

PROBLEMS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

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PROBLEMS OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Tuğba Yoldaş, certify that

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ABSTRACT

Problems of Self-Knowledge and Phenomenal Character

Self-knowledge regarding sincere attributions about mental states, bodily sensations, perceptions, and the phenomenal character of experiences seem direct and true.

However, the questions of how we acquire such knowledge and whether it is always reliable are significant in understanding more about ourselves. This is a study that revolves around the notions of consciousness, awareness, perception, introspection and the phenomenal character of one's own experiences. It is an attempt to present several important questions about self-knowledge. The study starts with an inquiry on Fred Dretske's question of how we know that we are not zombies and leads to an exposition and evaluation of two models of introspection called the displaced perception model and the inner-sense model. It follows with an attempt to understand the notion of phenomenal character of experience by evaluating two accounts held by Thomas Nagel and Peter Hacker. Although there are problems with the accounts of self-knowledge presented throughout the study, self-knowledge of mental states, physical sensations, and the phenomenal character of experience seems to be a cognitive achievement. This study concludes with the claim that both trivial self-knowledge and substantial self-knowledge are significant in understanding ourselves and they should be taken up together.

ÖZET

Kendinin Bilgisi ve Fenomenal Karakterin Sorunları

Zihinsel durumlar, bedensel duyular, algılamalar ve deneyimlerin fenomenal karakteri hakkındaki samimi atıflarla ilgili kendinin bilgisi doğrudan ve doğru görünmektedir. Ancak, bu bilginin nasıl elde edildiği ve daima güvenilir olup olmadığı soruları kendimizi daha çok anlamak için önemlidir. Bu çalışma bilinç, farkındalık, algılama, içe bakış ve kendi deneyimlerinin fenomenal karakteri kavramları etrafında gelişmektedir. Kendinin bilgisi hakkındaki çeşitli sorunları sunmak için bir teşebbüstür. Çalışma, Fred Dretske'nin zombi olmadığımızı nasıl biliyoruz sorusunun araştırılmasıyla başlamaktadır ve yeri değiştirilmiş algılama modeli (displaced perception model) ve içsel-duyu modeli (inner-sense model) diye adlandırılan iki içe-bakış modelinin sunumu ve ele alınmasıyla devam eder. Bu, deneyimin fenomenal karakterini anlamak için Thomas Nagel ve Peter Hacker tarafından savunulan iki izahat ele alınarak yapılan bir teşebbüs ile devam eder. Çalışma boyunca sunulan kendinin bilgisiyle ilgili izahatlerin sorunları olmasına karşın zihinsel durumlar, bedensel duyular ve deneyimin fenomenal karakterine ilişkin kendinin bilgisini bilişsel bir başarı olarak görebiliriz. Bu çalışma, hem basit kendinin bilgisinin (trivial self-knowledge) hem de hakikî kendinin bilgisinin (substantial self-knowledge) kendimizi anlamada mühim olduğu ve bunların beraber ele alınmasının gerektiği savıyla sona erer.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to elaborate on some theories of self-knowledge and of phenomenal character of experience. I claim that self-knowledge is possible and we are entitled to self-knowledge, whether it means (1) a knowledge of one's mental states like beliefs, or emotions such as desires, hopes, and fears, and moods, and thoughts, or it means (2) a knowledge of perceptions and bodily sensations, or it means (3) a knowledge of the phenomenal character of one's own experiences, which is also referred to as *something it is like for you* to have your own experiences.

Self-knowledge regarding sincere attributions about one's thoughts and feelings may seem peculiarly direct and true. Self-attributions are often considered less immune to falsity than any other attributions that we make, so we may not usually consider knowledge attributions of our mental states as something that requires a justification. However, philosophers of self-knowledge have concerns about the epistemic source of self-knowledge attributions. They view the questions of how we know that we know our own mental states, bodily sensations and phenomenal character of our own experiences and how we acquire self-knowledge as a challenge. Here is an example of the sort of questions that philosophers inquire: suppose you are listening to Janáček's Sinfonietta and you believe that you are listening to Janáček's Sinfonietta. How do you know that that is what you believe? Notice that the question is not "How do you know you are listening to Janáček's Sinfonietta?", but rather "How do you know that you believe that

you are listening to Janáček's Sinfonietta?" I think we can take knowledge of such beliefs as a form of self-knowledge, called knowledge of our own mental states. Similarly, I consider knowing that you are in pain and knowing that you think that Sinfonietta was composed in the 20th century as some examples of self-knowledge. As far as I understand it, there are at least two kinds of challenges to self-knowledge in the philosophical literature: the problem of explaining the epistemic source of self-knowledge and the problem of 'privileged access' to self-knowledge, which is the question of whether we have an epistemically special access to our own mental states but not to the mental state of others. In explaining the nature of the epistemic source of self-knowledge, the questions 'Is self-knowledge inferential or is it rather direct?' and 'Is self-knowledge always infallible or can it err?' will be discussed. In my view, to both questions the answer varies depending on which meaning of self-knowledge is taken up. The problem of 'privileged access' to self-knowledge will bring about the question whether the first-person authority of self-knowledge is necessarily more reliable than the third-person authority of self-knowledge. These are the sort of questions that I will focus on in my thesis.

Philosophical theories about the mind tend, as could be expected, to influence philosophical accounts of self-knowledge. The widespread belief in the existence of the authoritative self-knowledge has been challenged in philosophy of mind. A debate in philosophy of mind has brought forth a new series of questions about self-knowledge, specifically with respect to its putative epistemic source which is known as introspection. On the "externalist" side of this debate, philosophers like Fred Dretske and Michael Tye have argued that our knowledge of intentional mental states depends

on our knowledge or our awareness of external objects and their properties. Tye claims that we can extend this argument to the knowledge of phenomenal character of our own experiences. Being advocates of representationalism about mind, Dretske, Tye and William Lycan think that our mental states have representational contents that we become aware of when we acquire self-knowledge of mental states. According to Tye, phenomenal character of our experiences is identified with those representational contents. One motivation for this claim is the idea that our experience is transparent to us. In Dretske's and Tye's externalist accounts, introspection is very similar to sense perception, because we introspect about mental states and perceive objects around us through an awareness of their external properties which gives us representational contents of our mental states and of our experiences. In this theory, introspection is in a way taken as a perceptual faculty. On the contrary, Lycan thinks that introspection of our mental states is distinguished from perception, because we become aware of more than just representational contents through introspection. In his account, introspection is considered as a quasi-perceptual faculty. I am more sympathetic to Lycan's view of introspection, and I will argue that introspection is significantly different than sense perception, because it reveals to us something that we cannot acquire through mere sense perception.

In this thesis, first I will try to present Dretske's displaced perceptual model of introspection (DPM) and attempt to suggest some problems of his account along with his criticism against the inner-sense model of introspection. I will continue with Lycan's criticism against the displaced perceptual model and Murat Aydede's argument against this model in that the model seems to fail to provide an appropriate connecting belief for

us to make an inference about our own mental states. A following chapter aims at understanding what is meant by the phenomenal character of experience by evaluating two different accounts about phenomenal character and their problems. In the last chapter, I will claim that self-knowledge of phenomenal character of experiences is a cognitive achievement. Finally, the accounts of DPM and the inner-sense model of introspection support my claim that self-knowledge of mental states and physical sensations can be seen as a cognitive achievement.

CHAPTER 2

SELF-KNOWLEDGE AND TWO MODELS OF INTROSPECTION

2. 1 Self-knowledge of the fact that I am conscious

Under normal circumstances¹ each cognitively capable person seems to know that he is conscious. When I wake up in the morning I see the sun, birds, buildings, cars and all sorts of things around me. Suppose that I do not become aware of and perceive those objects through a mental intermediary such as an idea, an impression, or a sense-datum. In other words, let us presume that direct realism is true. No doubt even if I am not aware of or perceive all sorts of objects around me, they do not cease to exist, i.e., their existence does not depend on my awareness or perception of them. A cup of tea is still there when I turn around and look at another direction. The same goes for the properties of objects. The cup is still blue even after I direct my attention towards other objects. So, it seems that everything I am aware of would be the same if I were a zombie (Dretske, 2003, p. 1). Fred Dretske claims that in perception, there is nothing different in the world of a zombie and in the world of a human being (Dretske, 2003). The only difference would be that a human being is aware of the objects around him while a zombie is not aware of them, nor are they aware of their perception of them.

In his paper “How Do You Know You are Not a Zombie?”, Dretske inquires the question of what tells us that we are not zombies. It is important to see what is meant by

¹ I exclude the situations in which a person’s knowledge of his consciousness is impeded by various obstacles. Take, for instance, the case of a patient under hypnosis. The patient might not seem to know that he is conscious, but in reality, he is in a state of consciousness.

a zombie in Dretske's account before going into the details of his view. According to Dretske, unlike human beings, zombies do not see things, nor do they experience them (Dretske 2003, p. 6). They do not have feelings either even though they may exhibit what one might call physical symptoms of a particular feeling (Dretske, 2003, p. 4). Zombies are not aware of things and they cannot think, so they cannot have the higher-order awareness or the higher-order thought (Dretske, 2003, p. 2).

