

SINGING TOGETHER EVERY NIGHT:  
NOVEL FORMS OF MUSLIM WOMANHOOD IN TURKEY

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## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Ece Esmer, certify that

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- this thesis contains no material that has been submitted or accepted for a degree or diploma in any other educational institution;
- this is a true copy of the thesis approved by my advisor and thesis committee at Boğaziçi University, including final revisions required by them.

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## ABSTRACT

### Singing Together Every Night:

#### Novel Forms of Muslim Womanhood in Turkey

This thesis is a case study that examines how the cultural practices, engagement, and identities of young pious Muslim women are shaped as they build their own cultural settings within the context of Turkey's cultural and political environment. The study also provides a detailed account of how middle-class pious Muslim young women react, translate, as well as position themselves within the sphere they create as active participants by embracing contemporary political positions that are authoritative, nationalistic, and conservative in nature, as well as how they envision their middle-class membership. This case study examines the formations that these young people include in and omit from their cultural production processes, which are marked by their relationships with their families, religion, and traditions, using as its subject a music group comprised of pious young Muslim women. The research also aims to examine how this musical ensemble reinterprets the politically charged, critical songs they perform, as well as the reasons and strategies they employ in relation to the religious community and audience. In doing so, the politically and geographically diversified repertoire of the musical group is analyzed in order to shed additional light on its political origins. The study investigates the extent to which individuals accept these conditions and how, by their active engagement in cultural production processes, they form their identities in the public space.

## ÖZET

Her Gece Birlikte Şarkı Söylemek:

Türkiye’de Müslüman Kadınlıkların Yeni Görünümleri

Bu tez, genç, dindar Müslüman kadınların kültürel pratiklerinin, aidiyet ve kimliklerini Türkiye'nin kültürel ve siyasi iklimi bağlamında kendi kültürel ortamlarını nasıl inşa ettiklerini inceleyen bir vaka çalışmasıdır. Bu araştırma aynı zamanda orta sınıf dindar Müslüman genç kadınların birer fail olarak, milliyetçi ve muhafazakar politikaların etkisi altında şekillenen kamusal alanda kendilerini nasıl konumlandıklarının, bu politikaları ne şekilde tercüme ettiklerinin ve bunlara nasıl tepkiler verdiklerinin aynı zamanda bu politikaların orta sınıf aidiyetlerini nasıl şekillendirdiğinin ayrıntılı bir açıklamasını sunmaktadır. Bu tez, dindar genç Müslüman kadınlardan oluşan bir müzik grubunu konu alarak, bu gençlerin aileleri, dinleri ve gelenekleri ile olan ilişkilerinin kültürel üretim süreçlerine etkisini incelemektedir. Araştırma aynı zamanda bu müzik grubunun icra ettikleri politik içerikli, eleştirel şarkıları nasıl yeniden yorumladığını, ayrıca muhafazakar bir profile sahip dinleyicilerle ilgili olarak kullandıkları stratejileri ve bunların sebeplerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu sebeple, grup üyelerinin politik eğilimlerine ışık tutmak için müzik grubunun politik ve coğrafi olarak zengin repertuarı analiz edilecektir. Bu tez, dindar genç kadınlardan oluşan bu müzik grubunun aile, din, politika ve geleneğe içkin unsurları ne ölçüde kabul ettiğini ve kültürel üretim süreçlerine aktif katılımlarıyla kamusal alanda kimliklerini nasıl oluşturduklarını araştırmaktadır.

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# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 The main aim of the thesis

This thesis presents the key results and analysis of engagement with the cultural practices of pious Muslim women based on an ethnographic case study of this young pious Muslim women music group.. It examines the construction of the personal and social lives of young "pious Muslim women" as cultural participants in public space and culture-makers in Turkey's current social and political climate.

This study also examines the stigma and conflicts that young people face during the process of cultural participation and integration, as well as their various experiences in this regard. In addition, it explores how these women's attitudes, concerns, and perceptions shape their identity on a daily basis. In addition, it examines how these women's attitudes, concerns, and perceptions shape their identity on a daily basis. It examines intergenerational conflicts and moderations using Islamic literature, youth studies, Muslim women, and secularism as its sources. The concert group gives us insight into how their self-produced cultural understandings are formed and what is significant to its members as they prepare their musical repertoire and choose concert venues. Examining their practices before and after each concert, as well as how they are rooted in local contexts, provides more insight. This study forces me to question how pious, young, Muslim women create their culture as active agents with the potential to challenge the stigmatization of conservative Islamic principles while maintaining community meanings.

This thesis draws on ethnographic research to explore and elaborate on a group of pious Muslim women's identity construction processes and aims to increase their visibility in the social and cultural space through focusing on how they resist

the cultural codes of their community and negotiate with culturally dominant secular community during the last two decades in Turkey under the authoritative AKP (Justice and Development Party) government.

The presence of pious Muslim women in the setting of cultural production poses a risk to both religious and secular communities. By reinterpreting religion in their daily lives as opposed to accepting what is imposed upon them, these young Muslim women are constructing themselves as 'conscious', pious Muslim women.

This study also focuses on the group's repertoire and selected songs, which offer both resistance to religious family and community and compel them to engage with cultural spaces dominated by secularists via dress codes, images, and audience feedback. Thus, the group redefines the political and cultural baggage of the selected songs. Thus, the interconnectedness of the group, its audience, and its songs pushes us to investigate the process of meaning-making through performing the repertoire.

## 1.2 Method and data analysis

In what ways they mediate their religious values with their lives in Turkey in the twenty-first century or what changes the individual needs to make in their life personally and socially to be a member, what kind of relationship they have with religion, what rituals and beliefs they hold, and how they produce a new discourse that disrupts the existing system within a given society to regulate their everyday life and how they reshape their relations to the forms of social bonding. In this thesis, these themes will be analysed using the "extended case method" developed by Burawoy. To unpack these questions, researchers should implement Burawoy's "extended case method," which explains how macro structures, global grand historical context, and large social theories can be elaborated using micro, singular,

and individual data. He notes that the extended case method broadens an ethnographic study - which is limited in daily life - and creates a bridge between social scientists and the individuals being studied (1998, pp.17). So, in this thesis, I examine the capacity to challenge how participation and community production are carried out and to transform the sphere in which youth exist, while maintaining their status within the religious community. The purpose of this method is to follow the extended case method and examine microstructures to gain a comprehensive understanding.

I used qualitative data collection methods, such as participant observation and semi-structured in-depth interviews, during the research. To understand and interpret human actions, these techniques provided a "thick description" (Ryle, 2009; Geertz, 1973) of the social life of a young community (Ryle, 2009; Geertz, 1973). The informal setting of the selected case study enables the researcher to conduct "active participant observation" instead of passive one (Angrosino and Rosenberg, 2011, p. 161).

I actively participated in the improvisation nights in order to observe the relationship between the music group and the audience. During the concert evenings, I kept fieldwork diaries. The fieldwork notes contained observations and self-reflections regarding the concerts and other meetings. I went to concerts in several cities in Turkey (Bursa and Ankara) in order to analyse the impact of audience profile on the relationship between music group and their audiences.

In addition, I followed the group's and its members' Instagram profiles, as well as their live streams, stories, interviews, Instagram live streaming before and after performances, rehearsals, and touring. I also observed the group members' comments and posts, particularly on national holidays and special days, as well as

when there was an active political dispute in the nation. I asked questions during the Q&A sessions of the concert group's Instagram live streams. I updated my fieldwork journal following each performance and transmission. I photographed performance venues and audience members' written comments on notepapers.

I received interviewees' permission to record their interviews and voices. I recorded and transcribed interviews. Through the vocalist, I became friend with the group members after the first interview. We decided to meet again later. The encounters following shows were cordial. During these encounters, I was often invited to the next event. All interviews were place in the locations chosen by the interviewees. Only the performer invited me to her house. She indicated that she desired a more casual and candid interview by sharing her personal life. The arrangement wasn't hierarchical. The interviews were more conversational in nature. My age and gender were advantageous aspects.

Instead of focusing on the isolated effects of social identities, researchers and activists have increasingly taken an intersectional viewpoint to better comprehend the link between identity, experience, and power systems. According to this perspective, the effects of different social categories on people's experiences are inseparable, and the intersections of social categories mean that people experience oppression (and privilege) differently, depending on the specific social hierarchy and structure in which they are focused (Collins, 1990; Crenshaw, 1991; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Researchers have focused the majority of their efforts on the intersections of race, class, and gender. Depending on the social context in which they exist, religious identities can either subject individuals to discrimination or provide them with privileges (Wadsworth, 2011, pp. 202). My perspective is not merely intersectional because of my concern about Muslim women who are also pious believers. Rather, I

am engaged in illustrating how this intersection may not only affect their experiences of gender and religion in a unique way but also how they comprehend themselves and their identities in connection to these social categories, as well as how they critically interact with hierarchical gender and religious structures in society.

Due to the fact that the music group scheduled rehearsals at the last minute and communicated mostly through an internal network, I was only able to participate in activities that were announced on social media (via a WhatsApp group). Participating in the rehearsals would be advantageous for seeing their friendships, understanding their decision-making process, and gaining insight into their daily lives.

During the interviews, with my secular and non-veiled appearance, I attempted to elaborate on the questions by providing instances from my own life and vulnerabilities, while also considering the vulnerabilities of the respondents. The interviewees facilitated mutual reflection by sharing their opinions aloud on issues they had not previously considered.

I analysed the data using the NVivo 12 software for qualitative data analysis. Participant observation and in-depth interviews yielded data that was analysed using a code tree. In accordance with the purpose of the thesis, the coding tree (see Appendix A) was created using interview questions.

The coding procedure consisted of three steps, the first of which included re-listening to and reading the transcriptions of the interviews. The second step of data analysis consisted of personally comparing and grouping participant expressions within the context of the theoretical framework of the thesis, and then implementing the data in NVivo 12. The objective of the third step of data analysis is to initiate an

academic conversation analysing and conceptualizing the case study in light of current academic literature.

### 1.3 Accessing the research field

I had the opportunity to review the literature in the field of youth studies while working as a researcher in a research project which is titled “Cultural Heritage and Identities of Europe’s Future” under the Horizon 2020 program started in 2018. The CHIEF project was held across nine countries in and beyond Europe. One of the objectives of the research project was to carry out two case studies on youth groups involved in cultural production processes in Turkey. When looking for appropriate fieldwork for the case study, my teammate Ayça Oral and I tried to take into account the representation of youth groups in Turkey. As the first case study, we chose the boardgame players in Turkey. All participants in the group we selected had a middle-upper class secular profile. When we examine the youth, education and cultural policies that have been recorded in Turkey in the last two decades, we see a great expansion in the emphasis on religious values. This transformation caused us to choose a more pious youth group as the subject of the other case study. We started looking into youth groups involved in cultural production in areas of Istanbul where large religious communities like Üsküdar and Fatih reside.

While choosing this case study, we wanted to deal with religious and/or conservative young people from high schools as the increasing deism among young people in Turkey had been a major topic since 2018 and it was brought into the ruling party’s notice. We asked if there were some young people routinely visiting to a culture centre in Fatih, one of the conservative areas in Istanbul or else they convened for cultural output in any cultural centre in the vicinity where I have access

through informal networks. The network gave one information that there was a group comprising entirely of young Muslim women and presenting performances just to women and sent the Instagram account link. After a short browse through social media (Instagram, YouTube, Twitter), the group was thought to suit with the purpose of the thesis and the vocalist of the group, one of the founders, was contacted by phone. In the very first interview, we were asked to a concert and made acquainted with the group members. We planned a meeting with them after improvisation night to brief them about the research. We met the band's key members in the café where the activity was held. We explained the research and responded to the appropriate questions. The group members grew interested in this research.

The field includes a number of different concert halls, cafes, concerts, and school auditoriums hosting minor auditions. The data consists of the song, the repertoire, the relationship with the audience, all expressions before, after, and during the performance, dialogues, and small talk during intermissions.

The interviews for this study were optional, and all group members provided their consent, which was largely determined by the group's internal decisions. We coordinated the meetings via WhatsApp and phone. The interviewees determined the time, day, and location of the interviews. While selecting interviewees, we opted to meet with a woman who identifies as a Muslim feminist activist but is no longer a member of the group she founded. We wanted to comprehend the group's origins, motives, and tensions. This interviewee was approached via her social media account. The interview took held at her place of employment. Interviews with core group and chorus members contributed to the interpretation and presentation of the findings.

As a deliverable of the research project, we published two reports based to this ethnographic study.<sup>1</sup> After the reports, we also published an international book chapter (Oral and Esmer, 2022). I also published a book chapter which more focused on the embracing the religion as a changing concept and the living tradition (Esmer, 2022). In this thesis, I will more focus on firstly, the publicity of this musical group by analysing the gathering settings, forms and motivations, secondly, enhancing cultural capital affected by the cultural policies of the current government within the building the repertoire, and the lastly, the self-identification process and positioning across the social, political and cultural spaces in Turkey.

#### 1.4 The key information about the field

The concert's core group comprises of ten young, veiled women, while the chorus consists of fifteen women. They solely perform for women of various ages and geographic locations. Through concerts, the group seeks to investigate the interactions between individuals. While simultaneously announcing their performances via online platforms.

One of the reasons they perform primarily in the evening is that they feel gatherings should not be limited to the daytime; therefore, women can and will be active members of their city. This also frames a discourse against conservative woman norms and has the capacity to influence and shape daily life. Activities such as dancing with children, friends, or woman relatives, singing in the evening, and the

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<sup>1</sup> Please see: <http://chiefprojecteu.com/deliverables/par-ethnography-case-studies-reports/> and also see <http://chiefprojecteu.com/deliverables/cluster-analysis-of-ethnography-with-young-people/>

circumstance in which their spouses and male relatives take them home or they return home on their own serve as a model for the restructuring of everyday life.

Typically, the group holds its performances and events in Istanbul's conservative neighbourhoods. The group of woman college students offers opportunities comparable to traditional conservative women's house gatherings. Women who self-identify as "religious" are distinct from "feminist Muslim" women. Regarding religion, politics, and culture, the group's members hold diverse worldviews. There are also antifeminists, apolitical ones, and women who empathize with feminism but do not identify as feminists. Before discussing the group's dynamics and gathering motivations and settings, I would like to give details of how and with which motivations group set up and how it changed in six years.

In 2016, two pious women were performing in a jazz club at a university, but they did not feel comfortable performing in mixed-gender venues. Therefore, they decided to post their gathering plan on Instagram seeking women musicians who share their discomfort. Soon after, many women responded to the request, and they began to rehearse together.

The founding members of the group were the band's soloist, guitarist, violinist and qanun player. The violinist and qanun player contacted the soloist and guitarist because of their discomfort in the jazz club. While the soloist saw it as a space for religious women to express themselves, the guitarist interpreted it as an empowerment process and a feminist movement. This difference in motivation among group members would later cause conflicts among the group.

After the band members and chorists were selected, the first performances were held on the university campus. Performances at the school attracted such a great deal of attention that; About five months after the founding of the group, they

performed their first public performance in a large auditorium of a cafe. While the first places where the shows were held were mostly cafes and cultural centers of local associations, these concerts started to be held in the big congress halls of the municipalities and the big concert halls of the city. As the group's network expanded, financial and technical resources began to increase. These conditions also allowed the band to organize larger events.

With the expansion of the resources, the number of listeners also increased in the growing organizations. This music group is in constant interaction with the audience before, during and after the performance. After the performance, the band members talk to the audience about the concert and ask them what they think of the songs. In addition, group members regularly receive feedback from the audience about the repertoire on social media. This interaction caused changes in the repertoire of the music group. At the beginning of the process, the repertoire was heavy on rock music, but over time it started to include Turkish classical music and Sufi music. A similar change occurred in dress code. In the first period of the music group, they were wearing black and leather-weighted veils, but with the growth of the audience, they began to prefer silk and cotton fabrics in a wider colour scale.

