

Homogenization and Turkification Practices in  
Kuzguncuk, Istanbul in the context of  
the Events of 6-7 September 1955

Emircan Krkt

A thesis presented to the

Atatrk Institute for Modern Turkish History  
at BoĖazii University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

June 2019





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## Abstract

“Homogenization and Turkification Practices in Kuzguncuk, Istanbul in the context of the Events of 6-7 September 1955”

Emircan K rk t, Master’s Candidate at the Atat rk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boĝaziçi University, 2019

Associate Professor Z.Umut T rem, Thesis Advisor

Kuzguncuk is a small, popular village in Istanbul near the Bosphorus. According to most official and unofficial written and oral documents, Kuzguncuk was a village of mostly Jews, Greeks, and Armenians rather than Muslim Turks up until the mid-twentieth century. In other words, the neighborhood is usually described by residents and in local and official discourses as a village of peace, harmony, and tolerance.

Kuzguncuk’s non-Muslim population started to decrease following the Turkification and homogenization practices of the Turkish nation-state such as Turkifying street names (the 1930s), a capital tax (1942), 6-7 September pogrom (1955), the deportation of Greek (1964), and the military operation in Cyprus (1974). Most of the Greeks and Jews were forcibly or voluntarily migrated to Greece and Israel. Specifically, the events of 6-7 September directly damaged Kuzguncuk’s non-Muslims because looters attacked several non-Muslim houses and shops. Unfortunately, recent statistics reveal that the current non-Muslim population of Kuzguncuk is only 1 percent of the total population of the village. Kuzguncuk lost its multicultural characteristic though Muslim Kuzguncuk residents hold up the multiethnic characteristic of the village in their nostalgic discourses.

The general objective of this research is to unpack the historical facts of the Turkish Republic’s homogenization and Turkification practices via an analysis of the case of Kuzguncuk. In other words, this study is a memory work of one of the well-known villages of Istanbul.

35,000 words

## Özet

“6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları Bağlamında Kuzguncuk'ta Homojenleştirme ve Türkleştirme Pratikleri”

Emircan Kürküt, Yüksek Lisans Adayı, 2019

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Doçent Z.Umut Türem, Tez Danışmanı

Kuzguncuk, İstanbul'un Boğaziçi kıyısında popüler ve küçük bir semttir. Resmi/resmi olmayan yazılı ve sözlü belgelere göre, Kuzguncuk 20. yüzyılın ortalarına kadar çoğunlukla Müslüman nüfustan ziyade Museviler, Rumlar ve Ermenilerin ikamet ettiğini bir bölgedir. Mahalle sakinleri tarafından genellikle bu semti tanımlamada; barış, harmoni ve hoşgörü ifadeleri kullanılır.

Kuzguncuk'un yüksek gayrimüslim nüfusu, sokak isimlerinin Türkleştirilmesi, (1930'lar), Varlık Vergisi (1942), 6-7 Eylül Olayları (1955), Zorunlu Rum Sürgünü (1964) ve Kıbrıs Askeri Operasyonu (1974) gibi uygulamalarla zarar görmüştür. Dolayısıyla, Rumların ve Musevilerin çoğu, zorla veya gönüllü olarak Yunanistan'a ve İsrail'e göç etmiştir. Özellikle, 6-7 Eylül olayları sırasında yağmacılar sahipleri gayri-Müslim olan birçok eve ve dükkana saldırdığı için Kuzguncuk gayri-Müslimlerine doğrudan zarar verilmiştir. Ne yazık ki, son istatistikler Kuzguncuk'un gayri-Müslim nüfusunun semtin toplam nüfusunun yalnızca %1'ini oluşturduğunu belirtmektedir. Kuzguncuk çok kültürlü bir özelliğini kaybetmiştir. Fakat, Müslüman Kuzguncuk sakinleri söylemlerinde köyün çok kültürlü yapısını nostalji olarak sürdürmeye devam etmektedirler.

Araştırmanın genel amacı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin homojenleşmesi ve Türkleştirme pratiklerinin tarihsel gerçeklerini Kuzguncuk örneğini analiz ederek çözmektir. Başka bir deyişle bu çalışma, İstanbul'daki tanınmış köylerden birinin hafıza çalışmaları olacaktır.

35.000 kelime



To my family

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
BCA	Turkish Prime Ministry Republican Archives
RPP	Republican Peoples' Party
DP	Democrat Party
TMT	Turkish Resistance Organization
NCS	Turkish National Security Council
EOKA	National Organization of Cypriot
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress

## Acknowledgements

This thesis was prepared as the product of a long process of work that was extensively supported. First, I would like to thank Assoc. Prof. Seda Altuğ for her excellent encouragement and support. Second, I would like to thank my jury members Assoc. Prof. Z. Umut Türem, Asst. Prof. Tuna Kuyucu and Assoc. Prof. Umut Azak for their time and critiques. Of course, the Atatürk Institute's professors gave their valuable support for my study.

I am thankful to my high school and university friend Bora Tosun from Kuzguncuk for commenting on my research question and the structure of the thesis. In addition, I am indebted my childhood friend Efsane and her family Dicle and Bülent Çakıroğlu for offering a comfortable working place in Orhangazi, Bursa. During my research in the Turkish Republican Archive, Aykon and Serdar Dinler hosted me in their home in Ankara. I am thankful to them.

I want to thank the *idema* team specifically, Ali Ercan Özgür and Güler Altınsoy to support me during the first year at the Atatürk Institute. I am thankful my friends Cemre Ünal, Kristin Fındıkoğlu, Selin Belce, Begüm Uzun, İlker Arı, Ferhat Zupcevic, Dorukhan Demirbilek, Okay Caner, Mehmet Kaldırımoğlu and Burak Demiryakan who asked and wondered about my thesis. Special thank goes to İpek Avcı, who was always by my side during my research and writing process.

Last but not least, I am thankful to my family members Arzu, Ayşim, and Yeşim Türegün who always supported and encouraged me during my research and writing process.

NOTE: The in-house editor of the Atatürk Institute has made detailed recommendations with regard to the format, grammar, spelling, usage, syntax, and style of this thesis.



## Introduction

*Kuzguncuk'ta bir akşam / Soyunup üstümdeki  
hüznü / Yürüyorum bugünü / Rüzgarlarla yan yana  
/ Kulağında denizlerin şarkısı / Serçelerin sıcaklığı /  
Yanıbaşında / Kızıl bir yıldızı taşıyorum  
avuçlarımda.*

Gülsüm Cengiz, *Kuzguncuk'ta Bir Akşam*

*Ama geçmişi geri getiremezler. Başka birileri var  
artık. O hayata değmemiş, oradan geçmemiş insan-  
lar.*

Uğur Yücel, *Kenti Dinlemek*

**T**his introductory chapter develops a methodological and theoretical framework for this research. First, the chapter will briefly summarize the topic and aims of the research, and second, it will put forth the methodologies of the study. Thirdly, the chapter will present a theoretical argument that includes the development of oral history under the theories of memory and minority studies. The last part will present a detailed outline of the research.

The aim of founding a Turkish nation state was accompanied by social engineering policies that were usually catastrophic for the non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations of the empire. Before the establishment of the Turkish republic, the Committee of the Union and Progress (CUP) implemented nationalist practices in Ottoman territories such as the Armenian Genocide (1915), and after that early Republican elites pursued these kinds of policies with different frameworks.

Briefly speaking, the Greek-Turkish population exchange (1923), the Thrace pogroms (1934), the Dersim massacre (1938), the capital tax (1942), 6-7 September incidents (1955), and the deportation of Greeks (1964) were examples of Turkification and homogenization practices of the Turkish Republic which were aimed at modernizing the newly founded Turkish state yet had a tremendous impact on non-Muslim and non-Turkish populations in Turkey.

This research focuses on the 6-7 September incidents (hereafter referred to as the pogrom). The pogrom is a significant case that explains the strong relationship between Turkish nationalism, state violence, and popular mobilizations. The topic is studied by Turkish and western scholars such as Samim Akgönül, Rifat N. Bali, Dilek Güven, Speros Vryonis, and Hulusi Dosdoğru, and mostly focuses on the violence in a limited space (*Pera/Beyoğlu*) and on the macro-level. The violence of the Pogrom obviously spread to other districts in İstanbul and İzmir with large non-Muslim populations. Furthermore, macro-level studies fail to take into account individual narratives of the Pogrom in specific places.

The most stimulating work was published by Dilek Güven at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Güven assumes that the Pogrom was the part of the homogenization practices and economic nationalization of the Turkish republic rather than the result of the Greek and Turkish dispute over Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> The latter assumption is common in studies of the pogrom. This research changes the scope of Pogrom studies by focusing on the effects of the Pogrom in a small village of İstanbul between the villages of Beylerbeyi and Paşalimanı.

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1 Dilek Güven, *6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 13.

In addition to the Pogrom, the research will ask how one small village of İstanbul was affected by the Turkification and homogenization practices of the Republic. For this reason, the study elaborates on the influence of the capital tax, the deportation of Greeks, and national ideas/behaviours during the military operation in Cyprus (1974) in Kuzguncuk. The homogenization of the village took place over time, through certain significant incidents, not overnight as in other places.

Kuzguncuk is usually described by residents and in local and official discourses as a village of peace, harmony, and tolerance. These narratives create the identity of Kuzguncuk as a happy, peaceful and harmonic village. The most obvious example of this culture in the eyes of the sources is the location of the Armenian church and the mosque which are located side by side on *Kuzguncuk Çarşısı Street*. Moreover, the discourse of denial of the Pogrom in the village increased, particularly after the staging of Güngör Dilmen's theater play, *Kuzguncuk Türküsü – Ballad of Kuzguncuk* (2009), which presented the violence in Kuzguncuk during the Pogrom. Basically, this denial discourse in the village consists of silence among residents about the Pogrom and other nationalist events such as its economic transformation and the 1974 Cyprus military operation in the name of protecting Kuzguncuk's harmonic atmosphere. For this reason, this research determined that Kuzguncuk is a significant case for studying the Pogrom and other nationalist practices to present how one of the peaceful and happy village of İstanbul was damaged by Turkification and homogenization practices.

Methodologically speaking, the research consists of in-depth and group interviews, secondhand resources, and archival research. The in-depth interviews were conducted with one nonbeliever, eight non-Muslims (one Armenian, one Bulgarian Christian, three Greeks, and three Jews), and nine Muslims who were mostly born before the Pogrom. Unfortunately, the research could not provide a gender balance among respondents; the distribution of the interviewees is twelve men to six women. Group interviews form the second important resource for this research. And third, the Turkish Prime Ministry Republican Archive (*Başbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arşivi, BCA*) is fruitful to discuss 6-7 September Incidents in Kuzguncuk. This is the first research to

identify domestic actors who joined the Pogrom in the village by name. Furthermore, the archival research shows the damages to Greek citizens' houses and shops in Kuzguncuk during the Pogrom. The last, the research covers secondary resources related to memory and minority studies as well as the literature of the establishment of the Turkish Republic and the construction of Turkish national identity. Obviously, Turkification and homogenization practices in Turkey and studies by Amy Mills and Erdem Güven which elaborate on Kuzguncuk are also significant for this research.

## § 1.1 Oral History and Memory Studies

### 1.1.1 *Brief Introduction to Oral History*

Oral history is a type of social scientific research method to figure out historical facts and events via interpreting and elaborating the narratives of witnesses of a specific period or historical event.<sup>2</sup> This explanation of oral history suggests that witnesses are a crucial dynamic in terms of investigating what happened in the past. According to Starr, the general aim of oral history is “to obtain and preserve such a record.”<sup>3</sup> In addition to this, Stephen Counce believes that oral history is a scientific method to understand the past and future by picking up historical facts.<sup>4</sup>

Paul Thomson argues that oral history is a tool for changing the context and purpose of history because it opens research methods.<sup>5</sup> In oral history, ordinary people became a central subject of history by interpreting their narratives of historical events. For instance, oral history research is concerned with individuals who were not central figures in history, such as members of

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- 2 Esra Danacıoğlu, *Geçmişin İzleri: Yanbaşımızdaki Tarih İçin Bir Kılavuz* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2007), 138.
  - 3 Louis Starr, “Oral History” in *Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology*, ed. David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum, American Association for State and Local History in Cooperation with the Oral History Association, (1984):4.
  - 4 Stephen Counce, *Sözlü Tarih ve Yerel Tarihçi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2001), 11.
  - 5 Paul Thomson, *Geçmişin Sesi: Sözlü Tarih* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), 2.

the working class, minorities, marginalized groups, and local people.<sup>6</sup> Especially, the development of anthropology, qualitative sociology, cultural studies, and linguistics that study narratives, identities, and memories supported the progress of oral history's methodology, and it has become a multidisciplinary way of writing history.<sup>7</sup>

The development of oral history has a strong relationship to theories of memory, and they are crucial, debated topics for historiography in terms of reliability of memory. When history became a social scientific discipline in the nineteenth century, divisions emerged such as amateur vs. professional historian and scientific vs. literary history. Specifically, positivist historians worked on popular topics such as governments, state officials, and institutions. According to Yıkılmış, positivist historians did not use the narratives or memories of ordinary people as a resource for history.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, after the Second World War, oral history started to become popular in the United States, and memory began to be used as a resource for writing people's history. Historian and journalist Allan Nevins founded the United States' first oral history project at Columbia University in 1948.<sup>9</sup> Nevins focused on white male elites in this project. Moreover, oral history started to develop via recordings of working individuals in the 1950s and 1960s in Britain.<sup>10</sup>

During the 1960s, the number of oral history studies and programs in the United States radically increased, and individual memories became a fundamental field of study for historians.<sup>11</sup> Ethnic minorities, genders, and marginalized groups started to be discussed in the early 1960s. It seems clear that oral historians used a history-from-below approach in this decade.

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6 Ibid., 5.

7 Robert Perks, and Alistair Thomson. *The Oral History Reader* (London: Routledge, 2006), 5.

8 Meral Salman Yıkılmış, "Sözlü Tarihin Radikal Potansiyali," *Vira Verita* (2016):30.

9 David King Dunaway and Willa K. Baum, *Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology*. (Nashville, TN: American Association for State and Local History in Cooperation with the Oral History Association, 1984), 27.

10 Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, "Critical Developments: Introduction" in *The Oral History Reader*. ed. Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson (London: Routledge, 1998):1.

11 Starr, *Oral History*, 10,11.

Social historian Paul Thomson was the leading figure in the founding of the British Oral History Society in the 1970s, and his book ‘The Voice of the Past: Oral History’ was popular among oral historians in the world. In 1979, the First International Conference on Oral History was held by oral historian Ron Grele and others in England.<sup>12</sup> According to Starr, oral history became popular in different countries in the 1970s,<sup>13</sup> and the British Oral History Society is a significant example of its popularity.

In the early 1970s, oral history was criticized by positivist historians who believed that memory was open to misinterpretation and that not only interviewees but also interviewees have the power to distort narratives and memories.<sup>14</sup> Alexandre Portelli responds to the positivist critique with the following argument: “Oral sources are not objective. This course applies to every source, though the holiness of writing often leads us to forget it.”<sup>15</sup> Portelli mentions that subjectivity problems emerge not only from oral sources but written sources, as well. For example, emigrants’ letters tell about the daily lives and cultural activities of a specific group of people, but maybe emigrants reflect this information wrongly.<sup>16</sup> Written sources are a stable text, and researchers only read them with their own interpretations; oral sources, on the other hand, are the product of an interactive process such as asking a question about hidden historical facts.<sup>17</sup>

Oral history as a method of historiography started to become popular after the Second World War, and this method and memory studies have a strong relationship to each other. Especially positivist historians developed critiques of oral history directly related to the subjectivity of memory and also to connection between oral historians and respondents.

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12 Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, “Critical Developments: Introduction”, 3.

13 Starr, *Oral History*, 18.

14 Paul Thomson, “The Voice of the Past: Oral History” in *The Oral History Reader*. ed. Robert Perks and Thomson Alistair, (London: Routledge, 2006): 3.

15 Alessandro Portelli, “What Makes Oral History Different” in *The Oral History Reader*. ed. Robert Perks and Thomson Alistair, (London: Routledge, 2006): 38.

16 *Ibid.*, 34.

17 *Ibid.*, 38.

## § 1.2 Memory Studies

This second part of the memory theories chapter will briefly elaborate on the development of memory studies and examine the relationship between memory and history.

According to Neyzi, memory studies are popular among different social sciences such as history, anthropology, literature, and psychology.<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned above, Neyzi assumes that research on memory in the social sciences has a positive relationship with the development of oral history. The number of memory studies rapidly increased after the Second World War to investigate the Holocaust and the Jewish community in Europe.<sup>19</sup> The attention on identity is another reason the number of memory studies in the world increased. According to Neyzi, responsibility, justice and law are recent significant topics in memory studies.<sup>20</sup>

Memory studies are a new research interest for the Turkish social sciences, and it began to develop in the Turkish context in tandem with oral history in the early 1990s.<sup>21</sup> However, the real progress of memory studies in Turkey took place at the beginning of the twenty-first century.<sup>22</sup> Esra Özyürek, who compiled a variety of memory studies from Turkey, believed that the global development of memory studies affected Turkish historians. Specifically, top-down policies in the early Turkish Republic - such as changing from the Ottoman to the Roman alphabet - increased the interest in memory studies among a new generation in the Republic.<sup>23</sup> Social scientists used memory studies as a tool to uncover historical facts such as the Armenian genocide, the Dersim massacre, the 1934 events in Trakya, the 6-7 September events (the Pogrom), and

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18 Leyla Leyzi, *Nasıl Hatırlıyoruz?: Türkiye'de Bellek Çalışmaları* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 1.

19 Ibid., 2.

20 Ibid., 3.

21 Ibid., 4.

22 Ibid., 5.

23 Esra Özyürek, *Hatırladıkları ve Unuttuklarıyla Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Hafızası* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 78.

military coups.<sup>24</sup> It is easy to assume that political events in the Republic affected the development of memory studies and oral history in Turkey; however, such research was tardy in the Turkish Republic when compared to other states.

Further parts of this section will briefly explore significant theorists of memory studies such as Maurice Halbwachs, Pierre Nora, Paul Connerton, and Michel-Rolph Trouillot.

According to Thomas Hirsch, Maurice Halbwachs is accepted as the father of memory studies<sup>25</sup> with his study called ‘Les Cadres Sociaux de la Mémoire’. Halbwachs believes memory is a reproduction of ancestral periods,<sup>26</sup> and individuals have the power to reproduce the past with the help of social frameworks to which they belong.<sup>27</sup> In terms of collective memory, Halbwachs assumes that every group has specific memories; therefore, there is a multiple collective memory among different groups.<sup>28</sup> Misztal believes that Halbwachs’ idea of collective memory needs a group as well as individual memory directly related to membership in the group.<sup>29</sup> Theoretically speaking, Halbwachs’ thoughts on memory opened new paths for the social sciences, and memory studies started to become popular following his assumptions about memory and its relationship to the individual and to membership in a group. On the other hand, the introductory chapter of Esra Özyürek’s work analyzes the development of memory studies in line with the thoughts of Halbwachs and scholars could discover the sophistication of memory’s social side.<sup>30</sup> In other words, memory was not as simple as Halbwachs argued in his writings.

French historian Pierre Nora is another well-known scholar of memory. He makes a distinction between history and memory in his well-known study ‘Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire’.<sup>31</sup> According to him,

24 Neyzi, *Nasıl Hatırlıyoruz?: Türkiye’de Bellek Çalışmaları*, 4.

25 Maurice Halbwachs, *Hafızanın Toplumsal Çerçevesi* (Ankara: Heretik Yayınları, 2016), 9

26 Ibid., 12,13.

27 Ibid., 13.

28 Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering* (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2003), 51.

29 Ibid., 53.

30 Özyürek, *Hatırladıkları ve Unuttuklarıyla Türkiye’nin Toplumsal Hafızası*, 9.

31 Pierre Nora, *Hafıza Mekanları* (Ankara: Dost Kitapevi Yayınları, 2006), 19.

memory is produced by communities with respect to real life and it includes dialectics of remembering and forgetting. Furthermore, memory can continuously develop itself and has a strong relationship with the present. Nora also assumes that memory put importance on reminiscence and has certain characteristics: it is collective collective, individual, plural, and unlimited.

On the other hand, history tries to reproduce missing things and usually has problems in terms of absences. Nora believes that history is a realization of the past and needs analysis, narrative, and criticism. The most significant argument of Nora's argument is that history always looks at memory with suspicion and believes that there is a separation between history and memory. Furthermore, history is a product of everybody and does not belong to a specific person.<sup>32</sup>

Nora clearly separates history and memory with respect to their different characteristics. Moreover, he aggrandizes memory vis-à-vis history. However, Özyürek mentioned that contemporary scholars do not usually differentiate between memory and history as Nora assumed in his study.<sup>33</sup> They try to combine the two.

Paul Connerton works specifically on collective memory, and his study *How Societies Remember* focuses on how groups preserve their memory through history.<sup>34</sup> Misztal believes Connerton's study is related to collective memory.<sup>35</sup> According to Connerton, there are two important axioms that determine the remembrance of the past. He mentioned, on one hand, that the memory itself depends on our past, and on other hand, our memory's relationship with society's memory.<sup>36</sup> The matter is related to former images that have the power to determine an individual's present.

Moreover, Connerton believes individuals try to recall the past in two ways. The first is to recall history and give it a name.<sup>37</sup> The second is recall the

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32 Ibid., 19.

33 Özyürek, *Hatırladıkları ve Unuttuklarıyla Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Hafızası*, 9.

34 Paul Connerton, *Toplumlar Nasıl Anımsar?* (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1999), 8.

35 Barbara A. Misztal, *Theories of Social Remembering*, 5, 51.

36 Connerton, *Toplumlar Nasıl Anımsar?*, 9.

37 Ibid., 103.

past with the support of a remembrance ceremony.<sup>38</sup> Rituals are significant elements for remembering the past because according to him they have a reputation and retroactive actions. It seems clear that Connerton's assumptions on collective memory represent the relationship between individual memory and society. Furthermore, he tries to develop new thoughts on collective memory such as ceremonies and rituals.

Michel-Rolph Trouillot's study 'Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History' elaborates on the relationship between power and archives. He explains how silences are a common phenomenon in historiography. It is obvious that silences are related to memory and history writing. According to Trouillot, silences occur in four steps. The first step includes discovering sources and the second is the regulation of archives. The following step involves forming historical narratives, and the final step includes history writing. Power is a critical factor involved in all these steps to create history with respect to its decisions.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, power has the potential to choose some historical stories from the past, therefore, some stories will be excluded from history writing.<sup>40</sup> In this respect, archives are a significant actor in history because they determine what will be discussed from the past. Trouillot called this process "the power of the archives."<sup>41</sup> Furthermore, historical celebrations are an important dynamic of history, and power selects what will be celebrated. It thus tries to eliminate other stories from history.<sup>42</sup>

The silence of history is a common phenomenon in contemporary several nation-states. Turkey is one of the most well-defined nation-states in terms of its foundation. Therefore, the development of memory studies in Turkey has the power to determine the historical silences in the Turkish Republic which official histories avoid to mention for protecting the fundamental values of the state.

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38 Ibid., 72.

39 Michel-Rolph Trouillot, *Geçmiş Susturmak Tarihin Üretilmesi ve İktidar* (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2015), 54,56.

40 Ibid., 75.

41 Ibid., 125.

42 Ibid., 143.

In general, this part touched on the progress of memory theories in the world and in Turkey; it also showed that oral history and memory studies have a strong relationship to each other. Furthermore, the part presented well-known scholars in the field of memory studies such as Pierre Nora and Paul Connerton. The next part of the chapter will discuss the concept of minority and the development of minority studies. In the end, it will elaborate on the situation of minorities in Turkey throughout history.

### § 1.3 The Concept of Minority and the Development of Minority Studies

The concept of minority is related to the establishment of modern nation-states, and this part of the chapter briefly focuses on how the system of nation-states emerged in the world. Specifically, after the First World War, the term minority became a well-known phenomenon because of the rise of nation-states. According to Benjamin White, the version of the Encyclopedia Britannica printed in 1910-1911 did not have an entry for minority. On the other hand, Britannica's fourteenth edition issued one year later after the end of the First World War included an entry on the concept of minority of almost ten pages.<sup>43</sup>

White defined the notion of a minority with the following sentence: "The use of the word 'minority' in the modern sense – meaning a culturally defined group within a polity whose members face legal, political, or social disadvantages because of their cultural belonging – is relatively recent."<sup>44</sup> According to Samim Akgönül, the minority is not born of itself; it is created. For instance, forced deportations, massacres, and population exchanges decrease the numbers of specific groups which then become a minority in the eyes of the dominant group.<sup>45</sup>

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43 Benjamin Thomas White, *The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East: the Politics of Community in French Mandate Syria* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 21.

44 Ibid., 21,22.

45 Samim Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk Bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar* (İstanbul: Bgst, 2011), 27.

The field of minority studies developed along with other social science disciplines in the late twentieth century. According to Hu-DeHart, ethnic studies, which have a strong connection to minority studies, started to evolve in the United States after the antiwar and civil rights movements. In the 1960s, students who faced discrimination from racists wanted equal opportunities for education in universities. Specifically, San Francisco State University and the University of California established ethnic studies courses. This was the beginning of the study of ethnic and religious groups in the United States.<sup>46</sup>

Briefly, this research area focuses on identity, culture, language, and the religion of minorities. In addition to this, minority studies elaborate on the rights of minority groups in different countries. It seems clear that minority studies is a sophisticated field with a strong relationship to political science, anthropology, sociology, and history.

In the Turkish context, the number of minority studies started to increase after the early 1990s. The beginning of the 2000s was particularly significant in terms of the progress of minority studies in Turkey. It is obvious that the establishment of the Turkish Republic created a variety of problems for non-Muslim and ethnically non-Turkish minorities, specifically Jews, Christians, Kurds, and Alevis. For this reason, Turkish and international scholars have tried to figure out the effects of the establishment of the Turkish Republic with respect to violence, minority rights (“the right to use their own language, the right of political and civic equality, the right to establish religious, educational, and social welfare institutions, and the right to freedom of religion, travel, and migration”<sup>47</sup>) and memory.

## § 1.4 The Outline of the Research

This study consists of four chapters excluding the introduction and conclusion.

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46 Eyelyn Hu-DeHart, “The History, Development, and Future of Ethnic Studies”, *The Phi Delta Kappan*, Vol. 75, No. 1 (1993), 50-54.

47 Şule Toktaş, and Bülent Aras. “The EU and Minority Rights in Turkey.” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 124, no. 4, (2009): 700.

The historical background chapter is the next, second chapter of this research. Its first part elaborates on non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. Secondly, the chapter will discuss a general landscape of minorities in Turkey, and after that it will focus on the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its ties to the CUP during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. In addition, this part elaborates the construction of Turkish national identity which created a problem for non-Muslim and non-Turkish minorities of the Republic. Fourthly, the chapter will summarize the history of nationalization practices in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. The last part of the chapter will focus on the Pogrom in details.