To explain the difference between zombies and human beings, Dretske emphasizes a distinction between 'the content of awareness' and 'the awareness of content'. He argues that what a zombie cannot do, but we can is the transition from the content of awareness to the awareness of content in perception (Dretske, 2003). His question in the paper is not how we know about the content of our awareness, i.e., what we are perceiving or what we are thinking; rather, it is about how we know we are perceiving that content or thinking that content, that is what tells us that we are aware of our perception or thought of the content of our experience (Dretske, 2003). According to Dretske, unlike human beings, there is nothing that tells zombies how they know what they perceive- if they perceive at all. We are aware of objects, their properties, facts, and this is the content of our awareness. The things that we are aware of are the same in the zombieland, so they cannot be the source that tells us that we are aware of things. Dretske (2003) claims that the difference between a zombie and a human being is that a zombie is not aware of things and their properties, but a human being is. However, he suggests that in perceptual experience, we do not seem to be aware of our awareness of things; perception does not tell us that we are aware of our awareness of things. Then, the question is if it is not our awareness of our awareness of things, properties, and facts

that tells us that we are aware of our awareness of them, then there must be something else that tells us that we are aware of our awareness of things (Dretske, 2003, p. 2.).

Dretske concludes that since he cannot find out what that is, he does not know how he knows that he is not a zombie.

Perception is definitely something that might tell us how we know that we are not zombies. Proprioceptive systems in the human body inform us about some aspects of our bodies such as temperature, posture, balance, position and so on (Dretske, 2003).

According to Dretske (2003), proprioceptive information about bodies does not provide an answer to the question of how we know that we are not zombies, because zombies also have bodies. The body of a zombie is also located in a place; it has a balance, posture and so on. A zombie's body temperature may rise up or decrease as a result of diseases and so on. Therefore, there is nothing about our bodies that tells us that we are not zombies. Our body and the body of a zombie seem to physically function the same way. Dretske (2003) writes: "these sources of information don't tell us whether we actually perceive, whether we are conscious of, those conditions of the body that we receive information about" (p. 2). I think Dretske's claim about perception here is that perception gives information about objects and their properties, but since these objects and properties are not the things that tell us that we see them in visual perception, perception does not tell us that we see objects and their properties. Likewise, the information about the body that we receive in proprioception does not tell us that we actually perceive, whether we are conscious of, those conditions of the body. Zombies also get some information about their bodies through proprioception, but that information does not tell them that they see objects or they actually perceive. Dretske

refers to Bermúdez to claim that the information provided by proprioception is a form of self-consciousness and a way of perceiving the body rather than perceiving the psychological aspects such as consciousness of the embodied self (Dretske, 2003, p. 10, note 2). I evaluate Dretske's claim as saying that zombies have sensations through proprioception; they sense the body, but this sensation does not tell them that they see the body nor does it tell them that they are conscious of the body. This is because zombies do not perceive. In my opinion, from Dretske's claims, we may understand that zombies have sense experiences, because physical objects are presented to them; but that sensation lacks consciousness and awareness of the fact that they sense objects. Zombies are not conscious of anything at all. The reason for this is that the sensation of zombies lacks awareness and consciousness; they do not perceive or really see objects around them. Zombies' lack of consciousness blocks the way that goes from their sensation which is something physical to perception which is something mental. There are situations in which humans sense objects, but they do not really see them. At times, we gaze vacantly at objects; we sense objects, because objects are presented to us, but we do not see them in a meaningful way, i.e., we do not perceive them. We may sense an object coming from afar, but we may not see the object, thus we may not perceive it because our distance to the object is long. I say that I do not see the bus sign when it is not close to me, even though I obviously sense that there is the bus sign; I just do not perceive it in a meaningful way. I think the visual sensation of Dretske's zombies might be considered as analogous to those situations in which sensation occurs, but we do not say that we see objects and perceive them. In my interpretation, Dretske's zombies sense objects and their properties since objects are presented to them, but they do not see objects, nor are they conscious that they see objects or know that they perceive objects.

Let us consider an example to better understand Dretske's claims about the content of awareness, the awareness of content, and zombies. Imagine a zombie walking in a maze, stumbling across the rooms. There are objects around him in the rooms that he² enters. He stumbles over to a table in one of the rooms. In visual perception, the content of awareness here is the table and its properties. Suppose there is also a human being in the same room. If the human being is seeing the table, Dretske would say that there must be something that he is aware of that tells him that he is seeing the table. Perception makes him aware of the table and its properties, but it is not the table or its properties that tell him that he sees the table. After all, even though the zombie is facing the same table, he does not seem to see the table; he stumbles over to it. Therefore, it is not perception that tells the human that he sees the table and there must be something else that gives him this information. It might be the information about the position of his body that tells the human being that he sees the table through realizing that the position of his body and the position of the table do not coincide. The proprioceptive evidence about his body stops him from stumbling over to the table. However, just as the human body occupies a position, a zombie's body too has a position. A zombie also receives information about the position of his body in proprioception, but unlike a human being, a zombie does not perceive the table in front of him despite the table being presented to him. Therefore, it is not the information about the position of the body that tells the human that he is seeing a table. A zombie is simply not aware of the content of perception, because he does not perceive, while a human is aware of the content of perception. The human being thinks that there is a table; he is aware of the content of his

² I do not intend to attribute a sex to the zombie; I could as well refer to the zombie by using the indexical "it".

perceptual experience, but it is neither the table nor the information about the position of his body that tells him that he sees the table and he thinks that there is a table. The awareness of content differentiates a human from a zombie, but in perception, it is not the awareness of a table that tells us that we are aware of the table. It is not the information about the position of our body that tells us that we are aware of the table, because the position of our body gives us information about our embodied self; it does not give us information about consciousness. After all, zombies too have that kind of information about their embodied self. Dretske's conclusion is that it is not the content of awareness that gives us self-knowledge of the fact that we are conscious and that we are not zombies. Our awareness of content does not tell us how we know that we are not zombies either; it only tells us that we are aware of and that we are conscious. I think Dretske's position implies that zombies can have the content of awareness as long as they can sense and they are visually presented with objects, but that does not mean that they have the awareness of that content. They are not aware of the content of their sensations, because, to begin with, they are not aware of objects around them.

Another candidate for what it is that we are aware of that tells us we are not zombies is our points of view in perception. Dretske claims that we have a perspective on the world that creates a boundary between things we see and things we do not see; we have a point of view regarding objects around us in perception that changes as we move around, but zombies do not have points of view regarding objects around them (Dretske, 2003, p. 2). How I see a cup depends on the point from which I am viewing it. If I get closer to the cup, I see it in more detail and as bigger than when I view it from a farther point. From a certain point of view, I see only the half of a cup while from another point

of view I see the whole cup. Furthermore, there are things that I can see and things that I cannot see. I can see cups with my bare eyes, but I cannot see the atoms that cups are made of unless I use a microscope. Unlike me, Dretske suggests, a zombie does not seem to possess this sort of a point of view with regard to cups. A cup might be visually presented to a zombie, but the zombie's point of view does not change as he moves around the cup, because he does not see the cup. Although cups exist in the world of a zombie, the boundary between the parts (surfaces) of a cup that we can see and the parts (surfaces) that we cannot see does not exist (Dretske, 2003, p. 2). Dretske (2003) states, however, that having a point of view on the world and being aware of the fact that we have a point of view do not tell us that we are not zombies, because the question is about how we know we have a point of view, not that we know it (p. 3). The fact that you are seeing a half of a cup and you know that you are seeing a half of the cup does not explain how you know that you are seeing half of it. In perception, you do not see your point of view (Dretske, 2003). So, according to Dretske, we still have not explained what makes us aware of the fact that we are seeing a half of the cup. It is not our point of view that makes us aware of, because we do not see our point of view.

It is possible to object Dretske's claim about point of view by arguing that in a sense, zombies do have points of view regarding objects around them. To clarify this objection, I would like to make a distinction between objective and subjective points of view. I take objective point of view to be a point of view that does not involve subject's opinions, feelings, and so on; it just gives us objective facts. On the other hand, subjective point of view is a point of view that varies depending on different opinions and feelings regarding facts. Imagine a zombie is running after a human. He does not see

the human, nor have any opinions and feelings regarding him. Yet, he is running after a moving object without being aware of the object. If the zombie runs against the human, he has in a sense a different point of view regarding the human; his point of view cannot be the same as the point of view that he had when he was running after him. Now, he is closer to the human and he has to do something to walk away such as moving aside or stepping on the human or just pause. This is an objective fact, thus it is independent of any opinions or feelings. On the other hand, a human has an objective point of view and a subjective point of view. Now he is scared of seeing the zombie's face which he was not able to see from afar. I think if it is in the latter sense of point of view that Dretske argues for his claim that zombies do not have points of view, then his claim does not seem to be in trouble. Otherwise, if what he means by point of view is objective point of view, then his claim can easily be refuted. In any case, I think, for Dretske's claim about point of view to be a substantial claim, he needs to explain in what sense he uses the word "point of view".

Dretske brings our attention to the difference between seeing an object versus not seeing that object and seeing an object versus seeing another object in order to explain that having a point of view does not tell us how we know that we are not zombies (Dretske, 2003, p. 3). The fact that I know that I am seeing a cup or the fact that I know that I am not seeing a cup does not tell me how I know that I am seeing a cup or how I know that I am not seeing a cup. In the same way, the fact that I know that I am seeing a cup or a chair does not tell me how I know that I am seeing a cup or a chair. Surely, I feel the difference and I know that there is a difference for me between seeing a cup and not seeing a cup or seeing a cup or seeing a chair. But, Dretske's question of how I know

these differences still seems to remain unanswered, because we do not see how we see the difference between those visual experiences. Dretske's question about zombies is not a “what” question; it is a “how” question.

