..1, 25/04/1935.

<sup>399</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>400</sup> "Trakya'da Göçmenler İçin Ev Yapılıyor", *Tan*, 17 May 1937, p. 9.

than that number, it was planned to locate 300 immigrant dwellings in Diyarbekir and 100 in Zara<sup>401</sup>.

At the same time, however, the government was careful against the immigrants who did not speak Turkish. Many official instructions and decrees issued in relation to settlement and immigration gave specific emphasis upon the measures concerning them. For example, "Circular concerning the Completion of Settlement and Demographic Works Quickly"<sup>402</sup> adopted in August 7, 1934, whose stipulations concerning migration hierarchy was investigated in the chapter two, provided specific stipulation upon this matter. It urged the application of the Article 11 of the Law 2510 cautiously for the immigrants who were not from Turkish descent and who did not speak Turkish<sup>403</sup>. Having in mind the stipulations of this article, which prohibited the establishment of villages and districts by non-Turkish-speakers and charged the Ministry of Interior with the task of settling them in a scattered way, this reflected the ongoing assimilative attitude against non-Turkish speaker immigrants. Another instruction published in 1936 was concerned with this matter as well<sup>404</sup>. This urged the installation of the immigrants in a way that makes their assimilation possible. Moreover, it prohibited the location of immigrants and native dwellers separately in the villages<sup>405</sup>. It is obvious that this instruction addressed the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants since, as I

---

<sup>401</sup> "Göçmenler İçin Yeni Liste", *Tan*, 07 June 1937, p. 2.

<sup>402</sup> "İskan ve Nüfus İşlerinin Sür'atle İkmali Hakkında", no: 15035/6599, 7/8/1934 in *Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, pp. 234-239.

<sup>403</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 237.

<sup>404</sup> *İskan Toprak Talimatnamesi*, (Ankara: Köyöğretmeni Basımevi, 1936).

<sup>405</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

have noted above, the government intentionally settled the immigrants of Turkish ethnicity together in the dwellings constructed in Thrace. And this reveals that it was aimed to expose Turk and non-Turk immigrants to different manners of settlement.

## **5. ASSESSMENT OF TURKEY'S IMMIGRATION-SETTLEMENT POLICIES IN RELATION TO TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY**

I have concentrated hitherto upon the migration and settlement policies of the Turkish Republic implemented during the 1920s and 1930s and investigated how these policies were employed as the tools of efforts to construct a homogenous sense of nation. In so doing, I have put specific emphasis to the issues of which ethnic, linguistic and religious priorities were put into effect in admitting immigrants and of the different strategies of settlement the Turkish-speaker and non-Turkish speaker immigrants were exposed. In this respect, I tried to show that while the Turkish speaking immigrants were settled to the areas where the government aimed to Turkify, immigrants who were not speaking Turkish, due to a variety of reasons, were settled, at least theoretically, in a geographically scattered way and were mixed with the Turkish speaking native dwellers with the expectation of assimilation.

The primary concern of this part is to evaluate the implications of these issues for the analysis of Turkish nationalism and national identity. To this aim, first, I will examine the attitudes of nationalist elites towards the Muslims with different vernaculars in general, and towards the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants in particular. Second, I will discuss the implementations of these attitudes, together with the homogenization measures I have mentioned in the preceding parts, for the construction of Turkish national identity. At the same time, one of my primary intentions is to conduct this discussion within the theoretical framework underlined in the introduction part.

In so doing, my major goal is to reconsider the generally assumed categorization of Turkish nationalism, which views the ethnic formulation of Turkish national identity as the phenomenon of the 1930s. As I have debated in the introduction part, this categorization is based upon the assumption that while the ethnic formulation of Turkish national identity was developed overwhelmingly in the 1930s, the distinctive disposition of Turkish nationalism was its implicit reference to sunni-Muslim affiliation. And most importantly, according to this argument, the growing role of Turkish language in the construction of Turkishness went hand in hand with the increasing emphasis upon the ethnicity in the formulation of national identity. In other words, the more Turkishness was conceived in relation to the ties with Turkish ethnicity, the more Turkish language became the primary reference point in the formulation of Turkish national identity. Soner Çağaptay, for example, clearly supports this point of view.

*...the idea of definition of nation-over-language came into being as one of the fundamental foundations of Turkishness in the years of the thirties. This situation was bringing in problem to non-Turkish-speaking groups. The Turkish State was urging their assimilation by appropriating Turkish language<sup>406</sup>.*

According to Çağaptay, this idea takes its origins from the appearance of ethnic definition of Turkish nation in the 1930s<sup>407</sup>. This argument, however, involves serious problems. First, as argued throughout the preceding chapters, what Çağaptay attrib-

---

<sup>406</sup> "...dil-üzerinden-millet tanımı fikri otuzlu yıllarda Türklüğün temel paydalarından birisi olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu durum ülkedeki Türkçe konuşmayan gruplar açısından sorun arz etmekteydi. Türkiye Devleti tüm bunların Türk dilini benimseyerek asimile olmasını arzulamaktaydı". Soner Çağaptay, "Otuzlarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Irk, Dil ve Etnisite" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, p. 261.

<sup>407</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 249.

utes to the 1930s had already been on the agenda of Turkish nationalism from the very beginning of the Republic. To state the matter differently, the settlement policies were designed for assimilating the non-Turkish-speakers in line with the cultural and linguistic coordinates of imagined boundaries of Turkishness throughout the interwar period. Second, at the same period, the issue of compelling the use of Turkish among non-Turkish-speaker immigrants had been the primary aim of these policies through which, besides the immigrants, the government aimed to homogenize non-Muslims, Kurds, nomads and gypsies as well.

Ayhan Aktar, on the other hand, equates the Turkification measures of the Republic with the Turkish nationalism's growing emphasis upon the Turkish ethnicity in defining national identity. He searches the roots of this inclination in the deviation from Ziya Gökalp's understanding of nation, which relied upon cultural and social values<sup>408</sup>. According to Aktar, the shift in the Kemalist era from cultural-social construction of nation towards ethnic formulation went hand in hand with the incorporation of Muslims of different ethnicities into the "self". This is because this formulation viewed Kurds, Circassians, Lazs, Pomaks and other non-Turk Muslims as ethnic-Turks by extending the meaning of the Turkish ethnicity. At the same time, however, non-Muslims who preserved their identities became the target of the Turkification measures due mainly to the same formulation of nation, which perceived them as the "other"<sup>409</sup>.

---

<sup>408</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, pp. 96-99.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 98.

Aktar's argument, in a manner similar to Çağaptay's, does not give attention to the Turkification of non-Turkish-speaker Muslims. Therefore, the ethnic definition of Turkishness seems to be based on the dichotomy of Muslims and non-Muslims, which is clearly paradoxical. The other serious problem is a theoretical one. By searching the roots of the Turkification measures in a deviation from Ziya Gökalp's cultural/social understanding of nation, he equates the Turkification policies with the ethnic nationalism phenomenon. Nevertheless, as emphasized by Anthony Smith, who is frequently referred by Aktar, even territorial nationalisms may breed homogenizing policies and exclusive attitudes, though they were more marked in the ethnic nationalisms<sup>410</sup>. Moreover, as correctly argued by Will Kymlicka, all nationalisms have a cultural component that is associated with the concern of creating a common identity, in part by imposing a common language<sup>411</sup>. Even French and American nationalisms, which are generally exemplified as the clear cases of civic-nationalism, resorted to the homogenization policies. In the French case, for example, this language was imposed on the Basques, Bretons, and other linguistic minorities<sup>412</sup>. Thus, attributing the homogenizing policies of the Republic to the development of ethnic definition of nation fails to grasp the nature of nationalism phenomenon.

The examples concerning the misunderstanding of ethnic, religious and linguistic boundaries of Turkish national identity can be extended further. Having been discussed in detail in the introduction part, the existing literature fails to capture this is-

---

<sup>410</sup> Anthony D. Smith, "Ethnic Nationalism and The Plight for Minorities", p. 188.

<sup>411</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, pp. 242-253.

<sup>412</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245.

sue adequately being focused mainly upon the homogenizing measures targeting the non-Muslim minorities and the immigration policies which gave, according to this view, priority exclusively to the sunni-Muslim affiliation. This eventually leads to the understanding that perceives Turkish national identity as based mainly upon the dichotomy of being Muslim versus non-Muslim. For this reason, it is generally assumed that the homogenization measures targeted those non-Muslims, who were conceived as outsiders vis-à-vis the constructed boundaries of Turkish nation, due to the deviation from Ziya Gökalp's social/cultural definition of national identity towards ethnicity-oriented formulation.

What I have investigated throughout this study, however, should compel us to re-consider this broadly accepted interpretation. First, in sharp contrast to this view, the immigration policies of the Republic were not based exclusively upon the priority given to the Muslim religious affiliation but upon the assimilative perspective considering those Muslims who had no ties with any nationalist movement and nation-state as appropriate for assimilating into the cultural and linguistic boundaries of Turkishness. In other words, the religion was not applied for the sake of itself but due to its attributed unifying role. If this was not the case and if the religious affiliation was seen as free from assimilative mentality, then the Albanians and Arabs, for example, would have been provided with the possibility of immigration. But the official legislations governing the immigration policies of the Republic clearly rejected the immigration claims of these groups of people.

Second, once non-Turkish speaking Muslims were admitted as immigrant, they became one of the targets of the homogenizing policy, which was implemented by means of settlement policies, and thus the assimilative objective of the immigration

policies was realized. This means that the homogenizing measures were employed not only in relation to the non-Muslim minorities but also for Turkifying Muslim immigrants who were not speaking Turkish. Furthermore, the government attempted to Turkify some other Muslim groups including Kurds, nomads and gypsies by means of settlement policies. And this means that the government aimed to Turkify all Muslims who were not considered to be possessing the necessary requirements of being Turk. In fact, as will be discussed below in detail, the homogenization measures, in the sense of assimilation, targeted almost exclusively Muslim groups.

Third, since this homogenizing mentality was on the agenda of the governmental policies from the compulsory population exchange on, it is not proper to attribute its reason to the deviation from Ziya Gökalp's cultural/social understanding of nation. Or, one may also admit that his ideas did never influence the ideological framework of the nationalist elites and intelligentsia of the Turkish Republic. In fact, both of these explanations are not consistent. As will be discussed below, Ziya Gökalp's formulation of Turkish nationhood can be seen to be one of the intellectual sources of the homogenizing policies of the Republic.

Then, turning to the research question of the present study, one should ask at this point what were the ethnic, linguistic and religious boundaries of Turkishness on the basis of which the homogenizing policies were shaped. To put the question differently, what were the criteria the nationalist elite expected the population to possess?

