

VICIOUS CYCLE IN THE RUSSO-JAPANESE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE

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Vicious Cycle in the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute

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The present work is an analysis of the modern Russian foreign policy formulation to explain the recent change of the Russian policy in the territorial dispute with Japan over the southern Kuril Islands. It evaluates the former Soviet Union's Cold War period and the Gorbachev period as well as the Russian periods of Yeltsin and Putin. The aim behind this evaluation is to explain the transformation of the Russian foreign policy in these, given above, four periods. The explanation of the transformation process helps finding an answer to the question of why the change in the Russian stand on the Kurils issue happened. This change is the Russian announcement in 2004 to settle the territorial dispute with Japan according to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. Russia accepts this Declaration as an end of the dispute, whereas Japan considers it as a prelude for the return of all four islands renounced by Japan after WWII. An analysis of the recent developments in this dispute in the context of the transformation of foreign policy visions suggests that Putin's strategy of *great power pragmatism* is an answer to the asked question. The thesis analyzes the periods of Cold War, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin as one cycle of events because of the similarities between the current Russian and the former Soviet foreign policies.

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Başlık: Rusya ve Japonya arasında Güney Kuril Adaları Anlaşmazlığında Kısır Döngü

Bu çalışma, Rusya ve Japonya arasında süregelen Güney Kuril Adaları anlaşmazlığında ortaya çıkan son gelişmeyi Rus dış siyasetindeki değişimler çerçevesi dahilinde değerlendirmektedir. Bu değerlendirme, eski Sovyetler Birliği'nin Soğuk Savaş ve Gorbachev dönemleri ile Rusya'nın Yeltsin ve Putin dönemlerini kapsamaktadır. Bu analiz, Rus dış siyasetindeki değişimleri açıklayarak niye bu değişim ortaya çıktı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. 2004 yılında Rusya, bu tartışmayı sonlandırmak için 1956 yılında imzalanan Sovyet-Japon Ortak Bildirge'yi esas alacaklarını duyurdu. Bu Ortak Bildirge'yi Rusya, tartışmanın sonu olarak nitelerken Japonya ise anlaşmazlık konusu olan dört adanın hepsini almak için bir ön safha olarak algılamaktadır. Bu politika değişikliğinin sebebini anlayabilmek için Rus dış siyaset bakışlarını incelemeye aldım. Soğuk Savaş, Gorbachev, Yeltsin ve Putin dönemlerinde oluşturulan Rus dış siyasetlerinin analizi Rusya'nın yaptığı bu değişikliğin arkasında Putin'in dünya görüşü olan *büyük güç pragmatizm'i* yatmaktadır. Ayrıca, Rusya'nın bu tartışmada aldığı son kararı, eski Sovyetler Birliği'nin aynı konuda takındığı tavırla büyük benzerlik taşımaktadır. Onun için, Güney Kuril Adaları anlaşmazlığındaki gelişmeler bir bütün daire çizerek kısır döngüyü devam ettirmektedir.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

For over sixty years, a major issue obstructs the development of the Russo-Japanese relations. This is a territorial dispute over the southern Kuril Islands¹ under Russian administration. It prevents Russia² and Japan to sign a peace treaty concluding WWII. This unsettled yet issue interferes with progress in almost every aspect of present Russo-Japanese relations. The dispute comprises Japan's claim for four small rocky islands lying to the north of Hokkaido acquired by ex-Soviet Union after WWII³ and the Russian determination to hand back only two smaller islands for a peace treaty.⁴

¹ The Russian Federation refers to the islands of Shikotan, Kunashiri, Etorofu and the Habomai group of islets as the southern Kuril Islands, whereas Japan calls them as its Northern Territories. The total area of the islands is 4,996 square kilometers. For the exact location of the islands in dispute, consult the map in Appendix A.

In some relevant literature, the word "Kurile" has been preferred to the word "Kuril." However, the common spelling of the word among political science students is "Kuril," which is one I adopt in this academic endeavor.

² In this work, I refer to both the former Soviet Union and the present-day Russian Federation as "Russia" for the convenience of a reader who is aware of the fact that in both academic and political literature "Russia" refers to both the former USSR and the Russian Federation. Throughout the whole text of this work, the phrase "Russo-Japanese territorial dispute" has been preferred to "the Soviet-Japanese territorial dispute," except quotations from the official documents and literature of the time of the Soviet Union where the word "Soviet" was used.

For the purpose of convenience and simplicity and because modern Russian Federation is the major successor state of the former Soviet Union's main territory, military, economy, state institutions and population, as well as many of its problems and debts, I prefer the word "Russian" to refer to both former Soviet and Russian state institutions, governmental agencies and population.

³ In the San Francisco Treaty of 1951, Japan renounced "all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 Sept. 1905." For the relevant articles of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905 and the Treaty of San Francisco, 1951, see Appendix B.

⁴ William Nimmo illustrates these attitudes in his book *Japan and Russia: A Re-evaluation in the Post-Soviet Era* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994).

The year 2005 was the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Japan, initiated by the Empire of Russia and the Empire of Japan with the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Shimoda in 1855.⁵ To commemorate such an important anniversary, Russia and Japan organized series of international celebrations in Russia and Japan.⁶ However, these celebrations brought up the memory of another anniversary, which was the 60th anniversary of the occupation by the former Soviet Union of the southern Kuril Islands in the aftermath of WWII.⁷

Historical Background

In the first decade following the occupation, the Soviets denied the existence of this issue. This denial had a basis in the Cold War rivalry where two ideologies competed for military, economic and psychological supremacy. After the death of Stalin in 1953, Khrushchev's period of "thaw" between two Cold War blocs brought about the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956.⁸ It normalized the bilateral relations and stated that the Soviet Union would return the two smaller islands after the conclusion of

⁵ David Reese, *The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 14.

"The Russo-Japanese Treaty of Shimoda was signed on 7 February 1855. Unlike the agreements with the United States and Great Britain, the Treaty of Shimoda included a territorial clause, which for the first time formally divided the Kuriles between Japan and Russia. Under Article 2 of the Treaty, Kunashiri and Etorofu, the two southernmost islands of the archipelago, were awarded to Japan. The islands to the north became Russian. Sakhalin was to remain unpartitioned between the two countries. The southern Kuriles were now to remain Japanese until 1945, and the Treaty of Shimoda remains the basis of Japan's claim to the islands today."

⁶ To celebrate the 150th anniversary of the establishment of Russo-Japanese diplomatic relations, the governments of Russia and Japan hosted various events during the year of 2005. The schedule and official meetings and celebrations were posted on the websites of Foreign Affairs Ministries of Japan and Russia - www.mofa.go.jp and www.mid.ru – that were accessed on 2-17 February 2005.

⁷ Reese, Introduction. "Pursuant to the Yalta Agreement Regarding Japan, which was signed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin on 11 February 1945, Soviet forces occupied the Kuriles, including all four of today's islands, in late August and early September 1945. The Yalta Accord had provided that the Kurile Islands 'shall be handed over to the Soviet Union'."

⁸ For the relevant chapter of the agreement, see Appendix B.

the peace treaty. However, for the Soviets, this Declaration meant an end of the dispute, whereas for the Japanese, it meant a prelude for the return of all four islands. In 1985, the ascent of Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union brought winds of change to the Soviet foreign policy.

Gorbachev's Soviet Union relinquished ideology as a basis of foreign policy formulation. In April 1991, President Gorbachev visited Japan and signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué.⁹ For the first time in Russo-Japanese relations, this document recognized the existence of a territorial dispute over four islands between the Soviet Union and Japan. In December 1991, the Soviet Union disintegrated and the Russian Federation emerged as the successor state of the southern Kuril Islands. In October 1993, first Russian President Yeltsin signed the Tokyo Declaration¹⁰ stating that Russia and Japan should conclude a peace treaty by solving the territorial dispute and fully normalizing the bilateral relations. In November 1997, President Yeltsin signed the Krasnoyarsk Agreement¹¹ whereby Russia and Japan agreed to conclude a peace treaty and settle the territorial dispute by 2000. In April 1998, the two countries exchanged the Kawana Proposal and the Moscow Proposal¹² to secure a settlement by

⁹ The first visit to Japan by a Soviet leader was in April 1991 by President Mikhail Gorbachev. He and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué, which for the first time recognized in writing the existence of the territorial dispute with Japan.

¹⁰ The Tokyo Declaration, signed in October 1993 by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, defined the territorial dispute and stated that Russia and Japan should conclude a peace treaty by solving the territorial dispute and fully normalizing the bilateral relations. It defined the negotiation guidelines as based on historical and legal facts, documents agreed on by both states and the principles of law and justice. See www.mofa.go.jp.

¹¹ In the Krasnoyarsk Agreement of November 1997, President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed to “make the utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000 on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration.” See www.mofa.go.jp.

¹² In April 1998, Japan made the Kawana Proposal, to which in November 1998, Russia offered Moscow Proposal. However, these two proposals were not enough to secure a settlement by 2000. See www.mofa.go.jp.

2000. In March 2001, President Putin signed the Irkutsk Statement,¹³ which defined the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 as the starting point of the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty. In 2003, President Putin and Prime Minister Koizumi adopted the Russia-Japan Action Plan¹⁴ to provide grounds for peace-treaty negotiations by citing the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, the Tokyo Declaration of 1993 and the Irkutsk Statement of 2001. In 2004, President Putin declared that Russia intended to return only two islands according to the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, which they accepted as the end of the dispute.

The Puzzle

The brief chronology, presented above, of the Russo-Japanese agreements suggests that the Russian foreign policy on the southern Kuril Islands issue completed a full cycle between the years of 1956-2004. That is, Putin's Russian foreign policy on this issue resembles the Soviet foreign policy in 1956. This full cycle consists of the following statements: the return of two smaller islands for a peace treaty; the Soviets' acceptance of four islands in dispute; the agreement to solve the issue by 2000; the adoption of joint plan of actions toward the resolution; and the return of two smaller

¹³ President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori signed the Irkutsk Statement in March 2001. This statement defined the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 as the starting point of the negotiating process to conclude a peace treaty and confirmed its legal validity in writing for the first time since 1960 when the Soviet Union all but denounced the validity of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. See www.mofa.go.jp.

¹⁴ In 2003, President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi adopted the Russia-Japan Action Plan to provide foundation for future peace-treaty negotiations by citing the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, the Tokyo Declaration of 1993 and the Irkutsk Statement of 2001. See www.mofa.go.jp.

islands for a peace treaty. In other words, the developments were indicating that the territorial issue was going to be resolved, but it was not.

As this change of the policy occurred on the Russian side, I concentrate on the Russian foreign policy and ask the following questions. How can I explain this decision of Russia? Was it an inevitable consequence of the recent Russian domestic reforms? Was it a result of the coming into power of young pragmatic professionals? Was it a consequence of the competition of the domestic political forces? Was it a result of the process of adaptation to the changing international affairs?¹⁵ Most of these above explanations suggest that to explain such a behavior of Russia I have to examine the Russian foreign policy formulation process.¹⁶

Governments make foreign policies within the context of both domestic and international politics. However, the foreign policy decision-makers are closer to their domestic sources than to their foreign determinants. The decision-maker is actually a part of domestic politics. His ties to it are strong due to the various processes of internalization of domestic values, national culture and characteristics, and a constant exposure to influences and pressures of domestic politics: “Along with institutional structure by which governments make and implement foreign policies, one must also

¹⁵ William Wallace, *Foreign Policy and the Political Process* (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 13. “Those who regard foreign policy as an aspect of international politics tend to limit their attention to governments and foreign offices giving less space to domestic context. However, scholars who regard foreign policy from the role domestic social and political environment plays in influencing and determining foreign policy tend to see partisan conflict, interest group pressure and elite opinion as rather more central to the formulation of policy in this area.”

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7. William Wallace defines foreign policy as an important place of political activity of states where a bridge over “the all important boundary between the nation-state and its international environment – the boundary which defines the nation-state, within the limits of which national governments claim supreme authority,” is established. He explains the difficulty of studying foreign policy by the fact that foreign policy stands on the boundary of political science and international relations.

consider the whole domestic political process as it affects government's policy making."¹⁷

Therefore, in order to solve the puzzle of vicious cycle in the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute, I focus on the Russian foreign policy formulation processes of the former Soviet, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin governments.

Contribution of the Thesis

In this thesis, I suggest that the developments in the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute have completed a full cycle. In the period of 1956-2004, the Russian position underwent changes from firmness to softening, and from softening to firmness. The current Russian position resembles the firm position of the Soviets in 1956. The review of the relevant literature indicates that the available works are either outdated, that is, belong to the Cold War era,¹⁸ or do not approach this issue in terms of the Russian domestic policy formulation. I believe that the viable way to understand these reoccurring developments is to analyze the Russian foreign policy decision-making process. I take the whole picture of developments as a complete cycle. The reason for

¹⁷ Wallace, p. 12. In the study of foreign policy, there are two conceptual approaches. The first one, the ideological approach, explains foreign policy primarily in psychology terms, binding it to the motives and ideologies of leaders and government. Consequently, the foreign policy is a result of the preferences and convictions of political leaders, who implement their paradigms. This approach classifies foreign policies as democratic and totalitarian, libertarian or socialist, and peaceful or aggressive. The second approach concentrates on divergent determinants of state's behavior as its historic traditions, geographical location, national interest or security needs. As opposed to the ideological approach, this paradigm implies that foreign policy goes beyond individual beliefs and ideologies regardless of the party in power or the leaders and their private or public philosophies.

¹⁸ During the Cold War era, the Kuril Islands issue failed to attract the global attention due to its regional scale. It remained a bilateral territorial dispute during the confrontation of two global ideological blocs. Due to this reason, the scholarly literature contends to no more than a dozen of works dedicated to this issue. Scholars like J. Stephan, D. Reese, H. Kimura and R. Hayes dealt with this issue as a part of global power politics. The literature produced before the end of the Cold War divides into two ideology groups of capitalism and communism, which reflect the two opposite views of the two rival blocs.

concentration on the Russian policy-making is the occurrence of these developments on the Russian side. The importance of this study is an attempt, for the first time, to analyze the changes in this issue within a framework of a complete cycle, which, I argue, facilitates the comprehension of the full picture of the dispute.

The Research Question

I analyze the transformation of Russian foreign policy of the former Soviet Union's periods of the 1956-1985 and 1985-1991 as well as Russia's periods of the 1991-2000 and 2000-2004 in order to explain the vicious cycle in the territorial dispute. The purpose of this analysis is to answer the question of why the shift to the policy of "a return of two smaller islands for a peace treaty" happened. The tentative answer to this question, based on the relevant literature analysis, is that the foreign policy course chosen by the President Putin, which reflects the principles of the great-power pragmatism school,¹⁹ is responsible for this shift on the southern Kuril Islands issue. Then, how did this decision come up? This decision became possible by "the reshaping of domestic interest groups and their identity visions, as well as changes that had taken place in the international arena."²⁰ Therefore, in order to find an answer to the research question of why the shift to the policy of "a return of two smaller islands for a

¹⁹ Andrei P. Tsygankov, "New Challenges for Putin's Foreign Policy," *Orbis* (Philadelphia, Pa.), 50, no. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 153-165. "Putin's strategy of great-power pragmatism reflects a desire for Russia to be a normal great power and focused on cooperating with Western nations on a range of economic and security issues." I accessed the article at <http://www.library.boun.edu.tr/ElektronikServisler.html> on 2 October 2006.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

peace treaty” happened I analyze the transformation in the Russian foreign policy formulation process.

