

AN ATTEMPT AT CONFESSIONALIZATION AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINING
IN THE REIGN OF MUSTAFA II (1695-1703)

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AN ATTEMPT AT CONFESSIONALIZATION AND SOCIAL DISCIPLINING
IN THE REIGN OF MUSTAFA II (1695-1703)

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Hüseyin Göcen, certify that

- I am the sole author of this thesis and that I have fully acknowledged and documented in my thesis all sources of ideas and words, including digital resources, which have been produced or published by another person or institution;
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ABSTRACT

An Attempt at Confessionalization and Social Disciplining in the Reign of Mustafa II (1695-1703)

The central focus of this thesis is a set of Mühimme orders from the reign of Mustafa II. These orders concerned teaching basic religious knowledge to Muslim subjects, examining the creedal knowledge of religious personnel and replacing incompetent personnel with qualified ones, renovating mosques and madrasas, and urging the regular participation of all adult Muslim males in congregational prayers. While the orders in question were sent to various places in the empire, special emphasis was placed on the religious education of Muslims in the Balkans.

This study makes use of the paradigm of confessionalization to analyze the religious and moral reform program outlined in these orders. It is argued that these policies, while designed by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, were also the product of at least a two-century long process of confessionalization in the Ottoman Empire. Alongside the evolution of Ottoman confessional policies from the fifteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century, the social and political problems that faced the Ottoman administration in the Balkans and beyond in the aftermath of the Second Siege of Vienna are also emphasized.

ÖZET

II. Mustafa Saltanatında (1695-1703)

Bir Mezhebileştirme ve Toplumsal Disiplin Girişimi

Bu tezin odağında II. Mustafa saltanatından bir dizi Mühimme hükmü yer almaktadır. Bu hükümler Müslüman halka din bilgisinin öğretilmesi, din görevlilerinin dini bilgilerinin denetlenmesi, bilgisiz olanların yetkin olanlarla değiştirilmesi, cami ve medreselerin tamir edilmesi ve bütün erişkin Müslüman erkeklerin düzenli olarak cemaatle namaz kılmaya sevk edilmesi hakkındadır. Söz konusu hükümler imparatorluğun çeşitli yerlerine gönderilmekle beraber Balkanlardaki Müslümanların dini eğitimi özellikle dikkate alınmıştır.

Bu çalışmada, hükümlerde belirtilen dini ve ahlaki reform programının irdelenmesinde *mezhebileştirme* (confessionalization) paradigması kullanılmıştır. Bu politikanın esas olarak Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi tarafından tasarlanmış olsa da Osmanlı tarihindeki en az iki yüz yıllık mezhebileştirme sürecinin de ürünü olduğu savunulmaktadır. Osmanlı mezhebileştirme politikalarının on beşinci yüzyıldan on yedinci yüzyılın sonuna kadar olan evriminin yanı sıra Osmanlı yönetiminin İkinci Viyana Kuşatması sonrasında Balkanlarda ve diğer yerlerde karşılaştığı siyasi ve toplumsal sorunlar da ön plana çıkartılmaktadır.

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CHRONOLOGY

- | | |
|--|---|
| 1444-1446, 1451-1481: The reign of Mehmed II | 1687-1691: The reign of Süleyman II |
| 1471: Firman appointing prayer enforcer (<i>namazcı</i>) | 1691: The first şeyhülislam of Feyzullah Efendi |
| 1501: Establishment of the Safavid Empire | 1691-1695: The reign of Ahmed II |
| 1511: Şahkulu Rebellion | 1695-1703: The reign of Mustafa II |
| 1520-1566: The reign of Süleyman I | 1695, June-November: The first campaign of Mustafa II, and the first appointment of Kadızadeli sheikhs to accompany army on the campaign |
| 1537: Firman, ordering the construction of mosques and masjids in every village where Muslims live and obliging all adult Muslim men to perform the canonical prayers in mosques and masjids | 1696, June: Imperial firman, banning the use of the word “kanun” jointly with the sharia |
| 1545-1574: Ebussuud serves as şeyhülislam | 1696-1709: The second appearance of Murad Buhari in Istanbul |
| 1609-1678: Minkarizade Yahya | 1696, April-October: The second campaign of Mustafa II |
| 1630s-1680s(-1700s): The Kadızadeli movement | 1697, August-September: The third campaign of Mustafa II |
| 1635/6-1676: Fazıl Ahmed Pasha | 1697, 11 September: The Zenta defeat |
| 1638/9-1703: Seyyid Mehmed Feyzullah Efendi | 1697-1702: The grand vizierate of Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha |
| 1639: Kasr-ı Şirin/Zohab Treaty | 1699: The Treaty of Karlowitz |
| 1640-1720: Murad Buhari | 1699-1701: Crimean Revolt |
| 1648-1687: The reign of Mehmed IV | 1700: Istanbul Treaty |
| 1663: The arrival of Vani and his entourage to Istanbul | 1702, March-1703, July: Imperial orders, initiating a comprehensive campaign to educate the general Muslim public about the fundamentals of Islam |
| 1681-1686: The arrival and stay of Murad Buhari in Istanbul | |
| 1683, April-September: The Second Siege of Vienna | 1703, 17 July-22 August: The Edirne Incident |

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

On a Friday in January 2020, in the neighborhood mosque near where I live, the preacher was giving advice to his congregation before the noon prayer. The speech he delivered from the pulpit was full of criticisms about the people's religious conduct. After criticizing the congregation for prying into other people's private affairs, and for preoccupying themselves with useless matters, he continued, "These all happen because you are not reading your *ilmihals* but learning about religion from unqualified people who deceive and lead you astray!" He also provided the solution for these problems: "Come to the mosque regularly with your children and accustom them to perform the daily prayers." He also urged parents to make their children study the Quran and the life of the Prophet at school.

When I listened to these words uttered by my neighborhood preacher, I was struck by the similarity of his message with the orders of the Ottoman imperial court that were issued three centuries before, and which I was studying for my MA thesis.

1.1 The case

Beginning in March 1702, the Ottoman imperial court issued a set of orders to indoctrinate its Muslim subjects and raise their consciousness in religion and piety, to educate them in the Sunni creed and the pillars of Islamic worship, to teach them Qur'anic recitation; and to monitor their behavior in accordance with the norms of the sharia and the normative example of the Prophet. Stressing the Quranic maxim "enjoin the right and forbid the wrong" (*emr bi'l-ma'ruf ve nehy 'an el-münker*),

kadıs, muftis, and governors in various provinces were urged to implement the commands given in the orders and to urge the people living under their jurisdiction to comply with the sharia, and regularly participate in the Friday and five daily prayers. Ordinary people were not the only ones at the receiving end of the orders; imams and preachers were also to be examined about creedal matters, the sharia, faith, morals, reciting the Quran, and the services of prayer, and they were to desist from telling “false tales” from the pulpits. The religious personnel were to be inspected; those who lack the necessary qualities were to be trained, and the incompetent ones were to be reported to the capital. The teachers were to be investigated for their ability to teach the matters of faith, religious practices, and other creedal instructions from the customary Arabic and Turkish treatises and “reliable books,” and they were to deliver courses on the appointed days. Not only townsmen, but also villagers and nomads were expected to learn essential religious knowledge and perform the five daily prayers in congregation. A madrasa student was to be sent to reside among the Muslims and officials were ordered to supervise the renovation and maintenance of mosques and schools and to cooperate with the religious personnel sent to carry out the orders.

Even though the Ottoman authorities had tried to monitor the Muslim populace’s religious conduct since the late fifteenth century, none of the earlier orders matched those issued in the last year of the reign of Mustafa II (r. 1695-1703) in their scope. It is true that this ambitious attempt at religious reform was aborted in the summer of 1703, when a revolt broke out and Sultan Mustafa II was dethroned and his tutor Şeyhülislam Seyyid Mehmed Feyzullah Efendi (d. 1703) was dismissed from his office and tortured, mutilated, and killed in the hands of the rebels. However, even if ultimately unrealized, this religious educational project is still

worth analyzing within its immediate historical context as well as in the *longue-durée* of Ottoman history.

In this thesis, I will make use of the confessionalization paradigm to argue that in this period, the powerholders in Edirne attempted to transform Ottoman society according to the *sunnah* and *sharia*, to indoctrinate the Muslims in religious dogma, and to create pious subjects and thus achieve a well-functioning and harmonious union of society and state. In order to achieve these goals, the Ottoman authorities, led by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II, made use of almost every available means in their hands. In this respect, this religious education program came close in some respects to the ambitious religious and moral campaigns that were implemented by both the Protestant and Catholic authorities in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Confessionalization is a concept that was developed by a group of German scholars in the 1970s and 1980s to denote the socially transformative role of religion in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Europe. Though this paradigm was developed originally with reference to the German-speaking lands and more broadly to western Europe, it was introduced by Tijana Krstić into Ottoman studies and has attracted considerable attention since then.

I should state here that my central aim is not to prove that the case under consideration is a perfect example of Ottoman confessionalization. After all, this religious education campaign was halted by a rebellion. Hence I can examine here only the context, the initial motivations behind the program, its content, and the earliest applications. Still, this paradigm provides me a point of departure for examining my case, and the model it presents fits pretty well into the explanation I am going to build in this thesis. The two main pillars upon which my explanation will rest are, first, the long-term explanation, which is about earlier cases of similar

policies and other thoughts, ideologies, and discussions that have been influential on the religio-political and social domains of the Ottoman Empire; and second, the short-term explanation, which is about the potential of this project to serve as a cure and response to the problems that emerged in its immediate context.

It should be stressed that this confessionalization attempt can extend our horizons regarding state-society relations in terms of the place and the importance of religion and religio-political discourses and policies in Ottoman history. Until now, the process variously called “Sunnitization,” “confessionalization,” or “shariatization” was analyzed around two principal themes: the first was the Ottoman-Safavid conflict of the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, and its later reverberations, while the second was the conflicts among the ulema, the Sufis and puritanical preachers known as the Kadızadelis between the 1630s and 1683. Only a few scholars like Kerima Filan and Marlene Kurz focused on the aftermath of these debates and conflicts in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.¹ Some researchers have even argued that the eighteenth century was, in contrast to the earlier centuries, a period of secularization and even “deconfessionalization” in the Ottoman lands.² While some attention has been paid to social disciplining attempts in the late eighteenth century, these studies have not paid attention to the religious dimensions of these attempts.³ Besides recalling the earlier cases of similar sentiments dating to the period between the second half of the fifteenth century and the end of the seventeenth century, this case provides a bridge that connects the debates and ideas of the past into the following centuries.

¹ Filan, “Life in Sarajevo”; Kurz, *Ways to Heaven, Gates to Hell*; Filan, “Religious Puritans”; Filan, “Ulama (Scholars) as Members of Urban Community”; Filan, *Molla Mustafa'nın Mecmuası*.

² Hamadeh, *The City's Pleasures*; Özervarlı, “Intellectual Foundations”; Özervarlı, “Between tension and rapprochement.”; Küçük, *Early Enlightenment*.

³ Başaran, *Selim III.*; Beydilli, *Osmanlı Döneminde İmamlar*.

Abou-El-Haj, who conducted the most comprehensive studies on Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II, looked at this period through a primarily socio-political lens. Pointing to the events that had happened just before the issuing of these orders, he argued that the reform orders were essentially a response to the territorial losses and breakdown of public order that imperiled the Ottoman imperial order at the end of the seventeenth century.⁴ This study agrees with the analysis of Abou-El-Haj that the reform orders of 1702 were issued to target the problems that the Ottoman authorities faced after the Second Siege of Vienna and the Treaty of Karlowitz. However, I also argue that there were certain deep religious and ideological currents, along with some other recurring issues, that informed this reform program. Before delving into the case study and its analysis, I should first introduce the primary sources that I used in this thesis, and the earlier studies that have utilized some of these sources. Lastly, the outline of chapter summaries will conclude this chapter and give way to our voyage into the history of Ottoman confessionalization.

1.2 The primary sources

Here, I can begin with the main material of this thesis; the *Mühimme defterleri* (The Registers of Important Affairs). The Mühimme registers contain copies of the decrees sent by the Imperial Court to provincial governors after obtaining the consent of the sultan.⁵ For this study, I have surveyed 12 registers covering the period between 1695-1703, but drawn most of my material from Register 112, covering the period between 1113-1114 (1701-2) and Register 114, covering the period between 1114-1115 (1702-3).⁶

⁴ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 51-2.

⁵ Kütükoğlu, "Mühimme Defteri."

⁶ For all the orders see Chapter 4.

Altogether I was able to find 48 orders that pertain to this religious education campaign. Some of the orders are near identical, suggesting that they were copied from the same text. 13 of the orders seem to have provided templates for the later orders that were sent to different regions.⁷ The orders show consistency in their time sequence and their content. One document is of a different catalog, *İbnülemin – Hariciye* (İbnülemin – Foreign Affairs), giving a case of the sheikhs who were assigned for payment for their participation in this education campaign in Bucak (present-day Moldova).

In addition, I have also drawn on a number of chronicles to complement and contextualize the orders in question. Chronologically, the first work that mentions the reform project of 1702-3 is an anonymous chronicle covering the period between 1688 and 1704. Following the dismissal of Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha (d. 1702) from the office of grandvizierate and his death, we see a particular heading for our program's issued order: the theoretical part. The title is "The copy of the royal ordinance recorded and delivered to the Well-Protected Domains after the draft penned by his majesty Şeyhülislam Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi."⁸ In the following pages, the order sent to the provinces was copied.⁹ Then, the text continues with another extended code that the sultan issued about the navy. It seems that the author aimed to point out the reforms implemented in the tenure of Amcazade, and he gave the religious education program as a part of it. Also, this short entry about the program gives a hint about the composition of the orders that we will return to later in Chapter 4.

⁷ For the places mentioned in the orders see Chapter 4.

⁸ "Şeyhülislam Seyyid Feyzullah Efendi Hazretlerinin müsveddesiyle tahrir ve Memalik-i Mahrusa'ya gönderilen emr-i şerifin suretidir," Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 165.

⁹ Özcan, *Anonim Osmanlı Tarihi*, 165-7. The order copied here is the one that I have detailed in Chapter 4, BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#724.

Another contemporary source in which we see the case is the chronicle of Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Pasha (d. 1717): *Zübde-i Vekayiât*. This chronicle covers the period between the 1670s and the mid-1710s. In the section of the events of the year 1113 (1701-2), the author mentions only the appointed sheikhs, their duties to teach ilmihal and the Sunni creed, admonishing, and to admonish and counsel the common folk in villages and towns.¹⁰ The date of the event is not given, but because the work follows chronological order, the entry probably referred to an event that had occurred in March-April 1702. Among the chronicles in this time, one last reporting of the case comes from *Tarih-i Râşid*, the chronicle of Mehmed Raşid (d. 1735). This chronicle seems to have utilized the accounts of both Defterdar and Silahdar (d. 1726-7). Therefore, there are great overlaps between the former and the chronicles of these two historians.¹¹ As an abridged copy of the same entry of *Zübde*, the author mentions the sending of sheikhs to Rumelia.¹² Though Silahdar Mehmed Ağa's *Nusretnâme* was the work of an intimate companion of the sultan, we do not see any mention of either the program or the sheikhs sent from the center. Rather, Silahdar gives a sultan-oriented narrative, omitting the policies of the court and the chronicle of Defterdar, and in this respect, complements the period of Mustafa II.¹³

In addition to chronicles, I have made use of the travel account of Evliya Çelebi (d. 1684-5), *Seyahatnâme*, to shed light on the daily lives, customs, traditions, and social and religious conditions of the regions those orders were addressed to.

¹⁰ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 722. The four persons mentioned here probably stand for the second order and the sheikhs Mehmed and his three companions. For the evaluation of the document, see Chapter 4 below and for the original, see BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#661. The date of this document is April 1702.

¹¹ Râşid, *Târih-i Râşid ve Zeyli*, vol. 1, ix.

¹² Râşid, *Târih-i Râşid ve Zeyli*, vol. 1, 607.

¹³ *Nusretnâme* was simplified and published by İsmet Parmaksızoğlu in 1962. Yet, this publication omitted some critical parts in the narrative, and some translations into modern Turkish do not cover the exact meaning of their intended expression. Therefore, in this study, I also made use of the Master's thesis of Mehmet Topal, in which the full transcription of the source is available, Topal, "Nusretnâme," xiv.

1.3 The 1702 catechization campaign in modern scholarship

One of the earliest Western sources to take note of the reform attempt was Joseph von Hammer-Purgstall's (d. 1856) *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*. Hammer gave a rather detailed presentation of the program based largely on the information provided in the Ottoman chronicles.¹⁴ Another modern compilatory work that briefly mentions this program is İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı's *Osmanlı Tarihi*. Under the heading "The Internal Conditions after The Treaty of Karlowitz" Uzunçarşılı states that the government sent preachers to the border regions to raise the moral attitudes and religious beliefs of the people there, especially the regions of Babadağı and Bosnia.¹⁵

Other than these two surveys of Ottoman history, the reform program of 1702 was briefly mentioned in a number of studies focusing on the figures of Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II. One of them is the 1966 doctoral dissertation of Sabra F. Meservey on Feyzullah Efendi.¹⁶ The reform program is also discussed in a number of studies by Abou El-Haj. In his article "The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe," he mentions the Crimean branch of the program when he discusses the resentment of Tatars and Nogays regarding the terms of the Treaty of Karlowitz.¹⁷ In another article entitled "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz," Abou-El-Haj very briefly refers to the education program as discussed in a Mühimme Register.¹⁸ In his *Formation of the Modern State*, he deals with the program in a more extended fashion, and in the Appendix, he gives the translation of some of the

¹⁴ Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l'Empire ottoman*, 68-9.

¹⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi - IV. Cilt, 1. Bölüm*, 4.

¹⁶ Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 78.

¹⁷ Abou-El-Haj, "The Formal Closure," 471-2, especially 471n25, 472n26-27.

¹⁸ Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz," 498n2.

orders.¹⁹ Most recently, Nir Shafir has touched upon the program in an article that discusses the rise of moralist discourses during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.²⁰ Lastly, there are some other studies in which we see a few sentences mentioning our case in order to give context and information about the conditions after the Treaty of Karlowitz.²¹

1.4 The outline of the thesis

Together with this introductory chapter, the thesis consists of five chapters. In the second chapter, I will go over the history of confessional policies and discussions in the early modern Ottoman Empire. The chapter will begin with a brief introduction of the confessionalization paradigm in European historiography and its transition into Ottoman studies. In the rest of the chapter, I will use this analytical framework to provide an overview of the principal changes in Ottoman religious history from the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century.

The third chapter will examine the reign of Mustafa II and the şeyhülislamate of Feyzullah Efendi. This discussion will be crucial for contextualizing and making sense of the immediate reasons that lay behind the issuing of the orders under consideration. In Chapter 4, I will introduce and discuss the program in detail. After introducing the Mühimme orders, I will examine what the documents reveal regarding the agency of the şeyhülislam, the sultan, and the other actors of the time.

¹⁹ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 51-2. For the translations of the two orders, see book's Appendix C, 113-9. However, there is a problem with referencing to the orders. For the first order he translated in Appendix C of his book, page 117, Abou-El-Haj refers to Mühimme Defteri 112, and gives the numbers 191-3, without specifying whether they are page numbers or the order numbers. Since the numbers he cited corresponds to neither the page numbers nor the order numbers, I have checked the register itself. There is a discrepancy between the numbers El-Haj gives and the pages and/or the order numbers of the register. The correct reference for the document is BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#724-757.

²⁰ Shafir, "Moral Revolutions," 608-12.

²¹ For a selection of these studies, see Katgı, "Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar," 277n1571; Küçükali, "Ceyb-i Hümayun Defterleri," 18-9.; Çalışır, "Köprülü sadrazamlar ve sûfi çevreler," 798.

Some possible reasons for issuing these orders will be brought forward to explain why certain regions of the empire were particularly targeted in this program. The thesis will conclude with a fifth chapter, which will present the general findings and arguments of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

OTTOMAN CONFESSIONALIZATION: A LONG-TERM TRAJECTORY IN OTTOMAN HISTORY

In this chapter, I will introduce the paradigm of confessionalization and discuss how it was adopted and adapted into Ottoman historiography, and I will provide an overview of Ottoman history in light of this paradigm. The importance of this paradigm is that it fits well into the explanation of the case I will introduce in the following chapters of this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the long-term process of Ottoman confessionalization that paved the way for the more comprehensive and detailed plans to provide religious education and discipline to Ottoman subjects in the last years of Mustafa II's reign.

The first part of this chapter will provide an overview of both the development of this paradigm in the early modern European context and its adaptation into Ottomanist scholarship. In the second part of the chapter, I will discuss how the process of confessionalization unraveled in the Ottoman lands between the late-fifteenth and the early-seventeenth century. In the third and last part of the chapter, I will focus on the Kadızadeli, who were a group of preachers of the seventeenth century, and their followers in the capital, and who were seeking to cleanse the religious practice of Muslims from "innovations" (*bid'at*), and go back to the "pure" Islam of the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad. This movement has particular importance for my study, since the principal figures behind the confessionalization efforts in the reign of Mustafa II were connected with some of

the primary actors among the Kadızadelis and were informed by some of the same religious, political, and intellectual considerations.

2.1 The confessionalization paradigm

The concept of “confessionalization” was coined by two German scholars, Heinz Schilling and Wolfgang Reinhard, in the late 1970s to explain the role played by religion in the formation of modern Western societies. Nonetheless, as early as 1958, another German scholar, Ernst Walter Zeeden, had published an article in the *Historische Zeitschrift* that offered a new perspective on sixteenth-century European religious history. Rejecting the “Reformation - Counter-Reformation” polarity that had dominated scholarship until then, Zeeden proposed that in the second half of the sixteenth century, Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism in the Holy Roman Empire began to establish clearly defined confessional churches, which based their distinctive beliefs and practices on a written confessional testament. He called this process “confession-building” (*Konfessionsbildung*), a neutral term that could be applied to all the churches that underwent this kind of transformation. Gerhard Oestreich, another scholar of early modern history, introduced the notion of “social disciplining” (*sozialdisziplinierung*). It was by combining these two notions that Reinhard and Schilling arrived at the notion of confessionalization.²² This is the historiographical foundation upon which the idea of confessionalization was developed in the late 1970s and mid-1980s. Reinhard who was, like Zeeden, a historian of Catholic upbringing, developed the idea of confessionalization while trying to rewrite the history of early modern Catholicism without the overwhelming negative connotations of “Counter-Reformation,” whereas Schilling, who was a

²² Oestreich, “Strukturprobleme,” 179–197.

historian of Protestant upbringing, built up his model while working on Calvinism and Lutheranism in northwestern Germany.²³

In contrast to earlier historians, Reinhard and Schilling approached the subject from a comparative perspective and emphasized the “practical similarities” between the confessional churches, such as their commitment to religious indoctrination and social disciplining.²⁴ This also enabled them to supplant such formulations as the “Counter-Reformation” (used for responses of the Catholic church to the Protestant challenge), “Second Reformation” (used for the entry of Calvinism in German regions), and “Lutheran orthodoxy” with the broader concept of “confessionalization,” which could be applied equally to the Catholics, Lutherans, and Calvinist/Reformed, or more broadly as the defining feature of an “age of confessionalization,” or “confessional age.”²⁵

As explicated by Reinhard and Schilling, the goal of the religious and political powerholders was to engender compliant believers through creedal education and to socially monitor them. The powerholders collaborated in this mutual objective, and they sought a manifestation of canonical and ceremonial differences between Protestants and Catholics in the fashion of new “confessions.”²⁶ The basis of the concept comes from the context and the later developments after the Protestant Reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation of the sixteenth century. The results of these developments were “the establishment of respective pure doctrine and its handy formulation in the confession of faith [and] the extinction of possible sources of confusion,” which resulted in disseminating new ordinances

²³ Lotz-Heumann, “The Concept of ‘Confessionalization,’” 95.

²⁴ Lotz-Heumann, “The Concept of ‘Confessionalization,’” 97.

²⁵ Lotz-Heumann, “The Concept of ‘Confessionalization,’” 97.

²⁶ Brady, “The career of a concept.”

everywhere to suit the fashioning of confessions.²⁷ Systematic checking on the appointed representatives of religious authority in the cities and villages and record keeping were convenient means for social disciplining, monitoring, and maintaining orthodoxy there.²⁸ All these regulations were thought to have helped territorial integration and the creation of more homogenous proto-national identities.²⁹

In a nutshell, the paradigm aims to identify and explain the policies implemented in the pursuit of “social control, denominational cohesion and the emergence of Early Modern absolutist states.”³⁰ However, this is an explanation for the German case in the history of confession-building. The applicability of the paradigm to the entire European context is questionable.³¹ In time, however, the conceptualization of the paradigm was extended beyond the borders of Europe, and the paradigm began to be applied to the analyses of several cases from other corners of the world.³²

2.2 Ottoman confessionalization: Introduction

The paradigm of confessionalization has opened up a new venue to look at the history of society and religion in the Ottoman Empire. The importance of the studies and the works of Tijana Krstić must be stressed here; thanks to her discussion of confessionalization in the Ottoman context in a comparative perspective, we are now able to interpret Ottoman history in a new light.³³

²⁷ Wriedt, “Founding a new church,” 57.

²⁸ Wriedt, “Founding a new church,” 58.

²⁹ Wriedt, “Founding a new church,” 60-2.

³⁰ Headly, “Introduction,” xvii.

³¹ Headly, “Introduction,” xxiv-xxv.

³² Brady, “The career of a concept,” 5.

³³ For the earlier works of the discussion of confessionalization in Ottoman history see Krstić, “Illuminated by the Light of Islam”; Krstić, *Contested Conversions*. For a general discussion of confessionalization paradigm see Gara, “Conceptualizing Interreligious Relations,” 85.; Baer, “Contested Conversions to Islam”; Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization”; Terzioğlu,

However, it should be stressed that before the introduction of the confessionalization paradigm, there was a revolving discussion on similar topics. In the early period of Ottoman historical studies, the concept of religion held a central place in explaining the general political, social, and historical processes. After that, with the rise of socioeconomic history, the discussions of and the crucial role attested to religion receded into the background, and only beginning from the '80s and '90s did we see the (re)questioning of the transformation of the Ottoman polity "from . . . a 'syncretic' eighth/fourteenth-century polity where ambiguity between Sunnism and Shi'ism (and even Islam and Christianity) prevailed, into an Islamic state concerned with defining and enforcing a 'Sunni orthodoxy' by the early tenth/sixteenth century," along with the subject of the boundaries of Sunniness and the concept of heresy by stressing and attributing a more balanced role to religion.³⁴ The questions were addressing the themes of formation of a Sunni "orthodoxy," and the galvanizing of this process with the conquest of Constantinople, taking possession of Mamluk lands, bureaucratization, centralization, and, last but not least, the rise of the Safavids in the east at the beginning of the sixteenth century.³⁵ The scholarly studies produced in this endeavor also paid attention to the complex and intertwined nature of the relations between the religious and political realm, and the people of these two domains and their interaction – whether collaboration or conflict – vis-à-vis the

"How to Conceptualize"; Terzioğlu, "Where 'İlm-i Hāl Meets Catechism"; Burak, "Faith, Law and Empire"; Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevis*; Erginbaş, *Ottoman Sunnism*.

³⁴ Krstić, "Historicizing the Study of Sunni Islam," 5-6.

³⁵ For the discussion of these themes, see Sohrweide, "Der Sieg"; Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik*; Hess, "The Ottoman Conquest"; Allouche, *The Origins*; Üstün, "Heresy and legitimacy"; Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, pt. 2; Karamustafa, *God's unruly friends*, 65-84.; Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar*; Savaş, *XVI. Asırda*; Al-Tikriti, "Kalām in the service"; Necipoğlu, *The Age of Sinan*, Chapter 2.; Krstić, "Illuminated by the Light of Islam"; Krstić, *Contested Conversions*; Karakaya-Stump, "Genealogies of 'Heterodox' Islam"; Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize"; Burak, "Faith, Law and Empire"; Terzioğlu, "Where 'İlm-i Hāl Meets Catechism"; Burak, *The Second Formation*; Al-Tikriti, "Ibn-i Kemal's Confessionalism"; Atçıl, *Scholars and Sultans*, pt. 2; Erginbaş, "Problematizing Ottoman Sunnism"; Krstić, "From *Shahāda* to '*Aqīda*' and other studies of these scholars.

intellectual currents in historiography to read these connected histories within the framework of global early modernity. Recent scholarship has begun to criticize the earlier conceptualizations and brought a fresh look at the sources and topics of the field.³⁶

The confessionalization paradigm, according to Krstić, is a suitable means to discuss and interpret the interconnectedness of religious and political change in the sixteenth century, and an “age of confessionalization” can be attested to in the time in which the Ottomans and the Safavids faced a similar set of challenges as those of their European counterparts. This paradigm also offers new insights into and perspectives on the formation of Sunni identity and differing understandings of Sunniness and “orthodoxies.” She finds an analogy between the European and Middle Eastern contexts and explicates an Ottoman confessionalization between the mid sixteenth and late seventeenth centuries. The hand-in-hand activities of religious and political authorities to attain the twin aims of social disciplining and state-building; and the emergence of confessionally differentiated communities and polities set the bases for this comparison. In this confessionally polarized setting, the domain of the ruler became the scene of state and confession building to “achieve a tighter politico-religious integration.”³⁷ Krstić also points out the importance of the “social disciplining” agenda of the confessionalization thesis as a functional and exploratory tool to explain the “ability of ‘elites’ to impose religious reforms officially on the ‘people’ and the notion that the initiative in confessionalization came from the ‘above.’” In the Ottoman case, for the author, they “experienced

³⁶ For a concise and detailed discussion of this historiographical turns, besides the above cited sources please cf. Erginbaş, “Introduction”; Krstić, “Historicizing the Study of Sunni Islam” and the bibliographies of the edited volumes Erginbaş, *Ottoman Sunnism* and Krstić and Terzioğlu, *Historicizing Sunni Islam*.

³⁷ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 13.

analogous developments and implemented policies leading to the integration of politico-religious sphere similar to those taking place” in European domains contemporarily.³⁸ In the broader context of Eurasian religious geography,

the process of formation of distinct confessional territorial blocks and forging of religious ‘orthodoxies’ unfolded simultaneously in both Muslim and Christian empires in the sixteenth century as a consequence of imperial competition between the Ottomans and Habsburgs on the one hand and the Ottomans and Safavids on the other.³⁹

In the seventeenth century, on the other hand, we see a confessionalization-from-below, which was characterized by the negotiation of the Ottoman sultans with other social groups, especially the Kadızadeli preachers.⁴⁰ The age of confessionalization, according to Krstić, “lasted from the 1450s . . . to the 1690s,” when the Kadızadelis demised.⁴¹ A critical and constructive reading of the confessionalization comes from Terzioğlu, who discusses to what extent the process of Sunnitization can be conceptualized as “confessionalization of Sunnism,” and states that Sunnitization can be seen as the reflection of Ottoman confessionalization among the Muslim Sunnis. By giving a comprehensive and succinct overview of the literature, the history of Sunniness, and the Ottoman policies of Sunnitization in the historical course to provide the framework and set the foundation for the further studies, she concludes that Ottoman polity engaged in enforcing intimidating policies both for its non-Sunni and Sunni subjects, which was the result of not only the agency of the state but a collaborative effort of multiple agents, like ulema, Sufis, preachers, and ordinary people. The applicability of the confessional policies and the process of Ottoman confessionalization and Sunnitization were other critical remarks of the author that the ability of Ottomans to implement these policies in the large

³⁸ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 13.

³⁹ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 14.

⁴⁰ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 14.

⁴¹ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 15.

geography of the empire was a crucial problem and hence, the process of confessionalization is not something concluded but might have continued well beyond the 1690s and even to the end of the empire.⁴²

Before going over the history of Ottoman confessionalization, I have to stress that there are also considerable differences between the confessionalization processes in Christian Europe and the Ottoman lands. First of all, we cannot talk about a well-defined ecclesiastical institution like a church in Islam. As will be seen in the following pages, in the reign of Süleyman I, a hierarchical religious establishment was formed under imperial power, but this institution was still quite different from a church. It was, to begin with, much more dependent on the political authorities, and more crucially, it did not encompass all the different religious authorities and could not therefore monopolize religious truth in the way the Christian confessional churches could in the eyes of their members. Alongside members of the Ottoman learned establishment, Sufi sheikhs and provincial scholars without official appointments could also play important roles as agents of confessionalization in the Ottoman realms. Therefore, we can state that there are crucial points which distinguishes the Ottoman confessionalization from the one in the European context.

2.3 From the fifteenth century to the end of the sixteenth century

2.3.1 The context: The establishment of the imperial vision and confessional polarization

Anatolia, in the late medieval times, underwent a concurrent process of Islamization and Turkification. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the proliferation of different religious groups such as ahi brotherhoods, Sufi orders and medrese-

⁴² Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize," 320-4.

educated in “the lands of Rum” could be observed and they were boasting diverse, and, on occasion, conflicting intellectual and religious currents. In due course, some of these currents were eliminated, and some of them were either taken under the state’s control or were gradually transformed.⁴³ “Just as fifteenth-century Ottoman society was becoming socially and culturally more differentiated,” it should be emphasized that “considerable religious and doctrinal fluidity still characterized Sufi piety in this crucial transitional period, poised between the relative ‘metadoxy’ of the fourteenth century and the strident sectarianism of the sixteenth.”⁴⁴

Starting from the times when Anatolia was ruled by multiple *beyliks*, we see a strong influence of the Andalusian Sufi thinker Muhyiddin Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), who had lived for a while in Anatolia towards the end of his life. He affected both Sufis and early ulema circles. For example, the chief professor of the first Ottoman *medrese* in İznik (Nicaea), Davud-i Kayseri (d. 1350), was a follower of Ibn Arabi.⁴⁵ The early Ottoman institutions of higher learning were founded in the cities of Bursa, Edirne, and İznik, and literati and scholarly people gained their professional training in these medreses as well as in medreses established earlier in centers like Konya, Cairo, and Damascus, where Ibn Arabi had left a remaining legacy.⁴⁶ Neoplatonic philosophy and the Islamic reflection of this thought, the “unicity of being” (*vahdet-i vücut*), hold the central axis in Arabi’s teachings and shaped how life, Earth, God, and the universe were understood.⁴⁷

As Ottoman power grew in Anatolia, the religious culture in the lands under their rule was also slowly transformed. While the religious culture of frontier *beyliks*

⁴³ Karamustafa, *God’s unruly friends*; Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, 1-2.

⁴⁴ Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization,” 91.

⁴⁵ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 10.; Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, 3-5.

⁴⁶ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 41.; Kalaycı, “Osmanlı Sünniliğinin Beslenme Kaynakları,” 1120.

⁴⁷ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 40.

has been characterized as “metadox,”⁴⁸ a number of developments in the fifteenth century, most notably a messianic rebellion in the name of the Sufi and scholar Bedreddin, made the Ottomans warier about the power and influence of Sufi groups. The idea of saints as “friends of God” and inheritors of the legacy of the Prophet was hugely advantageous to charismatic religious figures and men who excelled in mystical piety, like Bedreddin. His posthumous account composed by his grandson depicts him as the second Messiah (*mesih-i sani*) and he relied heavily upon and fitted quite well into the millenarian expectations.⁴⁹

After the second half of the fifteenth century, apocalyptic expectations were further inflamed.⁵⁰ “Millenarian tendencies and expectations of spiritual renewal were part of the religious repertoire shared by Muslims, Jews, and Christians in the later Middle Ages.”⁵¹ According to Cornell Fleischer, the millenarian desires shared by religious networks around the Mediterranean started to strengthen as a result of the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 and peaked in the mid-sixteenth century.⁵² These desires initiated political characters from the Ottomans and Safavids to the Habsburgs and Venetians “to establish a Universal Monarchy and articulate their contending imperial claims in messianic terms.”⁵³

The notion of “*Monarchia Universalis*,” or universal rulership gained a new resonance in many different polities in the early sixteenth century. Alongside the Ottomans there several claimants to universal rulership in the wider region, namely

⁴⁸ Kafadar, *Between Two Worlds*, 76.

⁴⁹ Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, 114-130.

⁵⁰ Fleischer, “Shadows of Shadows,” 51-52.; Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul,” 1-3.; Melvin-Koushki, “Early modern Islamicate empire,” 15-6.

⁵¹ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 11.

⁵² Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 11.

⁵³ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 12.; Burak states that “[T]he conflict, even if it started as a competition fueled by vying messianic claims, contributed to the emergence of Sunni-Ottoman (and Shi’i-Safavid) ‘orthodoxies.’ To this rivalry one may add the Muslim Ottoman–Catholic Habsburg Mediterranean rivalry,” Burak, “Faith, Law and Empire,” 7.

Charles V (d. 1558) of the Habsburgs and Shah Ismail (d. 1524) of the Safavids. This competition led to a climax for the “millenarian conjunction” and the expectation of the Messiah.⁵⁴ Between 1400 and 1500, many vital events took place dealing with the issue of “true” religion, the identity of Messiah, conversion, and the apocalypse in an age of inter-imperial competition. These issues came to exist instantaneously in both Christendom and Islamdom, which underwent a process of religio-political fractioning that caused the process of “confessionalization” in three imperial powers after this period.⁵⁵ We see several parallel developments in three empires regarding the end of time and prophetic narratives in both Safavid and Ottoman realms, which subsided only after the failed siege of Vienna in 1529.⁵⁶ Whilst both empires, the Ottoman and Habsburg, lacked the might to impose an indisputable victory over the others, the quarrel on the messianic role of these empires did not fade away,⁵⁷ though it experienced a great blow.

In the sixteenth century, the continued expectation of spiritual renewal, as well as continued inter-imperial competition gave rise to the phenomena of confessional polarization and Sunnitization in the Ottoman Empire. This move was connected to the military and political concerns of Bayezid II and Selim I, their policies towards the Safavids, and the incorporation of the Islamic core lands, which resulted “in a different demographic, institutional, and cultural framework that changed [the empire’s] main constitutive identity, causing it to mold itself more clearly as an Islamic empire.”⁵⁸ The openness and the change of the limits of this policy demonstrated themselves in the times of Mehmed II and Selim I. The former

⁵⁴ Fleischer, “Shadows of Shadows,” 51-62.; Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah,” 159-77.

⁵⁵ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 76.; Krstić, “Illuminated by the Light of Islam,” 40-1.

⁵⁶ Turan, “The Sultan’s Favorite,” 240-335.; Fleischer, “The Lawgiver as Messiah,” 160-67.

⁵⁷ Fleischer, “Shadows of the Shadows,” 56-57.; Finlay, “Prophecy and Politics in Istanbul,” 1-31.

⁵⁸ Barkey, *The Empire of Difference*, 70-71.; For the philosophical and theological background of this transformation, see Kalaycı, “Osmanlı Sünniliğinin Beslenme Kaynakları.”

opposed some earlier flexibilities in favor of his centralization mission, and the latter fought against the openness towards inner “heterodoxies” to sustain stability in the face of the threat coming from the East.⁵⁹ The leader of the Safavids, Shah Ismail proclaimed himself as *Mahdi* and established his state in 1501. Shah Ismail initiated Iran’s conversion to Shia Islam. The first phase of the evolution of Safavid Shiism was a turn from the mystical, non-scriptural piety of the Kızılbaş (redhead) to Sharia-based Imami Shiism later in the sixteenth century. The result of this process can be seen in the messianic revolts in Anatolia (1511-38), instigated by the rise of this new power in the East.⁶⁰ The propagating of Shah Ismail’s belief among the Anatolian Turkomans necessitated an inevitable clash with the Sunni Ottomans.⁶¹ A political explanation for this confessional antagonism between the Ottomans and the Safavids can be provided, which, as Fleischer argued, is because the legitimacy of the former was not securely intact in the time being and because they were neither of Muhammadan genealogy nor Chingizid, both of which were two crucial tenets for legitimate rulership. For the Safavids, a Sufi background, descent from the Alids and a royal pedigree, served as the basis of their claim for legitimacy.⁶² Their resentment against the Ottomans, met with the millenarian expectation and confidence in the appearance of a Mahdi in tandem with the spirit of time, led to a preference for the Shah among nomads. Shah Ismail represented himself as “the perfect man” (*insan-ı kamil*) and pledged salvation from Ottoman oppression and a prosperous life.⁶³ The

⁵⁹ Barkey, *The Empire of Difference*, 71.

⁶⁰ Ayfer Karakaya-Stump points out that there was a general messianic revolt-zeitgeist in the region that resulted in a couple of revolts in the Eastern Anatolia, albeit not necessarily under the direct influence of the Safavid Empire. On the other hand, the messianic expectations were heightened both in the Sunni and Shii abodes of the region and the Kızılbaş community were not free of this assumed common motif in the sixteenth century, Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevi*s, 226.

⁶¹ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 56-7.

⁶² Melvin-Koushki, “Early modern Islamic empire,” 9-11.; Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevi*s, 273-4.

⁶³ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 57-8.

reaction of the Ottomans demonstrated itself in the “first consistent attempts to articulate and enforce a Sunni orthodoxy in the Ottoman domains and persecute the dissenters.”⁶⁴

In the sixteenth century, the well-respected figures of early Ottoman Islam, the *abdals* of Rum, were incorporated step by step among the Bektaşî saints. Bayezid II, at this point, was highly decisive on the development of a distinct Bektaşî order under the protection of the Ottoman state in the face of the Safavid threat. The sultan aimed to appease the groups that had been alienated by the absolutist measures of his father and predecessor Mehmed II, while continuing the centralizing thrust of the Ottoman state.⁶⁵ It was during Bayezid’s rule that the systematization of the Sufis picked up the pace. His support of the Sufis had significant strategical calibrations must be interpreted in the broader historical setting of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry.⁶⁶ This attempt must be interpreted in the broader historical setting of the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry.⁶⁷

Upon the repercussion of the message initiated and propagated by the Shah among the nomadic groups, Ottoman authorities grew alarmed and took excessive precaution against the supporters of the Shah, also known as Kızılbaş. A major anti-Ottoman, pro-Safavid rebellion erupted in the Turcoman populated region of Teke in southwestern Anatolia in 1511. This was the first of similar revolts that would erupt

⁶⁴ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 12.; Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar*, 268-304. For a general discussion of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, see Eberhard, *Osmanische Polemik*, which is a seminal work on this topic. Also, Üstün, “Heresy and legitimacy”; Babayan, *Mystics, monarchs, and messiahs*; Abisaab, *Converting Persia* can be referred among the earlier studies. Winter argues that Kızılbaş was “essentially the antithesis of Ottoman *din ü devlet*, religion and order,” Winter, “The Kızılbaş of Syria,” 171. Faruqi says that this articulation of Sunnism was a novelty in the Ottoman history, some early Ottoman sultans empathized with some “heterodox” dervishes and sheikhs who participated to the campaigns of these sultans, Faruqi, *The Ottoman Empire*, 35-6.

⁶⁵ Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization,” 93-4.

⁶⁶ Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization,” 92.; For the relations of Bayezid with the Sufi orders, see Karataş, “The Ottomanization of the Halvetiye.”

⁶⁷ Al-Tikriti, “Kalam in the service,” 136-145.

in east-central and southwestern Anatolia in the early sixteenth century. However, it should be noted that not all of the nomads adhered to the sanctity of the Shah Ismail and were willing to migrate from the Ottoman realm.⁶⁸ Upon the increased threats of the Safavids,⁶⁹ the son and successor of Bayezid II, Selim I, followed a harsher policy towards the Safavids and, in the Battle of Çaldıran (1514), defeated Shah Ismail.⁷⁰ Even though the Ottomans responded to the Safavid threat quite harshly, the influence of the Shah could not be entirely undone in Anatolia.

The Ottomans responded to the Safavid threat by repositioning themselves as champions of Sunni Islam and eradicators of “heresy.” In 1514, on the eve of the Battle of Çaldıran, the Ottoman scholars Sarıgörez and Kemalpaşazade issued fetvas declaring the Safavids to be “heretics” and “infidels” and war against them to be even more meritorious than war against the rival Christian polities.⁷¹ The defeat of Shah Ismail in the Battle of Çaldıran caused a degree of disenchantment among the followers of Ismail and made a dent in the aura of invincibility around the Shah.⁷² However, the ripening of these trends took half a century and the fruits were harvested only later in the reign of Süleyman I.⁷³ As Abdurrahman Atçıl has shown, towards the middle of the sixteenth century the Ottoman authorities felt the need to

⁶⁸ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire*, 35-6.; Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevi*, 227.

⁶⁹ Ayfer Karakaya-Stump emphasizes the rivalry of the Ottoman princes on the throne and states that the increased threat coming from the East may have been the propaganda of the prince Selim. In this rivalry, he wanted to represent himself as the only person able to handle this rising power and danger, considering that he was not the favorite prince for the throne, but his brother Ahmed was a strong candidate, Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevi*, 270.

⁷⁰ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 36.; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi 2. Cilt*, 248-66. Interestingly, when the Ottomans engaged in close contacts and some positive relations with the Safavids in the late seventeenth century, the former started to execute the Kızılbaş people of the Syrian region by labeling them “Rafizi Kızılbaş brigands.” However, this term might be used not to label their confessional identity but to show their illegal actions like banditry, Winter, “The Kızılbaş of Syria,” 175-6. This issue will be handled in Chapter 4.

⁷¹ Atçıl, “The Safavid Threat,” 296, 298-304. In his text, Atçıl provides a detailed explanation of the differing views of the Ottoman scholars-şeyhülislams towards the Safavids and their discourse-architecture in the changing conditions. For the treatise of Korkud on this matter, see Al-Tikriti, “Kalam in the service,” 146-7 and footnotes.

⁷² Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 60-62.

⁷³ Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize,” 303-4.; Krstić, “State and Religion,” 67-8.

rethink their position on the Kızılbaş.⁷⁴ Unlike the earlier chief muftis, Ebussuud's work deals with the problem of incorporating the Kızılbaş population into the subjects of the empire. His treatment bears the impacts of the earlier discussion on absolutely ideological issues and handling with the concern for the religio-legal situation of the Safavids and their supporters who live in the Ottoman realms.⁷⁵

Intermittent wars between the Ottomans and Safavids continued until the Treaty of Amasya in 1555. With this treaty, the Safavids accepted the authority of the Ottomans in Iraq and northern Azerbaijan and promised to abandon the cursing of the first three caliphs, while the Ottomans guaranteed the safe passage of Shii pilgrims through the Ottoman lands en route to the important centers of Shiism.⁷⁶ After 1555, Safavid propaganda continued inconspicuously, and to deal with the problem, the Ottomans either exiled some of the Kızılbaş or accused them with false charges.⁷⁷ These prosecutions and the suppression of rebellions continued until 1578 and intensified upon the succession of Ismail II to the Safavid throne in 1576. At the same time, a similar set of prosecutions was applied by the Safavids against the Sunni communities in Iran. These policies can be explained in the context of the Shiitizing impulse of the Safavid state and the suspicion that the Sunnis were collaborators of the Ottomans and the Uzbeks. In 1590, Shah Abbas signed a peace

⁷⁴ Atçıl, "The Safavid Threat," 304-7.

⁷⁵ Atçıl, "The Safavid Threat," 307, 310.; Burak, "Faith, Law and Empire," 3-4. Terzioğlu states that "Administrative pragmatism and 'confessional ambiguity' continued to characterize Ottoman religious attitudes during and after the Ottoman-Safavid conflict. Not only persecution, but also accommodating non-Sunni Muslims as if they are Sunni. So, the adaptation of a series of policies to modify the behavior (and to a lesser extent, beliefs) of all their Muslim subjects in line with the precepts of Sunni Islam, as they were understood at the time." Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize," 313.

⁷⁶ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 39-40.; Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi 2. Cilt*, 341-2.

⁷⁷ Altınay, *Onaltıncı Asırda*, 36-103. He gives several Mühimme orders on the actions taken against them and the false accusations directed. For the forms and content of these accusations, see Dressler, "Competing Claims," 154 and footnotes.

treaty with the Ottomans and focused on sustaining internal stability, which weakened Safavid propaganda in Anatolia.⁷⁸

In the following decades, the struggles between the two empires did not end, but they declined. One significant event in this period was the signing of the Treaty of Kasr-ı Şirin/Zohab (1639).⁷⁹ After this point, there was a definite de-escalation of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict as well as in the Ottoman persecution of the Kızılbaş under their rule.⁸⁰

2.3.2 Confessionalization in action

After the middle of the sixteenth century, the claims for world hegemony and messianic movements were no longer at the forefront. Instead, a competition for the expression of Islamic orthodoxy and the policing of boundaries characterized the relationship between the Ottomans and the Safavids. Since both parties failed in their messianic missions, a change happened in the discourse.⁸¹ The territorial and confessional polarization led to the deepening of the separation of Islamdom, at least in the geography that was already shared by the Ottomans and the Safavids, through religio-political and ideological seams. In the Ottoman case, the sultans dedicated themselves to the state- and confession-building programs that were supported by a range of social disciplining measures, like (re)naming the quarters after the mosques; criminalizing neglect of ritual prayer, Friday prayer, and the fast of Ramazan; communal monitoring of quarter or village inhabitants; forcing the mischief-makers or those who were deemed to be anathematized and ejected from the quarter or

⁷⁸ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 64-7.