As it was obvious in the implementation of migration and settlement policies, there were three principles of being or becoming Turk. First was being sunni-Muslim. Second was having Turkish vernacular and culture. And third, which has largely remained outside the research agenda of this work, was adhering to the political ideas

of the Republic, most importantly to the Republicanism and Laicism. Hence, it was aimed at homogenizing or assimilating all the people, who had not own these traits, according to these principles. Hamdullah Suphi clearly formulated this definition by stating that

*One who speaks Turkish, who is Muslim and who carries the love of Turkishness is Turk. We urge his unity in language, religion and desire*<sup>413</sup>.

From this perspective, being Muslim was a significant but not a sufficient criterion of being Turk. Thus, the government expected from the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants and other Muslims, who were perceived as not possessing Turkish culture, to adopt Turkish language to be included into the imagined boundaries of Turkishness. In this sense, governmental policy aimed at the nationalization of the population of Anatolia based on Turkish cultural and linguistic coordinates. As emphasized by Lowell Bezanis, for Kemalists this approach was crucial to the survival and long-term viability of nation-state<sup>414</sup>.

At that point, it is an urgent necessity to give specific attention to the role of religion in the construction of Turkish national identity. By revealing how it was conceived by the nationalist intelligentsia, we can grasp not only the underlying mentality of the immigration policies, which gave priority to the sunni-Muslims, but also the important aspects of Turkey's nation-shaping policies, which, as will be discussed below in detail, were imbued with assimilationist attitude vis-à-vis Muslims and dissimilationist attitude vis-à-vis non-Muslims. In so doing, it is inevitable to investigate

---

<sup>413</sup> "Türkçe konuşan, müslüman olan ve Türklük sevgisi taşıyan Türktür. Biz onda dil birliği, din birliği ve dilek birliği arıyoruz. Hamdullah Suphi, *Dağ Yolu*, (İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1929), p. 194.

the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, who is, without doubt, one of the most prominent founders of Turkish nationalist ideology.

### 5.1. Religion and Turkish National Identity

While discussing the principles under which individuals constitute nation, Ziya Gökalp addresses the non-Turkish-speaker immigrants' situation vis-à-vis Turkish nationality as follows.

*Individuals actually constituting a nation are not the only members of a nation. All those who may speak that language in the future will also be members of that nation. Thus, for example, the Pomaks [Bulgarian Muslims] now speaking Bulgarian and the Cretan Muslims now speaking Greek may learn Turkish in the future and cease to be Bulgarian- or Greek- speaking peoples. This means that nationality is not determined by language alone but also by religion<sup>415</sup>.*

Written in 1914, (at the time the ideology of Turkism enjoyed, for the first time, ascendancy in the administration of the Ottoman Empire because of the rule of Committee of Union and Progress), these words seem to be the harbinger of long-term immigration policies implemented not only in the last years of the Ottoman rule but also throughout the inter-war period of the Turkish Republic. The point propounded by Ziya Gökalp, as to the determination of the nationality not only by language but also by the religion, has crucial importance in order to understand the logic opening the door of Turkish nationality to the Muslim immigrants of different ethnic and linguistic origins, alongside the ethnic Turks. Most importantly, for Gökalp, being Mus-

---

<sup>414</sup> L. Bezanis, "Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey", *Central Asian Survey*, vol: 13, no: 1, 1994, p. 67.

lim is one of the requirements of being Turk since “as language plays a part in deciding religious affiliation, so religion plays a part in determining membership in a nationality”. He extends his argument with examples.

*The Protestant French became Germanized when they were expelled from France and settled in Germany. The Turkish aristocracy of old Bulgars became Slavicized following their conversion to Christianity. And today, the non-Turkish Muslims migrating to Turkey in a scattered way are becoming Turkified because of their religious affiliation. We may conclude, therefore, that there is a close relationship between linguistic and religious association*<sup>416</sup>.

An important point arising from these quotations is that by attributing crucial role to religious affiliation, Ziya Gökalp rejects the inclusion of non-Muslims into Turkishness and, at the same time, opens the doors of Turkishness to non-Turkish Muslims. This point of view, in fact, imprinted its remarks to the various practices of the Turkish Republic from immigration to homogenizing policies. However, in this regard, he does not propose an ethnic or racial purity of Turkish nation into which all Muslims would be incorporated with the cultural and linguistic traits that they own. In contrast, as it can be observed in the above quotation, Gökalp expects their Turkification. He carries his argument one step further by stating that

*In order for an ideal to arise in the future, it must spring from the intensification of one of the existing groups. Therefore, a great ideal should be born out of the intensification of only that group, which, in addition to being richest and most powerfully organized, is in a position to bring together and assimilate all other groups in its own organization. Which, then, is this inclusive group? Among the existing ones it is the language group-*

---

<sup>415</sup> Ziya Gökalp, “Nation and Fatherland” In Niyazi Berkes (ed.) *Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959), p. 78.

<sup>416</sup> Ziya Gökalp, “The Ideal of Nationalism” in Niyazi Berkes (ed.) *Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, pp. 80-81.

*that is, the nationality group-which is most capable of fulfilling such a function*<sup>417</sup>.

This quotation from Gökalp provides the intellectual roots of the homogenizing measures targeting Muslim minorities. Instead of viewing them as self-evident members of Turkish nationality, he obviously espouses their nationalization by the language group he conceives as nationality group. As correctly argued by Taha Parla, Gökalp's brand of nationalism was unequivocally based on a linguistic and cultural nationalism, which remained distant to the ethnic and racial formulations<sup>418</sup>. In his understanding, the nation is a social group or collectivity consisting of individuals who have received the same education, and who have a common language, emotions, ideals, religion, morality and aesthetics feelings<sup>419</sup>. However, this interpretation of Turkish nationality involves an assimilationist and exclusivist point of views at the same time. By viewing Muslim affiliation as the crucial component of Turkishness, Ziya Gökalp's cultural/social interpretation of nationality excludes non-Muslims from the definition of Turkish nationality. On the other hand, however, the same interpretation proposes the assimilation of the non-Turkish Muslims into Turkishness mainly by the linguistic-nationality group. In that sense, neither it perceives non-Turkish Muslims *a priori* as Turk, as argued by, for example, Tanıl Bora<sup>420</sup> and Ayhan Aktar<sup>421</sup>, nor the reason of Turkification measures can be connected to a deviation from

---

<sup>417</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>418</sup> Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*, (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985), pp. 34-35.

<sup>419</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>420</sup> Tanıl Bora, "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", pp. 36-37.

<sup>421</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, p. 98.

it. In contrast, there is an obvious continuum between his ideas and the Turkification policies implemented in the era under consideration.

One more point concerning this matter ought to be added. In a sense, for Gökalp, religion, being a sociological category whose function is to bind together the individuals of society<sup>422</sup>, is secondary in relation to the language for constituting a cultural nation.

*...we can easily detect that the substance of all aspects of social life – such as religion, morality, law, politics, economics, science, and fine arts – is language<sup>423</sup>.*

Apparently, while envisioning Turkish nationality with the unity in the cultural and linguistic peculiarities of the people, Gökalp finds in religion a powerful support to achieve this purpose. It is for this reason that he viewed the social function of religion as far more important than its theological aspect<sup>424</sup>.

Taking these points together into consideration, it is possible to say that the Republic inherited, to an important extent, the ideas of Gökalp concerning the cementing social function of the religion and the assimilative view towards Muslims with different ethnic and linguistic peculiarities. A closer reading of Gökalp reveals that he did not support any argument incorporating Muslims a priori into Turkishness. He merely expected their Turkification promoted with the social function of religion. Furthermore, from the rise of the CUP into power on -aside from the period of national struggle when the strategic necessities compelled the elites to unify all Muslim popu-

---

<sup>422</sup> Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*, p. 39.

<sup>423</sup> Ziya Gökalp, "The Ideal of Nationalism" in Niyazi Berkes (ed.), *Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, p. 82.

<sup>424</sup> Taha Parla, *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*, p. 41.

lation of Anatolia under the umbrella of Islam<sup>425</sup> - they were never viewed as such. In the first part of this study, I have revealed how the CUP government employed the settlement policy as the instrument of homogenizing the Muslims and of excluding the non-Muslims. Besides, I have also mentioned the same topic for the Republican era, which had a strikingly similar pattern with the preceding practices of the CUP government. Having in mind the discussion conducted here with respect to Ziya Gökalp, one can argue that *Gökalpian* definition of national identity was prevailing in these periods, in contrast to what Foti Benlisoy offers<sup>426</sup>, rather than at the period of National Struggle. At least, if one searches for the connections between Gökalp's ideas and the construction of Turkishness in the actual state practices, the nationalization policies of the Republic in the interwar period and of the CUP rule at the last years of the Ottoman Empire are far more revealing than the period of National Struggle.

In fact, Ziya Gökalp was not alone in making such considerations. As Erik Jan Zürcher argues, Muslim affiliation was seen as the crucial component of Turkishness by most of other members of nationalist intelligentsia including important figures such as Gaspıralı İsmail, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura and so on<sup>427</sup>. They regarded Islam as an integral part of Turkish national identity and as a crucial factor providing social unity. Furthermore, Foti Benlisoy makes an invaluable contribution to the literature of Turkish nationalism by revealing the crucial role of religion in the national

---

<sup>425</sup> Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, pp. 98-100.

<sup>426</sup> Foti Benlisoy, *Papa Eftim and the Foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church*, p. 186.

imagination of Turkish nationalist intellectuals. Investigating the nationalist discourse over the Christian Karamanlı population, he holds that even though they were accepted as ethnic Turks they were not included into the margins of Turkish nation because of their Christian religious affiliation. For Benlisoy, this stemmed mainly from Ziya Gökalp's social/cultural interpretation of nationality according to which Muslim affiliation was crucial component of Turkishness and therefore non-Muslims were excluded from the Turkish nationality<sup>428</sup>.

At that point, it is very important to investigate the ideas of another significant figure of Turkish nationalism, Hamdullah Suphi. Having experienced the constitution of the Turkish Republic and played a decisive role in shaping its nationalist ideology through his intellectual contribution, especially in Turkish Heartlands, his ideas over Turkish nationality and religion deserve specific attention.

One of the most important ideas supported by Hamdullah Suphi is the close linkage in between one's religion and his/her nationality. According to Suphi, while language plays a more decisive role than the religion in determining nationality in the Western part of the world, in the East, religion plays a preponderant role in defining nationality<sup>429</sup>. For Suphi, the example of the Cretan Muslims who were forced to leave their lands by Greek pressure was proving the validity of this fact. If they were categorized on the basis of language, they would have been considered as Greeks. Nevertheless, due to their religious affiliation, they eventually came and settled in

---

<sup>427</sup> Erik Jan Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları" In Ahmet İnel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), vol: 2, p. 47.

<sup>428</sup> Foti Benlisoy, "Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Katedilmemiş Bir Yol: Hristiyan Türkler", pp. 927-933.

<sup>429</sup> Hamdullah Suphi, *Dağ Yolu*, (İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1929), p. 180.