Although the members of the music group carried the Muslim woman identity as a common identity, their political views varied. The group included liberal-leftist Muslim-feminist women as well as right-conservatives. The group's motivation for getting together for the first time was that making music in mix-gender places was uncomfortable for a devout Muslim woman. Women who said that they discovered the empowering side of getting together, rehearsing and performing together, began to think that this group would inspire other young women with similar identities. The group members, who handled this inspiring process from a

feminist perspective, started to give interviews to leftist newspapers and magazines in this manner. The former guitarist, who claimed that this empowerment process could be understood as a feminist outlet of Muslim women, received negative reactions from within the group.

Other members of the group strongly objected to the idea that this group came together with a political motivation. While they accepted that women were empowered by making music together, they were of the opinion that this empowerment was not a political issue. Moreover, the group's audience mostly thought that it was forbidden to have fun in a mix-gender environment and that an activity carried out by women to women was more in line with the boundaries drawn by Islam. The religious motivations behind Audience's interest in the band's activities made the former guitarist uneasy. After in-group differences of opinion and differences in goals and deviations, the former guitarist decided to leave the group. After that, the band took both their music and image to a more nationalist-conservative streak. The subject of this thesis is the detailed analysis of the motivational conflicts I mentioned above and the transformation story in categories such as repertoire, dressing and using the space.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE VISIBILITY OF MUSLIM WOMEN IN PUBLIC-COMMON SPACE

#### 2.1 Women in Islam: Responsibility and the visibility

One of the main aims of this thesis is exploring how young pious Muslim women self-identify themselves and how they take positions within the religious Muslim community and the secular community in the context of current Turkey. In order to comprehend these self-identification and positioning processes it is crucial to rise the research question within the related literature and, undoubtedly, historical framework of Turkey in the context of the relationship of the secularization and the visibility of Muslim women in public sphere. For the purposes of this study, an understanding of how the status of women in Muslim communities has already been examined and which topics have been disputed is essential. In this section, I highlight crucial issues about Muslim women's position in the Islamic world and in Turkey.

One of the most contentious issues in the sociological and feminist analyses of women's status has been their role in Islam. Western feminists have engaged with the topic and framed women's role in Islam as an emancipation and liberation challenge (Toprak 1981; Kandiyoti 1987). However, in discussions in the early 1990s, Muslim women's "lower social position" began to be regarded as a challenge of patriarchal relations rooted within Islamic practices, rather than a problem of the Islam itself (Kandiyoti,1987). Both Muslim and the scholars began to emphasize the positive aspects of women's lives in Muslim countries, as well as the issues that Muslim women encounter, with a focus on the diversity of women's experiences in various societies. Given that Islamist movements grew in strength after the 1980s, it is possible to infer that the emergence of fundamentalist Islam demonstrated that there is no single Islam, but rather a variety of interpretations, the most prominent of

which is the patriarchal approach, and responsible for ideas and judgments about women's subordination. Women and their status in society are viewed by Islamist ideologies as a moral problem or a moral aspect of religion, rather than a power struggle.

In determining the status of women in the largely Muslim Middle East, the development of nation-states and the modernization of the states in this region have also played a significant role. While Abu-Lughod (1998) identifies the modernization reforms concerned with women's status as "remaking" women, Kandiyoti (1998) argues that these reforms are also "refashioning" gender since they aim to establish heterosexual monogamy and particular forms of masculinity and femininity as the ideal. This view of women implied more public visibility, educational accomplishment, and labour force engagement. But it also contained a new conception of women as mothers and spouses who were expected to raise the future citizens of the nation-state and follow their husbands as "modern-looking" women who are typically intended to be "unveiled." This new understanding of women as contemporary, educated, working moms and wives contributed to the emancipation of women, but only to a limited extent. This position of state religion in Turkey as both an emancipatory and regulating tool for pious Muslim women might be understood as a continuation and component of Turkey's modernization path. In addition, when women began working outside the home, their domestic obligations did not diminish. In contrast, women are now required to labor both outside the home and within it. This "double burden" is multiplied by three when a religious working woman regularly practices her religion.

In the pre-AKP period, critical studies on the religious representation of Muslim women in the public sphere were intense due to the Islamophobic policies of

the Turkish state towards public appearances of Islam. However, due to the authoritarian and misogynist policies of the AKP in the last decade, scholars have more focused on how Muslim women relate to these policies. There are various studies that analyse the urbanized and well-educated Muslim feminists (which is called the third wave of Muslim feminists) that emerged with the increase in women's mobility in the public sphere. Ünal's article (2022) investigates the dissident mindsets, behaviours, and social identities of young Muslim women in Turkey as they confront the epistemic conditions under which gender politics in AKP era. She focuses on Muslim feminist critique of gender discourse of AKP, primarily with a focus on the following concerns, using frame theory in social change research and the Foucauldian perspective to resistance, dissent, and protest. She also illustrates that young Muslim women's dissident mindsets and social identities create a new "political movement," a set of new interpretations and social goals aimed at social transformation, that emerges from resistance to gender grammar of the AKP (Ünal, 2022)

In addition, in the last five years, young women from religious families who decided to take off their headscarves have been worthy of research by some scholars. Through the issue of women's unveiling, Kütük-Küriş (2021) explores religious changes in contemporary Turkey. She asks to what degree and in what ways Muslim women's decisions to expose themselves are a reaction to the ruling AKP's drive toward political despotism and Islamic conservatism. According to her, some Muslim women, particularly young people, have abandoned the government due to its political authoritarianism and loss of Islamic beliefs related with justice. I think it is important to discuss about the new directions that young Muslim women in Turkey take in order to analyze the findings of my research.

### 2.1.1 Veiling: The visibility of Muslim women

Veiling opens the door to broader themes of gender and religion in public life.

Literature on gender and Islam is sometimes limited to discussions of veiling. This section brief the different controversies and interpretations surrounding the veil.

Some scholars see the veil as an instrument of liberation for Muslim women. Abu-Lughod (2002) considers the veil a "modernity" symbol because it promotes Muslim women's access to the public and higher education. Göle (1996) considers women's veiling as a political issue in the 1980s and 1990s Turkish context, when veiled university students were barred from entering university campuses and veiled women were barred from working in public institutions. Göle (ibid.) refers to the early Islamist women's movement as a feminist movement, stating that by entering the public arena, these women reinvented their Muslim identity. Göle (1996) argues that Muslim women who wear the Islamist hijab announce a conscious Muslim identity because they accept the veil out of personal choice and not out of respect for patriarchal authority. Cindioğlu and Zencirci (2008) offer a new layer to this argument by beginning with a critique of the "conscious Muslim women" notion. Cindioğlu and Zencirci (2008), examines women who were prevented from enrolling in universities due to their headscarves, as well as women who sought to pursue professional careers while wearing their headscarves. In the 1980s and 1990s, they were the early Islamist movement's agents. Cindioğlu and Zencirci (2008, p. 804) assert that the headscarf debate in Turkey lost its "counter hegemonic potential" with the rise of the AKP in the 2000s, as the actors of the headscarf debate shifted from women agents of the 1980s and 1990s to the wives of politicians, who lack the potential to liberate and build bridges with other feminists on the path to women's liberation. Examining the veiling disputes in Turkey, Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu

(2008) propose that while Islamist groups consider veiling as a civic right and freedom of religious expression, these same groups denounce the West and the ideas it supports and embodies, such as democracy. Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu's (2008) study also helps to explain why Islamist women refuse to collaborate with secular feminist women. If feminism is to have a future in Turkey, secularist and Islamist feminists must build a bridge identity for Turkish women capable of overcoming artificial differences and reaching consensus on crucial political problems. Consequently, a struggle for women in Turkey may be inclusive and applicable to all women (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008, pp.527). Similarly, Göle (2006) claims that Muslim women in Turkey throughout the 1990s partnered with secular feminists, particularly in the context of the headscarf ban, and this collaboration continues to this day.

Secor's (2002) investigation reveals that the meanings and experiences of veiling/unveiling differ throughout urban area; in one neighborhood, unveiling may be the norm, but in another, veiling may be the norm. Combining the contemporary emphasis on the body with Secor's geographical perspective, I propose examining veiling as a bodily spatial practice. This phrase represents the enormous amount of physical labor, or "bodywork," required for veiling. Additionally, it facilitates the investigation of the spatial experiences of the veiled body and via it. Veiling's physicality consists of the fostering of piety and modesty via daily practices. Through veils, belief is produced, enacted, and embodied. Veiling comprises a complicated interaction with gender, attractiveness, and social position, as well as certain Islamic ideas and acts that are regularly rethought, especially in its new, popular versions (Kılıçbay and Binark 2002; Sandıkçı and Ger, 2001).

In recent years, discussions regarding the wearing of veils in Turkey have primarily advanced in the context of the commodification of veils. The growing interest of religious women in fashion and the increased consumption of the headscarf as a textile and fashion product are the main reasons why many academics no longer discuss the headscarf issue as they did at the end of the 1990s and also because of the ban on wearing a headscarf in public has been lifted entirely.

Sayan-Cengiz's (2018) study on a symbolic significance of veiling contextualizes concerns about veiling fashion and Islamic consumerism within the framework of 2010s Turkey, where the Islamic bourgeoisie has been strengthened and class divisions among veiled women have become more pronounced. Her research focuses on the magazine *Ala*, which is issued by the Islamic, pro-government newspaper *Yeni Şafak*. The findings indicate that the magazine is criticized for highlighting the rise of consumerism among the Islamic bourgeoisie, for blurring the lines between Islamic and secular identities, and for fragmenting an idealized conception of Islamic collectivity by highlighting class divisions among veiled women. She thinks that the criticism of *Ala* in Islamic circles shows that people are worried about the loss of the symbolic meanings of veiling in Turkey, especially in terms of how it shapes the minds of Muslims as a whole. In a similar vein, Kaser's (2021) research focuses on the emerging controversies in secular states with significant Muslim minority groups, or Muslim majorities, between the campaigners of an emphasised Islamic culture and the protectors of a secular public sphere and arising religious media and marketing modes in Turkey. He explores the images of femininities and masculinities in secular and religious advertising as well as in Turkish films, television broadcasts, magazines, and newspapers. In addition, he

investigates new Muslim womanhood, which explores the social environment of university students who saw themselves as the embodiment of Islamic modernity.

## 2.2 Public space, common space, public- common space and the “*halal space*”

### 2.2.1 Public space, common space and public-common space

The term "public space" can mean a lot of different spaces, places, and people. For example, it can mean both Jane Jacobs' "sidewalk ballet" and Mike Davis' "fortress city" (Davis, 1992; Jacobs, 1961; 1992). Jacobs' sidewalk and Davis' fortress city are examples of two types of literature on public space: one that talks about public space as an ideal and one that talks about public space as "dying" (Cianciotto, 2019, pp. 13). Of the first type, many texts describe public space as a democratically open space where random people, friends, and relatives gather to mix under the rules of fairness and kindness (Anderson 2011). Also, there is a lot of literature about how public space has moved away from these ideals and toward surveillance, security, commodification, and social control, which has led many to say that public space is dead (Akkar Ercan 2010; Hou and Knierbein 2017; Madden 2010; Miles 2010;)

There is a certain difference and ambiguity between the scientific and daily use of the concept of public space. It is used in various meanings, such as "the set of non-domestic spaces", "physical places where people gather", "mediatic spaces where political debates take place", "democratic demands subject to the principle of publicity" (Dacheux, 2008, p. 14). By the end of the 17th century, the opposition between "public" and "private" took on a form similar to its mode of use today. While the word "public" means open to everyone's control, the word "private" is used to mean a reserved living area limited to one's family and friends (Sennett, 2010, p. 32).

As Habermas (2003, pp. 57) states, terms like "public opinion," "public space," etc. are used in everyday language with incompatible meanings. The reason for this is related to the different evaluations of these words in different historical phases and their use in some fields such as language, law, politics, and sociology, according to the limitations of these fields. However, the concept includes connotations such as partnership and generality that concern everyone in all its uses (Köroğlu, 2014, pp. 1489–1490). The origin of the concept of the public sphere goes back to Kant. Kant used the concept of "public sphere" in the sense of a normative ideal or principle. Kant argues that the natural abilities of man, the intelligent creature on earth, that will help him to use his mind develop within the species, not in the individual himself, and he attributes the development of a perfectly just civil society, which wants to reach the "sublime design of nature", to his freedom to think publicly with his own kind (Kant, 2003, pp. 45-46).

Habermas analysed the concept of public space from a historical perspective until the middle of the 19th century. Here, the concept of "public sphere" means "an area in our social life where something similar to public opinion can be formed." Access to this area is guaranteed for all citizens. Every speech in which private individuals gather as a public body forms part of the public sphere. This togetherness produces a distinctive civic behaviour pattern. Undoubtedly, this form is not similar to the behaviour of the individual while dealing with the affairs of private sphere, nor the behaviour of the "constitutional members of the state bureaucracy subject to the legal limit." The public body refers to the freedom of citizens to assemble, organize, express, and publish their opinions on public issues (Habermas, 2004, p. 95). Arendt, on the other hand, deals with the concept of public space from a historicist perspective, through the emergence of the distinction between private and public

space, like Habermas. Arendt refers to two meanings of the concept of public space. One of them is that everything that appears in the public space can be seen and heard by everyone (Arendt, 1998, p. 74).

The second is the area where different identities find the opportunity to express themselves by coexisting. According to her, the term "public" represents a common world that belongs to all of us, separate from the one we have privately (Arendt, 1998, p. 77). Arendt speaks of a social sphere apart from the public and private spheres. According to her, even though the distinction between private and public space dates back to Ancient Greece, the manifestation of the social sphere, which is neither private nor public, was possible with the birth of the modern age, and it found its political form in the nation state (Arendt, 1998, p. 47). According to Arendt (1998, p. 53), the distance between the social sphere and the political sphere in the modern world is much less than in Ancient Greece. According to Arendt, human enrichment is possible only by leaving the private sphere that belongs to him and joining the social or public sphere.

Another name that comes to mind when it comes to public space discussions is Richard Sennett. According to Sennett, the public sphere is the space where we can be together with strangers. Sennett approaches the concept of public space from a different perspective than Arendt and Habermas. Sennett defines the public sphere as "commitment to a mass, a "people," or a political practice in general, as opposed to "friendship or family ties," which represent bonds of togetherness and mutual commitment between people who do not have family ties or the other close ties. There is a parallelity between modern times and the decadence of Rome in the context of the balance between public life and private life. Just as in the age of Augustus, public life turned into a formal obligation and became lifeless for the

Romans, so today's public life has turned into an obligation, a situation of letting go, and has entered a process of deterioration (Sennett, 2010, p. 16). Today, which can be defined as the late modern period, people has focused on his own attributes and the process of knitting his individual identity and has tried to protect themself by isolating themself from publicity in their fragile and narcissistic inner world. Now, people turn into a closed box covered with fears and this process has become the primary concern of them (Sennett, 2010, p. 17).

All of this studies gives us a framework for figuring out what public space is. Public space is based on "publicity," which means to be in public or the state of being in public. Publicity is made by laws, social norms, and practices of legitimation that say who "the public" are and how they can use the space (Madanipour 2010, Neal 2009). Property is the foundation of this relationship. In general, public space belongs to the public, but the increasing privatization of public space has made this relationship more complicated (Langegger 2017). Whether the space is public, private, or a mix of the two, there is a prevailing authority that runs it for the public's benefit so that it can be used for certain things (Harvey 2013). Public space should be open to everyone and easy to get to (Anderson 2011, pp. 271, 275; Low and Iveson 2016; Madanipour 2010, pp. 7–13; Zukin 2011, pp. 29, 30). But, whether or not they are democratically open, public spaces are growing in cities all over the world as part of efforts by growth coalitions to make cities more "livable" and attract consumers and new citizens (Sassen 2012).

