

**Domestic sources of Russian foreign policy and their impact on Russia's
relations with Azerbaijan.**

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by

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Abstract

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The proposed thesis analyses Russian foreign policy during 90-s. The focus of the study is the domestic actors inside Russian politics and their impact on Russia's relations with its Near Abroad, particularly with its southern neighbour Azerbaijan. Foreign policy analysis is accepted as the method of research. Theoretical framework of foreign policy provides for our better understanding of complex relations within Russian government and how they are related to the world.

Chronologically, we have studied decision-making during Soviet time hypothesizing that some features of "Soviet behavior" could also be continuing in current Russian politics. Perestroika and regime change in Russia gave birth to new actors who were in support of Russia's cooperative relations with West and other countries. These new forces encountered a difficult task of competing with older ones with more hostile agenda and discourse.

Russia's Azerbaijan policy is analysed against the background of this fundamental transformation of Russian state, politics, society, economy and identity. Traditional attitudes of mind and new pragmatic approaches, myths and reality, political ideas and economic profit – these all are two contradictory sides of Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan during last decade.

Kısa Özet

Bu tezde 90'lı yıllarda Rusya Federasyonu dış politikası incelenmektedir. Bu tez Rus iç politika yapısının ülkenin Yakın Çevre'yle ve özellikle güney komşusu olan Azerbaycan'la ilişkilerin nasıl etkilendiği üzerine odaklanır. Araştırma yöntemi olarak dış siyaset analizi yöntemini benimser. Dış siyasetin teorik çerçevesi Rusya devleti içindeki karmaşık ilişkileri ve onların dışa nasıl yansıdığını daha iyi anlamamızı sağlar.

Kronolojik olarak, ilk önce Sovyet dış politikasında karar verme sürecini incelemeye çalıştık. Burada amaç tarihten günümüze süregelen bazı özellikleri tespit etmektir. Perestroika ve rejim değişikliği Rusya'da siyasi sahneye Batı'yla ve başka ülkelerle daha yakın ilişkileri destekleyen yeni aktörler getirdi. Bu yeni aktörler daha agresif tutuma sahip olan eski aktörlerle ağır bir rekabete girmek zorunda kaldılar.

Rusyanın Azerbaycana yönelik politikaları bu bağlamda, yani Rus devletinde, siyasetinde, ekonomisinde, toplumunda ve kimliğinde olan köklü dönüşümün ışığında tartışılıyor. Farklı bakış açıları ve pragmatik yaklaşımlar, mitler ve gerçekler, siyasi fikirler ve ekonomik çıkarlar – hepsi geçen onyılda Rusya'nın Azerbaycan politikalarını oluşturan iki zıt ana hatın yansımalarıdır.

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Introduction

The aim of my study is to analyze the impact of domestic politics on Russian Federation's foreign policies during different periods in the post Cold War era and the implications which these policies have had on the relations between the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijani Republic.

Throughout 90's significant changes have occurred within the frontiers of former Soviet Union in political, economic, societal and cultural terms. The new social forces, predominantly associated with business emerged during perestroika and partial liberalization of prices in 1992 in Russia. To the great extent, the internal alterations of social and political forces – emergence of new as well as the revival of old actors – have made impact on how the foreign policy of Russian Federation has been shaped during last decade. Russian decision-makers' options and attitudes have varied within wide spectrum of policy alternatives. Obviously, one of the fundamental problems of Russian foreign policy during indicated period has been its lack of expertise, incentive and capacity to formulate and implement an elaborate policy towards the world. This incapacity to sketch an elaborated foreign policy “has awaken many of Russia's ancient dilemmas and motivations, ranging from pan-Slavic messianism to Slavophile isolationism”¹

After the collapse of Soviet Union the old administration and bureaucratic system of USSR has experienced some changes and faced specific problems. Although Russia obtained a lion's share of the institutions and bureaucratic apparatus of USSR located in Moscow, the problem has emerged when Russian policy makers realized that they have

¹ Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot, “Russia and the new states of Eurasia: the politics of upheaval,” (Cambridge University Press, 1994) p.198

little information about their neighbors, newly independent states. This could, probably, be interpreted by the understanding that traditionally, Russians have never perceived the nations of “internal empire” as “others” and therefore, the leadership was far unaware and lacked also information background of how to construct the relations with the “newly emerged neighbours”. This so-called “identity crisis” appeared within Russian society and leadership coined the early Russian foreign policy towards former Soviet Union.

Initial uncoordinance and ingovernability in foreign policy has also affected perception of Russia inside former Soviet nations. Particular ministries, Parliamentary Committees, military bosses tended to act on their own without previously consulting Moscow. The states of former Soviet Union were considering the actions of particular actors as Kremlin’s strategic line and formulating their initial perceptions towards Russia in that perspective.

In order to shed some light at the phenomena of Russian foreign policy during the last decade, we decided to proceed in the following way.

In the First Chapter, we tried to review some useful sources related to theoretical concept of foreign policy and its relation to domestic context. The chapter includes matters related to:

- understanding of foreign policy phenomena in general,
- how analysis of foreign policy should be made
- what are the role and weight of domestic sources and actors in the making of foreign policy

Our focus on domestic politics and domestic actors can be explained by an assumption that domestic politics has a big share in the making of foreign policy. Especially, when Russia is under scrutiny, we can probably assume that domestic factors have had more influence in formulation of foreign policy than external factors. As Rosenau put it: "International environment is more important in determining of foreign policies of small states than it is of large ones".²

Therefore, trying to explain foreign policy through domestic change in Russia, we decided to specify the former (Russian foreign policy) as our dependent variable, and the latter (domestic transformation) as our independent variable. Identity crisis and coordination between governmental structures will be our intervening variables having been derived from domestic transformation variable.

Second Chapter concentrates on internal developments of Russian foreign policy as the country has been transforming from the USSR to the Russian Federation. Perestroika has brought a lot of incentive for Russian politics and society to get rid of totalitarian pressure of the communist party. Domestic situation and economic disadvantage of late Soviet system has hugely affected foreign policy having made it less ideologized. Gorbachev ceased using classic Soviet jargon of "world class struggle" and "world socialism". In contrast, proponents of perestroika focused more on the necessity and even crucialty of economic cooperation with Western countries. After independence, pro-Western forces which came to power under the leadership of populist democrat Boris Yeltsin continued the line initiated by ideologues of perestroika. Russian leaders at this initial stage of foreign policy were constructing their identity on the ground of

² James Rosenau., "Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy " (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1976) p.47-48

Western values of democracy, human rights, market economy etc. However, such an idealist and “irresponsible” leaning towards West irritated nationalists and conservatives in Russia who believed that Russia could only be successful if it pursued its “own way” (*samobytnost*). Consequently, we could roughly assume Russian politics to be divided along two major lines: between nationalists, conservatives and communists from one side, and liberals, pro-western group and democrats from the other. Foreign policy has been the focal point of these two groups in Russian politics. While first group has used rhetoric of restoring Russia’s lost pride and influence in the “near abroad”, the second group has advocated the ideas of approaching West and obtaining democratic and liberal values.

In the third chapter, our focus is the application of Russian policies to a particular state – The Republic of Azerbaijan. The Republic of Azerbaijan, having been one of fifteen republics of former Soviet Union, occupies an important place in Russian foreign policy due to two reasons: 1 - it has a geostrategic value for Russia’s connection to the Middle East, the Transcaucas and Central Asia 2 – it possesses rich oil resources. Accepting Pain’s categorization we assume that Russian foreign policy toward Azerbaijan has run along three main strategies during three major stages. These strategies are: isolationism (seeing Azerbaijan as a burden rather than an asset for Russia), domination (Azerbaijan, together with Caucasus is the “backyard” of Russia) and cooperation (Russia could obtain more influence in Azerbaijan through peacefully cooperating with it mostly in economic sphere)³. After gaining independence

³ Emil Pain, “Contagious ethnic conflicts and border disputes along Russia’s southern flank”, posted at <http://www.indem.ru/PUBLICATII/pain/ConflSouF.htm>

Azerbaijan's new democratic and pro-western leadership started to negotiate oil deals with leading world petroleum companies. Initially, Russian foreign policy leadership, while preferring to take a course of integration with the West appeared to be tolerant and indifferent to Azerbaijan's initiatives. However, the obvious failure of economic reforms in Russia brought to the scene conservative attitudes reviving old Brezhnev-like doctrines of "near abroad" and Russia's "special role" in these areas. With communists and hard line nationalists under Zhirinovski gaining majority in the Parliament, initial idealistic and isolationist flavor of Russian foreign policy has disappeared. During the second period Azerbaijan became almost an enemy for Russia. Only after Russian failure in first Chechen war the pragmatic wing of Russian leadership realized the necessity of developing cooperative relations with Azerbaijan. This can be explained by Russian decision-makers' realization of the fact that forceful projection of power around its borders has likely been to overstretch resources of Russia which was in a disadvantageous economic situation. This trend has been continuing until today.

One of the very significant events in Russian-Azerbaijani relations has been Putin's election to the presidency of Russian Federation. He has proved to have a pragmatic approach to the situation in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, he is supported by and supports himself the petroleum lobby, which has big interests in Caspian region. Economy started to be of primary importance for new "Sankt-Peterburg elite", which adopted also a pro-Western attitude. The creation of "friendly relations with neighbours" appeared in recent rhetoric of Russian leaders. Nevertheless, decision-makers in Kremlin do not wholeheartedly intend to lose control over Azerbaijan. Having changed only the

ways to achieve the goal they still think of Azerbaijan as a part of Russian sphere of influence.

Chapter 1. Theoretical framework: A literature review

1.1 Theories of foreign policy

Explanation of state behavior is one of the central tasks for the scholar in international relations discipline. Rosenau defines foreign policy as “authoritative actions, which governments take – or are committed to take – in order either to preserve desirable aspects of international environment or to alter its undesirable aspects”. In the general framework of “adaptive behavior” of organisms and societies, Rosenau, picks out foreign policy as different form of behavior in terms of its being a “purposeful, calculated and goal oriented”:

“The action may be hasty or considered, vague or pointed, long-range or short-range; but it will always be directed towards some conception of what events should or should not occur abroad. It is not random behavior. Officials undertake the action on the basis of some calculations, rational or irrational. The objective may be only that of muddling through a situation, but it is nonetheless purposeful action because criteria for coping with the situation must be used in order to muddle through it. In other words, some image of how the environment should be structured necessarily underlies every external activity undertaken by governments, and it is in this sense that foreign policy is a

distinctive form of adaptive behavior. Contrarily, he defines other types of social behavior (of particular individuals or groups) as “merely uncoordinated sum of many private decisions” which is quite different from foreign policy⁴.

Thompson and Macridis⁵ emphasize the intriguing and complex character of foreign policy as compared to other aspects of policy making. They trace foreign policy analysis from the times of French Revolution within two conceptual approaches. First one, labeled ideological approach, sees foreign policy primarily in psychological terms, binding it to the motives and ideologies of leaders and government. As a result foreign policy is “a function of political system in action” or of the preferences or convictions of political leaders who carry out its paradigms. This approach classifies foreign policies as democratic and totalitarian, libertarian or socialist and peace loving or aggressive. The second approach concentrates on divergent determinants of state’s behavior as its historic traditions, geographical location, national interest or security needs. As opposed to the ideological approach this paradigm implies that foreign policy transcends individual beliefs and ideologies regardless of the party in power or the leaders and their private or public philosophies. In present study we will try to examine this argument against the situation in early Russian and generally within Post-Soviet foreign policies.

Jacobson and Zimmerman⁶ raise the same question: Why do states, or those acting in the name of states, act as they do in the international arena? Before answering to the question authors acknowledge relative complexity of developing comprehensive

⁴James N. Rosenau. “Comparing foreign policies: Why, What, How” in James Rosenau (ed.) *Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods*, (SAGE Publications, 1974), p.7

⁵ Kenneth W. Thompson and Roy C. Macridis “The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy” in Kenneth W. Thompson and Roy C. Macridis (eds.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Prentice Hall, 1976), p.3

⁶ Harold Karan Jacobson and William Zimmerman, “Approaches to the Analysis of Foreign Policy Behavior” in H.K. Jacobson and W. Zimmerman (eds.), *The Shaping of Foreign Policy* (New-York, Atherton, 1969), p.5

foreign policy theories, due to the fact that many “vital processes are conducted in secret or at least in a narrowly circumscribed arena”. Authors also conclude that it is extremely difficult to apply statistical techniques in this field of research because some variables are not susceptible to quantification.

Wallace⁷ emphasizes that there remains a “disturbing lack of clarity or even an active disagreement” about the definition and characteristics of many aspects of foreign policy. First, the very term of “foreign policy” and the area of its political activity are still being discussed. To some, the term means “a conscious image of what is or ought to be the country’s place in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decision on specific issues”. To others it means rather “a field of related but distinct actions and issues, in which there neither is nor can be foreign policy in general”. Second, the actors of international politics are not defined ultimately. “...To talk of states as such (only actors of international politics) is clearly too crude and leads easily to mistaken assumptions about the bases of foreign states’ behavior”. Objectives governments follow, or should follow, are the third area of uncertainty.

According to the first, very popular view, which can be associated with the school of realism in international relations, states pursue their national interest in foreign policy defined as the maximization of national power. “Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. Statesmen and peoples may

⁷William Wallace, “Foreign Policy and The Political Process”, (London : Macmillan, 1971), p.11

ultimately seek freedom, security, prosperity or power itself... But whenever they strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power”⁸

The second school talks about national *interests* rather than of a single national interest. Considerations of prestige, economic gain, and domestic advantage as well as of national security form part of “that apparently single thing, the country’s foreign policy”. The relationship between foreign policy and domestic political process is the fourth point of disagreement among scholars of political science. There are two types of approach to the foreign political process: 1) from the viewpoint of its role within the national political system and 2) within the international system. Those who regard foreign policy as an aspect of international politics tend to limit their attention to governments and foreign offices giving less space to domestic context. Contrarily, scholars regarding foreign policy from the role domestic social and political environment plays in influencing and determining foreign policy tend to see partisan conflict, interest group pressure and elite opinion as rather more central to the formulation of policy in this area⁹.

1.2 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

The analysis of foreign policy should be *multicausal* and *probabilistic* rather than *monocausal* and *deterministic*. According to this rule, Jacobson et al have criticized previous theories and research in this field grouped into five principal categories:

⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, “Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace”, 3rd ed. (New-York, Knopf, 1960), p.27.

⁹ William Wallace, op.cit., p.13

- The systemic theories (states act as they do because of the nature of the international system of which they are part)
- Environmental theories (foreign policy behavior is the product of non-human environmental characteristics of the state)
- Societal theories (foreign policy behavior is the external manifestation of domestic societal forces, e.g. Marxist theories)
- Idiosyncratic or psychological (foreign policy is explained in terms of the individual characteristics of the state: nature of regime, the system of government¹⁰)

Further on, in our study of Russian foreign policy we are going to examine primarily the implications of last two groups of theories dealing with domestic situation and with its perceptual dimension.

Hermann, East and Salmore¹¹ view foreign policy behavior of governments as resulting from *random elements* and *discernible regularities*. Random elements are the factors that influence foreign policy behavior with an unpredictable likelihood of occurrence. Thus, they are to be regarded more like accidents: a sudden death of a world leader, canceling the summit meeting because of domestic riot. Contrarily, the factors influencing foreign policy with some regularity can produce patterns in foreign affairs and their influence can also be explained. However, it is also acknowledged that the

¹⁰Jacobson and Zimmerman, op.cit., p.7-9

¹¹ Maurice A. East, Stephen A. Salmore, Charles F. Hermann (eds), "Why nations act : theoretical perspectives for comparative foreign policy studies", (Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage Publications, 1978), p. 14

advancing of human knowledge in various aspects of the world can render some accidental factors predictable. Authors also criticize earlier explanations of foreign policy dividing them into two groups:

- a) Explanations with single and highly generalized determinants such as state power, geophysical location, social class, elite or group interest, leader personality and national interest. Although it appeared to be a reasonable strategy to begin with, soon the majority of analysts concluded that most single-factor explanations were unsatisfactory.
- b) Analysts in the second group, contrarily, offered a list of numerous elements that presumably influenced foreign policy rather than attempting to explain foreign policy in terms of a single factor. The shortage of this group is that the factors contributing to foreign policy were identified only by broad concepts (e.g. public opinion, technology, polarity) without of either the boundaries or discrete variable that were supposed to be included.

In the face of these conclusions, an increasing recognition of the need for more complex explanations of foreign policy behavior has emerged. The construction of a framework, in which to organize and locate numerous factors that could regularly influence foreign policy, has been an early step to the development of more complex explanatory system. Snyder et al (1954) has come up with decision-making framework and Allison (1969) persuasively demonstrated that “one can arrive at strikingly varied

interpretations of the same occurrence when focusing on different sets of explanatory variables from different frameworks or perspectives”¹².