Anatolia. Likewise, the Turkish-speaking Christians immigrated to Greece and settled there<sup>430</sup>. Obviously, this point of view was based mainly upon Ziya Gökalp's cultural/social understanding of nation. Hence, by following *Gökalpian* understanding, he finds the importance of religion in its social function of providing unity of the community. According to Suphi, thanks to this function of religion, Turkish nation embraced tens of thousand people who served to its aims in the Ottoman period. Not only the Muslim races such as Circassians, Bosnians, Albanians and so on but also Slavs, Greeks and other Christian peoples became Turk and served as the Janissaries thanks to conversion to Islam<sup>431</sup>. It is obvious that, like Ziya Gökalp, Hamdullah Suphi did not support the understandings of nation that take race as the reference point. He believes that all Muslims and prospective Muslims can be Turkified.

Apparently, Hamdullah Suphi does not leave any possibility of Turkification to non-Muslims, unless they convert to Islam. On the other hand, Suphi follows the same *Gökalpian* perspective while discussing the role of language in constituting nationality. In his point of view, Turkish language is the other crucial component of Turkish nationality. He argues that "our nationality is in our language more than any other thing"<sup>432</sup>. It seems that in Suphi's point of view what differentiates Turkish nationality from other Muslim nations is its language, which is remarked by the strength in preserving itself for hundreds of years<sup>433</sup>.

---

<sup>430</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180-181.

<sup>431</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 178-179.

<sup>432</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 187.

<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

After conducting a very detailed discussion over the roles of religion and language in determining one's nationality, he asks an important question: Who is Turk? Hamdullah Suphi's answer to this question reflects his cultural understanding of nationality. For him, one who speaks in Turkish, who is Muslim and who carries the love of Turkishness is Turk<sup>434</sup>. Accordingly, he finds the national feelings as important component of nationality as language and religion. The important point to be emphasized here is that relying mainly upon the *Gökalpian* definition of nation, the logical consequence of his ideas involves, as in Ziya Gökalp, exclusivist attitudes towards non-Muslims, due to his emphasis upon Muslim affiliation, and assimilatory attitudes towards Muslims with different ethnic and linguistic affiliations. While perceiving those Muslims as the prospective members of Turkish nation, he in no way tolerates the existence of different vernaculars in the life of Turkish community. In the last chapter, I have noted his sharp critics to the implementation of settlement policies by Ministry of Exchange, Reconstruction and Settlement. By indicating the dangers of settling the Greek-speaker Muslims in the Aegean coasts, he emphasized the necessity of eradicating any language other than Turkish. Furthermore, most of his speeches uttered especially in Turkish Heartlands reveal his assimilationist vision towards non-Turkish-speaker Muslims<sup>435</sup>.

Taking the ideas of Ziya Gökalp and Hamdullah Suphi concerning religion and language into consideration, we can easily grasp their relevancy to the underlying rationale of the immigration and settlement policies implemented in the interwar period.

---

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 194.

<sup>435</sup> See Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997), pp. 152, 205, 307-308.

In line with their ideas, Muslim religious affiliation was the key opening the doors of Turkish citizenship to Greek-speaking Muslims, Bosnians, Pomaks, Tatars and, to some extent, some Caucasian Muslim peoples. However, following the assimilationist considerations of Gökalp and Suphi, once admitted, Turkish nationalist elites expected their Turkification by adopting Turkish language and culture, which paved the way to the homogenizing mentality of the settlement policies. Hence, those who were viewed as inappropriate to the assimilation (like Albanians, Gypsies and Arabs) were not admitted. Apparently, it was expected from the immigrants to leave their ethnic and cultural affiliations in their country of origin. They were included into Turkishness with this conditionality. In discussing the immigration of Bosnians, for example, Yaşar Nabi reveals this approach in a very clear manner.

*Indeed, the difference in language is a point that will always remind Bosnians of their differences in blood from Turks. However, by the time this difference disappears, Bosnian learns Turkish like his mother tongue, the feeling of difference in descent disappears<sup>436</sup>.*

Therefore,

*Muslim Bosnian should choose one of these two alternatives: Sacrificing his religion by preferring devotion to his descent and language and protecting his ground. Or, by sacrificing his language and descent protecting his religion and tradition, which he adheres cordially, through joining to Turkish community<sup>437</sup>.*

---

<sup>436</sup> “Gerçi, aradaki dil ayrılığı, Türklerle olan kan ayrılıklarını Boşnaklara her zaman hatırlatacak bir noktadır. Fakat bu ayrılık ortadan kalktığı, Boşnak, türkçeyi anadili gibi öğrendiği andan itibaren, soy ayrılığı duygusunda ortadan kalkacaktır”. Yaşar Nabi, *Balkanlar ve Türklük*, p. 211.

<sup>437</sup> “Müslüman Boşnak iki şıktan birini intihab etmeye mecburdur. Soyuna ve diline merbutiyeti tercih ederek dinini feda etmek. Yahutta, dilini ve soyunu feda ederek Turk topluluğu arasına katılmak suretiyle candan bağlı olduğu ananelerini ve dinini muhafaza etmek”. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

Put in such a manner, there remains only one step further to the measures aimed at homogenizing the Muslim population, including immigrant communities and native dwellers, who do not possess Turkish language and culture. But, what kind of homogenization?

## 5.2. Assimilation and Dissimilation

As argued by Rogers Brubaker, the terms like nationalization, homogenization or Turk-ification are generally not sufficient concepts to explain the different dimensions of political processes<sup>438</sup>. These terms can refer to two different, even antithetical processes. On the one hand, they can designate an attempt to remake the human material of a state, that is, to nationalize the citizenry by turning, for example, Ukrainians into Poles, which occurred in the Polish state during the interwar period<sup>439</sup>. In this sense, the term of homogenization or nationalization refers to a form of assimilation, in other words, to an attempt of “making similar”. On the other hand, the same terms can refer to the practices involving dissimilation rather than assimilation. Far from endeavoring to make people similar to the putative characteristics of who were perceived as the legitimate owner of the state, such terms prescribe differential treatment on the basis of their presumed “difference”. In other words, instead of seeking to alter the different identities, such efforts take them as given. According to Brubaker, “as-

---

<sup>438</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, p. 88.

<sup>439</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 84-86.

similationist nationalization seeks to eradicate difference, while dissimulationist nationalization takes difference as axiomatic and foundational”<sup>440</sup>.

Accordingly, analyzing the nation-shaping policies of the Turkish Republic in the interwar period with this conceptual framework provides us with a more improved understanding in terms of the construction of Turkishness. In fact, the aforementioned paradox of the existing literature over this issue stems mainly from the lack of proper theoretical approach to analyze the different aspects of the homogenization efforts. In a sense, it is right to claim that Turkish nationalism treated Muslims and non-Muslims in a different manner in the era under consideration. Nonetheless, this does not mean that Muslims with different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds were incorporated into the “self” while non-Muslims were perceived as the “other” vis-à-vis Turkishness, as argued, for example, by Ayhan Aktar. Both of these categories were the targets of the nationalizing policies. However, in most cases such policies were assimilationist vis-à-vis Muslims and dissimulationist vis-à-vis non-Muslims, in the sense proposed by Brubaker.

### *5.2.1. Dissimulationist Attitudes towards non-Muslim Minorities*

Most of the practices of the Republic against non-Muslims reveal this dissimulationist attitude. For example, looking at the migration policy, which was one of the important instruments of nation-shaping policies, one can see that instead of making similar, the government endeavored to get rid of as many non-Muslims as possible. As I have mentioned in the second chapter, the government tried to enlarge the number of peoples who were exchangeable and for this aim supported the exchange of

---

<sup>440</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 88.

non-Greek Orthodox Christians. Even the Turkish speaking Karamanlı people could not avoid the compulsory immigration. The attitude of the nationalist elite was largely dissimilationist for those non-Muslims who remained in Turkey after the catastrophic years of First World War, War of Independence and the population exchange. Instead of settling them in a scattered way and of mixing with the native dwellers of Anatolia, as was the case for Muslim immigrants, the government tried to gather them together in big cities, especially in İstanbul. For example, because of Thrace Affair I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the Jews migrated to İstanbul. More importantly, shortly before the Thrace Affair, an important number of Armenians were deported deliberately from Interior Anatolia to İstanbul<sup>441</sup>. Moreover, according to the article of P. Genitzon, which was published by Temps, a journal published in Paris, in November 3, 1926, non-Muslims could not leave a certain region without authorization<sup>442</sup>. This restriction had been comprised within the municipal limits of İstanbul until the spring of that year but, at the time this article was written, it was extended to Bursa, Yalova and the neighborhood of İzmit. These measures were apparently undertaken to prevent the mixing of them with the native dwellers and to assure their given difference by preventing the possibility of assimilation.

Besides the immigration and settlement policies, most of other intentional activities of the government revealed the preponderance of dissimilationist attitudes towards non-Muslims. As Brubaker argues, nationalization in the sense of dissimilation

---

<sup>441</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, pp. 88-89.

<sup>442</sup> P. Genitzon, "Turkism and the Minorities" adopted from *NAUS*, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929 (M 353), 10/11/1926, 867.01/179.

are generally directed at “spheres of practice”<sup>443</sup>. In this respect, there are lots of academic studies designating the exclusion of the non-Muslim minorities from “spheres of practice”. For example, Çağlar Keyder<sup>444</sup>, Stefanos Yerasimos<sup>445</sup> and Ayhan Aktar<sup>446</sup> investigate the nationalization of the economic activities in terms of the exclusion of the non-Muslims with the policies of the Republic. Furthermore, as emphasized by Genitzon, in spite of the Constitution which provided that Armenians, Greeks and Jews of Turkey be recognized as citizens ranking equally with the Muslim Turks, they were not admitted as public functionaries or to the administrations of the State<sup>447</sup>.

### 5.2.2. *Assimilationist Homogenization of Muslims*

On the other hand, the attitudes of the governmental elites vis-à-vis non-Turk or non-Turkish-speaker Muslims were assimilative rather than being dissimilative. In other words, homogenization policies of the Republic against those Muslims attempted to nationalize them by turning their language and culture to the putative characteristics of Muslim-Turk population. Therefore, with the prominent pattern of settlement policies, those Muslim immigrants who did not speak Turkish language and possess Turkish culture were aimed to mix with native dwellers in a way that

---

<sup>443</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, p. 88.

<sup>444</sup> Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 1995).

<sup>445</sup> Stefanos Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye, Kitap: 3: Dünya Savaşından 1971’e*, (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992).

<sup>446</sup> Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*.

<sup>447</sup> P. Genitzon, “Turkism and the Minorities” adopted from *NAUS*, Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910-1929 (M 353), 10/11/1926, 867.01/179.

could promote the assimilation process. A similar policy design was also on the agenda for those Muslims of Kurds, nomads, gypsies and so on. Furthermore, the nationalization policy was implemented in a way that its exclusivist aspects were hardly touched upon these Muslims, which was clearly the case for the non-Muslim minorities. An interesting point to be noted is that even the Kurdish population who revolted against the authority of the Republic was hardly “otherized” as minority. For example, while discussing the law on the relocation of rebellious Kurds I have mentioned in the previous part, Falih Rıfıkı Atay perceived their revolts as a reactionary action against the progressive ideals of the Republic instead of designating the rebellious Kurds with their ethnic and cultural otherness<sup>448</sup>.