The following chapter, “The Pogrom in Kuzguncuk: Violence and Common Narratives” discusses the multiethnic characteristic of the village using population statistics and secondary sources that elaborate the history of Kuzguncuk. This part directly focuses on the narratives of Kuzguncuk’s residents about the demography of the village before the Pogrom, most of the whom -except for one Muslim man- remark that the percentage of non-Muslims was higher than that of Muslims before the Pogrom. Secondly, the chapter reveals the begin of the Pogrom in the village which is narrated differently by different Kuzguncuk residents. The third part touches on the violence of the Pogrom in the village and presents that the shops and houses of non-Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk were damaged by looters. This part also demystifies common myths in Kuzguncuk. For this reason, this part argues that Kuzguncuk had not a specialty during the events which related to the village’s harmony, culture of tolerance, and multiethnicity. The following part of the chapter presents the common narratives in Kuzguncuk about the Pogrom such as the protection of non-Muslims and the role of outside actors. The final part of the chapter answers the question of how the Pogrom influenced Kuzguncuk’s non-Muslims.

The next chapter, “Economic Transformation and Appropriation of Minorities’ Properties in Kuzguncuk,” looks at economic and property transformation in Kuzguncuk which was implemented not only by the Turkish government but also by Kuzguncuk’s Muslim residents. The economic transformation supported the homogenization and Turkification of the village. The first part identifies non-Muslim and Muslim spaces of Kuzguncuk

such as religious places and minority schools. This part is also a background for the last chapter of the study. Secondly, the research figures out the sufferers of the capital tax in Kuzguncuk which transferred non-Muslim economic capital to Muslims. The last part of the chapter handles official and non-official confiscation practices such as the occupation of the Jewish cemetery and derelict non-Muslim houses.

The final chapter explores the nationalization and Islamization of Kuzguncuk's spaces and architecture throughout Republican history. Firstly, the chapter discusses the historical name of Kuzguncuk. Several sources in Turkey place importance on the name Kuzguncuk which came from a well-known Muslim man, *Kuzgun Baba*, who lived in the Ottoman period. This part argues that this historical fact creates a Muslim characteristic for the village. The second part focuses on the re-naming of Kuzguncuk's streets after the foundation of the Republic using Pervitch's insurance maps. The third part focuses on the story of the construction of the Kuzguncuk Mosque in 1952 which represents the Islamization of the village. Fourthly, the chapter elaborates on how Kuzguncuk's shops and restaurants were nationalized by the government. The next part analyses the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaign in the village because, according to some narratives, posters about this protest were hung in several locations in Kuzguncuk. Lastly, this chapter reveals the physical violence towards Greek and Armenian spaces during the 1974 Cyprus military operation by Kuzguncuk's dwellers.

## On the Way to Kuzguncuk's Ethnoreligious Homogenization

After the foundation of the Turkish republic (1923), several religious and ethnic groups in Ottoman territories faced massacres and forced deportations because of the transformation from an empire to a nation-state. In fact, Christians and the Jews suffered from the discriminatory policies of the Ottoman Empire before the foundation of Turkey. This chapter will be a historical background for the research. On one hand, the chapter will elaborate on the general situation of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and in Turkey. Secondly, the chapter will discuss the construction of Turkish national identity. Moreover, the chapter will present major nationalization and homogenization practices in detail. Finally, the chapter will touch on the Pogrom in details.

### § 2.1 Non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman Empire was established in the early fourteenth century.<sup>1</sup> The conquest of Constantinople by Mehmed the Conqueror was the beginning of the empire's rise and was also significant in terms of the establishment of a

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1 Halil İnalçık, Hasan Soygüzel, Özer Ergenç, Yusuf Oğuzoğlu, and Yakup Bilgin Kocal, *Kuruluş: Osmanlı Tarihini Yeniden Yazmak*. (İstanbul: Hayykitap, 2010), 41.

new social order, namely the millet system.<sup>2</sup> However, before the millet system, the Ottoman Empire wanted to govern non-Muslims, and Benjamin Braude argues that the Empire possessed non-Muslims communities before the conquest of Constantinople.<sup>3</sup>

In the context of the Ottoman Empire, the term millet referred to specific religious communities, such as Jews, Orthodox Greeks, and Armenians.<sup>4</sup> It must be noted that the Empire also had other systems which supported social order and segregation (such as occupation); however, the millet system was the most significant.<sup>5</sup>

The millet system separated the non-Muslim population of the Empire into three sub-divisions: the Jewish (millet-i Yahudiyan), Orthodox Greek (millet-i Rum), and Armenian (millet-i Ermeniyan) millets.<sup>6</sup> *The head of the millet* (millet başı) referred to the religious chief for all non-Muslim groups and they had a variety of authorities over their millets. For instance, the heads of the millets regulated the community's educational, legal, and economic activities, and these authorities had the power to collect taxes from their millets.<sup>7</sup>

Akgönül criticizes studies that place importance on minorities rather than on the millets of the Ottoman Empire, and he argues that in the empire, millet did not refer to the concept of minority. Furthermore, according to Akgönül, the millet system was not a system to protect non-Muslims.<sup>8</sup> It is obvious that the Ottoman Empire's high Islamic feature created segregation between the

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- 2 Vjeran Kursar, "Non-Muslim Communal Divisions and Identities in the Early Modern Ottoman Balkans and the Millet System Theory," in *Power and Influence in South-Eastern Europe, 16-19th century*, ed. Maria Baramova, Plamen Mitev, Ivan Parvev, and Vania Racheva (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2013): 97-108.
  - 3 Braude, Benjamin. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition, with a New Introduction* (Rienner Publishers, Lynne, 2014), 16
  - 4 Ahmet İçduygu, Şule Toktas and B. Ali Soner, "The Politics of Population in a Nation-building Process: Emigration of Non-Muslims from Turkey," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, (2008): 362.
  - 5 Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk Bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar*, 110.
  - 6 Bruce Alan Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: The Roots of Sectarianism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 61
  - 7 Elçin Aktoprak, *Bir "kurucu öteki olarak": Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi İnsan Hakları Merkezi, 2010), 7.
  - 8 Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar*, 117.

Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the Empire; for instance, the Muslim subject of the Empire was referred to as the millet-i Hakime which means dominant millet. In other words, Muslim subjects had a higher position than non-Muslims in daily life, the courts, and the economy,<sup>9</sup> and it was a practice of Muslim dominance over the non-Muslim subjects.<sup>10</sup> Ussama Makdisi refers to Bruca Master's theory of the limits of Ottoman tolerance. Basically, Master thought that Christians and other non-Muslims of the Empire were not considered equals with Muslims and they were only tolerated.<sup>11</sup> However, Müge Göçek claims that the domination of Muslim subjects over non-Muslims terminated at the start of the period of regression.<sup>12</sup>

The millet system included freedoms and restrictions on three communities. On one hand, the system gave specific rights and freedoms to these millets. For instance, non-Muslim subjects were governed by their laws and could freely worship in Ottoman territory.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, Braude believes that non-Muslim millets sometimes chose shari'a courts, which were Islamic.<sup>14</sup> In addition, non-Muslim millets were governed by Islamic laws in the context of public law, and there was equality between Muslim and non-Muslim subjects in penal law.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, the Ottoman Empire restricted some rights of the non-Muslim millets in several contexts, specifically in their daily lives. For instance, non-Muslim millets were not allowed to ride horses without permission and had to wear different colored clothes from Muslim subjects. Also,

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- 9 Fatma Müge Göçek, "Türkiye'de Çoğunluk, Azınlık ve Kimlik Anlayışı" in *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları*, ed. Ayhan Kaya and Turgut Tarhanlı, (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2008), 69,70.
- 10 Ussama Samir Makdisi, *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 11.
- 11 Ussama Makdisi, "Ottoman Orientalism." *The American Historical Review*, vol. 107, no. 3 (2002): 768–796.
- 12 Müge Göçek, *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk, Azınlık ve Kimlik Anlayışı*, 70.
- 13 Rebecca Bryant, *Post-Ottoman Coexistence: Sharing Space in the Shadow of Conflict* (New York, Berghahn, 2016), 11.
- 14 Braude, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Abridged Edition with a New Introduction*, 16.
- 15 Aktoprak, *Bir "kurucu öteki olarak": Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler*, 6.

the houses of these millets had to be shorter than those of Muslim subjects.<sup>16</sup> It is clear that the millet system had dualities in terms of the freedoms given to and limitations placed on non-Muslim subjects by the empire.

The French Revolution (1789) and its significant result -nationalism- radically spread all around the world. The establishment of nation states was the result of enlarging nationalist movements. Actually, the idea of nationalism spread toward the Empire which had a multiethnic social structure. According to the 1831 census, the male population of the Empire was calculated as 3,722,736, and the number Muslims was 2,481,741.<sup>17</sup> The non-Muslim population of the Empire was estimated in the same census as 1,170,685 Christians, 3,659 Jews, and 3,142 Armenians.<sup>18</sup>

Fatma Müge Göçek argues that some Muslim and non-Muslim groups of the Ottoman Empire - such as Greeks, Arabs, Kurds, Bulgarian, and Armenians -were affected by nationalist movements, and these groups wanted to establish independent states. For instance, Greeks constructed their nation state in 1830, and after that, Bulgarians and Serbians succeed in establishing nation states in Balkan territory. However, Armenians, Kurds, and Lazis could not construct nation states.<sup>19</sup>

According to Elçin Aktoprak, the non-Muslim groups of the Empire supported the fights for independence of their communities, and the Empire accepted the Rescript of Gülhane (*Tanzimat Fermanı*, 1839) and the Edict of Reform (*Islahat Fermanı*, 1856) to promote Ottomanism to oppose these separatist movements. These reforms were also part of the centralization and Westernization<sup>20</sup> of the Empire and provided equality before the law for all subjects of the Empire.<sup>21</sup> Moreover, Taner Akçam argued that these reforms tried to ensure total equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of

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16 Ibid., 6,7.

17 Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population: 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p.21.

18 Ibid., 21.

19 Müge Göçek, *Türkiye'de Çoğunluk, Azınlık ve Kimlik Anlayışı*, 72.

20 Hasan Kayalı, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 14.

21 Aktoprak, *Bir "kurucu öteki olarak":Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler*, 9.

the Empire.<sup>22</sup> For instance, the Empire gave the right to non-Muslim subjects to be appointed to the civil service.<sup>23</sup> Yaşar Semiz mentions that the reforms created social inequality in Ottoman Empire.<sup>24</sup>

These reforms posed a problem for the Muslim population of the Empire because - before the Rescript of Gülhane and the Edict of Reform - non-Muslim millets had been inferior to Muslims.<sup>25</sup> For instance, Akçam pointed to the letter of a well-known statesman Cevdet Paşa in his study: “This [declaration] profoundly affected the Muslim population...a good many of whom began to say that ‘this was a day for weeping and mourning.’”<sup>26</sup> Historically speaking, the millet system officially continued up until the nineteenth century. However, Samim Akgönül remarked that the segregation of the millet system survived beyond the nineteenth century with different concepts. For example, starting in the nineteenth century, non-Muslim communities were excluded by the Empire and Muslims, but non-Turks, were seen as a group of people that was open to assimilation.<sup>27</sup> It is clear that the reforms of the Empire depended on equality between the Muslim and non-Muslim populations, centralization, Westernization and the illumination of the power of nationalist movements. However, Akçam presents that the Muslim majority of the Empire - also known as the Millet-i Hakime- was not content with the reforms and supported equality between Muslim and non-Muslim population.

## § 2.2 The General Landscape of Minorities in Turkey

As mentioned below, the foundation of the Turkish state was the breaking point for non-Muslims and non-Turkish minorities in Turkey. Several state

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- 22 Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*, (London: Zed, 2004), 79.
- 23 Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi: VI. Cilt: Islahat Fermanı Devri, 1856- 1861* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2007), 6.
- 24 Yaşar Semiz, “İttihak ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Türkçülük Politikası” (İstanbul:Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi), 219.
- 25 Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*, 79.
- 26 Ibid., 79.
- 27 Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk Bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar*, 119.

policies in Turkey such as the capital tax (1942) and the forced deportation of Greeks (1964) directly targeted the elimination of the power of non-Muslim communities in the Turkish Republic. According to Rifat Bali, the non-Muslim population in the waning years of the Empire had political, economic, and cultural power.<sup>28</sup> Statistics also show that the numbers of minorities decreased after the foundation of the republic. For instance, the non-Muslim population accounted for twenty percent of the total population in late 1912, but this number declined to 2,64 percent by 1927.<sup>29</sup> In the next chapter, this research will discuss the building of the Turkish nation state and its homogeneous policies toward non-Muslim communities in detail. Now, the part shows the general landscape of the major non-Muslim communities in the Turkish Republic.

From the legal perspective, according to Baskın Oran, the concept of minority in the Turkish Republic is limited compared to that of other states.<sup>30</sup> The constitution of the Turkish Republic has no article that mentions minority rights or prevents the discrimination of minorities; however, the Article 10 reveals that all citizens of the Turkish Republic are equal before the law.<sup>31</sup>

When the Treaty of Lausanne was signed by the Turkish state in 1923, Turkish officials rejected giving Muslim groups such as Kurds or Alevi minority status, and Samim Akgönül assumed that Turkey had to accept the communities of the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks under the definition of the minority.<sup>32</sup> In other words, Turkey limited of the definition of minorities and accepted the Lausanne Peace Treaty only as a principle of the minority.<sup>33</sup> For this reason, this research will present a brief evaluation of the minorities in Turkey that were accepted in the Treaty of Lausanne. On the other hand, the concept of minority includes more than these three ethnoreligious groups in

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28 Rifat Bali, "Resmî İdeoloji ve Gayr-i Müslimler." *Birikim* 105-106 (1998).

29 Soner Çağaptay, "Reconfiguring the Turkish nation in the 1930s" *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 8:2 (2002): 68.

30 Baskın Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İctihat, Uygulama*, (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2004), 36.

31 Nurcan Kaya and Clive Baldwin, "Minorities in Turkey" *Minority Rights Group International*, (2004): 4.

32 Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk Bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar*, 139

33 Kaya and Baldwin, "Minorities in Turkey", 4

Turkey; for instance, Peter Andrews's study figures out that Turkey has approximately forty different ethnic groups, and Oran believed that some of these groups could be utilized by the Turkish state under the concept of minority.<sup>34</sup>

Baskın Oran's work assumes that Orthodox Greeks were an autochthonous community<sup>35</sup> like the Armenians.<sup>36</sup> The Orthodox Greek population was estimated at 150,000 after the Treaty of Lausanne; however, according to statistics, this number radically decreased, and by 2010 the number of Orthodox Greeks is around only 1,000. Today, most Orthodox Greeks live in Istanbul and on the island of Imbros (*Gökçeada*) and Tenedos (*Bozcaada*).<sup>37</sup> The Turkish Republic's homogenization and Turkification policies, which the research will discuss in the next chapters, were the major factor impairing Greeks in Turkey.

The number of Armenian community members in Anatolian cities also diminished through history, most significantly after the Armenian Genocide (1915).<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, they were affected by other homogenization practices of the Turkish government, like other minorities. Most of the Armenians are Gregorian Orthodox. According to Oran, Istanbul is the main city for Armenians, and there are around 60.000 Armenians living there.<sup>39</sup>

The last community which the Turkish state accepted as a minority was the Jews. The Jewish community is not autochthonous in Turkish territory because they migrated to the Ottoman Empire mainly from Spain and Portugal in the fifteenth century. Oran also believes that the Jewish community is different from the Orthodox Greeks and Armenians in terms of their strifeless relationship with the state.<sup>40</sup> Akgönül's study reveals that the Jewish commu-

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34 Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, 36.

35 Ibid., 39.

36 Ibid., 38.

37 Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk Bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar*, 129

38 See for more information: Raymond H. Kévorkian, *Ermeni Soykırımı*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2015)

39 Oran, *Türkiye'de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama*, 38.

40 Ibid., 39.

nity currently has 30.000 members in the Turkish Republic; in time, the numbers of the Jewish community decreased like those of other non-Muslim groups in Turkey.<sup>41</sup> However, not only Turkification policies but also the foundation of Israel (1948) were major factors causing the number of the Jewish community's members to dwindle.<sup>42</sup>

This part presented the development of minority studies and non-Muslims under the Ottoman Empire and minorities in Turkish Republic. It seems clear that minority studies in Turkey are a new field of research that started to develop especially in the late 1990s. The last years of the Ottoman Empire and the time just after the establishment of the Turkish Republic were enervating periods for non-Muslim communities in this territory. The millet system gave specific rights to different religious groups in the Empire. However, it also restricted some rights of the minorities, which showed a difference between the non-Muslim and Muslim population in the Ottoman territory. As mentioned above, Turkification, homogenization, and the elimination of the economic capital of minorities in Turkey will be discussed in the next chapter focusing on the 6-7 September 1955 events.

### § 2.3 The Construction of the Turkish Nation State and National Identity

The transformation of the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic forms a field in the social sciences as it involved the use of violence and Turkification policies towards ethnic and religious minorities. This part is going to summarize the establishment of the Turkish Republic as a nation-state and also briefly discuss how the Turkish state constructed Turkish national identity.

Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot assume that the term “nation” in the modern sense arose in the sixteenth century, and they believe that it was the first time that nation had the same meaning as “people.”<sup>43</sup> Equality for people and the state

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41 Akgönül, *Azınlık: Türk Bağlamında Azınlık Kavramına Çapraz Bakışlar*, 138.

42 Aktoprak, *Bir "kurucu öteki olarak": Türkiye'de Gayrimüslimler*, 35.

43 Alain Dieckhoff, and Christophe Jaffrelot, *Milliyetçiliği Yeniden Düşünmek: Kuramlar ve Uygulamalar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010), 11.

was a significant result of the 1789 French Revolution. Therefore, the sovereignty of the people became integrated with that of the state. After these developments, the nation started to include the relationship between the state and the people. According to Dieckhoff and Jaffrelot, the term “nation state” emerged lastly and states started to homogenize their populations.<sup>44</sup> In other words, a homogeneous society emerged as a main goal of nation states.

Benedict Anderson argues that the eighteenth century was the beginning of nationalist ideology in Europe,<sup>45</sup> and it is obvious that nationalism was one of the significant outcomes of the French Revolution. According to Eric Hobsbawm, this nationalist idea was used as a tool for the liberation of colonies in the early twentieth century.<sup>46</sup> Specifically, nationalism in terms of national independence was developed in several states after the First World War; however, the number of nation states began to rise after World War II.<sup>47</sup>

Historically speaking, the Turkish Republic was established as a nation state in 1923, and it adopted Turkist, nationalist thinkings from the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Before the establishment of Turkey, the CUP’s policy of Ottomanism had turned into a more nationalist approach during the 1910s.<sup>48</sup> For instance, Turkism officially started to be put into practice in 1913 after defeats in the two Balkan Wars significantly affected the CUP’s national policies.<sup>49</sup>

The foundation of the Turkish state itself included several dynamics such as strong nationalism, a re-creation of historical facts, and exclusionary politics towards non-Muslim minorities, especially the Syrians, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Maronites, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Furthermore, the state targeted not only non-Muslim groups but also Muslims who were opposed to Republican values such as secularism and nationalism. The most obvious examples

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44 Ibid.,12.

45 Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması*. (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1995), 25.

46 E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914* (New York: Vintage, 1989), 377.

47 Büşra Ersanlı and Günay Göksu Özdoğan “Translators’ Preface” in *Uluslar ve Ulusculuk* (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1992), 7.

48 Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*, 133.

49 Ibid., 139.

are Kurdish and Islamist populations. For this reason, the state tried to eliminate their power in Eastern Anatolia with a variety of homogenization and migration practices. Moreover, the state made laws such as the “hat act” and abolished the caliphate in order to establish a secular society.

Turkey founded the Republic as a nation-state, and Mustafa Kemal and Republican elites were committed to destroying the imperial legacy of the Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth century. However, Erik J. Zürcher assumes that a continuity emerged between the last years of the Ottoman Empire (1908-1918) and the early Republican period of Turkey (1918-1945).<sup>50</sup> Therefore, it clearly seems that the degree of continuity or break vis-à-vis culture, institutions, and the political system have been a major debate for generations.

The phenomenon of continuity is obvious with respect to the Turkish state’s policies against different ethnic and religious groups. For instance, Armenians were targeted by the CUP in 1915. The CUP purposed to create a homogenous Anatolian territory; therefore, they started to undertake ethnic cleansing in the last period of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>51</sup> The desire to appropriate the economic capital of non-Muslim communities was also another motivation for the Armenian Genocide. It seems clear that the cadres of the CUP promoted Muslim Turkish groups in terms of economic activity with two laws, and the economic power of non-Muslim communities decreased.<sup>52</sup> This kind of homogenization practice via violence and laws also occurred after the foundation of the Republic.

Ambitions about the national economy and bourgeoisie were main characteristics of the CUP and the early Turkish Republic.<sup>53</sup> According to Zafer Toprak, Ziya Gökalp, who was the founding figure of the idea of Turkishness,

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- 50 Erik J. Zürcher, “The Ottoman Legacy of the Turkish Republic: An Attempt at a New Periodization” *Die Welt des Islams*, 32, no:2. (1992): 240.
- 51 Soner Cagaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London: Routledge, 2009), 9.
- 52 Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*, 141,142.
- 53 Zafer Toprak, *Milli iktisat - Milli Burjuvazi: Türkiye’de Ekonomi ve Toplum: 1908 - 1950* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları), 1995. xi.

and other nationalist intellectuals agreed that Muslim Turks had to join economic life.<sup>54</sup> The state started to implement a national economic policy via different laws. Specifically, foreign companies and their non-Muslim or foreign staffs suffered from the Turkification of the economy.<sup>55</sup> For instance, in the first years of the Turkish Republic, one specific law prevented non-Turks from working in public service.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, the government passed a law in 1932 restricting non-Muslim Turkish citizens to working in certain sectors, and around 15,000 Greeks lost their jobs.<sup>57</sup> These laws tried to change population characteristic of the Turkish economy. In other words, the state made an opening for Muslim Turks in the Turkish economy, and the number of Muslim Turks participating in economic activities increased in the short run.

As mentioned above, violence and discriminatory policies also targeted Muslim communities that the state wanted to assimilate into Turkishness. Moreover, in the eyes of the early Republican elites, the fact that some Kurdish communities in different regions of the Turkish Republic participated in political activities was problematic. The state sought the Turkification of the Kurdish population in the Eastern provinces of Turkey in the early Republican period.<sup>58</sup> Forced resettlements were implemented by the state in Eastern Anatolia.<sup>59</sup> According to Çağlayan, the aim of these forced resettlements were to replace Kurds in the region with Turks from Western cities. Moreover, the state targeted the elimination of the power of prominent Kurdish people with land confiscation policies.<sup>60</sup> Çağlayan argues that the establishment of the

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54 Ibid., 19.

55 Ayhan Aktar, “‘Turkification’ Policies in the Early Republican Era” in Dufft, Catharina *Turkish Literature and Cultural Memory: Multiculturalism as a literary theme after 1980* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2009), 40.

56 Ibid., 44.

57 Ibid., 44,45,46.

58 Ercan Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet’in Diyarbakır’da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014.), 15.

59 The first settlement law enacted in 1926. The state made the most extensive settlement law in 1934 which determined characteristic of migration policies. (Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet’in Diyarbakır’da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950)*, 117.

60 Ibid., 116.

Turkish Republic created a well-defined national identity. This Turkish national identity was defined by nationalism, Westernism and secularism. After the foundation of Turkey, national identity was radicalized by the Republican elites, and the latter two values became more apparent.<sup>61</sup>

Ahmet Yıldız's study elaborates on the establishment of national identity during the high Kemalist period (1919-1938). He believes that Turkish national identity includes three different notions: the legal, political, and the ethnic. Yıldız assumes that the properties of Turkish national identity changed over time. A dominant Muslim character emerged in the first period (1919-1923), while the second era (1924-1929) included the Republican values of the new state. Militant secularism and the unity of Turkish language, culture, and ideals were two major notions of the second period.<sup>62</sup> The third era (1929-1938) defined the Turkish nation as an ethnic and added this character to Republican ideas.<sup>63</sup> For this reason, the Turkish Republic defined the following groups as others: religious Muslims, Muslim groups that did not speak Turkish such as the Kurds, and non-Muslims communities.<sup>64</sup>

According to Ümit Üngör, who focuses on Turkification policies in Eastern Anatolia, Kemalist founding thought constituted a monolithic identity for Turkish territory.<sup>65</sup> For instance, the Kemalist state limited cultural activities such as the publishing books or composing of songs in other languages because these types of cultural interests directly damaged the national identity of Turkey in the eyes of the state.<sup>66</sup> Üngör assumes that the erasure of old memory, the creation of a new one, and the establishment of the new state are strongly related to each other.<sup>67</sup> For this reason, the new Turkish national memory erased the Ottoman Empire and created the memory of the Republic

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61 Ibid., 14.

62 Ahmet Yıldız, *"Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene": Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-seküler Sınırları (1919-1938)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), 16.

63 Ibid., 17.

64 Ibid., 18.

65 Uğur Ümit Üngör, *Modern Türkiye'nin İnşası: Doğu Anadolu'da Ulus, Devlet ve Şiddet (1913-1950)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2016), 356.

66 Ibid., 361.

67 Ibid., 380.

and its founding figure Mustafa Kemal.<sup>68</sup> For instance, the Surname Act (1934) was part of the memory policies of the Turkish Republic<sup>69</sup> because it targeted the erasure of individual identity and the past.<sup>70</sup>

Spatial policies were also effective dynamics during the establishment of Turkish national identity. According to Zeynep Keser's study, locals and state officials changed the usage of non-Muslims' notable sites in several villages. For instance, after the Greek-Turkish population exchange, many churches were turned into mosques.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, in the Kurdish region, historical mosques were used as dining halls, and barracks.<sup>72</sup> The early Republican Turkish state prevented the increase of the influence of Islam in the Kurdish region, while on the other hand, it focused on the change of Christian architecture in the west. These spatial policies were sometimes implemented for their symbolic meaning, and the state changed the names of villages that did not sound Turkish to the ears of Republican elites. For instance, the Jewish quarter in Ankara was renamed Freedom (*İstiklal*).<sup>73</sup> Kezer notes that the state changed the names of 12,000 small towns and 2,000 landforms (lake, mountain etc.) over some sixty years.<sup>74</sup> The renaming policy was mostly implemented in the Black Sea region and the east of the Turkish Republic.<sup>75</sup>

The construction of railroads was another significant policy of the early Turkish Republic represented westernization and modernization. The railroad had symbolic power for the Turkish Republic. According to Toprak, the railroad promoted the ideas of the Republic and the state. Moreover, Toprak argues that the concept of time changed with the railroads: it brought about a

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68 Ibid., 377.

69 Ibid., 386.

70 Ibid., 387.

71 Zeynep Kezer, *Building Modern Turkey: State, Space, and Ideology in the Early Republic* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 138.

72 Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950)*, 259.

73 Kezer, *Building Modern Turkey: State, Space, and Ideology in the Early Republic*, 142.

74 Ibid., 144.

75 Sezgi Durgun, *Memalik-i Şahane'den Vatan'a*. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 214.

secular understanding of time.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, the perception of space changed with the railroads, and the importance of the sphere of the mosque went down as railway stations became a gathering place for villagers.<sup>77</sup> The early Republican officials prioritized railway construction in Eastern Turkey because of economic, cultural and military concerns. The railways especially supported the linguistic and cultural unity in Eastern Turkey.<sup>78</sup> 78,6 percent of the total railway construction during the Republican period was in Eastern Turkey.<sup>79</sup> This number shows that Eastern Turkey was seen as a threat by Kemalist Republic which made huge investments in railroad construction in the region.