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin stressed the decision-making framework as the most appropriate method of analyzing foreign policy as well as international relations in general. He argued that in order to understand the external behavior of a state one “should think in terms of decision-makers and how they orient to action” For these purposes one must consider them (decision-makers) as participants in a “system of action”. Snyder et al stresses the importance of decision making-framework in the analysis of foreign policy:

“One may describe particular events, conditions and interactions without necessarily probing the nature and outcome of the processes through which state action evolves. However, and the qualification is crucial, if one wishes to probe “why” questions underlying the events, conditions and interaction patterns which rest upon state action, then decision-making analysis is certainly necessary. We would go so far as to say that the why questions cannot be analyzed without analysis of decision-making”¹³.

Allison¹⁴ proposed three models by which one can explain foreign policy behavior. Model I or Rational Actor Model (RAM) explains the happenings in foreign affairs as the “more or less purposive acts of unified national governments”. Laymen, theorists

¹² East, Salmore, and Hermann op.cit., p 16

¹³ Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, Burton Sapin (eds.), “Foreign policy decision-making : an approach to the study of international politics”, (New-York.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p.86

¹⁴ Graham Allison, Filip Zelikow, “Essence of decision : explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis” , (New York : Longman 1999), p.5

and strategic analysts focus attention on goals and objectives of the nation or government explaining by this the reasons under nation's acting in particular way:

“Predictions about what a nation will do or would have done are generated by calculating the rational thing to do in a certain situation, given specified objectives”

Thus, the concept of *rationality* is the main underlying trait of the model. Allison argues, however, that being only goal-oriented and purposive is not sufficient for to conceive of behavior as “action”. In addition to Rosenau's notion of foreign policy being a purposive and goal-oriented behavior, Allison in Rational Actor Model includes the idea of *consistency* of foreign policy action:

“What rationality adds to the concept of purpose is *consistency*: consistency among goals and objectives relative to the particular action; consistency in the application of principles in order to select the optimal alternative. Rationality denotes behavior that is appropriate to specified goals in the context of a given situation”¹⁵

Therefore, in pursuing explanation or prediction an analyst viewing state's behavior from Model I lenses ask following questions:

1. What are the objective (or perceived) circumstances that the state conceives as threats and opportunities?

¹⁵Allison, Zelikow, *op.cit.*, p.17

2. What are the states' goals (e.g. survival, maximization of power, etc.)?
3. What are the objective (or perceived) options for addressing this issue?
4. What are the objective (or perceived) strategic costs and benefits of each option?
5. What is the state's best choice given these conditions?¹⁶

However, Allison also argues that Rational Actor Model should be supplemented by “frames of reference that focus on the governmental machine – the organizations and political actors involved in the policy process”. Model I’s implication that important events have important causes, i.e. that monoliths perform large actions for large reasons must be balanced by the appreciation that

- 1) Monoliths are black boxes covering various gears and levers in a highly differentiated decision-making structure and
- 2) Large acts result from innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals at various levels of organizations in the service of a variety of only partially compatible conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives¹⁷

This theory provides the background for Organizational Behavior Model, according to which what is featured as “acts” and “choices” in Model I are thought of as “*outputs* of large organizations functioning according to regular patterns of behavior”. Government, according to the second model is a “vast conglomerate of loosely allied organizations, each with a substantial life of its own”:

¹⁶ Allison, Zelikow, op.cit., p.390

¹⁷ Allison, Zelikow, op.cit., p.5

“Government leaders sit formally on top of these conglomerates. But governments perceive problems through organizational sensors. Governments define alternatives and estimate consequences as their component organizations process information; governments act as these organizations enact routines. Governmental behavior can therefore be understood, according to a second conceptual model, less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior”¹⁸

Model II supposes that governments should not be “anthropomorphized” as if they are an individual person. Rather, the subjects in Model II explanations are organizations and their behavior is explained in terms of organizational purposes and practices common to the members of the organization, not those peculiar to one or another individual.

The questions supposed to be used by Model II analyst are the following:

1. Of what organizations (and organizational components) does the government consist (e.g., Strategic Rocket Forces, KGB, military intelligence, etc.)?
2. What capabilities and constraints do these organizations’ existing SOPs (standard operation procedures) create in producing information about international conditions, threats, and opportunities?
3. What capabilities and constraints do these organizations’ existing SOPs create in generating the menu of options for action?

¹⁸ Allison, Zelikow, *op.cit.*, p.143

4. What capabilities and constraints do these organizations' existing SOPs establish for implementing whatever is chosen?¹⁹

Allison's third model gives attention to the politics of a government. Events in foreign affairs are characterized neither as unitary choice nor as organizational outputs. What happens is understood rather as "a resultant of bargaining games among players in the national government". In this sort of bargaining outcomes are formed, and deformed by the interaction of competing preferences:

"In contrast with Model I, the Governmental Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players: players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse *intranational* problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent sets of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but the pulling and hauling that is politics"²⁰

Model III questions include:

1. *Who* plays? That is, whose views and values count in shaping the choice and action?
2. What *factors* shape each *player's* (a) preconditions; (b) preferred course of action, and thus (c) the player's stand on the issue?
3. What *factors* account for each *player's* impact on the choice and action?

¹⁹ Allison, Zelikow, op.cit. P.390

²⁰ Allison, Zelikow, op.cit. p.255

4. What is the “*action channel*”, that is, the established process for aggregating competing perceptions, preferences and stands of players in making decision and taking action?

1.3 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy

On the example of Allison’s theory, we have already discussed the running of institutional procedure of decision-making. Now we can take a brief look at the impact of domestic political, social and economic processes for to specify their possible impact on foreign policy making.

Wallace defines foreign policy as the “area of politics which bridges the all important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment – the boundary which defines the nation-state, within the limits of which national governments claim supreme authority”. He also adds that the problem of foreign policy study’s being on the boundary of Political Science and International Relations gives certain distinctiveness and peculiar difficulty to the study²¹.

Frankel²² argues that, in fact, the distinction between domestic and foreign is much less clear and the divorce between the two has never been complete. He states that: “Even in powerful continental countries, such as Napoleonic France or Bismarckian Germany, military requirements and foreign policy objectives invariably mingle with the basic issues of domestic politics”.

²¹ William Wallace., *opsit.*, p.7

²² Josef Frankel , “The making of foreign policy : an analysis of decisionmaking”, (London, New York : Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 85

Governments make foreign policy in the context of domestic as well as international pressures. However, decision makers in foreign policy are much more intimately connected with their domestic than with their foreign environment. Through internalizing its values, through partaking in the national culture and characteristics, through being constantly exposed to influences and pressures in the play of domestic politics, they are actually part and parcel of it. Therefore, along with institutional structure by which governments make and implement foreign policies, we must also consider the whole domestic political process as it affects government's policy-making.²³

In terms of sources of decision-making in foreign policy, the world of diplomacy remained an intimate and aristocratic one. Foreign policy has tended for long to be the matter for the executive branch of government. However, even before the WWI the international and domestic conditions, which supported this aristocratic insulation of foreign policy, had been significantly challenged. Since then the transformation of the environment of foreign policy by political, economic, technological and social developments has entirely altered the policy-maker's situation. Deutsch explains this change in the following way:

“Mass education and mass literacy have widened the potential circle of informed public opinion; radio and television arguably have widened it still further. The external demands which external policy (above all in the shape of defense policy) now make on domestic resources, the sharper competition for resources between different sectors in countries committed to economic growth and social improvement, and the impact which the high level of government

²³ Wallace, opsit p.12

spending makes on the citizens in the form of taxes, have brought the pressure of foreign policy to bear much more directly in domestic politics. So, it has become obvious that foreign policy, like all politics, can no longer be made by the few”²⁴

Deutsch analyses also the groups of interests as a factor that influences foreign policy decision-making, pointing to the wide range of social groups, including largest banks, investment houses, private business corporations. Another groups are military, higher bureaucracy, diplomats, mass media, professional politicians and even the universities as “think industries”²⁵.

Rosenau argues that although domestic sources are not always primary sources of foreign policy, they may be of considerable significance and sometimes they may be even well dominant²⁶

The significance of domestic politics in foreign policy was advocated by the students of *Innenpolitik* school which emerged as a counterweight to realist one mostly among Marxists and liberals who claim that not all the states are alike, that the causes of international conflict often lie within states. *Innenpolitik* school dismisses the strategic rationales of statesmen locating the roots of foreign policy in the social and economic structure of states²⁷

²⁴ Karl W. Deutsch, “The Analysis of International Relations”, (Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1968), p.38

²⁵ *ibid* p. 40

²⁶ James Rosenau (ed.) *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*, (New York.: Free Press, 1967), p.4.

²⁷ Farid Zakaria. *Realism and Domestic Politics. International Security*. VOL 17, No 1 pp. 177-198

Rosenau highlights some domestic factors as actors attitudes, institutions and processes. The actors are executive and legislative officials, civilian bureaucrats, political parties, interest groups and elite groups. Attitudes include ideology, political culture and public opinion. Institutions are executive, legislative, bureaucracy and military establishment, elections, party system, community systems and social institutions. And finally, the processes include socialization, recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation, policy making and policy administration²⁸

Mc Faul, elaborating on domestic politics' impact on foreign policy, comes up with the theory hypothesizing that domestic regime change – be it democratization, autocratization, decolonization etc – has often triggered international conflict or war. He argues that when a regime changes decaying institutions from ancien regime compete with the new rules of the game to shape political competition in ambiguous way:

“In desperation, losers from regime change may resort to violence to maintain their former privileges. Such internal conflicts become international wars when these interest groups who benefitted from the old order call upon their allies to intervene on their behalf or strike out against their enemies as a means to shore up their domestic legitimacy”. “In the modern world”, McFaul continues, “the scale of international strife that followed regime changes in France in the eighteenth century or Russia, Germany and Italy in the twentieth century, suggests that alterations in the internal balance of power of a given state may be one of the most important causes of international war”²⁹. This hypothesis about the importance of domestic politics for understanding the causes of international war seems to seriously challenge realist explanations of war, which do

²⁸ James Rosenau, (ed) “Linkege Politics”, Free Press 1969, p. 51-52

²⁹ M.McFaul. “Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy” International Security, VOL 22, N3, 97/98, p.5-6

not give much credit to domestic factors and explain international relations from state-centric paradigm.

Chapter 2. Domestic sources of Russian foreign policy

2.1. Theories of Soviet Foreign Policy

One of the most explicit denominators of Soviet foreign policy was thought to be its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Ideology has a huge part in the formulation of images and perceptions of the world beyond the Soviet borders.

Thus, one of the pillars of Soviet leaders' foreign policy was their conviction that Marxism-Leninism was a scientific system that had uncovered the fundamental laws of social evolution giving its supporters the capacity of prediction and partial control of events. This prediction coined Soviet diplomacy with an air of supreme confidence and dogmatic self-righteousness³⁰. Some attempts had been made by different scholars in the aftermath of WW II to think of explanatory theories capable of predicting Soviet behavior³¹. These theories attracted passionate proponents as well as adherents.

³⁰ Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet foreign policy" in Kenneth Thompson and Roy Macridis (eds.), *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p.171

³¹ There are always confusions concerning the terminology as many Sovietologists used "Russian" instead of "Soviet" when describing Soviet behavior. Admittedly, most of Western scholars conceded that Soviet behavior was predominantly "Russian" in nature. For a detailed explanation see Helmut Schmidt, "The Soviet Union: challenges and responses as seen from the European point of view", (Singapore: Institute of South-East Asian Studies, 1984)

Malik³² gives a short description of seventeen theories of Soviet external behavior produced by fifty-five scholars, including anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, political theorists, historians and practitioners of modern diplomacy. It would be worthwhile to touch upon some of them briefly.

Anthropological theory states that Russian personality is distinguished by ambivalence, frustration and fear. As a result Russian man is going up and down between fatalistic acceptance of totalitarian control and an urge to destroy scapegoats.

Psychoanalytic theory agrees that character determines politics. As regards Soviet character, two principal drives mark it: a) preoccupation with death, and b) latent homosexual impulses.

Sociological theory. The functionally operating characteristics of Soviet system are at the center of such theory. The points of strain are located in the Soviet system. For instance, Soviets are ignorant of the realities of outside world.

Historical theories tend to be the most popular among scholars and are divided into:

Geopolitical theory (George F.Kennan, Henry Kissinger), which maintains that strategic, interests dictated Soviet foreign policy from its position as a great landmass power. Its contemporary aspirations reflect the historic drive of Great Russia's policy.

Marxist theory or Basic Ideology (Lenin, Stalin, Dulles) is based on the existed debate between Americans and Soviets on the question of whether being a Communist or Russian is prior to Soviet leaders.

³² Hafez Malik. "Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy towards South Asia and the Middle East" St. Martin's Press, 1990 p. 1-39

Great Russian Imperialism (Harry Truman, Winston S.Churchill, Dean G.Acheson) supports the notion that Soviet domestic and foreign policy simply continued Great Russian national traditions and Marxism had never penetrated deeply into the social structure of Russia.

The champions of the *Eurasian theory* (Vernadskiy, Savitskiy, Trubetskoy, Kolarz) believe that Russia has always displayed a strong orientation towards Asia. The despotic nature of communism is thought to be something inherent to Asia rather than to the civilized Europe. The peak of eurasianists' domination in Russian Federation is thought to be the years of 1992-1999 when they have had a considerable impact on decision-making.

Urge to the Sea theory (Robert J.Kerner) Explains Soviet foreign policy objectives as a function of maritime factors, which have tremendously influenced it. A land locked Russia is not an independent country. Marxist state has not changed an urge to the sea. USSR's ambitions after WW II were directed toward control over the Skagerrak, the Dardanelles, the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region.

Schmidt agrees that the great part of Soviet foreign policy could be explained in these historical and political terms:

“He who wishes to understand future Russian behavior ought to study Russian history. The behavior of Soviet Union today is, in my view, at least three-quarters Russian behavior and if it comes out, 25 percent Bolshevik or Communist behavior. It is the Russian superpower we are dealing with and it would not be much different if it were not a Communist power but some other

form of dictatorship under a Tsar or whoever it might have been. Russia has always tried either to expand its borders or to enlarge its empire.”³³

2.2 Decision-making in Soviet foreign policy

Aspaturian, in his attempt to analyze the formulation of early Soviet foreign policy, complained of the “absence of periodic and systematic publication of documents, of the inaccessibility of archives and officials, the virtual nonexistence of memoirs and diaries of retiring statesmen, the puzzling duplication of party and state institutions, the perplexing fluctuations in their relationships, the ambiguity of Soviet ideology, the wide discrepancy between theory and practice, the arbitrary tendency to ignore elaborately detailed institutional channels and finally the convulsive turnover of personalities”³⁴

Stalin’s foreign policy was distinguished by his strong personal discretion. All rival and dissident views were discarded and their adherents liquidated. Most of the time Stalin simply acted without consulting even Politburo members. Although Politburo and Foreign Ministry existed as institutions dealing with foreign affairs, their weight in establishing foreign policy proved to be considerably lower as compared to Stalin’s wide authority. Foreign Minister usually was not the member of Politburo. In turn, the importance of Politburo was reduced and its work disorganized by the creation within it of various commissions – the so-called “quintets”, “sextets”, “septets” and “novenaries”.

³³ Helmut Schmidt, *op.cit.*, p.9

³⁴ Aspaturian, *op.cit.* p. 178

According to Khrushchev, these steps taken by Stalin was not devised for organizational efficiency but, actually, for the weakening of the collective body's authority.³⁵

During the Cold War the Politburo had played significant role in foreign policy-making. This indicates that actually the party and not the government institutions had a final say in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, according to Soviet literature, party congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions determined and established the general line in foreign policy, while Politburo appeared to be a secondary institution responsible for policy according to the decisions handed down by the congresses and plenums. As a matter of fact, the Politburo, however, is agreed to have been the key decision-maker.³⁶

Communist Party, like a "sovereign", claimed a monopoly of power. But in practice, the Soviet Baronies – the nomenclature of the party and government, the bosses of industry and agriculture, the armed forces, the KGB also claimed their share of power.

