

THE ELITE PROFESSIONAL CLASS IN KAYSERİ: A PRELIMINARY INTERPRETATION

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Title: The Elite Professional Class in Kayseri: A Preliminary Interpretation

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the formation and nature of the elite professional class in Kayseri, a newly emergent upper class group triggered by industrialization and urbanization of educated, occupational elites who earn high incomes in manufacturing, construction, and financing sectors. Specifically, this study seeks to 1) examine the question of how the economic development in Kayseri has shaped the elite professional class, exploring the underlying mechanisms which have helped form them, and 2) analyze the classed characteristics of the elite professionals in contemporary Kayseri. This study deals with the issues presented above, focusing on the period from 1980 to 2013.

I assert that the elite professionals occupied in private sectors in Kayseri have created a homogenous class identity in which individuals form a set of lifestyle, taste, and political outlooks. So as to prove this proposal, I will firstly discuss the theoretical approaches to the elite professional class, and then theorize Kayseri in accordance with my framework of study. Finally, I will prove my stand as my qualitative study in Kayseri reveals classed identities of individuals belonging to the elite professional class.

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Başlık: Kayseri'de Elit Profesyonel Sınıf: Ön İzah

Bu tezin amacı, endüstriyelleşme ve şehirleşme sayesinde, üretim, inşaat ve finans sektöründe yüksek gelire çalışan, eğitilmiş meslek elitlerinin oluşturduğu, yeni ortaya çıkmış bir üst sınıf grubu olan Kayseri'deki elit profesyonel sınıfın oluşumunu ve doğasını incelemektir. Özellikle, bu çalışma, 1) Kayseri'deki iktisadi gelişmenin elit profesyonel sınıfı nasıl şekillendirdiğini ve bu sürecin altta yatan mekanizmalarını incelemeyi, 2) bu grubun sınıfsallaşmış karakterini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışma yukarıda bahsedilen konulara değinecek ve 1980 ile 2013 arasında kapsayacaktır.

İddia ediyorum ki, Kayseri'deki özel sektörde çalışan elit profesyonel sınıf, belirli bir yaşam tarzı ve tercihi ile siyasi görüş etrafında homojen bir sınıf kimliği yaratmıştır. Bu iddiamı kanıtlamak için, öncelikle elit profesyonel sınıfa dair teorik yaklaşımları tartışacağım, daha sonra ise, Kayseri'yi çalışmaya uygun bir şekilde kavramsallaştıracağım. Sonunda, iddiamı elit profesyonel sınıfa ait bireylerin sınıfsallaşmış kimliklerini ortaya çıkaran niceliksel çalışmam ile kanıtlayacağım.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I have been interested in the sociology of professionals for a long time, as the praising images of them in the popular media and academic literature have been elevated. They are depicted as pursuers of non-traditional lifestyles, consumers of globalized and culturally rich products, and selective of special urban spaces, for all that are consciously designed by themselves to secure their professional identities. Although the above-mentioned depictions are not unique to the professional class itself, they can be attributed to other social classes as well, namely the new middle class, white-collar workers, and salaried bourgeoisie. The strategies pursued by the new middle class become more conspicuous, including the residential segregation movements from the dirty and crowded downtown toward elite and sterile gated communities, or the increase of new social movements representing the issues of environmentalism, consumer rights, or universal justice; however, this study is less about the general propensities of the new middle class, and more on the professionals who are considered the pillars of the globalized economy and supporters of the transnational networks accompanied by a young, dynamic, creative, and conscious spirit.¹

To study the professionals, one should also have a preliminary knowledge of what constitutes the professional part of the new middle class. In 1964, H. L. Wilensky posed the question of whether we were experiencing a professionalization of everyone. As the post-industrial society became more prominent, the organizational structure redesigned itself to professionalize its occupations.

¹ Yıldırım Şentürk, "İstanbul'da Şirketler Dünyasının Profesyonelleri," in *Toplum ve Bilim* 126 (2013), p. 66.

Those professional occupations gradually took over the business and the government by replacing the old aristocratic system with a meritocratic civil service, and the owner-managers of family firms with corporate managers. They also professionalized local government with skilled administrators and public health officers, the universities with career lecturers and researchers, the hospitals with specialized consultants, the courts with a reformed prosecution and legal aid service, and the army with a college-trained officer corps.²

The case is even truer for Turkey.

Popular representations of Turkey's coming of age as a regional economic power beginning in the 1990s frequently depict its pioneering urban middle class; that is, the young, urban, and educated people employed in the private sector, earning handsome salaries, with access to the latest global goods and services. Turkey's adaptation of economic liberalization policies that echoed the worldwide push toward the globalization of production has led to changes that are said to benefit members of the middle class. Most evidently, labor deregulation, the entry of multinational corporations, and the growth of the domestic private sectors that enjoy supranational trade prospects have expanded employment opportunities to highly educated and technically skilled professionals. At the same time, the globalized consumer market has made available to everyone goods and services that were once only accessible to the very rich. Those developments have triggered a unique trajectory in Kayseri.

Aslı Yazıcı Yankı points out that Turkey, Istanbul and Anatolia have always been seen as different worlds in the social and political arenas. Some of their differences can be traced to the fact that while the former traditionally has been characterized by economic dynamism, an urban secular bourgeoisie, and a relatively high standard of living, the latter is known for its backwardness, rurality, and the agrarian population.³ However, things are beginning to change

² Harold Perkin, *The Third Revolution: Professional Elites in the Modern World* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 14.

³ Aslı Yazıcı Yakın, "'There is a Village Somewhere out There.' Representations of Anatolia as Terra Incognita," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 20, no. 1-2 (2007), pp. 182-199.

for Anatolia. Many Anatolian cities have, over the last four decades, witnessed a great degree of social, economic and cultural transformation. In the 1980s, import substitution industrialization in Turkey was displaced by a more open and an export-oriented industrialization model in which various implementations were carried out to increase exports and adapt the Turkish economy to the international capital and goods market. In the following years, new business elites, called the *Anadolu Kaplanları* (Anatolian Tigers), have emerged to claim the benefits of the economic conditions, and reorganize the labor structure in a way to seize more opportunities for themselves.

This is indeed the stage at which the subject of this study, the elite professional class, has grown from the offspring of lower-middle class families to privileged individuals in society. It is important to highlight this assumption because the period of capitalist development in Kayseri was still dominated by the big bosses whose paternalistic form of social management created not only a labor force dependent on wage labor, but also a discourse designed to convince workers that their interests were identical to those of the Anatolian bourgeoisie. The elite professional class cannot escape from this discourse either. With rapid industrialization and urbanization, this phase in Kayseri thus produced a complex, hierarchical set of class relations between capital, the political regime, and the professional members of the middle class.

Why do professionals matter? There are three different, yet not mutually exclusive reasons behind the phenomenon of professionals. First, the professionals are believed to constitute a unique demographic profile composed of upwardly mobile urban residents who are professionally trained to acquire a unique blend of economic, social and cultural capital. Such formation of professional identity differentiates them from the other groups of the new middle class and white-collar workers, and, of course, the non-urban and nonprofessionals as well.

Second, this unique demographic profile creates a distinguishing set of political attitudes and opinions. In western democracies, professionals are usually seen as embodying the new politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s, including the social movements, environmentalism, identity politics, gender issues,⁴ and the economic conservatism of the 1980s.⁵ Third, as a consequence of their political views, they are considered to be an increasingly significant voting bloc; that is, they require special concern from candidates and parties.⁶ Although professionals constitute a very small percentage of the population in general, they do stand out from the great mass of Kayseri in their possession of economic, cultural and social capital volumes, and in their unique political perspectives. Thus, the study of the elite members among the professionals is even more important because an elite professional is one who has, as Khan writes, “vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource/capital,”⁷ and, as Gieryn adds, a professional whose occupation is “to draw and enact a social boundary that includes some actors and excludes others; the social phenomenon of the profession is an act of classification, an instance of boundary work.”⁸

As Khan rightly emphasizes, however, defining elites does not only mean to uncover their control over or access to capital, but also to consider the transfer of one form of capital into another form because capital is a socially defined object; a realm of social contestation. Defining elites is to make sense of who owns capital and how to operate it. Sources of capital and their

⁴ Steven Brint, “The Political Attitudes of Professionals,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 11, no. 1 (August 1985), pp. 389-414.

⁵ Steven Brint and Kristopher Proctor, “Middle-Class Respectability in Twenty-First-Century America,” in *Thrift and Thriving in America: Capitalism and Moral Order from the Puritans to the Present*, ed. Joshua Yates and James Hunter (London: Oxford University Press, 2011).

⁶ Hakan Yılmaz, *In Search of a Turkish Middle Class: Economic Occupations, Political Orientations, Social Life-Styles, Moral Values*, project sponsored by the Open Society Institute and Boğaziçi University (Research Fund, 2008).

⁷ Shamus Khan, “The Sociology of Elites,” *Annual Review of Sociology* 38, (2012), p. 365.

⁸ T.F. Gieryn, “Boundary-work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists,” *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 6 (1983), p. 782.

utilization in the context of Kayseri are the best way to realize the class characteristics of the elite professional class of this study. In light of their status relative to the population as a whole and to the new middle class, as well as their perceived importance in the minds of journalists, politicians, and academics, they may constitute a more potent social force than their numbers alone would suggest.

This study has deep personal as well as intellectual significance for me. It is of personal interest because, raised in an urban, secular, and liberal environment, and in 1990s Turkey, when right-wing populist governments were in power, my praxis as a youth was to cultivate a critical perspective towards my very environment. Experiencing the baby-boom era of the economic boost of the 1990s in Kayseri and attending universities in Istanbul, I had the opportunity to compare and contrast both environments socially and culturally in terms of how people construct their identities and struggle over everything that concerns the art of living.

Pondering over the alternative cultural trajectories for Kayseri, Çağlar Keyder presented a novel idea in his keynote speech during “The New Middle Class and Urban Development” symposium. He said,

they [the new middle class] may, in fact, serve to loosen the conservative hold of the owners of capital in economic organization (especially in family-owned firms), struggle against authoritarian educational practices in schools, and, through their chosen mode of matrimony, child upbringing and consumption practices, even in the patriarchal world of the family. Turkey missed out on the cultural liberation that 1968 ushered in. Perhaps, that negligence will be rectified by the growth of the NMC.⁹

This assumption encouraged me to study the elite professional class instead of the new middle class because the new middle class in Kayseri is far away from forming a class due to the heterogeneity of their power, their organizational positions, and their trajectories. There is not one unified new middle class, but an amalgam of groups among and even competing within it.

⁹ Çağlar Keyder, *The New Middle Class in Turkey*, unpublished paper, presented in The New Middle Class and Urban Development (Bogazici University, 2011).

Moreover, this study is less concerned about coding the favorite restaurants or popular sports among elite professionals, but more focused on revealing the social inequalities and structural hierarchy in Kayseri by conceptualizing shared sets of values, boundaries, and political preferences that have the power to shape the codes of daily life. To acquire such lifestyle habits, one needs substantial amounts of cultural and economic capital, which the elite professional class already has. Furthermore, the understanding of the elite professional class eventually paved the way for revealing the social stratification presenting itself in Kayseri, which is pushed toward more global and vicious market mechanisms. If I am inclined to study different trajectories for Kayseri and the potential actors to realize such paths, I have to look for the top ranking individuals of the new middle class; that is, the elite professional stratum itself.

It is also of intellectual interest because much of studies on the new middle class and professionals have concentrated on those in Istanbul and Ankara,¹⁰ and even though there has been a growing international interest in promising Anatolian towns, Turkish academia have neglected the structural inequalities and globalized subjectivities in Kayseri and even produced misrepresentations of it.¹¹ This study aims to pose different questions for researchers who wish to study different parts of Turkey.

This study is designed to extract what I consider to be the significance of this group for understanding and interpreting future developments in Kayseri. Thus, my conceptualization of the elite professional class represents a Bourdieusian understanding of the writings of both

¹⁰ Yıldırım Şentürk, "İstanbul'da Şirketler Dünyasının Profesyonelleri," *Toplum ve Bilim* 126 (2012), pp. 42-74; Sencer Ayata, "Yeni Orta Sınıf ve Uydu Kent Yaşamı," in *Kültür Fragmanları: Türkiye'de Günlük Hayat*, eds. Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber (İstanbul: Metin Yayınları, 2003).

¹¹ For instance, Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, *Kentler: Anadolu'nun Dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin Geleceği* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010), approached the topic with assumptions of already globalized and culturally rich Kayseri and the Anatolian Tigers as its main engine, and praising political agenda of current urban regime in Kayseri; however, my research suggests otherwise. For detailed analysis, see Chapter 4, Theorizing Kayseri.

Marxist and Weberian class analysts. Specifically, this study examines the question of how economic development in Kayseri has shaped elite professionals, exploring the underlying mechanisms which have helped form them, within the framework of entrepreneurial city theory, and analyzing the classed characteristics of the elite professionals. The elite professional class is always self-motivated to pursue its own objectives by the means of special instruments only available to them, thanks to their formal training and possession of a vast amount of different forms of capital. However, this motivation does not stem from an abstract form of class-based ideology, but from the concrete struggle to secure its social space and even further expand it to seize more shares of income and specific forms of cultural capital. It is indeed an art of politics. This is a preliminary attempt to understand the current development and formation of the class structure of Kayseri. Therefore, I intend to focus on the assumptions and questions this study raises in the process of the nascent formation of the elite professional class in Kayseri in an attempt to shed light on the future laying before the Kayseri society.

In order to understand such a process, I employed a research methodology to see how effective the above-mentioned assumptions in an attempt to uncover the structural inequalities in Kayseri. In the absence of systematic and comparable data on the sociology of class in Anatolia, I believe my assumptions will be helpful for other researchers as well. Moreover, I do not claim I have proven something in the sense of the efforts by the positivist school of thought further enhanced by complex statistical methodologies because, first, the small and a rather peculiar sample I collect does not permit such generalizations, and second, I employed a critical-dialectical methodology to understand the relations among the social classes from both structure and agency perspectives. Therefore, I think I have discovered some provocative relationships for those who study social change in Anatolia.

After Chapter One's introductory remarks on the study, Chapter Two examines the theoretical approaches to the elite professional class and will further clarify why such an amalgam of theories is needed for answering the research questions of the thesis. The chapter will begin with the works of recent scholars on elite professionals who have built their analysis on the assumptions of the two founding fathers, Marx and Weber. After discussing the change in class paradigm, four major daily life experience realms, taste, lifestyle, and cultural consumption; family trajectories and childrearing strategies; social interactions and boundaries; and the political attitudes through which the elite professionals have been studied will be discussed. Lastly, after discussing the literature on the elite professional class, the specific approach of the thesis will be presented.

The third chapter is devoted to the Turkish case. The traces of the transformations that led the demographic formation of the professionals and the new middle class will be discussed to construct a background for the specific focus of the thesis. The sociological discussion of the Turkish middle class in this chapter will show the reader that, in the absence of systematic data on class demographics and identities (like the Nuffield class schema in UK), Turkish literature on the middle class in general must rely on a descriptive-critical model to conceptualize its subject. This chapter, therefore, shows why I employ a similar approach in my study, too.

The fourth chapter examines how economic development in Kayseri has shaped the elite professional class, through exploring the underlying mechanisms that have helped form them. This chapter focuses on the period from 1980 to the present day, where Kayseri has made great progress in industrialization, urbanization, and the democratization of education. Although it is still an ongoing process, the elite professional class in Kayseri has already been privileged with the current socioeconomic conditions in this city and has established a distinguished political

entity. Therefore, conceptualizing the underlying mechanisms that shape the elite professional class is of utmost importance.

In the fifth chapter, the social space produced and secured by the elite professional class in Kayseri will be presented. The classed characteristics of elite professional identity in general and peculiarities to Kayseri is seen at best in the realm of social space. Four different but related approaches will be employed to identify the individualized strategies pursued by the subjects of this study. Those approaches are, respectively, family trajectories and childrearing strategies, lifestyle and cultural consumption, social distance and boundaries, and the politics of the good life.

In the conclusion, the outcomes of the qualitative analysis that yield the peculiarities of the Kayseri case will be discussed. In line with their classed characteristics, this chapter will shed light upon how those individualized strategies were formed instead of others, with references to the current political environment by which they have been influenced heavily. The mixed and somewhat contradictory nature of the results points to the contradictory nature of the elite professional class itself. But overall, the study suggests a rather homogenous character of the elite professionals in Kayseri, and for this reason they are treated as a single class composed of a shared set of values, lifestyle choices, symbolic boundaries, and individualized strategies of the politics of the good life.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter builds the theoretical framework for the particular method of this study through discussing two distinct, yet related, arguments: proposing a definition of the class characteristic of individuals who belong to the elite stratum of professionals, and its tendencies for cultural and social distinction in the course of active class formation by revealing its political outlook and its reproduction strategies in contemporary Kayseri. The various characteristics of professionals in the industrial age have been discussed widely in parallel with the sociology of the new middle class; however, different schools of thought focusing on the elite professional class have developed different research agendas as per methodological approaches they take. Thus, it is no surprise that Marxist and Weberian methodologies differ widely in terms of what the class character of elite professionals means, but these well-known debates are beyond the scope of this study.

This study adopts a relational approach to class methodology, which is inspired heavily by the Bourdieusian analysis of social class; thereby the main focus will be on the lived experience of the elite professionals in contemporary Kayseri. I will not give a review of Bourdieu's thought on class theory, but rather build the agenda on Bourdieu's philosophy, furthered by extensive critiques of Bourdieu so as to employ and reproduce the model of "class as a lived experience" on Kayseri. After presenting broad definitions on the elite professional identity in general, I further explain how the relational or transactional approach to the class is helpful to uncover the individualized strategies pursued by the subjects of this study.

Defining Class

The literature review on class analysis as per the methodology of this study raises two distinct, yet associated sets of questions. First, there are the questions that deal with how to identify the class in which the elite professionals fit. Lawler writes that “words, in particular the words that express one’s key concepts, are the means of illumination for the tasks of interpretation and explanation.”¹² Therefore, the researcher ought to clarify his language to dismiss any possibility of obscurity in his study. Such agenda would start with the question of what is class then? How many different classes are there? Why is the concept of the class needed? How exactly does one determine whether the elite professionals belong to the sociology of the new middle class, or solely a cluster of occupational groups? And how exactly does considering the elite professionals a class in themselves help us to understand the conflicts and inequalities of society, if class concept serves as such?

The second set of questions in forming the methodology relates to the way one ought to grasp and formulate, first, the relationship between the ideologies and interests of a class as a whole, and second, the ideas and interests of particular individuals. Researchers of class theory argue that a class usually possesses specific, shared interests and that those interests are expressed in the ideology of the class in the public domain.¹³ However, this is no longer a convincing argument as individuals from specific classes do not necessarily adapt to the ideologies and interests distinctive to their class. This does not always mean that, however, applying class theory to understand the function and role of the elite professionals is a useless quest. Rather, this study primarily claims that the real advantage of class theory, in relation to particular groups, is the

¹² Stephanie Lawler, “Disgusted Subjects: The Making of Middle-Class Identities,” *The Sociological Review* (2005a), p. 431.

¹³ Wendy Bottero, “Class Identities and the Identity of Class,” *Sociology* 38, no. 985 (2004), p. 987.

questions it raises; “allows the theory to lead the way”¹⁴ so as to uncover the conflicts and inequalities of society.

How one defines class is linked closely with one’s agenda. For different underlying purposes, different schools of thought have theorized various descriptions of class. The Marxist tradition lays out the class theory in respect to the relations of production, while the Weberian tradition shifts the focus of analysis to the market situation.¹⁵ Prominent sociologist Erik Olin Wright posits that the questions one seeks to answer shape how one defines class. Mike Savage contends that it is a “question of differentiation,”¹⁶ while Pierre Bourdieu writes that it is “social space.”¹⁷

So, what could be a suitable meaning of class then? The new form of class theory postulated that the relationship between culture and class is to be found in how cultural perspectives are related to the formation of social stratifications by understanding the modes of differentiations.¹⁸ The emphasis shifted toward the classed nature of certain cultural practices and social interactions from assessing the extent of the development of class consciousness. In the new theory, as Devine and Savage write, “class cultures can be usefully viewed as modes of differentiation rather than as types of collectivity,” where “class processes operate through individualized distinction rather than in social groupings.”¹⁹ The class is not death, but instead changed in how it functions while facing individualization; “while collective class identities are

¹⁴ Wolcott states, “in theory-driven descriptive accounts, theory is more apt to get in the way than to point the way, to tell rather than to ask what we have seen.” See Henry Wolcott, *The Art of Fieldwork* (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2005), p. 15.