A lot of the loss has to do with how the rules of public space are changing to keep certain groups and uses out. When access to public spaces is limited, the number of people who can be seen and heard is also limited. So, these places are not public because they don't provide a place for meaningful communication and

meeting between people from different parts of society (Madden 2010, pp. 189–91). This puts the focus on the loss of all people having a voice. It doesn't always have to do with the loss of specific communities and how they used and thought about the spaces that are going away. This kind of intervention goes against the arguments that were first made by Fraser in 1990, then by Hubbard in 2001, Iveson in 2003, Watson in 2004, and Warner in 2005. Instead of the general public and spaces of radical inclusion, this literature focuses on counterpublics and spaces of critical exclusion, which are not "public" because they are not open to everyone (Fraser 1990; Warner, 2005; Watson, 2004).

Counterpublics' spaces, which are usually in public places, mix with the spaces of the bourgeois public sphere. So, the changes in public space that Davis, Sorkin, and others explain not only make it harder for everyone to access and be included, but they also make it harder for people to make alternative spaces in public space. But the problem is that if these counterpublics are the ones being pushed out by the ongoing transformation of public space, it's hard to believe what they say about their spaces when they use the term "public space." The way counterpublics use public space often makes it harder for "everyone" to socially and/or physically enter a public space. So, their presence often goes against the idea of public space, which is based on the rights and power of the general public and the idea of a democratic openness for everyone. Because of this, the word "all," which is central to "public space," and the term "public space" itself cannot be used to clearly explain everyone's experiences in public spaces. This is because there are a lot of different kinds of social life in public spaces that don't concern the general public but rather the people who use them. Therefore, the universal has become a fallible category because it leaves out some groups whose identities are different. So, new language

and ideas are needed to talk about and understand these changes in public space as they affect people who live in publicly accessible spaces but are not part of the "general public." Cianciotto (2019) suggests adding the idea of "common space" to the study of publicly accessible spaces to deal with this problem. Common space puts the focus on the specifics, separating what makes a space common from what makes a space public (inclusive and accessible). It is close to the ideas of counterpublics and critically exclusive spaces, but it is different from them. This is because being inclusive or exclusive is just one part of common spaces, which are not necessarily counterhegemonic just because they are common. In short, there may be a link between being public and being a common space, but public space and common space aren't the same thing. Both in terms of analysis and ideas, they are different. But public space is often seen as less important than or already covered by the public/private divide (Zukin, 2011, pp. 29–30).

Cianciotto (2019) also presents that the common spaces does not have to be inherently democratic or antagonistic to capitalism. Commons can also be dangerously exclusive, like gated communities, which keep people apart to protect the interests of the people who live inside the gates (Harvey, 2013, pp. 71; Kohn, 2004, pp.9–11). But there are also "safe spaces" for populations that are emancipatory in the way they are closed off (Williams, 2018) Whether or not an open or closed common space is freeing or oppressive depends on the situation. Commoning happens in relation to the public, private, and common spaces around it. In both gated communities and safe spaces, it could be said that the outside world poses a threat to the common space and the people who use it. This is why the space is sometimes closed off. But the source of the threat and who or what the closedness serves are clearly different. One strengthens power, while the other questions it. To

understand this difference, you need a relational lens that is aware of how groups and their spaces interact with each other. I think public spaces should be thought of as "public-common spaces," or spaces that are both public and common. So, the musical group of the pious Muslim women, whose spaces don't fit neatly into public space, private space, or a mix of the two. Hence, in this thesis, I argue that the term "public-common space" fits the space that this musical group becomes visible in.

### 2.2.2. Discussions on halal spaces

As is common knowledge, the Arabic word "halal" means "permissible" in terms of Islamic law and protocol. In the course of my research, I visited innumerable "halal places," or places where halal life is practiced, either in person or through narrations and memories (Benussi, 2020). When we discuss halalness and space, we immediately consider eating establishments, retail spaces, supermarkets, and so forth. Benussi does not advocate doing away entirely with an emphasis on actual urban environments and the "punctual" objects found there. Instead, he suggests broadening the discussion by focusing on a wider lifeworld animated by pious practices that encompass and intertwine worshipping, learning, ethical consumption, body care, socializing, studying, having fun, working, using money, and in general "being alive" (Ingold, 2011) as pietists (Benussi, 2020). All of these activities take place in actual living spaces and transform them into actual locations. Places of piety, such as mosques, shrines, pilgrimage sites, and so on, have often been at the center of discussions of Islamic spaces (Fatima, 2016; Di Puppò and J. Schmo, 2020). This is because such landscape features are concrete and have clear, "objective" functions, which makes them easy for social scientists to study.

A sole focus on established places of worship would contradict the secularist belief that religious life can be "contained" in random places (Asad, 2002), and it could also make us miss out on much larger lifeworlds and more highly subjective rich experiences and interactions with space. In the last 20 years, there have been a lot of studies about self-improvement and striving in Islam (Anjoum, 2007; Mahmood, 2012; Fadil and Fernando, 2015). Some of the most important studies in this tradition (Hirschkind, 2006) have looked at issues of making space, paving the way for contributions. Yet, these works show what seems to be a paradox: Islam's ethical tradition is based on revealed texts that claim to be universally true, but universal truths don't easily "let themselves be territorialized" (Rancière, 1994, p. 91). So, Islamic ethics is "portable" (Metcalf, 1996, p. 6), and it may be thought that it goes beyond or even defies spatialization/localization.

Headscarves (Bowen, 2007) make it possible for religious women to move safely in places where nonreligious norms rule or where strangers' lines of sight are dangerous. The practice of listening to sermons on small players (Hirschkind, 2006) helps religious Muslims get around in the secular city, which is often not a friendly place. From a certain point of view, ethical practices can be seen as putting up a portable "citadel" around pious bodies, to borrow a metaphor from Caroline Humphrey (1996, 204), which separates them from backgrounds that aren't necessarily religious. From a different point of view, though, the debates over veiling and the disruptive impacts of Islamic sounds (like reciting the Quran, preaching, or calling people to prayer) in public places show that religious performances have effects beyond the bodies and selves of religious people. In the last few years, academics have become more interested in halal issues (Bergeaud-Blackler, Fischer, and Lever 2015; Christians and Yakin, 2021).

In this thesis, I use the term “halalscape” (Ulu Sametoğlu, 2015), in order to bring space more to the forefront of discussions about halal spaces by looking at how these pious women create Islamic ethically charged entertainment space that can affect the people who experience them while I explore the gathering settings and forms of the musical group. In summary, I argue that it will not be enough to use the concepts of public space, counter-public space, or private space while analyzing this music group consisting of Muslim religious women. Based on the discussions above, considering the exclusionary features of the space created by these women, I will define this space in this thesis, which can also be defined in a different context as halal space and as public-common space.

CHAPTER 3  
CREATING NEW SPACES CONSIDERING THE BORDERS OF THE  
RELIGION

Concert group is an independent musical group that performs for women. They have played in cafes, music halls, congress centres, and other cultural centres since 2018. The group consists of a total of 25 women ranging in age from 20 to 29. All members of the group are veiled. Their audience consists of women of different ages from various regions of Turkey. While preparing for concerts, they usually practice in cultural centres located in some of Istanbul's more conservative districts. If these cultural centres are unavailable, the group also rehearse in the homes of some members. Once a year, they travel to the suburbs of Istanbul and rent a luxurious villa with a swimming pool to rehearse their songs. In general, the objective of concert groups is to engage and interact with their audiences during performances, and they announce the dates of their performances through social media.

The main group comprises of ten vocalists, two women on piano, two women on violin, one woman on zither, two women on drums, one of them is the trap drummer, and one soloist who also plays guitar. One of the pianists also creates the outfits that the members wear during concerts. In addition to taking photographs of the group during performances, the photographer is also responsible for videotaping the concert. Occasionally, the core group may also invite guest musicians to play during a planned improvisation night; however, these guests are often from the same friendship networks and are also predominantly veiled. The guest musicians have included clarinetists, violists, flutists, etc. The membership of the core group consists primarily of university students, with a few people who have only completed

high school and are actively employed. One thing they all have in common is musical experience that began in either high school or university. The members of the group also share the same religious beliefs and social status overall. They all come from middle-class families who support education of young women.

### 3.1 The musical group's gathering settings and forms

The gathering settings and forms of the musical group is one of the focal points of this thesis. The locations where they meet play a crucial role in this case study because the cafes, cultural centres where the events take place, and the neighbourhoods where these places are located provide significant data for the group's networks in the sense that they choose or prefer those locations by using their networks.

When deciding where to perform, the group typically chooses cafes and cultural centres in historically more conservative and predominantly pious neighbourhoods. The group's concerts are held in Istanbul's more conservative neighbourhoods, such as Üsküdar, Fatih. Since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, conservative people have traditionally resided in these districts. They may also choose neighbourhoods developed after the AKP came to power, such as Başakşehir (Özet, 2019).

A part of this section is Pierre Bourdieu's study of cultural capital as an analytical category that transcends the pure economics of society to analyse structures of power that account for social mobility. Dorroll (2015, pp.21) argues that through urban landscapes, the arts, and architecture, the AKP is putting their ideological, Neo-Ottoman characteristics onto the built environment of Turkey, so causing a transformation in cultural capital. In this chapter, I will also discuss how

these pious Muslim women I introduced above, use the environments built through the AKP municipalities to enhance their cultural sphere. I shall describe these dynamics using the "response for spatial politics" (Dorroll, 2015, p.20). In addition, the basis of this argument is the main framework provided by Bourdieu, so that art and culture have values and hierarchical structures, which implies that at different times, certain types of art and culture are more influential for one segment of society than another.

Turkey nominated Istanbul as a candidate for European Capital of Culture in 2006, and the designation was granted in 2007 so that Istanbul may prepare for the 2010's title. This designation provided the AKP with the chance to rebrand Istanbul in line with Erdoğan's Neo-Ottomanism (Ergin and Karakaya, 2017). to appeal to an international audience. Throughout the whole process, Istanbul was transformed into a sort of open-air museum, and the scheduling of the events exposed the elements of Istanbul's cultural heritage that were officially sanctioned by the AKP. The official relocation of Turkish cultural heritage to Istanbul is of great significance in light of the attempt in the early Republican period to change the emphasis of cultural memory from the cosmopolitan Ottoman capital to the Anatolian hinterlands, represented by the addressing Ankara as the new capital of the Turkish Republic. However, since the early 1990s, Istanbul as the centre of Ottoman culture has come to play a pivotal role in Neo-Ottoman ideology, especially in the spatial and cultural politics of the AKP (Dorroll,2015, pp. 23).

The shift from Kemalist nationalism to AKP interpretations of Turkish national identity is the most intriguing aspect of the case. We must also keep in mind that tradition is not static; it evolves with shifts in political power, which are certainly not static (Dorroll,2015, pp. 24). How the heritage of İstanbul is interpreted and

contextualized is subject to the aims and ideologies of existing power regimes. Construction projects that employ few or no art historians or archaeologists are permitted to demolish and restore historically significant locations in accordance with their own Ottoman imaginaries. These freshly developed suburbs are owned and occupied by AKP politicians and members of the Islamic bourgeoisie, thereby enhancing their rights to the city. Heritage is also a commodity, something produced for outside consumption to financially enrich the elites' vision. The construction of heritage and the creation of political elites are consistent with the place-making and remaking (pp. 25). With these objectives, the AKP started a significant restructuring process in Istanbul and implemented a long-term plan to transform the city's appearance. The AKP's claim to make Istanbul a "World City" (traces its history to the Welfare Party era) (Öktem, 2006, pp. 53) parallel with the harmonization of the European Union. Preserving the historical urban fabric of the city, creating international cultural spaces, enhancing cultural and social activities, building or renovating international conferences, congresses, art and cultural centres, museums and archive centres are some of the policies prepared for these objectives, particularly in the context of recreating a cultural sphere.

The locations of the concerts are determined according to their size accessibility, and centrality. The musical group chooses to perform in facilities that can accommodate a big audience (such as theatres or conference halls), are easily accessible by public transit, and are centrally located within the city. In addition, it is easier and safer for women to attend the event, this method facilitates their audience. I argue that the clues given by these venue choices are that the main determining factor is that this music group prefers giant cultural centres with Neo-Ottoman patterns, theatre halls, restored historical baths and museums located in conservative

districts governed by AKP municipalities such as Üsküdar and Fatih. These pious young women, who benefit as much as possible from the cultural spaces that the AKP has reconstructed to preserve Istanbul's cultural heritage, use their networks from these municipalities which provided by their families and religious close circles.

However, the AKP also took a step backwards at the same time, applying social engineering to cover its insecurity in the cultural field. As conservative intellectuals put it, on the one hand current production of culture by state institutions does not meet the expectations of conservatives, on the other hand, what constitutes conservative aesthetics and conservative art is uncertain. To fill such a gap, the AKP prefers to take control by rejecting the existing contemporary and modernist modes of cultural production. Instead, it wants to “create yet another elitism, based this time on nostalgic and idealized perception of Ottoman and Islamist past and its cultural artistic achievements” (Aksoy and Şeyben 2014: 2010). Going back to the concept of conversion, converting a building that already exists is an attempt to change the form, function, and character of that space, and it gets more sophisticated when one converts a venue that was built especially for culture or with a cultural/industrial background.

Thanks to my fieldwork, I had the opportunity to visit numerous cultural centres built by AKP municipalities. These new cultural centres (which remain unused most of the year) created by the AKP with large financial resources in order to establish its dominance in the cultural field often host the AKP's own meetings and symposiums now. It is expected by the government that the content of cultural activities that can fill these huge spaces should be created by conservative pious youth. Although this music group's use of these places can be explained by

pragmatic reasons such as providing concert places for free or accessing to the audience more easily, I also argue that these cultural and spatial policies of the AKP on the city are corresponded by these pious young women.

In terms of understanding the group's dynamics and interaction with the audience, the forms of gatherings are worth analysing as well as the settings where the music group performs. It is essential to comprehend the information gathering forms. For understanding the strategies used to reach their audiences, The concert group performance appears in two forms: concerts and improvisation nights. These two forms are different from each other in terms of the size of the event organization, interaction with the audience, and distance between the group and the audience. Concerts are performed less frequently throughout the year and require a greater organization, budget, rehearsal, and location, whereas improvisation nights are done more frequently in smaller settings, such as cafes, where the group interacts with the audience more.

A concert typically lasts approximately two hours and begins at evenings. Audiences also enjoy interacting with the concert group and each other; they typically arrive 30 minutes early to socialize with other audiences and do not leave the place until 30 minutes after the performance has ended so that they can interact with the group members and talk about the performance. In terms of the payment, participants have the option of purchasing tickets online or upon arrival at the venue. The women who handle in-person payments are not part of the performing ensemble, but they are women. Their responsibilities include selling tickets and collecting payment at the venue's entrance. The concert group based the price of each ticket on what a university student could afford, which is approximately three dollars.

The average age of the audience is usually between 18 and 50 years old, and it is mostly head-covered. Audience members who do not wear headscarves are in the minority. Some of the audiences are mothers, while some are single, university students, and friends of the concert group members who are part of the inner circle. The men who are present to assist with sound and lighting, as well as food and beverage services, as they normally work for that place, are the sole exception to the woman-only group and audience. When it comes to on-stage presence, the choir usually stands on two sides of the core group, while the core group sets up to play in front on the platform. The reason why men and women do not come together during the performance is due to the fact that the music group mostly thinks that the woman voice is *haram*<sup>2</sup> thus they believe this voice should not be heard by men.