The Party apparatus had also a prevailing role over Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This continued until 1973 when the Foreign Minister was granted a full voting membership and acted as a personal advisor to the General Secretary. Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko was a first carrier diplomat in Politburo. But the real shift towards more independent MFA turned to be under Gorbachev as the First Secretary of

³⁵ Aspaturian, op.cit., pp. 182-183

³⁶ Melvin Goodman, "Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Process in Soviet Union" in Hafeez Malik, *Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy towards South Asia and the Middle East*, (New-York.: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p.88

Communist Party. Later, under Edward Shevardnadze as a foreign minister (since 1985) the MFA was reorganized and Foreign Minister became a full member of Politburo.³⁷

2.3 Gorbachev's de-deologization and the transformation of Soviet foreign policy.

The logic of *perestroika* initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev postulated that “the new thinking” in foreign affairs would establish a relationship with the West which would enable the Soviets to reduce the military expenditure drastically, switching investment to science, new technology and consumer goods; the economic program would construct a more decentralized market oriented system with financial incentives for workers and managements.³⁸

In 1986 Gorbachev emphasized the importance of initiative of “energetic steps to get rid of clichés and stereotypes of the past” and truly “dynamic, effective, combative diplomacy”. He called upon his diplomats to “overcome inertia and the kind of senseless stubbornness” which had earned Soviet negotiators the title of “Mr. No” and advised them to act boldly to try new approaches to the European Economic Community, arms control negotiations, human right issues and security problems in Asia. He also emphasized the need to find ways for the USSR to enter the world community³⁹

The burden of Cold War tended to be overwhelmingly exhaustive for the Soviet economy based on the administrative command system. The military security system of USSR, which was mainly directed to the threats emanating from “capitalist world”,

³⁷ Melvin Goodman, op.cit. p. 92

³⁸ Susan Saunders Vosper, “The demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” in Fateh A. Jabar (ed). *Post-Marxism and the Middle East* (Saqi Books, London 1997), p.28

³⁹ *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannix Del SSSR*, No 1, 1987, p. 4-6. quoted in Sylvia Woodbye, *Gorbachev and the decline of ideology in Soviet foreign policy*, (Boulder.: Westview Press, 1989), p. 14

created an expansive cyclical arms race. This race as well as Soviet military assistance for socialist and communist revolutions all over the world had been an enormous burden on the Soviet economy.⁴⁰

Thus at the beginning of 80's the greatest concern for Soviet leadership was not purely foreign policy or security threats but the poor state of Soviet economy, in particular, the deficiency of Soviet agriculture, which necessitated import of such essential product as grain. In 1983 Soviet Union had intended to import some 40 million tons of grain.⁴¹

Facing such tremendous capacity problems had compelled Soviet leadership to change its martial jargon in relation to the Western world. The then deputy foreign minister Adamishin wrote an article criticizing the ideological background of foreign policy. He put that:

“...Ideology is dangerous and counterproductive in world politics because it is both coercive and offensive”⁴²

The necessity in new foreign policy freed from ideology, which could reduce the East-West tension emerged as a central objective of Gorbachev's diplomacy. Gorbachev made a significant number of concessions in terms of readiness and willingness of elimination of all Soviet intermediate nuclear missiles, reinvigorated US-Soviet arms control negotiations and led to the immediate Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987. The Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan and the greater Soviet participation in international economic institutions was encouraged.

⁴⁰ Sylvia Woodbye, op. cit., p. 18

⁴¹ Helmut Schmidt, op. cit. p. 12

⁴² A. Adamishin, “Humanity's common destiny”, *International Affairs*, No 2, 1989 p.3 quoted in Woodbye, op. cit p.17

These unilateral concessions resembled the similar actions executed by Khrushchev during his so-called politics of “thaw” just after Stalin’s death. Inspired partly by the Geneva Soviet American summit and following it, he made concessions hardly conceived by the Soviet elite of that time: unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops from Finland and China, signing of a peace treaty with Austria and reduction of Soviet Army personnel.⁴³ However, the ideological difference between “thaw” and “perestroika” was obvious: While Khrushchev’s elite had thought that the Soviet system would prove the superiority of its ideology and social system by peaceful competition, Gorbachev’s elite has ceased to believe its system was superior at all. In sake of cooperation with the West on environmental, economic and social issues the initiators of perestroika were able to agree on a fundamental change. They started to use a discourse that transcended class differentiation and recognized the priority of human values. Any major difference that could bring opposing systems into conflict was denied, that is, international relations had to be de-ideologized.⁴⁴

Gorbachev’s perestroika has affected also the structure of foreign policy decision-making in late USSR. One of his first steps was bringing into Politburo of Vadim Medvedev, a Central Committee member known for his softer views towards West, who wrote a more moderate foreign policy doctrine towards the members of Warsaw Pact. He made a revolutionary declaration that Communism was in a period of crisis around the world and that the notion of class struggle was no longer a determinant of Soviet foreign policy.⁴⁵ New terms as “novoye politicheskoye myshleniye” (new

⁴³ Sergei Medvedev, “Power, space and Russian foreign policy” in Ted Topf (ed.) *Understanding Russian Foreign Policy*, (Pennsylvania State University Press., 1999), p.36

⁴⁴ Vosper, op.cit., p. 27

⁴⁵ Goodman., op.cit., p.101

political thinking), “glasnost” (openness) and “uskoreniye” (acceleration) were the messengers of fundamental changes in Soviet foreign policy. Shevardnadze who became “Mr. Yes” for the West (as opposed to Gromyko who was “Mr. No”) was pushing hard, together with Gorbachev in blaming previous Soviet leadership for the current state of East-West relations (the relations between Soviet Union and West).

The discussion and debate over foreign policy was thought to improve it. The quality of decision-making was for the first time thought to be the function of wider involvement of specialists as well as of general public opinion. These were initial steps on the way to ease the totalitarian grasp of Soviet state over foreign policy. The nineteenth Party Conference recommended that the Supreme Soviet (Soviet Parliament) should play a central role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. Shevardnadze came up with the idea that legislative commissions of Supreme Soviet should hold hearings to review policy options and have overall control over the military budget and any use of military sources outside the USSR. Shevardnadze supported the idea of “cost-effectiveness” maintained by Gorbachev, arguing that Soviet Union should avoid “vast material investment in hopeless foreign policy projects” and stressed that foreign policy should be compatible with resources and capabilities.⁴⁶ In foreign affairs these changes appeared mandatory. The success of internal economic transformation demanded a scaling down of weaponry involving a massive reduction in the military budget as well as building links into Western markets, making Western technology accessible. As it was mentioned above, Khrushchev had pioneered this softening up to the West and Gorbachev, influenced by such writers as Shakhnazarov, resumed the policy with determination.

⁴⁶ Woodbye., opsit. p. 36-39

The people who called themselves “democrats” led the ideological battle with totalitarian structure in Soviet politics, economy, society and other spheres of life. Democrats began to challenge seriously Communist Party by 1989 and soon they appeared as the dominant political grouping in Russia. One of the most striking things was that democrats were completely absent as a political force before the beginning of *perestroika* and managed to become a real competitor and pretender to the position of Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU).⁴⁷

Scholars explain that unprecedented rise by the phenomena of Soviet society, which proved to be highly educated and therefore possessed a potential to change. This very feature is acknowledged to be one of the major determinants in transformation of Soviet society and politics. As Lewin fairly put it: “The key lesson here is that a complicated urban society at some point stops responding to the urges of backward political institutions”.⁴⁸

Democrats were the “heterogeneous collection of activists” advocating a western course for the USSR and for the Russian republic. That meant Russia should have reoriented itself to multiparty democracy and market economy. The most prominent among democrats were Yeltsin, Sakharov, Rumyantsev, Afanas’ev, Kozyrev and Starovoitova.

⁴⁷ John B. Dunlop, “The rise of Russia and the fall of Soviet Empire”, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1993), p. 67

⁴⁸ Mosche Lewin, “The Gorbachev phenomenon: a historical interpretation”, (Berkeley, University of California Press 1989), p.130

2.4 The independence and foreign policy debate in Russia.

To understand Russian foreign policy since its independence one should probably trace the ideological and theoretical discourses to have affected the minds of decision-makers and made an overall imprint on the entire Russian politics of the period. Roughly putting, the major debate has been held along two schools of political thought. These were the Atlanticism and Eurasianism. In domestic politics this delineation overlapped with *zapadniks* (westernists), liberals, democrats from the one side and *derzhavniks*, *gosudarstvenniks* (statists), traditionalist, nationalists and communists from the other side. Arbatov, analyzing Russian foreign policy in the first period (1991-1993) makes a distinction between four groups within Russian foreign policy labeling them as Pro-Westerns, Moderate Liberals, Centrist and Moderate Conservatives and Neo-Communists and Nationalists⁴⁹

2.4.1. The ambiguity of Russian case: Identity Crisis

The identity crisis has made itself visible after the collapse of Soviet Union. This crisis made the most significant impact on the politics and society of Russian republic. Russians faced a qualitatively distinct situation, when the collapse of the USSR was tantamount to the collapse of the Russian state itself. The difference between Soviet and Western imperialism was that Soviet Empire did not contain a clear-cut metropolitan nation-state, which was separated from the periphery, dominated colonies and had its

⁴⁹ Aleksei Arbatov, "Russia's foreign policy alternatives", *International Security*, VOL 18 No.2 (1993) p.12

own political existence. Therefore, when the European empires broke up they did not have to create new nation-states – they had to adjust current nation-states to the new post-imperial realities. The Russians did not have any other ‘core’ nation-state to return to after break-up. The Russian and Soviet identities were closely interwoven, while the Russians had hardly any experience of living in a nation state in either their more recent or distant past⁵⁰

This crisis has proved to be the characteristic trait of Russian politics in 90-s. While trying to define “national interests” of Russia decision-makers as well as wider public have been still unaware of the change, occurred within Soviet space and consequently with Soviet government. What is “domestic” and what turned to be “foreign” were confusing for Russians as well as the people living in the former Soviet Union, now sovereign republics. As Soviet citizens, Russians profited from the ‘nebulous confinements’ (i.e. the fictitious borders separating one union republic from another) of both center and periphery. They felt at ‘home’ when migrating to Central Asia and when visiting relatives in Ukraine. This has abruptly changed: Russians have become foreigners outside Russian Federation and their country has largely been cut off from Europe, the fact that created a sort of geographical isolation if not political abandonment by the West. Thus, Russia appeared to have lost first its prestige in 1989 (by losing the external empire) and then its identity (with the lost of internal empire).⁵¹

Russian “national identity” and “national pride” damaged after the end of Cold War was one of the most important reasons under its aggressive stance towards states of “near abroad”. The “near abroad”, thus, appeared as the area where Russia

⁵⁰ Maksim Shashenkov, “Russian peace-keeping in the Near Abroad”, *Survival*, VOL 36, No.3 (1994) p.48

⁵¹ Mette Skak, “From Empire to Anarchy”, (London.:Hurst &Co, 1996), p. 141-142

could and was obliged to preserve and keep vivid its “power and hopes for victory”. Consequently, the “near abroad” has become the place on which Russian identity and international prestige could be constructed.⁵²

In regard with decision-makers in Kremlin, for the long time after dissolution of USSR, they have also perceived former Soviet space as the territory of now independent Russia. This attitude has been obvious in Russian military and foreign policy doctrines, which included items for Russia preserving its right to intervene as the guarantor of stability of “near abroad” states.⁵³

There has been a general agreement within Russian leadership that military intervention can be justified as long as it meets the requirements of one or more of the conditions below:

- contributes to the maintenance of Russia’s great power status
- protects Russians residing in the “near abroad”, including military personnel and their families
- prevents the spread of instability, especially to regions of Russia itself
- looks after Russia’s geopolitical interests, for example, protecting Russia’s southern borders and preventing the spread of Islamic fundamentalism
- coincides with nationalistic public opinion.⁵⁴

⁵² S.Dixon, “The past in the present: contemporary Russian nationalism in historical perspective” in G.Hosking and R.Service (eds.), *Russian nationalism: past and present*, (London.: McMillan, 1998), pp.163-164

⁵³ Geoffrey Hosking, “Russia and the Russians: a history from Rus to Russian Federation”, (London.: Allen Lane, 2001), p. 605

⁵⁴ Elanie Holoboff, “Russian views on military intervention: benevolent peace-keeping, Monroe doctrine or neo-imperialism?” in Lawrence Freedman (ed), *Military intervention in European conflicts*, (Oxford, UK, Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p.157

Herzig describes Russian leadership's mentality of thinking about their country's role, rights and responsibilities in the Post-Soviet space as "Post-imperial":

"This mentality is a mixture of regret at loss of power and control, resentment and ingratitude of the former Soviet republics and at the penetration of foreign competitors, and uncertainty about which direction Russia should take and how to frame policies that will steer country along that course. The mismatch between perceptions and ambitions on the one hand and resources and capabilities on the other offers, however, only a partial explanation of the problems of Russian policy in the Caucasus. Lack of coordination among multiple players and contradictions among competing sets of interests has also been important"⁵⁵

2.4.2. The impact of perceptions and identity on Russian foreign policy:

Culture One and Culture Two

The role of ideas, myths and ideologies has always been explicit and vigorous in Russian history. The ideology about Soviet Union's place in world – as the champion of international progress and proletarian revolution – constructed after October Revolution of 1917 had endured to the very collapse of USSR, though starting to be challenged already after Stalin's death. The breakup of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the collapse of whole structure of ideas. The shock waves and reverberations generated by this collapse have for a long time been traversing the field of discussion of foreign policy in Russia

⁵⁵ Edmund Herzig, "The new Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan" (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999), p. 104

In mid 1970's an architect Vladimir Paperny undertook a study of Soviet culture and dichotomized the findings in two main approaches: Culture One and Culture Two.

Culture One was associated with motion, Culture Two with settlement. In Soviet architecture, Paperny noticed, first culture was popular during October Revolution and until mid 30's, then replaced by the second culture from 30's to 70's.⁵⁶

Medvedev has tried to apply this dichotomous consequence of periods onto Russian foreign policy as well. Russian foreign policy, according to him, might be viewed as consequent, cyclic periods of Culture One and Culture Two.

Thus, Russian foreign policy in Culture One is "playful, lighthearted and irresponsible". The essence of decision in Culture One is bound to the concept of "Russian space": vast and hard to control. Decision-makers in that period tended to act self-denyingly with a feeling of sacrifice. For instance, Russian foreign policy in late 80's and early 90's is thought to be indicator of Culture one when trying to get rid of the heavy burden of Empire Russia was often giving more concessions than expected by the West (unification of Germany, withdrawal from the Middle East, refusal of support for leftist movements in Central America and Communist Parties all over the world etc.) The statement of Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev that "Russia has no national interests as such" appears to be very characteristic of Culture One.⁵⁷

Contrarily, Culture Two deals with the concept of power in Russian foreign policy. During most of the Soviet period Soviet identity and foreign policy was constructed in these terms. Beginning from 1993 with the election of right wing and communist parties to the state Duma (Russian Parliament's lower chamber) Russian

⁵⁶ Sergei Medvedev, *op.cit.* pp 15-57

⁵⁷ *ibid.* p. 36-37

decision makers became more preoccupied with the constructing of this renewed identity and placing it into foreign policy making. Vladimir Zhirinovski with its ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party was one of the ardent supporters of this old but renewed identity who strongly opposed to the damaging self-sacrificing and concessive attitudes of westernists.