⁷⁹ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 40-56.

⁸⁰ Küpeli, *Osmanlı-Safevi Münasebetleri*, 67-8.

⁸¹ Dressler, "Competing Claims," 162-3.

village to pursue a righteous life or punishing; and like.⁸² Notably, we also see increasing ideological and territorial definitions of Sunnism.⁸³ As discussed in detail by Burak, the making of Ottoman Sunnism was the result of two interdependent processes: the adoption of the Hanefi-Sunni school as the officially favored state *mezhep*, and the organizing of the ulema structure into a hierarchical establishment under the leadership of a şeyhülislam.⁸⁴ Both of these processes had started already in the late fifteenth century, but culminated in the later years of the reign of Süleyman I.

In the 1540s, the Ottoman sultan commenced a set of Sunnitizing and social disciplining policies through a reform of the empire's legal system concerting kanun and shariah under the auspices of Ebussuud Efendi (d. 1574). Not only the entourage or the proxies to the sultan, but also other influential people from the religious establishment were claiming to champion the religious "orthodoxy" from the stance of Hanafi law and made use of their power to label some actions as incompatible to religion and faith.⁸⁵ The Ottoman ruling elites established many new mosques and madrasas from which new generations of reform-minded preachers started to graduate.⁸⁶ We can draw several conclusions and important insights for the Friday mosque building campaign of Süleyman the Lawgiver. According to Necipoğlu, there are two differences between the Friday mosques and ordinary ones: the former were constructed only with the official permission of the sultan, while the latter can be constructed without the consent of the sultan and can be relatively humble

⁸² Heyd, *Old Ottoman Criminal Law*, 30, 122, 128-9, 130-1.; Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 107.

⁸³ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 97, 107.

⁸⁴ Burak, "The Abū Ḥanīfah of His Time," 6.

⁸⁵ For a detailed discussion of the several cases from the Ottoman history, see Ocak, *Osmanlı Toplumunda Zındıklar*, Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5. For specific focus on the implementation of Sunni orthodoxy in the reigns of the sixteenth century sultans against Kızılbaş people, see Dressler, "Competing Claims," 154-6, 160, 162-4, 169-173.

⁸⁶ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 14.

compared to the congregational mosques. They were established and funded by the local waqfs, and each quarter in Istanbul, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, had their quarter mosques. The relations between the state and the community were conducted by the imams of these mosques as semi-official intermediaries. The wages of these personnel were paid by the waqfs and selected upon the consent of the quarters' inhabitants. After 1546, each quarter began to be named after its mosque or masjid, which holds a great significance in the daily lives of the inhabitants.⁸⁷ In her article on these Friday mosques, Faroqhi made use of archival sources and commented on the relevant frequency and density of the pious institutions and mosques in certain regions and the relative scarcity in others. She argues that "one might link the large number of Friday mosques with the area's [the Teke and Menteşe regions] well-earned reputation for heterodoxy." The Şahkulu rebellion emerged and developed in these regions and after the suppression of this rebellion, the emigration of some of the most committed tribesmen to Iran was the result of this confessional polarization and the elimination of dissidents. "It would not be surprising," she continues, "if the Ottoman central administration had encouraged local men of substance, and particularly ulema, to found Friday mosques, in order to facilitate the spread of standard Sunni practices in this outlying and different area."⁸⁸ We also see the growing tendency towards turning the masjids into mosques by adding a pulpit in the countryside.⁸⁹

At the beginning of the sixteenth century, according to Faroqhi, neither the towns nor the nomad-settled regions of Anatolia "possess[ed] such a network of

⁸⁷ Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 47-8, 94. For a new study on this subject, see Sünnetçioğlu, "Imams and Their Communities," 355-7.

⁸⁸ Faroqhi, "A Map of," 166-7. Beside Teke region, Ahmed Refik also mentions Hamid region (around today's Isparta), Altınay, *Onaltıncı Asırda*, 24.

⁸⁹ Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 56-7.

mosques.” By giving the example of the Bozok-Yozgat domains, she further argues that the Islamization of these nomadic groups during this century was not complete, and “this observation is confirmed by the almost total absence of fifteenth or early-sixteenth century Friday mosques in most territories controlled by nomads,” where “many mosques were only established in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.”⁹⁰ Yet, with southwestern Anatolia as a place of nomadic populations, “basic Islamic institutions were already firmly established,” though the more distant localities of Teke and Menteşe remained rather difficult to access. This must be due to the fact that “while the Ottoman state of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries engaged in a drive of monumental building . . . this effort was diluted by the size of the Ottoman territories.”⁹¹ There was a state-enforced obligation prescribed over the Muslims of the empire to follow religious performances and to campaign the opening of new mosques and madrasas, which were converging currents in this sense. New madrasas for studios of workers reflect the implementation of this policy, even in their guilds, as also clearly expressed in a fatwa issued by Ebussuud Efendi. All these efforts to build Friday mosques are also a response to the Safavid practices of abandoning the congregational prayers, cursing the first three caliphs, and accepting the hadith about the legitimate succession of Ali after the death of the prophet.⁹²

In the reign of the Süleyman I, a firman issued in 1537 compels the believers to attend Friday prayers, and a fatwa of Ebussuud Efendi makes this obligation clear.⁹³ This firman did not remain on paper but was also applied rigorously. An order sent to the kadı of Vize in 1546 states that the governor must visit the villages

⁹⁰ Faroqhi, “A Map of,” 171.

⁹¹ Faroqhi, “A Map of,” 172. The map provided by the author can be found on page 173.

⁹² Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 47-50.

⁹³ The study of Evren Sünnetçioğlu makes it clear that this effort to oblige the believers to attend the daily prayers began no later than the 1540s. Also, the decree about the construction of these mosques in the Muslim populated villages dates back to 1537-8, according to the reference given in the fatwa of Ebussuud Efendi, Sünnetçioğlu, “Imams and Their Communities,” 341-2.

whose inhabitants were negligent in their daily religious observances, the masjids that remained in a dilapidated condition, and the imams who were unable to recite Quran properly. The kadı must admonish people to conduct their prayers, and those who resist must be dealt with by the sharia. The trustees of the waqfs should repair the masjids, and the ones that lack waqf funding must be repaired by the dwellers of the villages. The incompetent imams must be replaced with those who are capable to perform the recitation of the Quran properly, and these new imams must be notified to the sultan's court.⁹⁴ This long order also informs us that there were certain people appointed to the task of forcing people to attend the daily prayers, called *namazcı* (the person who obliges one to perform the prayers), but because these *namazcıs*' extortion aggrieves the people (presumably by coercing them to pay fines out of baseless claims), this application was abolished. Therefore, the kadı of Vize must solve this problem by using other means. We learn from the article of Demir that the practice of appointing *namazcıs* had been initiated in the reign of Mehmed II. An edict of the sultan dated May-June 1471 informs us of the strong reprimanding of those who do not observe their daily prayers and do not attend the Friday prayers. To make people attend the prayers, a *namazcı* was appointed, and he can fine or punish corporally, and the governors and judges should act accordingly and help to enforce the royal order. In the *kanunnames* of Bayezid II, Selim I, and Süleyman I, we see rulings about the punishment of habitual absentees from the congregational prayers.⁹⁵

Though the practice of appointing *namazcıs* was abandoned, there are fatwas of Ebussuud Efendi ordering to penalize absentees, since they were to be regarded as apostates (first by forcing them to renew their faith and marriage, and if they resist,

⁹⁴ Demir, "Terk-i Salât," 47.

⁹⁵ Demir, "Terk-i Salât," 46-7.; Sünnetçioğlu, "Imams and Their Communities," 343-4, 355-6, 357-362.

to punish them harshly, detain, or even execute them). In another legal opinion, Ebussuud urged those people to be executed if they do not return to the “true path” after severe punishment. He issued another fatwa that shows the aversion of the state to the attendance of prayers in mosque other than the mosque in one’s neighborhood. Clearly, the Ottoman authorities thought that they could monitor the religious behavior of their subjects most effectively through their local communities and the religious personnel in their neighborhood mosques. This brings to mind the parish-based surveillance in Protestant and Catholic Europe in the same period. Ebussuud, as some of his predecessors did, placed an individual responsibility on the ruler to sustain and perpetuate the continuity of believers’ attendance to communal prayers. The significance of these policies comes from the break they create between the earlier religiosity and the newer one. This is critical for individuals as well because attendance of communal prayers is the demonstration of one’s attachment to Sunnism and a public declaration of this affiliation.⁹⁶

The architectural aspect is significant, too. In the earlier decades of the Ottomans, T-typed convent-masjids were frequented by the “heterodox” dervishes, and they represented a looser religiosity compared to sixteenth-century policies of strict Sunnitization. The functions of these buildings were not separated clearly, and they served as both hospices, lodges, and masjids, which contrasts the strictly segregated functionality of the units of social complexes surrounding the imperial mosque.⁹⁷ Also, since Safavids did not build any Friday mosques in the first couple

⁹⁶ Demir, “Terk-i Salât,” 48.; Sünnetçioğlu, “Imams and Their Communities,” 346-350, 354-7. The article of Demir also provides information about the supporters of this policy, like Lütü Pasha, Mustafa Ali, Hasan Kafi and Defterdar Sarı Mehmed Pasha. Demir also gives some other instances of similar actions taken in the Ottoman history: an order dated to 1566, the edict of Murad III in 1588, the edict of Mahmud II in 1837, the edict of Abdülmecid in 1842, and a royal ordinance sent to Alemdar Mustafa Pasha.

⁹⁷ Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 48-50, 57. For the penalization of the absentees, see Sünnetçioğlu, “Imams and Their Communities,” 343-6.

of decades of the Safavid Empire and Süleyman ordered to build a Friday mosque in each residential domain, mosque attendance is primarily determined by one's affiliation in this context, too.⁹⁸ After the conquest of Constantinople, sultanic mosques replaced these earlier masjids. One prominent example of these sultanic mosques built after the congregational ones was the mosque of Mehmed II. This building marks a significant shift away from the earlier examples of zaviye-cum-masjids and the *ulucamis* of former times. The tenure of Sinan as the chief architect, marked with multiple examples of new imperial constructions, forged the imperial vision with the confessional policies of Süleyman.⁹⁹ The return of this architectural policy in the time of Sinan also communicates the fatwas on the denunciation of Sufi practices, like singing, dancing, and eating in the lodges and mosques, which were intolerable according to this new attitude. This also pinpoints the gradual differentiation of the Ottomans from both the frontier mentality and the Shia-affiliate examples.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the state supported Sufi orders, which defended the superiority of sharia. Halvetis are one example of these orders. The preacher posts of the sultanic mosques were filled with these "orthodox" Sufis in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They were holding public lectures and giving sermons on the Quran and hadith. By making the maxim "enjoin the right and forbid the wrong" as the guiding principle, they urge people to "perform ordinances and obligations of faith." This lecturing function of preachers makes them equal to the function of *müderris* in the madrasa, though with a more fundamental level of sophistication and an emphasis on the rudimentary knowledge of religion. These preachers were closer to the masses than the *müderريس*, and the former dealt with the problems of society

⁹⁸ Terzioğlu, "How to Conceptualize," 314-5.

⁹⁹ Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 50-2.

¹⁰⁰ Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 52.; Sünnetçioğlu, "Imams and Their Communities," 344-5.

to a greater extent, which made them the spokespeople of the community and the intermediaries between the state and society.¹⁰¹

Even though Ottoman-Sufi relations were negatively affected by the early phases of the Ottoman-Safavid conflict, members of the mainstream Sufi orders were reconciled with both the dynasty and the learned establishment, and some of them even began to play an active role as agents of Sunnitization. This trend peaked in the reign of Murad III (1574-1595), who had an intense interest in Sufism.¹⁰² In the context of Sunnitization, the role of Sufi orders was variable. It is critical to underscore that the Sufis were not just at “the receiving end” of Ottoman confessionalization strategies. They appeared in the Ottoman religious scene in different manners, whether by rebelling, dissimulating, arranging, and bargaining, or by presenting themselves as actors of Sunnitization, a duty that turned out to be progressively significant in the later sixteenth century. For instance, Sufi Ibrahim Kırımî’s importance comes from his political proxy position and his confessional mindedness in this conjecture. Specifically, Kırımî’s accentuation of the exhibition of strict authoritative customs and, particularly, the five daily prayers as indicating the right path in belief; his union of sharia-abiding Sufism with Sunnism; and his identification of Kızılbaş Islam with political treachery were in ideal arrangement with the prevailing religio-political viewpoint among the Ottoman decision-making elites in the very last years of the sixteenth century.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ Necipoğlu, *Age of Sinan*, 53. For the seventeenth century cases, see Terzioğlu, “Sunna-Minded,” 251-2.; Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization,” 96.; Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 66, 93-7, 100-104. For the connection to the Kadızadelis, see Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 89, 165, 198.

¹⁰² Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 150.

¹⁰³ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 185. Ayfer Karakaya-Stump argues that in the sixteenth century, the limits drawn for acceptable Sufism affected the Sufi background of the Kızılbaş movement in the time being as well, Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevi*, 29, 262. The confessionalization policies and related perspective of the partakers in this move were also significant, and she points out that Sufism was a crucial place for the negotiation and conflict over its correct form, Karakaya-Stump, *The Kızılbaş-Alevi*, 257, 283-7.

2.4 From the late sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century

2.4.1 The context

As can be seen from this long narrative of Ottoman religio-political history up to the seventeenth century, we can observe a progressive alteration in Ottoman policies and in the viewpoint regarding confessional matters. In this part, we will go over a new phase in Ottoman history, which was marked by a call to revive the ancient customs of the prophet and a strict turn to piety in the religiosity of the people, society, and the empire, both from the bottom-up and top-down. In comparing the sixteenth and seventeenth century confessionalization of the Ottoman state, we see continuities and differences between the two periods. As the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry lost its momentum after the 1630s, and Kızılbaş persecutions ceased, a new phase of Ottoman confessionalization began in the seventeenth century that “a more clearly articulated Sunni confessional identity struck even deeper roots in Ottoman society during the 17th century than previously.”¹⁰⁴ There we observe that the disputes within the Sunnis became more prominent, and the tendency towards a Sunnism in line with the prophetic sunna and Sunni traditionalism gained momentum. In this context, aim to provide a more explicit clarity of the standards and prescriptions of Sunni Islam, conscious awareness of *bid’at* and the revolving debates on it, and continuing uncertainties on the rapport between the various features of Sufism and the Sunna can be counted among the issues resumed to be highly disputed by the actors in the seventeenth century.¹⁰⁵ In this time, rising cognizance of the Sunna by the several

¹⁰⁴ Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize,” 318.

¹⁰⁵ Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization,” 96-7.

sectors of the society, as something not exclusive to *ulema*, is a crucial point that diverts it from the earlier times.¹⁰⁶

At the turn of the century, there was a general social, political and economic crisis in the Ottoman Empire. While the Ottoman state emerged from this crisis with some of its key institutions altered, the crisis and the accompanying changes created a great deal of discontent among the Ottoman ruling elites and the literati.¹⁰⁷ There we observe the amplification of the agents of the confessionalization process, along with state and the sultans, and the variegation of reading of Sunni Islam by these new actors.¹⁰⁸ The madrasa graduates who could not find a position in the *ilmiye* hierarchy, mosque preachers, Sufi sheikhs, and state officials were among those who expressed their discontent and who tried to find ways of reforming and restoring law and order. Some Sufi groups took “more active role than the . . . ulema in propagating what might be best called state Sunnism.” As a reaction to this, Kadızadeli launched grim promulgation of Sunnitization and critiqued the negligence of other groups in this cause, yet they were not the only agents to take the similar stand.¹⁰⁹ Also, these actors could be able to mobilize the ordinary city dwellers, which demonstrates the acute impact of the confessionalization of the previous century on the alteration of the popular piety.¹¹⁰ It was in this environment that some sunna-oriented groups among the scholars and preachers started to raise their voice against the upheavals and to argue that the solution to the problems lay in purifying the practice of Muslims from all blameworthy innovations known as

¹⁰⁶ Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize,” 319-320. For an example of the bottom-up repercussions of this sensitivity, see the relevant section on Nushi in Chapter 4 below. Also, in different contexts, we will see the influence of bottom-up and top-down relationalities of several actors in confessional strategies and policies in the seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Ottoman history.

¹⁰⁷ For the related discussion, see Fleischer, *Bureaucrat and Intellectual*, Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*; Tezcan, *Second Ottoman Empire*; Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*.

¹⁰⁸ Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize,” 318-9.

¹⁰⁹ Terzioğlu, “Sunna-minded,” 242-3.

¹¹⁰ Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize,” 319.

bid'ats. Many of the beliefs and practices that they labeled as *bid'at* were associated with the Sufis.¹¹¹ Thence, a “discourse of religious reform to target their opponents in religious economy” headed up in the ranks of these reformers, and they decided “to create a broader political consensus on the definition of Muslim ‘orthodoxy.’”¹¹² Katib Çelebi, a prominent scholar and literary person, cautioned about the rising extremism, as “the movements of popular dissent observed at the height of imperial institutions had given way to the strenuous reaffirmation of a certain type of traditional orthodoxy.”¹¹³ In the sixteenth-century, the assaults on the above mentioned issues were crafted by a little minority among the Ottoman ulema or as battles coordinated explicitly at “heterodox” and particularly Shi’itizing Sufis, such as the *abdals*, for example. The facts confirm that, in the sixteenth century, the government fundamentally focused on Shi’itizing vagrant dervishes, urging the authorities to keep them under control.¹¹⁴ Birgivi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1573), for instance, can be counted as a crucial person and the one famous advocate of this understanding and its intellectual development among some of these critics.¹¹⁵ Later on, these criticisms laid the ground for the Kadızadeli movement, gained a significant popular following, and contested “the role of all other brokers of piety in the Ottoman Empire including [the] sultan, ulema and Sufis.” It can be stated that though the sixteenth century was a “confessionalization-from-above,” the seventeenth century was the time of a “confessionalization-from-below.”¹¹⁶ As a result, these economic and religious incidents boosted the rivalry and strain among the Ottoman religious circles. Consequently, several impetuses for Sunnitization

¹¹¹ Terzioğlu, “State-Building and Confessionalization,” 96-7.; Tuşalp Atıyas, “Deviation in Şeyhülislam Fetwas,” 84-5.

¹¹² Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 133.

¹¹³ Barkey, *The Empire of Difference*, 182.

¹¹⁴ Tuşalp Atıyas, “Deviation in Şeyhülislam Fetwas,” 84-9.

¹¹⁵ Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident,” 58.

¹¹⁶ Terzioğlu, “How to Conceptualize,” 305.

processes created the basis for the surfacing and the advent of the Kadızadeli movement in the seventeenth century.¹¹⁷

2.4.2 The course of Ottoman confessionalization in the seventeenth century

The gathering of extremist Sunni preachers, Kadızadeli, were also called “*fakihs*” (jurisconsults, *fakiler*),¹¹⁸ “deniers” (*münkirin*),¹¹⁹ or “Birgivi followers” (*Birgiviler* or *Birgivi hulefası*).¹²⁰ It was between the 1630s and 1680s when we see this shariah-minded, reform-oriented, puritanical group of preachers who were fighting against the innovations by manipulating some sectors of society and members of the palace, bureaucracy, and the royal family, and by targeting Sufis, non-Muslims, and the ones who opposed their “agenda of reform” and a return to the glorious days of the prophet in Medina.¹²¹ Though it is almost impossible to set a beginning and end date for the movement, these years reasonably stand for the commencement and relative pacification of their voice in the empire, according to the existing literature. The movement is contemporary with the sultans Murad IV (r. 1623-1640), Ibrahim I (r. 1640-1648), and Mehmed IV (r. 1648-1687).

As mentioned above, the social conservatism of the Kadızadeli movement took the form of opposition to innovations, many of which were associated with Sufi beliefs and practices. However, the Kadızadeli were not completely against Sufism. As a new study by Tezcan has shown, Kadızade Mehmed (d. 1635), an early leader and the namesake of the movement had even affiliated with the Halveti order, and after abandoning it with the Nakşibendis. Tezcan compares him with his

¹¹⁷ Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 170.

¹¹⁸ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 215; Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 1.

¹¹⁹ Shafir, “The Road from Damascus,” 37.

¹²⁰ Tezcan, “The Portrait of the Preacher,” 234.

¹²¹ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 1-14.; Ocak, “Kadızâdeliler Hareketi,” 208-225.

contemporary and the founder of the Müceddidi branch of Nakşibendi order, Ahmed Sirhindi (d. 1624), a major figure from south Asia, and Sirhindi was also a person who tried his best to merge Ibn Arabi's ideas with Islamic law, which can be seen in the efforts of Kadızade Mehmed, too.¹²² The Kadızadeli-Nakşibendi rapprochement has been documented also by Le Gall and Sheikh, who demonstrated the closeness of the Nakşibendis to the Kadızadelis.¹²³ Nakşibendi ritual practices were not posing a challenge to Kadızadelis' mind, and similarly, Kadızade Mehmed's opposition to the Halvetis should not mislead one to think of him as an anti-Sufi person. As his spiritual father Birgivi described approvable Sufism, he was not rejecting this "a world unto itself" totally.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, the most noticeably lethal clash happened between the moderate Kadızadeli preachers and Sufi sheikhs of the Halveti order. By the seventeenth century, the Halveti order of dervishes had gotten inducted into decision-making circles, working near the sultan as his counselors and holding positions in the mosques as imams and preachers.¹²⁵ The masters of the orders were shariah-oriented figures and could alternatively serve the needs of preaching. The Kadızadelis clashed with Halveti sheikhs in particular probably due to "their popularity with the urban population, and . . . also with the representatives of the Ottoman state." Besides surviving the purges of Sufis, until the end of the seventeenth century "more than

¹²² Tezcan, "The Portrait of the Preacher," 229-230.

¹²³ Le Gall, "The Ottoman Naqshbandiyya," 167-174.; Le Gall, "The Forgotten Naqshbandis"; Sheikh, *Ottoman Puritanism*.

¹²⁴ For the Kadızadeli-Sufi relations, see Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 70-98, 101.; Terzioğlu, "Sufi and Dissident," 190-275, especially 234-6.; Tezcan, "The Portrait of the Preacher," 197-215, 230-31.; Sheikh, *Ottoman Puritanism*, 6-7, 41, 43, 119-23. Dina Le Gall also introduces a Nakşibendi from the sixteenth century, Mahmud Rıza'i of Filibe (Plovdiv in present-day Bulgaria), presumably a person with strict stance to Kızılbaş communities who eradicated the "wrong beliefs" and the "heretics" under the auspices of Rüstem Pasha, Le Gall, "The Forgotten Naqshbandis," 112.

¹²⁵ The preaching from the pulpits was the key media for shaping public opinion and religiosity, and the preacher posts of Istanbul were dominated by Celvetis, Nakşibendis, and Halvetis in these years, Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 99-104.

half of the lodges in Istanbul were under the control of Halveti sheikhs, and between 1030-1/1621 and 1096-7/1685, Halveti sheikhs were chosen for nineteen of the forty-eight appointments to the post of Friday preacher” at sultanic mosques.¹²⁶ In Kadızadeli preachers’ attacks on tobacco and coffee consumption, “while many of these ‘innovations’ were practiced by a wide sector of Ottoman society, the Kadizadelis singled out Sufi sheikhs as their foremost perpetrator.”¹²⁷ In the end, after the fire of 1633, though tobacco was not the cause of it, coffeehouses were closed and tobacco was banned. An underlying promising experience between Murad IV and Kadızade Mehmed Efendi set up a relationship between the primary preacher and the youthful sultan: the latter was seeking approaches to attain stability at home, secure the peripheries, and restore harmony and order, while the former supported the sultan for gaining his favor and for implementing his aims of reform.¹²⁸ The social, economic, and political troubles of the time perpetuated, and the bans on coffee and tobacco led many people to seek refuge in Sufi convents, where these substances were consumed.¹²⁹

While Sufi practices appeared to have distracted the Kadızadelis, there was in no way a unified social or ideological “Sufi” front in its responses against the Kadızadelis. As I stressed above, the Kadızadeli position on Sufis appeared within a broad spectrum of opinions during the seventeenth century. Neither the Sharia-minded ideologues of the sixteenth century, such as Birgivi, nor the seventeenth-century supporters of the Kadızadeli cause, dismissed Sufism categorically. When we look at the works of acclaimed Halveti sheikhs starting from the late-sixteenth century, it becomes evident that talking about the right convictions and practices

¹²⁶ Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident,” 247.

¹²⁷ Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident,” 5.

¹²⁸ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 22-3, 171-2, 202-3.

¹²⁹ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 102-3.

altered significantly starting with one Halveti branch, and then onto the next while regularly in open conflict with one another.¹³⁰ In any case, a tight embracing of the sharia had consistently been a significant qualifier of being a decent Sufi figure. It has been contended that, by the fifteenth century, and definitely in the old-school instructional manuals of Sufism of the sixteenth century, Sufism had, as of now, wholly grasped the Sunna, and, for example, the antinomian Sufis were, overall, the “deviation” from the standard.¹³¹

For instance, Sivasi Efendi advised Murad IV to send “a number of unprejudiced and sincerely religious officials to the provinces” to check the officials. The sultan should prohibit the innovations, as well as follow the principle “enjoin the right and forbid the wrong.”¹³² Hence, we can find some common points between the two opponents regarding the counseling and favoring sharia. The power of the sultan was shared by the delegates of certain cadres and households in the empire. In this context, the imperium of the sultan needed to be strengthened, and the advice literature gained a steady basis and had a central place in the discussions of the literati and the admonishers of the empire.¹³³ In this period, for instance, some Quranic verses were used to stress the position of the ruler in society as being a role-model for his subjects, like “the people fashion their behavior on that of their rulers,” “people are on religion of their rulers,” and “the servant is of the same mould as his master.”¹³⁴ The sultans were urged to consult the people in command in stately affairs and abide with the precautions and the advice of these people. Some also justified this by giving reference to the old customs of the state. The ulema, as the

¹³⁰ Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident,” 248.

¹³¹ Tuşalp Atiyas, “The ‘Sunna-Minded’ Trend,” 98-9.; Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 43.

¹³² Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 104-5.

¹³³ Terzioğlu, “Sunna-minded,” 248-9.

¹³⁴ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 169.; Tezcan, “The Portrait of the Preacher,” 235.

primary nominee for this position, was also the primary target of the disparagements of the Kadızadelis and the Halvetis.¹³⁵ On the other hand, the relations between the ulema and the other two were not solely about the criticism of the former by the latter, but we see the support of ulema to both sides in certain issues as well.¹³⁶ All of these writings and discussions show that there was a turning of the critical gaze of the Ottomans to themselves. In the sixteenth century, we see a universal perspective to regulate and dominate the norm. However, in the seventeenth century, we see an internal perspective to define the boundaries, the leading principles, and the dissenters. This is one crucial component and shift in seventeenth-century confessionalization compared to the earlier period.¹³⁷

2.4.3 The debates

In the historical course, no prominent figures appeared after the death of Kadızade Mehmed Efendi to dominate the movement. However, he left many students after him, and they individually continued their propagation in favor of the principles of their masters. Yet, it must be stressed that they were not a strict group at that time. This, nonetheless, did not mean that they stepped back and gave up their attacks. Far from that, they became even more impatient towards their subjects of criticism, and they boldly claimed some acts as forbidden. They continued their connection to the palace in the reign of sultan Ibrahim, and they were favored.¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Tuşalp Atiyas, "The 'Sunna-Minded' Trend," 106-7.; Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 39.

¹³⁶ Terzioğlu, "Sufi and Dissident," 220, 229-233. As a member of the top ranking ulema, Feyzullah Efendi's relationality to Vani Mehmed and some offshoots of Kadızadelis, as we will observe below, can be interpreted in this sense.

¹³⁷ A more convoluted explication of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century transformations in Europe and the Middle East can be found in the work of Tezcan. He also brings a reinterpretation of Shahab Ahmed's analysis of the transformations experienced in this period. Tezcan, "The Portrait of the Preacher," 238-9.

¹³⁸ Öztürk, "Islamic Orthodoxy," 216-7.

The second most well-known person in the movement was Üstüvani Mehmed Efendi (d. 1661). He was influential during the reigns of Ibrahim I and Mehmed IV. This period was marked with social and political turmoil that Üstüvani and his followers actively took part in politics, and their reformist thoughts were put into action by themselves. Kadızadeli activism turned into a massive protest of mobs, and targeting the Sufis became the primary objective among many some officials and many others in taverns and coffeehouses. However, we see a continuation in the intellectual discussion of Sufis through the thoughts and writings of the Kadızadelis, although polemicist activism was more at the forefront, which meant that this intellectual discussion remained at a secondary level. They began to criticize the perpetrators of certain acts as sinners, and these criticisms were not based on reliable books of Islamic law and teachings. Those acts include the musical recitation of the Quran, the call to prayer, invoking a blessing on the prophet and his companions during Friday sermons, singing eulogies to the prophet, and performing supererogatory prayers at *Regaib*, *Beraat*, and *Kadir* nights.¹³⁹ The practitioners of these acts were deemed infidels. The Sufi practices of *sema*, *raks*, and *deveran* were deemed illegal and the Sufis were, for the Kadızadelis, unbelievers.¹⁴⁰ For the followers of the movement, even entering a Sufi lodge made a person an infidel. These claims instigated tremendous public discussion, and the parties could find several supporters and opponents in society either being in favor of the Sufis or the Kadızadelis. “The result was a tendency towards polarization in the society of the time.”¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 184-307.

¹⁴⁰ It should be nuanced that banning the Sufi dance and ceremonies took place over time, Terzioğlu, “Sufi and Dissident,” 107.

¹⁴¹ Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 108-111.; Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 130-1, 236.

A critical actor of this period was Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (d. 1661), who accepted the position of grand vizierate. He was expected to be the savior of the state from its turmoil. A short break to the movement's activities was given by Köprülü Mehmed Pasha (1656–1661), an intense adversary of puritan extremism, just as a strong promoter of law and order in the capital moved rapidly to erase possibly hazardous traditionalist dispute. After that, he purged the followers of Üstüvani from state positions. He consulted the ulema and received their consent to suppress the Kadızadelis and exiled Üstüvani and some of his followers. Köprülü imposed his control on Sufi orders as well.¹⁴²

This did not put an end to the movement, however. Vani Mehmed Efendi (d. 1685) is the third person who is assumed to be the “leader” of the movement after the exile of Üstüvani Mehmed Efendi. He got in contact with Fazıl Ahmed Pasha (d. 1676) when he was the governor in Erzurum, and he was called to Istanbul after Fazıl Ahmed Pasha became the grand vizier. Then, he came closer to the sultan, and he was favored by the royal family and the bureaucrats.¹⁴³ The period of Vani's ascendancy as the most influential preacher in Istanbul endured from 1659 to 1683; during this time, relations soured among the diverse religious networks of Istanbul. The expanded radicalization of the Kadızadelis had discovered open support in Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, the grand vizier of the period, who permitted the extremism to prosper, mainly when the domain was occupied with troublesome battles, such as the attack of Candia, for example. Foreign hardships were intensified

¹⁴² Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 27, 107, 224. These Sufi lodges were specifically Halvetis, Mevlevis, Celvetis, and Şemsis.

¹⁴³ Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 158-162.; Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 269. The precise handling of Vani Efendi will be presented in the following chapter.

by the reestablished task of Islamization that was hawked as an answer for heightening the somewhat demised legitimacy of the Ottoman state.¹⁴⁴

The transgressions of the non-Muslims of their limits, the mingling of Muslims and non-Muslims, and the disregard for the segregations were on the agenda of the preachers. Vani Efendi, for example, was arguing that the present decadence of the state was because of the absence and need for conquests in the infidel lands and the strict application of the shariah in the Islamic realm.¹⁴⁵ Waging war against “infidels” held a crucial place in the discourse of the preachers. The ages-old mythical goal of the Ottomans to conquer Rome was in the minds of pro-war groups, and the last leading person of the Kadızadelis, Vani Mehmed Efendi, instigated this ethos and led the grand vizier Fazıl Ahmed Pasha to carry out new campaigns. Vani is also known for pushing the state cadres to commence the second siege of Vienna in 1683, which eventually failed and marked the end of Vani’s hegemony and the Kadızadeli regime.¹⁴⁶

However, after the failure in the second siege of Vienna, the successful and established career of Vani came to an end. When the army reached Edirne, the army preacher (*ordu şeyhi*) Vani Mehmed lost his all power, and he was exiled to his farm in Kestel. This marked the end of the Kadızadeli movement in the capital: they lost their old influential power over the politics. The practice of *sema* became legal again one year before the death of Vani in 1684.¹⁴⁷ However, his legacy continued for the followers of Kadızadelis. For example, in Hüdavendigâr (Bursa), a preacher condemned the supererogatory prayers as innovation, but madrasa students opposed

¹⁴⁴ The 1660 fire in Istanbul, for instance, gave a reasonable minute to the venture of Islamization in the capital. See Baer, *Honored*, Chapters 4 and 5.

¹⁴⁵ Tuşalp Atiyas, “The ‘Sunna-Minded’ Trend,” 113.

¹⁴⁶ Tuşalp Atiyas, “The ‘Sunna-Minded’ Trend,” 107-9.

¹⁴⁷ Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 166.

the preacher, and thus a fight occurred in the mosque. Probably, the preacher and the instigators of the combat were adherers of Vani.¹⁴⁸ Kadızadeli followers in the streets and the royal ulema support echoed in the mosques determined, in a sense, the voice of the center that shaped the “orthodoxy” and “orthopraxy” in this time. Otherwise, after the stepping down of Vani, the “Kadızadeli effect” must have disappeared; however, we do not see such a dramatic change.¹⁴⁹

Although this puritanical group lost the backing of the royal family, and its supporters were exiled from Istanbul in the wake of the defeat in the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, this is not an obstacle for the haunting of its specter in the palace, capital, or the empire in general. The famous Cairo incident and the attack of local ulema and Sufi tombs by Rumi soldiers after the speech of, again, a Rumi preacher;¹⁵⁰ a mosque quarrel in Hüdavendigâr in 1703; and the case study of Kerima Filan in Bosnia in the eighteenth century all show the hailing and roaming of this Kadızadeli spirit in the Ottoman Empire. And in the next chapter, we will see the return of this movement in different names and ways.

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, we went over the long process of Ottoman confessionalization over almost two centuries from 1450s to the 1680s. Ottoman history, historiography, and the history of religiosity were dealt with from a *longue durée* perspective. In this long period, Ottoman Islam was transformed from a relatively polychrome, multivocal tradition into a more homogenous and legalistic one. Concomitantly with this

¹⁴⁸ Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 171-2. It should be noted that this instance did not happen in 1692, as Çavuşoğlu states. The incident in Hüdavendigâr took place in March 1703. For more information see BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 114#314 (1-10 Zilkade 1114) (19-28 March 1703) and BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 114#574 (21-29 Zilhicce 1114) (8-17 May 1703).

¹⁴⁹ Tezcan, “The Portrait of the Preacher,” 236-7. The return of the Kadızadelis will be narrated in the next chapter.

¹⁵⁰ Şafir, “The Road from Damascus,” 47-9.

process, the power of the systematized religious establishment and the incorporation of, especially, the Mamluk lands and Hijaz region with their cultural and intellectual baggage are affective on the emergence and development of the Ottoman Sunnitization and the crystallization of the religious identities. The Ottoman ruling elite's attempt at defending the Sunniness brought stricter application of the stately defined "orthodoxy" by the several sectors of the society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It is important to stress the changes experienced in this long process of Ottoman confessionalization, whose multiple agents took their share in this play, developed their perceptions of the correct form of Islam, and acted in the service of the motivations emerged thereby.

From the looser handling of the religiosity in the frontier context to defining and enforcing Sunni "orthodoxy," we see the implementation of some practices and policies depending on the background represented in this chapter. In the face of the rising Safavids and the Kızılbaş threat in Anatolia, new policies of segregation, monitoring, and persecuting were implemented. The precarious Sunna-mindedness gave way to corrective enforcements to turn the subjects of the empire to pursue a righteous and pious life, state-owned campaigns to establish mosques and madrasas, criminalizing the dissidents and trying the "heretics." The reign of Süleyman I presents a particularly important period of Ottoman confessionalization, embraced and applied by the state. In this respect, the abandonment of universal projects of world domain and inter-state rivalry played a crucial role. Though, the role of the state and the sultan should not be overemphasized and attention should also be paid to different actors and the complex nature of the Ottoman confessionalization. In time, the rising sensibility for Sunna evolved into a nuanced and polemical discussion of Sunni "orthodoxy" and caused disputes among several groups. One

prominent of which was the Kadızadelis and they held a crucial place for the course of Ottoman confessionalization in the seventeenth century. Yet, it should be stressed that they were one party among many to defend the cause of Sunnitization in the Ottoman history. Another important point is that, the role and force of the state in the seventeenth century was portrayed as lagging behind the zealot and proactive Kadızadelis and Sufis, and at best, not a powerful agent. However, as we can see, the sultans and the bureaucratic cadres of the empire were always part of the process and intervened into the debates, made use of the groups and their discourses, and sometimes punished them. As my case here portrays the profound and primary role of the sultan in the confessional policies of the empire, we see the continuation of this enforcing position of the state in the beginning of the eighteenth century as well.

Here, this chapter comes to an end, though the influence of Ottoman confessionalization and Sunnitization did not conclude. In the next chapter, we will delve into the reign of Mustafa II and the people, groups, currents, Sufi orders, and dynamics that led to the unprecedented application of an empire-wide education program in the final year of his reign. In the following chapters, how the confessionalization policies of the Ottoman empire in these two centuries were affective on the confessionalization attempt of Mustafa II and Feyzullah Efendi will be discussed and analyzed, and how different factors than the Safavids and the Kadızadelis had impact on this process will be demonstrated.

CHAPTER 3

THE ŞEYHÜLİSLAM, THE SULTAN, AND THE SULTANATE

In the previous chapter, I discussed the Ottoman religious policies of the sixteenth and seventeenth century with reference to the concept of confessionalization. In the next chapter, I shall examine how these policies were given a new push by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi and Sultan Mustafa II in the early eighteenth century. Before examining the confessionalization attempts of these two figures, however, in this chapter we will take a closer look at these two individuals and the various factors that led them to embark on an ambitious religious reform program in the early eighteenth century.

First, I will begin with laying the background developments before the reign of Mustafa II through the biography of the key and the binding person of the narrative of the thesis, Feyzullah Efendi with reference to other leading people. After that, the revivalist tendencies, which were in rise before the Second Siege of Vienna and galvanized after the defeat and retreat, and quest for a stable order will be analyzed in connection to hailing of the famous Müceddidi sheikh in the last couple of decades of the seventeenth century. This perspective agrees with the ghazi ideal in the mind of Mustafa II, to restore law and order, attain the internal stability, and bring back the old glorious days of the empire, as well as realizing the divinely ordained duty to increase the piety of his subjects all around the realm. Besides the personal and the contextual aspects and drives, the political dynamics, structures, and plays will complete the portrait I am going to draw to provide the immediate context, in which the orders of religious education policy issued by the Imperial Court.

Personal, contextual and political currents all are going to help the reader to find out the connections between the reign of Mustafa II and the earlier times. I will also highlight the continuities of confessionalization policies in this specific period.

The aspects emphasized here will link this chapter to the next one that the sociopolitical context after the failed siege in 1683, the top-down and bottom-up agencies, religious currents, and beliefs and practices of the Muslim subjects of the empire will be underscored and revisited in light of the concepts, events, acts, and mentalities accentuated here. In discussion of the aftermath of the confessionalization attempt and the reign of Mustafa II, these points will be reevaluated in the last and concluding chapter of the thesis.

3.1 The background

Seyyid Mehmed Feyzullah Efendi was born in 1048/1638-1639 in Erzurum to a Halveti ulema family that had migrated from Karabağ (in present-day Azerbaijan) generations before.¹⁵¹ Feyzullah Efendi penned an autobiography in which he mentions his family history and every tutor and teacher he followed, with a detailed genealogy of their masters and the course materials he was taught exhaustively.¹⁵² This autobiography was composed in 1702.¹⁵³ He also wrote about his spiritual genealogy and life story.¹⁵⁴ In his autobiography, he notes that his lineage descends

¹⁵¹ Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 1, 31.

¹⁵² Türek and Derin, "Kendi Kaleminden – I," and "Kendi Kaleminden – II." According to Meservey, he had two autobiographies: one is about only the genealogy, and the second one is more a typical autobiography. The two were composed in Arabic, and only one was translated into Turkish, Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 30. This second autobiography may actually be a compilation of Feyzullah's manuscript notes and drafts, which were edited and copied by one of his grandsons, Seyyid Mehmed Emin, in 1178 (1764-5), Türek and Derin, "Kendi Kaleminden – I," 205.

¹⁵³ Nizri, "The Memoirs," 27.

¹⁵⁴ Kara and Çögenli, "Hayatı ve Eserleri," 35n35. He also gives the genealogy of his professors' professors, Türek and Derin, "Kendi Kaleminden – I," 206-211. Faruqi also wrote about this autobiography, and she states that Feyzullah Efendi compiled this treatise to represent himself in a fashion to be seen by his family and followers. Adding to this, she also speculates that he was well-aware of the criticisms directed against him, and he might have provided a sort of defence and self-gratification via this ego-document. Faruqi, "An Ulama Grandee," 201.

from Şems-i Tabrizi (d. 1247(?)), the spiritual master of Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi (d. 1273), which goes back to Ebubekir Sıddık (d. 634).¹⁵⁵ On his ancestors, Feyzullah Efendi states that “in the Ottoman registers, it is noted that they had many books in their possession,” which shows the intellectual capital and learned background of his family.¹⁵⁶

In his autobiography, he demonstrates the Sufi relations of his family and the history of their settling in the Ottoman realm. According to his narrative, when his uncle was the master of the order, the Safavids (whom Feyzullah calls “Rafizis,” a derogatory term for Shiites) attacked Karabağ, and the family migrated to Anatolia.¹⁵⁷ Sultan Murad IV hosted them in Istanbul, bestowed some lands in Erzincan, and they settled in Erzurum. In 1667-8, his uncle Sheikh Mustafa died, and his father Sheikh Mehmed succeeded his brother as the head of the order. Sheikh Mehmed (d. 1693) was appointed as the mufti of Erzurum. Feyzullah Efendi’s mother, Şerife Hatun, also belonged to a *seyyid* family, and her father was an influential person in the Karabağ region too. Feyzullah Efendi took his initial education from his close relatives.¹⁵⁸

Keeping the date when he composed this treatise, some points should be made. In this context, he might have wanted to stress the Sufi background of his

¹⁵⁵ Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 36. Though he and his forefathers hold the title *Seyyid*, there are some speculations regarding his *seyyid* lineage, and some argue that this is a pure fabrication, Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 267.

¹⁵⁶ Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – I,” 211-2.; Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 37, 39. Faroqhi speculates that Feyzullah might have thought to identify himself with Şems-i Tebrizi and Mustafa II with Mevlana Celaleddin Rumi, Faroqhi, “An Ulama Grandee,” 201, 201n7.

¹⁵⁷ Feyzullah Efendi was speaking a dialect of Azerbaijani Turkish, which is highly influenced by the Persian dialect, and because of this, some people were calling him “Kızılbaş, Rafizi, Acem,” and considering the notorious events that happened in his family history related to “Rafizis,” these monikers are ironic, Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 231. It is also reported that the top bureaucrats made fun of his dialect, Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 147. Zilfi goes ahead and states that the ulema of Istanbul regarded Feyzullah Efendi as an outsider since he is of provincial origin, and his will to build a dynasty was a great disturbance for them, Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 218. Meservey, argues that ascribing him Kızılbaş title is a transmission of the foreign sources’ attribution, Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 146.

¹⁵⁸ Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 38-9, 41, 49-52.

family. As we know, Kadızadelis confronted many Sufi practices and they combatted Halvetis, to which Feyzullah belonged to. As the movement “declined,” and Sufis regained the favor of the royal family, he could have tried to represent himself as coming from a prominent Sufi family. In this point, a significant person for Feyzullah Efendi, for his education, and the future comes to the fore: Vani Mehmed Efendi. He was born in Hoşab (Van), and he received his education from his family. Vani belonged to a respected ulema family who also claimed to be *seyyid*.¹⁵⁹ After completing his education in Van, he went to Tabriz, but it is reported that he did not want to stay there because of the presence of many “non-Islamic” communities.¹⁶⁰ Then, he moved to Karabağ, and he followed Molla Nureddin as his master. He probably had some interest in Sufism, but he did not remain there long and came to Erzurum and settled there.¹⁶¹ He met with the prominent figure of the city and the master of the Halveti order, Sheikh Mustafa Efendi, the uncle of Feyzullah Efendi.¹⁶² The Karabağ connection of Vani Efendi is essential because he might have heard about the famous Karabağ ulema family of Feyzullah Efendi and wanted to pursue his career in Erzurum. As a master of Feyzullah Efendi, besides traditional sciences, Vani also instructed him in logic, geometry, and astronomy,”¹⁶³ along with arithmetic, philosophy, qalam, exegesis, and hadith.¹⁶⁴

Vani Mehmed Efendi became a known figure in Erzurum, and he was preaching and was appointed as mufti of Erzurum in 1657 by Mehmed IV.¹⁶⁵ Vani

¹⁵⁹ Köse, “Fatwa Collections,” 28.

¹⁶⁰ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 271-2.

¹⁶¹ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 272.

¹⁶² Köse, “Fatwa Collections,” 34-5.

¹⁶³ This astronomy education is vital because in the reign of Mustafa II, Feyzullah Efendi thought to convert Galata Tower into an observatory with the aid of European scientists, Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 28.

¹⁶⁴ Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 50, 53. We also learn that Feyzullah Efendi penned a commentary on Avicenna’s eulogy, Ceviz, “el-Kasidetu’r-Ruhaniyye.”

¹⁶⁵ Köse, “Fatwa Collections,” 1.

married the daughter of Sheikh Mustafa Efendi.¹⁶⁶ While he is regarded as the leader of the Kadızadeli movement, I am not able to present any clue about the relationship between the Halveti master and Vani the “pupil”. To what extent he was tolerant to the Halveti order? Did the teachings of the Halveti order affect his position towards Sufism in the future? Unfortunately, I do not have the answers to these questions. Yet, his connection to this family was not limited to his marriage; his future student Feyzullah married to Vani’s daughter Ayşe in 1662, when he joined his close circle, and after her death (1669), he was married to Meryem, the other daughter of Vani Efendi.¹⁶⁷

Upon Fazıl Ahmed Pasha, then the governor of Erzurum, invited Vani to Istanbul, his and Feyzullah’s fate experienced a decisive turn, which also shows the political connection of the two. Vani came to the capital in 1663, and he became the preacher of Mehmed IV, and, after that Feyzullah came to the capital and met with the sultan. Vani was appointed to Yeni mosque in the year prince Mustafa was born (2 June 1664.)¹⁶⁸ The preacher soon gained fame, impressed Mehmed IV, and he was supported by Fazıl Ahmed Pasha in his rise in the profession of preaching. Since he was the sultan’s preacher and counselor to the Köprülü viziers, he became a crucial figure in the religio-political domain, holding circles in the palace with his followers, and he was appointed to the tutorship of the sultan. He was given some possessions, like the castle of Kestel, surrounding villages in Bursa, and a grove by the Bosphorus for his residence, known today as Vaniköy.¹⁶⁹ As we stressed in the former chapter, he was associated with the Kadızadeli movement at this time.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Pazarbaşı, “Mehmed Efendi, Vani”; Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 33-39.

¹⁶⁷ Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 41-2, 47.

¹⁶⁸ Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 69.; Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – I, 213.

¹⁶⁹ Köse, “Fatwa Collections,” 36.

¹⁷⁰ Köse, “Fatwa Collections,” 1-2.

Vani countered certain practices. In 1666, ritual dance was forbidden. Open and vocal meditations of Sufis were also banned.¹⁷¹ Vani also deemed tomb visitations as not acceptable. In September 1667, he criticized the visitation of Kanber Baba in Hafsa (Edirne) as being a form of “polytheism.” After this call, the tomb was destroyed. In the same year, the visitation of tombs in all manners was forbidden.¹⁷² Also, Vani exhorted the Janissary commanders to abandon their comforts in the campaign. The young boys who were brought to beautify the tents were not allowed to attend the military camps.¹⁷³ After 1670, the taverns were ordered to be closed, and the taxes taken for the sale of wine was abolished.¹⁷⁴

Feyzullah’s connection to the elites of the capital was not limited to the links of Vani Efendi, or he wanted to represent himself as such. According to Feyzullah Efendi, Minkarizade Yahya Efendi (d. 1678) was another important figure in his life, and he encouraged Feyzullah to embark on an *ilmiye* career. He completed the madrasa degrees quickly and came to the *kırklı* level. Yet Vani Efendi did not give his consent to his pupil to end up in a kadışip.¹⁷⁵ After that, Feyzullah went on a pilgrimage in 1667 and attended the meetings of scholars. In 1668, when he returned to Edirne, accompanied Vani Efendi, and attended many campaigns in the Balkans. Here we see another turning point of Feyzullah’s life because in 1669, the sultan ordered him to become the tutor of prince Mustafa, the future sultan, and in 1670, he was appointed to Haydarpaşa madrasa as a *müderris*. Not only the favor Vani could bestow to his student but also the personal efforts of Feyzullah would have been effective on these decisions. He continued to follow and complete the madrasa

¹⁷¹ Öztürk, “Islamic Orthodoxy,” 286-8.