In sum, Dretske does not accept the answer that in perception, what tells us that we are conscious is our awareness of content. Furthermore, he claims that it is not proprioception or having a point of view or a perspective on the world that tells us that we are conscious. At the end, he reaches the conclusion that “there is nothing we perceive that tells us we are conscious” (Dretske, 2003, p. 3).

I would like to offer another way to argue against Dretske’s explanation that having a point of view on the world is not how we know that we are not zombies, and why it does not work. I suggest that there is an additional difference to Dretske’s two sorts of difference between seeing an object and not seeing the object and seeing an object and seeing a different object. I think there is also a difference between seeing an object in a certain way versus seeing the same object in another way. It is not a difference that results from whether we see an object or not see it, nor is it a difference that results from whether we see an object rather than another object. The difference that I have in mind is related to having a point of view on the world, but it is a kind of subjective point of view. Here is an example: there is a difference between seeing a cup as an object that I can use to grow plants in and seeing it as a tool for drinking. I see the same object in two different ways by keeping in mind their different functional roles. It is not about whether I see the cup or I do not see it; it is also not about whether I see a cup or I see a chair. Rather, this difference is about my seeing the same object in multiple ways at the same time or at different times by seeing their different functional

roles. On the other hand, we may say that a zombie does not seem to have that kind of a point of view which enables him to see different functions of the same object at the same time. He may see one function at a time; for instance, he may sense a human as an object with a function of blocking his way when he runs into the human. But zombies are not aware of their sensations. A visual property of a cup tells me that I know that I see the cup in a certain way, but the way in which I see it is different in the cases of seeing it as a vase or as a tool for drinking. I think this is a difference of perspective or of point of view. I would not have different perspectives independent of properties of a cup such as having a space to be filled up with something, or having a handle. A zombie, on the other hand, does not seem to have a point of view in which he can perceive different functions of a cup at a time. Thus, one might argue that the way in which we perceive objects can be something that tells us we are conscious. Even if I am a direct realist and I take cups as mind-independent objects, there are different ways in which I perceive cups. These points of view or perspectives are dependent on me and the properties of the object that I perceive.

The argument goes as follows: there is something we perceive that tells us we are conscious, namely the way in which we perceive or having a point of view through perception, and that is how we know that we are conscious. Zombies sense objects, but they do not perceive, and therefore, there is nothing that zombies perceive that tells them that they are conscious. So, having a point of view is how we know that we are not zombies and it is also how we know that we are conscious. I think this argument still does not reply to Dretske's question of how we know that we are conscious, because even though in perception, we can perceive the same object in different ways while

zombies cannot, the way in which we perceive an object is not something that we can perceive. You do not see the way in which you see an object. Therefore, Dretske's claim that "there is nothing we perceive that tells us we are conscious" (Dretske, 2003, p. 3) still seems true.

Perception does not tell us how we know that we are conscious. Then, how is it that we know that we are not zombies? It must be something that we do not perceive. Dretske takes up another possible way in which we know that we are conscious and that we are not zombies. There are objects we are necessarily aware of, but zombies are not. We have some experiences the objects of which are not purely perceptual. Dreams, hallucinations, and so on or bodily sensations such as pain, hunger, and itch are some examples of the objects we are necessarily aware of. The argument goes as follows: zombies do not have these sorts of experiences, so that must be what tells us that we are not zombies (Dretske, 2003, p. 4).

Dretske reminds us that awareness of the objects we are necessarily aware of only shows us that we are aware of them (Dretske, 2003, p. 5). I am aware of my hunger and the awareness of my hunger tells me that I am hungry, but the awareness of my hunger does not tell me how my awareness gives me that information. Dretske presents an example to refute the argument that the objects we are necessarily aware of tell us that we are conscious. His example for the argument goes as follows: imagine there are *cuppts*. *Cuppts* are, by a stipulative definition, cups that I (not anyone else) see; they are cups that only I am aware of. Cups and *cuppts* are indistinguishable from each other by their look. However, the existence of *cuppts* depends on my being conscious of them. Since zombies do not have consciousness, there are no *cuppts* in the world of zombies.

The awareness of cupts and cupts are one and the same thing.³ The argument is that there are objects like cupts that I am necessarily aware of while zombies are not aware of and that is something that tells me how I know that I am conscious. If I were a zombie, then cupts could not exist in my world. Dretske argues that because there is nothing about a cupt that tells you it is a cupt, saying how we know a particular cup is a cupt is analogous to saying how we know we are not zombies (Dretske, 2003, p. 5). After all, just like a cup and a cupt look the same, a zombie and I look the same. So, there is nothing about a zombie that tells me that it is a zombie, because a zombie looks almost like a human and behaves almost like a human.

We can give a similar example about bodily sensations like pains, hunger, and itch. Dretske (2003) stipulates that protopain exists and he defines “protopain” as “pain that has all the properties you are aware of when you experience pain except for the relational one of your being aware of it” (p. 5). He claims that this example does not answer the question of how we know that we are conscious, because there is nothing about protopain that tells us it is protopain. In other words, there is no way for you to say how you distinguish protopains from pains. In fact, there is nothing that you are aware of that tells you that zombies do not have pain. If a zombie behaves like he is in pain, we may not be able to tell if it is pain that he has or it is protopain. Thus, Dretske claims, you still have not answered the question of how you know you are not a zombie.

³ Dretske gives his example by defining rocks and crocks in his paper. I have adapted Dretske’s example of rocks and crocks in his paper “How Do You Know You are Not a Zombie?” to an example of cups and cupts.

2.2 Awareness and consciousness: consciousness as self-luminosity

My criticism to Dretske's position is that his question "what tells us that we are conscious?" may not be a good question for clarifying what consciousness is and how it is. The question itself presupposes that in order to explain being conscious or being conscious of an object, and how we know that we are conscious, we must be told by something external or internal, perceptual or non-perceptual, that we are conscious of it.

I would like to suggest a different view of consciousness in the following way:

consciousness is immediate and it is known directly. The question of "what tells us that we are conscious?" assumes that for us to know that we are conscious, consciousness is to be mediated by something else. But, if we adopt a view of consciousness that takes consciousness as a direct process, then any attempt to find out what tells us that we are conscious is a futile act. The account of consciousness that I am suggesting goes as follows: consciousness is self-luminous; it does not require any representative to let the conscious being know that he is conscious. A conscious being does not say "I am not conscious"; that would be a contradiction. I could not have known that I was conscious or conscious of an object, if I was not conscious. When I am conscious or conscious of an object, my consciousness is plainly there in a way that does not leave me any doubt about its presence. We stipulate that there are creatures such as zombies who look like us, to some extent act like us, but who are not conscious. We know that we are not zombies in virtue of our knowledge that we are conscious. By the very definition of zombies, being a zombie and being conscious at the same time would be contradictory.

There are two different ways of understanding consciousness as self-luminosity. The first way of understanding of it is to see a mental state as having something like a

light built into it; the light exists as an essential constituent or characteristics of the mental state. In that case, when someone is in a mental state, the mental state is shining; it is self-luminous to its owner. But, if we accept that interpretation, we need to explain what it is that makes the owner of the mental state see the light built into that state. Is it possible to have a mental state, but not to have a vision to see it? I would say that indeed it is possible. If the owner is blind to that light or he is not directing his attention to the luminous mental state or there is something that blocks his vision, then he may not be able to see the light. There must be something that inherently shines in the owner of the mental state when he is in that mental state. In the second understanding of consciousness as self-luminosity, we may consider a mental state as something having its owner's consciousness built into it. In this case, the owner's consciousness of a mental state is an intrinsic characteristic of that mental state; it is in the nature of the mental state. I think adopting the first understanding of consciousness might be problematic. In my view, being in a mental state does not necessarily presuppose consciousness; there are conscious and unconscious mental states. When a mental state is unconscious, the owner is blind to the light built into that mental state. It seems to me that there must be something in the owner of a mental state that makes the mental state luminous, and that is the owner's consciousness of the mental state. So, I consider consciousness as being self-luminous in the second sense; I think when I am in a mental state, that mental state inherently has my consciousness of it that is glowing in the mental state. I cannot be blind to that light, because it is part of me; the light of consciousness is part of my nature although it may not be readily apparent, but when it is apparent, it is too bright that I cannot miss. I claim that consciousness is direct in the

sense that the light of consciousness is inherently in me, and I do not have to look for it and make an inference to get to know it from elsewhere.

There are some objections against the luminousness of mental states. I will briefly mention one of them that was suggested by Timothy Williamson (2002) and attempt to explain why it is not successful. Williamson gives an example of someone who feels cold at dawn but gets warm by noon. According to him, the person believes that she is cold even when she is barely cold. At the next moment, she feels a little bit warmer, and she starts to believe that she is warm even though there is not much difference of the degree of her feeling cold between these two moments. Williamson says that she has a false belief when she thinks that she is cold just before the moment that she thinks that she is not cold anymore. Thus, he concludes that the mental state of being cold is not luminous to the owner of that state. He generalizes this conclusion to claim that sensations are not luminous mental states (Williamson, 2002, pp. 96-98).