2.4.3 Atlanticists or Zapadniks.

Atlanticists were supporting the course initiated by perestroika: the reduction of East-West tension and Russia's finding its place in western, European community of nations. To make these ends happened, according to Atlanticist/Wetserner School, Russia should get rid of its "messianic" attitude in international relations, trying to make more efforts in the way of integration into Western world. The world-known Russian dissident Anatoliy Solzhenitsin, who is also known as the 'father of Russian democracy' has championed the idea of civilized Russia freed from its imperial burden. Referring to the idea of early twentieth century prominent Russian political thinker S.Krijanovski, Solzhenitsin wrote:

"We are out of capacity to make efforts, we possess neither moral nor economic power. We are not strong enough to have an empire. Moreover, we have neither need for it: it is the best time to throw away this burden from our shoulders for it makes us weaker and our catastrophe close"⁵⁸

⁵⁸ Aleksandr Solzhenitsin, "Rusya nasıl kurtulur?", (Istanbul; Remzi Kitabevi, 1992), p. 14

For instance, Solzhenitsin regards the loss of Poland and Finland by Russian Empire as a useful and profitable event for Russia's reinvigoration and revival. "We have to get rid of our Caucasian and Central Asian hump as well", states he further⁵⁹

The emergence of Atlanticist school is regarded as the natural continuity of new political thinking opposing to the views and perceptions of Soviet leaders and society that "hostile Western capitalist world" will "encircled and engulfed" USSR. Consequently, Atlanticists were aware of the danger that such perceptions and creation of a hostile "others" could evoke. They anticipated that the worst repercussion of such thinking would be the reorientation of these threat perceptions into domestic politics, legitimizing further more autocratic national identity.⁶⁰ This point of apprehension was partly justified during 1994 when first Chechen war began. Atlanticists-associated media organs warned that Caucasian war would serve the interests of "derzhavniks" (statists, imperialists) by justifying the reestablishment of authoritarian control of military budget and a reversal of the reform movement.⁶¹

First Russian Foreign Minister, one of the ardent initiators and supporters of Atlanticist school, Andrey Kozyrev, called for an "alliance relationship" with the West and for Russia to promote human rights. That appeared also to be the fulfillment of democrats' aspirations long suppressed by the Soviet regime. Westernizers truly believed that the West was to serve as an anchor for the domestic reform movement, which could otherwise be overwhelmed by reactionary forces in Russian society. These pro-Western oriented people of Russian political elite were ready to accept a Western

⁵⁹ Solzhenitsin, op.cit., p.16

⁶⁰ Zeynep Dağı, "Rusyanın Dönüşümü: Kimlik, Milliyetçilik ve Dış Politika", (İstanbul.: Boyut Press, 2002), p.181

⁶¹ *Izvestiya*, December, 23, 1994 quoted in Leszek Buszynski, *Russia and the West: towards renewed geopolitical rivalry?*, *Survival*, VOL 37 No.3 (1995) p.107 footnote 34.

model defined in the terms of the sanctity of law, political methods of conflict resolution and collective security, supporting the idea that this model could be extended eastwards to embrace entire Eurasian continent.⁶²

President Yeltsin was considered by Russian elite, as well as by the people outside Russia as a “westernist” or *zapadnik* and not as *Slavophile* or *Eurasianist*. He championed the idea of a “normal”, civilized country like France or Italy. Yeltsin believed that patriotism in Russian case would be a clear understanding of a real situation and acting according to such notion.⁶³ In an interview to *Sovetskaya Molodezh* Yeltsin insisted that “one cannot discard the two hundred year experience of American democracy” and suggested that Russians could in fact learn a great deal from the political experience of United States.⁶⁴

Foreign Ministry in the first month of Russian statehood repeatedly declared that Russia intended “to enter the club of most dynamically developing democratic countries”; that it was “the missing component of the democratic pole of Western hemisphere”; and that it “was about to return to Europe”.⁶⁵

The Presidential Administration has also been regarded as mostly pro-Western institution in Russian Federation. It is keen on business and foreign investment and good relations with the rich countries such as Germany, Japan and USA. The fact that Russian Presidential Administration together with MFA have always been cautious for not to deteriorate current relations with West has become obvious during the NATO operations in Kosovo. Although President Yeltsin himself and wider circles as well as public

⁶² Buszynski, op.cit. p.105

⁶³ Dunlop, op.cit. p.58

⁶⁴ *Sovetskaya Molodezh*, March 3, 1990 quoted in Dunlop, op.cit. p. 59

⁶⁵ Neil Malcolm, “The new Russian foreign policy”, *The World Today*, February 1994

opinion in Russia were furious with NATO for bombing Serbia, which has always been counted for one of the closest allies of Russia, he was nonetheless determined to “keep Slobodan Milosevic at arm’s length, and to save Russia from a really serious row with the West”.⁶⁶

Another aspect of reaction against pre-existing Soviet doctrine was the endorsing of vision of a new, peaceful and increasingly economically integrated world order. Hence, Atlanticists has unconditionally relied on international institutions in the matters of peacekeeping and collective security. In the case of 25 million of Russians, who suddenly found themselves living in foreign countries, it was thought that they had to be protected by such international institutions as OSCE and UN.⁶⁷ The great deal was assigned to European institutions because westernists have seen Russia as a European state. Moreover, Russia has also assigned itself as one of the builders of ‘common European home’. Vladimir Petrovsky, a Deputy Foreign Minister of Soviet Union, who was one of the main spokesmen of this view, declared that the building of ‘common European home’ was a putting into practice of Kantian principles of international relations.⁶⁸

This idealistic notion of foreign policy based on “all human values” and cooperation was the reason why Yeltsin and Kozyrev were under severe attacks from hard-line nationalists and communists. President and Minister of Foreign Affairs were also criticized for lacking a strategy to deal with newly independent republics and paying too much attention to relations with the West in order to obtain foreign aid. Under such criticism from all sides (especially from Supreme Soviet) Yeltsin was

⁶⁶ Charlemagne, “Igor Ivanov: Russia’s Balkan voice”, *Moscow State University Journal*, December 2001

⁶⁷ Buszynski, *op.cit.* p.106

⁶⁸ Malcolm, *op.cit.* p.28

compelled to release Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the key advocate of the reform movement, surprisingly retaining Kozyrev, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, signaling to the West that Russia's pro-western foreign policy stance would continue.⁶⁹

As agreed, first 18 month of independence (1991-1993) foreign policy is regarded to have been under the dominance of the Atlanticist group.

2.4.4 Eurazianists

The Eurasianist school, which is thought to be a more fundamental school of thought, emerged among Russian émigré intelligentsia in early 20's. It had developed and became wide spread among Russian intellectuals through 1921-1926. Emerged in Sophia soon it moved to Prague and afterwards to Berlin. The founding fathers of this school are thought to be linguist and philologist Trubetskoy, geographer and economist Savitskiy and the priest Florovski. Karsavin, Vernadskiy and Alekseyev are also thought to have been of great contributors to the development of school.⁷⁰

In parallel to Eurasianism another school of thought appeared in Russia under the name of Slavophiles. They advocated the idea of originality of Russia's historical path (*samobytnost*) morally and spiritually distinct from Western European. Slavophiles concurred with Eurasianists on the points that Russian culture unboundedly tied with Christian Orthodox Church.

However, Eurasianists opposed to the notion of Slavism as the source determining Russia's cultural distinctiveness. In contrast, the distinctiveness of Russian

⁶⁹ Holoboff, op.cit., p.157

⁷⁰ Chernysheva L.I., "Russkaya Shkola Geopolitiki" in N.A.Nartov (ed.) *Geopolitika*, (Moscow.: Unity, 2000), p.93

culture is in its mixture of European and Asiatic components. In this respect Russia resembles Byzantine, which also proved to unite western and eastern origins and had “Eurasian culture”.⁷¹

Modern Eurasianists have made themselves known from the late 80’s as the people leading opposition to Atlanticists. Eurasianists concede that the Russian state has been severely defeated by the United States in Cold War. One of the most prominent Eurasianists in modern Russia, Aleksandr Dugin, who is the Chairman of “Evraziystvo” (Eurasianism) Movement expressed his anti-Western views in this way:

“...We lost the Cold War. It does not matter how: with cunningness or power, through economic or ideological competition, but the reality is that our rivals have defeated us. Naturally, victors do not intend to give Russia a chance for prosperous future. What is going on now in world politics is the partition of our strategic and geopolitical body, and this will last and will never stop, until the “circle of anaconda” embraces Moscow ...”⁷²

However, anti-Westernism in Eurasianist rhetoric implies the negative stance only to USA, not taking Europe as the rival:

“We have different approaches to European Union and to USA. Pro-European orientation is the part of Eurasianist strategic thought. European Union and USA have common culture but different interests. Russia and European Union have different (sometimes antagonistic) cultures, but common interests (especially in energy sector).

⁷¹Chernysheva, op.cit. p.95

⁷²Aleksandr Dugin, “Budusheye Rossii zavisit ot nashey voli”, March 4, 2002, Online interview at www.smi.ru

The strategic alliance with Europe is vital for Russia, though it is unacceptable for US. This complicated picture defines Moscow's framework for geopolitical strategy".⁷³

1992 was the year when Russia's foreign policy had a task to respond to the question of what actions it should take vis-à-vis the other fourteen former union republics. This issue emerged as a central defining item of Russian politics. This task and the debates around it brought into agenda a new political orientation – the so-called democratic statist or national democrats. Soon the "pure democrats", or "Atlanticists" found themselves engaged in a sharp struggle with both the newly emerged moderate right and the statist hard right.⁷⁴

The rise of Eurasianists began with the erosion of pro-Westernists position in Russian politics close to the end of 1992. The pro-Western policy started to be criticized by the wide spectrum of opinion groups: moderate and hard line nationalists, communists, and neo-bolsheviks, for "failing to reflect Russia's real interests". The "near abroad" has become the space, where, according to Eurasianists, "the real interests" of Russia are located. Nationalists and neo-Bolsheviks insisted that policy towards "near abroad" could only be based on the assumption of Russia's predominance there. From 1992 on, foreign policy attitudes in Russia started to have been shaped by assumptions about the relationship between two elements of foreign policy: towards the "near abroad" on the one hand and the West on the other. However, conciliatory views between these two attitudes also existed. Centrists and mild conservatives believed that an active program towards the "near abroad" could be harmonized with Russian policy

⁷³ Dugin, op.cit.

⁷⁴ Dunlop, op.cit. p.287

towards the West; that Russia could act in this area without disturbing relations with the West.⁷⁵

2.5 The role of domestic actors.

2.5.1 Institutions and priorities in Russian foreign policy.

The identity crisis emerged in Russia affected to significant extent the minds of decision-makers as well. They have had to somehow manage their countries ungovernability during the transitional era: to dissociate themselves from Soviet ideology and imperial legacy and by the way not to neglect the fate of roughly 25 million Russians or Russian speakers now living abroad in other Post-Soviet republics.

However, the euphoria of democracy and vacuum of leadership and coordination in foreign policy has paved the way to the situation when Russian foreign policies were exercised not according to the established and coordinated by Government programs, but by different agencies and groups. Probably, we can claim that Russian foreign policy, has never been as diversified in respect to its domestic sources as in the first years of independence. Consequently, Russian foreign policy making has experienced in itself the first chaos of would-be democracy.

Admittedly, often the ungovernability in Russian foreign policy has led to the uncoordinated actions of some governmental departments and ministries, which did not make previous consultations with Foreign Ministry either. Among these actors were

⁷⁵ Buszynski, *op.cit.*, p.106

giants of economy, industries engaged in nuclear field, military industrial complexes, military itself and different ministries (as Ministry of Atomic Energy). Frequently, especially during Yeltsin-Kozyrev leadership in foreign policy these various actors have undertaken completely independent actions dealing with other countries without prior political approval. For instance, Moscow dismissed publicly the agreement that was independently signed between Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) and Iran. Nevertheless, Minatom's chief, Viktor Mikhailov, was not dismissed for these so-called independent initiatives revealing that they were a tacitly accepted element of Russian foreign policy.⁷⁶

Foreign minister Kozyrev made a statement expressing his apprehension by this arbitrary behavior of Minatom:

“Russia’s Foreign Ministry, based on additional instructions from the President, will insist on making all this work subordinated to interdepartmental expertise so that long term Russian state interests, rather than departmental or even commercial interests, are made a priority”.⁷⁷

McFaul elaborating on “belligerent capacity of democratizing states” argues that “protracted regime transformation in Russia seems like a probable precipitant of international conflict”. According to him, the new Russian polity became unfavorable for the political figures, organizations and interest groups that benefited from the old Soviet order.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Brenda Shaffer, “Partners in need: the strategic relationship of Russia and Iran”, Policy Paper No.57 (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), p. 21

⁷⁷ Interfax, April 4, 1995 quoted in Shaffer, *ibid.* p.22

⁷⁸ McFaul, *op.cit.*, p.5

Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have hypothesized that “states like contemporary Russia that make a biggest leap in democratization – from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy – are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.”⁷⁹

However, contrarily to predictions of Mansfield and Snyder, Russia’s transition to democracy has not produced the belligerent foreign policies. Liberal groups with an interest in peace – especially new economic elites created through Russia’s transition to a market economy – have prevailed over illiberal groups prone to war. This has been the result of radical political and economic change in Russia, which has produced leaders, political forces, and economic interest groups that have identified and benefited from liberal ideas.⁸⁰

Actors and interest groups in Russian politics, thus, can be roughly divided into two categories. First, as mentioned above, are political leaders, organizations and interest groups that benefited from the old Soviet order. After Soviet collapse and beginning of democratization in Russia these groups are regarded to be losers with respect to the second category. Second category includes political leaders, political organizations and economic groups that have had “normative and material interests in international cooperation rather than international conflict”. Russia is thought to pursue peaceful, integrationist policies with all the states as a result of victories of these actors.⁸¹ While most of the countries of former Soviet Union lack a firm institutional structure in the process of foreign policy making, this disadvantage has not been true for

⁷⁹ Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War”, in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (eds), *Debating the Democratic Peace*, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996), p.302 quoted in McFaul, op.cit.p.6

⁸⁰ McFaul, op.cit. p.11

⁸¹ McFaul, op.cit. p.7

Russia because it has inherited Soviet institutions and personnel and therefore less time has been needed for institutions to establish interests and priorities. However, the shortage of foreign policy making was not caused by the lack of institutions but by the fact that with the demise of USSR the *raison d'etre* of these institutions has also lost their previous meaning. And although Russia has a sizeable advantage over all the rest of Post-Soviet republics in the numbers and levels of training of its diplomats and officers, the effectiveness of them has been undermined because of the lack of direction and consensus over foreign policy priorities. Thus, one of the key features of post-totalitarian politics in Russia has been the inability of most state institutions to come up with unified policies that reflect the stable long-term corporate interests of the state. This inability of state to sketch an elaborate foreign policy “has awakened many of Russia’s ancient dilemmas and motivations, ranging from pan-Slavic messianism to Slavophile isolationism”.⁸²

At the initial stage there seemed to be at least three Russian foreign policies:

- 1) promoted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- 2) by the Ministry of Defense
- 3) by Parliament

These institutions were issuing controversial statements on foreign policy issues. Consensus have been achieved only in 1993, when Kozyrev (MFA), Pavel Grachev (Minister of Defense) and Yevgeniy Ambartsumov (Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in Parliament) agreed on a compromise “foreign policy concept” (Kontseptsiya Vneshney Politiki) adopted by Security Council in April 1993. The concept reflecting Foreign Ministry’s priority of rapprochement with advanced industrial

⁸² Dawisha and Parrot, op.cit., p. 198

countries envisaging at the same time a more active role for Russia in security and economic affairs in the “near abroad”.⁸³ 1993 Foreign Policy Concept reflected more the positions of Eurasianists having been concerned more with changing foreign policy orientations.

Although during Yeltsin-Ivanov (MFA) leadership Russian foreign policy appeared to be relatively consolidated, analysts agree that, in fact, there have been still several foreign policies. The most important source has been the presidency, dominated by Boris Yeltsin and his administration. Trying to adjust Russian policies to current political needs, it has had a broad pro-Western pattern. Second source are military and security services, subordinated to the president, at the same time having “a far more antagonistic view of the world”. Their distrust of NATO was huge and they made it explicit during NATO operation in Kosovo. Third source of foreign policy during Yeltsin’s and following administration were powerful economic interests, such as the oil and gas lobbies, which see foreign policy primarily in mercantile terms. For these groups Russia’s interests abroad consist of “ports and pipe-lines”. Their maxim: “What is good for Gazprom is good for Russia”. The role assigned for Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov is “to keep all three masters happy”. Ivanov’s being “friendly, informal, flexible and approachable” contributed to his job.⁸⁴

⁸³ Malcolm, *op.cit.* p.29

⁸⁴ Charlemagne, *op.cit.*

2.5.2 Actors concerned primarily with foreign policy

Until its recent consolidation during the Presidency of Vladimir Putin, as it has already been stated, Russian foreign policy presented a picture of dissociated actors who were hardly controlled by the President or Ministry of Foreign Affairs to whom this responsibility is assigned by the constitution of Russian Federation (*Konstitutsia Rossiyskoy Federatsii*).

Experts distinguish between three types of actors influencing Russian foreign policy towards the area Russians defined as their “near abroad”⁸⁵ and particularly Transcaucasian states. These are the actors dealing primarily with foreign policy, actors concerned with military security policy and those concerned with foreign economic relations.⁸⁶

The President together with its administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Duma comprise the foreign policy set of actors. Initially, the Presidency and MFA was expected to play coordinating and mediating role between competing governmental bodies concerned with foreign policy issues. However, Yeltsin, who was the first Russian president, appeared unable or unwilling to impose discipline, giving his support to one side or another, and casting the blame on MFA. Some of the worst confusion was evident inside the presidential apparatus, which was constantly being reorganized, but which remained apparently

⁸⁵ Actually, the term “Near Abroad” (“blizhneye zarubezhye”) invented by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in April 1992, is wider than CIS and refers to the entire former Soviet Union. It has also denoted the inner circle of foreign policy interests including Korea and Russia’s Asian neighbours as opposed to the far abroad which includes the West and Japan. Kozyrev included China as part of the near abroad as well. For details see *NeGa*, February, 1 1994 quoted in Buszynski, op.cit. p.124

⁸⁶ Herzig, op.cit. p.104

incapable of harmonizing policy.⁸⁷ The coordination in foreign policy was impossible even after establishment in 1992 of Security Council (which evoked huge opposition from liberals who suspect this body of trying to afford extra leverages for military and military-industrial interests) and interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission.