Critical Terms of the Thesis

The critical terms in the thesis are the territorial dispute, the Japanese claim, the Russian foreign policy schools, the vicious cycle in the territorial dispute, and current Russian foreign policy. The territorial dispute is the disagreement between Russia and Japan over the sovereignty of the islands of Kunashiri, Etorofu, Shikotan and the Habomai islets, referred to as the southern Kuril Islands or Northern Territories.²¹ The Japanese claim is the unconditional reversion of all four islands.²² The Russian foreign policy schools are *integrationism*, *great power balancing* and *great power normalizing/pragmatism*. The vicious cycle in the territorial dispute is a cycle of developments starting and ending with the similar vision of the solution to this problem. The viciousness of the cycle comes from an assumption that this cycle will continue for as long as the solid compromises from both sides of the dispute does not come. The current Russian foreign policy is *great power pragmatism*.

²¹ John J. Stephan, *The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontier in the Pacific* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 5. According to John Stephan, the Kuril Islands have many histories, each of which reflects a particular national perspective. He states that Soviet historians such as P. A. Leonov, K. I. Kniazev, A. Solovyov, M. A. Sergeev and L. N. Kudashev write that all of the Kuril Islands were an integral part of Russia since the middle of the eighteenth centuries through “prior discovery, prior settlement, and prior development.” These authors claim, “That the Japanese arrived on the scene as aggressive interlopers long after the islands had been incorporated into the Russian motherland.”

²² *Ibid.*, p. 6: “The Japanese historians have stressed the antiquity of Japan’s association with the islands and assume that they are “inalienably” Japanese, however, modern writers concede Russia’s historical rights to the central and northern Kurils and concentrate upon building a case for Japan’s “inalienable” ties with Kunashiri and Iturup.”

Explanatory Framework

The return to the initial point in this impasse represents an intriguing puzzle. The way to understand this puzzle is to explain the transformation of the Russian foreign policy formulation in the context of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute. In order to do this I concentrate on the Russian foreign policy schools that exerted influence during the years of the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin years.

The former Soviet Union's position was firm on giving only two islands in exchange for a peace treaty. This firmness was rooted in the dogmatic ideology confrontation with the West, to which Japan belonged. When Gorbachev changed the dogmatic ideology with universal values in foreign policy formulation, the Russian foreign policy on the territorial dispute became moderate. He opened the "windows of change" for "policy entrepreneurs operating within the institutional framework," which was restraining or supporting these ideas during the Soviet period.²³ These entrepreneurs, supported by the liberal minded leaders advocated the "new specific sets of ideas, frameworks and concepts."²⁴ These moderate intellectuals faced resistance from the uncompromising colleagues in their institutions. The change became possible only with the understanding of the leaders of the necessity of change.

To explain the transformation in the foreign policy of Gorbachev I analyze the ideas, concepts and the "entrepreneurs" in the context of the southern Kuril Islands dispute. Intellectuals who believed in integration with Western civilization and adopting

²³ Jeff Checkel, "Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution," *World Politics* 45, no. 2 (January 1993), p. 273. I accessed the article at the electronic journals service (JSTOR) of the Bogaziçi University library website on 8 October 2006.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 275.

its values as the only way for the Soviet Union to heal its ailing system have been articulating the ideas of relinquishing ideology, supporting the policies of openness, cooperation and unilateral concessions. These intellectuals, bureaucrats and leaders who supported these values were called Atlanticists for advocating the idea of leaning to the West.

Yeltsin increased the level of cooperation with the foreign powers. This cooperation introduced Russia to Western values such as market economy, free enterprise, human rights and individual freedoms. However, the improper implementation of these values caused chaos and suffering for the large majority of the population. The mass public's disappointment with these values was so vast that people started voicing ideas that Russia would be better off sacrificing all these western values for relatively small but stable payments, life security and overall order and stability in the country. This change in the minds of people who supported the strict and even constraining control of the state over its citizens strengthened Eurasianism, the political school advocating the development of Russia based on its distinctive values of being both European and Asian. The Eurasianists were conservatives who promoted the great power ambitions of Russia to be an independent pole of power and influence in the world politics and balancer of the other great powers. They defended these ideas against the integrationist (with the West) aspirations of the Atlanticist way of development. In this period, the competition of these two main visions of development shows the identity crisis of Russia. Therefore, this period was a period of inconsistent and uncoordinated foreign policies of Russia due to the competition of these two political schools.

Putin advocates the idea of Russia becoming a great power using the combination of the two competing schools of conservatives/Eurasianists and liberals/Atlanticists. His foreign policy framework is great power pragmatism, which promotes the idea of a strong Russia in foreign and domestic affairs. He uses great power methods of subordinating and making people loyal on the domestic opposition forces with aim to bring stability and order to Russia. After installing an order in the domestic politics, which he calls the “managed democracy,” Putin started engaging the West in an assertive and confident way. I believe that the knowledge of the principles of these schools would clarify my understanding of the transformation in the Russian foreign policy on the Kuril Islands issue. In addition, the knowledge of the nature of interaction among the foreign policy schools is vital to assess the weight of the dominant view in foreign policy formulation. Therefore, it is possible to explain Putin’s decision to adopt a policy of the return of two smaller islands after the signing a peace treaty as the result of the dominating of pragmatism in foreign policy vision.

Therefore, to describe the developments in the territorial dispute as a cycle, I explain the transformation of Russian foreign policy during the Cold War, the Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin periods.

Plan of the Thesis

In the second chapter of this thesis, I offer the analysis of the theoretical approaches to the Russian foreign policy. I argue that the Russian foreign policy is a product of the dominant domestic group of influence, which has support from the

leaders and the population. In addition, the international developments also facilitate their dominance in the foreign policy formulation. I argue that an idea of a *great power* Russia and a wish for a *civilized* Russia have always been present in Russia. Then, I analyze the Russian foreign policy formulation process through identifying the main foreign policy schools such as Atlanticism/integrationism, Eurasianism/great power balancing and great power pragmatism. I also pay attention to the two extreme versions of Eurasianism/great power, which are the Slavophil movement and the hard-line imperialism. Given the weight and the role of Russia in international affairs,²⁵ the analysis of the impact of the domestic sources on Russian foreign policy is very important. The chapter defines the place of ideology in Soviet foreign policy within the context of the expansionism of a *great power*. The dominance of the proponents of the *civilization* view provides an exclusion of ideology from the foreign policy formulation, which leads to the cooperation with the West. Then, I describe three Russian foreign policy schools that dominate the foreign policy formulation from the independence up to present day Russia. The first vision of Russian foreign policy is *integrationism*, which advocates close affinity with the West. To understand this vision, it is necessary to start the analysis from the ideas, concepts and reforms of Gorbachev. The second vision is *great power balancing*, based on the idea of Russian foreign policy as a great power, balancing the West. The final vision of Russian policy is *great power normalizing*, which pursues an active engagement with the West to preserve its national interests. These Russian foreign policy visions dominate the current domestic politics, because the political school adopted by Putin is a middle way of these two rival schools.

²⁵ James Rosenau, *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 47-48.

The third chapter explains in detail the Russian foreign policy in the context of the case of the southern Kuril Islands. I begin with the historical context including the Imperial treaties. Second, I provide the relevant parts of the Russo-Japanese treaties supplemented by the description of the developments in Russian foreign policy that happened in the period between the two treaties with an aim to presenting a complete picture of the puzzle. Third, I highlight the reasons and plans behind the occupation of the Kurils. Fourth, it is interesting to follow how the Russian stand on this issue shifts according to the change of decision-makers' vision of Russian foreign policy. Particularly, I analyze the foreign policies of the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin in the context of the dominant approach to foreign policy formulation, way of thinking and the implementation of policies.

The policy of the former Soviet Union period was a product of the dogmatic ideological confrontation. The global rivalry of Cold War determined the approaches to this regional territorial problem. The only achievement of that period was the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, which was ratified by both countries. The period of new thinking politics by the Gorbachev government advocated openness and cooperation in the international arena, which filled people with expectation and hope for an end to this impasse. In his period, the former Soviet Union acknowledged the existence of the territorial dispute between the USSR and Japan. With his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, Gorbachev broke new ground by declaring the new policy of

giving up an ideological fight, instead of it focusing on the economic development of the region.²⁶

The period of Yeltsin's government is marked with the rise of the Eurasianism in 1992. The competition between the two visions caused chaos and inconsistency in Russian foreign politics. Yeltsin was an Atlanticist but the rise of the conservatives was due to the inability of Yeltsin to consolidate power in his hands. During his period, many regions started doing business with their foreign neighbors directly, without paying taxes to the federal center. Many institutions also started dealing with abroad without consent of the center. Many Russo-Japanese joint meetings and agreements were held in his period. They increased hopes for a settlement of the Russo-Japanese dispute but were not enough to accomplish a solid achievement.

The period of Putin's government was a time of thoroughly calculated policies in domestic as well as foreign politics. His time was a period of great power pragmatism that was a period of pragmatic politics through combining great power balancing and integrationist visions. Putin's foreign policy has strove to increase relations with Japan, but at the same time accepts the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration and the return of two smaller islands for a peace treaty as an end to the territorial issue.

Therefore, these four periods with different policies constitute a full cycle in Russian foreign policy towards the southern Kuril Islands dispute. The similarities between the ex-Soviet and current Russian positions suggest that there is a cycle in the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute.

²⁶ Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramesh Thakur, (eds.), *The Soviet Union As an Asian Pacific Power: Implications of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok Initiative* (Westview Special Studies in International Security, Boulder and London, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), p.193.

To sum up, my puzzle is the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute over the southern Kuril Islands. This dispute is the main problem in their bilateral relations. The last three decades have brought about some changes in Russian foreign policy, which I name a completion of a cycle in Russian policy toward the territorial dispute with Japan. My research question is how the current Russian foreign policy came about. To find out an answer I analyze the Russian foreign policy schools that influence the foreign policy decision-making process.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

He who wishes to understand future Russian behavior ought to study Russian history. The behavior of Soviet Union today is, in my view, at least three-quarters Russian behavior and if it comes out, 25 percent Bolshevik or Communist behavior. It is the Russian superpower we are dealing with it and it would not be much different if it were not a Communist power but some other form of dictatorship under tsar or whoever it might have been. Russia has always tried either to expend its borders or to enlarge its empire.²⁷

Russia As a Great and Civilized Power

Russian foreign policy has never relinquished the idea of being a *great power*. At the core of this drive lies the notion of a strong Russia that brings balance to world politics. This notion has served as a foreign policy goal for many Russian regimes throughout history. Only the means to achieve this goal and the principles to follow have differed according to the regime type and domineering foreign policy school. At the same time, Russia has always wanted to become a part of a *civilized* West or even become a civilization itself. However, the notion of a *civilized* country has proved to be hard to achieve in Russia because the *civilization's* values such as basic human freedoms and rights have clashed with the *great power's* subordination and loyalty. The *great power* advocates Russian expansion and confrontation of the other power's

²⁷ Helmut Schmidt, *The Soviet Union: Challenges and Responses As Seen from the European Point of View* (Singapore: Institute of South-East Asian Studies, 1984), p. 9.

expansion that is, balancing the other power. However, *civilization* advocates integration with the other great power and living in a one-polar world. These two ambitions constitute the two main driving forces behind the domestic developments as well as the foreign policies of Russia. The dominance of one over the other has brought stability to Russian politics whereas the equality of power has caused chaos and inconsistency of policies.

An analysis of Russian political history suggests that the dominance of *great power* advocates in Russian foreign policy formulation has led to expansion and confrontation with the West, whereas the dominance of *civilization* advocates has led to integration with the Western world. In Imperial Russia, the principles of enriching the Russian budget through exploitation and empowering the Empire of Russia by bringing “civilization” to newly annexed territories, guided an expansion through geographic exploration and military occupation of new territories. In the Soviet Union, the ideological principles of “liberating” the countries from “decaying capitalism,” and “helping them to advance to the progressive socialism” guided expansion through military occupation and establishing socialist states. In the present day Russia, a mixture of a liberal method of *cooperation* with other superpowers on common issues and conservative methods of *balancing* them on other issues is a base of the idea of implementing a notion of strong Russia.

To sum up, the idea of great power Russia is present in all Russian regimes and only the means and guiding principles of Russian foreign policies differ. Therefore, to understand the Russian foreign policy decisions we need to analyze the Russian foreign policy schools and their interactions that influence foreign policy.

Russian Foreign Policy Theories

In political literature, there are some interesting theories explaining Russian foreign policy theory. The following is a short description of some of the seventeen theories of Soviet external behavior produced by fifty-five scholars, including anthropologists, psychologists, sociologists, political theorists, historians and practitioners of modern diplomacy:²⁸

- Anthropological theory states that Russian personality is distinguished by ambivalence, frustration and fear. As a result, Russian man is going up and down between fatalistic acceptance of totalitarian control and an urge to destroy scapegoats.
- Sociological theory states that the functionally operating characteristics of Soviet system are at the center of such a theory. The points of strain are located in the Soviet system. For instance, Soviets are ignorant of the realities of the outside world.
- Historical theories tend to be the most popular among scholars and are divided into:
 1. Geopolitical theory (George Kennan, Henry Kissinger), which maintains that strategic interests dictated Soviet foreign policy from its position as a great landmass power. Its contemporary aspirations reflect the historic drive of Great Russia's policy.
 2. Marxist theory or Basic Ideology (Lenin, Stalin, and Dulles) is based on the debate between Americans and Soviets on the question of whether being a Communist or Russian is prior to Soviet leaders.
 3. Great Russian Imperialism (Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Dean Acheson) supports the notion that Soviet domestic and foreign policy simply continued Great Russian national traditions and Marxism had never penetrated deeply into the social structure of Russia.
 4. Eurasian theory (Vernadsky, Savitsky, Trubetskoy, and Kolarz) believes that Russia has always displayed a strong orientation towards Asia. The despotic nature of communism is thought to be something inherent to Asia rather than to the civilized Europe.
 5. Urge to the Sea theory (Robert Kerner) explains Soviet foreign policy objectives as a function of maritime factors, which have tremendously

²⁸ Hafeez C. Malik (ed.), *Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy towards South Asia and the Middle East* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 1-39.

influenced it. A land-locked Russia is not an independent country. Marxist state has not changed an urge to the sea. USSR's ambitions after WWII were directed toward the control over the Skagerrak, the Dardanelles, the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region.

Culture One and Culture Two

In mid-1970s, an architect Vladimir Paperny undertook a study of Soviet culture and dichotomized the findings in two main approaches: Culture One and Culture Two. Culture One was associated with motion, and Culture Two with settlement. In Soviet architecture, Paperny noticed, the first culture was popular during October Revolution and until mid-1930s, then replaced by the second culture from 1930s to 1970s.²⁹

Russian political analyst Medvedev had tried to apply this dichotomous consequence of periods onto Russian foreign policy. Russian foreign policy, according to him, is viewed as consequent, cyclic periods of Culture One and Culture Two. Thus, Russian foreign policy in Culture One is “playful, light-hearted and irresponsible.”³⁰ The essence of decision in Culture One is bound to the concept of “Russian Space:” vast and hard to control. Decision-makers in that period tended to act self-denyingly with a feeling of sacrifice. For instance, Russian foreign policy in late 1980s and early 1990s is thought to be an indicator of Culture One when trying to get rid of the heavy burden of Empire. Russia was often giving more concessions than expected by the West (unification of Germany, withdrawal from the Middle East, refusal of support for leftist movements in Central America and Communist parties all over the world, etc.).