I believe that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument is not successful in refuting the luminosity of sensations. In my understanding of the situation, the person in Williamson's example does not have a false belief. She is in a particular mental state when she expresses it by saying "I feel cold". The way she expresses her current sensation does not show that her sensation is not luminous to her. She is having *that* particular sensation, and even though it is difficult to explain or describe it to others or even to herself, she knows how it feels to have *that* particular sensation at the moment. Elusiveness of the sensation that she is having does not imply that she has a false belief about her sensation nor does it imply that her sensation is not luminous to herself. Her

knowing how it feels to have that sensation at that moment means that she is seeing the light of consciousness which is embedded in her mental state; her sensation is luminous.

There is another way to challenge the view of consciousness as self-luminosity. Dretske (2003) states it in the following way: we do not know how this account of consciousness explains the existence of creatures that are conscious but who does not know that they are conscious (p. 9). He gives two examples of those creatures: babies and animals. How do I or anyone for that matter know that my baby is not a zombie? How does anyone know that a monkey in the zoo is not a zombie? According to the account of consciousness as self-luminosity, I would say either that I do not know that they are not zombies or that I have a justified belief that I know that they are not zombies. The account has a limitation, because it appears to imply that I can only know that *I* am conscious or *I* am conscious of an object. I may think that you are conscious, because you tell me so, but I cannot know it for sure. A neuroscientist may look into your brain and say that the regions that are associated with consciousness are active in your brain. Nevertheless, I am not you, so I have no way of getting direct knowledge that you are conscious. Yet, I might say that according to the neuroscientist's data along with what you tell me, I have a justified belief that you are conscious. In the same way, I do not know that a baby or a monkey is conscious although I might have a justified belief that they are conscious. I do not have access to knowledge of whether anyone is a zombie or not, but I know that *I* am not a zombie. In a similar way, when I am conscious of an object, in most cases, I know that I am conscious of it. According to the account of consciousness that I have presented, I may not know how I know that I am conscious. However, since the nature of consciousness is direct and self-luminous, what

consciousness is and how it should not be inquired by asking how I know that I am conscious. I would like to claim that this view of consciousness has an advantage over Dretske's account. If I adopt this view of consciousness, I do not have to look for how I know that I am conscious and that I am not a zombie; I know it directly and immediately, because I cannot miss the light of consciousness. In addition, I do not have to look for how I know that you are conscious or that you are not a zombie, because I cannot tell that for sure. I will never be you. Yet I can have a justified belief. How one might define the nature of justification at play here will not be my concern in this thesis.

My second criticism against Dretske's position is that it does not offer us a clear answer to what awareness is. Dretske claims that perception tells me that I am aware of objects around me, but it does not tell me that I see them. He also claims that perception does not tell me how I know that I am conscious. Therefore, in his account, awareness is different than consciousness, because perception gives me the knowledge of awareness while it does not provide any knowledge of consciousness. I agree with the claim that there is something that differentiates awareness and consciousness. I think the difference is that awareness requires consciousness while consciousness does not require awareness. Take the example of hallucinating. When I am hallucinating an object, there is no object around me, but I am conscious and I think that there are objects around me. However, I am not aware of any object since there is nothing to perceive. But unless I pass out or lose my consciousness for a while, I keep hallucinating objects. So, being conscious of an object does not necessarily amount to being aware of an object. However, when I am aware of objects and their properties, I am also conscious of them, because perception requires consciousness. Unlike what Dretske suggests in his paper, I

think objects in hallucination are not objects we are necessarily aware of, but they are objects we are necessarily conscious of. The same goes for dreaming. There is no object to be perceived and to be aware of in dreaming, but we have a form of consciousness to be able to dream and to be conscious of the objects of our dreams. Again, objects in dreams are objects we are necessarily conscious of, but they are not objects we are necessarily aware of. I think Dretske does not seem to clarify the distinction between being aware of an object and being conscious of an object.

2.3 Dretske's criticism against the inner-sense model of introspection

After claiming that the objects of perception and objects we are necessarily aware of do not tell us that we are conscious, Dretske ultimately takes up the possibility that introspection is the way in which we know that we are not zombies. He explains that maybe we are aware of our awareness of our experiences and this higher-level awareness of our own conscious experiences that we call introspection is what zombies do not have (Dretske, 2003, p. 7). I am aware of my visual conscious experience of cups (that is, cups), but sometimes I am also aware of my awareness (experience) of cups (the property that makes a cup a cup). Then, I would be aware of the experience of cups, and that distinguishes me from a zombie. Unlike a cup, this awareness of my awareness is easily distinguished from a cup that I am aware of in my perceptual experience. Thus, "we know by introspection that we are not zombies, that we are aware of things around (and in) us" (Dretske, 2003, p. 7.).

Introspection is considered to be the way in which we describe what is happening in our minds such as in our mental states and thoughts (Dretske, 2003). I introspect and become aware of the fact that I know that I am not a zombie. Through introspection, I know that I am seeing a cup (that is, a cup). Dretske (2003) claims that introspection does not reply to the question of how we know that we are not zombies; it only asserts the question by naming it differently. He points out that my awareness of external facts depends on my perceptual awareness of external objects and their properties. I look at the table and see a cup. I touch it and become aware of its properties like 'having a handle' and 'being blue'. I become aware of the external fact that there is a blue cup on the table. This is one way of being aware of external facts. Another way to be aware of external facts would be to experience a second-hand data like seeing a photograph of a blue cup on the table or hearing someone saying that there is a blue cup on the table. This kind of perception is called *D-perceiving* an object (Lycan, 2003, p. 16). Dretske defends an account of introspection which is called "displaced perception model of introspection" (DPM) that is based on a kind of displaced perception. I think in Dretske's DPM theory, the displaced perception is analogous to introspection. In D-perception, for instance, we hear the sound of a piano coming from the stage and we come to the conclusion that our pianist has arrived to the stage. The conclusion is established if the premise about the sound of the piano is true, and it depends on the connecting belief that the sound of the piano coming from the stage is a reliable indicator of the arrival of our pianist. Likewise in introspection, we directly introspect a mental image of an actual object and we come to believe that we see the object that is represented by the mental image. Dretske calls this kind of perception "displaced perception", because I think in D-perception, we perceive an object by directly

perceiving another object, so our perception of an object is displaced by our perception of another object. In introspection, we directly introspect a mental picture and come to believe that it is the mental picture of the object that we perceive. As I understand it, DPM theory suggests that we perceive an object through its representation, i.e., through another object that represents it, and we directly perceive that object instead of the actual object. In DPM, we are directly aware of the external object that represents another object.

Another account of introspection is called the inner-sense model of introspection. Dretske explains that in the inner-sense model, both of us are aware of the fact that I am not a zombie, but your way of knowing this fact is different than my way of knowing the very same fact (Dretske, 2003, p. 8). There is something internal to you about objects that you experience and there is something internal to me about the same objects that I experience. These things that are internal to me and to you are not the same. The inner-sense model of introspection maintains that it is not only the external facts that I am aware of when I am aware of the fact that I am having a certain experience, but there are also some internal facts such as the fact that I am conscious that make my awareness different than your experience. These internal states might tell us that we are not zombies. The difference between DPM model of introspection and the inner-sense model of introspection is that in the inner-sense model, I am not directly aware of the external object that represents another object, but rather, I am aware of the mental representation of the external object.

Dretske criticizes the inner-sense model of introspection that is advocated by Bill Lycan. He claims that Lycan is confusing the awareness that he has of an experience

with the very experience that he has (Dretske, 2003). The reason for this is that in the inner-sense model of introspection, we become aware of the external object and its properties without being made aware of our experience of the external object. I think Dretske's criticism goes as follows: the inner-sense model of introspection implies that in introspection, we are not aware of the actual object; rather, we are aware of a mental picture or a mental representation of the actual external object. Dretske says that in Lycan's view of introspection, inner sense does not give us objects, and therefore, it does not tell us how we know or are aware of facts about external objects (Dretske, 2003, p. 9). In Lycan's inner-sense model, an introspective belief, say the belief that there is a cat sitting on the chair, is a result of our awareness of a mental representation of a cat sitting on the chair, but there is no external object that we are aware of in introspection. Through introspection, I immediately become aware of the mental representation of a cat and form a belief about seeing the cat. Introspection gives us a direct and immediate awareness of a mental representation, so we do not need to be aware of an external object when we are introspecting; the mental representation is enough to form an introspective belief. According to Dretske (2003), this is not an answer to how we know that we have conscious experiences, because what it tells us is only that we have conscious experiences (p. 9). The inner-sense model of introspection does not reply to our question of how we know that we are conscious and we are not zombies, because it does not tell us how we are being aware of external objects without even being made aware of our awareness of them. I think what Dretske says is that the inner-sense model lacks an explanation about the nature of the immediate access to our awareness of mental representations of external objects. That is because in the inner-sense model, introspection makes our beliefs and awareness about external objects

transparent to us, but how we acquire this transparency of beliefs remains a mystery. In conclusion, Lycan's view lacks an explanation for how we become aware of the mental representation without being aware of something external such as an external object that represents the actual external object that we are aware of.

I agree with Dretske on the claim that the inner-sense model of introspection does not seem to reply to his question of how we know that we are not zombies. To alleviate Dretske's criticism, Lycan might need to explain better the nature of the immediate awareness of mental representations of external objects in introspection. But then again, introspection might be considered as a mental faculty which is self-luminous and explains itself like consciousness. In that case, I wonder in explaining introspection, if one really needs to ask the question of how we are aware of the mental representation when we are introspecting a belief about an external object. If we take introspection as self-luminosity in the sense that a mental state has the owner's introspection along with the mental representation built into it, then we may not need to ask the question of "how am I directly aware of the mental representation of the external object when I am introspecting?". I am directly aware of the mental representation, because introspection is self-luminous; it has a light that makes the mental representation visible to my inner sense immediately.