¹⁵ Loic Wacquant, “Making Class: The Middle Class(es) in Social Theory and Social Structure,” in *Bringing Class Back In: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives*, eds. McNall Scott et al., (Boston: Westview Press, 1991), p. 58.

¹⁶ Mike Savage, *Class Analysis and Social Transformation* (London: Open University Press, 2000), p. 32.

¹⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, “What Makes a Social Class,” *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 32, no. 1 (1987), p. 14.

¹⁸ Fiona Devine and Mike Savage, “Conclusion: Renewing Class Analysis,” in *Renewing Class Analysis*, eds. Fiona Devine and Mike Savage (London: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), p. 195.

¹⁹ Devine and Savage, *Conclusion*, p. 104.

indeed weak, people continue to define their own individual identities in ways which inevitably involve relational comparisons with members of various social classes, representing the reforming of class cultures around individualized axes.”²⁰

Defining the Elite Professional Class

The elite professionals are recognized as a distinct sociological group in the debate of class. This study argues that the elite professionals belong to one uniform social group. Today’s professions mainly originated in nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Peter Laslett writes about the pre-industrial era “all that can now be said of professional people is that there were very, very few of them.”²¹ However, the professions increased in nineteenth century England, as expanding, educated and professional classes developed a “new type of aristocracy.”²² In Germany, what Ringer describes as a “noneconomic middle class,” who lived in the universities and in the public service, obtained significant influence as “the educational system constituted the basis of social stratification.”²³ In the US, with the expansion of higher education, professionals restructured the occupational order in relation to the educational system.²⁴

Talcott Parsons declares the twentieth century “educational revolution” as significant as the industrial and democratic revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and comments

the growing reliance in government, industry, and culture on specialization and technical expertise, the growing centrality of the professions in the occupational structure, and the

²⁰ Savage, p. xii.

²¹ Peter Laslett, *The World We Have Lost* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1971), p. 52.

²² Kitson Clark, *The Making of Victorian England* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 274.

²³ Fritz Ringer, *Decline of the German Mandarins* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 15-16.

²⁴ Talcott Parsons, *The System of Modern Societies* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 94.

apparent power of professions in fixing the cultural coordinates of public discourse and private lives.²⁵

In addition, in 1968, Parsons stated that one of the most significant transformations in modern occupational structure was likely the development and the expansion of strategic importance of professions.²⁶

Since its first use, the term “profession” has denoted the same core principles: formal training in an educational institution, a relative authority in the workplace, non-routine mental work, and assessment based on both academic training and work experience for the analysis and solution of work-related problems.²⁷ Professional occupations, therefore, include those such as engineers, scientists, professors, lawyers, teachers, writers, and managers.

Rather than studying professions as a distinct set of occupations, I analyze the use of the word “profession” itself, considering when, how, and why it is invoked and what meanings are attached to it so as to understand elite professionals in the context of Kayseri. Thus, I plan to reveal what Gieryn describes as the “socially constructed, contingent, local, and episodic character of cultural categories” of the elite professionals.²⁸ Then, to what extent does the elite stratum of professionals distinguish themselves from mere professional occupation? How does the concept of the elite serve the quest of uncovering the conflicts and inequalities of society? It is not an easy task to define the concept of the elite since the scholarly debate is divided into two main camps. In comparison, the Marxist tradition refers to dominant positions within social relations, and the Weberian tradition refers to the availability of relative power and vast resources to one cluster.²⁹

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 94-95.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 95.

²⁷ Brint and Proctor, p. 464.

²⁸ Gieryn, p. 791.

²⁹ Khan, p. 363.

As in the case of the class debate, the question of elites is intimately linked to one's own disposition and methodology, so that rather than giving a full account of what elite means, instead I present what an elite professional means in terms of this study. As Khan writes, an elite professional is an elite who has "vastly disproportionate control over or access to a resource/capital,"³⁰ and a professional, whose occupation is, as Gieryn notes, "to draw and enact a social boundary that includes some actors and excludes others; the social phenomenon of the profession is an act of classification, an instance of boundary work."³¹ However, as Khan rightly says, defining elites does not mean only to uncover their control over or access to the capital, but also to consider the transfer of one form of capital to another form because capital is a socially defined object; a realm of social contestation. Defining elites requires making sense of who owns capital and how to operate it.³² Sources of capital and their utilization in the context of Kayseri are the best way to see the class characteristic of the elite professionals of this study, and will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Five.

However, a broad definition is needed for readers to picture the unit of analysis of this study. The elite professionals are those who generally lack forms of inherited economic and political capital, and who disproportionately own means of knowledge capital, which is gained through higher academic training and high level of work experience in their specialty, and who have the capacity to reallocate knowledge capital into forms of political, economic, cultural and social capital, to utilize their capitals to socially defined areas of contestation.³³ How small the population of the elite professionals is within society is not important as they are the engines of

³⁰ Ibid., p. 365.

³¹ Gieryn, p. 782.

³² Khan, p. 367.

³³ Khan, p. 367-8.

inequality within society, on the one hand, and culture of critical discourse against the power elites on the other hand.³⁴

The elite professionals usually hold managerial positions in their specialty, and are embedded in their organizational system so as to advocate the broad administrative vision in mind and organizational teamwork. Causer and Exworthy describe this kind of individual “quasi-managerial practitioner” or “managing professional” who has gained the trusts of other professionals in the company or specialty, has a prominent authority over the field of practice, and, most importantly, develops a strong individualized bond with political and business elites, regardless of the cultural outlook of the elite professional class.³⁵ The formalization of professional control over the field of practice could be beneficial for the elite professionals so as to gain more control over knowledge and economic capital. Moreover, in the case of Kayseri, where private manufacturing and the construction sector were dominated by the family-owned enterprises until the 1990s, the importance of the elite professionals in society has risen significantly.

But how does one define the elite professionals within an adequate class definition? In previous literature there is a lack of comprehensive and analytical scholarly attempts to theorize the elite stratum of professionals as one homogenous class entity. In the Weberian sense, they hold a relative status, power, and economic income in response to the market conditions. In Marxist line of thought, while they are subordinate to the capitalist class, they exercise an organizational authority over other classes; therefore, they have solid ground in the social stratification scheme. The scholarly literature theorizes professionals and managers at large in the

³⁴ For a more detailed account of this argument, see below, “Political Attitudes.”

³⁵ Gordon Causer and Mark Exworthy, “Professionals as Managers Across the Public Sector,” in *Professionals and the New Managerialism in the Public Sector*, eds. Mark Exworthy and Sam Halford (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1999), pp. 85-90.

process of class formation. There are four distinct, yet not mutually exclusive explanations of professionals in class theory. Steven Brint gives an adequate account of the debate of professionals and managers in society.

Barbara Ehrenreich and John Ehrenreich' class scheme is most broadly conceived. It includes salaried professionals and managers of all educational levels. Everett Ladd' scheme includes only salaried professionals and managers with baccalaureate and higher level degrees. Alvin Gouldner's scheme is still narrower; it includes only professionals in scientific and technical occupations and in occupations concerned with cultural production. Irving Kristol' scheme is the most narrowly conceived. It includes only professionals in the arts, media, teaching and academic research, and government regulatory and welfare activities.³⁶

Because of highlighting the class identity of and given a clear portrayal of professionals and managers at large, I partly adapted Ehrenreichs' methodology and implemented it by narrowing and crystalizing the unit of analysis of my study, elite professionals, instead of that of Ehrenreichs' professionals and managers at large, and created the basic theoretical framework for this study.

Therefore, in the sociology of class, elite professionals of this study refer to the groups who are well-experienced in the field of practice in which they operate and usually serve in managerial positions within the society that encompasses high-income earners (perhaps small portions of stock, too) of professionals based on their professional credentials. It includes those "who do not own the means of production, and whose major function in the social division of labor may be described broadly as the reproduction of capitalist culture and capitalist class relations."³⁷ They provide expert and necessary service to their firm, and perform important functions for capital, specifically, managing or controlling the labor power of many employees, and have considerable authority over marketing and investment decisions.

³⁶ Steven Brint, "New-Class" and Cumulative Trend Explanations of the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals," *American Journal of Sociology* 90, no. 1 (1984), p. 43.

³⁷ Barbara and John Ehrenreich, "The Professional-Managerial Class," in *Between Labour and Capital*, ed. Pat Walker (Boston: South End Press, 1979), p. 9.

I now outline the dynamic class construction of the elite professionals so as to add more precision and characterization to the formation of the elite professional class for this study. The class is the product of a special combination of a temporal and spatial relationship, and should be treated as such. The following part of this chapter will establish a class theory by means of diverse scholarly literature on the forms of capital, social trajectories, lifestyle habits, cultural consumption, social networking analysis, and the politics of elite professional identity.

The Relational Approach

The sociology of class has long been torn between structuralism and constructivism. As Bourdieu cleverly puts, the former has treated the individuals as things, codes in the occupational map reflected the relations of production and of market, or, ³⁸ such approach is useful to reveal the established inequalities of society by making sense of the location of individuals, which, in the end, produced a related set of ideas and values for those individuals. The main assumption is to utilize a macro-level analysis of the structural conditions in relation with each other, and then, follow the action of individuals as per their structural positions.³⁹ However, the latter argues that individuals are the real engines of creating the social reality so that the importance lays less on where individuals are located in respect to the relations of production or of markets, but much on how agents act to construct their very identity.⁴⁰ However, each view ignores the power of the other because the real benefit of class is to identify the inequalities of society and the interaction between different, and sometimes opposing, social classes. Therefore, reality does not stem from

³⁸ Pierre Bourdieu, "What makes a Social Class," *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 22, no. 1 (1987). pp. 1-2.

³⁹ le Grand, p. 2.

⁴⁰ Bourdieu, *What makes*, p. 9.

crystalized standpoints of each mutually exclusive view, but from their interaction, for “the real is the relational.”⁴¹

The relational approach was a response to reductionist approaches by both structuralism and constructivism.⁴² Over-emphasizing the economic structure and ignoring the decisive role of culture in the formation of class identity has its limitations.⁴³ Unlike structuralist theories, the relational theory of class identity regarded lived experience of individuals as a basic determinant. As Bourdieu puts,

the task of science, then, is to construct the space which allows us to explain and to predict the largest possible number of differences observed between individuals, or, what is the same, to determine the main principles of differentiation necessary or sufficient to explain or predict the totality of the characteristics observed in a given set of individuals.⁴⁴

It is true that, the social reality is the product of unique relationships between the structural formations of production and market, and active and dynamic construction by the agent in a given specific time and space. Moreover, the class-consciousness studied by the structuralist theory of class is replaced by a relational concept of the lived experiences of individuals, thereby the process of formalization of class and individual identities are that of dynamic products of history. As Wright rightly emphasizes,

When class is used to explain inequality, typically, the concept is not defined primarily by subjectively salient attributes of a social location but rather by the relationship of the people to income generation resources or assets of various sorts. Class thus becomes a relational, rather than simply gradational concept. This concept of class is characteristic of

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 3.

⁴² Mustafa Emirbayer, “Manifesto for a Relational Sociology,” *The American Journal of Sociology* 103, no. 2 (1997).

⁴³ For a detailed discussin, see Erik O. Wright, *Class Structure and Income Determination* (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 5-8.

⁴⁴ Bourdieu, *What makes*, p. 3.

both the Weberian and Marxist traditions of social theory. Class, in this usage, is contrasted to the many other determinants of a person's life chances – for example, geographical location, forms of discrimination anchored in inscriptive characteristics like race or gender, or genetic endowments.⁴⁵

Adapting the methodological approach of Bourdieu's concept of habitus allows researchers to shed light on how structural inequalities in the first place determine the overall volume of capital, and how the agent's struggle with everything that concerns the art of living determines change in both overall volume and composition of capital, and how social trajectories of individuals is influenced by the existing classifications in society.

In this regard, Bourdieu provides a prominent methodological tool to escape from reductionisms, and to re-theorize class as a result of the dynamic formation between the structural processes and agency's construction. He argues that different positions in relations of production are not the sole determinant of class boundaries, but rather they are drawn in the process of a class' search for distinction from other classes.⁴⁶ Therefore, both economic capital institutionalized as right of possession, and cultural capital functioning as a mode of distinction are indicators for hierarchy and stratification in society. As a result, one's social trajectory and the possession of the different forms of capital creates a social space which eventually determines our habitus.

For our place in social space, Bourdieu formulates various forms of capital of which three forms stands out distinctively: economic, cultural, and social capital.⁴⁷ Individuals can acquire any form of capital in various ways, and transfer them into other forms as long as they are capable and the capital in question does not have any limitation whatsoever. Those forms of capital constitute power not just because they have value in themselves, but also because they are

⁴⁵ Erik O. Wright, *Social Class*, Unpublished paper. Available online at: <http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~wright/Social%20Class%20--%20Sage.pdf>

⁴⁶ Bourdieu, *What makes*, p. 4.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

socially perceived as legitimate and as significant in the eyes of other social classes.⁴⁸ The formation of social space, according to Bourdieu, follows a unique path for each individual,

thus agents are distributed in the overall social space, in the first dimension according to the global volume of capital they possess, in the second dimension according to the composition of their capital, that is, according to the relative weight in their overall capital of the various forms of capital... ..and in the third dimension according to the evolution in time of the volume and composition of their capital, that is according to their trajectory in social space.⁴⁹

As Bourdieu suggests, occupational positions are good proxies for determining one's social space since they also denote an amount of economic capital acquired by certain forms of educational and cultural capital, and sometimes reflect a social capital in the eyes of other social classes as well. Therefore, the formation of class is a dynamic process in which sets of practices and values are attributed to the elite professional class and their relative positions in the structural map of society. Similar educational trainings create certain formation of cultural capital, which, in return, increase the volume of both economic and social capital through which individuals delineate the borders of their social spaces to mark and form their unique identity.

This study argues that certain practices through which the elite professionals of Kayseri construct their classed identities create distinctive habitus as means of explanatory variables for the social stratification and inequalities of the contemporary Kayseri. This is why this study builds its theory of class on Bourdieusian philosophy furthered by extensive contributions of the methodology that the relational approach proposes in order to reveal differentiation strategies derived from the everyday life experience of the elite professional class.

The three different realms functioning as modes of differentiation and reproduction in creation of distinctive habitus of the elite professional class in Kayseri are now discussed in the following order: "Formation of Families in Line of Social Trajectories," "Taste, Lifestyle and

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

Cultural Consumption as Forms of Cultural Capital,” “Social Networks and Boundaries as Forms of Social Capital.”⁵⁰ Moreover, the main argument of this study is that the elite professional class in Kayseri forms a distinct set of political preferences stemmed from their unique blending of the above-mentioned reproduction and differentiation strategies. Such preferences have special meanings for the comprehension of the socioeconomic conditions in contemporary Kayseri and identity formation of the subjects of this study; thus, in the last section of this Chapter, political attitudes of the elite professional class will be discussed.

Formation of Families in Line of Social Trajectories

An important process that defines the habitus is the social trajectory of the self. Such process starts in the family. Parents give the child a preliminary knowledge of things, so that these created knowledge filters are influencing the early development of the child. As one forms a habitus through which certain boundaries and distinctions are drawn toward habitus, the very process of differentiation starts. Bourdieu also stresses that the middle class families employ a “therapeutic ethic,” treating the child as

a sort of apprentice who must discover his body and the world through exploration; and blurring the boundaries between work and play, duty and pleasure, it defines play as muscular and mental learning and therefore a necessary pleasure... thus making pleasure a duty for children and parents alike.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Since my study employs a Bourdieusian interpretation of the class theory to understand the classed characteristics of elite professionals in the vast map of social classes, any other study which limits its subject of the research as narrow as myself will show a similar pattern of the research methodology. Yet, the reader should keep in mind that the power and the originality of my study stem from the importance of treating the elite professional class as one homogenous class in given context, and subsequently, the theoretical framework designed only to understand such homogenous class, but no other social class. For the other researches, see Chapter 3.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 369.

However, those differentiations and the strategies that create such modes of differentiation are not only being produced by the parents, but, in the adult years of the self, the one starts to transfer his or her own codes of culture to their children as well. It is a means of reproduction, and certainly benefits to secure and further expand a social space that middle class families are eager to constitute.

Moreover, as a means of securing one's social space, the very foundation of marriage is also seen as an important tool to delineate the borders for the elite professional class. The elite professionals are also part of the above-mentioned mechanism and, different strategies employed by this class also need further explanations. In her study, Hey argues that marriage is "a paradoxical site of personal labour and love, permeated by the wider structuring forces of the economic and symbolic power relations that impress the intimate to the shape of dominant social hierarchies."⁵² Therefore, it is no surprise that the elite professionals, who struggle over everything to secure their social space, conceptualize the marriage as an institution to maintain its advantageous various forms of capital, and to even further expand it so as to seize more power and space in the map of social classes.

Childrearing strategies also function as a mode of differentiation because, as Thrall writes, "child care choices also point-up and perpetuate subtle distinctions and tensions of values and lifestyle within the middle class, between class fractions."⁵³ Jeannie Thrall⁵⁴ conducted an important study on this very topic, arguing that the new middle class families generally form their childrearing strategies in two different fashions. The "orchestrated achievement" is practiced by

⁵² Valerie Hey, "Joining the club? Academia and working-class femininities," *Gender and Education* 5, no. 3 (2003), p. 322.

⁵³ Stephen Ball et al., "Middle Class Fractions, Childcare and the 'Relational' and 'Normative' Aspects of Class Practices," *Sociological Review* 52, no. 4 (2004), p. 479.

⁵⁴ Jeannie Thrall, "Strategic Parenting: Making the Middle Class through Distinction and Discipline" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2010).

parents with professional jobs, who believe, because of their work experiences, that their children need distinguishing accomplishments to prosper in life.⁵⁵ To achieve such accomplishments, children must develop a passion, which is promoted by the parents by providing a wide range of hobbies, special practices, and after-school activities.

“Disciplined self-management,” however, is practiced by parents with fewer credentials.⁵⁶ These parents believe that their children must work hard and establish certain networks to prosper in life, which is only achieved if parents nurture them with discipline and teamwork, and enroll them in sports activities and collective hobbies. Thrall also states that three types of habitus affect families towards either of those strategies: The “parents’ position within the middle-class labor structure, their classed background, and their spouse’ position within the middle class labor structure.”⁵⁷ Families with different volumes and compositions of capital form different strategies for their children. Therefore, it is essential to discover which strategies the elite professional class in Kayseri adapts, and for what reasons. This will be dealt with in Chapter Five. However, all studies on new middle class families share the same premise, appreciating education as an institutionalized mode of cultural capital and childrearing strategies as a means of transferring the class experience of the elite professionals to their offspring.

Taste, Lifestyle and Cultural Consumption as Forms of Cultural Capital

The relational approach reinvents the class theory not to superimpose the structure over the individuals’ minds and preferences, but to construct a theory of dynamic process in which both structure and agency work through creating a shared habitus. Such habitus is what defines the

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

⁵⁷ Thrall, p. 27.

identity of the members of the elite professional class and to act in a way particular to their social space. Bourdieu started his line of thought by stating, “any legitimate work tends in fact to impose the norms of its own perception and is tacitly defined as the only legitimate mode of perception the one which brings into play a certain disposition and a certain competence.”⁵⁸

However, the lifestyle practices and cultural consumption are not merely products of the structural conditions that the elite professional class conditioned, as in this case, being elite in the market structure, and being professional in the occupational structure. Rather, the very meaning of the lifestyle practices is also what constitutes the habitus itself. Since every act in itself carries a meaning, the act of cultural consumption is as important as the structural conditions for the elite professional class. Bourdieu writes that,

On the one hand, the objective structures which the sociologist constructs in the objectivist moment, by setting aside the subjective representations of the agents, are the basis of subjective representations and they constitute the structural constraints which influence interactions; but, on the other hand, these representations also have to be remembered if one wants to account above all for the daily individual and collective struggles which aim at transforming or preserving these structures.⁵⁹

Therefore, the point is to identify the process of the institutionalization of certain taste and lifestyle habits to construct the boundaries between social classes. Every practice for the elite professional class as a part of the middle class in the vast map of social class, in the end, is being reduced to the ways in which how one can distinguish itself from the others.