²⁹ Sergey Medvedev, “Power, Space and Russian Foreign Policy” in Ted Hopf, ed., *Understanding Russian Foreign Policy* (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 15-57.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

On the contrary, Culture Two deals with the concept of power in Russian foreign policy-making. During most of the Soviet period, Soviet identity and foreign policy were constructed on this concept. Beginning from 1993 with the election of right wing and communist parties to the State Duma (Russian Parliament's lower chamber) Russian decision-makers became more preoccupied with construction of this renewed identity and placing it into foreign policy-making. Vladimir Zhirinovskiy with its ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia was one of the ardent supporters of this old but renewed identity who strongly opposed to the damaging self-sacrificing and concessive attitudes of Westernists.

Ideology in the Soviet Foreign Policy

One of the most explicit denominators of Soviet foreign policy was its Marxist-Leninist ideology. Ideology played a big role in the formation of images and perceptions of the world beyond the Soviet borders. Therefore, one of the pillars of the Soviet leaders' foreign policy was their conviction that Marxism-Leninism was a scientific system that had uncovered the fundamental laws of social evolution giving its supporters the capacity of prediction and partial control of events. This prediction filled Soviet diplomacy with an air of supreme confidence and dogmatic self-righteousness.³¹

³¹ Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy" in Kenneth Thompson and Roy Macridis, eds., *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1976), p. 171.

Stalin's foreign policy³² featured his strong personal discretion. He discarded all rival and dissident views and liquidated their adherents. Most of the time Stalin simply acted without consulting even Politburo members. Although the Politburo and the Foreign Affairs Ministry existed as institutions dealing with foreign affairs, their weight in establishing foreign policy proved to be considerably lower as compared to Stalin's wide authority. The Foreign Affairs Minister usually was not even a member of the Politburo. In turn, the importance of the Politburo was reduced and its work disorganized by the creation within it of various commissions.³³ According to Khrushchev, these steps taken by Stalin were not devised for organizational efficiency, but actually to weaken the collective body's authority.³⁴ Therefore, Stalin's foreign policy formulation did not have a place for other foreign policy views.

During the Cold War period, the Politburo played a significant role in foreign policy-making. This indicates that actually the party and not the government institutions had a final say in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, according to Soviet literature, party congresses and Central Committee plenary sessions determined and established the general line in foreign policy, while the Politburo appeared to be a secondary institution responsible for policy according to the decisions handed down by the congresses and plenums. However, the Politburo was the key decision-maker.³⁵

³²Ibid., p. 178. Analysis of the early Soviet foreign policy formulation is complicated because of the "absence of periodic and systematic publication of documents, of the inaccessibility of archives and official, the virtual nonexistence of memoirs and diaries of retiring statesmen, the puzzling duplication of party and state institutions, the perplexing fluctuations in their relationships, the ambiguity of Soviet ideology, the wide discrepancy between theory and practice, the arbitrary tendency to ignore elaborately detailed institutional channels and finally the convulsive turnover of personalities."

³³ Ibid., p. 180.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 182-183.

³⁵ Melvin Goodman, "Foreign Policy and Decision-Making Process in Soviet Union" in Hafeez Malik, *Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy towards South Asia and the Middle East* (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1990), p. 88.

Therefore, during the Cold War period, the Politburo was the main Soviet foreign policy-maker.

In the Soviet foreign policy formulation, various powerful groups also tried to exert their influence on the foreign policy decisions. They were the nomenclature of the party, the *apparatchiki* in industry and agriculture, the armed forces, and the KGB who claimed their share of power to influence the process. The worldview of these groups had little power to influence the general Soviet foreign policy because their worldviews were in line with the general worldview of the party. Therefore, the impact of various powerful groups in the Cold War period was not enough to shift the Soviet foreign policy because there was an established mechanism of foreign policy formulation.

Although the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs had its policy planning organs, it still had no decisive say in foreign policy formulation compared to the party apparatus. This situation continued until 1973 when the Foreign Affairs Minister acquired a voting membership in Politburo and started acting as a personal adviser to the General Secretary.³⁶ Therefore, the role of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs was more of an executive organ than of a foreign policy-maker.

To sum up the above argument, the ideology about Soviet Union's place in the world – as the champion of international progress and proletarian revolution – played the main role in foreign policy formulation and endured until the ascent of Gorbachev to the leadership of the Soviet Union.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 92. Foreign Affairs Minister Andrey Gromyko was the first career diplomat in the Politburo. The real shift towards a more independent Ministry of Foreign Affairs happened under Gorbachev as the First Secretary of the Communist Party. Edward Shevardnadze reorganized the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Minister became a full member of the Politburo.

The Winds of Change in Soviet Foreign Policy

Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms in Soviet foreign policy formulation carried the aim of achieving better recognition of the world's problems and opening the way for a joint search for solutions in the international arena. In order to do this, he initiated a process of the *exclusion of ideology* as the guiding principle in Soviet foreign policy formulation. This reform process enriched political science with such concepts as *perestroika*³⁷ and *glasnost*. Behind this reform movement, there was an idea that without ideological differences, the level of communication would increase. At the same time, he aimed at the preservation of Soviet national interests and special characteristics.³⁸ This proved to be a hard task because Gorbachev defined such interests in terms of preserving "socialist values" which drew criticism from liberal-minded decision-makers. Conservatives charged him with making many unilateral concessions to the West. Therefore, the process of relinquishing ideology in Soviet foreign policy formulation brought about more interaction in the international arena.

This process also encouraged liberal groups in the foreign policy formulation establishment to compete for more influence. The proponents of cooperation with the

³⁷ The Russian word *perestroika* literally means restructuring, remodeling, or rebuilding. In the political literature, it refers to the sweeping reforms undertaken in 1980-90s in almost every sphere at both the domestic and foreign affairs levels. Mikhail Gorbachev, the only President of the USSR, coined this word in the literature of political science and international relations. Since then it has been used actively to indicate the policy of "new thinking" in Russian foreign policy in its interactions with the Western democracies. The reform itself was started during by General Secretary Yuri Andropov and was intended to heal the ailing Soviet system, but brought the collapse of the USSR in 1991.

³⁸ Tsygankov, p. 155.

West formed their ideas in the movement that was called *integrationism*.³⁹ The beginning of integrationism took place under the Gorbachev's rule.

To sum up the above argument, Russian foreign policy concepts like perestroika and glasnost were parts of the "new thinking" initiative launched by Gorbachev to reach out to the international community. The important feature of his foreign policy formulation was the exclusion of ideology from the Soviet foreign policy formulation process. This period of reforms could not fulfill its assignment and resulted in the disintegration of the country. It also signaled the coming fierce competition between the main Russian foreign policy schools.

Integrationism

To understand this vision of Russian foreign policy it is necessary to start with an analysis of the years of Gorbachev's rule, because his reforms in the Soviet foreign policy encouraged the empowering of the *integrationist* vision.⁴⁰ Gorbachev's reforms constitute the integrationist moves of the Soviets⁴¹ because his "new political

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 153-154. "The integrationists believed in the integration of Russia as only viable way to develop. The post-Soviet integrationists, inspired by liberal theories of interdependence, argued that the "natural" affinity of their country with the West was based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and the free market. The Russian Federation's first foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, declared that Russia's very system of values was to be changed, to bring the country into the tier of nations such as France, Germany, and the United States. Russia would accept the primacy of the individual and the free market over society and state in order to develop what was referred to as a "natural partnership" with Western countries. Many members of Russia's business elites and liberal media have been prominent supporters of integrationism since the fall of the Soviet Union."

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 154. "This *integrationist* vision was founded on liberal theories of interdependence that argued of the affinity of Russia with the West to be "based on such shared values as democracy, human rights, and the free market." The guiding principles of this school were the primacy of the individual and the free market over society and state in order to develop a beneficial partnership with Western countries. These ideas were greatly supported by members of Russia's business elite and liberal media."

⁴¹ "Diplomaticheskyy Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannih Del SSSR," no. 1, (1987), pp. 4-6, quoted in Silvia Woodby, *Gorbachev and the Decline of the Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview

thinking”⁴² opened new channels of international communication “to facilitate rather than avoid domestic change and sustain this radical international realignment to help to drive fundamental transformation at home.”⁴³ Demilitarization and de-ideologization were two major new security and foreign policies: “Demilitarization was a disarmament policy to lighten the economic weight of the defense burden as well as to improve the climate of East-West relations and de-ideologization was used to legitimate the new rapprochement with capitalism, with its emphasis on mutuality, interdependence and co-development rather than mere coexistence.”⁴⁴

Diversifying of Foreign Policy Directions

During his period, the country increased the level of cooperation with foreign powers and “several attempts were made to return East-West relations to a less ideological and more pragmatic base.”⁴⁵ Gorbachev tried to diversify foreign policy and persuade the world that they abandoned to view all conflicts “through the spectacles of East-West political or ideological confrontation.”⁴⁶ By diversifying the foreign policy,

Press, 1989), p. 14. He emphasized the need to find out the ways for the USSR to enter the world community.

⁴² Susan Saunders Vosper, “The Demise of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” in Fateh A. Jabar, ed., *Post-Marxism and the Middle East* (London: Saqi Books, 1997), p. 28. The logic of *perestroika* initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev postulated that “the new thinking” in foreign affairs would establish a relationship with the West which would enable the Soviets to reduce the military expenditure drastically, switching investment to science, new technology and consumer goods; the economic program would construct a more decentralized market-oriented system with financial incentives for workers and management.

⁴³ Alex Pravda, “The Politics of Foreign Policy” in Zvi Gitelman, Alex Pravda and Stephen White, eds., *Developments in Soviet and Post-Soviet Politics* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), p. 255.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 255-256. “One of Mikhail Gorbachev’s favorite lines of thinking was that the Soviet Union had to “purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic or “human” version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm).”

⁴⁵ *Pravda*, 31 July 1985 in Margot Light, “Foreign Policy” in Martin McCauley, ed., *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 216.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

they meant paying more attention to non-communist countries like Japan. Russians needed Japan as a supplier of technology and as a partner to strengthen its position in the Far East. However, to develop better relations, either Russia or Japan had to shift its policies regarding the territorial dispute. Despite good intentions, the cooperation remained limited to bilateral agreements on trade, economic issues and cultural exchanges of 1985 and 1986.⁴⁷

Changes in the Decision-Making Process

Gorbachev's perestroika also affected the structure of foreign policy decision-making in the late period of the USSR. One of his first steps was bringing into the Politburo Vadim Medvedev, a central Committee member known for his softer views towards the West, who wrote a moderate foreign policy doctrine towards the members of the Warsaw Pact. He made the revolutionary declaration that Communism was in a period of crisis around the world and that the notion of class struggle was no longer a determinant of Soviet foreign policy.⁴⁸

The discussions and debates over foreign policy aimed to improve it. The quality of decision-making was for the first time thought to be the function of the wider involvement of specialists as well as of general public opinion. These were initial steps on the way to ease the totalitarian grasp of the Soviet state over foreign policy. The 19th Party Conference recommended that the Supreme Soviet should play a central role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. Shevardnadze came up with the idea that

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 222. These Agreements were followed by Kaifu Joint Declaration of 1991, where Gorbachev agreed that there existed a territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands between Russia and Japan.

⁴⁸ Goodman, p. 101.

legislative commissions of the Supreme Soviet should hold hearings to review policy options and have overall control over the military budget and any use of military sources outside the USSR. Shevardnadze supported the idea of “cost-effectiveness” maintained by Gorbachev, arguing that the Soviet Union should avoid “vast material investment in hopeless foreign policy projects” and stressed that foreign policy should be compatible with resources and capabilities.⁴⁹

The first Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Kozyrev was an active supporter of this vision. As the Minister, he undertook many reforms to embed Russia in the international community. However, there were costs to conducting reforms at the international level as well as at the domestic level. The cost and burden of implementing these reforms were very heavy. The integrationists had to justify their actions against the conservative groups.

To sum up, the integrationist movement believed in the Western values as the common values for all societies. They viewed the West as “the most viable and progressive civilization in the world.”⁵⁰ The reforms undertaken by Gorbachev were attempts to align the Soviet Union with the advanced Western countries. In the case of Russia, the lack of authority and consistency to implement these Western values proved to be very hard due to the backlashes of improper implementation and the criticism of political rivals.

⁴⁹ Silvia Woodby, *Gorbachev and the Decline of the Ideology in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 36-39.

⁵⁰ Tsygankov, p. 153.

Early Russian Foreign Policy

The years of Gorbachev's "openness" in foreign politics introduced Russia to many new Western concepts. However, with the presidency of Yeltsin the reactionary forces within the foreign policy formulation establishment started gaining weight by criticizing the excessive leaning to the West and giving too many unilateral concessions. These (*great power balancing*)⁵¹ reactionary forces claimed that Russia's direction of development was not only the West but also Asia because Russia was a Eurasian country. Therefore, Yeltsin's period of foreign policy formulation was marked with a competition between the pro-western and reactionary forces.

Yeltsin's Foreign Policy

To understand Russian foreign policy since its independence one should examine the foreign policy schools and the interaction among them. The early years of Russian Federation witnessed a major debate between two schools of political thought, *Atlanticism* and *Eurasianism*. In domestic politics, this delineation overlapped with the westernists, liberals, democrats on one side and the statist, traditionalists, nationalists

⁵¹ Ibid., p.154. "Proponents of Russia's balancing the West's power across the world, or balancers, advocated the view of Russia as a geopolitically and culturally distinct entity. Such was the perspective of Yevgeny Primakov, the second foreign minister of the Russian Federation and a former chief of foreign intelligence. Primakov insisted that Russia must strive to become a pole of independent power in a multipolar world, and that it should be motivated primarily by its own great-power interests, not by the desire to be a part of the West. This vision of great power balancing was inspired by earlier Russian and European great-power diplomacy and by traditional geopolitical theories. The new coalition of military industrialists, the army, and the security services embraced this vision. Some of them shared the vision out of wounded pride after the significant loss of territory and world status brought about by the Soviet collapse. Others were disappointed by the failure of partnership with the West in the 1990s to bring about visible improvements in living standards or to pacify military conflicts on the Russian periphery. Still others saw a heretofore largely ignored potential to generate revenue by developing new technologies and exporting conventional weapons."

and communists on the other side. The competition between pro-western Atlanticism and conservative Eurasianism weakened the Russian foreign policy formulation mechanism that remained intact during Gorbachev's years. This competition created a lack of authority in the foreign policy formulation establishment that led to the uncoordinated and inconsistent foreign policy of Yeltsin's Russia.

Atlanticism

Atlanticists were supporting the course initiated by perestroika: the reduction of East-West tension and Russia is finding its place in Western community of nations. To make these ends happen, according to Atlanticist school, Russia should get rid of its "messianic" attitude in international relations and try to make more efforts on the way of integration into the Western world. The world-known Russian dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who is also famous as the father of Russian democracy, has championed the idea of civilized Russia free from its imperial burden. Referring to the idea of twentieth-century prominent Russian political thinker S. Krzhizhanovsky, Solzhenitsyn wrote:

We are out of capacity to make efforts; we possess neither moral nor economic power. We are strong enough to have an empire. Moreover, we have neither need for it: it is the best time to throw away this burden from our shoulders for it makes our catastrophe close and us weaker.⁵²

⁵² Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *Rusya Nasil Kurtulur?* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1992), p. 14.