The minority question discussed in the Lausanne Conference reveals quite clearly the different attitudes of the founders of the Republic towards Muslims and non-Muslims. What was on the agenda throughout this debate was the pressure upon Turkey for convincing it to accept the existence of linguistic and ethnical minorities in Turkey, in addition to religious minorities. Faced by such pressures, Turkish side insisted on the argument that there was a cultural and historical unity among the Muslim population of Turkey and its minority issue was concerned only with those non-Muslim groups due to this cultural and historical heritage<sup>449</sup>. Rıza Nur made Turkey’s argument clear by stating in the sub-committee of minority question that history

---

<sup>448</sup> “Nakil Kanunu”, *Milliyet*, 19 April 1927, p. 1

<sup>449</sup> See Rıza Nur’s statement in the sub-commission of minority question. *Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: II, pp. 175-179.

shows that the question of the minorities in Turkey always had reference to the non-Muslims<sup>450</sup>.

However, in a quite different manner from what Tanıl Bora argues, this did not mean that Turkish nationalism incorporated a priori Muslims of different ethnicities and languages into the boundaries of “self”<sup>451</sup>. Rather, what was at stake in the argument of the Turkish side was the security concerns. Turkey’s nationalist elites assessed the extension of minority rights to linguistic and ethnical minorities as a serious threat to the unity of the nation and national security since they were aware of the linguistic and ethnical diversities of population living within the boundaries of National Covenant (Misak-ı Milli). This attitude was reflected to the debates held in Turkish Parliament with respect to the evaluation of Lausanne Conference. Although Turkish delegation had succeeded in limiting minority status only to non-Muslim groups in Lausanne Treaty’s articles related to the minority rights, the last paragraph of the Article 39 of this treaty became the target of harsh criticism in Turkish Parliament. According to this paragraph, Turkey undertook to provide necessary measures for all non-Turkish speakers to make the use of their own language in Turkish courts possible<sup>452</sup>. Salahattin Bey, the deputy of Mersin, viewed this as a very heavy burden over the unity of Turkish nation<sup>453</sup>. According to Salahattin Bey, the inclusion of this paragraph into Lausanne Treaty made known the intention of Western powers to manipulate Turkey’s Muslim population. Apparently, he evaluated this as an obstacle to

---

<sup>450</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160.

<sup>451</sup> Tanıl Bora, “Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar”, pp. 36-37

<sup>452</sup> See İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları: Tarihleri ve Açıklamaları ile Birlikte*, p. 96.

the nationalization in Turkey<sup>454</sup>. Abdulkadir Kemali Bey, the deputy of Kastamonu, shared the same view and joined to Salahattin Bey's disapproval of the matter<sup>455</sup>.

The attitude of Rıza Nur, who was the chief of the Turkish delegation in the discussions over minority question, points out the prevailing feeling of insecurity as well. According to Rıza Nur, what was intended by the extension of minority rights to the linguistic and ethnical minorities was to shatter the unity of Turkish nation. He maintained that while the claims for the existence of racial minorities aimed to put Circassians, Abazas, Bosnians and Kurds to the status of Greeks and Armenians, the claims for the linguistic minorities intended to create minorities out of Muslims who were not speaking Turkish. Most importantly, what was offered by Rıza Nur as a response and solution to such claims reveals strikingly the assimilative mentality of the period.

*Leaving any person in our country with another race, language and religion is the most necessary, just and vital work to do as a response to such claims*<sup>456</sup>.

It is obvious that in this statement Rıza Nur was addressing the necessity of homogenizing non-Turk and non-Turkish-speaker Muslims, through the way of scattering their villages and locating them among the native Muslim-Turks<sup>457</sup>. As investigated in the last chapters, the subsequent practices of the Republic prove that Rıza Nur was not alone in this assimilationist mentality. The laws on settlement adopted in

---

<sup>453</sup> TBMM Gizli Celse Zabıtlar, Devre: I, Cilt: 28, İnikat: 3, Celse: 11, 02/03/1339-02/03/1923, p. 11.

<sup>454</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>455</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>456</sup> Rıza Nur, *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, p. 103.

<sup>457</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

1926 and 1934 were designed and implemented in line with this view. So did other legislations governing immigration and settlement policies.

Investigating some other discussions conducted in Turkish Grand National Assembly makes this matter quite clear. For example, Rüştü Bey, the deputy of Bursa, asked within the discussions about the budget of Ministry of Interior that

*People who speak language other than Turkish have been settled in Turkish territories. What has been done to Turkify them?<sup>458</sup>*

It is obvious in this question that Rüştü Bey was considering the use of Turkish language as a condition of being Turk and those who do not possess this condition ought to be Turkified. In answering this question Şükrü Kaya, the Minister of Interior at that time, stated that those who had been settled in a scattered way adopted Turkish language. Furthermore, Kaya put forth a very striking argument for those who were still speaking other languages.

*I guess that this mass whose number is a lot enough to say big, over one hundred thousand, will eventually understand the deficiency of their language. When they see that speaking in Turkish provides not only pleasure and honor but also political and economic advantages, they will naturally speak Turkish<sup>459</sup>.*

With this statement, Şükrü Kaya clearly points out the fact that in order to benefit from the political and economic advantages of being Turk, the Muslim immigrants should have adopted Turkish. Besides proving the determination of homogenizing

---

<sup>458</sup> TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: IV, Cilt: 3, İçtima: 28, 15/07/1931, p.120.

<sup>459</sup> “Öyle tahmin ediyorum ki büyük denecek kadar fazla olan, yüz bini geçen bu kütle de nihayetülemir lisanının noksanlığını anlayacak Türkçe konuşmanın yalnız zevk ve şeref değil, aynı zamanda siyasi ve iktisadi bir menfaat tevhit ettiğini görünce tabiatile Türkçe konuşacaklardır”. *Ibid.*, p. 123.

them, this was, in fact, a considerable threat to those who continued to speak in, for example, Bosnian, Albanian, Bulgarian and Greek languages.

In most cases, this determination went hand in hand with the rejection of their ethnic belongings, whose remembrance was perceived as an obstacle to the assimilation process. This was the case not only for the Muslim immigrants but also for all Muslim population of Anatolia, who were considered not to possess Turkish culture. Mustafa Kemal's following statement ought to be considered in relation to this issue.

*In today's political and social community of Turkey, there are some of our co-nationals and citizens who are urged to be propagated with the ideas of Kurdish-ness, Circassian-ness, and even Laz-ness or Bosnian-ness. However, these wrong designations, which are the products of the despotic epochs of the past, have produced no effect but grief over any individual of nation, except a few enemy tools, reactionary brainless people. Because, these people of nation possess the same past, history, ethic, law like all Turkish community<sup>460</sup>.*

In this statement, Mustafa Kemal reveals in a very clear manner the aforementioned attitude of Turkish nation-building project towards Muslims of different ethnicities. Furthermore, it is possible to grasp the intolerance towards any reference to ethnic affiliations other than Turkish ethnicity, which were perceived as factor blurring the homogenous sense of Turkish national identity.

A topic discussed in the first years of the implementation of population exchange reveals clearly the degree of such intolerance. In the parliamentary discussions about the problems aroused in settling the immigrants especially of Greece ori-

---

<sup>460</sup> "Bugünkü Türk milleti siyasi ve içtima-i camiasi içinde kendilerine kürtlük fikri, çerkezlik fikri ve hatta lazlık fikri veya boşnaklık fikri propaganda edilmek istenmiş vatandaş ve milletdaslarımız vardır. Fakat mazinin istibdat devirleri mahsulu olan bu yanlış tevsimler, bir kaç düşman aleti, mürteci beyinsizden maada hiçbir millet ferdi üzerinde teelümden başka bir tesir hasil etmemiştir. Çünkü, bu millet efradı da umum Türk camiasi gibi aynı müşterek maziye, tarihe, ahlaka, hukuka sahip bulunuyor". Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969), p. 23.

gin, three immigrant associations became the target of harsh criticism. According to Recep Peker, who was the Minister of Interior at that time, these associations<sup>461</sup> were working against the unity of Turkish nation, since they were trying to assure solidarity among the immigrants.

*Gentlemen, what does it mean? Solidarity among immigrants on the one side, solidarity among the native dwellers on the other side, will we produce duality in the country? ...*<sup>462</sup>

It is quite clear that even the tendency towards the constitution of immigrant identity was deemed as a threat to the unity of Turkish nation and thus it was found unacceptable. Since these associations could breed the ethnic and cultural belongings of the immigrants to their past affiliations, such initiatives had the possibility of preventing the constitution of homogenous Turkish national identity that was set out to construct.

Similar concerns were debated in the Turkish Grand National Assembly throughout the discussions of the Law on Surname (Soyadı Kanunu)<sup>463</sup>. Most of the speeches uttered in the parliament gave emphasis to the necessity of eradicating the ties of subject population to their ethnic and cultural affiliations. For this aim, it was suggested that the use of any title, surname and name echoing the affiliation to tribes, foreign cultures and nationalities ought to be forbidden. An interesting fact is that all the Muslim population of the country who were deemed as not possessing the neces-

---

<sup>461</sup> The names of these associations were not revealed in the discussions. I could not find any information about this issue in my examinations of Prime Ministry Archives and newspapers.

<sup>462</sup> "Bu ne demektir efendiler, muhacirler arasında tesanüt bir tarafta, yerliler arasında tesanüt bir tarafta, memlekette ikilik mi ihdas edeceğiz...". *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, Devre: II, Cilt: 10, İçtima: 3, 06/11/1340-06/11/1924, p. 85.

<sup>463</sup> For the parliamentary discussions on Law on Surname, see *TBMM Zabut Ceridesi*, Devre: IV, Cilt: 23, İçtima: 71, 06/11/1340-21/06/1934, pp. 244-259.

sary requirements of being Turk were cited throughout this discussion<sup>464</sup>. For example, the names belonging to Kurdish tribes like Haydaranlı, Halikanlı and Yusufhanlı were considered under this category. However, it was not limited with the Kurdish tribe names. According to Şükrü Kaya, the names and surnames that were associated with Circassian, Kızılbaş and Bektaşî cultures were to be forbidden. In addition, he added, many immigrants were carrying the names belonging to their past affiliations. Şükrü Kaya also supported the necessity of eradicating such kind of reputations, which was certainly agreed by other deputies<sup>465</sup>. He reveals in very clear manner the underlying mentality of this approach.