That is why Bourdieu conceptualizes both the culture of the dominant class and that of the working class – i.e. to highlight contrasting points for the middle classes. Since the elite professional class is not the dominant class, who own the political power supported by a vast amount of economic and social capital, and marked by a distinctive cultural aestheticism to reproduce its dominance over the other social classes, and is not the working class, who is

⁵⁸ Bourdieu, *Distinction*, p. 28.

⁵⁹ Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 125-126.

ultimately subordinate to the above in many ways, including cultural, economic, and social, and marked by a culture of necessity that stress importance and functionality of the products, rather than the aesthetic values in society.⁶⁰ The elite professional class is a social group that is torn between two competing cultures, and has tried to find its own social ground to build its identity and secure its possessions. One should always remember that the very act of consumption functions as a means of differentiation. Bourdieu illustrates this point by further adding that,

It is the expression of a habitus of order, restraint and propriety which may not be abdicated. The relation to food—the primary need and pleasure, is only one dimension of the bourgeois relation to the social world. The opposition between the immediate and the deferred, the easy and the difficult, substance (or function) and form, which is exposed in a particularly striking fashion in the bourgeois way of eating, is the basis of all aestheticization of practice and every aesthetic.⁶¹

Nevertheless, Bourdieu's hierarchical description of high and low culture is by no means unproblematic. Richard Peterson criticizes Bourdieu by putting forth the idea of cultural omnivores, a system of preferences employed by the upper classes inclined to taste everything, unlike the idea that the elite of society have a distinct or narrow set of practices.⁶² While he tries to recapture the true meaning of the taste as a strategy for distinction, he conceptualizes the elite proportion of society, and believes that the elites form a form of taste to possess all forms of cultural capital, so as to not limit themselves to narrow consumption of cultural capital. He writes, "the aesthetics of elite status are being redefined as the appreciation of all distinctive leisure activities and creative forms along with the appreciation of the classic fine arts."⁶³

However, this does not mean that the taste and lifestyle habits do not constitute a classificatory function in generating hierarchical social classes. On the contrary, they still matter.

⁶⁰ Bourdieu, *Distinction.*, p. 175-190.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

⁶² Richard Peterson, "The Rise and Fall of Highbrow Snobbery as a Status Marker," *Poetics* 25 (1997), pp. 75-92.

⁶³ Richard Peterson and Albert Simkus "How musical tastes mark occupational status groups," in Michele Lamont and Michael Fournier, *Cultivating Differences* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992), p. 252.

Peterson and Simkus argue that,

Elite taste is no longer defined as an expressed appreciation of the high art forms [and a moral disdain or bemused tolerance for all other aesthetic expressions]. Now it is being redefined as an appreciation of the aesthetics of every distinctive form along with an appreciation of the high arts. Because status is gained by knowing about and consuming all forms, the term omnivore seems appropriate. ...Univore, suggesting that those near the base of the pyramid tend to be actively involved in one, or at best just a few, alternative aesthetic traditions. At the same time, they are more likely to stoutly defend their restricted taste preference, be it religious music, etc., against persons espousing another of the lower-status musical form. ...As one approaches the bottom (of the pyramid), musical taste serves to mark not only status levels but also the status boundaries between groups defined by age, gender, race, religion, life-style, etc.⁶⁴

The question on the function of taste as to whether it creates a cultural hierarchy for the elite with which to distinguish themselves, or makes them form various cultural practices should be answered by keeping in mind that taste-forming is a locally contingent process under the influence of institutional setting and presence hierarchy. Thus, the taste, lifestyle, and consumption habits of the elite professional class are contingent with where it is located, how those practices become institutionalized, and how it interacts with other social classes. That is because pre-determined cultural consumption methods are no longer satisfactory descriptions of class development; instead, one ought to study taste as a classifier so as to give a genuine explanation of the class.⁶⁵ As a result, this study considers taste and consumption habits not as a result of their location in the occupational structure, but, on the contrary, as a very fundamental cause of their class location and classed identity.

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 169.

⁶⁵ Heinz-Dieter Meyer, "Taste Formation in Pluralistic Societies: the Role of Rhetorics and Institutions," *International Sociology* 15, no. 1 (2000), p. 51.

Social Networks and Boundaries as Forms of Social Capital

For Bourdieu, it is vitally important to understand the ways in which the elite and upper-middle classes reproduce and secure their social space, in order to picture the true image of social stratification and competing social classes. The above-mentioned forms of capital function to form an identity for and classify for the self, yet the social capital per se has a special meaning for the Bourdieusian theory, as it denotes not only as a means of differentiation, but also exclusively works for the exclusion of others.⁶⁶ Bourdieu himself states that,

social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition—in other words, membership in a group—that provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.⁶⁷

It is the social capital’s power to transfer itself to other forms of capital, including economic and cultural, to secure and maintain the social space of the elite professionals. They invest their social capital to acquire even more cultural or economic capital to retain even more power in their struggle of everything that concerns the art of living. It is a tool for them to enclose their particular social space from the unworthy ones, a tool to draw not only objective social distance, but also subjective symbolic boundaries.

In her research on American and French upper middle classes, Michéle Lamont,⁶⁸ criticizes Bourdieu’s insistence on the decisive authority of cultural capital because the symbolic meanings of daily life practices also determine the very habitus it raises. Lamont and Volnar further state that,

⁶⁶ David Gauntlett, *Making is Connecting* (New York: Polity Press, 2011), p. 131.

⁶⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital,” in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, by John Richardson (New York: Greenwood, 1986), p. 248.

⁶⁸ Michéle Lamont, *Money, Morals, Manners: The Culture of the French and American Upper-Middle Class* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992).

conceptual distinctions performed by social actors to categorize objects, people and practices as well as time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality. Examining them allows us to capture the dynamic dimensions of social relations, as groups compete in the production, diffusion, and institutionalization of alternative systems and principles of classification.⁶⁹

Therefore, symbolic meanings generate a system of preferences that influence and orient the very formation of social relations, which eventually reflect the hierarchy and inequalities of society.

The study of the elite professional class then embraces the cultural repertoires and the process through which the social capital is constructed by the various symbolic meanings.

Savage gives additional concept when he writes that: “people seem keen to invoke a distinction between their personal lives – in which class is rarely seen as a salient issue – and the world ‘out there,’ the world of politics, the economy, and the media.”⁷⁰ According to him, even the speech of people is socially constructed because “people want to belong to a group of ordinary, average types, differentiating from a group above them and below them.”⁷¹ Networks of friendship, partnership and cultural connection are used to map out the social relations as the characteristics of social interactions indicate factors for the distances within social groups, or between individuals and social objects.⁷² The social interaction is constructed through our social space, and it is the basic premise of social distance approaches.

Differential association can be seen as a way of defining distances within a social space: social interaction will occur most frequently between persons who are socially close to one another and relatively infrequently between those that are socially distant. It is possible to reconstruct this social space from the information about the set of distances. The social space determined in this way will reflect and represent the structure of stratification arrangements. The space is inherently social structural, not an aggregation of individual or group characteristics; it does not deal with each occupational group taken separately, but with each in relation to all of the others.⁷³

⁶⁹ Lamont and Volnar, p. 168.

⁷⁰ Savage, p. 116.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷² Wendy Bottero, “Interaction Distance and the Social Meaning of Occupations,” *Sociological Review* 53, no. 2 (2005a), p. 61.

⁷³ Wendy Bottero, *Stratification: Social Division and Inequality* (Cambridge: Routledge, 2005b), p. 215.

Therefore, social interaction and social stratification are constitutive parts of social hierarchy since, as Bottero notes, “our conception is one of stratification arrangements that involve differences in generalized advantage (and disadvantage) and hence in lifestyle and in social interaction related to level of advantage and lifestyle.”⁷⁴ Bourdieu too is concerned with social distances, yet he seeks it in the differences between taste and lifestyle habits, rather than as social distance approach suggested in the relations of social actors.⁷⁵ This approach focuses on the socially meaningful choices through which people construct their social relations, and which is something Bourdieu ignores.⁷⁶ Consequently, the social interaction approaches study close social interactions, such as marriage and friendship, or in the case of Kayseri, *oturmalar*.⁷⁷ Savage also writes that since social interaction functions as a mode of differentiation in the social order, the class “recognize[s] and acts as an important force in people lives, whether they are aware of it or not.”⁷⁸ Thus, social interactions shed light on the classed identities and reproduction strategies of the elite professional in Kayseri.

The Politics of Elite Professional Identity

The distinction and reproduction strategies of the elite professional class have been discussed, yet the realm of politics has been delayed on purpose. Bourdieu writes that the new middle class fights for everything relating to the art of living. Unlike the old middle class, which pursues a stable position in the hierarchy and a relatively good life, Klaus Eder contends that the new

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 218.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 40.

⁷⁶ Savage, p. 12.

⁷⁷ Local home gatherings to foster social solidarity. Discussed in Chapter Four, “Theorizing Kayseri.”

⁷⁸ Savage, p. 14.

middle class pursues “personal aggrandizement, autonomy, and competition.”⁷⁹ The social movements of the 1960s in America, for instance, were “largely middle class in their core constituency, as was the university-based new left, and much of the support for reform activity in Congress during the period.”⁸⁰ Lipset further suggests that parallel changes arose in other “Western democracies with the educated middle class ‘left’ dominating the Social Democratic parties of Sweden, Denmark, Britain, and the Green Party of West Germany, and also sharing power with the labor left in Socialist parties of France, Greece, and Spain.”⁸¹

The scholarly literature has produced many perspectives on this topic. Following the work of the psychologist Abraham Maslow, some sociologists claim that educated middle class and particularly middle class youth developed a sense of post-materialist values, whereby, Brint writes, “community and self-fulfillment were built on the satisfaction of more basic needs for security and comfort, and conditioned as well by their great distance from actual centers of power.”⁸² Others underlined that knowledge workers would fight for status and power even with the dominant business elites.⁸³ Broadly, these theorists and many others write of expanding professionals and their propensities toward “the adversary culture,” which reflects “the knowledge workers’ unique combination of envy and elitism, a combination that led to the projection of a distinctive class culture and politics of moral superiority against the material riches, yet lesser learning of the conservative business class.”⁸⁴

The politics of the elite professional class identity function as cultural consumption, childrearing strategies, or symbolic boundaries do: to secure their social space, and to expand it

⁷⁹ Klaus Eder, *The New Politics of Class* (London: Sage, 1993), p. 175.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

⁸¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1981), pp. 503-523.

⁸² Steven Brint, *The Political*, p. 392.

⁸³ Kristol, p. 30; Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, *The Professional*, pp. 13-15; Gouldner, p. 15.

⁸⁴ Brint, *New-Class*, p. 56.

further. Gouldner writes that the new class develops a “culture of critical discourse,” emphasizing reasoned argument, intellectual skepticism, and a critical orientation toward traditional social and economic arrangements.⁸⁵ The scope of culture of critical discourse can be diverse regarding the space in which it operates. “They are egalitarian so far as the privileges of the other classes are concerned.”⁸⁶ That is, they are ready to re-allocate the resources and practices of the others in favor of them under certain conditions, including de-professionalization of the work and its setting, denouncing the educational credentials in society, threats to consumer rights, and so on. It is, however, anti-egalitarian when they are ready to expand their social space in line of seizing more political power and greater public image to control the battle in the economic, political, cultural realms.

Moreover, the elite professional class follows an art of politics, which is defined by Gouldner as “a grammar of discourse, which is concerned to justify its assertions, but whose mode of justification does not proceed by invoking authorities.”⁸⁷ Through adapting the social ethos of Kayseri designed by the urban bloc consisted of the municipal government and the regional bourgeoisie, the elite professional class reconciles the various strategies in order to gain an advantage in their struggles with everything that concerns the art of living.

In Chapter Five, I will analyze the specific individualized strategies of struggle over the everyday lives of the elite professional class in Kayseri; therefore, the possible reasons for the culture of critical discourse as per the framework of this study will be illustrated. Moreover, I argue that the elite professional class constitutes a contingent relationship with the economic structure in contemporary Kayseri that is, as Chen and Chunlong describes,

⁸⁵ Alvin Gouldner, “The New Class Project, I,” *Theory and Society* 6, no. 2 (1978), pp. 176–178.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

of dynamic process that result of conflict, negotiation, and occasionally setback, rather than a unilinear approach originated from the school of modernization theory claims that economic development and the changes in the occupational structure inevitable cause to spread an anti-elite, democratic, liberal orientations among middle classes.⁸⁸

This theory reveals the salient facts of the relationship between the elite professional class and the socioeconomic structure that shapes the elite professional class because the characteristics of structure and agency are very much influenced by the institutional context and existing classification.

The class of elite professionals of this study, is comprised of individuals who occupy professions in occupational structure through their formal training and educational credentials, who have extensive work experience in the field of practice, and who can control access to a vast amount of both economic and cultural capital so as to secure or further expand their social space. One must have a preliminary knowledge of the elite professional class considering their structural positions to differentiate them from the dominant business class and political elites, and, considering their taste, consumption, lifestyle habits, social networks, and political preferences to differentiate them from other groups of the new middle class; and finally, considering their reproduction strategies and volumes of capital to consolidate their classed identities as elite professionals. Therefore, this study merges the relational analysis of the class with structural approaches to the extent in which the socioeconomic structure of Kayseri and the everyday lives of the elite professional class will be explained thoroughly.

This study presents the dynamic formation of the classed identities of elite professionals in Kayseri through their structural locations reflecting objectified inequalities, and through individual action reflecting creativity. I argue that both processes are active, constructed and negotiated in the struggle over everything regarding the art of living. Although the methodology

⁸⁸ Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu, "Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class's Attitudes toward Democracy," *Political Research Quarterly* 64, no. 3 (2011), p. 706.

adapted here is eclectic in nature, it is the best way to deal with peculiarities and universalities of class formation in Kayseri. Since the uniformity of the elite professional class in Kayseri has been observed in both structural and agency-centered approaches, my aim now presents the specific character of the taste, lifestyle habits, social relations, symbolic boundaries, and political attitudes of this particular class.

CHAPTER 3

THE ELITE PROFESSIONAL CLASS IN TURKEY

There has been a growing interest in the working lives of professionals. Studies mainly construct their research agenda around the concept of the new middle class, professional, and white collar workers. New middle class studies that generally focus on the study of lifestyles, particularly consumption habits and residential preferences (gated communities), open up the discussion on how these class members differentiate themselves from other social groups in society.⁸⁹ Studies on professionals consider the group itself as a supporter of the globalized economy through the maintenance of transnational networks, which they dynamically and innovatively produce and reproduce over and over in their daily life practices.

This growing interest in professionals is actually made into popular media in parallel with various conspicuous developments in society, including residential and lifestyle differentials that have started to shape the city more dramatically than ever. New consumer habits show themselves in the new shopping malls along with an increase in the numbers of gated communities and symbolized forms of residential segregation for the privileged. The case for Turkey is even truer for Kayseri, where the advancement of capitalism, as well as rapid urbanization, has made this process even more visible.

The public interest in professionals has dated back to economic magazines in the 1990s. However, after the 2001 economic crisis, where many institutions re-organized their work structure and employment relations, and when the interest of foreign capital was increased, the professionals created a new regime in which they were more powerful, more active, and closer to

⁸⁹ Şerife Geniş, "Producing Elite Localities: The Rise of Gated Communities in Istanbul," in *Urban Studies* 44, no 4 (2007), pp. 771-798; Hatice Kurtuluş, "Orta Sınıfın Sosyo-mekansal Yeniden İnşası," in *Express Dergisi* 127 (2012), pp. 10-13

the capital.⁹⁰ In Kayseri, for example, the paternalistic ties in family-owned companies started to fade away to give more space and power to professionals. This growing interest doubled during the crisis of 2008, when the public was eager to listen to what professionals had to say, or would do to save the economy.⁹¹

I will present the studies on the new middle class in Turkey instead of the elite professionals because, first, knowledge of the general characteristic of the new middle class is needed before going deeper into the subject of the elite professional class. Second, there are few studies dedicated to elite professionals per se, except for few studies from the school of management to determine the demographic characteristics of executive managers in İstanbul.⁹² The researcher should not solely present a theory of the class and fill the framework with the social class, but rather work with the theory to understand the strategies of the subjects in given context and speculate on the future implications.

Last, but not least, the reader should bear in mind that although the presented work comes mainly from some distinguished scholars in Turkey, those studies are not by any means inclusive of all class studies in Turkey, or others are not worth reading. All studies on the issue of the class in Turkey are worthy of respect, yet it is impossible to cover all these within the scope of an MA thesis, thereby a selection of studies related to this specific study are presented.

I contend that the term “new middle class” is discussed with three different theoretical approaches. First, the new middle class is conceptualized to respond to the recent rearrangement of the labor structure in the organizations, by putting it in the framework of proletarianization of

⁹⁰ Yıldırım Şentürk, “İstanbul’da Şirketler Dünyasının Profesyonelleri,” in *Toplum ve Bilim* 126 (2013), pp. 64-97.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁹² For two examples of those studies, see Hayat Kabasakal, “A Profile of Top Women Managers in Turkey,” in *Deconstructing Images of the Turkish Women*, edited by Zehra Arat (New York: Palgrave, 1999); İlker Hüseyin Çarıkçı, Münire Çiftçi, and Seher Derya, “İş-Aile Yaşam Çatışması: Türkiye’deki Kadın Yöneticiler Üzerine Bir Uygulama,” *Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi Vizyon Dergisi* 2, no. 2 (2010).

the professionals. The second discusses the new middle class in popular studies referring to its lifestyle practices. Finally, the new middle class is studied with reference to the residential preferences. In the following section, these two different theoretical approaches will be discussed.

The Proletarianization

One of the main difficulties in searching for the identity of the middle classes rises when the researcher tries to put the term in the organizational structure. Many distinguished scholars reformulate the Orthodox Marxian line of thought to capture the essence of the relations of production in contemporary work environments. Such attempts can show themselves even in Turkey. Yıldırım Şentürk, in his two yearlong ethnographic study, argues that it would be wrong to assume all workers consist of same shared values and political agendas, as professionals and upper cohorts of the new middle class distinguish its identity and its work environment in a particular way, marked by “success,” “personal development,” and “competition.”⁹³

In the advancement of globalization and neoliberalism in Turkey, the re-organization of the labor market mostly benefited the educated middle class. Their professional training, expertise in their specialty, authority over the work and knowledge, and individualized career objectives create an atmosphere in which the relations of production are equally distributed in non-hierarchical ways. Yet, this is often not the case. In Istanbul, according to Şentürk, professionals are also subject to profit-maximizing strategies adopted by the companies. They face serious mobbing practices, insecurity in the work place, fear of losing jobs, and inhumane work conditions.⁹⁴ Although many professionals do condemn these practices, such critique does

⁹³ Şentürk, p. 70.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 70-81.

not stem from the very act of the neoliberal market, but from the proletarianization, treating professionals as if they are mere blue-collar workers.⁹⁵ In the midst of those practices, professional usually develop individualized strategies, like one of the common practices seen in the elite professional class in Kayseri, to slightly improve their position in places where there is less insecurity and less fear of losing one's job.

With such normalization of injustices of advanced capitalism and conscious separation from the blue-collar workers, professionals become the backbone of the social stratification. They constantly produce, and reproduce the inequalities of and hierarchy in society. Tanıl Bora et al. also stress this constant urge to distinction found in the minds of new middle class workers.⁹⁶ Bora and his colleagues argue that the particular characteristics of white-collar workers stemming from high educational backgrounds and globalized cultural consumption do not necessarily mean that they are exempt from vicious capitalist development.

The Lifestyle Practices

By the end of the 1980s, newspapers, lifestyle magazines, and popular social science books were immersed with praising images of the new generation of white-collar workers, who were employed in significant positions in the organizational structure through their formal educational trainings, and subsequently, who obtained great sums of cultural capital. Much of this research is based on empirical analysis of popular media, including pop-songs, lifestyle magazines, dressing preferences, and so on. Yet, some include their daily-life remarks on these privileged lifestyles.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 71.