At initial stage Yeltsin and MFA were under severe criticism from nationalists and communists who gained seats in Duma. They criticized Yeltsin-Kozyrev leadership in foreign policy due to latter's idealistic notion of foreign policy based on "all-human values" and cooperation. They were also criticized for lacking a strategy for dealing with newly independent republics and paying too much attention to the West in order to obtain foreign aid.⁸⁸

The situation implied that president should have made a shift to the right making concessions to conservatives. Under such criticism from Duma, Ministry of Defense and other conservative institutions Yeltsin was compelled to release Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the key advocate of the reform movement, but surprisingly retained Kozyrev "signaling to the West that Russia's pro-Western foreign policy stance would continue"⁸⁹

The presidency of Vladimir Putin is distinguished by more coordination and coherence in foreign policy. Putin has managed as nobody else to concentrate the foreign policy leadership in his own hands. He could manage by consolidating his power to grasp the control over parliament, which was always competing and challenging the executive power. His party "Yedinstvo" established immediately before the elections has become the second biggest faction in the Duma after Communists. Thereby, Kremlin has

⁸⁷ Malcolm, *op.cit.* p.30

⁸⁸ Holoboff, *op.cit.* p.157

⁸⁹ Aleksei Arbatov, *op.cit.* p.17

got the guaranteed number of seats, which allows passing necessary decisions by attracting liberals from right and communists from left. Duma, thus, has become an obedient organ. Some authors call Russian democracy “controlled” or “managed” democracy. That implies the existence of democratic institutions, which at the same time are effectively controlled by the government. The weight of the opposition parties and the Council of Federation in the foreign policy has declined significantly.⁹⁰

The structure of decision-making and relative weights of particular institutions in foreign policy making has been altered by the new constellation of forces inside Russian politics. As we have highlighted above, the traditional power struggle between legislation and execution, i.e. between Duma and the President has changed in the favor of the latter. Putin reformed the higher echelons of ruling elite. The new staff comprised mainly of former officers from Leningrad branch (now Sankt-Peterburg) of KGB and some representatives of big business who became affluent during Perestroyka. Most of these business people are quite talented and have an expertise in dealing with Western business world.⁹¹

Presidential administration and his chief Aleksandr Voloshin became one of the most influential persons in foreign policy making. He was appointed by president Yeltsin and is said to represent the interests of Yeltsin’s political clan.

Another influential bureaucrat is Sergei Prikhodko, Kremlin Deputy Chief of Staff and top presidential foreign policy advisor, who also occupied the same position at

⁹⁰ Manfred Quiring, “Die Verwaltete Demokratie des Wladimir Putin”. *Die Welt*. May 7, 2001

⁹¹ Aleksandr Rar, “Vladimir Putin: Nemets v Kreml’e”(Vladimir Putin: a German in Kremlin) (Moscow: Olma Press, 2002), p.275

Yeltsin's administration. Prikhodko is said also to be in charge of Putin's appointment book.

Second in influence is the Ministry of Foreign affairs, which "works out tactical approach to policy set in Kremlin. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, who is the carrier diplomat, has shown himself to be a cautious official.

Third in importance is the Defense Ministry, headed by Putin's close and hawkish friend Sergei Ivanov. A former KGB officer, who studied with Putin at the university, is said to be the only one of Putin's advisors who can without question influence foreign policy decision-making.⁹² Being a Defense Minister, he has, however, never hesitated to interfere into the competences of other ministries such as MFA, Federal Border Service, Federal Security Service, "Rosoboronexport" and other "power ministries". In 2002 Ivanov was expected to be appointed to a new position where he could control all the power ministries and institutions (about 11 ministries and bureaus in total).⁹³

There are also members of "foreign policy elite": academicians, analysts, legislators with foreign policy expertise and other "shapers and mirrors" of public opinion. Chief among them is Margelov, head of Federation Council's Foreign Affairs Committee, another former KGB officer who is reputed to be close presidential advisor. He supports warmer ties with US saying that this is in the interests of Russian national security. When Putin was still a Prime Minister, Margelov assisted him to run military's

⁹² Interview with Alexandr Ryabov from Moscow Carnegie Center in Gregory Feifer "Who stands behind Russian foreign policy" *S.Petersburg-Times*, April 9, 2002

⁹³ Vadim Solovyev and Igor Korotchenko, "Antiterror vydvigayet novykh geroyev". *NeGa*, February 5, 2002

propaganda during 1999 Chechen war. By the time, Margelov was at the position of chief of “Rosinformcenter”, state information agency, which released “dubious statistics and rosy forecasts”.⁹⁴ The following table can illustrate the relative weight of actors in Russian foreign policy:

The President	91%
The Minister of Foreign Affairs	52,40%
President's Administration	47,60%
Gaz and Petroleum Complexes	36,70%
The Government	27,10%
Security Services' Heads	26,70%
Military-Industrial Complex	22,90%
Foreign Trade Lobbies	18,10%
Private Business	14,80%
Mass media	14,80
State Duma's Profile Committees (The Higher Chamber of Parliament)	9,50%
State Duma's Profile Committees Committees, (The Lower Chamber of Parliament)	9,50%
Army Leadership	7,10%
Experts in International Relations	6,70%

Source: Vneshnyaya Politika Rossi:Mneniye ekspertov”(Russian foreign policy:experts’view), Survey on foreign policy of Russian Federation among Russian political elite run by Russian Independent Institute for Social and National Problems (RNISNP) and Moscow Representation of Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. April 2001 (posted at http://world.ng.ru/dipcorpus/2001-06-07/1_rate.html)

⁹⁴ Gregory Feifer, “Who stands behind Russian foreign policy”, *S.Petersburg-Times*, April 9, 2002

2.5.3 Actors concerned with military security policy

After the disintegration of Soviet system, the most powerful fragments of the old bureaucracy, which remain in tact, were the military leaders and the state-sector industrial management. These groups have had certain important political advantages. First, they have had access to substantial organizational and material resources. Second, they are natural allies having a network of long standing contacts from the Soviet period during which they enjoyed high status. Large sectors of them appear to have a common interest in slowing up “marketization” and demilitarization, and in preserving as much of the former Soviet economic and military space as can be preserved. Third, they can pose as protectors of the public against radical economic restructuring and unemployment and as the patrons of Russians in the “near abroad”. Fourth, in the political conditions of 1992 and 1993, this group and its centrist political allies could occupy the crucial strategic ground between the radical Westernists on the one hand – the less “patriotic” democrats – and the irreconcilable nationalist and communist wing. Finally, the army has enjoyed extra leverage because of the chaos, confusion and civil war on Russia’s borders, and because of its role in resolving constitutional impasse in 1993 between the President and the Parliament.⁷

The set of these actors were mainly concerned with military-security policy and comprised of Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, several branches of Armed Forces

⁷ Malcolm, op.cit., p.31

and their local commanders, as well as presidential and parliamentary councils and committees concerned with defense and security.⁹⁶

Russian military leadership began to make clear their ideas about national interests in mid-1992. *Voyennaya Mysl* published a draft military doctrine. It highlighted that Russians living in the “near abroad” constituted a major part of Russia’s vital interests. It also suggested that Armed Forces should have a special mission to protect Russians outside the country. Additionally, the doctrine ensured that any placement of foreign troops near Russian borders would be considered a direct military threat.⁹⁷

2.5.4 Actors concerned with foreign economic relations.

The impact of economic groups on Russian foreign policy has been one of the factors establishing more pragmatic Russian policies abroad. Economic actors were the locomotives of Russia’s foreign policy becoming more liberal and cooperative rather than assertive, especially in the “near abroad”. Long suppressed by the Soviet leaders economic groups emerged as the powerful lobbies after independence and soon such Russian state monopolies as Gazprom, Lukoil, Itera and Yukos acquired an enormous share within Russian foreign policy decision-making.

The economic group includes the ministries of Foreign Economic Relations, and of Fuel and Energy, commercial concerns (principally oil and gas, financial and military industrial businesses) and branches and individuals in government sympathetic to them (for instance, Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin was always closely associated with

⁹⁶ Herzig, op.cit., p.104

⁹⁷ Holoboff, op.cit., p.158

oil and gas interests). Economic groups are regarded to be among the winners from Russian regime change after the fall of USSR, who has both “normative and material interests” to pursue cooperative rather than conflicting foreign policy. The victory of liberal forces, thus, have guaranteed that Russia has pursued peaceful, integrationist policies with all states rather than belligerent strategies.⁹⁸

This trend in foreign policy can be apparently observed in Russia’s relations with its neighboring state, Turkey. In the mid -1990s Russia appeared to perceive Turkey as a massive security challenge. For instance, The White Book of Russian Special Services described Turkey as an aspiring regional power that supports "Muslim movements" and cherishes "pan-Turkic ideas;" it also argued that Turkey might move into the "geo-strategic niche" in the Caucasus created by Russia’s weakening state. Moscow repeatedly accused Ankara of supporting – both morally and financially – the Chechen separatists during the first Chechen war. At the end of the 1990s and later, however, Moscow fundamentally revised its perception of Turkey’s role in Eurasia. Moscow has begun to view Turkey, instead, primarily as a "valuable partner" rather than a threat. Analysts argue that the natural gas was the main factor, which have influenced this revision of attitudes and the development of bilateral relationship between Turkey and Russia, as regional analysts argue. Turkey, along with Europe, is Russia’s major market for gas. Some of the largest energy business deals in Russia have been signed with Turkey. The recent completion of the Blue Stream gas pipeline under the Black Sea will

⁹⁸ McFaul, op.cit. p.6

increase Turkey's dependence on Russian natural gas from 66 percent up to 80 percent.⁹⁹

Initially, the Post-Soviet economic interests groups in Russia have been reorganized after the process of partial liberalization of prices and trade in 1992. Especially, oil and gas sector have benefited from that liberalization. Gazprom, the Russian natural gas monopoly, protected by then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin (the former chairman of the corporation), has managed to preserve its monopolistic control over the transport and distribution system of entire Russia's natural gas, making it thereby Russia's most profitable corporation. Russian major oil companies, numbered around a dozen, rank to the top twenty of the most lucrative companies in the new Russian economy. A number of other natural monopolies (electricity, communications, transportation, and precious metal extractors) have also large benefited from the new liberal market order.¹⁰⁰ Today the richest seven people in Russia are heads of biggest "energy" or "natural" monopolies. The fact that they are financing several political parties proves these monopolies' weight in Russian politics. For instance, all of 7 billionaires in Russia represent oil, gas, and precious metal monopolies. Among them are Khodorkovski ("Yukos", 3.7 billion USD, according to recent estimates 8 billion USD), Abramovich ("Sibneft" and "Russian Aluminium", 3 bln \$), Fridman ("Alfa

⁹⁹ Igor Torbakov, "The Turkish factor in the geopolitics of Post-Soviet space", International Eurasian Institute for Economic and Political Research, posted at http://iicas.org/2003en/08_01_03an_en.htm

¹⁰⁰ McFaul, op.cit. p.17

Group”, 2,2 billion \$), Potanin (“Norilski Nickel”, 1,8 bln \$), Bogdanov (“Surgutneftgaz”, 1,6 bln \$) and Alekperov (“Lukoil”, 1.4 bln \$)¹⁰¹

Nezavisimaya Gazeta labelled these persons as “seven of twenty most politically influential people in Russia”. Acknowledged as “oligarch number one” in Russia, the President of “Yukos” Mikhail Khodorkovski (who has recently purchased another influential oil monopoly Sibneft) has declared its intention to go into politics and then to Kremlin. Surprisingly, Khodorkovski has disclosed that he was financing by now the electoral campaigns of three influential parties in Russia: The Union of Right Forces, ‘Yabloko’ and Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF). However, his being in opposition to Putin and the fact that he is planning to run for forthcoming presidential elections caused his recent persecution and eventual detention, as analysts argue. However, as *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* stated: “Khodorkovskiy in prison is becoming more dangerous than when he was out”, pointing to his high popularity in Russia as well as outside the country.¹⁰²

Probably, with regard to economic groups it would be useful to distinguish between natural monopolies emerged after independence on one side and military-industrial complex and former state owned enterprises on the other side. The latter, having had a great share in Soviet period and being to date one of the major actors in Russian foreign policy, has lost to the former after the liberalization and privatization in mid 90-s. The Civic Union, an electoral block most firmly identified with the second group collected only 1.9 percent of the popular vote in 1993. After the defeat these

¹⁰¹ *Yeni Musavat* (Baku), May 5, 2002

¹⁰² Maksim Glikin. “Nelson Mandella” iz “Matrosskoy Tishiny”, *NeGa*, November 13, 2003

unsuccessful enterprises have formed alliances with opposition parties such as Communist Party of Russian Federation (CPRF) and the Congress of Russian Communities (KRO) creating lobbies such as the Union of Manufacturer's and The League of Defense Enterprises. However, these groups have also proved to be ineffective.¹⁰³

As it is approved by the analytical report of RNISINP the military industrial complex counts by now lower in its impact as the subject of foreign policy than oil and gas industry (23 versus 36 per cents).

Western analysts claimed that Russia could play a significant role in world, and particular in CIS, only through adjusting itself to economic way of reasoning and acting. Russian oil giant, Lukoil, led by an Azeri, Vahid Alekberov, has been regarded as one of the major actors to be utilized in CIS policy. However, to play such a role Russian state should undergo a "cultural revolution" and to possess necessary investment capacity. Lacking such assets, Moscow has lost its previous influence for it could not offer a positive economic cooperation (sending experts, offering grants, loans, and investments). Russia's influence is much more bound to its "capacity to harm and damage", which is barely an economic leverage.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ "Defense Industry – Ready for Battle or on Its Last Legs?" *Business in Russia*, No.76 (1997), p.22-25. quoted in Mc Faul, op.cit. p.19

¹⁰⁴ Olivier Roy, "Yeni Orta Asya: ya da ulusların imal'edilişi", (Istanbul: Metis 2000), pp. 258-259

Chapter 3. Russia's policy towards Azerbaijan.

3.1. The period of so-called Isolationism. (1991 - mid-1992)

In regard with Russia's policy towards Azerbaijan analysts classify Russian behavior as running along three major lines during three phases. First one, regarded as an isolationist stance, is associated with initial Russian strong pro-Western stance. From the end of 1991 to mid 1992 Foreign Ministry under Kozyrev and President Yeltsin gave low priority to the Caucasus seeing it more like a burden rather than an asset for the new independent Russian state. The new Russian elite was attempting to justify the image of Russia as the leader in the dismantling of the Soviet empire by trying to decrease its political, military, and economic presence in the newly independent states thereby diminishing also its imperial burden. The government of Yegor Gaidar, who has been considered to one of the most liberal and pro-Western leaders in Russia, presumed that it would be easier to overcome economic crisis alone rather than together with the states that were emerging in the southern part of former Soviet Union, which during Soviet times had received enormous donations and subsidies, basically at Russia's expense.¹⁰⁵ He was clearly pointing to Russia's willingness to construct equal and respectful relations with Azerbaijan:

“No matter what the circumstances are, we are going to trade with Azerbaijan according to world prices”.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Pavel Baev, “Russian foreign and security policy in South Caucasus”, (Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, 2002)

¹⁰⁶ Personal interview with Hikmet Hajizade, former Azerbaijani Deputy Prime Minister and Ambassador to Russia.