The soloist and the first violinist are the two members of the group that tend to interact with the audience the most during performances. They may solicit applause from the crowd, instruct them to sing along, or explain the meaning of songs and why the group believes they are important to perform. During the show, the other members of the ensemble interact with one another to maintain a high level of motivation. In order to please their audience as the event draws to a conclusion, the group often plays popular tunes. The audience becomes more interested at this stage, even joining in on the songs by stomping their feet and dancing or recording some of the instrumentals of the performance on their phones—but never singing, as

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<sup>2</sup> An Arabic word that means unlawful or forbidden. In the context of Islamic law, Muslims are prohibited from investing in, acquiring, or otherwise engaging in transactions involving prohibited products and activities, such as those involving pork, alcohol, gambling, and pornography. [https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-503-0010?transitionType=Default&contextData=\(sc.Default\)&firstPage=true](https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/2-503-0010?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true)

this is forbidden under Islamic law. The vocalist usually warns the audience against doing so.

The claim that the woman voice is haram is a matter of debate. There is no verse in the Qur'an directly stating that woman voice is haram. On the basis of the claim that women's voices are haram there are various reasons such as there are some warnings about women's reading of the Qur'an, women's voices cause a feeling of lust in the eyes of men, the tradition is forbidden, there is a verse about women's protection of their ornaments, the woman voice is more elegant and impressive than the male voice. Leyla, who believes that a woman's voice is haram, states: "I don't even find it permissible for a woman to read the Qur'an in mixed-gender places. That's why I don't want men to hear my voice when I'm singing."

Unlike Leyla, Pinar, who is not sure whether a woman voice is haram or not, uses the following expressions:

"...God created the sound. If the woman's voice were haram, he would have given her another occasion to speak. After I thought that a woman voice might not be haram, a lot has changed in my life, I said, 'I can sing!' But when you ask a man whether a woman's voice is haram in Islam, his answer will be "It is haram". Because he doesn't know it, because he hasn't researched it. It is not possible for something created by Allah to be completely haram. I will give a very simple example; We have a fruit called grapes. God says, 'You can make many things from this grape. For example, you can make grape sorbet or eat the grape itself. But when you make it as wine, it becomes haram...' (Pinar)

In addition to the above statements, Pinar reminds us of the borders drawn by Islam and says that she pays attention to these limits:

“...But it is absurd that the woman voice can be completely forbidden. Because music is also a created thing. Of course, this also has a limit. The forbidden part there, while singing, is there *shirk*<sup>3</sup> in it, is there sexuality in it? Because, interestingly, when there is sexuality, you have a different effect on the other person. Some things that won't change your position. Or things that disrupt the social order and that contain discrimination should not be in the lyrics. So, you have to think carefully. But for example, it could be a folk song or a song about nature. If I am able to choose these myself, I do not have a problem anymore...” (Pinar)

Aware of the religious sensitivities of the other group members and the audience, Pinar warns the audience before each concert that her own voice should not be recorded, despite her scepticism to the claim that the woman voice is haram.

One of the striking points of this study redrawing of the borders drawn by religion through verses, hadiths and especially traditions, with what modern life brings. According to Asad, tradition is neither a fixed nor unchanging category, nor is it in opposition to the modern. Rather, it is reproduced by the texts, and rituals of its believers (Asad, 1986, pp. 12). The Islamic discursive tradition can be regarded as a historically changing set of discourses, embodied in the practices and institutions of Islamic communities, and hence profoundly entwined with the material lives of those inhabiting them (Hirschkind, 1996, pp. 467).

“The priority that the music group gives to the interaction with the audience is one of the most notable findings of this study. After a stunning stage performance,

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<sup>3</sup> In Islam, idolatry, polytheism, and the association of God with other deities.

the group members desire to develop a more honest and direct relationship with the audience. After the concert, audience have the opportunity to interact with group members, congratulate them on their performance, and take pictures with the group. The group members also find important to receive feedback after every performance. In this way, they revise the repertoire considering the taste of the audience. Therefore, the musical group emphasizes the necessity of encouraging the audience to write down their emotions on a post-it notes, which they handout just after performance. The post-it notes are then attached to a special board. In general, audiences participate in this activity, and the response the groups receive is generally positive, with some audience members even stating that the event was inspirational. The audience sometimes sends in song suggestions for future concerts. Before the audience departs, the performance groups always advise them to keep a look out for future concert events on internet platforms. Following the concert, some attendees are picked up by family or take public transportation home, while others prefer to go out for tea or coffee together.

Improvisation nights are another common gathering form of the concert group. There is no pre-determined playlist, as the name suggest. All decisions are made during the concert depending on what the improv night players decide to play, as well as some suggestions from the core group members. These improv nights are unique in that anyone in the audience can participate by singing or playing an instrument with the core group members. Because the song selection is not predetermined, the participants should decide which songs will be played in which order. As a result, the core group does not have to interact with the audience as much and does not have to consider their reaction because the selection is based on what they believe the audience wants to hear. This means that someone who desires to

participate in the improvisation night can sing a song and be joined by others who play instruments. It is worth noting that the chosen songs have always been performed in Turkish. Aside from these distinctions, due to the nature of the event, there are fewer group members available. Another notable difference is that the actual performance is far more intense than usual concert nights because individuals bring their own instruments or sing along to others performing.

Before starting their improv performance, the individual introduces herself and describes how she discovered the concert group as well as her general involvement with music. These improv nights typically take place in more intimate settings than standard concert group performances, such as rooftops or gardens. Everyone gathers in a circle, and the concert group tells everyone why they are there and how important it is to focus on generating music, not necessarily on how well it sounds. These performances are typically available to the public, but only women are permitted to join the circle. Some people attend the event because they saw the announcement on social media, while others who were already in the neighbourhood are welcome to listen. Women who are in the area and hear the concert have the opportunity to join the circle and get additional information about the concert group. As with other performances, group photographs are taken at the end of the evening.

Even though, the improvisation nights give more opportunity to interaction with the audience than the concerts, these forms of gatherings both create a huge space for especially young women audience in order to witness how the group members interact with the music and to rethink on the boundaries that both societies and they have set through their Muslim women identities. Pinar, explains the effect of Muslim women, who cannot make music actually they wish due to the boundaries drawn by religion, in founding this group:

“I do it myself, I see that other women cannot. The need for self-actualization is a very important thing. You do it, there are women who cannot, and you respect them too. I thought a lot about what I could do for them. I wanted to do something for women who don't want to have fun in mixed-gender environments. I have two guitars. I named both of my instruments: Rosa and Rıza. I decided to organize an event called *henna night*<sup>4</sup> for Rosa and Rıza. But then this idea was very funny to me, and I gave up because I think *henna night* is ridiculous...” (Pınar)

The soloist emphasized that her secular peers don't understand the need of space for Muslim women to express themselves through music as follows:

“...But I still had an event series idea in mind. I shared this with my other friends, but they didn't like the idea because they were able to express themselves easily on stage already. There was a need for a space that Muslim women like me would need... (Pınar)

Most interviewees agreed with the statement that Muslim women in Turkey desire to have a setting of gathering created by themselves. The slogan of the group is “If we have foods during the *gold day*<sup>5</sup>, we also have music in the evening!”. This slogan raises the question of how getting together to make music differentiate from a *gold day*, a *henna night* or a *sohbet*<sup>6</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> Kına Gecesi, Henna Night is one of the traditional wedding customs in Turkey. It's a women's party before the wedding. The bride's friends and family members gather to eat, dance, and sing before the bride leaves her mother's home crying. It is called “henna night” because they put henna on their hands.

<sup>5</sup> Gold day is a social gathering that is organized between women in Turkey. Women from all ages get together with their friends or neighbours and collect gold coins during the day. In every event, a participant becomes the host and prepares meals for her guests.

<sup>6</sup> Sohbet is a cultural Islamic ritual where women-only gathering in a house of one of the participants to have discussions on certain religious topic. I emphasise that Islamic ritual practise is conceptualised under two categories: "Islamic worship practises" such as daily prayers and Quran recitation, and

### 3.2 The motivations of gathering: Halalscape (Halal circle)

Members of the group state that performing "performing arts" is different from performing an art in which they are not visible, and that this distinction makes it challenging for them to exist in these artistic fields. Additionally, people express satisfaction with this visibility. Some of the participants who indicated that they enjoy being seen and even feel beautiful on stage also stated that they felt more "woman" on stage. The unique relationship that a group member develops between the experience of singing on stage and pleasure also emerges. In response to the vast majority of prejudices aimed against them, women in this country in general argue that there is no contradiction between these feelings and their faith, and that they find no problem between expressing themselves and being visible as Muslim women. But according to Islamic law, expressing passion as pious Muslim women in front of a mixed-gender audience is *haram*. The needs for self-expression of these women and the Islamic law creates kind of doubt and confusion in the group members. However, despite all these doubts, these women decided to create a space to make music for only women in order not to push the borders drawn by religion and tradition and to protect their inner peace. The interviewee tells her story and expresses her motivation to get involved with the group as follows:

“I was unaware at the time that veiled women were also present in these mixed-gender spaces and involved in the arts. Then, I decided I wanted to play music, while being somewhat shy and anxious. Then, one of my friends brought up this music

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"culturally Islamic rituals" such as *sohbet*. I use the second term from Hart (2013), who divides Turkish rituals into two categories: cultural rituals, such as wedding ceremonies, unrelated to the religion, and culturally Islamic rituals, such as *mevlit* and *ziyaret*.

group's event link. She said, "Hey, there's such a group. Let's go to their concert!"  
(Havin)

Two of the group's members, Hatice and Sila, admitted that when they play for a mixed-gender audience at their university's jazz club, they don't always feel as comfortable as they would if they were performing for a women-only audience. In order to feel more at comfortable performing and expressing themselves artistically, they decided to form a women-only group. In the beginning, they posted a call for potential members on Instagram. Fortunately, their Instagram followers responded positively, and the group was able to immediately form. Members of the group believe that Muslim women do not have enough space for self-expression, especially in the performing arts, thus the platform they created is a great inspiration for other young, pious Muslim women.

"Many reactions came from the audience. They liked having such an atmosphere, being a part of such a thing, seeing conservative women coming together and playing, sharing this with women only. All these made a model for many conservative young women. I believe this is inspiring for them." (Tuğçe)

Hatice states that the starting point of the group was the desire to create a space that Muslim women need. She also believes that these spaces provide an opportunity to empower these women:

"...What we learnt from there is that these environments are necessary. When there are places like this, women feel more self-confident and stronger when they appear in mixed-gender environments thanks to the motivation and power they acquired there. That's why it seemed like an interim work like this was necessary. It meant the same for me too. It is exactly why I first contacted Akşam in the first place but also

parted ways with them. I mean what I thought was that Akşam was going to have women-only concerts but would also perform for a mixed audience.” (Hatice)

Despite the fact that the motivations for joining the group vary among group members, one of the most striking findings is that Muslim women avoiding entertainment in mixed-gender spaces:

“I consistently made music in high school and college, and people listened. I believe that the woman voice should not be heard too often. Women's voices should not be highlighted. However, I had no difficulty with this while playing the instrument. Both at university and high school, I did not feel completely comfortable walking or moving in mixed-gender environments. But when women watch when I perform, I do everything much more comfortably. Also, I don't know if it's written in the Qur'an, but I do know that women voices are haram. Of course, there is no such thing in the Qur'an that women should not make the sound of instruments, but at least one should not shake their hands, arms, or feet too much. Luckily, I'm not very visible behind the drums, so I'm somewhat comfortable.” (Ayla)

In women-only space, these women can make gestures that are not permitted in mixed-gender settings and sing lyrics about sexual desires and love without religious limitation:

“My primary motivation was to do something for conservative, religious women. On the other hand, there is something that limits me, for example. It's fine for me to study opera in a conservatory or make music in a mixed-gender environment, but I'm a woman who wears a headscarf. I'd like to form a strong bond with the headscarf. Some boundaries must be respected. There are songs, for example, that I sing as if flirting with the audience; some Turkish classical music works are like this. At the

time, I was truly in love with the audience. I might not prefer to make this a hybrid environment.” (Pınar)

One of the most striking points of the interviews I had with the group members was the frequent repetition of a particular concept, Tuğçe introduces to me the *halal circle*<sup>7</sup> term : “...I guess all of us approach to Akşam from a different perspective. The only reason I joined Akşam was music. Not making music with only women nor gathering with women or playing within *halal circle*.” For them, the notion has become a legitimate motif. This phrase, invented by Said Nursi, is defined as follows in Risale-i Nur: "The legal field is broad enough to satisfy our unlawful desires. There is no need to engage in illegal behaviour" <sup>8</sup> (Nursi, 2003, pp. 27). According to Nursi, the permissible in Islam outnumbers the forbidden. It is not required for Muslims to leave the borders of this circle and do what is banned in Islam when they can enjoy them in an enormous amount with halal activities. The halal circle is translated as "the lawful field" in his sentence, but I borrow the term "halalscapes" from Ulu Sametoğlu to highlight terms spatiality and will use it to refer to the new and alternative settings created and reshaped by the interviewees in order to have fun within in the permissible boundaries of Islam, as well as their moral imperatives and conceptions of what is ethical or not (2015, pp. 129).

Said Nursi's definition of "lawful field" (halal circle) includes the idea of entertainment within the Hizmet Movement. The natural desire for distraction is highlighted in an article published in a newspaper titled "Have Fun in a Halal

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<sup>7</sup> In Turkish: Helal Dairesi.

<sup>8</sup> In Turkish: Helal Dairesi geniştir, keyfe kafi gelir, Harama girmeye hiç lüzum yoktur.

Manner," yet the emphasis is always on the utility of leisure for personal development. Time is vital for a Muslim to reach Paradise, therefore "idle" types of leisure would be a waste of time. The limitations of the "lawful field" in Islam are defined as "entertainment without idolatry (shirk), without criticizing fate, and without distorting the ego (nefs) to carnal wants" (Köse 2015). Halalscapes, on the other hand, are discussed among women as an adjustment strategy in the case of conflict between Islamic and worldly habits, which is becoming increasingly difficult for a Muslim in modern "hedonist" undertakings, and with their young soul (zefs), which desires to "taste" everything (Sametoğlu,2015, pp. 136). New questions, interpenetrations, struggles, strategies, and alternate paths emerge from their interactions in secular public and private places. As a result, the establishment of halalscapes appears to be a concrete solution to Muslim women's dilemmas such as the problem of whether to shake hands with men, and the consumption of halal in every aspect of everyday life, including food, drink, clothing, films, music, sports, entertainment etc. Therefore, the term halalscape can be used to describe the process of creating a space where members of this group can express themselves on stage and satisfy the audience's entertainment needs without crossing religious boundaries. The events held in a halalscape can be considered an opportunity for both the group members and the audience. However, the former guitarist, Hatice, totally disagrees with this understanding. Interviewee tells her story of leaving the group as follows: "I had always been alone before, so it was quite a powerful feeling, the feeling that I was together on stage with many women who looked like me. It was also really empowering for them too, it was educating, the first concerts etc. However, in time even though group members all had different tendencies, for instance Zeynep is a woman soloist who is closer to feminism. However, the environment that allowed

conservative discourse, it was tolerating me with things like “that’s what they believe, let them be”. This was beyond my scope of toleration, you know. Once I experienced something and I just said I won’t attend the music group again. At an event in Tarlabası a woman came by me and said that she knew me, that I was playing the guitar, so she wanted to meet me. We met and she asked if I was still playing. I said I was playing at a café in Üsküdar every week. She then said ‘You had this thing within the halal circle, what was it called?’ I said, ‘Do you mean our music group?’ ‘Oh yes they played for women-only’. I was shocked. What I did to a mixed-gender audience where there are men is not halal and the other one is. It hit me really hard. The group, which is appreciated for being halal and that there is still an opposite somewhere.” (Hatice)

Hatice, who identifies herself as a Muslim feminist activist, was the group's ex-guitarist in the process of forming the group. She supported the soloist's idea of organizing a series of events that would empower Muslim women in the music and performing arts. After that, she decided to leave the group when Hatice was bothered by the halalscape concepts of the other group members and the audience. In addition, during my interviews with other group members, I discovered that the political connotations Hatice linked to the music group made these women uncomfortable. Although the members of the group had created a space of solidarity with Muslim women, they regarded it as dangerous to add a political context. After the interviews the ex-guitarist gave to the left-wing media about the group, Pınar totally parted with the group.