2.4 Inner-sense model of introspection and criticisms of DPM

In his paper "Dretske's Ways of Introspecting", William Lycan presents some criticisms against Dretske's displaced perception model of introspection (DPM). Dretske says:

What one comes to know by introspection are, to be sure, facts about one's mental life – thus (on a representational theory [of the mind], representational facts. These facts are facts, if you will, about internal representations. The objects and facts one perceives to learn those facts, however, are seldom internal and never mental... One becomes aware of representational facts by an awareness of physical objects (Dretske, 1995, p. 40).

When I have an experience or a thought and know that my experience or my thought has a characteristic mental property, the way I know this fact is through my perception of the representational content consisting of (in most cases) physical features of external objects, but I never know this fact by observing any feature of my experience or my thought. Take the example of seeing a cup. My experience has the mental property of “being an experience of seeing a cup”. I know this mental property, because I am aware of the representational content of my visual experience such as “having a cup-like shape”. I do not detect what my visual experience represents and I do not observe features of my visual experience; rather, I look at the representational content that I am aware of in my experience.

As an alternative to the inner-sense model of introspection, Dretske proposes the displaced perceptual model of introspection. I have tried to introduce DPM in the previous section. We can say that an example of that perceptual model is having a visual perception of a photograph of a cup on the table and coming to have a justified belief that there is a cup on the table through this indirect perception. By having a justified belief, Dretske means that the object would not be the photograph of a cup on a table unless the experience were one of the photograph of a cup on a table. In this model, to introspect that my visual experience has mental property of “being an experience of seeing a photograph of a cup on a table” is for me

(a) to represent that my visual experience has that mental property,

(b) on the basis of my seeing that the intentional object of my visual experience has some property P,

(c) the former representation being mediated by the justified belief that the object would not have P unless my visual experience had the mental property of “being an experience of seeing a picture of a cup on the table” (Lycan, 2003, p. 16).

Dretske then enhances his account by claiming that in order to know what the experience is like and what properties it has, the one who has the experience only needs to look at what the experience is an experience of and that gives him the relevant properties of his experience (Dretske, 1999, p. 112). Lycan objects to this by saying that Dretske’s enhanced account does not seem to explain how introspective beliefs are justified (Lycan, 2003, p. 17). In Dretske (1999) we see objects as these objects are represented in our experience of them; in our experience, the representation of objects that we see gives us the experience of the objects that are represented (p. 123, n. 12). Similarly, if someone tells me that there is a cup, my introspective belief is about the experience of seeing a cup. However, Lycan says, we need to look at the camera and its properties too in order to know whether the picture that I am seeing is the picture of a cup. He claims that we need to question the reliability of the person who told us that there was a cup. Without knowing those ‘additional’ factors, it seems that we are not justified in our introspective belief that I am having a cup-type experience or a cup-type belief (Lycan, 2003, p. 17).

I think Lycan makes a good point in his criticism. I see introspection as a faculty which gives us information about everything that is going on in our mind without skipping any details when we pay attention to our mind. It requires that introspective-belief formation is not only about what our experiences are experiences of, but they are also about anything else that contributes to the formation of the content of our experiences. In seeing a picture of an object O, we form an introspective belief that I am having an O-type experience or an O-type belief. But this is not enough; there is also the fact that O is represented in a certain way and it could have been represented in another way with a different sort of a camera or under different conditions of lighting. I think the problem with the displaced perceptual model of introspection is that in that model, in order to be aware of an external object, I need to be aware of another external object that represents the initial external object. The model seems to require me to be aware of something that mediates my awareness of another thing in introspection. That is why I think in DPM, introspection is considered as a faculty that gives me data in an indirect and inferential way. I infer my awareness of the external object from my awareness of another external object. However, I think introspection gathers data in a direct and non-inferential way. Lycan says that Dretske admits that my belief about my experience does not seem inferential (Lycan, 2003, p. 17). As I understand it, Dretske's way of introspection seems to make my awareness or my knowledge of my own mental states inferential. In my experience, I am aware of a photograph of a cup which represents an actual cup. By inference from my awareness of the representation of an actual cup, I form an introspective belief that I am having a cup-like experience. Thus, if I come to know about my mental states through DPM model of introspection, then my knowledge of my mental states turns out to be inferential.

According to Lycan, Dretske commits to an account of introspection in which introspecting gives us only the intentional contents of the states being introspected in perception, which is by using our sense organs. Even when the objects are inexistents such as objects in dreams and hallucinations, our introspection of them is a perceptual act (Lycan, 2003, p. 22). Lycan criticizes this view and claims that introspection provides us information of intentional contents and something more. First, he says it gives us the degree and intensity concerning intentional mental states (Lycan, 2003). My introspection shows me to what degree I hold the belief that there is a cup. I may slightly believe it or I may have a strong belief about my experience. The same goes for the introspection of my experience of bodily sensations. The intentional content of my experience of thirst may be a slight thirst or a strong one. Similarly, my perceptual quale of seeing a cup is not captured by my introspection of the intentional content of the picture of a cup that I am looking at. The picture of a cup does not yield a complete intentional content of what it is like for me to see a cup.

In criticizing Dretske, Lycan has another worry with regard to the use of the words ‘zombie’, ‘conscious’, and ‘pain’ in Dretske’s paper “How Do You Know You are Not A Zombie?”. He states that what Dretske means by these words is not clear (Lycan, 2003, p. 23). I agree with Lycan on this point: as I have argued earlier, I think Dretske merely implies that awareness and consciousness are not the same, but he does not explicitly states the difference between the two. I have attempted to explain what I think the difference is by suggesting that awareness always requires consciousness but not vice versa. Concerning what Dretske means by “zombie”, Lycan (2003) suggests that a Dretskean zombie is a human-like creature that does not perceive or sense anything. I

have offered a different interpretation of how Dretskean zombies are. I have claimed that Dretskean zombies have sensation, because objects are physically presented to them, but they do not have perceptions. I think due to their lack of consciousness and perception, there is nothing that tells them that they see objects; they just sense objects. It seems that they are not aware of objects, because awareness requires consciousness.

The displaced perception model of introspection faces some problems that we may avoid by adopting the inner-sense model of introspection. Another problem to be mentioned is concerning the inferential character of DPM. In his paper “Is Introspection Inferential?”, Murat Aydede argues that DPM faces an important problem. According to him, the inferential character attributed to introspection in this model fails in that there is no apparent connecting belief that makes introspective inference possible.

Dretske’s story for the DPM goes as follows: there are objects that we perceive by becoming aware of their external revealing properties. In ordinary perception, we form some perceptual beliefs about our perceptual experience. Then, we introspect on our perceptual beliefs, form conceptually articulated inferential knowledge and come to know something about ourselves (Aydede, 2003, p. 55). I have the visual experience of a cup; I form the belief that there is a cup, and that makes me aware of the fact that I am seeing a cup. I see a photograph of a cup; I form the belief that there is a photograph of a cup, so that there is a cup, then I form the introspective belief that I am seeing a cup or that I know that there is a cup. In the latter case, I infer a belief about myself from a perceptual belief that I form by perceiving the photograph instead of the actual object. In other words, my perception of a photograph of a cup displaced my perception of the cup itself. This displacement is achieved via a connecting belief (Aydede, 2003).

An example of a connecting belief would be given in the following way:

(1) If the thermometer points to numeral x when I look at it, then the room temperature is x (or rather the temperature represented by x).

Another example goes like:

(2) If the blood sugar meter points to numeral y when I look at it, then my blood sugar is y (or rather what y represents).⁴

Aydede argues that there is no inference that gives us the intended introspective belief. He says that representationalism about experiential qualia is compatible with DPM, because they are both externalist views; they claim that it is not intrinsic properties of experiences or mental states that we acquire knowledge of when we introspect, but introspection provides us the representational content of experiences (Aydede, 2003, p. 56). The qualitative content of my experience of seeing a cup is how my experience of seeing a cup represents the world. In the example of seeing a blue cup, my experience represents the world as blue and having a handle and so on.

Another claim that Aydede makes about DPM is that DPM is a version of the Higher Order Thought (HOT) theory of introspection. The reason is that according to the DPM, introspection yields conceptually articulated thoughts (beliefs) about experiences (Aydede, 2003). I can have an introspective belief about my visual experience of a cup only to the extent to which I have perceptual concepts that apply to the cup that is represented in my visual experience. These are concepts such as ‘blue’, ‘handle’,

⁴ These examples are adaptations of Aydede’s examples for connecting beliefs in his paper “Is Introspection Inferential?”.

‘circle’, ‘small’, etc., and they are what make me aware of my visual experience; however, they do not make me have the visual experience. Additionally, Aydede (2003) says that DPM requires us to have concepts of perceptual modes like seeing, touching, hearing and so on. So, it requires that we need concepts of intentional mental states.

Let us see an example of how introspection of experiences works according to DPM:

First, I form a perceptual belief (B): the cup is blue. This belief state is produced by the physical brain state causing my visual state and is itself the result of some physical structures in the brain. Secondly, I form a relevant introspective belief (IB): I am seeing that the cup is blue. There must be a connecting belief from which I infer my introspective belief. Candidates for the connecting belief are that:

(CB1) if the cup is blue, I am now seeing it as blue,

and, that

(CB2) if I have now come to believe that the cup is blue, then I am now seeing it as blue.⁵ (Aydede, 2003, p. 57).