The early Republic wanted to build new, contemporary cities.<sup>80</sup> The Ottoman Empire's capital city, Istanbul, was given up by the Republican thought and Ankara was selected as a new capital of the Turkish Republic. Naturally, the first urban planning projects were implemented in the new capital during the 1930s, and urban planning became compulsory for all cities in Turkey with new legislation.<sup>81</sup> Ankara, which represented the ideal place for the Turkish citizens was a model for other cities in the eyes of the government.<sup>82</sup> Nationalist monuments and sculptures promoted new Turkish Republican ideological values and were commonly installed by the government. Moreover, Çağlayan mentioned that parks, train stations, people's houses, and squares were the major dynamics of the new Turkish public spaces.<sup>83</sup>

In a nutshell, the Turkish Republic was established as a unitary nation-state; however, it had ties - such as the desire for a homogenous state - with

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76 Zafer Toprak, "Cumhuriyet, Demiryolu ve Laiklik bir 'Modernite' Metaforu." *Toplumsal Tarih* 168 (2007): 27.

77 Ibid., 28.

78 Çağlayan, *Cumhuriyet'in Diyarbakır'da Kimlik İnşası (1923-1950)*, 227.

79 Ibid., 230.

80 Ercan Çağlayan, "Ulus, Mekan ve Mimari: Kemalist Dönemde İmar Politikaları," *Uluslararası Şehir ve Medeniyet Sempozyumu*, Malatya, 2016:25.

81 İlhan Tekeli, "Bir Modernleşme Projesi olarak Türkiye'de Kent Planlaması" pp.136-152 in Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba. *Türkiye'de Modernleşme ve Ulusal Kimlik*. Trans. Nurettin Elhüseyni, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 145,146.

82 Çağlayan, "Ulus, Mekan ve Mimari: Kemalist Dönemde İmar Politikaları," 28.

83 Ibid., 29.

the Ottoman Empire's last powerful cadre the Committee for Union of Progress. The foundation of the Turkish Republic brought about a new Turkish national identity because the aim of Turkey was to create a homogenous population that restricted differences between citizens. The main dynamic of its homogenization practices was the implementation of Turkification policies, including economic laws to eliminate the economic capital and power of non-Muslims and the migration of Kurdish populations towards western cities. Moreover, massacres and violence against Armenians and Kurdish citizens emerged during the early Republican period. Spatial policies, which also tried to shape the new Turkish citizen, were targeted to more a homogenous geography in the symbolic and physical senses. The replacement of the old village names with Turkish ones, the building of new city centers in line with modernization, and construction of railroads were the main characteristics of the spatial policies of the Republic. In addition to this, the erasure and confiscation of non-Muslim properties were strongly related to the desire for a unified, homogenous Turkish Republic.

#### § 2.4 The History of Nationalization in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (1915-1974)

This part of the chapter will explore major Turkification policies and practices of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Briefly, it will focus on the Armenian Genocide (1915), the Turkish-Greek population exchange (1923), the Thrace pogroms, (1934), the incident of the Twenty Classes (1941), the capital tax (1942), the 1964 deportation of Greeks, and Turkey's military operation in Cyprus in 1974. The part will only summarize the first four nationalist practices because they are not the topic of this research. On the other hand, the part is going to present other Turkification practices of the Turkish state in detail because they were the main Turkification practices that affected Kuzguncuk, as well.

#### 2.4.1 *The Armenian Massacres*

This section is going to discuss early ethnic cleansing by the CUP, as well as the Hamidiye Regiments and the Adana Massacre, which occurred in 1909.

Turkism officially started to be put into practice in 1913<sup>84</sup> when defeats in the two Balkan Wars significantly affected the CUP's national policies. According to Akçam, the CUP wanted to protect the Anatolian territory of the Ottoman Empire and implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing of non-Muslims who lived there.<sup>85</sup> On the other hand, the Armenian Genocide was strongly related to the First World War. In the eyes of the CUP, especially Armenians in the Eastern part of the Empire had positive relations with Russia and which was one of the allied powers. Therefore, the CUP decided to suppress Armenians in Ottoman territory, and central powers such as Germany supported the Empire for the genocide.<sup>86</sup> Moreover, some Armenian political activities were seen as a threat in the eyes of the CUP.

The Armenian Genocide was a significant move towards homogenization which was started in 1915 and lasted until 1917.<sup>87</sup> Before the Armenian Genocide, in 1890, the Hamidiye regiments were founded by Abdülhamid and were made up of Sunni Kurdish people. According to Naci Kutlay, the Hamidiye regiments protected against Armenian and Kurdish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire's territory. The Hamidiye regiments suppressed Armenians for the first time in the Sason events (1894), and Kutlay mentioned that the Armenian community in the Empire refrained from the Hamidiye regiments after those events.<sup>88</sup> The Adana Massacre occurred in 1909 and demonstrates that the CUP was implementing Turkification policies before 1915. In addition

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84 Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*, 139.

85 Mark R. Baker, "The Armenian Genocide and Its Denial: A Review of Recent Scholarship." *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 53 (2015): 655.

86 "Ermeni Soykırımı (1915-16): United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, [www.ushmm.org/wlc/tr/article.php?ModuleId=10008189](http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/tr/article.php?ModuleId=10008189)

87 Akçam, *From Empire to Republic: Turkish Nationalism and the Armenian Genocide*, 149.

88 Naci Kutlay, *İttihat Terakki ve Kürtler* (Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2015), 31,33.

to this, the Adana Massacre expanded towards Maraş and Kessab, which were also overwhelmingly Armenian.<sup>89</sup>

The numbers of sufferer vary in different sources regarding the Armenian Genocide,<sup>90</sup> but the significant point is that it was put into practice by the CUP and the majority of Armenians suffered from it. 60,000 Armenians were killed by the CUP in the short run. Therefore, Armenians radically lost their military power and fought against the implementation of the genocide neither at the governmental nor at the ordinary level.<sup>91</sup>

The high nationalist policies implemented by the CUP hugely impacted the organizing of the Armenian Genocide. The CUP started to adopt ultra-nationalist ideas in 1913, and these were background for planning of the Armenian Genocide before 1915. It is clear that the CUP wanted to deport or kill most Armenians to create a Turk and Muslim state.

#### 2.4.2 *The Greek-Turkish Population Exchange*

The population exchange between Greece and Turkey took place between the years of 1922 and 1924 under the auspices of the “Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations”. Around 1,200,000 Anatolian Greeks in Turkey were exchanged for about 400,000 Rumelian Muslims in Greece.<sup>92</sup> This population exchange was the last step towards the homogenization of Anatolian Turkey because, before that, the Balkan Wars, the First World War, and Turkish National Struggle had contributed to the homogeneous population in Turkish territory.<sup>93</sup> The part will briefly discuss the reasons, structure, and results of the population exchange.

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89 Genocide Museum | The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, [www.genocide-museum.am/eng/chronology.php](http://www.genocide-museum.am/eng/chronology.php).

90 According to Talat Pasha’s statistics, 841.161 Armenians did not live their homelands in 1917. They were killed or deport by the CUP. (Bizzat Hallediniz, *Telgrafların İzinde 1915* | Babil Derneği, [http://aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/BizatHallediniz\\_KATALOG.pdf](http://aciktoplumvakfi.org.tr/pdf/BizatHallediniz_KATALOG.pdf))

91 Genocide Museum | The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, [www.genocide-museum.am/trk/armenian\\_genocide.php](http://www.genocide-museum.am/trk/armenian_genocide.php).

92 Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 17.

93 *Ibid.*, 23.

The Conference of Lausanne was started in November 1922 after the retreat of Greece from Turkish territory. The Turkish delegation to the conference promoted the idea of population exchange to solve minority issues in Turkish territory.<sup>94</sup> According to Elçin Macar, the head of the British delegation George Curzon, suggested a population exchange between Greece and Turkey.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, Samim Akgönül considers that many historians from Greece point to İsmet İnönü as the originator of the Greece-Turkey population exchange, while Turkish historians presented Eleftherios Venizelos as its founding father. Moreover, Akgönül assumes other objective historians remarked that Curzon for proposing the population exchange.<sup>96</sup> It is obvious that the national historiographies of Greece and Turkey fictionally on blamed each other for the population exchange.

After several meetings, the population exchange agreement was signed on 30 January 1923,<sup>97</sup> and not only Turkey but also Greece took steps towards a homogenous population.<sup>98</sup> The population exchange excluded some geographical areas from both states; for instance, the Turkish population from Western Thrace and the Greeks in Istanbul, and on Tenedos, and Imbros were not included in this agreement.<sup>99</sup> Arı draws attention to the character of exchange, which was a type of forced migration. Therefore, human and proprietary rights were temporarily suspended by the two states.<sup>100</sup>

According to Aktar, the population exchange created economic problems in Turkey because the new coming Muslim population from Greece were mostly involved in on agriculture. On the other hand, the Greeks who moved

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- 94 Elçin Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 95.
- 95 Ibid., 97.
- 96 Samim Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2007), 48.
- 97 Kemal Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç 1923-1925* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000), 1.
- 98 Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*, 22.
- 99 Macar, *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi*, 98.
- 100 Arı, *Büyük mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç 1923-1925*, 20.

from Turkey specifically labored in trade and industry.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, Arı mentioned that the Greek community wielded influence in service sectors, trade, and industry, and after the population exchange, Muslim Turks started to replace the Greeks in these sectors.<sup>102</sup> These historical facts demonstrate that the population exchange was a part of the Turkification of economic capital.

As mentioned above, property rights were under threatened during the exchange period. According to Aktar, the properties of Greeks who emigrated by force were confiscated by government officials, locals, and looters.<sup>103</sup> Furthermore, such appropriations expanded the household goods of the Greek populations in Anatolia because of the time delay between the respective migrations of Greeks and Turks.<sup>104</sup> Interestingly, under normal conditions these properties were given by the government to Muslim newcomers from Greece; however, this too was a practice of appropriation.

As a result, the population exchange between Greece and Turkey was an important step in the establishment of ethnically homogeneous nation states for the two countries. The economic development of Turkey was damaged by the population exchange; on the other hand, Turkish Republican elites desired a more pure Turkish state until the 1930s because some Greeks who had migrated to Greece returned after the signing of a peace agreement between the two states.<sup>105</sup> The following parts will show how the Turkish state tried to eliminate not only the Greek community but also other minorities.

### 2.4.3 *The Thrace Pogroms*

The 1934 Thrace events started in Çanakkale with an economic boycott that targeted the Jewish community.<sup>106</sup> In the short run, the boycott turned into

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101 Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*, .25.

102 Arı, *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç 1923-1925*, 177.

103 Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*, 37.

104 *Ibid.*, 38.

105 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 52.

106 Avner Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler: Hukuki ve Siyasi Durumları*, Ed. Rifat N. Bali. (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), 114.

physical violence (looting, thefts, beatings, and rapes),<sup>107</sup> and it spread toward other cities and villages in Thrace such as Kırklareli, Silivri, Babaeski, Lüleburgaz, Çorlu, and Lapseki.<sup>108</sup> Interestingly, Settlement Law No.2510 which targeted the Turkification of migrants was passed by the government in the same period.<sup>109</sup> This part will briefly discuss and early attack on the Jewish community in Thrace.

The causes and major actors of the events are discussed by different scholars. Zafer Toprak's study which analyzed the responsibility of the government and the Republican People's Party (RPP) assumed that the government was not responsible for the Thrace events.<sup>110</sup> Toprak argued that rising antisemitism in the world was the real cause,<sup>111</sup> and the RPP's local authorities in the region were directly responsible.<sup>112</sup>

On the other hand, Ayhan Aktar's work rejected Toprak's arguments, and he claimed that the government was the major actor during the Thrace Events.<sup>113</sup> Aktar also opposed the studies of Avner Levi and Haluk Karabatak focusing on the Thrace Pogrom. According to Ayhan Aktar, Levi's research only established a strong connection between Nazism and the Thrace Events,<sup>114</sup> and Karabatak's study expressed the events with just the influence of Nazi Germany. Moreover, he argues, Karabatak insufficiently represents the effects of the Turkish domestic conjuncture on the pogroms.<sup>115</sup>

Rifat Bali is another scholar who analyzed the Pogroms, and according to him, there is no evidence to blame the government for the Events. However, Bali mentioned one report from the Public Examiner of Thrace Region,

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107 Ibid., 115.

108 Ibid., 117.

109 Rifat N. Bali, *1934 Trakya Olayları* (İstanbul: Kitapevi, 2008), 38,39.

110 Zafer Toprak, "1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin ve CHF'nin Sorumluluğu," *Toplumsal Tarih*, 34 (1996): 25.

111 Ibid., 19.

112 Ibid., 20

113 Ayhan Aktar. "Trakya Yahudi Olaylarını 'Doğru' Yorumlamak," *Tarih ve Toplum* 155 (1996): 50.

114 Ibid., 46

115 Ibid., 45.

İbrahim Tali, which claimed at the economic capital of the Jewish community in Thrace was a threat. In other words, the reported that Jewish capital was dangerous for the Thrace region. According to Bali, the report of the Public Examiner demonstrated the role of the government during the Events.<sup>116</sup>

According to the government report published after the events, 10,000 Jews escaped from Thrace and moved to Istanbul during the Events. After the attacks, some families decided to stay in Istanbul while others returned to their homes. Furthermore, Levi argues that some Jewish families started to emigrate from Turkey.<sup>117</sup> The report also presents that sixty-five Jewish houses were damaged by looters.<sup>118</sup>

Briefly, the 1934 Thrace Events were one result of the homogenization policy of the early Turkish Republic. Scholars discussed the government's role on the Pogrom from different perspective, but the reality is that the events decreased the number of the Jews in the region. Furthermore, the economic capacity of the Jewish community in the region was negatively affected by the Pogrom.<sup>119</sup>

#### 2.4.4 *The Twenty Classes*

This short part will present one of the few studies<sup>120</sup> of traumatic events for minorities in Turkey which included compulsory military service for male, non-Muslims of the Turkish Republic between the years 1941-1942. Sait Çetinoğlu's study argues that this was a continuity between the thought of the Committee of Union and Progress and İsmet İnönü which provided the ethnic cleansing of the Turkish Republic.<sup>121</sup>

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116 Bali, *1934 Trakya Olayları*, 377.

117 Levi, *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Yahudiler: Hukuki ve Siyasi Durumları*, 124.

118 Ibid., 125.

119 Bali, *1934 Trakya Olayları*, 378.

120 Rıfat N. Bali, "II.Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de Azınlıklar-I 'Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatlar' Olayı," *Tarih ve Toplum* 179 (1998): 260.

121 Sait Çetinoğlu, "The Mechanisms for Terrorizing Minorities: The Capital Tax and Work Battalions in Turkey during the Second World War," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 23.2 (2012): 17.

The Turkish state drafted all male non-Muslims who completed their military service during the approach of the Nazis towards Turkish borders in 1941.<sup>122</sup> Interestingly, the state did not supply weapons to these people, and instead they had to work in the construction of roads, parks, and airports.<sup>123</sup> Armenians mostly worked for public works<sup>124</sup> because, in the eyes of the Turkish Republic, Armenians were the least trustworthy minority group.<sup>125</sup> On the other hand, Greeks, and Jews endeavored in service battalions and among the top brass.<sup>126</sup> Ruben Melkonyan's work presents that sources suggest different information about the age range of non-Muslims who suffered from the Twenty Classes (18-46, 26-45, and 18-60).<sup>127</sup>

Around 40,000 non-Muslim Turkish citizens suffered from the one-party regime's policy.<sup>128</sup> According to Çetinoğlu, the working conditions in the camps were hard;<sup>129</sup> however, Bali argues that the real problem was uncertainty among minorities about their future. For instance, they had no idea when they would return home.<sup>130</sup> In any case, approximately 40.000 male non-Muslim Turkish citizens felt insecurity and fear during the compulsory, quasi-military service.

Bali assumes that there are three prominent reasonings that clarify the Twenty Classes. The first argument presents that the Turkish Republic wanted to create a Muslim bourgeoisie and eliminate the power of non-Muslim citi-

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122 Bali, "II.Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de Azınlıklar-I "Yirmi Kur'a İhtiyatlar" Olayı," 260.

123 Ibid., 261.

124 Yahya Koçoğlu, *Hatırlıyorum: Türkiye'de Gayrimüslim Hayatlar* (İstanbul: Metis, 2003), 40.

125 Rıfat Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni: (1923 - 1945)*. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 410.

126 Ibid., 410.

127 Ruben Melkonyan, "On Some Problems of the Armenian National Minority in Turkey" *21st Century* 2.8 (2010): 65.

128 Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans, *The Problems of the Expatriated Against their Desire Greek-Orthodox Community of Istanbul*, (İstanbul: 2014), 3.

129 Çetinoğlu, "The Mechanisms for Terrorizing Minorities: The Capital Tax and Work Battalions in Turkey during the Second World War," 19.

130 Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni: (1923 - 1945)*, 417.

zens' economic capital with the implementation of the Twenty Classes. Secondly, Turkey did not trust non-Muslim minorities and believed that these populations had the potential to join fifth column activities. For this reason, Turkey tried to prevent non-Muslims with this policy. Last, Nazi Germany requested that Turkey execute this nationalist policy, and so Turkey implemented it. Bali believed that the lack of confidence in non-Muslims Turkish citizens was the determining factor.<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, Çetinoğlu thinks the policy of Twenty Classes were strongly related to the claim of Nazi Germany,<sup>132</sup> while Günel believes the real motivation behind the policy was to decrease the power of non-Muslim's economic capital.<sup>133</sup>

It is obvious that Twenty Classes was part of a discriminatory policy towards non-Muslim Turkish citizens prior to the Capital Tax. Specifically, the Jewish community was affected was so than Greeks and Armenians because of the threat of Nazis who were carrying out a Jewish genocide at that time.<sup>134</sup>

#### 2.4.5 *The Capital Tax*

This part will elaborate on the capital tax as a first attempt to Turkify the Turkish Republic. The tax was implemented in the last years (1942) of the one-party regime of Turkey in order to eliminate profiteering during the Second World War. However, the tax turned into a nationalist policy targeting the minorities of Turkey. First, the part will touch on Faik Ökte's memoir which is the first study of the Capital Tax. Secondly, the part is going to discuss Doğan Avcıoğlu's work on Turkish history which takes the target of the capital tax as a problematic. Rıdvan Akar's study will be the third study in this part. He elaborates on the capital tax as a tool of eliminating the economic power of the non-Muslim population. Lastly, the part will mention the most recent study on this issue, written by Ayhan Aktar. Briefly, Aktar gives several details

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131 Ibid., 421.

132 Çetinoğlu, "The Mechanisms for Terrorizing Minorities: The Capital Tax and Work Battalions in Turkey during the Second World War," 19.

133 Gülçiçek Günel, *İttihat Terakki'den Günümüze Yek Tarz-ı Siyaset Türkleştirme* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2006), 201.

134 Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni: (1923 - 1945)*, 418.

of the capital tax such as the transformation of the real estate of minorities during the time tax was in effect.

The Capital Tax was approved by the Turkish Grand National Assembly on November 16, 1942.<sup>135</sup> According to Faik Ökte's 'Varlık Vergisi Faciası', which was the first work on the topic, the Capital Tax targeted people who had significant capital and high earnings such as those who paid high income taxes, major farmers, and landlords.<sup>136</sup> If taxpayers unable to pay the tax were required to perform compulsory hard labor. According to Ökte's study, 1,400 non-Muslim taxpayers suffered from compulsory service, and they were moved to Eskişehir and Erzurum after 27 January 1943.<sup>137</sup> Ökte said that twenty-one taxpayers died while performing their compulsory. On the other hand, he mentioned that the conditions of the camps were relaxed, and the delinquent taxpayers sat in coffee houses and played cards or backgammon.<sup>138</sup> Unfortunately, we did not know why some taxpayers died in these camps even though the conditions were not troublesome. It seems clear that the study of Ökte was significant in the literature of Capital Tax because he was head of the provincial treasury in Istanbul when the tax took place; therefore, his work was a first-hand account. Ökte clearly presented that the capital tax was a negative event in Turkish history because it focused on eliminating the economic power of minorities in Turkey rather than decreasing the Muslim population's capital. For instance, he mentioned that the tax had nationalist and racist characteristics<sup>139</sup> given that the number of non-Muslims who owed the tax was 27,973 while the number of Muslims was just 3,973 in İstanbul.<sup>140</sup> In addition to this, Ökte argued that American, French, Italian, British, and minorities' churches, schools, and hospitals paid the capital tax.<sup>141</sup> Ökte's work criticized by journalists and politicians such as Yekta Ragıp Önen, Doğan Nadir, and

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135 Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası* (İstanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi, 1951), 54.

136 Ibid., 56.

137 Ibid., 157.

138 Ibid., 158,159.

139 Ibid., 211.

140 Ibid., 102.

141 Ibid., 244,245,246,247.

Şükrü Saraçoğlu because Ökte was a key person in the implementation of the tax. However, he could not actively criticize the government in 1942.<sup>142</sup>

Doğan Avcıoğlu touched on the Capital Tax in his two-volume study of Turkish Republic. According to him, variations of the tax emerged in different European states because of the economic crisis during the Second World War;<sup>143</sup> however, he believed that the tax in Turkey directly targeted non-Muslim populations. Furthermore, he indicated that the tax was unsuccessful because the government directly focused on the Turkification of Turkish foreign trade and eliminating profiteering in Turkey during the Second World War.<sup>144</sup> Furthermore, Avcıoğlu's study assumed that the commercial atmosphere of Istanbul did not change after the Tax; in other words, the Turkification of the economy was not successful.<sup>145</sup> In my point of view, the Capital Tax damaged not only the capital of the non-Muslim population but also their psychology because they felt insecurity vis-à-vis the instigator of the tax: the RPP. It seems clear that the Capital Tax also targeted psychology of non-Muslim population in Turkey via compulsory service. However, Avcıoğlu's work did not develop arguments about this significant topic, and he tried to legitimize the tax with reference to similar in other from European states.

Rıdvan Akar, a well-known journalist in Turkey, wrote two works about the Capital Tax and compulsory service. The first called 'Varlık Vergisi Kanunu: Tek Parti Rejiminde Azınlık Karşıtı Politika Örneği' was published in 1992 and the more far-reaching 'Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları' affected Turkish society when it was issued in the late 1990s. This part will mostly refer to the second study because it was a broader version of the first work. Akar assumed that the Capital Tax was economic genocide and the first time the Turkish government approached all non-Muslim communities as a single block.<sup>146</sup> Moreover, he did not think that the Capital Tax was an

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142 Rıfat N. Bali, "Çok Partili Demokrası Döneminde Varlık Vergisi Tartışmaları", 1997.

143 Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni 1* (İstanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1996), 475.

144 Ibid., 476,477.

145 Ibid., 476.

146 Rıdvan Akar, *Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları* (İstanbul: Belge Uluslararası Yayıncılık, 2000), 9.

economic policy of Turkish Republic because it directly created a huge trauma for the non-Muslim communities in Turkey.<sup>147</sup>

The last discussion of this section is about Ayhan Aktar, a professor in Bilgi University's Department of Social Sciences. The work 'Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları', published in 2001, is a compilation of Aktar's articles written between 1996-1998. According to him, the Capital Tax was part of the tension between the one-party regime of Turkey and its non-Muslim communities.<sup>148</sup> For this reason, he conceptualized the relationship between the Turkish government and the non-Muslim population.<sup>149</sup> Aktar gave general information about the Capital Tax mentioned above; however, the most significant section of the study elaborated on the transformation of real estate such as houses and workplaces in six districts of Istanbul (Beyoğlu, Şişli, Eminönü, Fatih, Kadıköy, and the Princes Islands). According to Aktar's research, 486 real estate properties were sold by Armenian, Jewish, and Greek communities in Istanbul's six districts to pay the Tax. Interestingly, Muslims sold just ten such properties because of the tax.<sup>150</sup> These data represent that the capital tax was a way for the government to nationalize the economy in Turkey, as Aktar mentioned. The tax did not involve physical violence against minorities in Turkey like the Pogrom about which the paper is going to discuss in the third chapter. The next section will explain the deportation of Greeks which occurred in 1964 and negatively affected the Greek community in Turkey.

#### 2.4.6 *The Greek Deportations of 1964*

This section is going to elaborate on the cancellation of the Convention on Establishment, Commerce, and Navigation which was signed by Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and Turkish President Mustafa Kemal in 1930.

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147 Ibid., 11.

148 Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve "Türkleştirme" Politikaları*, 15.

149 Ibid., 11.

150 Ibid., 203.

Briefly, the agreement allowed to 11.000 Greek citizens to remain living in İstanbul<sup>151</sup> and tried to increase friendship between Greece and Turkey in different ways such as through free economic circulation and trade.<sup>152</sup> However, the Turkish government decided to cancel the agreement in 1964, and the Greek community in Turkey was deported. Interestingly, the government legitimized the cancellation with the following argument: “The agreement was signed a long time ago and it is not fit for the contemporary situation.”<sup>153</sup> The first part of this section will refer Rıfat Bali’s work and show the economic pressure on non-Muslim populations in 1964, and the following part will explain the results of cancellation of the agreement via using arguments of Samim Akgönül, Rıdvan Akar, and Hülya Demir.

Before the 1965 general election, nationalism among the Muslim population in Turkey increased because of some Greeks attacks on Turks in Cyprus. According to Rıfat Bali’s work that investigates the relationship between the Turkish political atmosphere and the Turkish Jewish community from 1950-2003, Muslim Turks started to promote a nationalist campaign against Greek craftsmen throughout Turkey, and especially in İstanbul. In other words, Muslim Turks tried to put an economic boycott of Greek citizens in place in Turkey. For instance, nationalist university students prepared signboards with the following argument: “As money spent in this shop produce bullets used against your Turkish brothers in Cyprus, do not buy here.”<sup>154</sup> In addition, Bali mounted a significant argument for this economic pressure. He believed that the campaign became more inclusionary and targeted not only Greeks but also other minorities (Jews and Armenians) in Turkey.<sup>155</sup> It clearly seems that this campaign has commonalities with the Capital Tax in terms of its economic

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- 151 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 256.
- 152 Hülya Demir, and Rıdvan Atar, *İstanbul’un Son Sürgünleri*. (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1999), 40.
- 153 Ibid., 41.
- 154 Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans, *The Problems of the Expatriated Against their Desire Greek-Orthodox Community of İstanbul*, 6.
- 155 Rıfat N.Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Devlet’in Örnek Yurttaşları 1950-2003* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2009) p.110.

pressure on non-Muslim populations in Turkey, and it was also a part of the homogenization policies of the Turkish Republic like the Pogrom mentioned by Dilek Güven.