*As to the foreign names; the highest duty of a country is to annex and assimilate the dwellers within its frontiers to its own community (Applauds)... Our obligation is to introduce in any case those who are living here, who are in our community, into the civilization of Turkish community, and to provide them with the prosperity of civilization. Why to say still Kurd Memet, Circassian Hasan, Laz Ali. Indeed, this is a thing indicating the weakness of the dominant element. However, Turkish element is an element which most successfully assimilates. It is not true to leave these differences. If there is someone who has the least feeling of difference inside, lets eradicate it in the schools and in society. At that time, this guy will become Turk as much as me and will serve to the country. Thus, lots of guys of foreign races have served to the country. Why to separate them from ourselves?*<sup>466</sup>

---

<sup>464</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 246-249.

<sup>465</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 246.

<sup>466</sup> “Yabancı isimlere gelince; bir memleketin en büyük vazifesi sınırları içinde oturanların hepsini ilhak etmek, temsil etmektir...Burada oturanları bizim camiamız dahilinde bulunanları behemahal Türk camiasının medeniyetine sokmak ve onları medeniyetin feyzinden istifade ettirmek bizim borcumuzdur. Niçin hala Kürt Memet, Çerkez Hasan, Laz Ali diyelim. Bir defa bu hakim unsurun kendi zaafını gösteren bir şeydir. Halbu ki Türk unsuru en çok temsil eden bir unsurdur. Bu ayrılıkları bırakmak doğru değildir. Eğer kendisinin içinde en ufak bir ayrılık hissi varsa, mekteplerde ve cemiyette onu silelim. Böylece memleketi hizmet etmiş yabancı ırklara mensup adam çöktür. Niçin bunları kendimizden ayıralım”. *Ibid.*, p. 249.

Şükrü Kaya leaves very few words to say by revealing clearly the rationale of the assimilation, which imprinted its remarks to the Law on Surname. Considering the fact that the content of the discussions was referred exclusively to the Muslim groups, this speech is very important in revealing the assimilationist attitude towards Muslims, in the sense proposed by Rogers Brubaker, that is, an attempt of “making similar”<sup>467</sup>. On the other hand, uttered in 1934, this speech reflects in a clear manner Ziya Gökalps’s inclusivist/assimilationist interpretation of nationality, which has been discussed above. Having in mind the generally assumed argument of the literature that views ethnic nationalism as the phenomenon of the years of the 1930s, another important question arises here: to what extent is it possible to identify the tendencies of Turkish nationalism with the ethnic nationalism phenomenon? In the remaining part of this chapter, I will try to respond this question from a theoretical point of view.

### 5.3. Conceptualizing Turkish Nationalism

In discussing the types of nationalisms, Anthony Smith argues that the actual nationalist movements produce many combinations out of the underlying conceptual divergence between the civic-territorial model and ethnic-genealogical model of the nation. He resembles the divergences appeared in various nationalist movements to “chameleon” and states that, capable of endless manipulation, each nationalism can be understood only in each specific instance<sup>468</sup>. That is, each nationalism involves in

---

<sup>467</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, p. 88.

<sup>468</sup> Anthony D. Smith. *National Identity*, p. 79.

itself civic and ethnic elements and combines them in the matrix of its own nationalist discourse that can be analyzed only in its own particular context.

Seen from this angle, the difficulty of responding the above question becomes obvious. In the era under consideration, Turkish nationalism, in line with Smith's argument, involved various conflicting tendencies. Looking at the Article 88 of the Constitution of 1924, for example, one encounters to a civic-territorial definition of Turkishness. This article states that "the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race, in terms of citizenship, to be Turkish"<sup>469</sup>. Alongside this formal definition, however, a substantive-essentialist construction of national identity became visible not only in the political discourse but also in the actual practices. As far as this second face of national identity concerns, I have engaged in an examination over its reflection on the homogenization and immigration policies. However, in so doing, I have tackled only with these two issues and excluded various topics such as the Westernization project, secularism, anti-communism and so on. Besides religion and language, these themes constituted important dimensions of Turkish nationalism's identity discourse. For those reasons, any generalization that this study suggests is inadequate.

In fact, any generalization or conceptualization with respect to the disposition of Turkish nationalism cannot avoid insufficiency. In addition to tension and problematic corroboration of civic understanding with essentialist one (or France model with German one) whose traits were incorporated within the *mélange* of Turkish national identity discourse and practices, this is mainly because of the theoretical quagmire of nationalism studies. That is, theoretically speaking, the issue of nationalism is so puz-

---

<sup>469</sup> Quoted from Kemal Kirişçi, "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices", p. 1

zling that neither widely accepted definition nor any analytic consensus over its dynamics and nature exists. Therefore, any conceptualization that is consistent for one theoretical approach is generally inconsistent with another. The concept of ethnicity is a clear example of this lack of consensus. It is, if anything, more definitionally chameleonic than nation<sup>470</sup>. So is the phenomenon of ethno-nationalism. There is no agreed answer to the question of what differentiates it from, for example, cultural nationalism.

One of the best ways of dealing with this matter is to examine the process itself instead of attempting to classify it with terms such as ethnic, cultural or civic nationalism. This method is rather meaningful for the objectives of present study. Through the examination of immigration and settlement policies, one can see that, regardless of how to define it, the nation-building project of Turkey engaged in the homogenization of its population on the basis of linguistic, religious and cultural coordinates of an imagined definition of Turkish national identity. As far as its political consequences concerns, since Muslim affiliation was regarded as the crucial component of this definition, such project took an assimilationist shape vis-à-vis Muslims and dissimilationist shape vis-à-vis non-Muslims. In this sense, turning to the issue I have discussed in the introduction chapter, the subordination of cultural, linguistic criteria of Turkishness to the religious one in the existing literature concerning the analysis of Turkish national identity is highly problematic. So is searching for the roots of growing emphasis to language criterion within the ethnicity-oriented identity discourse of the 1930s. Not only in those years but also from the constitution of the Republic on,

---

<sup>470</sup> Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 100.

Turkish language was considered as the crucial component of national identity, the political result of which was the homogenizing measures targeting non-Turkish-speaker Muslims. Hence, just as in the Ziya Gökalp's cultural/social interpretation of nationality, the growing emphasis upon the descent and blood in the 1930s prepared the ideological ground for the Turkification policies. In other words, both cultural and ethnicity-oriented construction of Turkishness paved the way to similar political results.

In fact, there are very important theoretical implications of this last point. If ethno-cultural idea of nation, which jells around a common descent language and history<sup>471</sup>, is conceived as a politically constructed artifact, then the line demarcating *Gökalpian* understanding of nationality and the ethnic nationalism blurs in political field. This is what this study has theoretically suggested, in the introduction part, and what its empirical investigation has largely proved. Instead of relying on the assumption of opposition common to almost all discussions of nation and nationalism that goes by different names such as ethnic-geographical versus civic territorial, romantic versus rationalist, Eastern versus Western, German versus French nationalisms, I have employed a political approach to deal with my research agenda.

Conceptualizing nation as an imagined community that is particularly modern has been one of the primary ontological approach of this work. Drawing upon it, I have conceived the interwar period Turkey as "nationalizing state" in line with

---

<sup>471</sup> Jürgen Habermas, "The European Nation-state-Its Achievements and Its Limits. On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship", p. 288.

Rogers Brubaker<sup>472</sup>. Nationalizing states, according to Brubaker, are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as the states of and for particular nations, yet as incomplete or unrealized nation-states. The variant of nationalisms appeared in such kinds of states, i.e. nationalizing nationalism, involve claims made in the name of a “core nation” constructed in ethno-cultural terms and understood as the legitimate owner of the state, and sharply distinguished from the citizenry as a whole. Despite the idea that the core nation legitimately owns the polity, the full realization of this ownership signifies a specific action to promote the language, cultural flourishing, in brief, political hegemony of the core nation.

Hence, from such a theoretical point of view, not only the assumed duality between the 1920s and 1930s but also between the *Gökalpian* (cultural/social) and ethnic understanding of nation become vague with respect to their political results. As the similar pattern of immigration and settlement policies indicates, Turkish language, culture and Muslim affiliation was understood as the primary criteria of being or becoming Turk at both periods. At the same time, they were the peculiarities of constructed core of Turkish nationality, defined with ethno-religious terms, according to which the whole citizenry should have been Turkified. Therefore, just as it is not proper to attribute the role of language criterion to the ethnicity-oriented construction of national identity, so the role of religious criterion cannot be viewed as free from the nation-shaping policies of the Turkish Republic. The nationalizing state of Turkey appealed to religion to forge the unity of nation and identity that was set out to construct. It was found in religion a powerful support for this purpose. Nevertheless, be-

---

<sup>472</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*.

hind this consideration lied a political project that envisioned Turkish nationality with linguistic and cultural unity.

Considering this theoretical argument, and turning to the aforementioned question, can we still regard the disposition of Turkish nationalism in the interwar period as ethno-nationalism? It is possible to answer this question positively if, and only if, ethno-nationalism is conceived as a political project aiming to nationalize the population according to the cultural-linguistic peculiarities of an imagined-historical ethnic community, that is, the core nation. In other words, if one conceptualizes ethno-nationalism from a political point of view instead of searching for a continuity between the modern nations and pre-modern ethnies, then the interwar period of Turkey can be categorized as the classical case of ethno-religious nationalism, in which religion undertakes a supportive role to cement the unity of nation.

Remembering the immigration hierarchy that was employed by the official texts governing immigration makes this argument quite clear. As I have noted in the second chapter, ethnic Turks were conceived as the first category to be provided with the opportunity of immigration. Then came the non-Turkish Muslims who would adopt, in the eyes of nationalist elites, the cultural and linguistic features of the people of Turkish descent. In this respect, the Turkish descent was the main point of reference in the imagination of elites, and other Muslims should have adopted the features accompanied by ethnic Turks to fill the gap of belonging to other ethnicities.

However, besides excluding very important dimensions of Turkish nationalism, such as Westernization, modernization, secularism and so on, such kinds of conceptualizations are hardly important. What is theoretically more important is that, regardless of how to define it, each nation-building practice involves in itself the dynamics

of “mixing” and “unmixing” of peoples. Including what are called as the cases of civic nationalism, the existing nation-states are the results of nation building and nation destroying at the same time<sup>473</sup>. Nation-states have typically sought to build a common nationhood by destroying any sense of distinct nationhood of national minorities. As observed by Will Kymlicka, one can see this in the massive coercion used by the France government in the 19<sup>th</sup> century against Bretons and Basques, and one can see it today in the policies adopted by the former Slovak government against the ethnic Hungarians, or by the Latvian government against the ethnic Russians<sup>474</sup>.