Aydede claims that for (CB1), there is the worry of circularity. We are trying to find out how we pass from (B) to (IB) by assuming that if (B) is given, then (IB) holds. Remember, this is what we already know, but we are supposed search for what makes (IB) true given that (B). On the other hand, (CB1) is clearly false. Even if the cup is

⁵ The discussion about connecting beliefs for this example is adapted from Aydede.

blue, I may not be seeing it as blue due to a deficiency in my vision or some other impediment. As a result, (CB1) would be a false premise (Aydede, 2003).

Secondly, Aydede says, (CB2) clearly does not allow for making a modus ponens inference. The antecedent of our second premise, (CB2), is not the same as our first premise, (B). So, we cannot make a valid inference to reach (IB) from (B) and (CB2). (CB2) presupposes that I, as the person who is introspecting, am aware of the perceptual belief that I form, from which I already introspect my perceptual belief. But this introspection that I make use of in (CB2) also requires a connecting belief. The process would go on ad infinitum (Aydede, 2003, p. 58).

Maybe a modification of (CB2) in the following way would help us:

(CB2*) if I have now non-inferentially come to believe that the cup is blue, I am now seeing it as blue (Aydede, 2003, p. 59).

In this way, I would not need another connecting belief to save (CB2*), because the antecedent is not inferred from any other belief. However, now we have another problem: assuming that the nature of my introspective belief is non-inferential also requires introspection. Notice that what we are trying to explain is how I acquire my introspective belief. If I have knowledge about its nature, I would already know how I get this belief; but I do not know it. Another problem for (CB2*) is that if I non-inferentially come to believe that the cup is blue, I may also non-inferentially have come to believe that it has other properties in different sensory modalities such as I feel that it is solid. Then, the question of whether I have seen it or I have felt is problematic (Aydede, 2003).

I suggest another way to infer (IB) from (B) that could save DPM from this criticism. It goes as follows:

(B) the cup is blue.

(CB3) I have now come to believe that the cup is blue.

(CB4) I do not have any visual deficiency that make me see cups in different colors than other people do, nor am I hallucinating or dreaming the cup.

(CB5) if the cup is blue and I have now come to believe that the cup is blue and I do not have any visual deficiency and I am not hallucinating or dreaming, then I am seeing that the cup is blue.

From (B), (CB3), (CB4), and (CB5) by modus ponens, I reach the conclusion (IB), I am seeing that the cup is blue. But notice that this argument also does not work. I need to use introspection to have (CB3) and without (CB3) it seems that I would not have the relevant perceptual belief from which I reach the intended introspective belief. Finally, I do not see any argument that does not require me to use introspection to form a connecting belief in order to know my mental states in DPM. Therefore, I agree with Aydede on his claim that the inferential character of DPM is problematic in getting the knowledge of our mental states through introspection.

CHAPTER 3

PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF EXPERIENCE

3.1 There is 'something it is like'

Another candidate for how we know that we are conscious is the suggestion that there is something it is like to be the conscious creature that we are. Thomas Nagel puts forth the idea of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of conscious creature in his well-known paper "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" (1974). He first argues that any physicalist reductive theory fails to explain consciousness and subjective experience correctly: contrary to what such theories claim, it seems that subjective experiences cannot be reduced to physical phenomena. In order to reach that conclusion, he puts forward some claims about consciousness leading to his definition of consciousness as 'what it is like', which he maintains by means of his arguments about the subjective point of view, about bats, and about the subjective character of experiences. In this section, I will look at Nagel's arguments and most importantly at his definition of consciousness as a 'what it is like'.

In his much discussed article, he explains the importance of the phenomenon of consciousness in the mind-body problem. He says the following:

Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable... Without consciousness the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless" (Nagel, 1974, p. 435).

His attitude towards physicalist theories of consciousness can be expressed in the following way:

1. Any reductionist program has to be based on an analysis of what is to be reduced for it to succeed in reaching a complete analysis of the problem.

2. Physicalist theories are reductionist in the sense that they try to reduce mental phenomena⁶ to physical phenomena.

3. Physicalist theories have to be based on an analysis of the 'subjective character' of experience (From 1 and 2).

4. If physicalism is to be defended, the 'subjective character' of the experience must be given a physical account (Nagel, 1974, p. 435).

Therefore, physicalist theories are to be defended if and only if they are based on an analysis of the 'subjective character' of consciousness, in which they are given a physical account. What is it that he calls the 'subjective character' of consciousness?

The fact that an organism has conscious experience at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism [...] Fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism- something it is like for the organism (Nagel, 1979, p. 166).

From this definition of consciousness, we arrive at the conclusion that qua having conscious mental states, there is something it is like to be a human being which constitutes the subjective character of human experience. In this manner, Nagel denies the physicalist claim that mental phenomena can be reduced to physical phenomena. He presents a complementary argument to refute physicalist reductive accounts of consciousness. In the first part of the argument, he distinguishes between the subjective and the objective character of experience:

⁶ Nagel seems to think that mental phenomena include the subjective character of experience, in other words the phenomenal character of experience.

1. Reductive analyses of the mental phenomena are logically compatible with the absence of the subjective character of experience.

2. Therefore, no reductive analysis of the mental phenomena would catch the subjective character of experience (Nagel, 1974, p. 444).

The first claim above apparently asks for clarification. To clarify, he presents the distinction between the objective and subjective character of experience. Even if the concepts and ideas used in thinking are applied from a point of view, i.e. subjectively, they are employed to refer to things beyond themselves, which he calls the objective character of experience. Take an example of the use of the concept 'blue' by an Englishman and a German. On the one hand, they both refer to the color located between violet and green on the optical spectrum. This is the objective character of their experience in the sense that they refer to the objective feature of the color 'blue', which is beyond themselves. Nonetheless, these two people have two different concepts⁷ of 'blue': 'blue' also represents the human emotion of sadness for the Englishman, which he normally expresses by his utterance of the sentence 'I am feeling blue', whereas the German says 'I am blue' to express his state of insobriety. What Nagel means though is something different: he thinks that physicalism cannot capture the difference between how it feels for a human being to see the color 'blue' and how it feels for a different species to see the same color. Nonetheless, he does not go on to claim that this experience differs from person to person.

⁷ Nagel does not use the word 'concept'; instead, he prefers employing the term 'point of view'. But, the two seem to mean the same thing in this context.

In the reasoning below, he strengthens his claim that one cannot defend physicalism by using analyses of mental phenomena, because they cannot deal with the subjective character:

1. Physicalism states that physical theories can explain each phenomenon in the world.

2. Each subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view.

3. If an objective physicalist theory is to explain subjective phenomena, it should not leave out the points of view that subjective phenomena have.

4. It seems that these separate points of view that each subjective phenomenon has cannot be given a physical account. So, one cannot defend physicalism using analyses of mental phenomena which cannot deal with their subjective character (Nagel, 1974, p. 437).

What Nagel means by a 'point of view' is 'what it is like to be a certain type of organism', that is, how it is for the subject himself qua a member of this certain kind (Nagel, 1974, p. 440). He takes bats as an example in order to draw our attention to the difference between our point of view and bats' point of view as being different types of organism:

1. Bats have conscious experience.

2. An organism has conscious experience if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism.

3. There is something it is like to be a bat (From 1 and 2).

4. In order to know the conscious experience of bats I need to know what it is like to be a bat.

5. Bat sonar is not something that is subjectively like anything humans can experience or imagine. So, without changing my fundamental structure, my experiences would not be anything like the experiences of bats.

6. So, the conscious experience of bats is nothing like the conscious experience of humans, and the resources of my own mind are not adequate for me to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat.

7. Therefore, I cannot know about the conscious experience of a bat, nor can I know what it is like for a bat to be a bat (Nagel, 1974, p. 438).

The argument here presents a difficulty for the psychophysical reduction of experience. Nagel simply argues that experiences cannot be reduced to physical phenomena. The reason he gives is that the process of reduction in general must move toward a greater objectivity, but the nature of experiences does not permit such a process. Experience is always associated with a particular point of view, thus one cannot get knowledge of experience by discarding the particularity of a point of view (Nagel, 1974, p. 448).

Nagel reaches the conclusion that there is no way in which I can know what it is like for a bat to be a bat, nor is there a way for a bat to know what it is like for a human being to be a human being. That is because there are facts about bats beyond the reach of human grasp and human conception. These facts embody a particular point of view which can only be shared by the member of the same species. Therefore, human understanding and human knowledge is limited to human experiences only. Furthermore, he claims that these inaccessible facts cannot be expressed in human language.

Having presented Nagel's arguments for there being something it is like to be a certain kind of conscious organism, I proceed to some points that I find problematic in his account. In the first place, I have an objection against his assumption that bats have conscious experience. What seems to me to be problematic here is that he assumes that bats have consciousness even prior to his bat example when he says "Consciousness is a widespread phenomenon. It occurs at many levels of animal life [...]", then he continues by saying "We may call this the subjective character of experience" (Nagel, 1974, p. 436). This presupposition in a way seems faulty. Nagel takes the existence of bats' conscious experience for granted without knowing what it is like for a bat to be a bat. I do not deny that bats and other animals can have conscious experience, but I say that we do not know this for sure yet. Our inference that a certain organism other than us has conscious experience can only be based on our perceptions, and the comparisons that we make through our own conscious experience that we undergo via our perceptions. While trying to make an argument for his claim that there is something it is like to be a certain conscious creature, Nagel seems to make two groundless claims: the claim that there is something it is like for a bat to be a bat, and that this is different from what it is like for a human being to be a human being. He takes this first assumption as self-evident by saying "I assume we all believe that bats have experience" (Nagel, 1974, p. 438), and uses it to support the latter groundless claim, which underlies his main argument in the article. Therefore, in my opinion, Nagel's argument begins with a flaw when he maintains a problematic assumption, and then he makes almost no attempt to justify this assumption. Moreover, his assumption seems to me contradictory with his successive line of reasoning. How can we possibly claim that bats have conscious experience,

which I think can be included in what it is like for a bat to be a bat, and at the same time claim that we do not know what it is like for a bat to be a bat at all?