### 3.3 Conclusion

As a result, the group members' motivations for joining the group varied. Aside from the members of the group who see this as a way of self-expression and the desire to inspire women who have yet to express themselves, Some women desire to bring the benefits of modern living into their lives while following the religious guidelines, so they try to do this within a halal framework. Thus, in this chapter, the term halalscape used for describing the process of creating a space where members of this group can express themselves on stage and satisfy the audience's entertainment needs without crossing religious boundaries. The events of the group in a halalscape considered here as an opportunity for both the group members and the audience. Although the perspective that music making among women is a field of political struggle was important in the formation of the group at the beginning, it is no longer one of the arguments used by them, particularly because of how the group is represented in the conservative community and the group's concerns about not being an appropriate Muslim.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE CREATION OF THE REPERTOIRE: CONSIDERING THE TASTE OF THE AUDIENCE AND THE DESIRE TO CREATE THE "NEW" CULTURAL CAPITAL IN AKP ERA

This chapter examines how this music group of pious Muslim women created a cultural product through concerts, activities, and digital settings, with images mutually set by communication during the production and reception processes in the context of cultural policies in contemporary Turkey. During this examination, I also pay close attention to the audience, as they reveal how they relate to the music and its political and cultural background, as well as actively participate in the musical process.

This is achieved through peer-to-peer communication with audience before and after the performance, repertoire, social media posts and comments, and costume preferences. The audience's reactions and participation styles during concerts and improvisation nights, face-to-face contacts between the group and the listeners, this "write your emotions about the concert on post-its" event following each concert, and social media comments and direct messages in response to the performance create a dynamic communication between the group and its audiences. Therefore, the repertoire and image of the group are determined not only by group members, but also by communicating with the audience via social media and face-to-face feedback. Despite the fact that the repertoire is predetermined, the reactions after the concert constantly alter the repertoire. When I inquired about the contents of the songs or how and why they were selected, I got answers about the songs were chosen based on the beauty of their sound, their ability to energize and excite the audience, and

their ability to satisfy the audience's desire to experience various emotions such as yearning, sorrow, joy, etc. The aforementioned responses settle the study's central question: Why do they choose songs with political connotations, such as elegies about the Armenian massacre, Red Army's revolution songs, or a love song sung by an Egyptian Muslim woman, as opposed to songs that lead to other emotions, and how do these choices affect the audience's interaction with them? Consequently, this wide variety of songs, ranging from a product of a leftist cultural capital with a long history, such as *Ciao Bella*, to Ottoman court music of the late 19th century, Turkish pop songs, and British alternative rock songs, is one of the chapter's primary focal points.

Patterns are common between the East-West synthesis and modernization conception during Turkey's nation-state formation and the AKP's early cultural politics, which came to power in 2002. Even if the party did not build its own cultural agenda, the EU adaption process continued, and the private sector was encouraged to invest in culture and the arts, the AKP began producing culturally supporting projects. AKP developed a seasonal agenda that included support for tax breaks, advertising and marketing, establishing images, and establishing international relations, just like the contemporary art museums constructed by Turkey's biggest companies and other global examples. This process, which resembles an intervention of polarizing identity politics to secular lifestyle that began in 2011 and peaked in 2013 with the Gezi Resistance, brought the AKP's culture policies to a fundamental turning point. Gezi Resistance, which was largely a cultural movement, constrained AKP's political maneuverability and compelled the party to shift to cultural space, the only way to preserve contentious identity politics. After this breakup, an attempt was made to subjugate cultural space to political authority in order to maintain the

power struggle. In an effort to develop a new culture policy following the Gezi Resistance, with the slogan "cultural power," the AKP has created an alternative cultural resource consisting of culture, arts, and humour magazines and television series and programmes that had their own channels and made moves to monopolize other cultural segments outside of its control in the media sector. While the AKP was attempting to establish its own cultural resources, it began controlling and repressing the cultural space of social groups that it considered uncontrollable. Negative and discriminating discourses were expressed by state agencies on the contents of culture and art products. In 2012, the prime minister addressed people who opposed the privatization of state theatres.

“I am asking: Who the hell are you? Are the theatres in this country under your monopoly? Is the art in this country under your monopoly? Are you the only ones who have the credential to speak a word about the art? Those days have passed. The days when you humiliate and scold these people shaking your finger at them have long passed.”

These statements were the signals of an attempt to create their own cultural resources. And this was a call for the actors whom they needed to create his own “cultural power.” he Secretary General of the Presidency of that time defended the necessity for a political understanding in power for 10 years to create its own cultural line saying these words: "Just as we have a unique understanding of democracy as conservatives, we are also responsible for creating a unique conservative aesthetics and art norms and structures." This could be interpreted as an initiative to transform a political vision into a political agenda. In response to the state's related request, İskender Pala, a religiously conservative novelist, penned a "conservative art manifesto."

There are traces of the manifesto's articles in the cultural practices of the actors in our investigation. For instance, the article stating that "Conservative arts does not reject West, accepts its methodology and products but keeps its spirit at distance" corresponds with the group member Nurgül's views regarding the content of their music:

‘What am I playing? Actually, I don’t know. This may be our style as “the Group.” I tried so hard to find it, tried to figure out which channel I belong to. Is it Eastern or Western music? Do we love rock or classical music? I guess what we have not yet decided as a group is the style. We all think that good music is good music. We don’t look for whether it is Eastern or Western. One of the things we like to do is to put some Eastern improvisations into something Western like piano. I enjoy this kind of things so much. For example, until Nuray (qanun player) became a part of the group, I had thought that one of the styles I could hardly bear was Turkish classical music.’  
(Nurgül)

The reinterpretation of the cultural product is an additional crucial aspect highlighted by this observation. One layer of this redefinition is the reinterpretation of Eastern and Western music through instruments. The second layer is that they interpret particular songs carrying the cultural and political burdens of certain historical periods and bring them into the present. This issue appears in the manifest as follows: "The conservative art produces work using all the opportunities and techniques, knowledge and instruments of the civilization and modern age but is inspired by its own history while making the spirit of that work." In this context, "civilization" refers to Western civilization, while "inspired past" refers to the Ottoman period.

The actors of this cultural capital, which is in the process of formation, the group members, and their audience create a conservative urban lifestyle by gathering in cafes designed in a neo-Ottoman style, concert halls, and culture centres of conservative neighbourhoods, which they prefer for cultural production and consumption. The source of these symbols constructed around a conservative urban lifestyle is the past fiction consisting of court brashness and heroic studies established by the government-funded series and films modelled on the Ottoman era, which were shown on state channels. The influence of this fantasy established by these popular cultural instruments on Turkey's conservative community has had repercussions on the cultural practices of the threatened music group and its audience. The qanun player of the group describes her sentiments as follows: "I feel like a royal Ottoman woman while playing qanun."

The group members formed their own cultural capital by participating in exchange programmes, learning foreign languages in private high-schools and colleges, attending courses for playing musical instruments, and thereby being nourished by Western culture. They are part of a generation that was raised under AKP's early educational and cultural policies, which were in line with EU membership requirements. The above-mentioned manifesto, which was published during a time when the AKP's culture policies underwent a radical transition, recommends the formation of a cultural capital that incorporates local, traditional, and conservative values while benefits of Western culture. From another perspective, this group employs the called local and conservative motives as a balancing and acceptable element in their relations to the community, of which they are a part while performing Western music, their families and their future networks. The founder and lead vocalist explains the situation as follows:

“I pity it, I love the yeast they catch in Memleketim but I want them to experience this very same thing in other songs. I know this is a matter of process. This is the situation now, but it will be better after 10 years. The applauses will come to the almost same level. I will be interested in the opera just like a new-born and make some studies focusing on it. My mother hates opera, she does not like it at all, I’m a shouting woman but when I sing Turkish classical music, I suddenly become her favorite child. The reason of this dislike towards opera may be that they cannot relate to it, they cannot understand the lyrics or sometimes they regard it as so Christian. This is seen much more in people who are more Muslim and who think that we can only have interest in this Muslim geography.” (Pınar)

What keeps this synthesis alive is the repertoire of the group. Arguing that singing multi-cultural songs enable to embrace a wide variety, this repertoire redefines itself with an emphasis on only “being aesthetical and embracing each and every culture” that freed these songs of East-West synthesis from their political burden.

“The music must stay away from politics. The compositions are used for various purposes in time, but it is different from what we do. We always emphasize this and make our music carefully. Someone who knows us a bit can understand that we don’t play Ciao Bella as a communist song. We play from a wide variety of nations like the songs of Arabs, English, Armenians or Azerbaijani. Music is music. It is beautiful this way. And the music does not have to have a nationality. We make many pieces without words; instrumental ones and they don’t have a language all in all (Nurgül).”

The members of the group have slightly divergent explanations for why they prefer to tell less politically charged tales in their songs. Primarily, they stated that they are not the spokespeople or leaders of any political movements and that they are

merely musicians. The group feels that the political weight of the music tarnishes the music. They believe that the tone and ability of a piece of music to evoke strong emotions are what make it superior and valuable. They focus on the aesthetic and supreme aspects of music while ignoring the political aspects, and as a result, they believe they have purified and elevated their work.

The products of the "local and national" culture with religious overtones that the AKP is attempting to revitalize are insufficient for this group of young women musicians who are pious offspring of right-wing-conservative families. Consequently, they favor redefining this cultural accumulation strategically, which implies a form of reconciliation.

“Let’s talk about Bella Ciao. It is an old Italian folk song. One man goes to the field and says to his wife “Bella”. We played the song because we love it and its tale. Gülnihal will say something, I guess. We did not behave politically; we do not play it for political representation. Contrarily, this is just a song, and it was not composed for a political purpose. This is just a folk song! So, we want to play it because we love it and we want to save it from the political discourse around it. We play it because of its musical value. Of course, you don’t have to be making an Armenian propaganda to play an Armenian folk song. We play it for the sake of music, and we approach everything from a musical view...” (Nurgül)

While doing this, the repertoire is being constantly shaped by its audience’s taste. The mindset of synthesis promoted by the ruling party informs the group’s practices and thus the taste of its audience:

“I am so very happy that our young people came together as women and formed such a group I am so happy both because everyone in the group is women and their audience can only be women. I hope that group will be famous, and my own

daughter will be included in them. She would also play something. The group is a silver lining for me, I've liked them so much." (Ayşe)

The state's desire of creating alternative culture resources refers to a need for daily life in conservative community. This desire also makes a response to conservative community's complex due to the cultural hegemony possessed by the seculars for decades. Thus, the relationality between the group, which is focused by the research, and its audience is a representation of the state's desire to create an alternative cultural resource for twenty years on a micro-level. One of the audiences expressed this need for her own life and for her community as follows:

"I think it's heard. I was a mistress in dormitories. I spent so much time with students and while planning activities for them, you look for or hold such activities to attract students or young people. When you try to gather students together for something else, they do not come but if you find and bring a guitarist older girl, all young people come to listen. The youth is interested in such things due to the society's progression. Social media or similar activities, different perspectives. So, the increase in these activities is good to attract young people but if these activities are held within the framework of availability, that would be better. It would be better if they increase considering available options. I hope there will be more these kinds of groups, many more. Actually, the group has become somewhere we escape. We do not want to be with boys in events like concerts, we do not want to be in inappropriate events, in crowded or mixed-gender places. We feel comfortable when the event is only for women. We hang around only with women. That's why I think young people will demand the increase in such group. They will ask for it more and more. This kind of groups should increase. As I have said, we could not gather this many people if it were something else. It of course depends on the topic but

something with piano, with guitar or qanun attracts everyone's attention for sure.”

(Ayla)

In addition to performing traditional Turkish music, the group also selected folk songs that come from Russian and Albanian culture. The full range of their song selection is anything from ‘local’ folk music to folk songs that are popular around the world. Such selections may lead one to believe that the concert group is accepting of different cultures as some of the songs they choose do not necessarily fit in with their conservative beliefs. However, the group usually reinterprets the meanings of the songs that they choose and makes the chosen songs appear to be in line with their beliefs and culture, sometimes even removing the original meaning of the song entirely through their own interpretation so as not to clash with their political beliefs.

Doing so has in fact increased the popularity level of the concert group as they do not appear to represent any specific political group or perspective. However, based on their knowledge of different cultures, geography, and lived abroad for a period, the group's song choices can be seen as a means to engage with different cultures. It is also important to keep in mind that despite these choices, the concert attendees are all religious, Muslim women so when the concert group explains the meaning behind songs, they purposefully choose the parts of the song or the interpretation that is more conservative and appealing to their audience which means that they tend to avoid any political meanings behind the songs. Another defining characteristic of the concert group is their selection of songs that focus on nationalism—and not just Turkish nationalism. The group also puts a twist on international songs they play. They select traditional folk songs of protest coming from Europe but play it using eastern-style instruments. The concert group has performed songs such as “Mad About You” using the qanun, for example.

They state that in doing this they wish to make a connection with the West and hope to build a bridge between Eastern and Western cultures. The way the concert group usually shares their interpretations with the audience makes it seem as though the meaning behind the song is not so controversial and is in fact a bit neutral in meaning. They often do this by stating that the reason they selected such songs was because they liked the way they sounded. However, it can be implied that this is not necessarily the truth since most of their songs air on the side of controversial, i.e., most have a political meaning behind them. However, the songs they select is exactly why observing the concert group is so interesting and the major reason why this topic is worth examining.

Although they deem still-popular political songs like as *Ciao Bella* and *Polyushka Polye* to be fit for their repertoire, they are stripped of its political baggage before being given to the public. By interspersing anecdotes between songs throughout the concert, these melodies are made more romantic and anonymous. Only aesthetic pleasure and the joy of familiarity remain of the song. In other words, a group of Muslim women bring these songs from the 20th century, which continue to nourish the socialist culture, into the present and redefine them. Nonetheless, these remade tunes establish a memory of entertainment culture and the pleasure of consumption.

It is then worth posing the question of why such a religious and conservative group of Muslim women choose to perform music such as the communist song, *Ciao Bella* or, *Adanavi Voghperke* which tells the story of the Armenian genocide in public, to their own community. When such strongly and politically motivated songs are chosen and performed in front of an audience, the concert group focuses only on how good they sound, not on the meaning of the words used in the songs. What's

more, the concert group tends to organize their playlist very carefully, taking care not to put too many politically charged songs back-to-back, they tend to select songs that are less political in meaning in between the more controversial, political songs. For example, one song the group performs is Adanayi Voghperke (Adana Massacre), which is a song about the Armenian massacre in 1909, however, the group does not explain anything about the story behind the song in the concert. So, instead of facing the consequences of choosing such a controversial song, the group would rather sweep it under the rug.

This lack of explanation can even sometimes make the meanings behind the songs being performed more obvious. Although it does come with a caveat—by performing the song, the group makes it more popular, but at the same time it removes the political or controversial nature of the song to make it no longer associated with the reputation the song once held.