The phenomenon of Balkan nationalism is very revealing to grasp the fact that Turkish nation-building project is not a unique case in many respects. The histories of the Balkan nation (al)-states are the histories of mixing and unmixing of peoples. As Maria Todorova argues, all Balkan countries (Turkey included) have resorted to similar solutions in trying to resolve minority problems: emigration and assimilation<sup>475</sup>. In Greece, for example, in the aftermath of population exchange, the nation-building project produced a highly exclusive ethnic identity which combined membership in the Eastern Orthodox Church with fluency in the Modern Greek language and the subordination of individual rights to the interest of the state<sup>476</sup>. This construction of national identity, in a similar way with Turkey, led to the treatment of non-Orthodox peoples with dissimilationist attitudes while the Orthodox minorities became the tar-

---

<sup>473</sup> Walker Connor, *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, pp. 28-67.

<sup>474</sup> Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, p. 230.

<sup>475</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, pp. 176.

<sup>476</sup> Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, “The 1923 Greek – Turkish Exchange of Populations and the Reformulation of Greek National Identity” paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, (Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September, 1998), p. 1.

get of assimilative policies that rejected their different ethnic and national belongings<sup>477</sup>. Moreover, like non-Muslims in Turkey, Muslims of the Balkans such as Pomaks in Bulgaria, the Slavic Bosnians in Yugoslavia, Torbeshs in Macedonia and so on were exposed to exclusive attitudes<sup>478</sup>. Although language was the nucleus of different national identities among Balkan Christians (for the most part Orthodox), it could not raze the fundamental boundary between Muslims and Christians that had been formed during the centuries of the Ottoman rule<sup>479</sup>. Though religion could never be a sufficient component of national identity, the Balkan nation-states appealed to its supportive role in their efforts of homogenizing their societies administratively and linguistically<sup>480</sup>.

Accordingly, the nation-building project of Turkey in the interwar period shared similar characteristics with its Balkan counterparts in terms of engaging in the nationalization of society in line with the religious, linguistic and “so-called” ethnic coordinates of an imagined core nation. In seeking to create homogenous sense of Turkish nationality, this project led to the mixing and unmixing of peoples that was accompanied by forced migration, assimilation and dissimilation. Whereas the Muslims with different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds became the target of what can be called as “nation-destroying” attitudes and measures, non-Muslim minorities were exposed to

---

<sup>477</sup> Soner Çağaptay, “Kemalist Dönem’de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma”, p. 238.

<sup>478</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, p. 177.

<sup>479</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 177.

<sup>480</sup> P. Kitrimoidiles, “Imagined Communities and the Origins of National Question in the Balkans”, pp. 184-185.

forced migration and dissimilation due to the peculiarities of Turkey's nation-shaping policies sharing similar characteristics with the Balkan nationalism phenomenon.

## 6. CONCLUSION

This study has tried to deal with the issues of nation-state formation and national identity construction in the interwar-period Turkey. In this respect, it has endeavored to investigate how demographic measures were employed by the governmental policies directed to the rendering the newly created Republic identical to a culturally, linguistically and religiously homogenous nation. Thus, by conceptualizing the interwar period Turkey as a “nationalizing state”, in the sense suggested by Rogers Brubaker, it has focused mainly upon the immigration and settlement policies of the Republic, which were utilized as the instruments of the homogenization of the population.

When the constitution of the Turkish Republic was announced in 1923, its founders faced a country whose population was highly depopulated due mainly to the conditions of long period of consecutive wars. According to figures provided by Justin McCharty, the population of Anatolia fell by 30 percent from 1912 to 1922. The number of Muslims decreased from 13.7 million to 11.2 million between these years. On the other hand, the number of non-Muslims decreased dramatically from 2.8 million to 0.3 million at the same period<sup>481</sup>. The turbulent years of wars – started with the Balkan Wars, followed by the First World War and ended with the War of Independence – had gone hand in hand with the massacres, deportations, forced immigrations, war time casualties, in brief, demographic disorder. McCharty estimates

---

<sup>481</sup> Justin McCharty, “Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol: 19, no: 2, April 1983, p. 140.

that approximately 10 per cent of the Anatolian population emigrated and 20 per cent died between 1912-1922<sup>482</sup>.

On the other hand, tens of thousands of people had become homeless in the various parts of Anatolia by the time the Republic was constituted<sup>483</sup>. Besides the immigrants from the Balkans and the Caucasus, significant number of native dwellers, who lost their homes because of the war time conditions, were to be settled to prevent the demographic chaos.

In the face of the highly depopulated and disordered population structure, the policies of immigration and settlement had crucial importance for the founders of the Republic. First of all, increasing the population was seen as an urgent necessity due both to economic and social reasons. Thus, bringing the Muslims residing outside of the country was seen as one of the solutions to the demographic problems of the country. Second, immigrants and the homeless people were to be settled in an organized way. Therefore, specific measures were to be undertaken to regulate their settlement. In this respect, the policies of immigration and settlement were highly related issues after the ratification of the Lausanne Treaty.

However, such considerations constituted only one aspect of the immigration and settlement policies. The philosophy of the new Republic necessitated, in the minds of nationalist elites, the creation of Western type of nation-state. This meant that the new state was to be equated with a homogenous nation in its cultural and linguistic senses. It was aimed at creating a nation whose individuals are politically loyal Muslims,

---

<sup>482</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 140.

<sup>483</sup> Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925)*, pp. 8-11.

speaking in Turkish and possessing Turkish culture. Nevertheless, besides being depopulated and disordered, the population structure of Anatolia was multiethnic and, to some extent, multireligious. There were still Greeks, Jews and Armenians whose residence in Anatolia the nationalist elite found intolerable. Aside from the existence of non-Muslims, the Muslim majority of the country was hardly homogenous. There were Kurds, Bosnians, Albanians, Circassians and so on, who were speaking in languages other than Turkish<sup>484</sup>. In the face of this situation, in the era under consideration, Turkification of the population structure was one of the main topics on the agenda of the Republic.

In fact, as emphasized in the first chapter, the nation-building policies of the CUP government, implemented in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, constituted a strong reference point in the minds of the founders of the Republic. They were aware of the importance of demographic regulations regarding the aim of the homogenization of the population. Hence, their nationalist outlook was reflected clearly on the immigration and settlement practices. The compulsory population exchange with Greece is an important example of how the immigration practices were directed to the homogenisation. With the implementation of it, Turkey excluded massive number Orthodox Greeks, which was an important step towards the aim of homogenization.

On the other hand, the same nationalist outlook was clearly on the agenda of the policies regarding the incorporation of immigrants, which has been the main focus of this work. In a sense, the pattern of the immigration policies of the interwar-period Turkey involved the articulation of two purposes. First was the aim of increasing the

---

<sup>484</sup> For official numbers of non-Turkish-speaking Muslims in the censuses, see Fuat Dündar, *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*.

population. And second was the aim of creating culturally and linguistically homogenous nation. While demographic and economic necessities led to the admission of non-Turkish-speaker Muslims to the country, the nationalist disposition of the governmental elites led to the classification of those Muslims on ethnic and linguistic basis.

The Turkish speaking Muslims were the first group whose settlement in Turkey was desired. There was no problem in admitting them since their language and culture were considered as equivalent to the peculiarities of the "core nation" of Turkish descent. Nonetheless, this was not the case for the non-Turkish-speaker Muslims. Their language and way of life were different from the constructed characteristics of the individuals of Turkish nation. Instead of rejecting their immigration totally, however, the government chose to classify them on the basis of whom could assimilate by adopting Turkish language and culture and whom could not. Accordingly, due mainly to such consideration, Pomaks and Bosnians, for example, were admitted to the country whereas Albanians, Arabs and Kurds, for example, were rejected.

In fact, the settlement practices of the post-Lausanne Turkey were highly related to the pattern of immigration policy. As I have debated in the chapter four, once admitted to the country, Turkish speaking and non-Turkish-speaking immigrants were exposed to the highly differentiated settlement practices because of the homogenization objective.

First, Turkish-speaking immigrants, who were considered as the people of Turkish descent, were to be located to regions whose population the government intended to Turkify. In this respect, the Eastern region of the country, where the Kurdish population constituted the overwhelming majority, and Thrace, due to national security

concerns in the face of the tensions with Italy and Bulgaria, were among such kind of regions.

Second, different ethnic and linguistic groups of Muslims, especially immigrants, were to be settled in a geographically scattered form to promote their Turkification. What I have tried to show in the chapter four is that not only the non-Turkish-speaker Muslim immigrants, who were designated as the people possessing Turkish culture in the official legislations governing immigrations, but also the Gypsies, Kurds, nomads and other non-Turkish-speaker Muslims residing in Turkey were subject to assimilative settlement practices.

In investigating the policies of immigration and settlement, one of my primary aims has been to relate my research to the literature on Turkish national identity. In that sense, this study can be considered as an attempt of reconsidering some of the prevailing assumptions of the existing literature in terms of the religious, linguistic and ethnic boundaries of Turkishness.

One of the critics directed by this study to the existing literature concerns generally accepted conceptualization of the 1920s and 1930s to be distinct periods in terms of the construction of Turkishness. In a quite different manner from this argument, I have suggested in the chapter five that the political consequences of the ethnicity-oriented formulation of Turkish national identity in the 1930s were not that different from the 1920s. In both periods, the Turkification of the population on the religious, linguistic and the cultural basis of the imagined core of Turkishness used to be one of the primary practices of the nation-building policies.

My second critic has been very related to the first one. Having been discussed in detail in the Introduction, one of the primary assumptions of the existing literature is

that Muslim affiliation was the actual basis of Turkishness. What I have attempted to show is that this consideration subordinates the linguistic and cultural criteria of Turkishness to the religious one. By pointing out the homogenization efforts of the settlement policies targeting the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims and the assimilative dimension of the immigration policies, I have attempted to reconsider the role of religion in the formulation of nation. As I have argued in the chapter five, taking overwhelmingly assimilationist form towards Muslims and dissimilationist towards non-Muslims, the nation-building project of the interwar-period Turkey appealed to religion to forge the unity of nation and identity it created. Accordingly, rather than constituting the actual basis of Turkishness, it was found in religion a powerful support for the political project that envisioned Turkish nationality with cultural and linguistic unity.

Having not been subjected to sufficient scholarly interests, the examination of the settlement and immigration practices of Turkey offers an important research agenda to the prospective works concerning the nation-state formation and national identity construction processes of Turkey. For example, making comparisons between the different periods of the Republic would be very revealing in terms of the analysis of Turkish national identity. Disclosing the shifts appeared in the general pattern of immigration, naturalization and settlement policies would provide us with the opportunity of understanding the transformations in the prevailing idea of nation. In this regard, comparing the immigration policies of Kemalist one-party state with that of post- Second-World-War Turkey would be a very promising research agenda. Such a comparison would be very instructive as to whether the transition to a more democratic system affected the citizenship and nationality policies.