Such policy of estrangement from Transcaucasus rested, presumably, on the mentality of Russian foreign policy decision-makers. Russians did not tend to regard the newly independent nations of Transcaucasus and generally of “near abroad” as “others”. Instead, as some constructivists argue, Russian leaders were constructing their new identity through their relations with the European countries and USA. Therefore USA and Europe have been considered as the areas where Russian foreign policy should be active.¹⁰⁷

Russian foreign policy in that first period is hardly to be conceived as the coherent, coordinated and consistent foreign behavior. Although the new elite were trying to pursue the isolationist policy, some other factors were influencing the general picture of Russian behavior. First of all, the negative attitude of some part of elite (old as well as new one) has emerged after the bloody events of January 1990 in Baku. On January 20 Soviet Army according to the special decree of Gorbachev entered Baku in order to suppress national-liberation movement led by Azerbaijani Popular Front. The operation was disguised into rhetoric of “restoring order and preventing pogroms against Armenians”¹⁰⁸. Following that, mistrust and discomfort has emerged inside Russian conservative elite towards Azerbaijan. Allegations about Islamic fundamentalism have become a centerpiece of this unreliability provoked and inspired by conservative press organs like *Literaturnaya Rossiya* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya*. A popular Russian National Bolshevik publicist Volodin warned in *Literaturnaya Rossiya* (February 2, 1990) of the

¹⁰⁷ Henrikki Heikka, “Beyond neorealism and constructivism: desire, identity and Russian foreign policy” p.57-107 in Ted Topf (ed.), “*Understanding of Russian foreign Policy*”, (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999)

¹⁰⁸ In fact, grave pogroms and killings of Armenians in Baku was directly organized and executed by Soviet KGB in order to justify following intervention in Baku and purge against Azeri Popular Front leaders. For detailed information see Igor Polyain, *Moscow’s initiation of Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict*, *Central Asian Survey* (1994), VOL 13, N4, pp. 541-563

dangers of Islamic Jihad and the growth of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism in Caucasus and Central Asia. These mass media were trying to persuade Russian public opinion that “savage Azeris were killing and insulting Russian population”. Certainly, the accuracy of these materials published was highly open to question. These attempts to provoke Russian population of Azerbaijan (as well as Baltic and other Union Republics) into violent clashes with their governments have rendered to be unsuccessful, thereby making groundless the accusations of Russian conservatives.¹⁰⁹

The anti-propaganda launched by Russian nationalists and neo-Bolsheviks with the aid of Armenian diaspora represented in Moscow academia has created an image of “rogue Azeris” whereas Armenians were considered as the nation suppressed and cleansed by formers.¹¹⁰ Moreover, Yeltsin inherited from Gorbachev, and probably, partly influenced by the anti-propaganda mentioned above, a negative stance towards Haydar Aliev, Azeri Communist Party boss, and towards Azerbaijan in general. Close advisors to President Yeltsin Burbulis, Kozyrev, and Starovoitova were distinguished by their anti-Azerbaijani and pro-Armenian attitudes. Additionally, due to the lack of knowledge of Post-Soviet republics and poor coordination by Ministry of Foreign Affairs particular diplomats, bureaucrats, and representatives of Russian military were acting on their own, pursuing unattached policies. These acts were, actually, regarded by Baku as the strategic line of Kremlin. Some Russian analysts argue that as a result of such unprofessional approach Azerbaijan “from a potentially friendly neighbor has

¹⁰⁹ Dunlop, *op.cit.* p.141

¹¹⁰ Personal interview with Rasim Musabeyov, Political Analyst at Musavat Party Analytical Centre, March 25, 2002

become almost an enemy to Russia”.¹¹¹ Due to the pressures and attacks on their bases and equipments in Transcaucasus from nationalists and paramilitaries, the military security actors were already deeply involved to the regional conflicts. The responses to the attacks were based on the personal, local and institutional affiliations reflecting the mentality of Soviet officer corps and defense bureaucracy.¹¹²

In respect to Azerbaijan’s very security, the actions of Soviet military rendered to be extremely threatening. Already in 1987 Armenian SSR has launched the policy of territorial claims to Azerbaijani autonomous district of Nagorno-Karabakh, demanding its secession from Azerbaijan SSR and joining Armenian SSR. Although being the supporter of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity Moscow has seen Armenian policy as the possible tool to suppress Azerbaijani independence movement and keep the republic inside the borders of Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet military officers stationed in Armenia, have been engaged in an illegal arm trade for their poor living conditions also necessitated such attempts. In fact the local Armenian government itself to obtain weapons promoted ‘attack and capture’ policy. By that time, nationalist forces were in control of Armenian government including “power ministries” (ministries of Interior, Defense and Federal Security Service). As a result, by the time of Soviet Union’s collapse, Armenia was the only Post-Soviet country to have its own armed forces.¹¹³

United in Fall 1990 and consisted from different paramilitary groups, Soviet Armenian forces had at their disposal helicopters, armored vehicles, tanks, heavy

¹¹¹ Zurab Todua, “Azerbaidzhanskiy pasyans”, (Moscow; Kon-Liga Press, 2001) p. 104

¹¹² Herziq, op.cit. 106

¹¹³ *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, Interview with President of Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutallibov N132, 1991 quoted in Elkhan Mehtiyev, “*Security policy in Azerbaijan*”, (NATO-EAPC Research Fellowship 1999-2001), p.9

artillery and large amounts of machine guns and automatic weapons. Contrarily, due to the emergency situation and forced arms collection since 1988 Azerbaijan was left unarmed in the face of such Armenian armament. Facing such one-sided armament, pro-independence and anti-communist forces in Azerbaijan, therefore, raised their discomfort that Moscow was using Armenian rebels inside Azerbaijan to intimidate country to keep it within the borders of Soviet Union. The Azerbaijani independence leaders, thus, saw the only way to preserve territorial integrity in secession from USSR and declaration of Azerbaijani independence.¹¹⁴

After the “Bloody January” another step aggravating the Azeris’ mistrust of Moscow has been the destruction of Azeri town of Khojaly, which lies between Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and the massacring of its civil population by Armenian and Russian forces. As journalist Tomas Goltz reported, an estimated number of 1000 Azeris were killed on February 26 1992.¹¹⁵ Azerbaijani sources informed about the attack as one of the most brutal massacres of 20th century:

“Armenian forces, with the support of the 366th Motor Rifle Regiment of the Russian Federation, surrounded the town at midnight and shelled it with tanks and heavy artillery. Hundreds of people were killed and thousands taken hostage. The barbaric groups unleashed one of the most terrifying tragedies of the 20th century, by brutally killing sons in the presence of their mothers, humiliating husbands in the presence of their wives, fathers in the presence of their children. Corpses of babies, women and elderly were scattered over the hills down Hojaly following the unprecedented carnage

¹¹⁴ Mekhtiyev, op.cit. p.9

¹¹⁵ For a detailed information see Thomas Goltz, “Azerbaijan: a requiem for a would be republic”. (ISIS, Istanbul 1994), Chapter 7

of the 20th century”¹¹⁶. Undoubtedly, Russian regiment’s played an overwhelming part in Khojaly operation since, as experts argue, at that time there were not so many tanks and armored vehicles at the disposal of Armenian groups to capture Khojaly and the their transportation by helicopters from Armenia was impossible as well. In the face of Azerbaijan’s fury, Marshal Shaposhnikov, the commander of the CIS Allied Forces, immediately ordered to pull back the forces and military equipment from Nagorno Karabakh and borderline regions with Armenia. Surprisingly again, during the withdrawal, eight tanks, more than one hundred AIFV, artillery, air forces equipment and three fourth of ATK have been reported as “captured” by local Armenian officers. The sold equipment could easily be documented as captured.¹¹⁷ *Radio Mayak* also stated that 366th Regiment was ordered out of the region ostensibly because of the repeated attacks upon its personnel and military facilities carried out by armed units of both Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh in January and February 1992. Moreover, it was stated that although the withdrawing forces destroyed a batallion’s worth of equipment in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of the warring parties, some weaponry was known to have been sold or given to Karabakh forces.¹¹⁸

Opposition groups in Azerbaijan believed that the Hojaly massacre was an act of intimidation from the Russian Federation intending to “teach a lesson to Azerbaijan” for latter’s refusal to join CIS and for its demands to remove Russian troops from Azerbaijan. Others speculated on the version that Russian forces received a bribe from Armenians for the operation and Armenian forces acting behind the 366th regiment

¹¹⁶ Javid Turan, “Qarabağ Muharibesi” (Karabakh War) (Genje, 1994) quoted in Mekhtiyev, op.cit. p 11

¹¹⁷ Mekhtiyev, op.cit. p.11

¹¹⁸ *Mayak Radio Network*, 28 February 1992 in FBIS-SOV, quoted in Michael Croissant, *The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: causes and implications*, (London; Praeger, 1998), p.99

perpetrated the mass killings. Although the Azerbaijani president attended the CIS meetings, the parliament had decided not to join the CIS. This dual approach caused Russia's suspicion and mistrust to Azerbaijan.¹¹⁹

Azerbaijan began to accuse locally based Russian troops of involvement in the fighting on the side of Armenia. While denying Baku's accusations of participation by Russia's 366th Motorized Rifle Regiment in the massacre at Hojaly, Moscow acknowledged the possibility that some Russian soldiers could have been fighting on one side or the other as volunteers or mercenaries.¹²⁰

This event brought down Mutallibov's government bringing the opposition, anti-Russian Popular Front, to power.¹²¹ As Tadeusz Swietochowski witnessed:

"It took the tragedy of Hojaly to bring the simmering political crisis to the boil. The grisly images of hundreds of massacred Azerbaijanis – women and children whom the army had left to the tender mercies of attackers – produced in the public a shock that Mutallibov regime could no longer survive".¹²²

Military operations between Azerbaijan and Armenia were advancing after the independence. Under the pressures from Popular Front government with first democratically elected president Elchibey at the head, Russian garrison in Azerbaijan situated outside Genje departed in spring 1993. Nevertheless, the commanders of this garrison developed close relationship with Suret Huseynov, *de-facto* commander of

¹¹⁹ Mekhtiyev, op.cit. p.12

¹²⁰ Croissant, op.cit., p.80

¹²¹ Audrey Alstadt, "Azerbaijan's struggle towards democracy" p.119 in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (eds.), *Conflict, Cleavage and Change in Central Asia and Caucasus*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997)

¹²² Tadeusz Swietochowski, "The problem of Nagorno Karabakh: geography versus demography under colonialism and decolonization" (Washington D.C., 1999), p.154

forces on the northern front, turning over their equipment to Huseynov rather than to the representative of Azerbaijani government. The most striking thing was that on June 4, 1993 Huseynov, equipped with heavy military and airborne troops, started a military march to Baku in order to force president Elchibey to resign.¹²³ Supporters of the Azerbaijani Popular Front as well as many observers in the West alleged that Russia had a hand in the events of June 1993. Russian involvement can be hypothesized looking at the timing of the June coup as it was organized on the eve of Elchibey's planned multibillion-dollar accord in late June with Western oil companies. Coming to power, one of immediate decisions of Aliev was to postpone for indefinite period the signing of the agreement.¹²⁴ Facing pressures Elchibey had resigned inviting Heydar Aliyev, ex-first Secretary of Azerbaijani Communist Party, as the speaker of the Parliament. According to the big variety of Western sources, Russia was backing Heydar Aliyev's taking presidency in Azerbaijan. However, it is worth underlining that, as we have already put it above, Russian leadership was not so luke-warm to his personality. Russian leaders had, actually, their man – first president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutallibov, distinguished by strong pro-Russian feelings (he is based now in Russia and believed to have the same attitudes even today). However, things turned out not in the way Russians planned it and namely Aliev, not Mutallibov took the power in Azerbaijan. That makes clear that although Russia was planning to replace pro-Western and pro-Turkish Elchibey by pro-Russian Mutallibov (that was the original reason under Huseynov's coup'd'etat) Heydar Aliyev mobilized all his support and took initiative. In the face of this change Russian leadership has nothing to do but to agree and to

¹²³ Alstadt, *op.cit.*, p.128

¹²⁴ Croissant, *op.cit.*, p.91

recognize Aliev. Actually, for Russians Aliev's personality, though being worse an alternative than Mutalibov, appeared to be at least better than Elchibey's.¹²⁵

Although the period we mentioned first as "isolationism" showed quite assertive attempts by some Russian ministries and other actors to dominate in Azerbaijan, the official line, as of the President's, Prime-Minister's and MFA's, in that period was of trying to avoid unnecessary problems and consequently expenses emanating from "near abroad". With nationalists and communists gaining majority in Russian Parliament the situation started to change towards more assertive policy, which united virtually all the government with the exception of Ministry of Fuel and Energy.

3.2. The emergence of more assertive policy (1993– 1995).

From mid 1992 Russia has served notice of greater assertiveness towards reintegration of the Near Abroad. This was partly the result of government's need to response to ultra-nationalist and communist circles' anxiety about the danger of foreign penetration and of Pan-Turkist and Islamic ideas spreading from the south to Russia's Turkic and Muslim peoples. Thus, Russia formulated a "sphere of influence" policy towards the "near abroad" aiming a big variety of exclusive rights in guarding borders, in mediating conflicts, in economic relations and in protecting the rights of Russian-speakers (In fact, the term of "Russian-speaker" remains a vague one, since the majority of the former Soviet Union population spoke and still speaks Russian). Initially, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was thought to be the structural framework to achieve this policy, but due to the persistent failure of CIS integration, bilateral

¹²⁵ Shireen T.Hunter, "Azerbaijan: searching for new neighbours" in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.) *New states, new politics: building the post-Soviet nations*, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.87

relations became a priority.¹²⁶ Russia's new policy towards Azerbaijan was running along two directions. First one is Russia's policy towards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Second is Russia's action and stance towards Azerbaijan's development of Caspian Sea energy resources. In its 1994 issue *Obozrevatel* wrote that Russian National Security Concept is mainly concentrated on two concerns:

- the supply of Russian fuel and raw materials to other members of CIS
- the combat involvement of Russian troops in conflicts within the former Soviet borders.

The implied connection between security and energy has become obvious in the Concept.¹²⁷ Moscow was trying to put security on the top of Azerbaijan's political agenda by keeping Azerbaijan engaged in a conflict and unable to carry out its plan for Western-led economic development and transport of Caspian oil.¹²⁸

In 1993 a respected think tank produced policy recommendations on the South Caucasus, which implied that destabilizing the political situation in the Near Abroad was more advantageous to Russia than allowing the consolidation of anti-Russian newly independent states in Caucasus and along the Caspian littoral. The report also outlined the means by which Russia should restore its pre-eminence in the South: securing

¹²⁶ Herzig, op.cit. p.106

¹²⁷ Stephen Blank, "Energy,economics and security in Central Asia: Russia and its Rivals" *Central Asian Survey* (1995) VOL 14 No 3 p.375

¹²⁸ Shaffer, op.cit. p.47

Armenian military in the conflict with Azerbaijan and supporting the secessionist aspirations of Lezgi and Talyshi minorities in Azerbaijan.¹²⁹

In April 1992 Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev emphasized military establishment's strong pre-occupation with "active defense of Russian interests" in Transcaucasus and Central Asia. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* quoted his statement that: "The main threat to Russia's security emanates from South". At the same time, Foreign Minister Kozyrev spoke before UN General Assembly stating that: "Transcaucasus and Central Asia are a part of Russia's sphere of influence and no international organization of group of states can replace Russia's peace-keeping efforts in this specific Post-Soviet space". These statements were evaluated as "an abbreviated version of Brezhnev Doctrine" which asserted Moscow's right to intervene in the former Communist world.¹³⁰

As regards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, although initially Russia backed Azerbaijan's position because it was based on the principle of sanctity of borders, beginning from 1992 Russia has begun to support Armenia. The main reason for such a change is thought to be Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) coming to power. Abulfaz Elchibey, academician and former dissident, who headed rigorous APF, was elected the president of Azerbaijani Republic. His rule distinguished with strong anti-Russian and equally strong pro-Turkish attitudes. Armen Khanbalyan of *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* described the removal of Elchibey and his replacement by Aliiev as "a major

¹²⁹ I.Zevelev, "Russian Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests in the Caspian Region". Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet studies, *"The Geopolitics of Oil, Gas and Ecology in the Caucasus and the Caspian Basin"* Conference Report, May 1998 quoted in Tadeusz Swietochowsky, *"Perspectives on Azerbaijan"*, *Central Asian Survey* (1999) VOL 18, No 4, p.427

¹³⁰ Oles M. Smolansky, "Russia and Transcaucasia" in Alvin Z.Rubinstein, Oles M.Smolansky (eds.), *"Regional Power Rivalries in the New Eurasia: Russia, Turkey and Iran."* (M.E.Sharpe, 1995) p.205

achievement of Russian policy". Azerbaijan played a significant role in Caucasian politics. During Elchibey's government Azerbaijan had served as an important link between the former Soviet Muslim republics on the one hand, and Turkey on the other. Khanbalyan suggested that all that came to an end and Russian interests once again started to be dominant in the southern regions of former USSR.¹³¹ Elchibey tried to make Turkey the primary focus of Azerbaijani foreign policy. It can be explained by following reasons:

- Azerbaijani Popular Front and Elchibey held ardently pro-Turkish and in some respect Pan-Turkic views, believing that Azerbaijanis' ethno-linguistic heritage made Turkey "a natural choice as Baku's main foreign partner.
- Turkey represented the model of a secular, democratic, market oriented state to which Azerbaijan could aspire
- Finally, Turkey, through its ties to NATO and the West, offered Azerbaijan a potential means through which to balance what is viewed as biased Russian support for Armenia.¹³²

Moscow's major vehicle to achieve full control of Transcaucasus appeared to be Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Azerbaijan was regarded as the main obstacle for Russia to mediate the conflict and generally for the re-establishment of Russian preeminence in Transcaucasus. That is why Kremlin put some serious requests before new Azerbaijani leadership headed by Aliiev:

¹³¹ *NeGa*, September 10, 1993 quoted in Smolansky, op.cit. p.212

¹³² Croissant, op.cit. p.83

- establishment of Russian military bases on Azerbaijan's territory
- use of Russian border troops to guard Azerbaijani frontiers
- recognition of Russia as the sole initiator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
- some form of recognition by Azerbaijan of self-proclaimed "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic"
- recognition by Baku of a twelve-mile zone in the oil bearing Caspian shelf, accompanied by renunciation of fifty-mile exclusion zone on which Azerbaijan had insisted. Moreover, Russia put forward the problem that the oil being extracted from the Caspian shelf near Azerbaijan is the common property of all littoral states.

Russian Defense Minister Grachev specified that Russian leadership wished to establish military bases throughout the Transcaucasus and to station Russian frontier guards along Azeri-Iranian border.¹³³ As a response to such demands Aliiev had ordered a military offensive and traveled to Ankara in order to improve Azerbaijan's ability to negotiate and to gain a support of Turkey in these negotiations with Russia and Armenia. Baku opposed to Russian idea of deployment of Russian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh, giving priority to CSCE activity. Azerbaijan and CSCE agreed that negotiations on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh should begin only after the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories. Contrarily, Grachev said that he saw no need in observers from CSCE and assured that Russia alone could guarantee the implementation of cease-fire and of eventual peace settlement. Surprisingly, president Yeltsin's envoy to Transcaucasus Kazimirov said that Russia had no objection to multinational

¹³³ Smolansky, op.cit. p. 213

peacekeeping force, which would include units from such neutral states as Austria, Sweden and Finland. This fact indicated that there was no clearly determined line at the highest levels in Kremlin.¹³⁴

Besides Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia has had some other opportunities to exert influence over Azerbaijan.