It can be said that in general there may be some resentment among the people towards the current leadership. Although the political party AKP has been the ruling party for the last two decades, there has been this inability to build any kind of ‘cultural capital’ in the country and as a result, the resentment the people feel is often reflected in social or cultural events. The data gathered during the interview phase of the research shows how individuals have been fighting to build up culture and maintain it publicly, in this case, in the form of concert group performances. Specifically, in the case of the group, these performances give them the platform and confidence to take on different cultural positions and even more so by the way that they handle the explanations behind the music they perform. So, the group manages to adopt these songs, strip them of their political nature and historical meaning, and

turn them into cultural products to be enjoyed and as a result are able to include them in their own ‘cultural space’.

Being the children of right wing-conservative and religious families, these women with a secular educational background aim to achieve a geographical synthesis through interpreting the songs with Eastern and Western origins via Eastern and Western instruments. And they also redefine the past through bringing old songs with political and historical burdens into present day with their unique interpretation. While feeling kind of trapped since they have not yet created their own cultural resources, they also own the political and cultural memory emerging from popular culture and secular idea and change the form of these burdened cultural products. This music group of conservative religious women influenced both by Western popular culture and secular idea and the government’s politics promoting local and national culture keeps its repertoire update, varied and acceptable with the help of responses from the audience. The group’s active relation to its conservative audience and secular cultural capital originating from the West shows us that the traces of polarizing culture policies with the claim of being local and national that had the claim of being universalizing, inclusive and pluralist during EU membership process of AKP and then was radicalized in parallel to authoritarian politics after Gezi Resistance can be found in this study.

AKP’s ever-increasing authoritative, polarizing and aggressive attitude in the political area, especially in identity politics, has manifested itself in the form of becoming local, national and conservative. However, the ruling party could not succeed in forming its own cultural resources, tools and actors with this move of turning back to the old’s and roots, a maneuver with authoritative traces.

Consequently, it is nothing more than a revival of secular Western culture that this

music group of religious Muslim women, my study's main focus, redefines the past with a kind of synthesis while attempting to create a unique cultural capital sensitive to religious matters.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE WAYS OF SELF-IDENTIFICATION OF YOUNG MUSLIM WOMEN AND PLYING BETWEEN THE SECULAR AND PIOUS COMMUNITIES

The current government is implementing a strategy to reach out to the conservative urban middle class. When it comes to creating their daily lives, young people from conservative families respond in a variety of different ways. To put it another way, the government is developing a discourse with young conservatives by providing them with opportunity to grow their economic and cultural capital. By forming networks of cultural and symbolic consumption, these citizens are interacting with power.

The AKP government's educational and cultural policies are determined by a strategy founded on a vision of "acceptable youth" (Lüküslü and Yücel, 2013). The AKP government chooses to promote particular cultural and educational institutions, such as government-affiliated private colleges, cultural centres, and high schools for Imams and Preachers, in these programs. However, due to diverse social contacts and unlimited access to information, a growing number of young people have been shown to have unexpected responses, proving that the AKP government's vision of 'acceptable youth' does not totally correlate substantive in real life. Some members of the group objected to the concept of attending high schools for Imams and Preachers, claiming that such schools do not provide status or reputation, and that their students are stereotyped. The AKP's zero-sum approach appears to have been helped by the party's conservative religious ideology and seeming convergence with how the Kemalist legacy has been portrayed. The Islamist heritage in Turkey has been

projected as an authentic type of nationalism, defining the nation as Muslim first and foremost.

These women seek to place their pious Muslim identities among secular people by enrolling in secular educational institutions and explaining their distinctions to their own communities. These are all specific tactics used by young Muslim women to challenge the government's vision of youth, secular people's perceptions of pious Muslims, and their families' expectations to keep certain traditions alive. In this chapter, In this chapter, I will more focus on how the members of the music group identify themselves and how the veiling has an effect on self-identification in a historical context of headscarf in recent history of Turkey. It is also important to explore the barriers and the prejudices they face as they create their identities and increase the visibility of Muslim women in the public space.

I'll also discuss how the traditions and religious principles affect young Muslim women in secular life, as well as the tactics they use to find a balance between secular values and traditions inherited from their families and the conservative community, while preserving their life expectancy and living standards.

### 5.1 Different perceptions and reasons for veiling

Considering the historical context of veiling in Turkey, this section focuses on the experiences of pious Muslim women in the performing arts in the context of visibility in the public sphere. The fact that women take part in the branches of art performed on stage, from theatre to music, and in particular, the visibility of women in a professional sense has been possible as a result of long years of discussions and struggles almost all over the world. Regardless of the background, the presence and visibility of women on the stage brings along many prejudices and social pressures.

In this sense, women have to face different forms of discrimination against them when they appear on the stage, and they have to develop different ways of tactics. One of the newly visible subjects of the creation of these forms of tactics is Muslim pious women. Before discussing the experiences of the group's members in performing art, I think it is important to discuss how pious Muslim women gain visibility in the public space in Turkey.

The AKP's establishment and came to power in the 2000s established a religious-based political agenda. Following that, the party shifted its focus to a more economic program with a more hegemonic perspective. To further this agenda, political hegemony invents or promises new social identities that are distinct from conceptions of "just order," "equal distribution of income," and "equalities for everybody," as these narratives appeared in Welfare Party political discourse. Handled within the hegemonic framework, everyday practices are no longer the settings of either society's spontaneous self-reproduction (as in Bourdieu) or endless games and resistances (as in Scott cited in Tuğal, 2009). Everyday life is one of the primary grounds of conflict between various hegemonic projects (Tuğal, 2009). Turkey began to experience serious educational, economic, and socio-cultural transformations in favor of pious Muslim populations when the AKP gained majority control in 2002 (Özet, 2019; Tuğal, 2009). This trend allowed pious Muslim middle-class women to come forward, increasing Muslim women's visibility in the public sphere.

Once Muslim women became visible in political sphere (with the help of the public headscarf struggle), the door to the cultural domain, which had been dominated by secular people until the 2000s, was opened to Muslim women when the AKP took power. Muslim women have been in the position of determining and

representing what is "religiously acceptable" while trying to exist in the cultural domain under the shadow of the AKP's political agenda, as they struggle to gain a place in the cultural domain with its opportunities to access educational and professional contexts. To understand how conservative youth are affected by Turkey's cultural politics, it is crucial to examine the self-positioning and interrelationships of pious women actors involved in cultural production processes. The next discussion will focus on how and where these women are active in cultural production processes.

The fact that certain women who are (or call themselves) conservative, pious, veiled Muslims gather around the music group is relevant in the context of certain women becoming more visible in public space. During the event, the core members of the group wear generally pastel colors, while the choir wears black. Previously, the group wore much darker clothing, but since one of the pianists began designing their costumes, they've begun to wear much more vibrantly colored clothing, especially the soloist, who wears the most vibrantly colored dress. This could serve as a model for the dress code transformation. Even while the group members' attention to their colorful stage costume shows that they care about their appearance on stage, all the members of the group prefer darker colors (mostly black, dark blue and brown) in everyday life.

Despite the fact that the majority of women attempt to uphold an ideal of individual freedom and respect for diverse various lifestyles in public spaces, it is obvious that the diversity of Istanbul's streets, malls, and other leisure and entertainment areas pose uncomfortable challenges for many. These challenges typically occur when headscarves are encountered in the entertainment industry or in public places such as cultural centres, pubs, or universities, as one interviewee stated:

"I don't have so much difficulty when I go to the movies, the theatre, seminars, concerts, etc. even if I see some people's eyes on me but I do not want to think that I experience it because of my headscarf. I don't know... It is not a social thing but individual, alcohol is putting pressure on me. I feel weird when I go to bars. Obviously, everyone is free, and no one can disturb with one another, but drinking alcohol makes me feel uncomfortable<sup>9</sup>. In addition, for instance, the most recent concert took place in a bar in Taksim. And upon your entrance, all eyes turn to you. This is a social problem. They find this strange and wonder, "What are these women doing here?" (Havin)

When Havin goes to places where alcohol is consumed, she faces two types of challenges. The first challenge is an internal one, which she refers to as "individual." The majority of group members claim that wearing a headscarf gives them a sense of responsibility. Becoming veiled imposes the necessity of acting as a veiled woman. The second difficulty is what she refers to as a "social problem," which arises when wearing a headscarf in a predominantly secular environment. Both challenges, I argue, are different faces of the imposition of an "acceptable Muslim woman." Unsurprisingly, the religious community also imposes pressure on veiled Muslim women who are in the public sphere as Hatice states:

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<sup>9</sup> In Turkey, the sociospatial delineation of the boundaries of pluralism is heavily influenced by the serving and consumption of alcohol. Despite Islamic prohibitions on alcohol usage, the sale, marketing, and consumption of alcohol in Turkey have remained relatively unrestricted. In the lack of official regulation, the last two decades have witnessed a growth of 'alcohol-free' entertainment venues, ranging from cafes and restaurants to hotels that target pious Muslim customers. The absence of alcohol has played a significant role in the 'Islamic' branding of these new places (Gökarıksel and Secor, 2015, pp. 28).

“When I first stepped onto the stage, as reported by Hürriyet, those prominent brothers issued a "fatwa" against me, told that I was a provocateur and unfit for a conversation. People were avoiding me like the plague after hearing this.” (Hatice)

Another issue is that veiled women are generally assumed to have less cultural capital than non-veiled peers. The interviewee explained having some trouble about these assumptions, and the expectations from Muslim women which do not identify them but build barriers for them to express themselves in social life. An interviewee explains how wearing a headscarf limits her in everyday life:

“Certainly, some of my characteristics come from my parents. My parents always say, ‘You're wearing a headscarf.’, ‘Be careful about this.’, ‘Do not laugh like that!’ My mum always speaks in this tone. But when you get outside, you realize that you must live a certain way, raise your voice while working as a woman, etc. You are in mixed-gender environments. And others perceive you as a woman wearing a headscarf, which has a social dimension. I just now realized that. People do not anticipate you to discuss cultural topics such as art, literature, etc. They perceive you to have a narrow worldview or perspective.” (Havin)

Since the beginning, members of the music group have confronted various pressure and threats from the religious community. They receive numerous threatening messages, particularly via social media, stating that veiled pious women cannot sing in front of the public according to the Islamic principles. Members of the group do not consider these threats to be credible, but they prefer to disregard them. Even though wearing a headscarf is seen as a personal choice by the group members, they claim that many women are forced to veil by their families and husbands. A woman in the group emphasized the significance of being conscious-religious about

religious principles such as veiling. One of them expressed her concern about pressure from men on veiling:

"You can have whatever you desire in your head. To my opinion, though, the hijab<sup>10</sup> is more coherent. So many hijabi women are present. I mean that some of them are forced to veil by their husbands. However, when you mention hijab, I think of knowledge and consciousness. When you worship consciously and reflect this on your appearance, you have hijab. You are therefore a hijabi woman." (Havin)

The expression "consciousness" indicates that the primary Islamic source (the Qur'an) is being used as a base and that various interpretations of these sources are reviewed critically. People who self-identify as "conscious Muslims" claim that they think more rationally about the limits set by Islam and that they understand and practice it more accurately. This expression also emphasizes the agency of Muslims and the significance of individual choices in religious life.

Following a military coup in 1980, new dress codes in public institutions began to officially limit the wearing of the headscarf throughout Turkey. The secular state's historical attitude on women's unveiling as both a symbol and a necessary requirement of modernity became a legal necessity in some key public spaces, such as university campuses, schools, the courthouse, and the parliament, with these regulations (Gökarıksel, 2009, pp. 663). The scope of the headscarf ban has shifted throughout time and space, and it has occasionally been expanded to all civil

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<sup>10</sup> In Turkish, *tesettür*. *Tesettür* is more than a fashion; it is part of a lifestyle that ideally includes a religious-cultural code of conduct prescribing the spatial segregation of men and women, appropriate spaces for the movement of male and female bodies in public and the home, the appropriate relation between men and women, the authority of husbands and fathers over children and wives, and men over women, and prohibiting the communication of unrelated men and women. (White, 2002).

servants, but it has remained controversial. In reality, the ban has become one of Turkey's most contentious political issues (Secor, 2015). Wearing a headscarf, particularly in the new, fashionable style that appeared in the 1990s, makes women the focus of contentious political disputes between secular and Islamic societies (Gökarıksel and Secor 2009; Kılıçbay and Binark 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002). Despite the fact that Pınar did not face those difficulties, she states the effect her elderly relatives' experiences had on her:

“My aunt was the victim of it. I wasn't because I was younger, but when you hear the whole story, you think, "Yes, there is something like victimhood but experiencing it is something else entirely." I can argue that these experiences gave them a struggle spirit. Now we have had some flashbacks, and if we have to, we can say that when women see us playing music, some of them cry. Oh, you have no idea what we went through, she says, “Oh, you don't know what we went through.” I cannot say this because I have never had a similar experience. Naturally, I was somewhat impressed after observing those who had experienced it. However, they leave behind numerous traces.” (Pınar)

Within Turkish-Islamist ideology, the claim of victimhood has a long and strong historical and political context. In Islamist political and intellectual circles, it is widely believed that they are the real "victims" of Turkey's modernizing process. As a result, they have suffered at the hands of the Kemalist elite, who collaborated with Western powers to torture the country's "innocent," "pious," and "authentically" Anatolian people (Yılmaz, 2017, pp. 9). This claim has been made by both Islamists and liberal intellectuals throughout the years, with the latter criticizing Kemalist modernization as a forced top-down process. Politicians of traditional, conservative, and rural backgrounds, as well as the masses who today support the AKP, share and

nurture the strong sense of victimhood among Islamist academics and politicians (pp. 12). The current president, Erdoğan, is the most significant and successful example of a leader who has successfully expressed this assertion in campaign speeches. He has also dramatized claims of victimhood in front of television cameras on multiple occasions.<sup>11</sup> Erdoğan has said that the AKP's supporters are Turkey's "black Turks," who have been labeled "ignorant" by Kemalists and supporters of the more secular Republican People's Party (Demiralp, 2012, pp. 511). Furthermore, Erdoğan cried not only for himself as a victim of repression by his military, legal, and political foes, but also for other Muslim victims of the same oppressors. The AKP's populist tactic of creating a strong sense of victimhood, a narrative of suffering, and corresponding performances that embody and deepen emotional sensations of sadness, resentment, and revengefulness is not the only result (pp. 13). Clearly, the AKP is the group in Turkish society that pushes this ideology, and the way it talks has become a part of the culture. Although this power field created by the AKP on a discursive level has found a response in the religious community, it seems that it has not been internalized by most of the group members. The ideological burden of this discourse was occupied only by the former guitarist, who is a Muslim feminist activist. However, this discourse is embraced by Hatice not as a populist tool of Erdoğan, but rather in the context of the Islamist discourse of the 90s: "...I was claiming my pious Muslim identity, as a result of the victimization and it was not a sense of belonging."

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<sup>11</sup> See, Erdoğan's public speech in Kayseri, "Milli İradeye Saygı Mitingi."

Thus, there is still discrimination in social life, especially by secular society, but the members of this group do not think that this discrimination systematic in the sense Erdogan expresses. In today's Turkey, Muslim women are still discriminated against because of their identities in the public space. However, I argue that the basis of this discrimination is the ideal of "acceptable Muslim women", which is embraced and reproduced by both the conservative religious community and the secular community.