⁹⁶ Tanıl Bora et al., *Boşuna mı Okuduk? Türkiye'de Beyaz Yakalı İşsizliği* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2011).

Hayri Kozanoğlu contends that “the collectivist young social type of the 1960s” was replaced in the 1980s by another type, privileged among the new middle class, who has a never-lasting urge toward money, personal charisma, and power.⁹⁷ The global transformation spread in the 1980s pushed Turkey to adopt an economic system, whereby restrictions on the flow of economic and cultural capital were lifted, and subsequently, the newly affluent private sector of the 1980s, as per its globalized and mobile flow of transactions, created its own subjects whose way of thinking was generally composed of the ideas of individualization, competition, success, entrepreneurship, and adaptability. What he terms as “yuppies” (young, upwardly mobile, urban professional) became the main human capital of new industries, including finance, advertising, the media, and entertainment.⁹⁸ Regarding their consumption patterns, Hayri Kozanoğlu contends that they constantly wanted more, and have the mentality of *hep daha hep daha* (meaning that they always wanted to make more money, to engage in more luxury consumption practices, and to raise their status). They are highly motivated toward power and perceived images of themselves with which to gain even more power. They pursue the specific social and cultural capital that they think will help to increase their constructed images. Since they are university graduates, and gain more than one foreign language along with certain praised hobbies that continuously motivate them for self-development, they acquire a taste of globalized lifestyles and tolerance toward cosmopolitanism. Kozanoğlu argues that the group of “yuppies” in the Western vocabulary is equivalent to the “Özal’s princes”⁹⁹ in Turkey.¹⁰⁰

In response to the transformations of the Turkish economy, Meltem Ahıska and Zafer Yenal conceptualize the new middle class in İstanbul as a privileged group composed of

⁹⁷ Kozanoğlu, *Yuppiler, Prenslar ve Bizim Kuşak* (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınevi, 1993), p. 10.

⁹⁸ Kozanoğlu, pp. 10-24.

⁹⁹ Özal himself brought back professionals who had studied abroad and gave them important positions in public sector institutions. They were known as “Özal’s princes.”

¹⁰⁰ Kozanoğlu, pp. 18-24.

engineers, managers, economists, and salespersons, who work in multinational companies and have relatively high wages.¹⁰¹ This small, but growing segment of urban, professional, and highly educated global middle class has become the winner in contemporary global capitalism and enjoys its benefits. As they state, during the neoliberal era, many educated young professionals turned their cultural and educational capital into economic capital and were integrated into the global economy in which there is a constant demand for special individuals with special education for specific occupations.¹⁰² The members of the new middle class fulfill such a demand and are integrated into the profits of global capitalism in Istanbul, where the middle classes are affected by the neoliberal ideology and policies more than the rest of the country.¹⁰³ The new middle class can buy its image from shopping malls, online retailers, or magazines. They can construct their images through dress codes, eating practices, communication, entertainment, and other daily life practices to secure their social space in relation to the very rich, and marginalized below.

Çağlar Keyder has conducted valuable studies on this topic, setting his research in İstanbul, Turkey's major financial and commercial center. He contends that İstanbul has experienced important changes since the 1980s through attempts to re-position it as a global city.¹⁰⁴ The service sector in marketing, accounting, management, banking, and finance has flourished as a result of the entrance of transnational economic powers to the city. The growth of the service sector constitutes a small part of society composed of a group of young urban professionals who are able to operate in global markets and have adopted global consumption

¹⁰¹ Meltem Ahıska and Zafer Yenal, *Aradığınız Kişiyi Şu An Ulaşılamıyor: Türkiye'de Hayat Tarzı Temsilleri, 1980-2005* (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2006).

¹⁰² Ahıska and Yenal, p. 24.

¹⁰³ Ibid., pp. 24-25.

¹⁰⁴ Çağlar Keyder, "The Setting," in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, edited by Çağlar Keyder (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), pp. 13-16.

habits and lifestyles.¹⁰⁵ While this small segment of the population, that can be defined as the new middle class, has benefited from its incorporation into the world economy, the rest of the population has witnessed this integration process without participating in its benefits.¹⁰⁶ He further argues that the income and consumption polarization and poverty in the city became significant in the 1990s. The urban setting of the city was also demonstrated, as Keyder writes,

as new complexes, which were landscaped, expensive, inaccessible and forbidding to the outside population, were built for the small populations, who became corelike, meaning that they resemble their counterparts in the core countries in terms of salary, education and consumption, whereas the shantytowns bourgeoned in order to meet the accommodation need of new immigrants.¹⁰⁷

The Residential Preferences

Another line of studies focuses on the residential preferences of the new middle class drawn by the social exclusions of others and reproduction of their perceived images. Those studies also present detailed empirical data on the daily life practices and on the nature of the drawn social distances in response to the transformations Turkey has undergone in the last thirty years in terms of its economy, social life, labor market, occupational structure, and so on. The importance of those studies relies on their systematically collected empirical data that may be further developed to describe certain general characteristics of Turkish residential preferences and its uniqueness. Although they are not based on representative samples, they certainly provide insight to conceptualizing another urban case; Kayseri.

¹⁰⁵ Çağlar Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion in Istanbul," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 1 (2005), p. 124.

¹⁰⁶ Keyder, *The Setting*, p. 23.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

In her work,¹⁰⁸ Şerife Geniş studies the gated communities located in the sub-urban region of Istanbul. They argue that the gated communities are historically and spatially special products of certain urban transformations marked by neo-liberal economic transformation, globalized lifestyle practices, and increasing segregation in the class hierarchy.¹⁰⁹ During her ethnographic research she finds that upper-stratum of the middle class continuously try to differentiate itself from the below characterized by degenerating terms, including thievery, dangerousness, illiteracy, rudeness, and so on. Apart from the segregation of residents of those gated communities, Geniş argues that a new form of utopia was created in which educated, affluent, and urban groups of the middle class could live in the shared values and tastes of certain lifestyle practices, and thereby, reproduce their perceived images as constructed through self-ascribed values, including, hardwork, sincerity, civility, professionalism, and many others. Their isolation was reflected through their consumption habits and social distances toward others, so that their subjective choices of lifestyle produced objective distance between them and the imagined others. Their prosperity in both economic and cultural capital is turned into a market opportunity since many privileged colleges and hospitals have begun to build their associated franchises in the region.¹¹⁰

In recent years, Turkish society has witnessed an increasing image of Islamist groups among the new middle class. The power and conflict between those newly emerged upper-echelon of Islamist middle classes and rather secularist and long-established new middle classes have been documented in numerous ways. Ayşe Saktanber, in her Ph.D. dissertation,¹¹¹ questions

¹⁰⁸ Şerife Geniş, "Producing Elite Localities: The Rise of Gated Communities in Istanbul," in *Urban Studies* 44, no 4 (2007), pp. 771-798.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 778.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 780-3.

¹¹¹ Ayşe Saktanber, "Islamic Revitalization in Turkey: An Urban Model of a Counter-Society: A Case Study" (Ph.D. diss., Middle East Technical University, 1995).

to what extent Islam as a religion shapes the aspirations and organizes the daily lives of the Islamist groups of the new middle class. Her ethnographic study in Ankara shows that what distinguishes this group from the other middle class people is that they have developed a different system of classification as a result of their tastes. For example, “faith” functions as Bourdieu’s notion of taste, responsible for generating classificatory schemas.¹¹² Despite the emphasis on faith, Saktanber makes, this is not the case in Kayseri, at least among the elite professional class, to use faith as a classificatory tool because the strong conservative ideology in Kayseri does not permit faith to function as it does in Saktanber’s case.

The reader ought to keep in mind that a sociological analysis of cultural codes particular to temporally and spatially constructed residential areas should not be theorized as a general statement regarding the whole structure of the new middle class. Since socially constructed and dynamic relations of practices produce an image for the new middle class to secure its social space, these analyses always denote a limitation in national context. This limitation is also valid for my own field study, elite professionals in Kayseri, yet I do think I have found some provocative relationships which I hope will be useful in revealing the internal dynamics of the structural inequalities in Kayseri. That is worth study. Now, I present the points missing in these studies that my study will attempt to provide.

Discussion

The first line of the argument is built upon the assumption that the new middle class, or white-collar workers in Turkish context, appears as a result of the related shifts in the economic structure and subsequently in the labor structure. The researchers in this line argue that the class

¹¹² Saktanber, pp. 240-242.

positions are still torn between two opposing sides of what Marx theorized as the bourgeoisie as the owners of means of production, as the proletariat who do not own the means of production, and has nothing to sell except their labor. Such dualism still denotes in the sociology of class, yet, as Wacquant rightly puts it, it is no longer valid to take two opposing sides as static and unmovable reference points, and then, fill the remaining gap with the middle classes.¹¹³ Therefore, one should be more careful when treating classes as they are not empty spaces in the social map, but active and dynamic constructions of the individuals located in those places. Moreover, although my own study does not follow, and even criticizes, orthodox Marxism, the weakness of the above-mentioned approach stems directly from its attempt to be orthodox. This is a more general problem with any middle class or new middle class analysis; that is, the categories do not fit neatly into the Marxist framework, yet the researchers see the world from their perspectives, as seen above.

The second approach lacks unique characteristics of the new middle class particular to the Turkish context, and instead, what these studies provide is an amalgam of such lifestyles which are derived from the globalized form of consumption products and are open to anyone who can access these products and consumption habits. The cultural omnivore thesis discussed in Chapter 2 argues that one should not take the “taste” itself as a classificatory instrument, but the practice of taste in its special circumstances so as to reveal the true nature of cultural consumption and differentiated lifestyle practices. Since the researchers of the second line of argument ascribed certain language and habits to the new middle class, they do not mention why other groups who do not belong to the new middle class also use similar practices as well. The members of the new middle class defy the poor, yet so do the bourgeoisie. The new middle class lives in certain

¹¹³ Wacquant, p. 43.

districts, yet so with the members of the traditional middle class and petty-bourgeoisie.

Therefore, one should be careful about how to describe a certain cultural and social practice.

Another challenge is to define the new middle class as white collar workers and to analyze only the cultural practices of the upper crust of this class because such an assumption neglects sui generis strategies, whether economic, social, or symbolic, pursued by the members of this group to produce and reproduce their classed identities in any given context. Since those practices are different in İstanbul or Ankara from Kayseri, Denizli, or Hakkari, it is necessary to bear in mind that specific conditions of the chosen group of a class reflects its related occupation, everyday life practices, cultural production, social networks, and political attitudes. Although this would imply that we cannot generalize at all, one should remember that it is not the power of theory to be universal, but to understand and unravel the structural inequalities of specific societies at a specific time and place. Such descriptive studies do not diminish the power of their description of social hierarchy and inequalities.

The above-mentioned critique is also valid for the third approach, which conceptualizes residential preferences based on social network relations as the classificatory instrument for the new middle class as constructing the image of differentiation. Although the analyses of suburban neighborhoods are common in the sociology of the new middle class, the approach itself fails to recognize two important things. The first is the negligence of other members of the new middle class who do not live in a gated community but in downtown itself. How much their perspectives and the new middle-classness differ from those residents in the specific residential areas is an understudied subject. The second is that a residential complex is always perceived as one whole community whose image and lifestyle practices constitute a pressing picture of each individual in the community. The internal dynamics and conflicts among the new middle class, including

traditional\modern, religion\secular, and established\new comer perceptions are not present in those studies.

It is certain that not only the residential preferences, but also different trajectories and various compositions of capital in one's habitus create differences regarding the classed identity, values, schemas, and evaluative distinctions of this new middle class, and they are perhaps effective in creating certain inter-group tensions. It is, therefore, important to note that although studying the elite professional class in Kayseri has certain limitations for comparisons of that group to their counterparts in İstanbul or Ankara and in giving an overall picture of the new middle class in Kayseri, it does provide powerful insights for future research and approaches towards Kayseri.

CHAPTER 4

THEORIZING KAYSERİ

This chapter examines the question of how economic development in Kayseri shaped the elite professional class, through exploring the underlying mechanisms that helped to form them. During the period from 1980 to the present day Kayseri made great progress in industrialization and urbanization. Many Anatolian cities have, over the last four decades, witnessed a great degree of social, economic and cultural transformation. Many researchers have been examining the relevant influences of this change in the political and economic realms.¹¹⁴ Ahmet Haşim Köse and Ahmet Öncü, in their attempt to conceptualize the overall Turkish manufacturing sector, contend that the rapid Fordist industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s contributed to the creation of new geographies for manufacture production, such as Bursa, Eskişehir, Adana, Kayseri, and Kocaeli.¹¹⁵ Those industrialized geographies in the 1960s are called today “the traditional industrial cities,” where the service sector has expanded along with industry, informal labor has grown in the labor market, and reserve labor forces increased in substantial numbers due to rapid expansion in population.¹¹⁶ Therefore, Turkey experienced a dual process in the 1970s: the rise of industrialized cities, and the stagnation of underdeveloped Anatolian towns, where agriculture and craftsmanship were common modes of production.¹¹⁷ Yet, in the 1980s, import substitution

¹¹⁴ To get an overall perspective, see Ahmet Haşim Köse and Ahmet Öncü, “Dünya ve Türkiye Ekonomisinde Anadolu İmalat Sanayii: Zenginleşmenin mi Yoksa Yoksullaşmanın mı Eşiğindeyiz?” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 77 (1998), pp. 135-159; Şevket Pamuk, “Globalization, Industrialization and Changing Politics in Turkey,” *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no. 38 (2008), pp. 267-273; Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan, “Yerel Sanayi ve Bugünün Türkiye’inde İş Dünyası,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 118 (2010), pp. 92-123.

¹¹⁵ Ahmet Haşim Köse and Ahmet Öncü, “İşgücü Piyasaları ve Uluslararası İşbölümünde Uzmanlaşmanın Mekansal Boyutları: 1980 Sonrası Dönemde Türkiye İmalat Sanayii,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 86 (2000), p. 80.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹¹⁷ Köse and Öncü, *İş Dünyası*, p. 82.

industrialization in Turkey was displaced by a more open and an export-oriented industrialization model in which various implementations were carried out to increase exports and adapt the Turkish economy to the international capital and goods market.¹¹⁸ In the following years, new industrialized cities, called the *Anadolu Kaplanları* (Anatolian Tigers), emerged as alternative geographies of production to the traditional industrialized cities. Thus, Anatolia came to establish new industries in which primitive Taylorism was the dominant model of production and in which most of the establishments were small-scale and involved in labor-intensive production.¹¹⁹ However, Kayseri followed a different path.

By the end of the 1990s, Kayseri already became a major sociocultural and economic center where the state sponsored industrial investments and agricultural subsidies had been replaced by an impressive private sector, which constituted several of Turkey's most profitable companies. Such transformation, as presented in this study, also created the necessary conditions for the elite professional class to develop. There is a scholarly negligence in the sociology of Anatolia, where the class structure was radically changed by the process mentioned-above and these newly emerged business elites, who facilitated "economic growth industrial diffusion to Anatolian cities, and a rapid rise in export capacity."¹²⁰ The new business elites further redesigned the market structure in their favor to seize more shares in the distribution of goods and services, and subsequently, the prospects of more profitable market conditions have been created for them and for their allied groups as well.¹²¹ One of those allied groups is the elite professional class as part of the new middle class that represents the construction of a social group operating

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 83.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 85-87.

¹²⁰ David Kenner, "The Happy Story of the Anatolian Tigers," *Foreign Policy*, accessed in April 28, 2010. http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/18/the_happy_story_of_the_anatolian_tigers

¹²¹ Gül Berna Özcan and Hasan Turunç, "Economic Liberalization and Class Dynamics in Turkey: New Business Groups and Islamic Mobilization," *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 3 (2011), p. 66.

as a proponent of economic liberalization. The elite professional class in Kayseri marks the development of a particular set of social group identity, which receives the advantages of the current economic arrangement in Kayseri. Therefore, conceptualizing the underlying mechanisms that shape the professionals is of utmost importance.

As for this, I uncover the structure and relations of power according to which the elite professional class has developed certain strategies that reproduce, and, at the same time, overcome. I do not argue class warfare in Kayseri in the first decade of the 2000s, yet I contend that classed identity as a means of differentiation plays a crucial role so as to understand the social stratification and the characteristic of the current urban regime in Kayseri, and perhaps in other Anatolian cities that have undergone a similar pattern of economic and social development. Therefore, by placing Kayseri in the entrepreneurial city theory as the main instrument sheds light on the internal structure of the institutionalized systems of power and to explain the relationships among elected officials, the municipal body of administration, those individuals, and new business groups (which will be discussed later in this chapter), who influence their decisions.

After elaborating on the dynamics of Kayseri as an entrepreneurial city, two distinctive areas in which the professional class occurred are discussed: the advancement of industrialization and rapid urbanization accompanied by the spread of education. However, the reader should keep in mind that conceptualizing Kayseri as an entrepreneurial city, the main actors of which constitutes an urbanized form of hegemony, is a rather original and understudied approach, and needs further comprehensive research. Due to the scope of MA thesis, I am not able to present a full account of my hypotheses (although I plan to do so in my further research); yet, I present a glimpse of these approaches for the reader to perceive the overall picture of contemporary Kayseri.

Since this study will analyze the classed characteristics of the elite professional class, the occupational positions in the organizational structure are the only plausible way to determine whether one can constitute his social space as per being elite and professional. Unfortunately, neither TurkStat nor scholarly literature gives empirical data on which social space corresponds into which occupational space. Thanks to the recent empirical study conducted by BBC, I can deduce from complex and unorganized TurkStat occupational codes¹²² to proper social classes. Although the class structure and its analysis surely respond to the particular spatial and temporal conditions of the UK, the analysis of the recent survey by Mike Savage and his colleagues shows that social space should correspond to not only a position in production relations, but also income level and possession of cultural and social capital.¹²³ As such methodology is surely more apt for my own theoretical framework for studying the elite professional class, I adopted their study and transformed into Turkish context and my study, by adding a distinct area, the elite professional class, and by removing some social classes, which do not fit properly into the class structure and economic relations in the late-industrialized countries like Turkey, unlike to advance industrialized UK. Although many late-industrialized South Asian countries do have similar empirical research regarding their social structure; they are neither as complex and detailed as in the UK, nor do their conceptualizations of social space perfectly correspond to one's possession of economic, cultural, and social capital as a whole.

Taking the occupational positions into account, the occupational codes of TurkStat were divided into 22 categories by considering each position's relative income and perceived cultural and social capital through comparing TurkStat's occupational codes lists and consumer prices

¹²² TurkStat, Meslek Sınıflamaları, at <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/DIESS/SiniflamaSurumDetayAction.do?surumId=210&turId=41&turAdi=9>. Meslek Sınıflamaları

¹²³ Mike Savage et al. "A New Model of Social Class: Findings from the BBC's Great British Class Survey Experiment," *Sociology* 0, no. 0 (2013), pp. 1-32.

index.¹²⁴ Such indicators will serve as a distinguishing instrument to identify the subjects of this study. In 2013 prices, some consumer expenditures as means of differentiation for the elite professional class in Kayseri are: Recreation and Culture; Hotels, cafes, and restaurants; Luxury Furnishing; Education; Housing; and Miscellaneous goods and services. Such a basket of consumer products will serve to identify the social space of the subject of this study, and the basket equals approximately TL70000 per year.

Table 1. Reconceptualization of 22 Occupational Codes as Social Classes¹²⁵

Capitalist Class	Large Scale Commerce/Self-employed
	Large Scale Employers (over 50 people)
Elite Professional Class ¹²⁶	Chief Executives, Senior Officials, and Legislators
	Senior Level Professionals in Private Sector
	Senior Level Professionals in Public Sector
Technical/Professional Middle Class	Science and Engineering Professionals
	Professional Military Officers
	Health Professionals
	Teaching Professionals
	Mid-level Professionals/Administrators in Private Sector
	Legal, Social and Cultural Professionals
Petty Bourgeoisie	Middle Scale Employers (below 50 people)
	Small Scale Commerce/Self employed
	Craftsmen/Self-employed
	Agriculturalists/Farmers
Traditional/New Working Class	Technicians and Associate Professionals
	Clerical Support Workers
	Service and Sales Workers
	Unqualified Blue Collars in Private Sector
Precariat	Temporary Works with Hourly Wages
	Seasonal Agricultural Workers
	Unpaid Family Labor

¹²⁴ TurkStat, Consumer Prices Index, at <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/tufedagitimapp/?dil=2>

¹²⁵ The table is designed by the information derived from both TurkStat's occupational codes, International Standard of Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) and Mike Savage et al.' findings.