For example, he regards the loss of Poland and Finland by Russian Empire as a useful and profitable event for Russia's reinvigoration and revival saying that: "we have to get rid of our Caucasian and Central Asian hump as well."⁵³

The emergence of Atlanticist school is regarded as the natural continuity of new political thinking opposing to the views and perceptions of Soviet leaders and society that "hostile Western capitalist world" will "encircle and engulf" USSR. Consequently, Atlanticists were aware of the danger that such perceptions and creation of a hostile "others" could evoke. They anticipated that the worst repercussion of such thinking would be the re-orientation of these threat perceptions into domestic politics, legitimizing further the autocratic national identity.⁵⁴ This point of apprehension was partly justified during 1994 when the first Chechen war began. Atlanticist-associated media warned that Caucasian war would serve the interests of those who are longing for the old glorious days of Russian Empire by justifying the authoritarian control of military budget and a reversal of the reform movement.⁵⁵

The first Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, one of the ardent initiators and supporters of Atlanticist school, Andrey Kozyrev, called for an "alliance relationship" with the West⁵⁶ and for Russia, to promote human rights. That appeared also to be the fulfillment of democrats' aspirations long suppressed by the Soviet regime. Pro-Westerners truly believed that the West was to serve as an anchor for the domestic reform movement, which could otherwise be overwhelmed by the reactionary forces in

⁵³ Ibid., p. 16.

⁵⁴ Zeynep Dagli, *Rusya'nin Donusumu: Kimlik, Milliyetçilik ve Dis Politika* (Istanbul: Boyut Press, 2002), p. 181.

⁵⁵ *Izvestiya* (23 December, 1994), quoted in Leszek Buszynski, "Russia and the West: Towards Renewed Geopolitical Rivalry?" *Survival* 37, no. 3 (1995), p. 107.

⁵⁶ Here, the West is used not only in the geographical sense, but in rather the whole civilization, which is around the concept of the liberal democracy.

the Russian society. These pro-West oriented people of Russian political elite were ready to accept the Western model defined in terms of sanctity of law, political methods of conflict resolution and collective security, supporting the idea that this model could be extended eastwards to embrace entire Eurasian continent.⁵⁷

President Yeltsin was considered by Russian elite as well as by the people outside Russia as a “Westernist” and not as “Eurasianist.” He championed the idea of a “normal,” civilized country like France or Italy. Yeltsin believed that patriotism in Russian case would be a clear understanding of a real situation and acting to such a notion.⁵⁸ In an interview to *Sovetskaya Molodezh* Yeltsin insisted that ‘one cannot discard the two hundred-year experience of American democracy’ and suggested that Russians could, in fact, learn a great deal from the political experience of the United States.⁵⁹

Atlanticist Institutions

The Foreign Ministry in the first month of Russian statehood repeatedly declared that Russia intended “to enter the club of the most dynamically developing democratic countries;” that it was “the missing component of the democratic pole of Western hemisphere;” and that it “was about to return to Europe.”⁶⁰

The Yeltsin Administration had also been regarded as mostly pro-Western institution in Russian Federation. It was very enthusiastic on business and foreign

⁵⁷ Buszynski, p. 105.

⁵⁸ John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of Soviet Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 58.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁶⁰ Neil Malcolm, “The New Russian Foreign Policy,” *The World Today* (February 1994), p. 28.

investment and good relations with the rich countries such as Germany, Japan and the USA. The fact that Russian Presidential Administration together with Ministry of Foreign Affairs had always been cautious not to deteriorate current relations with the West has become obvious during the NATO operations in Kosovo. Although President Yeltsin himself and wider circles as well as public opinion in Russia were furious with NATO for bombing Serbia, which had always been counted as one of the closest allies of Russia, he was nonetheless determined to “keep Slobodan Milosevic at arm’s length to save Russia from a really serious row with the West.”⁶¹

Another aspect of reaction against pre-existing Soviet doctrine was the endorsing of a vision of a new, peaceful and increasingly economically integrated world order. Hence, Atlanticists have unconditionally relied on international institutions in the matters of peacekeeping and collective security. In the case of twenty five million Russians living abroad who suddenly found themselves outside of Russia, it was thought that such institutions as OSCE and UN would protect them.⁶² The great deal was assigned to European institutions because westernists have seen Russia as a European state. Moreover, Russia has assigned itself as one of the builders of “common European home.” Vladimir Petlovsky, a Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, who was one of the main spokespeople of this view, declared that the building of “common European home” was a putting into practice of Kantian principles of international relations.⁶³

⁶¹ Charlemagne, “Igor Ivanov: Russia’s Balkan Voice,” *Moscow State University Journal* (December 2001).

⁶² Buszynski, p. 106.

⁶³ Malcolm, p. 28.

This idealistic notion of foreign policy based on “all human values” and cooperation was the reason why Yeltsin and Kozyrev were under severe attack from hard-line nationalists and communists. President and Minister of Foreign Affairs were also criticized for lacking a strategy to deal with newly independent republics and paying too much attention to relations with the West in order to obtain foreign aid.⁶⁴ Under such criticism from all sides, especially from the Supreme Soviet, Yeltsin felt forced to fire Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar, the key advocate of the reform movement, but keep Kozyrev as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, thus signaling to the West that Russia’s pro-western foreign policy stance would continue.⁶⁵

Great Power Balancing in the Yeltsin Period

The period of Boris Yeltsin marks the introduction of Western values such as market economy, free enterprise, human rights and individual freedoms to Russia. However, these values caused chaos and suffering to a large majority of the population. At the same time, the political elite who opposed the political changes during the Gorbachev’s reforms activated their presence in the political field. His Presidency ushered in a period of chaos in Russian domestic politics. Yeltsin was a “political maverick, who until the end tried to play the mutually exclusive roles of democrat and tsar, who made revolutionary frenzy and turmoil his way of survival.”⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Elaine Holoboff, “Russian Views on Military Intervention: Benevolent Peace-keeping, Monroe Doctrine or Neo-Imperialism?” in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Military Intervention in European Conflicts*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), p. 157.

⁶⁵ Alexei Arbatov, “Russia’s Foreign Policy Alternatives,” *International Security* 18, no. 2 (1993), p. 17.

⁶⁶ Lilia Shevtsova, *Putin’s Russia* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), p. 3.

The competition between integrationists and balancers caused uncoordinated foreign politics, which led to the inconsistency in Russian foreign policies. During his years in power, Yeltsin signed several agreements to conclude the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute over the southern Kuril Islands.

To sum up, the Yeltsin period provided Russia with many freedoms but Russia could not adapt itself to unfamiliar freedoms and did not know what to do with them. This inability to accommodate itself to these freedoms turned into freedoms in “the absence of orderly habits, with a weak legal culture and egoistical elites which led to chaos and illegality, a disregard for all taboos and restrictions.”⁶⁷ Yeltsin’s period was a period with a division into two camps of people, one disappointed with new values and freedoms but reluctant to give them up, and the other of people longing for order and stability but fearing the autocracy. In addition to this standoff of two camps, there was a competition between integrationists and balancers, which caused chaos in domestic politics as well as foreign politics.

Eurasianism

The Eurasianist school that is thought to be a more fundamental school of thought emerged among Russian émigré intelligentsia in early 1920s. It developed and became wide-spread among Russian intellectuals through 1921-1926. Emerged in Sophia soon it moved to Prague and afterwards to Berlin. The founding-fathers of this school are thought to be a linguist and philosopher Trubetskoy, geographer and

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 258.

economist Savitsky and priest Florovsky. Karsavin, Vernadsky and Alekseev are also thought to have been of great contributors to the development of the school.⁶⁸

Modern Eurasianists have made themselves known from the late 1980s as the people leading opposition to Atlanticists. Eurasianists concede that the Russian state has been severely defeated by the United States in Cold War. One of the most prominent Eurasianists in modern Russia, Alexander Dugin, who is the Chairman of “Evraziystvo” (Eurasianism) movement, expressed his anti-western views in this way:

We lost the Cold War. It does not matter how: with cunningness or power, through economic or ideological competition, but the reality is that our rivals have defeated us. Naturally, victors do not intend to give Russia a chance for prosperous future. What is going now in world politics is the partition of our strategic and geopolitical body, and this will last and will never stop, until the “circle of anaconda” embraces Moscow.⁶⁹

However, anti-Westernism in Eurasianist rhetoric implies negative stance only to the USA, not taking Europe as the rival. Dugin in his interview explains the differences in their approach to European countries and USA by saying that with European countries, unlike USA, they share some common interests like energy supply regardless of the different cultures.⁷⁰

The year of 1992 was the year when Russia’s foreign policy had a task to respond to the question of what actions it should take vis-à-vis the other fourteen former Soviet republics. This issue emerged as a central defining item of Russian politics. This task and the debates around it brought into agenda a new political orientation – the so-called democratic statist or national democrats. Soon the “pure” democrats or

⁶⁸ L. I. Chernysheva, “Russkaya Shkola Geopolitiki” in N. A. Nartov, ed., *Geopolitika* (Moscow: Unity, 2000), p. 93.

⁶⁹ Alexander Dugin, *Budusheye Rossii Zavisit Ot Nashey Voli*, 4 March 2002. Article was accessed on 15 March 2002 on <http://www.smi.ru>.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

Atlanticists found themselves engaged in a sharp struggle with both newly emerged moderate right and the statist right.⁷¹

The rise of Eurasianists began with the erosion of pro-Western positions in Russian politics close to the end of 1992. The pro-Western policy started to be criticized by the wide spectrum of opinion groups: moderate and hard-line nationalists, communists and neo-Bolsheviks for failing to reflect Russia's real interests. Eurasianists claim that the neighboring newly independent countries are the space of Russia's interests. Nationalists and neo-Bolsheviks insisted that Russia is and have to continue to be strong in its close neighborhood. From 1992 on, foreign policy attitude of Russia started to be shaped by the assumptions about the relationship between two elements of foreign policy: towards the bordering and weak neighbors and towards the strong West. Between these opposing groups there was another group consisting from the centrists and mild conservatives who believed that Russia could and should play strong role in both spaces.⁷²

Great Power Balancing

The critics of the *integrationist* vision blamed integrationists for giving unilateral concessions to the West and leaning too much on the West. The believers in Russia's role as balancing the West's power throughout the world advocate the view of Russia as a geopolitically and culturally distinct entity. The most prominent advocate of this vision was the second Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Yevgeny Primakov. He

⁷¹ Dunlop, p.287.

⁷² Buszynski, p. 106.

claimed that Russia had to be eager to “become a pole of independent power in a multipolar world, and that it should be motivated primarily by its own great-power interests, not by the desire to be a part of the West.”⁷³

This vision accepted “a limited cooperation with the “strongest” (i.e., the West), although he insisted that in each instance of international cooperation, absolute equality of power must exist between the parties.”⁷⁴ Balancers view Russia’s counterbalance to the West, especially the United States, “by forming alliances with non-Western nations, such as China and India; by modernizing Russia's economy; and by strengthening its ability to organize and control the post-Soviet space.”⁷⁵

The origin of this vision lies in the earlier Russian and European great-power diplomacy and traditional geopolitical theories. Among the supporters of this vision, there were many security personnel in military industry, the army, and the security services.⁷⁶ The reasons for their support were either a wounded pride after the significant loss of territory and world status, a disappointment by the failure of partnership with the West in the 1990s.

Hard Line Neo-Imperialists and Slavophil

In parallel to Eurasianism, another school of thought appeared in Russia under the name of Slavophil. They advocated the idea of originality of Russia’s historical path

⁷³ Yevgeny Primakov, "Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya Nakanunye XXI Veka" (International Relations on the Eve of the 21st Century), *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (Oct. 1996); Yevgeny Primakov, "Rossiya v Mirovoy Politike" (Russia in World Politics), *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (May 1998), quoted in *ibid.*

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵ Yevgeny Primakov, *Gody v Bolshoy Politike* (My Years in High Politics), (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1999), quoted in *ibid.*

⁷⁶ Yevgeny Primakov, who is the champion of this Russian foreign policy vision, is a former chief of the KGB.

morally and spiritually distinct from the Western European. Slavophil concurred with Eurasianists on the point that Russian culture unboundedly tied with Christian Orthodox Church. However, Eurasianists opposed to the notion of Slavism as the source determining Russia's cultural distinctiveness. In contrast, the distinctiveness of Russian culture is in its mixture of European and Asiatic components. In this respect, Russia resembles Byzantine, which also proved to unite western and eastern origins and had "Eurasian culture."⁷⁷

In the context of the vision of great power balancing, I note a presence of a more hard line neo-imperialist vision, which is more aggressive than balancers. They support the identity of the "Russian empire," and their notion of balancing includes elements of foreign policy expansionism. The main advocate of this vision is Gennady Zyuganov, the leader of Russia's communists, who claims that, "Russia must restore the lost balance of world power."⁷⁸

Interactions of the Russian Domestic Actors

Without an analysis of interaction among domestic actors,⁷⁹ it is hard to know how the foreign policy was constructed in Russia in 1990s, because the end of the Cold War lifted some obstacles in intergovernmental negotiations and offered incentives for

⁷⁷ Primakov, p. 95.

⁷⁸ Gennady Zyuganov, *Rossiya i Sovremennjy Mir* (Russia and the contemporary world), (Moscow: Obozrevatel, 1995); Gennady Zyuganov, *Geografiya Pobedy - Osnovy Rossiyskoy Geopolitiki* (The Geography of Victory: the Foundations of Russian Geopolitics) (Moscow: G. Zyuganov, 1998), quoted in *ibid.* "Neo-imperialists feel it should remain an independent, socialist civilization that is autarchic, has a self-sufficient economy, and is generally isolated from "alien" Western influences."

⁷⁹ Arbatov, p. 12. "Pro-westerners, moderate liberal, centrist and moderate conservatives, and neo-communists and nationalists." Tsygankov, p. 157. "Integrationists, great power balancers and great power pragmatists."

each actor to pursue domestic interests without being influenced by the international environment. The Russian government has been trying to adopt democratic principles since the fall of communism, permitting various domestic groups to raise their voices.

The identity crisis that emerged in Russia affected to a large extent the minds of decision-makers as well. They have had to, somehow, manage their countries' difficulties government problems during the transition era: to dissociate themselves from the Soviet ideology and imperial legacy. However, the euphoria of democracy and vacuum of leadership and coordination in foreign policy has paved the way to the situation when Russian foreign policies were exercised not according to the well established and coordinated by the government programs, but by different agencies and groups. Probably we can claim that Russian foreign policy has never been as diversified in respect to its domestic sources as in the first years of independence. Among these sources in decision-making were big financial and industrial groups, military and other ministries. Those agencies were acting without political approval from the government during the Yeltsin tenure.

As one example of such a conduct, we see the dismissed later on by the government an agreement between the Ministry of Atomic Energy and the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is interesting to note the strength of these political players by noticing that the Minister of this Ministry, Viktor Mikhailov, remained in his post after this independent initiative in international politics. Upon this incident, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Kozyrev made a public statement expressing his apprehension by the scale of independent dealings of Russian institutions in international arena:

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, based on additional instructions from the President, will insist on making all this work subordinated to

interdepartmental expertise, so that, long-term Russian State interests, rather than departmental or even commercial interests are made a priority.⁸⁰

The President and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were expected to coordinate and mediate among competing governmental bodies concerned with foreign policy issues. However, Yeltsin appeared to be little interested to impose a discipline, giving support to various actors and casting blame on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Chaos in Domestic Politics

This situation reflected the situation inside of the Administration of the President, which was undergoing constant reorganization.⁸¹ The coordination of foreign policy-making seemed impossible after the establishment of Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission and the Security Council in 1992, which evoked an opposition from liberals who suspected presenting the military and military industry with more advantage.

These domestic actors used to benefit from the old Soviet order, but now they are not comfortable in the new political order, which can be “a probable precipitant of an international conflict.”⁸² Some analysts claim that the “states like contemporary Russia that makes a big leap in democracy are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are the states that remain autocracies.”⁸³ However,

⁸⁰ *Interfax*, 4 April 1995, quoted in Brenda Shaffer, “Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran,” *Policy Paper*, no. 57, (Washington Institute for Near-East Policy, 2001), p. 22.