Samim Akgönül works at Strasbourg University and studies the Greek minority in Turkey. His most substantial and influential work is “Türkiye Rumları”, which assumes that the Greek community in Turkey does not disappear because of its cultural values and public memory are still alive. On the other hand, the number Greek community’s members in Turkey is decreasing and will not increase in the future.<sup>156</sup> It seems clear that Akgönül is a pessimist with respect to the Greek community in Turkey. He expresses that most Turkish Greeks started to move to other states - mostly Greece - after 1964 because the Turkish government decided to cancel the agreement between Turkey and Greece, which was called the Convention on Establishment, Commerce, and Navigation<sup>157</sup> and was signed in 1930.<sup>158</sup> For this reason, the Turkish-Greek population started to emigrate from Turkey or were deported by the Turkish government. Furthermore, Turkish authorities decided to appropriate the real estate of Greeks in Turkey. According to official statistics, 2.092 real estate holdings in Turkey (valued at 200 million dollars) were appropriated by the government. Official data from Greece claim that the value of these landed properties was 500 million dollars.<sup>159</sup> The appropriation of the Greek minority’s real estate is an important point in Akgönül’s study. The study also presented that the day of the agreement was canceled (16 February) was the 44th anniversary of Istanbul’s liberation from the antecedent.<sup>160</sup> The popular Greek newspaper *Apyevmatini* showed that 6.000 Greeks in Turkey had migrated to Greece and other states by the end of August 1964.<sup>161</sup> Generally speaking,

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- 156 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 388,389.
- 157 Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans, *The Problems of the Expatriated Against their Desire Greek-Orthodox Community of Istanbul*, 5.
- 158 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 110, 263.
- 159 Ibid., 273.
- 160 Ibid., 262.
- 161 Ibid., 281.

the Greek population in İstanbul had been approximately 80.000 in 1960, and this number radically decreased to 25,000 by 1965.<sup>162</sup> Therefore, Akgönül's opinion that 1964 was significant for the Turkish-Greek population because they moved from Turkey<sup>163</sup> is confirmed by the data.

'İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri' was written by Rıdvan Akar and Hülya Demir. This work uses mostly newspapers to show the important consequences of the Greek deportation. Furthermore, the researchers talked with witnesses to the deportation. The study is much readable than the others because it gives fewer details of the deportation and touches only on the most significant points. According to Akar and Demir, the deportation had a strong relationship between the Cyprus issue with Greece and Turkey.<sup>164</sup> Historically, the EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), a national Greek organization, was a key actor in Cyprus issue. It started to attack Muslim Turk neighborhoods in Cyprus after 1963. Muslim Turks countered the Greeks with the TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization).<sup>165</sup> Therefore, the political atmosphere in Cyprus was tense between the Greeks and the Turks. Greece and Turkey also had problems with each other. As mentioned above, Turkey canceled the agreement between the two states because of the Cyprus issue. Akar and Demir mentioned that in addition to the deportations in 1964, Turkish government introduced new codes to limit the rights of Greeks in Turkey. For example, the government decided to cancel equivalent of twenty Greeks schools in İstanbul which had 684 students and 93 teachers.<sup>166</sup> In addition to this, for the first time the Turkish government criticized Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in İstanbul and took control of the Patriarchate's accounts in 1965.<sup>167</sup> These kinds of policies exemplify that the Turkish government directly targeted Greeks in Turkey and made a scapegoat of Greek community.

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162 Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans: *The Problems of the Expatriated Against their Desire Greek-Orthodox Community of İstanbul*, 7.

163 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 251.

164 Demir, and Akar. *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, 17.

165 Ibid., 18,19.

166 Ibid., 147,148.

167 Ibid., 120,121.

#### 2.4.7 *The Cyprus Military Operation of 1974*

The 1974 Cyprus military operation, also known as ‘Cyprus Peace Operation’, was another problematic issue, specifically for Greeks but also for other minorities in Turkey.<sup>168</sup> According to Samim Akgönül, it was the biggest crisis between Greece and Turkey since 1922.<sup>169</sup> Briefly, the Turkish army started a military campaign in Cyprus and divided its territory into two (north and south)<sup>170</sup> following an unsuccessful military coup in the region.<sup>171</sup> This section will present how the military intervention in Cyprus affected the non-Muslim population in Turkey via using Akgönül’s aforementioned in-depth study. Akgönül did not detail the military operation itself; however, the work explained the major reflections of the operation on the Greek population in Turkey. In addition to this, interviews with Armenian and Muslim Turks in İstanbul represent the nationalist feelings that emerged during the Cyprus operation not only toward Greeks but also toward Armenians in Turkey.

Samim Akgönül’s work assumes that Turkey had just a few Greeks by 1974.<sup>172</sup> Turkish newspapers did not publish nationalist news or columns in this period because the small Greek community was not a threat to Turkey.<sup>173</sup> Moreover, he mentioned that the Cyprus military operation negatively affected the Greek community in Turkey, and they started to move to other countries after the operation. When the Turkish military operation in Cyprus was conducted in 1974, the government implemented a new policy for the

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168 Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Devlet’in Örnek Yurttaşları, 1950-2003*, 199.

169 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 317.

170 Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Milliyetçilik Kısacasında Kıbrıs* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 14.

171 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci (1923-2001)*, 317.

172 The Greek population in Istanbul was 15.000 in 1970 and 10.000 in 1975. (Ecumenical Federation of Constantinopolitans, *The Problems of the Expatriated Against their Desire Greek-Orthodox Community of Istanbul*, 7.

173 Akgönül, *Türkiye Rumları: Ulus-devlet Çağından Küreselleşme Çağına Bir Azınlığın Yok Oluş Süreci*, 317.

Greeks in Turkey under which they could not sell their real estate without obtaining permission from the government.<sup>174</sup> After several months, the government expanded the real estate restrictions to the foundations of Armenian, Greek, and Jews in Turkey. The new rule stipulated that charities had to relinquish properties bought after 1936.<sup>175</sup> It seems clear that real estate was a significant issue for the Turkish government as it consistently sought to control minorities' properties during crisis periods. In other words, the properties of non-Muslim populations in Turkey were used by the government as a threat.

To sum up, these last parts of the chapter express how the Turkish state homogenized the country via various political and economic policies, and events. The most significant sections are the nationalist events that occurred the Greek deportation in 1964 because these events created huge trauma for the non-Muslim populations of Turkey. Furthermore, the Capital Tax and the relationship between Turkey and Greece with respect to Cyprus were also contradictory cases that fully explain why Armenians, Greeks, and Jews started to move out of Turkey and how Turkish economic capital changed hands from non-Muslim to Muslim Turks.

## § 2.5 The 6-7 September Events (the Pogrom)

The Pogrom, in other words the 6-7 September events, was a major nationalist incident in Turkish history. The events occurred in several districts of Istanbul and Izmir with significant non-Muslim populations. The violent incidents briefly unfolded as follows: İstanbul Radio transmitted news of a bomb attack on Mustafa Kemal's house in Thessaloniki, Greece. After that, İstanbul *Ekspres newspaper* published a column mentioning the same news. When people heard and read the news, they started to protest in Taksim Square in Istanbul and at Fuar in İzmir. Actually, the government officials turned a blind eye to looters during the Pogrom. However, the protests turned into an aggressive to non-Muslim shops and houses. According to statistics, approximately 100.000 people joined the protests on September 6, 1955.

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174 Ibid., 318.

175 Ibid., 318,319.

This part is going to elaborate on the historical context before the Pogrom and will explain the Pogrom with reference to Resul Babaoğlu, Dilek Güven Speros Vryonis, Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, and M. Hulusi Dosdoğru.

The Capital Tax was implemented by the RPP in 1942 to transfer economic capital from non-Muslims to Muslims.<sup>176</sup> The policy influenced non-Muslims in Turkey to vote for the populist Democrat Party (DP) government.<sup>177</sup> However, the DP's nationalist, statist policies such as 6-7 September Pogrom unmade non-Muslims' thoughts on the DP government.

According to Rifat N. Bali who has worked extensively in the field of the Jewish community in Turkey, the Turkish non-Muslim population felt secure once the DP came to power after the RPP in the early 1950s.<sup>178</sup> Unfortunately, the DP government implemented policies similar to the Kemalist homogenization and nationalization processes. For this reason, several scholars believed that the pogrom on 6-7 September 1955 was orchestrated by the DP. For instance, Resul Babaoğlu's work published in 2012 criticizes government officials (police and soldiers) because during the events they encouraged looters in various places.<sup>179</sup>

Dilek Güven's study entitled as "6-7 Eylül Olayları: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında" develops a different perspective towards the Pogrom. It is based on archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and literature reviews of other resources about the Pogrom. Güven mentioned that the Pogrom was clearly planned by the government before the Thessalonica events and was part of the religious homogenization policies of Turkish Republic. Güven's study is a phenomenon in the Pogrom literature because she disclosed the relationship between the events and the nation-state's desire for homogenization.

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- 176 Rıdvan Akar, *Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları* (İstanbul: Belge Uluslararası Yayıncılık, 2000), 9.
- 177 Meral Balcı, "Varlık Vergisi ve Uygulamalarının Demokrat Parti'nin Seçim Çalışmalarında Kullanılması," *The Journal of Academic Social Science Studies*, 63 (2017): 377.
- 178 Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri: Devlet'in Örnek Yurttaşları, 1950-2003*, 56.
- 179 Resul Babaoğlu, "6/7 Eylül 1955 Olaylarının Türkiye Rumları Üzerindeki Etkileri (1955-1959) *Dicle Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi Bilimi*, MA Thesis (2012): 74.

Firstly, she presented that most of the people who joined the Pogrom came from Anatolian cities such as Trabzon, Kastamonu, Erzincan, and Eskişehir and that these people were transported from these cities to İstanbul under the protection of Turkish security forces. Secondly, Güven showed that Turkish flags used by nationalist groups during the Pogrom were produced by the Union of Textile Industry in İstanbul.<sup>180</sup> The most significant point Güven's study argues is that the Pogrom was part of the nationalization and homogenization politics of the Turkish government. Furthermore, the Pogrom had a strong relationship to the Turkification of the economy.<sup>181</sup> Generally speaking, Güven's problematic refers to the transition of Turkish Republic from the Ottoman Empire.<sup>182</sup> According to her, many studies on the Pogrom mentioned that the Cyprus issue between Greece and Turkey was the key factor in the emerging violence against minorities<sup>183</sup>. For instance, the Turkish Journal *Tarih ve Toplum* (History and Society) published two articles in 1986 which focused supposedly on the relationship between the Cyprus issue and the Pogrom.<sup>184</sup> Güven believed that the Pogrom was part of Turkish nationalization policies and that the articles published in *Tarih ve Toplum* were straightforward examples of how historical realities were manipulated by historians and political elites.<sup>185</sup> Güven also demonstrated that the attacks during the Pogrom targeted not only the Greek population but all other non-Muslim populations' houses and shops, as well, especially in İstanbul and İzmir.<sup>186</sup> For instance, 2.200 Greek, 900 Armenian, and 400 Jewish workplaces were vandalized by looters during the 6-7 September events.<sup>187</sup> Therefore, Güven concludes that the Cyprus issue was not a fundamental reason behind the Pogrom.

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180 Güven, *6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında*, 84.

181 *Ibid.*, 13.

182 *Ibid.*, 11.

183 *Ibid.*, 209.

184 *Ibid.*, 16.

185 *Ibid.*, 6.

186 *Ibid.*, 173.

187 *Ibid.*, 49.

Greek scholars also have a huge impact in the 6-7 September Pogrom literature. Speros Vryonis's overarching academic study *The Mechanism of Catastrophe* details the Pogrom and is primarily descriptive rather than interpretative. Vryonis specified five territories of Istanbul<sup>188</sup> where the Greek population was high and mentioned which neighborhoods were damaged by looters.<sup>189</sup> Furthermore, Vryonis tried to explain what happened on the ground in these districts during the events. For example, he gives details of when looters started to destroy houses and shops in the neighborhoods of Istanbul. The initial events occurred in Yedikule, Samatya, Beyoğlu, Sıraselviler, Yeşilköy, and Bakırköy at the same time.<sup>190</sup> In addition, Vryonis's work fundamentally explains the understand details of the Pogrom in terms of who damaged Greek churches, killed non-Muslim Turkish citizens, and damaged houses and shops.<sup>191</sup> When we look at statistics, the European side of Istanbul suffered much more damage and violence than the Asian side. The book has just one problem: Vryonis focused only on the Greek community in Turkey. As mentioned above, Armenians and Jews also suffered from the violence, but the reader will not find information about which Armenian churches or Jewish synagogues were damaged by looters during the Pogrom.

After the 1955 Pogrom, the DP government established an aid committee under the auspices of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce to collect financial contributions for non-Muslim victims. According to Güven's statistics, 3,247 victims of the Pogrom received financial support from the government up until 1957.<sup>192</sup> However, Güven believed that the aid committee did not cover the

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188 These are the five areas of Istanbul: New City (Beyoğlu, Cihangir, Osmanbey, Şişli etc.), Old City (Eminönü, Yedikule, Kumkapı, Balat etc., European Shore of the Bosphorus (Arnavutköy, Ortaköy, Yeniköy, Bebek etc.), Asian Shore of the Bosphorus (Kadıköy, Kalamış, Kuzguncuk, Çengelköy etc.), and Princes' Islands. (Speros Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul* (New York, NY: Greekworks.com, 2005), 583,584.)

189 Ibid., 583,584.

190 Ibid., 103,104.

191 Ibid., 251,252,253,254,255,256,257,258,259,581,582.

192 Güven, *6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları: Cumhuriyet Dönemi Azınlık Politikaları ve Stratejileri Bağlamında*, 60.

losses from the Pogrom,<sup>193</sup> and my interview with a Christian former resident of Kuzguncuk resident (male, born 1938) confirmed her argument. The interviewee presented that the aid committee did not cover the damage from the Pogrom.<sup>194</sup> The DP government proved its inculpability for the Pogrom at a national and international level via establishing the aid committee and blaming communist groups.<sup>195</sup>

According to Hasan İzzettin Dinamo's short study, "6-7 Eylül Kasırgası", Aziz Nesin, Kemal Tahir, Hulusi Dosdoğru, and other communist writers and intellectuals were detained by the government after the events. The government accused them of being the organization committee for the Pogrom which was staged with the support of Russia.<sup>196</sup> However, Dinamo mentioned that political elites of the DP such as Adnan Menderes organized the Pogrom.<sup>197</sup> Dinamo's study is not expand on the Pogrom in detail; it was simply his memoirs. In addition to this, Hulusi Dosdoğru's "6/7 Eylül Olayları" adopted the same argument as Dinamo but took a more comprehensive approach. When we look at the details of Dosdoğru's study, it seems clear that he saw a relationship between the Cyprus issue and the Pogrom.<sup>198</sup> Dosdoğru's arguments about the non-Muslim population in Turkey were also provocative; for example, he claims that even though the RPP covered the losses of the Greek community in Turkey following the Capital Tax, the community did not vote for the RPP and voted for the DP, instead.<sup>199</sup> Dosdoğru directly blamed and criticized the Greek community's political decisions for the events.

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193 Ibid., 61.

194 Personal interview. 29.Oct. 2016,.

195 After the Pogrom, 52 leftist writers, journalists and intellectuals were interned by the DP government because the DP believed that these communists were the leaders of the 6-7 September events. (Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, *6-7 Eylül Kasırgası* (İstanbul: May Yayınları, 1971)

196 Dinamo, *6-7 Eylül Kasırgası*, 10,19,24.

197 Ibid., 8.

198 M. Hulusi Dosdoğru, *6/7 Eylül Olayları: 6/7 Eylül 1955'in Karası Topluma Sürülemez* (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1993), 9.

199 Ibid., 11.

Turkish military forces directly interfered in Turkish political life and overthrew the DP government in a coup d'état in 1960. Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, and Minister of Finance Hasan Polatkan were executed by the National Unity Committee.<sup>200</sup> This military coup uncovered that the 6-7 September events were organized by the DP government. After that, the RPP came to power again in the 1961 general elections and remained there until 1965.

This part presents a literature review of works on the 6-7 September incidents by various scholars. It seems clear that the Pogrom was traumatic for non-Muslim minorities in the Turkish Republic. Their houses and workplaces were damaged by looters on 6 September 1955, and the DP government tried to cover their economic losses. In general, most of Istanbul's villages with high numbers of non-Muslims were affected by the 6-7 September incidents. However, as mentioned in the introduction, several Pogrom studies focused on the effects of the events on the European side of Istanbul, especially in Pera. The following parts will widen the scope of studies of the 6-7 September Events' by focusing on Kuzguncuk.

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200 The military coup was planned and implemented by the Committee. Thirty-eight military officers from land, navy, air forces and gendarmerie worked for the Committee. The Committee defaected brasses from Turkish military service and 147 professors from Istanbul, Ankara and Middle East Techical Universities who were opponent in the Committee's eyes. (Levent Börklüoğlu, "27 Mayıs Askeri Darbesi Sonrasında Ordu İçinde İktidar Mücadelesi: Milli Birlik Komitesi ve Silahlı Kuvvetler Birliği" *Osmaniye Korkut Ata Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1: pp. 13-28)

## The Pogrom in Kuzguncuk: Violence and Common Narratives

The mainstream Turkish literature about the pogrom predominantly discusses the causes, political responsibility and results of the 6-7 September events. Studies of the pogrom mostly focus on the Beyoğlu/Pera district, especially İstiklal Avenue. Beyoğlu was a significant area for the non-Muslim population in Istanbul and many shops located there were damaged by looters during the 6-7 September incidents. Yet, the districts of the Princes Islands, Yeşilköy, Kumkapı, Kuzguncuk, Moda, Fatih, Çengelköy, Ortaköy, Bebek, and Eyüp also had a non-Muslim majority, and non-Muslims dominated the economic activities in these places. Accordingly, the 6-7 September incidents damaged in these neighborhoods, as well. However, the studies on the Pogrom only mention these places in a sentence without giving details. For this reason, this chapter will turn the lens towards Kuzguncuk and narrate the ways in which the events unfolded in this locality.

Former and current non-Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk felt the effects of the Pogrom on the 6th of September, 1955. Mills figures out that current Kuzguncuk residents mostly ignored the emerging Pogrom in the village. On the other hand, the field research revealed that the small number of remaining residents wanted to talk about the Pogrom's details. In fact, the findings of the field research revealed that the violence in Kuzguncuk was similar to that in other districts of Istanbul during the Pogrom in terms of violence towards

non-Muslims' houses and shops. Therefore, this chapter assumes that Kuzguncuk was damaged by looters in the Pogrom like other districts of Istanbul, and the village was not special in this regard.

The first part of the chapter focus on the discourse of the multiethnic character of Kuzguncuk because second hand sources and Kuzguncuk residents mostly focus on this. Therefore, the discourse of a multiethnic Kuzguncuk was used to deny the Pogrom in the village. Also, the part will present Kuzguncuk's demography before the Pogrom with reference to interviews. Secondly, the chapter is going to discuss the begin of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk. Residents recall different starting times for the Pogrom which suggests that the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk continued for several hours. The third part of this chapter will focus on the memories of residents' unrecognized violence practices in Kuzguncuk during the Pogrom. Moreover, the fourth part presents common narratives produced by Kuzguncuk residents such as the protection of non-Muslims, emerging isolated events, plunderers from outside, and a comparison of violence in Kuzguncuk with that in European İstanbul. The chapter is going to demystify common discourses of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk. Last, the chapter is going to show the eventual outcome of the Pogrom because this research assumes that the Pogrom was the breaking point for non-Muslims in Kuzguncuk. In other words, after the Pogrom Kuzguncuk minorities started to feel insecure.

### § 3.1 Remembering Kuzguncuk's Demographic Composition before the Pogrom

Kuzguncuk is a famous village located on the Asian shore of the Bosphorus. Its population of Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Muslim Turks lived in Kuzguncuk throughout history according to several sources. This part is going to present what the residents of Kuzguncuk remember about the population of this village before the Pogrom.

Demography has been an area of intense conflict and rivalry among competing state and non-state actors since the late nineteenth century. The conflict continues up until today and is revealed in the memories of the Kuzguncuk

people. It evokes memories of past violence and plunder. It has also implications for the present as well on claims about the future.

Current and former non-Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk were more likely to remember the non-Muslim demographic composition of the village; however, they could not openly narrate the violence during the Pogrom and other practices of homogenization. Actually, they tried to speak about the violence of the Pogrom with some reservations. Current Muslim residents usually referred to the number of the Muslims in the village before the Pogrom.

During the field research, the most radical narrative about the demographic characteristic of Kuzguncuk came from an interview conducted in front of a coffee house in İcadiye Street. A current Muslim resident (an elderly male) said: “We (the current Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk) are what remains from the non-Muslims.”<sup>1</sup> It is significant to present that some Muslims in the village knew that the village dwellers before the Pogrom were non-Muslims. Moreover, the interview shows that some Kuzguncuk residents have recently realized non-Muslims living in the village are few in number; however, they can not interrogate why this happened.

The population figures for Kuzguncuk in the 1950s is a source of conflict among current residents of Kuzguncuk. Some current Kuzguncuk dwellers whom this part is going to discuss below thought that the village had a Muslim density before the Pogrom. For instance, during the field research, a current Muslim resident (a middle-aged male) said: “If you want to learn the history of Kuzguncuk, you have to speak with A., S., and so on (all of whom are Muslim) because they are the real Kuzguncuk residents. Why you want to interview with M. (she is a current Greek resident) I do not know her and I think she is a newcomer.”<sup>2</sup> This exclamation presents that current Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk feel they possess the history of Kuzguncuk rather non-Muslims. Furthermore, this narrative is quite different than the previous one because the latter erases the earlier non-Muslim residents of the village. Instead, he thought that the Muslim community constituted the real residents of Kuzguncuk.

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1 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

2 Group interview. 02.Nov.2016.

According to an interview with a former Muslim resident (male, born 1934) who was living in the top of Kuzguncuk between the years 1948-1956, there were only three Muslim households in the neighborhood in 1948.<sup>3</sup> On the other hand, another former Muslim resident (male, born 1941) who came to Kuzguncuk from Central Anatolia in 1948 did not accept that non-Muslim groups were the majority in the neighborhood when he started to live there. He crossly claims that “the Muslim community was not a minority group in the past years. For instance, non-Muslims did not have so many houses in Kuzguncuk, and they had only 30 houses out of 150. Also, non-Muslims did not have houses near the Bosphorus.”<sup>4</sup> A current Jewish resident (woman, born 1945) who is born in Kuzguncuk remarks that “the term ‘Small America’ was used to describe the village’s modernity in the early years of the 1950s.” Actually, she mentioned Kuzguncuk’s modern way of life predated the migration of Muslims. Moreover, she remembers the houses of Jews, Greeks, and Armenians in Kuzguncuk and nearby neighborhoods such as Fıstıkağacı, *and* Bağlarbaşı before the Pogrom.<sup>5</sup> Another interview with a former Greek resident (male, born 1944) who left the village in 1977 describes the 1950s as follows: “Jews and Greeks were the most populous communities in Kuzguncuk. On the other hand, Armenians and Muslims were a minority.”<sup>6</sup>

Some dwellers of Kuzguncuk provide approximate population numbers. For instance, one current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) remembers the Greek population being 1,000-1,500 in the village before 1955. Moreover, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) recalls the Kuzguncuk Jewish population in 1948 when Israel was established. He says: “in 1948, there were 800 Jewish households in this place. If we assume that there were four people in every household there were easily 3,200 Jews.” Unfortunately, there is no official data indicating the demographic distribution of the village.

These narratives show that most witnesses who talked about the population placed importance on the too many non-Muslim population density of Kuzguncuk with the exception of one current Muslim dweller. Furthermore,

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3 Telephone interview. 09 Nov. 2016.

4 Personal interview. 08 Dec. 2016.

5 Personal interview. 02 Nov. 2016.

6 Personal interview. 31. Oct. 2016

the narratives suggest that non-Muslim dwellers of Kuzguncuk remember the non-Muslims, while Muslim people recall Muslims. It appears that the Muslims interacted with each other and non-Muslims intimate amongst themselves. For this reason, these communities remember the populations of their respective religious groups.

Kuzguncuk was remembered by its current residents as a village of harmony, peace, and tolerance. Moreover, the multi ethnicity of the village is usually said by the residents during the field research. The most obvious example in the eyes of the residents that shows the tolerance of different ethnic and religious groups is that the mosque and the Armenian church are adjacent. A former Christian resident (male, born 1938) believed that in the past, Kuzguncuk residents were not interested in their neighbors' religious and the case of the Armenian church and the mosque is a significant example of this way of thinking.<sup>7</sup>

In addition, the attendance at various religious funerals in the village is stated as another indicator of the culture of tolerance. For instance, a current Muslim resident (male, born 1955) said: "Kuzguncuk had a very special culture. Jews, Greeks, Armenians attended Muslim funerals, and Muslims walked on İcadiye Street in non-Muslim funerals with the Greek priest."<sup>8</sup> A former Greek resident (male, born 1944) narrated funeral ceremonies in Kuzguncuk positively: "Every Kuzguncuk resident stood up when a funeral passed in İcadiye Street, and everybody joined funerals. We went to different religious places (the mosque, synagogue, or Armenian church) for funerals."<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, during the group interview in the Kuzguncuk Armenian church, only one Armenian man (born 1954) claimed that the joining of the funerals of minorities by Muslims was not a sign of the culture of tolerance of the village. He thought it was directly related to humanity.<sup>10</sup> A young Armenian religious official who lived outside of Kuzguncuk joined the argument saying: "If you can believe it, I held a funeral in Kuzguncuk with only three Armenians. All other participants were Muslims." It seems clear that the two Armenian men placed

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7 Personal interview. 29.Sept. 2016.

8 Personal interview. 08.Dec. 2016.

9 Personal interview. 31. Sept.2016.

10 Personal interview. 23.Nov.2016.

importance on the low Armenian population in Kuzguncuk by not focusing on the culture of tolerance and discourse of harmony of the village. On the other hand, other Kuzguncuk residents remembered the joining of funerals as a positive characteristic of the village.

For this research, the tolerance culture and narrative of harmony are important because according to Amy Mills, the general trend among Kuzguncuk residents was to ignore the emergence of the Pogrom in the village because of the high culture of tolerance.<sup>11</sup> This research also found similar outcomes; however, the study will present how the Pogrom emerged in Kuzguncuk, these narratives of peace notwithstanding.

Many sources that introduce Kuzguncuk in different ways always place importance on the multi-ethnic characteristic of the neighborhood. In other words, these sources highlight that Jews, Greeks, Armenians, and Muslim Turks lived peacefully in Kuzguncuk through the centuries. It seems that multiethnic characteristic of the village was constructed not only by the residents of Kuzguncuk but also by several sources.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, in these studies and in the narratives of residents, the multicultural structure of the village is strongly correlated with cosmopolitanism, tolerance, harmony, and peaceful relations among different ethnic and religious groups.

However, most villages - not only in Istanbul but all over the Ottoman Empire - had a multiethnic structure before the establishment of the Turkish Republic because of the Ottoman Empire's millet system which was developed in 1454 after the conquest of Constantinople. However, as discussed below, the millet system included some restrictions for non-Muslims groups in the Ottoman Empire.

Multiethnicity did not always bring about a peaceful relationship among different religious communities. For instance, Erdem Güven's study that examines Kuzguncuk's Jewish community presents that a blood libel emerged between Jews and Christians in the 19th century in Kuzguncuk.<sup>13</sup> Güven also

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11 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul'da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 39.