¹⁷² Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 165-6.

¹⁷³ Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 149.

¹⁷⁴ Çavuşoğlu, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 163-7, 170-1.

¹⁷⁵ Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – I,” 213-4.; Faruqi, “An Ulama Grandee,” 202.

grades and attended the campaigns. Prince Mustafa also attended campaigns, and in 1672, he accompanied his father until Babadağı, where there was a royal mansion.¹⁷⁶ In 1678, Feyzullah Efendi was appointed to be the tutor of prince Ahmed, as well as to the position of Rumelian Chief Justice.¹⁷⁷

Vani Mehmed's power declined after the death of his patron Köprülü grand vizier in 1676, but his influence lasted until the end of the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, when he was the army preacher. He was also the person who instigated this campaign, and after the defeat, he was one of the targets of distress, and he was exiled to Bursa where he died in 1685.¹⁷⁸ Feyzullah Efendi also participated in the siege of Vienna, but he continued to be esteemed. Highly probably, his "career architecture" and correct decisions saved him from the calamities after 1683. But there were his rivals as well. In 1686, the sultan accidentally saw that the horse of Feyzullah was grazing in the royal garden, which was off-limits to non-royals. On the defaming of Feyzullah by his rivals, he was dismissed from the post of prince tutorship, but Queen Mother Turhan Sultan, with whom Feyzullah might have good relations, intervened, he was forgiven, and Eyüp was given as an *arpalık* (benefice). Besides surviving these critical threats to his career and life, he continued to be rewarded. In 1688, he was appointed as *Nakibüleşraf* when Süleyman II (r. 1687-1691) became the sultan. In the narrative, he portrays himself as a leading person to end the tumult in that period. In the reign of Süleyman II, the upheavals continued and grand vizier Siyavuş Pasha, Köprülü Fazıl Mustafa Pasha, and Feyzullah Efendi (though denying any identification with the rebels)¹⁷⁹ wanted to stop the chaos. They

¹⁷⁶ Özcan, "Mustafa II"; He experienced greater freedom than earlier princes and was known for his "independence and headstrong personality," Abou-El-Haj, "The Narcissism," 125.

¹⁷⁷ Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 2, 39-42.; Kara and Çögenli, "Hayatı ve Eserleri," 54-8.

¹⁷⁸ Öztürk, "Islamic Orthodoxy," 269-76, 292.

¹⁷⁹ Nizri, "The Memoirs," 31.; Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 38.

made a plan, but it did not work. The rebels wanted the dismissal of the grand vizier and şeyhülislam. Upon the inquiry of rebel leaders, Feyzullah was nominated as şeyhülislam, but he was appointed to this position only for 17 days. Feyzullah Efendi was planning a counter coup to the rebels, but the situation worsened, and the sultan ordered the grand vizier to resign and deliver the seal via Feyzullah Efendi. The rebels murdered Siyavuş Pasha, and the sultan appointed Nişancı İsmail Pasha to the grand vizierate, which was not favorable for Feyzullah Efendi. The new grand vizier was a rival of Feyzullah, and he reported to the sultan that Feyzullah was planning a rebellion that would bring prince Mustafa to the throne.¹⁸⁰ After that, he was dismissed and banished to Erzurum, as a kadı of the city.¹⁸¹ There, he related the continuity of his correspondences with his connections in the palace, which demonstrates that he was not living in recluse but trying to end up in the capital as soon as possible. After Ahmed II succeeded his brother, he learned that some, including Feyzullah, tried to enthrone Mustafa instead of him. The attempt failed, yet Feyzullah was somehow spared punishment.¹⁸² When Ahmed II died in 1695, grand vizier Ali Pasha nominated prince Ibrahim, but Mustafa did not wait, and with the support of his close retinues, he was coronated as Mustafa II on 7 February 1695.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ After the death of Süleyman II, the members of the Royal Court were discussing to accede whom to throne. Mehmed IV, his elder son Mustafa, and brother Ahmed were candidates to the throne. Mehmed IV was thought to be disciplined himself in the cage but was not approved. Prince Mustafa was also rejected. "Halen çekilen Sultan Mehmed'in uğursuzluğudur, padişahlığını hak ve kul hazmetmez, oğlu da yularsız aslan gibi büyümüştür, binüb inme, çeng ü çegane öğrenmiştir," Koçu, *Osmanlı Padişahları*, 289. The comments of the top-ranking bureaucrats on prince Mustafa demonstrate his strong character and the impossibility to control this "non-reined lion." Indeed, to stop the rebels, Mehmed IV offered his son to the rebels two times; in the first, for his execution, then in the second, to accede him to the throne, Koçu, *Osmanlı Padişahları*, 278.

¹⁸¹ Kara and Çögenli, "Hayatı ve Eserleri," 58-62.

¹⁸² Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 62-3.

¹⁸³ Özcan, "Mustafa II" He sent couriers to his mother in Istanbul and Feyzullah Efendi in Erzurum, Silahdar Mehmed Ağa narrates that Mustafa II acceded to the throne upon the unanimous decision of the Divan members, and he brought the news to the prince and took him to the Privy Chamber, Silâhdar, *Nusretname*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 3-5. However, Uzunçarşılı states that he sat on the throne by himself upon hearing the news of his uncle's death, without waiting for the official call for the ceremony, Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi 3. Cilt*, 502.

After he acceded to the throne, he declared his goals in an imperial order. He made changes in palace officials and made new appointments.¹⁸⁴ Four years later, Feyzullah Efendi became şeyhülislam again after the accession of Mustafa II to the throne, and since he unified both şeyhülislam and sultan tutorship posts, he was known as “*camî-ü’r-riyaseteyn*” (unifier of the two heads).¹⁸⁵

The narrative of Feyzullah Efendi provides valuable points for how he presented his life story to his family and the intended audience he had in mind. This treatise can be read as a manifesto of the chief mufti to counter the critiques of his rivals he clashed all through his career. It also provides us the personal and political backgrounds of the key people prior to the sultanate of Mustafa II. In reality, Feyzullah Efendi was successful that for eight years, he became the epitome of the political order of the Ottoman Empire, until 1703, the year of the Edirne Incident.

3.2 *Tecdid* (renewal), *müceddid* (renewer) and the Nakşbendi-Müceddidi connection

Feyzullah Efendi had taught Mustafa II about the earlier sultans, the “ghazi ideal” of Süleyman the Magnificent, and other successful ancestors, who were role models for the new sultan.¹⁸⁶ Claiming to be the “redeemer of state,” his main target was to

¹⁸⁴ Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 70-71.

¹⁸⁵ Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 49, 62-3.; This title was interpreted for different conjectures. For instance, Abou-El-Haj interprets this title for unifying the two most important positions of the state: grand vizierate and şeyhülislamate. Bursalı Mehmed Tahir notes that this title was given since he was appointed to the şeyhülislamate for two times. Some others attribute this title to him because he was the tutor of two princes, Mustafa II and Ahmed III, Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamı,” 255.

¹⁸⁶ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 115. In his *Nusretname*, Silahdar states that sultan held a court before his subjects to inquire a case regarding the governor of Ilbasan. The villagers “burned straws at the top of their heads,” the author depicts. This is a way of showing the distress people feel and that their condition is unbearable. It is called as “ateş istidası” (fire petition), Koçu, *Garip Vakalar*, 17-8. Silahdar praises the sultan for having revived the ancient custom of holding court by the sultan, which he claims had fallen into disuse for 220 years. However, it reckons to the reign of Mehmed II, and ironically, Silahdar disregards that this practice was abandoned by Mehmed II. Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 41-2. In Tamişvar, the sultan gets information about the enemy from the villagers, and Silahdar rhetorically cites that the people of Tamişvar had never seen the sultan, and they were so glad to see him, Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1 pt. 1, 72.

“turn the tide of retreat and defeat to one of expansion and victory.”¹⁸⁷ He was marked for great deeds, mainly to be the reviver of the “ever victorious state.”¹⁸⁸ This revivalist language and discourse used by the sultan to name his reign are not coincidental. The reason lies in the works of Feyzullah Efendi about the “renewal hadith” (*tecdid hadisi*), which is on the “renewer of the age” (*müceddid*), and the work is also known as *Nesayihü ’l-Mülûk* or *Şerh-u Hadis-i Tecdid*.¹⁸⁹

In the Islamic conceptualization of time and religio-social order, it is reported that in each epoch, a reviver of religion will be sent by God, and with divinely ordained power, this person will set law and order and the rule of God and religion in the world. The reported saying of the prophet is, “Allah will raise for this community at the end of every hundred years the one who will renovate its religion for it.”¹⁹⁰ Feyzullah Efendi penned an Arabic treatise on this hadith (*Şerh-u Hadis-i Tecdid*), and then, he translated it into Turkish to make people have access to this work.¹⁹¹

One point of debate is determining the hundred years. Since when the prophet said this hadith is unknown, it is difficult to determine the centenaries.¹⁹² The act of renewal is also ambiguous. The scholars do not give a single definition and explanation of the act. It is regarded as an instrument of teaching and instructing

¹⁸⁷ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 115, 118-9. After his second campaign against the League forces, the sword of David who killed Goliath was discovered in the palace, and this incident was interpreted as a divine message that Mustafa II would be ever victorious. The sultan ordered the sword to be girded in campaigns and kept in the inner treasury in times of peace, Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 133. The sultan issued an edict in the same year that the pages of the palace will wear a turban (*tûlbent ve sarık*). This may be read as another act coming out of pious motivation.

¹⁸⁸ After the accession to throne, two blessed incidences were reported; the conquest of the island of Chios, and the conversion of a priest to Islam, his telling the dream narrative, in which he saw prophet Muhammad and Mehmed IV. These two occurrences were regarded as good news for the sultan, Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 10-21, 24.; Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 119.

¹⁸⁹ Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 76-9.

¹⁹⁰ Sunan Abu Dawud, 4291. Also see Landau-Tasseron, “The ‘Cyclical’ Reform,” 79.

¹⁹¹ Ulu, “Tecdid Hadisi Hakkında,” 417-8. The author here states that there are two manuscript texts: the first one is the Arabic one (Süleymaniye, Reşid Efendi, 1008), and the other is the Arabic text and its Ottoman Turkish translation (Süleymaniye, Hacı Mahmud Efendi, 2149).

¹⁹² Ulu, “Tecdid Hadisi Hakkında,” 420-1. The beginning of the first century, in prophetic time, was reckoned based on three options: concerning either the migration of the prophet from Mecca to Medina, an event notable for Arabs before his death, and his death.

religion to the believers or stopping misattributions to the prophet. Feyzullah Efendi dwells on the matter of amending the rules by over time.¹⁹³ The author, then, after stating Ömer b. Abdülaziz and Imam Şafii as the renewers of their time, comes to his age and suggests that Mustafa II is the renewer of the age, and he dedicates this treatise to him. He acknowledged him as the renewer of religion and lists some of his qualities – like justice, gentleness (*rifk*), compassion, helping the needy, peace, and propriety, – allowing him to fulfill the requirements of a renewer candidate.¹⁹⁴

There is another treatise of Feyzullah Efendi about the same topic, named *Nesaihü'l-Mülûk* (Advice to Rulers).¹⁹⁵ In this treatise, Mustafa II was represented as “just, generous, an example of modesty, the most precious of his time, the protector of Islam, being unmatched by any Arab or non-Arab rulers, and a star shining with the deeds done for the sake of the religion.” “He developed countries, eradicated oppression and disorder with his sword, saved the sacred values of religion, unified the Muslims, revived religion, and thus, he surpassed the other sultans.”¹⁹⁶ After

¹⁹³ Ulu, “Tecdid Hadisi Hakkında,” 421-2. For the explanations of the hadith in the literature, see Landau-Tasserion, “The ‘Cyclical’ Reform,” 80-4.

¹⁹⁴ Ulu, “Tecdid Hadisi Hakkında,” 422-3. An important point about Ömer b. Abdülaziz is that he is known as a dedicated person for reviving the prophet’s tradition in his time. It is reported that he addressed his governors for spreading knowledge in their domains, recording the hadiths circulating among the population, rejecting all the innovations and fighting against the innovatory practices, canceling the applications of the former caliphs and reemploying the customs of the prophet, and reviving and spreading the hadith science, which is in “dead condition.” Since his policies resemble the first four caliphs, he was called “the fifth rightly guided caliph.” Ulu, “Tecdid Hadisi Hakkında,” 423-5 It is striking that we can find significant overlaps between the urges of Ömer b. Abdülaziz and Mustafa II. For other examples of the renewers in the history, their claims to be the renewer, the functions of the renewers, the methods of their “selection,” and the position of the renewer in the society and for Allah, see Landau-Tasserion, “The ‘Cyclical’ Reform,” especially 84-96.

¹⁹⁵ Abou-Manneh, “Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II,” 458-9. There is a problem on the authorship of the treatise and Şahin argues that the treatise was attributed to Feyzullah Efendi by Mehmed Tayşi, (Millet Kütüphanesi 2122/2, between pages 96-105) does not belong to Feyzullah Efendi. The statements of the author of this treatise imply that he lived in the fourteenth century CE. Therefore, this *Nesaih* is not Feyzullah Efendi’s. However, there is another *Nesaihü'l-Mülûk* that was authored by Feyzullah Efendi according to the reporting of Uşşakizade Seyyid İbrahim Hasib. Uşşakizade copied the entire treatise in his work, *Tarih-i Uşşakizade*. The author states that this treatise, *Nesaihü'l-Mülûk*, is the same treatise of Feyzullah Efendi’s work on the hadith of the renewer, with only minor changes, Şahin, “Nesaihü'l-Mülûk,” 342-4. For the Arabic original of the text, see Gündoğdu, “Uşşakizade Tarihi,” 388-393.

¹⁹⁶ Şahin, “Nesaihü'l-Mülûk,” 344.

stating that each community regarded their ruler as the renewer of religion, Feyzullah Efendi argues that they rely on supposition (*zan*), but suppositions do not provide a basis for the truth. Presumably, by giving the qualities of the sultan, he tries to prove his claim that he is the renewer for sure. A second important point is about the method he used to reckon the centenary. For Feyzullah, the clock must be started after the completion of religion by the prophet. Since one cannot renew something that was not completed at the time, not the migration of the prophet but his death must be the departure moment.¹⁹⁷ Continuing through this line of argument, he concludes that the year 1110 (1698-9 if the Hegira calendar was meant; 1699-1700 if the Rumi calendar was meant) “is hoped that let the tenth year of the eleventh century be the beginning of the centenary.” This year is the year of renewal, and since he is the caliph and people fear rulers, the sultan is the only perfect person who can realize this mission.¹⁹⁸ The content of the agenda is “being just, following and upholding the prophetic example and Quran, performing good manners, lifting oppression, and being gentle and protective towards the subjects,” demonstrating that, “the sultan is a more influential [person] in doing [right] since the people are afraid of the sultan, and he is the deputy of God on earth” and he is “the custodian for protecting the rights of God.” Only with his policies the lives of the people become disciplined, disorder and corruption (*fitne ve fesad*) eradicated. Without the sultan, the order is broken, the good and the bad become equal, disorder rules, the right cannot be separated from the wrong. The sultan can eliminate the disorder and oppression, and he reifies all these acts according to the orders of God.¹⁹⁹ Feyzullah Efendi uses the Quranic verse “O David! Lo! We have set thee as a viceroy in the

¹⁹⁷ Şahin, “Nesaihi’l-Müluk,” 345.

¹⁹⁸ Şahin, “Nesaihi’l-Müluk,” 345, 348-9.

¹⁹⁹ Şahin, “Nesaihi’l-Müluk,” 345-6.

earth, therefore judge aright between mankind and follow not desire that it beguile”²⁰⁰ to support his claim.

In this holy order, there are certain messages from God. One must stick to the Quran, in which the worldly and religious rulings were, as it explains the right and the wrong, and mercy and justice were taken as the essential norms. The establishment of a just rule should be the goal, and it can be achieved by divine ordinances.²⁰¹ Besides the Quranic verses, hadiths are crucial for the implementation of these orders. In addition, the person who developed a moral with the hadiths of the prophet and revived his tradition is the praised person for the prophet. From these two sources, many principles can be drawn, and they can be guides in the duty of the rulers, which erase oppression from the world, acting tender-mindedly and undertaking the responsibility to deal with the problems of the people.²⁰² Indicating this holy duty to the sultan after the defeat at Zenta and on the eve of the Karlowitz Treaty may stand for compensation for the dispirited sultan.

Not only the qualities of the sultan but also the context of the reign is important. Feyzullah Efendi explains the time before Mustafa II in the treatise: “the fire of revolt was kindled, strong winds blew from every direction, disorder emerged and tenets [of the faith] were turn out, . . . evil came out of its guise and it is time to be united.” He concludes his words by announcing that the victory will be of the sultan.²⁰³ This rhetorical language was applied in the autobiography of Feyzullah Efendi as well. In this work, he describes the condition of the empire as one in which “the fundamentals of the state were destroyed, the order was shaken, its arms and

²⁰⁰ Şahin, “Nesaihü’l-Müluk,” 345-6. The quoted verse is from the Quran, 38:26. The translations of the Quranic verses in this thesis and in the appendices are from Pickthall, *The Holy Qur-’aan*.

²⁰¹ Şahin, “Nesaihü’l-Müluk,” 346.

²⁰² Şahin, “Nesaihü’l-Müluk,” 347.

²⁰³ Şahin, “Nesaihü’l-Müluk,” 347. For the role of Feyzullah Efendi in the campaigns, and reading of his march in the trenches and encouraging soldiers to fight as reflecting the ancient dervish missions to convert the Balkans to Islam, see Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 53.

wings were broken.”²⁰⁴ After stressing the attacks of the League armies, he describes the hopelessness of the soldiers, the insufficiency in the military materials and equipment, the decrease in the treasury. For him, the realm was in despair and the infidels succeeded. “The ones of wicked thoughts in Edirne and Istanbul” he criticizes “did not come to their sense, and they got suspicious about God.”²⁰⁵ In this hour of crisis in which even the people began to question God, Mustafa II acceded to the throne. He says that he counseled the sultan when he asked for and followed Feyzullah’s advice and acted according to sharia²⁰⁶ to set law and order and make the subjects and the state prosperous.²⁰⁷ In the *Nesaih*, he continues to pray for the sultanate of Mustafa II and points out certain qualities of the sultan. In his reign, “the realms were abundant with justice and benefaction, people lived in safety, the smokes of grief and distress were unraveled, disorder among the populace was halted, and the backs of those who stubbornly caused disorder were broken.”²⁰⁸ This quest for order in the calamitous moment can be read within the post-1683 context, as well as a continuation and the effect of the zeitgeist. The seventeenth century is a time of continual crisis, and the people were seeking a solution to their problems. Shariah, as explained in the former chapter, was a strong candidate in this contest and gripped onto the Quran and sunnah of the prophet and cleansed them of the innovations. Maybe the reference to stopping the misattributions to the prophet

²⁰⁴ Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – II,” 81-2.

²⁰⁵ Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – II,” 81-2.

²⁰⁶ Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – II,” 82-3. For the superiority of sharia over kanun, see BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 108#1251, 10 Zilkade 1107/11 June 1696. For the transcription of this order, see Ergin, *Mecelle*, vol 1., 544n37. Tezcan states that in the time of Mustafa II, the usage of the term “kanun” was interdicted in 1696. He explains that this as an alliance in which Feyzullah Efendi “supported the sultan’s absolutism and could thus facilitate the expansion of the role played by the dynasty in the articulation of jurists’ law that was crucial for controlling the affairs of the ruling class.” Kanun does not provide the ability to manipulate “all areas of law,” hence the “full-fledged claim on the sharia” was aimed, Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 28, 44. The superiority of sharia over kanun was contradictory to the earlier customs of the state, Abou-Manneh, “Feyzullah Efendi and Sultan Mustafa II”, 457. This further implicates the highlighting of sharia consciousness.

²⁰⁷ Türek and Derin, “Kendi Kaleminden – II,” 89-90.

²⁰⁸ Şahin, “Nesaihü’l-Müluk,” 347.

among the renewer's duty stands for this understanding.²⁰⁹ In tune with the explanation of the sultan's role by Feyzullah Efendi in his work, for Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), "the sole criterion . . . for legitimate rulership is that rulers serve the Muslim community by upholding the sharia and protecting public order." In this sense, the latter articulates that "the exercise of authority for the benefit of the people' . . . as 'one of the greatest religious duties,' and he identifies princes and jurists as the two primary groups of people entrusted with this responsibility."²¹⁰ Though we do not see any reference to Ibn Taymiyya in both texts of şeyhülislam, the question raised by him remains the same: how can a just and shari rule be possible?²¹¹ In his key text, Ibn Taymiyya provides a model of a system that explicates the strong bases of sharia, which are the fundamentals of a steady society and state.²¹² Ibn Taymiyya noticed a significant responsibility for the sultan's official power, though understood in the Ottoman context as having a larger connotation than the Mamlukid one, "as long as it did not violate the precepts of the sharia, but rather helped reinforce them and maintain and protect public order." Since he viewed the implementation of power and compulsion to be vital for satisfying the Quranic order – enjoin the right and forbid the wrong – he "particularly supported measures that enhanced the coercive power of the state and protected the collective interests of the Muslim community."²¹³ The treatises of Feyzullah Efendi contribute to and enter a dialogue with Ibn Taymiyya by stressing the time of the crisis and the person who commissioned to bring it to an end. It has to be stated that Terzioğlu points out the ownership of the şeyhülislam of an old and valuable copy of the Arabic original of

²⁰⁹ Terzioğlu, "Bir Tercüme," 270. For the role of the renewer as cleansing innovations, see Landau-Tasseron, "The 'Cyclical' Reform," 107-112.

²¹⁰ Terzioğlu, "Al-Siyāsa al-Shar'īyya," 105-6.

²¹¹ Terzioğlu, "Bir Tercüme," 248.

²¹² Terzioğlu, "Al-Siyāsa al-Shar'īyya," 101-3.

²¹³ Terzioğlu, "Al-Siyāsa al-Shar'īyya," 105-7.

Ibn Taymiyya's work.²¹⁴ This treatise fits into the tradition of "the mirror for princes" well, but the stress here was over both the political and religious leadership of the sultan, by taking the hadith of the renewer at the center.²¹⁵

Another contextual interpretation may come from the possible influence of the Mujaddidi order on Feyzullah Efendi, which may provide a broader perspective and background to both these claims of renewal and the project of religious education, in connection to other religious currents. The Nakşibendi-Müceddidi order emerged as a sub-branch of Nakşibendiye in seventeenth-century India, following the doctrines of Ahmed el-Sirhindi, and expanded into Istanbul towards the end of the century by Sheikh Murad el-Buhari (d. 1720). After coming to the capital, the sheikh and the order became so popular among the populace and established itself in the heart of the empire.²¹⁶

This order is known for its strict adherence to the Quran and Sunna, placing these two into the center of the believer's life, and its enactment of the prophetic life in one's quotidian actions. As it emerged in a polytheistic milieu, the order undertook a stricter degree in its observance of the rites of religion, and reviving the sharia was a must in the eyes of the people who live in "full of darkness."²¹⁷ It is stated,

the Naqshbandi-Mujaddidi order was not merely concerned with the spiritual attainment of the Muslim believer, but equally so with restoring Orthodox belief and the primacy of the shari'a into the life of the Muslim believer and community and to encourage them to live by its ordinances.²¹⁸

²¹⁴ Terzioğlu, "Al-Siyāsa al-Shar'īyya," 136-7, 139-141. The specific context of the reign of Mustafa II and the prioritizing of sharia over kanun particularly make these Taymiyyan-influenced texts and their dissemination, circulation, and utilization especially important to take into account and read to conceptualize a sharia-based rule. Hence, the dialogue of Feyzullah Efendi with Ibn Taymiyya, his ownership of the latter's work, and the imprints of its central arguments in the former's deeds and works are not surprising.

²¹⁵ Şahin, "Nesaihi'l-Müluk," 348.

²¹⁶ Abou-Manneh, "Expansion of," 1.

²¹⁷ Abou-Manneh, "Expansion of," 2.; Weismann, *The Naqshbandiyya*, 57-61.

²¹⁸ Abou-Manneh, "Expansion of," 3.

The order attracted the upper classes of the society and according to Sirhindi, the Sufi orders were means to achieve sharia and the latter is superior to and more important than the former. For him, the central mission of the order is to restore the Orthodox Islam in the lives of the people, revive and renew sharia, which can only be attained by “strengthening of Islamic law, regeneration of the Muslim community,” and “invigorating the umma to spread sharia.”²¹⁹ For the follower and son of Sirhindi, Muhammed Masum (d. 1668), “intermingling with unbelievers or [having] friendly relations with them . . . contradicted the injunctions of the Quran” and Muslims should differentiate themselves from the unbelievers. He also adopted a strict and confined application of religious tolerance.²²⁰ Murad el-Buhari, the disciple of Muhammed Masum, was ordered to disseminate the teachings, and he went to Damascus.²²¹ The call to revive sunnah and sharia, combining Sufism with learning, rejecting ecstatic utterances, and observing sobriety found its way into the upper echelons of society and the ruling circles of the empire. The Müceddidi messengers spread his thoughts with missionary enthusiasm and contrary to the effect of the Kadızadelis, they offered a common ground for the divided community in the empire.²²²

In 1681, Murad el-Buhari moved to Istanbul, settled in Eyüp, a place that will later become the hub of Nakşibendis and the many who were affiliated with him. In 1686, as a side-effect of the toppling of Vani and the disgust for “men of religion,” Buhari left the city and returned to Damascus.²²³ The second appearance of him in Istanbul (1696) corresponds with the sultanate of Mustafa II and the şeyhülislamate

²¹⁹ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 2-3.; Weismann, *The Naqshbandiyya*, 1-2.

²²⁰ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 4-5.

²²¹ Weismann, *The Naqshbandiyya*, 68.

²²² Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 5-6.

²²³ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 9-10.

of Feyzullah Efendi. He met with the former via the latter, and some lands were bestowed to him as a grant. Receiving the support of the sultan and the şeyhülislam, he established two lodges in Damascus. Around the same time, Feyzullah Efendi founded a madrasa there, too.²²⁴ Feyzullah Efendi was also shown as an affiliate of the order when Buhari came to the city decades before. As I stated above, Feyzullah Efendi was born into a Halveti family. However, in the discussion of the history of the Müceddidi order in Turkey, Algar points out his connection to the order,

The Muḍjaddidī branch of the order established by Sirhindī was first transmitted to Turkey by Shaykh Muḥammad Murād Bukhārī (d. 1141/1729), a *murīd* of Khʿādja Muḥammad Murād Maʿšūm, Sirhindī's son and principal successor. Muḥammad Murād spent about five years in the Ottoman capital towards the end of the 11th/17th century, during which time he gained numerous '*ulamā*', including the *Shaykh al-Islām* Feyḍ Allāh Efendi, as his followers.²²⁵

However, Abou-Manneh states that no contemporary source makes a claim in this respect.²²⁶

Regardless of şeyhülislam's affiliation to the order, it is speculated by Abou-Manneh that Feyzullah aimed to make the existence of this order sustained by a vigorous endowment in a remarkable city through royal patronage. One plausible reason for this connection may be situating an agent there to propagate the Ottoman dynasty as the real defender of sharia and the role of the sultan as a renewer.²²⁷ Nonetheless, Murad Buhari seems to be unable to take root in the city because after the deposition of the sultan and the death of Feyzullah Efendi, he faced considerable opposition in the city and left it to hail in Istanbul in 1708. The stance of the Buhari in the city seems to be continued only through imperial auspices. The grandson of

²²⁴ Abou-Manneh, "Expansion of," 11-2.

²²⁵ Algar and Nizami, "Naqshbandiyya"; For his affiliation to Halveti order, see Kara and Çögenli, "Hayatı ve Eserleri," 48.; For his "initiation as a Nakşibendi disciple," see Le Gall, "Intra-Sufi Diatribe," 17.; Weismann, *The Naqshbandiyya*, 135. For the discussion of Feyzullah Efendi's tariqa affiliation, cf. Tayşi, "Feyzullah Efendi," Şimşek, "Murad Buhârî," especially the followers presented in the latter with the tariqa affiliation information in the former.

²²⁶ Abou-Manneh, "Expansion of," 12.

²²⁷ Abou-Manneh, "Expansion of," 12.

Buhari was called by Mahmud I in the 1750s to perform the pilgrimage in the name of the sultan, and he was appointed as the Hanafi mufti of Damascus in 1758.²²⁸

Excitingly, the connection of Mahmud I with his father's favorites comes to the fore.²²⁹

Nevertheless, this Nakşibendi-Müceddidi connection may not be limited to Feyzullah Efendi. There are interesting connections that become explicit when we inspect some of the people in detail. In 1696, in the second campaign of Mustafa II, the Ottomans began to prepare the army. Nonetheless, here we come across a group of people whom we talked about in the former chapter but were believed to be suppressed when their leader was banished to Bursa: the Kadızadelis. Once again, they entered into the scene, and now, they undertook a more engaged and active mission. Sheikh Tophaneli Hafız Mehmed Efendi (d. 1704-1705)²³⁰ and Bosnalı Mustafa Efendi (d. 1715-1716),²³¹ “from among the sheikhs following the path of Kadızade” (*Kadızade tariki şeyhlerinden*), will attend the campaign, and on Mondays and Thursdays, they will preach and give advice in the royal tent, and on other days, they will give sermons to soldiers. With whom they will camp and accompany was also determined.²³² In the collection of biographies, their task in the campaigns was

²²⁸ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 13.

²²⁹ We see the return of the Feyzullahzades in the reign of Mahmud I, and bringing them to higher *ilmiye* positions, Faroqhi, “An Ulama Grandee,” 207.

²³⁰ In *Vekayi'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, only one Tophaneli Sheikh Mehmed Efendi was listed. For the information on the sheikh, see Şeyhî, *Vekayi'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2351-2.

²³¹ In *Vekayi'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, there is only one Sheikh Bosnevi Mustafa Efendi, and for information about him, see Şeyhî, *Vekayi'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2748-9. In Şeyhî's work, it is stated that a certain Himmet Efendizade Sheikh Abdullah Efendi and İspiri Damadı Sheikh Mustafa Efendi accompanied him in the campaigns. For the relevant information about these sheikhs, see Şeyhî, *Vekayi'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2716-8, 2725-2736.

²³² Topal, “Nusretname,” 139. The Kadızadeli connection and its appearance once again in such a prominent position worth considering. Since Feyzullah Efendi was the son-in-law of Vani, and he was the leader of these people, it is plausible to find a link between the şeyhülislam and this group. Le Gall also argues that Feyzullah Efendi coupled the Nakşibendis and Kadızadelis, Le Gall, “Intra-Sufi Diatribe,” 16. Though attendance of sheikhs to campaigns is not unprecedented, openly calling these sheikhs “Kadızadelis” and defining them as an order/path (*tarik*) by Silahdar is quite crucial. This shows how they were conceived by their contemporaries as well. Though we know hailing of some provincial examples of the Kadızadelis they were later cases, and the important point here is the reappearance of these people at the very top positions of the empire without any hesitation to be called

explained that “it is the ancient custom of the sultans that accompanying a virtuous sheikh from among the great sheikhs who tell the merits of jihad and explaining the rewards of perseverance and patience.”²³³ A second order was issued and taking young boys with soldiers and the failure to participate in the daily prayers were prohibited.²³⁴

One sheikh whose attendance to the campaigns of Mustafa II, other than those mentioned above, was reported is İspiri Damadı Mustafa Efendi (d. 1708). He is the son-in-law of İspiri Ali Efendi (d. 1691), one of the famous preachers of his time and the preacher of Ayasofya mosque. The biography collection states that İspiri Ali Efendi is a Nakşibendi and that he is affiliated to one grand sheikh of Nakşibendiyye, Sheikh Murad Efendi (*eizze-i meşayih-ı Nakşibendiyye Şeyh Murad Efendi hazretlerinden inabet ile*), or Murad el-Buhari. When he came to Istanbul, Ali Efendi was a student of Minkarizade Yahya Efendi as well, like Feyzullah Efendi, and began his preaching career, not surprisingly, in Eyüp.²³⁵ It should be stressed that Minkarizade Yahya Efendi also penned a commentary on revival hadith, and possibly, he might have some revivalist tendencies, which found its reflection in the

Kadızedeli. Later, Silahdar notes that the sultan performed Kadir night prayer, without giving any details whether it was in congregation or not.

²³³ Şeyhî, *Vekayi 'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2717.

²³⁴ Topal, “Nusretname,” 144, “ordu-yı hümayun askerinde her kimde genç ve oğlan bulunup ve bi-namaz olanlar ba'de't-teftiş katl olunur deyü emr-i hümayun sadır olup muhkem tenbihler olmağın mahbub-ı dost olanlar azim vehme düşüp . . . ağızlarına sinek üşüp bi-ruh kaldılar.” In the context of the Second Siege of Vienna, we see the excessive consumption of alcohol, fornication, and the sodomy of Janissaries being shown as the object of the moral condemnation of God and one of the reasons for the defeat at the siege, Ateş, “Anonim Bir Tarihçe,” 48. A contextual clue about the astonishment of the Janissaries can be the hostility between the Kadızedelis and the Janissaries in the seventeenth century, Tezcan, *The Second Ottoman Empire*, 216. Now the new mission of Kadızedeli sheikhs in the army camp came up with a ban on the fellows of these soldiers, signing a spiritual victory of the former over the latter. Bearing the same admonishment of Vani Efendi in mind, we can see a continuation between him and his disciple.

²³⁵ Dağcı, “İspirli Alimler,” 27n8.

sensitivities of his students.²³⁶ Yahya Efendi might have had a contact with the order before the coming of Murad el-Buhari to Istanbul.

We can clearly state that these army sheikhs were chosen specifically by Feyzullah Efendi. The criteria for this choice are unknown to us; however, we can speculate. Maybe a connection to the Nakşibendi order was favored by the şeyhülislam, bearing their connections to the order. They might have known each other through Minkarizade either. Also, we are informed by the entries that İspiri Damadı Mustafa Efendi was chosen first for accompanying the army in the 1106-7 campaign (1695). Then, the other sheikhs, Bosnevi Sheikh Mustafa Efendi and Himmet Efendizade Abdullah Efendi (d. 1710-1711), attended to campaigns in 1108 (1697). Therefore, the first chosen person is a relative of another Nakşibendi. Silahdar gives the name of Bosnevi Sheikh Mustafa Efendi but omits Abdullah Efendi. On the other hand, he gives the name of Tophaneli Sheikh Mehmed Efendi, but in the entry of this sheikh in the collection of biographies, we do not see such clear information about his attendance of the campaigns. Silahdar also does not give any names of preachers in the narrative of the first campaign. We do not see another Nakşibendi reference in the entries of these people, as well. But İspiri Ali Efendi, İspiri Damadı Mustafa Efendi, and Bosnevi Sheikh Mustafa Efendi were all buried in Topkapı, a place known as “Şeyhler Makrebesi” (the cemetery of sheikhs).²³⁷ This place has significant importance that Kadızade Mehmed Efendi, the so-called first leader of the Kadızadeli movement, was also buried there. We learn that İspiri and his son-in-law were buried very close to Kadızade, which signifies the importance

²³⁶ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 16. One interesting connection between Minkarizade Yahya Efendi and Murad Buhari is that the latter was buried in the madrasa in Eyüp, which was built by the former’s son-in-law, Çankırılı Mustafa Rasih, whose son and disciple of Buhari, Ebu’l Hayr buried him there. Then, the madrasa was donated to become the order’s lodge that carried the sheikh’s name, Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 20, 20n95.

²³⁷ Dağcı, “İspirli Alimler,” 27n8; Şeyhî, *Vekayi’ü’l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2717, 2748-9.

attributed to being close to this famous person and may mean a kind of affiliation to this “predecessor,” reminding us the appellation of Silahdar when he introduced these people in his chronicle. A fusion of different affiliations and identities was transpiring, and being a Nakşibendi-affiliate, Kadızadeli, revivalist, ardent preacher, admonisher, palace frequenter, agent of the sultan and his policies were meddled in the twilight of the “times of calamities and hopelessness,” just like the description of the Muslims in the treatise of Sirhindi and the autobiography of Feyzullah Efendi.

Their appearance in the entries and the chronicles, in connection to the Nakşibendi order, attributed affiliation to the Kadızadelis, and their assumed proximity to Feyzullah Efendi had an impact on Mustafa II, too. The calling of Buhari’s son by Mahmud I is not a mere respect shown for a sheikh, but it demonstrates a close connection. Feyzullah Efendi may not be thought independent of a certain influence of Kadızadelis bearing the context and his familial connection to Vani Mehmed and his followers. The chief mufti had clear connections to the Nakşibendis, and he came from a Halveti background. Hence, sharing similar sentiments and solidarity pose significant aspects of these people. Maybe the Nakşibendis were the representatives of the genuine and sharia- abiding Sufism and were agreeable to the movement and its followers in this respect. Furthermore, the noted attendance of these sheikhs at the campaigns may not be the only time that these people appear. As I will discuss in the following chapter, these people might have been utilized as agents and actors of this educational program.

One evident element is that the Ottoman elites welcomed the coming of Murad Buhari since he was the one who was expected by the people at the time.²³⁸

²³⁸ Some of the followers of Buhari from the upper class are “the head physician Ömer Efendi, the vizier Numan Pasha, son of Grand Vizier Mustafa Fazıl Köprülü and himself grand vizier in 1710, the grand vizier Damad Ali Pasha (d. 1716) and Grand Vizier Damad Ibrahim Pasha [Nevşehirli]; Sheykh ül-Islam Ebü Ishak Ismail Efendi and others,” “Mevlana Ishak Efendi a highly learned alim, the elder

Writing treatises on renewer hadith demonstrates a specific context and mentality of the contemporaries, keeping the post-1683 context and the Treaty of Karlowitz in mind. Buhari was known for his “deep concern for Islam.” In the times of defeat and retreat of the “Muslim state at the hands of ‘the infidels’ and growing anxiety and despair,” he encouraged his disciples “who reached higher positions in the state,” to be “extremely vigilant about their religion and to work for its revival.” He expressed his will in one of his letters “that God will revive his religion at your hands.” In another one, he urged to “work ‘for the revival of this true religion . . . of which only the name has remained . . .’” He also expressed his despair; “I have spent my life, though disabled, weak and a stranger in the cause of delivering the word of truth by means of men like you.” He continued and stressed “vigilance vigilance [for the religion], ... impotence ('ajz) is prevailing, hope is lost, belief is confused, the enemy is victorious and the means of victory are blocked.”²³⁹ Sheikh Murad believed that “the return to Orthodox Islamic ideals was a precondition for the regeneration of the Muslim community (tajdid-i millat)” as Sirhindi said, “and for the restoration of the power of the state which would strengthen it in the face of its enemies.”²⁴⁰ The hunters of a suitable source for renewal and revival could not miss a representative of an order spreading these ideas. This patron might have instigated a revivalist idea and sensitivity among his followers and affiliates. Among other teachings of his order, like “the absolute unity of God, no partner to God, no union with Him, and no incarnation, . . . [following] the sharia strictly and reject[ing] blameworthy innovation, philosophy and ecstatic utterance, resembling the companions [of prophet] in their belief, deeds and sentiments,” Sheikh Murad underlined the

son of Ebü Ishak, and himself Sheykh ül-Islam in the early 1730s and who like his father was a follower of Sheikh Murad,” Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 17.

²³⁹ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 18-9.

²⁴⁰ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 19-20.

requirement to keep the *rabita* (mystical link) with him. “It was incumbent upon his disciples to be bound to him . . . he wrote that ‘the rabita could substitute for the dhikr (commemoration) if it were [spiritually] granted [and the affiliation with one’s sheikh] depends on it’”²⁴¹ Here, it is striking that we find great similarities between the words and urges of Buhari and the expressions and messages of Feyzullah Efendi. The temporal anxieties and motivations must have affected the minds and actions of these contemporaries.

As we stated in the previous chapter, sheikhs, preachers, and their followers had a lasting influence on the mentality, thoughts, imaginations, and activities of the people and on both daily and long-term politics and religious culture. Sufis of many colors affected both the period before and during the reign of Mustafa II, with an intensifying volume in the last century. This contextual expansion of the space in which the Sufis and their orders had a voice affected the stance of the sultan and his beloved master as well. His predecessors maintained a continuing relation to the mystics and the Sufis with differing tempos and momentum. The Nakşibendis are kind of latecomers or newcomers to this vivid scene, but they achieved to hold a strong place among the actors and often reappeared in the cases of the important turning points of Ottoman history in the following decades and centuries. One contemporary instance comes from the family of Feyzullah Efendi. Buhari might not have been successful in his mission, at least in the short run, but he did well in converting a descendent of a prominent Halveti family into his order, Mustafa Efendi, the son of Feyzullah.²⁴² This point also clarifies the force and imprint of his

²⁴¹ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 18.

²⁴² Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 16, 24; İpşirli, “Mustafa Efendi, Feyzullah efendizâde.” It is a significant combination indeed. The Halvetis and Nakşibendis were in a rivalry to win followers and the royal patronage. The Halvetis and Nakşibendis were two prominent and substantial elements of the “Sunnitization” policies of the state, especially in the Balkans. On the other hand, the missionary zeal of the two orders did not lead to a divide between the two. Contemporaries, for instance, do not cite a significant clash of the Halvetis and the Nakşibendis, Le Gall, “Intra-Sufi Diatribe,” 24-5.

strong order in the top policies and families of Ottoman polity. The reformist language of the order found its way into the court of the sultan and held a strong position within the policies, mentality, discourse, and enactments of the reign of Mustafa II, the most prominent one of which is the religious education policy.²⁴³

On the basis of revivalism, Mustafa II made some reforms and implementations accordingly, like enforcing new taxes on tobacco. He also sent Osman Pasha to Anatolia to bring law and order there, and he would visit the realm village by village and develop the life conditions in Anatolia.²⁴⁴ We also see some continuations from the earlier periods of confessionalization policies, like the adding of pulpits to mosques to turn them into Friday mosques. In a petition, the inhabitants of Karabiga, in present-day Çanakkale, requested the permission of the sultan for adding a pulpit to a masjid there to convert it into a Friday mosque.²⁴⁵ In Ismail, in present-day Romania, the Muslims demanded the approval of the sultan for performing Friday prayers in a local mosque.²⁴⁶ In Andırın, in present-day Kahramanmaraş, since there was no mosque or preacher, it was reported that the people abandoned the prayers and fasting. It was requested that a mosque be built and imams be appointed to teach religion, to explain to the people the rights and wrongs about ritual prayers and fasting, and to preach (*mescidlerinde ta'lim-i dîn, ve salât-ı hamsin ve savm-ı Ramazânın sıhhatlerin ve fesâdın beyân idüb va'z u nasîhat eylemek üzere*).²⁴⁷ Also, there is a petition (1696) requesting the sultan to appoint an

²⁴³ The aftermath of the Müceddidi order will be discussed in the conclusion chapter of this thesis.

²⁴⁴ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 597, 601, 608-9.; Topal, “Nusretname,” 216-220. For this appointment, see the relevant section in the following chapter.

²⁴⁵ BOA AE.SMSTII 67.7031, 29 Zilhicce 1114 – 16 May 1703. A similar issue was discussed in the fatwa collection of Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetava-yı Feyziyye*, 7#21. For the question of authorship of the fatwas in the collection titled “Fetava-yı Feyziyye” and the possibility of dating the fatwas in the collection to earlier and later şeyhülislams, see Özen, “Osmanlı Dönemi Fetva Literatürünün,” 347n1. Since I could not obtain any further note on the issues raised by Özen, I continued to refer to the author of the collection as Feyzullah Efendi, bearing the caution of Özen in mind.

²⁴⁶ BOA İE.EV. 29.3409 (November 1701).

²⁴⁷ BOA AE.SMSTII 11.1039, 22 Zilkade 1114 – 9 April 1703.

imam to Fethiye Camii in Sofia.²⁴⁸ In Nusretname, we learn that in his first campaign, the sultan visited Sofia incognito and encountered a converted church, which was built in the time of Jesus Christ, and then it was converted to a mosque in the time of Bayezid II and named Gül Camii. However, when the Habsburgs came to Sofia and destroyed it, the mosque was wrecked, the Muslim population fled the village, the Christians inhabited the area, and the mosque was used as a storehouse. The sultan ordered the displacement of Christians to another place and the repair of the mosque, naming it after his name, and inhabiting Muslims around the mosque. In Filibe, it is reported that Çukacı Sinan Çelebi Camii was ruined for 50 years, and the people requested the sultan to repair it. The sultan ordered to repair the mosque and again displaced the Christians settling around it.²⁴⁹ The sultan revisited Gül Camii next year and performed the Friday prayer there. He also visited the mosque in Filibe, but its repair was not completed yet. The sultan ordered the quick completion of the repair.²⁵⁰ These instances show both the intention of the sultan to undertake the duty of reviving the hearths of Islam and that the background of the orders was issued years later. One other incident may be stressed, too. In 1696, a great fire occurred in Galata and destroyed a significant part of the district. All the churches were consented to be rebuilt, but the Venetian church was destroyed to its bases, and

²⁴⁸ Gradeva, "Late Antique," 174n30.

²⁴⁹ Topal, "Nusretname," 47. Gradeva gives the history of the Gül Camii, also known as "Rotunda" or "Büyük Kenise Camii." Another name of the mosque is "Bayezid-i Veli Camii," which proves the narrative on the building Silahdar reports. Just around 1696, she states, new waqfs were appointed for the maintenance and functioning of the mosque. According to the documents, since "it was 'completely demolished' and it is impossible to conduct prayers inside or outside" the mosque, it was not in use since 1689-1690. During the League Wars, Köprülüzade Mustafa Pasha used the building to store "peksimet" for the army. She also states that Non-Muslims were forced to sell their houses to Muslims. There were also Jews in the neighborhood, and though they were also forced to move out of the neighborhood, they "managed to secure their right to stay," Gradeva, "Late Antique," 182-191. Also, it is informed that sultan "ordered the construction of four cells for 'very learned medrese students (talebe)'" and establish a Muslim neighborhood, yet Muslims never reached to the intended numbers there. One possible reason for establishing a Muslim neighborhood is the fear that the mosques surrounded by Christian settlements may lead them to usurp the mosque and convert it into a church. For the monograph and the restoration of the building, see Gradeva, "Sofia's Rotunda."

²⁵⁰ Topal, "Nusretname," 149-150, 157.

a mosque was built to the name of Queen Mother, which “cleansed and revived Galata” (*Galata’yı pak ve yeniden ihya eyledi*).²⁵¹ In the seventeenth century, we also observe increase in attempts to prevent the church restorations by the officials and the local Muslims, who obstruct even the repairs of the churches.²⁵² Hence, in time, hatred against the Non-Muslims escalated, manifesting the temporal attitudes of the Muslims.

Hence, we see great overlaps between the former cases and the program in the time of Mustafa II. In fact, the Ottoman state authorities had been emphasizing the congregational performance of the canonical prayers by Muslim adult males since at least the late years of the reign of Mehmed II. The issue had assumed new importance and received even greater attention during the sixteenth century. A renewed emphasis on the repair of mosques and the enforcement of congregational prayers in the early-eighteenth century is significant. It remains to be examined whether Mustafa II and Feyzullah were reviving the efforts of the sixteenth-century administrators, or whether similar attempts had also been underway in the seventeenth century. Also, the mobilization of the masses is an important means of sustaining the coherence of the community and solidarity. In this period, we also see the mobilization of the community of believers for praying for the victory of the Ottoman armies.²⁵³ As part of the reform program of Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha, we also see the application of dress codes according to the sharia. In October 1702, non-Muslims were prohibited from wearing Muslim clothes. In the same month, women were forbidden to wear the clothes of men, as noted in Defterdar’s chronicle.²⁵⁴ In

²⁵¹ Topal, “Nusretname,” 143.

²⁵² Gradeva, “Church Restoration Procedures;” Gradeva, “Christian Church Buildings.” I am grateful to Rossitsa Gradeva for providing her articles for his study.

²⁵³ BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 106#826, 827, 828 (August 1695); A.{DVNSMHM.d. 108#1509, 1510, 1511 (July 1696); A.{DVNSMHM.d. 110#410, 411, 412 (August 1697).

²⁵⁴ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 742, 745. The first prohibition regulates the appropriate clothes for “infidels and the Jews.” The second prohibition rules regarding the clothes of women. The ones who

Galata, we see restrictive orders for selling houses close to mosques to non-Muslims because they were behaving contrary to moral values.²⁵⁵ A ban on wine was also applied.²⁵⁶ Clearly, these policies bear the impact of revivalist and sunnizing motivations of the sultan and the earlier policies implemented in this respect.