⁸¹ Malcolm, p.30.

⁸² McFaul, “Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 22, no. 3, 97/98, p. 5.

⁸³ Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger of War” in Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996), p. 302.

Russia was able to manage to avoid international conflicts by bringing some order to its foreign policy making process. In Russian national politics of 1990s, the political actors can be divided into two big groups: 1. political leaders, organizations and interest groups that used to benefit from the old order; 2. political leaders, organizations and interest groups that are interested in “material and normative interests in international cooperation rather than conflict.”⁸⁴

Liberal groups, especially newly emerged young economic elite, were deeply interested in peace in order to maintain their financial superiority over other groups. Compared to other former Soviet republics, Russia inherited and maintained former Soviet Foreign Affairs institutions and personnel. However, the difficulties of a transition period brought lack of authority of government over the national political institutions.

While the President officially determines the foreign policy, he relies on a network of institutions and advisors to reach his decisions: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Defense; Security Council and Yeltsin’s advisors in the Presidential Council. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is officially responsible for implementing the policies set by the President. The adopted by the Security Council in April 1993, the new foreign policy concept was to abandon the uncertainties in the Russian foreign policy-making, which resulted from the controversial statements and operations by different actors. This concept stressed the priority of relations with advanced industrial countries while maintaining active role of Russia in its neighboring countries.

There was another group of actors in Russian foreign policy-making consisting of President Yeltsin and the interest groups: the pro-Western, liberal Administration of

⁸⁴ McFaul, p. 7.

the President with the President sitting atop; security forces, subordinated to the President but having antagonistic views of the world; and economic lobbies for whom the primary interest was economic profits awaiting them abroad and to get to them they had to use government channels. To produce such a unified foreign policy concept at that time the Minister of Foreign Affairs had to be friendly with all players in this game of national politics, which reached far beyond national borders.

Until its recent consolidation during the presidency of Vladimir Putin, Russian foreign policy presented a picture of disassociated actors who were hardly controlled by the President or Ministry of Foreign Affairs to whom this responsibility is assigned by the constitution of the Russian Federation. Experts distinguish between the following types of actors influencing Russian foreign policy: actors primarily concerned with foreign policy; actors primarily concerned with military security; and actors primarily concerned with foreign economic relations.

The President together with his Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Foreign Affairs Committee of Duma comprised the foreign policy groups of actors. Another influential actor is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which practically deals with the tactical assessment and implementation of foreign policy goals set forward by Kremlin. The Ministry of Defense is also a powerful player in setting foreign policy priorities. There were also members of “foreign policy elite:” academicians, analysts, legislators with foreign policy expertise.

After the disintegration of the USSR, the most powerful fragments of the old bureaucracy, which remained in tact, were the military leaders and the state sector industrial management. These groups have had important political advantages. First,

they have had an access to substantial organizational and material resources. Second, they were large natural allies having a network of long standing contacts from the Soviet period during which they enjoyed high status. Large sectors of them appear to have a common interest in slowing down marketization and demilitarization, and in preserving as much of the former Soviet economic and military space as can be preserved. Third, they can pose as protectors of the public against radical economic restructuring and unemployment. Fourth, in the political conditions of 1992 and 1993, this group and its centrist political allies could occupy the critical strategic ground between radical Westernists and irreconcilable nationalist and communist wing. Finally, the army has enjoyed extra advantage of the chaos, confusion and civil war on Russia's borders and because of its role in resolving constitutional impasse in 1993 between the president and the parliament.⁸⁵

The group of these actors were mainly concerned with military-security policy and comprised of the Ministry of Defense, the General Staff, several branches of Armed Forces and their local commander, as well as presidential and parliamentary councils and committees concerned with defense and security.

The impact of economic groups on Russian foreign policy has been on the factors establishing open Russian policies abroad. Economic factors were the locomotives of Russia's foreign policy becoming more liberal and cooperative rather than assertive. Economic groups include the ministries of foreign economic relations, fuel and energy, commercial entities and bureaucrats closely associated with these actors.

⁸⁵ Malcolm, p. 31.

Current Russian Foreign Policy

As for the current Russian foreign policy formulation, there are three powerful foreign policy visions, the *integrationist*, *great power balancing* and *great power pragmatism*.⁸⁶ These three visions within Russian foreign policy establishment are a result of interactions of the following foreign policy schools: the pro-westerners, moderate liberal, centrist and moderate conservatives, and neo-communists and nationalists.⁸⁷

Putin's Foreign Policy

Vladimir Putin's foreign policy indicates his commitment to the newly chosen course of *great-power normalization, or great-power pragmatism*.⁸⁸ Initially, he shared the vision of *great power balancing* advocated by Primakov. However, soon he leaned toward engaging the West in a new global project that resembled Gorbachev's strategy of "engaging the West in a shared understanding in order to achieve a better recognition of the world's problems and to open the way for a joint search for solutions."⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 155. "The advocates of great-power normalization emerged as an establishment critique of Primakov's balancing foreign policy, which they saw as overly ambitious and excessively anti-Western. The normalizers remained philosophically close to the balancers, but shifted the means of achieving their goals of power, stability, and sovereignty. The new Pragmatist consensus was summarized in the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy's "Strategy for Russia: An Agenda for the President--2000." Both integrationists, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamshin, and balancers, such as Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Duma's Committee on the CIS Affairs, collaborated in drafting the document. The authors proposed the concept of "selective engagement," which they compared both with Russia's nineteenth-century policy of "self-concentration" after its defeat in the Crimean War and with China's policy since Deng Xiaoping."

⁸⁷ Arbatov, p. 12.

⁸⁸ Tsygankov, p. 157. For a more detailed analysis of Putin's strategy, see Andrei P. Tsygankov, "Vladimir Putin's Vision of Russia as a Normal Great Power," *Post-Soviet Affairs* (June 2005).

⁸⁹ Ibid.

However, Putin engages the West with his commitment to the idea of great power. This foreign policy vision emerged as a critique of *great power balancing* of Primakov, which *normalizers* found too ambitious and too anti-Western. They remain “philosophically close to the balancers, but shifted the means of achieving their goals of power, stability, and sovereignty.”⁹⁰ Instead, they propose abandoning of “*pseudo-integration* at Russia's expense” and the “tough defense of our national economic interests.”⁹¹

This foreign policy came out by “the reshaping of domestic interest groups and their identity visions, as well as changes that had taken place in the international arena.”⁹² This reshaping of political context for foreign policymaking enabled President Putin to implement a new strategy in Russian foreign policy, which is *great power normalizing*.

To sum up, it is the vision of *great power normalizing/pragmatism* that dictates Putin’s engagement with the West and the rest of the world. At the same time, this vision also dictates the preservation of “special Russian national interest” while engaging with foreign affairs. Therefore, this vision of active cooperation with foreign powers while actively pursuing Russian national interests is *great power pragmatism*.

His period was a period of attempts to combine: “Westernization with Soviet-style super-power ambitions, democracy with personified power, the market with the

⁹⁰ Ibid. “The new Pragmatist consensus was summarized in the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy's "Strategy for Russia: An Agenda for the President--2000." Both integrationists, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamshin, and balancers, such as Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Duma's Committee on the CIS Affairs, collaborated in drafting the document. They found Primakov's vision of a multipolar world to be outdated and potentially confrontational, and the cost exorbitant.”

⁹¹ Alexei G. Arbatov et al., “Strategiya Dlya Rossii: Povestka Dnya Dlya Prezidenta—2000” (Strategy for Russia: An Agenda for the President-2000) (Moscow: Vagrius, 2000), quoted in *ibid*.

⁹² *Ibid*.

regulatory role of the bureaucracy, inclusion in Europe with curbs on a free press.⁹³

Russia rejected messianism and expansionism, Russian Orthodoxy as the state religion, and anti-Westernism as the official ideology.”⁹⁴

Great Power Pragmatism

The *great-power pragmatism* came about as a critique of *great power balancing*, which the pragmatic thinking young conservatives considered as too ambitious and too anti-Western. The integrationists criticized the balancers’ priorities⁹⁵ as being fundamentally misplaced and bringing few advantages. The new pragmatist consensus⁹⁶ “found the balancers’ vision of a multipolar world to be outdated and potentially confrontational, and the cost exorbitant.”⁹⁷

The vision of *great power pragmatism*, advocated by president Putin, was a new approach compiled from the two rival visions of *integrationism* and *great power balancing*. The proponents of this middle ground between integrationism and balancing clearly understand that without “moving in the direction of Westernization, Russia will remain provincial in economic and political dimensions.”⁹⁸

⁹³ Shevtsova, p. 264.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 265.

⁹⁵ Tsygankov, p. 161. “Reviving the Commonwealth of Independent States as a vehicle of post-Soviet integration, resisting the eastern expansion of NATO, developing military cooperation with Iran, and trying to build a Russia-China-India security axis.”

⁹⁶ Ibid., “The new pragmatist consensus was summarized in the influential Council for Foreign and Defense Policy’s “Strategy for Russia: An Agenda for the President - 2000.” Both integrationists, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamshin, and balancers, such as Konstantin Zatulin, chairman of the Duma’s Committee on the CIS Affairs, collaborated in drafting the document.”

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Tsygankov, p. 160.

The Great Power Pragmatism of Putin

The presidency of Vladimir Putin features increased coordination and coherence in policy as he managed to concentrate the control of foreign policy-making process in his hands. To describe him briefly, Putin wanted to pose as a pragmatic manager. He succeeded, at least outwardly, in achieving order and stability in Russia. As Shevtsova writes,

He has begun a pro-Western revolution in foreign policy. He has pushed forward economic reforms that had stalled under Yeltsin. Yet, at the same time, he has demonstrated a deep distrust of the major democratic institutions and an open desire to keep tight control over society. Unlike Yeltsin, who knew how to survive in an atmosphere of spontaneity and acquiescence, the new Russian leader prefers subordination and loyalty.⁹⁹

His *managed* or *controlled democracy* implies the institutions and the political process under effective supervision of the government by implementing the “verticality of authority,” a new “term coined by Russian elites to describe a top-down system of governance based on subordination and domineering role for the executive branch.”¹⁰⁰ To achieve this subordination and loyalty, he had to consolidate the political power in the Russian Parliament through the newly created but very successful political party, “Unity,”¹⁰¹ control over the Parliament, which had been challenging the executive

⁹⁹ Shevtsova, p. 258.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰¹ The political party *Yedinstvo* (Unity) emerged before the first election of Putin as president and many analysts say that it was designed to carry Putin into power. Looking back at that period, one cannot think of the brilliant planning and a discipline in the implementation of the plans aimed to change the status of the Russian Federation from an inferior position to, first, equal and then into a leading position in world politics. To be able to succeed in this endeavor, the team of Putin had to control domestic politics by appeasement of the opposition voices. His team, consisting mostly of young pragmatic professionals in the security forces, regional administrations and military, clearly understood that the path to bring back the “old glorious days” of Russia in world politics passed through national politics. The party of power, as often dubbed in Russia, had succeeded a lion’s share of a task to bring discipline and control to

power. The party became the second biggest party in the Russian Parliament after the Communists. The presence of representatives in the Russian Parliament fully supporting the course of politics chosen by Putin allowed his team to pass necessary bills to consolidate power in the hands of Kremlin. Therefore, the Russian Parliament ceased to be an arena for fierce battles of representatives of different interest circle and became a legislative organ working hand in hand with Kremlin.

Sustainability of Great Power Pragmatism Questioned

As a newly established vision, the sustainability of *great power pragmatism* raises a question. Until now, Russia has successfully juggled between its military deals with the countries of developing part of the world and the campaigns to develop a better image in the West. There is a tendency of the *great power pragmatism* sliding into the old-style great power balancing, if Russia gets tired of juggling on both sides of the world¹⁰² or the domestic support erodes.¹⁰³ To sustain the criticism of opponents and the challenge by domestic and foreign politics problems, it needs to grow out of being just a great power into a civilization like the West. This solution seems the only viable one given the failure of *Eurasianism* to sustain its success in the domestic politics of Russia.

domestic politics. The preparations for the coming local and federal elections in Russia show that this party continued to strengthen its positions by swallowing smaller parties and is now called *Yedinnaya Rossiya* (United Russia).

¹⁰² Tsygankov, p. 161. There is an assumption that West can grow impatient with Russia's pragmatism.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p. 162. "Great power pragmatism has been supported by a delicate domestic coalition that, absent strong leadership, may fall apart. Putin's way of dealing with Mikhail Khodorkovsky and other oligarchs alienated many business elites, while his military reform, which has involved the removal of key generals, is straining his relations with the military. The more he presses forward with military reform, the more likely he is to lose the support of elites, leaving him reliant on the support of the general public."

In order to do this, Putin needs a careful and consistent bridging¹⁰⁴ of the European and the great power components.¹⁰⁵

Why Putin's Russia Adopted Great Power Pragmatism?

Russia's desire to maintain its international stand pushed it to play actively in every possible field. It realized the existence of its close neighbors and reactivated its relations with socialist states. The growing pragmatism and commercialization of its foreign policy dictated active and energetic diplomacy of Russia. These were attempts to "base foreign policy on economic interests rather than on nostalgia for the lost emporium or a desire to counterbalance U.S. hegemony."¹⁰⁶ Putin, playing with different foreign policy goals was more intent to formulate Russia's foreign policy priorities based on Russia's limited resources: "In fact, he was the first Russian leader to think about Russia's ambitions in the context of capabilities. It is important to remember that in the same security and foreign policy community, with traditional horizons and mentality."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Shevtsova, p. 264. "Westernization with Soviet-style superpower ambitions, democracy with personified power, the market with the regulatory role of the bureaucracy, inclusion in Europe with curbs on a free press."

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 262. The current Russian system resembles an authoritarian system: "Authoritarian rule and attempts to play a great-power role and to pursue "uniqueness" are the major leftovers of the Soviet and pre-Soviet legacies."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 199.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 201.

Putin's View of the Russian Far-Eastern Policy

Russia views its relationship with Japan within the context of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. Russia sees itself as an Asian-Pacific, as well as a European (or arguably Euro-Atlantic) power. This region is an arena of interaction of four major powers (the USA, China, Russia and Japan – the first three being nuclear powers). It contains more than half of the world's population. It is a major economic center, rivaling the USA and the European Union. In addition, it could become a source of several major security problems, such as possible Chinese expansionism, North Korea's potential emergence as a nuclear weapons state, and the US-Japanese development of a theater of missile defense systems.

Changes in Decision-Making Institutions

The new constellation of forces inside Russian politics altered the structure of decision-making and the relative weight of particular institutions in foreign policy-making. The traditional power struggle between legislation and execution lost its importance. Putin has changed the ruling elite of Russia by bringing many the representatives of security forces and big business into the circle of power. This move is a part of well-calculated reforms in strengthening of the weakened power of the Kremlin in regions geographically located far away from Moscow, which practically have begun dealing with their foreign neighbors directly, avoiding Moscow.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I analyzed the theoretical approaches to the Russian foreign policy. I argued that the Russian foreign policy was a result of the dominant domestic group of influence, which had support from the leaders and the population. In addition, the international developments also facilitated their dominance in the foreign policy formulation. I claimed that an idea of a *great power* Russia and a wish for a *civilized* Russia had always been present in Russia. Then, I analyzed the Russian foreign policy formulation process through identifying the main foreign policy schools such as Atlanticism/integrationism, Eurasianism/great power balancing and great power pragmatism. I paid attention to the two extreme versions of Eurasianism/great power, which were the Slavophil movement and the hard-line imperialism. Given the weight and the role of Russia in international affairs,¹⁰⁸ the analysis of the impact of the domestic sources on Russian foreign policy was very important. The chapter defined the place of ideology in Soviet foreign policy within the context of the expansionism of a *great power*. The dominance of the proponents of the *civilization* view provided an exclusion of ideology from the foreign policy formulation, which led to the cooperation with the West. Then, I described three Russian foreign policy schools that dominated the foreign policy formulation from the independence up to present day Russia. The first vision of Russian foreign policy was *integrationism*, which advocated close affinity with the West. To understand this vision, it was necessary to start the analysis from the ideas, concepts and reforms of Gorbachev. The second vision was *great power balancing*, based on the idea of Russian foreign policy as a great power, balancing the

¹⁰⁸ Rosenau, pp. 47-48.