- About 40 percent of commodity turnover in Azerbaijan belong to Russia. When Russian frontiers were closed, it has driven the economy of Azerbaijan into desperate state.
- By that time there were 300 000 ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan. Russia used them as a ground for interference, though all their cultural rights were guaranteed by Elchibey's decree "About the rights of ethnic minorities".
- Russia has taken an active part in provoking separatism of Lezgins and Talyshs, living in the north and south of Azerbaijan. Armenia has also tried to raise a question of Kurdish people in Azerbaijan. Armenian propaganda advocates that most of the regions in Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia are places of compact residence of Kurdish people, who have always been lukewarm to Yerevan.
- The representatives of former Communist *nomenklatura* are also pro-Russian. This well-arranged force associated with financial commercial and industrial groups, headed by former president Mutallibov (who lives by now in Moscow), has been the main hope for Russia.

¹³⁴ *ibid.*, p.215

- KGB, Army Security Service and Frontier Troops of the former USSR have distributed Russian espionage system for 70 years of Soviet rule. As the Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan evaluated, in 1992 about 100 000 people in Azerbaijan were directly or indirectly linked with USSR secret services. A great number of adherents to Russia have been in the supreme officer's corps of the Azerbaijani Army.¹³⁵

Bagirov¹³⁶ adds several more leverages that Russia has tended to use to exert influence on Azerbaijan:

- An estimated number of 2 mln. Azeris live currently in Russia who have migrated there as a result of unfavorable economic conditions in Azerbaijan. This number is constantly increasing and Russia has seemed to take every opportunity to remind Azerbaijan of its “ability to create unbearable conditions for those who have found shelter in Russia and eventually to drive them out”. Although there have been no official documents justifying such behavior of Russian officials, in the past several years the records and reports in media (Azeri as well as Russian) of cases of persecution, detentions and killings of Azeri nationals in Russia have become frequent. Russian side has also recurrently pointed to the fact that Azerbaijanis working in Russia send their relatives in Azerbaijan 1 billion US dollars yearly. According to Moscow, this is a big figure and it should be regarded as Russian investment into Azerbaijani

¹³⁵ Hikmet Hajizade, “Russia in Transcaucasus or democracy in the state of emergency”, *Transition*, No.3 1997 p.5

¹³⁶ Sabit Bagirov, “Azerbaijan’s strategic choice” in Gennady Chufrin (ed), *Security of the Caspian Region* (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 176

economy. Azerbaijan responded that, in fact, Azerbaijani nationals in Russia make investment into Russian economy and open new working places.¹³⁷

- During about 200 years of Russian rule rigorous cultural influence of Russia has emerged in Azerbaijan. The overwhelming majority of Azeris speak Russian. There is a special category of Azeris, who are Russian-speaking, having been brought up in spirit of Russian rather than Azeri culture. Other indicators of Russian influence are the popularity of Russian TV channels, Russian schools, Russian-language departments at universities, Russian-language newspapers, and the supply by Russia of books and journals on many issues including science, education, culture, sport etc.,

As regards Azerbaijani attempts to explore Caspian oil and its transportation to the Western markets, Russia's initial stance towards this tended to be extremely negative and sometimes very aggressive.

Soviet administration established an energy transportation system that made littoral states completely dependent on Moscow. For Azerbaijan the transportation of its energy resources to the world market required huge amount of financial resources, the fact that made impossible the exploration and transportation of its energy resources without financial investment from outside.¹³⁸

During the second stage of Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan, Baku became more vulnerable due to the Russia's "propriety attitude" towards local oil deposits. Russia sought to force Baku to grant Lukoil a 10 per cent share of revenues from

¹³⁷ Samir Neymanoglu. "Rusiya-Azerbaycan iqtisadi münasibetleri", *Azadlıq*, January 25, 2002

¹³⁸ Blank, op.cit. p.375

Caspian without Lukoil's putting up a dime of equity. Additionally, Russia was trying to make impossible for Western oil companies to operate in the region. On April 28, 1994 the Russian government sent a demarche to London "claiming the right to veto any exploration in the Caspian Sea" and stating that they cannot be recognized without Russian approval. Further on it is read:

"The Caspian Sea is an enclosed water reservoir with a single ecosystem and represents the object of joint use within whose boundaries all issues and activities including resource development have to be resolved with the participation of all the Caspian countries"¹³⁹

In spite of all pressures from Russia, on September 20, Azerbaijan signed its first oil deal on the Azeri, Chirag and Guneshli fields with BP, Amoco, Statoil, the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO), Pennzoil, Ramco, Delta, Mc Dermott, Unocal and Lukoil. The contact has been labeled as the "Deal of the Century". Azeri government on the development of its on- and offshore fields concluded more 19 agreements. The total investment was expected to be \$50 billion, while expected production – around 10 billion barrels of oil and 2 trillion cubic meters of gas. According to expert estimation, if the oil contracts are successfully implemented, Azerbaijan's annual production will be around 1.5 per cent of world output.¹⁴⁰

As it was anticipated first opposition to the "Deal of the Century" has come from Russia. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared that the September 20 deal was "premature" and "illegal". The accord was considered to violate Soviet-Iranian treaties

¹³⁹ Blank, *op.cit.* p.376

¹⁴⁰ Bagirov, *op.cit.* pp.181-182

of 1921 and 1940, which treated Caspian Sea as a “unified whole” (its resources could be exploited only by an agreement of littoral states) and an “internal sea” (international conventions regulating the use of shelf are inapplicable in this case). Baku rejected MFA’s claims. Surprisingly, at the same time Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin assured president Aliev that Russian government had no objections to the September oil deal, although one day earlier MFA spokesman criticized those Russian industrialists who were collaborating with Baku in exploiting the Caspian resources. Spokesman also added that in “defending Russia’s rights, the Ministry was acting on Yeltsin’s orders. Later on, Kozyrev in his letter to Chernomyrdin suggested imposing economic and financial restrictions to force Azerbaijan “to respect the interests of Russia and the norms of international law”. Chernomyrdin turned this suggestion down. MFA found support in the Foreign Intelligence Service, whose boss Yevgeni Primakov, had the view that “oil contract represents a threat to Russia’s national security”. Finally, on November 17, Aliev met with Yeltsin in Moscow where the Russian president declared that “the leadership of Russian Federation intends to cooperate with Azerbaijan in developing Caspian Sea resources”. In fact, Yeltsin was compelled to choose between the MFA and Ministry of Fuel and Energy, and he seemed to have chosen the latter.¹⁴¹

Of course, after signing the “Deal of Century” Russia attempted also to utilize traditional means to destabilize the situation in Azerbaijan. Russian secret services launched terrorist attacks, assisted four prisoners (who were regarded by Aliev’s

¹⁴¹ Smolansky, op.cit. p.222-223

establishment as Russian agents) to escape and flee from Azerbaijan. Some other subversive activities did also take part.¹⁴²

As it is can be clearly observed, one of the ways in which Russia was attempting to obstruct the development of Caspian energy resources and the pipe-line routes supported by the West was through legal challenges to Azerbaijan's rights to decide independently on oil projects. However, it has been surprising sometimes how easily Russian Federation could give up its opposition to delineation presented as strictly legal issue. Such recurrent shifts in Russia's position indicated that "legal stances are tactical, but its overriding concerns are political and economic". Further on, Russia has barely missed an opportunity to be involved in certain oil and gas exploitation projects "abandoning its legal stances in order to allow the energy projects to move forward".¹⁴³

This very fact indicates the disagreement emerged inside Russian elite on energy issues. As Herzig fairly put it, there are two broad tendencies in Russian policy towards the states of South Caucasus. First one emphasizes control (to be achieved by political and economic pressure and the use of military levers, if necessary). Second one prioritize stability and therefore tends to support internal stability in the South Caucasus, stressing the development of normal, voluntary and mutually beneficial bilateral political, economic and security relations. The signing of 1994 "Deal of the Century" for the development of Azerbaijan offshore oil reserves "resulted in one of the most blatant

¹⁴² "Azerbaycan-Türkiye: Dostluq, Qardaşlıq, Strateji Emekdaşlıq", (Bakı, Şerq-Qerb, 1997)

¹⁴³ Shaffer, *op.cit.* p.49-50

contradictions among these actors, interests and tendencies: the confrontation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Fuel and Energy.¹⁴⁴

Now it seems that the position of Ministry of Fuel and Energy having been backed by Yeltsin won in this dispute. Yuri Shafrannik, the then Minister of Fuel and Energy, visited Baku in November 1993 together with the President of Lukoil Company. The negotiations resulted in an agreement according to which Azerbaijan granted Lukoil 10 percent of its own 30 per cent share of the profits from the “Deal of the Century”. As a response to such gesture, Lukoil took a commitment to lobby the interests of Azerbaijani government in Kremlin.¹⁴⁵

3.3 . Third phase: Shift to more cooperative and pragmatic approach.

3.3.1. Russian policy during Yeltsin’s presidency (1995-1999)

From the late 1994 powerful business lobbies with interests in Caspian energy resources have started to support the new tendency of Russian leadership with emphasis on maintaining regional stability and more cooperative relations with Azerbaijan. Such cooperative attitude seems to have been imposed by economic rationales, since Russian leadership have started to realize that any attempts to project power more forcefully is likely to overstretch resources and proves counterproductive in relation to more vital interests, especially in North Caucasus. Therefore, the promotion of regional stability

¹⁴⁴ Herzig, op.cit. 105-106

¹⁴⁵ Personal interview with Sabit Bagirov, former President of State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), March 19, 2002, Baku

and mutually beneficial relations with the South Caucasian states started to be considered as a rational policy to secure political, security and economic interests.¹⁴⁶

Obviously, Russian foreign policy has started to be more liberal, i.e. “based more on economic interests, rather than on political ideas”. As McFaul put it: “Groups with *economic interests* – Gazprom, oil companies, mineral exporters, and bankers – began to replace individuals and groups with *political ideas* as the main societal forces influencing foreign policy outcomes”.¹⁴⁷

Russian state has been actively promoting the interests of its economic groups in CIS by representing Lukoil in the Caspian Sea oil deliberations, pressuring CIS states to join the Interstate Economic Committee. At the same time liberals in government and economic groups were mostly against the political integration inside CIS that tended to be problematic. Therefore, they have delayed Russia’s integration with Belarus. Gradually a small, well-organized coalition of economic interest groups occupied a central role in making of Russian foreign policy.¹⁴⁸

Nevertheless, in general, Russian state during the third phase of foreign policy towards Azerbaijan has sought to preserve its political presence in Azerbaijan, to extend its control over the extraction of Caspian oil and its transport routes, and to restrain its political and geopolitical rivals such as Turkey, US and other Western countries. Therefore, Russia, in case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is to fulfill a difficult task of coordinating its domestic and foreign policy interests and the interests of the conflicting

¹⁴⁶ Herzig, op.cit., p.107

¹⁴⁷ McFaul, op.cit., p. 24

¹⁴⁸ MsFaul, op.cit., p.27

sides, as well as those of the countries concerned by or involved in the conflict. Thus, although Armenia was the priority for Russia in the South Caucasus due to the former's mostly pro-Russian stance after independence, Russian leadership realized that Azerbaijan should be treated at least in the same manner, partly because of its geostrategic importance, partly due to oil factor. Therefore, in order to "keep up the system of checks and balances" Russia, after signing a renewed treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security in 1997 with Armenia, concluded similar agreement with Azerbaijan. However, there still were differences in terms of the agreements: the treaty with Armenia obliges two countries to assist each other in the event of armed aggression by a third country, whereas the Azeri-Russian treaty merely provides for "urgent consultations"¹⁴⁹

The second most serious confrontation among two factions inside Russian bureaucracy and government (dominative and cooperative) emerged after the disclosure of facts on huge military arms transfer from Russian Federation to Armenia between 1993 and 1996. On February 14, 1997 Russian Minister for Cooperation with CIS countries, Aman Tuleev, alleged that 86 T-72 tanks, 50 APCs, and 32 Scud-B missiles were transferred to Armenia from the Russian Defense Ministry from 1993 to 1996. All weapons were transferred free of charge and without the apparent endorsement of the Russian government. Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov conceded the fact of transfer. Baku called this fact as "a gross violation of the Conventional Forces in Europe

¹⁴⁹ *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, No.8 (1997) p.41 quoted in Dina Malysheva, *The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: its impact on security of the Caspian Region* in Gennady Chufrin (ed.), *Security of the Caspian Region*, (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 266

Treaty” This very fact indicated that liberal factions in government started to raise their voices against destructive behavior towards CIS of imperialist minded actors.¹⁵⁰

At the conference organized by Turkish Atlantic Council in September 1998, First Deputy Chairman of Azerbaijani Parliament Yashar Aliev informed about the amount and type of arms transferred:

“After the signing of cease-fire agreement in May 1994, Russian Defense Ministry illegally transferred to Armenia following arms and weapons: a great amount of arms technology, R-17 and “Ilga” missile sets, “Krug” and “Osa” air defense systems, T-72 and BMP-2 tanks, Howitzer D-39, D-20 and D-1 reactive “Grad” sets, a huge number of guns, automated guns and other ammunition. Armenia also possesses long distance (300 km) missiles and famous “Scud” nuclear missile carrier. These missiles can easily destroy any district of Azerbaijan. The total amount of the military support amounts to 1 billion US dollars. It is obvious that such kind of extension of Armenia’s military capacity is not merely for defensive ends”.¹⁵¹

President Aliev stated that during the investigation inside Russian official bodies, in the Ministry of Defense and some Parliamentary committees it became clear that Russia transferred to Armenia heavy arms and armaments amounting to 1.5 billion US dollars.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Croissant, op.cit. p.120

¹⁵¹ “Orta Asya ve Kafkasyadaki durum ve Avrupa Güvenliği”, Report by Assembly of WEU, (Trabzon: Karadeniz Technical University Press, 1998) p.38,

¹⁵² President Aliev’s interview to Turkish Samanyolu TV, May 6, 1997

In March 1997 Russian Ministry of Defense confirmed to Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs that illegal arms transfer to Armenia was conducted, putting that investigation on the issue started. On April 2 1997 Duma Defense Committee Chairman Lev Rokhlin acknowledged the fact that of illegal arms transfer to Armenia during years 1993 to 1996. Rokhlin said that the Committee applied to the Prosecutor General to start criminal investigation on fact.¹⁵³

During 1997-1999 Aliev extensively used the fact of arms transfers to Armenia as one of the main bargaining chips in negotiations with Russia. For the first time Azeri administration seemed to have such effective card in its hands. Yeltsin's state of health, which resulted in inefficiency within bureaucracy further contributed to Aliev's advance in the issue.¹⁵⁴

In addition to arms transfers another move by Russia further aggravated the security of Azerbaijan. On March 15, 1995 the agreement was signed between Russia and Armenia enabling Russia to keep a military base at Gyumri with 3000 men equipped with SU-27 combat aircraft, a squadron of MIG-29 fighter planes and S-300 SAMs. Moreover, according to commitment taken by Russia at OSCE Istanbul Summit it is going to remove its military bases stationed in Georgia (Gudauta and Vaziani). Now the possibility of their redeployment on the territory of Armenia is being discussed. Overall, such kind of strong Russian military presence in Caucasus renders impossible Baku's

¹⁵³ Orta Asya ve Kafkasyadaki durum ve Avrupa Guvenliđi, p.40

¹⁵⁴ Personal interview with Elkhan Mekhtiyev, Peace and Conflict Resolution Center Director, March 21, 2002

effective military breakthrough if it decides to regain control of Nagorno-Karabakh and six other occupied districts.¹⁵⁵

3.3.2 Russian policy under president Putin (from 2000)

With Putin's coming to power in Russia, the relations between two countries have changed in a positive way. The foreign policy of Putin administration towards Azerbaijan labeled by Azeris as "more pragmatic" has significantly improved Russian images in Azerbaijan. Analysts explain this by the fact that unlike previous Russian leader Yeltsin's stance, Putin's view of Azerbaijan is not "emotionally charged" as both of them: Putin and Aliyev are coming from KGB. Contrarily, Yeltsin, a populist democrat, perceived Aliyev as the vestige of the previous communist system for the latter had a brilliant party carrier and managed even to become a Politburo member and the Deputy Prime Minister of USSR. In his turn, Aliyev has seen President Vladimir Putin's ascent to power in 2000 as an opportunity to build a pragmatic relationship with the Kremlin after years of discord between Moscow and Baku, which some analysts blamed on an inconsistent foreign policy. Aliyev gradually worked to mend relations with Russia and its new leader, who like him was coming from KGB. Aliyev pleased Moscow by allowing Russian companies to participate in exploration of Azeri oil and extraditing Chechen rebels. He also made a real effort to end the crossing of Chechen rebels from Azerbaijan to Russia, to let Russia keep its early warning radar in Gabala and to no longer bring up the issue of hosting NATO bases in his public dialogue with

¹⁵⁵ Malysheva, op.cit., p.277

Putin.¹⁵⁶ Analysts do not also exclude an effect of personal relations of Putin with Azerbaijan. He has visited Baku recurrently before assuming power and has personal friendship ties with particular individuals in Azerbaijan and among Azerbaijanis living in Russia. Putin is also thought to have good relations with Azerbaijani diaspora in Sankt-Peterburg.