3.3 The nature of politics in the reign of Mustafa II

Balatlı Georg, an eighteenth-century historian, reports that Feyzullah Efendi was known for his magical powers, he enchanted the sultan and established a strong influence over him and his mother.²⁵⁷ This supposition was not something to disregard. The strong connection between the sultan and Feyzullah Efendi led the contemporaries to think in this way. The relationship between Feyzullah Efendi and the sultan was analyzed by Abou-El-Haj in his article on the psychological critique of the policies and the reign of the sultan, and the study of Butrus Abu-Manneh on the relations of the two personas.²⁵⁸ These studies read the events in psychological terms. For instance, after the defeat at Zenta, when Feyzullah gained considerable power over the sultan, the latter's "personality changed from ambition, arrogance, and piety to ambivalence, indecisiveness, and narcissism."²⁵⁹ Meservy divides the reign of Mustafa II into three phases: between the years 1106 and 1109 (1695-1697),

do not regard the admonition must be taken by the secret inspectors (*mütenebbih olmayanları tebdiller ahz idüp*). We also see the severing of relations between the Muslims and non-Muslims. In İzmit (İznikmid), the poll tax collectors and local rulers offended a sailor, named Konstantin, that he was wearing yellow sandals and boots (*mest ve pabuç*) and a red fur cap (*kalpak*) (June 1703). The second example is from Konya. It is reported that though non-Muslims used to go to hammams on appointed days for themselves apart from the Muslims, the latter argued that they object the formers to continue to come to the hammam (June 1703), Çil, "38 Numaralı," 236, 247. Some other cases are going to be presented in the following chapter.

²⁵⁵ BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 108#1185 (1696)

²⁵⁶ An order was sent to Yanya in April 1703, BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#495. In July 1696 and January 1698, we see earlier attempts to ban the consumption and selling of wine, BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 108#1498-1499-1450., A.{DVNSMHM.d. 110#1117.

²⁵⁷ Andreasyan, "Balatlı Georg'a Göre," 48.; Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 35, 37.

²⁵⁸ Abou-El-Haj, "The Narcissism"; Abou-Manneh, "Feyzullah Efendi and Sultan Mustafa II."

²⁵⁹ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 55.

Feyzullah Efendi “had limited influence over Mustafa II;” between 1109 and 1113 (1695-1701), “he did not care much about Feyzullah Efendi;” and lastly, between 1113 and 1115 (1701-1703) “[the sultan] became power-mad and paranoiac.”²⁶⁰ He affixed himself to Feyzullah, and the latter became a kind of acting sultan in the name of Mustafa II. The condition reached such an extreme that he was attached intimately to Feyzullah, that even “by the end of his reign, neither the threat to his throne nor the disruption of public life would persuade the sultan to abandon the attachment and trust which he vested in Feyzullah.”²⁶¹

He was vested with full authority to be counseled in all the state affairs, and all the grand viziers were advised to seek approval from Feyzullah Efendi in any action.²⁶² Abou-El-Haj goes deep into the personality of Mustafa II and evaluates the self-confidence and “exhibitionistic pattern of behavior,” and the “aura of grandiose as a manifestation of a hollow, creating a dependent personality.”²⁶³ The source for this pattern is narcissism. The driving force behind this is ambition and its purpose is self-gratification.²⁶⁴ “Vindication and fulfillment of the fantasies of grandiosity, [and] insistence on external conformity” were the primary goals.²⁶⁵

After the defeat at Zenta, he demonstrated his incapacity to act without approval of Feyzullah Efendi.²⁶⁶ The author’s explanation for why Feyzullah Efendi, and not another person from the state bureaucracy was chosen, was because Mustafa

²⁶⁰ Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 108.

²⁶¹ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 10. A specific event cited from Balatlı Georg is meaningful in this sense, Andreasyan, “Balatlı Georg’a Göre,” 62.

²⁶² Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 122. Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 111-121.

²⁶³ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 124.

²⁶⁴ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 124.

²⁶⁵ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 125-7. Abou-El-Haj proposes two instances of image-manipulation and make-believe regarding the Silahdar and his history. He argues that the sultan’s will to make him name his chronicle as “Nusretname” (The Book of Victories), and the anecdote cited by Silahdar reflect the consideration of the sultan regarding his image in the chronicle, see Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 120.

²⁶⁶ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 122.

was dubious about the loyalty of the top bureaucrats, and Feyzullah Efendi nurtured no direct plan against the sultan, but he had dreams regarding his household.²⁶⁷

Mustafa II was a wise person, though he experienced a shock and failure on the battlefield. He was, for a long while, in politics, and the powerholders were aware of his knowledge about politics, as stated above.²⁶⁸ The sultan knew that some factions in the state prevented him from succeeding his father twice, and he tried to suspend their might and ostracize their power by playing on Feyzullah Efendi and letting him establish a household unto himself, with a rampant zeal.²⁶⁹

Also, he was effective on Mustafa II when he was a pupil, and his tutor impressed him about the brilliant forefathers of the prince, which incited the will and rigor to imagine to be a powerful sultan in the difficult times.²⁷⁰ Historical examples taught by Feyzullah in their classes as “model rulers and ghazi sultans” might have led to taking the courses seriously and adding the imam to the campaigns, forbidding soldiers from participating in delights in the war camps, and taking a moralistic attitude under the auspices of şeyhülislam, by which he might have thought to cleanse corruption and stagnation, guided by providence.²⁷¹ These points clarify and give a contextual framework to our explanation of the religious education program.

After the defeat at Zenta, the splendor of the sultan soon failed, and his personality underwent a significant change.²⁷² This was the beginning of the downfall of the sultan. He did not admit the defeat nor take any responsibility for the

²⁶⁷ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 130.

²⁶⁸ Please check footnote 180 above.

²⁶⁹ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 1, 104; Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 9. Feyzullah Efendi was prevented from being appointed as şeyhülislam when the sultan called him. Sürmeli Ali Pasha, the first grand vizier of Mustafa II, appointed Mirza Mustafa Efendi to the şeyhülislamate, and Feyzullah Efendi waited a while for this position. The grand vizier became the foe of Feyzullah Efendi and was dismissed and executed in the end, Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi 3. Cilt*, 503.

²⁷⁰ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 130-1.

²⁷¹ Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 131.

²⁷² Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 119-120; Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 71-73.

failure; he appointed Amcazade Hüseyin Pasha to the grand vizierate and withdrew from state affairs and spent time hunting and on festive occasions. But the şeyhülislam had extensive control over the actions of the grand vizier.²⁷³ In the absence of the sultan – free from his direct attention and control – once again, the Köprülü faction participated in state affairs with a fresh start, aiming to show the strength of the government and to take care of the state and military after the shocking defeat and treaty.²⁷⁴ Yet now, a new power, or some sort of a *kapı* (a household), was rising, and the person behind this move was Feyzullah Efendi.

The creation of Feyzullah's *kapı* is not a surprise if one looks at the position of şeyhülislam in the time being and his career during this period. The domination of state cadres by the household of Feyzullah,²⁷⁵ as large as the Köprülü household, can be read as a formation of another *kapı* in Ottoman politics, an "ulema dynasty."²⁷⁶ The nepotism and favoritism of Feyzullah were notorious for his contemporaries.²⁷⁷ The abuses triggered hatred among some of the ulema members towards Feyzullah and his family members, and in the Edirne Incident, his son Fethullah Efendi was also detained, tortured, and executed in Istanbul while his corpse was thrown to the sea.²⁷⁸ Feyzullah Efendi was himself aware of the criticisms regarding his nepotism,

²⁷³ Abou-El-Haj, "The Narcissism," 120.; Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 74.; For the reasons of the choice of Amcazade, see Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 116.

²⁷⁴ Sevinç, "Edirne Vakası," 155. Since the Köprülü family prevented the accession of Mustafa II to the throne, he had some doubts regarding the Köprülü. In order to keep them under control, şeyhülislam was used as his agent to preclude any possible threat, and Feyzullah Efendi married his daughters to the Köprülü family, Nizri, "The Memoirs," 34.

²⁷⁵ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 4. For the definition and function of the vizier-pasha households, see Faroqhi, "An Ulama Grandee," 199.

²⁷⁶ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 57-72.; Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 5, 56-7.

²⁷⁷ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 5; Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 127-130, 148.

²⁷⁸ Kara and Çögenli, "Hayatı ve Eserleri," 43-46.; Sevinç, "Edirne Vakası," 159-61. For other examples of nepotisms, Ahmed Efendi (d. 1716), İbrahim Enveri (d. 1709), Ömer Efendi (d. 1712), Ali Efendi (d. 1717), and Çelebi Mehmed Efendi (d. 1748) can be given. Some of these people continued to hold positions in the reign of Mahmud I, Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 199.

and he responded by representing his condition as a ship in the sea amid a storm.²⁷⁹

He also characterized his (over)promotion of his family as a filial act. He, in his autobiography, never demonstrates any apprehension of nepotism, yet he proudly mentions the positions of his sons, paying homage to the support of Mustafa II.²⁸⁰

This relatively short but undoubtedly active career and future architecture touched on a sore point for some power delegates, cliques, and coalitions in the state.²⁸¹ He, once appointed for şeyhülislam and shortly dismissed and banished after, became a person to nurture some resentment, most probably. But his fate turned suddenly after the star of Mustafa II started to shine. It is in tandem with the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century Ottoman political arena, and related events and issues in this complex chess, which came to an end with a checkmate.

From the earlier decades of the seventeenth century, we see a new formation of state bureaucracy and its influence on the appointments. By the 1680s, a new state oligarchy emerged out of civil power. This new rising power allied with the ulema and got the force to make or unmake the sultan. This marks the beginning of “grandee politics.”²⁸² In the *askeri* class, we see several groupings in that body with different interests.²⁸³ The result was a turbulent atmosphere. The orders issued by the Ottoman court, which are going to be discussed in the next chapters, were created in that context. The social and economic disarray in the Balkans, the Crimean revolts after the dissolution of unity, the devastating defeat in the wars, and the humiliating terms of the Karlowitz treaty wanted to be allayed by endorsing the tenets of

²⁷⁹ “Bizim halimiz bahr-i muhitte fırtınaya müsadif olan sefineye benzer. Ya kenar-ı selamet ya liman-ı eman buluncaya dek rüzgarın önüne düşüp gitmekten gayrı çaremiz yoktur . . . Devletten ihtiyarı çıkmak rızamız ile belaya uğramaktır,” Sevinç, “Edirne Vakası,” 162.

²⁸⁰ Faroqi, “An Ulama Grandee,” 201.

²⁸¹ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 6. The harm that the interference of Feyzullah into state affairs may cause was discussed by Naima. Compared to early Islamic history and several abstract cases, harsh criticism prevailed in the text, Naima, *Târih-i Na’îmâ*, vol. 6, 1862-1867.

²⁸² Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 44-6.; Abou-El-Haj, “The Narcissism,” 116.

²⁸³ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 49-50.

belief.²⁸⁴ Yet these attempts did not effectuate because of the success of the revolting parties in Istanbul over the Feyzullah-Mustafa II alliance. The Edirne Incident of 1703 “consisted of a struggle between coalitions of factions drawn from various groups, which hold control over a large share of key positions in the central and the provincial administration.”²⁸⁵ Besides the above mentioned reasons for the rebellion, the grief of the vizier-pasha households (*kapılar*) on the dominance of Feyzullah over bureaucracy resulted in the revolt. *Kapılar* rose as a compelling alternative to the slaves of the sultan.²⁸⁶ Mustafa II decided to circumvent or completely neutralize the power structure. For eight years, no power faction was credited for the rebellion. Only a delicate arrangement of the power relations, coalitions, and cliques could be summoned for one common purpose; otherwise, the others might try to drive the projecting group as a prey to the oligarchs.²⁸⁷

Yet the dominance of Feyzullah over state bureaucracy is not the sole reason for the ignition of the rebellion. Indeed, he could establish a truly ulema dynasty, but not a full-fledged household to nominate a pasha or vizier from his house. He could form some links with other families, but not a Feyzullahzade vizier nor a pasha was appointed to any position.²⁸⁸ Feyzullah Efendi affected the appointments and controlled the finances. Feyzullah and his household created such a vast power locus that it also affected the material gains of the *kapılar*.²⁸⁹ Feyzullah Efendi gained

²⁸⁴ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 50-52.

²⁸⁵ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 1.

²⁸⁶ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 8-9.

²⁸⁷ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 9-10

²⁸⁸ Nizri points out that in order to “fill the gap of manpower,” Feyzullah and Mustafa II relied on vizier-pasha households, Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 118. In this context, I can speculate that this religious-educational campaign may be interpreted as a strategic move to educate and then recruit the suitable personnel for the up-coming enlargement of Feyzullah’s household and replace the old bureaucratic households, which formed a delegated power-share system among themselves. The strangely modern methods of policymaking might have influenced Feyzullah and Mustafa II to force this alternative. In a sense, they were re-entering the *devşirme* recruitment system, now exclusively from the Muslim population.

²⁸⁹ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 13-6.

massive wealth in the reign of Mustafa II. Thanks to and through him, the sultan wanted to curb the power of the *kapılar*.²⁹⁰ Patronage links between the sultan and the people constituted the foundation of an administrative career for many.²⁹¹ Years-long proximity of Feyzullah to Mustafa II made the mentor a more reliable person against the extreme force implemented by the *kapılar*, as can be seen from the earlier depositions and accessions of sultans. Mustafa was aware of all these, and Feyzullah became a kind of hand of the sultan in politics and the economy, as well as being a sort of *alter ego* of the sultan. Defeat at Zenta might have led to a disturbance and loss of motivation for an ambitious rule by Mustafa, yet he could not give up Feyzullah in such a critical position; his throne and head were at stake.²⁹² Feyzullah, too, possibly made use of this conjuncture for his and his household's benefit, either in nepotism²⁹³ or in confessionalization politics. He forged alliances, built new networks and created patronage links, and worked as an architect to build his line to

²⁹⁰ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 1.

²⁹¹ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 3.

²⁹² This issue of the identification of Feyzullah Efendi with the sultan is not a hindsight interpretation, but the contemporaries were accusing and suspecting Feyzullah to dethrone Mustafa II and place himself and his family as the new dynasty of the empire. Balatlı Georg argues that the people in the streets were accusing Feyzullah as “this *Kızılbaş* [who] will extinguish the Ottoman family,” and “this *Kızılbaş* [who] wants to change our faith (*din ve imanımızı değiştirmek ister*) and put himself over the throne.” He also notes that the appeal petition of the rebels in Istanbul says that “we do not want a *Kızılbaş*, unbeliever, and a sorcerer as your mufti (bir *Kızılbaş*, dinsiz ve büyücü bir adam olan müftünü . . .)” This account was written at quite a later time and shows the influence and the circulation of the stories and anecdotes regarding Feyzullah Efendi and the Edirne Incident among the people, Andreasyan, “Balatlı Georg’a Göre,” 49, 52-3. We also learn that the soldiers changed their sides to the rebel powers of Istanbul, saying that “we do not fight our brothers for a *Kızılbaş*,” and “we do not want a heretic şeyhülislam,” Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 140. His intervention and role in the Karlowitz treaty was also known, and this treaty and its mastermind might have been regarded as a traitor. Hence, the title of *Kızılbaş* may be deemed appropriate for him by the contemporaries, Meservey, “Feyzullah Efendi,” 146. Zilfi tries to explain this calling of the şeyhülislam as *Kızılbaş* as the rebels trying to demystify him and his exalted lineage-claim, Zilfi, *Politics of Piety*, 219. The so-called aim of Feyzullah to replace the dynasty was linked to the specific event told in his memoir that the razing of his horse in the sultan's garden was evaluated by Balatlı Georg. He believes that there might have been many probable accusations raised against Feyzullah to make him disgraced in the eyes of the sultan, but this breach of the sultanic right was specially chosen to represent him in the light of an ambitious person to usurp the throne, Faroqi, “An Ulama Grandee,” 205-6.

²⁹³ Nepotism was an effective means and some sort of a norm in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century politics and promotions. However, Feyzullah Efendi hyperbolized this instrument, Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 57-72. For “an army of youthful Feyzullahzades,” see Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 91-98.

endure the violent nature of seventeenth-century Ottoman politics.²⁹⁴ However, despite all these ambitious attempts; the disregarding of many rules, protocols, and principles; and the influx into the state cadres in an unprecedented manner, he failed. The Edirne Incident was a significant blow to his plan and household.²⁹⁵

Coming to the end of this period, there are some steps taken before the final climax. In 1702, a coup was organized by Kiblelizade Ali Bey, the stables-master of Amcazade, but it failed. After this incident, Amcazade's health worsened, and he resigned from office. Daltaban Mustafa Pasha, a Köprülü-bred official, was appointed as grand vizier upon the advice of Feyzullah Efendi.²⁹⁶ In the beginning, Daltaban Mustafa was working in tune with Feyzullah Efendi, yet after consolidating his power and position in the state, he began to challenge the latter because he was tired of the pressure on him. He was aiming to breach the peace and wage a new war, and he triggered the Crimeans to attack Russians.²⁹⁷ His plans against Feyzullah Efendi made the sultan dismiss him from the post, and he was executed, which caused anger among the people because he had widespread support among them.²⁹⁸ Lastly, Rami Mehmed Pasha was appointed to grand vizierate and was strictly advised not to act out of the word of Feyzullah. He found himself under great pressure, and şeyhülislam's and his sons' derogatory attitude to the grand vizier, by barging in every matter and aiming to control the fiscal regime of the empire, made the grand vizier decide to end the power of Feyzullah Efendi.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁴ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 153-194.; Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 46-8.

²⁹⁵ Meservey claims that the Edirne Incident would have happened without Feyzullah, but not if the Zenta defeat was not realized, Meservey, "Feyzullah Efendi," 156.

²⁹⁶ Sevinç, "Edirne Vakası," 156.

²⁹⁷ Abou-El-Haj, "The Formal Closure," 473, 473n40.

²⁹⁸ Sevinç, "Edirne Vakası," 157-8. It is argued that, after the execution of Mustafa Pasha, abusive poems were read in coffeehouses, and some mosque preachers called şeyhülislam and Mehmed Pasha as traitors.

²⁹⁹ Sevinç, "Edirne Vakası," 159. Feyzullah Efendi and his sons were talking about the grand vizier and saying that "vezir bizüm kendi çırağımızdır," Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 2 pt. 1, 141.

3.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, I went over a relatively short period. The brief life histories of the key figures were presented along with the religious and mystical currents that affected the people and the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century Ottoman politics. The objective was not only to cover the political history and the biographies of the primary actors of the scene, but also the social, religious, and even psychological history of the period by bringing them to the forefront. The sultan and his mentor were the two principal figures behind that move. However, focusing on only these two individuals and essentializing this massive project to two persons can be misleading. As we have seen, the intellectual capital of Feyzullah Efendi and his masters, teachers, and the books he read; the courses he had taken; and the political, social, intellectual, economic, and religious atmosphere of the empire, with all the actors and the active groups of former centuries, and the newcomers with reviving tendencies and discourse had a contribution to this policy.

On the other hand, why this project was borne to life and aimed to explore the reign of Mustafa II deserves to be questioned. He had a dedicated personality, and contemporary statesmen knew this well. He was tried to be held off the throne he yearned to achieve, but they were unsuccessful. Sultan Mustafa had hopes and dreams in his mind, and he went into state affairs and the warfare wholeheartedly. Whether he accomplished his dreams or not is a predicament for him. He did pretty well at the beginning, yet in his last campaign, the drama of the sultan experienced its “first pinch point.” The sultan was planning to convalesce, but the Treaty of Karlowitz was a midpoint of his reign. He was forced to settle in Istanbul, but his master Feyzullah triggered him to go to Edirne, which stands for the “second pinch

point” that aggravated the disturbed parties of the state and society in general. Soon after, a minor payment delay inflamed the fire, which hoisted the tension to its climax and led to the resolution of the case with a bloody execution and blight dethronement. To understand the contextual factors that influenced and gave way to the aura surrounding the sultan, we dealt with that period.

The decades of warfare and defeat affected the mentality of the contemporaries to believe that these calamities were the torments of God to awaken and turn them to the right path of sharia. A quest for a reliable system for governance was there for a long while in the minds and discourses of the literati. However, these new developments exacerbated this need, and we see its reflection in the treatise of Feyzullah Efendi lucidly. On the other hand, a new Sufi order stepped into the Ottoman realm and gained a strong position among the elites of the capital. The revivalist language of the Müceddidi order dovetailed with the calls of the assumed-to-be-collapsed but proven-to-be-active Kadızadeli movement of the time and the other sharia-abiding orders, like the Halvetis. Feyzullah Efendi, the person amid these currents who was trying to lead his family ship “right into a storm” made use of any available means, pushed his power to its limits, and depleted all his credit in the end. Meanwhile, he was effective in the reform program initiated after the Karlowitz treaty, and this religious education program emerged out of this effort.

The ruler and the person behind the religious education program of our case study are crucial for understanding the background and the political context of the orders. Now, the question of, “What is this religious education, or confessionalization program?” comes to attract our attention. In the pages below, I will introduce the case entirely relying on the primary sources. However, the reasons for issuing the orders remain to be handled. In the next chapter, we will go over the

Mühimme orders of the Ottoman court, which was the immediate context that influenced this decision and had an effect on its application. The narrative and the discussions of this chapter about the sultan, the şeyhülislam, the policies of the ruler, religious currents, and the important figures who emerged and are mentioned are all going to play crucial roles in the next chapter to grasp the content and find connections between the orders and the explanations. Then, in the last part of the following chapter, we will deal with the broader set of reasons and explanations of these orders in this delicate moment of the empire.

CHAPTER 4

THE CONFSSIONALIZATION PROGRAM

In the following pages, I will discuss the attempt at confessionalization by drawing upon documents found in the Mühimme registers in combination with other primary and secondary sources. After presenting the documentary evidence, I will analyze what this evidence reveals about the principal agents of confessionalization in 1702-3 and their key ideas. I will draw attention to both what this project had in common with earlier attempts at confessionalization in Ottoman history and on the novel features of this reform project as well as the bottom up and lateral initiatives affective on this religious education policy. I will try to identify the reasons behind the issuing of such detailed and comprehensive orders at this specific point in time and discuss why certain regions and provinces were specifically targeted while other places were omitted from this program. The motivations and explanations highlighted here are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather complement each other.

4.1 The program

The program begins with the first order sent to Bosnia in March 1702. Between this one and the order addressed to the kadi of Istanbul, there were other orders addressing the administrators of the central Balkan regions. Then, with the order to Hüdavendigâr, a new set of orders begins. From the beginning of the summer of 1702 to the middle of autumn of the same year, three consecutive orders were issued

and sent to cities in the Balkans, Anatolia, and the so-called Fertile Crescent.³⁰⁰ The last set of orders concerned the sending of religious personnel to the three principal arteries (*kol*) of the province of Rumelia,³⁰¹ Bosnia, Babadağı (Dobruja), and the Belgrade region along with the villages and towns along the Danube River.

The first order we have is dated March 1702, and it is addressed to the governor-general (*beglerbegi*) of Bosnia – the *molla*, that is to say, the mufti of Sarajevo and the kadis of Bosnia.³⁰² The text is written in the voice of the sultan himself. With this order, the officials were informed that it came to the sultan’s attention that “the people who live in towns and villages that are far from the great centers of the ulema and jurists are negligent about acquiring ‘essential religious knowledge’ (*‘ilm-i hâl*).” The populace that is the target of this religious education campaign is defined as “the unlettered and common people among the Muslims” (*Müslimînin ümmî ve ‘âmmelerine*). The orders affirm that honoring the sharia and comprehending its principal texts are among the most important concerns of “religion and state” (*dîn ü devlet*).³⁰³ The text then alludes to the Quranic maxim about “enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong” as a guide for all Muslims. “The failure of those duties leads to the collapse of religion, the spread of ignorance,

³⁰⁰ For the spread of the orders, see the maps in Appendix A, and the table in Appendix B. For the transcriptions and the facsimiles of the orders, see Appendix C and Appendix D.

³⁰¹ The branches of Rumelia, left-middle-right, are administrative units of the first conquered regions of the Balkans. The left branch includes the towns and cities İpsala, Gümülcine (Komotini in present-day Greece), Serres, Kara Feriye (Veria in present-day Greece), and then splits into two sub-branches extending to Tırhala (Trikala in present-day Greece) and Üsküp (Skopje in present-day Northern Macedonia). The right branch includes Yanbolu (Yambol in present-day Bulgaria), Karın plain, Pravadi (Provadia in present-day Bulgaria), then splits into two branches and one extends to Tırnova (Veliko Tarnovo in present-day Bulgaria) and Niğbolu (Nikopol in present-day Bulgaria), while the other to Dobruca (Dobruja in present-day Bulgaria). The middle branch covers Çirmen (Ormenio in present-day Greece), Zağra (Stara Zagora in present-day Bulgaria), Filibe (Plovdiv in present-day Bulgaria), and then splits into two branches and one extends to Sofia and Niş, and the other to Köstendil (Kyustendil in present-day Bulgaria) and Üsküp (Skopje). Those three directions of raiders established the later right-middle-left branches of Rumelia, İnalçık, “Rumeli.”

³⁰² BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#551. A contemporary document is about the allowances paid to the sheikhs in Bosnia, “Bosna’daki ehl-i İslam’a talim-i din-i mübin için gönderilen meşayih verilecek harcıraha dair makbuz,” BOA İE.ML 66.6130 (March 1702).

³⁰³ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 117.

the weakness of power, the desolation of cities, and the demise of people” (*izmihlâl-i diyânet ve şuyû’-ı cehâlet ü dalâlet ve za’f-ı kuvvet ve harâbe-i bilâd ve helâk-ı ’ibâd*), as the order continues. In the crux of the document, we are informed that a certain Sheikh Muhammed and three unnamed companions³⁰⁴ were sent to Bosnia to answer the questions of the people there about ritual prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, obligatory alms-giving (*zekât*), and other forms of essential religious knowledge (*’ilm-i hâl*) to revive the prophetic tradition (*ihyâ-i sünnet*), to explain the rulings of religion and the sharia (*izâh-ı ahkâm-ı dîn ü şeri’ât*), and to improve their standing in this world and the next (*islâh-ı ’emr-i dünyâ ve ahiretleriçün*).³⁰⁵ The governor was ordered to “provide a house, provisions, and road guides for the sheikhs; to meet their needs in inspecting the realm quarter by quarter; and serve to them with subservient men.” Also, the kadıs in their districts were ordered to help the mollahs in their endeavors by encouraging the Muslims under their jurisdiction to attend to their religious obligations and to live virtuously.

The second order, issued a month later in April 1702, was addressed to the “exalted mollahs” (*mevâlî-i ’izâm*) and kadıs in Rumelia.³⁰⁶ The obligation of leading people to the path of the Prophet and salvation was stressed, and the Quranic principle of “enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong” was mentioned. They were informed that ulema had been sent to all the corners of the Ottoman realms with

³⁰⁴ The people assigned to these duties are as follows: the orders 551 and 661 of register 112 state four sheikhs: Sheikh Muhammed (or Mehmed) and his three companions. They were assigned to go to Bosnia and Rumelia. The orders 665 and 766 of the same register note three sheikhs: Sheikh İbrahim and his two companions, whose names were mentioned in the following order, Sheikh Musa, and Sheikh Mustafa. They were ordered to go to several Balkan cities and the places between Edirne and Iskenderiye. In Bucak, we see four companions: Salih the mudarris, Ali the mudarris, Sheikh Musa the preacher, and Hacı ‘Âribî the preacher. In the last couple of orders of register 114, we see three sheikhs. In the first order, 861, Sheikh Muhammed el-Bünyan and Sheikh Ahmed el-Kürdi were mentioned. In the last order, 862, we see a certain Sheikh Ali, appointed for preaching and teaching religious knowledge to people between Bosnia and Ağrıboz. If Sheikh Ali of Bosnia is not the sheikh mentioned in Bucak, we have 14 different sheikhs.

³⁰⁵ Regarding Sheikh Mehmed and his companions, I am not able to present any information.

³⁰⁶ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#661.

the aim of “renewing the covenant of the Sunna of the honorable prophet” (*tecdîd-i ‘ahd-i sünnet-i fahrü’l-mürselîn*). With this aim in mind these ulema will teach the people who live far from the major centers “essential creedal knowledge” (*mesâ’il-i zarûriyye-i ‘itikâdiyye*) and the “subdivisions of the virtues of knowledge and practice” (*teferru’-i fezâ’il-i ‘ilmiyye ve ‘ameliyye*). They will perform this task by offering “gentle counsel” (*mevâ’iz-i rikâk ile*) and by “taking into consideration the constitutions of the Muslims” (*tedebbür-i emzice-i Müslimîn*). The order then specifies that the Friday preacher Sheikh Mehmed and his three companions were sent to Bosnia to “teach the matters of sharia, to explain good morals and religious matters, and to command the right and prohibit the wrong” (*ta’lîm-i mesa’il-i şer’iyye ve tebyîn-i ahlâk-ı marziyye ve tefhîm-i mehâm-ı dîniyye ve emr-i bi’l-ma’rûf ve nehy ‘ani’l-münker içün*) in mosques and masjids. The recipients of the order were instructed that when these preachers arrive at their district, they must support and help these preachers, and talk to and encourage the Muslims to adorn themselves with the Sunna of the prophet. A letter was given to the sheikhs by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi to operate accordingly.

The content of the third order,³⁰⁷ dated April 1702, is almost the same as the first one. The person who was vested with the task of bringing religious knowledge of the common folk was a certain İbrahim “from among the exemplary ulema who practice what they know” (*kıdvetü’l-‘ulemâ ve’l-‘amilîn*) and his two companions.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#665.

³⁰⁸ Von Hammer states that Sheikh İbrahim is the son of Feyzullah Efendi (*fils du moufti*) and the tutor of prince Mahmud, later Mahmud I (*et précepteur du prince Mahmoud*), Hammer-Purgstall, *Histoire de l’Empire ottoman*, 67-8. In the previous chapter, among the sons of Feyzullah Efendi, I mentioned Ibrahim Enveri, but not in detail. In the sources, only Hammer states that Sheikh İbrahim is the son of Feyzullah Efendi, and we have no other evidence in this respect. Affirming Hammer’s statement is impossible depending on our orders, and probably Hammer did not pay attention to the usage of his sources or mistook them. I could find no information about the true identity of Sheikh İbrahim and his companions Sheikh Musa and Sheikh Mustafa. However, as you may remember from the former chapter, we had met a certain Bosnevi Sheikh Mustafa Efendi, who attended the campaigns of Mustafa II in the Balkans. Therefore, I speculate that he might have been in these travels as well.

The addressees of the order were Hüdaverdi, the governor of İskenderiye and Dukakin (Shkodër and Dukakin, both in present-day Albania); Osman, the governor of Delvine (Delvinë in present-day Albania); Selim, the governor of Yanya (Ioannina in present-day Greece); Osman, the governor of İlbasan (Elbasan in present-day Albania), Zeynel, governor of Avlonya (Vlorë in present-day Albania); Hasan, governor of Üsküp (Skopje, in present-day Northern Macedonia); Kurd Mehmed, governor of Prezrin (Prizren in present-day Kosovo); and the kadıs in Köstendil (Kyustendil in present-day Bulgaria).

The fourth order,³⁰⁹ issued in April 1702, was addressed to the kadıs, *kethüdas*, Janissary commanders, notables, and local militias of the towns that lay between Edirne and İskenderiye. Sheikh İbrahim and his companions Sheikhs Musa and Mustafa were sent to the provinces of Köstendil, Üsküp, Prizren, Ohri (Ohrid in present-day Northern Macedonia), Delvine, Yanya, İlbasan, Avlonya, Dukakin, and İskenderiye in order to teach religious matters and deal with the essential issues of religion. The officials were urged to help with the transferring of the sheikhs from one place to another.

The following five orders are almost the same in content. They were addressed to the kadıs, muftis, and mollas of the Hüdavendigâr sancak (comprising the lands around Bursa, Çanakkale, Afyon, Kütahya, Balıkesir, Sakarya, and Bilecik in present-day Turkey), as well as the governors, administrators, kadıs, and mollas of 33 different provinces; the kadı of İstanbul; the kadıs in Galata, Üsküdar, and Eyüp; the kadıs in and around the province of Özi (Ochakiv in present-day Ukraine); and mollas and kadıs in the province of Rumelia and its branches, Tatarpazarı and Filibe

Another possibility is İspiri Damadı Sheikh Mustafa Efendi. For these sheikhs please refer to the relevant section in Chapter 3.

³⁰⁹ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#766.

(Pazardzhik and Plovdiv, respectively, in present-day Bulgaria). These near-identical orders were all issued successively in time, from April-May 1702 to June 1703.³¹⁰ In total, we have 46 provinces, cities, and towns specified in these orders. They all begin with the hadith, “religion is advice” (*ed-dînü ’n-nasîha*).³¹¹ They all evoke the Quranic maxim to “enjoin the right and forbid the wrong” as a guide for the welfare of the Muslims living there, under the protection of the sultanate, and instruct the officials to implement the following five commands in the areas under their jurisdiction.

First, they should examine imams and preachers about their knowledge of the Sunni creed (*’akîde-i ehli ’s-sünnet ve ’l-cemâ’a*), their proficiency in Quranic recitation, and their knowledge about issues related to ritual prayer (*mesâ’il-i salât*). Those who are found to have deficient knowledge of the said items should be forced to learn what they do not know, and they should be replaced with others who have the required knowledge and who meet the approval of the community to lead them (as imam), and their petitions (for appointment) should be conveyed to the Sublime Porte.

Second, the order decrees that the teachers who teach the various branches of knowledge (*tedrîs-i ’ulûm-i mütenevvi’a ve ta’lîm-i fûnûn-i müsettete*) in madrasas and mosque-galleries (*medâris ü mehâfilde*) should come regularly and teach on the appointed days (four days a week). The instructors should comply with the lessons in the books of exegesis, hadith, and jurisprudence, which are the “means to eternal felicity and pious deeds” (*medâr-ı sa’det-i ebediyye ve vesîle-i hayrât-ı sermediyye*). They ought to continue in these endeavors and avoid neglect since the “heritage of

³¹⁰ BOA A. {DVNSMHHM.d. 112#724-757.; A. {DVNSMHHM.d. 112#884.; A. {DVNSMHHM.d. 112#909-911.; A. {DVNSMHHM.d. 114#316.; A. {DVNSMHHM.d. 114#811-814.

³¹¹ Tirmidhi, 1926.

the prophet” (*verâset-i enbiyâ*) depends on these fields of knowledge, and since their “importance is attested by the (following) hadith related by Abu Dawud and Ibn Majah: “Knowledge is three; this is a firm sign, an existing sunna, or a just duty.”³¹² The officials are to report to the state those who are negligent, incompetent, or ignorant to carry out those tasks.

Third, the addressed officials were instructed to observe the preachers to make sure that the latter conform to the following points. Preachers should “teach matters of the sharia, essential issues of religion, and good morals from the pulpits.” They should “soften the hearts of believers with their delicate approach” (*rikâk-ı takallüble kulûb-i mü'minîni terkîk*), and desist from misleading the people with “false tales and weak words” (*hikâyât-ı müzahrefe ve akvâl-ı muza‘‘afe*) and from being overly harsh and inciting them to animosity and enmity by way of fanaticism” (*ta‘assub*). They should “persist in ‘enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong”’ (*emr-i ma‘rûf ve nehy ‘ani’l-münkeri terk itmeyüb*) by transmitting important issues from the “reliable books” (*kütüb-i mu‘tebere*) in accordance with the Quranic verse: “And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture (He said): Ye are to expound it to mankind and not to hide it,”³¹³ and they should explain the commands of the sharia for the love of God and carry out the task of preaching and admonishing as advised by the great jurists (*şeraât-i tezkîr ve adâb-ı va‘azda fukehâ-i ‘izâm beyân itdikleri vech üzere ‘amel ideler*). The addressees of the order should inform the capital about those preachers who do not conform to these guidelines.

Fourth, the officials were mandated to inspect the primary schools (*mekteb*). If the teachers (*mu‘allim-i sıbyân ve mü‘eddib-i şebbân*) are pious and capable of

³¹² Sunan Abu Dawud, 2885.

³¹³ Quran (3:187).

reciting the Quran and of teaching “the tenets of the creed of the People of Sunna and Community” from “the reliable Arabic and Turkish treatises” (*resâ’il-i mu‘tebere-i ‘Arabiyye ve Türkiyye*), they are to be confirmed in their positions. If they are found to be incapable, then they should be replaced by those who are capable.

Fifth, Muslims must be made to attain basic religious knowledge (*‘ilm-i hâl*) about the ritual prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and *zekat*, as well as other issues regarding the belief, practices, and requirements of faith (*mesa’il-i i’tikâdiyye ve ‘ameliyye ve levâzım-ı dîniyye*). They must regularly participate in the Friday noon prayer and perform the five daily prayers in congregation. The children of believers ought to learn the Quran, occupy themselves with the requirements of faith (*mesa’il-i zarûriyye-i i’tikâdiyye*), “beware of preoccupation with worldly deceptions” (*sanâyi-i dînyeviyye ile iş[ti]galden hazer*), and study the “law of conditional practices” (*tahsîl-i şerâyi’-i ‘ameliyye-i hâliyye*). Villagers (*ehl-i kurâ*) and nomads (*ashâb-ı ahbiye*) must learn and acquire the necessities of faith and keep practicing daily prayers in congregation. A madrasa student is to be assigned to reside among each of these communities to teach them the requirements of Islam and to lead the daily prayers (*levâzım-ı islâmı ta’allüm ve tahsîl ve evkât-ı hamsede ikâmet-i cema‘at için talebe-i ‘ulûmden birer kimesneyi içlerinde îvâ ve iskân*). Officials should also urge and pressure the Muslim communities under their jurisdiction to renovate and repair their mosques and primary schools (*ta’mîr-i mesâcid ü mekteb itmeleriçün tenbîh ü teşdid*), and they should do their best to preserve the places of learning and recitation so that prayer and worship in towns and villages are not abandoned and are in good condition (*ve kasabât u kurâda olan bikâ’-i ‘ulûm u kırâ’at ve emâkin-i salât u ‘ibâdât mu‘attala olmayub ma’mûr ve meşhûn olmasiçün*). The addressees of the orders were urged to dedicate themselves to this task, insist on the requirements of

security and tranquility (*mûceb-i emn ü itmi 'nan*), and follow the advice attested by the sacred hadîth, “as you are so will your leaders be.”³¹⁴ Muftis were specifically instructed to act jointly with the kadis in this endeavor (*siz ki me 'zun bi 'l-iftâ olan mevlânâ-yı mûmâ-ileyhimsiz . . . hükkâm-ı şer' ile yedd-i vâhid olub*), and both were ordered to implement the instructions and act in accordance with the directives. Finally, the orders also refer to a letter that was written by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi about these matters, and instructs the addressees of this order to record both the letter and the issued edict into the court registers and to act in accordance with them.³¹⁵

In another order,³¹⁶ issued in September 1702, and addressed to the kadi of Üsküp, the three sheikhs mentioned in another order discussed above (112#766) – Sheikhs İbrahim, Musa, and Mustafa – reappear. It is reported that while these three companions were teaching and preaching to the “unlettered and common folk” and “enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong” in the towns and villages in Köstendil and Üsküp, it came to their attention that more than twelve taverns were operating in Üsküp. Even though the edict does not state this explicitly, it appears that the sheikhs then informed Istanbul (or possibly, Feyzullah) about this and facilitated the issuing of this edict. The edict refers to how “the consumption of wine by malicious people (*erbâb-ı fîsk u fücûr şurb-i hamr itmeleriyle*) leads to “manifold incidents of malice, corruption, murder, and turmoil” (*nice dürlü fesâdât ve şenâ 'ate ve katl-i nüfûs ve heng-i 'arâza bâ 'is olduđu*). Since the consumption, sale, and purchase of wine and *arak*, and the operation of taverns, are forbidden by religion and prohibited in the “well-protected” (i.e., Ottoman) domains, the kadi of Üsküp was ordered to close

³¹⁴ *Kama takunu yuvalla `alaykum*. Al-Daylami, *Musnad al-Shihab* (1:336).

³¹⁵ The orders 724-757 were issued in April-May 1702, the order 884 in May-June 1702, the orders 909-911 in June 1702, the order 316 in September-October 1702, the orders 811-814 in June 1703.

³¹⁶ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#1225.

down and demolish the taverns, and convert the shops to pious endowment estates. He was also instructed to make sure that no wine, *arak*, or any other intoxicants were sold in secret either in houses or in shops. Whoever commits this evil deed, be it a high-born or a lowly person (*eger a 'yân ve eger erâzilden*), should be assigned discretionary punishment and imprisoned (*hükm-i ta 'zîr ve habs eyleyüb*); otherwise, the officials will be responsible.

The last couple of orders are dated June 1703. The first one³¹⁷ addresses two sheikhs, Sheikh Muhammed ül-Bünyan and Sheikh Ahmed el-Kürdi,³¹⁸ who had previously been appointed as preachers to Bosnia. They are instructed that as they proceed towards Belgrade, they should also preach in the towns and villages that lie on their way; moreover, after they teach “the essential matters about the evident faith” (*ta 'lîm-i mesâ 'il-i zarûriyye-i dîn-i mübîn*) to the Muslims in the towns and villages in the vicinity of Belgrade, they should go along the Danube River and then to Babadağı (in present-day Romania) to preach and to teach the people in these regions *ilmihal* and the Sunni creed. The order also refers to a parallel letter by Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi with the same directives.

The second one³¹⁹ addresses Sheikh Ali, who was appointed to Bosnia to preach and admonish.³²⁰ It is ordered that while he travels towards Ağrıboz (Euboea in present-day Greece), he should move slowly (*âheste âheste Ağrıboz canibine*) and preach and admonish in the villages and towns on his route; he should also stay in

³¹⁷ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#861.

³¹⁸ There is a certain Kürd Ahmed Efendi, contemporary to Feyzullah Efendi and his compatriot, being of Erzurum origin. However, the information about him does not specify any such participation, and whilst our sheikhs were wandering around the Balkans, he was holding positions in different locales than the cities mentioned in the orders. For information about Kürd Ahmed Efendi, see. Şeyhî, *Vekayi 'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2485-6. Unfortunately, nothing is known about his companion Muhammed el-Bünyan.

³¹⁹ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#862.

³²⁰ Sheikh Ali, who was sent to Bosnia, might be the person mentioned in the biographical dictionaries as the mosque preacher and public lecturer of the Selim mosque in Edirne, Sheikh Genc Ali Efendi (d. 1710). For the short entry of Genc Ali Efendi, see. Şeyhî, *Vekayi 'ü'l-Fuzalâ*, vol. 3, 2725.

Ağrıboz for a few days to teach those who need the necessary knowledge about religion. During the winter, he should move from the left branch of Rumelia towards “here” (*bu tarafa*, presumably Edirne) while teaching the matters of religion upon the letter of the incumbent Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi.

Finally, a point to bring forth is the visual aspects of the orders. In most orders, the Quranic verses or hadiths cited were written in a very neat and legible *nesih* and thus clearly distinguished from the rest of the order, written in the usual *dîvânî* style.³²¹ Writing these Arabic quotes clearly may show the reverence performed to the sacred words.³²²

4.2 Agents of reform

After dealing with the orders and outlining their contents, it is important to highlight the crucial points of the program in relation to their agents. First, we can begin with the preparation and production procedures of the orders. As stated in the introduction of the thesis, we learn from the anonymous chronicle that the orders were the copies of Feyzullah Efendi’s draft. As we may remember from the former chapter, Feyzullah Efendi laid hands on government affairs after the Treaty of Karlowitz was signed, and the sultan vested him with the full authority to monitor and aid the grand vizier and state officials in governing the state. The reasons behind these orders will be speculated and tried to be resolved in the following pages, but it is certain that Feyzullah Efendi, in a way, decided to reform and educate the subjects of the empire from the bottom-up.

³²¹ In the orders of our case, these examples can be seen. Not all such orders have religious or religiously loaded content. Those orders may be about mustering soldiers for a campaign, suppressing a rebellion, negotiating with governors, and the like.

³²² Only in one order, BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#316, we do not see the clarity in writing these verses and hadiths.

When we look at the orders' drafted copies in the Mühimme registers, we see a further editing process. For instance, at the top of order 551 in register 112, the sultan's handwriting (*hatt-ı hümayûn*) can be seen. Some of the words in the text of the same order were crossed out, and sometimes extra words were added to fix the sentences grammatically.³²³ At the top of another order, 665 in the same register, we again see the handwriting of the sultan, urging to abide by the orders.³²⁴ We see other editing applications in order 909 of the same register, too.³²⁵ These instances show that the copies of the draft were controlled and approved after they were penned by the scribe. Most probably, the sultan checked and consented to the final edited and corrected version of the order in the register. Compared to the earlier period of his reign, this period, 1701-3, is known for his power-madness and paranoias. Hence, here, Mustafa II actively seized the process of production and the execution of the orders.

Another important agent behind the program was Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi. As we know, it was not usual practice for imperial orders to be drafted or accompanied by letters from the şeyhülislam. In earlier times, we know influential şeyhülsilams who cooperated with power holders and sultans in politics, as we delineated in the second chapter. Yet the most active participation of these figures was penning fatwas that offered legal solutions to specific problems, and they did not intervene directly in the execution, as Feyzullah seems to have done. Yet this "share of power" with the sultan is not the only way he participated in this task. Another aspect of his involvement is the men who were sent to the provinces to bring the "*ümme* and *amme*" up to speed about Islam.

³²³ Check the facsimile in Appendix D, Figure D1.

³²⁴ Check the facsimile in Appendix D, Figure D3.

³²⁵ Check the facsimile in Appendix D, Figure D7.

Above, I briefly tried to identify these people who were vested with full authority. I could reach no conclusive solution regarding these people. Since biographical dictionaries offer little information regarding the probable candidates, it is hard to identify these people clearly. On the other hand, the sheikhs mentioned in the orders bear almost no distinctive identifier to find any clues about their true identity in these sources. Their names are the most common ones of the time. Hence, the orders do not function as a helpful means to make use of in this respect. Thence, I will not continue in this direction but take another way to delve into the reasons for appointing these specific men in this project.

It is tempting to think that these men were handpicked by Feyzullah and shared his religious and moral vision. As I stated in the former chapter that his household was contestant to the existent ones, and he, in a sense, tried to establish a stronghold in the bureaucracy, in doing this, he must have gathered or chosen those who had similar sentiments and shared ideas with him. As moving his human resource and power on the field, he must have relied on the ones who were the most capable and reliable to execute the given duties. Why else would one send a certain Ahmed el-Kürdi to the Balkans? Since it is unlikely that he had prior connections in the region, the most plausible explanation for his choice would be that he was someone from Feyzullah Efendi's circles. Also, as I speculated in the previous chapter, any connection or affiliation to the Müceddidi order can be another aspect or quality of a person to be chosen by the chief mufti. As highlighted and discussed in the former chapter, Müceddidi order had a strong and capturing claims and calls for the ruling elite, literati, ulema and the common folk of the empire at the critical time that the empire was undergoing. In relation to the "revivalist" portrayal of the sultan, though they may not be the ones introduced in the previous chapter, highly probably

these sheikhs held almost similar stands in the religiopolitical scene. These constraints on the choice of people may help to explain and acknowledge the incongruity between the ambitious plans and the limited means behind this reform project: How could a small number of men bring everyone up to speed in religious matters by simply spending a couple of days, or even weeks, in multiple locales? How could they believe that such a short amount of time and limited number of personnel would suffice to bring about the desired change? So, it would be important not to get carried away by the rhetoric of these documents and lose perspective. Maybe the sheikhs were the supervisors of this massive program, leading the other unnamed and unspecified people who held positions in the addressed regions. The examination of imams, preachers, and teachers may stand for this aspect of the project: the elimination of those who were deemed incapable and the confirmation of those who were capable to perform according to the introduced regulations. The task defined in the orders may be addressed by the appointed sheikhs to the subordinates and those in their service to carry out; thus, the sheikhs we see in the orders were only intermediaries and the ones who were responsible for checking and monitoring the application, rather than actually taking their share in this effort. Of course, the court in Edirne was also trying to mobilize the administrative personnel in situ, as we can see in the documents. Nonetheless, the fact that the court preferred to set the reform program in motion by a select group of sheikhs sent from the center suggests that the former or Feyzullah did not trust the existing religious personnel to do the job.

This is highly related to the monitoring and examining functions explicated in the orders. At least one of the orders discussed above, the order to the kadi of Üsküp regarding the destruction of taverns further suggests that these sheikhs were meant to

function as the eyes and ears of Edirne, reporting to the center any irregularities in the provinces. This point should be considered in the context of transforming the state bureaucracy according to the tenets of sharia and sunna of the prophet, as well as to the criteria of loyalty to the authority of the sultan Mustafa II. The application of the orders in the provinces serves as a good topic to look at in order to make sense of the relationship between the center, the provincial notables, and the actors between the two. Constant references to reporting those who are negligent, incompetent, ignorant, and incapable to the state were stressed in terms of the religious duties and knowledge of the related personnel. However, the officers were repeatedly urged to help the mollahs who had been sent from Edirne with the execution of their tasks according to the instructions given by the şeyhülislam. Therefore, the local notables needed to be attentive to the new priorities and prerogatives defined by Edirne in order not to lose their positions.