¹²⁶ The group is composed of mainly high-status professionals, who acquired vast amount of economic, cultural and social capital through means of educational/professional training and long-years of experience in their respective fields of work.

This chapter builds the setting for the elite professional class, the members of which benefit from the current economic regime due to their professional training and specialization in their respective fields. Following discussion helps the reader picture the subject of this study with concrete evidences including occupational titles, their relative size in the work force, their relative income in general, and their composition in particular to other groups among the new middle class. The elite professional class, not only defined by being a professional as per the occupational structure and social meaning, also possesses a vast amount of economic and cultural capital. Since the elite groups of the professional class only constitute one part of class formation in Kayseri, this study also brings the relative size and importance of other factions of the new middle class into the following discussion. Furthermore, more concrete details about the subjective details about the elite professional class of this study are given in the next chapter, Qualitative Analysis.

Kayseri as an Entrepreneurial City

The spirit of urban entrepreneurship marked Kayseri long ago as various entrepreneurial strategies were being pursued in different economic and political settings. Its key role in an emerging “*Anatolization* of industrial capital”¹²⁷ and its favorable inclusion into the global economy also show a recent implication of such spirit.

The theory of the entrepreneurial city will be introduced to illuminate these issues. It claims that urban entrepreneurship is a valid tool to understand the different strategies employed by the cities. The institutional structure and specific strategies behind the economic creativity that support the thesis of entrepreneurial cities have been here for a long time. This argument, as Hall

¹²⁷ Özcan and Turunç, p. 64.

and Hubbard writes, “fails to capture what is novel about the role of entrepreneurial cities in capital accumulation due to its view on cities as engines of wealth creation regardless of the specific form in which this occurs.”¹²⁸

Bob Jessop proposes three defining features of entrepreneurial cities, which is inspired by Joseph Schumpeter and by David Harvey:

1) an entrepreneurial city pursues innovative strategies intended to maintain or enhance its economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other cities and economic spaces; 2) these strategies are real and reflexive; they are not ‘as if’ strategies, but are more or less explicitly formulated and pursued in an active, entrepreneurial fashion; 3) the promoters of entrepreneurial cities adopt an entrepreneurial discourse, narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and market them as entrepreneurial.¹²⁹

The first and second statements classify cities as “performing well economically, for whatever reason(s), from those that are entrepreneurial,” and, as Jessop and Sum note, “not all cities that perform well are entrepreneurial; and not all entrepreneurial cities perform well.”¹³⁰ The second specifically highlights why overt entrepreneurial strategies are needed to say a city is entrepreneurial as those strategies can be adopted in changing circumstances of economic and political environments.

The third differs the entrepreneurial city from non-entrepreneurial urban regimes. An urban regime is the regime whereby an alliance bet formed by certain factions of the bourgeoisie and local politicians, a.k.a. the urban bloc, constitutes an urbanized form of hegemony to pursue economic and social interests particular to that of business leaders, the mayor, important social figures, and so on.¹³¹ Different forms of urban regimes and urban blocs differentiate strategies, such as what Jessop and Sum list as “religious center, dream factory, imperial capital, modernist

¹²⁸ Tim Hall and Phil Hubbard, “The Entrepreneurial City: New Urban Politics, New Urban Geographies?” *Progress in Human Geography* 20, no. 2 (1996), p. 154.

¹²⁹ Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum, “An Entrepreneurial City in Action: Hong Kong’ Emerging Strategies in and for Inter Urban Competition,” *Urban Studies* 37, no. 12 (2000), pp. 2288-2289.

¹³⁰ Jessop and Sum, p. 2289.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 2290-2292.

utopia, municipal socialism, or tourist center.”¹³² Not all those cities can be identified as entrepreneurial, nor their strategies as entrepreneurial.

The city of Kayseri is an entrepreneurial city par excellence. Although it should not be forgotten that more sociological research must to be done to fully understand Kayseri in the concept of the entrepreneurial cities, preliminary attempts can give a hint at whatever strategies Kayseri pursues, and the reasons beyond them. For the first criterion, there are three distinct fields in which Kayseri is entrepreneurial not only in regard to assets that it produces as a city, but also non-economic\extra-economic factors that are central to economic competitiveness.¹³³ Those fields are by no means mutually exclusive and sole determinants of an entrepreneurial urban strategy, but rather a series of examples to conceptualize the overall picture of entrepreneurial strategies implemented by Kayseri.

First of all, new types of urban place and spaces for manufacturing, working, consuming, entertaining, and living have been introduced in Kayseri. Those include two distinctive types of new settlements: Beyazşehir and Tavlusun valley zone. The first project, initially started by Şükrü Karatepe, the former mayor of Kayseri, so as to provide a housing area in which new migrants are lured by the prospect of employment, especially from Yozgat and Sivas, live. It was initially built on the outskirts of Kayseri, where specially scheduled bus services connected them to the city center and working areas. In 2010, however, Mehmet Özhaseki, the current mayor of Kayseri, formerly an influential and successful businessman, finished an enormous construction project, the Tram, to connect Beyazşehir to the industrial zone by creating an inter-city transportation system like the Liverpool and Manchester Railway in 1830s Britain.

¹³² Ibid., p. 2292.

¹³³ Though Jessop and Sum states five of different stages, I combined them into three so as to make them more applicable to the case of Kayseri.

The second settlement in the Tavlusun valley zone is designed to build an elite cluster on the outskirts of Kayseri, the direct opposite to Beyazşehir, both geographically and economically. New highways are connected to the construction zone, as no one uses public transportation, but private cars. A state university has been built, Abdullah Gül University, near the settlement along with new shopping malls and entertainment centers, in order to provide necessary services to those residents. Although construction has not been completed yet, notable persons in Kayseri, including President Abdullah Gül, mayor Özhaseki, and the Boydak family have already moved into their new homes. Additionally, in the last four years, Kayseri has launched four new industrial zones, Mimarsinan, Develi, Hisarcık, and İncesu, to lure entrepreneurs to Kayseri.¹³⁴ As for the result, new urban places and spaces as commodities produced by Kayseri were introduced so as to pull new businessmen to work and to live in accordance with an entrepreneurial fashion.

For the first criterion, the second step was to find new sources of resources to increase competitive advantages vis-à-vis other cities.¹³⁵ The Erciyes Mountain Master Plan is par excellence for an entrepreneurial strategy. Even though Kayseri is located in the Cappadocia region, a historical and natural region, its tourism income is below the average of Turkey.¹³⁶ To reverse this situation, Kayseri started another enormous construction project on Erciyes Mountain to create a skiing complex to international standards for winter tourists to travel to.¹³⁷ Moreover, Kayseri hosted the World Women's Volleyball Championship, as well as a Turkey-Armenia football game, to maximize its advantageous position vis-à-vis other cities. The last has been to

¹³⁴ Mehmet Uğurlu, "Kayseri Nereye Koşuyor?" *Kayseri Gündem*, October 1, 2010.

¹³⁵ Jessop and Sum, p. 2290.

¹³⁶ İhlas News Agency, "Erciyes Butik Otel İhalesi Ay Sonunda," April 30, 2012, accessed on May 01, 2012. <http://kayserierciyes.com.tr/Haber.php?ID=7>

¹³⁷ Erciyes Dağı Mastır Planı, accessed on May 1, 2012.

<http://www.kayseri.bel.tr/web2/index.php?page=erciyes-master-plani-2>

redefine the urban hierarchy so as to empower the new business elites opposed to the Cami Kebir zone associated with small and medium entrepreneurs, and traditional petty bourgeoisie.

Generally, it is assumed that daily life practices in Kayseri are coded by the ideological outlook of small and medium entrepreneurs.¹³⁸ However, in the last decade, mayor Özhaseki and new business elites have changed this by displacing the ideological and cultural power of the Cami Kebir zone, and gained ultimate power over the daily life practices in Kayseri. With the expansion of manufacturing, construction and large-scale wholesale companies, those who have the power now constitute one pillar of the urban bloc, shared with the municipal body.

Some brief words of definition for this new business group are required. Simultaneous investment in various economic activities characterizes the defining aspects of the economic strategy of the new entrepreneurial class, also called the new business group, in Kayseri. This does not mean the peculiarity of the bourgeoisie in Kayseri, yet rather “the diversification of assets across a wide range of operations that constitute the defining aspects of many other entrepreneurial classes in the Americas and in Europe.”¹³⁹ Before the 1990s, Kayseri’s economy was based heavily on wholesale and retail trade, despite the existence of an already established industrial sector.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ Şükrü Karatepe, *Kendini Kuran Şehir* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2001), p. 204; Gürsel Korat, *Sokakların Ölümü: Kayseri ve Şehirlerimizde* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 1997), p. 15.

¹³⁹ Györgi Ranki, “The Development of the Hungarian Middle Class: Some East-West Comparisons,” in *Bourgeois Society in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, eds. Jürgen Kocka and Allan Mitchell (Oxford: Providence Press, 1993), pp. 444-448; Eric Hobsbawm, “The Example of the English Middle Class,” in Kocka and Mitchell, p. 129-135. For a detailed analysis of Britain in this respect, see William Rubinstein, *Wealth and the Wealthy in the Modern World* (London: Oxford University Press, 1980). Specifically, see pages 20-24, and 178-185.

¹⁴⁰ Doğan, pp. 91-101.




Fig. 1 Number of establishments over the years¹⁴¹

¹⁴¹ Turkish Statistical Institute (Turkstat), *Regional Indicators 2010 – Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat*. The reader should bear in mind that some of the figures in this chapter are for the region (Kayseri, Yozgat, and Sivas). It is plausible to state that these figures might be much higher when considering Kayseri alone, given Kayseri's economic and social advancement in the last 20 years as comparing to Sivas and Yozgat. For details, see Gül Berna Özcan, "Local Economic Development, Decentralization, and Consensus Building in Turkey," *Progress in Planning* 54, (2000), pp. 199-278.




Fig. 2 Turnover in YTL by sectors over the years¹⁴²

In Kayseri, the large-scale entrepreneurial elite pursued an economic interest in encompassing a wide range of manufacturing and service industries. According to Ali Ekber Doğan, manufacturing and commerce provided the elites' economic base.¹⁴³ This elite business group diversified its economic assets in many sectors, and has transferred those assets to take advantage of the moments of opportunity.

¹⁴² Turkstat, *General Census of Industry and Business Establishments 1992*.

¹⁴³ Ali Ekber Doğan, *Eğreti Kamusalılık: Kayseri Örneğinde İslamcı Belediyecilik* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınevi, 2007), p. 100.

With the opportunities presented by the globalization and post-1980s' liberalization, this group avoided over-specialization in one sector, which would hinder moving the assets into the more advantageous sector. In 2010, the new business group diverged from old businessmen specialized in commerce in small and medium-sized establishments. This group changed the urban hierarchy in favor of themselves.¹⁴⁴ It constituted a strong bond with the current urban bloc that created the basic conditions of the elite professional class' existence. This relation will be further evaluated below.

The second criterion that shows Kayseri as an entrepreneurial city is that the urban regime in Kayseri is an active agent with the ultimate and sole control over pursuing competitive strategies in an entrepreneurial fashion. This view holds that an urban bloc, as Jessop and Sum call it, is the sole determinant to mobilize "diverse social forces and organizational capacities around common entrepreneurial projects."¹⁴⁵ Kayseri as an entrepreneurial city acquired coherence as collective social forces mobilized to create more dynamic advantages and to share risks through dense social and institutional networks. Major local newspapers constantly support the city and its ruling elites;¹⁴⁶ many non-governmental organizations have been established to take advantage of the objectives of entrepreneurial strategies Kayseri publicly pursues (some of which were mentioned above);¹⁴⁷ and more specifically, religious communities and *oturmalar*,¹⁴⁸ which create an interpersonal and (inter)organizational structure, form a coherent and institutionally established urban bloc in Kayseri, consciously minded, with an entrepreneurial fashion in its strategies. It fills the felt need for socialization and for feelings of identity. All this

¹⁴⁴ Karatepe, p. 204; Doğan, p. 92.

¹⁴⁵ Jessop and Sum, p. 2291.

¹⁴⁶ Fuat Keyman and Berrin Koyuncu Lorasdağı, *Kentler: Anadolu'nun Dönüşümü, Türkiye'nin Geleceği* (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2010), p. 61; Doğan, p. 242-244.

¹⁴⁷ Doğan, pp. 242-267.

¹⁴⁸ Kayseri evening meetings are discussed by the end of this chapter.

social and economic networking has helped to transform Kayseri and has created a new urban bloc. At the same time, this transformation has arisen from religious traditionalism, and so, it would not be wrong to conclude that conservative social pressure has also risen in Kayseri.

The third criterion is simpler. Jessop and Sum write:

For it requires that the promoters of entrepreneurial cities adopt an entrepreneurial discourse, narrate their cities as entrepreneurial and market them as entrepreneurial. This involves the articulation of diverse economic, political and socio-cultural narratives and complementary non-narrative discourses to contextualize and reinforce calls for entrepreneurial action.¹⁴⁹

Kayseri's inhabitants are famous for their sharp wit and entrepreneurial spirit. They act like business people in every aspect of their lives, even in the mundane activities of daily life. Mayor Özhaseki stated that he acts like a businessperson as he rules the municipality; in each and every project, he first looks for potential trade-offs between profits and costs.¹⁵⁰ Such trade-offs involve "the portrayal of the local, urban, or regional economy as a distinctive object (of analysis, regulation, governance, conquest and/or other practices)," ¹⁵¹ and the social forces on various scales so as to promote urban and regional economy strategies and relevant extra-economic practices portrayed as essential to the potential accomplishments of the entrepreneurial strategies the city of Kayseri pursues.

Under the control of the urban bloc, the urban regime of Kayseri, in a Keynesian fashion, has made enormous investments in the infrastructure and housing market and other socially constructed economic relations including education, cultural, and public-private partnerships as in the fashion of the extra-economic phenomenon, "Where this strategy involves explicit reference to entrepreneurial narratives, strategies and self-identities, then the third criterion for an

¹⁴⁹ Jessop and Sum, p. 2292.

¹⁵⁰ Gül Berna Özcan, p. 258.

¹⁵¹ Hall and Hubbard, p. 165.

entrepreneurial city is also satisfied,”¹⁵² write Jessop and Sum to complete the theory of the entrepreneurial city.

Those criteria, by no means, are the only determinants of an entrepreneurial strategy or, the theory of the entrepreneurial city does not explain all the underlying mechanisms to understand the current system of power relations in Kayseri. Therefore, the above-mentioned theoretical approach to Kayseri still needs further explanations. This is because, as Hall and Hubbard write, “entrepreneurial cities that need further theoretical development and refinement... ..still at the early stages of design and implementation.”¹⁵³ However, it does give a useful perception to uncover those very same relations by providing a powerful analytical tool and it follows how their political outlook has built the necessary environment for the elite professional class to emerge. Now, I will discuss with this environment and its internal structure specifically.

Setting the Scene for the Elite Professional Class

The industrialization in Kayseri triggered a change in the occupational structure which was caused by the unique development of the service sector by the side of manufacturing and is the most prominent reason for the formation of the elite professional class. Although professional occupations are not equal to all the positions in the service sector, increasing demand for educated white-collar workers has affected the labor structure for much needed change for professionals. As Jung-Whan Lee argues, in many industrialized and late-industrialized countries, the service sector is the main engine behind the formation of professional class;¹⁵⁴ however, in

¹⁵² Jessop and Sum, p. 2229.

¹⁵³ Hall and Hubbard, p. 167.

¹⁵⁴ Jung-Whan Lee, “Industrialization and the Formation of the New Middle Class in Korea,” *Korea Journal of Population and Development* 23, no. 1 (1994), pp. 77-79.

the case of Kayseri, the real sector that fuels the development of the elite professional class is not only the service sector, but also the manufacture production in Kayseri, which has built one of the largest Turkish industrial zones. Kayseri is home for some of the best-known Turkish firms, which have become significant producers, not only for the local market, but also for Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Central Asia; particularly in the textile, metal and furniture sectors.¹⁵⁵




Fig. 3 The expectations for GDP per capita for Turkey and for Kayseri¹⁵⁶

Many conglomerates have joined the Kayseri economy. As can be seen from the figure below, many have attained unexpected success over the last two decades.¹⁵⁷ The largest numbers of

¹⁵⁵ Nasr.

¹⁵⁶ Berger, p. 34.

firms on the list belong to the textile and furniture sectors. Despite the increasing success of small and medium enterprises in Kayseri, it should be noted that firms from the city are still dwarfed by larger companies based in İstanbul, which continues to dominate the Turkish economy.¹⁵⁸ The most striking aspect of the last decade's industrialization is the increase in the number of establishments in the second list of 500 biggest companies of Turkey. In following an entrepreneurial manner, they shifted their capital into more profitable sectors such as manufacturing and construction.¹⁵⁹ Those sectors are the ones that have benefited the most from the recent wave of liberalization and economic progress in Kayseri. Many of them have created the basic conditions for the professional class to emerge, and to mainly be the active agents of the urban regime.

¹⁵⁷ The biggest firms in Kayseri, which are on the list, are: Kayseri Şeker Fabrikası, Merkez Çelik, Orta Anadolu, Boytaş-Hes, Hacılar Elektrik, İstikbal, Birlik Mensucat, Yataş, Erbosan, Saray Halı, Karsu, Boyteks, Keskinkılıç, Kumtel, Çetinkaya.

¹⁵⁸ Buğra and Savaşkan, p. 104.

¹⁵⁹ Doğan, p. 252.



Fig. 4 Number of firms in Kayseri on the list of the 1000 largest firms in Turkey¹⁶⁰

The largest number of companies in Kayseri are active in home products, furniture and construction sectors, And a number of firms in the city are active in producing for international markets. A remarkable increase in exports from Kayseri is one of the most important factors driving industrialization. As we can see in the following tables, in the last decade Kayseri has become one of the most industrialized centers of Turkey. Most of the businessmen in Kayseri indicate that state policies encourage exports; however, financial support by businessmen in Kayseri to participate in international fairs and exhibitions are the most important reason for the growing export capacity of the city.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ This information was compiled from various newspapers. <http://www.haberler.gen.al/2011-08-24/iso-ikinci-500-listesinde-kayseriden-22-firma-yer-aldi/>; <http://81ildenhaber.com/kayserihaberhaberleri-5457-ISO-500-e-Kayseri-damgasi/>; <http://yurthaber.mynet.com/detay/kayseri-haberleri/iso-ikinci-500-listesinde-kayseriden-22-firma-yer-aldi/41563>

¹⁶¹ Gül Berna Özcan, p. 259.




Fig. 5 Exports of Kayseri¹⁶²




Fig. 6 Imports of Kayseri¹⁶³

¹⁶² TurkStat.

¹⁶³ TurkStat.

It can be observed that from the 1980s onwards, the occupational pattern of the labor force in Kayseri experienced a decline in the rural labor force and an expansion in the second and tertiary sectors. Now in the 2010s, the service sector, instead of industrial, holds the largest proportion of the employment structure, as well as an expansion in the secondary sector. The following figure depicts those shifts.¹⁶⁴




Fig. 7 Employment by sectors 1985-2010¹⁶⁵

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Turkstat, *Regional Indicators 2010 – Kayseri*; Turkstat, *Census of Population, 1985, 1990, 2000*.




Fig. 8 Factions of new middle class by occupations over the years by sector¹⁶⁶

Since Kayseri embarked on an unprecedented scale of capitalist industrialization in the early 1980s, the new middle class has been the most rapidly expanding sector of the labor force. As is clear from Fig. 9, which presents changes in the class structure of Kayseri between 1985 and 2000, the new middle class continued to grow in absolute numbers and percentage of the work force. In 1985, the new middle class accounted for 15% of the total classes in the city center of Kayseri.¹⁶⁷ In 2000, however, its proportion of the total class structure increased to 22%.