In 2018, the growth of deism among Imam Hatip High School students became a central topic of discussion among AKP intellectuals and policymakers.<sup>12</sup> In a workshop hosted by the Konya Provincial Directorate of National Education, instructors from Konya argued that the worship-oriented education provided in IHL schools did not adequately inform young about religious values; thus, the topics of religious inquiry for youth were enlarged. Soon after, on social media, we read the #tenyearschallenge hash tagged accounts of other women removing their headscarves.<sup>13</sup> With the slogan of Women in Mosques<sup>14</sup> women who want to pray in mosques began to voice their demands. With the slogan "Women in Mosques," women who desire to pray in mosques began to express their demands. Conservative groups reacted to the participation of Muslim women wearing headscarves in the International Women's Day march on March 8.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> See <http://www.diken.com.tr/ensar-arastirmasi-deizme-kayan-imam-hatipliler-ya-ateistler-hakliysa-diye-soruyor/>

<sup>13</sup> See <https://m.bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/193792-basortusu-mucadelesinin-degisen-yolculugu>

<sup>14</sup> See <http://kadinlarcamilerde.com/>

<sup>15</sup> See <https://www.gazeteduvar.com.tr/gundem/2019/03/12/bu-saldiri-islami-feminizmin-yukselisine-de-yonelik>

It would be no coincidence that the debates took place primarily among young Muslim women. Young women have a key role in establishing the public visibility of Islam in Turkey. Women who are considered by men as carriers of piety serve a purpose in the Islamic perspective (Avcı, 2012; Yılmaz, 2015; Saktanber, 2002). Saktanber argues that particularly educated young women play a crucial role in social transformation because they increase the visibility of religious rituals in everyday life. Because the man serves as an annunciator in Islam, whereas the woman serves as a representative.<sup>16</sup>(Saktanber, 2002, pp 259).

Two major policies significantly impacted the visibility of Muslim women in public space. First, High Schools for Imams and Preachers graduates were permitted to enroll in conventional universities. Second, the headscarf ban, a relic of the 28 February military memorandum, was repealed in 2007 by an AKP government resolution. These two significant steps began to transform the everyday social lives of Muslim women (Yılmaz, 2015; Maritato, 2020). In the public sphere, feminist women and the libertarian wing of the Turkish left were the most ardent supporters of the struggle against the headscarf ban in 80's (Sirman, 1989, pp. 27). The encounter between secular groups (such as feminists and the left) and pious Muslims led to the formation of a political consensus. In some ways, the everyday activities of these groups also began to resemble one another. As pious Muslims in Turkey have increasingly embraced neoliberalism, privatization, and deregulation, and adapted to bourgeois lifestyles, they have integrated smoothly into both global markets and the

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<sup>16</sup> In Turkish, temsil.

secular state (Tuğal, 2009; Turam, 2012). Thus, I can conclude that the first significant encounter between these groups caused the political agendas of Muslims to resemble those of the leftists. The removal of the headscarf ban, which made possible another encounter between Muslim and secular groups, led to the integration/involvement of Muslims in the daily lives of secular groups.

## 5.2 Identity recontextualization among young Muslim women

According to the findings of my research, pious Muslim women's everyday lives, their relationships with politics and culture, and the concepts they use in order to identify themselves are diverse both within the group and in wider society, which enables rich discussions. The fact that the members of this music group use a wide variety of different terms when identifying themselves is one of the points that needs to be discussed further in this study. Although all group members define themselves as Muslims, it is possible to discuss the members of Islam and piety by attributing various interpretations to the concept of religiosity. There are women who convey the concept of conservatism with positive connotations, but there are also women who completely omit this concept and explain that they are not defined themselves by this term. From this perspective, the findings show that the interviewees prefer to self-identify as Muslims and do not directly exclude religiosity. As a result, these two notions were used in the relevant sections of the thesis, as the participants expressed themselves. In the thesis, the term Muslim pious woman was used to refer to a broad category. Similarly, it is possible to argue that the headscarf also plays a significant role in these identity constructions.

It is one of the important results of this study that women do not directly associate their performance motivations with their Muslim and pious identities in the

performing arts, and that they define their artistic performance as an action that takes place as a result of the external reflection of their inner experiences. However, it is seen that they decide what to do and what not to do in the performing arts they perform, in a way that does not contradict their Muslim identity and beliefs, which they express in their self-definitions, on the line of halal / haram, based on the interpretations of religious authorities or people who are suitable for their own religiosity and religious understanding. The majority of those who were interviewed predicated their sense of self identity on their religious affiliation; nevertheless, when it came to issues of conservatism, their opinions were quite diverse. Some of the interviewees avoid using the conservatism as a category:

“I call myself pious. Because if I only call myself Muslim, believing in Allah would be enough. If I call myself Muslim, does that mean all the Muslims must behave like this? No, this is not nice. If I say conservative... I think religious people and conservative people are different and this conservative thing is much more a sociological term. It means conserving what has happened without thinking too much on it.” (Pinar)

Another interviewee expresses her discomfort with the category of conservative:

"Can I call myself as a conservative? Not completely. And you know that terms have meaning in a culture, so when I refer to myself as conservative, I do not accept the conservative identity seen by society, therefore I probably do not refer to myself as conservative. I would rather explain myself. Being pious may be used if we are discussing having an identity based on religion. Obviously, I am constructing my identity based on my religion."(Nurgül)

The conservatism, in this thesis, should be considered as a separate category from political conservatism. This category, emerged to be the more influential realm of Turkish conservatism, centred upon an idealized holy family, which itself was revolving around an idealized Muslim woman (Yılmaz, 2008, pp. 59). Although, they mostly prefer to define themselves as pious<sup>17</sup>, considering that the definition of conservatism is limiting in terms of expressing themselves and is relatively closed to alternative interpretations of the term itself, they confess that they have some religious values to conserve:

“I think I have some core areas, which nobody can touch. And there are some things that I connect to. In time, I realized that I did not want to change them. And I feel like I’m growing. When I was younger, I thought that I was someone more marginal. But as I grew up, I decided that I have something to conserve because I am a veiled Muslim woman. I have things to protect such as honor<sup>18</sup>” (Nurgül)

Some participants opted not to be labelled and did not self-identify themselves with ideological terms. Occasionally, they used the terms “pious”, “Muslim,” and “veiled” interchangeably to describe themselves, but some of them believed that these terms bring limitations on their modes of existence. One interviewee expressed her concerns about being labelled with these terms as follows:

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<sup>17</sup> Müteyyin, in Turkish, in this context, refers to women who make religious observance a central focus of their life, without implying that they adhere to religious norms in every part of their lives.

<sup>18</sup> In this context and in Turkish, İffet.

“I try not to feel or perceive that way. I do not want to have this kind of label on me. I do not want to be determined. I do not want to have such a perception. If there is such social stigmatization, I prefer not to take it personally.” (Havin)

There was a significant generational disparity in this regard. Even if parents of some of them were politically active in Islamist movement in 90’s, these women do not want to completely bear the historical and political baggage of the Islamist movement in the 1980s and 1990s in Turkey. Still, as I mentioned in previous sections, Hatice, the former guitarist of the musical group, is motivated to use this political baggage in the context of self-identification:

“I want to see myself this way and want to be recognized and known this way. I remember thinking ‘I want it known that I am a Muslim’. I mean I am different; I have a different story; I have a different history. I feel sorry or excited about different things, I had this interest in separating myself from the others. I mean I don’t think there was a great spiritual motivation or anything behind my understanding of religion. Religion is highly political in a large part of my life. You know, fulfilling certain obligations. There isn’t much spiritual stuff, I mean, aside from following the important principles of being a subject. I have always considered Islam, rather than a faith thing, a structure that organizes the society, something that will bring justice, establish Allah’s justice, I mean within my family. It is still the more dominant side actually.” (Hatice)

Hatice implied that her difference is derived from her headscarf. In other words, 'veiling was an identity construction tool for her when she was a teenager. I observed during my fieldwork that different attitudes towards these concepts caused various conflicts and disputes in the group. The group’s dynamics with Hatice’s political views as I mentioned in the first chapter of thesis. After some discussion

about the motivations of making music for women, she decided to leave the group.

She defined herself as a feminist Muslim, as she explained:

“I used to feel more of a Muslim, in terms of belonging. I mean, I am a feminist. One of the things that affect my daily life the most and determines my decision making the most is feminism. Still, Muslimhood and feminism equally influence my discursive practices, my comments on things in my everyday life. I like talking to these people about how to create answers for things and what to say in which situation. I have found something like myself you know. Now there are tons of people around me who think like me. I talk to them; I feel like I belong together with them. Call it a community, now I feel like having something like that of my own.  
(Hatice)

Another interviewee explains that she does not use terms such as feminist, because of their roots in secularism:

“I’m aware of the relationship between Islam and feminism discussions. But I do not need to define myself as something different from Muslim. No other ideology is necessary. Islam is my religion and my lifestyle, so I do not need any secular ideology to define myself. I can think over some specific issues but belonging to any other ideology apart from Islam makes me feel uncomfortable. I don’t feel like belonging to any other ideology as a package other than Islam.” (Nurgül)

Just as the definitions of religiousness or being Muslim differed, stories and motivations of veiling diverged within the group. For example, one interviewee shared the concerns she held when she decided to wear the headscarf:

“I call myself veiled<sup>19</sup> Muslim. I hate terms like *covered* or *uncovered*<sup>20</sup>. And some people prefer saying hijab. Hijab sounds so assertive. I think hijab is like a higher piousness level. I may be comparing it to my own lifestyle, but it is like extra piousness to me. But as I’ve said, I am more idealist in my own life, I want it all but may not achieve. So, the headscarf gives me some relief. But hijab puts more weight over my shoulders.” (Pınar)

This research seeks to highlight the gap between the self-identification of musical group members and the categories imposed on them. As stated by one of the interviewees, "Categorizing is a form of violence"; labelling women in a manner that they oppose can be perceived as a form of violence. Therefore, terms such as Islamist, feminist, conservative, and hijabi do not accurately portray all members of the group. Although pious Muslim is seen as more acceptable than the other categories, the diversity of its definition and the shift from a collective to an individual perspective compels us to re-examine the concept.

### 5.3 Interrelationship with the secular and the pious Muslim communities: In-between or plying between?

Pious women’s identity-related challenges in public space are shaped by context. As visible Muslim women in secular spaces and as women in the male-dominated

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<sup>19</sup> In Turkish, *Başörtülü*. It is a term that is used for women who wear headscarves. The majority of Muslim feminists in Turkey use this term instead of "türban" to emphasize that they have a say in what and why they wear headscarves. Türban has been on the political agenda of AKP for a long time, mostly because male politicians have used it as a tool. It also has negative connotations for secular society.

<sup>20</sup> In Turkish, *Açık-kapalı*. These terms are also meant in intention with a distinction between secular and religious societies.

religious community, the unique aspects of their experience are rendered “invisible;” the challenges they face do not overlap with those of prototypical (secular) women or prototypical (pious) men (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2011, pp. 379). Below are participants’ narrations of these experiences and the emergence of a particular subjectivity under pressure from both religious and secular groups. It also enables us to understand what kind of tactics they regulate in their everyday lives in order to expand their elbow room they need to shape their own subjectivity.

With the removal of the headscarf ban, children of wealthy families now have access to education and can participate more actively in the social and cultural sphere. They interact with seculars, non-Muslims, people from many cultures, leftist groups, and feminists. Despite the fact that the majority of the group members attend Imam Hatip High Schools or private religious high schools established by religious foundations, they form daily relationships with people from various social groups through international exchange programs, leadership workshops, music festivals, and other university-sponsored activities. As follows, Havin explains her relationships with friends from various social groups:

“Some of my atheist friends made fun of me for my religious identity. I continue to be friends with many people from different walks of life, but I consider it disrespectful to be teased. I prefer to go the way I feel happy, and I told them that if they want to be in my life, they have to accept it. I cut off my dialogue with some of my friends, I continue with some of my friends. As I said, I may have embraced Islam, but it is definitely not a divisive thing. I can make good friends with a non-Muslim, it's not a problem at all, and it's uncomfortable to even talk about such things.” (Havin)

The fact that these young Muslim women gather for concerts as a form of entertainment in various city districts and particularly in the evening shows that they are active participants in a secular-dominated social life. These interactions might result in conflict and reactions across identities, as one interviewee explained:

“I attended a university where Ramadan never arrived. Everyone behaves as though nothing is happening. I have never encountered a different environment. I have never been there, have always had negative thoughts about it, and have never desired to explore. When I was contemplating my high school alternatives, I was told that this was a [secular] high school and that I could go a [religious] high school on the Anatolian side, where there were more students like me. Since I never felt that way myself, since I never had that sense of belonging, I never desired to be there. I can imagine the potential for conflict there. In college, I did not have any Muslim friends. I was aware that I would face discrimination in that setting for reasons like as why I fasted in that manner, why I fasted during my period, etc.” (Hatice)

As stated in previous chapters, these women claim that secularists (or secularism) also dominate the formal educational settings. Hatice stated that she prefers to fight in this field by maintaining solidarity with her own community and by establishing relationships with the secular community. Hatice feels it useful to create social ties with the secular community since she believes her own community does not engage in sufficient critical thinking and she cannot explain the origins of the patterns that create her own identity.

Most of the group members are supported by their families for accessing to high quality of education, do whatever they want to desire, for instance making music, while considering the borders drawn by the religion. Women who have supportive families feel privileged:

“When I wanted to study abroad through Erasmus, I observed my friends' families and also my own. Occasionally, I can act conservatively and consider whether I need to be in a particular environment. My family, set aside their doubts, supported me. I suppose this is so valuable to me. Thanks to them, I was open to new experiences. I could preserve my essence, participate in various circles, and aim to represent myself. (Nurgül)

Members of the group frequently interact social groups that are environmentally distinct from them, such as secular people from their universities and musician networks. Religion, on the other hand, has a significant effect in who people pick to be in their inner circle. One of the participants stressed religion when expressing her criteria of choosing friends:

“The first thing that strikes me as being different is religious belief and lifestyle. Anyway, I adore them [her non-religious friends]. We remain in contact. We have no problems, but when it comes to becoming closest friends or allies, they are the ones who are most like us. I believe this is unintentional, and that everyone feels the same way since you would be closer to someone with whom you might visit the mosque. You converse with the others, but your positions differ, and you begin to spend less time [together]. I made some friends abroad as well; we are close mates, but I believe my basis is a religious belief. Apart from that, people with strong ideological ideas are impossible to discuss anything. Even though we desperately want it, it is not possible. It makes no difference if the person is an Islamist. I am religious, but I don't like Islamists.” (Hatice)

Their attitude toward Islamists shows a fear of being involved in political debate. When analyzing Muslim women's attitudes toward "Islamism," it is important to consider the bad reputation of Islamism in Turkish politics. "I avoid

dealing with Islamists owing to the negative baggage of the terminology," one of the group members said, while confirming Hatice. "Despite my intellectual commonalities with Islamists, Islamism has become synonymous with radicalism and violence. This is the reason of my opposition."