In addition to the office-holders addressed by the orders, some of the local scholars serving the communities in the targeted locales were likely also informed about the contents of the orders. A document from the Bucak region (present-day Moldova) sheds some light on this topic. The document,³²⁶ dated May 1702, was issued in response to a petition by four sheikhs who identified themselves as Salih the mudarris, Ali the mudarris, Sheikh Musa the preacher, and Hacı Aribi the preacher.³²⁷ These sheikhs were living among the Tatars in Halil Paşa yurd in the Bucak region (*Bucakda Halil Paşa yurdunda sâkin Tatar tâîfesi arasında dört nefer va 'iz ve nâsih ve müderris mollaları olub*). Halil Paşa yurd was a place at the mouth of the Danube river that had been assigned for the settlement of Nogays in the second

³²⁶ BOA İE.DH 14.1288.

³²⁷ For these mudarrises and sheikhs, I could find no convincing information.

half of the seventeenth century.³²⁸ From the wording of the petition and the accompanying *buyruldu*, it would seem that these sheikhs were not sent there by the central government, but were performing duties that were very similar to the duties performed by the sheikhs appointed by Edirne. The sheikhs define their activities as reciting (the Qur'an), preaching, and transmitting knowledge day and night (*gice ve gündüz okuyub veyâ rifkat(?)'ı ma'bed ve ta'lim-i 'ilm ve va'iz ve nasîh olub*). Apparently, however, they had no income and requested to be assigned a yearly payment of 30 bushels from the tithes of the *yurd* (*a'sâr-ı şer'îyyesinden her birimize Kili kilesiyle senede otuz kile*). The request was approved by the sultan on the condition that the sheikhs in question were indeed capable of preaching and teaching essential religious knowledge to others.³²⁹ This last bit of information that we gain through *buyruldu* is important because the payment was dependent on the requirement of the correct and thorough performance of these applicants. Indeed, one wonders whether the four petitioners were locals who wanted to take advantage of the new imperial campaign of religious indoctrination and win further benefits for themselves. Or was there simply a convergence of local and imperial agendas? Perhaps there is no definitive answer, but the case is interesting in terms of highlighting the complexity of reform agendas and agencies.

4.3 The impact of initiatives and interactions

In this part, I will compare the measures of religious and moral instruction and disciplining prescribed in the orders of 1702-3 with similar measures that the Ottoman authorities had implemented in the previous two centuries and some of the

³²⁸ Emecen, "Halil Paşa Yurdu."

³²⁹ Bearing the payments made to the sheikhs appointed from the center, this case stands out as a different endeavor than the stately one. For the payment of the stately appointed sheikhs, see footnote 302.

lateral initiatives taken in the immediate context of the Mühimme orders. We shall see that to a considerable degree the plan of action devised by Feyzullah Efendi deployed elements drawn from these earlier attempts. Nevertheless, no comparable example of such a scheduled and structured policy and application on that scale existed previously.

As we know quite well, some of the points that are stressed in the documents dealt with here had been emphasized by the Ottoman ruling elites already in the sixteenth century, and even earlier – for instance, abiding by the sharia and enforcing the canonical congregational prayers. We have stressed these prerogatives of the sultans and the Ottoman authorities in the earlier chapters. The differentiation of priorities and the emphasis put on different aspects of the faith were discussed previously. In the reform plans of 1702, however, there were certain other aspects that, even if they were foreshadowed by earlier developments, were new in their present form. We can point out two particularly novel aspects of the 1702 religious and moral campaigns. These were: 1) the empire-wide push to teach *ilmihal* to the Muslim populace, and 2) the examination of religious personnel to make sure that they have the needed knowledge to teach the *ümmi* and *amme*. All the commands defined in the long orders issued by the court cover the actions to take in order to realize and execute these intended prerogatives, along with the above mentioned earlier considerations.

The seventeenth century is crucial for the history of *ilmihals* in the Ottoman empire because in this period, we see the popularization of writing treatises to address the commoners to “purify their beliefs and practices and to adhere strictly to the normative example of the Prophet (Sunna).”³³⁰ In this respect, advice-giving held

³³⁰ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 87.

a crucial place in this new language and in the political motivation of the actors.³³¹ Evolving over time into a genre itself, advice-giving in the seventeenth century merged with the Ottoman Muslims' political skepticism for a quest of seeking the internal enemies of Islamdom. We see the galvanizing of morality and *nasihat* with a discriminatory and policing role as well. The established norms could not be sufficient; therefore, one needed to prove his or her obligation to the Islamic community through his or her actions. This sensitivity to heresy and internal foes led to the elaborate handling of religion, social discipline, and politics because the daily practices of a person would provide valuable insight for detecting one's inner quality.³³² Also, the opening sentence of most orders in the program highlights advice as a crucial concept. In this sense, chief mufti's project was a climax of the year-long fermentation of the *nasihat*-originated perspective of reform-minded commentators and activists. As I stressed, the ascribed title of Feyzullah Efendi's work was "Counsel to The Rulers" (*Nesâihü'l-Mülûk*). Therefore, we see a contextual drive in this sense.

In the Mühimme orders, we see the cross-cutting and equalizing manner of addressing people to moralize and educate themselves. For Feyzullah Efendi, for instance, not only the ordinary populace, but also the top-ranking people, even the sultan himself, should make themselves familiar with the issues of religious sciences.³³³ In our project, *ilmihal* was taken seriously by the state, and we see repetitive references to it. Emphasizing *ilmihals* in state documents is an unprecedented occasion in Ottoman history as far as I know, and this is one specificity of this program. The *ilmihals* mentioned in the orders stand for "the basic

³³¹ Shafir, "Moral Revolutions," 598-9.

³³² Shafir, "Moral Revolutions," 604.

³³³ Shafir, "Moral Revolutions," 610-11

knowledge of Islamic faith and practice that was incumbent on all Muslims.”³³⁴ Only the Arabic and Turkish treatises may refer to *ilmihals* in the sense of the genre. A related component of the program, here, was the need to base religious education on “reliable books” (*kütüb-i mu‘tebere*). As Guy Burak notes, “any study of canon formations is essentially a study of modes of authority.”³³⁵ Categorizing books as reliable or not is part of establishing authority. In relation to the formation of an imperial canon on jurisprudence, the works accreted to the corpus of reliable books were the ones approved by the jurists’ accord, and then only with the imperial scholars’ authorization they enter into the imperial canon. Such stratification of the outer and core layers of religious bibliography comes with the inspectional control of the imperial, central, and hierarchized religious establishment.³³⁶ Therefore, producing, circulating, imposing, regulating, and specifying certain texts as approved ones lead to the formation of a standard recognition and perception of knowledge. Hence, these concepts of *ilmihal*, reliable books, and *nasihat* are vital means to inspect, control, and monitor the religious personnel, the lay public, and state officials. Though in our study we see the notion of reliable books, which ones were counted in this category were not specified. However, we know some exemplary works that are deemed reliable and may stand for the set of books implied in the orders.³³⁷

³³⁴ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 79.; Kelpetin Arpaguş, “Bir Telif Türü Olarak İlmihal,” 26.

³³⁵ Burak, “Reliable Books,” 15.

³³⁶ Burak, “Reliable Books,” 15.

³³⁷ For examples, see Burak, “Reliable Books,” 19. In 1565, we see an imperial edict of Kanuni, which openly states the names of the books to be taught in madrasas, Ahmed and Filipovic, “The Sultan’s Syllabus.”; Köse, “Fatwa Collections,” 44-5, 92-103, 105-113. Though these books represent the ultimate definition of the reliable books of the canon, they are for a higher grade and may not be suitable for mass educational purposes. This being said, one may also wonder how a reliable text of religious sciences can be suitable for an ordinary person, who are usually not proficient in necessary former education and even illiterate? Kelpetin Arpaguş deals with the “classical sources of Ottoman society” in religious subjects and lists widely read works. *Muhammediye* of Yazıcıoğlu Mehmed, *Envarü’l-Âşikin* of his brother Ahmed Bican, *Müzekki’n-Nüfus* of Eşrefoğlu Rumi, *Tenbihü’l-Gaflin*

Nonetheless, this top-down approach is not the only way we came across these religio-political dealings. In this period, samples prove a change from a plainer tackling of creedal issues to a more sophisticated and deliberate dealing with intra- and inter-confessional matters, both top-down and bottom-up.³³⁸ At this point, a highly related example of religious education and social discipline in our reform program comes from the work of Mustafa b. Hamza b. İbrahim b. Veliyüddin (d. 1633),³³⁹ also known as Nushi el Nasıhi (Advice Giver). Nushi was a learned Sufi who was affiliated with the Nakşibendi order. Like many other sharia-abiding, Sunna-minded Sufis he gave a great deal of importance to edifying the wider public about the principals of Islamic belief and practice, and composed in the course of his career several handbooks on Islamic creed and worship. One of these texts was a rather popular ilmihal titled *Mebhas-ı İman* (Discourse on Faith). What makes this text particularly important to this study, however, is the fact that in it Nushi advocated an empire-wide campaign to make sure that all Muslims above the age of seven know their ilmihal. The learning of *ilmihals* by ordinary people is important so that they can be prevented from “becom[ing] a heretic by simply obtaining false beliefs.” Since “these heretics do not demonstrate themselves openly,” people must beware of these pitfalls.³⁴⁰ Due to the “rampant heresy and indifference of the Muslims,” either pious or not, towards these dangers, they become “easy prey” to the evildoers and jeopardize their afterlives by being at odds with Sunna. Only by appealing to *ilmihal* learning and studying creedal matters can a person be saved from these heretics and evils. In this respect, his treatise makes a person distant

of Ebü'l-Leys Semerkandi, and two famous works of Birgivi can be shown as the examples of such books, Kelpetin Arpağuş, “Geleneksel İslam,” 24-42.

³³⁸ Here, the preachers and mudarrises in Bucak region should be remembered.

³³⁹ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 88.; Terzioğlu, “Bid‘at, Custom and the Mutability,” 24-5.

³⁴⁰ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 91-2.

himself/herself away from these “pretenders to be Muslim.”³⁴¹ The proposed solution is the age-old motif of “revivifying the religious sciences” and teaching the essential knowledge of creed and practice.³⁴²

The program of Nushi consists of a set of actions. Teaching the students *ilmihal* by teachers of Quran schools, public lecturers, and tutors, who are responsible for eradicating Hurufi threat by collaborating with the ulema, is substantial. In his plan, not only these schools, but also houses are important places of education. The fathers are the heads of the households, and thus, in charge of this educational duty. Not only fathers, but also mothers are responsible, and the parents are accountable to God for this training obligation over their dependents. In the eradication of the “heretics and atheists,” the capital of the empire would play the primary role, and the households would follow this imperial example. Hence, we see a hierarchical perception of the duties incumbent on all. Corresponding punishments must be applied if the addressees of the education reject it. The state can be the ultimate penalizing institution if the refusal resumes.³⁴³ Furthermore, he proposes a large-scale official inspection and penalization of the ones unsuccessful in learning the *ilmihal*. These examinations must be handled in a yearly fashion. The imams and muezzins of the quarters are the ones to list the names of the people subject to the examination. The questions are about “faith and Islam and ablution and ritual prayer.” Those who pass the examination should be praised, and those who do not should be reprimanded in public and punished.³⁴⁴

Nushi reflects on the role played and undertaken by these functionaries in his time, not only through an inspectional intervention, but also through monitoring

³⁴¹ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 92-5.

³⁴² Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 95-6.

³⁴³ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 97-9.

³⁴⁴ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 99.

society via neighborhood organs like imams and muezzins. Surveillance, reporting, and evictions performed by these proxies contribute to the implementation of “Sunni orthopraxy” among the Muslims, a case that resembles the European confessionalizations. The programmed nature of Nushi’s plan may be the earliest example of a systematic agenda for raising consciousness and piety from a non-elite person (i.e. a non-top-ranking ulema). All these proposals overlap with the confessionalization program as an explanatory tool to deal with the Ottoman crystallization of religious policy-making and its related repercussions from several sectors of society.³⁴⁵ The close resemblance of Nushi’s case with the one detailed here is spectacular and reflects a shared sentiment and motivation of the time being.³⁴⁶ Hence, the callings and urgings of Nushi were neither the first nor the last.

Some other people were also concerned about this issue and produced a good deal of works. A Halveti sheikh carries an important place for our analysis: Tatar İbrahim, also known as İbrahim Kırımî. İbrahim Kırımî, as his sobriquet suggests, is of Crimean descent, and he spent most of his years in eastern Rumelia and Istanbul. From these times onward, he expanded his network and worked as a “Sufi sheik, preacher, and, ultimately, royal companion.”³⁴⁷ Tatar İbrahim (d. 1593) exhorted Murad III (r. 1574-1595) to wage a great war against the Safavids and the inner “heretics,” who lived in the Ottoman realm, especially in the west. As Terzioğlu points out,

He urged the sultan specifically to appoint ‘Sunni imams’ to the villages of the ‘heretical’ Muslims of Dobruja and Thrace to see to ‘the instruction of their children, women and men’. Another Halveti preacher and one of the ‘ilm-i hal writers . . . Kadızade Mehmed İlmî, complained, like Nushî, about the corrupting influence of secular learning (specifically, philosophy) upon the people’s religious beliefs. In his words of advice to Murad IV (r. 1623–40), he, again not unlike

³⁴⁵ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 105-9.

³⁴⁶ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 88-9.

³⁴⁷ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalism,” 153.

Nushî, dwelt especially on the need to rectify the religious beliefs and practices of the Ottoman soldiers.³⁴⁸

One important station of his life was his inhabitation when he moved to Babaeski, and he lived there until the death of his beloved patron Kalga Adil Giray in Safavid captivity in 1579. He reports that he disputed with some people in the region whom he calls “Shiites (rafizî), Kızılbaş, and Simavnîs (i.e., followers of the teachings of Sheikh Bedreddin).”³⁴⁹ The main “duty” of Kırımî is advice-giving, and he rationalizes this position by defending it as one component of the obligations of men of religion, and he gives reference to a well-known hadith: “‘Religion is counsel’ (El-dîn el-naşîha).”³⁵⁰

Since he is a confessional-minded Halveti Sufi, Sunnism as the proper way to follow, and a Sufi-oriented interpretation with necessary adjustments to the conditional needs of the state are the true spirit of his Sunni perspective. His obedience was to such an extent that he accuses the ones who do not pray in favor of the house of Ottomans as non-believers and non-Muslims. In respect to this obedience, he also contrasts the archenemy of the Ottomans, the Safavids, on the Ottoman way of combining the sharia and Sufism, in which he stresses the success of the Ottomans. The main criterion for this differentiation is the respect paid by the Ottomans to sharia and Sunnah through a campaign of opening many mosques, madrasas, hospices, and charitable establishments, which the Safavids lacked for Kırımî. Hence, the Ottomans were saved from the calamity of Kızılbaşes. He urges the sultan to seek and penalize the “heretic” and “not-Muslim” dervishes, as well as the ones he refers to as “Simavnîs,” or a more generally known group of people called “Bedreddinis,” which is “a heterodox Muslim community which had its

³⁴⁸ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 110.

³⁴⁹ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalism,” 157.

³⁵⁰ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalism,” 167.

origins in the messianic movement associated with the famous Sufi and scholar Bedreddin of Simavna, but which by the sixteenth century had come under Shiitising influences and ‘turned Kızılbaş.’”³⁵¹ Terzioğlu provides a brief account of his prospective solution:

He advised the Sultan first to target the military personnel in the fortresses and to subject them to inspections (*yoklama*) to weed out the heretics. He also called for inspections to be undertaken at the lodges of the *ıyık*: ‘if the dervishes agree to give up their reprehensible practices such as cursing the Companions of the Prophet and the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs and to abide by the Sunna and the Sharia, fine; if not, then they should also be eliminated (*ref*)’”³⁵² (emphases in original)

Beyond the Bedreddinis, Kırımî envisioned reaching out to the entire rural populace and urges the sultan to appoint “a Sunni imam [who] should be sent to every village, and he should be in charge of educating the children, women, and men.”³⁵³

Undertaking a religious education program in outlined and comprehensive manner, as recommended by Kırımî, is spectacular and interesting. Besides, though it seems too abstract and rough to apply, one should not dismiss this project, because one century later, this advice found its repercussion in a stronger and thorough urging and its application under an advisor of Halveti-cum-Müjeddidi affinity and a sunnah-abiding person, namely Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi.³⁵⁴

Indeed, the chief mufti’s *nasihat*-originated education policy exceeds the confessional borders. In a case study, we see that Feyzullah Efendi took part in the religious and social confrontation “which affected the Eastern Christian communities of the Empire at the turn of the eighteenth century, interfering directly in the ecclesiastical organization of the Syriac and especially Armenian Church.”³⁵⁵ The

³⁵¹ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 173.; Ocak, “Zendeke ve İlhad” (Hérésie) Meselesi,” 37. The Bedreddinis will be handled in detail below.

³⁵² Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 174. This turning of the attention of the state and the sultan to internal foes is a recurring leitmotif in our case, too.

³⁵³ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 174.

³⁵⁴ Sariyannis, “The Kadızadeli Movement,” 271.

³⁵⁵ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 2. I am grateful to Cesare Santus for letting me see his manuscript before publication. The page numbers refer to the manuscript pages.

sources the author deal with “reveal how the Şeyhülislam became progressively aware of the need for a coherent confessional policy toward the Eastern Christian subjects.”³⁵⁶ We see that there were Jesuit missionaries in the Ottoman Empire in this period who were actively taking part in converting the Orthodox Christian population of the empire to Catholicism. Specifically, they were addressing the Armenian and Syriac subjects of the empire. After 1690s, as a result of the combined efforts of French diplomats and Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries, the local Christian subjects of the empire were targeted for Catholic proselytism. The connection between Feyzullah and Awetik (later patriarch of the Armenian community) goes back to the exile years of the former in Erzurum, where the missionaries’ activities were reported and appealed by the latter, which reverberates the reaction of the Armenian folk “if we must change our religion, . . . we prefer to turn Muslims than to embrace the religion of the Franks.”³⁵⁷ The office of the chief mufti concurred with a surge of confessional struggles within the Armenian communities. In 1701, upon the conflict between the Catholic and anti-Catholic parties, Feyzullah decided to appoint Awetik as the chief of the Armenian community in the fight against the Catholics.³⁵⁸ Not only the Muslims, but also the Christian population of the empire were regarded as deserving a similar education, such as the Armenian and Syriac populations who wanted to be “saved from the spoils” of Catholic missionaries.³⁵⁹ In the petition

³⁵⁶ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 2.

³⁵⁷ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 3-4, 10. The claims of the Armenians recall the critique of Feyzullah by rebels (*din ve imanımızı değiştirmek ister*), which denotes a contextual discussions and debates on religion and faith in the empire, regardless of the confessional differences.

³⁵⁸ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 7-8. The two nurtured good relations in Erzurum and Feyzullah issued a fatwa for securing the restoration of the church by the bishop against the accusation of the governor, Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 8n25.

³⁵⁹ An order was addressed to the kadı of Aleppo in July 1702, and it is reported that (in the archive entry of the document): “Rin Papa’ya bağlı bazı ruhbanlar ortaya çıkıp, Rum, Ermeni, Süryani vesair bunlara bağlı ehl-i zimmet-i nasaranı efrenc mezhebine davet ettikleri ve birçoklarını eski ayinlerinden döndürdükleri,” “ehl-i zimmet reaya tarafından şikayet edildiğinden bunların men edilip mezhep değiştirenlerin geri döndürülmesi, dinlemeyenlerin yakalanıp hapsedilmesi,” BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#1095. The copied drafts of the same order were addressed to Erzurum, Amid, Lefkoşa (Nicosia),

presented by Awtik, he states that “This servant brought the servants of the patriarch in Erzurum and a few from the Armenian community who had entered the Frank religion back to the path by advice [nasihat].” “And now the Armenian community wants us and asks us to advise them according to the rules of our rite.”³⁶⁰ Awetik notified his folk that “every parish priest should inquire and examine his parishioners, and if you find such a man [i.e. a Catholic convert], you should send the register (defter) to us,” as well as delineating the processes of repenting and re-admission to the community.³⁶¹ This urge to inspect the believers complies with the orders issued by the Imperial Court to inspect the Muslims by the officials. The emphasis put on admonishment was also in tune with the policies of the court pertaining to the orders targeting its Muslim subjects either.

I wonder whether the activities of the missionaries inspired the şeyhülislam to apply the same phenomenon in the Ottoman realm to indoctrinate the Muslims in their religion. The means employed by the patriarch to achieve his goal include “replacing a good number of high Armenian prelates with his own trusted men.” Referring to the replacement of Armenian prelates, Santus states that “he started to pursue a patronage policy similar to that of his protector Feyzullah.”³⁶² The stress on “trusted men” recalls my point on selecting special people for this religious education campaign. The Ottoman Muslim, Armenian Monophysite, and French Catholic missions and agencies seems to intertwine in the time being and had impact on their similar goals. In the discussion of Nushi, we have observed that it is surprising to see similar motivations of the missionary orders of Christianity in the

Sakız (Chios), Trablusşam (Tripoli in present-day Lebanon), Tokad, Konya, Kayseriye, Ankara, Adana, Van, İzmir, Sivas, and the three branches of Rumelia. An earlier example comes from May 1698, BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 110#1941, which is about the complaints of Armenians in Chios regarding Catholic missionaries.

³⁶⁰ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 10-11.

³⁶¹ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 11-12.

³⁶² Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 12.

treatise of this zealous supporter of grass-roots revivalism and religious inspection in the Ottoman realm. In the case of Nushi, Terzioğlu questions whether “could a Muslim scholar in the Ottoman empire have known about the new measures of religious surveillance that were being implemented, even if with varying degrees of success, in Catholic and Protestant Europe?” and gives several intermediaries by also noting the possibility of indifference.³⁶³ Maybe Nushi was not aware of the works of missionaries; however, Feyzullah Efendi was well-cognizant of these movements and practices. The ambassador of France was stunned that Feyzullah had great knowledge on the theological disputes within the Christianity. In 1701, “in a formal complaint addressed to the Sublime Porte against him,” it is reported that ““it is surprising that the Mufti Effendi . . . meddles into the discussion of our particular sects as a theologian expert in our religion.”³⁶⁴ Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that Feyzullah Efendi was aware of the history of the religious disputes among the confessions of Christianity, and he had knowledge about the policies implemented by the sovereigns and clergy in Europe, which later will be called as “confessionalization” and “social disciplining.” “The close contact between the Patriarch and the Şeyhülislam had in fact produced a common vision of confessional relations, a shared moral and rhetorical vocabulary,” says Santus, and adds “confessional disciplining did not necessarily mean adherence to a single creed, but rather enforcement of community borders and obedience to the official, state-sponsored ecclesiastical hierarchy.”³⁶⁵ The sensitivities towards delineating the

³⁶³ Terzioğlu, “Where ‘İlm-i Hal Meets Catechism,” 103-4, 109.

³⁶⁴ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 15. Also, Katgı speculates that the accusations of “infidel mufti” directed against Feyzullah Efendi can be the result of his connections to Europeans to establish an observatory in Istanbul, which is another strong evidence for a connection to Europe, Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 401-2. Also, the proximity of Feyzullah with Awetik caused rumors to spread “that before converting to Islam he had been a monophysite Christian,” Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 15.

³⁶⁵ Santus, “Feyzullah Efendi and the Armenian Patriarch,” 16, 18.

confessional and communal lines and urging the folk of believers to embrace the religious indoctrination of the authorities can be counted among the lateral factors that most probably affected the project of the Ottoman court.

4.4 The places, reasons, and observations: Speculations for issuing the orders

Now we can come to the specificity of the places mentioned in the orders and the probabilities regarding the greater question of the work: what might be the reasons for issuing these orders? In this respect, here, I want to come to some points that are going to be discussed, which will serve the purpose of comprehending the reasons behind addressing some regions and omitting others.

4.4.1 The Second Siege of Vienna and its aftermath

The Second Siege of Vienna was a watershed event in the history of the Ottoman Empire and Europe, which led to a series of catastrophic events to happen after the defeat and retreat. The socio-economic condition of the Balkans after the devastating 16 year-long warfare with the League powers has an important place in our case as well. We see a reported disruption and breakdown of social order during this period. The “humiliating” defeat in Zenta, the invasion, the burning down of Sarajevo, and the shocking loss of great chunks of lands in the north were the final nails in the coffin. Because many people migrated from the lost lands and banditry became rampant, tensions in the Balkans were at an all-time high. In the face of this general chaos, the state was desperate to restore law and order. Hence, these orders allowed the ruler to reiterate the persistence of the rule of the “glorious state” in his realm. As stated by Abou El-Haj, in briefly evaluating the reasons for the program,

The underlying meaning of the decrees, however, is inferred from the historical context. The decrees were issued as rebellions were breaking

out in the Balkan and Crimean provinces. The latter were triggered by the economic hardships and social dislocations in Ottoman frontier society due to the territorial compromises laid down in the treaties of Karlowitz (1699) and Istanbul (1700). In the eyes of the state, however, resistance to the concessions and territorial losses was portrayed in the decrees as failure in proper indoctrination and acculturation.³⁶⁶ Hence, one core motivation of the Imperial Court was to make up the losses by sustaining the strict obedience of the subjects, subjugating the dissidents, and incorporating the docile.

After the failed siege the Balkans turned into a battlefield during the long wars against the Holy League armies in the seventeenth century, and the Balkans were attacked from the north, west, and south. Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia turned into the major scenes of the battles.³⁶⁷ The forces responsible for the security of the settlements were broken up, as the protection and safety of highways withered. The village communities took up the responsibility and tried to defend themselves under the leadership of the prominent people of their regions.³⁶⁸ The banditry became rampant, and the disbanded soldiers formed gangs with fugitive peasants and outlaws. The Rumelian bandits were raiding primarily because of the retreat into the Balkans of disordered soldier groups who failed in seeking war spoils at the battlefield. In time, both those former soldiers' and Muslim and non-Muslim subjects' villages and lives were damaged by the war. Soon, in Serbia and Macedonia, the banditry peaked, and in these regions, the suppression of the bandits was obstructed because they were fighting irregularly, and the army was not able to curb these forces easily.³⁶⁹

Inner regions of the Balkans experienced a flow of people from the north, and the region underwent a wave of migrations in the vertical axis: Muslims to the south

³⁶⁶ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 51.

³⁶⁷ Sevinç, "Organizasyon ve Lojistik," 4.

³⁶⁸ Gradeva, "War and Peace," 151, 162, 174-5.; Korkmaz, "Bosna Eyaletinde Asayiş ve Düzen," 16.

³⁶⁹ Korkmaz, "Bosna Eyaletinde Asayiş ve Düzen," 62-3, 66-8.

and non-Muslims to the north,³⁷⁰ and the former mostly migrated to Bosnia while some Anatolian Muslims were deported to abandoned lands in the long run.³⁷¹ These relocations changed the social makeup of the peninsula. The regions and those between Niš, Vidin, Nikopol, Silistra, Sofia, and Serres were the hubs of Muslim migrants, and the nomads were settled to the deserted places to make them protect the land, repopulate the abandoned regions, and cultivate the lands and farms to increase agricultural production. The non-Muslim population of the region was pledging allegiance to the League forces and depopulating the Ottoman realm to move northward, mainly to the Habsburgs. Especially the Serbians and Bulgarians were working together with the Habsburgs and fighting against the Ottomans.³⁷² As a response, the Ottomans employed Tatars and Albanians against the Serbian rebels. The former two were also accompanying the travelers and protecting the highways and the newly inhabited villages of the migrants.³⁷³ The Albanians especially held an important place in defence organizations, and they were responsible for the protection of the lands between Bulgaria and Bosnia. In the cities of Elbasan, Dukakin, Vlore, and Delvinë, many Albanian mercenary soldiers were mustered. Not only in the military sense, but also demographically, Albanians played a key role given that their families were settled in the regions between Niš and Belgrade. In Macedonia, abandoned places where former Serbians used to live were populated with Albanian families.³⁷⁴ These practices were applied in Albania, Bosnia, Shkoder, and Ioannina, and the local Albanians and Croatians were converted to Islam.³⁷⁵

³⁷⁰ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire*, 58; Zhelyazkova "Islamization in the Balkans," 235.

³⁷¹ Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 184.

³⁷² Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire*, 58.; Korkmaz, "Bosna Eyaletinde Asayiş ve Düzen," 51.

³⁷³ Sevinç, "Organizasyon ve Lojistik," 5.

³⁷⁴ Faroqhi, *The Ottoman Empire*, 64.; Zhelyazkova "Islamization in the Balkans," 237-9.

³⁷⁵ İzeti, *Balkanlarda Tasavvuf*, 115.; Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 184, 184n3.

If we turn to the Mühimme orders, we can clearly see that the places most frequently mentioned in these orders were the places that were the most directly affected by the breakdown of order following the Ottoman defeats to the Holy League between the years 1683 and 1699. When we look at the map that shows the spread and the visitation sequence, we see that after the order of April 1702, the sheikhs visited the greater part of the central Balkans.³⁷⁶ The region covers the lands among the new borders with the League powers, i.e. the Danube River in the north; Bosnia in the northwest; and in the south adjacent places to Morea, which had been lost to the Venetians.³⁷⁷ More than one year later, we see the sending of a second envoy of sheikhs to Bosnia and the villages and towns along the Danube river, which had become the upper edge now.³⁷⁸ Belgrade and Babadağı were the two endpoints of the riverside itinerary. Then, we see an extension of the visitations to the north in time, beginning in the southernmost edge and ending in the northernmost belt of the Ottoman realm in the west. Besides the sequence, we should focus on the frequency as well. Seven cities out of 11 became the hub of visiting dervishes. From south to north, Yanya, Delvine, İlbasan, Avlonya, Üsküp, Dukakin, and Köstendil are the bastions with the most frequently visited cities, each in the first and the third expeditions. Prizren, Serez, Ohri, and İlbasan were the other mentioned places. These lands cover much of the European territories of the empire.³⁷⁹

The clear convergence of the social, political, and economic collapse of the region and its cities, with a zeal for both restoring law and order and controlling the people, presumably triggered the sultan and şeyhülislam to come up with a detailed program of applying the sharia, reviving the sunnah, educating the people about the

³⁷⁶ You can refer to the maps in Appendix A.

³⁷⁷ This large chunk of the lands was shown with the letter A on the map.

³⁷⁸ These places were shown with the letters B and C on the map.

³⁷⁹ It was shown with the letter D on the map.

religious sciences, teaching and catechizing religion to the people, and imposing piety in those times of crises, decadence, and depression, as stated by Feyzullah Efendi in his autobiography and treatise. Indeed, responding to the hard conditions in the Balkans can be interpreted by the repetitive and specifically detailed orders sent to certain locales in central Rumelia. The place names mentioned correlate with the control attempts of the state towards the people and statesmen there, bearing the details presented above. Then, were the power holders in Edirne trying to keep the Muslims who remained in their hands in the orbit of the state? Those who migrated or relocated from different regions, especially the frontier regions in the north in the Balkans, changed the demographic structure here. The Muslims who remained in the Ottoman realm were, highly presumably, the only targeted audience because the state aimed to turn them into good, obedient, and pious subjects of the pious state. Both as a continuation, culmination, and repercussion of the old practices of confessionalization and religious education found its place as part of the attitude of the Ottoman state in these religious policies. However, an unprecedented defeat in the battlefield here meets with an unprecedentedly detailed and engaging religious education program, which is meant to be applied in a full-fledged scale through the ultimate power of the state mechanism. It seems that “concomitant with the territorial losses was the dissipation of religious elan which can be inferred from the concerted effort of the Ottoman executive to ‘reeducate’ the reaya (subjects) in Muslim precepts.”³⁸⁰ The calamities that happened for years now can be cured thanks to the settlement with the treaty, yet the casualty and the aftermath of the consequences of the war were destructive. The conditions outlined by the şeyhülislam before laying hands on power were still intact. Hence, he found a precious opportunity to

³⁸⁰ Abou-El-Haj, “Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz,” 498n2.

implement his own prescription in this time of urgent thirst for the showering of God's benediction, grace, and mercy to these "black-faced" sinners.³⁸¹

To pick up another subject, in our orders, we do not see any mention of conversions into Islam. However, we know that some local people in the region were converted to Islam, especially Albanians and Croatians.³⁸² Therefore, it is possible that these orders were intended to be applied in the regions where these newly converted people lived. The uneven distribution of the orders and more specifically, their concentration on the Balkans begs for an explanation. Since the towns and villages (*kasabât u kurâ*) were especially stressed in the orders, we can assume that the re-located converts and new comers into the villages and towns may have been the intended objects of the program along with the former Muslim inhabitants. Non-Muslims, on the other hand, were not identified as the targeted audience, either, and they were treated as if they did not exist there. However, we know that some of them were revolting against the state.³⁸³ After the defeat in Zenta and the invasion of Bosnia, Austrians began to provoke the Christians living there.³⁸⁴ Also, it was reported that redoubt soldiers in the Bosnian frontier became apostates.³⁸⁵ Thence, how can we interpret these instances? How was the psychology of the Muslims? After the humiliating Treaty of Karlowitz, the relations among Muslims, Christians, and the state were severed.³⁸⁶ This can be regarded as an explication of the condition of the relations between the Balkan subjects and the state at the time. In face of

³⁸¹ For the self-denigration mentioned in the orders, please refer to footnote 253, regarding the call to prayers of the people for the Ottoman victory.

³⁸² Here, it should be noted that Albania was converted rather late compared to other regions of the Balkans. Hence, the Albanians in the late-seventeenth century would be the most suitable people to be taken into account in indoctrination, Antov, *Wild West*, 38-9.; Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 183-4. Please refer to the relevant section and the narrative below, regarding the religious culture of the Albanians.

³⁸³ Parveva, *Village, Town and People*, 198.

³⁸⁴ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 3, 317-20.

³⁸⁵ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 2, 218.

³⁸⁶ See the relevant section in the former chapter.

surfacing these “internal threats,” the aim to retain the commitment and loyalty of the Muslims to the Ottomans might be another contextual reason for issuing these orders. The rebellions of Tarnovo were interpreted by Parveva in this respect, in the context of a tense milieu, an atmosphere of revived memories, and a rival attitude based on a long historical evaluation.³⁸⁷ The sentiments of the Muslims must have been offended in these decades, and religion would serve as a reinforcement.

4.4.2 The revolts and disorder

Indeed, the grain of truth in the rhetorical lamentation of Feyzullah Efendi in his autobiography, as we pointed out in the former chapter, was significant. The problems of banditry, revolts, and disorder were not specific to the Balkans, which became the focus of our analysis with respect to its place in the Holy League wars. However, banditry and other problems were widescale in the empire in the seventeenth century, and widespread in Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and in the southern regions, especially on the pilgrimage routes towards the end of the century. Bandits were roaming the Ottoman realms and raiding, looting, breaking law and order, murdering, engaging in highway robbery, kidnapping, and committing many other crimes. The *levends* of Anatolia wanted to be taken under control.³⁸⁸ Even in the

³⁸⁷ Parveva, *Village, Town and People*, 186-203. She takes the Tarnovo uprisings and interprets them in the social, economic, and political conditions of this land in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. The author begins with the ongoing hostilities between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities and the rising tension in the region, Parveva, *Village, Town and People*, 191-8. The first uprising took place in this time when “not only the Bulgarian lands, but also the whole Balkans were affected by a powerful wave of insurgencies during the wars between the empire and the united Christian forces.” A second uprising occurred in 1686, and other similar actions were taking place in the rich waqf villages, which may show an economic downfall there as well. We can speculate the extended representative value of this case to all the Balkans, and even the empire, Parveva, *Village, Town and People*, 198. We also know two other uprisings took place in Bulgaria around the year 1700, Parveva, *Village, Town and People*, 198-9. After the revolts, the Holy Forty Martyrs Church was turned into a zaviye, and Halvetis were placed there, Parveva, *Village, Town and People*, 200-209. The specific examples also show the role of the Halvetis in the hard times of the late-seventeenth century. Please refer to the relevant section below for more information on the active participation of the Halvetis in this cause.

³⁸⁸ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 3, 332-3

mid-seventeenth century, Evliyâ Çelebi mentions the ruined social order in Anatolia and the Balkans.³⁸⁹ In the account of Silahtar and official documents, we also learn about the misbehavior of some soldiers, statesmen, and people. In the Balkans and Anatolia, many bandits and their leaders were executed as well.³⁹⁰ In Tripoli (Lebanon), some “Kızılbaşes” (Twelver-Shiites who were labeled as such) were committing banditry.³⁹¹ The same issue continued in the following year in Damascus, Saida, and Beirut, too.³⁹² Of course, these were only a selection of some specific cases of the reported instances from specific regions. These examples were presented to give a sense of the social condition in the time. They should be thought of in their own contexts, yet we cannot separate these from the general urging and the regulating nature of the orders we have in our case study.

Besides these minor problems, there were major questions to tackle. In the reign of Mustafa II, there were some rebellions in the empire. A rebel, named Bebe Süleyman, attacked the lands of Iran, with which the Ottomans had positive relations. In 1699, the governor of Baghdad suppressed the rebellion.³⁹³ A leader of a certain Arab tribe, Hüseyin el-Abbas, initiated a rebellion in the region of Aleppo and Damascus. In Basra, another Arab leader, Mani, rebelled against the Ottomans. The then governor of Baghdad, Daltaban Mustafa Pasha, repressed the rebellion and took Basra back in 1701.³⁹⁴ Several tribes in the eastern regions of the empire were rebelling against state authority. We learn the revolts of Turkoman and Kurdish tribes in the east. They revolted twice, and they were punished.³⁹⁵ In Arabia, the

³⁸⁹ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 270-1. For the same remarks, see Baer, *Honored*, 225-252.

³⁹⁰ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 610, 618, 620, 627.

³⁹¹ BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 102#315 (1692). The Shiites in Lebanon will be discussed below.

³⁹² BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 104#663-664-665 (1693). These regions were addressed in our orders.

³⁹³ BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 110#1829. (May 1698, the following orders, including #1835, were about this rebellion.)

³⁹⁴ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 627-8, 674-5, 699-700, 706-13, 720-1. (These rebellions took place between 1697-1701.)

³⁹⁵ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 2, 246-50.; Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 3, 323.

Damascus, Jerusalem, Gaza, and Nablus regions were shaken by the rebel Urban. In the Diyarbakır, Şehrızor, and Mosul regions we see the continuation of rebellions.³⁹⁶ Silahtar narrates the revolts that took place in Karaman and Egypt, and the governor of the former acted as a “Celali.”³⁹⁷ After the suppression of the revolts, we see the allegiance of Hijaz to the sultan’s authority.³⁹⁸ In Crimea, Gazi Giray Khan revolted against Devlet Giray on the terms that the Crimean people had to be removed and restrained from attacking the Polish lands, according to the Treaty of Karlowitz. Gazi Giray was exiled to Rhodes, and the revolt was curbed in 1701.³⁹⁹

Indeed, this last example needs further elaboration. The Nogay Tatars⁴⁰⁰ of the Bucak region were against the prohibition of Tatar raids into Poland by the Karlowitz Treaty and the appointments made by the court in Edirne. They did not pay attention to the warnings of the Ottoman court and waged an open rebellion. The cause they were defending was the “protection of the frontier of Islam,” and they thought the Ottomans were incapable of realizing this goal, bearing in mind the defeats at the battles, the losses of large chunks of lands, and even the hard conditions imposed by the treaty, which was the last straw.⁴⁰¹ For the Ottomans, the ability to control their subjects and adhere to the terms of the treaty were crucial, and this would prove the might of the state and restore its prestige.⁴⁰² Hence, the Ottomans were determined to restrain the Tatars and prepared some measures to do so. The Nogays were ordered to comply with the terms of the Ottoman center, that is

³⁹⁶ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi - IV. Cilt, 1. Bölüm*, 3.

³⁹⁷ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 136.; Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 3, 330.

³⁹⁸ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 2, 208.

³⁹⁹ Klein, “Tatar and Ottoman History Writing.”

⁴⁰⁰ Bucak Tatars were present in the region from the late fifteenth century onwards. Nogay tribes were deported to the region after the mid-seventeenth century and often the two groups were confused. Yet, in time, these two communities were merged into a single group, Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 4-7, 168-170.

⁴⁰¹ Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 474.

⁴⁰² Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 475.

to say, to “engage with ‘cultivation and herding’ and not raiding, pay the taxes, follow the terms of the treaty, give up the heretical practices and non-shari customs, abide by the instructions of the centrally appointed ulema, and observe the imperial orders.”⁴⁰³ Defterdar Mehmed Pasha gives a detailed account of the rebellion and briefly describes the measures. Defterdar uses the word “*töre*,” non-religious customs and traditions, and describes it as “improper” (*kabih*) and something to be renounced.⁴⁰⁴ Abou El-Haj explains that,

Settlement on the land and indoctrination into orthodoxy were meant to retire the Nogays as an independent military and political force and assure the Ottoman state of obedient subjects. The overall intent of these conditions was two-fold: to deter violations of the Polish- Russian boundaries and secure stability in the border regions.⁴⁰⁵

The Nogays had apparently retained several of their pre-Islamic native customs . . . In order to ensure the adherence of the Nogays to Islamic practices, mosques, medreses, and mektebs were to be built and established on their lands and ulema from the capital imported to educate them in the Islamic sciences.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰³ Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 471-2. This attitude of the sultan as an “upholder of international law with the non-Muslims was seen as a betrayal of the faith and the state (*dîn ü devlet*), a charge that was corroborated by the government’s readiness to meet both the spirit and the letter of its treaty obligations,” which marks the “abandonment of the Ghazi tradition and formal closure of the frontier,” the two objectives of the spirited young sultan now bygone, Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 475. On the other hand, the Ottomans were proving their stance depending on Quranic verses, Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 475n50. Mehmed Giray, on the other hand, stresses and criticizes that the Nogays were “ignorant, rebellious, unjust, and oppressive” and prone to create new innovations, which were reprehensible by the sharia, Klein, “Tatar and Ottoman History,” 138. She also emphasizes the utilization of Quranic verses, hadith, and Persian poetry by Mehmed Giray and argues that he tried to attune his work in tandem with the savor of the Ottoman elites by accentuating the *nasihatname* discourse in his text, Klein, “Tatar and Ottoman History,” 140. In this sense, the quoted verses and hadiths in our orders may be read as a subtle reflection of this advice-giving mission of the courtiers and literati of the time and an application of this function in the official documents.

⁴⁰⁴ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 702-5, the relevant reference is at 704, “fi-mâ-ba’d, Şer’-i şerife muhalif vaz’ u hareketden her biri îbâ vü rücu’ idüp, evvela şerî’at-ı mutahharaya mütâba’at ... beynlerinde ‘töre’ ta’bîr olunur fi’l-i kabîhi terk idüp,” “ve içlerinde Boğdan toprağında sâkin olanları, kadîmî yurdları olan Halîl Paşa Yurdu’na, sâ’ir münâsib olan yerlere iskân . . . ve sâkin oldukları mahallerde mesâcid ü medâris ü mektebler ihdâs ve ‘ulemâ’ vü fukahâ iskân idüp ‘ilm ü ‘ulemâyâ râğbet ideler . . .” The leaders of the Tatars used *töre* for their benefits, and this customary law stands for the essence of the law of steppe administrations. Mehmed Giray criticizes the leaders of the Tatars for creating innovations as well, Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 201-4. In the state documents, it is stated that the leaders of the Tatars tried to stop the implementation of sharia for the sake of *töre*, and thence their own benefits, Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 211. It should be stressed that this case may be interpreted as an extended application of the edict which favors sharia over kanun.

⁴⁰⁵ Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 472.

⁴⁰⁶ Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 471n25. For the definition of the Bucak region, see Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 1. According to the contemporary sources, the Bucak region consists of the southern Bessarabia, i.e. İsmail, Kahul, Akkirman, and Bender, and between the Danube, Black Sea, and Turla river extending until Prut. Interestingly, Evliyâ Çelebi narrates Halil Pasha Yurd as a place

For the author, these policies were executed to solve the Nogay problem by settlement and indoctrination.⁴⁰⁷ Albeit, this case is not a mere rebellion and has more to shed on our program.

As we know well, there were certain sheikhs and scholars who performed the imposed religious education on the Tatars of the Bucak region. Abou El-Haj shows that the imperial court would designate a kadı to monitor the deeds of the Tatars and observe their attachment to sharia.⁴⁰⁸ My sources do not make any reference to a kadı but give the content of the education program performed there. Now, this Tatar case gives us clues about the context and the mentality of the state. Though the rebellion happened in a remote corner of the empire and was easily suppressed, the forced settlement of the Tatars and their religious indoctrination significantly molded the *modus vivendi* of those people. Though the stressed reasons were different, this rebellion and the reaction of the Ottoman court against it shares similarities with the other contexts and cases of the time. We discussed the issues of banditry and other sporadic cases of grievances. The Nogay case offers valuable insights into the handling those troubles. This rebellion is also the first instance in which we see the use of the means of religious education and admonishment for the purposes of social discipline and indoctrination. Thus, while the rebellion was underway, the powerholders decided to implement the program in their minds. This, in a way, leads

whose villages had abundant mosques: “Bâlâda tahrîr olunan Akkirmân köyleri dahi câmi‘li ve zâviyeli ma‘mûr köylerdir kim bunlara Bucak Tatarı köyleri derler . . . Menzil-i şehri-i azîm İsmâ‘îl Akkirmân’dan bu mahalle gelince cümle . . . câmi‘li ve mesâcidli kurâlara cümle Bucak Tatarı köyleri derler,” Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 8, 23. Maybe the mosque reference in the orders here was to the Friday mosque, which may be lacking. The functioning of the mosques and madrasas may be another goal behind the Mühimme orders, because all the places Evliyâ mentioned had a mosque, small or not. Hence, those mosques might have been wanted to be reactivated after the negligence and ruining of those places.

⁴⁰⁷ Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 471n25.

⁴⁰⁸ Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 472n26. The names of the kadıs assigned to the prominent Nogay tribes were Seyyid Ebubekir Efendi and İbrahim Efendi, respectively. It is also interesting that, in 1704, those autonomous kadı administrations were abolished. Başer, “Bucak Tatarları,” 167n745, 167n746. This can be interpreted as halting the applications as well as the education program in the period of Mustafa II’s successor and brother Ahmed III.

to the belief that the idea of religious reform was planned at the turn of the century. Not only the settled Tatars in the Halil Pasha region, but also the people in the Balkans and other regions could be the subjects of the orders due to the above-illustrated condition of the peninsula and the empire. The logic seems to be the same.

Now we can change our perspective to look at the program from another angle. After the beginning of the wars, the following years witnessed sieges, destructions, revolts, migration, shortages, and forced conversion.⁴⁰⁹ In the long wars with the Holy League powers, the Ottomans lost human and material resources, large chunks of lands, and experienced a shocking defeat. As explained in the former chapter, Feyzullah Efendi penned a treatise on the revival hadith of the prophet. In the second version of the treatise, Mustafa II was represented as the reviver of the age. The contextual details were handled in that chapter. Now, we can see the reflection of this make-believe duty of the sultan here. Mustafa II strove to restore order within his realms and embarked on a spiritual, moral, and religious campaign instead of a military one. Yet we also see some precarious actions of the sultan in this respect. The *sekban-sarıca* institution was abolished by Mustafa II, and inspectors (*müfettiş*) were appointed to oversee the application of his orders.⁴¹⁰ In October 1696, Osman Pasha was appointed as the general inspector of Anatolia, and he was given an edict that contained many references to Quranic verses and delineated the contents of the inspection, which covered the security, the strict observation of the dissolution and pacification of paramilitary units, fiscal measures, and the general recovery of the provinces from the years-long depravity and chaos.⁴¹¹ Major tax

⁴⁰⁹ Clayer, *Mystiques, Etat et Société*, 183.

⁴¹⁰ BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 106#332, 333, 334 (May 1695), A. {DVNSMHM.d. 110#2544 (January 1699), A. {DVNSMHM.d. 110#2755 (February 1699). The register #110 includes many orders on this issue.

⁴¹¹ Topal, "Nusretname," 216-220.

sources of the state were lost along with the provinces that were lost in the battles. This led to a fiscal deficit and the worsening of the economy.⁴¹² Inflation, debasement, and the rocketing of prices were a blow to the economic well-being of Ottoman subjects and led to a decrease in tax revenues. New taxes were implemented to create available cash and surge the flow of money, and tax-farming began to be granted for lifetime.⁴¹³ Some reforms bore a strong reverberation of the religious disputes of the seventeenth century. For instance, new taxes were imposed on tobacco and coffee, named *bid'at-ı kahve*.⁴¹⁴ In the last chapter, we already highlighted the re-application of the dress code between Muslims and non-Muslims. As we stated, the conversions of churches to mosques, their repairments, and the issues of repairing the old churches found their ways into the chronicles, the registers of the state, and the fatwa collections; in the latter, a plethora of cases on the disputes of church repairments can be found.⁴¹⁵ These examples stand for the mirroring of these concepts in this specific moment and as a reflection of the implementations of the reviver-sultan to save his realm from the effects of the war and restore law and order. The religious education campaign of the “reviver sultan” was also the result of these considerations and the means to achieve the goals defined above.

⁴¹² Pamuk, *Osmanlı-Türkiye İktisadi Tarihi*, 141-2.