On the other hand, making comparisons with the demographic policies of other nation-states is another significant research topic. Such kind of researches would disclose the characteristics of nation-state formation in Turkey in a much more revealing way. In this respect, the formation of the Balkan nation-states, such as Greece and Bulgaria, would be a promising subject of comparison with Turkey. Inheriting the demographic and social legacy of multinational Ottoman Empire, these countries faced similar obstacles in equating the state with nation and followed similar paths in creating more homogenous nations, such as ethnic cleansing, forced assimilation, forced migration and colonization. Besides disclosing and questioning the similarities and differences in the courses of nation-state formation, such comparisons between Turkey and the Balkan States offer the opportunity of analytically reconsidering the effects of the Ottoman heritage upon the creation of nation states.

## **RESOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY**

### **Unpublished Resources:**

Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi (BCA).

The National Archives of the United States (NAUS):

Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1919-1929 (M 353).

Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1919-1929 (M 353), Review of the Turkish Press.

Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224).

Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Turkey 1930-1944 (M 1224), Review of the Turkish Press.

**Published Resources:**

*Düstur*

*Eski ve Yeni Toprak, İskan Hükümleri ve Uygulama Klavuzu*, Naci Kökdemir (ed.),

Ankara: 1952.

*Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 1,

Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969.

*Lozan Barış Konferansı: Tutanaklar, Belgeler*, translation: Seha L. Meray, vol: 2,

Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1969

*İskan Kanunlar ve Tefsirleri*, Ankara: Sümer Basımevi, 1939.

*İskan Tarihçesi*, İstanbul: Hamit Matbaası, 1932.

*İskan Toprak Talimatnamesi*, Ankara: Köyöğretmeni Basımevi, 1936.

*TBMM Gizli Celse Tutanakları*

*TBMM Zabıt Cerideleri*

**Periodicals:**

Cumhuriyet

Milliyet

Tan

## Bibliography:

AĞANOĞLU, H. Yıldırım. *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyete Balkanlar'ın Makus Talihi:*

*Göç*, İstanbul: Kumsaati Yayınları, 2001.

AHMAD, Feroz. *İttihat ve Terakki, 1908 – 1914*, İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995.

AHMAD, Feroz. *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu*, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1995.

AKÇAM, Taner. "Hızla Türkleşiyoruz" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.) *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997, pp. 143-158.

AKGÜNDÜZ, Ahmet, "Migration to and from Turkey, 1783-1960: Types, Numbers and Ethno-Religious Dimensions", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol: 24, no: 1, January 1998, pp. 97-131.

AKTAR, Ayhan. "Homogenizing the Nation; Turkifying the Economy: Turkish Experience of Populations Exchange Reconsidered", paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September 1998.

AKTAR, Ayhan. *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. 2001.

AKTAR, Cengiz. "Osmanlı Kozmopolitizminden Avrupa Kozmopolitizmine Giden Yolda Ulus Parantezi" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), vol: 4, pp.77-80.

ALTUĞ, Yılmaz. *Balkanlardan Anayurda Yapılan Göçler*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1991.

ANDERSON, Benedict, *Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995.

ANDERSON, Benedict. "Introduction" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 1-16.

ANDREWS, Peter Alford-BENNINGHAUS, Rüdiger (eds.). *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag, 1989.

ARI, Kemal. *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç (1923-1925)*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000.

ARSLAN, Emre. "Türkiye'de Irkçılık" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 409-426.

AYDIN, Suavi: "'Türk Kavramının Sınırları'", *Birikim* no. 71-2, March-April 1995, pp. 50-65.

BAKLACIOĞLU, Nurcan Özgür. "Albanian Migratons and the Problem of Security in the Balkans", *Turkish Review of Balkan Studies*, 2001, no: 6, pp. 75-122.

BALAKRIHNAN, Gopal. "The National Imagination" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 198-213.

- BALÇIK, M. Berk: "Milliyetçilik ve Dil Politikaları" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp.777-787.
- BALİ, Rıfat N. *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları. 2001.
- BAJRAMI, Hakif. "Konventa Jugoslavo – Turke e Vitit 1938 Për Shpërnguljen e Shqiptarëve" in *E Verteta Mbi Kosoven Dhe Shqiptaret ne Jugosllavi*, (Tiranë: Akademia e Shkencave e Të Shqipërisë Instituti I Historisë, 1990), pp. 334-340.
- BAYDAR, Mustafa. *Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve Anıları*, İstanbul: Menteş Kıtapevi, 1968.
- BEHAR, Cem (ed.). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu*, Tarihi İstatistikler Dizisi, vol: 2, Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü Matbaası, 1996.
- BENLİSOY, Foti. "Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Katedilmemiş Bir Yol: Hristiyan Türkler" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 927-933.
- BENLİSOY, Foti. *Papa Eftim and the Foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church*, Unpublished M.A. Thesis submitted to Boğaziçi University-History Department, 2002.
- BERKES, Niyazi (ed.). *Ziya Gökalp, Turkish Nationalism and Western Civilization Selected Essays of Ziya Gökalp*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1959.

BEZANIS, L. "Soviet Muslim Emigres in the Republic of Turkey", *Central Asian Survey*, vol: 13, no: 1, 1994, pp. 59-179.

BIRCH, Anthony H. *Nationalism and National Integration*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

BİLGİN, Nuri (ed.). *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997.

BORA, Tanıl. "Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik ve Azınlıklar", *Birikim*, no: 71-2, March-April 1995, pp. 34-50.

BORA, Tanıl. "İnşa Döneminde Türk Milli Kimliği", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 71, Winter 1996, pp. 168-192.

BORA, Tanıl. "Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997, pp. 53-62.

BORA, Tanıl. "Türk Milli Kimliği, Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Balkan Sorunu" in Kemali Saybaşı – Gencer Özcan (eds.), *Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar*, Ankara: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997, pp. 183-206.

BORA, Tanıl. "Ekalliyet Yılanları: Türk milliyetçiliği ve Azınlıklar" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 911-919.

BOZARSLAN, Hamid. "Kürd Milliyetçiliği ve Kürd Hareketi, (1898-2000)" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye 'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 841-870.

BOZDOĞAN, Sibel – KASABA, Reşat (eds.). *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997.

BREUILLY, John. "Approaches to Nationalism" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 146-174.

BRUBAKER, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

BRUBAKER, Rogers. "Aftermaths of Empire and the Unmixing of Peoples" in Karen Barkey – Mark von Hagen (eds.) *After Empire, Multiethnic Societies and Nation-Building: The Soviet Union and the Russian, Ottoman, and Habsburg Empires*, Boulder: Westview Press: 1997, pp. 155-180.

BRUBAKER, Rogers. "Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in France and Germany" in Gerschon Shafir (ed.) *The Citizenship Debates: A Reader*, Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998, pp. 131-164.

CALHOUN, Craig. "Nationalism and Ethnicity", *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol: 19, 1993, pp. 211-239.

CONNOR, Walker. *Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.

- ÇAĞAPTAY, Soner. "Kemalist Dönem'de Göç ve İskan Politikaları: Türk Kimliği Üzerine Bir Çalışma", *Toplum-Bilim*, no: 93, Summer 2002, pp. 218-241.
- ÇAĞAPTAY, Soner. "Otuzlarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Irk, Dil ve Etnisite" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 245-249.
- DANIEL, E. Valentine – KNUDSEN, John Chr. (eds.). *Mistrusting Refugees*, Berkeley and California: University of California Press, 1995.
- DEMİR, Hülya – AKAR, Rıdvan. *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1999.
- DÜNDAR, Fuat. *Türkiye Nüfus Sayımlarında Azınlıklar*, İstanbul: Doz Yayınları, 1999.
- DÜNDAR, Fuat. *İttihat ve Terakki'nin Müslümanları İskan Politikası (1913-1918)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.
- DÜNDAR Fuat. "Milli Ezber: Saf Türk-Karışık Öteki" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 893-900.
- EREN, Halit. "Balkanlarda Türk ve Diğer Müslüman Topluları ve Göç Olgusu", *Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı (OBİV)Yayınları*. 1993, pp. 289-299.
- ERIKSEN, Thomas Hylland. "Linguistic Hegemony and Minority Resistance", *Journal of Peace Research*, vol: 29, n: 3, August 1992, pp. 313-332.

FINER, Samuel E. "State – and Nation – Building in Europe: The Role of the Military" in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 84-163.

GEORGIEVA, Tsevetana. "Pomaks: Muslim Bulgarians", *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations*, vol: 12, no: 3, July 2001, pp. 303-315.

GERAY, Cevat. *Türkiye'den ve Türkiye'ye Göçler ve Göçmenlerin İskanı*, Ankara: Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi-Maliye Enstitüsü, 1962.

GELLNER, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalisms*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1983.

GELLNER, Ernest, "The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of Nation and Class" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 98-145.

GÖKALP, Ziya. *The Principles of Turkism*, Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968.

GÖKTÜRK, Eren Deniz (Tol). "1919-1923 Dönemi Türk Milliyetçilikleri" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 103-117.

GUIBERNAU, Montserrat. *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996.

GÜVENÇ, Bozkurt. *Türk Kimliği*, İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1998.

GÜVENÇ, Bozkurt. "Cumuriyet ve Kimlik: Konu, Sorun, Kapsam ve Bağlam" in Ar-  
tun Ünsal (ed.). *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı  
Yayınları, 1998, pp. 117-126.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. "The European Nation-state-Its Achievements and Its Limits.  
On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship" in Gopal Balakrishian  
(ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 281-294.

HAMDULLAH SUPHİ. *Dağ Yolu*, İstanbul: Yeni Matbaa, 1929.

HECKMANN, Lale Yalçın. "Ulus, Millet Azınlık ve Etnik Gruplar", *Birikim*, no: 71-  
2, March-April 1995, pp. 81-86.

HIRSCHON, Renee. *Mübadele Çocukları*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları,  
2000.

HOBSBAWM, E. J. *Nations and Nationalism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University  
Press, 1992.

HOBSBAWM, E. J – RANGER, Terence (eds.). *The Invention of Tradition*, Cam-  
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

HOBSBAWM, E. J. "Ethnicity and Nationalism in Europe Today" in Gopal  
Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996,  
pp. 255-266.

- HROCH, Miraslov. "From National Movement to Fully-formed Nation: The Nation Building Process in Europe" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 78-97.
- İNAN, Afet. *Medeni Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969.
- KADIOĞLU, Ayşe. "Milletini Arayan Devlet: Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Açmazları", *Türkiye Günlüğü* no: 33, March-April 1995, pp. 91-100.
- KADIOĞLU, Ayşe. "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol: 32, no: 2, 1996, pp. 177-193.
- KARABATAK, Haluk. "1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudiler", *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 146, February 1996, pp. 68-80.
- KARPAT, Kemal H. *Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi-Party System*, Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959.
- KARPAT, Kemal H. *Osmanlı Modernleşmesi: Toplum, Kuramsal Değişim ve Nüfus*, Ankara: İmge Yayınları: 2002.
- KAZGAN, Gülten. "Milli Türk Devletinin Kuruluşu ve Göçler" *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol: 6, Nüfus, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983, p. 1556-1563.
- KELLY, Charles B. "How Nation-States Create and Respond to Refugee Flows", *International Migration Review*, vol: 30, no: 4, Winter 1996, pp. 1046-1066.