West. The final vision of Russian policy was *great power normalizing*, which pursued an active engagement with the West to preserve its national interests. These Russian foreign policy visions dominated the current domestic politics, because the political school adopted by Putin was a middle way of these two rival schools.

After having discussed the main foreign policy schools in Russia, in the next chapter, I apply these visions on the case of the Russo-Japanese territorial dispute. First, I provide the historical context including the Imperial treaties between Russia and Japan. In this part, I explain the developments and the treaties signed between Russia and Japan. Second, I divide the remaining part of the chapter into four periods. These are the former Soviet period, the Gorbachev, the Yeltsin and the Putin's periods. I explain the dominant foreign policy approach, worldview and politics of each period regarding the southern Kuril Islands.

CHAPTER THREE
EXPLAINING RUSSIAN POLICY: THE CASE OF THE SOUTHERN
KURIL ISLANDS

The ability to understand and recognize the significance of a certain event comes through a process of acquiring a relevant historical background. In order to describe the nature of the southern Kuril Islands puzzle, I analyze the developments in a chronological order and divide them into the Imperial, Soviet and Russian periods. The chronological order will enable the reader to follow the developments. The division into periods gives an opportunity to understand events in a relevant timeframe.

Historical Context including the Imperial Treaties

The *nature* of the southern Kuril Islands issue is the historical rivalry, mistrust and suspicion between Russia and Japan. The geographical proximity does not necessarily provide a close relationship between countries.¹⁰⁹ Russia and Japan are rather “distant” neighbors because they possess a proven record of disagreement over

¹⁰⁹ The Japanese invaded the Russian Far East region during the Russian Civil War of 1917-1923 and sent 72,000 troops to Siberia in August 1918-October 1922, and the ex-Soviet invasion of the Kurils in August-September, 1945 resulted in occupation of four islands. The presence of U.S. military in Japan and the ideological difference with the ex-Soviet Union used to add to the sustained mistrust and suspicion. These features influence Russian and Japanese foreign policies.

the four islands under Russian administration. The following is a chronology of treaties with the description of developments between the respective treaties.

Imperial Treaties

Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan and Russia

(Treaty of Shimoda)

In 7 February 1855, Russia and Japan made the first demarcation of the Kuril Islands by the Treaty of Shimoda and agreed on the boundary drawn between Etorofu and Urup.¹¹⁰ The island of Sakhalin remained as terra nullius.

Treaty for the Exchange of Sakhalin for the Kuril Islands (Treaty of Saint Petersburg)

In 1875, the Treaty of St. Petersburg recognized Sakhalin as Russian land and all the Kurils as Japanese possessions. A borderline passed between the Cape Lopatka and the island of Shimushu.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ The Treaty of Commerce, Navigation, and Delimitation between Russia and Japan (the Treaty of Shimoda, 7 February, 1855) was signed in the port of Shimoda by the Admiral Putyatin of the Russian Imperial Navy and the Inspector General Masanori Tsutsui and Controller Toshiakira Kawaji of Japan. Refer to the official website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: <http://www.mofa.go.jp>. See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

¹¹¹ See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

The Portsmouth Peace Treaty

Imperial Russia and Japan fought the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, which ended by acquisition of Japan of a southern part of the island of Sakhalin. The new borderline was at 50 degrees North Latitude.¹¹²

Soviet Treaties

Yalta Agreement

The Yalta Agreement signed by the leaders of USSR, USA and UK stipulated “the Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union” and “the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union.”¹¹³ These terms were the Soviet conditions for entering war against Japan.

San Francisco Peace Treaty

The San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 stipulated that Japan renounced all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and to the southern part of Sakhalin, which it had acquired by the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905.¹¹⁴

After having signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty and renouncing the Kuril Islands, the Japanese claimed that, prior to 1945, no other country than Japan ruled the

¹¹² See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

¹¹³ See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

¹¹⁴ See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

four islands in dispute. Moreover, they say, the final status of the entire Kuril chain remains to be determined, as the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Treaty and was not named as a beneficiary of Japan's renunciation of the Kurils in that Treaty. It is a paradox that while holding the Kurils according to the results of WW II, the Soviet Union could have solved this problem. However, because the USSR did not participate in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, it cannot formally engage in any talks with Japan.¹¹⁵ Article 26 of this Treaty prohibits Japan from negotiating territorial questions with "outsiders."¹¹⁶ Many scholars in Russia consider this paradox as a matter of priority in foreign affairs of the postwar years or as just an oversight of Stalin, who was more concerned with a build-up of the buffer zones in Europe.

Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration

The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 officially ended the state of war and restored diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. In Article 9 of the Declaration, the two countries agreed to continue negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty and the Soviet Union agreed to hand over Shikotan and Habomai islands to Japan. The actual handover of these islands was to take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty. This Declaration was a legally binding treaty, ratified by both states. The

¹¹⁵ Oleg Bondarenko, *Neizvestniye Kurili: Seryezniye Razmishleniya o Statuse Kuril'skih Ostrovov* (Moscow: VTI-Data Press, 1992), p. 113. The book is in Russian and the title translated as The Unknown Kurils: Serious Thoughts about the Status of the Kurile Islands.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

difference in views as to which country the islands of Etorofu and Kunashiri belonged to prevented the signing of a peace treaty.¹¹⁷

After Nikita Khrushchev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he tried to normalize the relations with the countries in disagreement. These efforts paved the way for the signing of “The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration” on 19 October 1956. However, until 1985, the Soviet Union seemed uncompromising about the 1956 Joint Declaration.

The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow in 1985 brought a replacement of the hard-line Soviet government diplomats with flexible foreign policy spokespersons calling for greater contact with Japan. Gorbachev took the lead in promising new initiatives in Asia, but the substance of Soviet policy changed more slowly. Changes in Soviet policy carried out under Gorbachev beginning in the mid-1980s, including attempts at domestic reform and the pursuit of détente with the United States and Western Europe, elicited generally positive Japanese interest, but the Japanese government held that the Soviet Union had not changed its policies on issues vital to Japan.

Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué

The Soviet Union took the position that the territorial issue did not exist between the two countries. The Soviet Union continued to take this position until the becoming Mikhail Gorbachev as Secretary-General. In April 1991, President Gorbachev visited

¹¹⁷ See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

Japan and signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué.¹¹⁸ This document recognized the existence of a territorial issue between the Soviet Union and Japan.

The end of the Cold War changed the nature of the international system. Now, the issue of the Southern Kuril Islands was not a part of the power struggle of the Cold War period. The Gorbachev administration acknowledged the existence of a territorial problem and started talking about it with Japanese officials at the highest levels. Soviet officials asserted that their government would propose disarmament talks with Japan and might make more proposals on the southern Kuril Islands. Many observers expected that Gorbachev might propose a package deal with the islands, arms reduction and economic cooperation. The Soviet Union emphasized that it would not return all the islands because of Soviet public opposition and the possible reawakening of other countries' territorial claims against the Soviet Union. The Soviet military reportedly opposed a return because the Kuril Islands provided a protective barrier to the Sea of Okhotsk, where the Soviet Navy deployed submarines carrying long-range ballistic missiles.

Russian Treaties

Tokyo Declaration

The Tokyo Declaration signed in October 1993 by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa defined the territorial dispute and stated that Russia and

¹¹⁸ The first visit to Japan by a Soviet leader was in April 1991 by President Mikhail Gorbachev. He and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu signed the Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué, which for the first time recognized in writing the existence of the territorial dispute with Japan.

Japan should conclude a peace treaty by solving the territorial dispute and fully normalizing the bilateral relations. It defined the negotiation guidelines as based on historical and legal facts, documents agreed on by both states and the principles of law and justice.¹¹⁹

One remarkable change throughout the 1990s was that the Russian and Japanese governments conducted territorial negotiations by approaches other than the virtual confrontations in the previous decades. In Russia, President Boris Yeltsin showed considerable interest in normalizing relations between the two countries. In a New York meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa in January 1992, Yeltsin referred to the necessity of concluding a peace treaty and stated, "I'm going to prepare the details of conditions for the treaty, including the territorial dispute by the time of my future visit to Tokyo."¹²⁰ After the New York meeting, Yeltsin sent an official letter to Miyazawa in which he wrote: "Russia regards Japan as a partner and a potential ally. Russia has a strong intention to develop the Russo-Japanese relations. We continue to make efforts for the conclusion of a peace treaty based on law and justice."¹²¹

Moreover, Yeltsin announced a proposal for the settlement of the disputed islands, the so-called "Five Step Solution."¹²² In a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe in Moscow in May 1992, Yeltsin mentioned the beginning

¹¹⁹ See www.mofa.jp. See Appendix B for the source and the text of the Agreement.

¹²⁰ *Hokkaido Shin bun*, 1 February 1992 (evening edition), p. 2 quoted in Yutaka Okuyama, "The Dispute over the Kurile Islands between Russia and Japan in the 1990s," *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 1 (2003), p. 37. The article accessed on 17 August 2006 at www.questia.com.

¹²¹ *Hokkaido Shin bun*, 29 February 1992, p. 1, quoted in *ibid*.

¹²² According to the first step, the two countries declare the existence of a territorial dispute. The second step announces the islands as a free trade and an industrial zone. The third step suggests the withdrawal of military personnel to make the islands a de-militarized zone. The fourth step provides for a conclusion of a peace treaty. The final step is that the two countries expect that final solution of the dispute to be up to the future generations.

of military withdrawal except for the border patrol units.¹²³ This withdrawal had symbolic connotations, such as the end of the military confrontation in the Pacific between super powers and importantly from a territorial point of view, confirmation of the Russian intention to settle the dispute.

To sum up, after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian Federation's negotiation strength became weak because of its economic difficulties in the transition period to free market economy. Russia needed financial assistance from world debtors such as Japan and other developed countries. Therefore, the president of Russia Boris Yeltsin and the prime minister of Japan, Morihiro Hosokava, signed the Tokyo Declaration in 1993.

Krasnoyarsk Agreement

In Krasnoyarsk Agreement of November 1997, President Boris Yeltsin and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto agreed to “make the utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000 on the basis of the Tokyo Declaration.”¹²⁴

Yeltsin took a more decisive step for a settlement of the dispute in 1997. He suggested determining a timeframe to conclude a peace treaty when Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Russia in November 1997. At the summit meeting, both leaders agreed to conclude the treaty by 2000.¹²⁵ The major force behind Yeltsin's decision was the recovery of the Russian economic situation. Because of the massive

¹²³ *Hokkaido Shin bun*, 5 May 1992, p. 3, quoted in *ibid*.

¹²⁴ See www.mofa.jp.

¹²⁵ Shevtsova, p. 243. “The unofficial Russo-Japanese summit held on November 1-2, 1997, at Krasnoyarsk, an eastern Siberian city, was very productive by reached two important agreements by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto.”

inflation that had eroded the growth of the Russian economy, Yeltsin needed quick and enormous economic assistance in addition to the IMF program. He believed that conclusion of a peace treaty would give a new incentive for the Japanese government to assist the Russian economy.

The Kawana and the Moscow Proposals

In April 1998, Japan made a Kawana Proposal, to which in November 1998, Russia offered Moscow Proposal. However, these two proposals were not enough to secure a settlement by 2000.¹²⁶

Yeltsin and Hashimoto again met in Tokyo in April 1998 and confirmed their agreements of 1997. The second informal meeting between Yeltsin and Hashimoto took place in Kawana, 130 kilometers from Tokyo, on April 18-19, 1998.¹²⁷ At this summit meeting, Yeltsin and Hashimoto confirmed the 1997 agreements and announced an extensive plan for economic cooperation. They declared the establishment of a large investment company. Yeltsin also suggested at a news conference that he proposed the operation of a fishery complex under mutual management between Russia and Japan in the Kuril Islands. In an agreement to widen economic cooperation between the two countries, Toyota and Mitsubishi announced that they would build a mid-sized auto factory in Moscow in 1998.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ See *www.mofa.jp*.

¹²⁷ Shevtsova, p. 247.

¹²⁸ *Hokkaido Shin bun*, 20 April 1998, p. 1-3 quoted in Okuyama.

Irkutsk Statement

President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori signed the Irkutsk Statement in March 2001. This statement defined the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 as the starting point of the negotiating process to conclude a peace treaty and confirmed its legal validity in writing for the first time since 1960 when the Soviet Union all but denounced the validity of the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration.¹²⁹

In December 2000, Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov said that Moscow believed that "the search for ways in which to resolve the territorial problem between Russia and Japan must be based upon the inviolability of Russia's sovereignty over its territory."¹³⁰ The deadlock thus remained, although Russo-Japanese relations were otherwise cordial. Japan was unwilling to develop a closer economic relationship while the territorial problem remained unresolved. Moscow hopes that the economic cooperation in the Kurils envisaged in the 1998 Moscow Declaration might make the issue of sovereignty less important, and so reduce its salience in the Russo-Japanese relationship.

An expectation that Russia and Japan would continue peace treaty negotiations along with economic cooperation in and around the Kurils strengthened. Putin affirmed that the 1956 Declaration was still valid. He also hinted that his leadership's attitude towards the January 1960 USSR Memorandum to the Government of Japan had changed. This memorandum warned that the Soviet government considered that Japan

¹²⁹ See www.mofa.jp.

¹³⁰ *BBC Monitoring*, 9 December 2000 quoted in Mark A. Smith, "Russo-Japanese Relations," *Conflict Studies Research Centre* (Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, October 2003). Article was accessed at <http://www.csrc.ac.uk> on 22 August 2006.

had violated the 1956 Declaration by signing a new security treaty with the USA. The USSR therefore no longer considered itself obligated to fulfill Article 9 of the 1956 Declaration.¹³¹ Putin's comments implied that his leadership had repudiated the 1960 Memorandum, and was therefore strongly committed to the eventual transfer of Shikotan and Habomai.

Russia-Japan Action Plan

In 2003, President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi adopted the Russia-Japan Action Plan to provide foundation for future peace-treaty negotiations by citing the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, the Tokyo Declaration of 1993 and the Irkutsk Statement of 2001.¹³²

Although there was no progress on resolving the territorial question, moves were made towards broadening contact and deepening trust when Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi held talks in Moscow in October 2002 with Igor Ivanov to arrange the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi to Russia in January 2003.

They reached an agreement on six points of the future Russian-Japanese Action Plan. These were the strengthening of dialogue, efforts to sign a peace treaty, interaction in the international arena, cooperation in the economic and legal fields, and the development of cultural and human contacts. The main idea in this plan was to make it a guide for the further development of bilateral cooperation and to develop relations in a way that will raise them to a new level. It envisaged closer economic cooperation in the

¹³¹ *Pravda*, 29 January 1960 quoted in *ibid*.