¹⁶⁶ Turkstat, *Census of Population, 1985, 1990, 2000*; and TurkStat, *Regional*.

¹⁶⁷ Since my field of study is highly focusing on urbanized form of class, I exclude the agricultural strata from my analysis to make a healthy and clear comparison.




Fig. 9 The class structure in Kayseri between 1985-2000¹⁶⁸

The growth of the new middle class is much more noticeable when compared with changes in other classes in terms of overall trends. As seen in Fig. 9, the new middle class and the elite professional class have been continuously increasing since the 1990s. It is plausible to assume that ongoing industrialization and the expansion of the service sector of both classes are increased in absolute numbers, and the new middle class slightly increased its proportion in the work force.

¹⁶⁸ TurkStat does not give any detailed occupational slots for Kayseri after the 2000 Population Census. So I extrapolate the growth rate.




Fig. 10 Proportion of groups among new middle class¹⁶⁹

Within the broad category of the new middle class, there are several internal developments that give hints about changes in the overall economic structure of Kayseri. Fig. 10 presents the trends of groups among the new middle class between 1985 and 2000. First, during the last three decades, there were significant changes in the categorization of professionals\technicians, doctors\nurses, teachers, and the elite professional class. Since the 1980s, both professionals\technicians and doctors\nurses rose to 22% and 18%, respectively. Although the proportion of teachers slightly decreased, they still hold the largest proportion in the new middle class. Additionally, the elite professionals have increased slightly from 6% to 10%. On the other hand, the clericals have been following a slightly downward trend as a result of the privatization

¹⁶⁹ Turkstat, Census of Population, 1985, 1990, 2000.

wave of the 1980s.¹⁷⁰ In a broad way, these results were directly related to the economic development and urbanization Kayseri has undergone. During the 1980s, Kayseri concentrated on developing labor-intensive light industries based on the utilization of abundant labor and cheap wages.¹⁷¹ Parallel with the implementation of this strategy, the proportion of the manual working class increased steadily, whereas that of high-skilled professional\technicians in manufacturing was moderated (see Fig. 10 and Fig. 11).

This pattern of internal differentiation of the working force began to change as Kayseri shifted its economic structure to technology and capital-intensive medium industries¹⁷² in the 1990s, as well as rapid urbanization and pursual of a more expanded tertiary sector. This process can be labeled as one of proleterianization and polarization in both the second and tertiary sectors.¹⁷³ In Kayseri,

Proleterianization occurred through a transition from the agrarian tradition, a relative decline of the public sector, and an expansion of the working class, who worked in labor-intensive small or medium-sized establishments and often sold their labor without the obligatory social security coverage. Polarization entailed the growth of the private-sector entrepreneurial, professional and managerial stratum, and a simultaneous expansion of the informal sector.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁰ Doğan, p. 90; Hayriye Atik and Sevgi Sezer, “Kayseri’deki Aktif Nüfusun İstihdam Yapısı ve Sorunları,” in *Kayseri Sempozyumu* (Kayseri: Kayseri Ticaret Odası Yayınları, 2002), pp. 60-61.

¹⁷¹ Atik and Sezer, pp. 64-65.

¹⁷² Keyman and Lorasdağı, p. 50.

¹⁷³ Yunus Kaya, “Proleterianization with Polarization: Industrialization, Globalization, and Social Class in Turkey, 1980-2005,” *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility* 26 (2008), pp. 161-181.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 165-168.




Fig. 11 Subgroups of the professional class (percentages)¹⁷⁵

This polarization occurred in different sectors. In the case of the professional class, while professionals employed in the state sector dropped dramatically from 70% of overall professionals in the work-force in 1985 to 55% in 2000, their counterparts in the wholesale and retail trade sector bounced up to 20% in 2000 from 2% in 1985 (see Fig. 11). The professionals in manufacturing and construction increased in absolute numbers and their proportion was moderated, although they maintained their position with almost 27% in 2000. Therefore, if we assume ongoing developments in both the secondary and tertiary sectors, it is possible to state that the professional class in the private sector was larger than that of the state sector in 2010.

¹⁷⁵ Turkstat, Census of Population 1985, 1990, 2000.

The second process that has created the conditions for the elite professional class to emerge is rapid urbanization, as is the case in India or similar late-industrialized countries.¹⁷⁶ The term urbanization was coined to describe rapid rural-to-urban migration along with the structural transformations a city underwent, including industrialization, the expansion of infrastructural improvements, and the democratization of education.¹⁷⁷ The rural population left the agricultural mode of production in favor of the opportunities the city presented so as to pull this population to fill its empty occupational slots in the newly changed organizational structure.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶ Leela Fernandes, *India's New Middle Class* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 29-34.

¹⁷⁸ Keyman and Lorasdağı, p. 57.




Fig. 12 Urban population in years¹⁷⁹

Some scholars¹⁸⁰ claim that the high rate of urbanization, along with the construction of new shopping malls, trams, housing zones, and entertainment projects, makes Kayseri a city where all strata benefited from the recent wave of globalization and where a classless society emerged so as to transform Kayseri, and Anatolia, into a European and globalized area. However, the residences and houses constructed in the districts of Beyazşehir and Tavlusun, and other projects implemented by the urban bloc in Kayseri led to a change in the urban identity and motivated the urbanization of the city by the contrasts to the form and spatial order in which the stratification and classed identities of individuals are utter important.

¹⁷⁹ Turkstat, Regional Indicators 2010 – Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat

¹⁸⁰ Keyman and Lorasdağı., pp. 57-58.

This rapid urbanization also triggered a substantial growth of education that fueled the conditions for the elite professional class.¹⁸¹ As the industry shifted its focus from labor-intensive manufactured goods toward more advanced products, the sector demanded skilled labor and appropriate management techniques to further increase the value added to the products. Moreover, rapid urbanization has changed the formal relations between the state and civil society, or among the societal groups, which need a professionalization and institutionalization for efficiency of both state and civic organizations. Fig. 13 shows the absolute number of people who attended high school, university, and graduate school from 1990 to 2012.

¹⁸¹ Fernandes, pp. 3-10.




Fig. 13 School attending over the years¹⁸²

From the above discussion, we can conclude the relative size of the elite professional class in Kayseri by extrapolating our findings. It is virtually impossible to reach a firm conclusion on income levels as a proxy of the elitist characteristic of my subjects – a Weberian status indicator – and occupational allocation of professionals – a structural map in the Marxian sense – because TurkStat does not provide relevant data on city level analysis, not even at the regional level. Studying the re-categorization of the occupational map presented at the very beginning of this chapter and studying a basket of consumer products could be afforded by only the very wealthy of society¹⁸³ and can reveal a relative trend of the elite professional class in Kayseri from the 1980s to the 2010s.

¹⁸² Turkstat, Regional Indicators 2010 – Kayseri, Sivas, Yozgat; Turkstat, Census of Population, 1990, 2000.

¹⁸³ In 2013 prices, some consumer expenditures as means of differentiation for the elite professional class in Kayseri are: Recreation and Culture; Hotels, cafes, and restaurants; Luxury Furnishing; Education; Housing; and, Miscellaneous goods and services. Such a basket of consumer products will serve to identify the social space of the subject of this study, and the basket is equals approximately TL70000 per




Fig. 14 The size of the elite professional class in Kayseri over the years¹⁸⁴

year. Such indicator will serve a distinguishing instrument to identify wealthiest of society. Source, TurkStat, Consumer Prices Index, at <http://tuikapp.tuik.gov.tr/tufedagitimapp/?dil=2>

¹⁸⁴ Turkstat, Census of Population, 1985, 1990, 2000.

Oturmalar, or “Kayseri Evening Meetings”

One of the unique traditions that has continued over the centuries in Kayseri is *oturmalar*, the “evening meetings.” Usually during weekday nights, the individuals gather in one of their friends’ houses to discuss various issues in a wide range of topics including politics, economy, religion, cultural life, and so on. Today, these forms of meetings constitute a de facto hierarchy mirroring the exact same hierarchy in society. In the meetings, people gather around a semi caste-like system to reproduce their social bonds, to strengthen their differentiations, and to create new individual networks for their tangible and intangible interests. As Clark describes, “ties of trust, solidarity and teamwork develop along horizontal and vertical lines,¹⁸⁵ directly leading to the development of new social networks and, potentially, the diffusion of new ideas.”¹⁸⁶

During in-depth interviews, the respondents put a great emphasis on the importance of these meetings. In a society like Kayseri, where social stratification and economic equalities are real, yet not visible, and due to a high level of social solidarity and bonds that communities create in everyday life, the *oturmalar* are the ideal places for social capital to be produced and used for securing the identity of elite professionals. Elites discuss their work, organizational problems, current cultural life in Kayseri and its limitations, and recent political ideas and movements to see if there is any opportunity for them to seize more power. Many of those strategies are discussed in the following Chapter.

¹⁸⁵ Vertical lines refer to different levels in a hierarchy (as levels of social class or income group); while horizontal refers to the same level in a hierarchy in society.

¹⁸⁶ Jannie A. Clark, *Islam, Charity and Activism* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), p. 4.

CHAPTER 5

DELINEATING THE BORDER FOR THE ELITE PROFESSIONAL CLASS IN KAYSERI

This chapter discusses the outcomes of my own field study within the framework or methodology that this particular thesis offers. As illustrated previously, this study employs a relational theory of class to understand the classed characteristics of the elite professional class in Kayseri. Specifically, the formation of elite professional identity will be analyzed through different ways in which habitus of individuals are constructed and the ways which are produced and secured by individualized strategies of everyday struggle over everything that concerns the art of living.

The structural approach to Kayseri's economic and cultural patterns explains why certain strategies can be accompanied but not others. I conceptualize four different, but related methods in which the elite professional class constructs its social space and, subsequently, its identity. First, the social trajectories that trigger the initial formation of identity have the utmost importance for the formation of social space of elite professionals. Their meaning sheds light upon what it means to be an educated professional and understanding the transfer of certain values and ideas to their offspring. Second, lifestyle habits and cultural consumption define the reproduction of the social space so the elite professional class can transfer its economic capital into cultural and social capital as well.

Third, social networks and boundaries of the elite professional class further delineate to the borders of the social space to which only the elite professionals belong. This qualitative study shows that symbolic boundaries are as powerful and concrete as objective distance of the social. Finally, stemming from the above strategies, individualized strategies composed the art of politics, which are a dynamic process actively reproducing existing structural social inequalities and, at the same time, producing a discourse of critique that promotes a liberal and democratic

outlook for Kayseri. All of the respondents stated that they were highly tolerant of the recent boost of immigration into Kayseri, held liberal attitudes toward societal differences in today's society, and, several of them were active in non-governmental organizations to endorse educational projects and philanthropic deeds.

During fieldwork in Kayseri, 14 in-depth interviews were conducted and, although there were some exceptional cases, there was a pattern with respect to the experience of the respondents' class position. Results revealed that elements, including the composition of the different forms of capital and the class trajectory, affect class practices and create homogenous professional-classed identities. Since they had acquired high status in society it would be hard to access them; fortunately, my personal contacts, who had good relationships with these people, thanks to strong social ties particular to Kayseri, assisted me. They intervened on my behalf and arranged introductions. For the remaining interviewees, I benefited from the snowball method; thus, I chose these names among the friends of the first group. The interviews were conducted in either homes or offices or in other locations according to the preference of the respondents. Tertiary location choices or living-space atmospheres provided additional information about their lifestyles and socio-economic conditions. Since the interviews lasted several hours, tape-recordings were used to prevent loss of information. The interview questionnaire included several questions inquiring about personal information, family background, spiritual life, work life, leisure activities, tourism, political participation, and preferences, as well as consumption patterns, including food consumption, restaurant choice, cultural consumption and living-space preferences. For the purpose of this study the list of categories is limited by pin-pointing new distinction strategies that are narrated through family trajectories, social space of lifestyle, social relations and political agenda.

Before passing to the analysis, I would like to introduce the general pattern I found within the elite professional identities of the respondents in brief. The respondents work in three sectors: manufacturing, construction, and finance; all of which have been recorded as having proportionally the highest increasing rate of production in Kayseri.

The respondents ranged in age from 40 to 61. The average age for male respondents in the sample was 51 years and the average age for female respondents was 44 years. With regards to education, all respondents had BA degrees respecting their field of work and three of them had post-graduate degrees. Ten of the respondents started their professional careers in their current workplaces, which were start-up businesses, 20 years ago. All of the respondents were married with children, except two recently divorced mothers and half of them had been introduced to their spouses with arranged meetings by their parents. Interestingly, all of the respondents, except one, were born and started their careers in Kayseri. This was surprising because Kayseri has reached a level of manufacturing and service that has made it one of the most economically developed cities in Turkey in 30 years. However, this very reason also stemmed from the fact that most business enterprises in Kayseri are family-owned companies. Thus, it is not surprising that the respondents' first careers started with personal connections along with the quality of their professional training. Most spouses are unemployed, and eight of these spouses had university degrees. All respondents significantly followed the trajectory of upward mobility both in terms of economic and cultural capital, so that their established tastes were not transmitted by their families of origin, but acquired in the way of daily practices for the art of living.

The demographics of the sample, described below, illustrate an upper-middle class population with college backgrounds, white collar\professional occupations, lower-middle class backgrounds, economically in favor of lesser state intervention, and politically in favor of expanding civil rights. The following table gives information on the household income, gender

and occupation of the respondents. Pseudonyms are given in order to label the respondents, while quoting from their narrations.

Table 2. Demographics¹⁸⁷

Name	Sex	Age	Occupation	Monthly Income
Ahmet	45	M	Senior Project Manager	10000-7500
Ayhan	59	M	Head of Planning Department	+10000
Sami	54	M	CEO	+10000
Şenol	53	M	Executive Director	+10000
Kemal	51	M	Head of Human Resources	+10000
Murat	53	M	CEO	+10000
Savaş	45	M	Head of Project Dept.	10000-7500
Filiz	42	F	Head of Finance Department	10000-7500
Nazif	61	M	Executive Director	+10000
Namık	44	M	Head of Production Dept.	10000-7500
Şafak	47	F	Head of Sales Dept.	10000-7500
Aydın	55	M	CEO	+10000
Hakan	40	M	Head of Sales & Planning Dept.	10000-7500
Selma	42	F	Ex-Executive Director, now Independent	10000-7500

Although many of the subjects of this study perform managerial positions in their daily work routines, their identifying characteristics still portray them as being professional, not managerial, elites. They thought of themselves as professionals, they stressed their professional education, and they highlighted their career trajectory as ascending the steps thanks to their professional training. If a group refers to itself as one thing, how can a social scientist defy that a priori knowledge?

¹⁸⁷ Data was collected during interviews in April of 2012.

Strategies of Distinction

Formation of Families

Analysis of the interviews revealed that the majority of respondents' backgrounds were lower middle class. Most of them grew up in single income households, which affected the overall household budget in a negative way and they experienced a rupture in their class trajectories. Indeed, their parents are mostly either rural traditional middle class or urban lower-middle\working class in class terms. Moreover, they have experienced a recent upward mobility. Bourdieu argues that, the trajectory, apart from the amount and composition of capital, is the third element that is effective in shaping class habitus. Through the analysis, it also will be evident how those with a lower background sustain a greater urge to delineate the borders for established tastes and stronger boundaries, and at the same time, to conserve the traditional values and norms of society that are a cause of constant negotiating for the art of living.

Much has been written about kinship patterns, family, and the central place of the extended family in Turkey.¹⁸⁸ In everyday Turkish life, the predominant kinship system depends upon male descent and inheritance. The case is truer for Kayseri, as the rural networks and underdeveloped industry of Kayseri promoted such societal norms in a way that almost all of the respondents started their careers in Kayseri, specifically in their present companies.

After I completed my education at Ankara University, I started looking for a job. However, being the oldest son of my father, and having responsibilities to my parents, I had to come back to Kayseri. Before going to any job interviews, I came here and started work for Sami Boydak.¹⁸⁹ At first, my father wanted me to work with my uncle, who owned a small workshop for furniture manufacturing. However, after a few months, my

¹⁸⁸ The Ministry of Family and Social Policies, *Türkiye'de Aile Yapısı Araştırması 2011* (Ankara: Afşaroğlu Matbaası, 2011).

¹⁸⁹ Founder of Boydak Group, owner of İstikbal, Bellona, and Mondri.

uncle decided to send me to Boydak's workshop because he believed that my university education would be most benefited there. And, since 1984, I've been here, with Sami Boydak's son, and for the company. If it was not for my uncle, I might be still working for his small workshop, which is now working for an outsourcing company for Boydak Group.¹⁹⁰

My father never wanted to send to me to college for higher education because, after I finished my high school, I worked for Mustafa Eraslan for almost 2 years as a construction worker. He [my father] believed I'd be better off being a simple worker, rather than wasting my time and his money in college, where students were at constant war with each other. Nevertheless, I secretly studied for the entrance exam after work, and achieved great success for me and my family history. Then, my father changed his mind and sent me to the Civil Engineering Faculty at Gazi University. During my university years, I continued to work at construction sites to make my living. When I finished school, without further thinking, I came directly to Kayseri and started working for Mustafa Eraslan for two reasons. First, my mother found me a suitable, decent bride and I did not want to delay my plans to build a family and raise children of my own. Second, the market was so tough back then, and living in a strange city would destroy me both economically and morally.¹⁹¹

I started my career as public prosecutor in Gaziantep. But, as soon as I finished my mandatory service period as a public servant, I came to Kayseri because I was not cut out for this job or this line of work. Besides, I constantly heard from my parents that there were several new factories planning to open in Kayser, and my uncle, who started one of them (Karamancı Group), said to me they needed a professional manager. Though I am not trained in this particular field, I am good with people and I have an understanding of analytical production processes. Also, they wanted someone they could trust, so my uncle vouched for me and my good character opened the path for me. So, I found myself in this company, and have worked here ever since.¹⁹²

It is clear that all of the respondents experienced remarkable upward mobility thanks to their educational capital, and in some cases, social relations, which became valuable after a certain level of educational capital was acquired.

Without exception, respondents give primary importance to the education of their children. Almost all of them send their children to private colleges, hire after school tutors, and pay for specially planned sport training. Indeed, the child rearing practices and the evaluative

¹⁹⁰ Nazif, 61, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 3, 2012.

¹⁹¹ Sami, 54, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 1, 2012.

¹⁹² Kemal, 51, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

schemas determining the qualities that the children should be equipped with are something they were deprived of in their childhood. When Nazif talked about his early career years, he said:

I worked twice as hard as anybody else to save some extra money for my children's educational expenses. In those years, I even sacrificed owning a car or luxury products for more savings. I always tell my children that regardless of whatever will happen to me, you always need to look for yourselves.¹⁹³

In her study, Thrall identifies the “orchestrated achievement” techniques employed by professional parents who think that today's children need distinguishing achievements in their childhood to prosper in their life.¹⁹⁴ The elite professional parents continuously invest both enormous time and energy to transfer certain attributes to their offspring and, by doing that, the professional parents secure not only their social spaces, but that of their children too.

Apart from the parents' attempts to equip their children with a high level of formal education, they also organize out of school activities in order to transfer a certain field of interests which they perceive as creating necessary distinction. Both family resources and free time are mostly devoted to the activities that children want to engage in.

We carefully planned our after school time. We hired two private tutors, one for improving her English, and the other for music lessons. We don't want to interfere with her homework, so we planned each day to minimize any negative effects. I think it's equally important for our daughter to have socially healthy relations with her friends, so we are thinking about cancelling one of the private classes with a group lesson. Thus, she can meet with the alike friends, and that would be good for her character development.¹⁹⁵

When directly asked, most of the respondents also emphasized strongly the importance decisions regarding the choice of spouse. As stressed in Chapter 21, the foundation of marriage is also an important tool to secure the identity of elite professionals.

All my family has lived in Alparslan.¹⁹⁶ If I am inclined to marry again, I want to make sure that I can continue my lifestyle in Alparslan. It is not just about me, but about my

¹⁹³ Nazif, 61, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 3, 2012.

¹⁹⁴ Thrall, p. 21.

¹⁹⁵ Selma, 42, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 5, 2012.