When pious Muslim women want to criticize their religious communities while also "protecting" them from non-religious critics, who are frequently viewed as a threat, they face a unique difficulty. They want to fight ideas and actions that promote misogyny in one's community while also challenging secularists' viewpoints on that community (Okuyan, 2018, pp. 14). For religious women who question their community's male-dominated thinking and behaviors, this challenge is quite difficult. Some interviewees claimed that religious women's critical views on gender were faced with strong opposition, causing to marginalization within the religious community. It was significant for the group to express the feeling that there is a significant gap between themselves and the culture and beliefs of their parents. Differences included religious interpretation, altering daily life and dress codes. This is how one interviewee described this generational gap:

"As our age changing, everything becomes quite different. But our parents had a different perspective, and they have biases. They are more vigilant. I will have an example: they are more conservative. Previously, there were some red lines, but now... my life has changed. For instance, this boyfriend situation. I am referring to boys as both lovers and friends." (Selma)

I claim here that the borders between secular and religious lifestyle are flexible, practicing the secular lifestyle generates internal change in the religious community. Thus, we see women with headscarves walking across university campuses with their boyfriends while flirting with them. Hidayet Şefkatli Tuksal, an

Islamist feminist who wears a headscarf, and her non-Islamist feminist friends have formed a coalition and launched a blog in defense of women's rights. In a show of solidarity, they condemned all forms of "control over women's bodies, whether in the name of modernism, secularism, religion, tradition, morality, honor, or freedom." While these women interact with the secular life, their families may have certain expectations about their children and experience various religious concerns. It is possible to say that the behaviors and forms of expression expected from a veiled woman were instilled in these young women by religious community, especially their families. As I've mentioned in previous chapters, the members of this music group, who have chosen a lifestyle between secular and religious live-styles, profit from a variety of AKP-provided possibilities to fulfil their life goals. Through familial connections, these women attended summer-schools in BEKSAV and TÜGVA (which were well known for their close relations with the AKP) during their childhood. The members of the music group continue to teach music for children and take part in events at foundations such as TÜGVA and KADEM, not only to maintain their relationships but also to earn money.<sup>21</sup>

“KADEM had an event, we went to them a few times. There was also a special camp where their managers met, and there were high-level officials. Then there was Sümeyye Erdoğan, there was Esra Albayrak, we worked with them. Later, not directly with KADEM, but; Esra Albayrak has schools, we went there. Again, we did things with them, spent time, made music together, etc.” (Hatice)

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<sup>21</sup> These women no longer visit BEKSAV, the foundation of former prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu, due to the current political tension between Erdoğan and Davutoğlu. For more information please see <https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-ex-prime-minister-davutoglu-leaves-erdogans-party/a-50415035>

These women take tactical positions to increase their visibility in this area where family, tradition, religion, politics, and secular lifestyles are intertwined. While drinking beer with their friends at a table, they do not leave that place and say, "Well, I'll attend noon prayer when I get home in the evening." They prefer not to share the photos they take on vacation with their boyfriends on social media so that their families and conservative circles do not see them. In this manner, they both seek to maintain a secular lifestyle and preserve their reputation in the religious community because they see that this social capital from the religious networks will profit them in the future. I do not claim that taking this tactical position indicates a major social change, but people do make tactical decisions in their daily lives and create comfortable images on occasion in order to increase their mobility in public and social life and to extend or enlarge these areas.

#### 5.4 Conclusion

The pious Muslim women are the subjects of religious discourses that regulate their daily lives, enforce upon them the obligation to serve as representatives of the Muslim community, and confer upon them a unique responsibility for maintaining family ties. Thus, the responsibility for themselves and for the religious peers and family are becoming two sides of a coin for religious Muslim women. I argue that these urbanized middle-class, young, pious Muslim women in contemporary Turkey take various positions in the discourses on secular and religious ideals of womanhood, constantly reconstructing their own subjectivities. The self-representation tactics in the social sphere have been analyzed as a result of their balance practices between the ideals and assumptions shaped by both secular and religious communities.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

On the basis of an ethnographic case study of this young group of pious Muslim women musicians, this thesis presented the key findings and analysis of engagement with the cultural practices of pious Muslim women. It drew attention to the cultural participation and culture-making of these women. It also looked at how young "pious Muslim women" construct their personal and social lives as cultural consumers and producers in the current social and political atmosphere of Turkey.

This study also tried to explore the discrimination and conflicts that young people encounter as they participate in and integrate their cultures, as well as the range of experiences they have in this regard. It also looked at the daily identity shaping effects of these women's attitudes, concerns, and perceptions. This thesis presented the daily identity shaping effects of these women's attitudes, worries, and perceptions. It uses Muslim women, youth studies, secularism, and Islamic literature as its sources to analyze intergenerational conflicts and moderations. As they prepare their musical repertoire and pick concert locations, the concert group provides us with insight into how their self-produced cultural understandings are formed and what is important to its members. More understanding can be gained by looking at their routines prior to and following each concert, as well as how they are rooted in regional contexts. This study also raised the question of how pious, young Muslim women can actively shape their culture and challenge the stigmatization of traditional Islamic values while preserving social status.

This thesis focused on how a group of pious Muslim women resist the cultural codes of their community and negotiate with the culturally dominant secular

community during the last two decades in Turkey under the strong AKP (Justice and Development Party) government in order to increase their visibility in the social and cultural space. It draws on ethnographic research to explore and elaborate on these processes.

Both religious and secular communities are at risk when devout Muslim women are present in the context of cultural production. These young Muslim women are creating themselves as "conscious," pious Muslim women by reinterpreting religion in their daily lives as opposed to accepting what is imposed upon them.

This study also focused on the group's song choices and repertoire, which push the members to interact with secular-dominated cultural spaces through dress codes, images, and audience feedback while also offering resistance to religious family and community. The chosen songs' political and cultural connotations are thus redefined by the group. As a result, the connection between the group, its listeners, and its songs encourages us to look into how the repertoire is performed in order to create meaning.

This study provides new insights into the experiences of religious young Muslim women who actively participate in cultural production. The introduction chapter of the thesis includes the subject and method of the research, how the case study was selected, how I entered the fieldwork, descriptive information about the group, and finally the story of the establishment of the group. The group members I focused on were born under the AKP's rule. The place of these women within the Muslim community is being reinterpreted, and conventional behaviors within this society are occasionally deemed inadequate. As young people who grew up with the AKP's education, culture, and youth policies, they are direct witnesses to the AKP's shift

from supporting moderate Islam ideology in the early 2000s to market-oriented Islamic politics after 2007 (Tuğal, 2009).

During its first time of leadership (2002-2007), the AKP followed a policy known as moderate Islam, which emphasized civil politics with a democratic structure (inspired by the EU's process of harmonization). Following the 2007 elections, the AKP became the sole ruling party, and the Constitutional Court was ordered to dissolve the party the following year. 2007 was a watershed year for the AKP's policy. During the rapid shift between 2007 and 2011, the AKP prioritized the economy and increased its communication with Arab nations. After 2011, the anti-democratic tactics of the AKP suppressed social revolts against the party's market-oriented policies. Consequently, this case study permitted a discussion of the youth issue in Turkey, which has been influenced since 2007 by an increasingly authoritarian, conservative, and nationalist AKP government (Esen and Gumuscu, 2018). Rather than showing conflict or friction between Islamist and secular lifestyles, this thesis more focused on the extent to which the active social and cultural integration of Islamic actors in Turkish society has the ability to transform the actors themselves (or vice versa). This investigation is contextualized by the fact that the current political system has dominated government institutions and structures since the early 2000s, and that these institutions and structures were initially established under a weaker secular political system.

Today, a dichotomous division between religious and secular is irrelevant. The visibility gained through the employment of the headscarf in the public space (as advocated by radical Islamist groups in the 1990s) and the ways in which young women operate in the public sphere now are not founded on the same old

dichotomies. A pious middle class that is rethinking the limitations of radical and/or political Islam is openly presented with new lifestyle possibilities.

The above-described three major processes have had direct effects on the lives of pious young women. I investigated the young women's modes of visibility in public-common space, as well as their daily routines and cultural practices. These characteristics of the life of young women do not create a discourse or a reaction against authoritarianism. Rather, I observed that their disagreements with earlier generations and arguments within their own communities and peer groups regarding religion and tradition are tied to their cultural practices and the advantages of belonging to the pious middle class in Turkey. The third chapter of this thesis examines the means and ways in which the members of the music group that is the subject of this research create their own public visibility through cultural practices. It is possible to state that the conflicts between the group members' motivations go beyond personal conflict to include political and religious disagreements. In addition to a feminist perspective that considers group members' making music for women and women only as an empowerment process, a perspective that evaluates this coming together through the halal-haram dichotomy and creates its own field with some religious boundaries was also observed within the group. In addition, this section explains what kind of publicity the cultural environment created by this music group, which I called as halalscape and defined as public-common space, receives when considered together with the political and economic transformation processes mentioned above and the spatial policies of the AKP.

In the fourth chapter of the thesis' focus was, the content of the repertoire formed by the musical group. This chapter includes analysis of the selection process of the songs in the repertoire of the music group and the content of the selected

songs. Some members of the religious community believe that it is prohibited by religion for women to sing; this belief includes the concern that Muslim women will surpass the bounds that Islam imposes. Taking into account the country's political and economic interests, the ruling government controls this fear and, as a result, establishes a framework for the decent/proper Muslim woman. The ruling administration must have both its own cultural capital and representation of Muslim women in the cultural space. Observing the fear-demand dichotomy in this group, the women who present cultural works integrate political songs in their own cultural space by decontextualizing them or removing their message under the guise of universalizing them. In this manner, they circumnavigate the set boundaries without truly exceeding them. In addition, they satisfy a demand for productivity and visibility. Consequently, these players provide the place for cultural capital that the governing body cannot create. These observant Muslim women discover ways to both strengthen their own social standing and create an empowering environment for themselves.

In the fifth chapter of the thesis, I analyzed how these religious Muslim women in the music group identify themselves and how they create relations with the family, the tradition and the secular and the religious communities. Even while the cultural production practices of these young pious Muslim women promise a liberating and powerful revolution in their personal lives, it leads to a positioning process that is always mindful of their links with the ruling government and both secular and religious societies; these young women are careful not to jeopardize their social and economic capital. Without abandoning their families, who pay for their college tuition, the societies and networks that will influence their careers when they enter the workforce, or what the government in power makes possible, they build

certain spheres of personal freedom. They do it by relating to the actors they see on a daily basis, as well as by using discourse and imagination.

In Turkey throughout the 1990s, the everyday practices and social realities of pious Muslim women took a new turn. Thus, Muslim women's daily life gradually shifted from the private to the public realm. Muslim women began to appear in formerly male- and secular-dominated cultural and social venues. This can be understood as both an act of adopting a secular lifestyle and an act of employing hegemonic language to communicate with their own communities. The rising prominence of Muslim women in the social and cultural spheres typically raises two issues that frequently coexist: 1) the conflict of more aspects coming from secular lifestyles, and 2) a change in secular people's expectations of what a "pious Muslim" ought to be, based on conceptions from the past century. The secular/religious dichotomy, which had crystallized in the 1980s and 1990s, evolved into a social integration process in the 2000s. Incorporating several political and social differences (in terms of attitude, daily life, taste, and dress code), the concert group illustrates how encounters occur, how disputes and affiliations arise, and how the women construct their own lives through these struggles and social relationships.

Studies on the transformations in the visibility of Muslim women in the public sphere since the AKP rule have mainly focused on Muslim women as modest fashion consumers, as a part of halal consumption culture, reproducers of traditional gender codes and the members of the holy family. Unlike the studies on Muslim religious women in Turkey over the past two decades, this thesis deals with these women not only as cultural consumers but also as a part of cultural production. This research also showed that the research conducted in the 90s, which was affected by postcolonial literature and regarded being in the public space with a headscarf as an

important part of the democratic process, no longer coincides with today's realities in the twentieth year of AKP rule. In addition, this thesis analyzes how these women, who have the opportunity to participate in social life with their religious Muslim identity, want to expand their own spaces by considering the limits of their freedom with their religious sensitivities and how they establish tactical relations with state institutions, politics, family, tradition, religion, and secular environments. Finally, this thesis aimed to contribute to the literature by claiming that Okuyan (2018) claims that instead of being stuck in the narrow space of "in-between", these women expand their area of existence by oscillating in a larger maneuver field by "pyling-between".

APPENDIX A  
NVIVO CODING TREE

Name	Description
<b>Participants</b>	
Demographic Information	
Female	
Male	
Gender	
Age	Age group
Parents (family background)	migration background
Social status (participant, family)	Parents' Educational level, parents' occupation,
Information about the participant's household	Single parent, split family, social housing,
<b>Organization/ Group</b>	

Information about the organization/informal group	charity/company/branches/public/private/informal group
History (general and also history of personal involvement)	
Meeting spaces/places	Any; official, informal, public, private...
Participants	People attending group activities
Motives for involvement	
Activities	
Volunteering (public kitchen, collecting clothes and food for refugees/homeless etc.)	
Music	Genres of music, ethnic music, instruments, choir etc.
Sports	

Dancing	
Games	Board games and other games
Street performance	
Women only	
Men only	
Membership/informal sense of belonging to the group	
Decision making	
Financial aspects	
Accessibility	
Solidarity/ mutual help/collaboration	

Political views	Political views in the group or among the group members, deliberate inclusion or exclusion of political views
<b>CULTURE</b>	
Definitions of culture	
Local culture	
National culture	
Ethnic culture	
European culture	
Learning about culture inside school	
Learning about culture in family	

Learning about culture with peers	
<b>Interaction with other people and cultures</b>	
<b>Public Space</b>	
Neighbourhood	
Street	
Park	
School	
Peer group/ friends	
Neighbours	
Charity / Youth workers	
Police	
Representatives of laws regulating public spaces	

<b>Private Space</b>	
Family	
Peer group/ friends	
<b>Belonging</b>	
Cultural Identity	
Making Friends	
Enablers of interaction (within the group and outside the group)	
Barriers for interaction (within the group and outside the group)	
<b>CULTURAL HERITAGE</b>	
Tradition	Similarities or differences from national/local/familial culture and traditions
History	

National history	
Local History	
Culture	
Cultural education	
Identity	(ethnic, confessional, national. supra-national. regional, identity based on musical or similar style)
Styles	(clothes, dress code,
<b>PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPES (PERCEPTION OF)</b>	
<b>Stigmatization and labelling</b>	
Territorial stigma	

Stigma	
Racism	
<b>Conflict</b>	
Sites of conflict	
Dealing with conflict	
Forms of conflict	
Consequences of conflict	
<b>Identifying Us and Them</b>	
Gender	
Class and social status	
Religion focused	

Conservative	
Minority groups	
<b>FUTURE</b>	
Ideas about future - education	
Future plans	

## APPENDIX B

### ETHICAL COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Evrak Tarih ve Sayısı: 30.04.2022-64412

T.C.  
BOĞAZIÇI ÜNİVERSİTESİ  
SOSYAL VE BEŞERİ BİLİMLER YÜKSEK LİSANS VE DOKTORA TEZLERİ ETİK İNCELEME  
KOMİSYONU  
TOPLANTI KARAR TUTANAĞI

Toplantı Sayısı : 31  
Toplantı Tarihi : 28.04.2022  
Toplantı Saati : 10:00  
Toplantı Yeri : Zoom Sanal Toplantı  
Bulunanlar : Prof. Dr. Ebru Kaya, Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen  
Bulunmayanlar :

Ece Esmer  
Sosyoloji

Sayın Araştırmacı,

"Her gece birlikte söylemek: Türkiye'de müslüman kadının yeni görüntüleri" başlıklı projeniz ile ilgili olarak yaptığımız SBB-EAK 2022/36 sayılı başvuru komisyonumuz tarafından 28 Nisan 2022 tarihli toplantıda incelenmiş ve uygun bulunmuştur.

Bu karar tüm üyelerin toplantıya çevrimiçi olarak katılımı ve oybirliği ile alınmıştır. COVID-19 önlemleri kapsamında kurul üyelerinden ıslak imza almamadığı için bu onay mektubu üye ve raportör olarak Yasemin Sohtorik İlkmen tarafından bütün üyeler adına e-imzalanmıştır.

Saygılarımızla, bilgilerinizi rica ederiz.

Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin  
SOHTORİK İLKMEN  
ÜYE

e-imzalıdır  
Dr. Öğr. Üyesi Yasemin Sohtorik  
İlkmen  
Öğretim Üyesi  
Raportör

SOBETİK 31 28.04.2022

**Bu belge, güvenli elektronik imza ile imzalanmıştır.**

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