¹³² See www.mofa.jp.

Kuril Islands and advocated continuing visits by former Japanese residents to the islands. However, the January 2003 summit did not result in any new developments in relation to the peace treaty. The Action Plan repeated the statements of earlier summits, namely that negotiations would continue based on the 1956 Declaration and various bilateral statements and declarations since then (the Tokyo Declaration of October 1993, the Krasnoyarsk Declaration of November 1997, the Moscow Declaration of November 1998 and the Irkutsk Statement of March 2001).

In this part of the chapter, the treaties and agreements are given in a chronological order. They are the Imperial Treaties, former Soviet Declarations and the Russian Agreements. The purpose of the chronological order was to show the reader the full picture of the dispute that constitutes a vicious cycle.

The Former Soviet Union Period

After the Soviet Union's occupation of the Kurils, Joseph Stalin delivered a speech where he stated the islands' significance as *the means to link the Soviet Union with the ocean* and as *a defensive base against Japanese aggression on the Soviet Far East*.¹³³ The Kuril Islands have been predisposed to play a strategic role in Russo-Japanese relations:

The strategic significance of the Kurils assumed new importance after the middle of the nineteenth century because of three trends: (1) American expansion in the Pacific, (2) Russian absorption of the Amur-Maritime region and penetration of Manchuria, and (3) Japan is deepening involvement on both the Asian continent and in the Pacific. Acquisition of the northern Kurils in 1875 completed Japan's enclosure of the Sea of Okhotsk and cut Russia's Siberian coastline into two segments at Cape Lopatka. Ships from Vladivostok were

¹³³ Reese, p. 170.

obliged to negotiate Japanese-controlled straits to reach the Pacific, and even local routes around Kamchatka led through one of the narrow apertures of the Kuril chain. Such geopolitical conditions multiplied occasions for friction as Russo-Japanese and (after 1905) Japanese-American rivalry mounted in East Asia and the Pacific.¹³⁴

The Soviet occupation of southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in 1945 provided the Soviet Union with significant strength in the Northeast Asia and the Pacific. “Russia gained control of the Okhotsk Sea, unimpeded communication routes between Far Eastern ports, an outer defense screen against foreign intrusions, vantage points for watching Japan, and unobstructed access to the Pacific.”¹³⁵

After the acquisition of the islands, the Soviets *planned* to make use of their *economic potential* as well as their strategic importance. However, the economic development of the Soviet Kuril Islands was slow due to the lack of equipment and harsh weather conditions. The islands lie far from industrial and populated areas, and the severe climate deterred the prospective settlers. The main facilities of the Kurils specialize in herring, whale, salmon, and crab. Due to limited accessibility, the extraction of minerals such as bauxite, zirconium, gold, zinc, mercury, tin, tungsten, lead, and copper is in limited quantities. The various industries of the islands use sulphur deposits, pumice, perlite, and titanium-magnetite sands. Agriculture and animal husbandry have developed on the southern islands of the arc. Cabbage, turnips, radishes, carrots, sugar beets, peas, beans, and tobacco are the common crops. The local population raises cows, pigs, horses, and sheep.¹³⁶

The former Soviet Union denied accepting the Japanese claims to return the four renounced by Japan islands. In 1956, the former Soviet Union and Japan signed the

¹³⁴ Ibid., pp. 127-128.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 184.

¹³⁶ Stephan, pp. 176-177.

Joint Declaration agreeing to normalize the relations and the former Soviet Union agreed to transfer two islands after the conclusion of a peace treaty. However, since then no progress was made on this issue. The transfer did not materialize when the Japanese demanded all four islands. The former Soviet Union made clear that they consider this issue closed when both sides ratified the 1956 Declaration. The reason behind the failure to make a progress was primarily the memberships of both countries in rival blocs. The concession or compromise for the sake of the settlement was difficult due to the ideological war between them.

The Gorbachev Period

The former Soviet Union increased the level of cooperation with foreign powers and “several attempts were made to return East-West relations to a less ideological and more pragmatic base.”¹³⁷ Gorbachev tried to diversify foreign policy and persuade the world that they abandoned to view all conflicts “through the spectacles of East-West political or ideological confrontation.”¹³⁸ By diversifying the foreign policy, he meant paying more attention to non-communist countries like Japan. The former Soviet Union needed Japan as a supplier of technology and as a partner to strengthen its position in the Far East. However, to develop better relations, either the former Soviet Union or Japan had to shift its policies regarding the territorial dispute. Despite good intentions,

¹³⁷ *Pravda*, 31 July 1985 in Margot Light, “Foreign Policy” in Martin McCauley, ed., *The Soviet Union Under Gorbachev* (London: Macmillan Press, 1987), p. 216.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*

the cooperation remained limited to bilateral agreements on trade, economic issues and cultural exchanges of 1985 and 1986.¹³⁹

The end of the Cold War removed the ideological rivalry from the framework of the dispute. The Gorbachev government acknowledged the existence of the territorial dispute with Japan in the 1991 Soviet-Japanese Joint Communiqué. Gorbachev was the first Soviet leader to visit Japan. The emphasis on common concepts of peaceful coexistence, cooperation and development brought both governments closer. However, the integrationist approach and the friendly relations did not succeed in bringing the settlement closer.

The Yeltsin Period

The culmination of perception of positive change in the Russian position coincided to the years of Yeltsin government. He was an Atlanticist, who believed in the positive cooperation with other powers instead of confrontation. He signed the Tokyo Declaration in 1993. Yeltsin showed considerable interest in normalizing the relations through solving the territorial dispute. He signed also the Krasnoyarsk Agreement in 1997, which was stating that both sides would make the utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by the year 2000. Many meetings on various levels of representation were held and several official declarations committed to the resolution of the dispute have been signed. Japanese were stepping up their efforts to provide financial aid to Russian economy in crisis, paying special attention to the development

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 222. These Agreements were followed by Kaifu Joint Declaration of 1991, where Gorbachev agreed that there existed a territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands between Russia and Japan.

of plans to establish joint ventures to boost impoverished local economy. In 1998, Russia and Japan exchanged the Kawana Proposal and the Moscow Proposal. However, when the year of 2000 arrived, there was still no agreement to solve the problem if not to count the declarations of good will and reiterating intents to keep working on the agreement.

The Putin Period

In 2001, Putin signed Irkutsk Statement that defined the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration as the starting point of the negotiating process to conclude a peace treaty. In 2003, President Putin and Prime Minister Koizumi adopted the Russia-Japan Action Plan to provide foundation for future peace-treaty negotiations. It repeated the statements of earlier agreements to continue working toward the conclusion of a peace treaty. The purpose of this six-point plan is to strengthen the dialogue and cooperation in international and bilateral levels. In 2004, he said that they accept the Joint Declaration of 1956 as a guide to the resolution of this issue, that is, accept the conditions of the ratified 1956 Joint Declaration or get nothing. By this announcement, the atmosphere around the negotiations turned to an initial point. It is interesting to notice that the developments regarding this issue completed a full circle and now Japan faces a different Russia: a country with strong and growing economy, renovated systems of judiciary, executive and legislative organs, reforms in military and finance. Now it is not the same country of 1990s, needy for external support and domestic reformation.

Putin's Foreign Policy toward Japan

Russia desires to play a full part in the political, economic and security processes taking place in the Asia-Pacific region. It is therefore a member of APEC, and has a close relationship with ASEAN. In the post-Soviet period, Russia has sought to develop close ties with China and South Korea, and attempted to normalize its ties with Japan. Russia's main objectives in policy towards Japan are:

- *A resolution of the territorial dispute, and a conclusion of a peace treaty;*
- A development of a close strategic partnership; cooperation in bilateral and multilateral levels such as the UN, G8, APEC and the ARF;
- A development of a close economic relationship with Japan, particularly in the Russian Far East, where Moscow would like to see greater Japanese investment; Russian energy resources in Siberia and the Far East and Japan's dependence on imported energy potentially constitute a solid basis for the bilateral relationship.
- A prevention of the US-Japanese security relationship from developing in directions that could threaten Russian interests (e.g. over regional missile defense);
- To develop a close partnership as a partial counterweight to Chinese power in the Far East. For this reason, Russia probably has no intrinsic hostility to the US-Japanese Security Treaty.¹⁴⁰

The Putin foreign policy doctrine is multi-vectored but with emphasis on the West, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense, the bastions of conservatism, and a significant group of elites, continued to resist. Still, it is clear who is making certain foreign decisions, the distinction between the institutions and their areas of responsibility. One of the destructive sides of the managed democracy policy is

¹⁴⁰ Smith, pp. 2-3.

the continuation of the old Soviet way of making foreign policy decisions: “without any attention to society, without any effort at explanation.”¹⁴¹

To sum up, Russia has experienced two foreign policy visions and has decided to find a middle way between them. This middle way is psychologically close to the conservative vision; however, it recognizes the necessity to engage the West to become a “civilization” rather than being just a great power with geopolitical ambitions. The sustainability of this vision raises a question given the tremendous task of bridging the European and great power components. The Far-Eastern policy of Russia, particularly the Japanese policy of Russia, carries the obvious features of this great power pragmatism. Russia wants to be a close partner of Japan in many fields, preserving, at the same time, its sovereignty over the disputed by Japan southern Kuril Islands.

Return to the Initial Soviet Policy

In 2004, Putin declared that Russia intends to return only two islands. The reason behind this decision is the absence of common ground to negotiate due to different interpretations of historical events and treaties. Russia declared that it takes the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration signed on 19 October 1956, as their official position in this issue.¹⁴² The Russian side accepts this Declaration as a conclusion of the territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, whereas the Japanese side accepts it as a

¹⁴¹ Shevtsova, p. 243.

¹⁴² Reese, p. 154. The Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, 19 October 1956: “The USSR and Japan agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a peace treaty. In this connection, the USSR, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and Shikotan ... the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan.”

prelude for returning all four renounced southern Kuril Islands. This difference constitutes the basics of the two countries' official positions regarding the southern Kuril Islands.

The current Russian foreign policy adopted the ex-Soviet policy of 1956. By adopting this policy, they regard the issue closed as they agreed to return two islands for a peace treaty. They consider Japanese claims for the other two renounced islands as attempts to rewrite the history of WWII.

Russia wants to improve its relations with Japan as well as with other countries in the region. They say that the construction of this bridge of bilateral relations begins from two sides. They call on Japan to implement the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, which both countries ratified. However, the key to resolving this territorial dispute is a question of whether the Japanese government will drop its claim on the two bigger islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu. If the Japanese government fails to make such a concession, all four islands will remain under Russian sovereignty. This situation will cause this dispute to continue with an inevitable deadlock.

Full Cycle in the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute

Russia has undergone a complete cycle in the foreign policy regarding the territorial dispute with Japan. This cycle represents the changes in foreign policy formulation of Russia. To be precise, the changes are the results of competition among different visions of Russian foreign policy. To name them, they are *integrationism*, *great power balancing* and *great power pragmatism*. To describe them briefly, they are

the leaning toward the West, the balancing of power of the West, and the pragmatic strategy to combine the cooperation with the West while asserting its national interests. The beginning of *integrationism* took place under the Gorbachev's rule. The vision of *great power balancing* strengthened under Yeltsin's rule. The vision of *great power pragmatism* occurs under the Putin's presidency. Therefore, I argue that the developments in the Russian foreign policy on the southern Kuril Islands territorial dispute came to the position that has many similarities with the initial former Soviet position. The Russian policy went from the position of denial to the acceptance, from the acceptance to the promise to solve it by 2000, and from the promise to solve by 2000 to the return of two islands after the conclusion of a peace treaty. To explain this cycle, I analyzed the Russian foreign policy formulation process, namely, the schools that exert influence on the Russian foreign policy decisions. In the analysis, I found out that the Russian foreign policy schools also divide into to groups of vision and compete for the dominance. These were the liberal-conservative, Atlanticist-Eurasianist, integrationist/balancer schools. However, the reason behind the shift in the Russian policy was the great power pragmatism of Putin. This vision advocates both great power ambitions and integrationist's ideas. That is, they want to keep the islands and increase the level of engagement with Japan.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explained the Russian foreign policy on the case of the southern Kuril Islands. First, I presented all treaties and negotiations including the

Imperial treaties, in a chronological order to reflect the developments as a completed cycle in history of these two countries. I grouped this chronological order into the Imperial Treaties, Soviet Treaties and Russian Treaties periods. I also provided an examination of the significant developments that occurred in the interim periods of the respective treaties. In addition, I found out that the significance of these islands for Russia was mainly military and administrative, because the economic profit from these islands was limited. These islands remain as an important gate for the Russian Navy to access the Pacific Ocean and an administrative part of the Russian Federation. The main obstacle in this issue was the difference in interpretation of the ratified by both countries Joint Declaration of 1956. Russia considers it as the end to the conflict, whereas Japan sees it as a prelude to the return of the other two islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu.

Second, I created four periods consisting from the former Soviet period, the Gorbachev, the Yeltsin and the Putin periods. In these periods, I explained the foreign policy approaches, worldviews and the implementations of these policies by the respective period's leaders.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

The focus of this thesis is the recent change of Russian policy toward the Japanese claims to return the southern Kuril Islands. This change is a firm announcement by Russia to hand back only two islands for a peace treaty, as ratified in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration. This announcement is a shift from the earlier agreements and statements to resolve this issue by negotiation. This is a shift because the earlier policies acknowledged the territorial dispute as involving four islands. The present Russian policy dictates that they agreed to the return of two islands and the claim for the other two islands, renounced by Japan, are simply Japanese attempts to rewrite the history of WWII. Therefore, I suggest that the developments complete a cycle in this issue and ask why this shift happened. To explain why this shift happened I examined the transformation of the Russian foreign policy during the different periods of the former Soviet Union, the Gorbachev, the Yeltsin and the Putin periods. In these time-periods, I analyzed the Russian foreign policy schools that exert influence on the foreign policy.

This puzzle is important because this territorial issue is the biggest and the longest-lasting problem in Russo-Japanese relations. It affects every aspect of Russo-

Japanese bilateral relations. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the increase of level of Russo-Japanese relations without the settlement of this problem.

My contribution to the study of this problem is an analysis of the Russian foreign policy schools in explaining the puzzle and applying a different frame to take a picture of the events. Previous works on this problem have not tried to explain this issue from the angle of Russian foreign policy formulation. In addition, I suggest considering the change within a full cycle of developments because it presents a bigger picture of the dispute.

In order to explain my puzzle, first, I argued that the Russian foreign policy was a product of the dominant domestic group of influence, which had support from the leaders and the population. In addition, the international developments also facilitated their dominance in the foreign policy formulation. I argued that an idea of a *great power* Russia and a wish for a *civilized* Russia have always been present in Russia. Then, I analyzed the Russian foreign policy formulation process through identifying the main foreign policy schools such as Atlanticism/integrationism, Eurasianism/great power balancing and great power pragmatism. I paid attention to the two extreme versions of Eurasianism/great power, which were the Slavophil movement and the hard-line imperialism. The chapter defined the place of ideology in Soviet foreign policy within the context of the expansionism of a *great power*. The dominance of the proponents of the *civilization* view provided an exclusion of ideology from the foreign policy formulation, which led to the cooperation with the West. Then, I describe three Russian foreign policy schools that dominated the foreign policy formulation from the independence up to present day Russia. The first vision of Russian foreign policy is

integrationism, which advocates close affinity with the West. To understand this vision, it is necessary to start the analysis from the ideas, concepts and reforms of Gorbachev. The second vision is *great power balancing*, based on the idea of Russian foreign policy as a great power, balancing the West. The final vision of Russian policy is *great power pragmatism*, which pursues an active engagement with the West to preserve its national interests. These Russian foreign policy visions dominate the current domestic politics, because the political school adopted by Putin is a middle way of these two rival schools.