12 Ibid., 68.

13 Erdem Güven, *Mekan, Kimlik, Yahudilik: Kuzguncuk Yahudi Cemaati Üzerine Bir Çalışma* (İstanbul: Sosyal Yayınlar, 2011), 202.

believes the multiethnic characteristic of the village is promoted as a specific, significant notion of Kuzguncuk by official and unofficial sources such as interviews, articles, and television programs.<sup>14</sup> Historian Ayşe Hür also addressed an attacked one of the synagogues in Kuzguncuk when the people were manipulated by the press against the Jewish community in 1925.<sup>15</sup>

The fundamental academic study on Kuzguncuk was written by Amy Mills. According to Mills, the Capital Tax, the Pogrom, and the deportation of Greeks were the major factors in the shrinking non-Muslim population in the village.<sup>16</sup> She mentioned that residents always recalled the village as a mosaic of different religions and residents had a close friendships. For this reason, nostalgic narratives about the old days of the village are popular.<sup>17</sup>

As mentioned above, Kuzguncuk's residents always highlight the heterogeneity of the population of the village and narrate this is a discourse of Kuzguncuk's uniqueness. Especially former residents that came to the village in the second half of the twentieth century assumed that the neighborhood was a common for three religious communities and that these groups lived together without problems.

Moreover, current and former residents mention funeral rites and celebrations of religious or national holidays as examples of multi-ethnicity and cosmopolitanism because all residents joined in on the funerals and holy days.<sup>18</sup> For instance, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1935) said about the holy days of different religious. "We celebrated religious holy days with all Kuzguncuk residents. Muslims residents gave away meat during the sacrifice holiday, and we (Jews) offered showbread, which is our religious food."<sup>19</sup> A former Christian resident (male, born 1938) also touched on holy days in the village. "We celebrated religious days all together. Jews dished out their loaves of shew-breads. Residents from different religions joined the Greek rites in the

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14 Ibid., p. 199.

15 Ayşe Hür, *Gayri Müslimlerin Öteki Tarihi* (İstanbul: Literatür Yayınları, 2016), 4.

16 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul'da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 76.

17 Ibid., 68,71.

18 Field research in Kuzguncuk.

19 Personal interview. 05.Nov.2016.

church.<sup>20</sup> The celebration of Turkey's Republic Day in the village is significant for elderly Kuzguncuk residents to present the unity of people from different religions. In their narratives, the celebrations represent harmony and tolerance discourses. For example, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) remembered the celebration of Republic Day. "The Kuzguncuk community was constructed two celebration tacks (one located in front of the Greek Church and other in front of the Synagogue) in Kuzguncuk. The school's scouts paraded down İcadiye Street and a torchlight procession was made at night."<sup>21</sup> A former Greek resident (male, born 1935) thought that the celebration of Republic Day was important for Kuzguncuk residents. "The celebration tack was constructed in front of the Greek Church and Kuzguncuk residents garnished their houses. Muslim Turks did not know how to celebrate the Republican Day and mostly Jews and Greeks danced on these holidays."<sup>22</sup> Interestingly, his narrative places importance on the celebration by Kuzguncuk's historical residents (Jews and Greeks) rather than re-creating the discourse of harmony and tolerance.

The Kuzguncuk Jewish Foundation hosted a fast-breaking meal for twenty-four years, and during the field research, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) who works at the foundation told the story of hosting a fast-breaking meal during Ramadan. "We (the members of the Jewish foundation) host a fast-breaking meal in the village. The Üsküdar police commissioner, müfti, district governor, and Kuzguncuk dwellers came to the synagogue."<sup>23</sup> An Armenian man who works in the Kuzguncuk Armenian Community (born 1954) also narrated the Jewish Foundation's Ramadan invitation: "We join a fast-breaking in Kuzguncuk synagogue every year. Also, I always see high state officials at these invited events."<sup>24</sup> Interestingly, one current Jewish resident (woman, born 1945) mentioned her husband's fast-breaking events in

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20 Personal interview. 29.Sept.2016.

21 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

22 Personal interview. 31.Sept.2016.

23 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

24 Personal interview. 23.Nov.2016.

front of their house: “My Albanian husband hosted a fast-breaking for children, youth, and elderly Kuzguncuk residents.”<sup>25</sup> It seems that all of the narratives about fast-breaking present the tolerance culture of the village. Specifically, the Kuzguncuk Jewish Foundation continues to host its Ramadan event to sustain Kuzguncuk’s historically multiethnic character.

In addition to celebrations of national and religious holidays and the joining in on funerals, some Kuzguncuk residents believed that people from different religions intermarried in the village, which is another marker of the multiethnic character of Kuzguncuk. According to an Armenian man (born 1954), Kuzguncuk dwellers from different religions have gotten married to each other for years.; however, he believed that recently it is a more usual practice.<sup>26</sup> A former Muslim resident (male, born 1934) assumed that mostly Jews and Muslim Turks intermarried in Kuzguncuk using the following arguments: “Families wanted to prevent marriages between people with different religious background, however, if they loved each other; they got married. Jews and Muslims were more likely to get married to each other.”<sup>27</sup> A current Muslim dweller (male, born 1955) claimed that non-Muslim and Muslim Kuzguncuk residents married, and he is very sad when they migrate out of the Turkish Republic.<sup>28</sup> On the other hand, a current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) did not think that marriage between people from different religion was a common phenomenon in Kuzguncuk. “The first time a Greek married with a Muslim was in 1986. However, Greeks and Armenians commonly got married because they are from the same religion. I cannot remember any marriages between Jews and Greeks.”<sup>29</sup> The first two narratives conveyed that marriage was a symbol of Kuzguncuk’s unique, multi-ethnic atmosphere. The Greek woman’s statement was more significant than the others because she looked at the marriage phenomenon of a marriage in a more realistic way.

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25 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

26 Personal interview. 23.Nov.2016.

27 Telephone interview. 09.Nov.2016.

28 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

29 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

Jews are the oldest dwellers of the village, and they have a particular narrative about Kuzguncuk. Briefly, they assumed that the Jewish community in the Ottoman Empire had a strong, divine relationship with Kuzguncuk.<sup>30</sup> In their eyes of them, the village is contiguous and the closest territory to Jerusalem.<sup>31</sup> According to İbrahim H. Konyalı who worked on Üsküdar's historical monuments, the following statement was written on Kuzguncuk's fountain constructed in 1831: "Kuzguncuk did not have Muslim population, therefore, there was no mosque or prayer room in the village. The Jews were the only residents of Kuzguncuk."<sup>32</sup> Actually, the Kuzguncuk mosque which this research will mention in the last chapter, was constructed in 1952.

According to Minna Rozen, three Jewish families were living in the village in the sixteenth century, and the oldest headstone in the large Jewish Kuzguncuk graveyard dates back to 1562.<sup>33</sup> For this reason, it is claimed that the Jewish population is the earliest community in the neighborhood.

Journalist Muhtar Alus also wrote that Kuzguncuk was a highly populated Jewish village in Istanbul like others such as Balat, Hasköy, and Ortaköy.<sup>34</sup> Interestingly, an interview with a current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) in Kuzguncuk's Aya Pandeleimon Greek Orthodox Church represented that Kuzguncuk is a typical Greek village. This statement showed some Greeks do not accept that the neighborhood was predominantly Jewish.<sup>35</sup> Furthermore, the statement of the Greek woman suggested that there is competition among the various religious communities with respect to claiming to be the historical residents of the village.

Armenian historian Eremya Çelebi Kömürçiyân's work explained Kuzguncuk as a village of Jews in the eighteenth century. Kömürçiyân also

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30 P.Ç.İnciciyan, *XVIII. Asırda İstanbul* (İstanbul: İstanbul Matbaası, 1956), 107.

31 Personal interview with a Jewish man. 02.Nov.2016

32 İbrahim Hakkı Konyalı, *Abideleri ve Kitaberiyle Üsküdar Tarihi. Vol. 2.* (İstanbul: Türkiye Yeşilay Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1977)

33 Minna Rozen, *İstanbul Yahudi Cemaatinin Tarihi Oluşum Yılları (1453-1566)* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010), 396.

34 TT-50:339, Kişisel Belgelerde İstanbul Belleği, Taha Toros Arşivi.

35 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

writes that Greeks lived in the village and had one church, one holy spring, and two large orchards.<sup>36</sup>

Armenians started to live in Kuzguncuk in the 18th century.<sup>37</sup> According to statistics from 1840, 3,600 Jews lived in Kuzguncuk; however, the Jewish population radically decreased in the village in the second half of the nineteenth century.<sup>38</sup> Unfortunately, sources do not mention the reasons for the degradation of the Jewish community. According to Vital Cuinet's "La Turquie D'Asie", 3,600 Jews, 2,709 Armenians, 1,085 Greeks, and 230 Muslim Turks lived in Kuzguncuk, and the total population of the village was 7,624 in the late 19th century.<sup>39</sup> Cem Behar's study also used Cuinet's statistics that the total population of Kuzguncuk was 7,624 in 1894.<sup>40</sup>

The yearbook of *Şirket-i Hayriye* published in 1914 showed that 400 Jews, 250 Greeks, 1,600 Armenians, and 70 Muslims families populated the village.<sup>41</sup> The Hrant Dink Foundation's 2012 Declaration which tries to demonstrate the confiscated properties of various Armenian Foundations, showed that the Armenian population was higher than that of other communities in the early twentieth century.<sup>42</sup> According to the 1933 census, the population of Kuzguncuk had increased to 4,000 residents, 90 percent which was non-Muslims,<sup>43</sup> and Jews were the major community in the village.<sup>44</sup>

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- 36 Eremya Çelebi Kömürçüyan, *İstanbul Tarihi: XVII. Asırda İstanbul* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık ve Kitapçılık, 1988), 277.
- 37 Cengiz Bektaş, *Kuzguncuk* (İstanbul: Literatür, 2011), 19.
- 38 Naim A. Güleriyüz, *Fetih Öncesi ve Feth-i Hakani Sonrası İstanbul'da Musevi İbadethaneleri* (İstanbul: Osmanlı İstanbullu Uluslararası Sempozyumu, 2014), 449.
- 39 Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie: Géographie Administrative, Statistique descriptive et raisonnée de Chaque Province de l'Asie-Mineure*. (Istanbul: Les Ed. Isis, 2001), 48.
- 40 Cem Behar, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ve Türkiye'nin Nüfusu: 1500-1927* (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1996), 72.
- 41 Ibid., p.449.
- 42 Mehmet Polatel, Nora Mildanoğlu, Özgür Leman Eren, and Mehmet Atılğan. *2012 Beyanname-i İstanbul Ermeni Vakıflarının El Konan Mülkleri* (İstanbul: Hrant Dink Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 346.
- 43 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin ve Ünlülerin Buluştuğu Semt: Kuzguncuk*, 23.
- 44 Bektaş, *Kuzguncuk*, 24.

Especially during the 1960s, people from Black Sea region such as from, Kastamonu, Rize, and Sinop<sup>45</sup> started to migrate to Kuzguncuk and the Muslim population in the village quickly increased.<sup>46</sup> According to Tümertekin, population growth was 395 percent between 1960 and 1965.<sup>47</sup> Furthermore, according to 2013 statistics, 28% of Kuzguncuk's total population originate from the following cities: Kastamonu (9%), Rize (9%), Sivas (6%), Giresun (2%), and Trabzon (2%).<sup>48</sup>

The Muslim migration to Kuzguncuk began in the early 1960s, and the non-Muslim population began moving from Kuzguncuk to Israel, Greece, the United States, Armenia, and Australia in the latter years of the 1960s because of the nationalist policies of the Turkish state, including, for instance, the deportation of Greeks in 1964. On the other hand, a Greek woman (born 1946) assumed that Greek migrations first occurred among Istanbul's different neighborhoods and afterwards to Greece: "The Greek residents of the village migrated from Kuzguncuk to Moda or Cihangir, and after they migrated to Greece out of fear."<sup>49</sup>

Nowadays, Kuzguncuk's population is approximately 5,000,<sup>50</sup> and non-Muslim communities hold a marginal place in the village. Unfortunately, there is no reliable data about the exact non-Muslim population of the village; however, 2004 statistics from Nedret Ebcim's study mentioned 5,940 people living in Kuzguncuk, the Christian population of which was 1 percent and the Jewish population of which was 0.5 percent.<sup>51</sup>

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45 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin ve Ünlülerin Buluştuğu Semt: Kuzguncuk*, 23,24.

46 Personal interview. 29. Apr. 2016.

47 Erol Tümertekin, *İstanbul, İnsan ve Mekan* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014), 241,242.

48 Cemalettin Şahin, "Üsküdar Nüfusun Coğrafi Kökeni Üzerine Bir Araştırma" in *Üsküdar Sempozyumu VIII*, 21-23 Kasım 2014: Bildiriler, (İstanbul: Üsküdar Belediyesi, 2015), 436.

49 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

50 Kuzguncuk Mahallesi, Üsküdar Belediyesi, [www.uskudar.bel.tr/tr/main/mahalleler/kuzguncuk-mahallesi/22](http://www.uskudar.bel.tr/tr/main/mahalleler/kuzguncuk-mahallesi/22).

51 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin ve Ünlülerin Buluştuğu Semt: Kuzguncuk*, 23.

According to Erdem Güven, former and recent Kuzguncuk residents protect Kuzguncuk's multi-ethnic characteristic<sup>52</sup> And yet, Kuzguncuk's population statistics above prove that its diversity did not survive after nationalization practices such as the Capital Tax (1942), the 6-7 September events, the deportation of Greek community (1964) and the Cyprus war (1974).

In the eyes of government officials and nationalist Turkish citizens, these homogenization practices were significant for the establishment and survival of the Turkish nation-state. Especially, the negative relationship between Greece and Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s directly decreased the Greek population in Turkey including that of Kuzguncuk. For instance, before 1955, there were about 1,000-1,500 Greeks living in the village; however, there is now just one Greek woman (born 1946) left in Kuzguncuk who experienced the 1955 events.<sup>53</sup> It clearly seems that the cosmopolitanism of Kuzguncuk gradually diminished through state sponsored violence. We can thus argue that stressing Kuzguncuk's cosmopolitanism whether in written or unwritten works is nostalgia for old days.

In a nutshell, a glance at Kuzguncuk's population before 1955 explains how Republican population engineering practices affected the village throughout Turkish Republican history because currently there are only seven to ten non-Muslim Turkish citizens left in the village. Specifically, not only the influence of 6-7 September Incidents but also the forced Greek Deportation and the 1974 Cyprus War were felt by non-Muslim residents of the village. Official population statistics also prove that a Muslim population started to migrate to Kuzguncuk in the 1950s. During the field research, current and former Kuzguncuk (mostly non-Muslim) residents are likely to mention the high non-Muslim population which does not exist today. On the contrary, the narrative of a current Muslim resident (male, born 1941) places importance on the Muslim character of the village, which read as a counter memory during the field research. Only he does not accept that there was a high non-Muslim population in Kuzguncuk throughout history.

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52 Güven, *Mekan, Kimlik, Yahudilik: Kuzguncuk Yahudi Cemaati Üzerine Bir Çalışma*, 199.

53 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

Through remembering Kuzguncuk's former non-Muslim community, its present-day residents construct the Kuzguncuk identity of harmony, tolerance, and multi-ethnicity. In other words, Kuzguncuk Muslim and non-Muslim dwellers maintain Kuzguncuk's former character in their minds and try to establish a Kuzguncuk identity accordingly. The field research explores that Kuzguncuk identity is constructed by current Kuzguncuk residents via national holiday celebrations, funerals and events in Kuzguncuk's orchard. Also, most Kuzguncuk residents are members of the Association of Kuzguncuk and come together every month to discuss issues about the village. It is obvious that the meetings of the Association of Kuzguncuk is part of the construction of Kuzguncuk identity.

The following section of the chapter is going to present how Kuzguncuk residents who experienced the Pogrom remembered the begin time of the 6-7 September incidents because the field research figured out that witnesses remembered different beginning hours for the Pogrom.

### § 3.2 The Beginning of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk

This part focuses on Kuzguncuk dwellers' narratives about the beginning of the 6-7 September Incidents.

Only a small number of dwellers today are willing to talk about the 6-7 September events. According to Mills, Kuzguncuk's dwellers either do not want to remember the Pogrom or they ignored it.<sup>54</sup>

The village's residents and population statistics prove that only a small Muslim community lived in Kuzguncuk before the Pogrom and the number of non-Muslims was high. For this reason, the Pogrom obviously damaged the village.

Witnesses remembered different times for the emergence of the Pogrom in the village. Contrary to popular belief, the Pogrom was not initiated at the same moment in every non-Muslim district.<sup>55</sup> A current Greek resident

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54 Ibid., 190.

55 Speros Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, 103,104.

(woman, born 1946) assumes that events started approximately at midnight in Kuzguncuk and says. “After I had fallen asleep, I suddenly woke up because of a loud booming noise which came from outside of our home.”<sup>56</sup> Furthermore, another former Christian Kuzguncuk resident (born 1938) declares that the events began at 1:45 am. “That night we went to the Üsküdar with my father to watch a film and came back to Kuzguncuk sometime after midnight. On the road, we saw some military vehicles in the center of Üsküdar and also observed some fires on the European side. My father and I supposed that enemies had started to occupy İstanbul. When we came home, we watched the fires from our balcony. My uncle had a popular sweet shop on the corner of İcadiye Street which was closed. Nobody knows what happened that night. After that, we went to the uncle’s shop and the clock on the wall had stopped at 1.45 am. because of the attacks.”<sup>57</sup> According to him, the most interesting part he and his father supposed that the Pogrom was supposed as the occupation of Istanbul by his father and him. He believes that the occupation of Istanbul was a collective trauma for Turkish citizens. Furthermore, this similarity presents that the violence was seen by witnesses on the Asian side.

On the other hand, other interviews present that the events started before that night. For instance, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1935) said: “On this day, I stayed at my home which is located in the Valley of Kuzguncuk and I saw a crew enter the village in the dark.”<sup>58</sup> Moreover, Jewish resident who is still living in the slopes of Kuzguncuk (woman, born 1945) gave a specific hour for the start of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk. “The events began at around 6.30 p.m.”<sup>59</sup> According to Speros Vryonis, the incidents of 6-7 September began after midnight,<sup>60</sup> and the document from Republican Archive mentions that the events began in the district of Üsküdar at 12.30 a.m.<sup>61</sup>

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56 Personal interview. 09 Nov.2016.

57 Personal interview. 29. Oct.2016

58 Personal interview. 05. Nov.2016.

59 Personal interview. 07. Mar.2016.

60 Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, 103.

61 BCA 010.09.107.334.1.188.

It seems that the interval of the 6-7 September Incidents was remembered differently by different residents which exists either that the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk started in the evening and continued past midnight or else that some residents misremember the begin time of the incidents. It is clear that the Pogrom happened in Kuzguncuk as it did in other non-Muslim neighborhoods. The Pogrom's effect continued long hours on the 6 September, and for this reason, witnesses place importance on different hours such as towards evening or midnight. The next part is going to discuss in detail the violence of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk and will also present common Pogrom narratives.

### § 3.3 Violence in Kuzguncuk during the Pogrom

The Pogrom emerged at different locations in Kuzguncuk, and most non-Muslim residents of the village were affected by the looting that night. Some Kuzguncuk dwellers who observed the Pogrom would not say the details of the violence because, this research argues the Pogrom was traumatic for them. In addition, current Muslim and non-Muslim Kuzguncuk residents fear other Kuzguncuk residents who do not a knowledge the violence of the Pogrom. The houses and shops of non-Muslims were damaged in the village like in other districts of Istanbul with high non-Muslim populations. This part presents the details of the violence during the Pogrom and discusses major Pogrom narratives in Kuzguncuk. Also the part will demystify common narratives of the Pogrom in the village.

Looters damaged non-Muslim houses and shops during the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk. A current Jewish resident (woman, born 1945) who was 10 years old in 1955 remembered that: "They came across the village and they vandalized. My mother was in a quandary. She took us to the second floor of our house. Suddenly, blood flew from my mother's mouth because she was terrified. Our neighbors were shouting: 'Fly a Turkish flag.' My mom displayed the flag and the looters did not attack our house. However, a Jewish family living in the next house did not fly a flag. Terrible things happened at that house."<sup>62</sup> She could not continue telling what happened in the neighboring house

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62 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

(which is currently derelict); however, it was significant to represent the violence emerged in Kuzguncuk. Moreover, the witness focuses on a Turkish flag as a mechanism of protection during the Pogrom. On the contrary, a current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) who lived on the slopes of Kuzguncuk mentioned that a Turkish flag did not protect her house, indicating that looters sometimes knew that non-Muslims lived in a house even if they put out a flag. “We put a Turkish flag but one looter told us to lower the flag. The three group of looters threw stones and broke the windows and everything. However, they did not enter the house. The church was not damaged.”<sup>63</sup> A former Greek resident (male, born 1944) who moved away from Kuzguncuk in 1977 when the Greek School was closed said: “One or two houses were set alight and they also set fire to the Greek Church, but it immediately died out. Also, some looters tried to enter the house of a Protestant family located behind the Greek School, but the family resisted. After that, looters used hatchet and log to get in the house. The family kept the log after the incident; however, they replaced the wooden door with a tin door because they did not want anyone to see the damage. The school director of a secondary school in Fıstıkağacı, H., hid us in his home.”<sup>64</sup> Interestingly, this narrative presents that the family remembered to the Pogrom’s violence with keeping a log. On the other hand, the family tried to erase the violence from Kuzguncuk’s memory by replacing the door. According to the statistics, almost 200 houses of Greek families were damaged by looters.<sup>65</sup> Unfortunately, there is no exact data to calculate the damage to those of Armenians and Jews families; however, the field research proved that the properties of these non-Muslim families also were damaged by the looters in the village.

A former Muslim resident (male, born 1934) claimed that the looters circumcised the Greek priest and also went up to the roof of the church.<sup>66</sup> However, the field research could not reach another narrative about the circumcision of a Greek priest. The violence of circumcision was only mentioned by

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63 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016

64 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

65 Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, 234.

66 Telephone interview. 09.Nov.2016.

the one Muslim man; however, it was a serious assertion. On the contrary, a former Muslim dweller (woman, born 1947) living behind the Greek church saw a different landscape of violence from her window. She told: “I clearly remember the events. The looters came from outside in pickups and directly attacked the church. They had lots of sticks. The priest and his family were protected in the coal cellar of a relatives’ home for almost one month. When the looters entered the church, they could not find the priest, but they killed his sheep. Also, looters tried to remove church bell and my father screamed for the police. However, the policeman did not stop them, and in fact, he showed them other non-Muslim’s houses.”<sup>67</sup>

This narrative gives clues about how security forces indirectly or directly joined the Pogrom. During one group interview in the stationery shop, a current Muslim resident (male, elderly) assumed that the priest was protected in their house by his father who was a police officer.<sup>68</sup> A former Christian resident (male, born 1938) watched the events from his house and he said that “a group of looters passed through our street with sticks. One of them broke our window with a stone, but we learned of it only after a while. We stayed on our terrace and suddenly saw smoke above the Greek church. After that, a fire engine came to the village. We heard a noisy clamor because the looters had burned the Greek church and the priest’s house. The firemen put out the fire.”<sup>69</sup> A well-known newspaper of the time, *Akşam*, also reported that the Greek church in Kuzguncuk had burned.<sup>70</sup> In addition, Vryonis’ study mentioned that the Greek church was damaged during the Pogrom<sup>71</sup> and was also desecrated and looted.<sup>72</sup>

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67 Personal interview. 29.Apr.2016.

68 Group interview. 08.Dec.2016.

69 Personal interview. 29.Oct. 2016.

70 *Akşam* [İstanbul] 07 Sept. 1955: 2. Print.

71 Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, 433.

72 *Ibid.*, 510.

In addition to damage to houses and religious places, shops were vandalized by the looters. According to the field research several witnesses mentioned the damaged shop located at the head of İcadiye Street. Unfortunately, the building in which the shop was located were confiscated by the Istanbul Municipality to construct the coast road.<sup>73</sup> The shop was quite popular in Kuzguncuk because it sold fresh milk products and most importantly, the shop had a pay phone - which was red. A former Jewish dweller (male, born 1935) remembered that the shop was damaged by looters. “We were living very close to the shop. We heard the sound of windows breaking. Also, the refrigerators were damaged.”<sup>74</sup> A former Christian resident (male, born 1938) whose uncle was the owner of the shop said. “My father went to the shop early in the morning of 7 September, but suddenly he came back home. The looters harshly damaged my uncle’s shop. The clock, telephone, refrigerators, windows, and kitchen tools were broken. We could not find the doors of the refrigerators. My uncle was very sad because everybody knows him in Kuzguncuk. After the events, my uncle did not re-open the shop until 1958. In that year, he opened the shop with a partner in the above Kuzguncuk; however, it closed in 1960.”<sup>75</sup> On the contrary, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) who listened to the stories of elderly witnesses claimed that only one window was broken by the plunderers during the Pogrom.<sup>76</sup> A former Muslim bystander (male, born 1950) said that “everything in the shop was thrown out.” He continued, “The butcher’s windows were broken. Some Armenian brothers had a candy store at the Kuzguncuk ferry port which was also damaged. The shop of K, the Armenian barber, in İcadiye Street, as well. A. and another Armenian had a grocery, and plunderers did not vandalize it.”<sup>77</sup> Furthermore,

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73 Personal interview. 10.Mar.2016.

74 Personal interview. 05.Nov.2016.

75 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

76 Personal interview. 02. Nov.2016.

77 Personal interview. 10.Mar.2016.

Vryonis's study demonstrated that businesses in Kuzguncuk were damaged during the 6 September incidents.<sup>78</sup>

As shown before, the İstanbul Chamber of Commerce established an aid committee that gave economic support to victims of the Pogrom. According to the report which itemized damages to the properties of Greek citizens in İstanbul during the Pogrom, 1,070 Greek citizens suffered from the violence and the total cost of the damage was almost 27 million Turkish lire.<sup>79</sup> The report also presented that there were six Greek citizens in Kuzguncuk that were damaged. Greek citizen P.K lived in the downside of Kuzguncuk (on Tahtalı Bostan Street) and had a grocery in İcadiye Street. Both the house and grocery were attacked during the Pogrom and the pecuniary injury was calculated as 7,700 Turkish lire.<sup>80</sup> The house of a Greek citizen, G.V., house in Yapraklı Çınar Street was damaged and the total pecuniary loss was 1,705 Turkish lire.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, K.K.'s house located in Meydan Street was also damaged by looters. The committee calculated the damage to this house was 1,000 Turkish lire for his house. According to the report, the other three Greek citizen's house in the village were not damaged during the Pogrom, but their workplaces suffered financial losses.<sup>82</sup> Some Kuzguncuk dwellers remembered the support of the aid committee after the Pogrom. A current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) whose house was damaged said: "Every non-Muslim citizen applied for support from the aid committee after the 6-7 September Incidents. The committee almost covered the losses a bit at a time."<sup>83</sup> Furthermore, a former Christian (male, born 1938) claimed that the compensation did not cover the losses: "The government came and checked the losses (in my uncle's register) but we did not apply to the committee. The economic assistance could not

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78 Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of İstanbul*, 583,584.