According to Nagel, the reason for our inability to know about bats' conscious experience is that our imagination is not enough for us to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat because we are restricted to the resources of our own mind, and those resources are inadequate for the task (Nagel, 1974, p. 439). I think maybe it is not the resources of our mind that are inadequate for the task, but the resources of the scientific study of consciousness. As the science of consciousness progresses, we may come to know not only the content of bats' minds, but also how to simulate their conscious experience. Living in their habitat or just simulating that kind of a habitat to conduct research on their conscious experience could bring us closer to finding answers to our questions regarding their "conscious" experience.

Moreover, scientific research on blind people has shown us that some blind people can echolocate just like bats.⁸ This shows us that research on blind people can widen our understanding of bats' conscious experience. Nagel also believes that the only way to understand the conscious experience of a bat is to take a bat's point of view. But being conscious maybe does not necessarily require having a certain point of view (but the way in which I know that I am conscious may be through having a certain point of view). For example, I can be conscious of my pain, yet I may not have a point of view regarding it. If it is a chronic pain, I may become indifferent towards it. The point of view that I am talking about here is more like an attitude. I believe that it may be possible to understand the conscious experience of bats through scientific methods

⁸ See: http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0020162_

without having an attitude towards it. Secondly, the possibility of there being some conscious creatures that do not have a point of view is not implausible. Taken all together, these points suggest that the possibility that we can improve the resources of our mind to the extent of reaching the complete understanding of bats' conscious experience should not be underestimated.

Another closely related concern might be the possibility that the conscious aspect of a bat is not different from that of a human being. This is not to say that bats are as intelligent as human beings, nor that they can think and have the same experiences we undergo as human beings. Rather, I refuse to accept the idea that from bats' salient physical structure including the ability to echolocate and the physical structure of human beings, we can infer that 'being' a bat is different from being a human being. Yet, the possibility that bats have conscious minds and that conscious aspect of bats is no different from that of human beings is still there.

In addition, I think Nagel is too hasty in claiming that we know what it is like for us to be human beings. As Nagel moves along his argument, he makes the claim that we do not have the vocabulary to describe what it is like for a human being to be a human being although we know both what it is like and that it can only be understood by creatures like us. Obviously we tend to think that we are closer to having the knowledge of what it is like for us to be human beings than the knowledge of what it is like for a bat to be a bat. However, I think, we are still incapable of explaining numerous human behaviors, emotions, tendencies, and mental states, which most probably are included in what it is like for us to be us.

Nagel thinks that understanding of bat phenomenology 'may be permanently denied to us by the limits of our nature' (Nagel, 1974, p. 440). I believe that it is not

permanently denied to us; but, rather, we have not yet reached the point where we can describe every existing mental phenomenon and the structure of the mind in the world. Again, if we can come to know the conscious experiences of bats as science progresses and we learn to imitate them, we may be able to express what it is like for a bat to be a bat. I am not saying that the same also goes for humans. It seems to me that they will always be incapable of expressing what it is like for a human being to be a human being. We have the necessary equipment to do research on the conscious life of bats while they do not seem to have the equipment to understand ours. They cannot, for instance, live in daylight.

Now I will quote a passage in which I think Nagel makes a mistake by giving too much emphasis to hypotheticals:

It will not help to try to imagine that one has webbing on one's arms, which enables one to fly around at dusk and dawn catching insects in one's mouth; that one has very poor vision, and perceives the surrounding world by a system of reflected high frequency sound signals; and that one spends the day hanging upside down by one's feet in an attic. In so far as I can imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat (Nagel, 1974, p. 439).

Here, he seems to be imagining himself as behaving like a bat, not imagining a bat being a bat. There is circularity: by stating that he wants to know what it is like for a bat to be a bat, right from the start he removes himself from the situation, and takes a third-person perspective. Ultimately, he does not experience that which he assumes he is experiencing; rather, he experiences himself as behaving like a bat. He also removes himself from experiencing himself by trying to experience something that he cannot experience. I think Nagel's point is mistaken, because by attempting to experience another creature's conscious experience, he does not even experience his experience; he

experiences himself as if he was a bat. Nagel could make a modest claim by saying that there is something unique about being a bat, and we can develop our conception by understanding the physical and mental structure of bats.

Another problem in Nagel's account is that only sufficiently similar beings can understand each other's point of view. I think this raises the question of who the authority is in deciding which types of beings are to be considered similar enough to understand each other's points of view, and what criteria that authority is supposed to have in deciding. We may wonder whether a humanoid and a human can be classified as similar regarding what it is like for them to be them. So, for instance, how can we know that bats are not similar enough to understand the human point of view? We may say that they are not similar enough, because they have a very different physical structure. Take another example. Monkeys are usually regarded as beings which have a lot in common with human beings both physically and psychologically. But can we say that they know what it is like for human beings to be human beings? I cannot find any answer to this question in Nagel's article.

The sentence 'There is something it is like to be...' is an existential claim and it seems to refer to a particular state of affairs. In Nagel's account, such sentences refer to species-specific conscious experiences, which are inaccessible to conscious organisms other than the object class of organisms. On the one hand, Nagel tells us that this state of affairs is 'subjective'. But it appears that it is also 'objective' in a significant sense. In general, we think a state of affairs is objective, so as to be accessible to all sentient creatures. For example, the sky's being blue is a state of affairs. It is also a truth-maker in the sense that if the sky's being blue is a fact, then the proposition 'The sky is blue' is true. The truth of this proposition depends on this state of affairs' being a fact. In this

case, the truth of a state of affairs seems to be an objective fact, to which all sentient creatures can have access. The possibility of there being a 'subjective' state of affairs which we regard as objective in public language is at issue here. Nagel seems to be begging the question by maintaining the existence of this kind of state of affairs.

In conclusion, I think if the foregoing analysis is correct, then Nagel fails to establish an epistemological thesis about conscious experience when he says that there is something it is like for each conscious organism. He attempts to suggest a metaphysical claim against the physicalist positions by means of this epistemological thesis, but at the end, he does not succeed in his attempt.

3.2 There is not 'something it is like'

While the expression 'something it is like to be' has been used by many philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, and cognitive scientists, many others have objected to the suggestion that there is 'something it is like' to be a conscious organism. Peter Hacker has been one of the most notable among people who argued against the expression. He wants to argue that there is no place for the expression 'there is something it is like' in our language, because

It does not matter whether 'conscious experience' is understood as 'experience had while conscious' or as 'experience of which one is conscious'. The very expression 'There is something it is like for a person to have it' is malconstructed (Hacker, 2002, pp. 166-67).

First of all, Hacker does not deny that there is a way it feels to the person to have a specific experience. For him, the mistake is positing the existence of qualitative feels of experiences which are only accessible to the members of the same given specific kind. That is because, he says, experiences do not differ by their qualitative feel, because most

experiences do not have a qualitative feel. He gives the example of perceiving for the experiences which do not have qualitative feel. He claims that even if they have their qualitative feels, in many cases, they may be the same feel. What makes an experience different from another is that their objects differ (Hacker, 2002, p. 5). Then, what is the qualitative difference of experiences that are not species-specific? He replies to this question by giving a different definition of experience than that of Nagel's:

Experiences, we may say, are possible subjects of attitudinal predicates, that is, they may be agreeable or disagreeable, interesting or boring, wonderful or dreadful. It is such attributes that might be termed 'the qualitative characters of experiences', not the experiences themselves (Hacker, 2002, p. 6).

When I ask a person 'How is it to eat an ice cream?' or 'What is it like to hear Janáček's Sinfonietta?' the answers that I get are these persons' affective attitudes towards their experiences in a subject-predicate form. They may say 'It is wonderful', 'It is pleasant', and so on. These attitudes are to be considered as the qualitative character of experiences. However, these attitudes are not the things that differentiate a person's experiences from one another because of the fact that we may express our attitude towards different experiences by using the same affective attitudinal predicate. A person can answer both questions above by saying 'It is wonderful'. The difference between these two experiences is that the object of the first one is ice cream while the object of the latter is Janáček's Sinfonietta.

Hacker objects to Nagel's claim that every experience can be individuated by a distinctive qualitative character or a quale. Then, he proceeds to explain a problem for the formulation 'there is something it is like'. He searches for possible answers to the question 'what it is like for you to experience X?'. Take an example about desiring.

When I say ‘it is dreadful for me to desire to see a bat’, there are three ways to re-express this sentence in the form of an existential claim:

1. There is something which it is for me to desire to see a bat.
2. There is something which it is like to desire to see a bat.
3. There is something it is like for me to desire to see a bat.