KEYDER, Çağlar. *Türkiye 'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları: 1995.

KEYMAN, Fuat-İÇDUYU, Ahmet. "Türk Modernleşmesi ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunu"  
in Artun Ünsal (ed.). *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*, İstanbul: Tarih  
Vakfi Yayınlar, 1998, pp. 169-180.

KIBREAB, Gaim. "Revisiting the Debate on People, Place, Identity and Displace-  
ment", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol: 12, no: 4, 1999, pp. 384 -410.

KITRIMOLIDES, P. "Imagined Communities and the Origins of National Question  
in the Balkans", *European History Quarterly*, vol: 19, no: 2, 1989, pp. 149-  
191.

KİLİ, Suna. *Atatürk Devrimi: Bir Çağdaşlama Modeli*, Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası,  
1981.

KİRİŞÇİ, Kemal. "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices",  
*Middle Eastern Studies* vol: 36, no: 3, July 2000, pp. 1-22.

KOHN, Hans. *The Idea of Nationalisms*, New York: Mcmillan, 1945.

KOUFA, Kalliopoi K.-SVOLOPOULOS, Constantinos. "The Compulsory Exchange  
of Populations Between Greece and Turkey: The Settlement of Minority  
Questions at the Conference of Lausanne, 1923, and its Impact on Greek-  
Turkish Relations" in P. Smith, K. Koufa-A. Suppan (eds.) *Comparative Stud-  
ies on Governments and non-Governments Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-  
1940: Ethnic Groups in International Relations*, Dartmouth: European Sci-  
ence Foundation, New York University Press, 1991.

- KOUFOPOULOU, S. "The Treaty of Lausanne and the Re-emergence of Ethnic Groups: The Case of Moslem-Cretans (Kritiki) in an Aegean Community of Turkey", paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September, 1998.
- KÖKER, Levent, "Kimlik Krizden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm ve Sonrası", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 71, Winter 1996, pp. 150-167.
- KYMLICKA, Will. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- LADAS, Stephen P. *The Balkan Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*, New York: MacMillan, 1932.
- LEVİ, Avner. "1934 Trakya Yahudileri Olayı: Alınamayan Ders", *Tarih ve Toplum*, no: 151, July 1996, pp. 10-17.
- LEWIS, Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- LOIZOS, Peter. "Ottoman Half-Lives: Long-term Perspectives on Particular Forced Migrations", *Journal of Refugee Studies*, vol: 12, n: 3, 1999, pp. 237-263.
- MACAR, Elçin. *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003.

- MANN, Michael, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 295-316.
- MARRUS, Michael R. *The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- McCHARTY, Justin. *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of the Empire*, New York and London: New York University Press, 1983.
- McCHARTY, Justin. "Foundations of the Turkish Republic: Social and Economic Change", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol: 19, no: 2, April 1983, pp. 139-151.
- McCHARTY, Justin. "Muslim Refugees in Turkey: The Balkan Wars, World War I and the Turkish War of Independence" in Heath W. Lowry – Donald Quataert (eds.), *Humanist and Scholar: Essays In Honour of Andreas Tietze*, İstanbul: The ISIS Press, 1993.
- McCHARTY, Justin. *Ölüm ve Sürgün: Osmanlı Müslümanlarına Karşı Yürütülen Ulus Olarak Temizleme İşlemi*, İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi Yayın San ve Tic. A. Ş, 1998.
- McCHARTY, Justin. "Muslims in Ottoman Europe: Population From 1800 to 1912", *Nationalities Papers*, vol: 28, no: 1, March 2000, pp. 29-45.
- MENTZEL, Peter 2000: "Conclusion: Millet, States and National Identities", *Nationalities Papers*, vol: 28, no: 1, March 2000, pp. 199-205.

- MICHALOPOULOS, Dimitris. "The Muslims of Chamuria and the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey", *Balkan Studies*, vol: 27, no: 2, 1986, pp. 303-313.
- MILLAS, Herkül. "Milli Türk Kimliği ve "Öteki" (Yunan)" in Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (eds.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002, vol: 4, pp. 193-202.
- MILLAS, Herkül (ed.). *Göç: Rumlar'ın Anadolu'dan Mecburi Ayrılışı (1919-1923)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002.
- MOURELOS, Y. G. "The 1914 Persecutions and the First Attempt at an Exchange of Minorities between Greece and Turkey", *Balkan Studies*, vol: 26, no: 2, 1985, pp. 389-413.
- NEUBURGER, Mary. "Pomak Borderlands", *Nationalities Papers*, vol: 28, no: 1, March 2000, pp. 181-199.
- NEYZİ, Leyla. "Remembering to Forget: Sabbateanism, National Identity, and Subjectivity in Turkey", *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History*, 2002, pp. 137-158.
- NİŞANYAN, Sevan. "Kemalist Düşüncede "Türk Milleti" Kavramı", *Türkiye Günlüğü*, no: 33, March-April 1995, pp. 127-141.
- NUR, Rıza. *Dr. Rıza Nur'un Lozan Hatıraları*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları A.Ş, 1992.

- OEEMMEN, T. K. *Citizenship, Nationality and Ethnicity*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997.
- ORAN, Baskın. *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği: Resmi İdeoloji Dışı Bir İnceleme*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1990.
- ÖZBUDUN, Ergun. "Milli Mücadele ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık ve Kimlik Sorunu" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997, pp. 63-70.
- ÖZDOĞAN, Günay Göksu-TOKAY, Gül (eds.). *Redefining the Nation State and Citizen*, İstanbul: Eren, 2000.
- PARLA, Taha. *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp, 1876-1924*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1985.
- PARLA, Taha: *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Oku*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995, vol: 3.
- PETROPULOS, John A. "The Compulsory Exchange of Populations: Greek-Turkish Peacemaking, 1922-1930", *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, vol: 2, 1976, pp. 135-160.
- POPOVIC, Aleksandre. *Balkanlar'da İslam*, İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1995.
- POULTON, Hugh. *The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict*, London: Minority Rights Publications, 1993.

- POULTON, Hugh. *Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- POULTON, Hugh. "The Muslim Experience in the Balkan States, 1919-1991", *Nationalities Papers*, vol: 28, no: 1, March 2000, pp. 45-66.
- PSOMIADES, Harry J. *The Eastern Question: The Last Phase- A Study in Greek-Turkish Diplomacy*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1968.
- ROKKAN, Stein. "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe" in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 562-600.
- ROSHWALD, Aviel. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall Empires: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East, 1914-1923*, London and New York: Routledge, 2001.
- ŞAKİROĞLU, Mahmut H. "Lozan Konferansı Sırasında Kabul Edilen Türk-Yunan Ahali Değişimine Ait Tarihi Notlar" in *Yusuf Hikmet Bayur'a Armağan*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1985, pp. 227-238.
- SHANAHAN, Suzanne. "Scripted Debates: Twentieth – Century Immigration and Citizenship Policy in Great Britain, Ireland and the United States" in Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly (eds.), *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States*, New York and Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc., 1999 pp. 67-92.

SHAW, Stanford J. "Resettlement of Refugees in Anatolia, 1918-1923", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin*, no: 22, Spring 1998, pp. 58-90.

SINGER, Brian C. J. "Cultural versus Contractual Nations: Rethinking Their Opposition" *History and Theory*, vol: 35, no: 3, October 1996, pp. 309-337.

SMITH, Anthony D. *Nationalist Movements*, London and Macmillan/New York: St. Martin Press, 1976.

SMITH, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

SMITH, Anthony D. *National Identity*, London: Penguin Books, 1991.

SMITH, Anthony D. "Ethnic Nationalism and The Plight for Minorities", *Journal of Refugee Studies* vol: 7, no: 2/3, 1994, pp. 186-198.

SMITH, Anthony D. "Nationalism and the Historians" in Gopal Balakrishian (ed.). *Mapping The Nation*", London, New York: Verso, 1996, pp. 175-197.

SOMEL, Selçuk Akşin. "Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Kimliği" in Nuri Bilgin (ed.), *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997, pp. 71-83.

SOYSAL, İsmail. *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları: Tarihleri ve Açıklamaları ile Birlikte*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: 1989.

SUGAR, Peter. "Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century" in *Suna Kili'ye Armağan Cumhuriyete Adanmış Bir Yaşam*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1998, pp. 347-363.

TACHAU, Frank. "The Search for National Identity among the Turks", *Die Welt des Islams*, vol: 8, 1963, pp. 165-176.

TANÖR, Bülent. *Kuruluş (Türkiye: 1920 Sonraları)*, İstanbul: Yenigün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık A.Ş., 1997.

TEKELİ, İlhan. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Günümüze Nüfusun Zorunlu Yer Değiştirmesi ve İskan Sorunu", *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 50, Summer 1990, pp. 49-71.

TEKİN ALP. *Kemalizm*, İstanbul: Cumhuriyet Gazetesi ve Matbaası, 1936.

TILLY, Charles. "Reflections on the History of European State-Making" in Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 3-83.

TODOROVA, Maria. *Imagining the Balkans*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

TOPRAK, Zafer. "The Demographic Consequences of Lausanne Treaty in Turkey" paper presented at the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September, 1998.

TOPRAK, Zafer. "1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHF'nin Sorumluluğu", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no: 34, October 1996, pp. 19-25.

TRIADAFILOPULOS, Triadafilos. "The 1923 Greek – Turkish Exchange of Populations and the Reformulation of Greek National Identity" paper presented at

the conference on *The Exchange of Populations, The Refugee Studies Program*, Oxford: Quinn Elizabeth House, September, 1998.

TUNCAY, Mete. *T.C. 'nde Tek-Parti Yönetimi'nin Kurulması (1923-1931)*, İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992.

ÜNSAL, A. (ed.). *75 Yılda Tebaa'dan Yurttaş'a Doğru*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998.

ÜSTEL, Füsun. *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1997.

YERASIMOS, Stefanos. *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye, Kitap: 3: Dünya Savaşından 1971'e*, İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1992.

YALÇIN, Kemal. *Emanet Çeyiz: Mübadele İnsanları*, İstanbul: Doğan Kitapçılık AŞ, 2001.

YEĞEN, Mesut. "Yurttaşlık ve Türklük", *Toplum Bilim* no: 93, Summer 2002, pp. 200-217.

YILDIZ, Ahmet. *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Kültürel Sınırları (1919-1938)*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001.

YAŞAR NABİ. *Balkanlar ve Türklük*, Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1936.

ZOLBERG, Aristide R. "The Formation of New States as a Refugee-Generating Process", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no: 467, May 1983, pp. 24-38.

ZOTIADES, George B. *The Macedonian Controversy*, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1961.

ZÜRCHER, Erik Jan. *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999.

ZÜRCHER, Erik Jan. "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları" in Ahmet İnel (ed.), *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001, vol. 2, pp. 44-55.