79 BCA.010.09.109.338.1.19.

80 BCA.010.09.109.338.1.70.

81 BCA.010.09.109.338.1.63.

82 BCA.010.09.109.338.1.94., BCA. 010.09.109.338.1.27., BCA. 010.09.109.338.1.32.

83 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

cover our losses.”<sup>84</sup> These two narratives presented that the aid committee operated in Kuzguncuk after the Pogrom; however, it could not totally cover the economic losses of the victims.

The field research in Kuzguncuk mostly shows that residents in the village believed that looters on 6th September 1955 came from outside the district. Vryonis’s study mentioned the narrative of a Kuzguncuk resident who observed the Pogrom in the village and said: “Meanwhile, a boat from Istanbul full of demonstrators arrived at Kuzguncuk towards midnight. The village’s muhtar (headman) and an officer threatened to shoot the ship’s captain if he dared to land. Finally, the ship (Üsküdar 74) left and unloaded at Çengelköy where the demonstrators were reinforced by cadets from the military school of Kuleli and did great damage.”<sup>85</sup> During the field research, only one former Jewish witness (male, born 1951) remembered the story of Üsküdar 74.<sup>86</sup> It seems clear that the narrative of Üsküdar 74 includes two themes: on one hand, that the village was protected by Kuzguncuk’s headman, and an officer, on the other, that the looters came from outside of Kuzguncuk.

Most of Kuzguncuk dwellers assumed that the Muslim population of the village did not attack non-Muslim houses and shops during the Pogrom, however, some witnesses believed that there was one looter from Kuzguncuk, F., who helped the external actors. F. died in 2006 and several residents highlighted him as a layabout. It is obvious that F. is only guilty in the eyes of some residents. The reality is different than the residents’ recollections, because according to archives<sup>87</sup> and field research, more than ten Muslim residents in Kuzguncuk joined the Pogrom or helped the looters. A former Christian resident (male, born 1938) remembered some residents who joined the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk: “T. joined the Pogrom and I knew him from Kuzguncuk. Also, I knew F., and our window was broken by R. who was not an enemy of my

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84 Personal interview. 20.Oct.2016.

85 Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, 180.

86 Group interview. 05.Nov.2016.

87 BCA.010.09.108.3372.48.

family because we were friends in daily life.”<sup>88</sup> It is significant that Muslim friends of some non-Muslim Kuzguncuk residents also participated in attacks on their houses. Moreover, a current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) presented the following argument to show the involvement of local actors in the Pogrom: “The violence did not take place only with the involvement of outside actors. Some youngsters from the village also committed violent acts that night.”<sup>89</sup> This narrative differs from than the assumption of a current Jewish dweller (woman, born 1945) who believed that Kuzguncuk’s youth would not have resorted to those kinds of violence because, she thought, Muslims and non-Muslims in Kuzguncuk had a positive relationship in daily life before 1955.<sup>90</sup>

Another current Muslim dweller (male, born 1955) claimed that Muslim youth took money from Jews in the back streets of Kuzguncuk during the Pogrom. He said: “Some young men in the village wanted to take money from the Jewish people in Kuzguncuk. Of course, they were afraid and gave them the money.”<sup>91</sup> The interview with this Muslim resident was fruitful because he challenged mainstream narratives about Kuzguncuk. Moreover, he always said: “I am very happy to tell about the realities of Kuzguncuk. You have to write everything.” A former Greek resident (male, born 1944) who came sad while telling me about the Pogrom conveyed that there were two ringleaders from the village who led the attackers: “One ringleader’s name was F. and another was a woman, but I do not remember her name. Her son was a cobbler in Üsküdar. They were from Kuzguncuk.”<sup>92</sup> A former Muslim resident (woman, born 1947) emphasized certain looters in Kuzguncuk, one of whom was the son of a well-known restaurant’s owner in the village: “I remember looters from Kuzguncuk: for instance, the son of Y.F. and others. They used to join the celebrations, festivals, and entertainment in Kuzguncuk, but they started the violence in the village. In fact, some Muslim neighbors pointed out

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88 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

89 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

90 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

91 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

92 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

some of their non-Muslim neighbors to the group of attackers as targets to be attacked and looted.”<sup>93</sup> The narrative of former Kuzguncuk resident Salvador Dalva presented that there was an elderly woman who disliked her next-door neighbors were Greek; therefore, she pointed out the house to the looters. On the contrary, she protected some non-Muslims houses in the street. Dalva claimed that the conservative Muslim Turk turned a blind eye to the attacks to the Greek woman’s house because an elderly woman thought that a Greek woman fornicated in this house.<sup>94</sup> This case shows that some Muslim Turks behaved differently during the Pogrom toward their non-Muslim neighbors because of personel conficts among them.

The police report prepared after the Pogrom figured out that some ring-leaders were from the district of Üsküdar.<sup>95</sup> The field and desk research uncovered that there were four people out of fifteen who joined the Pogrom from Kuzguncuk. One former Muslim dwellers (male, born 1934) whose name is on the report did not accept the accusation, and F. joined the events with the following self-defense during the telephone interview: “I had Greek and Jewish friends in Kuzguncuk. I was an active member of Kıbrıs Türktür Cemiyeti (*Association of Turkish Cyprus*) which was blamed by the government after the events. Every member of the association was arrested; therefore, I was arrested and stayed in jail for almost one month in Selimiye, as well. Lots of looters came from Üsküdar and we tried to protect our village. I knew F. from Kuzguncuk, but he was not part of the Pogrom. Looters forced him to be a guide and made him point out the non-Muslim houses, and he did it.” Interestingly, he also expressed that after the events his family moved from Kuzguncuk to another part of Istanbul and he started to work as social police which was like a security intelligence for six years.<sup>96</sup>

Briefly, at least ten Kuzguncuk Muslim residents participated in the Pogrom with different roles. As mentioned above, four looters from Kuzguncuk

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93 Personal interview. 29. Apr.2016.

94 Salvador Dalva, “Kuzguncuk’ta Zaman Tüneli” in Bali, Rifat N. ed. *Türkiye'deki Yahudi Toplumlarından Geriye Kalanlar* (İstanbul: Libra Kitapçılık ve Yayıncılık. 2016) 189,190.

95 BCA.010.09.108.337.2.48.

96 Telephone interview. 09.Nov.2016.

were arrested by the government after the events. The field research also presented that there were other Kuzguncuk dwellers who joined the Pogrom; however, they were not arrested by the government. The most significant case is that, according to the narratives, some looters from Kuzguncuk had non-Muslim friends but joined the Pogrom and attacked their neighbors' houses. It seems clear that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims soured after the events. Specifically, non-Muslim residents started to be afraid of the Muslims who were arrested. For instance, a perpetrator from Kuzguncuk (male, born 1934) who did pleaded innocent said that "after the events and my imprisonment, non-Muslims in Kuzguncuk stayed away from me."<sup>97</sup> As mentioned below, he moved from Kuzguncuk shortly after the incidents.

As a result, the non-Muslim Kuzguncuk dwellers responded to the attacks by securing their doors, putting Turkish flags on their houses, and hiding in Muslim Turks' houses. Religious places, houses, and shops were the targets of the nationalists' vandalism. Moreover, the violence was not an isolated event in one location; the damage was spread around several points in the village. Some interviews did not mention damaged houses and shops during the field research which was the general trend among Kuzguncuk dwellers. Silence with respect to the violence against non-Muslims and their belongings is a strategy to construct and protect the myth of village's harmony, tolerance, and its peaceful relations among different ethnic and religious groups. Silences of some interviews present that silence is not only common phenomenon for state official or perpetrators after violent events but also it is the position of victims to protect themselves against the others. For this reason, current residents who lived through the Pogrom are more likely to stay silent. On the contrary, the recollection of violence disturbs the narrative of multiethnicity and coexistence in Kuzguncuk. Obviously, some residents who moved away from Kuzguncuk shared more exhaustive and critical narratives vis-à-vis the Pogrom - upon which this part elaborates below - because they no longer lived in Kuzguncuk.

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97 Ibid., 2016.

### § 3.4 A Comparison of Memories of Protection, Altruism and Violence in Kuzguncuk

The individual and group interviews in Kuzguncuk revealed that some common discourses emerged in the village regarding the Pogrom. Actually, some discourses were canonized by witnesses throughout several locations in İstanbul, and Kuzguncuk dwellers re-created them during the interviews. This part of the chapter covers the common discourses that came up during the field research in Kuzguncuk.

The comparison of violence in Kuzguncuk and in other sites of violence as well as the discourse of emerging isolated events are significant findings of the field research. In other words, the interviewees mostly talked about the Pogrom's violence in comparison to the violence on the European side of İstanbul, specifically in Pera. Furthermore, Kuzguncuk residents indirectly mentioned that the violence in Kuzguncuk was negligible when compared with the violence on the European side of İstanbul. For instance, one well-known Armenian man (born 1954) in the village said, "The events damaged Üsküdar but not like on the European side. Only discrete violence emerged in the village."<sup>98</sup> Interestingly, this man consistently mentions the Pogrom in Üsküdar rather than in Kuzguncuk during the interview because he did not live in the village at the time; he currently works in Armenian Community of Kuzguncuk. Unfortunately, current Kuzguncuk Muslim residents did not know him, which presented a poor relationship between Muslims and the Armenian Community of Kuzguncuk. Another current Jewish resident (woman, born 1945) assumed: "They vandalized Kuzguncuk; however, the real damage occurred in Aksaray and Beyoğlu."<sup>99</sup> Moreover, a former Jewish dweller (male, born 1935) answered the question about the effects of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk with the following assumption: "Mostly, İstiklal Avenue was destroyed by the looters."<sup>100</sup> The current Muslim member (male, born 1955) of Kuzguncuklular Association (*Kuzguncuklular Derneği*) listened to what happened during the

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98 Personal interview. 23. Nov.2016.

99 Personal interview. 02. Nov.2016.

100 Personal interview. 05. Nov.2016.

Pogrom from other, older dwellers in the village and said: “Some isolated events took place in Kuzguncuk, but the events actually started in Taksim.”<sup>101</sup>

These canonized narratives present that non-Muslim and Muslim Kuzguncuk dwellers usually put importance on the violence on the European side İstanbul, specifically in Beyoğlu and Pera, because most sources mention the violence in this location rather than in other places in İstanbul. In addition to this, many photographs were taken by journalists during the Pogrom in Pera, and for this reason, this place became the symbol of the Pogrom in the eyes of non-Muslim and Muslim Turkish citizens. However, this creates a problematic assumption which includes the comparing violence between different locations and Pera.

Another fundamental discourse was that looters came from outside the village to attack non-Muslim houses and shops. A small number of residents mentioned one or two dwellers of Kuzguncuk who joined the Pogrom along with the looters. A former Muslim resident (male, born 1934) claimed that approximately 1,500 people came from Üsküdar to attack the non-Muslims.<sup>102</sup> A current Jewish resident (woman, born 1945) said that “They came from the downside of Kuzguncuk. We do not know where they came from, but they come from outside. The youth of Kuzguncuk did not do this violence; also Turkish youths do not.”<sup>103</sup> It is obvious that a Jewish woman born in the village could not believe that Kuzguncuk youth joined the Pogrom given that, during two interviews with her, she often mentioned the peaceful relations between Muslim and non-Muslim dwellers of the village. In addition to this, a current Muslim resident (male, born 1950) expressed that “looters who came from outside Kuzguncuk attacked some shops. We lived peacefully in the village.”<sup>104</sup> A former Christian dweller (male, born 1938) whose house and uncle’s shop were damaged during the events believed that only two or three Kuzguncuk residents joined the Pogrom looters mostly came from outside of the village.<sup>105</sup>

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101 Personal interview. 08. Dec.2016.

102 Telephone interview. 09 Nov.2016.

103 Personal interview. 02. Nov.2016.

104 Personal interview. 10.Mar.2016.

105 Personal interview. 29. Oct.2016.

Interestingly, he observed Kuzguncuk residents attacking non-Muslim properties - indeed his own house - during the Pogrom, but he placed more importance on outside looters more than domestic ones. Moreover, a Muslim male who came to Kuzguncuk in 1941 said that “The different groups of plunderers came from outside.”<sup>106</sup> A current Muslim resident (male, born 1943) of Kuzguncuk witnessed people who came to Kuzguncuk by truck first attack the patisserie<sup>107</sup> on the corner of İcadiye Street. However, he argued that some Kuzguncuk dwellers guided them.<sup>108</sup> It seems clear that most of the dwellers focused on outsiders rather than local actors during the Pogrom. Even if witnesses saw local looters, like a former Christian resident did, they also highlighted outside actors.

Looters from outside is also a common narrative in the Pogrom literature. According to a story from Prinkipo (*Büyükkada*) looters threw rocks at a Muslim house because, the narrator believed, they came from elsewhere and targeted wrong house.<sup>109</sup> Furthermore, one bystander in Büyükdere observed looters coming from Çayırbaşı by boats.<sup>110</sup> The memoir of Greek male from Halki (*Heybeliada*) figured out that the actors of violence were not Turks from Halki.<sup>111</sup>

The protection of non-Muslim dwellers by their Muslim neighbors is another common discourse in the village. Mills’ study mentioned that the narrative of Muslim dwellers protecting the Jewish community during the Pogrom emerged in the village.<sup>112</sup> In addition, the work of Nedret Ebcim, which included interviews with residents of Kuzguncuk presented the protection of

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106 Personal interview. 08. Dec.2016.

107 The field research determined that this place was a pudding shop.

108 Personal interview. 07.Mar.2016.

109 Rıfat Bali, *6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları:Tanıklar-Hatıralar* (İstanbul: Libra Kitap, 2014), 249,250.

110 Ibid., 151.

111 Ibid., 101.

112 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul'da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 280.

non-Muslims the night of the Pogrom.<sup>113</sup> Furthermore, a video<sup>114</sup> prepared by Kuzguncuk dwellers to protest Güngör Dilmen's play "Kuzguncuk Türküsü", which suggested that the Pogrom created huge damage in the village assumed that a retired soldier in Kuzguncuk (Erdoğan Denizkurdu) protected the village's non-Muslims from outside looters.

According to Rifat N. Bali's work which combines stories of the 6-7 September events from different sources clearly shows that the protection of non-Muslims by Muslims during the Pogrom occurred in a variety of locations in İstanbul. For example, Muslim residents of Samatya,<sup>115</sup> Tarabya,<sup>116</sup> and Balat<sup>117</sup> protected non-Muslim neighbors from violence. In addition, some protection narratives are similar to those of Kuzguncuk, showing that Kuzguncuk was not exceptional during the Pogrom. For instance, the narrative of one eyewitness from Kuzguncuk mentioned by Vryonis in his study is similar to the story of Osman Belge, a police officer on one of the Princes Islands stopped the looters who came by boats from Istanbul with his gun.<sup>118</sup> According to the narrative of another example from Bakırköy, located on the European side of Istanbul, youth and elderly neighborhood dwellers protected the streets from the looters.<sup>119</sup>

The field research also found similar narratives. For example, a current Muslim dweller (woman, born 1941) told that "The younger generation from Kuzguncuk reassured non-Muslims during the Pogrom."<sup>120</sup> A former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) repeated the same narrative, saying: "Kuzguncuk's people did not give permission to create trouble in the village. For instance,

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- 113 Nedret Ebcim, *Kuzguncuklular, Kuzguncuk'u Anlatıyor* (İstanbul: İleri Yayınları, 2011), 20,64,65.
- 114 Kuzguncuk Türküsü Oyun Fotoğrafları 1955: Ezilen, Dövülen, Aşağılanan Kuzguncukluların Hali | <https://www.facebook.com/KuzguncukFace/videos/107816202566635/>
- 115 Bali, *6-7 Eylül 1955 Olayları: Tanıklar-Hatıralar*,158,159,160.
- 116 Ibid., 194,195.
- 117 Ibid., 258.
- 118 Ibid. 44,45.
- 119 Ibid., 71.
- 120 Personal interview. 08 Dec.2016.

Hilmi, who was a retired soldier went out with his gun and stopped the looters.”<sup>121</sup> Furthermore, a current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) mentioned that “the priest and his family were protected in a Muslim dweller’s house, and some Muslim residents did not permit looters to attack the village because of solidarity in the village.”<sup>122</sup> It appears that Muslim and non-Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk uphold the myth of protection during the Pogrom in interviews, and it has a strong relationship to the discourses of outside looters and distinctive events.

The outside actors, the comparison between the violence in Kuzguncuk and on the European side of Istanbul, and lastly, the protection of non-Muslim residents are usually underscored by the residents during the field research. It seems clear that these narratives are helpful for protecting Kuzguncuk’s multiethnic character in the eyes of the residents. This part of the chapter compared narratives from different locations in İstanbul and Kuzguncuk during the Pogrom. The similarities between Kuzguncuk and other places in İstanbul represents that Kuzguncuk is not special in terms of a tolerance culture and peaceful relations. Inarguably, Pera had more damaged during the Pogrom because it was a significant economic center of Istanbul. As this research discussed before, some witnesses in Kuzguncuk compared the violence on the European side with that in the village. In addition, the main common narratives of eyewitnesses from Kuzguncuk and other districts of Istanbul were quite clear. For these reasons, the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk resembled that in other districts of Istanbul; however, the tendency to forget and attribute of idiosyncrasy to the case of Kuzguncuk was common among witnesses there. The following part is going to explain the transformation of Kuzguncuk after the Pogrom.

### § 3.5 The Consequences of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk

The Pogrom caused discontent among non-Muslims minorities towards the Turkish Republic. Before the Pogrom, Turkish non-Muslim citizens suffered

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121 Personal interview. 02. Nov.2016.

122 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

from several Turkification and homogenization practices. The Pogrom affected the non-Muslim population of Kuzguncuk like those of other districts of İstanbul. This last part of the chapter will present the effects of the Pogrom in İstanbul's village of Kuzguncuk.

According to one of the interviews Amy Mills conducted in Kuzguncuk, two Greek dwellers of the village assumed that 6-7 September Incidents were a moment of transformation for the village.<sup>123</sup> Moreover, Mills mentioned another interview with a Greek woman who assumed that non-Muslims of Kuzguncuk were forced to emigrate in 1944, 1955, and 1964.<sup>124</sup> Erdem Güven's study on the Jewish community of Kuzguncuk also presented the perturbation that emerged after the Pogrom according to Jews of the village.<sup>125</sup> The field work of this research found similar consequences of the Pogrom.

A former Jewish resident (male, born 1935) thought that the breakdown of the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim dwellers of the village arose after the Pogrom. He said: "The breakdown of the relationship was felt mostly after the Pogrom; however, it was felt more apparent after 1963." Interestingly, he mentioned that daily life continued after 1955 in the following statement: "In fact, we continued our daily life after 1955."<sup>126</sup> The interview of a current Muslim resident (male, born 1955) also presented a similar argument: "These people, Muslim and non-Muslim residents of Kuzguncuk, continued to live together after 1955."<sup>127</sup> During one interview with a former Greek dweller (male, born 1944) who moved away from Kuzguncuk in 1977, his brother (born 1948) interrupted the conversation and he recalled being teased in Kuzguncuk after the Pogrom when he went to elementary school. He said, "When I went to the first or second grade, I heard the word unbeliever (*gavur*) often during my 15-minute walk."<sup>128</sup> According to a former Muslim resident (male, born 1934) who was arrested after the Pogrom, non-Muslims citizens

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123 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul'da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 194.

124 Ibid., 163.

125 Güven, *Mekan, Kimlik, Yahudilik: Kuzguncuk Yahudi Cemaati Üzerine Bir Çalışma*, 239.

126 Personal interview. 05.Nov.2016.

127 Personal interview. 08. Dec.2016.

128 Personal interview. 31.Oct. 2016.

of the village started to wince when they saw him after he returned to the village from jail. After that, he and his family moved to other place near to Kuzguncuk.<sup>129</sup>

The migration phenomenon was debatable for Kuzguncuk residents. Some dwellers believed that migration started to emerge after the Pogrom; however, some residents assumed that the forced Greek Deportation in 1964 most negatively affected the decreasing Greek population. A current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) claimed, “Most Greeks of the village started to migrate after 1955. Before 1955, the number of Greeks of the village was almost 1000-1500.” Moreover, she concluded that the emigrations continued until 1974. Put in other words, not all of the Greek population moved away from Kuzguncuk after the Pogrom: they left the village over the course of twenty years.<sup>130</sup> A former Greek dweller (male, born 1944) presented an approximate number of emigrants: “Our [Greek] population was 700 people in 1960.” On the contrary, he did not believe most of the Greeks started to move after the Pogrom: “Most Greeks did not emigrate after 1955. When Greek citizens of Kuzguncuk left in 1964, [that’s when] the village emigrated.”<sup>131</sup> On the other hand, a former and current Muslim resident (woman, born 1949) who lived in the village between 1956-1960 and was educated in Kuzguncuk believed that the major migration of non-Muslims occurred after 1974 and non-Muslims left the village because of the Pogrom.<sup>132</sup> Another current Muslim resident (woman, born 1934) who came to Kuzguncuk in 1961 said: “When I moved to the village in 1961, I saw isolated non-Muslims continuing to live in Kuzguncuk. I remember two Armenian doctors. They migrated after a while.”<sup>133</sup> An Armenian man who works for the Armenian Community of Kuzguncuk (1954) believed that the Pogrom caused trouble for Armenian dwellers of the village. He said “After the 6-7 September Incidents and the Cyprus military operation (1974), Armenians in particular migrated out of Turkey. Before these events, Armenians

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129 Telephone interview. 09.Nov.2016.

130 Personal interview. 09.Nov. 2016.

131 Personal interview. 31.Oct. 2016.

132 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

133 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

who lived on the hill of Kuzguncuk came to this church and prayed. Afterwards, they went to the ferry boat.”<sup>134</sup> During the group interview in front of the pharmacy on İcadiye Street, a current Muslim resident (male, elderly) who had converted from Christianity to Islam said: “Most of the non-Muslims migrated after 1960.”<sup>135</sup> It seems clear that the Pogrom posed a problem for the non-Muslim and Muslim residents of the village in terms of their peaceful relationship. However, non-Muslim migration did not radically emerge just after the Pogrom; it happened step by step throughout history. Generally speaking, according to Samim Akgönül, this kind of migration phenomenon is common among Greeks in Turkey. In other words, Greeks in Turkey did not specifically migrate right after the Pogrom.

As discussed above, approximately 30% of Kuzguncuk’s total population consists of citizens originating from Kastamonu, Sivas, Rize, and Trabzon. The field research presents that dwellers of Kuzguncuk remembered different periods of migration toward Kuzguncuk. A current Jewish dweller (woman, born 1945) observed most Muslims started to migrate to Kuzguncuk six years after the Pogrom: “Most of the Muslims came to Kuzguncuk after 1961 from different cities. For instance, Jews lived in mansions and Muslims came to the village. They [the Muslims] bought these mansions as well.”<sup>136</sup> A current Greek resident’s (woman, born 1946) narrative mentioned a similar period of Muslim migration. According to her, Muslims came to the village in 1960 and 1965. On the contrary, a former Greek resident (male, born 1944) claimed that migration from the Black Sea region started before the 1960s, saying: “The Laz people moved to the village in the 1950s.”<sup>137</sup> A former Jewish resident (male, born 1935) recalled that one well-known family in the village migrated from Rize in the 1940s; however, he was the only Kuzguncuk dweller who mentioned migration to the village before the Pogrom. Another former Jewish dweller (male, born 1951) assumed that new Muslims from several villages

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134 Personal interview. 23. Nov. 2016.

135 Group interview. 08. Dec. 2016.

136 Personal interview. 02. Nov. 2016.

137 Personal interview. 31. Oct. 2016.

came to Kuzguncuk in the late 1960s, and he recalled that the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims started to break down at that time. For instance, teasing increased.<sup>138</sup> It appears that the migration toward Kuzguncuk started to increase after the 6-7 September Events; however, it did not happen suddenly like the non-Muslim migration away from Kuzguncuk.

This final component of the chapter demonstrated the results of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk. The peaceful relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim communities of the village broke down after the 6-7 September Incidents. On the other hand, the migration from a variety of cities toward Kuzguncuk did not happen immediately after the Pogrom; it was a process that up until 1974. During one group interview, a current Muslim dweller (male, elderly) claimed that a small number of non-Muslim groups continued to live there in 1974. For this reason, he mentioned that the main non-Muslim migration occurred in 1974.<sup>139</sup> Furthermore, interviews represented that the Muslim population started to increase mostly after the Pogrom and specifically in the 1960s. The next chapter is going to discuss the appropriation of non-Muslim citizens' properties in Kuzguncuk and economic transformation throughout history.

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138 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

139 Group interview. 08.Dec.2016.



## Economic Transformation and Appropriation of Minorities' Properties in Kuzguncuk

**T**urkification and homogenization policies of the Turkish Republic included not only physical violence but also confiscation practices and the elimination of the economic power of non-Muslim Turkish citizens. The establishment of the national economy was a significant aim of the Turkish Republic which sought to create a Muslim Turk bourgeoisie and decrease the economic capital of minorities in Turkey.<sup>1</sup> The well-known example of the Turkification of the economy was the Capital Tax (1942) which focused on high taxation policy for non-Muslims rather than Muslims.<sup>2</sup> In addition to this, the Emval-i Metruke laws after the Armenian Genocide directly focused on the confiscation of Armenian properties, and Greeks suffered from these laws, as well.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious that the 6-7 September Incidents was another practice of confiscation because it included plunder and robbery.<sup>4</sup>

The decision to embark on Armenian Genocide was a preview of the foundation of a homogenous and unitary Turkish state. As Çetinoğlu mentioned,

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1 Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası*, 121.

2 Ibid., 102.

3 Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt, *Kanunların Ruhu: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzini Sürmek* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), 17.

4 Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955, and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul*, 103,104.

the deportation of Armenians and forced migration of Greeks targeted the erasure of these two communities in Anatolia. Not only government officials but also military and local elites started to confiscate the properties of Greeks and Armenians in many villages. Interestingly, Çetinoğlu also said that the historical root of the term *gavur malı* [the colloquial term for the property of a non-Muslim] came from these confiscation practices. The term is still used in Turkey by most people, and the interviews present that this term legitimized a confiscation practice in Kuzguncuk.<sup>5</sup>

According to Akçam and Kurt's study, confiscation practices were implemented vis-à-vis Greeks and Armenians by the Committee of Union and Progress government between 1913-1918 via various laws and the most general of which was the *Emval-i Metruke* (abandoned properties) act. The influence of these laws continued after the foundation of Turkish Republic.<sup>6</sup> As Ümit Üngör and Polatel assumed, there was a continuity throughout the era from 1915 to 1950 in terms of the situation of Armenian properties because the Republican People Party continued to implement the CUP's policies.<sup>7</sup> In fact, Akçam and Kurt claimed that the plunder of Armenian properties caused several problems for the Turkish Republic.<sup>8</sup>

The confiscation policies were implemented differently for Greeks and Armenians.<sup>9</sup> For instance, the government thought that radical liquidation was not implemented for Greek properties because they could return to their villages after the forced migrations to Greece and Central Anatolia.<sup>10</sup> The Arme-

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5 Sait Çetinoğlu, "Önsöz ya da Türk Kapitalistlerinin Kökeni ve Gelişimi" in *Emvâl-i metrûke Olayı: Osmanlı'da ve Cumhuriyet'te Ermeni ve Rum mallarının Türkleştirilmesi*, ed. Onaran, Nevzat (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2010), 9,10.