Hacker states that there is no problem in uttering the first formulation, but the other two formulations are problematic. The second formulation is used to express a comparison between desiring to see a bat and another experience. We use the third one when we make judgments of similarity. He says;

It is misconceived to suppose that one can circumscribe, let alone define, conscious experience in terms of there being something which it is like for a subject to have it [...] The very expression 'There is something it is like for a person to have it' is malconstructed. It is a request for specification of one's affective attitude at the time to the experience undergone, a specification of 'how it is (or was) for one' (Hacker, 2002, p. 7).

For Hacker, licit formulations of the questions ‘what is it like to be an X?’ have three notable features (Hacker, 2002, p. 8). The first one is that “the subject term...differs from the object term”. In other words, we can licitly ask ‘what is it like for a Y to be an X?’. I can ask, for instance, ‘what is it like for a man to be an actor?’, or ‘what is it like for you to be a Nobel Prize winner?’, or ‘what is it like for you to be a dad?’. The second feature of such questions, Hacker says, is that there must be an implicit principle of contrast between X and Y, that is a principle of contrast between Ys being Xs as opposed to another class being Xs. We might wish to find out what is distinctive about the career of a man, as opposed to a woman, in being an actor. Similarly, we might want to know your particular impressions of being a Nobel Prize winner. These questions imply a principle of contrast with respect to the subject class, namely Ys. Third, the

questions under the form ‘what is it like to be an X?’ involve a second principle of contrast with respect to the object class, namely Xs. “We want to know what it is like, or what it is like for Y, to be an X as opposed to something else Y might be or have been” (Hacker, 2002). We might want to know, for example, what it is like for a man to be an actor, as opposed to a member of some other profession.

In sum, Hacker argues against Nagel’s claim that there is a particular qualitative character of experience for each conscious organism which differentiates them from one another. He continues by claiming that the questions ‘what is it like for a human being to be a human being, or a bat to be a bat, or for me to be me?’ make no sense, and they simply do not have any place in our language.

I agree with most of the points that Hacker makes and I think his criticisms against Nagel are very informative, but there are some parts that I find problematic. In his article, he refers to David Chalmers’ question ‘Why do conscious experiences have their specific character? [...] Why is seeing red like *this*, rather than like *that*?’ (Chalmers, 1996, p. 5, quoted in Hacker, 2002, p. 11). According to Hacker, there must be a *this* or a *that* to which we can point in order for us to make sentences that contain these indexical words. He says that we see a red object like *this*, because it is red, and we call *this* red. He also says that there is no such thing as seeing sounds with one’s eyes. But, in fact, there are some people who can in fact see sounds with their eyes. They are called synaesthetes. Some of them can even see colors in numbers.⁹ Thus, this kind of perception is available to some members of our species.

⁹ See: <http://www.in-mind.org/article/theres-something-about-zero?page=2>.

When he claims that there are some experiences that have no affective or attitudinal quality, he gives the perceptual experience as an example. As I understand it, according to him, we do not have any affective attitudes towards propositions like ‘This table is blue’ when we have a perceptual experience of a blue table. I do not agree with his claim here. On the contrary, I think we can develop and express attitudes both towards our perceptual experience of seeing a blue table and towards the proposition that the table is blue. I may, for instance, say ‘the color of this table is wonderful, because blue is my favorite color’, and thus report my affective attitude towards the fact. Furthermore, I may tell you about my attitude towards the proposition ‘This table is blue’ by saying ‘I am happy that this is a true proposition’.

Another point that I will argue against is about Hacker’s claim “Different experiences which do have a qualitative ‘feel’ may have the very same ‘feel’” (Hacker, 2002, p. 5). I think his claim is not correct. In support of his argument, Hacker says, for instance, that we can say ‘it is boring’ both for seeing a movie and for collecting leaves; thus, we can have the very same qualitative ‘feel’ towards these two different experiences. My suggestion is that uttering the same proposition regarding our attitudes towards two different experiences does not necessarily show that we have the very same qualitative feel for both of them. In saying ‘it is boring’ to a question about my attitude towards seeing a movie, I may have in mind many other adjectives, adverbs, and descriptive expressions at the same time. The content of my attitude may include a conjunction which is entirely inaccessible to other people. It is even possible that I cannot find any expression to describe my attitude towards an experience or it might be the case that my description is incomplete. I would say that Hacker misunderstands the idea of the qualitative feel, because I believe that by its very definition, one qualitative

feel cannot be the same as the other. It differs depending on the person who has it, and the conditions under which he has it. In this sense, I think Hacker's affective attitudinal qualities may also count as qualia, or what Nagel calls qualitative aspect of consciousness.

Lastly, I think we should make a sharp distinction between the notion of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature and the notion of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Both Nagel and Hacker seem to use the language of there being something it is like to be a certain kind of creature while trying to explain the notion of there being something it is like to have a certain kind of experience. Moreover, it appears that they assume that we can infer the existence of the former from the existence of the latter. However, I think this assumption is not justified, and it needs further analysis.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION: IS SELF-KNOWLEDGE AN ACHIEVEMENT?

I assume that introspection is a way to know ourselves and I think both in the displaced perception model of introspection and in the inner-sense model of introspection, self-knowledge of phenomenal character of experience or qualia, self-knowledge of mental states and self-knowledge of bodily sensations are all cognitively achieved. According to DPM, we gain introspective awareness of experiences through an awareness of external objects, their properties and the formation of perceptual concepts. The formation of perceptual concepts surely seems to require having a cognitive capacity to realize relevant cognitive processes that yield concepts. The representational content of what it is like for us to have a certain experience consists of concepts that are formed in our mind.

According to DPM, in perception, I become aware of objects by becoming aware of external properties of objects. Then, I form a perceptual belief, but my perception of an external object is displaced by my perception of another object. For instance, I look at the numeral in the thermometer and then I form the belief that the room temperature is what that numeral indicates. This kind of process requires having the necessary cognitive ability to make relevant inferences, and thus it makes self-knowledge a cognitive achievement.

If self-knowledge of my mental states, phenomenal character of my experiences or my bodily sensations is obtained via an inferential method, then it requires some sort of rationality which in turn makes self-knowledge a cognitive achievement. The kind of

introspection described by DPM seems to me to be inferential by virtue of its representationalist character; in introspection, I infer my awareness of the external object from another external object that represents the former external object. So, in my understanding, DPM model of introspection supports the idea that self-knowledge is a cognitive achievement.

In the inner-sense model, by introspection, I am directly aware of the mental representation of an external object rather than another external object that is a representation of the initial external object. Unlike DPM model, the inner-sense model seems to give us a non-inferential model of introspection, because we do not infer our awareness of an external object through our awareness of another external object or through something else. Rather, we are directly aware of the mental representation of the external object. I think the inner-sense model of introspection also supports the idea that self-knowledge is a cognitive achievement not thanks to the inferential character, but rather thanks to its representationalist character. I believe that having the capacity to get mental representation of the external object means that the owner of the experience probably has mental concepts related to his experience and I consider concept formation as a cognitive achievement in its own right. Therefore, I think both models of introspection that I have taken up in this thesis supports the idea that self-knowledge of mental states, bodily sensations and the phenomenal character is a cognitive achievement.

Paul Boghossian mentions other facts supporting the claim that self-knowledge is a cognitive achievement. First, some people are better than others at explaining their mental states, bodily sensations and qualitative character of their own experiences. Secondly, the extent to which we know about our mental states depends on how much

attention we give them; if we focus more on our experiences, they tell us more about ourselves (Boghossian, 2003, p. 76). I agree with his claims and I also believe that in our quest for self-knowledge, relevant findings of psychological science or any kind of science can help us to realize that we have some prejudices, biases, delusions and so on even when we are in certain mental states. The awareness of prejudices, delusions and the like is cognitively achieved and is related to self-knowledge. However, the latter kind of self-knowledge is different from the kind that Dretske, Lycan, Nagel, Hacker, and most of other analytic philosophers are talking about when they present and adopt an account of self-knowledge.

Here I would like to bring up a distinction, which I believe is crucial in understanding self-knowledge, between what Quassim Cassam calls “trivial self-knowledge” and “substantial self-knowledge”. Cassam labels the knowledge of my beliefs, emotions, desires, pain, the phenomenal character of experience and all sorts of self-knowledge that are mentioned in this thesis so far as forms of trivial self-knowledge. For instance, the questions like “How do you know that you desire to eat ice cream?” and “how do you know that you believe that you are in pain?” are questions related to trivial self-knowledge. The reason why he calls them trivial is that the answers to those questions will not make a big effect on the life of the owner of that knowledge; in other words, they are not big questions of human life. On the other hand, knowledge about your character traits, values, your deepest thoughts and emotions is substantial and this type of self-knowledge seems more interesting and hard to attain.¹⁰ I think Cassam makes an important point here by drawing our attention to a less-discussed form of self-

¹⁰ See: <https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/know-thy-self-really/>.

knowledge. In my opinion, substantial self-knowledge is crucial in understanding the distinctiveness of self-knowledge. Being aware of one's delusions, biases, obsessions and so on could tell the person much about himself. This kind of self-knowledge may not be attained only through perception, introspection and the other methods that I have discussed here in this thesis. I believe that substantial self-knowledge requires something more than the means that we make use of when we are trying to obtain trivial self-knowledge. However, the point here is not about how we attain substantial self-knowledge, but rather that we should not discard the significance of substantial self-knowledge in understanding ourselves. I believe that we should handle the issues of trivial and substantial self-knowledge together and analyze the relation between them to reach a complete understanding of ourselves.

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