¹⁹⁶ One of, if not the, richest neighborhood in Kayseri, along with Çay Bağları neighborhood.

family [mainly her daughter], my neighbors, and my friends too. You take someone into your circle, making them important actors in your life. If you start to think about those things, you ask yourself, “is he really worthy of my family, my daughter, my lifestyle? I am in such an age that I cannot change my world view as I could do in my twenties.”¹⁹⁷

Many of the respondents also want to make sure their offspring would follow the right trajectory for their social space.

I cannot say that I won't interfere with my daughter's choice of groom. There are lots of good qualities in one's character, and it's important to have them all. I know that; however, I think she should marry someone who can at least be certain that she gets all the things she deserves and much more.¹⁹⁸

Family trajectories certainly mark an important phase in the formation of classed identities because the transfer of both economic and cultural capital available to parents determines how and where the elite professionals began their career. That is why childrearing strategies have the same importance for them as securing the social space. Its practice directly moves toward the mental map of the offspring who are accompanied by distinguished attributes in their early years to take advantage of future years.

Lifestyle and Cultural Consumption

This study finds that, in Kayseri, the salaries commanded by the upwardly mobile elite professionals in manufacturing and service sectors have had a huge impact on the sociocultural landscape. In recent years, Kayseri has seen the emergence of shiny office buildings, 5-star restaurants, gated communities, shopping malls, and complex entertainment centers thriving with business. The case is especially true for the elite professionals who have acquired a disproportionate amount of economic capital. In general terms, their incomes afford them, at the

¹⁹⁷ Selma, 42, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 5, 2012.

¹⁹⁸ Ahmet, 45, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 1, 2012.

minimum, two or three apartments in Kayseri, with at least two cars, and most of them can travel abroad on a regular basis.

Social groups use consumer goods, not just to reflect social divisions, but to dynamically construct distinctions between social groups. The elite professional class tends to distinguish themselves from the lower-middle class in several ways. First, they want to separate themselves through conspicuous consumption. On the other hand, they tend to distinguish themselves from the people who have high economic capital, but low cultural capital by choosing modest brand products and pretending to be indifferent to such luxury products.

Necessities for the elite professionals include an apartment, automobiles, the latest smart phones, LCD TVs, and many modern daily life electronics/conveniences. According to Hakan (M, 40), a manager at a plastic manufacturing company, it is the fast pace of life that has made it necessary to own these consumer durables,

Gadgets are becoming more and more a necessity to quicken your work. Once upon a time, all these gadgets were considered a luxury, but in today's life, if you want to squeeze the time, and make it faster, and to make some free time, you need these things. It's a question of where you are in life and how you want to use your time.¹⁹⁹

It was no surprise to see that all respondents owned smart phones or a tablet (sometimes both), but even the oldest respondent, Nazif(M, 61), owned a smart phone and a PDA used to translate his voice to text to save more time. While many respondents talked about how sensitive their workplace was to work-life balance, the truth is that it is often at the cost of home. Only when the deadlines at work have been met, can they have time off to attend to personal issues. The gadgets mentioned above, that are now available on the globalized market, are offered as timesaving devices to get things done faster and more efficiently, so that one has some free time. Thus, time

¹⁹⁹ Hakan, 53, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 5, 2012.

becomes a commodity that can be seized and made to go faster, and often a luxury that seems vague.

Although elite professionals display conspicuous consumption patterns, they also like to consider themselves to be frugal people. There are two reasons for this observation. First, the frugal code of morals is believed to be something important and should be followed regardless of one's economic conditions. Second, many of the respondents believe that the rich in Kayseri show off their frugal manners wherever they go, so that the respondents believe that this is something one should praise. Ironically, while the respondents do not show off their wealth, at least this is what they claim, they are proud to be frugal and do not avert to show it off in a conspicuous way. Although they claim they are indifferent to many luxury products, they unconsciously showed their branded products during the interviews.

Nazif (M, 61) is an executive manager in Boydak Group. He comes from a village background, and his parents are both peasants. After graduating from a non-elite university, Ankara University, he joined his current company in 1984 during his twenties. In the beginning, this company was small and just had a few employees working in a furniture workshop. However, over the years, the company doubled its size. As a result, Nazif was transformed from his humble origins into a millionaire. His wife is a housewife and, thanks to Nazif's success, she drives an Audi A6 Sedan, and changes her car every few years. They have two children and both are educated abroad. He showed me his son's reward ceremonies using their Apple TV box connected to their LED TV in his home, which was furnished with the best of home electronics. His family lives with their parents now, but he plans to buy another bigger apartment. When talking about his consumption patterns, he explained that:

I am not like someone who tries constantly to show off what he wears, where he goes, where he eats, etc. I don't care for such things. If something is durable and usable, I don't look at the price to assess whether it is valuable or not. Some luxury products are, in my

eyes, useless if you compare with things more cheap, yet more durable. You must remember that when the Head of IMF came to Turkey, he went to a mosque, and naturally he takes his shoes off before entering the mosque. Do you remember what did our press write about that? One of the socks he was wearing has holes in it. Perhaps our press can mock him, I mean the head of IMF, yet I praise this man. He doesn't care for his look, or in this case, his sock, as long as he does his job right. People should show off this virtue instead of their branded products.²⁰⁰

Thus, we can conclude from Nazif's conversation that he was not an advocate for conspicuous consumption and showing off. He believed that genuinely rich people do not consume to excess, and he wanted to emulate this attitude. When talking about his wife, he said,

Thanks to our *oturmalar*, my wife has to attend many women's gatherings, almost every day of the week. She has a busy schedule. Many of her friends are married with wealthy and important figures in Kayseri society. Since they are gathering in one's home, we should be careful to design our home accordingly, to not insult our guests. Sometimes my wife and I talk about such meetings, and she frequently tells me how the other women dressed, or carried expensive bags, etc. I know they do not show off their bags or dress in a blatant manner, yet if you have friends who share the same set of values, you should also share the same values. I can say bags, you can say something else.²⁰¹

We can see that his arguments conflict during our conversation. He did in fact buy products to show off wealth and status to secure his social space in relation to social interactions with his friends.

In our conversation, Şafak (F, 47) frequently states her indifferent manner toward luxury products. When I noticed her expansive bag she stated,

I did not know at the time this is an expansive bag, yet a friend of mine told me that it is. My husband and I bought it when we were in Italy from a street shopper, so I directly thought that it couldn't be that expensive. I actually don't care about its price as long as it looks good on me.²⁰²

Schor argues that although "in modern consumer societies, traditional taboos against envy, competition, and unlimited accumulation have been reduced, this taboo has not totally

²⁰⁰ Nazif, 61, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 3, 2012.

²⁰¹ Nazif, 61, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 3, 2012.

²⁰² Şafak, 47, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 4, 2012.

disappeared.”²⁰³ To some degree, this also applies in Kayseri. Hence, the elite professionals tend to display their status by announcing their moral virtues, as they believe that really rich people do not show off.

The presentation of self also functions as the strategy of distinguishing one’s social space from the others. Due to the status of the respondents in society and in the organization, they think they need to be well dressed. Murat (M, 53), worked in the renewable energy industry. After he graduated from Hacettepe University as an electrical engineer, he thought Kayseri was at the outset of the economic boost in the mid-1980s, even though there is no physical evidence to prove that, unlike during the mid-1990s. He came to Kayseri, and has been working for Eziņ Group ever since. When we met at his office, he welcomed me with a firm handshake, framed by the impressive watch he wore.

We need to be dressed properly, not only when going to meet clients, but also in the workplace. It is true that we are a family, with our boss and with our workers; however, people regard me as a role model; a big brother to follow. I must behave accordingly. In the old days, having the right type of cosmetics, branded stuff and all, earlier these were luxuries, now, however, they are a necessity.²⁰⁴

The same is true for Aydın (M, 55). He is the only person who was not born in Kayseri and did not grow up in Kayseri, yet he is the CEO of Kilim Furniture, a major furniture manufacturing firm located in Kayseri.

Of course, I would not fire anybody for dressing badly. It is not that. However, I want my employees to dress properly to show their respect for their company. We established a sort of company culture in which we believe workers can work more productively and peacefully. So, we established some sets of rules for both men and women. We are not dictating anything; we are not dictators (laughs!)... I personally follow the popular media, newspapers, and magazines about grooming, current fashion, and exercise.²⁰⁵

²⁰³ Schor, p. 94.

²⁰⁴ Murat, 53, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

²⁰⁵ Aydın, 55, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 4, 2012.

Those preferences have also spatial reflections. In other words, while spending their leisure time, the respondents prefer neighborhoods in which they feel comfortable. Indeed, as will be discussed in detail while analyzing social networks, the neighborhoods of Alparslan and Çay Bağları are the places where they mostly spend their leisure time.

We usually wander around the places in Alparslan more since they have decent cafes and shopping centers, unlike downtown, which is a really crowded and confusing place. Every time I go there I wonder, ‘who are these people continuously wandering around, or sitting around all day long?’²⁰⁶

The neighborhood of Çay Bağları is preferred because the lifestyle of the people in the neighborhood allows the respondents to pursue their individualized ways of living. One of my respondents clearly praised his lifestyle habits over others.

Many of my friends live here. I know Kayseri is not a very big city like İstanbul or Ankara, yet when you are doing a morning jog, it is a very good thing that your friend lives nearby. Some of my other friends complain about the noise in apartments, or children screaming all day. We don’t have such things here. More importantly, I know if my children go out to the playground, I know certainly that they will be okay. This is something you cannot buy from a market.²⁰⁷

Fernandes’ study in India showed that, with the liberalization of the economy, the new middle class actively participates in the ideology of globalizing consumerism.²⁰⁸ Such consumerism also comes with a certain level of anxiety. This is truer for Kayseri as well because, after the 1980s economic liberalization and boost in Kayseri’s socioeconomic life, elite professionals, who have the necessary means of economic and cultural capital, immersed in a new way of life. At first, given their purchasing power, the attitudes toward spending money and consumption practices outlined above, it may appear that conspicuous consumption has come to define the elite professionals in the post-liberalization period. While there may be some truth in such an assumption, it is an incomplete story. Consumption comes with its own share of anxieties. While

²⁰⁶ Selma, 42, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 5, 2012.

²⁰⁷ Aydın, 55, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 4, 2012.

²⁰⁸ Leela Fernandes, *India’s New Middle Class* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006).

many appreciate the material comforts they are able to buy with their incomes, the elite professionals are nostalgic about the losses they have suffered in the pursuit of upward mobility.

In my childhood, I made a promise to myself to earn so much money that I can buy whatever I want and I can eat whatever I want. Now I'm 59, and fortunately, I earned a great sum of money during my hardworking years. Not just for me, but for my parents, and for my children as well. In my childhood, we always had to wait to the first day of the month to buy something, if my parents even agreed to buy it. Now I can see that my children are happy for what I bought for them. I sometimes see they are throwing their stuff even after a month. Perhaps we didn't have much as compared to my children, yet those things bought for us have special meanings for me. I still remember how I slept with my present of shoes for the religious holidays.²⁰⁹

Some, like Ayhan, are aware of the link between income and rising consumption of professionals. The availability of goods and services on the globalized market fuels consumption and the need to earn more in order to consume more. This is an important reason that consumption assures them a high place in a status-oriented society, and they grasp it eagerly to make sense of a rapidly changing sociocultural scenario.

Others express dissatisfaction regarding the fast pace of today's life and wish they had more time on their hands.

Having relaxed working hours is a luxury for me. I don't have it right now; relaxed working hours, and having some time for your personal life. That's become a very costly thing for me. [After I asked him that having a managerial occupation, one might assume that timetables at the workplace would be more flexible] No, it is certainly not. If I continued my work as a professional engineer, I certainly would have more time for myself, or my family. But being a professional manager, I have to monitor all production activities, sale plans, workplace order, and consulting services to the bosses. It is certainly life-consuming.²¹⁰

Ironically, they criticize the lifestyle for which they strived so hard for as leading to an erosion of middle class values such as spending time with children and respecting and taking care of the elders. They are replaced by taking vacations once or twice a year, or buying things for their children to show affection:

²⁰⁹ Ayhan, 59, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

²¹⁰ Murat, 53, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

I can notice a dramatic rupture the way my family lives and myself. I have my perks and bonuses, yet I do praise one or two things about my parents' life. I mean, we were a family in the literal sense. Sit together, eat together... Private tutors see my children more than me. My father wasn't the friendliest person I've ever met, yet at least, back in my mind, I always know that he is my father, a great authority, the backbone of my family. I still admire him the way I always did. I don't know if my children see me as I see my father.²¹¹

Modern life for the elite professionals has its share of pleasures and worries. For many respondents, their income and lifestyle set them apart from their parents. They are happy to note that they can provide their family with almost anything they wish for, and enjoy a better lifestyle than their parents ever had. However, it also comes with more demanding workloads that keep them away from their family for long hours, gives them the loss of community, the health impact of stress, and finally, the feeling that they are not fully enjoying what they earn. Therefore, the elite professionals are confused about following a modernized lifestyle, defying old habits, and, at the same time, appreciating the nostalgic past that reminds them of the golden years of family values and happiness.

As Weininger argued, "the people who are endowed primarily with economic capital distinguish themselves through the pursuit of luxury goods and a carefully crafted opulence, while those who have more cultural capital tend to express their taste by practicing a cultural asceticism adjusted to the most intellectually demanding and least expensive forms of culture."²¹² Established norms of Kayseri and Islamic culture gives Kayseri a different set of cultural resources and perspectives; therefore, in Kayseri, elite professionals, who primarily possess economic capital, also distinguish themselves from the middle class through conspicuous consumption, but they further emphasize their frugal quality.

²¹¹ Namık, 44, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 4, 2012.

²¹² Elliot Weininger, "Foundations of a Pierre Bourdieu's Class Analysis," in *Approaches to Class Analysis*, edited by Erik Olin Wright (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 94.

The set of daily life preferences including the preferences of the leisure time activities and neighborhood constitutes the background image of cultural codes and the symbolic boundaries that this specific elite professional class forms and reproduces. Therefore, after presenting this background image, in the next section, how this specific formation constructs their mental maps and evaluative distinctions that determine the nature of their classed identity will be discussed.

Social Networks and Boundaries

I observed that cultural boundaries, as well as moral boundaries, are very strong within the mental map of the elite professionals. The preferences of the respondents on making friendships are dependent on many factors, including the level of education, cultural capital, social manners, and so on. A graduate from the Law School at Ankara University, Kemal (M, 51) talked about his hard years in college and how he and his friends are still in contact with each other.

The closest friends I got share the same values and habits with me. This makes it what we called a good friendship. I occasionally participate with the *oturmalar* gathered by my high school friends, and I always think, ‘what if I did not go to the university and become a professional manager, and, instead, became an owner of a small market?’ Certainly I cannot keep my good relationship with my current friends. I would not understand what they say, nor would they understand me. It is something your background and yourself make, a path. Our path consists of like-minded individuals who enjoy good conversation, discuss politics, etc.²¹³

Similar levels of education and similar evaluative schemas are defined as necessary conditions of forming social relationships. Savaş (M, 45) completed his university education in Yıldız Technical University as a civil engineer. After growing used to the lifestyle of Istanbul, he discussed how hard his first years were in Kayseri; where he came after the death of his father. Now he works for a major construction firm as head of the project management department and

²¹³ Kemal, 51, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

spends his time mostly with his co-workers or his friends at a civil society they founded to promote educational projects in technical high schools.

I have lots of friends from all kinds of backgrounds, but those I hold dear to me are the ones who enjoy the same things as me. Since I work so many hours, I do not really have time to make new friends. Instead, I am making stronger connections with my closest friends. You know what they say, you cannot choose your family, but you can choose your friends. I don't agree with this statement. I mean, how can you choose someone in a particular time and place to come to you and you know you will be good friends? That really depends on where you live, where you go, and what you do with your life. I don't have much doctor or lawyer friends, and I believe many doctors and lawyers don't have a civil engineer as a friend in their friendship circles.²¹⁴

Family trajectories certainly play a determining role in the shaping of habitus and mental maps of the elite professionals. As outlined above, some of the respondents delineate the borders for their social and cultural lives against the somewhat unworthy ones who have not made it into the circle of the professional, urban, educated, upper-middle class environment. Stressing their tolerance of every group in society and narrowing their social networks into a handful people, the elite professionals in Kayseri not only distinguish themselves from the lower-middle classes, but also from the above as well; the bourgeoisie. During the interviews, a pattern was established in terms of regarding the bosses and their lifestyles: an appreciation.

Şenol (M, 53) earned his engineering degree from Ankara in the early 1980s. Soon he realized the tough market conditions and came to Kayseri to benefit from his university education. After working for some years in various construction companies, his father pulled some strings in his kinship network, and Şenol started work for the Korkmaz Group. Afterwards, both the company and Şenol accomplished many successful projects. When we met at his office, I could not help but notice that he was tanned in mid-April. He is known to be socially very active and spends his leisure time at Erciyes Mountain skiing. During the interview, he often

²¹⁴ Savaş, 45, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 3, 2012.

stressed his appreciation to his boss and his help for him. When asked about his social relationship with his bosses, he mentioned:

We are very close. Last year the big boss (older son in the family-owned company) invited me to his son's wedding at Çırağan Palace, and we were seated near their table. Had I done the wedding, I would certainly welcome them as the way they did to me. In all Bayrams, my family and I go to their houses and pay our respect. In the last instance, I owe them a great deal because they hired me in their office and gave me lots of responsibilities, even though I was inexperienced in the field and recently graduated. I never made them regret their trust in me. [After asking him if he ever goes to Erciyes with them] It would not be appropriate. Several times they have called me to their villa to go to hunting, but I have always refused that. I have made my professional career on my education, training, and my experience in the field, so if I get any close to them, I would definitely hurt our work relations. I have lots of friends, professionals and managers, and some of my friends are lifting some boundaries, yet they are working in rather small companies. That won't work here for both parties.²¹⁵

Ahmet (M, 45) had a different perspective on the subject:

You know people in Kayseri socialize through *oturmalar* (Kayseri evening meetings).²¹⁶ In there, you'll never see me with my boss. I have my friends from my circle and he has his own. What could we talk about in a meeting with them? I have a villa of my own, but don't have any servants or regular daily maids. But the boss is used to being served, and I don't think my wife would love the idea after a few times. Besides, he wants to talk about new acquisitions, company mergings, and so on. I have a different set of interests.²¹⁷

It is clear that Ahmet and many others have already internalized the social hierarchy and distinguished level of the bourgeoisie. As was discussed in Chapter 4, individuals in Kayseri use these networks to create what Alberto Melucci calls "network meaning: communities that accept, internalize, and promote a particular set of values."²¹⁸ Their way of accepting cultural and social norms are echoed in their socialization preferences, which dynamically shape their mental maps according to their habitus. It is worth noting that above respondents and some others feel in debt to their bosses because they have been working for them, in some cases, almost 20 years. By conserving the social hierarchy through means of different socialization strategies, some of the

²¹⁵ Şenol, 53, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

²¹⁶ For detailed analysis, see Chapter 4, "Theorizing Kayseri."

²¹⁷ Ahmet, 45, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 1, 2012.

²¹⁸ Melucci, p. 75.

elite professionals are reproducing their place in society by distinguishing themselves from both directions, below and above.

Regardless of their intention, the elite professionals consciously differentiate themselves from below and above through establishing shared individualized practices as per their classed identities which echo in a society of social inequalities and different competing social groups. I repeatedly asked whether they actually had at heterogeneity within their network. Filiz (F, 42) said:

I am not a very social person. From home to work, from work to home... The places I go generally are limited in number and the only people coming from those places are those who have a certain amount of money. Even if they have the money, they would prefer somewhere else, where their friends would go. The same is true for my *oturma* group [she refers to her friends, who meet regularly in one of their houses]. If someone comes to my house, he or she knows what to expect. A TV, certain sofas, and so on... Even what we eat is also defined prioritarily on the basis of our lifestyle preferences. But, assume a co-worker from a different background comes to my house. I don't know what to serve them. I cannot help myself but think, "what would they think about my salon? My kitchen? Will our children get along with each other?" All sorts of these questions make me nervous, so I think my guests at home are normally the people I already know.²¹⁹

As seen from the above comments, *oturmalar* serve as a foundation to form sets of boundaries to defend the elite professionals against the outer world. Hence, the networks that link the elite professionals of Kayseri are highly conducive to the development of social capital, such as, trust, solidarity, and identity that underlay the classed characteristics of those individuals. Those forms of meetings constitute a de facto hierarchy that mirrors the same one in society.