6 Akçam and Kurt, *Kanunların Ruhü: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzini Sürmek*, 17.

7 Uğur Ümit Üngör and Mehmet Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011), 170.

8 Akçam and Kurt *Kanunların Ruhü: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzini Sürmek*, 243.

9 *Ibid.*, 17.

10 *Ibid.*, 18.

nian Genocide (1915) included confiscation practices, and the government implemented confiscation policies only for Armenians who were deported.<sup>11</sup> In the eyes of the Ottoman Empire and the early Republican government, Armenians had the right to their properties. For this reason, Akçam and Kurt mentioned that governments protected the properties of Armenians in official discourse; however, there were no rules to regulate when and how they could retake their properties.<sup>12</sup> According to statistics, 41.458 real estate properties were confiscated from Armenians in various provinces of Turkey such as Edirne (3.133), Adana (699), Ankara (2540), Sivas (3000), Diyerbakır (1055), İzmit (3589), and Kayseri (3000).<sup>13</sup>

The Turkish government focused on precluding non-Muslims from demanding their properties. After the Lausanne Peace Treaty which entered into force on 6 August 1924, some Armenians and Greeks returned to Turkey to reclaim their real estate because the treaty conferred their property rights. However, they were not allowed to enter the Turkish Republic because the state refused them security clearance.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, the early Republican government prevented the travel of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews within Turkey's territory.<sup>15</sup>

The government introduced Law No. 1331 to distribute titles to the new owners of Armenians and Greek lands in 1928. In addition, the law allowed the transfer of the incomes of Emval-i Metruke to the Turkish public purse. For this reason, the government decided to give the economic value of properties to former owners but did not return their real estate properties.<sup>16</sup> According to Akçam and Kurt, Emval-i Metruke were registered to the public purse; therefore, they did not distribute as a private property. On the other

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11 Ibid., 19

12 Ibid., 24,25.

13 Üngör and Polatel, *Confiscation and Destruction: The Young Turk Seizure of Armenian Property*, 72,73.

14 Akçam and Kurt, *Kanunların Ruhunu: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzini Sürmek*, 185.

15 Ibid., 212.

16 Ibid., 227.

hand, during Turkish Republican history, these real estate properties were plundered.<sup>17</sup>

Emval-i Metruke laws were canceled one by one over the course of Republican history;<sup>18</sup> however, a variety of lands and real estate properties were confiscated by states and local elites. The government classified 1915 land registers; in fact, the Turkish National Security Council (NCS) forbid the use of online land registers by researchers in 2006 to preserve of national security.<sup>19</sup> It seems clear that the Turkish Republic still tries to prevent discussions on the confiscations in the CUP era. In fact, the most significant institution correlating Turkish national security and the research of 1915 land titles is the NSC.

Confiscation practices started after the Armenian Genocide and continued after the foundation of Turkish Republic. Abandoned property laws had a huge impact on the non-Muslim populations of Turkey, specifically Greeks and Armenians. During the early Republican period, the government introduced multiple laws to prevent the return of properties to their real, non-Muslim owners. In fact, the government registered them to individuals. It is not clear how the abandoned property laws affected Kuzguncuk; however, the next part presents how - mostly Armenian - properties were illegally confiscated by the government and by individuals.

This chapter is going to focus on the economic aspects of Turkification and how it affected Kuzguncuk's economy. In other words, the chapter will elaborate on the economic transformation of the village and the increasing non visibility of non-Muslims in the economic sphere. On the other hand, the declining number of non-Muslim dwellers attests to confiscation practices in daily life such as the construction of a balcony over a non-Muslim's land. During the interview, a recent Muslim resident (woman, born 1949) said "I have not heard about confiscations in the village"<sup>20</sup> in order to protect the image of the village's culture of tolerance. However, not only this study but also those of Mills, Güven, and Gülsoy put importance on the different confiscation practices in the village.

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17 Ibid., 230.

18 Ibid., 243.

19 Ibid., 249.

20 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

The first part of the chapter briefly presents the spaces of Kuzguncuk. After that, the chapter is going to discuss the victims of the Capital Tax in the village. Finally, the chapter will focus on the appropriation of non-Muslim properties in Kuzguncuk.

#### § 4.1 Spaces of Kuzguncuk

The multi-ethnic, religious profile of the village's history - whether peaceful or not - is reflected in Kuzguncuk's architecture, religious places, and their schools.

The synagogues of the Jewish community (Bet Yaakov and Bet Nisim) were constructed in the nineteenth century.<sup>21</sup> The former synagogue is located along the main street of Kuzguncuk and it bigger than Bet Nisim, which is located on sloped of the village. According to Aron Rodrigue, the village had two Alliance Schools (for girls and boys) in which mostly those in the Jewish community took their educations.<sup>22</sup> One interviewee, a member of the Kuzguncuk Synagogue Foundation, mentioned that the Kuzguncuk Alliance School was active in the 1930s; however, he could not remember when it opened or closed.<sup>23</sup>

The Greek Orthodox community had two churches in Kuzguncuk built between 1821 and 1831.<sup>24</sup> The Greek community had also an elementary school in the village until 1964 with forty students and six teachers. Students took their educations in six classrooms.<sup>25</sup> The Armenian church, called Surp Krikor Lusavoriç, was built by Boğos Ağa Şalcıyan in 1861 and is still used today.<sup>26</sup>

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- 21 Kuzguncuk Sinagogu Vakfı | Our Synagogues, [kuzguncuksinagoguvakfi.org/english/Sinagoglarımız.php](http://kuzguncuksinagoguvakfi.org/english/Sinagoglarımız.php).
- 22 Aron Rodrigue, *French Jews, Turkish Jews: The Alliance Israélite Universelle and the Politics of Jewish Schooling in Turkey, 1860-1925* (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1990), 57.
- 23 Interview with Jewish man N.S. (02.11.2016)
- 24 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin ve Ünlülerin Buluştuğu Semt: Kuzguncuk*, 29, 31,32.
- 25 Demir and Akar, *İstanbul'un Son Sürgünleri*, 148.
- 26 Surp Krikor Lusavoriç Ermeni Kilisesi, Kuzguncuk | 3. Bölge. Türkiye Ermenileri Patrikliği, [www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/surp-krikor-lusavoric-ermeni-kilisesi-3-bolge-bo-gazin-anadolu-yakasi/](http://www.turkiyeermenileripatrikligi.org/site/surp-krikor-lusavoric-ermeni-kilisesi-3-bolge-bo-gazin-anadolu-yakasi/).

Furthermore, the Armenian community had one school called Lusavoriçyan which opened in 1853.<sup>27</sup>

The Muslim population had only one mosque (Üryanizade mosque) near the Bosphorus, the distance of which to the main street of the village is approximately 600 meters. It seems clear that because of the small size of the Muslim population, it had no religious building at the center of Kuzguncuk until 1952. The Kuzguncuk mosque was constructed near the Armenian church. Interestingly, Jews and Armenians financially supported the construction of the mosque. In fact, the Kuzguncuk Armenian community provided the land for the mosque. In my point of view, the late construction of the mosque for the Muslim population of Kuzguncuk represents the village's non-Muslim characteristic during the mid twentieth century.



Figure 4.1 The Kuzguncuk mosque (on the left) and the Armenian church (on the right)

27 Polatel, Mildanoğlu, Özgür, and Atılgan, 2012 *Beyannamesi: İstanbul Ermeni Vakıflarının El Konan Müllkleri*, 346.

The main street, İcadiye Street, is a significant area of economic activity in the village. In the early twentieth century, a stream flowed into the Bosphorus and the people crossed to the other side of the street over bridges. However, the stream was made to run underground by the municipality in the late twentieth century.

Nedret Ebcim is a key, local person who has a number of books (i.e. “Kuzguncuklular Kuzguncuk’u Anlatıyor” and “Ahh Canım Kuzguncuk”) about the village. He mentioned that different ethnoreligious groups had specific economic activities in Kuzguncuk. Generally speaking, in the twentieth century Jews made money as fishermen, fishmongers, and greengrocers; Greeks managed cotton gins and coffeehouses; and Armenians worked as haberdashers and jewelers.<sup>28</sup>

Regrettably, Ebcim does not mention the occupations of Muslim Turks in Kuzguncuk because few lived there in during the early twentieth century. Furthermore, according to the statistics of the Kuzguncuk Pier for early nineteenth century, there were fifty eight maritime workers (fortysix Jews and twelve Christians) working in the village pier,<sup>29</sup> suggesting that Muslim Turks did not have civic occupations in Kuzguncuk like the Jewish and Christians communities. Nowadays, there is just one non-Muslim shop in Kuzguncuk. Naturally, the other shops and restaurants are owned by the Muslim community.

Gentrification is the another historical and recent issue for Kuzguncuk and its residents. This part will only touch on significant debates about the issue because gentrification is not a major topic of the thesis.

Cengiz Bektaş is a well-known architect and intellectual in Turkey. When he moved to the village in 1978, Bektaş started to restore historical houses, especially those in Bereketli Street, with respect to their historical context.

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28 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin ve Ünlülerin Buluştuğu Semt: Kuzguncuk*, 23.

29 Mehmet Mazak, “1802 Tarihli Üsküdar İskeleleri ve Üsküdar Kayıkçılarının Demografik Yapısı” in *Üsküdar Sempozyumu II*, 12-13 Mart 2004: Bildiriler (İstanbul: Üsküdar Belediyesi, 2005), 68.

Furthermore, Bektaş tried to reclaim some historical houses as libraries for children.<sup>30 31</sup>

Several firms tried to destroy the well-known garden in Kuzguncuk, İlya'nın Bostanı (the garden of İlya), to construct a hospital or school; however, most residents of the village protected the garden via raising public awareness and organizing activities. According to Amy Mills, some along the non-Muslim population of Kuzguncuk did not actively participate in the protection of the orchard<sup>32</sup> because the garden had been occupied by the government in 1977 and was legally the property of one a non-Muslim of the village.<sup>33</sup> One interview with a member of the Kuzguncuklular Association confirmed Mills argument, and he said that because minorities felt insecure, they did not join the protest.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, during a group interview in Beth Yaakov Synagogue, most Jews believe that while newcomers used orchard as a community garden<sup>35</sup>, they thought it was the property of another person. It seems clear that non-Muslim population does not accept its use as a community garden by people who have no right to the land.<sup>36</sup>

In the early twentieth century and especially during the 1950s, Muslims started to migrate the village, from especially Black Sea cities. Together with state's various religious homogenization policies, Kuzguncuk started to turn into a Muslim majority town.

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30 Bir Semt Bir Yazar. Cumhuriyet Gazetesi. 16.01.1994.TT-50İ331

31 However, some people from the village, for instance, old neighborhood dwellers, do not take kindly to his restorations because they believe that the nostalgic atmosphere was destroyed by Bektaş. In addition to this, these people argue that Bektaş and his friends created a *team of intellectual*. They came from other districts to Kuzguncuk and started to embrace the village like old dwellers but in the eyes of the older people, they are exactly newcomers.

32 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul'da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 157.

33 Ibid., 147.

34 Interview with a member of Association of Kuzguncuklular. 08.Dec.2016

35 Recently, the garden is divided into a hundred parcels, and after the draw able to plant on these parcels.

36 Group interview in Beth Yaakov Synagogue. 05.Oct..2016

## § 4.2 The Victims of the Capital Tax

This short part of the chapter will present the effects of the Capital Tax in the village. The research figured out that not only Jews but also other non-Muslim minorities in Kuzguncuk were affected by this policy.

Sait Gürsoy mentioned in his study that Kuzguncuk was a poor village, and that for this reason, the tax did not affect it.<sup>37</sup> On the contrary, the field research discovered a different socio-economic finding in Kuzguncuk. For instance, a current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) said, “A mostly middle-class population lived in Kuzguncuk who were artisans. But, a small number of the residents were richer than the others.”<sup>38</sup> It seems clear that not all residents of the village were lower class throughout history, mostly middle-class residents who were artisans lived in the village.

A former Jewish resident who was seven years old when the Capital Tax was implemented talked about the Tax during the field say: “We suddenly vacated to our house and gave our household properties to some neighbors because the government could come and take our properties.”<sup>39</sup> Furthermore, a former Christian dweller (male, born 1938) remembered the implementation of the Capital Tax in the village because the government excised his uncle’s shop. “The government took everything from my uncle’s grocery which was located at the pier of Kuzguncuk. However, my other uncle’s dairy was not affected by the tax.”<sup>40</sup> His second uncle’s shop, though not affected by the tax, was not damaged by leaders thirteen years later during the Pogrom night. A current Muslim resident (male, born 1941) who had several non-Muslim friends in the village assumed that most of the minorities got tired of the Capital Tax and other taxes.<sup>41</sup> A former Greek dweller (male, born 1944) believed that after the Erzincan earthquake in 1939 and the implementation of Capital

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37 Sait Gülsoy, *Gündelik Yaşamda Yahudi Kimliği İnşası: İstanbul, Kuzguncuk'ta Niteliksel Bir Araştırma (2011-2012)* (İstanbul: Unpublished Master of Arts Thesis, 2012), 126.

38 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

39 Personal interview. 05.Oct.2016.

40 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

41 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

Tax, houses started to change hands. For this reason, he did not believe clear-cut confiscation practices emerged in the village,<sup>42</sup> which the chapter will discuss in the second part.

According to the impressment list gathered from newspapers during the Capital Tax period (*Tasviri Efkar, Yeni Asır, Türk Sözü, Tan*)<sup>43</sup>, eight non-Muslim Kuzguncuk residents suffered from garnishment because they could not pay the tax. The list presents that the government sequestered five houses in the village located in various streets. Moreover, three of the garnishments concerned only household properties and the last sequestration was of the workplace of the same Kuzguncuk dweller who had a casino on İcadiye Street. In total, the government sequestered 6,924 Turkish Liras from the five houses not including the goods of the three households and the one workplace. Unfortunately, the list does not elaborate on how these residents paid these garnishments and also the field research did not determine the outcomes of these impoundments.

Erdem Güven's study showed how one well-known restaurant in Kuzguncuk changed hands after the implementation of the Capital Tax. Güven assumed that the Capital Tax negatively affected non-Muslim dwellers of the village, and one restaurant near the Bosphorus transferred from a non-Muslim to a Muslim because the non-Muslim owner was compelled to sell.<sup>44</sup> During the field research, one former Muslim resident (woman, born 1947) also recalled this transfer and told a similar story: "The owner of the restaurant was Kiryako. After the Capital Tax, he sold the restaurant to its current owners."<sup>45</sup> Interestingly, the history of the restaurant does not mention Kiryako as a former owner. According to its information, the restaurant was the tavern of Todori Papaispiro and did not refer to the Capital Tax.

It seems clear that the policy of Turkifying the Turkish economy damaged the economic capital of minority dwellers of the village. Specifically, houses and workplaces were targeted by the government when the owners could not

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42 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

43 Ali Sait Çetinoğlu, *Varlık Vergisi 1942-1944: Ekonomik ve Kültürel Jenosid*. (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2009), 406-484.

44 Güven, *Mekan, Kimlik, Yahudilik: Kuzguncuk Yahudi Cemaati Üstüne bir Çalışma*, 209.

45 Personal interview. 29.Apr.2016.

pay the tax. As mentioned above, two witnesses who were children during the tax period remembered how the tax affected their families. Moreover, one elderly Muslim male assumed that the Capital Tax was an important factor in the departure of non-Muslims from the village. The next part of the chapter is going to discuss confiscation practices in Kuzguncuk.

### § 4.3 Confiscation of the Non-Muslims' Properties in Kuzguncuk

The interview with Tan Morgül, a member of the Kuzguncuklular Association, presented that transformation of properties in the village happened less violent than in other cases in Turkey because non-Muslims sold their properties when they left the village.<sup>46</sup> It is obvious that confiscation practices were sometimes actualized by citizens and that the state did not prevent them. For instance, the field research presents that some Muslim dwellers confiscated property in Kuzguncuk independent of the government. Therefore, this part will examine both confiscation practices in the village which were fundamental aspects of the Turkification and homogenization of Kuzguncuk.

As mentioned in the first part of this chapter, Kuzguncuk is divine territory for the Jewish community of Turkey, and several sources present Kuzguncuk as a historically Jewish village. The Jewish community has an extensive cemetery in the village, and a former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) explained the significance of cemetery: "The committee came to Kuzguncuk fifteen years ago and found a very old headstone (629 years old) in the Jewish cemetery. Also, most of the Jews in Turkey wished to be buried in this graveyard." After that, he claimed that the Jewish cemetery was confiscated in the 1960s and 1970s: "Part of the cemetery was occupied some 30-40 years ago. When you come from the traffic lights on the hill of the village, several buildings were constructed above the cemetery."<sup>47</sup>

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46 Hale Akay and Tan Morgül, "Kuzguncuklular Derneği Deneyimi" in *Savunuculuk ve Politikaları Etkileme Konferans Yazıları 2* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları Eğitim ve Araştırma Birimi, 2004), 3.

47 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.



Figure 4.2 Shantyhouses (in the foreground) and the Jewish cemetery (in the background)<sup>48</sup>

A current Muslim dweller (male, born 1954) also narrated the same confiscation practice in the village. He said that “Migrants from one of the Central Anatolian cities came to the village. They built shanty houses on the Jewish territory, and afterwards they were granted deeds for these houses.”<sup>49</sup> Interestingly, the field-research figured out that recent non-Muslim and Muslim dwellers of the village openly criticized the construction of buildings above the Jewish cemetery, a finding that Gülsoy’s study also mentioned.<sup>50</sup> On the contrary, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1958) who was interested in the topic claimed that the Kuzguncuk Jewish community had not effectively protected their rights with respect to this issue. “People pour in the area where the Jewish cemetery is located because it is very close to the Bosphorus Bridge. But nobody warned them that they should not construct houses in that place.

48 Ferhat Zupcevic photo archive.

49 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

50 Gülsoy, *Gündelik Yaşamda Yahudi Kimliği İnşası: İstanbul, Kuzguncuk'ta Niteliksel Bir Araştırma* (2011-2012), 48.

Unfortunately, the state and the Jewish community in not protect the rights.” Moreover, he told a terrifying narrative related to the cemetery: “We have a tradition of visiting our relatives in the Jewish cemetery between two feasts. One day, my father-in-law did not want to come with us on the visit and did not explain his unwillingness. Afterward, he told that his mother had been buried in the cemetery, and one day, someone from the Kuzguncuk Jewish community called him. He said that a house had been constructed above my mother’s grave and they collected graves and carried them a hollow. Immediately afterwards, my father-in-law met with staff from the community and they went into the house. Really, he saw that houses we constructed on the cemetery. By the way, the Jewish community did not use the police or judicial system. After that, they entered the house. Some fixtures in the bathroom and the countertops were made from tombstones.”<sup>51</sup>

It seems that the occupation of the Jewish cemetery is the most important confiscation practice in Kuzguncuk. Specifically, Muslims who migrated from Central Anatolian cities started to occupy the Jewish cemetery during the 1960s and 1970s. They used gravestones as steps, garden walls, countertops and masonry in their houses. Recently, most of the shanty houses on the land of Jewish cemetery became apartments. The field research figures out the state did not take action to prevent this occupation practice in the village. As discussed below, most of the current and former Kuzguncuk residents do not have positive opinion of this issue because the obvious confiscation practice creates a problem for Kuzguncuk’s multi-ethnic discourse.

Other confiscation practices happened in Kuzguncuk as well. The field research demonstrated several incidents of confiscation occurred in the village, and some were witnessed by other dwellers. For instance, a current Muslim dweller (woman, born 1959) witnessed the following case of appropriation in Kuzguncuk: “When I woke up in the morning, I saw my neighbor across from me had annexed the neighboring land to the house and built a veranda. However, the land owner was one of non-Muslims in Kuzguncuk. I asked to them:

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51 Personal interview. 14.Dec.2016.

‘Why did you construct a veranda on another person’s land?’ and they answered: ‘It was the property of a *gavur*.’<sup>52</sup> According to the field research, some derelict houses and empty lots along İcadiye, İnci Çayırılı, Yakup, Yenigün, Yapraklı Çınar and Kancabaş Streets were confiscated by Kuzguncuk dwellers and they used as car parks, gardens and verandas.



Figure 4.3 Occupied non-Muslim house in Kuzguncuk (on the right)

Furthermore, state confiscation policies were implemented in the village. For example, a former Greek witness (male, born 1944) figured out that the government confiscated the garden of Leonida: “There was a garden near the bakery on İcadiye Street. In 1975, the government disposed of the garden because the owner was a Christian with Albanian citizenship. Afterwards, the garden disappeared.”<sup>53</sup> A former Christian dweller (male, born 1938) also told of another confiscation practice implemented by the state. According to him, there

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52 Telephone interview. 05.Oct.2016.

53 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

was a Jewish school at the upper end of İcadiye Street; however, it is currently used by the Turkish military as a recruiting office.<sup>54</sup> Moreover, one Muslim man remembered that after the construction of the bridge, the military occupied some vacant lots in the top of Kuzguncuk and, he said: “There were some fields in the top of Kuzguncuk. When we were children, we flew kites there. The military poured fill to protect the Bosphorus bridge.”<sup>55</sup>

According to some narratives, the Pogrom generated rich Muslim families in Kuzguncuk. A current Muslim resident (male, born 1950) who migrated to the village with his family in 1956 claimed that some Muslim residents of the village became rich after the 6-7 September Incidents when confiscation practices emerged in Kuzguncuk.<sup>56</sup> Another interview with a current Jewish dweller (woman, born 1945) also supported this argument. She said: “Two or three families increased their wealth in Kuzguncuk after the 6-7 September Events.”<sup>57</sup> These narratives uncover that after the Pogrom, some Muslim residents of the village acquired non-Muslims’ economic capital and properties. Moreover, the local actors who joined the Pogrom clearly came to light.

The confiscation practices affected all non-Muslim communities in the village. For example, the Kuzguncuk Surp Krikor Lusavoriç Armenian Church Foundation had fourteen immovable properties; however, ownership problems affected almost ten premises which were included in the 1936 declaration. According to 2012 data, ownership problems for eight properties continue in the village. The six of eight properties had changed hands from the foundation to private ownership. The most interesting case is Kuzguncuk Armenian Cemetery, of which the foundation lost ownership and had transferred to an individual. Currently, the cemetery is located on the same parcel with the social center of Yapı Kredi.<sup>58</sup> An Armenian man (born 1954) assumed that the Armenian cemetery was destroyed and today Yapı Kredi’s social center is located

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54 Personal interview. 29. Oct.2016.

55 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

56 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

57 Personal interview. 07.Mar.2016.

58 Polatel, Mıldanoğlu, Özgür, and Atılğan, 2012 *Beyannamesi: İstanbul Ermeni Vakıflarının El Konan Mülkleri*, 346.

in the same area.<sup>59</sup> A 1922 map of Constantinople also proves that the Armenian cemetery was located on the parcel of today's Yapı Kredi's social center.<sup>60</sup>



Figure 4.4 Kuzguncuk in a 1922 map of Constantinople. (For a more detailed map, see Appendix A.)

Furthermore, land near the Armenian Church is used as a parking lot and because the narrow streets of the village lack parking, most Kuzguncuk dwellers park their cars there. During the field research, only one Armenian man, after relating the situation of the Armenian cemetery, told the story of this land: “In fact, the car parking lot in back was the property of the Armenian Foundation. However, the foundation transferred ownership to an individual because the government had the power to confiscate the foundation’s properties. After that, the municipality tried to determine the owner of the property but it could not. Therefore, the municipality seized the land and leased it out

59 Telephone interview. 31.Mar.2017.

60 “Istanbul Urban Database.” Istanbul Urban Database, [www.istanbulurbandatabase.com](http://www.istanbulurbandatabase.com).

to the car park.”<sup>61</sup> Actually, confiscation practices were implemented for several properties of the Kuzguncuk Armenian Foundation in a various locations of İstanbul, such as a plot of land in Üsküdar, a shop in Fatih, and an office in Laleli. However, during the interview, he only mentioned the car park and the land of the Kuzguncuk mosque.<sup>62</sup>

As mentioned in the first chapter, the large garden known as İlya'nın Bostanı on the right side of İcadiye Street is popular among dwellers of the village. The field research presents that the Kuzguncuklular Association organizes various activities such as movie screenings in the garden.<sup>63</sup> Recently, the garden has been divided into parcels by the mukhtar of Kuzguncuk, and village dwellers use this area as a community garden. Most of Kuzguncuk's residents joined the protest - except older non-Muslims dwellers and people living in shanties - against the construction buildings on the site of the garden.<sup>64</sup> The history of this garden is significant to present the confiscation practices of the Turkish government because, as Mills mentioned, the garden was appropriated by the state in 1977.<sup>65</sup> Hale Akay's interview with a member of the Kuzguncuklular Association clearly shows the confiscation practice for the garden. The interviewee claimed that the garden belonged to a foundation; however, during the period of Mehmet V in the Ottoman Empire, the garden was given to two families - Dodo and Soro families -. Until 1951, the cadaster did not register the garden and after that year, the Soro family was indicated to own one of six shares of the garden. The other shares were given to other Christian families from Kuzguncuk. In 1966, the General Directorate for Foundations confiscated the other five parts of the garden given to Christian families, and the part belonging to the Soro family was confiscated in 1977. However, İlya who was the son of Soro, did not know that the government had confiscated his land.<sup>66</sup> The garden, which was almost 700 years old, was directly confiscated

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61 Personal interview. 23.Nov.2016.

62 This research is going to elaborate the second case in the further chapter.

63 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

64 Amy Mills, “İlya'nın Bostanını Korumak: Kuzguncuk'ta Bir Mahalle 'Landscape'i Özlemini Gerçekleştirmek” (2006): 4.

65 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul'da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 20,147.

66 Akay and Morgül “Kuzguncuklular Derneği Deneyimi,” 5,6.

by the government; however, Kuzguncuk dwellers did not struggle to return the land to its Greek owner. Rather, they protested for ecological reasons. For this reason, as mentioned in the first chapter, old non-Muslim dwellers of the village said that the garden is used by Kuzguncuk dwellers who have no right to the property.

## Nationalization and Islamization of Kuzguncuk's Spaces and Architecture

This chapter will clarify the transformation of Kuzguncuk's spaces and architecture from non-Muslim to Muslim following the Pogrom. Debates about the name of the village, the renaming of streets, the construction of the Kuzguncuk mosque, the increasing dominance of Muslim owners in shops and restaurants, and practices of Muslim violence towards non-Muslims are the major points of discussion in this chapter because they have changed Kuzguncuk's spaces toward more Turkish and Islamic paths.

### § 5.1 The Renaming of Kuzguncuk's Streets

Unfortunately, none of the interviewees during the field research had an opinion about the former names of streets except about the most recent changes. For instance, respondents recalled that Ayhan Street had turned into Perihan Abla Street in the early 1990s. Thus, according to Pervititch's maps, the Turkification of streets' names in Kuzguncuk occurred right after the foundation of the Turkish Republic.