⁴¹³ For the life-time granting of tax-farming, see Salzmann, “An Ancien Regime Revisited.” In the index of consumer prices in Istanbul provided by Şevket Pamuk, the price increase continued in the seventeenth century with ups and downs and peaked in the last quarter of the century. The last decade of the seventeenth century marks the pinnacle of the price trends of the century. Though these values were assessed for the capital, the major towns of the empire present similar trends of price increases and decreases in silver content. From the Balkans to Anatolia and Syria, and even to Egypt with a slight difference, analogous fluctuations and the same economic condition can be observed, Pamuk, “Prices,” 454-6.; For the economic worsening in the Balkans, see Korkmaz, “Bosna Eyaletinde Asayiş ve Düzen,” 5-6, 16.

⁴¹⁴ Defterdar, *Zübde-i Vekayiât*, 632-633.

⁴¹⁵ For an instance from Mühimme registers, see BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 110#1942 (May 1698). In the fatwa collection of Feyzullah Efendi, there are a number of fatwas on church restorations and repair issues, the disputes between the non-Muslims and the local officers, the local Muslims and their compulsion on the non-Muslims. See Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetava-yı Feyziyye*, 125#835, 836, 837; 126#838, 839, 840, 841, 842. Not only the churches but also the houses of non-Muslims could be a matter of dispute, see Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetava-yı Feyziyye*, 127#845.

4.4.3 Heresy and superstitions

Feyzullah Efendi participated in the campaigns of Mustafa II in the Balkans, just as his beloved mentor and father-in-law Vani Mehmed Efendi had done in the past. The sultan had an aspiration to revive the ancient customs; he attended the army and led the soldiers in-person. In the three campaigns against the League forces, we see some important anecdotes, which are precious for our case. The sultan visited the local dervish lodges and villages in disguise.⁴¹⁶ The army held its camps in the countryside, near villages or fields.⁴¹⁷ In the campaigns, the sultan and his entourage, including Feyzullah Efendi, might have observed the local people. Since this was the first instance in which a sultan had taken part in a campaign after a long interval, we see the direct interaction of the sultan with his subjects. A curious gaze might have brought some issues to the attention of the mastermind of the orders and campaigns. To go further, we can ask some questions to open up some other venues. What was the motivation for the sultan to visit his subjects in disguise? Did he want to learn more about the social life of the people? We know that he is a very devout Muslim.⁴¹⁸ Did his curious gaze detect some “anomalies” in the lives and daily practices of these people? Unorthodox practices, superstitions, or maybe even “heresy” might have had an impact on the issuing of those orders to cleanse them and their folk beliefs. The ambiguous faith and popular piety of his dreamed subjects there may have challenged the mindset of the sultan or his companion Feyzullah

⁴¹⁶ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 39-40. The first lodge they visited was not named. On page 72, he sees the Halveti sheikh Selim Dede in Tamişvar. On page 30, a descendent of the Bektaşî order visits the sultan in Edirne (in 1695). Feyzullah Efendi attended the campaigns of Mehmed IV and stayed in the Balkan cities, as we stated in the previous chapter. Mustafa II also attended his father's campaigns, and he stayed in the royal mansion in Babadağı. Hence, these two might have known the local people and observed their lives earlier than the reign of the latter and cultivated a disciplinary outlook towards the people there.

⁴¹⁷ For the placement of Bektaşî lodges in the countryside, see Hasluck, *Bektaşîlik İncelemeleri*, 23.

⁴¹⁸ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 1, 19.

Efendi. They might have noted some points, and then, when the time came, they put their plans into action. Or they might have formed a preconcerted plan to make use of these campaigns as a field-check opportunity.

Turning back and focusing on the Balkans, the execution of the Mühimme orders here can be read in their own contexts, bearing in mind the latent beliefs and/or “superstitious attitudes,” especially of the Balkan people. So, not only the mentioned points in the orders, but also the indirect implications on the people’s mentalities, practices, and lives may hold a substantial place in our analysis as well. The reason for this assumption was explained by Abou El-Haj, specifically depending on our case. He states that,

From the official point of view, laxity in adherence to the tenets of the faith was tantamount to immoral acts (*mekruh*). But apparently, the decrees meant to condemn something much more specific, namely, indulgence in magical acts and superstitious or pagan practices . . . Therefore the admonition, *ad-din ul-nasiha*, which literally translates as “proper faith is in being properly guided (by accepting advice),” is therefore meant to enjoin absolute obedience by subjects to those in authority. Since the taking of advice is equated with an education in Islamic culture and ethos, officially the decrees are perceived as a serious breakdown in the binding powers of the ideology. Consistent with this analysis then, the decrees portray this breakdown as a grave deficiency on the part of the ulema, the remedy sought for meeting the social unrest is therefore found in the assignment of fresh, learned, and zealous recruits as teachers and preachers.⁴¹⁹

Hence, it is definitely important to delve into the daily lives and the practices of the locals and some “notoriously heretic” groups at this very specific time. One group that we focus on is the Bedreddinis.

The revolt associated with Bedreddin was a turning event and had decisive repercussions in the history of religion for the Balkan Muslims and non-Muslims.⁴²⁰ The classical study of Michel Balivet on Sheikh Bedreddin maintains a lot of invaluable information on the important places of Bedreddin’s influence. Serres was

⁴¹⁹ Abou-El-Haj, *Formation of the Modern State*, 51-2.

⁴²⁰ Antov, *Wild West*, 101-4.

presented as one of the important sites of the incitement of Bedreddin's movement. The narrative of the rebellion according to the chroniclers was commenced and organized by the regions of the Danube, especially Deliorman. On the route of the sheikh to the sultan, he was welcomed and revered by the locals. Deliorman, Nikopol, Zağra, Dobruca, Ohrid (in Bulgaria), Edirne, Silistra, and Varna were the places where Bedreddin was venerated by the local people. In general, the Danube region and Bulgarian lands were important centers of Bedreddin's ideas to be spread. The memory and the public esteem of Bedreddin were not effaced simply after the death of the sheikh. Even in the seventeenth century, this region was regarded as an important place of Bedreddiniyye.⁴²¹ For İbrahim Kırımî,

the Bedreddinîs lived mainly “on the other side of the Balkans”, in Dobruja and in the villages known by the name of Taviçeler (or Toyçalar) in the same region, but they were also to be found in Babaeski, where the Crimean sheikh himself had come into contact and clashed with them. On the basis of his own experiences, and, presumably, also of information that he would have picked up from his numerous associates in the region, Kırımî labeled the Bedreddinîs as Rafizîs (a derogatory term for Shiites), and claimed that they supported or were even indistinguishable from the Kızılbaş (Kızılbaşla birdür).⁴²²

For Kırımî, the Bedreddinîs were an important group to consider because of

the “ambiguous” nature of their faith.⁴²³ Kırımî accused this group with standard and stereotypical judgments that were reflected on the Kızılbaş groups by the Sunni-minded Ottoman elites and religious scholars defending this position. He claimed that they “ha[d] no respect for the sharia and the Sunna, and habitually curs[ed] the first four (!) Caliphs openly in public.”⁴²⁴ He also equalizes this group with the Celali

⁴²¹ Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, 93-5, 95n100, 101, 102-3. The author also points out the places where the revolt of Bedreddin started were the places where the revolt of Impostor Mustafa was initiated, Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, 104-5.; Antov, *Wild West*, 112-4.

⁴²² Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 173-4. This same quote was given by Ahmed Refik in his book by attributing it to Aziz Mahmud Hüdayi. He reads the name of the village as “Docalar.” Altınay, *Onaltıncı Asırda*, 17. Kırımî also states that, “I have experiences with them (*O taife ile kıssamız vardır*).” Altınay, *Onaltıncı Asırda*, 35.

⁴²³ Hasluck, *Bektaşilik İncelemeleri*, 75.

⁴²⁴ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 174.

bandits and points out that the rebellions occur in the places inhabited by these people.⁴²⁵ This incident has important implications for the mentality of the Ottoman ruling cadres and their advisors or masterminds revealing the general criminalization of confessionally dissident groups and political opponents.

Balivet reaches several conclusions in his contextualization of the hagiography of the sheikh within spatial dimensions, the sociological condition and the attitudes of the inhabitants. The Danube region and Bulgaria were important for the endurance of the spirit of Bedreddin's teachings and the resilience of the people against Ottoman authority. Some Sufi circles and popular resentment coalesced into a common opposition that was colored with mystic and "unconventional" modes of religious beliefs. These places were the cores of the rebellions that broke out in the following centuries, and they were also highly associated with Bektaşî and Bayramî-Melamî thoughts. Serres was the city where the sheikh was executed, so it turned into a pilgrimage center for his followers. There are other important centers for the movement. For instance, his hometown Simavna and the old capital Edirne, the home to Bektaşîs, who partially inherited the heritage of the sheikh. Didymoteichon also can be listed among these lands. This town links the Bedreddiniyye and Bektaşî order, and it is where Balım Sultan, who organized and institutionalized the Bektaşî order, was born. It is also a place near to Kızıl Deli, a prominent person of the order. Plovdiv, Zağra, Silistra, Varna, Deliorman, and the regions through the Danube river were frequently referred to in the hagiography. Generally, Thracia, Bulgaria,

⁴²⁵ Altınay, *Onaltıncı Asırda*, 18-9. He reports, "when a campaign was waged against Kızılbaş, some [of the sipahis there] abandon the timar and some 'seal the sword' and gone. They say, 'for the sake of timar, we do not draw a sword against the men (*Timar hatrı için ere kılıç çekmeyiz*),' and there is no instance of sharia and sunnah in them. Killing a Muslim is like killing an infidel, and [they] deem [it] as ghaza. They are Rafîzî and the source of malice. They are crowded (*kalabalık taifedirler*), and there are sheikh-named demons among them. They always work for deviating and marauding. There are some ışık lodges (*zaviye*), and they are in ruin. These people were called Simavni. Their master was also known as Simavni. They swear publicly the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs. It is hard to recount their mischiefs. They are heretic and apostate (*zındık ve mülhid*)."

Wallachia, Macedonia, and Albania were the centers of the Bektaşî order and Bedreddin's followers. After the mid-fifteenth century, the followers of the sheikh went into hiding, and sporadic instances of the group's appearance were reported in the later centuries, possibly because they merged with other dissident movements.⁴²⁶ However, the imprint of Bedreddin's thoughts hold a significant place in the minds and the memories of the people living there, and they might have been targeted by the orders of the imperial court in our case. The overlap of the places of Bedreddin's influence and the ones in the Mühimme orders with those in the discussion of Kırımî is obvious.

Likewise, it is critical to recall that Kırımî was not the only one focusing on the Bedreddinîs as he did. A few other Rumelian sheikhs in his part of the Halvetî order, including his own sheikh, Nureddinzade, and his sheikh, Sofyalı Bâlî, had focused on this group in the decades to come. The latter was a strict opponent of the "heterodox" orders, the Safavids, the Bedreddinis, the followers of Ibn Arabî, Bektaşîs, Melamis, Hamzavis, Ümmî Sinanis, Uşşakis, Gülşenis, Işıks, and so on. He took root in Sofia, Tatarpazarı, Strumica, Samakov, Vidin, Buda, and other places. These so-called "heterodox" groups were present in the Deliorman-Dobruca region. Sofyalı Bâlî was an extreme Sunnitizer and a sharia-oriented person, and he was a hater of the Kızılbaş people, too.⁴²⁷ Hence, here, we may spill some ink on the Hamzavis as well.

The Hamzavi movement, named after the famous mystic Hamza Bali and his followers, gained a stronghold in Bosnia. The movement was known for its

⁴²⁶ Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyân*, 111-3, 118. Especially the Bedreddiniyye-Bektaşîyye connection can be found in 125-9. The general characterization of the Deliorman region is described by heresy and dissent, and the Ottoman reaction to control and Sunnitize the region by establishing a new city, Hazergard (Razgrad in present-day Bulgaria), can be found in, Antov, *Wild West*, 2-3.

⁴²⁷ Clayer, *Mystique, Etat et Société*, 70-77, 112.

libertinism (*ibahat*) and its “heresy and irreligion” (*zendeka ve ilhad*). The famous sharia-oriented scholar and devout enemy of the “heretics,” Bali Efendi of Sofia, was the judge who handled the issue of effacing the Hamzavis.⁴²⁸ Though there were efforts to fight against this heretic group in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, the poet Ata’i stresses that those heretics were still present there in the seventeenth century. Some other evidence also proves the survival of the movement in this region after the combined efforts of the religious establishment and the sultan, at least certainly in the first quarter of the seventeenth century. Even some later resistance movements against the state apparatus were linked to the cause of the Hamzavis; however, these remain as speculations and lack the strength to prove the existence of a significant number of followers in that region, but these claims point out the endurance of a Hamzavi presence.⁴²⁹ The offshoots of the Hamzavi movement can be sought in several Balkan cities like Belgrade, Plovdiv, Sofia, Edirne, Gallipoli. Even in İstanbul, some Hamzavi-affiliated top-ranking bureaucrats could be able to hold respectable positions in the state.⁴³⁰ Again, not surprisingly, we see the appearance of the same places.

The travel book of Evliyâ Çelebi is an important source for learning about the daily lives and practices of the local people, and here, we will greatly benefit from this precious collection.⁴³¹ The account of Evliyâ Çelebi includes a plethora of anecdotes about folklore, and some of them may serve the purpose of pointing out some “heretical” or “superstitious beliefs” that were quite popular among some people. Or certain regions especially could be taken to be the hubs of “bizarre

⁴²⁸ Algar, “The Hamzaviye,” 246-9.

⁴²⁹ Algar, “The Hamzaviye,” 250, 252.

⁴³⁰ Algar, “The Hamzaviye,” 255.

⁴³¹ Since he took part in the surveys of the Balkan villages, the Balkans hold a prominent place in his travels and narratives. While he visits the cities of other regions, here in the Balkans, the villages were of primary position. İlgürel, “Evliyâ Çelebi.”

attitudes.”⁴³² As he visited the Balkans over decades, he narrated some instances that he deemed important. After mentioning the Bektaşî-Sarı Saltık connection in Pravadi,⁴³³ he goes through Shumen (Tr. Şumnu), Hazergrad, and Deliorman. In Shumen, he quotes a hadith, “may God curse those who are inside and outside” and concludes his comments on the people there with “may God correct them” (*Hudâ ıslâh ede*).⁴³⁴ For Hazergrad, he explicitly states that the people there constituted a community of monotheism (*cümle halkı ehl-i tevhîd ve muhibb-i fukarâlardır*).⁴³⁵ He reports about the false Seyyids and the “*şahsever-mumsöndü*” criticisms against the local people: he says that, in the village of İlhanlar, near the River Danube, “those lands were called Deliorman. These are prosperous districts . . . However, the people of this place were disparaged and decried as ‘*mum söndürüp şah sevindir*’, yet this is sheer calumny.” He argues against these criticisms and states that the people there were the true believers of Sunnah and *tevhid*. Only a group of plowmen and the poor are libertine-spirited.⁴³⁶ This complies with the attributions we mentioned above. Though he sides with the local people for their true essence of faith, he also expresses the “strangeness” of the Dobruca-Deliorman people (*Dobruca ve Deliorman kavmi birer gûne başka kavmdır*) and prays for an auspicious end for

⁴³² Köktürk, “Halk Bilimi Unsurları.”

⁴³³ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 173-4.

⁴³⁴ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 174.

⁴³⁵ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 175.

⁴³⁶ “Menzil-i Karye-i İlhanlar: . . . Bu mahallere Deliorman derler. Ma’mur [117b] nevâhilerdir . . . Ammâ ‘Mum söndürüp şah sevindir’ deyü bu tâ’ifeyi zemm u kadh ederler ammâ iftirâ-yı mahzdr.” Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 184.; “Bu nâhiye kurâlarına Deliorman derler, Silistre nâhiyeleridir. Ahâlisi için ‘şâhseven’ ve ‘Mum söndüren’ ve ‘şâh pabucundan su içen’ derler, ammâ görmedim,” Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 5, 51. Indeed, his stress on “ehl-i sünnet ve’l-cemaat” can be found when a group of people were notorious for their “heresy.” In the regions he visited, he sometimes refers to people who were “observant of prayer” (*müdâvim-i namâzdır*), Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 188. Though it may have truth in itself, these deliberate references can be interpreted within the positive light under which Evliyâ Çelebi represented those people. “Ammâ Dobrucalı deyü sehl mezmûm ü müttehemlerdir kim şâhseven deyü iftirâ ederler. Hâşâ sümme hâşâ şehi sevmezler ammâ pâdişâhlar pâdişâhı ve Habîb Muhammedü’l-Mustafâ’yı dürüst severler bir alay pâk-i’tikâd,” Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 196-7.

them (*âkıbetleri hayr ola*).⁴³⁷ He demonstrates the love of Ahl-al Bayt by the people of Babadağı, which may be interpreted as a quality of Shite affinity for the Muslims there.⁴³⁸ He also observes the same attitude among the Albanians when he visited Gjirokastër, a city in southern Albania. He states that, “Most of the people of Gjirokastër are devoted to Ali and the family of the Prophet. They sit down proclaiming ‘Ya Ali!’ and stand up proclaiming ‘Ya Ali!’,” and “one group secretly curse Muawiya and openly curse Yezid – at least this is what I was told ... They shamelessly drink wine and other intoxicating beverages.”⁴³⁹ But, of course, evoking the said groups’ love of Ahl-al Bayt would have been a rather neutral, and one might even say, positive way of describing their religious orientation. There, he mentions the antinomian dervishes (*yaldn ayak başı kabak köçekler*) and some “blasphemous plays and events” in the Babadağı domain and Sofia.⁴⁴⁰ For instance, Evliyâ talks about prostitute-chanters (*fahişe gûyende*) who visit houses and sing songs with several instruments in hand (*alâ mele’i’n-nâs hâne-be-hâne çöğür ve çeşde ve ravza ve karadüzen ve iklik çalup gezerler*). Evliyâ notes that “this is not regarded as shameful” (*ayıb değildir*). Though this practice wanted to be banned by the officials, it was opposed by the inhabitants. Evliyâ criticizes the practice as “demon’s play”

⁴³⁷ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 197. It should be stressed that this prayer was a customary one for non-Muslims to express the wishes of the Muslims for the “infidels” to be converted before they passed away. He also narrates the Albanian customs of celebrations, and for the author, their manners resemble the infidels: “Bunlar düğünlerde ve rûz-ı Hızır’da ve nevrûz-ı Hârezmşâhîde ve Kâsım günlerinde ve Sarı Saltık günlerinde ve iydeynlerde . . . bâdeleri nûş edüp . . . el ele verüp âyîn-i kâfir gibi kuç kucağ olup horos depüp kuşak kuşağa yapışup hora depme semâ’ı ederler,” Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 296. For a relevant fatwa of Feyzullah Efendi on this issue, see Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetava-yı Feyziyye*, 131#867. Also, some Alevi-Kızılbaş festivals can be noted here, Mélikoff, *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, 64-5, 78-83, 134-5, 138. The Sarı Saltık reference in the account of Evliyâ Çelebi is spectacular.

⁴³⁸ A selection of which can be found here, Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 199-202. There he reintroduces the discussion of Sarı Saltık and supports him through a story of Sultan Bayezid II. He says further that the ones who have doubt about his faith and religion would be sinners (*İmdi azîm, Muhammed Saltık Bay hakkında her kim şakk-ı şühede olursa ne’üzübillah âsim olur*).

⁴³⁹ Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality*, 72-3.; Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 295-6.

⁴⁴⁰ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 202, 224-5. Here, in Sofia, Evliyâ mentions some prostitutes and how the people of the city regarded them as a source of fertility. Maybe these beliefs were related to the fertility cults.

(*mekr-i şeytândır*) and again concludes with his wishes for an auspicious end for them.⁴⁴¹ Again, around the same region, he narrates a “certainly true” story he experienced about a woman turning herself into a hen, and converting *torlak* and non-Muslim children into her chicks, by smearing a handful of ash on her vulva and throwing the rest of the ash after spilling it both on herself and the naked children lying near the hearth. After they performed a procession in the village, a non-Muslim man urinates on her and turns her back to a woman and the chicks back to children. The parish father prays for her and performs an exorcism (*afaroz-ı mandolos eyledi*). The villagers were accustomed to this transfiguration of the woman and tried to relax Evliyâ, who was so shocked, and he had a nosebleed. He laments about the people of this village as well (*Çalikkavak melunu*).⁴⁴² This story, whether it is made up or not (!), says something about the life and people of the Balkans. He never tries to rationalize a story, and he makes use of the magical reality in his own time.⁴⁴³ The mixed lives of Muslims and non-Muslims influenced their folk stories, and probably, Evliyâ used this as an episode that he witnessed and placed his judgment about the locals at the end.⁴⁴⁴

Episodic narratives of saintly people, their wonders, and their popular reverence can be found in his account.⁴⁴⁵ In Silistra, Sofia, Uyvar, and many other

⁴⁴¹ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 204. An order was issued in July 1696, and it states that the nomad Kiptis in Nikopol were roaming around the region; their men were engaging in banditry; and their women were dancing in all-male gatherings of Muslims, while consuming wine and serving as prostitutes. They cause *fesad* and *şenâ'at*. The officials were urged to settle them down in Muslim-inhabiting quarters, convert them to Islam, and give them decent clothes. Those who did not convert were recorded in the registers and charged poll tax. If they insisted on living as nomads, consuming wine, and engaging in prostitution, they were to be punished accordingly. The copies of the order were addressed to Silistra, Tatarpazarı, Plovdiv, Kyustendil, Dubniçe (in present-day Kosovo), Şehirköy (Pirot in present-day Serbia), Samokov, Sofia, Çirmen (Ormenio), Kırkkilise, and Vize, BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 108#1486-1497.

⁴⁴² Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 205. The villagers say that she used to turn herself to a *karakoncolos* in winter nights, but this time, she became a hen. He also states that this place was the hearth of bandits.

⁴⁴³ Yavuz, “Evliyâ Çelebi.”

⁴⁴⁴ See Dankoff, *An Ottoman Mentality*, 202-203.

⁴⁴⁵ Atasever, “Menkibeler.”

places, he cites either a fountain or a shrine as the center of spiritual radiation.⁴⁴⁶

Some shrines, on the other hand, were destroyed by the authorities because they were turning into “centers of malice.”⁴⁴⁷ He gives some anecdotal events, which reveal clues about the improper behaviors and Hurufi tendencies, too.⁴⁴⁸

Related to the account of Evliyâ Çelebi, the historical background of the Islamization of the Balkans holds great importance for understanding the deep currents that were active in shaping the minds and beliefs of the people living there. This had affected the culture and the religious life in their villages and towns with practices they transmitted from the distant past and created a merge of different attitudes.⁴⁴⁹ In this regard, a primary figure is Sarı Saltık. According to tradition, he is the leader of the Turkomans who migrated to Romania in the thirteenth century. He has several narratives about his genealogy; his ghazi-dervish personality; his importance for the Bektaşî community in the Balkans; his connections to non-Muslims and Paulician and Bogomil communities; his mild attitude towards Bosnians and tacit acknowledgment of their former faith; his questionable identity as either a friend of God or a Christian monk, which even triggered a question to be raised to Ebussuud by Kanuni (and his opposite view of İbn Kemal, who was rather positive towards the saint) can all be counted as examples for his central role in this mission.⁴⁵⁰ He was specifically important for certain regions. A traveler from the

⁴⁴⁶ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 187, 219, 220, 221-2.; Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 7, 29, 30-1.

⁴⁴⁷ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 245. He tells the story of Sefer Şah Sultan, a Bektaşî dervish, and his shrine was inhabited by malicious people (*niçe bin eşirrâ-yı avâm*) who committed evil acts there (*niçe fisk [u] fücûr olur*). The shrine was destroyed in 1641. After the destruction, those who supported the destruction were found dead, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 245.

⁴⁴⁸ Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 244, 260. For Evliyâ, he not only mentions the Bektaşî shrines and lodges, but also gives the places of some Halveti, Celveti and Gülşeni examples.

⁴⁴⁹ Hasluck, *Bektaşîlik İncelemeleri*, 77.

⁴⁵⁰ His assumed link to the family of the prophet, a spiritual follower of Ahmed Yesevi and Hacı Bektaş Veli make him a charismatic leader of the Islamization narrative. For the relevant references, see Antov. *Wild West*, 95-6.; Evliyâ Çelebi. *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 7, 37; Hasluck, *Bektaşîlik İncelemeleri*, 76.; Turinay, “Özgün Bir Deneme,” 194-5, 204-7.; Özkan, “Sarı Saltuk ve Gagavuzlar,” 243.; Minkov, *Kisve Bahası Petitions*, 105-8. Though Evliyâ represents Sarı Saltık as a saintly person, İbn

early-twentieth century stresses his connection to Bektaşîs and notes the regard of people from the Dobruca region and the Balkans in general.⁴⁵¹ He took deep roots in Albanian culture and tradition; “syncretic” thoughts related to Bektaşîs raised him to an elevated position among them. Alid genealogy expressed in his vita and Hacı Bektaş Veli’s hagiography assures the revered nature of Sarı Saltık.⁴⁵² His gazi-dervish identity was crowned with some other mythical and magical attributions in folk literature and “superstitious” beliefs as well.⁴⁵³ Not only Sarı Saltık, but also the other *abdals* of Rum and their surviving legacies among the followers of those mystics, like Otman Baba, Demir Baba, Akyazılı Sultan, Kademli Baba, and the *kalenderî* dervishes, constituted a significant factor for the emergence of a Kızılbaş population in the Balkans.⁴⁵⁴

For the cult of Sarı Saltık, we can talk about “dual worshipping” by both Muslims and non-Muslims. This was the case for centuries, and we are exposed to an obvious interconnectedness between the two faiths and congregations.⁴⁵⁵ He holds a place in the minds and hearts of the people both consciously and subconsciously.⁴⁵⁶ He is undeniably significant for the Tatars, too. They preserve him in their memories and oral traditions.⁴⁵⁷ Dobruca, as the bridgehead of the transmission and juxtaposition of Christianity, Islam, and other local beliefs, has the characteristic features of “*uc*” (frontier), and it is a place of, let us say, “metadoxy.” The multi-

Battuta has some reservations for his rapport to Sunni belief, Kiel, “Sarı Saltuk Dede,” 284-5.; For a detailed discussion of religion of Sarı Saltık by three travelers, İbn Battuta, Evliyâ Çelebi, Petru Bogdan Baksiç, you may refer to Büyükcınar, “Sarı Saltuk ve Heterodoks İslam,” 269. It should be noted that centuries after his death, Sarı Saltık still held a substantial place in the minds of Ottomans, Büyükcınar, “Sarı Saltuk ve Heterodoks İslam,” 270. A later and precise tackling of the case can be found in Hasluck, *Bektaşîlik İncelemeleri*, 123-6.; İzeti, *Balkanlar’da Tasavvuf*, 48-54.

⁴⁵¹ Çağlayan “Sarı Saltuk Efsanesi,” 102-110.

⁴⁵² Muço, “Sarı Saltuk Dede ve Arnavutlar,” 114-9.

⁴⁵³ Hoca, “Efsaneler ve İnançlar,” 124-5.

⁴⁵⁴ Antov, *Wild West*, 244-250.; Minkov, *Kisve Bahası Petitions*, 102-3. References to towns and villages in the orders should be evaluated in this light as well.

⁴⁵⁵ Turinay, “Özgün Bir Deneme,” 185.

⁴⁵⁶ Turinay, “Özgün Bir Deneme,” 192.

⁴⁵⁷ Turinay, “Özgün Bir Deneme,” 200.; Hasluck, *Bektaşîlik İncelemeleri*, 123-8.

layered perception of these saints creates an ephemeral but recurring “bridge between Christian and Muslim traditions, [which] support for conveying devotional practices [that] enable[ed] elements from [the] two religions, including autochthonous religious beliefs to coexist, overlap and sometimes merge.”⁴⁵⁸ “From Dobruca to Albania, community life seems to have been fostered by . . . popular religious and cultic rituals, fed by continuing exchanges that characterize [the] interfaith worship dedicated to Sarı Saltuq and the Christian saints he is identified with.”⁴⁵⁹

Besides conversion, there are other factors that should be kept in mind, like “adhesion, or more pragmatic attempts at achieving a status change conditioned by ‘natural needs.’” Proselyting non-state actors is a contributor to the process.⁴⁶⁰ The Deliorman and Gerlova regions, for Antov, were repopulated by the ones who are not comfortable with the centralizing attitude of the Ottomans. “Heterodox, semi-nomadic Turcomans, Safavid sympathizers” were not suitable for a Sunni-sedentary future outlook of the state.⁴⁶¹ The establishment of new cities and waqfs attracted new migrations, and the newcomers constituted the non-Sunni element of the Balkans.⁴⁶² We also see the displacement and marginalization of non-Sharia-minded dervishes, semi-nomadic frontier Turcoman warriors, and frontier lord families as the other dissent-making elements there.⁴⁶³ These symptomatic examples go for all of the Balkans.

⁴⁵⁸ Turinay, “Özgün Bir Deneme,” 221-3.; Büyükçınar “Sarı Saltuk ve Heterodoks İslam,” 270.; Mélikoff. *Uyur İdik Uyardılar*, 24-5, 30, 38-9, 43.

⁴⁵⁹ For examples on the phenomenon of interfaith worship and cultic esteem shown for Sarı Saltık and saints, see Kuehn and Tütüncü, “Veneration of Sarı Saltuq Dede,” 237.; Özkan, “Sarı Saltuk ve Gagavuzlar,” 244-5.; Büyükçınar, “Sarı Saltuk ve Heterodoks İslam,” 271.; Zhelyakova, “Islamization in the Balkans,” 244-5.; Antov, *Wild West*, 283. In the fatwa collection of Feyzullah Efendi, there is a case on crypto-Christian: “Zeyd-i zimmi İslam’a geldikde nehar-i Ramazan’da hafıyyeten şürb-i hamr eylese Zeyd’e ne lazım olur? el-Cevab: Şöhret ve ayan ile istihlal etmediyse şürb-i hamr için hadd-i şürb ve cinayet ale’s-savm için ta’zir-i şedid olunup tövbe ve salahı zahir olunca[ya dek] habsolunur,” Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetava-yı Feyziyye*, 20#122.

⁴⁶⁰ Antov, *Wild West*, 37.

⁴⁶¹ Antov, *Wild West*, 2.

⁴⁶² Antov, *Wild West*, 2-3.

⁴⁶³ Antov, *Wild West*, 3.; Hasluck, *Bektaşilik İncelemleri*, 21-2.

Regarding the “heresies” in the Balkans, one stunning example comes from *Nusretname*, which is about the heretic beliefs of a former Albanian governor. His name was Celo Mustafa Bey from Delvine. As Silahtar reports, “he refused resurrection after death, paradise, and hell; reward or punishment in the afterlife according to one’s deeds; and rejected and disdained the prophet and Abu Hanife, claiming that ‘only the person you call Muhammed is a companion of God and the one you admit as *imam-i ‘azam* is a bald kid.’”⁴⁶⁴ The people of Delvine tell the claims of Mustafa before the Chief Justice of Rumelia, and upon the legal opinion issued after the appeal of Kazasker, he was executed in Alayköşkû in front of the sultan on 3 Zilkade 1108, or 24 May 1697, though he requested forgiveness.⁴⁶⁵ There can be no greater excuse or reason for issuing the orders we take into consideration here. After hearing these “heretic” claims, the sultan and Feyzullah Efendi must be ensured to revive the sunnah and the true belief in their realm.⁴⁶⁶ This is certainly a very relevant event for our case. One could see the execution of this man as yet another instance of the confessionalizing impulse, but one with a more inquisitorial turn. Celo Mustafa Bey was the personified version of the ambiguous faith and “heresy” in the regions they were roaming and camping. These points must not be underestimated in evaluating the case we deal with here.

The religious education program might have targeted these heretic beliefs of the commoners, and the many instances cited above form a massive body of

⁴⁶⁴ “Haşr ü neşri cennet ve cehennemi ve sevâb-ı ikâbı inkâr idüp ve peygamber aleyhi’s-selâm hazretleriyle İmâm-ı A‘zam radiya’l-lahü anhü hazretlerin tekzîb eyleyüp ‘ancak Muhammed didiğiniz Allah’ın dostu, İmâm-ı A‘zam ittiâz ittiğiniz de bir kel oğlandır.’” Topal, “Nusretname,” 280-1. These claims of Celo Mustafa Bey resemble the thoughts of Bedreddin and his followers, Balivet, *Tasavvuf ve İsyan*, 119-123. Almost 30 years before the case of Celo Mustafa Bey, Evliyâ visited Delvine, and he gave a stunning example that “Ârnâbüdları allâhümme âfinâ müselmânız derler ammâ aslâ dîn [ü] diyânet ve haşr [ü] neşr nedir bilmezler,” Evliyâ Çelebi, *Seyahatnâme*, vol. 3, 291-2.

⁴⁶⁵ Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 1, pt. 3, 263. Also, please cf. BOA İE.AS. 45.4085 (June 1697), AE.SAMD.III. 141.13632.1 (September 1717).

⁴⁶⁶ Abou-Manneh, “Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II,” 458-9.

reprehensible beliefs and opinions that appear as superstition, as in the case of Evliyâ's narratives, or the denouncement of mainstream faith and its message, as in the case of Celo Mustafa Bey. However, this latter case is not the only example. We can see that the overemphasis I laid on the Balkans should be balanced with other instances from different corners of the empire. Khaled El-Rouayheb gives the account of a certain preacher from Damascus, Yahya ibn Isa, in 1610 and his execution because of his heretical utterances from the pulpits as,

denigrating the Prophet Muhammad; insulting the class of religious scholars; criticisms of religion (i.e. Islam) and its followers; denying the existence of God; calumniating God and ascribing to Him perplexity and impotence; declaring the prophets to be ignorant; insulting the Damascene scholar Taqi al-Din al-Hisni (d. 1426) and the venerable founder of the Hanbali school of law Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 855); belief in "immanentism" (i.e. that God is immanent or incarnate in the world) and the transmigration of souls; and declaring freely available what is privately owned by Muslims.⁴⁶⁷

Rouayheb points out the position of the Damascene ulema members towards

this person and stresses that these people (like ibn Isa) were respected by the ordinary people as holy fools though their contradicting messages with sharia.⁴⁶⁸

Maybe the sultan and şeyhülislam tried to eradicate these instances from taking root among the populace through their zealous program. In addition, Abdülkadir Efendi "describes a cave in Şehrîzor (in present-day Northern Iraq) as a "lair of sorcery"

(*câzûlar yurdu*) where people were trapped and killed with magic."⁴⁶⁹ The danger of popular preachers and storytellers who told religious stories of Israiliyyat and could not be able to differentiate between the sound and corrupt hadith, was transmitting questionable material and conveying religious information that they had not attained via the canals that typically set the criteria of the religious establishment's power.⁴⁷⁰

⁴⁶⁷ El-Rouayheb, "Heresy and Sufism," 358-9.

⁴⁶⁸ El-Rouayheb, "Heresy and Sufism," 380.

⁴⁶⁹ Sariyannis, "Ottoman Ghosts," 203.

⁴⁷⁰ For instance, Ahmed Bican criticizes that the preachers "often imparted their misinterpretations to the people," Krstić, *Contested Conversions*, 33, 36.

Also, the spread of “popular religion” through these platforms bears a “threat” in that it leads to the definition of Islam as how people comprehend it to be. Thus, transparency of the religious limits leads to the “misshaping of the faith.”⁴⁷¹ As we can see, the wide-scale existence of heretical propagations of preachers and folk beliefs could have triggered the powerholders to implement this program.⁴⁷² Hence, we can grasp the urgings made to the preachers, which evidently reflect this practice and concern. As the preachers include anecdotes in their speeches, those narratives were defined as “weak” and “misleading the innocent by calling to fanaticism and prejudice, causing animosity and hostility, and spreading misery.” The order to refrain from engaging with these anecdotes may be read as an attempt to “turn to the origins” of Islam and “purify” the main site and medium of learning and teaching religion from the “spoiling” intrusions.

These different cases may provide a point of departure for another explanation for our case. The regional differences of the Balkan communities with respect to their religious culture, the change of the demographic structure, and the conversion to Islam was stressed by the authors of several works.⁴⁷³ Though these studies are about the Balkan context, we can extend the application of these regional variations to other regions of the empire as well. Thence, I wonder whether we can come up with an assumption that the state intended to level the religious culture and adherence to faith of its subjects by creating, so to say, “standard” believers? By applying the program empire-wide, the propagators of the program might have tried

⁴⁷¹ Berkey, *The Formation of Islam*, 253-6. A case study on local Islamic culture and practices in Palestine from the early-twentieth century can be found in Paton, “Survivals of Primitive Religion.”

⁴⁷² Sariyannis emphasizes that in Ottoman history, people “never experienced any major breach of their religious order . . . nor did the rural world in the Balkans or Anatolia ever have to give up its system of values and internal moral equilibrium in favor of central state interventions,” Sariyannis, “Ottoman Ghosts,” 208-9. Nonetheless, our case has objectives, which present the instance that was lacking before, according to Sariyannis.

⁴⁷³ Especially, Antov, *Wild West*, 40.; Minkov, *Kisve Bahası Petitions*, Chapters 2 and 3.; Zhelyazkova “Islamization in the Balkans,” 233; Gradeva, “The Ottoman Balkans.”

to solve the problems of heresy, dissent, mischief, rebellions, and revolts radically. Embodying revivalism, the divinely ordained sultan was burdened with the task of revivifying the Islam in his age as well as actualizing his hopes of taking his glorious ancestors as exemplars. Such a motivation would not be improper. For achieving this goal, a systematic application of a complex and convoluted religious education program of an unprecedented scale and scope was needed. The time of Mustafa II was especially suitable for such a meticulous and modern-like operation. The firman of the sultan to organize the courier system;⁴⁷⁴ the detailed cataloging of Feyzullah Efendi's library;⁴⁷⁵ the detailed instructions in the endowment deed of the şeyhülislam for educational standards and codes;⁴⁷⁶ the protocols of the Treaty of Karlowitz for a pedantic application of the terms on the land;⁴⁷⁷ the first firman of Mustafa II on laying hands on state authority;⁴⁷⁸ the order sent to the pasha for inspecting Anatolia; and the almost identical orders for the religious education program all present a constellation of a developed conceptualization regarding the handling of the administrative and related issues in a systematic and orderly way. Feyzullah Efendi was also criticized to establish his own household, or even a new dynasty, and I speculate that this move of the şeyhülislam can be interpreted as

⁴⁷⁴ Heywood, "Two Firmans of Muṣṭafā II."

⁴⁷⁵ Feyzullah Efendi had a long and exhaustive list of the books in his library with notes of the title, author, copier, volume number, style of writing, specificities of paper and binding, page and string number per page, language, and so on. These books were also listed according to their subjects in different headings, which resembles the modern way of library cataloging per the detailed information of the books, *Feyzullah Efendi Vakfiyesi*, Millet Kütüphanesi, MS Feyzullah, 2280. For the library of Feyzullah Efendi see, Gençboyacı, "Vakfettiği Kitaplar." For the index of the Feyzullah Efendi library cf. Özcan, "The Vakf of Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi," 70-1, 123-134.; (Generic OTA, CN B/4200 Defter-i Kütüphane-i Feyzullah Efendi ve Şeyh Murad ve Kalkandelenli İsmail Ağa. Dersaadet 14 Numarolu Matbaa 1310.) The document is digitally available via the digital library of Türk Tarih Kurumu, <http://kutuphane.ttk.gov.tr/details?id=534808&materialType=NE&query=feyzullah+efendi>, and <http://kutuphane.ttk.gov.tr/resource?itemId=300899&dkymId=3773>

⁴⁷⁶ The students and the professors of madrasas were ordered to pray for Mustafa II and his state after each class. Experts of the prophetic tradition were ordered to be appointed for hadith courses and to instruct from Kütüb-ü Sitte. Also, specific performances and behaviors were obliged to the students in the classes, such as wearing clothes for them (*kendilerine has elbiselerini giyeler*) and staying in solemnity in the hadith classes, Bakırcı and Kılıç, "Vakıfları," 431-5.

⁴⁷⁷ See Abou-El-Haj, "The Reisulkuttab."

⁴⁷⁸ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 104.

creating a pool of available personnel for the program he imagined, or getting rid of the other households in the bureaucracy. These points of systematizing and “modernizing” many domains (from politics to education, foreign affairs, the economy, etc.) bring to mind another component of the confessionalization paradigm: the modernization of the state. I do not argue that the few examples I listed here are enough to prove the modernization of the state in connection to this education program; however, the close relation in time, sequence, and content has to be thought of. Nevertheless, this program marks a special point in Ottoman history. As Antov articulates, the Ottomans lacked church organization and the means to impose elementary education to its subjects. Only in the political domain and the development of discourse would a confessional language do its best. Yet the case of this thesis provides a further step taken in this direction and the turning of the critical gaze of the state to its subjects *en masse*, thereby intruding into each tiny room available to the authority of the state.⁴⁷⁹ Though my primary motivation is not to vindicate the confessionalization paradigm in Ottoman history, the program of Mustafa II and his mentor should alter our perspective when we deal with the confessional matters of Ottoman history in detail and Sunnism in general, at least in the eighteenth-century context.

Though I have stressed the culmination and the influence of the confessional policies of former periods, I have said nothing in the reign of Mustafa II on the relation between the Ottomans and the Kızılbaş people, who were one primary figure in the confessionalization narrative in the Ottoman history. This will be the last point under this heading. Though the tense relations between the Ottomans and the Safavids in the second half of the seventeenth century were softened, there were

⁴⁷⁹ Antov, *Wild West*, 280-1.

continuing problems. The Basra region and some castles there were taken by Arab bandits, Manioğlu, and later, Iranians, who occupied some of those castles. After the conclusion of the wars with the League powers, Daltaban Mustafa Pasha was sent to this region to take these castles and the Basra region back under Ottoman rule in February 1701.⁴⁸⁰ In the account of Silahtar, we see the depictions of the people and their religious tendencies there. Davud Han, the governor of Basra, was addressed in a letter, and he was ordered to come under Ottoman rule. The letter had a crucial message in itself, the famous hadith of the prophet: “*ed-Dinü’n-nasiha*.”⁴⁸¹ Silahtar narrates the capture of Basra and relates the condition of the people there.⁴⁸² After this capture, the sheikhs of the surrounding regions declared their allegiance to the Ottomans. Silahtar says that since Basra was in the hands of Arab bandits, and then under Safavid rule, many mosques, masjids, and madrasas were in ruin, and the people fell into immorality (*vilâyetimize eşkıyâ-yı A’râb ve ehl-i bid‘at istîlâ itdikleri günden beru ekser cevâmi‘ ve medâris metrûk ve tarîk-i fitne ve fesâd-ı meslûk ...*). After the Ottomans conquered the region, they were repaired; congregational prayers were held again; and those who were resistant were either “moralized by the moral of Prophet or faced the justice of Omar, or the beat of Ali” (*inâda musırr eğer bir kimesne kalmış ise ... yâ hulk-ı Muhammedî yâ adl-i Ömerî yâ darb-ı Ali ile anlar dahi islâh olunmak ümîd olunur.*)⁴⁸³ He continues to talk about the Kızılbaş people there and their practices.⁴⁸⁴ The reports and letters were written to the locals, and capitulated bandits included several references to admonishment.⁴⁸⁵ Silahtar continues to make rhetorical explanations and create a dichotomy of people’s

⁴⁸⁰ Silâhdar, *Nusretname*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 52-60.; BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 111#1194-1197 (May 1700).

⁴⁸¹ Silâhdar, *Nusretname*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 60-1.

⁴⁸² Silâhdar, *Nusretname*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 65-70.

⁴⁸³ Topal, “Nusretname,” 487.

⁴⁸⁴ Silâhdar, *Nusretname*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 69.

⁴⁸⁵ Topal, “Nusretname,” 487-9, 494-5, 499-501.

condition before and after the Ottoman rule. There we also see the remark of İbrahim Kırımî on the people of Baghdad, in the manner of his similar handling of the Rumelian context, that “the people of Baghdad have been mired in heresy (*ilhad*) and libertinism (*ibahat*) since the time of Hallac-ı Mansur,” proposing an obscure, and rather scholarly, nature with the confessional make-up and history of this region. Kırımî’s discourse on Safavid Iran, both during and after the termination of the Ottoman-Safavid battles, was quite negative. As opposed to recognizing the Safavid Shah as an adversary administration, Kırımî portrayed Iran essentially as a land ravaged by “Kızılbaş clans” and “Kızılbaş gypsies” (*Kızılbaş kiptîsi*) in a lasting condition of disorder. At the same time, he coupled the Kızılbaş with the gypsies since he connected both with an absence of regard for Islamic social and religious standards.⁴⁸⁶ His points on the eastern provinces of the empire may shed more light on the reasons for addressing those provinces in the empire-wide orders.

In the next year, in 1702, a campaign was organized to Iraq, and after the people here were “liberated” from the oppression of bandits and Safavids, it is noted in a *buyruldu* that the former beliefs of Iranians (*Acemler*) were reprehensible, and the sheikh of the region reports that “we were infidels, but now we are Muslims,” and some were re-introduced to Islam by repentance after they did apostate (of course, according to the Ottomans’ view).⁴⁸⁷ Hence, the orders sent to these places share the same objectives as the ones sent to the Balkans and Tatars.

⁴⁸⁶ Terzioğlu, “Power, Patronage and Confessionalizm,” 176.

⁴⁸⁷ “Kafir idik müselman olduk,” “ba’de’l-irtidâd tevbe ile İslama gelenler,” Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 2, pt. 1, 113-4. Also, there are some orders addressed to the governor of Bagdad, in which we see references prohibiting oppression and innovations (*bid’at*), BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#1066 (July 1702), BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#1219 (September 1702). In the fatwa collection of Feyzullah Efendi, there is a fatwa on the Kurds who “turned rafîzi” and changing their creed (*revafîz-i acem itikadıyla mu’tekid olup*) and attacking Muslims at the frontier region (*Hudud-i memleket-i Osmaniye dahilinde*). See Feyzullah Efendi, *Fetava-yı Feyziyye*, 129#858.

As we move away from the core lands of the Ottoman Empire and turn our focus on the Kızılbaş people, I want to come to the Lebanese region. The pioneering study of Winter on Lebanon sheds some light on the position of the state towards the Shiite tribes of the region. In the early times of Ottoman rule in the region, the Harfushes, a Shiite tribe, were the magnate organization and medium of the Ottoman center in the area.⁴⁸⁸ In the seventeenth century, this consensual relationship between the Ottoman capital and, now, the Shiite Hamada family continued well within the *iltizam* system, which was backed by the state. As Winter states, “the Ottomans had no illusions as to the Hamadas’ heresy, violence, and taxcheating, yet with rare exceptions, they were unable or simply unwilling to invest themselves in replacing an institution which ... functioned passably well.”⁴⁸⁹ However, after 1683, the turmoil reigned all over the empire, and Lebanon was not an exception. The delicate balance of power and the fragile relations between the state and the local tax collector family led to a clash between the two, reaching a climax in the 1693-1694 campaigns.⁴⁹⁰ In this particular time, the allies of the Ottomans in the realm changed, and the new rhetoric, accompanied by and overlapping with the new families’ ability to execute the orders of the center in the region, affected the former co-opters of the Ottomans in Lebanon. The Hamadas and Harfushes now were marginalized due to “France’s protection of the Maronites, the Druze emirs’ choice of local partners, the civilian governors’ quest to eradicate heterodox rebels in Tripoli, and the reinvocation of Ebu’s-Suud’s definitions of illegal heresy.”⁴⁹¹ As we can see both in the former cases and in this one, there would be no need to seek any other reason to

⁴⁸⁸ Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon*, Chapter 2.

⁴⁸⁹ Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon*, Chapter 3, 87.

⁴⁹⁰ Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon*, 87.

⁴⁹¹ Winter, *The Shiites of Lebanon*, Chapter 4, 116, Chapter 6.

send orders to this region to educate those people in “true faith” and to turn these bandits and rebels to true believers.

4.4.4 The uncovered regions

So far, I discussed the different possibilities for sending these orders to certain regions. As can be seen in our map, we have only the Balkans, Anatolia, and the Fertile Crescent as the targeted regions. However, the Ottoman Empire does not consist of the provinces the orders were sent to. Hence, we need to seek some answers to this question: why did not the court address the other provinces of the empire? There are some explanations that I can propose. The first one is related to the power of the state.

Were not there political and social problems that struck these regions? We learned from *Nusretname* that there were some problems in the Hijaz region. There were some brothels in Mecca, and these houses were ordered to be demolished, for instance.⁴⁹² However, we do not see any orders sent to this province. There is contemporary evidence about the places far away from the authority of İstanbul. In the seventeenth century, the local administrations in northern Africa and the Hijaz region were connected to the center with weak bonds.⁴⁹³ There were also problems in those regions, but these places do not appear among the provinces addressed.⁴⁹⁴ Can we conclude that the orders were sent to the places where the state could afford to enforce them?

If the socio-political explanation does not apply to these places, then we may look at the heresy-related issues. Were there not heretical practices? Earlier evidence

⁴⁹² BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 108#370 (February 1696).

⁴⁹³ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi - IV. Cilt, 1. Bölüm*, 4-5.