Putin's new activism in Caspian started in spring 2000 following a decision by Security Council of the Russian Federation to re-activate Russian policy in the region.¹⁵⁷ One of the most important points has been the fact that Moscow and Baku finally managed to solve the disagreement over delimitation of Caspian Sea – the problem emerged immediately after the break-up of Soviet Union. Azerbaijan (together with Kazakhstan) has always opposed to the principle of common use of the sea because it possessed one of the biggest oil reserves in its offshore area. In 2000 Russia started to support Azerbaijan's position and proposed to divide Caspian along "modified median line" (allegedly because new oil fields have been discovered in Russian offshore). In 1998 Russia signed an agreement with Kazakhstan on delimitation of Caspian Sea between these two states. In 2001 Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan also agreed on division of the sea on the principle proposed by Russia. These initial accords evoked severe opposition from Iran, which even made an appeal to UN.¹⁵⁸

Putin's visit to Baku in January 2001 was the first official visit of Russian president to Azerbaijan since independence. One of the results of this visit was "Baku

¹⁵⁶ Simon Saradzhyan, "How Baku Avoided Tbilisi's Troubles", *The Moscow Times*, September 30, 2002 posted at <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2002/09/30/002.html>

¹⁵⁷ Robert Cutler, "Putin's Caspian diplomacy", *FSU Oil and Gas Monitor*, January 30, 2001

¹⁵⁸ Christina Hoffman, "Wem gehört das Kaspische Meer?" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 26 April 2002, posted at www.inosmi.ru

Declaration”, agreement between Azerbaijan and Russia on principles of cooperation in the Caspian Sea. According to it, the neighboring states should divide the seabed into sectors or zones on the basis of median line drawn due to the principle of equal distance practice. Azerbaijan and Russia agreed that each of the littoral countries would have exclusive rights for the exploitation of mineral resources and other legal economic activities.¹⁵⁹

On September 2002, presidents Aliev and Putin signed in Moscow an agreement on delineation of the Caspian Sea between two countries.¹⁶⁰

During his visit to Baku, Putin emphasized the “need for interpenetration” (*vzaimovnedreniye*) of the economies of Azerbaijan and Russia. Consequently, in 2002, after Aliev’s visit to Moscow, it has been agreed that in forthcoming years Russia would increase the amount of electric energy it sells to Azerbaijan by the medium of “RAO EES Rossiya” up to 3 billion KW. Russian oil giants “Lukoil” and “Yukos” will be participating in Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project. In 2002 Azerbaijan purchased 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Russian “Itera” Company.¹⁶¹ In April 2002 Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko visited Baku trying to attract Azerbaijan by the alternative to Baku-Ceyhan route. The thing is that beginning from 2005 (start of Baku-Ceyhan oil transfer) most of Azerbaijani (and probably Kazakh) oil will be bypassing Russia. Russian policy-makers competed to have a main export oil pipeline constructed across their territory to carry Azerbaijani and possibly Kazakh crude oil to the European market. Ankara (together with Washington) was pushing for the Baku-

¹⁵⁹ Bagirov, op.cit. p.189

¹⁶⁰ R.Gabiboglu.“Osnovniye batalii razvernutsa v sleduyushem godu”, *Zerkalo*, December 2002

¹⁶¹ Neymanoglu, op.cit.

Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export pipeline project that would bypass both Russia and Iran, whereas Moscow backed the so-called "northern route" to Novorossiisk. Therefore, Russian leadership was trying to do its best in persuading Azerbaijani side to use Northern pipelines. In Baku, thus, Khristenko stressed, that Russia had "big capacities of a big transit state", adding that if Azerbaijan "has a need in Russian territory as a transit for its oil, it should make a first step". However, Russian sources seem rather skeptical about Azerbaijani establishment changing its stance.¹⁶²

In November 2002 Russian Minister of Fuel and Energy Igor Yusufov visited Azerbaijan proposing to cooperate in exporting electric energy to third states. He stated that Russian side is ready for these ends to modernize the infrastructure in Azerbaijan. The minister also proposed Azerbaijan and Russia to cooperate in the oil and gas projects in the Middle East.¹⁶³

It has become obvious, that with Putin's assuming office, Russia's policies towards South Caucasus has become more coordinated and modest. Especially, beginning with the failure Chechen war Russian administration started to realize that its policy of "positioning different forces in the region against each other" could provoke a danger backfiring on its own stability and security. As Shaffer put it: "Although Moscow still strives to maintain influence in and obtain benefits from the region, the means it chooses to implement these goals seem to have changed".¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Varvara Aglamishyan, "Baku nadeyetsa na Jeyhan", *NeGa*. April 11, 2002

¹⁶³ "Rusiyadan yeni teklif", *525ci qezet* (Baku), November 30, 2002

¹⁶⁴ Shaffer, op.cit. p.39

One of the important steps in Putin's new policy appears to be an appointment of the former Minister of Fuel and Energy, Viktor Kalyuzhny, as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Special Presidential Envoy to Caspian Region. Kalyuzhny visited Azerbaijan recurrently during recent years negotiating Caspian problems. Kalyuzhny's belonging to oil lobby and his pragmatic approach to Caspian issues has contributed notably to the achievement of accord between Russia and Azerbaijan. Moreover, almost at the same time a certain cooling in Azerbaijan's relations with the West has been contemplated and this fact also increased Russians' chances. Kalyuzhny proposed to compensate costs and then divide the output between littoral states which have disputed oil fields. Thus, Russian leadership has realized that waiting for the international status of Caspian to be resolved would take time. So, Kalyuzhny initiated negotiation of agreements with littoral states before status have been adopted. Moreover, Deputy Minister proposed to create a center in Baku for "strategic development and monitoring of situation by elaborating proposals"¹⁶⁵.

Russian oil monopoly Lukoil, headed by ethnic Azeri, Vagit Alekperov, has played a considerable role in improving relations between two countries. This company was one of the biggest architects of new Russian policy towards Azerbaijan. Already in November 1993, president of Lukoil visited Azerbaijan together with then Minister of Fuel and Energy Viktor Shafrannik. Consequently, a special place in "The Deal of the Century" was given to Lukoil: Azerbaijan granted 10 per cents of its 30 per cent share to Lukoil. (which meant 1 billion US dollars annually). In turn, Lukoil leadership took a

¹⁶⁵ Vitaly Naumkin, "Russia's national security interests in the Caspian region" in Gennady Chufirin (ed), *Security of the Caspian Region*, (SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2001), p.133

commitment to promote Azerbaijan's interests in Kremlin.¹⁶⁶ Russian minister regarded the oil and the economic growth of Azerbaijan as being very important and that incorporation with Russia's economy was necessary:

“We used to move towards economy via politics. But today, I think, it is possible to solve political problems through economics. Perhaps, problems that cannot be solved by politicians can be solved by economists”.¹⁶⁷

Surprisingly enough, last year Lukoil disclosed its decision about withdrawal from Azeri, Chirag, Guneshli projects. Analysts explain that now Aliev does not have the problems he had with Russian leadership during Yeltsin's period and therefore, Lukoil has lost its profile as a sort of bridge between political elites of two nations. Another interpretation argues that Aliev was discomfited by the rumors that Lukoil's president Vagit Alekperov was going to actively participate in Azerbaijan's political life.¹⁶⁸

Economic considerations have also forced Russia to obtain more neutral stance towards Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia has begun to voice the argument that the expectations that “the key to solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is in Russia's hands” are somehow exaggerated. Russian Ambassador to Baku Nikolay Ryabov stated:

¹⁶⁶ Personal interview with Sabit Bagirov.

¹⁶⁷ Sefa Martin Yürükel, “Nationalism and foundation of national identity in Azerbaijan” in “Conflicts and Contrasts in Caucasus”, Conference Report, Aarhus, 1996, p.275

¹⁶⁸ R.Gabiboglu. “Osnovniye batalii razvernuta v sleduyushem godu”.

“Russia is not an empire to force others to act in a certain way”. The ambassador also proposed the “staged way” of solution of the conflict.¹⁶⁹

In April 2002 expressing his support for “staged way” of solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russian ambassador Nikolay Ryabov, emphasized also the necessity of restoring railway communication between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This proposal can be explained in following way. As it is already known Armenia has a huge amount of debts to Russian Federation and the republic is not capable of reimbursing its debts back. As a compensation for these debts Russian Federation obtained some state-owned enterprises in Armenia and needs now communication with this republic as it does not have direct land border with it. Moreover, railways running through the territory of Azerbaijan are regarded to be of the biggest capacity in Transcaucasus.

As it turns out the unresolved status of “neither peace nor war” of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict appears now to be economically unprofitable for Russia itself as it can not communicate freely with its companies in Armenia. Therefore, economic actors have significantly promoted the idea of fast solution of the conflict.

¹⁶⁹ M.Mamedov, “Klyuch k resheniyu Karabakhskoy problemi naxoditsa ne v Rossii”, *Zerkalo* April 3, 2002

Conclusion

In this thesis we have attempted to explain Russian foreign policy towards Azerbaijan as a result of domestic actors' competition over influence in foreign policy.

The making of foreign policy and different actors influencing (sometimes determining) its direction, the connection between domestic and foreign contexts were our main objectives. Through theoretical lenses of what foreign policy is and how foreign policy is made we have attempted to explain the developments in Soviet/Russian foreign policy. The literature review of foreign policy theory leads us to better understanding of state behavior as it relates to external environment. As it turned out from our study, Russia's foreign policy at the beginning of 90's hardly meets Rosenau's requirements of foreign policy as a "distinctive form of adaptive behavior" being goal oriented, purposeful and rational. It was more of a sort Rosenau defines as "merely uncoordinated sum of many private decisions" which is quite different from foreign policy¹⁷⁰. In Allison's terms, different players acted in terms of no consistent sets of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; these players make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but "the pulling and hauling that is politics"¹⁷¹. Only with development of Russian statehood and emergence of solid institutions foreign policy becomes more coordinated and consistent.

¹⁷⁰ James N. Rosenau. "Comparing foreign policies: Why, What, How in *James Rosenau (ed.) Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories, Findings and Methods*, SAGE Publications, 1974. p.7

¹⁷¹ Allison, Zelikow, op.cit. p.255

Why domestic actors are so important? While utilizing national level of analysis, we are far away from implying that we diminish the significance of systemic factors in the emergence of foreign policy. Contrarily, post-Cold War developments have made a tremendous impact on transformation of Russia's foreign policy. However, the thing we are trying to emphasize is as following. As our study confirms there is a strong link between the initial domestic regime change and the following changes in Russia's foreign policy behavior. It seems that liberal forces in government have won in the competition with other actors prone to initiating conflicts and pursuing more belligerent policies. A stable well-organized coalition of economic groups with government has emerged which prone to pursue cooperative relations with all countries. The state encourages these groups to engage in entrepreneurship activities within the territory of former Soviet Union. It seems that Russian leadership tries to make a shift from imperialism to neo-colonialism creating dependency relationship with "near abroad" states.¹⁷² Domestic political, social and economic changes in Russia paved the way to the emergence of new actors preoccupied mostly with economic profit. These actors such as oil lobbies have had a great share in directing Russian decision-makers to their own interests and ends. Together with new actors a huge segment of old actors such as military industrial complex, old communist nomenklatura, army leadership and others

¹⁷² Interview with Elkhan Mekhtiyev. Russian neocolonialism is also tangible in Russian attempts to reinvigorate its cultural influence in the "near-abroad". Russian ministers of culture, education and other ministers visit permanently these states emphasizing the need for closer cooperation and wishing these nations not to forget old good times of coexistence within one state – USSR. In Azerbaijan, for instance, Russia provides secondary schools and universities with necessary literature in Russian. The number of Russian radio channels in Baku has substantially increased during recent years. Especially, great importance is assigned to the task of preserving Russian language as a *lingua franca* in the "near abroad".

have still preserved their role in foreign policy making. During 90's the front line has run between these two camps, economic interests having a slight prevalence over political ideas. To sum it up, throughout 90's most of foreign policy, especially towards Near Abroad, was a function of this power struggle between pragmatists and hard line nationalists or so-called Atlanticists and Eurasianists.

An important aspect in foreign policy analysis is the concept of decision-making. In line with Deutsch's theory of diversification of foreign policy sources we saw how Russian foreign policy evolved from a totalitarian decision-making to more oligarchic one – with wider participation. Therefore, on the grounds of transformation from a monolithic Soviet-type decision-making to a more diversified Russian foreign policy we have attempted to demonstrate how changes in domestic context could alter decision-makers' stance towards the world, and particularly towards what Russia labeled as "Near Abroad".

We can also assume that "Near Abroad" has become the area where Russia experienced its biggest crisis: identity crisis. Neither decision-makers nor Russian people could escape this crisis. Presumably, this crisis was major obstacle as Russia was trying to construct relations with new independent states. Russian leaders, psychologically, were ignoring the existence of these states as sovereign units seeing them as "ours" and not "others", accepting them only as a part of former Soviet Union.

Rosenau's categorization of foreign policy sources includes among others also attitudes. Under attitudes Roseanu implies mainly ideology and political culture. In order to explain the impact of cultural and ideological factors on foreign policy we decided to

include identity crisis and political culture (Culture One and Culture Two) as important aspects of foreign policy making. Analyzing foreign policy from this constructivist approach has shed some light on our understanding of Russian behavior during initial period of independence. However, close to late 90-s, with foreign policy's becoming less vulnerable to fluctuations of cultural attitudes and ideologies, has lost in their impact.

As it relates to Russia's policy towards Azerbaijan, insubordination reigned during first half of 90's between three main groups of actors within Russian politics: actors concerned with foreign policy in general, actors concerned with foreign economic relations and those dealing with military security policy. This was a period of tense relations between two nations. Clearly, Russia was speaking to Azerbaijan with more than one voice. Military security actors were engaged in Karabakh conflict directly, or by proxy methods supporting Armenia with armaments. Soviet KGB still has significant liaisons within Azerbaijan. Only after 1994 first Chechen War Russian policy towards Azerbaijan modified. As Hajizade says, "The alteration occurred in the brains of all the actors in Russian politics: liberals as well as conservatives. They have realized that instead of cordial cooperation such kind of assertive policy leads to estrangement of Azerbaijan from Russia"¹⁷³.

As it turns out, traditional distinction between "Eurasianists" and "Atlanticists" thoughts and the differences in the attitudes of actors belonging to these opposite schools seem to have reconciled. Today, with Putin's "managed democracy", alternatives of foreign policy seem rather limited. Putin have managed to consolidate the foreign policy decision-making by strongly subordinating to him the most powerful sources and actors

¹⁷³ Interview with Hikmet Hajizade

of foreign policy. The Parliament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, other ministries and services which proved previously to be influential actors making “their own foreign policies” have been transformed into something like subsidiaries of omnipotent Presidential Office. Putin reworded foreign policy agenda in the way that appeared acceptable to both: conservatives as well as liberals. To quote just one, Aleksands Dugin, famous Russian Eurasianist and the leader of “Evrziystvo” Movement justifies current pro-Western policies of government saying that Putin has a heavy burden of governing the state in such a difficult period and the society’s task is to support him.¹⁷⁴

All in all, we can say that Russia has notably consolidated its foreign policy. It has become more coherent, consistent and directed towards pragmatic goals. It seems that by consolidating its foreign policy it is also making a historic change to what Paul Goble described as “the shift from mission to interest”.¹⁷⁵

Regarding Russian-Azerbaijani relations, some factors still continue to determine its specific nature. Among them are Russian cultural heritage (Russian language being its biggest indicator), about 2 million Azerbaijani nationals living and working in Russia, Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict and Russia’s security partnership with Armenia, Russia’s overt and covert support for electoral manipulations in Azerbaijan as well as its manipulation of separatist tendencies on the Azerbaijani territories close to Russian border. All these are the points where Russia still exerts a considerable influence over Azerbaijani politics.

¹⁷⁴ Dugin, op.cit.

¹⁷⁵ Sally N. Cummings, “Russian foreign policy in the ‘near abroad’” in K.R.Dark, *“New studies in Post Cold War security”*, (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1996) p.75

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