According to Jacques Pervititch's insurance maps prepared in 1930<sup>1</sup> and 1932,<sup>2</sup> some street names of the village changed over time. For instance, Biyiciyan Efendi Street along the left side of the Greek Church is on the map from 1930; however, the Armenian name Biyiciyan was turned into Bican Efendi Street within two years. The 1932 Pervititch map showed the same street with the latter name. According to the Üsküdar Municipality study which elaborates on the history of street names in Üsküdar, the historical root of Bican Efendi Street was a character from Turkish Cinema.<sup>3</sup> The study does not mention the name Biyiciyan Efendi as the former name of the street.

Other Turkification practices via renaming streets in the village included a street parallel to Biyiciyan Efendi Street. The 1930 Pervititch map presented that the name of the street was Konçina which, according to the the Turkish Language Society, is a Greek word. Unfortunately, this research can not assume the exact year of the renaming of this street because 1932 Pervititch map did not cover the area where the Konçina Street was located. Konçina Street was renamed Behlül, a Muslim name. Moreover, at the end of the Konçina Street, there was a small street called Konçina Aralığı. This was also changed by the government, and today the name of this street is Behlül Aralığı.

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- 1 Jacques Pervititch, *Sigorta Haritalarında İstanbul* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı and Axa Oyak, 2000), 268.
  - 2 *Ibid.*, 276.
  - 3 Halil Ekiz, *Üsküdar Sokak İsimleri Tarihçesi* (İstanbul: Üsküdar Belediyesi, 2013), 250.



Figure 5.1 Street sign in Kuzguncuk

The Üsküdar Municipality work only explains how the Jewish male name *Behar* turned into *Güzel Bahar* (*Beautiful Spring*) which one of the street names in Kuzguncuk. The 1930 Pervititch map also presented the name of this street as *Güzel Bahar*, therefore, this renaming occurred before 1930. According to the narrative, the former name of the street was that of a handsome Jewish male who worked as a real estate agent and lived on this street. On the other hand, the municipality's study assumed that *Behar* turned into *Güzel Bahar* in a spontaneously over time,<sup>4</sup> which is a plausible claim.

A local researcher, Nedret Ebcim's study presents another renaming policy in Kuzguncuk. According to him, the street where *Bet Nisim* is located was named *Ben Yakup*. Ebcim argues that *Ben Yakup* an early prophet of the Jewish community. It was renamed *Yakup*.<sup>5</sup> The 1930 Pervititch map indicates the street as *Yakup*, which means that the renaming was occurred before 1930. In

4 Ibid., 256.

5 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin Buluştuğu Semt Kuzguncuk*, 41.

this case, the renaming implementation did not target the whole name; however, it tried to make the symbolic Jewish person insignificant. The state implemented this same kind of policy in another street of Kuzguncuk. According to the Üsküdar Municipality study, one of the street names in the village is Bozacı came from the name of a well-known Armenian owner of a boza company. Misak Boyacıyan, who lived in this street. It appears that because the owner was Armenian, the street name of it is the Armenian name and includes only his occupation (bozacı).<sup>6</sup>

It seems that Turkification policies that included renaming of non-Turkish street names were implemented by the government during the early 1930s. The aim of the policy was to directly homogenized the space from non-Muslim symbols, names, and elements. However, the non-Muslim population was still significant in the 1930s. According to 1933 population statistics, for instance, the non-Muslim population was almost 90 percent of the total.<sup>7</sup> Briefly, before the several Turkification and homogenization practices such as the Capital Tax and Pogrom, the Turkish Republican regime made its national and Turkist mentality felt in Kuzguncuk via the renaming policies.

## § 5.2 The Construction of Kuzguncuk's Mosque

The first chapter showed that three Greek and Armenian churches and two synagogues were located in Kuzguncuk until the 19th century because of the high non-Muslim population of the village. Moreover, the Greek and Jewish communities had independent schools which no longer exist today. On the contrary, the small Muslim population had no religious seclusion in the village until the second half of the twentieth century. This part is going to discuss the construction of the Kuzguncuk mosque and asserts that the Mosque was a significant symbol in the claiming of Kuzguncuk and turning its space into a national and Islamic one.

The field research revealed that Kuzguncuk Mosque was constructed in 1952. Before then, the closest mosque (Üryanizade) was almost 600 meters

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6 Ekiz, *Üsküdar Sokak İsimleri Tarihçesi*, 253.

7 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin Buluştuğu Semt Kuzguncuk*, 23.

from the head of the İcadiye Street. The distance between the mosque and the center of Kuzguncuk presents that the small Muslim population in the village did not need their own mosque. However, during interviews, one current Muslim resident (male, born 1941) assumed that Üryanizade Mosque was close to Kuzguncuk and that the Muslim community easily went to this Mosque: “You asked why the Kuzguncuk mosque was built in 1952; however, we had a mosque near Kuzguncuk called Üryanizade. We walked to it in two minutes.”<sup>8</sup> It seems clear that a recent Muslim dweller does not believe Kuzguncuk Mosque was constructed following the Muslim migration; he argues instead that Kuzguncuk had always high Muslim population even before the mid twentieth century.

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8 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.



Figure 5.2 Pervititch map of Kuzguncuk, 1932 (For a detailed map, see Appendix B.)

According to the 1930 and 1932 Pervititch maps, the current land of Kuzguncuk Mosque belonged to the Armenian Church.



suggests that the non-Muslim community of the village supported the construction of the Mosque. The field research figures out that most of Kuzguncuk's dwellers, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, told this story as a representation of the tolerance culture and peaceful relations among Muslim and non-Muslim groups in the village. For instance, a former Christian dweller (male, born 1938) said: "Nobody has an interest in other person's religion. You can see the example of the juxtaposition of Mosque and Armenian Church."<sup>11</sup> However, this paper assumes that the juxtaposition of the Mosque and Armenian Church does not represent peaceful relations among different religious groups because, as mentioned above, during the 6-7 September Incidents several Muslims in the village joined the Pogrom or pointed out their non-Muslim neighbors. In addition to this, confiscation practices and economic transformations were obviously implemented by some Muslim dwellers of Kuzguncuk. Therefore, this research claims that some current and former Kuzguncuk dwellers put importance of this juxtaposition to present Kuzguncuk's multi-ethnic characteristic. In other words, the example of the juxtaposition of the Mosque and Armenian Church recreates peaceful relations among different ethnic and religious groups in the village.

Kuzguncuk dwellers usually claim that the construction of the mosque emerged as a collective work of different religious groups' foundations. However, some dwellers directly point out specific person as the constructor of the Mosque. According to a former Muslim resident (male, born 1934) who was on the list of ringleaders of the 6-7 September Incidents. Kuzguncuk mosque was built by his grandfather: "We came from Konya in 1948. Most of my family members worked as soldiers. My grandfather constructed the Kuzguncuk Mosque."<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, another recent Muslim resident (male, born 1941) pointed to a different Kuzguncuk dweller as the constructor of the Mosque.<sup>13</sup>

A former Jewish dweller (male, born 1951) who also mentioned the story of the construction of the Mosque assumed that architect constructed the

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11 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

12 Telephone interview. 09.Nov.2016.

13 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

mosque's dome level with that of the church's, which according to him, symbolized that Islam was not superior.<sup>14</sup> In fact, the field research revealed that the minaret of the mosque is higher than church's steeple. For this reason, there is no architectural equality between the village church and mosque. In addition, the research claims that the construction of the Mosque was strongly related to the establishment of Islamic and national identity in Kuzguncuk given that Muslim residents easily went to the Üryanizade mosque up until 1952. Therefore, the Kuzguncuk Mosque was part of these processes. Moreover, the Kuzguncuk Armenian Foundation's land and economic support were a representation of drawback toward Muslim residents of the village and state policies in Turkey. It seems clear that specific support via donating land to construct the mosque is an example of the confiscation policy discussed in the fourth chapter.

### § 5.3 The Nationalization of Kuzguncuk's Shops and Restaurants

The first part of the fourth chapter presented that the Capital Tax implemented in the village was an example of the nationalization of economic capital. The tax targeted non-Muslim's houses and workplaces; therefore, a transformation of economic capital was seen in the village. During the field research, some interviewees mentioned the transformation processes. This part of the chapter is going to discuss how non-Muslim dominance of Kuzguncuk's economic space decreased in the course of time and how Kuzguncuk dwellers remembered former shops and restaurants.

The field research figured out most elderly Kuzguncuk dwellers particularly remembered old İcadiye Street, which was the center of the economic activities of Kuzguncuk. Currently, most of shops and restaurants are still located on İcadiye Street. A recent Muslim resident (male, born 1955) said: "I have a document that shows the former owners of the shops in this street. They

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14 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

were mostly non-Muslims. However, I am preparing a book about Kuzguncuk, so I cannot share it with you.”<sup>15</sup> A recent Greek dweller (woman, born 1946) told: “the owners of the shops such as butchers and greengrocers were mostly Greeks. One Greek sold a fish called lakerda which was very delicious.”<sup>16</sup> A former Greek resident (male, born 1944) also claimed that Greeks dominated the economic activity of the village. He said: “Most of the shops were Greek in Kuzguncuk. There were three greengrocers and five barbers shops.”<sup>17</sup>

According to the work of local researcher Nedret Ebcim, the new owners of the shops are Muslim Turks.<sup>18</sup> The field research observed the same. Indeed, there is only one Armenian man who works as an electrician; however, he tries to hide his Armenian identity from people who come from outside. Moreover, he feels insecure because, as a recent Muslim resident (woman, born 1949) related, “a photographer came to the village to take my photo. When we walked along the streets, he took my photo in front of the shop whose owner was Armenian. He was inside and saw us. He went out and asked: ‘Could you delete the photo?’ because he in the background.”<sup>19</sup>

The high non-Muslim population of the village decreased in time because of several Turkification and nationalization practices of the Turkish Republic. The spaces of Kuzguncuk were also affected by these policies. As mentioned below, the Capital Tax created a huge trauma for non-Muslim shop owners in the village. The field research could not figure out how non-Muslim shops and restaurants in the village were transferred to Muslim owners. Today, there is only one Armenian electrician continues to work in Kuzguncuk. Unfortunately, the other non-Muslim business owners moved to other places. In conclusion, the spaces of economic activity changed hands from non-Muslims to Muslims, but elderly residents of the village still remember the old İcadiye

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15 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016. He published the book in 2017. He prepared the list which included old owners of the shops and restaurant at the end of the book. However, he did not mention any source and I did not use the list as a source.

16 Personal interview. 09.Nov.2016.

17 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

18 Ebcim, *Üç Dinin ve Ünlülerin Buluştuğu Semt: Kuzguncuk*, 140,141.

19 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

Street as one lined with non-Muslim shops and restaurants. The following section of the chapter is going to focus on the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” (*Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!*) Campaign.

#### § 5.4 The “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” Campaign in Kuzguncuk

The campaign called “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” was developed by the student community of Daru'l-fünun Faculty of Law in January 1928, and it is a significant example of how the Turkish Republic reshaped its citizens to Turkish. The leader of the student community argued that minorities should not speak their own languages in public spaces. After that, a second meeting took place in the Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*), the campaign group, and participants decided to put up posters to promote the speaking of the Turkish language.<sup>20</sup> This part of the chapter will first elaborate on the history of the campaign and secondly discuss how it affected Kuzguncuk’s non-Muslim population and spaces.

According to Rifat N. Bali, the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign was very influential especially in villages that had large non-Muslim populations such as Balat, Hasköy, Pera, and Eminönü. The campaign targeted all minorities who did not speak Turkish in the public sphere; however, Bali mentioned that the Jewish community in Turkey was the specific minority most targeted by the state in this campaign.<sup>21</sup> Işıl Demirel’s study claims that the campaign continued during the Turkish Republic and had no ending date.<sup>22</sup> On the contrary, Bali said that the impact of the campaign decreased when the DP came to power. However, during the 1960s the campaign became popular in Turkey again.<sup>23</sup>

Amy Mills’s study did not explain how pressure with respect to non-Muslims’ languages emerged in Kuzguncuk.<sup>24</sup> The field research of this study figures out that the campaign was openly discussed by residents. However, they

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20 Rifat N. Bali, “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş” *Birgün*, (23 Haziran 2006):2.

21 Ibid., 3.

22 Işıl Demirel, “Dünden Bugüne ‘Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş!’” (21 Şubat 2016)

23 Bali, “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş”, 4.

24 Mills, *Hafızanın Sokakları: İstanbul’da Peyzaj, Hoşgörü ve Ulusal Kimlik*, 101.

do not put importance on this campaign because Muslim Turk residents of the village did not get involved in the campaign. For this reason, the campaign did not cause a negative relationship between Muslim Turks and non-Muslims who spoke non-Turkish languages. The field research presents that some Kuzguncuk residents remembered ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ banners in various locations of the village, but others did not.

A former Muslim dweller (male, born 1950) claimed that there was a banner inside the Kuzguncuk ferry terminal: “I remember a ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ banner inside the ferry port, but, I do not remember the date.”<sup>25</sup> A former Greek resident (male, born 1944) also remembered banners in the village: “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ banners were posted somewhere in Kuzguncuk; however, we continued to speak Greek.”<sup>26</sup> A current Jewish resident (woman, born 1945) claimed that the campaign was reasonable because there was a law that forbade speaking non-Turkish languages: “There were some ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ posters in Kuzguncuk. They were right with a view because of a law that did not allow speaking a different language. We spoke Turkish not because of fear but out of respect.”<sup>27</sup> It seems that the “‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’” campaign was remembered by some residents of Kuzguncuk who were born between 1944-1950. During the interviews, the first two witnesses remembered the banners negatively; however, in the last interview, a Jewish woman highlighted some legality of the campaign which was interesting for this research.

Some Kuzguncuk dwellers claimed that there were no ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ banners in Kuzguncuk. For instance, a former Jewish dweller (male, born 1935) said: “We did not speak Turkish and it was not a problem in the village. Also, there were no posters. When we did not speak Turkish, problems sometimes emerged on boats, for example.”<sup>28</sup> A current Greek resident (woman, born 1946) also assumed that the village had no banners promoting

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25 Personal interview. 10.Mar.2016.

26 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

27 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016

28 Personal interview. 05.Nov.2016.

the speaking of Turkish: “We suffered from the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ Campaign on boats. However, there was no banner in Kuzguncuk.”<sup>29</sup> A former Christian resident (male, born 1938) did not remember “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” banners in Kuzguncuk.<sup>30</sup> It appears that more elderly Kuzguncuk dwellers do not remember posters in the village or they did not want to highlight them during the interviews. However, they usually put importance on how the campaign was influential on ferry, which were a popular means of transportation in that period. For this reason, according to these narratives, Kuzguncuk dwellers were negatively affected from the campaign, but in other places, not in the village.

To sum up, this part of the chapter tried to elaborate on the historical context of the “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaign. Moreover, the most significant part is how Kuzguncuk dwellers were affected by the campaign. Some dwellers remembered banners in a variety location of the village, but, others did not remember any posters. It seems clear that the latter group of Kuzguncuk dwellers, who were older than the others, selectively forgot the campaign’s influence in the village. On the contrary, the campaign is a direct example of the nationalization of Kuzguncuk’s spaces from two perspectives. On one hand, the campaign’s banners were posted in several locations of the village and, creating a national atmosphere in Kuzguncuk. Secondly, non-Muslim residents suffered from the campaign’s effects in their daily lives. Therefore, the campaign was one of the steps in Kuzguncuk’s nationalization process that accompanied the Turkification of its streets.

## § 5.5 Attacks on Non-Muslims’ Properties after 1964

Non-Muslim Kuzguncuk dwellers suffered from Muslim Turk violence mostly on the night of the Pogrom. Shops and houses were damaged by local and outside actors. The Pogrom created insecurity and unease among minorities of the village. In addition to this, when the Muslim Turk population started to increase, they became dominant and taunted the non-Muslims in Kuzguncuk.

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29 Personal interview. 09. Nov.2016.

30 Personal interview. 29.Oct.2016.

This part of the chapter will discuss violence towards the non-Muslim population in the village during the 1964 Greek Deportation and 1974 Cyprus Operation. The field research figured out that the Greek Deportation was unproblematic except that it decreased the population of Greek citizens in Kuzguncuk. However, clear violence towards minorities was observed during the 1974 Cyprus Operation.

A former Jewish resident (male, born 1935) assumed that the 1964 Greek Deportation did not create nationalist feelings among Muslim Turks dwellers of the village: “The 1964 event (the Greek Deportation) did not visibly create violence; however, we observed that the number of our Greek friends started to decrease.”<sup>31</sup> A former Greek dweller (male, born 1944) mentioned the Kuzguncuk Association that was closed in 1964 because of the low non-Muslim population: “We had a Kuzguncuk Culture Association that was established in 1946. Mostly Greeks were active members of this association. We prepared some events such as performances. There was no Muslim member of the association, but we took our close Muslim friends to some events. The association closed in 1964 because of very low non-Muslim population.”<sup>32</sup> Interestingly, a former Jewish dweller (male, born 1951) narrated the unproblematic situation of the 1964 Greek deportation; in fact, he did not elaborate on the migration of the Greek population: “Kuzguncuk is a unique place. The conflict between the Muslim and the non-Muslim populations may be emerged in other places in Turkey, but nothing occurred in 1964.”<sup>33</sup> It seems clear that there was no violence toward the non-Muslim population of the village in 1964; however, the decrease of the non-Muslim population of the village was a reality and negatively affected the non-Muslim characteristic of Kuzguncuk.

The field research assumes that the Turkish military operation toward Cyprus created a huge problem for non-Muslims in the village. Interestingly, the conflict emerged between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus Island; however, the nationalist feelings of Muslim Turks targeted not only the Greek minority in Turkey but also other minorities. According to an Armenian man (born 1954), the violence emerged during the 1974 Cyprus military operation: “We (the

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31 Personal interview. 05.Nov.2016.

32 Personal interview. 31.Oct.2016.

33 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.

Kuzguncuk Armenian Foundation) had two schools on the upper side of the village. The people came and all the chairs were thrown out. I did not understand what was the fault of the Greeks and Armenians in the village. The journalists came and asked me several questions. However, they did not ask why the non-Muslim population is so low. You understand what I mean.”<sup>34</sup> Moreover, violence towards Greek spaces such as the cemetery and church was also observed by a current Muslim dweller (male, born 1955): “During the 1974 military operation, some Muslim Turk dwellers from Kuzguncuk who were older than me started to attack the Greek Church and also broke the headstones in the Greek cemetery. They were taken into police custody and admitted their guilt. The police kept records of this event.”<sup>35</sup> On the contrary, a former Jewish resident (male, born 1951) who also observed that the atmosphere in 1964 was unproblematic claimed the same for the 1974 Cyprus operation.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, the 1964 Greek Deportation negatively affected the non-Muslim population of the village. On the other hand, the 1974 Cyprus military operation of Turkey increased nationalist feelings among Muslim Turk residents of the village, and they attacked to two Armenian schools and the Greek church and cemetery. It appears that these two political events reshaped the village’s population into a more homogeneous one. Furthermore, the violence against non-Muslim architecture symbolized the erasure of any trace of non-Muslims from the village.

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34 Personal interview. 23.Nov.2016.

35 Personal interview. 08.Dec.2016.

36 Personal interview. 02.Nov.2016.



## 6

### Conclusion

This research consists of six sections including the introduction and conclusion. The introductory chapter provided the methodology and theoretical background of the study. It is obvious that oral history and memory theories are useful for analyzing the field research in Kuzguncuk; for this reason, the introduction mentioned debates in oral history, the development of memory studies and theories, and the relationship between the history and memory.

The second chapter included historical background of the research focusing on the construction of Turkish nation-state and national identity. Moreover, this section covered several homogenization and Turkification practices throughout history. The last section of this chapter covered the Pogrom in detail. It seems clear that the small village of Kuzguncuk and its non-Muslim residents were affected by these practices at a different level than other neighborhoods in Turkey. Specifically, they were affected by the Pogrom.

The third chapter presented the memories of witnesses of the pogrom who observed the events in Kuzguncuk, the time of day that the Pogrom began, the nature of the violence, and the outcome of the 6-7 September Incidents for the village. Furthermore, this chapters reveals common discourses about the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk with respect to the field research. As mentioned before, the most significant goal of the study is to present the homogenization and Turkification of Kuzguncuk, placing the 6-7 September Incidents - also known as

the Pogrom - at the center. Therefore, this chapter is fundamental to understand the effects of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk.

The memory and counter-memory of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk arose after the staging of Güngör Dilmen's play (*Kuzguncuk Türküsü*) because most current Kuzguncuk dwellers claimed that the play did not reflect reality. For instance, a current Muslim resident (male, elderly) was very angry and said: "If the play was staged in Kuzguncuk, we would attack it without thinking."<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, a current Jewish dweller (woman, middle-aged) claimed that *Kuzguncuk Türküsü* nicely presented the influence of the Pogrom in the village, and she was surprised that it was staged at the State Theatre.<sup>2</sup> Briefly, this research was influenced by the memories of former and current Kuzguncuk residents about the Pogrom after Güngör Dilmen's play.

In addition to the Pogrom, the study tried to focus on those effects of other nationalist practices of the Turkish Republic in Kuzguncuk covered in the second chapter. Specifically, the fourth chapter of the research presented the transfer of economic capital from non-Muslims to Muslims in Kuzguncuk via the Capital Tax (1942) and also focused on official and nonofficial forms of the confiscation of non-Muslim residents' properties in the village.

The last chapter, on the other hand, elaborated on the nationalization and Islamization of Kuzguncuk's spaces and architecture. This chapter clarified that the Turkification of some of Kuzguncuk's streets in the 1930s was the beginning of the homogenization the village. Moreover, during the 1974 Cyprus military operation some Kuzguncuk dwellers attacked the Greek cemetery and church. It seems clear that the Turkification of Kuzguncuk was implemented not only by the government but also by Muslim dwellers of the village.

Kuzguncuk has been studied by several researchers and scholars because it is promoted as a village of tolerance, harmony, and peaceful relationships among different religions. Specifically, local writers put importance on Kuzguncuk's multi-ethnic property and they argue that Kuzguncuk is a multicultural village. For this reason, they usually deny the reflections of the Pogrom and other nationalist practices of violence in Kuzguncuk.

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1 Group interview. 26.Sept.2016

2 Group interview. 05.Nov.2016.

The most comprehensive research on Kuzguncuk was conducted by Amy Mills, and her ethnography drew a different picture of Kuzguncuk than other studies. In other words, Mills work criticized the common discourse of cosmopolitanism, peaceful relations, and harmony. However, Mill's study is missing archival research, confiscation practices, the renaming of streets, and interviews with perpetrators of the Pogrom in the village, which this research covers.

This study puts importance on Dilek Güven's doctoral dissertation which approaches the Pogrom as a homogenization practice of the Turkish Republic. Put in other words, Güven's argument was quite significant for this study because one of its main assumption that Kuzguncuk's heterogeneous atmosphere radically transformed after the Pogrom. More importantly, this work tried to change the scope of the Pogrom literature; most sources focused on the political causes and economic results of 6-7 September events and elaborate on the reflection of the Pogrom in European Istanbul rather than in small villages on the Asian side such as Kuzguncuk. In addition to this, the research combined the outcomes of field research (in-depth and group interviews), archival research, and output of secondhand resources; therefore, it presented different narratives of Kuzguncuk at the same time. Therefore, it paved the way for making a comparison among the memories of witnesses, official documents, and the arguments of secondhand sources.

The in-depth and group interviews conducted in 2016 are the most significant element of this study because differing memories came to light about the Pogrom and other nationalist practices in the village. Moreover, it was the first time that some interviewees narrated the various practices of violence in Kuzguncuk. Actually, most Kuzguncuk dwellers (whether non-Muslim or Muslim) who left the village openly narrated their varied reminiscences about the Pogrom, the 1964 Greek Deportation, and the 1974 Cyprus military operation. On the other hand, witnesses (mostly Muslims) who continue to live in Kuzguncuk timidly answered questions about homogenization and Turkification practices in the village. It appears that Kuzguncuk dwellers protected their Kuzguncuk identity by using positive arguments about the village. Specifically,

group interviews in several locations of Kuzguncuk presented that interviewers abstained from other dwellers reactions when they spoke about the village negatively.

Highlighting Kuzguncuk's multi-ethnicity, tolerance culture, and peaceful daily life were prominent discourses in the interviews. In other words, the most radical interviews which included the violence of the Pogrom also mentioned the specialness of Kuzguncuk such as its tolerance culture. It seems clear that former and current dwellers established their Kuzguncuk identity with respect to characteristics of the village; however, this study assumed that Kuzguncuk had no special property; many villages in the Ottoman Empire had similar tendencies. In fact, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Muslim Turks continued to live together because non-Muslim emigration emerged a step at a time throughout Republican history.

Research in the State Archives of the Prime Ministry of the Republic of Turkey presented the details of the Pogrom in Kuzguncuk; for this reason, this study approached the Pogrom from a micro perspective. The study discovered an official document which presented local actors from Kuzguncuk who joined the Pogrom. Another document revealed that Greek citizens who had lived in Kuzguncuk suffered damage from looters during the Pogrom, and the Democrat Party government tried to cover their losses. These state documents demystify the discourse of outside actors and the traces of violence narrated by some Kuzguncuk dwellers and by most researchers on Kuzguncuk. In addition, this study assumed that altruism and the protection of non-Muslims are mainstream narratives of the 6-7 September Incidents in several locations in Istanbul. For this reason, some Kuzguncuk dwellers reproduce these discourses during the interviews to promote Kuzguncuk's multi-ethnic property via narratives with which this research does not agree.

Today, Kuzguncuk is a very popular village among local tourists because of the village presents experience of historical texture via buildings, streets and so on. For this reason, Kuzguncuk's shops and restaurants are getting more touristic than before. In the eyes of Kuzguncuk residents, local tourists have huge impact on changing village's culture in a negative way. Furthermore, after the popularity of the village rent cost of houses and shops has radically


increased. To overcome the economic challenge occurred from the increased rent cost, local coffehouses have turned into third-way coffehouses or touristic restaurants. In the eyes of the some Kuzguncuk dwellers, the non-Muslim foundations which have strategic properties in Icadiye Street directly took advantage of tourists' interest to the village and they increased rents. Put it in other words, some Kuzguncuk residents blamed non-Muslim foundations in the context of changing village's historical culture.

In conclusion, this study demonstrated how one small village near the Bosphorus transformed from a non-Muslim characteristic to a Muslim one via a variety of official and unofficial Turkification and homogenization practices. The population statistics and memories of residents show that Kuzguncuk's non-Muslim population was once higher than that of Muslims; however, nowadays Muslim dwellers of the village are the majority. Particularly, the 6-7 September Incidents were the turning point for Kuzguncuk's non-Muslim population. They started to feel insecure about their Muslim neighbors and they also started to migrate toward other places in the long run. Furthermore, contrary to general belief, this study claimed that the Pogrom emerged in Kuzguncuk more or less similarly to other non-Muslim districts in Istanbul. For this reason, Kuzguncuk was not special as a result of its tolerance culture, peaceful relationship between non-Muslims, and Muslims and multi-cultural property. In other words, Kuzguncuk was Turkified and homogenized by the Turkish Republic throughout history just like other non-Muslim neighborhoods in the Turkish Republic.





Appendix B Pervititch map of Kuzguncuk, 1932.







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