They create a code of moral laws, cultural practices, lifestyle behaviors, educational and professional credentials, and socioeconomic boundaries so as to define themselves and their environments. Simultaneously, the defined concepts also define their identities in return by creating a dynamic circle of production and reproduction of selves of elite professionals. It is seen that their families and personal trajectories create an urge to defend their hard-working

²¹⁹ Filiz, 42, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 3, 2012.

positions in society, so that they developed a certain set of defensive mechanisms against every social group, whether below or above. Their mental maps cause differentiation to spatial and temporal relations with others, and the very tangible products of their lives also shape their mental maps. This relational relationship also is echoed in their political outlook toward society, other social groups, and the government.

The Politics of the Good Life

Bourdieu²²⁰ writes that the new middle class fights for everything related to the art of living. Unlike the old middle class, who pursue a stable position in the hierarchy and a relatively good life, Klaus Eder²²¹ contends that the new middle class pursues “personal aggrandizement, autonomy, and competition.”

The social character of the elite professional class must be defined both in terms of what professional means and how elitism interferes in concept. One of the classic studies toward the ideology of professionals comes from Barbara and John Ehrenreich.²²² The professional-managerial class, according to the Ehrenreichs, is “a subdominant authority class, the members of which are subordinate to propertied and top managerial elites and also exercise social or cultural authority over nonprofessional workers.” Theorists characterize the professional-managerial class as not only “antagonistic to business,” but also more “egalitarian” and “reformist” than the business class. In the area of personal values, the Ehrenreichs have stated “the professional-managerial class, in contrast to the old/traditional middle class, as more intellectually oriented, less

²²⁰ Bourdieu. *Distinction*.

²²¹ Klaus Eder, *The New Politics of Class* (London: Sage, 1993), p. 175.

²²² Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich, *The Professional*.

materialistic, more interested in quality-of-life issues and self-fulfillment, and less restrictive on sexual and moral issues.”²²³

Findings in Kayseri are different from what the Ehrenreichs have stated. First, I found that, in the last instance, the influence of place in the cultural and social hierarchies is stronger than for any other independent variable, including educational trajectories, backgrounds, occupational place, and lifestyle practices. This is because elitism in and the upper-echelon of certain professionals in Kayseri leads them to develop their own individualized strategies against and for the struggle over everything that concerns the art of living, and maintain their privileged statuses over society. Therefore, they produce a set of political outlooks including promoting economic liberalism and growing a culture of critical discourse against the political elites.

Professionals enjoy the superior labor market opportunities by advantage of their skills, culture, and training.²²⁴ Therefore, it is to be expected that they would be overwhelmingly conservative in response to unrestricted market competition. In his interview, Kemal (M, 51) told me about his strong preference for existing business leadership and income distribution. After being reminded that he is also an employee of the main company, he said:

I cannot classify myself as a simple employee. I know what you are trying to say. During my college years, we all heard about socialism, equality, and workers vs. the bosses, etc. However, it is no longer a valid description of our economy. One cannot simply divide the whole manufacturing facility into two groups; the ones who take orders, and the ones who give orders. What about a supervisor? Or our engineers? Or myself? You see, if you can abandon the old terms, you can easily understand the current economy and employment relations... But, if you insist I'm considering myself as an employer because I give orders, I take certain bonuses and shares of the annual profit, I can hire or fire people. I'm at the top of the command pyramid [laughs].²²⁵

In almost all interviews, whenever a similar comment about them being employees was made, the answers were the same. It could be argued that it is because the respondents' elite character,

²²³ Ibid., pp. 3-16.

²²⁴ Brint, *The Political*, p. 408.

²²⁵ Kemal, 51, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

possessing substantial economic and cultural capital in the social hierarchy, overcomes any antagonistic view of business leaders.

Brint²²⁶ details the transformation of the profession in over 30 years. According to him, professional life was guided not only by technical expertise, but additionally it promised to be guided by an appreciation of the important social ends it served. In demanding high levels of self-governance, professionals claimed not only that others were not technically equipped to judge them, but also that they could not be trusted to judge them.²²⁷

In other words, they are not only doctors, lawyers, or teachers, but also serve rulers of health, law, and education. In Brint's words, they form the social trustee professionalism, legitimated by moral codes, and seen as servants of the public welfare.²²⁸ However, over the last thirty years, Brint notes, this idea of the professions,

has become increasingly disconnected from functions perceived to be central to the public welfare and more exclusively connected to the idea of expert knowledge... ..which needed no sharp distinction from business enterprise, and it required less separation from the idea of pursuing trade for a profit... ..those who claim knowledge-based authority increasingly eschew any claims to representing vital or public interests. From a sociological perspective, expertise is now a resource sold to bidders in the market for skilled labor.²²⁹

Namık (M, 44) has worked in his current company for over a decade and plans to continue to do so as long as he is capable of it. When in the interview was conducted in his office, he greeted me with a warm smile in the middle of his well-decorated, almost 100-meter square office. After an hour of conversation, he was directly asked about his office, and replied:

It has to suit my position in the company. As you saw, there were many people coming into my office for my managerial duties. Therefore, my office must suit my needs to show those who come to my office that I am not a simple salary-based employee here, but an authority. It is important in the organizational culture and moral codes that, if I want to exercise my authority, I have to show it to them. Besides, it is not just because of the chair

²²⁶ Steven Brint, *In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

²²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

²²⁸ Brint, *In an Age*, p. 7.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 7-15.

here, but because of me. If tomorrow, the company declared bankruptcy, I will find another job tomorrow. It is like this easily. My experience in my field and my name will be sufficient for that.²³⁰

Murat (M, 53) justified the existing social hierarchy by explaining his personal ascension history.

I was a simple worker's son. But today, I command around 500 workers. It is because I earned my position by working hard as a student and employee, and was being sincere. While my co-workers went home at 6 pm, I continued to work, even after I became a father... I watched lots of movies, and I am familiar with the concept of the American Dream. You know, one can become anything he wants, as long as he works hard. I don't know any Turkish version of the term, but I strongly believe that Turkey is getting closer more and more toward the Turkish Dream. The state and many business leaders provide a huge amount of scholarships, and if you really can show yourself, you can be anything you want.²³¹

Next, elite professionals have developed an adversarial attitude toward the political elites in Kayseri, where, as shown in Chapter 4, *Theorizing Kayseri*, a firm urban bloc dominated by the mayor and local political party representatives controls, in great extent, the codes of everyday life in Kayseri. One can deduce from the above discussion that, as the level of education increases, the political preferences and civil values become more tolerant and democratic.²³² Those values are not leftist, or egalitarian per se, but they are indeed reformist in that they try to transform the community in a more educated and liberal way.

Savaş (M, 45) and Şafak (F, 47) have founded a civil organization to promote educational activities for technical high schools in Kayseri. They have arranged seminars for students, taken them into manufacturing facilities, and given them job opportunities after they graduate. Their motivation not only satisfies the demand for skilled labor, but also gives those children a life by securing their futures.

One time we made our visit to a modern cotton factory. The students were thrilled with the machines and employees working on those machines. I have never seen such excitement in my whole life. They were eager to ask questions and talk with the workers.

²³⁰ Namık, 44, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 4, 2012.

²³¹ Murat, 53, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

²³² Brint, *The Political*, p. 410.

Whenever I think about that trip, it makes me cry to remember their hopes, and the realization that so few of them will be able to work in such an environment. I wish our government or our so-called benevolent philanthropists funded those projects instead of making new roads, or drilling in the Erciyes Mountain. They claim to have the most philanthropists in Turkey, but I've never seen them in any school or poor neighborhood; only in fancy fasting tents established in the most privileged neighborhoods. Those people don't even need such help, but they use their money to show off for people, for Kayseri.²³³

While discussing the Global City Kayseri, Murat (M, 53) and Selma (F, 42), who even became a political candidate for the current local government in the elections of 2009, gave me their critiques on the current local government.

Don't get me wrong. Like everybody, I voted for the current government. Even today, I support them. However, those billboards about Kayseri being a global city are just a show. Do you know how many international airplanes fly to Kayseri, or vice versa? Or, how many foreign tourists come to Kayseri, after they visit Nevşehir? I don't even want to talk about the irregularity of theatre shows. It is not about building the most modern shopping mall, or highways. It is about mentality, and I'm afraid, I do not see a change in the local government in the near future.²³⁴

I have been a professional manager since 2000. In my routine work, I have been exposed to lots of meetings and workshops. And I have organized meetings, and made presentations for over 10 years. So, I am confident to say that I am well equipped with communications and organizational abilities. Thus, I think I am confident to participate in politics... Managing a political organization should be no more difficult than managing a company.²³⁵

After the Taksim Gezi Park demonstrations in 2013, I decided to contact two of the respondents to learn what they had to say not about Gezi Park, but on the subsequent protests in Kayseri. As these protests turned into anti-government demonstrations, they spread all over Turkey, yet Kayseri did not host such events, except for a few days. When I asked Kemal (M, 51) about the general lack of popular demonstrations in Kayseri, he replied:

It didn't surprise me at all. I don't know what protesters at the Gezi Park want or demand, yet in Kayseri, it is rather absurd. We are relatively more affluent from the other cities, and the city works hard to make many improvements on social life, like the new

²³³ Şafak, 47, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 4, 2012.

²³⁴ Murat, 53, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 2, 2012.

²³⁵ Selma, 42, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, April 5, 2012.

entertainment center, Mazakaland, or cafes in Alparslan neighborhood. Sometimes even I criticize Özhaseki, but I won't throw stones at him. I think there is a fundamental flaw in our political system. You know, we are still not used to the way democracy operates, even after so many years... Sometimes I talk to young engineers at the factory, and listen to them; their complaints on how Kayseri is so small, not cosmopolitan, not having many cafes and bars, etc. I listen to them, and I agree with them. If they demand something like that, Özhaseki should listen to them.²³⁶

Şenol (M, 52) is even more critical on how police responded to the protesters in Kayseri.

As the night of the protests began, I was watching the news. I heard that there were over 200 arrests in Kayseri, which was the largest number of arrests in Turkey about Taksim at that point. I knew around 500 people gathered that day in downtown, so the police practically arrested half of the protesters... As far as I can gather, people's demands are moderate, like environment, freedom, respect, etc. Of course I am excluding the marginal groups and their ridiculous wishes. Yet, these are mostly university students, educated people, who come from various backgrounds and different cities of Turkey. There is no harm in listening to them. If we still want to talk about our global power and colorfulness in our culture, we should embrace all peaceful demands.²³⁷

As can be seen, even though elite professionals show a nascent adversity toward the social ethos in Kayseri, they are first and foremost concerned about their social space and the settings which have created it. Thus, the study argues that, as long as they stay the beneficiaries of the current economic development, the market liberalists are related to the market opportunities and profit-making responsibilities. The culture of critical discourse, on the other hand, advocates more pronouncement of the educational credentials and occupational status. Typically, it is an amalgam of pragmatic and idealistic concerns. Those political outlooks are also representations of mental maps and cultural practices that the elite professionals of Kayseri developed. It functions as a means of social differentiation unique to elite professionals because they are the only group that possesses substantial economic and cultural capital, as well as confidence with their social position to reform society in the direction their habitus want.

²³⁶ Kemal, 51, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, June 13, 2013.

²³⁷ Şenol, 52, interview by Çağlar Köksal, Kayseri, Turkey, June 14, 2013.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The conclusions that may be reached from this study are indeed tentative and must be cautiously applied because I try to identify an ongoing process of the formation of the elite professional class. For example, this study did not compare the characteristics and attitudes of the professionals with those among the bourgeoisie or the working-class. Such a comparative study would provide a clearer picture of the relationship between the professional group of new middle class and major classes. Second, my measure of consciousness/classed identities of the elite professional class reflect current historical conditions. The political agenda in the late 1970s was dominated by the “left,” and one can see the professionals’ attitudes as reflecting this domination.²³⁸ But to the extent that economic liberalism or “right” forces come to dominate political and social issues, so might this swing be reflected in the attitudes of the elite professionals. These forewarnings aside, the following conclusions seem reasonable given the findings of this study.

First, there is a significant elite professional class in the contemporary class structure of Kayseri. This class is a product of developments in the region itself. Having Kayseri as the home town of all the respondents shows the validity of this assumption. Moreover, the elite professional class owes its origins to the development of advanced capitalism, yet Kayseri’s development should be seen as part of the development of advanced capitalism and globalization in the nation as a whole.

Turkey is the fastest growing economy in its region. Much of this growth has come about since it actively adopted economic liberalization policies in the 1980s, and the expansion of the

²³⁸ See Chapter 3.

domestic and global private sectors. Turkey's adaptation of economic liberalization policies that echoed worldwide push toward the globalization of production has led to changes that are said to benefit members of the middle class. Therefore, it is important to conduct a systematic enquiry into the socioeconomic transformations taking place in Turkey, and Kayseri, in the advancement of the capitalist period.

One of the easily observable shifts in the class structure of Kayseri since the 1980s can be perceived as the change in the composition of the middle class. The majority of the middle class is no longer composed of small businessmen or shopkeepers who run their businesses with the help of their family, or is not composed of agricultural petty commodity producers. Instead, in the early 2000s, white collar workers, who sell their mental labor to the market, constitute the main stratum of the middle class. The growth of the service sector at the expense of manufacture, the democratization of education, rapid urbanization, and technological advancements can be perceived as the major motivators behind this shift. In Kayseri, the hegemony of the market mechanism has now situated itself with the help of urban transformation and local business elites.

This study revealed that the process of urbanization administered by municipal leaders and urban regime coalitions produced significant societal reactions. In Kayseri, the increasing visibility of religion and conservative motifs in the urban scene, along with the globalization of consumer habits, has triggered economically conservative groups to become more vocal and the creation of an alternative trajectory of modernization with familiar patterns embedded in the norms of Kayseri – i.e. globalization with market capitalism, the conspicuous consumption of luxury goods, the rigid segregation of residential areas, praising conservative Islam with pretentious organizational activities, and combining all those elements in a hegemonic discourse. The fortunes of urban growth generated much welcomed confidence from all social classes, and

elite professionals have adopted their culture of critical discourse to the very same social ethos in Kayseri.

Additionally, the characteristics of Kayseri's elite professionals are similar to those described for the elite professionals elsewhere. They are highly educated, affluent, and successful. At the very least, their presence in the city should change those misleading stereotypes which see Kayseri as consisting solely of poor, undereducated, unskilled working-class, conservative, religious, economically liberal, and the ostentatious Anatolian Tigers. Professionals are there, and they matter.

It is reasonable to argue that taste more or less functions in the same way as an instrument of distinction for the elite professionals in Kayseri as it does in France, as Bourdieu shows. Indeed, consumption habits create a social space of lifestyle delineating an exclusionary social space for the elite professionals to satisfy their economic and cultural needs which, in return, construct their classed identities for even further distinction. Although the cultural omnivore thesis prevails in many of the advanced capitalist societies, no judgments of taste, as Kant says, are innocent if a social class such as the elite professionals struggling over the definition of their location in the social hierarchy. No consumer product is valuable in itself as an instrument of ascension, yet the social meaning of consumption of such luxury (thanks to the presence of high amounts of economic capital by the elite professionals) is surely one of the defining characteristics of the exclusionary social space of the elite professionals. The places where they socialize, the schools where they send their children, the malls where they shop, and the neighborhoods in which they live are all places where they construct their social spaces of lifestyle and the distinctions they draw. One of the peculiar natures of this group, however, is to stress on the conspicuous frugality of consumption habits. Unfortunately, there is no systematic data to validate whether all social classes in Kayseri show such a frugal attitude, or solely

individuals who accomplished inter-generational mobility are sensitive on the subject. This preliminary study does not give a conclusive theory to assess such hypothesis, since all respondents come from rather lower-class backgrounds, yet a tentative assumption stemming from the narratives is that, as Bourdieu suggests, social class background can be traced in practices of frugal consumption as it is inherited from the lower-class family, so the elite professional can be understood more properly.

Moreover, the elite professionals' emphasis is also on subjectivity, on personal relationships, and their therapeutic nature. The nature of their social relations is drawn from the urge of distinction from both the bourgeoisie and the lower-classes (even other groups among the new middle class, who have lesser economic and cultural capital). The elite professionals coded their cultural and moral boundaries with universal norms such as sincerity, sensitivity, hard-work, literacy, cleanliness, and meticulousness, yet those preferences always come with cultural and economic trajectories. The elite professionals who have acquired the above-mentioned preferences expect everybody to reach such levels, otherwise, they do not grant their friendship, or social spaces. Their exclusionary behavior works with their preferences of lifestyle to construct a unique identity of elite professional class in Kayseri. That is why their classed identities form a homogenous social group with certain shared values and behaviors toward outsiders, and that is why they try so hard to maintain their social location in society by their consumption, their childrearing practices, their symbolic boundaries, and their institutionalized professional identities.

A third conclusion is that the contradictory nature of the elite professionals makes them inclined to form a synthesis of pragmatic and idealistic concerns. It is argued that, as long as they stay the beneficiaries of the current economic development, their pragmatic concerns are related to the market opportunities and profit-making responsibilities.

Their elitist nature also promotes sympathy towards business culture. Although researchers often focus on “the condition of disadvantage when exploring inequality, one also has to point to how inequality has largely been driven by the wealth and income seizure and protection of the advantaged.”²³⁹ Thus, the elite professional class has to protect the existing institutional arrangements that help to secure their social space, and reproduce such norms and relations of boundaries so as to distinguish it from below.

The idealistic concerns, on the other hand, advocate more pronunciation of the educational credentials and occupational status. Therefore, the elite professional class tries to undermine the very status quo it defends. This is because the cultural codes the professionals have acquired through their families and educational trainings, which are coded by themselves to delineate the borders for distinction, are their resource for power. The political attitude of the elite professional class is to reorganize the social space of their class position in order to acquire more capital, resources, and to maintain as much. They require more space for their particular consumption habits, more privileged schools to pass-on their classed identities, more residential areas to sterilize their environment and ease their fears of and anxiety about the lower-middle class, and many others suiting their classed strategies for struggle over everything that concerns the art of living. They demand, and they are capable of realizing such wishes. They have the potential to make a contribution to Kayseri politics beyond their size because their access to and control over the vast amount of resources, including economic, social, and cultural capital make them more likely to change the trajectory of the development in Kayseri. However, it is important to remember that the general attitude of the elite professional class oscillates between the interests of business and of the lower-middle/working class, so that when and how the elite professional culture turns into an adversary or supporting of the status quo depends on contingent

²³⁹ Khan, pp. 361-377.

realities constructed by individuals that might be perceived as both favoring or diminishing their social space of classed identities.

The findings of this study contend with the above-mentioned theories of the culture of critical discourse²⁴⁰ associated with the professionals, or educated middle classes, as those engaged in for-profit commodity production seem to take a different view of business than do those whose institutional settings are guided largely by concerns that are not addressed by the private sector.²⁴¹ Professionals enjoy superior labor market opportunities by virtue of their skills, culture, and training.

Based on the findings mentioned above, it can be concluded that, as long as the ruling elite and the urban regime coalition of Kayseri remain determined to maintain the current hegemonic, profit-driven market system, the elite professional class is likely to continue to be solely determined for their cultural advancement demands because they benefit more from the current regime and have been more dependent upon the regime than any other class. Yet, given the relationship established between the elite professional class's material dependence on the current regime and its perceived socio-economic conditions in the social hierarchy, they may become more enthusiastic about more radical changes, if such dependence is significantly weakened and socio-economic conditions deteriorate. Thus, it can be said that among other factors, the urban regime coalition's failure to deliver economic growth, maintain social stability, and increase or maintain employment and career opportunities, and living standards for the elite professional class may help cause further political change in Kayseri.

²⁴⁰ See, Chapter 2, "The Political Attitudes of the Elite Professional Class."

²⁴¹ These findings are also consistent with that of the study of Micheal Macy. See Michael Macy, "New-Class Dissent Among Social-Cultural Specialists: The Effect of Occupational Self-Direction and Location in the Public Sector," in *Sociological Forum* 3, no. 3 (1988), pp. 325-356.

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