⁴⁹⁴ For example, see BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 111#1769-#1771 (February 1701), A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#270, 372, 380 (December 1701-January 1702).

for answering this question comes from the travel notes of Jean Thévenot (1633-1667). He was a French traveler.⁴⁹⁵ He gives precious information about the lives and customs of the Turks, Greeks, and Arabs in the regions he traveled. The point that attracts our interest comes from his visits to the regions between Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt. He talks about *hhouames* (presumably a word derived from *Ikhwan*) of a different religion than Islam.⁴⁹⁶ He narrates that these people live in dark tents. They perform their rituals at night in these tents, and they engage in sexual intercourse with anyone they come across after this performance, whether a foreigner or a member of their own family. When they come to the cities, they conceal their identities because if they were recognized, they were burned at the stake.⁴⁹⁷ This is not the only instance. He mentions the bizarre attitudes of the dervishes in Arabia. It is only half a century before our case. How, then, should we think of these cases? These regions and northern African provinces were never the targets of the orders. How should we read the exclusion of these regions? We see that heresy holds an important place for targeting a certain region. However, the southern provinces of the empire were simply omitted. It seems that the northern axis of the empire was under consideration by the authorities. I could not provide a clear answer or any strong proof for the exclusion of these southern regions from the set of orders. Maybe the distance of these regions was a reason for their omission. To issue an order, you have to be able to reach and rule in one domain. If you cannot enforce your word, you cannot rule. Therefore, the court might have decided not to deal with these regions for the time being, as the core regions and closer provinces were of higher need. Thus, the court prioritized these provinces. Maybe, if the rule of the

⁴⁹⁵ Thévenot, *Thévenot Seyahatnamesi*, 12.

⁴⁹⁶ Thévenot, *Thévenot Seyahatnamesi*, 256.

⁴⁹⁷ Thévenot, *Thévenot Seyahatnamesi*, 256. For the editor, this reference reminds us of the allegations against the Kızılbaş people.

sultan had continued, these omitted regions would have been addressed in the future. Only speculations avail for now.

4.5 Conclusion

If the rule and office of both Sultan Mustafa II and Şeyhülislam Seyyid Mehmed Feyzullah Efendi had turned out as they had wished, maybe now we would be talking about other outcomes. Yet, for a certain period, we see their attempt to create a more pious state and society, whether it was only a pretext to suppress some criticisms and soften anxiety, or a sincere will of attachment to the sunnah. Earlier examples of reviving Sunnah and puritanical agendas were discussed, which are well-known to Ottomanist scholars. Here, I made use of the confessionalization paradigm as a quite well-functioning heuristic tool to explain the task undertaken in the early-eighteenth century.

In this chapter, I outlined and unfolded the confessionalization program of Mustafa II and his mentor and tutor, Şeyhülislam Feyzullah Efendi, which was probably planned before and around 1702, and applied partially in 1702 and 1703. The unprecedented scale and scope of the orders issued by the imperial court and the details of the program and its attempt to send sheikhs from the center, make the case impressive, compelling, and provocative to read in light of the historical course of events. The relation with confessionalization and Sunnitization held the central explanatory axes here. Yet I also presented elements of the immediate context since one asks, “How could they come up with such an organized and planned program?” The answers to this question constituted the second axis of the chapter. The state might have needed such policymaking in the circumstances of the day. However, it could have been simpler to formulate some general comments about keeping the

sharia well-regarded and well-considered. There must be different purposes, broader contextual reasons, and deeper concerns behind these orders. Maybe these hold the gist of the discussion. I needed to look at the circumstances and structures, as well as the intellectual currents and ideologies, to define and determine these people's mental maps. The sections following the introduction of the case in this chapter aimed to bring a set of possibilities that might have led the policy-makers to delve into or look up at certain symptoms, results, and conclusions to come up with the project at hand. Nonetheless, they were not options to choose, but complementing aspects of the same context and background, which paved the way for the religious education program.

The possible causes were minutely discussed, and some speculations were proposed to provide a "thick description" of the time being, which would help us to contextualize the orders, the persons, the empire, and the geography in their places. The religio-political conditions; the activities of different groups in tune with several brands of religious outlooks and aspirations; top down and bottom up initiatives and lateral impacts; the targeting of "heresy;" and the long durée explanations laid the background of our case and were the main points of clarification for evaluating the orders. Social upheavals and a speculative handling of the scope of the orders constituted the supplementary explanations for our case. In addition to the former examples of Ottoman confessionalization practices, the currents were explained in the second chapter and the immediate context was demonstrated in the third chapter. The deeper vectors of different epistemologies and the world views discussed here have a significant impact on both the formulation and the application of our confessionalization or religious education program. Such an unprecedentedly detailed and encompassing program would only deserve a comprehensive analysis. A

set of conclusive remarks will be presented in the following, and the last, chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Was the admonishment of the preacher that I mentioned at the very beginning of this thesis well-received by the congregation? At the time, the Directorate of Religious Affairs had issued a legal opinion that deemed tobacco religiously prohibited, which instigated a great deal of argument in society. Yet the majority of the congregation that was addressed by the official of the Directorate were smoking when they left the mosque. Now, as this thesis comes to an end, I wonder about the influence or the success of the religious education program that was implemented at the very beginning of the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. In seeking answers to this question, I will try to present a discussion of the place of this short-lived confessionalization and social disciplining attempt in the long-term perspective of Ottoman confessionalization policies, and contemporary European confessionalization and social disciplining cases, in a comparative way. For the result and the aftermath of the case, a relevant question is that “was the populace ready or willing to take this intense and detailed religious training?” The chronicles and the reported instances on the Edirne Incident may give us some clues in replying to this question.

5.1 The Edirne Incident

After the sultan returned to Istanbul, soon the court of the sultan was moved to Edirne. Feyzullah Efendi based the justification of this relocation of the court on the arguments about supervising the border demarcation process, inspecting and

restoring law and order in the Balkans, and the abundance of hunting gardens – besides, keeping of the sultan away from the angry ulema, soldiers, and merchants.⁴⁹⁸ The stability attained after the Karlowitz treaty was fragile. Rumors of disgust spread to the extent that they became a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. Delays in payment to the soldiers; the “betrayal of Muslim faith and the state” by signing the humiliating treaty with the “infidels;”⁴⁹⁹ the mismanagement of state affairs; the dominance and nepotism of Feyzullah Efendi; the discomfort of the Crimean Khans; the economic hardships because of the move of provisions to Edirne; the rumors of making Edirne a permanent residence of the sultan; and the construction of new palaces in Edirne were the reasons behind the rebellion of the armorers.⁵⁰⁰ Rami Mehmed Pasha instigated this rebellion: the armorers refused to suppress the revolt in Georgia and marched into the city. Soon, they were accompanied by artisans, city inhabitants, Janissaries, the ulema, and the bureaucrats.⁵⁰¹ In the end, the sultan dismissed Feyzullah and his family from the posts and exiled them to Erzurum.⁵⁰²

⁴⁹⁸ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 4, 17-9.; Abou-El-Haj, “The Formal Closure,” 467-9; Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 2 pt. 1, 22, 47. Here, Silâhdar harshly criticizes Feyzullah for his deception of the sultan and for usurping the reins of state by using his position as the tutor of the sultan. It is also rumored that the sultan argues that Istanbul is the source of malice (*Orası fesat menbaidir, benim şehrim Edirne'dir*), Koçu, *Osmanlı Padişahları*, 294. This claim can be read in the light of taking his ancestors as glorious role models for him, resurrecting the ghazi ideals, and the revivalist discourse developed in this period.

⁴⁹⁹ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 3. Meservey points out that the Edirne Incident was an unprecedented event in Ottoman history. Since for the first time, the empire lost plenty of lands and signed a humiliating treaty with the “infidel,” this caused a massive destruction in the socio-economic and political domain and the fury of society, and the state and its organs fell into a chaotic position. She argues that whichever government in power would have been deposed. Karahasanoğlu, “Yanlış Zamanda Yanlış Adam,” 847.

⁵⁰⁰ Sevinç, “Edirne Vakası,” 162-4.

⁵⁰¹ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 3-4.; Kara and Çögenli, “Hayatı ve Eserleri,” 70.; Sevinç, “Edirne Vakası,” 159. For the stance of the Halveti order in the rebellion, see Faroqhi, “An Ulama Grandee,” 204.; Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 35. For the disgust towards Vani and the execution of his sons in the rebellion, see Pazarbaşı, “Feyzullah Efendi'nin Kayınpederi,” 194-5.; Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 336. Silâhdar lists the participants of the revolt, and we see the sheikhs among them, Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 2 pt. 1, 176.; He also states that the master of the Hüdayi lodge Abdülhay Efendi of Edirne, a Kadiri sheikh, and the sheikh of Muradiye Mevlevihane, Enis Dede Efendi, prayed in the presence of the sultan on 18 July 1703. This instance, in a way, presumably reflects the inter-order strife in the rebellion, Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 2 pt. 1, 176.

⁵⁰² Gündoğdu, “Hasib Efendi Gözüyle,” 183. It is reported that upon hearing the news of Feyzullah's and Dede Efendi's exile, the city dwellers of Edirne lined along the way while they were passing through, and the people called this event a great feast (*id-i ekber*).

Yet this did not mitigate the years-long anxiety and anger, and the result was an unleashed wrath.

The sultan was deposed, and Ahmed III succeeded him on 22 August 1703. Feyzullah was brought back to Edirne, and he was taken to prison to learn where his wealth was stored. Both Feyzullah and his son Fethullah were tortured severely, but they did not say anything.⁵⁰³ Fethullah was sent to Istanbul, and Feyzullah Efendi was killed and mutilated by the mob and tortured insanelly; his “body was dragged in the streets, accompanied by Christian priests who were chanting and burning incense,” and his corpse was torn into pieces and thrown into the Tunca River.⁵⁰⁴ Sultan Mustafa II learned the news, returned to the palace, and entered his chamber. He could not get out until his death on 29 December 1703 and was buried in his father’s tomb in Yeni Cami.⁵⁰⁵

The religious education project of Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II was the culmination of centuries of policy-making around Sunnitization, the sharia-mindedness, confessional polarization, sectarianism, and morality that highlighted the zeal to transform the subjects of the empire into moralized and well-educated true believers. Guaranteeing the empire’s ethical conviction, he was trying to reestablish its splendor and ordain the sultan as the defender of the sharia. The vital element is to evoke that this assertive mission was aborted, and it was probably one cause of the torture he experienced. Maybe the reason was “to sideline even the sultan and [to] make the office of the şeyhülislam the primary upholder of the empire’s morality. Or perhaps it was his vision of *naşîhat* that the empire’s subjects were simply unwilling

⁵⁰³ Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 396.; Nizri, “The Religious Endowments,” 34-6.

⁵⁰⁴ Abou-El-Haj, *1703 Rebellion*, 78-80.; Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 393-5, 401-2. It is speculated that the corpse of Feyzullah Efendi was buried in the cemetery at the yard of Sitti Hatun Camii, Edirne, Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi IV. Cilt, 1. Bölüm*, 39-40. There were two poems that criticize him as a Kızılbaş. See Katgı, “Öldürülen Şeyhülislamlar,” 401-2.; Zarinebaf, “Crime and Punishment,” 183-6.

⁵⁰⁵ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi IV. Cilt, 1. Bölüm*, 45.; Silâhdar, *Nusretnâme*, vol. 2 pt. 1, 184.

to accept.”⁵⁰⁶ This point is especially important because the rebels were claiming that he tried to transform their religion and faith (*din ve imanımızı değiştirmek ister*). Keeping the accusations of “infidel, Kızılbaş, and rafîzi” in mind, popular resentment of this religious education campaign may be reflected in these criticisms directed against him.⁵⁰⁷ Otherwise, why would the people accuse a şeyhülislam of transforming religion? Were the subjects of the empire content with their faith and ways of practicing it?

5.2 The analysis of the case

In this thesis, I analyzed the orders issued by the royal court and made use of the confessionalization paradigm to argue that in this period, the powerholders in Edirne attempted to transform Ottoman society according to the sunnah and sharia, to indoctrinate the Muslims in religious dogma, to create pious subjects, and thus, to achieve a well-functioning and harmonious union of society and state. The response from below proves the implementations of above. Hence, I can conclude my discussion of the culmination of the program by reflecting on the confessionalization scheme. Given that one core argument of my thesis is the heuristic value of the confessionalization paradigm for explaining my case in early-eighteenth-century Ottoman history, I want to briefly touch upon the premises of the tenets of the program.

If we compare the implementations explained above with the proposed items of the confessionalization paradigm, we see great overlaps. As the program’s content indicates, we see the formulation of doctrine and the strict control of the spread of knowledge. Constant references to ilmihals and reliable books in the orders are the

⁵⁰⁶ Nir Shafir, “Moral Revolutions,” 612.

⁵⁰⁷ Nir Shafir, “Moral Revolutions,” 608-10.

proofs can be demonstrated in this respect. Controlling appointments and checking up on religious personnel worked in tandem with polarizing and consolidating the faithful believers and removing the dissidents, by which they tried to ensure a religious “orthodoxy.” The addressed officials were ordered to control and report those who are not capable to perform the required missions and services. Inspecting and monitoring held a crucial place in the orders. Preachers and imams, as agents of the new program, in their preaching, sermons, and “advice-giving” centered on “enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong,” had a propaganda motive and disseminated the new norms. Educating, catechizing, and urging for pilgrimage and the observance of congregational and daily prayers; stressing social monitoring; and keeping discipline are the elements of internalizing community norms in these cases. They are also pivotal for the rites and their control of participation. Reporting the “acceptable and unacceptable” people to the Imperial court; disciplining the population; keeping homogeneity and obedience intact in the populace; and ensuring the personnel’s orthodoxy in strategic positions and places were the other goals of the orders. Keeping registers and regulating confessional integrity also conforms with this process. To summarize, an attempt at an incessant mission was laid out.

In Ottoman history, there were earlier cases that we see orders to urge the Muslim adult males to perform their daily congregational prayers in mosques, inspecting the religious personnel for their creedal knowledge and capabilities to lead and teach the congregation in religious subjects, and building and repairing mosques, masjids, and madrasas. These appeals are not exclusive to the Imperial court and sultans, but we see ulema members, bureaucrats, Sufi orders, sheikhs and preachers were also active role players and advocates of the similar measures and orders. However, in the Ottoman history, we do not see a similar project of this scope before

the reign of Mustafa II. The cases mentioned above were isolated instances articulated in different times by different people. Here, we see the compilation and refinement of the objectives laid out in earlier times in a detailed manner. Also, appointing sheikhs from the center and vesting them with privileges to command over the state personnel in the regions where they were sent to make this case distinguished from the earlier attempts, in which the orders were sent to the local officials to implement. Hence, this case presents an example of a coincidence or the influence of contemporary confessional mindedness and practices, as well as introducing supplementary new ordinances that were most probably inferred and deduced from the earlier “failures” and “neglect”. The religious education program clearly proves the existence of the state’s handling of the domain of faith and belief according to a refined and defined manner of instructing, disciplining, monitoring, homogenizing, systematizing, scheduling, missioning, visiting, and controlling, similar to the ones we see in other confessionalization cases in Europe. However, confessionalization in the Ottoman history differs from the European context in several respects that were defined in the second chapter above. Along with these differences, sociopolitical and religious dynamics in Europe functioned totally different from the Ottoman context, which has to be borne in mind. My main aim here was not to defend that Ottomans also had confessionalization in their domain just like the one(s) in Europe. I made use of confessionalization and social disciplining as concepts that help to explain and contextualize the religious education campaign of 1702-3. Yet, we see, again, an unprecedented rigor in executing the centrally issued orders. Even though this program abruptly halted by a rebellion, for one-and-a-half year, the court in Edirne worked vigorously to appropriately implement the drafts of the chief mufti and the architect of this program. As we will

see below, the policy seems to be abandoned after the rebellion; therefore, I cannot claim that the objectives of the program were embraced by the state, i.e. the top bureaucrats and the officials. Yet, the masterminds of the program aimed to make use of the state apparatus in achieving their goals, which was reflected either as domination of Feyzullah Efendi over the sultan and bureaucracy, his nepotistic arrangements, establishing his dynasty, and even coveting the Ottoman throne. On the other hand, it is clear that we see forcing the power and means of the state in this cause, either as a result of the pressing of the chief mufti or obeying the directives of Feyzullah Efendi reluctantly. As a result, the nonexistence of the explained detailed means of confessionalization in the Ottoman context led to conceiving these applications as being exclusive to the European context.⁵⁰⁸ In this respect, we can also state that this religious education program has considerable and significant similarities with the European confessionalization examples, at least in terms of the employed methods. The knowledge and competence of Feyzullah Efendi in doctrinal, political, and theological affairs of the Christendom also imply that he might have informed about and inspired by the confessional-mindedness and policies in Europe.

In other respects, this confessionalization attempt cannot be restricted to the intention, revivalist tendencies and make-believe agenda, and hostility to the existing power holder of the two companions. There are other agents from several backgrounds and statuses. I highlighted the state of the Ottoman elites as questioning of the defeats of the troops in the battlefield and the retreat, the rise of the revivalist expectations, and seeking solutions and answers to questions and problems. The appearance of Murad Buhari in this time and the close contact of him with the sultan

⁵⁰⁸ See and cf. Baer, "Contested Conversions to Islam," 392.; Erginbaş, *Ottoman Sunnism*, especially the Introduction, Chapters 2 and 9.

and Feyzullah Efendi, Sufi's disciples and their contact with the chief mufti, their appointment as army preachers, connections to the Kadızadeli movement, and affiliation to Minkarizade Yahya Efendi, his relationship with Feyzullah Efendi, and his association with Vani Efendi creates a close circle of similar-minded people who share similar interests and objectives, motivated by the similar inspirations. Not only these intimate people, but also those of distant localities were among the shareholders of this pietistic enterprise. The preachers and mudarrises of Bucak region were the evident example of this sort. Even, the people of different religion and background could have potentials to instigate a proselytizing operation too. The Jesuit and Capuchin missionaries with whom Feyzullah and his ally Armenian patriarch Awetik struggled might have impressed the chief mufti to embark on a similar activity. Hence, the similarity of the two confessionalization patterns can be explained through these aspects.

For the contributions of this thesis, I can bring some points to the fore. The confessionalization paradigm has been successfully applied to similar cases in the world and has provided a greater ease with which to problematize, contextualize, and analyze the events, societies, and periods in the history of religion. Yet one should be patient, cautious, and attendant to the contextual differences. My case here represents a new contribution to both the chronology and the content of the confessionalization discussion in Ottoman historiography. This case shows that the confessional policies of the Ottomans extended well beyond the 1680s and might have continued into the eighteenth and following centuries, and a mass education campaign was introduced in Ottoman history and was aimed to be rigorously implemented. For this reason, confessionalization cannot be perceived as something that is specific to certain periods. I believe this case may also balance the criticism of overemphasizing the

role of the state in this debate.⁵⁰⁹ It should be stressed that this confessionalization attempt can extend our horizons regarding state-society relations in terms of the place and the importance of religion and religio-political discourses and policies in Ottoman history. Besides recalling the earlier cases of similar sentiments, and hence showing a direct connection to the religious sensitivity of the Ottoman imperial elite, beginning with the second half of the fifteenth century and enduring until the end of the seventeenth century, this case provides a bridge that connects the debates and ideas of the past into the following centuries within a revived and further developed fashion.

5.3 The aftermath

Focusing on the orders dealt with here, their fate was coterminous with the fate of Feyzullah Efendi and Mustafa II. The legacy of Feyzullah did not vaporize suddenly, however. In the aftermath of the Edirne Incident, we see a *damnatio memoriae* for a short period, lasting as long as the appointees of coup organizations held office, from which they were removed one by one in the reign of Ahmed III. In the long run, his household survived and eventually became one important *ilmiye* branch, one among equals, until the end of the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹⁰ Though we do not see any clear sign of abandonment from the application of the orders, after the brutal death of the şeyhülislam, we do not come across any similar order that was initiated from state apparatuses.⁵¹¹ Indeed, in the order sent to Sheikh Ali in June 1703,⁵¹² it is stated that

⁵⁰⁹ Cf. Yıldırım, "Re-confessionalisation," 16.

⁵¹⁰ Nizri, *Ulema Households*, 195-217.; Nizri, "The Memoirs," 35.

⁵¹¹ Abou-Manneh, "Feyzullah Efendi and Sultan Mustafa II," 460. We do not see the continuation of this program after the reign of Mustafa II. Nir Shafir points out a later document stating the receipt of teachers in Bosnia to teach catechism there, Shafir, *Moral Revolutions*, 61 In64. The content of the order was stated in the archive catalog as "Bosna'ya nasihat ve sibyanı talim-i ilm-i hal etmek üzere gönderilen meşayıha verilen harcıraha dair makbuz," BOA İE.ML 112.10653 (April 1706).

⁵¹² BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#862.

in winter, he should come to Edirne. Hence, we can infer that this program was meant to be applied in the summer and fall of 1704. The reign of Ahmed III is known for the effervescence of the social life, revival in the cultural domain, and a time for the “modernization” of the state and society. Albeit, in the reign of successor sultan, Mahmud I, the son of Mustafa II, we see the return of the family of Feyzullah Efendi and convergence of Murad Buhari and the new sultan, as I stressed above. I do not have a concrete evidence for either the abandonment or continuity of the program; however, this program by itself holds a crucial place in our conceptualization of Ottoman confessionalization policies. Thus, for the periodization of Ottoman Sunnitization, confessionalization, and social disciplining, this study may provide a revisionist contribution and a call to revisit the existing arguments.

On the other hand, I can touch on the aftermath of the Müceddidi order in the immediate context, which would substitute the lack of evidence for the continuity of the similar policies after 1703. Mehmed Raşid, a contemporary and the official chronicler of the time, as well as a follower of Buhari, states that the upper classes in Istanbul welcomed Murad Buhari and venerated. Yet, Çorlulu Ali Pasha (d. 1711) exiled him to Mecca for pilgrimage, but he happened to settled in Bursa, where he was well-received by the locals and stayed for seven years despite the intimidating letters to leave the city, until he returned to Istanbul in 1717. The şeyhülislam, Ebu İshak İsmail, was a follower of him, and another follower, Nevşehirli Damat İbrahim Pasha soon became grand vizier, which made him feel safe there. He assumed the chief position of the order in the lodge but died in 1720.⁵¹³ It is stated by his grandson that the dignitaries in Istanbul became followers of the sheikh and the sultans Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730), Mahmud I (r. 1730-1754), Osman III (r. 1754-

⁵¹³ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 13-15, 19.

1757), Mustafa III (r. 1757-1774), and Abdülhamid I (1774-1789) “paid repeated visits to the tekke and to the sheikh’s [tomb] incognito.”⁵¹⁴ Though while the sheikhs were alive, it is customary to visit sheikhs by sultans, but it is not so after their death, states Halil Muradi and we see Mahmud I among the financial supporters of the lodge of Buhari.⁵¹⁵ Abou-Manneh points out that the influence of his doctrines “seem to have grown steadily throughout the century, . . . many upper class members . . . demonstrated piety and adherence to high ideals of Orthodox Islam by affiliating themselves to the order throughout the 18th century,” and cites several examples of “public acts on the cultural and religious levels,” emphasizing the possible influence of the Müceddidi order on them.⁵¹⁶ These instances shows that a religious current were active in the eighteenth century Ottoman empire, which bears the hallmark of the confessionalization and Sunnitization policies and sensitivities of the earlier centuries.

This study is aimed to be an insightful discussion of the religious education policy, a confessionalization and social disciplining attempt in the reign of Mustafa II, which was halted and aborted suddenly when a rebellion took place in 1703. Though it is intended to be a comprehensive analysis of both the context, content, and consequences of the program, there remain untouched aspects in this thesis. I hope that further studies shed light on the bottom-up responses, initiatives, and negotiations, as well as the top-down agents of the process, with an educated and revised focus on the local repercussions of the policy, the in-place application of the program, and any possible forms of continuity in reading this crucial period in a continuum with the Ottoman early modernity.

⁵¹⁴ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 20-1.

⁵¹⁵ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 21.

⁵¹⁶ Abou-Manneh, “Expansion of,” 22.

APPENDIX A

ADMINISTRATIVE CENTERS WHERE THE REFORM ORDERS WERE SENT




Fig. A1 The map of addressed regions

This map shows the towns and regions to which the Mühimme orders were addressed. Each town and province mentioned in the orders was indicated with a number. When only a province was named, the corresponding number was placed next to the administrative center of that province, hence blank spaces in the map were part of these provincial centers. The places were assigned different colors to indicate the time in which they were first targeted. The lines stand for the orders sent to the arteries or “branches” (*kol*) of Rumelia and two sheikhs in the Balkans for their special visits (a) from Bosnia to Belgrade and (b) from Bosnia to Euboea (Ağrıboz), (placed at the tip of the orange lines) and then to the left branch of Rumelia.




Fig. A2 The map of place names

In this second map, you see the names of the places (since some orders address some places repeatedly, they appear more than once).

The places to which the central government directed the orders of religious reform, and the personnel to carry them out are: Hüdavendigâr (*sancak* comprising Bursa, İzmit, Mudanya), right-left-middle branches of Rumelia, province of Bosnia, Babadağı (Dobruja), İskenderiye (Shkodra), Dukakin, İlbasan (Elbasan), Avlonya (Vlorë), Delvine (Delvina), Yanya (Ioannina), Üsküb (Skopje), Prizren, Köstendil (Kyustendil), Edirne, Ohri (Ohrid), Sultanönü (Eskişehir), Karesi (Balıkesir), Bolu, Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Şehrîzor (Shahrîzor), Vize (Kırklareli), Çirmen (Chirmen), Kırkkilise (Kırklareli), Thessaloniki, Tırhala (Tirhala), province of Anatolia (corresponding to present-day western Anatolia), province of Sivas, province of Karaman, Adana, province of Şam (Damascus), Trablus-ı şâm (province of Tripoli, Lebanon), Safed, Sayda (Sidon), Beirut, Aleppo, Raqqa, Maraş, Diyarbekir, Erzurum, Trabzon, Kars, Çıldır (Ardahan), Van, Tımışvar (Timişoara), Belgrade, İstanbul, Galata, Üsküdar, Haslar kadışip (Eyüp), Özi (Ochakiv), Filibe (Plovdiv), Tatarpazarı (Pazardzhik)




Fig. A3 The addressed places in the Balkans

For the explanations of these geometric shapes, please see the footnotes 377, 378, and 379 in the text.

APPENDIX B

ORDERS TABULATED ACCORDING TO PLACE AND DATE

Place number	Place name	Dates
1	Bosnia	1-10 March 1702
2	Skhoder	10-19 April 1702
3	Dukakin	10-19 April 1702
4	Ioannina	10-19 April 1702
5	Elbasan	10-19 April 1702
6	Delvine	10-19 April 1702
7	Vlore	10-19 April 1702
8	Skopje	10-19 April 1702
9	Prizren	10-19 April 1702
10	Kyustendil	20-29 April 1702
11	Skopje	20-29 April 1702
12	Prizren	20-29 April 1702
13	Ohrid	20-29 April 1702
14	Delvine	20-29 April 1702
15	Ioannina	20-29 April 1702
16	Elbasan	20-29 April 1702
17	Vlore	20-29 April 1702
18	Dukakin	20-29 April 1702
19	Shkoder	20-29 April 1702
20	Hüdavendigâr	30 April-10 May 1702
21	Sultanönü	30 April-10 May 1702
22	Karesi	30 April-10 May 1702
23	Bolu	30 April-10 May 1702
24	Vize	30 April-10 May 1702
25	Chirmen	30 April-10 May 1702
26	Kırkkilise	30 April-10 May 1702
27	Thessaloniki	30 April-10 May 1702
28	Tırhala	30 April-10 May 1702
29	Anadolu	30 April-10 May 1702
30	Sivas	30 April-10 May 1702
31	Karaman	30 April-10 May 1702
32	Adana	30 April-10 May 1702
33	Damascus	30 April-10 May 1702
34	Tripoli	30 April-10 May 1702
35	Safed-Sidon-Beirut	30 April-10 May 1702
36	Aleppo	30 April-10 May 1702
37	Raqqa	30 April-10 May 1702

38	Maraş	30 April-10 May 1702
39	Diyarbakir	30 April-10 May 1702
40	Erzurum	30 April-10 May 1702
41	Trabzon	30 April-10 May 1702
42	Kars	30 April-10 May 1702
43	Çıldır	30 April-10 May 1702
44	Van	30 April-10 May 1702
45	Timishoara	30 April-10 May 1702
46	Belgrade	30 April-10 May 1702
47	İstanbul	28 May-6 June 1702
48	Galata	28 May-6 June 1702
49	Üsküdar	28 May-6 June 1702
50	Haslar (Eyüp)	28 May-6 June 1702
51	Baghdad	16 July 1702
52	Basra	16 July 1702
53	Mosul	16 July 1702
54	Shahrizor	16 July 1702
55	Skopje	25 August-3 Sept.1702
56	Ochakiv	23 Sept.-2 Oct.1702
57	Plovdiv	16-25 June 1703
58	Pazardzhik	16-25 June 1703
59	Halil Paşa Yurd	16 May 1702

APPENDIX C
TRANSCRIPTIONS

The orders with record numbers and dates:

- BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#551 (March 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#661 (March-April 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#665 (April 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#766 (April 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#724-757 (April-May, and June 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#884 (May-June 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#909-911 (May-June 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#1225 (August-September 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#316 (September-October 1702)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#811-814 (June 1703)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#861 (June 1703)
BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#862 (June 1703)
BOA İE.DH 14.1288 (May 1702)

Transcriptions of the documents

BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#551 (1-10 March 1702)

Fermân-ı mümtâzû 'l-îmtisâlim mücebince 'amel idüb ta'zim-i şer'-i mübîn ve ihyâ-i sünnet-i seniyye-i fahrû 'l-mürselîne ihtimâm eyleyesüz deyü savâbına hatt-ı şerîf keşide kılınmıştır

Bosna vâlisine ve Bosna eyâlet sarâyı monlâsına ve Bosna eyâletinde vâki' olan kâdîlara hüküm ki,

makarr-ı 'ulemâ-i dîn ve mecma'-i fukahâ-i Müslimîn olan bilâd-ı mu'azzamadan dûr u ba'id olan kasabât ve kurâda sâkin ve mutavattın olan Müslimîne

ta'allüm-i 'ilm-i hâl ve istifâde-i mesâ'il-i dîniyyede terk ü ihmâl ve 'adem-i iştigâlleri mesmû'-i hümâyûnum olmagın ta'zîm-i şerâyi'-i marziyye ve tefhîm-i mütûn-i zekiyye

akdem-i mesâlih-i dîn ü devlet ve ehemmi-i meşâgîl-i mülk ü milletden olub bâ-husûs emr bi'l-ma'rûf ve nehy 'ani'l-münker *veltekün minküm ümmetün yed'ûne*

*ile'l-hayri [ve] ye'mürüne bi'l-ma'rûfi ve yenhevne 'ani'l-münker ve üla'ike hüümü'l-müflihûn*⁵¹⁷
misdâkı üzere vesîle-i necâh ve zeri'a-i fevz ü felâh olan

vâcibât-ı dîniyyeden olub terk ü ihmâli 'iyâzen bi'l-lâhi te'âlâ izmihlâl-i diyânet ve şuyû'-i cehâlet ü dalâlet ve za'f-ı kuvvet ve harâbi-i bilâd

⁵¹⁷ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

ve helâk-i 'ibâda mü'eddî olduğundan ma'edâ *kânû lâ yetenâhevne 'an münkerin fe'alûh lebi'se mâ kânû yef'alûn*⁵¹⁸ medlûlünce akbah-i

münkerâtan olmağla Bosna eyâletinde vâki' kasabât ve kurâda olan Müslimînün ümmî ü 'âmmesinin savm u salât ve hacc ü zekât

ve sâir 'ilm-i hâllerine müte'allik müşkilâtını hall ve elfâz-ı vecîze ile se[b]il-i reşâda hass u tergîb ve ihyâ-i sünnet ve îzâh-ı ahkâm-ı

dîn ü şer'at ve islâh-ı emr-i dünyâ u âhiretleriyçün iftihârü's-sülehâü's-sâlikîn Şeyh Muhammed (*zîde salâhu*) üç nefer rüfekâsiyle ol tarafa

irsâl olunmağın sen ki vezîr-i müşârünileyhsin inşâ'allâhu te'âlâ vusûllerinde evvelâ medîne-i Sarâyda bir süknâ tedârik ve kifâyet mikdârı

me'kûlât u meşrûbâtlarını ta'yîn ve ba'dehu gerek kendüye ve gerek rüfekâsını karîb u ba'îd iktizâ iden mahallere irsâl ve tarafınızdan

dahi yanlarına ma'kûl adamlar koşub semt semt gönderüb bu emr-i mühimmden sen dahi *ve te'âvenü 'ale'l-birri ve't-takvâ*⁵¹⁹ mâ-sadakı

olmağla bezl-i vüs' ü kudret eylesen ve siz ki kâdîlarsız siz dahi taht-ı kazânızda olan Müslimînün ümmî ü 'âmmelerine bu vech-i

vecîhe üzere 'ilm-i hâlleri ta'lîmi ile tefhîm-i mesâ'il-i dîniyye ve teshîl-i taraf-ı hayrâta *ibtigâen limerzâtillâh ihtimâm ve min*

ehli'l-kitâbi ümmetün kâi'metün yetlûne âyâtillâhi ânâ'e'l-leyli ve hümm yescüdün. Yu'minûne bi'l-lâhi ve'l-yevmi'l-âhiri

*ve ye'mürûne bi'l-ma'rûfi ve yenhevne 'ani'l-münkeri ve yüsâri'üne fi'l-hayrât ve ülâ'ike mine's-sâlihîn*⁵²⁰ fehvâ-yı kerîmesini

mülâhaza idüb nu'ût-i sâlihînden olan emr bi'l-ma'rûf ve nehy 'an el-münkerde mevlânâ-yı mumâileyhe ve rufekâsına mu'âvenet

ve müzâheret eylemeniz bâbında deyü yazılmışdır Fî evâ'il-i [Şevvâ]l sene [1]113

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#661 (30 March-9 April 1702)

Rumelinde vâki' olan mevâlî-i 'izâm ve kâdîlara hüküm ki,

Hazret-i rabbü'l-'ibâd (*celle şânehu ve 'azze bürhâneh*) bu ümmet-i merhûmeye irşâd-ı tarîk-i müstakîmi hâsseten hasene ve delâletince kavîm-i şîme-i müstahsene kılub Kur'ân-ı mu'ciz-beyâna

... 'esâre nedb ü da'vet ve bu câdde-i selâmet-i şî'âra hidâyet ve delâlet idüb *küntüm hayra ümmetin uhrîcet linnâsi te'mürûne bi'l-ma'rûfi*

⁵¹⁸ (5:79) They restrained not one another from the wickedness they did. Verily evil was that they used to do!

⁵¹⁹ (5:2) But help ye one another unto righteousness and pious duty.

⁵²⁰ (3:113-114) Of the People of the Scripture there is a staunch community who recite the revelations of Allah in the night season, falling prostrate (before Him). They believe in Allah and Last Day, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency, and vie one with another in good works. They are of the righteous.

ve tenhevne 'ani'l-münkeri⁵²¹ emr-i nedîmi üzere saltanat-ı 'aliyyeme makarr-ı 'ulemâ ve mevtın-ı fukahâ olan bilâd-ı mu'azammadan dûr olan erbâb-ı burd u hazar ve ashâb-ı burd

u hazara ta'lîm-i mesâ'il-i zarûriyye-i i'tikâdiyye ve tefhîm-i fezâil-i 'ilmiyye ü 'ameliyye ve tiryâk-ı rahîk-i revâk-ı mevâ'iz-i rikâk ile terbiye-i tıbbâ-i müsterşidîne ve tedbîr-i emzice-i

Müslimîn ile teşyîdlerinden dîn-i mübîn ve tecdîd-i 'ahd-i sünnet-i fahrû'l-mürselîn îmânın üzere her cânibe 'ulemâdan ba'zı kimesneler ta'yin olunmağla sulehâdan iftihârü's-sülehâ'

i's-sâlikîn eş-Şeyh Mehmed (*zîde salâhuhu*) üç nefer rüfekâsıyla bu hatîb-i celîl-efşân için emr-i şerîfimle Bosna tarafına irsâl olunmağın inşâ'allâh ü te'âlâ her kangınızın taht-ı kazâsına

dâhil oldukda ta'lîm-i mesâ'il-i şer'iyye ve tebyîn-i ihrâk-ı marziyye ve tefhîm-i mehâmm-ı dîniyye ve emr bi'l-ma'rûf ve nehy 'an el-münker için me'âbid-i Müslimîn olan cevâmi' ü mesâcidde

va'z u nas'ihat ve sebîl-i reşâda delâlet itmeleri bâbında [ve] *te'âvenü 'ale'l birri ve't-takvâ*⁵²² nazm-ı kerîmi fehvâsı üzere mezbûrlara mu'âvenet ü muzâheret ve 'âmme-i

Müslimîni tezekkür ve tezaccur-i tergîb ve sallî sünnet-i seniyye-i nebeviyye ile tahliyeye hass u tahsîs eylesiz ki bu şîme'-i hasene bi-'inâyetullâhi te'âlâ müstecâb-ı merâziyü'l-hiyye ve müsta'cib-i

sa'âdet-i dünyeviyye ü uhreviyyedir deyü a'lemü'l-melâ'i'l-mütebahhirîn efzâli'l-füzela'ü'l-müteverri'in bi'l-fi'il şeyhü'l-islâm ve müftiyü'l-enâm ve hâce-i fezâ'ilü'l-müttâkim(?) olan

Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhu te'âlâ fezâ'ilehu*) tarafından mektûb verilmekle vech-i meşrûh üzere 'amel olunmak için yazılmıştır fi evâ'il-i Zi'l-ka'de] sene [1]113

BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#665 (10-19 April 1702)

Fermân-ı vâcibü'l-imtisâlüm mücebince 'amel olunub hilâfindan ihtirâz oluna deyü 'unvânına hatt-ı hümayûn vârid olmuştur.

Ber vech-i arpalık İskenderiye ve Dukakin sancaklarına mutasarrıf olan Hüdâverdi ve ber vech-i arpalık Delvine sancağına mutasarrıf olan 'Osman ve ber vech-i arpalık

Yanya sancağına mutasarrıf olan Selîm ve ber vech-i arpalık İlbasan sancağına mutasarrıf olan 'Osman ve ber vech-i arpalık Avlonya sancağına mutasarrıf olan

Zeynel (*dâme ikbâlühü*) ve Üsküb sancağıbeği Hasan ve Prezrin sancağıbeği Kurd Mehmed (*dâme 'izzuhumâ*)ya ve elviye-i merkûmede ve Köstendil sancağında vâki' olan

kâdîlara hüküm ki,

Makarr-ı 'ulemâ-i dîn ve mecma'-ı fukehâ-i Müslimîn olan bilâd-ı mu'azzamadan dûr u ba'id olan kasabât ve kurâda sâkin ve mutavattın olan Müslimîne ta'allüm-i 'ilm-i hâl

ve istifâde-i mesâ'il-i dîniyyede terk ü ihmâl ve 'adem-i iştigâlleri mesmû'-i hümayûnum olmağın ta'zîm-i şerâyi'-i marziyye ve tefhîm-i sünnet-i zekiyye akdem-i mesâlih-i dîn ü devlet

ve ehemmi-i meşâgil-i mülk ü milletden olub bâ-husûs emr bi'l-ma'rûf ve nehy 'an el-münker *veltekun minküm ümmetün yed'üne ile'l-hayri* [ve] *ye'mürüne bi'l-ma'rûfi*

⁵²¹ (3:110) Ye are the best community that hath been raised up for mankind. Ye enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency.

⁵²² (5:2) But help ye one another unto righteousness and pious duty.

ve yenhevne ‘ani-l münker ve ülä’ ike hümü ‘l-müflihün⁵²³ mısâkı üzere vesîle-i necâh ve zerî‘a-i fevz ü felâh olan vâcibât-ı dîniyyeden olub terk

ü ihmâli ‘ıyânen billâhi te‘âlâ izmihlâl-i diyânet ve şuyû‘-ı cehâlet ü dalâlet ve za‘f-ı kuvvet ve harâbe-i bilâd ve helâkî-i ‘ibâda mü‘eddî olduğundan ma‘edâ

kânû lâ yetenâhevne ‘an münkerin fe‘alüh lebi‘se mâ kânû yef‘alûn⁵²⁴ medlûlünce akbah-ı münkirâtıdan olmağla zıkr olunan sancaklarda vâki‘ kasabât

u kurâda olan Müslimînin ümmî ü ‘âmmesinin savm u salât ve hacc ü zekât ve sâ‘ir ‘ilm-i hâllerine müte‘allik müşkilâtını hall ve elfâz-ı vecîze ile

se[b]il-i reşâda hass u terğib ve ihyâ-i sünnet ve îzâh-ı ahkâm-ı dîn ü şerî‘at ve ıslâh-ı emr-i dünyâ u âhiretleri için ifihârî’s sülhau’s sâlikîn kıldetü’l-‘ulemâ ve’l-‘âmilîn

İbrâhim (zîde ~~salâhuhu~~ takvâühü) iki nefer rüfekâsiyle ol tarafa [irsâl] olunmağın siz ki mîr-i mîrân-ı mûmâileyhim ve mîr-i mûmâileyhümâsız inşâ‘allâhü te‘âlâ

taht-ı hükûmetinize vusûllerinde münâsib mahallere kondurub ve kifâyet mikdârı zâd ü zevâde tedârik ve gerek kendüyi ve gerek rüfekâsını

karîb ü ba‘îd iktizâ iden mahallere irsâl ve tarafınızdan dahi yanlarına ma‘kûl adamlar koşub semt semt gönderüb bu emr-i mehâmmda siz dahi

ve te‘âvenû ‘ale ‘l-birri vet-takvâ⁵²⁵ mâ-sadakı olmağla bezl-i vüs‘ ve kudret eyleyesiz ve siz ki kâdîlarsız siz dahi taht-ı kazânızda olan Müslimînin

ümmî ü ‘âmmelerine bu vech-i vecîh üzere ‘ilm-i hâlleri ta‘lîm ile tefhîm-i mesâ‘il-i dîniyye ve teshîl-i turuk-ı hayrâta ibtigâen limerzâtillâh ihtimâm ve min ehli ‘l-kitâbi

ümmeün kâ‘imetün yetlûne âyâtillâhi ânâ‘e ‘l-leyli ve hüm yescüdün. Yu‘minûne bi ‘l-lâhi ve ‘l-yevmi ‘l-âhiri ve ye‘mürûne bi ‘l-ma‘rûfî ve yenhevne

‘ani ‘l-münkeri ve yüsâri‘üne fî ‘l-hayrât ve ülä’ ike mine ‘s-sâlihîn⁵²⁶ fehvâ-yı kerîmesini mülâhaza idüb nu‘ût-ı sâlihînden olan emr bi ‘l-ma‘rûf

ve nehy an el-münkerde mevlânâ-yı mûmâileyhe ve rüfekâsına mu‘âvenet ü müzâheret eylemeniz bâbında fermân-ı ‘âlişânım sâdır olmuştur deyü yazılmışdır. Fî evâsıt-ı Zi‘[l-kâde] sene [1]113

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#766 (20-29 April 1702)

Edirnededen İskenderiyeye varınca yol üzerinde olan kâdîlara ve zıkr olunan kazâlarda vâki‘ kethüdâ yerleri ve Yeniçeri serdârları

ve a‘yân-ı vilâyet ve iş erlerine hüküm ki,

Şeyh İbrâhim (zîde takvâühü) ile rüfekâsından Şeyh Mûsâ ve Şeyh Mustafâ ta‘lîm-i mesâ‘il-i şer‘iyye ve tefhîm-i mehâmm-i dîniyye

⁵²³ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

⁵²⁴ (5:79) They restrained not one another from the wickedness they did. Verily evil was that they used to do!

⁵²⁵ (5:2) But help ye one another unto righteousness and pious duty.

⁵²⁶ (3:113-114) Of the People of the Scripture there is a staunch community who recite the revelations of Allah in the night season, falling prostrate (before Him). They believe in Allah and Last Day, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency, and vie one with another in good works. They are of the righteous.

içün Köstendil ve Üsküb ve Prezrin ve Ohri ve Delvine ve Yanya ve İlbasan ve Avlonya ve Dukakin ve İskenderiye

sancaklarına doğru ‘azîmet etmeleriyle emnen ü sâlimen birbirinize irsâl ü isal eylemegin üzere şurûtiyle yol hükmi

yazılmışdır. Fî evâhir Zi’[l-kâde] sene [1]113

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#724-757 (30 April-9 May 1702)

Hüdâvendigâr sancağında vâki’ mollâ-yı ‘izâm ve kâdîlara ve müftülere hüküm ki,

*Ed-dînü’n-nasiha*⁵²⁷ hadîs-i şerîfi mısâkınca memâlik-i fesîhatü’l-ercâ ve mesâlik-i ba‘îdetü’l-enhâda müstazıll-ı cenâh-ı saltanat ve müsterîh-i ârâmişgâh-ı

‘inâyet olan Müslimîne ‘alâ ihtilâfî tabakâtihim nush-ı ‘âmm *veltekün minküm ümmetün yed’ûne ile’l-hayri ve ye’mürüne bi’l-ma’rûfi ve yenhevne ‘ani’l-münker*

*ve ülâ’ike hümmü’l-müflihün*⁵²⁸ mazmûn-ı şerîfine imtisâl ve kıyâmdan nâşî evvelâ her belde de olan e’imme ü hutebâ ihtiyâr u tefâhhus olunub ‘akîde-i ehli’s-sünnet ve’l-cemâ’a

ve tecvîd-i Kur’ân-ı ‘azîmü’ş-şân ve mesâ’il-i salâta habîr ü ‘âlim ve münâfî-i iktidâ olan umûrdan mütevakki ü sâlim olanlar mahallerinde takrîr ve bu hılâl-i

selâse de hâle ü noksânı olanlardan müsta’idlerini ta’allüme cebr ve tahsile kasd idüb mu’dimü’l-isti’dâdların yerlerine evsâf-ı selâse ile muttasıf

ve ihtiyâr-ı cemâ’atle iktidâyâ sâlih ü müstahikk olan kimesneleri ta’yîn ve ‘arzların südde-i seniyye-i saltanat-ı ‘aliyyeye irsâl idesiz. Sâniyen ifâde ü istifâde içün

li-vechillâhi te’âlâ mevzû’a olan medâris ü mehâfilde tadrîs-i ‘ulûm-ı mütenevvi’a ve ta’lîm-i fûnûn-ı müşettete iden müderrisîn-i kirâm eyyâm-ı mu’tâdda tadrîse ikdâm

ve medâr-ı sa’âdet-i ebediyye ve vesîle-i hayrât-ı sermediyye olan kütüb-i tefâsîr ü ehâdis ü fıkıhdan birer dersi iltizâm ve ‘ale’l-devâm bu hâl üzere kıyâm

ve terkinden tevakkî-i tâm ideler ki verâset-i enbiyâ bu ‘ulûm-ı menût ve ehemmiyeti Ebû Dâvud İbn Mâce tahrîcleriyle olan işbu hadîs-i sa’âdet-numûnda mübeyyîn

ve mazbûtdur: *El-‘ilmü selâsetün âyetün muhkemetün ev sünnetün kâ’imetün ev farîzatün ‘âdileh ve mâsivâ-yı zalike fehüve fazlun.*⁵²⁹ Bu tâ’ifeden kezâlik hasbü’l-emr kıyâmda

mütেকâsil veyâhûd ‘âciz ü câhil olanları li-vechillâh li’l-garez ‘arz u mahzar ile ‘atebe-i ‘aliyye-i devlet-medâra ifâde idesiz. Sâlisen vu‘âz ü müzekkirîne

nazar oluna. Kürsîlerinde mesâ’il-i şer’iyye ve mehâmm-ı dîniyye ve ahlâk-ı marziyye ta’lîm ve kütüb-i mu’tebereden rikâk-ı takallüble kulûb-i mü’minîni terkîk ü telyîn idüb

hikâyât-ı müzahrefe ve akvâl-ı muza’afe rivâyetiyle ihtilâl-i berâyâ ve ifrât-ı teşdîd ve dâ’iyye-i ta’assubla ilkâ-i buğzâ ve isâre-i şahnâdan tecennüb ideler.

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⁵²⁷ Sahih-i Muslim, 55a “The religion is advice”

⁵²⁸ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

⁵²⁹ Sunan Abu Dawud, 2885 “Knowledge is three; this is a firm sign, an existing sunna, or a just duty; anything else is extra.”