The third chapter explained in detail the Russian foreign policy in the context of the case of the southern Kuril Islands. I began with the historical context including the Imperial treaties. Second, I provided the relevant parts of the Russo-Japanese treaties supplemented by the description of the developments in Russian foreign policy that happened in the period between the two treaties with an aim to presenting a complete picture of the puzzle. Third, I highlighted the reasons and plans behind the occupation of the Kurils. Fourth, it was interesting to follow how the Russian stand on this issue shifts with the change of decision-makers' vision of Russian foreign policy.

Particularly, I analyzed the foreign policies of the former Soviet Union, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin in the context of the dominant approach to foreign policy formulation, way of thinking and the implementation of policies.

The policy of the former Soviet Union period was a product of the dogmatic ideological confrontation. The global rivalry of Cold War determined the approaches to this regional territorial problem. The only achievement of that period was the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, which was ratified by both countries. The period of new thinking politics by the Gorbachev government advocated openness and

cooperation in the international arena, which filled people with expectation and hope for an end to this impasse. In his period, the former Soviet Union acknowledged the existence of the territorial dispute between the USSR and Japan. With his Vladivostok speech in July 1986, Gorbachev broke new ground by declaring new policy of giving up an ideological fight, instead of it focusing on the economic development of the region.

The period of Yeltsin's government is marked with a rise of the Eurasianism in 1992. The competition between the two visions caused chaos and inconsistency in Russian foreign politics. As Yeltsin was considered by many as an Atlanticist, the rise of the conservatives was due to the inability of Yeltsin to consolidate power in his hands. During his period, many regions started doing business with their foreign neighbors directly, without paying taxes to the federal center. Many institutions also started dealing with abroad without consent of the center. Many Russo-Japanese joint meetings and agreements were held in his period. They increased hopes for a settlement of the Russo-Japanese dispute but were not enough to accomplish a solid achievement. dispute.

The period of Putin's government was a time of thoroughly calculated policies in domestic as well as foreign politics. His time was a period of great power pragmatism that was a period of pragmatic politics through combining great power balancing and integrationist visions. Putin's foreign policy has strove to increase relations with Japan, but at the same time accepts the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration and the return of two smaller islands for a peace treaty as an end to the territorial issue.

Finally, the examination of the relevant parts of the Russo-Japanese treaties and the developments in Russian foreign policy suggested that the current position of Russia

resembles the ex-Soviet position. That is, the developments have completed a cycle in the history of this territorial dispute. After stating of the importance of these islands for Russia, I analyzed the reason behind the deadlock in this issue. I found out that the interpretation of the 1956 Joint Declaration, which ratified the transfer of the two islands after concluding a peace treaty was behind this impasse. Russia accepts this Declaration as an end of the dispute, whereas Japan considers it as a prelude to the return of the two other renounced islands. During the dominance of integrationism in foreign policy formulation, some softening happened in the Russian stand and the struggle between two brought inconsistencies to the Russian foreign policy. The recent change in the Russian policy has been a result of the great power pragmatism vision of the current President Putin. This vision represents the great power ambitions with cooperativeness of integrationism.

To sum up, the puzzle of the territorial dispute led me to ask a question and give a tentative answer based on my previous knowledge of the subject. This answer formulated a statement, which I wanted to examine through the examination of foreign policy schools that exert influence on the foreign policy decisions. I came out with three visions of Russian foreign policy development. They were *integrationism*, *great power balancing* and *great power pragmatism*. The latter vision is a middle way of liberals and conservatives, although it is psychologically close to *balancers*. The answer to the question of the thesis, which was, how the change in the Russian foreign policy of the Kurils issue happened, proved to be located in the Russian foreign policy vision of great power pragmatism. As a combination of two rival visions, it stipulated active engagement in world arena, while preserving its special interests to balance.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

KURIL ISLANDS POLITICAL MAP



I downloaded this map on 04 September 2006 from the following source for the illustration purpose only: <http://www.askasia.org/teachers/maps>
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APPENDIX B
TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

This Appendix contains extracts of treaties and agreements that concern the Kuril Islands. For complete texts, consult the sources cited below each extract.*

TREATY OF SHIMODA
(7 February, 1855)

ARTICLE II

Henceforth the boundaries between Russia and Japan will pass between the islands Etorofu and Uruppu. The whole island of Etorofu belongs to Japan and the whole island of Uruppu and the other Kuril Islands to the north constitute possessions of Russia. As regards the island Karafuto (Sakhalin), it remains unpartitioned between Russia and Japan, as has been the case up to this time.

*Japan, Foreign Office. *Treaties and Conventions between the Empire of Japan and other Powers together with Universal Conventions, Regulations and Communications since March 1854* (rev. ed. Tokyo, 1884), p. 585.

TREATY OF ST. PETERSBURG
(7 May 1875)

ARTICLE II

In exchange for the cession to Russia of the rights on the island of Sakhalin, stipulated in the first article, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, for Himself and His descendants, cedes to His Majesty the Emperor of Japan the group of the Kuril islands which He possesses at present, together with all the rights of sovereignty appertaining to this possession, so that henceforth the said group of Kuril Islands shall belong to the Empire of Japan. This group comprises the following eighteen islands: (1)

Shimushu, (2) Araido, (3) Paramushiru, (4) Makanrushi, (5) Onekotan, (6) Harumukotan, (7) Ekaruma, (8) Shasukotan, (9) Mushiru, (10) Raikoke, (11) Matsuwa, (12) Rashuwa, (13) Suride and Ushishiru, (14) Ketoi, (15) Shimushiru, (16) Buroton, (17) Cherupoi and Buratto Cherupoefu [Chirihoi or Chiornye Bratia], (18) Uruppu, so that the boundary between the Empires of Russia and Japan in these areas shall pass through the Strait between Cape Lopatka of the peninsula of Kamchatka and the island of Shimushu.

ARTICLE V

The residents of the territories ceded from one and the other, the Russian and Japanese subjects, may retain their nationality and return to their respective countries; but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territories, they shall be allowed to stay and shall receive protection in the full exercise of their industry, their right of property and religion, on the same footing as the nationals, provided that they submit to the laws and jurisdiction of the country to which the possession of the respective territories passes.

*Japan, Foreign Office, *Dai Nihon gaiko bunsho*, VIII (Tokyo, 1940), 216-26. George A. Lensen, *The Russian Push toward Japan* (Princeton, 1959), pp. 501-4.

THE TREATY OF PORTSMOUTH, 1905 *September 5, 1905*

The Conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

The Emperor of Japan on the one part, and the Emperor of all the Russias, on the other part, animated by a desire to restore the blessings of peace, have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace, and have for this purpose named their plenipotentiaries, that is to say, for his Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Baron Komura Jutarō, Jusami, Grand Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and his Excellency Takahira Kogoro, Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, his Minister to the United States, and his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his Excellency Sergius Witte, his Secretary of State and President of the Committee of Ministers of the Empire of Russia, and his Excellency Baron Roman Rosen, Master of the Imperial Court of Russia, his Majesty's Ambassador to the United States, who, after having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in good and due form, and concluded the following articles:

ARTICLE I

There shall henceforth be peace and amity between their Majesties the Emperor of and the Emperor of all the Russias, and between their respective States and subjects.

ARTICLE II

The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea paramount political, military and economical interests engages to neither obstruct nor interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control, which the Imperial Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea. It is understood that Russian subjects in Korea shall be treated in exactly the same manner as the subjects and citizens of other foreign Powers; that is to say, they shall be placed on the same footing as the subjects and citizens of the most favored nation. It is also agreed that, in order to avoid causes of misunderstanding, the two high contracting parties will abstain on the Russian-Korean frontier from taking any military measure, which may menace the security of Russian or Korean territory.

ARTICLE III

Japan and Russia mutually engage:

First – To evacuate completely and simultaneously Manchuria, except the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in conformity with the provisions of the additional article I annexed to this treaty, and,

Second – To restore entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China all portions of Manchuria now in occupation or under the control of the Japanese or Russian troops, with the exception of the territory above mentioned.

The Imperial Government of Russia declares that it has not in Manchuria any territorial advantages or preferential or exclusive concessions in the impairment of Chinese sovereignty, or inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity.

ARTICLE IV

Japan and Russia reciprocally engage not to obstruct any general measures common to all countries, which China may take for the development of the commerce or industry of Manchuria.

ARTICLE V

The Imperial Russian Government transfers and assigns to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and the adjacent territorial waters, and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and it also transfers and assigns to the Imperial government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory, affected by the above-mentioned lease.

The two contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The Imperial Government of Japan, on its part, undertakes that the proprietary rights of Russian subjects in the territory above referred to shall be perfectly respected.

ARTICLE VI

The Imperial Russian Government engages to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Chang-Chunfu and Kuanchangtsu and Port Arthur, and all the branches, together with all the rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two high contracting parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

ARTICLE VII

Japan and Russia engage to exploit their respective railways in Manchuria exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes and nowise for strategic purposes. It is understood that this restriction does not apply to the railway in the territory affected by the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula.

ARTICLE VIII

The imperial Governments of Japan and Russia with the view to promote and facilitate intercourse and traffic will as soon as possible conclude a separate convention for the regulation of their connecting railway services in Manchuria.

ARTICLE IX

The Imperial Russian Government cedes to the Imperial Government of Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin and all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon. The fiftieth degree of north latitude is adopted as the northern boundary of the ceded territory. The exact alignment of such territory shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of the additional article II annexed to this treaty.

Japan and Russia mutually agree not to construct in their respective possessions on the Island of Sakhalin or the adjacent islands any fortification or other similar military works. They also respectively engage not to take any military measures, which may impede the free navigation of the Strait of La Perouse and the Strait of Tartary.

ARTICLE X

It is reserved to Russian subjects, inhabitants of the territory ceded to Japan, to sell their real property and retire to their country, but if they prefer to remain in the ceded territory they will be maintained protected in the full exercise of their industries and rights of property on condition of submitting to the Japanese laws and jurisdiction. Japan shall have full liberty to withdraw the right of residence in or to deport from such territory of any inhabitants who labor under political or administrative disability. She

engages, however, that the proprietary rights of such inhabitants shall be fully respected.

ARTICLE XI

Russia engages to arrange with Japan for granting to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coasts of the Russian possession in the Japan, Okhotsk and Bering Seas.

It is agreed that the foregoing engagement shall not affect rights already belonging to Russian or foreign subjects in those regions.

ARTICLE XII

The treaty of commerce and navigation between Japan and Russia having been annulled by the war the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia engage to adopt as a basis for their commercial relations pending the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation the basis of the treaty which was in force previous to the present war, the system of reciprocal treatment on the footing of the most favored nation, in which are included import and export duties, customs formalities, transit and tonnage dues and the admission and treatment of agents, subjects and vessels of one country in the territories of the other.

ARTICLE XII

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes in force all prisoners of war shall be reciprocally restored. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia shall each appoint a special commissioner to take charge of the prisoners. All prisoners in the hands of one Government shall be delivered to and be received by the commissioner of the other Government or by his duly authorized representative in such convenient numbers and at such convenient ports of the delivering State as such delivering State shall notify in advance to the commissioner of the receiving State.

The Governments of Japan and Russia shall present each other as soon as possible after the delivery of the prisoners is completed with a statement of the direct expenditures respectively incurred by them for the care and maintenance of the prisoner from the date of capture or surrender and up to the time of death or delivery. Russia engages to repay as soon as possible after the exchange of statement as above provided the difference between the actual amount so expended by Japan and the actual amount similarly disbursed by Russia.

ARTICLE XIV

The present treaty shall be ratified by their Majesties the Emperor of Japan and the Emperor of all the Russias. Such ratification shall be with as little delay as possible, and in any case no later than fifty days from the date of the signature of the treaty, to be announced to the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia respectively through the French Minister at Tokyo and the Ambassador of the United States at St. Petersburg,

and from the date of the latter of such announcements shall in all its parts come into full force. The formal exchange of ratifications shall take place at Washington as soon as possible.

ARTICLE XV

The present treaty shall be signed in duplicate in both the English and French languages. The texts are in absolute conformity, but in case of a discrepancy in the interpretation, the French text shall prevail.

SUB-ARTICLES

In conformity with the provisions of articles 3 and 9 of the treaty of the peace between Japan and Russia of this date, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have concluded the following additional articles:

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE III

The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage to commence the withdrawal of their military forces from the territory of Manchuria simultaneously and immediately after the treaty of peace comes into operation, and within a period of eighteen months after that date the armies of the two countries shall be completely withdrawn from Manchuria, except from the leased territory of the Liaotung Peninsula. The forces of the two countries occupying the front positions shall first be withdrawn.

The high contracting parties reserve to themselves the right to maintain guards to protect their respective railway lines in Manchuria. The number of such guards shall not exceed fifteen per kilometer and within that maximum number, the commanders of the Japanese and Russian armies shall by common accord fix the number of such guards to be employed as small as possible while having in view the actual requirements.

The commanders of the Japanese and Russian forces in Manchuria shall agree upon the details of the evacuation in conformity with the above principles and shall take by common accord the measures necessary to carry out the evacuation as soon as possible and in any case not later than the period of eighteen months.

SUB-ARTICLE TO ARTICLE IX

As soon as possible after the present treaty comes into force, a committee of delimitation composed of an equal number of members is to be appointed by the two high contracting parties, which shall on the spot mark in a permanent manner the exact boundary between the Japanese and Russian possessions on the Island of Sakhalin. The commission shall be bound so far as topographical considerations permit to follow the fiftieth parallel of north latitude as the boundary line, and in case any deflections from that line at any points are found to be necessary compensation will be made by correlative deflections at other points. It shall also be the duty of the said commission to prepare a list and a description of the adjacent islands included in the cession, and finally the commission shall prepare and sign maps showing the boundaries of the

ceded territory. The work of the commission shall be subject to the approval of the high contracting parties.

The foregoing additional articles are to be considered ratified with the ratification of the treaty of peace to which they are annexed.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed and affixed seals to the present treaty of peace.

Done at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, this fifth day of the ninth month of the thirty-eighth year of the Meiji, corresponding to the twenty-third day of August, one thousand nine hundred and five (September 5, 1905.)

*(Text taken from Sydney Tyler, *The Japan-Russia War*, Harrisburg, The Minter Company, 1905, pp 564-568, quoted in *There Are No Victors Here!: A Local Perspective on The Treaty of Portsmouth*, Peter E. Randall, Portsmouth Marine Society, #8, Peter E. Randall, Publisher, 1985, pp 95-100).

THE YALTA CONFERENCE (11 February 1945)

34/Secret Agreement Regarding the Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan

The leaders of the three Great Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and Great Britain – have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The Status Quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
 - (a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,
 - (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,
 - (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-

shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the Nationalist Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

J. Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

**Foreign Relations of the United States: the Conference of Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 984, *excerpts*. This top-secret document was made public by the Department of State on February 11, 1946.

TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN: THE SAN FRANCISCO TREATY (8 September 1951)

ARTICLE II

Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.

**The United States of America, Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, 1952, III, Part 3* (Washington, 1952), 3172.

SOVIET-JAPANESE JOINT DECLARATION (19 October 1956)

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan agree to continue, after the restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan, negotiations for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty.

In this connection, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and taking into consideration the interests of the Japanese state, agrees to transfer to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan, the actual transfer of these islands to Japan to take place after the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Japan.

**United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 263* (1957), 116.

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