Lâkin kütüb-i mu‘tebereden mesâ’il-i mu‘temedeyi nakilde levme-i lâ’imden hazer ile emr-i ma‘rûf ve nehy ‘ani’l-münkeri terk itmeyüb ve iz ehazallâhü

*mîsâkallezîne ûtû l-kitâbe letubeyyinünnehû li’n-nâsi velâ tektumûneh*⁵³⁰ mazmûnunca teblîğ-i ahkâm-ı şer‘de hasbetenillâh ictihâd ve şerâ’it-i tezkîr

ve âdâb-ı va‘azda fukehâ-i ‘izâm beyân itdikleri vech üzre ‘amel ideler. Bu tâ’ifeden dahi nâ-müstahikk olanları minvâl-i sâbık üzre

‘arz idesiz. Râbi‘an mekteblere nazar oluna. Mu‘allim-i sıbyân ve mü‘eddib-i şübbân olan kimesnelerden ‘afif ü sâlih ve tecvîd-i hurûf ile

Kur’ân-ı ‘azîmü’ş-şâna kâdir ve resâ’il-i mu‘tebere-i ‘Arabîyye vü Türkiyyeden tefhîm-i ‘akâid-i ehli’s-sünnet ve’l-cemâ‘a itmege müste’hil olan mu‘allimleri

yerlerinde takrîr ve bu evsâfı câmi‘ olmayan nâ-ehillerin yerlerine müstahikkîni ta’yîn idesiz. Hâmisan ‘âmme-i Müslimîn ve cümle-i muvahhidîn salât u savm

ve hacc ü zekât ve sâ’ir mesâ’il-i i’tikâdiyye ü ‘ameliyye ve levâzım-ı dîniyyeye müte‘allik olan ‘ilm-i hâllerini tahsîl ve isti‘lâm ve huzûr-ı cem‘

u cemâ‘atde kemâyenbağî kıyâm-ı tâm ve evlâdlarını ta‘allüm-i Kur’ân ve tefehhüm-i mesâ’il-i zarûriyye-i i’tikâdiyye ve tahsîl-i şerâyi‘-i ‘ameliyye-i hâliyye idinceye sanâyi‘-i dünyeviyye ile

iş[tî]gâlden hazer ve hakk-ı übüvveti edâda sa’y-ı belîğ ve cehd-i evfer idüb ehli-kurâ ve ashâb-ı ahbiye dahi zikr olunduğı minvâl üzere

levâzım-ı islâmı ta‘allüm ü tahsîl ve evkât-ı hamsede ikâmet-i cemâ‘at içün talebe-i ‘ulûmden birer kimesneyi içlerinde îvâ u iskân ve ta‘mîr-i mesâcid

ü mekteb itmeleriçün tenbîh ü teşdid ve kasabât u kurâda olan bikâ‘-i ‘ulûm u kırâ‘at ve emâkin-i salât ve ‘ibâdât mu‘attala olmayub

ma‘mûr u meşhûn olmasiçün emr-i ekîd ve cidd-i şedîd ve sa’y-ı hamîd idesiz ki bu şîme-i hasene müsteclib-i rahmet-i rahmâna ve müceb-i emn ü itmi’nân

ve sebeb-i inkifâf yede’l-‘udvân olduğı *kemâ tekûnû yüvellâ ‘aleyküm*⁵³¹ hadîs-i şerîfi ile beyyînü’l-burhândır ve siz ki me’zûn bi’l-iftâ olan

mevlânâ-yı mûmâ-ileyhsiz bu emr-i lâzımü’l infâzın tekmilinde ve *te‘âvenû ‘ale’l-birri ve’t-takvâ*⁵³² emr-i şerîfine imtisâlen zikr olunan

kazâlarda vâki‘ hükkâm-ı şer‘le yedd-i vâhid olub icrâ-yı merâsim-i cânib-dârî-i gayret-i dîniyye ve kıyâm-ı mevâcib-i teşmiyyet-kâri-i ahkâm-ı şer‘iyye

eyleyesiz deyü a‘lemü’l-‘ulemâi’l-mütebahhirîn efzâlî’l-fuzelâü’l-müverri‘în bi’l-fi‘il şeyhü’l-islâm ve müftü’l-enâm ve hâce-i feza’il-i irtisâmî olan Mevlânâ

es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhü te‘âlâ fezâ’ilehu*) tarafından mektûb virilmekle vech-i meşrûh üzre ‘amel eylemeniz bâbında fermân-ı âlişânım sâdır olmuştur.

Buyurdum ki --- vusûl buldukda bu bâbda sâdır olan fermân-ı celîlü’l-kadrim ve mevlânâ-yı müşârûnileyhimin mektûbu mücebince ‘amel idüb

dahi işbu emr-i şerîfim her kangınızın taht-ı kazâsına varub dâhil olur ise sicillâta sebt ve mazmûn-ı münîfini dâ’imâ tenkîd ve icrâ idesiz.

⁵³⁰ (3:187) And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture (He said): Ye are to expound it to mankind and not to hide it.

⁵³¹ Al-Daylami, *Musnad al-Shihab* (1:336) “As you are so will your leaders be”

⁵³² (5:2) But help ye one another unto righteousness and pious duty.

(According to catalog, early Zilhicce – late April, early May)

725: Bir sûreti Sultânönü sancağında vâki‘ kâdîlara ve müftîlere

726: Bir sûreti Karesi sancağında vâki‘ kâdîlara ve müftîlere

727: Bir sûreti Bolu sancağında vâki‘ kâdîlara ve müftîlere

728: Bir sûreti Bağdâd kâdîsına ve müftîsine

729: Bir sûreti Basra kâdîsına ve müftîsine

730: Bir sûreti Mûsul kâdîsına ve müftîsine

731: Bir sûreti Şehrîzôr kâdîsına ve müftîsine

işbu dört kıt‘a ahkâm sonra tahrir olunmuştur fi 20 S[afêr] sene 1114 (16 July 1702)

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732: Bir sûreti Vize sancağında vâki‘ kâdîlara ve müftîlere

733: Bir sûreti Çirmen sancağında vâki‘ kâdîlara ve müftîlere

734: Bir sûreti Kırkkilise sancağında vâki‘ kâdîlara ve müftîlere

735: Bir sûreti Selânik sancağında vâki‘ Mollâ-yı ‘izâm ve kâdîlara ve müftîlere

736: Bir sûreti Tırhala sancağında vâki‘ Mollâ-yı ‘izâm ve kâdîlara ve müftîlere

737: Bir sûreti Rumelinin sağ koluna

738: Bir sûreti Rumelinin orta koluna

739: Bir sûreti Rumelinin sol koluna

740: Bir sûreti Anadolu eyâletinde vâki‘ Mollâ-yı ‘izâm ve kâdîlara ve müftîlere

741: Bir sûreti Sivas eyâletine

742: Bir sûreti Karaman eyâletine

743: Bir sûreti Adana eyâletine

744: Bir sûreti Şam eyâletine

745: Bir sûreti Trablusşâma

746: Bir sûreti Sâfed-Saydâ-Beyruta

747: Bir sûreti Haleb eyâletine

748: Bir sûreti Rakka eyâletine

749: Bir sûreti Maraş eyâletine

750: Bir sûreti Diyarbekir eyâletine

751: Bir sûreti Erzurum eyâletine

752: Bir sûreti Trabzon eyâletine

753: Bir sûreti Kars eyâletine

754: Bir sûreti Çıldır eyâletine

755: Bir sûreti Van eyâletine

756: Bir sûreti Tımışvar muhâfızına ve kâdîsına ve müftîsine

757: Bir sûreti Belgrad muhâfızına ve mollasına ve müftîsine

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#884 (28 May-6 June 1702)

İstanbul kâdîsına hüküm ki,

*E'd-dînü'n-nasîha*⁵³³ hadîs-i şerîfi mîsdâkınca memâlik-i fesîhatü'l-ercâ ve mesâlik-i ba'îdetü'l-enhâda müstazıll-ı cenâh-ı saltanat ve

müsterîh-i ârâmişgâh-ı 'inâyet olan Müslimîne 'alâ ihtilâfî tabakâtihim nush-ı 'âmm *veltekün minküm ümmetün yed'üne ile'l-hayri*

*ve ye'mürüne bi'l-ma'rûfi ve yenhevne 'ani'l-münker ve ülâ'ike hümmü'l-müflihün*⁵³⁴ mazmununa imtisâl ve kıyâmdan nâşî evvelâ müderrisîn-i

kirâm tadrîse muvâzebet ü istifâde ü ifâdeye müdâvemmet idüb kadîmden mu'tâd olan vech üzere fikh-ı şerî'atdan birer dersi

iltizâm ve her üsbû'da dörder gündend derse çıkmaga ikdâm-ı tâm itmeleriyçün kendülere tenbîh-i ekîd idesiz. Ba'dehu cevâmî'

ü mesâcidde ve sâ'ir bikâ'-i 'ilmiyyede ders-i 'âmm olanlar eyyâm-ı mu'tâdede tadrîse ikdâm ve medâr-ı sa'âdet-i ebediyye

ve vesîle-i hayrât-ı sermediyye olan kütüb-i tefâsîr ü ehâdîs ü fıkıhdan birer dersi iltizâm ve 'ale'd-devâm bu hâl

üzere kıyâm ve terkinden tevkî-i tâm ideler ki verâset-i enbiyâ bu 'ulûm-ı menût ve ehemmiyeti Ebû Dâvud ve İbn Mâce tahrirleriyle

olan işbu hadîs-i sa'âdet-numûnda mübeyyin ve mazbûtdur. *El 'ilmü selâsetün âyetün muhkemetün ev sünnetün kâ'imetün ev farîzatün 'âdileh*

*ve mâsivâ-yı zalike fehüve fazlun*⁵³⁵ Bu tâ'ifeden dahi vazîfe-i lâzimeleri ikâmetden mütekâsîl veyâhûd 'âciz ve câhil

olanları li-vechullâhi li-garez-i resûlullâh 'atabe-i 'aliyye-i devlet-medâra i'lâm idesiz. Sâniyen e'imme ü hutebâ ihtiyâr u tefâhhus olunub

'akâid-i ehli's-sünnet ve'l-cemâ'a ve tecvîd-i Kur'ân-ı 'azîmü's-şân ve mesâ'il-i salâta habîr ü 'âlim ve menâfî'-i iktidâ olan

umûrdan mütevakkî ü sâlih olanları mahallerinde takrîr ve bu hılâl-ı selâsede hâle ü noksânı olanlardan müste'idlerini ta'allüme

cebr ve tahsîle kasd idüb mu'dimü'l-isti'dâdların yerlerine evsâf-ı selâse ile muttâsîf ve ihtiyâr-ı cemâ'atle iktidâyâ

⁵³³ Sahih-i Muslim, 55a "The religion is advice"

⁵³⁴ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

⁵³⁵ Sunan Abu Dawud, 2885 "Knowledge is three; this is a firm sign, an existing sunna, or a just duty; anything else is extra."

sâlih ü müstahıkk olan kimesneleri ta'yîn ve 'arzları sūdde-i seniyye-i devlet-i 'aliyyeye îsâl idesiz.
Sâlisen vu'âz ü müzekkirîne

nazar oluna. Tebliğ-i ahkâm-ı şer' de hasbete'n-lillâh-i te'âlâ ictihâd ve şerâ'it-i tezkîr ve âdâb-ı
va'azda fukehâ-i 'izâm beyân

itdikleri vech üzere 'amel idüb mesâ'il-i şer'iyye ve mehâmm-ı dîniyye ve ahlâk-ı marziyye ta'lîm ve
kütüb-i mu'tebereden rikâk-ı takallüble

kulûb-ı mü'minîni terkîk ü telyîn ideler. İçlerinde hikâyât-ı muzahrefe ve akvâl-ı muza'afe
rivâyetiyle ihtilâl-i berâyâ

ve dâ'iyye-i ta'assub ile ilkâ-i buğzâ ve isâre-i şahne ider kimesneler ve irâbe-i mûna'am olunub
velâkin ve iz ehazallâhü

*mîsâkallezîne ütû'l-kitâbe letubeyyinünnehû li'n-nâsi velâ tektumûneh*⁵³⁶ mazmûnunca kütüb-i
mu'tebereden mesâ'il-i mu'temedeyi

nakilde levme-i lâ'imden hazer ile emr bi'l-ma'rûf ve nehy 'an el-münkeri terk itmeyeler. Bunlardan
dahi nâ-müstahıkk olanları

minvâl-i sâbık üzere 'arz idesiz. Râbi'an mekteblere nazar oluna. Mu'allim-i sıbyân ve mü'eddib-i
şübbân olan

kimesnelerden 'afif ü sâlih ve tecvîd-i hurûf ile ta'lîm-i Kur'ân-ı 'azîmü's-şâna kâdir ve resâ'il-i
mu'tebere-i 'Arabiyye vü Türkiyyeden

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tefhîm-i mesâ'il-i 'akâid-i ehli's-sünnet ve'l-cemâ'at itmege müste'hîl olan mu'allimleri yerlerine
takrîr ve bu evsâfi câmi' olmayan nâ-ehillerin

yerlerine müstahıkkîni ta'yîn idesiz. Hâmisân 'âmme-i Müslimîn ve cümle-i muvahhidîn salât u savm
ve hacc ü zekât ve sâ'ir mesâ'il-i 'tikâdiyye

ü 'ameliyye ve levâzım-ı dîniyyeye müte'allik olan 'ilm-i hâllerini tahsîl ve isti'lâm-ı mahzûr-ı cem' u
cemâ'atde kemâyenbağî kıyâm-ı tâm ve evlâdlarını

ta'allüm-i Kur'ân ve tefehhüm-i mesâ'il-i zarûriyye-i 'tikâdiyye tahsîl-i şerâyi'-i 'ilmiye-i hâliyye
idinceye sinâ'iyye-i dünyeviyye ile iş[ti]gâlden hazer ve hakk-ı übüvveti

edâda sa'y-i belîğ ve cehd-i evfer idüb bikâ'-i kırâ'at ve emâkin-i salât u 'ibâdât mu'attala olmayub
ma'mûr u meşhûn olmasıçün

emr-i ekîd ve cidd-i sa'id ve sa'y-ı hamîd idesiz ki bu şîme-i hasene-i müsteclîb-i rahmet-i rahmâna ve
mûceb-i emn ü itmi'nân olması mukarrerdir deyû bi'l-fî'il

şeyhü'l-islâm Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhü te'âlâ fezâ'ilehu*) tarafından mektûb
virilmekle vech-i meşrûh üzere 'amel eylemek bâbında

fermân-ı âlişânım sâdır olmuştur. Fî evâ'il-i M[uharrem] sene [1]114

BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#909-911 (28 May-6 June 1702)

Galata kâdisına hüküm ki,

⁵³⁶ (3:187) And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture (He said): Ye are to expound it to mankind and not to hide it.

*Ed-dînü'n-nasiha*⁵³⁷ hadîs-i şerîfî mısâdâkıncâ memâlik-i fesîhatü'l-ercâ ve mesâlik-i ba'îdetü'l-
enhâlarında müstazıll-ı cenâh-ı saltanat ve müsterîh-i ârâmişgâh-ı

‘inâyet olan Müslimîne ‘alâ ihtilâfî tabakâtihim nush-ı ‘âmm *veltekün minküm ümmetün yed’üne ile’l-
hayri ve ye’mürüne bi’l-ma’rûfî ve yenhevene*

*‘ani’l-münker ve ülâike hüümü’l-müflihün*⁵³⁸ mazmûnuna imtisâl ve kıyâmdan nâşî evvelâ e’imme ü
hutebâ ihtiyâr u tefahhus olunub ‘akâ’id-i ehli’s-sünnet ve’l-cemâ’a

ve tecvîd-i Kur’ân-ı ‘azîmü’ş-şân ve mesâ’il-i salâta habîr ü ‘âlim ve münâfî-i iktidâ olan umûrdan
mütevakki ü sâlim olanlar mahallerinde takrîr ve bu hılâl-i

selâsede hâlel ü noksânı olanlardan müsta’idlerini ta’allüme cebr ve tahsile kasd idüb mu’dimü’l-
isti’dâdların yerlerine evsâf-ı selâse ile

muttasıf ve ihtiyâr-ı cemâ’atle iktidâyâ sâlih ü müstahıkk olan kimesneleri ta’yîn ve ‘arzların südde-i
seniyye-i devlet-i ‘aliyyeye îsâl idesiz. Ba’dehu cevâmî’

ü mesâcidde ve sâ’ir bikâ’-i ‘ilmiyyede dersi’âmm olanlar eyyâm-ı mu’tâdede tedrişe ikdâm ve
medâr-ı sa’âdet-i ebediyye ve vesîle-i hayrât-ı

sermediyye olan kütüb-i tefâsir ü ehâdis ü fukehâdan birer dersi iltizâm ve ‘ale’d-devâm bu hâl üzere
kıyâm ve terkinden tevki-i tâm

ideler ki verâset-i enbiyâ bu ‘ulûm-ı menût ve ehemmiyeti Ebû Dâvud ve İbn Mâce tahrîrleriyle olan
işbu hadîs-i sa’âdet-numûnda mübeyyin ve mazbûtdur:

*El ‘ilmü selâsetün âyetün muhkemetün ev sünnetün kâ’imetün ev farîzatün ‘âdileh ve mâsivâ-yı zalike
fehüve fazlun.*⁵³⁹ Bu tâ’ifeden dahi vazîfe-i

lâzimleri ikâmetden mütekâsil veyâhüd ‘âciz ü câhil olanları li-vechullâhi li-garezi resûlullâh ‘atabe-i
‘aliyye-i devlet-medâra i’lâm

idesiz. Sâlisen vu‘âz u müzekkirîne nazar oluna. Kürsilerinde mesâ’il-i şer’iyye ve mehâmm-ı
dîniyye ve ahlâk-ı marziyye ta’lîm ve kütüb-i mu’tebere

rikâk-ı takallüble kulüb-i mü’minîni terkîk ü telyîn idüb hikâyât-ı müzahrefe ve akvâl-ı muza‘‘afe
rivâyetiyle ihtilâl-i berâyâ ve dâ’iyye-i ta’assubla ilkâ-i

buğzâ ve isâre-i şahnâdan tecennüb ideler. Lâkin kütüb-i mu’tebere

ve nehy ‘an el-münkeri terk itmeyüb *ve iz ehazallâhü mîsâkallezîne ütû’l-kitâbe letubeyyinünnehû
li’n-nâsi velâ tektumûneh*⁵⁴⁰ mazmûnunca tebliğ-i

ahkâm-ı şer’ide hasbetenillâh ictihâd ve şerâ’it-i tezkîr ve âdâb-ı va’azda fukehâ-yı ‘izâm beyân
itdikleri vech üzre ‘amel ideler.

Bu tâ’ifeden dahi nâ-müstahıkk olanları minvâl-i sâbık üzere ‘arz idesiz. Râbi’an mekteblere nazar
oluna. Mu’allim-i sıbyân ve mü’eddib-i şübbân

olan kimesnelerden ‘afîf ü sâlih ve tecvîd-i hurûf ile ta’allüm-i Kur’ân-ı ‘azîmü’ş-şâna kâdir ve
resâ’il-i mu’tebere-i ‘Arabiyye vü Türkiyyeden tefhîm-i

⁵³⁷ Sahih-i Muslim, 55a “The religion is advice”

⁵³⁸ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

⁵³⁹ Sunan Abu Dawud, 2885 “Knowledge is three; this is a firm sign, an existing sunna, or a just duty; anything else is extra.”

⁵⁴⁰ (3:187) And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture (He said): Ye are to expound it to mankind and not to hide it.

‘akâ’id-i ehli’s-sünnet ve’l-cemâ‘at itmege müste’hil olan mu‘allimleri yerlerinde takrîr ve bu evsâfi câmi‘ olmayan nâ-ehillerin yerlerine müstahikkînî

ta’yîn idesiz. Hâmisân ‘âmme-i Müslimîn ve cümle-i muvahhidîn salât u savm ve hacc ü zekât ve sâ’ir mesâ’il-i i’tikâdiyye ü ‘ameliyye ve levâzım-ı

dîniyyeye müte‘allik olan ‘ilm-i hâllerini tahsîl ü isti‘lâm ve huzûr-ı cem‘ u cemâ‘atde kemâyenbağî kıyâm-ı tâm ve evlâdlarını ta‘allüm-i Kur’ân ve tefehhüm-i

mesâ’il-i zarûriyye-i i’tikâdiyye ve tahsîl-i şerâyi’-i ‘ameliyye-i hâliyye idinceye sanâyi’-i dünyeviyye ile iş[tî]gâlden hazer ve hakk-ı übüvveti edâda sa’y-ı belîğ

ve cehd-i evfer idüb bikâ’-i kırâ‘at ve emâkin-i salât u ‘ibâdât mu‘attala olmayub ma‘mûr u meşhûn olmasiyeçün emr-i ekîd ve sa’y-ı hamîd idesiz ki

bu şîme-i hasene müsteclib-i rahmet-i rahmâna ve müceb-i emn ü itmi’nân olması me’mûldür deyü bi’l-fi‘il şeyhü’l-islâm ve müftü’l-‘enâm ve hâce-i

fezâ’il-i irtisâmî olan Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhü te‘âlâ fezâ’ilehu*) tarafından mektûb virilmekle vech-i meşrûh üzere ‘amel olunmak bâbında

deyü yazılmıştır. Fî evâ’il-i M[uharrem] sene 1114

910: Bir sûreti vech-i meşrûh üzere Üskûdar kâdisına

911: Bir sûreti vech-i meşrûh üzere Haslar kâdisına

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#1225 (25 August-3 September 1702)

Üsküb kâdisına hüküm ki,

‘Ulemâdan Şeyh İbrâhim ile rüfekâsından Şeyh Mustafâ ve Şeyh Mûsâ emr-i şerîfimle me’mûr oldukları elviyeden Köstendil ve Üsküb sancaklarında vâki‘ kasabât

u kurâda olan ümmî ü ‘âmme-i Müslimîne ta’lîm-i mesâ’il-i zarûriyye-i i’tikâdiyye ve tefhîm-i fezâ’il-i ‘ilmiyye ü ‘ameliyye ve emr bi’l-ma’rûf ve nehy ‘an el-münker için me’âbid-i

Müslimîn olan cevâmi‘ ü mesâcidde va‘az u nasîhat u tezkîr ve ef‘âl-i zamîme ü seniyyeden nehiy ve a‘mâl-i hasenâta hass u terğîb itmeleriyle bi-‘avnilâhi te‘âlâ

cümle mütenassih u mütezekkîr ve nehy ü müstağfir olub lâkin nefsi-i medîne-i Üsküb sûkında ‘alâniyyen on ikiden mütecâviz meyhâne ihdâs olunduğundan

erbâb-ı fisk u fücûr şurb-i hamr itmeleriyle nice dürlü fesâdât ü şenâ‘âte ve katl-i nüfûs ve heng-i ‘arâza bâ‘is olduğu/olunduğu i‘lâm olunub *inneme’l-hamru*

*ve’l-meysiru ve’l-ensâbu ve’l-ezlâmu ricsun min ‘ameli’ş-şeytânî fectenibühü le‘alleküm tüflihûn*⁵⁴¹ nass-ı kerîmi üzere rics-i mahz

ve ‘asâr-ı şer‘iyye-i nebeviyye ile ümmü’l-hebâ’is olan hamrın ve keyfiyet ve hurkat-ı hamr hükmünde olan ‘arakın ehl-i İslâm beyninde tenâvül ü te‘âtîsinin ...-i maktû‘aya

olduğunun bey‘ ü şîrâyla dahi muharremât dan ~~olan~~ lâzımı’z-zecr ve’l-men‘ olan münkirât dan olmağla memâlik-i mahrûsemde meyhâneler işlemesine ve menba‘ü’l-fesâdât

⁵⁴¹ (5:90) (O ye who believe!) Strong drink and games of chance and idols and diving arrows are only infamy of Satan’s handiwork. Leave it aside in order that ye may succeed.

olan hamr u ‘arak ve sâ’ir müskirâtın bey’ ü şirâsına kat’â rızâ-yı hümayûnum olmamağla imdi sen ki mevlânâ-yı mûmâileyhsin emr-i şerîfim vusûlünde bu makûle

bâ’is-i fesâdât olan münkirâtın i’lâm u izhânı evvelâ meyhânelerin izmihlâl u iğlâfına mütezeyyel(?) olmağla medîne-i mezbûrede her kanda meyhâne

vâr ise hedm ü ibtâl u ta’tîl ve ashâbına tenbîh ile dekâkîn ve ahz-ı ‘akâr-ı şer’iyyeye tebdîl itdirüb fi mâ-ba’d kat’â meyhâneler işlemeyüb

ve eger dekâkîn ve eger hânelerde sırran u ‘alenen hamr u ‘arak ve sâ’ir müskirât bey’ ü şirâ olunmamak için muhkem tenbîh ü te’kîd eyliyesin.

Şöyle ki bundan sonra eger a’yân ve eger erâzilden her kim bu fi’il-i münkire ictirâ ider ise hükm-i ta’zîr ve habs eyleyüb ve ehl-i İslâm beyninde hamr

u ‘arakın ve sâ’ir müskirâtın te’âtisine te’âmî-i kuzzâtın ikâz-ı hududu’l-lâhın kıllet-i iktidalarından olmağla sen dahi mes’ûl olursun.

Ana göre husûs-ı mezbûrda ziyâde takayyüd ü ihtimâm ve nehy, sonra tarafına muvâfakat eylemeyüb mümâne’at ile erbâb-ı fıska mu’âvenet idenleri

isim ü resimleri ile ‘arz u i’lâm eylesin deyü yazılmışdır. Fî evâ’il-i R[ebiülahir] sene 1114

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#316 (23 September-2 October 1702)

Özi eyâletinde ve havâlisinde vâki’ olan kâdîlara hüküm ki,

*Ed-dînü’n-nasiha*⁵⁴² hadîs-i şerîfî mazmûnu üzere memâlik-i fesîhatü’l-ercâ ve mesâlik-i ba’îdetü’l-enhâda müstazîll-ı cenâh-ı saltanat ve müsterîh-i ârâmişgâh-ı ‘inâyât olan

Müslimîne ‘alâ ihtilâf-ı tabakâtihim nush-ı ‘âmm *veltekün minküm ümmetün yed’üne ile’l-hayri ve ye’mürüne bi’l-ma’rûfi ve yenhevne ‘ani’l-münker ve ülâ’ike hümmül müflihün*⁵⁴³ mazmûn-ı şerîfine imtisâl

ve kıyâmdan nâşî evvelâ her beldede olan e’imme ü hutebâ ihtiyâr u tefahhus olunub ‘akîde-i ehli’s-sünnet ve’l-cemâ’a ve tecvîd-i Kur’ân-ı ‘azîmü’ş-şân ve mesâ’il-i salâta habîr

ü ‘âlim ve münâfi-i iktidâ olan umurdan mütevakkî ü sâlim olanlar mahallerinde takrîr ve bu hılâl-i selâsede halel ü noksânı olanlardan müsta’idlerini ta’allüme cebr

ve tahsile kasd idüb mu’dimü’l-isti’dâdların yerlerine evsâf-ı selâse ile muttasıf ve ihtiyâr-ı cemâ’at ile iktidâya sâlih ü müstahıkk olan kimesneleri ta’yîn ve ‘arzların

südde-i seniyye-i saltanat-ı ‘aliyyeme irsâl idesiz. Sâniyen ikâze-i siccâl(?)’i ifâde ve idâre-i ... istifâde için li-vechillâhi te’âlâ mevzû’a olan

medâris ü mehâfîlde tadrîs-i ‘ulûm-i mütenevvî’a ve ta’lîm-i fûnûn-i müşettete iden müderrisîn-i kirâm eyyâm-ı mu’tadede tadrîse ikdâm ve medâr-ı sa’âdet-i ebediyye ve vesîle-i

hayrât-ı sermediyye olan kütüb-i tefâsîr ü ehâdis ü fıkıhdan birer dersi iltizâm ve ‘ale’l-devâm bu hâl üzere kıyâm ve terkinden tevakkî-i tâm ideler ki

verâset-i enbiyâ bu ‘ulûm-ı menût ve ehemmiyeti Ebû Dâvud İbn Mâce tahrîrleriyle olan işbu hadîs-i sa’adet-numûnda mübeyyîn ve mazbûtdur: *El ‘ilmü selâsetün âyetün muhkemetün*

⁵⁴² Sahih-i Muslim, 55a “The religion is advice”

⁵⁴³ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

*ev sünnetün kâ'imetün ev farîzatün 'âdileh ve mâsivâ-yı zalike fehüve fazlun*⁵⁴⁴ Bu tâ'ifeden kezâlik hasbû'l-emr kıyâmdan mütekâsil veyâhûd 'âciz ü câhil olanları

li-vechillah li-garezi resûlullâh 'arz u mahzar ile 'atebe-i 'aliyye-i devlet-medâra ifâde idesiz. Sâlisen vu'âz u müzekkirîne nazar oluna. Kürsilerinde

mesâ'il-i şer'iyye ve mehâmm-ı dîniyye ve ahlâk-ı marziyye ta'lîm ve kütüb-i mu'tebereden rikâk-ı takallüble kulüb-i mü'minîni terkîk ü telyîn idüb hikâyât-ı

muzahrefe ve akvâl-ı muza'afe rivâyetiyle ihtilâl-i berâyâ ve ifrât-ı teşdîd ve dâ'iyye-i ta'assubla ilkâ-i buğzâ ve isâre-i şahnâdan tecennüb ideler.

Lâkin kütüb-i mu'tebereden [mesâ'il-i] mu'temedeyi nakilde levme-i lâ'imden hazer ile emr-i ma'rûf ve nehy 'ani'l-münkeri terk itmeyüb ve iz *ehazallâhü mîsâkallezîne*

*ûtü'l-kitâbe letubeyyinünnehû li'n-nâsi velâ tektumûneh*⁵⁴⁵ mazmûnunca tebliğ-i ahkâm-ı şer'de hasbetenillâh ictihâd ve şeraîf-i tezkîr ve âdâb-ı va'azda fukehâ-i 'izâm

beyân itdikleri vech üzre 'amel ideler. Bu tâifeden dahi nâ-müstahikk olanları minvâl-i sâbık üzere 'arz idesiz. Râbi'an mekteblere nazar oluna.

Mu'allim-i sıbyân ve mü'eddib-i şübbân olan kimesnelerden 'afîf ü sâlih ve tecvîd-i hurûfla ta'lîm-i Kur'ân-ı 'azîmü's-şâna kâdir ve resâ'il-i mu'tebere-i

'Arabîyye vü Türkiyyeden tefhîm-i 'akâ'id-i ehli's-sünne ve'l-cemâ'a itmege müste'hil olan mu'allimleri yerlerinde takrîr ve bu evsâfî câmi' olmayan nâ-ehillerin

yerlerine müstahikkîni ta'yîn idesiz. Hâmisân 'âmme-i mü'minîn ve cümle-i muvahhidîn salât u savm u zekât ve sâ'ir mesâ'il-i i'tikâdiyye ü 'ameliyye ve levâzım-ı

dîniyyeye müte'allik olan 'ilm-i hâllerini tahsîl ü isti'lâm ve huzûr-ı cem' u cemâ'atde kemâyenbağî kıyâm-ı tâm ve evlâdlarını ta'allüm-i Kur'ân ve tefehhüm-i mesâ'il-i

zarûriyye-i i'tikâdiyye ve tahsîl-i şerâyi'-i 'ilmiyye-i hâliyye idinceye sanâyi'-i dünyeviyye ile iş[ti]gâlden hazer ve hakk-ı übüvveti edâda sa'y-ı belîğ ve cehd-i evfer idüb ehl-i kurâ ve ashâb-ı

ahbiye zikr olunduğı minvâl üzere levâzım-ı İslâmı ta'allüm ü tahsîl ve evkât-ı hamsede ikâmet-i cemâ'at için talebe-i 'ulûmdan birer kimesneyi içlerinde îvâ ü iskân

ve ta'mîr-i mesâcid ve mekteb itmeleriçün tenbîh ü teşdîd ve kasabât u kurâda olan bikâ'-i 'ulûm u kirâ'at ve emâkin-i salât u 'ibâdât mu'attala olmayub ma'mûr u meşhûn

olmasıçün emr-i ekîd ve cidd-i şedîd ve sa'y-ı hamîd idesiz ki bu şîme-i hasene müsteclib-i rahmet-i rahmâna ve müceb-i emn ü itmi'nân ve sebeb-i inkifâf yede'l-'udvân olduğı

*kemâ tekûnû yüvellâ 'aleyküm*⁵⁴⁶ hadîs-i şerîfi ile beyyinü'l-burhândır bu emr-i lâzımü'l infâzın teknilinde kazâlarınızda me'zûn bi'l-iftâ olanlar dahi ve *te'âvenû 'ale'l-birri*

*ve't-takvâ*⁵⁴⁷ emr-i şerîfine imtisâlen metâ'-ı şer'iyye yedd-i vâhid olub icrâ-yı merâsim-i cânib-dârî-i gayret-i dîniyye ve kıyâm-ı mevâcib-i teşmiyyet-kâri-i ahkâm-ı şer'iyye

ideler deyü seyyidü'l 'ulemâi'l-a'lâm senedi'l-fuzelâi'l-ke'lâm a'lemü'l-'ulemâi'l-mütebahhirîn efzâli'l-fuzelâü'l-müverri'in ...i'l-fezâ'il ve'l-... bi'l-fi'il şeyhü'l-islâm

⁵⁴⁴ Sunan Abu Dawud, 2885 "Knowledge is three; this is a firm sign, an existing sunna, or a just duty; anything else is extra."

⁵⁴⁵ (3:187) And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture (He said): Ye are to expound it to mankind and not to hide it.

⁵⁴⁶ Al-Daylami, *Musnad al-Shihab* (1:336) "As you are so will your leaders be"

⁵⁴⁷ (5:2) But help ye one another unto righteousness and pious duty.

ve müftî'l-e'nâm ve hâce-i feza'il-i irtisâmî olan Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhü te'âlâ fezâ'ilehu*) tarafından mektûb virilmekle vech-i meşrûh üzere 'amel oluna deyü yazılmışdır

Fî evâ'il-i C[emaziye]e[vvel] sene [1]114

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#811-814 (16-25 June 1703)}

Rumilinin sol kol nihâyetine varınca vâki' olan molla-i 'izâm ve kâdîlara hüküm ki,

*Ed-dînü 'n-nasîha*⁵⁴⁸ hadîs-i şerîfi mîsdâkınca memâlik-i fesîhatü'l-ercâ ve mesâlik-i ba'îdetü'l-enhâda müstazill-ı cenâh-ı saltanat ve müsterîh-i ârâmişgâh-ı 'inâyet olan Müslimîne

'alâ ihtilâfi tabakâtihim nush-ı 'âmm *veltekün minküm ümmetün yed'üne ile'l-hayri ve ye'mürüne bi'l-ma'rûfi ve yenhevne 'ani'l-münker ve ülâ'ike hümmü'l-müflihün*⁵⁴⁹ mazmûnuna imtisâl

ve kıyâmdan nâsî evvelâ her belde de olan e'imme ü hutebâ ihtiyâr u tefahhus olunub 'akîde-i ehli's-sünne ve'l-cemâ'a ve tecvîd-i Kur'ân-ı 'azîmü's-şân ve mesâ'il-i salâta

habîr ü 'âlim ve münâfi-i iktidâ olan umûrdan mütevakki ü sâlim olanlar mahallerinde takrîr ve bu hîlâl-i selâse de hâle ü noksânı olanlardan müsta'idlerini ta'allüme cebr

ve tahsile kasd idüb mu'dimü'l-isti'dâdların yerlerine evsâf-ı selâse ile muttasıf ve ihtiyâr-ı cemâ'at ile iktidâyâ sâlih ü müstahakk olan kimesneleri

ta'yîn ve 'arzların südde-i seniyye-i saltanat-ı 'aliyyeye irsâl idesiz. Sâniyen ikâze-i siccâl(?)'i ifâde ve idâre-i ... istifâde içün li-vechillâhi te'âlâ mevzû'a

olan medâris ü mehâfilde tedris-i 'ulûm-i mütenevvî'a ve ta'lîm-i fûnûn-i müşettete iden müderrisîn-i kirâm eyyâm-ı mu'tâdede tedrise ikdâm ve medâr-ı sa'adet-i ebediyye ve vesîle-i

hayrât-ı sermediyye olan kütüb-i tefâsîr ü ehâdis ü fıkıhdan birer dersi iltizâm ve 'ale'd-devâm bu hâl üzere kıyâm ve terkinden tevakkî-i tâm ideler ki verâset-i

enbiyâ bu 'ulûm-ı menût ve ehemmiyeti Ebû Dâvud ve İbn Mâce tahrîcleriyle olan işbu hadîs-i sa'adet-numûnda mübeyyîn ve mazbûtdur: *El 'ilmü selâsetün âyetün muhkemetün ev sünnetün*

*kâ'imetün ev farîzatün 'âdileh ve mâsivâ-yı zalike fehüve fazlun.*⁵⁵⁰ Bu tâ'ifeden kezâlik hasbü'l-emr kıyâmdan mütekâsil veyâhûd 'âciz ü câhil olanları li-vechillâh

li-garezi resûlullâh 'arz u mahzar ile 'atebe-i 'aliyye-i devlet-medâra ifâde idesiz. Sâlisen vu'âz ü müzekkirîne nazar oluna. Kürsilerinde mesâ'il-i şer'iyye ve mehâmm-ı dîniyye

ve ahlâk-ı marziyye ta'lîm ve kütüb-i mu'tebereden rikâk-ı takallüble kulûb-i mü'minîni terkîk ü telyîn idüb hikâyât-ı müzahrefe ve akvâl-ı muza'afe rivâyetiyle ihtilâl-i berâyâ

ve ifrât-ı teşdîd ve dâ'iyye-i ta'assubla ilkâ-i buğzâ ve isâre-i şahnâdan tecennüb ideler. Lâkin kütüb-i mu'tebereden mesâ'il-i mu'temedeyi nakilde levme-i lâimden hazer ile

emr-i ma'rûf ve nehy 'ani'l-münkeri terk itmeyüb *ve iz ehazallâhü mîsâkallezîne ütû'l-kitâbe letubeyyinünnehû li'n-nâsi velâ tektumûneh*⁵⁵¹ mazmûnunca tebliğ-i ahkâm-ı şer'de

⁵⁴⁸ Sahih-i Muslim, 55a "The religion is advice"

⁵⁴⁹ (3:104) And there may spring from you a nation who invite to goodness, and enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency. Such are they who are successful.

⁵⁵⁰ Sunan Abu Dawud, 2885 "Knowledge is three; this is a firm sign, an existing sunna, or a just duty; anything else is extra."

⁵⁵¹ (3:187) And (remember) when Allah laid a charge on those who had received the Scripture (He said): Ye are to expound it to mankind and not to hide it.

hasbetenillâh ictihâd ve şerâ'it-i tezkîr ve âdâb-ı va'azda fukehâ-i 'izâm beyân itdikleri vech üzere
'amel ideler. Bu tâifeden dahi nâ-müstahikk olanları minvâl-i

sâbık üzere 'arz idesiz. Râbi'an mekteblere nazar oluna. Mu'allim-i sıbyân ve mü'eddib-i şübbân olan
kimesnelerden 'afif ü sâlih ve tecvîd-i hurûf ile ta'lîm-i Kur'ân-ı 'azîmü's-şâna

kâdir ve resâ'il-i mu'tebere-i 'Arabiyye vü Türkiyyeden tefhîm-i 'akâ'id-i ehli's-sünne ve'l-cemâ'a
itmege müste'hil olan mu'allimleri yerlerinde takrîr ve bu evsâfı câmi' olmayan

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nâ-ehillerin yerlerine müstahikkîni ta'yîn idesiz. Hâmisân 'âmme-i Müslimîn ve cümle-i muvahhidîn
salât u savm ve hacc ü zekât ve sâ'ir mesâ'il-i i'tikâdiyye ü 'ameliyye ve levâzım-ı

dîniyyeye müte'allik olan 'ilm-i hâllerini tahsîl ü isti'lâm ve huzûr-ı cem' u cemâ'atde kemâyenbağî
kıyâm-ı tâm ve evlâdlarını ta'allûm-i Kur'ân ve tefehhüm-i mesâ'il-i zarûriyye-i

i'tikâdiyye ve tahsîl-i şerâyi'-i 'ameliyye-i hâliyye idinceye sanâyi'-i dîniyye [sic] ile iş[ti]gâlden
hazer ve hakk-ı übüvveti edâda cehd-i evfer idüb ehl-i kurâ ve ashâb-ı ahbiye

dahi zıkr olunduğı minvâl üzere levâzım-ı islâmı ta'allûm ü tahsîl ve evkât-ı hamsede ikâmet-i
cemâ'at içün talebe-i 'ulûmdan birer kimesneyi içlerinde îvâ

ü iskân ve ta'mîr-i mesâcid ü mekteb itmeleriçün tenbîh ü teşdid ve kasabât u kurâda olan bikâ'-i
'ulûm u kırâ'at ve emâkin-i salât u 'ibâdât mu'attala olmayub

ma'mûr u meşhûn olmasiçün emr-i ekîd ve cidd-i şedîd ve sa'y-ı hamîd idesiz ki bu şîme-i hasene
müsteclib-i rahmet-i rahmâna ve müceb-i emn ü itmi'nân ve sebep-i inkîfâf

yede'l-'udvân olduğı *kemâ tekûnû yüvellâ 'aleyküm*⁵⁵² hadîs-i şerîfi ile beyyinü'l-burhândır ve bu
emr-i lâzımü'l infâzın tekmîlinde kazâlarınızda me'zûn

bi'l-iftâ olanlar dahi *ve te'âvenû 'ale'l-birri ve't-takvâ*⁵⁵³ emr-i şerîfine imtisâlen hükkâm-ı şer'le
yedd-i vâhid olub icrâ-yı merâsim-i cânib-dârî-i gayret-i

dîniyye ve kıyâm-ı mevâcib-i teşmiyyet-kârî-i ahkâm-ı şer'iyye eyleyeler deyü seyyidü'l-'ulemâi'l-
a'lâm şeyhü'l-islâm olan Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhü te'âlâ*

fezâ'ilehu) tarafından virilen mektûb mücebince yazılmıştır. Fî evâ'il-i S[after] sene [1]115

Bir sûreti Rumelinin sağ kolu nihâyetine varınca vâki' olan Mollâ-yı 'izâm ve kâdîlara vech-i meşrûh
üzere yazılmışdır

Bir sûreti Rumelinin orta kolu nihâyetine varınca vâki' olan Mollâ-yı 'izâm ve kâdîlara vech-i meşrûh
üzere yazılmışdır

Bir sûreti Filibe monlâsına ve Tatarpazarı nâ'ibine ve ol mahallerde vâki' olan kâdîlara vech-i meşrûh
üzere yazılmışdır

BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 114#861 (16-25 June 1703)

Mütefahhriyyü's-sülehâi's-sâlikîn Bosna cânibine va'z u tezkîr içün ta'yîn olunan eş-Şeyh
Muhammedü'l-Bünyân ve eş-Şeyh Ahmed el-Kürdi (*zîde 'ilmuhümâ*)ya hüküm ki,

⁵⁵² Al-Daylami, *Musnad al-Shihab* (1:336) "As you are so will your leaders be"

⁵⁵³ (5:2) But help ye one another unto righteousness and pious duty.

Siz ki mûma-ileyhümâsız evvel taraftan ikiniz ma‘en hareket ve Belgrad semtine tevcîh vechine
matîyye-i ‘azîmet idüb inşâ‘allâhü te‘âlâ yollarda olan kasabât u kurâda

va‘z u nasîhat iderek Belgrad’a vusûlünüzde ol havâlîde vâki‘ kasabât u kurâda dahi muhtâc olan
Müslimîne ta‘lîm-i mesâ’il-i zarûriyye-i dîn-i mübîn

idüb ba‘dehu nehr-i Tuna sâhilinde olan bilâdâtta va‘z u nasîhate ve ta‘lîm-i ‘ilm-i şerî‘at ve tefhîm-i
‘akâid-i ehli’s-sünne iderek Babadağı cânibine

irhâ-yı ‘inân teveccüh ü ‘azîmet idesiz deyü seyyidü’l-‘ulemâi’l-‘allâm bi’l-fi‘il şeyhü’l-islâm ve
müftîyi’l-enâm fuzelâ-i fezâ’il-i irtisâmî olan Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh (*edâme Allâhü te‘âlâ*

fezâ’ilehu) tarafından mûmzâ mektûb virilmekle vech-i meşrûh üzere ‘amel olunmak için yazılmışdır

Fi evâ’il-i S[afêr] sene 1115

BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#862 (16-25 June 1703)

Bosna sancağında va‘az u tezkîr için ta’yîn

olunan Mevlânâ eş-Şeyh ‘Ali (*alâ müzeyyen-i zîr-i ‘ilmiyye*)ye hüküm ki,

Sen ki mevlânâ-yı mûmâileyhsin ol taraftan hareket ve inşâ‘allâhü te‘âlâ

Ağrıboz cânibine tevcîh-i matîyye-i ‘azîmet idüb yollarda olan kasabât

u kurâda va‘z u tezkîr iderek âheste âheste Ağrıboz cânibine vardıkda(?)

ol havâlîde olan bilâdda dahi birkaç gün va‘az u nasîhat

ve muhtâc olan Müslimîne ta‘lîm-i mesâ’il-i zarûriyye-i dîn-i mübîn idüb ba‘dehu

vech-i meşrûh üzere Rumelinin sol kolundan ta‘lîm-i mesâ’il-i dîn

iderek ve(?) fermân-ı şerîfe dahi(?) mücâhede(?) üzere olunub eyyâm-i şitâ

hlâlinde(?) bu tarafa teveccüh idesin deyü bilfi‘il şeyhü’l-islâm

olan Mevlânâ es-Seyyid Feyzullâh te‘âlâ(?) (*edâme Allâhü te‘âlâ*

fezâ’ilehu) tarafından mûmzâ mektûb virilmekle ma‘lûm ‘amel oluna deyü buyruldu

Fi evâhir-i S[afêr] sene [1]115

BOA İE.DH 14.1288 (16 May 1702)

Sahha

Tevâ’if-i mezbûreye va‘az u nasîhat ve müsta‘id olanlara ifâde-i

‘ulûm-i nâfi‘a ve sâ’irlerine dahi ‘ilm-i hâllerini ta‘lîm eylemek şartıyla

meşâyıh-ı tevhd(?) ve başka başka berât virilmek

buyruldu. 18 Z[ilhicce] sene [1]113

Devletlû ve mürüvvetlû sultânım pâdişâhım(?) hazretleri sağ olsun

Bucakda Halil Paşa yurdunda sâkin Tatar tâ'ifesi arasında dört nefer vâ'iz
ü nâsih ü müderris mollaları olub gice ü gündüz okuyub veyâ rifkat-ı ma'bed(?)
ve ta'lîm-i 'ilm ve vâ'iz ü nâsih olub gayrı kâr ü kesbimiz olmayub fakîrû'l-hâl ve seyyidü'l-medâr(?)
olub vech-i ma'âşda kemâl mertebe zarûretimiz olmağla şedîd(?)ü'l-hâl idüb devlet-i 'aliyyene
geldik. İtâfe(?)-i keremlerinden mercûdur ki vech-i ma'âşlarımıza murâd olmak üzere Halil Paşa
yurdunda hâsıl olan a'sâr-ı şer'iyyesinden her birimize Kili kilesiyle senede otuz
kile hinta ta'yîn ve ihsân olunmak bâbında 'ömrümüz oldukça devletlû sultânımın du'â-yı
hayırlarında edâmız baki. Emr ü fermân sultanımındır.
Ed-dâ'î Sâlihü'l-müderris Ed-dâ'î 'Alî el-müderris Ed-dâ'î Şeyh Mûsâ vâ'iz ve nâsih
Ed-dâ'î Şeyh Hacı 'Âribî vâ'iz ve nâsih

APPENDIX D

FACSIMILES OF THE ORDERS






Fig. D1 BOA A.{DVNSMHM.d. 112#551 (March 1702)




A. [DVNSMHH.d.00112

Fig. D2 BOA A. {DVNSMHH.d. 112#661 (March-April 1702)




A. [DVNSMHH.d.00112

Fig. D3 BOA A. {DVNSMHH.d. 112#665 (April 1702)




A. {DVNSMHM.d.00112

Fig. D4 BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#766 (April 1702)




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


A. {DVNSMHM.d.00112

Fig. D5 BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 112#724-757 (April-May, and June 1702)



A. [DVNSMHH.d.00112



A. [DVNSMHH.d.00112

Fig. D6 BOA A. [DVNSMHH.d. 112#884 (May-June 1702)




Fig. D7 BOA A. {DVNSMHH.d. 112#909-911 (May-June 1702)




Fig. D8 BOA A. {DVNSMHH.d. 112#1225 (August-September 1702)






Fig. D9 BOA A. {DVNSMHH.d. 114#316 (September-October 1702)



A.[DVNSMHH.d.00114

Fig. D10 BOA A.[DVNSMHH.d. 114#811-814 (June 1703)



A.[DVNSMHM.d.00114

Fig. D11 BOA A. {DVNSMHM.d. 114#861 and #862 (June 1703)}

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BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 106#332-334.

BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 106#826-828.

BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 108#370.

BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 108#1185.

BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 108#1251.

BOA A.{DVNSMHHM.d. 108#1486-1497.

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